Adriana Vizental Meaning and Communication From

Transcription

Adriana Vizental
Meaning and Communication
From Semantic Meaning to Pragmatic Meaning
Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României
VIZENTAL, ADRIANA
Meaning and communication / Adriana Vizental. Arad : Editura Universităţii Aurel Vlaicu, 2009
Bibliogr.
ISBN 978-973-752-390-7
811.111
3
Contents
Introduction
0.1 Language – a semiotic system
0.2 From semantic meaning to pragmatic meaning
Chapter 1: Meaning and semantic competence
1.1 Semantic competence
1.2 Types of meaning
1.2.1 Conceptual meaning
1.2.2 Associative meanings
1.2.2.1 Social meaning
1.2.2.2 Connotative and affective meaning
1.2.2.2.1 Connotative meaning
1.2.2.2.2 Affective meaning
1.2.2.3 Collocative and reflected meaning
1.2.2.3.1 Collocative meaning
1.2.2.3.2 Reflected meaning
1.2.3 Pragmatic meaning
1.3 Sense relations
1.3.1 Form-meaning relations
1.3.1.1 Synonymy
1.3.1.2 Polysemy
1.3.1.3 Homonymy
1.3.2 Meaning-meaning relations: Congruence
1.3.2.1 Hyponymy
1.3.2.2 Incompatibility
1.3.3 Normality relations: Consonance and dissonance
1.3.3.1 Lexical consonance
1.3.3.2 Lexical dissonance
1.3.4 Truth-conditional semantics
Chapter 2: Lexical innovation
2.1 Neologisms and lexical creativity
2.1.1 Development of the English language: Loan words
2.1.2 Word formation
2.1.2.1 Derivation, deflection, back formation
2.1.2.2 Conversion
2.1.2.3 Composition and blending
2.1.2.4 Contraction and abbreviation
2.1.2.5 Onomatopoeia and ablaut
2.1.2.6 Word coinage
2.1.3 Lexicalization
2.1.3.1 The functions of neologisms
2.1.3.2 The process of lexicalization
2.1.3.3 Neologisms and change of meaning
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2.1.3.3.1 The lexicalization of loan words
2.1.3.3.2 Word formation and lexicalization
2.2 Transfer of meaning: Figurative speech
2.2.1 Diachronic change of meaning
2.2.2 Figurative transfer of meaning
2.2.2.1 Relations between signifier and signified
2.2.2.1.1 Comparison
2.2.2.1.1.1 Simile and the metaphor
2.2.2.1.1.2 Zoosemy, personification, antonomasia
2.2.2.1.2 Vagueness and exaggeration
2.2.2.1.2.1 Euphemism, paraphrase, circumlocution
2.2.2.1.2.2 Ellipsis and substitution
2.2.2.1.2.3 Hyperbole and litotes, irony and banter
2.2.2.2 Sense relations
2.2.2.2.1. Synonymy
2.2.2.2.1.1 Tautology
2.2.2.2.1.2 Repetition, accumulation, gradation
2.2.2.2.2 Hyponymy: The metonymy
2.2.2.2.3 Opposition of meaning
2.2.2.2.3.1 Antithesis
2.2.2.2.3.2 False homology: Ambiguity and paradox
2.2.2.2.4 Semantic anomaly: Zeugma and bathos
2.2.3 Change of meaning and lexicalization
Chapter 3: Idiom and style
3.1 Idiomatic speech
3.1.1 Defining idiom
3.1.2 The origins of idioms
3.1.3 Idioms and figures of speech
3.1.4 Transparency and lexicalization of idioms
3.2 Register and style
3.2.1 The formality scale
3.2.1.1 Formal and ‘beyond formal’
3.2.1.2 Neutral and informal
3.2.1.3 Colloquial speech and slang
3.2.1.4 Argot and taboo
3.3 The formality of idioms
Chapter 4: The text
4.1 Constituents: Minimal groups
4.2 The clause
4.2.1 Clause as message
4.2.2 Clause as exchange
4.2.3 Clause as representation
4.3 Intonation and key
4.4 Clause complexes and sentences
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4.5
The text
4.5.1 Text and textness
4.5.2 Written and spoken discourses
4.5.2.1 Written texts
4.5.2.2 Oral texts
4.5.2.3 Speech in writing
4.5.2.4 The grammar of ‘little texts’
Chapter 5: Context and reference
5.1 Language in context
5.2 Reference
5.2.1 Person deixis
5.2.2 Social deixis
5.2.3 Place deixis
5.2.4 Time deixis
5.2.5 Discourse deixis
5.3 Manipulation of deixis
Chapter 6: Language in use: Speech acts
6.1 Linguistic competence vs. linguistic performance
6.2 Language functions
6.3 Speech acts
6.3.1 Locution – illocution – perlocution
6.3.2 Levels of meaning
6.4 Indirectness
6.4.1 Speech acts and indirectness
6.4.2 Factors that govern indirectness
6.4.2.1 Power
6.4.2.2 Social distance
6.4.2.3 Size of imposition
6.4.2.4 Rights and obligations
Chapter 7: Cooperation and inferential communication
7.1 Meaning in interaction
7.2 Indirectness and implicature
7.3 Cooperative communication
7.3.1 Observing the maxims
7.3.1.1 Observing the maxim of Quality
7.3.1.2 Observing the maxim of Quantity
7.3.1.3 Observing the maxim of Relevance
7.3.1.4 Observing the maxim of Manner
7.3.2 Flouting the maxims
7.3.2.1 Flouting the maxim of Quality
7.3.2.2 Flouting the maxim of Quantity
7.3.2.3 Flouting the maxim of Relevance
7.3.2.4 Flouting the maxim of Manner
7.4 Types of implicature
Chapter 8: Strategies of politeness
8.1 Politeness: Principles and maxims
8.1.1 Tact and Generosity
8.1.2 Approbation and Modesty
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8.1.3 Agreement and Sympathy
8.1.4. Other maxims
8.2 Face and face management
8.2.1 Strategies of positive politeness
8.2.2 Strategies of negative politeness
8.2.3 Off record strategies
9 Conclusions: Language and thought
9.1
Explicit vs. implicit communication
9.2
Relevance
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Annexes
ANNEX 1. English – a crazy language
ANNEX 2: Lexical innovation and associative meaning
ANNEX 3: Sense relations
ANNEX 4: Figurative speech
ANNEX 5: Meaning and thought
ANNEX 6: Idioms and style
ANNEX 7: Register and style
ANNEX 8: The text
ANNEX 9: Meaning in context
ANNEX 10: What words do!
ANNEX 11: Lexical meaning vs. speaker’s meaning
ANNEX 12: Diplomatic language
Bibliography
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Introduction
0.1
Language – a semiotic system
The role of a language is, in many ways, similar to that of money.
Just like money, which helps people to sell their ware and get the
goods they need for daily existence, a common language enables
people to get things (objects, information, help), to convey and
exchange ideas, etc.
People learn their first language at a very early age. At first,
children become familiar with the sonority of their mother tongue,
then they begin to learn the words used to designate objects,
actions and ideas, and they gradually begin to use them to express
their own thoughts and feelings. At a later stage, they are taught
the letters of the alphabet, which they learn to use to represent in
writing what they want to say. When it comes to learning a second
or a third language, learners must get familiar with the foreign
language equivalents of those items, and it is only by acquiring the
new lexis and grammar that they can begin to communicate with
the members of the new language community.
Language is a semiotic system, i.e. a system of signs used
as a code by a social group to name and describe things and
actions, to communicate and negotiate meaning. Within the
language community, the phonemes of the language, the letters of
the alphabet, the words of the dictionary, etc. have the same
value: they represent the generally accepted ‘code’ that ensures
smooth and relatively problem-free exchange of ideas.
For a long time, linguists considered that the signs of a
language are arbitrary, e.g. that there is no logical explanation
why an object is named book in English, livre in French, or carte in
Romanian; today, they argue that there is logic in every naming.
This, however, is of lesser importance for the communicative
process itself. What is essential is that the conventional signs of a
language are shared by all the members of that language community.
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), the father of
semiology
(the
science
of
signs)
describes
linguistic
communication as a process of encoding and decoding that goes
on between two or more individuals who ‘know the code,’ i.e.
share the same language. The process starts in the mind of the
speaker1 (the producer/sender of the message), who puts his
thoughts (meanings) into words, organizes them into structures
according to the rules of the language, then gives them a physical
(phonetic) form. The message thus constructed is ‘sent’ towards
the listener in the form of a continuous ‘ribbon’ of sound waves. In
his turn, the hearer who knows the language decodes the message
by following the same route, but in the opposite direction: he
receives the phonetic form, analyzes its structures and works out
the meaning the speaker wanted to express.
Schematically, this can be represented in the following way:
ENCODING
DECODING
MEANING
MEANING
STRUCTURE
STRUCTURE
FORM
FORM
In language, as in all semiotic systems, the individual signs
have no meaning of their own; they acquire their meaning when
they appear together with other signs of the same system2.
The signs of the language are grouped by linguistic ‘levels.’ For
example, the minimal signs of phonetics are the phonemes, e.g.
[ə], [æ], [b], [t]. The letters of the alphabet – e.g. a, e, u, m, n –
represent the minimal signs of graphology. The morphemes (e.g.
work+ing) function as the minimal units of grammar, etc. In
themselves, such minimal signs have no meaning; it is only when
they appear within ‘larger signs’ – e.g. words – that they acquire a
certain meaning. Thus, for example, the individual phonemes [b],
[u], [k] are meaningless; together they make up the word book,
whose meaning is known to all those who speak English.
The linguistic message, whether spoken or written, comes in a
linear form: sounds/letters follow one another to form words;
words combine into phrases and sentences/utterances3; utterances
in their succession produce the stream of speech; in writing,
1
De Saussure referred only to oral communication. Today, the term
‘speaker’ is often used generically in linguistics, to refer to the producer/
sender of the message, including ‘writer.’
2
The colour red has no meaning in itself, but it conveys the meaning ‘stop’
when it appears together with green (= go) in the context of traffic lights.
3
‘Spoken’ sentences.
Introduction
9
sentences build up into paragraphs and texts. The organisation of
the message (i.e. the way sounds, letters, words and sentences,
combine into larger units) is not random, but follows the unwritten
laws of the language.
De Saussure suggested that semiotic systems convey meaning
by virtue of their place in the system and of their relationship to
each other. That is to say, the individual signs acquire meaning by
paradigmatic choice and syntagmatic combination.
The paradigmatic axis controls the linguistic choices (e.g. of
the right sound, letter or word) the speaker makes. In a semiotic
system, most individual elements can be substituted by a number
of other elements, thus creating new items with different
meanings. For example, t in tin can be replaced by p or k to
produce other semantically logical combinations: pin and kin.
In the same way, the sentence consists of a number of slots
to be filled in: a subject slot, a predicate slot, an object slot, etc.
The actual wording for each individual slot is unlimited. For
example, the subject can be expressed by a proper noun (John
opened the door), a common noun (The boy opened the door), a
noun phrase (The young boy opened the door), a pronoun (He
opened the door), etc.
The syntagmatic axis governs the combinatory capacity of
signs. The individually meaningless speech sounds/letters become
meaningful within larger units. Thus, the meaningless letter i
becomes meaningful within words: when preceded by t and
followed by n it makes up the word tin; when preceded by k and
followed by t it produces the word kit. The combinatory power of
phonemes/letters is limited: English does not accept clusters of
consonants, such as *prgn1.
In their turn, words gain their full semantic power only within
larger units, i.e. phrases, sentences or paragraphs. Thus, for
example, the word get – a highly polysemantic word in English –
gains its full/exact sense only within a phrase (e.g. to get well) or a
sentence (e.g. He got the book, He got well again). However,
further context may be required to show exactly whether he received
the book, or bought it.
The combinatory power of words is also limited, both
grammatically and logically. The verb to sing, for instance,
requires a subsequent adverb to form a grammatically well formed
sentence (e.g. He sings well), but does not accept an adjective
(e.g. *He sings good is ungrammatical). Or, the proper noun John
1
The asterisk * shows that the construct is non-grammatical, anomalous, etc.
10
can combine with the verb to drink (living beings can perform the
act of drinking) and with the common noun water (a potable kind
of liquid), so that the sentence John drinks water is logical and
semantically well formed. But air and drink do not provide a logical
combination (air – an abstract noun – cannot perform the act of
drinking), so that *Air drinks water is semantically anomalous.
Paradigmatic choice and syntagmatic combination work within
all semiotic systems. Thus, for example, a lady going to a party
has to choose one pair of shoes to put on instead of all the others
she has got: this represents her paradigmatic choice. On the other
hand, her choice is determined by the other items of clothing she
puts on (e.g. black shoes, to go with a black dress and a black
purse), which represent her syntagmatic combination.
0.2 From semantic meaning to pragmatic meaning
To name the native speaker’s ability to encode and decode
linguistic messages thanks to his knowledge of the language,
Noam Chomsky1 (1928- ) proposed the term linguistic competence.
According to Chomsky, the native speaker possesses a
‘universal grammar,’ i.e. an innate knowledge of the basic
grammatical structure common to all human languages. This is
how, with the help of a limited vocabulary and a finite set of
grammar rules, he can recognize and produce an infinite number
of grammatically and semantically well-formed (i.e. accurate)
sentences2, including sentences that are totally new.
Hand in hand with his linguistic competence, Chomsky argued,
goes the speaker’s linguistic performance3, i.e. his actual use of
the language. Chomsky admitted that, in their performance, native
speakers often produce utterances that are not well-formed (e.g.
elliptical sentences), and that they often make mistakes when
using the language informally. However, he considered that such
utterances are not worthy of linguists’ attention.
The fluent speaker’s linguistic competence results from his
knowledge of the words of the language and of its grammar.
1
2
3
The founder of transformational-generative grammar, a system of
linguistic analysis that revolutionized linguistics.
A sentence such as, He is a boy, is both grammatically and semantically
well formed; *He has some air, may be grammatically well formed, but
semantically it is anomalous.
Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance is based on
the division proposed by de Saussure, between langue and parole.
Introduction
11
An analysis of any dictionary entry points to the fact that the
Saussurian levels of encoding/decoding can traced down to each
and every word.
Let us analyse a typical entry, as presented by Webster
Dictionary (abridged):
house (n., adj. hous; v. houz)
n. pl. <hous-es>(hou'ziz) v. < housed, hous-ing> adj.
n. 1. a building in which people live; residence.
2. a household.
3. (often cap.) a family, including ancestors and descendants: the
House of Hapsburg.
4. a building, enclosure, or other construction for any of various
purposes (usu. used in combination): a clubhouse; a boathouse; a
doghouse.
5. a theater, concert hall, or auditorium. etc.
…………………………..………………………………………………………………………….…………
16. HOUSE MUSIC.
v.t. 17. to put or receive into a house, dwelling, or shelter; lodge or
harbor: to house students in a dormitory; to house flood victims in
a church. etc.
………………………..………………………………………………………………………….…………
v.i. 20. to take shelter; dwell.
adj. 21. of, pertaining to, or noting a house.
22. suitable for or customarily used or kept in a house: house
paint; house pets. etc.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………
Idiom 25. <bring down the house> to inspire a live audience to break
into prolonged, unrestrained laughter or applause over one's
performance. etc.
………………………..………………………………………………………………………….…………
28. <put> or <set one's house in order>. to settle one's affairs.
The first line names the entry (and thus also provides the
correct spelling of the word), the grammatical classes it can
take on (in this case: noun, adjective and verb), and a
pronunciation guide1 for each word class and inflected form (in
this case, for the plural of the noun, and the preterit and present
participle of the verb). There follows a list of meaning definitions:
16 meanings for house as a noun, 3 meanings – as a transitive
verb, 1 meaning – as an intransitive verb, 4 meanings – as an
adjective, and there are also 4 idiomatic phrases.
1
Webster uses a simplified version. Other dictionaries (e.g. Cambridge or
Oxford) use the symbols of the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA).
12
The words emboldened in the previous paragraph stand for the
Saussurian levels: form, structure and meaning. These levels also
represent the object of three traditional branches of linguistics:
phonetics and phonology – for the oral form; grammar – for the
structures; and semantics – for meanings.
