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OVERCOMING
VIOLENT CONFLICT
OVERCOMING
VIOLENT CONFLICT
Volume 2
PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
IN NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR
Kamanto Sunarto
with Melina Nathan and Suprayoga Hadi
Publication of this book was made possible, in part, by the generous
assistance of the Department for International Development (DFID)
of the United Kingdom. Additional assistance was provided by the
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).
Overcoming Violent Conflict:
Volume 2, Peace and Development Analysis
in Nusa Tenggara Timur
First edition, 2005 © CPRU-UNDP, LabSosio and BAPPENAS
For further information contact:
Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU)
United Nations Development Programme
Menara Thamrin, 9th Floor
Jl. Thamrin No. 3
Jakarta, Indonesia 10250
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmittted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without full attribution.
Copyright for the illustrations herein is held by the respective artists.
Production Team:
Authors:
Kamanto Sunarto
with Melina Nathan and Suprayoga Hadi
Editor-in-Chief:
Eugenia Piza-Lopez
Series Editor:
Melina Nathan
Style Editor:
Suzanne Charlé
Production Coordinator: John H. McGlynn
Design and Layout: DesignLab
Printed in Jakarta, Indonesia, by Indonesia Printers.
Front and back cover artwork: Detail of True Love
by Mohamad Yusuf; aquatint etching, 17 x 13 cm., 2004.
ISBN: 979-99878-3-0
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ...............................................................................
ix
Executive Summary ...............................................................................
xi
1. Introduction and Background ...........................................................
1
1.1 Research Process ....................................................................
1
1.2. NTT Provincial Overview ..........................................................
2
1.3 The Impact of East Timor’s Independence Referendum .............
11
2. Social Conflict in Nusa Tenggara Timur .............................................
17
2.1 Impact of East Timorese Refugees on Conflict in NTT ...............
20
2.2 Key Perpetrators of Violence ...................................................
22
2.2.1 East Timor related violence .........................................
22
2.2.2 The role of the security forces ....................................
23
3. Conflict Causes ...............................................................................
27
3.1 Economic Tensions .................................................................
28
3.2 Social and Political Tensions ...................................................
30
3.3 Identity Politics ......................................................................
34
3.4 Media .....................................................................................
35
4. Impacts of the Conflict ....................................................................
37
4.1 Local Economic Development .................................................
37
4.2 Impact on Local Education and Health Services .......................
39
4.3 Governance ............................................................................
41
5. Responses and Peace-building ........................................................
43
5.1 Responses by Government and UNDP .....................................
45
5.2 Issues Arising from Responses ...............................................
48
5.2.1 Lack of coordination between different programme
dimensions .................................................................
48
5.2.2 Changing priorities in government policy on refugees ..
49
5.2.3 Inconsistent policies on settlement areas ...................
49
5.2.4 Need for standardisation of settlement activities ........
49
5.2.5 Coordination among stakeholders ...............................
49
5.2.6 Clear division of responsibilities at all levels of
government ................................................................
50
5.2.7 The benefits of the participatory approach ..................
50
5.2.8 Insertion strategy .......................................................
51
5.2.9 The importance of district-level resettlement working
groups ........................................................................
51
5.2.10 Accurate and updated data .........................................
51
5.2.11 Quality of location information ....................................
52
5.2.12 Matching mechanisms ................................................
52
5.2.13 Settlement standards for refugees ..............................
53
5.2.14 Capacity-building ........................................................
53
6. Conclusion: Peace Capacities and Vulnerabilities ..............................
Tables and Figures
Table 1 Physical Overview of East Nusa Tenggarra Province (NTT) ......
2
Table 2 Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Figures for
Human Development Index (HDI) and Human Poverty Index
(HPI), 1999 and 2002 .............................................................
9
Table 3 Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM), and Gender-related
Development Index (GDI), 1999 and 2002 ..............................
10
55
Table 4 Poverty in Timor ....................................................................
10
6.1 Peace Vulnerabilities ...............................................................
55
6.2 Capacities for Peace ................................................................
Table 5 Lifetime Migration in NTT, 1980 and 1990 ..............................
11
59
6.2.1 Governance .................................................................
59
Table 6 Displaced East Timorese in NTT, 6 June 2001 .........................
14
6.2.2 Social welfare ............................................................
60
6.2.3 Local economic recovery .............................................
62
Table 7 East Timorese Displaced Persons in NTT, 31 December 2002
versus 28 June 2004 ...............................................................
16
6.2.4 State and human security ...........................................
63
Table 8 Number of Villages in West Timor where Crimes have been
Reported, by District/Municipality and Type of Crime ..............
19
Annex 1. Institutional Affiliation of Informants Interviewed ..................
65
Annex 2. NTT Election Results, 1999 and 2004 ....................................
67
Figure 1 Religious Affiliations in NTT ...................................................
6
Annex 3. Data on Religious Functionaries in NTT (2002) .......................
68
Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................
69
Bibliography .........................................................................................
71
vi
vii
Acknowledgements
This study, the second in a series of volumes titled Overcoming Violent Conflict,
results from the contributions of a large number of individuals and institutions.
Primary credit for the written material in this volume goes to Kamanto Sunarto
of LabSosio, the Department of Sociology of the University of Indonesia; Melina
Nathan; of UNDP-Indonesia, wrote the sections on ‘Responses by Government
and UNDP’ and ‘Issues Arising from Responses’. Suprayoga Hadi contributed the
final section on ‘Capacities for Peace’.
The editorial board, whose members oversaw the writing, editing and
production of this report consisted of the following individuals: Eugenia PizaLopez of UNDP-Indonesia, editor-in-chief; Melina Nathan of UNDP-Indonesia,
series editor; Suzanne Charlé, style editor; and John H. McGlynn, production
coordinator. Additional credit goes to John Long of CPRU who edited earlier
versions of the report.
This volume benefited from the contributions and inputs of numerous
individuals and organisations in the field. These include the following: Y. Wasi
Gede Puraka and Hendrik Bolitobi who served as research assistants during
the author’s fieldwork in West Timor in July 2004; Stanis Tefa M., Regional
Secretary’s Office, NTT Province; Gregorius Mau Bili, Deputy Head, Belu District;
Servatius Lawang, NTT Provincial Legislator; Armindo Soarez, NTT Provincial
Legislator; Blasius Manek, Belu District Legislator; Hendrik Therik, UN-OHCA,
Kupang; Winston Pondo, CIS Timor, Kupang; Pater Paul N., Universitas Katolik
Widya Mandira, Kupang; Pastor Daisy, Tuapukan; Sister Sesilia, Forum Peduli
Perempuan Atambua; Sister Irndardis, Social and Economic Development
Programme, Atambua; Romo Paulus Nahak, Peace and Justice Committee,
Atambua; Romo Leo Mali, Peace and Justice Commission Office, Kupang; and the
non-governmental organisations that provided assistance and support, including
CIS Timor, YPI, YASO, Yayasan SANLIMA, PIKUL, CRS, JRS and PIAR.
The report was peer-reviewed by Patrick Sweeting of UNDP-Indonesia and
Kusumo Adinugroho of UNDP-Indonesia and Suprayoga Hadi of BAPPENAS.
Mohamad Yusuf. True Love; linoleum-block, 18 X 11 cm, 2004.
Publication of this volume and the other volumes in the Overcoming Violent
Conflict series would not have been possible without the the financial assistance
of the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom
and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of UNDP.
ix
Executive Summary
In 1999, violence broke out during the independence referendum in East Timor
and an estimated 270,000 East Timorese fled to the neighbouring Indonesian
province of East Nusa Tenggara. This report examines the impact of that
unprecedented refugee crisis on the region, the deficiencies of post-conflict
management and the ongoing tensions between the displaced East Timorese and
locals of West Timor.
This Peace Development Analysis of West Timor, East Nusa Tenggara
Province, focuses on forms of conflict between indigenous West Timorese and
displaced East Timorese between 1999 and 2004. The objectives of the study
were to investigate: the causes and impacts of these social tensions, the
social capacities that can contribute toward peace and human development,
and the vulnerabilities of such social capacities. The research team conducted
interviews and/or group discussions with informants from NTT provincial, district
and local governments, provincial and district legislative bodies, civil society
organisations, the local media, displaced East Timorese residing both inside and
outside camps, and West Timorese locals. Research took place in West Timor, in
Kupang municipality, Kupang District and Belu District, from 7 July through 31
July 2004. Secondary data were collected prior to, during and after the fieldwork.
In the wake of the post-referendum violence, an estimated 55,388 East
Timorese families entered West Timor. The influx of so many displaced East
Timorese had a major impact on the local communities in which they settled. In
particular, four districts and one municipality in West Timor, NTT Province faced
numerous challenges in the field of human development because of the refugees.
The flight or deportation of East Timorese residents to West Timor was
followed by various small-scale conflicts between locals and displaced East
Timorese which tended to take place around camps for displaced East Timorese.
The inter-group conflicts were triggered by a wide variety of factors, such as
disputes over the utilization of communal land, the illegal appropriation or
destruction of private and communal property and competition in traditional
markets.
Surya Wirawan. Keadilan sebuah Kunci (Justice if the Key); pencil drawing, 18.5 X 28 cm, 2000.
Informants stated that the presence of large numbers of displaced East
Timorese together with the presence of army and police units near the West
xi
Timor-Timor Leste border decreased many West Timorese’ sense of personal
security.
The key actors in East Timor related violence and hostile acts committed in
West Timor since 1999 have been displaced pro-integrationist East Timorese
who sought refuge in West Timor in 1999 following the referendum. The proIndonesian armed militia was formally disbanded in 1999 and surrendered large
numbers of firearms and ammunition to the Indonesian authorities, but by no
means all of their weapons.
Unrelated to the influx of East Timorese, acts of violence were also committed
by members of regular army and police units previously stationed in East Timor
as well as by those stationed in West Timor.
The victims or targets of violence during the initial stages of the presence
of displaced East Timorese in West Timor consisted of other East Timorese,
members of local/host communities, members of the Indonesian civil service,
UN workers and others regarded as opponents, such as the foreign press.
Following their exodus or forced deportation to West Timor, pro-independence
East Timorese became targets of violence, including murder. The data in various
reports show that the highest number of fatalities as a result of conflict involving
displaced East Timorese occurred between 1999 and 2000. The murder of three
UNHCR staff in Atambua on 6 September 2000 by militia members led to the
declaration of Security Phase V by the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD),
the evacuation of all UN staff from West Timor, and the disruption of aid to the
displaced East Timorese.
The main losers in the conflict were the displaced East Timorese who had to
leave all their assets and most of their personal belongings in East Timor. While
the subsequent formation of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste has put an
end to the armed conflict in East Timor, reconciliation between the East Timorese
in West Timor and in Timor Leste has not been achieved. Prominent East and
West Timorese caution that reconciliation is a necessary condition for peace in
the region.
Many ongoing local conflicts stem from tensions between displaced East
Timorese and West Timorese local communities due to different cultural
backgrounds as well as resentment over disparities in assistance received and
competition over scarce resources.
Informants stated that cultural differences based on ethnicity, religion and
colonial experiences contributed to the social distance between the displaced
xii
East Timorese and the indigenous West Timorese. The displaced East Timorese
are Catholic, whereas in a number of areas in NTT the locals are predominantly
Protestant.
Many West Timorese considered it incongruous that many East Timorese
consider themselves Indonesian citizens while also wishing to return to East
Timor. In reply, East Timorese camp residents noted that, despite the fact that
they had been formally classified as Indonesian citizens, displaced East Timorese
were often not regarded as members of the local community and were not
afforded the same rights and obligations.
Many displaced East Timbres felt they had been used to obtain aid from
domestic and overseas sources, and questioned the accountability and openness
of the management of allocated funds. Displaced East Timorese camp residents
also claimed that government agencies often discriminated against them in the
provision of public health and education.
While East Timorese employed by the state continue to receive their monthly
salaries, many East Timorese who traditionally earned their livings as peasants
or working in the informal sector have no means of livelihood in West Timor. This
has placed additional economic burdens on host communities, as well as putting
pressure on scarce local natural resources.
Prevailing methods of traditional land resource management were disturbed
by the influx of East Timorese. The permanent settlement of displaced East
Timorese in host communities has also compelled host communities to allocate
some of their land, voluntarily or otherwise, to the displaced East Timorese.
Disputes over the management of, and access to, natural resources, such as land
and water, are potential sources of conflict.
The presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor placed a burden on the
region’s health and educational facilities. The exodus to West Timor disrupted
the schooling of many East Timorese children. Although various arrangements
eventually led to an increase in the absorption capacity of local schools, camp
residents interviewed state that many children still chose not to attend school, or
dropped out.
At the outset, rates of infant mortality and malnutrition were high among the
displaced. Many displaced East Timorese families were unable to access health
services provided by the government. Displaced East Timorese women had
already suffered various forms of violence while in East Timor. Many displaced
East Timorese women faced further problems in West Timor
xiii
Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, a range of emergency programs
have been designed to mitigate the humanitarian problems resulting from the
exodus from East Timor and to find durable solutions for East Timorese. Support
for the evacuation of displaced East Timorese to West Timor was followed by
humanitarian aid in the form of access to emergency food aid, shelter, and health
and educational facilities for displaced East Timorese, and aid in repatriating
displaced persons who wished to return to East Timor.
The Indonesian government, NGOs and foreign and international donor
agencies have sought to address socio-economic inequality by declaring an end
to the displaced persons status of the East Timorese, and by extending equal
treatment to displaced East Timorese and locals. Programs have also been
initiated focusing on the economic empowerment of resettled residents, incomegeneration for camp residents, and voluntary participation in international
migration programs.
Peace-building initiatives include the facilitation of meetings between
residents in East Timorese camps and host communities as well as communities
where they will be resettled. Cross-border visits have been set up to facilitate
reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and Timor Leste
residents. East Timorese civil service employees and military personnel formerly
stationed in East Timor have been relocated from camps and reassigned to
units in their organizations within as well as outside West Timor, while former
members of the militia have been encouraged to pursue their interests through
political means.
Despite conflict resolution and peace-building efforts by various agencies, the
root causes of conflict between East Timorese camp residents and locals remain
unresolved: the occupation by East Timorese of communal land and land owned
by locals; competition for scare natural resources, and competition for jobs. The
only viable solutions—the relocation of displaced East Timorese to other parts of
Indonesia or their repatriation to Timor Leste—have progressed very slowly.
East Timorese are reluctant to take part in relocation and repatriation
programs due to lack of jobs and inadequate services. Meanwhile, many camp
residents still have no sustainable livelihoods; the discontinuation of assistance
has exacerbated these difficulties, and the competition for scarce natural and
social resources continues.
Humanitarian assistance for refugees has stoked the jealousy of locals,
whereas durable solutions, such as the provision of food aid for disadvantaged
xiv
families among locals, have not been made available to displaced East Timorese
living in camps.
Past as well as present human rights violations by members of the state
apparatus are also a main source of fear and uncertainty among the populace
and a fundamental obstruction to peaceful development.
NGOs are actively involved in providing information to camp residents, but
the activities are short-term and so not sustainable. Observers suggest that
intervention programs aimed at resolving the problem of the displaced East
Timorese can only be effectively implemented by changing the behaviour and
attitudes of their leaders The physical isolation of many camps, limited access to
electronic and printed media due to poverty and limited communication between
locals and camp residents also hinder the flow of relevant information from the
outside world.
