Muhammad Omor Faruq - Dhaka University Institutional Repository

Transcription

By
Muhammad Omor Faruq
A dissertation submitted to the University of Dhaka
in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic History and Culture
University of Dhaka
01 January, 2015
Dhaka University Institutional Repository
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that the thesis titled ‘Turko– Europe Relations (1945-1990)’ submitted to
the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in Islamic
History and Culture) has been composed by myself and completed under the supervision
of Professor Dr. Mohammad Tawfiqul Haider, Department of Islamic History and
Culture. I further affirm that no part or whole of the dissertation has been submitted in
any form to any other university or institute for degree or diploma.
My PhD Registration No. is : 79/2010-2011
(Muhammad Omor Faruq)
Assistant Professor
Department of Islamic History and Culture
University of Dhaka
Dated: 01 January, 2015
ii
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that the result of systematic research presented in this thesis titled
‘Turko– Europe Relations (1945-1990)’ has been the outcome of work carried out under
my guidance. It is further certified that the work presented here is entirely original and
suitable for evaluation for awarding of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
(Dr. Mohammad Tawfiqul Haider)
Professor
Department of Islamic History and Culture
University of Dhaka
Dated: 01 January, 2015
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I take pleasure in recording my heartfelt gratitude to all those who were involved in the
writing of this dissertation from the beginning until the end. My deepest gratitude is
reserved for my Supervisor and immediate past Chairman of the Department of Islamic
History and Culture Professor Dr. Mohammad Tawfiqul Haider for his immeasurable
academic guidance, constant supervision, motivation and encouragement throughout the
dissertation. Right from my early academic career in Dhaka University, he provided the
stimulus for my interest in pursuing courses on Turkey and encouraged me for higher
research in the field.
Due acknowledgment is to my teachers and friends at the university and abroad.
Mentionably Professor Dr. Md. Ibrahim, Professor Dr. Najma Khan Majlish, Professor
Ataur Rahman Miazi, Professor Dr. Mosarraf Hossain Bhuyian, Professor Ataur Rahman
Biswas and Assistant Professor Md. Abul Kalam Azad (Department of Islamic History
and Culture); Associate Professor Golam Gaus Al-Qadri (Department of English);
Professor A.B.M Mahmud (Department of History) and Professor Md. Ruhul Amin
(Department of International Relations) from Dhaka University gave their inspiration and
valuable advices regarding my research work.
It is my pleasant duty to record my feelings of profound respect and gratitude to the
internationally renowned scholar Professor Dr. Shofiur Rahman (Kolkata University); Dr.
Rabia Karakaya Polat (Isik University, Turkey), Ambassador Mosud Mannan ndc, Mr.
Zulqarnain (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh) for their
extremely helpful attitude and spontaneous cooperation. Special thanks to Mr. Abdullah
Al Mamun, my student of Dhaka University, who is presently pursuing his M Phil
research from Turkish University, who also helped me through providing valuable
materials; which were really beyond my reach.
I feel obliged to express my gratitude to the officers and staff of the Dhaka University
Central Library particularly those belonging to the rare section; Bangladesh Public
Library, Islamic Foundation Library; Al-Arafah Islami Bank Library;
Bangladesh
Foreign Affairs Library; Defense Services Command and Staff College Library; Asiatic
iv
Society of Bangladesh library; Shahidullah Gobesona Kaksha (Research Room) of
Bangla Academy; National Archives of Bangladesh; Asiatic Society of Kolkata Library;
Indian National Library, Kolkata; the Indian Center for Studies in Social Science,
Kolkata; Turkish Embassy library, Dhaka, all of whom ungrudgingly helped me in getting
to the necessary archival materials and sources of research.
Beyond everything, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to my family,
specially my wife Moriom Jamila Islam, Lecturer of Nazimuddin Bhuyan Degree
College, Narayanganj, who have inspired me all through during the years of research as
they had to go through every painstaking phase of my Ph.D. studies as much as, and at
times, even more than, I did. She efficiently controlled the household management with
loving care of our siblings Sulayman and Marzia during all these years of my sustained
work, contributed in more ways than I can acknowledge.
I am deeply grateful to my parents who are the main supporting and encouraging figures
throughout all the phase of my education life starting from the primary to the doctoral
research study. It is for their inspirational guidance that has in the first place made me
whatever I have become. My father always encouraged me to achieve the coveted
Doctoral Degree. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Mr. Abdur Rahman Rubel for
his technical help during the typing of the dissertation.
v
ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to give a comprehensive and objective analysis of the
historically significant relations between Turkey and Europe. This very important aspect
of regional history has been overlooked by researchers. Hence, the scope to carry out
intensive research upon this theme for portraying interesting aspects of this phenomenon.
The main focus of this research study is the period between two milestone years in the
history of the world. On the one hand, 1945 marks the year of the end of World War II
(beginning 1939) and the starting of Cold War between USSR and USA. On the other
hand, 1990 is significant for the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new order
characterized by a unipolar world.
What is interesting is that from the very beginning of the establishment Ottoman Turkish
Empire in Anatolia in the 13th century there has been a continuous process of building its
relation with Europeans. This process was augmented during the republican era and
formed the corner stone of its foreign policy. It gained further momentum during the Cold
War period. This study analyzes Turkey’s relation with European territories, European
institutions and eventually the shape of relations to emerge as a member of EU. To reach
the goal Turkey showed very positive attitude towards its European allies and brought
substantial changes inside the state to improve her financial and democratic institutions.
In this sense, Turkish political relations with Europe, economical co-operations with trade
and industrial exchanges, cultural activities and influences and maritime relations in the
light of international law and the historical process of Turkish accession to European
Union are the topics encompassing the entire gamut of the different chapters.
In the ultimate analysis this line of inquiry projects a new perspective about the time
honoured relations which embraces both intra and inter-state and also extends to
European institutions linked with Turkey. Particularly, the long drawn process of Turkish
accession to European Union bears immense historical significance with in regional and
international contexts.
This modest study thus gives a critical and in-depth insight into a glorious landmark of
the contemporary world which will give food for thought for the future generation of
scholars and researchers.
vi
NOTES ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, SOURCES,
TRANSLITERATION, REFERENCES, CALENDAR AND TRANSLATION
Methodology
As to the methodology, analytical method based on primary and secondary sources have
been used. By applying dialectic reasoning we have sought to integrate the various events
within the purview of this study. So combinations of the following research methods have
been used:
i) scanning of original sources and documents survey
ii) content analysis of the different literature available like periodical, tracts,
manuals, essays etc. and
iii) recording of oral history, use memories, private letter, interviews, discussions,
unpublished research materials and government web portals.
This research study thus stresses on a methodological thematic approach, which is
characteristic of the new non-conventional trend of the historical writing in the present
times. An arrangement of events in a chronological pattern with diachronic stress, and
understanding of events as a process have been the best possible method to explore the
unfolding and maturing of the whole range of affairs within this period of study.
Sources
The official records, with all their limitations have constituted a decisive part of the
source material of this study. Their slants and prejudices are naively transparent and can
easily be seen through. Events have been recorded as precisely and vividly as possible.
The mass of information of the historical personages of Turkey such as Ottoman Sultans
and Vizirs, Turkish Republican Presidents and Prime Ministers reviewed have provided
the first hand knowledge about the topic brought under review. Extremely useful and
interesting materials, which are much and varied, have been found in them. Turkish
literature of early 19th and 20th centuries provided crucially important materials. A whole
range of periodicals, journals, manuals and tracts shed valuable light on the Turkey
Europe Relations. To cite concrete examples The Insight Turkish, Middle Eastern Studies,
Journal of South Asian & Middle Eastern Studies and The Mediterranean Quarterly
offered much information of that period in general and Turkish foreign relations in
particular. Besides these other literary editors of the late 19th and 20th century have also
given relevant information about the period under scrutiny. Besides pamphlets and
booklets also constitute a source of perception of this topic. The study is not mere
vii
quantitative one but emerges in a more qualitative manner from strong impression gained
during the concentration on many of the relevant sources. Exchange of views with several
experts of the subject and men of the letters shed much light on the period under study
giving new insights.
Transliteration
Few words about Transliteration: This research study abounds with numerous nonEnglish terms (mainly Greek, Turkish and Arabic). For the sake of convenience of
topography and easy reading, accepted rules have been followed except in the case of
names of persons, places and publishers where the common usages has been followed.
References
The method developed in the MLA Handbook for Written Research Papers by Joseph
Gibaldi and Walter S. Achtert, New York, Modern Language Association, Fourth Edition,
1996, has been used for citing references in footnotes and bibliography, as far as possible.
While referring to an article in a given journal along with the date, we have specified its
Volume, Number and page. For instance Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern
Studies, Volume 41, Number10, January 1999, p. 13; European Studies, Volume 3,
Number 1, Spring 1996, pp. 2–15.
Calendar
In this research work quite a good number of books, journals and periodicals that have
been consulted follow the Gregorian Calendars.
Translation
As a number of source materials used in this thesis are in Bengali, therefore, obviously it
involved translation of the relevant portions. Translation from one language to another is
a most difficult and hazardous task. Particularly Bengali has its own turns and twist
lacking elsewhere. It is all the stiffer in case of the Bengali writings because of their
sonorous sweep and forceful expression not fully feasible of being conveyed from one
language to another. The translation from original version in Bengali into English has
been more or less literal as to make it readable and present it very largely in its original
state. Endeavour has been made to be faithful both to the letter and the spirit of the
original. On the whole, the English rendering has been done with careful verification of
the literal accuracy thus making it pretty reliable. Some translations done by accepted
authority have been duly acknowledged where applicable.
viii
SCHEME OF CONTENTS
Declaration
Certificate
Acknowledgement
Abstract
...............................................................................................
ii
..............................................................................................
iii
...........................................................................................
.............................................................................................
iv
vi
Notes on Research Methodology, Sources, Transliteration, References,
Calendar and Translation.......................................................................................
vii
Scheme of Contents
ix
...............................................................................................
List of Appendices, Illustration and
Tables................................................................
x
Abbreviation
...............................................................................................
xi
Chronology
...............................................................................................
xii
...............................................................................................
1
CHAPTERS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
17
AND MODERN TURKEY......................................
BACKGROUND OF TURKO- EUROPE
30
RELATIONS
POLITICAL RELATIONS...........................................
90
CHAPTER IV
SECTION - A
SECTION - B
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
CULTURAL RELATION
205
251
CHAPTER V
MARITIME RELATIONS............................................
281
CHAPTER VI
RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN EUNION..............
318
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION.............................................................. 414
BIBLIOGRAPHY
..............................................................................................
APPENDICES
...............................................................................................
ix
425
453
LIST OF APPENDICES
SL
Description
page
A
: List of the Ottoman Sultans.......................................................................... 453
B
: Maps related to Ottoman Empire and Turkey.............................................. 454
C
: List of the Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Turkish Republic............ 473
D
: Treaty Of Friendship And Collaboration.....................................................
475
E
: List of Anglo-Turkish Bilateral Agreements…………………….……
478
F
: Muslim Diaspora in Major Western Countries….………………………
483
G
: Member states of the EU, Candidate and Potential candidate states.........
485
H
: Turkish nationals, workers and job seekers in Eastern Europe.................... 486
I
: The letter from Britain’s Ambassador to France, for a Jewish state in
487
today’s Saudi Arabia...................................................................................
J
: Relevant pictures..........................................................................................
488
K
: Chart of Euro barometer..............................................................................
491
LIST OF ILLUSTRATION AND TABLES
Sl.
Description
Page
Table -1:
Table -2:
Table -3:
Albanians Religious Structure………………………………….......
Defense expenditures of Greece, Turkey and NATO………………
Turkish population in various state of Germany…………………...
129
145
164
Table -4:
Regional welfare weights of Turkey by province..............................
210
Table -5:
Figure-1:
Figure-2:
Basic Economic Indicators for Turkey and EU and………………..
Statistical effects of Turkey’s EU Membership……….…………...
GDP per capita in Turkey and in the EU…….…………..………...
231
232
232
Table -6:
Some Key Trade Indicators of Turkey (1963-2002) (Billion US dollars)…
235
Figure-3:
Export and Import Shares in GDP by years (%) …………………..
235
Figure-4:
Turkey’s total Trade, Trade with the EU and the EU………………
236
Table-7:
Turkey and the EU Trade....................................................................
238
x
ABBREVIATIONS
AKP
AP
BSEC
CFSP
CIA
COMECON
CSCE
DNA
DP
EEC
ENP
Justice and Development Party (Adalet Ve Kalkimna Partisi)
Additional protocol
Black Sea Economic Cooperation
common foreign and security policy
Central Intelligence Agency
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (carrying genetic information in chromosome)
Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
European Economic Council
European Neighbourhood Policy
EOKA
National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion
Agoniston)
EU
EC
ERP
FP
GDP
ICBM
ICJ
IMF
MHP
NATO
NACC
OECD
OEEC
OIC
OSS
PKK
RAND
SEE
TRNC
KKTC/TRNC
UNO
UNCLOS
USSR
USA
UNPROFOR
UNFICYP
WEU
European Union
European Commission
European Recovery Program
Foreign Policy
Gross Domestic Product
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
International Court of Justice
International Monetary Found
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organization for European Economic Co-operation
Organization of Islamic Cooperation
Office of Strategic Service
Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)
Research ANd Development
South-Eastern Europe
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Kuzey Kıbrıs Turk Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus)
United Nations Organization
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Union of Socialist Soviet Russia
United States of America
United Nations Protection Forces
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
Western European Union
xi
CHRONOLOGY AND TIMELINE OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS TILL 1990
RISE (1299–1453)
1299
1389
1396
1444
February 31 The rise of Osman I, founder of the Ottoman Empire
June 15, Battle of Kosovo, Most of Serbia is conquered.
September 25, Battle of Nicopolis, Bulgaria is conquered
November 10, Battle of Varna, Ottoman victory signals the end of Crusade of
Varna
GROWTH (1453–1683)
1453
1460
1461
1462
1463
1473
1475
1478
1480
1481
1482
1489
Mohamed II (the Conqueror) captures Constantinople, The Byzantine emperor
Constantine XI dies in the fighting, and the Byzantine Empire of the Romans
yields once and for all to the Ottoman Empire.
Mohamed II conquers Morea.
Mohamed II conquers Trabzon thus ends Empire of Trebizond.
Mohamed II begins to build his palace, Topkapi Palace (Topkapı Sarayi).
Bosnia is conquered.
Battle of Otlukbeli; Mohamed II defeats Uzun Hasan of Akkoyunlu Turkmens.
Gedik Ahmed Pasha captures Caffa. Crimea becomes vassal of the Ottoman
Empire.
Albania is conquered
Gedik Ahmed Pasha captures Otranto, the southeast corner of Italy as a base for
further attacks on Italy (only to evacuate after the death of Mohamed II).
Mohamed II dies. Bayezid II ascended to the throne.
Herzegovina is conquered
Montenegro is conquered
16TH CENTURY
1514
1516
1517
1519
1520
1521
1522
1526
1529
1533
1538
Battle of Chaldiran; Selim I defeats Ismail I of Safavid Persia; East Anatolia
under Turkish control
Battle of Marj Dabiq; Selim I defeats Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri of Mamluk
Sultanate of Egypt. Syria and Palestine under Ottoman rule.
Battle of Ridaniya; Selim I defeats Tuman bay II of Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt.
Egypt under Ottoman rule; Selim I takes the title Caliph
Algeria is conquered
The reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (Suleiman I) begins.
Suleiman I captures Belgrade
Suleiman I captures Rhodes
Battle of Mohacs. Suleiman I defeats Louis II of Hungary and Bohemia
Siege of Vienna
Iraq under Turkish rule
Sea Battle of Preveza, Turkish navy controls most of Mediterranean Sea (1550 1650s), Sultanate of Women
xii
1551
1541
1547
1566
1569
1570
1574
1571
1578
1590
1610
1612
1615
Libya is taken over
Suleiman I captures Budapest (known as Buda), which eventually leads to
conquest of most of Hungary.
Most of Hungary under Turkish control. Hungary is divided, by agreement
between the Ottoman sultan Suleiman I and Ferdinand I of Austria
The reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (Suleiman I) ends.
The great fire of Istanbul broke out
Conquest of Cyprus by Piyale Pasha
Tunisia is conquered
The Spanish and the Venetians defeat the Turks at the Battle of Lepanto
Tblisi and most of Georgia conquered
Treaty of Istanbul between Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia; Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as west Iran under Ottoman rule
Kuyucu Murat Pasha suppresses Jelali revolts. Turkmens suffer heavily.
Treaty of Nasuh Pasha between Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia. Ottoman
Empire gives up some gains of Treaty of Istanbul of 1590
Treaty of Serav ratifies Treaty of Nasuh Pasha
STAGNATION (1683–1827)
1683
1686
1687
1699
September11 Battle of Vienna. Ottoman defeat
Hungary evacuated
Mehmed IV dies.
Ottomans cede Hungary to Austria in the Treaty of Karlowitz
18TH CENTURY
1718
1718
1729
1730
1739
1768–
1774
1774
Treaty of Passarowitz signed.
Beginning of Tulip era (up to 1730)
First printing press in Turkish by Ibrahim Muteferrika
Revolt of Patrona Halil, End of Tulip era. Ahmed -III is dethroned.
Treaty of Belgrade signed.
Russo- Turkish War, Russo-Turkish War that brought Southern Ukraine, Crimea
and the upper northwestern part of the North Caucasus within the orbit of the
Russian Empire.
Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji signed
19TH CENTURY
1807
1808
1813
1821
May, Kabakci Mustafa rebellion: Reformist Sultan Selim III dethroned.
July 21, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha suppresses the rebellion. Selim III passed away
and Mahmud II becomes the new Sultan.
April 23 Second Serbian Uprising: The Serbs revolt.
Greek War of Independence: The Greek War of Independence begins.
xiii
DECLINE (1828–1908)
1830
1832
1831–
1833
1853
1860
1862
1876
1877
1878
1881
1882
1885
Algeria is gradually ceded to French rule.
July 21 Greek War of Independence: Greek sovereignty is formalized
Egyptian–Ottoman War
October 4, Crimean War: The Crimean War with Russia began which, though
won with British, French and Sardinian aid, would further demonstrate how
backward the Ottoman military had become
October 21: First newspaper in Turkish published by Agah Efendi
February 5: A united Romanian autonomous state is established
December 23: Opened the 1876–1877 Constantinople Conference
April 24: Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878): Another war with Russia, the Russo
Turkish War of 1877–1878, begins
March 3 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878): The Treaty of San Stefano
recognizes Romanian and Serbian independence, as well as the establishment of
an autonomous Bulgarian principality under nominal Ottoman protection.
Austria-Hungary occupies Bosnia by default. June 4 Cyprus is occupied by
Britain.
Tunisia becomes a French colony
Egypt goes under British protection.
September 6, the province of Eastern Rumelia is transferred to Bulgarian
jurisdiction
DISSOLUTION AND KAMALIST REFORMS (1908–1938)
1908
1912
1913
1914
1915
1919
1920
1922
1923
1924
July 3, Second Constitutional Era (Young Turks revolution), October 5
Bulgaria obtains full independence, October 7 Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia
The Ottomans are easily defeated by Italy in a short war, with the Italians
gaining Libya and ending the 340-year Ottoman presence in North Africa,
November 28, First Balkan War: Albania declares independence
May 17, Second Balkan War: The Ottoman Empire is nearly wiped out from
Europe, save for Istanbul and just enough land around to defend it.
August 2, The Ottoman Empire enters into World War I on the side of the
Central Powers. Cyprus is annexed outright by Britain.
April 24, Young Turk government organizes an exile of the Armenians to the
southern Anatolia after Armenians allied with Russians and revolted with arms
against the Ottoman Empire.
June 28, Treaty of Versailles signed; 1919-1921, National War of Independence
April 23, Grand National Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal as the first president
of assembly; August 10, humiliating treaty of Sevres signed.
November 1, Abolition of the office of the Ottoman Sultan.
July 24, Treaty of Lausanne was signed; October 29, Proclamation of
the Republic of Turkey
March 3, Abolition of the office of Caliphate held by the Ottoman Caliphate
xiv
1925
1926
1928
1932
1935
1938
November 25, Change of headgear and dress; November 30, Closure of
religious convents and dervish lodges.
Swiss civil code, Italian penal code and German commercial code introduced
instead of Islamic Shariah code.
November 1, Arabic alphabet was replaced by Latin alphabet in Turkish
language
June 21, 1934: Introduction of the law on family names; November 26,
Abolition of titles and by-names; December 5, Full political rights, to vote and
be elected, to women
Turkey was admitted to the League of Nations in July.
Sunday was declared as a weekly holyday instead of Friday.
10 November, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk has been passed away
TURKEY-EUROPE RELATIONS
(1939– Turkey maintained neutrality during the World War II period.
1945)
Turkey attends the San Francisco Conference and becomes a Charter member of
1945
the United Nations.
Republican People’s Party (CHP) wins the general elections in Turkey.
1946
Turkey is included, alongside Greece, in the Truman Doctrine.
1947
Turkey begins receiving Marshall Plan aid and becomes a member of the
1948
OECD.
Turkey becomes a member of the Council of Europe.
1949
Turkey holds its first multiparty general elections, bringing the Democrat Party
1950
(DP) to power. Turkey participates in the Korean War.
Turkey becomes a member of NATO.
1952
DP wins the general elections. Turkey and the US sign the Military Facilities
1954
Agreement.
DP wins the general elections.
1957
Turkey applies for Association to the EEC.
1959
First military coup in Turkey.
1960
The coalition government of the CHP and the Justice Party formed after the
1961
elections.
Cuban Missile Crisis and the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
1962
Signature of the ‘Ankara Agreement’: the Association Agreement between
1963
Turkey and the EEC.
Through the ‘Johnson letter,’ the US warns Turkey that it would not intervene if
1964
the Soviet Union attacked Turkey in defense of the Republic of Cyprus.
The Justice Party wins the general elections.
1965
Signature of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement.
1970
Second military coup in Turkey.
1971
The Additional Protocol enters into force. The coalition government of the CHP
1973
and the National Salvation Party is formed after elections.
xv
1974
1975
1980
1982
1983
1986
1987
1989
1990
1991
Following a Greek coup in Cyprus, Turkey militarily intervenes in the island.
US arms embargo on Turkey.
12 September military coup in Turkey, Turkey and the US sign the Defense and
Economic Cooperation Agreement.
Formal relations between Turkey and the EC are suspended following the coup.
The Motherland Party wins the general elections.
Relations between Turkey and EC are reinstated. The EC signs the Single
European Act.
Turkey applies for full EC membership.
The European Commission rejects Turkey’s application for membership.
Turkey participates in the Gulf War. The Treaty of Maastricht enters into force
Establishing the European Union.
xvi
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Turkey is one of the countries based on an ancient agrarian civilization. Constantinople1
(Istanbul) was the capital city of the Byzantine Empire for more than a thousand years,
since the fall of the Roman Empire in fifth century. After the fall of Byzantine Empire in
1453 CE, the Ottomans became the de facto ruler of this Empire for more than 600 years.
Prior to the World War I (1914-1918), this Empire was known as Ottoman Khilafat,2 its
territories sprawled across the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. In World War I
Turkey was compelled to participate in favour of Central Powers mainly Germany and
Austria. After the War Turkey lost most of her territories. The occupation of
Constantinople and Smyrna by the Allies3 in the aftermath of World War I prompted the
establishment of the Turkish National Movement. Under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal Pasha (1981-1938), the Turkish War of Independence was waged with the aim of
revoking the terms of the Treaty of Sevres.4 On 1 November, 1922 the newly founded
parliament formally abolished the Sultanate, thus ending 623 years (1300-1923) of
monarchical Ottoman rule. The Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 led to the
international recognition of the sovereignty of the newly formed “Republic of Turkey” as
the continuing state of the Ottoman Empire, and the republic was officially proclaimed on
29 October 1923 in Ankara, the country’s new capital. The symbol of central Islamic
unity, Khilafat was abolished on 3 March 1924.5 Ataturk was the President of the state
until his death in 1938.
The growth of Ottoman Turks in Europe is deeply rooted in the teaching of Prophet
Muhammad (SM).6 The dissemination of the Message of Muhammad (SM) in Eastern
and Western Europe has been accompanied by a history worthy of good remembrance
and entitled to the pride of Muslims7. On the other hand, unfortunately, there have
undeniably been situations betraying the ill will of many Europeans who, in order to
strengthen their religious views, resorted to the harshest of methods and the most
repulsive of deeds.
Those who came with the banner of Islam in the West, in Spain, France, and Italy, were
Arabs and Berbers, and those who raised it in the eastern parts of Europe were often
Ottoman Turks and Tartars, peoples who excelled in courage and boldness; yet despite
their differences in character, all their annals, from the standpoint of their success in
1
spreading the Message of Prophet Muhammad (SM) and their religious forbearance, are
covered with glory and deserving of pride. In contrast, both the pious and the wicked
among the European nations participated in a chain of sanguinary atrocities over the span
of hundreds of years to resist the Message of Prophet Muhammad (SM) in Western and
Eastern Europe.
What is difficult to explain is that this cruelty which the Europeans exercised in their
efforts to put an end to Muslim civilization and religion in Spain, France, and Italy and in
Eastern Europe was perpetrated in its ugliest forms even against Christians themselves,
whenever there was a sharp quarrel over a religious opinion or a Christian dogma, as well
as against Jews.
European nations are not all of one race, or from one area, or of one nature. There exist
among them the differences in race, language, and temperament that are found among
Eastern nations. What, then, unified their methods and rendered violence, murder,
treachery, and oppression the most outstanding methods for exalting one religion over
another? What has made desert peoples, such as the Arabs, and peoples whose profession
is to wage war, such as the Turks, Tartars, and Berbers, choose to spread their religion by
reason and example? For in a long history covering more than a thousand years and
including Eastern and Western lands, one finds no traces of those crushing atrocities
repeatedly committed for long periods of time by Europeans against other Europeans or
against members of other religious communities. For this a reason cannot be found with
which one can arm oneself, for the Prophet ‘Isa (may peace be upon him) was the victim
of violence; he was among the best of those who called to kindness and peace, and his
Message forbade war and fighting absolutely. It was not the religion of Christ which
spread this despicable spirit of prejudice.
Similarly, the simplicity of the religious decrees of the Muslims renders obvious both
what is sanctioned and what is forbidden in a revealed Book. Both the select and the
average man know that God has forbidden compulsion in religion; they know that He has
declared to His Prophet, “And had Allah willed, He could have gathered them together
(all) on true guidance, so be not you one of those who are Al-Jahilun (the ignorant)”8 The
religion which forbids its members to curse other religions makes no allowance for
persecution and oppression. Allah says, “And insult not those whom they (disbelievers)
worship besides Allah, lest they insult Allah wrongfully without knowledge. Thus We
2
have made fair-seeming to each people its own doings; then to their Lord is their return
and He shall then inform them of all that they used to do.9.”
The simplicity of the Muslim belief may be one of the factors responsible for the creation
of this forbearing nature, for this belief is based on the testimony, “There is no God but
Allah, and Muhammad is His Apostle.” When men proceeded on the simple premises
embodied in these elements and abandoned what lay beyond to the account of God, they
accustomed themselves thereby to the exercise of forbearance and magnanimity toward
each other as well as toward those of other religious communities who differed with
them. These causes constitute some of the reasons for the essential difference between the
religious laws of Muslims and the religious laws of Europeans.
When the Arabs entered Spain in 711 CE, the sixth Council of Toledo had decreed that
upon the assumption of their reign, Spanish monarchs were to take an oath not to tolerate
in their realms anyone who did not adhere to the Catholic faith, and to carry out this law
with intimate severity against those who dissented. Among other things, this law provided
for life imprisonment and the confiscation of property of whoever contemplated disputing
the decrees of the Church and Catholic teachings. According to Heliferich,
Edicts of a brutally severe character were passed against such as refused to be
baptized; and they consequently hailed the invading Arabs as their deliverers
from such cruel oppression. . . . Slaves who had become Christians also
rejoiced greatly in the coming of the Arabs, and those who had been
subjected to persecution now joined the religion of the Arabs in waves. . . .
The nobility as well as the masses were enthusiastic about this new and free
religion10.
In this regard Sir Thomas Arnold adds:
Having once become Muslims, these Spanish converts showed themselves
zealous adherents of their adopted faith, and they and their children joined
themselves to the Puritan party of the rigid Muhammadan theologians as
against the careless and luxurious life of the Arab aristocracy11.
In the days of the Arab conquest, no cases were reported of any attempt at compulsion in
religion or of any persecution or oppression for the purpose of changing a belief. Perhaps
the primary reason the Muslims came into rapid possession of this western section of
Europe was the magnanimity and forbearance which infused their religion. Likewise, the
3
forbearance displayed by Muslim governors, who permitted religious freedom to the
Christians, mingled with them, and married from among them, led to a large scale of
Arabization among the Christian elements, many of whom took Arab names and had
themselves circumcised like their Muslim neighbuors. Referring to those Christians
subject to Arab rule as “Muzarab” or “Arabized” indicates the direction in which they
inclined. Arabized Christian’s admiration for the language of the Qur’an became so great
that they began to recite it and marvel at it. Moreover, the effect of the Message reached
the heads of the church themselves, whose thinking, both inside and outside of Spain,
began to emulate the Islamic view.12
In brief, the exemplary behaviour of the Muslims, combined with the strength of their
Message, was instrumental in the Christians adopting Islam after only a very short period
of acquaintance. The effect of good example and wise preaching reached the point where
Christians would not abstain from joining Islam even when the defeated Muslims were
being treated with barbarous oppression and forced to desert their homelands in Europe.
One of the strangest phenomena in this connection comes to light in Sterling Maxwell’s
account of the events of 1499, seven years after the fall of Granada-that new Muslims
who had entered Islam fled with the crowds who were fleeing the sword and fire.
The barbarian armies of the Franks defeated the Arab Muslims in the eighth century, and
thereby greatly retarded the cultural advancement of Europe. 13 Treacherous and
prejudiced forces triumphed once more in a thorough fashion during the fifteenth century,
and thus gave a setback to knowledge and civilization. During the time when the courts of
the Inquisition and the swords of the state were leading the messengers of civilization to
slaughter or to the sea in the West, stripping homelands of their entire populations, and
during the time when Granada fell and the vestiges of two hundred thousand Muslims
were wiped out (most of whom were of the original inhabitants) through massacre,
banishment, and dispersal.14 The triumphant armies of Islam under another banner, the
Turkish, were conquering the Eastern European kingdoms, Christians were enjoying
refuge in the shade of a new justice, and people were being blessed with freedom of
conscience and religion.
Byzantium, the center of enmity against Muslims and the source whence tempests blew
upon Muslim homelands for eight centuries, fell, but religious rights were not abolished;
Conquerors did not dominate beliefs and religions, nor were people chased out of their
4
homelands, nor were they brought to account for their intentions and consciences. Let us
leave the word to some Christian historians15 as condensed by Arnold:
One of the first steps taken by Muhammad II (1432-81 CE), after the capture of
Constantinople and the re-establishment of order in that city was to secure the
allegiance of the Christians, by proclaiming himself the protector of the Greek
Church. Persecution of the Christians was strictly forbidden; a decree was granted
to the newly elected patriarch who secured to him and his successors and the
bishops under him, the enjoyment of the old privileges, revenues and exemptions
enjoyed under former rule. Gennadios, the first patriarch after the Turkish
conquest, received from the hands of the Sultan himself the pastoral staff, which
was the sign of his office, together with a purse of a thousand gold ducats and a
horse with gorgeous trappings, on which he was privileged to ride with his train
through the city. But notionally was the head of the Church treated with all the
respect he had been accustomed to receive from the Christian emperors, but
further he was invested with extensive civil power. The patriarch’s court sat to
decide all cases between Greek and Greek: it could impose fines, imprison
offenders in a prison provided for its own special use, and in some cases even
condemn to capital punishment: while the ministers and officials of the
government were directed to enforce its judgments. The complete control of
spiritual and ecclesiastical matters (in which the Turkish government, unlike the
civil power of the Byzantine empire, never interfered), was left entirely in his
hands and those of the grand Synod which he could summon whenever he pleased;
and hereby he could decide all matters of faith and dogma without fear of
interference on the part of the state. As a recognized officer of the imperial
government, he could do much for the alleviation of the oppressed, by bringing the
acts of unjust governors to the notice of the sultan. The Greek bishops in the
provinces in their turn were treated with great consideration and were entrusted
with so much jurisdiction in civil affairs, that up to modern times they have acted
in their dioceses almost as if they were Ottoman prefects over the orthodox
population, taking the place of the old Christian aristocracy which had been
exterminated by the conquerors..16
Such were the deeds of the Muslims in the East, and Granada fell to the Spaniards forty
years after Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks. Most analyses of the Ottoman
Empire’s identity and status in inter-national societies are generally presented from the
perspective of both Western states interests and Western scholars. Such works usually
5
regard the relationship between the European states and the Ottoman Empire as the
longest and most equal of all European relations with non-European states. As Wight
pointed out, “the politics of the defense of Europe against the Ottoman Turks were
religious politics ... The rulers of the West regarded the Turks with fear and disgust as a
barbarian intruder, and revived the idea of a crusade to deliver the Balkans and the Near
East from the infidel”.17 His emphasis was more on religious politics than identity
politics. The idea that European identity developed in relation to the existence of the
Ottoman Empire as the dangerous ‘other’ has been put on the research agenda of
international society scholars recently. From a different perspective, Edward Said also
emphasized that Islam was a source of European fear, within which the Ottoman Empire
represented a ‘constant danger’ for the whole of Christian civilization until the end of the
seventeenth century.18 Thus, the role of the Ottomans as the other in defining European
collective identity is the first neglected dimension of the conventional English School
approach.
From the Western point of view, the Ottoman Empire was not regarded as a European
state. But there is another side of the coin as well: it was not necessary for the Ottomans
to be part of the society of European states at the zenith of its imperial power since
Ottoman civilization was seen as superior to that of the Europeans. From the Ottoman
point of view, the West was also the ‘other’ (kafir –infidel)19 in terms of its different
socio-political structure and religion. The Ottoman Sultan was accepted as the head of the
Muslims, the Caliph and the successor of the Prophet Muhammad (SM).20 The
consequence of this belief, ‘Ottomanisation’ also signified ‘Islamization’ and its selfidentity was that of the ‘protector’ of the Muslim world against the ‘infidel’ Christian
world. Arguably, the Ottoman Sultans considered themselves superior to their Western
counterparts and chose to exclude the Empire from the European society of states.
Although the Ottoman Empire accepted Western ambassadors to Istanbul at certain times
for limited periods, Ottoman ambassadors were not sent to European states until the
eighteenth century, demonstrating that they did not understand such exchanges to be
reciprocal.21 However, the Sultans had to change their perceptions of the West in order to
survive with the help of European allies when the Empire started declining in the midseventeenth century.
When the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the politics of European states and reluctantly
decided to be a member of international society in the mid-nineteenth century, it was not
6
easy for either the European states or the Ottoman Empire to define the Empire’s identity
and place within this society. In fact, the first sign of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement
in European affairs was in 1536 CE when Francis I of France allied himself with the
Ottoman Sultan before launching an attack on Italy. However, this involvement was
short-lived. A more radical shift in European politics occurred in the seventeenth century.
The emergence of the Westphalian22 political order in Europe in 1648 CE and the defeat
of Ottoman forces in the Vienna siege of 1683 CE decreased the role of the perceived
Islamic threat to European identity and security. The first defeat of the Ottomans by the
victorious Christian powers, the Holy League, at Carlowitz in 1699 CE was a turning
point in Ottoman–European relations. While Europeans gained self-confidence about
their military superiority, they also decided to invite ‘the dangerous Ottoman-Turk’, for
the first time, to participate in a European congress.23 The subsequent Treaty of Utrecht in
1714 CE became the last treaty to refer to the notion of republica Christiana in European
collective identity as the medieval idea of ‘Christendom’ subsequently lost its power in
political thought.24 As Jackson remarks:
Medieval Europe was- at the most basic level of human ideas, thought and
feeling – a community of Christian believers. The sacred duty of the pope
and the emperor, of kings, barons, bishops, priest, and indeed of every
Christian to uphold and defend that community. The only uniform
institution that existed across Western Europe and by far the most important
institution of the Middle Ages was the cosmopolitan ‘Christian
Commonwealth’ or republica Christiana built on the community, which
was devoted to Christian redemption and salvation.” 25
As European politics became increasingly secularized throughout the eighteenth century,
Britain and France established close relations with the Ottoman Empire as an integral part
of their political and economic interests. The Ottoman defeat by the Russians in the war
of 1768–74 CE led the Ottomans to recognise that they needed European allies to protect
the integrity of the Empire. Although the Ottoman rulers decided to develop close
relations with the ‘infidel’ European states, this was not an easy task. They had to fulfil
‘the standard of civilization’, which was proclaimed as the criteria of membership of
international society by the European great powers. The notions of legitimacy,
international law and mutual recognition played an important role in determining which
state would be included or excluded within the ‘civilized’ international society.26
7
The 1853 CE Crimean War between the Russians and the Ottomans concluded with the
Treaty of Paris in 1856 CE and had a distinctive meaning for Ottoman history. 27 On the
one hand, it emphasized the continual disintegration and decline of the Empire; on the
other, the Empire was admitted as a power into the European society of states. As Karl
Polanyi argues, its ‘admission’ was granted when the integrity of the Ottoman Empire
was declared essential to the equilibrium of Europe in 1856 CE. The Concert of Europe
subsequently tried to maintain the integrity of the Empire. After 1878 CE, its
dismemberment would also be provided in a similarly orderly manner when its
disintegration was deemed essential to that equilibrium.28 It was after the Treaty of Paris
that the Ottoman government -Sublime Porte29 recognized that it had to develop close
economic, political and ideological relations with the European states in order to preserve
the Empire’s existence in the international system. After 1856 CE, the Sublime Porte
accepted the three main requirements of European international society in order to protect
the independence of the Ottoman state.30 In fact, it was a matter of survival as well as a
desire to become an equal member of the society of European states.
First, the Treaty of Paris forced the Sublime Porte to repudiate the Islamic character of
the state. By doing so, the Empire started acting more like a secular dynastic state on the
European model of the state system. The rejection of the Empire’s Islamic character was
interpreted by the Sublime Porte as accepting all the subjects of the Empire, of whatever
religion, as equal, and ensuring that it should be so regarded by other actors in domestic
politics.
Second, in relation to the first requirement, the Sublime Porte had to accept modern
arguments on the principle of nationality, or of national self determination. This created a
paradox in Ottoman politics since the acceptance of these principles threatened the
Empire’s integrity by leading to the disintegration of the millet system.
Third, if the Empire wanted to be part of the European society of states on equal terms, it
had to observe European international law. The Islahat Fermani (Reform Decree) of 1856
CE was a reflection of these requirements in domestic politics. The document emphasized
full equality for all subjects in its words, “Surely, the Ottomans did not offer equal rights
to their subjects-a meaningless anachronism in the context of that time and place. They
did however offer a degree of tolerance without precedent or parallel in Christian
Europe.” In fact, the Sublime Porte, during the reign of Sultan Abdul Majid (1839–61
8
CE), accepted these requirements in order to become an equal member of the European
society of states and to protect the independence of the state. Paradoxically, these
attempts brought about the demise of the Ottoman Empire.
Until the end of 19th Century, Turkey has observed internal political disorder, military
coups, and interruption of the democratic system by military in the framework of
Kemalist secular ideology and Europeanization process. Elected governments drifted
away from the power due to military powers given in the 1923 constitution. The debate
was going on in Turkish society from 150 years on the issue, how to prevent the collapse
of the empire. But after the collapse of the Empire, they tried to determine the pathway as
to how the development and prosperity of Turkey could be achieved. On the one hand,
some accepted man made worldly western culture and civilization, socialism and
secularism31 to move along with the changing world. On the other hand, some Turkish
believed that the development of the Turkish society can be ensured by following the path
of Islam, which was acted as the goading factor behind the expansion of Ottoman Empire
and Bodiuzzaman Said Nursi was one of them, who believed that Islam is the main source
of civilization. They also believed that the good aspects of the science and technology can
be accepted from the West, not the way of life.32
Presently Turkey is passing through transformation process in a dynamic international
environment. This process is an inevitable necessity of post Cold-War international
relations. This is also a consequence of Turkey’s geo-political position. Turkey has been
re-adjusting its foreign policy principles and priorities in accordance with its domestic
changes and the new counter appearance in the world politics. In the post-World War-I
period Turkish state was in a whole turmoil related to domestic and foreign affairs.
Turkey was both militarily fighting against the outsiders who were competing with each
other to have a share of the Ottoman territories and, testifying the culmination of an
uneasy reform process inside. Within the destructive ruins in the wake of the First World
War and then the War of Independence (1919-23), Turkey tried to consolidate integrity
inside and sovereignty outside, in order to survive as a newly established nation-state.
Turkey was then busy with conducting its westernization agenda in domestic politics,
while trying to normalize its foreign relations. These extra-ordinary conditions strictly
shaped and limited the foreign policy behaviour of the new Republic and mainly resulted
in security-oriented foreign policy formation.
9
With the ushering of the Cold War international system, Turkey’s sphere to maneuver
strategically in the international arena was also constrained. Cold War bipolar system
forced the states to place themselves within one of the two rival power poles, the USA
and USSR. In this power polarization, Turkey determined its position under the Western
security umbrella. In this context, Turkish foreign policy was mainly in harmony with the
Western expectations. Until the end of the Cold War in 1990, use of Turkey’s geopolitical position were mostly subordinated to the questions of security, due to Cold War
polarization outside and the hard domestic politics inside. Decline of the Soviet system in
1991 signified a vital transformation in the parameters of the Cold-War international
relations. Bipolar balance of power system collapsed. The end of the strategic balance
between the two continental powers left behind an ambiguity for the future of
international order. Consequentially, political instability remained after the bipolar order
paved way to the strategic monopoly of the US leadership.
It is obvious and acknowledged by many circles that the Turks and the Europeans
conjointly had a great role in shaping each other’s identity. Just as Europeans have greatly
contributed to the formation of the Turkish identity, so the Turks have also been the cause
for the search for a common “European” concept. Halit Refig writes in his article “Should
Turkey Look East?” that the Europeans alienated themselves from the Turkish lifestyle
and culture, which they characterized as “alla turca.” On the other hand, although it did
not fit with their everyday lives and culture, the Turks have done the opposite, making
European culture- which they called as “alla franca” – a part of their lives. They even
elevated it to an elite status. Turkey has faced Europe, as the inheritor of the Romans, for
a thousand years, seeking equality within its ranks, but always refusing to accept its
political supremacy. All the while, doing everything in their power to restrain the control
of Europe over Asia, Turks also have not regretted their Asian roots.33
British historian Lord Acton stated that, modern history and European self-awareness
emerged as a consequence of the pressure caused by the Ottoman victories. 34 Again,
according to some historians, the discovery of the American continent was a direct result
of European land access to Asia being sealed off by the Turks. As a result, the Europeans
started to search for new routes across the seas.
At this stage it is pertinent to mention that there is lack of authentic research work in this
particular period of study brought under review in this thesis. However, there are some
10
related works pertaining to Turko-Europe relations namely: Virginia H. Aksan’s work on
Ottomans and Europeans Contacts and Conflicts; The Greek Minority of Istanbul and
Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974 by Alexandris Alexis; Turkey’s Relationship with
the West and the Turkic Republics by Idris Bal; Building a Partnership: Turkey and the
European Union by Tozun Bacheli; Greek- Turkish Relations Since 1955, Anglo-Ottoman
Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays by Allan B. Cunningham; Europe
and the Turk, a Pattern of Alliances, edited by Edward Ingram & Dorothy Vaughan;
Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007 by Carter V. Findley;
The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe by Daniel Goffman, Turkish Foreign
Policy 1774–2000 by William Hale; Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991 Soviet
foreign policy, Turkey and communism by Bulent Gokay; Ottomans, Turks and the
Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered by Ebru Boyar.
Other mentionable books are viz; Turkey and The European Union : Domestic Politics,
Economic Integration and International Dynamics edited by Ali Carko Lu & Barry
Rubin; Turkish Foreign Policy And Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach by Yucel
Bozdaglioglu; Turkey and European Integration Accession Prospects and Issues edited
by Mehmet Ugur & Nergis Canefe; Identity And Turkish Foreign Policy: The Kemalist
Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus by Umut Uzer; American Image in Turkey: U.S.
Foreign Policy Dimensions by Giray Sadik; British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the
present: A study in the evolution of the resident embassy by G. R. Berridge; Sylvia
Kedourie edited Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics, & Seventy-Five Years of the
Turkish Republic and Turkey Before and After Ataturk: Internal and External Affairs;
Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804 by Peter F Sugar; Turkey and the
European Community by Ilhan Tekely & Selim Ilkin and Ali Resul Usul’s monograph
Democracy in Turkey : The impact of EU political conditionality.
On this particular theme of study there are also some articles/papers published in leading
recognized journals. These have correlation with the problem under scrutiny in this thesis.
To mention a few: Seiju Desai, ‘Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective
Risk or Opportunity’ in Defence Studies Journal, Sezer Haluk ‘Regional welfare weights
for Turkey’ in Journal of Economic Studies, Andrew Mango ‘Turkey and The
Enlargement of the European Mind’ in Middle Eastern Studies, Alexander Murinson ‘The
Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy’ in Middle Eastern Studies, W. Park
‘Turkey’s European Union candidacy: from Luxembourg to Helsinki-to Ankara?’ in
11
Mediterranean Politics, and Yucel Bozdaglioglu’s article ‘Modernity, Identity and
Turkey’s Foreign Policy’, in Insight Turkey.
All the above mentioned books and articles partially throw some light on Turko-Europe
Relations and does not exactly cover the Cold War period. Hence there existed a void in
this particular period and this demands a systematic and scientific research study in this
sphere. There are, of course, a number of components contained with this study like
geography, politics, economic relations, civilizations, values and traditions. In this
dissertation, there is an attempt to focus on these components during the Cold War period
examining Turkey’s foreign policy making, in the light of the main argument that Turkey
has new approaches with new dimensions in foreign policy primarily intended to enhance
its relations with Europe. This research study fills in that vacuum from the proper
historical perspective.
The contours of Turko- Europe relations has been shaped by a new orientation in the light
of the new regional and global developments. As a major country in the midst of the
Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that
cannot be reduced to one, unified category. In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a
Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and
Black Sea country all at the same time. Turkey should appropriate a new position in the
region by providing security and stability not only for itself but also for its neighbors and
the region. Turkey’s engagements from Africa to Central Asia and from EU to OIC are
part of a new foreign policy vision. Domestically, Turkey needs to deepen and enrich its
democracy, accommodate the differences within its society, and strengthen the
coordination and balance among its institutions. Through these initiatives Turkey is to
emerge as a global actor as it approaches 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the
establishment of the Turkish Republic (on 29 October, 1923).
12
Notes and References:
1.
The first known name of the city is Byzantium (Greek: Byzantion), the name given to
it at its foundation by Megarean colonists around 660 BC. The name is thought to be
derived from a personal name, Byzas. Ancient Greek tradition refers to a legendary
king of that name as the leader of the Greek colonists. However, modern scholars
have also hypothesized that the name of Byzas was of local Thracian or Illyrian origin
and hence predated the Megarean settlement. After Constantine the Great made it the
new eastern capital of the Roman Empire in 330 AD, the city became widely known
as Constantinopolis (Constantinople),
which,
as
the
Latinized
form
of Konstantinoupolis, means the “City of Constantine”. He also attempted to promote
the name Neva Roma -“New Rome”, but this did not attain widespread
usage. Constantinople remained the most common name for the city in the West until
the establishment of the Turkish Republic, and Kostantiniyye and Istanbul were the
names used alternatively by the Ottomans during their rule, see, Adrian Room, Place
Names of the World: Origins and Meanings of the Names for 6,600 Countries, Cities,
Territories, Natural Features, and Historic Sites, Jefferson, 2nd ed., N.C.: McFarland
& Company, 2006, p.177;
2.
The term Khilafat is derived from the Arabic word khaliah which means ‘successor’,
or ‘deputy’ and is considered a shortening of the term Khalifat Rasul
Allah (“successor of the messenger of Allah”), is a form of Islamic politicalreligious leadership which centers around the Khalifh - i.e. “successor”to Muhammad. see for details: Muhammad Omor Faruq & Mahfuzur Rahman
Akhanda, History of Islam: Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) and Khulafae Rashidin,
BIIT, Dhaka, 2014, pp. 225-231
3
After the end of World War I, Turkish victory in Turkish-Armenian, FrancoTurkish, Greco-Turkish wars (often referred to as the Eastern Front, the Southern
Front, and the Western Front of the war, respectively), Allies force agreed to was
abandoned the Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in July 1923.
The Allies left Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, and the Grand National Assembly of
Turkey decided the establishment of a Republic in Turkey,
4.
Treaty of Sevres, (Aug. 10, 1920), post-World War I pact between the victorious
Allied powers and representatives of the government of Ottoman Turkey.
The treaty abolished the Ottoman Empire and obliged Turkey to renounce all rights
over Arab Asia and North Africa. The pact also provided for an independent Armenia,
for an autonomous Kurdistan, and for a Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the
Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands commanding
the Dardanelles. Rejected by the new Turkish nationalist regime, the Treaty of Sevres
was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. (See: Andrew Mango, Ataturk: The
13
Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey, Overlook, p.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 536839/Treaty-of-Sevres)
ixxviii;
5.
Hakan Ozoglu, From Khilafat to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish
Republic, ABC-Clio, 2011, p. 8
6.
(SM) stand for- Sallahu Alaihi Wa Sallam, a supplication after the name of the
Prophet Muhammad Sallahu Alaihe sallam; it is obligatory on a Muslim to recite this
Doah or Supplication. The Quranic order in this regard is explicitly in Surah Ahzab,
thus: “Allah sends His Salat (Graces, Honours, Blessings, Mercy) on the Prophet
(SM), and also His angels. O you who believe! Send your Salat on him (SM), and
(you should) greet (salute) him with the Islamic way of greeting (salutation i.e. AsSalamu ‘Alaikum).” Noble Qura’n, Translation by Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Surah
Ahzab 33:56.
7.
According to Jane S. Nickerson, “Her [Spain’s] history in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries is stained by ferocious cruelty which she displayed in eradicating the
Muslims from her territory” A Short History of North Africa, New York, The DevinAdair Company, 1961, p.75
8.
Noble Qura’n, Surah Al Anaam, 6:35
9.
Noble Qura’n, Surah Al Anaam, 6:108, (As long as a Muslim confesses these two
beliefs, his life and property will not be violated by the community or the state for
other variances in dogmas or thought.)
10.
Adolf Heliferich, Der Westgothische Arianismus und die spanisehe Kertzereschichte
(Berlin,186O), p.68, citing Abd-al-Rahman Azzam, Ar- Risalah Al- Khalida, (The
Eternal Message of Muhammad) translated by Caesar E. Farah, Mentor Books, USA,
1980, p. 63
11.
Sir Thomas Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the
Muslim Faith (2nd ed.; tendon: Constable & Co., 1913), p.132, citing R. P. Dozy,
Histoire des Musulmaizs d’Espagne, Leyden, 1861, p. 11, p. 45 & p. 46.
12.
The terms Muslim and Islamic are often used interchangeably in discussions of Islam.
However, there are subtle, but important differences. Muslim refers to a religious and
cultural reality whereas Islamic denotes political intent. For instance, a Muslim
country is a country in which the majority of the population is Muslim, such as
Indonesia or Turkey; an Islamic state is a state that bases its legitimacy on Islam, such
as Islamic Republic of Iran.
13.
Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus,
Routledge, New York, 2014, p. 28
14.
J. N. Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms: 1250–1516. Volume II: 1410–1516, Castilian
Hegemony, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 373
14
15 .
Phrantzes, Finlay, Betzibus, and D’Ohsson
16.
Arnold , op. cit., pp.145-147
17.
Martin Wight, Power politics, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978, p. 302
18.
Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, 1979, p. 59. Said explains how the ‘orient’
played an important role as the other in defining Europe on a very large historical and
geographical scale. During this process, the difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’
based on cultural domination and social power created a new discourse of
‘Orientalism’.
19 .
The Qur’an uses the word kafir to signify various negative qualities of a person, all of
which assist in the precise defining of kufr. Kafir, kuf and words with the ‘K-FR’ root designate disbelievers and infidels, and an important Qur’anic concept for
distinguishing believers and non-believers of Islam.
20.
Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875–1914, London, Abacus, 1994, p. 278.
21 .
Muhammad Omor Faruq, ‘Ottoman Relations with their Christian Subjects and
Neighbours’, Probondh Sonkolon, Department of Islamic History and Culture, Dhaka
University, 2014, pp. 178-199
22.
Westphalia or Westfalia is a region in Germany, centered on the cities
Arnsberg, Bielefeld, Osnabruck, Dortmund, Minden and Munster. The Peace of
Westphalia of 1648 CE, signed in Munster and Osnabruck, ended the Thirty Years’
War. The concept of nation-state sovereignty resulting from the treaty became known
as “Westphalian sovereignty”. (http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Westphalia)
23.
Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the other, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 51
24.
Paul Rich, ‘European identity and the myth of Islam: A reassessment’, Review of
International Studies 25(3) 1999, pp. 453–474.
25.
Robert Jackson, Sovereignty, Polity press, UK, 2007, p. 33
26.
Paul Keal, ‘An International society?’ in Greg Fry and Jacinta O’Hagan, eds.,
Contending images of world politics, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 69.
27.
In Article VII of the Treaty of Paris (1856) the signatory states solemnly declared the
Sublime Porte admitted participation in the advantages of the Public Law and System
of Europe. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International relations and
the Third World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 63.
28.
Karl Polanyi, The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our
time, Boston, Beacon Press, 1957, p. 8.
29.
Porte is French for “gate”. The ‘Sublime Porte’ is a metonym for the central
government of the Ottoman Empire, by reference to the gate giving access to the
15
block of buildings that housed the principal state departments in Istanbul. Today, the
buildings house the provincial Governor of Istanbul. When Sultan Suleiman the
Magnificent sealed an alliance with King Francis I of France in 1536, the French
diplomats walked through the monumental gate or Bab-ı Ali in order to reach the
Vizierate of Constantinople, seat of the Sultan's government. French being the
language of diplomacy, the French translation Sublime Porte (the adjective being
unusually placed ahead of the word to emphasize its importance) was soon adopted in
most other European languages, including English, to refer not only to the actual gate
but as a metaphor for the Ottoman Empire.
30.
Roderic H. Davison, ‘The Westernization of Ottoman diplomacy in the nineteenth
century’, in Edward Ingram, ed., National and international politics in the Middle
East: Essays in honour of Elie Kedourie, London: Frank Cass, 1986, pp. 56–59.
31.
Some definitions of secularism are mentioned here:
1. “The Latin term from which the word ‘Secular’ is derived- Secularism means
generation or age, and came to mean that which belongs to this life, to the here and
now in this world. It is used as a short hand for the ideology which shape
contemporary society without reference to divine.” (Graeme Smith, A Short History
of Secularism, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2008)
2. (a) “Secularism is not regarded as religious & spiritually sacred. (b) Secularism is
not pertaining to or connected with any religion. (c) Secularism is not belonging to a
religious order.” ( Random House Dictionary of English Language, College Edition,
New York, 1968)
3. “Secular spirit or tendency especially a system of political or social philosophy that
rejects all form of religious faith.” (Encyclopedia of Britannica)
4. “Secularism is a code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on consideration
purely human, and intended mainly for those who find theology indefinite,
inadequate, and unreliable or unbelievable.” (Holyoake, English Secularism: A
Confession of Belief, Chicago, 1896)
5. “The belief that religion should not be involved in the organization of society,
education etc.” ( Oxford Advance Learners’ Dictionary)
32.
33.
34.
Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and Turkey (Bangla), Kamiub
Prokashon Limited, Dhaka, 2013, p. 276.
Halit Refig, ‘Should Turkey Look East?’, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol.18,
Issue 4, 2001, p.85.
John Acton, Lectures on Modern History, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1950,
p. 49.
16
CHAPTER I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKS FROM
OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO MODERN TURKEY
In this chapter there will be an attempt to trace the genesis of Turks and to inquire who
the Turks really are, and whence they originally came. Moreover, within the last few
years important archaeological discoveries have been made by Jadrintzeff and Heikel in
the valleys of the Upper Yenisei and the Upper Orchon Rivers1—near to the RussoChinese borders,—which show obviously that twelve hundred years ago the aboriginal
Turks had an epic literature of their own, which, if not very extensive, has at least been
recorded in a manner durable enough to survive for our perusal until the present day, and
circumstantial enough to confirm in the amplest way the statements of the Chinese
historians.2 As Standford J. Shaw remarks:
The rise of the Ottoman dynasty to rule much of Europe and Asia is one of the
most remarkable stories in history. In the thirteenth century the Ottomans ruled
only one of a number of Turkoman principalities that ringed the decadent
Byzantine state in western Anatolia. Within two centuries they had established an
empire that encompassed not only the former Byzantine lands of Southeastern
Europe and Anatolia but also Hungary and the Arab world, and that empire was
to endure into modern times. Who were the Ottomans?3
The history of Turks or Turkey encompasses the history of the region now known
as Turkey4, including the areas known as Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, from prehistory up
to the time of the modern Turkish Republic.5 Anatolia (Turkish: Anadolu) comprises most
of modern Turkey and is known by the Latin name of Asia Minor. Turkey has been
inhabited since the Paleolithic6, including various Ancient Anatolian civilizations and
ancient Thracians.7 The remnants of Bronze Age civilizations such as the Hattians,
provide examples of the lives of its citizens and their trade. After the fall of the Hittites,
new states such as Phrygia and Lydia appeared on the western coast as Greek civilization
began to flourish. The growing Persian kingdom eventually absorbed them. Following the
Persian invasion, its expansionism brought it into conflict with the Greek
monarch Alexander the Great (356-323 BC) who successfully expelled the Persians.
Although he brought an end to the Persian Empire, his reign was short and his empire
broke up on his death.8 Most of Anatolia eventually fell under the Seleucid Empire, the
largest of Alexander's territories, but they were driven back by the Romans by 191 B.C.,
most of their lands returning to local kingdoms such as the Kingdom of Pergamum.
Roman control gradually strengthened carving out provinces from the Anatolian lands,
17
but the Roman Empire was weakened by successive civil wars and barbarian invasions.
These resulted in periodic divisions of the empire.
Among the nomadic tribes during Middle Ages the Ottoman Turks were very first ones to
achieve the credit to establish independent rule in Central Asian region. They were not
satisfied by confining themselves within Asian border, but completed their dominance in
European lands. In most of the time, they were welcomed by the European leaders as a
power to counteract to other rival powers. Thus as a mediator to resolve the internal
problems of European states, Ottomans began to control the politics and eventually
established their rule on the vast area of Europe. Towards early fourteen century,
Ottoman rule in Europe had begun to take a dramatic turn in the political history of
Middle Age. Ottomans success of conquering European territories bear ample testimony
to their better ability, strength and might than any other nation of the contemporary world.
Prior to discussion about Turko-Europe Relations it is important to throw some light upon
the Ottoman Turks, their genesis and how they eventually established relations with the
European countries. Many descriptions are available about the historical theory about the
origin and rise of Osman and his successors. Here are some facts to substantiate that
theory on this regards. In 1272 C.E. Marco Polo passed through Asia Minor, and got the
impression that the Turks though nominally subject to the Mongols, were really under
their own local rulers and sometimes elected chiefs. In time this local rulers came to be
called Emirs. The tribes subsequently to be known Osmanli Turks were one of these
independent communities of nomad flock-owners and settled peasants.9
Chalcocondylas,10 a Byzantine scholar claims that, Osman is the great-grandson of
Duzalp, ‘chief of the Oghuzes’, grandson of Oguzalp, who, aspiring to succeed his father,
reached ‘in a brief time the highest time in Asia’; and son of Ertogrul, who in 1298 A.D.,
with his fleet devastated the Peloponnesus, Euboea and Attika. According to some
western writers, Osman is supposed to be the son of a Tatar shepherd, called Zich, who
roses to fame at the court of Seljuk Sultan Alauddin Kayqubad I (1220-37 CE) by
defeating in single combat a Greek cavalier that had killed many of the favorites of the
aforementioned ruler. According to others, the name of Osman I’s father is ‘the madaman
Delis’, a shepherd. For his success in killing the Greek, the Sultan rewarded him with the
castle of Ottomanzich, which is often confused with the Sugut, and is claimed to be the
origin of Osman’s name. Yet another historical source, asserted to be the invention of
18
Sultan Mohammed II (r.1451-1481), who thus wanted to legitimize in the eyes of the
world his claim to the throne of the Caesare, Osman I is the descendant of a certain Isaac
Comnenus, a member of the imperial Byzantine family, who fled to the court of the
Seljuks of Konia, and became a Muslim.
According to Ali Muhiuddin Saeduddin and Hazi Khalaf,11 the grandfather of Osman I
was Solayman Shah, prince or boy of Mahan in Khorasan, who was compelled to leave
his country at the approach of Chengis Khan, and lived seven years in Armenia. As he
was returning home, he was drowned in the Euphrates. Two of his sons, Ertogrul and
Dundar, turned back to the Asia Minor, and were, through the kindness of the Seljuk
Sultan, Alauddin I, given a residence near Angora, and, later on the confines of Bithynia.
Turkish Origins
The Turkish identity is partly built out of ties of language and ethnicity. The nation was
founded on a common sense of Turkishness that is shared by most, but indeed not by all,
citizens of the nation. About 87 percent of the current population are Turks, which is to
say that they speak Turkish and identify themselves as Turks. 12 The Ottomans descended
from the mass of nomads who roamed in the area of the Altai Mountains, east of the
Eurasian steppes and south of the Yenisei River and Lake Baikal in lands that today are
part of Outer Mongolia. These Altaic nomads had a primitive, mobile civilization based
on tribal organization, customs, and social sanctions without the formal organs of
government and laws characteristic of more advanced societies. Their livelihood came
mainly from raising flocks and taking what they could from their weaker neighbors.
Temporary leadership was entrusted to hans, but the scope of their authority was limited
to searching for pastures and to military activities and did not extend to relations among
individuals within the tribes or among the tribes themselves. Their Shamanistic beliefs
involved worship of the elements of nature through a series of totems and spirits
considered to have special powers that could affect man for both good and evil. Man
himself was helpless in the face of their power but could secure protection through the
intercession of shamans, priests with special power to control and use the spirits. It was a
simple religion of fear in which the dark elements of nature as interpreted by the shamans
rather than the moral considerations of higher religions were the accepted determinants of
right and wrong, and the nomadic way was considered the ideal of human existence.
Beginning in the second century before Christ, changing political, military, and climatic
19
conditions in the Altaic homeland sent successive nomadic waves against the settled
civilizations located on the borders of the steppes.
In the 4th century, during the reign of Constantine the Great, at the east part of the Roman
empire (referred to by historians much later as the Byzantine Empire) was established a
new capital at Constantinople. Parting from the West Empire, the Byzantine Empire
succeeded it to flourish for almost a thousand years.
From the early part of the sixth century C.E. onwards, Turkish nomads started settling in
Central Asia in successive waves following the transfers of power from one Turkish state
to another in this land with a long history of sedentary civilizations, influenced by those
of Iran, China, and India - which became Turkish thereafter.13 Oghuz Turks14 began
migrating into Anatolia in the context of the larger Turkic expansion, forming the Seljuq
Empire in the 11th century AD.15 After the Seljuq victory over forces of the Byzantine
Empire in 1071 at the Battle of Manzikert16, the process was accelerated.
Before the Turkic settlement, the local population of Anatolia had reached an estimated
level of 12 to 14 million people during the late Roman Period.17 The migration of Turks
to the country of modern Turkey occurred during the main Turkic migration across most
of Central Asia and into Europe and the Middle East which was between the 6th and 11th
centuries. Mainly Turkic people living in the Seljuk Empire arrived in Turkey during the
eleventh century. The Seljuks proceeded to gradually conquer the Anatolian part of
the Byzantine Empire. In the following centuries, the local population began to be
assimilated into the Turkish people. More Turkic migrants began to intermingle with the
local inhabitants over years, thus the Turkish-speaking population was bolstered.
However the majority of the DNA (carrying genetic information in chromosome) of the
inhabitants of modern Turkey has been found to have been from the native Anatolian
population rather than central Asian Turkic tribes.
The House of Seljuk was a branch of the Kınık Oguz Turks who resided on the periphery
of the Muslim world, north of the Caspian and Aral Seas in the Yabghu Khaganate of the
Oguz confederacy18 in the 10th century. In the 11th century, the Turkic people living in the
Seljuk Empire started migrating from their ancestral homelands towards the eastern
regions of Anatolia, which eventually became a new homeland of Oguz Turkic tribes
following the Battle of Manzikert on August 26, 1071 C.E. The victory of the Seljuks
20
gave rise to the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, a separate branch of the larger Seljuk
Empire19 and to some Turkish principalities (beyliks), mostly situated towards the Eastern
Anatolia which were vassals of or at war with Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. Stanford J. Shaw
thus quips:
In 1055 the real founder of the Seljuk dynasty, Tugrul Bey, forced the Abbasid
caliph to make him protector of orthodox Islam and to recognize him as sultan, or
temporal ruler. The Seljuk leader, as sultan, assumed most of the caliph's
authority to legislate and rule in matters concerning administrative, military, and
secular questions not directly regulated in the Muslim law.20
Turk Vs Ottoman
The term Turk is used interchangeably with the word Ottoman (not to mention the term
Seljuk and Turcoman), which can lead to confusion on the part of the reader. Therefore, a
brief review of Ottoman history through 1453 is presented to establish a contextual
framework for this chapter. The earliest Turkish political entity was known as the
Gokturk Empire, which extended from China to the Caspian Sea from the sixth to eighth
centuries. The Turcoman successors of the Gokturks swept into the Middle East and
Persia in the seventh to the eleventh centuries and established firm control over the
centers of Islamic civilization. The Turcomans were displaced by the Oguz confederation,
who founded the Seljuk dynasty in 1055. The Seljuk sultan, Alp Arslan, defeated the
Byzantines at Manzikert, allowing the Seljuks and Turcomans to sweep into Anatolia.
The Seljuks gradually subsumed the Turcomans into their empire but themselves were
overthrown by the Mongols in 1243. The people known as the Ottomans (or Ottoman
Turks) emerged sometime in the mid-1200s as a Turkic tribal group led by the legendary
Ertugrul. His son, Osman I (1280–1324), established the Osmanli dynasty (the Europeans
corrupted the word Osmanli to Ottoman)21 that centered on the Anatolian peninsula. The
term Ottoman Empire originated with Osman, but it was his son Orhan who took the city
of Bursa and then led his soldiers in 1346 across the Dardanelles into Europe, establishing
the dynasty as a force to be reckoned with. The dynasty expanded under sultans such as
Murad I and Bayezid I, but in 1402 Tamerlane (1336-1405 CE) trodden the Ottomans.
Muhmmad I reestablished the leadership of the house of Osman in 1413 after an internal
power struggle. Murad II ruled from 1421 to 1451, and the dynasty prospered and
undertook a period of great expansion in both the Europe and in Asia.22 (See Map 1& 2,
Appendix- B, page nos. 454 and 455)
21
Mongol invasion and the Turks
The Seljuq dynasty controlled Turkey until the country was invaded by the Mongols. On
June 26, 1243 CE, the Seljuk armies were defeated by the Mongols in the Battle of
Kosedag, and the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum became a vassal of the Mongols.23 This caused
the Seljuks to lose their power. Hulegu Khan (1218 –1265 CE), grandson of Genghis
Khan founded the Ilkhanate in the southwestern part of the Mongol Empire. The
Ilkhanate ruled Anatolia through Mongol military governors. After the death of last
Seljuk Sultan Giyath al Din Mesud II (1302-1308 CE), Mongol invasions of Transoxiana,
Iran, Azerbaijan and Anatolia caused Turkomens to move to Western Anatolia. During
the years when the country was under Mongol rule, some small Turkish states were born.
The Western branch of the Turks had their chief encampment in the Issikul region. Their
relations with Persia were more extensive than those with China, but as late as 931 CE
envoys were also sent to the more eastern court. It was from the agglomeration of tribes
or states ruled by the Turgas and Karluk successors of the Asena family in the west that
emanated the Khozars, Uzes, Patzinacs, and even the dynasties of the Tulunides and
Ikhshidides of Egypt; the Ghaznevides, Ghourides, and Seljuks of Persia and Turkestan;
and finally, after the Mongol conquests, the Osmanlis, who still reign at Constantinople.
Of course, the successive intermixtures of the Turks with the Persian, Syrian, and
Caucasian races have totally altered the aspect of the modern Turk, who, indeed, objects
to the word ‘Turk’ being applied to him at all; yet it is perfectly easy, with the assistance
of western history alone, to trace his origin step by step from the Caspian to the
Hellespont. In trying to establish and make clear the single question of the true origin of
the Turks, it is important to note that whether as Osmanlis, Kadjars, Uzbeks, Mongols,
Kirghiz, they practically cover much the same ground in Asia as they did 2,000 years
ago,—always, of course, with the addition of a slice in Europe.
The Turkomens founded some Anatolian beyliks (principalities) under the Mongol
dominion
in
Turkey. The
most
powerful
beyliks
were
the
Karamanids and
the Germiyanids in the central area. Along the Aegean coast, from north to south, stretch
Karasids,
Sarukhanids, Aydinids, Mentese and Teke principalities.
The
controlled
24
the Black Sea region round Kastamonu and Sinop. One of these states was the Ottoman
beylik which quickly controlled Western Anatolia and conquered much of Rumelia.
22
Compared with the Aydin, Saruhan, and Karaman principalities, the Ottoman principality
established by Osman and his descendants seemed, at first, to have no advantage over
several others of its size. They at first established themselves in northern Phrygia, along
the frontiers of Bithynia, between Dorylaem (Eskisehir) and Nicaea (Iznik) in the pasture
stretching from the slopes of the Domaniq Mountain northeast to Sogut, then extending
through the passes leading westward from the central Anatolian plateau into the plains of
Bithynia, the Ottomans made a quiet entry into history. The Ottoman beylik would,
however, evolve into the Ottoman Empire over the next 200 years, expanding throughout
the Balkans, Anatolia.25
The Byzantine Resistance
The Byzantine Empire weakened by longstanding internal problems, was unable to resist
when Turkoman threat increased. There were endemic struggles for power between the
bureaucrats and the landed gentry, which dominated the army, and between the latter and
the free peasants. There were economic difficulties involving the debasement of the
coinage, over taxation, and wasteful spending by the rulers and governors. The Byzantine
collapse at the Battle of Manzikert (1071 CE) and the temporary Turkoman occupation of
most of Anatolia in the following decade were early symptoms of decline. Though the
Byzantines were able to push the Turkomans back from western Anatolia (1081-1143
CE), the Latin control of Constantinople (1204-1261 CE) and Byzantine efforts to regain
their capital disrupted their defenses against the Turkomans. With the restoration of
Byzantine rule over Constantinople, imperial interest in Anatolia waned, making it
difficult for the Byzantine feudal holders to coordinate their resistance against the
advancing Turkomans.
Rise of Ottoman Turks
Upon the demise of the Turkish Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, precursor of Ottomans, in
1300s, Anatolia was divided into a patchwork of independent, mostly Turkish states, the
so-called Ghazi emirates. One of the Ghazi emirates was led by Osman I (1258– 1326
CE). The traditional account relates that the ancestor of the dynasty was one Suleyman
Shah, leader of the Kayi tribe of Turkomans, who ruled the small area of Mahan in
northeastern Iran in the late twelfth century. He is said to have fled from the Mongol
invasion in the early thirteenth century along with thousands of other Turkomans trying to
avoid death or enslavement at the hands of the new conquerors coming from Central
23
Asia. It is believed that he drowned while crossing the Euphrates into Syria, after which
his family divided; two sons led most of the family back to Horasan to enter Mongol
service while one son, Ertugrul, led part of it westward into Anatolia.
Ertugrul is considered to have been the founder of the Ottoman dynasty in Anatolia.
Supposedly, he brought some 400 followers into the service of the Seljuks of Rum as
auxiliaries against both the Byzantines and the Mongols as the latter began pressing
through Iraq into eastern Anatolia. In return for this service according to legend, the
Seljuk sultan gave Ertugrul lands in the marches of western Anatolia, two small districts,
Sogiit and Domaniq, in northern Phrygia on the borders of the Byzantine province of
Bithynia. When Ertugrul died (c. 1280 CE), this dominion and his leadership of his
portion of the Kayi tribe passed to his son Osman. Osman, founder of the Ottoman
dynasty, was born at Sogiit, in northeastern Anatolia, around 1258 CE and inherited his
patrimony on the borders of Bithynia some time before 1280 CE just as the emir of the
marches was abandoning his struggle with the Byzantines.
The Ottoman Empire:
Troops of the Osmanli Dynasty, which gave its name to the Ottoman Empire, moved
rapidly into southeastern Europe, defeating Serbian forces at the battle of Kosovo in 1389
CE. Although they were temporarily halted when the Mongol forces of Timur occupied
part of Anatolia in the early fifteenth century, in 1453 CE Ottoman forces captured
Constantinople, the last outpost of the Byzantine Empire. The Ottomans renamed
Constantinople Istambul (which was changed later as Istanbul after British declared
mandatory rule over Ottoman territories just after the World War I) and made it the
capital of a new empire and the seat of Sunni Islam as well as Greek Orthodoxy. Under
Suleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66 CE), the empire expanded across North Africa to
Morocco, farther into southeastern Europe, and across the Middle Eastern regions of
Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. However, after Suleyman’s death the empire began showing
signs of decay. The Ottoman navy lost the key Battle of Lepanto to Spanish and
Portuguese forces in 1571 CE, and succession struggles shook Istanbul.
Under the leadership of the Koprulu family, the empire made its final push into Europe in
the seventeenth century. The siege of Vienna, which was lifted in 1683 CE, marked the
farthest extent of Ottoman penetration into Europe. In the years that followed, a
24
multinational European force drove Ottoman troops southward and eastward, forcing the
empire to cede substantial territory in Europe in the Treaty of Karlowicz (1699 CE). In
the early eighteenth century, Russian Tsar Peter I initiated a long-lasting goal of Russian
foreign policy, to gain access to warm-water ports at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.
During the next two centuries, Russia fought several wars to diminish Ottoman power. In
1774 CE the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji26 gained Russian ships access to Ottoman
waterways. By the nineteenth century, the power and pomp of Ottoman Empire started to
decline and had the decay of its vast holdings and the nationalist forces that were
unleashed in the empire were central issues for all European governments.
In 1832 CE the European powers forced the Ottoman government to recognize Greek
independence after a decade-long Greek guerrilla war. However, Europe also recognized
the need to avoid the complete destruction of the empire. In the Crimean War of 1854–56,
France and Britain sided with the Ottoman Empire against Russia, which lost the war and
ceded some of its power in southeastern Europe. In 1878 CE the Treaty of Berlin
established the independent states of Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia from former Ottoman
territory. In the same period, Britain took possession of Cyprus and Egypt, and France
occupied Algeria and Tunisia, further diminishing Ottoman holdings.
Internal conditions also deteriorated in the nineteenth century. Under pressure from the
West, between 1839 and 1876 CE the Ottoman government undertook a series of reforms,
collectively known as Tanzimat. Dissatisfaction with reforms stimulated the Young
Ottoman movement, which sought Western-style reforms, including secular government
and closer relations with Europe. However, in the late 1870s Sultan Abdul Hamid II
(1876-1909 CE) stifled the reform movement and established a repressive regime.
Meanwhile, the empire’s financial and geopolitical positions worsened.
In the early 1900s, reformist groups remained active under the repression of Sultan Abdul
Hamid II. In 1907 the Committee of Union and Progress, better known as the Young
Turks, united under military officer Mustafa Kemal, who later took the name Ataturk,
“father of the Turks.” Between 1909 and 1912, European powers took advantage of a
weak Ottoman government to occupy or liberate most of the empire’s remaining territory
in southeastern Europe. In 1912 the First Balkan War deprived the empire of territory in
Macedonia and Thrace. In 1913 these losses led to the overthrow of the government by
Enver Pasha, who headed a dictatorial regime of Young Turks during the ensuing war
25
period. The empire regained some European territory during the Second Balkan War of
1913.
When World War I broke out in Europe in 1914, Enver Pasha’s alliance with Germany
caused Britain, France, and Russia to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. In early 1915,
mass deportation of the Armenian population led to the death of as many as 1 million
Armenians, an event that remains controversial nearly 100 years later. Ataturk defeated a
British amphibious landing at Gallipoli on the Dardanelles later that year. However, in
1916 a successful British campaign cut through the empire’s Arab territory, capturing
Damascus in 1918. After the empire had suffered numerous defeats, a provisional
Ottoman government sued for peace with the Allies.
The Republic of Turkey
After World War I, the provisional government retained control over very little of the
former empire. Ataturk led strong nationalist forces seeking to retain Anatolia. In 1921
the nationalists elected Ataturk President of a new government, the Grand National
Assembly. In 1922 Ataturk’s army repulsed an invading Greek force seeking to expand
Greece’s postwar allotment of Ottoman territory. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923,
negotiated between the Ataturk government and the Allies, defined control of the
Bosporus and the territorial extent of the new Republic of Turkey.
Ataturk’s reform program, which became known as Kemalism, aimed at establishing a
secular, Europe-oriented state. European name forms and dress styles were encouraged,
and the Latin alphabet was adopted. All links between Islam and the state were cut. In
1924 a new constitution guaranteed basic civil rights and prescribed a parliamentary form
of government in which the Grand National Assembly would elect the president. Only
one party, Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party, existed, giving the President control of
all phases of government. In the 1920sand 1930s, Turkey cautiously sought relations with
as many countries as possible. In 1936 Ataturk was able to negotiate a resumption of
Turkish control of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.
World War II found Turkey still in a weakened state. Despite German pressure, the
government of Ataturk’s successor, Ismet Inonu, maintained neutrality throughout the
conflict. In early 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany to ensure its status as one of the
charter members of the United Nations. During the Cold War era that followed World
26
War II, Turkey’s foreign policy was pro-Western. The Truman Doctrine, which
guaranteed the security of postwar Turkey and Greece, resulted in large-scale U.S.
military and economic aid to Turkey. However, Turkey’s membership in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which it joined in 1952, was complicated by
disputes with fellow member Greece over Cyprus and other regional issues. In the 1960s,
Turkey and Greece nearly went to war twice over their conflicting views on Cyprus, and
in 1974 armed conflict resulted in the partition of the island. Turkey joined a number of
other Western alliances and organizations in the 1950s and the 1960s.
In the liberalized postwar atmosphere, party politics became a source of instability and
democracy in Turkey. During the 1950s, tensions among the main parties increased as the
Democrat Party government of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes became more
authoritarian, and the economy suffered inflation and heavy debt. In 1960 Menderes
responded to protests by declaring martial law and suspending all political activity. The
army, which considered itself the guardian of Ataturk’s principles, then replaced
Menderes with an interim military government. In the four years following the legislative
elections of 1961, the government was an unstable coalition. When the Justice Party,
successor to the Democrat Party, gained a majority of seats in the elections of 1965,
Suleyman Demirel formed a one-party government. In the late 1960s, the far-right
Republican Peasants’ National Party (later the Nationalist Action Party) began instigating
political violence stimulated by economic conditions and resentment of Turkey’s proWestern foreign policy. As the strongest parties continued to lack a parliamentary
majority, Turkey suffered a series of weak coalition governments throughout the 1970s,
and religious sectarianism gained political influence.
After political and sectarian violence shook Turkey in 1978–79, the Turkish military took
power in 1980 to prevent further deterioration. Economic conditions improved
significantly in the early 1980s. Civil order was restored at the expense of measures that
curtailed human rights. In response to international pressure, a new constitution was
ratified in 1982. In the 1980s, the government of General Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980
coup, provided stability as power continued to shift among political parties and coalitions.
Evren’s former minister of state, Turgut Ozal, succeeded him in 1989. The pattern of
coalition governments continued in the 1990s, which is the terminal year of the thesis
brought under review.
27
Notes and References
1.
Jedidiah Morse, Aaron Arrowsmith & Samuel Lewis, The American Universal
Geography, Or, A View of the Present State of All the Kingdoms, States, and
Colonies in the Known World, Volume 1& 2, Thomas & Andrews, 1819
2.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/EHR/11/Origin_of_the_Turks.pdf
3.
Stanford J. Shaw, History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge
University Press, 1976, p.1
4.
The word Turkey derived from the Medieval Latin Turchia; i.e., “Land of the
Turks”.
5.
Frank W. Thackeray, John E. Findling and Douglas Arthur Howard. The History of
Turkey, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001.
6.
Mary C. Stiner, Steven L. Kuhn, Erksin Gulec, ‘Early Upper Paleolithic shell beads
at Ucagizli Cave I (Turkey): Technology and the socio-economic context of
ornament life-histories’, Journal of Human Evolution, Available online, 5 March
2013.
7.
http://www.metmuseum.org/pubs/bulletins/1/
8.
Anecdotes from history reveal that, Alexander died in Babylon due to malaria
caused by mosquito bite. This is further substantiated by the University of
Maryland’s School of Medicine report of 1998, Alexander probably died at the age
of 32, caused by a typhoid fever along with malaria which was common in ancient
Babylon. (Carlos G. Musso, ‘Megas Alexandros (Alexander the Great): His Death
Remains a Medical Mystery’, Humane Medicine Health Care, Retrieved in August
21, 2011.
9.
M. Philips Price, A History of Turks: from Empire to Republic, Humanities Press,
New York, 1968, p. 35
10.
Laonicus Chalcondyles, Proofs of Histories, an English translation of Books I-III
in Laonikos Chalkokondyles. A Translation and Commentary of the
Demonstrations of Histories, trans. Nikolaos Nikoloudis, Athens, 1996, and of
Book VIII in J. R. Melville Jones, The Siege of Constantinople: Seven
Contemporary Accounts, Amsterdam, 1972, pp. 42–55.
11.
Haji Khalifa or Kalfa, (1609-1657 CE) was an Ottoman scholar, historian and
geographer. He is regarded as one of the most productive authors of non-religious
scientific literature in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire.
12.
Douglas Arthur Howard, The History of Turkey, Greenwood Publishing Group,
USA, 2001, p. 4
28
13.
Turgut Ozal, Turkey in Europe: and Europe in Turkey, K. Rustem, 1991
14.
Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, Morrow Quill Publishers, New York, 1977,
p. 16.
15.
Lord Kinross, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
16.
op. cit,. p. 18
17.
J.C. Russell, Late Ancient And Medieval Population, Vol. 48, part 3, The
Transactions of The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1958
18.
Andre Wink, Al Hind: The Making of the Indo Islamic World, Vol. 1, Early
Medieval India and the Expansion of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries, Brill Academic
Publishers, 1990.
19.
Cyril Mango, The Oxford History of Byzantium, Oxford University Press, USA,
2002.
20.
Stanford J. Shaw, op. cit., p. 4
21 .
Therefore the Latin spelling of ‘Ottoman’ introduced from Arabic word ‘Osman’
or Usman. Yahiya Armadani, Modho Procho Otit O Bortoman (Middle East Past
and Present), Trant. in Bengali by Muhammad Enam-Ul-Haque, Bangla Academy,
Dhaka, 1984, p. 187
22.
Mesut Uyar & Edward J. Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans: from
Osman to Ataturk, ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA, 2009, pp. 1-2
23.
Lord Kinross, op. cit., p. 19
24.
Kate Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The
Merchants of Genoa and Turkey, Cambridge University Press, 1999
25.
Patrick Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire,
Morrow, 1977
26.
Also spell Kucuk Kaynarca or Kutchuk Kainardji was a peace treaty signed on 21
July 1774, in Küçük Kaynarca (today Kaynardzha, Bulgaria) between
the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Following the recent Ottoman
defeat at the Battle of Kozludzha, the document ended the Russo-Turkish War of
1768–74 and marked a defeat of the Ottomans in their struggle against
Russia.[1] The Russians were represented by Field-Marshal Rumyantsev while
the Ottoman side was represented by Musul Zade Mehmed Pasha. (Details:
Mesut Uyar; Edward J Erickson, op. cit.,)
29
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF TURKOEUROPE RELATIONS
In the previous chapter there has been a brief discussion of Turks, a very influential nation
who were a Turkic ethno-linguistic group primarily living in Turkey, and in the former lands
of the Ottoman Empire. The area now called Turkey has been inhabited since the Paleolithic
age, and housed various Ancient Anatolian civilizations and peoples of Thrace during
Antiquity.1 But still, historical evidences are not providing us the exact chronology of the
Ottoman Turks. Anyway, whatever confusion had been found about Ottoman identity, it’s
true that they ruled from the last of 13th century to the second decade of 20th century, that is
about 622 years of the major portion of Asia, Europe and African lands. The common
identity of the Turks are, those speaking in Turkish and living in Turkey. Turks lived in the
Eurasian steppe, which is called ‘Central Asia’ for the sake of simplicity. Despite the number
of tribes, the only reliable characteristic which united them was language. All tribes spoke
dialects of Turkish. Perhaps the more ambiguous but not necessarily less effective unifying
tie was, and still is, their sense of belonging to the same family of peoples. In this chapter
focus will be on the history of Turkish relations with Europe which dates back to the Middle
Ages when, according to Martin Wight:
Western Christendom expanded on the basis of a steady cultural, religious, and
linguistic penetration of surrounding lands and found itself in the east confronted by
the un-reciprocating will of the unspeakable Turk.2
Therefore, the majority of those people who settled in Anatolia were the settled population of
western Turkistan. Certainly, Turcoman who operated along the East Roman-Seljuk frontier
was nomads. The regular Seljuk forces were probably also largely composed of nomadic
elements, but they were in the minority among the Turks who settled in Anatolia. In this
regard J. P. Roux indicates that:
Turks who entered Anatolia in great numbers escaping Mongolian invasion.... for
reasons which are still unknown settled quite rapidly and displayed a particular
aptitude for adapting themselves to the new environment and becoming civilized.
They took over the brilliant Seljuk culture, but far from being slaves of it, they
transformed it quite profoundly, opening the way to that which could be the classical
Turkish civilization of the sixteenth century. Keeping away from Iranism, which was
then fashionable in the Muslim East, they spoke only Turkish and imposed it for the
30
first time in Anatolia as official language.3
The foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire were characterized by competition with the
Persian Empire to the east and Europe to the west. Conventional historiography generally
shows that the Ottoman Empire often made invasion into Europe on various occasions, which
led to the emergence of the modern European identity of Ottoman Turks. Concomitant such
ventures contributed to the construction of political, economic and cultural systems in the
Ottoman Empire.
It is generally assumed that, although not explicitly stated, Turkey and European countries
have not only different but also irreconcilable identities and between Turkey and Europe,
there is an incompatibility of values. 4 Europeans and Turks have been in close contact and
confrontation for a very long time, which has contributed to the formation of their modern
identities. In European identity formation, Turkey has been one of the most influential others.
Although a perception of the “Turk” as one of the others is more clearly visible in modern
European identity, the modern Turkish identity too, has been formed in relation to the
modern Europe.5
In the past, the mediaeval Catholic Church played a great role in the anti-Turkish
propaganda. The hostile preaching’s were reinforcing the European prejudices against the
Turks. This propaganda is resembled to the ones that were applied between the Catholics and
the Protestants. The European ruling class had used the fear against Turks as a propaganda
tool in order to keep the society under control. In an era when the religious wars were at its
zenith in Europe, the only point that the Catholics and the Protestants had in common, was
that the Turks was a heresy, tyrannical and despotic race. It is claimed by Diker that the
phrase “Turkenhund” was not created in the streets but rather in the churches. 6 The aim of
this was to foster the Christian identity by using the Turkish threat. Erasmus who is regarded
as one of the architects of Catholic Christianity, had said that “God has sent Turks in order to
punish the sinful Christians; however Turkish race cannot be wiped out without moral
purification”.7 The founder of Protestantism, Martin Luther, in his pamphlets “Prayer against
Turks” and “On War against the Turk” calls Turks as “the agents of the Devil” and calls the
31
Devil as “the head-commander of Turks”.8 Despite the close contact and mutual influence in
each other’s identity, the Ottomans were not considered as part of Europe until the late
eighteenth century, because Europe was still defined in terms of religion and the Turk had a
different religion, the heresy of Islam. Cemil Meric tried to make an emphasis on the
different identity values, especially on the religious differences between Europe and Turkey
by these words. “Even if we burn all the Qur’ans and tear down all mosques, we are still the
Ottomans in the eye of the European. Ottoman to them means Islam: a dark, dangerous and
hostile mass”.9
On the other hand, according to some scholars Turkey and Europe have been highly engaged
with each other throughout history, and it doesn’t always have to be in negative terms.
Yurdusev explains that a re-reading of history reveals that the confrontations between the
Turks and the Europeans were no more confrontational than those among the European
nations. The so-called religious difference, too, reflects a one-sided reading of the texts and
history. He also adds that historically conflicts between the Muslims and the Christians have
not been bloodier than the internal conflicts of these religious groupings. 10
In the amidst of all these discussions, the declaration of Turkey’s candidacy in the European
Union brought new discussions, such as the borders of the Union, the political order and the
bases on which this order will be built and the discussions on the political and cultural
identity of the European Union gained a different dimension.
“Throughout the history, Turks have been in contact with the Europeans, first as a
conquering superior and enemy, then as a component part, later as an admirer and
unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally”. 11 Relations between the Turks
and the Europeans go back to the arrival of the Turks in the Asia Minor. The first Turks in
Anatolia, Seljuks and others, had their initial meeting with Europeans by way of the
Crusaders, before they even saw Europe. These Sultanates chose to keep their close ties with
the easygoing Islamic world, rather than open up to the frightening Crusader world of the
West. After the Turks have conquered Anatolian lands, the places where Turkish was spoken
was named “Turkey” and this name was certainly given by the Europeans. The word
32
“Turkey” is used in the Barborassa Crusades for the first time in 1190 CE. The word was
frequently used by the European authors in the thirteenth century. The word is mainly used to
indicate the other of Europe at that time. On the other hand, the Turks regarded themselves as
Muslims rather than being Turkish. The language, country, ethnic sources were not as
important as the element of Islam. This element was mainly emphasized against the
Europeans who were regarded as the other. The word Turk was equal to the word Muslim in
the Europeans eyes. When a European converted into Islam, they used to say that the person
Turkified. The word Turk was so much identified with the word Muslim that while the
expression “Christian Arab” was meaningful, “Christian Turk” was regarded as meaningless
and contradictory. The element of Islam still takes its place in the twentieth century in the
Turkish identity but together with language, ethnicity, nationality and geography. 12 Opening
to the West was an Ottoman strategy that started with Osman Ghazi. Before they had any
status in Asia, the Ottomans were already an empire based largely on south-eastern Europe:
It is an important historical fact which is not often appreciated that the Ottoman
Turks started their career as a people in the extreme north-west of Asia Minor, facing
Europe; that they founded their Empire not in Asia but across the Sea of Marmara in
Thrace and the Balkans, in other words in Europe and that then expanded eastwards
into Asia Minor a century after they had already become a European power. 13
Ottomans were the first to cross to the European side of the Straits. With the confidence they
had in their own identity, they did not feel uneasy living side by side with the Europeans,
even beyond the Balkans. The Turks started to be a serious threat starting from the fourteenth
century for the Europeans. The Ottomans posed a very dangerous physical threat for the
Europeans as it was one of the most powerful forces in Europe until the end of the eighteenth
century. This danger could only be eliminated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when
Turks were completely driven out of the Balkans. Religion was playing a very important role
in the negative perception of the Ottomans.
Since Christianity and Islam were both monotheistic and universal religions, they had
common points. On the other hand, their rivalry had been severe. Islam has always been
33
regarded by the Europeans as a threat and heresy. Turks, with the flourishing of the Ottoman
Empire, were mainly regarded as the representative of Islam and came to symbolize Muslim
power. In the 14th century, Philippe de Mezieres, the French politician, in his letter to King
Richard II, wrote that Christians had to make good and mighty war against the Turks, fierce
and dishonorable enemies of the faith. To converse or disperse and destroy the false sect of
Mohammad and all idolatry was something God willed Christians to do. 14 Although Islam
was no more a threat for the Europeans from the beginning of the eighteenth century, this
perception remained in the minds. Islam has still been refused and seen as an obstacle in the
progress, modernization and civilization process. As it has also been stated by Yurdusev, the
reason of the prejudices and the negation against the Turks is the religious difference and this
religion-based prejudices and cultural differences form the foundation of the negative
perceptions.15
Stage by stage development of Turko-Europe Relations
The genesis and decline of states is a very complex process. Even today the real explanation
of how the Ottoman Empire became established remains buried in obscurity. It is still
surprising that a small tribe, entering Anatolia around 1225 CE, was able to found one of the
greatest empires of the world. Stanford J. Shaw observes,
The story of Ottoman history is a complicated and complex one. It involves not only
the Ottoman dynasty itself but also the many peoples who operated and ruled by it the Turks, the Arabs, the Serbs, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews, the Bulgers, the
Hungarians, the Albanians and many others, It constitutes the history of the major
religious groups among the subjects, the Muslims, the Jews and the Christians. It
takes into account relations between the Ottomans and their neighbours in Europe
and Asia, complicated stories of wars, conquests, diplomacy, and territorial losses
that much later were called the Eastern Question. It includes the history of the
political, administrative, and social institutions incorporated into this multinational
and multicultural empire. It demands discussion of the rise and fall, the birth,
efflorescence, and decline of the empire.16
However, by fighting at one time for, and at another time against, the Eastern Roman
34
Empire, the Ottoman Empire became sole candidate to inherit it. The end of the crusades
coincided with the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and marked the tacit acceptance by the
West of the fact that Asia Minor was Turkish. Initially the Ottomans formed the smallest
principality of Anatolia. Certain chroniclers recount that Osman I (1288-1326 CE), after
whom the Empire has been named dreamt that he saw a ray of light which settled on his
navel. The vision was interpreted by the diviners as the portent of an empire of many
nations.17
In imitation of the policy of the Seljuk, Osman divided his border areas into three
principalities, each commanded by a Bey, facing respectively the Black Sea to the north,
Nicomedia (Izmit) and Nicaea (Iznic). Most of his initial advances were made by the leaders
of these principalities at the expense of the feudal Byzantine 18 nobles, some of whom were
defeated in battle, other being absorbed peacefully by purchase contacts, marriage alliance,
and the like. The capture of Brusa (1326 CE) was an important step forward for the
Ottomans. With this victory their dominion changed from a nomadic border principality to a
real state with a capital, boundaries and settled population. 19
The extensions of territory by Osman I during his long thirty-eight years were affected by a
slow process of attrition. He acted in this respect, in the earlier stage, as fief-holder of the
Seljuk states; but later Osman I declared his independence and assumed the title Emir. He
was a brave soldier and a sagacious leader, who inspired confidence and trust in his followers
and subjects. He pursued with great persistency the policy of enlarging his domain. He was
also a wise and capable administrator and was assisted in this by his father-in-law, Edebali,
who acted as his vizier.20
The beginning of Ottoman supremacy in Europe
Shortly, after accession Orhan (r. 21 1324-1359 CE) moved toward the Sea of Marmara. This
led to Byzantine expedition personally commanded by Emperor Andronicus III (r.1328-1341
CE), but it was routed at Maltepe (Pelecanon) in 1328 CE. The Emperor fled back to
Constantinople. Orhan then took most of the Nicaea peninsula and the coasts of the gulf of
Nicomedia as far as Yalova on the south, including the towns of Gebze and Eskihisar,
35
isolating and taking Nicaea itself on March 2, 1331 CE, without resistance. He also occupied
most of the remaining Byzantine lands in northwestern Anatolia with little difficulty,
climaxing his efforts by taking the trade center of Izmit (Nicomedia) in 1337 CE after a sixyear siege and Uskudar (Scu-tari) a year later.
In 1349 CE the King of the Serbs captured Thessalonica. This event caused the Roman
Emperor to demand the help of his son-in-law, Orhan the Ottoman. Orhan sent his son,
Suleyman, who with the fleet recaptured the town and returned it to the Empire. This
cooperation between the Ottomans and the East Romans then continued against a BulgaroSerbian alliance. As a reward the basileus made a gift to the Ottomans of the town of
Tzympe, situated on the European shore of the Straits of Dardanelles.
The Greek supremacy was hampered when Brusa was finally conquered by the Ottoman
army. Before the death of Osman I, Ottoman Turks had conquered the small cities like Esk-eShehir (old city), Inonu, Bilejik, Yeni Shehir (new city). Until this time their border became
Sakharia River in the west, Esk-e- Shehir and Karamania in the South, Mount Olympus in
the West-south and Marmara Sea. Osman died at the moment of the surrender of Brusa.
Orhan took the throne of Osman and came into with contact of western world, hostile
neighbours far more powerful than himself. 22 The real charm of Ottoman history began after
the accession of Orhan. Brusa had fallen into his hands immediately and his position as a
Emir confirmed by the addition of Nicea and Nicomedia to his dominions and by the
transformation of his followers into a nation. From 1326 to 1344 CE he was busy in subduing
the territory of which he had been tentative master at the death of Osman, in forming his
nation and in organizing his army. From 1344 CE until his death in 1360 CE, his energies
were bent chiefly upon getting a foothold in Macedonia and Thrace. Ottomans captured
Karesai in the 1345 CE, which enabled them to enter inside the European lands rather than
Asian region.23 Recognizing Orhan as the real founder of Ottoman Empire Gibbon avers:
If to Osman, is given the honour of being father of a new people, the greater honour
of founding the nation must be ascribed to Orkhan... His three striking characteristics
were those which mark all men who have accomplished a great work in history,
oneness of purpose, inexhaustible energy, and an unlimited capacity for detail. He
36
began life as a village lad of an obscure tribe. After a public career of sixty years he
died, the brother in law of the emperor of Byzantium, the friend and ally of Genoa,
and potentially master of Thrace.24
The Ottoman supremacy over the Europeans in the period of growth was characterized
basically by two elements: conflict among the Greeks and marital relations of Ottomans with
the Greek princes. In the time of rivalry between Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus and
Emperor John Paleolugus for the throne, Cantacuzenus sought help from the Ottomans and in
exchange of six thousand soldiers he entered into matrimonial alliance by marrying his
daughter Theodora to Orkhan. Due to this relation Orkhan helped his father-in-law
Cantacuzenus many times against Paleolugus. Orkhan also strengthened his relations with the
Greeks by taking another Greek Princes ‘Nilufa’ as a wife for his son Halil. These relations
enabled him to achieve success in European land besides Black Sea region.25
Thus the internal affairs were worse for Byzantium during the civil wars that followed after
the death of Andronikos III. A six-year long civil war devastated the empire, allowing the
Serbian ruler Stefan IV Dushan (r. 1331–1346) to overrun most of the Empire’s remaining
territory and establish a short-lived “Serbian Empire”. In 1354 CE, an earthquake at Gallipoli
devastated the fort, allowing the Ottomans (who were hired as mercenaries during the civil
war by John VI Kantakouzenos) to establish themselves in Europe. 26 By the time the
Byzantine civil wars had ended, the Ottomans had defeated the Serbians and subjugated them
as vassals. Following the Battle of Kosovo, much of the Balkans became dominated by the
Ottomans.27
As Gibbon remarks, “John Cantacuzenos introduced the Osmanlis into Europe. John
Palaeologos accepted their presence in Thrace without a struggle. There is little choice
between these two Johns.”28 According to Yahya Armazani at least three events helped the
Ottoman to conquer European lands: first is the quarrel between two Byzantine rulers and
seeking help from the Ottomans; secondly the plague of black death started from 1347 CE
and spread upon the whole Balkan region and caused the death of nearly one third population
and thirdly the earthquake of 1354 CE, that occurred on the European side of Marmara Sea
37
region and destroyed Gallipoli.29 About the victory of Orhan in the European land S. J. Shaw
comments,
Less than two decades after Murad had ascended the throne, a little more than
30 years after Orhan has crossed into Europe, the Ottomans had assured their
rule in all of Southeast Europe, with only the principalities, Bosnia, Albania
and part of Greece remaining outside their control.”30
At the same time, the rising star of the Ottomans was already attracting certain Orthodox
Christians to abandon their State and join the Ottomans. They were the first to believe that
the Ottomans would become the inheritors of the Roman Empire. The most famous was the
Byzantine Prince Evrenos. A short time after Orhan’s conquest of Bursa (1326 CE), Evrenos
became converted to Islam and joined him. He later became a celebrated war leader,
commanding the armies in the west while Murad I (r.1360-89 CE), future successor of
Ottoman throne, commanded those in the east. The armies of Evrenos captured Thrace,
Macedonia as far as Albania, and Bulgaria with its capital Sona. During the reign of Sultan
Bayezid I (r.1389-1402 CE), who succeeded Murad I, Evrenos conquered central and
southern Greece, and then Thessaly and Larissa.
As they continued their drive into Europe, the Turkish army in the fourteenth century
developed tactics and training which gave it advantage over others. The Turks probably
learnt from the Byzantines, with their traditions of Roman legion, the art of using well
trained infantry. Meanwhile, jealousies and quarrels between Serbians, Bulgars and
Hungarians made easy the Turkish advance. The Bulgars actually gladly accepted Turkish
suzerainty in order to save them from their Christian neighbour. The Turks also were assisted
by the deep hatred existing at that time between the Eastern and Western Christian Churches.
Orthodox Christians of the Balkans and some of the heretical sects like the Bogomils 31,
accepted Turkish rule because they knew they would receive toleration than they would get
from the Hapsburg or the Roman Catholic prelates. 32
Relations in the period of expansion
Ottoman Empire started its westward expansion (See Map no. 2, Appendix B, p.455) into the
European continent in the middle of the fourteenth century. Its first significant opponent was
38
the young Serbian Empire, which was worn down by a series of campaigns, notably in the
Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The Ottoman Empire proceeded to conquer the lands of the
Second Bulgarian Empire - the Southern half (Thrace) in 1371 CE (Battle of Maritsa), Sofia
in 1382 CE, the then capital Tarnovgrad in 1393 CE, the northern rest after the Battle of
Nicopolis (Sept. 25, 1396 CE), except Vidin, which fell in 1422 CE; Albania in 1385 (Battle
of Savra) & in 1480 CE; Constantinople in 1453 CE.
