Free access

S. Daniel Abraham Center
for Strategic Dialogue
Peace - Dream or Vision:
A Decade Since the
Assassination of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin
The S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue,
operating out of the Netanya Academic College, is
a unique institution dedicated to stabilizing regional
and global conflicts by combining academic pursuits
with on-the-ground efforts. The Center represents
a multi-faceted approach to the growing threat of
regional and global disputes, by offering solutiondriven initiatives based on practical experience and
realistic goals.
The Center provides a combination of political,
security, academic and economic solutions to
conflicts by assembling teams of former politicians,
community leaders, security experts, distinguished
academics and prominent international business
leaders, each of whom offer the expertise in their
respective fields.
International Management
Mikhail Gorbachev, former President of the USSR
Co-Chairman
Prince Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan
Co-Chairman
Steering Committee
Mr. Trevor Spiro, Co-Chairman
Professor Zvi Arad, Founder and President of Netanya Academic College
Dr. David Altman, Senior Vice President, Netanya Academic College Deputy Chairman of the Center
Professor Joseph Ginat, Vice President of International Relations and Research, Netanya Academic College,
Director of the Center
Att. Zaki Kamal, Senior Advisor
Professor Moshe Maoz, Deputy Director
Dr. Reuven Pedatzur, Academic Director
Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Baruch Spiegel, Advisor to the Directory Board
Ms. Aviva Palter, Head of International Activities & Conference Director
Ambassador Yitzchak Mayer, Senior Advisor
Mr. Dov Ben Meir, European Affairs Advisor
Ambassador Alon Pinkas, North American Advisor
Mr. Elie Friedman, Coordinator
Conference Book Editor: Aviva Palter
Editing of Lectures: Howard Epstein, Elie Friedman
Graphic Design: Studio David Harel/Liat Harel
Printd In Israel © Copyright–SDC 2007
Board of Governors
Frederick W. De Klerk, former President of South
Africa Abdurrahman Wahid, former President of
Indonesia Mr. Berndt Schmidtbauer, former German
Minister of State Mr. James Woolsey, former Central
Intelligence Agency Director Mr. Louis Freeh, former
FBI Director Mr. Ya’akov Perry, former Head of General
Security Service Ambassador Edwin Corr, Director,
International Programs Center, University of Oklahoma Dr.
Shmuel Bar, Islamic radicalism expert Mr. Ram Caspi,
LLB, Caspi and Co Mr. Yehuda Raveh, LLB, Yehuda
Raveh & Co. Mr. Yossi Sadeh, advocate Cmdr. (ret.)
Arieh Amit, former Jerusalem Police Chief Cmdr .(ret.)
Gabi Last, chairman of Delek Group Commissioner
(ret.) Assaf Hefetz, former Israel Police Commissioner
Mr. Larry King, journalist, CNN Dr. Giora Eliraz, The
Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement
of Peace, Hebrew University, Jerusalem Gen. Mansour
Abu-Rashid, Chairman, Amman Center for Peace and
Development Maj. Gen. (ret.) David Ivri, National
Security Adviser, former Israeli Ambassador to Washington,
former Director-General of Israel’s Defense Ministry,
former IAF Commander Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yomtov
Samya, former General of the Southern Command
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Ya’akov Amidror, Vice President of
the Ladner Institute Mr. Moshe Ortass, entrepreneur
Ambassador Dr Edward J. Perkins, Chair and
Executive Director of the International Programs Center,
The University of Oklahoma Dr. Lawrence Kennedy,
President, Church on the Rock International Prof.
Bernard Pinchuk, Vice President and Rector, Netanya
Academic College Prof. Gabi Ben-Dor, Director,
International Security Research Center, Haifa Prof. Sinai
Deutsch, Senior Vice President, Dean of the Law School,
Netanya Academic College Prof. Theodor Postol,
MIT, USA Dr. Barry A. Feinstein, Senior Lecturer in
International Law, School of Law, Netanya Academic
College Mr. Shmuel Dankner, Dankner Investments
Mr. Yitzhak Teshuva, Delek Co. Mr. Jerry Feldman
and Mr. Michael Feldman, GP Strategies, USA. Mr.
Paul Ahlstrom, VSpring Capital Mr. R. Cameron
Walker, Vice President, Bank of America Investments Mr.
Elisha Yanai, President, Motorola Pastor Dr. Gerald
Mann, Riverbend Baptist Church in Austin, Texas Mrs.
Tovah Felds, award-winning Broadway actress
A decade marking the murder of Yitzhak Rabin is one of the most significant times in the life of a
nation.
Beyond the terrible pain and shock that accompanied the heinous murder, ten years is a space of
time to provide a perspective for a nation engaged in a process of profound soul-searching of itself
and its surroundings and preoccupied with learning the lessons of this period.
When the senior advisor to the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue, Ambassador
Yitzhak Mayer came to see me, proposing that we hold a memorial conference to mark this decade, I
welcomed his suggestion warmly, and I personally accompanied the preparations for this conference.
I considered it a mission which an academic institution in Zion needs to shoulder.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to express my pride in the fact that the Netanya Academic
College chose to lead the events relating to Rabin’s memorial at an academic, widely-participated
conference, attended by former world leaders side by side with senior ministers from Asia, Europe,
Africa and the United States – all of them coming here to pay tribute to the late Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin and express their solidarity with the State of Israel that is struggling against terror from within
as well as from the outside.
This occurrence was also a salute to all those who genuinely seek to obtain peace in the Middle
East – to all those who are not prepared to stand idly by the expectation of a better tomorrow, to
all those who are the doers and who take action.
Since that conference, the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue has promoted a number
of initiatives and ventures prompted by the search for peace, security, and understanding between
the peoples of the region.
I deem it only right to note the very special part played by the Chairman of the Center at the time,
M.K. Danny Yatom, who contributed most generously to the success of the conference, and may
blessings and rewards come to all those who were engaged in this work.
Prof. Zvi Arad
President
Netanya Academic College
Peace - Dream or Vision:
A Decade Since the Assassination
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
The purpose of the conference “Peace – Dream or Vision: A Decade Since the Assassination
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin”, was not to recall the heinous event in which our beloved Prime
Minister was murdered by an evildoer; it was rather to engage in serious, incisive soul-searching,
to look deep inside ourselves and at the world, and to face the fact that our leader was taken
from us – a man with the strength and ability to bring about a historical change in our region.
At the conference, participants discussed the void that has been left by Yitzhak Rabin’s
absence, as well as possibilities for individuals, groups, and nations to continue along the
path he blazed. At the conference, we attempted to understand how a society reacts to such
a traumatic event, an earthquake that shattered an entire society. The conference examined
several issues, including the world’s attitude towards the peace process as well as its duties
towards this process, the question of whether peace is contingent on events or on leaders,
and the current direction of the Middle East conflict. On several levels, the conference fulfilled
our expectations. The participation of a great number of statesmen and former ministers from
the region and from distant locations illustrated how deeply Rabin’s murder affected people
all around the world, and how the trauma caused by this horrid event is shared so universally.
Despite the widespread identification with Rabin’s path and message, our region has still yet
to undergo the creative breakthrough that would make his dream a reality. Instead the situation
in our region continues to tragically and rapidly deteriorate.
Conference participants analyzed various historical events that bore the stamp of Prime Minister
Rabin. Speakers emphasized that an opening had emerged for genuine dialogue between Israel
and the Palestinian Authority which, at that time, was ruled by Fatah. Conference participants
did not envision the political turnabout that took place in the Palestinian Authority, through
which Hamas rose to power. Such developments have proven some of the recommendations
offered by conference participants to be mistaken.
Above all, the conference was meant to serve as a global dialogue of meditation, analysis,
brainstorming and constructive thinking to enable positive developments for the future of our
region.
Conference participants came to the conclusion that there is a great need for a range of
multi-faceted frameworks for maintaining fruitful dialogue, in which the various issues can be
discussed openly and freely.
As the conference was attended by statesmen from various countries in addition to researchers
and academics, conference participants concluded that long-range plans for the region must
primarily be entrusted to academics, rather than to governments. Democratically elected
officials often refrain from long-term planning and difficult decision-making, due to both practical
constraints and the preoccupation with current and pressing issues. Only research institutions
can engage in the kind of far-reaching vision that can enlighten governmental decision-makers
to confront long-term issues.
Academic research must operate in conjunction with past, current and future decision makers
and statesmen to ensure that solutions presented have a broad historical perspective and a
long-term effect.
The academic world refrains from utilizing the slippery language of politics often used by decisionmakers. The innovative and creative thinking of research institutes can significantly contribute
to political decision-makers, by providing thorough analysis of various situations. Research
institutes have the ability to base their conclusions on a sober and objective investigation
of the possibilities of a given situation, always thinking of ways in which conclusions can be
implemented realistically through stages.
The conference was a type of salute to a unique political figure of valor and vision. Representatives
of the various countries who participated in the conference engaged in solemn soul-searching
regarding their previous approaches to the conflict, and provided concrete suggestions
regarding steps that need to be taken by all sides, including steps required by countries who
have attempted to mediate the conflict.
The conference proved that in our region there is not enough constructive dialogue, nor enough
original thinking free from prejudices and emotions, in attempting to deal with the Middle East
conflict.
The conference’s concluding discussions presented a certain historic window of opportunity –
however, the circumstances at the time were quite different than those confronting us today.
The obvious conclusion is that political and social processes are highly dynamic, and that we
must always be keenly attuned to these constant changes.
Dr. David Altman
Senior Vice President
Netanya Academic College
Prof. Joseph Ginat
Vice President of International Relations and Research
Director, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue
Netanya Academic College
Opening Session
Opening Greetings
By: Prof. Joseph Ginat
Director of the S. Daniel
Abraham Center for Strategic
Dialogue, Vice President for
International Relations and
Research, Netanya Academic
College
Good morning and welcome. In the
name of Netanya Academic College
and the Strategic Dialogue Center, I
am honored to start the conference
'Peace – Dream or Vision: A decade
since the assassination of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin.'
There are so many victims of terror
in Israel. There are many victims
of terror in Netanya, the city in
which we are gathered now. There
are victims of terror in the United
States, in Europe – Spain, England,
France – Egypt and Sinai. There are
recent victims of terror in Jordan.
We stand together with you, with
our neighbors.
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Pearl is here, whose son was
kidnapped, tortured, killed and
buried in Pakistan. And another name
I have to add is Ohav Sharif, who was
a good friend of many of us.
At the beginning of the conference,
I’d like to send, in the name of all
of us, a special greeting for a fast
recovery to our beloved President
of the College Professor Tzvi Arad.
He recently underwent surgery
and is now recovering. He sends
his greetings to you. He is a great
president, a wonderful person, and a
world-famous mathematician.
The Honorable Mayor of Netanya,
Miriam Fierberg-Ikar; Professor
Sinai Deutch, Acting President; Dr.
Bernard Pinchuk, Rector; Dr. David
Altman, Vice President; Member of
Knesset Danny Yatom, the director
of the Strategic Dialogue Center;
Vice President of the Strategic
Dialogue Center, Mr. Trevor Spiro;
Vice President of the Republic of
Congo, Dr. Arthur Z. Ngoma; Prime
Minister of Jordan Dr. Abd Al Slalam
Al Majali.
In the memory of the late Yizhak
Rabin and of the victims of terror, I
am asking you to rise for a moment
of silence.
I would like to ask of Dr. Majali
and General Mansour to send our
greetings to King Abdullah.
Thank you. In addition to the victims
of terror, I have to add that Judiah
I want to thank ministers of various
countries, vice-ministers, members
of Knesset, members of Parliaments,
the members of the board of Netanya
Academic College, representatives of
the European Union, lecturers, and
many other guests. I want to thank all
of those who have helped enormous
in organizing this conference. In this
conference, we have representatives
from four different continents – Asia,
Africa, Europe, and North America.
We thank you all for traveling
distances to attend.
Today, we have changed the name
of our center. From today forward,
our center will be known as the S.
Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic
Dialogue. Unfortunately, Daniel
Abraham could not attend due to a
last minute problem, so I am asking
Ambassador Dan Kurtzer to say a
few words in his name.
Greetings from Dan
Abraham
Greetings from the City
of Netanya
By: Ambassador Dan Kurtzer,
Former U.S. Ambassador to
Israel and Egypt
By: Miriam Fierberg-Ikar
Mayor of Netanya
I want to thank Professor Ginat for
giving me the opportunity to bring
greetings on behalf of Dan Abraham,
known to many of you as not only
a great friend of Israel and a great
friend of peace, but as one who has
dedicated so many resources to
developing the possibility of dialogue
and reconciliation between peoples.
It is therefore very appropriate that
this center at the Netanya Academic
College will now bear his name. I am
proud to announce my own close
association with this, because just
the other day Princeton University
appointed me as a professor of
contemporary Middle East policy
studies. Thus, the natural connection
between myself and this institution,
and between myself and Israel has
been renewed.
I would like to begin by welcoming
all of those who came from close by
and from far way, world leaders and
policy makers from Israel and from
the world at large. Good morning to
all of you.
I want to welcome you on behalf of
the 190,000 residents of Netanya,
the city that has absorbed in the last
decade over 63,000 immigrants from
the former Soviet Union, Ethiopia,
France, and many other countries.
Netanya is a successful and vibrant
city, which was given the prize this
year of being “Israel’s most beautiful
city”. Netanya has one of the more
beautiful beachfront promenades
in the world, and 13 kilometers of
golden beaches.
I am happy to host you in our
city, which has been given several
academic prizes, and contains within
its jurisdiction four colleges. As one
of the initiators of the founding of
Netanya Academic College, I am
proud of the S. Daniel Abraham
Center for Strategic Dialogue
– the framework organization of this
conference – and proud to open the
conference entitled 'Peace: Dream
or Vision', intended to commemorate
a decade since the assassination of
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
may he rest in peace.
Through dialogue, it is essential
to remember that we all must live
together here, within a complex and
fragile mix consisting of differences
of opinion. However, the feelings of
shock, disgust, and contempt with
respect to Rabin’s assassination are
common in all of us. Eitan Haber,
Rabin's bureau chief, expressed our
common feeling clearly during the
commemoration at Rabin square,
when he said, 'The mourning and
pain as a result of the assassination
do not belong to a particular political
camp. The tears do not have a
political coloring and are bitter to
all of us.'
Netanya:
continuing Rabin’s legacy
In Netanya, we have chosen to call
the developing Eastern part of our
city, where we are currently meeting,
‘Rabin Village’, and only meters from
here is the elementary school also
named after Yitzhak Rabin.
The choice to create a center that
deals with strategic dialogue towards
peace is anchored in the current
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situation of our city. Netanya, due
to its exposed location, reflects in the
bitterness of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Only a small strip of
land, approximately the length of
Broadway Avenue in Manhattan
sits between Israeli Netanya and
Palestinian Tulkarem.
During the Six Day War, the border
between the two cities fell. Citizens
of Tulkarem, Nablus, and Samaria in
general were welcomed by us with
good neighborliness. We opened the
gates of our city and the gates of our
hearts to them but were later struck
by horrible terror attacks.
A terror stricken city
Seven years ago, I was chosen as
the first female mayor in Israel. Then,
I did not know that I would have to
deal with five straight years of terror
attacks. Fourteen terror attacks have
taken place in Netanya amounting
to 62 deaths, among them babies,
children on their way to buy candies,
entire families sitting at the Passover
festive meal.
622 residents of Netanya were
injured and will be handicapped for
the rest of their lives.
In the tormented and wounded city
of Netanya, we buried our dead and
continued to build the city. We have
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wept and lamented our loved ones
and continued to build bridges and
pave roads. We offered consolation
to the bereaved families and we
established new child care centers
and schools.
During the city’s most difficult hours,
I would encourage residents of the
city by telling them that nobody could
succeed in silencing the beautiful
tune of the city.
And despite all of my frustration and
pain resulting from the terror attacks,
I answered the request of the local
government authorities to become
an active member of the negotiations
committee with the Palestinians and
took part in the talks that took place
in Greece, as the representative of all
mayors in Israel alongside Palestinian
mayors.
Believing in dialogue
I want to believe in dialogue. I want
to believe that our dream and vision
will become true peace as a result
of dialogue. Maybe the doctrine of
peace will spring forth from Netanya,
and our prayers will be answered and
our great desire for peace will be
shared by us and our neighbors!
The late Yizhak Rabin said in one of
his speeches at the White House,
'We all love the same children,
shed the same tears, hate the
same enemies, and we all pray for
reconciliation. Peace has no barriers.
'And this is why, despite all of the
tragedy, we will not ask ourselves if
the dream will be realized, but when
the dream will be realized.
The term 'peace' has been flown
as a banner for many years. We
are constantly pursuing peace, and
sometimes it seems like it is truly
within reach. However, that real
peace, between two nations who
have been hostile to one another
for generations, slips away time
and time again.
Peace requires vision. Its realization
requires a courageous heart. This
type of courage, we have shown
of late by conceding parts of our
land. This concession was heartwrenching, as difficult as handing
over parts of one’s own body. Such
a step is worthy of appreciation
and demands parallel actions from
the other side which have not yet
occurred.
As the late King Hussein said, 'The
children of Abraham from the three
great religions must make peace.'
Realizing the dream
We must pray that the God of our
common forefather will give the
two nations the required wisdom
to overcome the obstacles and
difficulties so that we can achieve
peace. May the prophesies of the
prophets Isaiah and Micah come
true: 'And they shall beat their swords
into plowshares, and their spears into
pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up
sword against nation; neither shall
they learn war any more.'
I will conclude with a personal note.
My son was born at the beginning
of the 1970s. The statement, 'When
you grow up, there will be no need
for you to serve in the army' was
very prevalent at the time. And now
as my grandson is on his way to
kindergarten, he will soon become
acquainted with the following words
of the great songwriter, Uzi Hitman,
who passed away a year ago:
'I was born for peace, may it arrive.
I was born for peace, may it come.
I was born for peace, may it appear. I
want, I want to be part of it already.'
I pray with him and with all of us. May
we have a very fruitful dialogue, and
welcome to all of you.
Greetings from the Rabin
Family
By: Dalia Rabin
Chair, Yitzhak Rabin Center
I would like to congratulate the
Netanya Academic College and
the Rabin Center for this mutual
project. We have decided to hold
this conference to commemorate ten
years since my father’s assassination.
We will hear, during the two days
of this conference, about the
relationship between Israel and its
neighbors, about the peace process,
and about our position ten years ago,
versus our position today.
Allow me to hand over the podium
to my brother.
By: Yuval Rabin
I would like to relate to two
separate incidents. Each one of us
has moments that are somehow
burned into our memories.
The first incident is as follows: It was
early 1975, and I had just graduated
an army officer’s course as a tank
officer. Very late at night, when I’m
positioned in Danny Yatom’s battalion, I
arrive for my first interview with Danny
who is my commander. I knew about
Danny’s past at this point and admired
and revered him greatly.
I distinctly remember the words he
told me about the expectations of the
young officers who had just come on
board, and I still remember clearly the
“dos” and “don’ts” that he pointed
out.
Those were times, just after the
1973 war, of rebuilding Israel’s
deterrent power, while at the same
time negotiating the first interim
agreement with Egypt, the first steps
towards the Camp David Accord.
'We will get the credit for
dismantling settlements'
The second incident I want to speak
of is related to the topic of this
conference. I think Dalia and I have
made it clear that we rarely had long
discussions with our father. It was
most always a one way lecture even
within the privacy of our home – he
spoke and we listened and from time
to time asked a question.
I remember asking my father a
question about the upcoming vote
on the Camp David Accords and
receiving a short and crisp answer.
At the time there was a proposal to
separate the vote on the accords into
two elements: the first regarding the
accord itself and second about the
idea of pulling out of settlements as a
concept. You can imagine who was
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in favor of separating it into two votes
(the Likud party) and who was against
(the Labor party). I asked my father,
'Why are you against separating the
votes?' His answer was clear: 'They
(the Likud party) will receive credit for
bringing the peace process, and we
(the Labor party) will get the credit
for dismantling settlements.'
I don’t think it’s a secret that my father
was no great fan of the Camp David
Accords. He viewed the Accords as a
departure from what he envisioned as
the way to peace and the road that
he had embarked upon during his
first term as Prime Minister.
I think it’s very relevant to what
we’ve seen within the context of
Oslo, which, in my opinion – and
this in no way is meant to diminish
its value - an implementation plan for
the Camp David Accords. It was an
implementation plan, which, unlike
the Camp David Accords, was
agreed to by the actual partners
who were meant to implement it.
Oslo has not been judged fairly
I think that Oslo, within the context
of an academic discussion, has
not been judged and evaluated
fairly and in many ways has been
labeled a failure for reasons that
have not been proven or evaluated
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correctly. Specifically, I’m referring
to the fact that the horrific wave
of terror that we’ve experienced
from 1994 onwards, with a few
lulls, is a direct result of the Oslo
Accords. I think that connection
requires better clarification, and I
do not believe that, had Oslo not
been signed, the status quo would
have been frozen as it was in the
early 1990s, and that we would
continue to only experience terror
at the pre-Oslo levels.
At the same time, we can achieve
an accurate comparison of the
different levels of opposition to the
Oslo Accords versus the opposition
to the Disengagement plan that
occurred last summer. I believe
that the differences are related to
the different levels of benefit that
the opposition leadership could
achieve by opposing the plan, in
each instance.
To sum up, is peace only a dream? I
honestly believe that peace is feasible
and with the right leadership on
both sides we can achieve it, not
within decades, but within the near
future.
Peace:
The Only Utopia on Earth
By: Dr. Arthur Z. Ngoma, Vice
President of Congo
When I speak in front of this
distinguished audience, I feel deep
inside me the great sense of hope
that I have spoken about on many
occasions – the hope that we will be
able to establish on earth the kingdom
of peace. We hope for cooperation
between people with morals and
values that will replace cooperation
between evil forces, which would
give people the power to overcome
obstacles in unity.
We live in a world in which our destiny
has become global – we share the
same destiny, the same fate. It is time
to cultivate the relationship between
various peoples and to engage in
cooperation that characterized by
justice and mutual respect. It is
time to understand that the culture
of war, hatred, and mistrust causes
poverty, fear, and death. It is time to
create relationships between peoples
through a culture of moral solidarity,
cooperation, and peace. It is time to
dismantle the true arms – the arms
that lie within the human spirit. Military
disarmament is what follows spiritual
disarmament.
Global cooperation as a must
We must find a basis for global
cooperation according to the mutual
interests of the community of nations
according to the principles of human
rights, first and foremost – the right
to live. The time has come to regard
differently the lives of the people in
the world’s ‘periphery’, in which
people seek freedom. These are all
ideas that resonate with the context
of this conference, which is intended
to commemorate 10 years since
the assassination of Prime Minister
Rabin, who was murdered because
he believed that war causes unlimited
hatred of the other and that it must
be abolished by the hope for peace
– a hope that lies inside each and
every one of us. Thanks to people like
Yitzhak Rabin, humanity has passed
through a necessary preliminary
stage on the way to peace.
The downfall of tyrannies, and the
inculcation of human rights and
democracy in areas where they were
previously foreign, will help us reach a
utopia of peace. This is the struggle
of people like Yitzhak Rabin.
I would like to see my invitation to this
wonderful conference as a chance
to celebrate the friendship that exists
between Israel and my country – the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Challenges of Congo
I would like to speak to you about
aspects of the crisis that my country
faces in its quest for peace. It is
difficult to understand the crisis in
Congo by analyzing ethnic or tribal
issues, but must be understood in
political terms.
Regarding foreign relations, we have
progressed greatly in negotiating with
our neighbors, thanks, in no small
part, to international assistance. We
are striving for a situation in which
militias will no longer be able to harm
civilians.
The loss of the legitimacy of
democratic rule is expressed twofold:
the problem of the legitimacy of
rule and that of conflicts between
neighboring countries in which certain
countries attempted to strip Congo
of its resources or rule over parts of
its territory. Today we understand the
importance of peace, that all is lost
through war, and gained through
peace. We are currently negotiating
with our neighbors to bring about
peace – the only utopia we strive for.
We believe that no country in our
region could prosper in a state of
war. In order to develop our region,
we must first establish a foundation
of peace.
When we see examples of bravery,
such as that of Yitzhak Rabin, we
can draw certain conclusions,
which have also been arrived at by
many scholars. For example, just
as we are against theft, we must be
against war. We must not hate one
another. We must not be torn apart
by violence and must establish the
divine goodness on earth that was
awarded to us.
Regarding our problems of the
internal legitimacy of rule, we are
currently engaged in projects
meant to rebuild the legitimate rule
of democracy. We are approaching
elections, which for us is a type of
miracle. We are currently in a stage
of political transition, and hope
that elections will take place at the
beginning of the next year.
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Israeli-Palestinian Peace:
A Human Security
Approach Rooted in Civil
Society
By: Michelin Calmy-Rey
Foreign Minister of
Switzerland
An incredible amount of human
energy, goodwill and ingenuity has
been devoted to the resolution of the
Near East conflict, and still there is
no end in sight, despite the fact that
a settlement would free the world
from the burden of the conflict and
would infuse the region with positive
momentum.
I am speaking on behalf of a neutral
country, a country with a long
tradition of direct democracy through
federalism system and of humanitarian
causes. Switzerland is the cradle of
the Geneva Conventions and of the
International Red Cross movement.
Its independence and prosperity
have always been predicated on its
ability to engage in peacemaking, on
its ability to settle conflicts, and on
respect for the law. Switzerland is a
country that places human beings at
the centre of its interests and of its
politics. We must ask ourselves: How
can Switzerland make a contribution
to the search for a solution to this
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almost sixty year-old conflict?
Europe, in general, and Switzerland,
in particular, have been involved with
the Middle-East conflict from the
beginning at a higher level any other
part of the world. As Europeans,
we share a responsibility for this
conflict. It concerns our values and
our convictions. We know that we
will lose our right to advocate these
values and convictions elsewhere
if we fail to ensure that they are
respected here.
Peace: accepting the
previously unacceptable
Making peace means flying in the face
of one's convictions, accepting that
which was previously unacceptable,
and trusting that the enemy's wish
for peace is as great as one's own.
This is extremely difficult, making
'well-meaning' pressure from third
parties necessary.
The realization for the need to take
a chance on peace comes against
a background of death, devastation
and great suffering. Often peace
becomes a possibility only when
the costs of war are horrible enough
to make the price of peace appear
bearable. Yitzhak Rabin was familiar
with the human costs of war and
violence. He passed through the
necessary phases to be ready for
peace and he was prepared to face
the challenge when the opportunity
arose. For this he will always deserve
our admiration.
Today, we know the parameters
for the vision of a just and lasting
peace:
• Israel has an inalienable right to
exist within secure borders – as it
defines itself.
• The Palestinian people has the right
to self-determination and therefore to
a viable state.
• The land-for-peace principle and
the two-state solution are the basis
for a solution.
• The wish for two states also implies
that there are clear limits to the right
of return.
• The settlements in occupied
territory are contrary to international
law. Thus, they must be dissolved.
Where this is not possible, the
loss must be compensated by an
equivalent land swap.
Peace as the mission of each nation’s
citizens
As fundamental as they are, these
elements look rather abstract, unless
one constantly bears in mind the fate
of the citizen populations on both
sides. Any proposal for a settlement
to the conflict can only have a chance
of success if the above principals
enjoy significant popular support.
Each side's population will only
commit itself to a peace proposal
if peace provides a horizon for a
lasting improvement to its security,
economic, and welfare situation.
Peace can only be sought on behalf
of each nation's citizens, and cannot
be achieved without them.
Yitzhak Rabin's name is inseparable
from that of the Oslo Process. He
displayed great courage in taking
this risk, and paid for his courage
with his life. The credit that he
deserves for this is enormous,
and we owe him lasting gratitude
and respect. Thanks to the Oslo
process, the very idea of peace
has become conceivable. Thanks
to Oslo, the Palestinian people saw
the emergence of a hope that they
would one day be able to satisfy
their national aspirations. Thanks to
Oslo, Palestinian recognition of the
State of Israel became possible.
Nevertheless, today, it appears that
the Oslo process has failed. Why
has it failed?
The Failure of the Oslo process
I see two reasons for this. The first
is that the process operated by trial
and error, without the formulation
of a clear final goal. Perhaps at the
initial stages of the process, hearts
and minds were not yet ready for a
clearly defined final goal; perhaps it
was necessary to keep all the options
open. The result of this vagueness
is the second reason for Oslo's
failure: it was not possible to obtain
the indispensable pressure from
citizens on each side, which could
have forced political authorities on
each side to continue the process,
even if they were hesitant, or even
opposed to pursuing the path
initiated by Yitzhak Rabin, his friends
and his partners.
This failure convinced me that
an historical conflict, such as
the Israeli-Palestinian one, can
only be settled if public opinion
on both sides is prepared for the
inevitable concessions by means
of a democratic debate, and only if
the decision-makers, thanks to such a
public discussion, know how far they
can go. This conviction was one of
the factors which prompted me in the
spring of 2003 to give my staff the
go-ahead to provide logistical support
for the civil society project that later
became known as the Geneva
Initiative. Like Prime Minister Rabin,
the general public has to go through
a process; it has to prepare itself for
peace. Successful negotiations
presuppose an atmosphere of hope
and of growing trust. This means that
the public needs to be able to form a
picture of the result towards which
the process is heading – one of the
reasons that Geneva Initiative has
been so essential.
The role of civil society
I strongly believe in the role of civil
society in such processes, both in the
solution-finding and implementation
phases. Civil society almost by
definition pursues a bottom-up
approach - it springs from the people
and has an awareness of the real
fears and worries of the general
population.
The vision of two states living sideby-side in peace will only be realized
when decision-makers recognize that
peace cannot be the perpetuation
of the defeat of one of the parties.
Peace must be the starting point
for justice and reconciliation – and
this can ultimately be achieved only
through negotiations.
In the search for peace, the end
cannot be separated from the
means. From our viewpoint, the
persistence of violence on the
ground, which is sometimes overt
and sometimes contained, is one of
the main obstacles to the resumption
of a dialogue capable of leading to
real negotiations. The main focus of
our concerns must be the everyday
living situation of the population, that
is, their human security.
13
The human security approach
The human security approach
– which has gained increasing
attention since the mid-1990s as a
framework for understanding the
broader factors that contribute to
peace and security – addresses
non-traditional threats to people’s
security related to economic, food,
health, and environmental factors,
as well as issues such as terrorism,
organized crime and gender-based
violence.
Human security is about recognizing
the importance of the security needs
of citizens, in addition to those of
states; it means reducing human
vulnerabilities and taking corrective
action when preventive measures
fail. The human security approach
focuses on individuals' security needs
and aims at developing integrated
approaches to address them.
As the depositary state of the
Geneva Convention, Switzerland
has developed particular skills
in promoting human security. In
the case of the quest for peace
in the Near East, this approach
involves full respect for international
humanitarian law. We consider this
the first indispensable step towards
the resumption of a constructive
dialogue.
14
It is essential that habituation to the
violence prevalent on the ground
ends. Switzerland is continuing its
initiatives that have taken different
forms over the years to ensure that,
in its work to protect the interests
of the civilian population, the law
should prevail. Any progress in this
area will be an appropriate means of
re-establishing trust.
at the civil society level that could be
used for a model for the political level.
As part of the search for popular
support and for the participation of
civil society in the battle for peace,
I would like to mention another
principle that is no less essential:
every step towards the final goal
should mean a step forward in terms
of the daily life of the populations.
The importance of confidencebuilding measures
The implications of the Gaza
withdrawal
The recent diplomatic conference
convened by Switzerland, which
discussed the recognition of an
additional emblem – the Magen
David - to the Geneva Convention is
an example of the kind of confidencebuilding measures that will help reestablish trust.
Israel's withdrawal from Gaza was
a unilateral act. Provided that it
proves successful in the long term,
and provided that it is regarded as a
stage and not as an end in itself, it
could lead to the resumption of the
peace process. However, the human
security challenges that result from
the disengagement are colossal.
The social and economic situation in
the Gaza Strip today is catastrophic.
We could even go as far as to claim
that it is on the brink of social
collapse. According to the World
Bank, unemployment exceeds 46%,
and the poverty level has risen to
68%. The number of persons living
below the poverty line has more
than doubled over the past four
years. 25% of Gazans live in deep
or 'absolute' poverty and are unable
to feed themselves adequately, even
with food aid.
Our objective not only corresponds
to the legitimate interests of Magen
David Adom, but also to the interests
of the entire international community
in maintaining the unity and the
universality of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement. At the same time, our
efforts to help achieve a cooperative
agreement between the Israeli and
the Palestinian emergency aid
societies have helped bring the two
sides together in a joint enterprise,
setting an example of rapprochement
Currently, more than 1.3 million
individuals live in the 365 squarekilometre Gaza Strip. And while
projections estimate that the
population will reach almost 1.5
million by 2010, no particular plans
have been made to respond to the
educational, health and employment
needs of the population. Such an
increase would require, only to
maintain the current low levels, the
establishment of an additional 730
classrooms and 130 primary health
centres by the year 2010.
Given the wide discrepancy observed
today between supply and demand
for social, educational, health and
employment provision, these figures
are bound to increase. Thus, ensuring
that the disengagement from Gaza
will have a positive outcome is
a tremendous humanitarian and
social challenge. A very significant
amount of humanitarian assistance
will have to be provided to ensure
the viability of the Gaza Strip before
economic activity and growth can
translate into tangible benefits for
the population.
The hope that the Gaza withdrawal
will create the potential for positive
developments in the area is still intact.
However, if the negative tendency
of recent weeks continues, there is a
danger that the positive impetus will
evaporate and the potential will not
be reached.
Conditions for progress
President Abbas has spoken in favour
of non-violence and was elected
on the basis of this message. His
approach needs to bear fruit quickly.
The international community is willing
to play its part; however, these
efforts will lead nowhere unless the
parties make all efforts to maintain
the necessary setting for progress.
Terror attacks are disastrous for such
efforts. Regarding the expansion of
West Bank settlements – this process
does not instil a sense of readiness
for peace.
live here. As I said, I am convinced
that citizens of both nations must
be involved in the debate regarding
a just solution. It is equally important,
however, to ensure that people can
live in dignity. Otherwise, they will
not be able to see the purpose of
peace.
Switzerland has set itself the task
of raising international awareness
of the security needs of residents of
the Gaza Strip. Before and during
the withdrawal, Switzerland insisted
on the need to address the issue of
humanitarian aid reaching the Gaza
Strip. Switzerland is also dedicated
to the promotion of human security
in the Gaza Strip.I believe that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be
solved. Israel exists and so do the
Palestinians. Neither will disappear
from this area. As long as there is no
peace, the alternative is only violence
and destruction. We cannot allow
this to happen to the people who
15
The Required Vision for
'Making Peace'
support. We must show the same
courage as Rabin displayed.
By: Laila Freivalds
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Denmark
The Road Map – today’s only
framework
Yitzhak Rabin was a man with
a military past, a warrior schooled
in battle. But we remember him as
statesman and peacemaker. Rabin
demonstrated political courage when
he engaged with the Palestinians in
the quest for peace. He knew that
he would face criticism. He knew
that peace would not be achieved
overnight.
First he had to convince skeptics that
peace was possible and thereafter try
to make it happen.
Almost 15 years later, we recognize
that the recent Israeli disengagement
from Gaza was a bold and courageous
move. I realize that the implementation
of the Disengagement Plan was
difficult for the Government and
painful for Israeli society. But the
withdrawal creates a solid basis for
future efforts. We are obliged to move
towards lasting peace – if we are to
honor Yitzhak Rabin’s legacy.
This requires further bold moves from
the parties, and collective, international
16
Today, the central framework
for progress is the Road Map, a
document with many similarities with
the Oslo accords. It is a document
with built-in phases. And like the
accords, the Roadmap is based
solidly on International Law. The
principle of land for peace is another
basic element of the Roadmap.
Although its original timeline has
passed, its vision and substance
remains indisputable.
The Road Map was designed as a
performance-based document. The
parties are expected to perform their
obligations in parallel. This principle
is important from a confidence
building perspective. In reality, we
have seen few examples of parallel
performance. Here, there is certainly
room for improvement.
Unilateral moves are difficult in
a complex political situation. The
parallel approach of the Roadmap
is more attractive and takes care
of this difficulty. To demand that
the other party acts first is unlikely
to lead to progress. Some actions
prescribed by the Roadmap have
been implemented. A fair number
could be implemented in the near
future, given a political will to do
so. We need to keep working on
all tracks: building security as well
as confidence, and finding just and
viable solutions for the two societies.
There is a huge need for political
courage and statesmanship. Sweden
stands ready to assist.
Israel’s security – a central
aspect of Rabin’s efforts
The security of Israel and its citizens
was central to Rabin’s peace efforts.
The same goes for the Government
of Israel today. It is any government’s
duty to protect its citizens. Israel
has experienced numerous terrorist
attacks and direct threats to its
existence. Barely two weeks ago, we
were all outraged by the remarks by
the President of Iran.
Let me be clear on the point of security.
The Swedish government supports
security measures undertaken by Israel.
But they have to be in accordance
with international law; they must not
obstruct or threaten peace efforts.
We know that only when international
law and peace efforts are respected,
will sustained security be obtained
for all.
The Settlements – obstacles to
peace
Now allow me a few words on the
settlements. Their construction
contravenes International Law.
They are situated on occupied
land, they cannot be justified
from the point of view of military
security and they, of course, don’t
contribute to the interests of the
local population, the Palestinians.
And there are other dimensions to
the settlements. One regards the
security of the settlers themselves.
They are exposed to unnecessary
dangers and their personal security
is threatened by the sheer fact that
their houses are built on land that
is occupied. International Law does
not allow security measures to
protect civilian constructions of this
kind on occupied territory.
In addition to this, the withdrawal
from Gaza has shown us the
personal tragedies connected with
dismantlement of these structures.
People have lived their lives believing
that they and their children can plan
for the future in their communities.
They had forgotten that their houses
were built on land that belongs to
someone else. All this makes it
even more difficult to take the steps
that are unavoidable if peace is to
be reached, that is, to give up the
settlements on occupied territories.
This is another reason why no
measures that risk prejudging a final
status agreement should be taken on
the ground. In this context, we are
particularly worried by developments
in and around Jerusalem.
The obligations of the
Palestinian Authority
The Palestinian Authority must act
forcefully and with determination
to establish control in Gaza,
particularly in the domain of
security. The Palestinian Authority
must create law and order for its
population. It will need the support
of the international community to
accomplish this. Sweden and the
EU provide substantial assistance
through the EU COPPS, and through
contributions to projects and other
efforts initiated by Quartet Special
Envoy, Mr Wolfensohn.
Equally important is that Israel
supports the Palestinian Authority
by making social and economic
progress possible. Improved living
conditions in Gaza and the West
Bank will also benefit the political
environment.
It will encourage and strengthen
those who seek cooperation and
dialogue rather than violence and
confrontation.
A vision of peace
The long cherished dream of a vast
majority of Israelis and Palestinians
is to live a normal life in peace and
security. For Sweden, a peaceful
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict has long been a central
foreign policy priority.
Our engagement springs from the
firm conviction that only a negotiated
two-state solution, based on
International Law, will be lasting.
Only such a solution will destroy
the breeding ground for terrorists
and create long-term security, for
Palestinians and Israelis alike.
In an address to the Knesset in 1992,
Prime Minister Rabin argued that the
time had come to do away with the
concept of a 'peace process'. From
now on, he said, we must speak not of
a 'process' but of 'making peace'.
Thirteen years later, making peace
is long overdue. Making peace
requires the concerted efforts of all
of us, Palestinians and Israelis, the
international community.
Yitzhak Rabin knew that making
peace is possible.
17
Turkey’s Ability to
Assist Regional Water
Development
By: Dr. Mehmed Himi-Blair,
Minister of Energy and Natural
Resources, Turkey
On behalf of my government and
people, I would like to pay tribute to
the great Israeli statesman, Yitzhak
Rabin, for whom this conference is
being held.
It is my honor to commemorate
assassination of the great Rabin,
who was murdered by the enemies
of peace. Prime Minister Rabin
played the historic role of rendering
the dream of peace an objective goal
in the Middle East. He demonstrated,
through his courage, that peace is
really within reach if one wants it
enough. In the ten years that have
passed since we lost Rabin, we
have witnessed ups and downs in
the peace process. Unfortunately,
ultimate peace has evaded us.
However, we have not lost hope.
The Israeli disengagement from
Gaza has provided a new window
of opportunity for the revitalization
of the peace process within the
framework of the Road Map. It is our
hope that the two sides will take the
road towards peace, no matter what
obstacles stand in their way. This is
18
what the legacy of Rabin demands
from us.
Water: essential for regional
stability
I would like to talk about the issue of
water in the Middle East, as it relates
to peace efforts.
Recently, water resource issues have
occupied international and regional
organizations more than ever. The
reason is well known: water is essential
to socio-economic development and
to life itself. Hundreds of millions of
people do not have access to
safe drinking water and sanitation.
Throughout most of human history,
fresh water resources have been
adequate to serve human needs, while
maintaining the integrity and biological
diversity of the earth’s ecosystems. As
a result of population growth, rapid
urbanization, and industrialization,
water has become less available
where it is most needed.
Turkey’s water resources and
projects
Let me elaborate on Turkey’s water
resources. Turkey is not a waterrich country. It contains almost 200
billion cubic meters of fresh water
per year, out of which 110 billion
cubic meters is available for human
consumption. Furthermore, most
of Turkey’s territory is situation in
a semi-arid region. Precipitation is
limited to 5 or 6 months per year.
The need to store water during the
wet season for use throughout the
year is obvious. We have focused
our activities on building several
reservoirs over the last number of
years, not only for hydro-powered
energy use, but also for irrigation,
drinking, and household use. Another
particularity of Turkey is its wealth
of trans-boundary rivers, which
constitute 40% of Turkey’s water
potential. The Tigris and Euphrates
rivers, the largest of Turkey’s rivers,
form a single basin as they feed the
Persian Gulf.
Turkey has many other transboundary rivers, a Turkey’s transboundary water policy is aimed
to efficiently utilize and share the
benefits of trans-boundary water
resources, and create conditions
for cooperation with other states.
Contrary to certain perceptions that
present trans-boundary water as a
source of conflict, we have always
utilized trans-boundary water as
a source of cooperation with our
neighbors.
Turkey expects the same approach
from her neighbors, since it is clear.
Turkey is keen to use its transboundary waters in an equitable,
effective and optimal manner. In order
to achieve this, neighboring states
ought to adopt a comprehensive
method to water utilization. Such an
approach requires full participation
of neighboring states in discussions
on trans-border water allocation.
Efficient water allocation required a
detailed exchanged of information
between states.
Allow me to say a few words about
CAP (Ceyhan Aslantas Project).
Turkey has developed one of
the world’s largest sustainable
development projects, CAP, at the
basin of the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers. This project allows us to utilize
the water resources of the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers and the land
resources of South-Eastern Turkey.
CAP includes 22 high dams and 19
hydro-powered plants.
These, when completed, will generate
27 billion kilo-watts of electricity
per annum and irrigate 1.7 million
hectares of farm land. The integrated
program covers all the development
related sectors including agriculture,
industry, transportation, health care,
infrastructure, education, tourism and
environment, coming to a total cost
of $32 billion, $17 billion of which
has already been invested.
The scarcity of water in the
Middle East
Having briefly summarized Turkey’s
water policy and projects, let me
return to the issues of water in
the Middle East. The Middle East
is historically a water suppressed
region. It has been reported that,
together with central Asia, China
and parts of central Africa, it will
face a serious water shortage in the
decades to come. The Jordan River
basin is likely to suffer, with a host
of social, political and economic
implications. Yitzhak Rabin said, “If
we solve every problem in the Middle
East, but we don’t satisfactorily
solve the water problem, our region
will explode. Peace will not be
possible.”
I agree that the issue of water in
the region is complex, political,
and therefore will remain with us
for years. However, despite the
complex nature of the problem and
conflicting interests, I do believe that
the countries in the region will, in the
end, opt to use water as a tool for
cooperation, rather than as a source
of conflict. The states of the region
will hopefully come to understand
that cooperation is imperative for
the improvement of the quality of life
of their people, the social economic
development, and above all, much
needed regional stability.
The Israeli-Palestinian Second
International Water Conference was
held in Anatalya, Turkey, last October.
During the conference, which I had
the pleasure of attending, it was
generally agreed that the problem of
water resources in Jordan River basin
cannot be resolved without water
transfer from neighboring regions.
In other words, desolation of local
resources without water transfer was
not seen as a sustainable solution.
In terms of water transfer solutions,
Turkey seems to be the only regional
country in which fresh water is
available and can be transported
either by pipelines or sea. Turkey
is planning to transport water to
the region by using the unusable
waters of its rivers that feed into the
Mediterranean.
Water transport projects
One of the projects that Turkey is
operating to supply fresh water is
the Manavgat water supply project.
Turkey has built a water treatment
plant and a loading facility. These
facilities are capable of exporting 180
cubic meters of water per annum.
An inter-governmental agreement
between Turkey and Israel was
signed on March 4, 2004 concerning
Israel’s purchase of treated water for
a period of 12 years. The water will
be shipped to Israel by tankers. A
19
provision of 50 million cubic meters
of water for Israel per annum and
the potential to transfer more will
hopefully ease the pressure on the
limited resources of the Jordan River
basin. I would like to point out that
through this project, we can supply
water to other Middle Eastern
countries, if they so desire.
Another Turkish project is the Peace
pipeline project, which seeks to
transport water by pipeline to the
Middle East from the Seyhan and
the Jeyhan Rivers. According to
projections, an annual amount of 2.2
billion cubic meters of fresh water will
be transferred to the region.
Another project that has been
discussed recently is the idea of
building a pipeline in the sea itself
to provide water for Israeli coastal
cities.
In short, we believe that Turkey has
the capacity to contribute to an
environment that would promote
social and economic development
of the people of the Middle East,
through joint water projects. We are
also of the opinion that water supply
issues could create interdependency
between the countries of the region
that would eventually enhance
economic and commercial relations
that are in the interest of all.
20
To conclude, it is my hope that the
countries of the region with show the
political will to engage in cooperation
and utilize effectively and share the
benefits of water resources that are
in the interest of their people’s socioeconomic development, peace and
regional stability. Turkey will contribute
her part to this vital cause.
The Road Map as the
Continuation of Rabin's
Vision
By: Dr. Per Stig Moeller
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Denmark
Ten years after the horrific act,
the assassination of the late Prime
Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin, we
are gathered in his memory. He
was one of the greatest leaders
of Israel – ever. For my generation,
Rabin will always be remembered
as an outstanding personality
of great political stature, a true
statesman. The transformation
from being a soldier of war, to
becoming a statesman of peace
demands courage, commitment
and ambition.
Rabin made a strong commitment
to peace and made difficult and
courageous decisions in this search
for peace – decisions that no other
Israeli Prime Minister before him
dared to make. For that he received
a Nobel Peace Prize and for that he
paid with his life.
'Peace will triumph over all of its
enemies because the eternity is
greater for us all.' With these words,
Rabin reminded us of the eternal
truth of this conflict. Unfortunately,
the enemies have overtaken the
dreamer in the last decade.
Ladies and gentlemen, a decade
has passed since the assassination
of Rabin. We have seen the Olso
process collapse, and we have seen
the outbreak of a second Intifada. We
have seen hope be replaced by anger
and mistrust. We have witnessed
more violence, more terror and
more suffering of innocent Israelis
and Palestinians. Upon this bleak
background, I nevertheless allow
myself to be hopeful and cautiously
optimistic. Brave decisions have been
taken by both sides of the conflict.
Now we are at a crossroads, and
the momentum has emerged that
will eventually lead to peace if there
is the necessary will and courage on
both sides.