Thus, spelling and pronunciation provide the written and,
respectively, oral FORM of words. Pronunciation, together with
suprasegmental phenomena, such as stress and intonation,
represent the object of phonetics/phonology.
The word classes and inflectional forms illustrate linguistic
STRUCTURE, and are the object of grammar, which also surveys
‘the way in which meaningful units are brought into sequence to
convey wider and more varied patterns of meaning’ (Crystal,
1987: 82).
Thus, grammar surveys the internal organization of words. In
this respect, dictionaries provide lists of words related to the entry
by structural variation (e.g. careless adj. > care'less-ly, adv.,
care'less-ness, n.), and there are also ‘specialized’ dictionaries,
which survey more complex linguistic units, e.g. phrasal verbs,
idioms, etc.
At a higher level, structure refers to the organization of longer
stretches of language – e.g. phrases1, clauses and sentences –
where grammar provides rules for correct syntagmatic
combinations. For example, grammar describes the way the
constituent elements of a clause – labelled Subject (S), Attribute
(A), Verb (V), Object (O), Complement (C) or Modifier (M) – can
combine to produce grammatically well-formed stretches of
language, as in:
S + V (My father + is working)
S + V + O (They + bought + a house)
S + V + A + O (I + bought + a blue + dress)
S + V + O + C (He + painted + the fence + green)
S + V + O + M (I + read + the book + yesterday)
Traditionally, form and structure were viewed as carrying no
meaning; but functional grammar (see chapter 4) has demonstrated
that meaning is carried by every level of the language.
1
In grammar, the term ‘phrase’ denotes a cluster of words grouped around
a Head, e.g. the noun phrase (the big ball); in semantics, it is used to
refer to all types of word groups which have a fixed structure.
Introduction
13
MEANING – the ‘main character’ of the present work – is the
most controversial aspect of the language and of communication,
because it is extremely complex and unstable.
To list the meanings of words, dictionaries were created. In
linguistics, semantics was developed with the specific purpose to
investigate meaning.
Two very popular approaches to semantics are conceptual
analysis – which studies the meaning of lexical items by surveying
their basic conceptual features (see section 1.2.1), and truthconditional semantics – which surveys the truth or falsehood of
utterances (see section 1.3.4).
But semanticists soon realized that the meaning of words and
utterances cannot be described simply in terms of their logical
content or truthfulness. They identified several types of
‘associative meanings’ (see section 1.2.2), and they also
understood that pragmatic meaning (based on the communicators’
knowledge of the world – see section 1.2.3) has a great impact on
the formulation and reception of the message.
Moreover, languages, and their basic ‘bricks,’ the words of the
dictionary, are nor fixed: they change continuously, under the
impact of their inner laws and of the transformations that occur in
society. To highlight the way in which speakers ‘create’ language
so as to cope with an ever wider and more complex world, chapter
2 focuses on linguistic creativity, on lexical innovation by word
formation and transfer of meaning. Conversely, chapter 3 centres
upon the social function of language, surveying the functions of
idiom and style.
Furthermore, linguists have realized that communication is
more than a simple matter of encoding/decoding.
Meaning is not carried by isolated words: it develops within
strings of lexical items (i.e. by full texts) organized according to
the rules of the language. For the analysis of texts, the functional
perspective is adopted (see chapter 4).
Furthermore, in ordinary communication, texts are embedded
in their non-linguistic context (discourses). To interpret what the
speaker says, the hearer must rely not only on the dictionary and
on his knowledge of the world, but also on features of the realworld context in which the conversation takes place. Such features
are pragmatic by nature. Therefore, it is the role of pragmatics and
of discourse analysis to survey the way in which features of the
real-world context of an utterance are reflected/grammaticalized in
the language and affect the meaning of that utterance (see
chapter 5).
14
In addition, neither the dictionary nor semantics can account
for the intricate ways in which meaning circulates among
communicators. That is why, the last three chapters of the book
focus
on
various
types
of
strategic
and
cooperative
communication: how the speaker uses the language ‘to do’ things
with it (chapter 6); how the speaker manages to convey more
meaning than is carried by the logical content of his words and
how the receiver manages to bridge the gap between ‘what the
speaker says’ and ‘what the speaker means’ (chapter 7); how
speakers exploit the language to appear polite, so as to keep social
relations in good repair (chapter 8).
In other words, to provide a thorough account of ‘meaning,’
the analyst must first survey what speakers know about the
dictionary; then he must proceed and investigate the way
communicators actually use the language to ‘make’ and ‘negotiate’
meaning.
In conclusion, for the study meaning, the present work adopts
a semantic-pragmatic approach. Starting from the meaning carried
by the dictionary and by the speaker’s semantic competence, it
gradually proceeds to meanings that result from the interlocutors’
knowledge of the world and of the context in which the linguistic
interaction takes place, to finally investigate the way meaning is
created and negotiated by the interlocutors within the cooperative
act of communication.
16
Chapter 1
Meaning and semantic competence
1.1
Semantic competence
Semantic competence is an essential component of the native
speaker's knowledge of the language, and thus, of his linguistic
competence.
For a semantic approach to language, the first thing to do is to
determine the basic unit for a semantic analysis.
The word, which is basic for establishing grammatical classes,
cannot be accepted as basic unit in semantics for two reasons:
o
the term ‘word’ does not designate the entire paradigm, i.e.
the ‘set of all the inflected forms of a word based on a single
stem or root’ (Webster); forms, such as sing, sings, sang and
sung are semantically related and appear as one entry in the
dictionary
o
there are numerous groups of words (phrases) which have a
unitary meaning and must be considered together, e.g. the
meaning of the idiom to break the ice is completely different
from the sum of the individual words.
To cope with both cases, semanticists propose the terms
lexeme, lexical item and linguistic unit.
The term lexeme is used to name the carrier of meaning, i.e.
the basic underlying dictionary form of words, e.g. go for go, goes,
went and gone.
Linguistic unit is generally employed to refer to phrases, e.g.
to make up one’s mind, to go crazy, etc.
The term linguistic item can be used to refer either to an
individual lexeme (e.g. go), or to a phrase (e.g. to go crazy) as,
semantically, they both function as one item.
Another essential factor for establishing the scope of semantics
involves defining the notion of ‘meaning.’
Linguists have dedicated a great amount of time and energy
and have provided numerous definitions for the term meaning,
from very simple, to rather complex ones. For example, one of the
earliest definitions is that of L. Bloomfield (Language, 1933:139),
who defines meaning as ‘the semantic load carried by any
linguistic sign.’ The definition has the merit of being quite succinct,
but it is rather vague and does not cover a multitude of facets of
the term.
Analysing various definitions of meaning, and finding that none
of them can cope with the wide spectrum of significances the term
covers, Geoffrey Leech (1981: Chapter 1) suggests that, instead
of trying to define the notion of meaning, semanticists should
focus on describing the native speaker's semantic competence,
i.e. they should ‘investigate what it is to “know a language”
semantically.’
In a nutshell, we can say that the native speaker:
1
knows the conceptual system of the language, i.e. the lexical
items in the dictionary and their lexical/logical meanings: two
persons cannot communicate properly unless words such as
window and freedom, to buy and to sell have the same
meaning for both of them;
can recognise and use grammatical markers: of plurality
(e.g. boy-boys; man-men); of preterity (e.g. worked; sang);
of degree (e.g. bigger), etc., as well as discourse markers
(e.g. but, therefore, however, consequently), which determine
logical and grammatical relations within the text (e.g. of
condition, consequence or result);
can identify various types of meaning (connotations, social
meaning, etc.), carried by lexical items alongside their
conceptual meaning;
can identify relations of meaning between lexical items and
constructs: a competent speaker knows that house and
building are semantically synonymous, that young and old, or I
went and I’ll go express opposite meanings, that dog is a
hyponym1 of animal, that weather and whether may sound
alike, but express completely different things, etc.;
can distinguish between semantically meaningful sentences
and semantically anomalous ones: a sentence such as, She is
a girl, is both grammatically and semantically well formed; She
eats air, may be grammatically well formed, but semantically it
is anomalous.
Hyponymy = inclusion of meaning (see Chapter 3 of the present work).
17
They often say that English is a ‘crazy language:’ the
relationship between the form/structure of lexical items and their
meaning does not always follow logical criteria. Read Annex 1 to
see just how illogical such relations can be. And yet, the
competent speaker has no trouble in dealing with them.
In the following sections and chapters we shall therefore focus
on various aspects of the speaker’s semantic competence.
1.2
Types of meaning
It was shown in the previous section that defining meaning is no
easy task. This is also because its study can be approached from
various perspectives.
Thus, for example, in a wide sense, meaning can be defined as
‘all that is communicated by language;’ its narrow semantic
interpretation limits it to the study of the conceptual system of the
language. However, there is so much in communication that does
not obey the rules of the dictionary that even a strictly semantic
approach cannot ignore the additional types of meaning lexical
items carry.
Language is not a close and rigid conceptual system, but an
open-ended one. Apart from their basic lexical/conceptual
meaning(s), words also carry additional semantic loads that have a
great impact on the sense of the message. Furthermore, the
meaning of words depends on the speaker’s encyclopaedic
knowledge, as well as on the way he uses the language: words
can mean what their user wants them to mean.
Consequently, it is advisable to break down meaning into
several ‘types of meaning.’ Three categories are suggested:
1. conceptual/logical meaning, i.e. the type of meaning that is
strictly related to the conceptual system of the language and which
is basic for the speaker’s semantic competence;
2. several types of ‘associative’ meanings (as Leech calls them),
i.e. the types of meaning which lexical items carry beyond their
actual semantic charge; and
3. pragmatic meaning, i.e. the meaning which results from the
speaker’s knowledge of the world and from the way he
organizes his message.
Let us survey briefly these types of meaning.
18
1.2.1
Conceptual meaning
Language is ‘the means by which we interpret our environment, by
which we classify or “conceptualize” our experiences, by which we
are able to impose structure on reality, so as to use what we have
observed for present and future learning and understanding’
(Leech, 1981: Chapter 3). It is also the main instrument of
educated communication among people.
The conceptual system of the language represents what
linguists call our ‘mental dictionary.’ It is shared by all the
members of a language community, and thus facilitates
meaningful communication.
Conceptual meaning (also called logical or cognitive meaning,
denotation or sense) is closely related to the dictionary and
accounts for the competent language user’s ability to encode and
decode meaning.
Conceptual meaning reflects and ‘encapsulates’ a term’s
referent (i.e. the real-world object or phenomenon the item refers
to), focusing on its criterial and stable attributes.
Dictionaries are the generally acknowledged preservers of the
vocabulary of a language, accepted and shared by all the speakers
of that given language. That is why, the dictionary functions as a
go-between for the world and the members of a certain language
community.
There has been considerable debate among linguists whether
there is a single, universal, conceptual framework common to all
languages, or as many conceptual systems as there are languages.
The general consensus is that, although languages differ widely in
the way they classify human experience, they all share – roughly
speaking – the same conceptual framework and approximately the
same grammar. Some semanticists have even suggested that a
universal property of the human mind has triggered a common
basic conceptual framework for all languages. Indeed, most
languages of the world possess words to name a number of basic
things (house, land, man, horse), activities (to go, to eat, to
learn), characteristics (good, bad, tall, blue), etc., because such
referents are universal.
The theory of semantic universals also explains how
translation from one language to another is possible. Words such
as father, house, work or good have correspondents in most
languages: tată, casă, muncă, bun – in Romanian; père, maison,
travail, bon – in French; etc. But cross references from one
language to another (e.g. one speaks one language, the other
19
uses words and structures of his own mother tongue, or they both
use a mixed kind of language) can lead, at best, to partial, largely
non-linguistic, communication. This is why speakers of different
languages cannot communicate according to the standards of
educated linguistic communication.
Discussing semantic universals, Chomsky (1965: 27-30)
makes a distinction between:
formal universals, i.e. ‘universal rules of logical structure,’ or
general characteristics of language construction; and
substantive universals, i.e. ‘universal categories of
conceptual content,’ viewed in terms of what elements or
components a language contains.
In other words, the category of formal universals is related to
grammar; that of substantive universals pertains to semantics,
and surveys the conceptual system of the language.
Leech (1981: Chapter 12) argues that, in the theory of substantive
universals, a further distinction must be made between
strong universals, i.e. that ‘all languages have a category x’; and
weak (or language-neutral) universals, i.e. that ‘there exists
a universal set of semantic features, of which every language
possesses a subset.’
The strong universal approach is contradicted by empirical
observation. Each language reflects the specific reality and life
experience of the people who speak it: Eskimos pay great
attention to describing the snow and its whiteness; Arabs living in
the desert focus on the sand and the winds; peoples living in
tropical regions devote large sections of their vocabularies to
naming the countless species of plants, insects and animals that
live in the centre of their universe.
Furthermore, classifications of the world and of society are
often culturally determined and terminologies differ significantly
from one language or culture to another. Leech (1981: Chapter 121)
supports this assertion with an analysis of kinship terminologies.
For example, in a number of cultures (e.g. the Nayar castes of
South India), the nuclear family, of parents and children, does not
exist. In other cultures, one or the other parent is biologically
considered to have an incidental role in procreation. Thus, the
notion of parenthood – subsuming motherhood and fatherhood – is
at best only a near-universal (in the strong sense) of kinship semantics.
20
In practice, however, the same semantic categories are seen
to operate in different languages, so that categories of meaning
can be regarded as language-neutral, i.e. as belonging to the
common human faculty of language, rather than to the ability to
speak a certain language.
Conceptual analysis is one of the most popular approaches to
analysing logical meaning.
Conceptual analysis is based on de Saussure’s idea according
to which semiotic systems make meaning by paradigmatic choice
and syntagmatic combination, which operate on all the levels of
the language.
For example, phoneticians have identified minimal sound
features, which combine to produce the phonemes of language.
The sound system is organized by ‘minimal pairs’ of opposite
phonemes, distinguished by one minimal feature in binary
opposition. For example, in the minimal pair [p]-[b], where [p] is
plosive, bilabial, voiceless, and [b] is plosive, bilabial, voiced, the
opposition is accomplished by the distinction ‘voiceless’ (for [p])
and ‘voiced’ (for [b]).
Studying linguistic forms and structures, semanticists reached
the conclusion that they could also describe meaning by analysing
their basic semantic components.
Thus, according to conceptual analysis, the meaning of an item
is broken down into its minimal components (or features) of meaning.
Just like the phonological system, the features of meaning are
organized contrastively (i.e. expressed in terms of [±]), so that
the semantic opposition characterizes the referent positively (by
features it possesses) or negatively (by features it does not possess).
For example, father and mother are distinguished by the
and
the
same
opposition
opposition
[+MALE]1/[-MALE],
distinguishes the pairs brother and sister, stallion and mare,
gander and goose. The distinction between boy and man, between
girl and woman, between kitten and cat, etc., is based on the
opposition [±ADULT]. The distinction between bear and teddy bear
is [±ANIMATE]; that between fact and idea is [±CONCRETE];
between history and story is [±TRUE], etc.
Not only nouns can be defined conceptually, but also:
adjectives and adverbs:
good: [GOOD]
bad: [–GOOD];
1
1
Quoting Goodenough (1970) and Lounsbury (1969).
The + sign can be discarded.
alive: [LIVE]
horizontal: [HORIZONTAL]
21
dead: [–LIVE]
vertical: [–HORIZONTAL]
prepositions:
in front of: [→DIRECTION];
behind, over, under: [←DIRECTION];
Conceptual analysis goes hand in hand with compositional
analysis, where conceptual meanings are descried in terms of
syntagmatic combinations of contrastive features. Thus, the
componential definitions of man, woman, boy and girl are:
man:
[HUMAN] [ADULT] [MALE]
woman: [HUMAN] [ADULT] [–MALE]
boy:
[HUMAN] [–ADULT] [MALE]
girl:
[HUMAN] [–ADULT] [–MALE]
or we can define car as:
car: [PRIVATE] [MOTOR] [VEHICLE].
