Too Soon to Turn Away - International Rescue Committee

Transcription

Too Soon to Turn Away
Security, Governance and Humanitarian Need
in the Central African Republic
International Rescue Committee | JULY 2015
Too Soon to Turn Away
Security, Governance and Humanitarian Need
in the Central African Republic
International Rescue Committee | JULY 2015
Table of Contents
2
Executive Summary
4Introduction
8Insecurity
11Governance
15 Humanitarian Need
21Risk
25 Roadmap Forward
27Conclusion
29Recommendations
33Appendices
IRC Report Caveats
From the Field: Messages to the International Community
IRC-SAIS Research Methodology & Limitations
The IRC in CAR
38Endnotes
40Acknowledgments
FRONT COVER: A
boy with a homemade toy gun near Kaga Bandoro, Central African Republic.
OPPOSITE PAGE: An
elderly Muslim woman, displaced by sectarian violence, sheltering
at Bangui’s main mosque.
©2015 International Rescue Committee | 122 East 42ND Street, New York, NY 10168 | Rescue.org
Executive Summary
The Central African Republic (CAR) has been unstable since its independence from
France in 1960 and is one of the least-developed countries in the world. It has endured
a succession of coups and decades of misrule and lawlessness.
Progress toward stability in the country was made between
2008 and 2012, but hope for a long-lasting peace was
dashed in March 2013 when the Séléka Muslim rebel
alliance overthrew the government of President François
Bozizé and subsequently fractured into militias that
exacted terror on Christian communities. Anti-balaka
Christian self-defense groups sought retribution on Muslim
communities and the country descended into ethnic and
sectarian violence, with thousands fleeing their homes
and the United Nations warning of a high risk of genocide.
Only the intervention of French troops and an expanded
UN peacekeeping force—and the efforts of international
humanitarian aid agencies—prevented CAR from further
descending into anarchy and humanitarian catastrophe.
By May 2015, the worst of the crisis seemed to be over.
Indeed, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC),
which comprises all major humanitarian agencies inside
and outside the UN system, removed CAR from its list
of “Level 3 Emergencies”—the UN’s highest designation
for a humanitarian crisis. However, the UN humanitarian
appeal for CAR is dangerously underfunded. As of May, only
$129.6 million of the $613 million proposed for humanitarian
aid for 2015—just 21 percent—has been met.1 Once again,
CAR seems destined to fade from the news and the focused
attention of policymakers, meaning that it may never emerge
from its decades-long cycle of failed governance, insecurity
and human suffering. As the UN’s humanitarian coordinator,
Claire Bourgeois, stated, “We must prevent the Central
African Republic from becoming a forgotten crisis… The
current funding for the strategic humanitarian response does
not allow us to ensure the protection of all these displaced
persons or to provide the minimum of what is needed to meet
the huge humanitarian needs.”2
It would be a critical mistake for the international community
to be lulled into thinking that stability has returned to the
country. Conflict and insecurity continue to be the defining
feature of life in CAR. The state has collapsed and armed
groups rule the countryside, challenging each other and
the shaky Transitional Government (TG) based in Bangui,
the capital. The national army and police force are underequipped, lack training and cannot ensure the population’s
safety or security.
2
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is issuing this
report with the intention of refocusing attention on the needs
of the Central African people as well as on the obstacles
the IRC and other humanitarian agencies are experiencing
in trying to aid the population. The report is based on field
research in CAR and draws on surveys and interviews with
85 conflict-affected Central Africans.3 Additionally, the IRC,
with support provided by a research team from the Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS), has projected what humanitarian need in
CAR could look like in two key areas—food security and
shelter—if insecurity persists and funding requirements are
not met. The combination of field research and this analysis
has led to the following key findings:
Chronic insecurity, misrule and failed governance are
the biggest obstacles to meeting the humanitarian
needs of Central Africans. Central Africans themselves
cite these problems as reason for skepticism that the
country will manage peaceful elections and transition
to a new government.
The impact of humanitarian assistance is muted by
the lack of comprehensive investment designed to bring
stability to the country and support long-term institution
building. Humanitarian assistance is desperately needed
and blunts the impact of the crisis on Central Africans,
but it is only palliative.
For the international community to make a difference
it must employ everything in its tool kit to ensure stability
—diplomacy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian and
development assistance.
The international community cannot afford to wait for
ideal conditions to lay the groundwork for CAR’s future.
It must take an approach that allows for security and
good-governance to take root while significantly increasing
investment to meet humanitarian needs. The international
community should seize a superb opportunity right now. In
May 2015, parties to the conflict, religious and traditional
leaders, and members of civil society adopted The
Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and
Reconstruction, at the close of a long-awaited national peace
dialogue, the Bangui Forum. Donors, humanitarian agencies
and the International Contact Group on the Central African
Republic, in tandem with CAR’s Transitional Government,
Security, Governance and Humanitarian Need in the Central African Republic
can meet humanitarian needs and stabilize the country by
lending their full diplomatic and financial support to this pact,
an investment in the rebirth of a stable nation governed
by effective, inclusive and accountable institutions. Failing
to support it will inevitably lead to new and expensive
chapters for both Central Africans and those who endeavor
to assist them.
Summary of Recommendations
Invest in efforts to reduce insecurity,
impunity and violence
Insecurity continues to shape life in the Central African
Republic. This instability disrupts markets, destroys
communities and causes people to flee their homes.
Every effort must be made to create a secure environment
where citizens do not live in fear and can lead productive
lives. The UN peacekeeping mission in CAR (MINUSCA)
must be fully staffed and resourced. State authority should
be extended across the country by establishing public
security infrastructure such as courts, prisons and police
services that respect the rights of civilians. Significant efforts
must be made to swiftly disarm, demobilize and reintegrate
combatants from all sides of the conflict to prevent ongoing
violence in communities. As efforts are being made to
create basic security, international humanitarian donors
should prioritize funding for conflict-sensitive programs
that prevent and respond to violence against civilians,
particularly women and children.
Create conditions that facilitate the delivery
of humanitarian assistance
Even with a reduction in violence from the peak of the recent
crisis in CAR, a humanitarian catastrophe continues to
unfold. Despite the deactivation of the “Level 3” emergency
status, humanitarian assistance is still desperately needed
and nearly 900,000 people remain displaced. Every effort
must be made to extend life-saving assistance and basic
services to conflict-affected Central Africans, including
to those in areas far outside Bangui. Donor governments
should not turn away from humanitarian needs prematurely
and should fully fund humanitarian appeals. The Transitional
Government of CAR in turn should remove unnecessary
obstacles to humanitarian operations. It should not delay
humanitarian materials in customs and should restore
the tax-exempt status of international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs).
A Central African woman, Kaga Bandoro.
Support the establishment of
effective, inclusive and accountable
government institutions
Prior to the conflict, the ability of the state to provide basic
services like education and health to its population was
weak. Central Africans had very little direct ability to hold
their government accountable or shape the decisions it
made. Donors and international financial institutions should
work with the Transitional and future governments in CAR
to overcome these challenges by strengthening the ability
of the state to manage public resources and provide basic
services. The social contract between citizens and their
government should also be strengthened through increased
information sharing, expanded spaces for dialogue between
people and the state, and new opportunities for participatory
decision-making.
Set CAR on a path toward sustained recovery
and development
Without lasting peace, it will be impossible to move beyond
the humanitarian crisis in CAR. Sustained diplomatic
engagement with the Transitional Government and parties
to the conflict is critical to breaking out of an endless
cycle of violence and poverty. The international community
must seize upon the Republican Pact for Peace, National
Reconciliation and Reconstruction. Funding should be
aligned to areas of the Pact that are critical to resolving the
crisis and establishing a path to a better future: governance,
economic and social development, justice and reconciliation,
and peace and security. The Transitional Government should
continue to consult with an ever-widening array of civilsociety representatives to develop, implement and evaluate
plans that emerge from the Pact.
Security, Governance and Humanitarian Need in the Central African Republic 3
Introduction
The Central African Republic (CAR) has been marred by
corruption, poor governance and chronic instability, all of
which have contributed to the country’s cyclical violence
and stagnation.4 The latest conflict, triggered by a coup
d’état in late 2012—the country’s fifth since independence
in 1960—plunged CAR deeper into crisis and increased
the need for humanitarian aid. The state, already dubbed a
phantom state,5 failed. One of the world’s worst humanitarian
emergencies unfolded, with 6,000 people dead and nearly
one million displaced.6 The already fragile health system
collapsed, with 42 percent of facilities damaged, 50 percent
looted and 68 percent experiencing a shortage of medicine.7
Significant declines in harvests and livestock8 have impacted
the income of over three-fourths of CAR’s agricultural
workers, as well as the food security of the entire population.
The international community, from diplomatic corps to
militaries to humanitarian aid agencies, has mobilized
to halt the violence, create the conditions for dialogue
between armed rivals, and deliver lifesaving assistance
to Central Africans. Starting in 2013, French, European
Union (EU) and African Union (AU) troops, as well as
UN peacekeepers, deployed to CAR to protect civilians.
In July 2014, international mediators facilitated a ceasefire
agreement, known as the Brazzaville Accord. Donors
and their partners have delivered at least $493 million
in humanitarian assistance.9
By early 2015, the crisis appeared to be abating; EU troops
withdrew and the French began to draw down their military
presence. In April 2015, the Transitional Government (TG)
held grassroots consultations to query the general public
on their views on reconciliation. This culminated in May
in a national peace dialogue dubbed the Bangui Forum,
which adopted “The Republican Pact for Peace, National
Reconciliation and Reconstruction,” a roadmap for peace
and sustainable development. As a result of these positive
developments, CAR could be in a position to hold national
and legislative elections by the close of 2015.
Conflict background
In March 2013, a coalition of predominantly Muslim
rebels, the Séléka alliance, ousted President
Bozizé, bringing Michel Djotodia to power. Djotodia
subsequently lost control of the alliance as it fractured
into multiple militias that embarked on a campaign
of terror against Christian communities. Due to the
complete breakdown in law and order, Christian
self-defense groups, known as the Anti-balaka
(AB), sought retribution against Muslim communities,
going on a “campaign of ethnic cleansing,” as
described by the International Commission of Inquiry.
At the apex of the crisis (late 2013/early 2014), the
French launched Operation Sangaris, deploying
1,600 troops to support the 3,700 MISCA (the AU’s
International Support Mission to CAR) troops on
the ground. President Djotodia resigned and current
interim-president Samba-Panza was elected. By
September 2014, power was transferred from MISCA
to MINUSCA, a multidimensional UN peacekeeping
operation with a mandate to protect civilians.
In July 2014, Séléka and Anti-balaka signed
a ceasefire agreement, the Brazzaville Accord, eliciting
international support for CAR’s transition toward
durable political, security and humanitarian solutions
(via the International Contact Group on the Central
African Republic).
In May 2015, the Bangui Forum was held, bringing all
national stakeholders to the table to set forth a plan
for reconciliation and sustainable peace. Elections are
due to take place by the end of 2015.
These events indicate progress toward peace. Yet stability
remains elusive. The Brazzaville Accord was not recognized
by factions of armed groups and thus not fully implemented.
