Malapportionment and ideological bias in Chilean electoral districts

MalapportionmentandideologicalbiasinChileanelectoraldistricts
JohnM.Carey
DartmouthCollege
http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jcarey/
November8,2015
Abstract
Chile'suniquetwo-memberdistrictlegislativeelectionswerelongcriticizedforthesharpseat
thresholdsthesystemimposedandformalapportionment.Bothcharacteristicsarewidely
regardedashavingbeenadoptedtofavortheideologicalrightovertheleft.Theelectoral
reformof2015replacedalmostallthetwo-memberdistrictswithhighermagnitudes,butit
reducedmalapportionmentmuchless,andtheChamberofDeputiesandSenateremainamong
themostmalapportionedlegislativechambersintheworld.Usinganewmeasureofdistrictlevelideologicalpreferencesbasedonpresidentialandmunicipalelections,however,this
analysisfindsnoevidencethatmalapportionmentproducedideologicalbiasinelectionssince
2000underthepre-reformsystem,northatitwillproduceanybiasinthenew,post-reform
districts.
Introduction
ChilecompletedalandmarkelectoralreforminMay2015,abandoningitsuniquesystemby
whichalllegislators,deputiesandsenatorsalike,wereelectedintwo-member(a.k.a.binominal)
districts.Inthenewsystem,districtmagnitudesrangefromthreetoeightintheChamberof
DeputiesandfromtwotofiveintheSenate.Criticsofthepre-reform,binominalsystemlong
heldthatitwasbiasedinfavorofChile'sideologicalright,bothbecauseofthelimitednumber
ofseatsineachdistrict,andbecauseofmalapportionment,whichisdiscrepancybetweenthe
shareofpopulationinadistrictandtheshareoflegislativeseatsitelects.
Inthispaper,IexaminemalapportionmentasapotentialsourceofbiasinChileanelections.
Specifically,IdocumentthelevelsofmalapportionmentinbothchambersoftheChilean
Congress,theChamberofDeputiesandtheSenate,undertheoldbinominalsystemandinthe
new,post-reformdistricts.Iexaminewhetherwhethermalapportionmentproducedideological
biasinrecentelectionsandwhetheritshouldbeexpectedtodosointhepost-reformsystem.
Usinganewmeasureofdistrict-levelideologicalpreferencesbasedonChileanpresidentialand
municipalelections,Ifindnoevidencethatmalapportionmentproducedideologicalbiasin
electionssince2000underthepre-reformsystem,northatitwillproduceanybiasinthenew
districts.
Ideologicalbiasunderthebinominalsystem
Thebinominalsystem'soriginsinthemilitarydictatorshipofGeneralAugustoPinochet
engenderedskepticismaboutitsfairness,andcriticsofthesystemhavelongarguedthatit
generatedbiasinfavoroftheideologicalright(Scully1997,Fuentes1999,Navia2005),themain
sourcesofwhichwereregardedtobe:
• SeatThresholds:Withtwo-memberdistrictsandthed'Hondtformula,thefirstseatis
awardedtothelargestlist,andthesecondtothesecond-largestlist,unlessthelargest
listmorethandoublesthevotetotalofthesecondlist.Ifthedistributionofvotes
acrosslistsissuchthatonecoalitionconsistentlyplacesfirst,butrarelydoublesthe
second-placecoalition,thesecond-placecoalitioncanconvertitsvotesupportinto
representationmoreefficientlythanthefirst-placecoalition–ararityintheworldof
electoralsystems(Rae1967).
• Malapportionment:Therewasinequalityofpopulationacrossdistricts,withdistricts
thatleanedtowardtheideologicalrightinitiallyfavoredwithmorelegislatorsper
populationthandistrictsthatleanedleft(RojasandNavia2005).
MostofthedebateoverbiasintheChileansystemfocusedonwhetherandhowseatthresholds
affecttheconversionofvotestoseatsbythemaincoalitionsthatdominatedChileanelections
fromre-democratizationin1989throughthelastelectionsheldunderthebinominalsystemin
2013.Notwithstandingsomecontributionsthatexpressskepticismabouttheextenttowhich
thebinominalsystemfavoredtheChileanrightovertheleft(Carey2003,Zucco2007),most
analysesconcludedthatthebinominalsystemwasadoptedtogenerateexactlysuchabiasand
waseffectiveindoingso(ScullyandValenzuela1997,Siavelis1997,Polga-Hecimovichand
Siavelisforthcoming).