Grammatical categories – e.g. [±PRESENT], or [±SINGULAR]
– can also be expressed componentially/compositionally, as in:
boil: [COOK] [IN WATER] [PRESENT];
fried: [COOK] [IN OIL] [-PRESENT]; etc.
Componential analysis also surveys the combinatory power
of semantic features. Logic, as well as the way things in nature
and society work, imposes some limitations on what semantic
features can combine, and what features cannot. Componential
analysis, therefore, explains how violations of selection restrictions
trigger anomalous constructs.
For example, male man is pleonastic because the componential
definition of man (i.e. [HUMAN] [ADULT] [MALE]) presupposes the
feature MALE; a second MALE dimension ([MALE] [HUMAN]
[ADULT] [MALE]) makes the definition redundant. The same is true
for dead corpse: corpse already contains the feature ‘dead.’
Combination of opposing features triggers another kind of
anomaly. For example, in male car there is a clash of features:
male presupposes the feature [ANIMATE], while car is by definition
[-ANIMATE].
Metaphorical speech often relies on such violations of selection
restrictions. In She eats air, for instance, there is a semantic clash
between the verb eat (which requires a [CONCRETE] object), and
the abstract noun air (i.e. [-CONCRETE]). Or, in He is a dog, the
[HUMAN] feature carried by he clashes with the [-HUMAN] feature
which defines the word dog. Faced with such semantic dilemmas, the
22
listener must stretch his imagination and perform some metaphoric
interpretation (see section 2.2.2 – Figurative transfer of meaning).
Semantically, the sentence is viewed as a proposition.
Propositions ignore the surface (grammatical) form of the sentence
(e.g. affirmative, interrogative or imperative) and focus on the
underlying semantic structure. For example, the sentences, The
child has a book, and Does the child have a book?, rely on the
same proposition: Child have book.
To analyse the semantic structure of the sentence,
semanticists rely on the predication as their minimal unit.
In most cases, the predication can be broken down into three
logico-semantic units:
o two arguments, i.e. the logical participants: child and book
o a predicate (not in the grammatical sense), i.e. the relational
element that links them: have
For example, the sentence (Leech, 1981: Chapter 8)
A tall woman was in front of the car
contains:
argument a: tall woman
argument b: car
predicate: be in front of
Defining in front of conceptually as [→POSITION] and
[-LATERAL] (as oppose [LATERAL] = beside), we can represent the
predication as:
a
→POSITION
- LATERAL
b
Further on, we can describe the arguments componentially as:
- argument a: [TALL] [HUMAN] [ADULT] [-MALE];
- argument b: [PRIVATE] [MOTOR] [VEHICLE];
This brings us to the predication-componential formula of the
sentence as:
TALL
HUMAN
ADULT
-MALE
SINGULAR
→POSITION
-LATERAL
PAST
PRIVATE
MOTOR
VEHICLE
SINGULAR
Componential
analysis
can
be
used
to
symbolise
classificatory, as well as relational structures of meaning.
23
For example, my uncle can be defined componentially by using
the features:
- male: [MALE] (as opposed aunt: [-MALE]);
- collateral kin: [-LINEAL] (as opposed to lineal kin – for
father, mother, brother, etc.); or
[-PARALLEL] (as opposed to [PARALLEL] – for
father, mother, etc.);
- one generation senior: [>GENERATION] (as compared to
[<GENERATION] – junior generation, or to
[=GENERATION] – same generation).
so that we get
my uncle: [>GENERATION] [-PARALLEL] [MALE]
Other members of the speaker’s family can be defined
componentially as:
mother: [>GENERATION] [PARALLEL] [-MALE]
aunt:
[>GENERATION] [-PARALLEL] [-MALE]
nephew: [<GENERATION] [-PARALLEL] [MALE], etc.
Going a step further, to predication componential analysis,
we can symbolise the relationship between parents and children by
using merely two oppositions:
- of sex: ±MALE; and
- of parenthood: [→ PARENT] (= parent of)
[←PARENT] (= child of)
by which we get:
father: [←PARENT] [MALE]; as opposed to
son: [→ PARENT] [MALE]
mother: [←PARENT] [-MALE]; as opposed to
daughter: [→ PARENT] [-MALE]
This way, the predications,
John is Tom’s father
and, respectively,
Tom is John’s son
can be defined as:
Tom
John
→PARENT
←PARENT
John
Tom
24
1.2.2
Associative meanings
According to some semanticists, conceptual meaning is the only
type of meaning that belongs to the field of semantics. The other
types of meaning, they claim, largely depend on pragmatic factors,
e.g. on the speaker’s knowledge of the world and his life
experience, so that they should be included in the study of
pragmatics. Other linguists, however, agree that the weight of
additional meanings is so great that they can hardly be ignored
without prejudicing semantics and the study of meaning itself.
Human linguistic communication does not rely on the
dictionary alone, but is greatly influenced by the knowledge of the
world (encyclopaedic knowledge) and the communicative
experience the speaker and the listener bring along. This
background knowledge helps them to use the dictionary efficiently,
so as to interact smoothly and economically.
In fact, conceptual meaning covers only a small part of a
term’s communicative content.
The great problem with conceptual analysis is that it views
semantic features as invariable. But in reality there are significant
variations among people’s interpretation of words. These
variations may be historical (differences from one age to another),
social (from one social group to another), or personal (different
persons interpret the same item differently).
For example, Webster defines the word rat as ‘any of several
long-tailed rodents … resembling but larger than mice’ – a
scientific definition that is addressed exclusively to our minds. But
in reality, people react emotionally to the word rat, and there may
be as many different reactions as there are receivers: a housewife
who has had rats in her cellar will get goose bumps at the very
sound of the word; conversely, a child who has seen the cartoon
Ratatouille (in which a human-friendly rat is a sophisticated creator
of French cuisine) will react positively both to the name and to the
sight of an animal of the category in his mother’s kitchen.
This shows that words carry significant additional meanings
which are generally not included in their dictionary definitions.
While conceptual meaning is shared by all the members of a
speech community, these additional meanings are less stable: they
may vary from person to person, from society to society, and from
age to age; yet, many of them are shared across contexts.
Leech (1981: 18) distinguishes five types of associative
meanings – social meaning, connotation, affective meaning,
25
collocation and reflected meaning – of which he asserts that they
‘all have the same open-ended, variable character, and lend
themselves to analysis in terms of scales or ranges, rather than in
discrete either-this-or-that terms.’
1.2.2.1
Social meaning
Social meaning refers to what ‘a piece of language conveys about
the social circumstances of its use’ (Leech, 1981: 14).
Pronunciation tells us a lot about the speaker’s social and
geographic background: even a beginner learner of the language
can distinguish an Englishman from an American or from an
Australian. Pronunciation can also provide clues for the speaker’s
social origin and educational background, e.g. working class or
gentry, educated or not. In the same way, vocabulary (e.g. lexical
and stylistic choice) and grammar (i.e. linguistic accuracy) give us
information about the speakers, their relative roles, the social
distance between them, the situational context, etc.
Vocabulary and style are the most direct ways by which the
speaker ‘grammaticalizes’ (i.e. encodes in the language) his
awareness of his own social status.
In the vocabulary of every language there are words1 (titles of
address, honorifics) which encode the speaker’s perception of his
own place in the interaction. For example, by addressing a person
as Sir or Madam, the speaker automatically voices his
consideration and respect, as well as his awareness of his own
social inferiority. Terms of address, e.g. Your Honour and Your
Lordship, are restricted to well-defined social categories (i.e. a
judge, respectively, a lord).
Titles of address and honorifics have corresponding rules of
morphological
agreement,
which
sometimes
contradict
conventional grammar rules, e.g. some second person singular
formulae of address (e.g. Your Lordship) require agreement with a
third person singular verb (e.g. Your Lordship knows the truth).
Vocative terms (pal, man), greeting, parting, or ritual
formulae also convey a lot of social meaning. Their use requires
careful stylistic grading, according to the relative position between
the speaker and the hearer, e.g. How do you do! (formal); Good
morning (neutral); Hello (informal); Hi (familiar).
1
Social meaning is closely related to register and style, which represent
the subject of section 3.2, as well as to social and person deixis,
discussed in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of the present book.
26
Stylistic levels range from elevated and formal – at one
end of the scale, to colloquial and slangy – at the other.
Stylistic dimensions of status vary according to the relative
position of the participants (e.g. socially equal or socially
distant), the type of discourse (e.g. the language of law, of
lectures, of casual conversation), etc.
Thus, the lexical choices the speaker makes are controlled
by socio-stylistic considerations. Estimation of the social
background tells the speaker whether to use child (neutral), kid
(informal), or brat (slang, pejorative); to die (neutral), to pass
on (formal, polite), or to kick the bucket (slang, derisive). Bad
linguistic choice triggers social sanction. For example,
expressing your condolences to your boss because his motherin-law kicked the bucket is an insult, rather than an act of
courtesy.
Formality of style affects not only vocabulary, but also the
grammatical structure of the sentence: formal language
requires longer and more complex sentences, with intricate
subordination (e.g. Would you mind terribly if I asked you to…).
It also involves manipulation of the illocutionary force of the
utterance, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 (section 6.4).
The scope of social meaning is much wider than dictionary
definitions: it is closely related to register and style (see section
3.2), it mirrors the real-world situation in which the interaction
unfolds (e.g. see sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 – Person deixis and
Social deixis), and it also results from the strategic intentions of
the speaker (e.g. see Chapter 8 – Politeness).
1.2.2.2
Connotative and affective meaning
The next two categories of associative meaning – i.e.
connotation and affective meaning – should be analysed
together, as they are both related to the language users’
affectivity (positive or negative). But, while connotative
meaning involves the receiver’s affective reactions to a certain
lexical item, affective meaning gives voice to the sender’s
feelings regarding a real-world object or situation.
27
1.2.2.2.1 Connotative meaning
Probably the most important type of associative meaning,
connotation is conveyed over and above the conceptual content of the
word, being based on the non-criterial characteristics of the referent.
While denotation is generally stable and invariable, connotation varies
from person to person, from social group to social group, as well as
from age to age.
For example, the word baby is defined by the dictionary as ‘an
infant or very young child,’ and can be defined conceptually as
[HUMAN] [-ADULT] [±MALE]. However, mention of the word baby
causes positive feelings in a young mother, and negative ones in a
person who is continuously disturbed by the shrieks of his neighbours’
children. Connotations can be carried visually or auditively, too: the
picture of a baby, or the sound of its cry, can induce the same reaction
in the listener.
Thus, semantically/conceptually words are neutral and stable;
however, they carry connotations which are variable, open-ended and
personal.
Dictionaries list the denotations of words; monosemantic words
have one denotation, polysemantic ones have several. The number of
meanings thus listed is limited. Conversely, the connotations words
carry are open-ended.
For example, the word apple is defined by Webster as:
1.
the usu. round red or yellow edible fruit of a small tree, Malus sylvestris,
of the rose family;
2. the tree, cultivated in most temperate regions;
3. the fruit of any of certain other species of tree of the same genus;
4. any of various other similar fruits or plants, as the custard apple or
May apple;
5. something resembling an apple in size and shape, as a baseball;
Idiom: 6. <apple of one's eye> someone or something very precious or dear
to one; a favorite.
But the connotations of the word cannot be listed fully: there are as
many connotations as there are people and occasions of use.
Some are generally accepted by most educated members of the
Western world: e.g. it connotes1 the Garden of Eden, the original sin,
wisdom, etc. The list will always be incomplete, because connotations
are also personal: for one individual it may connote childhood, for
another – winter evenings in the house of the grandparents, for a third
– a happy memory, etc.
1
After Cook, 1992.
28
Connotations cannot be described simply, in terms of ‘positive’ or
‘negative,’ but rather, as ‘connotations of… .’ Words, such as concept,
theory, cognition, etc. carry connotations of scientific achievement;
infection and virus – connotations of disease, even when the item
under discussion is a computer, not a human being; skyscraper or
rocket convey a sense of aspiration and flight; chocolate and perfume
carry connotations of softness and sensual indulgence; cowboy and
sheriff – of virility; etc.
Connotations also vary from culture to culture. Think of pairs of
words, such as king and shah, Pope and Imam. To Westerners, the
notion of king is a reality (there are kings in Europe), while their
perception of shah is mostly based on connotations (e.g. of a romantic
and mysterious East); for Arabs, the situation is the reverse: the term
shah is closer to their world, while their perception of king largely relies
on connotations (e.g. of authority). Similarly, the words denoting the
religious rulers of the two worlds trigger different reactions in the case
of a Catholic or a Muslim.
The culture dependence of connotations makes translation or
‘transposition’ from one language/culture to another problematic.
Take, for example, advertisements transposed literally: if the
audience of the target country does not share the same system of
connotations as the country of origin, the new public will fail to
understand its message, or will understand it differently. Consider
the Marlboro Country series. To Romanians, the aura of freedom
and tradition carried by the lonely cowboy is lost. Still, the ad does
carry some connotations for the Romanian public: they see in it
the ‘living in America’ concept, the glamour and fascination that
America exerts upon the whole world today.
In The Discourse of Advertising, Guy Cook (1992: 104) makes
a detailed analysis of brand names, choosing perfumes and cars as
prototypical products, ‘expressions of self and sexuality: … a
woman is her perfume, … a man is his car.’
Perfumes, he shows, are indescribable in words: a smell has
no denotation; and, since there is no component to be denoted,
there are almost no restrictions in their naming. As a result,
perfume names concentrate on connotation.
To prove the primacy of connotation in the naming of
perfumes, Cook gives the following example: Opium (the name of
a perfume) denotes a well-known narcotic. Morphine (a narcotic
refined from opium), and heroine (a narcotic refined from
morphine) are semantically related to the word opium (they are its
co-hyponyms). Yet, the connotations of the latter words make it
29
highly unlikely that a perfume should be named either morphine or
heroin: while opium connotes ‘the nineteenth century, the Orient,
Romantic poetry, and bohemian illegality’ (i.e. alluring), morphine
recalls ‘painful disease, hospitals and accidents, and heroin speaks
of organized crime, premature death, HIV infection, unwilling
prostitution, urban poverty.’1
With cars, the situation is slightly different: a car has a
physical materiality which cannot be ignored, so that the brand
name must share some denotational components with its referent.
Thus, the car named Jaguar2 is streamlined and accelerates fast,
just like the animal whose name it carries. But the name also
carries connotations of rarity, beauty, superiority, aggression,
violence, sexuality, etc.
1.2.2.2.2
Affective meaning
With affective meaning, the main function of words is to express
the speaker’s emotions, his feelings and attitudes towards things
or events going on.
For example, many interjections have no (or barely any)
conceptual content; speakers react positively or negatively to what
is going on, giving voice to their admiration (Wow!), delight
(Yippee!) or disgust (Yuck!). Adjectives can also be used to
express feelings of pleasure (Great!), of satisfaction (Cool!), of
displeasure (Awful!), etc.
Some words (e.g. darling, love, hate, gorgeous, horrible)
convey positive or negative feelings explicitly, through their
conceptual content: e.g. I love you, or I hate you, give voice to
the speaker’s feelings straightforwardly. In most cases, though,
the speaker’s attitude is conveyed more indirectly.
In numerous cases, words carry their affective charge through
their connotations. Some words intrinsically carry strong
connotations, either positive or negative: pet, honey or jewel,
indicate that the speaker’s feelings are positive; conversely, the
affective charge of dog, louse, leech or shark, is clearly negative.
1
2
The smoother sonority of opium (compared to morphine or heroin) was
probably another criterion of choice. Euphony (agreeableness of sound;
pleasing effect to the ear – Webster) is often decisive when selecting
brand names.
Jaguar is also the brand name of a perfume, but in that case its
connotations are different: wildness, sexuality, freedom, etc.
30
Linguists1 call the words with intrinsic negative connotations snarl
words, and those with positive connotations – purr words. The
main function of purr words and of snarl words is to convey the
speaker’s feelings and attitudes, while their conceptual content is
of secondary importance. As Leech (1981: 44) puts it, with snarl
words, ‘conceptual meaning becomes irrelevant because whoever
is using them is simply capitalizing on their unfavourable
connotations in order to give forceful expression to his own
hostility’.