Reasons for optimism
I base my optimism on the following
observations: Never before has a
solution to the conflict been clearer,
more recognized, and more widely
accepted than today: two independent
democratic states living side by side
in peace and security and within
internationally recognized borders.
That is the language of the Road Map
for Peace, signed by both parties and
endorsed by the Security Council.
Rabin never spoke directly in favor
of a Palestinian state. Today the
Israeli government recognizes the
goal of a Palestinian state. Because
now there is a Palestinian partner
with whom to talk - a Palestinian
President devoted to peace, who
has renounced the use of violence.
President Abbas is faced with huge
challenges: governing the Palestinian
Authority, enforcing law and order,
and combating terror. When I met
President Abbas last Saturday, he
confirmed that he would stand up
to these challenges, that he would
confront the terrorist infrastructure.
To my mind, there is no doubt
that President Abbas deserves all
the support that the international
community and Israel can give.
Abbas is the best Palestinian partner
that Israel has ever had, and perhaps
the best that Israel will ever get.
Last but certainly not least, the
courageous step by your Prime
Minister Sharon to withdraw all
settlements from Gaza and all
settlements from the West Bank has
set a new agenda on the road to
peace. It was a bold and significant
step. I dare say that this step was in
the spirit of the late Prime Minister
Rabin. The withdrawal shows
that the way forward is not more
settlements, but less. It gives the
Palestinians hope that one day the
21
occupation will end, a pre-requisite
for the two-state solution. It gives the
Palestinians the responsibility of how
to make Gaza a success.
The Road Map – a light at the
end of the tunnel
Ladies and Gentlemen, the window
of opportunity that was created is
still open, but time is running out. It
is urgent to ensure a political process
based on the Road Map to Peace
the only plan accepted by both
parties and with strong international
backing.
When we drafted the Road Map to
Peace plan, we tried to avoid some
of the mistakes made in the Oslo
Agreement. Oslo provided the parties
with a process, a tunnel, but, alas,
a tunnel without a light at the end.
The Road Map is, as in the words of
former Prime Minister Shimon Peres,
“a light,” a light, maybe, at the end of
the tunnel. It is a plan with a specific
set of steps that the parties would
have to take to move forward. I call
on both sides – lasting progress
on the way to peace can only be
achieved within the framework of
the Road Map.
In the short term, the focus should
be on meeting the parallel obligations
of the first phase of the Road Map.
22
It means that the Palestinians must
focus on security and disarming
terror capabilities and infrastructure.
Simultaneously, the Israelis must take
all steps to normalize Palestinian
life, freeze all settlement activities
including natural growth, and
dismantle illegal outposts.
The Road Map is an ambitious plan,
and the parties have to take greater
steps to implement it. I’m aware that
these are difficult steps. I’m convinced
that the vast majority of Israelis seek
peace with the Palestinians, and that
the vast majority of Palestinians do not
seek the destruction of Israel, only the
end of the occupation. The dreams
of both sides can be reconciled with
the dreams of the other.
But peace can only be achieved if we
can prevent extremists from setting
the agenda. Extremists should not be
allowed to hold the peoples hostage
or be allowed to provoke a cycle of
violence and war. Terrorists must
not be allowed to de-rail the peace
train on the way through its tunnel
because that is exactly what they
want to achieve.
Prime Minister Rabin articulated this
precisely, when he said, 'We will work
for peace as if there is no terrorism,
and we will fight terrorism as if there
is no peace.'
Opening Comments on
Rabin's Legacy
By: Maj. Gen. (ret.) Danny
Yatom, Member of Knesset
Chairman of the S. Daniel
Abraham Center for Strategic
Dialogue
I would like first to express my
deep to the President of Netanya
Academic College, Professor Arad,
and to wish him a quick recovery.
Ten years have gone by since Rabin,
the man, the statesman, and the
leader, was with us. Today we feel
that his legacy lives on and is of
greater relevance than ever to our
lives in Israel and to the Middle East
as a whole. Ten years have elapsed
since those three pistol shots were
fired into his back to wipe out his
vision of peace, and since then,
those shots have resounded over
and over again.
A second Intifada, terror attacks,
targeted killing, booby-trapped
routes, human fatalities, wounded,
an ocean of pain, and rivers of blood
– ours and the Palestinians as well
– have replaced the reality of peace
that could have prevailed. This would
have been a reality of cooperation,
development, prosperity, and a life
our tranquility for us and for them.
Ten years of grief and victims have
had to pass in order that the leaders
of this region have come to realize
that power, violence, and war will
never succeed in reaching what
Rabin wanted to achieve on the
road of peace.
I had the great privilege of standing
next to Yitzhak Rabin during those
decisive emotional moments. Rabin
underwent a process, in which he,
the military man, Mr. Security, the
general, whose life, since his youth,
had been one long preparation for
the battlefield, realized that the
bloody conflict could not be ended
through force. The courage displayed
by him in the battlefield would finally
make way for the bravery to make
changes and choose a new way.
Rabin: the ultimate patriot
'I fought so long as there was no
other way,' Rabin said. He explained
that once he reached the conclusion
that we had partners for dialogue,
the way of negotiations and peace
became far more preferable than the
way of war.
I would like to warn us all against
becoming confused here. Not for
a single moment did Rabin stop
being an Israeli patriot filled with faith
and belief in the importance of the
existence, security, and endurance
of the state of Israel. And as a true
leader, he saw peace as a strategic
objective that would strengthen the
county’s security. Rabin was sure
that a strong and powerful army
was a primary condition for Israel’s
existence in the Middle East. On the
other hand, he also realized that an
eager and vital county that exists in
the second millennium cannot be
satisfied with its existence based
mainly on its military might.
Changing national priorities
He said, 'let’s give a chance to
peace' and took calculated risks. He
perceived Israel’s human resources
and its ability to develop and prosper
as the future of this country. He knew
that our human resources could not
fulfill their potential in a region swept
by war and disasters.
When Rabin spoke of changing the
national priorities, he was referring
to the transfer of budgets for
education, infrastructure, research and
development. Indeed, as was his way,
he did not merely speak – he acted.
Instead of establishing settlements in
distant areas, he invested a network
of roads that would shorten the way
from the periphery to central Israel. He
provided a computer for every child
in the development towns.
23
He added hundreds of study hours
and quality teachers, to raise the
level of education to a level previously
unheard of previously or since.He
reduced the divide between Jews and
Arabs. He created job opportunities,
reduced unemployment, build housing
development, absorbed the continuous
stream of immigrants who desired to
come and live in Israel.
Rabin transformed Israel into an
esteemed and respected country to
which investors, statesmen, and men
of vision from all over the world wanted
to make their mark. Rabin did all this
by staying faithful to the concept that
peace must be made, that all terror
must cease, and that terror must be
fought as though no peace process
existed. Rabin never abandoned the
people’s security at the expense of
efforts towards peace.
It was Rabin’s wish to bring a better
future for Israelis, Jordanians, Syrians,
Palestinians, and all inhabitants of the
region who have never lived a year
of tranquility in their lives. But to our
regret, it has taken the leaders of
this region 10 years of bloodshed
and pain to understand these
things, and to begin doing exactly
what Rabin had spoken of. It took
the Israeli government 10 years to
decide to leave the territory of Gaza.
It took 10 years for the Palestinian
24
leadership to understand that terror
does not serve the Palestinian cause,
but the opposite, and that no goal
justifies terror.
Peace as a gift to our children
Rabin was not just a dream cherished
by the Israeli people. General Rabin
understood what Rabin the civilian
understood full well – peace is
a closing of gaps by investing in
education and economy. Peace
means living as other countries live
in a world that has become a global
village. Peace is a solution to issues
of water and environment. Peace is
open borders and diplomatic ties.
Peace is commerce without boycotts
and blossoming tourism. The most
important aspect of peace is that
a mother raises their children with a
smile instead of burying them long
before their time.
Rabin never lost sight of the next
generation. 'What will I leave my
children?' he asked, when he
addressed the U.S. congress in
Washington, in July 1994.
And he answered, 'I have no
property, no assets. I have only
dreams to bequeath the generation
that comes after me - a better world
that is more at peace, a world where
life is good. That is not too much to
ask,' he said.
This was and remains Yizhak Rabin’s
legacy. Rabin was a leader, a symbol
and a friend in our common path. I
too was shaped from the battlefield
in my youth. And in time, I exchanged
my duties for duties of sitting around
a negotiating table with Jordanians,
Palestinians, and Syrians. I have
fought in both sectors and I can tell
you that the negotiating table is far
more preferable to the battlefield.
The peace agenda must replace the
agenda of war. One entails prosperity
and welfare and the other entails
nothing but pain and despair. Both
we and our neighbors have paid the
price of war. Now the time has come
for the fruits of peace. Rabin taught
me that peace is no mere dream or
vision. It is reality.
Many of us today are in our fifties or
sixties. It is our duty to turn this dream
into a reality for the generations to
come, and not make due with a vision
only. Like Rabin, we must fight for it.
You only need one for war, but you
need two for peace. In war you lose,
even when you triumph. In peace
there are only winners.
Paving The Way: Yitzhak Rabin
and the Palestinian Issue
The transition from the Jordanian to the Palestinian option
Privatizing Peace: Turning
Aid into Investment
By: Shimon Peres
Vice Prime Minister and
Former Prime Minister
With elections approaching both
for the Israeli and Palestinian people,
I was to make a prediction about
our near future: Israeli elections will
take place in April, and it will take
approximately 3-4 months to put
together a coalition. I can assure you
that no single party will win a majority
of the Knesset seats. There will either
be a majority that will be left-leaning
or right leaning, or alternatively, a
national unity government.
Until these elections, politicians will
not make any major decisions, but
instead make major speeches. The
Palestinians will undergo similar
processes with respect to their
elections.
Important steps during the
election period
I will start by saying that I'm very
glad that an agreement was reached
regarding the Gaza crossings. The
crossings agreement is an essential
aspect of us being able to claim that
we are truly out of Gaza. Gaza should
26
not and cannot become a prison or a
soup kitchen for the impoverished.
A successful economy must enjoy
the free flow of goods and people.
It is essential to understand that an
improvement of the quality of life in
Gaza will translate into improved
possibilities for peace. Therefore, it
is in Israel's interest to enable Gaza
to flourish rather than stumble.
I would like to see a few things
take place until the election period
on each side is complete. The first
is the major economic aid that the
Palestinians must receive from the
G8. Mr. Wolfensohn presented a plan
for $3 billion per year for the next
three years. The Palestinians cannot
build the infrastructure required for
true statehood without receiving
a massive contribution by the G8.
In the next 6 months, there is a vital
need that this aid is received to
ensure this contribution to address
immediate Palestinian needs.
The second is that Israel keep its
promises regarding dismantling
the illegal settlement outposts
in the West Bank and refraining
from building new settlements or
building additional neighborhoods in
existing settlements. We made these
promises – we must keep them.
The third development I'd like to see
is that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
and President Abu Mazen renew
talks. Even if they can't come to
any agreements, it is important that
they meet and negotiate. The Israeli
policy must be to both fight terror
and negotiate peace simultaneously.
These two elements do not contradict
one another – they complement one
another.
The nature of the conflict:
modernity versus radical Islam
During our election period, a period
of diplomatic inactivity, there is one
thing that the international community
can do – recognize the nature of the
present conflict. The conflict is no
longer a conflict that exists between
Israelis and Palestinians on a broad
level. The conflict has broken down
into a conflict between terror and
anti-terror – or even more specifically,
a conflict between elements of the
Muslim world that refuse to enter
the modern age and fear modernity
as the enemy of Islam, and the
Western world itself. The most
extreme current example is Iran,
whose regime perceives all that is
modern as a threat. On the other
hand, Turkey has shown that there is
no necessary contradiction between
faith and modernity.
Dependence on global
understandings
I want to address an important issue.
Middle East peace is in many ways
dependent on understandings being
reached by the four members of the
Quartet; regional conflict cannot be
solved if global conflict exists. On
the other hand, agreement between
these parties on significant issues
can help us face certain dangers
that are ahead of us. I don't see
a solution to the Iran issue without
the major players in the international
arena coming to joint understandings
on how to deal with the threat. The
international community must take
into account that if the Iranians are
allowed to develop a nuclear bomb,
other Middle Eastern countries will
follow. Then we will have a region
fraught with nuclear problems,
in addition to our conventional
problems.
When it comes to grand schemes
for regional peace, Europe, the U.S.,
Russia, and the UN must all take
leading roles. Peace must become
global, just as the economy has
become global.
The global economy as a
solution
In my opinion, this problem must
be confronted economically rather
than politically. You cannot convince
societies to enter the modern age by
speeches or by preaching – you have
to change the structure of the society.
Economic solutions are boundless
because economics exists beyond
the borders between states – the
economy is global. Unless we allow
the global, modern economy to enter
the Middle East, we will be a bitter,
belligerent, hopeless region.
I believe that the international
community should strive to provide
for us, the Palestinians, and the
region as a whole, the following:
1. Help us enter the modern
economy and compete within it.
2. Provide us with security
guarantees.
3. Enable the conflict bypass
arcane structures by including us
in a global community.
I believe that Europe is the key to
helping us enter this economy, in part,
due to its geographic proximity to the
Middle East. Europe displayed a key
role in helping pass the agreement
on the Gaza crossings, and I think
it must have a broader role in other
economic projects such as the Gaza
seaport, airport, environmental
projects and others.
Privatizing peace
In a sense, we have to privatize
peace in which private, global
businesses take leading roles in
advancing peace. When it comes to
international aid, governments have
budgets, which include a number of
long processes and red tape, while
businesses have money. In addition,
nowadays, international businesses
are more concerned with global
political situations than are national
governments. Companies with
branches all over the world have a
vested interest in establishing peace
in growing markets.
The Arab world is a very large,
growing market. If global companies
enter the Arab world, the Arab
standard of living will develop and the
market will become more valuable.
The question of how global
businesses should enter the Arab
world is an essential issue. For
a starter, companies must build
industrial areas. The first of these
attempts was the QIZ (Qualified
Industrial Zone) initiative in Irbid,
Jordan, which has been highly
successful. It began 6 years ago
with $25 billion in exports to America.
This year they exported $60 billion,
and employ 60,000 people. These
zones involve the joint participation
of the U.S. and Israel. The project's
27
success has resulted in Egypt signing
on for 3 new similar zones. We have
to initiate similar projects in Gaza and
the West Bank.
Another issue, regarding international aid, is to give funds to
business leaders, as opposed to
governments, while establishing
the following conditions for such
funding:
1. The amount of money invested
by a business leader will be
matched by international aid.
This will double the amount
invested.
2. The international aid will be an
investment, not a donation.
3. Some of the money must be
used as a loan guarantee against
unforeseen occurrences.
Rabin's legacy and hopes for
the future
Rabin's legacy includes helping
the entire region enter the global
economy, by attempting, successfully
or not, to make peace with the
Jordanians, Palestinians, and Syrians,
and to build on the established peace
with Egypt. For peace and regional
cooperation, he was willing to pay
the highest price. People look at the
peace treaty with Jordan as a simple,
non-painful peace agreement. This
28
is not the case. In this peace treaty,
we gave back every peace of
captured land – a land mass that
is larger than the size of the Gaza
Strip 430 km2. To Egypt, we gave
back, along with Sinai, Taba, which
was a serious point of contention.
In addition, Rabin offered Syria farreaching concessions from an Israeli
standpoint. We must be prepared
for other painful concessions for
peace.
I think that their will be some positive
by-products of the Iraq War. As soon
as Hezbollah ceases to act as an
army within an army, a state within a
state, Lebanon will be free and will
establish peaceful relations with its
neighbors. The same thing goes for
Syria – they cannot continue playing
both cards. They must choose
between the dictatorial terrorist path
and the democratic peaceful path.
To conclude, I believe that Oslo
was an opening point that still has
not been exploited. I have been
asked repeatedly about Arafat's
role; I answer that without him, the
process would never have begun,
but with him, it could never come to
a peaceful conclusion. The process
has begun – we must bring it to a
conclusion. Part of the process is
behind us, much of it still ahead of
us. When I look at Yitzhak's legacy,
I view him as a man who had the
courage to make the toughest
decisions, not just as a man of
noble character. Whoever wants
to continue in Yitzhak's path must
have the bravery to negotiate the
most difficult issues that he did not
live to solve and continue to make
tough decisions – not just cherish
his memory.
Bilateral Negotiations:
The Only Hope for a
Dignified Peace
By: Mahmoud Abbas,
President of the Palestinian
Authority
(speech delivered by
Saeb Erekat)
Today we mark a solemn occasion
– ten years have passed since the
assassination of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin. Last Friday we
commemorated the first anniversary
of the death of President Yasser
Arafat. Ten years have passed
since the man who committed Israel
to seeking a negotiated peace was
himself taken by an enemy of peace.
Ten years have passed since all of us
witnessed not just a crime against a
man, but a vicious assault against
the very foundations that must form
the basis of our future. Every lasting
vision of peace and prosperity for
both Israelis and Palestinians alike
ultimately depends on the freedom,
security, and independence of both
peoples. That vision can only be
realized through the dedicated
collective work of both peoples.
During the past decade, we have
seen moments of unparalleled hope,
often replaced by despair. We have
witnessed attempts at achieving
peace destroyed by extremism,
ambivalence, and greed. We have
all suffered too much.
In these ten years, we have written
a new chapter in our histories.
History books on this period will
be kind to none of us. Regardless
of where the blame lies, we broke a
pledge not just to our peoples but
to each other – the pledge to bring a
free, safe, and prosperous future to
both Palestinians and Israelis. This
pledge was a vision of two states,
Palestine and Israel, living side by
side in mutual peace, security, and
prosperity – a vision that should be
a reality today.
Opportunity and hope
However, our history need not be
our destiny. We need not condemn
ourselves to repeating the mistakes
of the past. I am addressing you
today with an offering for peace and
a way to progress forward. I believe
that today we have the greatest
opportunity to finally move forward
so that the tragedies of yesterday
can be eclipsed by the coexistence
of tomorrow. This opportunity, though
great, is fragile. It is fragile because
we are again descending into the
same patterns that defined the last
ten years. To break from the past, we
must learn from it. I am not here to
blame or provoke you, but to seek
an understanding to ensure that we
refrain from repeating the mistakes
of the past.
On the eve of Mr. Rabin's assassination,
we were full of hope. We believed that
we were finally on a path towards
freedom and statehood. We had an
authority that acted as an autonomous
force over our major cities, while
remaining subjects of a military
occupation. We believed that we would
truly be given the opportunity to shape
our own future.
But soon thereafter, we witnessed the
massive expansion of settlements.
We witnessed the construction of
the wall, built not on Israel's border,
but deep inside our territory. We saw
the construction of the settler-only
highway networks, built throughout
the West Bank. Despite all of this,
we are committing ourselves to
peace, not because we wake
up with an aching conscience
regarding the plight of Israelis, but
because we need peace. Peace
for us means a viable future here
in 22% of our historic homeland
along with a fair and adequate
resolution for Palestinian refugees.
The Palestinians made a historic
compromise by accepting that our
state would only exist within the
29
1967 borders with Jerusalem as its
capital. We recognized Israel's right
to exist in peace and security on
78% of British Mandate Palestine.
Just as it was difficult for you to
come to the negotiating table, it
was particularly difficult for us – even
though we realized that only through
negotiations would reach the future
that both of our peoples desire.
I know that many in Israel saw
the disengagement from Gaza as
a painful step forward for Israel.
Make no mistake – removing the
settlements from the Gaza Strip was a
historic step and a positive move in
the right direction. We coordinated
with Israel on the disengagement
right up to about an hour ago,
when we concluded an agreement
on the Rafah crossing. I would like to
express my deepest appreciation to
Mr. James Wolfensohn – he and his
wonderful team made this agreement
possible. I would also like to thank
Dr. Condoleezza Rice for her efforts
throughout last night.
Unilateralism as dictation
We hope that the day after the Gaza
disengagement is a 'soft landing',
not just with respect to the Rafah
crossing agreement, but with respect
to the real, more difficult issues. We
currently see that the push towards
30
negotiations and bilateralism is being
repressed by Israel's unilateralism.
To us, as Palestinians, unilateralism
means dictation. We are a people
with no army, navy, air force, or
economy. Our economy in 2004
stood at 1/34 of Israel's. Yet our
deficit to you stands at $1.3 billion.
Unilateralism will not bring you
peace, an end to the conflict, or an
end of claims because it does not
allow both peoples to shape their
respective futures.
Prime Minister Rabin realized this
before many other Israeli leaders.
This should be remembered as part
of his legacy. There are many lessons
from Rabin's assassination that Israeli
society is eager to remember. But
there is an additional lesson that must
be recalled: the late Prime Minister
realized that it would be a mistake
for Israel to rely on the use of force
to bring security and peace and
that there would never be a military
solution to the Palestinian problem.
Mr. Rabin traveled major distances
from being a soldier in the army to
being a soldier of peace. I believe that
we now have a window opportunity
to realize the peace for which Rabin
gave his life. We must not destroy
this opportunity by restoring the old
methods of force and unilateralism.
We long for the day when the
language of bullets and bombs
will be replaced by the language
of dialogue, co-existence, and
neighborly relations. It is time that
the Palestinian people be given
the chance to regain their dignity,
freedom, and independence. And it
is time for Israelis to live in personal
security without the heavy burden
of occupation. It is time that our
people live in peace and be given the
opportunity to lead normal lives under
the rule of law, with one government
and authority, political pluralism, and
one legal weapon. We are committed
to peaceful negotiations, the only way
to achieve our interests.
The importance of dignified
elections
We are offering this vision to
the Palestinian electorate to the
forthcoming elections in January,
2006. And we urge you Israelis
– don't poke your noses into our
internal affairs. Leave us alone. Let
the natural growth of Palestinian
democracy take its proper course.
For our people to adopt the
alternative we're offering, they must
believe that it is viable, they must be
allowed to vote. We must be allowed
to conduct elections in accordance
with the 1996 agreements. Preempting final status negotiations
through the massive construction of
settlements, suffocating the Gaza
Strip, and isolating East Jerusalem
will prevent the peaceful alternative
we're offering the Palestinian people
from being viable. We must end
unilateralism now! Our vision of peace
is reasonable, simple, and outlined in
the Road Map, which was agreed to
by the current Israeli government.
Israel's turn to recognize
Palestinian rights
We want to achieve a bright future.
We recognize that the potential for
this future depends on your future,
just as our histories are deeply
intertwined. We have made our
historic compromise – we recognize
your right to exist with secure and
recognized borders. Now it is your
turn to recognize ours! We can make
peace today. Today, we must turn
our backs on the past, once and
for all. Let the last decade be the
last chapter of misery in our region.
Today let us join together to perform
our collective duty and reach our
collective future.
Some say that one man can change
history. Yitzhak Rabin's killer, for
example, killed peace. I believe that
it is probable that we would have
achieved peace long ago, had Rabin
not been assassinated. But Rabin's
assassin is not the reason that our
project has not borne fruit – it was
the choices that we made afterwards
that killed the project.
Let us stop the finger-pointing. We
made mistakes, you made mistakes.
Let's learn from these mistakes
because this is the only way to save
Israeli and Palestinian lives. There
was a failure to implement Rabin's
view after his death – he knew that
no society can indefinitely rule over
another, that no amount of force can
deliver peace, and that negotiations
are the only road to peace.
The need for a commitment to
peace
You may not agree with my analysis or
perspective, but I ask you to agree to
my commitment. We are prepared to
enter a final status peace agreement
with you. Today, we have the will to
end the conflict, normalize relations,
and bring security and dignity to both
Israelis and Palestinians.
speaking in slogans, but am speaking
from the experience accumulated
from sitting in negotiations over the
past number of years.
We, as you, are going through labor
pains. We must control these labor
pains and come to grips with them.
Maybe the Westerners here do
not understand the complexity of
the issues of Jerusalem, borders,
refugees and settlements, for Israelis
and Palestinians; these are the issues
that we breathe. This is not a normal
land conflict – it is a multi-faceted
psychological and religious conflict
as well.
Join me in working through our
differences peacefully. Join me at
this precious moment to ensure
that we write a new history that will
make generations of Israelis and
Palestinians proud.
All issues reserved for final
status negotiations – Jerusalem,
settlements, borders, refugees, water,
and other issues – are solvable. If
an Israeli partner willing to engage
in negotiations takes the lead, mark
my words, we do not need more
that 6 months to conclude a historic
permanent status treaty. I am not
31
The Transformation from
the Jordanian Option
every effort you have made and hope
you continue with these efforts.
You Israelis have three options for
the future:
By: Saeb Erekat
Head of the PLO's
Negotiations Affairs
Department
We are facing new realities in the
Middle East. The U.S., which once
bordered Canada and Mexico, now
borders Turkey, Iran, Syria, the Gulf
States, and many other states, both
geographically and conceptually.
Geography and politics have
changed. The functional role of
nations has changed. Today, the
Middle East region is going through
a major battle. If the forces of
extremism prevail, the lights will be
turned off, and we won't know when
they'll be turned on again.
1. A two state solution based
on the 1967 borders, with
accommodations for border
adjustments if necessary.
2. If you don't want to divide the
land, we are willing to go with the
one-state solution. However, this
solution has been called evil by
Israelis because it undermines the
Jewish nature of Israel.
3. The third option is continuing
the occupation. Israelis, of all
people, should not perpetuate
this situation. A situation in which
there are roads that I cannot use
because I'm a Palestinian must
be morally unacceptable to the
Jewish people.
As a young man I heard that Jordan
is Palestine, and Palestine is Jordan.
Jordan is sovereign country that has a
peace agreement with Israel. Jordan
is Jordan – and there is no other
country that is more supportive of a
Palestinian state than Jordan today.
Why do we keep hearing of the
Jordanian option, unilateralism, the
no-partner broken record, and all of
these similar slogans? If you want to
continue ignoring the existence of the
Palestinian people, let me inform you
are simply denying facts. We do exist
as Palestinians. Israel's acceptance
of the will of the Palestinians and their
aspirations is a key to the solution.
Shimon [Peres], your title is
unimportant to me – you are a man
of peace, and we are with you in
this endeavor. I do not differentiate
between 'pro-Palestinian' and 'proIsraeli', rather between those who are
for peace and those who are against
peace. You, Shimon, are with those
who are for peace, and we appreciate
32
The West and the Middle East have
gone through three major historical
processes:
1. The West created Middle
East autocracies to further their
interests.
2. The West created Middle
East theocracies to further their
interests.
3. Today, both the West and forces
in the Middle East want democracy
in the Middle East.
Anyone who says that Arabs are
not ready for democracy is racist.
Democracy is an essential element
towards peace and stability in the
region.
The best solution is obvious to
me. We must seize our current
opportunity – we don't need to
reinvent the wheel.
Peace: a Possibility
resulting from Direct
Contact
By: Lt. Gen. (ret.) Amnon
Lipkin-Shahak
Former Chief of Staff of the
Israel Defense Forces
The title of this conference is
'Peace: Dream or Vision.' Yitzhak
Rabin was a man of dreams and a
man of vision – but more than this,
he was a man of action. Yithak Rabin
did not interpret reality through his
dream or vision, but instead mapped
his path through his vision, and
implemented it through realistic
actions that could make his vision
into a reality.
Therefore, to my mind, the title
of the conference has a phrase
missing. Peace is not just a dream,
because a dream remains a dream
after the dreamer wakes up. Peace
is not just a vision because implies
an ever-distant future that is never
actualized. A vision has no schedule
or plan. Peace must be a plan of
action. Peace is a possible goal that
is meant to serve specific purposes
for living people and nations.
Therefore, I would have named this
conference 'Peace: Dream, Vision,
and Possibility'.
A very different reality – just 12
years ago
I want to take you back to a period
that today seems pre-historic – the
reality in the region 12 years ago.
If I take you back to 1993, there
was no fence surrounding the Gaza
Strip, there is no fence around
Judea and Samaria, there was no
public debate about the status of
Jerusalem. Approximately 100,000
Palestinians worked in Israel, entering
almost freely into Israel proper without
having to pass road blocks. There
were no suicide bombings within
Israel. Some people would say that
this was a dream situation.
However, at the same time, the IDF
was dispersed throughout every
refugee camp and city in Judea,
Samaria, and Gaza. The IDF were
in charge of the daily lives of the
Palestinians in every city in the
territories, including their education
and health care. There was no
Palestinian Authority; there was
only Fatah, sitting in Tunisia. There
were 12,000 Palestinian prisoners
in Israeli prisons. Also, there was
a significant Israeli public that
believed that the dream or vision or
possibility of Greater Israel could be
actualized. They believed that Israel
could have sovereignty over all the
land stretching from the Jordan River
to the Mediterranean, and that there
is no room for a second national
entity in the area.
Rabin's earthquake
This was the reality that Yitzhak
Rabin shook up with what was, at
the time, the political earthquake
that changed the face of the entire
region, up until today. What we are
seeing today are the aftershocks of
the earthquake that Rabin initiated
then. And the earth has been shaking
constantly since that time period.
Rabin's revolution was a brave,
difficult political move that was
made democratically, but in the end,
resulted in Rabin's assassination.
The IDF was not an active participant
in the Oslo Accords. Rabin
determined that Oslo was a policy
that was political in nature, and
therefore did not include the IDF
in his decision to sign the accords.
Once the accords were signed, and
the security arrangements became
essential to the agreement's
implementation, Rabin included
the IDF in the decision-making
process.
The reality of bilateral
negotiations
Rabin appointed me to preside over
the Israeli delegation for determining
the Gaza-Jericho negotiations – a
33
delegation that was comprised of
representatives from all relevant
government bodies in order to
reach solutions for all aspects of this
important first step. While Oslo was
a framework agreement, the GazaJericho agreement was a practical
step to allow the Palestinian Authority
to move from Tunisia and establish
their presence in the West Bank and
Gaza and assume responsibility over
sections of the territory.
This first step was subjected to a
heated debate within Israel. When
we arrived at the negotiating table,
we knew most the Palestinian
representatives by face and name
only – we had never actually met
them. Meetings with many of these
representatives, such as Muhammad
Dahlan, had been disallowed by the
Shin Bet on grounds that they were
involved in terrorist activities. Each
side entered these talks extremely
suspicious of the other. Each side
was concerned that he would be
portrayed among his own people to
be the one giving in to the demands
of the other. There was a fear of
setting precedents in this first step,
because it was clear to both sides
that the process of handing over
territory would not end with Gaza
and Jericho, and that every move
would influence the way future moves
were carried out.
34
This phase of negotiations took place
primarily in Egypt. There were several
breakdowns in negotiations, one of
the most difficult being the Baruch
Goldstein Massacre in the Cave of
the Patriarchs in Hebron.
However, it is important to note that
at that time, we did not require third
party mediators to bring us back
to negotiations, when negotiations
broke down. It was clear to all of
us, despite all the difficulties, which
were no less complex than today's,
that we would not achieve anything
without talking to the other side.
Although the international community
accompanied the negotiations,
there was no need for their actual
involvement. When negotiations
broke down, Shimon Peres and Abu
Ala or Abu Mazen would be sent to
help us find solutions.
Yitzhak Rabin oversaw the entire
negotiation process by setting
the agenda. Rabin would conduct
presentations to the negotiating staff,
give directives, and approve or reject
suggested moves.
Varying levels of trust
During this phase of negotiations, a
level of mutual trust was developed
between the two negotiating teams,
which did not necessarily reflect the
level of trust between the leaders.
I don't think that Rabin actually
believed in Arafat. His trust of Arafat
was shaken during situations such as
the closing ceremony of the GazaJericho agreements in Cairo, in which
Arafat, while on stage, refused to sign
on the maps presented to him. This
image, which was broadcast on
television worldwide, dimmed the
possibility of trust being established
between the leaders.
Although Rabin saw Arafat as the
legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, he never fully
trusted him. There was always a level
of suspicion between them.
The invention of Palestinian
suicide bombing
With the signing of the Gaza-Jericho
understandings, the Palestinian
Authority arrived in the territories,
and almost immediately afterwards,
Palestinian suicide bombing in
Israeli cities began. Suicide terror
was a new phenomenon for us that
shook up our trust of the Palestinian
side. All of these terror attacks were
conducted by the Hamas and Islamic
Jihad; Fatah was, at this stage, not
involved in terror. However, the
Palestinian Authority was not doing
anything to prevent terror. Until
Rabin's assassination, there was
no serious, systematic Palestinian
Authority activity intended to
prevent terror attacks or fight terrorist
organizations.
When Rabin was assassinated,
Shimon Peres attempted to continue
in his path, though the suicide
attacks became more frequent
and vicious. As a response to the
Hamas-led terror campaign of the
winter of 1996, for the first time
and only time since, the Palestinian
Authority led a systematic campaign
against terror, primarily in Gaza.
This campaign damaged Hamas'
strength significantly, without any
Israeli involvement.
This intense terror campaign,
which occurred on the eve of Israeli
elections, caused the Israeli public
to lose its faith in the diplomatic
process. Netanyahu and the Likud
party were victorious in the elections,
and a new reality was created in
which Oslo was no longer at the
forefront of the Israeli government's
diplomatic interests. The new slogan
was, "If they give, they'll receive. If
they don't give, they won't receive."
At this point we entered a diplomatic
freeze that lasted, for all intents and
purposes, until we left Gaza last
summer.
Today's reality
Palestinian internal security
Today we live in a different reality. We
are more experienced, more hesitant
to believe words and promises, and
now wait to see actions and results.
The leaders on both sides know
each other on a deeper level. There
is a plan that has been accepted by
both sides – the Road Map – which
has been stalled at a crossroads for
a long time.
There are disagreements regarding
the first stage of the Road Map,
including its order of operations,
dependencies, and timetables. There
has been no progress since the Road
Map was agreed to, aside from the
significant move of Israel pulling out
of Gaza and northern Samaria.
Israel has certain expectations of the
Palestinians' rule in Gaza. The first is
the implementation of law and order. I
am currently more concerned about
the Palestinians implementing law
and order in Gaza, than guaranteeing
Israel's security. Internal security
is a mounting problem for the
Palestinians today. Musa Arafat, for
example, was assassinated in Gaza,
at a distance of 100 meters from Abu
Mazen and 150 meters from Abu Ala.
The shootout in the area lasted for a
number of minutes despite calls to
the Palestinian police. Musa Arafat's
assassination and the kidnap of his
son were not prevented, and those
responsible for the attack have still
not been arrested. Although this is an
internal Palestinian matter, we must
remember – he who cannot ensure
security in his own house will not be
able to guarantee our security.
I want to discuss the Rafiah crossing
as an example of how things could
be different. Israel ended its presence
in Gaza over two months ago, and
only today was an agreement
reached on the Rafiah crossing.
The question is: why wasn't an
agreement made earlier, if we knew
we were leaving? I have no good
answer for this. I believe that over
a year ago, we could have reached
much better security agreements
with the relevant international
representatives, Egyptians and
Palestinians than those that we
agreed to today.
In addition to the Musa Afarat
incident, there have been a number
of other incidents: shots were fired
at Abu Mazen's headquarters in
Ramallah; the chairman of the
Interior Ministry was kidnapped.
These incidents are very worrying.
Israel has a vested interest in helping
Abu Mazen successfully bring law
and order to Palestinian society.
The alternative to Abu Mazen
35
and the Fatah is Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad, which are not real
alternatives for Israel. We must help
the Palestinian leadership, but there
are certain things that we cannot
get involved with: we cannot create
order within Fatah, solve their internal
generational disputes, or determine
their party list in the upcoming
elections.
However, these issues will all
influence our ability to return to what
given up on with the Palestinians
years ago – direct contacts and
bilateral negotiations.
Rabin's Pragmatic Shift to
the Palestinian Option
By: Aaron Miller
President, Seeds of Peace
'By being a cautious engineer and
a precise navigator,' Amos Oz wrote
in the wake of Rabin’s assassination,
'Rabin embodied the spirit of a new
Israel, one that seeks not salvation,
but solutions.'
Rabin the pragmatist
As an American, I don’t know much
about the idea of a new Israel (it
sounds rather grandiose to me).
But having known and worked with
Rabin for more than twenty years, I
can say without hesitation that he was
a seeker of solutions. A consummate
pragmatist, he hated windy rhetoric,
big complex theories, particularly when
they resulted in what he saw as bad
analysis. I remember in April 1974 at a
Passover Seder at his home in Tel Aviv
laying out my academic theories on
Middle Eastern politics only to be told
with a dismissive wave of his hand that
the world didn’t work that way. Twenty
years later, I got the same reaction in
Washington when I tried to explain to
him my view of Arafat’s behavior.
Rabin didn’t like big theories or
anyone who promoted them
seriously. He steered clear of 'isms'
36
and ideological rigidity of a secular
or religious character. He was not
cynical and had core beliefs. At the
same time, he was a tester, cautious
and slow to change but open to it.
Indeed, this willingness to test and
adjust to change if it made sense to
him was not easy nor all that common,
particularly late in life. And yet, Rabin
had this capacity: to believe in and
accommodate change – even in his
enemies.
Nowhere was Rabin - the seeker
of solutions, the pragmatist - more
apparent than in his relationship
to the Palestinian issue and the
pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace. No
question was more central to his
life and career or to the future of
his nation: how does a tiny state
living in an exceedingly dangerous
neighborhood without strategic
depth, abundant natural resources,
or reliable allies (save one) survive
and maneuver in a world quick to
judge and quicker to condemn?
With his election in June, 1992,
Rabin set out with a renewed
determination to find answers to
that question and to create national
priorities dedicated to testing the
possibilities for agreements with his
Arab neighbors. After four difficult
years, there was an expectation for
real change; much like there was in
1999 following another transition
from a Likud to Labor government.
But unlike the later transition,
Rabin had no set plan, no defined
blueprint. He was serious - focused
but cautious. He tested the Syrians
with hypotheticals and found them
wanting, and envisioned a limited
agreement with the Palestinians on
autonomy.
And yet it was his careful, deliberate
style – his weighing of options - that
paradoxically would bring him to a
dramatically changed conception of
how to address Israel’s relations with
the Palestinians.
In a sense, Rabin came to this radical
(for him) realization by default. He was
no visionary looking to embrace the
future by talking to the organizational
embodiment of Palestinian nationalism,
the PLO, or to its leader Yasser Arafat.
There was no moral imperative driving
him to break taboos and reach for
uncharted horizons. Instead, Rabin
was reacting as he had done all his
life to a changing environment – a
strategic response nonetheless.
Strategic Response to a
changing environment
What changed Rabin’s mind and his
approach was the first Palestinian
Intifada. It introduced two critically
important new realities which made
possible a third.
First, Palestinians in the territories
had put themselves on the map and
forced Rabin to take them seriously
– something he had never been willing
to do before.
Second, he came to the realization
that Israel’s response – a military
reaction to what was essentially a
political problem was not sustainable,
not if Israel wanted to maintain itself
as a Jewish, democratic state and
preserve the character of the Israel
Defense Forces, the institution Rabin
cared most about.
Indeed, the limitations of the use of
military force had always been one
of Rabin’s cardinal principles. 'If you
were to attempt to learn from the two
wars (Sinai, Lebanon), they had farreaching political objectives that were
not attained,' Yoram Peri quoted Rabin
as saying. 'Was this a coincidence?
Was it an accident? The answer is
no. There is a fundamental error in
the approach that uses military might
to achieve the total imposition of our
political will over an Arab state or
group of Arab states.'
These new realities which Rabin was
prescient enough to see served to
bring this deliberate incrementalist
to a stunningly new analysis and
policy. Quite simply, none of the
options for dealing with the issue of
whom or what would represent the
Palestinians was working. The 'ifs'
abounded. If the Jordanian option
(one of the grander illusions of Israel
and American policy) had been a
real option, it wasn’t. If the American
sponsored Washington talks had
not run their course, they had; if
West Bankers and Gazans had the
authority to negotiate independently
of the PLO, they didn’t. If, anyone of
these “ifs” had been available, then
things might have been different. They
weren’t. And Rabin was confronted by
a set of circumstances that the analyst
in him simply couldn’t deny.
During his first visit to Washington
as prime minister in March 1993,
the Israeli and American teams
gathered for a meeting – an analytical
free-for-all would have been a better
description. What was so striking to
me was not that Rabin was arguing
for dealing with PLO, but that
the Prime Minister was laying the
predicate by discrediting every other
option in his characteristically abrupt
and dismissive manner.
37
Rabin's grudging partnership
with Arafat
The fact is – and we all know it – Rabin
did not go looking for negotiations with
the PLO, let alone for a partner in Mr.
Arafat. Having assessed accurately, by
the summer of 1993 that Assad (the
Frank Sinatra of the peace process
so determined to 'do it his own way'
that he priced himself out of the
market) Rabin turned to the other
option (prepared for him by Shimon
and others) and to a leader, Mr. Arafat,
who might be a partner. And Rabin
(with Shimon at his side) gave the
Palestinian track the legitimacy and
credibility on the Israeli side that it
needed. That Oslo failed was not a
result of Rabin’s analysis, judgment,
or policies. The Palestinian option was
the right course. Oslo’s failure lay in the
ambiguities in its structure, its failure to
alter the situation on the ground (we
forget that 300 Israelis died between
1993-96 as compared with 172
during the 1987-93 period; and the
number of settlers increased by tens
of thousands), and a breakdown of
Israeli-Palestinian partnership in wake
of Rabin’s murder.
Much has been made of Rabin’s
personal relationship with Arafat. I
suspect a bit too much. Rabin had
a tougher and more realistic view of
the Palestinian leader than many on
38
our side. Nonetheless, from a kind
of loathing for Arafat, he eventually
moved to a grudging respect for the
tough decisions Arafat had made and
because he sensed that the success
of Oslo was rooted in their capacity
to work together. Quoting my father
about Arafat, Rabin once said to me,
“The only problem about dancing with
a bear is that you can never let go”.
This strange partnership sustained
much of the Oslo process during
1994 and 1995. And it was painfully
obvious in the year following Rabin’s
assassination, that the absence of that
partnership made an excruciatingly
difficult process impossible to
sustain.
Life has no rewind buttons and
speculation on the “might have beens”
is a frustrating game. At the same
time, it is hard for me to believe that
with Rabin’s strategic pragmatism on
peace, his regard for the US, and his
demonstrated capacity to understand
and work with Arafat that the mess
we confront now wouldn’t have
been mitigated substantially had
Rabin lived.
What then is the significance of
Yitzhak Rabin’s contribution to IsraeliPalestinian? Carlyle was more right
than wrong. History – certainly in the
Israeli-Palestinian arena – is indeed
the biography of great men and
women. And Rabin’s greatness was
his capacity to divine what changed
about the Israeli-Palestinian equation,
to figure out what Israel needed to
do about it, and then to lend his
legitimacy, credibility, and authenticity
to actually doing it. While much of Oslo
lies broken or bloodied in the streets,
its real contribution was mutual
recognition; and Israel’s recognition
that if peace were to come, it could
only come about in recognizing the
legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism
and through a historic repartition. No
one played a more central role in this
process. And it is that legacy of Yitzhak
Rabin that we mark here today, and
that Israelis and Palestinians as they
search for a better future will honor
for years to come.
A Critical Look at the
Oslo Process
would bring security -- was exploited
by Arafat consistently.
By: Ze’ev Boim, Deputy
Defense Minister, Israel
It was not surprising that in
September, 1996, in what became
known as the Western Wall Tunnel
incidents, Arafat commanded his
Fatah security personnel to open fire,
resulting in the death of 15 soldiers
and many other injuries. Following
these incidents, Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu refused to continue with
the diplomatic process, claiming that
the Palestinians were not upholding
their obligations. Netanyahu had
the 'gall' to demand reciprocity
from the Palestinians in adhering
to agreements. The Western Wall
Tunnels incidents were only the
‘promo’ of the full out terror assault
that was to be led by murderous
organizations that the ‘Rais’ either
led directly or allowed to exist.
I want to make a few observations
regarding the Oslo process. There
were three signatories to the
agreements: Simon Peres, Yasser
Arafat, and Yitzhak Rabin. Signing
the Declaration of Principles (also
known as 'Oslo I') resulted in each
of the three signatories receiving a
Nobel Peace Prize. Unfortunately,
giving the prize to Yasser Arafat was
a mistake – he will be remembered
as the destroyer of Oslo and of the
peace process. The Chairman of
Palestinian Authority, who throughout
his entire adult life was involved
in terror activities, was cunning
enough to trick his Israeli partners
into believing that he was interested
in peace.
In truth, Arafat never stopped using
terror to achieve his political goals.
Throughout the entire process,
he tricked and lied to all of his
partners. He smuggled and stored
weapons and doubled and tripled
the number of security forces at his
disposal – all of this in opposition to
the agreements that he signed. The
concept that guided the Israeli side
of the Oslo Accords -- that peace
The Second Intifada: a premeditated terror assault
Three months before the Camp
David meetings, whose purpose
was to achieve a final status peace
agreement, Arafat was already
planning to launch the second
Intifada – the armed Intifada. Ariel
Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount
soon after the breakdown of
Camp David was a mere excuse, a
convenient trigger for deciding on a
start date for a pre-planned strategy.
In fact, Palestinian Communication
Minister Imad Al-Faluji has attested
to the pre-planned nature of the
Intifada. The Palestinian terror assault
that infiltrated Israeli cities showed
no mercy for innocent citizens riding
buses, sitting in cafes, or shopping
in markets and malls. These terror
attacks soaked the Oslo Accords
in blood and forced Israel into a
defensive war.
Even believers in the Oslo process
and promoters of peace felt betrayed
by Yasser Afarat. By failing to adhere
to the basic precept of Oslo – that
all disagreements would be solved at
the negotiating table and not through
violence – Arafat succeeded in
bringing Ariel Sharon to the helm as
Prime Minister of Israel, and in doing
so, ended his political relevance. This
five year terror war, led by Arafat,
the father of the Palestinian nation,
has led to enormous suffering and
damage. Thousands of Palestinians
have been killed and injured. Over
1,000 Israelis lost their lives.
Arafat ended his life under siege in
the Muqata’a, declared irrelevant
and unfit to be a partner for the
resumption of the peace process,
even by those who had viewed him
as a serious partner for peace in
the past.
39
Rabin's true view of Oslo
To the best of my knowledge, Yitzhak
Rabin, from the start, did not like Oslo.
The plan was developed behind his
back by Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin,
and others. Rabin was willing to
give the plan a chance for the sake
of peace, despite its dangers, and
despite the fact that the accords
opposed his basic world view. It
was not easy for him to overcome
his suspicions of Arafat's intentions,
based on bitter experiences of
dealing with the man in the past. We
all remember how difficult it was for
Rabin to shake Afarat’s hand, and his
request that Bill Clinton ensure that
there be no hugs and kisses during
the signing ceremony on the White
House lawn.
Rabin was the type of person
who, once he decided to give the
process a chance, he persisted to
advance it. However, if Rabin was
with us today, I believe that he would
proceed the way that Ariel Sharon
is proceeding. He would have never
forgiven Arafat for forsaking the
peace process and would conduct
an unending war on terror. At the
same time, he would always keep
his hand outstretched and eyes open
in search of a diplomatic solution to
our conflict. I can’t say whether Rabin
would initiate a plan such as Sharon’s
40
disengagement plan, but I’m sure
that he would have looked upon it
as a productive attempt to kick-start
the diplomatic process.
We are inclined to think that children
often take after their fathers. In this
spirit, I read an interview of Yuval
Rabin in which he attested to
supporting Ariel Sharon, calling him
‘the right man in the right job.’
an opportunity to miss an opportunity’
have not changed.
After 10 years our eyes have been
opened and we have stopped
fantasizing that the day is upon us
when we eat hummus together with
our friends in Gaza and Damascus. At
present, there is no infrastructure for
peace, there is only an infrastructure
for terror that none of Palestinian
leaders are prepared to dismantle.