Despite the deployment of international forces and the
installment of a transitional government, insurgent groups
continue to burn, loot and murder, creating new chaos
throughout the country. Nearly 900,000 people—20 percent
of the total population—remain displaced. Until a strategy
and concomitant funding are in place for the realization of
the new Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation
4
and Reconstruction (hereafter referred to as the Pact),
CAR’s political direction may remain uncertain, causing
continued instability.
Despite this prognosis, humanitarian funding has dropped
well below what is required to meet the immense and
growing needs of those affected by the crisis. As of May, only
$129.6 million of the $613 million proposed for humanitarian
aid for 2015—just 21 percent—has been funded.10 The
drop in humanitarian funding reflects a lack of international
attention to CAR and could signal a growing complacency
with regard to humanitarian needs facing the country.
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is issuing this
report with the intention of refocusing attention on the needs
of the Central African people and on the efforts to stabilize
the country by strategically investing in the Pact. The IRC
sought answers to the following questions:
Is CAR emerging from crisis and moving toward stability?
Are the needs of people affected by crisis in CAR
being met?
What are the main challenges to meeting
humanitarian needs?
An IRC survey conducted shortly after the grassroots
consultations found that many displaced and conflictaffected Central Africans strongly questioned whether
the country is undergoing a positive transition.11 (The
consultations were carried out in all 16 of CAR’s prefectures,
but the effort elicited only 4,000 interviews, or a mere
.08 percent of the population.) Central Africans, at least
those responding to interviews, felt that their participation
in CAR’s peace process has been nearly nonexistent; they
did not view the Bangui Forum as a harbinger of peace when
large-scale disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
(DDR) of combatants had yet to take place—a process
they gave top priority. The Central Africans interviewed
overwhelmingly said they desire security first, then a political
process toward peace. In fact, despite assertions to the
contrary from members of the international community, there
is little indication that Central Africans are returning home
from refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps12
and it remains a question whether the country is truly on a
path to sustainable recovery.
Sadly, the conditions that gave rise to the conflict continue
to exist. A hollow state created discontent among
the disenfranchised, resulting in cyclical violence and
Elderly men and women participate in a meeting held by a local women’s association, Bocaranga, Ouham Pendé.
Introduction (continued)
humanitarian crises. The TG currently lacks authority:
warring parties continue to vie for control, weapons freely
circulate and banditry is rampant. Not only does the
population remain at risk, but the humanitarian community
faces tremendous obstacles to deliver basic aid because
of the country’s lawlessness.
Robust investment in efforts to reduce insecurity,
impunity and violence.
Concerted action to create conditions that facilitate
the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Resolute support for the establishment of effective,
inclusive and accountable government institutions.
Despite the skepticism of many Central Africans, the Pact
that emerged from the Bangui Forum offers an opportunity
for dialogue and for the international community to ramp
up its efforts at a critical moment—while understanding
that aid is not a long-term solution. A coherent approach
to CAR must include:
Prolonged commitment to set CAR on a path toward
long-term recovery and development.
A holistic approach to the crisis in CAR must address
the obstacles that humanitarian agencies face in meeting
the needs of conflict-affected people while working toward
long-term stability.
Displacement Figures, May 2015
SUDAN
1,300
94,024
VAKAGA
CHAD
2,700
BAMINGUI BANGORAN
SOUTH SUDAN
15,100
7,300
OUHAM-PENDÉ
82,500
HAUTE-KOTTO
26,300
NANA-GRIBIZI
OUHAM
64,800
6,500
15,700
OUAKA
HAUTMBOMOU
KEMO
18,700
11,000
NANA-MAMBÉRÉ
MBOMOU
48,400
OMBELLA-M’POKO
6,700
BASSEKOTTO
22,200
MAMBÉRÉ-KADEI
35,200
LOBAYE
58,700
Bangui
2,900
SANGHAMBAÉRÉ
247,245
CAMEROON
97,195
26,704
CONGO
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO
Source: IDMC and OCHA
6
A Sample of Central African Voices
he war is not over, as one can see in Kaga
T
Bandoro. There is a lethargy vis-à-vis the CAR.
The international community is mobilizing for
Boko Haram, but what about us?
—LOCAL AUTHORITY
ecurity Council Resolution 2127 has not
S
resulted in anything! There are still killings.
Why isn’t MINUSCA doing its job? I was a
refugee in Cameroon and I have only been back
in Bocaranga for 44 days. I want to see 2127
applied here.
– MUSLIM RETURNEE
e came here because we were scared;
W
when DDR happens in all the neighborhoods
and the situation gets better, each and every
one of us will be ready to go home … I have
no desire to be here; I want to go home but
I can’t because there is no DDR.
I am a bit confused by the elections calendar.
The census is not yet done and the people
are not yet disarmed. … This is critical. Recall
that the current crisis was set off by the 2011
elections. There was trickery. … So we need
a process, a real and coherent way to organize
the new elections so we don’t descend into
crisis again with accusations of trickery or
nonparticipation.
– LOCAL AUTHORITY
e said we are happy with the consultation
W
but this is not the case. We could have another
conflict right away. Our representatives lied.
– IRC STAFF MEMBER
– IDP IN BANGUI
I have no faith in the Bangui Forum; this is not
our first dialogue … the recommendations were
never applied.
– COMMUNITY LEADER
ill our vote count? No one in Cameroon
W
talked to us about elections. We felt totally
excluded from everything—the election process,
the peace process. People are sensitized here
but no one is going to refugee camps [to get
our opinions].
– MUSLIM RETURNEE
Zianabu Djoguel. President of the Hand in Hand Women’s Association of
Koui, Koui, Ouaham Pendé.
Insecurity
Conflict in CAR has decreased since 2013, due in part
to the deployment of international forces. The current
peacekeeping operation, the UN’s Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA), has played an important role in civilian
security, from proactive efforts to dislodge armed elements
from government buildings, to passive protection offered by
the mere presence of police and military staff. The mission,
however, faces significant challenges, including a slow scaleup,13 limited logistical resources, and a lack of government
counterparts, all of which have had direct repercussions on
MINUSCA’s ability to implement its protection-of-civilians
strategy—particularly in regard to DDR. MINUSCA and its
military predecessors (MISCA, Operation Sangaris, EUFOR)
have encountered resistance and violent attacks during
disarmament attempts. A new DDR agreement was only
signed in May 2015; its viability is yet to be determined.
Conflict Incident Trends
Year
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
Monthly Average
88
42
7
1.2
13
MINUSCA’s actions have improved security in the country,
but the number of conflict-related incidents (as tracked
by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project,
or ACLED), remains too high to describe conditions as
stabilizing. The number of incidents in 2015 (through
end of April)14 stands at 123, an average of 31 per month,15
far exceeding the level of conflict prior to the onset of this
crisis in 2013.
8
According to humanitarian agencies, as well as Central
Africans themselves (the IRC interviewed program
beneficiaries), CAR remains plagued by:
Border insecurity: Militia groups, including armed
Chadians, continue to launch cross-border raids;
there have been multiple reports of elements of the
Chadian National Army attacking villages in CAR.
Transhumance-related battles:16 Pastoralists and
farmers continue to clash over local resources such
as pasturelands.
Ongoing conflicts: Authorities are trying to
reestablish presence over ex-Séléka and other
armed elements; violence continues between existing
and new non-state actors.
Banditry and criminality: Individuals and former militia
members continue to capitalize on the security vacuum
and absence of rule of law to attack and pillage villages,
service-center points (health posts, religious sites,
charitable organizations, etc.) and transport vehicles.
Lack of a functioning police service: Absence of a
police force whose mission and purpose is to provide
rule of law and protect citizens.
For Central Africans, the breakdown of law and order in the
country is a matter of life and death and fuels displacement.
Recent displacement trends underscore that violence in
CAR has not subsided. Conflict-related incidents have gone
down drastically in comparison to 2014, but the overall
displacement figure still hovers just below 900,000, roughly
84 percent of what it was at the peak of the violence in
January 2014. While the number of IDPs has decreased
significantly (to 436,119) since the height of the conflict, the
number of new refugees flowing into neighboring countries
has increased (to 460,542 as of mid-May 2015).17, 18
Overlaying IDP displacement figures with data on the
number of conflict-related incidents shows a notable trend:
displacement levels rose sharply on the heels of increased
conflict and decreased sharply when conflict-related
incidents dropped after January 2014. Several factors
influence IDP numbers. While it is unknown if the reduction
in IDPs is due to individuals either going home or becoming
refugees, the trend shows a positive correlation between
conflict and IDP numbers, meaning that conflict will need
to be staunched in order to prevent further displacement.
250
800,000
200
700,000
600,000
150
500,000
400,000
100
300,000
200,000
50
IDPs
GRAPH 1
APR 2015
FEB 2015
MAR 2015
JAN 2015
DEC 2014
NOV 2014
SEP 2014
OCT 2014
JUL 2014
AUG 2014
JUN 2014
APR 2014
MAY 2014
FEB 2014
MAR 2014
0
JAN 2014
100,000
DEC 2013
Number of Central African IDPs
900,000
0
Number of Conflict-Related Incidents
Graph 1: IDP Numbers in Relation to
Number of Conflict-Related Incidents
Conflict-Related Incidents
This graph overlays ACLED’S conflict-related incident numbers
with OCHA IDP figures
Since the height of the conflict in January 2014, over
300,000 more refugees have sought safety in countries
neighboring CAR. Continued lawlessness in the country,
and refugee outflows, could have adverse security
implications in a region already plagued by conflict and
violence. It has long been feared that the current security
vacuum, coupled with a near total absence of law and order,
might lead to fertile terrain for terrorist groups such as Boko
Haram. While this has not materialized, the humanitarian
community has seen a worrying encroachment of the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) into CAR. In 2014, LRA attacks and
abductions in CAR increased compared to 2012 and 2013.
As the Uganda People’s Defense Force, with backing from
the United States, has pursued the LRA in southeastern CAR,
the insurgents have moved further north and west. In the
first three months of 2015, tracked incidents decreased;
however, this may be a short-lived trend.19 It may be partially
attributable to the fact that the LRA has moved into areas
where LRA crisis watchers are not active, and civilians may
not be able to identify which armed group is attacking them.20
Insecurity in Numbers
436,119
18
More than 36,000
The estimated number of armed
ex-Séléka currently making up the three factions of
the former coalition.25
The number of people
displaced within the country, living in fear of violence
and human-rights violations.21
The number of people trapped in seven enclaves with limited
access to basic services and at risk of violence and abuse.22
1,455
The number of security incidents recorded
since January 2014, of which 166 (or 11 percent) were direct
violence against humanitarians. In April 2015, 127 security
incidents were recorded, with 17 percent against aid workers
(specifically, humanitarian worker kidnappings).23
The number of aid workers killed between
January 2014 and January 2015.24
12,000
75,000
The estimated number of anti-Balaka
members distributed across the country, according to
their leaders, though some sources put the figure as
low as 20,000.26
10
Governance
CAR arguably has suffered a governance crisis since the
country’s independence in 1960. Indeed, as far back as
2007, the International Crisis Group (ICG) labeled CAR
a “phantom state…lacking any meaningful institutional
capacity at least since the fall of Emperor Bokassa in 1979.”
This underscores that the current crisis is not new, but
embedded in decades of governance failure. The governance
crisis has become more acute and is manifesting itself in
the following ways:
e don’t feel the efforts of the government
W
here in Ouham Pendé. It feels as if we are
abandoned. We have no resources to do
our work, no police, no office, nothing.
