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LAUNCH
Power Projection from Aircraft Carriers:
Naval Aviation in Korea
Adapted from a Department of the Navy Fact Sheet
Ed. Note: One of the Tailhook Association themes for 2016 is “The Role of Carrier
Aviation — Past, Present and Future.” To support the theme this is Part III in a threepart series of articles that account for some historical and mission perspectives.
S
ix months into the 1950s decade, the United States and its United
Nations Allies were involved in fighting what was to become a
three‑year limited ground and air war against North Korea and its
Chinese Allies on the Korean Peninsula.
The U.S. Navy’s (USN) primary role at the outset of the Korean War
was to help the United Nations (UN) Command avert a disaster in the
Far East. The mobility of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the forward basing
of its major combat element, the U.S. Seventh Fleet (7th Flt), allowed
President Harry S. Truman to support his decision to oppose what he saw
as a communist challenge in Asia. Soon after the North Korean invasion,
he announced that the United States, as part of a UN Coalition, would
use military force to preserve the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.
President Truman also made it clear that the use of Chinese communist
forces, and by implication then‑Soviet air and naval forces to broaden the
war in Asia would be challenged.
USN
Below: Artist R.G. Smith’s oil painting
of AD-4 Skyraiders torpedo attack by
VA‑195 against the Hwachon Dam, 50
miles northeast of the South Korean
capital of Seoul, 1 May ’51. Insert:
A VA‑195 AD-4 Skyraider carrying a
torpedo en route to the Hwachon Dam.
During the first week of the war, 7th Flt aircraft carrier USS Valley
Forge (CV‑45), heavy cruiser Rochester (CA‑124), eight destroyers and
three submarines were especially busy. The fleet displayed its strength
along the Chinese coast. Valley Forge air squadrons also bombed airfields
and rail yards in Pyongyang, North Korea, then beyond the range of the
U.S. Air Force planes in Japan. The North Korean capital was the nerve
center of the enemy’s military establishment.
With the release of documents from the archives in Moscow and
Beijing, it is clear that the Navy’s rapid show of force deterred the Chinese
communists from carrying out a long‑planned amphibious assault on the
island of Taiwan, which was held by anti‑communist Chinese Nationalist
forces. An invasion of Taiwan would have widened the conflict in the Far
East. Moreover, the quick deployment to the Far East of U.S. naval and
land‑based air forces influenced Soviet Premier Josef Stalin to withdraw an
earlier pledge of Soviet air support for the North Korean attack.
Throughout the Korean War, USN submarines and
aircraft patrolled between the Soviet Union and the
combat theater, not only to warn of surprise attacks, but
to discourage such attacks. Other submarines and patrol
planes and carrier task forces (TF), operated off the long
Chinese coast in a similar deterrence role.
R.G. Smith
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The Hook, Summer 2016
USN
Maintaining Sea Superiority
The Korean War found the USN in a transitional period of changing
to jet aircraft and modernizing its fleet. At the beginning of the decade,
mostly propeller‑driven aircraft flew from Essex (CVA‑9)‑class carriers,
light carriers (CVLs) and escort carriers (CVEs).
The object of the USN’s combat operations was to maintain superiority
at sea and in Far Eastern skies.
It was no coincidence that at no time during the war did the People’s
Republic of China or the Soviet Union use the sea or the air above it to
support communist forces on the Korean Peninsula.
The fleet’s presence in the Western Pacific and its
quick move to Korean waters helped MacArthur’s
Far East Command to slow down the enemy’s 1950
ground offensive, hold a precarious beachhead
on the peninsula and build up forces ashore for a
counteroffensive.
One of the allies’ first actions was to destroy
North Korean naval vessels. The North Korean navy
operated only 45 small vessels, but they were pressed
into the enemy’s initial assault primarily to transport
supplies to forces advancing along both coasts. In the
early hours of the attack, the enemy also used naval
vessels in a bold, strategic attempt to seize Pusan
by landing 600 troops near the port. Pusan was one
of South Korea’s largest ports, and its location in
southeastern Korea across from logistic support bases
in Japan also made it vital to the allied cause. A North Korean victory
there could have doomed the allied effort to retain a toehold in South
Korea.
The Tide of Battle Turns at Inchon
The fleet’s great mobility and control of the seas enabled General of
the Army MacArthur and the UN Command to turn the tide of battle.
In mid‑September 1950, Commander 7th Flt and Commander TF‑77
VADM Arthur D. Struble, USN, led an armada of 230 amphibious and
other ships in a surprise amphibious assault on the port of Inchon on
Korea’s west coast. Named Operation Chromite, the 1st and 5th Marine
Regiments of the 1st Marine Division spearheaded the
attack. Enemy and Allied leaders alike had doubted that a
major amphibious operation could be successful at Inchon,
USN
Above: VF-172 McDonnell F2H-2 Banshee landing on
USS Essex (CV-9) after its initial combat flight over Korea
25 Aug ’51.
Right: VA-65 Douglas AD-4 Skyraider launches with full
bomb load from Valley Forge (CV-45), c. 1951.
