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İHb; iINTEREST GkOLPS-srATE
INTEREACE:
THE CASE
Ol· TURKISH İNLîLSTR'îALISTS’
AND BUSINESSMEN’S
ASSC)l, 1Al ivJN
A Thesis
Siibm i t'.ed t o i-i'.e ü-eiJiircnienL o i
R·;· Li 1 1C.Mİ Science
Public Administration
of
Bilkent University
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Decree of
f
Master of Arts
by
Celal Nazim İrem
September l‘
J90
C c \a \
tarafiMd;.a 1,
0 iY|
, -w c’i-ir.
Hb
І ' ^ ’Э Ь -C L
, Τ 2
1-ЧЦ
ISÎiO
’ li'.'
I.'.j L ! l i a \ r e a d
IS 1u > 1;· a:K-.|uaLe,
l!ii-
t hj s
IIk-s j !:, and in n:.'.· :;ıinı·)l:
in scoiie and in (iin'il i t.y,
dC'g.refc· ol' Master ol
;i
as a iln.-sis I'ui
Arts in I'oJiticaJ S ci en ce and laihlic
AdrainiSt r a t i o n .
Prof.Dr. Metin Heper
1
c e r i i i ’ v that 1 have reaci Uiis t h e s i s and in m>· op in io n
:s t'.iii;
the
a·.: ·.,'.] 11 a U ' ,
in scope and in g ua l i i \,
as a lijc-sis
it
ilh
(ive;ri,-e o i .Master o f .Arts in i - 'o l i l i c a ] Scienct· and laibd’ c
Adfci n i s t ra t. i on .
Dr. Jerem\· SaJ t
I
certit>· tiuat I iiave read this thesis and in my opinion
is I'uJly adequate,
the
in scope and in quality,
ii
as a thesis lor
degree or Master ot Arts in Foliticai Science and Funiic
AdniinisT ral ion.
Di', A^■se Kadi oglu
ABSTRACT
İM
study
between
UK·
reievancy
state
since
the nature ol tiie overall treiids lu
and
interest groups
Jyüüs
description
ol‘ the
specificly,
aimed
Kere
relevant
at
wliich
analysed.
began
Ihe
a
to
inquiry
interest groups
providing
î «'iat
in
the
background
gain
i
i;;
political
begins
witli
political
information
Uie
system,
of
liie
organizational sciiema ol the business interests dui'ing the ijerioci concerned.
1ÎU/
stratr'îes
of
the relevant ¿i^.sociatioiis in
princess ol influencing the public jôlicies
In
state
lin.-iness
sector
c;1ientel isni.
were
employed,
notably
ti;e
invc-si igaieci.
ihr analysis arguments of the ideal-type models of interest
r-eiations
in
pluralism.
group-
corpoi'at 1sm
and
tven though none of the models is sufficient b\' tnemsej\es to
expiai ^ the interest group-state relations in Turkish politics on sectorial
bas is ·
Iron) t!:is perspt^ctive,
wi th regard to TurKisI:.
an empiiasis was placed
on ihe inter act ion between the stave and business groups.
tljat
whi l e in Cirr'lain areas A s s o c i a t i o n seemed to be t o l e r a t e d
11 s
vi ews,
Uie
As so cia ti' jn
Ujese
i t was ciiscusseci
most ar-eas o i the p u b l i c p o l i c y making was s l r i c i i \
in
contradictory
St lai.ugu's.
t.hat ccaiJu b·:
to
w.hijr/
tlje name o l defending tlie
’'st.atL·
e\(iress
closed
au t Moi 1 1 . y . "
to
fiuis,
tendencies lead to the d i \ers 1 1 i c a. 1 1 on o f
l u t v i e s t and
gr e at ly d i s t o r t i n g an>· one oi
rcr i at i (,nis;. i j.'
i deal
r\-);e
eioijed between business gioiips and the slati·' ..'/or liiin'.
11
OZEÎ
:JUU 1:ı
!oiı:a,
.
1:0 •.'MU 11
>'a;M İU:.'İ\ -^ı
'VİK'iH
\:l
1;l·''ip i'iI";
•'!:.ii·
■l eu 1
v:^ 1 ! ı.::M
( 1
}
!·· · C·
M
. 1
L t -J Jil «<4
^ bi'ü ş
1 :.ı\ i
“
el a
çoğu
k a mu
k a u a 11
a ş a i *a K ,
ii î:
^
n li i il i11e! i: i. •
Ii!l
kollVl j
c a l·’ Ls
kamu
İÜ r k
ac j s •
i cinci e
•· .1.0 r
i i is k is i
Î./C; i i t i k a s ı
] joİ i L ii; a s ı
o u i m a i; r a d ı r a
■’ ç ı k a r ' :ı n
lif^veren şnıp U ın
ve
iıa Kk ll: d a
i e .ad a m i. a r i.
yo. : r İ n T
i e i: o d ' İCİ
a l a n ı n ], n
Bu
."'J/ i i i a y i v: 1
ı'ik iı'
d e \ •1^::
Vury;u
î;evan
y a ; .il J i n a k v..ı‘;ieİ
a* t m e s i i r
c; l O r İ l e H i n i ı . · ·
; w-, tc e a L IVa i. iL ··‘ a 1 i. i . n u e i - i O î
y ö n t e m i e ı •i n '
:.. k * r n v ; y ; U i
ç n - s i Lt : en i i i v • s i n e
v v n
K. e r u n m a s .i
ö r n e İv
y ·:;!
i' .
a y İl;
^ * M'
len
■...rakı:;
a a : i;a
iiencıin--
s : ti i e 1 a ı · i I; I
a ç liia 1 a r 1 1 1 1 . n
y an ı s i r a
cievlet arasiiıda zaman Lcınde iêiişeP t. i.‘:rr:ei: olai: iıerlıani^
b i r modelinde bozulmasına yol a ç t ı k l a r ı
111
‘c artuş Lİıaaktadır,
Acl;nou· J edşemeiıt
1
would like to expr*ess my appreciation to I’t o I'.
stimulated
'..as
\ear
an
at
my interest in 7'urkish politics and even
Metin Heper wno
more
uiii'aijing· source of ad\ice and support throug’hout
U jv^ l;i:}:ent l;n ivers it.y;
2‘jeat deal.
IV
m\·
^raduat«’
and as the re\]evsvr of earliei'
oifer''/d extensive and t hou^^ht Cu 1 suggesti ons foi· re\iSiOii;
s
importantly,
drati
l owe iiin: a
I >u:.·
\ :■
‘ İKijM ('V ·.':i ·.
L
:
1
! i . l i -xiiic! i o n
hiipt o;· *i C) :
C îï.'ipt ei· J lircv :
:
i ’o j ; t : CO - кс C-liwfT. J ·.; ijo c k ş rc iü i!ü' i
i-.R:. rfoiio·.·
h.::.i
> ; v(
i¡1; ci
1‘. /Я0
! ïu ] і : і íîi InduKt r i a l i St K ’
; ііѵ : :·::^ΐί;ι1’.SSni у: П'
• : j:;: ' ··.
]Ü
Ti.0 0 : 4-1. i c J Ь.'іСк(ІГЧ;|])
у.
у.
As
;і;і
•18
: Cî. •
!. : ■i Ci 1. ;>. ■ a»]·: i:■
SiSiri-.-SS.Ti'-rli ' s
hç
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
The
stale-society relations may be conceptualized from
perspectives,
each
different
based on varying degrees of emphasis either on the
state or society.
Different
spheres.
a
views
advanced on the relation
between
the
two
It was emphasized by the classical economists that market was
self-adjusting
activity
were
natural
of diverse
order
which
social groups.^
coordinated
Sheldon Wolin
the
sponteneous
summarized
this
approach as follows:
What
was
society
truly radical in liberalism was its
as a network of activities carried on by
knew no principle of authority.
a
sponteneous
and
justice
actors
self - adjusting order
but
a
transferred
from
who
condition
[Hence] the age-old
of distributing goods according to some standard
was
of
Society represented not only
untroubled by the presence of authority...
function
conception
the
political
sphere
of
and
assigned to the impersonal judgement of the market.^
It
is
assumed that private interests would
within society.^
emerge
Intervention into the market by outside
autonomously
authorit>· (read ’’the state” ]>
reduced
Thus,
tu
bo
had to be prevented.
a guardian of private property but no more
thought,
criticisms
were
raised
against
that.
this
mainstream
of
which reached to its most elaborated form in the works of Karl
Polanyni^.
As he stated,
togetlnr.
SeJf-regulating market was unknown.
idea
of
"regulation and markets,
in effect,
Then,
development
of
a
prcidominaiit-
role
extra-market
free
market.
trend
intervention became the
Thus,
grew up
Indeed the emergence of
self-regulation was a complete reversal of the
development-.”·^
int
than
society conceived as the source of general order.
Certain
the
State’s role was
the state
in the fabric of society through
came
its
to
path
of
of
play
a
interventions
the market.
Increased
importance
of the state in contemporary world as
being
the crucial factor in the institutionalization of the market necessarily
brings
us to its relations with private interest.
On the other
hand,
state-society relations in different countries provided the backdrop for
the
extent
and scope of the state intervention to the private area
of
the part icular ist ic interests.^
As civil society is conceived of the sphere of particular interest^,
then the politically defined state’s^
gains impoiMance.
relation
to
It was suggested by Metin Heper that
and too
strong institutionalization pattern of the
drastic
implications in its relations with civil
High
its
environment
a non-political
state in Turkey had
societal elements.^
degre(3 of stateness^^ fed by strong institutionalization resulted
in a specific kind of "interest representation" that was in turn
shaped
by the confrontations of "state elites" and "political elites."
Thus,
between
was
as it was found by Powell Jr.,
political parties and social groups between 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 5 . It
also
into
there exis-ted weak linkages
a
poinLed out by Heper,
that "business group did not
class with autonomous economic power
and
norms.
develop
They
were
opportunistic rather than entrepreneurial and constructive.
As
the
crisis of the transition from "state-dominant
policy"
party-centered policy revealed itself over different periods^^
politicized
relations
unchanged.
between
government
and
to
highly
associations
remained
Even though one may talk that some continuities can be
observed in the patterns of relation between governments and business it
can
be
asserted
that with the emergence of
voluntary private business association,
TUSIAD,
as
the
first
there occurred certain changes
in the post 1970 period.
In
this
"government"
other
the
and
words,
state
essay
certain
"state"
features
of
TUSIAD’s
from 1971 till to 1990
relations
will be
studied
what is aimed at is to understand the relations
and voluntary sectoral representation and
legitimacy on both sides.
the
with
in
between
patterns
of
TUSIAD,
being
the
first
voluntary
businessmen
association,
constitutes a special case where its relation with the state may provide
clues
about
new
societal elements.
patterns of relations between
Thus,
employed
for their inclusion,
vis the bureaucratic elite.
are interesting.
began
policies
During the post-
A new type of bureaucrat emerged who offers
attitude
Thus,
On the other hand,
it can be said
towards the private
to erode by the emergence of these new type of
technocrats.
Here,
some changes took place vis-à-
his expertise to the political party in office,
bureaucrats’
civil
deserves special emphasis.
as pointed out by Heper,
traditional
and
into and exclusion from the
by the authorized agents,
1973 pi-r iod,
state
the answer to the question of "how TUSIAD is
represented in the political order?"
criterias
the
interest
officials
was
namely
the post-1980 re-institutionalization
of the state around different norms and values assigned new roles to the
interest
group associations.
"legitimation"
newly
with
In a changing political environment
and "structuration" of the "political actors" around the
formulated values and norms necessarily effected
"non
the
their
political bodies" which in turn redirected the
towards these values such as "unity" and "order".
Thus,
relation
associations
the relations
between the government and TUSIAD took new patterns.
Focusing
relationship
on
the
factors which may influence the
between TUSIAD and government,
analyse the resources held by the two parties.
types
of
control
which government possess
nature
of
the
an effort will be made to
We will try to show the
and
may
exercise
on
TUSIAD.
by
Parallel to this,
the strategies used and resources mobilized
TUSIAD in order to shape or influence the government policies on the
relevant issues will be taken up.
Furthermore,
kind of channels are used by both parties?"
be
useful
to
associations
of
the question of "what
will be looked at.
discuss the legitimacy of TUSIAD
among
other
and their relation with political actors with the
It will
business
purpose
providing certain arguments on the permittable limits of the "group,
autonomy" in the eyes of the government agents.
TUSIAD’s
1990 period,
TUSIAD
the
role in the economic system changed drastically in
if compared to the previous decade.
realm.
external
TUSIAD
intervene
But in 1980-1990 period one can talk about
leadership of TUSIAD among other business groups.
the
Between 1971-1980,
was an "emerging" business group which began to
political
1980-
dynamics
that
This was because
were closely related to
the
anatomy
into
the
of
of
i.e the sphere of the business activity in which firms belonging
to TUSIAD became the leading ones in their respective areas.
The
particular
increased
affected,
the
structure
conflict
between
of government
various
incentives
business
in
groups.
the nature of demands of TUSIAD from the government
economy
It
also
whether
they were economic or political demands.
It can be said that during "transformatory phases" of the
realm,
the
economic
every policy making institution becomes highly politicized,
and
relations between and with business groups take forms deviant from
that of the "already established ones."
By making a comparative analysis of 1971-1980 and 1980-1990 periods
we
wish
to
discuss the changing political factors that
economic issues.
decisions
In this sense,
were
arrived
at
effected
the
the political process in which
the
becomes important
"attributed function" in the political arena.
government
in
terms
of
TUSIAD’s
TUSIAD’s attitude towards
involvement in economy turns out to be a major factor in its
definition
of
"the
Government-business
definition
of"
state’s
relations
interest"
becomes
and
an
"private
important
interests."
factor
the state’s interest" and in terms of
for
the
identifying
the
business’ weight in policy process.
Within this framework,
groups
organized
in
the
ways in which social
and related to each other and to
conceptual tools are used:
discussed
we will discuss
chapter two.
corporatism,
the
pluralism,
state.
Three
and clientelisra,
How can we conceive the government
TUSIAD
relations in terms of the above mentioned conceptual tools is the
basic
question we will try to tackle.
The concept of clientelism will be specially handy.
personalized
superior
ideal
reciprocal
commanding
type
anonymity
and
of
and
n e x u s . W e
relationship between an
unequal resources,
bureaucratic
relationship
It refers "to a
inferior
moreover in contrast
the
norms
universalism are largely absent from
the
of
to
a
the
rationality
patron-client
will look at the nature of exchange relationship
TUSIAD and governments.
and
between
Iiiterpst
groups must be analysed within the context ol the genei'ai
distribution of power thoughout the entire political system.
respect,
we
environment
give
a
brief
during the 1970-1980
cliapter we
account
addilion,
politics and
delegitimation
1In* attitudes
i)oliticized
groups
of
the
reasons of
this
political
period in chapter three.
will try to evaluate the possible
of niuUipart\·
inavl\
will
In
In
this
the crisis
crisis that followed.
In
of the major political parties towards the
will
be examined
in
order
to
provide
a
framew(;rk to TUSIAD’s relations with political parties.
In
tin*
int.erface
TUSIAD.
fourth
between
chapter,
we
government
and
will give a brief
business
account
associations
of
other
the
than
Our purpose is to determine the resources of different business
associations
that they can offer to successive
governments.
Then
we
will inquire whether in this respect TUSIAD is distinct.
TUSIAD’s
evaluated
in
relation
with
other
business
associations
order to give a brief explanation of its
successive
governments.
businessmen
association,
TUSIAD,
as
being
the
had a significant impact on
will
relations
first
be
with
voluntary
politics.
So,
the reasons which underlined its emergence will be broached.
In
Third
the fifth chapter,
we will discuss the role of TUSIAD in
Turkish Republic and try to analyse the role of TUSIAD in
process.
the
policy
The overall project is designed to show why none of the varieties of
corporatist
or
pluralist
paradigm
TUSIAD-government relations.
is
appropriate
to
characterize
Alternative arguments developed around the
notion of clientelism will be offered in order to provide a framework to
understand TUSIAD-government relation.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1)
Eduart Herman,
History of Economic Thought.
Oxford Universit Press,
Harry Landreth,
Mifflin,
2)
1960),
3)
Houghton
Politics and Vi3ion^(Boston.
Little Brown,
p. 301.
of Interest,"
4)
(Boston:
pp. 33-67.
Charles N. Anderson,
p.
pp. 48-52. See also,
History of Economic Theory,
1976),
Sheldon Wolin,
1962),
(London:
"Political Design and Interest Representation
Comparative Political Studies
10 (April 1977),
129.
Karl Polanyi,
The Great Transformation.
(Boston,
Beacon Press,
1957).
5)
Ibid.
6)
Pierre
Society
7)
Birnbaun , "The State versus
11 (April 1982),
Metin Heper,
"Bureaucrats,
Corporatism,"
Politics
and
pp. 477-501.
Politicians and Officers in Turkey:
Dilemmas of new Political Paradigm"
in Modern Turkey: Continuity
ftnd Change, edited by Ahmet Evin,(Hamburg: Deutsche Orient Institu,
1984),
p. 69.
8)
Political
definition
of
the
state does
not
refer
to
"human
associations that successfully claim monopoly of the legitimate use
of physical force within a given territory." Thus,
the
sovereignity of the state varies from one setting to
Могсчлег,
tlie
associations
sovereignity
Turkish Political
Military
Bingham
Experience"
"Politics and Society
in State Democracy
Walter de Gruyter,
1980),
and
Powell
Jr.,
Ahmet
Press,
1985),
13)
Ibidp.
101.
]4 )
Metin Heper,
The
"Party
Systems
and
p. 2.
Political
System
Voting Participation Government Stability and Mass
75 (1981),
Metin Heper,
American Political Science
pp. 886-887.
The State Tradition in Turkey.
(Walkington:
Eothen
p. 102.
"Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişme Sürecinde Bürokrasi: Bir
Tipolüjiê Bazı Düşünceler,"
Amme İdaresi Dergisi
13 (Haziran
1980), pp. 73-77.
15)
Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg,
Development,"
the
p. 1.
State Military and Democracy.
Violance in Contemporary Democracies,"
12)
other
typescript.
and Evin eds.,
Preferences:
Review
vis-à-vis
"The State and Pluralism in a Muslim Context:
Turkisli Case,"
11)
state
ill Turkey in the 1980s , edited by Metin Heper and
9) Metin Heper,
Heper,
the
see Metin Heper,
Eyin, (Berlin and New York:
10)
of
another.
and collectivities assumed to be an emprical question
for each individual case.
in
the question on
"Political Clientalism and
Comparative Politics 4 (January 1972),
p. 151.
Chapter Two
THEORETICAL BACKDROP
AN OVERVIEW
Traditional
theory
of
studies on interest groups basicly derived from "group
politics" which conceived of politics as a
allocation
of
examining
the
process
of
the
social values and resources that could be unravelled
by
groups
in
which
take part in
and
have
potentiality
effecting the decisions made in the political process.^
Bentley’s studies ©penned up a new page in group theory of
and
were
attempts
later
aimed
elaborated by Truman and
of
understanding
Latham.^
politics
politics
Ultimately,
rather
than
to
these
develop
theoretical arguments on "interest groups."
A
set of concepts and arguments specificly
framework
provided
the
theoretical construct for
political behavior in general.