—PUBLIC SERVANT, BOCARANGA
Erosion of legitimate authority: Central Africans spoke
of feeling “abandoned by the government.” Despite the
strides made by the TG with the support of MINUSCA,
authorities have not been deployed to many of the country’s
prefectures. In addition, armed groups have threatened or
engaged in battle with foreign security actors to impede
the establishment of a government presence. Where
authorities have been deployed, many serve as figureheads.
For example, in Bocaranga, the sous-préfet (the equivalent
of a local governor) has no resources or mechanisms to
carry out his work. The gendarmerie (military police station)
remains burnt and pillaged.
e were assigned here in 2013 but we have
W
just gotten to our posts because of serious
financial difficulties. We had no transport,
so we had to hitchhike to get here; the last
time we had access to vehicles was during
Bokassa’s tenure.
—GENDARMES
Inability to provide public services: From beneficiaries
to community leaders to other key informants, the
overwhelming majority of Central Africans interviewed
described a near total absence of public services. When
queried on quality education, health, legal services and
management of natural resources, interviewees referenced
INGOs as the expected provider of those services, and
mentioned the need for more INGOs in CAR. These beliefs
are reinforced by the fact that in some places INGOs are
subsidizing the salaries of health workers. The absence of a
functioning state and good governance has led some Central
Africans to fundamentally misunderstand the role of the
state in regard to basic services for citizens.
The roads haven’t been fixed in over 50 years.
—WOMEN’S GROUP LEADER
The lack of investment in infrastructure is also quite evident.
Roads and bridges are so dilapidated that their condition
severely impedes the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
World Food Programme (WFP) and IRC staff members note
that in some areas it takes up to four hours to travel
120 kilometers,27 and the WFP has had to pay to repair
bridges to facilitate the transport of food aid.
Loss of control of territory: Both INGO staff and Central
Africans spoke of rebel groups providing security rather
than the state. In the northwest, the rebel group Révolution
et Justice has established checkpoints. IRC staff members
in Kaga Bandoro spoke of ex-Séléka as the only authority
recognized by locals. Even in places where government
authorities and/or MINUSCA are present, some Central
Africans still see armed groups as holding de facto power.
Erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide services
and loss of control of territory, coupled with widespread
corruption and criminality, involuntary movement of
populations, and sharp economic decline, are markers
of a failed state.28, 29
hen the communities have issues, they take
W
their complaints to Séléka and not the souspréfet, because he has no authority. Séléka is
truly the one in power. In fact, Séléka occupies
all buildings (in Kaga Bandoro). The sous-Préfet
is sitting at home while his office is occupied by
Séléka.
—NGO STAFF MEMBER
OPPOSITE PAGE: A destroyed house sits abandoned by its owners who
cannot return to their neighbourhood due to insecurity, Bangui.
Governance (continued)
We [INGO] have been in the CAR for eight years, through different stages of crisis
and calm. I keep hearing from the population that they want us to stay for years and
years, but this exposes a bigger problem—that there is an expectation that NGOs run
the country. I understand that with such limited service delivery, communities feel that
the government has not served them well, but NGOs, whether international or national,
are not the long-term solution to providing services. The expectation and dependency
factor concern me, and it affects meetings and messaging because we seem to
return to this perception.
—IRC STAFF MEMBER
Spotlight on MINUSCA
“Concerned with the security, humanitarian, human rights
and political crisis in the Central African Republic and its
regional implications, the Security Council authorized on
10 April 2014 the deployment of a multidimensional United
Nations peacekeeping operation—MINUSCA, with the
protection of civilians as its utmost priority. Its other
initial tasks included support for the transition process;
facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and
protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule
of law; and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and
repatriation processes.” 30 In recognition of the complete
breakdown of the state, the Security Council endowed
the mission with ’urgent temporary measures’ 31 to accord
MINUSCA the possibility of taking on some basic law
and order functions of the state.
MINUSCA was meant to help the TG establish authority.
Yet CAR’s continuing instability, nearly one year into
the mission, begs the question: why do insecurity and
governance failure continue to be the biggest obstacles
to both Central Africans and aid agencies in meeting
needs? Particular constraints surrounding both the
CAR crisis and the MINUSCA mandate pose significant
challenges to real gains in stability.
Mission Mandate: The protection of civilians is an
ambitious goal in an environment where multiple actors
are perpetrating widespread violence against civilians
and the TG does not have the capacity to contribute
significantly to the protection of civilians within its
borders. As such, MINUSCA must determine how
to prioritize its scarce resources between its various
mandated objectives and tasks. The UN Security Council
(UNSC) helped MINUSCA to prioritize protection by
12
sequencing its mandate, directing the mission to first
implement primarily protection-related tasks and to delay
many other activities until resources and conditions
permit. Unfortunately, the UNSC did not go far enough
in its efforts to narrow initial mandated activities,
leaving room for the dilution of resources away from
protection activities.32
Mission Strategy: MINUSCA must also determine
which threats and vulnerable populations it will address
and which are beyond its limited capabilities. All
peacekeeping operations mandated to protect must
develop a mission-wide strategy to determine which
protection risks it will prioritize. MINUSCA’s missionwide protection strategy is one of the most advanced
of any peacekeeping operation, drawing on the latest
UN policies and best practices. 33 In order to respond to
a dynamic environment, protection risks are prioritized
in a “flashpoint matrix,” developed in consultation with
other protection stakeholders. However, the success of
the strategy depends on MINUSCA’s ability to respond
flexibly and rapidly to evolving threats on the ground,
which is something peacekeepers struggle with for many
reasons, including, but not limited to, a lack of situational
awareness, poor information and communication
mechanisms and protocols, inadequate logistics and
assets and a lack of political will of some troops to act.
Mission Authority: In recognition of the absence of
governance structures throughout the country, including
those that contribute to the rule of law, the TG invited the
UN to accept temporary authority and maintain law and
order by arresting and detaining criminals. 34 The Security
Council refused, but did give MINUSCA the authority to
operate under “urgent temporary measures” which allow
UN police to detain and arrest, “but only when national
forces were not present or operational, on a temporary
and exceptional basis, without creating a precedent,
and without prejudice to the established principles of
peace operations.”35 MINUSCA has been implementing
this aspect of its mandate by arresting “high-value”
targets. 36 However, MINUSCA has to turn over arrested
persons to the TG, which has limited capacity to protect
prisoners, ensure they stay in prison and are tried in
courts according to international standards. 37
Mission Guidance: The UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field
Support have recently released a formal policy on
the protection of civilians in peacekeeping38 as well
as protection of civilian’s guidelines for the military
components of peacekeeping operations. However,
given that this formal guidance was issued in 2015, the
extent to which peacekeeping personnel in MINUSCA,
or any mission, are aware of it and/or trained in its
implementation is unknown at this time.
Mission Strength: MINUSCA is currently authorized
to deploy 12,870 total uniformed personnel, including
10,750 military personnel and 2,120 police. As of 31
March 2015, only 9,902 total uniformed personnel were
deployed (8,305 military personnel and 1,466 police).
Even at full strength, troops will continue to be spread
thinly across the vast country, and will be largely limited
to the main axes. MINUSCA does not have the numbers
to establish a protection presence in all areas, much
less in remote rural areas where civilians are under
threat. Further, the lack of available Formed Police
Units (FPUs) 39 means that MINUSCA FPUs are limited
to focusing on Bangui. Beyond numbers, troops and
police may not have the adequate training or assets that
would allow them to project themselves beyond limited
areas of operation.
Collectively, these challenges leave MINUSCA in a
difficult situation. The conditions do not allow for the
mission to fully carry out its stabilization mandate or
implement its protection strategy. With a long list of
resource-heavy priority tasks, a lack of state security
forces, an absence of a justice system, and an insufficient
number of personnel, assets and equipment, MINUSCA’s
hands are often tied.40
The mandate listed seven priority tasks
with at least 20 subtasks that the mission
should focus on in the initial phase. The
mandate rightfully included tasks related to
the physical protection of civilians, human
rights monitoring, good offices and political
support for efforts to address root causes
of the conflict, and support to reconciliation
and mediation at the national and local levels
in this initial phase. However, it also included
tasks to extend state authority. Furthermore,
the mandate decided that MINUSCA should
undertake approximately 10 additional tasks
as resources and conditions permit, but did
not identify what conditions were necessary
to trigger the additional activities.41
Members of the Seleka rebel militia, Central African Republic.
14
South Sudan’s Displacement Crisis
Humanitarian Need
Rampant insecurity and the government’s inability to
provide basic services in large areas of the country have
exacerbated the humanitarian situation. Despite reduced
violence and an international humanitarian response, needs
far outstrip the level of assistance being channeled toward
CAR. The number of people requiring emergency assistance
has increased since 2014 and stands to get worse if
significant efforts are not made to address the causes
and consequences of the crisis. A relative comparison of
humanitarian appeal funding levels shows the Strategic
Response Plan (SRP) funded at 21 percent in May 2015
versus 32 percent in May 2014. In actual terms nearly
$50 million more was given to the SRP in CAR by this
time in 2014.42
450
100
400
90
350
80
70
300
60
250
50
200
40
150
30
100
20
50
10
0
0
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Percentage of SRP to CAR funded
Funding in absolute amount – millions of USD
Funding Levels for SRP to CAR:
2014 versus 2015
Amount given to SRP in USD millions 2014
Amount given to SRP in USD millions 2015
Percentage of SRP funded in 2014
Percentage of SRP funded in 2015
GRAPH 2 Funding levels for the Strategic Response Plan, data based on
the UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service
OCHA identified 2.7 million in need of emergency
humanitarian assistance in 2015, an increase from
2.5 million43 in 2014. Among those, 1.5 million are suffering
from food insecurity, and the entire 2.7 million require
protection assistance.44 The humanitarian appeals likely
underestimate the full scope of need given the inaccessibility
of remote and insecure regions. Moreover, despite the strong
focus on IDPs in various appeals, there is very little data on
the specific needs of IDPs outside of Bangui.45 The following
represents just a snapshot of the challenges faced by
Central Africans:
Women and Girls
Women and girls face significant threats to their personal
safety. They risk rape and other forms of gender-based
violence (GBV), particularly when they collect firewood
and go to fields to farm. IRC assessments in Kaga Bandoro
revealed that some women and girls have had to turn to
negative coping strategies, including transactional sex,
to offset the impact of their loss of livelihoods. No formal
protection structures function outside Bangui to facilitate
assistance to suvivors.
Women face GBV, specifically sexual violence, at
shocking rates. In 2014, women and girls reported
over 1,500 incidents of violence to the IRC: 71 percent
were acts of rape, 23 percent physical assault, three
percent sexual assault, two percent psychological and/
or emotional abuse, and one percent denial of resources,
opportunities or services.46
In the bush and forest, women and girls are
exposed to terrible things. But with the crisis,
they continue to go to the bush, looking for
what they can to subsist—firewood, caterpillars,
mushroom, fish—since their livelihoods have
been ravaged. Things happen to them when
they go to the forest.