The illusion of the 'New Middle
East'
Disengagement as a general
policy
There were three signatories of Oslo:
Rabin was murdered on the altar of
Oslo; Arafat murdered on the altar
of Oslo; Shimon Peres, the only
survivor, still believes that Oslo was
the correct path, and that Israel’s
current diplomatic strategy is an
extension of the Oslo process. Is his
view a critical analysis of past events
that presents future goals that are
actually attainable? Or is he really
simply afraid to take responsibility
for choosing a mistaken path that
had disastrous implication because
he cannot admit that he developed an
illusory vision of the region based on
the deceit and lies of his Palestinian
partner? According to Peres, the ‘New
Middle East’ is already a reality. Most
Israelis are aware of the fact that there
is no ‘New Middle East’ and that the
Palestinians who ‘have never missed
Though this sounds like a cynical
forecast, I am prepared to suggest
something positive for the future:
instead of talking about a 'New Middle
East', I suggest that we discuss
disengagement, not just in terms of
Gaza, but as a general policy. Instead
of deluding ourselves with fantasies
of cooperation, we need to speak
of disengagement between the two
nations, in every sense of the word.
This disengagement would be based
on reaching a diplomatic agreement
between the nations that would
define a border, upon which an ‘iron
wall’ would be built that would divide
between two sovereign states. Each
state would form allegiances with
its natural partners – the Palestinian
state would form partnerships with
the increasingly extreme Islamic
and authoritarian states such as
Syria and Iran, while Israel would
partner with Western countries. We
would continue to develop a Jewish
democratic state based on the
enlightened principles of freedom,
progress and pluralism.
Until we can reach a diplomatic
agreement, the obligation to act
falls primarily on the shoulders on
the Palestinians. The ball is in the
Palestinians’ court, primarily in the
Gaza Strip, where the Palestinians
have been given a test case for
running an independent entity. The
Palestinians’ ability to establish
law and order, end the chaos, and
dismantle terror networks will have a
major influence on the Road Map’s
progress.
Today, the eyes of the world are
on Gaza, attempting to determine
whether the Palestinians will be able
to govern, checking whether we will
be able to continue on the path of
the Road Map towards a diplomatic
agreement. Although I do believe that
an agreement between us and the
Palestinians is possible, I am sure
that the dream of true and complete
peace will continue to exist only in the
‘end of days’ visions of Israel’s biblical
prophets. After all, we must leave
something for future generations.
41
A Survey of Israeli Public
Opinion Regarding the
Oslo Process
By: Prof. Tamar Hermann
The Open University of Israel
The Tami Steinmetz Center
for Peace Research, Tel Aviv
University
We at the Tami Steinmetz Center
for Peace Research at Tel Aviv
University have been studying
Israeli public opinion since June
1994, a few days before the first
visit of Chairperson Arafat to Gaza
and Jericho.
I will present a set of results regarding
various public opinion surveys visà-vis issues related to Oslo. In the
following graph, there are three
lines. The upper line represents the
Israeli-Jewish public's support for
the Oslo process from 1994 to the
present. The lower line represents
the Israeli-Jewish public's opinion's
belief that the Oslo Process will bring
peace to fruition. We have averaged
these two components into the 'Oslo
Index', which is the line represented
in the middle.
Oslo – support, belief, index
(1994-2005)
As you can see, perhaps paradoxically,
the highest levels of support were
displayed during Netanyahu's tenure
as Prime Minister. During Netanyahu's
reign, support for and belief in the
process were higher than during the
Rabin-Peres era, and considerably
higher than during the Barak or
Sharon eras. The lowest levels of
support and belief during Sharon's
first reign represent the most difficult
days of the Intifada and terrorism.
Recently, there has been an upturn
in support.
What has been the main factor that
influences Israeli public opinion of
the Oslo process? We found that
the level of religious observance, as
defined by those questioned, has had
the most direct level of influence on
results. In the following graph, you
will see the differing levels of support
based on this factor. The upper line
represents secular Jews' level of
support; the middle line represents
traditional Jews' level of support;
while the lower line represents
orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jews'
level of support. This connection is
far from trivial, as it shows the direct
connection between level of religiosity
and political affiliation. In addition, with
changing demographic trends in Israel
with respect to population expansion
within the orthodox and ultra-orthodox
communities, the future is not very
rosy in terms of Israeli public opinion
supporting peace.
100
Rabin-Peres
Netanyahu
Barak
Sharon I
Support
Belief
Index
80
60
40
20
0
42
Sharon II
Olso Support – by level of
religiosity
100
80
In our most recent poll, in October,
2005, we asked the public if they
believed that Rabin's decision
to initiate the Oslo process was
correct or mistaken. We found that
a plurality (though not a majority) of
those questioned (49%) believed
that Rabin's decision was either
'surely right' or 'probably right'.
However, it is important to note
that a higher percentage believed
that the decision was 'probably
right' rather than 'surely right'. 39%
believed that Rabin's decision was
mistaken, of which 24% believed
that it was 'probably wrong'. These
numbers also tend to correlate to
the level of religious observance of
the respondent.
60
40
20
0
Secular
Orthodox & Ultra Orthodox
Traditional
12
20
49
In retrospect, was Rabin’s
decision to opt for the Oslo
process right or wrong?
(October 2005)
Surely right
Probably right
24
We found the expected connection
between the answers given in the
above survey, and political affiliation
by party of the person questioned,
as displayed in the following graph.
Amongst Meretz and Labor voters,
there is a huge majority that believes
that Rabin's decision to initiate Oslo
Probably wrong
Surely wrong
Don’t know
39
29
15
43
was correct, while amongst Likud,
Shas, and NRP (National Religious
Party) voters, a significant majority
believed that Rabin's decision was
mistaken. We see that Likud voters
are more moderate than Shas or
NRP voters, which correlates to the
religiosity issue, as Shas and NRP
voters are generally orthodox or
ultra-orthodox, while Likud voters
are generally traditional or secular.
Survey by party voting in 2003
100%
5
9.5
11
20
10
80%
51
73
60%
In addition, we found the
expected connection between
the answers given in the above
survey, and religiosity of the person
questioned, as displayed in the
following graph:
60
40%
30.5
Don’t know
Wrong
35
Right
20%
38
27
20
0%
Meretz
Labor
Likud
Shas
NRP
Survey by level of religiosity
100%
12
8.5
26
40.5
44
11
14
80%
Don’t know
60%
71
76
40%
51
18
O
rth
od
ox
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
0%
10
U
ltr
ao
rth
od
ox
20%
Wrong
Right
62
Se
cu
la
r
We also surveyed the public's
opinion of the influence of Rabin's
assassination on the peace process.
We asked, in October, 2005: Had
Rabin not been assassinated, do you
think that a peace agreement with
the Palestinians would have been
reached? In this survey, the plurality
is on the negative side, as 49% gave
negative answers.
Had Rabin not been
assassinated, do you think that
by today a peace agreement
between Israel and the
Palestinians would already have
been reached?
(October 2005)
10
11.5
39.5
26
When mapping this survey upon the
party voting patterns of respondents,
we received the expected results.
While a majority of Meretz and
Labor voters believed that peace
would have been reached, a majority
of Likud, Shas, and NRP voters did
not, as displayed below:
Surely yes
Probably yes
Probably no
29.5
Surely no
Don’t know
49
23
Survey by party voting 2003
100%
When viewing this question in terms
of religiosity, there are significant
differences between the various
levels of religious affiliation as would
be expected:
10
10.5
18
19
80%
14
40
25
60
60%
40%
Don’t know
40
67
73
No
Yes
65
20%
29.5
20
9
0%
Meretz
Labor
Likud
Shas
NRP
45
Survey by level of religiosity
100%
8.5
12
80%
26
46
14
40.5
Don’t know
71
76
40%
No
Yes
62
51
20%
18
10
U
ltr
ao
rth
od
ox
O
rth
od
ox
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
0%
Do you or don’t you agree that
the Oslo principle of territorial
compromise is today already
part of the Israeli national
consensus?
(October 2005)
This question broke down according
to party lines, as would be expected,
as a vast majority of Meretz and
Labor voters believed that territorial
compromise has become part of
the national consensus, while the
majority of other parties did not:
11
60%
Se
cu
la
r
In our surveys, we also asked the
following question in October, 2005:
do you agree that the Oslo principle
of territorial compromise is today
already part of the Israeli national
consensus? We were surprised to
find that a plurality, 49%, believed
the Oslo principle of territorial
compromise has, in fact, become
part of the Israeli national consensus,
as displayed below:
9
48
21
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Don’t know
26
28
16
Survey by party voting 2003
On this issue, too, we see that level
of religiosity is most conclusively
connected to survey results, as
displayed in the below graph:
100%
10
10.5
18
19
80%
14
40
25
60%
Don’t know
60
78
40%
40
67
No
Yes
65
20%
29.5
20
4
0%
Meretz
Labor
Likud
Shas
NRP
Survey by level of religiosity
We asked a very important question
that ought to be taken account
when attempting to advance the
peace process in the future. We
asked how people felt that Israel's
ending the occupation beyond the
green line would influence the level
of Palestinian terrorism. The question
and the results were as follows:
100%
80%
10
31
14.5
13.5
14
14
19.5
14
37
60%
61
61
40%
59
67
67
Don’t know
No
Yes
67
48.5
20%
25.5
19.5
0%
Secular
Traditional
Orthodox
Ultra
Orthodox
47
Some argue that as long as
Israel occupies territories
beyond the Green Line,
Palestinian terror will continue.
Others maintain that even if
Israel withdraws from all the
territories, Palestinian terror
will not stop and will probably
even increase. With which of
the two arguments do you
agree more? (October 2005)
We were surprised to see that
74% of respondents believed that a
withdrawal from occupied territories
will not end Palestinian terror, and will
probably cause it to increase. This
very grim result must be taken into
account by anyone who is planning
to resume the peace process, with
the hopes that leaving occupied
territory will end terrorism.
48
With the first argument
19%
With the second argument
74%
Don’t know
7%
Would Rabin Have
Been Able to Reach a
Permanent Settlement
with the Palestinians?
By: Prof. Yaakov Bar-Simantov
Hebrew University
Head of the Applied Research
Institute of Jerusalem
The collapse of the Oslo process
and the outbreak of the Al Aqsa
Intifada spurred both political leaders
and academic scholars (including
myself) to analyze the reasons for
its failure. Proposed explanations
consider the nature of the conflict,
the ripeness of the sides for an
agreement, the conducting of the
negotiations, the implementation
failures, the psychological and
cultural barriers, the lack of domestic
legitimacy, and the role of the
mediator. Some of the negotiators
on both sides believe that, had
Rabin not been assassinated, the
Oslo process would have reached a
positive conclusion, or in other words,
a permanent settlement acceptable
to both sides. This belief is based on
the following assumptions: (1) Rabin’s
commitment to the process he
created; (2) his interest in concluding a
permanent settlement as the greatest
achievement of his life’s work; and (3)
his ability to manage with Arafat.
Commitment to the process
Rabin was committed to the Oslo
process, although he did not initiate
it, and was skeptical about reaching
an agreement with Arafat and the
PLO. Indeed, without the initiative of
Yair Hirshfeld and Ron Pundak and
the encouragement of Yossi Beilin
and Shimon Peres, it is doubtful if
Rabin would have pushed forward
the Oslo process. He did not like
Arafat, nor did he trust him. He
had to overcome severe cognitive
dissonance to negotiate with
Arafat, sign an agreement with him,
and even shake hands with him.
However, once he was convinced
that an agreement was possible he
became totally committed to it.
Rabin was ripe for an agreement
with Palestinians even before Oslo.
The Intifada as and the Gulf War of
1991 had significant impacts on
his willingness to attempt a peace
agreement with the Palestinians. Until
the Intifada, the Palestinian issue was
not a major concern of Rabin's. The
Intifada was a learning process for
him, which forced him to change his
attitudes and beliefs regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As a Minister of Defense, during the
first years of the Intifada, Rabin came
to realize that there was no military
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and that it was impossible to
break the will of a people struggling
for their independence. He perceived
the Intifada as a war of liberation,
although he refused to refer to it as
such publicly. He understood that
Israel could not continue its control
of the Palestinians and therefore,
had to be separated from them by
a peaceful agreement. If not, Rabin
feared that Israel would endanger its
status as a Jewish state.
The demographic factor was very
important in this regard. In his speech
to the Knesset, on October 5th 1995
(a month before his assassination)
when he introduced the Oslo II
agreement, he said: 'We preferred
a Jewish state, even if not on every
part of the Land of Israel, to a binational state…We chose a Jewish
state because we are convinced
that a bi-national state with millions
of Palestinian Arabs will not be able
to fulfill the Jewish role of the State
of Israel, which is the state of the
Jews.'
The Gulf War, whose missile attacks
caused thousands of Israelis to pack
their bags and leave the Tel Aviv area,
was another significant factor that
influenced Rabin's change in attitude.
He had deep concerns about the
willingness of Israelis to continue
paying the costs of a protracted
49
conflict. Rabin recognized the 'limits
of military force' on one side, and
the painful costs of a permanent
conflict on the other, and therefore,
was determined 'to expend all the
energy, to take any path, to do
everything necessary, possible, and
more, for the sake of national and
personal security, to achieve peace,
and prevent war'.
bring peace to Israeli people. He also
believed that the Palestinians were
also ripe for an agreement and the
process would succeed in building
trust between the two sides. Rabin
realized that the agreement's
implementation would take time
and that final status would only be
reached during his second term as
prime minister.
The collapse of the Soviet Union,
the defeat of Saddam Hussein,
and the U.S. hegemony as the only
superpower, were encouraging
developments. Rabin saw these
developments as opening a 'window
of opportunity that Israel should not
miss'.
The assassination of Rabin brought
to power two prime ministers,
Netanyahu and Barak, who did
not have the same commitment to
the Oslo process as that of Rabin.
Netanyahu opposed the Oslo process
and saw it as a dangerous and risky
one, and therefore acted to delay
its implementation. Barak who was
skeptical from the beginning as to
the logic of the Oslo process, in which
Israel made territorial concessions
without receiving a concrete Palestinian
return, preferred to jump quickly to a
final status agreement to check the
real intentions of the Palestinians.
With all of his doubts, Rabin saw the
Oslo Accord as a great opportunity.
He recognized that the accord was
not a perfect one, and there were
holes in it, as Ehud Bark maintained.
However, he believed that he could
control the process in a way that
it would not endanger Israel. He
believed that the gradualism inherent
in the process was the way to deal
with potential risks.
Rabin approached Oslo, as his
advisers maintained, with eyes
wide open. He perceived the Oslo
Accord as his own achievement. He
felt that his historical mission was to
50
Rabin's permanent agreement
vision
While Rabin was ripe for coming to
an end of conflict, to a final status
agreement with the Palestinians, he
had no any vision or any concrete
plan of what the permanent
settlement would look like.
From the little we have in writing
about Rabin’s view of a permanent
settlement, and from conversations
with various individuals who knew
him well and who participated in
the Oslo process, it seems doubtful
that Rabin would have been willing
to offer the Palestinians what was
offered by Ehud Barak, and rejected;
nor does it seem, would he have
accepted the Clinton outline, the
Taba understandings, or the Geneva
Accord, all of which exceeded Barak’s
concessions at Camp David.
Throughout the Oslo process,
from the time he was let in on the
secret meetings in February 1993
until the interim agreement with the
Palestinians was presented to the
Knesset in October 1995, Rabin did
not have a clear and well-formulated
plan for a permanent settlement.
He strongly refused to talk about
the meaning and elements of
a permanent settlement or to hold
internal discussions on the issue.
He kept his thoughts on this subject
to himself; he did not share them
even with his closest advisors. He
refused to give the Palestinians
during negotiations even a clue
about the final agreement, and he
never mentioned the possibility of a
Palestinian state. Although he refused
to use the term “state”, he realized
that the outcome of the negotiations
would lead to a separation from the
Palestinian independent entity.
Although it is not clear what motivated
Rabin from refraining to pursue a
permanent settlement, the following
explanations are possible:
• He viewed the Oslo process
as the fulfillment of the autonomy
agreement reached by Menachem
Begin at Camp David in 1978 – or
even as a continuation of the Madrid
process - and no more than that, at
the interim-agreement stage. Thus,
he desired to make few territorial
concessions during the five year
period of the interim agreement. He
strongly refused to freeze settlement
building or even dismantle a single
isolated settlement in the Gaza Strip
or Tel-Rumeida in Hebron. He was
afraid of a second Altalena.
• Before moving ahead, he wanted
to examine the implementation of the
interim agreement.
• He believed it was impossible to
reach a permanent settlement due
to the deep differences between the
sides on the question of Jerusalem
and the issue of Palestinian refugees
and believed that the chances of
resolving these issues was remote.
·• He was cautious about prematurely
revealing positions that could harm
Israel’s negotiating stance in talks
with the Palestinians on a permanent
settlement.
• He was concerned about
intensifying internal opposition
to the Oslo process as long as
it was uncertain whether
negotiations could in fact lead to a
permanent settlement.
• He had not developed a final
status program because he never
used prior planning or thinking as
a method for decision-making. For
him, all possibilities were open for
future developments and changes,
and therefore, he preferred not to
commit himself to any prior plan or
a program.
Nevertheless, Rabin understood that
Israel would have to make very painful
concessions in a permanent settlement
with the Palestinians. Rabin first offered
his view of a permanent settlement
in public on October 5, 1995 (when
he presented the Israeli-Palestinian
interim agreement to the Knesset).
In his speech, Rabin mentioned his
wish to reach a 'permanent solution'
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
main first and the foremost [principle]
in the framework of the permanent
solution was keeping the 'State of
Israel as a Jewish state, at least
80% of whose citizens will be, and
are, Jews.' However, this wish was
not reflected in his territorial terms of
the agreement.
Rabin would like to include in Israel:
'most of the area of the Land of
Israel as it was under the rule of the
British Mandate, and alongside it
a Palestinian entity which will be at
a home to most of the Palestinians
residents living in the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank. We would like this to
be an entity which is less than a state,
and which will be independently run
the lives of the Palestinians under its
authority. The borders of the State of
Israel, during the permanent solution,
will be beyond the lines which existed
before the Six Day War. We will not
return to the to the 4 June lines.'
Rabin referred to 'the main changes,
not all of them', which Israel 'envision
and want in the permanent solution':
A. First and foremost, a united
Jerusalem, which will include both
Ma'aleh Adumim and Givat Ze'ev
- as the capital of Israel, under Israeli
sovereignty, while preserving the rights
of the members of the other faiths,
Christianity and Islam, to freedom of
access and freedom of worship in their
holy places, according to the customs
of their faiths.
B. The security border of the State
of Israel will be located in the Jordan
Valley, in the broadest meaning of
that term.
C. Changes to the border which will
include the addition of Gush Etzion,
Efrat, Beitar and other communities,
51
most of which are in the area east of
what was the 'Green Line' prior to the
Six Day War.
D. The establishment of blocs of
settlements in Judea and Samaria,
like the one in Gush Katif.1
In Rabin’s eyes, the most important
element in the permanent settlement
was an expanded and united
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, under
Jewish sovereignty, with free access to
the holy places and freedom of ritual
for the other religions (essentially the
status quo before the permanent
settlement). In many of his speeches
since the signing of the Oslo Accord,
Rabin insisted that Jerusalem is not a
subject for negotiation or bargaining.
Nevertheless, Rabin never mentioned
what this united Jerusalem includes,
and whether it includes the 200,000
Palestinian residents.
Rabin differentiated between territorial
borders and security borders. In his
view, the territorial borders of the State
of Israel, though not clearly defined,
would exceed the lines of June 4,
1967. The security border would be
located in the Jordan Rift, but the area
would not necessarily be included
within the state’s territorial borders.
Rabin differentiated between types
of settlements (some of which
are cited by name) that should be
included within the territory of the
State of Israel, and blocs of Jewish
52
settlements, whose status he did not
clarify precisely.
The status of the Palestinian entity
would be inferior to that of a state;
it would be home to most of the
Palestinian residents living in the Gaza
Strip and West Bank and would be
able independently to govern the lives
of the Palestinians under its authority.
Rabin did not relate to the Palestinian
refugees in his speech.
In the estimation of his closest advisors,
Rabin would at most have been willing
to give the entire Gaza Strip to the
Palestinians, but no more than 70
percent of Judea and Samaria. He
strongly opposed any concession on
Jerusalem or on the Right of Return.
There is no clear answer as to whether
Rabin thought the Palestinians would
accept this approach to the permanent
settlement or view it as an opening for
negotiations. Even his closest advisors
did not know his true position.
This concept of a permanent settlement
entails fewer concessions than those
proposed by Barak at Camp David.
It is therefore doubtful whether the
Palestinians would have been willing
to accept it, although it could be
claimed that Rabin’s approach to the
permanent settlement was an optimal
program, subject to modifications and
negotiations.
In the final analysis, it is hard to assume
that a permanent settlement could have
been attained on the basis of Rabin’s
conditions. Nevertheless, some do
assume that due to the difficulties
of reaching a permanent settlement,
Rabin would have changed course and
worked instead for a long-term interim
agreement that would have satisfied the
Palestinians, or alternatively reached an
accord on some of the disputed issues,
with others deferred to the long term.
Dealing with Arafat
More than any Israeli prime minister
who followed, Rabin earned the
Palestinians’ trust as a man who
honors his commitments. This belief
- itself an improvable assumption ignores our uncertainty about Rabin’s
vision of a permanent settlement or if
his approach would have achieved a
permanent settlement satisfactory to
the Palestinians.The hypothesis states
that thanks to his personality and the
bonds of trust he had with Arafat, Rabin
would have succeeded in gaining the
Palestinians’ agreement to a negotiated
settlement, thus preventing the violent
confrontation. Although this hypothesis
is interesting and of course impossible
to confirm or refute, it is doubtful that
Rabin could have reached a permanent
agreement with the Palestinians based
on the program that he introduced on
October 5th 1995.
Rabin: the Broad Vision
of a Soldier-Statesman
By: Ambassador Chinmaya
R. Gharekhan, India's Special
Envoy for West Asia and
Middle East Peace Process
As the Special Envoy of the Prime
Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan
Singh, it is my privilege to participate
in this commemorative conference
to honor the late Yitzhak Rabin who
sacrificed his life in the service of his
country and in the cause of peace.
Rabin became the Prime Minister of
Israel shortly after India, which had
accorded recognition to the new
State soon after it was established,
decided to establish full diplomatic
relations with the State of Israel in
January 1992. Mr. Rabin was an
enthusiastic supporter of rapidly
expanding bilateral relations with
India. I am confident that he would
be more than satisfied at the growth
in Indo-Israel relations within a short
span of a dozen years.
Rabin's transparent forthrightness
I had the privilege of meeting Prime
Minister Rabin for the first time in
January 1993. As this distinguished
audience is no doubt aware, the
United Nations Security Council
adopted a resolution in December
1992, with the unanimous support of
all 15 members, on the deportation
of over 400 Palestinians from the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The
Security Council had requested the
Secretary General of the United
Nations to take up the matter with
the Government of Israel. I had
just joined the United Nations as
Under-Secretary General in charge
of the multilateral track of the Madrid
peace process. I was deputed by
the Secretary General as his Special
Emissary to negotiate with the
Government of Israel the modalities
of implementing the Security Council
resolution.
During my stay in Israel, which
lasted several days, I met with the
government leaders including the
then Foreign Minister, Mr. Shimon
Peres, Deputy Foreign Minister
Yossi Beilin, as well as the Director
General of the Foreign Ministry Uri
Savir, who went on to play a key role
in the negotiations leading to the Oslo
Accord. My principal negotiations
were, however, with Prime Minister
Rabin. Besides being the Prime
Minister, he also was in charge of
the Defence Ministry. I had, of course,
heard about Mr. Rabin, about his
“iron fist” policy and about his gruff
and even abrasive manner. I was,
therefore, not particularly looking
forward to my meeting with him.
I met him three times in his Defence
Ministry office in Tel Aviv. I still have
vivid recollection of those meetings.
I was immediately and pleasantly
surprised by the man I met. The
one quality, which struck me most,
was his transparent forthrightness,
his honesty. Here was a man, I
thought, who did not waste time in
diplomatic niceties but who, once
he agreed to something, could be
depended upon to honor his word.
He offered no excuses or apologies
for the deportations, nor did he
demonstrate any hostility towards
the United Nations. He encouraged
me to spell out my proposals to
which he promised to give careful
consideration. I, of course, had no
illusions. I did not expect Israel to
easily agree with Security Council’s
demand to revoke the deportations.
Nevertheless, I was impressed that
Mr. Rabin not only did not reject the
resolution but, in fact, showed full
willingness to negotiate a phased
withdrawal. I will not go into all the
details, but towards the end of my
mission, which was not successful,
as I would have wished, I suggested
to Mr. Rabin that he ought to arrive
at the same kind of deal I had
suggested to the United States rather
than that suggested to the United
Nations. He smiled and disarmingly
agreed with me.
53
Rabin: UN conferred legitimacy
on the State of Israel
The last time I personally met Mr.
Rabin was in October 1995, in New
York. He had come to participate in
the 50th anniversary celebrations of
the United Nations. At a gathering
of Jewish leaders at which I was
present, Mr. Rabin told his audience,
in unambiguous terms, that while
Israel had legitimate grievances
against the United Nations, the
Israelis and the Jewish community
everywhere must never forget that
it was the United Nations which
had conferred legitimacy on the
State of Israel. I know that the
relations between Israel and United
Nations have improved significantly
in recent years, but in 1995 it was
a very significant statement on the
part of Mr. Rabin.
Many people have claimed to have
authored of the Oslo Accords, but it
had only one parent on the Israeli side
- namely, Mr. Rabin. It was he who
had to take the political decision and
assume responsibility for signing the
accords. He put his political career
and, as subsequent events were so
tragically to demonstrate, his life on
the line for the sake of peace. He did
not act out of fear of the Intifada but
through careful calculation of Israel’s
interests and through a broad vision
54
of the direction in which he saw the
Israelis and the Palestinians moving
in the years ahead. Of course, he
would never dilute Israel’s military and
security capability, but at the same
time, he had the courage to come to
terms with the forces of history and
the realities on the ground. There can
be no definite answer to the question
whether the peace process would be
at a different stage today had Rabin
lived longer. Mr. Aaron Miller, who
knew Mr. Rabin as well as anybody
else, believes that, Rabin could
have overcome the deep distrust of
Israeli politics and worked with the
Palestinian partner. Most people in
this conference would probably agree
with Mr. Miller’s.
An overwhelming majority on
both sides crave for peace
The situation today, as I see it, has
not changed in any fundamental
sense over the past few years. An
overwhelming majority of people
on both sides continue to crave
for peace. The Oslo Accords have
been overtaken by the Roadmap.
The leadership on both sides
has accepted the Roadmap and
continues to pledge their respective
commitment to implement it. The
decision of Prime Minister Sharon
to withdraw from the Gaza Strip was
warmly welcomed by India and the
international community and, most
significantly, by the President of the
Palestinian Authority, Mr. Mahmoud
Abbas. It required political courage on
the part of the Prime Minister to make
the decision and implemented it.
A few months ago, Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh stated that Middle
East, or West Asia, to give the region
its proper geographical description,
had become a region of major
concern to India. Therefore, India's
Prime Minister decided to appoint a
Special Envoy to the region, the first
time that a government in India has
taken such a step.
Today, as we pay tribute to the
memory of Yitzhak Rabin, the
soldier turned statesman, it would
be beneficial to all of us in the
international community, including in
particular the Israeli and Palestinian
people and their leaders to reaffirm
their commitment to find solutions,
however difficult, to the undoubtedly
complex and emotional issues facing
them.
Rabin’s words are as relevant today
as when he said them more than
10 years ago: 'We shall negotiate
as if there is no terror and we shall
deal with terror as if there are no
negotiations.'
Prime Minister Blair's
Message in Memorial of
Yitzhak Rabin
By: Lord Michael Levy
Personal Envoy of Prime
Minister Tony Blair and Special
Advisor on the Middle East
I have been asked to deliver the
following speech on behalf of my
Prime Minister Tony Blair.
On this day of commemoration and
reflection, I would like to express
my gratitude for Yitzhak Rabin's
commitment and sacrifice. The loss
of Yitzhak Rabin was a tragedy not
only for his family, but also for the
whole Israeli people.
I became leader of my own country’s
Labor party only shortly before Yitzhak
Rabin’s death. I went to his funeral
determined to express my own
personal solidarity with his vision,
and with the people of Israel. That
occasion was my first personal
encounter with the profound and
impressive sense of determination
in adversity that has marked Israel’s
national life at difficult moments.
Throughout his long and distinguished
career, Yitzhak Rabin’s life was
devoted to the State of Israel. He
worked unstintingly for his country's
best interests. The combination of
integrity, courage, judgment and
pragmatism, so central to the way
Yitzhak Rabin worked, is an example
to us all.
Speaking before the US Congress
on the eve of the signing of the
Oslo Accords, Prime Minister Rabin
declared: “I was a military man for 27
years. I waged war as long as there
was no chance for peace. I believe
there is now a chance for peace,
a great chance, and we must take
advantage of it.” Yitzhak Rabin did
not make the move from being a man
of war to a man of peace because
the courage of his military career had
deserted him, rather the opposite.
The courageous thing to do then
was to search for peace. He knew
that achieving peace required difficult
decisions for the sake of a greater
good, but was undeterred.
Yitzhak Rabin set in train a dialogue
which, despite serious setbacks,
continues today. Now there is renewed
opportunity. The disengagement from
Gaza gives us all a chance to rebuild
the momentum. And the Roadmap
shows us the way ahead to end the
terrible conflict in this region.
We must never underestimate the
challenges. We are not complacent
about progress. And we will not
trivialize the decisions which remain
to be taken. But there remains a
determination to find new solutions
to longstanding and difficult problems.
The goal of an Israeli state and a
Palestinian state living side by side in
peace requires great courage, effort
and sacrifice. But it is a worthy goal.
And it is a crucial obligation we all
share. But just as Yitzhak Rabin’s
legacy has survived the terror which
took his life, so those who search for
peace can and will overcome those
who use violence for destructive
ends.
Those who demonstrate the bravery
to search for peace, despite obstacles
and opposition, are heirs to Yitzhak
Rabin’s vision. It has often been said
that the best memorial to Yitzhak
Rabin’s life would be a just and lasting
peace. As we remember Yitzhak Rabin
today, let us all redouble our efforts,
strengthen our resolve and extend
our compassion to all those who
have suffered from this conflict, so
that together we may be worthy of
his legacy.
(Footnotes)
1. Pursuing Peace: The Peace
Speeches of Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, Tel Aviv 1995, pp. 149-150
(my emphases)
55
His Vision - Our Reality:
Yitzhak Rabin and Egypt
From War to Peace
Yitzhak Rabin… A Fighter
for Peace
By: Dr. Osama El Baz,
chair of panel, Political Advisor
to the President of Egypt
In the history of nations, certain
individuals endowed with wisdom,
vision and courage emerge in the
midst of despair in order to pave the
road to a better future for their people.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the
late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was
one of these leaders. In an address
from the podium of the Knesset in
July 1992, he urged his colleagues
and his people at large to think of
engaging in peace making rather than
in a peace process. He believed that it
was absurd to waste any opportunity
for making peace and ending war,
violence, bloodshed and hatred. To
Rabin, the sad events and images of
the past should never block the vision
of real leaders and their supporters
from taking calculated risks along the
road to peace.
Throughout the history of our region,
the Middle East, we see shining
examples of leaders endowed with
courage and commitment. With their
sense of mission and hope, they were
able to defeat the voices of doom and
gloom of their adversaries and take
56
gigantic steps forward. This is how
history is written and how peace is
made. Without any doubt, Yitzhak
Rabin was one of these courageous
leaders who is committed to a better
future for his own people and for his
adversaries.
He recognized the right of the
Palestinian people to live in peace
and dignity like his own people.
He realized the fact that making
peace, however difficult and risky
it may appear, should be given top
priority and be approached with full
commitment. Those who become
discouraged by obstacles, sharp
differences or illusions of destined
conflicts and irreconcilable interests
must not be allowed to block the road
to the future. The future is made by
great individuals whose moral
commitment to peace precede their
suspicions and fears.
In Egypt, we came to know the late
Yitzhak Rabin over a number of years
through various circumstances. We
knew him first as an adversary, but
later we knew him as an interlocutor for
peace, and ultimately as a full partner
in peace, a true peacemaker. Rabin
has often puzzled commentators
who were astounded that a tough
soldier came to be regarded as a
man of peace; they argued that this
transition could only have occurred
late in his career. Yet this transition
from soldier to man of peace did not
arise from a vacuum. Rabin showed
signs of aspiring for peace earlier in
his career as well.
Rabin's development into a
peacemaker
Prime Minister Rabin, during his
first period term as Prime Minister
in the 1970s, negotiated with Egypt
towards an interim agreement.
Faithful to his very nature, Rabin
was sensitive to security issues.
However, more significantly, he
sought a political agreement, not a
military one. For Rabin, what was
important was the extent to which
this interim agreement would end
the state of war, and bring peace
a step closer. That initial step was
a clear sign of the peacemaker
which he was to become, and his
acceptance of the “land for peace”
formula. Addressing the Knesset
on the agreement, Prime Minister
Rabin stated: 'I assume that if it is
achieved, it will be demonstrated in
the future - whatever the criticism
that is being leveled at it today - this
was a serious attempt, on Israel's
initiative, to make a breakthrough
on the road towards peace.'1 After
the interim agreement was initialed
on 1st September 1975, the late
President Sadat, a hero of peace
himself, acknowledged that a new
period had begun that represented
a turning point in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The road towards peace
had been established, and it was
soon thereafter that President Sadat
took the first bold step on this road,
albeit with the new Prime Minister
of Israel, Menachem Begin. During
Sadat’s historic visit to the Knesset,
Yitzhak Rabin as a member of
Knesset, approached the President
and told him: 'your courageous and
bold arrival here hopefully created a
new era.' Yitzhak Rabin undoubtedly
had his share in initiating this very first
blossom of peace in our region.
Yitzhak Rabin would return more
than a decade later, and for a second
time become Prime Minister of Israel.
During the interim, he remained close
attuned to the realities of the ArabIsraeli conflict. Moreover, as Minister
of Defense during the national unity
government, he witnessed first-hand
the aspirations of the Palestinian
people expressed during the Intifada
in their quest for self-determination,
and their refusal to continue living
under Israeli occupation. Undoubtedly
this experience influenced Rabin's
outlook when he returned to the
premiership.
Egypt recognized early on that the
new Israeli Prime Minister meant
business regarding the peace
process. Likewise, Rabin knew that
Egypt was a key player in the future
of peace in the region. During his
address presenting his government
to the Knesset on 13 July 1992,
Rabin specifically mentioned Egypt
in his plans to pursue peace, when
he stated, 'In peace-making, we wish
to call upon the aid of Egypt, whose
late leader, President Anwar Sadat,
exhibited such courage and was able
to bequeath to his people – and to us
– the first peace agreement.' Rabin
recognized that Egypt would be a key
resource in the pursuit of peace, and
therefore ensured that his first foreign
diplomatic visit as Premier, coming a
few days after this Knesset address,
was to Egypt. This was also the first
such visit by an Israeli Prime Minister
to Egypt since 1986. Throughout the
course of his three and a half years
as Prime Minister, Rabin was to
visit Egypt on no less than seven
occasions to confer with President
Mubarak.
President Mubarak, in eulogizing the
late Yitzhak Rabin, said that Rabin
was 'a courageous leader and a
recognized statesman….He defied
the prejudices of the past to tackle
the most complicated of problems,
namely the Palestinian problem, in a
forthright manner.' Egypt recognized
Yitzhak Rabin as a partner for
peace, a true peacemaker. It has
always been our conviction that
the quest for peace, in addition to
true leadership, encompasses three
attributes: a vision for peace among
equals; a pragmatic approach; and
a belief in partnership. Allow me to
share with you what we believed to
be the manner in which Yitzhak Rabin
possessed these three attributes,
and how he employed them in the
quest for peace.
The need for a vision for peace
Rabin was an attuned observer of
the realities and imperatives of his
time. In presenting his government
to the Knesset in July 1992, Rabin
stated: “no longer are we necessarily
‘a people that dwells alone,’ and no
longer is it true that ‘the whole world
is against us.’ We must overcome the
sense of isolation that had held us in
its thrall for almost half a century. We
must join the international movement
towards peace, reconciliation and
cooperation that is spreading over
the entire globe these days – lest
we be the last to remain, all alone,
in the station.” In 1992, Rabin was a
believer in the imperative for peace
and the possibilities afforded to
achieve it. He set about to resolve the
Arab-Israeli conflict, not to manage
it. Unfortunately today, certain voices
are ignoring such lofty principles and
57
operating on the assumption of the
continuation of violence and of
subjugation.
Rabin possessed a vision of how to
achieve peace, which he outlined to
the Knesset as a priority. “The new
Government has made it a central
goal to promote peace-making and
to take vigorous steps that will lead
to the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict”.
he declared. Regarding the Palestinian
question, he would later elaborate by
referring to the plan stipulated by the
Camp David accords of applying selfgovernment in Gaza and the West
Bank for an interim period of five
years. No later than three years after
the period of autonomy was to take
hold, permanent status negotiations
would begin.
On the Palestinian track, a major
component of Rabin’s vision as it
was to unfold was his acceptance of
the inevitability that Israel would have
to sit down with the Palestinians as
partners for peace. In terms of his
vision on the withdrawal from the
Occupied Territories, Rabin was wise
enough to declare as early as 1979 in
his memoirs and earlier, that territorial
compromise was not anathema, and
'that it may well be the only truly
feasible solution precisely because it
is the most just''2. Rabin saw beyond
the emotional and religious attachment
58
to the Territories that was common
among his political colleagues. This,
in addition to Rabin's pragmatism,
enabled his vision for peace to bear
fruit.
The need for pragmatism
Yitzhak Rabin was personally wellsuited to the need for pragmatism that
would arise in the quest for peace.
He had been described by a keen
observer to exhibit pragmatism but
not cynicism, and was thus “motivated
by a belief in life’s possibilities.”3 He
looked forward to a future that would
offer better possibilities for both
peoples. Rabin was far from being
an ideologue and did not care for
dogma. His adaptability was always
evident and his capacity to change
and to reform his views was a major
credit to peace.
It was out of these personal convictions
that Rabin recognized the dangers and
the lost opportunities that would result
from a lack of pragmatism. In early
September 1992, Rabin cautioned
that 'it is time to give up the religion
of Greater Israel,' a reference to his
willingness for territorial concessions.4
He acknowledged that the previous
sterile formula of ‘peace for peace’
was going nowhere.
On the Palestinian track, Rabin’s
pragmatism recognized the need
for a change in his relations with
the PLO, and with Yasser Arafat.
Rabin’s pragmatism was soon to
carry the day, and in a little bit over
a year from assuming office, he
would officially recognize the PLO,
sign agreements with Arafat and
in an inspiring twist of fate, share
the Nobel Peace Prize with Arafat.
Today we are encouraged by further
pragmatic steps taken along the road
to peace. The Israeli withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip and a few settlements
in the northern part of the West Bank
is a step in the right direction. We
call upon the Israeli Government to
continue the withdrawal of its troops
from all the Palestinian territories, and
to implement all of its commitments
in this respect in accordance with the
Road Map peace initiative.
In a pragmatic reversal of policy on
the Syrian track, Rabin declared in
September 1992 that his government
would adopt the ‘territory for peace’
concept, acknowledging that UNSC
resolutions 242 and 338 applied to
the Golan.5 We urge Israel and Syria
to engage constructively on the road
to peace guided by this principle
acknowledged by Rabin, with its
roots contained in the Camp David
Accords.
The Need for Partnership
A solid path towards peace requires
the presence of trustworthy partners.
Rabin was lucky to have partnerships
that enabled him and each member
of the partnership to move forward
towards peace. Yitzhak Rabin
also found a profound and strong
partner in Shimon Peres, his Nobel
co-laureate. Despite their differences
over the years, both men had the
moral courage and responsibility
toward their people to partner for
this noble cause.
In his search for a partner on the
Palestinian side, Rabin was to discover
that the PLO and Arafat in particular
who were the real interlocutors.
Ultimately, on 10th September 1993,
Israel and the PLO were to sign letters
recognizing each other. Within a matter
of months, Rabin was to conquer his
lingering apprehensions about the
PLO and Arafat, and was to come
to recognize Arafat’s honoring of his
commitments. Trust began to replace
suspicion, and respect ensued.6
To some extent, the memory of
Yitzhak Rabin as a staunch fighter for
peace and coexistence coincided with
a turnabout in the Palestinian attitude,
championed by Chairman Yasser
Arafat. Arafat led the way to a new
chapter in the region’s history when he
courageously advocated the cause of
peace on the basis of “land for peace”
and the coexistence of two states
living side by side in harmony and
dignity. He entered negotiations with
Israel on this basis, hence departing
from the traditional Palestinian and
Arab position that considered the
establishment of a Jewish State in
part of Palestine be an unthinkable
anathema. Having taken a courageous
departure from long-held Palestinian
and Arab views, Arafat was attacked
by both sides equally.
It is a strange coincidence that the
memorials of these two historic
leaders are taking place at the same
time, more or less. We hope that the
vast majority of these two peoples
will honor the two great leaders by
heeding their historic transformation
and pursue peaceful coexistence
relentlessly. I am not unaware of the
obstacles and difficulties. However,
saving the lives of both peoples is a
historic mission that none of us can
ignore. May we be inspired by the
memory of Yitzhak Rabin in order
to revive the essence of peace and
coexistence. Today, we are reassured
that President Mahmoud Abbas is
maintaining this partnership.
On the Syrian track, actual
achievements have been unfortunately
limited. However, it would be a mistake
to attribute this fact to the lack of a
partnership between Rabin and the
late President Assad. Indeed, while
the two men never met, and while
negotiations between both countries
were limited, Rabin was reported to
have felt that he could trust Assad,
considered him a ‘man of his word,’
and that he would honor any accord
that they might reach.7
A more prosperous partnership for
peace for Rabin was undoubtedly with
the late King Hussein of Jordan. The
nature of the issues to be resolved by
both countries were not as complex as
on the other tracks and were quickly
resolved, culminating in the October
26th 1994 signing of the peace treaty
between Jordan and Israel.
President Mubarak was undoubtedly
considered by Rabin to be a partner
for peace, as discussed earlier.
Equally, the United States, which has
historically taken an essential role in
the search for Middle East peace,
has been an important partner. The
EU, Russia and the international
community have also played vital
roles in establishing peace. As
early as 1979, Rabin alluded to the
important role that the international
community could play in cementing
peace through their support and
financing of economic and social
development.8
59
The late Yitzhak Rabin had a vision
for peace, he had the pragmatism
to carry it out, and he had the willing
partners. Throughout his quest for
peace, he was constantly conscious
of the imperative of security for his
citizens, and the need to promote
it. Fortunately, Rabin was a believer
that peace and security must proceed
in tandem if either of them is to be
achieved. He realized that it would
never be possible to rely solely on
military force to serve as an instrument
of stability and for achieving security
for Israel.9 He was to express his
conviction about the simultaneous
necessity of peace and security soon
after taking office as Prime Minister
in 1992, where he stated: 'In my
opinion, peace constitutes a very
important component as a factor to
guarantee the security of the State of
Israel, [since] peace without security is
meaningless to me. However, a true
peace increases the security of the
State of Israel.'10
While the late Prime Minister Rabin
was progressing with his partners
towards peace, as he had cautioned
his fellow countrymen and women,
a price was being paid by both
Israelis and Palestinians. Violence
and terrorism raged then, as they
raged before the peace process, as
they are raging today. Violence and
terrorism are the common enemies
60
of both sides. Rabin was determined
that radical elements on both sides
would not prevail. In his final speech
to the Israeli public, at a massive propeace and anti-violence rally, Yitzhak
Rabin said, minutes before his death,
“I have always believed most of the
nation wants peace and is prepared
to take risks for peace. And you here,
who have come to take a stand for
peace, as well as many others who
are not here, are proof that the
nation truly wants peace and rejects
violence. Violence is undermining the
foundations of Israeli democracy. It
must be rejected and condemned and
it must be contained. It is not the way
of the State of Israel. Democracy is
our way... Peace is not just a prayer.
It is at first a prayer, but it is also the
realistic aspiration of the Jewish
people. But peace has its enemies,
who are trying to harm us, to torpedo
peace.”
We all miss the late Yitzhak Rabin
and his vision and convictions, his
leadership and his partnership.
During the period from September
2000 to September 2005, more than
3,300 Palestinians and almost 1,000
Israelis lost their lives in indiscriminate
acts of violence.11 We Arabs, Israelis
and, indeed, the international
community must continue fighting
for peace. Together, we must face
the painful challenges from radicals,
terrorists and blind unchecked
authoritative power. Our only hope
is through the true pursuit of peace
that focuses on the return of the
Occupied Territories.
Yitzhak Rabin and Egypt:
From War to Peace
By: Ambassador
Dan Kurtzer, Former U.S.
Ambassador to Egypt
and Israel
I want to thank the Rabin Center
and the Strategic Dialogue Center
of the Netanya Academic College
for the invitation to join you and
the opportunity to address this
conference. It is not my first time
at this College, and I want again
to congratulate Danny Yatom and
the administration, faculty, students
and supporters of this institution for
creating a center of excellence here
in Netanya.
The theme of this conference – being
held in remembrance of and in tribute
of the late Yitzhak Rabin – is probably
loftier than Prime Minister Rabin would
have been comfortable with. The late
Prime Minister Rabin exuded Israeli
realism and pragmatism. His thinking
was rooted in the here-and-now, far
less in the visionary thoughts of the
future. He seemed to conduct his
affairs as though saying: “The world
has dealt Israel and the Jewish people
cards that need to be played. Some
might pray for a better hand; others
might lament the cards not received .”
Yitzhak Rabin, however, would work
to maximize the benefits to be derived
from the existing cards and develop
strategies and tactics for changing the
rules of the game to suit the hand that
he was holding.
So, my remarks today will be less
romantic or visionary than the
occasion might call for, although no
less respectful of the extraordinary
personality that Yitzhak Rabin
exemplified throughout his life and
through his professional achievements.
He was a member of Israel’s founding
generation, but also a part of the
generation of transition. He was a
fighter, as brave and as brilliant as
any warrior ever produced by the
people of Israel; but he was also a
man of peace, unafraid to take the
risks associated with peace. He was a
man of vision but not really a visionary,
for he never lost sight of the firm
ground on which visions of peace and
reconciliation needed to be planted.
In a eulogy I delivered in Maryland
the week after the assassination,
I compared Prime Minister Rabin
with the forefather Yitzhak – two
historical giants, both with substantial
individual achievements but both also
noteworthy for carrying and building
on what the previous generation had
created. The healthy and vibrant Israel
of 2005 owes much to the dual roles
of founding father and transitional
generation continuity that Yitzhak
Rabin played.
The Nobel Prize which Rabin shared
in 1994 was awarded specifically for
the breakthrough achieved in the Oslo
Accords and the transformation which
he and Shimon Peres effected in
Israel’s relations with the Palestinians.
The Prize also reflected Rabin’s
leadership which, together with the
heroic efforts of the late King Hussein,
resulted in a Treaty of Peace between
Israel and Jordan.
I would maintain, however, that the
underlying strategic significance of
Rabin’s concept of war, peace and
Israel’s place among the nations of the
Middle East was in his longstanding
record of interaction with the United
States and with Egypt, both when he
had to fight on the battlefield and when
he represented Israel at the summits
of diplomacy. I want to explore this
thesis today from the perspective of
the United States and U.S. interests in
the Middle East in the three decades
following the 1967 war.