The Hook, Summer 2016
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Public domain
crucial close air support (CAS). Navy and Marine Corps
aviators launched more than 1,700 sorties during one week of
the operation. At the same time, battleship Missouri (BB‑63),
cruisers St. Paul (CA‑73) and Rochester and a score of
destroyers and rocket ships provided CAS around the
embarking allied troops. More than 23,000 16‑in., 8‑in.,
5‑in. and 3‑in. rounds and rockets fell on Chinese and North
Korean forces moving against the UN defensive perimeter.
By Christmas Eve, when USN explosive teams destroyed the
port facilities at Hungnam, the USN had withdrawn 105,000
troops, 91,000 civilian refugees, 350,000 tons of cargo and
17,500 military vehicles. Another 3,600 troops, 1,300 tons
of cargo and 196 vehicles had been airlifted out by Air Force
and Marine Corps aircraft.
Blockading the Coastlines
The navies of the UN coalition also maintained a blockade
of North Korea’s coastlines. This prevented the enemy from
using the sea and also allowed Allied ships to move about
in relative freedom. This strategic advantage also enabled
UN Command surface ships and submarines to land USN
underwater demolition teams, U.S. Marines, British Royal
Marine commandos, South Korean commandos and other
special forces on both Korean coasts and on many coastal
islands. The elite units destroyed enemy railways and
where the high tide ranged between 23–35 feet. At low tide,
attacking ships faced the risk of being stuck in the mud.
Furthermore, two fortified islands blocked access to the
port of Inchon. Following days of bombardment by carrier
planes and shelling by cruisers, destroyers and other naval
gunfire support ships, elements of the 5th Marines, part of
X Corps, initiated the assault at 0633 on 15 September. By
the early morning hours of 16 September their objectives
had been secured.
MacArthur hoped for another Inchon‑like landing on the
eastern coast of North Korea. What slowed the amphibious
operation was the fleet’s discovery of between 2,000 – 4,000
Soviet‑supplied magnetic and contact mines blocking the
approaches to the port at Wonsan. Several USN minesweepers
were sunk before the troops could land. The setback at
Wonsan resulted from the USN’s prewar reductions in the
mine warfare force, failure to provide adequate equipment
and general inattention to mine warfare. Despite the
difficulties at Wonsan, TF‑95 minesweeping force registered
successes, such as the loss‑free opening of the sea channel to
Chinnampo, the port serving captured Pyongyang.
In November 1950, the Communist Chinese People’s
Liberation Army entered the war to assist the North Korean
Army. The U.S. X Corps found itself outnumbered and
dangerously overextended in the heart of North Korea. The
allied command decided that X Corps, comprised of the
1st Marine Division and the Army’s 3d and 7th Infantry
Divisions, and three South Korean divisions of the I and II
Corps would be evacuated by sea from the eastern ports of
Hungnam and Wonsan.
Jim Barnes collection via Warren Thompson
Naval Support at Chosin
The withdrawal began 10 December 1950, when TF‑90
embarked elements of the 1st Marine Division, which had
just finished an arduous fighting withdrawal from the Chosin
Reservoir. Fleet carriers Philippine Sea (CV‑47), Valley Forge
(CV‑45), Princeton (CV‑37) and Leyte (CV‑32) and three
escort carriers had provided the American ground troops with
Above: ENS Jesse L. Brown, USN, the first African-American Naval
Aviator, on board USS Leyte (CV-32) with fellow pilots, c. 1950.
Note: See The Hook, Spring 2015, page 24, for the story of the loss
of ENS Brown near the Chosin Reservoir, 4 Dec ’50.
Right: A VF-72 Grumman F9F-2 Panther on a bombing run at a
bridge in North Korea. VF-71 was on USS Bon Homme Richard
(CVA-31) during CVG-7s 1952 Korean War deployment.
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The Hook, Summer 2016
Jim Barnes collection via Warren Thompson
railway tunnels, highway bridges and supply depots.
UN naval forces also landed Korean guerrillas ashore
for long operations behind enemy lines. In a major
effort from 16 February 1951 to the end of the Korean
War, the fleet prevented the enemy from using the port
of Wonsan by subjecting it to bombardment by air units,
battleships, cruisers and destroyers of TF‑95. History of
the war also credits this operation with diverting 80,000
North Korean troops from frontline duty.
Sea control was especially important during the
last two years of the war, when the enemy launched
numerous ground operations whose objectives were to
force the UN to withdraw its troops from Korea — the
best‑case scenario — or to improve their negotiating
position in the cease‑fire talks held at Panmunjom. Sea
power was a major factor in frustrating these communist
goals and persuading the enemy to sign the Armistice
agreement ending the Korean War 27 July 1953.