—IRC STAFF MEMBER
There has been no cessation in sexual and other forms
of gender-based violence since the peak of the crisis
in CAR. The IRC continues to see high numbers of
reported incidents. Yet, as of May 2015, the Protection
Cluster has not received any funding specifically to
address GBV.
efore we had a referral system with the police
B
and justice personnel. Now, there is no justice.
There is 100 percent impunity for rape
perpetrators in Bocaranga.
—IRC STAFF MEMBER
OPPOSITE PAGE: Kaga Bandoro has the region’s only hospital. Last year, advancing rebels ransacked the wards, stealing generators, mattresses, medicines,
and even bed frames. In one of the damaged wards, severely malnourished toddlers receive milk and peanut paste.
Humanitarian Need (continued)
The Guidelines for GBV Prevention and Response in
Humanitarian Settings call for access to safety, security,
health and legal services, but given the limited access
to basic services—including safe spaces and health
structures, the absence of authorities and existing
impunity—these guidelines are difficult to apply.
Without police and courts, alleged perpetrators cannot
be detained and survivors are vulnerable to reprisals.
Both increased poverty and the threat of sexual
violence are cited as main reasons for early and forced
marriage. The IRC has noted a decrease in the average
age of marriage for girls, some as early as age 12.
Child Protection
Children are most vulnerable to conflict, and an estimated
2.3 million children in CAR have been affected by the crisis in
2014.47 The impact is devastating; children may lose contact
with family members and they may be victims of, witness
or even be forced to carry out acts of horrific violence.
Even prior to the crisis, children had been associated
with armed groups, including self-defense militias allied
to President Bozizé,48 and two out of every three children
had never attended primary school. With the advent of the
crisis, children were forcibly conscripted into armed forces;
Save the Children staff also report that some joined under
pressure from family or peers, or to avenge acts of violence
perpetrated against them or their families.49
An estimated 10,000 children are associated with
armed forces.50 UNICEF has requested $73.9 million
in 2015 for child soldier reintegration and rehabilitation
efforts in CAR, but as of April 30, only $17 million
has been funded.
As of July 2014, 59 percent of schools remained
closed due to the absence of teachers, school buildings
being occupied by armed groups, and continuing
insecurity. While this figure has surely changed with
the reduction in the intensity of the conflict, children
in many areas have now missed two full school years
or more. OCHA reported in May 2015 that constant
population movements and the volatile security situation
in central and eastern provinces, especially in NanaGribizi Province, still hinder the provision of structured
education and the timely delivery and distribution of
school supplies.
Save the Children recently found that over 60 percent
of school-aged children CAR suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), having either witnessed or
16
experienced extreme violence during the conflict.51
These children require case management services and
psychosocial support to help them recover and heal.
While some services are available, the demand far
exceeds the current capacity.
Children have allegedly been abused by those
designated to protect them. In April 2015, an internal
report commissioned by the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights revealed allegations
of sexual abuse of young boys at an IDP site in Bangui
at the hands of French, Chadian and Equatorial Guinean
troops. Children interviewed for the report state that they
were exploited in exchange for food and money.
Health
The crisis has had a profound impact on morbidity and
mortality in CAR, a country that already had one of the
world’s shortest life expectancies, and the highest under-five
and maternal mortality rates.52 Central Africans have long
suffered from a near-total absence of government-sponsored
health services, a situation made worse by the flight of the
limited pool of health professionals, including those who
had benefited from years of INGO-led training and support.
Village health posts53 are now staffed by unskilled personnel.
Many health centers and posts have been looted, burnt or
otherwise abandoned. Meanwhile, as of April 2015, only
three percent of health needs are met through the CAR
humanitarian appeal, while 80 percent of functional health
facilities depend on support from the humanitarian sector.54
IRC health program staff have witnessed an increased
prevalence in the rates of malaria, diarrhea, acute
respiratory infections (ARIs) and acute emergency
cases. They also cite gender-based violence and
malnutrition as major public health issues.
A six-to-12-month gap in public health services during
the height of the conflict led to an interruption in the
vaccination of children, treatment for chronic diseases
such as HIV/AIDS, and other essential medical services.
Essential medicines such as paracetamol, antibiotics,
antidiarrheals and antimalarials are difficult to procure
locally, and if brought abroad or from the capital,
their transport is complicated by poor infrastructure
and insecurity. Similarly, mobile clinics such as those
operated by the IRC suffer service interruptions
intermittently due to insecurity.
Spotlight on Health
Given the near-total absence of government-sponsored
health services, CAR’s village health posts were
governed by a grassroots system called COGES (Comité
de la Gestion de la Santé), committees composed of
community-elected members. COGES sets costs for
consultations and medications and pays staff salaries.
Prior to the crisis, the IRC and other INGOs dedicated
significant resources to training COGES members and
health staff on diagnosis and treatment of STDs, malaria,
diarrhea and respiratory infections as well as neonatal,
obstetric and ante/postnatal care. This grassroots system
has all but collapsed with the crisis.
Many of the displaced health workers and COGES
members cannot, or chose not, to return to the
country or their health post due to continuing
insecurity or fear of retribution. INGOs thus have
fewer partners with whom to work and less access
to people whose needs have increased.
The Ministry of Health has not been able to
implement an alternative plan to compensate for the
nearly defunct COGES system. Instead, in August
2014, the ministry published a directive requiring
humanitarian organizations to support health facilities
comprehensively—in everything from rehabilitation,
to training, to the provision of drugs and payment
of salaries. The humanitarian presence on the
ground does not have the resources to provide this
blanket assistance, despite the ministry’s directive.
The plan does not promote sustainable recovery of
CAR’s health system and relies on the humanitarian
community to assume a role that should be covered
by the government.
COGES members have disclosed to IRC staff that
they are reluctant to exercise their duties (such as
oversight and corrective action of staff) given the
wide availability and circulation of arms. Some have
said that they fear “for their lives” should they upset
someone at one of the health posts.
An IRC-trained nurse weighs a baby at a hospital in Kaga Bandoro.
Humanitarian Need (continued)
Food Security and Livelihoods
If nothing changes in CAR, insecurity will
continue to increase and the population will
no longer work in the fields out of fear of being
attacked. Famine will overcome families and
there will be a humanitarian catastrophe.
The ability of Central Africans to feed and support
themselves has been dramatically altered by the conflict.
Market linkages have been broken, fields lay fallow and
inflation is rampant. The slaughter of livestock and the
flight of pastoralists also have reduced the food supply.
The inability of Central Africans to harvest crops makes
it difficult for them to pay for education, purchase medicines
and satisfy other important needs. Further, if insecurity
disrupts the 2015 planting season, CAR will absorb another
negative shock in food security and malnutrition rates.
As recently as May 2015, OCHA projected that an estimated
32,000 children may experience severe acute malnutrition
(SAM) and approximately 78,000 will exhibit moderate acute
malnutrition (MAM).55
Harvests have decreased nearly 58 percent from
pre-crisis levels,56 while the fish supply and livestock
levels have declined nearly 40 percent and
77 percent respectively.57
oday we are in the dry season, so we don’t
T
cultivate. But we are going to have some serious
problems if we can’t access the fields come
May and June. We won’t have money to pay
for education, to eat. It causes marital problems.
The fields are our source for everything.
– FEMALE FARMER
The consumer price index for goods and services
increased 15 percent in 2014, eroding the purchasing
power of families.58 Staple foods experienced a
shocking inflation of 30 to 70 percent from March
to August 2014.59
18
A family in a makeshift camp set up for displaced people
in Kaga Bandoro.
here are moments when you can’t even move
T
a truck because of gunfire. You may be meant
to give food in one zone, and when en route,
you are stopped by armed persons and pillaged.
Or you arrive at your target village, and the
village is attacked after you have completed
the distribution and left.
– WFP STAFF MEMBER
In 2014, WFP lost 454,634 tons of food to pillaging
en route or at points of distribution. WFP employees
report the consistent looting of food, leading some
partners, from health centers to church sites, to decline
distributing food on WFP’s behalf.
he roads are so poor that we must program
T
even four hours to travel 120 kilometers.
The bridges are in terrible condition and we
frequently have to unload tons of goods before
crossing and then reload.
– WFP STAFF MEMBER
The poor state of roads and bridges, together with
insecurity, slows down aid workers delivering food
and prevents Central Africans from reaching markets.
Spotlight on Delivery of Humanitarian Aid
Insecurity and the absence of governance or strong
institutions allow for the deliberate targeting of
humanitarian workers and have negative ramifications
for delivering goods and services to people in need,
even where humanitarian access is permissible:
Aid agencies have difficulty finding commercial
vendors and transporters, as commerce was largely
monopolized by Central African Muslims, 80 percent
of whom reportedly have fled the country. Existing
entrepreneurs are fearful of traveling due to
ongoing attacks and pillaging of trucks.
Insecurity-related blockages at the Cameroon-CAR
border lead to pipeline breaks, slowing down the
import of goods.
Delivery is often delayed in-country as aid workers
and transporters wait for other providers to travel in
convoys for enhanced protection.
e have to react to the presence of armed
W
groups to avoid harm to our staff and
beneficiaries, and sometimes this means
we must postpone our services. One day
makes a lot of difference to someone
who is expecting food, seeds, a dignity kit,
or mobile clinic health care.
Humanitarian Access Constraints
by Category
2%
5%
4%
2%
Violence against
personnel and/or
assets
Limitations in physical
environment
The TG has reversed the NGO import tax exoneration
policy, adding to financial difficulties for INGOs
(neither donors nor NGOs had foreseen these costs)
and creating significant delays at customs.
e can’t travel with significant amounts
W
of cash. It is too much of a security risk.
7%
Active hostilities
Interference in
implementation
Obstacles in accessing
population
80%
Restriction of
movement within
the country
– INGO STAFF MEMBER
It is difficult to get work done due to the
state of roads plus insecurity. By the time
you get to a village where you are to distribute
goods, you only have two hours before you
have to leave because of sundown, and
return to base.
GRAPH 3 Data taken from OCHA’s March 2015 Humanitarian
Access Snapshot
20
Risk
Ongoing conflict-related insecurity, governance failure,
and displacement outpace the efforts of aid agencies
that seek to meet humanitarian needs. Add to the mix the
unpredictability of humanitarian funding commitments, and
the situation could prove catastrophic for a country that is
already a failed state by many measures, and lead to more
costly interventions for the international community in the
future. There is a risk to not investing holistically in CAR
now—to address simultaneously humanitarian need, the
root causes of conflict, long-term recovery, peace dividends
and sustainable development.
The IRC, with support provided by a research team
from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS), has projected what humanitarian
need in CAR could look like in two key areas—food security
and shelter—if insecurity persists and funding requirements
are not met. This risk model analyzes how these needs could
change as a result of various levels of humanitarian funding
and levels of conflict to the end of 2015.60 (See appendix:
IRC-SAIS Research Methodology & Limitations for the
methodology behind the model, including the baseline used,
assumptions, calculations and caveats.) Specifically, low,
medium and high levels of funding are compared alongside
improving, status quo and worsening levels of crisis (defined
on the next page). The IRC also conducted an analysis of
no funding to estimate the effect of the crisis in absence of
humanitarian aid.
