The Impact of Crew Engagement and

Transcription

Market Intelligence Report
The Impact of Crew Engagement and Organizational
Culture on Maritime Safety in the Workboats and
OSV Sectors
Dr Kate Pike and Emma Broadhurst (Southampton Solent University)
Catherine Austin and Isabelle Rojon (Fathom Maritime Intelligence)
May 2015
1 Table Of Contents
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................ 6
1
Introduction To The Research Study .............................................................................................. 9
1.1
Purpose Of The Research Study............................................................................................ 9
1.2
Research Study Background .................................................................................................. 9
1.2.1
The Evolution Of Safety In The Maritime Industry .......................................................... 9
1.2.2
The Human Element ..................................................................................................... 10
1.2.3
The Importance Of Safe Operations ............................................................................. 10
1.2.4
Regulatory Governance ................................................................................................ 11
1.2.5
Influence Of Safety Incidents In Other Industries ......................................................... 11
1.3
2
3
Research Study Methodology .............................................................................................. 12
1.3.1
Qualitative Research .................................................................................................... 12
1.3.2
Quantitative Research .................................................................................................. 12
The Relation Between The Human Element, Safety Culture And Safety Performance ............... 15
2.1
The Human Element............................................................................................................. 15
2.2
Safety Culture ....................................................................................................................... 16
2.2.1
The Definition Of Safety Culture ................................................................................... 16
2.2.2
A Framework For Assessing Safety Culture ................................................................. 17
Governing Safety In The Workboat Sector ................................................................................... 23
3.1
Workboat Sector Regulations – United States Region ......................................................... 23
3.2
Voluntary Workboat Safety Initiatives And Programs – United States Region ..................... 24
3.2.1
3.3
The American Waterways Operator’s Responsible Carrier Program ........................... 24
International Maritime Safety Regulation.............................................................................. 24
3.3.1
The International Convention For The Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) ........................ 24
3.3.2
The International Safety Management (ISM) Code ...................................................... 25
3.3.3
The International Convention On Standards Of Training, Certification And
Watchkeeping For Seafarers (STCW) .......................................................................................... 25
3.3.4
4
The Maritime Labor Convention ................................................................................... 26
Safety Performance In The Workboat Sector ............................................................................... 27
4.1
Analysis Of European Accident and Casualty Statistics....................................................... 28
4.1.1
Analysis Of Marine Casualties And Incidents – 2011-2013 .......................................... 28
4.1.2
EU Marine Casualties And Incidents By Vessel Type, 2011-2013 ............................... 29
4.1.3
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 33
2 4.2
Analysis Of Vessel Deficiencies And Detentions, 2014........................................................ 34
4.2.1
General Overview Of Deficiencies As Recorded By Paris MOU Authorities ................ 34
4.2.2
General Overview Of Deficiencies As Recorded By Tokyo MOU Authorities .............. 35
4.2.3
Deficiencies And Detentions In The Tugboat Sector In European, North Atlantic And
Asia-Pacific Waters, 2014 ............................................................................................................ 36
4.2.4
Deficiencies And Detentions In The Offshore Support Vessel Sector In European,
North Atlantic And Asia-Pacific Waters, 2014 .............................................................................. 40
4.2.5
5
6
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 45
The Perception Of Safety Culture And Crew Engagement In The OSV Sector ........................... 47
5.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 47
5.2
Survey Findings .................................................................................................................... 47
5.2.1
Section 1: Respondent’s Profile ................................................................................... 47
5.2.2
Section 2: Vessel .......................................................................................................... 49
5.2.3
Section 3: Global Regions: ........................................................................................... 50
5.2.4
Section 4: Training ........................................................................................................ 55
5.2.5
Section 5: Communication ............................................................................................ 55
5.2.6
Section 6: Safety Culture .............................................................................................. 56
5.2.7
Summary ...................................................................................................................... 61
The Impact of Safety Culture on Incidents In The Workboat Industry .......................................... 63
6.1
Case Study 1: Fairplay Towage Tug Vessel – November .................................................... 63
6.1.1
Incident Overview ......................................................................................................... 63
6.1.2
Vessel Owner Information ............................................................................................ 63
6.1.3
Incident Summary ......................................................................................................... 63
6.1.4
Assessment of Safety Culture & Crew Engagement .................................................... 63
6.1.5
Action Taken After The Incident ................................................................................... 68
6.1.6
Safety Culture & Crew Engagement - Summary .......................................................... 68
6.2
Case Study 2: Holyhead Towing Company Limited (HTC) Tug Vessel– March 2010 ......... 68
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
Action Taken After The Incident ................................................................................... 71
6.2.6
6.3
Case Study 3: Midnight Marine Limited Tug and Barge Vessels – May 2014 ..................... 72
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
6.3.4
6.3.5
Action Taken After The Accident .................................................................................. 74
3 6.3.6
7
Industry Safety Leaders And Best Practice .................................................................................. 75
7.1
7.1.1
Company Overview ...................................................................................................... 75
7.1.2
Safety Performance Summary ..................................................................................... 75
7.1.3
Assessment Of Safety Culture & Crew Engagement ................................................... 76
7.1.4
Safety Culture & Crew Engagement – Summary ......................................................... 80
7.2
Case Study 2: Foss Maritime Company ............................................................................... 80
7.2.1
Company Summary ...................................................................................................... 80
7.2.2
7.2.3
Assessment Of Safety Culture & Crew Engagement ................................................... 82
7.2.4
7.3
8
Case Study 1: Svitzer ........................................................................................................... 75
Case Study 3: American Commercial Lines ......................................................................... 85
7.3.1
Company Summary ...................................................................................................... 85
7.3.2
7.3.3
7.3.4
Conclusions And Recommendations ........................................................................................... 88
8.1
The Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 88
8.2
The Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 88
8.3
The Offshore Industry Stakeholder Survey .......................................................................... 89
8.4
The Investigation Of Accidents ............................................................................................. 90
8.5
The ‘Safety Leaders’ Analysis .............................................................................................. 90
8.6
Recommendations................................................................................................................ 91
9
References ................................................................................................................................... 95
10
Annexes................................................................................................................................ 98
Annex 1: Indicators For Assessing A Shipping Company’s Safety Culture...................................... 98
Annex 2: Tugboats Inspected By Paris MOU Authorities In 2014 .................................................. 100
Annex 3: Tugboats Inspected By Tokyo MOU Authorities In 2014 ................................................ 101
Annex 4: Offshore Support Vessels Inspected By Paris MOU Authorities In 2014 ........................ 106
Annex 5: Offshore Support Vessels Inspected By Tokyo MOU Authorities In 2014 ...................... 112
Annex 6: Questionnaire: Supporting A Positive Safety Culture In The Offshore Industry .............. 114
4 Table Of Figures
Figure 1: Contribution Of Human Error To Accidents........................................................................... 15
Figure 2: Number Of Occurrences According To Severity, 2011-2013. ............................................... 29
Figure 3: Number Of Vessels Involved In Occurrences By Main Category, 2011-2013 ...................... 30
Figure 4: Distribution Of Vessels Involved In Occurrences By Main Vessel Sub-Categories, 20112013 ..................................................................................................................................................... 31
Figure 5: Number Of Vessels Involved In A ‘Casualty With A Vessel’ By Vessel Category,2011-2013
............................................................................................................................................................. 32
Figure 6: Number Of Vessels Involved In An Occupational Accident By Vessel Category, 2011-2013
............................................................................................................................................................. 32
Figure 7: Number Of Vessels Sunk, 2011-2013................................................................................... 32
Figure 8: Number Of Vessels Damaged, 2011-2013 ........................................................................... 32
Figure 9: Number Of Vessels Considered Unfit To Proceed, 2011-2013 ............................................ 32
Figure 10: Number Of Vessels By Year And By Category Requiring Towage Or Shore Assistance,
2011-2013 ............................................................................................................................................ 32
Figure 11: Fatality Per Vessel Category, 2011-2013 ........................................................................... 33
Figure 12: Distribution Of Injured Persons By Vessel Category, 2011-2013 ....................................... 33
Figure 13: Inspected Vessels With Deficiencies, ................................................................................. 35
Figure 14: Detained Vessels, By Vessel Type, 2014 ........................................................................... 35
Figure 15: Inspected Vessels With Deficiencies, By Vessel Type, Tokyo Mou, 2014 .......................... 36
Figure 16: Detained Vessels, By Vessel Type, Tokyo Mou, 2014 ....................................................... 36
Figure 17: Percentage Of Tugs With Deficiencies – 2014, Paris Mou ................................................. 37
Figure 18: Percentage Of Tugs With Deficiencies – 2014, Tokyo Mou................................................ 37
Figure 19: Number Of Deficiencies Per Area Of Deficiency – 2014, Paris Mou .................................. 37
Figure 20: Number Of Deficiencies Per Area Of Deficiency – 2014, Tokyo Mou ................................. 37
Figure 21: Reasons For Workboat Detentions In 2014, Paris And Tokyo Mou .................................... 40
Figure 22: Percentage Of Osvs With Deficiencies – 2014, Paris Mou ................................................. 41
Figure 23: Percentage Of Osvs With Deficiencies – 2014, Tokyo Mou ............................................... 41
Figure 24: Number Of Deficiencies Per Area Of Deficiency – 2014, Paris Mou .................................. 42
Figure 25: Number Of Deficiencies Per Area Of Deficiency – 2014, Tokyo Mou ................................. 42
Figure 26: Reasons For Osv Detentions In 2014, Paris And Tokyo Mou............................................. 45
Figure 27: Current Job Title .................................................................................................................. 47
Figure 28: What Is Your Nationality? .................................................................................................... 48
Figure 29: What Is Your Nationality? .................................................................................................... 48
Figure 30: Which Age Range Are You In? ........................................................................................... 49
Figure 31: Which Country Is The Vessel Flagged To? ......................................................................... 49
Figure 32: Which Country Is The Vessel Flagged To? ......................................................................... 49
Figure 33: Which Regions Of The World Have You Worked In? ......................................................... 50
Figure 34: Which Region Are You Currently Working In? .................................................................... 51
Figure 35: Which Region Are You Currently Working In? .................................................................... 51
Figure 36: Foss Maritime Incident Rates. 2007 - 2010 ........................................................................ 81
5 Executive Summary
Both workboats and offshore supply vessels (OSVs) operate in highly dangerous working
conditions. The work carried out by workboats is inherently risky, whereas OSVs often work
in extreme and unpredictable weather conditions with heavy moving equipment on open
decks.
Despite the dangerous nature of their work, workboats and OSVs have not been the focus of
much safety-related research. Instead, a lot of research has focused on the deep-sea
maritime industry, establishing that safety culture and crew engagement play an important
part in preventing marine incidents and accidents.
This research study aimed to examine the link between the human element and safety
performance on workboats and OSVs, answering the following research question:
How do crew engagement and organizational culture impact on maritime safety on
workboats and OSVs?
The research study concluded that, like in other industries, crew engagement and
organizational safety culture impact heavily on the safety performance on workboats and
OSVs.
To arrive at this conclusion, several research methods were used.
An in-depth literature review was conducted to identify factors important towards the
establishment of an organizational safety culture within the maritime industry, inclusive of the
workboat and OSV sectors. These factors are: communication; empowerment of employees;
feedback systems; mutual trust; problem identification; promotion of safety; responsiveness;
safety awareness. This set of eight factors was used to develop a framework for assessing
the safety culture of a shipping company.
In order to assess the current safety performance in the wider maritime industry as well as in
the workboat and OSV sectors, marine casualty statistics provided by the European Marine
Casualty Information Platform were examined. Almost 6,000 occurrences were reported
during 2011 and 2013 in EU waters or on EU-flagged vessels. General cargo vessels proved
to be not only the vessel category the most involved in occurrences, but also the vessel
category with the highest rate of casualties and experiencing the greatest number of
occurrences according to severity. In contrast, tugs and OSVs were involved in
comparatively few occurrences and recorded far less fatalities and injuries, suggesting that
their safety performance may be superior to that of other vessel categories.
Port State Control (PSC) inspections and the resulting vessel deficiencies and detentions
were then used as an indicator for safety culture and crew engagement. During 2014,
general cargo/multi-purpose vessels, bulk carriers and container ships recorded most
deficiencies and detentions and OSVs and tugs amongst the least. The vast majority of
inspected workboats and OSVs registered no or only very few deficiencies and only a very
low percentage of both vessel types were detained. However, those deficiencies and
detentions recorded were mostly due to factors related to safety culture and crew wellbeing,
hence it was concluded that better safety management procedures, improved safety culture
and ensuring crew wellbeing could contribute to lowering workboat and OSV deficiencies
and detentions.
In order to observe whether current safety procedures are adequate in the offshore industry,
an international online survey was run by Southampton Solent University with 50 participants
from key offshore companies to establish their safety working practices and their thoughts
6 and opinions regarding the safety culture within their current company and the industry as a
whole.
For this survey, organization and different geographical cultures were considered crucial
factors in determining the levels of safety practiced onboard. The key report findings
highlighted a general trust of the onboard management implementing the health and safety
procedures, but less certainty when this applied to challenging safety decisions made by
authority, unless it was felt the circumstances were life threatening. Failure to under report
accidents was evident and attributed to the fear of negative repercussions to job security and
the damage it may cause to a company’s good safety record and an additional
administrative burden. Issues surrounding communication and language barriers were
presented as another issue which is particularly relevant in light of the multi-national crews
operating onboard and the global nature of the industry. Issues between the onboard
management and the client were evident and were attributed to pressures to complete a job
on time and how this translated to under reporting safety failures off-shore. The onshore
management were also highlighted in the research as making decisions about safety for
offshore teams without thoroughly understanding the day to day operations at sea.
In order to understand how safety culture can contribute to accidents onboard workboats,
three case studies were conducted, examining the safety culture onboard workboats that
had been involved in an accident. The companies’ safety cultures were assessed based on
the framework developed through the literature review. The case study analysis established
that many factors contributing to the accidents find root in the company’s safety
management. This is even the case for those accidents, which were primarily caused by
equipment failure. In particular, incomplete or inexistent hazard identification procedures,
lack of safety procedures or failure to ensure they are implemented, lack of communication
about safety hazards and insufficiently trained crews were mentioned as factors contributing
to the accidents.
After establishing the link between poor safety culture and accident causation, the research
study focused on identifying to what extent a well-embedded organizational safety culture
can contribute to safety leadership within the workboat industry. Again, three case studies
were conducted, this time of companies with above-average safety records, and the
framework developed based on the literature review was used to assess each company’s
safety culture. All three companies communicate safety as their top operating priority and
despite not being legally obliged, two out of the three companies had established a certified
safety management system. Communication of safety procedures and other safety-related
information was found to be an important aspect and innovative ways were developed to
achieve effective communication. All three companies established reporting mechanisms to
encourage employee feedback and urged their crews to stop an operation they deem
unsafe.
Based on the research study findings, recommendations were made for companies in the
workboat and OSV sectors wishing to improve their safety records via establishing a sound
organizational safety culture. It was suggested that companies focus on the set of eight
safety factors identified in the literature review and validated through the case study
analysis. It was also recommended that companies establish a safety management system
following the principles set out in the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and
adapt it to the company’s specific needs and circumstances.
Furthermore, recommendations were made for further research in the area of further
exploring the client, management relationships and the onshore and offshore management
relationships in relation to decision-making for safety procedures at sea. Based on the OSV
7 survey findings, it was also recommended that further research is invested in establishing
which specific safety concerns exist in the Gulf of Mexico as this was an area that was said
to have a good and bad reputation towards implementing safety culture.
Safety culture is paramount in both the workboat and offshore sectors, but ensuring that
multi-national crews from different companies operating in different global regions
consistently work safely and report any accidents is difficult to ensure, and presents a highly
complex picture. This report presents some of the key issues raised by the industry and
discusses them in light of the organizational structures within the workboat and offshore
sectors. The findings highlighted provide evidence for future investigation.
8 1 Introduction To The Research Study
1.1 Purpose Of The Research Study
There are numerous studies, reports and academic papers that have addressed various
issues regarding maritime safety. A large amount of research has been conducted to identify
the impact of safety culture on safety performance within the maritime industry. The role of
the human element and the role of organizational safety cultures on the safety of maritime
operations have also been at the center of much research.
However, the majority of former research has mainly focused on the deep-sea maritime
industry and has in the majority been unspecific with regards to vessel types. The workboat
and offshore supply vessel (OSV) sector have been the focus of relatively few studies and
hardly any research activity has been devoted specifically to the impact of the human
element and organizational safety cultures on the safety of workboat and OSV operations.
In this research study, we examine the link between the human element and the safety of
operations on workboats and on OSVs. Specifically, we focus on the role of crew
engagement and organizational safety cultures and how they impact on workboat and OSV
safety.
This research study attempts to answer the following question:
How do crew engagement and organizational culture impact on maritime safety on
workboats and offshore support vessels (OSVs)?
Please note that within this research study, for ease of navigation, we use the term ‘Maritime
Industry’ to represent the global maritime industry inclusive of all sectors and vessel types.
We use the term ‘Workboat Sector’ to represent solely the workboat sector, workboat
vessels and workboat operations. Similarly, we use ‘OSV Sector’ to represent the OSV
sector and OSV operations.
1.2 Research Study Background
1.2.1 The Evolution Of Safety In The Maritime Industry
The maritime industry has taken great strides to improve the safety of its operations, both
across domestic and international voyaging sectors. The global maritime industry has
undergone a staged process of evolution in its quest for enhancing the safety of operations.
Initial efforts for this staged approach focused chiefly on technical faults. This is due to the
fact that “safety” was primarily perceived as being a technical problem.1
The resolution of technical problems such as enhancing navigation aids, improving vessel
structures and designs to improve the reliability of vessel systems has clearly contributed to
enhancing maritime safety. Despite the trebling of the world fleet from 30,000 vessels in
1910 to over 100,000 vessels in 2010, shipping losses have decreased significantly: One
vessel in every 100 was lost in 1910, a rate which has improved to around one vessel in
every 670 as at 2010.2
But whilst vessel structures are becoming safer, system reliability is better and today’s
vessels are becoming increasingly technologically advanced and highly reliable, the
maritime casualty rate is still high compared to other industries. Seafaring remains a
dangerous profession. While professional seafarer fatality rates have fallen – for example, in
1
Havold (2007) From safety culture to safety orientation: Developing a tool to measure safety in
shipping, PhD Thesis
2
Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2012) Safety and Shipping 1912-2012. From Titanic to Costa
Concordia
9 the United Kingdom per 100,000 seafarer-years, from 358 in 1919 to 11 in 1996-2005 – this
fatality rate is still twelve times higher than in the general workforce, two and a half times
higher than in the construction sector and eight and a half times higher than in
manufacturing.
Despite inconsistent data, other country statistics appear to be considerably higher: for
example Hong Kong recorded 96 per 100,000 seafarers per annum for 1996-2005, and
Poland a rate of 84 per 100,000 seafarers per annum for the same period.3
Despite the enhancement and improved reliability of vessels and their systems, why are
maritime casualties still high compared to other industries? It is because vessel structure,
technical aspects and system reliability are a relatively small element of the safety equation.
A vessel can be 100% structurally and technically safe with all the correct procedures and
documentation in place, however that vessel will only operate in a 100% safe manner via
interaction of the crew. Therefore, the crew is an inherent influencing factor on the safety of
maritime operations.
1.2.2 The Human Element
The maritime industry is a human-based system, and human errors figure prominently in
casualty situations. Approximately 75-96% of maritime casualties are caused, at least in
part, by some form of human error.4 Therefore, human error holds a high relative
contribution in safety-related incident causation.
The ‘human element’ was thus gradually added into the safety equation, first by attributing
accidents to dangerous acts of individuals workers and later by focusing more on
organizational safety and complex system interactions rather than individual wrong-doings.
However, it was only in the 1990’s that the notion of ‘safety culture’ gained wide-spread
interest within all major industries, including the maritime industry.5
1.2.3 The Importance Of Safe Operations
The importance of improving the safety of maritime operations is amplified due to the fact
that maritime incidents have a high potential for catastrophes and maritime disasters can
cause high rates of fatal injuries.6
Furthermore, the financial losses associated with safety-related incidents and accidents are
high and include, for example:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Costs due to the accident, including inspections, investigations, meetings and
administration.
Damages to equipment, machinery, materials and facility.
Delays in shipments and filling orders.
Medical costs for treatment, surgery, medicine and rehabilitation of the injured
employee(s).
Unwarranted negative media attention and potential reputation loss.
Potential government penalties.7
These financial costs can add up to sizeable sums. In the annual United States (US) Towing
Industry Safety Statistics Report, it is estimated that each incident of low severity causes
3
Concordia
4
Rothblum (2000) Human Error and Marine Safety
5
Havold (2007) From safety culture to safety orientation: Developing a tool to measure safety in
shipping
6
Hansen, Nielsen & Frydenberg (2002). Occupational accidents aboard merchant ships
7
Rainsberger (2014) Safety Corner: Direct Vs. Indirect Costs - Just the Tip of the Iceberg
10 damage of up to US$50,000 and that incidents of medium severity cost between US$50,000
and US$250,000 and incidents of high severity anything above US$250,000.8 For these
reasons, vessel owners and operators have had to act upon safety both from a financial and
moral perspective.
1.2.4 Regulatory Governance
In order to improve safety of operations, several regulations have been developed for the
maritime industry.
Although the safety of operations within the workboat sector is generally governed by
regional regulations, the sector has been influenced by a few international regulatory
instruments that take both the human element and technical safety requirements into
account.
Two key international regulations that have influenced safety in the workboat sector greatly
are the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, developed and adopted following the
sinking of RMS Titanic in 1914, and the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which
was ultimately adopted as Chapter IX of the SOLAS Convention. Both the SOLAS
Convention and the ISM Code are governed by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) and are, in practice, only applicable to (and only regulate) vessels engaged in
international voyages. Vessels below 500 GT generally do not come under the auspices of
such the regulations and governance contained within.
Whilst many workboats that engage exclusively in domestic operations, for example towing
vessels or passenger vessels, are not bound by the SOLAS Convention or ISM Code, many
domestic workboat operators voluntarily implement safety management systems that adhere
to or are inspired by the ISM Code and do this despite not explicitly being required to do so.
The safety of domestic workboat operations is also influenced by voluntary schemes that
provide guidance and non-mandatory recommendations for safety practices. When
examining any of these voluntary schemes, voluntary associations and accreditations, it is
clear that the human element plays a significant role in ensuring the safety of workboat
operations. For example, the Responsible Carrier Program by the American Waterways
Operators not only focuses on vessel equipment and inspections, but also incorporates
aspects such as safety and security policies, incident reporting and emergency response
procedures, manning, work hours and training, thereby underlining the importance of
managerial and human aspects in ensuring safe operations.
The regulation of safety at both an international and regional level and also specifically within
the workboat sector is examined further in Sections 3.1 and 3.3.
1.2.5 Influence Of Safety Incidents In Other Industries
The maritime industry has been influenced by safety incidents and accidents in other
industries.
One safety incident that gave insight into the importance of the human element and the role
of organizational safety cultures to ensure operational safety was the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant disaster in 1986.
8
US Coast Guard & American Waterways Operators (2014) USCG-AWO Safety Report National
Quality Steering Committee. Towing Industry Safety Statistics Report 1994-2013
11 The summary report of the post-accident review meeting on the Chernobyl accident by the
International Atomic Energy Agency noted that: “The root cause of the Chernobyl accident, it
is concluded, is to be found in the so-called human element.”9
The crucial role human and organizational factors play in nuclear safety were highlighted by
subsequent incidents across the nuclear community. In 2002, significant corrosion of the
reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant was discovered. The root cause
analysis of the situation identified a poor safety culture as the primary reason that the
operating organization allowed such a condition to develop.10
Subsequent reports into other major disasters across many different industries produced
similar findings. They too recognized the impact of safety culture on safety performance,
noting that most operational incidents are not solely the result of human error, technical
failures, or environmental factors. Often, there are more systemic organizational or
managerial flaws (e.g., a fatal combination of failure of management, employees not
performing their duties, and a breakdown in documented systems).11
1.3 Research Study Methodology
For this research study, the selected question is examined from both a qualitative and
quantitative approach. The question being:
How do crew engagement and organizational culture impact on maritime
safety on workboats and OSVs?
1.3.1 Qualitative Research
The qualitative research approach consists of a literature review used to analyze the impact
of the human element on maritime safety The literature reviewed included academic papers,
class society reports, white papers, conference reports, consultancy studies, and trade news
articles and features. The literature review was used to identify the constituting elements of a
sound maritime safety culture.
These elements form an assessment framework which is consequently applied to several
case studies to identify both best practice (i.e. companies with a good safety culture and
good safety performance) and worst practice (i.e. accidents induced by lack of safety
culture). The selection of companies with a good safety culture was based on their superior
safety performance records, whereas accidents induced by a lack of safety culture were
selected from official accident investigation reports published by Marine Accident
Investigation bodies. The data used to analyze the safety culture of these companies was
primarily sourced from authorized accident reports and publicly available resources,
including but not limited to, the company’s websites and news reports.
1.3.2 Quantitative Research
1.3.2.1 Analysis Of Marine Casualty Statistics And Deficiency And Detention Data
The first part of the quantitative approach of this research study consists of the analysis of
maritime safety-related statistical data from a selection of sources, including the European
Marine Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP), the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on
Port State Control (Paris MOU) and the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control (Tokyo MOU).
9
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (1986) Summary Report on the Post-accident Review
Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident
10
International Atomic Energy Agency (2013) Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Safety in
the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
11
ABS (2014) Guidance notes on safety culture and leading indicators of safety
12 EMCIP provides accident data and casualty statistics on vessels (inclusive of workboats and
OSVs) flying a flag of an EU Member State, accidents in European territorial seas and
internal waters or wherever there are European interests involved, as reported by EU
Member States in EMCIP. This data is used to assess the safety performance in the
maritime industry in general and in the workboat sector specifically.
Both the Paris and the Tokyo MOU provide data on the outcome of inspections conducted
by port States which check if vessels entering their ports comply with applicable regulations.
Such inspections can either result in deficiencies (when some aspects of the vessel do not
comply with applicable regulations) or detentions (if the vessel is either unsafe to proceed to
sea or the deficiencies on the vessel are so serious that they will have to be rectified before
the vessel sails). The deficiency and detention data is used to shine a light on the safety
culture in the workboat and offshore support vessel sectors and to identify potential gaps in
safety management practices.
Regional cooperation among port States has led to the conclusion of Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU). These MOUs seek to promote and realise more effective Port State
Control (PSC) for a given region and to eliminate the operation of sub-standard vessels
through a harmonised system of PSC. To date, nine different MOUs have been concluded:
•
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The Paris MOU (European coastal States and the North Atlantic basin from North
America to Europe).
The Tokyo MOU (Asia-Pacific region).
Acuerdo Latino or Acuerdo de Viña del Mar (South and Central America).
The Caribbean MOU (the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico).
The Mediterranean MOU (the southern and eastern Mediterranean region).
The Indian Ocean MOU (the Indian Ocean region).
The Abuja MOU (West and Central Atlantic Africa).
The Black Sea MOU (Black Sea region).
The Riyadh MOU (Persian Gulf region).
For the purpose of this research study, the MOU data sources selected were the Paris and
Tokyo MOU. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, the Paris and Tokyo MOU have the most
comprehensive reporting system in place and therefore offer the best set of deficiency and
detention data.
Secondly, the data provided by the Paris and Tokyo MOU is best aligned with the
geographical scope of this particular research study:
•
The Paris MOU consists of 27 participating maritime Administrations and covers the
waters of the European coastal States and the North Atlantic basin from North
America to Europe. The current member States of the Paris MOU are:
o
•
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
The Tokyo MOU consists of 19 member Authorities in the Asia-Pacific region. The
current member States of the Tokyo MOU are:
o
Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Papua New
13 Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu,
Vietnam.
The EMCIP accident data combined with the Paris and Tokyo MOU deficiency and detention
data is used to exemplify the overall safety performance of the workboat and OSV sector
and highlight safety non-compliance issues within three different geographical areas, i.e.
within European territorial seas and internal waters, the North Atlantic basin from North
America to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
1.3.2.2 Surveying Stakeholders In The OSV Sector
The stakeholder survey used a mixed methods approach. Secondary data collection
involved a preliminary literature review to highlight commonly acknowledged issues
associated with the concept of safety culture. It was important to determine possible
influences on an individual’s perception of safety culture, in order to assess their different
reactions these issues. Crew engagement and attitudes towards safety procedures whilst
operating offshore were captured through primary data collection using an online
questionnaire. This method was chosen following its success in previous studies that
recorded the views of offshore crews in relation to safety culture and its implementation;
clearly demonstrating crew’s familiarity and acceptance of the questionnaire process. The
survey utilized a series of quantitative and qualitative questions in order to produce a greater
range of detailed results, which is particularly important for the consideration of future
recommendations to the industry.
This questionnaire was distributed online using web-based survey collection software,
Sphinx, whose benefits include ease of data collection from a wide target audience from
different backgrounds and geographical locations.
Conducting research surveys in the offshore environment has limitations: it is notoriously
difficult to gain information from the offshore industry success is dependent on access to
contacts within the industry. In many industries there is a recognized sense of unwillingness
to divulge personal opinions for research due to fear of repercussions and also the time it
takes to complete them. Crew members with families relying on their income for support
back home may be hesitant to participate in anything that could potentially jeopardize their
careers, and subsequently their income. To counter some of these potential issues, this
survey guaranteed anonymity and utilized many contacts from Helm, Southampton Solent
University and Fathom. The questionnaire used in this study was distributed to 207 world
leading companies in the offshore industry. They included operators from the United
Kingdom, Norway, America and Singapore. The response rate was 24.15% of this figure,
comparable to previous response rates from other surveys conducted within the offshore
industry. 14 2 The Relation Between The Human Element, Safety Culture
And Safety Performance
2.1 The Human Element
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the safety and security of life at
sea, protection of the marine environment and over 90% of the world’s trade depends on the
professionalism and competence of seafarers.12
Conversely, it is therefore not surprising that marine accidents and incidents can often be
attributed to a lack of professionalism or competence of seafarers or other human and
organizational factors, factors loosely described by the term ‘the human element’.
There is no accepted international definition of the human element.
In the maritime context, it can be understood as a complex multi-dimensional issue that
affects maritime safety, security and marine environmental protection. It involves the entire
spectrum of human activities performed by vessels’ crews, shore-based management,
regulatory bodies, recognized organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other relevant
parties, all of whom need to co-operate to address human element issues effectively.13
The importance of the human element in the safety of maritime operations has been verified
by many industry studies to date.
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), for example, states that “one factor
still dominates the majority of maritime accidents; human error”.14
A report by the US Coast Guard (USCG) found that between 75-96% of marine casualties
are caused, at least in part, by some form of human error. More specifically, the study shows
that human error contributes to 89-96% of collisions, 84-88% of tanker accidents, 79% of
towing vessel groundings and 75% of fires and explosions (see Figure below).15
FIGURE 1: CONTRIBUTION OF HUMAN ERROR TO ACCIDENTS. PERCENTAGE VALUES REPRESENT MAXIMUM VALUES. 12
IMO (2015) Human Element
IMO Resolution A.947(23)
14
MAIB (2000) Annual report 1999.