Battle of Nicopolis was very crucial to confirm Ottomans superiority towards Europe. It is
considered the last effective Crusade of European Christians against Muslim; but not last
attempts to stop Ottomans forwardness. They failed to unite or resist Ottomans in future after
the defeat of this assembly at the Nicopolis. Ottoman supremacy had established over
Europeans as before, and through this war that truth become confirm. J. Shaw noted: “The
Ottoman victory over the Crusaders at Nicopolis increased European fear of the Ottomans
while adding to Ottoman – prestige throughout the Islamic world.”33
Thus Ottoman victory continued after the Battle of Varna and Second Battle of Kosovo
(1448 CE); Greece in 1460 CE; Serbia by 1459 and (after partial Hungarian re-conquest in
1480 CE) again by 1499 CE; Bosnia in 1463 CE (the Northwestern part only by 1527 CE)
and Herzegovina in 1482 CE The Battle of Kosovo34 (June 15, 1389 CE) ended with a
Turkish victory, the collapse of Serbia, and the complete encirclement of the crumbling
Byzantine Empire by Turkish armies. Murad captured many fortified places near
Constantinople and used internal troubles in Byzantium and the Slavic states to extend
Turkish conquests in the Balkan Peninsula. Moving into Serbia, he marched as far as
Kosovo, where he met Lazar’s army. At first, victory appeared to be on the side of the Serbs
when the Sultan was killed by a Serbian assassin, Milos Obilic 35, who stabbed Sultan with a
poisoned dagger.36 Some Serbian noblemen wed their daughters, including the daughter of
Prince Lazar, to Bayezid.37 In the wake of these marriages, Stefan Lazarevic (r.1389-1427)
became a loyal ally of Bayezid, going on to contribute significant forces to many of
Bayezid’s future military engagements. Similarly by the Turkish victory in the battle of
Nicopolis “the Turks discouraged the formation of future European coalition against them.
39
They maintained their pressure on Constantinople, tightened their control over the Balkans,
and became a greater menace to central Europe.”38 The Battle of Varna, (November 10, 1444
CE), confirmed the Turkish victory over a Hungarian force, ending the European powers
effort to save Constantinople from Turkish conquest thus enabling the Ottoman Empire to
confirm and expand its control over the Balkans.
Victory of Constantinople: new dimension of relations (1453 CE)
With the rise of Mohammed II (r. 1444-1446 CE, & 1451-1481 CE)39, called the “the
Conqueror” (Fatih), the Ottomans began a new era of conquest that extended the empire’s
rule across the Danube and central Europe as well as over the lands of Islamic Khilafahs in
the Middle East and through much of North Africa. Upon the accession of Sultan
Mohammed II on February, 1451 CE, he inherited an empire in far better than that which his
forefathers had. Even that, he needed a spectacular victory to fortify his political position
against the Turkish nobility, which always wanted peace in order to prevent the Kapikuli40
and devsirme41 from using new conquest to build their power. Nothing could be more
spectacular than the conquest of Constantinople. One strong point was that Byzantium had
sheltered Muslim claimants to the Ottoman throne to foment discord in the empire. Sultan
felt that as long as Byzantium held out, there would always be the possibility of new Crusade
efforts to rescue it and complete unification of the empire would be impossible.
Beyond these practical considerations there was the dream of establishing a world empire,
with Constantinople as its natural centre. For centuries Muslim hopes of world domination
had been associated with the capture of Byzantine capital. The ninth century philosopher AlKindi had expressed this feeling in his prophecy that the Mahdi42 or “rightly guided one”
would return to “renew Islam and cause justice to triumph. He will conquer the Spanish
peninsula and reach Rome and conquer it. He will travel to the East and conquer it. He will
conquer Constantinople, and rule over the whole earth which will be his.”43
Historian and traveler Ibn Khaldun related a tradition of the Prophet himself stating that: “He
will destroy the Byzantine Empire and will spend his treasures in God’s behalf, will be the
40
expected (Mahdi) when he conquers Constantinople.” Constantinople was the “Red Apple”
(Kizil Elma) of Muslim Tradition.44 Nourishing such dreams, Mohammad busied himself
with the plans for its conquest almost from the first moment of his accession. Constantinople
was captured on 29 May 1453 CE. Mohammed II allowed the Orthodox Church to maintain
its autonomy and land in exchange for accepting Ottoman authority. Because of bad relations
between the latter Byzantine Empire and the states of Western Europe as epitomized by
Loukas Notaras’s famous remark “Better the Sultan’s turban than the Cardinal’s Hat”, the
majority of the Orthodox population accepted Ottoman rule as preferable to Venetian rule.45
Byzantine historian George Sphrantzes was an eyewitness to the fall of Constantinople. In his
chronicle about the fall of the city, he recorded the events that had taken place at the end of
the third day of the conquest:
On the third day after the fall of our city, the Sultan celebrated his victory with a
great, joyful triumph. He issued a proclamation: the citizens of all ages who had
managed to escape detection were to leave their hiding places throughout the city and
come out into the open, as they were to remain free and no question would be asked.
He further declared the restoration of houses and property to those who had
abandoned the city before the siege, if they returned home, they would be treated
according to their rank and religion, as if nothing had changed. 46
The loss of the city was a great blow to Christendom, and it exposed the Christian west to a
vigorous and aggressive foe in the east. Pope Nicholas V (r.1447-1455 CE) called for an
immediate counter-attack in the form of a Crusade.47 When no European monarch was
willing to lead the crusade, the Pope himself decided to go, but his early death stopped this
plan. With the capture of Constantinople, Sultan Mohammed II had acquired the “natural”
capital of his kingdom, albeit one in decline due to years of war. And the conquest of the
Byzantine Empire removed a foe to the rear of the Ottoman advance into Europe.
But the capture of Constantinople created a real threat to European security and Christian
collective identity. Throughout the history of Ottoman–European relations, the fall of
Constantinople and later the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 CE became
symbolic historical events that played important roles in shaping a collective memory and
41
identity among European states. Thus, the Ottomans were the first non-Europeans to counter
an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy while creating a European collective identity that is one of the
basic notions of international society. When Constantinople fell, Ottoman historians
considered this event as the beginning of a ‘Yeni Cag’ (new era) in their history, signaling
their military superiority. European rulers and observers, on the contrary, did not credit the
role of the well-organized and disciplined army of Sultan Mehmet II but used the image of
‘dangerous Ottoman-Turk’ at the doorstep of Europe to defend the Christian faith and define
its identity.48 Although the political identity of Western Europe was based on the concept of
‘Christendom’ rather than ‘Europe’, these terms slowly became interchangeable as a result of
the Islamic Ottoman threat. After the fall of Constantinople, the statement of Pope Pius III in
identifying Europe with Christendom in 1458 CE had not only a symbolic meaning but also
played an important role in the construction of a European collective identity. 49 The fact that
the Christian communities and churches of Asia Minor—Anatolia (Anadolu)—were no
longer under Christendom but infidel Ottoman rule which was not ‘European’ became
another determining factor in ‘othering’ the Ottomans.50
Relation with Habsburg51 Empire
Conflict between Islam and Christianity for control of the western Mediterranean in Ottoman
times began on the sixteenth century. The Muslim domination that had made the entire sea a
Muslim lake had ended during the early centuries of Ottoman rise. With Italy and Spain too
divided and French diverted by the Hundred Years War (1337-1453 CE) with England, there
was for a time no dominating power. The European states that rose at the end of the fifteenth
century made the first attempt to fill the vacuum. Spain was united by the marriage of the
rulers of Aragon and Castile and strengthened by the conquest of last Muslim possessions in
Granada (1492 CE) by killing, burning, arson and destruction of the grand Mosjid (mosque)52
of Granada. Even though the Muslims were assured of safe passage by the Christian queen
Isabella and King Ferdinand, if they surrender and took shelter in the Mosjid, they acted
otherwise and thereby set examples of betrayal and distrust.
42
By the 16th century, the Ottomans had become a serious threat to Europe, with Ottoman
ships sweeping away Venetian possessions in the Aegean and Ionia and Ottoman-supported
Barbary pirates seizing Spanish possessions in the Maghreb. The Protestant Reformation, the
France–Habsburg rivalry and the numerous civil conflicts of the Holy Roman Empire served
as distractions. Meanwhile the Ottomans had to contend with the Persian Safavid Empire and
to a lesser extent the Mamluke Sultanate, which was defeated and fully incorporated into the
empire. Initially, Ottoman conquests in Europe made significant gains with a decisive victory
at Mohaacs reducing around one third (central) part of Kingdom of Hungary to the status of
an Ottoman tributary. After the Battle of Mohacs (1526 CE), only the southwestern part of
the Hungarian Kingdom was actually conquered,53 but the Ottoman campaign continued with
small campaigns and major summer invasions (troops returned south of the Balkan
Mountains before winter) through the land between 1526 CE and 1556 CE.
In this time diplomatic alliance was established between Sulaiman the Magnificent and
Francis I (r. 1515-1547 CE). The alliance was an opportunity for both rulers to fight against
the rule of the Habsburg54. (See Picture no.1 & 2, Appendix J, p.488) The objective for
Francis I was clearly to find an ally in the struggle against the House of Habsburg,55 although
this policy of alliance was in reversal of that of his predecessors. 56 The pretext used by
Francis I to seal an alliance with a Muslim power was the protection of the Christians in
Ottoman lands, through agreements called ‘Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire’.
In 1529 CE, they mounted their first major attack on the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy.
Attempting to conquer the city of Vienna (Siege of Vienna) in 1529 CE, is considered an
epic moment in the history of Ottoman-European relations. Martin Luther wrote his tract On
War Against the Turks protesting to the Siege of Vienna. He described Islam as a “patchwork
of Jewish, Christian, and heathen beliefs,” and saw the work of the devil behind this.57 The
Turks, however, were God’s scourge on European unbelief, “God’s rod and the devil’s
servant.”58 Before fighting the Turks, repentance was a prerequisite. 59
In 1538 CE, the Ottoman Empire invaded Moldavia. In 1541 CE, another campaign in
Hungary took Buda and Pest (which today together form the Hungarian capital Budapest)
43
with a largely bloodless trick: after concluding peace talks with an agreement, troops stormed
the open gates of Buda in the night. In retaliation for a failed Austrian counter-attack in 1542
CE, the conquest of the western half of central Hungary was finished in the 1543 CE
campaign that took both the most important royal ex-capital, Szekesfehervar, and the ex-seat
of the cardinal, Esztergom. However, the army of 35–40,000 men was not enough for
Suleiman to mount another attack on Vienna. A temporary truce was signed between the
Habsburg and Ottoman Empires in 1547 CE, which was soon disregarded by the Habsburgs.
In the major but moderately successful campaign of 1552 CE, two armies took the eastern
part of central Hungary, pushing the borders of the Ottoman Empire to the second (inner) line
of northern vegvars (border castles), which Hungary originally built as defense against an
expected second Mongol invasion-hence, afterwards, borders on this front changed little. For
Hungarians, the 1552 campaign was a series of tragic losses and some heroic (but pyrrhic)
victories, which entered folklore-most notably the fall of Dregely (a small fort defended to
the last man by just 146 men), and the Siege of Eger. Under Suleyman, popularly known as
‘the Magnificent’ or ‘the Lawmaker,’ the Ottoman Empire reached the apogee of its military
and political power. In the Mediterranean, navy captured all the principal North African
ports, and for a time the Ottoman fleet completely dominated the sea. By the end of
Suleyman’s reign, Ottoman hegemony extended over a great portion of Europe, Asia, and
Africa. (See: Map no. 3, Appendix-B, p. 456)
Latter was a major vegvar with more than 2000 men, but in poor shape and without outside
help. They faced two Ottoman armies (150,000 troops by earlier accounts, 60-75,000 men
according to recent research, which were unable to take the castle within five weeks the fort
was later taken in 1596. Finally, the 1556 CE campaign secured Ottoman influence over
Transylvania (which had fallen under Habsburg control for a time), while failing to gain any
ground on the western front, being tied down in the second (after 1555 CE) unsuccessful
siege of the southwestern Hungarian border castle of Szigetvar. The Ottoman Empire
conducted another major war against the Habsburgs and their Hungarian territories between
1566 CE and 1568 CE the Battle of Szigetvar (1566 CE), the third siege of Ottomans in
44
which; the fort was finally taken, but the death of aged Sultan, deterring that year’s push for
Vienna. (See Map no. 3, Appendix-B, p. 456)
During this period, Ottomans face some internal crisis and social difficulties resulting from
the long years of war in Asia, Europe and Africa. They were ready for peace. Safavid ruler
Shah Abbas I (1587-1629 CE) attempting to regain its territory and rebellions in Hapsburg
occupied Hungary likewise impelled the emperor to seek peace so that he would be free to
deal with his internal problems. The final Ottoman-Hapsburg treaty (November11, 1660 CE)
was signed at Sitva Torok, where Sitva River flows into the Danube. The Sultan’s desire for
peace was obvious.
Later, the Peace of Westphalia and the Spanish War of Succession in the 17th and 18th
centuries respectively left the Austrian Empire as the sole firm possession of the House of
Habsburg. By then, however, European advances in guns and military tactics outweighed the
skill and resources of the Ottomans and their elite Janissaries 60, enabling the Habsburgs to
retake Hungary. The Great Turkish War ended with three decisive Holy League victories at
Vienna, Mohacs and Zenta. The wars came to an end following Austria’s participation in the
war of 1787-1791 CE, which Austria fought in alliance with Russia. Intermittent tension
between Austria and the Ottoman Empire continued throughout the nineteenth century, but
they never again fought each other in a war and ultimately found themselves allied in World
War I, in the aftermath of which both empires were dissolved.
With the treaty the Ottoman rule over Hungary ended and two rulers became equal in rank.
Thus peace in the west was secured by Ottoman decline. Indeed the most important gain
came in addition to the treaty itself. Bocskay’s death (December 29, 1606 CE) was followed
by some turmoil and a rapid succession of princes in Transylvania. But the Sultan finally
secured the rule of Gabriel Bethlen (1613-1629 CE), who for many years accepted Ottoman
protection and supported the princes of Moldavia and Walachia in observing the bonds of
vassalage and providing military assistance when required. The “Revolt of the Principalities”
thus was ended, and the Ottoman position north of the Danube was restored at long last.
45
In addition, a new 20 years peace agreement with the Hapsburg (June 28, 1615 CE)
attempted to resolve problems that had arisen in regard to fulfilling the terms of Sitva-Torok.
The territory around Esztergom –which had been a particular point of dispute in the effort to
establish a boundary – was given to Austria, but one half of its tax revenues were to go to the
Ottoman treasury. In addition the Ottoman allowed Austria to show interest in the free
performance of the Christian religious rites within the Ottoman Empire and to allow needed
repair to Christian Churches, thus giving Hapsburg a legal right to intervene on Ottoman
internal affairs in the pretext of protecting the Sultan’s Christian subjects. The Capitulation
rights were also given to the merchants of Hapsburgs.61
Anyway, by depriving the Habsburg (later Austrian) Empire of dominating whole continent,
Ottoman Empire helped the proto-modern centralizing states, i.e. England, French and the
Netherlands, and Protestantism to survive the suppression of the Habsburgs. On the other
hand, by granting capitulations62 to these European states, it contributed to the economies of
these states in a way that they could be able to develop their emerging capitalist economies.
Eventually Ottoman Empire was not a passive actor and an outsider to the European system,
acted only as a counter-reference point in the formation of the European identity; rather, it
actively involved in the European politics, economics and culture as an active actor.
Ottoman Trade Relations with Europe
In the early stage of modern world, war and its political results including conquest and
subjection, together with trade and pilgrimage, can be identified as the three major modes in
which the inhabitants of any principality or empire were related to the world outside the
frontiers of the relevant polity. 63 There were many European merchants who came to the
Empire to do business with Ottoman subjects who went abroad for reasons of trade. Here are
descriptions of some of notable traders of different prominent European places with whom
relations were maintained in the 16th and 17th centuries.
Venice: Among merchants from Christian countries, in the late sixteenth and even in the
early seventeenth century, the Venetians still retained a prominent position. More
importantly Cyprus, with its rich production of cotton and sugar, in 1489 CE had become a
46
possession of Venice.64 This island, the site of Shakespeare’s Othello, remained under the
Signoria’s control until the Ottoman conquest of 1570–73 CE. Moreover, until the midseventeenth century the island of Crete was still a Venetian possession; it too was finally
conquered, by the Grand Vizier Koprulu-zade FazilAhmed Pasa, on behalf of Sultan
Mehmed IV (r. 1644–69 CE). But even after the final loss of all Venetian possessions in the
Aegean region (1718 CE) certain Ionian Islands and sections of the Dalmatian coast
remained in the Signoria’s hands, so that Venice remained a neighbour of the Ottoman
Empire until the very end of the ancient republic in 1797 CE. In spite of rather numerous
wars, Ottoman relations with this city were closer than with any other state of Christendom.
Wealthy subjects of the Sultanates continued to purchase Venetian fabrics and glassware well
into the seventeenth century, to say nothing of the cheeses that were highly esteemed by
certain sixteenth century Ottoman dignitaries.65 During, periods of war Venetian merchant’s
business activities were hampered having to use the certainly not disinterested services of
trading partners from France, England, or even the Habsburg Empire. This war-related
disadvantage explains why the ‘Doge and Lords of Venice’, as they were called in Ottoman
diplomatic parlance, attempted to end wars with the Sultans within a few years, as long as the
city’s merchants still played an important role in the commerce of the eastern
Mediterranean.66
Poland: In the sixteenth century, after Hungary had become an Ottoman province,
competition between the Habsburgs and the Sultans focused on the Polish crown. After the
extinction of the Jagiello dynasty in 1572 CE, Poland became an elective monarchy.
Immediately Sultan Selim II (r. 1566–74 CE) made it clear that he would not tolerate a
Prince from any of the neighbouring territories on the Polish throne, and his threats of war
applied particularly to any Habsburg candidate. As a result the crown was offered to a French
Prince, whom the Sultan was willing to accept if no member of the local nobility could
obtain sufficient support. This episode demonstrates that the Ottoman Sultans of the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries played a significant role in the formulation of the
policies of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. This fact is relevant here because
commercial relations cannot be treated without reference to the political setting, especially
47
when luxury items were of major significance, as is true in the present case. Certain highlevel commanders of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth carried the glorified version of an
Ottoman war mace (bozdogan) as a sign of their dignity and office. The seventeenth-century
portraits of Polish gentlemen, often painted for use at funeral ceremonies, show them
wearing garments in a style reminiscent of Ottoman kaftans. The Polish embassies visiting
Istanbul were numerous, and ‘magnificence’, as understood at the time, involved a numerous
retinue. Sometimes the king of Poland himself placed orders for textiles with gentlemen
visiting the Empire: thus in 1553 CE Sigismund August (1520-1572 CE) asked the castellan
Wawrzyniec Spytek Jordan (1518-1568 CE) to bring back no less than 132 textile items.
France: Ottoman Sultans were interested in friendly relations with rulers perceived as actual
or potential allies in the struggle against the Habsburgs.67 Capitulations granting privileges to
foreign merchants were typically issued in this context. In a sense, this was applicable even
to Venice, whose government in this period felt particularly threatened by the Spanish
presence in Naples and Milan, and thus was interested in a modus vivendi with the Ottoman
Empire.68 But the first Christian partner of the Ottomans in Western Europe was King
Francois I of France, whose alliance with Sulaiman the Magnificent included provisions for
the safety of French merchants on Ottoman territory. Several times in the seventeenth
century, the ‘understanding’ between the French and Ottoman rulers showed signs of
considerable strain. Yet conflict was contained, and in the period under discussion here, there
never was any war between the Ottoman Empire and France. 69
However, in the sixteenth century, and even during the first half of the seventeenth, there
were not many French merchants who actually availed themselves of the opportunities
provided by the Franco-Ottoman ‘special relationship’. At first the so-called wars of religion
and the civil war following the extinction of the royal house of Valois ruined the trade of
Lyons, at that time the commercial centre of France. As a result the Italian bankers who had
financed Lyons’ economic activities either returned home or else sought assimilation into the
French aristocracy. Once Henry IV of the Bourbon dynasty (1553-1610 CE) had gained
recognition as King of France, there was a brief period of commercial revival, reflected in a
renewal of the capitulations (1604 CE). But the murder of this ruler in 1610 CE inaugurated
48
another period of civil wars, which only came to an end with the defeat of the provincial antitax rebellions and uprisings of the court nobility, known as the Fronde, in 1652 CE. Yet even
during this period, the ‘special relationship’ with the Ottoman Sultans, established through
the capitulations, was of considerable value to the budding French diplomacy of the time.
For, while the Venetian capitulations were much older, they had lapsed during the period of
tension and war which preceded and followed the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. In
consequence, for a while all European merchants wishing to trade in the Empire had to do so
under the French flag. This explains why Valois and Bourbon diplomacy did not at all
appreciate English and Dutch attempts to secure capitulations of their own.
England: English traders occasionally had appeared in the fifteenth-century Mediterranean,
selling the woolen cloth that had begun to form the country’s major export item. A hundred
years later, after a brief interruption during the Veneto-Ottoman tensions of 1566–73 CE,
English merchants re-entered the Mediterranean in force, now with the intention of
displacing the Venetian carrying trade by any means at their disposal, not excluding piratical
attacks.
In examining why the diplomatic relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire
evolved from primarily commercial contacts dominated by the Levant Company 70 to
diplomatic relations controlled by the central government, scholars predominantly point to
one of three factors: (i) English imperial aspirations, (ii) an economic shift away from
Levantine trade, and (iii) internal political considerations. Because the hundred-year period
between Harborne’s appointment to Istanbul and the establishment of royal control over
diplomatic relations with Turkey coincides with the beginnings of England’s imperial
ambitions, some scholars point to the emergence of English imperial aspirations as the
driving factor behind the shift in Anglo-Ottoman relations. Literary scholar Gerald Maclean
describes the dynamic between England and the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries as “imperial envy.” 71
During the last decades of the sixteenth century, when the conflict with the Spanish crown
had reached its height, Queen Elizabeth I (r.1558-1603 CE) consented to dispatch her first
ambassador to the Ottoman Porte.72 However, their salaries were defrayed by the newly
49
formed Levant Company.73 Elizabeth focused her first letter to Sultan Murad III (1546-95
CE) almost exclusively on the commercial benefits that the opening of trade between
England and Turkey would confer on the Sultans dominions:
The product in which our realm abounds and which those of other princes lack are so
necessary for the uses of mankind that no people can be without them, or fail to rejoice
when it has obtained them by long and difficult journeys. But every one sells more
dearly to others in proportion as he seeks a living and a profit from his labour. So as the
acquisition of those products is advantageous, but the purchase of them from these
others burdensome, the advantage of your subjects will be increased by this free access
of a few of our people to your land, the burden will be diminished by allowing any of
our subjects to go.74
Throughout the seventeenth century, English traders constituted the most visible European
presence in the Ottoman Empire; in an outlying province such as Morea (Peloponnese),
occasionally Englishmen were farmers of Ottoman Market dues.75 However, English firms
withdrew from the Ottoman market after about 1700 CE. On the one hand, the supply of
Iranian raw silk became increasingly aleatory and in the end, almost dwindled to
nothingness, as the wars which preceded and then followed the end of the Safavid76 dynasty
(1501-1736 CE) discouraged producers from engaging in this delicate and labour - intensive
enterprise. Moreover, in both Bengal and China, English merchants found silk that was both
cheaper and more appropriate to the expanding industries of Europe. As a result, European
demand for Iranian silk practically collapsed. This phenomenon has been described as a
loosening of the ties that bound Ottoman producers of textile fibers to their European
customers, and Ottoman manufacturers were accorded a ‘period of grace’ before the full
onslaught of European manufactures began in the early nineteenth century. 77 For the time
being, English traders found themselves without goods to import from the Levant; and the
Aleppo houses whose principals populated the vicinity of London’s Devonshire Square
closed down one by one.78 This fact in itself demonstrates that in the eighteenth century the
Ottoman lands in fact were not a major outlet for English manufactured goods.
Netherland: Dutch merchants and shippers were latecomers to the eastern Mediterranean,
putting in a first appearance during the closing years of the sixteenth century. For a long
50
time, the lifeline of northern Netherlanders had been the Baltic trade, which permitted largescale imports of grain and, as a result, a level of urbanization unusually high for the early
modern period. Where Dutch commerce outside Europe was concerned, involvement with
the spice trade of the Moluccas and Ceylon - or even, in the seventeenth century, the abortive
attempt to gain a position in the Americas- maintained priority over exports to or imports
from the Ottoman domains.
On the Ottoman side, it seems that the Dutch were welcomed because of the long and
successful struggle they waged against Spanish–Habsburg hegemony. It has been suggested
that the pattern of the war in the Netherlands between 1568 and 1609 CE was at least partly
due to Ottoman initiatives: the timing of Sultanic naval actions in the Mediterranean may
well have taken the vicissitudes of the war in the Netherlands into account. 79
After all, the prospect of the Spanish fleet free to act against Ottoman North Africa can
scarcely have appealed to policy makers in Istanbul. It may, therefore, be assumed that the
ultimate survival of the Dutch Republic was due to the fact that the Spanish defence of
Catholicism had to be conducted on two fronts, not only in the rebellious Northern provinces,
but also in the Mediterranean theatre of war. The early nineteenth-century Ottoman
documents show that local artisans at that time were not having any trouble supplying
themselves. Occasional sales of mohair occurred in Holland even in the second half of the
eighteenth century, after the demise of the Leiden greinen80. Probably re-export to France
allowed a few Dutch merchants to continue their activities in Ankara even at this late date.
Relations in the period of Stagnation and reform (1683–1827)
During this period Russian expansion presented a large and growing threat. Accordingly,
King Charles XII (r. 1697 –1718 CE) of Sweden was welcomed as an ally in the Ottoman
Empire following his defeat by the Russians at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 CE.81 Charles
XII persuaded the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730 CE) to declare war on Russia,
which resulted in the Ottoman victory at the Pruth River Campaign of 1710–1711 CE.82 The
subsequent Treaty of Passarowitz (1718 CE) brought a period of peace between wars.
51
However, the Treaty also revealed that the Ottoman Empire was on the defensive and
unlikely to present any further aggression in Europe. 83
Together with Austria, Russia, under Catherine I, engaged in the Austro-Russian–Turkish
War (1735–1739 CE). The Treaty of Belgrade signed on 18 September 1739 CE, ended this
war and resulted in the loss of Serbia and “Little Walachia” to Austria and the port of Azov
to the Russians. However, following the Treaty of Belgrade, the Ottoman Empire was able to
enjoy a generation of peace as Austria and Russia were forced to deal with the rise of the
Prussians under King Frederick the Great. 84 In this long period of Ottoman peace there were
educational and technological reforms, including the establishment of higher education
institutions such as the Istanbul Technical University. In 1734 CE, when an artillery school
was established with French teachers in order to impart Western-style artillery methods, the
Islamic clergy successfully objected under the grounds of theodicy. 85 Not until 1754 CE was
the artillery school reopened on a semi-secret basis. In 1726 CE CE, Ibrahim Muteferrika
convinced the Grand Vizier Nevsehirli Damat Ibrahim Pasha 86, the Grand Mufti, and the
clergy on the efficiency of the printing press, and later submitted a request to Sultan Ahmed
III, who granted Muteferrika the permission to publish non-religious books (despite
opposition from some calligraphers and religious leaders.) Muteferrika’s press published its
first book in 1729 CE, and, by 1743 CE, issued 17 works in 23 volumes (each having
between 500 and 1,000 copies.)87
Under the pretext of pursuing fugitive Polish revolutionaries, Russian troops entered Balta an
Ottoman-controlled city on the border of Bessarabia and massacred its citizens and burned
the town to the ground.88 This action provoked the Ottoman Empire into the Russo-Turkish
War of 1768–1774 CE. The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (signed on July, 21, 1774 CE) was
one of the most fateful documents of Ottoman history, although its territorial provisions were
limited. The Crimea’s independence was recognized by both sides. The Russians agreed to
allow the Sultan to act as supreme religious leader of its Muslim inhabitants, with the title of
Khalifah, long since fallen into disuse, resurrected to express the new arrangement. In return
for this, however, Russia was allowed to occupy the territory between the Dnieper and the
52
Bug as well as the ports of Azov and Kinburun, which gave her a far firmer foothold on the
Black Sea than ever before, Russia would evacuate the Principalities and the Caucasus as
well as Orlov’s conquests in the Aegean Islands. But in return the Sultan had to give the
Catherine Czarina the Great (r.1762–96 CE) the right to build and protect an orthodox church
in Istanbul which was subsequently interpreted to signify Russian protection over all
Orthodox Christians in the empire. These events enabled Russia to intervene in Ottoman
internal affairs for its own advantage. Finally, the Sultan agreed to pay a substantial war
indemnity of 7.5 million akces over a three-year period, a substantial sum indeed for the
impoverished treasury. Thus Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru comments aptly:
The decisive defeat by Russia in 1774 had given the first to the Turks, and made
them realize that they were getting left behind by the rest of Europe. Being a military
nation the first thing that struck them that the army should be brought up to date. This
was done to some extent and it was through the new officer class that Western idea
crept into Turkey.89
A series of wars were fought between the Russian and Ottoman empires from the 18th to the
19th century. By the late 18th century, a number of defeats in several wars with Russia led
some people in the Ottoman Empire to conclude that the reforms of ‘Deli Petro’90 had given
the Russians an edge, and the Ottomans would have to keep up with Western technology in
order to avoid further defeats.91
In the late eighteenth century, just before the upheavals caused by the French Revolution
(1789), the Ottoman Empire roughly consisted of the Balkans (with modern day, or rather
yesterday’s Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and large parts of Romania), Anatolia
(modern-day Turkey) and most Arab world (with the modern states of Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, parts of Saudia Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria). In
large parts of his dominions, the Sultan’s real power was slight, in some parts (North Africa,
the Arabian Peninsula) it was practically non-existent.
Ottoman military reform efforts begin with Selim III (r.1789–1807 CE) who made the first
major attempts to modernize the army along European lines. These efforts, however, were
53
hampered by reactionary movements, partly from the religious leadership, but primarily from
the Janissary corps, who had become anarchic and ineffectual and firmly opposed to change,
they created a Janissary revolt. Selim’s efforts cost him his throne and his life, but were
resolved in spectacular and bloody fashion by his successor, the dynamic Mahmud II
(r.1808-1839 CE), who eliminated the Janissary corps in 1826 CE.
Apart from internal opposition, the Sultan was certainly hampered in his efforts at reform by
the fact that his reign coincided with the international upheaval caused by the French
Revolution of 1789 CE and the Napoleon’s invasion in Egypt in 1798 CE. Ottoman foreign
policy for over two centuries highlighted its friendly relationship with French, the arch
enemy of the House of Hapsburg. Napoleon’s expedition has been the subject of an extensive
literature. It was a result both of the colonial and commercial rivalry between French and
England, which was still being fought out in India, and of the realization in Paris that the
available means did not allow a direct attack on England itself. Invasion of Egypt virtually
seems Napoleon’s dreams of conquering the Middle East as a part of conquering world
conqueror, but French policy aims were indirectly to weaken the British position in the East.
This event shocked the Ottoman as well as Britain and Russia, but expedition lasted for
nearly three years. The peace of Amiens (1802 CE) saw a restoration of old warm
relationship between French and the Sublime Porte.92
The French Revolution of 1789 CE did have a marked effect among the literate members of
the Christian communities of the empire. The first to be influenced were the Greeks, than this
spreads to others. The three catchwords of the French Revolution, ‘liberty, equality,
fraternity’, had appealing effects among these communities; but to them liberty meant not the
guarantee of civic rights but national independence. Nationalism was introduced into the
Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of revolutionary wars. The year 1808 saw the beginning of
a Serbian insurrection, which at first was no more than a protest against the abuse of the local
Muslim landowners and the Janissaries, but which developed into a movement for autonomy
and later independence. It was no coincidence that the movement’s first leader was a rich
pig-exporter called Kara George. The birth of Greek nationalism can be traced to the
54
founding by Greek merchants in Odessa in 1814 CE of the Philiki Hetairia, a secret society
aiming for the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire. During the nineteenth century, the
growth of nationalism, first in the Balkans and later also in the Asiatic provinces, was to
prove the most important factor in the destruction of Ottoman state.
The Serbian revolution (1804–1815 CE) marked the beginning of an era of national
awakening in the Balkans during the Eastern Question. Suzerainty of Serbia as a hereditary
monarchy under its own dynasty was acknowledged de jure in 1830 CE.93 In 1821 CE, the
Greeks declared war on the Sultan. By the late eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire was in
a critical sate. Trade had declined still further; the Bedouin 94 tribes were out of control in
Arab provinces, and the local pashas 95 were no longer adequately manager by Istambul, were
often corrupt, and exploited the population. The Europeans, however, was going from one
triumph to another. But the Ottomans were not unduly worried. Sultan Selim III tried to take
a leaf out of Europe’s book, assuming that an army reform along Western lines would restore
the balance of power. In 1789 CE he opened a number of military schools with French
instructors, where students learned European languages and studied the new Western
sciences alongside modern threat. They had not yet realized that Europe had evolved a
wholly different type of society since the Ottoman Empire had been established, they had
now pulled irrevocably ahead of Ottomans and would shortly achieve world power.
Beginning in the 1780s, the Ottoman Empire began to weaken, as European powers gained
strength and began to vie with each other for access to resources and markets in the Middle
East. Most of the northern coast of the Black Sea had slipped away by 1812. The Ottoman
Empire lost Greece, Egypt, and Serbia to European-inspired independence movements over
the next 60 years. (See Map no. 4, Appendix- B, p.457) By the mid-19th century, the
Ottoman Empire had become known as the “sick man of Europe”.96 The suzerain states – the
Principality of Serbia, Wallachia, Moldavia and Montenegro moved towards de jure
independence during the 1860s and 1870s. These are reflected in decline of the Ottoman
Empire, which had already set in motion about a hundred years before (see Map no.5 & 6,
Appendix- B, p. nos. 458 and 459).
55
Relations during Tanzimat era
Sultan Selim III (1789-1807 CE) and Mahmud II (1807-1839 CE) was the pioneer of the
reforms works in the Ottoman Empire, which paved the path to Tanizmat. The period from
1839 to 1876 is known in Turkish historiography as the era of the Tanzimat, after the long
continuous external pressure was an important incentive for the internal administrative and
legal reforms announced during the period, which modernized the Ottoman state and society
through diplomatic means.97 The Gulhane Hatt-ı Humayunu (Imperial Degree of the RoseChamber), which opened a new era of the Tanzimat in Ottoman history, was declared in 1839
CE. It was a declaration of certain rights and political reforms, which introduced a new
meaning to Ottoman citizenship. It was a statement of intent on the part of the Ottoman
government, promising in effect four basic reforms viz;
(a) The establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of the Sultan’s
subjects;
(b) An orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax-farming;
(c) A system of conscription for the army; and
(d) Equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion (although this was
formulated somewhat ambiguously in the document).98
The Tanzimat leaders aimed to reform important institutions of Ottoman society at
administrative, judicial, financial and educational levels as well as the military. They left
traditional Islamic institutions such as religious schools and courts out of these reforms.
Specifically, the continuous theocratic nature of the state created a serious obstacle in the
development of Ottoman–European relations.
Christian minority’s status was improved from the second class to the equal position with the
Muslim majority, through this declaration. The promise of Gulhaneh were brought to reality
during the next 40 years by a group of ministers and bureaucrats collectively referred to as
the ‘Men of the Tanzimat’ comprising Mustafa Reshid Pasha and his protege, men whom he
had trained and brought to power in the traditional Ottoman way to support his endeavors.
56
Notable amongst them are Amin Ali Pasha, (1815-1871 CE), Mehmet Fuad Pasha, (18151869 CE), Midhat Pasha (1822-1883 CE) and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895 CE). The
rise of modern Turkey stands on Tanzimat, which injected many European ideas in the
empire.
Characteristics of Ottoman–European relations and Modernization
Before developing close diplomatic relations in the nineteenth century which would
eventually initiate the Ottoman Empire’s modernization, interaction between the Empire and
European states mainly occurred through warfare. After their major defeat at Carlowitz in
1699 CE the Ottomans had to learn new concepts and new ways of dealing with European
states.99 Most historians agree that the primary weakness of the Ottoman state was its
‘inability to adapt to the military technology of Europe’.100 Consequently, either the viability
of the Ottoman system had to be questioned or the superiority of European military
technology had to be recognized.101 As Bernard Lewis argues, the question was not only
‘what were the Ottomans doing wrong?’ but also ‘what were the Europeans doing right?’
More importantly, the essential question was ‘how do we catch up with them, and resume our
rightful primacy?’ These questions led to the acceptance of a shocking idea to Muslims; that
they might learn from the previously despised ‘inferior infidel’. The Ottoman Sultans Selim
III (1789–1807 CE) and Mahmud II (1808–39 CE), the Reformer were the first to
acknowledge this.102
Military reform
The need for modernization of the Ottoman Empire was initially intended to be limited to
military technology only. Military reform with the primary purpose of strengthening state
power gradually required the import of other ‘infidel’ technological developments. During
the reign of Sultan Selim III, the reforms of the Nizami Cedit (New Order) period dictated
that a new army be set up and new military schools were opened.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the limited military and technological reforms were not
enough to prevent the decline of the Empire. The Nizami Cedit reforms extended to nontechnical areas by recognizing the general superiority of the West. On the one hand, Selim III
57
recognized the importance of being part of European diplomacy and decided to establish
permanent embassies in major European capitals in 1793 CE. On the other hand, the Sultan
aimed at limiting the influence of the Ulema (Muslim clergy), which became the principal
authority of Islamic life and institutions in the Ottoman state and society as the Empire
declined. However, the need to modernize all Ottoman institutions and concepts was only
recognized by a small number of enlightened army officers and bureaucrats. It was not
surprising that the Ulema opposed the New Order and modernization attempts. In order to
obstruct progressive reforms, they used its influence to cooperate with the janissary
(yeniceri) army. Hence, the role of religion and the military became pivotal issues in
determining both Ottoman/Turkish modernization and their relations with European states. In
particular, the Islamic character of the Empire became the major obstacle in establishing
relations with Europe.
Sultan Mahmud II was the first reformist monarch in Ottoman history. He was tactical
enough to gain the support of the Ulema when he planned a complete reform of the army.
This cooperation between the Sultan and religious groups lasted only a short while, until the
janissary army was abolished in 1826 CE. Mahmud II’s first achievement was to set up a
new army and train army officers according to European models. The second achievement
was the more drastic step of depriving the Ulema of power, preventing them from obstructing
modernization. These reforms, however, only reduced the influence of religion, but did not
eliminate religious sentiments from Ottoman society. The modernist army officers and
bureaucrats always had a clash of interests with religious groups that highlighted the struggle
between the traditional and the modern in Turkish history. The Sultan was influenced by the
modern education system of France and in 1827 CE, he send four students to France for
higher education beyond the sentiment of Ottoman spirit. 103 Even he appointed an advisor of
France to develop the whole system. On the occasion of inauguration ceremony of a Medical
School, he states in his speech as a chief guest:
You will study scientific medicine in French........my purpose in having you taught
French is not to educate you in the French language; it is to teach you scientific
medicine and little by little to take it into our language....... work to acquire a
knowledge of medicine from your teachers and strive gradually to take into Turkish
and give it currency in our language.104
58
In fact, Mahmud II’s reforms signaled the beginning of the decay of a multinational Empire.
While the Sultan managed to control the power of the Ulema, he did not anticipate the rise of
nationalism among his subjects. His aim of decreasing the role of religion in Ottoman society
started a new process of change that undermined the structure of the Empire’s religion based
millet system, which was functional for several centuries. It was not a surprise that national
sentiments gradually moved into the vacuum created by the weakened role of religion in
Ottoman socio-political life.105
In general, the nineteenth century can be characterized as a century of national unification
and the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire were the first to explore the meaning of
nationalist ideology. The Serbs were the first collective group to launch a national rising
against the Ottomans in February 1804 CE. In 1815 CE, a second Serb rising was more
successful and won them recognition as an autonomous principality under Ottoman
suzerainty. The Greek uprising a few years later evoked widespread European support and
achieved a sovereign independent Greek kingdom. 106 In the end, Sultan Mahmud II had to
accept the independence of Greece, and an autonomous Serbia and Egypt. These movements
were the first signals of the emergence of nationalism within the Empire. The impact of
nationalism on the Empire’s millet system gained a new momentum by the proclamation of
the Tanzimat era.
Reception Movement of European Law in Turkey: From the proclamation of the Edict of
Tanzimat (1839 CE) to the revolution of law realized in the early years of the Turkish
Republic. For centuries before the Tanzimat, the legal system of the Ottoman Empire was
based on Islamic law - the Shariah. This was a system of law at variance with European
Continental law. In the Ottoman legal system, non- Muslims were subject to the rural
principles of their own religions and ethnic groups in the field of private law; in public law
they were subject to the rules of Shariah Law as it applied to dhimmis (“protected persons”).
Dhimmis were given freedom of conscience but were subject to certain restrictions attendant
upon their living in a Muslim society.
This system facilitated a peaceful existence for non-Muslims during periods in which the
59
state was powerful, but during the era when the power of the Ottoman Empire declined, they
were inflicted with unjust administration and unfair taxation. Consequently, they were
susceptible to the ideas of equality and nationalism emanating from the French Revolution in
1789 CE. The European powers, in an effort to interfere in the affairs of the empire, launched
a competitive race to draw the religious and ethnic minorities to their side and to place them
under their protection. The reception movement in the Ottoman Empire came as a result of
these external pressures. In the hope of gaining the loyalty of all its subjects, this movement
of reforms was designed to save the state from total collapse by granting equal civil rights to
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike. The reform movement started under the Sultans
Selim III and Mahmut II, leading to the proclamation of the edict of Tanzimat by Abdul
Majid in 1839 CE.
The Edicts of Tanzimat and Islahat: The principles embodied in the Edict of Tanzimat
stipulated that everybody living in the empire, whether Muslim or not, would be subject to
the same rules. The Edict of Islahat (1856 CE), considered as a supplement to the first edict,
rendered the original principle of equality totally inapplicable; although the 1856 CE edict
declared equality between Muslim and non- Muslim subjects, at the same time the privileges
previously given to non- Muslims were reaffirmed. Many further laws were passed in order
to implement the principles previously set forth by the edicts of Tanzimat and Islahat. The
Ottoman Government was trying to draft general laws not based on religious rules and
applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims on the basis of equality, the fundamental idea of
Tanzimat. The majority of the laws were adapted from Western laws.
Reception in Public & Constitutional Law: The most important event of the post-Tanzimat
period in the history of Turkish law was doubtless the restriction of the Sultan’s authority
through the acceptance of the constitution. The first ideas were proposed in the 1860s by
philosophers like Sinasi Pasha and Namik Kemal107 in the newspapers of the period. The first
philosopher to defend the idea of secularism was Ali Suavi. 108 These intellectuals, engaged in
the “New Ottoman” movement, were part of a great struggle against the oppressive regime of
Abdul Aziz. The Sultan was finally overthrown and Murad V became Sultan. It was Midhat
Pasha who strove to gain acceptance of a constitution. It would not be wrong to call him “the
60
architect of the Ottoman Constitution.” The German Ambassador in Istanbul during this
period observed that “Midhat Pasha is making far-reaching plans for the equality between
Muslims and Christians.”109 As a result of the deteriorating health of Murad, Abdul Hamid II,
known to view the constitution with disfavor, became Sultan. Nonetheless, Abdul Hamid II
promised to accept a constitution,110 and a commission consisting of 28 peoples 111 started to
work on the documents. An internal draft of the constitution, prepared by Sait Pasha and the
Council of Ministers (Meclis- i Vukela),112 was presented to the Sultan. The Sultan approved
the draft after making quite a few amendments in articles related to his authority. The
constitution was declared on 23 December 1876 CE. The Ottoman ambassadors in European
Countries were notified by Said Pasha by telegram.113
The Constitution was modeled on the Belgian Constitution of 1831 CE and the Prussian
Constitution of 1851 CE. It particularly resembled the Prussian Constitution which was based
on vesting all the power in the legitimate king, more than the liberal Belgian constitution. It
consisted of 119 articles just like the Prussian one. All the titles of chapters and articles were
completely the same. The constitution granted the Sultan great authority. The liberties that
individuals enjoyed were undermined; even the edict of Tanzimat accorded more individual
rights. But within a short period of time Sultan declared the constitution null and void. The
Sultan used the Ottoman Russian war as a pretext and dissolved the Assembly (February 14,
1878 CE). This was again summoned for meeting. With the efforts of the Young Turks,
especially the Committee for Union and Progress, Sultan Abdul Hamid-II was forced to
implement the constitution on July 23, 1908.114 Amendments were made to the constitution
after the Sultan’s dethronement in 1909. The powers of the Sultan were restricted and the
powers of the assembly were strengthened, making its dissolution more difficult. Article 113,
which restricted individual rights and liberties was revoked. 115
The new government also brought in some foreign experts to modernize the state
administration. For example, an expert was recruited to organize the customs administration,
a Belgian was appointed to the position of general director of the Post and Telegram service,
and Count Ostrorog116 was appointed as an advisor in the Ministry of Justice. The Ittihat ve
Terakki Cemiyeti’s (Committee of Union and Progress) CUP, having increased its authority,
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became an oligarchic power following the amendments made to the constitution at different
dates. Therefore, despite the existence of the Constitution, the Second Constitutional Period
like the First Constitutional Period, failed to bring democracy to the Ottoman State.
However, the struggle for freedom realized during the First Constitutional Period led to the
birth of constitutionalist ideas, which continued to circulate. With the Second Constitutional
Period, concepts such as secularism and women’s education and rights, spread to the Turkish
society for the first time. This was a period of transition in preparation for the democratic
order established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.117
Criminal Law: The first code enacted after the proclamation of Tanzimat was the Criminal
Code of 1840 CE. This code stressed the equality of all subjects, “from the Vizier to the
shepherd. The second Criminal Code enacted in 1851 was more detailed. Crimes were
divided into three categories: (1) crimes committed against lives and individual security, (2)
crimes against honour and dignity, and (3) crimes against the property of citizens. The
concept of ‘public case’ was introduced in Ottoman law for the first time with this code. In
1855, a code to combat bribery was enacted. In 1858, a new Criminal Code was drafted,
based on the French Criminal Law of 1810. The principle of punishment by the state of
persons committing crimes against the public order, even in the absence of the filing of a
complaint against the person, was accepted.
Procedure Laws: In 1879 CE, during the era of the Tanzimat, the French Criminal
Procedure Code was translated and adopted. This code was the basis for the establishment of
modern criminal courts and for the institution of public prosecutors. That same year, the Civil
Procedure Code was enacted, which was also based on French Law. What is apparent is that
Ottoman law was developing not only through reception of Western Codes, but also through
doctrine, following the prevailing mode of western jurisprudence. One of the interesting
problems that emerged from this development was the objection of foreigners to the
application of this procedural law to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
The justification for their objection was based on the Capitulations of the Ottoman
government to foreign states, and the contention of the non-Muslim clergy that they were still
62
entitled to separate rights and privileges. 118 Other legal reforms were to follow. A British
legal expert named Major Gordon was invited to Turkey to carry out a reorganization of
prisons and a code covering prisons was put into effect in 1881 CE.119 The various laws were
frequently amended, parallel to developments in the West.
Adoption in Private and Commercial Law: European trade practices were already used in
the mixed commercial courts in operation since 1840 CE. In order to compensate for the gap
in this domain, French Commercial Code of 1807 was translated and published in 1850 CE.
The Bankruptcy Code was published in 1855 and became part of Ottoman law. In 1860,
sections of the commercial courts were supplemented to the Commercial Code, once again
translated exactly from the French Commercial Code. 120 In 1861 CE, the French Commercial
Procedure Code was translated and put into force. In 1863 CE, the second volume of the
French Commercial Code on maritime trade was also translated. Drawing also from the laws
of Holland, Sardinia, and Prussia, this code was put into effect. The Commercial Code
contradicted Islamic law, causing many practical problems (such as the ban on interest in the
latter). An Ottoman jurist, Nazaret Hilmi, mentioned the problematic nature of the reception
of these laws in his book, Islahat- Adliye: “As most of our laws have been adapted and
translated from French laws, there is need to refer to the main sources to solve the problems
that arise from time to time, because of abridgements made in translation of these laws.
Furthermore, there are some articles that can only be understood by reading the Civil Code.
This gives rise to the need for jurists to have a French education.”121
After the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Period, a commission was established to
eliminate the shortcomings in the Commercial Code. This commission prepared a draft by
applying the commercial laws of Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Romania, Chile, and some
provisions of the Shafi sect. However, it was not possible to pass this draft as law. 122 Some
amendments were made to Kanunname-i Tijaret123 in 1915 and 1924, and it remained in
force until the new Commercial code of the Turkish Republic was drafted. Commercial
courts were organized in a detailed manner in 1860 CE, again in accordance with the French
example, in order to implement this law.124
63
The Developments in Civil Law: It was felt that a Civil Code was greatly needed, and its
preparation appeared on the agenda. Engelhard wrote: “A French advisor helped prepare a
Civil Code immediately after the proclamation of the Edict of Tanzimat, but it was not put
into effect”125 Ali Pasha proposed the adoption of the Civil Code, the most famous code of
this period, since other laws adopted after the Tanzimat were generally of French origin.
However, on a totally opposite pole, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha supported a civil code compatible
with Islamic law. Ali Pasha thought that the adoption of the Civil Code would provide real
equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha emphasized the
disadvantages of adopting a civil code for Muslims from a Christian country. It was his
opinion that was later accepted. A Civil Code was prepared by a commission (Mecelle
Cemiyeti), and was put into force under the name of Mecelle126. However, the Mecelle code
contained no provisions on issues of persons, family, foundations, and inheritance. Therefore,
Ottoman jurists aimed at making the Civil Code more comprehensive. For example, Ottoman
intellectuals published articles on the necessity of enacting a family law and to improve the
status of women. A number of Western Civil Codes were translated into Turkish. An
attorney, Nazaret Hilmi, translated the French Civil Code in 1885 CE. In the preface to his
work, he wrote that “the translation of the marvelous laws of the Western states is useful and
contributes to the needed reforms and developments.”127 Cemaleddin, who instructed the
Mecelle in the School of Law, compared the French Civil Code and Mecelle article by article
in a long article published in 1907. 128 Nazaret had translated the Swiss Civil Code into
Turkish in 1912 (without knowing that it would become the Civil Code of the Turkish
Republic 14 years later).129 In 1916, German Civil Code was translated into Turkish.130
The decree on Family Law of 1917, adopted from the work carried out by the committee,
grouped separately the rules related to marriage and divorce for Muslims, Jews, and
Christians, but authorized the Qadi courts to handle cases related to the marriage and divorce,
and dowry and trousseau claims of non-Muslims. This drew sharp criticism from the
diplomats of great powers. The Vatican especially voiced its strong opposition to the
jurisdiction of the Qadi courts over the marriage and divorce of Catholics. The occupation of
Ottoman lands in the wake of the empire’s defeat in the World War- I led to a war of national
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liberation, led by Kemal Ataturk, which was victorious. On the ruins of the Ottoman Empire,
the Republic of Turkey was founded.
All reform efforts taking by Tanzimatist, was not able to touch the ray of success, as Gokalp
criticized the Tanzimat for having failed to develop the cultural base of the nation. It had
borrowed automatically from Europe without attempting to distinguish what really was
needed and what could be taken from the Turkish national tradition. It had imitated the
external manifestations of Europe civilization without penetrating to its philosophical and
scientific foundations. It had introduced secular schools and courts without eliminating or
reforming the traditional institutions developed by Islam, thus leaving a dangerous dualism
that undermined whatever successes it might have achieved. Instead of unifying the nation, it
had widened the gap between the rulers and the common people.131
Relations post-Tanzimat era
In the precarious situation of the empire, however, and under the joint influence of the CUP and
the intellectual message provided by Ziya Gokalp 132, it was those who advocated modernism who
dominated Ottoman life during the later Young Turk years. Basing their ideas on the need for
unity with both the Turks and the Muslims outside the empire, they felt that the empire simply
had to modernize if it was to survive and that the West was the only model from which this
modernization could be taken. One of the leading the secular modernizers was the poet Tevfik
Fikret, who attacked the idea of Islamic domination of state and society rather than the religion of
Islam as much. But since, for the orthodox, Islam covered all aspects of life and since the
traditional Islamic state was based on religion, this still brought down on him the attacks of the
conservatives. Another persistent advocate of modernization was one of the early CUP founders,
Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932), who had first published his ideas in the Iqtihat (Struggle) in
Geneva. He criticized all those who would return to the past and showed impatience with those
who fell short of his expectations. Under Abdul Hamid he found fault with the people for
allowing such an autocracy; he attacked the Young Turks when they failed to live up to their
democratic ideals. To him the only civilization of the modern world was that of Europe.
Gladstone called Abdul Hamid as “Great Assassin”. 133
The trouble with the Tanzimat, the Young Turks, and Abdul Hamid was that they had not
65
gone far enough, they had left too much of the old for the new to work efficiently. What
should have been done, what had to be done, was to destroy the old and replace it with
European civilization, thus making the Ottoman Empire part of the West. He accepted the
Tanzimat idea that reform had to be imposed from on top and said that people had to be
driven to modernize themselves. Thus along with Ziya Gokalp he provided much of the
impetus for Mustafa Kemal’s reforms during the early years of the Republic.
Relations during World War-I period
The First and Second Balkan Wars were fought between the Balkan League and the
fracturing Ottoman Empire in 1912 and 1913 respectively, was posed the modernization
process and Young Turks fell in an adverse position as Nehru remarks that, “After the Balkan
Wars Turkey found herself exhausted and with just a foothold left in Europe.” 134 The
resulting Treaty of London further shrank the Ottoman Empire, creating an independent
Albanian state while enlarging the territorial holdings of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and
Greece. When Bulgaria attacked both Serbia and Greece on 16 June 1913, it lost most of
Macedonia to Serbia and Greece and Southern Dobruja to Romania in the 33-days Second
Balkan War, further destabilizing the region. Unfortunately after the Balkan Wars the
Ottomans had been driven out of nearly all of Europe and North Africa.
On 14 November 1914, the Ottoman Empire had entered World War I as Germany’s ally.135
On the eve of World War I, empires still dominated Eastern Europe. The retreat of the
Ottoman Empire from the European continent over the course of the nineteenth century,
however, had already led to the creation of six new states: Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania. Otherwise, much of Europe consisted of empires and large
states. (See Map no. 7, Appendix –B, p. 460) The Ottoman Empire suffered a defeat in WW-I.
However, the Empire did not allow the British Navy, under command of Winston Churchill,
to pass to Istanbul in the famous Battle of Gallipoli; Turkey temporarily lost most of the rest
of what it had left in Europe. After the war, all non-Turkish possessions were either granted
independence or placed under League of Nations mandates. The victory of Allied Forces in
World War I led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. After the end of World War One, the
Middle East became colonized by much of the countries who had previously colonized the
66
Ottoman Empire. Some of the territories that were affected included Arabia, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and Palestine. New boundaries of the Middle East were created after the Great War
and so were the Arab & Islamic nationalist movements. (See Map no. 8, Appendix-B, p.461)
The Allied Forces also signed separate treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria,
and the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sevres signed on 10 August 1920 was considered
humiliating and unacceptable by the Turkish nation and Grand National Assembly (GNA).
After the victory of the nationalist forces under the leadership of Mustafa Kamal Pasha
(1881-1938) the more acceptable Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923, which
stipulated a population exchange between Greece and Turkey, whereby 1.1 million Greeks
left Turkey for Greece in exchange for 380,000 Muslims transferred from Greece to Turkey.
Relations under Ataturk’s reform
At the end of the WW-I the population of the Ottoman Empire found itself on the brink of
poverty and despair. Eight years of war had an adverse impact on whole generation of youth
When the armistice was signed the Ottoman armies were already positioned within the
present borders of the Republic. Only Anatolia remained under Ottoman control-Anatolia,
motherland of the Turks since the time of the Crusades. Admittedly there were Christian
communities living there too, but they were not sufficiently numerous to justify cession of
the territory. If a reasonable peace treaty had been proposed to the Sublime Porte it would
probably have been accepted, given the traumatic circumstances in which the people were
struggling. However, this did not happen.
On 1 November 1922 the Grand National Assembly (“Buyuk Millet Meclisi”) of Turkey had
abolished the Sultanate. The creation of a secular Turkish nation-state was again tested
through diplomatic relations with European states. When the Allies invited the Ankara
government to the peace conference at Lausanne in 1923 the 600 year-old Ottoman Empire
came to an end and the new Turkish nation-state sought to take its place with other members
of European international society. The Ottoman Empire ceased being the ‘other’ when
Turkey was de jure recognized by the British, French, Italian, Japanese, Greek, Romanian
and Servo-Croat-Slovene governments with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July
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1923. 136 The Ankara government gained full sovereignty of the Turkish nation-state within
agreed territorial boundaries. On 29 October 1923, when the new Constitution declared the
Turkish state a ‘republic’ with sovereignty coming from the nation, the new Turkish
imagined community was defined as a ‘nation’ with de facto territorial sovereignty.137
The final stage of making the new Turkish nation homogeneous within the boundaries of the
new state was completed when the Greek minorities of Anatolia were exchanged for the
Muslims of Greece under the provisions of the agreement signed in Lausanne. In the final
analysis, with the Lausanne settlement the Ottoman Empire finally ceased being the other
and the modern Turkish state representing the homogeneous Turkish nation was mutually
recognized by Western states. The admission of the new nation-state into the European
society of states left no questions about the identity of Turkey and Turks. The new Republic
speedily and amicably negotiated with Greece the exchange of their respective Turkish and
Greek populations. The signing of this accord solved the question of the Christian minorities,
who had always constituted the stumbling block in the Sublime Porte’s relations both with
the European powers and with its neighbouring countries.
Ottoman society had its roots in local Anatolian, Muslim, and Turkish sources, 138 but as time
passed it absorbed elements of other cultures. The indigenous Anatolian (Hittite, Greek, and
other) influences upon modern Turks are acknowledged by most historians. Byzantine
influence was a result of protracted “cohabitation” of the Seljuks and Byzantium139 and was
somewhat intensified after the conquest of Constantinople. But the Byzantine influence on
Ottoman civilization, according to most modern Turkish and Western historians, was not as
great as lorga (who referred to Istanbul as the Turanian Rome) and certain other writers
contend.140
Muslim influence represented the most basic element of Ottoman society. Islam first reached
the Turks along the borders of the Khilafat in Central Asia, and, from then on, developed into
a religious form with a frontier quality. The influence of Central Asia on Ottoman society,
which was largely overshadowed by Islam and almost forgotten, was revived in the
fourteenth century when the Ottomans conquered large numbers of Turkish nomads in
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Anatolia. These nomads aroused Ottoman awareness of their Turkish origin and led to a
momentous manifestation of Turkish “national consciousness.” The Ottoman Sultans
assumed the old Turkish title of “khan” and adopted the Oghuz legend as the explanation of
the origin of their dynasty. 141 Apart from this temporary national awareness, the Turks did
not become nationally minded until the nineteenth century.
Ottoman feudalism, a synthesis of Arabo-Persian, Seljuk, and Byzantine elements, survived
until the nineteenth century, with some changes and adaptations. Late Byzantine feudalism
exercised powerful influence in shaping “the Ottoman system of military fiefs,” just as it had
itself been reshaped “under the impact of the Frankish feudalism of the Latin Empire of
Constantinople and its dependent and successor principalities.”
142
But whatever its origins,
the heart of Ottoman feudalism was the so-called timar-sidahi system.143 It was the keystone
of the politico-military and socio-economic structure of the Ottoman Empire. To a very large
degree, the timar-sidahi system governed social relations in the empire.
The success of countries is mostly designated in terms of their adaptation to these changing
dynamics and how they can use these dynamics to realize/fulfill their national goals.
Countries successful in developing rapidly, benefit from the world’s affluence and wealth at
highest level whereas the ones failing are getting marginalized and are smashed under the
heavy and complicated problems. Therefore, in today’s changing dynamic conditions, it is
very important to state the correct goals of foreign policy and to determine the principles to
be followed for a successful foreign policy. It is important to find the answers to these quires;
‘What are the goals and principles of Turkish Foreign Policy implemented in Ataturk’s
period? Can these goals and principles be also implemented today?’
Europe and the Middle East in Ataturk’s Foreign Policy
Ataturk’s lack of interest in Middle Eastern affairs, besides being the product of a broader
policy of moderate isolationism, reflected the fact that in the wake of World War I, the
Middle East was largely under European political control, and there were few independent
states with which Turkey could have had relations. Turkey could not have had a Middle
Eastern policy that was separate from its relations with European states. In this context, the
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only important decision facing Turkey’s leaders was whether or not to challenge the mandate
powers in the hope of reasserting influence in the region. Once this option was rejected,
Turkey had little to gain through involvement in the Arab world, and risked little through
non-involvement.144
Thus, whatever ideological prejudices the Kemalists may have had against Islam or Arabs,
the strategic imperative to focus directly on European affairs was compelling. Decisively
rejecting the Ottoman-era claims to the Middle East was certainly one of the more
revolutionary decisions Ataturk made, and also one of the most pragmatic. Even after their
defeat in World War I, many Ottoman leaders did not see the loss of the region as a foregone
conclusion. In Sultan Mehmet VI’s October 1918 proposal for armistice terms, Article 1
requested “Autonomy of the Hejaz, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia under the suzerainty of
the Sultan after the model of Egypt before the war.”145 When the Istanbul Assembly voted to
adopt the National Pact in 1920, it included language declaring that all former Ottoman
territories with an Arab majority should be allowed to decide their future by plebiscite.146
Ataturk’s rejection of these imperial ambitions fits very neatly with the nationalist ideology
he used to organize the Turkish state. It also reflected the fact that after the Ottomans defeat,
the Hejaz rebellion, and the rise of Arab nationalism, these imperial ambitions were clearly
unrealistic. Was Ataturk truly driven by a deep belief that Turkish nationalism should define
the borders of his new state, or was he simply making a virtue of necessity? The best
evidence that it was the latter lies in the way he handled a number of similar territorial
disputes that arose during the Lausanne Conference. Hatay, Mosul and Western Thrace were
all regions to which Turkey laid claim, but whereas Hatay and Mosul were of clear economic
importance –containing an important port and significant oil reserves respectively– Western
Thrace was not.
In terms of population, however, Western Thrace was predominantly Turkish speaking, while
Hatay was split between Turkish and Arabic speakers, and in Mosul, only the minority
Turkmen population spoke Turkish. Both at the Lausanne Conference and in the years that
followed, Ataturk showed his determination to regain Hatay and Mosul, in stark contrast to
the indifference he showed toward Western Thrace, where the population had the best claim
70
to Turkish identity as it was then being defined. While these priorities reveal the definite
triumph of pragmatism over nationalism, they should not be taken as evidence that Ataturk’s
nationalism was in any way insincere. The borders he sought may not have included all the
people who could have been considered Turks, but they certainly worked to the advantage of
the great majority of them. Had Ataturk decided to pursue an unrealistically expansionist
policy in the Middle East –as Mussolini and Hitler were to do elsewhere with disastrous
results– there were justifications he could have used that would not have contradicted his
political ideology or the organizational logic of his efforts to found the modern Turkish
nation state. Most ambitiously, he could have used the rhetoric that the League of Nations
had used in creating territorial mandates, and claimed that as a civilized, Western, European
country, Turkey had the same right to rule over the region as France or Britain.147
Another option, briefly considered during the War for Independence, would have been to
pursue a federated relationship with one or many potential Arab states, although this would
have been harder to justify on nationalist grounds.148 More realistically, Turkey could have
supported nationalist independence movements in the Arab territories in the hope of creating
independent states, which would then be susceptible or receptive to Turkish influence. Such a
policy, though, would have done little more than arouse the fury of the mandate powers
without bringing any benefits to Turkey.149
Turkish integration with Europe: An Analysis
One can argue that between the fifteenth and twentieth century’s, the Ottoman Empire was,
in realpolitik terms, a significant European power, controlling between one-quarter and onethird of the continent at its zenith.150 ‘The paradox is that it was not. Even though a
significant portion of the Empire was based in Europe, it cannot be said to have been of
Europe,’151 According to Carsten Holbraad, ‘the Ottoman Empire was never really part of
international society since it was ‘geographically marginal, culturally alien and historically
hostile’152. The Ottoman Empire had a different sociopolitical organization—its millet
(nation) system—and a different religion to European states.153 For the West, the Ottoman
Empire was an ‘other’, a non Western alien society, which had different principles of
existence and values from those of Europe.154
71
Although the Ottoman Empire was never accepted as a Western great power it had to be
taken into account by all major European states as long as it was materially powerful. This
caused the dilemma of being part of a European international system but not being a member
of European international society. 155 It was in the late fifteenth century that the Empire began
to be involved in Europe’s affairs, when it was drawn into alliances with Western powers in
order to help the Italian city-states against their enemies. The Ottoman Empire was the only
state which did not ‘know its place’ in the hierarchy of European powers until the midnineteenth century. Although it had extensive possessions in the Balkans and the Treaty of
Paris of 1856 CE formally admitted it to the Concert of Europe, it was never identified as a
European state. Being a formal part of the European system in 1856 CE did not mean that its
sense of self-identity was defined as European. Until that time, major historical events such
as the Crusades, the fall of Constantinople and the sieges of Vienna were emphasized to
create the collective memory of Europeans, and to some extent still exist in their
contemporary memories.
Relations in the period of World War II
Possible aggression by Italy remained the foremost concern of the Turkish leadership in the
late 1930s. Concern was intensified by Italy’s occupation of Albania in April 1939, which
brought Turkey, France and Britain closer together. Discussions about a treaty of mutual
assistance between Turkey, France and Britain went on all through 1939. They proceeded
only slowly because Turkey demanded large amounts of military and financial assistance in
view of its own weakness and because it was determined to preclude any possibility of
becoming embroiled in a war with the Soviet Union.
The Turkish government very much hoped to include the Soviets in the alliance. The sudden
announcement of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939, in which Hitler’s Germany
and Stalin’s Russia more or less divided Eastern Europe between them, therefore came as a
tremendous shock to Ankara. France and Britain than became even more anxious to secure
Turkish support and on 19 October 1939 the Anglo–Franco–Turkish treaty of mutual support
was signed. With it, the Turks got most of what they wanted. A loan of £16 million in gold
72
and a credit of £25 million for the purchase of military equipment were granted. In a separate
protocol attached to the treaty, Turkey was excused from any obligation that could involve
her in a war with the Soviet Union.156
The treaty stipulated that Turkey would ‘collaborate effectively’ with France and Britain in
the event of an act of aggression of a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean (a
clear reflection of the importance attached to the Italian threat). A casus foederi had clearly
arisen after Italy declared war on France and Britain on 10 June 1940. By then, however, the
collapse of France had drastically changed the balance of power and, despite its obligations,
Turkey devoted all its energy to staying out of the war, invoking the separate protocol as a
pretext. The British government saw Turkey as a valuable source of manpower and exerted
pressure to get it to enter the war, but Turkey resisted and Britain had no choice but to accept.
After the German occupation of Greece and Bulgaria’s siding with the Axis in 1941, the war
had reached Turkey’s borders. As a consequence, in June 1941, almost simultaneously with
the German invasion of the Soviet Union, it concluded a treaty of friendship with Germany.
Throughout the next year and a half, the period of the greatest German expansion, Turkey
kept up a scrupulously neutral position, pleading lack of preparation and the need for
supplies with the British government.
After the German defeat at Stalingrad (November 1942) allied pressure gradually increased,
but Turkey was still very exposed to a German attack. The allies’ requirements had changed
and they now regarded Turkey as a forward base for allied troops and aircraft rather than as a
source of manpower, but the Germans threatened that the arrival of even a single allied
fighter plane would mean war. In January 1943, Churchill and Inonu reached agreement over
a programme of preparations for the arrival – in due course – of allied warplanes, but the
preparations were subsequently sabotaged and the building of installations intentionally
slowed down by the Turks.157 The pressure increased even further at a conference of Inonu,
Churchill and Roosevelt in Cairo in December 1943. The allies now clearly held the winning
hand and they pointed out that, if Turkey stayed out of the war for much longer, it risked
being completely isolated after the war. The implied threat was that it would have to face the
Red Army and any demands Stalin might make on its own. Inonu now finally accepted that
73
Turkey would become an active belligerent on the allied side, but he asked for an overall
campaign plan for the allied conquest of the Balkans first. This was a clever ploy because the
allied powers differed widely about the desirability of a Balkan campaign, Stalin objecting to
any British or American interference in the area and the Americans tended to listen to him.
Throughout 1944, the Turks kept stalling, although they did break off diplomatic relations
with Germany in August. Their attitude led the British and the Americans to lend a more
sympathetic ear to Soviet demands. In February 1945, at the Yalta conference, they agreed to
future changes in the Montreux convention. Shortly afterwards, on 23 February 1945, Turkey
officially declared war on Germany in order to qualify as a founding member of the United
Nations. This was a purely symbolic act and no shot was ever fired in anger by a Turkish
soldier during the Second World War. Throughout the war both domestic politics and the
press were kept under tight control and they were both manipulated in Turkey’s effort to stay
out of the conflict. When Germany seemed to be on the verge of defeating the Soviets, there
was a resurgence of pan-Turkist propaganda.158 A pan-Turkist committee was founded in
July 1941 with German encouragement, a number of Turkish generals toured the eastern
front at the invitation of the Germans and some pan-Turkist sympathizers were taken into the
cabinet – all as a sort of insurance policy in the event of a German victory. When the
impending German defeat had become clear, in May 1944, the pan-Turkist organizations and
propaganda were suppressed.
Turkey’s policies during the war have often been seen as immoral and as reneging on the
treaty of 1939. The country’s international reputation was damaged, but keeping out of the
war was a great success in the eyes of politicians like Inonu and his successive foreign
ministers (first Sukru Saracoglu, then Numan Menemencioglu, and then Saracoglu again),
who had a clear memory of how the Ottoman Empire had allowed itself to be used as a
German tool during the First World War, and the disasters that this had brought upon their
country.
In the above discussion in fact vividly traces origin of Turko-Europe relations from the
foundation of mighty Ottoman Empire and then gives a descriptive analysis of the step by step
74
development of this historical phenomenon right up to the World War I (1914-1918). It’s a
historical fact that the Ottoman Turks had established the supremacy in Europe which lasted till
the Pre-World War I period. But as a result of the two Balkan wars Turkey lost its hold on
Europe. The condition became pitiable in the post-World War I period when Turkey was forced
to accept the humiliating Treaty of Sevres in 1920 (See Map no. 9, Appendix B, p.462). But the
Treaty of Lausanne at least to some extend restored that lost prestige of Turkey. From this point
onwards Turko-Europe relations extended into a totally different perspective. The Ottoman
Empire was the first to see how European concepts, institutions and norms would be compatible
with Islam. The Turkish nationalists rejected the identity of the Ottoman Empire and created a
homogeneous territorial state based on the approved European national model at the end of the
First World War. After the recognition of the secular Turkish nation-state by European states at
Lausanne in 1923 (See Map no.10, Appendix, p.463), they anticipated the discontinuation of
being the other in European international society. However, the question still remains whether or
not Turkey is considered a European member of international society. In particular,
contemporary relations between Turkey and the European Union make us think that the status of
Turkey as the ‘other’ is still continuing due to its Islamic and Ottoman characteristics, and
consequently is contributing to the politics of exclusion between Turkey and European states.
75
1.
Douglas Arthur Howard, The History of Turkey, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001
Retrieved from google.books.com at 2 April 2013
2.
Martin Wight, System of States, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1977, p. 120,
quoted by Paul Rich, ‘European Identity and the myth of Islam: A Reassessment’,
Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, 1999, p. 438
3.
J. P. Roux, in his book entitled L’Histoire des Turcs (p. 239), quoted by, Turgut Ozal,
Turkey in Europe: And Europe in Turkey, K. Rustem, 1991
4.
A. Nuri Yurdusev, ‘Perception and Images in Turkish (Ottoman)- European Relations’
in Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds.), Today’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First
century: A Changing Role in World Politics, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003, p.77.
5.
Mustafa Aydin, ‘The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s European
Vocation’, The Review of International Affairs, Vol.3, No.2, winter 2003, p.326.
6.
Quoted by, Ezg Genc, The Role of Religious Identity in Turco- European Relations,
unpublished MSc thesis, The Graduate School of Social Sciences, Middle East
Technical University, December, 2004
7.
Ibid,
8.
Ibid,
9.
Cemil Meric, Umrandan Uygarlia, stanbul, Otuken Yayinlari, 1979, p.9, Quoted by,
Ezg Genc, op. cit.,
10.
A. Nuri Yurdusev, ‘Perception and Images in Turkish (Ottoman)- European
Relations’ in Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydin (eds.), op. cit., p.88.
11.
Vocation’, The Review of International Affairs, Vol.3, No.2, winter, 2003, p.309.
12.
Quoted by, Ezg Genc, op. cit.,
13.
Morgan Philips Price, A History of Turkey; From Empire to Republic, London, Allen
& Unwin, 1961, p.44
14.
Tomaz Mastnak, ‘Islam and the Creation of European Identity’, in CSD Perspectives,
No. 4, Autumn, 1994, pp.5-6.
15.
A. Nuri Yurdusev, op. cit.,
76
16.
Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.-I, 1976,
p. vii
17.
Turgut Ozal, op. cit.,
18.
The Byzantine Empire was the predominantly Greek-speaking continuation of
the Roman Empire during Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Its capital city
was Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul), originally known as Byzantium. Initially
the eastern half of the Roman Empire (often called the Eastern Roman Empire in this
context), it survived the 5th century fragmentation and collapse of the Western Roman
Empire and continued to thrive, existing for an additional thousand years until it fell to
the Ottoman Turks in 1453 CE. During most of its existence, the empire was the most
powerful economic, cultural, and military force in Europe. Both ‘Byzantine Empire’
and ‘Eastern Roman Empire’ are historiographical terms applied in later centuries; its
citizens continued to refer to their empire as the Roman Empire.
19.
Stanford J. Shaw, op. cit., p. 14
20.
Lord Eversley, The Turkish Empire, abridged by Sheikh Abdur Rashid, Ashraf Press,
Lahor, 1958, pp. 6-7
21.
r., over here means period of rule of the mentioned personality; henceforth all r. mean
the same.
22.
Quoted by, Herbert Adams Gibbons, The Foundation of Ottoman Empire, edit. John
Rulf Willis, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968, p. 54
23.
Cambridge History of Islam, Edited by P.M Holt and Others, Cambridge University
press, London, Vol- 1 A, 1970, p. 274
24.
Herbert Adams Gibbons, Ibid, p. 109
25.
Cambridge History of Islam, op. cit., p. 274
26.
Stephen W. Reinert, ‘Fragmentation (1204–1453)’, In Cyril Mango, The Oxford
History of Byzantium, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 270
27.
Ibid, p. 288
28.
Ibid, p. 108
29.
Yahya Armadani, Middle East Past and Present, Ibid, p. 188
30.
Stanford J. Shaw, op cit., p. 22
77
31. The term Bogomil in free translation means “dear to God”, Bogomilism was
a dualist religiopolitical sect founded in the First Bulgarian Empire by the
priest Bogomil during the reign of Tsar Peter I in the 10th century, (see: John Van
Antwerp Fine, The early medieval Balkans: a critical survey from the sixth to the late
twelfth century, University of Michigan Press, 1991, p. 171)
32.
M. Philips Price, op cit., pp. 38-39
33.
Stanford J. Shaw, op cit., p. 33
34.
Also spelled Kossovo and known as the Battle of Kosovo Field or the Battle of
Blackbird’s Field
35.
Milos Obilic (d. 1389) was a Serbian knight in the service of Prince Lazar, during
the invasion of the Ottoman Empire. He was not mentioned in contemporary sources,
but he features prominently in later accounts of the Serbian history as the legendary
assassin of the Ottoman Sultan Murad I. Modern researcher Tim Judah doubt whether
Obilic actually existed or not and commented that, possibly Lazar’s family “gave
birth to the myth of Kosovo”, including the story of Obilic to strengthening their
political control. Because, he remains anonymous in the extant sources until the 18th
century, the dissemination of the story of Murad’s assassination in Florentine,
Serbian, Ottoman and Greek sources suggests that versions of it circulated widely
across the Balkans within half a century after the event. (Tim Judah, Kosovo: War
and Revenge, 2nd ed., New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 32)
36.
Roberta Strauss Feuerlicht, The Desperate Act: The Assassination of Franz Ferdinand
at Sarajevo, p. 22; Spencer Tucker, A global chronology of conflict: from the ancient
world to the modern middle east, 2009, Part 2, p. 314,
37.
Stanford Jay Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey, Cambridge University Press, 1977, Vol. II, p. 24
38.
‘Battle of Nicopolis’, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2009, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/ topic/414447/Battle-of-Nicopolis.Retrieved 2009-02-18
39.
Sultan Mohammad II, the Conqueror, enthroned by his father Murad II (14211451C.E.) in August 1444 C.E. The causes of Murad II retirement from the throne
was his longstanding depression following the death of his favorite son Alauddin,
opposition of some Gazi leaders of Rumeli and the consequent defeats inflicted on
him by Hungarian leader Hunyadi. But when declaration of Crusade from the
Christian Europe and uprising inside the Empire began, beyond his willingness
78
Turkish notables and Janissaries convinced him to return to the throne in August 1446
CE.
40.
This force consisted of infantry of the janissaries , the court cavalry, artillery (Topcu),
the armories (Cebeciler) and the Muteferrikas (Hoffouriere). The court cavalry was
first established in the 14th century, there were recruited from the Janissaries and the
pages of the court. This cavalry troop was in six squadrons divided: 1. Sipah (the
‘tab’) on the right wing; 2. Silahdar (the ‘armor-bearer’) in the left wing; 3. Sag
ulufeliler (the ‘salaried to the right’); 4. Sol ulufeliler (the ‘salaried to the left’); 5.Sag
garibler (the ‘strangers to the right’); and 6. Sol garibler (the ‘strangers to the left’).
The first two squadrons were the bodyguards of the sultan or the grand vizier in the
field.
41.
Turkish word ‘Devsirme’ means ‘collecting’. At first, the soldiers to serve in the
Ottoman military were selected from the slaves captured during warfare. However,
the system commonly known as Devsirme. In this system children of the rural
Christian populations of the Balkans - particularly Albanians, Serbs, and
northern Greeks - were conscripted before adolescence and were brought up as
Muslims. Upon reaching adolescence, these children were enrolled in one of the four
imperial institutions: the Palace, the Scribes, the Religious and the Military. Those
enrolled in the Military would become either part of the Janissary corps, or part of
any other corps
42.
In Islamic eschatology, the Mahdi (Guided One) is the prophesied redeemer
of Islam who will rule for seven, nine, or nineteen years (according to differing
interpretations) before the Day of Judgment (yawm al-qiyamah / literally, the Day of
Resurrection) and will rid the world of evil. (Moojan Momen, An Introduction to
Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism, G. Ronald, 1985, p. 75)
43.
Quoted in Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, Tr. Franz
Rosenthal, vols. III, New York, 1958, p. 191
44.
Quoted in Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.
1, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 55
45.
Stone, Norman ‘Turkey in the Russian Mirror’ pp.86–100 from Russia War, Peace
and Diplomacy edited by Mark & Ljubica Erickson, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London,
2004, p. 94
79
46.
George Sphrantzes, The Fall of the Byzantine Empire: A Chronicle by George
Sphrantzes 1401–1477, Translated by Marios Philippides, University of Massachusetts
Press, 1980
47.
A series of medieval military expeditions made by European Christians and sanctioned
by the Latin Roman Catholic Church to recover the Holy Land of Jerusalem from the
Muslims in the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries.
48.
Iver B. Neumann, ‘Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation,
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 45.
49.
Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the rest: Discourse and power’, in Stuart Hall and Bram
Gieben, eds, Formations of modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, p. 289.
50.
Ibid., p. 326.
51.
The Habsburg Monarchy (or Habsburg Empire) is an unofficial appellation amongst
historians for the countries and provinces which were ruled by the junior Austrian
branch of the House of Habsburg (1278–1780 CE), and then by the successor House of
Habsburg-Lorraine (from 1780 CE), between 1526 and 1804. The “Habsburg
Monarchy / Habsburg Empire” term came into use subsequent in the early 19th
century, which referred to the Empire between the 1526 – 1804 CE periods. The
Imperial capital was Vienna, except from 1583 to 1611 CE, when it was moved to
Prague. From 1804 to 1867 CE the Habsburgs ruled the Austrian Empire and from
1867 to 1918 Austria-Hungary.
52.
In the interest of correct pronunciation, the linguistically preferred transliterations of
Arabic names and words have been adopted rather than generally accepted English
usage (where such exists); hence Mosjid instead of Mosque, Muhammad instead of
Mohammed. Exceptions have been made in cases where the English pronunciation
accords with the preferred transliteration, as Mecca (instead of Makkah), Koran
(instead of Qur’an), and the like.
53.
The Battle of Mohacs, 1526, World History at KMLA, Korean Minjok Leadership
Academy, Retrieved July 14, 2008
54.
Stanford J. Shaw, op. cit., pp. 91-97
55 .
56.
William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927, Routledge,
1966, p. 2
Roger Bigelow Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566, Read Books, 2007,
p. 131
80
57.
Martin Luther, ‘On War Against the Turks, 155-205’ in Robert C. Schultz, trans. 1967,
Luther’s Works, Vol. 46, American Edition, Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, p.177
58.
Martin Luther, Ibid, p.170
59.
Martin Luther, Ibid, p. 184
60.
The Janissaries (Yeni Ceri) meaning ‘new soldier’, were elite infantry units that
formed the Ottoman Sultan’s household troops and bodyguards. Sultan Murad I
created the force in 1383. The number of Janissaries grew from 20,000 in 1575, to
49,000 (1591 CE), dropped to a low of 17,000 (1648 CE), then rebounded to 135,000
in 1826 CE. They began as an elite corps of slaves recruited from young Christian
boys, and became famed for internal cohesion cemented by strict discipline and order.
By 1620 they were hereditary and corrupt and an impediment to reform. The corps
was abolished by Sultan Mahmud II in 1826 in the Auspicious Incident in which 6,000
or more were executed. (see, Alan Warwick Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the
Ottoman Empire, M. Evans and Company, 1992, pp. 92–93.
61.
Stanford J. Shaw, op. cit., Vol.-I, pp. 187-189
62 . Sultan Suleiman had granted European merchants the diplomatic immunity, known as
Capitulations (because they formulated under capita: headings), meant that European
traders living in the Ottoman territory were not required to observed the law of the
land; their offences were tried according to their own laws in their own courts, which
were presided over by their own consul. Suleiman had negotiated these treaties with the
nations of Europe as an equal. But by the eighteenth century it was clear that these
Capitulations were weakening Ottoman sovereignty, specially when it was extended in
1740 CE to the Christian millets in the empire, and they were then ‘protected’ like the
European expatriates, and no longer subject to government control. (See: Karen
Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, The Modern Library, USA, 2002, pp. 136-37.)
63.
Suraiya Faroqhi, Ottoman Empire and World Around It, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London,
2004
64.
Frederic C. Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973, p. 198
65.
Benjamin Arbel, Trading Nations, Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern
Mediterranean , Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995, p. 195
66.
Frederic C. Lane, op. cit., p. 248
81
67.
Alexander H. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic, A History of
the Earliest Diplomatic Relations 1610–1630, Leiden, Istanbul: Nederland’s
Historisch- Archaeologist Institute, 1978, p. 94
68.
Frederic C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973, pp. 399-400
69.
Quoted by Suraiya Faroqhi, op. cit., pp. 138-45
70.
The Levant Company was established in 1581 CE to conduct trade with the
Ottomans; the merchant William Harborne was shortly dispatched as England’s first
ambassador to the Ottoman Porte. All early ambassadors had prior experience as the
Company’s agents in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, these early ambassadors were
selected and paid by the Levant Company rather than by the state. The ambassador’s
role extended beyond diplomatic representation on behalf of the monarch, to
managing the Company’s interests in Turkey.
71 .
Gerald Maclean, Looking East: English Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 20.
72 .
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II, London, Harper
Collins, 1992, pp. 442-443
73.
Daniel Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire 1642–1660, Seattle and London,
University of Washington Press, 1998, pp. 1-44
74.
Her Majesty’s Answer to the Turk’s letter, October 25, 1570, Calendar of State
Papers Foreign, Elizabeth, Vol-14, p. 76
75.
Daniel Goffman, op. cit., pp. 60-65; Ismail Hakki Kadi, Ottoman and Dutch Merchant
in the Eighteen Century, Brill, 2012, p. 299
76 .
Safavi is the first indigenous Iranian dynasty based on Shiaits Islam after long time of
foreign rule. Name of the dynasty derived from the name its religious icon Sofiuddin
Ishaque Ardavili- “The Safawi dynasty marks not only the restoration of the Persian
Empire and the re-creation of the Persian nationality after an eclipse of more than
eight centuries and a half, but the entrance of Persia into the comity of nations and the
genesis of political relations still to a considerable hold good.” (E.G. Brown, A
Literary History of Persia, Vol. IV, Cambridge, 1928)
77.
Murat Cizakca, ‘Incorporation of the Middle East into the European World Economy’,
Review, VIII, 1985, p. 353–78. (Based on tax-farming data, shows that the speed of
‘incorporation’ slowed down in the 17th century), quoted by Suraiya Faroqhi, op. cit.,
82
78.
Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square, English Traders in the Levant in the
Eighteenth Century, London, Macmillan, 1967, p. 240-42
79.
Geoffrey Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, 1559–1659, Ten Studies, London,
Fontana Press, 1979 (revised edition 1990), qouted in The Cambridge History of
Western Textiles, p. 113
80.
D. T. Jenkins (edited)The Cambridge History of Western Textiles, Cambridge
University Press, Volume 1, 2003, p.452
81.
Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, p. 371.
82.
Ibid, p. 372
83.
Ibid, p. 376
84.
Ibid, p. 339
85.
Stone, Norman ‘Turkey in the Russian Mirror’ pp. 86–100 from Russia War, Peace
and Diplomacy edited by Mark & Ljubica Erickson, Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London,
2004, p. 97
86.
Ottoman statesman who held the office of Grand Vizier three times, the first time from
4 April to 27 October 1596; the second time from 5 December 1596 to 3 November
1597; and for the third and last time, from 6 January 1599 to 10 July 1601
87.
William J. Watson, ‘Ibrahim Muteferrika and Turkish Incunabula’, in Journal of the
American Oriental Society, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1968), p. 435.
88.
Lord Kinross, op. cit., p. 393
89.
Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, The Glimpses of World History, Penguin Books, London,
2004, p. 691
90.
Peter the Great (r.1682-1725) was known in Turkey as Peter the Mad
91.
Norman Stone, op. cit., p. 97
92.
The Sublime Porte, also known as the Ottoman Porte or High Porte (Bab-i- Ali) is
a metonym for the central government of the Ottoman Empire, by reference to the gate
giving access to the block of buildings that housed the principal state departments
in Istanbul. The particular term was used in the context of diplomacy by Western
states, as their diplomats were received at the porte (meaning ‘gate’). (http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Porte)
83
93.
Tibor Ivan Berend,, History derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the long
nineteenth century, University of California Press Ltd, 2003, p. 127
94.
The Bedouin, also Bedouins; from the Arabic badw or badawiyyun, are a part of a
predominantly desert-dwelling Arabian ethnic group traditionally divided into tribes,
or clans, known in Arabic as ‘asha’ir. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Bedouin)
95.
Pasha or Pascha (Turkish: Pasa), formerly Bashaw, was a higher rank in the Ottoman
Empire political and military system, typically granted to governors, generals and
dignitaries and others. As an honorary title, Pasha, in one of its various ranks, is
equivalent to the British title of Lord, and was also one of the highest titles in prerepublican Egypt. There were three ranks of pashas: the first, or highest class, had the
privilege of bearing a standard of three horse-tails, the second of two, and the third of
one. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pasha)
96.
The term ‘sick man of Europe’ is commonly attributed to Tsar Nicholas I of Russia
(1825-1855), referring to the Ottoman Empire, in the mid-19th century, because it was
increasingly falling under the financial control of the European powers and had lost
territory in a series of disastrous wars. But later on it has been applied at one time or
another to nearly every other mid-to-large-sized country in Europe.
97.
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, op. cit., p. 55
98.
Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A modern history, London: I. B. Taurus, 1993, p. 53
99.
Bernard Lewis, What went wrong? The clash between Islam and modernity in the
Middle East, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002, pp. 17-18.
100.
Fernand Braudel, Civilisation and capitalism: 15th–18th century, Vol. III: The
perspective of the world, London: Collins, 1984, p. 482.
101. Serif Mardin, Turk modernlesmesi (Turkish modernization), Istanbul, Iletisim, 1991,
p. 12.
102.
Bernard Lewis, op. cit, p. 25.
103.
Enver Zia Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Ankara, 1947-56, p. 159, Quoted by, Sheikh Lutfar
Rahman, Usmaniah Sultanat (The Reign of Osmania Dynasty), Islamic Foundation
Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1991, p. 314.
104
Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 85.
105.
Although the Ottoman Empire is described as multinational, the usage of nation
(millet) here is totally different from the modern usage.
84
106.
107.
Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 34.
Sinasi pointed out that ‘it is necessary for the people to cease to be subjects who have
liabilities and become citizens who have the right to reason on the future of the
country.’ Namik Kemal translated ‘The Spirit of Laws’ by Montesquieu and tried to
explain the harmony of parliamentary regime with religious law. H. Z. Ulken, Istanbul,
1992, pp. 66-67 and Namik Kemal, ‘Hukuk-u Umumiyet,’ Ibret newspaper dated 1872
and No 18. Nihat Ozon, Namik Kemal and Ibret newspaper, 1938, pp. 96-97
108.
Ismail Hami Danismend, Ali Suavi, Istanbul, 1940
109.
German Foreign Ministry Archives, (A. A.) Bonn, R. 121413, A. 4238, Nr. 154,
Buyukdere, From Werther to Berlin, 29 July 1876.
110.
Quoted by Gulnihal Bozkurt, ‘Batt Hukukunun Turkiye’de Benimsenmesi’ Turk Tarih
Kurumu Publication, 1996, Ankara, p. 238 German Foreign Ministry Archives, (A.
A.), R. 12413, A. 4239, Nr. 599 From Werther to Bulow. 30 July 1876 and A. A. R.
12416, A. 4829, Nr. 186 from Werther to Berlin. That Abdul Hamid II took the
physician of the German Embassy to the position of the physician of the palace made
it easier for him to obtain information about the sultan and his opinions through this
channel. A.A. 12416, A. 4936, 14 September 1876.
111.
Istanbul Prime Ministry Archives (Basbakanhk Arsivi, BA) DUIT 49/11. No. 2, 1293L14-1333, Ra. 25 No. 5.
112.
Said Pasha had translated the French constitution and Midhat Pasha had analyzed the
Belgian constitution.
113.
A. A. R. 12417 A. 7247 23 December 1876 Nr. 206, Quted by Gulnihal Bozkurt, ‘The
Reception of Western European Law in Turkey (From the Tanzimat to the Turkish
Republic, 1839-1939’ in Der Islam, Volume 75, Issue 2, Pages 283–295
114.
The German embassy report (27 July 1908) interpreted the event as follows: ‘the
constitution was in force formally; but it remained dead as the parliament was not
summoned to meet’. A. a. 14167, A. 12238, Nr. 135.
115.
Article 36 of this constitution (which was on the authority and responsibility of the
Coxmcil of Ministers at times when the assembly is not meeting) was arranged in the
same wording with the Saxonia constitution of 1831.
116.
Count Ostrorog was a Judicial Adviser to the Ottoman Government and till 1927
Lecturer in Mohammedan Public Law and Turkish Land Law in the University of
London, has published three lectures delivered by him at the centenary celebrations of
85
University College. The publication is opportune in view of the fact that on April to
last the National Assembly voted the abrogation of Art. II of the Constitution of 1923,
thereby disestablishing Islam which till then had been the State religion. This was
done by a unanimous vote as usual, in spite of the declaration contained in the
Constitution that the principles and rights therein defined are final and that no
amendment tending to alter them may even be discussed. The duty of Count Ostrorog
was to prepare drafts in order to bring the Ottoman laws to the same level with
European laws(‘The Angora Reform by Count Leon Ostrorog’ Review by: W. H. Hill
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Third Series, Vol. 10, No.
4 (1928), pp. 336-339
117. “Ataturk” is the surname given to Mustafa Kemal by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly in 1934 following the adoption of Law of Surname
118. The Greek Patriarch resigned over the conflicts on this issue. BA. Yildiz Tasnifi,
Yildiz Archive, Hususi Dosya, Nr. 175, Sira Nr. 101 23.2.1301.
119.
B. A. Grand Vizer’s Office, trade, Hariciye, 8216, 28 N. 1274 and Grand Vizer’s
Office trade, Meclis-i Mahsus, Gurre, sevval 1274 Nr. 497 20 b/20.
120. Quoted by John k. Bragg, Ottoman Notables and Participatory Politics: Tanzimat
Reform in Tokat, 1839-1876, Rutledge, New York, 2014.
121.
Naaaret Hilmi, Islahat-wa Adliye, Istanbul, 1321, pp. 1-10.
122. John k. Bragg, op. cit.,
123. Kanunname-i Ticaret, quoted by Derya Bayir, Minorities and Nationalism in Turkish
Law, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013
124. Dustur, I. Tertip, vol. 1, pp. 445-465. For more information on the development of
commercial courts, see G. Bozkurt, op. cit., p. 155 and the following section(s).
125. Engelhard, Turkiye ve Tanzimat, John k. Bragg, op. cit.,
126. This commission prepared Mecelle, which was comprised of 16 books, between the
years 1868 1876. Each book beace law as soon as it was completed.
127.
Nazaret Hilmi, Code Civil, John k. Bragg, op. cit.,
128. op. cit.,
129. Hayeriyan was also teaching at the School of Law. He had also worked as a member
of the Salonica court. Ceride-i Adliyye, vol. 101 (1330), pp. 5662-5675
86
130.
Alman Kanun-uMedenisi, Istanbul, 1334
131.
Standford J. Shaw, op. cit.,
132.
Mehmed Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) was a Turkish sociologist, writer, poet, and
political activist. After the 1908 Young Turk Revolution that reinstated
constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire, he adopted the pen name Gokalp (“sky
hero”), which he retained for the rest of his life.
133.
J. Nehru, op. cit. p. 693
134.
J. Nehru, op. cit.
135.
On the military and diplomatic aspects of the German-Turkish alliance see Ulrich
Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1968); Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria,
and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1970
136. Anthony D. Smith, Theories of nationalism, London: Duckworth, 1971, p. 189
137. Anthony D. Smith, op. cit.,
138. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3rd edition, 2002, New York,
pp. 3-17.
139. Bernard Lewis, ‘Turkey: Westernization,’ in Grunebaum, op. cit., pp. 317-18.
140. Queted by Wayne S. Vucinich, The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule,
Slavic Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 597-616, See especially Kopriiliizade
Mehmet Fuat, ‘Bizans Miiesseselerinin Osmanli Miiessesele- rine Te’siri hakkinda
bazi Miilahazalar,’ Tilrk Hukuk ve Iktisat Tarihi Mecmuasi, I (1931), 165-313.
141. P. Wittek, ‘Le Role des tribus turques dans l’empire ottoman,’ Melanges Georges
Smets (Brussels, 1952), pp. 665-76
142. Bernard Lewis, op.cit,. p. 43.
143. The most common fief (sipdhilik) was the smallest of the landed estates called timar.
The holder who rendered military service (cavalry) in exchange for the grant was
called the sipaha. Hence the system is known as the timar-sipaha system. ‘A fief
yielding revenue amounting to from 2,000 or 3,000 to 19,999 akces [as pres-a piece of
silver] a year was called a Timar.’ Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., p. 48.
87
144. When, in the case of Hatay [the Sanjak of Alexandretta], Turkey did have a clear
interest in the Middle East, it could only be achieved by going through Paris.
Furthermore, France’s decision to resolve the issue in Turkey’s favor had nothing to
do with the political situation in the Middle East but rather with its desire to win
Turkish cooperation in the looming confrontation with Italy and Germany.
145. Gwynne Dyer, ‘The Turkish Armistice of 1918,’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.8, 1972,
pp.153-155
146. H. W. V. Temperley, The History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. 4, Oxford
University Press, 1969, pp. 605-606
147.
No one suggested that France or Britain were any less European because they took
over the Ottoman’s possessions in the Middle East. Quite the contrary, in the
imperialist ideology of the day, a nation earned the right to rule over another not by
sharing its culture or civilization but by having a superior one.
148.
Salahi Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1913-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the National
Movement, London, Sage, 1975, p. 23.
149.
That Ataturk was unwilling to risk Turkey’s relations with its neighbours over the
‘Outer Turks’ in Greece, Bulgaria or Northern Iraq suggests that even if he had felt
equal sympathy towards the Arabs, he would have been unlikely to take any
substantial risks on their behalf.
150. Paul Rich, ‘European identity and the myth of Islam: A reassessment’, Review of
International Studies 25(3) 1999, pp. 453–74, at p. 443.
151. Thomas Naff, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European states system’, in Hedley Bull
and Adam Watson, eds., The expansion of international society, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992, p. 143.
152. Carsten Holbraad, Middle powers in international politics, London: Macmillan, 1984,
p. 34.
153.
The millet system was characterised by religious and cultural autonomy of different
groups rather than ethnic communities or language. Thus, the separation was between
Muslims (Turks, Kurds, Lazs, Alevis), Christians (Armenians, Greeks), and Jews in
the Empire. The number of millets changed throughout the Ottoman history. New
millets were created as a consequence of pressure from the Western great powers. For
instance, while there were nine recognised millets, of which six were fairly large in
1875, there were seventeen in 1914. Kemal K. Karpat, An inquiry into the social
88
foundation of nationalism in the Ottoman states: From social estates to classes, from
millets to nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 88–98.
154. The conceptual pair of ‘self’/other’ allows a simple dichotomy between ‘us’ and
‘them’ to emerge during the process of collective identity formation. Iver B. Neumann,
‘Self and other in international relations’, European Journal of International Relations
2(2), 1996, pp. 139–74.
155. This differentiation is based on Hedley Bull’s classification of system and society in
IR literature. According to Bull, ‘[a] system of states (or international system) is
formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have
sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in
some measure—as parts of a whole’. Bull, Anarchical society, p. 9. Furthermore, in
his analysis, the definition of international society refers to a society of sovereign
states. ‘A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states,
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense
that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations
with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.’ He then argues
that the members of an international society are bound by certain common interests,
common values and certain rules. ‘At the same time they co-operate in the working of
institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of
diplomacy and general international organization, and the customs conventions of
war.’ Bull, Anarchical society, p. 13.
156.
Selim Deringil, Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War: an ‘active’
neutrality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 191
157.
Selim Deringil, op. cit., p. 149.
158.
The term ‘Turkism’ started to be used with a prefix ‘Pan’ (from Greek, pan = all), for
a ‘Panturkism’. Pan-Turkism is a movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
which had as its goal the political union of all Turkish-speaking peoples in the
Ottoman Empire, Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan. (See: Encyclopedia
Britannica Online, 2009. Retrieved 19 Jul 2009.)
89
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL RELATIONS
Introduction
After the end of Cold War1 the world has entered a new era. Parameters have changed; new
handicaps as well as new opportunities have been formed for countries. As Europe enters a
new period, with two world wars still residing in the shared memory, peace and prosperity
seems likely to continue. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, European
countries and borders have returned to their pre-World War II state. However, its nations are
faced with ageing populations and falling birthrates, making it increasingly challenging to
sustain luxurious programs of social services. As the twenty-first century began, the
continent is redefining itself with multiculturalism, a strengthening of Europe’s common
economic policies and the creation of a European parliament. The Europe of Nations, whose
patriotic sentiments led to two world wars during the first half of 20th century, is viewing the
federalism of the USA as a possible solution to forging a United Europe. Turkey as a
neighbour of former USSR, a member of NATO and located at the centre of receptive region
covered by Caucasus, The Balkan and Middle East, has been drastically affected by the end
of Cold War. Turkey has lost some of her bargaining issues in the new era and therefore has
needed new arguments. This requires encouraged Turkey to take active steps in the post-Cold
War era. This Chapter focuses on Turkish Political Relations with European states in the
Cold War era. In the previous Chapter has been discussed and analyzed the historical
background of Turko-Europe relations since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire. During
the pre-1945 period, the world had observed huge conflict and wars among the nations.
There are many concepts engaged to define Turkey’s conventional foreign policy philosophy
as conservatism, circumspection, protectionism, isolationism, sovereignty, balance of power,
submissive, neutrality, reactive, bilateral… so on and many more concepts can be added. But
there are two principal concepts explaining the traditional Turkish foreign policy as Status
Quo and Westernization. On the other words, Turkey’s foreign policy was formulated to rely
on two principles; first, ‘maintaining the established order within the existing borders and
balances’; second, ‘realization of a Western oriented foreign policy formation’. These foreign
policies were determined under the influence of the real conjunctural and structural factors. 2
Then the factors were shaped through an actual historical background with pre-given sources.
In this context, Murinson delineates four main sources of the traditional foreign policy as:
90
(i) the historical experience of the Ottoman State,
(ii) the nationalist Kemalist revolution and the creation of the Republic itself,
(iii) classical Western orientation and
(iv) distrustful perception of foreign powers and foreign interests’.3
In addition, the emergence of the Cold War in the 1940s constituted a supplementary issue
constraining Turkey’s foreign policy making. It is true that the Cold War system of
international order restricted Turkey’s capability of exercise in world politics. In order to
secure itself from the danger of any hot-tension of the prevailing power polarization, Turkey
defined its position under the Western security system and behaved in harmony with the
Western interests. This chapter also discusses the way how Turkey continues its foreign
relations with East European States? This encampasses two basic topics viz; analysis of the
Kemalist foundation and the Cold War international relations paradigm.
EUROPEAN MODEL OF REFORMS BY ATATURK
Mustafa Kemal Pasha founded a new Turkish Republic with the convening of the Grand
Assembly on April 23, 1920 even as the War of Liberation was in progress. The Assembly
introduced the principle of “national sovereignty” instead of the sovereignty of the Ottoman
family in the 1921 Constitution. In a speech the following year, Mustafa Kemal pronounced
that the legal system was going to be upgraded to the level of the “civilized countries.” 4 In
1923, the Ministry of Justice established various commissions to revise the old laws. The
Republic was proclaimed on October 29, 1923, and the Caliphate was abolished on March 3,
1924. This political revolution was the precursor of the legal revolution. In a speech in front
of the commissions the Minister of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bey, declared that what he desired
was not reform, but a revolution of Law.
The new government of the Turkish Republic, freed from the obstacles that had stood in the
way of the reformers of the Ottoman Empire, abolished the former laws. The Government
decided to adopt the Swiss Civil Code, which was written in a clear and simple language.
This was the most recent of the major Western civil codes until that time. It was translated
into Turkish language and made effective on October 4, 1926. Criminal Law of the Turkish
91
Republic was based on the Italian Criminal Code (Codice Zanardelli), which was translated
and entered into force on March 1, 1926. The Civil Procedure Code of the Neuchatel Canton
of Switzerland (1925) was put into effect on June 18, 1927 as the new Procedure Law of the
Turkish Republic. The Criminal Court Procedure Law, adopted from the German Criminal
Procedure Law, was put into effect on April 20, 1929. The Enforcement and Bankruptcy
Law, adopted from Switzerland, took effect oil September 4, 1929.5
TURKISH FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA
Turkish foreign policy in the early period of the Republic was conducted in an extra-ordinary
domestic and international atmosphere. During this period, the First World War, Ottoman
disintegration, the Republican Revolution and the establishment of the new Turkish state
were co-emerging historical transformations within a difficult cause and effect relationship.