After evaluating both ACLED’s conflict data and the UN
Financial Tracking Service (FTS) database, and looking at
historic trends in CAR’s conflict and funding, the following
parameters (defined on the next page) were established
to forecast various scenarios (calculations are described in
appendix: IRC-SAIS Research Methodology & Limitations):
N.B. For context, as of May 2015, CAR’s parameters are as
follows: below low funding threshold (21 percent of the SRP)
and lessening conflict (31 conflict-related incidents/mo.).
A severely malnourished toddler is fed at Kaga Bandoro’s only hospital.
OPPOSITE PAGE: A Seleka soldier in the central Nana-Gribizi province. The group, accused of rape, killings and extended looting, overtook Bangui, the
capital of Central African Republic, and overthrew the government of President François Bozize on March 24, 2013.
Risk (continued)
Tables: Scenario Projections of People in Need
All scenarios are given in terms of a probable interval of ± 10 percent to account for variation in the model’s prediction.
All output is in terms of people affected.
Food Insecurity (in terms of people)
No Funding
Low Funding
Mid Funding
High Funding
Lessening conflict
1,038,594
to
1,269,392
844,931
to
1,032,693
669,157
to
817,857
499,318
to
612,720
Status quo conflict
1,612,700
to
1,971,000
1,317,400
to
1,610,200
1,106,200
to
1,352,000
910,800
to
1,113,200
Increasing conflict
2,824,600
to
3,452,200
2,520,700
to
3,080,800
2,348,000
to
2,869,188
2,070,000
to
2,530,000
The following parameters were used to forecast various scenarios
Funding Level Parameters:
Low Funding (30 percent of SRP & previous
bilateral funds) = food security: $58,134,222,
shelter: $7,331,947
Lessening Conflict: Average 55 conflictrelated incidents/mo. (late 2014/early 2015
average)
Mid Funding (60 percent of SRP &
previous bilateral funds) = food security:
$116,268,644, shelter: $14,663,894
Status Quo Conflict: Average 85 conflictrelated incidents/mo. (2014 average)
High Funding (90 percent of SRP &
previous bilateral funds) = food security:
$174,402,966, shelter: $21,995,84161
22
Conflict Level Parameters:
Increasing Conflict: Average 125 conflictrelated incidents/mo. (early 2014 average,
heightened conflict)62
Shelter Needs (in terms of people)
No Funding
Low Funding
Mid Funding
High Funding
257,000
to
314,200
197,700
to
241,600
131,400
to
160, 600
74,900
to
91,600
196,200
to
239,800
227,900
to
278,500
268,400
to
328,000
338,400
to
413,600
350,400
to
428,300
291,000
to
355,600
220,000
to
269,000
163,700
to
200,000
180,000
to
220,000
226,300
to
276,500
266,800
to
326,100
336,800
to
411,700
474,800
to
580,300
415,400
to
507,700
356,000
to
435,100
296,700
to
362,500
162,700
to
198,900
225,100
to
274,500
279,000
to
341,000
353,100
to
431,600
Lessening
conflict
Status quo
conflict
Increasing
conflict
Emergency Shelter
Assistance Rebuilding / Returning
Risk (continued)
Food Security Analysis
The model allows us to observe that without any
humanitarian aid, needs would be greater. For example,
according to the model, approximately 400,000 fewer people
would suffer from food insecurity at high versus low levels
of funding, at every level of conflict. Yet currently, funding
is not keeping up with the growing need. Despite spending
over $130 million on food security in 2014, which the model
shows to have the caloric purchasing power to meet the
needs of 500,000 people, actual food insecurity numbers
decreased only by 80,000. The analysis sheds light on the
barriers to meeting humanitarian need. Various scenarios
can be assessed to evaluate the interplay of aid and conflict.
If conflict is reduced significantly and domestic food
production restored, the number of people suffering from
food insecurity falls drastically. The largest possible reduction
could be envisaged through a low-conflict/high-aid scenario:
fewer than 55 incidents per month coupled with SRP funding
in excess of 90 percent would reduce food insecurity levels
to approximately 600,000 people. However, this scenario
demands high humanitarian aid levels, which is uncommon
when conflict subsides.
Alternatively, if the conflict reignites to levels seen in early
2014, more people will suffer from food insecurity at all
levels of aid. Conflict has a higher negative effect on
domestic food production, the import of agricultural goods
and food prices than the positive effect of food aid. If conflict
causes a further 10 percent deterioration of harvesting,
fishing and livestock levels, CAR would suffer a loss of
over 270 billion calories annually. Food aid would have to
total approximately $127 million just to purchase the same
amount of calories lost. In order to have any improvement in
food security there would need to be a combination of lower
conflict and increased funding.
Shelter Analysis
On average in 2014, every conflict-related incident
displaced 640 Central Africans.63 If security is not
established, and the number of conflict-related incidents in
2015 mirrors 2014 averages, the humanitarian community
can expect nearly 500,000 new displacements. Providing
500,000 newly displaced people with emergency shelter
and non-food items (NFIs) could cost upward of $40 million,
based on the reach of 2014 aid.
24
In a scenario of significantly decreased conflict, new
displacements ostensibly would also drop. Further, with
aid levels and interventions equivalent to 2014, CAR would
see a decreased need for emergency shelter. However, this
reduction must be assessed against an increased need for
permanent shelter in a more stable environment. Permanent
housing needs (assistance returning and rebuilding) will
likely increase as the conflict subsides, as there will be an
increase in returnees from within and neighboring countries.
Consequently, even in a scenario of decreased conflict,
the need for shelter solutions will grow nearly two-fold—
from 178,304 to upward of 320,000 persons—from those
identified in the 2015 SRP.
A worst-case scenario (no funding and increasing conflict)
results in total shelter needs for 800,000 persons, whereas
best-case scenario (high funding and decreasing conflict)
results in shelter needs for 500,000. In short, shelter needs
will remain high throughout 2015.
What this tells us
By comparing food security and shelter needs in a
range of conflict scenarios and at various aid levels, the
international community can gain a sense of the tremendous
importance of establishing security while providing
humanitarian assistance.
The aid provided by the international community has been
invaluable in reducing conflict-related food insecurity and
providing emergency shelter during the current crisis in CAR.
However the reality is that humanitarian aid simply cannot
keep up with the needs created by insecurity.
The estimate of the number of people in need in a lowfunding/lessening conflict scenario is almost on par
with the number of people in need in a high-funding/status
quo-conflict scenario. That is, humanitarian aid without
addressing security provides only partial benefits
to people in need.
Food insecurity is only effectively addressed at high levels
of humanitarian funding and by increasing domestic food
production by tackling insecurity. This is not possible if
displaced citizens do not feel secure enough to return
home, or if people do not feel safe enough to leave their
homes to pursue livelihoods. The risks to the people of CAR
underscore the vital importance of a fruitful peace dialogue.
Roadmap Forward
The national peace dialogue, the Bangui Forum, took place
in May 2015. Nearly 700 political, religious and traditional
leaders as well as parties to the conflict, the private sector,
and civil society, gathered to propose a vision for a postconflict CAR. Others attending included leaders from donor
and neighboring countries, regional bodies, multilateral
institutions, and a host of international organizations
(including the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation).
Participants were grouped into thematic commissions
with the objective of planning a way forward in four
categories: governance, economic and social development,
justice and reconciliation, and peace and security. The
governance commission addressed aspects of the
constitution, law and policy, and ways to ensure the Forum’s
outcomes will be accountable to the people. The economic
and social development commission deliberated on the
decentralization of the state, budget management, and
the application of an integrated recovery and economic
development strategy, targeting the most disadvantaged
areas of the country. The justice and reconciliation
commission dealt with impunity and national and local
reconciliation mechanisms. The peace and security
commission considered peace accords, disarmament, and
measures to assure the security of the population. In a
plenary session, the commissions proposed a range of steps,
which were subsequently adopted.
governance. In sum, they represent the building blocks of a
potential stable nation.
Considering the vast scope of challenges on the table for
Central Africans, the outcomes of this high-stakes forum
are clear and comprehensive. They provide a roadmap
forward to address the most vexing challenges faced by
CAR. It should be noted, however, that this is the country’s
fifth national debate on peace and reconciliation since
1980. The forum, in fact, ended on an ominous note
with some Anti-balaka representatives walking out in
protest during the closing ceremony, and gunfire erupting
outside. The success of the Bangui Forum therefore, will
hinge greatly on implementation of the Pact, including
ongoing consultations among all key actors to make
sure their concerns are adequately represented, and
an international commitment to supporting CAR’s new
roadmap to the future.
ver 700 participants, key stakeholders of
O
national institutions and entities, against all
expectations, took part in this conference,
considered in everyone’s opinion to be the
last chance for the future of Central African
Republic.
– THE NATIONAL FORUM OF BANGUI REPORT
SYNTHESIS
his (crisis) is a page in world history that is
T
being rewritten.
– M. Abdoulaye Bathily
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARYGENERAL FOR CENTRAL AFRICA, AND PRESIDENT OF
THE BANGUI FORUM PRESIDIUM
Two groundbreaking outcomes received particular attention.
First, the Anti-balaka and 10 factions of the Séléka reached
a new DDR agreement. Combatants are to give up their
weapons prior to national elections and demilitarized parties
will be integrated into state security sectors or benefit from
income-generating activities. Immunity will not be granted to
perpetrators of war crimes. Second, Séléka and Anti-balaka
representatives agreed to release all children in their ranks,
and humanitarian agencies will be granted immediate access
to them so family tracing and reunification can begin. While
these two outcomes are certainly notable and inspire hope
for CAR’s immediate future, the Forum’s other outcomes—
proposals adopted via the Pact—are equally important,
as they could serve as a roadmap for stability and good
Pregnant women waiting for vaccinations at Castors
Health Centre, Bangui.
Roadmap Forward (continued)
Key Adopted Proposals
Governance
Constitutional amendments prohibiting
a rise to executive power by force;
establishment of a national, republican,
and multiethnic Central African army;
establishment of an independent High
Authority for Good Governance and
Anti-Corruption, with prosecutorial powers.
A series of new laws and policies with a
view to ensure equality for all, with special
provisions for minorities, and protecting
religious liberty, citizenship and voting rights.
National 10-year plans for increasing
access to education, employment and
health services.
An emergency plan for extending state
authority throughout the country’s territory.
Economic and Social Development
Efforts to secure transhumance corridors
in collaboration with pastoralists and farmers.
The establishment of basic social services,
specifically education, health and hygiene,
as well as access to water and housing for
all victims of the crisis.
A health policy including universal
health insurance.
Rehabilitation and/or construction of
infrastructure in all areas, from transport
to communications to renewable energy.
Peace and Security
Full implementation of the Brazzaville Accord.
The establishment in law of a Bangui Forum
monitoring committee.
Justice and Reconciliation
A special criminal court for conflict-related
crimes, rebellions and coups d’etats.
Free and universal access to justice.
Reparations for victims of “politicomilitary” crises.
Establishment of a mechanism
for transitional justice.
Establishment of a truth and justice,
reparation and reconciliation commission.
Creation of local peace and
reconciliation committees.
26
Conclusion
The tremendous amount of progress that the international
community, from diplomatic corps to humanitarian aid
agencies, has achieved since crisis newly broke out in
CAR cannot be underestimated. The country is not suffering
a campaign of ethnic cleansing, as the Commission of
Inquiry found to be true in 2014. However, the volatility of
CAR’s security environment cannot be underestimated.