Analysesofmalapportionmentweresomewhatlesscontentious.Siavelis(1997and200),Rojas
andNavia(2005),Auth(2014),ZapataLarrain(2014),andPolga-HecimovichandSiavelis(2015)
allconnectmalapportionmenttothemotivationsoftheelectoralsystemdesignersfromthe
1
outgoingmilitarygovernment.AlthoughthePinochetgovernmenthadalreadysettledonthe
binominalsystem,itundertooktore-drawthetwo-memberdistrictsafterthe1988plebiscite
thatrejectedanextensionofPinochet'spresidency.Undertherevisedmap,districtsthat
supportedPinochetintheplebiscitewereallocatedmoreChamberdeputiespercapitathan
weredistrictsthatsupportedthe"No"vote(ZapataLarrain2014).
Althoughmalapportionmentmayhavefavoredtherightintheearlypost-transitionelections,
however,anddespitethefactthatmalapportionmentitselfgrewmorepronouncedovertime,
bothRojasandNavia(2005)andZucco(2007)foundthatbytheearly2000s,changesinvoting
behaviorhadeliminatedthecorrelationbetweenthepopulationofagivenChamberdistrictand
thevotesharesofthetwomajorcoalitions.Theseanalyses,however,didnotestimatethelevel
ofbiasinSenateelections,wheremalapportionmentwasevenmorepronouncedandwhere
biasfromthe"originalsin"ofthesystem'sdesignmightthereforebeexpectedtobemore
enduring.
The2015reform
SomekeyelementsofChileanlegislativeelectionsremainintactfromthebinominaltothepostreformsystem.Legislatorsareelectedfromlistsnominatedbypoliticalparties,orbyalliances
thatcanincludecandidatesfrommorethanoneparty,andindependents.Thelistsareopen,
meaningthatvotersindicateapreferenceforanindividualcandidate.Votesforallcandidates
withinalistaretallied,andseatsareawardedfirsttothelistsusingthed'Hondtdivisors
formula,thencandidateswithinliststhatcapturedseatsareelectedinorderoftheirindividual
preferencevotes.Themainchangein2015isinthestructureofelectoraldistricts.Table1
illustratesthedistrictstructureofChileanChamberandSenateelectionsunderthebinominal
andthepost-reformsystems.
Table1.ChileanCongress–Districtstructurepre-andpost-reform
Chamber
Senate
Pre-Reform
Post-Reform
Pre-Reform
Post-Reform
NumberofDistricts
60
28
19
15
DistrictMagnitude
2
3–8
2
2–5
TotalSeats
120
155
38
50
Byincreasingdistrictmagnitudes,thereformraisedthenumberofdistinctseatthresholdsin
mostdistricts,dramaticallyreducingtheprospectthatthenationwidedistributionofloyalties
couldtranslateconsistentlyintobiasinseatdistributions.Thepost-reformsystemremains
substantiallymalapportioned,however,sothematterofbiasthroughmalapportionmentunder
thenewruleswarrantsrenewedattention.
Themalapportionmentremaininginthenewsystemreflectsthepoliticalbargainsnecessaryto
passanyelectoralreform.Between1990and2014,would-bereformersoffered26electoral
reformproposalsinChilebutneverassembledthesuper-majoritysupportrequiredtodispense
withthebinominalsystem(Anonymous2015,p.1).In2015,witheverypotentialvotein
supportcriticaltopassage,individuallegislatorswhoseelectoralprospectscouldbejeopardized
heldleveragetosettheallowableparametersforreform.Oneofthesewasthattheexisting
districtsmustbethebuildingblocksfornewdistricts,soasnotto"orphan"incumbent
legislators.Anotherwasthat,eventheleast-populateddistricts,magnitudewouldnotdecline
inSenatedistricts,andwouldincreasebyatleastoneseatfortheChamber.Thecartographers
2
alsosoughttoavoiddrawingnewdistrictsthatwouldpitincumbentsfromthesameparty
againstoneanother(Anonymous2015,pp.17-21).TheBacheletadministrationwenttogreat
lengthstoassurelegislatorsthattheirreelectionprospectswouldnotbedamaged,producing
simulatedoutcomesbasedonrecentelectionstoshowthat90%ofincumbentswouldbe
reelectedundertheproposedrules(Anonymous2015,p.18).Theconstraintsonbreakingapart
preexistingdistrictsandtheneedtoprotectincumbentlegislators'reelectionprospectslimited
thedegreetowhichthereformcouldreducemalapportionmentinChile.