These series of significant historical transformations had severe impacts on the new
Republic’s foreign policy formulation. After the end of the First World War, Turkish
liberation movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal rejected the Peace Treaty of
Sevres signed by the Sultan, which aimed at sharing the Ottoman territories between the
Allied Forces. The Turkish Liberation War of May 1919 and July 1923 against the Greek
forces, as an instrument of the Allied Powers in practice, ended up with the Turkish military
success and concluded with the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923. The fundamental
Turkish claim was to secure the boundaries as defined in the National Pact in 1920 and to
ensure economic and political independence. The Treaty of Lausanne, as a result, had been
the international recognition of the demands in the Turkish National Pact. Main theme of the
Pact had been to establish sovereignty inside within the existing borders and sovereignty
outside. The National Pact had been the declaration of Turkey’s political borders with no
alternative to Western priority in foreign politics.
Republican reform process did directly influence the post-Ottoman pace of foreign relation
formation. Throughout the full Ottoman past, religious motives became the only basis of
state’s survival and legitimacy in both domestic and foreign politics, which was considered
as an extension of internal politics. Military power and its enforcement to foreign powers in
Ottoman state, was visually for the sake of the expansion of Islam, protection of the Sharia
and the interests of the Muslims, in other words it was the promise in the name of the Faith. 6
92
However, foundations of the new Republic were based on the ultimate goal of exclusion of
the religious sentiments from the whole public sphere. Instead, nationhood is located in the
center of all kind of legitimacy for statehood within a secular set of Western principles. So,
new Turkish State was leaving its centuries of contradicting position behind and declaring its
demand for full integration to the Western civilization. 7
On the other hand, harmony between domestic reform agenda and foreign policy goals was
especially significant in the early foundation years. The principle of ‘peace at home and
peace in the world’ became a clear indication of the interrelation between the domestic order
and the international relations, as laid down by Ataturk. 8 With this respect, Kemalist
innovations in domestic sphere also drew the borders of foreign policy making. Any kind of
foreign policy alternatives contradicting with the Republican foundations were left. For
instance, Ottoman discourses in practical policy-making in international arena were refused.
Likewise, secular domestic structure should not have been disturbed or threatened by
religious motives in foreign policy, while engaging with the Muslim countries 9 (mostly
Middle Eastern), and the nation-based homogenous state structure should have not been
endangered. It meant the end of any expansionist tendencies.
In this frame, above-outlined security motive behind traditional Turkish foreign policy could
be explored within two-fold explanation. Firstly, Turkey desired to follow an independent
domestic politics by means of preventing the foreign intervention. Oguzlu and Kibaroglu
explain this security motive behind Turkey’s foreign policy formation using the concept of
“the logic of fear”. It was this logic, which compromises the eradication of the potential of
threat and interference to domestic issues by the Western powers could be provided by means
of Western- oriented reforms and cooperation with the Western security organizations. 10
Despite the inherent perceptions about foe, Turkey tended to be near by the foe: Western
countries. It was also necessary to strengthen the internal power of the new political ideology
as Fuller explains:
While the republic did face genuine external enemies, Kemalist ideology tended to
incorporate a fear of external powers and conspiracies as a key element in its world
outlook. This paranoia toward the outside world helped both to preserve Turkey’s
93
domestic power and to justify an authoritarian approach to guarding the nation
against external threats.11
Within a similar perspective, Turkish people has been educated and socialized through an
indoctrination process of being under constant external and internal threats. Historical
experiences were introduced as current realities. 12
Second aspect of the security issue is concerned with the socio-political reform process by
new political elite under the leadership of Ataturk. Throughout this process, large social
segments having strong religious sentiments were claimed to be excluded from various socioeconomical and political spheres of the new Turkish Republic. Governing elite and the
governed society were differentiated and thus, ‘the old Ottoman practice of establishing
bridges that linked elite and mass through the recognition of religion as discourse –
foundation of society-’ were broken, as Mardin argues: 13
After declaration of the Republic, an intensive reform process was launched with the
secularist motive. State, education and law system all were secularized many radical
reforms. All religious symbols were removed and reforms were enlarged to details
of the social life. The abolition of Sultanate and caliphate, removal of the Islam as
the state religion from the constitution in 1928, the adaption of Swiss civil code and
Italian penal code, adaption of the Law on the Unification of Education in March
1924, ban on the traditional headgear and religious attire, adaption of the Western
clock and calendar, adaption of the Latin alphabet, suppression of the dervish orders
(Tarikats) have been some examples of above mentioned reforms.14
Remnants of the First World War caused serious structural shifts in international context
surrounding the new state. Thus, post-war international environment was not similar to the
Ottoman ages in the wake of the First World War. Not only the Ottoman state, but also
Russian and Austria-Hungarian Empires were also disintegrated. The War left behind new
politically and economically unstable international actors. In addition, balance of power
system was shaken with decline of European dominance. International system transformed
into ‘a global one’ and, whose dominance would prevail did remain as a question until the
the Second World War. In such an international disorder, territorial conquest could no more
94
be a foreign policy choice, new state could not afford it either. Instead new Turkish Republic
was in need of a realist policy orientation which could serve the survival of the state. 15
In this framework, Turkish Republic redefined its foreign policy preferences within these
new domestic and international conditions. Turkey searched good Neighbourly relations in
general, tired to secure it by means of several pacts and alliances and signed numerous
documents. Kemal Ataturk emphasis on ‘nonintervention, Western orientation, and vigilance
with regard to national sovereignty’16, shaped the foreign policy attitudes of the young
Republic. Turkish foreign policy was conducted in search of main goals as, preservation of
neutrality by means of avoiding the conflicts, becoming a part of Europe and the West, and
the protection of its territorial integrity until the Second World War. 17
In order to preserve territorial and political integrity of Turkey, Ataturk signed a series of
friendship treaties. The Treaty of Moscow, March 1921 agreement was re-signed with the
Soviet Union in 1925; and in June 1926, the integration of the Mosul to Iraqi territory was
accepted; the Treaty of Friendship or the Treaty of Ankara with Greece was signed in 1930;
and the Balkan Pact in 1934 with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece was established
with the aim of normalizing its relations with the new states of Europe. In 1934, with Reza
Shah of Iran visited Ankara, and several agreements on tariffs, trade, borders and security
were signed between Iran and Turkey in the 1930s. Besides, the two countries signed a nonaggression pact called the Treaty of Saadabad in 1937, including Afghanistan and Iraq. 18
The main aim of Turkish policy appeared as staying out of the war and maintaining the
neutrality. Solution of the Hatay question19 in favor of Turkey remained as the only
exceptional case before this aim. With the apparent signs of the Second World War, major
foreign policy question of neutrality was consolidated. According to Millman, Turkey
defined some principles to reach her goals as follows:
keeping the alliance and cooperation with Russia in order to have secure borders in
the East and the Black Sea, to ensure common action of Balkans in case of any
external threat, as in the example of the Balkan Entente, and lastly the
rapprochement with the West with the aim of providing security against the Italian
and German threats, and to guarantee security in his South borders with Iraq and
Syria.20
95
Until 1937, Turkey tried to reach these goals by the way of the League of Nations. Turkey did
also search to consolidate its good relations and remove its potential enemies by the formation of
‘alliance networks’ outside the League. 21 In the inter-war period, primary motive was to preserve
the new state with its newly defined domestic build up while formulating the foreign policy
posture of Turkish Republic. Turkey followed a realist foreign policy orientation with no
challenge to ruling Western system, so that assertive Ottoman foreign policy stance was left.
Turkey preferred to be a part of Western civilization and adapted its domestic socio-political
structure to this end. As a result, new Turkey’s foreign policy emerged in search of keeping the
existing balances and status quo with a clear Western orientation.
Turkish Foreign Policy after Second World War
Turkish relations with European states after the World War II, which ended in 1945, has been
directed looking towards mainly to achieve following goals. Firstly, to achieve maximum
benefits for the Turkish state and people that was lost before by the Europeans in the midst of
variance and inconsistency among the European powers. Secondly, to save Turkey from the grip
of Soviet Russia’s aggressive attitude and imperialistic nature. This explains why Turkey joined
NATO. The post Second World War foreign relations which started in 1945 continued till
1980.22
For Turkey, US was the obvious choice for an allay after Stalin’s territorial claims. US leaders on
the other hand, was uneasy about the prospect of Soviet domination in the Eastern Mediterranean
and actively seeking new strong allies in the region. Support of Turkey as a safeguard against
Russian penetration to the Mediterranean had been an object of British policy since the time of
Palmerstone (r.1859-1865) and the US strategists did not have different plans to contain Russian
power in the region.
The opportunity for kindling the Turkish-US cooperation created by the death of Munir Ertegun,
Turkish first Ambassador to Washington in 1944. After the end of the war, the Ambassador’s
body was sent to Turkey aboard USS Missouri and carried on the shoulder of US soldiers to the
graveyard. Sending the dead body with the very ship aboard which Japan surrendered had a
symbolic meaning of the obvious intention was to intimidate the USSR.
The arrival of USS Missouri on 26 March 1946 became the turning point both for Turkish- US
and Turkish-Soviet relations. From mid-1940s until the end of 1950s, Turkey was increasingly
the focal point of the US defense plans of the western interest in the Middle East. Thus Turkey
96
was not viewed only as an important component of the NATO defense strategy but also a ‘thorn
in the side’ of any Soviet plan to invade Iranian Azerbaijan. 23 After the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between Turkey and US, Turkey had send 4500 strong military force to Korea. The
office of OSS and later CIA was increasingly active in the propaganda campaign as a part of
general fight against communist bloc.24
The 1960 military coup in Turkey aroused new hopes in Moscow, especially when Inonu, who
had always advocated closer ties with the USSR, became Prime Minister in 1961. Turkish policy
towards Soviet Union became more flexible following the Cuban missile Crisis and the US
withdrawal of Jupiter missile from Turkey, which led Ankara to emphasize that national policy
was independent of NATO. In 1966, US came out as a villain in Cyprus crisis, especially after
President Johnson’s letter ‘threatening’ Ankara 25 was publicized, and the Soviet Union gradually
adapted a more pro-Turkish position on the Cyprus question, taking advantage of the growth of
anti-Americanism in Turkey.
Throughout the 1960, the volatile public opinion oscillated as the Left gradually gained power in
the
Turkish
political
scene.
Parallel
to
the
activism
around
the
globe,
the
friction between Leftist and Rightist groups on the street was getting fiercer. Organized
ultra-nationalist paramilitary groups appeared and began to assassinate Leftist leaders and
scholars, and violence quickly spread around the country. The ultra nationalist ‘Grey
Wolves’, with organic links to the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) of
Alpaslan Turkes, and its youth organizations, Ulku Ocakları (Hearths of the Cause) were
generally considered to be supported by the CIA. The alleged American support for the Grey
Wolves was a common theme in the Leftist press and these paramilitary groups were
believed to be the Turkish wing of the Gladio. As the Soviet Union was seen as partially
responsible for the violence in the streets, bilateral relations became only worse when
Demirel’s right wing government came to power. Demirel’s majority in the parliament
refused to ratify the recent cultural exchange agreement between the two countries,
signaling the cooling of relations in the next decade. The ulku (the cause) of the ultra-nationalist
circles was nothing but the liberation of the numerous Turkic peoples around the world and the
establishment of the pan-Turkish state of Turan.26
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TURKEY’S STRATEGIC VALUE TO EUROPE
Turkey’s Importance and its Geo-strategic Location
It is important to know the geo-strategic favorable position of Turkey before going into
discussion on its relations with Europe. Turkey’s strategic importance to Europe and the
West can hardly be overstated. A key aspect of its significance lies in its central geographical
position and its influence in the increasing, unstable crossroads region where Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, and the Middle East smash together. 27 Any Europe-Asia map and post-1917
history text adequately illustrate the case for the Republic of Turkey’s “undeniable
importance.” For years a “front-line NATO state bordering the Soviet Union, 28 Turkey
occupies the massive Asia Minor peninsula that directly buffers Iran, Iraq, Syria, and two
former Soviet states. “Only Turkey lies either close to or at the center of most of the gravest
threats to Europe’s peace and well-being.”29 Furthermore, as the first secular Muslim nation
in the region and the history of Muslim World, more democratic, Western-oriented, and
industrialized than any of its Neighbours, Turkey represents a practical example for modern
liberal government. 30
Turkey’s influence towards Neighbour
Turkey’s broad influence reaches military, economic, religious, as well as political affairs. 31
Its military participation in modern European alliances dates back at least to the 19 th century,
when it was accepted as a European power in the Concert of Europe. 32 Better known is
Turkey’s pivotal role in Western security through the Cold War, 33 during which Turkey
served as an essential outpost on the border of Europe, “a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the
Middle East, and a contributor to the security of Europe. 34
Turkey was of tremendous strategic value after the end of Second World War. It was, as a
State Department official explained, “the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which
Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East.” No other nation in the region “has a government or
social order so stable and united as Turkey and none could be expected to stand against
Soviet pressure after Turkey had gone down.”35 Turkey boasts a population of seventy-five
million people,36 including 370,000 armed soldiers, more than any other NATO country
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except the United States. Today as this part of the world unfolds new governments and new
international and regional coalitions, Turkey’s role has changed in form and context, but not
in significance.37
Turkey’s Contribution to World Peace and Regional Stability
One aspect of Turkey’s new geo-strategic importance stems from its central location at the
junction of the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East which are major
regions of instability and conflagration in the Cold War era and onward. Because of the
centrality of its location, its peace-oriented policy and its willingness to make commitments
to this end, Turkey’s cooperation is required to preserve peace and stability in these regions.
Another aspect of Turkey’s new geostrategic significance derives from its influence in the
Turkish culture zone extending from the Balkans to China, most particularly with the newlyindependent states of Central Asia just after the end of Cold War. As Ian commented:
“The Gulf War pushes Turkey into the strategic forefront. With the disintegration of
the Soviet Union and the turmoil in the Balkans, [Turkey] is now poised to play a
leading role across a vast area, from Eastern Europe to western China38,
Turkey’s growing presence is magnified by “its centrality to regions of major instability and
conflagration,”39 from Iraq in the south to former Soviet republics in the north, and from
Kosovo in the west to Armenia in the east. The promising of the Turkic world has restored
Turkey to a position of foreign policy power reminiscent of prior centuries. 40
European involvement on Kurdish Issue of Turkish
In and beyond the Middle East, the Kurdish question comes into view in large, with
significant cross-border Kurdish populations. Nearly twenty five million Kurds are living in
Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are “the world’s most numerous stateless people”41
and restless for political status. These large Kurdish populations constitute another
destabilizing aspect of the volatile Turkish and Iraqi regions. 42 The widespread Kurdish
protests across European capitals after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 demonstrate
the Kurdish political determination for change in the European and Central Asian political
order.43 Turkish domestic stability suffered from Kurdish activity and other conflicts in the
time, as Kinzer remarks:
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Parliament in open rebellion against the political establishment, murderous terrorist
attacks being mounted against civilians and the trial of a hated Kurdish guerilla
leader approaching, Turkey suddenly finds itself facing deep uncertainties. 44
Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has stated that “[a] chaos is now awaiting Turkey,” as
the rump Parliament session was simmering against the government, and a third serious
terrorist attack of the month signaled a possible shift of the Kurdish separatist war from the
southeast to the urban cities of the west. 45 Later, the rebel PKK took responsibility for three
suicide bomb attacks, one in Istanbul that killed eleven, and another wounding the provincial
governor of Hakkari in southeast Turkey. 46
Observers are taking note of a power shift in the politics of the region, a developing but
unspoken “phantom alliance” between Israel, Turkey, and the United States. 47 A military
cooperation pact signed between Turkey and Israel in 1996 has evolved into “one of the
Middle East’s most serious geopolitical axis.48 Both the United States and Israel appreciate
Turkey for its military value, and the three-way trading partnership effectively moves raw
material to manufacturers and then to market. 49 Indeed, the PKK presence in Syria posed an
intractable problem for Turkey until recent military cooperation with Israel changed the
entire calculus of the region, squeezing Syria’s northern and southern borders. 50 This
pressure dislodged Kurdish strongman Ocalan from his secret Damascus headquarters,
sending him in flight and, ultimately, in his capture.
ISTANBUL AND PROCESS OF EUROPEANIZATION
The geographical position of Istanbul has long led Turkey to other connections. In fact
Istanbul is located in the European part of Turkey. In the case of political, cultural, and legal
systems that develop through commercial interaction and the resulting historical links to
Europe have been no less than epochal.51 Istanbul, Turkey’s leading city was the capital of
the Roman Empire for twelve centuries, previously as Constantinople, later Byzantium,
serving as the seat of government for Constantine, Justinian, and the Byzantine rulers that
succeeded them.52 In 324 A.D., Constantine first recognized the importance of this area as a
means of linking the fragmented Roman Empire. 53 Yet, it was Justinian in the sixth century
who would make the more lasting contribution to history, through the compilation of
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classical Roman law in the Corpus Juris Civilis, “the most influential collection of secular
legal materials the world has ever known.” This legal masterpiece created a structure and
system that would serve as the foundation for the civil law tradition. 54 This historical legacy
and cultural connection with Europe should not be lightly dismissed. In the twentieth
century, Turkey’s connection with Europe was strengthened with the well-known reforms of
Kemal Ataturk,55 aggressively importing and imposing Western European cultural,
economic, legal norms-while strongly resisting Islamic fundamentalist models.
In the 1990s, Turkey retains a strong interest in the European connection for political,
economic, and security reasons ... [and] the Turkish elite remains firmly committed to the
Western-looking Atatturkist tradition in cultural and intellectual terms. 56 The Turkish people
thus display an eagerness for Western ideas as shown by their eagerness for U.S. foods,
films, and music. In addition to these connections with Europe, Turkey has special
significance because it is the only secular democratic state with a market economy in the vast
Islamic region. This fact takes on increasing importance with the current intensification of
Islamic politics in key Arab countries. 57 Since its founding as a modern state, Turkey’s
leaders have embraced principles of republicanism and secularism. 58 Although a commitment
to secularism [is] almost a prerequisite for membership in the country’s political elite, Turkey
has experienced several popular movements of Islamic political activism. The most recent ...
began in the mid-1980s and ... has threatened secularism in ways the republic’s founders
could not have imagined....59 The “most dynamic political movement in Turkey was under
the Islamic Fazilet (Virtue) Party, whose appeal to Muslims rather than specifically to ethnic
Turks makes it popular among Kurds. So Kurdish nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism
are fusing together in Turkey in an anti-military alliance. As Graham Fuller explains, the
religious element cannot be ignored, as Turkey’s relative success in integrating Islam with
democracy offers a viable example for other emerging Islamic states.
The Middle East was dominated by the Arab-Israeli conflict in this century, but the early 21st
century may well be dominated by tumultuous change in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, in which
the stateless Kurds will play the pivotal role. 60 Turkey occupies a central position, energized
with modern conflicts: Israelis, Jordanians, and Turks on one side, with Armenia, Greeks, the
Kurds, Iraq, and Syria on the other. From many perspectives, Turkey’s position for
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leadership amid the moving religious, political, and economic currents renders it too valuable
to relegate to some marginal third tier. In every context, volatility and uncertainty are only
worsened by Europe’s further isolation of Turkey. Ultimately, European and world peace in
general are best served by Turkey continuing “as a stable, democratic, secular, and
economically dynamic state in a region that will remain turbulent for a long time to come.
TURKEY’S COLD WAR ALIGNMENT
After the end of the World War II, America and Soviet Russia emerged as the two opponent
powers with different ideological composition. Rivalry and possible terrorization for world
peace and security has constituted the Cold War international relations paradigm. It had been
a consequential determinant not only for Turkish state but also whole international system. It
resulted in transformation of the ‘balance of power’ system to a ‘bipolar’ power structure. It
forced the other actors to place themselves within one of these power poles. Emergence of
the Soviet Union as a superpower, with a rival ideological construction became the
accumulator of the new international relations standard. Cold War bipolarity constituted geostrategic stability between the “Trade-Dependent Maritime World and the Eurasian
Continental Power.”61
This balance ensured a strategic stability which delayed any offensive engagement between
the partners and protected the strategically sensitive areas. Rule was broken only in the case
of this strategic stability which was threatened by one of these super powers in any way to
control the heartlands of geo-politics. The Cuban missile crisis, the Korean and Vietnamese
Wars, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remained as the limited confrontational relations
between the partners.62 Within the above mentioned Cold War international paradigm,
Turkey defined its position in the Western Block 63. Cold War international order paved for
way the full embodiment of Turkey’s centuries of Westernization project in international
sphere, as Mufti characterizes Turkish foreign policy in this period as follows:
This phase was characterized by the westernization of Turkey’s international relations.
Stalin’s abrogation of the Turkish-Soviet friendship pact in 1945 and his demands to
return the Kars and Ardahan provinces, as well as to establish Soviet military bases
along the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, were instrumental in Turkey’s decision to
seek full affiliation with the West.64
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With the arrival of two rival powers, the United States and Soviet Union, it was no more
possible to benefit from the clashing interests between the European powers. In addition,
Turkey’s economic, military and the technological infrastructures were also insufficient to
keep the neutrality. Likewise, motives related to liberal democratic position of the West
against the Soviet camp were less important than Turkey’s territorial and security interests
with the explicit Soviet threat. 65
In the context of Turkey’s position, the period had constituted a deprecating factor for
Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. Cold War ideological polarization did leave
the two sides on opposite sides of the East-West divide, especially after announcement of
Turkey as an element of Western defense. During turmoil of the period, many Arab leaders
turned to Soviet Union as a result of a simple logic of ‘balance of power policy’ within the
lack of any security guarantee behind, while viewing Turkey as serving the Western strategic
needs.66
Within the coercive contextual factors of the Cold War years, Turkey forced to fight for
survival among the power polarization instead of the pursuit a central position using its geostrategic position, as it applied in the foundation years. According to Davutoglu, “policy
makers received this preference as a static paradigm”. This situation deprived Turkey of
producing alternative paradigms and resulted in Turkey’s down play of its “natural spheres of
influence” and alternative power centers. In this period, Turkey qualified all international
issues within a uni-dimensional foreign policy through the perspective of NATO alliance and
the USA. Relations with the other actors were kept at the minimum level. 67 During this
period, Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries and Third World states in
general were also an extension of Turkey’s Western-dependent foreign policy.68
Despite the continuation of the traditional foreign policy path of status quo and keeping the
Western axis, Turkey’s Cold War foreign politics did not display a unified body of policy
engagement, due to some exceptional cases of the period. From the mid-1960s on, harshness
of the Soviet military threat softened, and Turkey’s sphere to maneuver comparatively
enlarged. Turkey’s estrangement in international politics because of the Cyprus question
became an additional factor influencing foreign policy making in favor of the rapprochement
with pro-Soviet bloc. Effect of the domestic political cause as rise of Islamist discourse was
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also notable as a factor to getting closer to Middle Eastern countries as well. Thus, from
1960s onwards, Turkey began to develop relations with the Soviet Union, Middle Eastern
countries and the Third World countries depending upon the above mentioned causes.
Besides, especial relations with the United States were revised in both real politics and public
opinion.69 These changes remained limited in scope and restricted to few actual foreign
policy events. Turkey’s Cold War foreign policy initiatives remained in harmony with the
international system and regional relations in general, with the only exception of Cyprus
issue. Traditional Turkish foreign policy did not testify any transformation in its principles
and ultimate objectives, until the end of the Cold War in 1990.
Consequently, Kemalist point of view with its revolutionary agenda and practices, and the
Cold War paradigm of international relations have been the main factors shaping Turkey’s
traditional foreign policy making and reinforced each other for decades. Principles and the
objectives of foreign policy formation in tradition were defined under these two main factors
and experienced no serious change with any alternative perspective. Keeping the country’s
position within the existing international balances and a clear Western orientation has been
constant objectives.
NATO: TURKEY’S EUROPEAN IDENTITY
Turkey’s membership in NATO has served as the defining feature of its relationship with the
West for over half a century, and has been routinely cited by politicians both within Turkey
and abroad as evidence of Turkey’s European identity. At a practical level, Turkey’s NATO
membership provided the framework for the close relationship that developed with the
United States. Conceptually, it helped to give Turkey a new geographic position inside
Europe. After centuries of being seen as “barbarians at the gates”, the Turkish army took on
the role of “gatekeeper”, defending Europe’s southeastern flank. Furthermore, when it came
to defining the relationship between identity and foreign policy during the Cold War, the
only significant division was between the communist and anti-communist camps. In a world
where the “East” was communist and the “West” was not, Turkey could use NATO
membership as evidence of its Western identity with little fear of contradiction. In fact, this
division belies a more complicated ideological landscape. Despite his firm opposition to
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Communism as a political movement, Ataturk himself always worked to stay on good terms
with the Soviet government as part of his policy of neutrality. He sought their support during
the independence war, created an officially sanctioned communist party to win their
sympathy and signed a ten-year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union as early as 1935.
Ataturk argued that Communist ideology had no relevance for Turkey, as Turkey had no
class divisions, yet in embracing etatism,70 hiring Soviet economic advisors and
implementing his own five year plans in 1934 and 1938, Kemal demonstrated that some
socialist economic principles were not inconsistent with his view of modernization. 71
For Ataturk, Westernization meant both modernization and acceptance into the community
of European states. Seeing Turkey’s NATO membership as the fulfillment of Turkey’s quest
for a Western identity can mask the potential divergence of these goals and obscure the
similarities between Kemalist and Soviet views on modernization in the cultural sphere. In
fact, many of the very same reforms that were seen as Westernization in the Turkish context
were carried out by the Soviet government in Central Asia under the banner of Sovietization.
Not only did the Soviets bring nationalism to Central Asia through the creation of nominally
sovereign republics, but they also brought semi-mandatory education for women, forceful
unveiling, new Latin alphabets, and a swift end to any independent religious organization. 72
Without delving too deep into counter-factual history, it is easy to imagine that had a
different set of circumstances led Turkey into a close alliance with Moscow, this too could
have been presented as the natural accomplishment of Kemal’s positivist ideology.
TURKEY’S PLACE IN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
The situation in Europe just after the Second World War compelled the democratic European
states to integrate. Turkey, in those years and in the aftermath, actively participated in all the
European political, military-political, and economic integration movements, such as the
Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE (formerly CSCE) and OECD (formerly OEEC), and is
anxious to become a full member to the WEU and the EU. The first attempt to European
integration was the OEEC founded on 16 May 1948 by sixteen European states including
Turkey. The economic recovery of Europe led the organization to reconstitute itself, as the
OECD, on 14 December 1960, with the inclusion of some non-European states, such as
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada and the U.S.A.
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Turkey was one of the first admitted members to the Council of Europe which aims at
creating unity to safeguard and realize the ideals and principles of the European common
heritage, democracy, the rule of law and human rights and to facilitate the social, cultural and
economic progress of its members. Turkey shares the common values and objectives democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms- with the other European states. To this
end, both the government and the parliament try to raise the level of human rights to the
advanced standards of the family of democratic states. That is why Turkey became a party to
the European and most of the major UN human rights conventions, such as:
i. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
ii. The European Convention on Human Rights
iii. The right to individual petition to the Commission
iv. The compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with a reservation to the First Protocol’s
right to education, in order to safeguard its secular education system
v. Turkey is still not a party to the Sixth Protocol, 73 but no death sentence has been
executed since 1984
vi. The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
vii. The UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
viii. The European Social Charter (with certain reservations)
ix. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
x. The OSCE’s Charter of Paris for a New Europe
xi. The UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
All of these documents have become part of the Turkish domestic legal system and have the
effect of law. Turkish courts, including the Constitutional Court, have started to make
references to them, including political documents such as the “Helsinki Final Act” and the
“Paris Charter”. There are record evidences of Turkey’s close historical, cultural and political
ties with Europe, and its past and present contribution to the preservation of peace, stability
and security in the region and beyond which are shown below:
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a) Turkey is one of the 51 founding members of the United Nations, an early member of
NATO (1952) and one of the first countries which signed an Association Agreement
with the European Community in 1963. Turkey has the longest-standing associate
status with the EU of any non-member. Turkey is seeking full membership in both the
EU and its military arm, the WEU.
b) International terrorism is an act that not only breaches and destroys the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual, but also threatens democracies and the unity of
states. Turkey severely suffers from international terrorism and has played an important
and an active role both in the UN and in the Council of Europe for the adoption of
resolutions, recommendations, decisions and conventions in this field.
c) Turkey has worked both in the UN and in the Council of Europe for a convention on
racism, race discrimination and anti-Semitism.
TURKISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BALKANS
From the beginning of the Republic of Turkey until the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s
foreign policy was usually described with the similar features and principles. It was
considered to be largely constructed based on the late 19th century Ottoman heritage, great
trauma from the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and need to fight for territorial
integrity and legitimization of the newly founded Republic. At the same time it was strongly
shaped by the Western positivist and rationalist orientation of young republican elite and by
the process of elite led formation of secular, modern and democratic nation state 74. These
factors influenced Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 75 and governing circles around him to formulate
the external relations of the newly established Republic to be predominately security
oriented, with the sovereignty and territorial integrity as the main foreign policy concerns.
The principles of geopolitics, defensive and cautious real politik diplomacy aimed at the
preservation of the status quo and firm Western orientation became known as the traditional
determinants of Turkish foreign policy in the 20th century.76
During most of this century Turkey’s relations with the countries in the Balkans seemed to
follow the general pattern of the Turkish foreign policy and were dominated by these
traditional principles. After the establishment of the Republic, Turkey’s policy towards the
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Balkan region was in the line with preserving status quo and avoiding escalation of any
possible conflicts that could lead to the change of regional borders and would endanger hard
won sovereignty of the Turkish Republic. Turkey led defensive and realpolitik diplomacy
and through multilateral arrangements tried to balance great powers’ influence in the region.
It actively engaged in the forming of the Balkan Entente and tried to materialize its interests
by relying on collective security arrangements and power balance 77. In the interwar period
countries of Balkans were of the considerable geostrategic importance for Turkey. The
outbreak of the Second World War changed international and regional geopolitical structure.
By the end of the War constellation of power in the international system has changed
considerably and most parts of the Balkans lost previous relevance for Turkey’s geostrategic
calculations. During the course of the Cold War, Turkey became a prominent actor of the
Western bloc in that region. Most of the Balkan countries at that time were socialist countries
and Turkey did not develop closer cooperation with them during this period.
Following the end of the Cold War changes took place. Another transformation of the
international system occurred this time, from the bipolar to the multi-polar structure. Turkey
found itself in a great uncertainty and for the first time its traditional foreign policy approach
was being seriously questioned. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia and wars which followed
forced Turkey to strongly reconsider its policy towards the Balkans. Turkey tried to find a
proper response to these regional developments and position itself in this new geopolitical
constellation. Till the end of the Cold War Turkey’s foreign policy was usually characterized
as being passive and reactive but at the beginning of 1990s Turkey started developing more
assertive and multi - directional foreign policy, especially towards its Neighbourhood. For
Turkey, wars in the Balkans in the 1990s were of major security concern and Turkey actively
reacted to the crisis, especially to the war in Bosnia and towards solving Bosnian question.
But by the end of the 90s its focus changed and Turkey was again less visible in the region.
This started changing after November elections in 2002 and assumption of state power of the
AKP. After AKP formed its first government, Turkish foreign policy was presented with a
new vision and gained new momentum. The main intellectual architect of what was named
Turkey’s new foreign policy was consider to be Ahmet Davutoglu, who became chief foreign
policy advisor of the Turkish Prime Minister of AKP government and then from 2009
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Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. His book Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International
Position was the basis for defining the principles and objectives of Turkey’s new foreign
policy and it has greatly influenced Turkey’s relations with the outside world in the AKP
period.
What seemed particularly new about Davutoglu’s doctrine was that besides taking geography
as a determinant of the foreign policy, determinant which was continuously present in
Turkish foreign policy, Davutoglu also took history as the second one. He believes that
Turkey’s strategic depth is defined by its geographical position and historical legacy and that
based on that, Turkey should formulate its foreign policy. “Ottoman history, and also our
Republican history, the former bi-polar world, these are permanent parameters that cannot be
changed”78. Even though he openly rejected the concept of Neo-Ottomanism79, and believes
that historical heritage of the Ottoman period should be considered as one of the central
elements in organizing Turkey’s foreign policy. Since Davutoglu became Minister, Turkey
actively engaged in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus region. This activism was
coming from what was perceived as common cultural and historical heritage, which Turkey
shares with these regions and which come from Ottoman period. The impression was that
Turkey’s traditional foreign policy principles of strict Western orientation and defensive
diplomacy are being replaced with an active foreign policy and new identity based on the
Ottoman legacy80.
Anyway, the establishment of Communism in the Balkans and the attempts to add Greece
into this portrait influenced the foreign policy of Turkey. In more specific terms, Turkey
found itself encircled by the Soviet Union geographically and isolated in diplomacy in the
immediate aftermath of the war. Moreover, the Soviet Union sent a note to Turkey in March
1945 stating that it would not renew the nonaggression pact of 1925, demanded bases in the
Straits and claimed territory in Eastern Anatolia. In this connection, Turkey considered the
rise of Communism in the Balkans. Following the end of World War II, a serious issue came
to the possibility that the Soviet Union could further proceed to dominate the Aegean and
perhaps the Mediterranean. The intentions were seen relatively more clearly when the fact
that the Soviet Union demanded administrative claims in Libya, and Tito’s coveting
Thessaloniki were also taken into account. Following this, the Soviet Union preserved its
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claims and claimed more in the 1946 note demanding the amendment of the Montreux
Convention81 articles in favor of the littoral states.82 When Turkey rejected the Soviet note on
the Balkans, it was seen that the efforts to establish a south Slav Federation and mutual
alliance agreements between Communist Balkan states provoked Turkey to become even
more concerned. A possible Yugoslav - Bulgarian alliance in the Balkans was exactly what
Turkey tried to avert since the Balkan Entente days. Turkey viewed this rapprochement
directed against Greece, indirectly against Turkey and the Mediterranean. Upon Turkey’s
rejection of the Soviet note, the Soviet Union acknowledged that it would not achieve
superiority in the Straits with Turkey’s cooperation. So, through its domination in the
Balkans, it would now threaten the Straits as well as Greece. That was why Turkey declared
martial law in Thrace, the reasons of which are found in former Prime Minister Recep
Peker’s remarks in May 1947 when he said that “[t]he area covering martial law in Turkey is
the Straits and the Marmara basin surrounding the Straits. If there is to be an assault on
Turkey, one of the first and most fragile directions can be this region. For this reason, the
most sensitive point that needs to be secured is the region in question”.83
In the same years, former Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak’s reply to a question asked in
the parliament reflected Turkey’s relevant concerns clearly as he said that, there was a direct
relationship between the Greek Civil War and polarization in the Balkans; the agreements
were part of a larger project which obviously threatened security; and that unlike Yugoslavia
and Bulgaria, Turkey did not perceive the mutual agreements as efforts to form a peaceful
front.84 It was argued that if a Communist regime took power in Greece, the possibility for
Turkey to become “an island in the sea of Communism” would be reinforced.85
The aim of internal and external pressure was to establish a socialist government in Greece
and to place Greece among other satellites of Moscow. It would follow that the whole
peninsula would fall under Soviet hands, allowing the Soviets to reach the Aegean. In face of
growing security threat, Turkey stated that UN’s efforts were not adequate and called for
stricter measures.86 It has been correctly argued that the most important consequence for
Turkey with respect to the efforts to establish blocs in the Balkans and Greek Civil War was
that Turkey began to see regional conflicts as those between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union
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and as a matter of aligning its relevant policies parallel to those of the U.S.A. as Necmettin
Sadak’s remarks indicated:
The views of our government are the same with those of the U.S.A. and Britain. …
The future measures to be taken by the U.S.A. and Britain with a view to averting the
efforts of Cominform to turn Greece into a satellite state will definitely concern us
closely.87
The Aftermath of World War-II: Balkan Pact and Alliance
Turkey’s membership in NATO after World War II accompanied a new period in Turkish
foreign policy, in which Turkey was observed to reinforce security and defense systems in
the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean and to play a more active role. Turkey’s
membership in NATO had a negative impact on the Soviet Union which was most openly
seen with the note sent by the Soviet Union in November 1951. The note stated that the
responsibility to arise from joining this bloc directed against the Soviet Union would rest on
the Turkish government. In reply, Turkey stated that although Turkey had acted in peaceful
lines, the same could not be expected from the Soviet Union. The second note received in
late November 1951 did not have a less hostile tone. This hostile attitude prompted Turkey to
seek to form new alliances in its vicinity. Although NATO stretched into the Balkans, it did
not include Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was not included in the Soviet bloc since 1948, either.
Therefore it would be easier to include Yugoslavia into a new alliance system. Moreover, as
the efforts of Turkey and Greece showed, a rapprochement had started between the two
states. The foreign minister of Greek visited Turkey in early 1952, which have been followed
by more mutual visits. It seemed that with these mutual visits, the Balkan Entente of 1934
had been revived and Yugoslavia was part of the contacts, too. The first positive result was
seen when Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia signed the Friendship and Cooperation
Agreement in Ankara in late February 1953, also known as Balkan Pact. This was not an
alliance agreement per se, yet it was an important step to that end. The agreement envisaged
economic, cultural and security cooperation. In accordance with Article-VI (see AppendixD, p.475) of the Agreement, the parties would not engage in any alliance or any act which
was against the interests of other parties. 88 The pact did not last long, either. That is why
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examination of the pact is in order. The factors which led to the Balkan Pact can be
summarized as shown below:The threat posed by pro-Moscow Balkan states: After the exclusion of Yugoslavia from
the Soviet bloc in 1948, the friction between the two blocs which was being shaped in the
Balkans escalated. The Bulgarian pressure on Turkey; the measures by Bulgaria, Romania,
Hungary and Albania against Yugoslavia; and the deteriorating relations between Greece,
Bulgaria and Albania were key factors in this friction. Bulgaria’s deportation policy towards
the Turkish minority in 1950–1951 made Turkey concerned, and given the bipolar nature of
the structure at the time, this was perceived as a Soviet pressure on Turkey via Bulgaria.
Furthermore, Turkey saw itself more isolated on this occasion as the Western states remained
indifferent. From then on, Turkey accelerated efforts to enter NATO and took the initiative in
regional terms. Turkey’s membership in NATO was not welcomed by Bulgaria at all.
Yugoslavia also saw itself encircled by three Soviet satellites. Belgrade was open to easy
invasion due to geographical location. The Yugoslav army was equipped by the Soviet Union
mostly with inactive equipment. There were also rumors that the Bulgarian, Romanian and
Hungarian armies would invade Yugoslavia. The border clashes escalated according to what
Yugoslav news reported, killing Yugoslav soldiers. In short, Yugoslavia feared being
attacked. On the other hand, Greece had emerged from a civil war which was thought to be
supported by its northern Neighbours. Greece had a border problem with Bulgaria
concerning the Rhodope Mountains. It had strained relations with Bulgaria claiming that
Bulgaria abetted gangs of Greece, mutual claims over Macedonia, Bulgaria’s demands
concerning outlet to the Aegean, and Greece’s demand for reparations regarding World War
II. Therefore, from the Greek point of view, Turkey and Yugoslavia could be seen as a front
against Albania and Bulgaria. Thus, it would be seen that the policies of pro-Soviet Balkan
states in the Balkans were an amalgam of significant factors causing Greece, Yugoslavia, and
Turkey to become concerned.89
Trieste problem: The Trieste90 problem emerged as an issue between Italy and Yugoslavia
after World War II. Tito (r.1950-1980) saw the issue as a matter of prestige and this had great
impact on Yugoslav foreign policy after 1950. The Trieste problem strained the relations
between the two states. Yugoslavia feared that Italy would take Trieste and enter the Balkans.
112
This was one of the reasons why Yugoslavia engaged in cooperation with Greece and Turkey
and tried to show that the Balkans were for Balkan people. 91
Economic aid: The economic aid to be received from the West and the U.S.A. was another
important factor in pulling the three states closer. Some arguments even posit that there were
only two reasons why Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia engaged in cooperation. Such
arguments maintain that the Soviet Union was seen as an enemy by all of the three states and
their depending on the West in economic and military terms. 92
Vacuum in NATO strategy and Western support: The security line starting from the
North Atlantic stretching across Iran lacked only Yugoslavia in it. The need to pull
Yugoslavia into European defense system was obvious as Yugoslavia had a strategic
location.93 To fill the vacuum, the West could take in Yugoslavia under the NATO umbrella
and draw Yugoslavia into cooperation with Greece and Turkey. In turn, such cooperation
would strengthen the NATO front. 94
Turkish Efforts for Cooperation in the Mediterranean
After the unrest, caused by Bulgaria’s deportation policies, Turkey took the initiative to act
for cooperation in the Balkans. This began with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (r.19501960) visit to Athens in 1952. The two states concurred that trilateral talks must begin and
Turkey should take the initiative to make an appeal to Yugoslavia in that respect. However, it
is noteworthy that although Tito reciprocated positively to cooperation appeals, he hesitated
to engage in a written agreement with Turkey and Greece for a short time arguing that an oral
compromise would be even more influential in building friendly relations. To reiterate, this
did not last long and Tito’s attitude revealed by 1952 that it would cooperate with Turkey and
Greece.95
Western Support and Bilateral Contacts
While the three states continued negotiating at increasing pace, the U.S.A. and Britain also
showed their interest. Top level officials from both states had contacts in Greece, Turkey,
and Yugoslavia.96 A bilateral contact in the military venue between Turkey, Greece and
Yugoslavia was held. To implement the contact Foreign Minister Fuad Koprulu’s visit to
113
Belgrade in January 1953, that was the first official attempt to form the basis of the Balkan
Pact. In the same month, Koprulu visited Athens during which it was openly stated that a
pact would be signed between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The last visit was by Greek
Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos to Belgrade in February 1953. After the bilateral
talks, trilateral negotiations started. The government’s Balkan policy also received support
from the opposition in Turkey. 97
The Balkan Pact
The Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration was signed by Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia
on 28 February 1953 in Ankara (see Appendix- D, p.475). As mentioned above, the treaty
envisaged military, economic, technical, and cultural cooperation as well as not entering
alliances against any of the parties. It was also stated that the treaty would not affect the
liabilities of Turkey and Greece concerning NATO. Different from the Balkan Entente, the
Balkan Pact envisaged a common defense understanding and cooperation among general
staffs of the three parties. However, the Balkan Entente stipulated that each party would
defend itself with its own army in case of an attack. Still, the Balkan Pact was not merely a
military alliance although it came into being as a result of military considerations. It foresaw
collaboration between three general staffs. The reason why it was not a pure military alliance
was that a legal ground to reconcile the status of Turkey and Greece as NATO members with
that of Yugoslavia was not possible. Therefore, it was decided to sign such an agreement as a
first step towards establishing a military alliance. It should also be stated that the pact was
open to accepting other Balkan states if they so wished and if the signatories approved, just
as the Balkan Entente. These two states were also called on to join the pact in 1953. It is also
noteworthy that a socialist state concluded a treaty with Western states independent from the
directions of the Soviet Union, the signals of which were in fact observed when Yugoslavia
departed from the Communist bloc back in 1948. The ensuing years also made it clear that
the country would remain socialist, but not on Soviet terms.
The main objective of the Soviet Union appeared to prevent the pact to turn into an alliance.
The Yugoslavian example showed that Stalin’s Yugoslavia policies did not pull Yugoslavia
closer to the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it caused Yugoslavia to build cooperative
relations with the West. The Soviets feared that the Pact could turn into an alliance and as
114
such it could be supported by the 6th U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean and threaten the southern
flank of the Soviet Union in Europe. This would mean that the industrial and oil sources of
the Soviet bloc could be under risk. Seeing that previous policies had not worked, the Soviet
Union launched a policy of friendliness towards Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia. It sent a
note to Turkey stating that it did not have any territorial claims from Turkey in May 1953. It
also lifted the economic measures on Yugoslavia. Bulgaria followed suit and the former
Bulgarian Prime Minister stated that Bulgaria wanted to build friendly relations with Turkey
and Yugoslavia on the basis of mutual respect. 98
Balkan Alliance
The signing of the Balkan Alliance became possible by Tito’s visit to Ankara and Athens in
1954. During the talks in Ankara, the parties reached a compromise that it was time to sign
an alliance and that the fact that Yugoslavia was not a NATO member was not an obstacle
before signing an alliance. Eventually, the alliance was signed on 9 August 1954 in Bled,
Yugoslavia. It was a military agreement which recognized all parties’ liabilities concerning
the U.N.’s as well as Greece’s and Turkey’s liabilities concerning NATO. It was based on the
spirit of NATO, because it stated that in case of an attack on one of the parties, the other
parties, alone or together, would respond in the same way. In other words, it was based on
‘all for one, one for all’ principle. The alliance signed in Bled can be considered as a
significant contribution for the Western defense system since it covered Yugoslavia, and as
such, it encompassed the Eastern Adriatic coasts, Serbian mountains, and Vardar and Morava
valleys. Apart from military cooperation, the parties also signed an agreement to establish a
consultation assembly in March 1955. Moreover, in the same month, the parties stated that a
trilateral conference on economy would be held for improvement in the economic as well as
technical, cultural, and other areas. The parties also signed a postal communication
agreement.99
Dissolution of the Balkan Alliance
When military necessities disappeared, Balkan alliance also gave signals of dissolution.
However, first and foremost, certain changes came to fore in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy
after 1955 when the Soviet officials visited Yugoslavia. This visit was one that gave the
message that post-1948 policies of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia were erroneous and
115
that Communism on nationalist lines was not something unacceptable. Yugoslavia observed
that the attitude of the Soviets would be different than before. This meant that military
cooperation with Turkey and Greece was not a must. However, Tito did not unquestioningly
ally with the Soviet Union, either. Rather, he chose to follow active neutrality after 1955.100
On Turkey’s part, the most important development that worked to the break of the alliance
was the anxious Turkish – Greek relations due to the Cyprus issue in 1955. The Greek
government applied the UN regarding the Cyprus issue one week after the Balkan alliance
was signed. The relations further deteriorated with the 6 – 7 September events in Turkey.
Unlike the public reaction against Greece, Turkish government tried to maintain Balkan
alliance. The U.S.A. was also pushing for the preservation of the alliance arguing that the
issue of aid would be reconciled by the U.S.A. Although Turkey was supportive of
maintaining the alliance, it did not receive positive reciprocation by the two other parties.101
In the end, the pact ended up being an alliance on paper, in which even regular meetings
could not be held by 1956.
The pact was annulled implicitly by the statements of Yugoslavian and Greek foreign
ministries in 1960. Viewed through Turkey’s lens, the alliance did not bring much benefit for
Turkey. The 20 years term foreseen for the alliance ended in 1975 and was not renewed. It
has been correctly argued that the Balkan alliance was exemplary as being a product of the
policy of reinforcing Western defense with regional pacts after becoming a NATO member.
Yet, the positive consequences for Yugoslavia and Greece were far more than those for
Turkey since the former bolstered relations with their Neighbours by means of this pact. By
1955, in another regional attempt, Turkey turned its face to the Middle East for building
close relations with Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, which took shape as the Baghdad Pact. Leaving
some of the regional states out and taking some of them it was the commonality of both the
Balkan alliance and the Baghdad Pact, which prepared the ground for their failure. 102
Post-1955 Attempts for Cooperation in the Balkans
A. The First Stoica Plans
As part of the other similar plans for cooperation in the Balkans, the Stoica Plan was
proposed by Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica (r.1955 –1961) in 1957. Proposal was
116
made for Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. The plan was (i) to
develop economic and cultural relations, (ii) to settle dispute matters, and (ii) to launch joint
economic enterprises between the regional states.
Stoica’s plan was significant in that it included all Balkan states unlike the Balkan Entente 103
and the Balkan alliance. With the abovementioned aims, the plan was intended to prove a
lasting basis in the Balkans. Stoica’s plan was approved by Bulgaria, Albania, and
Yugoslavia on the condition that all Balkan states participated but was rejected by Turkey
and Greece. The reason for the rejection of Greek was stated by former Prime Minister
Konstantinos Karamanlis on the grounds that certain Greek territories were still under
invasion by some Balkan states, which were considered to be Northern Epirus in the
Albanian territory as well as Macedonia at the time. Yet, the interpretations in Ankara and
Athens said otherwise. It was considered that the two states were not in a state to engage in
cooperation at the time. On Turkey’s part, the plan was viewed as an effort to weaken
Turkey’s ties with NATO and thus to distance it from the U.S.A. at a time when Turkey had
improved relations with the country. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union rejected any Soviet
role in the plan. It did not yield the expected repercussions in Turkey, excluding the views
that saw it as a Soviet propaganda. The previous unsuccessful attempts for a cooperative
framework and Turkey’s prioritizing the Middle East after 1955 were two other factors in
that respect. It is noteworthy to remember that at a time when Turkey feared the superiority
of the Soviet Union in respect of arms and approved the U.S. missiles to be deployed in its
territory, it would not be consistent to accept the proposal.
The second Stoica Plan: The second Stoica Plan came two years later and covered the
following issues: (i) to work for a Balkans free of nuclear arms, which aimed to remove the
missile bases in Turkey, Greece, and Italy; (ii) a stronger Soviet influence than in the former
Stoica Plan; and (iii) the inclusion of Italy in addition. Turkey refused this plan with the note
it sent to the Soviet Union. It was seen that the note did not refer with a single word to the
Balkans, and it had almost the same wording of the note sent by the U.S.A., Britain, and
France. Last, but not least, it should be mentioned that while Turkey sent its note directly to
the Soviet Union, Greece sent its note to Romania. At the heart of this attitude lied the fact
that Greece considered its regional interests more. Apart from these proposals, annual
117
meetings were held in the 1960s with a view to building mutual understanding and
cooperation. These meetings articulated a region free of nuclear weapons, however it did not
receive positive response from Albania. Turkey did not attend the meetings. Albania was
opposed to the meetings from the beginning and Greece wanted to use the meetings as
another forum against Turkey. 104
In brief, between 1945 and 1955, Turkey saw its security threatened in the Balkan region and
preferred to ensure security through regional organizations and linked the Balkan pact and
alliance in 1953 and 1954. When the alliance completed its lifetime in 1955, Turkish foreign
policy towards the Balkans also changed, to the detriment of its relations with the region.
Turkey did not respond positively to the appeals for a Balkans free of nuclear weapons as
well as to the regional conferences. Turkey’s foreign policy perspective was determinant in
the formulation of policies as such, because between 1950 and 1960, the views of Democrat
Party were based on the consideration that peace in the world presented integrity so the
security of a country could not be viewed independent from overall security of the bloc to
which it belonged. Therefore, Turkey did not assume an active independent attitude towards
the Balkans unlike Greece, and so it acted in line with the Western bloc. Another foreign
policy pillar during these years was not to hold bilateral negotiations, not to enter bilateral
agreements; and not to cooperate with the opposite camp states. In parallel, Democrat Party
rejected proposals by the Communist states in the Balkans. The 1960 coup and National
Union did not alter Turkish foreign policy essentially. Yet, when the Cyprus crisis unfolded
in 1963, Turkey acknowledged that it had serious problems other than the security problem
with respect to the Soviet Union and tried to strengthen its place in the Western bloc in that
respect. Turkey saw that Greece’s enosis policy was a direct threat for Turkey and began to
seek ways to avert it outside the Western bloc by responding to the appeals made by the
Soviet Union since 1953 and by building relations with the non-aligned countries. Turkey
also saw that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria openly supported the Greek arguments of Cyprus by
1965. It would be remembered that Greece had begun to conduct an active foreign policy in
the Balkans after 1954. By 1965, Turkey realized that it had to do the same to act as
counterweight against Greece in the region. 105
118
B. In the decades of 1970s
In the 1960s, Turkey began to conduct multilateralism in foreign policy and this included the
Balkans as well. It also tried to improve relations with the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and
Eastern bloc states. In this connection, relations with the Balkan states were attached utmost
importance, yet this did not include Greece. The second period in which relations with the
Balkans further improved was during Ecevit administration since the beginning of Cold War.
The first visit was conducted by former Foreign Minister Turan Gunes (25.01.1974.
07.11.1974) to Romania in 1974. Turkey and Bulgaria signed a good Neighbourliness
agreement and Turkey and Romania signed a joint declaration in 1975. Tito visited Ankara
the following year. When Ecevit became prime minister for the second time in 1978, the
Balkans were again paid due attention in the general framework of maintaining friendly
relations rather than prioritizing armament. The first visit by Ecevit was to Yugoslavia and
this was followed by a visit to Romania. 106
C. The 1980-1990
The Balkans posed a relatively stable picture in the 1980s except for the pressure on Turkish
minority in Bulgaria, due to which relations with this country were strained in 1989. The
pressure had its precedent in 1950 when a similar influx was experienced from Bulgaria to
Turkey. Approximately 154.000 Turks had come to Turkey until the end of 1951. While
Turkey feared Bulgaria could use Turkish minority as a tool as in 1950 – 1951, Bulgaria
feared Turkey could use the Turkish minority to weaken Bulgaria from inside.
The Turks in Bulgaria preserved their social structure and traditions as they lived in the
country. While the Slavic population showed a tendency to shrink, the fact that Turkish
population indicated a growth caused Bulgaria to grow concerned. The forced emigration
policies did not yield the expected outcome, and to add onto the picture, the proclamation of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 prompted the Bulgarian officials to think
that Turkey also coveted Bulgarian territories. Consequently, Zhivkov administration
launched an assimilation campaign which included changing of Turkish names as well.
Former President Kenan Evren sent a message to Zhivkov stating the campaign to be brought
to an end immediately, only to see shortly that the situation would in fact be aggravated by
119
way of expanding into the northern part of the country. The Ozal government which took
power in 1983 preferred to act cautiously concerning the issue. Turkey sent a note to
Bulgaria in 1985 asking for a solution through negotiation. The Bulgarian government saw
this as interference into its internal affairs.
Meanwhile, Turkey tried to refer the issue to international forum. In 1985, Council of Europe
called on the Bulgarian government to end the campaign. The Organization of Islamic
Conference (later on change to Cooperation) 107 had sent a delegation to Bulgaria for on-site
observation of the developments. The U.S.A. reduced diplomatic contacts with the country.
Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International also criticized Bulgaria’s practices. While the
West showed its reaction, Greece pinpointed Turkey as the responsible state claiming that
Turkey had provoked the Turkish minority against Sofia, although not stating it expressly.
Furthermore, Greece signed a friendliness and cooperation agreement with Bulgaria in 1986
as the campaign was continuing full scale. Yugoslavia criticized Bulgaria and accepted the
Turks who escaped from Bulgaria giving them refugee status. However, Romania returned
the Turks to Bulgaria. In brief, Greece and Bulgaria assumed similar stances due to the
presence of Turkish minority in both states while relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia
became closer on this occasion, although not expressly stated. However, the 1990s would tell
a different story about minorities with the demise of Communism and the subsequent
emergence of nationalism in its extreme forms.108
TURKISH- RELATIONS WITH BULGARIA
Background: Turko-Bulgarian relations throughout the twentieth have been shaped by two
major elements. First one is the political changes in the Balkans, affected in large part by the
influences of the major powers and secondarily by the treatment of a sizable community of
ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. Even before the nineteenth century, Turkey and Bulgaria shared a
long history. Following the Battle of Nicopolis (now Nikopol) in 1396 CE, Bulgaria was
absorbed into the Ottoman Empire and ethnic Turks began to settle there. The Ottoman
government recognized the authority of the Greek Orthodox patriarch in Istanbul over all
Christians within the empire as part of the millet system of confessional autonomy since the
conquest of Constantinople in 1453. At the same time, the Balkans became the Ottoman
120
Empire’s “center of gravity,” to use Bernard Lewis’s expression, as more political and
military activities took place there than in the Middle East. 109
By the nineteenth century, Christians in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans, were
starting to be influenced by ethnic nationalism and were receiving varying degrees of support
from the major European powers. The Ottoman Empire, which had lost territory around the
Black Sea to the Russia, was under pressure to introduce political reforms. The promotion of
the concept of Osmanlilik (Ottomanism) by mid-nineteenth century governmental reformers,
in order to establish a multi-ethnic civic identity, failed to gain acceptance among the
population of the empire. Perhaps the most prominent of those reformers, Midhat Pasha was
governor of Bulgaria from 1864 to 1869. He invested a lot of money in the construction of
roads and bridges and established agricultural cooperative banks for loans to the peasantry.
The Bulgarian-populated areas were doing much better developments than other areas of the
Ottoman Empire. However, as one noted authority on the Balkans points out, while Midhat
“is still regarded among contemporary Bulgarian historians as a progressive influence ... their
admiration is tempered by dismay at Midhat’s uncompromising suppression of any
movement smacking of separatism.” 110
In 1870, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Aziz (r.1861-76 CE) issued a decree establishing an
autonomous Bulgarian Orthodox exarchate separate from the Greek patriarchate. Abdul
Hamid II (r.1876 –1909), meanwhile, became the Ottoman Sultan in May 1876 CE. In this
time Russians advancing to the outskirts of Istanbul and forcing the Ottomans to accept the
‘Treaty of San Stefano’ in March 1878. Among other things, this treaty called for a Greater
Bulgaria extending to the Aegean Sea. Alarmed by this development, Germany, Britain, and
Austria-Hungary forced Russia to have the treaty revised at the Congress of Berlin a few
months later. While the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania was formally
recognized, Bulgaria was made smaller and divided; an autonomous principality under
nominal Ottoman suzerainty was established north and west of the Balkan mountains, while
Eastern Rumelia, which was just to the south of the principality and was supposed to remain
under Ottoman rule, got a Christian governor. 111 In 1885, as Russian influence diminished in
Bulgaria, the two territories were united with British support, and later, in the midst of the
Young Turk revolution, Bulgaria’s independence was formally recognized in 1909. 112 The
121
Ottoman Empire regained control over Macedonia, but that territory was later divided among
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece as a result of the First Balkan War of 1912-13. At the same
time, many of the Turks in Bulgaria, who in 1878 outnumbered ethnic Bulgarians in that
country,113 chose to emigrate to Istanbul and other parts of the Ottoman Empire for political
or economic reasons.
Turkey and Bulgaria during the Cold War
By the latter half of 1944, the Soviets had signed an armistice with Romania and invaded
Bulgaria, where communist republics were to be established officially in 1947 and 1948,
respectively. By January 1946, Yugoslavia and Albania had adopted constitutions
establishing communist governments, while Greece fought a civil war against the
communists from 1944 to 1949. In March 1945, shortly before the end of the Second World
War, the Soviet Union denounced the pact of friendship and nonaggression that it had
concluded with Turkey in 1925 and was due for renewal. The Soviet Union demanded
territorial concessions, which were rejected. In March 1947, the United States enunciated the
Truman Doctrine,114 which resulted in the enhancement of Turkey’s military capabilities. In
July of the following year, an agreement was concluded for Turkish participation in the
Marshall Plan,115 to improve its economic situation. As for its position in the Balkans, given
the politics of the early Cold War period, Turkey’s relations with its communist Balkan
Neighbours until the mid-1960s were rather limited. An exception was the case of
Yugoslavia, with which Turkey and Greece established a short-lived Balkan defensive pact
in 1954.116 Turkey’s relationship with Bulgaria, however, was quite tense during the early
post-war years.
When the communists came to power in Bulgaria, a large number of ethnic Turks sought to
emigrate to Turkey, as their schools were nationalized and their farmlands were confiscated.
It should be noted that with Bulgaria’s annexation of southern Dobrudja in 1940 recognized
by the Soviet Union in 1947 Bulgaria acquired between 100,000 and 150,000 additional
Turks. Thus the Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria totaled about 750,000, more than ten
percent of that country’s population.
122
Most likely as a result of collectivization efforts in agriculturally rich Dobrudja and as a way
to hurt politically pro-Western Turkey, the Bulgarian government demanded in August 1950
that Turkey accept 250,000 Turks over three months time. A former Turkish ambassador to
Bulgaria notes, “This haste could be explained by the fact that the Bulgarians were probably
acting on behalf of the Soviets, who wished to ‘punish’ Turkey for its participation in the
Korean War.”117 Turkish authorities could afford to take in only about thirty thousand
immigrants to start with. They protested that the action by the Bulgarians would result in a
mass expulsion and a flagrant violation of Turkey’s 1925 treaty with Bulgaria concerning the
voluntary exchange of populations. Nevertheless, the Bulgarians sent Turks across the border
without entry visas, and by October 1950, Turkey closed its frontier. In December the
Bulgarian government accepted Turkish conditions that it wait for entry visas to be issued
and that it allow illegal immigrants to be returned, but it sent Roma across the border using
forged Turkish visas and refused to readmit them. Turkey was forced to close its frontier
once again in November 1951; in retaliation, Bulgaria issued no more exit visas.
Nevertheless, almost 155,000 Turks immigrated to Turkey over a two-year period.118 By
February 1952, Turkey (and Greece) joined the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, further
straining relations with Bulgaria.
Impact of 1960’s coup and relation
Turkey’s resentment over American policy toward Cyprus in 1964 pushed it toward
rapprochement with the Soviet Union. 119 The Greeks had started an insurrection against the
British in April 1955. Years of conflict between Turkey and Greece over the status of the
island ensued. In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson threatened Turkish Prime Minister Ismet
Inonu with the removal of Turkey’s NATO protection if it did not call off a planned military
intervention on the island. Turkey did not invade then, but it did turn toward the Soviet
Union, and this turn led to improved relations with Bulgaria and Romania. The Turkish
government accelerated its diversification of foreign policy, something that had been
developing especially since the military coup of 1960.120 A major aim of Turkey’s foreign
policy was to break out of its diplomatic isolation caused by its previously total commitment
during the 1950s to the United States and to gain international support for a solution to the
Cyprus problem satisfactorily protecting the rights of that island’s Turkish population.121
123
Better relations with the communist countries of the Balkans were seen as a way to outflank
Greece, its rival over Cyprus. 122 Despite the bad feelings caused by the Johnson letter,
Turkey realized the importance of its membership in NATO and expected the Soviet Union
to accept that reality. The Soviets were eager to improve relations with Turkey, and within
months, they expressed support for the Turkish position of having a federal arrangement of
government on Cyprus.
One Turkish expert explained at the time that while Turkey’s “active policy of opening-up”
in the Balkans cannot be interpreted as a move towards a revival of the Balkan union of the
1930s, or in the direction of the Balkan Pact [of the 1950s], it must be realized that Ataturk’s
basic concept of establishing an area of security in the Balkans is now being applied in a
different manner due to the changed conditions of the region, and overall international
relations.123
Indeed, Turkey exchanged ambassadors with isolationist Albania in 1966, five years before
Greece did and by 1968—the same year Bulgarian Communist Party First Secretary Todor
Zhivkov visited Ankara—reached an agreement with Bulgaria allowing for the reunion of
families separated since the last transfer of ethnic Turks came to a halt in late 1951. From
1969 to 1978, about 130,000 Turks immigrated to Turkey. 124 However, when Romania’s
President Nicolae Ceausescu, with the support of Bulgaria, called for developing a Balkan
“nuclear-free zone,” the Turkish government rejected the proposal as it remained firmly
committed to NATO.125 Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union and the communist regimes
in the Balkans continued to develop bilaterally, especially after the imposition of the
American arms embargo, which lasted four years, following the Turkish military intervention
in Cyprus in 1974.
Improvement of relation
In 1975, a year after the overthrow of the Greek military junta (which had been in power for
seven years) and the establishment of the Helsinki Accords on human rights, the new prime
minister of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, toured the Balkan countries in order to improve
relations in preparation for a conference to be hosted in Athens in January and February
1976. Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia attended, and while discussions focused
124
on noncontroversial subjects such as agriculture, energy, the environment, public health,
telecommunications, tourism, and transportation, little was accomplished, as Bulgaria proved
to be an obstacle to cooperation. Turkey’s chief representative, Oguz Gokmen, made clear
his country’s preference that Balkan relations would be better handled on a bilateral level,
“as otherwise we would be projecting our problems, our difficulties or even worse our
bilateral conflicts to a multilateral or international plane.” 126
During the latter part of the 1970s, relations with the Soviet Union and the communist
Balkan states-a Turkish Ostpolitik-came to center stage in Turkish foreign policy. In general,
détente was the accepted policy of the Western powers; as early as 1967, the report of
Belgian foreign minister Harmel titled “The Future Tasks of the Alliance” stated that “Each
[NATO] ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the
Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente
must not be allowed to split the alliance.”127 While Turkey remained loyal to NATO, the
American arms embargo pushed the Turks to pursue the above policy to the fullest extent.
Cooperation agreements
In December 1975, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a Declaration of Principles of GoodNeighbourliness and Co-operation, which included pledges of non-aggression and respect for
their common frontier. Also, between 1972 and 1976 CE, Turkish-Bulgarian trade increased
about 400 percent. Turkey’s relations with Romania developed even further; on a visit to that
country in 1978, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit noted that “even though both countries
maintain their place within their alliance systems, both pay attention to the alliances moving
away from the Bloc process more rapidly, and making larger contributions to Detente.”128
While Romania had the peculiar distinction of being a member of the Soviet Union’s
Warsaw Pact and of having an independent foreign policy, things were different with
Bulgaria, the Soviets’ closest ally in the Balkans.
Naturally, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 CE, the Bulgarians
were very supportive, while Turkey strongly condemned the action. Turkey’s political
relations with the United States improved, facilitating the successful negotiation and the
spring 1980 signing of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. 129 Following the
Turkish military coup in September 1980, the Soviet media attacked the regime as being
125
repressive and all too willing to collaborate with the United States; yet state-to-state relations
remained correct and Turkish-Soviet trade increased. Turkish-Bulgarian relations were also
business as usual; when Turkey was under military rule, there were mutual visits of
Bulgarian president Todor Zhivkov and his Turkish counterpart, General Kenan Evren. With
the return of civilian rule to Turkey in 1983 by the Turgut Ozal was elected prime minister—
relations with the Soviet Union were slowly to improve, becoming quite good when Mikhail
Gorbachev came to power in 1985. 130 Although Bulgarian foreign policy under the
communists reflected that of the Soviet Union, such was not necessarily the case during
Gorbachev’s rule, especially regarding bilateral ties with Turkey.
Relations in last decade of Cold War
Even as early as December 1984, months before Gorbachev came to power, TurkishBulgarian relations were deteriorating as a result of the Bulgarian government’s treatment of
its Turkish population. Bulgaria began a campaign of forced assimilation of ethnic Turks,
which included name changes, prohibition of Islamic religious customs, the closing of
mosques, and the banning of Turkish music and traditional clothing as well as the use of the
language in public.131 When news of the Bulgarian actions reached Turkey in early 1985,
there were agitations in the Turkish media and public protests throughout the country.
Bulgarian authorities attempted to deflect accusations made from Turkey by pointing to
Turkish treatment of its Kurdish minority. 132 In January 1985, Turkey’s foreign minister
Vahit Halefoglu gave the following statement to the Turkish newspaper Milliyet:
We are working on this subject [of the Bulgarian Turks] at the highest level. We
are carefully following developments. We are making the necessary demarches.
We are expressing the anxiety we feel on account of the news reaching us. We are
saying that if the news is true, the events that are taking place will not have a
positive impact upon bilateral relations. . . . If there are problems, we want them to
be solved without allowing . . . bilateral relations to suffer from them. 133
The Bulgarians refused to discuss the issue of their ethnic Turkish population with Turkey, as
they regarded it as an internal matter. By August, Prime Minister Ozal declared in an
interview broadcast on the Voice of America, “There is no difference between the situation
in Bulgaria and the treatment of Turks there and the events that are taking place in South
Africa.”134
126
While domestic resistance to the campaign of assimilation continued after 1985, it did not
manifest itself again on a large scale until May 1989. Meanwhile, Turkish-Bulgarian relations
improved somewhat during that time. Indeed, in February 1988, on the eve of a Balkan
conference in Belgrade—the only such multilateral meeting since the one in Athens in 1976 and
one which also had Albanian participation—the Turkish foreign minister Mesut Yilmaz and his
Bulgarian
counterpart,
Petar
Mladenov
(1971-1989),
signed
a
protocol
on
“good
Neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation.” The agreement called for the establishment of joint
committees: one to deal with economics, trade, tourism, technology, transport, communication,
and culture and the other concerned with “humanitarian issues.” While the first made progress,
the second was plagued by Bulgarian unwillingness to discuss the plight of its ethnic Turks. 135
Also at the Belgrade conference, Turkey rejected Bulgarian, Romanian, and Greek calls for a
nuclear- and chemical-weapons-free zone in the Balkans that had Yugoslav and Albanian
support, as it felt that all European states had to be involved in such a decision. However, Turkey
was favorable to attending subsequent multilateral meetings with its Balkan Neighbours,
especially regarding economic matters, since it was in the process of détente with Greece. In
1990, there was another conference of Balkan foreign ministers held in Tirana, Albania, but the
breakup of Yugoslavia the following year brought an end to this so-called Balkan process.136
As for the plight of Bulgarian Turks and other Muslims, it would eventually take the ouster of
Bulgaria’s president Todor Zhivkov in November 1989 and legislation the following year before
they would be allowed to restore their names and to practice their faith and customs freely. Until
then, Turkey brought up the issue of Bulgaria’s treatment of ethnic Turks at international
conferences and in its diplomatic discussions with Western and Islamic countries as well as the
Soviet Union. Such moves did bring some action prior to Zhivkov’s ouster; Azeris in the Soviet
Union held demonstrations of sympathy for Bulgarian Turks, while the Soviets at the urging of
Turkey attempted to reconcile matters between it and Bulgaria, obviously deciding in the process
that Zhivkov had to be removed. Prior to the Bulgarian leader’s ouster, in May 1989, he expelled
some two thousand Bulgarian Turk activists and demanded that Turkey open its border; when
Ozal did so, about 310,000 Turks entered Turkey until August, when Turkey reestablished visa
requirements and, in effect, closed its frontier. As it was difficult to provide shelter for the masses
of immigrants, Turkey desired an agreement that would regulate their numbers. By January 1990,
with a changed political climate, some 130,000 of the immigrants returned to Bulgaria. 137
127
TURKO-ALBANIAN RELATIONS
Albania was the last nation in southeastern Europe to claim independence from the Ottoman
Empire, on 28 November 1912. To this day, relations between the two countries are stable,
with Turkey being one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo, and with polls showing that
Turks are one of the best-received ethnic groups in Albania. Turkey has about 1.3 million
citizens of full or partial Albanian descent, and most still feel a connection to Albania. There
is also a strong Turkish minority in Kosovo, a country which is predominantly Albanian. The
bond between these two nations stems from historical reasons, especially since many
Albanians embraced Islam, the official religion of the Ottoman Empire.
Importance of Albania in European politics
As we know that, territorial boundaries are one of the most important factors in international
relations for a country, because it is one of the permanent elements beside a nation’s culture,
history and population. Greater attention is often given to the economy, technology and
military capacity for the bilateral relations. As a result of all the above factors, countries use
politics like capable actors in international area. A century of shifting borders has left ethnic
Albanians scattered across Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Greece. Due to its
strategic geo-political position, Albania, is seen as an interesting and different country of the
Balkans. This is firstly because of its continuous efforts to achieve unity among its
population divided by three different religions, two separate dialects and also a path of
history full of typical Balcan conflicts. In the late 80s, the dramatic political changes in East
European countries and also in Albania attracted the world’s public attention towards the
Balkans. These conflicts that originated in the Balkan Peninsula jeopardized the steps taken
by European Union (EU) for its further enlargement.
Religious diversity of Albania
Besides the Albania’s strategic position, the second important factor that made Albania vital
was its religious diversity. Although the majority of the people are Muslims, there is also a
part of population that belongs to the Catholic and Orthodox Christian religion. This mix in
religion has created the colourful diversity. Albania’s international relations are well
128
balanced. While maintaining a cordial relationship with NATO and EU, Albania has also
succeeded in developing good relations with Moscow and the Islamic countries. In other
words, with the collapse of the communist era, Albania begun a new era, in her foreign
policy. After a long isolationist policy, Albanian government tried to create a democratic
society and establish bilateral/multilateral relations with the other countries and international
organizations. Due to its geographical position as a Balkanic country, Albania is trying to
shape her policy by harmonizing the different nationalisms that have become stronger in the
peninsula by preserving the verity of cultures and religions while intensifying efforts in
becoming a EU member. After the Albanian integration to NATO, the integration to the EU
is not only a political necessity, but also a moral duty that follows the whole of Albania’s
national interest.
Table 1: Albania’s Religious Structure138
Religion
Muslim
Orthodox
Catholic
The Rate of Total Population (%)
70
20
10
Problem of ethnicity
The problems in the Balkans are various but the most crucial one is the different ethnicities.
Among ethnic Albanians are two major subgroups: the Gegs, who generally occupy the area
north of the Shkumbin River, and the Tosks, most of whom live south of the river. The Gegs
account for slightly more than half of the resident Albanian population. Ethnic Albanians are
estimated to account for 90 percent of the population. Therefore the first and foremost task is
to ensure their own regional security without the intervention of the international community.
Balkan security has been sustained with the increasing cooperation between Europe and
USA.139
Background in the Pre-Cold War Period
Efforts for constructing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Albania started in 1920s.
Soon after the declaration of Turkish Republic diplomatic relations between Turkey and
129
Albania constructed. In December 1923 eternal friendship Treaty was signed. This Treaty in
fact encompassed of Treaty for Constructing Diplomatic Relations, Treaty for Consular
Issues and Citizenship Agreement. Also this Treaty was a clear proclamation of rooted
historical ties and sharing of a common past between Albanian and Turkish societies. At the
time of signing this treaty Albania was governed by liberal powers. But after the coup of
Zogu Albania was entered into a dictatorship regime backed by Yugoslavia. As Rakibi
argues modern Albanian state emerged under the governance of King Zogu. King Zogu
achieved to establish centralized state and institutions over the Albanian territories. 140
It was hard to define Albania as a ‘state’ until that time. He reformed military, education and
other bureaucratic institutions according to the western models. Zogu’s 14 years long reign
ended in 1939 when Italy invaded and occupied the country. King Zogu fled to Greece and
then to Britain. With the beginning of World War II, Italy considered Albania as a bridge for
military expansion towards the Balkans and Italy’s invasions under Mussolini had been
expanded to the Adriatic region. 141 Albania during the WW II was first occupied by Italian
and then by German forces which installed puppet governments. Italian occupation of
Albania had been an important lesson also for Turkish foreign policy makers. Turkey during
the WW II was trying to keep its neutral stand. But proximity of Axis powers by expansion
towards Balkan and Mediterranean states raised security concerns for Turkey. Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sukru Saracoglu mentioned about the threat emerged with the Italian
occupation of Albania and he stated about Turkey’s decision to take a side with the Allied
Powers.142 During the beginning of the war in the Axis camp Mussolini was playing the
major role in Balkan politics. The German diplomats reiterated that they had no political
purposes in the Balkan region. Thus until 1940 they gave priority to Italian interests. Turkey
chose to cooperate with the Allied powers and attempted to maintain the status quo. The
main concern of the Turkish government was the Soviet Union at that time. 143
Turko-Albanian relation under Hoxha
In December 1945 general elections was resulted with the victory of Albanian Communist
Party and in 1946 constructive parliament declared the Albania People’s Republic. Hoxha
became the head of the government and Albania entered into the sui generis communist
dictatorship regime under the Hoxha until his death in 1985. However USA and other
130
Western states refused to recognize this election and considered the communist government
as illegitimate.144
During the Cold War, Turkey followed a foreign policy towards Balkans that maintains
status quo in the region. Within this framework Turkish policy towards Albania was no
exception. Nevertheless Turkey did not neglected importance of Albania’s sustainability for
the peaceful coexistence in the Balkan region. During Balkan Entente meetings Yugoslavia,
Greece and Turkey emphasized this view although Albania did not join to the meetings of
Balkan Pact in the beginning. When Yugoslavian aims toward Albania increased more and
dependency of Albania to Yugoslavian aids was signaling the threat of loosing sovereignty of
Albanian state. Hoxha looked for an alternative ally, and decided to took part on the side of
China in ideological differences between Sino and Soviet bloc.
With no land boundary, astonishingly, relations between both countries have been very
positive and steady during Enver Hoxha’s dictatorship, especially in 1965 when Albania felt
threatened by Yugoslavia, it heavily depended on allied countries like Turkey. Albania’s
relations with Turkey greatly improved especially after the Sino – Albanian split of 1978,
when Enver Hoxha was cautious to open his country with the rest of the world and
stubbornly ignored repeated invitations from the United States and other western European
democratic governments to re-establish diplomatic ties and strengthen his country’s
economy. In the decade of 1960’s, Turkish Albanian relations further intensified with
reciprocal official visits, academic interchange programs, as well as the signing of various
cultural and trade agreements.
In a polarized world, members of different blocs Turkey and Albania did not have tensions in
their limited relations. This was a result of common historical past shared by these two
nations. Turkey’s considered Albania as a friend and brother country and there are millions
of Albanian people living in Turkey with peaceful coexistence. 145 One of the turning points
in the relations between Turkey and Albania was Albanian vote for Turkey in the UN
meeting considering the Cyprus issue in 1965. This gesture had contributed much for the
development of relations between Turkey and Albania. After this event some official visits
begun and trade agreements signed bilaterally.
131
In 1968 the chairman of the Turkish National Assembly, Mr. Ferruh Bozbeyli visited
Albania, where he met with the communist leadership and discussed ways of how to further
improve Ankara’s ties with communist leadership of Tirana. In the 1980s relations continued
to be steady and Turkey considers Albania as a true ally in the Balkans, whose strong ties
with Ankara are rooted in the centuries old common history, cultural tradition and above all,
the formation of Albanian Diaspora to Turkey between 1946 and 1966, with their number
reaching more than 240.000 emigrants of Albanian origin who are now believed to be
Turkish citizens. According to recent reports, it is estimated that Turkey has about 4.8
million citizens with an Albanian background. 146
Turko-Albanian relation in 1980s
After Hoxha’s death his successor Ramiz Alia became the President of Albania. He declared
the continuity of the socialist regime in the country and insisted on his commitment to legacy
and principles of Hoxha. Between the years 1985 and 1989 Alia could not implement radical
political reforms according to the grand developments in international arena. Alia legalized
investments of some foreign firms and tried to establish diplomatic relations with the
Western states. Starting from mid-1980s, the Eastern bloc was facing great transformations in
political, economic and social realms. These winds of change inevitably started to effect
Balkan states. Under these conditions a meeting of foreign ministers of the Balkan countries
was held in February 1988 in Belgrade. Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey and
Yugoslavia were represented in the meeting. Main goal of the meeting was to prepare the
ground for rapprochement among the Balkan states. Meetings paved the way for signing
agreements in fields such as trade, economy, culture, transport. Regional cooperation had
been increased mainly because of common security concerns of the Balkan states. Several
meetings were held at different levels and the whole process is known as the Balkan
Multilateral Cooperation Process. 147
In 1988, Alia welcomed the Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz in Tirana, who was one
of the few members of the Turkish government to visit Tirana since the founding of Albanian
Republic in January, 1946.148 This visit could be considered as a milestone in relations
between Tirana and Ankara since it was the first contact at this level since the Communists
came to power in Albania. The official visit of minister Yilmaz, gave a new dimension to
132
Ankara’s bilateral relations with Tirana and further strengthened the ties of partnership which
at that time consisted only in political, cultural and diplomatic relations. Yilmaz commented
on the Turko-Albanian relations and declared that “no political problems” existed between
these two countries.149
Alia at first tried to manipulate the society by claiming that ongoing transformations would
strength Albanian communist regime. But rapid domestic and international changes were
indicating clearly that Albania could not remain as the sole communist regime in Europe.
Alia responded to domestic pressures by implementing some reforms. He granted Albanian
citizens the right to travel abroad and limited the powers of the Sigurimi, allowed religious
freedom, and adopted some free-market measures for the economy. 150
As Albania was at the edge of throwing behind the iron curtain and entering in a new chapter,
that of becoming a vibrant democracy in the region, the geo-strategic interests of Turkey took
a different dimension and were rekindled according to the new post-cold war era that was
sweeping Europe. Turkey’s foreign policy proactively became involved and addressed the
region’s salient challenges, therefore making it obvious that it would become an emerging
regional player and a leading contributor to Albania’s pressing need in constant economic
assistance. Ankara’s newly formed strategy towards South Eastern Europe was aimed to
reduce and counterbalance the role of Greece and Bulgaria in the territories between the
Adriatic and the Black Sea. Such a forward looking vision immediately paid off and Turkey
secured a privileged position in Albania’s Foreign Policy strategy which indeed at that time
was revising its bilateral relations with Neighbouring countries. Turkish Foreign Policy in the
Balkans was significantly influenced by Turkish President Halil Turgut Ozal who took a
tremendous advantage of Albania’s weak economy and its state of extreme poverty.
President Ozal announced in 1991, the approval of a Turkish loan of 13.87 Million USD
wired through Exim Bank to Albanian government. This was the first loan given to
democratic Albania by any country and the agreement was signed off by Albanian Deputy
Prime Minister Shkelqim Cani.151
A New Beginning in Defense Cooperation
In June 1991 Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel visited Albania and signed an
agreement of bilateral friendship and cooperation with his counterparts. In April 9th, 1992
133
Dr. Sali Berisha was elected as the first president of democratic Albania. 152 His election
helped to further reinvigorate Albanian – Turkish partnership which had received additional
support from the United States, the latter would further encourage strategic military relations
between both aforementioned countries. President Sali Berisha’s government was eager to
strengthen its ties, it had no time to lose. Albania moved promptly in order to develop a
stronger political, military and economic cooperation with Turkey.
Under the leadership of President Berisha, bilateral relations were intensified and the first
ministerial meeting of both governments was held in Ankara, on July 24th, 1992 in which the
two nations signed a comprehensive agreement on defense cooperation. According to the
Turkish Defense Minister Mr. Nevzat Ayaz “this agreement focused on broadening bilateral
cooperation, in the areas of military education and technology.” In his first official visit to
Turkey, Albanian Defense Minister, Safet Zhulali, was invited to visit Turkish military bases,
factories and command posts, which were open only to NATO officials. At this time Albania
was a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Minister Zhulali was perhaps
the only defense minister representing a non NATO member country to visit these sensitive
sites of Turkish armed forces. 153
Almost a month later, on August 28th, 1992, the Turkish Gearing Class destroyer, TCG
Maresal Fevzi Cakmak, paid a visit to the Albanian port of Durres, the first visit of a Turkish
naval ship since the Ottoman Empire. 154 In November 18th, Albanian ministry of Defense
was visited by high ranking Turkish generals, who discussed a long range of military issues
with their Albanian colleagues. Defense cooperation between Albania and Turkey would find
an enormous support by NATO Alliance. Indeed, in the 1990s Turkey would play a
tremendous role to help consolidate the democratic institutions of Albania, in addition to
strengthening bilateral defense cooperation under the frame work of NATO alliance. Albania
emerged as a key component of Turkey’s geopolitical strategy in South Eastern Europe and
the latter would use Albanian territory to monitor the new military developments and arsenal
improvements of its traditional rival, Greece. As Joseph Nye, former chairman of the U.S.
national intelligence Council rightfully affirmed in 1994 that “Albania had become one of the
pillars of stability in the Balkans.” The presence of Turkish military advisers, private
corporations and political support in Albania, would make Ankara become a regional player
134
that would try to complement a power vacuum that emerged after the disintegration of
USSR.155 Ankara’s strategic relations with Tirana, secured a fragile peace in the Balkans, and
prevented Albania from taking part in the regional conflicts of former Yugoslavia. Turkey
kept a consistent strategy towards Albania, and became involved in regional affairs only
when it was necessary.
Relations in 1990s
President Ozal’s real-politic and foreign policy approach continued to stay in place
throughout the 1990s; in fact it was a slightly different approach compared to Turkey’s
traditional foreign Policy in early years. Turkey pursued a high level of cautiousness on its
relations with Albania, its diplomatic alliances and actions persistently attempted to balance
the influences of other countries in the Balkans. Greece always was the main rival of
Turkey’s presence in Albania.156 Ozal had expressed an interest to sign a fifteen year
economic agreement with Albania that would cover a wide area of cooperation from
infrastructure projects to military assistance and growth of tourism industry.
Additionally, President Ozal convinced President Berisha to recognize the new independent
state of Macedonia (FYROM), with the conviction that improvement of relations between the
two countries would make the Balkans a more peaceful region. Tirana was later visited by
Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel who signed the strategic Agreement on
Friendship and Cooperation and assured his Albanian colleagues that Turkey was committed
to provide US$ 50 million in humanitarian and logistical assistance to Albania. In 1992,
Turkish government also granted US$ 29 million in the form of food, technology and
towards Albania’s economic revitalization efforts. In the same time, the two countries also
signed a public cooperation protocol. Albanian officials were eager to further strengthen a
multidimensional partnership with Turkey and came up with a list of items which had to be
addressed appropriately on their official meetings. Albanian officials noted the importance of
having a good coordination of bilateral agreements, and drawing a long term relationship
road map between both countries. Tirana’s concerns were addressed during President Ozal’s
visit in February 1993, in Albania and President Berisha’s visit to Turkey two months later.
135
Foreign Policy Association Expert, Marco Vicenzino, noted that: “Turkey’s historic growth
was inevitable, particularly when considering its physical size and population. The main
question was when Turkey would fulfill its natural leadership role in the region. Its time had
arrived. Now it must proceed responsibly…Turkey has been skillfully filling the void left by
other regional players.” Interestingly enough Turkey continues until today to provide an
exemplary leadership role in the region, always in concordance with NATO’s strategic plans
for Albania, even more so after April 1st, 2009 when Albania became a full member of
NATO. In the second half of 1990s, Turkey had further committed itself to provide a
monetary assistance to Albanian armed forces with more than 60 million USD. Turkey
continued to provide support to Albania in many levels and sectors, until Tirana would
become a full member of NATO.
Turko-Albanian relations: Role of OIC
The Organization of the Islamic Conference was established on 25 September 1969. OIC is
the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations which has 57
member states.157 Main goal of the organization is to safeguard and protect the interests of
the Muslim world and promote international peace. Turkey is a member of the Organization
since its establishment and Turkey sought to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with
Islamic States in the political, economic, cultural, scientific and social fields. 158
Based on the principles of respecting sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
each member state the OIC became a common platform for member states to promote, both
in domestic and international levels, good governance, democracy, human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. 159 Albania is the second greatest country with
majority of its population is Muslim after the Turkey in Balkan region. Also Albania is a
secular state as Turkey. It is a fact that most of the Albanians are indifferent to religion but
still membership to OIC was an advantageous political and economic movement for Albania.
Albania became member of OIC in 1992. In 1993 Albania received financial assistance from
Islamic Development Bank, a branch of OIC.
Albanians are highly sensitive to fundamentalist religious structures. Meaning of religion and
its implications could be more understandable by examining not only political but societal
136
perception of religion in Albania. After the end of communism in Albania legal ban over the
religious believers and practices was abolished. Many missioners find ways to spread their
religious ideas all over the country. European as well as Islamic ideas are rooted especially
among the Albanian youth. Although Turkey had not accepted a religious orientation in its
policy towards Balkans Turkey through Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs, supported
Muslims in the region by offering them scholarships at theology departments of Turkish
universities. Muslim Community of Albania, an independent institution that represents the
Sunni Muslims in Albania is also supported by granting religious education to students in
Turkey elected by the Community and by organizing common activities. 160
Turkey is also interested in the Bektashi Community in Albania which constitutes 20 percent
of the Muslim population in the country. In fact many of the leading Bektashi babas (leaders)
in Turkey were of Albanian origin. In 1925 Ataturk’s republican government banned all
religious orders and closed their tekkes161. Then dedebaba (the highest rank of Bektashi
leaders), Salih Nijazi Dede, left the Tekke of Haji Bektash in Turkey and in 1930 and were
moved to Albania.162
Turko-Albanian relations: Role of NATO
After the collapse of Warsaw Pact,163 Balkan countries faced drastic changes in the
established political balances. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia new states emerged
in the region along with the establishment of new democracies in existing ex-communist
states. At the Roma Summit in 1991 NATO took an initiative to form institutional
cooperation regarding the political and security issues between the Atlantic Alliance and the
countries of former Warsaw Treaty. NATO established NACC and Albania became member
of this Council in June 1992.164 Albania had been very enthusiastic to become member of
NATO. Albania hosted several NATO exercises within its territory and tried to participate in
many of the special force missions and activities abroad. Turkey welcomed efforts of Albania
and supported Albania’s membership to NATO. Albanian membership in NATO would
contribute to maintenance of peace and security in the region. One of the main tenets of
Turkish Balkan FP is to endure security in the region and thus Albanian membership to
NATO was an important step in achieving this FP goal of Turkey.
137
RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND CYPRUS
Indeed, Greek-Turkish relations have been marked by both antagonism and mistrust. To
rectify this antagonism and mistrust, a series of mediations had taken by various parties,
during or after crises.165 Also, the relations between Greeks and Turks were characterized by
mistrust, suspicion and threat perception. Which associated with the other side has grown day
to day. The national education system in Greece as well as Turkey, and the media played a
significant role in establishing mutual suspicion and prejudices among societies.
Only the short periods of interaction and cooperation in the beginning of the 1930s and after
the World War II were experienced. A spirit of reconciliation was reached in the beginning
of the 1930s, thanks to the efforts of Ataturk and Venizelos. This period was followed by the
détente period after the World War II when the two countries became the members of the
NATO, namely the Western Alliance. In those detente periods, there was a common
perceived threat which led to the rapprochement; Italy and the Soviet Union respectively.
Under the patronage of the US, Greece and Turkey became the important actors in
containment of the Soviet Union with their strategic location in the Southeastern Europe.
Greece and Turkey were enjoying the funds coming from the United States in the name of
ERP of Marshall Aid.166 The past rivalries were set aside under the umbrella of NATO until
the emergence of Cyprus issue in the middle of the 1950s. Here we like to discuss these
relations on the basis of chronological events that happened from 1945 to 1990s.
The Historical Legacy
Turkish-Greek relations have deep historical roots that directly affect how each side
perceives and relates to the other. These roots touch directly on important issues of national
identity.167 The Modern Greek state was born of a struggle against Ottoman rule. The Megali
Idea168- desired to unite Greeks in a common Greek state, was a driving force behind Greek
policy up until the early 20th century. Thus, Greece’s own independence and process of statebuilding have been closely tied to a struggle against Turkey. Similarly, the birth of the
modern Turkish state was closely associated with the War of Independence and the campaign
against Greece that ended with Ataturk’s expulsion of the Greek forces from Central and
Western Anatolia in 1922 and the subsequent exchange of populations in 1923–1924.169
138
Thus, both states link their existence and an important part of their identity to experiences
that are associated with negative images of the other side. This has served to reinforce a
sense of mutual mistrust that has complicated the resolution of exceptional differences. On
atypical occasions, however, Turkey and Greece have shown an ability to put aside their
differences and cooperate. The most important example of this capacity occurred during the
interwar period. Only eight years after Greece’s defeat at the hands of Turkey, Ataturk and
Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos signed the Ankara Agreement, resolving
outstanding issues left over from the earlier confrontation, such as property rights arising out
of the exchange of populations. This was followed by the conclusion of a formal Friendship
and Cooperation Treaty in 1933, which introduced a period of cordiality and cooperation that
lasted into the early postwar period. The onset of the Cold War and the threat posed by the
Soviet Union initially created strong incentives for both countries to put aside their
differences.
But beginning in the mid-1950s, relations became increasingly strained over the Cyprus
issue. The attempted coup against President Makarios of Cyprus by the Greek junta in July
1974 and the subsequent Turkish invasion of the island marked an important turning point in
relations. Thereafter, relations remained, until very recently, tense. In the last two decades of
20th century, there have been several attempts to overcome these difficulties and improve
relations. The most important was the meeting between Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in Davos in January 1988. 170 The two leaders
agreed to meet at least once a year, and to visit each other’s country. They also called for an
intensification of contacts. In an early gesture of goodwill, Turkey rescinded the 1964 decree
restricting the property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey. These moves led to a thaw in
bilateral relations. But the thaw proved short-lived due to lack of strong domestic support.
Neither leader sought to build bureaucratic and public support for the attempt at
reconciliation.
Relation after the event of 1955
After the end of the War, Greece and Turkey turned to the West, and more specifically to the
US for support. Announcement of the Truman Doctrine and substantial financial and military
aid helped stabilize pro-Western governments in both states and consolidate American
139
influence. In February 1952 both countries joined NATO after their initial request in 1950.
Acceptance by the alliance was made easier after the Korean War.
The move on behalf of Greece and Turkey was dictated not only by the Soviet threat, but by
domestic factors as well171. At the same time the heads of both state exchanged official visits
to gesture closer cooperation. Following the Soviet-Tito rift in 1953 Greece and Turkey
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Assistance with Yugoslavia 172. During an official visit of
the Greek Prime Minister to Ankara, he stated along with his counterpart that “... there is no
issue between the two countries that cannot be resolved in a friendly way.” As late as 1954
the Greek Prime Minister was declaring that “the Greek Turkish friendship cannot be
threatened or disturbed by the Cyprus question. 173“ Both countries were seen as “...Siamese
twins guarding the vital gates of warm water entry and exit into the Black Sea, and the soft
underbelly of the Soviet Union.”174
After 1955 Cyprus became the first issue to challenge alliance cohesion in the southeastern
flank. The struggle of the Greek Cypriot majority to connect itself with mainland Greeks
(enosis) was given forward motion by a strong desire for self-determination earlier than other
de-colonization trends which followed in the 1960s, a fact which inhibited early attempts for
internationalization through the UN. In January 1950 Archbishop Makarios had organized a
plebiscite in Greek Cypriot churches for or against union. 96% of eligible Greek Cypriot
voted for enosis175. The Greek government came under pressure from Makarios to clearly
support the Cypriot cause. Indicative of the mood in the security field of the time is a booklet
published after the Cyprus conflict of 1955 and attributed to Greek Foreign Minister Averoff.
It included a perception of possible Turkish military actions in the Aegean, with time
constraints set for the Greek reaction after a further Turkish provocation. It is important to
note some lines from the last paragraph of the booklet:
Since Greece’s honor would have been at stake, and as the military undertaking
against Constantinople would have been difficult, the Greek government would
have sought assistance from any party that might be interested to see Turkey
removed from the Straits176.
The same Foreign Minister suggested that a possible way out of the conflict was an exchange
of population between Turkish Cypriots and Constantinopolitan Greeks’177 proposition was
140
not of interest to the Turks, however, since their interest in Cyprus was and is strategic and
not demographic. Inter-communal killings began in 1956 and the Turkish side changed
strategies from anti-union to pro-partition178. Such a side saw a turning point in its Cyprus
policy after the Suez crisis. Cyprus was important but not sufficient for a successful Middle
Eastern policy. Realization of that fact alone allowed a British flexibility on the issue of
Cypriot independence179.
Relations after Crisis of 1963-1964
The 1963-1964 crisis cannot be understood without recounting the events which led to the
signing of the London and Zurich agreements. It was the product of an unworkable
constitutional structure created by those agreements and by the real conflict between Turkish
security interests and an independent Cypriot state. After 1955, EOKA, intensified its
struggle for independence. At the same time British officials proposed a series of plans that
were rejected by one or more of the parties. In 1958 after intense intra-communal fighting,
British interests could be well served by having sovereign bases and there was pressure on
Greece and Turkey to negotiate a Cyprus solution 180. As Couloumbis writes, “... what began
in 1954 as a British-Greek dispute over Cypriot self determination had been transformed by
1959 into a dangerous Greek Turkish bilateral dispute over the future of Cyprus.”181
Internationally there was increased tension in East-West relations after realization of Russian
ICBM capabilities (Sputnik). Regional tensions resurfaced and the Greek-Turkish conflict
entered a new era since economic and political reconstruction in both countries was well
under way182
Inter-communal violence in Cyprus in December 1963 reached a high point following a
proposal by the Cypriot President (Archbishop Makarios) to amend the constitution183. A
series of representations was made by the Turkish government to the Greek regarding
Cyprus. At the same time Turkish Cypriots prepared their own plans for reprisals in kind,
thus effectively opposing efforts from the mainland governments to scatter tensions184. The
first UNFICYP as established on the island in March 1964. When Turkish Foreign Ministry
announced that, Turkey was abrogating a 1930 agreement with Greece concerning the status
of ethnic Greeks in Turkey. Expulsions were conducted, and they were directly related to the
Cyprus crisis185 In April and May of the same year, Turkish Government introduced
141
measures that resulted in the Turkification of the Aegean islands of Imvros and Tenedos, whose
status was protected under the Lausanne Treaty. Greece did not reciprocate with the Muslim
minority in Thrace, but to balance the situation, initiated in July an agreement with Bulgaria to
settle some of the outstanding differences between the two nations. Since the Balkan wars,
Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish efforts in diplomacy aimed in belonging in the group of two
against the one186.
Relation after 1967
Turkey consented to a form of enosis in exchange for acquiring sovereign rights at a military
base in Cyprus, while the rest of the island had to be demilitarized. The Greek coup of 1967
brought a group of colonels to power in Athens and caused in Ankara a re-evaluation of foreign
policy. Even as the colonels submitted a proposal in September 1967 along the lines of the 1966
Protocol, a proposal similar to the Acheson plan, the Turkish side requested full partition or
return to the status described by the London and Zurich Agreements. Any understanding
achieved up to that time failed.
In November 1967, after the failed September talks, Colonel Grivas with the consent of the
colonels launched an attack on two Turkish Cypriot villages, following a minor incident. Turkish
reaction was immediate and included the threat of an invasion, conduct of over flights by the
Turkish Air Force and authorization by the Turkish National Assembly for the conduct of
military operations outside Turkey. The New York Times reported on 29 November 1967:
The Turks see the moment ripe to get back at the Greeks for all the injury and insult
they feel they have suffered in Cyprus since the US in effect prevented them for
invading after communal fighting in December, 1963. Now is the time, the Turks say,
for the security of their minority on the island to be assured for once and all, by
agreement if possible, by war if necessary.187
The sequence of Turkish reactions confirmed a model of characteristics in the Cyprus condition
which remained stable until 1974. Cyprus did not have complete sovereignty of the island, and
the question of how much territory was beyond its control was a question of quantitative and not
qualitative difference. The 1967 crisis according to some was a turning point in Cypriot history.
A period of disengagement from the affairs of the island by Greece and Turkey had started.
142
Relations in 1974-1976
The setting for the 1974 crisis was completed after the 1967 crisis with the removal of the
Greek contingent from Cyprus and the changes in the regional and international political
realities of the early 1970s. In March 1971 the Turkish armed forces intervened in Turkey
after a period of political unrest. The Athens junta attempted to approach the new Turkish
military government in an effort to resolve the Cyprus problem between the two military
regimes, but the problem did not solve.
In March 1974 inter-communal talks in Cyprus were discontinued. It is ironic that talks
between Turkish and Greek delegations on the constitutional future of Cyprus reached
agreement 36 hours before the Turkish invasion 188. The beginning of the 1974 crisis is
connected by many to the Makarios letter of 2 July 1974 to the Chief of Armed Forces,
Gizikis. The Archbishop requested the removal of all Greek officers serving in the National
Guard and the disbanding of the underground nationalistic organization supported by the
regime in Athens, after two attempts against his life and rumors of an upcoming coup. The
reply came in the 15 July coup against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion (20
July) in support of the Treaties of Guarantees (1960) 189. The Turkish side maintained that it
was conducting peace operations. Hostilities ended temporarily on the 22 nd after an alleged
threat by the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey 190. By that time the Turkish
armed forces were in control of a small portion of the island, which did not include all
Turkish Cypriot communities.
Relations at 1987
The 1987 Greek-Turkish crisis should be examined not only in its most acute phase of
imminent hostilities during the last days of March 1987, but rather as a comprehensive
example of Greek-Turkish relations. Domestic realities in both countries and international
pressures at many levels contributed both to the expansion and to the retraction of conflict.
Within the context of diplomatic initiatives preceding the crisis and the “Davos process” of
non-war resulting from it, one identifies most of the recurrent issues in our subject matter.
Still, an important question has not been answered, even if speculations abound. Why Greece
was dragged to the negotiating table and produced a “deplorable” paper, in the words of the
143
person who signed it, despite the advantageous diplomatic and military position it held at the
height of the crisis?
After coming to power in 1981, Papandreou pursued a pragmatic foreign policy despite more
inflexible ideological positions he had advised during his opposition years. Turkish writers
view his foreign policy as a strong departure from earlier Greek positions 191.Turkish Prime
Minister Ozal, after his coming to power in 1983, considered Greek-Turkish relations to hold
top priority. He announced a token withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern Cyprus and
lifted visa requirements for Greek visitors (March 31, 1994), among other measures, in an
effort to create an atmosphere of trust 192. For the US in particular, Stearns --a former
Ambassador to Greece-- argues that
Misunderstanding... is the result of the inclination of policymakers to treat Greece,
Turkey, and Cyprus as components of a strategic equation rather than as states with
long histories and military and diplomatic priorities based on regional concerns that
may or may not be compatible with the global strategy of the United States.
Approaching them in this way has induced a kind of tone deafness in US
policymaking and has led to serious miscalculations at critical moments. 193
Defense Policy and Relations
Turkey’s long standing military, political, economic and ideological identification
engagement in the west made the military leaders in danger to western influence and enabled
the west to adopt a policy of stress which was felt and responded to in the democratic
transition of Turkey, especially following the military intervention in 1980. The statement’s
validity, if true in 1950 or even in the early 1980s, should be re-examined today in view of
provocative Turkish military proposals regarding “gray areas” in the Aegean, the conduct of
negotiations with the US for continuing operations in Northern Iraq, and the resentful
statements for a preemptive attack against Cyprus. 194 As Chipman comments:
In the case of defense policy both Portugal and Turkey have succeeded... in
maintaining elite consensus and thus may reflect the still important influence the
military holds in the decision making process. In Turkey it remains the case that the
public is largely insulated from whatever debate on security policy takes place.195
144
For defense expenditures see Table 1. The arms race between the countries is de-stabilizing
for the region as a whole. Alliance partners have facilitated this buildup since the end of the
Cold War through cascading conventional arms.
Defence as % of GDP
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84
1995-89
1994
Greece
4.7
6.7
6.6
6.2
5.6
Turkey
3.4
4.4
4.0
3.3
4.1
NATO
-
-
4.6
4.7
3.3
per Capita expenditure
204 Greece
Greece/Turkey ($ 1985)
65 Turkey
Table 2: Defense expenditures of Greece, Turkey and NATO average as percentage of GDP.