Conflict incidence remains high, the vast majority of IDPs
have not returned home, refugee numbers have increased,
the TG has not established its presence throughout the
country, MINUSCA has not been able to secure the country,
and humanitarian aid agencies are severely restricted
from carrying out their mandates and reaching the most
vulnerable efficiently and effectively.
To determine whether the country is emerging from
crisis and moving toward stability, the IRC listened to
the voices of people whose lives have been impacted
by the conflict. Central Africans interviewed by the IRC
communicated resounding fear of the transition process
and skepticism about the national peace forum. They
identified security as their unmistakable and primary need
and specifically demanded a robust and rapid disarmament
process. The Bangui Forum’s outcomes, which address
many of these concerns, could reverse this fear and
skepticism with the right international support to see
through their implementation.
CAR’s history is one of poor governance, recurring political
violence and failed peace processes. The international
community has too often taken short-term approaches to
the deeply-rooted governance and security challenges facing
Central Africans. The current transition, now embodied
through the Pact, requires sustained diplomatic attention
and financial support. Without DDR, the development of
transparent and inclusive governance mechanisms, and
sustained international focus, CAR could face increased
violence and further collapse. A stable security environment
is essential for Central Africans to return home, rebuild their
lives, and participate in a sustainable and inclusive transition.
Likewise, improved security is the building block for aid
agencies to gain humanitarian access and deliver lifesaving
services in a timely and effective manner.
ur problems are many. It is necessary
O
that the international community see our
problems as their own, because what happens
here will affect the whole region. If CAR isn’t
supported, CAR could disappear. We depend
on international community support for us
not to disappear.
– IRC LOCAL STAFF MEMBER
International donors and diplomats must recognize the need
to promote institution-strengthening activities and robust
humanitarian assistance at this critical time. In this vein, the
IRC encourages a multifaceted approach for short- and longterm recovery that includes:
Investing in efforts to reduce insecurity, impunity and
violence.
Creating conditions that facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian assistance.
Establishing effective, inclusive and accountable
government institutions, including a police service that
protects civilians.
Setting CAR on a path toward sustained recovery and
development.
Despite the skepticism that some Central Africans expressed
in the lead up to the Bangui Forum, the dialogue’s outcomes
represent CAR’s best hope for peace and stability, and an
opportunity to arrest the cyclical violence that has plagued
the country for decades.
here is no doubt that if we maintain the status
T
quo, CAR will become a Somalia or a Libya.
A girl from the Peul ethnic group near Ouandago. The Peul are a nomadic
community of herders.
– IRC LOCAL STAFF MEMBER
28
Recommendations
As long as insecurity and failed governance persist, the
international community cannot meet humanitarian needs or
help achieve durable peace in CAR. Furthermore, it must be
understood that humanitarian aid is not a long-term solution.
A holistic approach to the CAR crisis at this critical juncture
should address the obstacles that agencies such as the IRC
face in meeting humanitarian needs, while reducing the root
causes of conflict to ensure lasting peace and stability.
Invest in Efforts to Reduce Insecurity,
Impunity and Violence
Prioritize protection of the vulnerable
Donors should institute early-warning systems that
identify signs of potential conflict before it erupts
and prioritize funding of conflict-sensitive programs
that prevent and respond to violence against
civilians, including gender-based violence and childprotection concerns.
Extend state authority
The international community should work with the TG
to support the redeployment of government authorities
in tandem with MINUSCA deployments, and to fund
the rehabilitation and reconstruction of public security
infrastructure such as courts, detention facilities,
prisons and gendarmeries.
Adequately support MINUSCA to protect
civilians
Troop-contributing countries should meet their
commitments and immediately deploy the remaining
2,379 uniformed and civilian personnel authorized by the
Security Council. Absent these commitments, MINUSCA
will be less able to fulfill its mandate to protect civilians.
Donors should supply MINUSCA with the equipment
necessary to carry out patrols and communicate
effectively internally within its own ranks and externally
with the humanitarian community and the civilians they
are protecting.
MINUSCA should invest in civilian-military coordination
mechanisms to ensure its plans are informed by
priorities identified by civilians, local civil-society groups
and INGOs.
Create Conditions That Facilitate the
Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance
Recognize that CAR remains in crisis
Despite the deactivation of the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC) System-Wide Level 3 Emergency
Response for CAR, international support, is still
required.64
The 2015 Strategic Response Plan and the forthcoming
2016 appeal should be funded in total.
Expand humanitarian reach
Donors should commit to a robust and long-term
humanitarian presence in key locations, especially those
areas that remain underserved due to insecurity. UN
agencies, MINUSCA, and INGOs alike must commit to a
sustained presence in areas where the need is greatest.
Donors should resource MINUSCA to ensure they can
fulfill their protection mandate, improve security and, as
a result, increase the delivery of civilian-led humanitarian
assistance.
Facilitate the delivery of aid
The TG should restore tax-exempt status to INGOs to
ensure the maximum amount of humanitarian assistance
reaches those in need.
The TG should eliminate bureaucratic hurdles to
releasing INGO goods at customs and border control
points in order to facilitate the swift delivery of
assistance to people in need.
Donors should recognize the inordinate logistical costs
of operating in CAR and fund agencies appropriately so
that their operations are not compromised and people in
need are reached.
The international community and MINUSCA should
use their leverage with the TG to ensure the swift
implementation of the new DDR agreement.
OPPOSITE PAGE:
Children in Kaga Bandoro, Central African Republic.
Recommendations (continued)
Prioritize investments in areas that most
impact people’s lives
Prioritize among the areas identified in the 2015
Strategic Response Plan to ensure the most basic
humanitarian needs are addressed throughout the
country.
Extend food security programming beyond IDP and
returnee target groups to all conflict-affected Central
Africans in need. Ensure that access to and availability
of nutritious food is prioritized.
Dedicate resources to meet the specific needs of
women and girls; address both restoration of livelihoods
and the violence they experience.
Redouble efforts to resource the opening of primary and
secondary schools and invest in extended psychosocial
and reintegration programs for former child soldiers and
all children affected by the crisis.
Reestablish primary health services, including the
introduction of community-based care. Maintain funding
for mobile outreach services until primary health care is
accessible to all conflict-affected Central Africans.
Support The Establishment of
Effective, Inclusive and Accountable
Government Institutions
Build accountable institutions
Donor governments and international financial
institutions should develop and finance comprehensive
strategies for institution building and improved
government service provision. The following should be
implemented and staffed with adequate resources:
30
––
Investment in “immediate peace dividends” that
support disarmament and build trust between
Central Africans and their institutions, including
employment and livelihood opportunities, and
increased access to basic services for all.
––
Support for rebuilding of core state functions in
order to establish greater legitimacy (including
delivery of health, education, legal, and security
services, among others).
institutions should build state capacity to effectively
plan and manage human resources and public finances
to support service delivery.
institutions should support the creation and
implementation of policies that remove financial barriers
to health and education for impoverished and conflictaffected people.
Strengthen the social contract between citizens
and the state
The TG should facilitate the dissemination of information
about government roles and responsibilities as well as
civic rights and responsibilities to all Central Africans,
particularly women and members of vulnerable and
marginalized groups.
The TG should expand spaces for state-society dialogue
and collaboration that are inclusive of the viewpoints of
Central Africans from all groups and geographic areas
of the country. These spaces should bring together
duty bearers (service providers, local authorities, etc.)
and community members and/or their representatives
(service users, civil society organizations, etc.) in settings
such as town hall meetings, and health and school
management committees.
The international community should strengthen the
capacity of civil-society organizations to mobilize and
support civic engagement in participatory decisionmaking (e.g., inclusive planning and budgeting
processes) regarding government-provided health,
education and other basic services, and to hold the
state accountable for addressing needs.
The international community should support state
institutions to recognize civic rights and engage
constructively with the population, and to demonstrate
greater responsiveness to the needs, priorities and
concerns of the people.
Central African women, Kaga Bandoro.
Set Car on Path Toward Sustained
Recovery and Development
Pursue peace
The international community should support the
International Contact Group in its continued pursuit
of a political solution to the CAR crisis through
sustained diplomatic engagement with the TG and
parties to the conflict.
Support the development of the May
2015 Republican Pact for Peace, National
Reconciliation and Reconstruction
International donors, organizations and financial
institutions should support the Bangui Forum proposals
by working with the four commissions—Governance,
Economic and Social Development, Justice and
Reconciliation, and Peace and Security—to develop
implementation strategies, including a robust monitoring
and evaluation plan to meet milestones.
The TG should continue to consult with an ever-widening
array of civil-society representatives to develop and
implement the commissions’ strategies and to evaluate
their impact on Central Africans’ lives.
Commit to funding recovery
institutions should commit to financing the
implementation of effective strategies that emerge
from the Pact.
Bilateral donors should ensure their development
and humanitarian assistance offices are aligned and
coordinated to achieve maximum impact on both shortand long-term needs.
Donors should provide funding that links
reconstruction and development, including support
for mechanisms such as the European Trust Fund
for the Central African Republic.
Appendices
APPENDIX: IRC Report Caveats
The IRC’s humanitarian character prohibits it from taking
a position on the viability or the timeline of elections; any
reference to elections are intended to communicate the
views of Central Africans interviewed for this report.
The IRC has done its best to ensure that all information
relayed in this report is accurate as of the time of publication
(June 2015). The information presented herein is subject
to change, particularly in light of the volatility of the crisis
in CAR.
7. “The elections are questionable—will the process
be transparent and will legitimate authorities be put
in place?”
8. “The international community must be involved to
establish the rule of law to help the Central African
administration recover—at least until it’s up and
running—and to strengthen security in all of CAR
and the neighboring countries.”
APPENDIX: From the Field—Messages
to the International Community
9. “What we are asking of the international community
is not food. We are asking the international community
to disarm combatants so that we can go home to the
neighborhoods we abandoned when we came to these
IDP sites. Neither food nor the small income-generating
activities at these sites will allow us to go home.”
The IRC asked Central Africans who consented to an
interview what they would like to communicate to donors
and policymakers in the international community. Here
is a selection of messages:
10. The international community knows that things happen
here, but we only hear silence. The truth is not told
because if it were, people would understand that
stability hasn’t yet returned to the country.”
1. “We need to multiply the number of blue helmets and
patrols along the border. The army is not present and
MINUSCA is trying to fill the gap, but they don’t have
the forces or the resources to do this.”
APPENDIX: IRC-SAIS Research
Methodology & Limitations
2. “We call on the international community to assist in
the Brazzaville Accord’s implementation. The accord is
in place but not the measures, and the state is too weak.
We need help.”
3. “The international community has rallied to take care
of humanitarian needs but not security needs. Security
and demilitarization is required to be able to roll out
humanitarian activities in optimal conditions.”
4. “CAR is still in a period of convalescence. It is too soon
for the humanitarian community to depart. We still need
donors, even after the elections. I fear for a catastrophe
if humanitarian assistance is withdrawn.”
5. “CAR is not the first country to live through a crisis.
Donors and supporters must change to help us fix the
system —above all, improve education. If people were
more educated, they would think more before engaging
in conflict. Those that are uneducated are manipulated.”
6. “In the DDR process, if the first D is missed, then the
second D and the R will never work. The first D is not
happening and we may see another rebellion.”
