Case Analysis of the Cullman and Dekalb County, Alabama

Transcription

Running head: CULLMAN AND DEKALB COUNTIES TORNADO RESPONSE
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AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
Charles Town, West Virginia
Case Analysis of the Cullman and DeKalb Counties Tornado Response
A case analysis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In
EMERGENCY AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT
By
Guy A. (Trey) Cain III
Department Approval Date
November 20, 2011
The author hereby grants the American Public University System and American Military
University the right to display these contents for educational purposes.
The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States
Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author‟s creation or in the
public domain.
CULLMAN AND DEKALB COUNTIES TORNADO RESPONSE
© 2011 Guy A. (Trey) Cain III
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CASE ANALYSIS
OF
By
Guy A. (Trey) Cain III
American Public University System, November 20, 2011
Charles Town, West Virginia
Professor James Smith, Advising Professor
On April 27, 2011 a series of storms moved through the southern United States from Mississippi
across to North Carolina. The storms generated a series of tornadoes that heavily damaged these
states throughout various areas. The responses in two counties in Alabama, Cullman and DeKalb
were compared with the ideal situations espoused by the National Response Framework and the
National Incident Management System to determine the effectiveness of the emergency
management responses. Each county experienced multiple tornadoes and the emergency
responses were complicated by such events as complete power failure in the northern part of the
state of Alabama. Successful aspects and aspects where improvement is warranted based on the
National Response Framework and National Incident Management System guidelines are
identified.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................3
Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………………………4
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..6
What Happened....................................................................................................................8
Cullman, AL………………………………………………………………………………9
Hanceville, AL……………………………………………………………………….......11
DeKalb County…………………………………………………………………………..12
Literature Review……………………………………..…………………………………………………...13
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………………….19
Research Questions for Analysis...………………………………………………………19
Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………..20
Participants…………….…………………………………………………………………21
Data Collection Methods...………………………………………………………………21
Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………..24
Early Warning Systems………………………………………………………………..…25
Communication Issues……………………………………………………………….…..27
Power Infrastructure Damage……………………………………………………………30
Response Complications ...………………………………………………………………32
NIMS…………………………………………………………………………………………….33
Overview (The Ideal)…………………………………………………………………….34
NIMS and Cullman………………………………………………………………………37
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NIMS and DeKalb……………………………………………………………………….39
Recommendations………………………………………………………………………………..41
Early Warning System Change Considerations....…………………………………….…41
Communication Mitigation………………………………………………………………43
Power Systems Mitigation……………………………………………………………….44
Response Complications and Debris Removal Improvements…..………………………46
Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………47
References……………………………………………………………………………………..…49
Appendices……………………………………………………………………………………….54
Appendix I Figures and Photos…………………………………………………………..54
Appendix II Tables………………………………………………………………………54
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Introduction
On April 27, 2011 a series of storms moved through the southern United States from
Mississippi to North Carolina. The storms generated a series of tornadoes that heavily damaged
these states throughout various areas. The total magnitude was unexpected in its damage extent
and unmatched since the 1970‟s (The Christian Science Monitor, 2011). In Alabama, areas like
Tuscaloosa, Jefferson, St. Clair, Cullman, DeKalb and Calhoun Counties all suffered major
damage and in some cases heavy loss of life from these storms. In Cullman County two lives
were lost to tornadoes of various strengths while in DeKalb County 35 individuals lost their lives
in the tornadoes which included at least one at the top of the Enhanced-Fujita Scale. Figure 1
shows the paths taken by the tornadoes through not only through these counties but also the other
tornado paths that ravaged Alabama as charted by the DeKalb County Emergency Management
Agency (DeKalb EMA) and the Alabama Emergency Management Agency(AEMA). (Lester,
Emergency Planner, 2011)
Figure 1 Map Showing Tornado Paths (Received from DeKalb County EMA)
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This case analysis focuses only on the two counties of Cullman and DeKalb, Alabama.
The goal of this analysis is to show how the responses of these two counties measure up against
the ideals set forth by the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (FEMA, 2008) and The
National Response Framework (NRF) (Homeland Security, 2008). The idea is to see what of the
existing response and mitigation plans of these two counties worked to expectations and what
improvements can be made after a disaster of the magnitude of those tornadoes on April 27,
2011. Emergency Response Systems (ERS) and Emergency Response Plans (ERP) have been in
place since being advocated by various Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD's).
These existing plans were challenged by these tornadic events to an extent that was unknown at
the time of their making. Infrastructure and power damage levels were beyond scopes known in
prior emergencies. Cullman County authorities faced increased damage levels due to the seven
different tornadoes known to have touched down there. This author was part of the Emergency
Medical Services (EMS) response system for Cullman County. In DeKalb County, which is two
counties east of Cullman County another set of responses occurred for the four tornadoes there.
In both counties the loss of life and heavy damage tolls strained existing response plans and
management systems. Each of these counties handled the operations required of it differently and
each county saw its own set of challenges for their response agencies and system. The following
is an analysis of how the two counties emergency management response agencies met the task
presented by the destructive events of April 27, 2011.
Current Federal standards will be the yardstick against which these counties are
measured. A final analysis is impossible at this time as data are still being collected, after-action
reports generated and meetings being held to see what can be done in the future for these events.
Mitigation steps are starting and recovery still continues for those affected. Through this analysis
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it is hoped that some of the major event issues are captured and compared for quality
improvement and analysis.
What Happened?
What happened in the counties of Cullman and DeKalb? How did some of the local
municipalities fare in these events? One needs a background of not only the days‟ events but a
little background about the counties themselves. In order to make it a little easier to understand
the information has been broken down into sections for what follows in answer to these
questions.
On April 27, 2011 the state of Alabama was hit with a series of storm lines that generated
numerous tornadoes. In the book Day of Devastation (which was a group effort by several
Alabama newspapers including the Huntsville Times and Birmingham News to raise funds for
victims) it was noted by Bob Ludwig, President and Publisher of the Huntsville Times that “It
was the worst natural disaster in our history, a day when 50 tornadoes hit Alabama taking the
precious lives of 230 Alabamians.” (The Huntsville Times, The Birmingham News, PressRegister, 2011, p. 6) It further notes that “Not since 1925 has the loss of life been so great in a
single day by tornadoes in the United States.” (The Huntsville Times, The Birmingham News,
Press-Register, 2011, p. 8) These tornadoes generally followed tracks from southwest to
northeast and an outbreak of this magnitude had not been seen since the 1920‟s. Figure 1 (found
on page 5) denotes the tracking of all of the storms through the DeKalb Emergency Management
Agency (DeKalb EMA) and Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA). The sheer
magnitude of the tornado events was overwhelming to all of the counties affected and has caused
a great deal of revamping of existing emergency operations plans (EOP‟s). During the initial
days after the events a great deal of rescue and recovery activity was ongoing along with an
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accumulation of damage information and a restructuring of response systems as needed. To
describe the events that affected Alabama one needs to follow the reports as events were
occurring on the first day.
Cullman, Alabama
This city area is the county seat and largest municipality in Cullman County, AL.
Cullman County is 738 square miles with a population of 80, 406. (Encyclopedia of Alabama Cullman County, 2011) The city houses a paid fire department with two stations along with the
offices for the county sheriff‟s department, the Emergency Management Agency, Cullman Police
Department, the barracks for the State Highway Patrol, and the county ambulance service,
Cullman Emergency Medical Services. A good stretch of Interstate 65 (19 miles) runs through
the west side of the city. The county court house sits off Highway 31 near the center of the city
and near the historic districts of downtown. The courthouse is a three-story building with a
marble façade and dual roofs. It is also the point at which the tornado that struck the city fully
touched down for extended time in the afternoon of April 27, 2011. The ambulance service
office and operations were located right across the street and were damaged by wind from the
tornado as it touched down (see Figure 2 following). Areas surrounding the building were older
red brick buildings of the type seen in many southern towns with shops and local businesses
inside them. While there was damage leading up to this point the actual touchdown occurred
here. The damage path then proceeded from southwest to northeast striking various residential
communities and creating a major damage path (see Figure 3 following) that closed down a
major east-west highway artery Highway 278 through the state. The time was 2:43 p.m. in the
afternoon. There were two deaths in Cullman County, a 20 year old that was killed by a falling
tree on his vehicle and a 68 year old man in the east part of the county caught outside. (The
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Huntsville Times, The Birmingham News, Press-Register, 2011, p. 93) A total of seven different
tornadoes passed through Cullman County. In analysis the tornado that struck the city of
Cullman was designated an EF-4 with winds of 190mph. The damage path was a half-mile wide
and forty-seven miles long. The tornado started in the Grandview area and continued across the
county through Cullman County and Marshall County. The damage included businesses,
churches, homes, trees, and included two fatalities. (The Huntsville Times, The Birmingham
News, Press-Register, 2011, p. 125) The destruction levels included several old buildings that
were taken completely to the ground by the tornado‟s winds. In addition, the hospital in Cullman
suffered near miss damage to a hospital office building. County damage included various
municipalities such as Hanceville, AL along with isolated residences, mobile homes and forest
land.