"any
group
certain
that
claims
So,
the
study
of
the
Truman defined interest group as
on the basis of one or more
upon
generated from "group"
other groups in society
shared
for
attitudes
the
makes
establishment,
maintenance or enchancement of form of behaviour that are implied by the
shared
attitudes.Truman
would emerge spontaneously.
wisdom
argues that interest
group
associations
He took an optimistic view on the
natural
of society in that competing groups will spontaneously arise and
an "invisible hand" will secure social checks and balances,
reasonable share for all,
stability,
and prevention of special sectional interests
being met at the virtual expense of other interest.·*
10
The
the
assumption
basis
behind the conventional pluralist approach is that
of the interest groups are shared or
public policies that reflect these common
common
interests.
attitudes inspire people to join a group.
interests
Thus,
and
’’shared
The emergence of an interest
group is based on the interaction on the basis of shared attitudes.”^
According
not
to Truman organizational structure of interest groups do
have any relevancy concerning the interest a group has
only
indicates
because
about the patterns in which the group members
As put by Truman,
it
operate.
’’the existence of neither the group nor the interest
is dependerit upon formal organizations...
Organization indicates merely
a stage or degree of interaction.”^
Group
theorists
perceived
between various interests,
of politics basicly
whether organized or not.
as
an
interplay
They studied the
methods interest groups utilize in order to pursue common interests.
From this perspective ”all politics is no more than interest
politics.”“
^
Even
though ”it [group theory] has relevancy in terms
the analytical design” as emphasized by Мое,
that
group
of
”it says nothing more than
politics is being interpreted through the employment of a
special
coi.ceptual device.”^
In
formal
power
the
group
theory of politics,
’’government is reduced
device for registering the outcome reached in the
among
interest
groups,
its independent
11
powers
struggle
and
to
a
for
creative
potentials
being
groups.The
subordinated to the function of meeting interests
of
government is assumed to be the passive-receiptent of the
demands of interest groups.
As pointed out by
sublimation
of
represented
a theoretical trend,
Brenner,
"reductionist
the political order into the world of social
some elements of which
pluralism
continue
to
Truman’s argument that "interests respond
to
dominate contemporary writing on pluralist democracy.
At
the
events,
same time,
interact
and
exert pressure on government according
to
the
general principles of group behaviour and independent of socio-political
conditions"'^
argument
raised
some criticisms.
It was
argued
that
Truman’s
neglected the impact of major structural and policy changes in
this relationship.
The rights,
power and expectations of the private
economic associations would be different in different cultural
and Truman’s model did not take this into account.
Thus,
emphasized
in
the
importance
of
political culture
settings
LaPalombara
determining
the
patterns of interest representation.
Structural-functionalism
politics.
provided
Structural
another
paradigm
functionalism
to
interest
group
politics
as a system of interrelated behaviors, distinguished
study
conceived
of
specific
functions that must be carried out if the system is to survive.
Gabriel
Almond provided the schema of five input
(recruitment,
communication,·
and interest aggregation) and
three
output
adjustment).
interest articulation,
functions
Each
(rule-making,
function
is
rule
performed by
12
socialization,
application
and
a
structure.
specific
rule-
Interest
groups are structures which perform the interest
articulation
function.13
Thus,
interest groups are the channels in
which specific demands
are transmitted from social system to the political
system.
Political
parties
function as aggregating agents with the task of reconciling the
demands
articulated
legislature,
by interest
executive
groups.
and judiciary,
Other
structures,
translate these
namely
inputs
into
policy outputs.
It
was pointed out that when structural functionalism
describe
politics,
dimentional
view
articulation
"there
of
is
interest
a
implicit tendency
groups or at
least
aspect of what interest groups are,
to
to
attempt
take
to
a
one
emphasize
the
what they do and why
they are important.
In
fact,
Almond
placed the traditional view of interest
groups
into a more comprehensive concept of interest articulation.^®
Interest
groups
boundary
as
functional
maintenance
between
parts of a
"working
system"
polity and s o c i e t y . I t
provide
implied that
a
certain
pattern
or type of interest articulation by the associational groups is
a norm.
It was emphasized that "...the structure and style of interest
articulation
and
society,
between
the
legislatures,
define the pattern of boundary maintenance between
and
within the political system effect
various
parts
of
the
bureaucracies and courts."^®
13
political
the
polity
boundaries
system-parties,
Thus,
Almond’s
understood
society.
classification of interest groups can be properly
wlien it is conceived
Almond
constant,
as a relationship between polity
points out that "associationai interest
specific,
general
and
instrumental
and
groups
style
of
with
interest
articulation contribute better to the boundary maintenance than those of
uninstitutionalized,
affective,
diffuse,
nonassociational
particular
and anomic interest groups with
and
affective
style
of
interest
articulation.
It
but
was argued that their function is not only demand articulation
also demand r e d u c t i o n . On the other hand "they inject
political
or...
system
diffuse
tendencies"
penetrate
uncompromisingly
in
the
the raw unaggregated demands of
turn
or
revolutionary
"specific interests
bureaucracy
specific
and undermine
and
its
into
the
interests,
and
reactionary
ideological
neutral,
tendencies
instrumental
character.i
Robert
schema of
Bianchi
Almond
Huntington’s
and
primary
marks
Samuel
the similarity between
Huntington’s
concern is,
relation between polity and society.
gaps
between
mass and elite,
linchpin
functionalist
developmental
approach.
the role of interest groups in
the
Huntington focuses on a series of
aspirations
and
participation and rate of institutionalization,
forces
the
capacity,
rates
of
newly mobilized social
and the s t a t e . " I n t e r e s t groups" and "the state" becomes the
of
Huntington’s schema.
14
He argues for
the
necessity
for
increasins:
the
state
power
confronted with excessive,
when
of
identified
with
’’legitimacy
the\'
governmental
the
legitimate
public
order”
where
the interest of the state.
public
Huntington
interest
is
argues
that
of government actions can be sought in the extent to
which
institutions
inst itut ions.
^
Thus,
derive their legitimacy and authority not
extent to which they represent tlie interests of the people
other
are
the basic problem of modernization is the
f*‘flect the interest of the governmental
’’government
structures
unlimited demands of the social groups.
According to Huntington,
’’creation
weak
or
grou[) but to the extent to which they have distinct interests
to
any
of
tiieir own apart fr*om all other groups.
The
effect
of
participation
modernization is the
in
politics
institutionalization.
necessary
demands
for
of
Huntington,
mobilization
participation
exceeds
and
the
It also means a dispersion of power where it is
channeling,
newly
where
increased
adopting
mobilized groups.
party and
group
and
structuring
the
The critical point is
organizations
are
not
the
excessive
that
for
means
of
channeling political demands but rather they function as ’’filters” where
the
newly
participated
ones are socialized to
the
already
existing
values and practices.
The
them
similarity to Almond’s approach lies in the fact that both
conceive
mechanisms.^^
interest
As
groups
and
parties
as
demand
reducing
emphasized by Bianchi ’’...the primary task of
and party or-ganizations is to ensure boundary maintenance between
15
of
group
polity
and society in order to prevent what might be called a "performance gap"
characterized
by
underperformance
overperformance
of
'input
conceptualizing
Almond contributed to the field by his attempt of
interest
politics
at a higher
around the notion of interest articulation.
theoretical
framework
institutionalization
their
the
which
around
which
state.
of
assertion
unstructured
pointed
that
interest
notion
some
cases
As pointed out by Bianchi
developmental
at
generalization,
Huntington constructed
the
in
level
of
to
lower
levels
of
groups tend to promote
the
"...the
and group theorists are
higher levels of development,
participation,
to
the
to
principle
in
relatively
participation
whereas
well organized groups tend to
contribute
need
summarized
development
excessive
a
political
threatens political stability and economic growth,
effective
the
Earlier group theorists discussed the basic premises in
intergroup relations,
contribution
and
of 'output f u n c t i o n s . ’
To sum up:
strengthen
functions’
stagnation
at
constrict
of
party-
electoral politics and preserve stable inequality."28
The importance of these theories stems from the fact that they make
emphasis
on
interest
state-society
groups
groups as significant structures
relations can be conceptualized.
perform
diverse
functions,
through
Even though
structuration
of
which
interest
interest
representation can be studied through three alternative paradigms, namely
pluralism,
corporatism and clientelism.
16
PLURALISM
Pluralism is defined as "a sociopolitical system in which the power
of
the
state
isshared
with
large
number
of
groups
interest
organizations and individual members r e p r e s e n t e d . E i g h t e e n t h century
contractualist
theorists
like
philosophical
justification
Locke
for
and
Madison
provided
pluralism with reference
to
the
natural
law.30
Pluralism
divided
is
conceived as a system in which
power
have any legal status,
but they exercise influence on
groups mediate between individual and organized state power.
regarded as
through
them
narrowed.
the
the
representatives of
distance
interests
between the state and
As emphasized by Douglas A. Chalmers,"
bargaining
and
confrontation
analysis...
The
pluralist
regulatory
terms.
Few
between
groups at
of
government
would
limit
the
the
center
the
the importance and extent of regulation.
remains
external
is not a constitutent part of
to
those interests,
incentives."32
17
of
its
essentially
state’s
recognize
state
is
pluralism places the
to the watchdog role posited by the early liberals
the
The groups
individual
behavior
model
Such
individuals;
view conceives of the state in
pluralists
a
The groups in question do
with the aim of influencing it with their own policy preferences.
are
is
among the branches of government and shared by the state and
number of private groups and individuals.3^
not
political
actual
and
most
But in a pluralist
interests.
setting boundaries,
Rather
rules
it
and
With
group
the
shift of emphasis from individual
to
group
behaviour,
participation in public policy became significant.
emphasis
thing
on group politics,
Growing
pluralist view posits that the
is competition and participation among the organized
not among the individuals.
’’any
mode
of
corporat.ist. ..
communication....
control.
Thus,
organized
into
competitive,
type
or
interest
involve
These
in
an
two
two
of
intermediation
contrasting
aspects
can
aspects
be
pluralist mode ’’the
unspecified
nonhierarchically
scope
groups
but
As elaborated by Phillippe C. Schmitter,
organized
must
essential
interest)
number
ordered,
categories
of
pluralist,
of
political
representation
and
constituent
units
are
multiple,
voluntary,
and seif determined (as
that
are
not
to
specifically
licensed,
recogîiized subsidized,
created or otherwise controlled
in
leadership
selection or interest articulation by the state and that
do
not
exercise
a
monopoly
of representational
activity
within
their
respective categories.
By
the
attitudes
increased salience of the state in
towards the state began to change.
the
economic
sphere,
Erosion of the negative
attitude towards the state coupled with the view that among other social
entities,
the state
alone
has the ability both to
recognize
produce resources that would meet the growing needs of the
modern
societies.
mutation,
many
It
was
interests
pointed
out that as
a
18
to
contemporary
result
emerged which depend on the state
benefit and subsidies and for its arbitration in their
and
of
for
this
the
competition with
other groups.
Thus,
in the normative sense the pluralist conception of
the role of the state was reversed.
CORPORATISM
Pluralist school of thought largely neglected the role of the state
in
group
state"^^
politics.
Multiple groups held together by the
is the main theme in the pluralist discussions on
Organization
essential
of
drive
centered
the
private
sphere
by the
groups
in society led the pluralists
approach.
"regulatory
the
which
to develop
state.
hold
a
Roy Macridis referred to this focus as
the
society"inputism"
and noted:
The famous "black box" as graduate students have come to
government
is
at
best
a
filter
interests express themselves,
transmission
mechanism.
mechanism
and,
through
at its worst,
know
which
a simple
The role of state is reduced to the
narrow confines of an organization which channels,
reflects
and expresses commands and instructions from 'elsewhere*^®
Even
though
corporatism
is
a
rival
corporatist
concept
interest representation in such a way that
pluralist framework in policy making,
19
have
as
pluralism,
of
theorists
regarded
broadened the
too.37
concept
scope
it
to
of
the
covers
the
The
predominant
representation,
theory,
view
Schmitter,
favors
the
representation”^^;
delegate
Claus
their
it
representative
crises
'’interest
where
it refers to a system of in
related
of
representation
the other hand,
Gerhard
to
"the
the p e o p l e . I t
of multiparty systems,
On
intermediation”
in
corporatist
to
"interest
which
citizen
As observed
diminishing
was suggested
role
of
him,
that
during
"corporatism
is
of
more than
a
as
representation.
As
peculiar
pattern
of
Rather it is an institutionalized pattern of
with
other and with public authorities not only in the articulation (or
even intermediation) of interest but,
authoritative
policies.
of
the
such
policy-formulation in which large interest organizations cooperate
each
of
between groups and the state.
some otlier students of corporatism
articulation of interests.
by
other
corporatism permits a special kind
Lechraburch had in mind more than a form of
by
interest
bodies especially parties as agents in the formation
will
interest
stated
term
is
of
one of the leading figures
representatory right to other bodies.
Offe,
political
is that corporatism is a form
state
traditional
allocation
in its developed forms,
in the
of values and in the implementation
of
such
It is precisely because of the intimate mutual penetration
bureaucracies
concept
and
of
large
interest
interest
organizations
representation
that
becomes
inappropriate for a theoretical understanding of corporatism."^^
20
the
quite
In
Lechmbruch*s approach corporatism is a way of policy-making
institutionalized pattern of policy formulation.
conceptualized
dire ts
lattor
and
corporatism
system
laisser
as an ’’economic system in which
refers
which
to a certain level
has
of
state
^
The
development
distinct characteristics
- faire capitalism;
Winkler
the
controls predominantly privately owned business.
definition
economic
Moreover T.
from
there would be a highly
an
of
the
the
early
bureaucratized
state which extensively intervenes in economy.^*2
Schmitter
tried
to
compare pluralist and
corporatist
forms
placing them in a continuum that is as opposite polar forms of
by
interest
group politics. Two forms may co-exist in varying degrees from one group
to another.
each type.
number
Schmitter elaborates a set of characteristics peculiar to
in their respective sectors they are singular or multiple in
and
are
organizational
voluntary
monopolistic or
structure
membership
organized.
These
licensed,
sutjsidized
control
of the groups may be based on
are
hierarchically
associations
or
agents.
may be
or
The
internal
compulsory
corporatist
is
or
non-hierarchically
officially
recognized,
created by the state and state may
exercise
over their selection of leadership and articulation of
and supports.
form
and
competitive
demands
Some groups such as employers associations fit better to
form but for
especially non-producer
groups
better s u i t e d , I t was suggested that corporatist
functionalin areas of incomes policy and
was
noted
by Wilson;
the
real world,
economic planning.
pluralist
form
is
As
it
”to cope with these mixed patterns that exist
in
theorists claimed that corporatism and pluralism
21
are
the
ideal types on a continuum with the actual practices somewhere
between.
Corporatism
thus
in
becomes an axis of development instead
of
situation or c o n d i tion.^
’’State” occupies a central place in corporatist
assumption
nuiv
not
theory.
Central
of the corporatist view on interest politics is that
be
an arena for which
const.i tut ive
element
regulating,
licensing
associations.”^'^
’’State
they [interest groups] compete
engaged in
defining,
and/or
distorting,
repressing
the
but
a
encouraging,
activities
of
Fowekaner underlines the importance of the state
follows ’’there is broad agreement that all corporatisms must be
as
located
in the field of relations between the capitalist state and civil society
and
that
of
talk
of the relationships between the
state
and
civil
society...
supposes a complex approach to the state itself,
which
understood
not as an instrument of the ruling class nor as a
political
arena
equally
unified
accessible to all class (and nonclass)
subject
society.
seen
the
in
The
its
own right which
floats
forces,
freely
as
above
is
a
civil
emphasis made on the state as a principle actor
is
by some as a clear advantage for corporatist theory as opposed
to
neglect
of
the state in pluralist
theory
especially,
in
the
extreme form'of group theory.
To
sum
representation
and
up:
Corporatism
is a term applied
to
of functional interests in the process of
the
structured
policy-making
refers to an exchange relationship with the interdependence of
22
the
interest
groups
content
of
to
the state and vice versa.
The
nature
and
the
the exchange specifies the relative power of the group
and
the state, and defines the degree of mutual autonomy Alan Cawson refined
the
concept
with
relations.
regard to the limited
According
includes,
of
government
to him corporatism has three
micro-corporatism
state,
meso-corporatism
sectors
and
the
sphere
varieties.
It
which involves individual firms and
involves
state,
group
interest associations
macro-corporatism
employer’s and employees’ peak associations,
involves
the
in
certain
the
state,
at the national level.
This
relationship Vjetween the groups and the state also determines the
power
of
the
corporatist
relative
partly
state over the groups.
theory
state
autonomy.
determined
is
As
it
was
treated as an actor
The structuration of interest
by
the
"public
policy
emphasized,
in
itself
a
in
with
organizations
are
associations
and
towards
political culture which means the direct impact of the "State in shaping
or
initiating group developent and the importance of
attitudes and values,
certain enduring
particularly among the political elite and
associational leadership in influencing the group behaviour.
the
^
CLIENTELISM
Clientelism
relationship
unequal
can
between
resources"
relationship,
"the
be defined "as a
an
personalized
inferior and superior" the
contrary
to
ideal
norms of rationality,
23
type
and
reciprocal
latter
of
"commands
bureaucratic
anonymity and universalism
are
absent
from
patron-client
n e x u s . jt
is
an
informal
particularistic
exchange relationship between actors of unequal
and p o w e r . I t
has been suggested,
actor
of
and
status
that more the state is a visible
the political game and penetrate society the more
one
would
come across clientelism based on patronage relations.^"*
In
terras
of
group
relations clientelism
basicly
refers
to
a
"posture of personnel dependence on a superior within a status hierarchy
for
fulfiling
assorted
social
economic
and
political
goals.
c:Iicntelism differs from corporatist linking of the organized groups
the
policy-making
personalism
As
discussed
of
process.
Clientelism
characterized
the relationship between the patron and
by
Chalmers "corporatism
draws
by
the
attention
to
the
client.^®
to
whatever
specific rights and obligations and norms of behaviour.
Corporatist set of arrangements basicly requires the monopolization
of interest representation by a noncompeting officially recognized group
that
is
authorized
by
the
s t a t e . I n
corporatist
relationship
between groups and the state is controlled by
requirements
of
informality
and
personalized
and,
the law.^^
On the contrary,
flexibility.
most
There
importantly,
would
forms
clientelism
be
the
the
formal
manifests
fragmented
uninstitutionalized
forms
and
of
interest representation at different levels such as at government, party
and/or bureaucracy.
24
In
the
process
differentiation
Political
Weber
system
an increased mobilization
boundaries^® are expected
to
take
and
place.
system would be structured on the basis of principles of what
called
’’officials
they
of
of modernization,
’’legal-rationality.”®^
In
Almond’s
terminology,
and individuals occupying roles in other subsystems
do,
becaus(i
functional
of impersonal bonds to the generally
duty of o f f i c e . I n
personalized
act
defined
as
and
such a polity no place is left for a
and affective bargaining and therefore
for
clientelistic
relations.
On
the other hand,
process
may
excessive
the
result
as Huntington is already noted modernization
in
an excessive
participation.
decrease their
deteoriate their complexity and coherence.
unstructured
politics
politically
in
political
which more and more
diverse
active and attempt to achieve their
institutions
articulation
and
difficult.®^
institutions
thus
it
aggregation
Moreover,
distorts
aggregation.
loses
capable
of
of
autonomy
of
and
The result is a chaotic and
various tactics that they can most effectively employ.
of
words,
demands may be an obstacle to the adaptability capacities
preexisting political institutions,
become
In other
providing
interests
delegitimation
of
social
forces
goals
through
The development
channels
becomes
the
main
for
the
increasingly
political
the expected forms of interest articulation
and
The state may be captured by a set of sectional interest;
its
autonomy.