OPPOSITE PAGE:
The figures given below were used as baseline
measurements, on which the risk model for humanitarian
need in food security and shelter was built.
Baseline
Humanitarian Need
According to the 2015 Strategic Response Plan (SRP)
the following are the current needs in food security and
emergency shelter:
1,520,000 people are in need of emergency
food assistance.
259,736 people are in need of emergency
shelter assistance.
178,301 people are in need of assistance
returning/rebuilding.65
Conflict Levels
The follow represent the level of conflict at the end of 2014
and its effects on hazards:
Risk: Level of conflict, which averaged 85 conflictrelated incidents in 2014.66
Muslim returnee in front of the ruins of his home,
Bocaranga.
Appendices (continued)
Hazards: Impact of conflict on key variables.
––
Harvesting levels: 58 percent reduction from
pre-crisis levels.
––
Fishing: 40 percent reduction from pre-crisis levels.
––
Livestock: 70 percent reduction67 from
pre-crisis levels.
––
Inflation: 10 percent 68 from pre-crisis levels.
––
Agricultural imports: 27 percent reduction69
from pre-crisis levels.
––
Number of Displaced: 20 percent of the
population70 from pre-crisis levels.
Humanitarian Aid Levels
2014 Humanitarian aid funding:71
SRP: funded at $382.2 million, 69 percent of requested.
Additional bilateral and multilateral: $111 million.
––
––
$106.5 million of this was given to food security
via the SRP, and an additional $30 million
(approximate) was given to food security outside
of the SRP from bilateral and multilateral donors.
$9.1 million of this was given to the shelter cluster
via the SRP, while an additional (approximate)
$10 million in aid was given through bilateral
and multilateral donors.
2015 humanitarian aid funding to date:72
SRP: funded at $115.2 million, 19 percent of requested.
Additional bilateral and multilateral funding:
$51.6 million.
Food Security Assumptions and Calculations:
Based on the current literature, our model assumes
that conflict is resulting in a loss of calories through four
main means:73
Reduction in agricultural production.
Reduction in agricultural imports.
Inflation levels lowering purchasing power.
Humanitarian food aid lost (diverted/pillaged/theft).
34
Humanitarian aid is resulting in an addition of calories
through two means, as per the SRP:
Aid spent on direct food assistance (food baskets,
vouchers).
Aid spent on indirect food assistance (agricultural
trainings, farming inputs).
The model measures food security in terms of calories,
including both the number of calories provided through
intervention funded by humanitarian aid, as well as the
number of calories lost due to the level of crisis. Caloric
intake was chosen as the measurement of food security,
as numerous sources cite the need for approximately
2,100 daily calories, including the World Food Programme.74
Although it is not a perfect measure of food security,
a Food Security Information Network study found a
significant correlation between the Food Consumption
Score (a measurement of both quality and quantity of diet)
and caloric intake. Furthermore, the measurement of 2,100
calories is cited by the SRP as their measurement for
food security; for the sake of consistency this definition is
maintained.
The model then measures the effect on calories of each one
percent change in funding (based on a calculation of calories
bought per dollar of aid), as well as the caloric effect of each
one percent change in hazards. The effects of both a change
in funding and a change in hazards are then combined to get
the overall effect on calories for an aggregate outcome.
The assumptions underlying the calculation of the effect
of humanitarian aid on food security are based on project
proposals submitted to the United Nations Financial Tracking
Service (FTS),75 as well as the food aid budgets of WFP and
USAID.76 By measuring the amount of calories purchased,
including overhead costs, per dollar, a measurement of the
relationship between aid spending and calories created
reach was calculated. The assumptions for the calculation
of the effect of change in the different hazards was based
on the level of output pre-crisis taken from the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), then the number of calories
of said output was calculated based on calories/ton.
Shelter Security Assumptions and Calculations:
The model assumes that conflict is resulting in an increase
in shelter needs through two main means:
Increase in the number of displaced (associated with
an increase in conflict).
Increase in the number of returnees (associated with
a decrease in conflict).
Humanitarian aid is resulting in a reduction in shelter needs
through two means:77
Aid spent on emergency shelter assistance.
Aid spent on permanent housing solutions including
assistance returning and rebuilding.
Shelter security is measured in terms of individuals
displaced. Shelter needs are determined by the number of
displacements due to conflict-related incidents. The Armed
Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) real-time
database,78 which tracks conflict-related incidents, was used
as the measurement of conflict in CAR. OCHA’s statistics79
were used to determine current displacement levels. By
looking at the relationship of these statistics, a correlation
was calculated to estimate the relationship between the level
of conflict-related incidents and the level of displacement.
Specific calculations concerning the reach of shelter aid are
based on project proposals submitted to the FTS, as well
as the previous shelter budgets of the UN by measuring
the cost of providing shelter to one displaced individual, a
per-dollar measurement was calculated of the relationship
between aid spending and shelter reach. The model then
measures the aggregate impact on shelter needs of any one
percent change in funding levels, as well as any one percent
change in conflict-levels.
Caveats
This model is, first and foremost, a statistical estimate, and
the following must be taken in to account when evaluating
the results:
1. The model relies on the best available data, but said
databases have their own limitations, including ACLED,
OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), SRP
and FTS, FAO, World Bank (WB), and International
Monetary Fund (IMF). There are limitations to each of
these sources including lack of comprehensive data,
and periodic and non-mandatory reporting, all of which
places limitations on gauging the full reach of aid. Said
limitations include the fact that the model is not able
to account for all aspects of domestic food production
in CAR. However the model accounts for those which
make up a significant portion of CAR’s production, as
reported by FAO, including cassava, cereals, livestock,
milk products, fish, and bananas. Furthermore, the level
of conflict as reported by ACLED may have limitations,
given the fluid level of conflict in CAR. Despite the above
limitations, the model is based on the most accurate
data available, which are regularly used by numerous
humanitarian and development agencies.
2. The population distribution used in the food security
model is a normal distribution and may not fully
represent the distribution of food security in CAR,
however, without a census of caloric intake of the entire
population, it would be impossible to build the true
distribution. Therefore a normal distribution is used as
the most likely representation. There is justification in
that this distribution matches the HNO statement that
30 percent of the population is moderately or severely
food insecure.
3. The model looks at the population of CAR as a whole
and therefore assumes somewhat equal access to
citizens in various areas. Given that this is unlikely,
the true need will vary slightly given the access to
different areas.
4. The model seeks to predict the need by the end of
2015 and there are limitations with that time frame; a
conflict that is only two years old provides a small pool of
sampling data, and therefore predicting the results of a
one year period, based on statistics from only two prior
years naturally assumes room for error.
5. Not all clusters are evaluated and it may be possible that
there are positive spillover effects between clusters, i.e.
assisting the WASH cluster may have a positive effect
on food security. This link is accounted for between
shelter and food security, but the effect of other clusters
on food and shelter are not accounted for.
6. There may be an oscillation in violence in CAR. If
violence drops and a large number of Central Africans
return, there may be an increase in tensions and violence
once again. This level of analysis is not conducted, given
the short time frame of this model, however, it would
need to be an important consideration in any model
projecting longer than the end of 2015.
Appendices (continued)
APPENDIX: The IRC in CAR
The IRC began working in Central African Republic in
December 2006, following an eruption of violence that
caused thousands of people to flee their homes. In response
to the more recent power struggle between Ex-Séléka and
Anti-balaka groups in 2013, the IRC shifted to a multisectoral
intervention, and has since been working to help the most
vulnerable populations affected by this ongoing crisis—
especially women and children. The IRC strives to repair
social cohesion by laying the foundation for recovery and
self-reliance, helping displaced populations to return home,
facilitating economic recovery and restoring access to quality
basic services.
Approximately 20 percent of the country’s population has
been displaced by the current crisis, compounding prolonged
preexisting poverty. The situation remains extremely
volatile; while many IDPs started returning home in 2014,
436,119 people remain displaced throughout the country
(as of May 2015), 58,700 of who reside in 34 sites in CAR’s
capital city, Bangui.
The IRC in CAR has restored functionality at targeted health
centers, established mobile clinics in rural Ouham Pendé,
supported food distribution and economic recovery activities
in Nana Gribizi, and led emergency interventions for the
protection of women and children in Bangui.
Violence continues to force mass displacement countrywide,
destroying much of the country’s social fabric. The farming
community has missed a second planting season, and many
markets have ceased to function. Women and girls continue
to be vulnerable to gender-based violence (GBV), with cases
being reported to the IRC at alarmingly high rates. Children
remain at risk of abuse, exploitation and separation from their
families. Infrastructure, such as health points and sanitation
facilities, are not maintained, especially in rural areas, making
access to health care nearly impossible.
Although the IRC and other organizations are working across
these sectors, available funding remains inadequate or short
term in nature. In response, the IRC is seeking to establish
local networks with alert and response mechanisms to
provide information on security issues and threats to early
recovery; such information is intended to trigger appropriate
and timely responses, at first from the international
community, but increasingly from local actors.
36
The IRC intends to continue its activities in
Ouham Pendé, Nana Gribizi and Bangui, and
expand its activities in La Kémo, throughout
2015.
The IRC in CAR: The IRC works in the following
sectors in CAR:
Women’s Protection and Empowerment
Economic Recovery and Development and
Food Security
Health
Child Protection
WASH activities will phase out in 2015 as environmental
health programming folds into other sectors, such as health
and economic recovery.
The IRC has its main office in Bangui and currently maintains
two field offices (Kaga Bandoro and Bocaranga). The IRC
implements programs in Bangui, Nana Gribizi, Ouham Pendé
and Ouham prefectures.
Staffing: The IRC in CAR operates with 15 expatriate staff
members and 90 national staff members.
Budget: The IRC in CAR has a projected budget of
approximately $9,500,000 for FY15. Funding for the IRC in
CAR is provided by SIDA, UNICEF, WFP, OFDA, EuropeAid,
CHF, Stichting Vluchteling and private donors.
Women’s Protection and Empowerment: The IRC
provides survivors of GBV with timely access to psychosocial
and health services, works with communities to reduce
risks confronting women and girls, and supports women’s
economic and social empowerment. The IRC established
safe spaces in Bangui, Nana Gribizi and Ouham Pendé,
where survivors can receive case management, counseling
and referrals to health care. The IRC also works at the
community level to prevent violence through advocacy
campaigns, focus groups and awareness sessions that
highlight the devastating effects of GBV and the importance
of protecting survivors.
Economic Recovery and Development: The IRC focuses
primarily on market-systems recovery by increasing
agricultural production and restoring microbusiness activities.
The overarching goal is to help local producers increase crop
and livestock yields. In addition, the IRC distributes seeds,
tools and food to help households restart and build resilience
against future shocks. The IRC also conducts market
analysis, trains producers on new and enhanced agriculture
techniques, provides support to small business enterprises,
and operates Cash-for-Work programs that provide local
people with short-term jobs on infrastructure construction
projects. The IRC also conducts cash transfers and incomegenerating activities to allow individuals and women’s groups
to build knowledge and resources to run small businesses.
Environmental Health/WASH: Over the past year and a
half, the IRC built 396 latrines and 328 showers for people
living in displaced camps. The IRC rehabilitated water points
and sanitation infrastructure in 10 villages in Ouham Pendé
and is also rehabilitating water points in 30 villages across
Nana Gribizi. The IRC also educates communities and
displaced people on the dangers of poor sanitation and the
importance of good hygiene.