Figure 2 (Cullman EMS Base Damage)
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Figure 3 (Highway 278 Damage Path)
Hanceville, Alabama
Hanceville, AL is a small city in the southern part of Cullman County, Alabama and was
one of the first municipalities in the county to be hit by the series of tornadoes that ravaged the
county of Cullman on April 27, 2011. Hanceville is home to Wallace State Community College.
The area suffered heavy damage especially in the Stouts Mountain region west of Highway 31.
There was also damage closer to the city. Parts of Wallace State were damaged along with
surrounding neighborhoods and power was lost to the area around 0600 hours on April 27, 2011.
Local responders were quick to act but damage was extensive. The Hanceville Nursing Home
suffered a near miss by the tornado and fortunately suffered little damage to the facility but a
residence across the street from the nursing home had heavy damage and major tree falls. This
particular aspect of the day shows the possibilities of heavy loss of life that were not incurred by
sheer fortune and happenstance. This area was just south of the college itself and it appears the
path of the tornado went from southwest to northeast glancing the college and missing the
nursing home. Any deviations would have presented a possibility for greater loss of life and
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higher property damage. The fact that major tree damage and other property damages occurred at
an early hour also helps to account for low fatality rates in the area. Adjacent communities were
also damaged in this same tornado including the area of Johnson Crossing.
Johnson Crossing Volunteer Fire Department suffered damage to the fire station by tree
fall which not only damaged the station but also blocked the use of the fire equipment trapped
inside the damaged building. (Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2011, p. 5) This
was a significant loss of resources for the community in the initial hours of the events.
Fortunately, no fire department personnel were housed in the station and no loss of life or injury
occurred as a result of this particular event. The loss of resources would be felt later.
The overall analysis of this tornado was a designation as an EF-2 with winds of 120 mph.
The damage path was a half mile wide with a damage path of twenty-six miles. Damage included
that already noted as well as eight power poles bent to the ground near the Wallace State campus.
In addition, numerous residences were damaged by winds and tree fall. (The Huntsville Times,
The Birmingham News, Press-Register, 2011, p. 125)
DeKalb County, Alabama
This county, that covers 778 square miles and boasts a population of 71, 109 citizens, was
struck by four different tornadoes. (Encyclopedia of Alabama - Dekalb County, 2011) The four
tornadoes consisted of two EF-2 tornadoes and two EF-4 tornadoes that hit in various parts of the
county. The time of impact was approximately 6:19 p.m. on April 27, 2011. A total of 33 deaths
(revised to 35 according to DeKalb EMA (Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011) ) were recorded in
these tornadoes. One of these tornadoes, the EF-4 with winds of 175mph that had a damage path
of 33 miles and three quarters of a mile wide was the tornado that struck Rainsville, Alabama. It
was later upgraded to an EF-5 with winds over 200 mph. (Murray, 2011) The path started at the
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Lakeview community and passed through Fyffe, Rainsville and Sylvania with heavy damage in
the last two communities including residential and business damage as well as tree fall. (The
Huntsville Times, The Birmingham News, Press-Register, 2011, p. 125) The Flat Rock
community was also struck by an EF-4 with winds of 190mph with a damage path a mile wide
and 28 miles long. This particular tornado killed around eleven people in various communities
that it struck. The other two EF-2 tornadoes hit various areas of the county damaging farm
buildings and residences. (The Huntsville Times, The Birmingham News, Press-Register, 2011,
p. 122) Search and Rescue (SAR) operations carried on for four to five days due to inability of
loved ones to reach certain individuals within the county according to DeKalb EMA and these
people were considered missing until information was obtained to note otherwise. (Lester,
Emergency Planner, 2011)
Literature Review
As part of the case study for the tornado response for Cullman and DeKalb Counties in
Central and Northeast Alabama there are several items that were analyzed to gain a clearer
overview of the response mechanisms in place, how they functioned during the events of April
27, 2011 and the time following. Some of these questions include:
1. What happened? What were the actual events?
2. What were the Emergency Responses for each like?
3. What was learned from each event in the forms of Emergency Management?
4. What mitigation events have taken place?
Reviews of the available literature help us to determine the answers to these questions and place
us on the right track through our study of these events to better prepare for the possible future
recurrences of a similar magnitude and apogee.
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The history and science of tornadoes provides a background for the events of April 27,
2011 in the Southeast. A tornado is described as “…a dagger from the clouds…” and that
“…These twisting storm columns can reach wind speeds of 318 mph (512 kph) and measure
miles across, scarring the Earth and decimating homes and buildings in the process…” (Lamb,
2011). The science of these vortices and the power they are capable of generating can be found
readily on the websites such as this one that Lamb writes on called science.howstuffworks.com.
Tornado research is an ongoing thing and is far from an exact science. The information is always
changing and under revision. In fact after decades of research it has been noted that “…tornado
watches are more accurate, and it's easier for meteorologists to predict where tornado
touchdowns are most likely, but only by a little. Meteorologists still can't effectively measure or
model the conditions that immediately precede a tornado. Nor are they sure those conditions
exist very long before a tornado forms…” (Bjoran, 2011). This article by Bjoran illustrates a
frustration of the scientific community in regards to how to predict accurately where a tornado is
going to appear. It also illustrates the difficulty the emergency management operations face
every day in regards to weather emergencies. Articles such as Bjoran‟s serve as background
framing the events of the tornadoes on April 27, 2011 in the Alabama counties. Historically
speaking, these tornadoes were ranked among the deadliest in history. The Christian Science
Monitor noted on April 30, 2011 that “The king of a series of massive long-track tornadoes that
clobbered the South this week may have traveled in excess of 220 miles
across Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, carrying wind speeds in excess of 200 miles per hour,
all of which could make it the most powerful tornado ever recorded in the US.” (The Christian
Science Monitor, 2011) The same article noted the long track history of these tornadoes which in
and of itself shows the unusual long life span and sheer numbers of these tornadoes in that
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“…Some 211 tornadoes were reported within a few hours' span on Wednesday, including a
series of so-called long-track twisters that raked across six states…” and “…If the estimated
number of tornadoes – 211 – holds fast, it would far outpace the previous modern record: the 148
confirmed tornadoes spawned during the "Super Tornado Outbreak" of 1974, which killed 308
people across the US and Canada.” (The Christian Science Monitor, 2011) These articles notate
the sheer magnitude of disaster along with the inabilities of accurate or ideal tornado predictions.
Yet, this research will compare the responses of Cullman County and DeKalb County along with
the partner agencies using the ideal guidelines shown in the National Response Framework
(NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to see how the responses fared.
The National Response Framework is designed around the “all-hazards approach” to
emergency management. In point of this fact, the summary of the NRF reads “The National
Response Framework presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare
for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies – from the smallest
incident to the largest catastrophe. The Framework establishes a comprehensive, national, allhazards approach to domestic incident response.” (Homeland Security, 2008) The NRF
incorporates NIMS principles and guidelines to complete its mission. In the Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQ‟s) portion of the NRF website there is an explanation of this principle that
states, “the NRF employs the NIMS standardized structures and tools that enable a unified
approach to be effective both on scene and at the emergency operations centers (EOC‟s).”
(Homeland Security (NRF/FAQ), 2008) These guidelines govern the mainline emergency
responses of the Cullman and DeKalb EMA operations as well as their partner agencies. This
information is the baseline to the analysis of the responses. Relevant detail of specific
Framework aspects will be revealed in later discussion. The NIMS principles are based around
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the old Incident Command Systems (ICS) used in California during the 1970‟s and 1980‟s to
fight wildfires. These principles allow for expanding command structures and organizations in
responses that are more adaptable to the changes of emergencies. In point of fact:
NIMS is based on the premise that utilization of a common incident management
framework will give emergency management/response personnel a flexible but
standardized system for emergency management and incident response activities.
NIMS is flexible because the system components can be utilized to develop plans,
processes, procedures, agreements, and roles for all types of incidents; it is
applicable to any incident regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity.