15
Rothblum (2000). Human Error and Marine Safety
13
15 The aforementioned USCG report suggests that the most severe problems in human factor
analysis are fatigue, lack of communication and coordination between the crew, as well as
poor technological skills concerning, for example, the use of radar.16
Another study found that during 2011, a total of 121 accidents occurred in the Baltic Sea,
half of which were caused by human error.17
The figures produced by Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs support the claim of the
importance of the human element for maritime safety. In 1993, the total number of claims
received by United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Limited
(UK P&I Club) was 1,971 costing it US$ 989 million. Human error was the main cause of half
of the claims they received with respect to cargo, as well as pollution damage, and of 65% of
the claims received with respect to personal injuries. Furthermore, human error was cited as
being responsible for 80% of the claims for damage to property to member vessels, and for
90% of all the collision claims the club received. Overall, three out of every five claims
received could be attributed to human error.18
2.2 Safety Culture
2.2.1 The Definition Of Safety Culture
As alluded to in the research study introduction (Section 1.2.5), following the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant disaster, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first devised
the term ‘safety culture’ in the accident investigation report.
They also developed the following widely-accepted definition of safety culture:
“The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which
establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the
attention warranted by their significance.”19
Over the years and across different industries, safety culture has been defined in various
ways. For a maritime-specific definition of safety culture, the logical starting point would be
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations specialized agency with
responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by
ships.
In a submission by the United Kingdom to the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the
IMO's senior technical body on safety-related matters, safety culture has been defined as:
“as a culture in which there is considerable informed endeavor to reduce risks to the
individual, ships and the marine environment to a level that is ‘as low as is
reasonably practicable’. Specifically, for an organization making efforts to attain such
a goal, economic and social benefits will be forthcoming, as a sound balance
between safety and commerce will be maintained.”20
Even though this IMO MSC definition of safety culture is a good starting point, this definition
is difficult to comprehend and cannot be used readily for assessing a company’s safety
culture.
16
Rothblum (2000) Human Error and Marine Safety
Ala-Pöllänen (2013) Cultural factors in maritime accidents
18
Parker (1993) Navigational and seamanship incidents - could they have been avoided?;
Shea (2005) The organisational culture of a ship: A description and some possible effects it has on
accidents and lessons for seafaring leadership
19
IAEA (2006) The management system for facilities and activities
20
IMO MSC 77/17
17
16 Therefore, other agencies in the maritime industry provide advisories or guidance around the
definition of safety culture and how to act upon it.
For example, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) published ‘Guidance Notes on Safety
Culture and Leading Indicators of Safety’ in 2014.21 This resource identifies and describes a
set of eight safety factors. These eight safety factors reflect and represent important
dimensions of a safety culture.
The eight safety factors as presented in the ABS Guidance Notes on Safety Culture and
Leading Indicators of Safety are described in more detail in the sub-sections that follow.
Additional information from academic literature and industry sources supplements the eight
safety factors. Furthermore, indicators are provided in the appendix that can be used to
analyze each safety factor.
2.2.2 A Framework For Assessing Safety Culture
In order to assess how crew engagement and organizational culture can impact on maritime
safety on workboats, we will use the set of safety factors as metrics for analysis.
2.2.2.1 Safety Factor 1: Communication
Communication is vital in workboat operations to ensure operational safety. Information
should reach all levels in the organization and should be understood by all, so that all of the
workforce (both crew and shore-side staff) has, and understands, all the information required
to do their jobs safely.
Effective communications should be open and people should be able to speak freely across
and within all different hierarchical levels of an organization.22
This is particularly important onboard the vessel as crew should be able to share any safety
concerns with their superiors. In this context, the academic literature uses the concept of
power distance, which refers to how members of an organization or institution accept how
power is distributed. For example, people from countries with low power distance relations
are more consultative and democratic whereas individuals from high power distance cultures
are more respectful of authority and less effective without orders from their supervisors.23
According to the Power Distance Index, North American and European countries as well as
Australia have a low power distance, whereas most South American, Asian and some
African countries have a high power distance.24 According to Berg et al. (2013), this
difference in power distance “is a challenge when, for example, the pilot is a westerner used
to getting straight feedback from the mariners”.25
Another very important cultural aspect related to communication is language. Open and
effective communication of course requires that people can understand each other and act
upon safety-related information. Berg et al. (2013) therefore state that “the proper knowledge
of a language clearly leads to fewer accidents.” Given the international nature of crews, it is
important to ensure that the crew are educated in English (or in another common language,
such as French or Spanish) but also that all safety communications are provided in native
languages as much as possible.26
21
23
Lu, et al. (2012) Effects of national culture on human failures in container shipping: The moderating
role of Confucian dynamism. Accident Analysis and Prevention
24
Ting-Toomey (2012) Communicating across cultures
25
Berg et al. (2013) The impact of ship crews on maritime safety
26
22
17 2.2.2.2 Safety Factor 2: The Empowerment Of Employees
It is important to empower employees to act upon, report on and feel responsible for safety.
Every employee should feel empowered to successfully fulfill their safety responsibilities and
accepts and fulfills his/her safety responsibilities.
Every employee should not only feel able to voice concerns and to make suggestions to
improve safety, but should also have the authority and responsibility to terminate a task or
activity if there are legitimate safety concerns. This behavior should be encouraged by
management.27
It is important to note that empowerment of employees does not have to equal challenging
the onboard hierarchy, which is often seen as a positive contributor towards safety
performance. According to Ala-Pöllänen (2013), one of the benefits of the onboard hierarchy
is that the division of work creates “a constant vertical system where everyone knows his
place” and where the authority of the captain is well respected.28 Empowerment of
employees is thus about making sure they employees can voice safety concerns where
necessary rather than blindly following orders.
In order to successfully fulfil their safety responsibilities, it is important to ensure that
employees have the right competencies to do so. Competence is generally defined as the
skills, qualifications and knowledge that enable a person to work as part of a professional
team, or for maritime activities, as part of a crew.29
Providing adequate training is therefore an essential means towards ensuring employees
can fulfil their safety obligations. With regards to towage operations, the Shipowners’ Club, a
mutual insurance association, recommends that training should be frequent, recorded in the
vessel's log books and cover safety aspects such as lifesaving and fire-fighting, as well as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dangers of and the safe practices for hooking up and releasing a tow
Capabilities and limitations of the towing equipment - Controls of the winches and
use of the emergency quick release mechanism
Emergency contingency plans for if the wire/rope parts during a tow. Dangers
associated with reconnecting the tow
Dangers associated with girting (girding) situations
Dangers associated with main engine or electrical failures
Risks associated with working in heavy weather and strong currents
Shortening the tow line.30
According to the IMO, the challenge for trainers and training, and managers ashore and
onboars is not only how to instill the skills but also the attitudes necessary to ensure safety
objectives are met: “The aim should be to inspire seafarers towards firm and effective selfregulation and to encourage personal ownership of established best practice.”31
2.2.2.3 Safety Factor 3: Feedback Systems
Research conducted by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) has shown that for
approximately every 330 unsafe acts or non-conformities, 30 are likely to result in minor
injury. Of these 30 injuries one is statistically likely to be a lost time injury. The prevention of
27
Ala-Pöllänen (2013) Cultural factors in maritime accidents
29
30
Shipowners’ Club (2014) Loss Prevention - Tugs and Tows - A Practical Safety and Operational
Guide
31
28
18 330 unsafe acts is thus likely to prevent a significant injury. Statistics also suggest that the
prevention of 30 lost time injuries is likely to result with the saving of a life.32
Reporting unsafe acts or non-conformities at an early stage, followed by appropriate
remedial action, can help prevent serious accidents and injuries and provide learning
lessons for the future. Therefore, in the literature, reporting of non-compliance, deficiencies
and near-misses by the vessels’ personnel and the willingness to learn from these incidents
have been seen as a significant indicator of a properly functioning safety culture.33 However,
Anderson (2002) discovered that the reporting of incidents was quite insufficient within the
seafarers and especially the minor incidents were not regularly reported.34
Social and economic prejudices often preclude people from making such reports.
Apprehension about reporting may take many forms: fear of being identified with a negative
incident such as slipping in the galley, dropping a hammer from a height or even
encountering a close quarter situation during navigation. Also, reporting non-conformity or
bringing to light deficiencies is often associated with slowing down shipboard operation and
making things “official”. In many situations, seafarers may consider making such reporting
unmanly and unprofessional, or associate it with fear of being judged negatively or even
being reprimanded.35
It is therefore crucial to establish an environment in which crews and onshore employees
can report any incidents without fear of punishment. In order to demonstrate that reported
incidents are taken seriously, any management, including the management teams both
onshore and onboard, should respond to safety issues and concerns in a timely manner, as
well as resolve mismatches between practices and procedures quickly. Similarly, outcomes
of incident investigations, audits, etc. should be communicated to the workforce in a timely
manner.36
Together, these factors will enable employees to learn from past mistakes and improve not
just themselves, but also the system that supports their activity.37
2.2.2.4 Safety Factor 4: Mutual Trust
Since vessel operations can only be remotely monitored by the shore management, it is
important that there is mutual trust and respect between the vessel and shore teams. The
vessel’s personnel are required to be open in reporting any errors and near misses but an
effective reporting culture depends (as mentioned in Section 2.2.2.3) on how the
organization handles blame and punishment.38 Reason (1997) stresses that a balance must
be achieved between a ‘no-blame’ culture and a ‘blame’ culture. The optimum state is the
presence of a ‘just’ culture, i.e. an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, and
even rewarded for providing essential safety-related information.39 However, this is qualified
32
ICS (2013) Implementing an effective safety culture. Basic advice for shipping companies and
seafarers
33
Anderson (2003) Cracking the Code - The Relevance of the ISM Code and its impacts on shipping
practices;
IMO (2005) Role of the Human Element – Assessment of the impact and effectiveness of
implementation of the ISM Code;
Mejia (2001) Performance Criteria for the International Safety Management (ISM) Code
34
Anderson (2003) Cracking the Code - The Relevance of the ISM Code and its impacts on shipping
practices
35
Bhattacharya (2006) How well does the safety code really work?, The Sea July/August 2006
36
37
Drouin (2010) The building blocks of a safety culture
38
Butalia (2011) Safety culture and the human element
39
Reason (1997) Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents
19 by recognising that a distinction must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable
behaviour. Unacceptable behaviour cannot be ignored and individuals must still face
consequences if they engage in it. In this context, it is essential that companies clearly
define the circumstances under which they will guarantee a non-disciplinary outcome and
confidentiality.40
Relationships between management and employees should also be characterized by mutual
trust and respect. If there is a good relationship, employees are more likely to be proactive in
both understanding and adopting any proposed safety measures. Conversely, if the
employee has a negative perception of their employer, they are less likely to trust the
motives of the employer for wanting to change, even when the changes are there to bring
benefit.41
Not only should employees trust their managers to ‘do the right thing’ in support of safety,
managers should also trust employees to shoulder their share of responsibility for safety
performance and to report potential problems and concerns. Similarly, employees should be
able to trust the motivations and behaviors of their colleagues.42
2.2.2.5 Safety Factor 5: Problem Identification
‘Problem identification’ is closely related to the safety factor ‘feedback systems’ in that all
parts of the organization should pay attention to indications of weaknesses in the system
that could cause problems or safety hazards, so that potential problems are identified in
time.
Ideally, employees at different levels of the organization should be involved in identifying
hazards, suggesting control measures and providing feedback, as this not only decreases
the likelihood of accidents happening, but also leads to a feeling that they ‘own’ safety
procedures.43
This requires that each member of the workforce has experience and/or training in how to
recognize unsafe acts and conditions and knows how to avoid or mitigate them. The burden
of proof is placed on determining that activities are safe rather than unsafe.
2.2.2.6 Safety Factor 6: Promotion Of Safety
Although the behavior of individuals may be influenced by a set of safety rules, it is their
attitude to these rules that really determines the culture. Essentially, a positive safety culture
should lead to a move away from a culture of “unthinking” compliance with external rules
towards a culture of self-regulation with every individual - from the top to the bottom - feeling
responsible for actions taken to improve safety and performance.44
To encourage this behavior, the company’s senior management should lead by example.
They should give safety a high status within the organization’s business objectives, embrace
it as a core value and prioritize safety in all situations. This entails that if in doubt, safety
takes precedence over performance targets.45
40
ICS (2013) Implementing an effective safety culture: Basic advice for shipping companies and
seafarers
41
Drouin (2010) The building blocks of a safety culture, Seaways October
42
43
HSE (1999) Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour
44
IMO (2015) The human element
45
HSE (2005) A review of safety culture and safety climate literature for the development of the safety
culture inspection toolkit
20 Senior managers should visibly and repeatedly demonstrate their commitment to safety
throughout all areas of the organization. This can be achieved by the use of verbal
communication (e.g. safety briefings, open door policy for safety) and written communication
(e.g. safety policy, statements, newsletters). In addition, senior management should
demonstrate that they do not just ‘talk the talk, but also walk the walk’ and ensure that
sufficient budget and coverage is allocated to safety and employees are given the resources
(in terms of skills and knowledge) to deal with a wide range of situations without
compromising safety. Together, this will create a shared vision of the importance of safety.46
Even though many companies in the workboat sector are not required to comply with the
requirements of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, it is recognized that
implementing a safety management system is consistent with good practice. A structured
and recorded system of an appropriate size to the operation not only improves safety, and
protects the employees but also protects the owner/operator.47
Managers should be seen to be committed to doing what is right, demonstrating their values
through their communications, actions, priorities, and provision of resources. This will allow
this attitude to cascade down through all levels of the organization.48
2.2.2.7 Safety Factor 7: Responsiveness
Employees should take adequate and timely actions in response to unexpected events and
emergencies in order to prevent potentially hazardous consequences and preserve safety.
All crew members are provided with emergency preparedness training and full personal
protection equipment.
For towing operations, the Shipowners’ Club (2014) recommends the preparation of
contingency plans that consider ‘what if’ situations and unexpected events that could happen
during the tow. Contingency plans could include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Girting or girding situation.
Failure or parting of the tow wire.
Failure of gob wire arrangements.
Grounding of the tug or tow.
Loss of hull integrity in either tug or towed vessel.
Collision or contact with a fixed object or installation.
Loss of main propulsion power or electrical power.
Failure of steering and/or other critical control systems.
Man overboard.
Bridge, accommodation or engine room fire.
Actions to take in the event of unexpected poor weather.
The Shipowners’ Club furthermore recommends that consideration should always be given
on how to transfer personnel and equipment to the towed vessel or unit during an
46
HSE (2005) A review of safety culture and safety climate literature for the development of the safety
culture inspection toolkit
47
Guide
48
Drouin (2010) The building blocks of a safety culture
21 emergency and that personnel should always wear life-jackets and utilize communication
equipment and portable lights during darkness.49
2.2.2.8 Safety Factor 8: Safety Awareness
All employees should be aware of their responsibilities with regards to safety and exhibit a
high standard of safety performance. All employees should feel accountable for their own
actions, and collectively for the actions of their colleagues and crew and will not tolerate
willful violation of safety standards, rules or procedures.
To ensure crew members are alert for potential safety hazards and able to exhibit the
required high standard of safety performance, it is essential that they are well-rested. This is
because the effects of fatigue are particularly dangerous in the maritime industry. The
technical and specialized nature of this industry requires constant alertness and intense
concentration from its workers. Fatigue is also dangerous because it affects everyone
regardless of skill, knowledge and training.50
Studies have shown that fatigue is a major contributor to safety because of its impact on
performance, and it is therefore considered to be the cause of several marine casualties.51
Even though fatigue is not a new issue in the maritime domain, the conditions in which
seafarers work are becoming increasing demanding. There are shorter sea passages, higher
levels of traffic, reduced manning, and rapid turnaround.52
Factors such as the quality and quantity of sleep, stress, fear, boredom, workload and
interpersonal relationships affects sleep negatively and are therefore contributors to fatigue.
Aside from moral reasons, it is therefore important to encourage sufficient rest between
working hours and create good living and working conditions for the crew.53
Local and international regulations may apply to the working hours of the crew. The
international rules for working hours are regulated by the IMO Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), amended in 2012. While
these regulations may not apply to non-international workboats, they could be used as
guidelines for ensuring adequate rest periods.54
49
Guide
50
IMO (2001) Guidance on fatigue mitigation and management
51
52
Hetherington, Flin and Mearns (2006) Safety in shipping: The human element
53
IMO (2001) Guidance on fatigue mitigation and management
54
Guide
22 3 Governing Safety In The Workboat Sector
One of the major challenges in the workboat sector is that there are different types of
operators, different sizes of companies, and different inspection or regulatory regimes. This
makes the development of an overarching regulatory regime that is acceptable and
appropriate to all interested parties a significant challenge.
As previously described in Section 1.2.4, the regulation of safety in the workboat sector is
conducted at a regional level. Therefore, due to the vast array of regional governance of
workboat safety globally, we focus on workboat safety regulation in the US region for this
research study as an example.
3.1
Workboat Sector Regulations – United States Region
Most commercial vessels are regulated by the US Coast Guard (USCG) and inspections are
used to ensure regulatory compliance. However, regulations are not evenly enforced
throughout the workboat sector in the US. For example, unlike other types of vessels, towing
vessels are unique because some towing vessels are not inspected at all. Inspections of
towing vessels in the US depends on size and service and the USCG currently only inspects
all those over 300 GRT and in ocean service.
3.1.1.1 The Coast Guard And Maritime Transportation Act Of 2004
In the last 15 to 20 years there has been a renewed focus on inland domestic operators in
the US as a series of pollution events, bridge strikes, and fatalities created an atmosphere in
which demand for tighter regulations, particularly among uninspected towing vessels,
resulted in the development and adoption of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Act of 2004.
This regulatory instrument authorized the USCG to promulgate rules for an inspection
regime that casts a wider net as well as the mandating of towing vessel safety management
systems.
3.1.1.2 Code Of Federal Regulations
In order to ensure that all commercial vessels operating in US waters meet minimum
operational and safety requirements, the USCG has put in place a variety of regulations,
outlined in Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This regulation addresses a myriad
of factors, including lifesaving equipment, fire suppression, machinery, manning, navigation
rules, pollution prevention, and so on.
The key regional regulations that govern safety in the towing sector, for example, are largely
found in Titles 33 and 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
3.1.1.3 SubChapter ‘M’
The proposed Subchapter M, which would address inspection, standards, and safety
management systems, would reside in Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Subchapter M, when in force, will address a segment of the US commercial inland marine
industry that currently carries the moniker of “uninspected” vessel.
Although such ‘uninspected vessels’ are far from uninspected, responsible operators, in
consort with the Coast Guard, the American Waterways Operators (AWO), insurers, lenders
and classification societies, have for many years – for safety and liabilities sake – addressed
a considerable number of issues now scheduled to be codified under Subchapter M.
Subchapter M began as a brief statement in the Coast Guard Act of 2004, which mandated
the regulation of towing vessels. It is not simply a set of rules adapted from blue-water
interests, and applied to the towing industry.
23 While the exact wording of the rules has not yet been published, it is known that there will be
3 options for compliance with regard to vessel operations.
Industry statistics and various publications (including a September 2012 article in
MarineNews) claim that the number vessels that will be subject to Subchapter M regulations
could be in the range of 5,000 vessels.
3.2
Voluntary Workboat Safety Initiatives And Programs – United States Region
3.2.1 The American Waterways Operator’s Responsible Carrier Program
The American Waterways Operators (AWO) is the national association for towing vessels
and barges. The mission of the AWO is “to promote the long term economic soundness of
the industry, and to enhance the industry’s ability to provide safe, efficient, and
environmentally responsible transportation, through advocacy, public information, and the
establishment of safety standards”.
The AWO hosts a Responsible Carrier Program which builds upon and exceeds the
government regulations and is available for companies to opt into in order to enhance their
credentials by assuring that they meet the heightened standards of the AWO. The program
is good for towing vessel companies because it is uniquely tailored to the industry. Along
with this program, the AWO ensures safety for towing vessels through their partnership with
the USCG and through safety committees.
The AWO has become increasingly involved and concerned with security measures since
September 11, 2001. With the USCG and the US Army Corps of Engineers, the AWO (2013)
developed a security plan for risks associated with towing hazardous cargo. In 2002, AWO
released the first Alternative Security Program, which is USCG approved under the current
regulations. This security program includes annual audits and requirements such as security
drills and exercises, security system and equipment maintenance, responding to changes in
the prevailing USCG-established Maritime Security Level, and security measures for cargo
handling.55
3.3
International Maritime Safety Regulation
International maritime safety regulations are enforced by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). In general, the mandatory requirements enforced through international
regulatory instruments are only applicable for vessels engaging in international voyage and
for vessels above a certain size range in some cases.
However, that does not mean that the guidance and governance within such international
regulations cannot be taken to advise the safety of workboat operations.
3.3.1 The International Convention For The Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS)
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) launched the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
Convention in 1914 which came into force in July 1915.
Since its adoption, the SOLAS Convention has had a huge influence on the evolution of
safety regulation and practices across the maritime industry, including the workboat sector.
This is because it is the first instrument of its kind to address safety aspects of commercial
vessel operations. The SOLAS Convention in its successive forms is generally regarded as
the most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of maritime vessels and
has evolved immensely over time with successive versions being developed and adopted in
1929, 1948, 1960, and 1974.
The SOLAS Convention applies to cargo vessels of over 500 gross tonnage (GT) and all
passenger vessels. According to the IMO, the principal objective of the SOLAS Convention
55
Bailey et al. (2013) Risk-based marine inspection performance measures
24 is to specify minimum standards for the construction, equipment and operation of vessels,
compatible with their safety.
When it was initially developed, SOLAS’s focus was largely on equipment installations as
safeguards in the event of casualty. However, over the years and through the succession of
modified versions over the past decades, the convention has evolved to incorporate other
critical safety factors such as construction, fire protection, navigation, and security.
3.3.2 The International Safety Management (ISM) Code
In 1989, the IMO adopted ‘Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and
for Pollution Prevention’ - the forerunner of what became the International Safety
Management (ISM) Code which was made mandatory through the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS).
The ISM Code establishes an international standard for the safe management and operation
of vessels and for the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS).
Tools such as the ISM Code and SMSs undoubtedly aid compliance with regulation, but they
do not necessarily improve safety culture. There is a general recognition in the industry that
encouraging safe working practices does not require more rules, regulations, and
procedures. Instead, the industry needs a better understanding of the social and
organizational factors that foster professionalism in the seafarer in routine and emergency
situations.56
An effective SMS allows these requirements to be formalized and become second nature.
Although many towing companies are not required to comply with the ISM code, it is
recognized that implementing an SMS is consistent with good practice. A structured and
recorded system of an appropriate size to the operation not only improves safety, and
protects the employees, but also protects the owner / operator from legal pursuit.
The ISM Code requires establishment of clear roles and responsibilities, transparent lines of
communication between upper management and vessel personnel, identification of critical
equipment, a robust preventative and corrective maintenance scheme, and a method for
reporting and tracking deficiencies to foster continuous improvement. Effective
implementation of the ISM Code should lead to a move away from a culture of "unthinking"
compliance with external rules towards a culture of "thinking" self-regulation of safety - the
development of a 'safety culture'.
3.3.3 The International Convention On Standards Of Training, Certification And
Watchkeeping For Seafarers (STCW)
In an effort to introduce common training standards worldwide, the IMO developed the
Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping Convention of 1978 (STCW
Convention).
In 1995 the STCW Convention was completely revised and updated to clarify the standards
of competence required and provide effective mechanisms for enforcement of its provisions.
A comprehensive review of the STCW Convention and the STCW Code commenced in
January 2006, and culminated in a Conference of Parties to the STCW Convention which
was held in Manila, PH from 21 to 25 June 2010, that adopted a significant number of
amendments to the STCW Convention and STCW Code. These amendments, now referred
to as the Manila amendments, which provide enhanced standards of training for seafarers,
entered into force on 1 January 2012.57
56
57
25 As of March 2015, the STCW had a total of 158 contracting parties representing 98.62% of
the world tonnage.
The instructions for the proper manning of vessels are stated in the IMO resolution
A.890(21) on the principles of safe manning. It states that there should be enough crew on
board a merchant vessel to have the capability of maintaining safely the navigation, mooring,
environment, fire prevention and fighting, medical care, life-saving equipment and cargo
handling of the vessel.
The STCW applies to ship owners, training establishments and national maritime
administrations and it concerns merchant vessels in domestic or international operations.
The Convention applies separate requirements for each position on board a vessel. It
specifies the amount of seagoing experience a master of a vessel has to have, the certificate
of education and training and the age of the seafarer.
The STCW Code is often not applicable to workboat operations carried out in some
jurisdictions, particularly for non-international voyages, such as river passages.
International rules for working hours are regulated by the STCW Convention. For the
workboat sector, Subchapter M will also monitor this.
3.3.4 The Maritime Labor Convention
The International Labor Organization (ILO) established the Maritime Labor Convention. This
Convention states that every seafarer has the right to a safe and secure workplace, a right to
fair terms of employment, a right to decent working and living conditions on board a vessel
and a right to health protection, medical care, welfare measures and other forms of social
protection.
26 4 Safety Performance In The Workboat Sector
In order to assess the current safety performance in the workboat sector, this research study
looks at different safety indicators, accident and casualties as well as vessel detentions and
deficiencies identified during Port State Control (PSC) inspections.
The first set of data comes from the European Marine Casualty Information Platform
(EMCIP) which collects and publishes accident data and casualty statistics on vessels
(inclusive of workboats) flying a flag of an EU Member State, accidents in European
territorial seas and internal waters or wherever there are European interests involved, as
reported by EU Member States in EMCIP.
Accidents and casualties are a relatively obvious indicator of safety performance. A high
accident and casualty rate within an organisation or industry sector is indicative of a poor
safety performance within that organisation or industry sector, respectively.
The second set of data used was gathered from the Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU. Both the
Paris and the Tokyo MOU provide data on the outcome of inspections conducted by port
States which check if vessels entering their ports comply with applicable regulations.
Typically, PSC officers inspect the vessel’s certificates, look at the vessel’s condition,
equipment and the crew at work as well as at any prioritised target areas, such as security or
pollution. If some aspects of the vessel do not comply with applicable regulatory
requirements, a deficiency is noted down. The number and nature of the deficiencies found
determine what corrective action the vessel needs to take, i.e. how quickly the deficiency is
to be rectified. If the vessel is found to be unsafe to proceed to sea or the deficiencies on the
vessel are considered very serious, the vessel may be detained.
The number of detained vessels can therefore also be used as a safety performance
indicator due to the fact that they have been deemed unsafe to operate by PSC or have had
very serious deficiencies. In fact, statistical analysis conducted by Knapp (2007) suggests
that after a vessel has been detained, it is still more risk-prone in that detained vessels show
the highest probability of casualty compared to vessels that have been inspected but not
detained and vessel that have not been inspected.58
The relationship between deficiencies and safety performance is less clear, however
deficiencies can give indications for safety culture and crew engagement, dependent on
which deficiency is under examination.
With regards to safety performance, to date, relatively small amounts of research59 has been
conducted that specifically examines the significance of deficiency codes (in the study
referred to as ‘simply ‘deficiencies’) in terms of safety performance and the results from
previous research efforts are thus far inconclusive.
Knapp (2007) found that deficiencies related to the ISM Code increase the probability of
having a casualty60 and Meija (2001) suggests ISM deficiencies as a safety performance
criterion.61
58
Knapp (2007) The Econometrics of Maritime Safety: Recommendations to enhance safety at sea
See for example Bailey et al. (2013) Risk-based marine inspection performance measures; Knapp
(2007) The Econometrics of Maritime Safety: Recommendations to enhance safety at sea
60
61
Mejia, M (2001), Performance Criteria for the International Safety Management (ISM) Code
59
27 For the purpose of this study, however, ISM deficiencies may not be a conclusive safety
indicator given that, due to their size, many workboats do not fall under the requirements of
the ISM Code.
Other research studies have also previously suggested that the amount of deficiencies
identified could even reduce the number of casualties as the rectification of deficiencies
could improve the vessel’s safety.
Yet Knapp (2007) shows that this is currently not the case, stating that “the probability of
casualty increases from about 0.1% to 0.2% as the number of deficiencies increases” which
points to a lack of enforcement or follow up on deficiencies by port state control.62
Based on the above it follows that accident and casualty data as presented in Section 4.1
can be used to assess the current level of safety performance in the workboat sector,
whereas detentions and deficiency data as presented in Section 4.2 could not only provide
information about potential future accidents and casualties, but also give indications for
safety culture and crew engagement.
4.1 Analysis Of European Accident and Casualty Statistics
The European Marine Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP) is a platform operated by the
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) that provides data and information on marine
casualties, accident and incidents involving merchant vessels, recreational crafts and inland
waterway vessels. The EMCIP has been in operation since 2011.
All Member States of the European Union (EU) are obligated to report such incidents to the
EMCIP.
In 2014, EMSA has published a report63 summarizing casualty statistics on vessels with an
EU Member State flag (vessels holding an EU Member State flag registration), accidents in
European territorial seas and internal waters or wherever there are European interests
involved. All data within this report was as reported by EU Member States.
For the purpose of this research report, it is this EMSA report that we draw data from for our
analysis within this Section as we believe it will provide valuable insight into the safety
performance of the maritime industry in general and the workboat sector in particular.
4.1.1 Analysis Of Marine Casualties And Incidents – 2011-2013
The term ‘occurrence’ within the EMSA report of EMCIP data is used in reference to both
marine casualties and marine incidents.
EMCIP estimates the number of annual occurrences to be around 3,500.
Between 2011 and 2013, a total of 5,816 occurrences were reported to the EMCIP.
Of those 5,816 occurrences, 209 (3.6%), were classified as very serious, signifying that the
occurrence involved the total loss of the vessel, a death or severe damage to the
environment.
1,054 occurrences (18.1%) were classified as serious, therefore could have involved for
example a fire, collision, grounding, heavy weather damage, suspected hull defect, resulting
in the vessel being unfit to proceed or in the vessel polluting the marine environment.
62
63
EMSA (2014) Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2014
28 The majority of occurrences - 4,553 (78.3%) - were classified as being less serious.64
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES ACCORDING TO SEVERITY, 2011-‐2013. Considering that an occurrence may involve more than one vessel, in particular in the case
of collision where two or more vessels could be involved, the number of vessels involved in
the 5,186 occurrences that happened from 2011 to 2013 was 6,685.
4.1.2 EU Marine Casualties And Incidents By Vessel Type, 2011-2013
The EMCIP distinguishes between five main vessel categories according to the vessel’s
main activity:
•
•
•
•
•
Cargo vessels;
fishing vessels;
passenger vessels;,
service vessels; and
other vessels, subdivided into:
o inland waterway vessels;
o recreational crafts, navy vessels;
o and unknown vessel types.
For the purpose of this study, the vessel types that we examine fall under two different
categories within this taxonomy:
•
•
Service vessels; and
inland waterway vessels.
Service vessels are vessels designed for special services and include the following vessel
types:
64
EMSA (2014) Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2014
29 •
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dredger.
Factory Vessel.
Floating Platform.
Floating Production, Storage and
Offloading Vessel (FPSO)/ Floating
Storage Unit (FSU).
Ice Breaker.
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
(MODU).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Multi-Purpose Vessel.
Offshore Support Vessel (OSV).
Other Offshore Vessels.
Research Vessel.
Search and Rescue (SAR) Craft.
Special Purpose Vessel
Tug (Towing/Pushing).
Other.
Inland waterway vessels are vessels intended solely or mainly for navigation on inland
waterways. This category includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Barge.
Floating Equipment.
Floating Establishment.
Floating Installation.
Passenger.
Pusher.
•
•
•
•
•
Recreational Craft.
Tanker.
Tug.
Worksite Craft.
Other.
Unless specified otherwise, inland waterway vessels are represented across the Figures that
follow under the category ‘Others’.
The number of vessels involved in marine occurrences by main vessel type category during
the period 2011 – 2013 is shown in Figure 3 below.
