Humanizing Heinrich Himmler

Transcription

Humanizing Heinrich Himmler:
Power and Alliances in Transition
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
Florida Gulf Coast University
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirement for the Degree of
Master of Arts in History
By
Sara Elise Gottwalles
July 24, 2014
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
The requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts in History
___________________________________________
Sara E. Gottwalles
Approved:August 25, 2014
___________________________________________
Paul R. Bartrop, Ph.D.
Committee Chair/ Advisor
___________________________________________
Erik Carlson, Ph.D.
___________________________________________
Eric Strahorn, Ph.D.
The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both
the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above
mentioned discipline.
Abstract
Heinrich Himmler was known as Hitler’s executioner, the Architect of Genocide, an evil
genius, a murderous monster, and der treue Heinrich. But the Reichführer SS, once a sickly child
bent on placating and pleasing all of those around him had a great deal of influence during his
rise to become one of the most dangerous individuals of the twentieth century. His rivalries
formed his political career just as much as his friendships—interestingly enough, the two lines
often crossed. This work examines Himmler’s rivalries on his rise, and peak of power. Some
would argue that his downfall was also brought on by his enemies, but the evidence contained in
this work states otherwise. Himmler was the cause of his own fall from power with at the very
most, mere assistance from an outside source. Himmler was naive, manipulative, easily
persuaded, an obsessive people pleaser, and had a weak personality. These qualities and faults
ultimately were self-damaging to Himmler.
This work specifically focuses on Himmler’s relationships with Göring and Heydrich,
discussing his rise to power, and Bormann is studied in relation to Himmler’s peak of and halt to
power. The first two men assisted Himmler in his ascent, and Bormann, wavering between friend
and enemy, quite literally acts as the preventative gatekeeper between the Reichsführer-SS and
Hitler, and thus prevents any further ascent to power.
By examining these rivalries we are able to get a better view into Himmler’s mind and
personality. Each of these relationships were quite diverse, and Himmler was able to gain various
positions, knowledge, and experience. Hitler was supportive of rivalries within his Reich, and
many of these have been closely examined by contemporary historians. What this work offers
which has previously not been scrutinized is a close examination of the relationship of Himmler
and Bormann. Though the thesis is dense through this chapter, its preceding chapters are vital to
building knowledge of Himmler’s interactions with various other leaders. Additionally, the
Bormann chapter examines Himmler’s ability to retain power until Bormann prevented his
further ascension, subsequently leading to Himmler’s fall from power.
This thesis includes primary and secondary documentation from sources such as diaries,
captured German records, memoirs, and monographs.
Acknowledgements
This work would not have been possible without the support and assistance of so many
people.
I would like to thank my parents for always being near a phone during the final stages of
writing to listen to a draft, talk me through a bump in the road, and to assist in a game of “what
is the word I’m looking for?” They each nurtured my love for history throughout my
adolescence, encouraging me to learn, ask questions, and maintain an open mind capable of
critical thinking.
My Aunt Cheryl instilled in me an interest which has grown into a scholarly passion
during my years of Holocaust study. Her early education proceeding with caution due to my
young and impressionable mind sparked a curiosity in me to continue developing my Holocaust
knowledge.
My friends and colleagues deserve my most sincere gratitude for their patience and
support. Many of them acted as captivated (or held captive) audiences, offering helpful advice
and words of encouragement. To Tristan Laznovsky, Alisa Platas, Jessamyn Inglis, Martha
Rosenthal, Matthew Seifert, Gary Coleman, Tom Santin, Linda Keene, Michael Elliot, Heather
Kiszkiel, Anna Waite, Tom Bailey, and Crystal Clemons, thank you all for joining me on this
long journey.
To Ms. Eve Grimm—We have made it! Thank you for everything you have done for me.
I am truly grateful to you for your encouragement, kind heart, and tough love.
Finally, I must extend an immeasurable amount of gratitude to the man who has acted not
only as an advisor, but as a caring father-figure to me, Dr. Paul Bartrop. For all the
conversations over coffee, the hours of labor, and your overall genuine interest in my well-being
and my future, there are not words to express my gratitude. Thank you, sir. You are The Great
Red Pen.
Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….…1
Himmler…………………………………………………………………………..…………..…13
Personality and Brief Biographical Study of a Studious Boy Turned Executioner
Göring…………………………………………………………………………………………..38
Ascent to Power: Himmler’s Rise Under the Navigation of the Last Red Baron
Heydrich………………………………………………………………………………………...54
The Architect and the Aryan Archetype
Bormann………………………………………………………………………………………...77
Written Out of Power
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….…….…115
Bibliography………………………………...…………………………………………………119
1 Introduction
“The best political weapon is the weapon of terror. Cruelty commands respect. Men may hate us. But, we
don’t ask for their love; only their fear.”- Heinrich Himmler
When considering the senior members of the Third Reich hierarchy, and more
specifically, Heinrich Himmler, it becomes apparent that scholarship on the Reichsführer-SS
contains gaps concerning his psychological profile. Due to this missing information, there has
previously been a lack of cohesion between work concerning Himmler’s personality and his
relationships with his rivals.
The assessment in the pages that follow discuss the important impact of three rivalries on
the political career of Heinrich Himmler. These relate to fellow Reich leaders Hermann Göring
(Hitler’s designated successor from 1934 until 1942), Reinhard Heydrich (Himmler’s immediate
subordinate), and Martin Bormann (Secretary of the Reich Chancellery). Exploring Himmler’s
relationships with each of his rivals substantiates the contention that he would not have ascended
to power without a substantial measure of infighting with these three men. This work will
provide a new approach to the study of Himmler’s personality. His character will become
apparent through an analysis of his personal life, and the interactions with his contemporaries.
Limited work was published specifically on Himmler until the 1990s. Though he was
included in books examining the Third Reich as a whole, such as William Shirer’s Rise and Fall
of the Third Reich, published in 1959, and a specific study of Third Reich personalities in 1970
2 by Jochim C. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leaders.1 Monographs
relating specifically to Himmler’s biography have been sporadic. There have been entire decades
devoid of scholarship explicitly devoted to Himmler.
In 1953, the first major biography of Heinrich Himmler was written by journalist Willi
Frischauer. Frischauer allowed his bias against Himmler to affect his writing, resulting in a
skewed view of his subject. Both of Frischauer’s parents perished in the Theresienstadt
concentration camp, explaining Frishauer’s disdainful portrayal. His journalistic integrity suffers
in the writing of his work. Interestingly, Frischauer’s book on Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring
published two years prior in 1951, is a well written and researched piece, also standing as one of
the first published biographies on Göring.2
Following Frischauer’s work, the most prominent biographies on Himmler were
published by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel in 1965, and Bradley Smith in 1971.3 While
Manvell and Fraenkel utilized secondary sources as well as primary sources comprised of
memoirs and diaries, Smith’s work was primarily based on Himmler’s unpublished diaries.
The confusion surrounding scholarly writing about the Nazi State has been impacted by
author bias, the complex nature of the topic, the availability of primary sources, and, often,
absence of conceptual connections within the available information. Many of the authors
previously mentioned were challenged by at least one of these complications. Smith presented
his audience with a worthwhile biography of the first twenty-six years of Himmler’s life. He
1
See William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1959) ; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1970).
2
See Willi Frischauer, The Rise and Fall of Hermann Goering (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1951). 3
See Roger Manvell, and Heinrich Fraenkel, Heinrich Himmler: The Sinister Life of the Head of the S.S. and
Gestapo (New York:Fall River Press, 1965) ; Bradley Smith, Heinrich Himmler: A Nazi in the Making (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1971). 3 utilized Himmler’s diaries as a primary source, and then explains the historiographical
importance of the information discussed. His work is concise and well written. Though Manvell
and Fraenkel provide a useful study where some interactions of contention between Third Reich
members are brought to light, upon closer examination, their study of Himmler does not include
his personal diaries. Himmler’s diaries and letters were employed during the Nuremberg trials of
1945-1946, yet the inclusion of Himmler’s own thoughts and correspondence into research did
not come to pass until Smith published his study in 1971. An attempt to interpret Himmler
without his own words is weak scholarship. One must gain insight to Himmler’s personality and
critical thinking skills in order to knowledgably write about the Nazi leader.
One example of the biased complications caused by a lack of inclusion of these primary
sources can be found in Frischauer’s work. Frischauer describes Himmler as a despicable child
who was unable to make friends and was often avoided.4 Smith counters this argument with
evidence of close childhood friends, some of whom remained with Himmler well into his years
of political activism. 5 Smith is able to provide this matter-of-fact information by citing
Himmler’s diary.
After the appearance of Smith’s work, Himmler was overlooked within the field of
scholarly writing until 1990. Nearly two decades passed before Himmler was taken on as a topic
of study. Furthermore, until the works of Peter Padfield in 1990, recently followed by that of
Peter Longerich in 2012, little if any in depth attention was given to the study of Himmler’s
personal relationships.6 If one wished to understand Himmler from as many angles as possible in
4
Frischauer, Himmler, 20.
Smith, Heinrich Himmler, 28. 6
See Peter Padfield, Himmler (New York: MJF Books, 1990) ; Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
5
4 order to develop the strongest comprehension of a personality profile of the Nazi leader,
however, the literature falls short.
As the majority of Himmler’s diaries remain unpublished and distributed through several
repositories in at least three different countries, this work relies upon the entries gathered and
translated by Smith. None of Himmler’s diaries had been published in any form until co-authors
Peter White and Stephen Tyas published their work, Himmler’s Diary 1945: A Calendar of
Events Leading to Suicide, in June 2014.7 As this included only five months of diary records, and
has so far been available only in limited circulation, there was, unfortunately, no opportunity to
access it as the current work was being completed.
To help compensate for the lack of a diary from Himmler, the diaries and memoirs of
Himmler’s subordinates and colleagues have been employed, instead. These have contributed to
establishing a profile of Himmler’s personality as seen from the perspectives of his closest
contemporaries. These accounts provide insights to Himmler’s character and interactions with
other Third Reich leaders. Post-war interrogations were also useful in helping to understand
Himmler’s relationships. While secondary sources and biographies were also utilized in gaining
background information regarding Himmler, these diaries, memoirs, interrogations, and personal
accounts generally provide the most important information for a work of this kind.
The United States Army drew up G-2 reports in 1938 on the rivalry between Göring and
Himmler. Reports were also drawn up by United States authorities during the early 1940s
discussing the tension between Reinhard Heydrich and Himmler. Though the studies of
Himmler’s relationships with Göring and Heydrich have added to scholarly knowledge of the
7
Peter White and Stephen Tyas, Himmler Diary 1945: A Calendar of Events Leading to Suicide (London:Fronthill
Media, 2014).
5 Nazi Party, little work has placed the Bormann-Himmler rivalry in the foreground. Intensive
inclusion of Martin Bormann is a requirement of Third Reich history—not only to comprehend
the relationship between Himmler and Bormann, but also to understand how Himmler related to
other leaders, particularly Göring and Heydrich.
The relationship between Himmler and Bormann certainly deserves the same amount of
attention as has been allotted to the Himmler-Göring rivalry. While previous historians such as
Jochen von Lang, and Anthony Read may have included mention of Himmler’s association with
Bormann, the scholarship was not focused on this Bormann-Himmler aspect. 8 Instead, the
relationship was utilized to provide further evidence of another broad topic such as Bormann’s
reputation as a disliked member of the Nazi Party. Read approached the topic of rivalries in his
work, yet the pages which follow further the connections omitted in his study. In examining
Himmler’s personality, Bormann’s influence on the Reichführer-SS is pivotal in studying the
larger scope of the infighting Himmler involved himself in with Göring, Heydrich, and Bormann.
These aforementioned historians include Jochen von Lang, who wrote The Secretary:
Martin Bormann: The Man Who Manipulated Hitler, originally published in Germany in 1977,
and the biography by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel co-authored in 1965. Each work
fails to provide an understanding into the Bormann-Himmler relationship (and thus further
ascertaining closer comprehension of Himmler’s personality). For instance, von Lang discusses
Bormann’s attempts at controlling Himmler’s security intelligence agency, the Sicherheitsdienst
(SD), but does not explain the full detail of Bormann’s efforts. While von Lang states, “Bormann
8
See Jochen von Lang, The Secretary: Martin Bormann: The Man Who Manipulated Hitler (Athens: Random House
Inc., 1979) ; Anthony Read, The Devil’s Disciples: Hitler’s Inner Circle (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2003).
6 forbade all Party functionaries to supply the SD with any further information or reports,”9 Ernst
Kaltenbrunner stated during a post-war interrogation that not only did Bormann forbid Party
functionaries from SD membership, but the 1936 Emergency Law was drawn up providing
Himmler with sole supreme command over the Gestapo.10 Currently, this evidence is preserved
in German documents captured by the United States where it is publicly available. However, von
Lang may not have had full access to these documents, as he researched his work in the late
1970s.
Had von Lang provided this crucial evidence of the power struggle between Bormann
and Himmler, his attempts to illustrate the rivalry between these two men would have become
evident to readers. Given that von Lang’s work may seem to fall short in primary documentation,
it is apparent that the author largely employed secondary information. Even the Bormann letters
were cited from a secondary source rather than consulting the originals.
From these early historians of the 1950s until the work in the late 1970s, there is an
egotistical attitude in conveying the history of the Third Reich. It seems as if early authors felt
themselves inherently masters of the topic since they had lived through the World War II era. In
reality, the organization and chain of command of the Reich was difficult for even its leaders to
fully understand. Though there are several exceptions such as William Shirer and Gerald
Reitlinger each of whom wrote studies on the Third Reich and the SS, these early publications,
9
Von Lang, The Secretary, 289.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Appendix II: Concentration Camps: Report on their origin, persons responsible,
motive, judicial status, and their organization in Germany. Statement by Kaltenbrunner, RG 65, Entry A1 136Z,
H.Q. Class 100, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
10
7 especially biographies during the 1950s, were products of personal interpretation rather than
useful academic studies. 11
Certainly, many of these books have served as pioneering studies over the decades.
However, the works of these authors have been employed by later historians to improve upon the
field. With further knowledge gaining the attention of historians, new documents and evidence
becoming available, and additional connections being made within the field, it is clear that World
War II studies will continue to develop. Thus the problem with these early authors is not
necessarily that they were poor researchers who attempted to explain the Third Reich within a
short period after its collapse, but rather that they thought they could fully explain the history.
Continuing to forge connections within the history, this thesis is unlike any other
academic work as it devotes a chapter solely to the study of the Himmler-Bormann rivalry. The
relationship between these two men proves not only essential to the understanding of the political
career of Heinrich Himmler, but this rivalry is also pivotal in explaining Himmler’s relationship
with his contemporaries (particularly Heydrich and Göring). This is an aspect of Third Reich
history overlooked by previous authors.
By reviewing the biographies of both of these men, and creating similar personality
profiles, this work provides an analysis of the Himmler-Bormann rivalry based on these men as
individuals. Each man has been studied in the attempt to gain insight into their psychological
character. Removing the pervasive Nazi categorization in favor of humanization and personal
identification of these men renders the current work different from others. While historians have
examined Himmler’s childhood and wondered what made him become a mass murderer, little is
11
See Gerald Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation 1922-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1957).
8 known of Bormann’s childhood. Therefore, the simple examination of adolescence alone cannot
provide insight into the minds of these criminals. By their twenties, both Himmler and Bormann
had become members of political groups to satisfy their needs for attention from a source of
authority.12 Their similar desires for control, power, and reputation were the cause of their
rivalry. Each considered himself an excellent record keeper. They built their secret personal files
on their enemies, and had their own entourages. Though Himmler had other adversaries who
were equally skilled in espionage or collecting supporters, the cat and mouse game which
Himmler and Bormann played with one another is unmatched by any other relationship Himmler
managed.
The focus on Bormann brings this study full circle in explaining how Himmler’s ascent to
power was predicated by the infighting in which he involved himself. This rivalry led to the
prevention of further power by his sometimes friend and supporter, Martin Bormann. Göring
provided Himmler with positions allowing him to become a worthy adversary for Bormann. Near
the end of the war, Göring tried to advise Himmler against trusting Bormann. Heydrich provided
an opportunity for Himmler to continue gaining and retaining power, reinforcing animosities
with Bormann. Thus, by including the Himmler-Bormann rivalry as the final case study, this
work proves the full strength of the conflict between the two leaders coincided with the end of
the war. Where previous work has focused on the Himmler-Göring rivalry as the most important
of Himmler’s career, this work demonstrates that the relationship with Bormann was the most
turbulent of Himmler’s associations.
The documentation of the Himmler-Göring rivalry prepared by the United States Army in
1938 presents a very matter-of-fact, description of two men fighting over control of policing
12
9 agencies. In reality, Himmler and Göring enjoyed a friendship which indicates a tutelage
relationship. The infighting of the two became to a working relationship. This was visible as
Göring attempted to assist Himmler in early 1944 and 1945. This particular relationship
humanizes Himmler. The association illustrated a young politician seeking the guidance and
friendship of a father-figure. Himmler then demonstrated his immense desire for control as he
attempted to oust Göring from his leadership roles. In the final stage of the Himmler-Göring
relationship, humility was present in Himmler as he begged Göring for forgiveness and
assistance.
Himmler and Heydrich were known rivals, especially after Heydrich’s appointment as
Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. Himmler led Heydrich into power, and had a hand in
his death. The Himmler-Bormann relationship becomes important during the latter part of
Himmler’s infighting with Heydrich as both Himmler and Bormann stood to gain with Heydrich
no longer serving as a threat. Following this thought, it would make sense if Bormann and
Himmler agreed to work together to remove their mutual rival permanently from power.
Himmler and Heydrich shared a business-oriented relationship in which at times it was difficult
to discern who was in charge of whom. While the two seem to have been friendly from their first
meeting in 1931 until the outbreak of war in late 1939, Himmler was eventually pushed to
perceive his right-hand-man as such a threat as to take part in a plot against his life. The role the
Himmler-Bormann relationship played during Heydrich’s assassination, perhaps even extending
to Bormann being the vocal encouragement Himmler needed to carry out the deed, cannot be
overlooked in this examination of Himmler’s rivals.
By utilizing his political rivalries, Heinrich Himmler attained notoriety as one of the most
dangerous personalities of the twentieth century. Himmler’s contentious relationships with his
10 colleagues and rivals within the Nazi Party, Hermann Göring, Reinhard Heydrich, and Martin
Bormann, each played a pivotal role in his leadership positions. Göring initiated Himmler’s
ascent to power. Heydrich aided his control further while helping maintain the positions
Himmler possessed. Finally, Martin Bormann prevented Himmler’s continued success. He
removed Himmler’s power through sabotage of his leadership and his relationship with the
Führer, Adolf Hitler. These three relationships formed Himmler’s roles within the Nazi Party
and were the most essential to his overall leadership.
To understand the rivalries of Heinrich Himmler, his personality and family background
must first be examined. Himmler grew up during World War I, during a time in which battle was
still romanticized and young men aspired to serve in the military and see combat. Himmler
proved no different, but he did not meet the age requirements for military acceptance. This was a
disappointment Himmler never overcame. This frustration combined with his complex family
relationship, especially with his mother, and added to Himmler’s unhappiness. The typical
anxieties associated with adolescence, placed him in a state of depression which he recorded in
his diary.13 During his search for acceptance and a political career he so strongly desired based
on his numerous diary entries, Himmler began his work with the Nazi Party in 1924. The Party
was at first a haven organization for misfit revolutionaries and military veterans seeking to
rebuild Germany while feeding their narcissism, debauchery, and need for gratification.
Himmler, the misfit aspiring revolutionist, fitted in well.
Each member of the Nazi Party sought to provide himself with control and respect within
the party, thus inevitably earning his share of enemies. Himmler’s political conflicts were each
due to his aspirations for further ascension to power. In a government in which the Nazi Party
Leader, Adolf Hitler, encouraged rivalries and infighting to ensure the most brutally loyal men
13
Smith, Heinrich Himmler, 89. 11 were rightfully in their roles, leaders were forced to intrigue against one another to assure
themselves to be the most qualified man for their position. As the man who ultimately controlled
most of the secret intelligence and internal security services in Germany, Himmler rose to the
position of one of the most despised leaders of the Third Reich of whom his rivals wished to rid
themselves.
Ironically, three of his most challenging adversaries also presented themselves as friends
or advisors. Hermann Göring was an experienced war veteran who greatly assisted Himmler in
his ascent to power by providing him with roles of leadership for which he was well-suited.
Himmler and Göring formed a mutually respectful relationship, which even through their most
serious infighting, seemed to remain present, even if only on a surface level. Reinhard Heydrich
was the stone-hearted subordinate Himmler needed. Though Himmler hired him for his “Aryan”
appearance and to work with him closely as a right-hand-man, there were times when it became
difficult to discern exactly who controlled whom. Heydrich continued to help to elevate
Himmler’s leadership roles while also guarding the positions he possessed. Much of Heydrich’s
defense was against Martin Bormann, who was perhaps Himmler’s greatest adversary.
Manipulative and merciless, Bormann had no qualms about gaining and retaining power at any
expense. He made certain that Himmler’s power came to a standstill, and after the assassination
of Heydrich, Bormann turned Hitler against Himmler. Ultimately, Hitler’s growing hatred of
Himmler, cultivated by Bormann, ended his political career, causing Himmler to flee Berlin in
April 1945.
This work discusses the important impact of these three rivalries on the political career of
Heinrich Himmler. The relationship of Himmler with each personality is explored to substantiate
the contention that Himmler would not have ascended to power without the infighting he
12 participated in with these men. Each association was vital in shaping his role within the Nazi
Party, whether that should have been for his personal betterment or detriment.
13 Himmler
Personality and Brief Biographical Study of a Studious Boy Turned Executioner
To understand the rivalries of Heinrich Himmler, his personality and background must
first be examined. Himmler was not born or raised into the antisemitic disposition for which he is
widely known, rather he was self-indoctrinated. Once he discovered a political party which not
only allowed him to express his views, but also fostered antisemitic, occultist, overt German
nationalism, Himmler immediately sought leadership positions. In his attempts to create a
position of control for himself within the Nazi Party, Himmler additionally found satisfaction for
his need for praise, and to constantly please others. Heinrich Himmler came to embody the
ideology of the Nazi Party.