In the language of the press, terms like communist or fascist,
sharks or vultures, corruption and pollution, are generally used to
snarl. The category of political purr words can be illustrated with
terms like democracy, freedom, or human rights.
Advertising has its own purr words and snarls words. New,
soft, free, only, high-tech, innovative are used to purr, while old
and other (e.g. your old detergent/your other products) have the
function of snarling at the competitors’ seemingly inferior products.
In many cases, the educated speaker resorts to stylistic
devices to convey his likes or dislikes indirectly. For instance, he
may rely on word choice and intricacy of the grammatical structure
to make his remarks more or less polite. Will you be so kind as to
keep your voice down, conveys a completely different attitude than
a barked Shut up!
Furthermore, expression of affective meaning does not rely on
words alone: the speakers paralinguistic message (i.e. his tone
of voice, intonation, facial expression) greatly affects the meaning
of his words. Even an obviously impolite Shut up! can be made to
sound mild if uttered in a friendly tone and with a smile on the
face; but a harsh tone of voice turns it into an angry command.
Conversely, a linguistically polite request can be made rude and
ironic by negative paralanguage, e.g. Will you do me the favour to
stop talking?, becomes insulting if the speaker uses a mocking tone
and facial expression.
How speakers manipulate linguistic indirectness to soften or
enhance their message according to their real-world aims will be
discussed in more detail in Chapters 6-8 of the present work.
1
Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action, quoted by Leech (1981: 44).
1.2.2.3
31
Collocative and reflected meaning
Two other types of associative meaning – collocative and reflected
meaning – should also be surveyed in association, as they refer to
the effect of one lexical item, or of one type of usage, upon
another. But while collocations focus on lexical co-occurrences, as
conventionally accepted by the system of the language, and the
reciprocal effect of one item upon the other, reflected meaning
takes the analysis further, to investigate the effect of the actual
realities that stand behind the term upon its semantic load.
1.2.2.3.1
Collocative meaning
A collocation represents a sequence of lexical items that
habitually co-occur, i.e. they appear and function together. Their
co-occurrence is based on convention and longstanding usage, not
on logic. Nobody could explain, for instance, why we say Merry
Christmas and A Happy New Year, and not vice-versa:
semantically, *A Merry New Year! is well formed; still, the
experienced speaker knows it is ‘not English!’
Any ‘change of partner’ in a collocative group is either perceived
as unnatural, or brings about a certain change of meaning.
The example also suggests that mention of one element in the
collocative group usually recalls the other: on hearing the word
Merry …, the word Christmas automatically comes to mind. The
same is true for collocations, such as bread and butter, gin and
tonic, to take a holiday, to catch a bus, to miss a train, to pay a
visit to someone, to book tickets, to lend assistance, to run a risk,
etc. Sometimes, collocations have regional variations: e.g. the
British say to take a trip and to take a decision, while Americans
say to make a trip and to make a decision; the British say to bring
a contribution, while Americans prefer to make a contribution; etc.
Collocation is also basic for the great number of English verbs
with obligatory particles: to look at, to wait for, aimed at, etc., and
in this respect there are significant differences between various
languages. For example, in English, to be angry is followed by with
or at, while the Romanian collocative particle is pe (English on).
In many cases, choice of the proper synonym is determined by
the general collocative associations of the word.
Theoretically, synonyms carry the same semantic load, so that
the speaker could choose any member of a synonymic group; in
practice, however, his choice of the proper word is limited. For
example, shows Leech (1981), the verbs to quiver and to tremble
32
are semantically synonymous; but collocative usage has imposed
the group to tremble with fear and to quiver with excitement.
Adjectives have a high degree of co-occurrence regulations.
For example, Cruse (1986) shows that the adjective heavy (with
the sense of ‘much’) collocates with terms of consumption (e.g. a
person may be a heavy smoker or a heavy drug-user, and a car
can be heavy on petrol, etc.), or with the rain (a heavy rain); but
*a heavy eater or *a heavy learner are dissonant.
‘Change of partners’ in a collocative group is often
accompanied by change or addition of meaning. For example,
pretty, beautiful and handsome are semantically synonymous, but
they are not interchangeable. The word pretty is restricted to
young persons (especially female, as in a pretty girl) or small
things (as in a pretty box); beautiful is used with nouns denoting
mature women and valuable items (as in a beautiful woman/a
beautiful painting), while handsome is usually restricted to male
persons and nouns denoting objects with connotations of maleness
(as in a handsome man/a handsome airliner). Change of the
partner is sometimes acceptable (e.g. a handsome woman);
however, it involves considerable change of meaning: the new
partner (woman) acquires connotations (i.e. of maleness) brought
over from the semantic field of the term’s usual partner.
By the restrictions on the language it imposes, collocation
ultimately gives birth to idiomatic phrases, e.g. they say as blind
as a bat (the Romanian variant is ‘as blind as a mole’), as drunk as
a lord (why lord?), etc. Repeated usage conventualizes not only
the co-occurrence of words, but also word order and phrase
structure: they say ham and eggs and not ‘ham with eggs,’ nor
‘eggs and ham’; no internal variations are allowed.
1.2.2.3.2
Reflected meaning
Reflected meaning occurs especially in the case of polysemantic
words which have different types of uses. Think, for example, of
the great number of metaphorical computer terms: on hearing a
word, such as mouse, virus, or worm, the IT specialist will also
think of the computer device, even when the speaker is referring
to the real-word item the word designates.
In the cases when the term has two types of uses – a positive
and a negative one, or a general usage and one that is associated
with something shameful or unpleasant –, the negative/unpleasant
33
associations of the term rub off on the general usage,
contaminating it to a certain degree.
The term ghost, for example, has positive connotations in
religious language (in the collocation Holly Ghost), and negative
ones in secular language (many people are scared to death of
ghosts). Such people are unlikely to find comfort in the mention of
the Holly Ghost, especially if they are not regular church-goers.
Quite often, words die out of general usage because the
‘shameful’ or unpleasant sense of the word is ‘reflected’ upon, and
thus contaminates, its other sense(s).
Taboo words are perhaps the best example of how lexical
items get contaminated and fall out of regular usage on account of
the negative associations they recall.
For instance, words connected with the body’s excremental
functions, or with the physiology of sex, become contaminated by
the reality behind the word (i.e. the actual physical act). Since
they are perceived as shameful or embarrassing, people avoid
using the words in everyday conversation, replacing them with
roundabout or euphemistic1 expressions. But the new expressions
get again contaminated, because what is ‘shameful’ is not the
linguistic expression, but the reality it covers.
To illustrate this assertion, let us analyse the history of the
term used to name the room that caters for our (very natural)
excremental functions. Hailed as one of the greatest inventions of
the 20th century, the water closet was given a very decent name.
The term euphemistically avoids any reference to ‘what is going
on’ in the room; instead, it focuses on the use of water (connoting
cleanliness and hygiene) and on the enclosed quality of the place;
the French sonority of the term also connotes elegance and
refinement. Gradually, the term water was discarded, leaving the
term closet to refer metonymically for the place catering for our
physiological needs.
Looking up the word closet in the dictionary, we realize that it
underwent a process of drastic degradation2, its basic meanings
having no negative or shameful component. Webster defines closet
as: 1. a small room, enclosed recess, or cabinet for storing
clothing, food, utensils, etc. 2. a small private room, esp. one
used for prayer, meditation, etc. 3. a state or condition of secrecy
or carefully guarded privacy. And yet, on hearing the word closet,
1
2
See section 2.2.2.1.2.1 – Euphemism, paraphrase, circumlocution.
See also section 2.2.1 – Diachronic change of meaning.
34
people today do not think of clothing or food, of prayer or
meditation. That is to say, the ‘decent’ term closet was polluted by
the reality (considered shameful) the word was called upon to
name, and today people avoid using it in its other senses.
The abbreviation WC underwent the same process of
degradation, as did all the other euphemistic phrases – bathroom,
lavatory, ladies room, etc.
In the same way, words related to sexual activities get
‘shamed’ and shunned. Terms, such as erection, or ejaculation,
used to be perfectly respectable a short time ago. The word
erection means ‘something raised’ (e.g. a construction), and
ejaculation has the non-sexual sense of ‘an abrupt, exclamatory
utterance.’ But sexual usage contaminated the terms, so that
there is a tendency towards dropping them from general usage: a
teacher who utters one of these words may not be able to control
his class afterwards. The same thing happened to words used in
slang to name sexual organs: cock, pussy, dick.
Taboo contamination on sexual grounds can work very fast: the
word gay, for instance, which was perfectly innocent some thirty
years ago (meaning ‘cheerful’), is generally avoided today because of
its more recent sense, i.e. that of homosexual. However, writing is
lasting and stands witness of things past: in literary pieces, or in
textbooks for teaching English written no more than a quarter of a
century ago, the term gay can be encountered in its non-sexual,
sense, to the great amusement of many learners of English.
The third category of meaning – pragmatic meaning – has even
greater impact upon the meaning of words and utterances.
1.2.3 Pragmatic meaning
The analyses of conceptual and of associative meaning point to the
fact that meaning is a complex thing. It also shows that there are
many things related to the meanings of lexical items that are not
inherent in the dictionary. Leech (1981: Chapter 1) is careful to
point out that, in surveying the native speaker’s semantic
competence, the analyst must make distinction between his
‘knowledge of language’ and his ‘knowledge of the “real world”.’
In linguistics, the speaker’s knowledge of the world (or his
encyclopaedic knowledge) is called pragmatic knowledge.
35
Indeed, many aspects of the vocabulary itself involve
knowledge of facts pertaining to the world and to human society,
rather than to the world of words.
Take, for example, associative meanings: it is not the
dictionary, but his own background knowledge and experience,
which tell the speaker that rose or pet have positive connotations,
while those of rat or leech are negative; which help him discern
the social meaning carried by terms of address such as kid, old
chap or my love, or to react to the reflected meaning of words,
such as gay or erection.
Figurative speech is also based on the communicators’
knowledge of the world. How else would they know that you can
walk on ice with no ice around, or that you don’t have to be in a
forest or in a zoo to throw someone to the wolves.
A person’s mental dictionary, i.e. the overall amount of
lexical items that he knows and uses, depends directly on his own
life experience and education. The more eventful his life, the richer
the baggage of words he can manipulate. But man’s life experience
and world outlook – and therefore his vocabulary also – are strictly
related to the society he lives in, to the social, cultural,
philosophical views of his age.
In other words, the conceptual system of the language is
subject to significant variations, according to the personal, social
or cultural characteristics of the language user. As a result, there
is also a serious gap between one’s mental dictionary and one’s
mental encyclopaedia, i.e. his general capacity for assimilating,
storing in words and implementing world experience.
Just like the world itself, the dictionary is so rich and varied
that our mind cannot contain it all. No matter how educated a
person might be, he cannot learn all there is to be known about
the world, just as he cannot learn all the words in the lexicon. To
use the language efficiently, the speaker must use not only his
knowledge of the dictionary, but also his background knowledge,
which also helps him to put things in order.
When learning a foreign language, people often use the
dictionary to look up the meaning of a new term. In the case of
their mother tongue, though, people rarely use the dictionary. In
most cases, they learn new words because there is something new
(e.g. some new object or reality) in the world they want to talk
about. This means that we first come in touch with the reality behind
the word, and only afterwards do we learn the word that names it.
36
On the other hand, when we come across a new term for
which we do not have a handy real-world equivalent, we still prefer
to avoid using the dictionary. In the real world, new words come in
a well-defined context – both linguistic and non-linguistic – and we
generally infer their meaning by linking the new item to items that
we already know. For instance, the receiver who first encounters
the word emoticon is a user of the Internet, who reads and writes
numerous e-mails, so that the word comes in the context of his
experiences, of visual images on the screen (icons) which clarify
the word’s meaning. The real world – whether physical or in the
form of a (visual) model – is always close by.
This shows that our mental dictionary is empirical, rather than
scientific, i.e. that the words we use, and the way we use them,
are strictly determined by our life experience and by the way we
perceive the world. It also suggests that one’s mental dictionary
cannot be separated from one’s mental encyclopaedia.
Given the importance of pragmatic knowledge in the way
speakers use the language, we must briefly survey the way our
background knowledge is organized and functions.
Dictionaries are complex and the definitions they give precise.
To the user of the language, though, complexity and precision are
less important than simplicity and practicality. In rapid
conversation, the speaker does not have the time to think of the
entire dictionary definition of a word such as dog; instead, he may
visualize in his mind a typical dog. Naturally, dogs come in all sizes
and a great variety of forms – e.g. the bulldog is quite different
from the chihuahua – but the speaker will not waste much time on
variations; rather, he will perceive the dog he is talking about as
belonging to the wide category that goes under the label dog.
In other words, in interpreting and organizing experience, we
use mental categories, not individual examples. Thanks to our
mental encyclopaedia, we recognize the members of a category by
matching them to a prototype1, i.e. a mental model of a typical
example of that category (in this case, both bulldog and
Chihuahua are ‘dog-like’). The word itself (i.e. dog) is used as a
label for the entire category of real-world objects that can relate to
the prototype.
The prototype has some typical central features (e.g. dog: a
domesticated animal, four-legged, furry, barks, etc), as well as
vague and variable boundaries (e.g. big or small, dangerous or
1
The prototype theory was suggested by Eleanor Rosch, 1977.
37
not). Therefore, prototype meaning is fuzzy – there are no clearcut delimitations – and accommodates borderline cases easily.
The capacity of the human mind to define objects by relating
them to prototypes may trigger mistakes: most speakers would
call a whale a fish (it lives in the water and looks like a fish); yet,
the dictionary defines the whale as a mammal, i.e. not a fish.
The prototype theory also explains variations of interpretation
for the same dictionary item. When asked to describe a car, every
person will produce a different description, according to his
personal experience (or dream) regarding the object discussed:
the child will describe a toy-car; his teenage brother – a
convertible sports car; his father – a powerful BMW; etc.
Prototypes depend on the speaker’s geographical, historical
and socio-cultural background. For example, in today’s Western
society a young female person aged thirteen is generally referred
to as a girl; in centuries passed, or in some primitive civilizations
even today (e.g. Gypsy communities, tribes in Africa), woman
would be the appropriate label. Perception of the term may also be
determined geographically: to most European children, the word
pet will probably recall a dog or a cat; to African children, it is
likely to bring to memory a monkey or a parrot.
Pragmatic knowledge also helps communicators to fill in factual
gaps (or missing links) in the conversation. In ordinary
communication, speakers do not put into words everything that
needs to be communicated, but often leave out considerable
amounts of information.
Take, for example, the utterance, She dressed in white
(Levinson, 1983). According to conceptual analysis, the verb to
dress in… collocates with a word denoting clothes; in this case,
however, the word ‘clothes’ is a ‘missing link’. Still, the world-wise
hearer can retrieve the word from his pragmatic knowledge: he
knows that clothes can be white, so he understands that the
adjective white stands metonymically for ‘white clothes.’
Longer stretches of language generally contain several missing
links. For instance, in I went shopping this morning. I saw a nice
dress but couldn’t afford it, there is one between shopping and
saw (the speaker does not mention the fact that shopping involves
‘looking at’ objects); another between shopping and dress (the
speaker does not say that shopping is ‘for objects,’ and that dress
is one such object); one between dress and afford (the speaker
does not mention the fact that ‘buying’ requires money); etc.
38
Obviously, such information is superfluous: it is understood by
default by all communicators who ‘know about’ the world.
The language user’s capacity to deal with logical gaps is based on
psychological factors. Linguists (e.g. Brown & Yule, 1983: 236-52)
suggest that our background knowledge is organised into easily
accessible units that incorporate conventional aspects of a certain
situation: things that are generally known need not be mentioned,
thus conversation becomes simple and economical.
These units may take the form of frames based on visual
perception, e.g. when we hear the word school we automatically
see a classroom, with desks and a blackboard, with students and a
teacher. Or we may rely on scripts, i.e. action stereotypes, in
which a word triggers a sequence of events, e.g. the word
shopping is perceived as a series of actions: window-shopping,
going in, trying things on, selecting items, paying, etc.