This
LaPalombara’s terminology as clientela
25
process
may
take
place
and parentela relationships.®"*
in
In
access
other
clientela
to
the bureaucracy,
groups
parentela
relations certain interest
in
the
same
groups
gain
priveleged
ministeries or to the political
sector may
not have
such
party but
access.
relations certain interest groups gain privileged
policy-making
process through the ruling party.
In
access
to
The relationship is
shaped by the nature of resource the relevant interest groups can
offer
to bureaucracy and/or to the ruling party in the "exchange" process. The
resources
over
at the clientela form are,
respective
expertise.
In
determined
rhetoric,
by
group’s representative capacity
sector,
organizational strength and its
parentela
form
group’s
the nature
ofthe
to the
ruling
commitment
technical
relationship
party’s
political
its voting capacity and financial resources.
Then,the
critical question turns
out to be "who gets what
how and when" in therelationship between TUSIAD and government.
as
is
already
noted,
TUSIAD-government
in this essay,
relations
fit
to what extent (if at
either
interest group politics - pluralism,
of
the
and
Thus,
all)
the
three paradigms
of
corporatism and clientelism.
NOTES AND REFERCES
1)
Arthur Bentley,
The Process of Government.
of Chicago Press,
2)
David Truman,
Knopf,
and Earl Latham,
1952).
26
(New York:
Alfred A.
The Group Basis pX Politics:
A SUiJy iri Basing Point Legislation.
University Press,
University
1908).
The Governmental Process.
1951),
(Chicago:
(Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell
3)
Truman,
4)
Ibid.,
p. 33.
5)
Ibid.,
p. 506-516.
6)
Ibid.,
p. 36.
7)
Terry M. Мое,
The Governmental Process,
p.33.
The Organization of Interest:
Internal Dynamics of Political Interests Groups.
University of Chicago Press,
8)
Ibid.,
1980),
and Stanley Rothman,
Group Theory,"
Comparative Politics
Ibid.
11)
Ibid.
12)
See Joseph LaPalombara,
14)
Ibid.
15)
Мое,
16)
Brenner,
2 (October 1969),
54
p. 163.
Interest Groups in Italian Politics,
Princeton University Press,
Ronald H. Chilcote,
Colorado:
American Political Scrence Review
"Functional Representation and Interest
10)
13)
pp. 38-51
pp. 15-33.
Michael J. Brenner,
(Princeton:
54 (December 1960),
"Systematic Political Theory: Observations
on the Group Approach"
(March 1960),
Robert Golembiowski,
Notes on Analysis and Development,"
American Political Science Review
9)
p. 152.
for critism of group theory see,
"The Group Basis of Politics:
(Chicago:
1964).
Theories of Comparative Politics.
Westview Press,
1981),
pp. 162-168.
The Organization of Interest.
"Functional Representation,"
27
pp. 155-156.
p. 114.
(Boulder
17)
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell,
A Developmental Approach.
p.
18)
(Boston:
Comparative Politics:
Little
Brown,
1966),
33-34.
See Gabriel Almond and James Coleman eds.,
Developing Areas.
(Princeton:
The Politics of
Princeton University Press, 1960),
p. 33.
19)
Ibid.,
pp. 33-•38.
20)
Ibid.,
pp. 35- 37.
21)
Almond and Powell,
Approach,
22)
p. 38.
Samuel Huntington,
(New Haven:
Yale University Press,
23)
Ibid.,
p.7 and
24)
Ibid.,
p. 27.
25)
Ibid.,
p. 24.
26)
Robert Bianchi,
Turkey.
27)
Political Order in Changing Societies.
(Princeton:
1968),
p.57.
1984), p. 10.
Boundary maintenance is defined as "shielding the bureaucracy
from political demands."
Ibid.,
p. 10.
For a critical analysis
of the problem of boundary maintenance see,
Concept of the Political System:
Government and Opposition
28)
Ibid.,
29)
Roberta Prestus,
A Textual Critique,"
5 (1970),
pp. 3-21.
pp. 27-28.
"The Pluralist Framework" in Frontiers ^
Democratic Theory,
House,
S.E. Finer, "Almond’s
1970),
edited by Henri S. Kariel, (New York, Random
p. 280.
28
30)
Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O ’Leary,
The Politics of Liberal Democracy.
1988),
pp. 13-14.
31)
Ibid.,
pp. 14-15.
32)
Douglas A Chalmers,
(London,
lh)Hs,
Westview Press,
edited by J. Wiarda,
1985),
p.
"Pluralism and New Corporatism,"
(March
1983),
pp.
86-102
and
33)
1978),
34)
Political Studies
Cawson,
Philippe C. Schmitter,
Chalmers,
36)
Roy C. Macridis,
Government;
50 (Winter 1983),
37)
Modes of Interest Intermediation and
10 (April 1977),
The Search for Focus,"
Frank L. Wilson,
(October 1983),
Schmitter,
Comparative
p.9.
p. 57.
"Comparative Politics and the Study of
p.85.
"Interest Group and Politics in Western Europe:
The Neo-Corporatist Approach,"
38)
p.899.
"Corporatism in Comparative Politics,"
1 (October 1968),
"Pluralism,
Models of Societal Change in Western Europe,"
35)
31
"Democratic Theory and NeoCorporatist
Social Research
Political Studies
See also M. Martin
pp. 178-198.
Phillippe C. Schraitter,
Practice,"
54.
Alan
Corporatism and the Role of the State,"
(Winter,
Macmillan Press,
"Corporatism in Comparative Politics," in
Directions in Comparative Politics,
(London:
Theories of the State:
16
p.l07.
"Modes of Interest Intermediation,"
29
p. 10-37.
39)
Claus Offe,
"The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups:
Observations on the West German Case,"
in Organizing Interests
in Western Europe and the Transformation of Politics,
Suzanne P. Berger,
1981),
40)
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,
143.
Gerhard Leclimbruch,
"Liberal Corporatism and Party Government,"
Comparative Po1itical Studies
10 (April 1977),
Also David Marsh and Wyn Grant,
11)
R.E Dahl and J. T. Winkler,
State: Myth
or Reality?".
Policy 1976),
42)
Ibid.
43)
Schmitter,
12 (July 1977),
"Corporatism in Britain" in Corporate
(London:
Centre for Studies in Social
"Modes of Interest Intermediation,"
(January 1987),
p.9.
For a
Youssef Cohen and
"Corporatism and Pluralism:
of Schmitter’s typology,"
Europe,"
pp. 194-211.
p.7.
Franco Pavoncello,
Wilson,
p. 92. See
"Tripartism: Myth or Reality?"
critique of Schmitter’s perspective see,
44)
edited by
a Critique
British Journal of Political Studies
pp. 117-122.
"Interest Group and Politics in Western
p. 110.
For a critique of Wilson’s perspective
see John T.S. Keeler "Situating France on a Pluralist Corporatist
Continuum,"
17 January 1985),
pp. 229-
247.
45)
Ibid.,
see also Gary Marks "Neo-Corporatism and Income Policy
in Western Europe and North America,"
18 (April 1986),
p. 253.
30
Political Change in Southeast Asia,"
Science Review
65 (March 1972),
pp. 91-114.
Rene Lemarchand,
"Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in
Tropical Africa;
Competing Solidarities in Nation Building,"
65 (March 1972) ,
American Pol itical Sc_ience Rev lew
54)
Robert P'atton, Making of a Liberal Democracy,
Revolution 1975- 1985 ,
1987),
55)
p.
(Boulder,
Roberth F. Kaufmann,
"Corporatism,
Ibid.
57)
Chalmers,
58)
Schmitter,
"Corporatism in Comparative Politics," p. 59.
"Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of
59)
Chalmers,
60)
Almond and Powell,
p. 9.
"Corporatism in Comparative Politics," p. 59.
Approach,
Comparative Politics: A Developmental
p. 258-280.
David Beetham,
Max Weber and The Theory
Allen and Unwin,
Modern Politics,
1974), especially chapter 3.
Elaborated by G. Almond in "Political Development: Analytical
and Normative Perspectives,"
I (January 1969),
63)
Clientelism and Partisan
University of Pittsburg Press,
Societal Change in Western Europe,"
62)
Lynne Rinner Publ.,
p. 113.
56)
(London:
Senegal ’s Passive
in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America
edited by M. Malloy,(Pittsburg:
1977),
Colorado:
pp. 68- 91.
95.
Conflict"
61)
American Political
Huntington,
p. 463.
Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 198.
32
64)
Сох and O ’Sullivan,
65)
Ibid.
The Corporate State.
33
p. 79.
Chapter Three
POLITICO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND,
The
1960s
1960-1980
were the years in which Turkey experienced
coalition
and
majority
inherited
the
votes
elections
JP
of
party governments.
the former
both
The Justice
Demokrat
Party
defeated Republicans People’s Party
Party
(DP).
(RPP)
weak
(JP)
In
which
1965
headed
coalition governments between 1961 and 1965.
During
these years RPP introduced the "left-of-center position" to
the political arena - which shifted the
new leader emerged in the party,
party to moderate left while
namely Bülent Ecevit.
a
The left-of-
center position did not result in a victory at the polls in 1965 whereas
stimulated new opposition groups in the party.
to
27.4 percent in the 1969 elections.
JP
alienated
commitment
issues.
of
to
some
of
the
The
party’s vote fell
Taking over
factions in the
party
big business and by its relative
the votes of
with
moderation
its
strict
on
social
National Order Party (1973) and National Salvation Party (NSP)
Necmettin Erbakan and militant ultra nationalist Nationalist
Party
DP,
of
(NAP) of Alparslan Türkeş and the Demokratik Party of
Bozbeyli (1971),
along with other splinter parties,
Action
Ferruh
also emerged.
There occurred the fragmentation and polarization of the political
parties
which reached to its apex in late 1970s.
During these
ideological distinction between two major parties,
JP and RPP,
to
the
be
sharpened that
was fed by the emergence of
34
Turkish
years
began
Labor
Party (TLP) which had a v i s i b l e impact on the org anize d la b o r movement.^
During the 1960s the main economic concern was that of setting up
wide
industrial
base
substitution policy.
the
state
in
behind
protective
measures
of
an
a
import
Throughout the 1960s a new role was attributed to
the economic arena.
State had to supervise
and
back
private sector’s growth.
State
intervention
political
parties.
principle,
in the economy was encouraged
RPP,
expr-essed
and
the
intervention
protect
etatist
private
industry.
certain
In other areas,
JP
argued
it must
that
state
in the economy was necessary because private sector
proposed a
economic
major
view that state should operate in
not realize the goals of economic development by itself.
JP
the
with its strong commitment to the
fields especially in strategic industries.
encourage
by
temporary role to the state.
could
However,
the
State’s activity in
the
sphere would prevent the formation of monopolies and would
complementary
conditions
to
state
the activities of private sector.
Under high
would provide commercial leadership in
fields
be
risk
where
huge capital investments and technical assistance were necessary.^
During
6.7
the period under consideration annual growth rates reached
percent in riâl terms while structural changes took place
economy.
percent
The
share
of
agriculture in the total GNP
fell
in 1960 to 23 percent by 1976 while industry’s share
fr-oni 16 p(‘rcent to 25 percent.·^
35
in
from
the
38
increased
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s planned development was the axis
of
the economic policy whicli aimed at creating harmonious relations between
public
of
and private sectors.
Industrialization through the production
manufacturing goods so that Turkey could be competitive
markets,
and
Community
by
ultimately
integration
into
the
in
European
the 1990s were the principal goals behind
the
foreign
Economic
economic
policy making.·*
As
a
private
there
result
sector
was
of
the "developmentalist
approach"
within the framework of five-year-plans
an effort to coordinate all sectors of
investments.
The
model
state
backed
through
public
and
which
private
was based on expansionist policies which
effect resulted in continuously increasing inflation and large
in
balance-
of-payment deficits.
As
the
Iountry
reached
to the 1970s the
picture
was
blurred. The governments were challenged from many sides.
rate reached to high levels,
somewhat
Unemployment
accompanied by severe urban violence
of
leftist and rightist activists.
There occurred two important developments during the 1970s.
first
one
Military
government
and
was the "military coup by Communique" in March
forced
the Demirel government to resign
was driving our country into anarchy,
claiming
The
12,
1971.
that
fratricidal
strife
social and economic unrest with the consequence that the future
the Turkish Republic is... seriously threatened."^
36
"the
of
Turkey
two
and
was governed by ’’above-party governments” in the
one-half years·
slowed down.
It
In 1972,
Under the martial law, street
was
was suggested by Nordlinger that the 1971 coup by communique was
exercise)
preserving
veto power over civilian
military exercise (or threaten
governments with
the social and political status quo.^
resisted the military’s rule in politics.
came
violence
TLP was closed by martial law authorities.
a moderator type of military rule i.e.,
to
following
to
the
goal
Political
of
parties
The military and politicians
a confrontation when in 1973 the military’s candidate for
the
presidency of the Republic was rejected by RPP and JP."
Another important development was the shift that took place in
ideological
1973
and in the electoral fortunes of the RPP.
general elections RPP emerged as the biggest single party
left.
but
stand
In
the 1973 elections RPP received 33.3 percent of the
the
By
the
on
the
votes
the 1977 elections was a turning point where the votes gathered
the party reached to 41.4 percent.
trend
of
the
by
It was suggested that RPP reversed
the votes it received in the past where one can observe
significant decrease from 1950 onwards.®
In January 1974,
basis
of
government
Front”
an
RPP and NSP formed a coalition government on the
agreement on some
broad
economic
programs.
But
the
fell'from power in September 1974 and the first ’’Nationalist
government
contributions
of
headed
three
by
JP was formed in
other parties on
37
the
April
right
1975
namely
with
the
National
Salvation Party,
Nationalist Action Party and the Republicans Reliance
Party (RRP).
From
1975
unemployment
Front
onwards
and
Turkey
experienced
foreign indebtedness·
government
rapid
Thus,
majority
was based on only three
high
Demirel’s Nationalist
supported by NSP and NAP and RRP
to take decisions necessary for the stabilization
parliamentary
inflation,
could not be able
of the economy as its
votes·
During
this
period "the conflicts between the coalition members frequently ended
immobilism
- a characteristic
in
consequence of a political consolidation
crises·
RPP emerged for the second time as the biggest single party in June
1977
elections
strict
emphasis
left- of-center
distribution
RPP’s party program which was adopted
on
in
"social justice" as the principal
ideology·
1976
placed
component
Party argued that just and balanced
was a necessary condition for a just social
of
income
order·
The
measures which party advocated for reducing the income inequalities were
based
on
fiscal
economy,
to
and monetary policies,
structural changes
reorganization of public services in order to give
low income groups and on developing underdeveloped
proposed
change
a
land
reform program as a means to achieve
in the economy·
in
priority
regions·
the
They
structural
The notion of "popular sector" introduced
the
party
The
sector was supposed to exist as an intermediary between public
private.
was the second category of the
structural
change
the
by
program·
and
It would be based on the economic enterprises established by
38
workers,
public enterprises and popularly based corporations.
It
was
expected
that the popular sector would contribute to the achievement of
high rates of economic development and minimize the inequality in the
distribution
of i n c o m e . E v e n though the party received 41.4 percent
of the votes casted,
majority.
in terms of seat it was short of a
parliamentary
RPP could not manage to form a majority government.
Thus
second Nationalist Front government was established but it was forced to
resign in December 1977 by a vote of no confidence in the parliament.
Following
minority
resignation
government
government
October
the
by
a
of
fluid
the
support
government,
in
the
RPP
formed
Assembly.
That
resigned after the defeat of RPP in Assemby by-elections
1979.
Then,
a
JP minority government was formed
a
which
in
was
ousted from power by the military intervention in 1980.
It
was
characterized
decisive
suggested
by
Tachau
"fragmentation
authority
polarization
by
went
and
Heper
that
the
1970s was
and polarization and by the
on the part of the government.^
The
lack
of
extent
of
beyond the party system and contaminated the
social
sectors such as organized labor and civil bureaucracy.
The
term
schema of politics developed by Samuel Huntington
"praetorianism"
seems
to provide a set of concepts in
which
one can evaluate the political crises of the 1970s.
years
concerned newly emerged groups in society confronted
"nakedly",
and
without
around
terms
During
each
the
of
the
other
any moderating influence of mediating institutions
legal restraints.^^
The picture became close to Hobbessian war
39
of
all against all.
There occurred a series of crises of legitimacy which
appeared in part the product of increased participation.
In
a praetorian environment being in power is central
provides
the
because
it
leader the means to control and manipulate the government
apparatus and furnishes opportunities for patronage.
The
regulate
tlie
incapacity of the already existing political
military
side
to
tlie demands of diverse sectors of the society was perceived by
as
authority.
the
institutions
the "erosion of state’s
authority"^^
or
"lack
of
The institutional framework prevented decisive action on
of
uneasiness
the political
to
the
liberal
authorities.
The
provisions of the
military
1961
showed
constitution
its
by
imposing amendments after the 1971 coup by communique.^^
The
exceeded
military claimed that the demands of the newly emerged
the capacity of governments to satisfy them.^®
Thus,
groups
military
backed the above party governments which drew their policy frameworks on
the
theme that certain sacrificies of political and social rights
necessary
for
the
long term rapid industrialization program
were
and
for
membership to European Common Market.^**
From another view point,
to
The
have
developments of early 1970s may be said
given the first signs of a change in economic
August
inward-looking
10
1970 measures were the first steps
to
external-oriented growth
40
model.
of
policy
a
making.
shift
Economic
from
policy
measures
aimed to back big business and stimulate the industries by re-
allocative mechanisms.20
The
demands
values
Third
for
and
Five-year plan (1973-1977) required the reduction
income distribution and social justice.
priorities of JP i.e.,
rhetoric.
The
plan
It reflected
a strict commitment
recognized
the
of
imbalances
to
in
a
the
growth
the
income
distribution but it was noted that redistributive measures would have
a
negative
a
effect
certain
level
standard
on economic growth rates.
of income,
It was stated that ”at
even if it is were possible to
raise
of living of certain income groups through measures
income distribution,
improving
such an approach would limit the growth potential
of the country by slowing down capital accumulation,
and thus
the
in
achievement
Consequently,
of
groups
system
to
and
include
objectives.
everybody
a
the
income
the
higlier
standard
of
living
improvement of income distribution
regions and the extension of
the
In the short run,
the
future.
among
various
social
the entire society are accepted only
retard
as
security
long-term
however it will be made possible that
receive a share of the rising income sufficient to
meet
his
minimum requirements.”2^
The
approach
inefficient
economic
of
the
era
was
based
use of resources would slow
growth.
The
on
the
observation
down capital accumulation
plan emphasized the incompability
equity and economic growth and gave priority to the latter. 22
41
that
of
and
social
Post-1971
economic
period could be characterized by changing political
priorities.
On
the
political
arena
new
and
measures
for
moderating demands for participation were introduced and new patterns of
distribution
of
resources among the productive sectors
were
adopted.
The measures taken by new military rule were different from the previous
ones of 1960 intervention,
polit ics
"both
military,
leaders
before
which encouraged participation.
and after the March coup came
technocrats
to
Turkish
involve
and bureaucrats and party and interest
the
groups
in a subtle bargaining process aimed at fashioning a long
term
non-authoritarian compromise that would provide institutional mechanisms
for consensually moderating demands and allowing a big push towards large
scale industrialization and eventually Common Market membership.^
It is also important to note that the attitudes of two
parties,
each
major
[RPP and JP] towards "participation" in politics differed from
other to such an extent that the consolidation of one of
them
in
power would have changed the picture drastically.