There is a great amount of discrepancy in the description of the personality of Heinrich
Himmler among historians who have considered him as a topic for study. Himmler’s first
biographer, Willi Frischauer illustrates Himmler as cold, calculating and callous. 14 His research
is based on the Nuremberg interviews of Himmler’s comrades and older brother Gebhard, while
Bradley F. Smith presents a deeper psychological view of Himmler from childhood until age
twenty-six, utilizing Himmler’s diary.15As Smith observed, emphasis on the “interaction between
the process of maturation and the changes in the environment in which he matured” should not
be overlooked in favor of his later political activism. 16 These concepts dovetail to form
Himmler’s overall psychological and political temperament, thus grooming him for the odious
tasks which he later accepted.
14
See Willi Frischauer, Himmler: The Evil Genius of the Third Reich (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953).
See Bradley Smith, Heinrich Himmler: A Nazi in the Making (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971).
16
14 Heinrich Himmler was not always a man operating purely on cold and pitiless behavior.
The ruthlessness of his actions became a keystone of his personality over time. As Smith points
out, historians such as Frischauer stripped Himmler of his “pedestrian characteristics,”
presenting only what Frischauer noted as “The Evil Genius.”17 Himmler evolved into this
malicious person after his appointment as Reichsführer-SS in 1929. His reading up to this point
bolstered his elitist mindset through Social Darwinism, antisemitism, and puritanical thought.
Yet under the icy, calculating, exterior which he presented to the outside world, the boy who
enjoyed motherly attention and pampering still existed. He toured the concentration and death
camps which he oversaw, but never developed the ability of being able to directly oversee and
view the executions he approved without showing signs of physical illness. Evidence of this can
be found in a 1973 interview of his Chief of Personal Staff, Karl Wolff.18 To understand the evil
which Himmler came to personify, one must first recognize how this character was able to
evolve.
Himmler’s antisemitism was not a result of his upbringing. There is no evidence of racial
or cultural hatred taught within the Himmler household.19 Himmler’s antisemitism was a result
of self-driven interest turned obsession. He chose on his own terms to embrace this
discrimination and educated himself to become one of the most notorious antisemites the world
has ever known.
17
Smith, Heinrich Himmler, 3.
Jeremy Isaacs, The World At War, Vol.6, Episode 1, Genocide, Documentary, Jeremy Isaacs, A&E Home Video,
1973.
19
15 Childhood
Heinrich Himmler was born on October 7, 1900 in Munich. The second son to Gebhard
and Anna Himmler, they raised their three boys in Bavarian. Heinrich took great delight in
listening to his father’s tales which often featured themes of German nationality and strength
with his elder brother, named for their father. Gebhard senior was a school teacher who prided
himself on his German ancestry. Heinrich and his brothers grew up surrounded by portraits of
relatives as a constant reminder of their descent. 20 Antisemitic views were prominent in the
völkisch movement which was made up predominantly of middle-class citizens, especially in
Munich.21 Though their father was proud of his family’s lineage, there are no documented signs
of antisemitism or of Gebhard and Anna teaching their sons that they were members of a master
race.22
Despite his childhood seeming to contain all the necessities of love, support, nurturing
and education, Himmler always sought more. He wanted constant attention and praise and would
do everything within his capabilities to obtain respect, accreditation, and success throughout his
life. Be it from his parents and teachers as an adolescent, or from his Führer as an adult, Himmler
held a burning desire to stand out from the crowd and be commended on any and every action he
undertook.
Himmler grew up an average middle-class German child. He was prone to sickness, and
was a bit of a know-it-all, which made him the target of a certain amount of ridicule at school.
While Frischauer indicates that the boy had few friends and was avoided, Smith asserts the
20
Roger Manvell, and Heinrich Fraenkel, Heinrich Himmler: The Sinister Life of the Head of the S.S. and Gestapo
(New York:Fall River Press, 1965), 2.
21
Peter Padfield, Himmler, 36.
22
Willi Frischauer, Himmler, 16. ;Willi Frischauer, Himmler,3. 16 opposite, directing readers to observe journal entries and letters from Himmler’s childhood
friends. Some of his childhood companions with him up until his political memberships .23
Himmler’s numerous occasions of illnesses and convalescence caused his father to seek
out additional tutoring for the boy so as to ensure he did not fall behind in his education.
Gebhard senior insisted that each of his boys’ academic performance would be nothing less than
stellar. It appears as if he was especially strict with Heinrich, who, as a result, became
compulsive about his academic performance. Even through his years at the university level,
Himmler would often equate his self-worth with his scholarly performance.24
The bedrock of Himmler’s many challenges lies in his childhood. Himmler was a people
pleaser. This deep-rooted concern began in adolescence and remained with him into adulthood.
While Himmler did have childhood companions, he could not help himself when it came to
snitching on a culprit. Himmler constantly sought the approval and appreciation of an adult. If
this meant denouncing one of his peers in order to gain attention, Himmler was willing to do
so.25 Anna began to notice this behavior, and realizing that her son was troubled, did not spare
him criticism.26
Though she wrote that she was proud of him, until Himmler’s suicide in 1945, Anna still
took her son in hand and made her opinions and preferences known to him.27 Though
documentation does not specify precisely at what age she began to worry for her son, it seems to
have been before Himmler reached his teenage years that the characteristic first became
23
Frischauer, Himmler, 20 ; Smith, Heinrich Himmler, 28.
Padfield, Himmler, 22-23.
25
Ibid, 25.
26
Frischauer, 19.
27
Padfield, Himmler, 141. 24
17 apparent.28 Himmler strove to excel. He wished to make the highest grades in school not only to
please his father, but also himself. Himmler seems to have been very tough on himself as a child
academically, and was disappointed when he fell short of his goals.29 In many ways, Himmler
maintained this child-like desire for attention until the day he took his own life. In fact, it was
this selfish longing to be recognized which caused his capture and subsequent death.30
The son of a school teacher, Himmler reprimanded himself if his class work fell below
standards he and his father set. He excelled in the subjects of religious education and history.31
By the age of ten, Himmler was able to converse about famous German battles.32 Yet he was
clumsy, and his athletic ability was pathetic.33 When Himmler was 10 years old, his father
insisted that he begin keeping a journal, which Gebhard edited himself. This was to be the
beginning of the boy’s obsessive attention to detail and record keeping, and his father’s
corrections deeply seeded a need for perfectionism in Himmler.34 Recording each minute detail
occurring in his life, Himmler not only created extraordinary entries for personal use and
recollection, but the journals also serve as vital tools for historians and psychologists to attempt
to understand Himmler.
Young Himmler included the most mundane details in his diary. At times, he seemed
more the accountant of his young life than the boy meant to enjoy childhood, paying close
attention to even the minutest details. In 1911 for example, the boy kept track of each time he
swam during the family vacation. “First swim,” “second swim,” and so on is listed up until the
28
Frischauer,Himmler, 19.
30
Frischauer,Himmler, 10.
31
Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 19.
32
Padfield, Himmler, 23.
33
34
Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 13-14. 29
18 “thirty-seventh swim.”35 Himmler’s diaries begin to show more spirit and excitement in his
entries on the outbreak of war. On July 29, 1914, Himmler wrote, “Gebhard’s Birthday.
Beginning of war between Austria and Serbia. Outing to the Waginger See. Agnes and Julie go
with us…En route we become very sick. I go right to bed. During the night Mommy became
very sick.”36 Through the details of his day, it is interesting to note that there is a sense of
importance still present in his list of events. It was Gebhard’s birthday. Family was still most
important, followed by the announcement of the beginning of war. In the original diary, Himmler
italicized and underlined this sentence.37 Another entry describing the family’s return from their
holiday reads “at 10:20 dear Mommy and we three boys left for Lindau.”38 Through these entries
the personality of a fussy, prissy little boy clinging to his mother’s skirt hems becomes visible.
The war brought out a more mature, masculine desire in Himmler to grow to become a soldier.
Himmler kept details of radio announcements, troop positions, wartime news, and his emotional
reactions to this information.
Himmler found news of the war very exciting. He was a maturing fourteen-year-old boy
during the outbreak of World War I. The combat came at a time when boys his age were still
excited about the prospect of serving their countries, having never dealt with a great war where
the knowledge of the carnage was widespread. In 1914, war was still romanticized, and Himmler
and his friend, Faulk Zipperer, “would like best of all, to be in the middle of it,” Himmler wrote
on August 28.39 An August 26 entry demonstrates how the war was intermingled with the events
of Himmler’s daily life: “played in the garden with Falk. 1,000 Russians captured by our troops
35
Ibid, 33-34.
37
38
Ibid, 30.
39
19 east of Weichsel. Advance of Austrians. In the afternoon worked in the garden. We now have 42
cm. cannons.”40 Himmler’s personality would be greatly influenced by World War I.
Psychological Issues Concerning his Mother
As a child it is apparent that Himmler was doted upon and spoiled. It is clear through
reading his early journal entries how important family was to him. He recalled and noted
birthdays and even his parents’ anniversary. And though he began showing signs of maturing
with his entries about the war, he obviously held an especially close connection to his mother.
Himmler always called Anna “Mommy” in letters and journal entries well into his late
twenties.41 Anna, being the doting mother, gave in to every plea for “goodies” in his letters home
from his studies and praktikums (on-the-job-trainings), but remained critical of her middle son,
even as he sat in his Nazi position of power.42
Their relationship became strained over the years. Throughout Himmler’s sickly
childhood primarily caused by digestive problems and constant bouts of the flu and bronchitis,
Anna attempted to make her son’s life as comfortable as possible .43 She fulfilled the boy’s every
need and whim, and as a result, she inadvertently created a seemingly weak-minded, narcissistic
child. Especially in his letters home during his late teenage years, Himmler shows classic
characteristics of an only child, not expecting to have to share, wishing constant instant
gratification, and attention solely paid to him. Himmler angrily lashed out or attempted to make
his mother feel guilty when these desires were not fulfilled.44
40
Ibid, 51.
42
43
44
Ibid, 116. 41
20 Himmler shows a great deal of homesickness in his letters when he was away studying,
and constantly fretted over his health. He shows signs of living in self-pity in which cases he
always played the role of the victim, and was often pessimistic about the future or outcome of
tasks.45 He would write to Anna requesting “goodies” only to turn around in a subsequent letter
to demand needed affection which he manipulatively insisted he was not receiving. He would
play the innocent victim to her neglect through numerous letters while he was away studying
from 1919 until 1921.46
As Padfield showed, Dr. Harry Guntrip’s theory of Schizoid Phenomena can be used to
explain Himmler’s behavior.47 Guntrip, a British psychologist, specialized in psychological
relationships, and was a major contributor to the object relation theory. This theory primarily
states that once a positive object is introduced, a positive ego is formed. With the removal of the
object, the positive ego is replaced with a negative ego. Utilizing Guntrip’s theory, it can be
speculated that as a result of his separation from Anna while away at school, for which he
apparently was not prepared for whatever reason, Himmler’s ego suffered. These effects led to
an “anti-libidinal” mode which essentially caused him to embrace a sadomasochistic side
emerging in his personality. 48 This was caused by Himmler’s inability to work through the anger
or resentment he felt with the withdrawal of his mother—both physically and most likely
emotionally as she realized her son’s abnormality. In addition, he may have suffered from a
sense of abandonment caused by the absence of his father while he was teaching in neighboring
cities. This triggered Himmler to seek a sense of belonging elsewhere. Though he wanted his
45
Smith, Heinrich Himmler, 80-81.
47
Padfield, Himmler, 12. ; See Harry Guntrip, Schizoid Phenomena: Object-Relations and the Self (London:
Hogarth Press, 1977).
48
Harry Guntrip, Schizoid Phenomena,21. 46
21 parents to be pleased with him, he would later seek out attention and praise from those whom he
considered greater men. These men would have their right arms emblazoned with the swastika.
Himmler became easily aggravated with his parents—especially toward his mother,
insisting his problems were of her causing in an effort to ensure that he was in control of
himself.49 As there is no evidence of clinically documented mental illness, Himmler’s behavior
can only be studied ex post facto. This desire for control was to be another of Himmler’s
personality defects present and thriving throughout his life. He struggled to maintain a sense of
authority, control, and ability. Though he desired and received attention and affection from his
parents, this was never enough for Himmler. This behavior demonstrates a need for perfection
which is often equated with a sense of emotional abandonment.50 Yet through his journal entries
of family interaction, it is difficult to locate the outlet from where this self-victimization
manifested. Though historian Gerald Reitlinger was of the opinion that Himmler did not quarrel
with or feel estranged from his parents, the evidence demonstrates otherwise from Himmler’s
own words. 51
Himmler Begins to Self-Educate
Perceiving himself to have been robbed of the glory of battle during World War I owing
to his youth, Himmler clashed with his parents over the focus of his life ambitions. His shortsightedness prevented him from joining the navy, as had been his dream as an adolescent.52
Though he passionately wished to become a military officer and completed some preparation at
the military training school, the timing was never right, and each group he became involved with
49
Claudia Black, Changing Course: Healing from Loss, Abandonment, and Fear (Center City: Hazelden, 1993), 3841.
51
Gerald Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation 1922-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1957), 17.
52
22 fell by the wayside. In 1919, when Himmler was 19 years old, there was a marked anticommunist attitude and interest in politics in his journals.53 He joined the Freikorps and became
the deputy to the commander of the Oberland in the spring of 1919.54 But when the group was
absorbed into the Reichswehr and his services were no longer required, Himmler found his
political and military ambitions thwarted once again.
Though Himmler had shown no previous interest, upon his parents’ requests to find a
practical career, he entered the Technical High School of Munich to study agronomy.55 However,
Himmler did not entirely drop his political aspirations. While in school, he read a great deal of
military, anti-communist, and Freemasonry-themed books. His Catholic background caused him
to form a bias against Freemasons. Freemasonry is spoken of in Catholic canon law 2335, which
states: “Persons joining associations of the Masonic sect or any others of the same kind which
plot against the Church and legitimate civil authorities contract excommunication.”56
Additionally, Himmler read Austrian politician and lawyer, Friedrich Wichtl’s, work on
Freemasonry. Wichtl also discusses anti-communism and antisemitism. Himmler noted the work
in his journal as being “a book that explains everything and whom we must fight against next
time.”57 Though it is not apparent that at this time he did not fully accept the “Jewish
Conspiracy,” Himmler was exposing himself to the antisemitic mindset.
Himmler fell into a depression while at school. He was self-conscious, awkward, and did
everything in his power to avoid seeming weak. In his attempts to portray himself as stronger,
Himmler took on the persona of a young man wise beyond his years. He began to be more
53
Ibid, 66.
55
56
“Catholicism vs. Freemasonry—Irreconcilable Forever,” EWTN, Global Catholic Network, accessed April 2,
2014, https://www.ewtn.com/library/ANSWERS/BACAFM.HTM.
57
Smith, Heinrich Himmler 74. 54
23 overtly critical of his parents, brother Gebhard, and friends, as the tattletale child grew into a
domineering adolescent. This created a great deal of strain in these relationships. Though he
would often apologize later with obvious remorse for his actions, the damage was done.58 This
discomfort, coupled with the desire to overcompensate and appear powerful became driving
forces in his pursuit for military authority. Himmler thrived on a strange dichotomy, desiring
constant doting from his mother, yet also attempting to keep a distant relationship with her. His
frequent illnesses as a child had solidified her role as a strong loving mother in his youth, yet as
Himmler aged, the two personalities apparently attempted to wean from one another. Himmler
perhaps put forth the role of independent adult more so than he was honestly capable of in order
to support this process and appearance.
Himmler’s self-righteousness was only to worsen as he got older. In 1924 Himmler
crossed numerous lines of acceptable behavior when he forced the breaking of his brother
Gebard’s engagement. Himmler had obtained information that his brother’s fiancée was perhaps
not the most innocent girl of choice. He then wasted no time in making his discoveries popular
knowledge.59 This was the first example of action rather than simply words being exercised to
have an effect on the lives of others.
Given to continuing bouts of depression throughout his life, his diary entries from his
teenage years to his twenties reveal a fragile, overprotected young man bent on finding
acceptance.60 According to schoolmates, he was not the lonely, friendless student as some
historians have portrayed, but rather he was an intelligent student his friends respected while also
58
Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 73-75.
60
59
24 being the informer they resented if they found themselves on the receiving end of punishment for
their actions. He was very attached and loving toward his parents, even during their quarrels.
Himmler observed two groups of people, classifying himself as “melancholic and stern”
in one of his 1922 diary entries. This was opposed to the other group which he perceived to be
the “easy-going and hot-blooded sort who followed their desires without too much thought or
sense of responsibility.”61 This sense of self-control and self-righteous piety seem to have in part
been the cause for his states of depression. In his writing, he often pondered his future and
reasons for living.62
Himmler recorded in his diary all the various books he read. In his early twenties, he
made notes of several philosophy books, and in his numerous entries, a corresponding sense of
melancholy bordering on suicide can be found during his readings. Especially when he was away
from home, Himmler wondered about his purpose and if he would be missed if anything was to
happen to him.63 He was serious and concerned that he had already failed in his still young life.
This attitude was amplified by his parents’ constant push to focus on his agricultural work,
obtain a proper job, and abandon his military ambitions and political interests.
Himmler also began dabbling in New Age practices and spirituality. He read Mathius
Fidler’s Die Toten Leben (The Living Dead) and learned about transmigration of souls, and
turned to philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Ibsen for assistance in finding personal
61
63
Ibid, 72.
62
25 truths.64 From these readings he reaffirmed in himself that his decisions to maintain stern selfcontrol, abstinence were justifiable.
Possessing a strong sense of Catholic ethics and morality, Himmler was skittish when it
came to the topic of sex. In fact, some of his closest friends claimed to believe Himmler
maintained his virginity until the age of 26, when he married Margarete Boden.65 Though he read
many books on the subject and participated in listening to the encounters of his male peers,
Himmler was cautious to keep his own sexual desires at bay. Himmler was a member of the
Apollo fraternity at Munich’s Technical University. If he attended a dance with his Apollo
brothers, and escorted a young lady home, he always ensured they were joined by one of his
fraternity brothers. This was to prevent any possible temptations. 66
As Smith suggests, Himmler seems to have gone through a period as a young adult when
he constantly observed and judged young women, as evident in his treatment of his brother’s
fiancée. He would note his opinions in his diary including the appearance and location of the girl
if a name was not applicable, as well as his perception of her morality based on how she carried
herself and interacted with others.67 If he found a young lady to be favorable, he often wrote of
her as a “good German Gretchen.”68His readings on sexuality led him to attempt to enlighten
himself on homosexuality, but he found the lifestyle to be immoral and repulsive. Himmler’s
repugnance to homosexuality may lay to rest the suspicion that Himmler was a latent
homosexual. He seems genuine in his reaction from his academic research of the topic.69
64
Smith, Heinrich Himmler 106. Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler, 9.
66
Smith, Heinrich Himmler 85.
67
Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 49-51.
68
69
Ibid, 86-87. 65
26 In all topics he studied, he approached the subject from an academic perspective.
Naturally the topic of sex proved no different. More than likely from his father’s scholarly
influence, Himmler always researched for himself any information he encountered which piqued
his interest. Himmler was prudish in his education and personal handling of sex, yet he was
deeply interested in the topic of propagation. This interest would later reemerge as he instructed
his SS men to become promiscuous, impregnating as many women as possible to reproduce for
the sake of the Reich. Himmler must have overcome his apprehension as he himself took on a
mistress who bore him two illegitimate children.70
What Himmler gained from his reading was self-awareness, pride, and elitism. These
were new concepts for this chronically people pleaser. His pre-existing qualities of neediness,
desire for control, and manipulation never dissolved. Thus these new characteristics added to his
growingly dangerous personality as he became more passionate about his mission and dogmas
throughout his life. His pride, combined with his tendency to fret over details, turned his people
pleasing into an obsession that he would have to fulfill for himself, using Hitler as an ideal. He
rarely admitted failure, and had a strong desire to be admired. This characteristic would be
present while he was in school, trying to assist his fraternity brothers with their troubles, and,
later, in his Nazi career when he led the SS and its branches.
Himmler’s Attention Turns to Antisemitism
After World War I, antisemitism and the “Jewish Conspiracy” were thriving and
spreading throughout Germany. He had begun reading books with an antisemitic theme in midApril 1920,71 one of these being Artur Dinter’s Die Sünde wider das Blut (The Sin Against the
70
Katrin Himmler, The Himmler Brothers: A German Family History (London:Pan Macmillion Ltd, 2007), 246-253.
71
27 Blood). Himmler noted that the work was a clear introduction to the Jewish question; however
the author seemed “somewhat blindly enraged in his hatred of the Jews.” 72
The meticulous student examined and sought out information on one of the most popular
conspiracy topics of his era. Himmler’s antisemitism is an example of the times in which he was
situated. Hearing the “Jewish World Conspiracy” as the cause for Germany’s state of affairs and
the loss of the war led to Himmler’s initial interest in the belief. Placed in the hands of this
deadly mind, antisemitic books, propaganda, and lore became lethal. Himmler, with his
unmerited sense of elitism, began educating himself on how to become a bigot. The “Jewish
Conspiracy” after World War I gained his attention, and he became interested in political leaders
spouting the same information combined with the indoctrination of their personal neurotic ideals.
Himmler was impressionable yet cunning, governed by his desire to please and conform.
By 1922, Himmler’s relations with his parents were intensely strained, and his political
views were clearly more radical judging by entries in his journal. Constantly attempting to
vindicate his latest acquired knowledge, Himmler was unable to help himself from embracing the
schoolmasterly persona he had inherited from his father.73 In January, his desire for facts rather
than just hatred about the Jews, so he could formulate his own opinion, turned him to pseudoacademic texts. His writing began to take on a nationalistic tone, he wrote of land reform, antihomosexuality, degeneration of bloodlines, and the Jewish question.74 Peter Padfield states that
at the age of twenty, Himmler was willing to believe Jewish stereotypes and grotesque
exaggerations of Jewish attributes.75 Smith wrote that at twenty-two-years-old, Himmler was
showing clear signs of becoming a racist and an antisemite. This is evidence of a steady stream
72
Ibid,, 47. Reitlinger, The SS, 15.
74
75
28 of “study” and “examination” for two years caused Himmler to accept the animosity. Not only
was he not raised an antisemite, but the mindset was not one he accepted overnight.
During this time there was a marked decline in Himmler’s attendance at mass. Instead, he
turned his attention to readings he noted in his journal as citing Catholicism as “too doctrinaire”
or “fanatical.”76 He wrote of religious doubt, and of spiritualism and occultism as “unbelievably
deep and significant.”77 Where Himmler had been studying texts on the Jews, he now turned to
making his decisions of Jewish character. He no longer sought only “academic” work, but also
propaganda on the Jewish culture to foster his antisemitism. Likewise, Himmler began seeking
out texts on the history of ancient societies and religious relics to further his knowledge of the
occult.