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN OCCURRENCES BY MAIN CATEGORY, 2011-‐2013 Between 2011 and 2013, cargo vessels represented 46% of all vessels involved in an
occurrence, followed by passenger vessels (21%), service vessels (15%) and fishing vessels
(12%).
A more detailed split of occurrences by vessel type is shown in Figure 4. However, please
note that the analysis presented in Figure 4 only examines the main detailed vessel subcategories that were involved in occurrences during the 2011-2013 period. While other
detailed categories exist, the EMCIP deemed their totals during that time period less
significant than those displayed, therefore are not shown in the analysis provided in Figure 4.
30 FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN OCCURRENCES BY MAIN VESSEL SUB-‐CATEGORIES, 2011-‐2013 Figure 4 illustrates that general cargo vessels were involved in 17% of the total number of
occurrences. The analysis shows that passenger vessels carrying only passengers were
involved in 11% of the total number of occurrences. Tugs were involved in 3% of the total
occurrences, and offshore support vessels were involved in 2% of the total occurrences.
Therefore, offshore support vessels are a vessel category within this analysis that were the
least involved in marine occurrences. This may be because operators of offshore support
vessels are said to maintain a higher safety standard and level of crew training than is often
observed in the maritime industry in general.65
The number of vessels involved in a ‘casualty with a vessel’ (i.e. when a vessel is affected
by an accident) and the number of vessels involved in an occupational accident (i.e. when
the accident affects a person) are shown in Figures 5 and 6, split up by vessel category.
65
Tobin (2011) P&I clubs help OSVs face uncertainty, meet environmental requirements, Offshore Magazine 31 FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN A ‘CASUALTY WITH A VESSEL’ BY VESSEL CATEGORY, 2011-‐
2013 FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN AN OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT BY VESSEL CATEGORY, 2011-‐2013 Figures 5 and 6 show that cargo vessels are the vessel category with the highest rate of
casualties, both for the categories ‘casualties with a vessel’ and ‘occupational accidents’.
They are followed, in terms of severity, by fishing vessels, passenger vessels and service
vessels. ‘Other’ vessels record the lowest rate for both casualty types.
This order of severity of vessel categories remains fairly static when examining the
consequences of occurrences, as presented in Figures 7-12. The only exceptions are the
number of fatalities and of injuries in which passenger vessels are more involved.
FIGURE 7: NUMBER OF VESSELS SUNK, 2011-‐2013 FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF VESSELS DAMAGED, 2011-‐2013 FIGURE 9: NUMBER OF VESSELS CONSIDERED UNFIT TO PROCEED, 2011-‐2013 FIGURE 10: NUMBER OF VESSELS BY YEAR AND BY CATEGORY REQUIRING TOWAGE OR SHORE ASSISTANCE, 2011-‐2013 32 FIGURE 11: FATALITY PER VESSEL CATEGORY, 2011-‐2013 FIGURE 12: DISTRIBUTION OF INJURED PERSONS BY VESSEL CATEGORY, 2011-‐2013 Figures 9-12 confirm that generally speaking, cargo vessels experience the greatest number
of occurrences according to severity (with the exception of injuries).
Fishing vessels record the second highest number of vessels that are considered unfit to
proceed and that require towage or shore assistance.
The data confirms that between 2011 and 2013 in EU waters or on EU-flagged vessels,
most injuries happened onboard passenger vessels.
The vessel type that logged the least number of occurrences overall, according to severity,
was service vessels. Service vessels represented the vessel type with the lowest number of
vessels considered unfit to proceed and requiring towage or shore assistance. Service
vessels also recorded the least fatalities and the second-lowest number of injuries.
4.1.3 Conclusion
The analysis of EMCIP data provided a general overview of marine casualties and incidents
(so-called occurrences) on vessels with an EU Member State flag, within European territorial
seas and internal waters. Across all vessel types, nearly 6,000 occurrences were reported
during 2011 and 2013. Nearly 80% of these occurrences were classified as less serious.
The assessment of occurrences by vessel categories showed that general cargo vessels
were the vessel category the most involved in occurrences. They are also the vessel
category with the highest rate of casualties and that experiences the greatest number of
occurrences according to severity. Passenger and container followed cargo vessel in terms
of how often they were involved in occurrences. Passenger vessels also record the second
highest number of fatalities and injuries by vessel category.
In contrast, tugs and offshore support vessels were involved in comparatively few
occurrences and recorded far less fatalities and injuries, suggesting that their safety
performance may be superior to that of other vessel categories, such as cargo and
passenger vessels.
Please note that the number of occurrences by vessel type is not comparative to the total
number of vessels within that vessel category, i.e. the high number of occurrences within the
cargo vessel fleet might be due to the high number of cargo vessels worldwide. However,
based on an analysis of Lloyd’s Register data for 2000-2010, the ‘Safety and Shipping
Report’ by Allianz states that shipping losses broadly reflect the distribution of vessel types
in the world fleet, although cargo vessels (general cargo, ro-ro cargo, other dry cargo) make
up a disproportionate number of losses (44% of losses, despite representing 20% of the
world fleet by number). Conversely, tankers (including LNG/LPG carriers and crude oil
tankers) have a relatively low loss rate at 8% of losses despite representing 13% of the total
world fleet, as do container vessels (4% of fleet; 1% of losses) and offshore industry vessels
33 (5% of fleet; 1% of losses).66
4.2 Analysis Of Vessel Deficiencies And Detentions, 2014
In this Section of the research study the deficiencies recorded and detentions imposed on
vessels by both the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU for the year 2014 are examined.
As introduced in Section 4, Port State Control (PSC) inspections and the resulting vessel
deficiencies and detentions can be used as an indicator for safety performance and can be
sued to draw assumptions regarding safety culture and even crew engagement.
Deficiencies span across many technical, administrative and crew-related factors.
Generally, deficiencies are grouped into the following categories:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Certificate & Documentation (Ship And Crew Certificates, Documents).
Structural Condition.
Water/Weather-tight Conditions.
Emergency Systems.
Radio Communications.
Cargo Operations Including Equipment.
Fire Safety.
Alarms.
Working And Living Conditions.
Safety Of Navigation.
Life Saving Appliances.
Dangerous Goods.
Propulsion And Auxiliary Machinery.
Pollution Prevention.
International Safety Management.
Labour Conditions.
Other.
Detailed information on the inspected vessels can be found in the Annexes 2 to 5.
4.2.1 General Overview Of Deficiencies As Recorded By Paris MOU Authorities
Vessel deficiencies and detentions, as instructed by Port State Control within European and
North Atlantic waters are recorded through the Paris MOU authorities.
The Paris MOU consists of 27 participating maritime Administrations and covers the waters
of the European coastal States and the North Atlantic basin from North America to Europe.
During 2014, the Paris MOU authorities carried out 18,433 Port State Control inspections on
15,421 individual vessels of which 614 (4%) were detained. 18 (0.1%) vessels were banned,
meaning that the vessels had already been detained several times and are now refused
access to any port in the region of the Paris MOU for a minimum period, .
The percentage of inspections with deficiencies was 54.7%.
General cargo/multi-purpose vessel types represented 26.4% of all inspected vessels. Bulk
carriers represented 20.8%, container vessels represented 10.7%, chemicals tankers
represented 9.1% and oils tankers represented 8.1%.
66
Concordia
34 Offshore support vessels and tugs represented 3.3% and 1.5% of the inspected vessels,
respectively.
Deficiencies were reported most commonly in general cargo/multi-purpose vessel (41.9%),
followed by bulk carriers (19.8%) and container vessels (7.0%).
Offshore support vessels and tugs accounted for 2.2% and 1.4% of all deficiencies,
respectively (see Figure 13).
In terms of detentions, general cargo/multi-purpose vessels accounted for nearly half
(49.2%) of all detentions.
Container vessels and bulk carriers accounted for 26.3% and 18.6% of all detentions,
whereas offshore support vessels and tugs were responsible for 1.8% and 2.1% respectively
of all detentions (see Figure 14).
FIGURE 13: INSPECTED VESSELS WITH DEFICIENCIES, BY VESSEL TYPE, 2014 FIGURE 14: DETAINED VESSELS, BY VESSEL TYPE, 2014 4.2.2 General Overview Of Deficiencies As Recorded By Tokyo MOU Authorities
Vessel deficiencies and detentions, as instructed by Port State Control within Asia-Pacific
waters are recorded through the Paris MOU authorities.
The Tokyo MOU consists of 19 member Authorities in the Asia-Pacific region.
During 2014, the Tokyo MOU Authorities carried out 38,514 Port State Control inspections.
70.35% of these inspections resulted in deficiencies and 3.13% in detentions.
35.7% of all inspections were carried out on bulk carriers, followed by 24.3% on general
cargo/multipurpose vessels, 14.7% on container vessels and 6.7% and 5.7% on chemical
and oil tankers respectively.
Inspections on tugs and offshore support vessels accounted for 0.9% and 0.4% respectively.
35 Deficiencies were found mostly in bulk carriers (33.6%), general cargo/multipurpose vessels
(29.8%) and container ships (13.8%). Tugs and offshore support vessels accounted for 1.0%
and 0.5% of all deficiencies, respectively (see Figure 15).
The majority of vessel detentions were imposed on general cargo/multi-purpose vessels
(40.1%). Bulk carriers and container vessels accounted for 30.8% and 11.3% of all vessel
detentions respectively, whereas tugs and offshore support vessels were responsible for
1.1% and 0.7% of all detentions (see Figure 16).
FIGURE 15: INSPECTED VESSELS WITH DEFICIENCIES, BY FIGURE 16: DETAINED VESSELS, BY VESSEL TYPE, TOKYO VESSEL TYPE, TOKYO MOU, 2014 MOU, 2014 4.2.3 Deficiencies And Detentions In The Tugboat Sector In European, North
Atlantic And Asia-Pacific Waters, 2014
This Section will analyze the vessel deficiencies within the tugboat sector that occurred in
2014 across the regions governed by both the Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU.
In 2014, a total number of 66 tugboats were inspected by the Paris MOU authorities and 167
deficiencies were found.67 The average number of deficiencies per inspected vessel is
therefore 2.53.
The number of tugboats inspected as well as the number of deficiencies identified by the
Tokyo MOU authorities in 2014 was greater than for the Paris MOU as described above. In
total, 393 vessels were inspected by Port State Control with 1,422 deficiencies found.68 The
average number of deficiencies per inspected vessel is therefore 3.62.
This shows that the average number of deficiencies per vessel is greater for the Tokyo MOU
than the Paris MOU for the same year. This might indicate that vessels operating in waters
covered by Tokyo MOU authorities display a lower level of safety culture than those
operating in waters covered by Paris MOU authorities.
67
68
For a tabular overview of the inspected tugboats, please see Annex 2
For a tabular overview of the inspected tugboats, please see Annex 3
36 For both the Paris and Tokyo MOU, the vast majority of inspected tugs registered no
deficiencies. Also, for both the Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU the majority of vessels inspected
by Port State Control, registered less than 5 deficiencies as presented in Figures 17 and 18
below.
FIGURE 17: PERCENTAGE OF TUGS WITH DEFICIENCIES – 2014, PARIS MOU FIGURE 18: PERCENTAGE OF TUGS WITH DEFICIENCIES – 2014, TOKYO MOU 4.2.3.1 Reasons For Workboat Deficiencies
The data from both the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU allows for the comparison of the
areas of deficiency, providing more evidence as to why a deficiency was identified by Port
State Control. This comparison is presented in Figures 19 and 20.
FIGURE 19: NUMBER OF DEFICIENCIES PER AREA OF DEFICIENCY – 2014, PARIS MOU FIGURE 20: NUMBER OF DEFICIENCIES PER AREA OF DEFICIENCY – 2014, TOKYO MOU Although the numbers of deficiencies are not comparable between the two MOUs, their
distribution across the different areas is similar. Looking at the reasons for deficiencies more
closely can provide valuable insight into the safety culture and crew engagement in the
37 workboat sector.
Both the Paris and the Tokyo MOU authorities have identified the majority of deficiencies in
the areas of ‘safety of navigation’ (11 % and 25% for Paris and Tokyo MOU, respectively)
and ‘certificate and documentation’ (21% and 17% for Paris and Tokyo MOU, respectively).
The deficiency code ‘safety of navigation’ is directly related to safety as navigational errors
can result in collisions, groundings or striking wrecks.69 Therefore, deficiencies in this area
represent a safety hazard that the workboat sector needs to address.
Many deficiencies were identified for the deficiency code ‘Certificate and Documentation’,
which is further divided into crew certificates, documents and ship certificates. The
distribution of deficiencies across these sub-categories is relatively even, as shown in Table
1, hence all of them will be briefly discussed below.
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF DEFICIENCIES WITHIN THE CATEGORY ‘CERTIFICATE AND DOCUMENTATION Paris MOU Tokyo MOU Crew Certificates 12 84 Documents 11 81 Ship Certificates 15 75 Total for Certificates and
Documentation 38 240 Crew certificates mainly establish the competency of seafarers and many of the required
ship documents relate to crew working conditions. Ship certificates, for the most part, prove
a vessel’s seaworthiness and whether its construction and equipment are safe. Therefore,
the high number of deficiencies in the deficiency code ‘Certificate and Documentation’ could
indicate that the competency of seafarers, their living and working conditions and the ship’s
construction and equipment are not of the required standard. It could also be an indicator of
a company’s negligence in these areas, suggesting that safety may not be the company’s
priority.
The same is the case for deficiencies in ‘life saving appliances’, ‘fire safety’, ‘emergency
systems’ and ‘alarms’ which can indicate that a negligent approach is taken to safety
matters. Under both the Paris and Tokyo MOU, these deficiency codes together account for
nearly 23% of all identified deficiencies, showing that negligence may indeed be an issue in
the workboat sector.
Furthermore, the deficiency codes ‘living and working conditions’ and ‘labour conditions’ can
reflect the importance attributed to crew wellbeing and be an indicator for onboard crew
culture. Under the Paris and Tokyo MOU, these deficiencies account for 15% and 9% of
identified deficiencies respectively, hence it seems as though crew wellbeing is considered
as fairly important.
Deficiencies relating to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code could also be
considered as an indicator for safety management and crew culture onboard, particularly in
the deep-sea shipping industry with larger vessels who have to comply with the Code.
69
IMO (1998) Focus on IMO: IMO and the safety of navigation 38 However, most workboats do not have to comply with this Code as they are below the
500GT threshold, this deficiency code is not further considered.
4.2.3.2 Reasons For Workboat Detentions
The number of vessel detentions is relatively low. For inspected tugs, only 3 out of 66
(4.55%) were detained under the Paris MOU and only 13 out of 393 inspected tugs for the
Tokyo MOU (3.31%).
However, the detention of a vessel for safety reasons is very significant and examining the
reasons for vessel detentions can present valuable insight into the safety culture onboard
workboats in the waters covered by the Paris and Tokyo MOU authorities.
The reasons for the detention, alongside the owning company and vessel name, is provided
in terms of areas of deficiency, as shown in Table 2 and 3 below.
TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF TUGS DETAINED UNDER PARIS MOU -‐ 2014 Company name Tug detained Reason for detention Eide Marine Services AS Eide Rex •
Structural Conditions
Posh Fleet Services PTE LTD Salviceroy •
ISM
Avra Towage BV West •
•
Safety Of Navigation
Certificate & Documentation - Ship
Certificates
Living And Working Conditions - Working
Conditions
Pollution Prevention - MARPOL Annex I
•
•
TABLE 3: OVERVIEW OF TUGS DETAINED UNDER TOKYO MOU -‐ 2014 Company name Tug detained Reason for detention Mermaid Marine Australia LTD Britoil 81 •
Fire Safety
Fair Shipping Korea Co LTD Dongbang Pearl •
•
Emergency Systems
Pollution Prevention - MARPOL
Annex I
Go Offshore Pty LTD
Go Spica
•
Fire Safety
Offshore Marine Services
Alliance Pty Ltd (OMSA) Jason Dua •
Life Saving Appliances
Mermaid Marine Australia LTD Jaya Crystal •
•
Fire Safety
ISM
PMCS INC Kongou •
•
•
Fire Safety
Safety of Navigation
Maersk Supply Service AS Maersk Server
•
Samson Maritime Pty LTD Magellan 1 •
•
Emergency Systems
Pollution Prevention - MARPOL
Annex IV
39 Australian Offshore Solutions
PTY LTD Offshore Discovery •
Swire Pacific Offshore
Operations PTE LTD Pacific Rigger •
Certificate and Documentation – Ship Certificates
Fire Safety
Pollution Prevention – MARPOL
Annex IV
ISM
•
•
•
International Maritime Services
PTY LTD WATO •
•
•
Certificate and Documentation – Ship Certificates
Safety of Navigation
Labour Conditions – Accommodation, Recreational
Facilities, Food and Catering
Figure 21 below shows the main reasons for detentions across both the Paris and the Tokyo
MOU.
FIGURE 21: REASONS FOR WORKBOAT DETENTIONS IN 2014, PARIS AND TOKYO MOU The most frequent reason for detentions is ‘fire safety’, followed by ‘pollution prevention’, ‘life
saving appliances’, ‘ship certificates’, ‘ISM’ and ‘safety of navigation’. With the exception of
pollution prevention, all of these indicate a lack in onboard safety management and culture
(as explained in Section 4.2.3.1), hence improved safety management could prevent
detentions in the workboat sector.
4.2.4 Deficiencies And Detentions In The Offshore Support Vessel Sector In
European, North Atlantic And Asia-Pacific Waters, 2014
In this Section, vessel deficiencies and detentions found by both Paris and Tokyo MOU
authorities in 2014 within the Offshore Support Vessel (OSV) sector will be presented.
40 Analogous to Section 4.2.3, data from both the Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU will be
compared and contrasted.
In 2014, a total number of 483 OSVs were inspected by the Paris MOU authorities and 898
deficiencies were found.70 The average number of deficiencies found per inspected vessel
was 1.86.
The number of OSVs inspected by Tokyo MOU authorities was less than that of the Paris
MOU. A total number of 170 OSVs were inspected with 637 deficiencies identified, resulting
in an average of 3.75 deficiencies per vessel.71
For both the Paris and Tokyo MOU, the majority of inspected OSVs registered either no
deficiencies at all or less than 5 deficiencies, as presented in Figures 22 and 23 below.
Figure 22: PERCENTAGE OF OSVS WITH DEFICIENCIES – 2014, PARIS MOU Figure 23: PERCENTAGE OF OSVS WITH DEFICIENCIES – 2014, TOKYO MOU 4.2.4.1 Reason For OSV Deficiencies
The data from both the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU allows for the comparison of the
areas of deficiency, providing more evidence as to why a deficiency was identified by Port
State Control. This comparison is presented in Figures 24 and 25 below.
70
71
For a tabular overview of the inspected OSVs, please see Annex 4
For a tabular overview of the inspected OSVs, please see Annex 5
41 FIGURE 24: NUMBER OF DEFICIENCIES PER AREA OF DEFICIENCY – 2014, PARIS MOU FIGURE 25: NUMBER OF DEFICIENCIES PER AREA OF DEFICIENCY – 2014, TOKYO MOU Although the numbers of deficiencies are not comparable between the Paris and Tokyo
MOUs, their distribution across the different areas is similar. Looking at the reasons for
deficiencies more closely can provide valuable insight into the safety culture and crew
engagement in the OSV sector.
Both the Paris and the Tokyo MOU authorities have identified the majority of deficiencies in
the areas of certificate and documentation (27% for both the Paris and Tokyo MOU), fire
safety (19% and 15% for Paris and Tokyo MOU, respectively) and safety of navigation (12%
and 18% for Paris and Tokyo MOU, respectively).
The most frequent deficiency code ‘Certificate and Documentation’ is further divided into
crew certificates, documents and ship certificates. The distribution of deficiencies across
these sub-categories is shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF DEFICIENCIES WITHIN THE CATEGORY ‘CERTIFICATE AND DOCUMENTATION’ Paris MOU Tokyo MOU Crew Certificates 33 51 Documents 101 40 Ship Certificates 109 78 Total for Certificates and
Documentation 243 169 As Table 4 shows, deficiencies in ‘ship certificates’ were most frequent within the ‘category
certificate and documentation’. Ship certificates, for the most part, prove a vessel’s
seaworthiness and whether its construction and equipment are safe. Crew certificates mainly
42 establish the competency of seafarers and many of the required ship documents relate to
crew working conditions. The high number of deficiencies in the deficiency code ‘Certificate
and Documentation’ could therefore indicate that the competency of seafarers, their living
and working conditions and the ship’s construction and equipment are not of the required
standard. It could also be an indicator of a company’s negligence in these areas, suggesting
that safety may not be the company’s priority.
The high number of deficiencies relating to ‘fire safety’ could suggest that not enough
importance is attributed to safety matters. The same is the case for the deficiencies identified
in the areas of ‘life saving appliances’ (9% for both the Paris and Tokyo MOU) and
emergency systems’ (4% and 5% for Paris and Tokyo MOU, respectively).
Another frequently identified deficiency in the OSV sector relates to ‘safety of navigation’. As
navigational errors can result in collisions, groundings or striking wrecks, the high number of
deficiencies in this area indicate that the OSV sector needs to focus more on mitigating the
navigational safety hazards.
Furthermore, the deficiency codes ‘living and working conditions’ and ‘labour conditions’ can
reflect the importance attributed to crew wellbeing and be an indicator for onboard crew
culture. Under the Paris and Tokyo MOU, these deficiencies account for 9% and 7% of
identified deficiencies respectively, hence it seems as though crew wellbeing is considered
as fairly important.
4.2.4.2 Reasons For OSV Detentions
The number of OSV detentions is relatively low. For inspected OSVs, only 7 out of the 483
(1.45%) were detained under the Paris MOU and only 8 out of 170 inspected OSVs were
detained under the Tokyo MOU (4.7%).
While the overall percentage of OSVs detained may be low, the difference in percentages
between vessels detained by Paris MOU authorities and by Tokyo MOU authorities is
significant. One could speculate that this difference may be due to improved vessel and
safety management procedures in the OSV sector in waters covered by Paris MOU
authorities, i.e. European and North Atlantic waters. This thought is further examined in the
survey conducted amongst OSV operators as presented in Section 5.
Furthermore, the examination of OSV detentions due to significant deficiencies can present
valuable insight into the safety culture onboard workboats in the waters covered by the Paris
and Tokyo MOU authorities.
The reason for the detention, alongside the owning company and vessel name, is provided
in terms of areas of deficiency, as shown in Tables 5 and 6 below.
TABLE 5: OSVS DETAINED UNDER PARIS MOU -‐ 2014 Company name OSV detained Reason for detention Spanopoulos Group SA Christos XXIII •
•
Fire safety
Propulsion And Auxiliary Machinery
Fairmount Marine BV Fairmount Alpine •
Safety Of Navigation
Nordic Maritime PTE LTD Mokul Nordic •
•
Certificates
Certificate & Documentation - Crew
•
43 Certificates
Yacht Bilgin Shipyard Europe
Riverton
•
•
Certificates
Certificates
Sentinel Marine LTD
Sentinel Star
•
•
•
Other
Structural Conditions
Topaz Marine
Topaz
Commander
•
Certificates
Certificates
•
Hartmann Offshore GMBH &
CO KG
UOS Enterprise
•
•
Emergency Systems
Lifesaving Appliances
TABLE 6: OSVS DETAINED UNDER TOKYO MOU -‐ 2014 Company name OSV detained Reason for detention Emas – AMC PTE LTD
Lewek Antares
•
Fire Safety
Australian Offshore Solutions
PTY LTD
Sea Surfer
•
ISM
Trinity Offshore PTE LTD
Revelation
•
Certificates
PT Triton Global Maritim
Triton Jawara
•
Certificates
Lifesaving Appliances
ISM
•
•
PT Asmi Nusantara
Asian Warrior
•
Certificates
Vallianz Offshore Marine PTE
LTD
Swiber Mary-Ann
•
Certificates
Lifesaving appliances
•
Tidewater Marine International
INC
Bailey Tide
•
Certificates
Tidewater Marine International
INC
Hart Tide
•
Certificates
Figure 26 below shows the main reasons for detentions across both the Paris and the Tokyo
MOU.
44 FIGURE 26: REASONS FOR OSV DETENTIONS IN 2014, PARIS AND TOKYO MOU The principle reason for OSV detentions relates to ‘crew certificates’ and ‘ship certificates’,
followed by ‘life saving appliances’, ‘fire safety’, ‘ISM’ and ‘pollution prevention’. Just as with
workboat detentions (as discussed in Section 4.2.3.2) and with the exception of ‘pollution
prevention’, all of these indicate a lack in onboard safety management and culture (as
explained in Section 4.2.4.1), hence improved safety management could prevent detentions
in the OSV sector.
4.2.5 Conclusion
As introduced in Section 4, Port State Control (PSC) inspections and the resulting vessel
deficiencies and detentions can be used as an indicator for safety performance and can be
sued to draw assumptions regarding safety culture and even crew engagement.
During 2014, the Paris MOU authorities carried out 18,433 Port State Control inspections.
55% of these inspections resulted in deficiencies, 4% in detentions and 0.1% in bans. The
same year, the Tokyo MOU Authorities carried out 38,514 Port State Control inspections.
70% of these inspections resulted in deficiencies and 3% in detentions.
The most inspected vessel categories across both the Paris and Tokyo MOU in 2014 were
general cargo/multi-purpose vessels, bulk carriers, container vessels and tankers. Offshore
support vessels represented 3% (Paris MOU) and 0.4% (Tokyo MOU) of the inspected
vessels, and tugs 2% (Paris MOU) and 1% (Tokyo MOU), and were thus amongst the vessel
categories least inspected.
This distribution across vessel categories is also reflected in the number of deficiencies and
detentions recorded by both the Paris and Tokyo MOU authorities, with general cargo/multipurpose vessels, bulk carriers and container ships recording most deficiencies and
detentions and offshore support vessels and tugs amongst the least.
The analysis then focused on the deficiencies and detentions recorded in the workboat and
OSV sector.
45 For both the Paris and Tokyo MOU, the vast majority of inspected workboats registered no
or less than five deficiencies. However, the average number of deficiencies per inspected
workboat was greater for the Tokyo MOU than for the Paris MOU which could indicate that
vessels operating in waters covered by Tokyo MOU authorities display a lower level of safety
culture than those operating in waters covered by Paris MOU authorities.
Both the Paris and Tokyo MOU recorded similar reasons for workboat deficiencies, most of
which relate to safety culture and crew wellbeing. This is also the case for reasons for
detentions. This leads to the conclusion that improved safety culture, safety management
and crew wellbeing would lower the amount of deficiencies and detentions in the workboat
sector.
The findings in the OSV sector are very similar. Again, the vast majority of OSVs inspected
by Paris and Tokyo MOU authorities registered either no deficiencies at all or less than 5
deficiencies. Similar to the workboat sector, the majority of deficiencies and detentions in the
OSV sector were cause by factors related to safety culture and crew wellbeing, hence better
safety management procedures, improved safety culture and ensuring crew wellbeing could
contribute to lowering OSV deficiencies and detentions. One interesting finding specific to
the OSV sector was that the average number of OSVs detained by Tokyo MOU authorities
was higher compared to the average number of OSVs detained by Paris MOU authorities.
This difference could be due to improved vessel and safety management procedures in the
OSV sector in European and North Atlantic waters (covered by Paris MOU) compared to
Asia-Pacific waters (covered by Tokyo MOU).
46 5 The Perception Of Safety Culture And Crew Engagement In
The OSV Sector
5.1 Introduction
In order to observe whether current safety procedures are adequate in the offshore industry
and assess the level of crew engagement and organizational safety culture within this sector,
an international online survey was conducted with 50 participants from key offshore
companies. The responses from this survey are used to establish their safety working
practices and their thoughts and opinions regarding the safety culture within their current
company and the industry as a whole.
5.2 Survey Findings
The findings from the survey are largely presented by title similar to the questions that were
asked on the online survey (Appendix 6). Some have been discussed as a general topic and
may incorporate two or three questions within the same theme. Anonymized quotes have
been used to highlight key points of interest and other findings are graphically displayed.
5.2.1 Section 1: Respondent’s Profile
5.2.1.1 Current Job Title
The survey respondents were asked for their current job title of the title of the last job they
had. Their responses showed various occupations within the offshore industry (Figure 27)
which are categorized as follows:
Master/ Captain
Technical - including: Engineers of different ranks; Dive technicians; Supervisors and
Geophysicists.
Crew – including: Able Officers and Mates of different ranks; Able Seamen and Ship’s Cook.
Health and Safety – including: jobs specific to monitoring and enforcing safety in the
offshore industry, such as a Medic safety.
Management – including: Maritime advisor; Managing director and Business development
manager.
FIGURE 27: CURRENT JOB TITLE 47 The survey participants were a relatively equal spread across these categories. They
provided a range of different insights from people working in many occupations in the
offshore industry.
5.2.1.2 Current Contractual Company
Respondents had contracts with a diverse range of companies from both large and small
organizations. The four most common companies respondents held contracts with were:
Siem Offshore (including contractors) (10%), BP (6%) and Chevron (4%) and Shell (4%).
5.2.1.3 Male/Female
All survey respondents were male. This is entirely indicative of a virtually all male offshore
industry.
5.2.1.4 Nationality
Figure 28 shows that 54% respondents were from countries in Europe, including the UK and
Germany. 32% were from the American continent, which includes North and South America
and Canada. By comparison, a small number of respondents came from the continents of
Asia and Australia (2%). Those from Asia came from countries including Singapore and
India.
Figure 29 focuses on three target regions: 59% of respondents classed themselves as
British; 38% of as American and 3% as natives of Singapore.
FIGURE 28: WHAT IS YOUR NATIONALITY? FIGURE 29: WHAT IS YOUR NATIONALITY? 5.2.1.5 Respondent’s Age
The majority of the respondents were aged between 31 and 60 (Figure 30). All those taking
part in the survey were male. Both these facts are indicative of an industry that is
predominantly male dominated attracting a young to middle age group of skilled workers
able to work in challenging conditions offshore.
48 FIGURE 30: WHICH AGE RANGE ARE YOU IN? 5.2.2 Section 2: Vessel
5.2.2.1 Current Vessel Type
The survey respondents worked on a range of vessels. The four most common of these
were: Diving Support Vessels (22%), Platform Supply Vessels (10%), Offshore Support
Vessels (8%) and Multirole Offshore Support Vessels (6%).
5.2.2.2 Country Vessel Flagged To
The majority of vessels that respondents were working on (Figure 31) had been flagged to
countries within the continent of America (40%). Five of these included the Bahamas, St
Vincent and Grenadines, Liberia, Vanuatu and Panama; all assigned flags of convenience
by the ITF. 39% of vessels were flagged to the USA. This is not surprising due to the
requirement for US operating vessels to be flagged and registered in the USA. Figure 32
shows Singapore had 28% of vessels registered to it, which emphasizes the country’s
increasing role as a top an international maritime center. 14% of the total vessels were
flagged to the continent of Asia. 26% of vessels were registered in Europe, of which, 33%
were UK registered.
FIGURE 31: WHICH COUNTRY IS THE VESSEL FLAGGED TO? FIGURE 32: WHICH COUNTRY IS THE VESSEL FLAGGED TO? 49 5.2.3 Section 3: Global Regions:
5.2.3.1 Regions Of The World Worked In? 72
Most of the survey respondents have worked in a number of global regions. 46% of
respondents had operated in Europe, with a large majority of these having worked in the
North Sea. 24% of respondents had operated on the continent of America, with the majority
of these having operated in the Gulf of Mexico / USA (Figure 33).