It
was proposed by Huntington and Nelson that the populist
models
of development tend to adopt policies that aim at reducing socioeconomic
inequalities
and
technocraticmodel
inequality.
become
tends
Thus
redistributive
democracy’
political
to
reduce
participation
participation
whereas
and
instinctively aware of the
implications
of
it is no coincidence that the RPP which clearly
policies,
based
on
also
a
strongly emphasizes a
'more widespread
42
and
the
increase
As Ergun Ozbudun observed "Turkish parties seem to
at least
models.
increase
have
these
favors
'participatory
effective
political
participation.’
towards
Similarly,
the JP combines
conservative
attitudes
income distributions with a concept of democracy which is
more
representative than participation. "2“*
The
policies
participation
by
opportunities
for
force.
On
growth
advocated
by
RPP
were
designed
encouraging the popular sector,
effective
organization and
tlie other hand,
conjoined
and
to
increase
by
providing
unionization
the JP’s strict commitment to
with a view of democracy derived from the
national sovereignity.
person,
national
labor
economic
notion
Thus,
"No
group or institution may have a claim to represent
will...
of
According to this view sovereignity belonged to
nation and exercised through the elected representatives.^5
other
of
or
become
a
negative
a
partner
to
the
right
of
the
national
sovereign ity. 6
JP
developed
associations,
of
view to
the
business and trade unions
potentiality of influencing the legislature.
as an arena for politicians.
to
be
activities
which
of
would
voluntary
have
Politics should remained
Once they were elected
politicians "were
considered as the sole and legitimate representatives
nation.
bodies
the
of"
the
It was pointed out that political activities of nonauthorized
create
obstacles
to
the
formation
of
strong
and
stable
governments.27
In
passing
Nationalist
gradually
Front
became
it
is important to note that with
governments
an
active
the
bureaucracy
partisan
43
was
instrument
the
emergence
politicized
of
of
and
governments.
Especially
increase
small
their
partners
control
organizational
They
the
over
structure
increased
their
of
Nationalist
bureaucracy
of
the
by
Front
changing
ministries
the number of civil
service
own militants to those posts.
Thus,
attempted
the
which
posts,
to
internal
they
then
held.
appointed
"ministries came to
be
referred to as citadels of this or that party.
The
erode
norms
which
bureaucratic
of rationality,
are
the
basic
relationship.^^
constituency
partisanship.
characteristics
of
an
and
to
type"
that
"the
and the extreme emphasis deputies placed
service also contributed to bureaucratic
Deputies
began
"ideal
It was stated by liter Turan
spoil game nature of politics,
on
anonymity and universalism
other
officials of
decline
government
and
parties
wanted to get things done no matter what the broad lines of governmental
policy were or what the last might say:
and only a partisan bureaucracy
could respond favorably to everything they requested.
Emergence of mass parties in the political arena accelerated a new
kind
of
of interaction between parties,
business
organizations
impact
patterns
and
labor
government and peak associations
community.
The
number
of
voluntary
in Turkey rose from 802 in 1946 to 37,806 in 1968.^^
The
of this development on the governmental apparatus openned up new
of
politicized
interaction
as
many
of
in a praetorian environment.
interest of their
members
the
associations
were
overly
Articulation of the
common
tended to be a secondary function
most of the associations were dominated by small,
politically motivated
cadr-es and became instruments of polarized political struggle.
44
where
Even
though
interest "articulation" function
overpoliticized
environment,
representatives
of
the
political
Nevertheless,
associations
deteoriated
which claimed to
in
be
an
the
their respective areas flourished as new actors
game.
The result was a certain degree
of
of
pluralism.
the questions of the characteristics of the relationship
between government and associations or what kind of benefits accrued and
sacrifices
and
made remained rather obscure.
The increased
participation which were fostered by the falling rate
polarization
of
economic
growth led to the deteoriation of the institutional mechanisms in major
sectors of the economy and of the polity.
The
newly emerged relationship tended to be a clientelistic
Government
political
offered the respective clients a set of incentives
gains.
politics proper,
It
is now in order to look at the
type.
for
interest
the
group
the role of various interest group associations
and
the emergence of TUSIAD.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1)
FrankTachau and Metin Heper,
Military in Turkey,"
p. 23.
"The State,
Politics and the
16 (October 83),
See also Ergun özbudun and Frank Tachau,
and Electorial Behavior."
Towards "Critical Realignment’s?"
International Journal of Middle East Studies
pp. 460-479 and Üstün Ergüder,
Behavior in Turkey,"
(1980-1981),
"Social Change
16 (October 1975),
"Changing Patterns of Electoral
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi
pp. 45-81.
45
8-9
2)
Selahattin Özmen,
Teşekkülleri.
3)
Mine Toksöz,
Türkiye’de ve Dünva’da İktisadi Devlet
(Ankara;
Sevinç Matbaası,
Turkey to 1992:
Ibid.,
5)
Feroz Ahmad,
Eric A.
p. 15.
The Turkish Experiment in Democracy.
Kestview Press,
"The State,
1977)^ p. 205 as cited in Tachau and
Soldiers in Politics Military Coups and
(Eaglewood Cliffs N.Y.;
Tachau and Heper,
1950-1970.
Politics and the Military in Turkey," p. 23.
Nordlinger,
Governments,
7)
1988),
pp. 15-19.
(Boulder,
Heper,
pp. 167-168.
Missing Another Chance? . (London;
The Economist Intelligence Umit,
4)
1967),
"The State,
Prentice-Hall,
1977).
Politics and Military in Turkey,"
p. 24.
8
RPP gathered 39,9 percent of votes in 1950 elections.
1957,
1961,
1965,
1969,
1973,
and 1977 election RPP gathered
34.8 percent 40.6 percent 36.7 percent,
28.7 percent,
percent, 33.3 percent and 41.4 percent of the votes,
see Walter F. Weiker,
(New York;
Holmes and Meier,
1981),
145.
Metin Heper,
"Recent Instability in Turkish Politics;
Monocentrist Polity,”
10)
respectively,
pp. 1-17 and
(Winter 1979-1980),
27.4
The Modernization of Turkey; From Atatürk
to the Present Day,
9)
In 1954,
End of
International Journal of Turkish Studies
p. 103.
Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan eds., The Political Economy of
Income Distribution in Turkey.
1980),
pp.
69-70.
46
(New York;
Holmes and Meier,
a
11)
Tachau and Heper "The State,
p. 24.
Politics and Military in Turkey,"
see also Sabri Sayan,
Transition,"
"The Turkish Party System in
Üstün Ergüder,
12(1978),
pp. 39-57.
Secim Sistemleri ve Türk Demokrasisi ^ (İstanbul:
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Publications,
1982)^ pp. 97-138.
For
further evaluations on fragmentation and polarization of Turkish
party system,see
Ergun Özbudun,
"The Turkish Party System:
Institutionalization Polarization and Fragmentation,"
Eastern Studies
17 (April 1981),
pp. 228-240.
12)
Ibid.
13)
Huntington,
14)
Ibid.
15)
Milliyet,
16)
Cumhuriyet, (Istanbul Daily),
17)
Heper,
18)
New "Fundemental Rights and Freedom Law"
Political Order in Changing Societies.
(Istanbul Daily),
Middle
March 1,
p. 196.
1971.
March 13, 1971.
State Tradition in Turkey,
p. 125.
which would provide an
opportunity to put restriction on associational activity was in
the agenda of Demirel government.
October 10,
19)
Meban Semineri Tebliği,
1979),
p. 4.
Gelişme Strate jileri ve Gelişme İdeolo.iileri.
Yurt Yayınları 5,
1987),
p. 53.
Özbudun and Ulusan, eds.. Political Economy of Income Distribution
in. Turkey,
22)
1968.
Haldun Gülalp,
(Ankara:
21)
(Istanbul Daily)
B. Balassa "Growth Policies and the Exchange Rate in Turkey.
(Istanbul:
20)
Cumhuriyet,
p. 75.
Ibid.
47
23)
Bianchi,
Interest
Groups and Political
Development
in
Turkey, p. 206.
24)
Ozbudun and Ulusan, eds., Political Economy of Income Distribution
in Turkey,
p . 77.
25)
Ibid.
26)
Electoral Program of JP as cited in Political Economy of Income
D istribution in Turkey.
27)
Munci Kapani,
Özbudun and
Ulusan
eds.
p78.
Demokratik Teori Alanında Bazı Yeni Görüşler ve
Tartışmalar ^ (Ankara:
Ankara University Publications,
1977),
pp. 215-219.
28)
29)
liter Turan,
Republic" in Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey,
edited by
Ergun Özbudun,
p. 93.
David Beetham,
(London:
30)
"Stages of Political Development in the Turkish
Turan,
(Ankara:
Seyinç Matbaası,
1988),
Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics.
Allen and Unwin,
1974),
chapter 3.
"Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic,"
p. 94.
31)
Ahmet Yücekök,
Tabanı.
Türkiye’de örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik
(Ankara:
Ankara Uniyersity
Science Publications,
32)
Ergun Özbudun,
1971),
Faculty of Political
p. 119.
"Deyelopment of Democratic Goyernment in Turkey:
Crises Interraptions and Reequilibrations in Perspectiyes on
Democracy in Turkey,
edited by Ergun özbudun,
48
p. 46.
Chapter Four
EMERGENCE OF TURKISH INDUSTRIALISTS
AND BUSINESSMEN’S ASSOCIATION
BACKGROUND
Dankwart A. Rustow once suggested that "pressure groups are notably
absent
from the Turkish political s c e n e . B u t
several
labor and business organizations entered the political scene and
tried
beginning by the 1970s
to accomplish certain goals through formal and/or informal means,
such as party affiliation or party patronage.
The
industrial
characterized
by
the
st-ate patronage,
It
but
sector’s
exceptional
with
protections.
the
state
"They...[enjoyed]...
state
"Turkish industrialists are not threatened
‘intervention’ in the form of state
subsidies
protection they receive in exploiting a limited market.
enormously
high
tariffs,
not
been
a
Protected
by,
and
by
their fear is not state ‘intervention’ but
competition in any form whether public or private.
has
was
monopoly opportunities and concentration of power.
was also noted that
welcome
relationship
threat but an instrument
in
The state in Turkey
the
creation
and
the
protection of a national industrial class.
In
access
of
their
relationship
with the state
the
business
community’s
to government was the consequence of state’s initiative
because
the fI’agmentation of their organizational structure and multiplicity
49
ot'
interests among the business sector.
As expressed by an
Istanbul
industriali sts,
everybody
not
should know that the private sector in
as
influential
heterogeneous
It
is
not
as
it
is
often
thought.
and intra-sector jealousies
well
organized.
competition persists.
wi t h small industry.
Turkey
is
It
is
are all persasive.
Istanbul
versus
Anatolia
Large industry is always in
conflict
Some of the Chambers of Industry do not
view favorably the Turkish of industrialists and Businesmen’s
Association
which
industrialists.
commerce
liad
they
think is an exclusive
of
big
There are no close ties between chambers of
and of industry.
been
club
organized
Only one third of the
within the
[Turkish
employers
Confederation of]
Employers’ Association.^
Commercial
arid
industrial
sectors
were
organized
in
several
associations
between 1970 and 1980.
these were.
The Confederation of Artisans’ and Craftraen’s Association,
Turkish
Commerce
Confederation
chambers
of
of
Employers
The most influential ones
Union,
Union
use the abbrevations of synonyms in Turkish,
of
lastly
the
[Now on,
EZDK,
TISK,
we will
TOBB and
r’espect.i\’ely.j
Artisans’
and
Craftmen’s
associations began to be
spread around the country since 1946.
were
chambers
Industry and Commodity Exchange and
Turkish Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association.
TUSIAD,
of
among
authorized
in
However,
1965 and in 1978 Confederation
50
wider
of
organized
and
associations
Artisans’
and
Cr'’ftmen’s
68
Associations
province-wide
representing
million
and
associations
estimated
Artisans’
membership
which include nine occupational
and
and
some
50 per cent
Craftmen’s
was
400
of
federations,
local
Turkey’s
associations
appovimately
established.^
Until
was not compulsory as it was for a number of other
3
1964
interest
groups sucii as TOBB.^
Table 4-1
Interest Group Associations in Turkey,
Year Artisans and
Craftmen’s Associations
Employers
Associations
1940-1970
Agricultural
Associations
Professional
Associations
1946
103
-
2.0
28
1950
253
-
49
53
1955
1460
2
146
119
1960
2745
23
272
189
1965
3578
260
1970
ca 4000
106assns.
570
(1927 member)
120assns.
(10760 members)
1975
108 assns.
(89.43 members)
1979
ca 4000
Source: Walter Weiker,
113 assns.
The Modernization of Turkey,
p. 93.
The relationship between state-artisans’ and crafmen’s
association
was cliaracterized by dependency more than genuine bargaining.'^
of
1964
was
associations
a turning paint,
voluntary
because in artisans’
membership,
51
was
replaced
and
with
The year
craftmen’s
compulsory
membership.
against
the
turn
industrial
strategy
of
In
the
and
associations
commercial
sought
groups.
government
The
protection
overall
which aimed at rapid industrialization imposed the
the interaction between government and these
economic
parameters
associations.
Among
other business associations Union of Chambers occupied an important
place.
Gradually,
the artisans’ and craftmen’s associations began to
have less influence upon policy-making.®
The rising stars of the economy were organized within the framework
of
different
business associations.
Increasing importance
of
TOBB
was
adversely
affected artisans’ and craftmen’s associations.
As it
suggested
by
craftmen’s
association
Weiker
under
law
507
each
artisans’
and
was given responsibilities such as supervising the licences
of taxi drivers or setting the number of establishments of a
kind
in
which can operate in a specific town or district.
the
hands
surprising
single
of each province association and it
that
artisans
and small merchants
particular
Authority was
was
therefore
comprised
the
largest
group on the city councils of most communities.® The efforts
artisans’
and
craftmen’s associations were directed towards
not
of
obtaining
resources from government for small scale production units while general
economic
trends
put them in a disadvantageous
situation
compared
to
industrial and commercial groups.
Justice Party’s strong links with Union of Chambers and its pro-big
business
economic
associations
towards
fundamentalists.
policies
pushed
establishing
the
artisans’
close relationship
NSP favored ties with Muslim World,
52
and
with
craftmen’s
religious
attacked "western
imperialism"
Market
and expressed opposition to Turkey’s ties with the
which
was
essentially
conceived
as
a
"Jewish
Common
/Zionist
organization set up by Catholic states.
So
As
already noted,
it
was aimed at channeling small private savings
which
RPP introduced the notion of "people’s
into
were to be organized by the people themselves,
economic
development.
alignments
against
among
the
The
idea
implicity
enterprises
and
stimulating
referred
to
permanent loosers during the deepening of
profiting few.
In this game
artisans’
sector."
a
broad
capitalism
and
craftmen’s
groups were assumed to be loosers.
Tiie successive governments’ preferences in economic policy such
keeping
to themselves the initiative in the organization of production,
increasing efficiency,
scale
as
of
economy
adversely.
employment of new technologies and expanding the
were
Thus,
bound to
affect
the
artisans
artisans and craftmen became
and
means
craftmen
of political
manipulation because of the shortage of resources which they commanded.
Another
Turkish
important
Confederation
initiati\e
of
back to 19GÜS,
actor
of
in
business-government
Employers’
Union
relations
established
with
the Koç G r o u p . Even though the history of TISK
its "political relevancy''^^
was
the
dated
increased in early 1970s.
Tin? organizational structure of TISK was different from that of TOBB and
TUSIAD.
It
It was an employer union,
neither chamber nor an association.
was suggested that while the latter aimed at influencing
nationwide
macro policy making, the union attempted at strengthening the
employers’
53
amount of sales.
Union guaranteed to finance the employers out of
this
fund during t.he lockouts.
Towards the end of the L970s,
TOBB.
It was
TISK became a rival organization to
emphasized that stressing ’’the
private
voluntary
specifically industrial character of their organizations.
accused
TOBB
and
TISK leaders
of surviving only by virtue of mandatory membership of
dues of stifling industrial enterprise in bureaucratic formalities,
and
of i^rMng politically rather than professionally managed.
It can be said that the primary goal was that of centralization
of
business associations in TIS\ and making other business groups impotent.
Fragmentation
with
and
diffusion of power in 1973-1980 period were
coupled
tlie absence of strong central institutions either in public or
private.
The
increasing
situation placed great pressure to the
the
particularistic
and
contradictory
creating any basis for political consensus.
governments
demands
in
by
without
Support for centre and for
specific governments had been based on a set of clientelistic exchanges.
TOBB’s
labour’s
causes
unions
of
the
governmc^nts
economic
towards
and RPP’s close
relations
was perceived by the industrialists in TISK
erosion of
could
crises.
governments
Cliaii'man
orientation
winked
not
governmental
authority.
The
take the necessary measures to
as
with
the
successive
cope
with
the
While neglecting the long term interests of economy
at certain
groups, as was
(d‘ TISK between 1970-1974:
55
noted
’’...because
by
of
Halil
the
Kaya,
one-sided
social policies of the governments,
among
the
there emerged a widely shared view
workers that since the government is on our side we
can
do
whatever we want to do.”^^
Industrialists
who
core cadre of TUSIAD.
of
TISK
and
harmonious
were previously organized in TISK
the
They were disapproved by the increased militancy
JP’s patronage links with
class
became
relations.
TOBB.
TUSIAD
On the other hand,
advocated
during
the
more
1970s
medium size industrial units became members of TOBB and there emerged
conflict
rivalry
with
the
so-called big business.
within TISK,
contrast
too.
There
develop
Capital intensive productive
units
in
to labor intensive ones could better resist to the demands
high wages on the part of trade unions.
Thus,
their
trade unions were smoother as compared to others.
issues
also
in
question
associations
fostered
strengthened
the
place
TUSIAD
among
the
other
while deepening the cleavages among business sector.
the
fluidity of relations of TISK and
TOBB
of
relations with
Nevertheless,
of
a
with
It
successive
governments.
Turning
private
sector
industrial
the Union.
of
to
it
has been a nationwide association
with a semi-official status.
All the
It was based on local chambers in every city.
dated
back
significance
to the
during
nineteeth
the
1950s
of
commercial
employers with ten or more workers had to be the
chambers
particular
TOBB,
member
and
of
The history
century.^2
They
and
Up
1960s.
the
gained
to
1950
industrialists and commercial groups were organized together in chambers
but
beginning
by
1950 industrialists began to organize
56
in
different
chambers
During
tough
they
were
still under the
control
of
the
Union.^3
the DP governments (1950-1960) the private sector was given
authority
to
form a peak association and TOBB was established in
(Act 5590 February 6,
In
1958,
the Union acquired the right to
allocate
import
concentration
favoritism.25
of
quotas
Also it came to have the right
to register importers by issuing certificates to them.
and
1952
1952).2“·
among industrial ami commercial groups.
corruption
the
The result was
Close connections with
government
and
power in the Union were the sources of Union’s
power
and at the same time its debility vis-à-vis both the government and
its
member unions.
Fol l owi ng
1960
As it was
reversed.
foreign
the
currency
commodities
military
intervention
pointed out by 5ncii:
allocations
for
the
"the idea
investment
situation
was
quotas
that
and
while
of
subject to import restrictions would be decided by relevant
ministries in line with the objectives of the developmental
actual
lists
was
of
task
distributing the limied amount
of
plan,
foreign
the
currency
available among individual importers and industrialists would be left to
Chambers.