A person’s background knowledge largely depends on his
socio-cultural schemata, i.e. on his society’s views concerning the
real-world situation behind the term. For example, the act getting
married is visualised differently by the rich heiress of an American
tycoon and by a poor country girl; similarly different are the
images that phrases such as going to a concert, or having fun,
trigger in the minds of rich city adolescents and poor middle aged
farmers. Nor can 21st century going to a concert or having fun be
compared to what the terms covered in earlier times.
Prototypes, frames and scripts belong to our pragmatic
knowledge, which is activated whenever it is needed, according to
the requirements of the conversation.
Pragmatic factors influence all our linguistic and non-linguistic
choices: of lexis, of grammatical construction, tone of voice, body
posture, etc. Everything is constrained by the context of utterance,
by the norms and unwritten rules of social coexistence. Nonadherence to these norms is sanctioned by society (e.g. in a public
library one must keep one’s voice down and move around quietly,
so as not to disturb the readers).
Pragmatic errors do not necessarily involve semantic or
grammatical mistakes. An utterance that is grammatically and
semantically well-formed, but uses inappropriate vocabulary
(colloquial style at a formal meeting) is obviously more offensive
than a linguistic mistake. Wrong usage of honorifics can also
39
represent serious blunders: e.g. addressing a person as Mister,
when you do not know his name, is terribly impolite1.
Pragmatic choices are also culturally determined: what is polite
in one country may not be polite in another, e.g. first-name
address on short notice is widely popular in the USA, but
Romanians would resent it. Honorifics may also be culturally
determined: the word Lady is restrictive in England (it is a title of
nobility); in America, it is used euphemistically to address politely
any person of female sex.
To practice types of meaning, go to Annexes 1 and 2.
1.3
Sense relations
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that semantic competence also
involves recognizing semantic relations among lexical items.
Relations of meaning operate both on the paradigmatic and on the
syntagmatic axis, i.e. they control both word choice and word
combination.
The meaning relations that arise among lexical items can be
analyzed according to various criteria.
1.3.1
Form-meaning relations
Between the form and the meaning of lexical items there are three
basic types of sense relations: synonymy, polysemy and homonymy.
1.3.1.1
Synonymy
Synonymy, or ‘sameness’ of meaning, is a several-to-one formmeaning relationship: various linguistic items have a similar
meaning, e.g. house – building; child – kid; big – huge; to hit – to
kick; to come in – to enter; etc.
Synonymy gives the speaker/writer the possibility to choose
the most appropriate linguistic form for his thoughts.
For example2, the sentence ‘Please leave me alone,’ she
_______ , accepts as possible choices for the empty slot a wide
variety of synonymic terms: said, shouted, yelled, cried,
1
It is only acceptable as Mister X; the speaker who does not know the
addressee’s name should address him as Sir. The correct forms of address
for a female person are Mrs. X or Madam.
2
After Seely, 2002:14.
40
screamed, shrieked, whispered, murmured, muttered, mumbled,
sighed, gasped, sobbed, wailed, panted, drawled, yelped, growled,
snapped, snarled, squeaked, whined, etc. But each variant
conveys a meaning that is (slightly or significantly) different from
the others. It depends on the larger context which one is the best
choice. Mark Twain’s appreciation, that the difference between the
‘proper’ word and the ‘almost proper’ word is like that between
lightning and the glow-worm, shows clearly how important it is to
select the most appropriate synonym.
Synonymy is not a word-to-word relationship. It was shown in
section 1.1 that the word is a grammatical category; semantics
deals with lexical items/units, which can consist of several words.
Thus, to postpone and to put off, to decide and to make up one’s
mind; to go and to hit the road, etc. are synonymic pairs, in spite
of the formal difference between the elements of each pair.
Synonymic choice can be constrained
o
o
o
by a word’s usual collocations (see 1.2.2.3.1), e.g. to tremble
with fear and to quiver with excitement; hard worker – heavy
smoker; etc.
by stylistic requirements: e.g. girl (neutral) – maiden (poetic)
– chick (slang); jolly good (colloquial) – very good (neutral); etc.
regional variations, e.g. underground (Br.E.) – subway
(Am.E.); pavement (Br.E.) – sidewalk (Am.E.); litter (Br.E.) –
garbage (Am.E.); a storm in a teacup (Br.E.) – a tempest in a
teapot (Am.E.); etc.
In some cases, the synonymy between two terms can be
merely contextual. For example, rancid and sour are no real
synonyms; but in the context rancid butter and sour wine, the
collocations share a similar meaning (= gone bad).
There is also grammatical synonymy, e.g. He would
go/used to go there every day.
In spite of their similarity of meaning, there is no absolute
semantic sameness between synonyms; always there is a slight
difference, otherwise one of the terms would be excluded from the
language. Thus, in the synonymic series big – broad – large –
huge – immense – gigantic – tremendous – vast, the first element
(big) is stylistically neutral and can be used to refer to all types of
dimensions (height, width, vastness); broad is used to refer to
width (e.g. Broadway); vast – to great areas; large – to volumes
or quantities (e.g. a large house, a large number of …). The
elements of the sub-chain huge, immense, gigantic, tremendous
41
convey modal connotations (of excess), as well as semantic or
stylistic differences: huge is perceived as almost neutral; gigantic
recalls fairy tales and suggests objects or people of exceptional size;
tremendous connotes extraordinary intensity or achievement;
immense sounds more sophisticated and can be used to describe
boundless spaces (e.g. the immensity of oceans). The words in the
series cannot exchange collocations freely: e.g. broad can
collocate with mind (e.g. a broad mind), but not with ball (*a
broad ball is anomalous; nor can one say *an immense mind).
The examples above belong to the realm of conceptual or
cognitive synonymy. But there is also pragmatic synonymy,
which results from the language user’s knowledge of the world,
e.g. Shakespeare – the Sweet Swan of Avon; London – The capital
of England; the camel – the ship of the desert; etc.
1.3.1.2
Polysemy
Polysemy is a widely represented feature among English lexemes.
If synonymy provides several linguistic forms for the same
meaning, polysemy is the opposite case: one lexical form has
several meanings.
Few single words in English are monosemantic (i.e. with only
one meaning). For example, Webster gives only one definition for
the adverb heretofore (= before this time; until now); this is
probably because the word is highly sophisticated, used only in
elevated contexts. Monosemy is more frequent among complex
lexical items, e.g. phrasal verbs (e.g. to call off = to cancel; to
drop out = to cease to participate), or idiomatic phrases (e.g. in a
nutshell = briefly; to make up one’s mind = to decide; etc.).
Most English words, especially those of Germanic origin, are
very simple in form (mono- or disyllabic), but very complex in
meaning: they are highly polysemantic (i.e. they have more than
one meaning).
Take, for instance the word round, for which Webster provides
52 meanings: as an adjective – 15 meanings (e.g. 1. having a
flat, circular form, as a disk or hoop; 2. curved like part of a
circle, as an outline; etc.); as a noun – 18 meanings (16. any
round shape or object; 17. something circular in cross section, as
a rung of a ladder; etc.); as an adverb – 2 meanings (34.
throughout or from the beginning to the end of a recurring period
of time: all year round; etc.); as a preposition – 2 meanings (36.
throughout a period of time: a resort visited round the year; etc.);
as a transitive verb – 8 meanings (38. to make round; 39. to free
42
from angularity; fill out symmetrically; etc.); as an intransitive
verb – 7 meanings (46. to become round, plump, or free from
angularity, often fol. by out), including phrasal variants (e.g. round
up). The dictionary also lists two idiomatic phrases, in the round
and make/go the round, with 4 and, respectively, 2 meanings (e.g.
54. <make the rounds> a. to go from one place to another, as in
seeking employment; b. <go the rounds>, of a rumour, story, or
the like = to spread from one person to another; etc.).
Obviously, no matter how competent the speaker might be, he
is unlikely to know all the dictionary definitions of the term.
However, he will most probably be able to make sense of most
cases in which he encounters the word: the (linguistic and nonlinguistic) context in which the term occurs will help him to
deduce more or less precisely which meaning is used in that
specific environment.
More complex lexical items are often polysemantic, too. For
example, phrasal verbs, e.g. to make up: 1. to invent (a story); 2.
to make peace with someone; 3. to put makeup on one’s face.
With idiomatic phrases, e.g. to lose one’s shirt, to break one’s
neck, to have sticky fingers, etc., the situation is different:
sometimes they can allow two types of reading – a literal reading
(e.g. one can actually lose one’s shirt) and an idiomatic reading
(the idiomatic meaning of the first phrase above is ‘to lose
everything one possesses’).
1.3.1.3
Homonymy
Homonymy is another widely represented feature in English.
Just like polysemy, homonymy is a one-to-several formmeaning relationship, but in this case the relationship is even more
complex: various lexical items look and/or sound alike (i.e. are
spelt and/or pronounced alike), although they belong to different
lexical or grammatical categories.
There are three basic types of homonyms:
o absolute homonyms, i.e. words pronounced and spelt alike,
e.g. bank (= the slope bordering a river) – bank (= a financial
institution); figure (= a numerical symbol) – figure (= the form or
shape of something); post (= a pole) – post (= mail) – post (= a
job); race (as in human race) – race (= a contest of speed); etc.
o
homophones, i.e. words pronounced alike but spelt
differently, e.g. air – heir – e’er (poetic form of ever); fair –
fare; I – eye; mare – mayor; meet – meat; peer – pier; sun –
43
son; sore – soar; their – there; where – wear; weather –
whether; witch – which; etc.; homophones are extremely
numerous in English.
o
homographs, i.e. words spelt alike but pronounced
differently, e.g. e.g. wind [wind] (= air in natural motion) –
wind [waind] (= to take a frequently bending course, e.g.
winding stairs); wound [wu:nd] (= injury) – wound [waund]
(Past Tense and Past Participle of to wind), e.g. They wound
up in jail); minute [’minit] (= a time fraction) – minute
[mai’nju:t] (= detailed); record [’rekəd] (= an account in
writing or the like preserving the memory or knowledge of
facts or events) – to record [ri’k‫כ‬:d] (= to set down in writing
or the like, for the purpose of preserving evidence); etc.
Phrases and grammatical units can also be homophonic, e.g. a
notion [ə’nəu∫n] – an ocean [ən’əu∫n]; an icecream [ən’aiskri:m] –
a nice cream [ə’nais’kri:m]; I can seal [aikən’si:l] – I conceal
[’aikən,si:l]; house trained [’haustreind] – how strained [hau’streind];
(Pârlog, 1997:117), etc. Even though stress and juncture
differentiate between the members of such homophonic pairs, a
learner may have difficulties in establishing the right variant.
Homonyms may also require a larger context for the hearer to
disambiguate their meaning. In the sentence, The bank was
beautiful, for instance, the hearer may imagine that the speaker is
talking about the bank of a river; but if the latter continues to say
that, It was a very old building, the receiver will realise that he
had picked the wrong meaning.
Youngsters and advertisers often exploit homonymy for the
sake of humour, e.g. 2 fast 4 U? (Too fast for you?); CUL8R (See
you later), RU UP 4 IT 2NITE? (Are you up for it tonight?); etc.
It is not always easy to distinguish between cases of polysemy
and homonymy: it takes specialised literature to tell us whether, in
the case of bed (piece of furniture; place where flowers are planted
– flower-bed), for example, we are facing are case of polysemy (one
word with several meanings), or of homonymy (two words spelled in
the same way and having the same pronunciation).
The easiest way to make the distinction is by looking up in the
dictionary the etymology of the word(s). This way we learn, for
example, that pole (= a long, slender piece of wood or metal …)
comes from the Latin palus (= stake), while pole (as in the North
Pole) derives from the Latin polus, which in its turn comes from the
Greek polos (= pivot, axis, sky), i.e. an obvious case of polysemy.
44
1.3.2
Meaning-meaning relations: Congruence
The relations established among the meanings of individual lexical
items can be viewed as relations of congruence, in which case there
are four main types of sense relations (after Cruse, 1986: 86-88):
•
•
•
•
cognitive synonymy, i.e. identity of meaning
hyponymy, i.e. inclusion of meaning
compatibility, i.e. overlap of meaning
incompatibility, i.e. disjunction (exclusion) of meaning
Schematically, this can be represented in the following way:
Synonymy
Hyponymy
Compatibility
Incompatibility
Synonymy has already been discussed in the previous section.
Compatibility of meaning is the semantic relation that exists
between two items which have some features in common (some of
their traits overlap), as in dog – pet (some dogs are pets, but not
all/not only dogs are pets); or snake – poisonous animal (some
snakes are poisonous; but not all/not only snakes are poisonous).
The intuition of the language user and his knowledge of the world
enable him to identify such cases easily.
Therefore, in this section we shall focus on the other two types
of congruence relations: on hyponymy and incompatibility.
Hyponymy and incompatibility can be represented as
taxonomies, i.e. hierarchies organised in the form of tree
structures (Cruse, 1986: 88-92).
1.3.2.1
Hyponymy
Hyponymy designates a relation of semantic inclusion of one
meaning into another, as in animal – horse (i.e. the horse is ranged
among animals); fruit – apple (i.e. an apple is a kind of fruit); to
go – to walk (i.e. walking is a type of going); etc. The ‘includer’ is
called supernym, while the elements included are its hyponyms.
45
46
o
Thus, for example, the relationship between the word colour,
and the range red, blue, yellow, green, etc., can be schematically
represented in the taxonomy:
colour
red
blue
yellow
green
etc.
where the term colour functions as supernym for red, blue, yellow,
green, etc., which are its hyponyms.
The co-hyponyms of a term are incompatible, i.e. they are
mutually exclusive (an object is either red, or blue, or yellow, …).
Taxonomic organisation can be developed along several levels.
Thus, animal is the supernym of bird, of mammal and of fish. In
their turn, these words have their own hyponyms, e.g. sparrow,
nightingale, etc. – for bird, horse, dog, etc. – for mammal,
sturgeon, salmon, etc. – for fish, etc. Schematically, this appears as:
animal
bird
mammal
fish
horse
dog sturgeon salmon
In this taxonomy, the supernym (animal) is the superordinate
term, bird, mammal and fish are the interordinate elements,
while the hyponyms (sparrow, nightingale, horse, dog, sturgeon,
salmon) are the subordinate elements.
1.3.2.2
o
Incompatibility
Incompatibility (or disjunction of meaning) involves the
exclusion of one meaning by another due to a clash between the
semantic features of the items compared.
It is important to perceive the difference that exists between
oppositeness of meanings and opposition of meaning.
Conceptually, oppositeness of meaning can be:
latent, i.e. the semantic field to which the words belong
contains other members beside the two named, e.g. Friday –
as opposed to Monday, or Wednesday, etc.; yellow – as
opposed to green, or blue, or pink; etc.;
patent, i.e. the members of a binary pair divide the semantic
field exclusively, e.g. boy – girl; big – small; buy – sell; come
– go; fast – slow; male – female; dead – alive; etc.
Latent opposites illustrate oppositeness of meaning: they
are contrary (i.e. incompatible), but not contradictory – as are the
co-hyponyms of any supernym: terms such as dog – horse;
sparrow – nightingale; red – blue; blue – yellow, blue – green; are
mutually incompatible because they have nothing in common
except their supernym.
Conversely, patent opposites involve opposition of meaning,
i.e. they are contradictory and mutually exclusive. While
oppositeness can be established among several items, opposition
of meaning involves binary pairs (two elements).
Opposition of meaning is a paradoxical phenomenon, because
it involves simultaneously both similarity and difference. The
opposite members of a group differ along one dimension, and are
identical along all the other. For example, in the binary pair man –
woman, the feature that differs is [±MALE], while the features
[HUMAN] and [ADULT] are common. Or, in the pair girl – woman,
the feature that differs is [±ADULT], while the features [HUMAN]
and [-MALE] are common.