MeasuringMalapportionment
Thestandardmeasureofmalapportionment,fromSamuelsandSnyder(2001)is:
MAL–(1/2)Σ|si–pi|
wheresigmastandsforthesummationoveralldistricts,siistheshareofseatsallocatedto
districti,andpiistheshareofthepopulationresidingindistricti.SamuelsandSnyder(2001)
measuredMALforelectednationallegislativechambersaroundtheworldasofthelate1990s.
Chilerankedasseverelymalapportioned,withitsSenateninthmostmalapportionedamong
upperchambers,anditsChamberofDeputiestheeleventhmostmalapportioned,amongthe78
countriesSamuelsandSnyderexamined.
AsRojasandNavia(2005)previouslydocumented,malapportionmentincreasedthroughthe
1990s,aspopulationsinmoredenselypopulated,urbandistrictsgrewmorerapidlythaninless
populatedones.Continuingthistrend,malapportionmentintheChamberofDeputiesrose
furtherinthefirstdecadeofthe2000s.1The2015reformsubstantiallyreduces
malapportionmentamongChamberdistricts,withMALdroppingfrom.17to.11,butthe
ChileanChamberremainsamongthemostmalapportionedlowerchambersintheworld.
Senatemalapportionment,moreover,atMAL=.32,isunchangedbythe2015reform.
Figure1plotsdistrictmagnitude(DM)againstpopulationforthetwenty-eightnewChamber
districts(toppanel)andfifteennewSenatedistricts(bottompanel).Notethat,intheChamber,
therearemanydistrictswithhigherpopulationsbutfewerseatsthancorrespondingdistricts
withfewerpeopleandmoreseats(anydotbelowandtotherightofanyother).Itispossibleto
havesubstantialmalapportionmentevenwithoutsuchinversions,buttheirexistenceis
particularlystriking.2
1Post-reformMALiscalculatedfromdataprovidedbytheObservatorioPoliticoElectoralatthe
UniversidadDiegoPortales,courtesyofPatricioNavia,withpopulationdatafromthemost
recent,2012nationalcensus.Pre-reformChamberMALiscalculatedfromdatadrawnfromthe
2002census,matchedtoChamberdistrictsonWikipedia
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_divisions_of_Chile).Pre-reformSenateMALis
calculatedbasedontotalvotersperdistrictratherthanpopulation,byaggregatingupthetotal
votescastineachSenatedistrictfromthe2001and2005electionsasaproxyfortherelative
districtpopulations.
2Forexample,usingthed'Hondtformulaofsuccessivedivisorstoapportionthe155seats
acrossthenewdistrictsbypopulationwouldretainMAL=.03,muchmoreinlinewithlower
chambersinmostdemocraciesworldwide,butwithnoseat-populationinversions(dataand
figureavailablefromauthor).
3
Figure1.Seatsbypopulation,post-reformChileanChamberandSenate
Despitethefactthatthe2015reformincreasedthenumberofSenateseats,reducedthe
numberofdistricts,andsoincreasedthemagnitudeofmanydistricts,theChileanupperhouse
willbeasmalapportionedasitwasbeforethereform,andslightlymoremalapportionedthanit
initiallywasthe1990s.Therearenocasesofmorepopulateddistrictsbeinggivenfewerseats
thanlesspopulatedones,asintheChamber,buttheSantiagoMetroregion'snearly7million
inhabitantsaredramaticallyunderrepresentedwithonlyfivesenators,thesamenumberasthe
TalcaorTemucoregions,eachwithapopulationunder1million.Evenmaintainingthecurrent
minimumoftwoseatsforeachnewdistrict,malapportionmentcouldbedramaticallyreduced
byredistributingseatsfromthemid-sizeddistrictstotheSantiagoMetroregion,withtheeffect
ofmorethandoublingthecapital'sseattotaloffive.3
Measuringdistrictideology
Todeterminewhethertheapportionmentofseatsconfersideologicaladvantage,Ineeda
measureofvoterpreferencesatthedistrictlevel.Legislativeelectionresultshavebeen
3Usingapured'Hondtformulatoapportionseatsinthepost-reformSenatewouldnotbe
feasibleasthedistrictsarecurrentlyconfigured,aseachoftheleastpopulatedfourdistricts
wouldwarrantnorepresentationatall.