As a child, Himmler went on hiking trips with his family in the summer of 1912. The
Jesuit relics and other religious artifacts, as well as the German occultist Thule Society history to
which he was exposed to on the trip left a lasting impression on him.78 Himmler was greatly
impressed by the Teutonic Knights and the Jesuit order. He found the combination of their
fearless valor and steadfast devotion to be highly desirable characteristics by which to live and
model his S.S. order.79 In 1934 he allowed his fascination with the occult to mingle with his
obsession with the Teutonic Knights when he refurbished and expanded Wewelsburg castle,
completed in 1609 in the town of Westphalia, dating back to Charlemagne.80 Rituals and spiritual
practices took place among those of the S.S. who were chosen to gain access to regular retreats.
76
Ibid, 145.
78
79
Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler, 48.
80
Ibid, 49.
77
29 Himmler would later allow his occult interests to catch him in a firm grasp, building great halls
and dedicating rooms to German historical figures and dedicating hours to their study.81
Political Aspirations Attained
The standstill of Himmler’s political life changed in 1922 when he linked himself with
the paramilitary group known as the Reichskriegsflagge (Imperial War Flag Society.) This
organization was of special interest to Nazi paramilitary leader, Ernst Röhm, who used the group
to assist in the 1923 putsch. Hitler staged the putsch in an attempt to overthrow the Weimar
government and supplant it with the Nazi Party. Once Himmler formed a connection with Röhm
his political advancement seems to have been set. This would prove to be a connection which
would repay Himmler greatly later on. His relationship with Röhm is especially interesting as it
shows the ruthlessness of his desire to ascend to power.
Himmler was drawn to the old fighter’s desire to restore Germany to its pre-World War I
state, rebuilding a strong, financially independent Germany with an improved military. Röhm
told him of the Nazi Party, and deciding to solidify his support, he joined the party in 1923.
During the Putsch, Himmler’s Company Werner Unit of the Bavarian Army supported Röhm
and thus Hitler, yet the men remained neutral and disarmed.82 As Röhm awaited orders with the
Reichkreigflagge to seize the War Ministry buildings, the men were surrounded and prevented
from assisting Hitler’s efforts. As the groups were disbanded and ultimately banned, Himmler
found his political aspirations upset once again.
Despite the failure, grass roots Völkisch (people’s movement) organizations continued to
form. Himmler visited Röhm during the latter’s time in Stadelheim prison for his association
81
82
Manvell and Frankel, Himmler, 49. Smith, Heinrich Himmler, 136.
30 with the putsch, and absorbed more of the political leader’s ideologies. Longerich cites Röhm as
a mentor for Himmler, and this seems to be accurate.83 Without the assistance of Röhm, Himmler
would not have been able to advance within the party, gain attention, or been given the
responsibilities which he was shouldered. Himmler began presenting speeches on behalf of the
Völk, writing newspaper articles, and networking with leaders growing in popularity.
One of these leaders was Gregor Strasser of the Nationalsozialistiche Freiheitsbewegung
(National Socialist Freedom Movement or NSFB) in lower Bavaria. The formation of this single
relationship would later prove to be the springboard of Himmler’s political and later Nazi career.
Where Röhm was the connection, Strasser was a major figurehead within the party. Strasser
observed Himmler’s marked disappointment in not seeing active military duty. He knew
Himmler would take pride in the party and any position he was assigned as he was so supportive
of the cause. It was due to this drive and enthusiasm coupled with his impeccably tidy
recordkeeping ability that Himmler later became Strasser’s adjunct, claiming the title of Deputy
Gauleiter (deputy leader of a regional branch of the party) of the NSFB in early 1924. 84
In this position, Himmler was charged with keeping schedules, maintaining files,
correspondence, transportation arrangements, assisting with details of the group newspaper, and
general business duties. 85 This proved to be vital experience later, and Strasser continued to
assist Himmler to obtain leadership roles within the party which aided in his rise to power.
Strasser bragged about Himmler’s propaganda abilities, noting his superior education and ability
to adapt.86 Strasser described Himmler as “A remarkable fellow. He looks like a half-starved
83
Longerinch, Heinrich Himmler, 119-20. Padfield, Himmler, 80. ; Smith, Heinrich Himmler, 154
85
Smith,Heinrich Himmler, 154.
86
Padfield, Himmler, 84-84. 84
31 shrew. But keen I tell you, incredibly keen. He is underway the whole day-from one farm to
another- from one village, to the next.” 87
Difficulties met the unsuccessful attempt of the rise of the “Strasser wing” of the Nazi
Party. While Strasser shared Hitler’s antisemetic and anti-capitalistic views, Strasser held a more
socialized option of economics. Strasser had little support, and could not compete with Hitler as
an orator.88 The conformist in Himmler was slipping to Hitler’s side despite everything Strasser
had done for him. Himmler realized Hitler could provide the power, control and attention he
desired, and Strasser simply became a stepping stone. But most of all, Hitler provided a
successful group which Himmler greatly wanted to be a part , especially as he had never
experienced being part of a group with the upper hand. Hitler gained Himmler’s allegiance, and
for the man who truly gave Himmler a start to his political career, and put money into his hands,
came an assassination bullet in 1934 when Strasser was murdered during the S.A. purge.
During this party purge, also known as the Night of the Long Knives, members of
Hitler’s entourage, including Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Göring, and Minister of Propaganda,
Joseph Goebbels, executed those who were viewed to be a current or possible threat to the Nazi
Party. The S.A. paramilitary organization was the primary target as the group grew more difficult
to control. Himmler employed the Gestapo and his Schutzstaffel (SS) to carry out the executions.
Though Strasser was viewed as a political enemy of Hitler, Himmler could have taken actions to
change the outcome of Strasser’s murder by the Gestapo. Himmler had surrendered his support
to Hitler in exchange for respect and authority. In the same vein, Röhm had also assisted
Himmler in his rise through leadership ranks within the party. When Heydrich executed Röhm,
87
88
Ibid, 117. 32 Himmler experienced mixed feelings: first questioning the decision, and later, accepting the
murder.89 This callousness is evidence of Himmler’s acceptance of Nazi ideology and growing
desire to succeed, regardless of consequences.
Himmler Adopts Nazism
By 1924, there was a visible ruthlessness to Himmler’s writing. This cruelty increased
over the years and enabled him capable of the executions he assisted in conducting ten years
later. He read a pamphlet on Hitler and wrote, “truly a great man, and above all, a genuine and
pure one. His speeches are splendid works of Germandom and Aryanism.” 90 Himmler was
captivated by Hitler’s messages, and when the NSFB decided to dissolve their organization in
1925, Himmler followed Röhm to the NSDAP.91 But a difference of opinion between Hitler and
Röhm caused the latter to leave Germany and take up a role as German military adviser to the
Bolivian Army.92 Fortunately for Himmler, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party
(NSDAP) absorbed Strasser’s entire organization in February 1925, and he was able to maintain
his position as deputy.93 One of Himmler’s added tasks was occasionally to present public
speeches at campaign rallies across Germany.94 With this responsibility, Himmler could add
“orator” to the list of qualifications for his future leadership positions within the Nazi Party.
89
United States Department of War Strategic Services, The Career of Heinrich Himmler, Classified November 29,
1961, RG 263 Entry ZZ-19, Box 28, CIA 2nd Release Name Files NN3-263-02-008, National Archives and Records
Administration (College Park, MD.).
90
Ibid, 156-157.
92
93
94
Smith, 158. 91
33 Himmler joined the SS in 1925.95 He was member number 168.96 His skills as an orator
served him well when he was appointed Deputy Reich Propaganda leader in September of
1926.97 It came as no surprise to Himmler’s friends and colleagues that he became such a
devoted follower of Hitler. Even as he worked under Strasser, Himmler exhibited a
“schoolboyish adulation” of Hitler.98 One of Himmler’s acquaintances, Hans Erhard, knew him
to have a framed photograph of Hitler hanging from his walls. Erhard recalled that he, “secretly
observed Himmler not only looking up at Hitler, but addressing the picture as a sort of rehearsal
for the time he would meet the Führer.”99 The exact date Himmler met Hitler is uncertain but, it
is most commonly agreed that Himmler met his idol sometime in 1926.100 Another important
meeting took place in September 1927 with Margarete Boden, who he began courting. Himmler
specifically marked September 12 in his pocket diary, and it is assumed he was noting the day he
first saw her in the town of Sulzbach in Bavaria.101 Seven years his senior, with light hair and
blue eyes, Margarete was a good match for Himmler. 102 Not only did she conform to the ideal
Nazi concept of a perfect German type, but due to her age (34), Himmler could view Margarete
as a makeshift mother to attempt to fill the negative void in his ego caused by the sense of
withdrawal he felt from his own mother. Additionally, Margarete was a nurse, which certainly
acted as an attraction to Himmler’s hypochondriac nature.103
95
96
Manvell, and Frankel, Himmler, 16.
97
98
Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 43.
99
100
Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc,
1991), 33.
101
102
Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970),
116. 103
34 After proving himself a likeminded and loyal party member and leader, Himmler was
appointed deputy to Reichführer SS Erhard Heiden in 1927.104 Life progressed rapidly over the
next two years. In 1928 he and Margarete married, and though it appeared the two would make
for a perfect union, this was not the case. Himmler was never much of a family man, allowing
love for his work rather than the love for his wife to take precedence.105 The contents of
Himmler’s letters and infrequent visits home show that Himmler was much more attached to his
career.
He replaced Heiden as Reichsführer, at Hitler’s insistence on January 6, 1929.106 In just
five short years, Himmler went from Deputy Gauleiter to the role that would later authorize him
to execute the Final Solution. In the summer, a daughter was born to Himmler and Margarete on
August 8, 1929. They named the child Gudrun after the German heroine from Werner Jansen’s
book, Das Buch Liebe (The Love Book), one of Himmler’s favorites.107 Though he loved his
child, his SS provided her with competition. Based on her letters to her husband, it seems
Margarete spent a great deal of time alone pining for Himmler. In one correspondence she wrote,
“only today I was thinking how we should celebrate your birthday…My love, let’s go to some
exhibition together. We’ve never done that.”108 One of the few documented occasions of
Himmler spending time with his wife was in 1936 when the couple undertook a spa excursion at
Wiesbaden in Hesse.109
104
Ibid, 91.
106
Manvell and Frankel,Himmler, 17.
107
108
Ibid, 93. 109
“Himmler and his wife at Wiesbaden, Hesse Germany, 1936,” World War II Database, accessed April 2, 2014,
ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=7638.
105
35 Though he had a family of his own to care for, with an infant daughter who needed his
attention and affection, Himmler selfishly remained at Hitler’s side instead, seeking admiration
from his leader. This serves as a strong example of the intense need for gratification through
pleasing others Himmler harbored. He has been noted as a supreme conformist, and as
possessing a mind that was easily swayed. 110 This is evident through his adoption of
antisemitism.
Himmler was consumed by his need to gain authority, power, and admiration. He came to
depend on his personal crusade against the Jews to gain admiration and approval from Hitler. It
could be argued that while the Shoah was carried out by other leading Nazi Party members out of
a sense of duty, fulfilling a task, or commitment, for Himmler this was a private mission. He was
on a crusade to save not only Aryan blood, but the entire world from what he saw as the
poisoned grasp of the Jews. He wished to prevent the Jewish population from procreating.
Himmler was convinced that members of the Jewish community were sexual miscreants, acting
as sexual villains who were on a mission to violate and exploit the Germanic bloodline.111
Himmler blamed eroticism as a cause of moral decay. He named the Jews as the leading culprit
of this problem. A great deal of Himmler’s antisemitism contained a sexual aspect.112 This is
evident in his later treatment of the Jews during the Shoah. Himmler’s desire to sterilize Jews,
ban “interracial marriages,” and discontinue assimilation of Jews into German culture, leads back
to his view of the importance of ending the procreation of the Jewish people.
Being impressionable, Himmler sought to become a part of a larger cause. He simply
needed acceptance, a leader who would provide him with direction and recognition from that
110
112
Ibid, 144. 111
36 leader. Himmler found this acceptance in the Nazi Party. Under the principles of the party,
Himmler was able to work towards the goals he desired for Germany and the people of the
country as well as practice his antisemitic views, interests in German folklore, and belief in the
occult. Yet it was his hatred of the Jews and his steadfast support of the Final Solution which
provided Himmler his ascent to power. For Himmler, antisemitism was not simply a mindset
presenting a task to be carried out, but a value of his passionate belief system.
Himmler, like his comrades, believed that his actions were for the betterment of the
German people. Himmler delivered a speech to German army officers in February 1938, which
gave some insight to his beliefs. “We are a nation of 70 million in the heart of Europe. We will
survive only because we are qualitatively more worthy than the others, who will always outstrip
us in numbers. We are of better Quality. We are fortunate that we live in this age when once in
2,000 years an Adolf Hitler was born.”113 Right up to the end of the war, Himmler’s loyalty
would remain steadfast to Hitler.
Throughout his career, there were three defining men who stood out as important factors
in Himmler’s leadership positions within the Third Reich. Two comrades assisted in Himmler’s
ascent to power. Hermann Göring and Reinhard Heydrich elevated Himmler to leadership roles
either by direct actions or successful guidance of measures Himmler himself should pursue. The
third influence was Himmler’s long-time adversary Martin Bormann, who performed his key
role as the man who unmade Himmler after preventing his further ascent to power, rapidly
followed by Himmler’s downfall in the Third Reich.
113
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Memorandum for Mr. Nichols, May 10, 1941, RG 65 Entry A1 136P, Box 1,
Section 001, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
37 Himmler was not truly an adult until he assumed his role within the Party. “An adult
Heinrich Himmler separate from the Party and its ideologies never existed. Himmler was
Nazism.”114 He went figuratively from the teat of his mother to the arms of the party. For
Himmler, this was the movement of one security to another, yet in his mind only Hitler would
elevate him to become the powerful and respected person he desired to be.
114
Padfield, Himmler, 82. 38 Göring
Ascent to Power: Himmler’s Rise Under the Navigation of the Last Red Baron
Of all of Himmler’s rivalries, his animosity toward Hermann Göring is the most readily
comprehensible and straightforward. A decorated World War I ace fighter pilot, Hermann
Göring joined the Nazi Party and established the Gestapo in 1933. Göring assisted Himmler in
his ascent to power. He provided Himmler with positions, insider knowledge, and personal
advice. Later, Göring foolishly passed along some of his important roles to Himmler, thereby
inadvertently elevating Himmler to political strength he had not intended.
Though not the most crafty politician in the Reich, Himmler proved himself more
calculating than Göring. Göring created the Gestapo and began building secret intelligence files
which Himmler later inherited, yet he was not the vengeful, slippery person that Himmler
was.115 Göring was also not the type who needed the attention and reassurance that Himmler
required. He was personable and gregarious, a capable executive, popular with the masses, an
art lover, and continuously carried an air of respectability and “something of the atmosphere of
an air lieutenant out on a spree.”116 When Göring first met Himmler, his young comrade was
still trying to make a name for himself in the Nazi Party. By 1945, Göring was trying to get
Himmler to find safety by leaving Berlin. It was during (and because of) his rivalry with Göring
that Himmler ascended to most of his power.
115
116
United States Army, The Military Attache, Berlin, The Inner Political Situation in Germany: The Rivalry of
Goering and Himmler, November 24, 1938, RG 165 Entry 77, Box 1080 G-2 Regional File Germany, National
Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
39 As Himmler found himself excited to participate in the Beer Hall Putsch November 8-9,
1923, forceful political activity was nothing new to the old fighters. He at last had the
opportunity he had been waiting for— involving himself in a revolutionary political movement.
Despite the protests of his parents, Himmler had become a member of a political movement.
Himmler’s fresh, young face was among the war-weathered military men, Hitler, Röhm,
and Göring. While Himmler remained in the background holding the flag, Göring loyally
marched alongside Hitler, the man he hoped could take Germany back to its pre-World War I
glory days of strength and self-sufficiency.117 Himmler also held these aspirations for Germany,
and this was one of the commonalities between Himmler and Göring that drew the seasoned
veteran and the eager aspiring politician together. Additionally, Himmler held to the admiration
his father instilled in him of old German nobility—nobility of which Göring was bred. 118
Though he has been marked in history as “brutal,” Göring also attempted to maintain his
sense of dignity and aristocratic heritage.119 He was not a true antisemite, and focused much of
his attention on the military and economic aspects of the Reich. Despite his efforts, Göring lost
his dignity when he used Himmler as a scapegoat after the end of the war. Göring claimed to the
Allies that he had no knowledge of the extent of Holocaust; Himmler’s extermination of the
Jews was a “fiendish pleasure” Göring imagined he acquired. “It is beyond me, just what was
behind all that.”120
117
Willi Frischauer,The Rise and Fall of Hermann Goering (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1951), 38.
119
120
Investigatory Records Repository, Interrogation of Goering, June 25, 1945, RG 319 Entry A1 134B, Box 235,
XE00096, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
118
40 Like other leaders of the Third Reich, Göring possessed qualities which, had they been
put to positive use, he could have had a beneficial effect on his country. Himmler truly believed
he was working for the betterment of the German people. Leaders of the Third Reich were
convinced that their form of government could save and revitalize Germany. Due to the early
support of the masses prior to 1938 when the party began acting upon its expansion and
extermination agenda at a public level, the desire to rejuvenate Germany seemed to have been a
general post-war objective. He also offered his unique qualities to the party, such as his tactful
diplomatic skills. Göring played a pivotal role as an ambassador for Hitler in helping create an
ally in Italian leader, Benito Mussolini. As Mussolini was not initial a supporter of Hitler’s
ideology, this alliance could not have been formed without Göring’s assistance.121
Aristocratic Beginnings
On January 12, 1893, Hermann Wilhelm Göring was born to Germany’s MinisterResident for Southwest Africa, Heinrich Ernst Göring, and his second wife, Franziska
Tiefenbrunn.122 When Franziska found she was pregnant with her fourth child, she left Haiti
where her husband was acting as consul-general, to give birth in the Marienbad Sanatorium at
Rosenheim in Bavaria. Though Prussian by ancestry, Göring always regarded himself as
Bavarian, and it would later be the “Bavarian Group” of the Nazi Party of which he became a
member.123
121
Rodger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Goering: The Rise and Fall of the Notorious Nazi Leader (New York:
Skyhorse Publishing, Inc, 2011), 60.
122
Manvell and Fraenkel, Goering, 21.
123
Frischauer, The Rise and Fall of Hermann Goering, 9.
41 Göring had a strong, impressive, Prussian background. Tracing back his heritage, he
found that his ancestral lineage included Goethe, Bismarck, and Count Zeppelin.124 Göring grew
up taking pride in his family history and was raised among the aristocracy, influenced by his
father’s gifts for diplomacy and financial acumen. Typical of highly indulged children with a
lack of discipline, Göring was an extremely willful child. His every desire was met as his
parents apparently showed him no other form of affection or instillation of respect by way of
discipline.125 Not noted as a good student, Göring disliked school, and was labeled “wild and
difficult to control, ordering his companions about in his eagerness to play at soldiers” by the
master of his boarding school in 1900.126
His desire to become a soldier was made a reality in 1906 when Göring began attending
military college at Lichterfelde near Berlin. He was nineteen years old when he became a
commissioned officer in the Prinz Wilhelm Regiment, the 112th Infantry, in 1912.127 From this
point forward, Göring spent many of his waking hours in a military uniform. His time at
Muelhausen with his infantry regiment were happy days in which he made friends among his
fellow officers and popularized himself among the ladies with the assistance of his personal
allowance of two thousand marks.128 But Göring’s life took a serious turn when he was called to
live up to his promise when he stated, “if war breaks out, you can be sure I’ll give a good
account of myself and live up to the name of Göring.”129 On June 29, 1914, Austrian Archduke
Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were assassinated in Sarajevo. On July 27, Göring poured
124
Ibid, 6. Manvell and Fraenkel, Goering, 24.
126
Ibid, 24.
127
Manvell and Fraenkell, Goering, 27.
128
129
Manvell and Fraenkell, Goering, 27.
125
42 his heart out into a letter to his mother, and two days later Germany mobilized.130 Göring was
finally fulfilling his dream of participating in military combat.
By the end of the war, Göring’s credentials included acting as the last commander of the
Richthofen Fighter Squadron (making him the last Red Baron), being awarded the Pour le
Mérite, and demobilized as a decorated ace pilot with rank of captain.131 Göring returned home
with his medals and honors to a broken post-war Germany. He found himself in the same
situation as so many World War I veterans reverting to ordinary citizens with little to no
experience outside of the military realm. Göring was lost in this new and dismal country.
Göring Finds the Party and a Ruthless Young Man
In the autumn of 1922, Göring heard Hitler speak, and the message resonated. Göring
joined the Nazi Party that year, and devoted himself to Hitler.132 During the failed Beer Hall
Putsch of early November, 1923, Göring was shot and suffered a groin injury. He was
medicated with morphine. He became addicted to the drug, and despite his four years at the
Langbro Asylum in Sweden to cure his dependency, Göring would continually have problems
with his usage after his return to Germany in 1927.133
When Hitler selected Göring to act as leader of the SA, he was delighted to have such an
experienced and decorated veteran at his service. Hitler boasted, “moreover, he has money and
doesn’t cost me a cent!”134 Göring served as Oberster SA-Führer (commander of the SA) from
1923 until what became known as the Stennes revolt in 1930. During the revolt, SA troops
130
Frischauer, The Rise and Fall of Hermann Goering 14-15.
Manvell and Fraenkel, Goering, 32-36. 132
133
William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1959), 146.
134
Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 74. 131
43 attempted a coup against the party. Hitler quelled the revolt, placating the group with funding
and recognition, and assumed an overall command position. Hitler then called on his fellow
World War I veteran and friend, Ernst Röhm to lead the SA on January 5, 1931. The promotion
of Röhm would later cause a purge, during which many old fighters (including Röhm) lost their
lives.