(Source: NATO Handbook, Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995)
The Cyprus Conflict and Turko-Europe Relations
Turkey’s relations with Greece form an important part of Turkey’s broader agenda. The
conflict between the two countries has been a persistent threat to security in the Eastern
Mediterranean since the mid-1950s. During the Cold War, the differences between the two
countries threatened to break out into open conflict on several occasions.196 However, these
differences have taken on added importance since the end of the Cold War for several
reasons. First, the Aegean has been one of Europe’s most dangerous flashpoints. Second, the
Cyprus issue continues to exaggerate Greek-Turkish relations. Since 1974, the division of the
island has toughened, with little interaction between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot
communities.
Cyprus is a second major source of tension between Turkey and Greece. During the 1930s
and 1940s when Cyprus was under British rule, the fate of the Turkish Cypriots was not a
burning issue for the Turkish government. It became a major concern only in the 1950s when
the Greek Cypriots, supported by the Greek government, intensified their demands for enosis
(union with Greece) and the British government began considering relinquishing control over
the island. Although Turkey preferred a partition of the island (taksim), it agreed to
independence on the condition that the Turkish Cypriots would have the status of a
community with equal rights with the Greek community. From the Turkish point of view,
145
independence was a second-best solution. It was accepted because it prevented enosis and
provided important legal guarantees of equality for the Turkish Cypriot community. 197
Under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, 198 Turkey became one of the three guarantor powers
(along with Greece and Britain) of the island’s independence. This ensured Turkey a certain
degree of influence over developments on the island and gave Ankara the right to intervene,
either singularly or collectively, to reestablish the constitutional arrangements on the island if
they were violated. It was under the provisions of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee that Turkey
justified its invasion of the island in 1974. The 1960 constitutional arrangements, however,
proved unworkable and collapsed when President Makarios sought to amend the
Constitution.199 His changes would have relegated the Turkish Cypriots to the status of a
minority rather than a community with equal political rights with the Greek community.
This was unacceptable to both parties.
TRNC: European reactions
When anti-Turkish violence broke out in 1964, Turkey threatened to intervene. However,
Ankara was deterred from carrying out the threat by President Johnson’s blunt letter to
Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu warning that the United States and NATO could not
guarantee Turkey’s protection if a Turkish invasion provoked Soviet intervention. 200 Turkey
showed only lukewarm support for the Turkish Cypriots in the period 1965–1973. However,
Turkish policy hardened after the election of Bulent Ecevit as prime minister at the end of
1973. When the military junta in Athens sought to overthrow Makarios and install a proenosis extremist, Nicos Samson, as president, Ecevit ordered the invasion of the island.
However, Turkey invaded only after first requesting that Britain participate in the invasion
under the terms of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. When Britain refused to participate, Turkey
decided to act unilaterally. The 1974 invasion set the outlines for the conflict. It led to the
expulsion of 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and the division of the island into two
autonomous administrations, one Greek Cypriot, the other Turkish Cypriot. Since then,
Turkey has maintained 30,000 to 35,000 troops on the island. The Greek Cypriots regard the
troops as occupation troops. Turkey, however, see the troops as the main guarantee of the
rights of the Turkish Cypriots. From the Turkish perspective, the invasion “solved” the
Cyprus problem. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot part of the island declared itself an
146
independent state as the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC)—with Rauf Denktash as
its president.201
The TRNC is recognized only by Turkey and is economically and politically dependent upon
Ankara, which heavily subsidizes its economy. Although this subsidy imposes a substantial
economic burden on Turkey, Ankara has considered the political and strategic benefits worth
the economic costs. Turkey’s approach to Cyprus has undergone an important shift since the
mid-1990s. Before 1997, Turkey put primary emphasis in its Cyprus policy on the protection
of the Turkish Cypriot community on the island. For years Ecevit argued that Cyprus should
be seen not as a burden but as an important component of Turkey’s own security.202
Ankara sees Cyprus as a cornerstone of Turkish security and a key element of the defense of
Anatolia. Cyprus is also increasingly seen as important for the protection of Caspian oil that
is expected to flow through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and then be transported on to Europe.
Thus, Turkey wants to ensure that the island is not controlled by a hostile power, especially
Greece. Many Turks believe that, the best way to ensure that this does not happen is to keep
the island divided and maintain a strong military presence there. Turkey has reacted harshly
to efforts to change the military status quo such as the Greek Cypriot decision to acquire S300 missiles from Russia. Ankara threatened to use military force, if necessary, to prevent
the deployment of the missiles on Cyprus. 203
The crisis was finally defused when the Greek Cypriot government—under strong U.S. and
EU pressure—agreed to deploy the missiles on Crete rather than the Cypriot mainland.
However, the aggressive Turkish response to the initial threat to deploy the missiles on the
Cypriot mainland highlights the importance that Turkey attaches to maintaining the political
and military status quo on the island. Since the late 1990s, Turkey has taken steps to
strengthen its ties with the TRNC. In July 1997, Turkey and the TRNC issued a joint
statement expressing their determination to strengthen and deepen cooperation.
The
declaration called inter alia for the establishment of an Association Council, the creation of
an economic and financial union between the two states, the inclusion of the TRNC in
Turkey’s regional development master plan, and the improvement of transportation links
between Turkey and the TRNC.204
147
Turkey also began to include Turkish Cypriots in Turkish delegations and missions abroad.
At the same time, Turkey moved away from the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation that it
supported for nine years, insisting on the recognition of two separate states as a basis for any
solution. The passage of time, moreover, has led to a hardening of the status quo. At present,
a whole generation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots has grown up with virtually no contact
with one another. This situation is likely to grow worse with time, leading to even greater
estrangement and isolation between the two communities. In addition, the ethnic composition
of the TRNC is changing. As a result of the massive influx of new settlers from the Turkish
mainland and the emigration of educated Turkish Cypriots, the proportion of Turkish
Cypriots in the TRNC is declining. Today, Turkish Cypriots make up only about 60 percent
of the TRNC’s population. If the economic situation in the TRNC continues to deteriorate,
their number is likely to further decline, as more and more Turkish Cypriots—especially
educated ones—emigrate because they cannot find jobs.
RELATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA
A Brief History of Yugoslavia
It is better to sketch a short summary of the historical highlights of former Yugoslavia since
some sort of a background is absolutely necessary to understand the depth of the conflicts in
the region. In the Appendix-B of this thesis (Map no. 11, p. 464), there is a map of 1991
Yugoslavia, showing its location on the Adriatic Sea; it’s Neighbours: Austria, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania; and the division of Yugoslavia into six Republics:
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, with the
two autonomous provinces within Serbia, Kosovo 205 and Vojvodina. The existing Slav tribes
arrived in the Balkans from Persia (what is now Iran), but were assimilated by the Slavs in
the 6th and 7th centuries.206 They were split up in the “Great Schism in Christianity”, when the
Serbs in the southern and eastern areas became Orthodox Christian, while South Slavs in the
northern areas, the Croats and Slovenes, became Catholic. 207 The presence of Islam, of
course, is due to the Ottoman Empires’ five hundred years reign and the Muslim population
which grew over time due to shifting loyalties between the people, especially in Bosnia.208
John V.A. Fine notes:
148
The Ottomans extended toleration to people of the Book (Jews and Christians) and
divided the population into communities under their respective religious heads, which
eventually came to be called millets. The Catholics as an empire-wide body did not
get a millet, but the Bosnian Franciscans received a charter to operate and thus on a
local scale enjoyed the privileges of a millet which increased over time as more and
more Bosnians came to staff the local Franciscan operation. The Franciscans were to
be the only Catholic clergy operating in Bosnia for the whole post-1340 medieval and
subsequent Ottoman periods.209
An important occurrence and epic defeat for the Serbs in Yugoslavian history was the
Ottoman victory at Kosovo Polje (Blackbird’s Field) in 1389, which caused Serbia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina to be controlled by the Ottoman Empire, while the Croatian and Slovene
peoples were under the Hapsburg rule. 210
This battle and the death of Prince Lazar were to become the symbolic focus of Serbian
political history transcending to modern times to show that Slavic Muslims and Serbs are
ancient and fated enemies.211 Throughout the seventeenth century, the various Hapsburg
emperors strengthened their defensive strip to protect against Ottoman expansion into
Europe. As well, the Serbs also distrusted Rome, as indicated by Misha Glenny in his words,
“Suspicion of Rome was a mighty force within the Serbian Orthodox Church,... the
relationship between so many Serbs and Croats can perhaps trace its roots back a long way,
but its flowering has been a relatively recent development.”212
Serbian nationalism became a force during the nineteenth century, with their effort to claim
independence as the Ottoman Empire slowly dissolved. Leslie Benson notes:
The divide between Christianity and Islam, in one sense so fundamental to the
structure of Bosnian Society, was not related in any simple way to social and political
cleavages. A Muslim population monopolized wealth and power, ruling over a
servile Christian populace composed predominantly of Orthodox sharecropping
peasants. But most Muslims were small-holding peasants, not big landowners, and
shared the hardships of their Christian Neighbours in lean years.213
149
Conflicts between all factions continued for the next fifty years, until May 1913, when
Ottoman power ceased to exist and the Serbs reclaimed their former lands. Unfortunately, a
sad credit to Yugoslavian history is the fact that in 1914 World War I was triggered by the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb in Sarajevo. The history of
internal division continued developing within Yugoslavia through various civil conflicts, and
in March 1941, Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact with Italy, Japan and Germany, as well
as Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria to enter into World War II. Leslie Benson notes that the
Yugoslavs killed far less of the Axis occupiers than they did each other; that the “guerilla
war was a sideshow”; and that the end of World War II allowed the Communist Party to
seize power “thanks to Stalin’s patronage”.214
After forty years of discussion since the end of the war, it was finally determined that
approximately 1 million of 16 million Yugoslavs were killed, but questions still remain about
“who suffered most at whose hands”.215 The Serbian ‘Chetniks’ versus the Partizans216, the
Croatian ‘Ustasha’, and the Bosnian and Slav Muslims and their rumored SS division, or at
least of their Nazi or fundamentalist influence, 217 were brutally pitted not only against Jews
and others, but also against each other. In 1945, Josef Tito assumed power, and assumed the
role of President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1948 until his death in
1980. Power was very important to Tito and even though many Yugoslavs had died in World
War II, Tito himself killed an estimated 250,000 people in “mass shootings, forced death
marches and concentration camps in the period 1945-1946.”218 Stalin’s anti-religious
influence over Yugoslavia remained in place after Tito assumed power in 1945, with
especially harsh sanctions on the Muslim population. Surprisingly, Noel Malcolm states:
. . .the drive for recognition of the Muslims as a nation in the late 1960’s and 1970’s
was not an Islamic religious movement. On the contrary, it was led by Communists
and other secularized Muslims who wanted the Muslim identity in Bosnia to develop
into something more definitely nonreligious.219
All the details are far too complex to be explored in this place, but suffice it to say that there
is a long history in Yugoslavia based on the premise that whenever a leader felt the need to
exploit an certain ethnic group or religion, it was done. Slobodan Milosevic (1941-2006), a
politician from Yugoslavia’s Socialist Party, manipulated his way into the Yugoslav
presidency in 1989 and became associated with Serbian nationalism. Milosevic and his allies
150
were interested in personal enrichment and power, and they used nationalist fervor for their
own ends. However, under Milosevic’s tenure, Yugoslavia, especially Serbia, became
internationally isolated. 220
The breakup of Yugoslavia after the end of Cold War ended and the wars that followed were
the result of political figures “grappling for economic and political domain” in a series of
power struggles. As Rogel notes:
Yet both the breakup and the war have often been portrayed in terms quite removed
from the very real factor of politics. This is partly because the leaders themselves
wished to mask their motives, and partly because they needed popular support that
could be mobilized only by evoking nationalist and religious causes.
Outside
observers, including journalists and representatives of foreign governments,
frequently accepted such explanations for Yugoslavia’s tragedy without much
questioning. Some did so out of naivete, others because the area was exotic to them
and because such cultures, in their view, seemed to be governed by inexplicable, nonrational forces.221
Historically, there has been a long multicultural tradition where religious and ethnic
differences were not reasons for hostility. 222 Despite sanction attempts by the UN, the VanceOwen Peace Plan, and other attempts at international intervention, Yugoslavia continued to
dissolve, with Milosevic manipulating the people and the truth, and promoting the brutal
crisis in Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement authorized a federal state consisting of two main
entities, the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation, a new constitution, human
rights protection, a plan for the return of refugees and economic reconstruction, and
international troops to maintain peace. 223
By the time, the war finally came to Kosovo and Serbia with NATO’s seventy-eight day
bombing campaign in the spring of 1999, President Milosevic was being compared in the
media as another Hitler for the atrocities committed under his leadership. After NATO
started bombing, hundreds of thousands of Albanians fled to Montenegro. NATO justified its
humanitarian intervention on the premise that had emerged during the conflict in Bosnia:
Military intervention against sovereign states is legitimate if it prevents or halts the abuse of
human rights by a state against it own citizens... Humanitarian considerations alone may
justify war.224
151
The Yugoslav civil wars had been especially brutal, contradictory, and complex. All sides
committed atrocities against the others, but most brutal were the actions of the Serbs.
Yugoslavia today is rebuilding, with different dynamics and levels of rebuilding occurring in
the different states. Leadership and religion and history still play a factor in the psyche of the
people. However, despite the long history of conflict, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo
were not due to Yugoslavia’s conflictual nature alone, as many people have suggested as an
explanation for what happened in Bosnia and Kosovo. Zlatko Isakovic notes:
The problem is that there is a lack of tolerance and protection for some religious
minority rights: those who are in a dominant or ruling position do not care for the
religious identification of those who do not support and follow them, even in cases
when it is a matter of family traditions, national identification, beliefs, etc.225
The Main Players of conflict
Bitter conflicts between Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Slovenes, Hungarians, and Albanians
summarize the players in these conflicts. The intensity of Yugoslavia’s ethnic strife, well
before the outbreak of war in 1991, was reflected in the existence of independent military
organizations throughout the country. According to Huntington:
In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and
family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and
institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones. . . . In the former
Yugoslavia, Russia back Serbia, Germany promotes Catholic Croatia, Muslim
countries rally to the support of the Bosnian government, and the Serbs fight
Croatians, Bosnian Muslims, and Albanian Muslims. Overall, the Balkans have once
again been Balkanized along religious lines.226
Historically Bosnia had been set up as a buffer state between Serbs and Croats, but with its
diverse population and industrial importance Milosevic and others created the political and
economic impetus for conflict. Ethnic nationalism also began to assert itself elsewhere in
Yugoslavia: Slovenians, Croats, Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo Albanians all
wanted independence, most Serbs and Montenegrins in Serbia and other republics wanted to
remain part of Yugoslavia.
152
The Muslim population came to include both the people who continued to practice Islam and
those who did not but considered themselves a Muslim by ancestry or by virtue of culture
and ethnicity.227 The conflicts simply increased Muslim recognition and identification within
the Yugoslav nation, as well as their identity with the worldwide Islamic Ummah.228
Huntington’s portrayal of Islam is that Islam is too self-contained to adjust to any modernity
or democracy. This image fails to acknowledge the divisions that which exist within Islam,
exaggerates the degree to which ‘fundamentalist’ forces symbolize Islamic societies, and
miscalculates the degree of inconsistency in the Muslim world, as it is seen in Bosnia and
Kosovo. Huntington focuses only on interacting of Islam with other civilizations in conflict
rather than in peaceful interchange. Similar to Islam in Indonesia or in some African
countries, the Muslim population in Bosnia and Kosovo has its own “spin” on Islam.
Christian Moe and Ahmet Alibasi note that contemporary Islam in Bosnia can be divided into
a “mainstream” and a “new fringe.” Saudi Arabia and the High Saudi Committee as well as
Iran funded the Bosniaks during the war. 229
Since the end of the Yugoslav war, Saudi Arabia has been increasingly active in Bosnia,
helping to build new mosques to replace those destroyed in the war, and trying to “put their
stamp on Bosnian Muslims” who do not want their brand of Islam. 230 The Bosniaks gravitate
more toward Sufism rather than Wahhabism231 or Salafism232. As was noted, prior to the war,
many Bosniaks weren’t the most religious people and didn’t necessarily define themselves as
such. However, those with the Orientalist view and many nationalist Serbs feared that the
Muslims were trying to recreate the Ottoman Empire. 233 It is highly unlikely that the Muslim
Community will be swayed by any one interpretation of Islam.
The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia
The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) came to an end in late June 1991,
that is, when the Federal Army launched an attack on Slovenia.234 However, the very first
ostensible sign of the disintegration was the breakup of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia when the Party’s collapse became irreversible following the interruption of the
14th Extraordinary Congress held in January 1990 as the Slovenian delegates walked out.
This suspension ratified the dissolution of the League of the Communists into independent
republic parties.235 Slovenian and Croatian independence had been declared only two days
153
before the Federal Army launched its frontal attack in June 1991. The example of Slovenia
and Croatia was followed by Bosnia for full independence. In January 1992, Slovenia and
Croatia finally received international recognition. Thereafter, the Serbs already started the
campaign of creating enclaves in Bosnia before the Bosnians declared independence in
October 1991 which suggested that the Serb war in Bosnia was not provoked but was
planned.236 In April 1992, Bosnia was recognized as an independent state and the Serb
paramilitary forces conducted an operation upon which between 50,000 and 100,000
Bosnians came in the streets to protest.237
The Serb chauvinists go to Serbia and all the Croat chauvinists go to Croatia, and stated that
they wanted to remain in Bosnia together and to keep Bosnia intact, the demonstration was
interrupted with automatic weapon fires. However, these bursts of gunfire had already
happened before more than a week in the Bosnian towns of Banja, Luka and Mostar.238
Although the observations regarding the causes and the backdrop of the war vary in their
degree of content, they mostly describe the common points that laid the basis for the crisis.
There were at least three significant developments that altered the prospects of Bosnia’s
political leaders:
First, the Federal Army changed its mission in the latter half of 1991 from defending the
Yugoslav ideals to acting as an agent of Greater Serbian nationalism. Second, the 1991 war
in Croatia strengthened national extremist sentiments among Bosnian Serbs. Finally,
although the international community voiced their lofty principles, their actions worked to
create a maneuver space for the Serbs to move on with their plans. 239 In similar vein, it has
been argued that viewed in retrospect, it is seen that the genuine causes of Bosnia’s
destruction came from outside Bosnia in two forms: first as the political strategy of the
Serbian leadership and then in the form of the miscomprehension of the Western leaders. 240
Turkey’s respond to the conflicts in Yugoslavia
When Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991, Turkey was worried about the
peace and stability in the region. It opposed the secession of the Yugoslav republics and was
mainly relying on the European Community and the UN to find a proper solution for the
crisis. When at the beginning of 1992, European countries and the US recognize
154
independence of these two countries, Turkey decided to follow. But when the question of
Bosnia and Herzegovina came out, especially after the war in Bosnia broke, Turkey decided
to take more active and assertive role in this matter. Even though Bosnian War did not pose a
direct threat to the security of Turkey, it did become an important issue of the “soft security”
mainly through the question of identity and migration 241. Significant number of Bosnian
Muslims flew to Turkey and together with a great number of Turkish citizens with the
Balkan origin created a pressure on Turkish policymakers to provide greater support for the
Muslim population in Bosnia and its independence. For Turkey it was also an opportunity to
confirm its relevance for the European security and its affiliation to its long lasting allies.
Turkey started diplomatically engaging on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims in international
organization. It organized a special meeting dedicated to the conflict in the Organization of
the Islamic Conference during Turkey’s presidency. It also presenting its own “Action Plan”
for Bosnia to the UN Security Council and participated in the London Conference in August
1992 organized by the EC regarding the situation in the Balkans 242. In November 1992
Turkey organized a Balkan Conference for Neighbouring and regional countries regarding
the conflict. Since these initiatives didn’t give any significant results, Turkey decided, in
spite of the UN embargo, to support Bosnian Muslims with arms. Turkey also participated in
establishing no fly zone by NATO and participated with its troops in the UNPROFOR
stationed in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav wars. Even though
Turkey showed great interest and bilateral activity in the issue, it was strongly supporting
multilateral approach and closely cooperating with its main Western ally, the US, in
responding to issues in the Balkans 243.
After the epidemic of the conflict in Kosovo, Turkey pursued a more cautious and restrained
policy than in the case of the Bosnian War. One of the reasons for that was the presence of a
big Turkish minority in Kosovo244 that feared of greater repression from Albanian majority.
Turkey showed less bilateral interest in this issue but complied with its strategic partners and
participated in the NATO’s air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, so as in the UN
peacekeeping forces in the Kosovo afterwards. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and conflict in
the Balkans brought back the Turkish-Greek rivalry over the influence in the region, which
also had important effect on the level of Turkish activism in the Balkans. Turkey showed a
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great support for Macedonian independence and was second country to recognize Macedonia
in 1992 and the first one to open an embassy in Skopje 245.
It was the Bosnian War, which made Turkey to become more active player in the region.
Still, Turkey firmly stimulated multilateral solutions and was careful in balancing its bilateral
activism with other powers interests, staying always in the line with the US approach.
European countries and especially the US feared of greater involvement of radical Muslim
communities and countries in the Bosnian War, especially from Iran. Support that was
provided for Bosniaks from a moderate Muslim country like Turkey was perceived as much
better option. For that reason, cooperation in the case of Bosnia was beneficial for all sides
and by that strengthening of their alliance was for sure one of the motives for Turkey’s
activism246.
RELATION WITH CROATIA
Historical relations between Croatia and Turkey were defined by competing visions of
national interest and of what constitutes an acceptable international order. By contrast, today
there is a common view that the European Union and NATO are the anchors of peace and
stability on the European continent and beyond. The structure of understanding and
diplomatic relations between this two countries has developed through economic and trade
measures. As the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman (r. 1990-1999), said during the Turkish
President, Suleyman Demirel’s last visit to Croatia,
Croatia and Turkey neighbour the turbulent Balkans. Even though our two countries
have different geographic and strategic positions, and belong to different cultural
spheres, our bilateral relations are nevertheless very developed. We enjoy such a
degree of mutual understanding that both Turkey and Croatia are able to contribute to
resolving complex problems in the Balkans, particularly in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.247
Despite certain cultural and historical differences, Croatia and Turkey have found a common
understanding that has been based on dialogue, trade and good diplomatic relations. Turkey
is clearly anchored in Europe, and has been a constructive power in two turbulent areas of the
world. Turkey’s cultural similarity and sense of moral responsibility in Bosnia-Herzegovina
is understandable in the light of historical experience. Relations with Croatia are also
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grounded historically. Take for example President Demirel’s statement to a joint session of
the Croatian Parliament in 1994:
Historically our people share heritage and geography. History is born through mutual
ties and cultural influences. It is therefore natural that our countries nurture the
feeling of respect, love and friendship for each other. If to this already favourable
climate we add modern possibilities and joint will, I believe that we shall promote
Turkish-Croatian friendship and cooperation very soon.248
In addition to the common Turkish and Croatian European orientation and values, Croatia’s
interests in developing closer ties with Turkey is also prompted by Croatia’s concern about
certain regional approaches, ill-thought out, such as the proposals to form a Balkan
association or ‘Euroslavia’ on the ashes of former Yugoslavia. Policy makers have to
understand that the predictable, irreversible and not deplorable—except in terms of the
avoidable violence—dissolution of former Yugoslavia has created the opportunity for laying
the foundations of a stable and durable international order in Central and Southeastern
Europe. Countries like Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have made a conscious
decision to become part of Western institutions, namely NATO and the European Union.
This is not the case with other countries from the former Yugoslavia. Croatia believes that
European stability and security can only be fully achieved if NATO and the European Union
expand eastward. Revitalizing the transatlantic community and extending the ideas, values
and institutions that underpin Western civilization are the formidable challenges that Europe
and the United States face. Turkey has a clear understanding of this historic opportunity and
has itself made a similar transition following the end of the First World War.
Clash of Civilization and Role of Turkey
Turkey’s role in Southeastern Europe has become more important since the collapse of
communism and the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. Turkey responded to the crisis and
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a constructive approach that helped to heal the wounds
between Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Turkey supported Croatia’s efforts to bring Bosnian
Croats and Muslims closer together, through the establishment of the Federation of BosniaHerzegovina within the framework of the Washington Agreements. In addition, Croatia,
Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina developed a system of tri-lateralism to further their
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relations. This helped to guide Bosnia-Herzegovina closer to achieve independence as well as
closer to establish a peaceful Europe.
Turkey’s role in stabilizing Southeastern Europe can be characterized as responsible and
conducive to strengthening the foundations of a new international order in the region. During
the worst days of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were clear signs that the war
could have become broader, drawing in not only neighbouring countries, but also the major
powers. This phenomenon can be explained by Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘clash of
civilizations’ thesis. Huntington’s argument, of course, is that one of the central sources of
conflict in the world in the conceivable future are the tensions arising out of the competing
civilizations that clash at key points across the globe. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, one can
witnessed the clash of three civilizations: Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam and Western
Christianity. Yet, Turkey played an instrumental role in mitigating the tensions between these
three civilizations because of its historical experience in the region and its understanding that
international affairs should be based on universally recognized standards and values. Turkey
has been an example of a responsible, secular democracy in a turbulent region. It has pursued
policies that have strengthened European stability and the stability of the Middle East.
Although conflict is endemic in international affairs, particular wars or conflicts are
avoidable. Returning to the potential clash of civilizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey
understood that the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina lies in close relations with Croatia and
Europe. Turkey’s own role and experience with European institutions, values and standards
were crucial in bringing Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks together.
An Evaluation of Turkey’s Policies towards the Neighbours
It can be argued that a number of factors have played important roles in the formulation and
implementation of Turkey’s Balkan policies, which can be summarized as follows:
(i)minority issues and Turkey’s Balkan legacy; (ii) instability and conflicts in the region; (iii)
the geo-strategic importance of the Balkans for Turkey; (iv) the commonly observed
misinterpretations of Western politicians of the realities of the region, especially in crises,
and (v) the need to incorporate the Balkan states into Euro – Atlantic structures. In general,
Cognizant of the possibility of
population influx to Turkey particularly at times of crises,
Ankara’s Balkan policy in respect of the minority question is based on preserving the
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acquired rights and status of Turkish minorities in the region as well as promoting their
integration into political and economic life in the countries they live in, and hence the
importance of averting instability and conflicts in the region arises. Furthermore, the region
is of geostrategic importance for Ankara due to the increased importance to handle relations
with abundant number of states after the regime changes in the region and the wars in former
Yugoslavia. With a view to establishing and bolstering ties, Ankara, in the first place, tried to
put the relations on track with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and to normalize its relations
with the newly emerged states. In this regard, it also paid due attention by opting for
multilateral initiatives, bilateral contacts, as well as regional cooperation platforms. On the
other hand, Ankara’s policies towards the region also have to do with its cognizance of the
region. Due to her historical legacy and geographical and cultural proximity to the Balkans,
Turkey has always had pre-cognizance of the region which the Western states lacked. his
very cognizance has in due course enabled Turkey formulate policies which were more wellworked than those of its Western counterparts, one example of which was the Ankara’s
proposed Action Plan as early as in August 1992 submitted to the UN Security Council. The
final NATO policy through the end of the war in 1995 was this Turkish Action Plan in
essence. Finally, Ankara also acknowledges the importance of assisting the regional states in
their efforts of integration into Euro–Atlantic structures. It self being a NATO member,
Turkey can make significant contributions in this regard. In such a framework, Ankara has
been influential in establishment of security and stability which came forth as a vital issue
after the war in Bosnia. Its policies were also based preventing any regional state to become a
hegemonic power in the Balkans. Moreover, it refused any rhetoric that suggested Ankara
was a part of the Muslim-Christian polarization by trying to play a constructive role between
the West and Islamic countries. Thus Ankara became influential in the efforts of providing
security and stability in the region after the Cold War. 249
TURKO- ITALY RELATION
Turko-Italian relations continued to develop after the unification of Italy in1870 CE, but
deteriorated when Italy attacked Tripoli in 1911. The lack of intervention by the Ottoman
Empire already engaged in the Balkans War left Tripoli and the Twelve Islands under Italian
rule. Italy, which was among the foreign powers that invaded Anatolia following the First
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World War, relinquished the places it held in Anatolia in June 1921. Thus, Italy became the
first country among the powers that intended to share the Anatolian territory after the First
World War, to establish friendly relations with Turkey. The establishment of friendly
relations between Turkey and Italy at the end of the Liberation War under was initiated by
the dynamic leadership of Ataturk. The two peoples began to know each other better and
remember their numerous resemblances more than their differences. 250
The presence in Rome of a representative of the Turkish Government in addition to the
Ottoman Embassy during the Liberation War, contributed greatly to the start of future
friendly relations. The crew of an Italian vessel anchored in the harbor followed the funeral
ceremony of Ataturk when he died on 10 November 1938 in Istanbul. One of the main
reforms achieved by Ataturk was the abrogation of the Shari’ah Law and the adoption of
secular legislation and in this framework, the Italian Criminal Law was chosen as a reference
for the Turkish Criminal Law details of which have been discussed in Chapter II of this
thesis.
Besides the difficulties encountered in the period between the signing of the Lausanne Treaty
and the Second World War due to the policies of Mussolini and in the last period due to the
terrorist KKP leader Abdullah Ocalan, the relations between Turkey and Italy have been
carried out based on mutual understanding and national interests without important problems.
Hence it would not be wrong to state that the Italian people know to search for friendship
instead of hostility in history, just like the Turkish people.
Today Turkey and Italy are two regional powers that share common interests, common
history and common values in the Mediterranean basin. In this respect, it would be
appropriate to define Turkish-Italian bilateral relations as a strategic partnership. Turkey and
Italy work together to find solutions to regional and global issue as well. From Afghanistan
to Lebanon the two countries cooperate with a view to bringing peace and stability to a vast
geography. Italy is currently Turkey’s fourth biggest trade partner. Current field of
cooperation include energy, defense industry, tourism, infrastructure, automotive and
chemicals; but there is still a great potential develop economic and commercial relations.
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As a founding member of the EU, Italy supports Turkey’s membership to the EU. It is widely
agreed in Italy that as an important and reliable regional power, Turkey will make important
contribution to the EU and help the Union to become a true global power. There are three
important platforms that make it possible to exchange views regarding various dimensions of
Turkish-Italy intergovernmental Summits, Turkish-Italian Forum and Turkish-Italian Media
Forum. Turkish-Italy bilateral trade volume increased to 21.3 billion Dollars in 2011.
Nowadays, more than 900 Italian firms are operating in Turkey in various sectors such as
transportation, banking, telecommunication, construction, electronics and pharmaceuticals.
And nearly 50 Turkish companies are operating in Italy. 251
TURKO-GERMAN RELATION
During World War II, Turkey maintained diplomatic relations with Germany until August
1944. The non-aggression pact was signed on 18 June 1941. In October 1941, the “Clodius
Agreement” (named after the German negotiator, Dr. Karl Clodius) was achieved, whereby
Turkey would export up 45,000 tons of chromite ore to Germany in 1941-1942, and 90,000
tons of the mineral in each of 1943 and 1944, contingent on Germany’s supplies of military
equipment to Turkey. The Germans provided as many as 117 railway locomotives and 1,250
freight rail cars to transport the ore. In an attempt to prevent the supply of this strategic
mineral to Germany, the United States and Britain went on a spree of what was termed
“preclusive buying,” buying out Turkish chromite even if they did not need so much of it. As
a part of the “package deal,” the Anglo-Americans bought Turkish dried fruit and tobacco as
well.252 In August 1944, the Soviet Army entered Bulgaria and cut overland contact between
Turkey and the Axis powers. Turkey severed its diplomatic and commercial relations with
Germany, and on February 23, 1945, declared war on Germany.
Turks were slow to conclude that Hitler’s Germany was, indeed, on its deathbed. They
feared, that one squadron of German bombers would set [Istanbul] on fire and destroy it from
end to end. Turkish fears reflected both the city’s real vulnerability-narrow streets, wooden
homes, no antiaircraft defense-and a deception promoted by the Abwehr.
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The Germans played on these concerns in order to ensure that Turkey did not come into the
war against them. They warned that German bombers would destroy Istanbul if Turkey
joined the Allies. British aerial reconnaissance of Bulgarian airfields showed that the
Germans had few planes left and that the Abwehr exaggerated the figures on its air power
which it gave to Turkish military attaches in Sofia. When British intelligence tried to explain
to Turkish generals that the Germans were incapable of such attacks, however, the Turks
assumed that the British were trying to fool them. While von Papen fought a temporarily
successful holding action, the Turks were becoming convinced that Germany had lost the
war. Consequently, they cooperated more with the Allies.
The British worked hard, with Churchill meeting Inonu for some personal persuasion-to
convince Ankara to join the winning side. But the Turks were reluctant to do anything until
they received huge amounts of military equipment, far beyond what the Allies could supply.
Railroad trains full of Turkish chrome continued to clatter across the Turkish border toward
the Reich’s factories.253
Turkish Diaspora and Relation
With an estimated number of at least 2.1 million Turks in Germany, they form the largest
ethnic minority. The vast majority are found in Western Germany. Based on good TurkishGerman relations from the 19th century onwards, Germany promoted a Turkish immigration
to Germany. However, large scale didn’t occur until the 20th century. Germany suffered an
acute labor shortage after World War II and, in 1961; the Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany) officially invited Turkish workers to Germany to fill in this void,
particularly to work in the factories that helped fuel Germany’s economic miracle. The
German authorities named these people Gastarbeiter (German for guest workers). Most
Turks in Germany trace their ancestry to Central and Eastern Anatolia. Today, Turks are
Germany’s largest ethnic minority and form most of Germany’s Muslim minority.
Characteristics
The German state does not keep statistics on ethnicity but, subsequently, categorizes ethnic
groups originating from Turkey as being of Turkish national origin. This has the consequence
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of ethnic minorities from Turkey living in Germany being referred to as “Turks”. However,
about one-fourth to one-fifth254 of Turkish nationals are ethnic Kurds (amounting to some
350,000).255 Furthermore, the number of ethnic Turks who have immigrated to Germany
from Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, the Republic of Macedonia, Romania and other traditional
areas of Turkish settlement which were once part of the Ottoman territories in Europe are
unknown as these Turkish minorities are categorized by their citizenship rather than their
Turkish ethnicity. These populations, which have different nationalities, share the same
ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious origins as Turkish nationals. 256 Turkish populations
in various states of Germany are as follows:
Number of
% of State
% of Turks in
Turks
population
Germany257
1,100,000
6.0
32.0
Baden-Wurttemberg
600,000
5.5
17.0
Bavaria
450,000
3.5
11.0
Hessen
400,000
6.5
8.0
Berlin
300,000
8.5
8.5
Lower Saxony
250,000
3.0
6.5
Rheinland-Palatinate
130,000
3.0
3.5
Hamburg
120,000
6.5
3.5
Schleswig-Holstein
60,000
2.0
2.0
Bremen
60,000
7.0
1.5
Neue Lander (former East Germany)
30,000
0.3
1.0
Saarland
25,000
2.5
1.0
3,500,000
4.5
100.0
State
North Rhine-Westphalia
Total
Table- 3: Turkish populations in various states of Germany
Germany and Turkey have held strong economic ties with one another throughout time.
Machinery, electrical goods and motor vehicles and supply parts for the automobile industry
account for a particularly large portion of German exports to Turkey. Textiles/leather goods
and food, and increasingly motor vehicles and electronic goods, are the principal German
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imports from Turkey. At present, companies owned by Turksih businessmen in Germany
employ approximately 200 thousand people. The annual turnover of these companies has
reached 45 billion marks. More than three millions German tourists visit Turkey annually.
More than 4000 German companies are active in Turkey. Germany has turned out to be the
number one partner of Turkey in fields such as foreign trade, financial and technical
cooperation, tourism and defense industry.
TURKO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Background of Turko-Soviet Relations
Soviet Union became one of the first counties to recognize Turkey. The Soviet Union
considered the Turkish War of Independence (see map no. 18, Appendix- B, p.472) as an act
against western imperialism and as the awakening of the Muslim people.258 Accordingly, the
cooperation and establishment of good relations was important both for Turkey and the
Soviet Union. The Russian aim was to impose a communist regime in Turkey and to prevent
the latter to reach an agreement with the Western powers. This policy constituted the core of
the Russian policy towards Turkey between1919-1923. The relations between Turkey and the
Soviet Union are based on three agreements signed in the first years of the Turkish Republic.
The l92l Friendship Agreement between Turkey and the Soviet Russia, which was ratified on
22 September 7921, was the basis of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Most of
the future agreements were to refer to this agreement as it was the case in the1950s when the
Soviet Union wanted to improve and recover relations with Turkey. The Friendship and
Neutrality Agreement signed in 1925 was renew in 1929, l93l and 1935 and by referring to
that agreement Turkey got the support of the Soviet Union in negotiations with the UK
concerning Mosul.259
On 24 July 1923 The Lausanne Treaty was signed replacing the Sevres Treaty and
recognizing Turkey as an independent state. The Soviet Union did not participate in the
conference from the beginning because of the British hostility to the soviet regime.
Accordingly the Soviet Union and Bulgaria attended to the consultations only on issues
regarding the rule and control of the Turkish Straits. 260 The Soviet Union argued that national
independence of Turkey should be respected and it should be the only sovereign state at the
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Turkish Straits. This required the closure of the Turkish Strais to all warships and provided
that they should be opens to all merchant ships without discrimination. On 4 December 1922,
the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs said that “soviet Russia was ready to sign any
agreement concerning the Straits so long as it secured Turkey’s independence, did not
discriminate against any state, and guaranteed free commerce”.261
The Soviet Union, forgetting its imperialist ambition of reaching the Mediterranean, wanted
to close the Turkish Straits to the warships. The change in the Russian attitude was in fact the
result of the Russian desire of peace and to be protected against any possible attack on the
southern parts of the country.262 Nonetheless, the terms of the agreement changed thirteen
years later since the role of the League of Nations to provide the security of the Turkish
Straits made Turkey to feel insecure since any decision in the League of Nations needed the
unanimity of votes. 263
In 1939, the President of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin (r.1922-1952) presented, the Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoglu, the Soviet proposal for the review of the Montreaux
Convention264 and the establishment of co-sovereignty at the Turkish Straits. Turkey rejected
the proposal and declared that such agreements as it had been the case for the Treaty of
Hunkar Iskelesi would not be accepted. 265 On the contrary, Turkey accepted the AngloFrench proposal for the establishment of a trilateral military alliance on 19 October 1939,
which supposes to help the other if there is a war at Mediterranean. 266 Nonetheless, the
alliance did not force Turkey, to act against the Soviet Union. When the Germans and the
Soviet Union made an alliance on 23 August 1939, the cooperation between Turkey and the
Soviet Union came to an end. The relations worsened when the Soviet Union wanted to
revise the Montreaux Convention and to annex the Turkish territory in Eastern Anatolia, such
as the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, at the end of the World War II.
In course of war Turkey, though did not enter the war, let the German battleships to pass
through the Turkish Straits and this act was protested by the Soviet Union between 19411944 at least for four times. Turkey, believing that Germany would be the winner of the war
and Hitler would keep his promises, let the ships to pass through and arrested, them only
after it declared war against Germany in 1945. Under these conditions, during the Yalta
Conference, Stalin (r.1922-1952) asked for the renewal of the Montreaux Convention.
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Though other parties in the conference not applauded this idea, Roosevelt stated that the
change might be rational. Even Turkey’s declaration of war against the Germany and Japan
on 23 February 1945 to join the San Francisco Conference did not satisfy the Soviet Union.
Turkish-Soviet Relations during Cold War Period
On 07 August 1946 and on 24-25 September 1946 the Soviet Union sent Turkey two
diplomatic notes concerning the control of the Turkish Straits.267 In the first note the Soviet
Union stated that Turkey does not use its authority over the Turkish Straits in a good way. 268
The second memorandum had similar concerns and demands from Turkey. The Soviet Union
asked for talks between Turkey, the US, the Great Britain and the Soviet Union; but, Turkey
rejected the Russian demands. The Great Britain and the US were also unhappy with these
Soviet notes. The US sent a counter note the Soviet Union on 09 October 1946 and made its
worries clear.269 The British Minister of Foreign Affairs Bevin, stated in his speech to the
parliament that giving abuse to Russians at the Turkish Straits would be against the sovereign
rights of Turkey putting Turkey under the sovereignty of another power and additionally the
rights of other powers concerned about the Turkish Straits would also be harmed. 270 The
Soviet Union, being a typical land power because of its geographic location, thought that it
was secure in defensive terms; but when talking about the offensive means the Soviet Union
was aware of its weakness. This forced the Soviet Union to take two offensive attacks first at
the beginning of the Cold War and at the end of it.
In 1947, the Great Britain declared that it could no more afford the military and economic
aids given to Turkey and Greece. The US offered to fill the gap in the region and on 12
March 1947 the American Congress ratified the Truman Doctrine providing Turkey and
Greece with military and economic aid. The main aim of the Truman Doctrine was to prevent
the Russian expansionism and to expand the American understanding of politics and
economics. So, the Truman Doctrine forced Turkey to establish close ties with the West and
to join political, military and economic organizations established by the Western powers.271
Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952 was not an exception despite the oppositions at the
beginning. In these years Soviet Union blamed Turkey for being a country which ‘had lost its
independence, had become Marshallized, a colony of Wall Street and a base for the capitalist
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aggression against the Fatherland of Socialism’ and these beliefs began to change only after
Stalin’s death in March 1953.272 Deployment of Jupiter Missiles on the Turkish territory in
1961 increased the tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union. 273 In a letter to Turkey, the
Soviet Union stated that “Turkey by allowing the use of its territory against its Neighbours
put itself into danger” and restated the Russian will for the establishment of good relations
and trade with Turkey.274 The Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (r.1950-1960),
replied to this letter by stating that deployment of missiles should be considered as a
defensive act.275
Between 1960 and 1980 the relations of Turkey and the Soviet Union developed as a result of
the question of Cyprus and the worsening relations with the West. 1960s was a turning point
in Cold War relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. In 1963, a Turkish delegate
went to Moscow and met the President of Soviet Union Khruschev (r.1953-1964). In this
meeting, Khruschev expressed the Russian will to improve and establish friendly relations
with Turkey and declared that Stalin’s policy toward Turkey should be changed.276
Nonetheless, among the NATO members Turkey was the only state that could not improve
relations with the Soviet Union.277
Between 1965 and 1979 Turkey and the Soviet Union held high level diplomatic visits,
signed agreements and Turkey accepted the Russian economic aid. 278 Turkish intervention to
Cyprus had also been effective in relations but it was not a determinant. The Soviet Union
supported the first intervention; but opposed the second intervention arguing that the problem
should be solved in international arena. 279 The Soviet Union was careful however, not to
speak against the Turkish intervention and at all times emphasized the importance of the
independence and integrity of the island, and the equal rights of two nations on the island.
Besides, the US’s attitude toward Turkey, the Johnson letter and the US’s arms embargo
caused improvement in relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The US arms
embargo on Turkey played a vital role to develop relations and beginning from 1976 the
relations developed also in the military field. In 1978 Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit went to
Moscow and during his visit three agreements were signed between Turkey and the Soviet
Union. One of the agreements was political, the other was cultural and the third one was
concerning the limitation of continental shelf of the Black Sea. It was expected that the US
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embargo would bring Turkey and the Soviet Union closer but this did not happen at least for
three reasons as mentioned below:280
a) First of all the Soviet Union did not support Turkey in second intervention to Cyprus.
b) Secondly, nationalist political parties in Turkey were against the establishment of
close ties with the Soviet Union and
c) Lastly, activation of the US bases on Turkey causing the Russian intervention to
Afghanistan prevented establishment of further relations. 281
In the field of economics, there were important developments too. Beginning from1967
Turkey began to get credits and aid from the Soviet Union. On 25 March 1967 The
Economic-Technological Agreement was signed and provided the resources for the
establishment of seven industrial units in Turkey.282 On 09 January 1975 The Second
Economic-Technological Agreement was signed and provided an industrial investment
costing seven thousand dollars.283 Until the establishment of Intergovernmental Joint
Commission in l976 the economic relations were conducted on the basis of economic
relations. Economic relations reached its peak in 1979 when Turkey and the Soviet Union
signed an agreement providing Turkey eight billion dollars aid and credit for the construction
of a thermal power plant and for the improvement of refineries. In 1981 the overall amount
of Soviet credits to Turkey provided since 1967 was 972,610,000 dollars and Turkey was one
of the countries who were able to get both the US and the Soviet Union aid in Cold War
years.284
Despite the fact that developments in the Soviet domestic politics provided an opportunity
for Turkey and the Soviet Union to further develop relations it is not wrong to say that the
relations between1980-1983 were relatively calm. The Soviet intervention into Afghanistan
and the military intervention in turkey played an important role in this. The Soviet
intervention to Afghanistan forced Turkey to accept thousands of refugees. The new Turkish
government too, blamed the Soviet Union for the anarchy emerged in the country at the
beginning of 1980s. Nonetheless, in line with the argument of the thesis at a time where
political relations were not much promising, the amount of Turkish exports to the Soviet
Union’s reached a peak since 1924. Beginning from 1960s there has been an improvement in
relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union and the positive effects of this improvement
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was also observed in the field of politics in 1980s. 285 In that respect the Natural Gas
Agreement of the 1984 and the Trade Agreement signed in 1989 played a crucial role for the
future of the relations. Another important development in political relations has been the
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1991 during the official visit of President
Turgut Ozal to Moscow.
Turkish influence over the Former Soviet States
In spite of its cooperation agreement with the NATO alliance, Russia’s continuing nuclear
ability and the “superpower mentality of its foreign policy elite” breed tension over the extent
of Western influence.286 Part of the problem is a Russian leadership vacuum in which
political and military leaders have difficulty planning effectively. 287 One German foreign
policy expert observes that the whole region is unstable because Russia is “in a state of
disintegration. “The existing Russian economic decline, described by experts as a crisis in it,
adds to the uncertainty in the region, especially as it affects the former communist countries.
Terrorist bombings, kidnappings, and other forms of violence in the southern states of
Chechnya and Georgia reveal Russia’s southern borderlands as “exhausted and impoverished
by wars and lawlessness since the Soviet Union broke up.”288 During the Cold War, Russian
military presence in the Caucasus had been perceived as a threat by Turkey. So Turkey had
deployed a large amount of troops in eastern part of the country. With the end of the Cold
War, it was thought that Russian military presence on the Turkish border and the Caucasus
would be reduced if not diminished.289
TURKO-BRITISH RELATIONS
The UK was one of the first countries with which the Ottoman Empire established regular
diplomatic relations. The first Ambassador appointed by the UK to the Ottoman Empire,
William Harborne, assumed his duties in Istanbul in 1583 CE and Yusuf Agah Efendi
appointed as the Ottoman Ambassador to London in 1793. The two countries had a history,
marked with periods of friendly relations as well as periods of confrontation and war in
various alliances, prior to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The AngloTurkish relations since the establishment of the Turkish Republic had undergone signifıcant
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changes. There were a number of issues in Anglo-Turkish relations before 1959, which
continued to affect their relations in the period 1959-1965.
Strategic and Defence issues
During the 1920s, Britain strongly opposed to the new Turkish National Government in
Ankara during the period of the Liberation War (1919-1923) and did not recognize the new
Turkish administration until the Lausanne Peace Treaty that was signed after intensive
negotiations on July 24, 1923. After Lausanne, Turkey was preoccupied with domestic
affairs and was determined to cure her backwardness by means of rapid orientation towards
Western values. There were however number of unsettled points leftover from the Lausanne
Treaty. The Mosul dispute which concerned the British mandate administration in Iraq was
one of the more important problems that occupied the energy of the new Republic.
During the 1930s, British policy became less strained. On July 6, 1934, Ali Fethi Okyar,
close friend of M. Kemal, was appointed as the Turkish Ambassador to London, and in the
same year Sir Percy Loraine was appointed as a new British Ambassador to Ankara. These
were signifıcant points attesting to the shift in Anglo-Turkish relations from hostility to
alliance.
A new step was taken with the signing of the Balkan Entente on February 9, 1934 under the
leadership of Turkey and Greece, with the participation of Romania and Yugoslavia. The
Entente was supported by both Britain and France. It was obvious that the expansionist
policies of Italy and Germany were affecting the British and Turkish interests in the region.
Turkey also took the lead in the conclusion of the Sadabad Pact in July 1937 with Iran, Iraq
and Afghanistan, which created a new chain of indirect co-operation between Britain and
Turkey since Britain was involved as the mandatory power in Iraq. The Italian attack on
Ethiopia in 1935 caused similar concern in both countries.
German occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939 led Britain to take countermeasures. As a result Britain and France offered to protect Greece, Romania and Turkey
against German attack. However, Turkey proposed that this collaboration should take the
form of an alliance. The meeting between Britain, France and Turkey ended with the Turco170
British and Turco-French declarations of May 12, 1939 and June 23, 1939 respectively.
Finally the Turco- British-French Pact was signed on October 19, 1939.
During the war, Britain and Russia pressured Turkey to participate in the war on the Allied
side. Turkey’s involvement in the First World War, however, had produced tragic
consequences and there was an understandable reluctance to enter the second conflict. Thus
Turkey’s official reply was that its army and air force lacked equipment to perform the tasks,
which were demanded of them. Thus, after resisting to the end of the War, Turkey finally
declared war on Germany on February 23, 1945. Turkey’s decision was essentially aimed
fulfilling the pledge taken at the Yalta conference that is to qualify for the founding
membership of the United Nations. The confrontation with Britain during the war over
Turkish neutrality, however, led to a cool atmosphere afterwards.
Later on, Britain encouraged Turkey to lead the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.
The Pact was reorganized in 1959, after the revolution in Iraq and her withdrawal from the
pact, as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Both Britain and Turkey agreed for the
continuation of the Pact under the new framework. Cyprus became the main issue between
Britain and Turkey in the second half of the 1950s. Finally, Britain, Greece and Turkey as
well as the Turkish and Greek Cypriots themselves reached a consensus in 1959/60 on the
basis of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Cyprus Constitution of 1960. 290 During the 1950,
Turkey not only became the forward shield of the West, but also a champion of the Cold
War. The DP leaders continually expressed deep suspicion of the Soviets. They were not
receptive to the new policy of the post-Stalinist Soviet leaders who had denounced Stalin’s
expansionist policies and urged better relationship with Turkey.291
Between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s British diplomacy in Turkey
had slowly adjusted to peace and then settled down to business as usual. At the end of this
period, however, mounting concern in Britain about the balance of payments prompted two
further investigations into the diplomatic service to emphasize the need for it to achieve
significant economies and also to give much higher priority to commercial work.
171
US INFLUENCE ON TURKO-EUROPE RELATIONS
There have another peak in the discussion––the role of the Unite States292. The United States
has long advocated Turkey’s membership in the European Union, but its advocacy campaign
has not always been effective.293 The case can be made that the United States achieved major
progress toward this goal in 1999, when Turkey was granted candidate status after an intense
campaign by the Clinton administration. Turkish-EU relations became part of internal
European Union business rather than a foreign policy issue in the strictest sense.
Consequently, the emphasis the United States has traditionally placed on the strategic value
of EU enlargement to Turkey has become reductive for Europeans, who have focused on
other problematic issues, such as amalgamation capacity, domestic reform in Turkey, trade,
immigration, etc.
A second explanation, however, has less to do with the United States’ continued emphasis on
the strategic dimension of EU enlargement to Turkey, but with the way Washington has
framed and made this “strategic argument.” Not all Europeans were happy with the
traditional U.S. Atlanticist position, which argued that Turkey deserved “a seat in the
European Union on the grounds that Ankara has been a loyal NATO ally since the early
1950s.294
The Cold War and U.S. Interests
U.S. involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean was largely driven by the onset of the Cold
War.295 Prior to l945, the United States had no major interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
However, the expansion of Soviet power into Eastern Europe after the Second World War
and the fear that Greece and Turkey might be the next victims of Soviet aggression, led to the
decision by the Truman administration to provide political and military assistance to Greece
and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine in March l947 to help them resist Soviet subversion
and aggression and to the incorporation of Greece and Turkey into NATO in l952. This
period represented the heyday of U.S. influence in the region. Both Greece and Turkey were
willing to subordinate their national interests to U.S. and NATO policy in return for a
guarantee of U.S. protection against Soviet aggression. This period lasted roughly to about
1960. In the early 1960s, however, this coincidence of interests began to erode and U.S.
172
relations with both Greece and Turkey became marked by increasing friction and conflict.
Several factors contributed to this more conflictual relationship.
The first was the erosion of strict bipolarity and the onset of U.S.-Soviet detente. As long as
Greece and Turkey were primarily concerned about the danger of an attack or subversion by
the Soviet Union, they were willing to subordinate their national interests to the dictates of
Alliance solidarity. But once the fear of Soviet attack began to erode, Athens and Ankara
began to give national interests greater priority.
The second factor was the emergence of Cyprus as a bone of contention between Greece and
Turkey. For Greece and Turkey, important national interests were at stake. Each saw the
island as critical to larger ethnic and political goals. U.S. policy toward Cyprus, by contrast,
was dictated by strategic and Alliance considerations. Washington viewed the Cyprus issue
primarily through the prism of its geopolitical rivalry with the Soviet Union. The United
States had two main interests related to Cyprus: (1) preventing the Soviet Union from
expanding its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean; and (2) deterring an outbreak of a
conflict between Greece and Turkey that would weaken NATO’s cohesion. Indeed, as van
Coufoudakis has argued, there was a high degree of continuity in U.S. policy toward
Cyprus.296
Hence the U.S. sought to avoid any internationalization of the Cyprus issue - which would
have legitimized a Soviet role in any settlement - and tried to resolve the problem “within the
NATO family.” A prime example is the l964 Acheson Plan, which sought to resolve the
dispute through partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey. The plan was regarded
by Washington as an optimal solution. U.S. policy in the Cyprus crises in l963-64 and l974
should be seen against this broader strategic background. But U.S. efforts largely failed and
resulted in provoking serious strains with one or both allies. The infamous “Johnson letter”–
in which President Lyndon Johnson (r.1963-1969) warned Turkey that if Turkish military
action provoked a Soviet military intervention, the United States might not come to Turkey’s
aid, succeeded in forestalling a Turkish military intervention. However, it sparked a strong
anti-American reaction in Turkey and an effort by Turkey to diversify its foreign policy and
reduce its reliance on the United States. 297
173
The l974 Cyprus crisis caught the United States largely by surprise. The passive U.S.
response to the crisis is often attributed to the vacuum precipitated by the onset of the
Watergate scandal298 and the transfer of power from Richard Nixon (r.1969-1974) to Gerald
Ford (r.1974-1977). And certainly this was an important factor. However, some observers
have also suggested that the initial U.S. passivity reflected Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger’s belief that the Turkish military invasion would tip the balance in Turkey’s favor
and make negotiated solution favorable to U.S. and NATO interest easier. 299
The Cyprus issue of 1974 precipitated serious strains with both Greece and Turkey. When
negotiations failed and Turkey invaded Cyprus, Greece temporarily withdrew from the
military wing of NATO and U.S. relations with Greece seriously deteriorated. At the same
time, the arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the U.S. Congress caused the Demirel
government in Turkey to suspend U.S. use of some Turkish facilities and badly damaged
relations with Ankara. Since 1974, the United States has largely been content to let the
United Nations take the lead in trying to resolve the dispute and has played a supportive role
behind the scenes. On a few rare occasions the U.S. has departed from this largely passive
and supportive role to push actively for a Cyprus settlement. In the summer of l991, the
government of George Bush senior (r.1989-1993) tried to give the inter-communal talks new
impetus and for a brief moment it looked as if the administration’s effort might bear fruit.
But the effort failed and thereafter the United States reverted to its traditional supportive role.
The turmoil in the Balkans in the mid l990s galvanized the Clinton administration into
making a new push to try to resolve the dispute. However, the outbreak of the crisis between
Greece and Turkey over Imia/Kardak derailed these efforts. With the departure of Richard
Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, the architect of
the Dayton accords and the main advocate of a proactive attempt to resolve the Cyprus
problem, the U.S. effort to promote a Cyprus settlement lost momentum.
Changing U.S. Perspectives on Turkey
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had an important impact on
U.S. policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean. This was particularly true in the case of
Turkey. Contrary to the expectations - and fears - of many Turkish strategists, the collapse of
the Soviet Union did not diminish Turkey’s strategic importance in U.S. eyes but rather
174
enhanced it. Turkey was no longer seen in Washington as a bulwark against the expansion of
Soviet power into the Mediterranean but as an important strategic link to the Middle East and
Gulf. The 1990-91 Gulf War reinforced Turkey’s strategic importance in U.S. eyes. At the
same time, it contributed in important ways to many of the current difficulties in U.S. –
Turkish relations. U.S. and Turkish perceptions of the impact of the Gulf War differ
significantly. American officials tend to regard the war as a kind of “golden age” of U.S.Turkish cooperation. However, as Ian Lesser has noted, for many Turks the Gulf War is
“where the trouble started.”300 President Turgut Ozal saw the war as an opportunity to
demonstrate Turkey’s continued strategic importance and cement closer defense ties with the
United States. He hoped that his firm support for the U.S. military campaign against Iraq
would bring important foreign policy dividends in terms of strengthening the “strategic
partnership” with the United States and enhancing Turkey’s prospects for achieving
membership in the European Community.
However, Ozal’s expectations remained unfulfilled. The strategic partnership with the United
States never materialized. Ozal’s support of the United States also did little to advance
Turkey’s membership in the EU. Economically, Turkey paid a high price for its support of
the U.S. military campaign in terms of pipeline fees and lost trade. The financial losses
incurred by Turkey and the lack of tangible benefits from its support for the United States in
the Gulf War contributed to a growing perception in Ankara. In addition, the war marked a
major escalation of Turkey’s Kurdish problem. The establishment of a de facto Kurdish state
in northern Iraq under Western protection gave new momentum to Kurdish nationalism and
provided a logistical base for attacks on Turkish territory by PKK. Many Turks, in fact,
viewed U.S. support for the Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq as part of a conscious design to
support the emergence of an independent Kurdish state on Turkey’s southern border. Finally,
the Gulf War reinforced Turkish sensitivities regarding national sovereignty. President
Ozal’s willingness to allow the United States to use Turkish facilities to conduct sorties
against Iraq in the Gulf War has been the exception, not the rule. Generally speaking, the
Turks have been very wary of allowing the United States to use their facilities for non-NATO
contingencies. Ankara refused to allow the United States to launch offensive strikes aligned
with Baghdad, including during the l996 crisis over Iraqi operations in the North and during
Operation Desert Fox.
175
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER OZAL
Turgut Ozal was confirmed as President of Turkey on 9 November 1989, the very day the
Berlin Wall fell. That Ozal’s presidency so neatly coincided with the end of the Cold War
has greatly complicated the task of understanding whether the changes that occurred in
Turkish foreign policy in the early 1990s were the result of his personal commitment to a
more active, less traditionally Kemalist policy or were a result of the radically altered global
circumstances. Additionally, the image Ozal gained from confronting the power of the
military and challenging secularist and nationalist views on some social issues often cast an
ideological shadow over the interpretation of his foreign policy decisions.
Two motives are apparent in the way Turkey engaged the world under Ozal. First, Ozal
sought and exploited opportunities to advance Turkish interests directly by enhancing
Turkey’s regional influence and economic position. Second, Ozal sought to demonstrate
Turkey’s continued value to the U.S. and NATO, which he believed were still essential
partners for Turkey even with a lesser or diminishing Soviet threat. Thus, Ozal’s activism
was aimed at taking advantage of the new possibilities that the Soviet collapse had brought
while simultaneously minimizing the negative consequences that it might also bring. The
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) stands out as a prime example of Ozal’s desire to
seize new political and economic opportunities. Founded in 1992 at Ozal’s initiative, it was
an attempt to institutionalize a new and profitable relationship with countries that had almost
all previously been trapped behind the iron curtain. Similarly, in reaching out to the Turkic
republics of Central Asia, Ozal was making contact with an area that had previously been
off-limits to Turkish diplomacy. In both cases, there was a powerful economic incentive
driving Ozal’s policy. Ozal’s term as president saw the fruition of the economic reforms he
had instituted while prime minister. As a result, by the late 1980s, the Turkish economy was
not only increasingly dynamic, but also increasingly export-oriented and more deeply
integrated into the world economy. Ozal was quick to see that many of Turkey’s Neighbours
could serve as much needed markets for Turkish goods, and that enhancing political ties
would be the natural first step toward consolidating a profitable economic relationship. By
bringing a sizable delegation of businessmen along with him whenever he traveled abroad,
176
Ozal showed his commitment to putting Turkey’s regional relations in the service of its
economic interests.
At the same time, Ozal was eager to show that Turkey could contribute militarily to the
defense of what was then still being optimistically called the “new world order.” Seeing the
United Nations’ 1992-1993 involvement in Somalia as a chance to do this, Ozal successfully
pushed for Turkey to take a prominent role in the U.S.-led “Unified Task Force”. In other
cases, most notably his outreach to the new Turkic states of Central Asia, Ozal saw Turkey’s
direct and indirect interests as working in tandem. In the early 1990s, there was much talk of
Turkey serving as an emissary of the west in Turkic Eurasia. The Turks’ cultural
connections, it was suggested, would lay the foundation for the economic and political
connections that the U.S. in particular wanted to establish in the region. In this way, Turkey
would receive economic benefits for itself while simultaneously making itself invaluable to
the West.
The term “Ottomanism” or “neo-Ottomanism” has become closely associated with Ozal’s
active pursuit of foreign policy. When used in his own time, Ottomanism generally referred
to Ozal’s vision for a more inclusive and multicultural state. Ozal saw the Ottomans as
offering a historical example for incorporating Islamic and Kurdish identity into Turkish
political culture. He even drew parallels between the political structures of the Ottoman
Empire and the United States, emphasizing that both “allowed different cultures and gave
people freedom to exercise their religion, nationality and economic preferences.”301
As a term to describe Turkey’s new approach to relations with its Neighbours, NeoOttomanism was used both by Turkish writers like Cengiz Candar, for whom it had positive
connotations, and by writers from the Balkans and Middle East, for whom the Ottomans were
associated with imperial rule, not multicultural harmony. 302 While writers of both
persuasions contrasted neo-Ottomanism with the Kemalist tradition of neutrality and nonalignment, the term was not used at first to imply a particular focus on relations with Islamic
or the Middle Eastern countries.303
In defending his activist approach, Ozal contrasted it with what he saw as the overly
cautious, not to say timid, approach of past Turkish leaders. Unfairly, perhaps, he cited Ismet
177
Inonu’s policy of neutrality in World War II as one of the prime examples of this tendency.
Not content to conclude that his approach was the realistic one for the strong, secure country
that he led, while Inonu’s had been proper for its time, Ozal instead implied that their
different approaches were the product of different ideologies, not different circumstances.
Moreover, in claiming that his approach would not only serve contemporary Turkey better
but also would have served Turkey better in the past, he tried to wrap his ideology in a
mantle of timeless pragmatism.
Recognizing the degree of expediency in Turkish foreign policy throughout the Republic’s
history leads to several tentative conclusions which should give European and American leaders
cause for both optimism and concern. Whatever its rhetoric, no Turkish government will pursue
ties with any Middle Eastern state to the point of precipitating an irreconcilable breach with
America or Israel. In the case of Iran, security concerns over the potential consequences of the
country’s nuclear program will limit the extent of any potential rapprochement. More broadly,
the limited economic and military potential of the region as a whole precludes it from ever
becoming a serious strategic partner for Turkey. European leaders would be naive to expect that
Turkey’s Kemalist, “pro-Western” imperative will keep it on track towards EU membership in
the face of repeated rejection, but they should also realize that the economic and political benefits
of EU membership will continue to influence Turkish leaders from all ideological backgrounds.
American leaders would also be naive to expect that the election of a less Islamic-oriented
government will necessarily lead to improved U.S.-Turkish relations. Additionally, the focus on
the AKP’s ideology and Middle Eastern policy should not distract American leaders from
potentially greater long-term challenges, such as the rise of anti-Americanism among those in the
military and secular left. There is also the possibility that the increased democratization of
Turkish foreign policy at a time of widespread anti-Americanism will challenge the pragmatic
inclinations of Turkish leaders, as it did when it prevented them from allowing American troops
to use Turkish territory for the invasion of Iraq. From Turkey’s perspective, the most serious risk
is that foreign policy makers would actually allow their ideology to shape their decisions instead
of just their rhetoric. Given the strength of the historical precedent, though, and the fact that the
broad contours of Turkey’s current policy enjoy support from across the political spectrum, there
is ample reason to believe that the tradition of pragmatism will prevail.
178
1.
The Cold War was a sustained state of political and military tension between powers in
the Western Bloc (the United States, its NATO allies and others) and powers in
the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its allies in Warsaw Pact). Historians have not
fully agreed on the dates, but 1947–1991 is common. It was ‘cold’ because there was
no large-scale fighting directly between the two sides, although there were major
regional wars in Korea (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953), Vietnam (1 November 1955 –
30 April 1975), Afghanistan (December 1979 to February 1989) and First Persian Gulf
War (22 September 1980 – 20 August 1988) that the two sides supported.
2.
There are two basic variables shaping the foreign policy of a country; (i) structural
variables which are continuous and static as ‘geographical position, historical
experiences, cultural background, together with national stereotypes and images of
other nations, and long term economic necessities’, (ii) conjunctural variables which
changes under domestic and foreign developments and has temporary influence,
changes in decision-makers individually, non-permanent economic fluctuations. Further
see, Mustafa Aydin, ‘Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework
and Traditional Inputs’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.35, No.4, 1999, pp.155-156.
3.
Alexander Murinson, ‘The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol.42, No.6, November 2006, p. 945.
4.
March 1922, TBMM, Zabit Ceridesi, I. Donern, I, III. 1338, Vol. 1, pp. 4-5
(http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/biyog/tut1.htm)
5.
In all these laws, large scale or partial amendments were subsequently made in
accordance with the needs; and some were prepared once again.
6.
Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey, As a Pivotal State in the Muslim
World, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2008, p.19
7.
Yucel Bozdaglioglu, ‘Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy’, Insight Turkey,
Vol.10, No.1, 2008, pp.60-61
8.
Canan Balkir, Turkey Since 1970: Politics, Economics, and Society, Debbie Lovatt
(edited), Palgrave, New York, 2001, p. 195
9.
In this respect Fuller express that, ‘Decades of Kemalist-oriented history instruction
indoctrinated the country to think negatively about the Islamic world in general and the
Arab world in particular. Turks have been socialized to associate the Muslim world
only with backwardness and extremism. Yet these Turkish views are based more on
ideology and prejudice than on genuine knowledge of the area’. This negative
179
manipulation of domestic view of the neighborhood was ultimately been resulted in
perceptional deficiencies in decision-making mechanism with lack of strategic thought
in foreign policy formation. Fuller, op.cit., p.13
10. Tarik Oguzlu & Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in
Turkey: Who’s to Blame?’, Turkish Studies, Vol.10, No.4, December 2009, p. 579
11.
Graham E. Fuller, op. cit., p. 29
12.
Gareth Jenkins, Context and Circumstance: the Turkish Military and Politics, No: 337,
Adelphi Paper, IISS, 2001, pp.16-18.
13. Serif Mardin, ‘Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social
Science,’ in Sibel Bozdogan & Resat Kasaba, ed. Rethinking Modernity and National
Identity in Turkey, Washington, 1997, p.71.
14.
Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, I.B. Tauris & Co, 3rd Edition, New York,
2004, pp.186-195
15.
Mustafa Aydin, op. cit., p.156
16.
F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of
Uncertainty, Pittsburgh, RAND, 2003, pp.18-19
17. Cameron S Brown, ‘Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003’, Turkish Studies, Vol.8,
No.1, March 2007, pp.89-91
18.
Available
at,
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_0709/jung_
sevres/ jung_sevres.html
19.
Hatay Province is a province in southern Turkey, on the Mediterranean coast. It is
bordered by Syria to the south and east and the Turkish provinces of Adana and
Osmaniye to the north. The administrative capital is Antakya (Antioch), and the other
major city in the province is the port city of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). There are
border crossing points with Syria in the district of Yayladagı and at Cilvegozu in the
district of Reyhanli. Legitimacy over the province remains disputed with neighbouring
Syria, which claims that the province was separated from itself against the stipulations
of the French Mandate of Syria in the years following Syria’s independence from the
Ottoman Empire after World War I. Though the two countries have remained
generally peaceful in their dispute over the territory, Syria has never formally
renounced its rights to it.
20.
Brock Millman, ‘Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy, 1934-1942’, Middle Eastern
Studies, July 1995, Vol.31, No.3, pp.487-490
180
21.
Ibid, pp. 491-493.
22.
Usman Goni, Osmaniah(Ottoman) Khilafat of Turkey, (Bangla) Mollik Brothers,
Kolkata, 2006, p. 213
23.
Joint Middle East Plan Committee, A Study of Military Implications of House Joint
Resolution 117 for the Middle East Area, study prepared by the JCS, JCS 1887/363,
29 May 1957, 2768 as reprinted in Mercy Agnom, Defending the Upper Gulf:
Turkey’s Forgotten Partnership’, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 21, No.
1, pp. 87-88
24.
Usman Goni, op. cit.,
25.
The 1964 letter from Lyndon Johnson stated in part: ‘Furthermore, a military
intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet
Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to
consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union.
…’. See Documents, Middle East Journal, Summer 1966, p. 387
26.
The word was first used in a Turko-Iranian legend to refer the ‘land of the Turks’, and
popularized by the 20th century nationalist writer-poet Ziya Gokalp.
27.
Graham E. Fuller, Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World, in
Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From The Balkans To Western China p. p.163 (1993)
(‘Islamic fundamentalists favor a shift away from the pro-Western policy, and the
spurning by Europe could cause policy shifts toward more dangerous Turkish
nationalism.’)
28.
Stephen Kinzer, ‘A Dynamo Redefines Turks’Role in the World’, New York Times,
July 31, 1998
29.
John Newhouse, European Adrift, Pantheon Books, 1997, p. 252; (‘Turkey is
directly involved with Israel, Syria, Cyprus, Iraq, the belligerent tribes of the
Balkans. ... the newly independent states of central Asia and the Caucasus and the
competition with Russia and Iran for influence in some of them.’).
30.
Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, ix (Turgut Ozal ed. 1991),
(‘Turkey is the first country with a Muslim population which has established a
republican regime .... founded a secular society, become truly democratic, and is
industrializing rapidly.’); David Barchard, Turkey And The West 1 (1985) (‘Turkey
is the first Middle Eastern and Islamic country to achieve industrialization within the
framework of the nation-state.’);
181
31.
Graham E. Fuller, op. cit.,
32.
Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War, in
Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From The Balkans To Western China 100-01 (Graham
Fuller & Ian Lesser eds. 1993, p. 99
33.
Graham E. Fuller, op. cit., p. 165. It is pivotal because of its strategic location on the
southern flank of the Soviet Union, its guardianship of the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles straits, which controlled access to the communist-dominated Black sea....
its explicit commitment to the Western security cause, demonstrated as early as the
Korean War, in which Turkey fought. Thus, geopolitics and Turkey’s pro-Western
orientation rapidly won Turkey a prominent role within NATO.
34.
Ian O. Lesser, op. cit., p. xiii
35
Barry M. Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues, Bogazici University Press, Turkey, 2002
36.
Mid-year population estimations and projections, 1986- 2011, Turkish Statistical
Institute, Retrieved, 24 May 2013.
37.
Michael R. Gordon, Nato to Hit Serbs from Two More Sides, New York Times, May
11, 1999, The end of the Cold War has not obviated security needs in the region. In
May 1999, NATO planned to launch air strikes into Kosovo from Turkish bases. see
US Planes Hit Iraqi Radar Site After Threat, New York Times, Jan. 31, 1999,
(explaining that U.S. planes use bases in Southern Turkey to attack Iraqi radar sites
and missile launchers); see also Tim Weiner, U.S. Helped Turkey Find and Capture
Kurd Rebel, New York Times, Feb. 20, 1999, (stating that United States ‘has an
increasingly close military and intelligence relationship with Turkey,’ using Incirlik
base for planes and eavesdropping technology for region).
38.
Ian O. Lesser, op. cit.,
39. G. Fuller, op. cit.,
40.
41.
Ian O. Lesser, op. cit., p. 185.
Robert D. Kaplan, Redrawing the Mideast Map, New York Times, February 21, 1999,
p.17; see Gavin A. Symes, Note, Seeking a Legal Justification for the 1996 U.S.
Military Intervention in Iraq, 19 Michigan Journal of International Law (MICH.J.
INT’L L.) 581, 584, n.12 (1998) (‘The Kurds are ‘a non-Arab people with distinctive
linguistic and cultural characteristics and an undimmed national consciousness . . .
[who] have lived in a territory straddling present-day Iraq, Turkey, and Iran for over
4000 years.’‘).
182
42.
Graham E. Fuller, Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World, in Turkey’s
New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, 1993, pp. 172-73. (‘Islamic
fundamentalists favor a shift away from the pro-Western policy, and the spurning by
Europe could cause policy shifts toward more dangerous Turkish nationalism.’)
43.
Alessandra Stanley, Top Kurd’s Arrest Unleashes Rioting All Across Europe, New
York Times, Feb. 17, 1999. Some 850,000 Kurds and 3 million Turks live in the EU,
with 500,000 Kurds and 2 million Turks in Germany alone. Turks, Kurds, and the
Outside World, New York Times, Feb. 20, 1999.
44.
Stephen Kinzer, Turkey’s Political Turmoil Deepens as National Election Nears, New
York Times, Mar. 15, 1999. The war ‘has cost Turkey more than $100 billion and the
lives of more than 30,000 people over 15 years, tearing the country apart.’ Stepehen
Kinzer, Turkey’s Views on Minority Rights Make a Kurdish Peace Unlikely, Int’l.
Herald Trm. July 6, 1999, p.1
45.
Stephen Kinzer, op. cit.,
46.
Four Killed in Bomb Blast in Southern Turkey, Agence France PR., Apr. 11, 1999,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, and AFP File.
47.
William Safire, The phantom Alliance, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4 , 1999 (‘Turks, unfairly kept
out of the European Union by Germany and Greece, see America as making the
world go round and Israelis as the key to American support.’)
48.
The Turkish-Israeli Affair, Economist, Sept. 19, 1998, at 57 (stating that their navies
and air forces engage in joint exercises in the Mediterranean, their intelligence services
exchange information, they buy and sell military equipment, and bilateral business
agreements nurture trade between both countries).
49.
William Safire, op. cit., (illustrating that trade ‘boosts the Turkish economy, which
hires Israeli companies to construct power plants, and develop irrigation projects ...
[and] the U.S. leans on oil companies to build a pipeline from the Caspian Sea
through Turkey rather than Iran.’).
50.
Turks, Kurds, and the Outside World, New York Times, Feb. 20, 1999, (arguing that
arrangement strengthened both allies diplomatically and militarily).
51.
From the time before Christ was born to the Byzantine Empire, Turkey linked the
classical world to the Renaissance and the modern history of Europe with ‘much to
teach us today about the origins and antecedents of our own world.’ Glanville DowNey, Constantinople in the Age Of Justinian V, Vi (1960).
183
52.
Michael Maclagan, The City of Constantinople (Ancient Peoples and Places, 60),
London, Thames and Hudson, 1968, p. 74-82.
53.
Constantinople was founded because of its obvious geographical and military
advantages over other possible capitals for the empire. Because it neatly linked the
Eastern and Western fringes of the Roman Empire, Constantinople became the true
center of the Roman Empire.
54.
John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to The Legal Systems
of Western Europe And Latin America, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, (2d ed.),
1985, p. 7-10. It was to rescue the older Roman law, cleanse it of imperfect accretions
over time, and organize the result into a useful system.
55.
More radical legal and cultural changes are rarely found, including proclamation of the
Republic, abolition of the Caliphate, introduction of the Latin alphabet, emancipation
of women, and other reforms aimed directly at westernizing the society, including
even banning the Turkish headgear. See Lord Patrick Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of
A Nation, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1965. Reforms also included enactment
of European law codes, counting calendar years from the birth of Christ rather than the
Hijrah of Muhammad (SM), and the introduction of Sunday as the day of rest, rather
than Friday. Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Ataturk as an Institution Builder’, in Atatork:
Founder of A Modern, State, Ali Kazancigil & Ergun Ozbudun eds., 1981.
56.
Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War, in Turkey’s
New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, p. 99 (Graham Fuller & Ian
Lesser eds. 1993). Turkish elite take pride in ‘being part of a broadly European culture
and Western political orientation.
57.
Fuller, op. cit. p. 167-68. Turkey is a model in the Islamic world for its ‘increasingly
free market, democratic governance, and secularist outlook.’
58.
59.
Named after its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the governmental dogma of
Kemalism was founded on the cardinal ‘principles of republicanism, nationalism,
populism, secularism, etatism and revolutionism.’ Dankwart A. Rustow, Atatiirk as
an Institution Builder, in Atatork: Founder of A Modern State, Ali Kazancigil &
Ergun Ozbudun eds., 1981, p. 16
Turkey, a Country Study, (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1996). The revival of religiously
motivated political activity began in the early 1980s, with the organization of the new
Welfare Party in 1983, having strong appeal in lower middle class.
184
60.
Kaplan, op. cit., (‘Act I of the New Middle East ends with a Turk- ish-Israeli victory
over Syria... [but] Act II could be more complex, bloody, and unpredictable . . .
because Turkey and Syria are each, in their own way, unstable.’).
61.
‘Trade-Dependent Maritime World’ refers to the whole of the Americas, Western
Europe, Africa except the northeastern corner, offshore Asia and Oceania. ‘The
Eurasian Continental Power’ contains the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Eastern and
Central Asia, borrowed from Cohen; COHEN, Saul. B. (2003); Geopolitics in the
World System, Rowman and Littlefield, New York.
62.
Ahmet Davutoglu, ‘The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)order’,
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol.2, No.4, December 1997February1998, p.5.
63.
Mustafa Aydin clarifies the sequence of events that brought about Turkey to participate
in the Western Block: ‘…During the secret German-Soviet negotiations in November
1940, Turkey was one of the bargaining pieces, and was a price asked by the Soviets
to enter the Berlin Pact. Subsequently, allied with the West, the Soviets brought their
demands to Yalta and Postdam Conferences in 1945. Having received Churchill’s
acquiescence at the Moscow Conference (October 1944), Stalin presented Soviet
position at Yalta (February 1945) vis-a-vis the Turkish Straits. ‘It is impossible,’
remarked Stalin to accept a situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia’s throat’…
Having already received these hints about Soviet intentions on its territorial integrity,
and alarmed by the Soviet note of 19 March 1945, denouncing the 1925 Treaty of
Friendship and Non-aggression, Turkey was terrified by another Soviet note on 7 June
1945, demanding Soviet bases on the Straits in addition to the territorial adjustments in
the Soviet-Turkish border as the price for renewing the Treaty of Friendship and
Nonaggression…’ In the following years, Turkey did also start to benefit financial aid
by means of the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948). Financial aids
indicated Turkey’s more other economical motives behind its placement in the
Western camp. See Mustafa Aydin, ‘Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy:
Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold war’, Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 36, No.1, 2000, pp.106-110.
64.
Malik Mufti, ‘Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy,’ Middle East Journal,
Vol. 52, No.1, Winter 1998, p.41.
65.
William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, Frank Cass Publishers, London,
2001, pp.109-110
66. G. Fuller, op. cit., p.39.
185
67. Available at, http://www.ait.hacettepe.edu.tr/egitim/ait203204/II12.pdf.
68.
Mustafa Aydin, ‘Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and
Conjunctures during the Cold war’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No.1, 2000,
pp.111-113.
69.
Mustafa Aydin, Turkish Foreign Policy; Framework and Analysis, SAM Papers, No.1,
Ankara, Centre for Strategic Research, 2004, pp.67-82.
70.
Devlet Cilik, one of the six arrows of Kemalism
71.
The 1934 five year plan was launched in January while the 1938 plan was launched in
September, thus making them less than five years apart in calendar years.
72.
A detailed discussion of Soviet policies towards women and family life can be found in
Shoshana Keller’s ‘Trapped between State and Society: Women’s Liberation and
Islam in Soviet Uzbekistan, 1926-1941.’ Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 10, No. 1
Spring, 1998, pp. 20-37
73.
Sixth Protocol is concerning the abolition of the death penalty. The member States of
the Council of Europe, signatory to this Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’) Considering that the evolution that has
occurred in several member States of the Council of Europe expresses a general
tendency in favor of abolition of the death penalty. Have agreed as follows: Article 1:
‘The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or
executed.’
74.
Mustafa Aydin, Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: historical framework and
traditional inputs, in: Middle Eastern Studies, 35/4, 1999, p.159
75. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (19 May 1881 – 10 November 1938) was an Ottoman and
Turkish army officer, revolutionary statesman and the leading figure in Turkey’s War
for Independence. He is credited with being the founder of the Republic of Turkey and
was its first president. His surname, Ataturk (meaning ‘Father of the Turks’) was
granted to him and forbidden to any other person in 1934 by the Turkish parliament.
76. Mustafa Aydin, op. cit.
77. Dilek Barlas, Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities
and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s, in: Journal of Contemporary
History, 2005, 40/3, p. 449.
186
78.
Davutoglu speech at SETA Foundation Washington, 2009, Quoted by Marija Mitrovic,
Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: The influence of traditional determinants
on Davutoglu’s conception of Turkey – Balkan Relations, GeT MA Working Paper
Series, no. 10, 2014
79.
Neo-Ottomanism (Turkish: Yeni Osmanlicilik) is a Turkish political ideology created
during the Turgut Ozal period. In Turkey’s foreign policy it was used for creating a
wider identity abroad, Ottoman rather than Turkish covering all neighboring Muslim
peoples and all minorities in Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism placed great importance in the
cultural similarities of Turkey to the Middle East, the Balkans and the Central Asia and
argued that based on that Turkey was natural economic and political partner of the
countries in these regions.
80.
Alexander Murinson, The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy, in: Middle
Eastern Studies, 42/6, , 2006, p. 953
81.
The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits is a 1936 agreement
that gives Turkey control over the Bosporus Straits and the Dardanelles and regulates
the transit of naval warships. The Convention gives Turkey full control over the Straits
and guarantees the free passage of civilian vessels in peacetime. It restricts the passage
of naval ships not belonging to Black Sea states.
82.
Yavuz Sezer, Demokrat Parti’nin Ilk Yillarinda Balkan Politikasi, A Master’s Thesis
Submitted to Dokuz Eylul University, 2006, p. 50.
83.
Oral Sander, Balkan Gelismeleri ve Turkiye (1945 – 1965) [Developments in the
Balkans and Turkey], pp. 42-43
84.
Ibid, pp. 43-44.
85. Yavuz Sezer, Demokrat Parti’nin Ilk Yillarinda Balkan Politikasi, p. 52, citing Altemur
Kiliç, Turkey and the World (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 136.
86.
Ibid, p. 53.
87. 18 February 1948, in Oral Sander, Balkan Gelismeleri ve Turkiye (1945 – 1965), p. 48.
88.
Fahir Armaoglu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi, pp. 521-522. Celal Bayar was of the opinion
that Balkan Entente of the 1930s must be revived and he launched a preparation to that
end. He thought the revival of the agreement would be a basis for a prospective
Mediterranean pact. The idea of a regional pact was also supported by the U.S.A.,
Yavuz Sezer, Demokrat Parti’nin Ðlk Yillarinda Balkan Politikasi, pp. 54-55.
89. Oral Sander, op. cit., pp. 81-86
187
90.
Trieste is a city and seaport in northeastern Italy. It is situated towards the end of a
narrow strip of Italian territory lying between the Adriatic Sea and Slovenia, which lies
almost immediately south and east of the city.
91. Oral Sander, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
92.
Ibid, p. 88.
93.
If there was an attack on Yugoslavia from Bulgaria, and the Yugoslav troops retreated
to the West, Greece’s Vardar valley would be open to aggressor’s moves. If Hungary
attacked, and Yugoslav troops retreated to the mountains leaving Ljublijana, Trieste
and Po plain would come under threat. If there was a threat against Turkey and Greece,
a balance could be struck by cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia against the
aggressor, Ibid, p. 89.
94.
Ibid.
95.
Ibid., pp. 93-95
96.
Ibid., pp. 95-96
97.
Ibid., pp. 96-98
98.
Ibid., pp. 102-103
99.
Ibid., pp. 107-112
100.
Ibid., pp. 113-115
101.
Ibid. pp. 113-117.
102.
Oral Sander, Balkan Gelismeleri ve Turkiye (1945 – 1965), pp. 124-125.
103.
104.
Balkan Entente, also called Balkan Pact, (Feb. 9, 1934), mutual-defense agreement
between Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia, intended to guarantee the
signatories’ territorial integrity and political independence against attack by another
Balkan state (i.e., Bulgaria or Albania). The agreement provided for a Permanent
Council, composed of the members’ foreign ministers that would coordinate
legislation and foster economic cooperation.
(http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/50273/Balkan-Entente)
Ibid., pp. 147-163.
105.
Ibid., pp. 169-177.
106.
Ilhan Uzgel, ‘Balkanlarla Iliskiler’, pp. 174-175.
188
107.
On 28 June 2011 during the 38th Council of Foreign Ministers meeting (CFM) in
Astana, Kazakhstan the organization changed its name from ‘Organization of the
Islamic Conference’ to its current name ‘Organization of Islamic Cooperation’. The
OIC also changed its logo at this time.
108.
Ibid., pp. 175-181.
109.
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, Oxford University Press,
1968, p. 57.
110.
Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999,
New York, Viking Penguin, 2000, p. 95
111. William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, London, Frank Cass, 2000, p. 28
112.
Omer E. Lutem, ‘The Past and Present State of Turkish-Bulgarian Relations,’ Dis
Politika 23, nos. 1-4 (1999): 2, at www.foreignpolicy.org.tr.
113.
Glenn E. Curtis, Bulgaria: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Federal Research
Division of the Library of Congress, 1992, p. 81.
114
The Truman Doctrine was an international relations policy set forth by the U.S.
President Harry Truman in a speech on March 12, 1947, which stated that the U.S.
would support Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid to prevent them
from joining the Soviet sphere. Historians often consider it as the start of the Cold
War, and the start of the containment policy to stop Soviet expansion.
115.
The Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was the
American initiative to aid Europe, in which the United States gave $13 billion in
economic support to help rebuild European economies after the end of World War II
in order to prevent the spread of Soviet Communism. The initiative was named after
Secretary of State George Marshall.
116.
Denise Folliot, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1954, London: Oxford
University Press, 1967, pp. 197-200.
117.
Omer E. Lutem, op. cit., p. 5
118.
Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, New York: W. W. Norton, 1978,
pp. 476-80.
119.
Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974, Leiden: Brill,
1975, p. 89 and 91.
189
120.
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1977, pp. 407-9.
121.
Cyprus was granted independence by Great Britain in 1960, but its ethnic Greek
President Archbishop Makarios threatened in late 1963 to amend the constitution,
which guaranteed rights to ethnic Turks on the island. Despite a contingent of some
six thousand UN peacekeepers being sent to Cyprus in spring 1964, the Turkish
community, which had fled to enclaves for its protection, was under economic
blockade, while Turkish Cypriot government officials were prevented from exercising
their legal authority. See Michael B. Bishku, ‘Turkey, Greece and the Cyprus
Conflict,’ Journal of Third World Studies 8, no. 1, 1991), pp.165-79.
122.
Aurel Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans, London: Macmillan, 1983, p. 140
123.
Fahir Armaoglu, ‘Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy,’ DisPolitika 1, no.
1, 1971, p. 89.
124.
Simsir, 245-64; J. F. Brown, in his Bulgaria under Communist Rule, New York,
Praeger, 1970, p. 296, states that ten thousand to fifteen thousand ethnic Turks left
Bulgaria during 1968 A.D.
125.
Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 205; Ilhan Uzgel, ‘The Balkans:
Turkey’s Stabilizing Role,’ in Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional
Power, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci , Boulder, Colo, Lynne Rienner, 2001
126.
Times (London), 27 January 1976, as quoted in Braun, p. 53
127. Quoted in Ahmad, p. 409.
128.
Milliyet, 15 November 1978, as quoted in Michael M. Boll, ‘Turkey’s New National
Security Concept: What It Means for NATO,’ Orbis 23, no. 2 (1979): 625.
129.
It should be noted that the American arms embargo against Turkey had been lifted in
September, 1978.
130. Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 256-7; Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in
Southeastern Europe , Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991, pp. 95, 102.
131. The practice of using force on minorities to adopt Bulgarian names had been carried
out against the Pomaks (Slavic Muslims) between 1972 and 1974 and against
Turkish-speaking Roma between 1981 and 1983.
190
132. Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, London: Minority Rights
Group, 1991, pp. 129-51; Simsir, 264-7, 274-6.
133.
Milliyet, 26 January 1985, as quoted in Simsir, 278.
134.
Cumhuriyet, 24 August 1985, as quoted in Simsir, 283.
135.
Lutem, 9.
136.
Gareth M. Winrow, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Regional Security and Ethnic Identity.’
Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association annual meeting, Research
Triangle Park, N.C., 11-14 November 1993, 4.
137.
Andrew Mango, ‘Turkish Exodus from Bulgaria,’ World Today 45, no. 10 (1989):
166-7; ‘Prime Minister Ozal Opens Turkish Borders to Minority Turkish Population
Expelled from Bulgaria,’ Turkey Today, no. 114, May 1989, pp. 1-2
138.
Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, editors, Albania: A Country Study,
Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994, p. 153
139.
Ibid.,
140.
Albert Rakipi, Weak States and Security; Rethinking the Balkan Post Cold War
Security Agenda, AIIS, Tirana, 2008, pp.82-83
141. Glenny Misha, Balkanlar 1804-1999: Milliyetçilik, Savas ve Buyuk Guçler, Translated
by Mehmed Harmanci, Sabah Kitaplari, Istanbul, 2000, p.340.
142.
Mehmet Yilmaz, ‘Turk Dis Politikasinda Arnavutluk’, unpublished Master’s Thesis
submitted to the Dept. of International Relations, Gazi University, 2001, p. 102.
143.
Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans; Twentieth Century, Vol.2, Cambridge
University Press, NY, 1994, p. 214.
144.
Rakipi, op cit., pp. 78-79
145.
Although there is no exact record or number of Balkan and Albanian people that
immigrated to Turkey between 1946 and 1966, 246000 Albanians immigrated to
Turkey. (see Yilmaz, op cit., p.103) It is estimated that today 3-4 millions of Albanian
and approximately ten millions of Balkan people lives in Turkey as Turkish citizens.
146
On the other hand, one of the founding fathers of Independent Albania in November
28th, 1912, Ismail Qemali, had served as the Speaker of Turkish National Assembly,
Secretary General of Turkish Foreign Ministry and Turkey’s Minister of the Interior.
191
147.
N. Asli Sirin, ‘Inter-State Cooperation in the Balkans: The Cold War Era’, Turkish
Review of Balkan Studies, OBIV, 2002, p.178.
148.
Louis Zanga, ‘Solid Turkish-Albanian Relations’, Background Report/156 on www.
osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/4-5-32.shtml,accessed,on 25/10/2009.
149.
Ibid.
150.
‘Albania’ on www.albanian.com/information/history/collapse.html accessed on
27/09/2009.
151.
Turgut Ozal, born in Malatya, Turkey in October 13, 1927 and died in April 17,
1993; served as Undersecretary of the government of Suleyman Demirel, when he
was Prime Minister, 1983-1989, transformed and further developed the Turkish
Economy by privatizing many state enterprises. Became President of Turkey in
November 9th, 1989 until April 17th, 1993, a time when he died in office.
152.
In 1990 Tirana was preparing to host the yearly meeting of the Balkans’ foreign
affairs ministers in which was expected to participate the Foreign Minister of Turkey,
Mr. Mesut YILMAZ, it was an historic gathering and the first multilateral meeting
organized in Albania since 1945. On this occasion Turkey’s former Diplomacy chief
stated that: ‘there are no political problems in bilateral relations between Turkey and
Albania.’
All participants in this meeting agreed that in order ‘for the nations in the Balkans to
join the integration process in the Euro-Atlantic community, first they must establish
democratic institutions within their own governments,’ otherwise their aspirations to
join EU will remain in vein. Initially, Turkey pursued a passive role towards its
bilateral relations with Albania. It was in 1990 when Albanian Foreign Affairs
Minister visited Ankara and signed two bilateral agreements with the Turkish
officials, the first was on postal services and the second was on cultural cooperation.
The signing ceremony had certainly helped to warm up the relations between both
countries which convinced Ankara to move quickly in intensifying its relations with
Albania and play an active role in preserving peace and democracy in the Balkans.
153.
Peter Tas, ‘Albania And Turkey: Two Nations With Common Vision To Strengthen
Bilateral Cooperation, 1990-2000’, Foreign Policy News, January, 2014
154
The TCG Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak (D 351) was commissioned by the Turkish Navy in
September 1973, previously the ship belonged to the US Navy under the name of
192
USS Charles H. Roan. TCG Çakmak, participated in operation Atilla during the
conflict of Cyprus in 1974 and finally was scrapped in April, 1995.
155
Albania was an exception in the Balkans because it did not have diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union, for more than 20 years (since 1968, when Soviet troops
invaded Czechoslovakia).
156
In order to exert more leverage in the region, Turkey decided to promote the
multilateral diplomacy practice through two regional organizations: The South East
European Cooperation (SEEC) process which was established in in July, 1996, in
Sofia, Bulgaria during the Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting; the Organization of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation founded in June 25th, 1992 in Istanbul, Turkey,
at a time when rapid democratic reforms where taking shape in the region. The goals
of the organization are to strengthen stability, security, and excellent relations among
neighboring countries. During the 1990s, just like Turkey; Albania’s southern
neighbor, Greece had its share in identifying and intensifying its relations with many
Balkan countries. In front of this situation, in addition to bilateral diplomacy, Turkey
used multilateral forums such as the (SEEC) and adopted visionary policies for the
Balkans.
157.
www.oic-oci.org accessed on 07/12/2009.
158.
www.mfa.gov.tr/the-islamic-conference--_oic_.en.mfa accessed on 07/12/2009.
159.
www.oic-oci.org accessed on 07/12/2009. also see Mohammad Tawfiqul Haider,
‘Reflection on the OIC’, Probondo Sonkolon, (collection of Articles),2009, pp. 235-260
160.
see Anne Ross Solberg, ‘The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks n the Western
Balkans’, SUDOSTEUROPA, 55 (2007) 4, pp.429-462.
161
In the Muslim society generally, a monastic complex, usually the centre or settlement
of a sufi.
162.
Huseyin Abiva, ‘Bektashism and Its Presence in Albanian
www.bektashi.net/historybekbalkans.html accessed on 13/12/2009.
163.
The Warsaw Pact (formally, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual
Assistance) was a mutual defense treaty between eight communist States of Central
and Eastern Europe in existence during the Cold War. The founding treaty was
established under the initiative of the Soviet Union and signed on 14 May 1955, in
Warsaw. The Warsaw Pact was the military complement to the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CoMEcon), the regional economic organization for the
193
Lands’
on
communist States of Central and Eastern Europe. (See United Nations Treaty
Collection. Retrieved 2013-08-22.)
164.
www.mfa.gov.al accessed on 29/12/2009.
165.
Panagiotis Lymberis, Reek-Turkish Crises Since 1955: Implications For GreekTurkish Conflict Management, an unpublished thesis of the Department of National
Security Affairs under Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, USA
166.
The Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was the
American initiative to aid Europe, in which the United States gave economic
support to help rebuild European economies after the end of World War II in order
to prevent the spread of Soviet Communism.
167.
See Heinz Kramer, ‘Turkey’s Relations with Greece: Motives and Interests,’ in
Dimitri Constas, ed., The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1991, pp. 57–72.
168.
The Megali Idea was an irredentist concept of Greek nationalism that expressed the
goal of establishing a Greek state that would encompass all ethnic Greek-inhabited
areas, including the large Greek populations that, after the restoration of Greek
independence in 1830 from the Ottoman Empire, still lived under Ottoman
occupation.
Seehttp://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/greece/introduction.htm
169.
For a comprehensive discussion, see Harry J. Psomiades, The Eastern Question: The
Last Phase, New York: Pella, 2000.
170.
For a good discussion of the Davos process, see Richard Clogg, ‘Greek-Turkish
Relations in the Post-1974 Period,’ in Dimitri Constas, ed., The Greek-Turkish
Conflict in the 1990s, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991, pp. 12–23
171.
Robert McDonald in Adelphi Papers 229, London : IISS, Spring 1988, p. 72
172.
The pact lost any significance after 1955
173.
Alexis Alexandris, , The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations,
1918-1974, Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992, p. 267
174.
Theodore Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey. The Troubled Triangle.
New York: Praeger, 1983, p.24
175.
Tozun Bahcheli, Greek Turkish Relations Since 1955, Boulder-San Francisco, West
view Press, 1990, p.33
194
176.
Alexis Alexandris, op. cit., p.268
177.
Suggestion made to the American Ambassador in Greece George Allen. Alexis
Alexandris, op. cit., 1992, p. 272
178. Tozun Bahcheli, op. cit., p.39
179.
Monteagle Stems, Entangled Allies; US Policy towards Greece Turkey and Cyprus,
New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p.27
180. Tozun Bacheli, op. cit., p.43
181.
Ibid
182. Couloumbis, op. cit., p.42
183. The amendment became known as the thirteen point amendment
184.
Ibid
185.
Statement by the Turkish government spokesman: ‘unless the Greek government
changed its attitude in regard to the question in Cyprus, all the Greek nationals in
Istanbul might be expelled en masse’ Alexandris, p.282
186.
Giannis Valinakis, Eisagogi sthn
Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1989, p. 104
187.
Quoted by Bacheli, op. cit., p.73
188.
op. cit., p. 77
189.
‘In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the
guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty’
190.
Constas, op. cit., p. 112
191.
op. cit. p. 29
192.
op. cit., p.30
193.
Monteagle Stems op. cit., p. 16
194.
Sylvia Kedourie, edited, Turkey. Identity, Democracy, Politics, Portland: Frank Cass,
1996, p. 17
195
Ellhniki
Ejoteriki
Politiki.
1949-1988.
195.
John Chipman, NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges, New
York, Routledge, 1988, p. 357
196.
For background, see Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and
Turkey: The Troubled Triangle, New York, Praeger, 1983.
197.
See Clement H. Dodd, ‘A Historical Overview,’ in Clement H. Dodd, Cyprus: The
Need for New Perspectives, Huntingdon, England: The Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 1–15.
198.
The Treaty
of
Guarantee is
a
treaty
between
the Republic
of
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland promulgated in 1960. Article I bans Cyprus from participating in
any political union or economic union with any other state. Article II requires the
other parties to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of
Cyprus. Article IV reserves the right of the guarantor powers to take action to reestablish the current state of affairs in Cyprus, a provision which was used as a
pretext for the Turkish invasion of 1974. The treaty also allowed the UK to retain
sovereignty over two military bases.
199.
For a detailed discussion, see Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio; Nancy Crawshaw, The
Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1978.
200.
For the text of the Johnson letter, see the Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, Summer,
1966, pp. 386–393
201.
Muhammad Omor Faruq, ‘Cyprus Problem: A Historical discussion’, Journal of
Sociology, Nazmul Karim Study Centre, Vol.-IV, Issue 2, University of Dhaka, 2012,
pp. 37-66
202.
As he stressed at the celebration of the 25 th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus in July 1999: ‘As much as Turkey is the generator of KKTC (Kuzey Kıbrıs
Turk Cumhuriyeti) [TRNC] security, the KKTC is the guarantee of Turkey’s
security.’ See ‘Turkey and Cyprus Not Moving an Inch from Cyprus Policy,’ Turkish
Probe, July 25, 1999.
203.
For a detailed discussion, see Madeleine Demetriou, ‘On the Long Road to Europe
and the Short Path to War: Issue-Linkage Politics and the Arms Build-Up in
Cyprus,’ Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, winter 1998, pp. 38–51.
204.
For the text of the Joint Statement, see Muhammad Omor Faruq, op. cit.,
196
205.
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008 as the Republic of
Kosovo, which is a partially recognized state in Southeastern Europe, While Serbia
recognizes the Republic’s governance of the territory; it still continues to claim it as
its own Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. Kosovo is landlocked in
the central Balkan Peninsula. Its capital and largest city is ‘Pristina’. It is bordered
by the Republic of Macedonia and Albania to the south, Montenegro to the west,
and Central Serbia to the north and east.
206.
G. Scott Davis, Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia, Routledge, New York,
1996, p. xvii
207.
Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1998, p. 32.
208.
Ibid., 36.
209.
John V.A. Fine, ‘The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia: Middle Ages to the
Present,’ in Islam and Bosnia:Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic
States, ed. Maya Shatzmiller, Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2002, p. 6.
210. Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
211.
Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1998), p. 31.
212.
Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, New York, Penguin
Books, 1992, p. 4
213. Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, New York, Palgrave Macmillan,
2004, p.6
214.
Ibid., p. 73.
215.
Ibid.
216.
Ibid., 75-78.
217. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History , NY, New York University Press, 1996, p.
xxiii.
218.
Ibid., 193.
219.
Ibid., 200.
197
220. See Ibid., pp. 213-229; See also, Marko Attila Hoare, The History of Bosnia: From
the Middle Ages to the Present Day, Hamra, Beirut: Saqi Books, 2007.
221.
Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Its Aftermath, Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 2004, p. 41.
222.
Ibid.
223.
Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, New York University Press, 1996, p. 268.
224.
Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999,
NY, Penguin Books, 2001, p. 661.
225.
Zlatko Isakovic, Identity and Security in Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
2000, p. 251.
226.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 126-27.
See also Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3, 1993,
p. 30
227.
Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2002, p. 786.
228.
Tone Bringa, ‘Islam and the Quest for Identity in PostCommmunist BosniaHerzegovina,’ in Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in MultiEthnic States, ed. Maya Shatzmiller, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2002, p. 30.
229.
Christian Moe and Ahmet Alibasi, ‘Current Islamic Trends in Bosnia: A Critical
Survey,’ Study for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2006, p. 4
230.
Hans Kung, Islam: Past, Present & Future, trans. John Bowden, Oxford, UK: One
World, 2007, p. 636.
231.
Wahhabism is named after an eighteenth century preacher and scholar, Muhammad
ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). He started a revivalist movement in the remote,
sparsely populated region of Najd (today’s KSA), advocating a purging of practices
such as the popular cult of saints, and shrine and tomb visitation, widespread
among Muslims, but which he considered idolatry, impurities and innovations
in Islam. Eventually he formed a pact with a local leader Muhammad bin
Saud, offering political obedience and promising that protection and propagation of
the Wahhabi movement, would mean “power and glory” and rule of “lands and men.”
The movement is centered on the principle of Tawhid (uniqueness) and unity of God.
Basically, it aspires to return to the earliest fundamental Islamic sources of
198
the Quran and Hadith, with inspiration from the teachings of medieval theologian Ibn
Taymiyyah and early jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal.( Nazeer Ahmed, History of Islam:
Sheikh Ibn Abdul Wahab of Najd, from www.historyofislam.com)
232.