Those Who Served
More than 265,000 Navy personnel served in Korea
during the war — a sizeable proportion of the 5,720,000
other Americans. Four hundred seventy‑five USN
personnel were killed in action; another 4,043 Sailors
died from disease or injury; and 1,576 were
wounded in action during this first major
conflict of the Cold War era.
USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA‑31) and Uhlman (DD‑687) refueling from Guadalupe (AO‑32) during
a 1952 Korean War deployment with CVG‑7 embarked.
Chronology of Air Group Deployments
Days
Deployed
Dates
Aircraft Carrier
Commanding Officer
Commander
Air Group
Air Wing
1 May ’50 – 1 Dec ’50
214
USS Valley Forge (CV-45)
CAPT L.K. Rice
CAG-5
CDR H.P. Lanham
24 Jul ’50 – 7 Apr ’51
287
USS Philippine Sea (CV-47)
CAPT W.K. Goodney
CAG-11
CDR R.W. Rynd
79
USS Boxer (CV-21)
CAPT C. Briggs
CAG-2
CDR D.M. White
6 Sep ’50 – 3 Feb ’51
150
USS Leyte (CV-32)
CAPT T.U. Sisson
CAG-2
CDR W.F. Madden
9 Nov ’50 – 29 May ’51
201
USS Princeton (CV-37)
CAPT W.O. Gallery
CAG-19
CDR C.R. Stapler
6 Dec ’50 – 7 Apr ’51
144
USS Valley Forge (CV-45)
CAPT J.M. Carlson
CAG-2
CDR R.W. Rynd
2 Mar ’51 – 24 Oct ’51
236
USS Boxer (CV-21)
CAPT D.J. Sullivan
CAG-101
CDR W.W. Brehm
24 Aug ’50 – 11 Nov ’50
25 Mar ’51 – 9 Jun ’51
USS Philippine Sea (CV-47)
CAPT I.E. Hobbs
CAG-2
CDR R.W. Rynd
10 May ’51 – 17 Dec ’51
221
76
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV-31)
CAPT C.B. Gill
CAG-102
CDR H.W. Fink
26 Jun ’51 – 25 Mar ’52
273
USS Essex (CV-9)
CAPT A.W. Wheelok
CAG-5
CDR M.U. Beebe
8 Sep ’51 – 2 May ’52
237
USS Antietam (CV-36)
CAPT G.J. Dufek
CAG-15
CDR R.F. Farrington
15 Oct ’51 – 3 Jul ’52
262
USS Valley Forge (CV-45)
CAPT O. Pederson
ATG-1
CDR C.H. Crabill Jr.
31 Dec ’51 – 8 Aug ’52
221
USS Philippine Sea (CV-47)
CAPT A. Smith Jr.
CAG-11
CDR J.W. Onstott
8 Feb ’52 – 26 Sep ’52
231
USS Boxer (CV-21)
CAPT D.J. Sullivan
CAG-2
CDR A.L. Downing
21 Mar ’52 – 3 Nov ’52
227
USS Princeton (CV-37)
CAPT P.D. Stroop
CAG-19
CDR W. Denton Jr.
20 May ’52 – 8 Jan ’53
233
USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31) CAPT P.W. Watson
CAG-7
CDR G.B. Brown
16 Jun ’52 – 8 Jan ’53
235
USS Essex (CVA-9)
CAPT W.F. Rodee
ATG-2
CDR J.G. Daniels III
11 Aug ’52 – 17 Mar ’53
218
USS Kearsarge (CVA-33)
CAPT L.E. French
CAG-101
CDR H.P. Ady
15 Sep ’52 – 18 May ’53
245
USS Oriskany (CVA-34)
CAPT C. Shands
CAG-102
CDR G.P. Chase
20 Nov ’52 – 25 Jun ’53
217
USS Valley Forge (CVA-45)
CAPT R.E. Dixon
CAG-5
CDR C.V. Johnson
15 Dec ’52 – 14 Aug ’53
242
USS Philippine Sea (CVA-47)
CAPT P.H. Ramsey
CAG-9
CDR T.D. Harris
24 Jan ’53 – 21 Sep ’53
240
USS Princeton (CVA-37)
CAPT W.R. Hollingsworth
CAG-15
CDR J.E. Parks
30 Mar ’53 – 28 Nov ’53
243
USS Boxer (CVA-21)
CAPT M.B. Gurney
ATG-1
CDR L.A. Whitney
26 Apr ’53 – 4 Dec ’53
222
USS Lake Champlain (CVA-39)
CAPT L.B. Southerland
CAG-4
CDR J.R. Sweeney
Note: In addition to air group deployments listed above, light carrier and escort carrier deployments with
USN and Marine Corps squadrons or detachments embarked included USS Bataan (CVL‑29), Rendora
(CVE‑114), Bairoko (CVE‑115), Badoeng Strait (CVE‑116), Sicily (CVE‑18) and Point Cruz (CVE‑119).
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