Rabin's interaction with the
United States and Egypt
The ascendancy and dominance
of the United States in world affairs
– in particular, in Middle East affairs
– expanded consistently from the
late 1960’s onward. Although the
61
Vietnam War drained much of the
military will of the United States to
intervene militarily, and although the
rivalry with the former Soviet Union
for regional dominance challenged
the United States consistently
throughout this period, the growing
U.S. economic and political strength
became a force to be reckoned with
in international affairs.
During this period, Israel enjoyed
a positive relationship with the United
States, but not without problems. For
several decades, the U.S. had been
balancing its commitment to Israel’s
survival with the pursuit of other national
interests that appeared to contradict
that commitment – specifically, the
U.S. interest in developing strong
ties with moderate Arab states; U.S.
interest in assuring access to Middle
East energy resources; and the U.S.
interest in keeping the Middle East
safe from external and internal threats
to stability.
Rabin’s tenure at the pinnacle of Israel’s
military and his ascent to the pinnacle of
Israeli politics bridged and were shaped
by this period. While it is hard to pinpoint
a single event or set of circumstances
that led to the coalescing of the strategic
outlook that Rabin was to maintain for
the rest of his life, by the time of the 1973
war, two things seemed to dominate
his thinking:
62
• Israel must ensure strong strategic
ties with the United States, i.e.,
relations that would persist even
in times of bilateral or regional
crisis, and relations that would be
concretized in bilateral agreements
and understandings.
Rabin understood that a superpower
and a regional power would never
be able to bring their interests or
policies fully into concert. But he
also understood that Israel should
not pursue policies that were
antithetical to the vital interests of the
U.S., and conversely that strategic
understandings between the two
countries were possible. We shall
see later how Rabin managed this
strategic imperative in relations with
the United States.
• Second, Rabin believed that Israel
must find a way to regularize its
relations with Egypt, the only Arab
power able to challenge Israel’s
military supremacy and to impact its
political weight.
In some respects, as we shall see,
Rabin applied the same tactics to
managing relations with Egypt as he
did with the United States. The results
in both cases were substantial, positive
and very similar.
1975 Israel-Egypt interim
agreement: Rabin's diplomacy
of realism
The 1975 negotiations on a second
interim agreement between Israel
and Egypt reflect Rabin’s nuanced
use of diplomacy, politics, crisis
management and calibrated threats
to navigate toward an outcome with
profound positive outcomes for all
sides. Although the 1975 agreement
has a modest title, the stakes in the
negotiations were very high, the
issues were terrifically complex, and
the outcome paved the way for the
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty that was
reached several years later.
The United States needed a positive
outcome for several reasons. On
the domestic front, President Ford
wanted a foreign policy success in
order to demonstrate his capacity to
lead and to reassure the American
public – one year before a Presidential
election – that he was Presidential
material. The United States was in
the final stage of disentangling itself
from Vietnam. Diplomatic progress
in the Middle East would help mute
the voices of those who forecasted
a decline in American international
influence.
The United States was also interested
in improving relations with Egypt and
was beginning to understand that its
previous skepticism about Anwar
Sadat was misplaced. Sadat’s pre1973 diplomatic and strategic moves
– especially, his decision to send
Soviet military advisors home and
his decision to dispatch his national
security advisor to meet Kissinger for
secret talks – were not evaluated as
seriously by either the United States
or Israel as Sadat had intended. The
1973 war had been an important
wake-up call, but two years had
passed without the war’s having
changed the strategic outlook in the
region. A second interim agreement
could have such an effect.
The core issues in the negotiations
were profound – Israeli pullback
from the Suez Canal, transfer of the
oil fields, reassertion of Egyptian
control over the Canal for the first
time since 1967, U.S. monitors
and observers on the ground, and
guaranteed freedom of passage for
Israeli vessels. While lip service would
also be sought for the Palestinian
issue, the core of this agreement was
bilateral, and its success would say
much about the possibility of moving
further toward a bilateral peace treaty
between Israel and Egypt.
Both Israel and Egypt needed an
agreement for their own domestic,
political and, especially, economic
reasons. Washington’s assessment
of the Israeli economy in that period
was bleak, and Rabin made clear
how dire the situation was, by
pressing Washington for a very
large assistance package. Egypt’s
economic picture was even bleaker,
for without an immediate injection of
assistance, the Egyptian economy
came ever-closer to breakdown.
The upside stakes for Israel and Egypt
were equally large. Rabin sought not
only a large infusion of economic and
military assistance, but also a new
strategic understanding, covering a
broad range of issues, especially U.S.
relations with the Palestine Liberation
Organization and an assurance on
oil supplies to replace the oil fields
from which Israel would withdraw in
Sinai. Egypt also sought to establish a
strategic relationship with the United
States and was ready to take small
steps, for example, purchasing nonlethal military equipment, as a means
of breaking the ice that had frozen
U.S.-Egyptian ties since 1967.
Rabin’s diplomacy during this
period was instructive of his overall
approach to complex problems and
his willingness to be tough when
necessary. The negotiations nearly
collapsed in mid-year, and Rabin’s
perceived obstinacy caused the United
States to announce a reassessment of
its policy and to delay implementation
of an arms deal. Rabin’s concerns
about the possibility of enhanced
U.S.-Egyptian ties probably lay at
the foundation of the hesitancy
which marked his approach to the
negotiations.
However, once agreement had been
reached and once the package of
public and secret understandings had
been reached with the United States,
Rabin described to the Knesset the
underlying philosophy of his approach
and his appreciation of what had
been achieved. Some excerpts from
his September 3, 1975 statement to
the Knesset:
…The agreement with Egypt which
we have initialed is a very hopeful
event. Its principal significance
is saliently political. Its principal
content is that agreement has been
achieved that force and fighting will
not be the characteristics of IsraelEgyptian relations, that neither side
will resort to the use of force against
the other….
'…I attribute great political
significance to the very fact that
the President of Egypt found it
possible for his government to sign
such an agreement with Israel – an
agreement that stands on its own,
without being conditional upon
events on other fronts….
63
'…The close involvement of the
United States in the process by
which the
agreement was attained, in the
agreement itself, and in its concrete
results,
at the bilateral level and in the
global context, is also of political
significance….'
Rabin concluded his statement to
the Knesset in what I would presume
to call Rabinesque language. 'I
stand at the rostrum of the Knesset
not as a celebrant, or as one who
takes off his armor.' And then
later, 'I have no intention of making
soothing statements.' What we see
is a hard-headed realist, fresh from
the successful pursuit of a series of
complex negotiations, taking stock of
what was achieved and recognizing
what lay ahead.
The strategic underpinning of this
process is what interests me.
Rabin had laid the groundwork and
foundation for strategic relations with
the United States and a partnership
of trust and understanding with Egypt
that was to last for the next twenty
years. He had taken the cards that
were dealt to him and played them
with supreme confidence and skill.
And he had changed the rules of the
game, for the Israel-U.S. relationship
and the Israel-Egypt relationship were
64
from that time on to move in new
directions.
The Rabin-Mubarak
relationship during the Oslo
process
The second example I want to cite to
underscore my core argument - that
Rabin, through realism, toughness
and a keen awareness of Israel’s
strategic possibilities and limitations,
sought and achieved enhanced
strategic relationships with the United
States and Egypt - is the last period of
his life, when he was overseeing the
Oslo process. A definitive study of this
period has not yet been written. While
we have seen several first person
accounts of the process, we are still
missing a book that puts the peace
process, politics and diplomacy into
perspective. Allow me a few broad
comments at this time.
During my tenure as the United States
Ambassador to Egypt (1997-2001),
President Mubarak repeatedly told me
that he yearned for a relationship with
an Israeli Prime Minister akin to what
he had enjoyed with Yitzhak Rabin.
He said Rabin visited him often, called
all the time and, most important,
always fulfilled his commitments.
Mubarak added that Rabin also told
him what he could not do, which
Mubarak respected.Indeed, the first
trip abroad by Rabin after becoming
Prime Minister in July 1992 was to
Egypt, and he was in frequent, almost
constant, contact with Mubarak
after that. Having revolutionized
the political landscape in the Oslo
Accord in 1993, Rabin understood
the need for constancy and reliability
in Israel’s position in the region. Egypt
and the United States provided these
necessary ingredients.
This was never in more evidence
than during the last phase of the
negotiations on the first Interim
Agreement, signed in Cairo on May
4, 1994. The negotiating venue was
no accident. Yassar Arafat needed
a place in which he felt comfortable
and local hosts whom he could trust
and in whom he might confide; and
Rabin needed a place close to home
in order to monitor the negotiations
and in the presence of a host he also
could trust.
Who will ever forget the scene,
televised internationally, during the
signing ceremony when Arafat refused
to sign the maps accompanying the
agreement? Who will ever forget
Rabin’s instruction to the Israeli
delegation to prepare to depart? And
who will ever forget who saved the
day – Hosni Mubarak, who leaned
on Arafat and secured his signature
on the maps. Rabin’s long-term
investment in a relationship with
Mubarak paid extraordinary dividends
that day.
Conclusions: Rabin as realistic,
credible peacemaker
So, what do these brief historical
snapshots tell us about Yitzhak Rabin
and his relationship with the United
States and Egypt? First, I believe they
underscore the realpolitik that stood at
the center of Rabin’s strategic makeup. He was not a romantic about
peace and certainly not Pollyannaish
about the readiness of the Arab
world to turn a new page with Israel.
This was not in the cards, as far as
he could determine. But, he played
his hand to the full, understanding
the need for strong regional and
international pillars on which Israel’s
political-military strategy could rest.
Having fought often against Egypt,
Rabin knew Egypt would be the Arab
lynchpin of peace, and he successfully
developed the kind of mutual trust on
which strong ties could rest. Equally,
he achieved the same with the United
States, not yielding to American
pressure but working with it to develop
mutually agreeable outcomes.
A second outcome worth considering
is style. A conversation with Yitzhak
Rabin was not full of charm or flattery.
There was no small talk. He started
with business and finished with
business, perhaps punctuating his
comments now and then with a wry
smile that elevated only one side of his
mouth. And yet he was trusted in both
Washington and Cairo. Policymakers
in both capitals didn’t need flattery
or what Rabin called “soothing
statements” to recognize in Rabin a
leader who could and would deliver.
Diplomats who put more store in how
they say things, rather than what they
say, should take note.
Third, I would cite Mubarak’s emphasis
on credibility as an enduring legacy
of Rabin’s approach to relations with
the United States and Egypt. When
Rabin was ready to flirt with new
policies and approaches, he would
do so – witness, the turnabout he
achieved in Israel’s formal relations
with the PLO and his willingness to
deposit some ideas with the United
States to try to attract Syrian interest
in a peace settlement. He would say
what he was trying to do and then go
about trying to do it.
consequences for many years. Among
the highlights of my own diplomatic
career were those opportunities to
work with or close to Yitzhak Rabin.
We met privately in the late 1980s and
early 1990s in his small office on a side
street in the Kirya. I sat in on meetings
between him and Secretaries of State.
I learned more than I can describe,
and I came to admire the man, the
statesman and the giant that he was.
May his memory always be blessed,
and may our collective memory of him
draw inspiration from the successes
of his historic life and career.
But when he wasn’t ready to flirt
with an idea, he didn’t sugarcoat his
statements. His ‘no’ meant no, just
as his ‘yes’ meant yes. Indeed, Rabin
combined these attributes of style and
substance into strategic relationships
with both the United States and
Egypt, which were to have profound
65
Egypt and Israel –
From War to Peace
By: Ambassador Moshe
Sasson, Former Ambassador
of Israel to Egypt
I served as the second Israeli
ambassador in Egypt for seven years,
two months, and one day: from May
18, 1981 until the end of June, 1988. In
this role, I worked closely with President
Anwar al-Sadat, a true visionary, who
knew how to understand events and
trends occurring in his country and
in the region. He was able to face
difficult situations, draw the appropriate
conclusions, and make the required
leadership decisions.
Sadat's forecast of his own death
Approximately two months before his
assassination, Sadat told me during
one of our intimate conversations
that the day on which he is to 'meet
his maker' is approaching. I was
shocked by his words, and started
to question his meaning; however,
he refused to add a word. When I
asked Sadat's wife, Jehan, about her
husband's words, she also found them
discomforting, and added that her
husband had recently been unusually
inquisitive regarding his place of burial.
According to Jehan, the President had
requested burial in Wadi al-Rahat in
66
Sinai, and wanted a mosque and a
synagogue to be erected beside the
Santa-Katrina monastery. Jehan told
me that she rejected her husband's
idea, claiming that neither she, nor
the Egyptian nation would make the
arduous trek out to his grave, if he
was buried in the middle of the Sinai
desert. In the end, Sadat was buried
neither in Wadi al-Rahat in Sinai nor
in his birth-place, but was instead
buried in the place that Jehan decided
upon – beside the Islamic Warrior's
grave, across from where he was
assassinated.
The meaning of 'strategic peace'
Twenty-six years have passed since
the historic signing of the EgyptIsrael peace accords. From the
Egyptian perspective, this peace is
not, and has never been based on
an ideological commitment to peace,
or Egyptian leaders' commitment
to peace as a value or way of life.
From the Egyptian perspective, this
'strategic peace' came into being
due to the clear national interest to
return the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian
sovereignty.
Upon his death, President Nasser left
the new President Sadat a country
whose smaller geographical area
(Sinai) was occupied by Israel, and
a serious demographic population
explosion problem. When the military
coup d'etat took over the government
in 1952, Egypt's population stood at
approximately 20 million. By the time
of Nasser's death, the population had
grown to 32 million, and by the time
of Sadat's assassination, it had grown
to 42 million. Currently, the population
stands at approximately 63 million,
and by the middle of this century,
it is expected to reach a whopping
200 million.
When Sadat rose to power in 1970, he
consulted with army chiefs and senior
counselors regarding the chances
that Egypt could recapture the Sinai
Peninsula from Israel. All of those
consulted claimed unanimously that
the Egyptian army could not defeat the
IDF and recapture the Sinai Peninsula,
which resulted in Sadat attempting to
return Sinai to Egyptian rule through
a peace treaty with Israel. Sadat also
understood the emotional state of his
nation – he knew that he could not
reach a peace agreement with Israel
until he somehow erased the dishonor
suffered by his country at the hands
of Israel during the 1967 war.
To this end, Sadat launched the 1973
Yom Kippur War, whose intention was
not necessarily to return the Sinai to
Egyptian sovereignty, but was merely
to ensure that his army cross the
Suez Canal and progress a number
of kilometers eastward.
'Strategic Peace' is not to be
confused with the traditional meaning
of the word 'peace'. Neither Israel
nor the Egyptians anticipated that
an era of 'peace', in its traditional
meaning, was upon them when
signing the accords. However,
before his death, Sadat signed
several normalization agreements
with Israel, including the birth of a
bus service from Tel Aviv to Cairo
and the exchange of tourists. Natural
contacts between the nations had
begun.
Limited normalization under
Mubarak's rule
Despite all progress towards
normalization, I never ceased
asking myself, from my first day in
Cairo, what would be the fate of the
peace agreements if Sadat were to
unexpectedly meet his end, for one
reason or another. During those days,
and still today, I am convinced that the
peace agreement with Egypt is still
undergoing a 'maturing process' and
primarily dependent upon the IDF's
deterrent power.
Truthfully, there has not been any
government-initiated border violence
since the peace treaty. However, under
Mubarak's rule, there has been no
attempt to educate Egyptian society
to accept Israel as a peaceful neighbor.
Mubarak himself has repeatedly made
the mistake of causing tensions in
Egypt's relations with Israel and has
refused to make diplomatic visits to
Israel. Israel, naturally, will continue to
develop and prosper even without visits
from the Egyptian leader – visits which
are more essential to the progress of
regional peace than to Israel itself.
I should clarify the following point: I give
my blessing to this 'strategic peace'
with Egypt, and have the utmost
hopes that similar strategic peace
agreements will be signed with the
rest of our neighbors.
Egypt's leading role in the Arab
world
It is no coincidence that Egypt has
'led the pack' of Arab states in
progressing towards peaceful relations
with Israel – Egypt was the first to sign
a separation of arms agreement with
Israel in 1949 and the first to sign a
peace agreement with Israel. Attempts
to reach peace treaties with other Arab
countries (i.e. Jordan, Lebanon) before
signing a peace agreement with
Egypt, inevitably, failed. This lesson
must be applied to the Palestinian
front – without Egypt's involvement
and assistance, no Palestinian
leader will work for a peace treaty
with uAs I understand the reasons
behind Sadat's assassination, there
is no basis to the claim that he was
murdered because of the peace treaty
he signed with Israel. There are only
two leaders who were assassinated
because of their attempts to achieve
peace: Yitzhak Rabin and Bashir
Gemayel. All other Arab leaders in
our region who were assassinated
– and there have been many – were
murdered because of internal Arab
factional conflicts.
In essence, Sadat was assassinated
because he rejected the demand to
impose 'Sharia' Islamic Law as part
of the country's constitution – the very
same reason that a group of 'Muslim
Brotherhood' radicals attempted
to assassinate President Nasser in
1954.
Lessons learned from peace
negotiations
UN Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338 left conquered territories
in Israel's hands (unlike the UN
decision of 1956), causing Israeli
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to claim,
"Israel will strengthen its hold on the
conquered territories, as long as we
have not reached peace agreements."
This left 'bargaining chips' in Israel's
hands, in exchange for which Israel
could negotiate peace accords. This
was true for the Sinai Peninsula, the
Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and
67
the West Bank. We learned several
important lessons from the EgyptianIsraeli peace accord and from other
peace negotiations, lessons that
can be used during future peace
negotiations in the region:
• In our region, there is no such thing
as "Peace in exchange for Peace".
In order to achieve peace, Israel is
expected to hand over at least some
of its 'assets'.
• Peace cannot be imposed on the
other party (as former Prime Minister
Barak attempted). Peace must be
negotiated.
• The relationship formed between
the relevant figures on each side
(for example, Sadat and Begin) is
of the utmost importance for peace
negotiations.
• It is essential to not miss opportunities.
As President Clinton said to Yasser
Arafat after the failure of the Camp
David negotiations, "You missed an
opportunity in 1947, and you have
repeated the same mistake today.
You, Arafat, will be the reason that
Temple Mount remains under Israeli
sovereignty."
• It is essential to both abandon
the path of violence and the path of
establishing 'irreversible facts on the
ground'
• Any peace achieved in our region
must be an honorable peace.
• For the purpose of achieving
68
peace, Israel's military strength and
deterrence capabilities have the
utmost importance.
• A third party that oversees
negotiations is essential. Without the
Americans, peace with Egypt would
not have occurred.
• Fully-normalized peace, as opposed
to mere 'strategic peace' is achievable
with our neighbors. However, it is
deeply intertwined with our ability to
reach a peace agreement with the
Palestinians.
Essential principles for reach
peace with the Palestinians
By taking all of these points into
account, I have reached the following
conclusions regarding the approach
that must be taken in order to
reach a peace agreement with the
Palestinians:
1. The approach of 'interim agreements'
is unacceptable. Despite this claim, I
will add, leaving the Gaza Strip as an
interim step was essential, not because
it presented an actual solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but because
7,500 Jews had no business living
amongst 1,200,000 Arabs.
2. The claim that there is no Palestinian
partner is untrue. Similarly, the claim
that it is impossible to solve the most
substantial issues between Israel and
the Palestinians through negotiations
is also untrue. We must stop trying to
flee from genuinely attempting to solve
the Palestinian problem by talking to
the Palestinians.
3. Today, the ball is in our court, not
in the Palestinians. Above all, we
have the power through democratic
means to determine our goals and our
borders, and to stop clinging to the
dream of 'Greater Israel'. The actual
'Greater Israel' described in the
Bible stretches from the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers to the Nile. Thus,
our borders cannot be set by making
reference to the Bible.
4. If we continue to hold onto the
West Bank we will become, within a
small number of years, a minority in
our own country.
5. We must stop fleeing from
negotiating with the Palestinians
by using various excuses, such as
the 'no partner' excuse. Many of
these oft used excuses are pure
demagoguery.
To sum up, I want to discuss two of
the most difficult issues related to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Jerusalem
and Palestinian refugees.
Jerusalem & the status of holy
sites
While serving as Ambassador
in Egypt, I learned that for the
Egyptians, and for many other Arab
and Muslim nations, the importance
of Jerusalem is encapsulated by the
two Muslim holy sites located on the
Temple Mount – the Al-Aksa Mosque
and the Dome of the Rock. The city
itself is of less importance.
Therefore, the status of these holy
sites may be the key to solving the
Jerusalem issue. We can look to a
historical example for assistance:
A decades-long conflict arose
between the Vatican and the Italian
government when Italy declared
Rome to be its undivided capital in
1870. The conflict over holy sites
lasted for 60 years until both sides
agreed that the 5 major basilicas
in Rome (outside of the Vatican)
would be attributed a "special and
guaranteed international status."
Similarly, to solve our issue of the
Jerusalem Muslim holy sites, we
could grant the two mosques a
similar status while adding a clause
that guarantees entrance to the
Temple Mount to anyone independent
of religion, race, or sex. This type of
approach could prevent the need
to split our eternal capital into two
cities, while allowing Muslims to have
a type of sovereignty over their holy
mosques (the structures only, not the
grounds underneath).
The Refugee problem
– creating a solution out of a
problem
The Palestinian refugee issue has been
a huge stumbling block preventing a
peace agreement between Israel
and the Palestinians and the Arab
world at large. I believe that we can,
through an Israeli initiative, change
the refugee burden into a revitalizing
force that advances the peace
process and co-existence between
Israel and the Palestinians.An Arabic
proverb states, "Everything that can be
achieved through money – is cheap."
With this in mind, we should initiate a
program, created through international
backing, which encourages refugee
families to settle in areas of the
West Bank intended for the future
Palestinian state. These families
will receive compensation payment
on an individual basis from us, not
collective compensation as proposed
by previous Israeli governments.
Neighborhoods, industrial zones,
and agricultural areas could be
erected in suburbs of Nablus and
Hebron. In time, Palestinian refugees
would become productive citizens
of Palestine, living in peaceful and
neighborly relations with Israelis,
who will lend a hand to assist them
is establishing a respectable standard
of living.
The Lessons of Camp
David as a Prism for
Viewing more Recent
Developments
By: Dr. Yoram Meital
Chairman, the Chaim Herzog
Center for Middle East Studies
and Diplomacy,
Ben-Gurion University
When looking at Israel-Egypt
relations, after 26 years of peace,
it is important to look at the various
processes that have accompanied
this peace over a number of decades.
It is possible that these processes can
teach us something about the current
state of relations between Israel and
Egypt and in the region as a whole.
There are three essential historical
events that I want to discuss: the
Camp David Peace Treaty between
Israel and Egypt (1978-1979), the
failed Camp David negotiations of
200, and the Israeli Disengagement
from Gaza and the northern West
Bank (2005).
The Camp David breakthrough
I want to open with a quote, which
was said for the first time publicly by
Dr. Osama El Baz, which summarizes
69
the incredible turnabout in Egyptian
policy at the time. He made this
statement, not for a foreign audience,
but for an Egyptian audience, with the
intention of inculcating the Egyptian
public with a specific message about
the meaning of peace with Israel. El
Baz was quoted by the Egyptian
press as saying something akin to
the following – I will paraphrase:
We must view the current diplomatic
process with Israel as a transition from
a conflict over the Israel's right to exist
to a conflict over Israel's borders and
the conditions under which peace will
be acceptable.
I believe that this statement, given
the fact that it was made for local
rather than foreign consumption,
was extremely important and has
proven to hold significant historical
legitimacy and truth. This transition
is one of the most important concepts
of the entire Middle East diplomatic
process. It was expressed through the
incredible breakthrough of 1978-1979
– the Camp David Accords – and
has implications not just between
Egypt and Israel, but for the Middle
East as a whole. Egypt, the leading
Arab nation at the time, in a daring
step, challenged Israel with the test
of forcing Israel to 'lay its cards on
the table.' The Camp David Accords
raised the most difficult issues in
70
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had
far-reaching implications both for
the Palestinian avenue and for the
region as a whole.
It is no coincidence that the 1993
Declaration of Principles was based on
the concepts addressed in the Camp
David Accords, and that 15 years after
Camp David the same principles were
used in dealing with the PLO.
I also want to point out the mediation
role played by the U.S.A. has not been
merely essential for the Israeli-Egyptian
track, but for diplomatic progress on a
regional level. We must remember that
in 1978 the Cold War was the guiding
force of international diplomacy, which
had implications for the depth of
American involvement in the region.
Camp David 2000: the failure
of American mediation
With this in mind, I must point out
that there was a different level of
American involvement between
Camp David of 1978 and Camp
David of 2000. In 1978, Jimmy
Carter led negotiations intelligently
and successfully by using both the
'carrot' and the 'stick'. He knew how
to bring the sides to concessions that
neither side was prepared for at the
beginning of negotiations.
I want to make the following blanket
statement that I don't have time to
deal with in detail: President Bill
Clinton failed at Camp David 2000.
He did not make use of the lessons
of 1978 and the sides were not
properly prepared for the required
concessions. The results of these
negotiations speak for themselves.
The Policy of Openness
The 1978 Camp David Accords
and diplomatic processes thereafter
began a process that I like to call 'the
policy of openness'. My meaning is
that peace has not existed in bubble,
but has been deeply connected to
internal economic and political
developments, particularly in Egypt.
This openness began in the late
1970s and is still developing today.
I will provide an example that
demonstrates this point. Today,
one of the most significant topics
in regional discourse, including
in Egypt, is political reform. The
question of whether democratization
and political pluralism, even if this
pluralism includes political parties
who oppose peace with Israel,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood,
is a positive step for the region,
is a question that requires serious
consideration. This question has no
simple unequivocal answers.
Disengagement and the
mentality of unilateralism
I want to finish by dealing with the
Israel's recent Disengagement from
Gaza and the northern West Bank, and
the policy of unilateralism in general.
I want to take issue with the attempt
to present the Disengagement, a
unilateral step, as another step along
the road towards peace.
A unilateral approach that is based on
the assumption that there is no partner
on the other side will have disastrous
implications. Whoever assumes that
growing tensions between Israel
and the Palestinians will have local
implications only does not understand
how the Middle East operates. Lack
of dialogue with the Palestinians has
an extremely negative influence on our
relations with the Arab World, and in
particular with Egypt.
Whoever thinks that the Disengagement
will create a bearable level of quiet that
we can all live with is gravely mistaken.
And whoever thinks that the negative
implications of unilateralism can be
contained to Israel and the Palestinians
ought to reconsider Jordan and Egypt's
fragile positions in the region.
The bottom line is that today, we face
a twofold challenge:
1.Twenty-five years after signing
the peace agreement with Egypt,
Israel must stop being suspicious
of Egypt's intentions and must stop
making public statements about
Egypt's intention to use the Sinai
Peninsula as a launching grounds
for the next war or their intention
to blow up the Aswan Dam. These
types of comments are harmful both
to the Israeli public discourse and to
our relations with Egypt.
2. The greater challenge presented
before us is to transform our
current mentality of unilateralism
into a mentality of discussion and
negotiations, and to create the
required mechanism for advancing
negotiations. Unilateralism will not
bring peace to fruition.
The Forgotten Hero:
Yitzhak Rabin and
Israeli-Egyptian Relations
By: Prof. Elie Podeh
Chair, Middle East
Department, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem
“When President Sadat made his
historic visit to Jerusalem… I was no
longer Prime Minister. Yet that visit…
could never have come about were it
not for the course of my government
adopted in signing the 1975 interim
agreement.
That our policy provoked the anger
of the Likud opposition… has not
prevented Mr. Begin's government
from reaping the fruits of our labors…
Whenever I hear talk of 'peace breaking
out' any moment - as if the history of
negotiations began in November
1977 - I feel obliged to set the record
straight. The 1975 agreement with
Egypt was never meant to be an
end in itself. As its title implies, it was
designed to advance the 'momentum'
toward peace, and in that sense it
has achieved its objective - no minor
accomplishment in ME politics.
I can only hope that the next
achievement along the road will prove
to be as durable and successful.”12
71
This passage, taken from Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin's memoirs,
should be treated cautiously by the
historian. Politicians, in their postfactum assessment tend to glorify
their deeds. But with the wisdom of
hindsight, exactly thirty years after the
agreement and ten years after Rabin's
assassination, it seems that Rabin's
judgment was correct.
The legacy of the Interim Egypt
agreement
1. Rabin was the first Israeli leader
to realize, following the 1973 war,
that a peace agreement with Egypt
was both crucial and feasible. In
his opinion, the fact that the war
was considered in Arab circles as
an Israeli "defeat" and Arab victory
paved the way, psychologically and
politically, for a possible settlement.
He also realized - though he was not
the first Israeli leader to do so - that
because of Egypt's pivotal role in
regional politics, it should be the first
to conclude a peace agreement.
When we talk about Rabin's role in the
Arab-Israeli conflict we usually talk of
the Oslo Agreements and the IsraeliJordanian peace treaty. In contrast,
when we talk about the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty, the immediate heroes
that come to our mind are President
Anwar al-Sadat and Prime Minister
Menachem Begin.
2. The fact that Rabin thought of a
settlement in stages (based on Henry
Kissinger's step by step diplomacy) led
to the signing of Sinai II in September
1975. In retrospect, this agreement
paved the way, psychologically and
politically, for the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty of March 1979.
This is logical since these two leaders
are mostly associated with the initiative,
negotiations and subsequently with
signing the peace agreement in March
1979. Without detracting from their
role, we need to acknowledge the role
of Begin's predecessors, particularly
that of Prime Minister Rabin in his brief
tenure between June 1974 and May
1977 in the process that eventually
led to the signing of the agreement. In
this article, I would like to emphasize
three points:
3. Rabin was the first Israeli Prime
Minister to suggest meeting any
Arab leader anywhere in order to
further peace talks. The fact that
such a meeting did not take place
during his term was connected to
several developments in the Arab
world, coupled with political events
in Israel. In other words, had the
Labor Party not suffered the price of
the 1973 mishap (mehdal), and had
Rabin not resigned as a result of his
wife's foreign account scandal, it is
72
highly likely that he would have hosted
Sadat in Jerusalem.
Rabin's early view of Egyptian
leaders
Rabin's thinking with regard to the
Egyptians changed throughout
the years. A careful reading of his
statements and behavior13 shows
that, following the 1948 war, Rabin
objected to the signing of an armistice
with Egypt. Later, as a senior military
officer, he held - like many other
Israeli leaders - a demonic image of
the Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd alNasser, whom he thought to be bent
on destroying the state of Israel.14
Initially, Rabin also possessed a
negative image of President Sadat.
In his memoirs, he said: "Sadat's
past actions did give me reason to
view him as fickle."15 He then added:
"Ever since the time he turned
toward Nazi Germany as a young
officer… Sadat's career had been
marked by a succession of sharp
and sudden shifts." In this regard,
Rabin mentioned three "proofs":
First, in 1971 he signed a friendship
treaty with the Soviet Union, which
was followed by the expulsion of the
Soviet experts a year later. Second,
he opened the 1973 war with Assad,
but abandoned him by signing the
cease-fire first. Finally, he was disloyal
to Nasser.16
Even in 1980, after the signing of
the peace agreement, Rabin wrote
that the real intentions of Sadat were
unknown and that one should not
rule out the possibility that "he still
conspires to annihilate Israel."17
Rabin's policy of gradualism
Rabin - like previous and future
Israeli leaders - was thinking of
Israel according to the Biblical
phrase: "A people that shall dwell
alone, and shall not be reckoned
among the nations".18 In fact, an
attempt to sketch Rabin's world view
- a difficult task given the paucity of
sources - suggests that he believed
in Jabotisnky's "Iron Wall" strategy:
that peace would be achieved only
from a position of strength.19 Thus,
when Rabin was confronted with the
question of peace negotiations with
Sadat, he needed to overcome his
deep suspicions. The only way for
him to diminish, as far as possible,
the cognitive dissonance existing
between his perceptions of Sadat
and the unfolding reality was to
adopt a phased, gradual approach.
This is why he embraced Kissinger's
step-by-step diplomacy that ensured
the gradualism of the peace process.
Even after signing the peace treaty
in 1979 he stated: "the process of
transition from war to peace will be
extremely lengthy."20 He did not
believe in historic giant leaps, such
as following Sadat's visit to Israel:
"Any attempt to solve the problem
by a single act," he warned, "will lead
nowhere."21
The significance of the second
disengagement agreement
oil fields (supplying more than half of
Israel's oil supply). Second, Article
Eight of the agreement stipulated
that it "is regarded by the Parties
as a significant step towards a just
and lasting peace."24 It was the first
time that an Arab country was willing
to commit itself to such wording.
In this respect, the agreement
foreshadowed the peace treaty
signed less than
Third, the Egyptian-Syrian alliance
that initiated the 1973 war
disintegrated. Indeed, Syria signed
the first disengagement agreement
in May 1974 but was unwilling for
domestic and regional reasons to
participate in the Geneva Summit or
to sign a second agreement. In the
years 1975-77, Sadat attempted to
involve the Arab states in his peace
campaign in order to secure broad
Arab support for his policy. Yet, his
failure to enlist the Arab states led
him to take a unilateral step. The
unilateral 1975 agreement, therefore,
was a forerunner to the 1977 initiative
to visit Jerusalem.
Following the Israeli-US-Egyptian
intensive negotiations, the second
disengagement agreement was
signed in September 1975. This
agreement was highly important for
several reasons. First, Israel withdrew
from the strategic passes of Mitla and
Gidi, as well as from the Abu Rodies
Fourth, and no less important,
by signing the agreement Egypt
decided to further distance itself
from the Soviet Union. The result
was the strengthening of USEgyptian relations - a development
reflected both in the political and
economic realms.25 Finally, Israeli-
Indeed, this was the policy of Rabin's
government during the years 197477. In one of his articles, he argued
that Israel, in the post-1973, period
was confronted with two choices:
either to progress towards peace in
stages, or to opt for a full, immediate
peace agreement with the Arab
countries. Rabin was in favor of the
first option and operated according to
this policy.22 Evidently, from the start
he was bent on furthering the peace
process with Egypt and the only
questions were what concessions
he was willing to make and what
price Sadat would be willing to
pay. Sachar aptly summarized the
position: "a piece of territory for a
piece of peace."23
73
US relations were also significantly
consolidated. Avi Shlaim claimed
that "the agreement with America
was as important to Rabin as that
with Egypt."26 Ephrain Inbar went
even further, in his book on Rabin
and national security, he argued
that in signing the agreement Rabin
was primarily motivated by the
desire to strengthen relations with
the US. This led him to conclude
that the agreement stood on its
own and was not a necessary step
toward peace.27 Their assessment
was also based on the text of the
Israeli-US memorandum attached
to the agreement signed at that
time of which Article 12 clearly
says: "the US Government regards
the [Disengagement] Agreement as
standing on its own."28
The post-interim agreement
impasse
It is true that the agreement was not
linked to further steps or committed
any party to a future settlement.
However, evidence from the Labor
Party Archives shows that Rabin
did not consider the agreement to
be an isolated event. In a meeting
of the Labor Party, convened a day
after the signing, he expressed some
doubts as to the direction which the
interim agreement would take, but
was convinced that in the long run
74
it would bring about the desired
peace agreement. Thus, in order
to overcome this uncertainty and in
order to overcome his own doubts
concerning the Egyptian leader,
Rabin adopted the technique of
a phased and gradual process,
enabling the Israeli side to test the
credibility of Sadat, which, at that
time, was still at stake.29
Until Rabin's forced resignation
in December 1976, the political
climate was not conducive to peace
negotiations. With the successful
conclusion of the interim agreement,
Rabin was compelled to pay more
attention to some thorny economic
and social issues. The Arab world
was preoccupied with the Lebanese
civil war, which broke out in April
1975. Sadat, fiercely attacked by
Arab leaders (particularly by Assad
who felt betrayed and isolated)
for signing a separate agreement,
was compelled to demonstrate his
commitment to the Arab cause.
This resulted in deep Egyptian
involvement in Lebanon and attempts
to enlist Arab partners to the peace
caravan. The fact that 1976 was an
election year in the US contributed
to the political impasse.
Nevertheless, Rabin tried to find
new avenues for holding direct
negotiations with Egypt. Visiting
the US in early 1976, he told a joint
session of the Congress that he
was "ready to meet any Arab head
of government at any time and in
any place."30 No Arab leader heeded
his request. Then, in 1976-77, there
were few attempts, through Austria
and Romania, to open direct dialogue
with Sadat.31 Rabin also made a
secret visit to Morocco, where he
hoped to persuade King Hassan to
arrange a meeting with Sadat with
the aim of achieving peace.32 All to
no avail.
At the time of Rabin's attempts,
Sadat was occupied with the
Lebanese war. When it ended with
the Cairo Arab summit in October
1976, he felt that, with the election of
US President Jimmy Carter who was
more sympathetic to the Arab cause,
he would be able to bring other
partners to the peace negotiations
(even including the PLO). It should
be remembered that the food riots,
which broke out in January 1977 in
Egypt, constituted a severe domestic
challenge to Sadat.33 Therefore, he
sought an Arab and US umbrella
in order to safeguard his declining
legitimacy, which had been at peak
only four years earlier with the
October 1973 "victory".
It was only in the autumn of 1977,
when Sadat realized that all the
pressure exerted by the US and
Saudi Arabia on Syria and the PLO
failed to produce results, that he
decided to continue on his own.
By that time, however, Rabin was
no longer Prime Minister. Begin had
replaced him in May 1977. In his
desire to break the vicious circle and
punish his Arab recalcitrant partners,
Sadat decided to take the risk and
visit Jerusalem. No one could have
expected this; in his memoirs, Rabin
admitted: "I cannot say that I really
expected Egypt's head of state to
visit Israel, openly, and with all the
pomp and formal ceremonies, at
such an early date."34
From Interim Agreement to
Peace Treaty
In what way did Rabin and the
disengagement agreement with
Egypt enhance the possibility of
an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty?
I would like to mention three
points in this connection. First, the
implementation of the first and second
disengagement agreements began
to create the impression in Israel that
Sadat could be trusted.35 Second,
these agreements psychologically
prepared the Israeli public for another
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. And,
though the final concession was
significant - full withdrawal from
Sinai - so was Sadat's move. Third,
the Israeli public realized that if Rabin
- who was constantly concerned
with Israel's security - was willing
to withdraw from the strategically
important passes and oil fields, it
would be possible to concede further
territories for the sake of peace.
Indeed, Rabin was right: signing a
peace agreement cannot be done
in one stroke. It is a process; and
this process began following 1973
- maybe even following 1967 - with
the adoption of Resolution 242 and
the Rogers Plan.
Yet, although Rabin himself did not
succeed in reaping the fruits of his
labor, we can at least acknowledge
his contribution to the process,
thirty years after the second
disengagement agreement and ten
years after his death.
Rabin continued observing EgyptianIsraeli relations in the opposition
and, later, as Minister of Defense
in the coalition unity governments
in the 1980s. Though many in
Israel criticized the "cold" nature
of the treaty, Rabin expressed his
understanding for the Egyptian
constraints; in June 1992, a short
period before his election as Prime
Minister to a second term, he said:
I am admittedly disappointed by
the lack of satisfactory progress
in normalizing ties between two
countries at peace; however, I am
also aware that the Egyptians have
difficulties in promoting normalization
before the peace process gathers
momentum, especially in the IsraeliPalestinian sphere.36
Rabin's Egypt policy in the
1990s
Following Rabin's election, EgyptianIsrael relations improved substantially.
In an attempt to demonstrate his
appreciation of Egypt's leading role
in Arab politics, Rabin visited Cairo
a week after he entered his office
- the first made by an Israeli PM
in six years. The Egyptians were
disappointed that Rabin did not
initiate immediate concessions to the
Syrians and Palestinians. Moreover,
his tough policy led to the expulsion
of some 400 Hamas activists to
Lebanon in December 1992. In
addition, tension in Egyptian-Israeli
relations developed in 1994-95
over the Egyptian insistence that
Israel sign the Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).37
Still, Rabin found Egypt to be an
important interlocutor with regard to
the Oslo agreement. The negotiations
and Egyptian mediation led Rabin
and Arafat to sign the Gaza and
Jericho Agreement in May 1994, in
Cairo. During the years 1992- 95,
75
Rabin and Mubarak developed warm
working relations. As military men
they spoke the same language and
enjoyed a mutual trust. Whenever
confronted with problems on the
Palestinian issue, according to a
senior Israeli diplomat, Rabin would
pick up the phone to Mubarak.38 No
surprise that upon hearing of Rabin's
assassination, Mubarak insisted on
attending Rabin's funeral. When
Mubarak first met Rabin he promised
to make a return visit. Unfortunately,
this took place only in November
1995, at the funeral. Though private
and not official, it was the first visit of
an Egyptian President to Israel since
Sadat's historic visit - a testimony
to Rabin's standing in Egypt. In his
eulogy, Mubarak depicted Rabin as
"a true hero of peace."39 A few years
later, the Egyptian president said that
Rabin was "a man of his word." He
expressed his sorrow that he did
not live longer because then "we
would have been able to solve the
[Palestinian] problem."40
Ironically, during one of his sojourns
in Cairo Rabin visited the tomb of
the assassinated Sadat. Shortly after,
Rabin himself was assassinated.
And though Sadat and Begin are
the twin leaders associated with
the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, history
linked Sadat and Rabin together in
terms of martyrdom and symbolism:
76
both were victims of peace, killed by
a religious fanatic. This analogy had
not escaped Mubarak; seven years
after his assassination he said in a
televised broadcast: "these two great
men [Sadat and Rabin] realized that
despite the noble goals of peace, the
process would face many difficulties
and violent resistance by many forces
on both sides. But they were wise
enough to realize that speeding the
process of a just resolution would
spoil the opportunity for these forces
to obstruct the process."41
After assessing Rabin's relations with
Egypt, one might ask what his legacy
was for Israeli-Egyptian relations in
particular and Israeli-Arab relations
in general. I would sum it up in three
points:
1. Peace with our Arab neighbors,
preferably on a gradual basis, should
always be sought. The gradualism of
the process is necessary to test the
credibility of the other party, as well
as to alleviate the anxieties of the
decision- maker emanating from his
own biased perceptions.
2. Egypt, because of its central
position in the Arab world, should
always be involved in the peace
process as a key player.
3. Negative perceptions of the enemy
can change, or at least be attuned
to the reality. Otherwise, leaders may
be captives of their own old images,
which are no longer valid.
In conclusion, I would like to say
that this legacy is very relevant to
the current peace process and
recommend that Israeli decisionmakers of today wholeheartedly
embrace it.
Footnotes
11
BBC Statistics published 5
November 2005.
1
Interview with Prime Minister Rabin
on Israel Television, 22 August 1975.
2
Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs,
Expanded Edition (Berkeley; Los
Angeles: University of California
Press), p. 334.
3
Yoram Peri, “Afterword: Rabin:
From Mr. Security to Nobel Peace
Prize Winner,” in The Rabin
Memoirs, p. 362.
12
Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin
Memoirs, Expanded Edition
(Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996), p. 275.
Quoted in Shalom, Friend: The Life
and Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin (1996),
David Horovitz, ed. (New York: New
Market Press), p. 139.
See, in particular, Arieh Dalal,
Yitzhak Rabin's Perceptions of the
Arabs and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
MA Thesis, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, 2003. [Hebrew]
6
Yoram Peri, in The Rabin Memoirs,
p. 364.
7
Horovitz, ed., p. 273.
8
The Rabin Memoirs, p. 330.
9
Peri in The Rabin Memoirs, pp.
352-53.
20
Inbar, Rabin and Israel's National
Security, pp. 16-17.
21
Ibid., p. 17.
22
Rabin, Strategic Relations, p. 47.
23
Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel's
National Security, Washington: The
Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1999, p. 13.
15
Rabin's Memoirs, p. 260.
16
Ibid.
5
Statement in the Knesset by Prime
Minister Rabin, 14 September 1992.
Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel
and the Arab World, New York:
W. W. Norton, 2000, p. 504.
See also Inbar, Rabin and Israel's
National Security, p. 15.
13
14
4
19
Howard M. Sachar, Egypt and
Israel, New York: Richard Marek
Publishers, 1981, p. 236.
24
Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda
Reinharz (eds.), Israel in the Middle
East: Documents and Readings
on Society, Politics and Foreign
Relations, 1948 - present, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 35.
17
Yitzhak Rabin, "Strategic
Relations," in Hareven, Alouph,
Between Risk and Chance: From
Conflict to Peaceful Relations
(Jerusalem: Van Leer Foundation,
1980). p. 44. [in Hebrew]
By the way, we know very little
on Sadat's views of Rabin. In his
memoirs, Sadat mentioned most of
Israeli leaders but not Rabin.
25
Yoram Meital, Egypt's Struggle
for Peace: Continuity and Change
Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 1997, pp. 151-52.
26
Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 338.
27
Inbar, Rabin and Israel's National
Security, p. 21.
10
Statement in the Knesset by Prime
Minister Rabin, 14 September 1992.
18
Inbar, Rabin and Israel's National
Security, pp. 8-9.
28
Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 340.
29
Dalal, pp. 52-53.
77
30
Robert Slater, Rabin of Israel:
Warrior for Peace, London: Robson
Books, 1996, p. 300.
Eulogy for the Late Prime Minister
and Defense Yitzhak Rabin by
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak,
6 November 1995.
31
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs,
pp. 301-2.
40
Interview in Al-Arabiyya channel,
15, January 2001.
32
Slater, Rabin of Israel, p. 308;
Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 348.
33
Meital, Egypt's Struggle for Peace,
p. 153.
34
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs,
p. 322.
35
Ya'akov Bar-Siman-Tov, The
Transition from War to Peace: The
Complexity of Decision- Making
- The Israeli Case ,Tel Aviv: The
Tammy Shtinmatz Center, 1996
p. 35.
36
Kenneth W. Stein, "Continuity and
Change in Egyptian-Israeli relations,
1973-97," in Efraim Karsh (ed.),
From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's
Troubled Agenda, London: Frank
Cass, 1997, p. 312.
37
Ibid., p. 311.
38
See Leslie Susser, 10 June 1994,
www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query
39
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive
Speeches;
78
41
Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 611, 7-13
November 2002.
Two Leaders and Visionaries:
Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein
- Promoting Peace
The Required Conditions
for Peace
By: Dr. Abdel Salam Majali,
chair of panel, Former Prime
Minister of Jordan
Today we meet to remember
a remarkable man. A man who
knew that peace is for the brave
and the brave only. Yitzhak Rabin
– a soldier turned politician, turned
peace-maker.
Breaking down traditional
beliefs
Jerome Slater, in his last book, Lost
opportunities for peace: reassessing
the Arab-Israeli conflict, indicated
that among the most enduring and
potent of the conventional beliefs
about the Arab-Israeli conflict is
the view that until very recently the
Palestinians and most Arab states
refused to recognize the existence
of Israel, rejected all compromise,
and sought its destruction. Israel, it
was thought, has always been ready
to negotiate peace. As Abba Eban's
famously stated, "The Arabs have
never missed an opportunity to miss
an opportunity!"
A new wave of Israeli historical
scholarship, however, has revealed
that this generally-accepted narrative
is seriously exaggerated. While
focusing on the origins and early
years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this
new Israeli historiography strongly
suggests that Israel has been at least
as responsible as the Arabs for the
ongoing enmity from 1948 through to
the present. This new scholarship has
argued that the Israelis have been far
less ready for genuine compromise
regarding the central issues of the
conflict, particularly the status of
Palestinians and the final borders of
Israel, than the dominant mythology
has implied.
The new momentum of the
1990s
I say this as a prelude to the
remarkable period in Middle East
history that began after the first
Gulf War, a period in which our late
friend Yitzhak played a major rôle by
partnering with former enemies to
make peace.