Salafi movement, is a movement within Islam that references the Salafist
doctrine known as Salafism. It takes its name from the term salaf (“predecessors”,
“ancestors”) used to identify the earliest Muslims, who, its adherents believe, provide
the epitome of Islamic practice.
233.
Michel Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press,1998, pp. 118-119
234.
Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia – Tracking the Break-Up 1980-1992,
London: Verso, 1993, p. 327.
235.
Vladimir Goati, ‘The Challenge of Post Communism’, in Jim Seroka and Vukasin
Pavlovic (eds.), The Tragedy of Yugoslavia–The Failure of Democratic
Transformation, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992, p. 10. The real causes were deeper
and they concerned different views about the character of the political system, the
position of the Communist parties in the system, the nature of the Yugoslav
community and the debates on confederalism and federalism, and also the policies
regarding Kosovo.
236.
The prelude to the war was designed by Milosevic and the like-minded officials in the
Serb administration and it constitutes the blueprint for what was done in Bosnia later
on. As Malcolm writes, three techniques were used. The general method was to
produce radicalism in the Serb population with an incessant misinformation and fearmongering bombardment by using the media and the local politicians. The second
was one of guerilla warfare which was based on stating an incident such as shooting a
group of policemen in a certain place and then inviting reprisal to be followed by
distributing arms to villagers again by misinforming them that the police are planning
to attack them. The third one was to create violent incidents and calling the army to
take action as an ‘impartial arbiter’. While the Serbs in Croatia were told that they
were threatened by an Ustasa regime, in Bosnia, the Muslims were told they were
threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. After 1989, the nationalism of Serbia and
Croatia had already been seen as intimidating in Bosnia, and Milosevic’s and
Tudjman’s ambitions were understood by the Bosnians. Tudjman believed most of
the Bosnian Muslims were of Croatian origin and Bosnia and Croatia formed an
indivisible entity. It was also seen that Milosevic’s plans were openly associated with
Former Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic who was the main architect of Greater
Serbia Project. By early 1991, Milosevic publicly said that if there were any attempts
199
to replace the federal structure of Yugoslavia with a confederation, he would annex
both Croatia and Bosnia. For more information on how the war in Bosnia was
planned from the outside, see Noel Malcom, Bosnia: A Short History, London,
Macmillan, 1994, pp. 213 - 233
237.
Noel Malcolm, Bosnia, op. cit., p. 235.
238.
See Ibid., p. 235. Malcolm cites the report by Michael Montgomery, Daily Telegraph,
7 April 1992.
239.
Robert J. Dania and John V. A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition
Betrayed, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 220.
240.
Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 251
241.
Quted by Arija Mitrovic, Turkish Foreign Policy towardsthe Balkans: The influence
of traditional determinants on Davutoglu’s conception of Turkey – Balkan Relations,
MA Working Paper Series, Department of Social Sciences, Humboldt University of
Berlin, also see www.sowi.hu-berlin.de/getma
242.
op. cit., pp. 7-8
243.
Sabri Sayari, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of
Multi-Regionalism, in: Journal of International Affairs, 54/1, 2000, p. 177
244.
‘This Turkish minority numbers around 12 000 according to the 1991 census (0,6 % of
the total population of the Kosovo province), but the Kosovo Tur ks claim that they
number at least 60 000.’ Sylvie Gangloff, Turkish policy towards the conflict in
Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests, Balkanologie, 8/1, 2004, p.
117
245.
Sayari Farooqi, op. cit., p. 178
246.
Ibid.
247.
Miomir Zuzul, ‘Croatia And Turkey: Toward A Durable Peace In Southeastern
Europe Perceptions,’ Journal of International Affairs, September - November 1998,
Volume III - Number 3
248.
Ibid.
249.
For more information, see Mustafa Turkes, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy towards the
Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security in the Balkans’, in Idris Bal (ed.),
Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold Era, Florida, Ashgate, 2004, pp. 197 – 209
200
250.
http://digilander.libero.it/romabe/Pages/Turkiye-Italya_uk.htm
251.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-italy.en.mfa
252.
Allied Relations and Negotiations With Turkey, US State Department, pp. 6-8
(http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9806_ng_turkey.pdf)
253.
For
more
details
see:
http://www.gloria-center.org/pt_free_books/istanbul-
intrigues/?chapter=2
254.
Roy Jerome, Kimmel, Michael (2001), Conceptions of Postwar German Masculinity,
State University of New York Press, p. 290
255.
Bernard Cook, (2001), Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia, Garland,p. 987
256.
Ali Riza Gulcicek, (2006), The Turkish presence in Europe: Migrant Workers and
New European Citizens, http://assembly.coe.int/: Parliamentary Assembly, p. 6
257.
http://www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de/Publikationen/Stat_Berichte/2012/
258.
Gurset, Haluk F.; Tarih Boytmca Turk Rusiliskileri, Ankara, Akyayinlari, Lstanbul
1968, p.182
259.
Rozakis, Christos L. and Stagos, Petros N.; The Turkish Straits, Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, I 987, p. 38.
260.
Ferenc A Vali, Bridge across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, p. 169.
261.
Christos L. Rozakis, and Petros N Stagos, op. cit., p.35.
262.
Anderson, M. S.: The Eastern Question (1774-1923), Hong Kong: Macmillan
Education Ltd., 1991, p. 373.
263.
Christos L. Rozakis, & Petros N. Stagos, op. cit., p. 39. Ferns A.Vali, Bridge Across
The Bosporus:The Foreign Policy of Turkey, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1971, p.186.
264.
The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits Signed on 20 July
1936, an agreement that gives Turkey control over the Bosporus Straits and
the Dardanelles and regulates the transit of naval warships. The Convention gives
Turkey full control over the Straits and guarantees the free passage of civilian
vessels in peacetime. It restricts the passage of naval ships not belonging to Black
Sea states. The terms of the convention have been the source of controversy over the
201
years, most notably
the Mediterranean Sea.
concerning
the Soviet
Union’s
military
access
to
265.
lbid., p. 43
266.
Ibid., p. 44
267.
For The Soviet diplomatic notes given to Turkey 7 August 1946 all don 24-25
September 1946 and Turkey’s response to the Soviet Union see Erkin, Ibid., pp. 414440.
268.
This new regime allows the free passage of all trade vessels both in times of peace
and war, and lrce passage ot all stati:s neighboring the Black Sea; prohibits passage
of warships states with no border to the Black Sea both in peace and war times. The
Soviet Union said that this regime should be regulated by the Black Sea states and
the free passage and the security of the Straits should be under the control of the
Soviet Union and Turkey. Tellal, Erel; ‘sovyetleriteitigtciter- in Turk Dry politics
(edit. by Qran, Baskm) Volume I, Istanbul: Ileitis yaymlan, 2002, 6th ed., p.507.
269.
Anderson, M. S.; The Eastern Question (1774-1923), Hong Kong, Macmillan
Education Ltd, 1991, p. 35
270.
Ibid.
271.
Ibid, p. 8
272.
Ferenc A Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, p.173-174.
273.
See Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘Turkey and Shared Responsibilities,’ in ‘Shared
Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate,’ Occasional
Paper, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2010,
pp. 24-27.
274.
Erel Tellal, ‘SovyetlerileIliskiler’ in Turk Dus Politicos (ed. by Oran, Baskrn),
Volume I, Istanbul: IletisimYayrnlarr, 2002 (6th ed.), p. 516. (retrieve from:
www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/tdp-haziran2013.pdf)
275.
Ibid.
276.
Ferenc A Vali, op. cit., p.176
277.
Erel Tellal, op. cit.,
278.
Ibid, p. 776
202
279.
Ibid. p. 779
280.
Ibid., p. 781
281.
Ibid.,
282.
Ibid, p.782
283.
Ibid., p.783
284.
Ibid.
285.
Ibid., p.163
286.
Michael R. Gordon, ‘Era Dawns as in Europe, Old Foes Find New Roles’, New York
Times, Mar. 14, 1999,
287.
Roger Cohen, ‘Germany Adjusts as all Its Neighbors Turn into Friends’, New York
Times, Mar. 14, 1999, at A10.
288.
Celestine Bohlen, Bomb in Market in Caucausus City Kills 58 and Hurts 100, New
York Times, Mar. 20, 1999, at A3.
289.
http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/18/turkey-039-s-foreign-policy-towards
russian- federation.html#_ednref21
290.
Cihat Goktepe, British Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, 1959-1965, London and
New York, Frank Cass, 2003.
291.
Cihat Goktepe, op. cit., p.9
292.
For recent U.S. official statements on Turkey and Turkey’s role in Europe, see Barack
Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament,’ Turkish Grand
National Assembly Complex, Ankara, April 6, 2009. See also, Assistant Secretary of
State Philip H. Gordon, ‘The U.S. and Turkey: A View from the Obama
Administration,’ Sabanci Lecture at the Center on the U.S. and Europe, The
Brookings
Institution,
March
17,
2010,
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/events/2010/0317_turkey/20100317_turkey_sabanci.pdf>.
293.
For a comprehensive reconstruction of U.S. influence on Turkey-EU relations in the
past twenty years, see, Nathalie Tocci, Bullying Brussels: U.S. Involvement in EU
Turkey Relations, New York University Press, forthcoming.
203
the-
294.
For a recent analysis of U.S. priorities and preoccupations in relation to Turkey, see,
F. Stephen Larrabee, Troubled Partnership. U.S.-Turkey Relations in an Era of
Global Geopolitical Change, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, 2010,
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf>.
295.
For background see Bruce R, Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near
East, Princeton: Princeton University Press, l980
296.
Van Coufoudakis, ‘American Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Problem, 1974-1978: the
‘Theory of Continuity’ Revisited,’ in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides,
Greek- American Relations: A Critical Review, New York: Pella Publishing Company,
l980, pp. 107-130
297.
For a detailed discussion of the Turkish reaction, see George S. Harris, Troubled
Alliance, Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
l972, pp. 105-124
298.
The term Watergate has come to encompass an array of clandestine and often illegal
activities undertaken by members of the Nixon administration. Those activities
included ‘dirty tricks’ such as bugging the offices of political opponents and people
of whom Nixon or his officials were suspicious. Nixon and his close aides ordered
harassment of activist groups and political figures, using the FBI, CIA, and the
Internal Revenue Service. The scandal led to the discovery of multiple abuses of
power by the Nixon administration, articles of impeachment, and the resignation of
Richard Nixon, the President of the United States, on August 9, 1974—the only
resignation of a U.S. president to date.
299.
Van Coufoudakis, op. cit., pp. 113-114
300. See Ian O. Lesser, ‘Turkey, the United States and the Geo-Politics of Delusion,’
Survival, Vol. 48, No.3, Fall 2006, p.2
301.
Sedat Laciner, ‘Ozalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign
Policy?’ Journal of Administrative Sciences Vol. 1, 2003, p. 182-185.
302.
For a negative view of Ottomanism, see Stephanos Constantinides, ‘Turkey: The
Emergence of a New Foreign Policy The Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model,’ Journal of
Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 24, Winter, 1996
303.
Interestingly, Ozal’s pursuit of closer ties with the Turkic republics of Central Asia
was often described as Neo-Ottomanism, despite the fact that the area was never part
of the Ottoman Empire and only became identified with modern Turkey through the
rhetoric of Turkish nationalism.
204
CHAPTER IV: SECTION-A
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
The global economy has undergone dramatic changes over the past 60 years. In the early
1950s, the world economy was essentially divided between developed or industrialized
countries in the “North” and developing or non-industrialized countries in the “South.”
Developed countries, excluding Japan, at that time accounted for 90% of world
manufacturing output and 90% of world exports of manufactured goods. Production
remained largely enclosed within national boundaries and trade patterns reflected the
respective country specializations. Inputs for most products were sourced within national
borders. In addition to a large imbalance in the structure of production and exports, there was
a dramatic imbalance in living standards and political power as well.1
On the Turkish side, she has to raise its political and economic standards up to the EU level
and to accept acquis communautaire during the negotiation period. These developments and
adjustments towards the EU not only in economic but also in political terms would be more
clear for Turkey and mutually beneficial for both. In this context, the aim of this chapter is to
examine the relationship between Turkey and the EU under the sub period, which might be
clearly distinguished from the economic policies carried out and macroeconomic
environments.
A Brief Review of Turkish Economy
The economic policy implemented immediately after the independence of the Republic of
Turkey was based on a liberal economic policy which emphasized the role of private
sector2. During the early periods, main emphasis was given to the establishment of an
economic base on the grounds of self-sufficiency. In 1922, the Turkish Commercial Union
was established to constitute a “national economy” with the opportunities created by the state
and to mainly fill the vacuum provided by the non-Muslim minorities who abandoned their
businesses. In order to determine the economic policies of the Republic, the first Turkish
Economic Conference which was held in 1923 in Izmir where mixed economic policies were
accepted, but the following decade a liberal economic policy was implemented3. In addition,
the government even enacted the Law for Encouragement of Industry to initiate and foster
private sector in 19274. Turkey, however, did not have the proper environment to succeed
with such a development policy based on private enterprises in the 1920s. The reason was
205
that there were a lot of problems such as shortage of national capital, underdeveloped
financial institutions, inadequate policies for introducing foreign capital as well as a shortage
of entrepreneurs and an under developed infrastructure. In addition to these disadvantages,
the economic liberalism of the new state did not last long as the deteriorating world
economic conditions at the end of the 1920s pushed the regime to revise the economic policy
and to adopt rigid state-led industrialization, namely etatism, where the state takes an active
role in economic activities. By adopting etatism, the government established State Economic
Enterprises (SEEs) for the industries which needed a long time and enormous amounts
of capital and planned industrialization centered on the SEEs, while it worked for an
accumulation of capital for private sectors and industrial development. Moreover, with the
establishment of the Republic, the founders of the State clearly stated that their objectives
were to catch up with and become part of “contemporary civilization” which constituted the
fundamentals of the Turkish modernization. The Turkish modernization effort in nature was
elite and state driven and these bureaucratic elite controlled the course for the development5.
Turkey turned her face to the west as an integral part of a national project after World War I.
In fact, for major periods of European history, Turkey has been an important factor of
European politics. Moreover, Turkey closely aligned itself with the West and has become a
founding member of all important other European organizations and since the Second World
War has played an important role in contributing to the shaping of European policies. In
particular, Turkey began to enter into traditional western institutions in the late 1940’s and
thus become an important strategic partner of the West. It was admitted to the OECD in
1948, the Council of Europe in 1949 and, most importantly for Turkey, NATO in 1952.
Therefore, it can be clearly seen that Turkey has been closely watching economic and
political developments in the Western Europe and, to this end, applied for the European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.
Turkey is a large country with a surface area of 778,000 km 2. It has a population of almost 71
million and more than 40% live in rural areas6. Turkey’s per capita GDP was $6,900 in 2003,
based on purchasing power parity, compared with $29,800 for UK and $37,600 for the USA 7.
Around one-third of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector although the share
of agriculture in GDP is only 12 per cent. There is a significant degree of inequality among
206
the different geographic regions of the country with respect to the distribution of income and
wealth. For example, the richest region, Marmara, is almost four times as rich as the poorest
region, Eastern Anatolia. As for the difference between the richest and the poorest provinces,
based on 2001 data, Kocaeli leads with $6,165 per capita GDP, an income level that is over
ten times higher than the corresponding GDP figures for the poorest provinces, Agri ($568)
and Mus ($578) (Table I).
In the 1960s and 1970s Turkey’s efforts to achieve economic development and growth were
characterized by an indicative development plan and import-substitution policies. However,
following the so-called “January Decisions” of 1980, the Turkish economy began an intense
process of opening-up to and integrating with the western capitalist economies. This process
culminated in a customs union agreement with the EU in 1995. Turkey also experienced
several economic and financial crises requiring several stand-by agreements with the IMF8.
Nevertheless, the ultimate objective in Turkey’s economic and political aspirations is the full
membership of the EU.
Turkey was not only one of the relatively poor countries in Europe but also one of those with
the most serious inequality in the regional distribution of income. Although Turkey has in
recent years achieved reasonable macro-stability and higher GDP growth rates than most of
the EU countries, regional imbalances are an important issue since they have been one of the
factors contributing to economic and social dissatisfaction and unrest in the eastern and
south-eastern provinces.
In contrast to the proposition of the Additional Protocol, the governments in the 1970s
maintained the import-substitution industrialization policies. However, it is generally argued
that the import-substitution strategy of the 1960s and 1970s generated an economy highly
dependent on imports and foreign borrowing but with limited capacity to export.9
Consequently, the Turkish economy experienced severe disequilibria towards the end of the
1970s, following a period of rapid economic growth and structural transformation during the
1960s and the early 1970s.
207
Table-4: Regional welfare weights of Turkey by province10
208
Notes:
Ytr, GDP per capita for Turkey;
Ypr, GDP per capita for province/ region; and
Wi, regional welfare weight
This issue is especially important, since Turkey started negotiations for the terms of
membership of the European Union on 3 October 2005. Therefore, the government must
develop policies dealing with the problem of regional imbalances and income inequality in
the interests of a timely and smooth passage towards membership of the EU. This is
important for the country since the overwhelming majority of Turks wish to be in the
European Union and there are some real benefits likely to accrue to Turkey from such
membership. Firstly, accession to the internal market of the EU would boost the GDP of the
Turkish economy particularly in sectors such as textiles and wearing apparel 11. Also,
membership of the EU will improve the institutional and structural framework in Turkey,
209
which would reduce bureaucracy and improve the functioning of the public sector. This will
facilitate foreign direct investment into Turkey.
The liberalization reforms in Turkish Economy
Turkish state Since the 1930s, the state has acted not only as a regulator and planner, but also
as a significant producer and employer. In the 1960s, the public sector produced more than
half of the industrial output and undertook about 50 per cent of total investment. Despite
foreign exchange shortages and liberalization reforms, this pattern remained the average
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.12 Even during the first half of the 1980s, the Turkish state
remained a significant source of fixed capital formation. This heavy state involvement in the
economy has been branded as etatism (devletcilik).13
The consequences of etatisme have been discussed widely in the academic literature as well
as reports by international organizations.14 One consequence of etatisme was the high level
of discretion it conferred on public policymakers in general and economic policy-makers in
particular. This was encouraged by the state’s control on significant economic resources,
which could be used by the government of the day to exploit electoral support. Another
consequence of etatisme was the incentives it provided for rent-seeking. Rent-seeking was
encouraged because private economic actors realized that they could exchange political
support for privileged access to economic resources and employment opportunities controlled
by the state. At the same time, rent-seeking was necessary because private economic actors
had to balance the risks instigated by discretionary policies with side payments from the
state15.
The third consequence of etatisme was the adverse effect it had on Turkey–EU relations.
Given the import substitution strategy that characterized etatisme since its inception in the
1930s, Turkey was unable to comply with the gradual tariff removal envisaged in the
Additional Protocol (AP) of 1973. From 1973 to 1987, Turkey reduced its tariffs on
industrial products only twice: once in 1973 and once in 1976. These reductions represented
20 per cent of the tariff phasing-out applicable to products in the 12-year list and only 10 per
cent of that applicable to products in the 22-year list. As far as adoption of the common
external tariff was concerned, Turkey did not undertake any of the required adjustments until
210
1988. The link between etatisme and the problematic Turkey–EU relations was
acknowledged even by the State Planning Organization, which stated in 1972 that the AP
was incompatible with Turkey’s import substitution strategy16.
Etatisme ran into a serious crisis by the late 1970s. The crisis was characterized by a deep
recession, galloping inflation and a severe shortage of foreign exchange – consequences that
had been predicted well in advance by the critics. To get out of the crisis, the centre-right
government of the day adopted a package of devaluation and liberalization in line with IMF
prescriptions – the so called 24 January 1980 decisions. While devaluation tackled the overvaluation of the Turkish lira, liberalization removed the ceiling on interest rates and the
prices of public-sector goods. The aim was to increase the significance of price signals for
resource allocation, stimulate foreign demand for Turkish exports, and pave the way for
export-led growth instead of import substitution.
The next steps in the programme involved external liberalization. In May 1981, the fixed
exchange rate policy was abandoned in favour of managed floating. In 1984, Turkish citizens
were granted the right to open foreign exchange deposit accounts in Turkish banks, and
current account transactions were liberalized. In 1989, the government introduced capital
account convertibility. So, by the end of the 1980s, there was little restriction on inward and
outward financial transactions by either residents or non-residents.
The liberalization programme led to impressive improvements in Turkey’s macroeconomic
performance. The export/GDP ratio increased from 4.1 per cent in 1980 to 13.3 per cent in
1988. The external balance was reversed from a deficit of 7 per cent of GDP in 1980 to a 1
per cent surplus in 1988. Consumer price inflation fell from 110 per cent in 1980 to 30 per
cent in 1987, while the public-sector borrowing requirement as a percentage of GDP was
brought down to single digits from 1981 onwards 17. International organizations monitoring
Turkey’s economic policy and performance were generous in their praise 18. Some experts of
Turkey–EU relations, on the other hand, suggested that the economic reforms of the 1980s
aimed to facilitate Turkey’s integration into the EU. They even argued that reform
recommendations by the IMF and OECD played only a complementary role, with the
ultimate aim being compliance with EU standards 19.
211
Growth Performance
Turkey is one of the largest economies in her region with a GDP estimated at approximately
$170 billion in 1995. While the country was dominated by rather backward agriculture in the
late 1950’s, considerable progress was made in industrialization between 1960 and the mid
1970’s, especially with building an infrastructure to unify Turkey’s domestic market and
create a suitable environment for private industry to develop.
These policies, which favored an inward-looking development strategy, produced a balance
of payments problem as well as the inefficiencies of a bureaucratic economic decision
making mechanism. In 1980, Turkey adopted an outward looking program with strong
emphasis on private sector development, including liberalization of foreign trade, financial
markets and finally the capital account. The last phase was completed in 1990, when the
government lifted all restrictions on capital movements and made Turkish currency fully
convertible. Succeeding governments have been inconsistent in dealing with public sector
finance, especially after 1987. However, even the deteriorating public sector balance and its
effects on the rest of the economy through crowding out increased uncertainty and high
interest rates. But this did not prevent the nation from sustaining a high GDP growth rate,
growing at an average rate of 5.5 percent between 1990 to1995. This was the strongest
average growth of any OECD member.
As Europe’s political and economic weight declines and Turkey is consolidated as a regional
power, cooperation on economic issues will be increasingly supplemented by cooperation in
other areas in order to maintain a geopolitical balance in the region and limit the presence of
external players, as Stratford says, “The expansion of the European Union is grinding to a
halt. European structures are faltering as the continent struggles through a deep economic
crisis marked by weak growth prospects and a grim demographic outlook.” 20
Meanwhile, Turkey is continuing its nascent expansion and is re-evaluating its geopolitical
position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. Its economy and its
population are growing. Indeed, Turkey is expected to have a larger population than any of
the European powers by 2025. Turkish and Western European interests have collided several
times throughout history as the Turks’ sphere of influence overlapped with that of European
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powers in Central Europe, as well as with France and Spain. With the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, Turkish influence abroad shrivelled and the Turks
lost nearly all of their European territory.
Importance of Turkish Natural Resource to the West
The same geography that positions Turkey so strategically for military purposes has long
offered superior economic positioning21 Turkey controls the vital water passage between the
Black and Mediterranean Seas, as well as the land passage between the Middle East and
Europe, including valuable avenues for oil and gas transportation. 22 In addition, the
headwaters of the historic Tigris River, pouring forth water that Iraq desperately needs, are
also within Turkey’s borders.23 Thus, Turkey’ “pivotal resource position, both as a conduit
for.., oil ... and as a source for water for its Middle East neighbors,”24 contributes to its
importance. Ultimately, Turkey’s size as a market and a producer make it an important
member of the global trading system. Ambassador Michael Lake, Head of the Representation
of the European Commission to Turkey, noted in 1997 that Turkey was “the sixth biggest
trading partner of the EU, worldwide, with a total two-way trade of $35 billion a year.”25
Turkey’s overall exports and imports grew to US$ 74 billion in 1997. 26 Many observers
express confidence that Turkey will become “a major regional and international industrial
power.27 Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, explained his nation’s geographic and
economic positioning:
We no longer perceive ourselves as a country on the outer periphery of Europe. Of
course, we are a part of Europe. But now we see ourselves as a pivotal country in
the emerging geography of Eurasia.... Enormous amounts of oil and gas are
beginning to flow out of the Caspian region. China is emerging as an economic
giant. Goods will soon be moving in huge volumes around this region. You only
have to look at a map, and to understand the size of the Turkish economy, to realize
that we are in a very new and very important position.28
Turkey’s Leadership in Regional Economic Cooperation
In the aftermath of the radical transformation in world power balances following the end of
the Cold War, new horizons have opened for Turkey to expand and enrich its domain of
interests. For example, Turkey took the initiative in 1992 to establish the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation, a zone of 11 member states, embracing 300 million people and
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aiming at the gradual establishment of a free trade area, which would form part of the EuroMediterranean Free Trade Area to be established by 2010. Turkey invited all interested
parties, despite conflicting interests, including Greece and Russia. Joint projects are already
under way to stimulate economic development through improved communications and
transportation infrastructure. In 1996, Turkey signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel, the
region’s only other democracy.
Turkish Culture Zone
The dissolution of the Soviet Union put the Central Asian Republics and Azerbaijan, which
belong to the same family of Turkic lineage, on the world political stage, with a common
history, language and race. Turkey and these republics are rapidly developing closer
economic relations in addition to political and cultural cooperation. Turkey has extended to
these sister countries Exim bank credits of $1.5 billion, thus ranking fourth among aidproviding states. Turkish companies have invested $5 billion and trade volume between
Turkey and these countries has reached $800 million in a very short period of time. The
Turkish private sector has the knowledge and expertise to be instrumental in channeling
western investments into these countries which possess rich natural resources. Close to eight
thousand students from the five Central Asian Turkic Republics and Azerbaijan are currently
studying in Turkish universities on scholarships granted by Turkey. In addition to the official
aid, Turkish foundations have made intensive efforts with the establishment of more than 200
high schools in these countries, where tens of thousands of students study.
Water: A New Strategic Factor
In the Middle East, where the scarcity of water is felt with increasing intensity and concern,
water has attained the characteristics of a strategic element. Mitchell and Collars,
internationally recognized experts on the issue of water resources, have made the following
assessment of Turkey’s role:
Turkey and the Middle East Pax Aquarum: A new paradigm is developing in Southwest
Asia. In the past, there were “have” nations with ample petroleum resources and “have-not”
nations, which were petroleum barren or petroleum poor. The nations of the Arabic
Peninsula, as well as Iran and Iraq, were essentially the “haves”, while Turkey, Syria,
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Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel were the “have-nots”. But times have change and new
circumstances present a different paradigm in which food production and security based on
ample supplies of water are beginning to weigh as heavily as petroleum profits in the
international scales. Population pressure in Southwest Asia is forcing to the fore the fact that
Turkey is the only viable source of surplus in the region 29. This evaluation adds another
dimension to the strategic importance of Turkey which is the only country in the region to
possess sufficient water resources.
Importance of Turkey in constructing Oil and Gas Pipelines: Recent exploration has
identified the Caspian Sea as one of the world’s major new energy sources for both oil and
gas. The challenge is how to get these land-locked reserves transported safely and efficiently
to the West. Turkey has proposed construction of a major pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to
the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This would bypass the already overcrowded Bosporus,
thereby reducing safety and environmental concerns, and provide the West with its only
secure oil terminal located in a NATO ally. It would also ensure that no one country controls
all the transit of Caspian Sea oil, which would give monopoly power over price and
allocations. The availability of Caspian Sea energy as a market alternative to Gulf oil will
enable the West to meet its supply demands in a more secure and stable manner.
Ultimately, the place of the Turkish-Russian relationship within the Euro-Atlantic system is
determined not despite the energy component, but to a large extent because of it. The
complicated politics surrounding the European-Russian energy relationship (with U.S. input),
however, can put Turkey in a difficult position. Turkey faces difficult choices between
competing and mutually exclusive energy supply routes. Some routes serve Western
Europe’s interest in reducing its dependency on Russian gas, while others will help Russia
strengthen its position as the main energy producer for European and Turkish markets. 30
These complications notwithstanding, the current state of relations also offers Turkey some
measure of maneuverability in its relations with both Russia and the European Union. Since
Turkey has not yet invested in any of the pipeline projects, it may be able to leverage its
decision in a way that secures more accommodation and certain privileges from each of the
interested parties. The uncertainty of the situation means Russia and Turkey will likely
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continue to demonstrate goodwill toward one another as long as Turkey remains undecided.
However, once a pipeline route is chosen, this phase will come to an end. For Turkey, this
result will entail consolidation of its friendly ties with one party and increased tensions with
the other.
To prevent a choice that thaws one relationship while it freezes the other, the problem should
be taken up in open negotiations with Russia, Turkey, and the European Union. Such a
discussion would require certain conditions (some of which are already in place):

willingness on the part of major European companies to participate in multiple
pipeline projects, assuming they are commercially viable;

agreement among the parties that they would not harm Turkey’s interests if
competing projects are implemented simultaneously (This is not a major source of
concern in Turkey, as the construction of multiple routes would reinforce Turkey’s
goal of becoming a regional energy transit hub and the attendant political status this
would bring);

recognition by all parties of the need to take Russian national interests into account
namely, its wish to remain the principal natural gas supplier for both Turkey and
Europe.
The difficulty in achieving this goal is organically integrating Russia into the international
fabric of Europe’s energy supply needs at a time when Europe is unwilling to contemplate
further dependence on Russian gas. One possible remedy for this impasse would be the
creation of a unified energy space between Russia and the European Union, which would
take account of Russian interests by adopting a principle of “equal access for partners to the
energy base, distribution, and transmission networks.”
Areas of cooperation between Turkey and Europe
Economic relations between Turkey and Europe have strengthened over the past decades,
especially since the signing of an EU-Turkey customs agreement in 1996. Currently,
approximately half of Turkish exports go to Europe. Germany is Turkey’s largest export
market, and five out of Turkey’s top 10 export markets are European countries. Closer ties
with Europe have allowed the country to produce more value-added goods. A decade ago, the
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country’s most important exports were textiles, but in recent years, the export of vehicles and
vehicle parts, machinery and electronic equipment has increased. Due to these ties, the economic recession in Europe will negatively impact Turkey in the
short run. More than half of all tourists visiting Turkey are European. Tourism accounts for
around 10% of the country’s gross domestic product and is important for Turkish social
stability since the sector provides more than 7% of the country’s jobs.
More than 70% of foreign direct investment flowing into Turkey comes from Europe. Still,
despite a short-term negative outlook, the Turkish economy is expected to strengthen
especially as its population continues to grow. For Europe, Turkey is important as a future
export market. Europe’s economic crisis and poor demographic outlook are weakening
domestic consumption. To return to growth, the continent must find new export markets. In
the longer run, it must attract immigrants. Turkey offers both. Europe and Turkey also share common energy diversification needs. Europe’s energy
resources are limited to the North Sea and are decreasing, making the continent largely
dependent on Russia for energy. This gives Moscow leverage, which Europe would like to
reduce. Turkey has a similar problem: Its dependence on Russia limits its foreign policy
options in the Balkans and Central Asia, which are also in Russia’s sphere of influence. Thus, the European Union and Turkey plan to cooperate on the transit of natural gas from
Azerbaijan to Europe. Europe needs Turkey because of its geographic location and its role as
an energy hub, and the pipeline must pass through Turkish territory. Ankara is happy to have
Europe involved to provide money and expertise. Jointly, the two regions also have more
power to resist Russian attempts to hamper such diversification efforts. Immigration and foreign policy
Immigration is a third area that binds Europe and Turkey together. Turkish migrants were
once welcomed in Europe extensively, especially in Germany, where Turks provided a
much-needed labour force in the 1960s. An estimated 5.5 million Turkish nationals currently
live in the European Union, accounting for one-quarter of the non-EU nationals living in
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there. Turkish citizens comprise the largest group of foreigners residing in the bloc. EU
countries fear that a liberalisation of the visa regime would produce a massive inflow of
Turkish workers into Western Europe. Immigrants would change the societal structure in
Western Europe, making this a highly sensitive issue.
Europeans also fear that Turkey’s lax border controls would make it the European point of
entry for illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa. Talks over liberalisation of the
visa regime will set the tone for relations between Turkey and European countries in the
upcoming years. Despite its fears, Europe’s poor demographic outlook requires it to welcome
immigrants to beef up its work force to bolster its social security system. Visa negotiations
are already under way, and an agreement is expected within the next three years. Turkey and Europe will likely coordinate more closely on foreign policy in the Islamic
world. Europe is becoming too distracted with problems at home to invest much energy
toward its former colonial spheres of influence. Turkey, on the other hand, is trying to
strengthen relations with governments across the Islamic world at a time when political Islam
is battling secularist regimes. Turkey is still the most Western-oriented Muslim country,
especially by virtue of its NATO membership. Turkey is positioning itself to become the
primary interlocutor between the West and the Muslim world. Europe, along with the United
States, supports a strengthened Turkish influence in the Middle East in hopes that Ankara can
balance other regional powers such as Iran. Opportunities for Bilateral Ties
Britain emerged from the Second World War much weakened but still a world power with
far-flung interests, not least in the Middle East. As for Turkey, the war was barely over
before it was apparent that it had become a frontline state in the West’s emerging ‘Cold War’
with the Soviet Union. Over the coming years, therefore, it was inevitable that the British
Embassy in Turkey would have to deal with many questions pressing heavily on British
interests. Among these were integrating Turkey into the Western alliance system, providing it
with economic aid and technical assistance, and ensuring that it remained indulgent to the use
of its sovereign territory for intelligence gathering and over-flying by military aircraft.31
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Between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s British diplomacy in Turkey
had slowly adjusted to peace and then settled down to business as usual. At the end of this
period, however, mounting concern in Britain about the balance of payments prompted two
further investigations into the diplomatic service to emphasize the need for it to achieve
significant economies and also to give much higher priority to commercial work.32 In the
mid-nineteenth century-led in some quarters to calls for the scrapping of British embassies
altogether, the embassy at Ankara was as active as ever, not least in the negotiation of
bilateral agreements. In the first half of the 1970s these still dealt with development loans and
then, as an economic crisis in Turkey began to bite deeply, with their re-financing. Like
almost all their predecessors, series of agreements, which remained numerous until the mid1980s, were signed in Ankara (see Appendix- E p. 478)
The rise of Turkey and weakening of Western Europe will become most apparent in the
Balkans. Despite relatively strong Russian influence in the region, especially on energy
issues, and historical tensions between Ankara and some Balkan countries, proximity and
Turkish economic strength will naturally lead to stronger regional ties. This will be especially
true in countries with large Muslim populations such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo. Historical tensions will not deter strengthened economic ties with Greece, Bulgaria
and Romania, the biggest Balkan economies, especially through business relations. Similarly,
a better relationship between Turkey and France, whose bilateral relationship was especially
strained over the past years, would be a bellwether of such developments. The FrenchTurkish relationship reached a low during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. But later, both
France and Turkey have stated an intention to open a new chapter in their bilateral
relationship, when Francois Hollande elected president. On foreign policy issues in the
Middle East, the two broadly agree. Deeper economic ties, defence industry contracts or
involvement of French energy companies in the eastern Mediterranean and Central Asia to
deter Russian firms would further indicate warming relations.
As Europe’s political and economic weight declines and Turkey is consolidated as a regional
power, existing cooperation on economic issues will be increasingly supplemented by
cooperation in other areas in order to maintain a geopolitical balance in the region and limit
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the presence of external actors. As a result, greater cooperation between Turkey and
European countries can be expected in the coming years.”
Impact of globalization in Turkish economy
The year 1980 was a turning point in the Turkish economy, and thus also of Turkish society.
The Turkish economy, which up to that date had been more of a closed economy, opened its
doors to the world economy. The more Turkey opened itself to the world, the more the
effects of the world economy, and therefore of globalization, has been felt. The most
important characteristic of globalization is the elasticity introduced in many areas. Being able
to move capital in considerable amounts from one point to another in the world; the moving
of companies very quickly from regions with high production costs to those with lower costs;
the use of the internet, fast communication tools, and new trading opportunities such as ecommerce can be listed as examples of this flexibility. It is true that the flexibility introduced
by the globalization process goes beyond the borders of the nation-states and reduces
differences between countries to a certain extent, but it also increases the gap between
different segments of society. Indeed, it is possible to observe similar developments also in
the case of Turkey. In particular, as the economy integrated more to the world with the
adoption of the decision to liberalize its markets in the 1980s, and the decision on the
customs union in 1996, the pressure of external competition caused the Turkish economy to
develop a much more flexible structure. Later, the reforms implemented as part of the
‘structural adjustment programme’ being carried out in co-operation with the IMF and the
World Bank after the economic crisis of 2001, and those implemented as requirements of the
accession process for the EU have led Turkey to become closer to the global world.
However, problems of development have still not been solved despite these steps being taken
and reforms implemented.
It is a well-known fact that general public opinion in Turkey is not very critical of
globalization as in the matter of market. Even though people are not against globalization in
general, they do not differentiate particularly between globalization and development. To put
it more clearly, they have an unquestionable belief that globalization would inevitably
provide development. However, there are no real examples that would justify the belief that
being more integrated into the global world would solve the problems of development. If, for
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example, the South American experience is taken into consideration, it is apparent that
Argentina could not succeed in this. Argentina, as is well known, was in total collapse at the
end of the 1980s. The government had become bankrupt, the national currency had lost its
value, the wages were so low that they were not even enough to meet basic needs, and
violence was everywhere in society. To solve these problems, a ‘structural compliance
programme’ was implemented under the leadership of the IMF. The programme was initially
very successful and provided speedy improvement. Indeed, Stiglitz had even defined
Argentina as the ‘top student’ of the IMF33 . However, by the year 2000, Argentina was
suffering another crisis. In 2001, 40 per cent of the population was living below the poverty
line. Argentina’s globalization process is a live example of how globalization in a country,
where development problems have not been solved, can cause social collapse. Therefore,
considering globalization as a tool in the development process the driving force would be a
much more realistic approach from the point of a genuine development process.
On the other hand, the international institutions related to Turkey’s globalization process,
such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU, do not accept this approach. According to
them, what needs to be done is to implement the required reforms in order to enable the
market mechanism to work better. These reforms will give way to development through
maintaining macroeconomic stability; in other words, these institutions suggest that these
reforms will also provide development. The IMF and the EU have a similar approach in this
context. The Structural Adjustment Programme, which has been in existence since 2001 with
the IMF, contains reforms leading to the optimization of the free market economy. 34
Naturally, the barriers to the market mechanism need to be removed, and the market needs to
function better. Nevertheless, as was noted above, the realization of these reforms might not
be sufficient to solve the developmental problems. In other words, Turkey may sustain a
place in the global world with the implemented reforms and those yet to be implemented;
but, this place may not be the one that Turkey desires, because the global world has a
hierarchy in itself, and the position that Turkey will find itself in this hierarchy will not be in
the upper levels as long as the long-standing structural problems are not solved.
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A very simple rule-of-thumb calculation can be made to indicate how serious Turkey’s
existing problems really are. Turkey’s per capita income was €7,000 in 2004, against an
average of €23,500 for the European Union. Again, let us assume that Turkey has a 5 per
cent growth rate annually, and the EU a 2 per cent growth rate. How many years will it take
Turkey to catch up to the same degree of welfare as in the EU countries? The answer is,
almost forty years. Considering the fact that Turkey cannot grow at 5 % every year, and that
the EU will grow at more than 2 per cent annually reflects a more likely situation, which
would mean that this period would even be longer. This is only a simple calculation;
however, the result is true and clear: the economic performance Turkey has achieved to date
has not been sufficient to reach the welfare level of Western European countries, because it is
not possible for Turkey to develop through a globalization process that does not have any
other objective than enabling a better-functioning market mechanism.
In fact, perceiving globalization as a provider of development per se is in essence reducing
this process to very simple terms. For a company to be able to be competitive world wide it is
vital for that company to have a very strong economic environment and infrastructure in
every sense – in other words, it needs to be developed. It follows from this that globalization
needs a well-developed local economic environment. In other words, being successful in the
globalization process is directly related to how developed is the local basis.35 Therefore, the
sound development of globalization in Turkey depends to a great extent on how well the
Turkish local basis is developed. So, the local basis in Turkey developed enough to carry a
sound globalization? It is very hard to give an affirmative answer to this question. Instead of
providing various statistics on the matter, it would be more beneficial to look at the regular
reports of the European Commission. The quoted passages below summarize the results from
the evaluations done within the framework of the Copenhagen economic criteria:
Turkey has made considerable progress in addressing the most urgent imbalances
in the economy, yet the process of achieving a functioning market economy is not
completed. [5] … The quality of education, health, and infrastructure needs to be
improved in order to enhance the competitiveness of Turkish human and physical
capital and to allow for a decline in the present social and regional differences.36
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Or as stated in another report:
Turkey has made progress [my emphasis] in improving the functioning of markets
and in strengthening the institutional framework for a fully functioning market
economy. However, macroeconomic stability and predictability has not yet been
achieved to a sufficient degree … As a result of decades of insufficient spending on
education and human capital development, the overall level of education of the
Turkish labour force is relatively low.37
These remarks state that on the one hand, a functioning market economy has not been
developed in Turkey, yet on the other hand (despite the fact that in the most recent yearly
reports the Commission has accepted that Turkey has a free market economy), investments
must be made for the development of education, health, and other infrastructure. How can
these problems relating to the local basis of Turkey, which hardly has a fully functioning free
market economy, be solved within the market economy alone?
Economic Relations between Turkey and Albania
Albania offers advantageous investment opportunities for Turkish firms. It has strategic ports
that open to Mediterranean countries and geographical proximity to European countries as
well as to other Balkan countries. Economic relations between Turkey and Albania had been
started in 1986 with the Agreement on Trade and later the Agreement on Economic,
Commercial, Industrial and Technical Cooperation in 1988. Since then Turkish exports and
investments were increased towards Albania. Economic and commercial relations between
Albania and Turkey are further developed following the Free Trade Agreement between
Turkey and Albania that entered into force in 2008. Agreement provided Turkish exporters
equal opportunity of competition with EU exporters in Albanian market and also encouraged
Turkish and Albanian businessmen to increase their joint investments. With the FTA Turkey
annulled the custom duties to Albanian originated industrial commodities and Albania
annulled the duties for more than 80% of Turkish originated industrial products and Albania
agreed to totally abandon custom duties in 5 years period. Both sides also agreed to recognize
and implement any advantageous adjustment in custom duties that is compromised to EU
originated industrial commodities. In addition, with FTA both countries recognized to
abolish custom duties for unlimited or quoted quantities of some agricultural products.
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Albania and Turkey abolished custom duties for processed agricultural products, dried fruits,
fresh vegetables and fruits reciprocally.
Turkey mainly exports iron, steel, textile, electronic products and iron products to Albania.
Turkey basically imports metal gem, leather, animal and herbal raw sources and cafe and
cacao from Albania.38 Ten items that most frequently imported to Turkey from Albania
constructs 95,8% of all Albanian exports to Turkey. This rate implies the concentration of
Turkish importation from Albanian market. Most frequently traded items are copper ore
(33,4), steel scrap (27%), pharmaceutical and cosmetic seeds, fruits and vegetables (10,6%),
crude oil (10,6%), electricity switch (3,8%), leather (3,7%) and chrome ore (2,8%). 39
On the other hand, ten most frequently exported items from Turkey to Albania amounts
28,5% of total exports of Turkey to Albania. Most frequently exported items from Turkey to
Albania are superchargers and concrete pipes (9,4%), pharmaceutical drug capsulate (3,1%),
copper frames (2,7%), infrastructure equipments (2,6%), light-refined fuel (2,1%), synthetic
fiber trousers (2,0%), tricot shirt (1,9%), raw copper (1,7%), biscuits (1,6%), cement additive
(1,4%).40
There are 70 big, middle and small sized Turkish companies listed in the records of the
Turkish Office of the Commercial Counsellor in Albania. 41 These Turkish companies are
operating in various sectors within Albania from banks to dentists and from educational
services to mining sector. Turkey is the 3 greater investor country in Albania after Italy and
Greece with a total investment value of USD $ 115 million. 80 Turkish nationals, 2.553 full
time and more than 300 part time Albanian nationals are employed in the Turkish companies
operating in Albania.42 Biggest Turkish companies that operate in Albania are Calik Holding,
Kurum Iron-Steel Joint Stock Company, ALPET and Tepe Construction Joint Stuck
Company. Calik Holding had become one of the main players of the communication sector
of Albania by acquiring Albtelecom and GSM license in 2007. Çalik Holding invested more
than 50 million Euros to GSM operator Eagle Mobile which is the 3 biggest GSM operator in
the country.43 Calik Holding also runs BKT the third biggest bank in Albania.
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Big-sized construction companies namely ENKA, 44 TUMAS45 and GINTAS46 undertook
several tenders in Albania. ENKA participated in the American army support program for
Albanian immigrants, TUMAS won the tender for rehabilitation of petroleum fields and
GINTAS rehabilitated Vlore Pasha Port Military Base and constructed several housing sites
in Tirana. Su Yapi47 Company took the tender for advising to rural infrastructural
development project of Albania. This project is financed by Islamic Development Bank and
includes 65 different projects for construction of schools, health care units, water pipe
systems and rural roads.48
TIKA’s Activities and Projects in Albania
Turkey provided technical and humanitarian assistance to Albania for contributing its
economic and democratic development in post cold war period. Turkey’s official technical
assistance institution Turkish International Development and Cooperation Agency –TIKA
undertook several activities and projects in social, economic and cultural areas in the region.
TIKA was established following the collapse of the Eastern Block and the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republics, mainly to provide development support to the newly independent
states in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkan Region. The historical and cultural ties
between these new and/or transforming states and the Republic of Turkey have brought
cooperation opportunities in various fields. Main purpose of TIKA is defined as to help
Turkish speaking states and neighboring states in their efforts for development in
economical, trade, technical, social, cultural, educational realms through implementing
cooperation projects and programs. TIKA fully grants the whole finance to receiving country
in its projects. Thus in post cold war period TIKA played an important role as an instrument
of Turkish foreign policy especially in neighboring and Central Asian countries. TIKA
undertook projects and activities to develop social and cultural ties between receiving
countries. TIKA’s projects are intended to reach the attention of local population to strength
or establish new ties with the people of receiving countries.
Competition and Cooperation between Turkey and Russia on Energy resource
During the Cold War era, the energy resources of the former Soviet republics were not
opened for exploitation of other states. After the Soviet Union collapsed the new states with
225
rich energy resources entered the world politics. Many states and companies wanted to take
part in the exploitation and transportation of these resources. Caspian region’s rich oil and
gas reserves and its land locked position required that transportation project for the resources
should be introduced and regional states also would take part in the transportation of these
resources to the world markets. Turkey and Russia introduced their own projects, which
competed each other for oil pipelines. Energy played an important role in Turkey’s policy
towards the Russian Federation. Turkey sees Russia not only as a rival in the competition for
the transportation of Caspian oil but also as a supplier of natural gas to Turkey. Turkey
offered the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, aiming to attain lucrative transit revenues and the
Turkish government also wanted to meet expanding domestic demand for oil. 49 Turkey also
offered a pipeline project to transport Turkmen natural gas to the world markets. Turkey is
located at one of the potential export roads for both Caspian oil and Turkmen natural gas.
While Turkey competed with Russia for oil pipelines, Turkey became one of Russia’s main
customers for natural gas and wanted a pipeline to be built beneath the Black Sea to carry
natural gas from Russia to Turkey. That project was called Blue Stream and it was
considered as a rival project to the Turkmen natural gas. (See Map. 12/A, B, Appendix B,
P.465)
Turkey and Russia were adversaries during the Cold War era. For Turkey, the Soviet Union
was the main threat for its security. The Russian Federation as a successor of the Soviet
Union was also perceived as a danger for Turkey’s security. Russia’s aggressive stand on
Chechnya, Russia’s intervention on domestic affairs of the new republics of the Caucasus
contributed the image of Russia as a security threat in Turkey.
However, the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union were not comparable in terms of their
impact on world politics and their visions. The Soviet Union was one of the superpower of
the bipolar world and it was an empire with messianic ambitions. On the other hand, the
Russian Federation has domestic tensions, serious economic problems and only has a relative
impact in what Russia call is “Near Abroad”. This picture changed the character of Turkey’s
relations with the successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation. It is the fact that
both regional powers competed for the influence of regional affairs. However, there was also
potential for cooperation, particularly in the field of energy. The bases for it emerged before
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the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the agreement about Turkey’s purchase of
Russian natural gas in 1984. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union pledged to
provide Turkey with 120 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Part of the revenue was to be
used for imports of Turkish goods, of which 35 percent was allocated to Turkish contracting
services in the Soviet Union.50 The agreement entered into force in 1987 and it constituted
the basis for economic cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation.
Turko-Russian Economic Relations
Unlike the geopolitical relationship, which has historically been fraught, the economic
relationship between Russia and Turkey has long served as an instrument to foster and
advance bilateral political contacts. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union assumed the role
of aid donor and Turkey the role of aid recipient. The supply of natural gas from the USSR to
Turkey along the trans-Balkan pipeline, beginning in 1987, represented an evolution of the
traditional relationship: The technical and economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union
to Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to a supplier/consumer relationship in which
Turkey received preferential terms.
Turkey’s economic ties with Russia influenced Turkey’s regional policy vis-a-vis the Russian
Federation. As Russia became a very important market for Turkish exports goods, Turkish
exporters did not want Turkey to continue harsh competition with Russia in Eurasia. While,
in 1992, total Turkish exports to Russia were $441.9 million, in 1995, Turkish exports
reached $1,238.1 billion. In 1996, total trade volume was $3.39 billion, which reached
$4.097 billion, in 1997.51 Turkey’s export to the Russian Federation reached the highest level
in 1997 with $2 billion. However, Turkey’s export to Russia declined to $589 million in
1999. It increased in 2000 to $644 million and in 2001 Turkey’s export to Russia was $923
million. Turkey’s import from the Russian Federation has increased since 1998. While
Turkey’s import from Russia was $2.152 billion in 1998, it raised to $3.887 in 2000 and
$3.476 in 2001.52
Since trade with Russia is important for the Turkish economy, some businessmen lobbied in
favor of the Blue Stream Project. Russia’s importance as trade partner also softened the
Turkish government reactions towards Russian military involvement in the Caucasus, as was
227
clearly seen in the Turkish government’s policy during the Chechen conflicts. However,
Turkey and Russia competed on matters such as oil transportation from the Caspian Sea and
influence in the Turkic republics.
As already mentioned above, the basis for the increase in trade between Turkey and Russia
was established before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The 1984 Natural Gas
Agreement between the two countries constituted a turning point in trade relations.
Debt relations also developed alongside increased trade. In 1989-1991, the Turkish
Eximbank had allocated $1,150 million of export credit to the Soviet Union. These credits
were provided for the purchase of consumer goods from Turkey. 53 Turkish Eximbank credits
played a crucial role in Turkish-Russian relations. At the end of the 1980’s, economic
liberalization policies in the Soviet Union paved the way for the expansion of formal and
informal trade. In this period, ‘suitcase trade’ established itself as a lucrative economic
activity for both countries. Turkish contractors also signed contracts in Russia with six
contracting companies, successfully completing projects worth $716 million for the housing
of the Russian soldiers returning from Germany. Turkish companies have also constructed
official buildings in Russia. The success of the construction companies encouraged Turkish
businessmen to be even more actively involved in the Russian market. 54
Russia’s economic crisis made it difficult to meet its debt payments. As a result, Turkey and
Russia signed two major debt-rescheduling agreements on 19 July 1994 and 15 December
1995. Under these agreements, Russia’s debt repayments to Turkey were to be made in
semi-annual installments, with the last payment scheduled to take place in the year 2011. The
two countries have also become involved in joint ventures, with the first joint-venture
producing motorcycles opening in Turkey in 1995. Under another agreement, signed in
December 1995, the Turkish Eximbank has opened a new credit line for $350 million to be
used for financing the export of Turkish goods and services to Russia, thus bringing the total
amount of Turkey’s credit facilities to Russia to $950 million. 55
As already discussed above, Russia is also a major gas supplier to Turkey. Russia’s
petroleum and natural gas reserves are important for both economic and political/strategic
reasons. Turkey was a lucrative market for Russia. Despite the political problems between
Russia and Turkey, both countries managed to establish economic relations independent from
228
any political problems. However, to preserve the developments on the economic relations front
both countries need to compromise on some political issues. There remains a danger that
historical hostilities might be revived and undermine improvements in trade and commerce.
Turkey’s main concern was the revival of Russian nationalism and the re-establishment of
Russian domination in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia’s desire to deploy more soldiers in
the Caucasus caused insecurity for Turkish foreign policy makers regarding co-operation with
Russia.
Turkish contracting firms continued to be at the leading edge of Turkey’s economic involvement
in Russia as increasing numbers of Turkish firms began to operate there. The benefits of
economic co-operation, of course, are mutual. Russia still has the biggest share in Turkey’s gas
market and Turkey could become a lucrative market for the Russian defense industry, as the sale
of some military equipment to Turkey has been vetoed, from time to time, by the US Congress
and Turkey has wanted to diversify its source of military supplies. In addition, Russia wanted to
sell a nuclear reactor to Turkey. 56 A further source of co-operation has been their membership in
the BSCE, even though the latter has not been working efficiently because of the political
disputes among the member states.57
Besides the economic benefits for Turkey, Turkey’s volatile relations with the EU were one of
the main factors that made Turkish-Russian economic co-operation possible for Turkey. Having
established strong economic relations with Russia, Turkey also wanted to strengthen its hand visa-vis the EU and to reduce its economic dependence on Europe. 58 The success of Turkish private
companies in Russia encouraged the Turkish government to co-operate with Russia. Turkey’s
economic relations with Russia had an impact on Europe as well. Some European countries,
particularly Germany, were unhappy with Turkish-Russian co-operation since Turkish companies
were getting lucrative contracts in Russia at the expense of European companies. In fact, during
his visit to Turkey, Russia’s ex-Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin stated that, “We do not
want either our economic co-operation or political relations to depend on transient external
circumstances. No foreign designs, foreign views, political intrigues, and other external
circumstances can prevent our dialogue”.59
Cooperation in the Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Project
The next stage in the economic relationship came with the agreement to build the Blue Stream
gas pipeline, which increased the imported amount of gas from Russia and other neighbouning
229
states (see Chart, Appendix-K, p.491). This agreement was executed despite multiple
complications in the political relations between the two sides. The primary causes of renewed
tensions were restrictions imposed by Turkey on the transit of sea vessels through the Black Sea
Straits, as well as Turkey’s explicit goal of expanding its influence across Central Asia and in the
Southern Caucasus, including efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of the Muslims residing on
Russian territory. In the face of these tensions, Russia hoped to normalize relations by
consolidating economic interdependency.
According to the project, the Russian Company Gazprom and ENI of Italy would jointly
construct a pipeline 2200-metres beneath the Black Sea to the Turkish Black Sea town of
Samsun. Turkey would build a pipeline from Samsun to Ankara and Turkey was also responsible
for building the Ankara distribution center. 60
With the Blue Stream project, Turkey would become the second largest importer of Russian gas
after Germany.61 The Blue Stream project had international economic and political implications.
It was considered as a rival project for Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline (Turkmen gas pipeline)
project, which would carry gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey. Therefore, the Blue Stream project
was criticized by the US and Turkmenistan and some circles in Turkey. In addition to US
criticism, the project created tension between Turkey and Turkmenistan and a crisis within the
coalition government in Turkey. During the visit of Turkish Energy Minister, Cumhur Ersumer,
the President of Turkmenistan, Sapar Murat Turkmenbasi (Niyazov) stated:
Turkey pays 114 US dollars per a cubic meter of natural gas from Russia.
Turkmen gas will just cost 70 US dollars and Turkmenistan’s 23 trillion cubic
metre reserves are enough to meet Turkey’s need for next 500 years. Turkey
does not need the Blue Stream project. Turkey and Turkmenistan are one nation
and two states. We have to speed up the Turkmen pipeline project. Russia does
not want Turkmen gas to be reach the world market and the Blue Stream
project will only benefit Russia. 62
Although Russia had the biggest natural gas reserves in the world, it had difficulty supplying
natural gas to Europe since Russia’s economic crisis made it impossible to renew the existing
pipeline, which carried natural gas from Siberia. Russia started to buy gas from Turkmenistan
with barter trade or paid for it with robles and sold it to Europe, Armenia and Ukraine.
Sometimes the dispute between Russia and Turkmenistan, about payments, resulted in
Turkmenistan’s cutting natural gas to Russia. Turkmenistan wanted to sell its natural gas to
230
Europe via Turkey. In fact, Turkey was itself a very lucrative market for Turkmen gas.
Turkmenistan was concerned that the Blue Stream project might prevent the Turkmen gas
pipeline to Turkey from being realized. (See Map- 15, Appendix B, P.469) 63
Economic Relations with the European Union
From a European perspective Turkey is a large country, in regard to both its area and its
population (see Table 5). Turkey’s area exceeds that of France, the largest current EU member
state, by far. With 72 m. inhabitants Turkey has only 10 m. inhabitants less than Germany and
around the same number of inhabitants more than France, Italy and the United Kingdom. If
Turkey became a member of the EU today the area of the EU would increase by 20% and its
population by almost 16% (see Figure 1). However, since Turkey’s economy is much less
productive than that of the EU – even significantly less than that of the new member states – its
potential contribution to the economic output of the EU is very small. Turkey’s GDP is only
roughly equivalent to that of Denmark, Austria or the German state of Lower Saxonia. In 2005
the accession of Turkey would have increased EU GDP by only 2.7%. Due to the low
productivity of Turkey’s economy the per capita income of the country is also very low (see
Figure 2). In 2005 Turkey’s GDP per capita amounted to only 17.2% of that of the EU measured
at current prices and 30.7% measured in purchasing power parities.
Turke
y
Bulgaria
EU15
EU 10a
EU25
and
Romania
Population (in million)
72.1
388.2
74.1
462.3
29.4
GDP (market price; in billion €)
290.5
10286.6
557.6
10488.2
100.8
GDP (in billion PPS)
519.4
9864.1
980.1
10488.2
234.3
GDP per capita (market prices, €)
4031
26496
7525
23455
3431
GDP per capita (in PPS)
7208
25407
13228
23455
7980
a
New member state since 2004
Table: 5- Basic Economic Indicators for Turkey and EU
(Source: Eurostat, queen Tree (online data bank), 2006; own calculation.)
231
Figure: 1- Statistical Effects of Turkey’s EU Membership (increase in % of EU)
(Source: Eurostat, queen Tree (online data bank), 2006; own calculation.)
Figure: 2- GDP per capita in Turkey and in the EU, 2005
Source: Eurostat, queen Tree (online data bank), 2006; own calculation.
Turkey was one of the two countries which approached first the newly born European
Economic Community way back in 1959. This early approach was a clear manifestation of
Turkey’s European vocation. The Ankara Association Agreement of 1963 was one of the
earliest contractual ties of association to the Community. The customs union with the EU
constitutes an important step towards the consolidation of Turkey’s integration with Europe
after decades of active participation in its political, military, defense and economic
organizations side by side with the other Western European countries. As such, the customs
232
union will anchor Turkey to the West in a definitive and irreversible way. The Turkey-EU
customs union is a two way street. It provides mutual benefits to the Union and Turkey.
a. Benefits to the EU:
Turkey is one of the largest trade partners of the Union. The customs union will open and
consolidate Turkey’s less saturated 71 million consumers for community producers. With all
tariff and non-tariff barriers eliminated, community exporters will have preferential access to
and an increased share of the large Turkish market. Harmonisation of Turkish legislation
with that of the Union will facilitate doing business in Turkey and the process of dispute
settlement. The EU firms operating in Turkey will enjoy increased legal certainty on a par
with the member states.
EU firms will take advantage of the investment and production opportunities offered by
Turkey. They will be able to make use of Turkey as an export base for the Middle East, the
Black Sea region and Central Asia. They may operate more easily and effectively in these
markets, having improved co-operation and joint activities with the Turkish firms. Trade
relations between Turkey and the EU have increased considerably in recent years. In 1980,
Turkey ranked forty-fourth among countries exporting goods to the EU, while in 1993
Turkey ranked sixteenth. In 1980, Turkey ranked twenty-sixth among countries to which EU
exported goods; however it ranked sixth in 1993. These figures show that Turkey has already
turned into an extremely profitable partner for the Union. Turkey sets an example as a
pluralist and secular model of development for the countries in the region beset by political
instability and economic difficulties. The customs union will increase the appeal of the
Turkish model on its periphery, sending a message to move away from radical and extremist
attitudes which might threaten the economic and security interests of Europe proper.
b. Benefits to Turkey:
The customs union will help rationalize and modernize the economic structure of the Turkish
economy. More efficient production facilities and infrastructure will improve the
international competitiveness of Turkish firms and the resulting economies of scale will
increase the capacity of the Turkish industry. Turkish products will have higher quality and
standards. Consequently, Turkey’s exports to the EU will rise. Turkish consumers will
233
benefit from less expensive but better quality goods from a wide spectrum of suppliers. The
customs union is expected to increase the inflow of foreign direct investment from EU
countries, which will bring with it state of art technology and know how. It will also attract
investment from third countries to Turkey in the form of joint ventures. As a matter of fact,
the Central Asian countries consider the customs union of Turkey with the EU as their
window opening up to Europe.
The upgrading of legislation related to economic activities, especially in the fields of
competition rules and protection of intellectual property rights, will create a legislative
framework more conducive to the steady development of economic transactions. These will
translate into more employment in Turkey which will ease social tensions and improve the
country’s socio-economic situation at the same time as decreasing emigration pressures. It
will also help to redress macro-economic imbalances. The increased economic
interdependence with the EU will, through the strengthening of civil society, contribute to the
further development of a sound democracy and consolidate democratic values. In view of the
foregoing, the customs union makes sense for both Turkey and the EU. Yet it is not an end in
itself. It will serve as another important step towards Turkey’s progressive integration with
Europe.64
Turkey and the EU Trade Relationship
As a major emerging economy and a member of NATO and the G20, Turkey is a key partner
for the European Union. It is recognised as an active regional foreign policy player, with an
influential role in supporting reforms in its region. The EU is therefore committed to political
dialogue with Turkey on foreign policy issues of mutual interest. EU-Turkey political
dialogue is carried on at all levels on issues of mutual concern. At ministerial level, dialogue
is led for the EU by Baroness Ashton (High Representative for foreign affairs and security
policy) and Stefan Fule (Commissioner for enlargement).
A turning point in Turkish trade policy came in January 1980. Inward-looking (import
substitute) industrialization strategy was replaced by an outward-oriented (export-led) growth
strategy which relied on more market-based economy. Gradual import liberalization, more
234
flexible exchange rate regime, more effective export promotion to encourage rapid export
growth were general objectives of this reform program65. There is little doubt that the
Turkish economy has achieved an impressive transformation from an inward-looking
economy to an outward-oriented one (see Table 5 & Figure 3).
Table-6: Some Key Trade Indicators of Turkey (1963-2002) (Billion US dollars) 66
Figure 3: Export and Import Shares in GDP by years (%) Source: SPO (State Planning
Organization/Turkey), SIS (State Institute of Statistics/Turkey)
235
Figure 4: Turkey’s total Trade, Trade with the EU and the EU-6 (billions US$), Source: SPO
(State Planning Organization/Turkey), SIS (State Institute of Statistics/Turkey)
Turkey’s export performance has been impressive, especially in the first half of the 1980s.
1987-89 period had witnessed relatively small increases in export. Between 1980 and 1990,
exports grew at an average annual rate of 17.2%, while manufactured goods exports
increased in current US dollars at an annual rate of 26.2%. Exports came from 2.9 billion US
dollars in 1980 to 12.9 billion US dollars in 1990, and the export/GDP ratio increased. The
export composition changed in favour of manufactured goods. In addition to the leading
subsectors like textiles and clothing, iron and steel, several other subsectors also enjoyed
remarkable expansion. Along with the manufactured sectors, many service export industries
such as tourism, transportation and contracting also expanded their shares.
Turkey’s export performance slowed significantly especially during the 1989-1993 period
due to the expansionary monetary policies and the appreciation of the Turkish lira. A
stabilization program was announced in 1994 with the aim to reduce the domestic demand
and rate of inflation and to increase exports through the real depreciation of the Turkish lira.
As a result of the program, exports increased in this period the growth tendency of exports
continued till 1997 when the export performance decreased due to the crisis in the Southeast
Asia and the Russian Federation. The earthquakes occurred in 1999 also affected the
economic conditions negatively67. In addition, Turkey liberalised its import regime
236
substantially from 1980 onwards. In short, nominal tariff rates were reduced remarkably,
quantitative restrictions were abolished, and bureaucratic controls over imports were also
relaxed continuously68
EU-Turkish Trade at a Glance
a) The EU is Turkey’s number one import and export partner while Turkey ranks 7th in
the EU’s top import and 5th in export markets.
b) Turkey’s main exports markets are the EU, Iraq, Russia, USA, United Arab Emirates
and Iran.
c) Turkey’s exports to the EU are mostly machinery and transport equipment, followed
by manufactured goods.
d) Imports into Turkey come from the following key markets: the EU, Russia, China,
USA, Iran and South Korea.
e) EU exports to Turkey are dominated by machinery and transport material, chemical
products and manufactured goods.
The EU and Turkey trade relationship
There exist two basic dimensions of the European Union (EU) and Turkey relationship 69. The
first began with Turkey’s application as an associate member to the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1959. This application forms the basis of Turkey’s current Customs
Union (CU) Relations which was came in to force in 1996. The second is the application for
full membership to the EC in 1987. This study focuses particularly on the association
relationship between parties to see trade relations in specific. Economic relations between
two parties have been strong since the early 1950s, but were intensified over recent decades.
The long-standing preferences between Turkey and the EU have resulted in the EU being not
only the most important market for Turkey (50.5% of Turkey’s exports in 2002) but also one
of the main sources for imported goods (45,1% of Turkey’s imports in 2002) The
Community accounts for nearly half of Turkey’s total imports and exports as compared to
other partners (See Table 7).
237
Table- 7: Turkey and the EU Trade
Source: State Planning Organisation (SPO), IMF Financial Statistics, several years. 70
Figures in Table 5 suggest that the EU share in the Turkish exports and imports have always
been around 50 per cent. This shows that Turkey and the EU have been traditional and stable
trade partners over time. This fact has not changed even in the years of economic crises of
1999, 2000 and after. Empirically, it is difficult to measure the effects of the CU (trade
creation and trade diversion effects-revenue lose-sectoral effects) in such a short period of
time. Instead, in our study, we employed trade modeling for the period 1963-2002, which
produced relevant price and income elasticities that are crucial for policy implications for
both Turkey and the EU.
Between 1980 and 1990, exports grew at an average annual rate of 17.2%, while
manufactured goods exports increased in current US dollars at an annual rate of 26.2%. The
export growth rate of Turkey has been above the world export growth rate leading to an
increase in Turkey’s share in world exports (see Table 7 above and Figure 3 & 4). Exports
came from 2.9 billion US dollars in 1980 to 12.9 billion US dollars in 1990, and the
export/GDP ratio increased. The export composition changed in favour of manufactured
goods. The export boom was mainly in manufactured goods. In addition to the leading
subsectors like textiles and clothing, iron and steel, several other subsectors also enjoyed
238
remarkable expansion. Along with the manufactured sectors, many service export industries
such as tourism, transportation and contracting also expanded their shares.
Turkey’s export performance slowed significantly especially during the 1989-1993 period
due to the expansionary monetary policies and the appreciation of the Turkish lira. By the
end of 1993, however, the economy was overheating. Domestic demand raised by about 12
per cent in 1993, import volumes jumped by 36 per cent and GDP grew by 8.1 per cent.
Following years of high fiscal deficits and inflation in excess of 50 per cent a year, a sharp
deterioration in public sector (PSBRs are 12 per cent of GDP in 1993) and external deficits
caused a loss of confidence in the Turkish lira and a financial crisis in early 1994.
The EU and Turkey trade over time: an evaluation
There are two dimensions to Turkey and the European Union (EU) relations. The first one
began with Turkey’s application as an associate member to the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1959. This application forms the basis of Turkey’s current Customs
Union (CU) Relations. The other is the application for full membership to the EC in 1987.
This study focuses particularly on the association relationship between parties to see trade
relations in spesific. Turkey’s application to the EEC as an associate member was made on
31 July 1959. Following difficult and protracted negotiations, the application ultimately
resulted in the signing in Ankara on 12 September 1963 of the Association Treaty. The
Ankara Treaty came into force on 1 December 196471. The stated objective of the Agreement
was to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations
between the parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure accelerated development
of the Turkish economy and the need to improve the level of employment and living
conditions of the Turkish people. Association Agreement was aimed establishing a customs
union integration between parties (The Ankara Treaty, 1963).
The Ankara Agreement foresaw the economic association between Turkey and the EC in
three stages: a preparatory stage, a transition stage, and a final stage, that is the CU period.
During the first preparatory stage, which began in 1964 and lasted 5 years, The Community
granted unilateral concessions to Turkey in the form of financial assistance and preferential
tariffs on Turkey’s traditional agricultural exports products. Turkey on the other hand, was
239
not obliged to modify her foreign trade policies. Turkey had followed an import subsititution
strategy, coupled with high protection rates. Her exports to the EU was mainly a few
traditional crops. During this stage, Turkey’s only commitment was to improve her economy
and prepare for the transition period. The preparatory stage was completed in five years
without any problems and Turkey took the necessary steps to initiate the second stage of the
Association Agreement.
The second stage was the transitional stage which was aimed at setting the timetable towards
the establishment of a CU between the parties at the latest in 1995. The Additional Protocol,
establishing the second stage was signed on 23 November 1970 in Brussels, but came into
effect in January 1973 (The Additional Protocol, 1970) The Additional Protocol covered
Turkey’s and the EC’s trade and financial commitments to each other.
After the Additional Protocol, the EC abolished tariffs and equivalent taxes (as of 1
September 1971) on industrial imports from Turkey in a short period, with the exception of
certain sensitive products such as machine woven carpets, cotton yarn and cotton textiles.
The EC also removed all quantitative restrictions on industrial imports from Turkey with the
exception of restriction on imports of cocoons and raw silk. In addition, by November 1987,
the EC abolished the customs duties on Common Agriculture Policy goods which were not
included within the CU. However, it did continue to apply quotas and minimum import
prices which were within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy. The EU has
fulfilled most of its obligations during the transition period. However, its non-tariff barriers
against some of Turkey’s comparatively advantageous goods like textiles, iron and steel,
raisins, fresh fruits and vegetables has been one of the main problems between Turkey and
the EU. By taking and applying protectionist measures towards Turkey’s exports of those
products, the EU put more obstacles on Turkey’s economy. Instead of quantitative
restrictions, anti dumping has become an EU policy towards Turkey.
Turkey was given a longer period of adjustment to make successive reductions to the
customs tariffs applied to imports from the EC within the frame of two seperate lists with
different time spans (as of 1 January 1973). The twelve year list is included in the important
inputs for existing industries and the products of these industrial branches which were
240
thought to be in a position to compete in the foreign market in twelve years. Turkey promised
to decrease the tariff rates on more sensitive commodities in twenty two years. Furthermore,
Turkey promised to adopt Common Customs Tariffs of the Community over time.
During the first four years of the transitional period (1973-1976), the implementation of the
Additional Protocol went ahead as planned. After 1976, Turkey-EC relations ran into
problems. The process of implementing the Additional Protocol came to a virtual standstill.
Turkey’s main failure was being unable to reduce the tariffs as planned. Turkey could not
make the necessary reduction on tariffs. Tariffs on goods (on a twelve year and a twenty-two
year lists) were reduced only twice, in 1973 and 1976 respectively. In January 1977, Turkey
postponed the first step of her scheduled tariff alignment with the Common Customs Tariff.
One year later she also postponed the third round of tariff reduction 72.
The period between 1976 and 1987 relations were strained. The first disappointment emerged
after the first oil crisis, as stagflation and rising unemployment in Europe affected labour
recruitment from Turkey, demonstrating the Community’s inability to comply with the
provisions concerning the free circulation of labour 73. Another major problem sprang from
the extension of concessions by the EC to many LDC’s under the General System of
Preferences, more importantly, under the global Mediterranean Policy which considerably
eroded the preferences granted to Turkey in agriculture and industry. Then, the relations
between the EC and Turkey were affected by the overthrow of the civilian government
towards the end of 1980, and were not normalized until six years later. After the military
takeover of September 1980, the Community’s aid programme to Turkey was frozen 74. With
Turkey’s possible exclusion from the Council of Europe, relations between Turkey and the
Community became bitter.
Turkey-EC relations showed signs of normalization only towards the end of 1986. On 14
April 1987 Turkey formally applied for full EC membership. After her application to the EC,
Turkey rapidly began to fulfill her obligations and started to implement tariff reductions and
adoption for the common customs tariffs in the frame of the Association Agreement. In fact,
this accelerated adoption to the Community’s tariffs was also due to the structural change of
Turkish economy in the eighties.
241
After Turkey’s application for the full membership, on 5 February 1990, the EC member
states concluded on the basis of the ‘Opinion’ of Commission on 18 December 1989, that it
would be inappropriate for the Community, which was in a state of flux, to become involved
in new accession negotiations. The completion in 1995 of the CU, in accordance with the
provision of the Agreement was considered by the Commision to be of prime importance for
increased interdependence and integration between Turkey and the Community. At a meeting
of the Association Council at ministerial level on 9 November 1992 both sides agreed to
restart the implementation of the provision laid down in the Association Agreement. Until the
end of the 1995, Turkey fulfilled all her tariff reductions which was mentioned in twelve and
twenty two years lists in the Additional Protocol.
Turkey as an energy supplier of Europe
For years, Turkey has been growing in importance for Europe when it comes to the delivery of
oil and natural gas. Turkey’s proximity to the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and
Europe makes the country an ideal center for energy distribution. Since the outbreak of the
current political crisis in Ukraine, the country has come to the top of the list of strategic partners
for Europe when it comes to importing oil and natural gas. Christian Grun said "We’re observing
increasing interest from European and international companies, particularly for the Turkish
energy market. And anyway, its geostrategic position is one of a kind, also the liberalization of
the Turkish market represents one of the biggest opportunities and challenges for the country. 75
Turkey is currently working on multiple projects to diversify its regional energy supplies. For
one, there is the southern gas corridor, intended to transport natural gas from the Caspian Sea and
Middle East to Europe without crossing Russia. The southern gas corridor is to be served by the
trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), which aims to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan
through Turkey and into Europe.
Turkey and Euromed
Turkey is member of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership76 (Euromed) and as such should
conclude free trade agreements with all other Mediterranean partners, with a view to the creation
of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership promotes
242
economic integration and democratic reform across 16 neighbours to the EU’s south in North
Africa and the Middle East. One important part of this work is to achieve mutually satisfactory
trading terms for the Euromed region’s partners. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is an
essential component in the pursuit of greater economic integration in the Mediterranean region. 77
It is precisely at this juncture that Turkey’s integration to the EU assumes critical importance. It
is not clear when and if Turkey will become a full member of the EU. Nonetheless, the
membership process is likely to create a stronger institutional framework for economic change.
For the economy, the key contribution of the goal of membership will be the strengthening of the
political will to proceed with the institutional changes that may raise the water level in the glass
and carry Turkey’s economy to a new level.78
Long-standing as it is, Turkey’s far reaching foreign policy along with its geo-strategic
emplacement at the fulcrum of East-West see-saw and its key role in the regional and global
political and economic equilibrium, impels it to attach due importance to relations with Europe at
large. A critical position such as this requires both a constant exploitation of every opportunity
for improvement and a diversification of its foreign economic relations. The Western dimension
of this policy is defined by its full membership in NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and
OECD as well as its associate membership of the EU from 1963. Turkey applied for full
membership in the EU on 14 April 1987, signed the Free Trade and Co-operation Agreement
with the EFTA on 20 December 1991, and applied to become a full member of the WEU in 1992.
The customs union with the EU entered into force as of January 1996.
From a purely macroeconomic perspective Turkey’s full membership could be an advantage.
This can be taken as certain in the case of Turkey. As far as the incumbent states are concerned
the advantages or disadvantages in relation to their GDP seem to be small. They depend on the
degree of the deterioration which the states have to face in their transfer position. Although
migration from Turkey into the current member states could lead to positive production effects
the costs necessary to realise them are regarded as high, at least by some member countries.
Thus, Turkey’s accession is not a problem for the EU economy as a whole but it seems to be a
problem for some members. Furthermore, it is not the economic integration of two areas itself
which may create negative effects. Rather, it is the existing EU framework of agricultural and
regional policy establishing a certain pattern of favoured member states.
243
Of course, full EU membership of Turkey presumes and implies a high degree of structural
change in the private sector as well as fundamental institutional reforms in that country. The
costs of the adjustment processes will be high, but the economic benefits will be high too. Not
only Turkey would have to adjust, however; the EU and the member states would also have to
implement changes in order to be able to integrate such a large, poor country. The EU has to
reform its common agricultural policy as well as its regional policy. The recent decisions on the
EU budget for the period 2007-2013 do not include any substantial change reducing the
distribution conflicts which have to be envisaged in the case of Turkey’s membership.
It is true that it has been agreed that in 2008 or 2009 fresh decisions can be taken on all revenues
and expenditures. But it is still to be seen whether the EU is willing to come to decisions which
are more appropriate for a European Union including Turkey. As far as the single member states
are concerned, they have to show that they are willing and able to liberalise their labour markets
and to bear and handle the costs involved. If the EU and the member states do not move in this
direction, Turkey’s full membership will become very improbable. This holds true independently
of considerations with a political, cultural and religious background, which may be much more
important than those made from an economic perspective.
The Turkish economy is thriving. Growth averaged 7 percent through the first decade of the
century and it weathered the global financial downturn much better than most EU nations. Its
public finances are the envy of southern Europe. Per-capital income has increased six-fold and
the average Turk is now better off than his Romanian and Bulgarian counterparts in the EU. Only
New York, London and Moscow have more resident billionaires than Istanbul. Bringing in such a
dynamo would inject new life into the EU economy, as well as adding 75 million consumers to
the single market.
244
1.
Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World
Economy in the Second Millennium, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 512.
2.
O. Okyar, ‘The Concept of Etatism’, Economic Journal, March, 1965, (https://www.
academia.edu/1613307/Turkey_s_Economic_Integration_into_the_EU_Challenges_a
nd_Opportunities.
3.
Aktan, C.C., 1997, ‘Turkey: From Etatism to a More Liberal Economy’, Journal of
Social, Political and Economic Studies, 22(2), pp. 165-184
4.
Ibid.
5.
O. Mehmet, ‘Turkey in Crisis: Some Contradictions in the Kemalist Development
Strategy’, Journal of Middle East Studies, 1983, Vol. 15, pp. 47-66.
6.
OECD, Total Population for OECD Countries, Demographic Indicators Statistics,
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005, Paris.
7.
Ibid.
8.
I. Civcir, , “Money demand, financial liberalization and currency substitution in
Turkey”, Journal of Economic Studies, 2003, Vol. 30 No. 5, pp. 514-34
9.
Z. Onis, & B. Webb, ‘Turkey: Democratization and Adjustment From Above’, in Z.
Onis (ed.), State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative
Perspective, Boazici University Press, 1999, Istanbul, p. 325.
10.
Turkish Republic, State Institute of Statistics, National Income Accounts by Province
Quoted by, Haluk Sezer, ‘Regional welfare weights for Turkey’, Journal of Economic
Studies, Vol. 33 Issue 5, 2006, pp.357 - 368
11.
A.M. Lejour, R.A. de Mooij, and C.H. Capel, “Assessing the economic implications
of Turkish accession to the EU”, CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis, 2004, No. 56, March
12.
Mehmet Ugur and Nergis Canefe (edit), Turkey and European Integration, Routledge,
New York, 2005, pp. 74-77
13.
One of the six fundamental pillars of the ideology of Kemalism: 1. Republicanism
(Turkish: cumhuriyetcilik), 2. Populism (Turkish: halkcilık), 3. Nationalism (Turkish:
milliyetcilik), 4. Secularism (Turkish: laiklik), 5. Statism (Turkish: devletcilik), and 6.
245
Reformism (Turkish: devrimcilik). The principles came to be recognized as
unchangeable and sacrosanct.
14 .
OECD (1987/1988), OECD Economic Survey: Turkey, Paris: OECD.
15.
Mehmet Ugur, The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma,
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999, p.59-67
16.
Mehmet Ugur, op. cit., p.91
17.
Ertugrul, A. and F. Selcuk (2001), ‘A brief account of the Turkish economy, 1980–
2000’, Russian and East European Finance and Trade, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 6–30.
18.
OECD (1987/1988), OECD Economic Survey: Turkey, Paris: OECD.
19.
Müftüler, M. (1995), ‘Turkish economic liberalisation and European integration’,
Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 85–98
20.
Stratfor is a Texas-based global intelligence company, www.stratfor.com/
21.
Archaeologists report evidence of flourishing trade and technological development in
the copper age (circa. 2500-200 B.C.) and onward, with the Troy of Homer’s Iliad
recognized as having been on the Anatolian side of the Aegean. Tuitv, A Country
Study 6-28 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1996). For broad treatment of ancient origins in
the region, see Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey In Europe And Europe In Turkey (Turgut
Ozal ed., Eng. ed 1991), pp. 1-55.
22.
Today the same geographical-commercial positioning also includes linking the oil rich
Caspian Sea region to the Mediterranean, as Turkey may offer the safest route for
exploiting these vast oil reserves. Turkey’s President Offers His Support for Caspian
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A9. Negotiations are under way among a
1999 consortium to build a US $2.5 billion gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, through
the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, to Turkey. Id.; see Robert Corzine, US. Is
Urged To Step in to Kickstart Caspian Gas Project, Financial Times, April 15, 1999,
(explaining that “[t]he U.S. favors such an energy export corridor” that bypasses
Russia and Iran, which are two dominant powers in region)
23.
Robert D. Kaplan, op. cit., p.17
24.
Lesser, op. cit., p. xiv
246
25.
Press Release, Representation of the European Commission to Turkey, (visited May
10, 1998) http://www.eureptr.org.tr/english/flash/flash5.html (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal)
26.
Foreign Trade (visited April 11, 1999) <http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/
English/treconomy/balance/2foreign.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal)
27.
Turkey, A Country Study, p. 230
28.
Stephen Kinzer, ‘A Dynamo Redefines Turks’ Role in the World’, New York Times,
July 31, 1998
29.
J. Collars, and W.A. Mitchell, ‘The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolian
Development Project,’ Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-USA, 1991
30.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/19/turkey-and-russia-evolving-relationship,
retrieve 23/11/2014
31.
G R Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers , Leiden- Boston, 200, p. 204
32.
op. cit., p. 237
33.
R. Sugdenand & J. R. Wilson, ‘Economic Globalization: Dialectics,
Conceptualization and Choice’, Contributions to Political Economy, 2005, vol. 24,
p. 16
34.
As is well known, the Copenhagen criteria are: the existence of a functioning market
economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces
within the Union.
35.
This shows that globalization and localization are not conflicting, but rather are
complementary processes.
36.
EU Commission Regular Report on Turkey, Brussels: European Commission, 2000,
p. 31
37.
EU Commission Regular Report on Turkey, Brussels: European Commission, 2003,
p. 52
247
38.
“Arnavutluk Ulke Profili” on www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action=detay&
yayinID=236&icerikID=210&dil=TR accessed on 12/12/2009.
39.
Ibid.
40.
Ibid.
41.
Ibid.
42.
“Arnavutluk Ulke Bulteni”, DEIK, op. cit., p. 11.
43.
“Calik Holding grows in Europe with investments in
www.calik.com/news_item.aspx?id=32 accessed on 12/12/2009.
Albania"
on
44.
EKNA (Ekna construction & Indurtry Co. Inc.) http://www.enka.com/
45.
TUMAS
(Turkish
Engineering,
www.tumas.com.tr/brosur/EN.pd
46.
GINTAS (Gintas Construction Contracting and Trade) http://www.gintas.com.tr
47 .
www.suyapi.com.tr
48.
Ibid.
49.
Colin Barraclough, ‘Asian Republics: A Turkish Delight’, Insight, no. 47, 23
November 1993, p. 15.
50.
FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), 27 December 1984, Eximbank
Reports, 1992.
51.
See DEIK, Dis Ekonomik Iliskiler Kurulu (Foreign Economic Relations Board)
Report, Central Asian Republics and the Republic of Azerbaijan, June 1998.
52.
Turkish Embassy
/rus_tek.html
53.
DEIK, Op. cit.,
54.
See Turan Aydin and Olgan Bekar (eds.), Turkiye’nin Orta ve Uzun Vadeli Cikarlari
Acisindan Turk-Rus Iliskileri, (Istanbul: Tesev Yayinlari, 1997).
55.
Web site of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ae/russian.htm
56.
Milliyet, 22 December 1997, www.milliyet.com.tr
in
Moscow
web
248
Consulting
site,
and
Contracting
Co.)
http://www.turkishline.ru/embassy
57.
Tor Bukkvoll, ‘The Black Sea Region’, in Erik Hansen (ed.), Cooperation in the
Baltic Region, the Barents Region and the Black Sea Region, The Royal Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997, pp. 38-50.
58.
Mehmet Ali Birand, ‘Rusya Kartini Oynayalim’, Sabah, 16 December 1997
59.
Itar Tass, ‘Russia and Turkey Promoting Political Dialogue’, 23 December 1997
60.
A. Novopashin and A. Lavrentiev Stroytransgaz, ‘New Pipelines of Natural Gas from
Russia to Turkey’, Paper presented in Onshore Pipelines Conference, Istanbul, 3-4
December 1998.
61.
ITAR-TASS News Agency, 20 July 1998
62.
Hakan Gurek, ‘Moskova’da Ne Isiniz Var?’, Milliyet, 7 October 1999. See also
Gungor Mengi, ‘Gaz Kokusu’, Sabah, 7 October 1999. See also Ferai Tinc,
‘Turkmenbasi Fircasinin Perde Arkasi’, Hurriyet, 8 October 1999.
63.
Sedat Ergin, ‘Turkiye Dogal Gazin Vanasi Olursa’, Hurriyet, 12 November 1999,
www.hurriyetdailynews.com
64.
Ercan Ozer, ‘Foreign Economic Policy and Relations of Turkey: The Regional
Perspective,’ for detail see: Sam.Gov.Tr/Wp-Content/Uploads/2012/
65.
Baysan, T. and C. Blitzer (1991), “Turkey”, in Liberalising Foreign Trade: The New
Zealand, Spain and Turkey: Vol.6, D. Papageorgiou, M. Michaely and A.M. Choksi
(eds.), A research Project of the World Bank, Basil Blacwell, Cambridge, MA
66.
Source: State Planning Organization (SPO), IMF Financial Statistics, several years.
Quoted by, Utkulu, Utku; Seymen, Dilek, Trade and Competitiveness Between
Turkey and the EU: Time Series Evidence, Discussion Paper, Turkish Economic
Association, 2004, No. 2004/8,
67.
Cosar E., ‘Price and Income Elasticities of Turkish Export Demand: A Panel Data
Application’, Central Bank Review 2, 2002, pp. 24-25
68.
G. Kazgan, ‘External Pressures and the New Policy Outlook’, in Turkey and Europe C.
Balkir, A.M. Williams (eds.), Pinter Publishers Ltd, London, 1993, pp. 69-99
69.
D. Seymen, ‘Customs Union Relations Between Turkey and The European Union’,
Turkey on the European Road, Conference, University of Sussex, June, 1998
70 .
Ibid.
249
71.
Ankara Agreement is an agreement which set up association between Turkey and the EU.
It does not commit full membership for Turkey. But, Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement
envisages the possibility of ultimate full membership for Turkey at a future unspecified
date, provided that Turkey proves to be capable of fulfilling her commitment as stipulated
in the Agreement
72.
Togan, S. (1995), Trade Policy Review of the Republic of Turkey, The World Economy
Global Trade Policy, Sven Arndt, Chris Milner (eds) Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford.
Qouted by Utku Utkulu and Dilek Seymen, Working Paper, “Trade and Competitiveness
Between Turkey and the EU” Time Series Evidence Discussion Paper, Turkish Economic
Association, No. 2004/8, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83227
73.
Article 36 of the Additional Protocol stated that the Turkish workforce could have the right
to freedom of free circulation within the member countries. In addition to this, the
Turkish workforce was to benefit from social rights of where ever they worked. This
article was to came in to force by 1986. However the EC was reluctant on allowing the
Turks to use this right. There for the Turkish workforce was not able to benefit from this
article. This was later supplemented by the introduction of visa requirement for Turks
visiting the EC countries, see: D. Seymen ‘Customs Union Relations Between Turkey
and The European Union’, Turkey on the European Road, Conference, University of
Sussex, June, 1998
74.
There were four financial signed protocols by 1980 between Turkey and the EC. These
aids are partly in the form of donation and partly in the form of credit from the European
Investment Bank Turkey did benefit from the first three protocols but the fourth protocol
was frozen due to the Turkey’s relations with Europe being weakened. After the CU
Decision, another financial aids program planned for helping Turkey’s adoption to the
CU and cover her tariffs revenue loses from third countries (to eliminate trade diversion
effect of the CU). On the other hand, Turkey has not benefited from these aids efficiently.
Since Turkey is not the member of the EU, she does not use financial found of the
Commission to cover her loses caused by the CU. So, those financial aids are very
important for Turkey to receive the benefits of this integration.
75.
http://www.dw.de/europe-eyes-turkey-as-an-energy-supplier/a-17612168
76.
Euro-Mediterranean partnership members are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey
77.
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean
78.
Sevlet Pamuk, ‘Economic Change in Twentieth Century Turkey’ edited by Resat Kasab,
The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol-4, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 300
250
CHAPTER IV: SECTION-B
CULTURAL RELATIONS
“Isolated by Ottoman history, language and culture from the West and by its Republican
history and political choices from the East, it is very difficult to place Turkey into any neat
geographical, cultural, political or economic category” writes Mustafa Aydin. He explains
the dilemmas and the complexity of defining Turkish identity in the following way. Although
about 97 percent of Turkey’s land mass lies in Asia, Turkey’s progressive elite consider their
country as part of Europe. About 98 percent of its population is Muslim and yet Turkey is a
secular state by choice and its religious development has taken a different route from that of
other Muslim states. Culturally, most of the country reflects the peculiarities of Middle
Eastern culture, but with an equal persistency it participates in European cultural events. It
claims to have a liberal economic system, but the features of the planned economy are still
encountered. In the religious, historical and geographical senses it is a Middle Eastern
country, yet any development impinging upon the status quo of the Balkans, the Caucasus,
Caspian and Black Sea regions and the Mediterranean directly affects Turkey just as much. 1
As mentioned above, there are many objective elements, such as the Graeco- Roman and
Judeo-Christian heritage, Renaissance and Reformation, Enlightenment and Industrialization.
These categories, which non-Europe does not have, are used to define Europe. It is clear that
the European identity is mostly shaped by the differences that it has from the others. It is
argued by many scholars critical of the Eurocentric heritage that the self-constitution of
Europe has been made possible through the construction of the other which has been
conceived as being inferior to Europe.2 Among all the others, the most obvious and the most
threatening has been the Islamic Near East, represented from the fourteenth century onwards
by the Ottoman Empire. Turkish ‘other’ may be said to have the most powerful influence.
Many scholars believe that the European identity is based very much on exclusion and rather
than inclusion. In order to define itself, Europe needed another against whom it could
construct an identity of its own and for most of its history the Ottomans and Islam fulfilled
this duty well. The Turks starting with the Ottoman Empire to today claimed to be a
European state and it is admitted by the Europeans that Turkey has been in Europe for a very
long time in history, but has never been accepted as a European state. Actually, Turks has
been a perfect other of Europe. On the other hand, the modern Turkish identity too has been
formed in relation to modern Europe.
251
Since the beginning of history, Anatolia, well known as one the earliest settlements, has
continued to flourish with the migration of various tribes, and accumulated a large cultural
heritage through a line of succeeding empires and civilizations. Many empires ranging from
the Sumerians to the Hittites, the Lydians to the Byzantines and the Seljuks to the Ottomans
have once thrived and expired within the borders of Turkey. Ankara is the capital of Turkey,
which established a democratic regime with the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
The Bosporus and the Dardanelles, connecting the seas of this magnificent landscape
surrounded by the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Aegean and Marmara seas, function as
bridges connecting the lands of the region almost like silk threads.
Greece and Bulgaria to the west, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to the east and Iran, Iraq,
and Syria to the south are the border neighbors of Turkey. The member of various
international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference our country continuous to evolve and grow at rapid
speed. Located at the mid-point of the European, Asian and African continents, Turkey has a
varied geography rich in mountains, plains, caves, seas and many other natural formations
and beauties. All types of sports activities and more specifically outdoor sports can be done
amidst a breathtaking nature providing both for adrenaline and entertainment.
The Ottoman Empire and Europe: Cultural Encounters
Although the Islamic world and Christian Europe had been in contact since the westward
expansion of Islam, scholars in the past were interested in the political and economic history
of the two worlds, wars and conflicts, diplomatic and commercial relations rather than
interactions in art. Fortunately recent research has thrown light upon the cultural exchange
between Europe and the Islamic world revealing the fact that Islamic and Western art
interacted with each other over the centuries. This Chapter covers mainly the cultural
encounters between Europe and the Ottomans who had become immediate neighbours on the
Balkans and the Mediterranean after the Ottoman state expanded into Central Europe.3
The two cultures met in different geographies under different conditions and through the
centuries the rulers and art patrons as much as the political, diplomatic and trade relations
252
had a great role in the cultural exchange. Different as the two artistic traditions may seem
cultural contacts enriched each other’s artistic and technical achievements, little affected
by wars and conflicts of belief.4
Sultan Mehmed II: the patronage of Art
Sultan Mehmed II is considered as one of the rare rulers who changed the course of world
history but less known is his art patronage that left deep traces in the Western and Eastern
world. Mehmed II, who was interested in ancient history and Western culture from an early
age, was the first Ottoman ruler who had cultural relations with the West. He enriched his
library with a great number of scientific books written in various languages in the fields of
geography, medicine, history and philosophy. Among these were Bibles and classical Greek
works. Giorgios Amirutzes of Trabezond produced a world map for the Sultan by making
use of Ptolemy’s Geographike.5 In the Topkapi Palace, there is a Latin copy of the
Geographike and an Italian translation by Berlinghieri Fiorentino dedicated to Mehmed II.
Italian and Catalan maps and portolans also reached the palace in this period.6 In addition to
scientific books and maps Italian engravings depicting mythological and religious scenes
found their way to the Sultan’s library.7
Mehmed II’s personality, politics and his interest in the Western world led to the spread of
the image of the Turks in European art. The first portrait of the Sultan produced in Europe
has the inscription El Turco and it is based on the image of the Byzantine emperor Johannes
Paleologus found on a medal struck on the occasion of the council that convened in Florence
in 1438 with the purpose of uniting Eastern and Western churches. 8
Mehmed II, who followed the developments in the Renaissance art and science, wanted to
immortalize his own image with medals and portraits, like the Greek and Roman rulers and
the Renaissance humanists whose portraits were objects of diplomatic and cultural
exchange.9 He requested artists from several rulers in Italy. 10 Sent by Ferdinand Ferrante II,
the King of Naples, Costanzo da Ferrara, was the first Italian artist who came to the Ottoman
palace. This Venetian medallist stayed in Istanbul in the mid-1470s and struck medals with
portraits of the Conqueror.11 After the peace agreement made with Venice in 1479, political
and cultural exchanges with the Venetians had increased. The Sultan asked from the doge of
253
Venice for a bronze caster who could make medals and a painter. Gentile Bellini came and
worked for the Sultan in Istanbul, struck a medal with the Sultan’s portrait and produced
other portraits and city views. Moreover, it is thought that the Sultan sent this medal to
Lorenzo dei Medici with whom he had good relations. Mehmed II had arrested in Istanbul
the leader of the Pazzi uprising against the Medicis. 12
Bellini’s most important work is the oil portrait that is now at the National Gallery in London.
In this portrait, Bellini used the Renaissance portrait model but still followed an oriental
iconography. According to recent research, the crowns on both sides of the arch in the portrait
symbolize the Ottoman Sultans preceding Mehmed II. The seventh crown that of the reigning
Sultan Mehmed is found on the embroidered cover. 13 The important point is that Mehmed II
obtained what he wanted and the portrait medals he commissioned and their copies made in
Europe provided for the spread of the image of the Sultan in Europe.14 The activities of the
European masters undoubtedly influenced the local artists working at the Conqueror’s
ateliers. A portrait of the Sultan attributed to a local artist, Sinan Bey, shows how borrowings
from Western painting were transformed into Islamic norms. Bellini as well as many other
fifteenth and sixteenth century painters, led by the Venetian painters, used figures dressed in
Turkish costumes in their paintings depicting scenes from the Bible. It is known that in this
period the Ottoman fabrics and carpets were imported to Italy by Italian merchants.
Moreover, fabrics similar to these were produced in some of the Italian cities.15 Turkish
carpets depicted in fifteenth century European paintings are proof of their popularity.16
Sultan Bayezid II
Mehmed II’s successor, Sultan Bayezid II, did not seem to share his father’s interest in
European painting, but he was aware of the activities of Italy’s masters and requested
architectural and engineering services from some of them. Leonardo da Vinci wrote a letter
to the Sultan making a proposal for a floating bridge on the Golden Horn. In fact, the
drawing of such a bridge project is found in Leonardo’s notebooks.17 Michelangelo also
prepared a model for the same bridge and he even considered coming to Istanbul.
18
Sultan
Bayezid II, unlike his father, did not have an interest in portraits. However, it is interesting to
note the first series of Ottoman Sultan portraits was produced in Europe during his reign.
This series of portraits ending with Bayezid II, is attributed to Felix Petancius, who painted
254
the portraits by relying on the information provided by the Hungarian Embassy delegation
that came to Istanbul in 1495. In this series, in scroll form, portraits of the first seven
Ottoman Sultans up until Sultan Bayezid II are placed in medallions. 19 Such examples
prove the growing interest in Europe in the Ottoman Sultan portraits after Sultan Mehmed
the Conqueror.
Suleyman the Magnificent
The expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century during the reign of
Suleyman the Magnificent as far as Central Europe and the important role the Ottomans
played in the European balance of power caused an increase in interest as well as anxiety
towards Turkey and the Turks. Two different approaches towards the Ottomans were
encountered in the sixteenth century European art and culture. The first group were the books
and materials produced with the reaction and fear against the crushing, threatening power of
the Turks. Prejudiced propaganda publications were prepared against the expansion policy of
the Ottomans. In the newspapers and bulletins published in the Germanic countries there
were pictures with a political content carrying negative images of the Turks.20 The second
group was composed of more objective publications and works of art that illustrated Ottoman
country and culture.21 Several Europeans, who came to the Ottoman country with various
political and diplomatic purposes, wrote books about the Ottoman Empire and had their
books illustrated with paintings done by the artists who accompanied them or by the
local artists they commissioned in Istanbul.
In fact, travel books and illustrated books related to the Ottoman Empire became widespread
in Europe after the period of Suleyman the Magnificent. Ottoman daily life and costumes and
views of Istanbul, included in almost all of these, are documentary sources for the Ottoman
Empire in this period. For example, Pieter Coecke van Aelst from Anvers, who came to the
Ottoman capital in 1533 on behalf of the gobelin factory in Brussels to sell tapestries, stayed
in Istanbul for a period of time and he made a series of drawings related to the Ottomans.
Cosmographer Nicolas de Nicolay, who accompanied the French ambassador sent to Istanbul
in 1553, also made numerous drawings documenting the Ottoman costumes and these
paintings printed in his travel book in Lyon in 1568 became a documentary source for many
artists in later years. Melchior Lorichs from Flensburg, who came with the Ambassador
255
Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, sent by the Holy Roman Empire to the Ottoman court, produced
the most realistic paintings depicting the period of Suleyman the Magnificent. Lorichs’
Istanbul panorama and his drawings of various districts, streets, monuments in Istanbul
and his costumes are important visual documents for the Ottoman Empire in this period. 22
Suleyman the Magnificent is one of the Ottoman rulers most frequently portrayed in Europe.
Undoubtedly, this is because of the significant role he played in European politics throughout
his reign for forty-six years. Suleyman’s alliance with Francois I, who was defeated by the
Habsburgs in 1526 and his Hungarian campaign against the Habsburgs is the most important
political event of this period. In this manner, the Ottoman pressure on the Catholic
Habsburgs facilitated the spread of Protestantism and Luther’s success. 23 In fact, the portraits
of the Sultan became more widespread in Europe after his Mohacs campaign and the 1529
Vienna siege. As early as 1526, Albrecht Durer, drew the portrait of the Sultan. Tiziano, the
Venetian artist, painted a bust portrait of Suleyman, and used images resembling the Sultan
in some of his religious paintings copied from images that already existed. An interesting
portrait, painted by Agostino Veneziano in 1535, depicts the Sultan with a helmet decorated
with precious jewels. This helmet, in the shape of a crown, was commissioned in 1532 to the
Caorlini’s, a Venetian jeweller family because Suleyman the Magnificent wanted to wear
an imperial crown like the westerners to show his supremacy over the European
rulers. In fact, sources indicate that the Sultan wore this crown in a ceremony that was also
attended by the Habsburg ambassadors in Nis before the 1532 campaign. 24 The conquests
and personal life of the Sultan were the source of inspiration for many literary works, ballets
and operas in Europe after the sixteenth century. Not only the Sultan himself, but his wife
Hurrem Sultan (Roxelana) and his Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha were also included in plays
and librettos. Even Cervantes and Lope De Vega, two famous Spanish authors, wrote many
plays about the Turks. Among these, Cervantes’ La Gran Sultana and El Trato de
Constantinople are among the most important.