Displaced persons are slow to move out of camps. Internal factors include:
unwillingness to be relocated, even to another location within West Timor, if this
involves separation from relatives and friends and unwillingness to be resettled
in areas outside West Timor. External factors include the close patronage bonds
between displaced East Timorese and their leaders, negative information and
disinformation about repatriation, resettlement and transmigration programs,
the lack of arable land in West Timor and the government’s limited budget.
Peace Capacities identified by this assessment include increasing
democratisation and decentralisation of power as well as the strengthening
of civil society. Peace capacities also consist of peace-building initiatives by
government agencies, traditional/local leaders and NGOs. Activities include
the facilitation of meetings between both groups and the promotion of peace
between students from both groups through the establishment of peace schools.
The local government has also begun to provide services without
distinguishing between former displaced persons and locals, thus enhancing
inter-group relations and reducing an important risk to peace. Specific sectoral
attention should focus on improved governance, delivery of basic services,
economic recovery and empowerment of victims of conflict.
There are several ways to increase the peace building capacity of the
government, affirming its role as a dominant actor in averting potential conflict.
One is to increase the government’s capacity to make refugee management
policies that are sensitive to potential conflict.
xv
Village governments are also important actors, and it is imperative to increase
the capacity of and support for these governments in their efforts to open forums
for dialogue between refugees and the local community. It is also important to
encourage refugee involvement in decision-making at the village level.
Finally, it is imperative that all stakeholders participate and be actively
involved in the planning and implementation of peace and development
programs. The emphasis in peace-building activities should be on participatory,
empowering bottom-up grassroots approaches.
There are a number of important steps to promote social welfare, among
them improving living conditions and expanding employment opportunities
(with the appropriate supporting infrastructures), so that unemployment or
underemployment does not become a potential for conflict.
Understanding land issues, including ownership and usage, is central to
promoting social welfare. The pattern of settlement insertion, in which refugees
are settled in small numbers among the local community, could become a
mechanism to reduce the ghettoisation of the refugees, which can lead to
aggression if triggered.
violence – including domestic violence - need to be introduced. Programs for
the empowerment of women are also recommended, especially regarding
participation in formal schooling, small and medium enterprises, and in politics.
Economic empowerment should be aimed at both refugee and local
communities. To enable equal access, there needs to be a more detailed
assessment to determine the indicators for targeted beneficiaries and suitable
forms of economic empowerment. Economic empowerment can also be
coordinated with the border area accelerated development program.
The security context in West Timor can be influenced by the situation in Timor
Leste. Indicators need to be developed to anticipate insecurity or destabilization
across the border as well as an early response system to minimize the impact in
West Timor. Support needs to be provided for human security programs, such
as the empowerment of human rights watch (HRW) activities and advocacy
programs, and the empowerment of organizations involved in the performance
of legal, health, psychological and economic support for victims of human rights
violations.
Improving refugees’ access to appropriate health care can be done by
enabling community health centres (PUSKESMAS) to give cheaper health care to
refugees, and encouraging PUSKESMAS to be more proactive in their services.
Health education specifically related to healthy living would provide a forum
for dialogue between refugees and the local community, while simultaneously
helping them to care for environmental health; more paramedics need to be
educated within refugee and local communities.
Refugees’ citizenship status must be affirmed so refugees can access
government aid, including health care and education. The government needs
to improve the schools, address the serious lack of teachers and provide
scholarships to student who need aid and have Schools can be sites for new
education and communication programs in peace-building skills and curricula
that teaches multicultural education principles.
Special services should be provided for women in exile, especially women
who no longer have husbands, both in relation to reproductive health and
their vulnerability to violence, as well as their access to and control of basic
public facilities in all programs to ensure that women are not left behind in
peace building efforts. Programs for advocacy and support for victims of
xvi
xvii
1.
Introduction
and
Background
In 1999, violence broke out during the independence
referendum in East Timor and an estimated 270,000 East
Timorese fled to the neighbouring Indonesian province of
East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tengara Timur, NTT). This report
examines the causes, dynamics and impacts of conflict
between these displaced East Timorese and the local
population of West Timor.
1.1
Surya Wirawan. Berikan Cinta Pada Sesama (Show Love for Everyone) ; hardboard cut, 10 X 10 cm, 2003.
Research Process
This Peace and Development Analysis of West Timor, East
Nusa Tenggara Province, focuses on forms of conflict
between indigenous West Timorese and displaced East
Timorese between 1999 and 2004. The objectives of the
study were to investigate the causes and impacts of this
conflict, the social capacities that can contribute toward
peace and human development, and the vulnerabilities of
such social capacities.
The research team conducted interviews and/or group
discussions with informants from NTT provincial, district
and local governments, provincial and district legislative
bodies, civil society organisations, the local media,
displaced East Timorese residing both inside and outside
camps, and West Timorese locals. This research took place
in West Timor, in Kupang municipality, Kupang District
and Belu District, from 7 July through to 31 July 2004 (see
Annex 1). A provincial workshop was conducted in Kupang
on 29 July 2004. Participants included Kupang-based
informants who have previously been interviewed and/or
members of their affiliated organizations. Secondary data
was also collected prior to, during and after the fieldwork.
1.2
NTT Provincial Overview
East Nusa Tenggara Province, NTT, is divided into one
municipality (the provincial capital of Kupang) and 14
districts: Alor, Belu, East Flores, East Sumba, Ende,
Kupang, Lembata, Manggarai, Ngada, North Central Timor,
Rote Ndao, Sikka, South Central Timor and West Sumba.
These are comprised of 170 subdistricts, 2,207 desa
(rural villages) and 309 kelurahan (urban villages). The
total population of NTT in 2002 was 3,924,871, of which
39.42 percent live in West Timor. 1 There are 11 major local
ethnic groups in NTT. 2 These are Alor, Ende, Larantuka,
Manggarai, Ngada, Nge Reo, Rote, Sabu, Sikka, Solor and
Sumba ethnic groups. The majority of NTT’s population is
Catholic.
Table 1
Physical Overview of East Nusa Teggara Province (NTT)
Location: 8-12 degrees South Latitude and 118-123 degrees East Latitude
Land area: 47,349.9 square kilometers (2.49 percent of Indonesia’s area)
Sea area: 200.000 square kilometers
Borders: Flores Sea (north), Indian Ocean (south), Democratic Republic of Timor
Number of islands:
566 islands (42 with inhabitants); largest islands: Flores, Sumba and Timor
Leste (east), West Nusa Tenggara Province (west)
Average temperature: 27.6°C
Source: Provincial Government of East Nusa Tenggara, Governor of East Nusa Tenggara: ‘Humanitarian services in
and with various limitations report’. Kupang, 2001.
Prior to the colonial period, the region of NTT was
ruled by numerous indigenous and independent ethnic
groups, which were continually competing and engaged
in wars against one another. The roots of present-day
competition for power, prestige and privilege among major
ethnic groups in the province can be seen in rivalries of
the pre-colonial and colonial eras. 3 During Dutch colonial
rule NTT was part of the Sunda Ketjil (Lesser Sunda)
region; later, in the 1950s, it was renamed Nusa Tenggara
by the Indonesian Government and included the islands
of Sumbawa, Lombok and Bali. According to Heather
Sutherland, a Dutch historian and cultural anthropologist,
Nusa Tenggara has ‘a long history of contact with the
outside world. Foreign ships—Chinese, Javanese and
Malay—had been trading in the area since the fifteenth
century’.4
On 11 August 1958, through Law No. 64 5 Nusa Tenggara
was divided into three distinct provinces: Nusa Tenggara
Barat (West Nusa Tenggara), Bali and Nusa Tenggara
Timur (East Nusa Tenggara). A. S. Pello, NTT province’s
first governor, inaugurated the new province of NTT on
December 20, 1958.6
1.)The population breakdown in West Timor is: Belu: 343,777, Kupang District: 332,840,
Kupang Municipality: 261,704, North Central Timor: 204,388, South Central Timor:
400,482. See BPS Statistics of Nusa Tenggara Timur Province, 2004, in http://ntt.bps.
go.id/03.htm, http://ntt.bps.go.id/04.htm, http://ntt.bps.go.id/05.htm, http://ntt.
bps.go.id/06.htm, http://ntt.bps.go.id/71.htm (accessed 20 July 2005).
2.)Informasi Dasar [Basic Information], in Pengolahan Data Elektronik, Pemerintah
Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur [Electronic data processing, East Nusa Tenggara
Provincial Government] (Kupang: Pemerintah Daerah Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2003)
http://www.pemda-ntt.go.id (accessed 25 June 2004).
3.)Ibid. See also Clark E. Cunningham, ‘Soba: Sebuah Desa Atoni di Timor Barat’, in
Masjarakat Desa di Indonesia Masa Ini [‘Soba: An Atoni village in West Timor’, in
Village Communities in Contemporary Indonesia], ed. Koentjaraningrat (Jakarta:
Jajasan Badan Penerbit FEUI, 1964, 225-252, and Andrew McWilliam, Path of Origin,
Gates of Life: A Study of Place and Precedence in Southwest Timor (Leiden: KITLV
Press, 2002), 49-69.
4.)Heather Sutherland, preface in I Gede Parimartha, Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa
Tenggara 1815-1915 [Trade and Politics in Nusa Tenggara 1815-1915] (Jakarta:
Penerbit Djambatan, 2002).
5.)Lembaran Negara 1958/115 Tambahan Lembaran Negara No. 1649, Undang-undang
tentang Pembentukan Daerah-daerah tingkat I Bali, Nusa Tenggara Barat dan Nusa
Tenggara Timur (Law on the formation of the provinces of Bali, West Nusa Tenggara
dan East Nusa Tenggara), 1958 (http://www.theceli.com/dokumen/produk/1958/
uu64-1958.htm).
6.)‘Gubernur NTT Sejak 1958’ [‘NTT Governors Since 1958’] in Pengolahan Data
Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
In 1979 President Soeharto’s New Order government
introduced Law No. 5 on village government, requiring
the structure of all local governments to be uniform; as
a consequence, traditional political systems in NTT and
elsewhere lost their power.7 Although the unseating of
existing traditional local governments soon led to various
sociological and political problems, dissatisfaction with
the law could not be voiced openly until after the fall of
the New Order government in 1998. In 1999, delegates to
the Traditional Communities of the Indonesian Archipelago
Congress (Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) criticised the
marginalization of traditional communities brought about
by three decades of New Order rule.8
The delegates, traditional leaders representing Timor,
Rote and Flores claimed that various national laws
allowed the government to usurp traditional rights to
land and natural resources in the name of opening up the
archipelago to the market economy. They pointed out that
millions of hectares of traditional community land had
been converted into concessions for large-scale extractive
industrial enterprises without the permission of the
communities. The NTT Traditional Communities charged
that the standardization of agricultural patterns through
the use of seed, industrial fertilizers and the monoculture
system marginalized traditional agricultural patterns so
important to communities.9
As a result of the nation-wide reform movement that
began in 1998, local government and local communities
in NTT have initiated the ‘revival’ of adat (customary)
law. This process has included the emergence of a local
7.)Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa [Law No. 5, 1979
on village government], Lembaran Negara Tahun 1979 No. 56 Tambahan Lembaran
Negara No. 3153.
8.)Masyarakat Adat Nusa Tenggara Timur. ‘Pernyataan Sikap Masyarakat Adat Nusa
Tenggara Timur untuk Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara: Masyarakat adat NTT
menggugat keadilan’. Siaran pers. [‘East Nusa Tenggara Adat Communities: Statement
of the East Nusa Tenggara adat communities at the Congress of the Adat Communities
of the Indonesian archipelago: The East Nusa Tenggara adat communities demand
justice’. Press release] (Kupang, 12 March 12) http://www.mail-archive.com/
[email protected]/msg00068.html (accessed 30 December 2004).
9.)Ibid.
movement aimed at obtaining legal recognition for hak
ulayat (communal land rights) and calls for the provincial
government to scrap the Peraturan Daerah No. 8, 1972, a
regional regulation which states that all customary land is
under state control.
Elites from Rote, Sumba and Sabu, and more recently
from Flores, have dominated the social, economic and
political dynamics of NTT, especially in the provincial
capital Kupang.10
Ethnicity is closely related to religion. Most Catholic
bishops, pastors, brothers and nuns as well as Islamic
ulamas (religious leaders) are stationed in Flores, whereas
most Protestant preachers, bible teachers and Sunday
school teachers tend to be stationed in West Timor and
Sumba (see Annex 3). Since religion in NTT is inextricably
intertwined with ethnicity, ethnic rivalry for control
of strategic executive and legislative positions at the
provincial level inevitably contains undertones of religious
rivalry, especially between Catholics and Protestants.
Ethnicity and religion have always played an important role
in the election and appointment of local public officials,
and ethnic and religious issues are accentuated during
local elections.
In the 2004 national elections, however, NTT voters
tended to vote for nationalist parties rather than religious
parties. In 1999, during the nation’s first free and fair
election since 1955, the dominant Functional Group Party
(Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar ) saw its support in NTT
decline to 39.61 percent (in the 1997 elections, it had
garnered as much as 94.94 percent). The Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perjuangan, PDI-P) garnered 39.04 percent. In the 2004
election for seats in the DPR, the Golkar Party and PDI-P
remained the front-runners.
10.) Indonesian Society for Social Transformation (INSIST) and Netherlands Institute
for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). Sekolah Demokrasi : Strengthening Democratic
Society in Indonesia 2004-2007. (Unpublished report, Yogyakarta, 2004).
Although the majority of the population was either
Catholic or Protestant (see Figure 1), religion did not play
an important role in this election. The newly established
Christian party, the Peace and Prosperity Party (Partai
Damai Sejahtera, PDS) only received one seat, while the
overwhelming majority of voters supported nationalist
parties. Golkar won five seats, PDI-P three, while the
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), Justice and Unity Party
(Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKPI), Enhancement of
Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi
Indonesia, PPDI) and Pioneer Party (Partai Pelopor) each
won one. For the results of the 1999 and 2004 elections,
see Annex 2.11
Figure 1
Religious affiliations in NTT
Catholic 55.49%
Protestant 34.46%
Muslim 9.07%
Other 0.88%
When an estimated 270,000 East Timorese Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) entered West Timor in 1999, 12
many of them for an indefinite period, the four districts
and one municipality in West Timor as well as NTT
Province faced numerous challenges in the field of human
11.) See Komisi Pemilihan Umum. ‘Perhitungan Perolehan Kursi DPR-RI Pemilu 2004’
[‘General Elections Commission. Seats in the People’s Representative Council of
the Republic of Indonesia obtained in the 2004 general elections’] http://www.kpu.
go.id .
12.) UNHCR Global Report 2001: East Timor (Geneva, 2001) 329-334. http://www.unhcr.
ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3dafdd0215 (accessed 20
July 2005).
development. The NTT provincial government defined
these challenges as ‘barriers to development’, including
‘high rates of poverty, low educational levels, low levels of
health’.13 The majority of the population of most villages
in the four districts in Timor work in agriculture: in Kupang
district, all 187 villages are predominantly agrarian; while
between 96 and 97 of the villages are agrarian in South
Central Timor, North Central Timor and Belu.14
The Indonesia Human Development Report 2001
and the Indonesia Human Development Report 2004,
a collaborative effort between Badan Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS, National Development
Planning Agency), Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS, Central
Statistics Bureau) and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), contained national, provincial and
district/municipal data on development, poverty and
gender disparity using indices applied by the UNDP to
measure the state of human development in the world.15
These indices consist of the Human Development Index
(HDI), Human Poverty Index (HPI), Gender Empowerment
Measure (GEM) and Gender-related Development Index
(GDI). Using these indices, the BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP data
show that NTT Province’s HDI, GEM and GDI scores in 1999
and 2002 were lower than the national average scores,
while the HPI score was higher (see Tables 2 and 3). The
data reveal disparities between districts in West Timor as
well as an urban-rural divide. Kupang Municipality’s 1999
and 2002 HDI scores were higher than the national average
and its HPI scores are very low. South Central Timor District,
on the other hand, has very poor HDI, HPI and GEM scores.
13.) ‘Permasalahan Pembangunan di Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘Problems of development
in East Nusa Tenggara’] Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur
(2003), op. cit.
14.) Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Propinsi NTT-BPS Propinsi NTT [Agency for
the empowerment of village communities in NTT Province-Central Statistics Bureau
of NTT Province.] Hasil Pengolahan Data dan Analisis Potensi Desa Nusa Tenggara
Timur 2002 [Result of data processing and analysis of village potentials in East
Nusa Tenggara, 2002] (Kupang, 2002).
15.) BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report 2001: Towards a
new consensus: democracy and human development in Indonesia (Jakarta: BPS
Statistics Indonesia-BAPPENAS-UNDP, 2001). BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia
Development Report 2004: Financing human development. Draft. (Jakarta: UNSFIRBPS-LPEM-UI, 2004).
indication of an overall increase in human development.
HPI rankings have decreased, except in Belu District. While
the GEM scores of NTT province have remained relatively
constant, GEM scores in West Timor (except in Belu district)
have declined. GDI scores in NTT province have also
remained relatively constant – an indication that overall
gender disparity in the province has remained constant. In
West Timor, however, no clear pattern emerged; in some
districts GDI scores have increased, while in others scores
have decreased.
BPS data on poverty in NTT in 2004, quoted by Kompas,
shows that between 10.55 percent and 37.38 percent of the
population of four districts and one municipality in Timor
live below the poverty line (see Table 4).16
Referring to data in the UNDP Global Human
Development Report 2000, Gaspersz and Foenay observe
that: ‘the income per capita of the population in NTT
Province . . . is lower still than the income per capita of
the population in the poorest state in the world (Sierra
Leone).’17 Referring to the BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP 2001
Indonesia Human Development Report they further observe
that ‘income per capita in East Nusa Tenggara is the worst
in Indonesia,’ and that South Central Timor district has the
lowest income per capita in Indonesia.18
In assessing developmental challenges, the provincial
government has pointed to a number of incidents that
have had adverse societal and economic effects.19 These
include the Kupang riots on 30 November 1998 and the
influx of displaced East Timorese during 1999. The large
numbers of Asian and Middle Eastern illegal immigrants
in NTT seeking entry to Australia, along with the East
Timorese, compromise the provincial government’s ability
to act. Their presence has major political, psychological
and security implications, puts pressure on social services,
and also attracts international concern, but the district and
provincial governments have limited resources to deal with
the problem.
However, a comparison of 1999 and 2002 data shows
that average HDI scores (and national rankings) in all areas
of West Timor except Kupang District have increased – an
Table 2
Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Figures
for Human Development Index (HDI) and Human Poverty Index (HPI)
1999 and 2002
Province/
West Timor District/
Municipality
1999
NTT
HDI
2002
Nation
Rank
HDI
64.3
NTT
HDI
Nation
Rank
HDI
NTT
60.4
24
60.3
28
Kupang
57.0
266
56.9
328
65.8
South Central Timor
49.2
290
57.7
325
North Central Timor
53.7
281
59.5
312
Belu
51.8
285
58.3
318
Kupang Municipality
66.6
80
70.9
53
HPI
Rank
HPI
HPI
Rank
HPI
NTT
29.5
21
25.2
28.9
24
22.7
Kupang
32.2
247
27.5
231
South Central Timor
35.1
264
29.7
261
North Central Timor
34.7
259
24.6
174
Belu
30.5
212
27.3
227
Kupang Municipality
16.7
36
14.4
29
Source: BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report: Financing Human Development, Jakarta, 2004.
16.) CAL. ‘Tujuh kabupaten di NTT terancam krisis pangan’ [‘Three districts in NTT
threatened by crisis in food supply’], Kompas, March 3, 2005, 29.
17.) Vincent Gaspersz and Esthon Foenay, ‘Kinerja pendapatan ekonomi rakyat
dan produktivitas tenaga kerja di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘The income
performance of the folk economy and labor productivity in East Nusa Tenggara
Province’]. Jurnal Ekonomi Rakyat, II No. 8 (November 2003) http://www.
ekonomirakyat.org.
18.) BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report 2001, op. cit.
19.) Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
Because of NTT’s harsh natural conditions, many NTT
locals are forced to migrate to, or seek employment in,
other parts of Indonesia or Eastern Malaysia (Table 5).
Table 3
Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Figures
for Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 1999 and 2002
Province/
West Timor District/
Municipality
1999
NTT
GEM
NTT
46.4
Kupang
South Central Timor
North Central Timor
Belu
Rank
18
Table 5
Lifetime Migration of NTT 1980 and 1990
2002
Nation
GEM
49.5
NTT
GEM
Nation
Rank
GEM
Type of Migrant
1980
1990
46.2
22
47.1
36.9
268
In migrants
35.007
46.310
34.8
19.3
332
Out migrants
47.534
99.442
35.3
27.0
323
Net migrants
-12.527
-53.132
35.6
44.0
175
Kupang Municipality
52.6
44.1
174
GDI
Rank
GDI
Rank
GDI
NTT
56.8
14
56.3
20
69.2
Kupang
53.9
45.6
311
South Central Timor
39.6
38.1
334
North Central Timor
46.4
52.4
240
Belu
45.9
53.6
223
Kupang Municipality
58.2
60.3
97
GDI
54.6
Source: BPS. Statistics of Nusa Tenggara Timur: ‘Nusa Tenggara Timur in Figures’
1.3
Source: BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report: Financing Human Development, Jakarta, 2004.
Table 4
Poverty in Timor
District/Municipality
Population
below poverty line
(in 000s)
% of population
of district or
municipality
Poverty Line
Rupiah Per Capita Per Month
in IDR and USD
Kupang District
109.0
32.68 %
96,416
$9.86
South Central Timor District
149.5
37.38 %
96,207
$9.84
North Central Timor District
62.7
30.65 %
104,810
$10.72
Belu District
70.4
20.51 %
97,100
$9.93
Kupang Municipality
27.8
10.65 %
112,962
$11.56
Source: Kompas, 3 March 2005, based on BPS data.
10
The Impact of East Timor’s
Independence Referendum
In 1976, the Indonesian Government annexed the territory
of East Timor (at that time a Portuguese colony), and
integrated it into the Republic of Indonesia. The annexation
of the province led to more than two decades of conflict
between East Timorese pro-independence supporters
and the Government of Indonesia. Casualty numbers vary.
Quoting a United Nations Economic and Social Council
source, Tadjoeddin reports that between 1975 and 1980
an estimated 100,000 East Timorese were killed, and that
between 1980 and 1984 another 100,000 were either killed
or died from disease or starvation.20 In one incident alone,
in Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on 12 November 1991, the
Indonesian army fatally shot between 50 and 400 unarmed
East Timorese, who were demonstrating against the killing
of an East Timorese. The Indonesian authorities estimate
a much lower figure, estimating fatalities in East Timor at
20.) Report by Bacre Waly Ndiaye for the UN ECOSOC, in United Nations, The United
Nations and East Timor: Self-determination through popular consultation,
Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 2000, quoted in
Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin. Anatomi Kekerasan Sosial dalam Konteks Transisi:
Kasus Indonesia [The Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition:
the Case of Indonesia] UNSFIR Working Papers Series No. 02/01-1 (Jakarta: April
2002), 52-54.
11
around 30,000.21 The Central Intelligence Agency estimates
that between 100,000 and 250,000 East Timorese lost their
lives during this long-running conflict.22
On 27 January 1999, President B. J. Habibie surprised
many when he announced that a referendum on
independence would be held. On 5 May 1999, the
government of Indonesia, the government of Portugal and
the UN agreed in New York that the referendum would
take place on 30 August 1999 and would be monitored by
the United Nations.23 More than 78.5 percent of 432,287
registered East Timorese voters chose independence
over integration with Indonesia. (Voter turnout was an
astounding 98 percent of registered voters).24
As a result of the vote, pro-integration militias, backed
by members of the Indonesian security forces, rampaged
across East Timor.25 In a news report on 11 September,
CNN showed Pope John Paul II condemning the acts as
‘slaughter’, while a Vatican official claimed ‘genocide’.26
An estimated 1,000 East Timorese were killed in the
violence following the vote, according to UNTAET.27
The UNHCR estimates that more than 75 percent of the
population was displaced and more than 70 percent of East
Timor’s private housing, public buildings and utilities were
destroyed. Some 200,000 persons were deported to West
Timor and other areas in Indonesia.28
21.) Tadjoeddin. Anatomi Kekerasan Sosial dalam Konteks Transisi, ibid.
22.) Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook/ East Timor, http://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tt.htm (accessed 22 July 2005).
23.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur. Pelayanan Kemanusiaan, 37.
24.) Kirsty Sword Gusmao with Rowena Lennox, A Woman of Independence: A Strong
Love and the Birth of a New Nation (Sydney: MacMillan Australia Pte Ltd., 2003)
236.
25.) For a description of the scale of violence and destruction in East Timor in August
and September 1999, see Chris Dolan, Judith Large and Naoke Obi, Evaluation
of UNHCR’s repatriation and reintegration programme in East Timor,1999-2003
(Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, February 2004) 11-13.
26.) CNN ‘U.N. Mission to Assess Bloodied East Timor Firsthand’ (11 September 1999)
http://www-cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/southeast/9999/10/etimor04/ (accessed 14
July 2005).
27.) Tadjoeddin, op. cit., 53.
12
According to NTT Government data, by 19 October
1999 an estimated 55,388 East Timorese families had
entered West Timor.29 The influx of so many displaced East
Timorese was unprecedented in West Timor’s history, and
had a major impact on the local communities in which
they settled. On 6 June 2001 the Indonesian Government
conducted a registration that shows that 96.72 percent
of the estimated 284,148 displaced East Timorese were
settled in West Timor 30 (see Table 6).
In the 6 June 2001 registration, 98.02 percent of
113,794 participating East Timorese displaced persons
in NTT opted to stay in Indonesia and registered as
Indonesian citizens.31 The Program on Humanitarian
Policy and Research, however, reported, “the UN and
international humanitarian agencies claim these numbers
are not accurate. International critics suggest that the
results of such a count may have been hampered by militia
intimidation and discrepancies in the voting procedure”.32
28.) UNHCR. Global Appeal 2000. The Timor Situation. East Timor. http://www.unhcr.
ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e2ebc230 (accessed
20 July 2005). Kammen described the situation as follows: “Two days later this
euphoria was shattered by the outbreak of massive violence. Thousands of nonTimorese fled the territory, most returning to their native places in Indonesia.
Hundreds of thousands of East Timorese were forcibly evacuated across the border
into Indonesian West Timor, while several hundred thousands more fled into the
hills”. Kammen, Douglas, ‘The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military,
Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor’, in Benedict R.O’G. Anderson
(ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, second printing, (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell South East Asia Program, 2002), 156-188.
29.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, 237 Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa
Tenggara Timur. Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Timur: ‘Pelayanan Kemanusiaan dalam
dan dengan pelbagai Keterbatasan: Pertanggungjawaban Publik Penanganan dan
Pemanfaatan Dana Serta Bantuan Barang dalam rangka Penanganan Pengungsi
Timor Timur’ [ ‘Humanitarian Services in and with Various Limitations: Public
Accountability of the Handling and Utilization of Funds and Material Aid in the
Handling of East Timorese Displaced Persons’], Tahun Anggaran 1999/2000-2001
[Fiscal Year 1999/2000-2001] (Kupang, 2001) 237.
30.) Belu District (61.42 percent), followed by Kupang District (19.24 percent), North
Central Timor District (8.14 percent), Kupang Municipality (5.87 percent), and
South Central Timor District (2.06 percent).
31.) Ibid., 74-75.
32.) Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research: ‘Building Human Security in
Indonesia, West Timor’ (Cambridge, MA : President and Fellows of Harvard College,
28 December 2004) http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_wtimor_
refugees.php.
13
(the military, police and civil service) who continue to
receive their monthly salaries and accompanying fringe
benefits have been reassigned and also live outside camps.
Table 6
Displaced East Timorese in NTT, 6 June 2001
Island
West Timor
District/Municipality
• Belu District
IDPs
174,528
• Kupang District
54,666
• North Central Timor District
23,124
• Kupang Municipality
16,669
• South Central Timor
2,805
Alor
• Alor District
3,012
Flores
• Ende District
1,714
• Sikka District
1,371
• Manggarai District
876
• Ngada District
716
• East Flores District
706
Lembata
• Lembata District
560
Sumba
• East Sumba District
194
• West Sumba District
163
In West Timor the displaced East Timorese are a minority
group whose numbers are dwindling.34 Over the past
five years, many have left NTT via organized relocation
programs (resettlement and transmigration) as well as
spontaneous migration; displaced East Timorese military
personnel and civil servants have been reassigned to
other locations and services, and still others have been
repatriated to Timor Leste. According to the UNHCR, by
the end of 2001 an estimated 193,000 East Timorese had
been repatriated,35 including 125,000 in 1999 and 50,000
in 2000.36 By 28 June 2004 the number of East Timorese
displaced persons in NTT had declined to 14,185 persons
or 7,094 household heads.37 (See Table 7). As of May 2005,
4,199 families still remained in camps or refugee-type
accommodation.38
284,148
TOTAL
Source: Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur 2001, 75.
Many displaced East Timorese peasants now make a
living by labouring on community land owned by locals or
land controlled by the Indonesian Government, which the
East Timorese had previously appropriated and cleared
illegally, or by renting land from local landlords (crop
sharing). Others are employed in the informal sector,
including selling vegetables and animals (chicken, pigs,
cows) in local markets, working as ojek (motorcycle taxi)
drivers or urban labourers, or selling goods to Timor Leste
through cross-border trade.
Many East Timorese who have not been repatriated have
taken part in organized relocation programs through which
they are integrated with locals, or have left the camps
voluntarily for integrated neighbourhoods to live with
relatives or in rooms or houses leased by locals.33 Many
East Timorese members of the Indonesian state apparatus
14
33.) Ibid.
34.) Ibid.
35.) UNHCR, Global Report 2001: East Timor http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3dafdd0215 (accessed 20 July 2005).
36.) UNHCR Global Report 2000: Timor Operation http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e23eb720 (accessed 22 July 2005).
37.) Provincial Coordinating Unit for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees.
Report on the development of the handling of former East Timorese displaced
persons in East Nusa Tenggara Province. The situation in 2004 (Satkorlak PBP NTT.