FIGURE 33: WHICH REGIONS OF THE WORLD HAVE YOU WORKED IN? 5.2.3.2 Region Of The World Currently Working In
The respondents’ current jobs were in a wide range of global locations. Europe was the most
common region, with 32% operating in the North Sea. 30% were currently working in
America and 10% were on the continent of Africa, mainly in the West. Asia had 28% of
respondents, predominantly in the Persian Gulf and Singapore. No respondents were
operating on the Australian continent (Figure 34).
72
Working on the assumptions that America includes the Gulf of Mexico and Britain includes England,
Scotland the North Sea and the English Channel.
50 FIGURE 34: WHICH REGION ARE YOU CURRENTLY WORKING IN? FIGURE 35: WHICH REGION ARE YOU CURRENTLY WORKING IN? 5.2.3.3 Specific Safety Problems/ Challenges Related To These Regions
50% of respondents indicated that they had experienced specific challenges relating to
safety culture whilst working offshore. Whilst some of these were specific to the geographical
region they were operating in, others were common across a number of regions worldwide.
5.2.3.4 Weather
The main challenge associated with offshore work in different global regions highlighted by
the survey, was the weather. Unfavorable weather conditions and particularly the
subsequent effects this had on a vessels’ exterior surfaces, heightened safety problems for
the crew working outside on-deck. This was acknowledged as a major challenge in the North
Sea region, “The weather in the North Sea can be very difficult and unpredictable”. One
respondent drew attention to this as a significant factor on DSVs in the North Sea particularly
as DSVs operate in close proximity offshore structures. Another respondent suggested that
this threat is heightened when there is an urgency to deliver equipment to a platform on time.
In other regions extreme weather conditions such as gales, typhoons and excessive heat
posed comparable threats. They all have the potential to cause accidents in the offshore
industry.
5.2.3.5 Standardization
Overall there is a general lack of clarity regarding standards operated by individual countries
and regions. “Lack of clarity of minimum vessel standards when taking a UK flag vessel to
work in other European waters”. One respondent noted that crew may not be aware of what
is expected of them in terms of safety in other countries and the survey emphasized that this
is prominent in the North Sea region. It was also noted that different regions have different
levels of adherence to safety procedures. For example, “safety is not so important in Persian
and Mexico Gulf”
5.2.3.6 Language And Communication
Language and communication is a recurring challenge faced by offshore crews. Survey
respondents mentioned issues in the Far East, Baltic and Middle East, with difficulties arising
from poor pronunciation of English or understanding of various English dialects when
English is not their first language, ”….particularly at safety briefs when indigenous personnel
are used as a client requirement but hardly anyone can understand their English, with up to
7 or 8 nationalities on-board the only common language is English but for those who have it
51 as a second language, their pronunciation can be a real problem at safety briefs”. It is clearly
essential for safety on--board that everyone can understand safety briefings and can make
them-selves understood if they have questions arising from them.
5.2.3.7 Hierarchy
Many crews around the world rely on their jobs to support their families back home. Many of
these people would be understandably unwilling to risk anything that could put their jobs in
jeopardy, particularly challenging authority. In some cases this is also seen as a cultural predisposition. For example, “As the crews are 90% Indian Indonesian, there is a reluctance to
speak out on some issues”, “A lot of the crew are the main bread winners for their family and
their for will get the job completed to collect bonuses” and “Crew are un-willing to challenge
authority”.
5.2.3.8 Region Specific
Certain region specific issues mentioned by respondents included the high risk of crew
fatigue, with a specific example of the transit route between Canada and Africa. Crew fatigue
at sea is well documented and is considered a significant global issue that the shipping,
aviation and other industries take very seriously.
10% of respondents considered safety standards in the Gulf of Mexico to be poor, with
difficulties “getting the vessel crew to actually follow their own safety procedures”. One
respondent in this region stated “there is no controlled boat transfers what so ever”. They
added that during boat transfers, there was the risk of accidents from luggage being thrown
aboard and crew misjudging the surfaces, especially when crew are suffering from fatigue.
In the region of West Africa, particularly in Nigeria, three respondents expressed the
potential risk of piracy and kidnapping. One respondent stated that “'Nigerian has a
significant problem with kidnapping of foreign nationals”.
5.2.3.9 Differences In Regional Safety Standard Enforcement
56% of respondents have experienced variations in safety culture between geographical
regions. Their responses indicate an un-official hierarchy of recognized regional safety
standards, with the North Sea at the top and more Eastern regions held in lower regard.
“Areas considered to have a good safety culture that I have worked in [have been] the North
Sea, [the] USA Sector of the [Gulf of Mexico] GOM, Certain areas of the Far East,
Singapore, Philippines”. One respondent noted “Areas considered to have a poor safety
culture [are] “West Africa, Mexican sector of the GOM”. 32% of respondents specifically
mentioned The North Sea as a good region to work in, in relation to safety standards. One
respondent stated that due to the North Sea having “higher standards than [the] rest of the
world due to better regulatory authorities governing the industry”. Another said the, “North
Sea is better because of European standards of work and relationship to people”, and the
“North and Norwegian Seas; highest standards I have worked under”.
The USA was also considered to have high safety standards and good enforcement of them.
“US Waters have a better set of safety standards and they enforce them with inspections”.
However, it can be argued that the trade-off for higher standards is increased number of
inspections. Brazil is noted as a good region to operate in for safety, but increasing amounts
of paperwork when an accident occurs have been observed. “Brazil is high on safety but
vast in paperwork to an extreme”. Administrative bureaucracy is highlighted by 8% of
respondents as a deterrent in the reporting of some accidents.
There are mixed feelings about the safety culture in the Gulf of Mexico. Due to its
geographical location, the region is commonly split into two sections; the American section
and the Mexican section. One respondent has noted that the “Gulf of Mexico has very high
52 safety standards compared to most other areas of the world”, whilst another commented that
it was easy to replace crew in the Gulf of Mexico if they don't comply with safety standards.
Safety standards within this region would benefit from further research.73 Variations were
also mentioned from respondents working in South East Asia. It appears that in some areas
a relaxed attitude is taken towards implementing and practicing safety procedures, whist
others are more proactive.
Individual companies play a crucial role in determining the safety culture operated onboard a
vessel; with considerable variations existing between companies. This is largely based on
the company’s unofficial hierarchy in the offshore industry and the influence they have over
the industry and its resources. One respondent commented that, “some companies have a
very high level of safety culture - BP, Shell, STAT oil etc. whilst some smaller companies
have a much lower level”. Larger companies have reputations to maintain and undergo
constant scrutiny from the industry and media, which often makes them apply higher safety
standards. Additionally, larger companies have access to greater finances which can enable
higher safety standards to be maintained. One respondent acknowledges that the “North
Sea is a good region to work in [as they were] working for Maersk who have a high standard
of training”.
5.2.3.10 Cultural Differences Between Approaches Taken To Enforcing
68% of respondents said they had experienced differences in the approach taken to
enforcing safety when working in different cultural regions. For example,
“Germany/France/UK/Norway all have differing specific H&S requirements and guidelines.”
Variations have been observed in the approaches taken to enforcing safety, “ .. [there are]
different safety mind-set for different region”. One respondent noted that “Western European
areas tend to have a much better safety culture - to an excess at times - while African
regions tend to be much more lax, and Far Eastern areas somewhere in between”. Another
stated that, “safety culture in West Africa for instance is generally of a low level”. Europe and
the USA were considered satisfactory at enforcing a good safety culture.
The survey responses also suggested that the enforcement of safety policies are based on a
national perception of the value of life. For example, “Each geographical region has its own
culture and value of life issues”. Respondents generally considered Western regions to have
higher safety standard. “Europe and the USA tend to have a higher safety cultural
awareness than many other countries where safety of life is not a very high priority”. Whilst
national safety procedures exist in all countries, shipping companies have a duty to
implement and enforce safety within their own operations. As noted above, some companies
experience difficulties when trying to implement and enforce safety procedures over different
global regions, “many oil and gas companies operating in third world areas reduce their
safety standards for those areas. It seems that it is just too difficult for the oil and gas
companies to maintain their typical high standards in the second and third world
environment”. One respondent suggested that in regions, such as West Africa, companies
who engage local crew members with little awareness and training in this area, find it
challenging to maintain safety regulations. “Whilst the operator may be BP for instance it is
still difficult to convince some of the local work force of the necessary safety requirements as
they do not understand what they are doing wrong”. This comment suggests that different
training requirements maybe necessary for different global regions, alongside good local
crew engagement in safety practices, to enable consistent standards.
73
See recommendation’s section
53 As noted above, (hierarchy) in some cultures there is a reluctance to question and challenge
the authority of superiors. “Some cultures are reluctant to speak out especially towards
higher ranks”. Crews, from Eastern countries, for example, may find it disrespectful to
dispute any decision or judgement taken by senior personnel, regardless of safety
implications. However, this is not considered the case for Western crews, who have been
observed to freely challenge their superiors. “Westerners tend to be quite a bit more
outspoken when it comes to raising safety issues. They are more willing to stop a job or tell
their supervisors if they are asked to do something which they feel might not be safe”. One
respondent noted a very different cultural approach to this, “In Indonesia I have encountered
the ‘inshalla’ approach to safety - that God's omnipotent will is behind everything that
happens and therefore accidents are in the hands of the divine rather than under individual
control to prevent”.
The analysis demonstrates clearly that some cultural differences can have a negative effect
on safety offshore and the need for these to be understood and respected if safety is to be
adequately addressed. It is important to recognize that different cultures operate with
different views and beliefs and these should be respected and accommodated with
sensitivity.
5.2.3.11 Special Qualification Requirements To Work In Different Geographical Regions
The global regulatory and qualification requirements concerning safety standards offshore
are complex. All offshore crews and operations should conform to the IMO’s standard safety
regulations. Additionally, requirements may vary depending in which part of the world you
are working, the type of vessel you are working on, which company you work for and what
kind of job you are carrying out. Sometimes Port State Control also exert their own
requirements, such as those seen in Brazil. 54% of respondents said that they needed
special documentation or qualifications to enable them to work in their current geographical
region. For example, personnel operating in the North Sea region have to comply with
additional safety standards, some of which are specific to an individual country, for example,
the “German Certificate of Equivalence for UK vessels working in German waters”. It is
important to note that as well as these safety requirements, personnel must be legally
authorized to work in the North Sea by being a EU citizen or by obtaining either a certificate
of equivalent competency (CEC) or a STCW certificate of competency (COC).
The Gulf of Mexico requires personnel operating in the region to hold all standard SOLAS
required paperwork and the obligatory STCW training. Additionally, crews must possess B1OCS US visas (for international vessels). In order to operate crews must conform to the
regulations and standards determined by the U.S Coast Guard. This includes the possession
of a TWIC (Transportation Worker Identification Card). All of these requirements are required
when operating offshore in both the Gulf of Mexico and the West Coast of USA. These
additional requirements also apply to the US section of the Gulf and support evidence that
the US is recognized for setting and enforcing high standards of safety.
In the Canadian East Coast, respondents are obliged to undergo specific training in cold
water management, “BST (Basic Survival Training) is an advanced course for cold water
mandatory here in Canada, similar to Bosiet but more intense”. This is region specific
training necessary due to the harsh winter conditions that are experienced there.
When operating in the United Arab Emirates, a respondent has noted that “STCW / ILO
medicals are not usually recognised particularly in the UAE”. This is surprising given that the
STCW standard is implemented by IMO signatory countries, of which the UAE is one. The
respondent also noted the requirement for local medicals to be conducted.
54 As highlighted, it is critical to recognize that the implementation and awareness of safety
standards and legislation are dependent on many factors including the geographical region
of operation. This creates a very complex situation in an industry where the majority of its
workers rely on contracts across many different geographical regions.
5.2.4 Section 4: Training
Adequate Training?
Nearly 100% felt they had undergone adequate training to do their job safely. However, of
these, 34% said their company needed to offer additional training specifically in relation to
operational duties and certain technical items of equipment.
5.2.4.1 Additional Training?
34% of respondents believed their company needed to offer additional training, in particular
for operational duties and “certain items of equipment” in potentially highly dangerous areas
onboard, such as the engine room and in engine surveying techniques and failures in hull
and structures. One respondent noted the importance of offering training in items of
equipment that had been subjected to recent regulations for example, ballast water
treatment and confined space entry.
Another respondent felt that “HR/Managing Training needs to be given to superintendents
and managers to enable them to be approachable, i.e. incidents that occur during the quiet
hours (managers, superintendents sleeping) do not get shaken to inform of incidents due to
the fact if the incident is not as serious as first thought then the reportee is told off”. It is
important that employees feel comfortable enough to approach the management in order to
report accidents.
Some respondents have demonstrated that initial crew training needs to be improved before
the crew boards a vessel. This may take the form of “work Experience [and] additional
offshore training for junior engineers”. The importance of this is highlighted by the following
quote, “We use unlicensed engineers so mechanical, electrical, etc. training needs to be
increased”. Greater experience offshore would suggest more competent personnel,
therefore helping to lower the risk of accidents. As one respondent states offering,
“additional training is always beneficial”. This may include training anything from “Boat
handling, awareness, teamwork, troubleshooting”. Whilst additional training is to be
recommended, the reality of finding time to schedule this is likely to be difficult in an industry
pressured by deadlines and time constraints.
5.2.5 Section 5: Communication
5.2.5.1 Making Yourself Understood At Work
Most crews have with more than one nationality onboard; one respondent noted 18 different
nationalities operating on their vessel. It is therefore not surprising that communication
problems sometimes occur, with 12% of respondents finding it difficult to make them-selves
understood in their work place.
Communication between crew members of different nationalities was considered a global
issue, particularly as English is not a first language for many. Poor levels of English were
identified, in particular, technical English being used by crew members. Due to the
specialized nature of the offshore industry, it is critical for crew members to be able to
understand and communicate using technical English; especially given the various types of
often heavy equipment and difficult working conditions at sea that crews may regularly
encounter. 10% highlighted language and linguistic skills as an issue faced at work on
offshore vessels. One respondent noted poor levels of English of a “technical level by
55 locals”, with another stating that “language issues mostly with crew”. Difficulties have arisen
when English is a second language. I’m currently working with Nigerian ratings and Ukraine
officers - the Ukrainians tend to speak mostly in their mother tongue especially in
emergencies, it makes controlling situations very difficult” and “People often revert to what
they know when faced with potentially dangerous and stressful situations”.
Training was highlighted as another potential issue concerning communication in the
offshore industry. Although all crew members, whose first language is not English are
required to undertake qualifications in English language, one respondent noted a “poor
grasp of working language even by those with a certificate claiming to have a proficiency in
English language”.
In certain situations onboard offshore vessels there can be difficult working conditions which
make communication difficult, particularly when a crew member’s English is already poor.
One respondent said, “As an engineer this is particularly (…) difficult when working in areas
with a high noise level..”.
One respondent raised an issue about the understanding of risk assessment forms. It was
suggested that there is no way of checking if personnel have fully read and understood the
risk assessment form before signing it, which of-course becomes more of an problem if a
crew member has poor English reading skills. “The Risk assessments are generally [of a]
pretty poor standard - they tick all the boxes but there are lots of errors in them and some
stuff is just put in to make it look right with no actual direct check that those that sign it have
actually understood its contents, particularly the non-English speakers/readers”.
Two respondents placed emphasis on communication of safety regulations, especially
between companies and fleets. For example, “not enough dialogue between companies
regarding safety rules, regulations and implementation. This can cause confusion when
moving from one company to another”. This suggests that more interaction should take
place between companies, allowing best practice to be shared. However, this outcome may
be unrealistic as not all companies would want to share their practices with potential
competition. Several respondents highlighted the need for generic information regarding
accident reporting culture, including near misses, to be shared with other vessels. For
example, “I do feel that more could be done to encourage companies to share information
regarding accidents and incidents, I may be wrong but I am not aware that there is any
requirement for companies to make their respective safety statistics public knowledge”.
5.2.6 Section 6: Safety Culture
5.2.6.1 Involvement In Accidents Offshore And Appropriate Responses
40% of respondents said they had had an accident while working off shore. Despite this high
figure, it was encouraging that only 12% of those did not think that appropriate action was
taken to prevent it from happening again. This suggests that majority of respondents are
largely satisfied with the action taken following an accident occurring offshore. Of those who
were not happy, consensus focused around a failure to acknowledge the accident sufficiently
and then subsequently modifying working patterns to prevent it from happening again. An
example experienced by a respondent who suffered an accident whilst working on an
unfavorable side of a rig, noted that they continued “working on this side” after the accident.
Another incident concerning communication issues between the deck and the bridge was
reported as a result of a respondent encountering an accident whilst operating offshore. It
was commented that, “Lack of [] understanding [between the] deck and bridge [with] officers
refuse to receive deck people advices”.
56 5.2.6.2 Reporting Culture
It was significant that all the respondents said they would feel confident enough to tell others
if they felt they were doing something dangerous that may threaten their own or someone
else’s life. However, this appeared to be contradicted by 50% of respondents saying that
safety standards have been compromised because it is difficult to say no to a client or senior
member of staff. The issue here may relate to a natural response to stop something that is
felt to be life threatening; but when it comes to speaking up to seniority, such as clients or
higher ranking staff, safety standards may be compromised, particularly if they are not felt to
be life threatening.
84% of respondents said that they were backed up by management if they reported an
accident, or at least felt that they would be, and 84% also said they believed that the
management would successfully respond to any safety concerns they may have. Conversely
however, 78% of respondents believed that commercial pressure could influence the safety
of their working practice. This is perhaps because commercial pressure is something that the
majority of respondents felt were outside of their control. This indicated a potential issue
between the client and their understanding of setting realistic timeframes for the allocated
work to account for good safety to be practiced. This was influenced by making money and
saving time. It points to the need for strong communication between the clients and the crew
managers to understand what the job entails and to set a safe but realistic time frame
against that.
Crew generally seem trust their onboard management and feel they have some influence
over the decisions made by them. 76% believe that their management is honest and that
they were supported by them; 92% feel that their line manager / officer is approachable
enough to them to feel comfortable in reporting any safety concerns they may have, and
92% of respondents felt empowered enough to be able to stop the job due to safety issues.
This may suggest that because the management and crew are all working in the same
environment together they are more connected and trusting of each other by experiencing
the same onboard conditions.
44% of respondents said they had left a job due to bad safety culture and or accident. Whilst
this is quite a high percentage and perhaps is indicative of the dangerous work within the
offshore industry, it also demonstrates that these respondents were empowered enough to
leave and move to another company as a result of the accident or safety breach. Although
this is not stated, it may also suggest that they would rather leave and work elsewhere than
go through a reporting procedure that could potentially damage the company’s safety
reputation or jeopardize their own career.
5.2.6.3 Unreported Accidents
Repercussions
64% of respondents believe that some accidents go unreported. One of the main reasons
given for this was the threat of repercussions. This was expressed in the survey as
discrimination or potential job loss, such as, “Fright of reprisals on reporting” and “could lose
your job”. There was a feeling that reporting accidents may lead to an individual being
‘labelled’ as a trouble maker potentially leading to a non-renewal of contract. For example, “I
know of a case where a guy would not get onto the crew boat due to no proper gangway, the
company H&S man supported him until it was time to come back for another stint, then
guess what …. no space on the roster for him!”. This suggests that there can be negative
implications to acting on safety concerns and even if a job is not lost at the time of reporting
the accident, the individual may find that their contract is not renewed.
57 Fear of getting into trouble or looking incompetent was another issue raised. One
respondent stated that “The injured party may be afraid of being reprimanded” or potentially
“accused of being stupid for having the accident in the first place”. Another respondent said,
“People are afraid of punishment and are embarrassed by accidents”. Non-compliance to
safety standards that lead to an accident may cause embarrassment, which can lead to nonreporting of certain accidents.
If a company adopts a no blame culture, without the threat of repercussions, it is likely to
encourage individuals to report accidents, particularly if they can remain anonymous A noblame culture is one in which, “all are encouraged to openly disclose near misses or the
errors that have led to an accident. It also allows an organization to improve its safety
performance. This necessitates trust on all sides that any information disclosed will not be
used against an individual, but will instead be used in the learning process of the
organization itself”74. It can be argued that it should be possible for the crew to trust their
management to respond to any incidents or safety concerns, without discrimination to the
crew member who reported the incident. However, the survey demonstrates that this is not
always the case, with one respondent noting their management, “does not adopt 'no name,
no blame culture”.
Jeopardizing A Good Safety Record
There is a commercial pressure for companies to maintain a clean safety record. The survey
demonstrates that this is sometimes passed onto the crew in the form of discouragement to
report accidents, for example, “Not to bring undue attention to safety statistics”. Another
respondent added that there is a “fear of damaging a good safety record”. Companies with
good perceived safety records may attract more business compared to those with a poor
record, despite this sometimes being due to a case of better reporting of accidents. Another
respondent supported this idea saying this, “can skew statistics problematically for future
relationships” (most likely in terms of the crew’s relationship with the client). This is
supported by another respondent who said, “so many times officers want to show that there
is no problem & everything is going on OK so that they should be appreciated of good
management”. This respondent notes that even though they are told good safety
management is in place onboard, this is not really the case; with implementation of safety
procedures by crew sometimes being unappreciated by the management.
Administrative Burden
Accident reporting creates a huge amount of paperwork and an administrative burden on all
those that have to complete it which can sometimes severely impact accident reporting.
However, this situation seems to be worse when the accident is minor, “Any accident
reported creates a lot of paper work with regard to reporting processes etc, Some may
consider the accident so minor that they cannot be bothered with the hassle of filling in the
necessary reports”.
Time Pressure
Tight deadlines may compromise safety. Companies may exert pressure on employees
when up against a deadline, particularly if there is an external influence from the client. One
respondent acknowledged that “cost and time”, “peer pressure” and “client pressure” are all
factors they believe prevent accidents from being reported. Additionally, crew may be
susceptible to peer pressure from their colleagues, in respect to the reporting of accidents.
74
Naoum, Roswell and Fong (2009) A Proposed Framework for Changing the Safety Culture within
the UK Construction Industry
58 Stop Cards
It is important to recognize that the offshore industry is unique in terms of its operations and
working conditions, which makes it more difficult for health and safety industries ashore to
understand how it conducts itself regarding accident and reporting culture. This is illustrated
by one respondent who said that, “The incident is often blown up out of proportion by the
HSE ashore because they have no understanding of offshore life”. This may relate to the
type of safety procedures that have been implemented onboard, especially when they have
been implemented by onshore personnel. For example, “People get pressured to put stop
cards 75in - they want 5 a month per person! Surely this is not what they are meant for! If the
job is safe and it should be then a stop card should be a rare thing, if the job is that bad that
every crew member is pressured into raising 5 stop cards, all that happens is they put in
positive comments - if you are too negative, you don't get to come back”. This comment also
indicates a potential lack of understanding between the shore and offshore teams which
could lead to un-necessary procedures and crew resentment.
30% felt that they were sometimes made to carry out tasks that were not safe. Although this
contradicts the previous responses where 92% of crew felt they were empowered enough to
stop a job if they felt there were safety issues. This shows that from time to time crew may
be obliged to contravene safety as part of their jobs. Whilst this goes against the safety
culture, if the crew feel that management are generally trustworthy and on their side, then if
things go wrong from not sticking to safety procedures, the management would support them
(particularly if they are sanctioning the work).
Company’s Safety Procedures
Respondents were very positive about the company’s safety procedures with 96% of
respondent’s feeling they were easily able to find their company’s safety procedures and the
same percentage feeling that the company’s safety procedures clearly stated what was
expected of them in terms of health and safety. 94% said they were kept up to date with any
changes made to the company’s health and safety procedures and 100% said that they
personally implement health and safety practices when working. These figures demonstrate
that training has been partly successful in that crew know where to access health and safety
information and that it is kept updated. However, 26% still felt that there were safety
requirements they were unsure about, which demonstrates a gap in the training and a lack of
thorough understanding of the procedures. Interestingly, 26% felt that some safety
procedures made their job dangerous, for example, “… wearing goggles on deck that get
fogged up because there is no proper breathing / ventilation to them, can be quite
uncomfortable, even dangerous, Like-wise poor quality gloves etc”.
In terms of providing recognition for adherence to safety procedures, 82% of respondents
said they believed that their company acknowledged good health and safety practices from
employees, although suggestions regarding further ways to motivate crew were made in the
next section
80% of respondents were happy with the current safety procedures that are implemented on
their vessel and 86% felt that safety was enforced enough by their managers. The working
conditions experienced onboard largely allowed for a positive safety culture to be practiced,
with 92% of respondents feeling that the handover procedures were adequate for them to do
75
Fleming and Lardner (2001) define stop in the following way, "STOP is designed to encourage
safety observations and conversations at the worksite, and allow the identification and correction of
unsafe trends in behaviour or working conditions”. It is considered with the observation and reporting
of unsafe working practices. 59 their job safely. In addition, 88% of respondents felt that their working conditions allowed
them to practice health and safety, which included being encouraged to take breaks and
report any illnesses to their line manager.
It can be summarized that the fear of repercussions following an accident has the potential
to prevent employees from reporting them. This and the administrative burden of the
paperwork that accident reporting creates can mean that they sometimes go unreported.
This is summed up by the following quote, “people are afraid of the consequences in
reporting things or they have to go through a long drawn out process to report things”.
5.2.6.4 Promoting Safety Standards And Encouraging The Crew To Behave Safely
Minimum Standards/ Incompliance
50% of respondents felt that more could be done to help promote safety standards. When
examining these recommendations, it should be noted that the level of safety enforced on
board can be largely attributed to the operating company; with some companies choosing
only to “operate at the minimum required to comply with the regulations”. Accidents resulting
in loss of life, limbs and other harm, still occur offshore due to incompliance with safety
regulations. Examples given in the survey include: situations such as crew entering oxygen
deficient tanks without taking necessary precautions, and when launching the lifeboats.
Inadequate handover procedures can also attribute to poor safety standards. For example,
one respondent stated that “There is often No handover with the person you are taking over
from due to boat and crew transfers timings”. Increasing handover time can play an
important part in ensuring a safe embarkation and debarkation of the crew. A point was
raised relation to the attention that should be paid towards previous historic accidents
particularly when they have been specific to a similar vessel type or geographical region.
This can be fundamental in terms of safety training, allowing lessons to be learnt from
previous accidents to assist with future prevention of them. “Safety education is a 24/7
struggle, especially when sharing lessons learned in the industry, As new people come into
the company old lessons from historic accidents tend to be forgotten as people have moved
on, so there is a risk that the same dangerous situations repeat themselves”. Availability to
view and examine past accidents must be possible. Another respondent recommended
additional training in the form of safety seminars.
Respondents felt that good safety standard could be promoted through rewarding an
“individuals personally for safety contributions [with the suggestion that] …. A little bit of
acknowledgement goes a long way”. Additionally, “small material awards each week for
promoting safety culture on board” was also suggested. Another recommendation supporting
this included, “Monetary award for good safety suggestion / improvements, Behaviour Safety
award etc.”. Motivational rewards are likely to have a positive impact on a crew if they felt
they could benefit by following safety procedures and their efforts were being noted.
One respondent noted that, “Safety officers have to be of strong character and not under the
control of offshore management i.e. independent of vessel captains / superintendents /
OCMs”. This suggests that employing independent management will eliminate the potential
for to disregard to safety concerns in order to protect the company’s safety record.
As previously mentioned, a no blame culture towards the reporting of accidents could
potentially increase the number of accidents being reported. This is supported by the
following statement “A breach of H&S doesn't mean the end of the world and sometimes
there is a good teaching point to come out of it. We need to adopt a no - blame culture rather
than a 'Them and Us' fight”. However the effectiveness of implementing a no blame culture
60 can be questioned when there is an apparent element of distrust embedded in reporting
culture, particularly in terms of reporting near misses.
Additional Thoughts
Many of the respondents’ additional thoughts supported the points raised elsewhere in the
survey. However, some demonstrate just one person’s opinion and help to show the varying
degrees of opinion regarding safety. The operating company was mentioned again as a key
influencer of whether safe practices were carried out onboard. Aspects such as time and
economic cost have been attributed to practices in poor safety culture, particularly from crew
members. It is important to recognize that offshore personnel commonly work to tight
deadlines, sometimes leading to safety procedures being ignored to maximize production.
A respondent noted a way to raise awareness about the safety requirements in a specific
geographical location “.. send on board the really informed officers so that they can remind
other crew members about safety concerns according to the location where they are
working”. This would help crew to gain from local experience specific to the geographical
location they are working in
The threat to an individual in the form of repercussions after reporting an accident has been
pervasive in the research findings. Whilst crew have been encouraged to report their safety
concerns to the management, in some cases doing this has put a crew member’s career on
the line. For example, “The common comment I hear offshore is that everyone nods their
heads to H&S but if you try to use it to stop the job then don't expect to come back out for
another trip, THAT is the biggest problem in my opinion”. This comment suggests that
although management are aware of the safety procedures, they would rather they didn’t
interfere with operations onboard, particularly when operation timescales are tight.
In contrast, the following respondent felt there needs to be a cultural change of mind-set so
that fearing repercussions from reporting an incident are not valid, “When working every
employee has the responsibility to use Stop Work Authority (SWA). It's getting them to
understand that they will not be reprimanded for the action”.
Again, excessive paperwork has also been viewed as a deterrent to reporting accidents on
board. For example, “sometimes safety can get annoying and people start losing interest in
the procedures. When people are forced to write up observation cards every single day and
are singled out when they don’t, they will tend to write some made up cards just so they
have one done”. This suggests that safety forms such as observation cards should only
been filled out when an accident or a near miss has been encountered to allow for reliable
information to be reported. It could also improve a crew’s perception of safety and the
importance of reporting incidents, without being considered a worthless task.
This study raises questions regarding the development and implementation of safety
procedures as to whether they are always within the best interests of the crew, or more
geared to conform to industry requirements and maximization of productivity. The following
statement provides an example, “In my experience safety is client driven, and the
standards/requirements are generally speaking not really relevant to shipboard operations,
they are either generic or written by someone with rig experience but no ship experience”.
5.2.7 Summary
This has been a small but globally wide survey providing perspectives from male dominated,
multi-cultural view-points regarding the safety culture in the offshore industry. The
respondents work on variety of vessels and their jobs range from Captain to cook.
61 The research findings highlight a number of key issues concerning safety, some apparently
contradictory. Whilst it is apparent that generally speaking the crew have a certain amount of
trust in the management onboard and their decisions concerning safety, there were still
issues highlighted with under reporting due to the fear of repercussions and the marring of a
company’s good safety record; and not least because it generates a lot of paperwork and is
often quite time consuming.
Time and money are the bottom line in business, and the responses raise the issue of tight
deadlines as an underlying factor that can compromise safety. Issues were also raised
between the client and management offshore, and between the management teams on and
offshore in relation to their priorities and understanding of safety issues and procedures.
Half of the respondents felt more could be done to help promote safety standards including
better handover procedures, sharing lessons learnt from past accidents and motivational
rewards for safety conscious crew members.
The offshore industry is global and most respondents had worked in over 2 continents. This
raises potential issues with cultural differences, different environmental working conditions
and different regional safety standards. Respondents highlighted a ‘gold standard’ safety
culture in the North Sea, with less safety compliance in African regions. Individual
companies also play a vital role in the promotion of a good safety culture with some going
beyond minimum compliance and others barely achieving it. Extreme weather conditions,
lack of industry standardization over safety procedures and language communications
issues also play a key role in compromising safety offshore.
Safety in the offshore industry has greatly improved over the last few decades and the
findings show that companies have clearly put much effort into helping crew know where to
find safety procedures onboard and in keeping these procedures up to date. However there
are still underlying issues within the offshore industry concerning the reporting of accidents,
particularly the apparently minor ones. The fundamental problems appear to surround client
and management relationships and the fine balance of getting a job done on time but without
compromising safety; encouraging crew to report accidents without the fear of
repercussions; making accident reporting possible without excess administration; and getting
the shore based management to understand the realities of operating offshore.