Thus
ministerial
Chambers
to
of
and
fierce
chamber level.
Industry,
Nevertheless,
Union
the
during
controlled
competition
would
down
This is in fact did happen,
became very powerful in
1967-71
move
period,
1960-1970
JP was able to
57
the
period."2®
manipulate
the administration of the Union.2^
opportunity to intervene to the intra-Union cleavages.
and
from
jp
had
the
the
Expansion
sector
of
capitalism caused to a differention
within
private
and the emergence of multiplicity of interests while the formal-
legal
structure
distributed
of
by
TOBB remained u n c h a n g e d . A c c e s s
the
affiliation.29
Union
Furthermore,
became
rapid
possible
only
to
resources
through
party
industrialization and new
requirements of industrial sector necessitated a revision of the
of
commercial
Unions.
But
voting
turn
weight
groups and industrialists in the administration
of
the
because of legal constraints it was not possible for the
industrialists to change the representational
Commercial
input
groups
monopoly
of
the
dominated the chambers as the law required
Union.
weighted
and designated an upper limit for any single chamber
which
resulted in Anatolian local units’ majority in Chambers.
in
About a
decade later Hulki Alisbah observed:
In the elections,
predominant
industrial and commercial firms which are
in their respective sectors have the same
of votes as smaller firms.
reasonable
I am of the opinion,
must
be
criteria
for
election
such
as a minimum employment requirement or
number
that there
qualifications,
minimum
foreign
exchange capacity for being elected to authorized committees or
to
the
executive
board
of
the
Union
of
Chambers
and
Industry.30
Under
obtain
these constraints it was difficult for the industrialists to
foreign
currency necessary for purchasing of
raw
materials.3i
In rOBB industrialists were subordinated to commercial groups.
58
The
intersified conflict between industry and commerce and as well
as increased inability of TOBB to exert pressure on government vis-à-vis
the
long term interests of private sector were the general factors
the
emergence
military
and
of
takeover (March 12,
'stability’
changes
TUSIAD in 1971.
It was stated
by
Öncü
that
for
"a
1971) aimed at restoring 'law and order’
in the country should immediately
be
accompanied
by
the foreign currency quota allocation system indicates what
an
important source of power and political patronage is involved.^^
EMERGENCE OF TUSIAD
The
Turkish
founded
on
Industrialists’
April
2,
1971
and
on
industrialists including Vehbi Koç,
Ertuğrul
Soysal
and
Sakıp
Sabancı.
Businessmen’s
the
initiation
Nejat Eccacıbaşı,
In
its
first
Association
of
the
Selçuk
was
leading
Yasar,
decade,
the
Association was headed by Feyyaz Berker of Tekfen Group of Companies.
On
August 2,
1971,
a declaration signed by eighty-six leading
figures of the sector designated the goals of the Association.
emphasized
It
was
that they aimed at serving "Turkey’s goals of democratic and
planned development and lifting the country to the level of contemporary
civilization."'^^
Atatürk
They ultimately wished to defend the
and his laicist conception on the state.
principles
of
It was declared that
free enterprise was the pillar of the economic life and guarantee for
democratic system of government. Furthermore,
they argued that capital
and lal)or "were complementary elements: 3·* and "for the maintenance of a
59
a
"35
mixod economic order i t i s n ec e ss a ry to provide s o c i a l j u s t i c e .
Moreover
means
to
declaration
catch
up
underlined economy which was
with the Kest.ê ’’For this
considered
purpose
we
find
the
the
attempts which would challenge the unity of the nation dangerous.
The declaration came to end that
’’[the industrialists had] decided to carry out all the
duties
on the Li* part for the realization of Turkey’s goals.
In
the
specified.
by-laws of the Association these principles
According
to the Association’s by-laws,
were
the
clearly
Association
would be involved in the realization of goals such as
increasing
capital
national
market,
employer-labor
savings and encouraging
people
towards
giving priority to education, directing the
collaborations towards
the
path
that
would
contribute to the development of the country,
channeling the
investments
for
towards
the
areas
significant
economic
growth.
As
]970s
noled
but
protections,
distr· ibut ion
State
certain
above private enterprises multiplied
tlu^ success of the private
ctieap
of
protected
credits
scarce
and
resources,
during
business depended on
tax exemptions or
particularly
1960s
the
priority
foreign
the private business from outside competition
mechanisms such as tariffs and quotas put on imports.
60
and
state
in
the
currency.
through
On
the
other hand,
inputs necessary for the production of private sector were
obtained from the state economic enterprises at low prices.
The
spheres
structuration of the
facilitated
resources.
the
the
state in
the
political
and
successive governments access to
economic
the
scarce
The governments had the "last word" in the distribution
resources.
For
the private enterprise,
of
it became crucial
to
obtain the resources distributed by the government as for them it was
a
matter of survival.
Other
business
manipulated
by
the
business sector.
associations
JP
especially
the
in order to create trusty
Chambers,
clients
were
among
the
Alignments on party-association nexus were based
on
strong commitment to the rhetoric of "freedom to private enterprise."
As
leading
The
a
reaction
to this state of affairs concerns
shared
industrialists led to the idea of establishing an
transfer
the
association.
of the control over the foreign currency quota system
the ministerial level,
TUSIAD’s
representing
by
made the unions useless for the industrialists.
distinctiveness lies in the fact that it did not
a
section of it,
to
major
portion of the private enterprise but
mainly the industrialists.
aim
at
rather
a
That is the section
of
the private sector underrepresented in Unions organized
themselves in
the first voluntary businessmen association,
TUSIAD has been
a
small
provided
association
the
industrialists.
with
selective
TUSIAD.
membership.·*®
The
membership
association a strong financial base as it housed
Thus,
Feyyaz
Berker
61
of Tekfen Group was
to
the
big
first
chairman
between (1971-1980),
(1980-1984),
Şahap
then Ali Koçman of Koçtuğ Shipping Group
Koçatopcu,
a
manager
Sakıp Sabancı of Sabancı Group (1985-1987),
and
of Koç
Group
(1984-85),
Ömer Dinçkök of Akkök Group
lastly Cem Boyner of Altinyildiz Textiles
became the
chairman
of
the Association.
Small
and
selective
membership it was
hoped,
would
homogeneity of interests within the the Association.
Asso·.: i
ion
could
develop comprehensive
guarantee
It meant that the
approaches
regarding
macro
economic pelic ies.^^
Indeed,
successive
necessity
capital
TUSIAD aimed
above-party
at providing
governments
which
set
of
project
of
proposals which TOBB advocated.
TUSIAD
Also,
proposals
generally
for policies that would promote capital
accumulation
could
a
was
in
to
the
emphasized
the
accumulation.
conflict
with
by
TUSIAD
the
integration to the Common Market
only be achived only through harmonious class relations,
advanced
The
was in conflict with TISK*s
provocative
a
view
attitude
towards labor unions.
In
the 1971-1978 period TUSIAD supported policies which encouraged
labor-capital collaboration.
TUSIAD
state
favored
In contrast to other business associations
’’autonomous collective bargaining,
expanding
and opening new lines of communication with moderate
on the lef t.
2
62
welfare
politicians
-U a meeting' arranged by TUSIAD on March 2,
that
1974,
it was declared
the reorganization of the price system and the attempts of
government
for
emphatically
establishing
welcomed
a
"dialogue"
with
free
enterprise
by the industrialists.·*^ TUSIAD also
conciliatory attitude,
Ecevit
adopted
a
towards tlie left-of-center policy of RPP and the
latter’s close connection with the labor.
The
prestige
o f TUSIAD among business sector increased
Associat.ion convened Free Enterprise Council.
council
was
expressed
by
TUSIAD in
1974:
when
the
The necessity for such a
"The
associations
which
represent the business world should form a common front for the problems
of business environment. "‘*·*
In
the
assumed
council the representatives from
different
sectors
were
to be the equal partners apart from the fact that TUSIAD had
special place.
a
From this perspective two interrelated development took
place during 1970’s.
Thus,
it
representative
TUSIAD
that
to
minimuras"
quite
evident
that
agent of the private sector.
TOBB
was
Then,
not
wished to protect its "above party" stand and
only
on
certain
principles referred
such as protection of private property,
enterprises and the like.
63
the
the reaction
TOBB’s attempts to provide political support to
TUSIAD
alignments
became
to
as
JP
sole
of
implied
favored
of
the
"common
freedom of
private
Lvfjii though TUSIAD proposed that the private sector should not give
support
to any political part,
consisted
of
TISK
and TOBB representatives who asserted
sector had to back JP.
easy
there was another group in the
Hani Kartay stated that,
to defend the free regime.
Ertugrul Soysal,
attacking.
Vehbi Koç,
and the initiator of TUSIAD,
those
who
gi\e
It is now the time to attack.
We must make self-criticism.
the way out.^·^
said:
But
"I’am against
We know the loopholes for tax
The Western social democratic regime is
one of the leading industrialists in Turkey
pointed out to the minimum condition
seek the support of private sector:
priority
that private
"...it would not be
one of the founders of TUSIAD,
evas. ion better than the state.
Council
’’This council will
to any party or institution which do not
respect
for
not
basic
beliefs of the private enterprise.
While
whether
agreed
the
they
representatives
of different sectors could
would or would not support
any
political
on the point that they will all oppose NSP.
NSP
injected
and
had
not
agree
party,
they
It was noted
statist tendencies to the coalitions formed on the
to be prevented from becoming the key party in
the
that
right
coalition
governments.^^
The attitude towards RPP on the part of TUSIAD was not very
clear.
Some sections of the private sector did not view sympathically the RPP’s
entr'ance to S(jcialist International
of
the
artisans,
Free
Chairman
of RPP,
and also,
Bülent Ecevit,
because of the speechs
in which he
declared
that
cr-aftmen and small peasants would not take their place in the
Enterprise
Council because their interest was
64
in
conflict
with
those of big capital.
However,
the speakers at the Council meeting did
not
severely criticize RPP as there existed the possibility
the
party
at government.
representatives
power,
how
in
Thus,
the council]:
new
relations.
Trie
environment
of
erosion
institutionalized
sec;t(;r
voluntary
pluralism,
existing
and
the
patterns of interaction between the
association
including
interest group association]
TUSIAD,
the
government?"
criterion
such
rested with
the
government·
controlled
newly
business
by the government.
an
of
and
emerged
relationship
Here,
was whether would it be beneficial to the
the
in
governments
The initiative on the decision of whether a
place
dialogues
clientelistic
put the business in hesitancy on
question of "how to establish and structure its
take
of
coopting
absence
[read
the
would
in
easy access
of the pre-existing formal relations
debilitating
the
power.
the resources provided them with the means for
clients and/or in manipulating the already
private
of
”If the party we support is not
will we conduct our relations with the party in
to
facing
Ali Çarmaklı stated [one
Turning to the issue of relations with the government,
government
of
expected to
gain
with
dialogue
the
primary
government.
access
to
From
resources
In turn governments expected to
secure
political support.
1977
elections
was important both for RPP and
TUSIAD.
The
received 41.4
percent of the votes and became the only political
on the left.
Bülent Ecevit,
the chairman of RPP;
power
began to follow a
new strategy which winked at a ’'national coalition” government.
65
RPP
When
the
of
prog'ram of government formed by RPP was
the
Turkish Grand National Assembly,
emphasis was on general principles.
submitted to the
one could observe
approval
that
the
The details were to be shaped by a
national coalition government that was expected to emerge on a consensus
on the principles set forth in the program.
The
RPP’s program aimed at not to provoke
politically reli'\/int interest groups.
any political party or
It emphasized the reconstruction
of ”pnl.)lic order” and a ’’balanced foreign exchange policy.”
implied
that whoever came to power had to stop street
the disputes on Cyprus question,
In
general
terms,
majorproblems of
at
thebeginning of 1978
there
foreign trade balance,
1979,
deal
and deal solutions to economic crises.
by TUSIAD,
too.^^
it was stated that,
existed three major problems in Turkey,
Until
violence,
these were the problems which were
Turkey
The program
conceived
as
In a TUSIAD report issued
”As we approach the 1980s
political
instability,
and birth control.
TUSIAD did not take a militant stand against
social
democratic formulas provided that would bring about a harmonious
labor-
capital relationship.
In an interview Vehbi Koç observed:
The economy was in a bad situation when the RPP came to power,
for
a long time state was not able to pay its
violence was still rampant.
in
the red.
America and
Common
question.52
66
and
State economic enterprises
We had had uncertain
the
debts
relations
Market,especially on
with
the
were
Greece,
Cyprus
Koç continued
Among
these problems which were ail difficult to
RPP
government handled
was
followed
solve
American embargo skillfuly,
by the adoption of a reasonable policy
Cyprus question.
the
which
to
the
RPP also took effective steps for delaying
the foreign debts.^3
On
by
the other hand,
The Nationalist
Front governments initiated
Justice Party had problems with the private sector
especially
with
those who were close to the principles advocated by TUSIAD.
The small
partners
for
of
increasing
tlie
dissatistaction
governments.
consensus
Necmettin
the
from
the
reason
arguments
[chairman
Unions,
there emerged an
advanced
by
NSP,
of the NSP]
in
the
Front governments too,
The
the
would
Nationalist,
that a
country.
invervention
business
During
of
community
the
previous
Erbakan had tried to find
clients
supporting
obstacles that had been thus created to big business in
ministries attaclied to Erbakan,
business
Front
implicit
mainly stimulated by TUSIAD,
provoked the big business.
the
Nationalist
business sector and to create a circle of businessmen
himself.
l.lie
TUSIAD
the
NSP would be good for the benefit of
statist
Erbakan
Nationalist
among
of
was
Before the 1977 by-elections,
without
the
through
governments
among private sector,
government
Besides
coalition
not
Front
bolstered the view that
find an opportunity for
governments
communication
in which Erbakan’s party
element,
67
was
the
big
with
the
the
key
Ill tlie economic sphere,
mainly
from
import
substituted
great
emerged
the shortage of foreign exchange which was outcome of
policy.^^ Foreign exchange bottleneck
difficulties
aggravated
TUSIAD argued that the problems
"by
for
industrialists.
1974
and
recession,
concominant
with
continuation
of trade policies geared more towards import
than
encouragement,
deteoriatirig
subsequent
terms
including an exchange
created
situation
shock
discmiraged
in
The
oil
export
the
the
had
the
of
was
world
wide
trade
and
substitution
rate
regime
inflows of capital and worker’s remittrances.
that
Thus,
the
GNP growth rate fell to 2.4 in 1978 and declined further to -0.9 percent
in 1979 and -0.8 percent in 1980.
Moreover the rate of inflation reach
to 70 percent in 1979 and above 100 percent in 1980."^^
The
fragmentation
parliamentary
souglit
a
new
of
majorities
the
party
system
and
added to the problem.
In the
government and a new economic policy.
Economy
was
exchange
in
shambles
industry
could
because of the
not
work
instability
with
event
of
TUSIAD
As stated by Koç
lack
of
foreign
full
capacity...
Beginning by 1973 and onwards RPP and JP coalitions whether in
l)ower
or in opposition did not think of the interests of
country...
partisan
Professional
politics.
associations
were
involved
The party in power did not support
associations which did not depend upon them. ... "
68
the
in
those
The
began
campaign
by
policy
a series of paid advertisements
of
methods
of TUSIAD against the social
Ecevit
government that is,
elicited
reaction
in
democratic
major
newspapers.
the employment
from TUSIAD.
governments
of
The RPP policy
non-market
led
to
emergence
of black market to which the industrialists could not
adopted.
Besides,
lost
control over the increasing labor
its
that
union
easily
militancy.The
politicized the Association by taking it
the heart of the discussions on ’’regime problems.”
the
the
it seemed that the social democratic government had
political crisis Turkey faced,
at
The
RPP government’s policies
TUSIAD
aimed at could do away
asserted
with
the
would
also
democratic system of government.^^
Tl'SIAD
proposed
an
alternative policy package which
guarantee the pillars of the regime.
The program advocated by
aimed at encouraging private enterprise,
intervention,
liberalizing
the
state economic enterprises,
TUSIAD
eliminating undue government
economy increasing efficiency of
the
and carrying out a tax reform.
The mission of the Association was stated as follows:
We,
as
members of private sector,
declare that the
force that will improve our welfare under a system of
democracy
always
is
free
prompted
productively.
the
The
enterprise;
individual
developed
free enterprise
to
work
nations of
harder
our
age
main
liberal
that
and
has
more
reached
prosperity under conditions of freedom only through this path.
There is no alternative path.
69
Tl'SIAD- social
for two reasons.
vis
other
democratic
government confrontation was
Firstly TUSIAD acquired prestige and legitimacy vis-à-
business associations.
From 1979 onwards it was seen as an
association that toppled governments.
had
important
Secondly TUSIAD’s preoccupation
shifted from the sphere of economic policy to the
deteoriation
of
tlie poJit>' in the direct.ion of debilitating pluralism.
TUSIAD’s
changing
react, ion
style
of
to social democratic government was due to
Ecevit.^^
Ecevit attempted to change
mission of RPP as the ’’protector of the Papa State.”
taken
by
the
the
earlier
Also,
measures
the government such as nationalization of certain mines
were
conceived by TUSIAD as the reimposition of etatism.^^
During 1979 Turkey began to adopt IMF policies.
{)roducts
of
State
Economic
decrease
the burden on the treasury.
was the 1978 devaluation.
IMF
that
it
would
The
though
democrats
social
advocated
would
by IMF,
secure
were
increased
as
to
The most important development
use
the
resources
of
wages and salaries would not
rejected
to
strictly
the
be
exchange
sources for
the
Central
Bank
increased.
adopt
they now agreed to implement those
fresh
so
The social democrat government promised to
not
inefficiently.
Enterprises
The prices of the
the
Even
policies
policies
stabilization
which
of
the
economy.^^
On
the other hand,
these policies led to the breakdown of
alignment with labor unions.
would
adopt
a
In 1976,
RPP^s
Ecevit had declared that RPP
new policy which would be based on Scandinavian social
70
democtatic movena-nt’s policies.
prolessional associations;
use
of
labor
state power.
Thus,
it would have been suit with
they would be participated in and share
New strategy of RPP had aimed at
reshaping
movement which was fragmented and politicized.
RPP’s
the
the
ultimate
goal was to unite the workers under the RPP umbrella.®·*
For a while,
labor - RPP alliance seemed to work.
But then in
1978 Ecevit as Prime Minister resorted austerity measures,
which were
formally announced in the Fourth Five - Year Plan (1978-1982).
pointed
out
that
deepening financial crises
foreign credit.
the
labor
Parallel to IMF advices,
of
necessitated
Ecevit tried to hold down
costs for controlling the inflation.
which broke labor-party alliance.
Turkey
It was
It was this
attempt
As an opposition leader Ecevit
taken serious steps in uniting the fragmented labors sector,
had
but when
he became to prime ministry in 1977 the old coalition collapsed.
From
the
point
of
TUSIAD,
the breakdown
of
this
necessitated a fresh look at the problems the regime faced.
the
dissolution
of
the labor
- government
alignment
coalition
Following
Feyyaz
Berker
(chairman of TU.SIAD) stated:
The
trio
of employees
with problems.
price
and
We,
wage
employers,
and the state must
cope
as employers and employees must bring the
increases
inflation.