Additionally, NIMS provides an organized set of standardized operational
structures, which is critical in allowing disparate organizations and agencies to
work together in a predictable, coordinated manner. (FEMA, 2008)
These standards for response will serve as standards of comparison and the guides for what
responses occur within the research.
The overview of the events, science and standards of operation set the stage for the
foundation of the case analysis of Emergency Management (EM) and Emergency Response
Operations (ERO). The overview was gleaned from the myriad reports through various media
outlets and some interviews of responding personnel. In this case, the author had some personal
insight to emergency operations the day after the event. News reports from news websites were
in abundance for those needing a summary of what occurred and a general timeline of the events
of those days in April. The websites such as “al.com” have numerous articles, including one by
Kent Faulk, regarding the statewide devastation wrought by the multiple tornadic vortices
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throughout these counties. In DeKalb County, the death toll and one tornado path was described
as “…The tornado carved a path northeast at least 25 miles long from Grove Oak to Ider,
injuring an estimated 200 ...” and a death toll of “…at least 32…” (Faulk, 2011) The same
website gave insight to the Cullman County tornadoes as well in an article by Greg Richter of the
Birmingham News, in discussing the amount of the damage it was noted that “…The Cullman
County courthouse is missing half its roof and the railroad tracks behind the county courthouse
are blocked by storm debris.” (Richter, 2011) These little dices of information from media sites
were building blocks of an overall picture and served as a starting point for setting the depiction
of events of that April day. One can note from just these two instances of information the general
magnitude of events and a glimpse of the infrastructure issues that were evident after the events.
When dealing with the media articles one must look over the data presented in the existing
format of time and date. The researcher must glean from these articles the pertinent information
by comparison with other existing information that comes apparent in later articles. One must
gather what information is there with time providing the truth of the evidence in the articles
utilized. One can also use that same disbursement of information that may or may not be truth of
the time to set the reasoning for actions in a response setting. A so-called “fog of war” may be
active in events.
Video and photo reports are also available online through “YouTube” and news site
sources such as “Fox10tv.com.” Watching the actual events unfold brought a new perspective to
the research involved as reviews of the videos themselves gave a new dimension to the events.
Items that were noted in video reviews include the traffic flows during events, placement of the
damage paths of the tornadoes and perspectives of response agencies to the events. These images
also notated the levels of damage in infrastructure, property, and lives. A solid example that is
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available is a personal video by Chris Lancaster of one of the tornado touchdowns in Cullman
County as shown on YouTube.com. This was the tornado that damaged most of downtown
Cullman, Alabama. In the video, multiple vortices are seen with one large touchdown. The
skipping path can also be noted in the video as well as it crosses a major north-south interstate
with high traffic flow (Lancaster, 2011). The damage to the Cullman Emergency Medical
Services is seen in a video by ABC 33/40 TV that shows a great deal of the damage down town.
Specifically at time 4:57 the building is clearly shown to be heavily damaged and
communication facilities from it destroyed. A transmission tower near the EMS building is
shown in this same video at time 3:49 and the damage is catastrophic including twisting and
collapse (ABC33/40 TV, 2011). Situations such as these shown in this particular video show the
initial stages of infrastructure loss that affected responses. These videos also show some of the
mitigation and cleanup efforts similar to the ones shown in a YouTube video by user
RachelBlondie1. The video shows during the first twenty seconds some of the original damage
and goes on to show that many cleanup efforts had barely been started forty-five days posttornado including trees still down on homes, brick piles sorted but not removed, trees placed on
curb but not removed, etc. (RachelBlondie1, 2011). Further points of this will be discussed in the
Discussion/Recommendation portions in regards to the debris removal sections of the NRF.
Video analysis adds a different dimension to research in its stark truths and imagery that allows a
researcher to see firsthand what one may not have experienced directly.
The Emergency Response information had to be gleaned from direct interviews of
sources like the directors of the emergency management agencies in both of these counties. In
one case, the Cullman County EMA Director, Phyllis Little had testified to the Subcommittee in
the House of Representatives (Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2011). The
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information contained in this is a summary overview of some of the response and mitigation
practices during and after these events. An example of the infrastructure damage is noted by the
power loss over five to seven days by Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and also the inability
of businesses to operate due to power losses. Citizens lost access to basic purchasing needs
(Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2011, pp. 3-4). Testimony such as Director
Little‟s allows an insight into the emergency operations without doing a direct interview.
However, a direct interview with the directors and other responders give firsthand information to
the thought process used by emergency managers during chaotic events like the Cullman and
DeKalb County tornadoes. Interview information was obtained from several agencies including
Hanceville Fire Department and DeKalb EMA. This information gives clear answers to what
occurred in the areas. Protection of client interview information was available but all interviews
have allowed publication of the information given. Further research and sources will be
necessary once more information is available and a more comprehensive after action and
mitigation plan analysis is available but due to time constraints that will be done beyond the
scope of this analysis.
Hypothesis
Hypothesis: Thorough review and analysis of any major disaster event brings to light new best
practices through a review of the disaster response aspects that succeed and fail.
Research Questions for Analysis
Question #1: Were the EMA operations handled in a proactive or reactive manner?
Question #2: Were response agencies trained for the level of mass casualty operations
presented by the events of April 27, 2011?
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Question #3: Were Infrastructure damage levels presented by the events were ever
considered in drills and exercises and did this cause a degraded response?
Question #4: Were communication systems resilient enough to handle the events?
Question #5: Would significant upgrades in response systems help prevent or minimize
recurrence of response issues?
Methodology
The mixed methodology needed for the analysis of the events in Cullman and DeKalb
County, Alabama during the tornadoes of April 27, 2011 required interaction with several
participants of those events. (Cresswell, 1999, pp.13-14) The information appears primarily in
qualitative form for analysis purposes but certain statistical information like deaths, costs,
response agency numbers and the like cannot be ignored. Interviews with some key personnel
were delayed due to access and regulatory issues that were involved in the research. In some
cases, access was lost due to personnel turnover or career changes. Those officials who did
supply information were of great assistance and revealed some interesting informational aspects
to the tornado responses within Cullman and DeKalb Counties. In addition, as part of the
preparation for a career in Emergency Management, the completion of the FEMA courses for
Intermediate and Command staff training (ICS300/400) allowed interaction with the individuals
of DeKalb County who responded to the tornadoes. The examples used in the class showed a
very clear picture of how reaction to events in real life compare to the ideal situations used by the
standards of NIMS and the NRF. The courses laid out how to respond to a complex emergency
like the tornadoes and the real life comparisons were enlightening and clarifying in the true
needs of emergency management.
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Participants
The primary interview groups were members of response agencies and emergency
management personnel from both Cullman County, Alabama and DeKalb County, Alabama.
Primary contacts were head of agencies. In Cullman County, for example, interviewees were:
1. Allan Bolling
Chief, Hanceville Fire Department
2. Phyllis Little
Director, Cullman County EMA
In DeKalb County the interviewees were:
1. Anthony Clifton Director, DeKalb County EMA
2. Darryl Lester
Planner, DeKalb County EMA; FEMA instructor for ICS300/400
3. Christy Hardin
Deputy Director, DeKalb County EMA retired
These participants shed light on the actual response operations of that day through a series of
questions listed below in the Data Collections Methods section. Interviews were conducted with
some agency heads and some chose to respond to the questions in written form. Interviews with
these individuals gave clearer picture to the response problems due to infrastructure damage and
physical damage. The decision process used by these individuals and their agencies during these
events became clearer.
Data Collection Methods
One had to make sure that at no time during interviews and data gathering that the
information found would be considered a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) or other ethical standards. HIPAA protects personal information of a
patient or individual from being utilized or obtained with expressed written consent of the
individual or if it is related to the care of an individual in the event of a medical emergency. All
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interviews had a preset question form outline and notes were taken or supplied in written form by
the interviewees if time availability was a consideration. The questions included:
1.
Were there any major issues that complicated your response operations? If so,
what were they?
2.
Was mutual aid involved in your operations and how were they involved?
3.
Were there any additional response problems or issues that came to light from
these events?
4.
Did these issues hamper your response to a level that was significant and how so?
5.
Had there been exercises of similar events to this one that helped you prepare?
6.
Did the Early Warning Systems function as planned?
7.
Do you feel your agency was prepared for the magnitude of the disaster that
occurred? What would you do differently now that you have been through this
event?
8.
Were there any response agencies that were unavailable due to damage to their
response equipment or facilities?
9.