4
systematicallyimperfectmetricsofdistrictpartisanpreferencesduringthebinominalera
becausethemajorcoalitionsallocatedtheirtwonominationswithineachdistrictinnegotiations
thatinvolvedtheirmultiplecomponentparties,withpartiesforfeitingtherighttonominatein
somedistrictsinexchangeforfavorableslotsinothers(Carey&Siavelis2005).Ratherthanuse
legislativeelectionresults,then,Irelyondatafrompresidentialcontestsandfrommunicipal
electionstomeasuredistrict-levelideology.
Forthispurpose,anyChileanelectionshavepotentialadvantagesanddisadvantages.Municipal
electionsimposethefewestconstraintsonvotersbecausedistrictmagnitudesarehigherfor
municipalcouncils,reducingtheimperativeforalliancestorationnominationsorforvotersto
votestrategically.Butmunicipalelectionsmayturnonlocalissues.Presidentialelections
embodythenationalleft-rightdivide,butthecontestforasingleofficemaximizedstrategic
constraintsonvoterchoice.Fortunately,theresultsofthisanalysisdonothingeonwhich
electionsweexamine.Imeasuredistrictideologythreedifferentways,basedon:
• second-roundpresidentialelections,codingvotesaseitherleftorright;
• municipalelections,codingpartiesasleftorrightaccordingtotheirparticipationin
nationalalliances;and
• municipalelections,codingpartiesaccordingtotheirideologyscoresfromBaker&
Greene's(2011)seminalarticleanddatabase,andcalculatingaweighteddistrict
ideologyscore.
Intheinterestofsimplicity,Ipresenttheresultsfrompresidentialelectionshere,butthe
analogousresultsusingbothmunicipalelection-basedmeasures,aswellasalternativemodel
specifications,areavailableinaweb-basedappendix.
IbeginwiththefourChileanpresidentialconteststhatproceededtoasecondroundpittinga
singlecandidatefromthecenter-leftagainstonefromthecenter-right.Becauseminor
candidates,whocansplitthevoteoneortheothersideofthespectrumduringafirst-round
electionhavebeeneliminated,therun-offelectionsprovideasimpleandcleanmeasureof
districtpreferencesbetweenleftandright.Fourpresidentialelectionsresultedinrun-offs,
listedbelowwiththeleftistcandidatesfirstandthewinningcandidateitalicized:
• January2000–RicardoLagos(PartyforDemocracy)vs.JoaquinLavin(Democratic
IndependentUnion)
• January2006–MichelleBachelet(Socialist)vs.SebastianPinera(NationalRenovation)
• January2010–EduardoFrei(ChristianDemocrat)vs.SebastianPinera(National
Renovation)
• December2013–MichelleBachelet(Socialist)vs.EvelynMattei(Democratic
IndependentUnion)
Tomeasuredistrictideology,Ibeginwithdataonpresidentialvotesatthelevelofcomuna,the
smallestadministrativesub-unitinChile.4Votetalliesatthecomunalevelcanbeaggregatedup
tothelevelofthepre-reform,binominaldistricts,andthepost-reform,multi-memberdistricts
4
Thereare346comunas,groupedinto54provinces,whichthemselvesaregroupedinto15
regions.