71
under
control
and
stop
the
As for as TUSIAD was concerned,
Sakıp
Sabancı,
the
this was what the economy needed.
leading industrialist of Turkey talked along
the
same Lin^-^s:
There
can not be development in a country if "vote
became
superior to economic policies.
period,
big
par-ties
policies"
During the
1973-1979
of the country could not arrive at
a
consensus on the vital issues but instead gave priority to the
[;o Lic ies.
TUSIAD ad'/ocated a National Coalition government of RPP and JP.
the
By
timing of the paid advertisements of
issuing
between
the
advertisements
TUSIAD
towards the end
Uie government and IMF,
was
of
So,
well-calculated.
the
negotiations
TUSIAD sought to make an
impact
and
aimed at weakening bargaining power of the RPP government vis-à-vis IMF.
Ecevit
that
himself
admitted the influence of the campaign and
later
said
"it was not the IMF or USA that undermined us but our own business
cir*cles.
By tills time,
free enterprise coalition which was previously tried
to be held together under the patronage of the JP was also broken
down.
Thus,
which
aimed
TUSIAD
at
attempted
pr-everiting
to inject new principles into politics
the
’’erosion of the state
power."
Ali
Koçman
(chairman of TUSIAD between 1980-82) complained that
'^hen we get into trouble or are faced with unfair treatment we
often
ask
as
"where
is the state?"
72
But if
we
have
the
opportunity we,
too,
treat other unfairly. A wild search
for "truth” is going on in the daily life.
the
state
knocking
fact,
is
does becomes freedom...
down
The dynamites
used
the ones who are dominant in politics
placed at the roots of the state itself.
taken as a political party;
State
Opposing to what
Before,
everything
STATIZATION
(emphasis
OF
is
THE
mine)
else,
what
is
that
their
in
The state
and
required
STATE Millions of states
suppose
are
everybody is against
is the only absolute power that can unite
for
in
it...
direct.
is
the
the
own,
STATE
flags
and
economic power are sufficient for self-subsistence...While all
these
happen
reasonable,
there
emerged a new class in Turkey
which
is
works rationally and productively and is able to
leap towards the stages of efficient industrialization and and
can understand social development in more practical terms than
the ones who are adversely affected by that development.
untiring
warriors of the private sector who
create
The
miracles
constitute this class.
Turkish private sector must get under
heavy
for
responsibilities
mentioned picture.
or
even
service
concerning
the rearrangement of
It must consider it its duty to
reconstruct the state.
through
the
politics
key
is
functions,
if necessary,
73
above
restore
We will be politicians
unavoidable.
that
is,
commodity production and providing services,
duty and,
the
At
if
least,
encouraging
we should be on
be an officer [of the state].
The
new
erosion
of
mission TUSIAD set for itself was that of preventing
state’s
authority in Koçman’s words
’’statization
state/’ As the polity had become more politicized,
access
to scarce resources were more blurred
party governments
the
of
the
the criteria
for
at the hands of different
and particularly weak coalitions,
economic decision
making had been completely politicized.
Thus,
could
channels through which TUSIAD interact with the government
be
no more than informal, one - to - one relationships
members
of
tlie
TUSIAD
rather
than
government.
Thisprovides
dealing
successive governments.
with
Association
itself
of
the
with
the
in
its
a flexibility to the Association
But the individual members
as
members could more easily be manipulated by the governments.
Following
elections,
the
JP
fall of Ecevit
took
the office.
government
after
the
1979
The new JP government began
byto
implement a new set of measures known as the January 24(1980) Decisions.
It was a stabilization program which aimed at structural adjustments
the
Turkish
economy.
TUSIAD supported the new policy
package.
in
As
Vehbi Koç observed:
These
decisions
obtained.
dynamism
are correct in principle and results would
But the industry and economy in our country have a
of
its ov;n.
hindei* developments,
January
be
Interfering with
if not today,
that
dynamism
may be tomorrow...
24 decisions lias to be implemented by making
So
certain
adjustments which will better adopt them to our economy.
74
may
f-ieturning
to the basic query of this study,
consideration
transmitted
from
tlirough
to
1973
which
mechanisms the
during the period under
demands
of
the economic decision-making centers.
TUSIAD
were
As noted
onward a new type of bureaucrat had emerged
in
above
Turkish
civil
service who gave his expertise to a certain party or
rhetoric."^
These
newly
interaction
emerged technocrats were the pillars
of
the
between government and the Association.
From
example.
this
perspective
Gzai
was
during Demirei
served
as
he found
stayed
Ozal
is
the undersecretary of State Planning
l>;veinment
v ict:*-min ister
established
the career of Turgut
(November 12,
typical
Organization
1979 - September 12, 1980) and
for about two years
soon after September 12,
a
under
Ulusu
government
1980 military intervention. Then
Motherland Party and became prime minister in 1983 where he
at office till 1989 when he was elected as the President of
the
Republic.
In
his
community,
among
He
life career Ozal developed close relations
he was also a TUSIAD member.
with
business
But Ozal gained predominance
business s<-ctor as the general coordinator of the Sabancı
became
Melal
Works
Industry
which was known by its tough and militant stand against
labor
\mioris.
By tl.»e end of 1970s,
shape
TUSIAD’s policies,
as a member of TUSIAD,
and,
of
he was able to
to
the
undei’secretary of state in charge of economic affairs in late 1979,
he
became
the
Llie chairman of the Employer’s Association
Group.
when he was appointed
virtually the sole architect of the 1980 stabilization
75
program.
''lien tlie 1980 military takeover took place Vehbi Roc recommended Ozal to
General
Kenan
Evren,
the head of the Junta,
and asked him "not
to
change Ozal."'i
During the end of the fragmentation of the earlier formal
and
the
emergence
political
easy
environment
access to
loosen-;
hand;
of
of
a new type of
bureaucrat
ixi
the
politicized
provided TUSIAD the chance to have a
resources particularly when compared to
the game namely the artisans and craftraen.
relations
relatively
the
On
permanent
the
other
politization of the polity in a centre-dominant system meant that
favoritism,
uncertanity
and unpredictability would become
widespread
issues about which members of TL'SIAD always complained.
In
1970-1980
period,
the polity was characterized
p o l a r i z a t i o n and politization.
in
the
During
increased
of 1971-1977 period TUSIAD was
competition with other business associations.
end by 1977 with the Free Enterprise
by
This period came
Council.
From 1977
to
onwards
TUSIAD acted as a peak association among the business community but only
as
the
sector
representative
of
of the big business which
became
the
tlie Turkish economy under the parameters introduced
dynamic
by
new
economic policies.
These developments signified drastic changes within
l)usiness
community
which
unions.
The
the
name
was
formely
represented
by
semi-official
answer to the question of "who would say the last word in
of Tur.kish private enterprise during the
was now quite evident:
it was going to be TUSIAD.
76
following
decade?"
NOTES and REFERENCES
1)
Dankwart A. Rustow,
"Turkey;
The Modernity of Tradition" in
Political Culture and Political Development ,
Lucien Pye and Sydney Verba,
Press,
2)
1965),
(Princeton:
edited by
Princeton University
p. 196.
İlkay Sunar,
State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s
Development,
(Ankara:
Ankara University Faculty of Political
1974),
p. 112.
3)
Ibid.
4)
Ertugrul Soysal,
"Government and Private Sector"
April 30,
cited in Metin Heper,
1974,
in Milliyet,
"The Recalcitrance of
the Turkish Public Bureaucracy to 'Bourgeois Politics’: A MultiFactor iôlitical Analysis,"
1976),
5)
Keiker,
6)
Ibid.
7)
Bianchi,
Turkey.
8)
Middle East Journal
p. 497.
T_h^ Modernization of Turkey,
p. 93.
Interest Groups and Political Development in
p. 248.
Yeni Ortam May 21,
1973.
Since the goal of indiistrial sector
was integration to Common Market,
existed
a
beginning.
conflict
with
it can be said that there
artisans’
and
On the other "protectionism"
Weiker,
10)
Ibid.
77
craftmen’s
from
was a polity favored
by the both parties.
9)
30 (Autumn,
p. 94.
the
11)
Jacop M. Landau,
E. J. Brill,
12)
13)
1974),
Mustafa Sönmez
1990),
Radical Politics in Modern Turkey. (Leiden:
pp. 188-193.
Kirk Haramiler (Ankara:
Arkadaş Yayınevi,
p. 160.
Politically relevant group is conceptualized as those who do not
control central government authority such as ministeries and Prime
Ministry but tliose activity may be important for the operation of
the political system.
See Eldon banning
American Political Systems,"
1974),
14)
Sönmez,
15)
Ibid.,
16)
Bianchi,
Kirk Haramiler,
p. 149.
p. 160.
Interest groups and Political Development in
p. 266.
Sendikacılığı,
see also Pars Esin,
(Ankara:
Ibid.
18)
TISK Annual Report,
April 1978,
(Ankara),
1977,
Bianchi ,
April 4,
Türkiye’de İşveren
Sevinç Matbaası,
17)
Turkey,
6(April
p. 372.
Turkey,
19)
"A Typology of Latin
1974).
pp. 78-79 see also Yankı
July 4,
1977.
Interest Groups and Political Development
pp. 267-268.
20)
Yankı,
April 22-28,
1974.
21)
Yankı,
April 15-21,
1974.
22)
Weiker,
23)
Sönmez,
Kirk Haramiler,
24)
Weiker,
îte Modernization of Turkey,
p. 95.
p. 154.
78
p. 96.
25)
Ayşe üncü,
’’Chambers of Industry in Turkey.
An Inquiry to State -
Industry Helati^>ns as a Distributive Domain" in ^litical Economy
Ci' Income Distr ibut ion i_n Turkey edited by Ergun Ozbudun and Aydın
Ulusan,
(New York:
26)
Ibid.,
27)
Kemali Saybaşii,
Holmes and Meier,
1980),
p· 467.
"Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
Parties and Government:
Turkish Cases,"
Developmen i.
Midd1e East Technical University Studies in
11(1976 ),
pp. 117-133.
Ibid.
29)
Yankı April 22-28,
30)
Hulki Alisbah "Sanayide Kurumlaşma” 11.
Tebliğleri ,
to
Nisan 1974.
(Ankara:
İktisat Kongresi
Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayınları,
Even thougli the speech was made in 1981,
an
important
industrialist,
problem.
Sakıp
elected only twice.
Ibid.,
32)
Ayşe Öncü,
33)
Yankı,
3-1)
Ibid.
35 )
Hi id .
36)
Ibid.
it pointed out
Sabancı,
proniinant
Mustafa Sönmez,
in the same way Vehbi Koç
Kirk Haramiler,
p. 155,
"Ciiambers of Industry in Turkey,”
August
a
elected to the Executive Board of TOBB only
within 30 years by a court decision,
31)
Political
A Comparative Analysis of British an
28)
1981).
pp, 455-180.
2-8
1971.
79
p. 470.
p. 157.
once
37)
Ibid.
38)
Ibid.
39)
See
article 3, By-laws^ TUSIAD,
(Istanbul:
TUSIAD
Publications,
1984. )
40)
Ibid,
article 5.
41)
Yeşim Arat,
42)
Bianchi,
Turkey,
"Politics and Big Business,"
typscript.
Interest Groups and Poli t ical Development in
p. 269.
43)
Yankı,
April 8-14,
44)
"Iş Alemi Hükümet İlişkilerine Evrensel Bakış,"
(Istanbul:
1974.
TUSIAD publications,
January 24-30,
TUSIAD
1974), p. 31.
45)
Yankı.
1977.
46)
Ibid.
47)
Ibid.
48)
Ibid.
49)
Ibid.
50)
"1978 Yılına Girerken ve 1980’lere Doğru Türkiye’nin Temel
Sorunları Üzerine Görüş ve öneriler,"
TUSIAD.
(Istanbul:
1978).
51)
Ibid.
52)
Yankı,
53)
Ibid.
54)
Yankı.
55)
"1978 Yılına Girerken ve 1980’lere Doğru Türkiye’nin Temel
December 11-17,
1978.
July 4-10, 1977.
Sorunları Üzerine Görüş ve Öneriler,"
1978).
80
TUSIAD.
(Istanbul:
56)
Ozbudiin,
Perspectives on Democracy iji Turkey,
57)
Yankı,
October 16-22,
58)
Yankı,
May 21-27,
1979.
59)
Yaukl)
June 4-10,
1979.
60)
"1979 Yılı Çalışmaları,"
1978.
TÜSIAD,
Yankı,
December 11-17,
1978.
62)
Yankı,
November 16-22,
1979.
63)
Yankı,
June 25,
64)
Yankı 1
January 19,
65)
Yankı
66)
Yankı November 16-22,
67)
C.
68)
as cited in Yeşim Arat,
typescript,
61)
p. 11.
1979.
1976,
January 4-10,
Arcayiirek,
Yayjnevi,
pp. -43-44.
1976.
1979.
1979.
Cüneyt
1986),
and January 26,
Arcavürek
Anlatıyor.
Bilgi
p.320.
1979 Yılına Girerken ve 1980’lere doğru Türkiye^nin Temel Sorunları
Üzerine Görüş ve Öneriler,"
Publications,
June 28,
TUSIAD,
(İstanbul:
Nokta
70)
see. Heper
"Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişme Sürecinde
Bürokrasi:
Bir Tipoloji ve Bazı Düşünceler."
Hulusi Turgut,
1986).
TUSIAD
1978).
69)
71)
8 (Ankara:
1982.
12 Eylül Partileri.
p. 182.
81
(İstanbul:
ABC Ajansı,
Chapter Five
TURKISH INDUSTRIALISTS’ AND BUSINESSMEN
ASSOCIATION IN THE 1980s
TOWARDS A NEW POLITY
Ttif' m i l i t a r y
1961,
1971
in Turkey intervened in p o l i t i c s three times,
and
1980-1983)
s tr u c t u r a t i o n o f the s t a t e 1980
p er io d,
:nter';*st.
new
group
in t er ve n t io n s
led to important
i n t e r e s t group r e l a t i o n s .
changes
in
Throughout
groups emerged and attempted at shaping the
interface.
in
which
(1960-
Turkey
It was noted by Heper
did ciiuse n e i t h e r
that
authoritarian
the
the
1960-
statemilitary
regimes
as
happened in Latin America nor c r e a t e regimes s tr u c t u r e d on c e r t a i n c l a s s
formations.
Military
aimed
at r e s t r u c t u r a t i o n o f democracy so as
remov<^‘ those f a c t o r s which c o n t r ib u t e d to the emergence o f
democracy. ( 1 ) The s t a t e ,
whicli
however,
among other things,
The
1961
National
new
had an impact on i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y .
c o n s t i t u t i o n s tr u c t u r e d the s t a t e in
uleologv;
has
tutelle
1 h<-*ir·
been
].)O w ers
civil
bureaucracy
The l a t t e r c o n s t i t u t i o n
to the President o f the
Se c ur it y Council,
It
exercise
powers
debilitating
continued to have a s a l i e n t r o l e ,
1982 c o n s t i t u t i o n strengthened the e x e c u t i v e .
granted
to
Rep ub lic,
and
the m i l i t a r y became the *’ c o - l o c i
suggested that " n e i t h e r o f
over
jurisdiction
was
'p o litic s ’
in
terms
them
of
through
of
expected
an
the
to
official
r*estricted to that o f safeguarding the
t er r i tor i a ] i 11 tegr i ty . ^
82
The distinctiveness of post 1980 period lied on the fact tfmt
state"
and "politics" were now two distinct spheres witii a
between
state
"compromise"
and
that
elimination
of
continuously
political
emerged
elites."^
in
uncertanities
It
can
be
the post-1980 period
in
politics
which
"the
"compromise
suggested
resulted
were
that
in
generated
changing political dynamics of praetorian politics of
the
by
the
1970s.
As
noted above,the 1982 Constitution strengthened
It also granted new powers to the Prime Minister.
responsible
Minister.“
^
not
only
executive.
The relations of the
Prime Minister· with his ministers took new forms;
now
the
the ministers were
to the Parliament but
also
It was argued by Heper that "the framers
to
the
the
Prime
constitution
considered bringing the state back in indispensable.’
The
new
Constitution
restructuration
of the state
to the e\ents of the previous
things,
brought
groups.
with
its
emphasis
around new norms,
decade.
on
the
revival
emerged as
The Constitution,
group
associations
were
faced
of
interest
with
certain
limitations and at times even
banned.
activities
decreeissued by the Council of
which
were permitted by
classified
On the other
hand,
TUSIAD among the associations promoting
interest,
83
a reaction
among other
some restrictions to the structuration
Interest
and
TUSIAD’s
Ministers,
the
"public
The
control
of
the state over
the
associations
firstly by increased control on raerabership selection.
associations
parties.
was
bolstered
Secondly,
were barred from establishing* linkages with the
Thirdly,
a related measure,
engage in politics.
the
political
the associations could not be
They could act as an ’’interest group” but not as a
”pr-essur-e group. ""
The
post-UiBO period was characterized not only by the ’’revival of
the
state"
but also by ’’the debureaucratization of
the
government.”^
The
decade
was characterized by the emergence of a
personalistic
and
particularistic form of relationship between government and TUSIAD.
After the 1980 military coup,
The Motherland Party,
first elections were held at 1983,
advocated economic policies with emphasis on the
regulatory r()le of the market forces came to power.
policies
for
enunciated
business
emphasis
on
At first sight the
by the party seemed to provide news
sector.
The
program of the party
the market forces and weakening the
opportunities
aimed
role
of
at
placing
traditional
bureaucratic elements in the public policy making.^
A liberalization program of foreign exchange regime was accompanied
by
that
a discourse which signified the end of the "mixed economy”
had
been
bureaucratic
the
earlier
defended
by
the
political
and
elites and still found its proponents within the ranks
parties in the opposition.
of
The new approach allowed for a minimum
amount of government involvement in economy,
credits,
pre-1980
rhetoric
tax incentives and the like.
84
tlirough subsidies,
cheap
The MP governments encouraged of
partnerships between firms in Turkey and abroad.
The
the
result
state’ s
became
a goal
was the a n t i - e t a t i s t p o l i c i e s which aimed to
r o l e in
pr o du cti v e
E x p o rt - o r i e n t e d
growth
not only a means f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n o f c e r t a i n p o l i c y goa ls but
in i t s e l f .
It must not be foi’gr^tten,
were
activities.
reducing
carried
however,
that the most radical measures
out during the interregnum of
1930-1983.
Reducing
the
demands of the politically relevant groups become part and parcel of the
stabilization
solution
According
to
pr-ogram
the
implemented by the military’s
economic
to Nordlinger,
and political crises
government
of
the
late
the 1980 coup was a "ruler type."
as
a
1970s.
In
this
type of military takeo\ers military does not seek to maintain the status
(JUG but wishes to impose changes in the economic,
political and social
spheres:
They
in v a r i a b l y
monarchies,
p a r t i e s . ..
powered
bring
more
attempt the root-an d-br anc h
traditional
Praetorian
oligarchies,
destruction
and
of
political
r u l e r s . . .commonly.♦. b e l i e v e that
high
investment and modernization programs are required to
about steady economic g r o w t h . . . Repression i s
e x ten siv e.. . Pollty,
penetrated from above.
85
economy
and
g e n e r a ll y
s o c i e t y are
to
be
to
Political rr^slructuration was completoi before Ozal government
came
power.
than
Consequently,
economic
restructuration
rather
politirai cuie became the main axis of the policies adopted during the MP
rule.