Laporan Perkembangan Penanganan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur di Propinsi Nusa
Tenggara Timur. Keadaan Tahun 2004). (Kupang, June 2004).
38.) Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat, Kantor Menko Kesra,
‘Koordinasi Kebijakan Penanganan Dan Pemberdayaan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur
Di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘Coordinating Policy to Address and Empower
Former East Timorese Refugees in NTT’], Bogor, 2005.
15
Table 7
East Timorese Displaced Persons in NTT
31 December 2002 versus 28 June2004
Status of Displaced Persons
Number in NTT Province as of December 31, 2002
Individuals
28,097
HH
9,805
2.
Social Conflict in
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Repatriated and relocated between January 1, 2003 and
June 28, 2004:
•
Repatriated
•
Resettled
•
Transmigrated within NTT
532
97
•
Transmigrated outside NTT
211
48
•
Received aid for construction of home or
have left camps
1,540
308
14,185
7,094
588
147
11,041
2,111
Remaining East Timorese displaced persons in NTT on
June 28, 2004:
Source: Satkorlak PBP NTT, June 2004.
Tadjoeddin classifies NTT province between 1990 and 2001
as an intermediate conflict area involving 14 incidents of
violence, mostly communal in nature (96 percent), of which
eight involved at least one fatality.39 A total of 55 fatalities
are recorded. In a presentation of their ongoing research
on post-New Order local level conflict in Flores, Barron et
al identify the following types of conflict in Flores: natural
resource conflicts; administrative disputes; gender/sexual
violence; and vigilante retribution.40
The PODES 2003 data quoted by Barron, Kaiser
and Pradhan shows that 11.6 percent of the villages
and hamlets in NTT reported various cases of conflict,
namely inter-group fights, fights between members of the
39.) Tadjoeddin, op.cit. Tadjoeddin defines Communal Riot Prone II (CRP II) as “a
district/municipality with a fatality rate between 0.54 and 39.7 per 100,000
residents.” 36 and 82.
40.) Patrick Barron, Rachael Diprose and Joanne Sharpe, ‘Brokering Conflict:
Understanding Local Level Conflict Pathways in Indonesia’. (Guest Lecture
Presentation at the Universitas Indonesia, 12 May 2004).
16
17
community and the authorities, fights between students,
inter-ethnic fights, and other disturbances in the field of
security.41 The PODES data furthermore show that in 6.0
percent of the villages and hamlets the conflict resulted in
casualties and material damage, in 8.5 percent new conflict
was reported, and 51.5 percent of the conflict reported
was of a violent nature. In their study in the Manggarai and
Sikka districts in Flores, Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan also
found that cases of conflict tended to be under-reported by
the village authorities. Kompas daily newspaper reported in
June 2004 that Police Brigadier-General Edward Aritonang,
the NTT regional police chief, regarded NTT as a conflictprone region.42 Traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms
not only vary widely according to each ethnic culture but
also are often at odds with Indonesian law. Aritonang
cited conflicts within communities over land, marriages,
gambling and other customary law disputes in Flores,
Sumba and West Timor as creating further inter-ethnic,
social and communal violence, which can often lead to
fatalities. Consequently, he suggested that judges familiar
with customary law be empowered to handle inter-ethnic
conflict in the region.
Crime statistics collected at the village level in West
Timor show that, in comparison with other crimes, torture
or violence is reported by a relatively high number of
rural and urban villages (Table 8). They also report a high
incidence of other crimes, such as rape and murder.
41.) Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser and Menno Pradhan, ‘Local Conflict in Indonesia:
Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns’. (Draft, lecture, Cornell Conference
‘75 Years of Development Research’ Ithaca, New York, 7-9 May 2004).
42.) Kompas, 27 June 2004.
18
Table 8
Number of Villages in West Timor where Crimes have been Reported,
by District/Municipality and Type of Crime
District/Municipality Theft Robbery Looting
Torture/
Violance
Kupang
77
9
6
33 (43%)
12
5
-
13
3
187
South Central Timor
62
17
4
9 (15% )
12
5
1
3
-
215
North Central Timor
68
11
3
20 (29% )
6
7
1
4
2
159
Belu
91
9
6
21 (23% )
11
5
-
12
2
168
Kupang Municipality
23
-
2
7 (30% )
-
5
4
4
-
45
756
78
35
187(25%)
118
56
10
86
39
2,550
NTT Province
Arson Rape
Drugs Murder
Other Total
Source: Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Propinsi NTT-Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi NTT, 2002.
Violence against women, including domestic violence, is
reportedly rampant in NTT. Perempuan di Bawa(h) Lakilaki yang Kalah presents detailed reports of cases taking
place before, during and after the 1999 forced deportation
or flight to West Timor. Virtually all forms of violence are
accounted for: murder, torture, abduction, assault, rape,
adultery, extra-marital sex and sexual harassment.43 High
rates of violence against women are detailed in an analysis
of reports in Pos Kupang newspaper from January 1998
through December 1999 and a report by the Jaringan
Kesehatan Perempuan Indonesia Timur, JKPIT (Eastern
Indonesia Women’s Health Network).44 One NGO activist
from the Jaringan Perempuan Usaha Kecil, Jarpuk (Women’s
Small Business Network) in Kupang argues that women
face other obstacles as well: reports of domestic violence
43.) Karen Campbell-Nelson, Karen et al. (eds.), Perempuan di Bawa(h) Laki-laki yang
Kalah. Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan Timor Timur dalam Kamp Pengungsian di
Timor Barat. [Women Beneath/Accompanying Defeated Males: Violence Against
East Timorese Women in West Timorese Camps for Displaced Persons]. Research
report. Kupang: Jaringan Kesehatan Perempuan Indonesia Timur–Yayasan
Penguatan Institusi dan Kapasitas Lokal [Eastern Indonesia Women’s Health
Network-Foundation for the strengthening of institutions and local capacity], 2001.
See also Indonesian Society for Social Transformation (INSIST) and Netherlands
Institute for Multi-party Democracy (NIMD), Sekolah Demokrasi, op. cit.
44.) Komnas Perempuan, Peta Kekerasan: Pengalaman Perempuan Indonesia
[Indonesian Commission for Women Map of Violence: The Experience of Indonesian
Women] (Jakarta, 2002).
19
against women are not treated seriously by the authorities;
girls are not given equal educational opportunities; wives
can not obtain bank loans without the consent of their
husbands; the regional budget does not allocate sufficient
funds for women’s health, and female candidates in the
elections for legislators are put at a disadvantage because
their names are often placed at the bottom of party lists.45
Violence against women is sometimes rooted in cultural
traditions. The payment of belis (the dowry) by the
bridegroom’s family to the bride’s family marks the transfer
of ‘ownership’ of the bride to the bridegroom’s family, so
that in cases of domestic violence a wife cannot return to
her family. Among Catholics, because of the church’s ban
on divorce, a wife cannot leave her husband, even in cases
of spousal abuse.
2.1
Impact of East Timorese Refugees
on Conflict in NTT
The flight or deportation of East Timorese residents to
West Timor was followed by various small-scale conflicts.46
Conflicts between locals and displaced East Timorese,
which were widely reported in the mass media, tended to
take place around camps for displaced East Timorese. The
inter-group conflicts were triggered by a wide variety of
factors, such as disputes over the utilization of communal
land, the illegal appropriation or destruction of private and
communal property, competition in traditional markets,
disputes between rival gangs of thugs over the control of
territory (which preceded the Atambua tragedy), disputes
over the sexual harassment of girls (which led to assault
and arson in Tuapukan), and disputes between East
Timorese parents and West Timorese teachers over the
academic achievement of East Timorese students (which
45.) Interview: Kebijakan Publik Belum Berpihak Pada Perempuan [Public Policy Is Not
Yet Supportive of Women], Suara Kampung No. 4, May 2004, 11-13. (Note: When
voters vote for a party rather than for a candidate the votes obtained are allocated
to candidates whose names are at the top of the party’s priority list, and the names
of female candidates are often placed at the bottom of the list.)
46.) Campbell-Nelson et al., op. cit.
20
led to the destruction of a school). According to reports by
the press and informants, the early stages of East Timorese
exodus was accompanied by an increase in crime in West
Timor.47
In a chronology of events in its handling of East Timorese
displaced persons in West Timor from 4 September 1999
through 2001, the NTT Provincial Government listed cases
of conflict involving East Timorese displaced persons.
The report lists communal fights with local residents in
Tuapukan (26-29 May 1999), the destruction of a UNHCR
car in Tuapukan (16 June 2000), riots, communal fights
and arson of local homes in Oesao, Tuapukan (1 through
3 July 2000), destruction of property, arson and looting
in Noelbaki (27 July 2000), torture of three UNHCR
staff in Naen (22 August 2000), the destruction of a
government building and property, including official cars
and computers, and the torture of four local reporters (30
August 2000). Riots in Webriamata and Atambua followed
the murder of a militia commander by locals, resulting
in the murder of seven locals in Webriamata and three
UNHCR staff in Atambua, the wounding of three civilians
(including a UNICEF physician and a Brazilian reporter), and
the destruction of private and UNHCR and IOM property (6
September 2000).48
Informants stated that the presence of large numbers
of displaced East Timorese, especially during the initial
phases of the exodus, together with the presence of army
and police units near the West Timor-Timor Leste border,
decreased the feeling of personal security among many
West Timorese citizens.49 Feelings of personal security
were also undercut by manifest or latent rivalry between
members and units of the army and police.
47.) See, for instance, Esthi Susanti, ‘East Timorese Refugees and Deportees Start to
Use Violence, Terror to Survive’, Penguin Star, 28 February 2002.
48.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op. cit., 237-270.
49.) A number of informants provided accounts about cases of extortion, confiscation
of personal property, non-payment of services rendered, assault, and sexual
harassment as well as cross-border smuggling by members of the army. See also
U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Reports for 2000, 2001 in http://www.
humanrights-usa.et/reports/Indonesia.html .
21
In a paper, I.G.P. Antariksa discusses cases of violence
committed by East Timorese displaced persons in Belu
District between 9 September 1999 and 26 July 2003.50
Cases listed include fatal shootings and stabbings,
physical assault, hostage-taking, violent rioting and
demonstrations, fights between displaced persons residing
in different camps, communal fights with locals, and the
assault of Timor Leste residents who wandered into West
Timor. Antariksa also lists cases of violence committed by
locals against displaced persons, including assault and
murder of East Timorese and the abduction of an East
Timorese woman.
2.2
2.2.1
East Timor
related violence
2.2.2
The role of the
security forces
Key Perpetrators of Violence
The key actors in East Timor-related violence and hostile
acts committed in West Timor since 1999 have been
displaced pro-integrationist East Timorese who sought
refuge in West Timor in 1999 following the referendum
on 30 August. These militias are composed of ordinary
civilians (mostly peasants); civilian members of the armed
militia; members of the Civil Service (Pegawai Negeri Sipil,
PNS); and the Milsas, composed of civilian members of the
Civilian Defence (Hansip), People’s Defence (Wanra) and
People’s Security forces (Kamra), who were accorded formal
military status outside formal channels in appreciation of
their contribution to the Indonesian state.51 The Coalition
to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) based in London,
reports that ‘in early 1999, militias comprised some 50,000
people’. Former child soldiers were found in the militia
in camps in West Timor, and, in 2000, 130 displaced East
Timorese children were abducted from camps by proIndonesian groups to be trained as anti-independence
activists.52
50.) I.G.P. Antariksa, Peta Konflik di NTT: Kasus Kabupaten Belu, unpublished report,
n.d.
51.) Sinta R. Dewi classified civilian forces into the Wanra (Perlawanan Rakyat, People’s
Resistance), Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih, Trained Populace), and Kamra (Keamanan
Rakyat, People’s Security). Sinta R. Dewi, ‘Violence Against Women and War, The
Use of Sexual Violence to Conduct a Covert War and to Construct Impunity for the
Military: Indonesian Occupation in East Timor,’ unpublished report, n.d.
52.) Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2001, East
Timor chapter, http://www.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/01junchild.htm (accessed
January 25, 205).
22
The pro-Indonesian armed militia was formally
disbanded in 1999 and surrendered large numbers of
firearms and ammunition to the Indonesian authorities,
Although the Indonesian authorities conducted regular
raids, confiscating hidden firearms, informants believe that
a large number of firearms remain unaccounted for and
could be retrieved at any time.
Unrelated to the influx of East Timorese, acts of violence
were also committed by members of regular army and
police units previously stationed in East Timor as well as
by those stationed in West Timor. Based on reports in the
local press and a local NGO newsletter, Campbell-Nelson
et al. drew up a selected list of acts of violence against
locals committed by army units stationed in East Timor. The
cases, reported between 26 September 1999 and February
2000, include fatal shootings and stabbings, torture, rape,
robbery, abduction, confiscation and destruction of private
property, arson of private homes and rioting, as well as
other criminal acts such as gambling.53
Some of the cases of brutality by security personnel in
NTT highlighted by the media include the fatal shooting of
five demonstrators by police in Ruteng, Manggarai54 and
accusations that members of the Indonesian security forces
stationed on the West Timor-Timor Leste border raped local
women. Some of these rapes reportedly led to unwanted
pregnancies and the birth of children without legal status.55
2.3
Victims of Violence
The victims or targets of this violence (during the initial
stages of the presence of displaced East Timorese in West
Timor) consisted of other East Timorese, members of
local/host communities, members of the Indonesian civil
service, UN workers and others regarded as opponents
by the pro-integrationists, such as the foreign press.
Following their forced deportation to West Timor, the pro53.) Campbell-Nelson et al., op.cit., 265-266.
54.) Ant-83,’ Mapolres Manggarai diserang, 3 tewas’ [‘Manggarai Police Headquarters
Attacked, Three Fatalities’] Suara Merdeka 11 March 2004.
55.) Suara Timor Lorosae, 1 March 2001.
23
independence East Timorese became targets of violence,
including murder. The data in these reports show that the
highest number of fatalities as a result of conflict involving
displaced East Timorese occurred in 1999 (six fatalities)
and 2000 (16 fatalities, including three UNHCR staff and
two UN peace-keeping forces) while four fatalities were
reported from January through June 2003.56
underscored by the murder of two female high school
students, residents of an East Timorese camp in Belu
District who went to Timor Leste to visit their relatives. This
tragedy sparked demonstrations in Atambua by former East
Timorese displaced persons in Belu District.58
The main losers in the conflict were the displaced East
Timorese who had to leave all their assets and most of their
personal belongings in East Timor without any prospect of
being able to reclaim their lost property; and those who
would like to return to East Timor but cannot or will not
do so for fear of being brought to justice in Timor Leste for
past crimes, for fear of becoming victims of vengeance,
and/or because of concerns about finding work in East
Timor. The murder of three UNHCR staff in Atambua on 6
September 2000 by militia members led to the declaration
of Security Phase V by the UN Security Coordinator
(UNSECOORD), the evacuation of all UN staff from West
Timor, and the disruption of aid to the displaced East
Timorese.57
While the subsequent formation of the Democratic
Republic of Timor Leste has put an end to the armed
conflict in East Timor, reconciliation between the East
Timorese in West Timor and in Timor Leste has not been
achieved. Prominent East and West Timorese caution
that reconciliation is a necessary condition for peace
in the region. The volatility of relations between Timor
Leste residents and the East Timorese in Indonesia was
56.) Since some of these reports are limited in scope and do not include cases
of abduction and murder of pro-independence East Timorese in West Timor
mentioned in various other reports, the actual casualty list is probably much
higher. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Refugee camps in W. Timor offer no refuge,
displaced persons in E. Timor subject to attack, summary execution’, press release,
September 1999, http://www.hrw/org/press/1999/sep/wtimor0910.htm . Also,
Charmain Mohamed and Eric Umansky, ‘Report on East Timorese refugees in West
Timor’, Tapol, the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, 11 November 1999, http://
tapol.gn.apc.org/r991111etwtre.htm.