Were there any casualties? If so, were they confined to a singular area or
disbursed throughout the county? How long were search and rescue operation
conducted?
10.
From a communication standpoint, how do you feel the interaction between the
agencies and EMA fared? What suggestions or improvements would you note in
manifested issues?
11.
Did the EOC operations go as planned and how were agencies represented at the
EOC?
12.
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How bad were road conditions and how long before they were cleared for
operations?
13.
How long before key infrastructure facilities and operations were back in place
after the event? For example, power, water, gas, road openings.
14.
Is there any further comments or information that would be of use to research that
could be shared?
Some questions were not utilized in certain agency interviews if they were focused
towards the emergency management agency responsibilities of the area and not the response
agency itself. A release form was obtained allowing use of the information gathered during the
interviews. During these interviews, it was hoped that information regarding comprehensive after
action reviews and their contents would become more available. In most cases this information
was still being developed and collated showing that the extent of these disasters were taxing on
systems and causing delays in gathering of pertinent information. Existing datasets of
photographs taken during and after the events are being used for graphic purposes to show
damage extents and mitigation operations with no identifiable individuals in them. Videos that
were currently in existence were also being utilized for data analysis of the tornado numbers,
types, and damage paths. Links to these are available in the reference lists for research analysis
comparisons. The goal of this case analysis has been to compare the operations of both Cullman
and DeKalb County against the ideals set forth in both the National Response Framework (NRF)
and its component processes such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). In this
comparison the best practices found can be taken in a lessons learned format and the practices
that do not measure up to the standards can be reviewed and analyzed for improvement in similar
events.
24
Other data research was obtained through literature and information available in libraries
and the Internet. Videos, eyewitness testimony and testimony to government bodies were
available on the web. Reviewing these existing data sets allowed an overview of the events
surrounding the tornadoes on April 27, 2011. The overall analysis of the existing data sets was to
determine event scope and magnitude through various media sources along with any information
pertinent to the research such as mitigation grant funding that may have been announced in the
days since the original event.
Once all data were in place a more comprehensive picture for analysis appeared and a
comparison to the ideals set forth in the NRF and NIMS was possible. Some interview
information was not obtainable or obtainable in a timely manner due to regulatory issues or lack
of data to this point. Preparation of a backup contingency for alternate sources of that
information was necessary. Use of media coverage and a fundraising book recapping the events
of that day throughout Alabama gave information that was useful. Mitigation plans for the
counties were available online as well to measure against the ideal settings of the NRF and
NIMS. Information had to be verified and cross checked with other sources. Information
collection was the key to setting up the analysis methods for the qualitative data and the
quantitative data.
Discussion
Before delving into the NIMS aspects of discussion, it is good to know what was facing
the county response agencies on April 27, 2011. There were several issues of note including the
functioning of early warning systems, communication issues, response complication with debris,
and power infrastructure damage. These issues are items found to be of note in many disasters
25
and even many practiced agencies have found themselves faced with aspects of these response
needs. The conditions that these aspects added to the overall disaster affected some decisions
related to how NIMS operated within the communities affected. A little later mitigation of these
issues will be discussed.
Early Warning Systems
The siren operations of the communities affected worked well according to the EMA and
local officials within the counties. The siren systems served as the early warning systems
hearkening back to the days of civil defense. The systems themselves, however, suffered damage
in the storms. In Hanceville, Alabama the sirens worked during the initial morning tornadoes but
not as successfully during the later hours of the day due to damage. Fire officials noted that two
sirens were damaged in the initial event. The sirens that were located near the college and near
downtown were damaged and nonfunctional in later hours. These sirens also gave little lead time
of warning to the populace when the initial tornadoes hit according to these same officials.
(Bolling, 2011) The systems are built on a design by which they are triggered from the
Emergency Operations Centers of the Emergency Management Agencies in the affected
counties. This means that the sirens had to be triggered by someone in the EOC itself and not
remotely by computer. Each siren carries a separate “address” for triggering in either singular or
group settings. Newer systems are being designed and placed on order for these counties to
replace the older systems according to EMA officials that were spoken with. These systems will
also tie in with the National Weather Service warning systems as well. (Clifton, 2011)
In addition to the outdoor warning sirens, many individuals received their warnings from
weather forecasters on media outlets like television and radio. One of the most notable of these is
26
James Spann, who works with the ABC 33/40 station in Birmingham, Alabama. The fact that
many were able to watch during the initial events may have helped mitigate later injury. Areas
that lost power during the storms did not have access to the television coverage though. At that
point they were forced to rely on NOAA weather radios or radio affiliates if they still had battery
operated sets. Spann has a definite opinion about the use of weather sirens versus the radios or
other technology. This excerpt from his blog makes his point quite well:
This is what is going to kill more Alabamians than anything else in future tornado
outbreaks. For some reason, it seems like people in our state are born with the
notion that you should hear an outdoor warning siren before every tornado. After
almost any severe weather event, our folks in the newsroom will interview
somebody that says „I never heard the siren‟ before the tornado arrived. The
national media, generally based in New York or the West Coast, typically are
clueless about the warning process and love these sound bites.
Quite frankly, if it was up to me, all of the outdoor warning sirens were be taken
down and put out of service. That way, you KNOW you will never hear one.
The truth is that sirens are horribly ineffective at reaching people inside a
building, whether it be a home, office, church, or school. And, even their outdoor
range is very limited.
Sirens were a product of the Cold War, when we had the threat of a nuclear attack
from the Soviet Union, or Cuba. It was a great idea in 1955, but this is 2010, and
we have the technology to put these things to bed.
27
Yes, for now, the best solution is a NOAA Weather Radio. The new models are
digital, which means you can select the counties for which the alarm sounds.
Every Alabama home and business needs one.
But, we are rapidly moving into a time when technology will pass Weather Radio
by. You can get warnings on your phone (cell or home) with services
like WeatherCall, and apps are being developed that offer warnings on your
phone based on GPS location information.
The bottom line is this... never, and I mean never, rely on an outdoor warning
siren to let you know a tornado is coming. Have a working NOAA Weather Radio
receiver programmed properly in your home, and have WeatherCall or a similar
service active for your phone. Getting the warning does save lives during tornado
outbreaks, and it is time for the siren mentality to end. (Spann, 2011)
According to DeKalb EMA there were also multiple warnings leading up to the events.
There were many briefings by the National Weather Service over a two week period that was a
“buildup” leading to the actual storm events. The problem, as stated by EMA personnel was that
even though “…we knew it was coming, we knew it was going to be rough, we just didn‟t know
how rough or exactly where it would hit, and ultimately there was and still is no way of knowing
until it gets here…” (Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011)
Communications Issues
In Cullman County the communications towers were damaged by the tornadoes. Two of
the damaged towers are visible in the photos labeled Figure 4 and Figure 5 (following). The
tower outside of Cullman EMS is the primary communication tower for Emergency Medical
28
Services in Cullman County. It is also the backup tower for the county 911 service as well. With
its loss the damage to 911 services was immediately visible. While there was still some
communication ability it was severely limited. The loss of the other radio tower also damaged
the backup cellular capabilities. Services had to be dispatched out by portable radios with limited
range. The information would be radioed from the 911 service to the EMS temporary base at the
Cullman PD in order to dispatch an ambulance. All communications from that point were
through radios in ambulances or portables carried by EMS workers. Text messaging and cell
services were unreliable and delayed in transmission when functional at all. Supervisors at
Cullman PD maintained a constant communication with crews that had to maintain at Cullman
PD for the duration of the communications outages. Police, State Troopers and Fire Departments
were also dispatched in similar manners. Hanceville FD and Police had the benefit of a local
repeater tower that was functional but Hanceville Fire workers had to go and refill the tower
generator about every two hours during the daytime and overnight it would operate for up to 12
hours on battery backup. (Bolling, 2011)
Figure 4 (Cullman EMS Radio Tower Damage)
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Figure 5 (Radio/TV Tower Damage)
In DeKalb County a similar problem was being worked around in that tower repeaters
were down due to damage and power loss. G. Darryl Lester is the Fire Chief for Sylvania in
DeKalb County and also the Emergency Planner for DeKalb EMA. During the ICS-300 and ICS400 courses that Lester taught in September and October examples from the DeKalb operations
were used to layout emergency management examples from the tornadoes in DeKalb County. As
an example, one of the problems with communications was that the EOC was not utilized fully
until one to two days into the event due to the amount of damage and confusion from the events.