There are two types of patent opposites:
sparrow nightingale etc.
gradables (or antonyms), i.e. the kind of opposition which
accepts degrees of contrast, e.g. fast – slow; easy – difficult;
much – little; well – badly; terms which denote degrees of
length, weight, speed; etc.
non-gradables (or complementaries), i.e. opposites
(mostly verbs or adjectives) which ‘divide some conceptual
domain to which they belong into two mutually exclusive
compartments, so that what does not fall into one
compartment, falls into the other’ (Cruse 1986: 198), e.g.
dead – alive; come – go; male – female, succeed – fail; true –
false; in front of – behind; etc.
In other words, the difference between
complementaries consists in the fact that:
o
o
antonyms
and
antonyms are defined in terms of more or less, e.g. the
passage from easy or difficult, or from slow to fast, moves
through a wide range of intermediary degrees
complementaries are defined in terms of either … or, e.g. a
person can be either dead or alive, either male of female,
either single or married, etc.
47
In practice, however, the term ‘antonym’ is used generically,
to refer to both types of patent opposites.
There are also cases of lexical triplets: e.g. learn – remember
– forget; earn – save – spend; etc.
Lexically and grammatically, opposites can be:
•
•
radical, i.e. expressed by different lexical units, e.g. boy – girl;
beautiful – ugly; to succeed – to fail; to drop – to pick up; etc.
affixal, i.e. expressed by words that have the same root, to
which a negative affix is added, e.g. happy – unhappy; to
trust – to distrust; moral – immoral; useful – useless; etc.
Grammatical antonymy can be established between:
o
o
grammatical forms, e.g. taller – shorter; I know – I don’t know
grammatical categories: of tense (Present vs. Past Tense: I
have – I had); of voice (active vs. passive: It says – It is
said); of number (singular vs. plural: cat – cats); etc.
Just like synonymy, opposition of meaning can be established
not only between single words (e.g. to love – to hate; good –
bad), but also between single words and phrases (e.g. ugly – a joy
to look at), or between two phrases (e.g. to come into being – to
vanish from the face of the earth). This is because opposition is
not established between the lexical items themselves, but between
their meanings. Some antonyms are context-free, expressing
opposition in any possible context (e.g. north – south, above –
below, to buy – to sell, beautiful – ugly; child – adult; etc.).
However, given the high polysemy of English words, as well as the
complexity of language use, there is no simple straightforward
answer to the question ‘What is the antonym of …?’.
For example, the word nice has become, through overuse, a
cliché lacking precision and intensity, so that it has numerous
meanings, and each meaning has its own antonym(s): 1. = pretty
– ant. ugly; 2. = delicate – ant. gross; 3. = elegant – ant. sloppy;
4. = pleasant – ant. unpleasant, disagreeable; 5. = amiable – ant.
unfriendly; 6. = tactful – ant. tactless; 7. = suitable – ant.
unsuitable, improper; etc.
Moreover, the opposition is often merely contextual: the
antonym of man can be woman in one context (distinctive feature
[±MALE]), and boy in another (distinctive feature [±ADULT]), and
even horse (e.g. I can’t do all that work alone, I’m a man, not a
horse!), in which case the feature of distinction is [±HUMAN]. This
last example also illustrates pragmatic opposition of meaning.
48
We should also mention a rich bulk of cultural antonymy. The
sources of such pragmatically antonymic pairs can be the Bible
(Adam and Eve; Cain and Abel), folk mythology (the Sun and the
Moon; the cat and the mouse; the wolf and the lamb), literature
(the ant and the grasshopper – La Fontaine; the prince and the
pauper – Mark Twain; red and black – Stendhal); etc.
1.3.3 Normality relations: Consonance and dissonance
The meaning of a lexical item gains its significance in ‘the full set
of normality relations which a lexical item contracts with all
conceivable contexts’ (Cruse, 1986: 16).
Syntagmatic relations between lexical items can be
characterized as consonant (i.e. normal, as in He went to sleep)
or dissonant (i.e. anomalous, as in *He woke up to sleep.)
The consonance or dissonance of an utterance depends on the
syntactic and semantic affinity that exists among its elements.
Consonant lexical relations abide by the rules of grammatical
and semantic well-formedness; dissonant ones break them.
Normality is not an either-or phenomenon; rather, we perceive
degrees of normality, i.e. an utterance is felt to be more-or-less
consonant or dissonant.
Since consonance follows the road of logic, it would seem
natural that it should characterize much of the linguistic output of
ordinary communicators. And yet, linguistic dissonance (anomaly)
is by no means an isolated phenomenon.
1.3.3.1
Lexical consonance
Lexical consonance illustrates lexical normality. Utterances, such
as, He is walking to school, or The cat drinks milk, abide by the
rules of conceptual well-formedness: he ([+HUMAN]) can perform
the act of walking, and to school names a logical destination for
the act of walking; or, a [+ANIMATE] noun, such as cat, can
collocate with a verb denoting feeding (drink), which in its turn
requires a noun denoting liquid food (e.g. milk).
But even among apparently consonant (grammatically and
semantically well-formed) sentences, there are some which break
the rules of straightforward communication by being more or less
anomalous.
Ambiguity is the most obvious type of consonant utterances
whose meaning is less than clear. Ambiguity respects not only
49
grammatical, but also semantic well-formedness; and yet, the
message is far from straightforward or obvious.
The main sources of ambiguity can be lexical or grammatical.
a. Lexical ambiguity relies on form-meaning relations, i.e. on
polysemy or homonymy. The apparent similarity (of form)
conceals an actual difference (of meaning), so that several
possible interpretations are possible. That is why, ambiguity is also
called double meaning.
Polysemantic words and phrases may trigger ambiguity if
their context is not sufficiently informative: e.g. We had a row last
night can mean either ‘We had a fight,’ or ‘We went rowing.’ Or,
They made up, can signify either ‘They made peace,’ or ‘They put
cosmetics on their faces.’
Homonymy can also trigger multiple interpretations,
especially in oral communication. In spoken language, for
example, there is no difference between mare (= female horse)
and mayor (= elected leader of a town), and the listener who
hears the sentence I saw the mare/mayor, will need further
context to understand whether the speaker is talking about a
human being or an animal. Similarly, on hearing the utterance,
The sun’s/son’s up, the listener will not know whether the speaker
is referring to the star in the sky, or to the male child of the
family. But in communication, the context (either linguistic or
situational) will provide the necessary clues.
In ordinary speech, ambiguity is often accidental, i.e. the
speaker does not realize that his utterance is not clear. For
example, in Customers have a right to clear information, the word
clear can be interpreted as an adjective, in which case the utterance
means ‘Customers have a right to receive unambiguous information,’
or as a verb, which triggers the reading ‘Customers have a right to
erase information.’ Our knowledge of the world helps us to
disambiguate such utterances: in this case, the context being
customers’ rights, it tells us that the correct reading is the first one.
Ambiguity (or double meaning) is also an important figurative
device (see section 2.2.2.2.3.2 – False homology), but in that case
the ambiguity is intentional.
b. Grammatical (or syntactic) ambiguity relies on the capacity
of English words to belong to different grammatical categories
without any formal change.
Thus, for instance, in I saw her duck, the word duck can be
interpreted as a noun (i.e. I saw her (toy) animal), or as a verb
(i.e. I saw her perform the action of stooping/bending suddenly).
50
Or, an Italian pizza parlour can be interpreted as
offering Italian pizza (in which case, Italian pizza
compound Modifier for the Head parlour), or as a
owned by an Italian boss (in which case, Italian
Modifier for the compound Head pizza parlour).
1.3.3.2
a restaurant
functions as
pizza parlour
functions as
Lexical dissonance
Lexical dissonance results when there is ‘a semantic clash between
two or more lexical items in the same sentence (or discourse)’
(Cruse, 1986:106).
A dissonant sentence can be:
•
inappropriate, for reasons of:
o collocation, i.e. the clash results from semantic cooccurrence restrictions, e.g. *The professor was deeply
handsome is anomalous because handsome does not
collocate with deeply (although, in the collocation deeply
touched, deeply means ‘very’); the correct collocation of
handsome is the adverb very, i.e. very handsome.
o stylistic, i.e. the clash is due to the co-occurrence of
diverse stylistic levels, e.g. *The professor was very cute is
dissonant in terms of formality requirements: the highly
formal noun professor clashes with the colloquial adjective
cute; a formal adjective (e.g. handsome) is required here.
•
tautologous/pleonastic, i.e. the breach of selectional
restrictions triggers redundant and uninformative utterances:
o tautologous constructs are grammatically well formed,
but semantically redundant: e.g. sentences such as I am
my wife’s husband, or The orphan has no parents, etc.
have no meaning to communicate.
o the semantic anomaly of the pleonasm is also caused by
redundancy. In *married wife; *young infant; *rich
millionaire; *more preferable; *He descended down the
stairs; etc. the clashing terms are synonymous, or one is a
hyponym of the other: wife carries the feature
[+MARRIED]; infant is by definition [+YOUNG]; a
millionaire is by definition [+RICH]1; to descend already
carries the semantic feature [DOWN]; etc.
The difference between the two categories is that,
while tautologous constructions are merely uninformative,
1
Although not in a country where there is monetary inflation.
•
•
51
pleonastic ones are semantically non-wellformed, i.e.
mistakes not to be uttered by educated speakers.
And yet, in English we come across some idiomatic
phrases that are pleonastic and still perfectly correct,
e.g. to gather together, to live a happy life, to dream a
wonderful dream, etc.
paradoxical, e.g. *a male aunt; *a married bachelor; to
sleep awake; to fall upwards; The widow has a husband,
etc.
If tautology and pleonasm rely on synonymy, the
paradox results from opposition of meaning, and from a
clash between the semantic features of the elements. Thus,
male clashes with the [-MALE] trait carried by aunt, just as
married clashes with the [-MARRIED] feature inherent in the
word bachelor; the term awake is by definition [-SLEEP],
which cannot collocate with the [+SLEEP] trait carried by
the verb; to fall is by definition a movement downwards,
which clashes semantically with the adverb upwards; widow
automatically involves [-HUSBAND]; etc.
incongruous, e.g. a hungry word; to drink air; a square
ball; The widow’s husband is sleeping; etc.
Incongruity, viewed as semantic anomaly caused by
logical irrationality, results from breaching semantic
selectional restrictions and, at the same time, breeching the
laws of nature. Thus, word is an abstract notion, while
hungry is a state restricted to living beings; a ball is by
definition round, so that a square ball is logically absurd; a
widow does not have a husband, so that logically there is
nobody to perform the act of sleeping; etc.
And yet, in language use, we often come across
instances of conceptual anomaly. Consider the example, She
spits fire: spit is by definition liquid, and no fire can come
out of a living being’s mouth. But the semantically
competent language user knows that neither spit not fire
should be taken at face value, i.e. that the phrase as a
whole has a figurative/metaphorical meaning (= to be very
angry, to scream and shout at everybody around).
52
1.3.4
Truth-conditional semantics
Truth-conditional semantics surveys relations of meaning that
arise between two elements of a phrase or sentence, or between
individual sentences, in terms of their truthfulness or falsehood, as
perceived by the intuition of native speakers.
According to Leech (1981: 73-78), the basic truth-conditional
sense relations are:
a. Synonymy
X is synonymous with Y
Truth condition: if X is true, Y is true
Also: if X is false, Y is false
For example1:
I am a married woman
is synonymous with
I am a woman who has a husband
As shown before, synonymy is based on sameness of meaning;
in the example above, a married woman is pragmatically
synonymous with woman who has a husband. Therefore, if I am a
married woman is true, then the statement I am a woman who
has a husband is also true. Or, if the former statement is false, the
latter is also false.
b. Tautology
X is a tautology
Truth condition: X is invariably true
For example:
This widow has no husband
Tautology relies on redundancy of meaning by inclusion of two
synonymous expressions within the same sentence, e.g. widow is
synonymous with having no husband. The act of conveying the
same meaning twice (under different forms) makes the sentence
redundant and void of meaning. Consequently, the tautology is
invariably true: in this case, the truth of being a widow
semantically implies the truth of her having no husband.
c. Contradiction
X is a contradiction
Truth condition: X is invariably false
1
After Leech, 1981: Chapter 5.
53
For example:
The widow has a husband
Contradiction is based on opposition of meaning, on the
inclusion of two antonymous items within the same phrase,
sentence or text, e.g. widow and has a husband. In terms of truth
condition, contradiction is the opposite of the tautology and is
invariably false: if the fact that the person is a widow is true, then
her having a husband is false, and vice-versa.
d. Presupposition
X presupposes Y
Also, if the negation of X is true, Y is true
For example:
My husband is (not) at home
presupposes
I have a husband
Presupposition, defined by Grice as non-controversial
information, refers to some piece of information that the speaker
presents as known and likely to be accepted as such by the
hearer. Thus, for example, the sentence My husband is at home
presents the fact that the speaker has a husband as a given, noncontroversial fact, i.e. presupposed to be true. After such a
statement there is no need to ask the speaker whether she has a
husband or not.
In terms of truth condition, if the assertion, My husband is at
home is true, then the fact that she has a husband is also true. In
addition, if the first statement negated is true (i.e. … is not at home),
the latter statement is still true (i.e. she still has a husband).
e. Entailment
X entails Y
Also: if Y is false, X is false
For example:
entails
I have a husband
Entailment1 is based on hyponymy (i.e. meaning inclusion) and/or
on logical consequence. In the example above, having a husband is
1
To entail = to cause or involve by necessity or as a consequence: This
project will entail a lot of work (Webster).
54
included by definition in the idea of being a married woman, so that I
have a husband logically involves that I am a married woman. In
terms of truth condition, if I am a married woman is true, then I have
a husband is also true, and vice-versa, if I am a married woman is
false, then I have a husband is also false.
f. Inconsistency
X is inconsistent with Y
Truth condition: if X is true, Y is false
Also: if Y is true, X is false
For example:
is inconsistent with
I have no husband
Inconsistency is based on incompatibility of meaning and stands
at the opposite end to entailment because the truth of one assertion
automatically contradicts the truth of the other. Thus, if the assertion
I am a married woman is true, then the statement I have no husband
is automatically false; conversely, if the former statement is false,
then the latter must be true.
g. Semantic anomaly
X is semantically anomalous
Truth condition: X is absurd because it presupposes a
contradiction
For example:
The widow’s husband is sleeping
Semantic anomaly is also based on opposition of meaning, in the
sense that it implies a clash between the semantic features of the
individual items brought together within the same sentence. In the
example above, for instance, there is a clash between the [HUSBAND] feature of widow and the assertion that her husband (i.e.
[+HUSBAND]) is sleeping. In terms of truth condition, such a
statement is logically absurd: it makes no sense to ask whether the
widow has a husband or not.
Obviously, on the pragmatic level, many of the above cases are
manipulated and exploited strategically so as to convey additional
meanings. Such manipulations will be discussed in more detail in later
sections and chapters, e.g. section 2.2 – Figurative speech, section
7.3.2 – Flouting the maxims, etc.
56
Chapter 2
Lexical innovation
Language is a living thing, always changing;
old words die, new words come in. Some
constructions gradually fall out of use,
others push their way in. The English of
today is not quite the same as the English of
the 18th century; the English of King Alfred
could not be understood at all by
Englishmen of today. What was good
grammar for Shakespeare could be bad
grammar for Shaw.1
2.1
Neologisms and lexical creativity
Language is a living organism, a body that grows and changes
constantly. A person who does not care about reading and
education has a limited vocabulary, sufficient to cover his limited
life experience and needs; in the same way, the language of
primitive (e.g. tribal) peoples is restricted. The more the person
experiences and learns, the richer his vocabulary becomes; in the
same way, the lexicon of a great civilization, such as that of the
British, requires a vast vocabulary to cover the rich life experience
and eventful past of the people who speak the language.
It is generally recognised that English has a very rich word
stock, probably the richest of all languages. Still, it is not equipped
to cope with all situations: the world is undergoing dramatic
changes at a very fast rate, and new terms are required to cover
the developments that occur in various fields, e.g. politics,
economy, or science.
As a result, large numbers of neologisms2 are introduced in
the language almost daily and, thanks to modern mass
1
2
Eckersley, Essential English for Foreign Students, vol. 3, Lesson 15.
Leech (1981) uses the term neologism in a restricted sense, i.e. as
resulting from the techniques of word formation; in its more general
acceptance, the term includes recent loans, too.
communication, they become familiar to many people in a very
short time; a few terms become archaic1 or die out altogether; still
others receive new meanings.