57.) UNHCR The Refugee Agency. Global Report 2000 Genva http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e2ebc230.
24
58.) Jems de Fortuna, ‘Warga Atambua Demo Pembunuhan di Timor Leste’ [Atambua
Residents Demonstrate Against Murder in Timor Leste’]. KORAN TEMPO, 8 February
2005.
25
3.
Conflict Causes
Much of this violence stems from tensions between
displaced East Timorese and West Timorese local
communities, in areas where the displaced East Timorese
settled or were placed by the authorities. The settlements
for displaced East Timorese were built on publicly
owned land or land owned by West Timorese religious
organizations, communities and individuals. According
a NTT provincial study, most locals refuse to accept the
displaced East Timorese because of problems related to
land and because the displaced persons were perceived as
unfriendly and disruptive.59
Local communities at first tolerated the presence of
the displaced persons because they saw it as a temporary
Mohamad Yusuf. Sama Makan Kenyang (Full Stomachs for All); etching, 18 x 12.5 cm.
59.) Satkorlak PBP Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Laporan Hasil Pelaksanaan Rapat
Evaluasi Penanganan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur dan Pembahasan Program
Tahun 2004 di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur [Report on the implementation of an
evaluation meeting on the handling of East Timorese former displaced persons and
the discussion of the 2004 program in East Nusa Tenggara Province], Kupang, 2004.
27
solution to a humanitarian problem. The plight of the East
Timorese even elicited generosity on the part of locals.
Gradually, however, attitudes began to change after the
survival strategies employed by the East Timorese began
to interfere with the livelihoods of locals. For a variety of
reasons, many East Timorese did not take part in relocation
and repatriation programs but instead remained in the
camps. According to NGO informants in Atambua, attitudes
toward the East Timorese were also negatively affected by
the murder of three UNHCR staff by members of the East
Timorese militia.
3.1
Economic Tensions
The issue of economic inequality between displaced East
Timorese and local host communities came to light during
the initial stages of the exodus into West Timor. Before
the East Timorese settled in camps, locals often shared
their homes and food, although the locals themselves had
little. When the displaced East Timorese started receiving
emergency aid from national as well as international
sources, locals became jealous when aid—specifically food
and shelter – was not made available to them. The term
orang miskin yang harus menolong orang susah—‘the poor
who have to help the needy’—was used in one government
document.60 A government official also used a similar
phrase during an interview.
In interviews, NGO informants reported cases in which,
soon after their displacement, East Timorese in West Timor
profited by selling food they had received from various
donor agencies. Informants also mentioned cases in which
displaced East Timorese registered their names with
multiple donor agencies operating in various locations to
obtain as much aid as possible.
The government eventually declared that after 31
December 2002 the displaced East Timorese who opted to
become Indonesian citizens would no longer be regarded
60.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op. cit. 36.
28
as displaced persons but would be treated as other
Indonesian citizens. Once they became citizens, assistance
such as food and water aid was gradually withdrawn. Aid
programs were subsequently redesigned to benefit both
former displaced East Timorese and the locals equally.
Since 1 January 2003 the UNHCR has also ceased to
regard the East Timorese in West Timor as refugees and
has consequently ceased its involvement in West Timor,
including its repatriation assistance.61 The UN OCHA is also
phasing out its activities in Indonesia.
Displaced East Timorese interviewed in camps
expressed frustration, disappointment and anger at what
they perceived to be unjust treatment and neglect by the
Indonesian Government, despite the fact that (according
to them) they had risked their lives to defend the ‘Red and
White Flag’ of the Republic. West Timorese informants,
as well as some displaced East Timorese, said the East
Timorese had not come to West Timor voluntarily, but had
been forced to leave East Timor and subsequently been
transported to West Timor while their houses were burned
and their personal property looted.
There were also tensions among various groups of
displaced East Timorese. Displaced East Timorese who did
not take part in certain government-sponsored relocation
programs complained that they were cut off from some
forms of aid that were made available to those who chose
to relocate.62 Economic inequality also appeared to be
linked to power hierarchies within camps of displaced East
Timorese. Those with power had an ability to control access
and distribution of aid from donor agencies (deciding
who got what and in what quantities), sometimes even
misappropriating the aid.
61.) See: JRS Dispatches No. 124, January 10, 2003: ‘East Timorese no longer regarded
as refugees by UNHCR’, http://www.jrs.net/dispatch/disp.php?lang=it&dispId=dp
0301124en (accessed 20 January 2005).
62.) Ibid. The government’s policy explicitly states that empowerment aid is made
available to displaced persons and locals who have settled in resettlement facilities
made available by the government. Government data show that empowerment aid
distributed includes items such as rice, cattle, clothing, medicine, hand tractors,
water installations and typewriters.
29
3.2
Social and Political Tensions
There were some social and political tensions between the
displaced and host communities. Informants stated that
cultural differences based on ethnicity, religion and colonial
experiences contributed to the social distance between the
displaced East Timorese and the indigenous West Timorese.
Many West Timorese considered it incongruous that
many East Timorese consider themselves Indonesian
citizens while also wishing to return to East Timor. In reply,
East Timorese camp residents noted that, despite the
fact that they had been formally classified as Indonesian
citizens, displaced East Timorese were often not regarded
as members of the local community and were not afforded
the same rights and obligations. For example, although
they were allowed to take part in national elections, they
could not vote in local elections for village head. Unlike
local residents, they were exempt from land and building
tax.
Such acts of exclusion, practiced by many in the host
communities, were probably based on fear that the
extension of equal communal rights to their displaced
East Timorese neighbours would inevitably lead to major
shifts in the religious, ethnic, economic, social and political
balance within the host communities. Most West Timorese
were reluctant to risk the possibility of becoming a minority
group within their own communities. They continued
to regard the presence of their displaced East Timorese
neighbours as temporary, and expected them eventually to
move on to new locations.
Informants from government and other agencies
state that, due to NTT’s limited natural resources, the
government would like to close the camps and relocate
the East Timorese to areas outside West Timor. West
Timorese viewed displaced East Timorese as rude,
domineering, violent, possessive and manipulative.63 An
informant used the phrase mentalitas Porto (‘Portuguese
mentality’), referring to the attitudes of displaced East
Timorese.64 A shared perception among many West
30
Timorese informants is that the displaced East Timorese
have received special treatment from the government. One
prominent West Timorese informant voiced his opinion
that “they have been spoiled for 24 years.” Some claimed
that, during its occupation of East Timor, the Indonesian
Government poured in disproportionate funding in
order to develop East Timor’s infrastructure, and that, in
comparison with prevailing policies outside East Timor,
East Timorese civil servants and military personnel were
given preferential treatment in the form of exemptions
from formal recruitment requirements and relatively higher
remuneration. Repeated demands for government aid by
displaced East Timorese were often perceived by locals to
be a manifestation of the past pampering they had received
from the government.
According to a NTT provincial government document,
“the dependence of the displaced persons on their
prominent leaders and their political elite is very high.”65
Those who have worked closely with displaced East
Timorese have noted a form of social stratification within
camps. The upper layer is usually occupied by camp
coordinators, who control access to the camp by outsiders,
as well as controlling goods, services and information
from outside. This upper layer normally consists of
members of the Indonesian army, the militia, and the
civil service (PNS), and their extended families.66 The
lower layer consists of peasants. Relations between camp
63.) For a detailed description of attitudes and patterns of interaction between East
Timorese displaced persons and locals in the Noelbaki village, Central Kupang
subdistrict, Kupang District, see Patje O. Tasuib, ‘Interaksi Sosial antara Pengungsi
Timor Timur dengan Masyarakat Lokal: Studi Komparatif di Desa Noelbaki,
Kecamatan Kupang Tengah, Kabupaten Kupang’, [‘Social interaction between
East Timorese displaced persons and the local community: a comparative study
in Noelbaki village, Central Kupang subdistrict, Kupang District’] Skripsi Sarjana
Sosiologi Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Nusa Cendana,
Sarjana thesis in sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Nusa Cendana
University), Kupang, 2004.
64.) It is interesting to note that in the past a certain group in Timor was referred to
as “black Portuguese.” See I Gede Parimartha, Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa
Tenggara 1815-1915, 2002, op. cit.
65.) Satkorlak PBP Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2004, op. cit..
66.) This was before the government introduced a policy of reassignment, through
which members of the army, police and civil service living in camps were relocated
and assigned new positions in their organizations.
31
residents and their leaders are viewed as paternalistic.
Camp leaders often communicate with the outside world
on behalf of camp residents. Civil society activists say
decisions about important issues such as participation in
government-sponsored repatriation are made collectively,
not individually. As an example of social pressures, one
NGO activist who worked in a camp described an incident in
which a number of residents had agreed to be repatriated
to Timor Leste but did not show up on the day of departure.
Camp residents also obey their ketua adat (traditional
chief ). When asked about his willingness to be resettled on
Sumba Island, for instance, a camp resident in Tuapukan
said, ‘It depends on the power-holder, on the ketua adat. If
the ketua adat has given his agreement and has arranged
the coordination, and it is agreed upon, then, okay, we
will all go there. But we do not go over there just because
the government has constructed [settlements]’. Gambling
and the production, sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages are reportedly prevalent in some camps.
(Previously, the possession of firearms was common.)67
These practices have exacerbated negative stereotypes
of the displaced East Timorese. Some displaced East
Timorese have also been suspected of misappropriating
aid from donors. Locals in the Kupang District complain
that displaced East Timorese families have more children
than West Timorese families, and are believed to be either
ignorant of, or indifferent to, family planning programs.
This perception, even if it is based on reality, should be
related to cultural differences because most East Timorese,
being Catholics, do not use birth control. Locals are
concerned that this perceived imbalance might tip the
already precarious ethnic and religious balance in the
neighbourhoods to favour the East Timorese.
Displaced East Timorese who were interviewed also
held a number of grievances. Many felt they had been
used to obtain aid from domestic and overseas sources,
and questioned the accountability and openness of
67.) See various newspaper reports quoted in Campbell-Nelson, Karen et al., op. cit.
217-242.
32
the management of allocated funds, as well as the
appropriateness of certain aid projects. An informant in
Kupang reported that a Ministry of Health research project
to investigate the state of their mental health was greeted
with hostility because the displaced persons felt that their
sanity was being questioned.
In interviews, displaced East Timorese camp residents
also claimed that government agencies often discriminated
against them. Informants and displaced East Timorese,
for instance, reported cases of discrimination by health
workers, although it was not clear whether the perceived
discriminatory treatment was specifically directed against
displaced East Timorese patients, or because health
workers had a tendency to discriminate against patients
from other ethnic groups, as observed by NTT Governor Piet
A Tallo.68
Displaced East Timorese reported that they were not
included in the government’s beras miskin, raskin (rice
for the poor) program and were given only temporary ID
cards.69 A camp coordinator remarked that East Timorese
encountered difficulties obtaining bank loans because
of concerns that they might return to East Timor without
repaying their loans. Local informants in Naibonat say that
government support for the construction of basic housing is
only available to applicants who can display a certificate of
personal ownership of the plot of land on which the house
is to be built—a condition few displaced East Timorese
camp residents are able to satisfy. NTT government data
shows, on the other hand, that from 2002 through 2004
they had provided aid in the form of building materials to
2,259 household heads in Kupang and Kupang District, 308
of whom resided in camps.70
68.) See Pos Kupang, 28 July 2004.
69.) East Timorese residing in other areas outside NTT also encountered problems with
ID cards. See, for instance, Sinar Harapan, 3 June 2003, which reported that the
East Timorese residing in Yogyakarta “have lost their country of birth and are still
being subjected to unfairness.”
70.) Satkorlak PBP NTT: Gubernur NTT: Laporan Perkembangan Penanganan Eks
Pengungsi Timor Timur di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Keadaan Tahun 2004
[Progress report on the handling of former East Timorese displaced persons in East
Nusa Tenggara Province, situation in 2004], Kupang, 2004.
33
3.3
Identity Politics
community formally accepted temporary land-use rights for
residential and agricultural use and agreed to obey state,
regional, local, customary and church laws, to honour
the sanctity of traditional forest, and to return the land to
the rightful owners without compensation when the loan
expires or when they have to move elsewhere. To facilitate
the integration of both groups, the government has
adopted a relocation policy it refers to as the pola sisipan
(insertion pattern), by which the East Timorese are placed
in new settlements where they are integrated with locals.
Religious and cultural differences between displaced East
Timorese and locals have on occasion become obstacles
to integration. The displaced East Timorese are Catholic,
whereas in a number of areas in NTT the locals are
predominantly Protestant. Informants report that religious
differences have been a problem in Central Timor, Kupang
and Sumba. But cultural differences can also stand in the
way of peaceful communication, even in areas where the
majority of locals are Catholic.
The relationship between refugees and locals varies
from place to place. A number of West Timorese as well as
East Timorese informants interviewed observed that, over
time, the groups tend to integrate. There are some reports
of more cooperative interactions between the two groups,
especially in integrated neighbourhoods.71 One government
official observed a strong relationship between displaced
East Timorese and locals in Oecussi, where the displaced
East Timorese work in crop-sharing arrangements within
an integrated land management system. One local village
organization facilitated a traditional signing ceremony by
local hosts to formally accept the displaced East Timorese
as members of the local community and hand over land
use rights to them. A more integrated relationship was also
found in Southern Central Timor.
Other informants observed good inter-group relations
in South Belu and in Ngada, Flores and in the eastern
part of Kupang District. An NGO activist stated that in one
village his organization had facilitated a traditional (adat)
signing ceremony. During the ceremony, witnessed by
local government officials, the local police chief, and the
pastor of the parish, a representative of the East Timorese
71.) Satkorlak PBP-NTT, Laporan Akhir, ‘Pendampingan Masyarakat dalam Rangka
Pelaksanaan Resettlement. Timor Barat dan Kabupaten Sumba Barat Propinsi Nusa
Tenggara Timur’ (Final report, ‘Support for communities in the implementation
of resettlement, West Timor and West Sumba district’). Bantuan Kemanusiaan
Pemerintah Jepang [Humanitarian aid from the Japanese government], Bidang
Permukiman, Dinas Kimpraswil Prop., NTT-Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian
kepada Masyarakat Universitas Katolik Widya Mandira, Kupang, 2004.
34
Intermarriage between members of the two groups has
also begun to occur. However, locals and NGO activists say
cultural factors, such as religious differences and the size
of the dowry that displaced East Timorese brides often
demand from the families of the bridegroom, prevent intergroup marriages from occurring more frequently. Patje O.