In October 1991, the George H. W.
Bush administration successfully
used America's newfound regional
dominance to convene the Madrid
Middle East Peace Conference.
This conference, for the first time,
launched direct contacts between
Israel and all its Arab neighbors.
The idea of convening the Madrid
Conference was a master-stroke
of international diplomacy. The
proposed arrangement of the
conference, carefully worked out by
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker,
with the help and advice of the late
King Hussein, who has always been
a champion of peace, satisfied the
long-standing Arab demand for an
international conference involving the
five permanent members of the UN
Security Council, and Israeli demand
for bilateral negotiations with each
country.
King Hussein's offer to include
Palestinian representatives in the
Jordanian delegation succeeded in
circumventing Israel's rather inflexible
policy of refusing to hold talks with
representatives of the Palestinian
people. At the Madrid Conference,
the whole world witnessed a civilized,
eloquent Palestinian delegation
coming to the forefront, paving the
way for the subsequent signing of
the Oslo Accords.
In June 1992, sensing a change in
the regional environment, Israelis
went to the polls and gave Yitzhak
Rabin a mandate to pursue peace.
In the words of Asher Arian and
Michal Sahmir in their book The
Elections in Israel 1992: "As the
momentum towards peace in the
79
Middle East surges and wanes, the
intensity of politics in Israel takes
on added relevance. There can be
little doubt that the historic IsraelPLO peace accord could not have
occurred were it not for the turnabout
elections of 1992."
Ending the dream of Greater
Israel
It was in Oslo, in 1993, that the Israeli
government, under Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and his peacemaking
partner Shimon Peres, first agreed
to withdraw from parts of the West
Bank and Gaza. With this shift in
Israeli policy, Rabin ended the Israeli
dream of Greater Israel. Moreover, he
signaled his support for a solution to
the conflict that envisioned a new
state of Palestine arising alongside
Israel, which would be finally
recognized by Arab states.
part, due to the sizeable part of
Jordanian population that trace
their roots to Palestine. Many
Jordanians, Palestinians, and
international experts have warned
that Israel is simply waiting for the
right historical moment to turn
this wishful thinking into a reality
and transfer Palestinians by force
into Jordan. In face, the policy
of population transfer to fulfill
Zionist aspirations has, in effect,
been implemented covertly and
gradually over several decades.
Establishing trust – a key to
peace
The Israeli government at the
time belonged to the school that
perpetrates the old doctrine that a
Palestinian state exists, not within
the boundaries of historical Palestine
but across the Jordan River, in what
has been for the last 60 years the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
His Majesty, the late King Hussein
once told me that to make peace
with anybody, you have to build
trust and respect for the other side,
and truly understand the difficulties
facing it. This is a view that I have
personally held for decades. I also
want to point out that negotiations
take place between adversaries,
and almost never between friends.
However, through negotiations,
you need to both trust your own
judgment and your adversary's
wisdom, and come to trust and
respect your adversary.
The idea that Jordan equals
Palestine has been promoted by
several Israeli political forces, in
Should we be surprised at the level
of mistrust between Arabs and
Israelis after fighting five wars? I will
80
not answer that question; instead I'll
provide an insight that sheds light on
how relations have developed.
On the Israeli side, there has always
been this ostensible and tactical
stumbling-block in the hearts and
minds of her leaders to oppose
negotiations with the Palestinians.
This has manifested itself in a failure
to act decisively or be proactive
towards peace. This stance often
led to aggressive acts which caused
the loss of life on both sides, and
in the Israeli public accepting the
impossibility of achieving peace.
The hostility – peace
relationship
In actual fact, every significant peace
agreement was preceded by an
apparently inexplicable action by the
Israeli government that inadvertently
mobilized public opinion towards a
readiness for 'compromise' for the
sake of peace.
The person who we are honoring
here today embodied this pattern.
To his mind, peace justified these
types of actions.
For example, the deportation of
Palestinian activists to Lebanon,
described by the Israeli press at the
time as a "draconian measure…that
awarded it [Hamas] a certificate of
honor which will not be easily
devalued." The press called the
decision "a very stupid decision…
illegal and immoral."
Although such actions may have
been considered brutal, they laid
the proper political backdrop for a
significant move by Israeli leaders
on the peace track. This type of
pattern may have borne fruit in the
past; however, to my mind, violence
can only breed more violence.
Israelis and Arabs have traversed
a long road of mutual hostility for
over a half-century to reach the
negotiating table. Revival of hostility
is not in the interests of either side as
we have experienced enough rivers
of blood that have not led to any gain
by either side.
The global village – an end to
misconceptions
Let me recall Leon Uris' novel
Exodus, later made into a movie,
which described Israel's founding.
One of the most dangerous flaws of
this account was its depiction of Arabs
as a people who fear only the whip,
who only understand force.
As an Arab and Muslim, I must
contend that this claim is altogether
unfounded. Arabs are a proud and
generous people who respond to
gentle dialogue rather than to brute
force. I fear that Israel and many
other countries have yet to come
to realize this simple fact. Force will
only lead to more bitterness and
anger, and never yield positive results.
Confidence-building dialogue is the
only solution.
Arabs are no longer an illiterate
people. Jordan and many other Arab
countries boast an intelligentsia that
was educated in the West. This group
of people does not have negative views
of Western values. Israeli and U.S.
actions, within the context of the 'War
on Terror', are alienating this potential
pro-peace, pro-tolerance lobby.
Our American friends are spending
hundreds of million dollars to improve
their image worldwide. However,
American public image is constantly
being damaged by 'stray bullets' in the
form of insensitive political statements,
disrespectful conduct, or blatant
aggression.
The technological revolution, particularly
the implications of satellite media, is
opening the hearts and minds of
people around the world. People are
more open to a variety of opinions
from satellite and Internet media
outlets. A one-sided film such as
Exodus would no longer generate the
type of sympathy for Israel as it did in
1960. There is too great a knowledge
of different opinions.
Peace as giving people a
fair deal
In the words of a current champion of
peace, His Majesty King Abdullah II:
"Peace in this part of world will never
become a reality unless and until the
majority of people become convinced
that they received a fair deal." Only
peace based on legitimacy and
security will last. Peace based on
domination and military might can
never last.
This was also the belief of the soldier
of peace we are honoring today.
Having seen the scourges of war, he
became convinced that only through a
genuine peace, a brave peace based
on trust, could this part of the world
turn a corner and witness lasting
security.
With the historic concessions made
by the Palestinians at Oslo and by
the Arab states at the Beirut Arab
Summit, namely the acceptance of the
state of Israel in return for withdrawal
from the lands occupied in 1967, the
issue of peace in the Middle East was
transformed. Rather than continuing
to attempt to redress history, the Arab
81
world has accepted Israel as part of
the region.
Israeli leaders must build on the
foundations of peace thus far achieved
- particularly Camp David I, the Oslo
Accord, the Peace Treaty with Jordan
- in order to restart the peace process
with the Palestinians, and with the
Syrians and Lebanese.
It is all well and good to say, as do
President Bush and the European
Union, that the overarching objective
continues to be a negotiated twostate solution agreed to by all parties,
which would result in a contiguous,
sovereign Palestinian state, and that
the only route to this goal is via the
Road Map. However, encouraging
words do not suffice.
Yitzhak Rabin had a dream that one
day peace would prevail over our
region. He created a tangible vision
to realize this dream and worked
endlessly to turn his dream into a
reality. I genuinely believe that we all
have to work to turn Rabin's dream
into a reality by we ourselves becoming
visionaries. We owe it to Yitzhak – he
paid for his vision with his life!
82
Jordanian-Israeli Relations
during Rabin's First Tenure
as Prime Minister
By: Mr. Amos Eran
Former Director-General,
Prime Minister's office
Approximately an hour after the
media publicized Israel's famous
'Operation Entebbe', the Prime
Minister's office received a message
from Jordan's King Hussein to Yitzhak
Rabin. The message contained
warm words of praise regarding the
decisiveness, daring, and leadership
displayed by Israel, which can be used
as an example to the world in fighting
terror. When I passed this message
to Rabin, who was exhausted after
a number of sleepless nights, I saw
a smile of satisfaction pass over his
face.
A number of days later, a news
agency reported the Jordanian
Ambassador to the United Nations
condemning Israel for its "pirate and
reckless operation in Entebbe…that
endangers world peace." After
showing the news report to Rabin,
he joked that we ought to show the
Ambassador to the United Nations
the message sent by the King who
he represents.
This example illustrates, to a large
extent, the Middle Eastern reality.
There were countries that were
formally at a state of war with Israel,
but secretly conducted warm and
intimate relations with Israel.
King Hussein was constantly held in
the grip of serious and continuous
pressures from Syria, at times from
Egypt and Iraq also, and obviously
from the Palestinians both within
their borders and without. The
state of Israel was a 'thorn in the
side' of these peoples. During King
Hussein's rule, there were a total of
16 attempts on his life. Throughout
his lifetime, Hussein had to navigate in
a strongly oppositional environment.
He needed to 'hit the brakes' on
several diplomatic initiatives in order
to survive.
Hussein's contacts with Israel were
of great assistance to him, despite
dangers associated with contacting
Israel. At least twice, in 1958 and in
1970, King Hussein required the Israeli
army's assistance to help him quash
uprisings that threatened to end his
rule. In addition, Hussein's contacts
with Israel enabled him to strengthen
his contacts with the Americans. Both
Israel and Jordan had vital interests
in improving their relations.
I will discuss the direct and indirect
relations that existed between Rabin
and Hussein during Rabin's first
tenure as Prime Minister from 19741977, and in the years leading up to
Rabin's first premiership.
Israel's military assistance in
1970
In September, 1970, Rabin, then
serving as Ambassador to the U.S.,
flew from Washington to New York
to lecture to an important JewishAmerican forum, and to meet with
various figureheads. After arriving at
his hotel, the White House suddenly
contacted Rabin with a message
that the President Nixon and Foreign
Minister Kissinger request that he
immediately arrive at the White House.
Rabin's New York engagements were
cancelled, and within two hours, he
arrived at the White House and was
immediately taken to the 'Situation
Room' where the National Security
Council was meeting, headed by
President Nixon. This forum was
discussing King Hussein's request
for immediate military assistance,
claiming that his rule was under
direct threat. As a response to the
Jordanian army's response to the
rebellion on behalf of the PLO and
other Palestinian organizations, two
Syrian tank brigades had mobilized
towards the Jordanian border to take
vengeance in the largely Palestinian
areas of Irbid and Jarash. There were
83
also signs that Iraq was preparing to
join the Syrian effort. King Hussein's
situation had reached a critical stage.
The U.S., preferring that Israel be the
one to come to Jordan's aid, asked
Rabin for his opinion on the situation.
Rabin, who knew the territory well
from his tenure as GOC Northern
Command, analyzed maps of the
area and described the military
situation in the area, including the
various possibilities for stopping the
Syrian invasion.
Israel had previously declared that
it would not agree to the existence
of foreign armed forces in Jordan
that may threaten Israel. And it was
obvious that both Israel and the U.S.
had common interest in this respect.
When Nixon requested Israel's
response to the idea of sending troops
to Jordan's aid, Rabin consulted with
Prime Minister Golda Meir. Golda met
with the appropriate security forum,
and after a series of urgent meetings,
decided that the Israeli Air Force would
bomb the Syrian tank units, while they
were still on Syrian territory, and that
Israel would mobilize tank units, in
an obvious manner, from Southern
Israel towards Jordan. This ‘flexing
of muscles’ achieved its goal, as
it prevented Syria's intervention,
and allowed the Jordanian army to
quash the Palestinian uprising, which
84
eventually led to the expulsion of the
Palestinian terror groups from Jordan
in July 1971.
Israel hoped that this type of military
assistance would influence Jordan's
position vis-à-vis diplomatic
understandings with Israel, and even
a full-fledged peace agreement.
Meetings between Rabin and
Hussein from 1974-1977
Rabin's first tenure as Prime Minister
began officially on July 3, 1974. Two
weeks later, President Nixon arrived
in Israel, within the framework of a
Middle Eastern diplomatic visit. When
meeting his old acquaintance Rabin,
Nixon said to him that the U.S. gave
its blessing to the separation of forces
agreements with Egypt and Syria
(which were only finalized at the end
of 1975), but would only be satisfied
when Israel signs a similar agreement
with Jordan. Kissinger added, "If you
do not reach an agreement with King
Hussein regarding the West Bank
quickly, the international community
will recognize Arafat. You need to
act fast."
When I began serving as the
Chairman of the Prime Minister's
Office as Rabin's political advisor, he
immediately assigned me to a 'secret
file' related to Kissinger's warning. I
read all the reports of meetings with
Hussein dating back to 1963, and
summarized all the materials that were
written in preparation for meetings
with King Hussein.
I summarized Israel's goals in future
meetings with King Hussein as the
following:
• Checking the possibility of
achieving a separate peace
agreement with Jordan, or at least
an interim agreement.
• Formulating coordinated
positions regarding various
developments in the Territories
in general, and regarding the
existence of terror organizations in
the Territories, specifically.
• Finding solutions to ad-hoc
problems that tend to occur in
bi-lateral relations between the
countries.
• Identifying areas in which
agreements or understandings
could be reached between the two
sides.
• To learned from an ‘inside
source’ of developments and
trends in the Arab world.
Secret meetings between
Rabin and King Hussein
Foreign Minister Yigal Allon and
Defense Minister Shimon Peres took
part in all meetings. Before these
meetings, the Israeli delegation met
to coordinate positions in preparation.
The first of these meetings took place
on August 29, 1974, and was the first
of eight meetings that occurred with
King Hussein during Rabin's three
year tenure as Prime Minister. During
these meetings, King Hussein was
generally accompanied by Zayyad alRafi, who served as Jordanian Prime
Minister, and continued participating
in these meetings even after he retired
from the post.
All the meetings, except for one,
were held in the Arava desert valley
in a caravan that was always set in a
different location, and always totally
covered by a mound of sand. One
meeting took place in a government
guest house north of Tel Aviv, as
Rabin insisted that this meeting
have a festive atmosphere due to
King Hussein's birthday. Rabin even
presented the King with a birthday
gift – a "Galilee" rifle in a decorative
case made of olive tree wood. The
King was very moved by the meeting,
and asked me, on his way back to
his helicopter, to thank Rabin for the
festive meeting.
King Hussein always arrived at these
meetings in his personal helicopter.
He would always arrive at dusk, just
before darkness would descend. I
would generally wait at the helicopter's
landing location. Once the Jordanian
team landed, I would lead them to an
IAF helicopter that was parked in the
area, which would transport us to the
meeting place. This travel time gave
me the opportunity to have informal
discussions with the King and to pass
messages to him, as required.
Conditions for peace with
Jordan
The meetings would generally open
with a detailed and comprehensive
survey of the situation by Rabin
and Hussein. The King would often
include his impressions from meetings
with various Arab leaders including
meetings with Syria, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and the Gulf States. He was
often critical of President Sadat.
He would often emphasize the
importance of the Americans, but
would complain about their lack of
understanding of the dynamics in the
Middle East.
Regarding the possibility of a separate
peace agreement with Jordan, King
Hussein’s position, to summarize,
was as follows: “If you want direct
negotiations, you will receive them.
If you want a peace agreement and
normalization including and exchange
of ambassadors and economic
cooperation, you will receive them.
I am prepared to stand in the face
of enormous pressure and criticism
from the Arab world, but I have one
condition for this – the return of all
territories captured from Jordan
during the 1967 war, including
East Jerusalem. If this principle is
acceptable to you, I am prepared to
come to understandings regarding
your holy sites in the conquered
territory, and for small border
adjustments, for example in the
area of Latrun, but on the basis of
full reciprocity. If you think you can
obtain a more favorable deal from
the PLO, go talk???
Ministers Allon and Peres would
often add their opinions to issues that
related to their fields, as did Zayyad
al-Rafi. Rafi would often directly
criticize Israel, to which Allon and
Peres would respond, while Hussein
and Rabin would usually refrain from
direct criticism.
It was clear that Israel could not
agree to the King’s terms, and from
meeting to meeting, it became
clearer that we could not reach a
separate agreement with Jordan,
although this situation did not
prevent us from arriving at a series
of understandings in the areas of
85
border indicators, ecology and flights.
However, we were not able to make
headway in certain fields, such as
water allocation and elections in the
West Bank.
Fallout of the Rabat
Commission
The developments surrounding the
Rabat Commission, which focused
on the Palestinian issue, had
a negative affect on our contacts
with the Jordanians. A week before
the commission, a meeting took
place with King Hussein, in which
we understood that the Palestinian
issue would be frozen. Hussein told
us during that meeting that he had
fully coordinated his position with that
of President Sadat, and Rabin had
nothing to worry about. This position
stated that Hussein would deal with
issues pertaining to the Palestinians of
the West Bank and that the PLO would
be responsible for the Palestinian
Diaspora. However, the results of the
Rabat Commission are well known
– the PLO was determined as the sole
representative of the Palestinians. The
King felt that Sadat stabbed him in the
back. In the meeting that took place
with the King after the commission,
the King was dispirited and critical
of Sadat, who he felt had broken
their agreements. In addition, al-Rafi
did not hide his criticism of Israel,
86
claiming that had Israel been more
flexible previously regarding a pullback
from Jericho and other territories, it
would have been possible to prevent
the developments of the commission.
This led to a difficult meeting between
the two sides.
In summary, clearly, the main
importance of the contacts between
Rabin and Hussein was the fact that
they took place. Even if a peace
agreement at the time with Jordan
was not possible, the very fact that
Israel and Jordan were meeting was
essential. If a peace agreement was
achieved at the time, it is almost certain
that the King would have paid with his
life. These meetings did achieve a set
of tactical understandings dealing with
important issues, and a level of trust
was established between the Hussein
and Rabin. The two sides also came
to understand the limits of the other
side, and there was an unprecedented
sense of acceptance of the other.
There is no doubt that these talks
contributed enormously to the eventual
peace agreement between Israel and
Jordan that was signed during Rabin’s
second tenure as Prime Minister, only
after the signing of the Israel-Egypt
peace accords.
A Review of Israel-Jordan
Steps towards Peace
By: Justice of the Supreme
Court Elyahkim Rubenstein
Former Attorney General
Although ten years have passed
since that fateful day of Rabin's
assassination, I still have not been
able to adapt to the fact that a
Jew's hand was lifted to murder
a Prime Minister of Israel. This act
is in contradiction to everything that
Judaism represents, as Judaism
gave to the world, among the Ten
Commandments, the commandment
"Thou shall not murder." The horrid
murder is also in contradiction to the
values that Israel, as a Jewish and
Democratic state, represents. The act
is in contradiction with both Jewish
and humanistic values, which respect
the person, as a being created in
the image of the Almighty. It is in
contradiction to morality, honesty,
and freedom. The act of killing
the other, within the framework of a
political debate, is an atrocity.
This week, we will read the Bible
portion from the book of Genesis
known as "The Binding of Isaac
(Yitzhak)". Unlike the Biblical Yitzhak,
our Yitzhak was not fortunate enough
to hear the commandment from
above, "Do not raise your hand
against the boy, or do anything to
him. And the hand was lifted."
I had a close personal relationship
with Yitzhak Rabin, for whom
I served as Cabinet Secretary
and peace negotiator. I miss him
deeply and am saddened by
his demise – as a human being,
a Jew, an Israeli, and as his
associate.
A personal relationship that
enabled peace
As you all know, there are schools
dedicated to researching what
exactly makes history progress:
ideas or personalities. In my view,
the answer is a combination of the
two. I see ideas as letters that require
a postman to deliver them to their
correct address. The historic 'letter'
of peace between Israel and Jordan
was brought to its correct address:
Prime Minister Rabin and King
Hussein. The relationship between
the two of them, which went back
to the 1970s, enabled these two
leaders to embark upon the historic
mission of bringing peace to fruition.
The relationship between these two
leaders and the mutual confidence
that they had in one another had
a major impact on the central
components of the peace treaty.
The renewal of the relationship
between the two leaders began
during the Madrid Conference
and continued up until the peace
agreement. The negotiations with
Jordan operated using parallel
channels – they involved both
official negotiating delegations and
direct talks between the leaders
and through messengers, such as
Ephraim HaLevy and myself, which
included confidential talks on water,
energy, and environmental issues,
which were of specific interest to
Prince Hassan, the unsung hero of
these negotiations.
'The Common Agenda'
took the Jordanians by surprise,
though they knew of efforts to
reach a Declaration of Principles
agreement with the Palestinians.
A day after Oslo was signed,
Jordan agreed to secretly sign 'The
Common Agenda'. However, during
the months following, negotiations
with Jordan were put on hold, until
a meeting was set up between King
Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin,
a meeting in which I took part. This
meeting was essential, as it led
to a renewal of negotiations, first
through tri-lateral talks in Washington
with American mediation, and then
through bi-lateral talks in the region
in the summer of 1994.
During meetings in Washington, the
Israeli and Jordanian delegations
came to an initial agreement entitled
'The Common Agenda'. This draft
was, in fact, already prepared in
November 1992. However, we waited
to publicize this draft or advance it
into a peace agreement, because
Jordan, ever cautious, did not want
to pre-empt other Arab missions to
Washington.
Jordan's strategic decision for
peace
In September 1993, the Olso
Declaration of Principles took
many Israelis by surprise, including
our negotiating delegation in
Washington, which had also dealt
with the Palestinian issue. Oslo also
In the summer of 1994, we began a
new era of Israel-Jordanian relations.
These summer meetings began in
a tent in Israel's Arava desert valley
on July 18th. During these meeting,
I recall saying to my Jordanian
I believe that at some point during
the spring of 1994, King Hussein
made the strategic decision to make
a peace agreement with Israel. Once
the Palestinians had entered the Oslo
process, he felt comfortable making
peace with Israel – something that he
had wanted to do for decades.
87
counterparts, "This tent is temporary,
but peace will be permanent."
The stepping stones leading up
to a peace agreement
A couple of days later, Foreign
Minister Peres met Prime Minister
Dr. Majali in Jordan near the Dead
Sea. On July 25th, Prime Minister
Rabin met King Hussein in the
White House under the mediation
of President Clinton to sign the
Washington Declaration. Over the
next three months, the peace treaty
was born.
I want to briefly address the various
stages leading up to the Israel-Jordan
peace treaty. In 1991, the First Gulf
War created a window of opportunity
in the region that President George
Bush and Secretary of State James
Baker successfully utilized. Secretary
Baker initiated a 'Shuttle Diplomacy'
that included nine visits to the region
from March to October 1991, which
led directly to the Madrid Conference.
Jordan, at the time, was not in the
most favorable position vis-à-vis
the U.S.A., due to its perceived
relationship with Iraq before the war.
The chemistry and confidence
between the two leaders, which
took some time to recover after the
Oslo surprise, helped bring about
a number of creative solutions to
significant issues. The climax of
the process occurred on the night
of October 16th in Amman, where
the two leaders and delegations
convened to finalize the peace
agreement, which was officially
signed on October 26.
We all remember the deep emotions
expressed by King Hussein for Rabin
when eulogizing him at Rabin's
funeral. Unfortunately, Hussein too
was to depart from us soon after
Rabin. Both of these leaders left an
incredible legacy.
88
On the eve of the war, in December
1990, Prime Minister Shamir and
King Hussein met to decide on the
'red lines' between the two countries
during the war. A series of confidential
meetings followed this meeting for
the purpose of laying down the
infrastructure of negotiations.
During the Madrid Conference,
Israel insisted that Jordan and the
Palestinians be represented by a joint
delegation, with the hopes being
that a tri-lateral solution could be
found between the three players.
However, as we found out, this
was not possible – the JordanianPalestinian partnership did not
develop into a natural unit. We
were forced to work on each track
separately, all the time maintaining
liaisons between the two fronts. In
those days, though we had already
signed the secret 'Common Agenda'
agreement, negotiations were slow.
The Jordanians were hesitant to
move forwards towards a peace
accord, mainly due to fear for their
standing in the Arab World.
Meanwhile, we started various
Israeli-Jordanian action groups in
Washington, whose purpose was to
deal with various issues, and secret
meetings between our leaders, which
Prince Hassan termed the 'safety
net.' Progress occurred slowly, until
the breakthrough of the summer of
1994.
The term 'ripeness' for peace is
extremely relevant in this case.
Diplomatic processes often take
time, until the day comes when a
strategic decision can be made.
Following the Washington Declaration
of 1994, we began a set of very
intense negotiations in the region that
covered a range of issues including
security, water, and borders. The
climax arrived in September 1994,
when Prime Minister Rabin gave me
the green light to pass a draft of the
peace agreement to our Jordanian
counterparts. Within just a few days,
in part due to the confidence that had
been built, Jordan gave its approval
to the draft as a basis. A group of
us spent a few sleepless weeks at
Prince Hassan's home in Aqaba,
where we worked through the final
details of the accord.
Central point in the IsraelJordan peace treaty
I want to finish by pointing out some
of the central points of the treaty,
many of which had existed since
'The Common Agenda':
1. Termination of the state of war and
belligerency.
2. Recognition, diplomatic
relations, and the exchange of
ambassadors.
3. Border corrections, an issue
that did not receive much public
attention, though I believe it was
one of the most important aspects of
the treaty. The border between Israel
and Jordan was historically defined
in 1922, but was for the most part,
never demarcated. Jordan wanted
to establish a border that would
be based on the armistice lines
of 1949. Israel wanted to keep
agricultural areas that belonged to
Kibbutzim and Moshavim (communal
towns) in the Arava region that were
located beyond the 1949 armistice
lines. We succeeded in negotiating
an agreement that included a territory
exchange of almost 70 square
kilometers. The Jordanian leadership
was able to tell its people that it
had obtained the armistice lines,
while our government could tell the
farmers in the area that they could
continue farming their land under our
sovereignty.
4. No international forces were
delegated to the area, unlike the
previous peace treaty with Egypt.
5. Cooperation on water issues.
After the treaty was signed, intensive
negotiations took place regarding the
treaty's implementation.
To sum up, the relationship between
Israel and Jordan has gone through
various incarnations. I am still waiting
for the day when joint colleges are
established in the Arava region, and
when joint tourism and business
ventures are promoted beyond their
current levels.
and nurtured; it cannot be taken for
granted.
The commonly-held view that
negotiations between Israel and
Jordan were easy is mistaken. A lot
of creativity was required to make
these negotiations work – and the
results speak for themselves.
Having taken part in peace negotiations
for over 25 years, I just want to point
out that, despite recent setbacks, we
must not forget the negotiations that
have succeeded, as these examples
give us hope for the future. Let us
remember the partnership between
King Hussein and Prime Minister
Rabin. Let us remember the great
soldier and peacemaker Yitzhak
Rabin. We need to ensure that such a
murder never recurs by educating our
public with the values of tolerance and
respect for every human being.
I regret that we have yet to implement
the aspects of the peace treaty that
speak of tolerance and understanding
of the other. Advancing peace is like
growing a flower – it must be cultivated
89
The Jordan-Israel Peace
Accord: A Unique Type of
Agreement
By: Prof. Asher Susser
Director of the Moshe Dayan
Center, Tel Aviv University
The peace between Israel and
Jordan was a function of two great
men who are no longer with us:
Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein.
However, even now that we are
without these two figures, the peace
between the two states remains
stable.
The geo-political background
to the accords
In our current geo-political environment
there is much talk about Israel being
located between the war in Iraq
and the Intifada in the Territories. In
the early 1990s, the situation was
in a way similar – the geo-political
situation was changing because of
the First Iraq War and because of the
First Intifada. Israel, because of the
First Intifada, was keen to negotiate
with the Palestinians, while Jordan
had already ‘disengaged’ from the
West Bank. In addition, after the
First Iraq War, Jordan felt that it was
critical to reassert its relationship with
the United States, which also meant
90
opening negotiations with Israel.
This was the backdrop for the Madrid
Conference, which, for Jordan,
presented the convenient formula
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation. Israel had often wanted
Jordan to negotiate on behalf of
the Palestinians; however, Jordan
would not agree to this arrangement.
Therefore, the joint delegation was a
convenient formula for Jordan.
The Jordanians were taken by surprise
by Oslo. Just as it was for many
Israelis, Oslo represented a shock to
Jordanian expectations. The meeting
after the initiation of Oslo between
King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin was
essential for reassessing the shaken
strategic understanding between
Israel and Jordan regarding regional
issues, and particularly regarding
the Palestinian question. Rabin and
Hussein had to agree upon a strategic
platform of understanding before a
peace treaty could be negotiated.
Third-party elements of the
agreement
The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty,
when compared to the treaty with
Egypt and the attempted treaty with
Syria, was unique because third parties
played central rôles in influencing the
requirements of each side. For Israel,
Iraq was a great concern, and for
Jordan - the Palestinians. There are
elements of the treaty, that, though
they do not mention these parties
by name, clearly represent interests
that Israel or Jordan have vis-à-vis
these parties. For example, there is
a clause in which each side agrees
not to allow potentially hostile forces
to be stationed on their territory. This
clause is essentially Jordan reassuring
Israel that Iraqi or other forces will not
be stationed in Jordan.
In addition, Israel committed itself not
to allow for the involuntary removal of
populations from its territory – a clear
guarantee that Israel will not ‘transfer’
Palestinians into Jordan. Israel’s
recognition of Jordan’s boundaries
essentially guaranteed to Jordan
that Israel would not attempt to
undermine the Hashemite Kingdom
in a future peace agreement with the
Palestinians. All of these clauses, in
essence, made reference to third
parties.
Another peculiarity of the IsraeliJordanian treaty is the lack of security
arrangements such as early warning
arrangements, buffer zones, or multinational forces. This lack indicates
the level of trust that already
existed between the two states and
particularly between the two leaders.
After Rabin’s assassination, the
relationship between the two states
changed. The level of warmth and
trust between Rabin and Hussein
was never recreated between any
of the Israel’s later Prime Ministers
and Hussein or Abdullah. Currently,
the relations are stable and businesslike, but the personal warmth no
longer exists. However, maybe this
is a normal state of relations between
states that are at peace in the Middle
East.
91
The Various Stages of
Jordan-Israel Relations
and the Rabin-Hussein
Relationship
By: Prof. Shimon Shamir
Tel Aviv University, Former
Israeli Ambassador to Egypt
and Jordan
As Israel’s first ambassador to
Jordan, appointed by the Rabin
government, I would like to make a
few comments on the relationship,
as it developed between Rabin and
Hussein.
A few days after my appointment,
I was invited to Rabin’s office for
a briefing, in March 1995. Rabin
wanted to give me a thorough
briefing of the evolution of the
relations between the two states.
Anyone who was subjected to a
presentation of such a nature by
Rabin knows that he gave very long,
detailed, analytical, and systematic
presentations.
This presentation, which I will try
to summarize for you, is of interest
because it illustrates Rabin’s views of
how relations developed between the
two states. Rabin presented to me
the evolution of the relations in five
stages, starting from 1974, his first
92
contact with King Hussein as a Prime
Minister. Note that these stages only
cover time periods in which Rabin
himself had direct relations with the
Jordanians, either as Prime Minister
or Defense Minister.
Stage One: 1974-1977
In 1974, Rabin met with Hussein in a
caravan in the Arava desert, where
they discussed the separation of
forces, something very important to
King Hussein in order to strengthen
his position ahead of the Rabat
Conference. Hussein wanted
Israel to withdraw approximately
ten kilometers, a request that had
previously been rejected by Golda
Meir and Moshe Dayan.
Rabin held with Golda and Dayan
and did not agree to the separation
of forces; however, he made a
number of counter-proposals to King
Hussein, including offering Jordan a
port in Haifa. I’d like to point out that,
in my opinion, we did not do enough
to strengthen King Hussein ahead
of the Rabat Conference, whose
result – the recognition of the PLO
as the sole representative of the
Palestinians – was harmful both to
us and to Hussein.
Stage Two: 1984-1988
From 1984 to 1988, Rabin, as
Defense Minister, worked in
a dynamic way to strengthen the
Jordanian presence in the West
Bank and remove PLO influences
from the area. Rabin described the
policy at the time as ‘improving the
leaving conditions’ in the West Bank,
which meant investing in specific
development and infrastructure plans,
as well as increasing the flow of
Jordanian money into the West Bank
and establishing a Jordanian bank.
When the King decided to disengage
from the West Bank in 1988, this was
a serious disappointment for Rabin,
which he didn’t hesitate to indicate
to Hussein.
Stage Three: 1991-1992
After the Iraq War, Jordan had been
weakened due to its identification
with the Iraqi side. Israel was quite
angry with Jordan for the stance that
it took during the war.
As a result, Jordan was eager to
cooperate with American Secretary
of State James Baker, and was very
helpful in putting together the joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for
the Madrid Conference, which made
bilateral talks possible.
Stage Four: 1993
King Hussein, initially, regarded the
Oslo Accords as a very heavy blow to
his position, and he closed the bridge
crossings immediately following the
Declaration of Principles. Hussein
made clear to the Israelis that
he felt that they had abandoned
Jordan in signing the Declaration of
Principles without coordinating with
Jordan. Rabin, immediately after Oslo
was initiated, rushed to assure the
King and promise him that nothing
in principle had changed in their
relations.
Stage Five: 1994
During this period, the peace treaty
with Jordan was concluded. A series
of secret meetings led to the joint
declaration, in which Rabin and
Hussein appeared before the U.S.
congress, and officially declared an
end to the state of war.
At the end of the meeting with Rabin
detailed above, Rabin instructed me
that he wanted to keep in constant
contact with the situation in Jordan,
and that I could call him at any time.
While my immediate superior in the
Foreign Ministry often took a couple
of days to return my phone calls,
Rabin was always available within
five minutes, at any time of day or
night. After that meeting with Rabin,
I continued to a meeting with Eitan
Haber. Haber said to me, 'For
Rabin, the peace between Israel
and Jordan is the apple of his eye.'
He also emphasized that all matters
regarding peace with Jordan are
directed from the Prime Minister’s
office, while matters regarding the
Palestinians are directed by the
Foreign Affairs Ministry.
The Rabin-Hussein
Relationship
By the time I was appointed, the
chemistry between these two leaders
was already famous. For Hussein,
Rabin displayed the two most
important attributes that he desired
in both leaders and in anyone with
whom he worked: credibility and
discretion. Hussein saw Rabin as a
man of his word, a man who says
what he thinks, and a man who does
what he says. Hussein saw Rabin as
realistic and pragmatist. Both leaders
had backgrounds as war heroes who
had fought in crucial battles for their
respective countries – Rabin in 1948
and 1967, and Hussein in 1970.
Both leaders led their respective
countries by always emphasizing
strategic considerations. They both
saw their countries as fighting for
survival within a hostile environment.
Rabin’s strategic thinking at the time
heavily emphasized the implications
of radical Islam. Rabin predicted that
the Iran threat would worsen – as
it has - and therefore devised the
concept of a window of opportunity.
He also felt that Syria needed to be
neutralized. These were strategic
considerations that were shared by
both leaders.
Neither Rabin nor Hussein were
people who enjoyed making ‘small
talk’. I remember at state dinners
Rabin and Hussein, sitting across
from each other, neither contributing
much to the discussion. Peres carried
the burden of the conversation, and
did so brilliantly. King Hussein would
listen and smile, and from time to
time, encourage some of the other
participants to speak. Both Rabin
and Hussein were, to a certain
extent, shy people.
The pair developed a relationship of
trust, friendship, and mutual affection.
I believe that, aside from his relations
with the Egyptian leadership, Hussein
formed his closest bond with Rabin,
of all regional leaders.
If we compare the Rabin-Hussein
relationship with the Begin-Sadat
relationship, we see stark differences.
The ice between Begin and Sadat
was never broken.
If I may speculate, I believe that
Rabin’s understandings of Hussein’s
93
sensitivities were such, that the
opening of Western Wall Tunnel
(which occurred under Netanyahu’s
rule), without any prior coordination
with Hussein, would not have
occurred under Rabin’s rule. In
addition, the Khaled Mashal affair
would not have happened under
Rabin’s rule.
A convergence of interests
However, we should not get carried
away stressing the chemistry between
the two leaders. Chemistry, though
important, was less essential than
the convergence of interests between
the two leaders. Rabin was able to
identify early on in their relationship
the central concerns of the King:
reclaiming lost territory, water rights,
holy sites in Jerusalem, the burden
of Palestinian refugees, regional
security, and economics. Rabin
tried to accommodate these needs
as best he could. Rabin worked hard
to convince Washington to provide
aid for Jordan, while also convincing
Hussein to shorten his shopping list.
He also recognized the special rôle
on Jordan in administering the holy
sites in Jerusalem, an important issue
for Hussein.
It is important to admit that the
relationship was not free of problems.
Friction did surface from time to time.
For examples, shortly after my arrival
94
in Amman, the Israeli expropriation
of land in East Jerusalem in April
1995 created a storm in Jordanian
public opinion. Jordanian Members
of Parliament wanted to recall their
Ambassador from Israel, and kick
me out of Jordan. King Hussein
faced enormous internal and
external pressure. On May 21st, King
Hussein sent a secret letter to Rabin
in which he explained the damage
caused by this expropriation of land,
claiming that it contradicted Jordan’s
special rôle in Jerusalem. He asked
that Rabin coordinate steps taken
regarding the status of Jerusalem
with Jordan.
Bilateral agreements
The bilateral agreements between
the two states were very important
for Rabin. Elyakim Rubenstien, and
then myself (when he was appointed
to the Supreme Court), directed the
monitoring committee that was meant
to conclude bilateral agreements in
approximately 15 areas. Unfortunately,
this monitoring committee did not
always progress effectively.
There were great obstacles due to
security considerations, bureaucratic
issues, vested interests, and smallminded pettiness. When we got
stuck, we always turned to Rabin, a
method I learned from Elyakim.
For example, when we reached a
dead end in negotiations over the
aviation agreement, in part, due to
El Al’s interest in limiting Jordanian
fly zones, Rabin intervened and
demanded that we find a compromise
within one week – which we did.
Let me conclude by stating that
for his vision of peace, Rabin paid
a terrible price. He said in the
Knesset on October 25, just days
before his assassination, that “the
peace agreement with Jordan is
not just a political agreement; it is
a basic and substantial change in
our existence.” Rabin was devoted
to peace, with both the Palestinians
and the Jordanians.
The Jordanian response to the
assassination
On the night of Rabin’s assassination,
King Hussein called me repeatedly in
order to receive updated reports from
the hospital. Though the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs did not find it important
to keep me frequently updated that
night, thankfully, my daughter in Tel
Aviv continually phoned me with the
latest information. I could feel in the
King’s voice the great shock that this
horrible event elicited in him.
Hundreds of people came to our
Embassy in Amman to express their
sympathy, including the royal family,
politicians, military men, students,
and ordinary people coming in their
working clothes from all parts of
the Kingdom. They all wrote their
feelings in the condolence book
that we opened for the public.
At Rabin’s funeral, Hussein’s speech,
which was not prepared, but instead
delivered straight from the heart,
succeeded in moving millions of
viewers. He said to Rabin, “I am only
used to standing in these types of
ceremonies when you are standing
near me to talk about peace, our
commitment to build a better future,
and future generations that will live in
peace. I never thought that my first
trip to Jerusalem would be under
these circumstances.”
Ali Shukri once told me that the King
said to him during Rabin’s funeral, “I
wish to end my life as Rabin has – as a
martyr, and not on a sick bed.“ As we
all know, this did not happen.
95
Syria and Lebanon
Yitzhak Rabin and the Efforts to bring an End to the War
Peace with Syria:
Still a Strategic Option
By: Edward P. Djerejian,
chair of panel, Founding
Director of the James A. Baker
III Institute for Public Policy at
Rice University,
Former U.S. Ambassador to
Syria and Israel
I would like to give a brief context to
our discussion of Rabin’s attempts to
reach peace with Syria and Lebanon.
We have heard about how Yitzhak
Rabin was a strategic thinker – a
type of lawyer statesman. In dealing
with Syria, he was facing another
strategic thinker – Hafez al-Assad.
Rabin understood the geo-political
importance of Israeli-Syrian relations.
He knew that comprehensive peace
would not be possible without
peace with Syria. He understood
Syria’s regional rôle, particularly in
terms of Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey.
Rabin understood that Assad had
succeeded in creating a pan-Arab role
for Syria, perhaps beyond its actual
capacity. I think that this background
is essential to understanding Rabin’s
critical so-called ‘hypothetical deposit’
in 1993.
When I was in Syria from 1988-1991,
we, the Americans, initiated high level
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strategic dialogue with Assad on the
topics of Lebanon, U.S. hostages,
building a unified front against Iraq,
and even the freedom of travel for
Syrian Jews. However, the essential
issue, from our perspective, was
convincing Assad to agree to direct
face-to-face negotiations with Israel.
We felt that if we could get the panArab leader, Assad, to agree to
negotiations with Israel, other Arab
countries would fall into place. In
fact, Yitzhak Shamir, in part, agreed
to attend the Madrid Conference,
because of the breakthrough we
had achieved in Damascus.
The issues of land, peace, security,
and water have all been discussed
during various stages of negotiations
between Israel and Syria, with U.S.
mediation. The conventional wisdom
is that 80% of these issues have
been dealt with, meaning that when
negotiations resume, we will begin at
an advanced starting point.
Although the Geneva summit, in
which President Clinton mediated
between Prime Minister Barak and
Assad, failed, the ‘strategic option
of peace’, as Bashar el-Assad calls
it, still exists.
The current American
approach to Syria
I want to make a few comments
on the current American thinking
about the state of affairs with
Syria. Contrary to what is generally
published in the press, for the last
two years the Bush administration,
aside from the 3 month period that
kick-started the Iraq War, attempted
to engage Bashar Assad in the
kind of strategic dialogue that we
developed in the 1990s with his
father, particularly regarding issues
concerning Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, and
the Palestinian groups in Syria. Two
years ago, Secretary of State Colin
Powell went to Damascus to begin
high level dialogue, which I took part
in. At my last meeting with Bashar
el-Assad last January, I realized that
there was a major difference between
negotiating with the father and the
son. The strategic grasp of Hafez elAssad was such that, though he was
the toughest negotiator in the region,
once he made a decision, he could
be counted on. With his son Bashar,
there were too many ambiguities and
not enough decision-making.
The Hariri assassination, and the
Mehlis report which followed, has
put the whole situation on hold,
until the final findings of the report
are publicized in December. At that
point, the international community
will need to re-analyze its relations
with Syria.
Syria is currently at a very significant
crossroads. The path that Syria
chooses will have very serious
implications for Lebanon, Iraq,
Israel, and Turkey. In addition,
the possibilities for Arab-Israeli
peace could be influenced by the
implications of the Mehlis Report.
However, the strategic option of
peace remains.
The Achievements and
Failures of Israel-Syria
Peace Negotiations under
Rabin
By: Prof. Itamar Rabinovich
President, Tel Aviv University
and former Ambassador of
Israel to the U.S.
I would like to begin by discussing
Rabin’s initial view of the Syrian
peace track. During Rabin’s
election campaign of 1992, Rabin
emphasized the possibility of an
interim deal with the Palestinians,
but opposed the notion of an IsraeliSyrian peace deal and withdrawal
from the Golan.
If you visit the Golan Visitor’s Center
today, you will see excerpts from
Rabin’s pre-election statements, in
which he spoke against withdrawing
from the Golan. These statements
assumed great importance when
Rabin, as Prime Minister, initiated
negotiations with Syria. Obviously,
Rabin’s pre-election perspective
changed once he was elected.
The ‘hypothetical deposit’
On Secretary of State James Baker’s
last visit to Jerusalem after visiting
Damascus, he informed Rabin of
two significant facts:
1. Hafez el-Assad was ready to make
a peace agreement with Israel that
was comparable in terms to the
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
2. The Bush administration was
willing to give full backing to such
an agreement.
At this point Rabin became more
open to the idea of directly negotiating
with Syria. My mandate, as chief
negotiator on the Syrian track, was
to explore this possibility. For the next
year, the Prime Minister advanced the
peace process on two parallel tracks:
the Palestinian and the Syrian. After a
series of negotiating efforts between
Israel and Syria in Washington, in
early August, 1993, Secretary of
State Warren Christopher came to
Israel to meet Rabin, received Rabin’s
famous ‘hypothetical deposit’, and
continued to Damascus.
This ‘deposit’ was a hypothetical,
conditional willingness to withdraw
from the Golan in return for Syrian
willingness to sign a peace accord
modeled after the Israeli-Egyptian
agreement in terms of its nature,
structure, timetable, and willingness
to engage in public diplomacy that
would create a domestic climate
enabling Rabin to withdraw from
the Golan.
97
There are two issues I want to raise
with respect to the ‘deposit’:
1. There was a blatant contradiction
between Rabin’s pre-election
statements and the new hypothetical
reality. How would Rabin reconcile
these, should an agreement occur?
Rabin’s answer to this, which he told
President Clinton, was that, should
an agreement be reached, he would
take the issue to a referendum. He felt
that he needed to obtain legitimacy
for a move that he explicitly opposed
in his election campaign.
2. Given the monumental step of
the ‘hypothetical deposit’, why
was a peace deal not reached?
First and foremost, Hafez el-Assad
did not rise to the occasion. His
response to Rabin’s proposal was
disappointing. As a result, Rabin
decided that it was not worth it to
enter into a long, drawn-out set of
negotiations with the Syrians, and
chose to advance the Palestinian
front instead, putting Syria on the
backburner.
In a sense the failure of the
‘hypothetical deposit’ was the
turning point of the peace process
in the 1990s, as it determined that
the Palestinian front would be the
focus of the process, as opposed
to the Syrian.
98
Rabin was not the only Israeli Prime
Minister willing to withdraw from the
Golan Heights – Peres, Netanyahu,
and Barak were all willing to withdraw
from the region in exchange for
peace. All four of these leaders
preferred the Syrian option as a first
step to the Palestinian option. The
Clinton administration also preferred
the Syrian option to the Palestinian
option, as the first step. And yet,
throughout the 1990s, there was
no Syrian-Israeli deal.
ambivalent about peace. Though
he came to the conclusion that
a peace agreement with Israel was
advantageous, on another level, he
was not ready to make the significant
move.
2. The Soft superpower
Aside from Assad’s disappointing
response to Rabin’s ‘hypothetical
deposit’, there were a few other
significant factors that prevented
an agreement on this front:
The Clinton administration acted
as a ‘soft’ superpower. Experience
has shown that in our region we
need a broker to be tough and
manipulative in order to enable the
parties to come to an agreement.
During the Clinton years, there was
a lot of time, goodwill, and creativity
invested; however, the iron fist was
lacking.
1. The Ambivalence of the
leaders
3. Obstacles built into the
relationship
It is difficult to come to an agreement
when the negotiations are taking place
between ambivalent partners. Both
sides wanted an agreement, but both
sides were ambivalent and ambiguous
with respect to the required sacrifices
for an agreement. Rabin, though he
displayed the courage to make tough
decisions, was an ambivalent man. He
agonized upon these tough decisions
and was ambivalent about withdrawing
from the Golan – who would not have
difficulty, if not the former GOC of the
Northern Command? Assad was also
There were certain obstacles built
into the relationship that prevented
progress. For instance, if Assad
made a deal in 1993, he would
have to explain why he had refused
to make a deal during the Camp
David era.
The idea of making the same deal 15
years later, after wasting billions of
dollars and thousands of casualties,
would be difficult to explain.
Therefore, Assad needed to be able
to show that he had obtained more
than Sadat. However, that necessity,
made it difficult for any Israeli Prime
Minister to make a deal.
Though Assad was a great strategic
thinker, he failed to understand some
of the key elements of modern society
such as mass-communications,
public opinion, and democracy
– components of modern life that
Anwar Sadat understood instinctively.