All events of importance in the development of the world need
to be named and discussed. To accommodate those needs,
speakers of the language resort to various techniques of lexical
creativity. Consequently, the language changes gradually, in
accordance with its inner linguistic laws, and under the impact of
other civilizations and languages.
There are three main types of lexical innovation:
•
•
•
borrowing, i.e. ‘importing’ or ‘loaning’ words from other
languages
word formation, i.e. creating new words from words or
particles already existing in the language
change of meaning, i.e. derivation of new senses from
established lexical items
Of the three types, only change of meaning belongs strictly to
the field of semantics. But since all linguistic innovation is
accompanied by certain semantic change, a brief survey of the
techniques and effects of borrowing and of word formation is also
justified in this context.
The first part of this chapter aims to present in a nutshell the
reasons, sources and techniques of lexical borrowing and of word
building, as well as the process by which new words and phrases
are gradually assimilated by the lexicon. The third type of lexical
creativity, change of meaning, represents the subject of the second
part of the chapter.
2.1.1 Development of the English language: Loan words
The development of a language is closely linked to that of the way
its users live and think, and it also mirrors the most important
events in its history.
The vocabulary of contemporary English contains words
borrowed from a wide range of languages spoken all over the
world. These entered the English language either directly (e.g. as
a result of the domination of England by another nation), or
indirectly (e.g. through literature or philosophy, economic or
1
Their usage is restricted to texts related to historical or mythological subjects.
57
political contacts, colonial occupation, etc.). The amount of
borrowings (or loans1) in the English vocabulary is extremely high.
The English language of today is based on the Germanic language
brought over from the continent, in the 5th and 6th century, by the
Anglo-Saxon tribes which settled here.
Leviţchi (1970: 32-33) shows that only 35% of the
contemporary English vocabulary can be traced back to AngloSaxon, the remaining 75% being non-Germanic. Nevertheless,
words of Anglo-Saxon origin hold first place: they are widely
represented in the basic word stock, as they name things related
to basic human needs, activities and relationships, such as:
parts of the body: hand, foot, arm, ankle, nose, finger, etc.
household terms: house, home, floor, door, land, etc.
family relationships: father, mother, brother, daughter, son, etc.
common animals: cow, horse, hound, sheep, swine, etc.
common adjectives: good, small, long, old, new, etc.
common verbs: have, eat, go, drink, speak, see, etc.
Furthermore, the frequency of occurrence and circulation in
the language of Old English words is very high: compare the usage
of get, drink, hand or good, with words of non-Germanic origin,
such as industry, entertainment, location or determination.
Apart from the Germanic element, four other elements are
widely represented in contemporary English: Latin, Scandinavian,
Greek and French.
Latin words entered the English vocabulary in successive
waves: during the Roman occupation of Britain – when English
acquired words such as port or caster, or later, beginning with the
6th century, when Christianity was introduced in Britain – when
English borrowed words related to the religious service (candle,
disciple, minister), but also to domestic life (cook, beet, plant).
Due to their long history and wide usage, such words are not
perceived as alien to speakers of English. Later Latin words, e.g.
those borrowed during the Renaissance (appropriate, conspicuous,
external, malignant, monopoly, temperature, etc.), sound more
sophisticated and learned, so that they are employed mainly in
formal speech.
The Scandinavian occupation of England had a great impact
on the language. With large numbers of Scandinavians (Danes,
1
Loan-word: a word in one language that has been borrowed from
another language and usu. naturalized (Webster).
58
Norwegians, Swedes, Icelanders) settling in England in those days,
today more than 1400 places in England bear Scandinavian
names.
Scandinavian words have been easily accepted into English, as
Scandinavian languages are also Germanic. Moreover, many words
(e.g. folk, house, life, sorrow, can, better, full, under, well, wise),
were identical in both Old English and Old Icelandic. That is why
plenty of Scandinavian words became part of the English basic
word stock: nouns (anger, crook, crop, guest, knife, link, trust,
window); adjectives (happy, ill, low, odd, ugly); verbs (call, cast,
clip, cut, die, hit, happen, lift, seem, take): etc.
The Greek element is widely represented in the scientific
vocabulary, and Greek words entered the English vocabulary
mainly during the Revival of Learning. Since Greek words have an
almost unlimited power to form compounds and derivatives, Greek
has given birth to a great number of technical and scientific terms.
For example, in the field of linguistics: lexicology (lexicon/lexikos
= word; logos = word, proposition, teaching); etymology (etymon
= literal sense of a word); neologism (neo = new); homonym
(homos = the same; onyma/onoma = name); homophone (homos
= the same; phone = sound); homograph (homos = the same;
graphein = to write). We can also add: biology, geology,
philosophy, encephalitis, gastritis, etc. The list shows clearly that
words of Greek origin are internationally used: the Romanian
equivalents, for instance, look quite similar, though there may be
significant differences in pronunciation.
Thus, Latin, Greek and Scandinavian contributed to enriching
the English vocabulary considerably. But the element that affected
English the most was the Norman-French element; its effect was
so consistent that it almost reversed the Germanic character of the
language.
The Norman-French domination of England – which lasted for
almost three centuries – can be viewed as the conquest of a whole
people by another. The English had no king (Edward had died on
the battlefield) and no nobility (most English nobles had perished
at Hastings – 1066). William the Conqueror crowned himself king
of England and brought in a new nobility from Normandy.
Obviously, French was imposed as official language in the country,
to be used at court and in all official occasions, so that speaking
French became a key element to obtaining high positions and
important jobs. But the language of the villagers and of the lower
classes remained English.
59
During the 12th century, though, the need to communicate
with the majority of the local population induced many members of
the ruling classes to learn English, too, so that a massive part of
the population was bilingual.
The domination of one nation by another led to a merging of
the resources of the two vocabularies and to far-reaching effects
on the language of the dominated nation. With the number of
French words which gained access into the English vocabulary
between 1200 and 1500, the English vocabulary was almost
doubled.
The French loans of those times were largely accepted in the
basic word stock of English. They cover all domains of human life:
food terms (appetite, dinner, beef, mutton, poultry, sugar,
sausage); household words (chair, lamp, curtain, towel, blanket);
family relations (uncle, aunt, cousin, nephew); colours (blue,
scarlet, brown); church terms (religion, baptism, sermon, clergy);
war terms (battle, victory, defeat, army, peace, enemy); nature
terms (mountain, summit, river, lake, flower); learned terms
(study, grammar, literature, surgeon, stomach, anatomy);
government terms (parliament, chancellor, administration, reign,
tyrant, court, minister, rebel, traitor, treason, liberty); etc.
By 1200, though, English was back in common use and,
towards 1500, French was cancelled out in England.
The Norman-French occupation of England imposed the last direct
influence upon English. Nevertheless, influences pressuring the
language did not cease to occur. They may have been indirect and
more elusive, but some no less powerful.
The Renaissance meant great interest in the products of Italy
and France, where man’s spiritual revival had produced material
and spiritual goods of unequalled value. The great interest in
music and literature, the translation of the great literary works of
Greek and Roman antiquity, as well as of the masterpieces of the
Italian and French Renaissance, and even of lesser but highly
popular contemporary French novels, was accompanied by a
massive influx of Italian loans (related mostly to fine arts and
entertainment: carnival, concert, opera, sonnet, soprano) and
French loans (belonging mostly to aristocratic culture and fashion:
ballet, coquette, façade, naive, restaurant, etc.).
While old Italian and French loans have been fully assimilated
by the English language, most Italian and French words borrowed
after 1500 sound sophisticated or specialized, e.g. haute couture,
entrepreneur, pasta, graffiti, etc.
60
On the other hand, ever since the Renaissance, fearless sailors
set out to conquer the seas and discover new lands, thus pushing
the limits of geographical boundaries. America, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, India, Egypt and South Africa were, for longer or
shorter periods of time, among the prize possessions of the English
crown. With the expansion of the English colonial system, English
began to be spoken in widely distant areas of the world.
Colonial expansion, and later on, the gradual globalization of
the world, meant not only the imposition of English in far away
places, but also a confrontation with new cultures and ideas, which
in its turn triggered a continuous influx of new loans. As a result,
the English vocabulary of today contains words of the most varied
origins:
Italian: confetti, don, graffiti, Mafia, pasta, pizza, spaghetti, etc.
French: chic, divorcée, fiancée, lingerie, début (in society), etc.
Spanish & Portuguese: barricade, cannibal, chocolate, embargo,
guerrilla, guitar, hurricane, macho, potato, ranch, etc.
German: Blitzkrieg, iceberg, mumps, quartz, swindler, waltz, etc.
Scandinavian: cruise, yacht, landscape, etc.
Russian loans: intelligentsia, Soviet, sputnik, troika, glasnost, etc.
Persian & Arabic: ayatollah, bazaar, caravan, coffee, dervis(h),
emir, fatwa, fellah, harem, jackal, Imam, sheik, etc.
Japanese: kamikaze, hara-kiri, sushi, tycoon, karaoke, etc.
East Asian (Chinese, Indian, Malay): amuck, bamboo,
bungalow, gong, jungle, ketchup, pyjama, shampoo, thug, etc.
Australian: boomerang, dingo, kangaroo, etc.
North-American Indian: moccasin, tomahawk, wigwam, shaman, etc.
miscellaneous: anorak (Greenlandic), robot (Czech), safari
(Swahili), taboo (Fijian), voodoo (West African), etc.
The recent loans – which mirror in the vocabulary some
important international events (e.g. Intifada, Perestroika, Taliban)
– attest the fact that borrowing is still highly productive.
Sometimes foreign words gain access into the target
vocabulary by way of translation. For example, the English word
homesickness, is a translation loan from the German word
‘Heimweh’ (Heim = home; weh = pain, sorrow); masterpiece comes
from ‘Meisterstuck’, place in the sun from ‘Platz in der Sonne’; refusenik
is a partial translation from Russian, meaning a Soviet citizen who has
been denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union; etc.
In numerous cases, loans triggered misunderstandings and/or
mispronunciations, causing instances of folk etymology or corruption.
61
Folk etymology is the process by which the form of a foreign
word/phrase is reshaped so as to resemble a word/phrase in the
mother tongue.
Folk etymology may be based on people’s desire to show off.
For instance, in their desire to gain access into high society, many
Englishmen pretended they could speak French. In fact, they
adapted the French phrases they heard to something that was
familiar to them. This is how ‘ça ne fait rien’ became Fairy Ann and
asparagus turned into sparrow-grass; etc. Misinterpretation is also
the reason why the German population of Pennsylvania is called
the Pennsylvania Dutch: as the Germans pronounced the word
‘Deutch’ (= German) [dait∫], the local inhabitants thought it was
[d^t∫] (i.e. Dutch).
Folk etymology can work via translation, e.g. humerus (= the
shoulder bone) was interpreted as ‘humorous’ and translated as
funny bone.
Folk etymology can also convey a specific attitude: e.g. a
riding path in Hype Park was originally named Route de Roi; to
show their contempt for the ‘foreign lingo,’ the English rephrased it
as Rotten Row.
Corruption is closely related to folk etymology, but in this case
speakers simply invent words/phrases which sound like those in
the foreign language.
For example, the French ‘il n’y a plus’ became na-poo in
English, and ‘quelque chose’ turned into kickshaw. In the same
way, Romanians have created blugi (< blue jeans), obsaid (<
offside), henţ (< hands), ghem (< game), etc.
Corruption is mostly the field of the uneducated. And yet,
there are instances of corrupted words that have entered the basic
word stock, e.g. the French card game ‘jeu parti’ (involving
danger) was assimilated as jeopardy in English, a noun meaning
‘risk of or exposure to loss, harm, death, or injury, etc.’; later, it
produced the verb to jeopardize.
Today English is a source, rather than a receptacle of new words.
Although England is no longer a great colonial empire, English is
still the most influential language in the world. Today, a quarter of
the world’s population speaks English and about 80% of the
electronically stocked information is in English. This also means
that English loans represent a massive source of enrichment for
many languages. For example, Romanian has borrowed countless
English loans in the field of economy (management, marketing),
62
computers (maus, PC, laptop), the mass media and advertising
(target, spot publicitar, un trend ascendent), cosmetics (spray,
makeup, gloss de buze) or sport (henţ, fault, aut), etc.
In the olden days, English words and phrases generally
originated from British English. Nowadays, it is American English
which contributes most consistently to enriching world-wide
English.
The turning point was, probably, World War II, when the
freedom-searching nations of the world united against a common
enemy and the U.S.A took on the leading role. In the decades
after the war, American popular culture fast established itself as the
dominating world power, and languages also accepted the new
influence.
Among the main reasons for the wide influence of American
English today we can mention:
o
o
o
o
the magnitude of the publishing industry in the U.S.A.
the amount and influence of the American mass media
the world-wide appeal of American popular culture, language
and habits
the international political and economic position of the U.S.A.
Thus, for example, the emergence of new media after World
War II established powerful channels for the American way of life
and popular culture to advertise itself. Thanks to the influence of
television, of movies, and – nowadays – of the interactive media,
the U.S.A. has become the major factor of influence. As a result,
the changes in the English language today are mostly determined
by the changes that occur in American English.
Some governments or academies reject loans and insist that new
words should be coined in the country’s own language, or that the
terms should be translated into the mother tongue (translation
loans). The Germans and the French generally abide by this rule:
German has coined the word Fernsehe (fern = distance; sehen =
to see) for television and Fahrrad (fahren = to travel; Rad =
wheel) for bicycle. The French introduced ordinateur for computer
and translated mouse as souris.
In the Romanian government, there was also a powerful trend
against the massive influx of English loans, its supporters insisting
that the foreign terms should be translated. But the attempt was
forced into failure, mostly by the furious reaction of the public who
considered that you cannot translate properly computer
terminology, or words related to business, marketing or
63
management, etc. They also insisted that the Romanian language
could not produce such brief and suggestive terms as fast-food,
pet shop or drive-in.
Although the former insistence of the Romanian government
comes against the natural tendency of the language to develop,
there are several aspects about the way Romanians borrow new
words that should ring a warning bell:
a tendency to use the foreign (English) term even when there
is a perfectly valid Romanian correspondent: bodyguard – pază
de corp; popcorn – floricele; target – scop; trend – current; etc.
numerous cases of corruption: obsaid; henţ; blugi; sticksuri; etc.
funny/stupid adaptations: zumăm (< zoom in/out), upgradăm
computerul (combining Romanian and English pronunciation);
aplicăm pentru un post (< to apply); Vino la show-roomul
Volkswagen să faci un test-drive; etc.
by readily accepting foreign terms, speakers become passive
imitators and relinquish any attempt to linguistic creativity.
2.1.2
Word formation
Word formation, i.e. the ‘formation
bases’ (Bauer: 1983: 33), is one of
linguistic creativity. It is also a major
vocabulary.
Let us survey briefly the most
techniques of word formation.
2.1.2.1
64
e.g. happy (adj.) – un.happy (adj.); kind (adj.) – un.kind (adj.),
understand (vb.) – mis.understand (vb.), etc. A few prefixes are class
changing, e.g. a-: sleep (n.) -asleep (adj.); be-: witch (n.) –
bewitch (vb.), en-: slave (n.) – enslave (vb.); mis-: take (vb.) –
mistake (n.), etc.
Suffixes can be grammatical (e.g. –s, -ed, -ing), in which
case they are called inflections; this category, however, does not
pertain to word formation. Lexical (or derivational) suffixes, on
the other hand, carry meanings, e.g. prefixes, such as un-, a-, i-,
mis-, and the suffix -less express a negative meaning. Appended
to smaller lexemes (e.g. to roots or stems, as in un.happy.ness),
they give rise to new words whose meaning, and sometimes
grammatical function, is different from the initial one. The various
forms which result by derivation (e.g. form, form.al, form.al.ity,
form.al.ize, etc.) represent the lexeme’s derivational paradigm.
Affixes can be analysed according to various criteria. In the
present context, though, we shall focus on the meaning they convey:
of new lexemes from given
the most popular types of
source of enrichment of the
popular and/or productive
Derivation, deflection, back formation
Derivation (also called affixation) represents a highly productive
technique of word formation.