Suleyman the Magnificent’s relations and political alliances established with France left deep
marks on both sides. The Ottoman-French alliance mentioned above provided for the
Ottomans expansion and sovereignty in the Mediterranean. The sea campaigns of the
256
Ottomans initiated the Ottoman science of geography. Undoubtedly, the Ottomans were also
using the Portuguese, Catalan and Italian maps that reached the Ottoman capital. In fact, Piri
Reis, the famous cartographer of the period, made his world map, which is now lost except
for a fragment, by using Christopher Columbus’ map, and therefore, is an important product
of the cultural exchange in the Mediterranean. He also wrote his Kitab-i Bahriye (Book of
navigation) in this milieu. The city views in Kitab-i Bahriye are the forerunners of Ottoman
topographical paintings that developed as a separate genre. 25 Matrakci Nasuh, the famous
historian and miniature artist of Suleyman’s period, while describing the Sultan’s Hungarian
campaign and Admiral Barbarossa’s Mediterranean campaign, drew the different states in
these campaigns, the cities, towns and ports and documented the topography of these
regions. In other words, from then on images related to Europe were encountered in Ottoman
painting. Haydar Reis (Nigari), another miniature artist in the same period, not only
portrayed the Sultans, but also painted portraits of King Charles V and King Francois I, (see
Picture no. 1, Appendix-J, p. 488) the two leading European rulers. 26
Nigari as an artist close to the palace circles, must have seen some European engravings in
the palace, as he used the form of busts and 3/4 profile. In fact, it is believed that a series of
Ottoman Sultan portraits painted by Nigari reached France during the Mediterranean
campaign of Barbarossa in 1543. These portraits were given by Barbarossa to Virginio
Orsini, the French admiral. Paolo Giovio, the Italian historian and collector, who collected
the portraits of famous people of the period at his villa in Como, borrowed the Sultans’
portraits from him and had them copied by Tobias Stimmer, the Swiss artist, and the
woodcut prints were published in Giovio’s book Elogia Virorum Bellica Virtute Illustrum.27
Trade and Culture
The trade privileges granted by Sultan Suleyman to the European countries increased the
cultural relations in both directions. Trade increased with France, England and Holland,
as well as Venice. While the Ottomans purchased weapons and armaments from
Europe, the Ottoman carpets, fabrics, ceramics, marbled paper and leather bindings found
customers in Europe. In a short period of time, local ateliers were formed in Europe to copy
the Ottoman carpets and ceramics. It is sufficient to look at the works of the sixteenth century
257
painters such as Hans Holbein or Lorenzo Lotto, to observe to what an extent the Ottoman
carpets had become widespread. Moreover, the carpets depicted in these paintings have
caused the Ottoman carpets to be classified as Holbein, Memling or Lotto carpets. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Usak carpets were produced in England and Belgium
under the name of Turkish carpets.28 Copies of the Iznik ceramics were made in centers such
as Liguria and Padua in Italy. 29 An interesting example of the cultural exchange with Europe
is the order placed by the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha through the Venetian balio in
Istanbul, during the reign of Sultan Murad III Sokollu, who must have seen the illustrated
dynastic histories in Europe, wished to have a manuscript similar to these produced and
commissioned the official court poet of the period and the renown miniature artist Nakkas
Osman, to prepare a book containing the information related to all the Ottoman Sultans
illustrated with their portraits. He thought that it would be proper to refer to Sultan portraits
in Europe for the images of the earlier Sultans. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who heard that such
a series existed in Venice, asked the Venetian balio to have these brought to Istanbul. These
oil portraits produced in the Veronese workshop, reached Istanbul in 1579 and most of them
are still kept at the Topkapi Palace Museum. 30 Osman, used this series and also referred to
certain historical texts, studied the authentic costumes of the previous Sultans kept at the
palace or in their mausoleum and then drew the portraits of the twelve Ottoman Sultans from
Sultan Osman through Sultan Murad III. Osman did not use the bust form in these portraits.
The Sultans used to sit with their knees bent, holding a handkerchief or a flower in their
hands in the Eastern tradition. However, their common feature with the European portraits is
the 3/4 profile model. In this manuscript, painter Osman formed the iconography for Sultan
portraits that was used for centuries in Ottoman miniature painting. In fact, this manuscript,
the Semailname is the Islamicized version of the illustrated Western biographical histories.
With the increase in the diplomatic relations with Europe a more realistic Turkish image
appeared in the European art of the seventeenth century. This is especially reflected by those
paintings made by the artists accompanying the European embassy delegations to the
Ottoman court.
The Austrian artists who came with the embassy delegation sent to Sultan Murad IV by the
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Austrian King Ferdinand in 1628 under the leadership of Ludwig Kuefstein, depicted
receptions and audiences attended by the ambassador. These paintings are exhibited at the
chateau belonging to the Kuefstein family at Grillenstein and at the Perchtoldsdorf Museum
in Vienna.31 In 1641, the French ambassador Jean de la Haye was sent to Istanbul to renew
the capitulations. George de la Chapelle, an artist accompanying him, painted mostly the
women in the Ottoman Empire and printed them in 1648 in his book called Receuil de divers
portraits de principals dames de la Porte du grand turc. 32 In the background of George de la
Chapelle’s figures are scenery from Istanbul documenting various districts of the city.33
Paintings depicting the Sultan, viziers and the dignitaries painted by the painter in the service
of Claes Ralamb, who was sent as ambassador to Sultan Mehmed IV in 1657, are at the
Nordiska Museet in Stockholm.34
Role of Diplomats
The ambassadors sent by the Ottomans to the European capital cities also kept their
contributions in the developments of cultural relations with the Europeans. The visits of the
Ottoman embassy delegations to Europe aroused great interest. Suleyman Aga, sent in 1669
by Sultan Mehmed IV to King Louis XIV, was so influential and after this, Turkish costumes
started to be worn at masked balls organized at the court. Moliere added a Turkish ceremony
to the play called Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme and Suleyman Aga was depicted as a comical
character.35 It is said that Suleyman Aga was accommodated at a palace decorated in the
Ottoman style and here the visitors were offered delicious meals and coffee. This played a
role in the affectation for coffee in France. Coffee started to be used in Europe as of the
seventeenth century. Sources indicate that it reached Venice around 1615 and the first
coffeehouse there was opened in 1630.36 After a short while it became widespread in London
as well. It is believed that coffee became popular in Vienna after the 1683 campaign and that
the first coffeehouse there was opened by Count Kolschitzky, a translator of Polish origin.
However, coffee must have been known in 1665 during the visit of Ambassador Kara
Mehmed Aga to Vienna.37 The embassy delegation of Kara Mehmed Aga had a great impact
on music. The European composers occasionally used the melodies of the military band
music. The Seyahatname (Travel Book) by Evliya Celebi, who accompanied Kara Mehmed
Aga to Europe, is considered to be the first book written by a Turk related to Europe. From
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then on, the Ottomans started to become better acquainted with Europe and took an interest
in European culture and science. In fact, many science books of European origin were
translated into Turkish in the seventeenth century. Katip Celebi translated the book called
Atlas Minor written by Jean Bleau, the Dutch geographer. He also wrote the books called
Cihannuma, which is an important geographical source, and also Irsad’ul-Heyara ila Tarih’il
Yunan ve’n-Nasara, which is related to Greek and Christian history. 38 In the seventeenth
century, a great number of European engravings and books came to the Ottoman palace
(TSM H2135, 2148, 2153).39 Figures wearing European costumes are encountered in the
albums prepared during the reign of Sultan Ahmed I at the beginning of the seventeenth
century. Illustrated albums, especially those with costume studies, started to be produced in
Istanbul in this period, hi these albums, which the English called Costume Book and the
Germans called Trachtenbuch, there was occasionally a short introductory text, but most
of the time there were only brief captions in Italian, French or English. Most of these were
works of local masters, although there are some painted by European artists.40
The books about Turkey and the Turks becoming widespread in Europe were the sources for
the Turkish motifs used by several seventeenth century European artists. For example, Peter
Paul Rubens, the renowned Flemish artist, used such albums when drawing his Turkish
costumes.41 Rembrandt drew Turkish figures as well. After the Ottomans granted trade rights
to the Dutch in 1612 CE, Ottoman carpets, metals and ceramics reached Holland and
Ottoman motifs started to be used in Dutch art. Tiles and ceramics with Ottoman motifs were
produced in the Delft ceramic ateliers. The tulip was the most popular decorative motif. The
botanist Clusius, a Dutchman working for the Austrian court in Vienna, grew tulips from the
bulbs, which had been brought to Vienna by Ambassador Busbecq in the sixteenth century
and took the bulbs to Holland. Books were written about this flower and the tulip became a
part of daily life. In a short period of time, the passion for tulips, called tulipomania, made
the flower a popular theme for Dutch painters.42
In the era of 18th Century
The eighteenth century is a period of balance, more correctly, a balance of power in
European history. Both the Ottomans and the Europeans accepted equal terms and
consciously wished to acquaint themselves with the cultures of one another after the 1683
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Vienna defeat. In Austria Turkish motifs were used in minor arts, architecture and in objects
of daily life. This cultural interaction is best displayed by architect J. L. von Hildebrandt in
Vienna at the Belvedere palace, which has corner domes looking like an Ottoman tent with
tassels or in the towers resembling minarets at the Karlskirche built by the renowned
Austrian architect J. B. F. von Erlach. 43
The Turkish affectation was very widely spread in literature.44 Voltaire wrote his book
called Essais sur les Moeurs, describing the characteristics of different countries, right after
the visit of Said Efendi. C. S. Favart treated the relation between Sultan Suleyman and
Hurrem Sultan in his comedy called Solimon II ou Les Trois Sultanes. Moreover, sources
indicate that Favart had costumes brought from the Ottoman Empire for his actress wife,
who played the part of Roxelana. The first act of Rameau’s four act opera, Les Indes
Galantes, first staged in 1735 CE, was called Le Turc genereux45. Turkish characters and
melodies spread towards the end of the century with Mozart’s famous opera, Die
Entfuhrung aus dem Serail. There is also an unfinished opera by Mozart called Zaide, which
treats the subject of Sultan Suleyman.
The new relations between the Ottomans and the Europeans in the eighteenth century
brought many diplomats, merchants, travelers and artists to the Ottoman capital. With the
growing interest in history and archaeology in this century, collecting antiques and
curiosities had reached its height and many travellers came to the Ottoman Empire for
research. Among these there were architects and painters. The market for travel accounts
with engravings grew in Europe. Consequently, most of the artists working in embassy
circles, even the ambassadors themselves often produced such illustrated books. 46 Baron
Gudenus, a military draftsman, accompanying the Austrian ambassador Corfiz Ullfeld to
Istanbul in 1740 CE, drew a panorama of the city, which still is one of the most important
documentary sources about Istanbul at that time and specifically its vernacular architecture. 47
Sir Robert Ainslie, the English Ambassador appointed to Istanbul between1776-1794 CE,
was also an antique collector, and he had employed Luigi Mayer, an artist of Italian origin, to
make drawings of the historical buildings. The French artist J. B. Hilair, who worked for the
French Ambassador Count Choiseul Gouffier, painted scenery from various regions of the
Empire in a trip he made with the ambassador in 1776 CE. Most of his paintings were
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engraved in Voyage pittoresque de la Grece, the travel book published by Choiseul Gouffier
between 1778-1782 CE.48 Hilair also made illustrations for Tableau General de l’Empire
Ottoman written by Mouradgea D’Ohsson, an Armenian from Istanbul, who worked as a
translator at the Swedish Embassy. 49 Architect A. I. Melling, who was invited by Sultan
Selim III to Istanbul around the end of the century and spent approximately 20 years in
Istanbul, drew the topographical views from various districts of Istanbul and they were later
published in his book called Voyage pittoresque et les rives du Bosphore. 50 A. L. Castellan,
was another architect who came to Istanbul with an engineering assignment in 1797 CE and
published the paintings he did in Greece and the Ottoman Empire in his book Lettres sur la
Moree, l’Hellespont et Constantinople in 1811 CE. Besides these illustrated travel accounts,
many costume books were also published in this century. Although there are some costume
books illustrated by European painters, most of them were produced by local artists, as was
the case in the previous centuries. 51
The paintings about the Ottoman Empire that have found their way to Europe through
diplomatic relations constitute another group. For example, the Gustav and Ulric Celsing
brothers, who served as ambassadors in Istanbul between 1747-1779 CE, took back many
objects and paintings related to the Ottomans and displayed them in their mansions.
Especially the collection of paintings, including the reception scenes, single figures with
Ottoman costumes and landscapes, that were brought by the Celsing brothers are now kept at
the Celsing manor in Bibi, Sweden, and are invaluable pictorial documents of the eighteenth
century Ottoman world.52 Another interesting example in Sweden is the portrait of Sultan
Abdul Hamid -I placed on the wall of a hall added by King Gustav III in 1770 CE to the
Gripsholm Chateau near Stockholm. The king, who wished to portray himself together with
the great European rulers of the period, also included the Ottoman ruler. 53 The new
diplomatic, trade and cultural relations established with the European countries in the
eighteenth century left profound imprints in the Ottoman artistic milieu. 54 Many books and
objects of European origin reached the palace. Besides, various gifts, engravings, plans and
architectural drawings were brought from France by ambassadors Mehmed Celebi and Said
Efendi. Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha requested the French Ambassador Marquis de Bonnac to
acquire from France engravings and architectural drawings, most of which were related to
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the Versailles Palace, have been influential in the buildings constructed during the Tulip
Period. The Sadabad Palace, which started to be constructed at the Golden Horn in 1722 CE,
with its springs, fountains and cascades, could rival the French palaces. No doubt, the
European influence on Ottoman architecture increased even more after the Tulip Period.
However, the traces of the baroque and rococo styles prevalent in Europe appeared mainly in
architectural decoration.
Architectural exchange
There were no major alterations in mosque architecture. More accurately, the plans did not
change, but on the exterior facades, doors and windows, on the niches and Mimbars in the
interior, curving motifs in the baroque and rococo styles, seashells and cartouches are
encountered. The Nuru-i-Osmaniye Mosque (1748-1755 CE) is the only example among the
mosques, displaying this style, most often called the “Ottoman Baroque” with undulating
multi foil arches, masses and cornices, high portals, capitals with baroque motifs and
minarets with bulbous feet followed in the 19 th century. This shows that Ottoman architects,
rather than bringing a structural change to architecture, adopted new features in the
decorative program. No doubt, a certain period of time was needed for any structural change
in Ottoman architecture, which had such a long tradition. A period of transition was also
needed for the Ottoman art of painting.55 The new demands and tastes, which developed with
the interest aroused in European art in the Ottoman palace circles, brought a new flavour to
the art of painting. Undoubtedly, the European artists who established themselves in the
Ottoman capital were influential in creating a new artistic milieu. Technique and content
changed in painting.56 Miniature paintings were gradually replaced by water colour paintings
and what is more important, perspective entered into miniatures. The subjects were also
changed. The miniatures with historical themes were replaced by stories with a light content,
scenes from daily life, landscapes, portraits and floral compositions.
The most important development observed in the Ottoman painting in this century is the
introduction of canvas paintings. All of the Sultans who reigned during the second half of the
eighteenth century had their portraits painted in oil on canvas. Moreover, starting with Sultan
Selim III, the Sultans distributed their own portraits. Sultan Selim III, who realized that the
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rulers in Europe exchanged their portraits as gifts, had his own portrait engraved and
distributed it to the high dignitaries in the Empire, the European rulers and ambassadors.
As a matter of fact, a copy of this portrait was sent to Napoleon. Both this portrait and a ring
with Napoleon’s portrait on it, sent to Sultan Selim III, are kept in the Topkapi Palace
collection. Sultan Mahmud II, who succeeded Sultan Selim III, had medals made with his
portrait showing him wearing a jacket, trousers and a fez, symbolizing the costume reform he
realized. These were also produced for distribution. 57
Developments in 19th Century
The Ottoman-European relations followed a different line in the nineteenth century.
While further achievements were taking place in science and culture in the gradually
industrializing Europe, the Ottoman Empire continued its significance as a profitable market
for the Europeans. This was a period in which westernization in the Empire became
institutionalized. The Ottomans, who had established permanent embassies in Europe after
Sultan Selim III, improved their diplomatic and commercial relations. Especially after the
1839 CE Tanzimat Firman, it is observed that Europeans and non-Muslims became
influential in commercial and cultural life in the Ottoman capital city and the major cities in
the provinces. All the European styles were now adopted, both in architecture and in the art
of painting. The palaces constructed in Istanbul one after the other such as the Dolmabahce,
Beylerbeyi, Goksu, Ciragan and Yildiz, which the Sultans wished to see as the symbols of
westernization, are quite different from the traditional palaces. These buildings display an
eclectic style, a blend of the neo-baroque, neo-classical or even neo-gothic styles in the
nineteenth century European architecture.
These palaces were composed of various quarters unified behind a long facade, like the
palaces in Europe, and unlike the Topkapi Palace where pavilions are collected around
courtyards. These palaces are marked by their monumental gates and intensive decoration on
their facades. Their interiors are dazzling with gilded reliefs, carved wooden and cartonpierre decorations, panoramic wall paintings, European-made furniture and porcelains. The
Ottoman elite, who adopted westernization, used the same styles and decorations in the
mansions they built in the capital city and the provinces. 58 While westernization was
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becoming a lifestyle in the Ottoman palace circles and the elite class throughout the
nineteenth century, for the Europeans, the exotic and novel lay in the East. This was reflected
in the wave of orientalism, which spread in France, England, Germany, Austria and Italy.
Actually, orientalism, which is a concept created by Europe nourished by imperialism and
colonialism as a result of the industrial revolution, has manufactured an exotic, mystical,
“Oriental” image filled with unknowns. 59
The same approach is also observed in the art of painting. 60 These painters who depicted the
orient following the orientalism in literature, created the same mysterious, dramatic,
picturesque oriental image. Some of these artists who never visited the Ottoman Empire
painted the orient they themselves imagined by making use of the illustrated travel books.
The most favourite themes were the scenes of the oriental bath and the harem, which even if
they travelled in the East would be unable to see. Some of the orientalist painters even
delineated the topography to create a pictorial and dramatic effect. Well-known orientalist
painters such as E. Delacroix, J. A. D. Ingres and others have attempted this. Moreover, H.
Vernet, J. L. Gerome and L. Deutch, although they travelled in the Orient, presented
exaggerated scenes and topographical images, because when they exhibited their paintings
in the Paris Salon, the viewer was still seeking that “oriental” image manufactured by the
West. In fact, these painters were forced to compete with the photographs that had become
widespread in Europe.
On the other hand, there were European artists in the nineteenth century who came to the
Ottoman Empire with a curiosity about history and archaeology and who documented what
they saw with scholarly accurate drawings. They painted the orient, but they were not
orientalists in the concept described above. Pasini and Zonaro who came to the Ottoman
capital at different times painted realistic scenes from the Ottoman Empire. Especially
inspired by Napoleon, the archaeological research started in Egypt, these artists came on
scholarly journeys, made accurate topographical drawings and costume paintings. 61 Artists
like T. Allom and W. Bartlett, who both had started their careers as architects, worked
together with the clergyman Robert Walsh at the British Embassy in 1836-1838 and they
published the illustrated work Constantinople and the Scenery of Seven Churches of Asia
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Minor. Bartlett, when he came to Istanbul in 1835, made illustrations for the book called The
Beauties of the Bosphorous that was published in 1839 by Julia Pardoe. The orientalist
movement also influenced European architecture in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Buildings were inspired by the Islamic architecture in an extensive geography from North
Africa to India, with the Ottoman Empire in the lead. The participation of the Ottomans in
the world exhibitions and fairs organized one after another in Europe and the United States
had a role in this. Sultan Abdulaziz, who attended the 1867 Paris Universal Exposition,
had Ottoman architectural drawings prepared for the Universal Exposition in 1873 in
Vienna. The models of the Ottoman buildings were built at the fairgrounds. These drawings
and models were copied in many European countries. From then on, it was possible to find
Turkish fountains in the parks and Turkish rooms in the homes. 62
In the Ottoman capital a large number of European architects and artists worked for the
Ottoman Sultans during the second half of the nineteenth century and they made projects for
the Ottoman Sultans who commissioned them, satisfying the demands and tastes of the
Sultans. Sultan Abdulaziz and Sultan Abdul Hamid also formed a collection of European
paintings at the palace. Moreover, Sultan Abdul Hamid even established a museum63 at the
Yildiz Palace and displayed paintings. Operas of the European composers were staged at the
Yildiz Palace theatre. The Ottoman palace and the Ottoman capital had become an important
centre for European culture and art as well.
A look at the European-Ottoman relations throughout the centuries clearly indicates that the
cultural relations stayed firmly behind political and economic developments. Among the
Islamic communities, the Turks have always had the closest relations with the Western
Christian world. The way these relations were reflected in art and culture since the fifteenth
century shows variations according to political alliances, victories and defeats, diplomatic
relations, and even the personalities of the art patrons. While in the earlier years the Turkish
image in Europe carried an exoticism brought by the unknown, for the Europeans in the
sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was a state administered by powerful rulers, having
great political significance for Europe. In this connection, the influential rulers of this
empire, the snobbish ceremonies of the Ottoman court and the elaborate Ottoman costumes
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were reflected in European art. No doubt, the unique topography and interesting monuments
of Istanbul, the capital city of the empire, were drawn by almost every artist. However,
during these centuries the European-Ottoman cultural relations preserved their unilateral
character. More accurately, a profound European influence was not encountered in the
Ottoman culture and art until the eighteenth century. However, after the eighteenth century,
both the Ottomans and the Europeans attempted to become more closely acquainted with
each other under equal terms and have been even more inspired from each other. The
European influence penetrating into Turkish art in parallel with the Turquerie fashion
developing in Europe is a concrete indicator of these relations. The political balances in the
nineteenth century pushed the Ottomans into an intensive westernization and the European
culture was much more influential. It is a fact that Ottoman-European cultural interactions
developing throughout history have contributed a rich content to both European and Ottoman
art and indicates that different cultures can produce powerful syntheses.
Modern Turkish Culture and the European Community
Turkey has been and is in Europe. That is sure. It has membership of all European
organizations. But is Turkey of Europe? One may say that this question should have been
answered before concluding the Association Agreement. Indeed, it was answered positively
at that time. But since some circles wish to reopen this question, Turkey should not take
refuge behind legalistic arguments. Although westernizing reforms to a great extent
transformed Turkey into a European country, primarily politically and economically, the
question remains whether Turkey is culturally European as well. The contemporary culture in
the West has been greatly influenced by the structures of the modern economy. The
production organization and consumption patterns determine a certain life-style and world
view. Countries and peoples resemble each other to the extent that they are industrialized and
economically developed. Modern communication and transportation technologies enhance
the unifying forces of the industrial civilization over the globe. The political regime based on
democracy and respect for human rights, and social structure based on secularized urban
culture on the one hand, and the industrial (now increasingly post-industrial service)
economy on the other, are closely inter linked and interacting with a view to creating the
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modern society whose common characteristics have largely outgrown its differences. In this
respect Japan, an Asiatic society, is much closer to the West than Christian Ethiopia.
In order to reinforce self-identity against this engulfing uniformity, the cultural differences of
a traditional and religious nature are deliberately and defensively emphasized, inter alia, by
Western countries even among themselves. This is especially what the EC is trying to do. In
this context it is interesting to note that the famous historian Jean-Baptists Duroselle, who
was commissioned by the EC to write a European History, allegedly omitted in his book the
contribution of Ancient Greece and Byzantium to European civilization. This attitude seems
to assert the exclusiveness of Western Europe, for the sake of creating and strengthening a
European identity. Present-day Turkish culture is a product of major historical developments
which occurred in the last one hundred and fifty years. These are the advent of secularism,
nationalism, social mobilization and democracy in the post-1945 period. Under the influence
of the above mentioned phenomena the culture of the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace and
Anatolia started to experience drastic and radical changes from the 1840s on.
The Advent of Turkish Nationalism
When Halit Efendi went to Paris as Ottoman Ambassador, he was shocked to find himself
called the ‘Turkish ambassador’. . . It was obvious to Halit Efendi that ‘Turk’ was a
derogatory term. As late as 1897 CE it was impossible to find traces of Turkish nationalism
in Anatolia. Furthermore, the very concepts of national homeland (vatan) were still literary
concepts in the second half of the nineteenth century. The efforts to ìnvent’ a concept of
nationhood (millet) were not without problems. The term millet was used to refer to nonMuslim religious communities in the Ottoman Empire. Besides, in the sociological or
historical sense of the term there was no Ottoman nation either. The Turks of the Ottoman
Empire had fully submerged their identity in the Umma, the international community of
Islam. Consequently, nationalism started out as the intellectual or even scholarly endeavour
of a group of Young Turks. Turkish nationalism emerged thus not as a mass political
movement, but as a `strong, and eventually dominant, current of opinion, adding a
completely new dimension to the older order’. Consequently, Turkish nationalism was
initially developed as a world view by the help of which new political action and
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governmental policies could be devised to protect the Ottoman fatherland (vatan) from
imminent foreign threats.
A major influence on the development of Turkish nationalism into a dominant political
current was the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War,
leaving in Turkey a culturally homogeneous population of 97.3 per cent Turkish Muslims.
The first endeavour of the Turkish nationalists, under the leadership of Ataturk, was to
redefine the legitimate political authority on the basis of national will and national
sovereignty. The ‘Turkish Nation’ was declared to be the sole sovereign power in the Turkish
homeland. This declaration rejected any allegiance to the international community of
Muslims on the one hand, and negated the right of the Ottoman dynasty to rule the Turkish
nation on the other. The successful War of Independence paved the way for the Turkish
nationalists not only to establish a new political regime, but to do away with Ottoman rule as
well. Thus the tie between the religious Ummah and the citizens of the Turkish Republic was
severed by the abolition of the Caliphate.
Secularism in Turkish Culture
The major steps toward secularization of the Turkish culture were taken by the Republican
regime. Since these reforms dwelt in second chapters, not repeat them here. But we like to
draw attention to the fact that new art forms were either introduced or, if previously
introduced, encouraged. For example, classical ballet 64 was implanted in Turkish culture
during the Republican era. Ballet in Turkey is barely sixty years old. It would, however, not
be erroneous to claim that its influence on contemporary Turkish thought has been important;
through the advent of classical ballet, a wholly westernized outlook upon music and dance
has developed. Turkish composers, choreographers, and dancers have kept this ‘elite’
window to the West entirely open, causing international artistic cross-currents to influence
and modernize the Turkish public’s view of the performing arts in general. The Turkish
people have accepted it as a vital form of art to the extent that in less than a decade the list of
Turkish choreographers who use the stage as a laboratory for avant-garde forms of dance
would probably form a thick volume.’ Other performing arts, plastic arts, classical and
polyphonic music all received State support from the new Republican Governments.
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Culture statistics indicate that Turkey ranks well with the Western countries. In terms of the
number of museums and museum attendance, Turkey ranks higher than Austria, Israel, Australia,
and Luxembourg; she has greater public library capacity than Austria, Portugal, Ireland, and
Iceland; from the standpoint of theater and performing-arts buildings Turkey comes before
Norway, Denmark, and Luxembourg; as for professional and amateur performances of dance and
drama, the United Kingdom follows Turkey.
Finally, women’s rights were guaranteed by a law promulgated in 1934. Hence almost all aspects
of Turkish culture have been molded by the comprehensive secularizing cultural reforms of the
1920s and 1930s. Interestingly, they have received a considerable amount of support among
Turkish citizens, especially among the educated and urban segments of the population. In
Turkey, when the self-identity of the Turkish citizen is analyzed, nationalism and secularization
cannot really be considered separately. After such a large-scale modification of cultural symbols
and values under the combined or complementary influences of nationalism and secularization,
the self-identification of the Turks has become associated with the nation state.
Democratization and Political Culture
The Turkish experience with democracy is already more than half a century old, although
parliamentary experience is much older. Turkish citizens have participated in eleven national
legislative elections and a similar number of local electoral contests. They developed strong
identifications with the political parties of the 1946-1990 eras. It is also obvious that the Turkish
electorate does not prefer single party rule.
Self-Identity of Turks
The impact on Turkish culture of the socio-political transformation of Turkish society has
precipitated the emergence and persistence of new values, expectations, and attitudes. The
founders of the Republican regime seem to have reached one of the goals, namely the severance
of the new society’s cultural ties with its recent Ottoman past in the sense that the Ottoman
language and script are out of use. The ‘subject culture’ of the Ottoman masses has rapidly
eroded. The increase in the scope and variety of acts of political participation is a lucid indication
of this fact.
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What seems to have happened in Turkey is a cultural revolution which has not totally replaced
the ancient culture, but has led to an engulfing of the cultural system of the country to incorporate
utterly new values, beliefs, and expectations which have partly replaced or blurred the previous
values, beliefs, expectations, and attitudes which in turn have also shown some signs of change
or adaptation. This became most clear in the 1980s. The perception of the religious conservatives
as an anti-system political movement has been changing, whereas the old anti-science approach
of at least some Islamists has also been modified.
The Italian Language was very familiar especially to the people of Istanbul and Italian terms in
the fields of marine, music, trade and banking were introduced into daily life. The traces of
Turkish – Italian relations can be observed in Italy as well. There are several examples: a
restaurant in Otranto named after Gedik Ahmet Paşa (the Ottoman Commander who had captured
Otranto in 1480), the recruitment of the soldiers of Gedik Ahmet Paşa by the King of Naples
when he left Otranto to return to Istanbul a year later, nobility signs of Pedreables, Tommasini
and Brevei families of Genoa consisting of crescent and star, the dictionary of “Codex
Comanicus” located at the National Library in Venice with its Italian, Turkish and Persian
versions, “Letteratura Dei Turchi”, the first book on Turkish literature in Europe published in
Venice in 1688 by Gian Battista Donaldo, Rossini’s opera “Maometto II” whose subject matter is
Sultan Mehmet II, Bonarelli’s tragedy “Solimano” (Suleyman the Magnificent), the painting on
the wall of the church at San Marco Square in Venice depicting the trade between Ottoman and
Venetian merchants, “Fondaco Dei Turchi” located on the Grande Canale in Venice, also known
as the Turkish Inn, (see Picture-4, Appendix-J,,p.489) which was inaugurated in 1621 and
allocated to Turkish merchants for the ensuing 200 years, the building in Ferra owned by a family
whose members served the Ottoman Empire bearing an inscription on it as Seraglio Turco
(Turkish Palace), the annual festivities held in Moena, a town near the Austrian border, in
memory of the Janissary who took refuge there after the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the
designation of a street in the same town as “Turchia”, a sculpture of a Turkish soldier carved out
of a tree and another sculpture of a Janissary with crescent and star, (see Picture no, 5 & 6
Appendix-J, p.496) all reflect the dimension of bilateral relations.65
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The intensity of bilateral relations has influenced also the Italian popular culture and some
idiomatic expressions referring to the Turks are commonly used in daily life. The most used
among these expressions are the following:“To smoke like a Turk” (Fumare come un Turco)
“Strong like a Turk” (Forte come un Turco)
“Mommy, the Turks are coming” (Mamma li Turchi)
“To swear like a Turk” (Bestemmiare come un Turco)
The life-style of the citizens of Turkey has completely changed in the course of the six decades
since the promulgation of the Republic. Modern practices, directed by human rationality,
technological necessity, and the adoption of international standards, mould the practices of work,
leisure, and recreation in Turkey, the more so in the urban centres. The countryside has also been
under the profound influences of the novel agricultural inputs on the one hand and advances in
communication and transportation facilities on the other. Turks have shown a great ability to
adapt to a new way of life. When compared with other efforts at manipulating cultural change,
such as those that occurred in Russia and China, the Turkish experience looks more successful,
not less. A similar comparison with other countries containing large Muslim communities makes
the Turkish case look like a spectacular Cultural Revolution.
It is true, as in every complex human society that the peasants are more conservative than the
urban middle classes, and the petty bourgeoisie is more religious than the upper classes in
Turkey. Most journalistic accounts abroad of the `Turk’ are no more than a sketchy and partial
image of one social group of Turks, the nationally representative value of which is at best
dubious. I am afraid some able European politicians are guilty of the same logical fallacy when
they make allusions to a fictitious ‘typical Turk’ and to his values vis-a-vis Europeans.
As a matter of fact Turkey is a secular nation-state with a Muslim population. Therefore the
notion of a Christian EC versus a Muslim Turkey is a basic fallacy. The cultural ties between the
two are based on secularism, but not religion. In the words of a world-renowned British
Turcologist, ìf the implication is that the ordinary people of the member-countries of the
European Community might not approve the accession of Turkey because she is not a Christian
country, I should find that hard to accept. I doubt if the prospect would worry the de-Gospelized
millions who constitute the bulk of the population of Western Europe. I think that Christianity is
no longer a political force.’ Geoffrey Lewis further ponders about what cultural differences
272
separate Turkey from EC member countries. `The cultured Turk’, he writes, `can hold his head
up in any gathering of cultured Europeans. He can talk about Shakespeare or Goethe or
Baudelaire with the best of them. In addition he can talk about Nedim or Yahya Kemal or Orhan
Veli, which they can’t. But how many Portuguese, how many Greeks have heard of Schiller? I
am not asking how many have read him; I am simply asking how many have heard of him. How
many Frenchmen have ever heard of T. S. Eliot?’ Lewis ends with a saying attributed to the
Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’mun: ‘Class unites its members; a noble Arab has more in common with a
noble Persian than with an Arab commoner. It may be that a cultured German EC official will
one day find that he has more in common with a cultured Turkish EC official than with an
uncultured German.’ But before that day can dawn, one will have to abstain from stereotypes and
develop a slightly more sophisticated understanding of the social stratification of one’s own and
of other societies.
When Turkey gains full membership in the EC, it is hard to envisage any revolutionary change in
Turkish culture that might take place. Adaptation to the legal system of the EC may pose
problems in daily juridical practices and also to the Turkish Government, yet they will not
constitute an insurmountable challenge, especially if and when the younger generations of
lawyers are properly trained and politicians show a willingness to adapt themselves to the new
conditions. Some Turkish universities have currently started to educate lawyers with an eye to
full EC membership. Furthermore, it is a fact that Turkey has historically practiced major and
wholesale changes in her legal system and demonstrated a remarkable capability to adapt to such
changes. Her current secular legal system still carries the impact of the continental European
legal system of earlier decades. A drive for more modernity and rationalization will hardly create
any intractable difficulties.
The Turkish educational system may need to be overhauled to adapt to EC norms. Language
education is the most likely area to require some special attention. Currently, Turkish secondary
school education does not provide its graduates with a sufficient comprehension of European
languages. The civic orientation of the Turkish education system is also somewhat fragile. The
basic practice of memorizing texts and regurgitating them upon request needs also to be replaced
by self-inquiry on the part of students about the subject matter of the course materials.
273
The Turkish political system has also been going through a period of democratic consolidation.
The last four decades of experience with multiparty democracy has created a responsible
electorate, widespread adoption of the values of pluralism to an extent unparalleled in any
previous period of Turkish history, a concomitant feeling of tolerance of political opposition, and
a distinct mass dislike of oligarchic rule by an ènlightened’ élite group. The masses assign a
positive value to multiparty pluralism. They seem to correlate the latter with their personal
welfare.
However, the Turkish political system is not without problems. The national vote is fragmented
into blocks of various sizes. There still exists a tendency for polarization of the party system
between the Government and opposition parties. The cultural divisions in the country that
influence the self-identity of Turks also cast an influence on the political system. The political
parties, obviously, tend to take the various self-images of Turks into consideration. Thus political
parties propagate somewhat different educational and cultural policies, which further expand the
gap between them. Consequently, much depends upon the ability of the Turkish political élite to
engineer an overall compromise on the essential rules of political interaction. The process of
integration with the EC will further motivate the Turkish political elite to negotiate and
compromise over the rules of the game of Turkish democracy.
Democratic consolidation has been a learning process in Turkey. Much has been learned and
thoroughly assimilated by the masses and élites alike. Political integration with Europe will
further ease the institutionalization of democracy in the Turkish political system. A secular and
pluralist culture has been gradually taking root in Turkey. Integration with the EC will only
enhance its ability to persist into the twenty-first century. Turkey has been fully entwined in
Europe’s history since the Ottomans crossed the Bosporus in the 14th Century. The country’s
westward outlook has accentuated under the Republic since 1922. Turkey’s rich cultural heritage
is unique, but it is also undeniably European. EU membership would be a catalyst for resolving
the Kurdish issue as well as relations with Cyprus and Armenia.
274
1.
Vocation’, in The Review of International Affairs, Vol.3, No.2, Winter 2003, p.306.
2.
Banu Helvacioglu, ‘The Paradoxical Logic of Europe in Turkey: Where Does Europe
End?’, in The European Legacy, Vol. 4, No.3, 1999, p. 22.
3.
For details see, G. Renda, ‘Europe and the Ottomans: Interactions in Art’, in Ottoman
Civilization (ed. H. Inalcik, G. Renda), Istanbul, 2000, pp.1048-1089.
4.
The 1973 New York, 1983 Vienna and Munster, 1989 Berlin, 1995 Dresden
exhibitions and their catalogues published constitute the most important sources on
this subject: A. N. St. Clair, The Image of the Turk in Europe, New York: The
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1973
5.
Important information is given about Mehmed II’s library and the scientific circles in
Istanbul. See J. Raby, ‘Mehmed the Conqueror’s Greek Scriptorium’, Dumbarton
Oaks Papers, No. 37, 1983, pp. 15-34.
6.
The most interesting is a map of Venice /TSM HI829. For the maps that came to the
palace in this period see Istanbul Topkapi Sarayi Muzesi ve Venedik Correr Muzesi
Kolleksiyonlarindaki XIV-XVIII Yuzyil Portolan ve Deniz Haritalari. Portolani e
Carte Nautiche XIV-XVIII Secolo dalle Collezioni del Museo Correr-Venezia Museo
del Topkapi-Istanbul (Istanbul, 1994), Nos. 4, 6, 8.
7.
J. Raby, ‘Mehmed II Fatih and the Fatih Album’, Islamic Art Volume, 1981, pp. 4249.
8.
J. Raby, ‘Opening Gambits’, in the Sultan’s Portrait, Istanbul, 2000, p. 65.
9.
L. Jardine and J. Brotton, Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West,
New York: Cornell University Press, 2000, pp. 23-25.
10.
Mehmed II’s patronage of the European artists is discussed in detail by J. Raby,
‘Opening Gambits’, The Sultan’s Portrait, pp. 64-72.
11.
Ibid.,
12.
Ibid.
275
13.
M. Pedani-Fabris, ‘The Portrait of Mehmed II: Gentile Bellini. The Making of an
Imperial Image’, Turkish Art, 10th International Congress of Turkish Art, Geneva,
17-23 Sept. 1995, Actes/Proceedings, Geneva, 1999, pp. 555-558.
14.
Archpriest Matteo Bosso saw the medals with portraits of the Conqueror. Moreover,
when he met Cem Sultan, the Conqueror’s son in Rome, he stated that he wondered
whether or not there was a resemblance. See J. Raby, ‘Opening Gambits’, The
Sultan’s Portrait, 69, footnote 26.
15.
H. Inalcik, ‘Harir (Silk): The Ottoman Empire’, Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. III,
Leiden and London, 1971, pp. 211-218.
16.
S. Yetkin, Turkish Historical Carpets, Istanbul, 1981, pp. 47-72.
17.
Leonardo’s project and this letter now kept in the Topkapi Palace were published by
F. Babinger: ‘Vier Bauvorschlage Lionardo da Vincis an Sultan Bajezid II (1502-3)’..
J. Richter, The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci (arranged and rendered into English
and introduced by Edward M. Curdy), volume- 1, New York, 1889, pp. 215 & 387.
18.
Vasari, who wrote the biographies of the Renaissance masters towards the end of the
sixteenth century, in his Le Vite indicates that Michelangelo planned to go to
Istanbul; J. Raby, ‘Opening Gambits’, The Sultan’s Portrait, p. 72
19.
A scroll similar to this scroll at the Budapest National Library is in Madrid; see The
Sultan’s Portrait, Cat. No. 9.
20.
J. Meyer zur Capellen and S. Bagci, ‘The Age of Magnificence’ in The Sultan’s
Portrait, 96; also see footnote 6 in this article.
21.
The costumes of Turkish women and men are included in the books by Abraham
Bruyn and Jean-Jacques Boissard published in 1581. See C. D. Rouillard, The Turk in
French History, Thought and Literature (1520-1660) (Paris, 1938), 278; Three such
books that were written and illustrated in the second half of the sixteenth century are
at the Vienna National Library. Furthermore, similar examples are at the Mayer
Memorial Museum in Jerusalem and the Bodleian Library in Oxford.
22.
Lorichs wished to publish the pictures he drew in Istanbul in two different books, but
his work could only be published in 1626 after his death: Wolgerrissene und
geschnittene Figuren in Kupfer und Holtz durch den Kunstreichen weitbermbten
Melcher Lorch fur die Mahler Bildhawer unde Kunstliebenden an Tag gegeben, anno
1619. The original of this publication did not last until the present, but copies have
been produced. E. Fischer, Melchior Lorck. Drawings from the Evelyn Collection,
276
Stanor Park, England, and from the Department of Prints and Drawings, Copenhagen:
The Royal Museum of Fine Arts, 1962), 20-71; Melchior Lorck in Turkey
(Copenhagen: The Royal Museum of Fine Arts, 1990).
23.
For the letter written to Suleyman the Magnificent by Francis Fs mother and the text
of the correspondence on this subject see H. Inalcik, ‘Mutual Political and Cultural
Influences between Europe and the Ottomans’, Ottoman Civilization, 1062
24.
O. Kurz, ‘A Golden Helmet made in Venice for Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent’,
Gazette des Beaux arts 74 (1969): 249-258; G. Necipoglu, ‘Suleyman the
Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg
Rivalry’, The Art Bulletin, 71/3 (September 1989), pp. 401-427.
25.
For maps and atlases of European origin at the Topkapi Palace see E. H. van de
Waal, ‘Manuscript Maps in the Topkapi Saray Library in Istanbul’, Imago Mundi, 23
(1969): 81-89; For the sixteenth century Ottoman cartography and topographic port
portrayals see G. Renda, ‘Representations of Towns and Sea Charts of the Sixteenth
Century and their Relation to Mediterranean Cartography’, Solimon le Magnifique et
son temps. Actes du Colloque, Paris, 7-10 Marh 1990 (Paris, 1992), p. 279-298.
26.
These portraits, which were in the Binney collection at one time, are presently at the
Fogg Museum in Boston. E. Binney, Turkish Treasures from the Collection of Edwin
Binney, 3d ed., Portland, Oregon, 1979, p. 25.
27.
Quoted, Ekmeleddin Ihsanogulu, edited, Cultural contacts in Building a Universal
Civilization: Islamic Contributions, Istanbul, IRCICA, 2005
28.
S. Yetkin, Turkish Historical Carpets (Istanbul, 1981), 79; the examples found in
some English collections prove that these carpets were produced in England as well.
See J. Mills, Carpets in Pictures. Themes and Painters in the National Gallery
(London, 1975); J. Mills, ‘The Turkish Carpet in the Paintings of Western Europe’,
Turkish Carpets from the 13th-18th Centuries, Exhibition held at the Museum of
Turkish and Islamic Arts (Istanbul, 26 September-12 November 1996), 38-44.
29.
J. Raby, ‘The European Connection’, Iznik, The Pottery of Ottoman Turkey, eds. N.
Atasoy and J. Raby (London, 1989), pp. 264-268
30.
For the Veronese series portraits see The Sultan’s Portrait, p. 150-163.
31.
Hans Gemminter and Valentin Mueller; At the Sublime Porte. Ambassadors to the
Ottoman Empire 1550-1800, (London: Hazlitt, Gooden and Fox, 1988).
277
32.
The Sultan’s Portrait, Cat. No. 79; C. D. Rouillard, the Turk in French History,
Thought and Literature (1520-1660) (Paris, 1938), 283-285.
33.
The Sultan’s Portrait, Cat. Nos. 81, 98, 99.
34.
Some of these paintings were in the Islamic exhibition held in Sweden in 1985: Islam.
Art and Culture, Statens Historiska Museum (Stockholm, 1985), 201, 203; K. Adahl,
‘The Ralamb Paintings and the von Celsing Collection at Bibi Manor. Turkish Motifs
from the 17th and 18th centuries in Sweden’, Milletlerarasi Turk Sanatlan
Kongresi/9th International Congress of Turkish Art, vol. 1 (Ankara, 1995), pp. 13-17,
fig. Ill, 1-2.
35.
H. Desmet Gregoire says that the visit of Suleyman Aga started the Turkish fashion (a
la turca): Le Divan Magique. L’Orient turc en France au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1980),
pp.18-19.
36.
F. Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible (New York,
1981), pp. 256-259.
37.
H. E. Jacob, Coffee: The Epic of a Commodity, New York, 1935, pp. 44-77.
38.
For more detailed information on Katip Celebi and the interest of the Ottomans in
Western science see B. Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (Toronto, 1982).
39.
In particular, the engravings belonging to the seventeenth century Dutch school are in
the majority. There is a Virgin Mary and Jesus painting signed by Georg Wyns in an
album of Ottoman origin at the Metropolitan Museum (67.266.7.5 r).
40.
There are few examples from the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Mundy
album (1974-6-17-013) dated 1618 and a second album (1928-3-23-046) belonging to
the 1620s are in the British Museum.
41.
O. Kurz, ‘The Turkish Dresses in the Costume Book of Rubens’, Nederlands
Kunsthistorisch Jaar book, 23, 1972, pp. 275-290.
42.
For the Turkish motifs on the Dutch ceramics and tiles see The Tulip, A Symbol of
Two Nations, eds. M. Roding and H. Theunissen, Utrecht and Istanbul, 1993.
43.
The exhibitions organized in Vienna in 1983 set forth in a clear manner the OttomanAustrian mutual cultural influence.
44.
For the Turkish affectation in literature see C. D. Rouillard, The Turk in French
History; R. Bezombes, L’exotisme dans I’art et la pensee, Paris, 1953.
278
45.
for the Turkish costume of Mme. Favart in the role of Hurrem see F. M. Gocek, East
Encounters West, pictures, p. 74
46.
The 1985 exhibition catalogue composed of his drawings is the best source: Cornelius
Loos, Tekningar fran en expedition till Fram’re orienten, 1710-1711, Stockholm:
Nationalmuseum, 1985.
47.
Copies of the Istanbul panorama by Gudenus are at the Kungliga Bibliothek in
Stockholm and the Ataturk Library in Istanbul. This panorama was printed in the
book called Collection des Habillements en Turquie dessines d’apres nature par le
Baron de Budenus et dedies aux ambassadeurs qui sont et ont ete a Constantinople.
48.
A. Boppe, Les peintres de Bosphore, 191, 212-228, 234-240,274-277.
49.
For a new edition of D. Ohsson’s book with chapters by S. Theolin, C.V. Findley, G.
Renda, P. Mansel, V. Ciobanu, K. Beydilli, A.Temimi, R.V. Sellaoti, F. Ludwigs, see
The Torch of the Empire, Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson and the Tableau of the
Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century, Istanbul, 2003.
50.
The original of the Melling book was published in Paris in 1819. A facsimile edition
was published in Istanbul in 1969.
51.
N. Atasoy, ‘The Birth of Costumes Books and the Fenerci Mehmed Album’, Ottoman
Costume Book: Fenerci Mehmed (Istanbul, 1986).
52.
For a recent publication on the Celsing collection see: Minnet av Konstantinopel. Den
osmansk-turkiska 1700-talssamlingen pa Biby, (K. Adahl, M. Ahlund, C. Brown, E.
L. Karlsson, A. Karlsson, Ff. Kaberg, M. Laine, G. Renda), Stockholm, 2003.
53.
G. Renda, ‘Europe and the Ottomans’, Ottoman Civilization, p. 1114.
54.
B. Lewis, The Muslim Discovery, 168-169; F. M. Gocek, East Encounters West, p.
114.
55.
For the European influences observed in Ottoman architecture see A. Kuran, ‘18th
Century Ottoman Architecture’, Studies in 18th Century Islamic History, eds. Th.
Naff and R. Owen (Southern Illinois Univ., 1977), 163-189; D. Kuban, ‘Ottoman
Architecture’ in Ottoman Civilization, pp. 626-697.
56.
For the developments in the eighteenth century art of painting see G. Renda,
‘Ottoman Painting and Sculpture’ in Ottoman Civilization, pp. 932-967.
279
57.
For portraits of Selim and Mahmud see G. Renda, ‘Propagating the Imperial Image:
Tasvir-i Humayun 1800-1922’, The Sultan’s Portrait, p. 442-543; G. Renda,
‘Ottoman Painting and Sculpture’ in Ottoman Civilization, pp. 932-967.
58.
For general information related to the nineteenth century palaces, D. Kuban, op. cit.,
‘Ottoman Architecture’, pp. 626-697
59.
For treatment of the political and sociological factors in the formation of this concept
in the nineteenth century in the most comprehensive manner see Edward Said,
Orientalism, New York, 1978.
60.
In recent years, numerous books or exhibition catalogues have been published on
orientalism in European art. The following are the important ones: P. Jullian, The
Orientalists: European Painters of Eastern Scenes, Oxford, 1977; M. Verrier, The
Orientalists, New York and London, 1979; P. and V. Berko, Peinture Orientaliste,
Brussels, 1982; L. Thornton, The Orientalists. Painter-Travellers 1828-1908, Paris,
1983; J. Sweetman, Oriental Obsession, Cambridge, 1988; S. Germaner and Z.
Inankur, Orientalism and Turkey, Istanbul, 1989; B. Folsach, By the Light of the
Crescent Moon: Images of Near East in Danish Art and Literature, 1800-1875,
Copenhagen, 1996; C. Peltre, Orientalism in Art, New York, London, Paris, 1998; S.
Germaner and Z. inankur, Orientalists’ Istanbul, Istanbul, 2002.
61.
Mohammad Rifat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt, Longmans, Green, 1947
62.
Z. Celik, Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth Century World’s
Fairs, Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford, 1992.
63.
G. Renda, Propagating the Imperial Image: Tasvir-i Humayun 1800-1922: The
Sultan’s Portrait, pp. 442-469, Cat. No. 177
64.
Ballet is a type of performance dance that originated in the Italian Renaissance courts
of the 15th century and later developed into a concert dance form in France and
Russia. The word ballet comes from the French and was borrowed into English
around 1630. The French word in turn has its origin in Italian balletto, a diminutive of
ballo (dance) which comes from Latin ballo, ballare, meaning ‘to dance’; See:
Glynnis Chantrell, (2002), The Oxford Essential Dictionary of Word Histories, New
York, Berkley Books.
65.
The pictures concerning Moena have been provided by the Municipality of Moena
and from the internet site of the Municipality of Moena. Availing this opportunity the
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Rome thanks to the Municipality of Moena.
280
CHAPTER V
MARITIME RELATIONS
Introduction
Turkey is a country geographically located in an area where a part of its territory, Thrace, is
on the European continent and the main part of its territory –Anatolia– is on the Asian
continent. Given its location, as well as the position of the Turkish Straits 1, Turkey
constitutes a natural geographical boundary between Asia and Europe. Moreover, Turkey has
coasts at three different seas, namely the Black Sea, Aegean, and the Mediterranean.
Therefore, it has several maritime neighbours, especially at the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean, whereas it has a single and a unique neighbor at the Aegean. This part of
dissertation will try to examines Turkey’s maritime boundary relations, and sheds light to the
reasons why Turkey has differing practices in its seas, as well as to the nature of the disputes
it has with some of its neighbor countries. In this respect, it is necessary to include an
analysis of maritime issues of Turkey at the Black Sea and the Aegean, rather than solely
focusing on the Mediterranean, in order to be able to provide a comprehensive overview of
Turkey’s behavior concerning its maritime relations with its neighbours, which may lead the
readers to view Turkey from an impartial perspective. Without knowing Turkey’s
international maritime and delimitation policies, people might think of or blame Turkey as a
country creating “unrest” in the region or as one finding it “hard to agree on territorial
questions”.
This chapter attempts a descriptive analysis of Turkey’s policies and attitude on maritime
issues since the “First Law of the Sea Conference” of 1958, and in particular the “Third UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea” of 1974. This analysis will help to identify the
continuities in Turkey’s attitude as well as the crucial factors that determine Turkey’s
maritime policies. This will be followed by regional studies in order to determine what
specific policies Turkey have pursued, in which cases and why. Finally, an overall evaluation
will be provided.
World’s Crisis Period
It is possible to claim that the Cold War (1945-1990) is a period of crisis for the world.
However, it is just as impossible to find a period when the world did not face a crisis.
Moreover, it could be said that the world has been going through an age of continual crisis
281
since the French Revolution. There are two fundamental facts that substantiate this claim.
One is technological change. The ubiquitous technological transformation the world has been
undergoing almost daily has given rise to both micro- and macro-crises. The second is the
struggle for control over the world. In a wider sense, the fault line of this crisis is the
imperialist division of the world into the powerful and the weak, the will and desire of the
powerful being to subjugate the weak, to usurp their will both at the national and individual
level of consciousness. The passion for control over the weak has brought on wars that are
the most concrete crystallisation the concept of crisis yet.
Religion and Balance of Power
On the one hand, there are the older models that limit the use of force; on the other, systems
that arise despite the constraint of such models, which project and legitimize the use of force.
Religion projects such an understanding. There is no religion on earth which systematically
promotes itself while upholding a passion for brute force. 2 Yet, it is impossible to claim that
religions bring an ultimate balance of power to the societies they rule, primarily because
class differences, among others, exist despite religion. Even though some advanced religions
declare that they are on the side of the weak and the downtrodden, the situation has not
changed. Christianity is such a movement. Many sources portray Islam as an almost
“socialist” religion. 3 As such, it designates the protection of the poor, the weak and the
desperate as its primary goal.
Even so, religions have been unable to overcome the problem mentioned above. We are now
at one of the most critical crossroads of political history. As history evolves, an even more
complex situation regarding religions will arise. Certain empires will adopt religions as their
ideological superstructure. Moreover, the representative of the centralised authority will
resort to use of force in the name of the religion. Perhaps they will be bold enough to
interpret the use of force as a mandatory aspect of religion, as in the concept of gaza
(religious war). The use of such concepts and the systematic application of force becoming
routine practice are evidence that religions and systems of religious sovereignty deepen the
problems referred to above, instead of solving them.
282
Among the most important instruments of modern politics is the search to overcome these
constraints and prevent the open use of brute force, as well as to abolish the implicit models
of this approach. The new social order following the Industrial Revolution, and the political
movements that have been developed in relation to this order, have played an important role
in the establishment of this idea. These models, which may be defined as “Left” in the widest
sense, have undertaken powerful struggles for the abolition, or at least the limitation, of
implicit and explicit hegemonic orders, the use of authority, unilateral and oppressive
sovereignty, and introverted, isolationist models of government. The struggle continued
throughout the late twentieth century. The post-1968 movement took important steps and
covered much ground in establishing of this approach, both at a macro- and micro-level. The
problem has been defined as a dilemma of power, and has been consolidated within the
assumption that sovereignty is a unilateral and oppressive reality at all levels. The objective
has been defined as the abolition of this sovereignty and the inherent problem of authority.
Two separate processes can be considered to reach this objective. The first is the concept of
democracy. However, it should be noted that democracy alone does not suffice to eliminate
an unequal exercise of power, an oppressive model of authority, or an isolationist approach.
Although it has an important function at a micro level, democracy is not sufficient or
functional in more comprehensive applications.
Foremost among such applications is international relations, which is a dilemma in its own
right. One of the most important steps in the development of a political approach based on
the use of brute force and violence is foreign policy. The main purpose of the world’s
international policy institutions and policy-making processes is the prevention of this
situation. In the background of the quest for policy in the post-1945 period lies this fact.
International and supranational institutions draw their power from this ideal. Starting with the
United Nations, efforts towards institution building have gained an altogether new dimension
since 1989. Transnational institutions that have emerged in the world today have a
perspective that widens and advances the boundaries of this approach. The idea to establish
such institutions stems from the notion that nation-states, as introverted closed structures,
comprise an inward use of violence, and from the need to escape this vicious circle.
283
Neighbourhood Concept: Neighbourhood is not a concept of narrow scope and limited
functionality. On the contrary, it is a very complex phenomenon where ritual processes of
law become the most functional and intensively applied, and which gains meaning in any
type of bilateral relationship, and even reproduces the acquired meaning. It is not only valid
between individuals, but also resorted to among nations or states. In this respect,
neighbourhood is not only a founding concept; it also becomes the threshold for testing a
series of established relationships. Moreover, it is a fact that neighbourhood is also used by
the super-narratives of applications of traditional and ritual morality and law. These
applications not only determine neighbourhood processes but also analyse them, and even
start defining new structures that reside upon the consciousness, implementation, and model
of neighbourhood. The fact that neighbourhood is a concept or even a precedent often
referred to in international relationships is altogether a result of this approach. Taken into
consideration with these aspects, the concept of neighbourhood is active in the definition and
shaping of both political theory and international policy, as well as the development of
certain structures with implicit and explicit meanings. It is also obvious that neighbourhood
does not suffice to eliminate these processes.
TURKEY’S DELIMITATION POLICY ON THE LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES
Turkey and the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958)
During the Conference, Turkey favored a 3 nautical mile (n.m.)4
territorial sea and
delimitation between the coasts of opposite and adjacent states, based on the principles of
International Law. Nonetheless, it did not oppose the idea of 6 n.m. as a limit, and declared
its intention to apply greater limits on the basis of reciprocity in case a maritime neighbor
would apply a territorial sea of more than 3 n.m. 5 For fisheries purposes, Turkey favored the
establishment of a contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea and supported draft article
resolutions to this end. This is why Turkey embraced the Canadian resolution6 that aimed at
establishing a territorial sea up to 6 n.m. and a contiguous zone of 6 n.m. beyond this 6 n.m.
limit.7 Nonetheless, since no limits for the territorial sea was accepted at the Conference,
Turkey neither signed nor ratified any of the Conventions concluded in Geneva on 29 April
1958, which came to be known as the “1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea”. 8
284
Turkey and the Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1960)
The basic aim of this Conference was to reach an agreement on the breadth of territorial
waters. States almost agreed on a breadth of territorial waters up to 12 n.m., but this
agreement lacked the required number of votes for the adoption of a text. Furthermore, many
states, including Turkey, 9 supported with real majority the idea to establish a 6 n.m. territorial
sea and an additional 6 n.m. fisheries zone beyond this 6 n.m. territorial sea, which was used
to be called as the 6+6 formula in the joint resolution of the US and Canada. 10 Nevertheless,
this draft was not adopted due to lack of a few votes. As a result of the developments taking
place in the Law of the Sea as well as in its own state practices, Turkey abandoned the
former limit of 3 n.m. that it had been exercising since 1923, and enacted a Law No. 476 in
1964 that established a 6 n.m. territorial sea for Turkey. 11 Since then, Turkey has strictly
been applying a 6 n.m. territorial sea at the Aegean, and for reasons of equity, it expects
Greece to apply the 6 n.m. limit12 at the Aegean. Nonetheless, Turkey exercises a 12 n.m.
territorial sea at the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It should be noted that Law No. 2674
of 1982, which repealed Law No. 476 of 1964, kept the same limits and practice. 13
Turkey and the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1974-1982)
Turkey, compared to the former Conferences on the Law of the Sea, was highly active
throughout this last Conference and in particular during the Second Committee meetings,
where it was elected as the Vice Chair of the Committee. From the very beginning of the
Conference, Turkey had submitted several draft article resolutions related to coastal maritime
areas14
and their delimitation with the aim to achieve durable settlements through the
application of the principles of equity, especially in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, as well
as areas where the coasts of two or more states are opposite or adjacent to each other. The
features of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and in particular the Aegean had determined the
logic lying behind Turkey’s policy at the Conference. In light of its geographic, geologic and
geomorphologic realities, Turkey opted for defending its vital interests in such seas, and also
for the settlement of boundary questions under the spirit of equity and equitable principles.
An issue-based analysis reveals more about Turkey’s strategy. 15
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Turkey’s Maritime Areas Policies during the Conference
When the Conference first met at Caracas in June 1974, in order to influence the negotiations
and the negotiating text to be prepared by the “Conference Secretariat” for the conduct of
future meetings and negotiations related to the “International Law of the Sea”, Turkey
submitted draft articles related to maritime areas and their delimitation, reflecting its basic
principles and policies related to the Law of the Sea.
Turkey’s Policy related to Territorial Waters
Turkey, throughout the Conference, taking into account the special features of the Black Sea,
Mediterranean and in particular the Aegean 16, defended views in favor of equity and
equitable principles related to the breadth of the territorial sea and its delimitation. It also
argued for delimitation in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas on the basis of an agreement
between the coastal states that will take into account the special circumstances of the coasts
and the sea area to be delimited. For the purpose achieving an equitable settlement, Turkey
proposed the application of various methods during delimitation.
In line with this basic policy, Turkey submitted to the Conference two draft article
resolutions on territorial waters. According to the draft related to the breadth of the territorial
waters17, without referring to a specific limit, Turkey accepted the establishment of territorial
waters for each coastal state based on the principles to be accepted by the Convention. In
addition, it declared that delimitation lines should start from the applicable lines to be
determined by the Convention, which could be the normal base lines (the low-water line) or
straight baselines according to the principles of International Law. Furthermore, it asked for
the incorporation of a basic principle of International Law into the Convention, that is, no
state shall have a right to close the territorial waters of a state, in whole or in part, to the high
seas while determining the breadth of its territorial waters or delimiting it. These principles
favored by Turkey were based on the established principles of law to practice equity and to
prevent any abuse during the use of a right. Turkey also proposed that the breadth of the
territorial sea should be determined jointly by the related coastal states in semi-enclosed seas
with special circumstances.
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In the second proposal that Turkey submitted, which concerned the delimitation of territorial
waters,18 it was proposed that when the coasts of two or more states are opposite or adjacent
to each other, the boundaries of the respective coastal states should be delimited by an
agreement based on the principles of equity. During the deliberations, the parties should take
into account the general position and configuration of the coasts, the existence of islands and
islets off the coasts, which constitutes special circumstances according to law, and should
apply any relevant method(s) for delimitation in order to reach an equitable agreement. In
case of a dispute between the parties or a failure in reaching a settlement for delimitation, the
parties should choose any of the peaceful means referred in Article 33 of the UN Charter or
any other peaceful means that they would agree on. Turkey’s preference for flexible means
of settlement aimed to preserve the sovereign rights of states, and not to force any of the state
parties to a certain means of settlement in a compulsory manner.
Turkey’s Policy related to Continental Shelf
Turkey, while determining its policy and expressing its views on the “continental shelf” was
highly inspired by the judgment of the ICJ related to the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 19
Accordingly, Turkey based its continental shelf policy not on the distance criteria but on
“natural prolongation” as well as “equity and equitable principles”. In Turkey’s draft article
on the continental shelf 20 , it can be observed that there is no reference to a definition of the
continental shelf. The records of the meetings indicate a stance of Turkey in favor of the
“natural prolongation” criteria. In its draft article, Turkey specifically referred to delimitation
between states whose costs are opposite or adjacent to each other, and put emphasis on the
criteria of agreement between the parties and on the basis of equity. It also emphasized that
during delimitation all relevant special circumstances (e.g. the coasts’ geological and
geomorphologic structure, the presence of islands, islets and rocks, fringe of islands, etc.)
should be taken into account in the area till the outer limits of the “continental slope”,
including the island and islets located on the continental shelf of another state. To this end,
according to Turkey’s point of view, the parties may decide to apply various means of
delimitation methods at the same time on the concerned area in order to reach to an equitable
settlement. During delimitation negotiations if a dispute arises between the parties, (such as a
new issue coming to the surface, a refusal to negotiate a settlement process or to continue
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negotiations), Turkey asks from the parties to choose the means offered by the UN Charter
Article 33, or any other peaceful means that they are open to or that is binding upon them due
to the international agreements which they are a party to
Turkey’s policy related to exclusive economic zone
Turkey, in its draft article related to exclusive economic zone 21, focused on the delimitation
between states whose coasts are opposite and adjacent to each other. As Turkey’s proposal
was identical to its proposal related to the “continental shelf”, further explanation does not
seem necessary at the moment.
Turkey’s policy related to the regime of islands
Taking into account the Aegean Sea’s geological and geomorphologic realities, Turkey
submitted a draft article related to the regime of islands. 22 18 In there, it did not define what
an “island” is in order to lead the states and the Conference to make a definition of this
geographic formation.23
In the meantime, Turkey objected to certain kinds of islands located on the exclusive
economic zone or on the continental shelf of another state, and stated that such islands can
and shall have no exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf of their own, if their
surfaces are less than 10% of the whole territorial surface of the mainland and also if their
population is less than 10% of the mainland’s population. In other words, it proposed that the
islands to be situated on the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of another
state ought to be of considerable size and population. Turkey also raised the view that islands
of a state that have no economic life of their own, situated off the territorial waters of that
state, and should be allocated neither territorial waters nor maritime areas. Furthermore, it
stressed that the rocks which come out to surface at low tide should have no maritime areas
of their own, while arguing that coastal states that have a group or a fringe of islands on their
coasts cannot claim maritime rights for those islands based on archipelagos or archipelagic
waters concept. Finally, Turkey proposed that in semi-enclosed seas with special geographic
features, the maritime areas of the islands of such regions should be determined jointly by the
related regional states.
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Turkey’s policy related to enclosed and semi-enclosed seas
In its draft article, Turkey expressed the view that the general principles that will be adopted
by the Convention related to territorial waters and exclusive economic zone shall also be
applied in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas24 in accordance with the principle of equity. To
this end, it proposed that the states bordering such seas should negotiate among themselves in
order to decide for the application of the provisions of the Convention according to its
purpose and also to meet the requirements that arise from the features of their region.
Why Turkey did not become a party to UNCLOS
Turkey, despite its active efforts and sincere cooperation with the other states that had
similar concerns, did not manage to get included in a more specific and clear manner the
articles or provisions into the text of the Convention, which will would expressly take into
account the special circumstances for maritime delimitation in enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas. Turkey expressed its views as to why it was going to vote against the text of the
Convention at the closing session of the Conference on 10 December 1982. 25 An analysis of
Turkey’s statement sheds light to many questions in mind and may contribute to change the
negative opinion of certain people, groups and/or states against Turkey.
As stated by Turkey during the final session of the Conference, the basic and sincere aim of
Turkey had been establishing a regime based on equity in all areas of seas in order to serve to
the interests of all people. To this end, Turkey continuously tried to underline that the
geographical differences and circumstances should specifically and with particular
importance be taken into account for the realization of equity and equitable principles in
delimitation.
According to Turkey, the Conference failed to achieve this aim. Another issue put forth by
Turkey concerned the inclusion of a provision for raising “reservations”. In order to obtain
universal support to the Convention, Turkey raised the opinion to review the text at the final
sessions of the Conference. This effort of Turkey was supported by 45 states either through
the positive or abstention votes they had caste at the voting of the Turkish resolution. This
support can be considered as an evidence of the lack of full support to the Convention. Due
to the rejection of the right to “put reservations” on the provisions of the Convention, which
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left Turkey without the required guarantees to protect its vital interests in the delimitation of
maritime areas at semi-enclosed seas, Turkey had to vote against the Convention.
Turkey’s abstention from signing the Final Act of the Conference was mainly due to
paragraph 41 which stated that all the provisions of the Convention were adopted with
“consensus” from the very beginning of the Conference. This, from the Turkish point of view
was a statement that did not reflect the reality. Turkey, for itself, from the very beginning of
the Conference had objected to some provisions and even proposed amendments to this end.
If Turkey would have signed this document, it would be an acquiescence and would
inevitably contradict with Turkey’s attitude and goals pursued throughout the eight years of
the Conference.
The lack of clarity in certain provisions of the UNCLOS was among the main factors that
made Turkey refrain from signing the document. For instance, Turkey emphasized that
Article 3 (breadth of the territorial sea) cannot be interpreted as if the article declares an
absolute limit of 12 n.m. that is applicable under every circumstance. According to Turkey’s
clear point of view, 12 n.m. is not an absolute rule, thus it can only be exercised according to
the general principles of International Law, and is subject to the limitations raised by Article
300 (good faith and abuse of rights). By such view, Turkey once more aimed to safeguard its
vital interests at the Aegean, as Greece’s claim for an absolute 12 n.m. territorial sea means
the closure of Turkish coasts to the Aegean high seas. It should also be noted that according
to Turkey’s point of view, a state’s sovereign right only covers the airspace over its territorial
sea and under no circumstance states can claim sovereign rights over the airspace beyond that
limit.
Turkey also underlined that the 12 n.m. limit was neither accepted as a rule nor acquired the
status of an established customary rule of International Law yet. In addition, it noted that a
state could oppose the adoption of a customary norm at the stage of its establishment, since
even such norms of International Law are subject to the consent of states. Turkey, from the
first day of the Conference opposed the application of 12 n.m. territorial sea limit in enclosed
and semi-enclosed seas, and that is why Turkey submitted drafts related to such seas giving
priority to special circumstances and to the achievement of the principle of equity in such
seas. For this reason, Turkey had been claiming that 12 n.m. territorial sea limit could not be
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imposed upon Turkey without its consent. To this end, since then Turkey has preferred to
base its legal views related to the extent of the territorial sea as well as the features of the
principle of abuse of rights on the three judgments of the ICJ in the “Fisheries Cases”. 26
In relation to delimitation between states with opposite and adjacent coasts, their respective
exclusive economic zones (UNCLOS Article74), and their continental shelves (UNCLOS
Article 83), Turkey raised the view that the Convention did not put much emphasis on special
circumstances. Therefore, it tried to underline the importance of special circumstances, and
based its views on three judgments of the ICJ, i.e. the judgments of the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case, 1969; Tunisia- Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Continental Shelf Case,
1982; and the Ad hoc Arbitration Court’s judgment in the Channel Case, 1977, which give
priority to the principles of equity and equitable delimitation, under the light and effect of
special circumstances that exists in the related area, inevitably affecting delimitation in
reaching an equitable settlement. Turkey by its comments tried to emphasize that
delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf where
the coasts of states are opposite or adjacent to each other in semi-enclosed seas, can only be
realized by an agreement between the parties based on equity and equitable principles.
Another basic reason for Turkey’s negative attitude towards the Convention relates to islands
and their regime as established by Article 121 of the UNCLOS. Turkey views Article 121 as
a general provision where there is no reference to the maritime areas that will be given to
such geographical areas. In reality, the existence of islands in areas subject to delimitation
creates special circumstances that have to be taken into account in order to reach to an
equitable settlement. To this end, Turkey argues that no effect or a semi-effect is to be given
to islands during delimitation, and tries to support its views with the judicial judgments of the
Channel Case (1977) and the Tunisia-Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Continental Shelf Case
(1982).
Among Turkey’s views the most important and the striking ones probably are: Turkey’s total
rejection of the provisions of UNCLOS, and therefore its claim that the provisions of the
Convention are not applicable to Turkey; and finally, its argument that the 12 n.m. rule had
not yet become a customary rule of law, and if its application creates an abuse of rights, it
would be impossible to talk about the existence of a customary rule of international law that
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can be imposed on Turkey. In light of this general overview of Turkey’s policies during the
UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea, it is viable to analyze how Turkey has put into
practice in its seas what it had defended throughout the conferences. To this end, the
following section will study Turkey’s maritime relations with its neighbours, and identify its
differing practices in different seas and the reasons why.
TURKEY’S MARITIME BOUNDARY RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBUORS
BLACK SEA
Turkey has several neighbours at the Black Sea, which are Georgia, the Russian Federation,
Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria. Despite the fact that Romania has no continental shelf or
exclusive economic zone neighboring Turkey at present, it might have a small maritime
boundary with Turkey, due to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone maritime
areas delimitation between Romania and Ukraine. This delimitation was a disputed matter
between Romania and Ukraine, which has recently been settled on 3 February 2009 by the
judgment of the ICJ.27 Formerly, the boundary issues between Turkey and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were resolved on the basis of principles of equity. 28
After the demise of the USSR, no problem had arisen between Turkey and the succeeding
countries of Georgia and Ukraine related to the existing maritime boundaries. Maritime
relations of Turkey with Bulgaria, on the other hand, have not been as smooth. Nonetheless,
after a very long negotiation process, the two states managed to reach an equitable settlement
of their issues through the application of the principles of equity. In this regard, at present,
with the exception of a few fishing cases that takes place from time to time within the
exclusive economic zones of Bulgaria and Ukraine, no dispute exists between Turkey and its
neighbours at the Black Sea. The validity of this argument can be proven through state-bystate analyses, which are due in the following subsections.
Relations with Bulgaria
Unlike with its other neighbours at the Black Sea, Turkey’s maritime relations with Bulgaria
have been problematic. The Sofia Agreement finally settled the long-standing lateral
territorial sea boundary dispute between the parties on 4 December 1997. 29 This agreement
not only delimited the maritime boundary in the Begendik 30/Rezova Bay and beyond that
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area, but also settled all other maritime boundary issues including the lateral territorial
boundary line and the continental shelf as well as delimiting the superjacent waters of that
area –i.e. the exclusive economic zone boundaries of the contracting states. 31 The parties
applied a simplified equidistant line for the delimitation of their respective maritime areas
with the belief that equidistance was likely to produce just and equitable results. Although
the initial point taken for delimiting the lateral territorial sea boundary seems to fall contrary
to Turkey’s interests, an analysis reveals that the delimitation related to the continental shelf
and exclusive economic zone aims to compensate it. Formerly, Istanbul Peace Agreement of
29 September 1913 between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire determined the land boundary
between the two states, and the Lausanne Peace Treaty, signed on 24 July 1923, confirmed
this boundary line.32
Accordingly, at the mouth of Mutludere/Rezovska River, the land boundary ended at a point
equidistant from the two states’ shores, and this point served as the initial point for their
maritime boundaries. Nonetheless, due to accretion and avulsion, the natural configuration
and the length of the shores within the Bay inevitably changed, and this made the
demarcation a concern. The collapse of the Communist regime in Bulgaria positively
contributed to the change in the attitudes of the parties towards each other, and this paved the
way for the settlement of the dispute. The parties finally agreed to resolve the lateral
boundary issue by agreeing on an initial point, and in addition, they managed to delimit and
demarcate not only their lateral territorial sea boundary but also their continental shelves and
exclusive economic zones. The Agreement of 1997, both parties first agreed to establish the
initial boundary point at the mouth area of the River up to the closing line of the Bay. They
delimited the boundary line to determine their respective inland waters within the
Begendik/Rezovo Bay, and then established the initial point of their respective territorial sea
boundary line as 41° 58' 48.5″ N., 28° 02' 15.8″ E at the mouth of the Bay. The boundary line
after this initial point follows initially a geodetic line, and then, through loxodromes follows
a geographic parallel till it meets the terminal point of 41° 58' 52.8″ N., 28° 19' 25.8″ E.,
which is the outer edge of the 12 n.m. of the respective territorial sea lines of the two states.
Bulgaria, being a party to the 1958 Conventions as well as The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), practices a 12 n.m. territorial sea as Turkey does at the
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Black Sea. Both states have continental shelves and exclusive economic zones that are
delimited by the Sofia Agreement of 1997. Bulgaria, in addition to its 12 n.m. territorial sea,
also has a 24 n.m. contiguous zone due to its domestic law, 33 and the provisions of the
UNCLOS. At present, the maritime neighborly relations between the two states is going well,
with the exception of some minor fisheries disputes within the exclusive economic zones of
the parties. Nonetheless, the parties with their goodwill are able to resolve such minor
disputes, and do not to permit their escalation.
Relations with Greece: The Aegean Region
Greece and Turkey have had a conflictual relationship in the Aegean especially after mid1950s. The disputes between the two states concerning the Aegean Sea and the lack of a
solution have been a source of aggravation also for third flag countries in the Eastern
Mediterranean, as the Aegean Sea is also a route for international navigation. The first
maritime boundary relation between the two states was established with the Lausanne Peace
Treaty of 1923, and in the early post-war period that followed, the relations between the two
states had been very friendly. 34
With the conclusion of three agreements in 1930,35 the positive relationship reached its
peak36 and it continued till the midst of the 1950s. Then the “Cyprus Case” and Cyprus’s
future status became issues occupying the international agenda, and these affected the
relationship between the two countries in a negative manner. 37 Then, one by one, disputes
started to break out between the two parties such as “the demilitarized status of the Eastern
Aegean Islands”; “sovereignty over certain islands, islets and rocks”; “the extent of the Greek
national airspace”; “air traffic services”; and “command and control issues within NATO”.38
The Aegean Sea disputes still wait to be resolved but Greece and Turkey have not yet proven
that they have a full mutual political and military will to achieve an equitable solution. There
is also lack of a common understanding of the issues to be discussed by the two states.
Among these come the issues of the extent of the territorial waters and the delimitation of the
territorial sea boundary, which are not very well known by the (national and international)
public in comparison to the continental shelf issue. Nonetheless, these two seems to
constitute the key issues between the parties, since solution of other problems highly depends
on a mutual agreement related to these main issues.39 A brief study of the prior agreements
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signed in the earlier years of the Turkish Republic reveals that, previously concluded
agreements, at the current state of affairs, fall short in solving the existing disputes.
The lateral boundary at Maritza River and its seaward extension
The boundary line on Meric/Maritza River is the median line, whereas in the navigable parts
of the River it is the median line of the principal channel of navigation (the thalweg) 40 line.
Following the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty41, a Joint Boundary Commission was
established for purposes of delimitation and demarcation. The Commission, based on
Articles 6/2 and 12/2 of this Treaty, and the territorial sea practice of the two states in the
then years, not only demarcated the boundary line on the river, but also delimited the lateral
territorial sea boundary line from the mouth of the river up to 3 n.m. of its extension to the
Aegean.42 After the Commission realized its task, a protocol was signed between the parties
on 3 November 1926, and deposited to the Government of the French Republic in accordance
with the provisions of Article 11 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty.
As years passed, two facts posed a challenge to the terms of this Protocol. The first is the
change in the practice of the two states related to the breadth of their territorial sea, an issue
inevitably affecting the lateral territorial sea delimitation at the Aegean at the mouth of
Maritza River. The second fact is the geophysical changes within the banks and courses or
the channels of the River due to the flow and currents of the River, accretion and avulsion,
and its soil (territorial) effects on the mouth of the Meric/Maritza River. Therefore, these
facts necessitated a new demarcation at the river as well as at the mouth of the river towards
the Aegean Sea. Accordingly, the parties agreed on the terms of re-demarcation, and signed
one main and some additional technical and administrative protocols in Ankara on 7
December 1971.43
At present, on the one hand Turkey argues that they have to renegotiate the terms of the
Protocols in order to meet the geographic, geomorphologic and geophysical changes that had
happened since then. On the other hand Greece rejects this offer and declares that the 1971
Protocol is in force, and that there is no need to negotiate for a new binding international
document related to the demarcation of Meric/Meritza River and its extension to the Aegean
Sea in order to determine the lateral maritime boundary line of the parties.
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Efforts for delimitation between Greece and Turkey
Neither territorial boundaries of the two states were challenged nor the status quo of 1930s
changed until the 1950s. Greece and Turkey became NATO members in February 1952, this
led Greece to ask Turkey in mid 1953 in Ankara, to agree on the terms of an agreement via
an exchange of notes based on the principles agreed between Italy and Turkey by the 28
December 1932 Accord.44 Turkey preferred to remain silent for a while, and then in early
1954, it sent a positive response to the Greek request to negotiate the terms of a delimitation
agreement, which, according to Turkey’s official point of view, is a legal confirmation of the
non-validity of the 28 December 1932 Accord. Turkey did not receive an official reply from
the Greek side. Nonetheless, for technical reasons the parties came together in Ankara at the
end of the year, where the Greek representative claimed that he had no power to negotiate or
to sign a document in this field on behalf of his state. Therefore, no progress was achieved at
this end. After the failure to negotiate the boundary at the Mentese/Dodecanese islands
region, Greece made another attempt in mid 1955 in Ankara by a note verbale. This time the
purpose was to start working for delimitation at the northern parts of the Aegean as if the 28
December 1932 Accord was still valid and in force. Within two months, Turkey unofficially
rejected the Greek request due to rapidly changing circumstances in the island of Cyprus, and
the Greek support to the “Megali Idea” policy pursued on the Island. This diplomatic
rejection of Turkey was prior to the London Conference that was held in London in order to
discuss the future status of Cyprus among the concerned states. When this reality is taken
into account, Turkey’s negative attitude can easily be approved.
In light of this analysis, it is possible to claim that no agreement between the parties exists
related to the delimitation of their territorial seas, with the exception of the outward boundary
from the mouth of Meric/Maritza River. Given the status of the prior documents of the 1926
Protocol and 28 December 1932 preparatory work regarding the delimitation of the territorial
sea boundary between Greece and Turkey, the conclusion of an agreement for this purpose
seems vital between the two states on their respective territorial waters where the coasts are
adjacent or opposite to each other. Although the Greek claim is that “the delimitation of the
territorial sea between the Turkish coast and the Dodecanese islands took place according to
the method of the median line in the treaty concluded in 1932 between Italy and Turkey”, 45
this agreement falls short of regulating the territorial sea boundary between the two states. In
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this regard, Turkey aims for delimitation through a bilateral agreement based on the principle
of equity.46 The status quo remained the same at the Aegean until 1964, that is when Turkey
adopted a new “Territorial Waters Law”, which extended the breadth of Turkish territorial
waters from 3 to 6 n.m.47
The reason for Turkey to amend its domestic law and practice concerning the breadth of its
territorial waters was, as was observed during the First, and in particular, the Second UN
Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, the changing tendencies at the
international fora in this regard. At the Second UN Conference, states almost agreed on a 6
n.m. territorial sea limit, and this played an important role in Turkey’s decision to extend its
territorial waters to 6 n.m., especially at the Aegean. Since 1964, the practices of Greece and
Turkey remained the same, and so the status quo. 48 Nevertheless, Greece being a party to the
UNCLOS49 , aims to extend its territorial waters from 6 n.m. to 12 n.m.50
Greece’s efforts for the extension of its territorial waters, throughout the Third UN on the
Law of the Sea favored a 12 n.m. territorial sea limit in absolute terms. It also attempted for
the acceptance of the Aegean Sea as “archipelagic waters”, which would turn the status of
this Sea into “Greek internal waters”. Although Greece failed to convince the other
participants of the Conference on this matter, it insists on interpreting Article 3 of the
UNCLOS in way to recognize every state, under every circumstance, a right to establish its
territorial waters as 12 n.m.
This attitude of Greece contradicts first of all with the views raised by states throughout the
Conference, secondly with Article 3 that uses the term “up to” and gives discretion to the
coastal state, thirdly with Article 300 that aims to protect good faith and prevent abuse of
rights,51 fourthly with the judgments of the ICJ52 as well as the customary rules of
international law, and finally with the former official Greek statements raised during the
1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea related to the breadth of territorial waters. 53
Greece, despite these international realities, while ratifying the UNCLOS on 1 June 1995
empowered its government to extend its territorial waters to 12 n.m. when it deems necessary
and nationally beneficial. Turkey responded to act at its 121 session at the Turkish Grand
National Assembly (TGNA) on 8 June 1995. The TGNA in this session announced to the
Greek public and to the world, with peaceful desires and in a spirit of friendship, the possible
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consequences of an extension of the Greek territorial waters beyond its present limits of 6
n.m. To this end, it presented comparative figures on the present areas of national jurisdiction
and those after the possible extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 n.m., as well as the
percentages of the present and future areas of high seas in case of extension. Based on these
findings, Turkey declared such extension of territorial waters as a casus belli as it wanted to
safeguard its vital interests. 54
This declaration of Turkey aimed to indicate the
determinedness of Turkey to prevent any extension of Greek territorial waters further than 6
n.m., because if this extension happens it will decrease the high seas areas at the Aegean to a
great extent, and will close the shores of Turkey to high seas access, and thus, traversing
from the Greek territorial waters will become inevitable. Nevertheless, since Turkey’s clear
response, this issue seems to have been suspended from the daily agendas of the two states, at
least for the moment. This issue presumably is still being discussed between the parties in the
ongoing “exploratory talks”. On the part of Turkey, the criticality of the breadth of Greek
territorial waters is due to the following: Turkey considers the Aegean Sea as “a common
sea” for both countries;
The Continental Shelf Dispute
When the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil gained importance due to the oil crisis
of the 1970s, the continental shelves of the coastal states and their exploration and
exploitation became prominent issues affecting foreign policies of states and their claims
related to their continental shelf rights. 55 Greece was the first country at the Aegean that had
granted oil concession rights as well as exploration and exploitation licenses to companies. It
started exploiting the oil off the shore of Thassos –an island off the shore of Mesta/Nestos
River at the north coast of Greece. In November 1973, this time Turkey granted exploration
licenses to a Turkish company named Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi (TPAO). These
exploration licenses concerned areas beyond Turkey’s territorial waters but on its own
continental shelf, and in this regard, twenty seven areas were declared as areas for oil
exploration by TPAO.56
Greece protested this practice of the Turkish State and on 7 February 1974 gave a note
verbale57 where it declared the granting of oil exploration concession licenses by the Turkish
Government inadmissible. Turkey responded to the Greek note verbale on 27 February, and
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this was followed by a Greek counter note verbale on 24 May. Turkey responded to the
counter Greek note verbale on 5 June. This exchange of note verbales continued also in 1975.
Turkey, in its note verbales defended its position, based its practice on the established
principles of international law, and invited Greece to negotiate in order to reach an amicable
settlement to the continental shelf dispute that would be “in the interest of both countries”. 58
Greece’s view was not to oppose to “a delimitation of the continental shelf between the two
countries based on the provisions of present day positive international law as codified by the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf”. 59
The Turkish Government, in order to secure its ipso facto and ab initio rights on its
continental shelf, granted two other oil concession licenses in June and July of 1974 off its
territorial waters at the Aegean but within its own continental shelf areas. To the east as well
as at the south eastern areas of the Island of Rhodes, it granted additional licenses. 60 Turkey,
following this, started scientific seismic researches on the seabed of the Aegean, under the
safeguard and escort of the Turkish naval and air forces in order to prevent any military
interference or interception by the Greek armed forces that were navigating very close to or
flying over the Turkish scientific research vessel “MTA Sismik-I”. All these practices of
Turkey can be interpreted as Turkey’s keenness in defending its national and vital interests at
the Aegean.
After exchange of note verbales in 1974 and 1975, the parties met in 1976. Two of these
meetings were held in Bern prior to Greece’s referral of the dispute before the UN Security
Council and the ICJ. After Greece’s application to the Court, the third and final meeting was
held again in Bern. The parties on 11 November 1976 agreed on not escalating the dispute
and on some other fundamental facts related to the Aegean Continental Shelf Dispute. 61 The
Bern Agreement in somewhat terms contributed to the stabilization of the dispute since it
prevented the parties from further conduct of exploration and exploitation activities in the
“continental shelf of the Aegean” until a settlement was reached. Despite this, other crises
broke out in 1981 and 1987 due to Greece’s drilling activities beyond its territorial waters in
violation of the principles of Bern Agreement. The crisis of 1987 was averted by the efforts
of the Foreign Ministers of the two states on the basis of the principles agreed at the Davos
299
Summit (30-31 January 1987) held between the Prime Ministers Turgut Ozal and Andreas
Papandreou.
While the political dialogue was continuing between the two states through exchange of note
verbales and directly through the Bern meetings, Greece applied to the UN on 10 August
1976 and asked from the Security Council to seize the dispute. The Security Council invited
the parties to participate in the discussions of the case without the right to vote. After hearing
the parties on 25 August 1976 the Council recommended the parties (1) to continue to
negotiate for resolving their differences by adopting mutually acceptable solutions; (2) to
respect each other’s rights; and (3) to reduce the tension. The Council also invited them to
take into account the ICJ channel to resolve their legal differences. 62
It is worthwhile to note that Greece, while bringing a complaint against Turkey before the
UN, at the same time and date, also applied to the ICJ for the settlement of the Aegean
Continental Shelf Dispute. In this unilateral application, Greece also asked from the Court to
take interim measures of protection in order to protect its interests from the Turkish
violations on Greece’s continental shelf and to protect its exclusive continental shelf rights. 63
The Greek attempt to settle the Aegean Continental Shelf dispute before the ICJ, and to
delimit the continental shelf between the Greek islands off the shores of Turkey and Turkey’s
mainland64 failed as the Court, on 19 December 1978, found that it lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the case. The ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction in this case stemmed from the Greek
reservations raised to the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of
1928 done at Geneva.65
It is important to note that when Greece asked for delimitation between its islands of the
Turkish coast and the Turkish mainland, it simply disregarded: the role of natural
prolongation in delimitation, the existence of those islands on Turkey’s natural prolongation
and their presence on the Turkish continental shelf, the special circumstances created by
islands, basically when they are located on the wrong side, the importance of the principles
of equity, equitable principles and equidistance in the delimitation of maritime areas. Years
later, in 1995 Greece as a full member to the European Union (EU), in order to comply with
the EU acquis, adopted a law entitled “Law Relating to the Exploration, Research and
300
Exploitation of Hydrocarbons and Related Issues”, 66 in which there was a reference to the
exclusive economic zone. As is well known, the coastal state has identical rights over its
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, with the exception of the water column for
the rights recognized to states. Any practice of Greece related to an exclusive economic zone
will no doubt add new problems to the Aegean disputes. Such an addition might bring the
bilateral negotiations to a deadlock, a situation that none of the two parties would benefit
from, and which would ruin all the progress, including the confidence building measures
achieved so far.
All in all, one can easily claim that no agreed continental shelf boundary line exists at the
Aegean between the two countries at present, and the absence of an agreement determining
this boundary line lies at the core of the dispute. Nonetheless, as the Bern Agreement of 1976
is still in force, the parties refrain from taking any initiative or act, in any manner, related to
the Aegean continental shelf. Thus, as was agreed in Bern, the two states simply continue to
respect the status quo concerning the continental shelf.
Settlement efforts of Greece and Turkey
From time to time the Aegean disputes had escalated in a way that is likely to endanger
international peace and security. These reminded the parties of their obligation stemming
from articles 2/4 and 33 of the UN Charter to resolve their differences through peaceful
means indicated in Article 33. Nonetheless, the parties still need to decide for the means for
the settlement of their differences on common grounds. 67 68
No positive initiative or progress was made in order to settle the Aegean disputes after the
Bern Agreement of 1976 until the Davos Summit of January1988 during which the first
positive steps were taken. Following this, on 27 May 1988 the Athens “Memorandum of
Understanding”, and on 8 September 1988 the Istanbul “Guidelines” were signed. These two
documents aimed to regulate military exercises at the Aegean international airspaces. After
the conclusion of these documents, there came a pause, which lasted until the outbreak of the
Kardak/Imia crisis on 25 December 1995. After this incident, Turkey offered Greece to
negotiate and settle all disputes similar to Kardak rocks, but this proposal was refused by
Greece. This did not discourage Turkey, and on 24 March 1996, it took the initiative to
301
propose a third party settlement to be mutually agreed on by Greece and Turkey. This effort
failed due to Greece’s negative response.
Since the Aegean Sea constitutes a crucial region for international maritime navigation, the
delimitation of the territorial sea boundary in this area also has an international aspect.
Therefore, the delimitation of the territorial sea boundary between Greece and Turkey
constitutes an important matter not only for the bilateral relations of the two states but also
for international maritime navigation. In this regard, especially the issue of the extent of the
territorial sea at the Aegean, which is not even considered as a matter of conflict by Greece,
is the one that should be settled first among other issues. In the absence of a mutual
agreement on the existence of this problem, no solution can be sought through legal
channels.69 In general terms, what the two countries need most is a political will to solve
these disputes and to pursue positive diplomacy, not populist politics. 70
To this end, the parties also need to put their sincere efforts into achieving an equitable
settlement of their differences. If there remains any unresolved issue, then those can be
submitted to the ICJ. Nevertheless, if the parties achieve an equitable solution in the bilateral
talks conducted, then they will probably no longer need to apply to the ICJ neither for the
territorial sea dispute nor the other maritime issues.71
The Mediterranean
As there are no delimitation agreements between Turkey and its neighbours, the
Mediterranean maritime areas too have a disputed status. The seabed and subsoil of the
Mediterranean Sea indicates the existence of hydrocarbons and oil resources at the Eastern
Mediterranean. In addition, the need for oil is inevitably increasing for every state. This
situation has led some states at the region to conclude exclusive economic zones delimitation
agreements, and to grant oil exploration concession to oil companies. Some of these
agreements and concession grants stem from political factors, and some others from
economic needs. A state-by-state analysis of Turkey’s maritime relations with its neighbours
at the Mediterranean sheds light to the existing problems in the region. 72
302
Greece
Greece also has coasts at the Eastern Mediterranean because of its islands of Crete and
Castellorizo. It should be noted that the Greek island Rhodes is considered as an island
within the Mentese/Dodecanese group of islands and lies within the Aegean, not the
Mediterranean. As Greece acquired the sovereignty of the Island of Meis/Castellorizo from
Italy by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 73 –which is a status establishing agreement according
to international law and creates erga omnes obligations for all states even for the nonsignatories– it is also the successor of the 4 January 1932 Ankara Agreement. 74 This
agreement determined the sovereignty on the islets around the island of Meis/Castellorizo, 75
and it is the only agreement concluded by Turkey related to its maritime areas with its
neighbours in the Mediterranean. In conformity with its Law No. 230, Greece is currently
applying a territorial sea of 6 n.m. also around the island of Meis/Castellorizo. Likewise,
despite exercising a territorial sea of 12 n.m. at the Mediterranean, Turkey is applying a 6
n.m. territorial sea at this particular region. The 12 n.m. territorial sea practice of Turkey
starts from Kemer/Antalya and follows the Turkish coast till the Syrian border due to the
“Search and Rescue Order” of the Turkish Naval Forces adopted in 1969. Turkey continues
this policy in order not to give Greece a chance to abuse this practice and to extend its
territorial waters at the Mediterranean more than 6 n.m. It is highly interesting that during
May 2003, the Greek Foreign Ministry requested Turkey’s permission for scientific
exploration by a Greek scientific vessel of the seabed areas of the southern shores of the
island of Meis/Castellorizo. The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded to this request
positively, and in quite a short time the Greek authorities gave their consent for the scientific
activities in the concerned region. Bearing in mind the well-established principle of
international law related to the continental shelf rights of coastal states, no state can carry out
a scientific research on the continental shelf of a third state without its consent. Therefore
Greece’s request of permission from Turkey must be interpreted, on grounds of international
law, as an ipso facto and ab initio acquiescence of recognizing Turkey’s sovereign rights on
the seabed and subsoil of the region. This is a factor that needs to be taken into account in the
future during delimitation.
303
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
No delimitation agreement exists between Turkey and the TRNC related to maritime areas
between the two states although Turkey recognizes the TRNC as an independent state that it
has opposite coasts with. This is probably due to a general fact that in a “Federal State” the
natural resources, in principle, belong to the central authority. Indeed the “Annan Plan”
rejected by the Greek Cypriots at the referenda held on 24 April 2004 included a provision
parallel to the stated principle. Under the light of this well known principle, Turkey prefers to
oppose to the agreements concluded by the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern
Cyprus related to the delimitation of maritime areas in order to protect the vital interests of
TRNC, which in the future might be irreparable, even for a united Cyprus or for two separate
and independent states. It is important to note that Turkey’s interventions in such acts are
based on the Guarantee Agreement of 1960 and to their spirit, as well as Turkey’s traditional
policy understanding that “the Greek Cypriot Administration has no power to represent the
whole island in a way to include the Turkish Cypriots”. The initiatives of the Greek Cypriot
side will no doubt affect a settlement on the island, where the leaders of the two communities
are holding direct talks for a settlement under the guidance of the UN. Nonetheless, if the
Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus continues to grant oil exploration licenses
to third state companies through international tenders, it might become inevitable for Turkey
and the TRNC to conclude a maritime areas delimitation agreement on the basis of equity
related to their exclusive economic zones or their continental shelves. 76 This sort of a policy,
we believe, may create a political advantage and equality for the TRNC in the settlement
negotiations that is being carried out between the two states under the framework of the UN
objectives and principles as well as the Security Council’s resolutions.
Recent Turkish State Practices on its Continental Shelf
The maritime areas practices of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus with
Egypt and also with Lebanon had led Turkey to exercise expressly and openly its ipso facto
and ab initio rights, which do not require any express declaration, over its maritime areas for
the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction rights on its own continental shelf, deriving from the
established principles of international law, at its southern coasts, in the areas beyond its
territorial waters. After the commencement of the Greek Cypriot, Egyptian and Lebanese
practices, the Turkish Government had started granting several gas and oil exploration
304
licenses beyond its territorial waters, to the Turkish petroleum company TPAO. It also
promulgated those licensed areas in the Turkish Official Gazette, and, in general, by their
coordinates. One of those licensed areas draws immediate attention that extends up to the
TRNC territorial waters.77 An analysis of some of those licensed areas display the
overlapping of the claims of the two states, Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Administration of
Southern Cyprus. The counter measures adopted by Turkey to the practices of the Greek
Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus off its territorial waters for the exploration of the
natural resources on its continental shelf or on its exclusive economic zone, made it
inevitable for Turkey to openly declare and safeguard its vital rights on its own continental
shelf areas laying off its territorial waters. The state practices of Turkey for the exploration of
its natural resources beyond its territorial waters and on its own continental shelf, where it
has ipso facto and ab initio rights recognized by international law that does not require any
express promulgation, not only aims to display its express will to safeguard its interests, but
also aims to make it public to the world that those areas are its own continental shelf
jurisdiction areas, and also to display legal evidences related to its legal rights. Until now, no
state other than the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus 78, had objected to
Turkey’s such state practices on its claimed continental shelf areas, including the granting of
licenses to the east of the longitude 32º 16" 18" E.
Turkey’s case is somewhat unique as it is a country that has coasts at three different seas
surrounding its peninsula. Given the number of its maritime neighbours, Turkey has had
many issues to deal with concerning the seas it has a coast to. In this regard, it had settled all
its maritime boundary issues at the Black Sea, and able to dissolved all problems with its
Black Sea neighbours. The agreements concluded to this end not only reflect the bona fide
attitudes of the Black Sea riparian states but also reflects their respect to the principles of
equity related to maritime delimitation issues. On the contrary, the Aegean maritime issues
still remain unresolved, and the need for the delimitation of the maritime areas is increasing.
The attempt to resolve the disputes between the Greece and Turkey continues since 1950’s,
and the parties are trying to rebuild their confidence towards each other which was severely
hampered due to the Cyprus issue. Lately, no major dispute has arisen between the two
states, and this probably is due to the improving friendly relations between them as well as
the need to cooperate in this part of Europe, as tense relations had contributed to nothing for
305
the two nations except for hostile feelings and material loses for the sake of improving their
military capacities. Despite the fact that the Aegean disputes are mainly legal issues, the
parties prefer to treat them as political ones since these concern their sovereign rights and
vital interests. In this regard, it can be claimed that Aegean disputes are somehow connected
to the Cyprus dispute, and if this issue is settled, there is a possibility that the Aegean
disputes will be resolved more easily. Unlike the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean is an
area full of new problems related to maritime jurisdiction areas. The claims for maritime
jurisdiction areas that states started to put forward in early 2003 constitute the main reason of
the tension in this area. While reacting diplomatically against the illegal actions and practices
of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus that is taken on behalf of the whole
of the island, as well as Egypt’s and Lebanon’s practices for maritime jurisdiction claims at
the Eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish Government from time to time finds it necessary to
support its political reactions and to display its determinedness to protect its vital interests
through the assistance of military means. 79
Taking into consideration, in particular, the political criticisms of the EU one needs to ask
whether or not “the policy makers/planners of Turkey and the military” feel the necessity to
reconsider this policy under the light of the narrow interpretation of Article 2/4 of the UN
Charter80, which is an interpretation supported by the UN organs and also by a majority of
states. Above all, the settlement of all the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes
requires the bona fide will of the related states. At present it is not easy to claim that such
will exists as there are underlying political reasons, and the related parties aim to use these
disputes as a political leverage against each other. Here, it is worthwhile to note a wellknown saying of a prominent Turkish statesman H.E. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil: “I don’t want
to spoil my term of office by trying to resolve artificially created issues”
81
. If the related
states of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean would display their goodwill to establish
good neighborly relations, and refrain from adding new concerns to their already crowded
agendas just for the sake of trying to gain political advantages, the desired settlement of the
problems in the region as well as prosperity for the regions’ people would be achieved.
306
1.
The term ‘Straits’ covers the ‘the Strait of Istanbul, the Strait of Canakkale and the
Sea of Marmara’. For an analysis of this term see Yuksel Inan, ‘The Turkish Straits’,
in the Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, edited by
Ali L. Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), pp.
160-161,163-164; Yuuksel Inan, ‘the Current Regime of the Turkish Straits’,
Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1, 2001, pp. 99-101.
2.
The promotion or even commandment of the concept of jihad by some religions
comprises an altogether different concept.
3.
Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, New York, The Modern Library, 2002
4.
The nautical mile (symbol M, NM or nmi) is a unit of distance that is approximately
one minute of arc measured along any meridian. By international agreement it has
been set at 1,852 metres exactly (about 6,076 feet). The international nautical
mile was defined by the First International Extraordinary Hydrographic Conference,
Monaco (1929)
5.
See the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. III, 1958, p.41
6.
See UN Doc. A/CONF.13/C 1/L.77/ Rev. 3
7.
See ibid., p. 176 par. 27
8.
The Conventions concluded at the Conference are the Conventions on the ‘Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone’, ‘the High Seas’, ‘Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas’, and ‘the Continental Shelf’
9.
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, 1960, p. 30
10.
See UN Doc. A/CONF. 19/L.11, and UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official
Records, 1960, p. 173
11.
Turkey till 1964 had no domestic law related to the breadth of its territorial waters,
and used to interpret the breadth of its territorial waters with reference to the terms of
307
Article 12/2 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which established that ‘Except where a
provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less
than three nautical miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty’.
Some Turkish authors consider that the Lausanne Peace Treaty provides a 3 n.m.
territorial sea in the Aegean Sea for the two countries. They arrive at such a
conclusion by inference from certain elements, such as the attitudes of the parties
during the Lausanne Peace Conference and the then practices of the two states. See,
Yuksel Inan and Yucel Acer, ‘The Aegean Disputes’, in The Europeanization of
Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, Karaosmanoglu, A. and Tashan, S.
(eds.), Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, pp. 132-150. In May 1964, Turkey
enacted ‘Territorial Waters Law’, No. 476, to fix the breadth of its territorial waters
as 6 n.m., like Greece. However, Sea, (Yuksel Inan and Sertac H. Baseren, ‘The
Troubled Situation of the Aegean Territorial Waters’, Hellenic Studies, Vol.4, No.2,
1996, p. 57). For the text of Law No. 476, see, Turkish Official Gazette, 24.05. 1964,
No. 11711; LIS, No. 36, p. 149.
12.
Greece, since 1936 applies a 6 n.m. territorial sea on the basis of its Law No. 230
enacted in September 1936. See the text of Law No. 230, LIS, No. 36, p. 61.
13.
In 1982 Turkey repealed Law No. 476 by enacting a new ‘Territorial Sea Law’, Law
No. 2674, dated 20 May 1982, Detail of the text of the Law, Turkish Official Gazette,
22.05.1982, No. 17708; LIS, No. 36, 149. Relying on this provision of Law No. 2674,
the Council of Ministers, took into account the circumstances at the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean, as well as the principles of equity, and approved the continuation of
the pre-existing practice of 12 n.m. limit in these seas. See the decision of the Council
of Ministers, Decision No. 8/4742 dated 29.05.1982, Turkish Official Gazette,
29.05.1982, No. 17708 (Supplement)
14.
The concept ‘maritime areas’ covers the coastal state’s marine areas of ‘inland
waters’, ‘territorial waters’, ‘contiguous zone’, ‘continental shelf’, and ‘exclusive
economic zone’.
308
15.
Mustafa Kibaroğlu (edit. ), Eastern Mediterranean Countries And Issues, Foreign
Policy Institute, Ankara, 2009, p. 157
16.