The Stennes revolt provided evidence that even under the command of Göring, the SA
was a difficult paramilitary group to control. Hitler believed that by placing Röhm in command
of the organization, he and his party would be protected. In May 1933, Göring worried that
Hitler had poorly placed his security. Tensions were rising in the SA with feelings of resentment
from the “old fighters” toward the new Nazi Party members they felt were simply jumping on
the bandwagon. Despite these complaints, SA membership grew. In 1934, membership
increased six times its count from the previous year.135 During the beginning of 1934, Röhm
spoke of the need to launch open attacks on the Party and German army in an attempt to
intimidate the Nazi Party into accepting the SA as a national militia, capable of supplanting the
army.136
Göring is Benefactor of Himmler’s Ascent to Power
This affected Göring directly, who realized that a political crisis would soon be at hand if
action was not taken. He had been building his collection of secret intelligence since 1933 as
head of the Gestapo. His files included information to support action taken against the SA.
Göring gained the support of Goebbels, Himmler, and Heydrich as the main actors in the purge.
He knew of the plot to execute Röhm and his organization of revolutionaries would work as
135
136
Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 22.
Evans, The Third Reich in Power, 24
44 long as he obtained the proper allies to assist him. Worried that his Gestapo director Rudolf
Diels would not be capable of carrying out the tasks placed before him, Göring replaced Diels
with Himmler, whose ideals he found to be ruthless and in the best interests of the party. 137 The
Gestapo transition to power occurred on April 20, 1934, and it was no coincidence that it just
happened to fall on Hitler’s birthday. Göring explained at the Nuremberg trials how he came to
pass his Gestapo forces to Himmler.
At that time I did not fully oppose it. [Himmler gradually taking over the German police
states.] It was not agreeable to me, I wanted to handle the police myself. But when the
Führer asked me to do this and said it would be the correct thing and that it proved
necessary that the enemies of the State should be fought throughout the Reich in a
uniform way, I actually handed the police over to Himmler, who put Heydrich in
Charge.138
Göring was especially reluctant to hand over control of his Gestapo as he felt it was the real key
to his power in Prussia.139 Heydrich ultimately gaining this source of power would become a
point of rivalry between Himmler and Göring. Likewise, as Göring did not seem to approve of
Heydrich, there would be a sense of animosity between these two men as well.
With Himmler now commanding both the Gestapo and SS, Göring felt confident that the
young Reichsführer would dutifully carry out and delegate as necessary. Though Göring did not
fully trust Himmler’s right-hand-man, Reinhard Heydrich, Göring knew they each represented
power and fear. Each man drew up lists of SA members, leaders, and other political adversaries
they believed posed a possible problem in the future. Göring went so far as to take measures to
protect himself, Himmler, and their men in declaring that he was prepared to intervene with an
137
Ibid, 54. Manvell and Fraenkel, Goering, 108.
139
138
45 “iron hand” against anyone posing as enemies to the State. 140 His declaration further stated that
in the event of an incident, the punishment would include “the death penalty or long terms in the
penitentiary for attacks or even plans for an attack upon members of Hitler’s Brown Army.”141
The round-ups and executions began on June 30, 1934 and were completed by July 2.
“The executions were carried out by the SS and at this time Himmler ‘rubbed out’ several
innocent persons against whom he had some personal grudge” as did Göring.142 In a special
interview for the German press, Göring later claimed that the Röhm Purge, or Night of the Long
Knives as it came to be known, was a result of he and Himmler combining forces to defend and
protect the Party. Göring clarified the situation with, “That is to say, my office and that of
Himmler, the Reich leader of the SS…that a portion of the highest SA leaders had turned away
from the purpose of the movement.”143
Hitler was shocked at the thoroughness of the executions, shouting at Waffen-SS
General, Sepp Dietrich, “You have gone too far!”144 Hitler was in hysterics as many of the
victims had been his old friends. 145 Göring walked him into the Berlin operation’s headquarters,
and handed Hitler the telegram from German President Paul von Hindenberg. The telegram was
addressed to Göring and read, “Accept my approval and gratitude for your successful action in
140
Confidential Letter No. 34, E.I.C. Germany: Internal Situation, Enclosure, Minister President Goering on the
subject of the “Cleansing Process”, July 10, 1934, RG 165 Entry 77, Box 1080, 3600-3700, National Archives and
Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
141
142
Thomas C. Van Cleve, Lt. Col. AUS, Special Detention Center “Ashcan” Detailed Interrogation Report:
Forschungsamt Des Reichsluftfahrtministeriums, June 15, 1945, RG 165 Entry UD 27, Box 2, National Archives
and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
143
144
145
Ibid, 107.
46 suppressing this high treason stop with comradely thanks and greetings.”146 This of course
changed Hitler’s outlook. Though he was still not thrilled with the events of the purge, those
who would seek to remove him from power could no longer pose a concern. Göring and
Himmler had shown their loyalty to the Führer and with this attention came further contention
between the two.
With the army safe from any SA displacement, Göring aspired to take on the role of
Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Reich.147 Though he had given responsibility of the
Gestapo to Himmler, who passed it down to Heydrich, not all of his secret information went
with the organization and its members. Göring refused to allow his Forschungsamt (FA) secret
military communication intelligence agency to be taken from him. Both Himmler and Foreign
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop attempted to gain control of the agency and failed.
Himmler went to Hitler at the recommendation of Heydrich and SS Foreign Intelligence
Chief, Walter Schellenberg, and claimed all intelligence should fall under the jurisdiction of his
Reich Security Main Office. Hitler merely deflected, instructing Himmler to speak directly with
Göring on the matter.148 As Göring’s organization had a reputation of being the most successful
in decoding and capturing foreign military intelligence, it is understandable why the FA was so
desirable to other intelligence directors.149 Himmler had a difficult time dropping the notion of
gaining control of the FA. Schellenberg recalled a conversation in which Himmler said, “Göring
should bear vis-à-vis Hitler the responsibility for all telephone monitoring, for if he [Himmler]
would do this, Hitler might suddenly conceive the idea that his own telephone conversations
146
Manvell and Fraenkel, Goering, 108. 148
United States Army, Goering’s Replies to Sharp Interrogation Brief: Forschungsamt, June 22, 1945, RG 153
Entry A 144, Box 56, Göring 100-159, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
149
147
47 were overheard.”150 Here, Himmler seems to be accusing Göring of the ability to listen in to
Hitler’s phone calls. Though he most likely said this out of frustration at not attaining his
wishes, his outburst also carries his vengeful intention of causing trouble for Göring. The FA
presented yet another point of contention in the relationship between Göring and Himmler.
The personalities of these two men allow for distrust and minor squabbles, but the
infighting never reached the level of Himmler’s other rivalries. Göring was seven years
Himmler’s senior, well established within the party, popular with the German people, and was a
capable executive.151 Himmler lacked his military experience, but was clever, and shared
Göring’s gift of executive ability. After studying the relationship of these two men, it seems as if
there were times when Göring could easily have harmed Himmler politically. Instead, he let the
situation pass, perhaps due to Himmler’s youth, lack of experience, or respect.
During the 1935 anniversary reenactment of the Beer Hall Putsch, Göring and Himmler
both stood next to Hitler. In photographs taken of the event, there are several intimate images of
Himmler and Göring speaking and laughing. They stand close to one another, and in the photos
where they are each laughing, Himmler is leaning into Göring’s circle of personal space.
Himmler speaks animatedly in nearly all of them, utilizing his hands, while Göring stands cool
and collected with his hands on his hips or resting at his side, actively participating in the
conversation.152 The body language in these photographs provides evidence of the relationship
of two men competitively seeking to further their respective positions within the Nazi Party.
These men conspired with each other almost as much as against one another. Of Himmler’s
150
Office of Strategic Services, Schellenberg Interrogation, June, 1945, RG 226 Entry 119A, Box 26, National
151
152
“Kätha Zahler,” Kätha Zahler, last modified November 9,2011, accessed on April 6, 2014,
http://kathazahler.tumblr.com/page/34.
48 rivalries, Göring seems the most predictable and level-headed in his behavior. Himmler
respected Göring’s military experience, and Göring had faith in Himmler’s abilities. Though he
knew he must be cautious of Himmler, Göring does not present a sense of fear of Himmler as he
later does Heydrich who appeared “more immediately dangerous” to Göring.153
On June 16, 1936 all police organizations were consolidated from individual state forces
into one entity for the Reich. Himmler was charged with the new title of Chief of the German
Police. This placed all policing agencies in the hands of the SS, which was rapidly increasing in
power and membership.154 Himmler had been expanding the SS by use of the Gestapo, which,
under the leadership of Göring, had been little more than an organization employed for the arrest
and murder of political opponents. Under Himmler and Heydrich, the Gestapo grew to become
feared. Now with the entire German police force under his command, Himmler could utilize this
strength as an extension of the SS.155 His position of Chief of German Police remained separate
from his Reichsführer-SS title.156
On October 18, 1936, Göring was placed in charge of the Four Year Plan. Assigned with
creating jobs, creating public works, stimulating the economy, and otherwise bettering German
life, Göring, with his experience as a diplomat, economic knowledge, and “doer personality,”
proudly accepted the task.157 This position lessened any resentment Göring felt over the loss of
his policing forces as he was able to focus his attention to the causes which brought him to join
the party.
153
Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 274.
155
Ibid, 270.
156
Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler, 56. 157
154
49 The Minister of War Dispute
In 1938, Göring and Himmler met with another disagreement over power. When Werner
von Blomberg, Minister of War, was removed from his position in January that year after a
scandal involving accusations that his new wife previously employed herself as a prostitute, his
position was left unfilled. Göring, with his military aspirations, naturally coveted the ministry.
Himmler could utilize the post to strengthen his SS forces and supplant the German Army.158
The disagreement was not helped by the fact that both men had collected information showing
Blomberg’s new bride was of low moral standards and each used this information against
Blomberg to oust him from his role. The post carried with it more power than any other single
cabinet post.159
This placed pressure on the uneasy alliance between Göring and Himmler. It was
believed among the party that in the event that Hitler should somehow fall from power, Göring
would immediately purge Himmler and the SS in the same manner that he had participated in
the Röhm and SA purge, and establish a “conservative regime, or perhaps a monarchy.” 160
Though Göring kept a close watch on both Himmler and Heydrich, his plot was unnecessary.
Himmler may have spoken of a desire for ultimate power, yet unlike Göring, Himmler knew he
could not handle ultimate leadership. This is evident in his desertion from the Reich in April of
1945.
Hitler ended the quarrel by taking on the position himself. Rather than name Göring
Minister of War, he instead awarded him the title of Reichsmarschall, the highest rank of the
158
160
Donald R. Heath, 1st Secretary of Embassy, Memorandum on the International Opposition to the National
Socialist Regime, February 17, 1941, RG 165 Entry 77, Box 1081, 3600-3700, National Archives and Records
159
50 armed forces. After this clash, Himmler and Göring seem to have generally gone their separate
ways. With the exception of Hitler’s line of succession, their organizations and respective
powers rarely came into contact. A working relationship formed once more in 1942 when
Himmler supplied Göring with labor workers and supported some prisoner experiments such as
the high altitude and exposure experiments relevant to the interests of his Luftwaffe.161
While Himmler and Göring maintained a working cooperation, attention to the
connection between the two had waned. This came in useful to Göring during the Nuremberg
Trials. In an attempt to distance himself from the Reichsführer, when asked about the
exterminations of the Final Solution, Göring stated,
“Himmler must have suddenly gotten a fiendish pleasure out of such things. I have heard
such stories before, for example that a large load of Jews left for Poland during the
winter, where some of the people froze to death in their vehicles…When I made
inquiries, I was told that such things would not happen again—it was claimed that the
trains had been sent on the wrong route.”162
Göring Encounters Himmler the Human
Göring was not fond of Himmler’s subordinate Heydrich, who at times acted in direct
defiance of Göring’s wishes—as exemplified when Heydrich established an SD office in Berlin
against Göring’s demands.163 Heydrich possessed the ability to influence and persuade Himmler
to make decisions, give orders, and take certain actions. The real question in dealing with the
rivalry between Göring and Himmler is how much of an impact Heydrich had on the
161
Anthony Read, The Devil’s Disciples: Hitler’s Inner Circle (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 799800.
162
163
51 relationship between these men. Despite Himmler’s best efforts, he never actually seems to have
surpassed Göring in Hitler’s favored entourage.
Without Göring, Himmler would not have ascended to the level of power he was able to
attain. Even though his control of the Gestapo came at the behest of Hitler, the strength and
intelligence information the organization came with was a direct result of Göring’s leadership.
Throughout Himmler’s leadership within the party, Göring was present offering his opinion as
he felt necessary to assist the young leader to the benefit of the party.
Interestingly enough, each man ultimately experienced his downfall at the hands of the
same man—Martin Bormann. Göring had long suspected Bormann of intrigues against him, his
power, and his role as successor to Hitler. During one of their walks, Speer confirmed these
suspicions, telling Göring of Bormann’s comments against him when he was not present at
Hitler’s tea times.164 Speer informed Göring that Bormann was working to place Hitler against
Head of the Hitler Youth, Baldur von Schirach, and Göring was next. 165 “As a final clincher,
Speer told Göring he had evidence that Bormann was planning to supplant him as Hitler’s
successor and presented him with a number of examples to prove it.”166 This of course infuriated
Göring, and in their discussions, he warned Himmler against him as well. While Göring took it
upon himself loyally to advise Himmler to use caution, he never seems to have suspected the
secretary would control his own collapse of power.
While Göring suspected Himmler of standing as his main rival for ultimate power, he
came to realize the truth sometime after 1942. Though he did not recall an exact time during
which his influence decreased, during his Nuremberg interrogation, he simply stated it was some
164
Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 791.
Ibid, 791-792.
166
Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 792. 165
52 time in the middle of 1942.167 When asked who his competitors for power were, he replied,
“Himmler, later Bormann.”168
Evidence of Himmler’s weakness came to Göring’s attention when he detained Himmler
at Hitler’s birthday gathering on April 20, 1945 to privately discuss Himmler’s contacts with the
Allied powers, which had come to his attention. Göring attempted to convince Himmler to drop
his attempts and leave Berlin. Göring told Himmler, “don’t take offence, but I doubt that they’ll
[the Western Allies] find you acceptable as a negotiating partner.”169 Himmler became prickled,
and responded, “sorry to contradict you, but I have incontrovertible proof that I am considered
abroad to be the only person capable of maintaining order.”170
Himmler then asked Göring if he would appoint him Chancellor should anything happen
to Hitler. Astounded, Göring replied that the request was impossible as the offices of Chancellor
and Führer were lawfully combined. Göring was met with both a chilling and pathetic request
when Himmler responded, “Herr Reichsmarschall, if anything should prevent you from
succeeding the Führer—say you are eliminated—can I have the position?”171 This bizarre
request was spoken from a man reverting to a timid child. This question of “can I have the
position,” demonstrations the true control Himmler knew Göring possessed. Göring had
Himmler’s measure, and they each were aware of the fact. Himmler suddenly found himself
back into his position of 1926, when he was trying to make a place for himself on the political
stage. Here he was, graciously asking Göring to once more, assist him in his ascent to power.
167
168
Ibid.
169
170
Ibid, 893
171
Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 893. 53 With all the grace and dignity bred into him, Göring gently but authoritatively replied,
“my dear Himmler, we shall have to wait and see. That will depend upon circumstances. I can’t
for the life of me see what might prevent me from taking up the office.”172 Himmler heeded
Göring’s advice and left Berlin that night.
172
Ibid, 894.
54 Heydrich
The Architect and the Aryan Archetype
Just as Göring assisted in Himmler’s ascent to power after 1929, Reinhard Heydrich
further elevated Himmler’s leadership positions through a combination of subtle persuasion and
outright suggestion. Heydrich utilized his insight to select roles and political maneuvers which
would benefit Himmler and, through the trickledown effect, himself as well. Heydrich was able
to influence the naïve Reichsführer undetected, an ability Heydrich would maintain over his
superior until his death.
Determined to maintain and fully reap the benefits of his work, Heydrich ultimately acted
as a protecting agent for Himmler. Heydrich needed Himmler, but only to a certain point, and
once he recognized his opportunity to unburden himself from his superior and pursue his own
leadership opportunities, Heydrich took his chance. Heydrich’s own vanity proved to be his
downfall. His arrogance was the cause of his rivalries within the party, his reason for driving in
an open car through a city which despised him, and the cause of his assassination. Heydrich
aided Himmler in achieving and maintaining his leadership roles until his death in 1942. Though
Heydrich was a dangerously close rival, working as Himmler’s aide-de-camp, Himmler could
not have politically survived or prospered without Heydrich’s efforts.
The likeness Reinhard Heydrich bore to the perfect Aryan ideal set the precedent within
the Nazi Party. When Himmler held the self-portrait Heydrich had sent along with his
application, he knew he was viewing the personification of Aryan perfection. Heydrich’s
shrewdness served him well, and he included a self-portrait along with his application. He knew
that his appearance would only place the odds of obtaining employment in his favor.
55 Heydrich’s height, blond hair, and facial features all satisfied the racial requirements
Himmler demanded of his SS recruits. This was a man of Nordic descent. Looking at Heydrich’s
photograph, Himmler was forced to recall all of his readings of the German occultist Thule
Society, pan-Germanic purity, and proclamations of the Aryan race as “masters of the world”—
he was impressed. Here was a potential SS member who could serve as the poster boy for his SS
organization.173 Himmler felt he had to obtain Heydrich for his entourage;174 preferably through
leadership as Heydrich would ultimately be representing Himmler, but a member of Himmler’s
inner circle for the pure sake of acting as the model of Aryan appearance would suffice as well.
Heydrich was viewed as the ideal German man.
After sending his application and weeks of waiting without a response, Heydrich
journeyed to Himmler’s home in the summer of 1931. He was permitted by Margarete Himmler
to speak to her husband who had taken to his bed with the flu. “Himmler simply entered the
room and said to him, ‘You have twenty minutes to write down on this piece of paper the
functions of a security service of the SS’.”175 Heydrich had not the slightest idea what to write,
but was aware that he had to make his best effort with this opportunity. When Himmler reentered the room, he was apparently pleased with what Heydrich had written. He offered
Heydrich the position of organizer of the Sicherheitsdienst, SD—the security office of the SS.
Neither man was entirely sure what was required of a security office, nor how properly to
formulate such an organization. Yet these two men were able to forge a working relationship
which created a security organization unlike any before, and which has used as an example for
other fledgling organizations. Himmler admired Heydrich’s wireless telegraphy and signals
173
G.S. Graber, The Life and Times of Reinhard Heydrich (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1980), 43.
175
Graber, The Life and Times of Reinhard Heydrich, 46.
174
56 knowledge, as well as his antisemitic views. 176 Heydrich’s Navy service, while also admired,
though it may later have served as a source of envy for Himmler, having not been physically
capable of joining the service branch of his choice much earlier in his life.177 Still, Himmler
appreciated this experience in Heydrich. It showed his ability to follow orders, work for the
greater good, and his dedication to Germany.
Troubled Youth
Born in the Halle province of Saxony on March 7th, 1904, Heydrich was four years
Himmler’s junior. His father was the Director of a private music academy, and his mother also
came from a musically inclined family.178 With education and culture held in positions of
importance in Heydrich’s middle class family, he strove for excellence in school and, like his
father, participated in fencing clubs.179 He showed signs of both courage and arrogance in his
youth. In high school, he was given a B in chemistry after arguing with his professor in the
presence of his peers that his work in fact deserved an A. Despite this instance occurring in an
era when one did not argue with teachers over grades, the professor was somehow inspired to
raise Heydrich’s grade.180
Heydrich’s mother, Elisabeth, realized her eldest son’s attitude needed to be corrected,
and she had no difficulty being a disciplinarian. However, Elisabeth’s method of choice was
caning. One uncomfortable recollection of Heydrich inquiring “what about the other cheek” after
his corporal punishment is evidence that the boy had a dark side frighteningly close to a
176
Graber, The Life and Times of Reinhard Heydrich, 46. Padfield, Himmler, 107.
178
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nazis in the News: Reinhard Heydrich, May 27, 1942, RG 65 Box 21, File
202554, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
177
179
180
Ibid, 10.
57 masochistic personality.181 Due to his experience with “tough love,” no matter how apparently
unsuccessful, Heydrich was hardened. Yet he seems to only have been disciplined according to
the acceptance of his strong will. He knew how to behave to obtain what he desired, and outside
of this he was selfish and narcissistic. Combining these traits with his intelligence and craftiness
made him dangerous.
The comparison of Heydrich’s and Himmler’s respective childhoods provides insight to
their later working relationship. Heydrich was an avid sportsman and an excellent musician. He
excelled on the violin.182 On the other hand, Himmler was clumsy and unskilled in gymnastics.
His lack of coordination made him a failure with his piano lessons.183In contrast to Heydrich,
who showed evidence of a quick temper even as a child, Himmler retained his faint smile, never
showing his anger, but retaining his vengeful thoughts for a later date – a reaction to anger which
remained with him through adulthood.184
Both men were raised by a father in the education field, and emotionally strong,
intelligent women. Himmler and Heydrich each had a mother who realized her son was troubled,
but whereas Himmler’s mother would verbally reprimand Himmler and continue to coddle him,
Heydrich’s mother would physically correct her son. Though both men have been branded
“brutal” by historians over the decades, Heydrich was mentally and physically able to inflict the
terror of the Third Reich and the Final Solution. Himmler simply was not capable of such
actions.
Heydrich’s good grades awarded him the opportunity to attend the Reformgymnasium (a
respectable reform school for secondary education), where he was able to practice the latest
181
Graber, The Life and Times of Reinhard Heydrich, 11. Padfield, Himmler, 107.
183
Smith,Heinrich Himmler, 27.
184
Ibid, 27.
182
58 technologies and sciences. “In 1906, no fewer than 95 percent of Protestant and 91 percent of
Catholic children were educated in schools of their own confession. Reinhard Heydrich’s
educational experience was therefore exceptionally modern and forward-looking in more than
one sense.”185 Heydrich was well educated, learning science, mathematics, and physics, but also
was exposed to German literature and languages.
Unlike Himmler’s childhood, which was rich in pride of German heritage, there was a
nagging question mark over the possibility of a Jewish connection in his background. As a child,
he was taunted over this. In response, as an adolescent through his young adulthood, he became a
staunch antisemite. He wished to distance himself from the possibility of shared lineage with this
culture. 186 Historian G.S. Graber writes that while Heydrich’s younger brother Heinz threatened
his own tormentor who referred to the boy as “a dirty Jew” with a knife and thus proved his
nerve, Heydrich would simply whine about the teasing to adults.187 This childhood behavior of
assuming the position of the victim was quite out of character in contrast to the heartless killer
Heydrich would become in the future. Likewise, these experiences during Heydrich’s youth pose
a possible cause for the merciless hatred of the Jews which he would grow to embrace.