Whilst it is commendable that companies are actively trying to improve their safety
procedures, there is a fear that if any accident, potential or otherwise (near-miss) has to be
reported, crews may feel that they can no longer trust their crew mates for fear of a whistle
blowing culture. Trust is an important element for crews operating offshore, particularly in
light of the difficult and dangerous conditions they operate in.
62 6 The Impact of Safety Culture on Incidents In The Workboat
Industry
In order to analyse the impact of safety culture and crew engagement on the occurrence of
safety incidents (accidents and casualties) in the workboat industry, three case studies are
presented. This analysis gives insight into how a lack of organizational safety culture and
crew engagement can contribute to incidents onboard workboats.
For each case study, a brief summary of the safety incident is provided, followed by an
analysis of the safety culture and crew engagement for that particular workboat operator and
the vessel in question, based on the framework for assessing safety culture outlined in
Section 2.2.2.
Please note that the information and data within the case studies that follow have been
primarily sourced from authorized accident reports and publicly available resources,
including but not limited to, the company’s websites and news reports.
6.1 Case Study 1: Fairplay Towage Tug Vessel – November76
6.1.1 Incident Overview
•
•
•
•
Vessel Involved In Incident: Fairplay 22
Registered Vessel Owner: Fairplay Towage
Date Of Incident: 11 November 2010
Location Of Incident: Nieuwe Waterweg near Hook of Holland, Netherlands
6.1.2 Vessel Owner Information
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Year Company Established: 1905
Company Size (Number Of Employees): No information available.
Area Of Operation: Offices and tug-stations in Rotterdam, Antwerp, Rostock,
Wismar, Sassnitz, Wolgast, Szczecin, Swinoujscie and Gdynia
Annual Turnover: No information available.
Public or Privately Owned Company?: Family-owned, private.
Location Of Headquarters: Hamburg, Germany.
Fleet Size And Composition: Approximately 40 tug vessels.
6.1.3 Incident Summary
The tug vessel Fairplay 22 capsized in the New Waterway near the Hook of Holland while
establishing a towage connection in readiness to assist Ro/Ro passenger vessel Stena
Britannica to moor at the Hook of Holland pier. The incident resulted in the death of the
captain and the engineer, a third crew member was slightly injured and a fourth crew
member escaped unhurt.
6.1.4 Assessment of Safety Culture & Crew Engagement
Promotion of Safety
The Fairplay 22 vessel is not obligated to comply with the International Safety Management
(ISM) Code due to the vessel size being below 500 GT. Nevertheless, Fairplay Towage had
voluntarily obtained ISM certification of Fairplay 22 as well as its sister vessels. Fairplay
Towage felt this was important because these tugs often performed activities at sea. Clients
also regularly asked Fairplay whether its tugs carried a Safety Management Certificate
(SMC).
76
Dutch Safety Board (2012) Collision and capsizing of tug Fairplay 22 on the Nieuwe Waterweg near
Hook of Holland
63 Fairplay’s safety management system defines the following health and safety objectives:
•
•
•
•
Each vessel shall be operated in accordance with safe operational practices and
healthy conditions documented in respective procedures.
The working environment and conditions for the crew shall be governed by strict
observance of safety at work regulations and other applicable requirements, e.g. port
state regulations.
Identified risks are taken account of by adequate documented precautions. Where a
particular risk is identified on a vessel the Master shall establish safeguards
appropriate to the situation and inform the Designated Person thereof.
Safety awareness and skills of management and line personnel ashore and on
company vessels shall be continuously improved for routine activities as well as
emergency situations.
Since the autumn of 2009, Fairplay 22 was only deployed in the port of Rotterdam. Fairplay
then decided to end the voluntary ISM certification of Fairplay 22, in part due to the
administrative burden for its crew resulting from certification.
While Fairplay’s safety management system remained in force after 2009, it was no longer
reviewed on the basis of the ISM Code.
Communication
Fairplay Towage sets out its safety objectives in the Health, Safety, Quality and
Environmental Protection Manual (HSE-Q Manual). The HSE-Q Manual contains procedures
for identifying risks, performing work and how to act in the event of various types of
incidents. Amongst other things, it states the following:
•
•
•
•
•
Control measures shall be taken and their effect shall be verified;
a risk assessment shall be performed for each activity involving a specific risk;
a periodic Master’s review of the HSE-Q system shall take place;
an annual management review of the HSE-Q system shall take place; and
an annual internal audit shall take place.
A procedure for performing tug assistance is also available. However, there is no hazard
identification and analysis for sailing at close quarters to the bow of a ship requiring
assistance or for passing/taking in a heaving line. Amongst others, the tug assistance
procedure incorporates the following:
•
•
While performing tug assistance all watertight openings must be closed; and
when taking the heaving line, a speed through the water of 6 knots is advisable.
However, these procedures were not followed.
Had they been followed, the accident may have been avoided. This suggests that Fairplay
did not communicate its safety procedures effectively, did not make sure they were
understood by crews, failed to monitor their implementation and/or enforce them sufficiently.
In the following, the shortcomings of Fairplay’s safety management in relation to these
procedures are described.
Closing Watertight Openings
Fairplay’s HSE-Q Manual states that the engine room vents must be closed when engaged
in towage operations. However, the Dutch Safety Board’s accident investigation revealed
that, at the time of the accident involving Fairplay 22, the vents of the engine room and a
door leading to the after deck were open. This enabled water to flood into the ship when the
64 tug heeled over as a result of the collision with Stena Britannica. As a result, the vessel’s
stability deteriorated and capsizing was accelerated. The tug could no longer right itself.
The investigation revealed that on Fairplay 22, if the engine room power plant is to function
properly air supply is required. Closing the vents blocks off the air supply to the engine room,
which causes failure of the engine room power plant. Therefore, the procedure described in
the HSE-Q Manual could not be carried out in practice because this would result in the
breakdown of the engine room power plant.
High Speed
The importance of maintaining an appropriate speed when providing tug assistance is
common knowledge within the sector. This is because the higher the speed through the
water, the larger the hydrodynamic sphere of influence and hydrodynamic interaction
between the ships. Sailing at high speed substantially increased the risk of the tug becoming
uncontrollable and the risk of collision. To decrease this risk, the International Harbour
Masters Association and the European Harbour Masters Committee recommend a speed of
6 knots when making a towage connection.
Fairplay’s internal procedure is in line with this recommendation, specifying a speed of 6
knots when taking up the heaving line. Despite this, the tug master of Fairplay and Stena
Britannica’s chief officer agreed on a speed of 7 knots. This speed was even exceeded
during several attempts of taking up the heaving line.
The accident investigation found that the high speed through the water was a crucial factor
in the accident. If a lower speed had been maintained during the manoeuvre, Fairplay 22
would have had more reserve power to enable the tug to move away from the ferry’s sphere
of influence and given the captain more time and opportunity to anticipate the situation.
The accident investigation also revealed that Stena Britannica had sailed at a speed through
the water exceeding 6 knots on a number of previous occasions while tug assistance was
provided by Fairplay.
The safety management objective states that Fairplay seeks to guarantee that employees
work in accordance with the procedures and that this is adequately supervised. Also,
according to the principles of safety management, the shipping company is required to
ensure supervision of compliance with the procedures. Had Fairplay maintained adequate
supervision, it would have been aware that the crew did not adhere to the procedures when
providing tug assistance and could have taken action, such as emphasising the importance
of maintaining a low speed or by tightening supervision of the procedure.
Problem Identification
Fairplay’s HSE-Q Manual states that it is required to perform a risk assessment for every
activity involving a specific risk. However, no risk assessment was carried out for
manoeuvring close to the bow of a vessel requiring assistance, for passing/taking in a
heaving line or for providing tug assistance even though the shipping company states in the
harbour tug assistance procedure that the forward tug in particular is vulnerable while
establishing a towage connection.
The sector has been aware of the fact that a forward tug is vulnerable while establishing a
towage connection for years, as evidenced by the Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 199 issued
by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) in the United Kingdom in 2002. The MGN
states: “When vessels are manoeuvring at close quarters for operational reasons, the
greatest potential danger exists when there is a large difference in size between the two
vessels and is most commonly experienced when a vessel is being attended by a tug. A
65 dangerous situation is most likely when the tug, having been manoeuvring alongside the
vessel, moves ahead to the bow to pass or take a tow-line.”
In line with the safety management principles, any shipping company should learn lessons
from indicators, near misses and accidents, developments and renewed insights within and
outside the sector. The MCA guideline was announced to the sector eight years before the
accident.
In spite of this, Fairplay failed to carry out a risk assessment for manoeuvring close to the
bow of a ship requiring assistance or for passing/taking in a heaving line. Fairplay made
inadequate use of the knowledge available within the sector about the risks involved while
establishing a towage connection. This means that the company failed to avail itself of the
opportunity to improve its safety performance.
Another major downfall in relation to problem identification is the limited design stability of
Fairplay 22. The tug was designed on the basis of the stability requirements in force when
the vessel was built in 1998. After 1998 the International Association of Classification
Societies Ltd (IACS), an organisation representing the most important international
classification societies, drew up additional and more stringent stability criteria. Fairplay 22
did not meet these criteria and while it was not required to, it does mean that the tug faced
an increased risk of capsizing compared with modern tugs that do comply with these
additional criteria.
Fairplay 22 was however obliged to comply with the stability requirements specified by the
See-Berufsgenossenschaft (SBG) in 1998, yet the accident investigation showed that the tug
only complied with the SBG stability requirements when its vents were shut. However, when
the ship was in operation, the vents to the engine room could not be shut as doing so would
largely block off the required air supply and the machine room would no longer be able to
operate properly. This means that while operating with its vents open, the vessel did not
meet the 1998 SBG stability requirements.
Fairplay was aware that Fairplay 22’s sister ships, which had been chartered by another
shipping company and which also provide assistance to seagoing vessels, were provided
with permanent ballast to improve stability. In spite of this, Fairplay took no action to assess
the stability of its own tugs or to determine whether Fairplay 22 complied with the stability
requirements. Furthermore, Fairplay could have known that Fairplay 22 and her sister
vessels did not comply with the stability criteria that currently apply to tugs. After all, the
shipping company put into operation a number of newly built tugs after the additional stability
criteria had come into force. Fairplay nonetheless did not take any action to improve the
stability of its older vessels, thereby endangering their crews.
Empowerment
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent human factors and training contributed to the incident,
partly because two crew members lost their life during the accident.
In the Netherlands no dedicated theoretical training programme for tug captains exists, so
how shipping companies go about this is left to their discretion. Some shipping companies
offer their own training programme, which all tug captains are required to follow before being
permitted to work as such. Fairplay however, only provide captain with on-the-job training
where trainee captains sail under the supervision of a qualified tug captain. By performing an
increasing number of tasks themselves, they acquire the necessary knowledge and skills in
a stepwise manner to enable them to work as a tug captain.
66 The captain of Fairplay 22 did not work for Fairplay but had been hired in from a temporary
employment agency. He had acquired over ten months’ experience on Fairplay 22. Prior to
that he had gained extensive practical experience as a captain on various tugs. The captain
had not undergone any theoretical tug captain training. As a result, he may possibly have
had no or little theoretical knowledge of the risks involved in establishing a towage
connection and in sailing at a higher speed.
Safety Awareness
No specific information on the work force’s safety awareness could be found. However, the
fact that the tug captain decided to operate at a higher speed than that recommended by
company procedures suggests that he might have been unaware of it, possibly due to a lack
of communication.
Feedback
Fairplay did not carry out an investigation into the accident involving Fairplay 22 but decided
to await the results of the Dutch Safety Board’s investigation. According to the safety
management principles, it is important to learn from incidents and accidents in order to
prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. By awaiting the results of the Dutch
Safety Board’s investigation, which extends over a period of around one year, Fairplay could
only take limited preventive measures to improve safety shortly after the accident. By not
conducting an investigation into the accident, Fairplay has failed to fulfil its own responsibility
and has therefore failed to avail itself of the opportunity to increase safety in the short term.
In view of the outcomes in determining the stability of Fairplay 23, the sister vessel of
Fairplay 22, the Dutch Safety Board decided to submit an interim recommendation to
Fairplay Towage ahead of the final report. By issuing interim recommendations, the Dutch
Safety Board urges parties to implement precautionary measures as soon as possible. Such
recommendations are therefore only issued in specific cases, particularly where unsafe
situations occur.
The interim recommendation was submitted on 29 June 2011 as follows:
“Determine the stability of Fairplay 23’s sister vessels. If the determined stability is found to
correspond with that of Fairplay 23, it is recommended that measures be taken to improve
the stability of all vessels to at least ensure compliance with the requirements stipulated by
SBG in 1998.”
In its response to this recommendation, Fairplay Towage stated that they:
1. Are considering installing on the bridge an indicator light to show the status of the
door to the aft deck; and
2. will inquire with the classification society whether a Certificate of Class was provided
erroneously.
In the response to the draft version of this report, Fairplay Towage indicated that a number
of measures have been taken, or are under consideration, regarding the stability of the
shipping company’s tugs. For the Dutch Safety Board, it is unclear whether these measures
will result in Fairplay 23 satisfying the 1998 SBG stability requirements. No written response
from Fairplay was received showing whether they intend to concur with the recommendation.
Responsiveness
No information available.
Mutual Trust
67 6.1.5 Action Taken After The Incident
In response to the draft version of the accident report, Fairplay indicated that the following
measures have been taken:
•
•
•
•
An indicator light on the bridge to verify whether the door to the aft deck is closed
was installed on the tugs that did not yet possess such a light;
a towing line and the subsequently required ballast water were removed from sister
ship Fairplay 23 (to lower the vertical center of gravity of the tug);
few vent openings on tugs have been made more watertight; and
permanent ballast was added to sister ship Fairplay 23.
Fairplay has stated that it considers modifying the vent openings to the engine room.
6.1.6 Safety Culture & Crew Engagement - Summary
The incident involving the vessel Fairplay 22 was principally due to high vessel operational
speed through the water, the failure to close watertight openings and the insufficient stability
of the vessel.
These factors all find root in Fairplay’s safety management system and safety culture which
showed multiple shortcomings.
More specifically, the hazard identification and analysis was incomplete, the procedure
regarding the watertight openings was practically infeasible and the procedure regarding
speed was not followed, showing that safety awareness was low. These hazards went
unnoticed due to insufficient monitoring. The safety management system therefore failed to
meet the company’s own safety objectives, such as continuous improvement ensuing from
the identified risks, adequately documenting control measures and verifying the effect of the
control measures implemented.
Furthermore, Fairplay failed to investigate whether the stability of its vessels needed to be
improved despite the fact that the tug’s stability failed to comply with the current stability
criteria and being aware that the stability of Fairplay 22’s sister ships was enhanced when
chartered by third parties. This indicates that safety was not Fairplay’s number priority and
that problem identification procedures failed.
The accident onboard the vessel Fairplay 22 also raised the question of how to encapsulate
external contractors into the company’s safety culture and ensure they are sufficiently
trained, a question insufficiently resolved by Fairplay.
6.2 Case Study 2: Holyhead Towing Company Limited (HTC) Tug Vessel–
March 201077
•
•
•
•
Vessel Involved In Incident: Llanddwyn Island.
Registered Vessel Owner: Holyhead Towing Company Limited (HTC).
Date Of Incident: 1 March 2010.
Location Of Incident: Roscoff, France.
77
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (2010) Report on the investigation of a fatality on board the
workboat Llanddwyn Island;
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (2010) Flyer to the towing industry - Llanddwyn Island
68 6.2.2 Vessel Owner Information
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Year Company Established: Early 1960’s.
Company Size (Number Of Employees): No official information available. 22
employees listed on LinkedIn.com (Social Networking Site)
Area Of Operation: Europe, Mediterranean and Caspian Seas, Persian Gulf, West
Africa, India. Joint venture operations in the South of France, the Falkland Islands
and the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Public Or Privately Owned Company?: No information available.
Location Of Headquarters: Holyhead, United Kingdom.
Fleet Size And Composition: 47 vessels, including:
o 11 shallow draft tugs & anchor handling tugs.
o 8 shallow draft multi-purpose vessels.
o 3 workboats & crewboats.
o 4 survey vessels
o 21 wind farm vessels
The 21.5m workboat Llanddwyn Island was assisting an 870 tonne backhoe dredger into
position, when the single hawser connecting the vessels suddenly parted under tension. The
failed element was a chain connected to the stern of the dredger. As the hawser recoiled, it
struck the deckhand who had entered the ‘snap-back’ zone.
The deckhand died at the scene.
Promotion of Safety
Only one of the vessels in HTC’s 30 vessel-strong fleet has to meet the requirements of the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the others are exempt from these
requirements.
Due to a need to provide a more structured safety management of its workboat fleet, the
company employed a health, safety, environmental and quality (HSEQ) manager in 2009.
This HSEQ manager was hired to develop a framework for a health and a safety
management system for its workboat fleet, including the implementation of onboard safety
manuals. This work was ongoing at the time of the accident.
Despite the appointment of a HSEQ, a number of factors indicate that the safety
management of Llanddwyn Island was rudimentary.
These will be elaborated on in the remaining sections, but can be summarized as per below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Not all of the vessel’s activities had been considered in the risk assessments
completed in 2006 and the assessments had not been reviewed periodically.
The risk assessments were not reviewed following the serious accident onboard
another of HTC’s workboats, the Afon Caradog vessel.
The crew had not read the risk assessments.
No guidance or written procedures were provided regarding towing and pushing
arrangements or operations.
The chain used had not been provided by HTC, and the certificates for some of the
loose towing equipment were not held on board.
HTC did not provide towage training for its more experienced crew.
69 While HTC’s planned provision of safety manuals and procedures is important to the
development of a safety management system, it is unlikely to be successful unless it is
accompanied by measures to assist the development of a safety culture among its captains
and crews. Safety Awareness
Following the accident, tests were conducted on the chain connected to the stern of the
dredger as this was the element of the hawser that failed. The tests indicated that because
the chain was doubled up around the pad eye at the stern of the dredger, its breaking load
was significantly reduced.
The inclusion of a doubled-up chain in the hawser was not in accordance with best towing
practice and was inappropriate for the work being conducted. It would have been more usual
to connect a hawser of this type with a stronger element such as a wire pennant or a single
chain with a sufficient breaking strain.
The deckhand that died from the recoil of the hawser was an experienced deckhand who
should have been aware of the dangers associated with the tensioned line. It is not known
why he moved to the forward part of the deck while Llanddwwyn Island was still
manoeuvring ahead against the hawser. It could have been due to a wrong assessment of
the situation, but just as well due to a general lack of safety awareness.
Due to the diverse nature of employment of the Llanddwwyn Island, it is likely that there
were no permanently safe areas on deck, making it even more important for HTC to ensure
the safety of personnel and remind crew of the hazards of towing or pushing to sharpen their
safety awareness. As shown in the following section ‘Communication’, this did not happen.
Communication
Three failings can be identified with regards to communication.
1
2
3
HTC did not provide guidance or written procedures regarding towing and pushing
arrangements or operations for use onboard Llanddwyn Island.
In view of the potential hazards on the deck of Llanddwyn Island when engaged in
towing or pushing, procedural measures such as toolbox talks, briefings, and
positive communication would have been essential to remind crew of potential
hazards, but did not take place to the extent required.
Prior to Llanddwyn Island commencing operation, HTC and the client Boskalis only
exchanged little information and few details on the scope of the work. This lack of
information exchange prevented HTC and the workboat’s captains from fully
assessing the suitability of the vessel, and her manning and equipment
requirements in relation to the activities she was expected to undertake.
Empowerment
Although the crew of the Llanddwyn Island met the qualification requirements for the
operation of workboats (i.e. the captain should hold at last a Royal Yachting Association
Yachtmaster Offshore certificate of competence), the use of these certificates alone is highly
questionable in view of the potential dangers associated with a number of workboat
operations. The limitations of the training and qualifications required to operate workboats
has been recognised by the National Workboat Association (NWA) and the British
Tugowners Association (BTA).
HTC had not provided internal training for Llanddwyn Island’s crew, but instead relied upon
their experience within the workboat sector.
70 Problem Identification
In 2006, HTC conducted a risk assessment of the Llanddwyyn Island, yet not all of the
vessel’s activities had been considered in the assessment. The risk assessments had not
been reviewed since 2006 even though an accident happened onboard another company
workboat in February 2010. An engineer onboard HTC’s workboard Afon Caradog was
seriously injured when a wire rope came under tension and slid over the top of the waist post
and struck the engineer on his right arm.
Being similar in nature to the accident onboard the Llanddwyn Island, a full risk assessment
could have provided valuable learning lessons would might have helped avoid the accident
in question.
In 2006, risk assessments had been completed, however not all of the vessel’s activities had
been considered in these assessments, the assessments had not been reviewed periodically
and the assessments had had not been read by the crew or reviewed.
There was also no pre-charter checklist that would have helped to determine the scope of
work expected to be undertaken, the manning and equipment requirements.
Feedback
Little information is available on feedback mechanisms, however, the poor practice related to
risk assessments, especially after serious accidents, shows that HTC’s management did not
respond adequately to safety issues and suggests that feedback mechanisms were not
sufficiently developed within HTC. This is underlined by the fact that the crew had not read
the results of the last risk assessment in 2006.
Responsiveness
No information available
Mutual Trust
No information available
6.2.5 Action Taken After The Incident
HTC has:
•
•
•
•
Informed its crews of the circumstances of this fatality and the serious injury on board
Afon Caradog.
Commenced seminars for its captains focusing on safety and procedures.
Continued to develop and introduce its onboard safety manual.
Developed a pre-charter checklist to determine the scope of work expected to be
undertaken by its vessels, and the manning and equipment requirements.
Despite the fact that this incident was primarily caused by equipment failure, the analysis of
the accident onboard the Llanddwyn Island vessel confirms that the safety culture of the
company had some shortcomings and without them, the incident may have been avoided.
More specifically, HTC did not provide guidance or written procedures regarding towing and
pushing arrangements or operations for use onboard the Llanddwyn Island vessel. There
was a lack a communication to remind crew of potential hazards when engaged in towing as
well as a lack of information exchange between HTC and their client Boskalis prior to the
towing operation.
71 The latest risk assessment had been conducted 4 years prior to the incident, also it was not
regular review. This was still the case following an accident onboard another company
workboat (the Afon Caradog vessel).
While the crew met the qualification requirements for the operation of workboats, the use of
these certificates alone is highly questionable in view of the potential dangers associated
with a number of workboat operations. The limitations of the training and qualifications
required to operate workboats has been recognised by different industry associations. HTC
did not make up for these limitations and did not provide internal training, but instead relied
upon the crew’s experience within the workboat sector.
6.3 Case Study 3: Midnight Marine Limited Tug and Barge Vessels – May
201478
•
•
•
•
Vessels Involved In Incident: Western Tugger (tug) and Arctic Lift I (barge).
Registered Vessels Owner: Midnight Marine Limited.
Date Of Incident: 10 May 2014.
Location Of Incident: 33 nautical miles southwest of Burgeo, Newfoundland and
Labrador.
6.3.2 Vessel Owner Information
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Year Company Established: 1990.
Company Size (Number Of Employees): 10.
Area Of Operation: Canadian East Coast, Gulf of St. Lawrence, and St. Lawrence
River.
Public Or Privately Owned Company?: Private.
Location Of Headquarters: St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada.
Fleet Size And Composition: two tugs
On 10 May 2013, at approximately 0625 Newfoundland and Labrador Daylight Time, the
barge Arctic Lift I, which was carrying a cargo of steel rebar, capsized while under tow by the
tug Western Tugger in moderate weather about 33 nautical miles southwest of Burgeo,
Newfoundland and Labrador.
The subsequent strain on the tow wire caused an auxiliary brake drum on the tow winch to
shatter, and parts of it struck a crew member, who sustained fatal injuries.
Promotion of Safety
As the Western Tugger is not engaged in international trade, it is not subject to the
International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) or the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
Pollution Prevention, and does not require a safety management system (SMS).
Nonetheless, the company was working toward implementing a certified SMS, including risk
78
Transportation Safety Board of Canada (2014) Marine Investigation Report M13N0014: Capsizing
of tow and accidental death
72 assessments and safe work practices; however, the SMS was not in place at the time of the
occurrence.
The accident investigation report identified the following causes and contributing factors for
the accident:
•
•
•
•
The barge developed a list to starboard due to one or a combination of the following
factors: water shipped on deck, water ingress, free surface effect, and shifting of
cargo.
The barge was loaded with unsecured cargo and to an extent that caused the vessel
to have minimal freeboard.
The emergency tow release was prevented from operating by a nut-and-bolt
assembly.
The deckhand entered the winch room to release the nut-and-bolt assembly, and
when the barge capsized, the sudden strain on the tow wire caused the secondary
brake drum to shatter, projecting shards into the winch room that fatally injured the
deckhand.
As mentioned under ‘promotion of safety’, no safety management system, including a formal
risk assessment process, was in place at the time of the accident. The company did have a
health and safety manual on board, but the manual did not include risk assessments or safe
work practices for tug operations.
If a vessel operator does not have a safety management system that includes a process for
ongoing risk assessments, there is an increased risk that operational hazards will not be
identified and mitigating measures will not be proactively implemented. The Western Tugger
is a good example for this. Had a formal risk assessment process been in place, it might
have identified the following potential hazards prior to sailing:
•
•
•
•
An emergency tow release that was not capable of being operated immediately,
hatches that were not reliably watertight,
minimal freeboard; and
cargo that was unsecured.
Safety Awareness
Prior to the accident, the tug and barge had made successful voyages under similar
conditions. It is therefore possible that the risks of towing operations had become normalized
through repetition and that, with the completion of each successful voyage, the perception of
the severity of each risk had decreased.
Communication
Empowerment
It does not appear that the qualification of the Master and crew played a role in the accident.
Even less so as the crew were in possession of valid certificates for their positions and for
the trade in which they were engaged.
The master held a master’s certificate for vessels up to 500 gross tonnage engaged on near
coastal voyages or tugs up to 3,000 gross tonnage engaged on limited, contiguous-waters
voyages. The master had initially obtained a master’s certificate in 1985 and had worked for
the current owner for approximately 6 years, serving as master on various vessels within the
73 company. The master had served on the Western Tugger for the 2 previous voyages from
Sorel to Long Pond.
Feedback
The company’s assessments of risks and safe work practices did not identify or mitigate the
potential hazard associated with the installation of the nut-and-bolt assembly on the
secondary brake and the requirement that it be manually released in an emergency.
Mutual Trust
Responsiveness
6.3.5 Action Taken After The Accident
Transport Canada is currently consulting on the expansion of the Safety Management
Regulations.
Under the current proposal for the expansion of the Safety Management Regulations, the
Western Tugger would be required to have a safety management system in accordance with
the International Safety Management Code.
The vessel operator is repairing the vessel’s towing winch, which will not incorporate a
second brake.
The principle failures for this incident were related to mechanical failures. However,
regarding the company’s safety management and safety culture, there was a lack of a safety
management system and therefore, of formal risk assessment procedures.
Had such procedures been in place, the company might have identified the following
potential hazards prior to sailing:
•
•
•
•
an emergency tow release that was not capable of being operated immediately,
hatches that were not reliably watertight,
minimal freeboard, and
unsecured cargo.
74 7 Industry Safety Leaders And Best Practice
In order to analyse the impact of safety culture and crew engagement on the occurrence of
safety incidents (accidents and casualties) in the workboat industry, three case studies are
presented, the analysis of which explores the safety procedures and safety cultures of
companies that, due to their superior safety performance, can be considered as safety
leaders within the workboat industry.
For each case study, the analysis of each company’s safety culture is based on the
framework for assessing safety culture outlined in Section 2.2.2. The case studies are based
on publicly available information such as the companies’ websites and news reports.
7.1 Case Study 1: Svitzer
7.1.1 Company Overview
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Company Size (Number Of Employees): 4,000.
Area Of Operation: SVITZER currently operates in 40 countries globally.
Annual Turnover: Svitzer made a profit of USD 82m in 2014 (compared to US
$134m in 2013)
Public Or Privately Owned Company?: Svitzer is a member of the Maersk Group,
a public company.
Location Of Headquarters: Copenhagen, Denmark.
Fleet Size And Composition: 434 towage and salvage vessels
7.1.2 Safety Performance Summary
In the years prior to 2012, Svitzer had seen a consistent drop in lost time incidents, with
many operations recording five years or more without any lost time injuries.
In 2010, the company won the 2010 Lloyd’s List Safe Transport Award which goes to a
company with an exceptional commitment to improving safety standards in the maritime
industry.
In 2012, however, six employees and a customer’s contractor lost their lives in an explosion
and subsequent fire onboard the Svitzer tug Al Deebel while assisting in a maintenance
operation at Ras Laffan, Qatar offshore a mooring buoy. The tug was involved in flushing the
loading hose string with sea water, when back flow of liquid condensate in the line and
subsequent gas evolution resulted in an explosion on board. Four other crew members and
another customer’s contractor who was on board survived the incident.
The Al Deebel accident made it evident that further improvements in safety governance and
risk management were necessary and safety initiatives were catapulted to the top of the
company’s priority list. One of the main initiatives since the accident was the implementation
of the Offshore Vessel Management and Self Assessment (OVMSA) system throughout the
organization. The OVMSA is a best practice safety and quality standard developed by the oil
majors. It is divided into four stages of compliance, the first and basic level being equal to
the International Safety Management Code, which is a prerequisite for operating at sea. The
OVMSA guidelines encourage vessel operators to assess their safety system against a
certain level to which they must comply. Svitzer is the first tugboat company in the world to
be fully compliant with OVMSA and meets Level 2 of this standard.
Svitzer has been awarded with an IHS SPECTRUM Excellence award for achieving
compliance with OVMSA marine safety standard to reduce incidents and grow business. The
IHS SPECTRUM Excellence Awards recognize the outstanding accomplishments of
75 strategic planners, engineers and operational leaders from a host of industries worldwide
who make critical decisions based on best-in-class information, analytics and expertise.
The company’s safety initiatives have resulted in a decrease in lost-time injury frequencies
(LTIF). The LTIFs for the past three years are listed below:
•
•
•
2012: 1.46
2013: 0.51
2014: 1.06
Svitzer also use another safety indicator: the Total Recordable Cases Frequency which
measures the number of recordable cases per million exposure hours. This allows the
company to learn how to prevent incidents which could potentially turn into lost-time
incidents. In 2013, the company achieved a TRCF of 4.4, thereby overachieving on their
target of 6.0.
7.1.3 Assessment Of Safety Culture & Crew Engagement
Promotion Of Safety
Svitzer’s focus on safety is summed up in their safety slogan: ‘Every Day a Safe Day’. This
reflects the company’s commitment to letting their actions be governed by their high safety
standards every single day.
As mentioned, the company’s safety management came under scrutiny after the Al Deebel
accident. This accident triggered a comprehensive review and reshaping of the approach to
operational safety. Raising safety standards across the organization became Svitzer’s
number one strategic objective.
Being highly decentralized with almost every of its 110 entities operating independently, also
in their approach to safety, the company’s combined operations at the time of the accident
had over 1,200 different safety procedures and seven safety systems across regions. This
level of complexity not only made it difficult to ensure that all employees enjoyed the same
high safety standards, but also proved to be a major challenge from a customer perspective,
e.g. the same client faced different safety procedures for a similar operation in discharge and
load ports.