He refused to understand that the
Israeli Prime Minster needed Assad’s
public support to help convince the
Israeli public of the benefits of leaving
the Golan Heights. Ambassador Indik
and I invested a month of work
convincing Foreign Minister Farouq
al-Shara to give an interview to Israeli
television, hoping that this would act
as an ice-breaker. A grudging alShara gave an interview in which he
spoke of the ‘original sin’ of Israel’s
creation – not a fantastic way to win
over public opinion.
of American mediation, in which
fundamental issues were explored
in great depth, were a new and
significant phenomenon. The basic
structure of an Israeli-Syrian deal was
created. Bilateral relationships and
the issue of Lebanon were all agreed
to, pending the core issues of the
actual withdrawal and normalization,
which eluded us.
The almost four years of negotiations
under Rabin were not wasted.
However, negotiations collapsed in
the summer of 1995 after the second
meeting between the countries’
Chiefs of Staff. When Rabin was
assassinated, we were in the midst
of efforts to revive negotiations.
However, the assassination, which
terminated so many other efforts,
temporarily terminated the attempts
to renew negotiations with Syria.
The achievements of the Rabin
years
Despite the disappointments, we
made significant achievements
during the Rabin years on the Syrian
track. Most importantly, we broke the
ice. Israel and Syria began to talk to
each other. Handshakes and drinking
coffee together were not realities
before the Rabin era. Face-to-face
meetings, always under the auspices
99
A Comparison between
the Syrian Strategic
Environments of the
1990s and Today
By: Prof. Shibley Telhami
Anwar Sadat chair for
Peace and Development
at the University of Maryland
Senior Fellow at the Saban
Center at the Brookings
Institute
When we hold conferences on
people of the stature of Rabin, it
focuses our attention on the important
theme of leadership. In political
science, we often underestimate the
role of leadership. In my field, we are
trained to learn from patterns of the
past, and attempt to project into the
future. This is one of the reasons that
we don’t generally predict dramatic
change very accurately. Every
juncture of change in history has
had a particular leader associated
with it. Since the role of leadership
has not been properly studied, the
major junctures of change that have
occurred in this region have not been
accurately predicted by academics.
100
The Strategic environment that
enables negotiations
At the end of the day, Rabin was a
leader, and his decisions were greater
than the historical forces surrounding
him.
Nonetheless, leaders do not operate
in a vacuum – a phenomenon that
political scientists can more accurately
describe. While all leaders will not react
similarly to strategic environments,
every leader must take into account
their strategic environment when
making decisions.
I will try to describe the strategic
environment in which Rabin operated
vis-à-vis Syria, and to contrast this with
the strategic environment in which
Israel’s leadership operates today.
Henry Kissinger was quoted as
saying, “When I ask Rabin after the
1973 War to compromise, he said, ‘I
don’t want to compromise when I’m
weak, so help me be strong.’ When
I came back to him after making
him strong, he answered, ‘Why do I
have to compromise now that I am
strong?’”
This is a very powerful strategic
dilemma, and is the psychological
state that guides leaders’ approaches
to negotiations. But Rabin did
compromise in the end, with
respect to his willingness to enter into
negotiation with Syria. How can we
explain this? To my mind, the space
for negotiations is born somewhere
between positions of strength and
weakness. Rabin clearly believed that
Israel must negotiate from a position of
strength – a view shared by, I think, all
Israeli Prime Ministers. One negotiates
when one has the upper hand, but
also when one feels the heat of an
uncomfortable status quo – this is the
space that creates negotiations.
The Israeli-Syrian strategic
environment leading to
negotiations
It is essential to look at the strategic
environment of Israeli-Syrian relations
in the 1990s to understand what
brought on negotiations. Syria
approached negotiations from a fairly
strong strategic position, despite the
fact that it had recently lost its key
supporter – the Soviet Union.
Syrian policy, throughout the 1980s
and before, had been largely based
on the relationship between Syria and
the Soviet Union. However, there were
two factors that gave Syria an edge
following the Iraq War:
1. Syria had joined the coalition in the
Iraq War and actually sent troops to
Iraq. In participating, Syria legitimized
the position taken by Saudi Arabia. In
addition, Syria’s participation, as well
as other European and Arab countries’
participation, was hinged on the U.S.
promise to help create a new Middle
East reality after the war. Therefore,
Syria’s role in the war gave it an edge
vis-à-vis the U.S. regarding the postwar environment.
2. While in the 1980s, Israel’s presence
in Lebanon allowed it to apply pressure
to Syria, by the 1990s, Israel’s
presence in Lebanon was helping
Syria apply pressure to Israel.
Attacks in Lebanon became the ‘hotbutton’ that Syria could push when
required. The conventional wisdom
in Israel at the time was that Israel
could neither unilaterally pull out of
Lebanon, nor make a peace deal
with Lebanon without a prior deal
with Syria. Therefore, the Lebanon
situation gave Syria an edge. Thus,
though Israel clearly had the military
upper hand, Syria had the advantage
of its post-war improved diplomatic
standing, and the ability to apply
heat in Lebanon when necessary.
Therefore, a space was created that
allowed for negotiations, which did not
previously exist.
Syria’s current problematic
strategic situation
When contrasting the situation in
the 1990s with the current strategic
environment, we find major differences.
First, Lebanon can no longer be used
by Syria as a source for pressuring
Israel. In fact, today the opposite is
true, particularly after Syria’s recent
withdrawal. Lebanon has turned into
a pressure point against Syria.
The U.S.A. no longer feels obligated
to assist Syria with respect the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Syria
cooperated with America for a short
period after 9/11, providing it with
essential intelligence information, U.S.
- Syrian relations changed dramatically
over the issue of Iraq. Today, American
foreign policy views Syria as a target,
distinct from the issue of the IsraelSyria conflict. Syria is currently being
heavily pressured by the U.S., without
an independent source of backing.
Within the Arab World, public opinion
is split regarding Syria. Arab public
opinion supports Syria’s relationship
with Hezbollah and its position vis-à-vis
Iraq, in part, due to the Arab World’s
current antagonism towards America’s
Iraq efforts. However, Arab public
opinion has condemned Syria on the
issue of Rafik Hariri’s assassination.
This was not a popular assassination,
particularly among the Saudis.
It is essential to understand to what
types of international pressure Syria
actually responds. Syria’s rapid pullout
from Lebanon, following international
demands, did not occur primarily
due to American pressure. Syria
has always been able to withstand
American pressure, as long as Europe
and Arab public opinion were on its
side. However, the pressure regarding
the Lebanon pullout, which included a
UN resolution and a French-American
alliance, was too much for Syria. In
addition, Syria failed to translate Arab
anger with America into Arab public
opinion support on this issue.
The implications of chaos in
Syria
I want to conclude with a few words
about America’s future Syrian foreign
policy. America no longer accepts
the claim that it must support rogue
régimes out of fear that the only other
option is an Islamic fundamentalist
government.
However, I believe that it would
be a big mistake for America to
encourage instability and anarchy
in Syria, hoping that it would lead
to a régime change. We have seen
in the past that Syria responds to
deterrence and has red lines that
it fears crossing. The same is true
for Hezbollah, as well. For example,
Hezbollah has not carried out
attacks in the heart of Israel, but in
border areas only – this seems to be
a red line that Syria/Hezbollah was
101
deterred from crossing. However,
if chaos were to bring Al-Qaeda
related groups to Syria, deterrence
capabilities would be lost. Al-Qaeda
does not respond to deterrence, but
is restrained only by the limits of its
own capabilities. Therefore, I believe
that the issue of provoking régime
change requires far more analysis,
consideration, and reflection than
we have been hearing in the public
discourse.
Rabin and Peace with
Syria: the Transformation
of a Leader
By: Prof. Moshe Maoz
Dean of Middle Eastern
Studies Department, Netanya
Academic College
Nowadays, we hear many figures
who have been involved in the
peace process claim that, had Rabin
not been assassinated, there would
be peace between Israel and the
Palestinians. I even heard such a claim
from Arafat a few months before he
died, due to the trust that Arafat felt
for Rabin.
Rabin’s view of the Syrian track
If this is the case regarding the
Palestinians, I believe it is even more
certain regarding Syria. Rabin himself
said in 1994 that he trusted Assad
more than he trusted Arafat, and that
the Syrian track was simpler than the
Palestinian track. He even claimed that
the Syrian régime was more stable
than the Egyptian régime.
Rabin did not attempt to make
peace with Syria due to some kind
of revelation from the Almighty,
as President Bush claims to have
had regarding the establishment of
102
a Palestinian state and the need to
attack Iraq. He attempted to make
peace due to realistic, strategic
reasons, such as the changed status
of the Soviet Union and the aftermath
of the first Gulf War.
The unpopularity of returning
the Golan
Essentially, Rabin was not an
ideologue. He was a pragmatist
who made choices due to strategic
analysis. Rabin, as has been stated,
was very brave in going against the
Israeli consensus. At the time, 70%
of the public was against giving back
the Golan to Syria. The Israeli public’s
position until today is that they are for
peace with Syria, but against returning
the Golan.
Rabin was under a very vicious
attack from the right wing when he
hinted that he was willing to give
up the Golan for peace. During
fierce demonstrations against him,
Rabin was labeled as a traitor who
had deceived the people and was
endangering Israel’s security and
water resources. Even our current
Prime Minister Sharon, who has been
recently labeled a traitor, has accused
previous prime ministers, including
Rabin, of endangering Israel’s security
and water resources by negotiating
with Syria for the Golan Heights.
Rabin was ready to withdraw to
the 1967 lines on the Golan for
real, normalized peace. Peres and
Netanyahu were also willing to make
this full withdrawal, while it is unclear
how far Barak was willing to go.
Rabin’s earlier view of peace
with Syria
The revolutionary change that Rabin
went through when he became
Prime Minister the second time is
truly intriguing. Only a few years
previously, Rabin was vociferously
against returning the Golan even for
peace when he was Defense Minister.
As Defense Minister, he claimed that
he preferred the Golan without peace
with Syria, rather than peace with Syria
without the Golan. In 1989, Rabin and
Prime Minister Shamir presented
a plan for peace with Jordan and
with the Palestinians, but not with
Syria. Rabin said at the time that he
did not regard Assad to be a partner
for peace.
In 1991, just one year before he
became Prime Minister, Rabin again
repeated that Israel should not
make peace with Syria, due to the
importance of the Golan. He even went
as far as threatening Syria, claiming
that if Syria were to use groundto-ground missiles against Tel Aviv,
Damascus would be destroyed.
Just before the 1967 war, as Chief
of Staff, Rabin actually threatened
to topple the Syrian régime. These
types of threats can be seen as one
of the contributing factors leading to
the deterioration of relations leading
up to the Six Day War.
The transformation of a leader
With all of this in mind, it is amazing
that Rabin underwent such a drastic
transformation in his views of Syria.
This transformation, I believe, displays
the difference between a politician and
a statesman, between a politician and
a leader. A statesman is somebody
who leads his people, and is not led
by public sentiment.
he wrote in his biography, was within
reach. He withdrew from peace
negotiations due to public opinion.
I would like to conclude that it
wasn’t just a change in the strategic
circumstances that brought upon
Rabin’s change in thinking regarding
Syria. It was also his leadership and
courage that allowed him to pursue
potentially unpopular moves.
As Ataturk used to say, which was
repeated by Ben Gurion, ‘I do not care
what the people wish for. I know what
the people need.’
I want to compare Rabin’s leadership
to that of the Prime Minister before
him, Yitzhak Shamir.
When, at the Madrid Conference
in 1991, Shamir agreed to peace
with Syria but refused to discuss the
Golan Heights, due to public opinion
concerns, Shamir claimed that UN
resolution 242 spoke of ‘territories’,
not ‘The Territories’, meaning that not
all occupied territories would have to
be returned for peace. He claimed
that we had already returned the Sinai
which should suffice as ‘territories’.
Even Barak reneged on peace with
Syria, which according to Clinton, as
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The Problematic Approach
of Bashar el-Assad
By: Prof. Eyal Zisser
Head of the department of
Middle Eastern and African
History, Tel Aviv University
I would like to address the current
situation between Israel and Syria
and prospects for the resumption
of negotiations under Ariel Sharon
and Bashar el-Assad.
Two major events happened in our
region in the last week. The first
was Bashar el-Assad’s speech at
Damascus University, in which he told
his audience that Israel, in collusion
with an American conspiracy, is
behind the assassination of Rafik
Hariri. According to Assad, this is
all part of a massive American-Israeli
conspiracy to take over Iraq, achieve a
deal with the Palestinians with heavy
Palestinian concessions, bring about
régime change in Lebanon, disarm
Hezbollah, settle Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon, and weaken Syria.
It is my impression that Assad really
believes that he is facing some kind
of Western conspiracy or plot. We
ought to assume that these are, in
fact, Assad’s beliefs, when trying to
understand his actions.
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The second major event in Israel last
week was the Phil Collins concert in
Tel Aviv, and the fact that he came
directly from Beirut, where he also
gave a concert. This shows us
another aspect of the changes taking
place in Lebanon. We, mistakenly,
tend to think of Lebanon only in
terms of Hezbollah; however, there
are strong Western leaning forces
there, as well. It is also important
to note that Bashar el-Assad did
not attend the concert in Beirut,
though we know from an interview
in 1999, before he was president,
that Assad admires Phil Collins.
Perhaps his changing opinion
about Phil Collins indicates the major
difference between Bashar el-Assad
of the 1990s, and the hopes that we
pinned to him, and Bashar el-Assad
of today.
The disaster of Bashar’s rule
When looking back at the five years
of Bashar’s rule, it appears that he
succeeded in destroying everything
that his father created during his
30 year reign. Syria is clearly not a
stable country today, as it has been
witness to several incidents at the
hands of extremist Islam. Bashar
succeeded in destroying Syria’s
special relationship with France, and
with Europe in general. He damaged
Syria’s relationship with Egypt and
Saudi Arabia. In addition, he was
forced to withdraw from Lebanon
and lost the trust of the Americans
of the peace camp in Israel. While
in the 1990s, there were many
Israelis who argued for the logic of
negotiating with Syria, this pro-Syria
peace camp is virtually non-existent
today. In Israel, nobody listens to
Bashar’s calls for the resumption of
negotiations.
When he came to power, there were
inflated expectations that the young
leader would bring about reform and
change – the only question was
how far these reforms would go.
Regarding the Israel-Syria peace
track, there was an assumption
that negotiations would resume
and that peace could be achieved.
In the eyes of many, there was a clear
difference between Bashar and his
father, as he gave the impression of
understanding that the status quo
was not tenable. It was thought that
Bashar may be willing to ‘smile’ for
the sake of mobilizing Israeli public
opinion, where his father could not.
However, we saw no positive change
or reform on the ground, but only a
resumption of Hezbollah attacks with
the blessing of Syria, support of terror
groups, and extreme declarations
by Assad denying Israel’s right to
exist.
Questions have been raised about
whether Bashar el-Assad or the
Baath régime in general will survive.
Over the last year, it appears that,
due to his mistakes in Lebanon and
in dealing with America and Europe,
he is losing the ability to rule over his
own country.
The impossibility of resuming
negotiations
Bashar el-Assad has continually, over
the last five years, has continually
called for a resumption of peace talks
with Israel. The framework and legacy
of peace talks have been handed
down to us by Rabin and Hafez elAssad. However, there are currently
no prospects for the resumption of
such negotiations because there is no
Syrian partner or Israeli partner. It is
unclear how serious Assad actually is,
or whether he has the required power
or will to actually make peace.
In addition, Israel is currently interested
in issues other than negotiating with
Syria. Israel no longer sees Syria as
a threat or the key to the question
of Hezbollah, and therefore sees no
need to offer the weakened country
concessions. In addition, there is no
American mediating partner for such
talks, a role that has always been
crucial for the Israel-Syria track.
It appears that Bashar’s calls for
a resumption of negotiations is not
meant for the purpose of achieving
peace, but is for the purpose of
resuming some level of dialogue with
Washington. I doubt very much that
he will achieve this goal.
I believe that there is a certain amount
of logic behind Bashar’s moves.
However, his logic appears more
similar to that of Saddam Hussein,
than to his father’s, who knew when
to refrain from taking unnecessary
risks. Bashar, in confronting America,
is taking a calculated risk that he may
pay for, just as Saddam did. In a way,
he is following what his father did in
the 1980s in Lebanon, when Syrian
forces clashed with American forces;
however, the situation today is far
different today than it was then.
When speaking with my Syrian
colleagues, we all agree that an
opportunity was missed in the 1990s.
My Syrian colleagues believe that
many opportunities to improve life
in Syria, beyond a peace agreement
with Israel, were missed during the
last ten years of Hafez el-Assad’s
rule. Unfortunately, I fear that, with
Bashar’s current policy, even more
opportunities to improve Syria’s
standing and improve the life of
Syrians will be missed.
105
Building a Bridge over Troubled
Water: Water in the Middle East
Opening Remarks
By: Michael Stark, chair of
the panel, President,
Veolia Water U.S.
It is an honor for my company,
Veolia Water and me to chair this
session. The sessions yesterday and
this morning set out to highlight the
sincere belief of all those who live in
this region of the world that peace is
not simply the preferred option but
also a necessity.
This session, “a bridge over troubled
water” is centered on life’s most basic
resource. Without water we cannot
sustain health, an economy, industry
or life itself. Water can be either a
source of fundamental divisiveness
or an instrument of peace.
Around the world, water transcends
borders between villages, towns,
cities and nations. Local and national
governmental agencies routinely
communicate and work together to
establish institutional frameworks and
agreements on the management of
that precious resource.
These agreements are often complex
and ongoing in their development.
Where water scarcity or other
limitations exist, cooperation is more
difficult to establish. Where political
106
tensions exist, these difficulties quite
naturally escalate. This morning and
early this afternoon, we will hear from
a distinguished panel of public and
private-sector experts who have been
involved in the management of natural
resources, especially the management
of water.
In the Middle East, as in the rest of the
world, various water resources cross
borders and boundaries. Jordan,
Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq and
Egypt share rivers, the Red Sea, and
the vast Mediterranean Sea.
Within these countries there are
definable opportunities to establish
regional water facilities or networks
that can provide water to the areas
with scarce or seasonally-impacted
water resources.
New technologies are being applied
daily in the water industry. These
technologies, when harnessed, could
help foster beneficial cooperation.
Yet the impacted countries have little
or no international law addressing
specific water and wastewater
issues and conduct only limited
discussions for exploring mutually
beneficial cooperation. For the sake
of humanity’s most basic need – which
is water – there is an opportunity to set
aside political differences by building
water-treatment facilities, expanding
and/or rerouting networks and even
establishing new pipelines to transport
water from one location to the next.
These are the issues we shall discuss
today. These represent a “bridge over
troubled waters”.
Joint Projects: the Only
Solution to Limited Water
Resources
By: Binyamin Ben Eliezer
Minister of National
Infrastructure, Israel
The issue of water is a very major
component in our relationship with
our neighbors. Water is one of the
fundamental issues, along with
security, borders, refugees, and other
issues, that face all of us attempting
to solve regional conflict.
Today's water technology situation
is far different from in the past. There
are means for artificially producing
potable water at reasonable costs,
the most popular being desalination.
With new technological capabilities,
water, instead of being a source
of tension, should be a source of
cooperation and an impetus for
advance other related issues. The last
water-related agreements were signed
over 10 years ago, just prior to the
assassination of Rabin. Multi-lateral
and bilateral agreements regarding
water were agreed upon within the
framework of both the Oslo II Interim
Accord with the Palestinians and the
permanent peace treaty signed with
Jordan. Bilateral committees have
been formed to implement these
agreements, which have not ceased
their activities since their formation.
Even at the height of Intifada terrorism,
joint Israeli-Palestinian teams held
ongoing meetings on water issues.
The Jordanian-Israeli bilateral teams
have promoted joint projects beyond
our original expectations, when the
agreements were signed.
Due to the scarcity of water in the
region, all parties in the region must
come to understandings that, despite
political disputes, we must abstain
from damaging one another's water
systems. Every year, broad multi-lateral
activities are gaining momentum.
Countries that stand to gain from large
scale water projects must encourage
donor nations to participate in these
efforts. Joint projects strengthen the
ties between the participants and act
as confidence-building measures as
part of the process of normalization.
Natural resources in our region are
capable of supplying us with only
a small quantity of water – only
40% of the lowest critical amount
required for minimum human
welfare, economic activity and food
requirements, as determined by
the UN. In another 20 years, our
region's natural resources will be
able to supply urban consumption
requirements only. In order to initiate
sustainable development of natural
water resource, we will need to create
desalination projects within the scope
of at least 800 million cubic meters of
water annually.
The deteriorating quantity and
quality of water
Our natural water resources are
decreasing both in quantity and
quality. Global warming is causing a
decrease in natural water resources
both regionally and globally. In
addition, pollution, as a result of
unceasing human activity over the
last century, has decreased our
water quality significantly. Abuse of
natural resources has resulted in salt
accumulation in the western area of
Israel. Climatic instability and long
drought periods have hampered our
abilities to exploit water resources
in a sustainable manner. Despite
these unfavorable circumstances,
countries in the region have been
able to maintain a reasonable level
of human welfare and development.
However, we have yet to achieve
adequate water supply and sanitation
levels for all in the region, particularly
in the Palestinian Authority.
The necessity of joint
cooperative projects
In our region, we cannot afford to try
to divide water supplies according
107
to state, when the natural sources
are shared. The geographic water
situation of shared resources required
joint cooperative projects. The idea
of exploiting water as a means for
cooperation was expressed by
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
when he said, "The water problems
of the world need not be a cause of
tension, they can also be a catalyst
for cooperation."
The spirit of the late Yitzhak Rabin
is embodied in the section of the
accords he signed regarding water
cooperation. A water engineer
by trade, Rabin understood the
importance of cooperation, of creating
additional water sources, of sustaining
existing resources and of preventing
harm to existing water systems – all
features of the peace agreements that
Rabin initiated.
In the past few years, Israel has
intensified its efforts to explore new
sources, increase its water supply
and to satisfy not only its own water
needs, but also those of its neighbors.
For example, in March, 2004, Israel
and Turkey signed an agreement
which will supply 50 million cubic
meters annually for the next 20 years.
In addition, we are currently focusing
on the joint project called the 'Peace
Canal', which will transport 200 billion
cubic meters of water annually from
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the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. This
water will be desalinated near the
Dead Sea and create 800 million
cubic meters of potable water that
will serve Jordan, Israel, and the
Palestinian Authority. This project is
the realization of a vision initiated by
the late Yitzhak Rabin – the ultimate
pathfinder in search for a solution
to our regional conflict. May his
memory be blessed and serve as
a guide to us all. This plan has
been on the agenda for a long time;
unfortunately, from 1994 until today,
no serious assessment of this project
has been made. This pipeline, it is
assumed can provide us with 800
million cubic meters annually.
The Need for a New
Water Strategy
By: Prof. Avishay Braverman
President, Ben Gurion University
When working for the World Bank,
I led a study with top players and
researchers in the field of water in
Israel to assess the water situation
west of the Jordan River.
Dr. Munther Haddadin was asked to
lead a similar study in Jordan. We
came to the following conclusions:
• We found that the land west of the
Jordan contains approximately 10 or
11 million people, while the water
supply is approximately 2 billion
cubic meters.
• We predicted that by the year 2040,
the holy land will hold approximately
20 million people. If we assume
that the Palestinian consumption
level should equal the Israeli level,
for the point of view of equality, by
2020, we will face a shortage of
approximately 2 billion cubic meters
in the holy land.
• Dr. Munther Haddadin found that in
Jordan, they will be facing a shortage
of 1.5 billion cubic meters of water
by 2040.
With this in mind, we needed to
assess a few possibilities. We actually
considered the possibility of getting
rid of agriculture due to the vast water
needs of agriculture. However, we
declined this proposition because we
learned that the waste water created
by the growing urban population,
which is currently destroying the
aquifer of the Mediterranean, can
be used constructively by purifying
it for specific agricultural projects in
the Negev and Galilee regions. We
deduced that purifying this waste
water would provide approximately
1 billion cubic meters.
Beyond this, we have two options:
importing water or desalinating water.
Though we import a small amount of
water from Turkey – 50 million cubic
meters – we decided that our best
bet was to advance desalination
projects through canals.
Water desalination possibilities
There are currently a few different
canal solutions. For many reasons,
Shimon Peres and Prince Hassan
of Jordan decided to push for the
'Peace Canal' solution, which is to
run from the Red Sea to the Dead
Sea. In order to implement this
project, we must assess the current
state of the Dead Sea and the SyrianAfrican fault line. The Dead Sea,
which was once 392 meters below
sea level has sunk to 416 meters,
and is declining. It is essential that
this type of study be conducted as
soon as possible so that the canal
project can be implemented. We
considered the option of a Syrian
Canal, which has been put on hold
for obvious reasons. However, when
there is peace between Israel and
Syria, water need not be the dividing
point. Syria has enough water
sources in its north connected to a
national water carrier, in addition to
the water sources near the Jordan
River to allow for significant water
cooperation.
The Middle East – the next
water technology hub
I have heard people quoted as saying
that water is an excuse for war. As
Rabin used to say: this is nonsense.
Basically, there is no reason to fight
over water. I believe that a major
water initiative including desalination
can alter this area. It has to be done
by serious professionals, with minimal
obstacles. Cooperation in this field
between Israel, Jordan and Palestine
is a must.
At the height of the Intifada we built
the biggest water institute in the
Middle East at Sde Boker, all the
time working with the Palestinian
109
and Jordanian Water Commissioners.
We never violated water agreements,
even during the height of violence.
However, the situation in Gaza, in
which waste water is destroying
the aquifer, is very disturbing and
must be stopped. The World Bank
must take immediate action on this
disaster
I believe that Israel has to make
a strategic decision to become a
hub for water technology. We have
so many young, eager engineers
and water-technologists that can
shape a new water situation for the
region. We are starting a major fund
for investment in the field of water.
If the government sets long term
water goals and works together with
international corporations, water can
become a big business for Israel and
for the region. This is achievable, if
we can change the political system
to work for long term solutions.
110
A Brief History of
Regional Water Conflict
& Possible Future
Cooperation
By: Dr. Munther Haddadin
Former Minister of Water,
Jordan
My speech is guided by the title
of this panel 'Building a Bridge over
Troubled Water'. These waters
have been very troubled. These
troubles started at the same time
as the troubles over land resources
began.
Water conflict in the Ottoman
and British Mandate periods
Perhaps the modern history of
water disputes began when the first
Zionist Congress of 1897 dispatched
a water engineer to survey the
water resources of Palestine, and
determine how best to utilize water
resources for the benefit of Jewish
settlement in the holy land. The
engineer submitted his report to
the congress. He also submitted
a letter to a reverend gentleman in
the Anglican Church, asking him to
urge the King of England to purchase
lands in the Jordan Valley at a cheap
price from the Ottoman Sultan. The
engineer would then implement the
water projects that he had devised
and England could sell the land to
Jewish settlers for a higher price,
enabling Great Britain to offset the
expenses of the purchase and of the
Boer War in South Africa.
The pursuit of water resources by
the Zionist enterprise continued,
as in 1919, the Zionist Congress
dispatched a Jewish engineer named
Haiim Rotenberg to Palestine. He
conducted a detailed study in which
he proposed producing energy from
the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers. He
obtained a license, as a private
individual, from the British Mandate
to advance his power generation
projects on the Yarmouk, Jordan,
and Yarkon Rivers, and to dry up the
Hula swamps – all for the purpose to
putting a foothold in these regions.
During the British Mandate, Jewish
water initiatives increased in scope,
including the establishment of
Mekorot in 1932. There was much
more Jewish activity on water
resources than the Arabs were
aware of, until the first Palestinian
Intifada of 1936. After six months
of turbulence, a Royal Commission
intervened, eventually recommending
the partition of Palestine, and a link
between the Palestinian state and
Trans-Jordan. This proclamation
caused the Jordanians to investigate
whether the area had enough water
resources to support two states. At
the same time, the Jewish Agency
commissioned an American engineer
to investigate the same issue. At this
point, both sides started competing
for the same Jordan Valley water
resources for their future states and
future settlements.
not on the political level by the Arab
League or by Egypt.
The U.S. supported Israel's National
Water Carrier project and Jordan's
canal project in Jordan Valley
monetarily, on the condition that
the sides agreed to only drawing
the amount of water stipulated in the
American envoy's plan of 1955.
Water conflict after Israel was
given statehood
When Israel started taking large
amounts of the Jordan River water
supply for the National Water Carrier
in the mid-1960s, President Nasser
initiated an Arab Summit, where it
was decided to divert waters from
the Jordan River in the Jordan.
It has been mistakenly proposed that
the 1967 War was a war over water.
This was not the case. Documents
in the U.S. and Israeli archives can
testify to this. However, in 1979,
water issues almost led to an allout armed conflict between Israel
and Jordan, in which forces were
mobilized and facing each other,
only divided by the Yarmouk River.
The United States, with the help of
your truly, helped avert a war over
water.
Once Israel was declared a state,
Israel updated its plans and began
building the National Water Carrier,
which was built from the south
towards the Jordan River in the north.
When the water carrier approached
Syrian water diversion sites, conflict
ensued with the Syrians, including
armed clashes.
The U.S., attempting to become
the superpower of the Middle
East, dispatched an envoy, led by
Ambassador Johnston, to create
a water sharing plan between the
conflicting states. The envoy arrived
in the area on October 12, 1953 and
proceeded to shuttle between the
Arab states and Israel for a period of
two years. This envoy came up with a
general plan for sharing the region's
water and developing the Jordan
valley. This plan was accepted on
the technical level by all parties, but
When the Israelis came up with their
MED plan to link the Dead Sea to
the Mediterranean, we in Jordan, in
attempting to compete with Israel
over water resources, thought of
the idea of connecting the Dead Sea
with the Red Sea. When competition
between the Israeli and Jordanian
initiatives increased, the UN sent
three experts who came to talk both
to the Israelis and Jordanians. One
of the UN representatives asked me
about the damage the Israeli project
would cause Jordan. I answered him
that if the Dead Sea was raised back
to its previous levels, as Israel had
intended in their MED plan, the new
water level would damage a nearby
aquifer that yields approximately 15
cubic meters per year.
Cooperative plans for water
resources – a positive sum game
Competition over control of the Dead
Sea continued until February, 1994,
when I had the honor of presenting
to the tri-lateral committee of
the Jordan-Israel peace talks an
integrated development plan for
the Jordan Rift Valley, which was to
include the participation of Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt,
and Saudi Arabia. The plan was
to enable seven states, which have
generally been in conflict – primarily
with Israel, but also amongst each
other – to cooperate in developing
and preserving common water
interests.
Dennis Ross, highly impressed by my
presentation, said, "This is the first
111
time, since I have been involved in
the peace process, that I have heard
something with meat on it."
This marked the birth of the 'RedDead Canal', which was later included
as a separate article in the JordanIsrael peace treaty. I will have to
dispute Binyamin Eliezer's comment
that the late Yitzhak Rabin envisioned
this canal – it has and always will be
a Jordanian vision.
If Israel continues to monopolize water
supplies in the Jordan Rift Valley and
the three underground aquifers that
are shared with the Palestinians, it
will not have enough water to meet
all of its water requirements, in terms
of reaching a water supply to level to
balance its food commodities imports
and exports.
The same concept would apply if
somehow Jordan or the Palestinians
would monopolize water resources.
Therefore, no good can come from
monopolization at the hands of a
single party. However, much good can
come of each party within the Jordan,
Palestine, Israel triangle sharing
resources equally and cooperating
to produce a positive-sum game,
instead of the competitive approach
which produces a negative-sum
game, in which the gain of one party
is the loss of the other.
'Green water', the water captured
by soil after rain fall through surface
112
tension (as opposed to pumped
ground water), is another aspect of
water supply that requires cooperation.
This water supports the production
of food and the rain-fed agriculture.
I assessed this topic in Jordan and
found that this 'green water' is in as
high a quantity as the 'blue water'
– the pumped ground water and
underground water we all talk about.
Therefore, we must cooperate to use
green water resource to up with better
production conditions in a variety of
land areas. I would like to conclude
by saying that the vision of Rabin
paved the way for the understandings
created between Jordan and Israel.
I managed the water conflict with
Israel for years, and negotiated the
new phase of water cooperation, and
witnessed first hand the importance
of Rabin's vision.
Our ability to agree on water issues
came when Rabin said to King Hussein
in my presence, "Your majesty, I am
not interested in one square inch of
your territory, nor one drop of your
water." That stand, taken by Rabin
paved the way for understandings on
water resources and on land issues.
God bless his soul, and I wish that the
next government of Israel would adopt
the same vision that the late Rabin
had, so that the current conflicts with
Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians
can be resolved.
Water: A tool for Peace
By: Dr. Alfred Abed Rabbo
Water and Soil Environmental
Research Unit (WSERU),
Bethlehem University
Worldwide, the availability of
adequate freshwater has become a
limiting factor for human development.
The Middle East, as a region, is
characterized by scarce water
resources and rapid population growth
- making it all the more essential that
its nations cooperate to ensure that
freshwater solutions are found for all
citizens.
In the more humid regions of the area,
the central concern regarding water
is the deterioration of its quality due
to pollutants that have infected water
sources. Conversely, in semi-arid and
arid regions, water scarcity has always
been the dominant problem.
Ecosystem disruption due to overexploitation of both surface and ground
waters, limited ground water renewal
and surface drainage fluctuation
due to changing land usage have all
resulted, not only in the deterioration of
the water, but also in salinity build-up
in soil and water. These factors, when
combined, have had drastic effects on
fresh water availability in the region.
With water scarcity becoming more
acute, the control of water resources
has become an increasingly significant
feature of the Arab-Israel conflict,
in general, and of the ongoing
Palestinian -Israeli struggle, in
particular. In fact, at the outset of the
peace process initiated in the 1990s,
water was recognized as one of the
most significant final status issues.
Guaranteeing adequate quantities
and quality of water, particularly on
the Palestinian side, has been one of
the most sensitive items on the agenda
for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
Not a scientific issue
exclusively
Water deprivation cannot be alleviated
solely by engineering and scientific
solutions – its human, political, and
cultural aspects must be dealt with as
well. The current water allocation policy
in Israel and the Palestinian territories
derives from a complex mix of sociocultural pressures. Water is viewed
as a strategic, as well as economic,
commodity for both nations, and has
significant political ramifications. The
relationship between water security
and socio-economic development is
vitally important, particularly for the
Palestinians.
The Bilateral Interim Accord signed in
Washington in 1995 (popularly known
as Oslo II), an attempt to push the
Israel-Palestinian conflict towards
a resolution, attempted to tackle
water scarcity issues. Article 40 of
this document deals extensively with
water supply, and wastewater removal
and treatment issues.
Article 40 and its appendices defined
water allocations between Israelis
and Palestinians. In the opening
paragraph of Article 40, Palestinian
negotiators managed to receive a clear
acknowledgement that they had rights
to water. The agreement allowed the
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) to
accept foreign grants for drilling and
for improving their water infrastructure.
For the Palestinians, regaining control
or being given shared management of
the aquifers under its territory was an
important step in becoming a viable
state. The water-related aspect of
Oslo II was also essential to the
development of cooperative projects
between the two nations, as Israeli,
Palestinian and other scientists and
engineers cooperated to find ways
to satisfactorily co-manage the
aquifers.
The acknowledgement of water
rights
also vital to providing Palestinians
with access to workplaces within
their own territory (as opposed to
113
having to work as day laborers in
Israel), essential for developing an
economy that would allow for stable
livelihoods and food security.
Lack of coherent
implementation
Unfortunately, actuall implementation
of Palestinian water rights, in terms of
a coherent policy, has been limited. In
the West Bank, political maneuvering
has proven to be a prime force
governing water use and allocation
and has had haphazard affects on
patterns of groundwater degradation
and resource depletion. It is essential
that Palestinian access to water and
waste water services translate into
an improvement in the coverage and
quality of water networks, especially
for households that currently have
no connection to water networks.
Currently, approximately 88% of the
Palestinian population in the West
Bank is connected to the water
network; however, this translates,
into approximately 55% of towns
and village, only.
Although water security is closely
related to socioeconomic development,
which is highly influenced by access
to workplaces, there is no necessary
linkage between access to local water
supplies and food security. Food
security depends much more heavily
114
on access to trade avenues that allow
for food import.
Since the beginning of the Oslo
process, Palestinian politicians have
more vigorously fought for water rights
and water allocation than for food
security. However, it soon became
apparent that there were serious
problems regarding the sustainability
of the West Bank aquifers.
Food and water self-sufficiency
In the end, Palestine will gain
water self-sufficiency and food
self-sufficiency only once it gains
independence through a fair deal at
the negotiating table. However, "selfsufficiency" is a loaded term that must
be fully understood. Self-sufficiency
implies that the Palestinians need to
achieve a balanced water and food
budget through trade.
Food self-sufficiency is not directly
dependent on locally available water
resources, but is more closely related
to Palestinian water management,
raising important questions regarding
the perceived relationship between
agriculture, food security and water
use. Therefore, the equivalence
often attributed to “self sufficiency”
and “water security” must be more
thoroughly examined.
Agricultural water strategy
The purpose of raising these questions
is to ignite a serious debate that will
allow the Palestinians to legislate
improved water policies, reforms, and
priorities. Irrigation agriculture must be
a key component of overall Palestinian
agricultural water strategy.
Overall targets, in terms of water
networks' resources and costs
required for water withdrawal for
irrigation agriculture, must coincide
with Palestinian water agricultural
strategy as a whole.
In addition, Palestinian policy makers
must engage in a productive debate,
and balance the necessary trade-off
between its agriculture water strategy
on the one hand and its municipal and
industrial water needs on the other.
Management challenges facing water
policy makers in Palestine demand
a pragmatic approach to policy
implementation that introduces reforms
and complies with them.
This approach must be intricately
linked with wider long-term social and
economic change. Water management
by regulatory bodies such as the PWA
(Palestinian Water Authority) must
coordinate their approach with other
Palestinian ministries and NGOs.
Water management reforms
Prioritization of water uses is an
essential aspect of Palestinian
economic self-sufficiency. Palestinian
policy makers must implement, in a
step-by-step manner, conventional
reforms tailored to both hydrogeological and socio-economic
conditions. A new system that defines
ground water abstraction rights is
badly needed. The Palestinians must
establish an approach that implements
water rights and legislates water
management laws. This approach
would provide a constructive platform
for building a consensus around
water issues and raising awareness
of the importance of proper water
management. Finally, the Palestinians'
water legislation must allocate water
among agricultural, municipal and
industrial sectors in way that can
cope with drought situations.
Sewage management presents
another set of issues that must
be dealt with by Palestinian policy
makers. Several towns, particularly
rural areas, are still not connected to
public sewage networks and a general
shortage of sewage plants exists.
Developing waste water collection
and treatment plants is essential for
protecting the environment and for
using recycled water for a number
of uses.
Other methods for water conservation
and distribution include rainwater
harvesting, a wider use of springs
and water tankering. Treating
wastewater at appropriate standards
for non-domestic uses is essential for
agriculture and industry. However,
irrigation practices have a long way
to progress - in the southern West
Bank, for example, only 2% of
agricultural land is irrigated. In that
area, water resources are insufficient
for the development of industry and
agriculture, and are inadequate to
supply domestic needs. Through
American intervention, Israeli and
Palestinian politicians eventually
resolved the apparently intractable
problems regarding the establishment
of a wastewater treatment plant in
the southern West Bank. The plant's
construction was to begin in the
autumn of 2000, but has unfortunately
been delayed, primarily due to the
volatile situation existed in the area.
completely vague context. The Road
Map must commit the parties involved
to resolve the continuing dispute over
water. Although the Road Map's
supposed improvement over Oslo is
the use of "performance parameters"
to enable fair judgment of each side's
fulfillment of obligations at various
stages, there are no such parameters
for measuring the fulfillment of waterrelated obligations.
In spite of the hostility, lack of trust
and uncompromising attitudes that
developed on each side of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, a bilateral solution
to the present water crisis is possible.
However, a resolution that seeks a just
and equitable allocation of the scarce
water resources available requires
courageous political decisions that run
counter to ideological currents gaining
strength in each respective culture,
which have in many cases been
adopted by each side's politicians.
The Road Map ignores the
issue
The most recent phase of international
framework for progressing towards
a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is the Quartet (UN, U.S.,
EU and Russia) sponsored Road
Map to Peace. Unfortunately, in
this document, water-related issues
are mentioned only once, and in a
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Middle East regional
water options: Minimizing
the risks associated with
water scarcity
By: Saul Arlosoroff
Director of the Board, National
Water Corporation, Israel
I had the honor of discussing water
issues with the late Yitzhak Rabin
from 1967 onwards. Rabin has been
linked with water since his childhood,
especially after finishing his studies
at Kadourie Agricultural School, and
throughout his military career.
I first met Rabin when he was in
the process of transition from being
a soldier into statesman in 1967, after
his famous address at Mount Scopus
at the Hebrew University. Whoever
listened to him at that speech realized
that a new Rabin had emerged from
the 1967 War. During that speech,
he said, "All that I ever wanted was
to be a water engineer, and I turned
out to be a general."
In 1976, after the first Egypt-Israel
armistice agreement, I spent three
days in the southern Sinai with
Rabin in others as a farewell visit to a
water project that we executed in the
Sinai. During that trip, he gave a very
touching address to oil workers in
116
the area who were preparing to leave
their jobs, due to the withdrawal. I
remember saying to Rabin during the
trip, "I think that water will act as a
bridge or window of opportunity, and
not a cause of war." Rabin did not
react, but simply nodded his head.
A few months before he was
assassinated, when we gave Rabin an
honorary degree as a water engineer,
I told Rabin that I believed that the
water negotiations between us and
the Palestinians and Jordanians are
not going in the proper direction.
When he asked me why, I gave him my
opinion in brief. He nodded and asked
that we set up a meeting to discuss
this more thoroughly. Unfortunately,
that meeting did not occur.
Water, from my point of view, is
undoubtedly a window of opportunity.
Water must be a part of any political
regional solution. Even without
implementing multi-billion dollar
projects, there are ways in which we
can cooperate with our neighbors that
will cease to make water of cause of
disputes.
I see imported water, though not on
the multi-billion dollar level, as has
been suggested by my colleagues,
as a solution. At some point in the
future, it will be economic to bring
in expensive water for desalination
at the Dead Sea. There is no doubt
that desalinating Mediterranean Sea
water is the most logical option for
the short and medium term.
I want to give a brief overview of what
Israel is trying to achieve regarding
water resource management, which
can be also applied to other countries
in the region.
I want to deal with certain short term
solutions, which to my mind are
much more practical than the Red
Sea–Dead Sea canal plans. These
solutions will hopefully produce short
water relief solutions for the region.
My presentation focuses on the set
of technological instruments that
can be used to open a window
of opportunity for a peaceful coexistence by minimizing the risks and
socio-economic problems associated
with regional water scarcity.
The following points summarize the
current water situation in the area:
The levels of water uses and related
scarcity , at present and especially
in the future, within the three Middle
East entities – Israel, Jordan and
Palestine – are at approximate rates
of 280,140,80 cubic meters/capita/
year (CMCY) respectively, for all uses.
These rates of use represent critical
levels (World Bank definition for semi
arid countries—is considered critical
and acute for levels below 500
CMCY).
• It is assumed that by 2010, unless
significant changes in supply and
demand management is implemented,
the water scarcity and water quality
deterioration will cause severe socioeconomic damages and risks to
the social life of the three regional
societies.
• Since the great majority of the
regional conventional water resources
have already been developed by the
three entities, and since over-pumping
from ground water storage already
prevails during dry periods, there
remain only three realistic options to
minimize the regional social economic
risks and problems associated with
water scarcity:
1) More efficient management of
water demands.
2) Augmenting supplies from
international sources.
3) Desalinizing brackish and sea
water resources.
Water demand management
– Israel as a case study
Water demand management is a
strategy aimed at minimizing water
waste and increasing agricultural
and industrial production per unit
of water, which summarize Israel's
unique and comprehensive strategy.
It was designed and aimed to achieve
a successful national water demand
management program.
It took Israel almost 40 years to
legislate, research, develop the
technological and agronomic means,
create the financial and economic
incentives and sanctions, and
harvest the results. These results
are shown and detailed in the
slides 7, 8, 9, and 10, particularly
regarding the agricultural sector,
urban and industrial sub-sectors,
and the nation-wide waste water
re-use program.
From these results, it is clear that
the real agriculture production per
unit of water has risen by more
than 300% enabling farmers to
maintain adequate production and
income despite a reduction of water
allocations, an increase in water
pricing, and incentives and sanctions,
regarding water use. Each country
in the region and beyond must
make a national assessment of its
water supplies and figure out how
to conserve water and increase the
efficiency of water use. The cheapest
un-utilized water resource is our
ability to learn how to make the
most of what exists.
Drip irrigation
One of Israel's major breakthroughs
in the area of agriculture was the
transition from gravity irrigation, to
sprinkler irrigation, and finally to drip
irrigation. Today, almost all irrigation in
Israel is drip irrigation. Unfortunately,
much of the developed world has
not implemented these types of
advanced irrigation systems. Their
irrigation efficiency stands at only
40%, while in Israel, it is over 90%.
Just by implementing drip irrigation
methods, countries can conserve
billions of cubic meters of water,
without having to spend billions of
dollars.
Similar conservation programs have
been implemented in selected urban
centers, such as the dual volume
flush toilets, flow regulators and
drip irrigation in urban parks and
gardens.
The impact of these measures is
apparent in slide 10, where it is
displayed that industrial and urban
water use per capita has remained
almost constant, despite over
350% increase of GDP/Capita,
which presumably would influence
water use/capita.
117
If Israel had not have embarked on
nation-wide programs such as drip
irrigation, it would have had to make
use of an additional 150-200% of its
water resources at prohibitive costs
by desalting huge quantities of sea
water.
Re-use of waste water
I believe that Israel was the first
countries in the world to efficiently
use treated waste water. The Israeli
government has given priority to the
national waste water treatment and
the needed connections of treated
wasted water to the farming areas.
This project will free up fresh water
currently allocated to agriculture to
other uses. In 2003, 50% of the
total water allocated for agricultural
irrigation was treated waste water
(see Slide no. 8). This percentage
will grow over the years.
The re-use of waste water is
particularly pertinent regarding the
waste water of Palestinians and
Israeli settlers who live above the
mountain aquifer, as their waste
water is currently destroying the
aquifer.
Water transfer solutions
There are several water pipeline
possibilities that could bring large
118
quantities of water into the region
(see slide 15). Naturally, these are
dependent upon agreements between
the relevant parties, and in some
cases, the signing of peace treaties.
Some of the options are as follows:
• Desalination-West Bank pipelines:
Sea water desalination is already being
performed in Ashkelon, and is under
consideration in Caesarea. I want
to propose a pipeline which could
be owned by a 3rd-party to remove
suspicions on each side, such as the
Americans or Europeans, which could
carry desalinized water from Caesarea
towards Nablus in the Palestinian
territories. This type of project and
another similar pipeline towards the
Hebron area and in Gaza could help
the Palestinians reach maintainable
water levels in the West Bank.
Affordability is definitely an issue for
these types of pipeline projects.
• Litani River water supply: The
greatest and cheapest fresh water
supply in our area is the Litani River in
Southern Lebanon which discharges
approximately 500 Million cubic meters
per year into the Mediterranean.
This supply is useful in that it could
connect to our National Water Carrier
and to the Sea of Galilee. Utilizing this
essential water supply would require
an agreement with Lebanon. This
water source could reach southwest
Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinian
Territories, as well.
• Nile basin water supply: Water from
Nile after being used by Egyptian
farmers, could be connected to a
pipeline towards Northern Sinai, to
the Gaza, and to southern Israel.