The Aegean Sea covers an area of around 196,000 km2 including the surfaces of all
the islands, islets and rocks, except the island of Crete, which is considered as a
Mediterranean island. In addition, the Aegean coastlines are distinct in nature and
there are approximately about 1800 islands, islets and rocks that are scattered all
around this semi-enclosed sea. Only about a hundred of those islands are inhabited.
For
further
information,
see,
Inan
and
Acer,
‘The
Aegean
Disputes’,
http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/251202.pdf., p. 125
17.
See UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 8, http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/
lawofthesea-1958/vol/english/1st_Cttee_vol_III_e.pdf
18.
See UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 9, op. cit.,
19.
See International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and
Orders, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969
20.
21.
See UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 34 , http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/
22.
23.
See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol.
II, Summary Records of Meetings, 1975, par. 63, p. 284
24.
See UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 56 , op. cit.,
309
25.
For Turkey’s objections to the text of the UNCLOS, see Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, vol. XVII, pp. 7678; see also
A/CONF.62/WS/34 dated 15 November 1982
26.
Turkey bases its legal views on the judgments of the ICJ concerning the disputes
between UK and Norway, UK and Iceland and Federal Republic of Germany and
Iceland. See ICJ, Reports of Judgments Advisory Opinions and Orders, Fisheries
Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 18. December 1951. The text of
these reports and judgments are available at: icj-cij.org
27.
The ICJ in its judgment related to the delimitation of the maritime boundary line for
the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones of Romania and Ukraine, seems
to take into account the provisions of the Moscow Agreement concluded between
Turkey and the Soviet Union, done on 23 June 1978. According to the judgment of
the Court, the maritime boundary line of Romania and Ukraine were delimited till the
co-ordinates 44º 02' 53.0’ N and 31º 24' 35.0’ E. See, ICJ, Case Concerning Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment of 3 February 2009,
par. 218, p. 219 available at icj-cij.org.
28.
See Article 1 of the Moscow Agreement done in Moscow on 23 June 1978 between
Turkey and the Soviet Union on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black
Sea. Article 1 establishes the initial point of the maritime boundary line as ‘further to
the west between the geographic point Latitude 43° 20' 43 ″ N and 32° 00' 00″
Longitude E, and geographic point Latitude 43° 26' 59″ N and Longitude 31° 20' 48″
E’. For the text of the document, see Turkish Official Gazette, No. 17226 of 20
January 1981 (Turkish and Russian); Limits of the Seas, No. 109, 1988
29.
For the text of the ‘Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of
Bulgaria on the Delimitation of the Boundary in the Mouth Area of the
Mutludere/Rezovska River and Delimitation of the Maritime Areas Between the Two
States in the Black Sea’, see Turkish Official Gazette, 21 July 1998, No. 23409; 38
LOS Bulletin (1998), 62.
310
30.
Begendik (sometimes pronounced as Beyendik) is a town in Keşan district of Edirne
Province, Turkey
31.
For a technical analysis of the Sofia Agreement and the delimitation of the maritime
areas see Inan, ‘International Maritime Boundaries’, op.cit., pp. 2871-2886
32.
For the text of this agreement see 28 LNTS 12, reprinted in 18 AJIL (Supplement
1924), p. 4
33.
Act No. 24/2000 of 28 January 2000, while repealing Act No. 2210 of 8 July 1987,
did not change the limits of the Bulgarian maritime areas.
34.
For a detailed analysis of the development of maritime relations between Greece and
Turkey with a specific focus on the territorial sea issue, see Mine Pinar Gozen, The
Territorial Sea Issue in Greek-Turkish Relations: Disputes, Claims and Settlement
Proposals, Verlag Dr. Müller (VDM), USA, 2009.
35.
These agreements are as follows: On 10 June 1930, ‘The Convention Concerning the
Final Settlement of Exchange of Populations’, which gave an end to the commonly
known ‘habitants (établis) dispute’ between the two countries, was concluded. On 30
October 1930, when the Greek Prime Minister M. Eleftherios Venizelos officially
visited Turkey and attended the celebration ceremonies of the foundation of the
Turkish Republic, two other agreements were concluded. The first was the
Convention on ‘Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration’, and the second
was the Convention on ‘the Establishment of Commercial and Maritime Relations
and the Recognition to the Citizens the Right to Reside, Between Greece and
Turkey’. For the text of the first Convention see Turkish Official Gazette, 28 February
1931, No. 1735; 125 LNTS 9. For the text of the second Convention see Turkish
Official Gazette, 15 March 1931, No. 1748; 125 LNTS, 371
36.
The conclusion of ‘the Cordial Agreement’ in Ankara on 14 September 1933
positively affected the relations between the two states. For the text see Turkish
Official Gazette, 12 march 1934, No. 2651; 156 LNTS, 165
311
37.
One can claim that the turning year is 1954, when Greece started to explicitly
pronounce ‘the accession of the Island to Greece’. This policy, namely ENOSIS, was
carried out by Greece until 1974 that is when Turkey undertook its ‘peace operation
on the island’ with the purpose of reestablishing the state of affairs under the
provisions of the Guarantee Agreement of 1960.
38.
For a detailed analysis of the Aegean disputes, see, Inan and Acer, op. cit., pp. 125157
39.
Gozen, ‘The Territorial Sea Issue in Greek-Turkish Relations: Disputes, Claims and
Settlement Proposals’, op. cit., p. 59
40.
The term used in text of the Treaty for the navigable part of the River is ‘the median
line – la ligne mediane- of the principal channel of navigation’ which technically in
contemporary international law means ‘the thalweg line.
41.
The relevant articles on border issues between the two states are Articles 2/2, 5, 6
and 11
42.
The Commission despite referring to 3 n.m., stated that 1 mile is equal to1609.31
meters. This length is and equals to a land mile.
43.
For the text of these Protocols and Turkey’s ratification, see Turkish Official Gazette,
14 May 1981, No. 17340
44.
This diplomatic attempt of Greece, being suspicious about its succession to the 28
December 1932 Accord as well as its legal validity, can be regarded as an
acquiescence of seeking possibilities of de jure succession or its de facto confirmation
by Turkey.
45.
Tulio Treves, (edit.). The Law of the Sea: The European Union and Its Member
States, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 255.
312
46.
Gozen, ‘Territorial Sea Issue in Greek-Turkish Relations: Disputes, Claims and
Settlement Proposals’, op. cit., p. 50
47.
Turkish ‘Territorial Waters Law’, No. 475, 15 May 1964. For the text of the Law,
see, Turkish Official Gazette, 24. 5. 1964, No. 11711
48.
For more information related to the domestic legal practices of the two states see,
Inan and Acer, op. cit.
49.
The Convention entered into force on 14 November 1994
50.
Article 3 (Breadth of the territorial sea) reads as follows: ‘Every State has the right to
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles,
measured from baselines determined in accordance with this convention’.
51.
Article 300 (Good faith and abuse of rights) reads as follows: ‘States Parties shall
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise
the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which
would not constitute an abuse of right.’
52.
See in particular, International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory
Opinions and Orders, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 18
December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 132
53.
The Greek delegate Mr. Kripsis, during the First UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea, stated: ‘If Greece extends its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, which,
according to Article 3 of the Commission’s draft, would not be contrary to
international law, it would be closing the whole Aegean Sea to the international
community.’ UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. III, First
Committee (Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone), Summary Records of Meetings
and Annexes, UN Doc. A/CONF.13/39, Geneva, 24 February-27 April 1958,ffffff
pp. 21-22
313
54.
See the Official Minutes of the TGNA’s 121st
Session held on 8 June 1996
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/turkey_progres
s_ report_2008
55.
For the definition of continental shelf and the rights of states in this area, and its
delimitation, see UNCLOS, Articles 76-85
56.
See Turkish Official Gazette, 1 November 1973; ‘Aegean Continental Shelf Case,
Pleadings,...’, pp. 14-15
57.
Note verbale is a diplomatic communication prepared in the third person and
unsigned: less formal than a note (also called a Letter of protest) but more formal than
an aide-mémoire. A note verbale can also be referred to as a third person note,
see.Note verbale at Wiktionary
58.
Turkish note verbale dated 7 February 1974 , The view raised by Turkey related to
the settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes still remains the same. Turkey continues to
argue for the settlement of all the disputes between the parties through negotiations,
and concerning the ones that remain unresolved, asks for their settlement by the ICJ
based upon an agreed compromise agreement.
59.
Greek note verbale dated 24 May 1974. Greece favors a delimitation of the Aegean
Continental shelf between the Turkish mainland (Anatolia) and the Greek islands
located off the shores of Anatolia. This simply is a demand to not to recognize Turkey
a continental shelf area at the Aegean seabed and subsoil. In that time, Greece was a
party to the Convention while Turkey was not. The positions of the two states are, at
present, the same.
60.
Rhodes is accepted to be an Aegean island, and is among the Mentese/Dodecanese
Islands group. See The Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923), Article 15; Treaty of Peace
(1947) concluded with Italy, Article 14. See also Limits of Oceans and Seas,
International Hydrographic Organizations, Special Publication No. 23, 3 rd edition,
1953, p. 18
314
61.
See the terms of the Bern Agreement related to the procedure to be followed for the
settlement of the dispute
between Greece and Turkey, ‘Aegean Continental Shelf
Case, Pleadings, ...’, p. 280; Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1976, p. 2936.
62.
UN Security Council Resolution 395 (1976) of 25 August 1976
63.
The ICJ in its Order of 11 September 1976 refused the Greek demand to take interim
measures of protection at the Aegean continental shelf claimed to appertain to
Greece. See International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions
and Orders, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Request for the
Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, 1976, p.
10 par.28 and 29, p.14
64.
The Greek islands off the shores of Turkey, in general, are located on Turkey’s
natural prolongation, simply on the Turkish continental shelf, e.g. Limnos, A.
Efstratios, Lesvos, Chios, Ikaria, Kos etc. See E. Arpat’s explanations on geological
data explaining Turkey’s position during Bern meeting held on 2 February 1976. Also
see ‘Aegean Continental Shelf Case, Pleadings...’, p. 168
65.
See International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and
Orders, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment of 19
December 1978, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 45
66.
Greek Law No. 2288 of 1995
67.
When Greece brought a claim against Turkey on 10 August 1976 with the argument
that its continental shelf rights were being violated, the Security Council seized the
dispute under the framework of Chapter VI and adopted a resolution on 25 August
1976. See UN Security Council Resolution 395 (1976) of 25 August 1976
68. ‘Treaty between Greece and Turkey related to Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and
Arbitration’ done at Ankara on 30 October 1930 cannot be applied to the Aegean
disputes due to Article 4 of the Agreement that excludes ‘matters falling under the
domestic jurisdiction of states’ and ‘matters related to sovereignty’
315
69.
Gozen, ‘The Territorial Sea Issue in Greek-Turkish Relations: Disputes, Claims and
Settlement Proposals’, op. cit., pp. 59
70.
Especially since the 1950s, the politicians of the two countries have utilized these
disputes as a tool of politics to gain more votes in domestic elections.
71.
Pinar Gozen, ‘The Greek-Turkish dispute related to the possible extension of the
Greek territorial waters more than six nautical miles,’ East Asian Studies, No. 10,
June 2005, p. 129
72.
Jonathan I. Charney, M. Alexander Lewis, Dr. Robert W. Smith (edit), International
Maritime Boundaries, Volume 4, American Society of International Law
73.
For the text of the Treaty, 49 UNTS 126
74.
The Agreement was concluded in French language. For the text of the Agreement, see
138 LNTS 234; Turkish Official Gazette, 25 January 1933
75.
See note 63 for a discussion of whether the agreement is a delimitation agreement or
an agreement related to the determination of sovereignty over the islets around the
island or not.
76.
The TRNC Cabinet and the Parliament has the power to declare maritime areas of its
territorial waters and to conclude agreements with other states that has opposite or
adjacent coasts to the TRNC. See TRNC Law 63/2005, TRNC Official Gazette, No.
206, 28 November 2005. This law related to ‘the Maritime Areas of the TRNC’ came
into force with a retroactive affect on 21 March 2003, except for articles 15-17 that
impose sanctions for the violation of its maritime rights. Those articles came into
force on the day of the promulgation of the related law. The retroactive effect of this
law inevitably brings the question of its validity, since as a general rule of law, laws
can come into affect on the day of their promulgation or at a date to be decided by the
legislative organ.
77.
The areas allocated to the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) for exploration
activities are as follows: The first area is off the shores of Mugla and beyond the
316
Turkish territorial waters named as Mugla Oil Region No. XVIII and TPO/XVIII/C.
See Turkish Official Gazette, 16 February 2007, No. 26436, No. 26507 and No.
26608
78.
For the counter claims raised by this administration on 28 December 2004 and
transmitted to all States parties to UNCLOS at the request of the Permanent Mission
of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations .see letter dated 28 December 2004,
Ref.: 06.15.007.004 (UN Doc. 24 January 2005, LOS/12).
79.
The EU criticizes those sorts of military support. See EU Council Conclusions, 8
December
2008,
Brussels.
See:
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/press Data/en/ec/104692.pdf and the annexed document of Council
conclusions of 8 December 2008 on enlargement (16981/08). Similar views also exist
in the EU’s Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p. 29.
80.
Article 2/4 of the UN Charter reads as follows: ‘All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations’ (emphasis added).
81.
He was the Member of the Parliament (1961-1980), Foreign Minister, Speaker of the
Senate, Acting President of the Republic during the absence of the President of the
Republic according to the provisions of the Constitution (Article 100 of the 1961
Constitution), and also after the first quarter of 1980 when the Turkish Grand
Assembly failed to elect a new President till the ‘Military Intervention’ of September
12, 1980.
317
CHAPTER VI
RELATIONS WITH EU
Perhaps every country between Greece and Japan has at some point been described as a
congregation place of East and West. However, Turkey has an especial and close
relationship with this cliche, as it has a unique inter-continental geography. Furthermore,
in Turkey’s case, the rhetoric of East and West has been matched by the oratory of Islam
and democracy. As a result, the geographic concurrence of being both in Europe and Asia
has become merged with the historical circumstance of being both Muslim and
democratic or, alternatively, both Muslim and secular. These joint identities have come to
dominate consideration of Turkey’s domestic and foreign politics, both within Turkey and
among the international scholarly communities. With the rise of the AKP and the ongoing
dispute over the nature of its religious ancestry, these labels have become particularly
confused in recent years. This confusion is apparent in the widespread belief, that
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s political disconnection from the Middle East was a product of
his nationalist ideology and domestic commitment to Westernization, as well as the belief
that the AKP’s more active Middle Eastern policy has been driven by its Islamic
orientation. The first part of this claim regularly appears as a preamble to scholarly works
on Turkish foreign policy, including those by Philip Robins, Graham Fuller, Stephen
Larrabee and Yucel Bozdaglioglu.1 Robins, for example, writes that: The strong
ideological orientation given to Turkey by Ataturk contained an umbilical link between
the Western value system of the Kemalist elite and the external orientation of the state,”
while Fuller goes so far as to claim:
The essence of Ataturkism oriented Turkey firmly toward the West to transform it
into an advanced and westernized state. For well more than half a century under
the rule of Ataturkists, Turkey behaved almost literally as if the Middle East did
not exist. That region represented an unhappy association with Turkey’s past….2
At the same time, some scholars have argued that the AKP’s commitment with the region
represents an ideologically-motivated reversal of this supposed Kemalist tradition. This
position has been put forward in its most extreme form by Soner Cagaptay, writer of the
Washington Institute, who claims:
The AKP has taken an avid interest in Middle Eastern Muslim causes. Because the AKP
government has not supported Turkish foreign policy moves paralleling those of the
country’s Western allies, instead putting a premium on Turkey’s ties with Muslim
countries and emphasizing solidarity with Muslim causes, the Turks are turning to the
Muslim Middle East. This transition is feeding into new and powerful political sentiments
318
in the form of Muslim nationalism, with many Turks concluding –in line with the AKP’s
arguments– that their interests lie with other Muslim-majority countries.3
Many scholars have overemphasized the role of domestic identity and ideology in
determining Turkish foreign policy, both now and in the past. A review of the pragmatic
concerns that shaped Turkey’s international relations in its long history –under Ataturk,
during the Cold War and under present time– will provide the background for the claim
that pragmatic concerns have influenced the AKP much more than any Islamist ideology.4
Introduction to European Union
The Franco-Prussian War, World War I, and World War II have left an indelible mark on
modern Europe. The ferocity and destruction of these wars has led to a concerted effort
by European leaders to secure a lasting peace in Europe. At a political level it was agreed
that the best method would be to unite the nations economically and politically. Thus
began the European Union (EU).
There are currently 28 members of the European Union (See Appendix –G, p.485). The
original six members were France, (West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and
the Netherlands. Between 1973 and 1986, Denmark, Ireland, Britain, Greece, Portugal,
and Spain joined the EU. The emblem of the European Union is a blue flag with twelve
gold stars on it. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU. Nine years later ten
countries were admitted - Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. The number of EU members rose again in
January 2007 with the addition of Romania and Bulgaria and in July 2013 when Croatia
joined. Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey are currently in talks about future
possible membership of the EU. (See Picture no.7, Appendix- J, p.490).
Transformation of EC to EU
The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 28 member states that
are located primarily in Europe. The EU operates through a system of supranational
independent institutions and intergovernmental negotiated decisions by the member
states. Institutions of the EU include the European Commission, the Council of the
European Union, the European Council, the Court of Justice of the European Union,
the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors, and the European Parliament. The
319
European Parliament is elected every five years by EU citizens. The EU’s de facto capital
is Brussels.
Since the Maastricht Treaty has come into force in 1993, the European Community is
renamed European Union. With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union completed the
initial vision of European integration by launching a common currency for its common
market; since 2002, the euro is the only currency in a growing number of EU member
states, in fifteen of them in 2009. Afterwards this Treaty, the European Union also started
its new rationale for European integration by gradually becoming a global political
player; in 2009, the common foreign and security policy of the European Union is still
incomplete. The geopolitical as well as the internal transformation that has accompanied
the past two decades of European integration was enormous. All in all, the European
Union has achieved a lot during these past two decades. But its global strategy and
foreign policy is still incoherent. The core of the matter when assessing the root causes of
this prevailing deficit: While European integration has started in the 1950s as a project of
peace and reconciliation, of pooling of sovereignty and taming of national interests, the
world around the European Union until 2009 (and certainly well beyond!) is driven by
sets of norms, codes of conflict and forms of pursuing interests which often differ from
European self-perceptions. The European Union prefers to be understood as a normative
power, yet it is often challenged by the power of external realities that it finds difficult to
reconcile with its own set of norms.
Geo-strategies of the European Union
Strategically, the European Union is torn between different concepts of geopolitics and
different strategies of how to implement them. With William Walters once can define
four different types of geo-strategies which the European Union is trying to practice
simultaneously: The idealistic concept of de-territorializing politics and advancing a
borderless sphere of networked, co-operative and multilateral relations. What shall be
achieved inside the European Union is also suggested to be the guiding line for transnational and international relations in the age of globalization. As borders have been
abandoned by and large inside the European Union, many in the EU prefer to perceive the
world at large through the same lens of potential border lessness. Effective control of
frontiers and clashing realities should happen through a wide set of cooperative measures.
Joint interests instead of conflicting constellations – thus is the mantra of deterritorialized politics.
320
The sceptical concept of buffer-zones, are intended to divide chaos and stability, inside
spheres of inclusion and outside spheres of exclusion. Without generating direct
confrontation between the two spheres, the “in-between” spheres are left as indistinct,
grey and undecided. Inter-zones between powers with potentially clashing norms and
interests are a soft form of frontier. The aggressive concept of colonial frontier which is
linked to the projection of norms, standards and interests, this concept includes an
element of expansion which is not necessarily violent. It is inherently linked to the desire
of transforming the outside spheres in order to enhance joint stability and mutual
advantage.
The rigid, static concept of explicit limits, frontiers and barriers, while the aggressive
concept of expansive frontier is ready to engage with the spheres outside the border, the
static concept of protective and defensive frontiers draws a clear line in the sand between
inside and outside. Relations between inside and outside, at best, can be asymmetric,
implying the unchangeable inferiority of the outside sphere.5
In pursuing certain elements of all four concepts, the EU is aiming to reconcile
contradicting strategies. This situation is worsened by the fact that the EU is also trying to
reconcile different modes of governance. This effort in itself produces a tall agenda of
internal coordination and conflict, incoherence and frustration. Scholars such as Jan
Zielonka are characterizing the EU as a neo-medieval empire without a stringent center of
power, with loose peripheries, informal modes of projecting norms and with a
decentralized implementation of decisions and regulations.6 In contrast stands the
traditional model of the Westphalian state, a centralized state with the monopoly of
sovereignty and power. While the EU never intended to emulate the Westphalian state
model, its neo-medieval character is curse and benefit at the same time: It helps to
accommodate the diversity of Europe but it makes coherent common action difficult. This
is especially felt in the European Union’s dealings with its strategic neighbourhoods.
The Northern dimension of the European Union was especially promoted by the
Scandinavian states and Finland. They were considering the end of the Cold War an
opportunity to explore and tap the resources of the Baltic Sea and, eventually, of the Artic
Circle. The Northern Dimension was designed as an optimistic strategy of cooperative
multilateralism.
321
The Eastern dimension of the European Union was torn between three geopolitical
strategies: hope, fear and uncertainty about the fate of Russia. Cooperation and normative
expansionism and new frontiers out of security concern or buffer zones between itself and
the newly rising Russian power were combined in the absence of a clear commitment to
the states “in-between”, especially the Ukraine. The European Union has been adopting
elements of all three attitudes in the outlook to its geographic east. The Western energy
dependency has helped Russia not only to use a new strategic weapon but to remind the
European Union that its development is tight to Russia for better or worse – and that the
key to decision-making on energy and other Eastern matters does not simply lie in
Brussels.
The Southern dimension of the European Union has initially been driven by three
unrelated aspects: The concern of the Southern EU countries to counterbalance the
eastern orientation of Germany and some other North Western European states; the desire
to built bridges across the Mediterranean, especially to the Magreb with its strong links to
France and the Iberian peninsula; and the hope to turn the fear of importing insecurity
(including migration, radical Islam and poverty) into a new mode of equilibrium and
control.
Turkey and EU
Ottoman Empire was never accepted as an equal member of the European society of
states even after it was formally admitted to the Concert of Europe in 1856. Before its
admittance, the Ottoman Empire had always been in contact with European states through
warfare, trade and diplomacy because of its geographical proximity. The Empire had an
ambiguous status within the European state system due to its different socio-political
organization and religion but it never really became a full member of international
society. The Ottomans became the first ‘other’ by which Europeans differentiated
themselves from those outside of Europe when they were defining a collective European
identity.
Turkey’s formal orientation towards the institutions of the west dates from the creation of
the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923. Since then, commitments to Westernization
have been central theme of Turkish state ideology.7 Turkey has sought membership of all
principal Western international organizations, becoming a member of the Council of the
Europe and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 8. Since then, for
322
many important sections of the Turkish political elite, accession to the EU has become a
symbol for the successful completion of the long-term Ataturk revolution, involving the
most basic and vital points of identity and orientation for Turkey. 9 Turkey has been an
associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate to EU membership since
1999. The European Council in December 2004 finally scheduled to open negotiations in
view of Turkish accession to the EU on 3rd October 2005 10. The December decision
provoked intense reactions all across political forces as well as among European citizens.
The debate over Turkey’s accession has been a far more intense one than that which
surrounded the start of negotiations with the accession countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEECs) in 1998.
As William Penn (1644-1718) asserted that the Ottoman state will be included only if it
renounced Islam. Neumann and Welsh claim that this notion of an entry requirement for
European society has persisted even to the present day.11 Similarly, many European
politicians clearly declared that Turkey was not a true European because its people were
Muslim and belong to a different civilization.
However, the prospect of Turkish accession presents the continuation of an ongoing
debate between the theoretical schools of liberal inter-governmentalism and
constructivism. The Turkish EU membership bid presents scholars and decision makers
the prospect of some resolution upon this issue. This is because while Turkey offers
members states potential economic expansion and security intensives, discourse of
Turkish European identity within the public arena has threatened to halt full accession.
This diversion is represented within the wider theoretical debate. Liberal inter
understanding propose that due to welfare maximizing tendencies of actors, eventually
Turkish accession will occur. On the other hand constructivism contends that due to the
un-European nature of Turkey this can never occur.
THE ROLE OF THE TURKS ABOUT EUROPEAN IDENTITY
Europe is a comparatively modern idea and it did not mean a cultural political unity
during the ancient years12. Geographically, Europe is one of the peninsulas of the Asian
continent like India or the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, it does not have very clear
natural borders to differ it from Asia. Furthermore, it was not one of the centers of
classical civilization, in contrast to the Middle East or China. In the works of Delanty,
there is little historical congruency between the modern notion of Europe as the West and
323
the ancient idea of Europe for example; the Roman Empire was Minor states. These
states, which together with Christianity form the roots of the European Identity, never
claimed to be European, in the words of Hay.13 For the Greeks as later for the Romans,
the word Europe was associated in the first place with myth rather than science. The idea
of Europe had little meaning from the ancient period, and did not mean a cultural or
political entity.14 Although the idea of Europe began to emerge with the decline of the
Greek civilization, it was still a geographical concept but not political, religious or
cultural. Likewise the Romans never had a strong sense of a European identity15; on the
other hand, Boer claims that the association of Europe with political liberty, one of the
three elements of the idea of Europe, was first made in ancient Greece, in the fifth century
BC.16 However we cannot find any evidence for this claim in the writings of Greece. 17
The Roman civilization, like the classic Greek civilization, was spread over
Mediterranean coasts. The heart of the Empire was the north and the south shore of the
Mediterranean and the Romans belong to the Eastern world at that time much of the
European Europe roman ethnocentrism was focused, not on the idea of Europe but on the
myth of Rome as the centre of the world and for the Roman Empire Europe did not
constitute a cultural model. Even Christianity could not change the Roman identity for a
long time, in early Christian era to be a Christian was to be a Roman, not a European18
That is to say; the Mediterranean Sea did not divide the peoples but served to unite them.
The Cultural religious and political difference between the north and the south was
limited. During these years the European idea did not signify the western continent but
rather expressed a vaguely defined occident the land of darkness the land of the evening
sun territories19
However, there is no doubt that Europe has, politically and demographically, been unique
entity as a continent since the Roman Empire but again the idea of Europe was relatively
unimportant and did not express the common values the Europeans shared. The most
important factor served to emerge to the European idea was external; the barbarian
attacks from the Asian steps and later the rise of Islam. The economic problems, military
defeats and natural disasters in the Central and Western Asia caused a huge migration and
attacks from Asia to the European territories. The nomad Turkish and Mongolian tribes,
notably Huns and avars, poured into Europe.20
324
However, ‘the barbarian invasions’ could not create Europe and Europeans. They were
not Easterners or non-Europeans but just ‘barbarian’ or nomad tribes and there were
many nomad, barbarian tribes in Europe as well. As a matter of fact most of them
inhabited in Europe and, in time they become Europeans like Bulgarians. Although the
legacy of the barbarian invasion remained for the centuries and helped to form the fear of
Muslim invasion these tribe peoples did not challenge to the Mediterranean civilizations.
Many of them converted to Christianity and became the backbone of Christendom.21
The rise of the Islam was one of the most significant events during these centuries. In a
short time Islam spread to a huge area from the Northern Africa to India and the Islam
armies started to gain the control of the Mediterranean. In comparison to Islam Europe
was technologically backward and also weak in terms of military and economy. That is to
say the northern shore of the sea was ill equipped to defend itself against the Muslim
attacks. Moreover Islam was not only a religion but also the name of a political, economic
and cultural system. That is to say it was, contrary to the barbarian attacks, Islam was an
alternative to the existed systems. As note earlier, the European territories were very
vulnerable to attacks from the north and the East. With the rise of Islam, Christian
peoples and the other European tribes were blocked in a relatively small geography,
namely the north west of Europe. Now the Mediterranean divided the two culture as the
Islamic and Christian worlds. As a result the Christian West was put on the defensive.
With the Muslim victories in Iberian Peninsula and In Anatolia the Christian territories
shrank to the emergence of the idea of Europe. Europe became identical with the notion
of a Christian world. Christianity was the most important element that the European tribes
shared. In the words of delanty, “Without the image of hostility afforded by Islam, the
Christian West would have been unable to attain a single and high culture capable of
unifying the diverse elements of European society”22.
Thus Christianity was transformed as a European religion, in other word, it was
westernized or ‘Europeanize’. As a matter of fact that Christianity was an eastern
religion, but now there were significant differences between the Syrian, Byzantium
Christianity and the Latin Christianity. In the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries the Christendom
became aware; it was not the eastern Christendom or Christendom of Constantine but an
assertively western or Latin Christendom.23
325
As a result Christianity became to provide ‘legitimating ideology’ for the kings and
increased the cultural homogeneity by uniting the peoples under the common religious
values. In the crusades the unity of Europe and Christianity was mostly shaped.
Henceforth, Europe was characterized by the European Christianity and the antagonism
towards the Muslims became one of the unchangeable components of the European
identity. In the words of Bartlett, men who thought of themselves as living Christendom
were conscious that the rest of the world was not Christendom. For them while the
Europeans were living under Christendom, then others were under heathendom.24
In brief, Christianity was imprisoned in the continent by the Muslim attacks, and this
deepened the differences between European and others25 Thus, Europe gained its main
character, which set the pluralistic European political and economic structures, such as
feudalism and decentralization. For many scholars, the culture and environment that
emerged in Europe during these clashes can be called the first European civilization.26
The crusades, in particular, nourished the idea of Europe and Europeans.
The Turks, As the Cause of Europe
With the rise of the Seljuki Turks (Selcuklu Turkler) the Turkish became the Icon of
Islam and replaced the threat of the Sassanid Empire of the European countries. Thus the
age old conflict between Europe and the Arab Muslim State reproduced itself as a conflict
between the Muslim Turks. Contrary to the previous threats, the Turkish armies were well
organized and a permanent danger which would continue for centuries. As noted earlier,
before the Turks, the Europeans had faced with “Barbarians, pagan tribes” and the
Muslim menace. However the Turks, who were originally the people of the steppes of the
Central Asia, represented both of these dangers. For the Europeans, the Turks were
Barbarians. Ambrose writes that the best Turks one could find in heathendom.27 For many
Christian Europeans the Turks had no wisdom, strength or virtue, but they succeed as
God punished sinful Christians. They were the Scourge of God. 28 For Gladstone, the
Turks were much more dangerous than the other Muslims. He described the Turks as a
cruel people:
What the Turkish race was, and what it is, it is not a question of
Mohammedanism simply, but of Mohammedanism compounded with peculiar
character of a race.... They were the first black day they entered Europe, the one
great anti human specimen of humanity wherever they went, a broad line of
blood marked the track behind them as far as their dominion reached, and
civilization vanished from view.29
326
Likewise, Francis Bacon described the Turks as a cruel uncivilized bloodthirsty savages,
“---it is truly said concerning the Turk, where the Ottoman’s horse sets his foot, people
come up very thin...”30 For many Europeans it was a terrifying environment which had
been caused by “the terrible Turks.” (Brant’s well known poem shows the fear of the
Turks in the European public:
“So strong the Turks have grown to be
They hold the ocean not alone,
The Daunbe too is now their own
They make their roads when they will
Bishoprics, churches suffer ill.
Now they attack Apulia,
Tomorrow even Sicilia
And next to its Italy,
Wherefore a victim Rome may be
And Lombardy and Romance land,
We have the arch foe close at hand...31
The hate against the Turks dramatically increased when the Turkish armies recaptured the
territories that had been occupied by the Crusaders. The later Crusades failed miserably to
recover lost land. Especially the conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul), which put an end
to the Byzantium Empire in 1453 CE, was a turning point. The only thing that might unite
the Europeans against the Ottomans was the religion. Christianity had provided common
values for all the Europeans. Thus the religious and the secular authorities co-operated to
unite the peoples and the states against the Turks. For example, before the siege of
Constantinople, both the universal authorities’ in Christendom, the Emperor Sigismund’s
time and the popes continuously, had made tremendous efforts to rouse Christian Europe
to unite against Turks.32 After the fall of Constantinople, Cardinal Bessarion (1403-1472),
writing to the Doge of Venice described the Turks as the ‘most inhuman barbarians’:
A city which was so flourishing ... the splendor and glory of the East.... the
refuge of all good things has been captured, despoiled ravaged and completely
sacked by the most inhuman barbarians by the fiercest of wild beasts much
danger threatens Italy, not to mention other land, if the violent assaults of the
most ferocious barbarians are not checked,33
327
With the fall of Constantinople, the Europeans were also forced to find another way to
reach the East that led to the discoveries, since the Ottomans blocked the way in south
and east. Also as a result of the isolation of Europe from the Mediterranean world, the
idea of Europe became linked to a system of what was coming to be regarded as
specifically European values.34
In this framework, contrary to the present European indifference to the Turks, in medieval
Europe the Turks were one of the most important international problems for the
Europeans. Politicians and moralizers placed the Turk near the centre of every
argument.35 For example, in France between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, twice as
many books were printed about the Turkish menace as about the Turkish threat as about
the American Discoveries.36 The Europeans understood that it was impossible to
overcome the Turks without a European coalition against them. To fend off this evil all
that was required was for Christians to repent, unite and take up the defense of the faith.37
In addition the European countries came together in the Holy Alliance (1571 CE), and
many other co-operative actions against the Turks. When the Ottomans put Vienna under
siege (1529 & 1683 C.E.),38 the West mobilized itself in an international campaign, Holy
Alliance, financed by the pope.39 As a result of these co-operations, the Europeans felt
that they were different from the others.
The Turkish threat was a vital factor for the unity of Christianity as well. For Instance,
when Tamerlane defeated the Ottoman Sultan Beyazid (1403 CE), Turkish pressure on
the west was relaxed; as a result, the internal contradictions in the universal Church
produced more divisions than before.40 However, the Turkish menace not only united the
Christian sects and groups, but also provided an environment for the political cooperation and unity among the European secular governments. For example, Burke
claimed that Europe was virtually one great state, accentuating the cultural similitude
throughout Europe of the monarchical of government, Christianity, the Roman law and
heritage, old Germanic customs and feudal Insulations.41 Similarly, the other European
integration ideas were also against the Ottomans and were based on the Greek, Roman
legacy and the Christian religion and culture. Voltaire’s comment on this regard:
...a kind of great republic divided into several states, some monarchical, the
others mixed... but all corresponding with one another. They all have the same
religious foundation even if divided into several confessions. They all have the
same principle of public law and politics, unknown in others parts of the
world.42
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It can be said that these were the first attempts, or at least the early forms of the concept
of the European Union. In 15th and 16th centuries Polish and Habsburg publicists began to
suggest that their government were defending European values. The European
Christendom concept was transformed to a secular European concept. Nevertheless this
transition from a religious to a secular term of identification did not involve the
elimination of the Christian element.43 In 1693 when William Penn put forth his scheme
for an organized European society of states, he asserted that the Ottoman state be
included only if it renounced Islam.44
And according to Coles, “Profession of the
Christian faith was still a necessary, and in eyes of most peoples much the most important
part of being a European”45. Even after the reformation and Enlightenment, the secular
Europe was identified by Christianity as a common culture of the Europeans. For
example, Fernand Braudel argues that, “a European even if he is an atheist, is deeply
rooted in the Christian tradition”, because the Western Christianity is the main constituent
in European thought,”46 he added. The true Europeans were the children of Greek, Roman
civilizations and Christendom even if they were not true Christians.
For instance Erasmus exhorted the nations of Europe to a crusade against the Turks
although he was no longer addressing the European states as the constituent powers of
Christendom. According to historian Close, the reason of the antagonism between the
Europeans and the Turks was ‘the cause of Europe’.47 Obviously, there was no room for
the Turks in such a European structure,48 because the Turks represented violence,
perverseness, injustice, in short, an uncivilized society. 49 As Neumann and welsh pointed
out, in European eyes, the Turk, with his pagan and barbarian political culture, could not
be incorporated into such a cultural consensus.50
During these years, the Europeans used the terms “Turks”, infidel and Islam almost
interchangeably and the Turkish threat legacy played a vital role in making of the idea of
Europe even in Germany, France and England, which were relatively invulnerable from
the Turkish attacks and had a significant trade with the Ottomans. In Germany, for
example, the Turk was like sin itself. The Turks were the Scourge of God.51 Likewise
although they had a very close relation with the Ottomans for many French, Turk was not
a part of Europe, even not human being. For example, after his travel to the Ottoman
Empire, Nicole de Nicola wrote that he had seen no human life in Turkey. In fact, his
most of the descriptions were false because he described many institutions and places
without seeing them, like the Harem.52 Even in England, which was the most secure
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country from the Turkish attacks, the Turkish image was one of the factors in describing
English justice and Europeanness. To cite Beck:
from the middle of the sixteenth century ‘Turks’ or Turkish was applied to
anyone having the so called qualities of the Turks, i.e., cruelty, unmanageability,
and general barbarity, or Turk might be used as a name for targets on shooting
ranges.53
For instance, when Shakespeare described English justice, he contrasted the English court
with the Turkish court.54 Henry V (1386-1422 CE) assures Kathrin, daughter of the
defeated Charles VI of France (1368-1422 CE), that their son would be a young lion who
“shall go to Constantinople and take the Turk by the beard.”55 As could be seen from the
pages of many western writers, the Turk was described as different, as opposed to the
rational, virtuous and normal European.56 In brief, the Turkish pressure stimulated a
process of self examination, which led members of the European societies concerned
increasingly to identify and distinguish themselves from the Ottoman enemy.
The Meaning of Europe in Turkey: An Evolution of Perceptions
During the past hundred years of Turkish history, a process of defensive modernization
was implemented, based on the view that in order to be strong against the West one needs
to adopt its civilization, getting rid of one’s own tradition and moral codes. For selfempowerment, a comprehensive Westernization process was necessary. As expressed
quite eloquently by Ahmet Agaoglu (1869–1939), who played a key role in intellectual
development of concepts of Turkish nationalism and Westernization:
First of all, we need to be sincere; do we accept and admit the superiority of the
Western civilization? If yes, then we cannot explain that superiority only by
referring to its science and knowledge or even its politics and social foundations.
The superiority of the Western life over our life is comprehensive. If we want to
escape from this and maintain our existence we have to accord our entire life not
only through our dress and some institutions but also with our minds, hearts,
views, and mentalities. There is no other way for salvation. 57
Ziya Gokalp, a major philosopher of Turkish nationalism, eloquently expressed this view
in one of his poems, “We were defeated because we were so backward,/To take revenge,
we shall adopt the enemy’s science./We shall learn his skills, steal his methods./On
progress we set our heart.”58 Turkey’s defensive modernization was characterized by this
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eagerness to learn from “the enemy” rather than to integrate. In embarking on a process of
Westernization, the new Turkish regime saw the social and political influence of Islam as
its most significant challenge to establish for itself a political hegemony and associated it
with backwardness (irtica). From the tradition that viewed Islam as an obstacle to
progress, the modernizing elites sought emancipation in the West through a civilizing
process.59 Thus, Westernization for the sake of resisting the West required deOrientalization or alienation from the Oriental residues, a process that was never fully
completed. In trying to catch the train of modern civilization, Turks had to wait in the
train depot seemingly forever. As Meltem Ahiska notes, “Catching the train is a metaphor
that signifies the destination of history to which the ‘latecomers’ are always already
late.”60 This was perfectly in line with modernization discourse, which conceived of
modernization as requiring a takeoff, a departure from the traditional.61 In order to
modernize, one has to leave the original location and be emancipated from original
conditions.62
Hence, these opposing and contradictory constituent others run as constituent units of
what can be called the Kemalist identity: “political Islam” as countered by the principle of
secularism and Westernization, on the one hand, and “the West” as countered by the
principle of Turkish/Muslim nationalism and national sovereignty, on the other. 63 On one
side of the coin lies the perpetual domestic threat, irtica, and on the other lies the
perpetual external enemy, Europe. Against the former, Kemalism is an ideology of
Westernization in its domestic battle against Islamic identity, but against the latter, it is an
ideology of Turkish nationalism, historically developed as Islam-less Muslim
communalism for the remaining members of the Ottoman Muslim millet within the
territory that could be liberated from the European occupation. On foreign policy, the first
image suggests an anti-Arab and anti-Islamic isolationism from the Middle East
strengthened by historical memory of “the Arab treason,” or the Arab Revolt of 1916–18,
while the other image implies isolationism from Europe, an external threat that occupies
and foments seeds of national disintegration fed by the historical memory of events such
as the Treaty of Sevres (1920) and the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), a Kurdish uprising
that aimed at Kurdish independence and was believed by the Turkish state to be a
provocation of the British. Hence, Europe is both the center of the civilization, which
Kemalists are eager to join through a civilizing mission, and a threat to Turkish
independence and national integrity, from which Turks seek to escape. 64 These two sides
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of the Kemalist coin may be found in the mindset of individuals equally, or they may be
emphasized to varying degrees by different individuals.
The image of European security and cultural threat in the Kemalist mindset often reveals
itself in soft means of expression such as political cartoons. Political cartoons often
express what is otherwise hidden in the mindset of the cartoonist; they provide windows
through which to perceive elements of identity. In this regard, European and Turkish
depictions of each other as the other of their respective identities can be examined
through political cartoons.
Turkish cartoons in the secularist media express a strong dramatization of the Western
other on religious grounds. In a recent instance, Turhan Selcuk, Turkey’s leading
Kemalist cartoonist, drew the EU as a mother pig nursing numerous baby pigs, while the
lone Turkish lamb waited aside, desperately hungry and isolated, suggesting the existence
of a strong and irreconcilable biological difference between Europe and Turkey. 65 No
matter how badly Turks want to drink from European milk, they cannot have it: not
necessarily because Europe does not want to give it, but because it will not be accepted
by the Turkish body. Europe as the pig image essentially stems from a religious imagery
of difference; it reflects a religiously charged description of folk Europe as a pig, the
untouchable of Muslim cultural identity. A pig is dirty (necis) and therefore one should
stay away.66 In a related case, Selcuk illustrated the Islamist support for EU membership
in the shape of a headscarf-wearing girl carrying a pig’s head and turning her face to the
EU logo.67 Clearly, a Turkey-versus-Europe dichotomy expressed with a discourse of
Islam-versus-Christianity runs in the background of Kemalist nationalist imagination of
the West. The Kemalists criticize the transformation of Islamism in Turkey and the idea
of supporting EU membership as a cultural deformation, or a process of piginization. In
this process, one loses his or her cultural authenticity and becomes similar to the cultural
other. Yet the irony of the matter is that the Westernization process implemented by
Kemalism as a civilizing mission is itself about losing cultural essence and becoming
similar to the West. This is an essential contradiction rooted in the ideology of Turkish
secularization.
It is possible to derive from Ataturk’s ideas a liberal and secularist nationalist view that
does not oppose the idea of EU membership and rather views EU membership for Turkey
as the culmination of Kemalism’s civilizing mission. Such liberal nationalists agree with
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the view that modernization equals Westernization and the process of modernization
would be best consolidated through Western political institutions and a liberal world
economy. As Tanil Bora suggests, “The civilizationist discourse of liberal nationalism
considers liberal market economy perfectly in tune with the ideal of ‘attaining the rank of
modern civilization’ inherited from Ataturkism and defines a cultural identity in terms of
its ability to ‘achieve’ and ‘catch up with’ the modern lifestyle.”68 An example for such a
counter image of the West in the secularist media is another controversial illustration that
appeared in the liberal Kemalist newspaper Radikal. It depicted the transformation of
Turkish Islamists into proponents of EU membership in the form of steps of biological
evolution. In the illustration, a monkey-shaped, traditionally dressed heavily bearded,
radical Islamist walks through the steps of evolution and finally evolves into a modern
looking, Western-dressed, EU-embracing person that looks like Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan.69 Apparently, in the imagination of the illustrator, the EU is represented as the
final step in the evolutionary process of civilization, and support for the EU represents a
higher, culturally superior form of evolution. As opposed to how Selcuk sees it, the
newspaper accepts the EU as a civilizing process for Turkey’s “culturally backward”
Muslims.
In this view of liberal secularism, Turkey will achieve elevation of its civilizational
standard by joining the EU. Full membership in the EU is seen as the logical evolution of
Ataturk’s cherished goal of making Turkey an equal member of the family of European
nations. The Kemalist nationalists, on the other hand, interpret this goal as requiring a
modern but fully sovereign Turkey, an impossible goal, in their view, if Turkey should
fully implement the reforms required for membership.70 Kemalist nationalists often quote
Ataturk’s description of sovereignty as a notion that “does not accept sharing in any
meaning, form, color and appearance.” General Yasar Buyukanit, Turkey’s military chief,
said, “We can foresee today that the political side of globalization can bring more harm
than good through eroding the concepts of nation-state and sovereignty.”71 The word
globalization can be replaced with that of European integration as the meaning of the
concepts of nation-state and sovereignty are transformed through the European
integration process.
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Turkey in Europe: The Historical Question of Defining Europe
Identities do not emerge in a vacuum. Identities are defined through relationships with
others, which are constructed through historical experience. The project of imagining
Europe as a singular entity shifts the focus of shared memories from the level of nationstate to the level of European culture. While the shared historical memory of European
nation-states primarily evokes a history of an intra-European construction of others, the
construction of a European common identity depends on the existence of Europe’s
cultural others. European “civilized” peoples are juxtaposed against a multitude of
“barbarians.”72 According to Edward Said, the Orient was a European invention as a
space of romance, exoticism, and fear, upon which Europe painted its other and, by
projecting its internal differences, came to know it and define its identity.73 Similarly, Iver
Neumann and Jennifer Welsh state, “The very idea of what Europe was from the
beginning was defined partly in terms of what it was not. In other words, the other, i.e.,
the non-European barbarian or savage, played a decisive role in the evolution of the
European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states.”74 Throughout
history, a common European identity was built upon a variety of external and internal
others, of which Muslims are primary. Turks with their military might and physical
proximity represented the most serious political and religious challenge to Europe and
served as a common source of fear.75 Talal Asad observes that “in the contemporary
European suspicion of Turkey, Christian history, enshrined in the tradition of
international law, is being re-invoked in secular language as the foundation of an ancient
identity.”76
The experience of the Crusades was particularly instrumental in building a European
shared identity and in the formation of long-lasting perceptions of Europe’s primary
other, the Muslims. Following the defeat of the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV (r.10681071) by Seljuk Sultan Alparslan (r.1063–1072) in 1071 at the battle of Malazgirt
(Manzikert), and within a mere ten years following the capture by the Seljuk Sultan
Suleiman in 1081 of Iznik (Nicaea), a city of great importance to Christianity only a
hundred miles from Constantinople, the Crusades were initiated to drive the Turks out of
the domain of Eastern Christianity.77 Between the era of Seljuk Sultan Suleiman (r.10771086) and the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66), Turkish power was
firmly established in Eastern Europe and the image of the Turk permanently imprinted on
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the mind of the European public. Even though the Crusades were militarily a failure, the
Crusader became a unifying ideology of Western Christian unity and the name “Turk”
represented in European Christian consciousness a power that was both feared and
respected.78 As Tomaz Mastnak claims, “The ideas, iconography, and discourse
associated with the Crusades made a profound imprint on ‘all Christian thinking about
sacred violence’ and exercised influence long after the end of actual crusading... The
crusading spirit has survived through Modernity well into our own postmodern age.”79 A
similar argument is offered by Roger Ballard:
The Crusades can usefully be regarded as a mould-setting development. In the
face of the emergence of an overwhelmingly powerful Islamic order to its south
and east, a sense of collective identity began to crystallize amongst the
population of the territory which was subsequently to identify itself as Europe–
and most especially as Western Europe. However the banner under which
collective mobilization began to be organized was that of Christendom, while
the other at whom this nascent power was directed was perceived as being
Muslim, oriental and black. The foundations around which contemporary
conceptualizations of Europe were to be constructed were now in place.80
The slogan “chasing the Turk out of Europe” motivated Europeans to rally around
Christianity against the expanding Ottoman Empire. Most dramatically, the siege of
Vienna by the Ottomans in 1683 helped consolidate a common European fear and panic.
Even, centuries later, the historical memory of the siege of Vienna serves as the most
significant reason why Austria remains the most ardent opponent of Turkish membership.
The weakening of the Ottoman Empire transformed the image of “base and bastard Turk”
into the “sick man of Europe.”81 As noted by Neumann, the “sick man” was a Russian
description of the Ottomans and “of Europe” was later added, “adding ambiguity to the
Turk by offering him a principled place among the European hale if he could only heal
himself.”82 During the nineteenth century, under the influence of social Darwinism,
Europe perceived itself as the center of civilization in distinction from the barbarians. In
this Eurocentric civilizational order, Turkey’s place was hotly debated among experts of
international law. James Lorimer, a nineteenth-century natural law theorist, suggested, “In
the case of the Turks, we have had bitter experience of the consequences of extending the
rights of civilization to barbarians who have proved to be incapable of performing its
duties, and who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind.”83
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With the decline of the Ottomans, Europe entered into a process of internal competition
characterized by two world wars. Europe did not have external challenges during that
period. The end of the Second World War led to the Cold War, when a strong Soviet
Union shifted the dominant other in European identity to Russia. Now it was Russia and
the Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe that marked the boundaries of Europe.
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the unification of Western
and Eastern Europe under the umbrella of European integration created a new geopolitical
context in which Russia lost its salience as the other. (See Map no.13, 16 & 17,
Appendix- B, page nos. 467, 470-471). The new context was also geo-cultural, as
European streets were increasingly marked by cultural diversity with increased visibility
of Muslims. Turks in Germany, North African Arabs in France, and Pakistanis and
Indians in Britain, all of whom were once tolerated as immigrant guest workers, became a
new center of attention. Around these minorities Europeans created a deeply embedded
fear of losing their cultural integrity. In this context, Turkey’s demand for membership in
the EU only fuelled such fears and hence faced strong opposition. Despite Turkey’s
attempts since the founding of the republic in the 1920s to project itself as European,
Turkey and Islam have continued to be seen largely as synonymous as far as the dominant
European perception is concerned.
Turkey and the EU’s Civilizational Identity
Today, there are two opposing perspectives in Europe on Turkey: Turkey as an integral
part of Europe, and Turkey as the essential historical other of Europe. Underlying these
two perspectives is the debate on the definition of European integration. Is European
integration based on a single civilization, defined as European civilization and marked by
distinct European cultural heritage and values? Or is Europe based on common ideals and
a common destiny, a union that members of different civilizations can join on equal
terms? Imagining Europe as a civilizational project allows others the possibility of
becoming “European” only if they can be assimilated into Europe’s civilizational—read
Christian—values. It is also a matter of civilizational conversion for Europe’s cultural
minorities. This is clearly not acceptable to Turkey, which sees Europe as a meeting place
for civilizations. The first view emphasizes a culturally homogeneous Europe, while the
second emphasizes multiculturalism and advocates a pluralistic interpretation of
civilizational identity. In contrast to Turkey, which demands recognition of its
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civilizational authenticity, an increasingly powerful view in Europe suggests the contrary,
that European integration is a singular civilizational project. From this perspective, the
expansion of the EU will reach its end point with the membership of the Balkan countries.
According to this increasingly widespread view, Turkey is not part of Europe because of
its different civilizational roots. It is not a member of Europe’s cultural heritage based on
Christianity and Enlightenment values and thus is doomed to remain outside its
boundaries.
Hence, the essential debate boils down to whether European identity can be defined in
non-cultural terms. References to Christianity as well as Europe’s common secular
history and culture—such as the Enlightenment and Hellenic-Roman traditions—
automatically exclude Turkey, which does not share the same cultural heritage. Defining
Europe as a culturally open space, however, would assist the integration only not of
Turkey but also Europe’s increasingly large Muslim minority. However, religion
continues to inform the ideological subconscious, particularly when it comes to drawing
the boundaries of a perceived European civilization. This is also evident in the electoral
support of political parties that openly refer to their Christian identities. Paradoxically, in
Germany, where church attendance is low, Christian Democrats are a very important
political force, having emerged as the leading party in the 2005 general elections. They
are known for their firm opposition to the idea of multiculturalism, which envisions a
culturally neutral Europe.84 German chancellor Angela Merkel openly states that
“democracy is unthinkable without Christian values.”85
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKO-EU RELATIONS
The decision to open negotiations in view of Turkey’s accession to the EU followed a
nearly 50 year’s long history of various forms of ‘partnerships’ between Turkey and the
EU. The major phases of this relationship, essentially based on increased economic and
trade relations between the EU and Turkey, are presented here.
The Association Agreement
When Turkey’s became an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) in
1992, its relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) began in 1959,
with Turkey’s application for associate membership of the EEC. An Agreement
establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey, the so-called ‘Ankara
Agreement’, was signed in 1963 and came into force in 1964. The Association
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Agreement envisaged a ‘stage by stage’ integration process with consideration of
eventual Turkish membership of the EEC86. In order to achieve the objectives of the
Association Agreement, three Financial Protocols allocating funds for the economic
development of Turkey were signed in 1964, 1973 and 1977 respectively. The
Association did not gain any substantial form before 1970, when the EEC and Turkey
signed an Additional Protocol87, which came into force in 1973. The Additional Protocol
established a timetable of technical measures to be taken in order to attain the objective of
the Customs Union within a period of 22 years88.
The freezing period of the EU-Turkish relationship
Following the military coup in Turkey 12 September, 1980, the Community decided to
freeze its relations with Turkey and block the signing of the fourth Financial Protocol.
The collapse of the democratic regime meant that there was no further chance for Turkey
to be accepted as a candidate for full-membership status in the foreseeable future.
Relations were gradually normalized after the restoration of a civilian government in
1983.
The Customs Union
In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership to the EEC. The Commission rejected
Turkey’s application in 1989, on the basis of its economic instability and its human rights
record. However, the Commission explicitly endorsed Turkey’s eligibility for
membership. Further progress was achieved in 1995, when the Association Council
adopted the agreement creating the EC-Turkey Customs Union89, which entered into
force in 1996.
The “Official” Concern
The full “official” list of accession criteria is long, developed over the years as the Union
evolved. Typically, discussion of Turkey’s inclusion in Europe opens with the two
traditional criteria for EU membership: a “European” geographical position and a
democratic government.90 Additional criteria have been formalized since the original
treaties elaborated upon the basic qualifications, most famously at the 1993 Copenhagen
Summit:
The candidates’ must achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights, and respect for the protection of minorities; the
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the union; [and finally] the ability
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to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union.91
These so-called “Copenhagen guidelines” represent the first time that specific conditions
were placed on applicant countries.92 Further, the newly effective Treaty of Amsterdam
“enshrined in Article F a constitutional principle that ‘[t]he Union is founded on
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and
rule of law.93
Main outlines of the Customs Union:
After a series of negotiations, the agreement to establish the Customs Union was signed
on March 6, 1995. With the final approval of the European Parliament in December 1995,
the last barrier for accession into the customs union was to be removed as of January 1,
1996. According to the decision (No 1/95) of the Turkey-EC Association Council of
December 22, 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union,
94
Turkey
would first eliminate all customs duties, quantitative restrictions, and all charges having
equivalent effect to customs duties and all measures having equivalent effect to
quantitative restrictions in trade with EU as of January 1, 1996. This had the following
implications:a. Turkey had to completely open its economy to international competition.
b. The Customs Union only covers the free trade of manufacturing commodities and
processed agricultural products and not primary products and services;
c. It would adopt the Common Customs Tariff (CET) against third country imports by
January 1, 1996, and all of the preferential agreements the EU had concluded with third
countries by the year 2001. In the case of particular products specified according to article
19/2 of the Additional Protocol, Turkey would impose higher tariff rates than those in the
CET for another five years.
d. The creation and full functioning of a Customs Union did not only require traderelated
measures; equally important were activities concerning the regulatory framework of
production like state aid, subsidies to enterprises, competition and anti-trust policy, and
industrial and intellectual property rights. Turkey would have to conform to EU standards
in all these spheres.
e. With a view to harmonizing its commercial policy with that of the Community, Turkey
would align itself progressively with the preferential customs regime of the Community
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within five years from the date of entry into this decision. In practice this meant that
Turkey would lose its national sovereignty concerning foreign trade policy without any
form of active participation to the decision making process in Brussels.
f. An EU-Turkey Customs Union Joint Committee would be established. The Committee
would carry out exchange of views and information and formulate recommendations to
the Association Council. On the other hand, the EU would resuscitate financial aid and
the Financial Protocol in order to ease Turkey’s adjustment process into the existing
rough competition conditions and to close the gap in economic development between the
two sides. The financial assistance comprised five fundamental components:95
g. within the framework of a five year program, ECU 375 million yearly from
Community budget sources, starting on January 1, 1996,
h. Within the framework of the Mediterranean Program (1992-1996), ECU 300-400
million.
i. An uncertain amount of financial assistance from the Mediterranean Fund amounting to
ECU 5.5 billion, starting in 1996,
j. Project loans of ECU 750 million yearly, financed by the European Investment Bank
over a period of five years.
k. Macroeconomic assistance, if necessary and upon the demand of the Turkish
government, in coordination with the relevant international institutions; the total amount
of financial aid planned for the following five years was around ECU 6 billion.
Turbulence and hindrances: from Customs Union to Candidacy
The European Council Meeting in Luxembourg on December 12 and 13, 1997, marked
not only a moment of historic significance for the future of the Union and of Europe as a
whole but also for relations of the EU with Turkey. EU leaders proclaimed “the dawn of a
new era” after a historic two-day summit in Luxembourg which took the first step
towards opening the bloc’s door to the countries of former Communist-dominated Eastern
Europe.96 Negotiations were to open with Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovenia and Cyprus beginning on March 31, 1998, on the basis that they were best
qualified and prepared for the rigors of full membership. Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Bulgaria and Romania were deemed less prepared, but were included in comprehensive
pre-accession partnerships and annual screening arrangements designed to accelerate their
progress towards membership.
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Turkey, an applicant to join the EU since 1963, was in a third category, with special
conditions. The Council offered Turkey only a vaguely defined “strategy of
rapprochement” and said it should improve its human rights record and treatment of
minorities as well as compromise on issues directly related to Greece and Cyprus. The
crisis in Turkish-EU relations blew up after the summit meeting when the EU refused to
place Ankara as a formal candidate for future membership in the same category as the
former Communist countries in central and southeastern Europe. Ankara was very upset
both at being left out of the enlargement process and, at the same time, being invited to
the “European Conference” in 1998 on certain conditions.97
The Turkish Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, told a news conference on December 14,
1997, that Turkey was cutting off political dialogue with the European Union and
rejecting an offer to take part in a pan-European conference in 1998. The Prime Minister,
reacting to the EU summit decision, declared that “There will not be a political dialogue
between Turkey and the EU. Turkey would ignore statements by the EU on Turkey’s
rows with Greece and Cyprus.” And, he added: “We accept none of the conditions
attached to the conference proposal. This issue has lost its meaning for us. Rehabilitation
of ties will depend on the European Union if it gives up its erroneous and unjust Turkey
policies.” He also pointed out, at the same press conference, that Turkey would go ahead
with plans to cooperate closely with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus if the EU
launched membership talks with the divided island’s internationally recognized GreekCypriot government, as it had announced it would.98
Turkey complained that the decision to exclude it from accession negotiations was
inappropriate for several reasons. First, Turkey was not evaluated on the same criteria as
the other countries. Second, many of the steps that the EU demanded of Turkey had not
yet been implemented by the other countries. Third, some of the assessments about the
Cyprus issue and Turkey’s infrastructure were exaggerated and prejudiced. Fourth, many
of Turkey’s achievements were disregarded, the effect of which ultimately imposed
unacceptable political conditions on Turkey.99 The government would maintain the
Association Agreements with the EU, but insisted that this unfair treatment and mentality
would not produce constructive dialogue, or a sound and credible basis for future
relations100 Commentators have noted that
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[m]any [Turks] have mixed feelings about Europe. Most middle class Turks feel
no gap between themselves and the western world. But the world view of others,
not least the peasants of Anatolia, is shaped as much by Turkey’s easterly roots.
Most Turks want to be ‘in Europe’ for practical economic reasons; but they do
notlike the high minded, bossy sounding declarations of the European Union.101
Even more importantly, most Turks believe that the EU’s reaction to them is based on
their Muslim faith, and that Eu-rope’s tolerance of atrocities to Muslims in Kosovo and
Bosnia demonstrates this discriminatory view. History shows that once-great empires,
suchas the British, French, or Turkish,102 often have difficulty suffering lessened status:
The sense of being the heirs of a major world empire colours both Turkish
official attitudes and to some extent, public opinion. The question of how a state
which in its heyday was more powerful than any kingdom in Christian Europe
was eventually reduced to “underdeveloped” status has preoccupied many
writers.103
In March, the opening meeting of the European Conference was conducted in London,
followed later that month by the launch of the actual accession negotiating meetings in
Brussels, which set the framework for the process.104 Delegations from Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia were present in six negotiating
intergovernmental conferences between the Member States and the applicants. Turkey
could only view from the sideline as the process began in earnest. The Luxembourg
exclusion created a “political climate of national resentment” in Turkey, leaving an
unstable situation in this important nation.105
Thus, in rejecting Turkey’s application for full membership, the summit proposed almost
the same strategy as the European Commission had in 1989. Again, Europe’s strategy for
Turkey was based on building on existing agreements, intensifying the Customs Union
and implementing its financial provisions, and approximating Turkey’s laws to the EU’s
acquis as in the “Matutes Plan” prepared by the EU Commission in 1990. The European
Council recalled that “strengthening Turkey’s links with the EU also depends on its
pursuit of the political and economic reforms.106 These comprised: the development of
the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement; the intensification of the Customs
Union; the implementation of financial cooperation; and the approximation of laws and
the adoption of the Union’s acquis. However, after the summit, European newspapers
were full of statements given by European politicians who argued that they had not had
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such an intention and had intended just the opposite. They proclaimed Turkey’s
“eligibility” to join the EU and said that Turkey’s candidacy would be judged by “the
same criteria” as the other applicant states. They promised a new strategy to bring Turkey
closer to the EU in every field. Finally, Ankara was invited to an annual conference of EU
members and would-be members in London in March 1998.
Historical Milestone: the Helsinki Summit Meeting (1999-2005)
If relations between Turkey and the EU had hit rock bottom in 1997 over the EU’s
rejection, what, then, had changed to allow Turkey to become a potential candidate within
only two years? After the capture of the PKK leader in Kenya in February 1999, the EU’s
General Affairs Council of February 21-22, 1999 declared:107
The EU reiterates its condemnation of all forms of terrorism. . . . The EU fully
upholds the territorial integrity of Turkey.” At the present time, the EU expects “
…Turkey to resolve its problems by political means with full respect for human
rights, the rule of law in a democratic society and in full accordance with
Turkey’s commitments as a member of the Council of Europe... The trial of
Abdullah Ocalan, the procedure of the trial seems to have been largely correct
and in accordance with the applicable Turkish Law. The death sentence against
Ocalan has been appealed before the Turkish Supreme Court and would also
have to be confirmed by Parliament before it could be carried out...
A second factor was the positive development in relations between Turkey and Greece
due to the rapprochement between the two neighbors following the catastrophic
earthquakes of August 17, 1999. This also had a positive influence on relations between
the EU and Turkey.108
After the earthquake, the EU Commission immediately released 4 millions € for
emergency aidand 30 millions € was held ready to support the package in the
rehabilitation phase. Furthermore, the Greek and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Ismail Cem and Yorgo Papandreou, visited each other within a short space of time. They
agreed to establish a new basis for bilateral negotiations and to intensify cooperation on
such undisputed issues as tourism, culture, environment and combating organized crime,
including illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Another important argument
for the development of closer relations between Turkey and the EU was that Turkey,
especially in the eyes of Washington, was a staunch member of NATO and a close ally.
Turkey’s integration into the EU has been traditionally supported by both the U.S. and
Israel.109
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The breakthrough in the relations between Turkey and the EU was reached at the Helsinki
summit meeting. In October 1999 the European Commission recommended that Turkey
should now be considered as a candidate country, but set no date for the opening of
accession negotiations at this stage. The European Commission’s report emphasized that
negotiations could only be opened if Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria in accordance
with the annual individual candidate’s report. Finally, the European Council followed the
recommendations set out and the political leaders of the fifteen member countries decided
at the summit meeting in Helsinki on December 10 and 11, 1999, officially to name
Turkey, a country that had been knocking on the EU’s door longer than any other
outsiders, as a “candidate.”
As the Final Communiqué agreed in Helsinki stated, “the European Council welcomes
recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission’s progress report, as
well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen
criteria. Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same
criteria as applied to the other candidate states.”110
European leaders at their 2002
Copenhagen summit meeting promised that the EU-15 would open accession negotiations
with Turkey, on the basis of “The Progress Report on Turkey 2004” and recommendation
from the Commission on October, 6 2004. The EU finally opened membership
negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005.
At least publicly, the EU Commission and the EU leaders seemed to be persuaded that
Turkey had made sufficient progress on fulfilling the so-called “Copenhagen political
criteria” regarding democracy, human rights and legal reforms. By opening the way for
Turkey’s eventual full membership in the EU, there was a widespread conviction among
private and public representatives that this historical decision would bring Ankara closer
to realizing one of its most cherished dreams. The European side obviously aimed with its
decision to anchor a modern, democratic Turkey in the West and integrate the country
fully into Europe in all fields. Furthermore, it was generally argued that the pressure and a
positive signal from the EU would offer encouragement to the Turkish government and
administration to push ahead with reform, improve its human rights records and lead to
comprehensive peace talks with Greece, on such problematic issues as the Aegean Sea
and Cyprus.
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Final Act: A Historical Decision and First Step to a Final Decision
With the EU Commission and the EU leaders persuaded that Turkey had made sufficient
progress on fulfilling the so-called “Copenhagen Political criteria,” negotiations could
begin. The European Parliament also adopted a resolution for the opening of negotiations
with Turkey on December 15, 2004.111 The hope was that now that Turkey had gained
full recognition as a member of the European family, it would bring Turkey a step closer
to realizing one of its more cherished dreams. With this historical decision by the EU
institutions, Turkey’s place in the “European House” was, it seemed, confirmed and its
participation in the enlargement process justified. However, the decision was just the
beginning and a long road lay before Turkey, a road full of surprises and turbulence and
various political and economic obstacles. The following conclusion can be drawn from
the summit declaration of October 3, 2005:112
The start sign for negotiations: the most important result was that Turkey gained a fixed
date for starting membership negotiations. What is negotiated is “how and when” rather
than “what” (and is mainly concerned with transition periods and – at the end -- financial
flows). It is noticeable that until now no country which has begun membership talks has
ever been rejected by the EU.
Shared objective is accession, but an open-ended process? Somewhat against the above,
the talks were to be an open-ended process, the outcome of which was not guaranteed
beforehand. Neither Article 49 of the EU Treaty, nor the conclusions of the Council in
October 2005, nor any other document promises full membership to Turkey. The question
arises therefore: what would happen if Turkey were to complete the negotiation process
successfully, but was not then accepted as a full member, even after ten or fifteen years?
In other words, what if Turkey is ready for membership but the EU is not? The wording
in the text gives the impression that the EU has kept the door open for a “privileged
partnership,” when the final decision is taken after ten or fifteen years.
Pace will depend on Turkey’s progress: so far it has been the EU that has decided
whether a candidate state would be able to assume all the obligations of membership and
it has made continuous efforts to ensure that end in a successful and timely way. In this
respect, it is expected Turkey will be treated on the basis of the same criteria as applied to
the other candidate states.
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Suspension if persistent breach of democratic principles comes about: while the EU
did temporarily halt membership negotiations with Slovakia over its breaches of
democratic norms, the EU made it explicit that it would suspend negotiations “in the case
of a serious and persistent breach in a candidate state of the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental reforms and the rule of law on
which the union is founded.”
Accession not before financial report from 2014: The EU warned Turkey that the
“financial aspects of accession of a candidate state must be allowed within the applicable
Financial Framework “…After the establishment of the Financial Framework for the
period from 2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms.” In plain
language, Turkey cannot be full member of the EU before 2014, even though the
accession negotiations might have been successfully completed.
Derogations, permanently available safeguards: The EU can consider long transition
periods, derogations or safeguard clauses that could be permanently available in sensitive
or costly areas such as free movement of persons, regional subsidies or agriculture. Such
restrictions could in effect prepare the ground for a “privileged partnership” rather than
full membership. A “privileged partnership” is not a well defined concept and little
detailed worked has been carried out. It presumably must be some sort of partnership
between Turkey and the EU that aims at close cooperation but not full membership. In
other words, it is based on the assumption that Turkey can join the EU but without full
participation in the EU institutions. Significantly, conservative German and Austrian
politicians have brought the issue to the agenda even during the preliminary negotiations
between Ankara and Brussels. There is clearly a fear that the negotiations could be
completed successfully, and that therefore Turkey’s membership of the EU needs
somehow to be stopped.113 The possibility of ‘permanent derogations’ to the full
liberalization of the four freedoms between Turkey and the rest of the EU would
constitute a basic contradiction to the principles of a “Single European Market.”
EU absorption capacity while integration continues: The final condition on which
Turkey’s membership will rest will be the EU’s attitude towards its own absorption
capacity. It would seem that even if Turkey was regarded as ready for full membership
the member states might still turn around and say “we are not in the position to accept
you as member of the Club.”114
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Cyprus: Although formally not a precondition to starting membership talks, Cyprus
became the most sensitive issue at the Council. The EU wanted Ankara to sign a protocol
to update Turkey’s association agreement with Turkey to cover the 10 newest EU
member states. For many, that would have amounted to a de facto recognition of the
(Greek) Republic of Cyprus. Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos warned that the protocol to
agreement- that covers free movement of people and of goods- must be signed and
implemented. “If they don’t do it, they simply don’t continue negotiations”115. It is
obvious that Nicosia can exercise its veto over the negotiations at every step of the way to
membership. The substance of the negotiations, which are formally conducted in an
Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of all member states on the one hand
and the candidate state on the other, are subject to unanimous agreement. The main
question that arises is how Ankara can negotiate entry terms with the twenty-seven EU
governments without recognizing one of them.
Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey: another crucial point on the agenda is
Turkey’s relations with Greece over territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea. The European
Council “reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on
the
accession process, should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for
settlement.” It seems clear that not only would political issues between Turkey and its
neighbors appear on the agenda, but also historical disputes such as the “Armenian
question” might be brought up.116
The Helsinki decision
After EU Heads of the State declined again to grant candidate status to Turkey at the
Luxembourg Summit of 1997, the Helsinki European Council of 1999 finally agreed on
the candidate status of Turkey117. The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession
at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 opened a new page in relations
between Turkey and the EU. As foreseen in the Helsinki European Council conclusions,
the EU Commission started to prepare an Accession Partnership for Turkey, which was
adopted on 8 March 2001. After the approval of the Accession Partnership by the EU, the
Turkish Government announced its own ‘National Program for the Adoption of the EU
Acquis’ on 19 March 2001 and submitted it to the European Commission the same
month. The National Program has been produced with a careful assessment of the short
and medium term priorities as spelled out in the Accession Partnership. Within the past 3
years, Turkey has taken a number of important steps towards this end.
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The most important among these was the major review of the 1982 constitution. Thirty
four articles of the Turkish Constitution were amended in 2001 in accordance with the
provisions of the National Program. Seven reform packages have passed through the
parliament. The packages of constitutional amendments have covered a wide range of
issues, such as improving human rights, strengthening the rule of law, restructuring
democratic institutions, increasing freedom of association and the right to assembly, as
well as gender equality and child protection and adoption of a new civil code. In addition,
the reform packages have amended various laws regarding the legal basis for the
detention and sentencing of many intellectuals for expressing their views, extended
further the scope of freedom of thought and expression and freedom of the press. They
have reinforced measures for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment, and introduced
stronger deterrents against human rights violations by public personnel.
The most remarkable of these reforms were those abolishing the death penalty, lifting
legal restrictions on individual cultural rights, making retrial possible in the light of the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, ensuring the right to property of
community foundations belonging to official minorities in Turkey, providing the legal
basis needed for the activities of foreign foundations in Turkey, introducing new
definitions and measures to deal with illegal immigration. Together, these mark a radical
break with the long history of statism.
Turkey was accepted in principle as a candidate State for membership, whose application
was to be assessed on the basis of the same criteria as other candidate States. These
criteria are the “political” criteria set at the Copenhagen European Council in June
1993118 namely that the candidate country achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”.
Compliance with the political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of the accession
negotiations, while compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria, including economic
ones, is necessary for accession to the Union. On the basis of the proposals already laid
down by the Commission in March 1998119, the Helsinki Council adopted the “European
Strategy for Turkey”, designed to stimulate and support reforms in Turkey during the preaccession phase. The Programme was welcomed by the Turkish government.
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The Accession Partnership
In March 2001, the Council of the EU adopted the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership as a
key element of the existing “European Strategy for Turkey”. The purpose of the
Accession Partnership was to assist the Turkish authorities in their efforts to meet the
accession criteria, with particular emphasis on the political criteria and the issue of human
rights. It fixed the priorities on which accession preparations had to concentrate in light of
the Copenhagen political and economic criteria and the implementation of the acquis
communautaire. Turkey’s Accession Partnership was complemented by Turkey’s own
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), giving details of Turkey’s
commitments with regard to achieving the Copenhagen criteria and adopting the acquis.
In December 2002 the Copenhagen European Council concluded that:
If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a
recommendation from the Commission, [decided] that Turkey fulfils the
Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with
Turkey without delay.120
The new government, which was formed after the general elections of 3 November 2002,
prepared two further legislative packages. The first legislative package, the socalled
‘Copenhagen Package’, was submitted to Parliament on 3 December 2002. It was drafted
with due regard to the evaluation made in the EU’s 2002 Regular Report on Turkey. The
purpose of this package was to reinforce the reform process and eliminate certain
ambiguities, especially with respect to implementation. With the adoption of this package,
all legal impediments to the prosecution of public officials accused of resorting to torture
and ill-treatment will be removed. By this, the Turkish government has declared ‘zero
tolerance’ against torture and ill-treatment and alerted all public officials accordingly.121
As part of the reform packages, the role of the National Security Council (NSC), which is
generally seen as reflecting the ‘political role’ of the Turkish military, was also amended.
The new provisions aim to limit the role of the NSC in Turkish politics, primarily by
increasing the number of civilians in the council. In the light of all these reforms that have
been diligently carried out by Turkey, the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen
European Council held on 11–12 December 2002 stated that
It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the
Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the
subsequent implementation measures, which cover a large number of key
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priorities specified in the Accession Partnership. The Union acknowledges the
determination of the new Turkish government to take further steps on the path of
reform and urges in particular the government to address swiftly all remaining
shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to
legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation. The Union
recalls that, according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993,
membership requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities.122
The Presidency Conclusions additionally stated that the Union encourages Turkey to
pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on
the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession
negotiations with Turkey without delay in order to assist Turkey towards EU
membership, the accession strategy for Turkey shall be strengthened. The Commission is
invited to submit a proposal for a revised Accession Partnership and to intensify the
process of legislative scrutiny. In parallel, the EC–Turkey Customs Union should be
extended and deepened. The Union will significantly increase its pre-accession financial
assistance for Turkey. This assistance will from 2004 be financed under the budget
heading ‘pre-accession expenditure’.123 As the conclusions indicate, the future of Turkey
in the EU will depend to a great extent on the decision at end of this year, which therefore
carries utmost importance for both sides since the EU is expected to give a date for the
start of the accession negotiations with Turkey. Section 3 will explore some short-term
and long-term future sceneries in this regard.
In the meantime, EU leaders agreed to extend and deepen co-operation within the
framework of the EC-Turkey Customs Union and provide Turkey with increased preaccession financial assistance. In May 2003, the Council of the EU revised the priorities
of the Accession Partnership with Turkey In October 2004; the Commission presented the
2004 regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, in which it recommended
the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey.
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PROSPECTS OF TURKISH ENTRY IN EU
Turkey, Europe, and the constraint of neighbourhood
The relations between Turkey and Europe, recently institutionalised as the European
Union, go far beyond what is known in actuality. Sultan Selim III, who was crowned in
1789, the year of the French Revolution, was exchanging letters with the King of France
before that time.124 The history of the era after 1789 evolved through important
milestones in 1839, 1876, 1908, and 1923 into the present, when Turkey desires to be a
full member of the European Union.
Turkey’s relations with Europe have been defined by different concepts at different times.
At first, the relationship did not include any discourse of “Europeanization”, and foresaw
the transfer of a certain technology created in that geographic space (whose major point
of crystallisation is France, and England to a second and much more limited degree) to
Turkey. Westernisation became a serious “movement” in itself after 1908, and evolved to
reach its apex in the political circumstances and institutions formed after 1923.
Westernisation has now become an act of integration, hence the Kemalist reforms
manifest in many different aspects of society.125
Turkey strives to become a part of Europe and expects the latter to have the same
perspective towards itself. It must be noted that Turkey has been viewing itself with a
self-directed orientalist perception during this process. Intent on becoming Europeanized,
it belittles all of its innate values and due to its self-perceived incompetence commits
itself to change. In time, this process has rapidly gone behind far beyond being just an
element of a discourse. Between 1923 and 1950, Westernisation turned into a systematic
process that rejected all local attributes. From 1950 onwards, Turkey entered a
progressive period of self-reconciliation and integration with its own local values. In this
period, Westernisation attained a dual meaning: While Turkey held on to its intention of
becoming part of Europe, it also tried to maintain traditional features which were
particularly defined within a religious discourse and expressed by the emergence of
religious values in daily life. This approach manifests itself fully in the bid for EU
membership. The ambitious desire of the currently governing political party, one with a
markedly Islamicist background, to integrate with the EU solidifies the new phase of this
relationship.
As mentioned, the relations of neighbourhood and community the world seeks in an era of
wars, of divisions based on religion, and a clash of civilisations –expressed in religious
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terms – contains a reasoning that determines the relation of Turkey to the EU. Turkey
claims that accession into and integration with the EU will eliminate the present
circumstances beset with conflict. Moreover, it views the exclusionary stance of EU
towards Turkey as the result of this isolationist mindset. Turkey views this as a
relationship of “friendship” and “neighbourhood”. Comments on this subject imply that
integration with the EU, rather integration of the EU with Turkey, is seen essentially as a
communalisation.
The point where this understanding manifests itself most is the criticism and reservation
of France towards Turkey. Any statement by France on this issue meets with a strong
condemnation from Turkey. Turkey’s reaction to France is much sharper than its reaction
to other countries; the reason being explained by reference to the “history” of Turkey’s
relationship with France. This relationship, its duration strongly emphasized, is seen by
Turkey as more of a “love affair”. For years, Turkey accepted France as its “partner”,
tried to emulate it, adopted, defended and institutionalised its values. French culture and
literature were the indispensable source of reference for Turkish intellectuals for a very
long time. Turkey had, in its own opinion, honoured all its obligations due to an “affair of
love”. In return, it implicitly expects, even demands, an acceptance on the part of France,
or at least that it not be rejected. Yet France does not display any attitude that would
acknowledge such a relationship and bases its decisions and declarations on its own
interests.
This “one-sided” love may or may not yield returns among the manoeuvres of
international politics; apart from that, it hardly has any function. However, since Turkey
cannot come to terms with this fact, it applies the same mentality to its relations with the
EU. In this case, Turkey claims that since it has fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, has
made the changes required in the process, it expects the EU to grant membership. Going
further, it refers to the centuries-long history of its relationship with Europe.
As I have tried to demonstrate above, there is absolutely no meaning or functionality in
Turkey’s definition of this relationship along the lines of neighbourhood and love. This
approach, consciously or unconsciously, realises the inherent “natural hierarchy” of
neighbourhood. Upon scrutiny, it will be realised that the relationship is identified as
“unilateral”. Accordingly, Turkey is the party on the chase, while the EU is on the run. In
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this sense, the EU is in power, and Turkey agrees to be the object of this power. It is clear
that such a relationship does not comprise the logic of equality.
Aware of this fact, Turkey resorts to a special reasoning and claims that “friendship”
should emerge exactly where inequality resides. This is an approach that is derived by
Turkey from a practice of neighbourhood, excessively dominant in daily life.
Neighbourhood is a practice that also includes inequality; it exists only on its own set of
rules which preclude equality. The mindset, summarised in the Hadith as “he who sleeps
with a full stomach when his neighbour is hungry does not belong to us”, shows that the
practice of neighbourhood is more tolerant to inequality, in the most radical form. Basing
its relationship with the West on this reasoning, Turkey expects the West to accept it
despite inequalities.
This reasoning cannot possibly be expected to advance the relations between Turkey and
Europe. Moreover, it is wrong and unnecessary. The internal contradiction of Turkey’s
reasoning lies within Blanchot’s definition of friendship as a relation between identical
entities based on infinite distance. Turkey, seeking acceptance on the grounds of
diversity, while at the same time trying to reach the same goal through its claims of
friendship based on likeness, creates the internal constraints of the process. What is more,
if friendship is to be taken into consideration, non-interaction will emerge.
Nevertheless, Turkey is aware of the presence of an inequality. In order to maintain a
dynamic relationship, it should keep the issue of inequality alive so as to activate
interaction. The productivity of Turkey’s relationship with the West depends solely on
this. To use the same definition, Turkey can and should use the infinite distance pointed
out by Blanchot to its own benefit and as a concrete parameter in order to establish a
productive relationship.
Under these circumstances, Turkey should approach the issue not with such subjective
concerns and concepts, but an objectivity that will surpass these. This will allow Turkey
to become an adult, and becoming an adult is only achievable through patricide. Turkey
should grasp this reality without wasting any more time and “kill” its neighbours.
Achieving this in a period when impossible quests for neighbourhood are emerging would
bring Turkey more returns than it has been expecting. Thus Turkey would be freed from
the quest for “affinity”, from the effort to attain likeness, and from the concern for
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sameness. If, on the contrary, it remembered the “infinite distance”, it will be not so
difficult at all to achieve those returns.
Fulfillment of Conditions: The European Commission’s declaration in early October
2004, that Turkey has made sufficient progress in democratic and human rights reform to
start negotiations for EU membership is a landmark moment in the history of both Turkey
and the European Union. Turkey is the biggest and the poorest country ever to seek to
join the European Union and its entry will influence the future course of European
integration. If Turkey were to become a member, for instance, the borders of the
European Union would stretch to Syria, Iraq and Iran. Turkey’s membership bid is also
controversial because only a tiny fraction of the country is geographically within Europe
and, while officially secular, it would be the first Muslim nation to begin entry
negotiations with the European Union.
It is worth underlining, however, that the Commission is proposing to open negotiations
on Turkish membership, not necessarily to conclude them, and that the talks could last
many years. Massive problems of economic, legal, social, environmental and political
integration remain to be solved before either the government in Ankara or the
governments of the European Union will be ready to sign a deal. Even if they do, the
process will not be complete. The treaty of accession between the European Union and
Turkey will have to be ratified by either a parliamentary vote or a referendum in all the
EU member states, as well as in Turkey itself. President Jacques Chirac of France, for
example, has already served notice that he will propose an amendment to the French
Constitution requiring a referendum to approve Turkey’s eventual accession. It is a pretty
safe bet that by the time the final, crucial stages of the accession negotiations are reached
the European Union will have more than 30 members, compared to only 15 until very
recently. Ten new members, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, joined in May
2004, bringing the total to 25. After entrance of Bulgaria and Romania 2007and Croatia
on 1st July, 2013 the EU member states is now 28.126 Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and
Serbia want to be admitted sometime in the coming years, and it is quite possible that
Kosovo and Montenegro could follow suit if, as seems likely, they emerge as independent
states in the future.
It is common ground between Brussels and Ankara that the negotiation of Turkish
membership will take a long time. Diplomats and politicians are openly speculating that
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the process might take ten to 15 years - meaning that if negotiations begin in 2005 or
2006 Turkey might not be admitted into the European Union until around 2020. Contrary
to the views of some US analysts, Brussels officials believe that this extended timetable is
very much in the interests of both Turkey and the European Union. It will take years of
hard work to implement the economic and political reforms in Turkey. These reforms are
essential if EU membership is to strengthen the country rather than weaken it. Some of
the most far-sighted Turkish reformers actually believe that the European process is more
important in itself than the final outcome of the negotiations. In this view, the opening of
the negotiations should provide an overarching European political and legal framework
within which the reformers would have the best chance of achieving the country’s
economic, political and social modernization. The entire process will demand a radical
change in orthodox political mindsets in both Turkey and the European Union. There are
grounds for measured optimism. European political leaders have been greatly encouraged
by the success of the moderate Islamic government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in carrying
through basic democratic, legal and human rights reforms in order to meet the criteria for
EU membership. Mr. Erdogan’s AKP party has done more than decades of pro-Western
secular governments to transform Turkey’s legal system, strengthen the democratic rule
of law, tackle the long abused rights of the Kurds and other minorities and crack down on
torture. In the past, Turkey’s episodic experiments with military regimes took its human
rights record backward.
The European Commission has given a clear warning that any relapse by Turkey in
implementing the latest reforms would put the entire accession process at risk. The hope
in Brussels is that, despite Turkey’s unique cultural and political characteristics, its
accelerating progress toward a ‘European model of society’ will strengthen the hand of
reformers in other Islamic states in the region and far beyond. Turkish joining the
European Union has come as a considerable culture shock to important sections of the
European political classes and public opinion. It has led to declarations by some
conservative politicians that Turkey can never really be part of Europe because it is
overwhelmingly a Muslim, not a Christian, country. Advocates of Turkish membership
retort that such claims ignore both Europe’s history and the reality of the multicultural
societies that are emerging in Europe today. Some argue that the Muslim world,
particularly in Spain, played a vital role in inspiring Europe’s Renaissance. Today, more
people go to the mosque each week in Britain than attend the services of any single
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Christian denomination, and there are important Muslim communities in many West
European EU states, most notably France. Three of the countries likely to join the
European Union in the next decade or so, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania, are mainly
Muslim.
Nevertheless, there is no shortage of legitimate worries about Turkey’s eventual
accession. Turkey is so poor and underdeveloped that there are serious questions as to
how the country can be successfully integrated into the European Union. Under present
policies, Turkey alone would swallow virtually all of the limited EU funds intended to
help close the development gap between the Union’s richer and poorer countries and
regions. The consequences might be compared to those of trying to incorporate Mexico
and the rest of Central America into the United States.
Continuous Enlargement Process and Turkey’s Future: Moreover, the continuing
enlargement of the European Union poses truly horrendous challenges to the future
efficient functioning of the Union. But, some EU countries, especially Britain, have
encouraged the idea of continuous enlargement precisely to see it as a free trade zone.
The recent enlargement already poses challenges to the effective and democratic
functioning of the Union that will be impossible to overcome if the proposed
constitutional treaty is not ratified in all 28 current member countries. Nevertheless, there
are powerful tectonic forces pressing the European Union to strengthen, not weaken its
integration. The constitutional treaty marks a decisive stage in the creation of common
foreign, security and defense policies.
The Union is also responsible for important areas of internal security and justice, a
development that would have been unthinkable for many member states just a few years
ago. The single European market and the Euro will require a further deepening of cross
border integration if they are to succeed. The question is how continuing enlargement and
further integration can be pursued at the same time. If enlargement continues in the next
decade or so, and particularly if it is to include Turkey, it is hard to see how a vast array
of 30 or more diverse states could unanimously agree on important steps to closer
integration. The constitutional treaty, however, suggests the most likely way ahead by
providing for groups of member states to integrate further and more quickly than the
Union as a whole. In the next few years, for example, the countries of the euro area will
probably strengthen their economic ties and even introduce some elements of common
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tax policies. Participants in the ‘Schengen agreement’127, which abolishes controls on the
movement of people across EU internal borders, may tighten police and judicial
coordination. Even Britain (which remains outside both Schengen and the euro) supports
closer EU defense cooperation. If the will is there, the means can be found to organize
even a 35-member Union that could include Turkey. A multi-speed, differentially
integrated European Union seems inevitable, and the prospect of Turkish membership is
likely to hasten its arrival.
European Neighborhood Policy: One other important factor may help decide the final
shape of Turkey’s integration in Europe the development of a European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP). This envisages the eventual creation of a common market, common
internal security arrangements and possibly even a common foreign policy linking the
enlarged European Union to its new neighbors. These are, to the East, Ukraine, Belarus,
Moldova and maybe Russia if it does not move away from the path to democracy, and, to
the South, the North African and Middle Eastern countries bordering the Mediterranean.
Some believe that this Big European House (in the words of the late French President
Francois Mitterrand) may eventually require a sharing of sovereignty in common
institutions. The project is clearly also designed to provide an alternative to continual
enlargement of the Union to the point where it could no longer function. In 15 years,
Turkey and the European Union will certainly have evolved much farther. It is neither
necessary nor helpful now for either side to prejudge the outcome of the accession
negotiations. If toward the end of the next decade Turkey’s transformation has been
achieved, and if the European Union finds a way to reconcile enlargement and
integration, Turkish entry must surely follow. It is possible, however, that by then
Turkey’s leaders might prefer to be a leading partner in the new, wider “European House
ø rather than accept the vast nexus of legal obligations required for full membership. For
now, the priority in Brussels is to use the goal of EU membership to help Turkey establish
itself in its region, and throughout the Muslim world, as a beacon for those aspiring to
democracy and reform.
The prospect of Turkish accession through a liberal intergovernmentalist scope, is that of
its economic consequences for member states. It is acknowledged that at least in the short
run, enlarging to new members much poorer then the EU 15 inevitably burdens structural
and agricultural funds consequently forcing existing member states to increase their
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contribution to the EU budget. Enlargement is expected to lead to an extended market and
thus to increased trade and128 on the other hand, economic gain. Economist pointed to
both static and dynamic gains from integration, that is trade creation on the one hand, and
economies of scale, enhanced competition and intensified research and development
activity on the other.129
Hope for New Economic Boost: The commission in 2002 argued that enlargement
would ‘boost economic growth and create jobs in both old and new member states’ and
claimed that numerous analysis have shown that the benefits on enlargement outweigh the
costs.130 In line with this hypothesis, three of Turkish characteristic initially imply
potentially large demands on the EU budget: (a) low level income, (b) A large population
and (c) their importance of agriculture. However membership would grant bin the long
term large economic benefits. As a lower middle income country with large
concentrations of wealth, Turkey’s poorest regions report income around one fifth that of
their richest regions. Turkish accession therefore would increase regional economic
disparities in the enlarge EU by an estimated 9% representing a major challenge for
cohesion policy.131
European Commission Proposals of the structural and cohesion funds Turkey would be
eligible to reached 22.4 billion per year, with current expenditure within cohesion policy
standing at 45.5 billion in 2007,132 member states reluctance to fast track Turkish
accession become understandable. Furthermore as essentially an agricultural country
considerably less developed economically in comparison to the EU, Turkey would need
considerable time to make a number of agricultural sectors more competitive in order to
avoid substantial income losses for Turkish farmers. Under present Common Agricultural
Policies (CAP) Turkey would be eligible for substantial support. Estimating the total
amount of support is the difficult but one such forecast from the commission places the
amount 8.2 billion Euros per year.133 This is the total expenditure upon CAP in 2007
budget being 42.7 billion of CAP expenditure.134
Turkish subsidies within CAP alone would equate to a total of 20% in order to
comprehend the potential impact of such large demands upon other member states. The
CAP and Cohesion policies combined equate to just fewer than 70% of the 2000 EU
budget. 135 There for the combination of the current estimates would mean that would be
currently eligible for 24% of 2000 EU budget, a proportion that represent one of the
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current major concerns for European decision makers. Furthermore, the demographic size
and the relative poverty of Turkey
Furthermore, the demographic size and the relative poverty of Turkey are factor giving
rise to concerns about the likely immigration flows. With the entrance to EU removing all
barriers to free movement to labour, Turkish labour flows its substantial and uncontrolled
could led to important disturbance within EU labour market. Estimates place the total
number of unskilled rural Turks expected to migrate by 2030 anyway between 500,000
and 4.4 million.136 Yet if economic expansion advances sufficiently and rapidly while
being accompanied by adequate employment policies and job creation, developing
growth areas such as Istanbul and Koecali could absorb a large part of these rural migrant
flows. 137
The accession of Turkey to the EU therefore represent in the short term and important
commitment by European substantial expenditure, even after a necessary reform of the
EU budget and policies predicted. However the long term picture is much more
promising. If Turkey accedes to the EU and gains greater international credibility, it will
surely use EU finding, FDI and other investment flows to improve infrastructure and
modernize industry. This also presents an enormous opportunity for European
construction and engineering farms. Turkey has enormous mineral and raw material
reserves and has strategic position in the crude oil transit network. 138
European Interest in Future: These factors would be valuable addition to the European
strategic resource position. Its cultural linked and geographical position opens door for
Europeans into new markets, for example European firms based in Turkey supplying the
wider Middle East area. Turkey’s adhesion is therefore clearly in interest of the European
export, construction and engineering sectors. Moreover integration as stated earlier, may
bring economies of scale resulting from increased production due to extension of the
market. As well as the initial benefit to capital owner’s profit and equity valuation, we
might presume the households would also realize downstream benefits from the capital
accumulation after sometime. Therefore, in the short term the growth potential of
Turkey’s integration realistically is small. However, a study by Deutsche Bank Research
Think Tank predicted an average growth rate of total GDP equating 4.1 percent per year
for the period 2006- 2020. 139
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This would mean that by 2020 the Turkish economy would be similar today’s Poland in
terms of per capita income.140 Furthermore with a large, young and growing population
Turkey could potentially be a positive asset for a European economy burdened by the
increasing weight on an ageing population.141 Security considerations are the second
important contribution for liberal inter-governmentalist assessment. It is commonly
understood that enlargement is expected to bring new capabilities and interests that
augment the EU ability to realize its security objectives. The ‘EU security system’ can be
conceptualized as living two distinct roles. The first is the promotion of stability and
security within its immediate neighborhood. The second role is to act in a wider security
role.142 Within the immediate region, Turkey has the potential to play a key function with
many are as:
Firstly, the EU has recognized transnational crime and international terrorism, amongst
others, as key threats to its internal security. 143 Turkey’s position at the prosperous region
makes it a source, destination and transit route for transnational crime. Many third
country nationals from the Middle East, Africa and Asia try to travel Turkey in an attempt
to reach Europe.144 It is generally accepted that the principle supply of heroin into EU
regions come through Turkey and then the vast majority of opium/morphine that transits
the country from the Golden Triangle145. and Golden Crescent146 is also processed into
heroin147. Turkey in the EU could act as the frontline against these ever-growing ‘soft
threats’ through beneficial cooperation in the Justice and Home affairs pillar.
International terrorism is not a new phenomenon for Turkey. For the past two decades,
the country has been fighting Kurdish Terrorist. Whereas this conflict was ethnically
fuelled, the 2003 bombing in Istanbul demonstrated that Turkey is not immune from so
called Islamic terrorism. Although AKP has stressed that these were foreign planned and
orchestrated attacks, the poverty and disillusionment in the east of Turkey provides a
fertile ground for recruitment for groups such as Turkish Hezbollah148. Concerns that
these groups will be able to move freely across the open boarder into the heartland of
Europe are fueling the perception of Turkey as a security risk.
It is highly unlikely that international terrorism will be defeated in the near future
however Turkey’s inclusion within the EU could create two effects; First, at a strategic
level it would demonstrate the ‘Christian Europe’ is not the enemy of Islam. Second,
Brussels could Utilize Turkey’s advance military and intelligence capability in its
struggle against these threat.149 The EU has recognized that its own security is highly
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depended on thye stability and security of its near neighborhood. It could be urged that
Turkey being at the crossroad of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East and the
door of Central Asia, holds a strategic position which gives its a role major importance.
Military Capability: Turkey’s geographical location, NATO class military infrastructure
and logistical means constitute an indispensable environment for European military
power projection to theaters of operation outside the EU. In short, Turkey could become a
force multiplier in ESDP, especially when considering that the EU member states have
armed forces that number 1.2 million, yet only 80,000 of these can be deployed.
150
Turkey also has the second largest army in NATO and thus already has a long experience
of working with many European armed forces, sharing the same defense doctrines and
training procedures (see Map no. 14, Appendix B, p. 468). Turkey has also been involved
in numerous UN missions, notably in Somalia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the
Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrating its political willingness and ability to
contribute to global security. Turkey’s success as lead nation for operations in
Afghanistan during 2002 was due in part to the Turk’s cultural awareness and sensitivity
for the Afghan people, based on long standing relations.
151
Such cultural and religious
value could become a significant asset especially in a world where Islam is the fastest
growing religion.
Financial Stability: As the EU increasingly seeks to take a greater responsibility in
global matters, it does so with the framework of multilateralism and international law.
While it is already an influential economic actor and development agent, for example in
the South America and South Africa, it now wants to reinforce these capabilities, if and
when necessary with the ability of use force when its vital interest are at stake and to be
able to respond more effectively to crises.
Turkey’s participation in theEU’s possible military operations could contribute significant
to their success and, maybe, could determine their feasibility.152 No less than 2.4% of
Turkey’s gross domestic product is spent on the military and its capability will be further
enhance by a multibillion dollar procurement programme. 153
Turkey might be a Bride with the Muslim World: Turkey has been a member of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation154 since 1960. The EU has acknowledged that
‘Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better
understanding and communication. There is no doubt that a ‘no’ to Turkey would
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evidence the problems of coexistence between the West and Islam. In particular, the
millions of Muslims from North Africa, the Middle East and Asia residing in Europe
would have legitimate reasons to feel worried about their possibilities of integration . 155
Turkey could provide that vital link between EU and the Muslim world. Ferhat Kentel,
thinks Turkey’s accession into the EU would be important not only for Turkey, but for the
EU as well. 156 He also told that it would help reduce tensions based on Islam phobia and
promote world peace. 157 Kentel’s further remarks is that when compared to countries like
Bulgaria or Romania - former Soviet bloc states - Turkey is far better prepared for joining
the EU. But he doesn’t believe that Turkey’s EU accession is a sure thing. “Just the fact
that Turkey is negotiating with the EU changes the situation in Turkey with regard to
democratic standards,” Kentel said. He emphasized that Turkish society’s interest in EU
accession has greatly decreased; only recently going back up with public appearances by
politicians such as Erdogan or Merkel.
In post-Helsinki documents from the Commission, Turkey is defined in a very similar
manner as it was in the first half of the 1990s. Being a ‘bridge between civilization’s still
seems to be the role designated for Turkey. Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn158
stated that ‘as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the European Union, Turkey
would play a significant role in Europe’s relations with the Islamic World.’ At a later
occasion, Rhen further stated that:
A Turkey where the rule of law is firmly rooted in its society and state will
prove that, contrary to prejudices, European values can successfully
coexist with a predominantly Muslim population. Such a Turkey will be a
most valuable crossroads between civilizations.159
The Oil issue: US war against Iraq in 2002 probably encourage the EU to develop
mechanisms to act in greater harmony, while also avoiding being excluded from the
power structures that would control oil supplies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the
Middle East. There are two important reasons why the EU may be interested in full
membership for Turkey: first the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline that will bring Caspian Sea oil
to the Mediterranean through the territory of Turkey; second, the difficult post-war
situation in Iraq and the increasing American control of the Iraqi oil supplies. Turkey, as a
neighbor to Iraq and as a host to a pipeline, brings Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, will
have great geostrategic importance for the EU. In the foreseeable future, the only access
to the Mediterranean for both pipelines seems to be through Turkish territory.
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The transatlantic competition for markets
The other reason why the EU may be more interested in accepting Turkey as a full
member has to do with the increasing American power in the Middle East and the
Mediterranean. As the United States will have a foot in the Middle East from establishing
a firmer presence on Iraqi territory, the EU will have to increase its power in order to
cope with American power in these regions and cannot do it without securing Turkey to
its side. A Euro-Mediterranean partnership which currently envisages the creation of a
free trade zone across both the north and south Mediterranean by the year 2010 will
probably accelerate to balance the increasing presence of the United States in the same
region. The EU, after possibly admitting Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, may consider
opening accession negotiations with Turkey.
Taking into account both the economic and strategic assessment of Turkish accession its
potential becomes apparent. As a potential source of large economic growth and a strong
partner within the Union’s likely military plans, the liberal intergovernmental approach
argue the odds of potential succession are strong. Yet, when one observes the discourse
that it occurring throughout the European press and statistics of public opinion on the
issue, a different scenario will emerges altogether. According to a recent poll conducted
by European commission ‘Euro-barometer’160 of all the candidate and potential candidate
countries, the prospect of Turkey’s accession generated the most disapproval. 48% is
opposed to its entry to the Even if it complies with all conditions set by EU, while 39% is
in favor.161 (See the graph, Appendix – K, p.491)
Such sentiments are mimicked by various European political elites. According to Frits
Bolkestein, that former Dutch European commissioner, ‘Europe would implode’.162
Nicolas Serkozy opines that, Turkey’s geographical position in the midst of unstable
regions and the potential influx of Islamic radicalism as threats to Europe, and for a
simple reason that it is in Asia Minor.” 163 German Chancellor Angela Markel, although
encouraging continued accession talks with Ankara, Like Serkozy, favours a privileged
partnership agreement as opposed to full membership.164 The question is therefore raised
if member state governments are able to gain significant economic and security
advantages through a strategic partnership as opposed to membership, why would they
offer such an agreement? It is here that constructivist understanding provide an important
contribution.
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Prospective Foreign Policy Player
With her size and location, Turkey is likely to be an important foreign policy player in the
EU. Furthermore, its borders with the Middle East and the Caucasus will become the
Union’s borders too with implications both for EU foreign policy interests and relations
with these neighbours and for the EU’s internal security. But Turkey’s overall impact
will depend substantially on the separate question of how much the EU itself will develop
as a foreign policy player in the next decade. This is an open question.
After the deep splits over Iraq among EU countries, the prospects for rapid progress in
building a stronger, more effective common foreign and security policy (CFSP) do not
look strong. For the foreseeable future, CFSP will certainly remain intergovernmental.
After their sharp disagreements over Iraq, Britain, France and Germany have been trying
to cooperate more on foreign policy, making a common approach to Iran for example
over its nuclear plans. Some suggest that such a trilateral directoire is the only feasible
way for EU foreign policy to develop. But it is rather unlikely in an EU of 25 or more
that all other countries will simply follow the lead of the three large countries. Countries
such as the Netherlands have made clear their strong opposition to such a concept. A
much more subtle, sophisticated and inclusive approach to leadership will be necessary
for real progress. Nor is it clear anyway whether the ‘big three’ will be able to come to
solid agreements on the most difficult issues, including on relations within the US.