Therefore, the Svitzer leadership team decided to harmonize safety standards across the
many independent entities. As one of the first steps, Svitzer established a Marine Standards
organization, reporting directly to the CEO, responsible for all aspects of safety, including
HSSEQ, marine operations and marine standards. The company has also appointed global
and regional Heads of Marine Standards, both in its Group Headquarters in Copenhagen
and in Australia.
In order to standardize safety management across the organization, Svitzer decided to
pursue a risk-based safety management system - the Offshore Vessel Management and Self
Assessment (OVMSA) standard - as a global framework for their operations. More than
1,000 safety procedures were reviewed and assessed against best practices. In addition, the
risks of each service were re-evaluated, ranging from oil and gas terminal maintenance,
piloting in ports and navigating in ice. Taking inspiration from the airline industry, risk-based
checklists were developed to remind employees of the hazards they face in their day-to-day
operations and how to manage them well.
Safety Awareness
In order to improve safety awareness and safety leadership across the marine and shore
organization, Svitzer launched an annual global Safety Day in 2013. The Safety Day
76 emphasizes management commitment and two-way communication, followed by guidance
and coaching on safety awareness and carrying out comprehensive risk-based audits
through the year. This day is meant to bring together all of Svitzer’s 4,000 employees in their
respective locations worldwide for safety discussion and exercises.
Each Safety Day has a specific theme. In 2013, the theme was stop authority - raising
awareness that every employee holds not only the authority but also the responsibility to
stop an operation if anyone is in doubt of its level of safety (see also section
‘Empowerment’).
Under the theme ‘Shipshape’, the 2014 Safety Day emphasized the importance of a tidy and
well maintained work environment to prevent incidents from happening. Shipshape is part of
a larger campaign to promote year-round safety awareness and encourage behavioral
change. The centerpiece of the campaign was a short video animation that demonstrates the
possibly disastrous consequences of safety lapses in real life situations. The animation was
shown at Svitzer locations worldwide on Safety Day and also posted on the corporate
website and Facebook page to ensure that everyone throughout the organization viewed the
entire Shipshape presentation at least once. In addition, the Shipshape safety message was
communicated to the organization using teaser alerts to computers, posters, screensavers,
giveaway items as well as a smartphone game called ‘Shipshaper’. The game allows players
to score points by successfully avoiding safety obstacles while navigating Duke Shaper, the
Safety Hero of the Shipshape campaign, through a series of realistic onboard safety
hazards. Further incentives to stay involved and think safety are built into the game as
players participate in monthly price drawings.
Svitzer’s Shipshaper game was named one of the three business-to-business apps of 2014
by US-based Advertising Age magazine. The award for Shipshaper noted that, “The
Shipshaper game is anything but [boring] and is miles ahead of training films of the past.
This lively little app beckons users to learn safety in a way that’s fun and keeps them from
tuning out.”
Communication
On a company-wide level, the effectiveness of communication has been improved through
the implementation of the harmonized safety management system. Safety updates are now
received instantly across the globe and the harmonization ensures people receive the same
information, have the same knowledge related to safety procedures and do not have to learn
a new system if they move to another location.
The safety management system includes all categories of procedures, all necessary
checklists, forms, risk assessments, certifications and much more pertaining to every kind of
job and because it is fully electronic, this information is accessible to all Svitzer employees
via computer or mobile devices.
On a regional level, communication initiatives are undertaken if a need for it is identified. In
Australasia, for example, the 2012 engagement survey (see also section ‘Feedback’)
identified a lack of communication as a problem. It caused crew to feel disengaged from the
larger organization and to complain of a lack of awareness of their daily efforts from
management. In response, SVITZER Australasia developed a Facebook-like online bulletin
board called Yammer which has helped SVITZER’s southernmost region break down the
geographical distance and identify managerial barriers between senior management and
crews at ports around Australia’s vast coastline. In spring 2013, about 10% of local staff had
signed up and two-way communication quickly began increasing.
77 Another example can be found in the United Kingdom. At two employee engagement
sessions for crew in the Svitzer United Kingdom regions of Thames and Medway, the need
for more efficient communication between sea and shore-based employees was brought up.
So far, two concrete initiatives are under way: a monthly newsletter for the cluster focusing
on local news, contracts won and lost and the progress at the London Gateway project, and
a Who’s Who of shore employees detailing their roles and responsibilities. The Who’s Who
idea was well received and will be implemented across the United Kingdom.
Empowerment
On their company website, Svitzer states: “we encourage you [employees] to challenge the
status quo and voice your opinions, even if they are new and different. We believe each of
our employees is an expert in his or her field and the one best positioned to take the
necessary actions to improve our service to our customers and optimize our operations.
Even more importantly, safety is our highest priority and all Svitzer employees have the
authority and the obligation to stop any operation they do not find safe.”
This message was taken up at the first Svitzer Safety Day ‘Stop Authority’ where Svitzer
stressed that all employees have the authority, the right and not least the duty to stop any
operation they think is unsafe or have doubts about, no matter what and no matter what job
function they hold.
Svitzer’s training courses enable employees to successfully fulfill their safety responsibilities.
In 2011, Svitzer launched a one-day Safety Culture Course which by end of 2013, 2,175 of
the approximately 4,000 employees had completed. By end of 2015, the company plans for
all its employees to have completed the course.
In addition to this more general training, Svitzer provides project-specific training, if required.
Crews working with the Gorgon project LNG terminal in Western Australia, for example,
have undergone training specially tailored for small boat and tug operation within the highly
sensitive LNG terminal environment. Local staff has completed Australia Tug master training
courses at Launceston, Broome and Fremantle.
In some of its operating regions, Svitzer offers additional training. In 2012, Svitzer Australia
launched a new leadership training initiative for over 600 Australian crew and shore staff.
The two-and-a-half day program is designed to give all employees a better understanding of
SVITZER’s priorities, purpose and direction.
Another example is the new in-house training program that Svitzer Bahrain is rolling out in
response to concerns raised by employees regarding training and career development
opportunities. The program covers topics such as:
•
•
•
•
•
SVITZER Safety Culture.
Risk assessment.
Seamanship and line-handling safe practices.
Ship-handling and use of tugs.
English language – effective communication.
In Angola, Svitzer has tailored an entire program for training future Angolan seaman with no
local history or prior experience in seafaring. When establishing a new 20-year towage
contract with the Angola LNG terminal in September 2011, Svitzer undertook a
comprehensive localization program. The objective was to ensure that at least 90% of the
positions would be covered by Angolans within 10 years. A complete training package was
developed and tailored to educate and prepare Angolans for life and work at sea. They were
78 provided with an internationally recognized and STCW certified education, developed in cooperation with recognized maritime institutions and the Danish Maritime Authority. In 2014,
Svitzer was awarded for their “Training and Angolization program in Soyo, Angola” as a
nominee in the ‘Investment in People’ category by the respected global maritime recognition
schemes, Seatrade Awards 2014 in London, United Kingdom.
In 2015, Svitzer plans to roll out the so-called SOVIQ, a self-assessment tool for tugs based
on the OVMSA standard that has already been implemented as part of Svitzer’s new HMS
guidelines. This process was already started in the final quarter of 2014 through worldwide
train-the-trainer sessions in the use of SOVIQ questionnaires. Those trained will then extend
the training throughout the organization.
Beginning 1 April, fully trained SOVIQ inspectors are expected to go onboard all tugs at sixmonth intervals, working alternately with engineers and deck officers to ensure that all areas
of each tug are meeting Svitzer’s safety and maintenance requirements. In addition, crews
will do their own self-assessments through a questionnaire.
Feedback
Every year, Svitzer conducts an employee engagement survey to evaluate the company’s
safety management, planning initiatives and taking action to improve employee engagement
where the survey results show it is necessary.
Some initiatives have been started or improved as a direct result of the survey results, e.g.
the communication initiatives in the UK and Australasia and the provision of further training
in Bahrain. Similarly, Svitzer has acted on criticism of the survey itself and the distribution of
feedback on the survey. As a consequence, Svitzer now publishes articles about actions and
improvements
resulting
from
survey
feedback
in
its
company
magazine
LighthouseMagazine. Furthermore, Svitzer are introducing new standards whereby all teams
can expect to receive information about results and actions from their manager shortly after
the survey results are published. Meetings to discuss results and action plans will be held
within four weeks of publication.
In addition to the employee engagement survey, Svitzer’s safety management system
provides a uniform way of reporting incidents and near misses and suggesting
improvements. Employees are encouraged to report near misses in order to improve safety
procedures, prevent incidents and avoid complacency. In 2014, 4,200 near misses were
reported.
Responsiveness
Svitzer extensively uses specialist training in simulators as it allows employees to learn how
to react and perform in challenging and emergency situations. Simulators with uniquely
developed software help Svitzer’s crew prepare for operating new vessel types, operating in
especially challenging conditions or practicing new procedures. Portable simulators allow for
training on location, often involving other important stakeholders such as pilots.
At Svitzer’s Salvage Academy, customers, partners and employees learn how to respond to
maritime emergencies using a combination of theoretical learning and real-life simulation.
Mutual Trust
Evaluating the level of trust in a company is difficult, especially for an outsider. However,
based on the previous indicators, it seems that Svitzer is genuinely concerned about
employee welfare and satisfaction which would facilitate an atmosphere of trust. Employees
79 are actively encouraged to report any concerns they have and feedback is taken seriously
and acted upon (see section ‘Feedback’).
The company website states that “Teamwork in Svitzer means acceptance, respect,
dedication, and the idea that we can achieve more when we all pull together. We believe
that good Svitzer leaders serve by example and inspire others, and that the best indication of
strong leadership is the success of the team.”
7.1.4 Safety Culture & Crew Engagement – Summary
Svitzer’s good safety record took a serious hit in 2012 when seven people lost their lives in
an accident onboard a Svitzer tug. This accident triggered a complete overhaul of the
company’s existing safety management systems and procedures. Safety was declared
Svitzer’s number one priority which has been reflected in the actions taken since then. The
company homogenized safety procedures across the different regions and operations
decided to implement the highly ambitious OVMSA safety management system across the
company. With the implementation of this new management system, communication was
made more effective because safety updates are received instantly across the globe,
facilitating greater crew engagement. Furthermore, the safety management system includes
all safety-related documents in electronic format, ensuring this information is accessible to all
Svitzer employees at all times. This global communication approach is supplemented by
regional initiatives where necessary.
Safety awareness is heightened by a number of highly innovative approaches, including the
organization of a global Safety Day, a smartphone game that highlights safety hazards or a
regional Facebook-like page to increase two-way communication between employees.
Svitzer provides both general safety training in the form of a one-day Safety Culture Course
and project-specific training. This helps employees identify potential problems, as will the
self-assessment tool for tugs that Svitzer plans to roll out in 2015. Furthermore, Svitzer
urges its employees to stop an operation they deem unsafe and encourages them to provide
feedback through an annual employee survey. Some of the survey results have led to direct
actions which are communicated to the employees, thereby showing that feedback is taken
seriously.
7.2 Case Study 2: Foss Maritime Company
7.2.1 Company Summary
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Year Company Established 1889.
Company Size (Number Of Employees): 1,500.
Area Of Operation: All major US East and West Coast ports, including the
Columbia and Snake River system; Pacific Rim, Europe, South America and
Arctic
Annual Turnover: US$ 302m in 2010.
Public Or Privately Owned Company?: Owned by Saltchuk Resources, a
privately-owned family investment company.
Location Of Headquarters: Seattle, Washington.
Fleet Size And Composition: Over 150 tugs & barges.
For the past few years, Foss Maritime’s lost-time injury rates (LTIRs) have been well below
industry standards. In 2012, Foss Maritime operations reported an LTIR of 0.14, compared
to an industry standard of 1.30. Injury rates are calculated based on the number of incidents
80 per 100 employees during the reporting period and are intended to enable comparisons of
companies of varying sizes.
Foss Maritime’s LTIR amounts to what an equivalent number of injuries would be for an
employee group of 100 working 40-hour weeks, 50 weeks per year.
Not only are Foss Maritime’s injury rates low, they have also experienced a general
downwards trend. While more recent statistics could not be found, Figure 36 below presents
the trends for the years 2007 - 2010.
FIGURE 36: FOSS MARITIME INCIDENT RATES. 2007 -‐ 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 Recordable Injury Rate 5.03 4.18 3.2 2.32 YTD 2011 (through July) 1.55 # of Recordable Injuries 60 48 31 21 7 Lost Time Injury Rate 3.52 2.18 0.72 0.11 0 # of Lost Time Injuries 42 25 7 1 0 Foss Maritime’s good safety record has been recognized with several prizes.
Every year since 2008, the Chamber of Shipping of America (CSA) has honoured Foss
Maritime vessels with the Jones F. Devlin Award. The Jones F. Devlin Award is presented to
self-propelled merchant vessels that have operated for two full years or more without a
crewmember losing a full turn at watch because of an occupational injury. In 2008, Foss
Maritime had 18 vessels with this accolade. Since 2008 the number of vessel’s awarded has
increased steadily to 73 vessels in 2014 when altogether, Foss Maritime vessels achieved
the equivalent of 483 years without a lost-time injury.
Additionally, US Coast Guard (USCG) officials have publicly commended Foss Maritime for
being an industry leader in safety and compliance. This was due to Foss Maritime becoming
the first company to complete the US Coast Guard’s Towing Vessel Bridging Program, a
voluntary towing vessel examination. 35 out of 36 Foss tugs passed this voluntary exam in
2011. The Towing Vessel Bridging Program was initiated to ease the transition and ensure
that both the Coast Guard and the towing vessel industry are informed and prepared to meet
the new requirements to be finalized in Subchapter M.
81 Furthermore, in 2011, the Pacific Maritime Association honoured Foss Maritime’s ongoing
commitment to safety and accident prevention with four awards. Foremost was the
recognition of Foss Line Service for reducing its annual injury rate more than any of its
Washington state-based competitors. Foss line-handlers recorded no time lost for injuries in
2010. In addition to being recognized for recording the greatest reduction in injury rates,
Foss Line Services took home three other honors:
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First Place Safety Award, Washington state, based on incident rates as
determined by federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
recordable injury reporting.
First Place Accident Prevention Award, West Coast-wide, based on incident rates
as determined by OSHA recordable injury reporting.
Accident Prevention Award, West Coast-wide, for a zero injury rate.
7.2.3 Assessment Of Safety Culture & Crew Engagement
Promotion Of Safety
Foss Maritime has established a Safety Management System in line with the requirements of
the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and that even though it is voluntary for the
majority of its fleet. All of their tug vessels undergo annual auditing to demonstrate
compliance with the safety management system. Foss Maritime implemented its first ISMcompliant SMS in 2003. In addition, Foss Maritime is ISO 9001 certified, meaning that it
complies with ISO 9000 Quality Management System standards.
Foss Maritime also participates in the Responsible Carrier Program (RCP), a domestic set of
safety, quality and environmental standards by the American Waterway Operators
developed for the US tugboat, towboat and barge industry, and has been the first company
on the US west coast to become recertified under the RCP.
Foss Maritime’s embracement of safety is reflected in its overall motto “Always Safe. Always
Ready”.
The company’s safety policy states that:
“It is the policy of Foss Maritime Company to provide its employees with a safe and
healthful working environment. Employees are encouraged to promote conditions,
practices and attitudes, which establish such an environment. Every manager is
accountable to maintain the standards, which are required to fulfill these basic
principles. These standards shall apply to the condition of facilities and equipment,
establishment of safety objectives, and endorsement and support of the program.
Through proper training and education, all employees will have a clear perception of
what is expected from them regarding safety performance.”
Foss Maritime has a goal of operating with zero injuries and environmental incidents. To
achieve this, the company has been working to standardize safety programs and provides
different tools to create and maintain a safe working atmosphere.
These include:
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Safety Training.
Job Safety Analysis.
Near Miss Reports.
Safety Meetings.
Regional Safety Committees.
Drills.
Shipmate Plus Observations.
82 •
Serious Injury and Fatality Prevention.
In a continuing effort to create a zero-incident culture, Foss Maritime has developed a set of
“safety rules to live by” that aim to stop potential evolutions of serious safety situations
before they start. The new rules will be incorporated into Job Safety Analyses (JSAs)
conducted before all operations performed in the fleet and at the company’s shipyards.
Specifically, the rules are designed to help employees avoid situations that could develop
into serious injuries or fatalities.
These ten safety rules are listed below:
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I will always start my work with pre-task planning and a JSA when required.
I will protect myself from falls when working above 5 feet.
I will not walk under suspended loads.
I will wear approved safety equipment (PPE) in all required production and work
areas.
I will stay out of the snap-back zone AND the bight of lines.
I will maintain my work area free of hazards at all times.
I will VERIFY isolation of energy (LOTO) before work begins.
I will only enter confined spaces that are certified by a marine chemist or shipyard
competent person.
I will only work with a valid hot-work permit when required.
I will use my stop work authority when exposure increases beyond plan.
Safety Awareness
In order to ensure all members of the work force are aware of their responsibilities with
regards to safety, Foss Maritime has established the Marine Assurance Group (MAG). The
MAG acts as the interface between the mariner and the policy and procedures that govern
Foss Maritime operations. It is tasked with providing each mariner with the proper guidance
to perform his or her job in the form of current and regularly updated policies, procedures,
and operating manuals. Central to this is the company’s Safety Management System
manual, which provides guidance to the entire Foss Maritime fleet on their day-to-day
operations and compliance with the ISM (International Safety Management) and ISO
certifications of the company. All mariners have access to the SMS through their onboard
computers.
The company requires every seagoing employee to review all safety communications issued
since last working on the boat before undertaking a tour.
Another important aspect of safety awareness is that employees feel not only accountable
for their own actions but also collectively for the actions of their colleagues and crew. To this
effect. Foss Maritime has implemented the Shipmate Plus program. This is a people-based
safety program specifically tailored to the company’s marine operations but modeled after a
similar program that has been successful in the company’s shipyards. It was first tested in
the San Francisco Bay region in 2009 and was subsequently implemented throughout the
company’s marine operations. As in the shipyard, employees use checklists to observe coworkers performing everyday tasks. Because boat crews are small groups, they review the
safe and unsafe behaviors recorded during the observations as a group.
Communication
Foss Maritime recognizes that the corporate safety culture (and performance) can be
improved by providing sound guidelines to improve safety related communication.
83 One of the company’s means to achieve open communication and ensure safety
communications reach every employee are the Regional Safety Committees. Each operating
region at Foss Maritime has a Regional Safety Committee. With regard to safety
communication, the Committees communicate Foss safety policies and goals to other
employees, motivate other crew members to follow sound safety practices and policies, and
exchange information and expertise about safety and health issues. They also act as a
visible and approachable body to listen to other employees’ safety concerns and
suggestions and communicate employee safety concerns and suggestions to management
to help correct safety hazards at the earliest stage. Committee members also take what they
hear or learn from the Safety Committee meetings back into the fleet and talk to their fellow
crew members about safety. Every employee can join the Committee and participate in the
quarterly meetings. During 2013, Regional Marine Safety Committees held 24 quarterly
meetings.
Furthermore, Foss Maritime publishes the company magazine ‘Tow Bitts’ several times a
year. This magazine features safety topics heavily and in June 2013, a regular safety column
written by Director of Health and Safety was included in Tow Bitts.
Empowerment
According to Al Rainsberger, Foss Maritime’s Director of Health and Safety, “we [Foss
Maritime] invest a fair amount of time and money to assure that we are all trained to be
safe”.
Foss Maritime provides annual mariner trainings and organizes drills and weekly safety
meetings and the Regional Safety Committees participate in and make suggestions for
safety training. However, no further details on training could be found.
As a subsidiary of Saltchuk, Foss follows Saltchuk’s Code of Ethical Business Conduct
which states that “every employee has the right and responsibility to stop an unsafe act”. It
urges employees to take responsibility for their actions and to always stop, correct and
report any unsafe or hazardous condition they see to their supervisor. To ensure that all
employees have an opportunity to raise concerns, Saltchuk offers two other ways to
anonymously report issues: an online reporting tool and an independently operated Ethics
Hotline that employees can call. Saltchuk forbids any form of retribution directed toward
those making reports, asking questions, or participating in an investigation in good faith,
stating that “retaliation for making a report is itself a violation of our Code by the person who
retaliates”.
In 2007, Foss Maritime began developing the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) program. The JSA
program provides tools for employees to assess risks before beginning any job, identifying
specific hazards and taking preventive measures to complete jobs safely. Throughout the
company’s marine operations, deck officers and crew-members consider the safety aspect
of every job and review every job they do, deciding whether a JSA should be performed.
As part of the program, the Safety Department maintains a library of JSAs that marine
personnel can access through their onboard computers or on the company’s intranet portal.
During 2013, more than 16,000 job safety analyses were performed prior to work and more
than 15,000 safety observations were conducted, with 95% showing no at-risk behaviors.
Feedback
In 2007, Foss Maritime implemented a ‘Lessons-Learned’ program. Under the program, all
lost-time incidents are investigated. Following the investigation, investigators produce a
document containing a brief accident summary, corrective actions taken and lessons
84 learned. The lessons-learned system can also be used for incidents that do not necessarily
result in lost time, but are reportable under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA), result in equipment damage, or that might affect the company’s reputation.
The Regional Safety Committees review and discuss incidents, near misses and lessons
learned to increase hazard awareness.
Responsiveness
According to company information, Foss Maritime has one of the most knowledgeable and
experienced workforces in the industry, averaging well over 20 years per person.
Each mariner participates in annual safety training and depending on their position, attends
deck officer, engineer, tanker man, or deckhand seminars designed to provide position
specific training. Crews drill on emergency towing techniques, often with Foss’ customers
and have annual incident command drills to verify their readiness. Response equipment
such as pumps, emergency tow gear, blowers, etc. are staged at Foss Maritime operating
locations and on many of their vessel to ensure emergency readiness.
Mutual Trust
Foss Maritime has an overall above industry average safety record: injury rates are low and
continue to decrease and have earned the company several awards. This good safety
record is based on thorough safety management practices throughout the company. Even
though it is voluntary for the majority of the fleet, Foss has established a Safety Management
System in line with the requirements of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. In
addition, Foss is ISO 9001 certified and participates in the Responsible Carrier Program by
the American Waterways Operators.
As part of the ISM safety management system, all of Foss’ tugs undergo annual safety
audits, thereby improving problem identification. Furthermore, Job Safety Analyses are
conducted before all operations performed in the fleet and Foss has implemented the
Shipmate Plus program whereby employees use checklists to observe co-workers
performing everyday tasks which helps increase safety awareness. In order to ensure all
members of the work force are aware of their safety responsibilities, Foss Maritime has
established the Marine Assurance Group which acts as the interface between the mariner
and the policy and procedures that govern Foss operations. There are also Regional Safety
Committees that communicate Foss Maritime safety policies and goals to other employees,
motivate other crew members to follow sound safety practices and policies, and exchange
information and expertise about safety and health issues.
Foss Maritime provides annual mariner trainings and organizes drills and weekly safety
meetings and the Regional Safety Committees participate in and make suggestions for
safety training. To ensure that all employees have an opportunity to raise concerns
anonymously, Foss Maritime offers an online reporting tool and an independently operated
Ethics Hotline that employees can call. Under the company’s ‘Lessons-Learned’ program, all
lost-time incidents are investigated and a document is produced containing a brief accident
summary, corrective actions taken and lessons learned.
7.3 Case Study 3: American Commercial Lines
7.3.1 Company Summary
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Company Size (Number of employees): 2,200.
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Area Of Operation: American inland waterways.
Annual Turnover: For the year 2013, the Company reported total revenues of US
$811.6 million and Adjusted EBITDAR of US $232.1 million. Compared to 2011
results, revenues declined US $41.4 million, or 4.9%, while Adjusted EBITDAR
improved by US $57.8 million, or 33.2%.
Public Or Privately Owned Company?: Public.
Location Of Headquarters: Jeffersonville, IN.
Fleet Size And Composition: Approximately 2,300 barges, powered by over 100
towboats.
For the past four years, the Chamber of Shipping of American has recognized American
Commercial Line (ACL) vessels with the Jones F. Devlin Award for Safety. The J.F. Devlin
Award Certificates are awarded to all manned merchant vessels that have operated for two
full years or more without a crew member losing a full turn at watch because of an
occupational injury. In 2014, 56 ACL vessels were recognized with the J.F. Devlin Award,
approximately 68% of the company’s fleet.
Promotion Of Safety
ACL pledge that: “We will conduct all of our activities in a safe, conscientious and
environmentally sound manner. We will continually align the production, quality and
performance of our products and services with safety as our first priority.”
Allegedly, safety of the team, the marine environment and their customers’ cargoes is ACL’s
operating priority.
Towards this end, ACL partners with and participates in industry and government programs
that foster continuous improvement in safety performance with expanded resources,
standardized measurements, reporting requirements, and proven management systems.
The company holds the following safety-related memberships and certifications:
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Member of the American Chemistry Council's Responsible Care Partnership
Program.
Certified by the American Waterways Operators' Responsible Carrier Program.
Partnering with the U.S. Coast Guard:
o Enrollment in the Coast Guard's Tank Barge Streamlined Inspection Program.
o Host of a bridging program to educate Coast Guard members on the inland
barge transportation industry.
o Implementation of Crew Endurance Management.
Safety Awareness
ACL requires all employees to sign an annual statement that they have read, are familiar
with and understand the Code of Ethics. This signature also confirms that they will
incorporate the Code of Ethics into their daily work activities and comply with the Code of
Ethics, company policies and procedures and all applicable workplace laws and regulations.
Communication
No information available. Empowerment
According to ACL, the company takes all reports of violations seriously and addresses them
promptly.
86 ACL believes that all accidents and injuries can be prevented and empowers each employee
with the right, the responsibility and the resources to make safe decisions in the workplace,
be it on a vessel, in a shipyard or terminal, or in an office building.
Feedback
Mutual Trust
ACL communicate that they are committed to maintaining a culture that encourages the
highest standards of ethical conduct and integrity in every aspect of their business. The
company’s understanding of ethical conduct and integrity is recorded in its Code of Ethics
which is publicly available online.
ACL actively encourages and even obliges its employees to report any condition that is
believed to be unsafe, unhealthy or hazardous as well as any violation of the Code of Ethics.
ACL has a dedicated Integrity Helpline that employees may contact to report violations or
otherwise unacceptable conditions. Reports can also be made to the employee’s supervisor,
a Human Resources or Legal Department representative.
Employees have the option to report anonymously, but even they make their identity known,
ACL commits to take reasonable precautions to keep their identity confidential. All reports
made will be handled with confidentiality and discretion.
Retaliation for the good faith reporting of an apparent or actual ethical violation of the law,
the Code of Ethics or any Company policy or procedure, or for participating in any
investigation of a suspected violation is expressly prohibited.
Responsiveness
For the past four years, an increasing number of ACL vessels have been recognized with the
J.F. Devlin Award for Safety.
The company pledges that safety of the team, the marine environment and their customers’
cargoes are their operating priority. Towards this end, ACL partners with and participates in
industry and government programs that foster continuous improvement in safety
performance with expanded resources, standardized measurements, reporting
requirements, and proven management systems.
To ensure employees are aware of their safety responsibilities, ACL requires all employees
to sign an annual statement that they have read, understand and will comply with the Code
of Ethics, company policies and procedures and all applicable workplace laws and
regulations. ACL welcomes employee feedback and actively encourages and even obliges
its employees to report any condition that is believed to be unsafe, unhealthy or hazardous
as well as any violation of the Code of Ethics. Towards this end, ACL has a dedicated
Integrity Helpline that employees may contact anonymously to report violations or otherwise
unacceptable conditions. This increases the success in identifying potential safety hazards
and other problems.
87 8 Conclusions And Recommendations
8.1 The Literature Review
The analysis conducted through this research study has confirmed that crew engagement
and organizational culture does impact safety on workboats and OSVs.
The literature review reinforced this finding: a plethora of reports and research documents
establish that there is a positive relationship between a well-established organizational
safety culture and safety performance across many industries. This positive link has also
been established in the maritime industry and it was confirmed that crew engagement plays
an important role in a similar way that employee engagement plays a vital role in onshore
industries. Such positive relationships are transferrable to the workboat and OSV sector with
the correct resources and support for industry stakeholders available.
Through the literature review, a maritime-specific framework was established that aids any
assessment of an organisation’s safety culture. It was this framework that was subsequently
used to analyse the industry case studies presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
8.2 The Data Analysis
In order to assess the current safety performance in the workboat sector, this research study
examined datasets that contained elements that could be extracted and used as indicators
for safety culture and crew engagement. The principal datasets analysed were relating to
accident and casualty statistics as well as vessel detentions and deficiencies identified
during Port State Control (PSC) inspections.
The analysis of the accident and casualty statistics examined almost 6,000 occurrences that
were reported during 2011 and 2013 in EU waters or on EU-flagged vessels. The
assessment of occurrences as per vessel category exposed that general cargo vessels were
the vessel category the most involved in occurrences. Cargo ships are also the vessel
category with the highest rate of casualties and that experiences the greatest number of
occurrences according to severity.
In contrast, tugs and offshore support vessels were involved in comparatively few
occurrences and recorded far less fatalities and injuries according to the data, suggesting
that their safety performance may be superior to that of other vessel categories, such as
cargo and passenger vessels.
Port State Control (PSC) inspections and the resulting vessel deficiencies and detentions
were then used as an indicator for safety performance, culture and crew engagement.
The data analysis showed that during 2014, general cargo/multi-purpose vessels, bulk
carriers and container ships recorded most deficiencies and detentions and offshore support
vessels and tugs amongst the least.
According to the data analysed, the vast majority of inspected workboats registered no
deficiencies at all or less than 5 deficiencies. However, when examining on a region-byregion basis the average number of deficiencies per inspected workboat was greater for the
Tokyo MOU authorities than for the Paris MOU authorities which could indicate that vessels
operating in waters covered by Tokyo MOU authorities display a lower level of safety culture
than those operating in waters covered by Paris MOU authorities.
For both regions, the data reflected that most workboat deficiencies and detentions are
related to safety culture and crew wellbeing. This leads to the conclusion that improved
88 safety culture, safety management and crew wellbeing would lower the amount of
deficiencies and detentions in the workboat sector.
Similar datasets for the OSV sector were also analysed, showing similar results to the
workboat sector analysis. The vast majority of OSVs inspected by Paris and Tokyo MOU
authorities registered either no deficiencies at all or less than 5 deficiencies. Similar to the
workboat sector, the majority of deficiencies and detentions in the OSV sector were due to
factors related to safety culture and crew wellbeing, hence the conclusion can be drawn that
better safety management procedures, improved safety culture and ensuring crew wellbeing
and improved engagement could contribute to lowering OSV deficiencies and detentions.
The average number of OSVs detained by Tokyo MOU authorities was higher compared to
the average number of OSVs detained by Paris MOU authorities. This difference could be
due to regional difference in safety cultures and practices in the OSV sector in European and
North Atlantic waters (covered by Paris MOU) compared to Asia-Pacific waters (covered by
Tokyo MOU).
8.3 The Offshore Industry Stakeholder Survey
It is clear that the offshore environment contributes towards highly dangerous working
conditions, particularly given the mix of often extreme weather conditions whilst working with
heavy moving equipment on open decks. This research has highlighted some significant
factors contributing to positive and negative safety culture from which several conclusions
can be drawn.
The evidence collected demonstrates that under-reporting of safety issues appear to be
endemic and systemic through-out the offshore industry. People sometimes do not report
accidents for fear of repercussions either from being made to look silly or because they are
afraid to be unofficially blacklisted and not offered subsequent contracts. Potentially an
accident may not be reported because of the transient nature of employment, meaning that it
could be easier to get another job if there are safety concerns, rather than deal with the
issues at hand. This suggests that safety is being compromised and potentially lives are
being put at risk by the very nature of employment and the power relationships it engenders.