Beginning of the privatization of state economic enterprises and
the creation of new bureaucratic agencies^where people from outside were
appointed ^
were
some
of
the
attempts
traditi')nal bureauci’atic cadres.
to
decrease
In the process,
the
role
of
political executive
came to occupy a more prominent place in the polity,
Economic
measures
liberalization
of
economic
and
economic
growth
the
adopted
by
the
MP
governments
economy was resulted in the
development as a problem of
the
decade
increasing
those which operated in the key sectors of the economy
could contribute to the export capacity of the country.
continued
and
engaged in
took
and
which
The government
t(; iiave the initiative as it controlled credits the exporters
industrialists were in need of.
extremely
of
exports.
Governments encouraged the establishment of foreign trade companies
supported
the
’’concentration
political p o w e r , P o l i c y - m a k e r s of
and
for
important
especially
The government’s
for those firms which
policies
were
now
were
also
exporting since it was a matter of survival for them,^^
Moreover,
as
indicated by Oni^ public investments still surpassed
those made by the pi-ivate sector.
Through the financial system public
sector continued to control the capital market,^**
86
Il
cuuld
Western
or i c m ted »
approaches
be
expected that the
anti-etatist,
elites
commitment
and
pro-market
anti-protect ionst
would correspond with the businessmen’s concerns who operate
in the dynamic sectors of the economy.
corresi)ond
give
political
but,
as
To a certain degree,
It was argued that most
the
channels to government were even more blocked than before
uric
li
«
.anie
inner
executive
did
indicated by Heper '‘central elites continued to
shc^rl shrift to the social groups.
iV:
it
across in government
circle’
made
'the
up of che prime
of
"because
autonomization
minister and
of
a
an
few
tecliiiGcracIs ;iround him.
The
division
accurately
elites
and
responsibility for handling economic
elites
independence
the
labor between state
political
reflected in the area of public policy
had
state
of
primary
was to
of the country and,
nation.
sphere.
functiori
The
Here,
elites
making.
matters
safequard
the
Political
whereas
the
security
and
the indivisibility and integrity
political elites dominated the former
metfiod
bureaucracy
neither the state elites nor civil societal elements
was
introduced
secure.
which made the posts
As already noted,
wer^> -^.M'iected the public buja?aucracy.
acted
were
of
governmental
The I'Ublic Ijureaucracy became subordinated to the governing
Contract
was
in
tiie
party.
public
important transformations
New units were established which
as eniaiicialions of the government.
Certain critical
Iransfei’rcd to these newly-created units.
For example,
functions
to
Undersecretary for Treasury and Foreign Trade were transferred some
87
the
to
f un c t io ns
wiiich were e a r l i e r performed by the M inistry o f
Finance.
cadr es
o f o f f i c i a l s emerged who headed c r i t i c a l ag enc ie s such as
banks,
the Central Bank,
New
state
the State Planning Organization and some o f
tlie s t a t e economic e n t e r p r i s e s and who were d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to
Prime M ini ste r,
The
effects
association
As
it
was
Ozal,
hims el f.
of these developments upon government-interest
interaction
noted
institutionalized
the
by
was a
Heper
domination-subordination
"there
[neo-corporatist]
social groups and the government.
was
hardly
group
relationship.
pluralistic
give and take between the
or
weigthy
The relationship that existed was of
a clientelistic type but as it was of a parentala variety and
therefore
no
government
consultation
and
the
let alone bargaining took place between the
’’interests",
the
former often dictated its
wishes
to
the
latter."^^
THE ROLE INTEREST GROUPS SHOULD PLAY: TUSIAD’S VIEWS
Within
this
context,
the
answer to the
question
of
"whether
Turkish polity was now moving moving towards a political system in which
there
would be greater participation inpolitics on the part
societal
elem'ents?" gains vital importance.
of
civil
Second question would
be
about the limits of TUSIAD’s access to and influence upon government.
TUSIAD
1970s.
Due
come
to
to
the
have i n c r e as in g p o l i t i c a l relevancy by
reasons dis c us s e d in
the
pr evious
relevancy was bound to be high in post-1983 p e r i o d ,
88
too.
the
chapter,
late
its
However,
as already noted,
during the 1980s the economic policy
making was monopolized by the political elites.
necessary
meetings were arranged for the announcement of the
taken by the ’’inner circle.”
and
Then if it was deemed
TUSIAD
met
decisions
It was suggested that even when government
it was an opportunity for the governmental
elites
to
communicate tliat directives to the members of TUSIAD.
It
can be said that the lack of an overall strategy and
presence
of
a
great
deinslitutionalization
TUSiAD.
degree
of
the
Uiiiristitutionalized
advantages
to
the
of
uncertain!ty
resulted
relations between
the
patterns
government.
of relations
There
was
sector
differeril
and its representation
types
in
further
government
provided
and
several
’’flexibility”
formulation and implementation of the policies.
private
therefore
in
the
The fragmentation of
by several associations
with
legal status’ and orientations enabled governments to
manipulate the situation.
It
can
be
implementation
relevant
close
the flexibility
in
of
the uninstitutionalized patterns
ties
politics.^^
one
of
with
Necessity of
of
an
89
keeping
A
Schmitter in his analysis
of
resources.
members of TUSIAD and one time
observed,
the
unforeseen
The business groups were be subordinate
the
and
relationship.
through availability or absence of financial
Kocatopçu,
formulation
policy obliged TUSIAD to keep close
point was elaborated by Pliilippe
Brazilian
the
’’integrated” TUSIAD to the system which was
crnisequeiice
state
of
that
’’centre” where the decisions were made.
ties
similar
said
its
to
the
Sahap
chairman
If
we
wish
TllSIAD
the dialogue with the
government
to
should take up the problems to government
discussing them in the open.
to keep its mouth shut.
views
TUSIAD
should
In other words,
continue,
instead
of
it should know
Instead of letting the media know its
take
them
to
the
government,
if
‘necessary fight for them and when agreement on a certain view
is
readied,
it
should
be announced
view...Many persons in TUSIAD,
as
the
government's
who are in fierce competition
with each other in many fields of business,
have agreed on a
common denominator.
The points that are agreed upon are:(l)
Dt^t^Miding
democracy;
(2)
political
party;
Staying
outside the
orbit
of
(3) giving priority to country’s long
a
term
intei'ests.^ ^
In
the
introductory
part
of a
book
published
by
TUSIAD
the
following point was made:
Formally
TUSIAD
recognized as an ‘Association of National
plays
enterprises
large
and
important role in the presentation
Interest’
of
private
views and in its recommendations to the public
to government and all those others
with
at
economic
policy and T u r k e y e c o n o m i c well being.22
Defending
economy"
ar*e
the
long
terra
two
important
"national interest"
themes
which
are
distinguishes it from other business associations.
90
and
"free
important
for
market
and
Let
us reiterate:
expansionist
p r iv a t e
the post-1980 period was characterized by
economic
goals
TUSIAD
enterprise.
with emphasis
on
the
its
encouragement
members mostly operated in
most
of
dynamic
sector of the economy.
TUSIAD
members,
uncertainities
projt." tions
have
to
Ihey
however,
faced:
continued
"...free
to
complain
enterprise can not
about
make
the
healty
because it does not know the exact amount of taxes it
pay."^4
bureaucrats,
They argued that
creative
"besides
the
will
politicians
and
ideas and practices in the industry would
come
from by those in the private sector.
They thus pressed for dialogue with the government:
market
"A transparent
economy based on dialogue with the government is not a dream
utopia.
Administrators
knows
everything’,
who thought for a long time that *Papa
must not conceive the consultations
with
or
State
private
sector as a weakness on their part."^^
TUSIAD
longed for influencing the policy making process during its
formulation phase.
For the sake of establishing institutionalized and
formal relations with government,
advisory'
commitees
in
TUSIAD offered to establish
which
public
private
TUSIAD
posHive
in "decreasing tension" and "egoism of the
Such
a
were
responsible
1982,
such a dialogue
in
sector
collaborate.2’
effect
justified
and
terms
demand had also been transmitted to the authorized
Ali Kograan,
for the preparation of the
1982
could
of
its
groups.
agents
Constitution.
the then chairman of TUSIAD said that "in
91
certain
who
In
advanced
industrialized
countries
governments
witli civil societal elements.
institutionalized
consultations
We liope that our government too,
soon
terms of realization such a system the establishment of a
"High
develops such mechanisms.^
In
Economic
Consultative Council" was proposed,
the
Council would
have
members from private and public sectors as well as the academe.
We
propose the establishment of a High Economic Consultative
Council
which
private
and
would
public
have as its
sectors
members
as v;ell
as
people
the
from
the
universities,
would meet periodically and which would be used by governments
as a sounding board.
It
was
evident
that
TUSIAD was wary of
interest groups-government interface.
government
private
to
be
sector
come out
rather
than
in
the
They make the contact with
the
by an association
the
confusion
representing the
whole
by sectoral associations or by the
firms
themselves :
Instead of contacts with government by individuals,
sectorial
the
associations it would be better to have
government
private
sector.
beneficial
to
by
an
Such
everyone
realize it.^^
92
association
an
access
representing the
arrangment would
concerned and
firms or
everyone
be far
would
to
whole
more
soon
Unstructured
governmental
and unroutinized relations with ministries and
agencies have been the basic features of the relationship
between government and TUSIAD.
to
government,
circle”
the
other
Even though TUSIAl) had an easy
agencies through its close connections with
nature
of
the
relationship in
the
last
access
the
’’inner
analysis
was
personalistic and particularistic and could break down at any moment.
As noted al)ove,
Turgut Ozal,
the Prime Minister of the time was a
member of TUSIAD and sixteen of the cabinet ministers appointed in
had
earlier worked in the private sector.
establish,
Thus,
1983
TUSIAD was able to
in Scott’s terminology ’’personal and diffuse linkages” with
the government.
TUSIAD
government.
insisted on formal,
TUSIAD argued,
oppor'tunity
to
institutionalized relations with
it would among other things,
that
membership
would
enable
Thus,
to Union of Industry Employers
TUSIAD
to collect valuable
to
the
an
unlike
it was pointed out
Confederation
information
about
economy and politics and the Association would contribute,
things,
provide
furnish government on some critical matters not
the situation in Japan^^ and West Germany.^"*
the
(UNICE)
European
among other
acceleration of Turkey’s integration to the
European
Community.
TUSIAD
would also act in UNICE with government when a decision
to be made concerning the Community affairs.
It is important to
that
membership to UNICE became a matter of competition
TISK
and
TUSIAD.
between
is
note
TOBB,
UNICE could not decide on the matter and took the
93
matter to its executive council.
It
was
announced
association
Where TUSIAD was selected as member.
by TUSIAD that UN ICE recognized TUSIAD as
among business community and underlined its
the
peak
central
place
among other business organizations.^^
So,
process
for
TUSIAD
had
tried hard to have a word in policy
formulation
on certain topics such as the strategies which will be
the
integration
of Turkish industry to the European
general economic policies.
On the other hand,
adopted
one
and
on
TUSIAD has not sought to
have responsibilities for the implementation of the public policies even
those
For
assumed to be in the direct area of interest of the
TUSIAD,
policies
a consensus among the public and private sectors about the
to
consensus
Association.
implementation
was crucial:
”It is
necessary
on the economic problems facing Turkey,
to
policies to
have
tackle
them and on the implementation of those policies.
TUSIAD
sectors,
also
wished collaboration between the public
clarity
concerning
the
rules
and,
and
private
transparency
and
predictability in policies:
As
is the case in many developed countries including Japan in
those areas characterized by serious economic problems
should
made
be debated and solutions sought in commitees or forums
of
public
and
private
Entrepreneurs
cannot
be
successful
up
principles
JviSt
issues
as
governing
sector
unless
economic policies
and
representatives.
they
know
business
the
life.
the economy is openned up to outside there sliould
94
be
transparency in governmental operations too.
It would be far
better to consult relevant public sector associations,
media
and
and the universities before making laws,
to
have
an
pursued
in
laws,
they
are
It is the most natural rights of businessmen
idea
of the economic strategies
the years to come.
transparent
and
degree
regulations than frequently changing them once
put into effect.
mass
and
A market
that
will
be
economy
that
is
paralleled by a dialogue between
government
private sector will help to realize Turkey’s aim to
open
the economy outside.^®
TUSIAD
again
and
again
demanded
that
uncertanity
arbitrariness surrounding economy should be eliminated.
Bczacıbaşı
if
Thus,
(presently member of the Administrative Council
of
not
Bülent
TUSIAD)
stated :
Suggestions made by Yusuf Özal,
for
economy,
Ozal
was
was
State Minister
a flicker to hope for the industrialists.
going to hold monthly meetings with
TUSIAD and other business associations.
TUSIAD,
among
leading
role
responsible
the
heads
Ömer Dinçkök, head of
the spokesmen of private sector groups had
in
trying
to
establish
of
such
a
a
dialogue.
Although such meeting provided an oportunity for both sides to
listen
problems
to
the
of
other
the
no lasting
industry
meeting.
95
could
solutions
be
for
formulated
the
basic
at
those
irsIAD
has seen the existing patterns of the dialogue as one
side talks over the head of the other.
each
TUSIAD wished to replace it
a
genuine dialogue based on exchange of knowledge on crucial issues.
In a
state-dominated
polity TUSIAD has been able to transmit its demands
to
the
but
in
government
economic
could
decision-making.
government
not in general have an
It
is
now in order
effective
to
role
look
at
TUSIAD-
characteristics
of
TUSIAD-
relat.ions more closely.
TU SIAD -C X) VERNMENT 1 NTERFACE
It
can
government
be
said that the nature and
relation
substance
a/)d
conceived
a
form
to a large extend depended on the changes
of the national
policy
making.
in
TUSIAD
the
itself
broad area of public policy making as appropriate for
its
involvement.
As noted above,
characterized
the
during 1980s,
economic policy making was to be
by strict commitment to the self-regulatory
market forces.
adequate
of
the
resources
1983
But in the changing political
post-1983 period the market forces
for limiting state
MP came to power in 1983,
elites
patronage.
Parliaments
1987
were
enabled
dominated by
the
96
did
And,
not
after
the traditional bureaucracy’s and the
influence in polity was drasticalJy reduced.
and
of
The expected consequence of such a shift would be
the growing autonomy of the market place.
environment
capacity
the
governing
government
political
have
the
state
The Parliaments of
party.
elites
The
two
to control
economy
through tlie decree laws.
Thus>
governments had had the
opportunity to dominate the private sector and prevent them to use their
1't'sourc-es for sabotaging the economic policy of the government.
The members of TL'SIAD association
where
governnu-nt
spheres
the
inter\ention was less visible in comparison to
actors
associations.
operated in an economic sphere
of
which
were
represented
by
other
other
business
The association tried to keep its autonomy by distancing
itself from the governing party and lias for along time engaged in "above
party rhetoric.” Cem Boyner,
chairman of
TUSIAD,
stated:
"I do not
find if r*ealistic on the side of businessmen to express and defend their
political views in a country like Turkey where state and government have
enormous powt-r.
As
al^^'eady
noted,
TUSIAD
became one of
the
most
prestigious
businessmen associations in the decade following the 1980 military coup.
In
1985,
within
the
top one hundred industrial firms the
share
TUSIAD members in production and employment reached 80 percent.
share
of
the
private sector in the value added
of
of
The
manufacturing
is
around 70 percent and TUSIAD members share in production and employment
of
private
Association
companies
the
manufacturing
represents
industry
about
one
is
about
thousand
50
percent.
companies.
And
The
these
represent a significant portion of private sector as most
members
(operate in banking as well insurance,
ice sec:tor*s.'^
97
construction
of
and
The
relations
different
from
and
MP
TUSIAD
with MP
governments
those of other compulsory business
tradit wnially
TUSIAD,
of
have
had
followed
a
path
associations
linkages with other parties
on
which
the
right.
by its strong commitment to reforms in foreign trade, taxation
foreign exchange system became
program.
a one of the ardent advocate of the
But the distinctiveness of TUSIAD’s support to the
program
lies
adopted
in
in the fact that the Association evaluated
terms
of overall economic necessities
and
the
the
MP ’s
policies
long-term
interests of the community.
The
e f f e c t s
reflected
in
exporters.
period,
of tlie economic policies pursued by MP governments were
the
deepening
cleavage
between
industrialists
In the overall development of the economy in the
credits
and
and
post-1980
subsidies became the means for manipulating
the
exporters.
For a long time these resources were controlled by the
bureaucratic
state.
the
elites
However,
for
the sake of defending the
of
an
by
aJlocating
the
The
bureaucracy’s
was replaced
by
the
traditional
governmental
iriitiati\e mainly the that of Prime Minister himself.
98
the
changed
of
The anti-bureaucratic attitudes of the MP
TOSIAD.'^^
resources
of
What happened was
inner circle and the debureaucratization
government took place.
well-comed
interests
as noted above the post-1980 developments
overall authority structure in government.
automization
traditional
role
the
the
was
in
elites,
By
early 1980s TUSIAD was advocating* policies which would
provide
cheap credits and bringing to the governments attention member companies
which
had
to
adapt to the new rules of the game imposed
by
the
new
pc'onomic stabi 1 izat ion program. ^^
Since the late 1970s
on
the
other
hand,
growth rates had continously increased.
the
volume of
public
investments
had
increased
and
the public had been investing for more than the
sector.
The
relative
share
of private sector in
the
But
also
private
total
fixed
capital investment decreased to 42.9 percent in 1985 from 45 percent
1984
remained
at the level of 42.9 percent in 1 9 8 6 . The
in
imbalance
had effects on government - business relation because of the variety
of
means which government could employ in their relations with the business
community.
vis-à-vis
Public
investments strengthened the hand of the government
business.
infrastructur‘e
and
It had been noted that MP government invested
communication both at the state level
through the municipalities.
of
half
of
the
as
well
in
as
Special off-budget funds with a net income
consolidated state budget
increase its discretionary spending of the
helped
MP
government
to
public funds for politically
advantageous purpose to maintain its center-right coalition.
Export-oriented
new
power
to
the
growth model of the post-1983 governments provided
governments
under
the
’’liberalization
program.”
Export incentives and tax rebates provided to the governments new
over
the
exporters*
incentives.
The 1984 ’’Export Promotion
means
Decree”
lodged the responsibility for to providing those incentives to the prime
minister’s office.
99
On
cheaper
tho
other
hand industrialists organized
credits and lower interest rates.
importance
wfiich
provided
opportunity for patronage.
it
the MP
with
in
Central
TUSIAD,
sought
bank credits gained
enormous
discretion
and
A report prepared for TUSIAD argued:
is true that in market economies the central banks do
have
passive
roles.
They are in
fact obliged to
economic
trends both in their own country
determine
the most appropriate medium and long-term
policies.
In order
central
banks
to perform these
should
have
and
not
monitor
abroad,
functions,
their autonomy
and
monetary
however,
from
the
govef'nment. ^
TUSIAD
pri^■ate
pi'oposed
a
new status for the Central Bank
so
that
the
sector would not be subject to politically motivated government
inteventions.
It is obvious that TUSIAD was pleased of the privileged
access to government but was unhappy about the unpredictability stemming
from the way the economy was run.
Furthermore,
should
The same report continued:
monetary
targets
the
Central Bank
has mind
be disclosed in the beginning of every year ad should
not be revise unless there is an absolute necessary.
absolutely
necessary for the private sector to
This is
effect
sound
investment planning. ^
From
policies
1985
as
stratiigy of
onwards TUSIAD became more critical of
came
Uie
to
have a critical place in the
government,
but at the same time
100
the
government
overalleconomic
TUSIAD
did
not
disagree
with
policy.