This limited radio communications to agency radios and mobile radios throughout the county
with the DeKalb Ambulance Service and various fire agencies like Ider and Sylvania. EOC
operations were placed into a secondary status due to the blind emphasis on Search and Rescue
during the first 48 hours. Chief Lester even admits that this not uncommon in the early hours of
disasters. (Lester, 2011) Life Safety is a primary function in NIMS and was the focus of those
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early event hours and days. Fire Departments throughout DeKalb County were involved in the
search and rescue efforts as the primary agencies. In addition, these same departments were also
assisting with debris removal to allow access to areas to complete search and rescue.
Power Infrastructure Damage
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) through various subsidiaries such as the Cullman
Electric Cooperative supplies power to most of northern Alabama. The Browns Ferry Nuclear
plant is the primary supply line to cities like Huntsville, Cullman and Ft. Payne Alabama. There
are also fossil fuel plants as well such as Widows Creek Fossil Fuel Plant in Jackson County,
Alabama. These plants lost distribution capability through tower damage and line loss caused by
the tornado that passed through the area. Two days after the tornado event it was noted by the
Chief Operating Officer of TVA, Bill McCollum that “… it could be weeks before can be
restored to all of the utility‟s 300,000 customers…” It was also noted that “…a number of large
industries that are wired directly to TVA transmission lines, will not have power until the lines
are repaired, McCollum said.” (Sohn, 2011) This damage was critical in the effects it had on
response agencies in affected areas along with place like hospitals and food distribution outlets.
How bad was the damage extent? A month after the event TVA authorities put out an update on
damage repairs that stated that approximately 353 power structures had been affected and that to
date all but fifty had been repaired or replaced. (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2011) This is
extensive damage to any power system. This loss of power distribution capability also caused a
shutdown of the power facilities at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. (Doyle, 2011)
The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant was shut down due to a loss of external power to the
facility causing the plant to go onto backup generators and to idle the reactors to keep the rods
from overheating. This plant produces 3400 Megawatts of power which equates out to about ten
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percent of TVA‟s power output. The plant went onto diesel generator backup which successfully
maintained the cooling on spent fuel rod pools and the reactor itself. Unlike the incident in Japan
at the Fukushima facility all of the backup operations remained intact and worked successfully.
(Sohn, 2011) The facility remained somewhat idle until a month later when the facility had only
one reactor of three left to bring back online. (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2011)
One of the biggest issues created by the power systems damage was supply of electricity
to area facilities like hospitals. This analysis uses Cullman Regional Medical Center as an
example for some of these issues that were common also in other Alabama hospitals without
power. Although hospitals are equipped with backup generators the fuel supplies are limited and
access to fuel supplies are critical. In most cases, these hospitals carry some agreements with
power companies for priority response in the event of power outages and emergencies. However,
with an entire state area and all of the primary carrying capacity damaged by the storms, TVA
was unable to get power back up in one or two days. Some of the issues that came about from
this are noted by officials at CRMC who supplied this author with a comprehensive report on the
daily activities of the hospital during the storm events. Some of the primary problems that were
caused by the power outage included:
1. Computer system overheating
2.
Lab equipment overheating
3.
Reduction in refrigeration capability of medical supplies and food storage
4.
Pharmaceutical access issues
5.
Dialysis operations reduced in the county that the hospital had to handle
6. Various system shutdowns with generator power capacity overload or failure
These problems continued throughout the first week while equipment was brought in to augment
power issues including one generator capable of handling the whole facility. During the first five
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days, even with the power issues, the hospital ER had to see over 800 patients and care for an
average of 95 patients within the hospital. These problems were overcome through various
means and the hospital continued to function well. (Cullman Regional Medical Center, 2011).
This example shows some of the items that are not generally considered during an emergency
such as computer system loss that have become a part of society or the susceptibility of
electronic equipment to the changes in environment. In addition, logistical issues such as picking
up the patient load from offsite facilities or transfer of patients with information that is generally
computerized and inaccessible in power outages become more daunting tasks.
Response Complications
Hanceville FD brought to light one of the key issues with any damage path area. Damage
paths require removal of debris for access to areas to perform not only search and rescue but also
aid with the ability of relief to flow into an area. If trees are down over highways then it is
impossible for relief efforts to continue. In addition to the relief efforts, medical and fire agencies
cannot access injured individuals. This set of storms caused a great deal of debris of natural and
man-made sources. Areas were isolated and inaccessible for various time periods. In Hanceville
the Stouts Mountain area which lies west of Highway 31. Despite being equipped to deal with
the tree cutting needs, the Hanceville FD had to wait on heavy equipment to be brought in on
later days in order to move some of the larger tree falls in the area. (Bolling, 2011) This same
debris became a factor later in that all of the debris had to be dealt with. Figure 2 shows the
damage path and debris on Highway 278 near Convent Road in Cullman. The debris paths and
magnitudes hampered responses in Cullman County. While discussing with various EMS
workers about the travails of this, this author was told on more than one occasion that debris had
blocked road access to patients for EMS causing ambulance equipment to be carried by EMS
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workers long distances to get to patients. Even the day after the initial event this author had
experience of the same type reaching some locations within Cullman County. The same
response issues were also relevant to DeKalb County. According to DeKalb EMA officials, the
response agencies were tasked with not only response but clearing of the roadways as well for
access. (Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011)
As has been noted in the situation with DeKalb County response, debris created a large
problem with the response efforts as well as the aid arriving to help the responders in DeKalb
County. Emergency Planner Darryl Lester stated that “…outside resources were slowed in their
response because they had to “cut” their way in…” (Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011) Also,
EMA staff noted that from an EOC standpoint many local agencies were not represented within
the EOC. Noting a long standing practice of “the way we‟ve always done it” and a lack of
willingness by some agencies to participate in the EOC operations that needs to be improved.
(Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011) It has been noted that there has been improvement on this
one problem now that the tornadoes have shown the fallacy of that particular attitude within the
area. It has been noted by DeKalb EMA staff in regards to the DeKalb response that “…we took
the hit, we got up and went to work to get it fixed and we‟re still working today… this disaster
gives us a very good benchmark of what can happen and shows us that the disasters of the past
weren‟t near as bad as they could have been.” (Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011) This statement
bring a clear understanding to all who work in emergency management about relying on past
practices and thinking along the lines of there is nothing worse than what has come before.
Emergency Managers are forced to rely on the teachings found in the NRF and NIMS and hope
the functions will fit the needs as those functions are designed to do.
NIMS
34
Overview (The Ideal)
The National Response Framework in conjunction with the National Incident
Management System sets forth the guidelines for responding to emergencies and allows for a
flexible framework of command that can expand and contract as necessary to handle any
incident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has established the system throughout
the United States and response agencies adopted this system as part of the daily operations. It is a
requirement that these agencies maintain this system as a function of their eligibility for Federal
funding through grants and other sources. This system was built on the old Incident Command
System founded in the 1970‟s to assist with the handling of wildfires throughout California.
Through series of trainings and exercises agencies strive to master a simple system that can grow
to be very complex if necessary. Most operational systems require a minimum of the following
trainings for emergency response agencies. The list of classes provided by FEMA includes a
series of independent study courses done online. These courses are:
1. IS100- Introduction to the Incident Command System. This course “provides the foundation
for higher level ICS training. This course describes the history, features and
principles, and organizational structure of the Incident Command System. It also
explains the relationship between ICS and the National Incident Management System
(NIMS).” (Emergency Management Institute, 2011)
2. IS200 – ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents. This course is “to enable
personnel to operate efficiently during an incident or event within the Incident
Command System (ICS). ICS-200 provides training on and resources for personnel
who are likely to assume a supervisory position within the ICS.” (Emergency
Management Institute, 2011)
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3. IS-700 – NIMS, an Introduction. This course “introduces and overviews the National
Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS provides a consistent nationwide
template to enable all government, private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations
to work together during domestic incidents.” (Emergency Management Institute,
2011)
4. IS-800 National Response Framework, an Introduction. This course “introduces
participants to the concepts and principles of the National Response Framework.”
(Emergency Management Institute, 2011)
In addition to these four courses there are two additional courses taught by affiliated faculty and
sites with the Emergency Management Institute such as the Center for Domestic Preparedness in
Anniston, Alabama. These courses are designed for higher level management of intermediate and
complex incidents. They are:
1. ICS-300 Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents
2. ICS-400 Command and General Staff – Complex Incidents
It is from these classes and texts that the layout of the ideal situation of command is generated
for this analysis. These courses are taught to those who will be capable of functioning in the
positions of higher command within an incident for a more clear understanding of the principles
of NIMS. It will be noted later though that there are cases where ideals cannot be reached and the
best that can be done is to stick as close to the framework as possible.