Cooperation between the relevant
Middle East countries, transfer of
knowledge and experience, as well
as support by donor states will
prove that water issues can become
a window of opportunity instead of
being a cause of conflict. As water
scarcity poses serious risks to socioeconomic development and regional
prosperity, cooperation in this sector
must be seen as a potential strategy
that can be used in other sectors.
The budgets proposed for such
projects are well within the capacity
donor states and countries in the
region. Problems associated with
the continuation of the water status
quo will, in the end, cost more than
the potential solutions discussed in
this paper.
Without the need for multi-billion
dollar projects, we have both the
water technology and water supply to
reach adequate levels. Implementing
proper water demand management
and developing cooperative projects
are essential for the water situation.
A Plan of Action
for Regional Water
Development
By: Patrice Folladosa
International Executive
Chairman and CEO, Veolia
Water
In the Jordan River region, the
situation is characterized by the
viscosity of scarce water resources,
coupled with the fragmentation
of water management among
numerous states, actors and bodies.
Water resources in this region cross
national boundaries, and therefore
require strong cooperation between
neighboring countries.
A geographical situation
requiring cooperation
Fifteen million people live in the
Jordan River region. The 1.5 million
cubic meters conveyed annually by
the Jordan represent only 1/50 of the
Nile's flow rate. With less than 500
cubic meters of fresh water available
per person annually, Jordan, Israel,
the West Bank and Gaza are in a
permanent state of shortage.
Water resources are always viewed
as a geo-political subject; this region
is obviously no exception. Two of
the three major rivers in the region
are shared by several countries,
increasing the interdependence of
the various states. The Jordan River,
which is 360 km long, flows across
five countries. Even countries with an
abundance of water resources often
have difficulty agreeing on how to
share the resources.
There is one fundamental factor that
governs relations between states
regarding water issues: geography.
Geography determines which country
is upstream, a key advantage in this
field. Cooperation is all the more
essential in arid areas due to the
slow rate of precipitation, the slow
rate of aquifer replenishment, the
over-utilization of ground water, high
watering levels required for agriculture
and fast rate of evaporation.
Urban and industrial development is
increasingly competing with agriculture
for water resources, though agriculture
is still the regions leading consumer
of water. In Israel, almost half the
water demand is for agriculture,
while in Jordan agricultural irrigation
is consuming almost 3/4 of the water
used.
Politics are obviously a decisive
factor in water management in the
area. Technology alone cannot settle
the problems here – little can be
achieved without diplomatic activity.
However, technology can produce a
larger degree of freedom for water
management and overcoming
imbalances between the players.
A three-point action plan
Based on my experience, I would like
to make three proposals that could
be put into action in the region:
1. Intensify the use of thermal or
membrane technologies for water
desalination. Today only 1% of the
world's drinking water is produced
through desalination. There is a lot
of room for growth, provided that
the cost of energy is controlled. The
new plant in Ashkelon offers a line of
access to this essential technology.
Assuming that 20% of the 120 cubic
meters that can be produced by this
plant were routed to the Gaza Strip,
100 liters of water per capita per day
would be supplied to more than half
a million Palestinians.
2. Intensify the transfer of expertise
in order to optimize infrastructure
management in all countries of the
region. By transferring technological
know-how to the Palestinian
Authority, the Palestinians will be
able to supply more water per capita
without having to invest in new water
resources. This will put an end to the
50% water loss that currently exists
119
in the West Bank and Gaza.
3. Develop alternative resources by
intensifying waste water recycling.
Israel has reached a level of recycling
95% of its renewable resource. In
Israel, currently 250 million cubic
meters of waste water are used for
irrigation, which have been purified
and treated to varying degrees. The
remainder is discharged into rivers
and the sea due to a lack of waste
water treatment facilities. Treated
waste water could be also used to
restock ground waters, boosting
their potential beyond natural
levels. This process could prevent
intrusion into ground water and the
water aquifer, and can be used as a
type of underground dam. Indeed,
treating waste water for irrigation is
essential for the future of agriculture
in this region.
The role of water treatment in
public health
Louis Pasteur said, "We drink our
illnesses." Supplying clean drinking
water and developing water
treatment facilities are extremely
effective weapons against illness.
The role of water treatment in public
health must not be underestimated.
The public health revolution in
Europe in the 19th century, which
was spearheaded by the collection
of waste water by sewage systems
120
and the distribution of clean drinking
water, led to an increase in life
expectancy of 10 years. Wherever
water treatment is provided, public
health is improved.
Water sharing and cooperation
is a solution in itself. Fresh water
resources in the region are obviously
inadequate to serve the needs of the
15 million inhabitants of the region,
a population quickly increasing.
Therefore, managing water more
efficiently, transferring expertise, and
creating alternative water resources
must be implemented. The sharing
of technology is possible, and awaits
diplomatic initiatives, which can be
implemented on a step-by-step
level.
I would like to conclude by saying
that I would like to have seen this
conference called: 'From Dream to
Vision, and from Vision to Action.'
This can be done.
Water Cooperation at the
American Municipal Level
By: Mayor David G. Wallace
Sugar Land, Texas
I join you today to share my
experience as an active member
of the US Conference of Mayors
and as the Mayor of Sugar Land,
Texas. Within the US Conference
of Mayors, I serve as a Trustee and
am active in an Advisory Board role
with over 1,200 cities in the United
States that have Mayoral forms of
local government.
I also serve as the Co-Chairman
of the US Conference of Mayors
Homeland Security Task Force, and
the immediate past Co-Chairman
of the Urban Water Council where
I continue to serve as a Task Force
member. The US Conference of
Mayors is the preeminent national
organization in the United States
serving as the public policy voice
of America’s principal cities. Cities
with populations of 30,000 or more
turn to the Conference of Mayors
for leadership in shaping federal
policy that affects the vast majority
of Americans. To give you some
perspective on the importance of
the Conference of Mayors and its
longevity, I would point to its founding
history and the role it plays today.
The Conference was founded in
1932, when 14 million people were
unemployed, lines stretched for
blocks in front of soup kitchens,
homeowners were unable to pay
taxes, veterans were selling apples
on street corners and the nation's
cities were close to bankruptcy.
Responding to the appeals of
mayors, Congress created a $300
million federal assistance program
for cities, marking the first time in
the US history that federal relief was
provided directly to cities.
The Conference has grown both in
Mayoral membership and stature.
The primary roles of the Conference
of Mayors are to:
• Promote the development of
effective national urban/suburban
policy;
• Strengthen federal-city
relationships;
• Ensure that federal policy meets
urban needs;
• Provide mayors with leadership
and management tools and create
a forum in which mayors can share
ideas and information.
Cities compete for water
resources
It is usual for American cities to
compete with each other to increase
their tax base and grow their local
economies. These are prime
indicators of standard of living and
quality of life. Indeed, great attention
is paid to maximizing “comparative
advantage” whereby a city will
advertise particular advantages that
citizens and businesses would enjoy
if they lived or located in a certain
town or area. For example, a highly
educated workforce attracts the hightech industry; while access to major
transportation routes helps lower
shipping costs for manufacturers.
Large call centers are often located
in the central states of Nebraska
and New Mexico because it lowers
the overall telephone costs involved
with reaching the national consumer
audience.
The presence of water resources
such as lakes, rivers or the seaside
has traditionally served as a magnet
to attract businesses and people.
Not only does the presence of
water serve the wheels of industry,
but also it provides one of the
preconditions necessary for large
scale energy production – “once
through cooling.” The presence
of water also provides many cities
with a basis upon which they can
establish and grow a tourism industry
that further enriches the local and
regional economy.
Above all, however, water is a
natural resource that is essential
to sustaining human life. Like food,
energy and infrastructure, water is
a basic need that no society can
forego. Fresh water, the type that we
call potable, or drinkable, is certainly a
major limiting factor for development.
Cities that are blessed with an ample
supply can thrive, while cities that
are “water constrained” will always
struggle, unless they arrange for
a transfer of water supply from a
water-rich region.
This is the case in the United States.
The humid climate that prevails in
the east is characterized by bountiful
precipitation. It is an area that has
full rivers, full reservoirs and plentiful
ground water. The arid climates
of the west, however, have lakes
and rivers that are dry for a good
portion of the year, and the ground
water is found at great depths below
the surface. We have learned over
the last few decades that weather
patterns change, and the once
reliable distribution of fresh water
can no longer be taken for granted.
Drought, combined with great
population growth, has imperiled the
once adequate water supplies east of
121
the Mississippi River. As water levels
recede in reservoirs, the water supply
becomes more vulnerable to pollution
and invasive species. This increases
the cost to provide water for people,
businesses and local government.
Similarly, in the western portion of
the United States, droughts have
diminished water supplies. Chain
reaction events are now becoming
more common. As less water is
available to support vegetation, it is
common for trees to become stressed
and experience high rates of disease.
When human- or naturally-caused
fires occur, there is a tendency to
see catastrophic wildfires that further
devastates the landscape. Then,
when the land becomes denuded, the
rainfall causes catastrophic flooding
even when moderate rainfall events
occur.
Cooperation yields public
benefits
California, with its vast population and
arid climate, is undeniably dependent
on diverting water supplies from the
Colorado River. But so are the states
of Arizona, New Mexico and others.
While competition for the limited
supplies of water from the Colorado
River is often contentious, the vying
states negotiate an allocation scheme
that seeks to satisfy all of the water
122
consumers. This approach has
worked for some time, for better or
worse. Allocation methods combine
the consideration of basic population
needs in a humanitarian fashion,
along with the needs for economic
growth and development.
Along with transfers of water there
are also transfers of payment,
because while water is natural, but
it is not free if you want to treat it so
that it is useful and transport it to
the ultimate users. It is common for
these arrangements, in the United
States, to be governed by state
compacts or the establishment of
water authorities. The water authority
approach serves to institutionalize the
legal, governance, political and social
arrangements necessary to satisfy
the often competing water users.
The water authority approach is also
one of the most economical ways
to harness water use for competing
users because it takes advantage of
economies of scale that would not
otherwise be attainable, and it can
be governed in a way that is fair to
all of the participants. A few relevant
examples are drawn here from the
U.S. Conference of Mayor’s Urban
Water Council “Best Practices” series
to illustrate how water authorities can
serve to establish social stability and
economic certainty.
Examples of successful water
cooperation:
Tampa Bay, Florida
Tampa Bay and St. Petersburg,
Florida have populations of 285,000
and 236,000, respectively. They are
situated on the Gulf Coast (west) side
of Florida. Tampa Bay Water Authority
(TBWA) was established as the
regional water utility, and it services
Tampa Bay, St. Petersburg and four
other surrounding communities. In
all, Tampa Bay Water has a service
area population of 2 million people,
but also includes businesses,
retail commercial establishments,
government and other public
institutions.
The communities are located in
a warm, humid climate, and they
experience plentiful precipitation
each year. There is enough, so that
they have relied on ground water
wells for many years. But then the
population exploded, due in part
to the opportunity in the area for
employment, and perception of it as
a “great” place to live with its warm
temperature and seaside recreational
amenities. As the population grew,
so did water consumption. The
once plentiful ground water began
to diminish, and the aquifer became
very vulnerable to salt water intrusion.
Such intrusion would further diminish
the ability of the Tampa Bay Water
to rely on ground water to sustain
the area.
There were two alternatives that the
Authority could turn to, besides water
conservation, to ensure an adequate
and affordable water supply for the
future. They were: develop a 66 million
gallons per day (MGD) surface water
plant; and initiate the desalination
process of brackish sea water from
Tampa Bay. I want to describe how
Tampa Bay Water turned to a Public
Private Partnership for both these
initiatives because there are many
parallels to the opportunities in this
part of the world.
Tampa Bay Water Authority decided
to contract for the construction of a
66 MGD surface water plant through
a Public Private Partnership which
guaranteed the capital cost, the
annual operating expenses, the
asset life and the quality of water
produced all for 20 years. After
successful completion and start-up
of the surface water facility, they again
contracted for a 25 MGD desalination
plant. The capital investment was
valued at nearly $200 million (US)
in 1999 dollars. Tampa Bay Water
relied on its members to obtain
tax-exempt financing (municipal
bonds) to pay for the surface water
plant and to obtain tax free private
activity bonds for the desalination
plant. These plants also rely on a 14
mile pipe interconnection to deliver
the treated water into the existing
water distribution system. Tampa
Bay Water retains responsibility for
customer service, including metering,
billing, and collections.
What makes this approach acceptable
to the Tampa Bay Water Authority and
its member communities of 2 million
people? It really comes down to the
following reasons. The Board of
Directors for Tampa Bay Water is
comprised of local elected officials
from the participating communities
as well as local opinion leaders.
So, each community has a voice in
the discussions and the decisions.
In effect, each participating entity
maintains strategic control over its
own destiny and the needs of its
constituents. Since the surrounding
communities use their public authority
to provide the financing to build the
facilities, they demand that the
operations of the facilities be open
and transparent. So, the financials
of Tampa Bay Water are open to
inspection. Also, Tampa Bay Water
is subject to public scrutiny via the
requirement to hold open Public
Hearings on all major decisions, and
from time to time, concerning their
record of service and budgetary
proposals.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Another relevant example drawn
from the U.S. Conference of
Mayor’s Urban Water Council’s “Best
Practices” series involves a PublicPrivate Partnership approach. The
private water company that served
Indianapolis for 130 years was
put up for sale because it was
purchased by an energy company
that was ordered to divest its water
utilities. The Indianapolis leadership
was concerned over whether
the sale of the water utility would
result in rate hikes, limits on water
supply and customer service. The
water company served a 25 mile
radius including Indianapolis and
Marion County, along with its many
communities (over 30 separate and
distinct municipalities).
The water company serves 279,000
customers and includes approximately
1.1 million people. While the entire
City of Indianapolis is served by the
water company, roughly 75 percent of
the customers and 80 percent of the
revenues come from approximately
30 participating communities and
public entities.
The water company was allowed to
operate under a franchise established
by the City in 1870. Thus, the City
had a legal right to acquire the facility
123
at any time, but preferred to have
a private company with expertise
in this area run the operations
rather than run it as a government
bureaucracy. The decision was
made by the City-County Council
to purchase the water company
and then seek competitive bids from
private water companies to enter into
a Public-Private Partnership. The
Leadership appointed a bipartisan
Board of Waterworks to conduct a
Request for Qualifications (RFQ) and
then a Request for Proposals (RFP)
process to select a private operator;
and the Board was designated to
oversee the new operators. The
Board of Waterworks selected Veolia
Water North America as the private
operator.
The Indianapolis Mayor was quoted
as saying, “The basis of the publicprivate partnership with Veolia is a
unique, incentive-based contract
that uses the free enterprise system
to encourage improvements in our
Indianapolis water system.” Under
this contractual arrangement the City
pays the private operator an incentive
fee if performance measures such
as customer service, water quality,
operations and management, and
community involvement are met. The
net result of the partnership has been
improvement in several key areas:
rapid customer response, improved
124
water taste and odor, increased
participation of minority and women
owned businesses, and the creation
of a citizen’s advisory group.
The citizens of Indianapolis and central
Indiana have realized significant
public benefits from this partnership
approach. For example, water rates
have been frozen for five years; the
City maintains control and ownership
of the asset; and community service
and involvement has increased
dramatically.
The Board of Waterworks meets
regularly with the facility operators to
review performance measurements.
The private operator conducts
periodic engineering assessments
of the physical plant and reports to
the Board on the “condition” of the
plant. They also report to the Board
on estimates and projections for
replacements that involve capital
investments. The City has, in effect,
harnessed the expertise of the private
sector to provide a public service in
a cost-efficient manner, and has
avoided the establishment of yet
another government bureaucracy
in an area where private sector
expertise is already established.
But perhaps most important was
the ability to see over 30 separate
municipalities, each with disparate
views and opinions, and through
the creation of a single water
authority, facilitate the acquisition,
development and operation of a life
sustaining asset for the benefit of all
stakeholders.
Conclusion
Water authorities serve a useful
public purpose by rationalizing the
competing interests seeking to lay
claim to scarce water resources.
• They are, or can be, an institution
that realizes economies of scale to
make water supplies both adequate
and affordable to consumers.
• They are, or can be, an institution
that is useful for introducing new
paradigms, such as public-private
partnerships that can harness private
sector capital and expertise to realize
public benefits.
• They are, or can be, an institution
that provides an environment for
rational decision making for scarce
resource among often competing
parties.
• They are, or can be, an instrument
to facilitate cooperation of varying
interests to promote economic growth
and the standard of living for a myriad
of citizens and businesses.
• They are, or can be, an institution
that can provide certainty over one
of the basic necessities of society
– water resources – that has important
implications for social cohesion
– a basic measure of the strength of
communities. In short, they are, or can
be, an institution that can promote
and help to facilitate a high quality of
life to the water authority’s members
in the region.
conjunction with the “life-giving”
effects of water as a resource, can
be used in all parts of the world. It can
yield public benefits that go far beyond
cost-savings. It can provide the basis
for certainty, prosperity and stability: all
of which are the essential ingredients
for peace among neighbors.
It makes good sense to consider
a next level of discussions and
investigations to establish a jointly
owned water authority to own,
develop, efficiently operate and
provide oversight for the distribution
of the water related assets. The costefficiencies involved can be substantial
and can yield significant public benefits
as well as use water wisely. Veolia
Water North America, the host of this
session, is a global water company
with established expertise in building,
operating and maintaining water and
wastewater infrastructure. And, they
already maintain a significant presence
in the region. Neighboring countries
should take advantage of such
worldwide experience in providing
leadership and expertise in exploring
and working with multi-governmental
agencies through, public-private
partnerships. The model of public
private partnerships in providing
water and wastewater services, in
125
United in Vision:
Yitzhak Rabin and the U.S
- Close Strategic Partnership
Rabin: Committed to
Peace and Development
across Borders
By: Dr. Edward J. Perkins,
chair of the panel
The William J. Crowe Chair
Professor of Geopolitics and
Executive Director of the
International Programs Center,
University of Oklahoma
First off, I would like to extend
the greetings of the President of
the University of Oklahoma, David
L. Boren. President Boren has had a
long and enduring interest in doing
whatever he can to bring about a
resolution of conflicts in the world,
and particularly in the Middle East.
President Boren’s concerns range
from political stability to provision of
education, to social advancement,
and economic development.
He was quite pleased to know
that I would be here along with my
colleague, Ambassador Ed Corr, to
convey his best wishes and those of
the University of Oklahoma.
In 1992, I was privileged to represent
President George H. W. Bush as
America’s Ambassador to the
United Nations and Representative
126
in the Security Council. Part of
the responsibility was acting as
Ambassador-at-Large when it became
necessary for our government to send
specific messages to various players
on the international scene.
It was my pleasure to bring a message
from President Bush to Prime Minister
Rabin regarding the efficacy of using
non-governmental organizations to
help advance the cause of peace
in the Middle East by giving more
attention to the settlements.
Prime Minister Rabin, never a person
who appeared to be in a hurry,
took the message in his office in
the Knesset. He was thoroughly
reflective in thought as he smoked
a cigarette. Finally he turned to me
and said, 'Ambassador Perkins,
tell the President the answer is yes.
'The remaining conversation reflected
a person committed to peace and
development and cooperation across
borders.
I felt that I was in the presence of a
giant dedicated to building bridges;
one who envisioned a greater
productive community amongst
the peoples of the Middle East, and
indeed the world.
It was a sorrowful time for me when
he was assassinated. But I was
fortunate, as were many other people,
to have been in the company of such
greatness at least once in my life.
It is now, more than ever, incumbent
upon me and others to embrace
and make operational his views of
peace and continue his fight toward
a greater community of nations. The
view from wherever one sits is that
hope is a powerful weapon. Having a
conference such as this one enhances
both the meaning of hope and the
possibility of realizing hope.
We are all here to give more strength
to the vehicles that will, in the end,
bring about peace and cooperation
in the Middle East. I can only applaud
all of you for being here and offering
your vision and hope.
Humbly, it is my pleasure and privilege
to act as chair and moderator for this
panel.
Rabin: Creator of the
U.S.-Israel Strategic
Relationship throughout
the Times
By: Ambassador Martin Indyk
Director of the Saban Center
for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution
Former U.S. Ambassador to
Israel
I think that all of us who had the
opportunity to work with the late
Yitzhak Rabin were enriched by the
experience of working with such
an extraordinary leader. One of his
greatest qualities was his ability to
think strategically and to operate
on the basis of a very realistic
analysis of the situation. This is
one of the reasons why, from the
American point of view, everyone
who dealt with Rabin appreciated
the opportunity.
Rabin would always start meetings by
giving us his strategic analysis of the
topic at hand. The only other leader
who I knew who did that was Henry
Kissinger, another great strategic
thinker. It is no coincidence that the
Kissinger-Rabin partnership played
a key role in laying the foundation
of the strategic partnership that
exists between Israel and the
U.S. It is easy for us to take this
relationship for granted today, but
when Rabin and Kissinger began
working together, the strength of
the Israel-U.S. relationship was far
from obvious. Israel, which has no
oil, inhabits an oil rich region, which
is of vital importance to the U.S - a
fact that pushes American strategic
assets to the Arab side. Therefore,
in the 1960s, Washington viewed
Israel as a strategic liability rather
than a strategic asset.
Israel's role on the front lines of
the Cold War
I should like to discuss Yitzhak
Rabin's contribution to this strategic
shift in the American point of view.
Rabin came to Washington in 1967
as Israel's ambassador to the U.S.,
after he, as Chief of Staff, had led
the Israeli army to a major military
victory. At the time, Henry Kissinger
was in the White House as National
Security Advisor to President
Nixon. Rabin's ability to understand
how Israel's strategic position had
changed following the 1967 war
enabled him to work with Kissinger
and lay the foundations of strategic
partnership.
One of the major changes was that
Israel's new border was the Suez
Canal, a critical strategic position.
A huge Soviet military presence sat
opposite Israel, on the other side
of the canal, that had moved in to
rebuild the Egyptian army after the
1967 war and sponsor the Egyptinitiated War of Attrition.
While Rabin was in Washington
talking to Kissinger, the IDF was
fighting Egyptians, under Soviet
tutelage, across the canal. Rabin
quickly grasped that Israel had made
the shift from U.S. strategic liability to
being on the front lines of the Cold
War competition for influence in the
Middle East. That understanding was
the basis of a new understanding
that Rabin was able to develop
with Kissinger. Kissinger, of course,
viewed the Middle East as a stage
upon which Cold War influence would
be played out, with Egypt being seen
as a dangerous concentration of
Soviet influence.
In Rabin's first private meeting with
Kissinger, the pair discussed how
Israel could help the United States
in the Cold War rivalry. The very
idea that Israel could contribute
something to the United States was
both new and counter-intuitive, given
the natural power imbalance.
As a result of this dialogue with
Kissinger, Rabin lobbied his
127
government to use its newfound
capabilities – U.S. provided Phantom
jets – against Soviet piloted MIGs.
The IDF using American equipment
to shoot down 6 Soviet-piloted MIGs
was the first manifestation of the new
strategic relationship. Washington
was extremely happy that Israel had
played the role of America's 'cat's
paw', which could scratch the Soviet
Union. At a time of great difficulty
for America in Vietnam, this military
episode went a long way to prove
the role that Israel could play.
This principle was reinforced 6
months later in August, 1970, when
the King of Jordan found himself in
great difficulties with Yasser Arafat's
PLO operatives based in Jordan,
who had launched a full-fledged
challenge to the Hashemite Kingdom.
The Syrian army was supporting the
Palestinian revolt, and its tanks had
started rolling towards the SyriaJordan border.
Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin
agreed that Israel would 'kick up
some dust' on the Golan Heights,
by mobilizing tank units towards the
Syrian border. This troop mobilization,
in conjunction with the movement of
the U.S. Navy's sixth fleet towards
Syria's shoreline, deterred Syria
from advancing against Jordan.
The result was that the Syrian troops
128
turned around towards home, the
Hashemite Kingdom was saved,
and again Israel had demonstrated
its usefulness to the United States
in its ability to help protect American
moderate allies in the Arab world.
The notion of Israel protecting Arab
states allied with the U.S. was also a
concept that was unheard of before
Rabin's tenure as ambassador.
Kissinger who built the strategic
relationship with Israel turned on
Israel and forced it to stop its efforts
to destroy the Egyptian Third Army
because American and Israeli
strategic interests had diverged.
The Soviet Union was threatening
to intervene, potentially with nuclear
weapons – possibilities that were
against American interests.
The principle of Israel helping the
United States when their interests
converged on a strategic level formed
the basis of the strategic partnership
that has existed for decades between
the two countries.
The principle of land for peace
and compensation
The shake-up of the 1973 war
There was the danger of Israel getting
carried away with its new role, which
to an extent happened leading up to
the 1973 war. In part, due to this new
strategic relationship, Israel came to
view itself as the superpower of the
Middle East, which gave Israel the
sense that it was more significant
than it actually was, in terms of the
international balance of power.
The 1973 war was a very rude
awakening for Israel. From this
war, Israel learned of the limitations
of its power and the true nature
of the American-Israeli strategic
relationship. The very same Henry
Nevertheless, the 1973 war ushered
in the era of an American-led peace
process, causing another change in
the strategic relationship, with Rabin
as Prime Minister and Kissinger as
Secretary of State. The critical
principle of the strategic partnership
became Israel's willingness to give up
territories it had conquered in 1967
as part of a U.S. sponsored peace
agreement. This was critical both for
America's ability to widen its level of
influence in the region and to help
secure Israel.
In the process of setting up the
bargain of Israel giving up territories in
exchange for peace agreements from
its Arab neighbors, Rabin established
another important principle, which
has been developed into an art-form
by subsequent Israeli Prime Ministers.
This principle stated that Israel should
not only receive peace agreements
with Arab countries in exchange for
giving up territory, but should also
receive compensation from the
United States. This compensation did
not only include monetary assistance,
but also new levels of technology
transfer, and political commitments
made by the United States to Israel
regarding future developments of the
peace process.
The Sinai II disengagement agreement
is the best example of the way in
which Rabin, who fully understood
the importance of Israel giving up
territory to an Arab country in the
eyes of the Americans, was able to
develop the concept of American
compensation within the context of
an agreement.
The post-Cold War era
– partners in peace
In the post-Cold War era of 1993, a
new stage in the strategic partnership
between Israel and the U.S. was forged
between Rabin and Clinton. If during
the Cold War, Rabin had led Israel into
a role of a promoter of freedom and
American interests in the Middle East
to counter Soviet influence, in the postCold War era Rabin led Israel into the
role of becoming America's partner
in pursuing a comprehensive peace
in the region.
Rabin approached this new dynamic
in his own way – he did not want
the United States directly involved
in negotiations, but preferred direct
negotiations between Israel and
its Arab neighbors. He viewed the
United States as the supporter of but
not participant in these negotiations.
Rabin feared that direct U.S.
involvement in negotiations would
shift the U.S. from the role of Israel's
supporter into the role of objective
mediator. He had experience the U.S.
role as mediator during Kissinger's
'shuttle diplomacy', in which he felt
the intensity of Kissinger's pressure
on him.
He didn't want us involved; however,
with the Syrians he didn't have a
choice because Assad insisted that
Warren Christopher shuttle between
Damascus and Jerusalem. Oslo, on
the other hand, was signed began
behind our backs. It came as a
surprise to us because Rabin had
been pursuing peace with Syria
through the United States, and we
assumed that this was the only track
being pursued at the time.
Ambassador Itamar Rabinovitch
argued yesterday that Rabin was
disappointed by Assad's August
1993 response to his 'hypothetical
deposit', in which he indicated Israel's
willingness to withdraw from the
Golan. That's not how I remember
the events. Much to our surprise,
Rabin reported to the press of the
good news he'd received from Syria.
He was not disappointed, though he
understood that a Syrian deal was
going to take time. Rabin felt that he
had a bird in the hand – the Oslo deal
that Shimon Peres was finishing up –
and a bird in the bush – negotiations
that were just beginning with Syria.
He chose the bird in the hand. When
Christopher had asked Rabin about
the Palestinian front before he left
Israel for Damascus, Rabin dismissed
it with his typical wave of the hand.
Rabin's misleading of us stemmed
from the fact that he wanted to
conduct direct negotiations with
the Arabs, with little mediation or
interference. He saw the U.S. role as
to support the deal and compensate
the deal, but not to negotiate it. This
principle was not pursued by his
predecessors – Netanyahu, Barak,
and Sharon have all preferred to
negotiate with the United States, and
have the U.S. impose a deal upon
the Arab partners. It's not surprising
that this strategy was less successful
than Rabin's direct approach.
Rabin was both responsible for
creating the basis of the IsraelUnited States strategic partnership
and for enabling this relationship
to transition from its Cold War
129
concept into its post-Cold War
concept, in which Israel and the
United States were partnered in
their pursuit of peace. The current
partnership between Israel and the
United States in the war on terror,
came into being after Rabin's time,
but was made possible by the
foundation that Rabin had laid.
United in Vision, Strategic
Partnership & Friendship
By: Major-General (ret.) David
Ivry, Former Ambassador of
Israel to the U.S.
Former Director-General,
Ministry of Defense
The strategic relationship between
the United States and Israel began
with President Truman's recognition
of the state of Israel. The relationship
between the two states exists on a
number of American parliamentary
levels, despite the U.S.'s presidential
system. The essence and center of
power of the relations between the two
states has evolved between different
time periods.
Israel has always tried to stay active visà-vis the American government through
various channels, and during various
time periods. The various branches
of the American government – the
White House, the State Department,
and the Pentagon – have competed
for the task of presiding over aspects
of U.S. relations with Israel.
I will focus on Prime Minister Rabin's
approach to relations with the U.S.
both as Defense Minister and as Prime
Minister. From the time that I started
working as Chairman of the Defense
130
Ministry in 1986, I had no doubt of
the strategic importance that Rabin
attributed to Israel's relationship with
the United States. At first I believe
that Rabin attributed exaggerated
importance to U.S. relations, but as
time passed I learned to appreciate
his approach.
I was directly involved in three formal
points of contact with the American
regime – the JPMG (Joint Political
Military Group), the JSAP (Joint
Security Assistance Planning Group),
and the ACRS (Arms Control Regional
Security).
JPMG: Rabin's detail-oriented
approach
The JPMG was a cross-ministry,
bi-yearly forum, with one meeting
taking place in Israel and the other
in the U.S. At a certain point, there
were as many as 25 participants from
each county in the meeting, making
it necessary to form sub-meetings in
addition to the general meeting.
In the U.S., the meetings were led
by the Assistant Secretary of the
State Department, and in Israel the
meetings were led by the Chairman of
the Defense Ministry. I led 24 meetings
in total, 16 under the direction of
Rabin.
The JPMG began activities in 1983,
when I was serving as Assistant to the
Chief of Staff. At its outset, there was
an attempt to define the delegation's
working parameters. The American
strategic interest in this forum
was to learn from Israel's combat
experience and military strategies.
Therefore, the group initiated a joint
military action group that planned
joint military exercises and other
training activities. The Israeli strategic
interest in this forum was to maintain
constant contact with the American
government and its branches, to build
trust between the two states, and to
present various challenges that Israel
faces.
Rabin was deeply involved in preparing
for these meetings and defining their
goals. Our staff would prepare a
presentation for his review, and he
was always the decisive factor when
opposing opinions arose. Rabin saw
the JPMG meetings as preparations
for meetings that would take place
at a more senior level. During JPMG
preparatory discussions, we decided
on the issues that would be raised
for approval at senior governmental
levels. We kept to the premise of never
raising issues in meetings with the
Americans that had not been agreed
to within the Israeli preparations.
During each JPMG meeting, we tried
to raise original ideas and to promote
joint operations which raised the level
of cooperation and understandings
between the two states.
being surprised with issues that
they were not informed of from the
outset.
Rabin would often participate in the
JPMG meetings in order to fully exploit
the understandings of the group for
future activities. He would ensure to
come prepared to these meetings and
always took an interest in our reactions
to the American views presented. In
general, Rabin took a high level of
interest in the JPMG.
Rabin had the advantage of a deep
understanding of procedures and
chain of command within the American
administration, and understood with
whom various issues were to be
discussed.
The shortcomings of other
defense ministers
Unfortunately, other Defense Ministers
did not take such a high level of
interest in the JPMG meetings.
Some neglected the meetings,
and viewed the trip to the U.S. as
a vacation. These defense ministers
barely took part in the Israeli team's
preparations and focused mainly on
their personal meetings with members
of the American government.
Generally, the accomplishments during
these periods were unsatisfactory
compared to those achieved when
the team functioned under Rabin's
guidance. The Americans could
not reach understandings with us
when our teams showed a lack of
coordination among themselves.
Also, the Americans did not appreciate
Rabin's accomplishments
During Rabin's tenure as Defense
Minister, we advanced many issues
in addition to the joint military
exercises known as 'EUOCOM',
such as the stationing of American
artillery and other military equipment
in storehouses in Israel, which
allowed Israel to have instant access
to weapons in emergency situations.
This setup enabled us to keep our
emergency storehouses less full and
lowered our dependency upon the
shipment of equipment in emergency
situations, a hard lesson learned from
the Yom Kippur War. During Rabin's
tenure, we established three military
hospitals that allowed for quick
emergency activity. In addition, we
built landing fields for American
planes according to American
standards at Israeli military airports.
The American's attributed to Israel
the stature of 'Non-NATO Major Ally'
which gave us first priority to surplus
131
American military equipment. Initially,
this stature was highly significant,
though it became 'watered-down'
when it was given to several other
countries.
of the problems of the project was that
the frequent changes in leadership
disrupted the cohesiveness of joint
projects, as each new leader required
a trial period to 'learn the job'.
Within the framework of the JPMG,
we advanced the "Draw Down"
concept, in which the IDF would
borrow equipment from the American
army. The principle work of the JPMG
was the army training exercises set
up through 'EUOCOM' in Israel,
whose activities corresponded to
the current political environment
and operational requirements of the
American army.
On the Israeli side, there were Defense
Ministers who did not appreciate the
potential of the dialogue group, which
was obvious to the Americans.
In addition, the Americans would
generally suggest raising levels of
strategic cooperation if Israel had
taken significant diplomatic strides
vis-à-vis the peace process.
The American delegation at the
JPMG
Strategic cooperation between the
two countries experienced both
periods of growth and reduction.
As someone who led Israeli efforts
for over 12 years, I saw how the
standing of the leader of the American
team influenced our meetings and
accomplishments. Generally, the
American position of leadership in the
JPMG was a sought-after position for
which various Assistant Secretaries of
the State Department competed.
In Israel, the Defense Ministry led the
JPMG team, while the American team
was led by the State Department. One
132
Strategic Dialogue at the level above
the JPMG usually took place in the
form of private meetings that included
politicians, which included primarily
the exchange of information and
opinions, rather than plans for joint
activity projects.
The importance of the JPMG
The very existence of the JPMG was
an important tool for both parties
involved. For example, during the first
Gulf War, although the Americans had
agreed not to coordinate war plans
with Israel for the sake of maintaining
a coalition with Arab countries, they
Americans used the JPMG framework
to meet with the Israelis, calling
these meetings 'mini-JPMG'. Thus,
'routine' JPMG meetings allowed the
Americans and Israelis to coordinate
strategies, despite American promises
to the Arab allies in its coalition. Rabin
understood that an institutionalized
dialogue creates ties between two
countries that are very difficult to
undermine. The faith and goodwill
that is built through such institutions
stands strong in the face of small-scale
disagreements and conflicts. Therefore,
Rabin always made every effort to hold
the JPMG meeting twice a year, even
during periods of disagreement on
several issues between the Israeli
and American regimes.
JSAP: a display of Rabin's
diplomatic talents
The second of the Israeli-American
dialogue forums is the JSAP (Joint
Security Assistance Planning Group),
a yearly meeting that focuses on
planning the year's security assistance.
During this yearly meeting, teams
would agree to the assistance that
would be recommended to Capital
Hill for approval. The meeting would
generally occur directly after the
passing of the American budget, in
order to prepare for the next year's
budget.
Within the JSAP framework, we
aspired to secure several elements
of this budget, such as the budget
for offshore procurement.
During Rabin's tenure as Defense
Minister, the preparations for the
JSAP meeting were always reviewed
thoroughly by Rabin before approval.
The IDF generally made unrealistic
demands on the Americans, and
Rabin would ensure to moderate
the unrealistic requests to make
them presentable to the Americans.
Rabin's utilized his diplomatic
awareness, and refused to allow
the IDF to pressure the JSAP team
into making unrealistic demands of
the Americans.
The 'Under Secretary' of the U.S.
State Department headed the
American team at the JSAP annual
meeting, while the Israeli team
was led by the Chairman of the
Defense Ministry. These meetings
required critical preparatory work.
When serving as Chairman of the
Defense Ministry, I would meet
frequently with Pentagon personnel
to prepare them for what the Israeli
delegation planned to bring up at
the annual meeting. Usually, I was
able to achieve agreement from
the Pentagon to our terms in these
preparatory meetings, ensuring
that the State Department was
well-prepared to hear our demands
at the JSAP meeting. The key
to these meetings' success was
always preparatory deliberations
and keeping consistent to these
preparations during the actual annual
meeting.
me the feeling that he completely
trusted my opinions and approach.
ACRS: another example of
Rabin's involvement
Strategic setback in American
relations
We also took part in the ACRS
(Arms Control Regional Security)
in partnership with the American
government. The ACRS was a
multi-lateral regional arms control
delegation that was created as
a continuation of the Madrid
Conference, after the first Gulf War.
The ACRS created five regional
action groups, one of which was
led by me. One of the reasons
for my appointment was that I
had already formed a productive
working relationship with several of
the Americans, many of whom were
involved in the JPMG.
In our strategic relations with the
Americans, there were certain setbacks
that generally resulted from errors or
mishaps. We recall the failed attempt
to release American hostages from
Iran in exchange for Israeli weapons.
This bitter failure is often referred to
as 'Iran-gate'.
Though the U.S. and Russia were
co-sponsors of the ACRS, with
Russia occupied with post-'Glasnost'
internal affairs, the U.S. became the
dominant force in the initiative.
Although, I was appointed to lead
the Israeli delegation by Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir, when Rabin
became Prime Minister, I continued
in this post. Rabin, as Prime Minister,
became deeply involved in the issues
raised at ACRS deliberations. Rabin
supported me in this post, and gave
I believe that this mishap can be
attributed to our failed attempt to
work with the Americans using Israeli
methods of flexibility and improvisation.
This simply caused a lack of trust and
misunderstandings – we tried to help
the Americans release hostages, and in
the end, despite our good intentions, we
were thought of as the party at fault.
The Pollard affair is an example of a
mistake at the non-governmental level,
in which the governmental level was
not aware of and had not approved of
the activities. Despite this, the Pollard
affair caused monumental damage and
significant setbacks in our relationship
with the Americans.
In general, all setbacks in AmericanIsraeli relations were caused by errors
and mistakes, and did not result from
133
any Israeli intention to damage the
Israeli-American strategic relationship.
Most setbacks resulted from
misunderstandings or lack sensitivity
to American cultural norms, which
resulted in mistrust.
Rabin's approach: trust and
consistency of action
Rabin always displayed consistent
and trustworthy behavior vis-à-vis
the Americans. For example, when
we were accused of selling Patriot
missiles to China, Rabin exceptionally
approved my bringing a group of
Americans to check our missile
warehouses, so that any suspicion
of guilt could be removed before it
gained momentum.
In general, Israel has a significant
interest in maintaining and further
developing regular strategic relations
with the Americans. Israel has always
made decisions keeping in mind the
importance of strategic relations
with the Americans, as long as the
American interest did not significantly
damage Israel's existential security.
The Cold War as an
essential influence on
strategic U.S.-Israel
Relations
By: Prof. Galia Golan
Political Science, Hebrew
University Jerusalem
I'd like to relate to two aspects of
the Israel-U.S. strategic partnership:
the strategic partnership or ‘special
relationship’ between the two states,
and the Cold War as a major influence
on this relationship.
The special relationship between
Israel and the U.S., which did not
always exist, began with President
Kennedy, and the promises he
made in 1962 and 1963. I won't go
into the specifics of why Kennedy
changed American policy; however,
we tend to look at a number of
factors that contribute to this special
relationship:
• Shared values between the
two states including democratic
governments and the JudeoChristian tradition.
• The overlap of strategic interests, as
discussed previously by Ambassador
Indyk – that is, the Cold War as a
strategic factor.
134
The Cold War: conflicting
American interests
I believe that the Cold War played an
enormous role in the U.S. attitude
towards Israel, in the U.S. attitude
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and in Israel's attitude towards the
United States. This was not a simple
relationship in which the U.S. was
pro-Israel, and the Soviets were
pro-Arab. I would argue that during
the Cold War, supporting Israel was a
problem for the U.S. because of U.S.
geo-strategic, political, and economic
interests in the Arab world. In fact, it
was the Soviet Union that sought to
create an East-West dichotomous
situation in this arena. The Soviet
Union introduced the Cold War into
the Arab-Israeli conflict, by attempting
to use the Middle East as a tool
against the U.S.
This complicated matters for the
U.S., but also created a new reality
for Israel. Soviet involvement in the
conflict caused the U.S. commitment
to Israel's security to be of such
paramount importance to Israel. I
am convinced that it was only the
risk of direct American confrontation
that tempered Soviet Middle-East
policy both in 1967, 1973, and with
regard to the PLO. Although the U.S.
commitment to Israel did not deter
Arab attacks, it did deter Soviet
behavior; thus, the U.S. position was
vital to Israel during the Cold War.
Rabin’s understanding of Cold
War American interests
However, the Cold War imperatives
caused the U.S. to constantly try to
improve its situation in the Arab world
in order to temper Soviet influence.
This interest often caused to U.S.
to convey conflicting messages
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
U.S. often attempted to diffuse the
conflict, or even end it by extracting
concessions from Israel in order to
gain favor with the Arab world.
I believe that Rabin was extremely
sensitive to the complexity of
American interests both at the global
and regional levels. He was keenly
aware of the relationship between
U.S. Cold War interests and U.S.
policy regarding the Middle East
conflict. As ambassador, Rabin
seemed fairly sympathetic to
Kissinger and Nixon's attitudes
towards the conflict. Rabin shared
both Kissinger's skepticism of
reaching a comprehensive peace
deal and the importance he attributed
to Egypt. He also shared Kissinger's
view that Golda Meir had not
displayed enough flexibility regarding
Sadat's initiatives in 1971.
During the Cold War, the U.S. was
interested in Middle East stability to
enable it to pursue its multi-faceted
interests regionally and globally.
Different U.S. policies throughout
the Cold War revolved around the
question of the optimal way to
achieve this stability. Was it best
to arm Israel to prevent deter Arab
attacks or pressure Israel to diffuse
or end the conflict?
All of these questions present a
context for U.S.-Israel relations under
Yitzhak Rabin, in which the 'special
relationship' of shared values figure
prominently.
The two periods in question are
Rabin as U.S. ambassador and then
Prime Minister in the 1970s and as
Prime Minister in the 1990s.
Once Rabin was Prime Minister,
however, Kissinger and Rabin had
a parting of ways over just these
issues. While they still agreed on
the importance of Egypt and on the
value of step-by-step agreements,
one front at a time rather than at a
comprehensive level, they disputed
over the price. Rabin and Kissinger
disagreed regarding the concessions
that Israel would have to give up in
the 1975 interim agreement with
Egypt, resulting in Kissinger's
famous four month 'reassessment'
– a 'time-out' in negotiations of
roughly four months, in which arms
deliveries to Israel were delayed
and recriminations were expressed
by Washington. At the time, Rabin
refused to agree to the proposed
withdrawal lines and other elements
of the deal.
1975 Interim agreement:
cultivating the ‘special
relationship’
In the end, a compromise was
reached which took the form of a
U.S. military presence in Sinai. While
the 1975 interim agreement is not to
be underestimated as the pre-cursor
of the peace agreement, I think that
its importance lay in another realm
– Rabin achieved a significant step
up in the special relationship between
the U.S. and Israel in the form of
the U.S.-Israel memorandum of
agreement signed on September 1,
1975. This set of promises included
military commitments, oil supplies, a
commitment to Israel's security, and a
guarantee that the U.S. would seeks
to prevent any international proposals
that were detrimental to Israel's
interests. One of the most significant
American commitments was their
promise to refuse to recognize or
meet the PLO, unless the PLO
recognized Israel's right to exist and
accepted UN resolutions 242 and
338. In general, this memorandum
135
of agreement document was the
strongest commitment ever given
by the United States to Israel.
This commitment acted to pressure
the PLO to come to the decision
to recognize Israel, the impetus
for the Oslo Accords and the twostate solution. Although the PLO’s
recognition of Israel in 1988 was
the product of years of internal
PLO dispute and was influenced
by a number of issues, it was highly
influenced by the PLO needing to
side with the United States, following
the end of the Cold War.
The post-Cold War order as the
stage for the peace process
The end of the Cold War brought
on the PLO’s decision to accept
resolutions 242 and 338, and also
changed Rabin’s view of the conflict,
thus making Oslo possible from both
sides’ perspective. The end of the
Cold War resulted in Rabin coming to
the understanding that peace treaties
with neighboring states and with the
Palestinians were more necessary
than ever. Rabin fully grasped
the importance of the Americans
emerging as the sole superpower
in the post-Cold War era, and the
impact of this development on the
Arab world. The loss of the Soviet
Union changed Arab states’ strategic
136
military position, bargaining power,
and economic potential.
Obviously, there were other factors
that influenced Rabin’s changed
thinking in the 1990s, including
the possibility of a nuclear Iran, the
rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the
Intifada in the Occupied Territories,
and Israeli war-wariness. However, I
believe that the most important factor
was Rabin’s view of the United States
as the sole world superpower and
the new world order that resulted.
This caused Rabin to believe that
a window of opportunity had been
opened. Rabin spoke of this window
remaining open for perhaps five
years only, and he sought to take
full advantage of this opening.
Yigal Amir slammed that window
shut in November, 1995. However, a
crack in the window remained open
which could not be shut – the mutual
recognition of each nation’s national
aspirations, accorded by Oslo. During
the mid-1990s, I contended that the
peace process was not irreversible,
and that Israeli tanks could very well
reenter Palestinian towns, which, as
we know, has happened. However,
the Palestinian recognition of Israel’s
right to exist could not be reversed,
nor could Israel’s recognition of
the Palestinian people, and by
implication, their rights.
Today, in my opinion, the window
of opportunity may be reopening.
Let’s hope that we have the sense
that Rabin had to take advantage
of this opening and to return to
negotiations.
Notes Regarding Rabin’s
Role in the Israel-U.S.
Relationship
Before getting into my lecture, I
must take exception to one point that
Galia Golan made. As I understand
it, the 1975 American commitment
regarding the PLO was not a promise
regarding speaking to the PLO.
Kissinger promised not to negotiate
with the PLO until the organization
recognized Israel, but did not promise
not to talk to them. This promise
was expanded into a promise not
to negotiate inadvertently by Jimmy
Carter early in his administration and
ultimately written into legislation by
the U.S. Congress. However, in the
1975 agreement itself, Kissinger kept
the door open for dealing with the
PLO, though not for negotiating with
them. Kissinger, it should be noted,
was very upset when Carter closed
that door prematurely.
Israel strategic relationship.
First impressions of Israeli politics
I arrived in Israel the day after
Menachem Begin was elected as
Prime Minister in 1977 as U.S.
Ambassador. My introduction to
Israeli politics occurred about a week
later. Joe Cisco, who had been one of
Kissinger’s associates in Middle East
negotiations, was in Israel for a visit.
