(Safety Culture Ms Kerhoas)SCAK [Compatibility Mode

Workshop on Establishing a Safety Infrastructure for a
National Nuclear Power Programme
July 4 - 15, 2011
IAEA, Vienna
Safety culture during pre-operational phases
of nuclear power programmes
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Anne Kerhoas
IAEA
Outlines
• IAEA draft safety reports series on SC
during pre-Operational phases of nuclear
power programme (version of 16 June 2011)
• Key elements of management system
• SC oversight, recent developments
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IAEA draft safety reports series on SC
during pre-Operational phases of
nuclear power programme (version of 16
June 2011)
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Background(1)
General experience feedback from NPP construction projects
•The Owner’s or representative’s inability to adequately control all aspects of the
construction project, including planning, scheduling, procurement, and oversight of
contractors;
•Inexperience with nuclear plant construction, resulting in utilities and their
contractors not fully appreciating the complexity and difficulty associated with
building a nuclear power plant and therefore the importance of nuclear-related
standards;
•A false sense of security growing out of prior successes;
•A failure to establish an atmosphere that encourages problem reporting and
resolution at all levels of the organization;
•A failure to delegate authority commensurate with responsibility; and
•A failure to have clear communication pathways across all project interfaces.
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Background (2)
Experience feedback at the site level
•Poor communication between design and construction organizations and within organizations
participating in construction;
•Overconfidence in personnel with little nuclear industry experience and inadequate oversight and
training;
•Ineffective problem identification, inadequate reporting, and inadequate corrective actions;
•Unrealistic and aggressive schedules to complete designs sufficiently ahead of construction;
•Inadequate assignment of responsibilities and authority to control assigned work;
•Inadequate communication of nuclear power plant specific requirements on quality and quality
control from the plant vendor to subcontractors at the tendering stage and in purchase agreements;
•Inadequate understanding by vendors and contractors of the special work practices required for
performing work in the nuclear field;
•Inadequate training of subcontractors and manufacturers regarding the importance to safety of
their work and the special requirements for the construction of nuclear power plants; and
•Over reliance on subcontractors by the owner.
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Integrated framework model
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IAEA APPROACH TO SAFETY CULTURE
FROM INSAG 4 TO PRESENT
1992
1998
1999
2006 2009
2002
INSAG 7
INSAG 1
1986 1991
1995
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1999
2003
2008
TECDOC 1329-2002(C)
• Broadens the concept to disciplines such as
anthropology and psycho sociology
French philosopher, Jean Baudrillard
“To open our eyes to the absurdity of
our own customs is
the charm and benefit of travel”
• Proposes a significant presentation of the
organizational model developed by the Swiss
psychologist, Edgar Schein
• Points out the diversity of safety culture
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IAEA safety culture framework
• SAFETY IS A CLEARLY
•
•
•
•
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RECOGNIZED VALUE
LEADERSHIP FOR SAFETY
IS CLEAR
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
SAFETY IS CLEAR
SAFETY IS INTEGRATED IN
ALL ACTIVITIES
SAFETY IS LEARNING
DRIVEN
…
…INCLUDING
37 SAFETY CULTURE
ATTRIBUTES
Safety culture and new programme
• All various definitions of SC, indicate that the core meaning is :
to prioritize safety as a shared value within an organization.
• In order to work with safety culture, organizations should spend
sufficient time to reach a common understanding since the
concept by its nature is difficult to explain in a few sentences.
Culture is a dynamic concept that encompasses everything that
happens in an organization. It affects what we do, what we
think, and what we make sense of – it is our collective
understanding of reality. Therefore, to eliminate ambiguity, it is
valuable for an organization to share perspectives about what
safety culture encompasses in day to day work-related tasks.
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Promote understanding of nuclear safety and safety culture
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Countries initiating a new NPP programme
•
•
•
•
•
•
Become signatories to all applicable IAEA and international conventions, and commit to
engage in international cooperation and support. Review international requirements and
standards.
Establish intergovernmental agreements between the participant country and the vendor
country to provide a foundation on which to build contracts.
…
Perform an early assessment of national and local cultural attributes in relation to
safety awareness and attitudes toward risk. National and local cultures are the context
within which safety culture must be developed. Efforts should be directed at strategies for
countering attributes that would hinder the development of a strong safety culture.
Assign leaders with an understanding of and commitment to developing a strong
safety culture. Such leaders have the courage to promote organizational learning by
questioning established practices, revitalizing complacent organizations, and helping
those who are not familiar with best practices.
Engage external expertise in the early phases, specifically in the areas of safety,
safety culture, human performance, organizational design, management system
design, and regulatory development.
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Regulatory bodies(1)
1.Prescriptive strategy
This approach establishes detailed regulations and requirements for
conducting activities. Regulators require significant expertise to implement
this approach. Detailed review and approval of licensee activities may
cause a perceived shift in nuclear safety accountability to the regulator.