In a situation that is increasingly complex the system is expandable to handle the basic
principles of NIMS/ICS. Two of the basic ideas noted throughout NIMS are “unity of command”
and “span of control”. These are defined within the NIMS system as follows:
36
1. “Unity of Command” – “A principle of management stating that each individual involved in
incident operations will be assigned to only one supervisor.”
2. “Span of Control” – “The number of resources for which a supervisor is responsible, usually
expressed as the ratio of supervisors to individuals.” Under NIMS the minimum is 1:3 not to
exceed 1:7 with an ideal of 1:5 as ratios go. (FEMA ICS300, 2008, pp. G-13, G-16)
These principles define how the management of an incident progresses throughout its life. The
more complex an incident the larger the management system of it becomes to handle it. In
example, an incident that requires a large response may have a large number of management
staff ranging from Incident Commander, General Staff, Command Staff, Branch Directors, and
Individual Response Units managed by a host of supervisors and directors. The command
organizational chart can change with the needs to maintain unity of command and span of
control principles. Are these the only principles for NIMS and the NRF? No, but these are key to
the issues that were developed in DeKalb County and to the same extent in Cullman County.
While the general idea is to maintain a single incident commander in any event there may
be situations that require multiple incident commanders if a large enough area is affected or is so
geographically diverse that a multi-agency Area Command is set up and incidents broken up into
Unified incident commands. This situation is necessary to manage the level of incidents that can
occur when a large area is affected. Relying on these principles is the backbone of the National
Response Framework. To put this into a small real world example a small incident might be a car
fire on the interstate with a single fire engine responding with three people. The engine lieutenant
is the incident commander and the rest of the company handles the incident. A large example
would be an incident like Hurricane Katrina that involved multiple states, jurisdictions and
response agencies with multiple incident commanders and various command staffs and agencies.
FEMA stresses the use of various forms pre-developed for use in major events to aid with
37
command and control operations and recording of the events. These forms help to maintain
organization and are usable not only in emergencies but also preplanning of large scale events.
The forms system also allows for forwarding of Incident Action Plans to various shifts and
agencies in a timely and concise manner. In addition, consistently maintained paperwork is
necessary for recording the history and progress of any event and highly stressed for the
purposes it has been put forth such as asset management, monitoring and planning. This is a
great idea but sometimes falls short in actual practices due to a lack of access to the paperwork,
lack of understanding, or no way of creating copies due to things like power outages. For the
paperwork to be effective a lot of preplanning and staging must be completed to allow teams to
utilize it.
NIMS and Cullman
In the case of the Cullman tornadoes there was a unified command set up at the
Emergency Operations Center in Cullman County. The EOC was activated at 230 a.m. on April
27, 2011 according to the testimony of EMA Director Phyllis Little. (Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 2011, p. 4) There were multiple agency representatives there
including the Directors for EMS, PD, Fire, and Hanceville PD among others. (Bolling, 2011)
Each individual agency was working together to make decisions on the events as they occurred
throughout the event. In the case of EMS, information would flow to supervisors in another area
at Cullman PD from the EOC through the Director at EMS by portable radio. This did cause a
delay and some confusion occasionally between agency representatives. The reliability and
quality of communications sometimes caused errors. In addition, the EOC was often not up to
date on current status of equipment for plans that were in play. For example, ambulances would
go out on calls from the 911 center which was separate from the EOC as would fire apparatus.
38
The whole setup for the county was in three areas. The 911 dispatch center was at the Sheriff‟s
Office in the county jail. The EOC was two blocks down from that location. The Cullman Police
Department which was the rally point for ambulances and law enforcement was on the north end
of the city. The fact that the EOC was operating helped out with response communications with
other agencies but the spread of commands in the local area could have been seen as unnecessary
if facilities were capable of serving the multiple roles a little better. By this, it means that if the
EOC were large enough and hardened enough a central location for all command functions
would be more flexible with optional fall back agency distribution such as was seen in the
Cullman incident.
Of note in the Cullman responses is the situation in Hanceville, Alabama. Early in the
morning after the tornado had struck two urban search and rescue teams (USAR) arrived from
Madison, Alabama and Hoover, Alabama. These teams arrived to help with the search and
rescue of entrapped victims in residences in the Hanceville area. According to Hanceville Fire
officials the teams were effective in searching the urban regions but refused to take on the task in
rural areas. According to the fire officials they preferred to stick with what the teams had trained
for as an urban environment which meant that local fire officials had to handle areas of the
county near Hanceville. In addition these teams were not equipped for road clearing like the local
fire department was as part of the usual tasks the fire departments faced in Cullman County. The
training for Hanceville Fire Department had also been in relation to this type of event due to
prior windstorm activity in previous years. According to the fire officials the Hanceville Fire
Department performed as expected and for what they had trained against. The department had
acquired a great deal of tree clearing equipment in the past due to these incidents which helped
the overall situation but the need for heavy equipment was still there and this need was not filled
39
until the next day when Louisiana Pacific provided two front end loaders to help clear debris.
(Bolling, 2011) In regards to the overall response it was good for Hanceville residents despite
some delay in outlying areas due to equipment needs. It is distressing though that some USAR
teams may be focused on one task when a more flexible nature is required to aid in Life Safety. It
is good these teams know the work but Life Safety is a priority.
NIMS and DeKalb
In DeKalb county, as is noted, there was a large spread amount of damage that was
incurred over a wide spread area and not localized to the city areas. In the ICS 300 and 400
classes it was noted that DeKalb actuated the EOC for a more thorough control three to four days
into the event. In the meantime, the county had been divided up into three incident zones. Zone 1
was the area from Geraldine to Rainsville. Zone 2 was from Sylvania to Henagar. Zone 3 was
from Ider to the state line with Georgia. Each area was under the command of a unified
command of fire captains from the local fire districts. Zone 1 was commanded by the Chiefs of
Geraldine and Rainsville. Zone 2 was managed by the Chiefs of Sylvania and Ft. Payne. Zone 3
was managed by Ider and Henagar. The three command posts were located Rainsville, Sylvania
and Ider. Each command post communicated its needs to the EOC as required to get equipment
once the EOC was established but otherwise all meeting prior to EOC establishment were
through radio and teleconference among the command posts. (Lester, 2011)
The DeKalb Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan, drawn up by the Regional Council of
Governments, for tornadoes had been drawn up in 2010. Within this document was a discussion
of the probability of tornado damage and activity. According to this document, DeKalb County is
considered a Wind Zone IV area where winds can reach a maximum of 250mph. In addition the
county had seen severe tornado activity over the monitored last fifty years with 33 significant
40
events noted. (Top of Alabama Regional Council of Governments, 2010, p. 44) The plan went on
to note that “…it is expected that at some time over the next fifty years, DeKalb County will
experience tornadoes of similar number and severity as occurred over the last fifty years…” with
probabilities of said events being 34% in any given year and damage probabilities at 32%. (Top
of Alabama Regional Council of Governments, 2010, p. 46) It is ironic how quickly those events
manifest in early 2011. The plan went on to project potential losses from 2010 to 2030 of
approximately $32M dollars to the area. (ibid, p.46)
How did DeKalb fare overall in comparison to the ideal of NIMS? Based on the area of
damage and discussions held during the ICS-300/400 classes by agencies involved one could say
the response was not too bad with the exception that there was never an assignment of any
overall Area Commander to help coordinate efforts among the three incidents and delays
opening the EOC. Three incident commands fighting for resources require a resource
management team and organization. A Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) team would have
been appropriate when it could have been setup. If you do not have resource management then
you have duplication of effort or a lack of priority given to certain equipment needs like
generators for example. Deputy Director Christy Hardin of DeKalb EMA stated in the classes for
ICS300/400 that she “made a thousand decisions in one day and couldn‟t remember half of them.
Hardin also noted they were still organizing paperwork from the events to allow for Federal
reimbursement through disaster declarations as that had been put off due to other priorities.
(Hardin, 2011)
During these same classes both Chief Lester and Deputy Director Hardin noted that the
training for this type of event had occurred but what was completely unexpected was the total
loss of power long term that complicated the response efforts. It took around a week to repair the
41
distribution services enough to get power sent in from neighboring states to critical areas and
longer still to restore the whole system as noted in the Power Infrastructure Damage section of
this analysis. The overall loss of life in the area was from initial damage and not prolonged
response issues. The agencies of DeKalb County were up against a strong event that was noted
but magnitude was beyond that ever expected. Teams can prepare for various events but as usual
there will always be that portion of the event that requires an adaption of plans. This is the reason
that the National Response Framework is just that, a framework. There is no way to prepare for
each individual item that may occur in any event.