5
forboththeChamberandtheSenate.Foreachpresidentialrun-offelection,Icalculatethevote
talliesforeachcandidateineachcomuna,usingdatafromtheChileanServicioElectoralwebsite
(ServicioElectoraldeChile2015a).ThenImatchthosedatawithotherdataonthecomposition
ofthepre-andpost-reformChamberandSenatedistrictstoaggregatetalliesfromthecomuna
leveluptothelevelofeachofthefourtypesofdistricts(ServicioElectoraldeChile2015b,
ObservatorioPolíticoElectoral2015;SenadodeChile2015).Itallyupallthevotescastineach
typeoflegislativeelectoraldistrictforallfourleftistcandidatesandallfourrightistcandidates
acrossthesetofrun-offelections,thencalculateatheoverallleftistvoteshareasasingle,
district-levelmeasureofideology.Tallyingacrosselectionsreducesthepotentialimpactof
election-specificidiosyncrasies(e.g.,thelocalappealofaspecificcandidate)thatmight
otherwisedistortthedistrict-levelestimate.Summariesofthedistrict-levelleftismstatistics
acrossthefourelections,threeofwhichwerewonbytheleftistcandidateandonebythe
rightist,areshowninTable2.
Table2.Leftistshareoftwo-partyvoteinpresidentialrun-offelections,2000-2013
ChamberDistricts
SenateDistricts
Binominal
Post-Reform
Binominal
Post-Reform
Median
.59
.57
.57
.58
Minimum
.31
.43
.50
.51
Maximum
.72
.65
.65
.65
Noevidenceofideologicalbias
Figure2plotsdistrictleftism,ontheY-axes,againsthowwellrepresentedthedistrictwasinthe
binominalChamber(toppanel)andSenate(bottompanel)basedonpopulationduringthe
2000s.Linearbest-fitlineswith95%confidenceintervalsareimposedonthescatters.5Districts
thatareover-representedrelativetopopulationarefurthertotheleftontheX-axes,andunderrepresenteddistricts(withgreaterpopulationperrepresentative)aretotheright.Thus,an
upward-slopinglinewouldindicatethatmalapportionmentproducesbiasinfavoroftheright,
andadownwardslopewouldindicatebiasinfavoroftheleft.
5Usingaloess,ratherthanalinearfunctiondoesnotaltertheresults(seeonlineappendix).
6
Figure2.LeftismbyapportionmentinthebinominalChamberandSenate
Thebest-fitlinesareflat.Basedontheelectionresultssince2000,thereisnoevidenceofany
correlationbetweentheideologicalpreferencesofvotersinthebinominaldistrictsandhow
over-orunder-representedthedistrictswereintheChamberorintheSenate.
Figure3showsanalogousscatterplotsforthepost-reformdistricts.Thereisaslightupward
slopetothebest-fitlineforthepost-reformChamber,suggestingamildpro-rightistbiasfrom
malapportionmentinthenewChamberdistricts,buttherelationshipisnotevencloseto
statisticallysignificant(p=.56inabivariateregression).FortheSenate,thebest-fitlineis,again,
completelyflat.NotethattheSantiagoMetroregioncontinuestostandoutforitssevere
under-representation.
7
Figure3.Leftismbyapportionmentinthepost-reformChamberandSenate
Conclusion
Chile'sold,binominalsystemwasoftendecriedasfavoringtheright.The2015electoralreform
eliminatedthemostcontroversialsourceofbias,theuniquesetofseatthresholdsinherentin
two-memberdistrictcompetition.Italsoreducedthesecondpotentialsourceofbias,
malapportionment,somewhat,althoughthelegislativepoliticsofreformpreventedits
eliminationentirelyandsubstantialmalapportionmentremainsinthepost-reformsystem.
Usinganewmeasureofdistrictideology,thisanalysisfindsnoevidencethatmalapportionment
producedideologicalbiasundertheoldsystem,noranyreasontoexpectitwillproducesuch
biasinthenewone.Theabsenceofideologicalbiasdoesnotnecessarilymean
malapportionmentisinnocuous.InbothchambersoftheChileanCongress,thepreferencesof
votersinsomedistrictsstillcarryfarmoreweightthanthepreferencesofvotersinother
8
districts.Nevertheless,theapportionmentsystemadoptedin2015doesnotappeartobe
stackedinfavorofeitherleftorright.Tosumup,theprincipleofvoteequality–or"one
person,onevote"–continuestobeviolatedinChileanlegislativeelections,butthereisno
evidencethatmalapportionmentwillskewelectoraloutcomesacrossdistrictsaccordingtotheir
ideologicalpredispositions.
9
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