Tasuib’s study in Noelbaki Village for his Sarjana degree
found that locals as well as East Timorese tended to reject
inter-group marriages.72
3.4
Media
Some of the daily newspapers in NTT are affiliated with
national newspapers, while others are regional or local
publications. One regional daily newspaper, Pos Kupang,
is part of the Jakarta-based Kompas group. Its staff says
that it is cautious and responsible in its reporting of issues
relating to displaced East Timorese, for fear of stirring up
conflict. It also states that it has a policy of not printing
the names of ethnic or religious groups when reporting on
conflict, and tries to elicit comments from influential people
it regards as potential actors in the resolution of conflict.
The chief editor of Pos Kupang is, however, facing libel
charges after publishing a report alleging the involvement
of police officers in smuggling sugar from East Timor.73
Another regional daily newspaper, Timor Ekspres, is
affiliated to the Jawa Pos group.
72.) Patje O. Tasuib, Interaksi Sosial antara Pengungsi Timor Timur dengan Masyarakat
Lokal, 2004.
73.) The Jakarta Post, October 29, 2004.
35
4.
Impacts of
the Conflict
4.1
Local Economic Development
The majority of the population in the four districts in Timor
works in agriculture.74 While East Timorese employed by
the state (the military, police, civil servants) continue to
receive their monthly salaries, many East Timorese who
traditionally earned their livings as peasants or working
in the informal sector, had no means of livelihood in West
Timor. This placed additional economic burdens on host
communities, as well as putting pressure on scarce local
natural resources.
Surya Wirawan. Aku Adalah Saudaramu (I am your Brother); etching, 8.5 cm in diameter, 2001.
Prevailing methods of traditional land resource
management were disturbed by the influx of East Timorese
because traditional communal land, including forests,
was forcibly appropriated and utilized without regard
74.) Kupang District: in all 187 villages; South Central Timor: 97 percent of 215 villages;
North Central Timor: 96 percent of 159; Belu: 96 percent of 168. See Badan
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Propinsi NTT-BPS Propinsi NTT, Hasil Pengolahan
Data dan Analisis Potensi Desa Nusa Tenggara Timur 2002, Kupang, 2002.
37
for existing local customs.75 Environmental damage was
reported in Belu after the traditional forest in Wemer,
regarded by local communities as communal property
and by the government as protected forest, was cut
down and turned into agricultural land.76 A Belu District
forestry agency report states that the actions of former
East Timorese residents and local residents resulted in
the damage of more than 4,000 hectares of protected
forest area.77 The permanent settlement of displaced East
Timorese in host communities has also compelled host
communities, including religious organizations, to allocate
some of their land, voluntarily or otherwise, to these
displaced East Timorese. Disputes over the management of,
and access to, natural resources, such as land and water,
are potential sources of conflict.78 Inter-group relations
in a number of locations are volatile and described by
informants in terms of bom waktu (time bomb), api di
dalam sekam (fire in a haystack) and rumput kering (dry
grass).
The impact of the presence of displaced East Timorese
on the local and regional economy was also apparent in
the formal sector. The government and a wide variety of
donor agencies have, over the years, allocated significant
funds for programs and projects to assist displaced
East Timorese.79 These funds have been used, among
other things, to construct settlements and other forms
of infrastructure and to purchase consumer goods and
agricultural tools for distribution. Funds were also
allocated for related activities: training and other forms
of information-education-communication (IEC) activities;
the re-registration of displaced East Timorese; workshops,
75.) When the assessment team visited a camp, the residents were carrying out landclearing (membersihkan, to clean), stacking firewood which according to them
could be sold for IDR90,000, (US$9) per truckload.
76.) Satkorlak PBP Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Timur:
Laporan Hasil Pelaksanaan Rapat Evaluasi Penanganan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur
dan Pembahasan Program Tahun 2004 di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
77.) Pos Kupang, 8 July 2004.
78.) Pos Kupang, 28 January 2003.
79.) For a breakdown of emergency aid received or allocated and expenditures made
from 1999 through 2001, see Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op.
cit.
38
seminars and research, and development activities that
benefit public, non-governmental and private organizations,
as well as local and regional businesses and industries.
4.2
Impact on Local Education and Health Services
The exodus to West Timor disrupted the schooling of many
East Timorese children. When they settled, many had to put
off their formal education because of a lack of educational
facilities. Most existing schools did not have the capacity
to accept the large number of displaced East Timorese
children. Consequently, sekolah tenda (tent schools)
were established. Recently, attempts have been made to
close the tent schools and transfer the students to regular
schools.80
Once in the public schools, the East Timorese faced
the same chronic problems faced by low-income West
Timorese: paying school fees, purchasing supplies and
uniforms, and paying for public transportation fares.81
The presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor
placed a burden on the region’s health and educational
facilities.82 An NTT provincial government document cites
a host of problems: ‘educational facilities in emergency
schools in resettlement locations are in general very
limited’, ‘health services from community health centres
located near the camps are not optimal because of the
frequent absence of physicians and the distance between
community health centres and the camps/resettlement
locations’, ‘limited medical staff for medical services in
various camps’, and ‘malaria eradication efforts by the NTT
provincial health service are not optimal’.83
80.) Serah Terima Bangunan Sekolah SD GMIT dan SD Inpres di Tuapukan [Handover
of East Indonesia Christian Church elementary school and Presidential Instruction
elementary school buildings in Tuapukan]. In Jesuit Refugee Service Indonesia
website, No. 42, 20 October 2003.
81.) Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
82.) For data on the health and education in NTT, see Pengolahan Data Elektronik
Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, ibid.
83.) Satkorlak PBP NTT: Gubernur NTT: Laporan 2004, op. cit.
39
At the outset, infant mortality and malnutrition was high
among the displaced.84 Although various arrangements
eventually led to an increase in the absorption capacity
of local schools, camp residents interviewed state that
many children still chose not to attend school, or dropped
out due to factors such as the distance between camps
and existing schools, and the inability of many families
to pay school fees. The same factors also accounted for
the inability of many displaced East Timorese families to
gain access to health services provided by the rumah sakit
daerah (regional hospitals), Puskesmas (pusat kesehatan
masyarakat, community health centers), Polindes (polikinik
desa, village clinics), Posyandu (pos pelayanan terpadu,
integrated service stations) and Postu (pos pembantu,
subordinate stations).
The enrolment of displaced East Timorese students
significantly affected the ethnic, religious and age
composition of schools. Several local informants maintain
that inter-group activities are limited and conflict
occasionally breaks out. There are also reports of parents
transferring their children to other schools to avoid
extortion and physical assault by East Timorese students,
reports that a school building was vandalized by East
Timorese camp residents because many of their children
did not pass the final examinations, and reports of a high
drop-out rate among displaced East Timorese students.
Displaced East Timorese women had already suffered
various forms of violence while in East Timor.85 Many
displaced East Timorese women faced further problems
in West Timor, as victims of domestic violence, sexual
harassment, rape, involvement in commercial sex, and
the disintegration of the family.86 It is also reported that
widows are typically not regarded as the head of their
households and therefore face more economic and social
difficulties than other families.
84.) See also Lela E. Madijah, ‘What could be worse than East Timorese refugee
camps?’, The Jakarta Post Online Special, 23 November 2000, http://www.
thejakartapost.com/special.
85.) Sinta R. Dewi, ‘Violence Against Women and War’ op. cit..
86.) See, for instance, Campbell-Nelson et al., op. cit.
40
4.3
Governance
There is no information on whether the conflict affected
institutional capacity, transparency and accountability of
public, corporate and civil society governance. Informants
reported that displaced East Timorese, the media and
civil society organizations demanded transparency and
accountability in the management of funds made available
by national and international donor agencies. The media
has frequently aired cases of public dissatisfaction with the
lack of transparency and accountability of the management
of funds for the displaced East Timorese. As in other
areas of Indonesia, corruption, collusion and nepotism
(korupsi, kolusi dan nepotism, KKN) are endemic in NTT,
and the reform movement thus far has failed to improve
the situation.87 During the assessment team’s stay in West
Timor, cases of corruption involving government officials,
members of the legislature, as well as prominent figures in
the private sector, were reported in the local media on an
almost daily basis.
In a speech, NTT Governor Piet A. Tallo warned that some
people had turned poverty into projects (memprojekkan
kemiskinan) for their own benefit.88 Quoting Pos Kupang,
Kompas reports that Indonesian Corruption Watch has
classified the corruption rate in NTT as the sixth highest
in Indonesia.89 For example, some NGOs, the NTT DPRD
and East Timorese displaced persons have all alleged the
misappropriation of humanitarian aid from the Japanese
government totalling IDR 53,123 billion.90
87.) For a breakdown of emergency aid received or allocated and expenditures made
from 1999 through 2001, see Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001.
88.) Pos Kupang, 21 July 2004, 5.
89.) Kompas, 18 November 2004.
90.) Republika Online, 16 October 2003 and 17 October 2003.
41
5.
Responses and
Peace-building
Mohamad Yusuf. Buruh Tani Ayahanda Kami (Farmers are our Parents); pen and ink on paper, 21.5 X 21.5 cm, 1998.
Since the beginning of the conflict, a range of emergency
programs have been designed to mitigate the humanitarian
problems resulting from the exodus from East Timor and to
find durable solutions for East Timorese. The Indonesian
Government, the NTT provincial and district governments,
and the military and police all worked on these programs,
in cooperation with private, state-owned and regionallyowned enterprises, political parties, national, local and
international civil society organizations, international
and regional organizations, and foreign governments.
Support for the evacuation of displaced East Timorese to
West Timor was followed by humanitarian aid in the form
of access to emergency food aid, shelter, and health and
educational facilities for displaced East Timorese, and aid
in repatriating displaced persons who wished to return to
East Timor.
A UNHCR report evaluating the repatriation program
estimates that 90 percent of the East Timorese in West
Timor—225,000 people-- had returned to Timor Leste
43
by May 2003.91 By 2002, 1,373 of 4,323 separated East
Timorese children had been reunited with at least one
parent.92 Other resettlement and transmigration programs
helped East Timorese who wished to remain in Indonesia
relocate throughout NTT and other provinces.
supported by all locals—the warga lama (old residents)—
an indication that distrust still exists.
Peace-building initiatives also include the facilitation
of meetings between residents in East Timorese camps
and host communities. Similar meetings have been set
up between East Timorese and members of communities
where they will be resettled.
Many donor agencies have been actively involved in
providing emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction
services: the Australian Red Cross; Care International
Indonesia (water and sanitation, income-generation
and other livelihood recovery); Catholic Relief Services;
Christian Children’s Fund Indonesia (health-related children
and youth infrastructure, rehabilitation and nutrition);
CONCERN, Danish Refugee Council; Food and Agricultural
Organization (refugees, agriculture and incomegeneration); International Organization for Migration;
International Rescue Committee; OXFAM Australia; Save
the Children UK (health and education, children and youth);
United Nations Children’s Fund (education); UNDP (multisector, local settlement programme); UNHCR and a number
of West Timorese NGOs.93
Government agencies and civil society organizations
have initiated various peace-building programs to facilitate
communication between displaced East Timorese and
locals. West Timorese locals as well as East Timorese
camp coordinators established links between the two
communities. Language has been one of the focuses:
It has been suggested, for instance, that terms such as
warga baru (new residents) or warga lokal baru (new local
residents) be used, rather than pengungsi (displaced
persons) or eks pengungsi(former displaced persons),
which have come to be seen as derogatory. Several
informants, however, say that the endeavour is not
91.) See Dolan, Large and Obi, ‘Evaluation of UNHCR’s Repatriation and Reintegration
Programme in East Timor, 1999-2003’, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Geneva, February 2004, www.unhcr.
ch/epau.
92.) UNHCR The Refugee Agency. Global Report 2002, Geneva, 348.
93.) Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Cambridge, MA: President
and Fellows of Harvard College, 2001, in http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/
main/maps_wtimor_refugees.php and the United Nations Consolidated InterAgency Appeal for Indonesia, 2003.
44
Cross-border visits (‘go and see visit’ and ‘come and
talk visit’)94 have been set up to facilitate reconciliation
between the East Timorese in West Timor and Timor Leste
residents.95 A local NGO is participating in a Timor Leste
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As part
of peace-building efforts, East Timorese civil service
employees and military personnel formerly stationed in
East Timor have been relocated from camps and reassigned
to units in their organizations within as well as outside
West Timor, while former members of the militia have been
encouraged to pursue their interests through political
means.
5.1
Responses by Government and UNDP
In the six years since the post-referendum violence, the
national and NTT regional governments in partnership
with international donors, foreign and local NGOs have
worked consistently at getting East Timorese out of refugee
camps and into more permanent housing. In 2002, the
Indonesian Government formulated its official policy on
resolving the East Timorese refugee problem by giving all
refugees the choice of three options: repatriation to Timor
Leste; transmigration to settlements outside of NTT; or
resettlement within NTT. The East Timorese were given
until 31 December 2002 to decide and since remaining
in the camps was not an option, it was believed that
there would be no more refugee camps or refugees in
2003. Housing and relocation were handled by different
government agencies such as the Department for Regional
Settlement and Infrastructure, Department of Manpower
94.) ....
95.) See UNHCR Global Report 2002,op. cit., p. 348.
45
and Transmigration, Department of Social Affairs and the
military. The results of these efforts however fell short of
the original objective:
•
•
1.
2.
3.
4.
From the beginning of the crisis until December 2002,
42, 063 households moved out of the refugee camps
into more permanent housing leaving a balance of
9,805 households in the camps.
In the financial year 2003, 2,397 households were
rehoused leaving a balance of 7,408 households in
the camps as of March 2004.
In the financial year 2004, a further 3,209 households
were rehoused with the Department of Manpower
and Transmigration resettling 1,530 households; the
Department of Regional Settlement and Infrastructure
providing housing for 500 households and the
Department of Social Affairs providing housing
assistance for 4,199 households.
As of May 2005, 4,199 families still remained in
camps or refugee-type accommodation.96
The main problems encountered included insufficient
socialisation of the options to the East Timorese refugees
as well as adequate information on living conditions in the
new settlements and a begrudging acceptance or outright
hostility from the local host communities. In light of the
uneven progress, the Indonesian Government supported
by UNDP decided to adopt a more participatory and
sustainable approach towards resettlement that would
factor in both the needs of the host community as well as
the refugees. Host communities were recognised as the key
to successful local settlement; settlement without the host
community’s agreement or coerced agreement could be a
cause for future violence.
The key characteristics of participatory local settlement
include:
96.) Kemeterian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat, Kantor Menko Kesra,
‘Koordinasi Kebijakan Penanganan Dan Pemberdayaan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur
Di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘Coordinating Policy to Address and Empower
Former East Timorese Refugees in NTT’], Bogor, 2005.
46
•
•
•
•
•
Host communities and refugees are invited to
participate in planning and implementation, assuring
participation of women.
Host communities and refugees reach agreement
without coercion.
Host communities participate in detailing the support
they need to receive refugees.
Refugees participate in decisions on settlement
locations and on the support needed for a sustainable
livelihood.
The needs of women and children are taken into
account in the planning and implementation.
Local government authorities are expected, with
the support of UN agencies, to take the lead in
the planning and implementation by appropriate
agencies, including: government entities, NGOs,
community organisations and private sector.
The local settlement programme proposes two
funds to support the settlement of refugees and the
sustainable development of the host community.