Noted as being cruel to the servants in the household of his parents, unruly in public
toward strangers, and described as a “truculent, unhappy loner” by those acquainted with the
family, something must have snapped within Heydrich to progress his grumbling and rude
behavior into acts of violence and murder. 188 Whereas Himmler chose to brainwash himself
against the Jewish people, Heydrich, it could be argued, found a cause for his hatred. He did not
185
Robert Gerworth, Hitler’s Hangman: The Life of Heydrich (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 24. Padfield,Himmler, 107.
187
188
Ibid, 9.
186
59 wish to feel “different,” but rather blend into the masses.189 Though the allegation Heydrich’s
father Bruno was of Jewish ancestry was proven false, this was an audible stigma Heydrich lived
with during his childhood, shifting to fearful whispers as an adult member of the Nazi Party. 190
In 1932, after receiving several inquiries from party members, Gregor Strasser had
Heydrich’s ancestry examined. Dr. Achim Grecke, head of the Information Office, was charged
with the task. His report of June 22, 1932 clearly stated Heydrich to be “of German origin and
free from any influence of colored or Jewish blood.”191 Shaken by the resurfacing of the Jewish
blood rumor, Heydrich continued to research his ancestry privately, utilizing the SD services.
Heydrich’s fears were unnecessary, however, as his heritage had been cleared. He became
respected, protected, and feared within the party so much so that in 1940, when a baker in Halle
attempted to spread the rumor once more that Heydrich was a Jew, he was tried for libel and
incarcerated for one year.
Evil Behind Blue Eyes
Aside from his concerns about his heritage, Heydrich also differed from his superior in
that he was anything but a sexual prude. In 1922, he joined the Reichsmarine (Navy) and was
commissioned as Sub-Lieutenant by 1926. Promoted to Lieutenant in 1928, he became an
Intelligence Officer in the Baltic Command. In 1931, he abruptly resigned from the Navy and
sought other employment.192 Martin Bormann created a security file on Heydrich including
information about his sudden resignation from the Navy after he engaged in pre-marital relations
189
Graber, The Life and Times of Reinhard Heydrich, 10. 191
Gerwarth, Hitler’s Hangman, 61.
192
190
60 and impregnated his fiancée, daughter of a high-ranking marine engineer. Heydrich refused to
marry the girl claiming that she had indulged in pre-marital relations (though he had been the
other participating party), and the girl’s father insisted to Heydrich that he resign from the Navy
before he was dismissed. 193
Heydrich was a frightening character. As his roles grew within the party, his tasks and
expectations seem to have become increasingly trying to his psyche. Historian Joachim C. Fest
recounts a night out as described by one of Heydrich’s colleagues. When the “Blond Beast”
returned home to his apartment after a night of drinking, he shot his reflection in the mirror. “He
was the prisoner of this figure of negation, he lived in a world populated by the self-created
chimeras of a hostile distrust, scented behind every treachery, intrigue or snares of the hidden
enmity… Himmler said of him that he was ‘the embodiment of distrust.”194 Heydrich collected
information, and judged who should live or die based on the loyalties and reports of others.
Though he seems to have enjoyed his work and his power—and performed his duties
effectively—it seems something was taxing Heydrich’s mind.
Heydrich was a cunning and transparently charming man. He was able to gain supporters
through his charismatic performances or from the fear he instilled. Behind his piercing blue eyes
lay a cold, calculating, and murderous mind. Pathologically jealous, Heydrich became greatly
offended if he presented work, such as a criminal file he built on one of his many victims, only to
have his efforts minimized or laid aside by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.195 both He
would then become irritable with Ribbentrop. Heydrich knew how to gain information,
193
Frischauer, Himmler, 35-36. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 102.
195
Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg, Hitler’s Chief of Counterintelligence
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 107. 194
61 blackmail, and continue his rise within the Third Reich. Heydrich purposefully sought out
information to build files which would place him in Hitler’s favor.196
He was able to manipulate Himmler in such a way that he could convince his superior to
make certain decisions and actions which would help not only Himmler, but himself as well. One
example was Himmler’s decision to not allow control of the Gestapo from leaving his hands.
Heydrich working under Himmler’s command knew that it would benefit him greatly to ensure
that the man he could easily influence remained his superior, preventing all outside influence.
Heydrich recognized that anything he was able to convince Himmler to do, say, or command
would in turn benefit him. Schellenberg recalled, “he supplied Himmler with brilliant ideas so
that he could shine in conferences with Hitler, Hess, Bormann, and the General Staff, and yet
would do this so tactfully that Himmler never suspected these ideas were not his own.”197
Heydrich had the foresight to see that Bormann needed to be kept at arm’s length. Yet he
never saw that Heinrich Müller, his own trusted recruit to the SS and Gestapo, had established a
relationship with Bormann and was in fact informing on Heydrich and Himmler. 198 Müller
handed information from the SD and Gestapo to Bormann. In 1943, after Heydrich’s death,
Müller turned completely against Himmler. Himmler attempted to shield Admiral Wilhelm
Carnaris, Chief of German Military Intelligence for resistance against the State. He ordered
Müller to drop the case.199 After this, Müller joined with Bormann, turning Ernst Kaltenbrunner,
Heydrich’s replacement as Director of the Reich Main Security Office, from having loyalty to
that of Himmler to Bormann as well.200
196
Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, 211. Ibid, 14.
198
Gerwarth, Hitler’s Hangman, 76. ; Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, 188.
199
200
62 Himmler was aware that his subordinate was talented in deception, but it would not be
until approximately eleven years later, during 1942, that he would fully realize and come to
terms with the fact that his right hand man was resigned to take orders and follow direction.
Heydrich wished to make his own commands. He was extremely cold, controlled, and
approximating—perhaps even more so than Himmler. The latter was aware that his subordinate
had the ability to rise into further power. Himmler coupled this awareness with his growing sense
of inferiority to Heydrich, and came to realize that he actually feared the man he had brought to
power as his right hand.201
Heydrich’s Intelligence
At the time of their meeting, Heydrich had no idea of Himmler’s military ignorance,
assuming that Himmler’s position of Reichsführer-SS had to account for his experience. On the
other hand, Himmler was under the impression that given his military background, Heydrich was
at least familiar with the inner workings of a security service.202 Heydrich would spend the next
several years building and re-organizing the SD, performing his job so well “that the mopping up
of political opponents in 1933 was done with a thoroughness and swiftness which was decisive
for the continuation of Hitler’s regime.”203
Heydrich, however, did not completely build the SD from the ground up. Hermann
Göring had already been building secret police files on personalities of interest. At Hitler’s
behest, Göring passed power over the Gestapo to Himmler on April 20, 1934. Himmler then
201
Fest, Faces of the Third Reich, 101.
Graber, The Life and Times of Reinhard Heydrich, 46-48.
203
202
63 named Heydrich the head of the Gestapo on April 22, 1934.204 Göring’s pet, the Forschungsamt
(FA) secret military communication agency was activated in 1933 to act as a military
communication intelligence agency. Heydrich then suggested Himmler absorb the agency,
claiming the organization should be a branch of the police. Each time Himmler brought up the
subject, Göring adamantly refused. The FA was a useful tool to the Luftwaffe and army. Göring
had given intelligence information and agencies to Heydrich and Himmler before in accordance
with Hitler’s orders, and this was one organization he was not going to pass down. 205
Against Göring’s wishes, and in direct defiance of his authority, Heydrich established an
SD office in Berlin.206 During the 1934 purge of the SA, Party Leader and rival to Hitler, Gregor
Strasser was “murdered by the hand of Reinhard Heydrich to satisfy Göring’s animosity and
also, it seems to pay off a Heydrich grudge.”207 Though he may have been attempting to pass off
some sort of olive branch to Göring, for the sake of their personal and working relationship,
Himmler had mixed feelings on the execution of his previous superior who had brought him up
in the party. Heydrich could have been the cause of rivalries among Himmler and other members
of the Reich, especially Göring. Heydrich possessed the ability to manipulate Himmler, to the
point where it was sometimes difficult to differentiate just who was the superior. While on the
surface, some of Heydrich’s prodding of Himmler may appear to be to the Reichsführer’s
advantage, Heydrich quite often stood to gain from the advancement as well. Heydrich helped
Himmler continue his rise to power without losing any previously gained footing by swaying
Himmler to a decision—no matter how unintentional. Kaltenbrunner later claimed that Himmler
204
Manvell and Fraenkel, Goring, 108-109. United States Army, Goering’s Replies to Sharp Interrogation Brief: Forschungsamt, June 22, 1945, RG 153
Entry A 144, Box 56, Göring 100-159, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
205
206
207
64 was “not capable of an unequivocal decision.”208 Therefore, Heydrich’s actions truly benefited
both men.
Himmler was encouraged to seek the position of Police President of Munich by
Heydrich. Though Hitler was relieved that his faithful Himmler requested the position, Heydrich
knew that Himmler would entrust him to share the power and work load. 209 Heydrich then
convinced Himmler that the SS should side with the Army rather than the rowdy SA, which was
on the brink of self-destruction. 210 Hitler was already facing the difficult dilemma of turning
from his old comrade Röhm and his SA in favor of the Army to maintain his own control, lest he
side with the SA against the wishes of President Paul von Hindenberg. The additional support of
Himmler to join forces with the Army was beneficial to both Hitler and Himmler for the very
same reason—ousting Röhm would secure each of their positions and put to rest any worry of a
coup of power or overthrow of position. Hitler feared Röhm would wish to lead the Nazi Party,
utilizing his SA paramilitary forces as physical support, and Himmler knew that the man who
trained him would be capable of overtaking his position if he was not mindful.
Heydrich was highly intelligent, and possessed the foresight to predict the concerns of his
superiors, and prepare a solution. Thus Heydrich was able to secure his own position, validate
loyalty, and keep the men who were able to assist him in his ascent within their own realms.
There were times, however, when Himmler was fully aware of Heydrich’s plan to encroach on
his authority. In such situations, Himmler would reprimand his subordinate.211 If Himmler and
Heydrich were in a meeting and the latter overstepped his boundaries in attempting to push
208
209
Ibid, 46.
211
Mario R. Dederichs, Heydrich: Face of Evil (Drexel Hill: Casemate Publishers, 2003), 122. 210
65 Himmler into a decision, Himmler would storm from the office, postponing any decisions which
had been made out of vindictiveness. “I have had enough of your cold, rational criticism,”
Himmler once said before his exit.212 After all, it was Heydrich who was able to aid Himmler
into arriving at the realization that Röhm had to be executed to prevent any possible future
uprising.
Himmler and Heydrich on the Rise
With the combined power of Himmler controlling the SS and Heydrich commanding the
Gestapo, the two were able to crush the SA and political opponents who were a possible threat to
the Party and Hitler’s command. In 1936, Heydrich attained further power as a result of his
proven ability to plot, command, and execute objectives. The Security Police (SiPo) and
Criminal Police (Kripo) were placed under the control of the SD. The Gestapo and Kripo became
agencies under the SiPo. Heydrich thus oversaw the Gestapo, SD, Kripo, and SiPo, all being
weapons of intelligence and police forces. To all intents and purposes, this made Heydrich the
“chief of the whole security police.”213
Another joining of organizations occurred on September 27, 1939 when the SD and the
SiPo were integrated into the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), remaining under the
command of Heydrich.214 He was given the title “Chief of Security Police and SD” on October 1.
Heydrich’s career flourished as he gained power. The admired sportsman, fencer, horseman, and
avid swimmer was awarded the Reich Sport Badge in 1940.215 Heydrich’s comrades experienced
a mixture of pride and jealousy when it came to “the blond beast.” Certainly Himmler felt both
212
Mario R. Dederichs, Heydrich, 122.
213
214
215
Dederichs, Heydrich, 123. 66 proud to have Heydrich as his right-hand-man, as well as envious that his subordinate was the
capable sportsman he had wished to be. For Bormann, Heydrich’s added attention was
undesirable, and jealousy forced him to action.
Exactly two years after the RSHA absorption, Heydrich was appointed Deputy Reich
Protector of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on September 27, 1941. Heydrich’s new
position came at the recommendation of Bormann.216 Bormann jumped at the opportunity to not
only be able to act as a channel between Heydrich and Hitler, making Heydrich even more
dependent on him, he also wished to elevate Heydrich to a position where he was closer to
Himmler’s rank. Heydrich had always “stood in Himmler’s shadow. Now he had the opportunity
to draw level.”217 This was the perfect opportunity for Bormann to attempt to create a rift
between Himmler and Heydrich in the hopes that the SD, SS, or one of the police organizations
may be destroyed or better yet, passed to Bormann himself as per his previous requests. Though
Heydrich indeed grew in power, Bormann’s plan was foiled when Himmler and Heydrich
continued working alongside one another.
The “Butcher of Prague,” as Heydrich came to be known, wasted no time in thinning out
the 10.3 million Czech population with the assistance of approximately 1,841 Gestapo officers.
Between Heydrich’s arrival in Prague and the end of November 1941, “a total of 404 official
death sentences were carried out and some 6,000 arrests were made. “ On September 30 alone,
“fifty-eight people were executed, and 256 sent to Gestapo prisons.”218 Driven by egotism,
Heydrich crowned himself with the jewels of the Kingdom of Bohemia on November 19, 1941.
The occasion was so ghastly, no photographs or films were permitted to be taken of the
216
Ibid, 123.
Dederichs, Heydrich, 122.
218
217
67 “coronation.”219 This demonstrates Heydrich’s overall narcissism, conceit, and growing desire
for power.
There was no doubt that Heydrich was gaining influence. On January 20, 1942, when
Heydrich himself called for the commencement of the Wannsee Conference to discuss the Final
Solution, his ascent to power became clear. On July 31 of the previous year, Göring had written
to Heydrich, personally authorizing him to prepare a plan for the “total solution of the Jewish
question.”220 Göring would later claim that the extermination of the Jews had been instigated by
Himmler and Heydrich; murder had never been his intention. He claimed he “could never have
approved of such a measure.”221
Whether Göring was telling the truth will never be known. It is interesting that he
assigned the plot designing to Heydrich and not Himmler. Heydrich was Chief of the RSHA,
however, it was Himmler who commanded the SS branch of the Einsatzgruppen. This special
force acted as the mobile killing squads. Going from town to town, the Einsatzgruppen
systematically rounded up the Jewish population and executed them in nearby forests. A power
struggle between Göring and Himmler serves as one explanation why Göring would have
depended on Heydrich instead of the Reichsführer. In addition, Heydrich’s qualifications for
ensuring information remain secret and be carried out covertly could have been an attraction to
Heydrich over Himmler.
Returning to Prague, Heydrich continued his tasks of governing. When Albert Speer,
Minister of Armaments and War Production, visited Heydrich in December 1941, he was
horrified to discover Heydrich’s lack of urgency for his personal security. Whereas his home in
Berlin was fully alarmed and his cars bore a likeness to mobile armories, Heydrich commuted
219
Dederichs, Heydrich, 121-122. Manvell and Fraenkel, Goering, 259.
221
Ibid, 386. 220
68 through the streets of Prague in his open top Mercedes. He refused an escort claiming it would
create an image of German weakness to the Czechs222 and that bodyguards were for ‘the Party
big-wigs.’223When Speer voiced his concern for Heydrich’s safety to the Protector, Heydrich
replied, “why should my Czechs shoot me?”224 The following spring, Heydrich’s arrogance
would cost him his life.
The Death of the “Beast”
On May 27, 1942 the reckless governor was shot near the city boundary of Prague as his
car slowed to take a sharp bend.225 Heydrich was being driven by a different chauffer that day,
prompting Schellenberg to write that “had Heydrich’s old and experienced chauffeur been at the
wheel, he certainly would not have let himself be duped by the assassin who jumped out into the
road.”226 The first man, Josef Gabcik, leapt into the road shooting, and the driver made the poor
decision of slowing rather than quickly accelerating from the ambush. The second assailant, Jan
Kubis, then rolled a bomb underneath the vehicle. After the bomb detonated, Heydrich jumped
from the car and opened fire on the assassins, who escaped on bicycle.227
Kubis and Gabcik met at the French Foreign Legion in Poland where they volunteered for
the mission to assassinate Heydrich. 228 The men were parachuted in to Czechoslovakia by
British Royal Air Force planes, and then waited several hours until Heydrich, consistent as ever,
222
Dederichs, Heydrich, 140.
224
Ibid, 140.
225
Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 108.
226
Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, 291.
227
Ibid, 291.
228
223
69 traveled down his daily route. After the attack Heydrich collapsed and was cared for by top
doctors sent by both Hitler and Himmler.229
Shrapnel from the bomb penetrated Heydrich’s body, causing an infection. Material from
his uniform and fragments from the car seat had entered the wounds causing further infection.
Despite efforts, infection spread to Heydrich’s spleen, and he died on June 4, 1942. 230 Before
Heydrich’s death, Himmler visited him on May 31. It seemed Heydrich was slowly recovering,
and the two held a conversation. Shortly after, Heydrich relapsed and died. As penicillin had
been discovered in 1928 and experimented throughout the 1930s, the antibiotic could have been
brought into Germany if requested—and most certainly would have to save Heydrich’s life had it
been suggested. Supporters of this idea include historian Robert Gerwarth who wrote, “had
penicillin been available in Germany in 1942, Heydrich would have survived.”231
The fact that Heydrich had been trying to surpass Himmler in power and similarly
obtaining a position of poor standing with Bormann may have contributed to Heydrich’s death.
Himmler had some of his own doctors present to treat Heydrich, and though he “is said to have
wept when he heard the news,” it is still debatable if the doctors Himmler dispatched were
charged with saving Heydrich. 232 As Heydrich was showing signs of recovery, only to die in
agony just a few days after Himmler visited him, contemporary historians wonder if doctors
were perhaps sent to ensure Heydrich’s death.233 Given the evidence of Himmler’s jealousy of
Heydrich, the power Himmler stood to gain with his removal, and the suspicious details
surrounding Heydrich’s last days, the possibility that Himmler influenced the death of Heydrich
cannot be ruled out.
229
Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 108. Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, 290.
231
232
233
Ibid, 749.
230
70 Himmler said fate had “snatched Heydrich away at the zenith of his power.”234 Heydrich
had the knowledge, ability, and personality that if he wished, he could have removed each of
these men. Heydrich possessed the organizational, political intelligence, and diplomatic
characteristics necessary to serve as Hitler’s secretary. Heydrich certainly had a history of
pressuring Himmler into decisions and acting of his own accord. Together, Himmler and
Heydrich dominated the paramilitary and secret intelligence agencies of Nazi Germany. Himmler
acted as the representative power and as Göring put it, “the brain was called Heydrich.”235
Heydrich possessed ruthlessness, conniving ability, and comprehension of how the SS
and Gestapo were to run. He was both liked and feared within these organizations, and a coup to
over throw Himmler would not have been out of the realm of possibilities for Heydrich. In fact,
Heydrich had become quite a threat to both Himmler and Bormann. During a drunken stupor,
Heydrich bragged that he planned to become Minister of the Interior, taking the RSHA with him
and leaving Himmler with a crippled SS, devoid of a Gestapo or secret intelligence.236 As it was,
when Himmler obtained the position of Minister of the Interior, he ensured that no one could
even attempt to command his security organizations—which he had controlled for nearly a
decade by 1943 when he was promoted.
According to Schellenberg, Heydrich was afraid that Bormann and Himmler’s mounting
jealousy would prompt them to ruin and murder him. Heydrich believed that Bormann would be
the more vicious of the two; that he would destroy Heydrich both personally and politically out
of jealousy. Heydrich believed that Himmler on the other hand, would confront him head on,
verbally and cruelly.237 Though there would be a great deal of personal anger and resentment,
234
Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 109. Ibid, 103.
236
235
71 Heydrich felt Himmler would keep the issue among the two of them. This makes sense for each
man. Bormann was always the manipulative schemer, and Himmler would be so upset and
borderline mortified that someone else had taken the spotlight, he would not wish to draw
outside attention which may in return make him look weak or like a fool.
Other Party leaders did not put aside the possibility of the assassination having been
organized by a Heydrich rival. In a post war interview with the Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Kaltenbrunner stated that he did “not know whether
Himmler had anything to do with the death of Heydrich, but does not deny the possibility.238
According to Schellenberg, Heydrich was becoming nervous for his position. He asked
Schellenberg to join Hitler’s entourage to act as an insider spy on his behalf. It was in the spring
of 1942 that Schellenberg recalled that Heydrich shared with him that there was a great deal of
rigidity between he and Himmler. He was attempting to be as agreeable as possible. Heydrich
told Schellenberg he was concurring with decisions out of necessity. Heydrich said, “if Himmler
insists on it, and just at this moment I just show my goodwill. The situation between us is pretty
tense just now.”239
Himmler’s jealousy toward Heydrich, coupled with Bormann’s aggression and acts of
intrigue against Heydrich, had the latter quite concerned for his safety. Both men were envious
of Heydrich’s relationship with Hitler, including his ability to confer alone with the Führer.
Heydrich’s ability to speak directly with Hitler especially annoyed Bormann.240 To attack either
of them was dangerous not only due to their individual retaliations, but Hitler was intensely
238
Records of the United Stated Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Goering as a War Criminal, RG
238 Entry P1-21, Box 1, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
239
240
Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, 288. Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler, 128.
72 passionate about internal SS loyalty. The breaking point for the three was Heydrich’s promotion
as Protector of Bohemia- Moravia.241
“It was the practice of Hitler and Himmler to rule by playing their associates off one
against the other. But with a man like Heydrich this was impossible. Besides, as head of the
Reich Security Office, and also as Acting Reich Protector, he had become too powerful for
them.”242 Schellenberg said this in reference to Himmler and Bormann. Heydrich could no
longer divert attention from the honors and attention paid to him by Hitler. The very power and
control Heydrich had so strongly desired eventually cost him his life.
Upon reception of the news of the assassination attempt, the United States Office of
Strategic Services wrote a report stating, “Heydrich was one of the most important members of
the Himmler group within the Nazi Party, all the more important as he controlled the Gestapo,
the most important instrument of power in Germany.”243 With Heydrich removed, the constant
threat of being overthrown by his subordinate was cleared from Himmler’s mind. Whether or not
he did indeed have something to do with the assassination, Himmler now could replace Heydrich
with controllable personalities over whom he could keep a firm grip. Heydrich had turned out to
be too intelligent, charismatic, and fearsome than Himmler anticipated. He was not going to
make the same mistake again. After Kaltenbrunner replaced Heydrich, he claimed that the SD
became part of the SS, leaving him only as the head of the Internal Information Service, though
he was titled Head of the RSHA.244 Himmler never placed his trust in another subordinate as he
had Heydrich.