Additionally, the loss of a company’s good safety reputation was acknowledged as a
deterrent to reporting accidents, and indicates that management and the client need to
honestly apprise what is fundamental to business, and try to balance making money with
safety concerns.
The research suggests that there needs to be assurance that management will support
employees if they were approached with reports of an accident or safety concerns. Whilst
the evidence strongly supports this, there is the impression that employees are wary of the
tight timescales and deadlines that they and their companies have to meet. It is unclear from
this survey whether there are any visible signs of stress expressed from management when
approaching a tight deadline. There is the possibility that even though employees feel that
their management would support them, they would be reluctant to put extra burden on their
superiors during already noticeable periods of stress.
Multicultural issues concerning communication, deferring to authority, and family financial
dependence issues have been widely recognised by the respondents and can compound
and exacerbate onboard safety. The evidence suggests that this is at its most acute in those
very areas where safety becomes more critical, such as in the technically specific activities
onboard, for example, in the engine room, and when emergencies such as life and death
situations occur.
89 This study has highlighted the importance of safety statistics. Whilst they are important, the
research suggests that they may be valued so highly by a company at times, that crews are
sometimes reluctant to report anything that might affect them. Evidence shows that the crew
believe that management are supporting them, and yet there is still a reluctance to report all
accidents. If accidents aren’t being reported then the safety statistics cannot be realistic, and
it is possible that safety is not as good in reality as the safety statistics would suggest.
8.4 The Investigation Of Accidents
The analysis of industry accidents gave insight into how a lack of organizational safety
culture and crew engagement can contribute to incidents onboard workboats.
Many factors identified in the case studies find root in the company safety management.
Despite the fact some of the incidents analysed were primarily caused by equipment failure,
the analysis confirmed that the lack of safety culture still contributed to the causation of the
accident.
The lack of execution of vessel safety checks and non-adherence with safety procedures
were a common theme across the case studies. Furthermore, safety awareness was shown
to be generally low.
Also, it was confirmed that safety management systems may frequently fail to meet the
company’s own safety objectives, such as continuous improvement ensuing from the
identified risks, adequately documenting control measures and verifying the effect of the
control measures implemented.
The failure to provide guidance or written procedures regarding workboat operations for use
onboard the vessel by the crew was highlighted as major factor contributing to safety
incidents through this research. Also a lack of formal risk assessment procedure and
feedback mechanisms is prevalent across the case studies analysed.
The accident onboard one particular vessel also raised the question of how to encapsulate
external contractors into the company’s safety culture and ensure they are sufficiently
trained. Limitations in the training and qualifications required to operate workboats and the
lack of crew training, and rather relying upon the crew’s experience within the workboat
sector, was a common factor that contributes to diminished crew engagement and in turn
safety performance.
A lack of communication to remind crew of potential hazards when engaged in workboat
operations as well as a lack of information exchange was a contributing factor in the case
studies examined.
8.5 The ‘Safety Leaders’ Analysis
The analysis of the safety procedures and safety cultures of companies that, due to their
superior safety performance can be considered as safety leaders within the workboat
industry, showed that the installation of safety management systems can have a marked
positive impact on safety performance. This positive impact can be attributed to improved
crew and onshore employee engagement as well as the promotion and subsequent actions
conducted under improved organizational safety culture.
The homogenization of safety procedures across the different regions and operations across
a company is key for strengthening safety culture.
90 The analysis of safety leaders confirmed that for the effective implementation of any new
management system, communication needs to be effective and continuous. For example,
the delivery of safety updates that can be received instantly across the globe, facilitates
greater crew engagement. Furthermore, any safety management system should include all
safety-related documents in an easy to access format, for example in electronic format,
ensuring that information is accessible to all crew/ employees at all times.
The use of innovative approaches to safety management by one particular industry leader in
order to engage crew were highly successful. Also, the use of crew training and
development of self-assessment tools was a key factor for the fostering of safety culture.
All safety leaders examined urge their crew to stop an operation they deem unsafe. To
promote feedback, one of the safety leaders asks its employees to provide feedback through
an annual survey. Some of the survey results have led to direct actions which are
communicated to the employees, thereby showing that feedback is taken seriously and is an
effective mechanism for crew engagement that has a direct impact on safety performance.
The ability to be able to raise concerns anonymously was an important factor stated by some
of the safety leaders.
The safety leaders also had established their Safety Management System in line with the
requirements of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. Also, many were
participants in the Responsible Carrier Program by the American Waterways Operators.
Finally, the achievement of safety awards and crew/employee recognition programs featured
heavily in the safety success stories. Gaining industry recognition and demonstrating
commitment enriches both the crews and onshore employees and promotes a positive
safety culture.
8.6 Recommendations
This research study has shown that organizational culture and crew engagement have a
significant positive impact on safety in both the workboat and OSV sector. Therefore, owners
and operators who wish to improve their safety performance should look to establish and
embed a safety culture in their organizations.
As shown by the literature review and validated through the case studies, several factors are
important for establishing an organizational safety culture within the maritime industry,
inclusive of the workboat and OSV sectors. We recommend to focus on these factors to
establish an effective safety culture. The different factors and ideas on how to fulfil them are
briefly summarized in the following:
1. Communication: Information should reach all levels in the organization and should
be understood by all, so that all of the workforce (both crew and shore-side staff) has,
and understands, all the information required to do their jobs safely. Effective
communication should be open and people should be able to speak freely across
and within all different hierarchical levels of an organization.
Safety-relevant information could be communicated in the company’s newsletter, on
the website, the intranet, or other already established communication channels. In
companies with multi-cultural crews, companies should ensure that information is
provided in the crews’ native language or offer language courses to educate crews in
one common language (often English).
2. The empowerment of employees: Employees should feel responsible for safety
and be empowered to successfully fulfil their safety responsibilities. They should feel
91 able to voice concerns, make suggestions to improve safety and be authorized to
terminate an activity for legitimate safety concerns.
Empowering employees requires training to ensure they are able to successfully their
safety responsibilities. Furthermore, companies can establish safety committees that
employees can join to actively steer the company’s safety initiatives.
3. Feedback systems: Crew and onshore employees should report unsafe acts or nonconformities at an early stage without having to fear punishment or retaliation.
Management teams should respond to safety issues and concerns in a timely
manner and communicate outcomes of incident investigations to the workforce.
In order to foster a reporting culture, organizations can establish a dedicated
reporting mechanism, such as a helpline or online reporting tool which allow for
anonymous reporting.
4. Mutual trust: Relationships between on- and offshore employees and between
management and employees should be characterized by mutual trust and respect.
Both management and workforce should feel confident that a just system exists
where honest errors can be reported without fear of reprisals.
Mutual trust is difficult to establish through single measures and an atmosphere of
trust will likely be the result of several factors. To start, a company could develop,
and live by, a Code of Ethics, have documented policies in place that prevent
unethical behavior in the organization and establish a fair system for incident
investigation.
5. Problem identification: All parts of the organization should pay attention to
indications of weaknesses in the system that could cause problems or safety
hazards. Employees at different levels of the organization should be involved in
identifying hazards, suggesting control measures and providing feedback.
To increase the identification of problems, companies could provide their crews with
tools to assess risks and identify potential hazards (for example safety checklists)
and ask them to use these tools before beginning any job.
6. Promotion of safety: The organization’s management should promote safety as a
core value, give it a high status within the organization’s business objectives and
prioritize safety in all situations. Safety should always take precedence over
performance targets.
Demonstrating the management’s continuous commitment to safety can be achieved
by the use of verbal communication (e.g. safety briefings, open door policy for safety)
and written communication (e.g. safety policy, statements, newsletters). To show that
safety is not just a mere theoretical commitment, sufficient budget and coverage
should be allocated to safety purposes and employees should be trained and
educated to deal with a wide range of situations without compromising safety, for
example through dedicated safety training, drills or e-learning.
7. Responsiveness: Employees should take adequate and timely actions in response
to unexpected events and emergencies. Towards this end, all crew members should
be trained in how to react in challenging and emergency situations. The training
should not only include theoretical lessons, but also real-life simulation, for example
in portable simulators which allow for training on location.
92 8. Safety awareness: All employees should be aware of their responsibilities with
regards to safety and exhibit a high standard of safety performance. All employees
should feel accountable for their own actions, and collectively for the actions of their
colleagues and crew.
Safety awareness can be increased by, for example, requiring employees to review
and sign written safety procedures and communications or by organizing regular
meetings in which safety-relevant topics are discussed.
To approach safety management in a holistic and structured manner, we advise that
organizations establish a safety management system following the principles outlined in the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code, even if that may not be mandatory for the
fleet. Under the ISM Code, the following aspects should be covered by or addressed in a
safety management system:
•
•
•
•
•
•
A safety and environmental protection policy.
Instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the
environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State legislation.
Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst, shore
and shipboard personnel.
Procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions of this
Code.
Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations.
Procedures for internal audits and management reviews.
There are many different resources within the wider maritime industry that provide guidance
on how to establish a safety management system that conforms with the ISM Code. Such
guidance should be sought to facilitate the establishment, operation and maintenance of
such a system. It is, however, important to not blindly copy procedures for the sake of it and
make sure that the safety management system is adapted to the organization’s specific
circumstances and needs and addresses the specific challenges the organization faces.
In addition to recommendations on how to improve the safety culture of organizations in the
workboat and OSV sector, this research study has identified a number of recommendations
for further research. For example, it would be interesting to see how Subchapter M, once
adopted, will influence the safety of the workboat sector in the United States and to study
how workboat safety is regulated in other countries.
In order to get even more in-depth insights into organizations’ safety culture, we would
recommend to interview stakeholders on how they established a safety culture within their
organization and how this has impacted on the organization’s safety performance.
Furthermore, based on the OSV survey findings, several recommendations for further
research and industry change can be made.
The regional ‘gold standard’ that has been highlighted in relation to the North Sea safety
standards is unofficial. It would therefore make interesting research to explore this concept
more and focus on the key elements that contribute to the perception of this standard. In
doing so, research would highlight best practice that may be transferrable across other
global regions; particularly those that are considered to be in a poorer position for practising
good safety standards, such as West Africa.
A company’s accident reporting culture is important. The research demonstrates an
apparent issue of trust in relation to the under reporting of accidents and near misses. This is
93 partly due to the threat of potential repercussions as a result of reporting an incident. The
research shows the importance of an independent off-shore safety officer to work onboard
who is not under the control of the offshore management (for example, under control of the
Captain). An independent officer would be in a better position to support the crew and a no
blame reporting culture. Implementing this, might reassure crews that their safety concerns
are being given a fair hearing.
In spite of the regional/national differences noted, another influencing variable is the
difference between safety standards among operating companies, which does not appear to
be consistent across regions. This suggests that more interaction should take place between
companies, to allow good practices to be acknowledged and followed by other companies.
Although this may be unrealistic due to the unlikelihood of all companies wanting to share
their best practice, it raises the question of whether recommendations for good practice
could be released by unions and organisations like the IMO. Although this must be further
researched, it would be interesting to see to what extent this possibility would be feasible.
As highlighted in the research, there is a split over which parts of the Gulf of Mexico are
considered to have a good safety culture. In order to produce a detailed and realistic
discussion about the current state of safety standards in the Gulf of Mexico, a further study
would need to be conducted in which respondents would disclose what part of the Gulf they
were operating in. Collecting this information would allow similarities and differences in
safety culture between the two areas to be examined and discussed. This would allow
recommendations to be made on the basis of improving the safety culture in the region as a
whole, whilst allowing good safety practices to be acknowledged and transferred as
necessary.
94 9 References
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97 10 Annexes
Annex 1: Indicators For Assessing A Shipping Company’s Safety Culture
Communication
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Empowerment of
employees
•
•
•
•
Feedback systems
•
•
•
•
•
Mutual trust
Problem
identification
Promotion of safety
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Responsiveness
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Provision of a communications training program.
Provision of a company newsletter.
Provision of bulletins, toolbox talks, or similar regarding lessons
learned or alerts regarding incidents that could have fleet-wide
application.
Provision for making safety communications available in native
languages.
Provision of an anonymous reporting system.
Provision of communications of safe work practices.
Provision of two-way communication.
Provision of new hire training.
Environmental, Health and Safety policy and goals are communicated
with the crew.
Presence of clear documented accountabilities for safety.
Presence of a means for crew involvement and/or influence in safety
improvement.
Presence of an off-the-job safety training program.
Establishment of a safety committee that includes a vertical slice of the
organization.
Presence of an employee suggestion/feedback program.
Presence of a crew feedback system concerning near misses and
hazard identifications.
Presence of a feedback system to crew on safety audits, issues and
concerns.
Periodic employee opinion/attitude surveys.
Presence of a crew feedback system concerning shipboard meetings
concerning safety.
Presence of documented policies that prevent unethical behavior in the
organization.
Establishment of a fair system for incident investigation.
Presence of a documented hiring policy and procedures.
Presence of an interviewer training program.
A policy is in place mandating safety procedures, instructions, or rules
for all jobs.
A policy and/or procedures are in place for reporting unsafe conditions.
Safety checklists are provided and updated regularly.
A policy to complete pre-operational checks exist.
Presence of safety budget.
Safety budget is not reduced due to operational budget.
Presence of safety goals.
Presence of a procedure that makes all incident investigation findings
available to employees.
Presence of an induction training program that meets the requirements
of the STCW code.
Procedures to identify and impart any training required in support of
safety management systems.
Senior management attend safety meetings.
Presence of maintenance budget.
Maintenance budget is not reduced due to operational budget.
Provision of personal protective equipment for crew.
Presence of a training program for emergencies.
Creation of metrics for resolution of safety concerns.
Procedures to enable crew to get scheduled rest/time off duty.
98 Safety awareness
•
•
Documented procedures for effective ship and watch hand-overs.
Provision of a training program for hazard/risk assessment.
99 Annex 2: Tugboats Inspected By Paris MOU Authorities In 2014
IMO No.
Tug Name
Flag
IMO No.
Tug Name
Flag
8908258
DE YI
CN
9464194
SMS CAMPECHE
MX
7601657
IONION PELAGOS
PA
7420728
VOS ATLANTICO
TR
7232638
MULTRATUG 10
NL
7403146
EAS
CY
9108752
BOSS
FO
7038642
PANTODYNAMOS
PA
7635957
EILEEN MCALLISTER
US
8224523
FFS ACHILLES
NO
7302732
PROVENCAL 1
FR
9345506
SMIT BARRACUDA
CY
9468372
HUNTER
DK
9497531
SPASATEL KAREV
RU
8519590
WARLOCK
PT
9662124
BOKN
NO
8973942
HURON SERVICE
US
9440899
SVITZER RAMSEY
GB
9479694
SMIT ANGOLA
BE
9548885
KINGFISHER
NL
9130729
ZEUS
FI
9548902
KAIKOURA
VC
9338060
MARINTUG I
TR
9360051
BB WORKER
NO
9729142
LOOKMAN
RU
9524516
HARRIER
NL
7419690
HELLAS
BZ
8986315
MB-1204
RU
9313979
ARAL
KZ
8414817
STADT SLOVAG
NO
9560118
MANGYSTAU-1
KZ
7041625
CHRISTOS XXIV
PA
9398541
ORCUS
LR
7392816
EIDE REX
NO
9433743
PEGASUS
AG
9483657
KESTREL
VC
9175250
FRIGGA
DK
9355848
GSP QUEEN
GI
9276676
SALVISCOUNT
SG
9351830
SALVICEROY
SG
9602447
SVITZER GAIA
FO
9163738
GENUA
IT
8915471
ST.ANNASTRAND
BE
9320817
RT CLAIRE
MT
9230165
KAPITAN SHEBALKIN
RU
9405382
SEA GOLF
NL
9602459
SVITZER GEO
FO
7636365
SERVAL
VC
9429560
BUGSIER 10
DE
9323156
URAG ELBE
CY
9451537
TRITON
NL
9623142
TORSTEN
NL
9055058
SANMAR-2
KZ
9662112
BORGOY
NO
9056789
THORAX
NO
9323168
URAG EMS
CY
9440356
RED HUSKY
ES
7734727
LEONTIY MARTINOVICH
CK
7618399
KRAFT
FI
9434876
WEST
CW
9476006
FAIRPLAY 33
AG
7601657
IONION PELAGOS
PA
9560120
MANGYSTAU-2
KZ
7230135
CHRISTOS XXII
GR
9502685
BB COASTER
NO
7303815
KAPTAN TEOMAN
TR
100 Annex 3: Tugboats Inspected By Tokyo MOU Authorities In 2014
IMO No.
Tug Name
Flag
IMO No.
Tug Name
Flag
9650107
SVITZER VENTURE
SG
8418198
L'ASTROLABE
FR
9650092
SVITZER VISION
SG
9618434
SAMHO T-9
KR
8996657
MANYPLUS 6
MY
7390911
VU
9650092
SVITZER VISION
SG
7527631
RESOLVE
GLADIATOR
TAN CANG 4600
9315094
LEWEK SWIFT
MY
9169471
IM
9572824
ODIN
NL
9564827
MAERSK
SUPPORTER
GLORY 1
9373864
EVERLINE 9
MY
9344863
FAR STRAIT
SG
9528938
GO CAPELLA
SG
9060364
FAR FOSNA
NO
9149457
PACIFIC BARBARIAN
SG
8864397
BOSUNG T NO. 5
KR
9702821
YUN TONG 301
CN
9647423
TAIAROA
VC
8915940
SS T-1
KR
7522863
303 WOOSUNHO
KR
9563809
PU 2815
SG
9390446
HUB GAZELLE
PA
9659074
FAR SIRIUS
NO
9376581
SURYA PUTRA 5
PA
9441661
BRITOIL 22
SG
9311945
SUNGAI LAYUN 1
MY
8403662
DUBHE
PH
9428164
HIGHLINE 51
MY
9563809
PU 2815
SG
9315563
NL
9191371
MAERSK SERVER
IM
9275713
FAIRMOUNT
SHERPA
LADY MELINDA
9142899
DAESANG FRONTIER
KR
9373852
EVERLINE 3
MY
9688673
MTS VANGUARD
VC
9633886
MAGELLAN 2
PA
8202135
VIBORA
PH
7501716
EDADES
PH
9594212
JAYA CRYSTAL
SG
9149457
PACIFIC BARBARIAN
SG
8996669
MANYPLUS 18
MY
9307310
TOISA DARING
BS
9572824
ODIN
NL
9413767
HUB DOLPHIN
PA
9192014
DE SUI
CN
9318759
MANYPLUS 9
MY
7375911
HYUNDAI HT-112
KR
9606261
JASON DUA
MY
8925232
MIMOSA
PH
9149457
PACIFIC BARBARIAN
SG
9149457
PACIFIC BARBARIAN
SG
8996657
MANYPLUS 6
MY
8922589
BO SUNG T 17HO
KR
9344863
FAR STRAIT
SG
9668001
MACALLAN 1
MY
9565986
PB KONUI
CK
9556612
DINTELSTROOM
NL
9581320
BRITOIL 70
SG
9443542
PACIFIC VULCAN
SG
9338462
SURYA WIRA 2
SG
9361689
PACIFIC VIPER
SG
9276664
SALVANGUARD
SG
9547312
SOUTHERNLINE 3
MY
9381160
HAI GANG 36
CN
8409977
DONGBANG PALLAS
KR
9637040
SURYA RATNA 25
SG
9673111
KWANG JIN NO.17
KR
7375911
HYUNDAI HT-112
KR
7626853
DONGBANG PEARL
PA
9413755
HUB UNICORN
PA
9368728
ATLANTIC 1
MY
9616319
HUB 16
MY
9348259
FAR SOUND
IM
9394002
OMS ENDURANCE
SG
8109735
CAPT LATHAM
US
8909393
SPEED TURBO
MN
9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
7378250
DONGBANG VENUS
KR
9246437
PACIFIC RIGGER
ID
9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
SL
MY
SG
101 9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
9433999
HIGHLINE 53
MY
8109735
CAPT LATHAM
US
9408891
MARY K
SG
9650107
SVITZER VENTURE
SG
9342592
MARITIME RATU
SG
9650092
SVITZER VISION
SG
9514274
POSH CHAMPION
SG
8996657
MANYPLUS 6
MY
9307310
TOISA DARING
BS
9650092
SVITZER VISION
SG
9606261
JASON DUA
MY
9315094
LEWEK SWIFT
MY
7817945
TRABAJADOR I
PH
9572824
ODIN
NL
9412220
ALLISON TIDE
VU
9373864
EVERLINE 9
MY
9623001
MAGELLAN 1
PA
9528938
GO CAPELLA
SG
9376646
SURYA PUTRA 6
SG
9149457
PACIFIC BARBARIAN
SG
9623001
MAGELLAN 1
PA
9702821
YUN TONG 301
CN
9690042
NAUTICAL DOLPHIN
ID
8915940
SS T-1
KR
9483645
JIANG JUN
PA
9563809
PU 2815
SG
9169366
PACIFIC BLADE
SG
9659074
FAR SIRIUS
NO
9502477
NOR AUSTRALIS
SG
9441661
BRITOIL 22
SG
9324772
EPIC SASA
MY
8403662
DUBHE
PH
9548627
MERMAID VISION
SG
9563809
PU 2815
SG
8739279
JIN HWA 30
MY
9191371
MAERSK SERVER
IM
9324772
EPIC SASA
MY
9142899
DAESANG FRONTIER
KR
9368132
SOLID I
MY
9688673
MTS VANGUARD
VC
8201404
HUA YUE
LR
8202135
VIBORA
PH
9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
9594212
JAYA CRYSTAL
SG
9447665
SKANDI ATLANTIC
NO
8996669
MANYPLUS 18
MY
7736361
ULSAN701
KR
9572824
ODIN
NL
9633886
MAGELLAN 2
PA
9192014
DE SUI
CN
7375911
HYUNDAI HT-112
KR
7375911
HYUNDAI HT-112
KR
9581320
BRITOIL 70
SG
8925232
MIMOSA
PH
9633886
MAGELLAN 2
PA
9149457
PACIFIC BARBARIAN
SG
7736361
ULSAN701
KR
8922589
BO SUNG T 17HO
KR
9571947
JIN HWA 32
MY
9668001
MACALLAN 1
MY
9560821
BERKAH 38
SG
9556612
DINTELSTROOM
NL
9441635
BRITOIL 20
SG
9443542
PACIFIC VULCAN
SG
9545857
COXON TIDE
VU
9361689
PACIFIC VIPER
SG
9392418
BS
9547312
SOUTHERNLINE 3
MY
9344851
OFFSHORE
DISCOVERY
FAR SWORD
8409977
DONGBANG PALLAS
KR
9530412
GO EMERALD
SG
9673111
KWANG JIN NO.17
KR
9425722
MAERSK LOGGER
DK
7626853
DONGBANG PEARL
PA
9532238
SAMUDRA JAYA I
MY
9368728
ATLANTIC 1
MY
9270634
PACIFIC WRESTLER
SG
9348259
FAR SOUND
IM
9476850
J KEITH LOUSTEAU
VU
8109735
CAPT LATHAM
US
9172284