Recommendations
Early Warning System Change Considerations
There have been questions raised into the effectiveness of warning sirens to inform the
public of severe weather events. Should this technology even be used in this day and age of
smart phones, internet and instant communication? The fact that these sirens have been utilized
more often in recent years for weather events that are not tornadoes along with the advent of new
detection systems has created a certain level of apathy as described by some forecasters. The
well-respected local meteorologist by the name of James Spann noted in an article with Thomas
Spencer that “I firmly believe apathy and complacency due to a high false alarm ratio over the
years led to inaction in many cases that could have cost lives…” (Spencer, 2011) The fact that
the possibility exists has resulted in a revamp of the utilization of these sirens within Alabama
for tornadoes only instead of severe thunderstorms, high winds, and other weather phenomena.
The newer networked systems will tie in with National Weather Service (NWS) systems. Will
this increase reliability? That question is unanswerable at this time but if one bases an answer off
of the existing data then it is not a favorable answer. Data about National Weather service
42
accuracy reads “…In the late 1980s, according to the storm lab, the false alarm rate was about 80
percent, meaning that for every 10 warnings issued only about two turned out to be tornadoes.
According to the most recent data available, the false alarm rate is down to 76 percent.”
(Spencer, 2011) So in effect, in thirty years of technology updates including Doppler radar,
computer networks, enhanced computer technology and other system improvements the accuracy
of being able to predict a tornado has improved an incredible four percent from technology
available in the 1980‟s. Once again, a sign that with all of the scientific data covered over the
years, humanity still has a lot to learn about tornadoes.
So how is the problem fixed? With the advent of the new technologies like smart phones
and tablets with internet access Americans are more connected than ever to the information
highway. Programs like WeatherCall that James Spann mentioned and other applications as well
as portable NOAA weather radios then Americans should be able to receive information in a
timely manner. (Spann, 2011) This is not always the case. As this author experienced in a poststorm Cullman County the cell phone operations were nearly inoperable due to tower damage
and text messages were sporadic. In one case a text message sent by this author was not received
until twenty-four hours later due to storm damage to the cellular tower infrastructure and the
power systems supplying the communications systems. This particular problem lasted several
days.
What about a combination of old and new? The sirens are still capable of delivering
warnings and in some cases have been upgraded to carry voice messages. These can be heard
indoors but the messages need to be area specific as well. Locations of potential threats can be
broadcast with the right upgrades. Transistor radios may be antiquated technology but one can
buy a headset with digital FM stations at many retailers for a reasonable price and many local
43
EMA‟s have been supplying emergency alert radios for years. This author has one supplied by
Gadsden-Etowah EMA as part of a mitigation program for the area. Computer networks and
social websites are becoming a popular technology for dispensing information to a community
and if access is available then this can be a good tool to reach those with information about
weather threats. Electronic billboards or signs on roadways can also be utilized for more than
traffic directions and controls if equipped with capabilities to update quickly to dispense
information to motorists in a threatened area. Once again the key problem with any technological
solution, however, is power whether it is battery-based or hardwire. If the power is out for
extended periods such as the tornadoes of April 27, 2011, then information may not be
obtainable once that power is lost.
Communication Mitigation
Communication issues are continual during disasters. New requirements for radio
communications are being brought forth by the Federal Communication Commission that will
aid agencies. The biggest problem is interoperability among agencies from a local and state
standpoint. Each agency is assigned to their own bandwidths and frequencies of operations.
Speaking from personal experience this author has seen the range of operations of radios from
Citizen Bands to 800 MHz digital trunk systems. All systems have their strengths and limitations
and the problem with all of them is range due to geographic issues. A radio operating over flat
plains has a longer range than one that is forced to operate with the valley between two
mountains. In the case of Cullman, Alabama the area is a combination of flat plateau and rolling
hills. In DeKalb County, the area is located between both Lookout and Sand Mountains. Radio
operations that lose repeater and tower systems become severely limited in those conditions. The
best thing that can happen is to have a set of back up towers or repeaters available. This author
44
has experienced the use of a mobile radio repeater truck as part of operations with the Shelby
County Sheriff‟s Office in Memphis, TN. The truck was equipped with antennae, radios and
repeaters and allowed the operation of radio system when tower systems were non-functional in
an area. The acquisition and use of such a resource would be beneficial to both of these counties
based on the amount of damage and power infrastructure losses that both suffered. The resource
could be acquired through mitigations grants provided by FEMA in this post disaster event. It
would be mobile and strong enough to assist with continued coverage in storm damaged areas.
DeKalb County EMA has stated that a non-descriptive “plan” is now in place to be tested within
the county on a “trial basis” in four areas of the county during the next severe weather event. The
plan was in relation to issues with interoperability of local agency radios using interoperable
simplex channels. (Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011) Interoperability and access to common
frequencies serves as a benefit to any agency that has an affected disaster area. For a single radio
to carry a multitude of frequencies in an area is unusual. It is becoming more common, but cost
prohibitive through providers. It is a technology that would be beneficial for events like the
tornadoes of April 27, 2011.
Power Systems Mitigation
The fact that the nuclear plant had to be idled due to a loss of external power and other
distribution systems to the plant brings to mind a question. Why does a plant that generates
power for an area have to have an external tie-in to maintain its own facilities? If the plant was
struck directly and its own power substation damaged this would be an understandable issue due
to the needs of transforming power from higher voltage transmission levels down to workable
utility levels at the plant. This was not the case however. So, in the spirit of mitigation ideas for
the events of April 27, 2011 a question is presented that asks why a nuclear power facility cannot
45
be self-sustaining electrically with redundant outside systems and backup generator systems if
needed?
In regards to the distribution systems utilized within the United States, Americans drive
by and under power system lines every day of their lives. They are strung on towers and poles
with wires of various sizes and transmission capabilities supplied by nuclear and fossil fuel
generation plants. People sometimes wonder why a below ground system of power distribution is
not utilized versus the more vulnerable infrastructure of the above ground wire systems. What is
the reason? Cost is the big factor along with issues like flooding of ground areas and geological
problems like earthquake zones. As a mitigation factor for high tornado frequency areas the
thought would have to be considered. However, the costs can be as much as ten times the cost of
regularly maintained overhead lines according to utilities like the American Transmission
Company. (American Transmission Company, 2011)
Emergency backup generation capabilities for critical facilities are necessary. In the
example set forth by Cullman Regional Medical Center, the existing generation capabilities had
to be augmented by other generators that were brought in days later. Fuel supplies for these
generators had to be trucked in due to loss of power in the areas so pumping of gas was not able
to be accomplished. (Cullman Regional Medical Center, 2011) These logistical issues need to be
considered when creating emergency plans as they can be easily overlooked until it is too late.
The disaster of April 27, 2011 was unique in its magnitude but not isolated in its ability to repeat
itself at any time in any part of the world. Whether it is a hospital or a critical business then
redundancy of power and critical operation systems need to be factored into the daily business
plans so that when an emergency does strike there is not a scrambling to obtain equipment like a
generator that has now become a high demand commodity.
46
Response Complications and Debris Removal Improvements
The access issues that were noted in the initial Response Complications section will be
common in most disasters whether it is flood, earthquake or tornado. What is meant by this is
there will always be some form of impediment created by the events that emergency
management and response agencies face. Flooding will block or wash away roadways, bridges,
land, and so forth. Earthquakes will collapse structures and rift the landscape at its whim.
Tornadoes will topple trees and strew debris along its path. How does an agency deal with these
issues? Preparedness before the event is how it is done or through creative use of existing
resources. An example of preparedness is an agency buying boats to handle flood areas to access
people or preparing a ferry in case of loss of a local bridge. In DeKalb County, when no heavy
equipment was available in an area then local farmer‟s tractors were utilized to help remove
debris from areas and roadways. (Lester, Emergency Planner, 2011) In the case of Hanceville
equipment was supplied by a business, Louisiana Pacific, to help move debris. (Bolling, 2011)
The goal was to get access, clear paths and do what needed to be done as soon as possible. When
lives are threatened, time is a precious commodity to lose waiting on equipment that needs to be
available beforehand. Reality says that you can only buy what your budget supports but
preparedness and understanding your areas allow an emergency agency to key on certain
equipment to stockpile. The rest can be obtained through other acquisition techniques like mutual
aid, memorandums of understanding, or memorandums of agreement.