241
Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, 288-289.
243
244
242
73 Himmler realized he had been so preoccupied by his fascination with this image of
Heydrich’s “perfect” Aryanism that he failed to recognize the dangerous mind behind the
features. Schellenberg said of Heydrich,
He was far superior to all his political colleagues and controlled them as he controlled the
vast intelligence machine of the SD. …Heydrich had and incredibly acute perception of
the moral, human, professional, and political weaknesses of others, and… his unusual
intellect was matched by the ever-watchful instincts of a predatory animal… he operated
on the principal of ‘divide and rule,’ and even applied this to his relations with Hitler and
Himmler. The decisive thing for him was always to know more than others… and to use
this knowledge and the weakness of others to render them completely dependent on him,
from the highest to the lowest… Heydrich was in fact, the puppet-master of the Third
Reich.245
Photographs and Schemes
In observing photographs of Himmler and Heydrich together, their complex relationship
comes into focus. In addition to the many photographs of the two in deep conversation, there are
also images of the two talking and smiling. There are images from Himmler’s 35th birthday in
1935 where Himmler and several other SS dignitaries are giving Heydrich’s car a push after it
refuses to start.246
245
Himmler and six other SS dignitaries push Heydrich’s car, photograph reproduced in G.S. Graber, The Life and
Times of Reinhard Heydrich, London: Robert Hale Limited, 1980. 246
74 Figure 1. Above second from right, Heinrich Himmler. Driver’s seat, Reinhard Heydrich.
In one, Himmler is leaning on the driver’s side of the car laughing with Heydrich. Was
Himmler sharing a laugh with Heydrich about his misfortune on that October day? Was
Heydrich the sort of man who could laugh at a joke at his expense and return the favor? If
Himmler’s swastika armband is removed, along with his uniform insignia, the picture tells a
story of two friends.247
247
Himmler, Heydrich, and Wolff, photograph reproduced in Rober Gerwarth, Hitlet’s Hangman: The Life of
Heydrich, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
75 Figure 2. Above center, Heinrich Himmler;
center, Reinhard Heydrich; bottom left,
Karl Wolff.
Figure 3. Above left, Kurt Daluge; center,
Reinhard Heydrich; right, Heinrich
Himmler.
They appear as ordinary citizens smiling in a photo in their hunting garb with their Chief
of German Order Police, Kurt Daluege. No armbands, no death’s heads, just overcoats and their
rifles.248
To the uninformed eye, these images could speak of two men, working alongside one
another while maintaining both a working and outside friendship. This is not altogether untrue.
There were times when these men seemed to get along well, and even enjoy each other’s
company. But at the core of the relationship, this was a pair independently trying to climb the
ladder of achievement to Hitler. Though they each had their reasons for desiring success as well
as their methods of obtaining their ascent to power, their careers depended on one another.
248
Himmler, Heydrich, and Daluege, photograph reproduced in Rober Gerwarth, Hitlet’s Hangman: The Life of
Heydrich, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
76 Despite the infighting between the two, when they were in front of the camera, it was
clear who was the superior. In group photos where Himmler is speaking before a group with
Heydrich’s face blended into the crowd, or Himmler leading a meeting where Heydrich leans in
to hand off a report249 there is a sense of authority in Himmler. But no photographs are quite as
telling as the images taken of a triumphant Himmler walking several paces ahead of Heydrich in
Vienna after the Anschluss in March 1938.
Himmler employed Heydrich and elevated him to positions which gained him attention,
notoriety, and further power. Heydrich manipulated Himmler into much of his decision making
which, as a result, worked to further the careers of each man. Himmler brought Heydrich into the
upper echelons of the Third Reich, and perhaps when Heydrich’s influence grew uncomfortable
for Himmler, he and Bormann removed Heydrich. Though this theory has not yet been proven,
there seems to be strong evidence leading to this possibility. When Heydrich died, Himmler’s
political powers became threatened. Himmler’s subordinates, such as Heydrich’s replacements
Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Heinrich Müller, criticized and intrigued against him. He now had no
one to act as a buffer between him and his leading rival, Martin Bormann. Heydrich was no
longer able to intimidate Bormann and thus defend Himmler.
249
Himmler, Heydrich, and Wolff, photograph reproduced in Peter Padfield, Himmler, New York:MJF Books, 1990. 77 Bormann
Written Out of Power
To understand the relationship between Bormann and Himmler, a specific examination of
Bormann is necessary. This proves a difficult undertaking as both men were talented deceivers.
Bormann’s method of operation was to select a victim, gain their trust, weaken them, and then
remove them from power. When Bormann challenged Himmler, perhaps he initially believed he
could strip him of his positions easily, and take on his roles. However, Himmler proved himself
to be a worthy adversary whose inner circle included those who worked actively to protect him
and his leadership. Bormann was able to establish a cautious relationship which worked both
professionally and personally with Himmler. Though he seemed to assist Himmler in his ascent,
Bormann actually prevented him from attaining further power. Once Himmler’s influence
reached its peak, and there was no one strong enough to come to his aid, Bormann destroyed
Himmler politically.
Martin Bormann was seemingly the most disliked high ranking leader within the Nazi
Party based on the personal diaries and accounts of his cohorts. Himmler and Baldur von
Schirach Found him to be common and coarse.250 Göring despised Bormann for his smug
personality, “his boorish ways, and above all for his malign influence on Hitler.”251 Hitler’s
mistress and later wife, Eva Braun, hated Bormann. “He caused her a lot of trouble. She had
known for a long time about his intrigues for power.”252 He was constantly trying to outdo his
fellow Nazi leaders, or strike them down at whatever cost. Bormann was devious and crafty. He
250
Jochen von Lang, The Secretary: Martin Bormann: The Man Who Manipulated Hitler (Athens: Random House
Inc., 1979), 52.
251
Read,The Devil’s Disciples, 791.
252
James McGovern, Martin Bormann (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1968), 145. 78 had such a way of planning and executing plots to bring about the downfall of a rival—of which
he had many. He maintained the persona of an innocent aid to his rival, while in reality, it was
Bormann who had preordained their downfall. Such behavior was especially prevalent in his
relationship with Himmler.
Born on June 17, 1900 in the town of Wegeleben in Prussia, Martin Bormann was the son
of Theodor and Antonie Bormann. His father was a postal clerk who had been a sergeant-major
in the Army.253 Much like Heinrich Himmler, he came into adolescence in the shadow of World
War I. When it came time to join the armed forces, though Bormann claimed to have
volunteered, it seemed that he was drafted into the 55th Field Artillery Regiment the month of his
eighteenth birthday. Whereas Himmler was not old enough to see action during the Great War,
Bormann was rumored to have avoided front-line duty. Though Bormann’s lack of experience
was a result of the end of the war rather than avoidance, Schirach remained unconvinced, openly
calling Bormann a coward. 254
Himmler “rose higher so far as offices were concerned than any other member of the
hierarchy.” 255 While Himmler ascended to power while in the public eye, Bormann obtained his
offices privately, behind closed doors. Himmler worked in such a way that his results were
visible to all—and this was primarily a conscious effort to prove his worth. If Himmler was
thought of as the people pleaser, forever seeking attention and approval, Bormann on the other
hand must be considered crafty and manipulative, bent on personal success at any cost. A master
253
255
254
79 at exploiting people to gain his greatest advantage, Bormann politically damaged whomever he
felt necessary to become noticed by and thus obtain approval of the Führer.
Himmler and Bormann had devoted time and effort to gaining their positions. Neither
was capable of simply allowing someone to step in and rob them of power. This leads to the
question of Reinhard Heydrich’s death. Was the assassination conducted by agents of the exiled
Czechoslovakian government, or was his death an inside job conducted by Heydrich’s own
peers? In a report from the U.S. Chief of Council for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality,
Kaltenbrunner, Heydrich’s successor, apparently claimed to not know for certain if Himmler had
anything to do with Heydrich’s death, but did not discard the possibility. 256 In his memoirs, SS
Foreign Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg claimed that in the spring of 1942 Heydrich told
him that he feared upsetting Bormann or Himmler. Hitler had taken a great liking to Heydrich.
With his pure Aryan appearance, and successes in Bohemia and Moravia, Heydrich was quickly
growing to become one of the Führer’s favorites. Hitler would meet privately with Heydrich, and
though he was honored, Heydrich was quite aware of the jealousy this relationship sparked with
Himmler and Bormann.257 He may have even feared for his life as he was well aware of the
extremes these men would go to in order to seek prevention of his further success.
Heydrich realized the importance of placating his superior, and agreed to discuss matters
at Himmler’s request regardless of his own personal opinion. As Heydrich allegedly told
Schellenberg, the relationship between the two leading SS men was tense, and Heydrich knew
256
257
80 the best plan of action was to keep his head down and continue showing his loyalty to
Himmler.258
Himmler had devoted his efforts to entering Hitler’s circle of trust, yet despite his best
attempts, he was unable gain the intimacy with his Führer he desired. The main obstacle
Himmler faced was Bormann, who most certainly could not allow anyone to jeopardize his own
position with the Führer. Bormann alone could carry out Hitler’s wishes and act as a buffer
between him and the harsh realities of the regime and the war.259 Heydrich’s relationship with
Hitler presented a challenge to each of these men. For Himmler, Heydrich seemingly eased into a
position of acceptance and trust which the Reichsführer desperately desired. And if Bormann
guarded his position with Hitler against Himmler, the cunning, charming Heydrich certainly
posed a threat.
Schellenberg accompanied Heydrich to deliver an economic report of the Protectorate to
at the Wolf’s Lair bunker. The date of the meeting is unclear, but could have been some time
after September 1941. Schellenberg recalled that Hitler appeared displeased and returned to the
bunker. Bormann later explained that Hitler was no longer interested in the report. This seems a
strange meeting and reaction. The fact that Heydrich was assasinated on May 27, 1942 after his
return to Prague, however, lends some credibility to his intuition. Indeed, perhaps his fears of
Bormann disliking him were not creations of Heydrich’s paranoia. 260 If Reinhard Heydrich was
assassinated by his peers, Himmler would have assisted in the act as he stood to gain from the
removal of Heydrich as Himmler feared Heydrich would gain Hitler’s attention and the Führer
would supplant him with Heydrich, or Heydrich would at least surpass him in power. Himmler’s
subordinates such as Kaltenbrunner believed him to be connected to the murder in some way, but
258
Ibid, 288.
Von Lang, The Secretary, 222. 260
McGovern, Martin Bormann, 87-88.
259
81 it was Bormann who would have organized the preparations. 261 Be it genuine nervousness or
intuition guiding Heydrich to share his concerns with Schellenberg, he was dead by June 4, 1942.
Despite being one of the most disliked personalities among the Third Reich, Bormann
was able to obtain a working relationship with Himmler during certain points in their career. This
relationship may have been provided by Bormann as leverage to be utilized at a later time, as
actions toward the betterment of the Party, or bribery in the face of a blinded Himmler. Though
Himmler was cold and calculating, he seems to have still been naïve when it came to the game of
extortion. If it was not naïveté, then perhaps Himmler thought only he was capable of coercion.
The leader of the secret police and secret intelligence should have always been able to suspect
when he was being misled, but perhaps this shortsightedness was present in his personal life as
he trusted the wrong person in Bormann. By the time Himmler stopped wavering between
friendship and rivalry with Bormann, finally realizing Bormann for the danger he was, it was too
late for Himmler’s career.
Bormann was conniving when showing any kindness or camaraderie towards Himmler.
Usually, he acted when the situation worked best in his favor. A son was born to Himmler and
his mistress, Hedwig, in February 1942. A boy born of Aryan stock and Nazi leader parentage
was of course greatly welcomed, but Himmler lacked the funds to place Hedwig and the child
they named Helge into a home of their own. Whereas other Nazi leaders had obtained material
gain through corruption and exploitation, Himmler had not accepted such benefits. Upon
Himmler’s request, Bormann provided a loan of 80,000 marks skimmed from the Party.262 This
assisted in building a congenial relationship between the two which was also bolstered by the
261
262
82 growing friendship between Hedwig and Bormann’s wife, Gerda.263 In June of 1944, Hedwig
gave birth to a daughter. Once again, Bormann provided a loan from Party funds which was used
to purchase a home near Schönau in Berchtesgaden. Himmler’s mistress and illegitimate children
were to be kept a secret.264 Most likely out of respect for the party and propagation of the Reich,
Bormann was respectful of Himmler’s privacy in this matter.
The assistance Himmler received in 1942 strangely coincides with Heydrich’s concerned
conversations with Schellenberg.265 Bormann and Himmler both stood to gain with Heydrich
removed. Heydrich repeatedly spoke to Schellenberg of his suspicions of Himmler and Bormann
plotting against him during the spring of 1942. As stated however, by June he was dead. In 1944,
Bormann once again loaned funds to Himmler to gain his trust. This happened to coincide with
the two working together to create the Volkswehr home defense to act as a military unit of
ordinary male German citizens between the ages of sixteen and sixty capable of bearing arms.266
Bormann then nominated Himmler to lead the Army Group Vistula in a failed battle against the
Russians in January 1945. Bormann expected the loss, but wrote to his wife of “Uncle
Heinrich’s” unfortunate failure so as to seem innocent of any ill intent.267 Bormann was
constantly trying to weed Himmler out of power. When Bormann felt he could gain something
he desired from cooperating with a comrade, he would take advantage of the situation, often
crippling his associate later.
Commonalities
263
Ibid, 747.
Himmler, The Himmler Brothers, 253-254.
265
Schellenberg,The Labyrinth, 289-290. 266
267
Martin Bormann, The Bormann Letters, Editer by H.R. Trevor-Roper (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
1954),189.
264
83 One of several similarities shared by the two rivals was their love of attention and power.
After proving their merit, each obtained advancements at the order of Hitler. In a pamphlet
discussing the career of Heinrich Himmler, the United States government claimed that Himmler
was “more indispensible to Hitler than any other figure in the regime.”268 With his SS troops,
Himmler had the ability to perform both as a security organization as well as a replacement
army. Yet Bormann was the gatekeeper to Hitler; and herein lies a great source of rivalry, not
only between Bormann and Himmler, but Bormann and seemingly the entire upper echelon of
the Nazi Party. While Bormann may have been charged with keeping Hitler’s head clear,
Himmler could have ensured that his life was ended. Himmler, with his SS forces behind him,
presented a challenge even the cunning Bormann could not easily overcome.
They also shared a commonality in each choosing to spearhead the battle with religion.
Himmler targeted the Jehovah Witnesses as a collective religious group. The persecution of
Protestants and Catholics was based on their own individual actions or involvement. This went
against the advice of Göring who recalled, “I told Himmler on one occasion that I did not think
it was clever to arrest clergymen, and that as long as they talked only in church they should say
what they wanted .”269 FBI agent R.C. Hendon wrote in a May 10, 1941 memorandum for a Mr.
Nichols within the bureau that because of this trilateral hatred, Himmler was known as “the only
two-hundred-percent Nazi.”270
Likewise, Bormann lost his Catholic faith during the war, and began his own antiChristian actions. Though he never publicly professed his anti-religious views, Bormann made
his feeling toward the church clear. In January 1940, Bormann forced the Protestant and Catholic
268
Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 61. Manvell and Fraenkel, Goering, 137.
270
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Memorandum for Mr. Nichols, May 10, 1941, RG 65 Entry A1 136P, Box 1,
Section 001, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.).
269
84 churches to donate funds to the Reich. He demanded that salaries and clergy members be cut, if
need be, to afford the required contributions. 271 An unnamed source for the United States War
Department recalled during an interrogation that he or she “blame[d] Bormann for the actions
against the Church.” The source discussed Bormann’s brutality especially against religious
groups. “Bormann is said to have been the most brutal of all and according to Source, was more
to blame for the treatment of the Jews than any other.”272 Though the source claimed Bormann
acted as the most brutal Nazi, it is important to reiterate that this was the source’s opinion. There
is no documented proof that Bormann controlled anything other than verbal warfare against the
Jews. However, it is important to note this view as it obviously reflects an opinion of Bormann,
his brutality, and his outlook on the Jewish people. While Bormann stole from the wallets of the
clergy and spoke openly against the Jews, Himmler took their lives. Though the source may
claim Bormann held the most brutal mindset toward the Jews, Bormann was not building death
camps, having Jews shot in the streets, or commanding death squads to murder thousands in
trenches and ravines.
In August 1920 Bormann became the manager of a large farm estate near the village of
Parchim.273 Only a few weeks after obtaining his new employment, he began modifying himself
to adapt to his new environment. This included adopting the political beliefs of his employers,
the von Treuenfels. Bormann accepted the antisemitic notion of a Jewish world conspiracy,
became an antisemite, and began participating in Freikorps activities.274 This aspect of
Bormann’s background is quite similar to Himmler’s young adult life. Both worked in
271
272
273
274
McGovern, Martin Bormann, 12.
Von Lang, The Secretary, 24-25.
85 agriculture, participated in political groups, and each felt the need to manipulate themselves and
those around them to obtain praise and gratification from others.
Similarly to Himmler, Bormann was a farmer. But unlike his rival, Bormann was
successful. He acted the part of a treasurer to keep affairs in order on the Mecklenburg farm as
banned Freikorps members performed the labor, ensuring them employment when no one else
would hire them. 275 With ravaging inflation rendering money useless in Germany, average farm
hands became disgruntled with their pay, and estate owners became leery of rebellions. Freikorps
members, as they were recently banned and no longer receiving government wages for their war
service, found themselves without homes in many cases. It was decided by many estate owners
to hire these ex-paramilitary men not only to protect their land and goods but to provide them
with room and board in exchange for a day’s hard labor.276
During his own farming years, Bormann dominated with an iron fist. Many of his
workers disliked him for his domineering and brash manner. It also came to light after World
War II that Bormann had been involved in crooked deals with foodstuffs, utilizing inflation and
gouging his prices. He was fined 3,000 marks for “violation of an agriculture ordinance”
between 1922 and 1923 which Von Lang translates to Bormann’s involvement in black-market
deals.277 This corruption and profiteering would re-emerge later in his Nazi career when he
seemingly sensed no shame in accepting his illicit wealth.
Bormann’s Criminal History Begins
On May 31, 1923, Bormann was involved in the murder of a school teacher Walther
Kadow suspected of spying for the German communist regime and filtering Freikorps
275
Ibid, 26.
276
86 information to the French government.278 Kadown was at a tavern in the northern German town
of Parchim when the men Bormann sent to “give him a proper thrashing” found him. Kadow was
loaded into a hunting cart provided by Bormann and transported him to a meadow where he was
beaten to death and buried in the woods of Gut Neuhof that night.279 It was none other than
Rudolf Höss, later the commandant of Auschwitz, who delivered the fatal blow to Kadow’s skull
with a maple sapling.280 The police exhumed Kadow’s remains, and Bormann was sentenced to a
year in prison for his complicity in the murder. 281 On March 12, 1924, Bormann’s hearing
determined the murder was not premeditated and therefore not actually murder but
manslaughter.282 Just as Himmler was able to offer his compliance and even assistance in the
execution of his mentors and superiors, Strasser and Röhm during the 1934 SA purge, Bormann
was able to be an accomplice in the murder of the man who had been one of his school
instructors. 283
Höss took full blame for the murder, receiving a ten year sentence for his crime. Before
his execution in 1945, he said of the murder, “Every betrayal was punished by death. Many
traitors were eliminated this way.284 Historian Jochen von Lang insinuates that Höss protected
Bormann during the murder trial. Höss recalled in his memoirs, “When I noticed in the course of
the hearing that the comrade who actually did the deed could be effectively indicted only by me,
I took the guilt upon myself, and he was released during the inquiry.”285
Bormann was sentenced to only a year for procuring the hunting cart. The conclusion
Lang draws from this statement is that “It may be assumed with certainty that even with the
278
Secretary, The Secretary, 30.
280
Ibid, 30.
281
282
Secretary, The Secretary, 32-33. 283
284
285
Ibid, 29.
279
87 gallows looking him in the face, he was still covering for Bormann as the instigator.”286 A great
deal can be drawn from this. Bormann allowed a fellow comrade take the blame for a crime that
perhaps he committed. Is the reaction of Höss a sign of his intimidation by Bormann, the strength
of camaraderie, or perhaps both? Was Bormann a coward as Shirach alleged, or did he inflict
enough fear into his contemporaries that Höss shouldered Bormann’s crime? While Bormann’s
intimidation ability received missed reviews from his contemporaries, the loyalty among
comrades certainly would support Höss’ decision to assume punishment for the crime rather than
inform on Bormann and be labeled a traitor among Freikorp members. Regardless, the
camaraderie of Höss and Bormann is an instance of guilty-by-association. Bormann would
become a desk criminal while Höss continued as a murderer.
Martin Bormann did not come from a bourgeoisie or military upbringing. Instead, he
utilized his intelligence and abilities of persuasion and cautious scheming to enter the minds of
his opponents and superiors and manipulate his way to his end goal. He came from the working
class, having no advantage of nobility, nor had he any experience in battle during the war.
Should the regime fail, Bormann had no power or plan to fall back on. He had ensured through
his deceitful actions that he would have no friends or support.287 His only experience prior to his
role in the NSDAP was as a glorified farm hand. Though Bormann had dropped out of school, he
was a gifted administrator. He was also excellent at reading people. His greed for power and
material goods far exceeded his sense of ethics and morals.
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the Himmler-Bormann relationship lies in
how the two men rose individually to their respective positions. Himmler’s ascent can be
charted, when read chronologically. Bormann’s timeline however, is so fragmented with missing
286
287
Von Lang, The Secretary, 29. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich 128.
88 information, it is an uncompleted puzzle. Himmler, in complete view of the public, climbed the
metaphorical stairs of influence within the Nazi Party. Each political position brought him to
another landing on his way to the party’s peak.
Bormann, on the other hand, performed only a few acts early in his political career to
gain public attention. He performed his first recorded criminal deed in early 1923. But Bormann
was not yet associated with the Nazi Party at this time. He did not take part in the Beer Hall
Putsch of November 8-9, 1923. Instead, Bormann was involved in the murder of the school
teacher Walther Kadow in the spring of 1923.