LADY SANDRA
SG
9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
7639006
KOSCO 101
KR
9246437
PACIFIC RIGGER
ID
9570204
ATLANTIC 10
MY
9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
9314703
IRIS
PG
NO
102 8109735
CAPT LATHAM
US
9520467
PB KOMATA
CK
9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
9570175
TOLL OSBORNE
SG
7900778
MYUNG SAN NO. 301
KR
9578397
POSH CONCORDE
SG
7626853
DONGBANG PEARL
PA
9300647
YEO TIDE
VU
9246437
PACIFIC RIGGER
ID
9600504
TAIKOO
HK
0
MIIKEMARU
KR
9276676
SALVISCOUNT
SG
9169366
PACIFIC BLADE
SG
9314703
IRIS
PG
9169354
PACIFIC BANNER
SG
9441635
BRITOIL 20
SG
9556612
DINTELSTROOM
NL
9570175
TOLL OSBORNE
SG
9581320
BRITOIL 70
SG
9439890
UOS ENDEAVOUR
AG
9270634
PACIFIC WRESTLER
SG
9371440
EVERLINE 6
MY
8748294
TOUEI MARU NO. 2
MN
9646560
LIZ F
NL
9392418
BS
7817074
HUA YANG
LR
7432721
OFFSHORE
DISCOVERY
301 CHOYANGHO
KR
0
KOHO MARU NO.2
KR
9581320
BRITOIL 70
SG
9169366
PACIFIC BLADE
SG
9532238
SAMUDRA JAYA 1
MY
9515589
SG
9392418
BS
9459785
9594212
OFFSHORE
DISCOVERY
JAYA CRYSTAL
SWISSCO
SEARCHER
HUB ORCA
SG
7378236
SAMAL
KH
8409977
DONGBANG PALLAS
KR
9105255
PB COOK
CK
9594212
JAYA CRYSTAL
SG
7639006
KOSCO 101
KR
9545120
MICLYN VENTURE
SG
8121915
SINOPEC 381
PA
9495208
GO PHOENIX
MH
7522136
HUA AN
LR
9570175
TOLL OSBORNE
SG
9155664
PACIFIC BATTLER
SG
9594212
JAYA CRYSTAL
SG
9004968
SL MABINI 1
PA
9125463
ROYAL AMITY
MN
9373840
EVERLINE 1
MY
9495208
GO PHOENIX
MH
9559274
RT SENSATION
MT
9430349
PU 2007
SG
9456197
PACIFIC DEFIANCE
SG
9575644
SB102
SG
8219619
HUAWANG
LR
9571947
JIN HWA 32
MY
9363742
TOURMALINE
SG
7375911
HYUNDAI HT-112
KR
9652404
LAKE MICHIGAN
MH
8201404
HUA YUE
LR
9295622
TARKA
PA
9545857
COXON TIDE
VU
9659983
TERAS BETHEL
SG
9390446
HUB GAZELLE
PA
8126848
PA
9558476
JAEWON 3
KR
8996669
DONG FANG YONG
SHI 2
MANYPLUS 18
9155664
PACIFIC BATTLER
SG
8104046
WATO
PG
9559274
RT SENSATION
MT
9578866
TALENT 1
MY
9465681
YEW CHOON 6
SG
8104046
WATO
PG
9476862
WILLIAM R CROYLE II
VU
9346081
FAR STREAM
IM
8995043
SUNGAI SILAT 1
MY
9565974
PB KAREPO
CK
9523691
HUB DRAGON
PA
9520467
PB KOMATA
CK
9160073
DE YONG
CN
9523691
HUB DRAGON
PA
7913012
SETA MARU
PH
9520467
PB KOMATA
CK
8209339
TAMINGA
PG
8104046
WATO
PG
PA
MY
103 7817074
HUA YANG
LR
9548627
MERMAID VISION
SG
9573971
MERMAID RELIANCE
SG
9574822
LANPAN 22
SG
9538684
BRITOIL 81
SG
9017604
PANNAWONICA I
VC
7526754
KONGOU
CK
9017616
LAMBERT
VC
9658264
TERASEA OSPREY
SG
9191371
MAERSK SERVER
IM
9417402
GO SPICA
PA
9663544
LANPAN 26
SG
9658252
TERASEA EAGLE
SG
8504624
YONG NAM NO. 1
MN
9371440
EVERLINE 6
MY
9480813
SEALINK 161
MY
0
TABIT
PH
9191371
MAERSK SERVER
IM
7526754
KONGOU
CK
9538701
BRITOIL 121
SG
8739279
JIN HWA 30
MY
7522136
HUA AN
LR
9566007
POSH PANGLIMA
SG
9663544
LANPAN 26
SG
9558476
JAEWON 3
KR
7432721
301 CHOYANGHO
KR
9413755
HUB UNICORN
PA
9144964
T-301 KUMYOUNG
KR
9548627
MERMAID VISION
SG
9538701
BRITOIL 121
SG
8219619
HUAWANG
LR
9355836
NOR SUPPORTER
SG
8806228
BOSUNG LEADER
KR
9483645
JIANG JUN
PA
9434008
HUB III
MY
9373864
EVERLINE 9
MY
7526754
KONGOU
CK
9441661
BRITOIL 22
SG
9459785
HUB ORCA
PA
9425722
MAERSK LOGGER
DK
9324772
EPIC SASA
MY
9361691
PASIFIK VIXEN
SG
9573971
MERMAID RELIANCE
SG
9565974
PB KAREPO
CK
9324772
EPIC SASA
MY
9295622
TARKA
PA
9573971
MERMAID RELIANCE
SG
9433987
HIGHLINE 59
MY
9047219
NS 308
TH
9371658
LEWEK KEA
SG
9556870
RT TOUGH
MT
9172284
LADY SANDRA
SG
9361691
PACIFIC VIXEN
SG
9439890
UOS ENDEAVOUR
AG
9568081
WESTSEA PHOENIX
SG
9295622
TARKA
PA
9413767
HUB DOLPHIN
PA
9559274
RT SENSATION
MT
9417402
GO SPICA
PA
9545120
MICLYN VENTURE
SG
9191371
MAERSK SERVER
IM
8429850
TAMARAW
US
9565974
PB KAREPO
CK
9709881
POSH RADIANT
SG
9179921
MALILI
ID
9658252
TERASEA EAGLE
SG
8922589
BO SUNG T 17HO
KR
8996669
MANYPLUS 18
MY
9361689
PACIFIC VIPER
SG
9373864
EVERLINE 9
MY
9169471
MAERSK SUPPORTER
IM
7600378
RACHEL
US
8996633
MANYPLUS 1
MY
9471628
HIGHLINE 61
MY
9547300
NEWTON 3
MY
9633886
MAGELLAN 2
PA
9307322
TOISA DAUNTLESS
BS
9149457
PACIFIC BARBARIAN
SG
9550890
PIONEER 241
SG
9565986
PB KONUI
CK
9523691
HUB DRAGON
PA
7600378
RACHEL
US
7220398
SHINEI MARU
MN
9545132
MICLYN VICTORY
SG
7375911
HYUNDAI HT-112
KR
9447665
SKANDI ATLANTIC
NO
9532977
BERKAH 36
SG
9641986
MACALLAN 2
MY
104 9447665
SKANDI ATLANTIC
NO
8996580
HIGHLINE 26
MY
9433975
HIGHLINE 56
MY
9502477
NOR AUSTRALIS
SG
9538701
BRITOIL 121
SG
9261877
LADY ASTRID
NO
8915940
SST-1
KR
9318759
MANYPLUS 9
MY
9172284
LADY SANDRA
SG
9605762
ARCHON TIDE
VU
9430337
PU 2008
SG
9038921
KURUTAI
NZ
8659039
MARINA 29
ID
7505982
VU
9646819
SURYA WIRA 26
SG
7390911
9568081
WESTSEA PHOENIX
SG
9190925
8126848
PA
9167837
9373840
DONG FANG YONG
SHI 2
EVERLINE 1
RESOLVE
COMMANDER
RESOLVE
GLADIATOR
RESOLVE
MONARCH
NIIGATA
MY
9499993
ATLANTIC 6
MY
9646819
SURYA WIRA 26
SG
9614658
BRITOIL 72
SG
9623001
MAGELLAN 1
PA
9270634
PACIFIC WRESTLER
SG
9545871
GO SIRIUS
SG
7505982
RESOLVE
COMMANDER
VU
9060352
FAR GRIP
NO
9433987
HIGHLINE 59
MY
9213466
HAMAL
MN
VU
VU
MN
105 Annex 4: Offshore Support Vessels Inspected By Paris MOU Authorities In
2014
OSV Name
Flag
OSV Name
Flag
8959879
IMO No
ARMANBORG
KZ
9402342
IMO No
ISLAND ENDEAVOUR
NO
9378034
POOL EXPRESS
NL
9263631
NORMAND FLIPPER
SG
8316900
OCEAN TROLL
GB
8501103
NORMAND SKARVEN
NO
9513878
OOC JAGUAR
AG
9665530
NORMAND VISION
IM
9488138
VOS ENDEAVOUR
GB
8101331
FUGRO MERIDIAN
BS
9236884
HOS NOME
US
9398292
OLYMPIC CHALLENGER
BS
9185023
SKANDI ADMIRAL
NO
9177844
OLYMPIC PRINCESS
NO
7404839
C.M. ITALIA
KZ
9442421
SIEM GARNET
NO
9665566
A.H VARAZZE
IT
9408671
SKANDI SEVEN
IM
9412921
AL HARTHY TIDE
VU
9239343
HIGHLAND FORTRESS
MT
9664380
MAKALU
CY
9630535
ISLAND CROWN
BS
9420186
SEA TROUT
CY
9244609
NORTH MARINER
NO
7404188
VOS COMMANDER
GB
9570709
VOS HERA
IT
9193070
VOS PROVIDER
GB
8112548
BUCENTAUR
BS
9648386
PACIFIC LEGEND
SG
9083172
GSP LICORN
MT
9424819
GRAMPIAN TALISKER
GB
9418664
HAVILA AURORA
BS
7402544
OCEAN SPRITE
BS
9325738
ISLAND PATRIOT
NO
7414262
ATLANTIC EAGLE
NO
9617313
OLYMPIC ORION
NO
9417725
SIEM AQUAMARINE
NO
9651852
SAYAN PRINCESS
MT
7214753
WIND EXPRESS
VC
9201786
STRIL NEPTUN
FO
9641649
ESVAGT CELINA
DK
9533373
VOLSTAD SURVEYOR
MT
9344784
FAIRMOUNT ALPINE
NL
9421556
BRAVO TOPAZ
GI
9366598
ISLAND CHAMPION
NO
9214458
KIESSE
VC
8008967
BRODOSPAS RAINBOW
LU
9591856
REM SERVER
NO
9226437
SKANDI GIANT
BS
9470478
KL SALTFJORD
NO
9169756
TOISA INVINCIBLE
BS
9270062
KINGDOM OF FIFE
GB
7302237
VOS NORTHWIND
LR
9646326
KOLGA
NL
9671539
GLOBAL FALCON
VC
8501098
NORTHERN COMMANDER
NO
9520144
MARIANNE G
PA
9663025
OCEAN SCOUT
NO
9488152
VOS ENDURANCE
GB
9489467
DINA ALLIANCE
MH
9608738
FANNING TIDE
VU
9435727
SKANDI SKOLTEN
BS
9526021
OCEAN PRIDE
NO
9371385
NORMAND TITAN
NO
9000625
OCEAN ZEPHYR
MH
9239604
SKANDI WAVENEY
BS
9609756
VOS ATHOS
GI
7406825
SENTINEL STAR
NO
9488176
VOS VIGILANT
GB
9625425
SKANDI AUKRA
NO
9594042
ESVAGT AURORA
DK
9281657
SKANDI CALEDONIA
NO
9361615
HIGHLAND LAIRD
GB
8406999
SBS CIRRUS
GB
9521021
REEF DESPINA
NO
8111740
SNIPE
IT
9475181
SIDDIS MARINER
NO
8912338
SKANDI FALCON
BS
9678434
ESVAGT CORNELIA
DK
9665047
STRIL SERVER
NO
9343766
NORMAND CORONA
NO
9621546
GEO SERVICE I
SG
106 9656644
SEA SPIDER
MH
9489481
REM STAR
NO
9668518
BOURBON FULMAR
CY
9557666
UP JASPER
PA
9171852
TOISA PERSEUS
LR
7921007
BLUE ALFA
DK
9625504
EDDA FERD
MT
8211746
ROCKWATER 1
BS
9417816
FAR SCORPION
NO
9529932
BRAGE TRADER
NO
9579482
ISLAND CAPTAIN
NO
9352896
C.M.RUBY
MH
9387011
RED SNAPPER
VC
9487732
MARISKA-G
PA
9276391
SKANDI SOTRA
NO
9364033
NORTH PROMISE
NO
9645695
SEA FLYER
CY
8119601
PROSPER
FO
8107062
GSP VEGA
NO
9686821
REM PIONEER
BS
8010001
VOS DON
BS
9422108
REM VISION
NO
8016110
NATALIE
AG
9488695
C.M.RAHIL
MH
9703526
OLYMPUS
MH
7382433
CHRISTOS XXIII
PA
9419333
RED LOBSTER
VC
9645956
ISLAND DAWN
NO
9533373
VOLSTAD SURVEYOR
MT
9608271
LUNDSTROM TIDE
VU
9665126
BLUE PROTECTOR
NO
7406825
SENTINEL STAR
NO
9270074
MED OTTO
IT
9237694
TOISA CONQUEROR
LR
9388613
MAERSK TRACER
DK
9482366
KL BARENTSFJORD
CY
7404176
GLOMAR PATRIOT
PA
9631400
PACIFIC DOLPHIN
SG
7415137
EIDE WRESTLER
BS
9447964
REM GAMBLER
NO
9198068
ESVAGT DON
DK
9648697
DINA STAR
NO
9544413
BOA BISON
MT
9522477
GO ACAMAR
BZ
9379428
ASSO VENTINOVE
IT
9393400
HAVILA NEPTUNE
NO
9656620
SEA SPARK
MH
8206961
AGAT
MT
9255957
TOISA INDEPENDENT
GB
9479967
HAVILA CLIPPER
NO
9690872
DEEP HELDER
NL
9365738
C.M.ROSE
MH
9430753
HAVILA BORG
NO
9235309
ESVAGT SIGMA
DK
9491410
EDT JANE
CY
9657636
NS IONA
KY
9657650
NS FRAYJA
NO
9224817
OCEAN SPEY
BS
9399155
REM PROVIDER
NO
9528926
GO CANOPUSUS
SG
9158666
STRILBORG
NO
9261487
UNION MANTA
BE
9656474
AMBROSIUS TIDE
VU
9185889
BURCH WILLIAMS
VU
9216664
RUSSELL TIDE
VU
9470193
HAVILA COMMANDER
BS
9537446
ARMADA TUAH 84
MY
7401306
OCEAN SEARCHER
BS
9537953
ARMADA TUAH 85
MY
9418030
HAVILA VENUS
NO
9390056
BOURBON ARCADIE
FR
9122978
SKANDI MARSTEIN
NO
9358943
NL
8420244
SEVEN PELICAN
BS
9608764
FAIRMOUNT
EXPEDITION
GLOMAR PRIDE
PA
9441233
HARKAND DA VINCI
MH
7381635
OCEAN PRODUCE
NO
9451666
POSH COURAGE
SG
7613014
V.B. ARTICO
PA
8841565
ATLANTIC SURVEYOR
LR
9624756
SEA TRIUMPH
CY
9444778
MOKUL NORDIC
PA
9268629
SEVEN PETREL
IM
9366005
HUGIN EXPLORER
CY
9427043
TOISA ELAN
BS
9341251
CARLO MAGNO
IT
9390082
BOURBON ARGOS
LU
8119584
ENDURANCE
VC
107 9638123
WORLD PEARL
NO
8111001
NSO SPIRIT
BS
9623025
VIKING FIGHTER
NO
9321287
BREMEN FIGHTER
AG
9543653
MARIDIVE 521
BZ
9682148
OLYMPIC BOA
NO
9451422
ELDBORG
FO
9259783
RICHARD M. CURRENCE
VU
9535292
SAEBORG
FO
8601551
ROMULUS
PA
9283473
SKANDI TEXEL
NO
9575620
SEA TANTALUS
CY
9608740
DEMAREST TIDE
VU
8309933
FIVEL
VU
9544516
TROMS ARTEMIS
NO
8213897
MAINPORT ELM
MH
9284324
SKANDI CAPTAIN
NO
9199622
TOR VIKING II
SE
9351969
STRIL ODIN
NO
9442433
SIEM AMETHYST
NO
9649184
TROMS LYRA
NO
9666297
BOURBON PETREL
CY
8601551
ROMULUS
PA
9116450
CASPIAN EVA
KZ
7824883
FUGRO GAUSS
GI
8822428
REMUS
PA
9260706
HOS RIDGEWIND
US
9628518
SUNRISE-G
PA
9398539
URANUS
LR
7402465
RIVERTON
PA
9462770
HAVILA CRUSADER
NO
9194294
TOPAZ COMMANDER
VC
9625023
SKANDI MAROY
NO
9303481
MALAVIYA TWENTY
IN
9255139
DEEP VISION
GB
9302047
ESVAGT CAPELLA
DK
9539614
CABINESS TIDE
VU
9106431
FAR SERVICE
IM
9249403
GARGANO
GB
9529061
VOS HESTIA
IT
9210921
MCKENNY TIDE
VU
9630547
ISLAND PRIDE
BS
7421837
SEA SAILOR
NO
9668520
BOURBON GANNET
CY
9660102
SIEM DAYA 1
CY
9040546
HOS CENTERLINE
US
7424786
RED 7 REEL
VC
9585390
SUBSEA 204
VU
9178410
SEA LYNX
NO
9561746
CASSANDRA VI
MY
9278442
ASSO VENTICINQUE
IT
8010049
YAGUAR
KZ
9681340
GSP PEGASUS
MT
9183192
ASSO VENTUNO
IT
9678422
ESVAGT CLAUDINE
DK
9666716
BOURBON GREBE
CY
9377016
FUGRO SALTIRE
NO
9591870
REM COMMANDER
NO
9634347
ENERGY INSULA
NO
9659062
FAR SIGMA
NO
9631424
PACIFIC DUCHESS
SG
9444778
MOKUL NORDIC
PA
9534353
FAR SERVER
IM
8401963
BLUE ARIES
DK
9579470
ISLAND CENTURION
NO
8401949
BLUE ANTARES
DK
7827029
VOS SERVER
BS
8112665
BLUE BETA
DK
9435478
AKER WAYFARER
NO
9653989
VESTLAND MIRA
BS
9362009
BOURBON MISTRAL
NO
9259771
JOHN P.LABORDE
VU
8109266
FUGRO COMMANDER
PA
8213885
SMIT ORCA
BE
9673800
MT
7129130
SEA SAFETY
NO
8102529
LAY VESSEL LV-108
(JUL-14)
RED SEA FOS
PA
8206961
AGAT
MT
9657648
NS ORLA
NO
9676216
SIEM MOXIE
NO
9544877
OCEAN ALDEN
NO
9386677
BOURBON PEARL
NO
8401949
BLUE ANTARES
DK
9510307
SIEM PILOT
NO
9315563
FAIRMOUNT SHERPA
NL
9591923
SJOBORG
FO
8126850
VENGERY
RU
8206959
BRODOSPAS STAR
MT
108 9442419
SIEM OPAL
NO
8008979
BRODOSPAS STORM
LU
9179751
NORMAND PIONEER
IM
7400819
SENTINEL PRINCE
NO
9468205
NORMAND OCEANIC
IM
9557458
ATLANTIC MERLIN
BB
9199634
BALDER VIKING
SE
9239446
SKANDI CARLA
BS
9249348
NORMAND MERMAID
IM
8321591
ARTEMIS
CY
8119649
NSO FORTUNE
GI
9643867
HIGHLAND PRINCESS
GB
9666546
STRIL LUNA
NO
9121053
NORMAND NEPTUN
NO
8612691
ELIZA
BG
8521531
SHELF EXPRESS
DK
9665073
NORTH SEA ATLANTIC
MT
9667239
UP CORAL
PA
9431915
MICOPERI PRIDE
PA
9667227
UP AGATE
PA
9424728
OLYMPIC ZEUS
NO
9655494
UP OPAL
PA
9614608
GRAND CANYON
PA
9383077
GRAMPIAN TALISMAN
GB
9423839
MAGNE VIKING
DK
8406573
BAVENIT
RU
9653496
GRAMPIAN SCEPTRE
GB
9043067
OCEAN TAY
GB
9417713
SIEM TOPAZ
NO
9280720
RELUME
BS
9585742
VOS THEIA
GI
9351189
BOURBON THOR
PA
9668518
BOURBON FULMAR
CY
9480875
MARIA-G
PA
9194294
TOPAZ COMMANDER
VC
8601587
SEA LORD
LR
7128356
OCEAN SUN
BS
9601510
VOS SHINE
NL
8022925
ARABIAN SEA FOS
PA
9530101
BOURBON FRONT
NO
8211863
SKANDI FJORD
BS
8206985
BRODOSPAS MOON
MT
8030661
VOS PATROL
BB
8030673
VOS SIREN
BB
9492581
FUGRO SYMPHONY
BS
9429742
ATLANTIS DWELLER
BB
9603776
MARIDIVE 703
BZ
9491422
EDT HERCULES
CY
6712514
PUTFORD SHORE
GB
9653757
ELAND
VU
9644445
TORSBORG
FO
9327970
MARIDIVE 232
BZ
9439450
HIGHLAND PRINCE
GB
9664706
POLAR ONYX
NO
9656668
SEA SUPRA
CY
8110992
GRIMSHADER
BB
9495210
GO PEGASUS
MH
9392690
REM FORZA
BS
8325793
HIGHLAND SPIRIT
GB
9408994
SIEM MARLIN
NO
9244568
VIKING DYNAMIC
NO
9427067
TOISA EXPLORER
BS
8216526
IMS ONYX
VU
9177856
SEVEN NAVICA
IM
9431575
ESVAGT STAVANGER
DK
9427110
TOISA WAVE
BS
8215948
HAM 601
NL
9527972
OZREN TIDE
VU
9687241
NORMAND REACH
IM
8115863
VOS CLIPPER
BB
9459759
SKANDI SKANSEN
BS
9664445
WORLD SAPPHIRE
NO
9235294
ASSO VENTIQUATTRO
IT
9282132
TOISA VIGILANT
BS
9668520
BOURBON GANNET
CY
9350240
E.R.KRISTIANSAND
AG
8415548
PEARL
IE
9657624
NS ELIDA
KY
9583304
BELUGA 2
SG
9639335
HIGHLAND DEFENDER
GB
9169677
GB
9165906
OCEAN SURF
NO
9402330
HIGHLAND
CHALLENGER
ISLAND EARL
NO
9489479
OPAL
MT
9661170
REM INSTALLER
BS
8722109
AURELIA
MT
9134531
NORMAND CARRIER
NO
9366835
SBS TEMPEST
GB
109 9413432
NORMAND RANGER
NO
9087312
MALAVIYA SEVEN
IN
9127320
EDDA FRIGG
NO
9475791
BRAGE VIKING
DK
9031076
FS PISCES
GB
9660073
SKANDI ICEMAN
NO
9505508
HAVILA SUBSEA
NO
9654098
NORTH CRUYS
NO
9000637
EDDA SPRINT
NO
9330977
PORTOSALVO
GB
9444338
VOS PRECIOUS
NL
9372896
SKANDI FLORA
NO
9158678
NORTH STREAM
NO
9672935
SEA GALE
DK
8224470
NSO CRUSADER
PA
9379014
A.H. GIORGIO P
BR
9648025
WORLD DIAMOND
NO
9255141
NORTHERN WAVE
NO
9274783
HAMAL
IT
7125811
ODYSSEY EXPLORER
BS
9525508
VORTEX
GB
9599494
GRAMPIAN DEFIANCE
GB
9429467
ASSO TRENTA
IT
8021749
GRAMPIAN PRINCE
GB
9155054
NORMAND ATLANTIC
NO
9235323
GRAMPIAN DEFENDER
GB
9621522
SANABORG
NL
7402477
OCEAN CLEVER
GB
9262742
UNION SOVEREIGN
BE
7214753
WIND EXPRESS
VC
9530137
BOURBON RAINBOW
NO
9545481
GO ELECTRA
MH
9348211
TROMS FJORD
IM
9215206
MAERSK RESPONDER
DK
9262857
HIGHLAND CITADEL
GB
8206973
BRODOSPAS SUN
MT
9158666
STRILBORG
NO
9361421
GRAMPIAN COURAGEOUS
GB
8311314
BIG ORANGE XVIII
BS
9599482
GRAMPIAN DISCOVERY
GB
7914470
DIAVLOS PRIDE
MT
9282144
TOISA VOYAGER
BS
7905273
NSO CHAMPION
GI
9439929
UOS FREEDOM
AG
8516952
BLIZZARD
NL
9000625
OCEAN ZEPHYR
MH
9544413
BOA BISON
MT
9439905
UOS ENTERPRISE
AG
9409730
EDDA FRENDE
NO
9455129
PACIFIC CHAMPION
SG
9280445
IDUN VIKING
GB
8401432
VALIANT ENERGY
MH
9518311
SEVEN PACIFIC
IM
9361615
F. D. INVINCIBLE
GB
9644342
VESTLAND CETUS
BS
9246736
MAERSK HELPER
IM
9352224
VOS SATISFACTION
NL
9665712
OLYMPIC ARES
BS
9330680
SKANDI BARRA
NO
9198056
ESVAGT DEE
DK
9373228
ESVAGT CONTENDER
DK
9393852
FREYJA VIKING
GB
9613692
BLUE FIGHTER
NO
9521021
REEF DESPINA
NO
9181510
NORMAND PROGRESS
IM
9475181
SIDDIS MARINER
NO
9203203
BB TROLL
NO
9356995
EDDA FRAM
NO
9529920
BRAGE SUPPLIER
NO
9660114
SIEM DAYA 2
CY
9348974
NOR STAR
SG
8107177
VOS SYMPATHY
NL
9355771
OLYMPIC OCTOPUS
NO
7382885
ATLANTIC CARRIER
LR
9678939
REM OCEAN
NO
8104125
VOS SCOUT
BS
9591868
REM SUPPORTER
NO
9391921
VOS TRAPPER
LR
8503515
SEAMAR SPLENDID
GI
9427055
TOISA ENVOY
BS
9250749
SKANDI FOULA
NO
9321287
BREMEN FIGHTER
AG
9484845
STRIL EXPLORER
IM
8110796
IONIAN SEA FOS
MT
9329435
NORMAND AURORA
NO
7301245
RAMCO EXPRESS
PA
9602904
OLYMPIC
COMMANDER
NO
9487720
CASSANDRA 5
SG
110 9547415
OLYMPIC ELECTRA
NO
9423827
NJORD VIKING
DK
9583263
SOC ENDEAVOUR
TV
9419125
SEVEN ATLANTIC
IM
9489493
STRIL MARINER
FO
9274410
TOISA VALIANT
BS
9407897
STRIL MERKUR
FO
9639359
HIGHLAND CHIEFTAIN
GB
9613707
BLUE PROSPER
NO
9482354
KL BROFJORD
NO
9418042
HAVILA JUPITER
NO
8120911
MARIDIVE VIII
EG
9385104
ISLAND EXPRESS
NO
7905273
NSO CHAMPION
GI
9171620
OLYMPIC POSEIDON
NO
8224286
VOS SHELTER
NL
9263514
SKANDI BUCHAN
NO
8500393
VOS LISMORE
GB
9249441
HIGHLAND BUGLER
GB
9331268
NORMAND SKIPPER
NO
9249453
HIGHLAND MONARCH
GB
9608788
IEVOLI GREY
CY
9270397
ODIN VIKING
DK
9488164
VOS VENTURER
GB
9249635
SKANDI RONA
NO
7396563
VOS DEE
GB
9620982
VESTLAND MISTRAL
BS
8506050
VOS ISLAY
GB
9297797
VIKING NEREUS
NO
8216021
VOS RAASAY
IM
9479541
DEEP CYGNUS
PA
9344332
DINA MERKUR
GI
9659074
FAR SIRIUS
NO
9656723
SEA FORTH
CY
9390666
ISLAND EMPRESS
NO
8304816
NORMAND JARL
NO
9235672
OLYMPIC HERCULES
NO
9070668
VOS VICTORY
GB
9420150
STRIL COMMANDER
NO
9656462
LIZ V
NL
8406470
NORMAND DRAUPNE
NO
9232694
GEOSUND
IM
9424730
OLYMPIC HERA
NO
7225673
VOS WARRIOR
LR
9486037
BRAVO SAPPHIRE
GI
9596753
ASSO TRENTUNO
IT
9409663
ISLAND COMMANDER
NO
9639347
HIGHLAND GUARDIAN
GB
111 Annex 5: Offshore Support Vessels Inspected By Tokyo MOU Authorities In
2014
IMO No
OSV Name
Flag
IMO No
OSV Name
Flag
9086215
HAN JI 2
HK
9666716
BOURBON GREBE
CY
9199622
TOR VIKING II
SE
7817086
HUAHAI
LR
9527984
POSH VIRTUE
KY
9456202
PACIFIC DISCOVERY
SG
8008565
HUAJEN
LR
9451654
POSH CONQUEST
SG
9671345
JASA KENYALANG
LR
9240952
NORMAND IVAN
NO
9483059
SURF SUPPORTER
MH
9607344
GREATSHIP RAGINI
SG
9656682
SEA SWAN
CY
9477012
SEA VALIANT
PA
9199622
TOR VIKING II
SE
9619127
BAHTERA MULIA
MY
9528093
DAVID TIDE II
VU
9291652
PACIFIC 28
SG
9180695
MAERSK SEEKER
DK
8219152
HUAYUAN
LR
9166613
SKANDI MOGSTER
NO
9249623
LADY GRACE
IM
9685932
AL KASER MPS
VC
9552161
VOS ACHILLES
SG
9685944
AL NISR MPS
AE
9572305
FUGRO EQUINOX
BS
9166613
SKANDI MOGSTER
NO
9249623
LADY GRACE
IM
9528093
DAVID TIDE II
VU
9291652
PACIFIC 28
SG
8028474
CORAL SEA FOS
PA
9552161
VOS ACHILLES
SG
9413200
LEWEK ANTARES
PA
9169471
MAERSK SUPPORTER
IM
8121915
SINOPEC 381
PA
9239757
FAR SALTIRE
IM
9444120
TRINE K
MH
9636620
TERAS GENESIS
SG
9656632
SEA SPEAR
CY
9396476
BELAIT AISHAH
BN
9680449
PMS BELEYIM
TV
9577202
TEKNIK WIRA
MY
9667538
FOS THOR
PA
9609794
LEWEK TEAL
MH
9559042
BORCOS THAHIRAH 2
ID
9656644
SEA SPIDER
CY
9366665
TOISA SONATA
BS
9369605
SEA WEASEL
MY
9239769
HIGHLAND NAVIGATOR
MT
8008565
HUAJEN
LR
9214939
SEACOR VALOR
MH
7419250
VIKING BOY
PA
9510400
FOS POLARIS
PA
9480734
SKANDI HAWK
NO
9656670
SEA SURFER
CY
9413200
LEWEK ANTARES
PA
9474424
ENDEAVOUR
ID
9609990
FAR SITELLA
SG
9371646
LEWEK KESTREL
SG
9555424
SWIBER MARY-ANN
MH
7359175
REVELATION
BZ
9409651
FAR SCIMITAR
IM
9656670
SEA SURFER
CY
9541186
PTSC HAI PHONG
VN
9215218
BOLD MAVERICK
PA
9656644
SEA SPIDER
CY
9376139
SEA SOVEREIGN
PA
9355953
FAR SWAN
SG
9656694
SEA SWIFT
CY
9669988
ANAIAH
VC
9214939
SEACOR VALOR
MH
9672894
EXECUTIVE TIDE
SG
9688922
BES SAVVY
SG
9355953
FAR SWAN
SG
9401702
VOS HERCULES
SG
8407577
HUA SHUN
LR
7359175
REVELATION
BZ
9555424
SWIBER MARY-ANN
MH
9503031
PACIFIC 999
SG
8222109
HUA QUAN
LR
9539157
PW RELIANCE
SG
9495208
GO PHOENIX
MH
112 9545479
GO EXPLORER
MH
9579119
PARIFIC HORNBILL
CY
8223672
C/S VEGA
PH
9239769
HIGHLAND NAVIGATOR
MT
9737668
TRITON JAWARA
ID
6820983
EGS SURVEYOR
ID
9533684
ALDEMIR SOUZA TIDE
VU
9661467
RAWABI 11R
TV
9270608
PACIFIC WRANGLER
ID
9421207
SEA COMANCHE
PA
9541095
CREST RUBY
ID
9387217
SKANDI ACERGY
IM
9652181
LEWEK ALPHARD
MH
9697478
ARMADA TUAH 307
MH
9566368
FOS LEO
PA
9659323
MAINPORT CEDAR
MH
9703033
TOPAZ MEGAN
MH
9505261
PACIFIC PALLADIUM
SG
7909463
ALTUS EXERTUS
LR
9609988
FAR SKIMMER
NO
9639830
VC
9572020
HARKAND HARMONY
SG
9376139
BOURBON EVOLUTION
806
SEA SOVEREIGN
PA
9365738
CM ROSE
MH
9541095
CREST RUBY
ID
9169354
PACIFIC BANNER
SG
9625114
CREST AMETHYST
SG
9387217
SKANDI ACERGY
IM
9422952
ASL SCORPIO
SG
9468190
NORMAND BALTIC
IM
9394595
BAHTERA INTAN
MY
9619098
LU
9522453
TANJUNG GAYA
MY
9533579
BOURBON LIBERITY
309
HART TIDE
9375381
SEA APACHE
PA
9269491
LADY GRETE
SG
9505259
PACIFIC TITANIUM
SG
9503043
PACIFIC EXCELLENT
SG
9624598
TERASEA HAWK
SG
9533567
BAILEY TIDE
VU
9624586
TERASEA FALCON
SG
9619103
BOURBON MUKDA
SG
9374258
LEWEK TROGON
SG
8113578
VT ELAINE
MN
9261865
LADY CAROLINE
NO
9619024
BOURBON GOMEN
SG
9681364
NG
9533567
BAILEY TIDE
VU
9672909
PRINCESS
AJIRIOGHENE
EXECUTIVE STRIDE
SG
9533579
HART TIDE
VU
6714847
ASIAN WARRIOR
KN
9193795
MAERSK ATTENDER
DK
9672909
EXECUTIVE STRIDE
SG
9443097
ENA COMMANDER
SG
6714847
ASIAN WARRIOR
KN
9417402
GO SPICA
PA
9374258
LEWEK TROGON
SG
9609770
VOS ATLAS
SG
9394117
BOURBON HIMALYA
FR
9269491
LADY GRETE
SG
9161338
HIGHLAND ROVER
MT
9231535
NORMAND CUTTER
IM
7922312
PA
9555852
D'SOUZA TIDE
VU
9656474
DONG FANG YONG SHI
3
AMBROSIUS TIDE
VU
8028448
HUAFA
LR
9656656
SEA SPRINGER
MH
9537159
POSH PERSISTENCE
SG
9180683
MAERSK SUPPLIER
DK
9005352
HUI ZHI
HK
9647019
WESTSEA TRIPET
SG
9387217
SKANDI ACERGY
IM
9503079
PACIFIC 3
SG
7922312
PA
9656670
SEA SURFER
CY
9010149
DONG FANG YONG SHI
3
WESTERN MONARCH
9413200
LEWEK ANTARES
PA
9390745
SEA SUPPORTER
PA
9456214
PACIFIC DISPATCH
SG
9161338
HIGHLAND ROVER
MT
9424778
MAERSK NOMAD
DK
9528093
DAVID TIDE II
VU
9424778
MAERSK NOMAD
DK
9161338
HIGHLAND ROVER
MT
9186144
FAR SUPPLIER
IM
VU
PA
113 Annex 6: Questionnaire: Supporting A Positive Safety Culture In The Offshore
Industry
About you
Current Job Title (or title of last job you had)
Who is your current contract with (or the last job you had? – eg. With BP, Stat Oil etc.)
What is your Nationality?
Which age range are you in?
•
20-30
•
31-40
•
41-50
•
51-60
•
61+
What is your gender?
•
Male
•
Female
Vessel
1. Which vessel type do you currently work on?
2. What tonnage is the vessel?
3. Which country is the vessel flagged to?
4. Which regions of the world have you worked in? (eg. North Sea, Gulf of Mexico,
Singapore)
5. Which region are you currently working in?
6. Do you find that there are specific safety problems/ challenges related to these
regions?
•
Yes
•
No
If yes, please specify what they are
7. Do you require any special documentation or qualifications to work in the
geographical region that you are in?
•
Yes
•
No
If yes, what are they?
8. Is any region better to work in in terms of the safety standards enforced there?
114 •
Yes
•
No
If yes, Where? And Why?
9. Is your training adequate for you to do your job safely?
•
Yes
•
No
10. Do you think that your company needs to offer any additional training?
•
Yes
•
No
If yes, please specify what training.
11. Do you ever find it difficult to make yourself understood at work?
•
Yes
•
No
If yes, please explain why?
12. Do you ever find that you have problems understanding what is required of you at
work?
•
Yes
•
No
Does this ever affect safety?
•
Yes
•
No
13. Do you find that there are any differences between approaches taken to enforcing
safety when working in different cultural regions?
•
Yes
•
No
Please Specify
14. Have safety standards ever been compromised because it is difficult to say no to a
client or senior member of staff? (This could affect you or another member of staff).
•
Yes
•
No
15. Have you ever had an accident whilst working offshore?
•
Yes
•
No
115 Did you think that the appropriate action was taken to prevent it from happening
again?
•
Yes
•
No
If no please specify.
16. Would you feel confident enough to tell others if you felt they were doing something
dangerous that may threaten yours or their lives?
•
Yes
•
No
17. Are you backed up by management if you report an accident (or do you feel that you
would be?)
•
Yes
•
No
18. Do you believe the management would successfully respond to any safety concerns
you had?
•
Yes
•
No
19. Do you believe that commercial pressure can influence the safety of your working
practice?
•
Yes
•
No
20. Do you feel that you are empowered enough to be able to stop the job due to safety
issues?
•
Yes
•
No
21. Do you believe the management is honest and that they are supporting you?
•
Yes
•
No
22. Is your line manager / officer approachable enough for you to feel comfortable in
reporting any safety concerns you may have?
•
Yes
•
No
23. Have you ever left a job over issues concerning poor safety?
•
Yes
116 •
No
24. Do you believe accidents go unreported?
•
Yes
•
No
Why do you think this is?
25. Do you feel that you are ever made to carry out tasks that are not safe?
•
Yes
•
No
26. Are you able to easily find your company’s safety procedures?
•
Yes
•
No
27. Do the company’s safety procedures clearly state what is expected of you in terms of
health and safety?
•
Yes
•
No
28. Are you kept up to date with any changes made to the company’s health and safety
procedures?
•
Yes
•
No
29. Do you personally implement health and safety practices when working?
•
Yes
•
No
30. Are there any safety requirements you feel unsure about?
•
Yes
•
No
31. Do you feel that some safety procedures make your job dangerous?
•
Yes
•
No
32. Are handover procedures adequate for you to do your job safely?
•
Yes
•
No
33. Is safety enforced enough by your managers?
117 •
Yes
•
No
34. Does your company acknowledge good health and safety practices from employees?
•
Yes
•
No
35. Are you happy with your current safety procedures?
•
Yes
•
No
36. Do your working conditions allow you to practice health and safety? (Including being
encouraged to take breaks and report illnesses to your line manager?)
•
Yes
•
No
37. Is there anything else that could be done to help promote safety standards and
encourage the crew to behave safely? (This could include procedures that other
companies follow but yours currently don’t)
•
Yes
•
No
Please explain your answer
38. Please add additional thoughts you may have
118

The Impact of Crew Engagement and

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