One additional problem is what to do with all of the debris once events slow down. The
Cullman County EMA Director discussed the problem in her testimony and stated that as of July
14, 2011 450,000 cubic yards of material had been removed by FEMA and the contractors.
FEMA had worked out a new program called Operation Clean Sweep that allowed homeowners
47
to apply for assistance in debris removal. Though the 450,000 cubic yards had been removed
there were still numerous piles of debris in Cullman County to be removed as of that July 14,
2011 date. (Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2011, p. 6) Debris removal is a key
factor in not only access issues but also rebuild and health reasons as well. Trash breeds rodent
growth. This author personally has experienced also the sight of tents on home sites as
homeowners stay waiting on insurance and FEMA to help with the rebuild of their residences.
DeKalb County debris removal specifics were unavailable at the time of this analysis.
Conclusions
Agencies including FEMA train for ideal situations and set the training goals towards that
ideal. Paperwork is readily available. Resources are readily available. The agencies all work to
the highest level of performance that can exist. Even with the reach towards the ideals espoused
by the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework
(NRF). These guidelines are the skeleton of response agencies and the backbone of any incident
response in these days and times. The counties of Cullman and DeKalb in Alabama suffered a
great deal of damage in the tornadoes of April 27, 2011. Agencies within those counties were
faced with disasters of magnitudes not seen in almost a century. Infrastructure damage and
communications challenges far exceeded what was expected but through various adaptive
processes and the use of the NIMS and NRF principles the county agencies were able to manage
well. Ideal cases were not met but due to the flexibility of incident command systems through
NIMS an adaptive success was created. The local agencies were able to hold to Life Safety
principles espoused throughout NIMS.
Could things have been done better? There is always room for improvement. The events
of April 27, 2011 revealed glaring problems with agencies and businesses in regards to
48
operations after a disaster of the magnitude of these tornadoes. Logistical issues created by loss
of power and structural damages were glaring. The vulnerability of power infrastructure was
once again noted and mitigation of these issues is now at the forefront of the State of Alabama‟s
response agencies and Emergency Management Groups. Communications issues are being dealt
with through equipment research and modifications of standards being used. It is hoped that prior
to another event of this magnitude all of these issues will have been mitigated but there is no way
to know for sure until the chance to test the changes arises.
Table 1: Comparison of Agencies shows a comparison of how the county‟s match up
against the ideal. As one can see the counties‟ prepared well and in some cases managed to
handle the communication losses through great coordination with agencies. Even so as noted
there is always room for improvement. The power disruption was a crippling problem to
overcome and without unlimited resources for power, one that requires great management of the
generator commodities.
Table 1. Comparison of Agencies
NIMS Ideal
Cullman
EOC Use for main coordination
system
Multi-Agency operations required
Similar training prior to event
Prepared for complications with
power
Prepared for communications
problems
Prepared for other obstacles
(Debris, etc)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
DeKalb
No (eventually
yes but not initial
first days)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
49
References
ABC33/40 TV. (2011, April 28). Cullman Tornado Damage Aerials. Retrieved September 16,
2011, from www.youtube.com: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hR83MBQNGqw
American Transmission Company. (2011). Underground Transmission Lines. Retrieved
November 3, 2011, from www.atcllc.com: http://www.atcllc.com/IT5.shtml
Bjoran, K. (2011, May 26). The Limits of Tornado Predictions . Retrieved September 15, 2011,
from technologyreview.com:
http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/37634/page2/
Bolling, A. (2011, November 5). Chief of Hanceville Fire Department. (G. Cain, Interviewer)
Clifton, A. (2011, November 6th). Director of Emergency Management. (G. Cain, Interviewer)
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. (2011, July 14). Testimony of Phyllis Little:
Director of Emergency Management. Retrieved August 25, 2011, from
republicans.transportation.house.gov:
http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyEDPB/2011-0714%20Little.pdf
Cresswell, J. W. (1999). Research Design (3rd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
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Tornado Disaster April 27th, 2011. Cullman Regional Medical Center. Cullman: Cullman
Regional Medical Center - Dustin Wooten.
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Doyle, N. (2011, April 28). Alabama tornadoes: Power could be out for 5 days in Madison
County, TVA infrastructure damaged. Retrieved October 30, 2011, from blog.al.com:
http://blog.al.com/breaking/2011/04/tva_damage.html
Emergency Management Institute. (2011). Independent Study Course List. Retrieved november
2, 2011, from training.fema.gov: http://www.training.fema.gov/IS/crslist.asp
Encyclopedia of Alabama - Cullman County. (2011). Cullman County. Retrieved November 5,
2011, from www.encyclopediaofalabama.org:
http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/face/Article.jsp?id=h-1326
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2011, from www.encyclopediaofalabama.org:
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Faulk, K. (2011, April 28). Alabama tornadoes: DeKalb County path of destruction 25 miles
long. Retrieved September 1, 2011, from al.com:
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2011, from www.fema.gov: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf
Hardin, C. (Performer). (2011, September). ICS/300/400 Class. DeKalb EMA, Ft. Payne, AL,
USA.
51
Homeland Security (NRF/FAQ). (2008). National Response Framework: Frequently Asked
Questions. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from www.fema.gov: The NRF employs the
NIMS standardized structures and tools that enable a unified approach to be
Homeland Security (NRF/FAQ). (2008). National Response Framework: Frequently Asked
Questions. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from www.fema.gov:
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRF_FAQ.pdf
Lamb, R. a. (2011, March). How Tornadoes Work. Retrieved September 14, 2011, from
science.howstuffworks.com: http://science.howstuffworks.com/nature/climateweather/storms/tornado.htm
Lancaster, C. (2011, April 27). Unbelievable Cullman Tornado I65 and Hwy 278. Retrieved
August 30, 2011, from Youtube.com:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3AZaNn3WDsQ&feature=related
Lester, G. D. (2011, November 8). Emergency Planner. (G. Cain, Interviewer)
Lester, G. D. (Performer). (2011, September). ICS-300/ICS-400 Class. DeKalb EMA, Ft. Payne,
AL, USA.
Murray, B. (2011, June 17). DeKalb County April 27th Tornado Upgraded to Highest Ranking.
Retrieved November 2, 2011, from www.alabamawx.com:
http://www.alabamawx.com/?p=49266
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RachelBlondie1. (2011, June 12). Cullman Tornado Damage: 45 days later. Retrieved
September 14, 2011, from www.youtube.com:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GEfGY20cQE
Richter, G. (2011, April 27). EMA investigates possible tornado damage at Cullman Regional
Medical Center. Retrieved September 1, 2011, from al.com:
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/04/ema_investigates_possible_torn.html
Security, H. (2008, January). National Response Framework. (FEMA publications) Retrieved
September 2011, from Fema.Gov: http://www.fema.gov/NRF
Sohn, P. (2011, April 29). TVA Loses All Power Transmission Lines in Alabama, Most in
Mississippi. Retrieved November 3, 2011, from www.timesfreepress.com:
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Spann, J. (2011). The Siren Mentality. Retrieved November 5, 2011, from JamesSpann.com:
http://jamesspann.com/js/?q=node/19
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Tennessee Valley Authority. (2011, May 27). Power Restoration Updates. Retrieved November
2, 2011, from www.tva.gov: http://www.tva.gov/news/releases/aprjun11/storm.htm
The Christian Science Monitor. (2011, April 30). South's 'super tornado' outbreak may be worst
ever in US history. Retrieved September 15, 2011, from www.csmonitor.com:
53
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0430/South-s-super-tornado-outbreak-may-beworst-ever-in-US-history
The Huntsville Times, The Birmingham News, Press-Register. (2011). Day of Devastation.
Birmingham, AL, USA: The Birmingham News Multimedia.
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Agency.
54
Appendices
Appendix I Figures/Photos
Figure 1: Map Showing Tornado Paths (Received from DeKalb County EMA)………5
Figure 2: Cullman EMS Base Damage………………………………………………….9
Figure 3: Highway 278 Damage Path………………………………………………….10
Figure 4: Cullman EMS Base Damage With Radio Tower Visible…………………....27
Figure 5: Radio/TV Tower Damage…………………………………………………....28
Appendix II Tables
Table 1: Comparison of Agencies……………………………………………………...48
All photographs and information contained within this document except where noted are
property of the author and all copyrights are reserved. © Guy A. Cain III 2011

Case Analysis of the Cullman and Dekalb County, Alabama

Transcription

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