Bormann Commences His Career with the NSDAP
Bormann was released from prison in February 1925, and by the end of 1926 he had
become a full-time employee of the Nazi Party. He was tasked with small administrative duties,
but built himself up to be of significant use with his knowledge of insurance for the NSDAP and
its members, as well as relief and support funds for paramilitary group members. 288 It was not
until February 17, 1927 that Bormann actually joined the Nazi Party, however, as number
60,508. From this point, his ascent within the Nazi administration continued steadily. During
1927, he served as press chief of the Party of Thuringia. By April 1, 1928, he had become the
district leader and business manager of Thuringia. The following year on November 15, he was
selected for the staff of the Supreme Command of the Sturmabteilung (SA.) Utilizing his
previous experience in party and member affairs, Bormann then left the SA, accepting a position
as Leader of the Aid Fund of the Nazi Party on April 25, 1930.289
288
289
Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 220.
McGovern, Martin Bormann, 19-20.
89 Bormann began testing his blackmailing abilities, as well as the reception of his deeds in
the Third Reich. On October 5, 1932 he wrote a 5-page letter to Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess,
containing complaints lodged against SA leader Ernst Röhm. Bormann did not yet feel as if he
could go directly to Hitler with his concerns, but hoped that Hess would relay the information to
the Führer. Hess did not like to be the bearer of bad news to Hitler. Therefore, it is still unknown
if Bormann’s claims that Röhm was ensuring “every SA man has it drummed into him…that he
must cover for his comrades and leaders—and then the most prominent SA leader of all goes
ahead with flagrant betrayal and slander,” ever reached Hitler.290 Bormann stated, “I am
convinced that the post of chief of staff could be filled by any SA leader with an understanding
of people and a talent for organization. I was never much of a soldier myself, but I’d bet my
boots that even I could manage it. Take a look at the SS. You know Himmler and you know
Himmler’s capabilities.”291
This was all Bormann said of Himmler, perhaps deliberately understated. Whether this
comment meant that Himmler was true to the party, predictable, or controllable, is uncertain. It
does, however, seem as if Bormann was lifting Himmler above Röhm as a better leader and more
loyal to the party. Hitler considered a putsch “not only politically wrong, but hopeless.”292
Nonetheless, the 1934 Röhm purge plotted and carried out by his subordinates cleared the way
for Hitler to lead without fear of uprising of opponents or political enemies. Be it coincidence or
a case of cause and effect, after Bormann took a chance and wrote to Hess, his ascent within the
Third Reich truly began.
If Himmler took the metaphorical stairs to gain ruling positions in the Nazi Party, visible
to all who cared to look on, Bormann stepped inside the elevator and allowed his dealings to
290
Ibid, 60.
292
90 occur behind closed doors. Whether it was through coercion, manipulation, or corruption,
Bormann’s ascent fails to follow a prescribed pattern or sensible cause and causality flow.
Certainly, his documented rise to power is traceable. However, there seem to be accounts and
documentation missing. For example, little is known of Bormann’s actions between April 1930
when he led the Aid Fund and 1933, when Bormann’s career took an incredible upward turn. In
July 1933, Bormann was appointed Rudolf Hess’ Secretary. On October 10, 1933 he became
Reichsleiter, the second highest political rank below Führer, and in November he was made a
member of the Reichstag. 293
The advantage Bormann had over Hess was organizational ability and knowledge of how
to construct an administrative apparatus. 294 Thus, Bormann was granted certain powers which he
otherwise would never have been permitted. It must be understood that though Hess possessed
the skills of oratory that Bormann lacked, he otherwise had no bureaucratic abilities. This is why
Bormann was seemingly able to overstep Hess’ orders. Deeply interested in the occult and
astrology, Hess was looked upon as a ridiculous day dreamer. With Göring beating him out in
the publicity polls, Bormann knew it would not be difficult to work his way into the
administration.295
Bormann wasted no time in furthering his attempting to impress the Führer. When Hitler
began his building project of the Obersalzberg in 1935, Bormann saw to the financing and
adopted the project as his own. He bought up farms and destroyed the pre-existing centuries-old
buildings and skimmed off party funds to add to the construction. Bormann commissioned the
construction of the Kehlsteinhaus (The Eagle’s Nest) addition to be presented to Hitler on his
293
Ibid, 66.
295
Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 192.
294
91 50th birthday on April 20, 1939.296 Ultimately, Bormann began overseeing Hitler’s finances
altogether. Even Hitler’s girlfriend, Eva Braun, depended on Bormann to provide her with her
allowance.297
Hitler did not partake in alcohol, tobacco, or the consumption of meat. In the presence of
Hitler, Bormann also abstained from these commodities, though there are several photographs of
Bormann smoking and witness accounts of him enjoying a beef steak in Hitler’s absence.298 As
he became accepted into Hitler’s inner circle, Bormann was permitted to take lunch with the
Führer. To seem important and highly involved, Bormann regularly arranged for an adjutant to
call him away to tend to business during the meal.299 While this was a clever plan, Bormann’s
actions also point to his desire to appear significant within the party and able to take on any
responsibility accorded to him. Each instance, that of Bormann’s adaptability, his characteristic
of needing to be accepted by and please his superiors, becomes apparent.
Bormann’s deceitfulness became more identifiable to his peers as he gained standing
within the party. Reich Minister of Food and Reich Peasant Leader Richard Walter Darré was
awarded an honorary SS rank after he and Himmler developed a relationship based on the shared
beliefs in the need for selective human breeding. After the enthusiasm of his new title wore off,
Darré grew leery of the SS, and knowing of the mutual mistrust between Bormann and Himmler,
he turned to Bormann for guidance. Bormann attempted to gain as much information to use
against Himmler from Darré as possible. When Darré became aware of Bormann’s scheme, he
realized his mistake in alliances. In late 1935 Darré wrote, “all threads of political intrigue came
296
“Eagle’s Nest- The History,” Kehlsteinhaus, accessed on March 22,2014,
http://www.kehlsteinhaus.de/en/geschichte.php?navid=3 .
297
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs by Albert Speer (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks,
1970), 85-86.
298
299
Ibid, 36. 92 together in Bormann… I noticed that Bormann passed [ultimate] judgment on leading
personalities in Berlin.”300 Darré then reported, “I warned Himmler first of all, and he was taken
aback.”301
Himmler was taken aback, of course, by the realization that Darré had acted disloyally,
intriguing with Bormann against him. Yet he must have allowed Darré an opportunity for
redemption as the two continued to work together in subsequent years. This report enlightened
Himmler of just how cautious he was required to be in the presence of Bormann. Though they
were not the best of friends, Himmler and Bormann had found they could be useful to one
another.302 Yet this placed a strain on the situation. Even when Bormann was not actually
present, Himmler now knew there were those who would work as informants for his rival.
It must have also caught Himmler’s attention when Darré said Bormann passed judgment
on personalities in Berlin. Though this was the responsibility of he and Heydrich, policing and
political intrigue were tasks Bormann aspired to control. For Bormann to attempt to overstep his
boundaries so soon after the SA purge must have served as evidence of Bormann’s immense ego.
He apparently did not fear Göring, Himmler, or Heydrich. Where Himmler claimed to his
entourage that he understood Bormann to be a dangerous man, he did not distance himself from
Bormann as Göring did, nor did he study Bormann in an attempt to understand the enemy as did
Heydrich. Instead, Himmler decided to seek a common ground by which he could try to exploit
Bormann—and herein lay the problem. By the spring of 1945, Himmler would prove himself an
unworthy adversary to Bormann as the latter would allow Himmler to ascend to the peak of his
power, and then solely prevent any further acquisitions of prestige.
300
Ibid, 85.
302
93 The relationship between Himmler and Bormann was one of cautious cordiality before
the spring of 1936. Though each mistrusted the other, Himmler recognized Bormann’s growth
within the party. Though Bormann tended to avoid personal relationships, he accepted Himmler
as at least an ally, and more likely, a tool. When Bormann’s fourth child was born on June 13,
1936, he was named Heinrich Ingo, and Himmler served as his godfather.303 It was common for
Bormann to refer to Himmler as “Uncle Heinrich” in letters to his wife, Gerda.
The Himmler-Bormann Rivalry
The infighting began with the consolidation of power as a result of the 1934 purge of the
SA. Himmler and Göring banded together for the destruction of Ernst Röhm, head of the SA.
Röhm had been a thorn in the sides of both Himmler and Göring who expected to gain control of
the armed forces with the removal of Röhm.304 The SS became a free standing paramilitary
organization after its separation from the SA on July 20, 1934.
Bormann took serious issue when Himmler consolidated all German police forces,
including the Gestapo, into the SS. This action provided Himmler with command of the SS, the
Gestapo, and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). Thus Himmler controlled all forces capable of arrests,
interrogations, and paramilitary activity. Hess announced on June 9, 1934 that “in the future the
SD was to be the NSDAP’s official intelligence service.”305 Himmler began this consolidation on
June 17, 1936—four days after the birth of his godson, and on Bormann’s birthday. Bormann
was enraged by his “gift.” During the shift in powers, Himmler made it quite clear to his senior
officers that no orders were to be passed without his authority. This included any “Chief of
303
Reitlinger, The SS, 74.
305
304
94 Ministerial Department.”306 Himmler decreed the directive of when internment in a concentration
camp was justified, including: by order of the Gestapo, by order of the Kripo, a court decree, or
by order of Himmler himself. Himmler, as leader of the SS and overseer of the Gestapo, enacted
this “Emergency Law” also known as the “Frame Law.”
By binding justifications for internment, Himmler created regulations which banned
Bormann from encroaching upon his power. While the Emergency Law protected Himmler’s
orders from being infringed upon by any other leader shy of Hitler, Himmler was aware that
Bormann was his primary rival. Though both Göring and Bormann could have presented a threat,
it was Bormann who would do so, as Göring had set his attention to the army and building of the
Luftwaffe. Himmler deliberately enacted this law to keep Bormann in check.
If Himmler had been previously perceived as naive, this is evidence of his cunning
mistrust of his fellow party members. Furthermore, what the law meant at its core acted as most
likely the first bristle between Himmler and Bormann. “This law authorized the Stapo [political
police] to take all measures deemed suitable for the protection of the Party and the safeguarding
of the State against any internal enemy. The Gestapo was not bound expressly by this law to
respect the existing laws and decrees.”307 Bormann believed that Himmler was himself and his
organizations not only the law, but above the law. He was furious that Himmler had written out
the ability of any other leader short of Hitler to authorize commands.
“This exceptional concentration of power was not only the constant cause of envy and
mistrust of Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellory, but often the frequent subject of
306
307
95 differences with Göring, although only of a temporary character. Nevertheless, it is certain that
this ‘Emergency Law’ inspired Himmler never to give up the direct and personal command of
the Gestapo,”308 Kaltebrunner stated during a post-war interrogation. Here, Kaltenbrunner
provides evidence of Himmler’s fear of his rivals, as well as his actions taken to maintain and
control his position. Once again, Himmler was not bleary-eyed and trusting. He was either aware
of the need for caution, or he was being well advised by a source. Though Himmler provided
Bormann a commission as an SS-Gruppenführer on January 30, 1937, it was simply an honorary
position. If this was a gesture of appeasement on Himmler’s part, the attempt could not have
hurt. However, if Himmler believed this would somehow cause Bormann to feel or believe
himself a subordinate of Himmler, he was gravely mistaken.
The Flight of Hess and SD Arguments
When Rudolf Hess left Germany to seek a peace agreement with Britain shortly after
midnight on May 11, 1941, he crashed his Messerschmitt Bf 110 in Scotland, where he was
captured. 309 On May 29 1941 Bormann was appointed Head of the Party Chancellery by Hitler’s
decree. 310 In this capacity, Bormann would choose continually to make power plays seeking to
dismantle Himmler’s organizations and intelligence services. Incensed that Himmler had
removed ability for multiple commanders, “Bormann especially, repeatedly demanded the
surrendering of all I.S. [Intelligence Services,] and reporting work covering subjects which the
Party Chancellery claimed came within the scope of its work. These covered in fact all special
308
H.Q. Class 100, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD.). 309
“Rudolf Hess,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, last modified June 10, 2013, accessed on March 27, 2014,
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007113 .
310
96 questions regarded spheres of life. Compliance with the demand would therefore have meant
winding up the work of the SD, while the Party Chancellery would not have been in the slightest
degree capable of further performing the tasks of the SD. ”311 Himmler had backed Bormann into
a corner, and Bormann did not react well.
Bormann responded by forbidding SD membership to those “officially employed in the
political organization of the Party, and demanded the dismissal from the SD of al bearers of high
office and political leaders.”312 He repeatedly attempted to create counter measures toward
Himmler’s orders, but to his aggravation, his work was to no avail. Even direct subordinates of
Himmler were not awarded direct command—especially after the death of Heydrich in June
1942. In a post war interrogation, Kaltenbrunner attested this fact in his testimony stating that he
was “never given executive power over the Gestapo or Kripo.” He believed “he was given the
title of Chief of RSHA in 1943 by Himmler, because Himmler at that time was losing influence
with Hitler as compared to Bormann.”313
Ultimately, Bormann’s interest in having influence over the SD was spurred by his
interest in appeasing the Gauleiters who acted as regional branch party leaders and were
answerable only to Hitler and the Reichsleiter. Bormann had held the position of Reichsleiter
since October 1933, and systematically began turning the Gauleiters against Himmler. One main
interest Bormann had in controlling the SD was to protect his regional leaders who felt that the
SD were spying on their personal and political lives. The Gauleiters also feared SD apprehension
311
Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (United Kingdom), SS Gruppenführer Ohlendorf, May 21.
1945, RG 319 Entry 134B, Box 578, XE00083, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park,
MD.).
312
Ibid. Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (United Kingdom), SS Gruppenführer Ohlendorf, May 21.
MD.).
313
97 as they were not above the law. Some regional branch leaders had a great deal to hide, and were
well aware that the SD would waste no time in drawing up and rendering reports.314
On February 14, 1935, Bormann declared,
All complaints concerning inside party matters received by the Main Security Office
should be transmitted without review or examination of the facts to the Deputy of the
Führer. The Main Security Office will arrange that also in the future all cases of a
criminal nature, even though they may concern fellow party members should be
submitted automatically to the competent state prosecutor, in accordance with the law
affecting all German citizens. This regulation will eliminate in the future all possible
friction between the SD and all party offices.315
As secretary to the Deputy Führer at the time, Bormann would inevitably take on the task of
reviewing reports himself. Rather than the SD examining and acting upon the report, Bormann
suggested the State—he being the acting agent representative, look into the concern, thus
removing power from the SD.
During his interrogation conducted by the Seventh Army Interrogation Center, SS
Obergruppenführer Kurt Knoblauch stated Bormann was “completely unscrupulous, very
egotistic, and wanted full powers and unlimited authority. He ruthlessly opposed those who did
not submit to his wishes.”316 As Heydrich and Himmler often opposed Bormann, this could be
one motive for taking part in Heydrich’s murder. Regardless of the circumstances, Bormann
stood to gain from Heydrich’s absence.
314
MD.).
315
Office of United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, SD and Party Offices, February
14, 1935, RG 238 Entry NM-66 38, Box 1, Folder 9, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park,
MD.).
316
Department of Defense, OMGUS, Civil Affairs Division, Public Safety Branch, Final Interrogation Report: The
Liaison Between Himmler and Hess, November 21,1945; RG 260, Box 393; National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, MD.
98 In June 1943 Bormann was successful in forbidding party functionaries from even
supplying the SD with information. With Heydrich no longer alive to defend his organization,
Himmler actually did allow this to happen. Yet by this point Himmler was also looking for an
exit plan, so perhaps the loss of one responsibility could be handled—especially as the SD was
not Himmler’s only line of defense. He still held to the Gestapo. According to Kaltenbrunner,
Himmler refused to let this “instrument of power” be taken from him.317 Bormann would have
been less likely to challenge Himmler if Heydrich had still been alive and leading the SD.
What was truly problematic was Himmler’s poor rapport with the Gauleiters who
seemingly worked against Himmler to the benefit of Bormann. Bormann presented the regional
leaders with the belief that he could control Himmler and his SD, resulting in Gauleiters
complaining to Bormann “and because he quickly came to their rescue, they rallied to him more
strongly than ever.”318 Bormann had been studying the structure of the Nazi Party since he
joined. He knew that should he wish to ever rise further in the party, or even succeed Hitler,
support of the Gauleiters would be vital.
Hitler’s Successor
The ultimate goal for these two men, though at the surface identical, was that it was based
on differing expectations. There were speculations that Bormann wished to succeed Hitler by
party leaders such as Göring. Though Himmler did wish to be second in command, due to his
unyielding desire for attention and gratification, Himmler would not have been pleased to be at
the head of the party. Though he displayed his interests of succeeding Hitler when asking Göring
317
318
Von Lang, The Secretary, 288. 99 to name him his own successor, Himmler would have been incapable of performing as Führer.
He needed to be commanded and rewarded for his efforts. This was all he had ever known, and
despite his overwhelming desire to be an impressive persona with total power, Himmler knew he
was incapable of commanding the entire Nazi Party and its organizations.
Bormann, on the other hand, seems to have been making all the proper adjustments and
wisely placing himself in the event that his rise was possible. After the attempt on Hitler’s life on
July 20, 1944, Himmler focused a great amount of attention to his peace negotiation possibilities.
Escaping Nazi Germany with the support of the Allies became Himmler’s end goal, whereas
leading Nazi Germany, having learned from Hitler’s mistakes, was Bormann’s intention.
Following the model Stalin had set after his succession of power after Lenin in the Soviet
Union, Bormann plotted to work as Hitler’s secretary to gain information, experience, and trust.
Clever Bormann knew that if he were to succeed, he had to possess the same information as
Hitler, and then be able to improve upon Hitler’s “legacy.” Bormann would have to prove where
Hitler went wrong, what could be done to solve the issue, and then enforce the change.
Though he craved the limelight, was accepted during his Nazi career, and accumulated
leadership roles, Himmler could not handle command of the party. Himmler was happy
controlling his SS and Gestapo. He had the ability to inflict terror and massive chaos into the
lives of his enemies and victims, and could focus all of his attention on this endeavor. Perhaps
Himmler realized that there were those who would not take him seriously, and he realized his
value to the party was already in play.
100 The Ascent of Bormann’s Power and the further decline of His Popularity with Comrades
Himmler’s strategy altered after Hess left Germany. Hitler eliminated the position of
Deputy Führer, and replaced it with Head of Party Chancellery—a title which he delegated to
Bormann. With this access to information, ability to manipulate messages sent to Hitler, and his
overall closeness with Hitler brought by this position, Bormann ascended further in power and
arrogance. In the process, he made enemies with Himmler, Heydrich, Göring, and Goebbels as
well as Alfred Rosenberg, Reich minister of the Eastern Territories and racial theorist, Hans
Frank, Hitler’s personal lawyer, and Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War
Production.319 Göring’s dislike of Bormann was no secret. There were especially two acts of
behavior Bormann exhibited which disgusted Göring: Bormann moved his mistress into the
home he shared with his wife, Gerda, and “once when a stray dog had attacked his own pet, he
had doused it with petrol, set it alight, and roared with laughter as he watched it run away in
flaming agony.”320
Himmler and Schellenberg discussed what reason should be given to the German people
to explain Hess’ departure. Though Himmler believed Hess had come to fear Bormann and
resent his slow but steady ascent to power, the other option was to provide a cover story of
Hess’ madness. The problem with claiming Hess was not of sound mind was that it could reflect
negatively on the other leaders of the party to have someone unstable acting as Deputy Führer.
Schellenberg told Himmler that at any rate, he felt the claim of mental illness would not hold as
“he considered the German people much too intelligent” to believe such a farce. 321 Himmler
319
Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 87.
320
101 replied “[well,] that was Bormann’s influence.” Himmler stared at Schellenberg in thought for a
few moments, and then quietly added “it is too late to do anything about it now.”322
Though the contemporary perception of Himmler is that he was a sly man in the corner
taking notes, building intelligence files, and implanting himself within the Party as a force to be
feared, Himmler simply could not live up to this persona. His personality required attention and
accreditation from a superior. For a time, Heydrich adopted this role to Himmler’s advantage.
After Heydrich’s death in 1942, though Himmler took up the position of Director of RSHA,
Bormann increased his activities as an independent secret intelligence collector. Bormann had
always aspired to control the SD, and with Himmler as the face, desiring to be noticed and
awarded attention, this presented Bormann with his opportunities to stealthily obtain information
and intrigue against his rivals without constant observation.
Evidence from diaries, memoirs, and interrogation reports from Third Reich leaders
shows that while there were some who found Himmler to be a thorn in their side, everyone it
seemed, loathed and distrusted Bormann. Though the personalities of these men differed (and
this factor must be taken into consideration) they were each intriguing against their comrades and
seeking to further themselves in their roles within the Party, actions which Hitler encouraged and
cultivated an assurance of loyalty and individual ability. Perhaps the fact that in reality Himmler
had the position of SS leader and, ultimately, RSHA overseer, played a role in his reception by
his peers as they knew to expect this activity from him. Bormann, on the other hand, possessed
no qualifications or title enabling him to collect secret files and build a personal card index
against anyone other than for the sake of his personal usage and in furthering power. 323 While
Himmler did indeed utilize such information accordingly, he also truly believed in the cause of
322
323
Ibid, 61. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 131.
102 the Third Reich and the Final Solution. Bormann on the other hand was seemingly bent on his
personal ascent to power rather than following any party dogma.
What Himmler meant in his response to Schellenberg was that Bormann had risen within
the Party and was needed by Hitler. Bormann could no longer be removed from power. Himmler
realized there was no visible end to his rival. Bormann’s ascent after the departure of Hess set
him on track to gain the ability to prevent any further addition to Himmler’s position within the
party. Himmler no longer had Hess’ protection of proclaiming the SD as the official intelligence
service of the Nazi Party, and Bormann was obtaining more and more dependency and trust from
Hitler.
Perhaps in an attempt to draw Himmler’s attention away from the parting of his superior,
Bormann wrote Himmler a letter stating his beliefs for Hess’ flight. Bormann blamed Hess’
sense of inferiority apparently caused by his impotence for Hess’ desire to leave, thus proving his
virility. Though Hess had fathered a son during the period he was supposed to be unable to
reproduce, Bormann wrote, “in the opinion of the Führer, these are in fact the real causes.”324
According to his behavior toward Bormann, it appears Himmler believed these views were not
original to Hitler but rather instilled by Bormann. At this point, it was accepted in even the upper
leadership circles of the Nazi Party that Bormann held a strong influence over Hitler. If Himmler
has been mistakenly perceived by contemporary audiences, Hitler has been misunderstood much
more so. Weak in the ways of comprehending military strategy, though possessing a firm grasp
on leadership necessities, he actually thrived on the rivalries within the upper echelon of the
party. Hitler nurtured and depended on this infighting,; and required this dualism. These rivalries
not only provided security Hitler that each task and role was fulfilled by the most suitable men,
but also that his subordinates would be too involved with their personal battles to attempt to
324
McGovern, Martin Bormann, 61. 103 challenge him. As von Lang writes, “The two power machines always canceled each other out.