With Turkish accession, the EU’s borders will extend to the southern Caucasus (Armenia
and Georgia) and to Syria, Iran and Iraq. This will both sharpen the Union’s foreign
policy concerns in these regions and increase its involvement in issues that previously
would have been considered as either essentially bilateral between Turkey and its
neighbours or not seen as a high priority for the EU – such issues range from visas and
border controls, to diplomatic recognition (Armenia), or disputes over resources (such as
water). Turkish accession will also strongly increase the EU’s interests in the Black Sea
region – though the prior accession of Bulgaria and Romania will already have given the
Union sea borders with Black Sea countries. Turkish accession will impact too on the
EU’s developing and complex relationship with Russia. Turkey’s control of the vital
Bosphorus route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and its position as a transit
country for important energy networks including the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline all add to the
complexity of issues that will face the Union.
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The EU is already in the process of recognizing that it needs a more coherent policy in its
wider region, with the enlargement to 25 (and then 27) bringing the Union’s land borders
into contact with a number of new countries.
How effective the EU’s ‘new
neighbourhood’ policy will be remains to be seen. But Turkish accession will further
underline the lesson of the current 2004 enlargement, that the Union needs to put much
more political priority and resources into relations with its neighbours, especially where it
is not in a position to – or chooses not to – use the tool of enlargement as the main basis
for influence and positive relations. Given its location, Turkey has strong regional
interests – but it does not have pretensions like France or the UK to be a global foreign
policy player. The strategic sensitivity of its location has also meant that Turkey has
always put strong emphasis on its international alignments, not least with NATO and in
particular with the US.
Given the European splits over Iraq, and the lack of agreement over how the transatlantic
relationship should develop in the future, some EU countries such as France, have seen
Turkey as likely to align itself with the UK – and US – on foreign policy issues. But
Turkey surprised many, including itself, when its parliament voted to reject the request
for US and UK troops to be based in, and transit, Turkey in the Iraq conflict in 2003.
Many foreign policy commentators in Turkey see this decision as having had unexpected
but very welcome positive effects – in not involving it in a highly controversial and
damaging conflict, in enabling it to distance itself somewhat from the US but without too
much damage to Turkish-US relations, and consequently in enabling it to be (as many in
Turkey see it despite the EU splits) ‘more European’. The criticism by the Pentagon of
the Turkish army for failing to apply sufficient pressure to ensure US troops could come
through Turkey, and the rejection of the Turkish offer of troops after the conflict in Iraq,
had according to Turkish commentators a perceptible effect in Turkey in weakening the
power of the military, and so strengthening the power of the government in pushing
through political reforms.
Turkey has its own interests in Iraq and is watching developments with great concern.
Civil war or a fragmented Iraq, and the possible emergence of an independent Kurdistan,
would impact strongly not simply on Turkish foreign policy (including any possible
intervention – which if it occurred would stop any EU negotiations in their tracks) but
also on its internal political dynamics. Overall, the Iraq conflict does not mean an end to
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Turkey’s atlanticist outlook but it has shown that Turkey, unlike the UK, does not and
will not automatically follow the US in major foreign policy decisions.
Some have argued that Turkey as an EU member will provide the EU with a ‘bridge’ to
the Middle East. But others, including experts and observers in Turkey, doubt this.
Turkey has not been a very strong player in the Middle East and Turkish-Arab relations
have not always been easy, not least given the strong relations between Turkey and Israel.
However, with the arrival of the AKP government, the dynamics have started to change
somewhat. Neither Erdogan nor Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul had made no
official visit to Israel since they came to power. And in a recent media report, Erdogan
strongly criticized the Sharon government and its attacks on the Palestinian population–
calling it ‘state terrorism’165.
But for now, military and intelligence cooperation
continues.
Turkey’s relations with other Middle East countries also vary. The situation in Iraq has
the potential to be highly destabilizing if it deteriorates further166. Relations with Syria–
frequently difficult with intertwined disputes over territory, water, and the Kurds – have
started to improve only in the recent past, after Syria took a tougher line on Kurdish
separatism. Nor is Iran a natural partner, even if Turkey is less suspicious now than in the
past that Iran is trying to export a fundamentalist revolution to Turkey. Relations with
Jordan and Egypt are better. Rather than a strong ‘bridge’, some suggest that Turkey can
and would act to some extent as an interpreter or translator for the EU with the Middle
East but to an extent that should not be exaggerated and that will vary by country.
In the Caucasus, and further East in relations with the Turkic republics of Central Asia,
Turkey has strong interests. Relations with Azerbaijan are particularly strong –’one
nation, two states’ according to some Turkish politicians – which has impacted negatively
on Turkey’s relations with Armenia. The dispute over the Nagorno Karabakh167 enclave
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, combined with Turkey’s desire for strong relations
with Azerbaijan not least due to its energy interests have given Azerbaijan a strong
influence over Turkey’s currently frozen relations with Armenia.
These relations are further aggravated by the Armenian demand, so far resisted by
Turkey, for recognition of the Armenian genocide. Relations with Georgia, particularly
given the closed border with Armenia, are also important to Turkey. But a number of
commentators suggest Turkey has not been highly successful in developing a strong
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foreign policy towards the region – its rather equivocal approach on the Caucasus leading
to a lack of clear strategy168. And Turkey’s perhaps overambitious aims in the early 1990s
for strong multilateral cooperation with the Turkic republics of Central Asia have for now
resolved into a softer but more effective emphasis on economic and cultural ties169.
Normalizations of relations with Armenia, as a neighbouring country, is likely to be seen
by the EU as one essential pre-condition of Turkish accession. Overall, it is clear that the
combined accessions of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey will pull the EU into paying much
more attention to the Caucasus – where both Russia and the US are already strongly
involved – than it has until now. As such, the EU might be pushed into developing as a
much more strategic foreign policy actor, but whether it will have the political will or find
the means to do so, is rather doubtful. Turkish accession will also impact on EU-Russia
relations. Although Turkey is already in NATO, Russia may not welcome further
extension of the Union along the southern shores of the Black Sea. Nor have TurkishRussian relations always been easy. But Turkey now imports most of its oil from Russia
instead of Saudi Arabia, despite the concerns of some in its foreign policy establishment
at such a switch.
Turkish-Greek relations have long been a source of tension in the eastern Mediterranean
and caused difficulties within NATO. The recent rapprochement between the two
countries has been widely welcomed, and Greece is a supporter of Turkey’s EU
membership bid. Turkey’s highly significant and welcome shift on Cyprus, supporting the
UN plan to end division of the island, and the Turkish Cypriot ‘yes’ in the April
referendum, has given Turkey substantial political credit and effectively removed the
issue of Cyprus as a potential block to opening EU accession negotiations. But both the
division of Cyprus and ongoing border disputes with Greece in the Aegean will have to
be resolved prior to actual accession.
Turkish accession would not only change the EU’s borders but it would also change
Turkish relations with its neighbours and other third countries not least in terms of visa
regimes. New visa regimes may be unwelcome – not only in the third countries but in
Turkey too, just as new members like Poland and Hungary were concerned at creating too
strong divisions with neighbouring Ukraine. This is where the EU’s new neighbourhood
policy will be tested – whether it is able to create good relations in the region rather than
new divisions and barriers.
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At the same time, many in the EU are concerned at the prospects of Turkey being part of
the Schengen border free area. Turkey’s eastern borders are quite porous and difficult to
protect especially in mountainous regions. Turkey is a transit country to the EU for
problem areas like human trafficking, drugs, illegal immigration and other aspects of
organised crime170. It is clear that the EU would demand long transition periods in the
Schengen area and would be extremely strict on judging when Turkey met the full
criteria. At the same time, once Turkey is a member of the Union, the EU will have more
influence over issues in justice and home affairs such as illegal immigration. This will
clearly be a difficult area for negotiations. Overall, Turkish accession will extend and
deepen EU foreign policy interests in its surrounding regions. But the Middle East, Black
Sea and Caucasus are regions that the EU in any event is going to have to engage with
more strongly given its own foreign policy and security interests.
Turkey, once in the EU, is likely to want to be an active foreign policy player. And given
its large army, Turkey could be in a relatively strong position to contribute to the
development of EU peacekeeping forces in the context of its developing security policy.
However, how much the defence dimension of Union policy will develop in the next
decade or more is far from clear, but it is not likely to be swift. Turkey itself is unlikely
to want to see EU foreign policy develop in anything other than an intergovernmental
direction. And some Turkish commentators suggest Turkey may find it very hard to
accept that the Union will want to have a say in its foreign policy in its own region.
TURKISH CHALLENGES TO ENTRY IN EUROPEAN EUNION
In spite of all the variety of arguments that support Turkey’s membership of the EU, the
likelihood of another scenario is worth considering. This is the scenario in which in the
near future the EU does not even give a date for the start of the accession negotiations and
tries to keep Turkey on the sidelines by emphasizing the ‘insurmountable’ differences
between the two sides that have been expressed from time to time by important European
leaders. Future obstacles to Turkey’s gaining membership of the EU are mentioned
below:
(a) Turkey’s Demographic Situation: Due to the institutional set up of the EU, the
population of Turkey is another great concern on the part of the EU member states. One
commonly raised point is that, when it joins the EU, Turkey will become the EU’s most
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populated Member State. Turkey’s current population is 71 million, and demographers
project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years. This compares with the largest
current EU Member State, Germany, which has 83 million people today, but whose
population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 2020171. Turkey’s political
weight would be comparable to that of Germany, based on voting weight by population
share. Opponents to Turkish accession therefore argue that Turkey will be a too powerful
member for the EU There is further concern that Turkish membership may seriously
impede further development of the Union172. This fear is boosted by the fact that Turkey’s
economy is characterized by major regional inequalities, partly reflecting its rural/urban
divide. Many fear that it will be too difficult for the EU to digest the Eastern enlargement
and then engage in another enlargement of almost the same dimension at the same time.
Therefore, some the EU member states which consider Turkey as belonging neither to
‘geographical Europe’ nor to ‘cultural Europe’ express their concern from time to time
that such a late comer should not be able to play a major role in decision- making that will
affect the future of all the EU member states. The impact of this concern was illustrated
with the Nice European Council’s decision to omit Turkey from the calculations of voting
power in an enlarged Union173.
(b) Identity Crisis of ‘European’ versus ‘Turkish’: One of the important aspects of
Europe’s future vision seems to encompass the creation of a European demos on the basis
of common European values174. The enlargement process is a means whereby the EU is
shaping its eastern and southern periphery in accordance with its own priorities. In this
sense, the EU also defines being a European state according to certain criteria 175. Since
the demise of the strategic division of Europe into two blocs, the definition of borders of
Europe has started to be questioned. Yet this inquiry did not concern the CEEC countries
much due to their historical bonds with Western Europe. Eastward enlargement was not
motivated just by political, economic and security interests on both sides, but it also had a
moral dimension in reuniting Europe and reviving the pre-Yalta order176.
In other words, the definition of Europe and ‘Europeanness’ has been linked closely to
geography, politics and culture and therefore creates concern for some countries, such as
Turkey177. The words uttered by the Head of the Convention Valerie Giscard d’Estaing
who said “Turkey must never be allowed into the European Union. Since it has a different
culture, a different approach, a different way of life”, were very much resented in Turkey.
D’Estaing was unambiguous on the issue of the EU membership and stated that ‘Turkey
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is a country that is close to Europe, an important country, but it is not a European country.
Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population is outside178. His words can be seen as a
good indicator of how some Europeans still perceive Turkey. Likewise, although
Germany has officially backs Turkey’s bid, the Christian Democrats, who play a very
important role in German politics, argue that Turkey’s admission could be ‘political
suicide’, alleging that Turkey’s membership would ‘overtax’ the EU’s capacity for
integration and hinder economic growth within the bloc.179
On the other hand, recent Euro-barometers reveal the fact that 77% of the Turkish
population is not well-informed about the EU, its enlargement policies, or its internal
political mechanisms. Therefore, accession to the EU will seemingly remain as a project
of the Turkish elite that has not been well-presented to the Turkish public with its pros
and cons. This lack of information becomes quite important especially when relations
with the EU become a matter of domestic politics and are used as a tool of party politics
rather than a national policy in Turkey. Therefore the first important problem remains the
internationalization of the project of the EU membership by the masses in Turkey. This
problem can only be overcome with a large-scale communication strategy that embraces
all sectors of Turkish society, not the educated elite only.
On the EU side, the situation is not very different since the lack of information about
Turkey and misperceptions characterize European public opinion in most of the EU
member states. The perceptions of Europeans are mostly shaped either by factors
emanating from the internal political and social problems of the EU such as xenophobia
due to high unemployment and illegal immigration, or by factors that stem from sui
generis problems which would arise due to a possible future accession of Turkey to the
Union. Among these factors are the following: the historical psychological legacy that the
Ottoman Empire left behind, especially in countries that were once a part of the Empire;
the huge population of Turkey, and the Turkish youth that might flow to Europe in case
of a possible membership; the fact that Turkey is predominantly a Muslim country, and
the perception of Islam as a threat—especially after the September 11 incident in 2001. In
conclusion, the perceptions of the EU regarding Turkey are shaped both by its own
current problems as well as the problems that Turkey is considered to bring in its
‘backpack’ if it were to become a member state.
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(c) The Cyprus Imbroglio: The Cyprus question has become closely linked to Turkey–
EU relations and is even regarded by some as Turkey’s key to the EU180. The application
to the EU of the Greek government in Cyprus in the name of the whole island as well has
started to complicate things regarding Turkey’s position vis-a-vis the EU. Instead of
making the solution of the Cyprus problem a pre-requisite for Cypriot membership, the
EU seemed to prefer a tactical approach, thinking that the EU membership will act as a
catalyst in the search for a solution to the island’s division181. The declaration of Greek
Cypriot President Tasos Papadopoulos on 7 April 2004, on the other hand, revealed that
he himself did not approve of the Annan Plan and does not see this as the ultimate chance
for a solution. What he implied in his speech to the Greek Cypriot population was that
after Cyprus becomes an EU member, it would block any decision regarding Turkey’s EU
membership, until a solution is reached on better terms for the Greek Cypriots than the
Annan Plan. The Annan Plan was voted by referendum on each part of the island, has had
a significant impact on Turkey’s bid for opening accession negotiations with the EU.
About 75% of the Greek Cypriots voted ‘no’ while 65% of the Turkish Cypriots voted
yes.
Therefore, the Cyprus problem may continue to pose an important challenge to the future
of Turkey in the EU, particularly in view of the accession of the Greek part of the island
despite their rejection of the Annan Plan. There seems to be two important issues at stake:
the lifting of the embargo on the Turkish Cypriot part, and the recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. The statements of the EU officials before the referendum
signalled that the EU is willing to change its attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot part.
For instance, Javier Solana, on the date of the referendum stated that “if at the end of the
day the southern part vote no and the other part yes, the relation with the other part will
have to be also different. They cannot be left forever in the cold”182. After the
referendum, Gunther Verheugen, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, stated that “he
felt ‘cheated’ by the Greek Cypriot leadership which has campaigned against the plan”183.
Nevertheless, the EU did not change its attitude towards the Greek Cypriot part and they
were admitted to the EU on 1 May 2004. This caused a serious resentment on the part of
the Turkish Cypriots. The resentment can best be seen in the words of Prime Minister
Mehmet Ali Talat who stated that “The side which accepts Annan Plan is outside the EU
while the side which rejects the plan joins the EU with the claim of being the
representative of the other side. That is out of question we abided by our commitments. It
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is now the turn of the international community to prepare proposals. to alleviate or
remove the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots”184. The same sort of resentment is also
prevalent on the part of Turkey. According to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan stated “From now on nothing should be the same, and the EU must now initiate
a process and act to conform to its pledges to ease the impact of an embargo on northern
Cyprus”185. Turkey is also pressing the EU to revise the terms of Cyprus’s accession to
the union, saying the results of the referendum have changed the bases of existing
conditions.186
Another major issue on the agenda regarding the Cyprus problem, if the issue of getting
international recognition in order to demonstrate that the Greek Cypriot rejection of the
Annan Plan, could lead to a permanent partition on the island. Although Turkey expected
the support of the EU in this regard, Verheugen underlined that “the EU would get into
direct contact with the Turkish Cypriot officials but cooperation does not mean
recognition”187.
Turkey also seems quite dissatisfied about the revisions that EU ambassadors agreed to
make to entry regulations since the revisions fall short of meeting a firm Turkish demand
for direct communication, transportation and trade links between the EU and Turkish
Cypriots. The revisions envisaged that all goods produced in northern Cyprus could cross
the ‘green line’, but they denied to propose any measure that would allow direct
international air and sea links from the EU states to northern Cyprus. One other problem
is concerning the role of the Turkish military in the Cyprus problem. The military most
recently voiced out its support for President Rauf Denktas who strongly opposed the
Annan Plan. On this matter, the AKP government and the military seem to pursue
different policies which may also affect the future course of Turkey’s policy towards
Cyprus as well as the EU.
In the light of all these recent developments, what the future holds for the Turkish Cypriot
part is quite uncertain. This uncertainty on the part of EU’s future Cyprus policy as well
as a growing future resentment on the part of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey may act as
important challenges to the future of Turkey’s relations with the EU. Therefore, the
Cyprus problem will continue to occupy an important place in determining the future
relations of Turkey with the EU. Therefore, the EU policy of acting as a catalyst in
Cyprus may have some negative consequences for Turkey’s bid for the EU membership,
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if Turkey’s expectations are not fulfilled by the EU’s Cyprus policy in the near future.
This is because there has been and will continue to be an essential overlap between
hardliners on the Cyprus conflict and the most nationalist and euro-sceptic forces in
Turkey, as those who are sceptical of Turkey’s future in Europe seem to be persistent in
their effective opposition to the unification of Cyprus188.
(d) The EU’s dilemma of deepening versus widening: One of the most critical tasks
that the EU has been dealing with is the future of Europe itself and what kind of regime
model it will adopt. The models vary from ‘A European Confederation’ to ‘A European
Kind of Switzerland’ or ‘Canadian-type European Federation’189. The future of Europe
has been a major issue since the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998 due to fears
inherent in rapid change within the nation-state and the different effects of the EU
policies on member states and their citizens190. The Nice European Council of December
2000 called for a deeper and wider debate about the future development of the EU. To
this end, a declaration on ‘The Future of the Union’ was annexed to the Nice Treaty and
the debate was formally launched in 2001. Jan Zielonka argues that ‘although the future
EU is usually seen as a new type of West Phalian federal state with a central government
in charge of a given territory with clear-cut borders, an enlarged EU would more closely
resemble a neo-medieval empire with serious practical and conceptual implications
191
.’
He argues that the EU increasingly acts in concentric circles due to various opt-outs
negotiated by individual member states in the areas of foreign, monetary and social
policy. In addition, as a result of the effects of globalization, the EU lacks a strong and
coherent sense of cultural identity, let alone a European demos or patria 192. This
ambiguity regarding the EU’s own future will not only have clear implications upon
Turkey’s future accession to the EU but will shape the former’s integration within the EU
after a possible accession.
With the expansion of Europe to include all of Christendom, new frontiers were formed,
with the Eastern-most part of Europe always being considered the “periphery”. This
periphery was considered distinct from Asia, but at the same time, was not fully European
compared with its Western counterparts. The various states of the Balkans, Greece, and
Russia have this distinction, and as Michael Hertzfeld describes in his article “The
European Self,” this distinction can generate both resentment at being viewed as a
“second class” European nation and internal division in the country over whether citizens
should change their behavior in order to appear more European193.
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This type of distinction is divisive enough with nations that are still geographically part of
continental Europe. It is even more difficult for a nation to consider itself part of Europe
if it is mostly Asian, has a different majority religion and ethnicity, and has been a
military adversary of Western Europe for hundreds of years. It is in this situation that
Turkey seeks to join the European Union. With these vast differences, EU member states
believe that Turkey’s membership could fundamentally change the identity of Europe,
thus it is no surprise that they are reluctant to admit Turkey as a member.
Before going into Turkey’s specific circumstances, it is important to note that historically,
Islamic nations and Islam itself have been considered as outsiders and even invaders in
the historical conception of Europe. Europeans have historically seen the Ottoman
Empire, precursor to the Modern Turkish state, as a military threat. An example is the
conquest of the Constantinople by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, which brought an end
to the Byzantine Empire. With further expansion, the Empire conquered Greece and other
areas of Eastern Europe (such as Bosnia) and continued with the foundation of the
Muslim state of Al-Andalus (southern Spain). Though it existed as an independent state
for over 700 years, constant attacks were launched by the nations of Christendom, ending
in their expulsion from the continent during the Spanish Reconquista.194
Furthermore, though the Islamic world had a great influence on the development of
European science, technology, and philosophy (through importation of ideas from the
East and the circulation of Classical texts), it is relegated to the status of a “carrier
civilization” to Europe, rather than being a part of European identity (in development, and
culturally in the previously occupied areas). Even modern Muslim immigrants who are
officially European citizens are considered as outsiders in their respective nations. As
Talal Asad describes in these Muslims have “Asian” origins, and are therefore considered
as a minority group. Worse, they can’t elevate themselves above this discrimination
because “true” Europeanness comes from having an ethnic and racial tie to that particular
nation state.195 With this conception of Muslims as both “Asian outsiders” and “hostile
invaders”, it is no surprise that there is resistance to Turkey joining the European Union.
However, this is not the sole factor of this resistance. There are also a number of political
and cultural factors working against Turkey as well.
(e) Democratic Stability: there are several reasons that Turkey is finding it difficult to
enter the European Union. They mainly have to do with the balance of power in Europe,
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and more importantly, a series of obligations that new member nations must satisfy,
known as the “Copenhagen Criteria”.196 The first criterion states that candidate countries
must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.” Turkey already has
difficulties with several parts of this criterion, beginning with stability.
In Turkish politics, the army has a privileged place in the state power structure, seen as
heritors and defenders of the secular “Kemalist” state. Historically, they have launched
several coups against the government when they felt that it has been threatened by parties
that were either too Islamist, or did not adequately conform to Ataturk’s ideology. Their
first coup occurred in 1960, with the removal of all officials of the Democratic Party. In
1971, the army acted again, forcing conservative Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to
resign and declaring martial law. Their last major intervention was in 1980, when
generals took over the Turkish government among conflict between Left and Right-wing
student activists (the army was worried that such infighting would start a civil war).
Though there has been no major coup since 1980, the army has forced an Islamist
coalition in 1997 led by Necmettin Erbakan to resign, as they felt he was leading the
country toward “increasingly religious rule”.197 The constant threat of coups by the
military is not conducive to a stable democratic regime and hurts Turkey’s image as a
stable democracy. It is also ironic that the army is so willing to intervene in the name of
Kemalist ideology, as Ataturk himself opposed any intervention by the armed forces in
the affairs of the state.198
In addition, there have been several complaints that Turkey is not respectful of human
rights, based upon the past treatment of Armenians during end of the World War I. Based
upon suspicions that they would defect to the enemy (in this case, the Russians), army
officers allegedly received orders to begin relocating the Armenians to the Eastern border
of modern Turkey. Several EU member nations in addition to Armenian communities in
Europe and the United States have called upon Turkey to recognize this action as
“genocide” of the Armenian people, due to the casualties during the relocation process.
Turkey has not recognized it as such and this is viewed as unfavorable to their candidacy
in the EU.
To Turkey’s credit however, it would be difficult to make such a declaration with the
current foreign relations it has with Armenia. Apart from the past circumstance of the so-
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called “genocide”, Turkey is attempting to support its fellow “Turkic brothers” in
Azerbaijan, Armenia’s eastern neighbor, which is involved in a territorial dispute over a
disputed region in Western Azerbaijan known as Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s
conflict has been raging since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In response to
Armenia’s role in the conflict, Turkey has an economic blockade with Armenia,
forbidding trade between the two countries from flowing across each other’s borders.
With these combined effect of these two circumstances on Turkish opinion of Armenia, it
would be very difficult for the Turkish government to gather the political capital
necessary for such recognition. Thus although they could satisfy Europe by recognizing
their past actions as a so-called “genocide”, it would not be a practical or expedient
solution for Turkey itself.
There has also been criticism by the European Union that, according to the previously
mentioned part of the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey hasn’t adequately ensured the rights
of freedom of expression. Since the founding of Turkey, the ruling elite and the military
have held Ataturk in high regard and his ideology of Kemalism is key to the structure of
the modern Turkish Republic. However, this veneration of Ataturk has been criticized by
some as a cult of personality, particularly regarding freedom of speech. Not only has the
army intervened in political affairs against politicians who are either too Islamist or not
supportive enough toward Ataturk’s legacy, but criticism of Ataturk is forbidden in the
Turkish constitution. The preamble of the constitution reads
No protection will be extended to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish
national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of Turkey, or to Turkish
historical and moral values, or to the nationalism, principles, reforms, and
modernity of Ataturk.199
In addition, article 130 of the Turkish constitution states that “scientific research or
publications” not being absolutely compliant with the values outlined in the preamble are
to be banned by university rectors. This article is used by the Turkish Council of Higher
Education in some cases to silence professors who appear to be “ideologically dissident,”
such as sociologist Ismail Besikci, who was ousted from his position and imprisoned for
allegedly having pro-Kurdish sympathies. Examples such as this show up in the Turkish
penal code and form a very worrying message the Turkey, even if it becomes a member
of the European Union, will not respect the free-speech rights of its citizens who are not
ardent supporters of Kemalist ideology.200 There are signs that such action is weakening,
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as a “more Islamic” party, the AK party, is currently in power and the army has not gotten
itself involved, but it will take time if Turkey is to get past the reputation of an
interventionist army.
Economy also concerns member nations of the European Union. According to the second
of the Copenhagen Criteria, the European Commission states that candidate countries
must possess a stable market economy.201 For the member nations of the European
Union, there is reserved apprehension of Turkey joining because of a somewhat unstable
economy and fear of mass emigration, as witnessed by previous experiences in Turkish
guest worker programs. Turkish guest workers began to come to Western Europe starting
in 1960, as Turkey’s constitution had just guaranteed the right of its citizens to acquire a
passport and travel abroad.202 Germany had particular interest in foreign workers, as their
industries were expanding and due to construction of the Berlin Wall, the supply of East
German migrants had all but dried up. In October 1961, they signed a bilateral labor
agreement with Turkey, which allowed workers to come to Germany and work under one
year permits. The plan was very popular in Turkey, initially attracting nine thousand
workers in 1961 and rising quickly to 136,000 in 1973.203 This initial interest also
pleased the Germans, as they would be able to get a cheap labor force to staff their
industries and also keep unemployment low by having a constant rotating supply of guest
workers. (See Appendix-H, p. 486)204
(f) Economic Recessions: The problem came with the plan’s implementation in
economic recessions. It was expected for Turkish families to return to their homeland
upon dismissal from their jobs, so that employment levels could be kept low. However,
this turned out to go against the interests of both the workers and German factory
owners. Workers did not want to return home, as by working in Germany, they would be
able to earn eight to ten times the wages they could possibly receive back in
Turkey. Likewise, for the factory owners, there was little incentive to force worker
rotation, because they would be sending trained laborers home and be forced to find and
hire untrained replacements. Thus the guest workers generally did not return home, but
their numbers increased greatly due to the arrival of their families. In the original bilateral
agreement, companies could renew their guest worker permits for up to two years, which
also permitted the dependent
families of
the
guest
workers
to come to
Germany. Furthermore, if the workers were in Germany for five years, they could switch
employers and remain in Germany even if they had lost their jobs. 205 Even after this guest
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program stopped, Turks continued to immigrate to Germany either under asylum, “family
unification” programs, or through illegal means. Because of these various factors, the
employment rate dropped dramatically among foreigners in Germany from 66% in the
early ‘70’s to a lowly 33% only twenty years later.
From the experience of the guest worker programs, Germany does not want Turkey to
become part of the EU due to a fear of mass emigration, which could destabilize the
economy and greatly raise the unemployment rate. This opinion is shared by other
countries who worry that through such programs, their unemployment situations could get
worse, and that with a foreign community of Muslims, there would be difficulties with
integration and assimilation (such as is the case in France). In addition, the EU member
nations worry about Turkey joining the European Union from a fiscal standpoint.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Turkey
would be the poorest EU member nation, with a GDP of only $2100 in 2001, compared
with the average in the EU of $21,000 (It should be noted however that these amounts are
during 2001, one of Turkey’s worst economic crises; the current GDP per capita is
$11,200206. Furthermore, approximately 35% of Turkey’s workers are employed in
agricultural sectors. If Turkey joined the EU, many of these unskilled workers could
immigrate off the farms of Anatolia into Western Europe. To rich EU nations such as
Germany and France, the worry is that these unskilled workers could crowd out the job
market. Also, Turkey has had a very unstable economy in the past, which shrunk by 6%
in 1994, expanded by 6% per year from 1995-1997, and shrunk again by 10% in 2001,
only becoming stabilized in 2002 with an emergency loan of $16 billion from the
International Monetary Fund. With this past fluctuation in its economy, an argument can
be made that if Turkey was admitted as a full member of the European Union, the overall
economic welfare of EU nations could suffer. However, the fear of mass immigration
into Europe is not very well founded, as it is standard procedure for new members of the
European Union to have restrictions on travel between them and the rest of Europe for
several years before granting full open borders.
In order to get more information about the relationship Turks have with religion in
government, Turks views on the EU, and any other cultural factors that would repel
Europe from accepting Turkey into the EU, I contacted an acquaintance that I had met on
a previous excursion to the country as part of an interfaith dialogue and culture trip. The
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contact, who shall be cited as “Istanbul” in this paper, conducted an interview with me via
e-mail and over the phone, providing an insider perspective.
In the beginning, we noticed that there are significant differences between religious
identity and role of religion in public life between the EU and Turkey. Although there is
variety in religious presence in the public sphere in the EU, the EU is generally portrayed
as a secular bastion of the modern world. In order to modernize Turkey, Ataturk adapted
various secular principles, particularly those of France, when founding the modern
Turkish Republic. However, ever since its establishment, there has been debate over just
what the role of Islam consists of in Turkish society. As discussed above, there have been
several coups against the government for being too “Islamic,” restrictions placed upon
free speech in order to preserve Ataturk’s legacy, and citizens and politicians have been
imprisoned for anything that isn’t ardently secular. More disconcertingly, even religious
officials preaching modern values have been sanctioned, a good example being a Turkish
Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen. An Islamic moderate, Gulen condemns terrorism,
preaches that Muslims as a community have a “duty of service” to the common good of
Muslims and non-Muslims, and encourages interfaith dialogue between Muslims and the
other Abrahamic faiths. Yet even with this progressive theology, Gulen was tried in
abstentia (he was in the United States seeking medical care at the time) in 2000 under
charges of “attempts to establish an Islamic dictatorship”207, however all charges were
dropped by the court in 2006.
In my correspondences with Istanbul, I discovered that while secularism is indeed a large
force in Turkish politics, it does not exclude religion from Turkish life. Religion has
always been important to Turks, and although not all of them are practicing Muslims,
most have some form of religious belief, the majority of them Sunni Muslims. However,
the influence of religious expression in public life has waxed and waned over time
depending on who controlled the government. When Ataturk instituted modernizations in
Turkey, he did so via a top-down enforcement model, such as abolishing the caliphate and
converting many of the state-run mosques and religious orders of the Ottoman Empire
into museums. Other reforms were put in place to make Turkey appear more modern in
the eyes of Europe, such as banning the wearing of the Fez. However, the Turkish people
did not internalize all of these reforms, but practiced them because it was the law. There
are moderate secularists in Turkey now, mostly associated with the Social Democratic
Party who don’t want religion formally tied to government, yet respect the rights of
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religious practice and don’t favor army involvement in politics. When it comes to the
European Union, this shifting idea of acceptable religion in the public sphere is not really
something holding Turkey back. Rather, this cultural factor contributes to the instability
of the government, with tensions between the religious and the secularists, a political
criterion.
(g) Cultural Factors: in Turkey’s candidacy for the EU is their conception of national
identity, which differs somewhat from other Western European nations. It dates back, that
the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which fractured due to its many different ethnic groups.
The various minor ethnic and religious groups within the Empire started nationalistic
movements contributing to the decline in central authority and the eventual collapse of
the Ottomans. In order to avoid this fate with Turkey, Ataturk made sure to unite the
people of Turkey under a single Turkish nationality (he couldn’t unite them under
religion because of the smaller religious communities of Christians and Jews, as well as
different Muslim sects). Ironically, if one were to immigrate to Turkey and become a
citizen, they would be considered part of the Turkish nationality, even if they weren’t
born of a Turkish ethnicity.
While this ethnic identification works well for giving Turks a sense of nationhood, it has
caused trouble with the E.U. because of how each group defines minorities. The European
Union has complained to Turkey that it does not ensure the minority rights of the nonTurks inside of its borders. For Turkey, EU is referring to the armed Kurdish nationalist
militia (referred to as PKK, or the “Kurdistan Workers Party”) launching attacks to the
Turkish and Kurdish civilians mostly in the Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, in an
attempt to form their own nation in a region between Turkey, Iraq and Armenia. On the
other hand, the Turks do not view the Kurds as a minority group, because according to the
Treaty of Lausanne (a treaty signed at the end of World War I establishing the modern
Turkish Republic), minorities are defined as those who are of a minority religion, not a
minority ethnic group. As a result, the Turks view this demand of minority rights for the
Kurds, who to the Turks are part of the Turkish nation as Turkish citizens, as a double
standard. This difference in the conception and treatment of minorities leads to criticisms
by the EU that Turkey does not respect the rights of its minority citizens. The Turks
respond that these independent groups are Turks and that if they were recognized as a
separate minority group, they would threaten national unity. This is a response to the
nationalization that occurred after the Ottoman Empire’s war in the Balkans. After the
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Ottomans lost on this front, in the World War I , the formerly Ottoman subjects of
Greeks, Armenians, and others decided to form a nation state. In Turkey’s War for
Independence, there were many migrations, voluntary and coerced, of Balkan
communities to the West and Muslims to the East. Thus in Turkey’s formation, while it
still retained some of these multi-ethnic groups that were present during the Ottoman
Empire, their presence was greatly reduced, and Turkey became over 98% Muslim. With
these historical circumstances, it is understandable why Turkey would state that these
groups threaten national unity.208 Since this issue of minority definition is not limited to
Kurds, but can also consist of other formerly Ottoman communities living in Turkey,
such as Armenians and Greeks, and there is such a difference in Europe and Turkey’s
views on the subject, I believe that this is the biggest reason Turkey is having trouble
joining the EU.
When it comes to Turkish opinions on joining the European Union, the population is
almost evenly split. According to a recent poll, about 55.3% of Turks are in favor of
joining the European Union. The main Turkish groups opposing entry are Secularists
(who believe that the EU will provide more religious rights, therefore expanding
religion’s presence in everyday life), nationalists (who are already afraid of Greeks,
Armenians, and Jews living in Turkey, and with entry in the EU, could possibly petition
for their own nations), and radical Islamists (who view Europe as a Christian threat to
Islam in Turkey). However, these groups only comprise about 40 percent of the Turkish
population. The rest of the Turks are more favorable to the European Union, but public
opinion shifts greatly whenever there is an important political development, such as a
report by Brussels criticizing Turkey.
Overall, Turkey still has a while before it will be accepted as a member of the European
Union. Europe is concerned with the ability of the Turkish government to maintain
stability and protect the basic rights of its citizens and minorities. Certain nations are also
somewhat apprehensive about the economic effects of Turkey joining the European
Union. This is in addition to overcoming the attitude of Muslims as fundamentally outside
of what it means to be European. There are signs that these factors are changing; Turkey
has a “more Islamic” party in power, and the army has not interfered, and Western
European nations such as France are starting to recognize that Muslims, with their everincreasing
immigration,
are
going
to
become
significant
parts
of
their
population. However, this will all take time. Until then, these political and economic
381
concerns, as well as basic concerns over identity, will hinder Turkey from being fully
accepted as part of Europe. The conception of European identity must first evolve to
accommodate Turkey.
Possible Future Impact if Turkey Join EU
If Turkey joins the EU in 2015 it will be the same size as Germany; by 2025, Turkey
would be the EU’s largest member state. This size effect is probably the biggest impact of
Turkish accession but also the most difficult to analyze in terms of its implications. The
impact will depend not only on Turkey and its political development and policy and
strategy choices but also on how the enlarged Union develops in the next two decades.
Even in the EU of 15, no single country dominated EU political and policy developments
and this is even less likely as the EU heads towards 30 or more members. But Turkey, as
eventually the largest country, will clearly be an important player.
The potentially difficult to manage political fact of being a newcomer, but rapidly
becoming the largest in population terms, will be mitigated by the fact that economically
Turkey will continue to represent only a very small part of the EU economy (2.9% in
2015), unlike the other large countries. Turkey will have its own clear interests in
economic and social policy issues, but it will not be in a position to lead strategically in
developments in the internal market or the euro (which it is unlikely to join for a number
of years after accession anyway). Turkey will have a much stronger voice in more
political areas, notably foreign policy. It will also have considerable interests in questions
of internal security, though its likely long transition period before it becomes a full part of
the Schengen border free area will also limit some of its political scope.209
The political and institutional impacts of Turkish accession are in many ways simpler
than those of the 2004 enlargement. Enlargement to 25 (soon 27 and later 28, see
Appendix-G, p.485) new members has substantially altered EU politics and institutions
through the large increase in numbers and diversity of countries. The current challenge
for the enlarged EU is to manage this numbers and diversity effect. In contrast, adding
only one more country to the EU summit table, or to other institutions and meetings, is
much more manageable. It is in its large size that Turkey has more and different impacts
to the current new ten.
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The main question with Turkish accession, given its size, is what sort of political player it
will be and how it will impact on existing political dynamics among the 27, particularly
how it impacts on the dynamics among the larger member states and between the larger
and smaller members. Size on its own clearly does not determine political impact or
stance. France, Germany, Italy and the UK have all been very different political players
in the Union.
France has long aimed to be the political leader in Europe, using the Franco-German
relationship to this end. But enlargement and German reunification have weakened
France’s political position in the Union, one factor explaining France’s relative lack of
enthusiasm for the enlargement process in general, and also for the accession of Turkey in
particular. Germany, post-reunification, is in many ways becoming a more ‘normal’
player, more likely to emphasis the open promotion of its national interest and much less
reliably integrationist or federalist than in the past. Italy has been an important political
player in the Union but that influence has been much diluted in recent years, notably
under the Berlusconi premiership. And the UK has remained a rather awkward player in
the Union, remaining outside the Euro zone and Schengen border-free area. Political
dynamics among these four – and with Spain – have changed over time and according to
the political colour and stance of different governments and according to alliances with
other EU member states. How Turkey will impact on such changing and changeable
political relations among the larger countries is uncertain.
Some in France harbour the idea that France and Germany can lead the euro zone, and
France, Germany and the UK between them can lead foreign policy. Turkish accession is
then seen as disrupting this scenario. But it is a highly unlikely scenario. The FrancoGerman alliance is widely seen as too narrow to provide strategic leadership in the
enlarged Union, and anyway at present is operating very much on the basis of narrow
national self-interest rather than considering pan-European interests as a whole. The
Franco-German relationship remains important in EU politics but it does not have the
weight it had in the past.
Some in the current EU express concern that Turkish accession will mean an end to
political integration and to the federalist dream. But although Turkey is a large country, it
is unclear why its accession should be the tipping point in determining the future direction
of the Union. Even at 25 members, the future direction of the Union is unclear given
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countries’ different viewpoints, while the draft EU constitution preserves the EU’s
balance between inter-governmentalism and supra nationalism. Nor is it yet clear how
well – or badly – the Union will operate at 25 or whether and how it will find strategic
leadership or direction. The challenge for the enlarged Union, whether of 25 or 28, is not
to lose all direction in a myriad of changing and competing alliances but to find sufficient
commonality of purpose and direction. To do this, the Union will probably need a
stronger Commission than it has seen in recent years, and it will need to see larger and
smaller countries working together on strategy.
Whether this happens through the
emergence of a formal or informal core group of countries working together, or through
different leadership groups emerging in different areas, or not at all, is one more open
question.
How Turkey will impact on political dynamics in the Union, depends on which, if any, of
these different scenarios develops. In an EU of changing coalitions and alliances, Turkey
will find different partners just as other member states do. It will share common interests
with many of the ten new member states on budgetary and redistribution issues, and with
others perhaps Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal on agricultural issues. On economic
issues, few in Turkey expect it to be at the strongly liberal end of the spectrum but rather
somewhere in the EU middle ground. If the Union develops different leadership groups
in different areas, then Turkey will probably look especially to play a significant role in
the foreign policy and defense areas but less so in economic areas. Given its equal size
with Germany on accession, Turkey can be expected to aim to establish strong relations
with the other larger countries.
In the current Union, some fear that Turkey as a member state may be rather too similar
to the UK – an awkward partner, defensive of its sovereignty, and strongly leaning to
intergovernmental approaches. Some Turkish commentators suggest that this may be an
apt comparison. But others disagree, considering Turkey will be a more positive and cooperative player and with more in common with some of the EU’s southern members.
Moreover, given the impact of the EU already on political reforms in Turkey, there is less
chance that public opinion will consider the Union as essentially an economic
organisation as in the UK.
Public opinion surveys do show that economic benefits are important motivations for the
Turkish public, but political motives including promoting democracy, reducing
384
corruption, and increasing Turkish power are all present as motivations too. On the other
hand, public opinion also shows a distinct negative response to symbolic issues such as
the EU flag flying alongside the Turkish one210. The most recent Eurobarometer survey211
shows a marked decline in Turkey in the last year in levels of support for the euro (from
56% to 44%) and for a common foreign policy (from 67% to 47%). But it is early days to
assess public opinion in Turkey. There is strong support overall for joining the EU but
few have much knowledge about the real implications of Union membership.
Overall, political impacts are dependent on how the EU of 25 or 27 will develop
politically and how well it will operate in the next decade or more. These are at present
rather open questions. But the next ten years will see the enlarged Union develop and
take decisions on its strategic political and policy direction. If the enlarged Union
develops as a strong coherent political actor with greater public support and participation
than in recent years, then that is the Union Turkey will join and within which it will
develop its own political position. If the Union struggles to function effectively at 25 or
27, and remains more an economic than political player on the global stage, then that is
the Union Turkey will join. Even as a large country, Turkey on its own – just like any
other member state – will not determine the EU’s direction of development. But it will be
an important new player.
Future Prospects: Turkey’s future in the EU will be determined to a great extent by the
answer to the following question: Will the future of the EU be determined by religious
and racial boundaries, or will it be one that reaches out to embrace the diversity and unity
of a much broader geography? The answer will also indicate if the EU can survive in the
light of future challenges that it will face. The future of Turkey in the EU will be
determined largely by the integration of the new member states. The duration and success
of the EU’s ‘digestion period’212 will help to determine the time frame for Turkey’s future
accession to the EU. Thus the eventual acceptance of Turkish membership will be a
political decision, and it will depend not only on progress made by Turkey but also on the
political preferences of the EU member governments at the moment of choice 213. In the
short-term, 2004 and 2005 will be crucial years for Turkey–EU relations since they may
affect strongly how EU–Turkey relations will develop, especially after the European
Council Conclusions in December 2004. Although the opening of negotiations with
Turkey constitutes a preliminary step towards the EU membership in the long term, it will
be a crucial decision, both for Turkey and the EU. If the bid is successful, Turkey will
385
become definitively anchored to the EU. Most likely, this will be followed by positive
political and economic results for Turkey and will lead to a relaxation of the tension
between the EU and Turkey.
In the long-term, the EU’s decision will be more about its own identity and its own future
than the eligibility of Turkey. It will decide whether it will face the challenges of an
emerging new world; whether it is capable of seizing the new economic, historical and
cultural opportunity; whether it can contribute to the embracing of civilizations rather
than ‘clash’ of them214. It is very important for the EU to send signals to Turkey about its
seriousness. Otherwise, the EU option will lose its credibility in Turkey and strengthen a
feeling of betrayal within Turkish society. The content of the decisions will also affect to
a great extent how the issue of the EU will be exploited in domestic politics to garner
votes. A postponement of the date for the start of negotiations may increase the tensions
within the Turkish public who already feel somehow alienated from the EU and who bear
the general feeling that “whatever we accomplish, we will never be allowed to step
inside”.
The Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has recently stated that “If the EU does not give the
expected go-ahead it will not be difficult for Turkey to channel its huge potential in
another direction”. He also added that “a negative response from the EU would both
disappoint the Turkish people who have formed its will towards the European values and
damage the philosophical basis of the Union irreversibly”215. Unless the EU injects some
energy and motivates Turkey by giving a prospective date for the start of negotiations, it
seems that, especially after the enlargement of May 2004, EU–Turkey relations may go
down the drain once again, and unfortunately the Turkish economy is too fragile to carry
the extra pressure that this would generate. If the EU decides to initiate accession
negotiations, even if the eventual membership takes a long time, the decision will lift the
pressure, especially on Turkish public opinion; will erase the current feeling of
deprivation, and eventually will ease relations between the two sides.
On the other hand, the image of the EU in the eyes of Turkey is quite controversial since
although some countries adopted a positive attitude, others adopted a negative attitude
towards the decision regarding Turkey. In other words, the EU member states seemed to
be divided over the issue. While Spain, Great Britain, Belgium, Portugal, Italy,
Luxembourg and Greece have earlier declared their support for a date to be given to
Turkey for the start of the accession negotiations, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden
386
and Ireland generally think that a date can be given only after observing the
implementation of the reforms that Turkey has passed through its Parliament 216. While
France and Germany talk of the year 2005, depending on the Progress Report prepared by
the Commission, Germany, Spain, Italy, Great Britain and Greece think that Turkey
should be given a date by the end of 2004, and according to Belgium this date should be
given as soon as possible. According to the recent declarations, it seems that Austria and
France are the leading countries who oppose Turkey’s membership217, whereas Belgium
and Germany have been sending positive signals regarding this matter.
The decision on whether and when to open accession negotiations on full Turkish
membership in the EU will probably be primarily political, since the measurement of the
progress regarding the Copenhagen Criteria will be very difficult and will remain to the
subjective discretion of the individual member states of the EU. Although the
Copenhagen Criteria are set forth as an important obstacle that will determine the future
of Turkey’s accession, Turkey’s institutional role in the Union’s common foreign and
security policies, its significant military capabilities and its pivotal geographical position
will continue to determine Turkey’s strategic importance for the EU in the post-Cold War
era, due to the former’s role in the EU’s possible military operations and strategic
concerns. Europe requires a stable, modernizing and democratic Turkey to keep radical
Islam away from Europe’s borders218. If this can be supported by the EU membership,
then it will make the EU membership for Turkey more likely. Turkey’s role in the Middle
East-especially regarding Iraq and Israel, its geostrategic weight in Southeast Europe and
the Balkans and finally its role in the Caspian region as an energy corridor for Europe will
help shape the attitude and policies of the EU in the post-2004 enlargement years. The
war on Iraq has revealed the importance of Turkey for the stability of the region once
again and it is one of the arguments of the Turks that there are also plausible reasons for
the EU to view Turkey’s membership positively from a security perspective. 219
Southern European Perspectives on Turkey’s Relations with the EU
The geography of European Union views on Turkey is varied and evolving, but attention
has generally focused on the divide between the United Kingdom and other traditionally
pro enlargement EU countries in Northern Europe and France, Germany and other
continental EU members such as Austria.220 The former group, with the external support
of the United States and most recently of some of the European Union’s new members
387
such as the Czech Republic and Poland, has advocated Turkey’s EU membership on the
grounds that Turkey has been a key strategic ally of the West since the Cold War era and
has become an ever more valuable economic partner of the European Union. These
countries have also often stressed that, as a predominantly Muslim society with secular
institutions and a capitalist system, Turkey represents a model for the larger Muslim
world and can act as a bridge between the West and the East.
On the other side of the spectrum are some of the EU’s original and leading members,
such as France and Germany. Although the position of these countries has often
significantly changed over time (French President Jacques Chirac actually deserves credit
for the breakthrough decision in 2004 to open EU negotiations for Turkish membership),
in recent years French-German resistance has become a major obstacle to Turkey’s EU
ambitions.221 Germany has made no secret of its mixed experience with Turkish
immigrant communities on German soil, which are frequently accused of not having
made a serious effort to integrate fully into German society. 222 (See Appendix-F, p.483)
Berlin has also been highly critical of Ankara’s uneven record of domestic reform and
selective approach to fulfilling some of the legal obligations it has undertaken with the
EU during the accession process.
France, for its part, has unilaterally blocked five of the thirty-five chapters of the EU
negotiations with Turkey––in addition to the eight that have been frozen by the European
Union itself as a result of Turkey’s unfulfilled commitments on Cyprus.223 These include
chapters covering critical subjects such as economic and monetary union. The French
veto is a product of the country’s current leadership, which simply does not want Turkey
to become a full member of the European Union. President Nicolas Sarkozy has openly
questioned whether Turkey belongs to Europe from both a geographical and a cultural
perspective.224 His questions reflect the concerns of the French public, which—like the
larger European public—has grown increasingly Islamophobic in recent years. Recent
polls show that the majority of Europeans now oppose further enlargement of the
European Union, and that Turkey receives particularly low levels of support in France,
and across Europe more broadly, mainly because it is perceived as religiously different.225
Although cultural and religious factors should not be underestimated, it is doubtful that
these fully explain the resistance in Paris and other European capitals to Turkey’s
integration in the European Union. Among experts and diplomatic circles it is well388
known that opposition to Turkey is also tied to concerns that the inclusion of a nation
with a population exceeding seventy million people, a young and rising economy, and a
growing set of geopolitical ambitions of its own, would dramatically alter the EU’s
already complex balances––most probably creating new institutional problems, and
undermining the already imperfect coherence of interests among EU states, as well as
leading to a loss of status for some of the European Union’s original members.
European Public Opinion and Turkey’s European Prospects
Democratic legitimacy and public participation in the functioning and direction of the
integration process within context of the enlargement, is the essential requirement of
convincing the European public of the indispensability and benefits of this process. 226 The
European public opinion on enlargement in general has been indifferent, and towards
Turkey’s accession in particular, has been far from favorable.227
Indeed, the main obstacle to the smooth progress of Turkey’s accession process emanates
from the perceptions of the European public as regards Turkey. The Europeans’ negative
attitudes towards Turkey are often stemming from their view of Turkey’s inability to
conform to the European ideal and practice, and this, in turn, is the direct result of their
divergent identity perceptions. As long as the negative public opinion towards Turkey’s
accession is not replaced with some degree of the desirability of a common future on the
part of the European peoples, Turkey’s becoming a member would prove to be an
insurmountable challenge.
The concerns about increased immigration, unemployment, organized crime and drug
trafficking, redistribution of the funds for the current and acceding members, increased
difficulty in decision making in the enlarged Union and a decrease in living standards
have been cited as the underlying motives for this ambivalent public opinion towards
enlargement.228 For Turkey, in particular, Meltem Muftuler Bac ascertains four factors
that shape European public opinion towards Turkey’s future accession, as the issues of
center of gravity, immigration, fear of increase in xenophobia or racism, and distribution
of funds, and points out to the fact that with the possible exception of xenophobia to a
certain extent- almost all of these concerns apply to all the other new members and
candidates of the EU.229
Turkey’s relative backwardness in economic terms; its population -in terms of its
essential attributes, and its size and potential weight in the decision making structures of
389
the Union; the so-called cultural differences, and the possibility of these differences
triggering xenophobic tendencies in European societies; an unstable neighborhood as a
direct consequence of Turkey’s geopolitics appear to be the fundamental grounds for
concern for the European public opinion. The social and political tendencies of the
domestic public opinion at the Member State level, as well as the general attitudes at the
European level have a significant bearing on the decision for Turkey’s future prospects
concerning its EU membership. In that regard, the considerable divergences amongst the
individual Member States and their public opinion on Turkey’s future membership should
be noted.230 Be that as it may, those differences amongst the Member States in the degree
of support for Turkey’s membership or the divergences in the approach to the assessment
of the country’s contributions to and challenges for the integration process, do not alter
the fact that Turkey’s membership appears to be the least desirable, compared to all the
other candidates.
On the basis of these findings, it has to be pointed out that, at a time when the European
Union is striving for bridging the gap between itself and its citizens, and for more
democracy, participation and legitimacy, such unfavorable public opinion will be a
crucial hindrance for Turkey’s EU membership. Further enlargement, including Turkey’s
accession, without proper debate on its normative, political and pragmatic justifications in
order to convince the European peoples of its necessity and advantages, entails the risk of
tensions emanating from diversity rather than the maximization of its benefits. Moreover
such an outcome has the potential of alienating the European citizens from the integration
process.231 Walker puts forward the crucial question: “Can the fragile legitimacy of the
EU shoulder the burden of further enlargement without proper public debate and social
legitimation?”232 However, more significant queries revolve around the normative
premise and framework of such debate; the proper public discourse that should inform it;
and the best way to secure these prerequisites and the outcomes.
The unfavorable public opinion on Turkey’s membership has already started to influence
the direction of the integration process. In the Member States that conducted referendums
for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, like France, the issue of Turkish
membership has become one of the obstacles in the way of a favorable vote.233 Despite
the fact that the results of the public opinion surveys undertaken in the aftermath of the
French and Dutch referendums demonstrated that opposition to Turkey’s EU membership
played a very insignificant role in the unfavorable vote against the Constitutional Treaty,
390
the reaction of the politicians was far away from reflecting this fact. 234 Even before the
constitutional referendums, in order to appease their public opinions, Austria and France
had already committed themselves for a public vote on Turkish accession, “when the time
comes.”235
The normative legitimacy of a referendum only for Turkey’s accession would be
contentious if it is not generalized on the basis of some normative approach, where each
new accession is subjected to such a procedure and also in the entirety of the Member
States. Such a “European” referendum, rather than national referendums for future
enlargements might have the added value of assisting the emergence of a European public
space. The insistence on subjecting only Turkey’s accession to such procedure, however,
resonates with the perception that the Europeans perceive their own identity as a coming
together on the basis of some thick commonalities premised on common values, whilst
Turkish identity is seen as substantially divergent and hence would justify such
discriminatory behavior. Our discussions within the framework of this paper, however,
indicate only the prospects of the emergence of a European collective identity which is
“thin” in the sense that it is based on shared objectives and their attainment through EU
law, institutions and mechanisms, rather than on a “thick” conception of common values.
The cost of a rejection by popular vote of a candidate country which has fulfilled the
accession criteria, and completed the accession negotiations, even signed an accession
treaty with the Union would be the refusal of the EU values of respect for the supremacy
of law, adherence to legal and political commitments, and fulfillment of legitimate
expectations. This would, in turn, be damaging to the credibility of the EU both inside
and outside. A sufficiently normative EU identity that is worth identifying with cannot be
based on such discriminatory and arbitrary attitudes. The legitimate expectations that
have been raised both within Turkey and in the wider world by the last 40-odd years of
progressive relations between the parties deserve a normative approach. If the Union’s
identity is an open, inclusive, normative identity based on universal ideals and on
practical necessities in order to provide legitimacy to its democratic governance and
constitutionalism, and if popular or social legitimacy cannot be the only basis for
European legitimacy, this must also hold true for the rejection of Turkey’s accession into
the European Union. The Union’s decision on Turkey cannot solely be based on favorable
public opinion, but should be premised both on normative and pragmatist justifications.
391
Moreover, in the eventuality of a referendum on the issue, its timing, procedure and
mechanism should be considered and designed with utmost care.
Changes over the period
In the past half century both Turkey and the EU have changed dramatically. In 1963
Turkey was reeling from the consequences of its first military coup and the execution of
its first democratically elected prime minister, Adnan Menderes. It was an
overwhelmingly rural and very poor country. The majority of Turks, and the large
majority of Turkish women, was illiterate. In 1963 the European Economic Community
had six members. France was emerging from a long colonial war in Algeria and a coup
attempt in 1961. Germany was divided, the Berlin Wall just two years old. Spain and
Portugal were ruled by dictators, while Central and Eastern Europe was in the hand of
communist regimes.
In the past half century fascist, communist and military regimes have collapsed across
Europe. The EU has grown from six members with a population of some 170 million to
28 members with half a billion people. The average life expectancy in Turkey rose from
48 years in 1963 to 74 years today. The core idea of the Ankara Agreement, that
increased interaction leads to prosperity and benefits both sides, is as valid now as ever.
However, when it comes to people to people contact we find huge, untapped potential to
take the EU-Turkey association to a different level.
The EU (also) speaks Turkish at the same time there is another issue where EU and in
particular the Republic of Cyprus might take a step forward: progress towards making
Turkish an official EU language. EU regulations are clear: any official language of an EU
member state can also be an official EU language. Three countries have indicated to the
EU that they have more than one official language: Finland (Swedish and Finnish),
Belgium (French, Dutch and German) and Ireland (English and Irish). According to
Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish are even now
the country’s two official languages.
In early 2004 it was already widely expected that Turkish would soon be added to the list
of EU official languages. Cypriot passports contain text in Greek as well as Turkish and
English. The Cypriot EU Presidency website had a Turkish version. All it takes is for
392
Cyprus to put its second official language forward to the EU institutions. This would be
one of the most visible and concrete ways to make Turks feel part of the common Europe.
Turkey and Europe: the way ahead
12th September 2013 marks the 50th anniversary of the Ankara Agreement, signed in
1963 in Ankara, hence its name. The agreement established an association between
Turkey and the then European Economic Community (EEC) signaling the start of a longstanding close relationship. The Ankara Agreement provided the basis for deepening the
economic, political and institutional relations between Turkey and the Community. It was
part of a broader political project in which Turkey was offered the prospect of full
accession, as clearly stated in its Article 28[1] of the Agreement. 236
Fifty years ago, no one could have ever imagined that this journey would last so long.
Turkey has become the longest standing applicant to the European Union. Turkey’s bid
for EU membership has gone through many ups and downs. 2013 was a year in which
renewed momentum was expected to be injected into the accession negotiations, as some
positive developments were underway. However, the outbreak of massive antigovernment protests across Turkey last June, which seem far from having ended, and
particularly the way in which the AKP has handled those protests have greatly polarized
the Turkish society fueling distrust on the EU side whether Turkey is still committed to
make reforms in line with EU standards.
Accession talks have been put on hold since then. Despite major reservations from
Germany, the opening of chapter 22 on regional policy -blocked until very recently by
France- was finally opened as planned but talks were postponed until the release of the
Commission’s progress report in mid-October, which is not expected to appear
condescending with the internal political affairs in Turkey. It seems unlikely to see any
move in EU-Turkey relations until the results of the German elections, to be held on the
22nd of September, and the EU institutions evaluate Turkey’s current situation.
The Turkish government on the other hand seems more preoccupied with the crisis
situation in neighboring Syria while preparing the ground for the upcoming local and
presidential elections to take place in March and September 2014 respectively. 2014 will
also be crucial for the EU, as European elections are expected to take place between 2225 May. The direction that the EU will take in the coming years will be decisive for
Turkey’s place in Europe. Regardless of Europe’s fate, Turkey has to show its real
393
commitment to reform proving that EU membership remains its long-term national goal
and revive the reform spirit of the early years of the AKP government making sure
Turkey doesn’t wait for fifty more years.237
To sum up, it seems quite probable that Turkey will continue its European orientation in
the foreseeable future no matter what kind of response it gets from the EU. The
realization of the ‘yes’ scenarios will most probably depend on the strategic importance
of Turkey for the EU. In any case, the even though the accession negotiations start in the
short-term, their completion and the eventual accession to Turkey to the EU will probably
not take place in 10–20 years. If Turkey becomes a member at the end, it will definitely
be facing a quite different Europe than it is today. Europe, in the meanwhile, will have at
least 27 members with varying support for Turkey’s integration into the EU. Turkey will
be one of the countries, which will have the highest number of seats in the European
Parliament and the European Council due to its high population and will most likely
influence the decision-making process in the EU. On the other hand, it is also possible
that due to the obstacles mentioned earlier, a future decision for Turkish accession will
stay in a limbo. Although the EU may decide to give a date for the start of the accession
negotiations, it will not be able to reach a consensus among the member states regarding
full membership of Turkey to the EU.
In this case, although the official Turkish position will most probably continue its
European orientation, the relations between Turkey and the EU will go through serious
crisis due to eroding confidence of the Turks in the EU. The most important political
implication of this scenario might be Turkey’s more introverted and nationalistic stance
or a probable rise in the votes of the Islamic parties with a strong anti-European and antiWestern rhetoric and practice. The economic implications of such a scenario may suggest
a serious economic crisis due to the outflow of foreign capital from Turkey on whose
economy is highly dependent. This will lead to further isolation of Turkey and a
subsequent social and economic instability in the country. No matter which scenario may
come true, it is important to note that the 45-year old Turkey–EU relations have come to
an important turning point. The future course of events will be determined by the
developments that will take place within the EU; by the degree to which Turkey will be
able to meet the EU’s demands; and by the international context that will frame the future
of Turkey in the EU. The history of Europe is the history not only of its unifying ideas,
but also of its divisions and frontiers, both internal and external. 238 As an inverted
394
identity, the idea of Europe was constructed in a historical process First step was making
a European identity. In the words of Delanty:
Identification takes place through the imposition of otherness in the
formation of a binary typology of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The purity and stability
of the ‘we’ is guaranteed first in the naming, then in the denomination
and, finally, in the cleansing of otherness.239
As will be seen, after the ‘barbarian’ and Arab-Islam Empire attacks, the Turks played a
vital role as ‘others’ in the making of the European identity. The Turks were perceived as
Barbarians for a long time. Thus although have been in the European continent and their
states have been empirically European states, for the other Europeans they were not ‘true
Europeans’. During the 19th and 20th centuries the world has been considerably
transformed. While the Turks accepted the European values as a way of life, the other
European countries recognized liberal democracy as the symbols of being civilized and
modern. After the Second World War the majority of the free world identified itself with
the universal values, such as pluralism, democracy and liberalism, but not the religious or
regional values. Thus, for the past 50 years, Turkey participated in the activities of
practically all-international bodies involved in European integration like the EU, NATO,
the council of Europe, OECD etc. When the Cold War ended Turkey was the European
Union’s (EU) longest standing associate and had the oldest and most standing formal
relationship that the EU had with any third country. During the Cold War years the
historical role of the Turks in the making of the European identity had played almost no
role. However, with the end of the Cold War the concepts of the world politics changed
dramatically. Some Western academicians, like Huntington, claimed that the cultural and
religious differences would be latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern
world.240 In this framework, it was predicted that Turkey would inevitably excluded from
the European political-cultural system. Since the end of the Cold War Turkey’s almost all
demand, except the Customs Union, have been rejected by the EU. The representatives of
the Union implied that Turkey would never be a full- member while some of the leaders
of the EU members declared that Turkey candidature for full membership was
unacceptable because Turkey was not part of the European civilization.241 After the 11
September Attacks Turkey’s cultural and geo-political position became important again
for Europe and the EU adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards Turkey.
395
Turkey EU relations is unique as has been seen, this relations cannot be seen simply as
economic or political relations. The cultural factors in the relations have proved that
Turkey has not been an ordinary applicant for the EU but an element that revealed Europe
and EU’s identity crises. Now, beyond Turkey’s Europanness the EU has to decide what
made Europe European and what the European values are, whether the religious, historic,
cultural prejudices or the universal values such as pluralism, human rights, modernity and
democracy. The answers of these questions are very important not only for Turkey but
also for the others Muslim Europeans, like Bosnians, Albanians, Kosovo and the other
millions living in France, Germany etc. Obviously, it would not be a very easy to
overcome the stereotypes and the historical biases. Therefore the EU must be a platform
for the Muslim and Christian Europeans, not a barrier.
396
Notes & References:
1.
Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms (London: The Royal Institute of International
Affairs and Pinter Publishers, 1991, pp.136-160;
Graham Fuller, ‘Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities’, The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 151-164;
Stephen Larrabee, ‘Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol.
86, No. 4, July/August, 2007, pp.103-4;
Bozdaglioglu’s Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist
Approach, New York: Routledge, 2003, makes this argument in some depth.
2.
Philip Robins, op. cit., p. 138-139; Graham Fuller, op. cit., p. 59.
3.
Soner Cagaptay, ‘Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey: New Elections,
Troubling Trends, vii,’ Washington Institute Policy Focus, No. 67, April, 2007.
4.
Nicholas Danforth is the editor of the Turkey page at the Project on Middle East
Democracy, Washington, DC, commented in his article ‘Ideology and pragmatism
in Turkish Foreign Policy: from Ataturk to the AKP’
5.
See William Walters, ‘The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic
Perspective’, Geopolitics, 9:3, 2004, pp. 674-698.
6.
Jan Zielonka, ‘Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union’,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
7.
Bretheron, Charlotte, and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor,
New York: Routledge, 2nd edition, 2006 p.141
8.
S. Desai, ’Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective Risk or
Opportunity?’, Defence Studies, Volume 5, Issue 3, 2005 p. 371
9.
Charlotte Bretheron and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor,
Routledge, 2006 p. 141
10.
Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 2004.
11.
Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer Weals, The Other In European Self Definition,
Nupi Paper, No. 445, May 1991, p. 20
12.
Norman Davies, Europe: A History, London, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.7
13.
Denys Hay, Europe: the Emergence of an Idea, Edinburg, Edinburg University
Press, 2nd edition, 1968, p.1
397
14.
Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe, London, Macmillan, 1995, p.7
15.
Gerard Delanty, Ibid., p. 7
16.
Pim den Boer, The History of the Idea of Europe, Peter Bugge, Ole Waver and
Kevin Wilson, 1995, p.13
17.
David Gress, Plato to Nato: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents, New York,
The Free Press, 1998, He claims that turning the Greeks into the Westerns is to
misunderstand both the Greek and the West.
18.
Gerard Delanty, op. cite., p. 7
19.
Ibid.,
20.
Geoffrey Parker (ed.) The Times Atlas of World History, London, BAC, 1994
21.
Gerard Delanty, op. cit., p. 24
22.
23.
Robert Bartlett, The Making of Europe, Conquest Colonization and Cultural
Change 950-1350, London, penguin Books, 1993, p.254
24.
Bartlett, op. cit., p. 253
25.
Ilhan Tekely and Selim Ilkin, Turkey and the European Community-1, Ankara,
1993, p. 37
26.
Mckay, Hill and Buckler, A History of Western Society, Boston, Houghton
Miffilin Company, 1987, p. 225
27.
Quted by Robert Bertlett, p. 254
28.
Brandon H. Beck, From the Rising of Son: English Images of the Ottoman Empire
to 1715, American University Studies: Series 9, Peter lang publishing, 1987, p.24
29.
Quted by Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, Dissolving Images, London,
Penguin Books, 1995, p. 234
30.
Andrew Wheatcroft, op. cit., p. 231
31.
Robert Schwoebel, The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the
Turk, 1453-1517, Nieuwkoop B. de Graaf, 1967, p. 217
32.
Maurice Keen, Medieval Europe, London, Penguin Books 1991, p. 321
33.
Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, London, Thames and Hudson, 1968,
p. 147
398
34.
Gerard Delanty, op. cit, p. 30
35.
Margaret Aston, The Fifteen Century,: The Prospect of Europe, London, Thames
and Hudson, 1968, p. 10
36.
Mckay, Hill and Buckler, A History of Western Society, Boston, Houghton
Miffilin Company, 1987, p. 466
37.
Neumann and Welsh, op. cit., p. 14
38.
Vienna was siege two times by the Ottomans. The first attempt was in 1529, led
by Suleiman the Magnificent, to capture the city of Vienna, Austria. Second siege
of Vienna was 100 years later in 1683, had been besieged by the Ottoman
Empire for two months. The Battle of Vienna took place on 11 and 12 September,
of that year, where Ottomans were defeated.
39.
40.
Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, Edinburgh, 1957, p. 68
41.
42.
Quted by Hay, p. 123
43.
Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, London, Thames
and Hudson, 1968, p. 149
44.
45.
Paul Coles, op. cit.,
46.
F. Braudel, A History of Civilization, London, Penguin Books, 1993, pp. 333-334
47.
Coles, op. cit., p. 148
48.
Neumann and Welsh, op. cit.,p. 22
49.
Wheatcraft, op. cit., p. 239
50.
51.
Brand H. Beck, From the Rising of the Son, English Images of the Ottoman
Empire to 1715, New York, Peter Lang Publishing, 1987, p. 19
52.
Brand H. Beck, op. cit., p. 21
53.
Brand H. Beck, op. cit., p. 29
399
54.
Suheyla Artemel, ‘The Great Turk’s Particular Inclination to Red Herring: The
Popular Image of the Turk During the Renaissance in England’, Journal of
Mediterranean Studies, Vol. 5, No. 5, 1995, pp. 188-208
55.
Brand H. Beck, op. cit., p.21
56.
Bulent Gokay, ‘From Western Perceptions to Turkish Self- Perception’, Journal
of Mediterranean Studies, 1995, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp-159-169, p. 261
57.
Ahmet Agaoglu, Uc Medeniyet (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1972), 13.
58.
Quoted in Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and
Teachings of Ziya Gokalp, London: Luzac, 1950, p. 79
59.
Nilufer Gole, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 57–82.
60.
Meltem Ahiska, ‘Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern,’ South
Atlantic Quarterly 102 (2003): 354.
61
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto ,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961
62.
Gole, op. cit., p.13.
63.
Political Islam is a highly contested term that is often employed in the public and
academic discourse uncritically. In the Turkish context, Islamism is a label that is
often used to refer to those who express both their religiosity and interest in
politics. For an incisive discussion of this term, see Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Political
Islam: Image and Reality,’ World Policy Journal 21, no. 3 (2004). Also see his
Many Faces of Political Islam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
forthcoming 2008).
64.
For an elaboration on the role of historical memory on Kemalist opposition to the
EU, see Hasan Kosebalaban, ‘Turkey’s EU Membership: A Clash of Security
Cultures,’ Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002); Ihsan Dagi, ‘Pro-Western
Kemalists: A Western Illusion,’ Today’s Zaman, 15 March 2007. For an opposite
view that suggests the political establishment in Turkey, including the military,
remains the force behind EU membership aspirations, see Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali
Ozcan, and Dogan Akyaz, ‘The Turkish Military’s March toward Europe,’
Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006). Ozcan, who is a retired major from the Turkish
armed forces and a prolific writer on strategic studies, himself suggested to the
author that the membership process is destabilizing Turkey’s efforts to maintain
its territorial integrity.
65.
Reprinted in Turhan Selcuk, ‘Karikaturun Notu,’ Cumhuriyet, 25 April 2006.
400
66.
In pre-Islamic Turkish nationalist discourse, a pig was a symbol of settled and
urban China, the other of pre-Islamic Central Asian Turks. Turks despised pigs,
as, unlike lamb, they were not suitable for their nomadic life-style. See Emre
Akoz, ‘Turhan Selcukun Niyeti Ne?’ Sabah, 24 April 2006.
67.
Cumhuriyet, 19 April 2006. For a discussion of the image of the United States as
expressed through cartoon in the Turkish media, see Ayseli Usluata, ‘U.S. Image
Reflected through Cartoons in Turkish Newspapers,’ in Images of the U.S. around
the World: A Multicultural Perspective, ed. Yahya R. Kamalipour, Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1999.
68.
Tanil Bora, ‘Nationalist Discourses in Turkey,’ South Atlantic Quarterly, Issue
102, 2003, p. 443
69.
‘RP’den AKP’ye Kabul Degistiren Turkiye,’ Radikal, 13–15 June 2006.
70.
Gareth Jenkins, Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics,
Oxford University Press, 2001.
71.
Yasar Buyukanit, ‘Kuresellesme ve Uluslararasi Guvenlik’ (‘Globalization and
International Security’) (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etut
Baskanligi Yayinlari, 2003), quoted in M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan,
‘The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party,’ Middle
East Journal 13, no. 1 (2006): 112.
72.
While Islam is often regarded as the other of European identity, the influence of
European exchanges with Muslims on European civilization itself is often
neglected in the present civilizational discourse in Europe. For a classical study on
the Turkish influence on French intellectual and cultural legacy, see Clarence D.
Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature: 1520–1660, New
York, AMS Press, 1973
73.
Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1st ed. New York, Pantheon Books, 1978.
74.
Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Other in European Self-Definition:
A Critical Addendum to the Literature on International Society,’ Review of
International Studies 17, no. 4, 1991, p. 329
75.
Ibid, p. 330
76.
Talal Asad, ‘Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?’ in
The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 213.
77.
Pope Urban II informed his audience that ‘nay, base and bastard Turks hold sway
over our brothers’ in his historic call for the First Crusade in 1095 in Clermont,
France. This is according to the version of Baldric of Dol. See August Charles
401
Krey, The First Crusade, the Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1921), 33–6. For a comparison of
different account of this speech, see Dana Carleton Munro, ‘The Speech of Pope
Urban II at Clermont, 1095,’ American Historical Review 11, no. 2 (1906).
78.
Halil Inalcik, ‘Turkiye ve Avrupa: Dun ve Bugun,’ Dogu Bati 1, no. 2 (1998): 13.
79.
Tomaz Mastnak, Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and Western
Political Order, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002, p. 346.
80.
Roger Ballard, ‘Islam and the Construction of Europe,’ in Muslims in the Margin:
Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, ed. W. A. R.
Shadid and P. Sj van Koningsveld (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1996), 26–
7.
81.
See end not no. 96, Chapter II of this thesis
82.
Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 55.
83.
Quoted in Ibid, 57.
84.
Viviente Valt, ‘Life on the Front Lines,’ Time (Europe), 28 February 2005,
www.time.com/time/europe/html/050228/story.html
85.
‘Merkel: Demokratie ohne christliche Werte undenkbar,’ Rhein-Zeitung, 11 June
2005
86.
The Association Council was set up by the Agreement in order to take decisions
on developing the relationship and settle disputes.
87.
Official Journal, European Communites, Current through, 2006, L 293,
29/12/1972 p. 4, OJ 1972, L 293. http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup07/
basicmats/ec_turkey1.pdf
88.
The EC immediately dropped all tariffs and quotas on Turkish industrial goods,
with a couple of exceptions, and granted Turkey a long list of agricultural
concessions.
89.
Official Journal, op. cit., OJ 1996, L 35.
90.
‘The effective functioning of democracy is a primordial question in assessing the
application of a country for membership of the Union.’ e, e.g., European
Commission, Agenda 2000, For a stronger and wider Union in E.U. Bulletin, no.
12.97, 56 (Supplement 5/97), also in <http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/
off/bull/en/9712/i2001.htm#anchOO48> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
402
91.
E.U. Bulletin., Ibid, Tracking the language of the Copenhagen Summit, see
Conclusions of the Presidency (Copenhagen European Council, June 1993), E.U.
Bulletin, June 1993, pp. 1-13.
92.
Birol Yesilada, The Mediterranean Challenge, in The Expanding European Union
178 (Redmond and Rosenthal eds. 1998); Regular Report On Turkey’s Progress,
Directorate General 1, European Commission, Regular Report From The
Commission On Progress Towards Accession, (Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enlargement/turkey/rep_11_98/blO.htm> at 5. On
April 14, 1987, Turkey presented its application for membership of the
Community.
93.
See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty],
as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741
[hereinafter SEA]). The Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) was amended by the
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J.
C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These amendments were
incorporated into the TEU, and the articles of the TEU were renumbered in the
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 340/2 (1997), 37
I.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consoli- dated TEU], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on Amsterdam.
94.
Decision No: 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995,
Official Journal of the European Communities, Turkey, February 13, 1996.
95.
Decision No: 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of December 22, 1995,
Financial Protocols. In: Official Journal of the European Communities, Turkey,
and 13.2.1996.
96.
The Irish Times on the Web, December 15, 1997.
97.
See for more detailed information about the summit meeting: Luxembourg
European Council, December 12 and 13, 1997, Presidency Conclusions, and
Luxembourg December 14, 1997.
98.
International Herald Tribune, December 15, 1997. http://www.iht.com/articles/
1997/12/15/turkey.t_0.php. ‘Turkey cuts off dialogue with EU and says it will
integrate north Cyprus’ The Irish Times, December 12, 1997.
99.
Statement of the Turkish Government (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.
byegm.gov.tr/Turkey and Europe/govstatementl4dec.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal)
403
100.
Ibid..
101.
Mesut Yilamz, Ambivalent Turk, Economist, March, 14, 1998, p. 60.
102.
Ibid..
103.
David Barchard, Turkey and the West, 1 (1985) (‘Turkey is the first Middle
Eastern and Islamic country to achieve industrialization within the framework of
the nation-state.’), p. 11.
104.
Giorgio Maganza, The Treaty of Amsterdam’s Changes to the Common Foreign
and Security Policy Chapter and an Overview of the Opening of the Enlargement
Process, 22, Fordham International Law Journal, 1999, p.186
105.
Michael Emerson, Redrawing The Map of Europe, 1998, P. 72
106.
‘The New European Strategy for Turkey,’ EU Commission, Brussels, March 1998.
107.
See The General Affairs Council Report on February 21-22, 1999, in: ‘1999
Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress toward Accession’,
13.10.1999 Brussels: pp.5-7.
108.
1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards
Accession,’ Brussels, p. 7
109.
Former President of the U.S.A. Bill Clinton, speech delivered in the Turkish
Parliament in November 1999: ‘…there are still those who see Europe in narrower
terms. Europe might stop at this mountain range or that body of water or, worse,
where people stopped to worship God in a different way…our vision of Europe is
that it is undivided, democratic and at peace for the first time in all of history. It
will never be complete unless and until it embraces Turkey. The United States is
not a member of the Union, but I have consistently urged European integration to
move further and faster--and to include Turkey…’
110.
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999
111.
Here are the reactions of some European politicians; see BBC News, October 4,
2005. Jose Manuel Barroso, head of the European Commission, said: ‘Today is
also a new beginning for Europe and for Turkey... This is not the end of the
process. This is the beginning.’ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair said ‘the deal
showed there was no fundamental clash of civilisations between Christians and
Muslims. On the contrary, if [Turkey] fulfills the same principles of human rights,
then Muslim and Christian can work together.’ The U.S. welcomed the
breakthrough. Secretary of State Colin Powell said: ‘A Turkey that is firmly
anchored in Europe and sharing European values will be a positive force for
prosperity and democracy.’ However, French President Jacques Chirac stressed
that Turkey’s membership in the EU was still not guaranteed, and promised the
404
issue would eventually be put to a referendum in France. Austrian Chancellor
Wolfgang Schussel, who has argued against letting Turkey into the EU, said his
country would also hold a referendum. Under the agreement, Turkey must issue a
written statement promising to sign an accord extending its customs union to the
ten new EU members, including Cyprus.
112.
Riccardo Serri,’EU Enlargement and Turkey’s Accession’ (presented by Serri as
Power Point at European Commission. D.G Enlargement, Brussels, April 19,
2006).
113.
Karl Theodor Gutenberg, ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen der Turkei und der EUeine Privilegierte Partnerschaft,’ Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Aktuelle Analysen 33
(2004). Wolfgang Schauble and David L. Phillips, ‘Talking Turkey, ‘Foreign
Affairs, 83, 6 (November/December (2004).
114.
See Siegfried Schultz and Ulrich Brasche, ‘The EU’s Absorptive Capacity: Key
Aspects and Questions,’ Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen, Analysen, Positionen, Essay,
March 2007, pp. 6-19.
115.
Roy Watson, ‘Ultimatum may end Turkey EU Hope,’ Times on Line, November
9, 2006.
116.
See Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller, eds., Der Armenische
Völkermord und die Shoa (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2002).
117.
Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, 10/11 December 1999.
118.
Op. cit., 21/22 June 1993.
119.
See the Commission Communication ‘European strategy for Turkey, COM (98)
124 final.
120.
Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, 12/13 December
2002.
121.
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr
122.
Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 12–13 December 2002.
123.
Ibid.
124.
For details see. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford
University Press, 3rd edition, 2001.
125.
Hasan Bulent Kahraman, ‘The cultural and historical foundation of Turkish
citizenship: modernity as Westernization’, in: E. Fuat Keyman and A. Icduygu
(eds.), Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish
Experiences. London: Routledge, 2005.
405
126.
28 members are: 1.Austria, 2.Belgium, 3.Bulgaria, 4. Croatia, 5.Cyprus, 6.Czech
Republic, 7.Denmark, 8. Estonia, 9. Finland, 10.France, 11.Germany, 12.Greece,
13.Hungary, 14.Ireland, 15.Italy, 16.Latvia, 17.Lithonia, 18.Luxemburg, 19.Malta,
20.Nether lands, 21.Poland, 22.Portugal, 23.Romania, 24.Slovakia, 25.Slovenia,
26.Spain, 27.Sweden, 28.UK
127.
The Schengen Agreement led to the creation of Europe’s border less Schengen
Area in 1995. The treaty was signed on 14 June 1985 between five of the then ten
member states of the European Economic Community near the town
of Schengen in Luxembourg.
128. AndrewMoravcsik, and Milada Anna Vachudova, ’National Interests, State Power,
and EU Enlargement.’ p. 44
129.
This point is discussed within: Baldwin, Richard E., Joseph F. Francois,
Richard Portes, Dani Rodrik, and Istvan P. Szekely. ’The Costs and Benefits of
Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe’
130.
European Commission, Question and Answers about the Fifth Enlargement
131.
Jung, Stephanie, and Stanislav Kubaeck, ’Economic Aspects of Turkey’s
Accession to the EU: How Turkey’s Membership is Challenging the EU’, p.178
132.
European Commission, ’EU Budget 2007.’
133.
Commission of the European Communities, ’Recommendation of the European
Commision Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.’
134.
European Commission, ’EU Budget 2007’
135.
Ibid.
136. Jung, Stephanieand Stanislav Kubaeck. ’Economic Aspects of Turkey’s Accession to
the EU: How Turkey’s Membership is Challenging the EU.’ p. 182
137.
Ibid., p. 183
138.
Ibid.
139.
Deutsche Bank Research, ’Turkey 2020: On Course for Convergence’
140.
Ibid.
141.
Ibid.
142.
Bretheron, Charlotte, The European Union as a Global Actor, p.198
406
143.
Kem
Kirisci,
‘Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration,’
Mediterranian Politics, Vol-12, No.1, (March 2007), p.77
144.
Mitselegas, Valsamis, Jorg Monar, and Wyn Rees, The European Union and
Internal Security:Guardian of the People? p. 6
145.
Thailand, Laos and Myanmar
146.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran
147.
John Roper, “The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests”,
International Spectator (Rome), vol. 34, 1999, p. 92.
148.
Ibid.
149.
John Roper, op. cit.,
150.
Ibid.
151.
Ibid.
152.
Everts, Steven, ’The Ultimate Test: Can Europe and America Forge a Joint
Strategy for the Wider Middle East,’ p.671
153.
Roland Dannreuther, European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a
Neighbourhood Strategy, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 162
154.
OIC ‘Organization of Islamic Conference’ now renamed as ‘Organization of
Islamic Cooperation.’ See End notes 113, Chapter III of this thesis.
155.
Jose I. Torreblanca, Europe’s Reasons and Accession, ARI
(Translation from Spanish) Fecha 7/2/2005 , p. 6,
realinstitutoelcano.org)
156.
A prominent sociologist at Istanbul’s Sehir University, Turkey
157.
http://www.dw.de/turkish-democrats-demand-eu-entry/a-16915880
158.
Olli Ilmari Rehn, is a Finnish politician, currently serving as European
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro and vice
president of the European Commission. He had previously served as
Commissioner for Enlargement.
159.
Olli I. Rhen, ‘EU and Turkey: Ahead of Historic Accession, SPEECH/98/534.’
160.
According to Eurobarometer public opinion surveys conducted by the European
Commission, public support among Turkish citizens for EU membership was 71
407
Nº
(see:
199/2004
http://www.
percent in 2004, highest among the candidate countries of the time. That figure
dropped to 49 percent in 2008, 42 percent in 2010 and 36 percent in 2012,(see,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/07/201375144547728327.html)
161.
Eurobarometer, ’Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement’,
http://ec.europa. eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf
162.
The Times, ’European Union divided as Turks clamour to join.’
163.
Trend News Agency,
‘Turkey should be EU partner, not member: French president.’
164.
Boland, Vincent, ’Merkel softens stance on Turkish bid to join EU.’
165.
The Guardian, 4/06/04
166.
The PKK successor group, Kongra-Gel, declared in May an end to its 5 year
cease-fire. Observers are unsure how serious this threat is given splits within the
organization, but PKK camps remain in northern Iraq – BBC 29/05/04
www.bbc.co.uk
167.
The word Nagorno- is a Russian attributive adjective, derived from the adjective
nagorny , which means ‘highland’. he name Karabakh is made of two words,
‘kara’ and ‘bagh’ (or ‘bakh’) which originate, respectively, from Turkic and
Persian, and literally means ‘black garden’
168.
see, for example, T. Ziyadov and E. Suleymanov (2003) ‘Turkey and the
Caucasus at the edge of EU and NATO enlargement’ Turkish Policy Quarterly
169.
D. Jung with W. Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads – Ottoman Legacies and a
Greater Middle East, Zed Books, 2001.
170.
For a discussion of current EU-Turkey cooperation on these issues, see K. Kirisici
(2003) ‘Harmonising Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU’ in
‘Turkey and the EU: from association to accession’ Record of the High-level
Roundtable Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands
171. See dossier on EU-Turkey relations, Euractiv website, http://www.euractiv.com/
Article?tcmuri=tcm:29129678-16&type=LinksDossier
172.
See H. Kramer, Whither Turkey’s EU Accession? Perspectives and Problems
After December 2004, Paper presented at the AICGS Conference, 20 September
2004, Berlin.
173.
Ibid., p.13
174.
Ali Tekin, Future of Turkey–EU relations: A Civilizational Discourse, Futures
408
175.
R.H. Ginsberg, The impact of enlargement on the role of the European Union in
the world in: J. Redmond, G.G. Rosenthal (Eds.), The Expanding European
Union. Past, Present, Future, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1998, p. 212
176.
S.E. Kahraman, ‘Rethinking Turkey–European union relations in the light of
enlargement’ in, Turkish Studies, Vol-1, Issue 1 , 2000, p. 6
177.
S.E. Kahraman, Ibid..
178.
The Guardian, 9 November 2002
179.
See http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1432A961819,00.html, 3.9.2003
180.
F. O zbilgen, Cyprus: Turkey’s Key to the EU, BIA News Center, 12 December
2003 reproduced in http:// www.bianet.org/2004/03/01_eng/news27402.htm
181.
Thomas Diez (Ed.), The EU and the Cyprus Conflict:Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union, Manchester University Press, Manchester/New York, 2002, pp.
139–162
182.
Turkish Daily News, 24 April 2004
183.
184.
Ibid..
185.
Y. Kanli, What now on Cyprus? Turkish Daily News, 26.4.2004
186.
187.
Op. cit., 28 April 2004
188.
N. Tocci, Turkey’s strategic future, Paper presented at the CEPS/IISS European
Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May 2003, reproduced at http://www.iiss.org/eusec/
tocci.htm,p.5
189.
Peter Coffey, The future of Europe, Edward Elgar Publishing House, Aldershot,
1995, pp. 162–163
190.
V. Symes, C. Levy, J. Littlewood, The Future of Europe: Problems and Issues for
the Twenty-First Century, Macmillan Press, London, 1997 p. xvii
191.
J. Zielonka, How new enlarged borders will reshape the European union, Journal
of Common Market Studies, 39 (3) (2001), p. 50
192.
J. Zielonka, op. cit., p. 52.
193.
Anthony Pagden, (ed.), The Idea of Europe, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2007, pp. 145-170
409
194.
The Reconquista (‘re-conquest’) is a period of approximately 781 years to the
Christian Europe, in the history of the Iberian Peninsula. It was from the
first Muslim conquest of Spain in 711 AD to the fall of Granada, in 1492 AD, end
of Muslim rule in Spain.
195.
Anthony Pagden, op. cit.
196.
European Comission, 2010, Accession Criteria http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm Accessed 25 April
2010
197. Telegraph.co.uk, 2007, A history of Turkish Coups http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/1550156/A-history-of-Turkeys-coups.,Accessed 25 April, 2010
198.
Eric Rouleau, Turkey’s Dream of Democracy, Foreign Affairs, 79(6), 2000, p.
104
199.
Eric Rouleau, op. cit., 107
200.
Eric Rouleau, op. cit., pp. 107-108
201.
European Commission 2010, op. cit.,
202.
Teitelbaum, Michael S. with Phillip L. Martin, 2003, ‘Is Turkey Ready for
Europe?’ Foreign Affairs, 82(3), 2003, p.102
203.
Teitelbaum and Martin, Ibid., p. 103
204.
Angel M. Rabasa & others, The Muslim World after 9/11, RAND Corporation,
2004, pp.436-437
205.
Ibid.
206.
CIA-The World Fact book, 2010, Turkey, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html, Accessed 25 April 2010
207.
Eric Rouleau, Ibid., p. 108
208.
Silverstein, Brian. ‘Islam and Modernity in Turkey: Power, Tradition, and
Historicity in the Provinces of the Muslim World’, Anthropological Quarterly,
76(3): 2003, pp. 506-507
209.
Kirsty Hughes, Turkey And The European Union: Just Another Enlargement?,
working paper on the occasion of European Policy Summit, 17 June 2004.
210.
Dr. Hakan Yilmaz, ‘Euroskepticism in Turkey’ Booazici University
211.
Eurobarometer 2004,1 Public Opinion in the acceding and candidate countries
Spring 2004 First Results
410
212.
C. Baydarol, Genislemenin Avrupa Birlgiine Getirdigi Sorunlar in Turkiye
Avrupa Birligii liskilerinde Gelismeler ve Gelecek (The Developments and
Future regarding Turkey–European Union Relations), Anadolu Universitesi
Yayinlari, Eskisehir, 2001 p. 60
213.
F. O zbilgen, Cyprus: Turkey’s Key to the EU BIA News Center 12 December
2003 reproduced in http://www.bianet.org/2004/03/01_eng/news27402.htm.
214.
The ‘clash’ is borrowed from Samuel Huntington’s famous work, The clash of
civilizations, This point was also dealt by Ali Tekin, Future of Turkey–EU
relations: a civilizational discourse, Futures.
215.
Turkish Daily News, 5 May 2004
216.
Radikal (Istanbul daily), December 7, 2002
217.
On 7 April 2004, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier told French National
Assembly that France would oppose Turkey’s entry into the European Union
under current circumstances. The Austrian Social Democrat Part leader Alfred
Gusenbauer lso stated on 11 May 2004 that Turkey odes not possess the maturity
to become a member of the EU nor the EU have the maturity to accept Turkey. He
said that accepting Turkey as a member country would be irresponsible without
first achieving complete integration of all 25 members within the EU.
218
W. Park, ‘Turkey’s European Union candidacy: from Luxembourg to Helsinki-to
Ankara?’, Mediterranean Politics, 5 (3) (2000), p. 46
219
H.T. Oguzlu, ‘How to Interpret Turkey’s Accession Process with the European
Union? A Clash of Discourses’, Perceptions, (December 2002–February 2003),
pp. 51–83
220.
For a comprehensive analysis of European debates on Turkey, see Nathalie Tocci
(ed.), Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication
Strategy, IAI Quaderni English Series No. 13. December 2008,<http://www.iai.it/
sections/ pubblicazioni/iai_quaderni/Indici/quaderno_E_13.htm
221.
See, Barbara Lippert, ‘Wait-and-See Attitudes of German Stakeholders towards
Turkey-EU Relations,’ in Nathalie Tocci, Ibid.em, 136-160. On the French
position, see the recent article by Nicolas Monceau, ‘French Perceptions,’ in Sait
Aksit, Ozgehan Senyuva, Cigdem Ustun (eds.), Turkey Watch. EU member States’
Perceptions on Turkey’s Accession to the EU, Ankara, CES-METU, April 2010,
16-31, <http://sinan.ces.metu.edu.tr/ dosya/turkey_watch_en.pdf
222.
For recent remarks of German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Turkey and Turks in
Germany, see ‘Angela Merkel’s Ankara visit tense after claims of hatred towards
411
Turks,’ The Guardian, March 29, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/mar/29/angela-merkel-visit-hatred-turks.
223.
Turkey has thus far failed to meet its obligations under the ‘Ankara Protocol’
which requires it to extend the customs union agreement with the EU which
entered into force 1995 to the Republic of Cyprus, a member of the EU since
2004. Turkey refuses to open its ports and airports to the Republic of Cyprus until
an acceptable settlement is found for the Turkish community living in the northern
part of the island. For an analysis of the status of the accession process, see the
latest Progress Report of the European Commission, October 14, 2009,
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.
224.
‘Sarkozy et la Turquie,’ Le Monde, August 29, 2007
225.
See recent data contained in Standard EU Barometer 72, updated on February
2010, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/ eb72_vol1_fr.pdf>.
A recent opinion poll conducted in five European countries found that 52% of
their public would vote ‘no’ to Turkey’s EU membership in referendum, mainly in
consideration of ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ factors. See, ‘European Perceptions of
Turkey as a Future Member State,’ Bogazici University, Autonomous University
of Madrid, University of Granada, Avrupa ile Diyalog Dernegi-Dialoge with the
Europe Association, August-September 2009, <http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_
site_admin/
assets/docs/BUCES-AID-UAM-OpinionPollComments-Englishv01.356161846.pdf
226.
Richard Sinnott, ‘Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement for the Existing
Member States: The Public Opinion Perspective’, EUI Working Papers RSCAS,
No. 2004/11, (2004); Erik Jones and Niels Van Der Bijl, ‘Public Opinion and
Enlargement: A Gravity Approach’, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Working Document, No. 192, (2003).
227.
Eurobarometers for monitoring the attitudes of the European citizens towards
enlargement are available at http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/public_opinion.
228.
Helen Wallace, ‘Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge of
Analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4, (2002), pp. 658-665;
Meltem Muftuler Baç, Enlarging the European Union: Where Does Turkey
Stand?, TESEV, (2002), available at http://www.tesev.org.tr.
229.
Ibid..
230.
For differences amongst the Member States according to their particular policy
priorities and concerns over Turkey’s future membership, see Muftuler Bac, supra
note 274.
412
231.
Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Thick Constitutional Patriotism and Its Implications
for the Role and Structure of European Legal History’, German Law Journal,
Special Issue-Confronting Memories, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2005), p. 323-324. Kumm
asks whether it is true that Turkey’s membership without proper public debate and
popular legitimacy would ‘effectively preclude the development of a genuine
European democracy, a European public sphere and a strong social cohesion in
Europe, because it would further alienate a majority of Euroepan citizens, and
strengthen Euroscepticism across Europe?’ Whether the existence of such
potential already points to the fact that there is a ‘thick’ identity in Europe, as
Kumm suggests, remains a debatable assertion.
278.
Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalising Enlargement, Enlarging Constitutionalism’,
European Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2003), p. 377
233.
See, for instance, Franck Biancheri ‘Comment: The day the Commission
torpedoes the Constitution?’, EU Observer on http://www.euobserver.com/
?aid=17362&sid=9.
234.
For the surveys conducted in France and the Netherlands in the aftermath of the
referenda regarding the reasons behind the no-vote, see Flash Eurobarometer 171:
The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France: Fieldwork
conducted in 30&31 May 2005, published in June 2005 and Flash Eurobarometer
172: The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in The Netherlands:
Fieldwork conducted in 2/4 June 2005, published in June 2005..
235.
Mattias Kumm, op .cit., he asserts in that regard that Turkey’s accession would be
highly problematical ‘if a clear and stable majority of European citizens continues
to be against it. In this respect the decision by France to hold a referendum need
not be inappropriate.’ p. 324
236.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf
237. European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 16-17 December 2004, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/1.pdf
238.
Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe, London, Macmillan, 1995, p.3
239.
op. cit., p.5
240.
Huntington, op. cit., p.22
241.
Andrew Mango, ‘Turkey and The Enlargement of the European Mind’, Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 132, No. 2, April 1998, pp. 171-192
413
CONCLUSION
In the aforementioned chapters an attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive
account and objective analysis of the time- honoured Turko-Europe relations encompassing
different facets. What has been focused is an in-depth study of these relations between the
end of World War II in 1945 and the end of Cold War in 1990. During this period TurkoEurope relations assumed new dimensions in the political, economic, cultural and maritime
spheres. In particular relations with the European Union has been of utmost importance as
Turkey’s much awaited entry into EU waxed and waned. Although relations between Turkey
and EC have been reinstated in 1986 but full membership has been rejected in1989 and till
the completion of this research study no visible development has taken place in this respect
to Turkey’s admission in EU. But this has not impeded the intra and inter-state relations of
Turkey in the entire Europe.
Turkey, being at the epicenter of three continents, that is, Asia, Europe and Africa, found
itself surrounded with arcs of instability in almost every direction. Due to the high degree of
uncertainty in the international system, the task of the Turkish decision-makers to formulate
adequate foreign policy options that would best serve Turkey’s national interests has become
increasingly difficult. Anticipating the dramatic shifts in the power structures at global and
regional levels has been very crucial for determining Turkey’s foreign policy orientations in
such a chaotic neighbourhood. To what extent this has been done, and what lessons, if any,
have been drawn from the implementation of foreign policies toward the neighbouring states
over the period of Cold War, constitute the two major questions whose answers have been
sought in this dissertation in about seven chapters. The number of Turkey’s neighbuors has
doubled almost overnight due to the drastic changes brought about firstly after World War II
and secondly as a consequence of the collapse of Union of Socialist Soviet Russia. However,
the change was not only in the number of states neighbouring Turkey, but was also in the
nature of Turkey’s bilateral relations with these states many of which have undergone a
period of painful transition from closed dogmatic regimes toward open liberal democratic
societies. Hence, this research study has examined the changing nature of Turkey’s relations
with its European neighbours throughout all these years in constant turmoil from the end of
World War II to the end of Cold War period.
414
In trying to trace the origin of Turks, it has been found that they are not a single element in
the world history that can be defined in a sentence, as it is easy to define the Dutch, English,
German, France and Bengali etcetera. The rise of the Ottoman Turks under the leadership of
Osman I from a small military group to a vast Empire forms a remarkable episode of history.
Rising from the Asia Minor the Ottomans brought under their fold much of Asia, Europe and
African regions. Eventually the Ottoman Empire became a center of Islamic Khilafat and
continued to rule until 1924. With the declaration of Turkey as a Republic by Mustafa Kamal
Ataturk, a new era in the history of Turks began. After his death, Turkey started multi party
democracy practice and new dimensional relations with the Europe.
It is important to mention here that, Turkey’s relations with the European is embedded in
history right from the beginning of Ottoman Empire’s connection with European territories to
the end of the World War II reveal interesting milestones of history. After its establishment
in the 13th Century, Ottoman Empire started its westward expansion into the European
continent in the middle of the 14th century. Constantinople fell in 1453 CE notably after the
Battle of Varna in 1444 CE and the First and Second Battles of Kosovo June 15, 1389 CE
and October 17, 1448 respectively.
In the latter half of the 14th century the Ottoman Empire proceeded to advance north and west
in the Balkans, completely subordinating Thrace and much of Macedonia after the Battle of
Maritsa in 1371 CE. Sofia fell in 1382 CE, followed by Tarnovgrad, the capital of the Second
Bulgarian Empire in 1393 CE, and the northwest remnants of the state after the Battle of
Nicopolis in 1396 CE. Much of Serbia fell to the Ottomans by 1459 CE. The Kingdom of
Hungary made a partial re-conquest in 1480 CE, but it fell again by 1499 CE, Greece fell in
1460 CE. The defeat in 1456 CE at the Siege of Nandorfehervar (Belgrade) held up Ottoman
expansion into Catholic Europe for 70 years, though for one year (1480–1481 CE) the Italian
port of Otranto was taken, and in 1493 CE the Ottoman army successfully raided Croatia and
Styria. Much of Albania in the 1385 CE and complete territory of Albania came under
Ottomans after the capture of Durres in 1501 CE.
After the Battle of Kosovo, the Kingdom of Bosnia fell into Ottoman hands in 1463 CE part
of Croatia was conquered in 1482 CE and Bosnia was completely added to Ottoman Lands.
Hungarian Kingdom came under Ottoman rule from 1421 CE and lasted until 1718 CE,
415
Montenegro was overrun by 1499 CE, Belgrade finally fell in 1521 CE, along with the
greater part of the Kingdom of Hungary, The Serbian Despotate fell in 1540 CE, Ottoman
forces invaded and captured the island of Rhodes in 1522, 1570–1571 CE; the Conquest of
Cyprus. After the war with Venice 1645–1669 CE the conquest of Crete was complete. Thus,
until the end of Eighteenth century Ottomans and European engaged with each other in
various rival campaigns.
In 1923, the Turkish Republic, a new nation-state, was born from the ashes of the old, multiconfessional, and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Turkish Republic was the immediate result
of the Turkish War of Independence1 (1919-1923) during which Istanbul, the Ottoman
capital, and Western Anatolia was under foreign occupation. The Sultanate was abolished in
1922, as was the Khilafate, which had previously been conceptually separated from the
Sultanate to become a kind of Muslim pontifical dignity, in 1924. Historians have shed much
light in discussing the political continuity from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic,
just as they had done regarding the transition from Byzantium to the Empire of the Sultans.
Relationship between Turkey and Europeans forms the crux of the topic brought under
review in this line of inquiry.
Turkey as an integral part of Europe, occupies a pivotal role at the crossroads of Eurasia, the
Balkans, the Black Sea region, Mediterranean, the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia.
Located in a unique geo-strategic position Turkey developed a multidimensional character.
Turkey’s economic and foreign policy is a synergy of a long state tradition and the
contemporary aspirations of its people. It has a long-term perspective, a sense of purpose and
a realistic vision. It reflects a dynamic outlook of a multifaceted nature. It is guided by
Ataturk’s ever relevant motto “Peace at home, peace in the world,” whereby Turkey seeks to
promote relations of friendship and economic co-operation with all countries starting with its
neighbours and contributes to cooperation, peace and stability at the regional as well as
global level.
Following the crumbling of communism, dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact 2
and COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 3, changing threat perceptions,
the unraveling of the former Yugoslavian Federation with its resultant armed conflicts,
economic liberalization and democratization, the historic evolution of Pan-European
416
integration still continues. A new and a larger Europe is emerging, because a new
Mediterranean, a new Middle East, a new Central Asia and a new Black Sea region is
emerging. Any changes in these areas will have repercussions on the Turko-Europe relations
and beyond.
Turkish Culture is in a sense unique in the world in that it has influenced and has been
influenced in return by cultures and civilizations from China to Vienna and from Russian to
North Africa for over millennia. Turkish culture reflects this unparalleled cultural richness
and diversity, and remains mostly shaped by its deep roots in Middle East, Anatolia and
Balkans, the cradle of many civilizations for at least twelve thousand years.
The evolution and role of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in Turkish European relations
is an interesting aspect of Turko-Europe relations. History and the essence of the European
approach towards the Mediterranean Basin in conjunction with the problems faced while
trying to turn the region to an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation that would
guarantee peace, stability and wellbeing” have been examined. What is emphasized is the
unease which Turkey displays at the Euro-Mediterranean partnership can be an alternative to
Turkish membership of the European Union to which it has been aspiring since 1959. Turkey
does not distance itself from cooperation of the EU in the Mediterranean area, but that it
operates on other platforms than the Euro-Mediterranean scheme. In addition, it has been
highlighted that Turkey is likely to participate more enthusiastically in the EuroMediterranean cooperation if and when it becomes an EU member

Muhammad Omor Faruq - Dhaka University Institutional Repository

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