Licensees may become dependent on detailed requirements,
expectations, and approvals from the regulator.
2.Case-based strategy
In this approach the regulator does not develop universal requirements
that apply equally to all licensees of a particular type of facility. The
regulator determines the safety performance of each licensee through
individual assessments and considers the unique history of each facility.
Although this approach takes into account specific circumstances, it may
be perceived as arbitrary and inconsistent by the operating organization.
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Regulatory bodies(2)
3.Outcome-based strategy
This approach establishes specific goals for licensees but does not specify
how licensees attain these goals. This approach allows the licensee to
determine how they will conduct activities, but learning may be less
proactive, and may take place only after failures occur.
4.Risk-based strategy
This approach identifies areas and systems of significant potential risk. It
requires regulators and operators to identify what areas of the NPP are
likely to initiate an accident and how serious the accident might be. This
results in safety focus on these areas; however, not enough attention may
be given to other areas, particularly human system and organizational
aspects required to support a strong safety culture.
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Regulatory bodies(3)
5.Process-based or system-based strategy
The regulator identifies key processes and systems needed for safe
operation and requires licensees to establish and implement these
processes and systems effectively. This approach takes a systemic view of
safety and includes physical and organizational aspects. This approach
has a positive impact on safety culture since it covers the entire system yet
allows the licensee to determine how the work will be done.
6.Self-assessment based strategy
Licensees develop and implement a self-assessment programme to
identify good practices and areas needing improvement. This approach
fosters learning and adoption of best practices; however, the regulator may
become too dependent on the licensee for information on plant
performance.
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Key elements of management system
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Differences
IAEA GS-R-3
FOCUS
ISO 9001:2008
Management
Responsibility
Measure
Assess and
Improve
Nuclear
Safety
Process
Implementation
Management
Responsibility
Resource
Management
Measure
Assess and
Improve
Customer
Product
Realization
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Resource
Management
Integration-IAEA GS-R-3
Employees
Shareholders
Requirements
Requirements
Customer
Requirements
Regulator
Requirements
Nuclear
Safety
Supplier
Requirements
Society
Requirements
IAEA GS-R-3 INTEGRATES REQUIREMENTS OF ALL
FACTORS AFFECTING THE ACTIVITIES
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Differences at requirements’ level
•
•
•
•
•
Management system
Management responsibility
Resource management
Process implementation
Measurement, assessment and
improvement
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Management system (cont.)
• Safety culture
The promotion of and support for a strong safety culture, an
integral part of IAEA GS-R-3
Safety culture is not a requirement of ISO 9001:2008
• Grading application
The graded application of requirements is an integral feature of
IAEA GS-R-3 but is not a stated requirement in ISO 9001:2008.
There is in ISO 9001:2008, however, the implied use of the
concept of a graded approach in the application of a few specific
requirements, for instance, by the use of wording such as “as
appropriate…,” “where appropriate...,” “where applicable…,”
“as necessary…,” “where necessary…,” or “the extent of…” in
the text or explanatory notes of these requirements.
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Management responsibility
Responsibility
& Commitment
CEO
Directors
Department
Managers
Section Managers
Foremen
STAFF
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ISO 9001:2008
Top Management
shall provide evidence
of its commitment in the
development and
implementation of the
quality management
system
Management Commitment
In IAEA GS-R-3, senior management has a number
of responsibilities not specified in ISO 9001:2008 ; they
include:
• Developing individual values, institutional values and
•
•
•
•
behavioral expectations…
Communicating to the individuals the needs to adopt these
values and expectations
Fostering the involvement of the individuals…
Establishing and developing the goals, strategies,
plans and objectives of the organization…
…
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Self-assessment
IAEA GS-R-3
Responsibility
& Commitment
Requires senior management &
management at all other levels in the
organization to carry-out selfassessment
ISO 9001:2008
CEO
Directors
Department
Managers
Section Managers
Has not the equivalent
IAEA
Foremen
STAFF
Independent assessment
IAEA GS-R-3
• Independent assessments
• The establishment of an organizational unit with the
responsibility for conducting independent assessments
ISO 9001:2008
• There are no similar requirements
• But, requires internal audits of the quality management
system to be conducted
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SC oversight, recent developments
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International Atomic Energy Agency
The basis for the regulatory oversight
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Some features of the oversight process
• The approaches implemented could be constrainted by the resources
• There is a need for people trained and skilled in recognizing safety culture
•
•
•
•
•
•
relevant information and in formulating SC elements findings
The process should integrate an holistic approach
Multidisciplinary team
Several and various sources of information are necessary for identifying SC
elements findings and for probing at a deeper level into behaviors, attitudes,
and values
The findings shall be validated and the wordings shall remain factual
Validation of findings requires the correlation of observed facts with relevant
SC attributes
Issuing straightforward conclusions based on limited information should be
refrained!
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SC oversight (1)
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SC oversight (2)
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