Moreover, Himmler never managed to get a firm foothold in the entourage,” a problem Bormann
overcame.325
Bormann committed himself to performing any act in his power which would further
separate Himmler from Hitler. Aware of Himmler’s inferiority complex, Bormann utilized every
opportunity to further offend Himmler and make him feel as if he were unappreciated or being
neglected from party meetings or events. When Himmler complained to Bormann that he felt
Hitler had been treating him unjustly for years while others were favored, Bormann patronized
him, saying that he was certain Himmler was imagining it, however he had heard the Führer
criticize the activities of the SD. This of course was not altogether true. Hitler’s criticisms of the
SD were instigated by Bormann’s lies.326 In a letter to his wife, Bormann alleged Himmler’s
reaction was so strong that “in other circumstances I should have had no choice but to get up and
say, “I’m sorry, but I must take my leave of you, and take off your uniform. The Führer is the
Führer, and he is beyond all criticism.”327
For Bormann to suggest he was capable of making anyone take off their uniform was a
extreme example of his smugness. There could have been several reasons why Bormann would
have made this claim. Whether he simply said this to his wife to appear virile, and powerful, if
Bormann truly believed he was capable of such an act, or what his other motives could have been
is unclear.
As biographer Jochen von Lang wrote, “Martin Bormann and his legendary rise to power
can be explained only by written testimony. He was never the hero of dramatic scenes; he never
325
327
Martin Bormann, The Bormann Letters, ed. H.R. Trevor-Roper (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954), 126.
326
104 stood in the limelight. He deliberately remained in the shadow of a bigger man.”328 This
description differs greatly from that of the attention-seeking Himmler. Himmler should have
acted as the man lurking the shadows, collecting information to be used against his peers.
Instead, Bormann took on this persona and was constantly secretive about his operations.
Himmler was most stealthy when gathering intelligence on his personal enemies. Whereas
Himmler received mixed reviews from his comrades, especially from his subordinates who
worked closely with him, Bormann was looked upon with trepidation by the party.
Baldur von Schirach attempted to give Bormann an opportunity to prove himself to him,
but resolved instead to never be a Bormann enthusiast.
At first we Reichsleiters had no reason to complain about Bormann. He dealt with
matters needing Hitler’s attention more quickly than Hess, who was always vague and
slow. Originally Hess was supposed to be present at every conference between Hitler and
the party leaders, but he soon passed that duty to Bormann. From then on, whether Hitler
was in Berlin, Munich, or Obersalzberg, without Bormann there would be no conference.
He pretended to be your good friend, innocent of any self-serving, who represented the
interests of the Party leaders. It took quite a while before I saw through him and realized
how dangerous he was.329
Incidentally, after the war, Hess and Shirach served twenty years together in Spandau prison.
Schirach was of the opinion that Hess’ flight was a result of slowly losing his power to Bormann.
Schirach offered “perhaps it was in protest against this silent degradation that Hess took himself
off on his mystery-shrouded flight to England.”330 Hess would never say.
Minister of Food and Agriculture, Richard Walther Darré’s opinion of Bormann was also
enlightening, noting the Reichsleiter’s “mixture of personal ambition, hunger for power,
328
Von Lang, The Secretary, 82. Ibid, 84.
330
329
105 pragmatism in questions of organization and administration, including money management, and
pronounced inferiority complex because of his subordinate position.”331 Darré made the
interesting connection of Bormann’s actions to those of Stalin in their leadership and activities
within the party.
After the loss of the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943, Bormann increased his role as
an information filter, ensuring that Hitler was guarded as much as possible from the news of the
war’s harsh reality. Hitler’s personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, recalled Hitler
becoming intensely defensive of Bormann should he believe someone was being critical of him.
Hoffman later recalled Hitler as having said, “Whoever is against Bormann is against the State!
I’ll shoot the lot of them, even if they number in the tens of thousands.”332
Bormann abused his influence with Hitler and the loss of Stalingrad to convince Hitler to
allow for a three-man board to act as the head of the Reich Chancellery in February 1943. This
new entity came to be known as the Committee of Three. At its controls were Marshal Wilhelm
Keitel for the military sector, Minister Hans Lammers controlling the government sector, and
Bormann was in charge of Party affairs. The intention was to create an ad hoc committee to
control specific areas of responsibility.333 Goebbels came to refer to them as the “Three Wise
Men.” He and Göring attempted to force the Committee to dissolve, but were unsuccessful.334
Their efforts were not in vain, however, Bormann’s compulsive need for control coupled with
the continued loss of power commanded by Keitel and Lammers made the committee
unsuccessful.335
331
Von Lang, The Secretary, 84. McGovern, Martin Bormann, 101.
333
334
335
Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945:Nemesis, Volume 2 ( NY W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 569-577. 332
106 Lammers, especially, felt the overbearing pressure of Bormann’s rise. He came to expect
his orders from the Führer to be delivered by Bormann rather than Hitler personally. Lammers
found himself and his position in the Committee greatly disparaged as Bormann melded the
government and party positions together to benefit himself, edging out Lammers. Whether
Lammers was mindful of his need to be as diplomatic with Bormann as possible is not
completely clear, however, his caution suggests that perhaps he was aware of the special file
Bormann kept on him in the event he felt Lammers was becoming a problem.336 Bormann had
simply made two more enemies, offering further evidence of his ability to undermine and bully
his peers in order to further ascend in positions of influence.
Bormann as Secretary
On April 12, 1943, Bormann was finally awarded the position he most coveted (aside
from the title of Fürer.) After meeting with Hitler in his study at the Berghof at the Obersalzberg,
Bormann emerged from the room with a folder containing a sheet of paper announcing, “As my
personal assistant, Reichsleiter M. Bormann will bear the title ‘Secretary to the Führer’.”337
Bormann had of course been playing the role of secretary without the title for quite some time.
During a post-war interrogation with the Allies, an anonymous source claimed that Hitler
mentioned Bormann as a possible successor to Hess, but the informant “was not in favor of him,
so they decided to take some time to consider the question.” The source learned two weeks later
that Bormann had been appointed after reading the information in the newspaper.338 The official
336
Ibid, 225.
338
337
107 position was all Bormann needed to assert further power over his rivals. His new task allotted
him free admittance to Hitler’s presence as well as access to any and all internal knowledge.
After Bormann was appointed Secretary to the Führer, Bormann’s long-time rival Joseph
Goebbels immediately altered his sentiments in his diary. Suddenly whatever faults Bormann
had previously been accused of were resolved by his extraordinary loyalty to Hitler.339 Goebbels
was intelligent and possessed the foresight to believe that his diaries could one day come under
scrutiny. He did not wish to present Bormann with any evidence which could be used against
him. This is quite similar to the letters Bormann wrote to his wife. He often altered the truth to
his benefit, informing Gerda of the foolishness of Goebbels or the mistake “Uncle Heinrich” had
made when it was actually Bormann who caused his comrades’ misfortune. Bormann also knew
of the ability to use his communications against him; additionally, he wished to appear in a
positive light to his wife.
Hitler developed a dependency on Bormann. While Himmler had the support of
Schellenberg, Goebbels, and, by 1943, Göring (to some degree), Bormann stood supreme with
the support of Hitler. The secretary had long been in the making as Bormann had actually been
speaking for Hitler and taking actions which had previously been reserved for the Führer. One
such example was the disagreement between Himmler and Reich Minister of Justice Otto Georg
Thierack in September 1942. After Himmler met with Thierack, expressing his concerns with
Thierack encroaching on his responsibility of determining who should be put to death, the
stalemate argument was taken to Hitler. But rather than speak with the Führer, Bormann
intervened and attempted to act as mediator.340 Bormann claimed he had final jurisdiction over
339
340
Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 796. Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 636.
108 the life and death of a human being by acting on behalf of Hitler. Even more appalling, Bormann
added, “in principle the Führer’s time will no longer be taken up by matters of this kind.”341
Himmler’s Final Ascent
Any sense of cordial behavior between Himmler and Bormann began to wane, especially
during this period. Himmler viewed his treatment by Bormann, such as in the instance of the
incident with Thierack, as arrogant, showboating his inflated power, and unruly. It was difficult
for Himmler not to take this treatment personally, as the two seemingly had established a
mutually beneficial working relationship. After Bormann was given the title of Hitler’s private
secretary, letters sent from Bormann to Himmler were no longer addressed with the familiar
“Du” reserved for friends and acquaintances, but were instead addressed with the more formal
“Sie.”342 It was the equivalent of Bormann changing “Dear Heinrich,” to “Dear Comrade
Himmler.”
Himmler was able to set aside Bormann’s pettiness and instead revel in another
achievement. Hitler was quite pleased with his reports of exterminated Jews from the end of
1942, and that new extermination camps were being constructed. Hitler agreed to allow Himmler
to set up his own armament factories. This allowed Himmler to move one step closer to his
vision of a self-contained SS state where he was only answerable to Hitler. Additionally,
Himmler shared his views that the Hungarian Jews should be included in liquidations. Himmler
insinuated that Hitler would be capable of such persuasion.343 Though he was crafty, Himmler
was not as convincing as Bormann.
341
Von Lang, The Secretary, 223. Ibid, 226.
343
Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 799-798. 342
109 Himmler’s last promotion was achieved on August 20, 1943 when he was appointed
Minister of the Interior by Hitler. Himmler replaced Wilhelm Frick, who had held the position
since 1933. This completed Himmler’s control of the police state. The SS, the RSHA, and the
Ministry of the Interior which controlled the general German police were all under Himmler’s
command.344 Whereas Bormann felt comfortable with the tired old man Frick, now his young
adversary held the very position Bormann desired for himself. Minister of the Interior would
have awarded Bormann control of a policing force which he had coveted for years. Yet Bormann
was able to console himself with the realization that taking up this post would have meant not
being able to remain constantly at Hitler’s side.345 His position as secretary was much more
valuable to him due to intimacy and ability to control messages to and from the Führer, altering
information if he saw necessary.
Bormann’s greed for control still would not allow him to accept Himmler’s new title, and
he actively sought ways to discredit Himmler. The secretary was determined to ensure the
Reichsführer would ascend no further. Indeed, in the summer of 1944, Himmler reached the peak
of his power.346 The Hungarian occupation took place in March 1944, with commencement of
Jewish deportations beginning in early May.347 Yet due to Himmler’s covert attempts at peace
negotiations with the Allies, Himmler assigned Obergruppenführer Adolf Eichmann to act as a
proxy in the deportations and extermination of the Hungarian Jews. Amid discussions on peace
talks with his subordinates and inner circle, Himmler still battled with the concept of turning his
back on his Führer, and their cause, the Final Solution. During a conversation with his masseuse
344
Ibid, 812.
346
Ibid, 289.
347
Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary (Detroit: Wayne State University
Press, 2000), 135.
345
110 and confidant, Felix Kersten, Himmler said, “I can’t get rid of the Führer, to whom I owe
everything.”348 With this, Himmler provided evidence of his remaining devotion to Hitler.
After the July 20, 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life at Rastenburg, Poland, Himmler wanted to
have Bormann arrested. Himmler was aware of the suggestion in some quarters that Bormann
was acting against Hitler’s life in attempts to succeed him as Führer. Himmler immediately
suspected him of foul play. Göring feared Bormann would instigate a coup and assassinate
Hitler. Himmler agreed that this seemed possible. After all, Bormann was not present for this
meeting at the Wolfschanze—one of the few of Hitler’s meetings he missed. A group of young
men who were leaders in the Hitler Youth were closely watching Bormann for any sign that he
may attempt to succeed Hitler, willing to murder Bormann if necessary.349 After the culprits of
the assassination attempt were found, no actions were taken against Bormann.350 However,
Himmler kept a closer watch on Hitler, further gaining the Führer’s trust.
Just before the assassination attempt, Hitler bequeathed Himmler the responsibility of
ensuring “training, National Socialist indoctrination, disciplinary penal codes, and court martial”
knowledge be instilled into fifteen new army divisions. 351 This essentially provided the
opportunity of creating new Waffen-SS units. This extension of power was the honor for which
Himmler had been waiting.
In November 1944, though Himmler lacked any tangible military training, Hitler named
him Commander-in-Chief of the Upper Rhine. After failing to make any visible contribution
during the Battle of the Bulge, Himmler was transferred to the Army Group Vistula under
348
Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler, 163. Von Lang, The Secretary, 296. 350
Ibid, 296.
351
349
111 Hitler’s command, inevitably advised by Bormann.352 Himmler was a failure as a military leader,
allowing the Russians to cross the Vistula and advance on the German line.353 Keeping to his
habitual reaction when he performed poorly, Himmler suddenly “fell ill” and took to a
sanatorium to convalesce, thus avoiding reprisal from his Führer. Hitler was severely
disappointed in Himmler’s failed leadership skills as well as his lack of ability to accept his
shortcoming. This event marked a great loss of faith in Himmler, and it can be certain that
Bormann was coaxing Hitler against Himmler the entire time. 354 Himmler had Hitler’s favor
after the July 20 plot up until this loss. Göring stated during his June 10, 1945 interrogation,
“from then on, Bormann was supreme.”355
In addition to Himmler’s military failure, sending him away from Führer Headquarters
would provide Bormann with a private audience to Hitler. Bormann was free to instill whatever
plots he wished into the mind of his weakening leader. One of those possible plots materialized
in Hitler’s order of the destruction of the concentration camps, all evidence of the Final Solution,
and remaining prisoners to prevent their capture by Allied forces.356 The news hit the highly
nervous Himmler, still recuperating, quite hard. This meant the removal of one of Himmler’s
major power bases. On March 15th, 1945 Himmler traveled to Berlin to meet with Hitler where
according to Goebbels’ diary entry, Himmler received “an extraordinarily severe dressingdown.”357
352
Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 715-717. 354
Ian Kershaw, Hitler: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008),914.
355
353
356
357
Ibid, 876. 112 Bormann Divides the Reich
Bormann examined every piece of information addressed to Hitler. The most
controversial example was Bormann’s interception of Göring’s April 23, 1945 telegram.
According to General Karl Koller and Reichsleiter Philipp Bouhler, Göring feared Bormann
becoming Hitler’s successor: “He is merely waiting for his chance to liquidate me.”358 He
continued discussing his options with his comrades. “If I act now, they’ll call me a traitor. And if
I don’t act, I’ll be reproached for having failed Germany in the decisive hour.”359 Göring had
grown accustomed to Hitler’s outbursts blaming him for military losses or issues within the
Party. He was debating whether or not to send a telegram Hitler asking what action should he
take, and should he still take into consideration Hitler’s decree of June 29, 1941 naming Göring
his successor should he somehow be removed from power.360 Koller suggested “if you want to
make absolutely sure, why not send Hitler a message that puts the matter quite clear?”361 Though
Göring’s original message can never be retrieved, at the Nuremberg Trials, Göring claimed that
the telegram which was read to Hitler had been altered. He suspected he had been challenged by
none other than his adversary, Bormann. Once again, Bormann successfully manipulated
information to his benefit. Rewording the message to sound more like an ultimatum than a
question of procedure, Bormann condemned Göring, having him arrested and expelled from the
Party.362
By the April 1945, it was finally clear to Himmler that he had been underestimating his
rival, and repeatedly presented himself as a target over the years. In realizing his mistake of
believing he could outwit Bormann, he recognized his best choice of action was to flee Berlin.
358
Ibid, 315.
360
Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 1116.
361
362
Ibid, 315-319.
359
113 He spent one last birthday with Hitler, leaving the bunker on April 20, 1945. Himmler knew he
had to concede to Bormann. Otherwise, just as his adversary had convinced Hitler to distrust
Himmler, he feared Bormann would persuade Hitler to demand his murder.363
It was true that “Himmler rose higher, so far as offices were concerned, than any other
member in the hierarchy, and those offices were derived from Hitler.”364 Ultimately, though
Bormann held influence over Hitler’s actions, orders, and perceptions, it was Himmler who held
the power over life or death for Hitler.365 Himmler had the power, but lacked the personality and
mental stamina to utilize his SS forces to carry out a coup, assassinate Hitler and assume
leadership power. The man who did have the desire and capacity to take up power so was
Bormann, but for all his drive and aspiration, he lacked the support from any Special Forces or
comrades. In fact, there were those who would murder Bormann if Hitler was removed from
power.
Bormann allowed Himmler to rise as far as Minister of the Interior before sullying his
relationship with Hitler. By creating antagonism between Himmler and the gauleiters, Bormann
attempted to ensure that in the absence of himself or Hitler, Himmler would be blocked from
power by these regional leaders, though it is doubtful that Bormann had fully calculated the
strength of Himmler’s S.S. units. Himmler could have worked around this barrier. What finally
saw Heinrich Himmler’s ultimate demise was the loss of trust, respect, and loyalty from Hitler.
Destruction of the relationship Himmler had worked for years to establish, costing him his leader
363
MD.).
364
365
Ibid. 114 whom he struggled to please and gain admiration from, was the true death stroke of Himmler’s
power.
115 Conclusion
Himmler was present in the Berlin bunker to celebrate his Führer’s last birthday on April
20, 1945. It was the final time he saw Hitler. Himmler then spent several days wandering
through Germany. He apparently had not made any prior plans for himself. No evidence exists of
Himmler having written letters or preparing a suicide plot, and, he had decided he did not wish to
die in battle, either.366 His realization that the Allies would somehow secure him safe passage
from Germany was a false hope and a tough blow. In accordance with what we know of his
personality, Himmler lacked the necessary decisiveness to hand himself over as a prisoner, as
Göring had done, and he believed he would be hunted as a war criminal.
On May 11, 1945, Himmler traded his glasses for an eye patch, shaved his moustache,
and disguised himself as “Sergeant Heinrich Hitzinger.” He began traveling through the country
without an apparent pattern or reason, leaving Flensburg, in the far northern German state of
Schleswig-Holstein, for Freidrichskoog, to the southwest.367 Ironically, Himmler’s narcissism
remained so strong that his false name bore the same initials to his given name. Himmler was
captured with his two escorts at a checkpoint near Bremerförde on May 21.368 Himmler
presented his suspiciously false papers, and his escorts kept glancing back to check that he was
still with them—making it overly obvious to the British patrol that something strange was
occurring. The Nazis were taken to British Second Army Headquarters in Barnstedt, in Lower
Saxony.369 When word came to Captain Tom Selvester that there were three men insisting to see
the officer in charge, he had them brought to him. Selvester saw through Himmler’s disguise,
366
Longerich, 735.
Ibid, 735.
368
Longerich, 736. 369
367
116 recognizing him immediately.370 Upon being seated, in a quiet voice, without being asked, the
disheveled man said, “Heinrich Himmler.”371 The men were searched, but their British captors
were not certain they had found all of the poison on Himmler’s person after finding only a phial
in the lining of his jacket.372
Company Sergeant Major Edwin Austin was present that night acting as an interpreter.
Austin ordered Himmler to get undressed, to which Himmler indignantly said from behind an
army blanket “he does not know who I am!” Austin assured Himmler he was aware of his
identity, and repeated his order. Himmler was inspected thoroughly, and when the medical
officer came to his mouth, Himmler acted. “Himmler drew his head away and, clamping down
on the doctor’s fingers, crushed a phial of poison.”373 Himmler had carried the cyanide in his
mouth for hours waiting for the right moment and most dramatic moment to take his own life.374
Himmler fought to maintain control right up to his death. In committing suicide, he not
only commanded his own destiny, but he also died in the same manner as his Führer. Göring and
Heydrich brought Himmler to power and assisted in its retention. Bormann ultimately removed
him from his leadership, but through his death Himmler perceived himself as being in total
control once more. No one could interfere with the decision he held between his teeth. It took
him forty-five years, but Himmler was finally a man in control of himself. Despite this
accomplishment, Himmler remained the people pleaser who needed to be noticed. Rather than
escaping the country and hoping to live out his remaining years undetected, Himmler announced
his identity, and made a spectacle of himself, a victim of his own narcissism.
370
Manvell and Fraenkel, 245.
Ibid, 254.
372
Manvell and Fraenkel,247.
373
Frischauer, 10.
374
Ibid, 10. 371
117 His rivals proved themselves personally stronger than Himmler, even through their
deaths. Göring was tried at Nuremberg and took his own life rather than hang. He felt it better
suited a decorated soldier to commit suicide than be executed by hanging.375 Heydrich was
assassinated, and it was determined that Bormann committed suicide after emerging from
Hitler’s bunker in Berlin on May 2, 1945.376
Himmler allowed the Nazi Party to consume his identity. His leadership skills were
formed by his three leading rivals. In battling Himmler, they in turn strengthened him. For
Göring and Heydrich, their associations meant survival. In the Göring-Himmler relationship,
survival meant Göring ensuring his ability to call upon Himmler for assistance. As Göring had
elevated Himmler to such a powerful position within security leadership, the two experience a
fair-weather association. For Heydrich, his rapport with Himmler was mostly of necessity and
greed, but Bormann’s aims were destruction. Though Himmler asserted control over his destiny,
it was his rivals that had dominated his past.
Without these three rivalries, Himmler would never have become such a strong force
within the Third Reich. Hermann Göring, Reinhard Heydrich, and Martin Bormann provided
Himmler not only with competition, but with ascension to power. Hitler desired infighting
among his leaders as a sign of strength, loyalty, and brutality. Göring and Heydrich clearly
provided Himmler with leadership roles or inspired Himmler to seek out a position. Yet the
underlying irony was that these men also made Himmler appear desirable to the Führer by
engaging him in clashes for power. The same can be said for Bormann, who, despite his lack of
assisting Himmler’s further acquisition of power, provided Himmler with a relationship
375
376
Manvell and Fraenkel, 392-393
Von Lang, 335. 118 characterized by animosity. Given the evidence, it can be said with certainty that Himmler’s
leadership roles within the Third Reich were shaped by these men. Heinrich Himmler would not
have ascended to power without his rivalries with these three close Party comrades.
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Humanizing Heinrich Himmler

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