Health: As one of few actors in Ouham Pendé prefecture,
the IRC is working to reestablish the health care system in
the region. In 2014, the IRC health program implemented
lifesaving activities for conflict-affected populations in 10
villages and is currently expanding to 15 health facilities in
La Kémo prefecture. The team initiated two mobile clinics
that bring free health care to people in need in four villages.
The IRC is also rehabilitating 15 looted health facilities,
training staff and providing incentives for them and
community health workers, as well as providing essential
medicines and medical devices worth $330,000. From
2014 through March 2015, the IRC mobile clinics and the
supported health facilities provided quality care to conflictaffected populations through 22,154 curative consultations.
One of the key ways to bring stability back to CAR is to help people get back to work. The IRC has programs designed to train both men and women in
useful skills to help them find jobs or create small businesses.
Endnotes
1 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1071
23 OCHA Humanitarian Access Snapshot: www.refworld.org/pdfid/552d0e244.pdf
2 UN Central African Republic At Risk of Becoming the World’s Largest Forgotten Humanitarian Crisis: www.unhcr.org/553e49ec6.html,
http://data.unhcr.org/car/flash_read.php?ID=131
24 IRIN CAR data: www.irinnews.org//report/100994/car-data-a-crisisin-numbers
3 Central African who are displaced, non-displaced, returnees, and
local humanitarian staff.
4 Even before the crisis, CAR was ranked 180 in a list of 186 countries
on the Human Development Index.
5 ICG – CAR, Anatomy of a Phantom State: www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/Central%20African%20Republic%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Phantom%20State.pdf
6 In July 2014, there were 925,610 total displaced within and outside
of CAR.
7 WHO March 2014 Fact Sheet on Central African Republic www.who.
int/hac/crises/caf/sitreps/central_african_republic_country_fact_
sheet_march2014.pdf
8 FAO, GIEWS Country Briefs on Central African Republic: www.fao.
org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=CAF
9 OCHA Financial Tracking Service: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.
aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1029
10 OCHA Financial Tracking Service http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.
11 Note: all field research was conducted prior to the Bangui Forum;
some interviewees may have changed their views since the adoption
of The Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction at the close of the Bangui Forum.
12 OCHA Central African Republic: www.unocha.org/car
13 In April 2015, the UN Security Council renewed the MINUSCA mandate, authorizing the additional deployment of 750 military personnel,
280 police personnel and 20 corrections officers to the previously
approved 11,820 uniformed personnel, as well as an increase in
military equipment.
14 Analysis was done only through April, not May, to account for the
likelihood that not all May incidents were documented by time of
publication.
15 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): www.
acleddata.com/
16 Central Africans report a significant worsening of transhumancerelated conflict with the advent of this crisis. According to the
International Crisis Group, resentment and violence between these
groups has increased because of the herdsmens perceived links
to ex-Séléka members. Livestock is coveted both by Anti-balaka
and ex-Séléka, and pastoralists often respond to cattle thefts with
brutal retaliations.
17 UNHCR CAR Regional Refugee Response: http://data.unhcr.org/
car/regional.php
18 At present, there is no data on returnees. The UNHCR is said to
havE a border presence to monitor the situation, but there is no
formal registration of returnees. It should also be noted that displacement fluidity makes returnee tracking challenging. Estimates point to
a low number of returnees given that there is no formal voluntary
repatriation scheme established at this time; current returns
are spontaneous.
19 Paul Ronan - Project Director, The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative.
20 Paul Ronan, Project Director, the Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative.
22 OCHA Situation Report 55: http://reliefweb.int/report/
central-african-republic/central-african-republic-situation-report-no-55-27-may-2015
38
27 Example give: the Paoua–Markounda route, with its poor roads and
weak bridges, can take four hours. During the rainy season, it can
take up to two days as trucks get stuck in the mud and goods must
be transferred to other vehicles.
28 The Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index: http://library.fundforpeace.
org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf
29 The 2014 Fragile States Index Rankings categorizes CAR as the third
worst in the world, behind Somalia and South Sudan. http://library.
fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf;
In 2013, Freedom House categorized CAR as a failed state. https://
freedomhouse.org/blog/central-african-republic-failed-state#.
VVYuGtNViko
30 MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/
31 This is the first time this happens outside of an executive mandate.
32 Alison Giffen, Prioritizing the protection of civilians in UN Peace
Operations. Submission to the high-level independent panel on peace
operations. March 2015. Stimson Center.
33 Interview, Alison Giffen, Stimson Center, March 30, 2015, Washington
DC.
34 What’s In Blue - Resolution Establishing UN Peacekeeping Mission
in CAR: www.whatsinblue.org/2014/04/resolution-establishing-un-peacekeeping-mission-in-car.php
35 United States Institute of Peace: www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
SR365-UN-Peacekeeping-in-the-Sahel-Overcoming-new-Challenges.pdf page 12.
36 United States Institute of Peace: www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
SR365-UN-Peacekeeping-in-the-Sahel-Overcoming-new-Challenges.pdf page 12.
37 Voice of America – Prisoners Take Over Jail in CAR Capital:
www.voanews.com/content/prisoners-take-over-ngaragba-jail-in-car-capital/2535484.html
38 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support Policy – The Protection of Civilians in United
Nations Peacekeeping: www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/biblioteca/documentos/150323%20POC%20policy%20final.pdf
39 A Formed Police Unit (FPU) is a team of 140 police officers, which is
deployed as a group, who undertake crowd control, protect UN staff
and material and escort UN personnel when they must visit insecure
regions of a mission area: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/units.shtml, In MINUSCA, FPU’s operate under temporary urgent
measures, giving them additional responsibilities to contribute to law
and order.
40 For further information on challenges and recommendations related
to Integrated Missions such as MINUSCA, see the work of Alison
Giffen and William J. Durch, of the Stimson Center.
41 Prioritizing the protection of civilians in UN Peace Operations.
Submission to the high-level independent panel on peace operations.
March 2015. Alison Giffen, Co-director, Future of Peace operations
program &Civilians in Conflict Project lead, Stimson Center.
42 OCHA’s Situation Reports on the Central African Republic:
www.unocha.org/about-us/publications/humanitarian-reports.
44 2015 Strategic Response Plan Central African Republic:
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Final%20
SRP%20CAR%202015.pdf
63 Each conflict-related incident differs in severity, thus displacing a
different number of people, and decreases in conflict will allow for
the return of some individuals; however, this number seeks to show
the association of conflict to displacement, and the resulting average
per incident in 2014 (calculated by dividing the change in displaced
by the total number of conflict-related incidents).
45 Humanitarian Practice Network’s Needs Assessments in CAR:
www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-62/
needs-assessments-in-the-central-african-republic
64 Without an L3 declaration, the IASC principals can still request specific sectors to scale up and adapt their response or activate specific
L3 measures and protocols, including mobilizing resources.
46 These statistics represent data reported to IRC’s Women’s Protection
and Empowerment programs in CAR from the point when service-based data collection commenced through the GBV Information
Management System. The statistics include only information from
survivors who have consented to share their aggregate information.
The data is only from reported cases and is no way representative of
the total incidence or prevalence of GBV in CAR.
65 2015 Strategic Response Plan Central African Republic: https://
docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAR/CAR%20SRP%202015.pdf
43 2014 Strategic Response Plan Central African Republic:
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Revision_2014_CAR_0.pdf
48 UNICEF Press Release – UNICEF Calls for Cessation of Child
Recruitment in the Central African Republic: www.unicef.org/media/
media_67117.html
49 Save the Children - The urgent Need to Demobilise Children from
Armed Groups in the Central African Republic: www.savethechildren.
org.uk/resources/online-library/briefing-caught-combat-zone
50 UN News Center - Central African Republic Armed Groups Agree to
Release Child Soldiers, says UNICEF: www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=50771#.VWSeqdLBzGc
51 Save the Children Press Release - While Life-Saving Funding Stalls,
Severe Psychological Trauma Effects Over Half of Children: www.
savethechildren.net/article/while-life-saving-funding-stalls-severepsychological-trauma-affects-more-half-children
52 WHO 2011 Global Statistics: www.who.int/whosis/whostat/2011/en/
53 Health posts are community-run health centers for villages that do
not have easy access to government-administered health centers
and hospitals.
54 OCHA CAR Situation Report, No. 53: https://gallery.mailchimp.com/
ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/OCHA_CAR_Situation_Report_No_53.pdf
55 In addition, protracted displacement, food insecurity, increased morbidity, a lack of medical care, and poor access to water, sanitation and
hygiene (WASH) facilities will likely cause these figures to increase,
OCHA CAR Situation Report, No. 54: http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20CAR%20Situation%20
Report%20No%2054.pdf
66 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2015/
67 FAO: www.fao.org/fishery/facp/CAF/fr
68 Quandl: www.quandl.com/c/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-inflation, UN Data: https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.
aspx?crName=Central
69 FAO Stat: http://faostat.fao.org/desktopdefault.aspx?pageid=342&lang=en&country=3 7
73 Means were determined through literature review, most commonly
cited impacts on food security as noted by FAO and the UN.
74 WFP’s Food Basket: www.wfp.org/nutrition/WFP-foodbasket
75 OCHA Financial Tracking Service: http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32_A1029___15_May_2015_(11_22).pdf
76 WFP: http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/
BR/200050_1006. Pdf, www.wfp.org/nutrition/special- nutritional-products, http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/
BR/200050_1006. pdf)
77 OCHA Financial Tracking Service: http://fts.unocha.org/reports/
daily/ocha_R32_A1029___15_May_2015_(11_22).pdf
56 FAO, GIEWS Country Briefs on Central African Republic: www.fao.
org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=CAF
57 FAO – Central African Republic Farming and Families Hit by Insecurity: www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/263271/icode/
58 Knoema World Data Atlas: http://knoema.com/atlas/Central-African-Republic/CPI-inflation
59 FAO – Central African Republic Farming and Families Hit by Insecurity: www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/263271/icode/
60 The model does not propose to predict the level of conflict or the
level of humanitarian aid, but rather to evaluate the effect on humanitarian need at various levels of aid and conflict. The model acts as
an “if-then” statement, specifically: if the following assumptions are
accurate, and the following conditions are met, then it is likely the
following outcome will occur.
61 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1029
Acknowledgments
Author: Francisca Vigaud-Walsh
Contributor: Vanessa M. Roy, Kate Phillips-Barrasso
Researcher: Francisca Vigaud-Walsh, Vanessa M. Roy
Reviewer: Paul Taylor, Anne-Marie Brinkman, Alison Giffen,
Aditi Gorur
Typesetting: Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk
Vice President, Public Policy & Advocacy:
Sharon Waxman
Photos: All photos by Peter Biro/IRC except: p.5, 7, 18, 25,
David Belluz and p.32, Francisca Vigaud-Walsh
40
The International Rescue Committee responds to the world’s worst
humanitarian crises, helping to restore health, safety, education, economic
wellbeing, and power to people devastated by conflict and disaster. Founded
in 1933 at the call of Albert Einstein, the IRC is at work in 40 countries and
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Too Soon to Turn Away - International Rescue Committee

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