It
the
general
parameters of
the
government’s
was because of the very characteristics of
the
economic
relations
between TUSIAD and government which prevented TUSIAD openly so critical.
In
a
political and economic environment where political power
critical for the destruction or success of the firms,
way
for
TUSIAD,
industrialists,
this reason,
critical,
with
deepening
cleavage
is
the only possible
among
exports
seemed that of remaining loyal to the government.
and
For
pei'sonalized relations with government became extremely
It was a matter of survival.
Despite
the cleavages that arose among the member companies,
sectoral basis,
the measures
on
taken by the government was referred by
TUSIAD as the ’’necessary measures for the welfare of the country.
As Koçman,
chairman of TUSIAD in 1984,
said:
Different
preferences of various sectors will
birtli
the
to
debates.
But
we all know
continue
and
accept
give
the
necessity of placing emphasis on exports.
Koçman added.
If
the
there
model takes businessmen as the
should
not
be
differences
of
proponents of the model and businessmen.
that
a
creative
opinion
force
between
the
It is for this reason
dialogue between the two is more critical than
101
then
ever.
we
earnestly hope that the iôvernnient too would
think
along
and
rule”
the same lines.^^
There
were
strategy.
also complaints about government’s ’’divide
Istanbul Chamber of Industry stated:
...Who is the boss of export incentives?
in
the
State
Undersecretary
said
Organization
and
there
for Treasury and Foreign Trade.
is
the
It is
being
that a new office at the undersecretariat level will
formed.
divide
Planning
There is a coramitee
There
is an indeterminancy.
and rule.
policy-divide
That can not be.
and
rule.
be
Ankara is trying
That was
late
to
İnönü’s
We must be careful against
this,
and stick together.
’’Collaboration”
among
business
criticising
as
with
it
government has been
provided
government’s policies.
economic
the
favorite
advantages
In a study made by
strategy
compared
TUSIAD
to
which
covered selected among 6347 members of the Istanbul Chambers of Industry
(sample
represents a major portion of private sector in Turkey)
it was
found that some sort of governmental action was conceived necessary
for
the solution of tlie problems faced by the private sector.
1)
see Metin Heper,
’’The State,
Military and Democracy in Turkey,”
The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations
pp. 52-64.
102
9 (1987),
2)
Metin Heper,
"The State,
1983 Turkey,"
Political Party and Society in Post-
Government and Ooposition
25 (1990) pp. 321-
333.
3)
Metin
Heper,
1989,”
"Executive in the Third Turkish
Governance:
Administration
Republic,
1982-
International Journal of Policv and
3 (1990),
p. 308.
4)
Ibid.,
p. 307.
5)
Ibid.
6)
Sr-imev.,
7)
Elaborated by Metin Heper in "Interest Group Politics in Turkey:
K_i rk Haramiler.
p. 152.
A Theoretical Perspective."
Paper Presented for submission at
the International Conference "Government and Organized Interests."
(Zurich,
8)
Switzerland September 27-30).
Metin Heper,
Case,"
"The State and Debureaucratizations The Turkish
International Social Science Journal.
9)
Motherland Party Government Program,
10 )
Eric A Nordlinger,
Governments.
Ankara,
forthcoming.
1983.
Soldier in Politics Military Coups and
(Eaglewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977),
pp. 22-23.
11)
Heper,
Case,"
12)
"T)ie State and Debureaucratization:
The Turkish
typescript.
Ziya Onis,
"Evolution of Privatization in Turkey:
The
Institutional Context of Public Enterprises Reform" Paper
presented for submission at the Conference
and Society in Middle East,"
"Dynamics of State
Egypt June (1989),
103
p.l2.
13)
Gpxiis,
(Istanbul,
TUSIAD Publication)
14 September,
1986
and February 1986.
14)
see Önis,
"Evolution
of
Privatization
in
Turkey:
The
Institutional Context of Public Enterprises Reform."
15)
Heper,
"The State,
1983 Turkey,"
16)
Political Party and Society in Post-
typescript,
p. 12.
Heper,
"The State and Debureaucratizations: The Turkish
Case,"
typescript,
17)
Ibid.
18)
Heper,
p. 12.
"Interest Group Politics in Turkey:
A Theoretical
Perspective " typescript, p l2..
19)
Ibid.
20)
see Phillippe C. Schmitter,
Change in Brazil,
21)
Tercüman,
Interest Conflict and Political
(Stanford:
(Istanbul Daily) August 24,
was expressed by Cem Boyner,
(Istanbul Daily) June 24,
22)
Stanford University Press, 1971).
A Brief Who’s Who of Leading
TUSIAD Publications,
23)
Ibid.
24)
Ekonomide Kesimlerarasi Diyalog ve Şeffaflık;
TUSIAD,
1988).
25)
Ibid.
26)
Ibid. pp. I-II.
27)
Ibid.
Hürriyet
1990.
(Istanbul:
Japonya’daki Uygulama,"
A similar view
Chairman of TUSIAD,
TUSIAD Member’s Company Profiles’:
Turkish Companies,
1985.
p.l.
104
1984)
AT Ülkeleri ve
(Istanbul: TUSIAD Publications,
28i
Ibid, p .1.
29)
Ibid. p.2.
•İÜ)
Ibid. p.3.
31)
Ibid.
32)
Scott,
"Patron Client Politics and Political Change
in Southeast Asia."
33)
Görüş.
12 (November,
34)
Görüş.
14 (January,
35)
Ibid.
36)
Hürriyet (Istanbul Daily)
37)
Görüş,
38)
Görüş. 17 (January 1989).
39)
Ibid.
40)
Hürriyet,
41)
"TUSIAD
1986).
July 28,
1987.
18 (January 1990).
June 24,
member’s
Publications).
42)
1989).
1990.
Company
profiles,"
Also Yeşim Arat
"Kamu Bürokrasisi",
TUSIAD,
(Istanbul:
"Politics and Big Business", typescript.
(Istanbul:
1983).
43)
Görüş,
13 (March 1985),
14 (February 1986) and 8 (August
1987).
44/
Arat,
45)
Ibid.
46)
'loksöz,
47)
(lörüş,
48)
Ibid.
typescript,
p. 12.
Tyxkey to 1992: Missing Another Chance, p. 51.
18 IJanuary 1990).
105
TUSIAD
■19)
Ibid.
50)
Görüş
51)
Ibid.
52)
Cumhuriyet,
53)
Esmer Y,
12 (.
Fisek H.,
F
Kalaycıoğlu, E.,
Sorunları:
S
orunları:
Öncelikler,
İstanbul:
(İstanbul:
Özmucur,
Beklentiler ve Çözümler,
106
1987).
S., İş Dünyasının
TUSIAD,
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The
present
essay
aims of providing a set of
arguments
on
the
exchange relationship between the central governmental authorities and a
politically
relevant
relationship
there
group,^ namely
may
TUSIAD.
be different patterns
In
each
this
exchange
corresponding
distinct forms of the government-group structurations (1) "The
may
domiiifitc
or
control the "politically
government and politically relevant group "may be relatively
activity
group
(4)
but
of
"a
"The
group"(3)
power:
the domination
group"{2)
mav
in
under
government
govcrniiieni
equ; 1
be
relevant
to
politically
each capable of maintaing a sphere
government may be autonomous
from
of
relevant
independent
politically relevant
associations may effectively influence the
relevant
public
policies.^
It
- group
political
iias been suggested that the last three categories of government
relations had stemmed from the experience of
systems
and refer to
"state
corporatism,
(societal corporatism) and pluralism respectively.
lias
been
polity.
there
suggested
as
Western
the one which fits
best
European
neo-corporatism
The first category
the
Ottoman-Turkish
The distinctiveness of the latter polity lies in the fact that
emerged
interest,
an autonomous government having tenuous
groups'*
interiiied iai V s:;>cial
in
the
absence of
structures.
107
corporate
and
relations
with
autonomous
and
Th^.* relationship between successive governments and TUSIAD has gone
through
forms
t)ecause
of
different
from those
the respective periods.
issues
in
power
the
government
before
experienced
the
nature
of
effected the ’’tone" of
the
the
industrialist,
who
The
organized
in TLSIAD in 1971 originated from the role the state
the management of the economy.
some
associations
and drew limit of TUSIAD’s influence on public policy.^
of
control
business
On the other hand,
which TL'SIAD was involved in,
themselves
in
other
the economic and political changes that Turkey
during
dialogue
of
Government tried to
played
maintain
its
which
led
o\‘*r business associations through certain means,
of the students of Turkish politics to analyse the above mentioned
relationship
in
terms
of
corporatism and pluralism.
that
pluralist
coexisted
and
two models of
Thus,
corporatist
in modern Turkey.
interest
group
politics
Bianchi arrived to the conclusion
forms
Moreover,
of
interest
representation
Bianchi asserted that
there
exists a tendency of the consolidation of the latter.^
Above,
making
business
it
through
and/or
participants
in
was
noted that corporatism is a pattern
institutionalized
labor
contacts
organizations.
decision-making
are
between
The relative
determined
by
of
policy-
government
status
of
’’law.”
corporatism, policy is made through collaboration between the state
groups; in the pluralist version such formal institutionalized
are absent.
108
and
the
In
and
contacts
The
formal-legal design of TOBB seemed to justify one to
designate
the relationship between the state and groups as corporatism.
uncertainity
generated
environmetit,
doubt
by
the
continuously,
system made the system less corporatist,
the
first
state
place.
in
changing
a reflection of praetorian polity of the
on the validity of that conclusion.
But the
political
1970s,
casts
Fragmentation of the
party
if it was a corporatist one in
As it was suggested "the nature and autonomy of
Turkey
also means that the cost of being out
of
the
power
are
extremely liigh.
Because of high degree of governmental centralization
and
of
large
role
the Turkish
government have access,
state
in
the
economy,
those
in
directly or indirectly to an immense amount of
resources in relation to the resource base of society,
which they' can
distribute.
The
decade
saliance
of
of
small
the
1970s was
parties where political
survival were closely interrelated.
is
further
manii)ulate
characterized
power
by
and
the
increasing
organizational
In an economy where private sector
diversified the parties would have more effective means
the
situation.
In contrast to the
corporatist
to
principle
which postulates organized linkage between the state and group the 1970s
were
characterized by fragraentalized forms of interest
Conflicts
Commerce
within TOBB,
plus
commitment
the
actors
to
the
representation.
between Chambers of Industry and Chambers
emergence
of a new
type
of
of
bureaucrat®
with
changing political goals and the informal links
between
renders the corporatist model inappropriate to
situation in Turkey of the 1970s.
define
the
Informal contacts between government
109
and
the members of private sector became even more salient
during
the
1980s.
TL'SIAD’s
on
foundation in 1971,
the business side of the game.
signified an important development
Alongside the compulsory
group
associations,
TUSIAD emerged as the first
group
association.
In
fragmentation
the
state
a
decade
of
interest
voluntary
debilitating
interest
democracy
with
and polarization of the polity and the gradual erosion of
power
and decomposition of
the
government,
TUSIAD
has
undertaken unto itsc'lf the mission of eliminating the uncertainities
so
generated.
Tliese years witnessed the emergence of RPP’s left-of-center policy.
TUSIAD
hoped
that RPP could control the militant worker
movement
bring about some order to otherwise a very confused situation.
and
That is
why initially TUSIAD has not adopted a confrontationist strategy against
this Social Democratic Party.
part
of
When RPP could not stop militancy on the
worker’s movement and in fact seemed to encourage
it,
there
occurred the "TUSIAD-RPP confrontation" in 1979.
Even
pluralism,
to
with
though
during
these
years tliere
was
a
certain
degree
of
tlie autonomy of groups varied depending upon to their links
government.
TUSIAD,
as a voluntary interest group
association,
independent resources and organization skills of its own was
to distance itself from the political parties.
no
able
Ill
general terms,
however,
TUSIAD-government relations till 1979
were characterized by government initiate and TÜSIAD reaction.
sound
It may
a paradox to talk about government initiative with the erosion of
governmental power.
Government initiative meant that in its relation
to
newly emerging groups,
the
latter.
which
they
governments could establish control
Government continued to have control over
could
perspecL ivf-,
always divert to this or
RPP*s
hope
that
the
group.
over
resources
From
this
to mobilize the labor movement through
party apparatus and JP ’s reaction to Erbakan in the latter’s attempt
find
new clients among the Union members were typical types of
its
to
control
mechanisms and interaction patterns between political parties and social
groups.
This particular strategy on the part of successive governments
viewed
somewhat differently by TUSIAD as compared to reaction of
was
other
business associations TUSIAD tolarated Social Democrat - labor alignment
at least until 1979.
a
political
Stability
With the breakdown of the alignment last hopes for
stability
and predictability have gone
down
the
and predictability were indispensable for the economic
drain.
growth
model advocated by TUSIAD.^
TUSIAD
also
tried
to bring some order to the
private sector vis-à-vis the government.
eliminate
the
fragmentation.
Thus,
convene the Free Enterprise Council.
Ill
Here,
representation
too,
of
it wanted
to
TUSIAD took the initiative
to
During the 1970s, governments* role in the economy was conceived as
supporting
private
sector as long as they contributed to the
growth as designated by the governments.
arguments
developed
economic policy.
groups.
be
by
RPP
economic
TUSIAD’s reaction to
and NSP led TUSIAD searching
etatist
for
a
new
RPP’s philosophy led to attempts to create new social
People’s sector was the prominent example.
If the policy could
implemented newgroups in question would have an
easy
access
to
government compared to the there existing business associations.
TUSIAD
RPP.
did
Still,
not show resistance to the new policies
developed
it was not considered a partner in policy-making.
by
It did
not have formal and institutionalized access to the government.
P\)l lowing
government
the
in
restructuration
TUSIAD
1979,
of
confrontation with
the
social
TUSIAD’s first item on its agenda
the state,
and political order.
there was a need for a strong state.
labor-Social
social
severe
Democrat
was
that
of
According
to
It was for
alignment was seen as a necessity
democrat
this
for
peace so that newly emerged groups could be smoothly
reason
securing
integrated
to the political system.
Wheji
the military intervened in September 12,
stabilization
implemented.
of
the
program
advocated
by
TUSIAD
began
1980 the economic
to
be
strictly
In 1981 the status of the Association was changed to that
an association working for the public interest by the
Council of Ministers.
decision
of
But the nature of relations between TUSIAD
112
and
authorized agents of the state still remained cool
and
therefore,
personalistic and informal.
From 1980 onwards,
TUSIAD became a "peak association" among other
business organizations.
The political goal for TUSIAD turned out to be
t.lie formation of a center-right coalition.
The p o s t - 1980 jjeriod was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the emergence o f an inner
ex ec u t i v e c i r c l e
in government.
p o l i t i c a l exer;utive,
making
became
government
an
With the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f power in the
dominated by a small group,
a c t i v i t y which TUSIAD could not e a s i l y i n f l u e n c e .
contributed
to
the
c le ava ges that
betwi>(>n e xpo rt er s and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s .
rules
turned
the economic p o l i c y
out
arose
within
The
TUSIAD,
The d i s c r e t i o n a r y a p p l i c a t i o n o f
to be the means f o r f o s t e r i n g the
fragmentation
of
implementation
of
i n t e r e s t s represented through the A s s o c i a t i o n .
In
addition,
economic
lack
of
coordination
in
the
policies formulated by the inner circle,
and bureaucracy out of the picture.
let the
ministries
The latter were no longer
points
to which it was wortwhile to have access.
In
the
post-1980
period,
although
institutionalize its relations with government
continued
to
relations
personal
to be a more effective channel to transmit
the relevant governmental agents.
of
clientalia type.
TUSIAD
informal
to
connections
specific demands
The result was sets of informal
The inner circle exploited
pattern of interaction with members of the private sector.
hand,
tried
such
a
On the one
channels increased the importance of the inner circle.
113
At
the
Not
same time it enabled them to manipulate
able
with
to do anything else for the most
the
inner
government
circle.
clients
part,
more
TUSIAD
Sabotaging of the economic
easily.
cooperated
policy
of
was never thought of because of the multiplicity of
the
rewards
that go\ernment could bestow.
Ill
fact,
criterion
loyalty to the center-right ideology of the MP became a
for privileged access to resources.
circle
largely
subordinated TUSIAD to its
TUSIAD
called for predictability,
The
inner
wishes.
executive
However,
institutionalized
still
contacts,
and
consensus on tlie parameters of the economic policy making.
It
can be suggested that interest group-state interface in
hardly
developed
lines.
As
it
through
was
corporatist,
emphasized
neocorporatist
’’...the
absence
or
of
Turkey
pluralist
powerful,
economically dominant interests able to capture the state and use it for
their own purposes and the weakness or absence of corporate intermediary
structures,
First,
had
it
important consequences for subsequent
modernization.
led to what is known as the ‘autonomy of the state* meaning
that the state apparatus is not captive or handmaiden of any
social
that
class,
can
change,
autonomous
capacity
but
state,
to
possess sufficient autonomy to
eliminate
unhampered
accumulate
or create
by
class
114
decisions,
relationships.
corporate structures
and expand political
modernization of society.
make
particular
power
and
has
bring
This
a
high
about
The
praetorian politics of the 1970’s prevented the emergences
neither corporatism nor neocorporatism.
of
For corporatist forms to emerge
the
’’minimal condition” is ’’coopérâtion” rather than ’’confrontation.”^^
The
restructuration
debureaucratization
of the state during the 1980s accompanied
of the government led to the emergence of an
executive which dominated policy-making.
hardly
impringe
on
the
inner
interest groups could
alone
participate
In contrast the government
which groups to support (exporters).
though
Thus,
government (pluralism) let
decision-making (neo-corporatism).
clients’
by
in
decided
Exporters became the *government’s
they too at any moment could be faced
with
decision
that would have adversely affected their interests.
1)
The phrase was borrowed from banning in order to illustrate the
’’actual” place of TUSIAD in the political arena.
relevancy in the political system,
of course,
TUSIAD’s
depends on the
nature of its exchange with the central governmental agencies.
But it is also apparent that through the reports and/or speeches
of the predominant figures,
it has some impact on the governments
and sometimes determines the political agenda.
Cumhuriyet May 30,
2)
Metin Heper,
1990,
May 31,
Ibid.
4)
Ibid.
1990 and June 1,
see
1990.
’’Interest Group Politics in Turkey: A Theoretical
Per’spective^ ” typescript.
3)
For example,
115
5)
In his
discussion of pattens of government and business relations
in USA Theodore Lowi pointed out that the "type of issue" affects
the government - business relations Lowi argued that in different
areas one would to different patterns decision-making across the
proposed that not only there existed different patterns in
different patterns of influence and locus of power.
Theodore Lowi,
’’American Business,
Studies and Political Tlieory,"
1964),
6)
Bianchi,
see
Public Policy, Case
World Politics
16 (July
pp. 677-715.
Interest Groups and Political Development ij)
Turkey.
7)
Turan,
’’Stages of Political Development."
8)
Heper,
’’Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişme Sürecinde Bürokrasi:
Bir Tipoloji ve Bazı Düşünceler.”
9)
As already noted,
the measures taken after the 1971 coup by
communique gave the first
signs of the shift towards a new
pattern of economic growth.
10)
Ozbudun "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey:
Crises Interruptions and Reequilibration,”
11)
Metili Heper,
"Interest Group
Pe rspec tive"
typescript.
116
p. 39.
Politics in Turkey: A Theoretical
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13D

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