The Community Development Fund will address
the immediate impact at community level including
settlement and village development support. The
Area Development Fund is aimed at promoting the
economic and social advancement of the area in
which the refugees have been resettled and to reduce
potential jealousy among communities who benefit
from the arrival of refugees and communities that
could not accept refugees and hence could not benefit
from the Community Development Fund.
As there was little field experience in the local
settlement of refugees following this participatory and
sustainable approach, a small-scale pilot project was
established to coordinate mechanisms, build capacity and
generate ‘lessons learned’ to scale up the programme.
UNHCR and UNDP agreed to support the implementation
of local settlement programme pilot and signed the first
Exchange of Letter (EOL) in November 2002. The EOL
stipulated that 1,100 households would be settled by the
end of 2003 with total budget allocated of US$1.2 million
from the European Union (EU).
47
This local settlement programme had two dimensions.
UNDP in collaboration with the Department for Regional
Settlement and Infrastructure (National level) assumed
responsibility for the host community dimension.
UNHCR and the implementing partners (NGOs) assumed
responsibility for the refugee dimension, i.e. informing
refugees about local settlement support, recording
refugee aspirations, identifying refugees who would match
available settlement opportunities, moving refugees to new
locations and providing shelter and livelihood support.
Due to constraints in the coordination among the
different actors and the imperative of meeting the time
limit on the use of EU funds, the target beneficiaries were
drastically reduced, from 1,100 households to 550, then
to 70 households at the end of 2003: 50 in West Sumba
district and another 20 in West Timor. The budget allocation
was accordingly reduced to US$270,631.
5.2
48
5.2.3
Inconsistent
policies on
settlement areas
The East Timorese Local Settlement pilot emphasised the
importance of both the host community and refugees,
however both dimensions are inter-linked; the progress
or steps taken by one dimension are highly dependent
on the results of the other dimension’s activities. Poor
coordination and communication mechanisms between the
two main programme components resulted in delays or,
in some cases, the premature moving of refugees before
local communities had facilities to accommodate them. In
future, the programme should ensure better coordination
and clearly articulate the responsibilities and timelines for
delivery by each participating agency.
While the Indonesian Government clearly articulated three
options for East Timorese refugees, the priority settings for
each option changed several times, adversely affecting the
outcome of the local settlement pilot. For example, when
the repatriation option was prioritised, the programme
was not allowed to explicitly promote the option of
resettlement.
Initially, local settlement programme policy stated that
resettlement would only take place outside West Timor.
Accordingly East Timorese refugees expressed an interest
in relocating to West Sumba district. However when the
Indonesian Government changed its policy and allowed
resettlement within West Timor, nearly all refugees who had
already registered for West Sumba backed out, preferring
to remain in West Timor.
To prevent this from recurring, programme facilitators
should ensure that decisions to relocate are made on
the basis of genuine options, i.e. that refugees register
because they are genuinely convinced that they are moving
to viable locations and not because they do not have any
other alternative.
Issues Arising from Responses
The slow progress and numerous setbacks in resettling the
East Timorese refugees both through conventional methods
as well as the innovative participatory local settlement
approach has provided many useful lessons that can be
applied to the remaining East Timorese refugees as well
as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in other parts of
Indonesia.
5.2.1
Lack of
coordination
between different
programme
dimensions
5.2.2
Changing
priorities in
government
policy on refugees
5.2.4
Need for
standardisation
of settlement
activities
The Indonesian Government’s policy on refugees is
inconsistently implemented. This is apparent in the variety
of settlement strategies created by different government
agencies. For example, the Department for Settlement
and Regional Infrastructure provides shelter in the form
of simple houses, which differ from the standards of the
Department of Manpower and Transmigration; for its
part, the Department for Social Affairs provides building
materials. Each sector has different unit costs which
creates jealousy among the participants in the various
programs.
5.2.5
Coordination
among
stakeholders
Resettlement is a multi-stakeholder effort. The
Departments for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure,
Social Affairs and Manpower and Transmigration are all
responsible for housing preparations. The Department for
Settlement and Regional Infrastructure is also responsible
49
for the provision of public facilities, i.e. water and
sanitation, roads, bridges and the like. Social Affairs is
responsible for food and living allowances before and after
the resettlement, while Manpower and Transmigration is
responsible for the transportation of refugees from the
camps to transit sites and resettlement locations.
In the East Timorese Local Settlement pilot, additional
players such as the UNHCR and NGO implementing partners
were involved in helping the refugees while UNDP and the
Department of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure dealt
with the host communities’ needs through local NGOs. A
lack of coordination and integration of individual activities
at the beginning of the pilot led to conflicting agendas,
duplication of work and unnecessary delays in project
delivery.
5.2.6
Clear division of
responsibilities
at all levels of
government
5.2.7
The benefits of
the participatory
approach
50
In the pilot local settlement project, the National
Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure
assigned responsibility for coordinating the programme to
the NTT Provincial Settlement and Regional Infrastructure
department. The district government, which is ultimately
responsible for the sustainability of the programme, was
given a minor role. To accelerate the settlement process
and optimise results, the relevant provincial and district
sectors should review their responsibilities and allocate
on the basis of the comparative advantage and respective
expertise of the different sectors and levels of government.
Maximising involvement of the district governments will
improve their commitment to assume responsibility for
the sustainable development of the settlement locations,
which in the past have so frequently been neglected. At the
national level, the Department for Settlement and Regional
Infrastructure should play a monitoring role, provide
technical assistance and ensure the availability of funds.
The success of the participatory approach in increasing
the East Timorese refugees’ sense of belonging in their
new home and the sense of responsibility of the host
community towards new arrivals has convinced the
Indonesian Government that this is best approach in
resettling refugees/IDPs. The establishment of district level
resettlement working groups has proved to be an effective
tool in enhancing participation of local government and
civil society. In West Sumba District there was such high
local ownership of the programme that the pro-active
district head (bupati) wrote to the governor to authorise
the transportation of refugees who had chosen to move
to West Sumba because the settlements were ready. The
refugees arrived to a welcoming ceremony, officiated by the
bupati and all the department heads and witnessed by the
entire community, and were initiated as new members of
the community.
5.2.8
Insertion strategy
5.2.9
The importance
of district-level
resettlement
working groups
5.2.10
Accurate and
updated data
In the past, the Indonesian Government has located new
settlers in locations isolated from the host community.
Such actions have, in some cases, undercut social cohesion
and created tensions between the host community and the
settlers. In the East Timorese Local Settlement pilot, the
new settlers have been mixed with the local community.
This insertion strategy accelerates integration between the
new settlers and the host community.
Significant improvement in communication and
coordination between the UNDP team and the West
Sumba District Government occurred after the bupati
established, by official decree, the Resettlement Working
Group. The creation of a dedicated task force resulted in a
new awareness on the specific roles and responsibilities
of the working group and district government. The district
government assumed the lead in implementing the
local settlement pilot and became deeply involved in all
aspects of the programme, including becoming familiar
with the programme’s approach, the implementation and
coordination arrangements, and other responsibilities
assigned to district agencies.
Government and NGO data on the number of East Timorese
refugees in camps differ by wide margins and are not
regularly updated in spite of the fact that the refugees
are highly mobile. No systematic information is available
regarding the number of refugees willing to settle
51
outside West Timor. In September 2003, the Indonesian
Government conducted a registration of East Timorese
refugees but did not publish the results. To improve the
planning and identification of settlement opportunities,
more systematic information is required on the number of
refugees that may be willing to settle outside West Timor
and the localities outside West Timor where the refugees
would be willing to settle.
each process that would support and accelerate the parallel
process.
5.2.13
Settlement
standards for
refugees
Updated information on refugees should be shared
frequently by the various agencies and organisations, such
as the police, the military, the Ministry of Home Affairs,
SATKORLAK and NGOs. Information on refugees should be
updated in order to support informed decision-making in
the identification of settlement locations.
5.2.11
Quality of location
information
5.2.12
Matching
mechanisms
52
Information about location settlements in Sumba was
facilitated by the Centre for IDP Services (CIS) and Jesuit
Refugee Services (JRS), particularly through ‘go and see
visits’ (GSVs) by representatives of interested refugees
and ‘come and talk visits’ (CTVs) by representatives of
host communities and as such, information reached a
limited number of people. At the early stages of the pilot,
the general population of refugees in the camps was not
well-informed about settlement opportunities outside of
West Timor. Information that was available was not wellpackaged or evenly circulated to the refugee population. In
addition, questions/issues raised by the refugees were not
properly answered or addressed. To gain a more favourable
response from refugees, all institutions concerned need
to improve communication with the refugees and utilise
various media such as community radio which has a broad
reach.
At present, matching refugees are identified after a
settlement opportunity has been found and community
agreement has been established. If an insufficient number
of refugees accept the settlement opportunity, the time
and effort expended in establishing the community
agreement goes to waste. Instead, processes to identify
host communities and refugees who willing to participate
should run in parallel, with intermediate milestones for
5.2.14
Capacity-building
Communities agree that refugees require proper housing but
express concern that their own housing could be of a much
lower standard than the houses made available to refugees.
Communities should be informed of the support that will
be available to refugees, including the quality of housing.
Compared to locally prevailing standards, refugee support
may be perceived as excessive and become a source of
jealousies, which could lead to tensions between the host
community and the settlers. Potential host communities may
not be interested in receiving refugees if the programme
cannot adjust to local conditions. A similar rationale applies
for access to water supply standards. If a standard of 100
metres is applied (distance walked to fetch drinking water),
this would disqualify most of the settlement opportunities
that local communities are able to offer. In the future,
the programme should review the standards for refugee
support and formulate standards that permit adaptation
to local conditions to ensure that support for refugees is
perceived as proportional to the living conditions of the host
community.
The East Timorese Local Settlement pilot has not only
benefited its direct beneficiaries such as refugees and
impacted local communities in the settlement locations
but has also contributed to building and strengthening the
capacity of institutions and individuals involved such as the
National Executing Agency (Department for Settlement and
Regional Infrastructure), the District Government of West
Sumba, the NGO implementing partners and the community
committees in each location that managed the Community
Development Fund.
The slow and uneven progress in resettling the East
Timorese refugees can also be attributed to the lack of
capacity within Indonesia to address the needs of refugees/
IDPs as well as host communities in a transparent, timely
and coordinated manner. The lessons learned from these
past responses will increase local and national capacities to
address the remaining IDP/refugee households.
53
6.
Conclusion:
Peace Capacities
and Vulnerabilities
6.1
Peace Vulnerabilities
Despite conflict resolution and peace-building efforts by
various agencies, the root causes of conflict between East
Timorese camp residents and locals remain unresolved: the
occupation by East Timorese of communal land and land
owned by locals; competition for scarce natural resources,
and competition for jobs. The only viable solutions—the
relocation of displaced East Timorese to other parts of
Indonesia or their repatriation to Timor Leste—have
progressed very slowly due primarily to East Timorese still
residing in camps who are unwilling to participate.
Surya Wirawan. Seri Lagu Mentari (Sun Dance); linoleum-cut, 30 x 42 cm, 2002.
There are several reasons why the displaced East
Timorese are reluctant to take part in relocation and
repatriation programs. Lack of jobs and livelihood income
sources is one; another is the spectre of inadequate
services. Meanwhile, many camp residents still have no
sustainable livelihoods and are dependent on aid, despite
having lived in camps for five years. The discontinuation of
assistance has exacerbated these difficulties.
55
Impoverished, many of the East Timorese camp residents
continue to occupy land owned by local communities
and individuals. The locals, the majority of who are poor
themselves, have begun to demand the return of their
land. Competition for scarce natural and social resources
continues. Although inter-group social relations have
improved over time, significant cultural differences—
including religious differences—have given rise to
stereotyping. This increases the risk of conflict.
Humanitarian assistance for refugees has stoked the
jealousy of locals, whereas durable solutions, such as the
provision of food aid for disadvantaged families among
locals (the rice for the poor program), have not been made
available to displaced East Timorese living in camps.
Disputes concerning the illegal occupation and utilization
of private and communal land, water resources, as well
as other forms of personal or community property, have
not been satisfactorily resolved. Consequently, there is a
need for dialogue between IDPs and host communities of
concern to build peace between displaced East Timorese
and the local community and to resolve inter-group
problems.
All of these factors have contributed to the creation of
social distance between the two groups. On the one hand,
perceived socio-economic inequalities in the past led to
jealousy on the part of locals during the initial stages of
the conflict. On the other hand, resentment is evident
among displaced East Timorese over what they perceive
as discriminatory treatment, even after having opted for
Indonesian citizenship. These conditions, if left unresolved,
have the potential to lead to open conflict between the two
groups in the future.
Past as well as present human rights violations by
members of the state apparatus are the main source of fear
and uncertainty among the populace and a fundamental
obstruction to peaceful development.
In its capacities-vulnerabilities analysis, the UN
Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Indonesia 2003 has
56
listed three major problems in NTT, namely lack of essential
services (particularly health related), informed and
voluntary choice, and integration/settlement of refugees.97
In camps and resettlement locations for displaced
East Timorese, the UN team noted a lack of essential
services, particularly health related. The discontinuation
of water aid programs has led to hardship; in settlement
areas located far from water sources, water is unfit for
human consumption. Schooling and health facilities in
camps are inferior to those provided to neighbouring
local communities. The assessment team also found
that, because of poverty, residents have limited access to
essential services such as transportation, basic medical
services, prescription drugs, tuition, and the purchase of
schoolbooks, equipment and uniforms. Camp residents
report that long distances from schools and an inability
to pay tuition fees have caused many youngsters to drop
out from school. Nonetheless, some camp youths have
successfully enrolled in universities.
According to the review, NGOs are actively involved in
providing information to camp residents, but the activities
are short-term and so not sustainable. Some observers,
noting that camp leaders attempt to control information
from the outside world, suggest that intervention programs
aimed at resolving the problem of the displaced East
Timorese can only be effectively implemented by changing
the behaviour and attitudes of the camp leaders, as well as
external influential figures. Other factors, such the physical
isolation of many camps, limited access to electronic and
printed media due to poverty, and limited communication
between locals and camp residents, also hinder the flow of
relevant information from the outside world.
In keeping with the findings of this report, a 2003
UN document states “refugee children and some host
communities [were] highly at risk of malnutrition and other
97.) UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia, New York and Geneva,
February 2003.
57
disease threats.”98 The discontinuation of humanitarian
aid for displaced East Timorese has adversely affected the
human development of families living in camps, especially
those who have yet to establish sustainable livelihoods
in West Timor. The assessment team has encountered
families who, due to a lack of food, were forced to consume
porridge made of the core of trees and drink unhygienic
ground water carried from distant locations
The slow movement of displaced persons out of camps is
caused by a number of internal as well as external factors.99
Internal factors include: unwillingness to be relocated,
even to another location within West Timor, if this involves
separation from relatives and friends and unwillingness to
be resettled in areas outside West Timor. (During interviews
the camp residents cited a number of reasons such as
being too far from East Timor, their native land, and from
relatives still living in East Timor; their unwillingness
to ‘cross the sea’, and their unwillingness ‘to become
refugees once again’. The displaced people are unwilling
to be repatriated due to their concern about the economic
and political situation in Timor Leste. They particularly
worry about the prospect of being tried for serious crimes
and becoming targets for revenge. The recent murder in
Timor Leste of two female high school students from an
East Timorese camp in Belu District has heightened such
concerns.100
Another external factor is the amount of negative
information and disinformation about repatriation,
relocation, resettlement, and transmigration programs
obtained through gossip, personal experiences, as well
as personal accounts from people who took part in such
programs but later decided to return to the West Timorese
camps. Problems include a lack of transparency and
accountability in the management of aid programs; and
broken promises or perceived shortfalls between what had
been explained and the realities later encountered, such as
the absence of promised essential facilities or support in
relocation or resettlement sites. Other important external
factors include the lack of fertile land in West Timor and the
government’s limited budget.