Moshe Dayan hosted a dinner party
in his garden in honor of Joe. The
guests included Ezer Weizmann and
his wife, Yitzhak Rabin and his wife,
Yael Dayan and her husband, and
us. My wife and I sat and watched
Israeli politics and family politics at
their most exquisite. Rabin, who
was technically still Prime Minister,
had recently honorably resigned
from his post due to legal issues
surrounding his wife’s foreign bank
account, and Shimon Peres had
just lost the elections to Mencahem
Begin, whose campaign was led by
Ezer Weizmann. Weizmann was on a
high, after leading Begin’s campaign
to victory. Rabin, obviously suffering
due to his resignation and the election
results, sat there all evening listening
to Ezer throwing darts at him, taking
great pleasure in Rabin’s fall.
I would like to make a few personal
observations about my relationship
with Prime Minister Rabin and then
discuss a breaking-point in the U.S.-
The family relationship only made
the dynamic more interesting, as
Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizmann
were brothers-in-law via Dayan’s first
By: Ambassador Samuel Lewis
American Academy of
Diplomacy, Israel Policy Forum
Former U.S. Ambassador to
Israel
wife, who was the mother of Yael.
There were a lot of familial crosscurrents between them, along with
the political cross-currents which had
recently intensified following Likud’s
victory. All the dirty laundry was hung
out for us that night, leaving my wife
thinking, “Where in the world have
we landed?”
My impression of Rabin from that
evening was that of a man of
enormous self-control, dignity, a
taciturn nature, and very thick skin.
Through a mutual friend, I often
played tennis on Saturday mornings
with Yitzhak and Leah Rabin. During
that period, my impressions of
Yitzhak were more based on his
tennis game, than on anything else.
Though he lacked mobility, but he
would never give up on a point. If he
did miss a point, he would become
incredibly determined and angry. In
fact, his tenacity and determination
are the two characteristics that
I best remember from our tennis
matches.
Rabin the outsider –
a frustrated patriot
For the next couple of years, Rabin
was a bitter outsider in Israeli politics.
In those years of being out of power
and outside of Israel’s strategic
defense apparatus, he would spend
137
a lot of time on the tennis court. After
our frequent tennis matches, Rabin
would give me his strategic analysis of
the situation. He was very pessimistic
of Begin’s leadership, and of Peres’
attempts to rekindle the Labor party.
In general, Rabin gave the impression
of being a frustrated patriot, who
would analyze the situation very
thoroughly and accurately, with no
ability to change it.
Rabin was also very critical of the
American administration, in terms
of the way they were pushing the
Camp David Accords with Egypt,
and Palestinian autonomy plan,
which, as you know, was still-born
plan. Though he gradually came to
support Camp David, he felt that the
Palestinian autonomy plan was an
absolute disaster.
It became clear to me that Rabin
missed Henry Kissinger and Richard
Nixon. He could not understand
Jimmy Carter or Cyrus Vance, and
did not hold them in high opinion.
Part of my job was to keep the Labor
party leaders informed regarding the
Camp David negotiations, even
though they weren’t directly involved.
Whenever Secretary of State Vance
came to Israel, I would organize a
briefing between him, Rabin, and
Peres. After one of these briefings,
138
in which we discussed a minor
advance in the autonomy plan’s
implementation, Rabin decided to fully
let his opinions known. He delivered
one of the most undiplomatic series
of comments to an American
Secretary of State in the history of
the U.S.-Israel relationship. Though
Vance respectfully listened to Rabin’s
tirade, he later suggested to me that
we refrain from holding these types
of briefings during future visits.
Rabin’s role in rehabilitating
U.S.-Israel relations in the
1980s
Following the 1984 elections, a
national unity government was formed
and Rabin returned to a position of
power. Rabin was appointed Defense
Minister for the full four year term,
while Shamir and Peres were to trade
between the jobs of Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister after two years.
Rabin was, in essence, the anchor
of that coalition. I remember the
transformation that Rabin underwent
when he walked back into the Defense
Ministry, his natural home – it was as
though he had suddenly lost ten
years and was fully rejuvenateRabin’s
return occurred when the U.S.-Israel
relationship was in pretty bad shape.
Though we had developed a deep
strategic relationship in the 1970s,
the Lebanon War almost destroyed
this relationship. Some of you may
remember a famous picture in Time
magazine of an American soldier
pointing a firearm at an Israeli tank,
attempting to stop the tank from
entering Beirut. That picture was rather
symbolic of our strategic relationship
during the war. By the time the war
ended, and Ariel Sharon was driven
out of the Defense Ministry by the
Kahan Commission in 1983, there
was almost no defense relationship
between the two states and many
angry people in Washington.
The first attempt to renew the
relationship was initiated by Moshe
Arens as Defense Minister and Yitzhak
Shamir as Foreign Minister during
the autumn of 1983. They came to
Washington, met with Secretary of
State Shultz and President Reagan,
and came to understandings
regarding the importance of getting
over the period of difficult relations.
They attempted to renew the failed
document of semi-alliance that
had been previously been initiated
by Begin and Reagan, which was
suspended when Israel decided
to annex the Golan Heights in
December, 1981. This time there
was a much more serious effort that
was initiated by Arens and continued
by Rabin, when he assumed the post
of Defense Minister the following year.
From that point on, the strategic
relationship gradually returned to
its potential. It is only fair that we
acknowledge that Rabin was not
the one who initiated the renewal
of this relationship, and that Moshe
Arens receive due credit for getting
the renewal process started.
Reasons for problems in the
strategic relationship
I want to point out that most of the
misunderstandings at the strategic
level between Israel and the United
States have resulted from Israeli
leaders assuming that they know
more about the United States than
they in fact do, or from American
leaders thinking they know more about
Israel than they in fact do. The IDF and
Pentagon, as well as the respective
security agencies, have very close
working relationships. However,
the Pentagon has not always seen
things the way the White House has,
resulting in the Pentagon making
implicit commitments that causes
enormous political angst for our
political leadership. These instances
have occurred all too frequently, to
an extent, due to different Israeli and
America negotiating styles: Israelis are
informal, react quickly to situations,
and often negotiate orally, whereas the
Americans have a more careful, formal,
systematic style of negotiations.
In addition, each government has
a different worldview, as a function
of each country’s size, role, and
power. Israel has often implicitly
assumed that the United States is
a big, powerful country that can
handle any uncomfortable situation
that arises, while Israel is a small
existentially
unstable
country
surrounded by enemies. Therefore,
Israeli leader have, in a way, assumed
that the U.S. should be more flexible
in letting Israel do what it sees fit to
ensure its security. Israel in a way
seems to think that America worries
too much about its own interests,
as affected by Israeli actions. This
kind of subterranean psychology
has interfered with relations from
time to time, as it certainly did in the
Lebanon War.
In general, I believe that Yitzhak Rabin
had supreme importance in developing
the Israel-U.S. relationship. I, like many
others, believe that if Rabin had not
been prematurely taken from us, we
would have reached a full-scale peace
accord by this time.
139
Round Table: The Middle East
Towards the Future
Partnering Academic
Institutions
By: Ambassador Edwin Corr,
co-chair of the panel
Associate Director of the
International Programs Center,
University of Oklahoma
Former Undersecretary
of State
I want to say a few words about
Netanya Academic College. We at
the University of Oklahoma feel that
we have a very special relationship
with this college. Professor Ginat has
served as the director of our Center
for Peace Studies for approximately
five years. He also serves as the Vice
President for International Relations
and Research at Netanya Academic
College, but more importantly for
us is his role as the director of the
Strategic Dialogue Center.
Our Center for Peace Studies
at the University of Oklahoma is
carrying out a number of projects
in the Middle East very intensely
over the last number of years. We
are very pleased to have Netanya
Academic College as our most
important partner for these projects.
In addition to other projects, we have
just initiated an academic exchange
program between our institution,
140
whereby students and professors
can attend each others’ universities
and promote joint research.
I could go on about the wonderful
relationship between our two
educational institutions, but I don’t
want to take more of your time.
At this point, I would like to invite
Ambassador Jones, the co-chair of
this session, to approach and say
a few words before we move onto
the speakers.
The American Vision of
the Region’s Future
By: Ambassador Richard
Jones, co-chair of the panel
U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Former Ambassador to
Lebanon, Kazakhstan,
and Kuwait
Unlike most of you in this room,
I did not know Mr. Rabin, but I was
on the White House lawn that
beautiful autumn day in September,
1993, when the dream for lasting
peace became real for the first
time. How appropriate it is that
we hold a discussion about the
future possibilities for peace, while
commemorating Rabin’s legacy. I
congratulate the organizers of this
conference – I cannot imagine a
more fitting way to continue Rabin’s
legacy, or a more impressive slate
of speakers. In the past few days,
leaders from all over the world have
joined the Rabin family and the
people of Israel to commemorate
and celebrate the life of Yitzhak Rabin
and to ponder his legacy. On Monday
evening the new Rabin Center for
Israel studies was inaugurated. Its
noble goals go beyond preserving
Yitzhak Rabin’s memory and legacy,
but attempt to prevent another
political assassination in Israel by
working to bridge conflicts within
Israeli society.
Today’s round table session will take a
look at the future vision for the Middle
East. Last Sunday night, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice spoke of the
American vision for the Middle East.
She described the Middle East as a
region where “democracy flourishes
and the non-negotiable demands of
human dignity form the foundations
for citizenship. We envision a Middle
East where all men and women are
secure in their persons and their
property, with equal opportunities
for prosperity and justice. We will
continue to envision and work
towards a future when all the people
of the Middle East can gather not
to mourn a fallen hero, but to build a
common future.”
Yesterday I was privileged to see
Secretary Rice lay a foundation
for the common future through her
successful mediation of negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority on a new agreement
on movement and access. As
Secretary Rice noted during her
press conference yesterday, “The
agreement is intended to improve the
daily lives of people on both sides. It
will also help to safeguard security
for both parties and provide concrete
steps to bring President Bush’s vision
of two democratic states living side
by side in peace and security more
sharply into focus.”
I look forward to discussing this
agreement and its implications with
you today. I can certainly say, as one
of the people involved in negotiations,
we have our work cut out for us to
make this agreement into a reality.
The implementation of the agreement
will not be easy, but we believe that
it will ultimately be successful.
Mr. Lionel Jospin
Former Prime Minister of
France
Israeliens et de Palestinians et
qui à etait suivi avec une attention
passioné par les autres people du
monde. Je n’ai pas eu le privilege
de jouer au tennis avec Itzhak Rabin
comme un president mais j’ai eu
la chance de le rancontre a plus
heures repris a travers les annes la
prèmiere fois en Israel en 1980 à cote
de François Miteran qui n’etait pas
encore le president e la république
Française. La dèrniere fois alor que
le processuse de Paix etait engage.
Après sa mort et j’etait la à cote de
vous tous le jour, après sa mort je nué
avec son epouse Lea de respect et
de l’amitie à l’occasion de rencontre
en France comme en Israel.
I’l ya 10 ans Itzhak Rabin est tombé
sur le bal de son assansain et nous
n’avons pas tarde à comprendre
que c’est tragedie personnel était
aussi un drame politique pour Israel,
pour la region et pour le monde.
C’est pourqui sa mort fu pour
nous aussi un d’oeil. Itzhak Rabin
n’etait ni antendre’ ni un naif il avais
etait longtemps un gerier, meme
si curusement les images quand
nous montre de nous ces dèrnieres
jours pour évoquer sa memoire etait
141
plein de netrange douceur mais c’est
douceur n’etait sans doute que une
serenité.
Il n’etais ni attend ni un naïf mais il
avait compris un homme politique
et un homme d’etat que l’antere
fondementale d’Israel et la perenite
de cette etat passé par un compromis
teritoriale et ci possible par une attend
avec l’autre people de cette terre
les people Palestinains. Avec l’aid
de Shimon Peres son minister des
affairs des étrangers, avec comme
interlocateur son ansiens anemie
Yaser Arafat, et comme pardoner
l’O.L.P il à explorer le voix de ses
compromis, le processes.
Ce processes voulais saver na rien
nu du nodal, il fut ertée et dificille
et il falut de moi de delicate des
negosiation pour que les accord
d’Oslo trouve l’application, c’est a
dire le transfer de l’autorité politique
a une autorité Palestinienne sur
le grand center uraban à Gaza et
au Jordani. Dans l’esprit d’Itzhak
Rabin que j’ai rencontré à cette
époque Oslo etait un pois de depart.
Il voulait aller au bout du processes
lancer, c’est a dire j’ai le crois
personellement jusqua la creation
negotié de l’etat Palestinian meme
s’il n’a pas formalment evouquer
cette idée. Il beneficiat pour cela
de la double confiance du peuple
142
Israeliens et de dirigent Palestinian.
Disant plus tard quand est-il de la
vision de Rabin elle reste largement
inlache. Certain de progress real ont
etait uncompli, le plus important a
mes yeux et que l’idée de deux etats
Israelien et Palestinian cote a cote
fasse aujourd’houi l’objet dans large
consenssuses dans les deux opinions
Israeliene et Palestinian, malgre les
annes de preuve, de violence et de
frustration de terorisme ai prouvés
dans cote et on a fais l’experience
tragique à Netania et de misere
soubis de l’autre. Ensuit le countour
possible de sinon et l’etat Palestinian
ont etait pratiquement defini par les
partieses elles meme, on sait bien
que si la paix se fait elle se fera
sur ligne de partage qui se trouve
quelque part entre la ligne verte et
le carte dessiné en Janvrier 2001 à
Taba l’hors de la dèrniere racontre
de nagotiation Israel-Palestinienne
jusque ces jours.
En fin, un pas positive significative
vien d’etre uncomplis par le retrait
de Gaza et la destruction de
colonies sur le teritoire decide par
le gouvernement Israelien. Cette un
fete nouveau car pour la prèmiere
fois depuis 1967 les autorites
d’Israel ont demontoulent la totalite
de colonies sur une partie de teritoire
Palestinian. Pour une temps on ai loin
de l’achevement de la vision d’Itzhak
Rabin et Shimon Peres en 1995. Ce
que nous voyons aujourdhui ce le
blocage de la feuille de route et dans
veritable prosessues de negotiation
Isaraelien-Palestinian. C’est la pour
suite des acts terrorist par de groupes
Palestiniennes, c’est la continuation
de la colonization notament autour
de Jerusalem et la fermeture
progressive d’une grande Jerusalem
vis-à-vis de l’interland Palestinian,
c’est la discretion du quartete et de
la communite international, discretion
que l’ont peut expliquer peut-etre
par la lacitude mais aussi par
l’emergance d’autres un jeux dans la
region d’Iraq, la situation Libanaise,
la Syrie, le dossier nucleare Iranien
au quele les diplomacie oxidentale
accord aujourd’hui un plus grand
interes.
Ces problems efectivement sont
importents mais le staus que actuelle
sur la question Palestinienne est
fragile meme ci la double cheance
electorale de 2006 reconduire certain
a attendre, le retrait du Gaza ne doit
pas etre une fin en sois, il peut-etre
une etat.
Ma conviction est que l’evoulution
pacifique, democratique depend
peut-etre du sort de l’Iraque mais
certenement de la reponse apporte
au conflit Iasrael- Palestinian.
Car la permanence de ce conflit
la situation et les conditions de
vie extraordinairement dificille de
Palestinians entre tien et blocage
politique et psicologique chez
les peoples du monde arab et
muselmans il nous ris le reger de
l’etat d’Israel, la conviction que le pay
occidenteau pratique dans la region
a deux pois un juste la dificullte de
condamer clairement le terrorism.
Mon sentiment et que la solution
du conflit Israel-Palestinian appelle
sans doute trois changements: le
premier du cote Palestinian consist
a renonce definitivement au terrorism.
Cette renosantion proclamer et mise
en air le choix exlusivement politique
donnrai a mon sens au Palestinian
l’instuement desizife qui lors fait
aujourd’hui de faut en attendre
l’objectife historique le seul qui
accepté come un note international
un etat souvren , viable, reconnu et
respect. Cette renonsation explicite
et effective considerable sur la
communite international qui pourai
alors un site de façon plus raconte
Israel a avance et aurai eagalement
et peut-ete meme sur tout un impact
très important sur la secne politique
Israelienne au profit de force favorable
à la recherché de la paix.
Le dexieme changement du cote
Israelien consist sans doute a
accepter de sortir de la fatalite du
statu – co et de negotie malgre les
acts de terror et pour le vanqure
asser egart à l’esprit se que disait
Itzhak Rabin j’ai la sit il faut combatrre
le terrorism comme s’il n’y avait pas
de negosiation et negotier comme s’il
n’y avais pas de terrorism. Il est sans
doute de la responsabilite de dirigent
Israelien d’ofrir une perspective
acceptable dans l’hypothèse que
n’est pas d’ailleurs la logique de
la feuill de route. Le paradox de la
period dans laquelle nous sommes
et on vois sans doute quele sere la
solution possible, ne que la marche
vert le reglement rest obscure. On
peut comprendre la tentation unit la
teraliste mais je ne crois pas quele
puis manaer un solution veritable
parceque cette solution sere accepté.
Il foudra donc bien que les parties
se remettre au tour de la table pour
trouve de reponse equitable et realiste
au grand question de la negosiation.
Le troisième changement releve
de la communité international et
en particulier de Etat-Unis et de
l’Europe. La volonté clair et traduite
en act de trouver une solution
veritable à la question Palestinian fera
plus pour le qui libre de la region et
les espoires de democracy au moyen
orient que toute les denmostrations
de force et l’aura un impact positive
conciderable sur le monde qui vous
en tout meme si elle ne peut a elle
seul resolve tout les problems. Dans
cette nouvelle perspective Israel
pourait esperé dans cette region ou
il continaura a vivre comme etat et
comme nation ne plus etre seulement
a bastion isolée de la democracy
mais afferement un example de
cette democracy pour nous tous
fondemantal.
J’exprime cette conviction au nom
de l’amitie ansiene et fidelle que j’ai
avec Israel je form avec à l’esprit la
vision de paix qui etait seul d’Izhak
Rabin et qu’il nous revien desormer
de faire vivre. Grasse a lui le reve et
devenu vision en realite.
Je vous remercie.
143
Sr. Manuel Chaves
Presidente De La Junta De
Andalucia
Quiero, en primer lugar, agradecer
la amable invitación del Centro
de Diálogo Estratégico, de este
prestigioso Netanya College, una
institución que tantas contribuciones
viene haciendo a la causa de la paz
y el entendimiento en esta parte del
mundo.
Se cumplen 10 años de la muerte
de Isaac Rabin. Ante todo deseo
expresar mi agradecimiento como
Presidente de la Junta de Andalucía
y de la Fundación Tres Culturas
del Mediterráneo, por haber sido
invitado a los actos conmemorativos
del aniversario, así como a este
Seminario organizado por el Centro
de Diálogo Estratégico, de este
prestigioso Netanya College, una
institución que tantas contribuciones
viene haciendo a la causa de la paz
y el entendimiento en esta parte del
mundo.
Como su propio nombre indica, este
seminario, “Paz – Sueño o Visión”,
es una apuesta decidida por la paz
y por el diálogo como única fórmula
de alcanzar acuerdos duraderos
sobre un conflicto tan cargado de
destrucción, dramatismo y violencia
como el conflicto israelo-palestino.
144
Permítanme recordar asimismo que
la muerte de Rabin lo fue a manos
del extremismo, del fanatismo y del
fundamentalismo. Ingredientes
trágicos que de uno y otro lado han
sido protagonistas con demasiada
frecuencia del escenario del conflicto.
Ingredientes que cada vez que
actúan, como ha ocurrido hace
apenas una semana en Jordania,
un país tan cercano en tantos
sentidos, agravan el problema,
encienden las pasiones, generan la
represalia, instalan un círculo infernal
de violencia y retrasan la solución
pacífica de los contenciosos.
Rabin, como militar, había defendido
siempre la seguridad de su país,
ganándose un alto grado de respeto
en dicho terreno. Pero durante la
primera Intifada comprendió que ese
nuevo tipo de enfrentamiento no se
podía ganar. Su compromiso con la
seguridad de su pueblo le condujo
hacia la negociación y la búsqueda
de un acuerdo con los palestinos,
y ello empezó a abrirse paso en la
Conferencia de Madrid en el año 91
y en el posterior y complejo proceso
que condujo a los Acuerdos de Oslo.
Rabin inició una nueva senda: la del
diálogo, la de la comprensión de las
posiciones del otro, la de la tolerancia
y el respeto a otras legitimidades,
la de la aceptación del otro como
interlocutor necesario.
Rabin pagó con su vida su propósito,
su empeño y seguramente su sueño,
y su muerte precipitó una regresión
en el proceso de paz con un repunte
de la violencia.
Hacer frente al racismo, el
fundamentalismo, la xenofobia y la
intolerancia es uno de los grandes
desafíos en este comienzo del siglo XXI.
El antisemitismo es la modalidad más
antigua de esa deformación mental,
ideológica y de las actitudes sociales,
que tienen muchas ramificaciones.
Pero el antisemitismo es la matriz, el
prototipo de raíz más antigua del odio
al otro. Pues en él se funden todas
las variantes: la religiosa, la cultural,
la intelectual, la socio-económica y
finalmente, la racial.
De la misma manera, en el contexto
europeo, la Islamofobia se ha convertido
en salida preferente a las ansiedades
psicológicas y las inseguridades sociales
que provocan la economía global y la
intensificación de los movimientos
migratorios.
Todos ellos son elementos de
lo irracional que dominan con
frecuencia sobre las respuestas
políticas, a veces tan frágiles, que
se ven arrastradas por el empuje de
los mitos simplificadores. También
en España y en Andalucía hemos
conocido una trayectoria de extrema
intolerancia fanática y de extrema
generosidad universalista, y los dos
extremos han convivido, en cierto
modo, en tensión dialéctica a lo largo
de la historia.
Durante años en ciudades como
Sevilla, Córdoba o Toledo convivieron
cristianos, judíos y musulmanes.
Aquí se fundieron Sefarad – una de
las grandes corrientes culturales de
la historia judía -, Al-Andalus, un
califato mítico para la memoria del
Islam, y la influencia de la Castilla
cristiana. En esta tierra andaluza,
que lo fue de Séneca, Osio, Averroes
y Maimónides coincidieron los
impulsos de culturas diversas que
permitieron elaborar una poderosa
síntesis de saberes.
Creo que hoy más que nunca
se hace necesario reivindicar la
cultura del diálogo, de la tolerancia,
de la negociación, del pacto, del
acuerdo.
A veces el peso de la historia
reciente, cargado de sangre y de
sufrimiento, hace difícil remontar la
mirada y buscar denodadamente
el objetivo supremo de la paz. Una
paz que siempre estará construida
con cesiones y con renuncias. Pero
en las que el premio final siempre
será superior a los jirones que hayan
quedado en el camino.
El giro hacia la paz, primero con la
Conferencia de Madrid en 1991,
después con los Acuerdos de Oslo y
el encuentro histórico de Washington
entre Rabin y Arafat, fue posible
cuando cada adversario aceptó no
fundamentar más su propio derecho
sobre la negación del derecho del
otro, reconociendo a éste la misma
legitimidad que a sí mismo, y sobre
todo, porque tanto israelíes como
palestinos han aceptado hacer
coexistir su propio derecho con la
afirmación del derecho del otro.
El proceso de paz descansa sobre dos
principios “dos Pueblos, dos Estados”
y “Paz por territorios”, susceptibles
de garantizar estos derechos y de
hacerlos vivir juntos. El proceso de paz
ha conocido periodos de esperanza y
fases de estancamiento, de retroceso,
de nuevos derramamientos de sangre y
de dramáticos rebrotes de la violencia, y
ello debido al resurgimiento en ambos
lados de tendencias que volvían a
cuestionar la coexistencia de ambos
derechos.
En los últimos tiempos algunos
signos esperanzadores se han ido
abriendo camino: elección de Abu
Mazen, Cumbre de Sharm el Sheij.
Retiradas del ejército israelí de
ciudades palestinas, desconexión
de Gaza, disminución de los actos
de violencia, acuerdo de “tregua”
con las principales organizaciones
y milicias palestinas. Elementos que
apuntaban a una reactivación de la
Hoja de Ruta y que parecían situar el
conflicto en una nueva dinámica de
diálogo y acuerdo. Pero nuevamente
la violencia ha vuelto a ensombrecer el
panorama y amenaza con enterrar las
esperanzas abiertas. Deseo vivamente
que la tenacidad y la habilidad de los
dirigentes palestinos e israelíes no se
estanque en el atolladero del ciclo de
violencia y reanude el diálogo que los
últimos acontecimientos empezaban
a alumbrar.
Nuestra posición y nuestro compromiso
pasa por el reconocimiento del derecho
a la existencia de Israel dentro de
fronteras seguras e internacionalmente
reconocidas, y este compromiso
transciende coyunturas políticas y tiene
carácter permanente. Esta posición no
es exclusiva de la social democracia
europea sino que es compartida con
la familia democristiana y liberal.
Al mismo tiempo reiteramos nuestro
compromiso con la resolución de
la cuestión palestina y su derecho
a la autodeterminación según las
resoluciones de NN.UU. y la Hoja de
Ruta, con especial mención a la solución
del problema de los refugiados.
El periodista Theodor Herzal públicó
en 1896 el documento “El Estado
145
Judío” en el que argumentaba
que “el problema judío sólo podía
solucionarse creando un Estado
judío”. En mi opinión, la única
manera de solucionar “el problema
palestino” es la constitución de
un Estado palestino al lado del
Estado de Israel. La construcción
de una sociedad palestina estable,
pacífica y democrática es el cimiento
realmente básico para conseguir la paz
y estabilidad en Oriente Medio y un
paso importante para la lucha contra
el terrorismo (Adel El Adarwy).
En esta dirección, debemos ayudar
a los palestinos a construir su propio
Estado y se han de establecer y
desarrollar programas que contribuyan
a reducir de forma sensible las
extremas diferencias de rentas que se
producen entre Israel y los territorios
palestinos.
En todo caso, debemos volver a
manifestar nuestro más firme rechazo a
cualquier expresión de terrorismo, de
violencia contra civiles como fórmula de
actuación para obtención de objetivos
políticos. El Premio Nobel de la Paz Elie
Wiesel ha escrito, “La guerra es como
la noche, lo oscurece todo”. Solo la
política y el diálogo serán capaces de
disipar las tinieblas en las que está
inmersa esta región atormentada y
bellísima y devolver a sus habitantes
la luz de una vida libre, segura y llena
de esperanza en el futuro.
146
Permítanme que haga una referencia
al proceso de paz en el marco de
un proceso más amplio, que afecta a
todo el Mediterráneo, el Proceso de
Barcelona. Proceso que nació en 1995
y en el que la U.E. pretendía crear un
espacio de encuentro político entre
las dos orillas del Mediterráneo, con
una dimensión integral, que abarcara
la política, el desarrollo económico,
el intercambio y diálogo cultural y la
seguridad.
Hemos podido constatar que en los
diez años de Proceso de Barcelona
éste se ha contaminado por el
conflicto en Oriente Medio, llegando
incluso a paralizarse. En Noviembre de
este año, la U.E. volverá a tener una
oportunidad de contribuir desde una
perspectiva global a la estabilización
y desarrollo del Mediterráneo en
ámbitos complementarios como son
la economía, la seguridad, la política,
la cultura y el medio ambiente.
Próximamente, a finales de este
mes de Noviembre, vamos a revisar
ese compromiso en la Cumbre
de Barcelona que celebrará el
10º Aniversario de su creación. Y
debemos reforzar nuestro compromiso
consensuando acciones concretas y
poniendo todos los medios a nuestro
alcance para asegurar su éxito, ya
que si no se produjeran cambios
en lo institucional y reformas en los
ámbitos económicos, legales, sociales,
educativos y políticos, el conjunto de
la región tendrá que enfrentarse a
constantes inestabilidades.
Tenemos ante nosotros la oportunidad
histórica de evitar que el Mediterráneo
se convierta en el escenario de
confrontación entre Oriente y
Occidente.
No cabe duda de que la paz en la
región pasa en buena medida por
la solución del conflicto palestinoisraelí. Desde hace más de 60 años,
es un factor de inestabilidad política
y económica, cuyo resultado más
evidente es la débil integración e
institucionalización regional.
Acudimos a esta cita mediterránea con
el factor de esperanza que supone la
consagración en la última Asamblea
General de Naciones Unidas de
un nuevo reto: el del diálogo entre
civilizaciones, la denominada “Alianza
de Civilizaciones, que propugnada
inicialmente por el Presidente
Zapatero ha conseguido el respaldo
de la comunidad internacional.
Con dicho diálogo se pretende
adoptar medidas y compromisos, que
más allá de la retórica, profundicen
en dos elementos y valores comunes
a las distintas civilizaciones y
culturas, y en particular la occidental
y la islámica, y al mismo tiempo se
adopten estrategias comunes para
luchar contra los extremismos y
fundamentalismos de uno y otro
signo que son la verdadera amenaza
que intenta arruinar el entendimiento
entre culturas.
No hay choque de civilizaciones,
sino problemas de aceptación del
otro en las diferentes culturas. Pues
bien este espíritu de diálogo cobra
en la cuenca mediterránea y en
Oriente Medio una gran actualidad.
Y debemos aprovechar el proceso
de reflexión que con esta iniciativa
se abre para profundizar en los
dividendos de la paz.
Pero en esta ocasión quiero también
dirigirme a Uds. en nombre de una
Fundación, que tengo el honor de
presidir, la Fundación Tres Culturas
del Mediterráneo. Desde la creación
de la misma hemos intentado
contribuir modestamente, entre
muchas de sus actividades, a la
causa de la paz y el diálogo entre
palestinos e israelíes.
Tengan Uds. la seguridad, que todas
aquellas personas e instituciones que
animados de un espíritu constructivo
de paz y entendimiento acudan
a la Fundación Tres Culturas con
iniciativas e ideas para debatir,
encontrarán las puertas de la
Fundación abiertas.
Señoras y Señores, cuenta Marek
Halter que un día los judíos de Helm,
un pueblo de Polonia, decidieron
capturar la luna. Llenaron un cubo
de agua y cuando la luna se reflejó
en él lo taparon. Al alba, la luna
había desaparecido, pero esto no
les desalentó lo más mínimo. Al
día siguiente volvieron a hacer lo
mismo, y todas las demás noches.
No sé si los judíos de Helm acabaron
encerrando a la luna en un cubo de
agua. En cambio sé que, cansados
por los años de violencia, los israelíes
y los palestinos quieren la paz, y a
fuerza de esperarla, como a la luna,
acabarán por capturarla.
The Global Importance of
Middle East Peace
By: Miguel Angel Moratinos
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Spain
Yitzhak Rabin is now a part of the
history of Israel, part of the history of
the world. The four elements of fear,
fanaticism, close-mindedness, and
ignorance, though they shortened
his life, could not erase his legacy. I
treasure many positive experiences I
had working with Yitzhak Rabin. One
of these experiences occurred when
Rabin came to Spain, where I, as
Spain’s Director-General of Middle
East policy, accompanied him on
his first visit to the city of Toledo. He
was struck by Toledo’s similarity to
Jerusalem, with its ancient alleyways,
and the showed an incredible interest
in the Jewish legacy in the city.
I also remember meeting Rabin
in Israel, just ten days before his
assassination. Javier Solona, who
was at the time Spain’s Foreign
Minister, asked Rabin, who was
smoking a cigarette and drinking
coffee, how he was feeling. Rabin
answered that the doctors had told
him that his health was not good
since he refused give up smoking
and drinking coffee, yet still playing
147
tennis every Saturday. Ten days later
Rabin was brutally assassinated.
The will and courage needed
for peace
Convening here in Netanya and
commemorating the great man with
figures from all over the world to pay
tribute to his legacy is of supreme
importance in our attempts to actualize
his vision. When looking at the future
of this region, we are all concerned
by the monumental challenges ahead.
We all feel frustrated and disappointed
by the failures of peace efforts and
some have come to the conclusion
that peace in the region is impossible.
However, I don’t follow this line of
thinking. I have dedicated seven years
of my life trying to help bring peace to
the Palestinians and Israelis, which I
still believe is possible. We need the
political will and commitment towards
the goal of peace. I’m sure that the
Palestinian and Israeli people are
thirsty for this lasting peace.
Reaching peace involves many
different components. One of these
is strongly condemning absolute
declarations made by extremist
leaders such as the Iranian president.
In addition, we must form a clear
picture of what peace will actually look
like. We must all agree that the twostate solution is the only solution and
that this concept must include a stable
148
and secure Israel. We must ensure
that a Palestinian state is peaceful,
democratic, and pluralistic, and at the
same time politically, economically,
and socially viable.
Many Palestinians have made the
strategic mistake of believing that
they will achieve their national
aspirations through violence. Now
is the time to turn over a new
page – diplomacy must be the only
legitimate tool for achieving ultimate
goals.
The importance of confidencebuilding measures
I think that the election of President
Mahmoud Abbas has empowered
a reasonable, serious, peace-loving
and credible leader who wants to
work together with the Prime Minster
of Israel. I am also convinced that the
very courageous step taken by Prime
Minister Sharon of leaving the Gaza
Strip has given us the possibility to
engage in a new dynamic of peace.
In addition, today we can announce
that thanks to the tireless efforts of
James Wolfensohn and Javier
Solana, as well as the efforts of the
Israeli and Palestinian negotiating
teams, the Rafah crossing agreement
has been completed. This agreement
is a monumental symbol of new
momentum and confidence.
The EU has always been a nonpartisan partner that attempts to
promote peace and stability in the
region. In the last seven years, I
have tried to intensify the European
Union’s role in this process, and
to increase each side’s trust of
the EU. With the signing of the
Rafah agreement, the EU has
been presented with an enormous
challenge: ensuring security at border
crossings. This illustrates a new level
of trust that the sides have given to
the EU. I believe that these kinds of
confidence building measures are
essential for creating trust on each
side. However, we should not lose
sight of our future broader goal of a
final status settlement.
I am sure that the upcoming elections
in Israel and Palestine will be the
basis for new opportunities that will
arise. It is essential that each side
acts as a legitimate partner in efforts
to achieve a final peace accord.
The international community’s
commitment to Rabin’s legacy
The Road Map agreement has been
finalized in writing, but we have yet
to get on this the road. I’m absolutely
convinced that this road should be
taken immediately after each side’s
elections. I believe that each side is
begging the international community
to tell it that peace is possible and to
become more actively engaged.
The first step that must be made is to
totally eradicate terrorism and violence.
The Palestinians must express their
clear desire for peace through their
upcoming elections, rather than
adopting any policy that justifies
violence. At the same time the Israelis
must be willing to engage in final status
negotiations immediately. We all know
what the final parameters of the peace
deal will be and what the final map
will look like. The only question is
whether we have the political will to
achieve it. I’m not sure that Israelis
and Palestinians understand how
important Middle East peace is for
the international community. I can
assure you that in every corner of
the world there is concern about the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process and
there are important people trying to
advance Middle East peace. The
amount of people, organizations,
NGOs, media, and politicians that have
been involved in the peace process is
astounding – and they all know what
has to be done. International forums
are constantly discussing peace in
the Middle East as an immediate
necessity.
We the international community must
commit to peace – the must be our
commitment to Rabin’s legacy. The
best gift we can give Rabin, who gave
his life for peace, is to truly believe
that peace is possible and to make
it a reality by giving the Israeli and
Palestinian leaders the required push.
Without peace, we have no future. And
we need to ensure a better future for
all of us.
The Future of the Middle
East
By: Spilios Spiliotopoulus
Minister of National Defense,
Greece
It is a great privilege and pleasure to
be given the opportunity to address
such a distinguished audience and
participate in such a major effort to
promote dialogue and consolidate
an atmosphere of cooperation,
confidence and security.
The security environment in
the Middle East has become
increasingly complicated during the
past decades. Up to and including
the 1991 Gulf War, the regional
environment was largely shaped
by fears of interstate aggression.
Those fears certainly remain today,
but they are manifesting themselves
in new ways. Although the ArabIsraeli conflict has been a persistent
source of tension for decades,
traditional issues have been joined
by several more recent problems
that defy easy solutions. Weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs) continue
to spread throughout the region,
despite international non-proliferation
efforts. Terrorists recruited and
trained in the Middle East are now
carrying out attacks far beyond their
149
own borders, creating unified global
interests to counter the roots of this
phenomenon.
Greece's role in peace-making
Greece has traditionally maintained
friendly relations with Arab and
Middle East countries, due to its
geographical proximity, economic
cooperation and strong historical and
cultural bonds, dating back to ancient
times. Furthermore, Greece has been
called upon to play a role in promoting
peace and stability in the region, by
actively participating in the elaboration
and planning of the European Union
Common Foreign Policy, as well as by
exercising its role as a non-permanent
member of the UN Security Council
for the period of 2005-2006.
Greece has always advocated a just,
comprehensive and lasting resolution
to the Israeli-Arab conflict in the Middle
East. Over the years and on a bilateral
level, Greece has tried to offer its
services in approaching all parties
involved, acting as a mediator for
peace. Our traditional friendly bilateral
relations with all countries of the region
offered us the opportunity to further the
Middle East peace process during the
Greek Presidency of the E.U. Council
in 2003. Upon this line of policy, the
Greek government hosts a special
series of "Track Two" meetings on vital
150
Middle East topics. These meetings
have gradually expanded to include
representatives from all countries
in the region, bringing together
officials, academics, journalists,
security experts, and people from
the private sector, creating dialogue
that would otherwise be impossible
due to communication gaps among
countries in the region.
Road Map as focal point
As a member of the EU and the
international community, Greece
considers the Road Map to Middle
East Peace to be the central instrument
of the Middle East peace process.
To this end the active cooperation
amongst the members of the Quartet
is crucial. The vision of two states
coexisting in peace and prosperity
within internationally recognized and
secure borders is one that we share
and concur. Thus, we express our
strong concern with regards to any
action, whether governmental or
extra-governmental, that contributes
substantially to the vicious cycle of
violence in the region and perpetuates
the already aggravated humanitarian
and security situation.
The war against all forms of
terrorism as well as compliance with
international law and UN Resolutions
are of paramount importance. Greece
believes that all parties involved should
spare no effort in effectively and
lastingly dealing with this international
as well as regional plague.
As a basic policy guideline, my country
has pursued multilateral cooperation
and aims to help achieve stability in the
Middle East. Our cooperation within
the framework of the EU Barcelona
Process has been extensive and active
at economic, social and cultural levels.
In this respect, coordination with key
countries in the Middle East will
continue.
In the context of NATO’s Mediterranean
Dialogue initiative, there is extended
cooperation among these countries.
Recently, a very successful multinational
search and rescue exercise codenamed
“DOLPHIN 2005” took place in the
Eastern Mediterranean, with the
participation of assets and personnel
from Greece, Jordan, Israel, Egypt,
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue initiative
constitutes an important project to
promote stability and security, not
only for the region but for the wider
Euro-Atlantic area as well. Moreover,
it is one of the few frameworks that
give Israel and Arab States have the
opportunity to cooperate. Therefore,
we must ensure that this unique
initiative always maintains its cohesive
character.
We saluted the successful completion
of the Israeli disengagement from Gaza
through fruitful coordination with the
Palestinians. However, we urge all
parties involved to abstain from actions
that endanger the peace process, as
well as the fragile truce. Here I should
mention that Greece welcomes
the report of the Quartet’s Special
Envoy Mr. James Wolfensohn for the
disengagement and reconstruction
of Gaza, and supports the Quartet’s
continuous engagement in the
peace process. Israel should take
all necessary measures to support
the economic and political viability of
Gaza and the West Bank, as well as
secure freedom of movement between
the Palestinian population areas. It is
our belief that Gaza must not be
economically disconnected from the
West Bank.
Greece is ready to take an active role in
successful post-conflict reconstruction,
using the experience that it has
acquired in dealing with the conflict in
the Balkan states.
The Palestinian Authority and President
Abbas should do everything in their
power to advance the necessary
reforms and to fight terrorism. In
this context, EU’s support through
the “EU Police Mission for the
Palestinian Territories” program is of
vital importance. The transformation of
Hamas into a genuine political force,
which would renounce violence and
enter the political process, should be
encouraged. Its participation in the
parliamentary elections of January
2006 should not be viewed with
fear, but rather should be seen as an
encouraging sign of the organization
choosing
imperative
political
transformation.
Solutions to regional conflict
must be comprehensive
We have to reinvigorate our efforts
to promote progress on all tracks
of the peace process. A lasting and
sustainable peace in the Middle East
will not prevail unless the solution is
comprehensive. Final status issues,
including border issues, have to
be agreed to by the two parties.
Peace, stability and prosperity in
the Mediterranean region are of
fundamental importance to all of us.
Regarding issues related to Syria
and Lebanon, we believe that only
full implementation of UNSCR
1559 can guarantee a sovereign,
independent and democratic Lebanon.
Meanwhile, the newly unanimously
adopted Security Council Resolution
1636, a great achievement of the
International Community, serves the
cause of regional stability and thus
of international security and peace. It
is our hope that Syria will cooperate
fully and unconditionally with the
International Investigative Commission,
in order to identify and bring to justice
the perpetrators of this terrorist act,
thus facilitating peaceful settlement of
the issue and a chance to open a new
chapter in its relations with Lebanon.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons is
absolutely unacceptable. Any actions
by states that appear to raise that
prospect must be blocked at an early
stage. At the same time, we strongly
support the EU’s approach regarding
the Iran situation, according to which
negotiations are seen as the optimal
method for solving the crisis. This,
of course, depends on Iran’s attitude
regarding finding a solution in the
near future. Undoubtedly, we cannot
but condemn in the strongest terms
President Ahmedinejad's comments
regarding the State of Israel.
Continuation of the comprehensive
dialogue between the EU and Iran is
of paramount importance and should
include all issues of mutual concern
and interest such as terrorism, counternarcotics, the proliferation of WMDs,
human rights, the MEPP, and regional
issues.
Similarly, sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity, stability and unity
of Iraq are of vital importance for
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all of us. In the on-going political
process in Iraq, endorsed by UN
Security Council Resolution 1546,
Greece supports the principles
of inclusiveness, participation,
reconciliation and national unity, with
the aim of a federal, democratic,
pluralist and unified Iraq, with full
respect for human rights. Terrorist
violence, which no cause can ever
justify, is unequivocally condemned.
We urge Iraqis to eschew violence and
participate in the political process as
they set the course for Iraq’s future.
Today, the developed dynamic for the
settlement of disputes in the region
gives hopeful signals and offers an
opportunity that we cannot afford
to miss.
Within this positive atmosphere, the
international community and Middle
Eastern states must display courage
and decisiveness towards a common
direction of peace. The cost of failure
is particularly high.
Towards that goal, we should increase
dialogue and cooperation, the
cornerstones for implementing peace
and security in the Middle East.
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Concluding Remarks
By: Maj. Gen. (ret.) Danny
Yatom, Member of Knesset,
Chairman of the S. Daniel
Abraham Center for Strategic
Dialogue
Over the last two days, we have
experienced very emotional and
interesting discussions and events.
The time has come to make some
concluding remarks, although there
is a saying in Hebrew that is loosely
translated as ‘It is finished, but not yet
completed.’ This is not only the way
to view this conference, but also the
issue of peace. The discussions over
the last two days strengthen my belief
and evaluation that peace could have
been achieved had Rabin still been
with us.
I speak from a standpoint of a broad
perspective and wealth of experience
in the peace process. I participated
in all the negotiations, meetings, and
discussions during Rabin’s tenure, as
I served as his military secretary at the
time. I participated with Peres during
all such meetings, and with Barak in
Sheppardstown and Camp David. I
believe that amongst Israeli political
leaders who are alive today, I have the
most comprehensive level of experience
regarding peace negotiations between
Israel and its neighbors over the last
15 years.
The ten years since Rabin’s assassination
have included almost no political
progress. They were, in essence, ten
wasted years. Instead of just talking
about the peace process, we all could
have done much more to develop peace
and push it forward.
future where our children and
grandchildren will be able to enjoy
peace the way normal nations enjoy
peace in many other parts of the
world.
The need for courageous
leaders
Many have asked me, ‘What is the
legacy of the late Rabin?’ My answer
is that his legacy is very broad and
deep, and touches almost all aspects
of life. His legacy includes setting an
example for others, self-determination, a
total obligation to country and people,
courage both on the battlefield and in
the struggle for peace, honesty and
dedication to truth, and approaching
security as something enhanced
by peace. Rabin was a man of his
word – his word was more solid than
a rock, and could be fully depended
on. Although he was not a man of
small talk, he had the ability to build
very unique and warm relations with
many leaders in the area, especially
with the late King Hussein and
President Mubarak.
In this region, we need courageous
leaders such as the late Prime Minister
Rabin, the late King Hussein, the late
President Sadat, and the late Prime
Minister Begin. We need leaders to
lead us, pave the way, and bridge
gaps, so that the people of this region
can finally live in peace and tranquility.
We need leaders who will be ready
to overturn every stone in search of
peace. We need leaders who are
ready to take calculated risks and
make concessions.
The main difference between peace and
war is that peace is a win-win situation,
while war is a lose-lose situation. We
need leaders who will dare to trust one
another and be ready, as Rabin said,
to ‘give a chance to peace’.
We are dealing with issues of life and
death. We must give a chance to a
better future, to a calmer future, to a
future void of hostilities, violence and
terror. We must create a prosperous
Rabin’s legacy
Rabin understood that the conflict
between Israel and its neighbors is,
at its root, a conflict between Israel and
the Palestinians. However, he really
believed that it would be easier to
achieve peace with Syria than with the
Palestinians due to the fact that the
issues between Israel and Syria are
153
much easier to solve. The Israel-Syria
conflict is mainly a question of borders,
while the Palestinian issue includes
many other factors. Rabin had the
courage to negotiate on three tracks
in parallel: the Syrian, Palestinian, and
Jordanian tracks.
Rabin believed that he, a man with his
military and political background, had
the power and leadership to come to
the Israeli people and with agreements
that he found suitable and convince the
Israeli people to approve of them and
agree to very heavy compromises and
concessions.
The charted map for peace
Rabin understood that if our neighbors
are happy, we are happy. It is no mere
coincidence that ten years after the
assassination, we miss Rabin so
much. It is no coincidence that ten
years after the assassination, so many
great figures from all over the world
have come to Israel to participate in
the commemoration of the man and
his legacy.
I believe in Rabin’s way. My hope is
that this conference will help push
the peace process forward. The
geographic and demographic position
of each side is well-known. If you wake
me up in the middle of the night, I can
tell you exactly the position of the
154
Palestinians and Syrians. They could
do the same regarding Israeli positions.
We know the price tag of peace. We
need courageous leaders to call for
a resumption of talks without any
pre-conditions. Of course, we must
fight terror with all of our strength. But
we should not create conditions that
delay the process of peace-making.
By discussing peace, we will find ways
to fight terror in conjunction with our
Arab neighbors.
I must confess that this conference
has felt to me like a time-machine,
as it took me back ten years ago
to a time when I spent days and
nights with many of the Palestinian,
Egyptian, Jordanian, American,
European, and Israeli figures present
at this conference, in our joint struggle
for peace.
I want to conclude with a short
touching story. Immediately after
Rabin’s funeral, the late King Hussein
called me and Eitan Haber to his hotel
room in Jerusalem. With tears in his
eyes, the King told us, ‘I know that
you have just lost a leader, a father,
a Prime Minister, but I, King Hussein,
have lost my best friend.’ These were
the depths of his feelings towards the
late Rabin.
I would like to take this opportunity
to thank each and every one of you.
First of all, I would like to thank the
organizers, my team at the Strategic
Dialogue Center, and all those who
came to our assistance to make this
conference a reality. I spent many
sleepless nights worrying about this
conference, and was quite nervous
yesterday morning at the conference’s
outset; however, when I saw the hall
filling up with so many nice and familiar
faces, I relaxed. I would like to thank,
from the bottom of my heart, all of the
speakers – the Israelis, and the good
friends of ours who came from all over
the world. I would like to conclude by
saying to everyone goodbye, salam
alekum, and shalom l’kulam. Thank
you very much.