6.2
Peace Capacities identified by this assessment are the
increase of autonomy and democracy in local politics and
the strengthening of civil society’s role in society.
Peace Capacities also consist of peace-building
initiatives by government agencies, traditional and local
leaders, and NGOs (including the facilitation of meetings
between both groups and the promotion of peace among
students from both groups through the establishment of
peace schools.
The local government has also begun to provide
services without distinguishing between former displaced
persons and locals, thus enhancing inter-group relations
and reducing an important risk to peace. Increased
consultation, advocacy and capacity building activities
by local NGOs could also provide a Capacity for Peace.
Specific sectoral attention should focus on improved
governance, delivery of basic services, economic recovery
and empowerment of victims of conflict.
External factors associated with the slow exodus of
displaced East Timorese include the close patronage bonds
between displaced East Timorese and their camp leaders,
as well as with other influential persons living outside the
camps, so that important individual decisions are often not
made independently but are subject to group control.
98.) Ibid., 120.
99.) In its most likely scenario, the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia
estimates that “30-40 percent repatriate, 5 to10 percent settle off Timor and
majority of remainder continue residence in camp communities.” Ibid., 123.
100.) Koran Tempo, ‘Warga Atambua demo pembunuhan di Timor Leste’ [‘Atambua
residents demonstrate against murder in Timor Leste’], 8 February 2005.
58
Capacities for Peace
6.2.1
Governance
There are several ways to increase the peace building
capacity of the government, affirming its role as a dominant
actor in averting potential conflict.
59
One is to increase the government’s capacity to make
refugee management policies that are sensitive to potential
conflict. This would include:
• Increasing the capacity to map existing and potential
conflicts;
• Analysing the effects of policies on the aforementioned
(potential) conflict;
• Understanding the principles, concepts and practices
of management policies that actively contribute to
peace building.
Village governments are also important actors, and
it is imperative to increase the capacity of and support
for these governments in their efforts to open forums
for dialogue between refugees and the local community,
through activities which are relevant and advantageous
to local needs and conditions. These activities could
centre on: hygiene and health education, sports activities
and economic revival job creation). It is also important
to encourage refugee involvement in decision-making
at the village level, as well as in village and sub-village
development meetings (musrenbang desa and musrenbang
dusun), in particular in resettlement locations.
Finally, it is imperative that all stakeholders--the
subjects of development endeavours as well as civil society
organizations--participate and be actively involved in the
planning and implementation of peace and development
programs. The emphasis in peace-building activities should
be on participatory, empowering bottom-up grassroots
approaches.
6.2.2
Social welfare
60
There are a number of important steps that can promote
social welfare.
1. Support efforts to improve living conditions, including
appropriate housing and basic infrastructure
and facilities. Improvement of settlements also
needs to focus on ways in which the beneficiaries
can make their livelihoods (with the appropriate
supporting infrastructures), so that unemployment
or underemployment does not become a potential for
conflict in the future.
2. Understanding land issues, including ownership
and usage, are central to promoting social welfare.
As stated in this paper, they have been central to
tensions among refugees and the communities around
them. The pattern of settlement insertion, in which
refugees are settled in small numbers among the local
community, could become a mechanism to reduce
the ghettoisation of the refugees, which can lead to
aggression if there is a trigger.
3. Improving refugees’ access to appropriate health care.
This can be done by:
• Enabling community health centers (PUSKESMAS)
to give cheaper health care to refugees.
Encouraging PUSKESMAS to be more proactive in
their services, including regularly visiting camps
or resettlement locations when needed. This is
important because many refugees are not used
to being treated in PUSKESMAS; if they are not
encouraged to do so, late treatment can be fatal.
• Attempts to resolve administration of the
citizenship of refugees, so that they can receive
social security programs that will can help them to
obtain appropriate health services.
• Facilitation of health education to produce
paramedics within the refugee and local
communities. Health education specifically related
to healthy living (hygiene education) would
provide a forum for dialogue between refugees
and the local community, while simultaneously
helping them to care for environmental health
(preventative action against disease).
4. Aid for education. Education aid can be given through:
• Improvements or provision of educational
facilities.
• Clarifying the citizenship status of refugees so
they can access aid provided by the state to pay
educational costs.
• Providing scholarships to those who really need it
and who have academic ability.
• Urging the government to give serious attention
to the lack of teachers. In addition, there should
61
be support for peace-building programs include
short-term support for information, education
and communication programs in peace-building
skills, and long-term support for the learning
of multicultural education principles, such as
respect for and appreciation of cultural diversity,
in primary, secondary and tertiary educational
institutions. This could be integrated into the
competency-based curricula introduced in 2004.
5. Rehabilitation or development of social infrastructure
in locations where limitations in social infrastructure
are a cause of conflict. Installation of infrastructure
also needs to be accompanied by development of
maintenance mechanisms which are utilized as forums
of communication between the two communities,
for example, the formation of the Water Committee
for regulating the usage and maintenance of water
facilities, whose members are from both communities.
6. Providing special services for women in exile, both in
relation to reproductive health and their vulnerability
to violence, as well as their access to and control of
basic public facilities. Particular attention should be
paid to women who no longer have husbands. This
special attention is needed in all programs (crosscutting) to ensure that women are not left behind
in peace building efforts, as the principle of gender
mainstreaming needs to be applied. Programs
for advocacy and support for victims of violence
– including domestic violence--need to be introduced.
Programs for the empowerment of women are also
recommended, especially regarding participation in
formal schooling, small and medium enterprises, and
in politics, such as in the election of female national,
regional as well as district/municipal legislators and in
the presidential elections.
6.2.3
Local economic
recovery
62
needs to be a more detailed assessment to determine the
indicators for targeted beneficiaries and suitable forms
of economic empowerment. Economic empowerment can
also be coordinated with the border area accelerated
development program, which focuses primarily on
economic development.
6.2.4
State and
human security
Given the large number of East Timorese refugees in West
Timor who still communicate with friends and relatives and
obtain information about the conditions in Timor Leste,
the security context in West Timor can be influenced by
the situation in Timor Leste. As a result, indicators need
to be developed to anticipate insecurity or destabilization
across the border as well as an early response system to
minimize the impact in West Timor. In addition, support
needs to be provided for human security programs, such
as the empowerment of human-rights-watch activities and
advocacy programs, and the empowerment of organizations
involved in the performance of legal, health, psychological,
and economic support for victims of human rights
violations.
Poor economic conditions exacerbate conflict (i.e. fighting
over employment). Economic empowerment should
be aimed at both refugee and local communities, so
that jealousies are not created and negative stigmas/
stereotypes are avoided. To enable equal access, there
63
Annex 1
Institutional Affiliation of Informats Interviewed
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Kelompok Rakyat Biasa, Damai di Hati, Damai di Bumi (Peace at Heart, Peace on Earth),
silkscreen on paper, 60 x 45 cm, 2001
Institution
Provincial, district and village government officials
• Officials, NTT Provincial Government, Kupang
2 interviews
Official, Belu District Government, Atambua
• Official, village government, Belu District
1 interview
1 interview
• Official, village government, Kupang District
1 interview
• Neighbourhood association functionaries, Kupang District
Group discussion
Provincial and district legislators
• Member, NTT Province People’ Representative Council,
1999-2004 term, Kupang
1 interview
• Member, NTT Province People’ Representative Council),
2004-2009 term, Kupang
1 interview
• Member, Belu District People’ Representative Council,
1999-2004 term, Atambua
1 interview
Civil Society Organizations
• Functionary, CIS GAMKI-GMKI (Center for IDPs, Indonesian
Christian Youth Movement-Indonesian Christian Student
Organization), Kupang
1 interview
• Functionary, CRS (Catholic Relief Services), Kupang
1 interview
• Functionary, FPPA (Concern for Atambua Women Forum),
Atambua Bishop’s Office
1 interview
• Functionary, Justice and Peace Committee, Atambua
Bishop’s Office
1 interview
• Functionary, Justice and Peace Office, Kupang Archbishop’s
Office
1 interview
• Volunteers, JPI, Atambua
2 interviews
• Volunteer, JRS (Jesuit Relief Services), Atambua
1 interview
• Functionary, PIAR (Information Center on People’s Adat),
Kupang
1 interview
• Functionary, PPSE (Socio-economic Development Program),
Atambua Bishop’s Office
1 interview
• Functionary, Protestant Church, Kupang District
1 interview
• Faculty member, Widya Mandira Catholic University,
Kupang
2 interviews
• Functionary, YASO (Solidarity Foundation), Atambua
1 interview
• Functionary, Yayasan Sanlima (Humanity Care Foundation),
Kupang
1 interview
65
66
1 group discussion
• Female camp residents, Belu District
1 group discussion
• Male camp residents, Belu District
1 group discussion
• Female camp residents, Kupang District
1 group discussion
• Male camp residents, Kupang District
1 group discussion
The Press
• Functionary, Radar Timor Newspaper, Kupang
1 interview
• Functionaries, Pos Kupang Newspaper, Kupang
1 group discussion
7.
Other
• Functionary, UN-OHCA, Kupang
1 interview
8.
Kupang-based organisations participating in Provincial
Workshop
• Functionaries/volunteers, CIS, Sanlima, Widya Madira
Catholic University, YPI, PIKUL (Foundation for the
Strengthening of Local Institutions and Capacity)
1 group discussion
20.06%
Percentage:
Votes:
Percentage:
5
432,823
Seats Won:
Votes:
51%
Percentage:
1,045,157
39.61%
Votes:
609,890
Percentage:
Golkar
Votes:
Party d)
71.78%
1,115,507
62.31%
1,344,116
3
447,710
39.04%
618,899
PDI/PDI-P
28.22%
438,648
14.50%
312,777
1
54,192
--
Demokrat
00.40%
8,757
0
41,327
2.70%
58,341
0
27,228
4
Sources: NTT Province. Provincial Election Committee. General Elections 1999 (Propinsi NTT. Panitia Pemilihan Daerah Tingkat I, Pemilihan Umum 1999); General Elections Commission. 2004
General Elections. Calculation of People’s Representative Council seats: calculation of seats obtained by political parties participating in general elections for membership in the People’s
Representative Council in the 2004 General Elections in NTT-1 and NTT-2 election districts (KPU: PEMILU 2004: Perhitungan Perolehan Kursi DPR: perhitungan perolehan Kursi partai politik
peserta Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat dalam Pemilihan Umum 2004 Daerah Pemilihan NTT-I, NTT-II). General Election Commission. Recapitulation of the results of vote
counting for pairs of Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Valid votes. General Elections Commission, October 2004. (KPU: Rekapitulasi Hasil Perhitungan Suara untuk pasangan
calon presiden dan wakil presiden, Suara Sah, 2004; KPU Oktober 2004).
Notes:
a)
During the 1999 Legislative elections 48 political parties vied for seats.
b)
In the July 2004 presidential elections there were 2,156,814 valid votes in NTT.
c)
Because in the July 2004 presidential election no party achieved a majority, a run-off was held in September 2004.
d)
Representing the political parties as presidential and vice presidential candidates were, respectively: for Golkar, Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid; for PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri and
Hasyim Muzadi; for the Demoractic Party, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla: for PPP, Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar; for PAN, Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo.
e)
Other parties include PKPI, PPDI, Partai Pelopor and PDS.
September 2004 Run-off c)
• Male camp residents, Atambua
July 2004 Presidential Election b)
1 group discussion
Others e)
• Female camp residents, Atambua
PAN
2 interviews
PPP
Camp residents
• Camp coordinators, Atambua (2 camps)
April 2004 Legislative Elections
6.
Institution
1999 Legislative Elections a)
Election
5.
Annex 2
NTT Election Results, 1999 and 2004
by number of Votes, Percentage of Electors and Seats Won
No.
67
1
27
701
Total
Source: Pengolahan Data Elektronik Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2003
7
590
120
1,019
1,504
1,444
37,494
1
47
57
152
-
3
7
6
83
95
16
4
55
77
2
Ngada
Manggarai
26
1
4
106
24
3
6
347
29
51
1
Ende
1
44
42
3
6
43
5
99
-
138
1
3
174
11
89
1
East Flores
Flores
Sikka
2
91
45
370
6
3
Alor
Alor
18
2
30
64
157
32
60
1
Kupang Municipality
2,097
2
7
42
12
62
12
53
1
Belu
2,938
2
5
36
15
34
30
North Central Timor
36
3
28
25
1
30
441
548
353
141
16
8
-
9
18
-
South Central Timor
Kupang
Timor
4,762
10
19,682
3
4
13
3,124
4,573
136
122
146
282
7
44
11
6
40
1
Penadita
Ulamas
Preachers
Nuns
Brothers
Priests
Catholic
Bishops
East Sumba
West Sumba
Sumba
Hindu
Islam
Sunday
school
Teachers
Protestant
Bible
Teachers
District/
Municipality
Region
Religion
Annex 3
Data on Religious Functionaries in NTT (2002)
68
Acronyms and Abbreviations
BAPPEDA Regional Development Planning Board
BAPPENAS National Development Planning Board
BAKORNAS-PBP
National Coordinating Board for the Management of
Disaster and IDPs/Refugees
BPS
Central Statistics Bureau
CIS
Centre for Internally Displaced People Service
CSO
Civil society organization
DPR
People’s Representative Council
DPRD Regional People’s Representative Council
DPRD I
Provincial People’s Representative Council
DPRD II
District/Municipal People’s Representative Council
GEM
Gender Empowerment Measure
GOLKAR
Functional Group
HANSIP
Civilian Defence Force
HDI
Human Development Index
HPI
Human Poverty Index
JRS
Jesuit Refugee Service
INSIST
Indonesian Society for Social Transformation
KAMRA
People’s Security Force
KIMPRAS-WIL Regional Settlement and Infrastructure
KPU
General Election Commission
MPR
People’s Consultative Assembly
NGO
Non-government organization
NTT
East Nusa Tenggara
PAN
National Mandate Party
PDI-P
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PEMDA
Regional Government
PNS
Civil Service
PODES
Village Potential
Poliandes
Field Health Post
69
Posyandu
Integrated Health Service
Puskesmas
Primary Health Centre
Pustu
Primary Health Unit
RATIH
Trained Populace
RDTL
Democratic Republic of Timor Leste
REPELITA Five-Year Development Plan
SATKOR-LAK PBP
Provincial Coordinating Unit for the Management of
Disaster and IDPs/Refugees
SATLAK PBP
District Executing Unit for the Management of Disaster and
IDPs/Refugees
TNI
Indonesian National Army
UN
United Nations
UN ECOSOC
United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR
United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees
UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOHCA
United Nations Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian
Affairs
UNSECOORD United Nations Security Coordinator
UNSFIR
United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery
UNTAET
United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor
UNTAS
Uni Timor Aswain, Union of Timorese Heroes
WANRA
People’s Resistance
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