Words such as and, if, talk or book are simplex: they cannot
be broken down into constituent segments. But terms, such as
selfishness or unhappiness are made up of a root (the ultimate
indivisible segmental portion of the word, common to the entire
paradigm), a stem/base (the word form that remains after
removing the last affix, e.g. the base of the word use.less.ly is
useless) and affixes (the lexical or grammatical elements that can
be placed at the beginning of a word, i.e. prefixes, or at its end,
i.e. suffixes).
Most prefixes are class maintaining, i.e. they change the
meaning of the word without influencing its morphological status:
negative: a- (apolitical); i-/im-/irr-/ill- (immoral, impossible,
irregular, illiterate); dis- (dissatisfied); mis- (misfortune); un(uneasy); -less (cloudless); etc.
a numerical information: bi- (binoculars); tri- (tricycle);
multi- (multimedia); -some (threesome); etc.
endowed with a certain quality: -ful (beautiful); -ed (blueeyed); -ish (boyish); -ly (friendly); etc.
the doer of an action (agent nouns): -er (worker, writer); etc.
a state: -dom (freedom); -hood (childhood); -ness
(calmness); etc.
a process: -ment (movement); -ion (erosion); etc.
a system or philosophy, adherent to a system or philosophy: -ism
(Darwinism); -ist (socialist, realist); etc.
a type of discourse: -ese (journalese, legalese, officialese); etc.
derogatory, deprecatory: -ling (weakling); -eer (profiteer);
-art (braggart); -ster (dumster); etc.
diminutival suffixes: -let (budlet); -y (doggy); -ette (kitchenette).
Affixation is highly productive today, as the following random
list of ‘new words’ suggests: ageism, destatisation, faxable,
flavoursome, launderette, monoskiing, megastar, newmannery,
pre-schooler, redeployment, wellness, singlehood, sportswear,
sub-prime, stardom, vogueing, etc.
Derivation has two interesting ‘variants’: deflection and back
formation.
65
In the case of deflection (or root inflection), the inflection is
placed in the root of the word, by vowel change: blood – to bleed,
full – to fill, food – to feed, hot – heat, long – length, broad –
breadth, wide – width, lose – loss, run – ran, etc. The new words
can belong to the same word class, e.g. sing – sang – sung (vb.)
or to different classes, e.g. sing (vb.) – song (n.). Deflection was
productive in the early days of the English language, but it is no
longer productive at present.
With back formation, the word initial or final sound/syllable is
interpreted1 as an affix and dropped: to donate (< donation); to
televise (< television); to force-land (< forced landing); surreal (<
surrealist); to survey (< surveillance); to harp (< Harpy); to
enthuse (< enthusiasm); to nostalgise (< to indulge in nostalgia);
to baby-sit (< babysitter); to globe-trot (< globe trotter); etc.
2.1.2.2
Conversion
Conversion is related to derivation, but is different from it by the
fact that there is no suffix added, i.e. it is zero-derivation.
Conversion involves using a word that is generally viewed as a
belonging to a certain grammatical category as though it belonged
to another.
Today, conversion is probably the most productive word
formation technique in English. This is largely due to the
analytical character of the language: in the absence of typical
inflections for word classes and categories, the speaker can toss
words around according to his own whims.
The word while, for example, can be a noun (a while ago, or
worth one’s while), a conjunction (He ate while he waited), or a
verb (to while away the hours). Or, the word round is an adjective
in a round ball, a noun in My round is over, a verb in They rounded
up the evidence, an adverb in all year round, a preposition in a
resort visited round the year, etc. (see also section 1.3.1.2 –
Polysemy). Such conversions may sound strange to the learner,
who may have difficulty in finding the predicate of the sentence
such as These buildings house students.
1
In earlier days, back formation was generally based on misinterpretation
of a word-final segment as an affix, e.g. the [ə] sound in the word editor
was mistaken for the suffix –er (as in writer) and dropped, thus producing
the verb to edit. Today, however, the process may be intentional, aimed
at creating new words, e.g. lazy < to laze (in the sun).
66
On the other hand, English is a highly graphical language, in
the sense that many words trigger visual or auditory images that
appeal directly to the senses. For example, in He downed his
whiskey (adverb-to-verb conversion), or He swished by
(interjection-to-verb), you can actually see, respectively, hear the
action described. Obviously, such single-word descriptions are
incomparably more suggestive than ‘He drank up his whiskey’ or
‘He passed by rapidly.’
Easy transfer from one grammatical category to another has
given rise to countless synonymic variants, the different forms
often conveying subtle variations of meaning and style. Writers
and advertisers often exploit conversion for the sake of fun or for
the extra meaning the new words convey. In Three Men in a Boat,
for instance, J.K. Jerome suggests to hotel it, and inn it, and pub
it when you are on a trip and it rains (so much more suggestive
than the straightforward ‘to put up at a hotel or an inn and spend
your time in a pub’). Or, in an advert for clothes, which offers
beautiful ways to weather winter, the noun-verb conversion
accomplishes not only more suggestiveness (in comparison with
‘to get through winter’), but also euphony (alliteration on w makes
the text musical and smooth-flowing).
Among the types of conversion that are common in English we
can mention:
noun to verb: water – to water, bridge – to bridge (a gap),
book – to book (seats), cash – to cash (a cheque), etc.
verb to noun: to hit – a hit, to call – a call, to drive – a drive,
to guess – a guess, to spy – a spy, etc.
adjective to noun: rich – the rich; English – the English; etc.
noun to adjective: a chicken (farm); a trial (match); a gold
(watch); peace (talks); etc.
adjective to verb: better – to better; open – to open; right –
to right (a wrong); etc.
interjection to verb: to zoom in, to swish by, etc.
Compounds and even phrases can also be converted, as in:
noun to verb: network – to network; data-bank – to data-bank; etc.
verb to noun: to broadcast – a broadcast; to show off – a
show off; to drive in – a drive-in; etc.
phrases: also-ran – an also-ran; has-been – a has-been;
good for nothing – a good-for-nothing; etc.
Conversion goes back to Old English and it is so pervasive that
today it is often difficult to say which form is the original and which
67
the converted one. That it is still highly productive is attested by
funny and whimsical IT terms, e.g. Google (a proper noun) is
frequently used as a verb: Let’s Google it up!
2.1.2.3
Composition and blending
Composition – another productive word formation technique –
relies on ‘the formation of new lexemes from two (or more)
potential stems’ (Bauer, 1983: 202).
Unlike free combinations (e.g. a green board, a tall man, a big
tooth), in the case of compounds (e.g. blackboard, gentleman,
Bluetooth) there is a semantic-grammatical fusion between the
original words, roots or stems, the meaning of the compound
being different from that of the individual terms. For example, a
blackboard names an object that is different from that denoted by
the word board: it is used for other purposes (the blackboard is
used in the classroom, for writing on it; ‘boards’ are used for
making furniture). In the same way, a gentleman is not a ‘gentle
man,’ but a man of good breeding or social position, and Bluetooth
is not a tooth that is blue, but ‘an open wireless protocol for
exchanging data over short distances, from fixed and mobile
devices, creating personal area networks (PANs) (Wikipedia).
Graphically, compounds can be spelt in one word (e.g. laptop,
sunflower), they can be hyphenated (e.g. she-wolf, wheel-chair,
make-believe) or spelt separately (e.g. deep structure, cable
television) – there are no definite rules in this respect.
In terms of pronunciation, compounds require a single stress,
on the first syllable (e.g. ’blackboard, ’gentleman), while free
combinations are uttered with two stresses, one for each individual
word (e.g. a ’green ,board, a ’gentle ,man). Nor do compounds
accept determinants, the way free combinations do, e.g. *a very
blackboard and *a really gentleman are non-well-formed, while a
very green board and a really gentle man are accurate.
To illustrate these assertions, let us analyse the title of a
classic Western movie, Seven-Sinners (starring Marlene Dietrich
and John Wayne). At first sight, one may be tempted to interpret it
as ‘seven persons who are sinners.’ But this interpretation is
incorrect: the hyphen indicates that we are facing a compound (to
be pronounced with only one stress [’sevənsinəz]), a noun in the
plural, for which we can derive a singular form – a seven-sinner.
Knowledge of the Bible brings to mind the seven deadly sins, so
68
that we can conclude that a seven-sinner is a person who commits
all the seven deadly sins1.
When homonymy is involved, the situation becomes even
more obvious. For example, the dictionary gives us the adjective
grave (= serious, solemn) and the noun grave (= an excavation
made in the earth in which to bury a dead body). Obviously, the
meaning of ’grave ’men is quite different from that of ’grave men:
not all ’grave ’men are ’grave men.
Every word class can have its compounds.
For example, compound nouns are extremely numerous in
contemporary English. Written with or without a hyphen, or even
as separate words, they have been coined to name entities in the
world that needed a label.
Compound nouns can be made up of: noun + noun
(sunflower, wheel-chair, cow-elephant, manservant, family
planning, flash memory, touchscreen, smartphone, Buckingham
Palace); gerund + noun (fishing-rod, walking stick, driving lessons,
singing bird); noun + verb (birth-control, brain-drain, nosebleed,
sunshine); adjective + noun (blackboard, bluebird, fast-food,
software, double-cross, wisecrack); pronoun + noun (s/he-goat,
she-wolf); verb + noun (breakfast, pushcart, spoilsport, cutthroat); verb + verb (a make-believe, a has-been); adverb + verb
(welcome, upgrade, update, download, overcome); verb + particle
(makeup, drawback, breakthrough, drop-out, stand-by, gobetween); phrase compounds (editor-in-chief, lady-in-waiting,
Handheld Mobile Computers); etc.
Compound adjectives (adverb + adjective: over-qualified,
uptight, cross-modal; adverb + participle: easy-going, self-tanning,
broad-shouldered), etc. or compound verbs (noun + verb: to
brainwash, to shoplift, to breast-feed, to sky-dive; adjective +
verb: to whitewash, to sweet-talk, to bad-mouth, to hot-wire a
car; verb + verb: to typewrite, to freeze-dry, to make do, to dare
say), etc., are almost as numerous and varied.
Phrasal verbs – composed of a main verb and an adverbial
particle (up, off, in, out, through, etc.) – are a variety of
compound verbs. Most monosyllabic verbs of Germanic origin have
given rise to phrasal verbs: to break (down, through, up, etc.); to
call (in, up, off, etc.); to drop (by, in, off, etc.); to get (up, out,
down, away, in, etc.); to take (down, up, off, etc.); etc.
1
The Romanian translation of the title, Şapte păcate capitale, falls far
behind the suggestiveness of the original title: it only mentions the sins,
not the persons who commit them.
69
Some phrasal verbs allow a noun or a pronoun to be inserted
between the verb and particle, e.g. to add (something) up; to
break (something) down; to bring (something) about; to bring
(something) off; etc. Others do not allow the particles to be
separated from the verb, e.g. to break into (a house); to call for
(somebody); to carry on with (something); to catch up with
(somebody); to come across (something); etc.
There are also verbal phrases (e.g. to break loose/free; to
let/leave alone; to get well; to turn bad; etc.). With verbal
phrases, the verb is followed by an adverb or an adjective, which
carries greater semantic weight.
The huge number of phrasal verbs and verbal phrases makes
English highly idiomatic and suggestive, but also a hard nut to
crack for the foreign learner.
Blending takes the device of composition a step further, achieving
a formal fusion of the elements. Blends (also called telescoped or
portmanteau words1) are a category of disguised compounds
where, as Lewis Carroll puts it, ‘there are two meanings packed up
in one word.’
Carroll created several whimsical combinations – e.g. slithe
(slimy + lithe), mimsy (miserable + flimsy), chortle, (snort +
chuckle), or galumph (gallop + triumph) – some of which have
survived to the present day.
Sometimes the constituent elements of such disguised
compounds have blended to such a degree that they are difficult to
distinguish. Among the best known examples of blends we should
mention: smog (smoke + fog), to hustle (hurry + bustle), motel
(motor + hotel), to squash (squeeze + crash), etc. Remember also
the famous Walt Disney movie that delighted our childhood:
Aristocats (aristocratic + cats).
Some more recent blends include: brunch (breakfast + lunch);
camcorder (camera + recorder); celebutante (celebrity +
debutante); Chunnel ([the English] Channel + tunnel); cremains
(cremated + remains); cyborg (cybernetic + organism); dawk
(dove + hawk – with reference to politicians); fantabulous
(fantastic + fabulous); frienemy (friend + enemy); guestimate
(guess + estimate); slanguage (slang + language); etc.
1
The term was coined by Lewis Carroll (Through the Looking Glass, 1872)
to explain some of the words he had made up and used in the nonsense
poem Jabberwocky. Portmanteau is a French term designating a large
carrying case for clothes, hinged in the middle, so that it falls open into
two halves.
70
Blending is also productive in Romanian – think of words such as
aprozar (= aprovizionare + zarzavaturi) or Impex (= import + export).
The process of blending is so suggestive and handy that some
lexemes are being used today as affixes: auto-: autocide =
automobile + suicide; tele-: teleworking = working from home
communicating by computer and fax; (-o/-a)holic: workaholic,
shopaholic (= addicted to work/shopping); -burger: hamburger,
cheeseburger, fishburger, etc.; -cracy: advertocracy (pursuit of
public policy by mass advertising campaigns); -mania:
Gorbymania (extreme enthusiasm for the former Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev); etc.
Composition or blending may work together with derivation, to
produce words which carry great semantic loads. For instance, the
word teenager, consists of:
-teen = the suffix of numerals between 13 and 19
age = a noun designating the length of time during which a being/thing
has existed
-er = a suffix designating the doer or sufferer of a certain action/state
Together they produce the overall meaning of ‘person aged
between 13 and 19.’
2.1.2.4
Contraction and abbreviation
Contraction (also called shortening or clipping) involves the
partial reduction of a word, either simple or compound.
There are three basic types of contraction (Leviţchi, 1970):
o
o
o
aphaeresis, i.e. the reduction of the initial segment of the word:
e.g. phone (< telephone); car (< motor-car); etc.
In most cases, the difference between the two forms is only
stylistic (phone < telephone; specially < especially; Fro < Afro);
the clipped variant being restricted to casual or slangy speech. In
some cases, however, the reduction also brings about change of
meaning: history < story; defence < fence; exchange < change;
example < sample; etc.
syncope, i.e. deletion of the middle part of a word, e.g. mart
< market; ma’am (< madam); parylene < paraxylene; etc.
Lexical syncope provides colloquial equivalents for Standard
English words, but it often occurs in poetic discourse, e.g. e’ev
(< ever); o’er (< over), etc.
apocope implies the reduction of the final segment of a word.
Unlike back formation, apocope does not involve change of
grammatical category.
71
Apocope is highly productive in contemporary (especially
colloquial) English: exam < examination; info < information;
deli < delicatessen; fax < facsimile; porn < pornography; mike
< microphone; etc. The clipping of compounds is also
productive: pub < public house; prefab < pre-fabricated (building
material); narc < narcotics agent; shrink < head shrinker);
sci-fi < science-fiction; sitcom < situation comedy; etc.
Contracted grammatical forms are also cases of aphaeresis
(’ll < will, ’d < should/would, ’ve < have) or of syncope (n’t < not,
e.g. isn’t, doesn’t). With such cases, stylistic variation is obvious.
Abbreviation takes the device of contraction a step further,
reducing the words/word groups to their initial letters.
Abbreviated words are read in various ways:
o
o
as individual letters of the alphabet: BA < Bachelor of Arts;
DVD < digital versatile disk; IT < information technology;
MBA [,embi:’ei] < Master in Business Administration; PDA
[,pidi’ei] < personal digital assistant; VCR [,visi’a:] < video
cassette recorder; etc.
Communication by e-mail or mobile telephony has
triggered lots of (funny) abbreviations, e.g. asap [,eiesei’pi:] =
as soon as possible; np [en’pi:] = no problem; etc. Sometimes
abbreviation goes hand in hand with composition, e.g. iPhone
(internet-connected phone), Palm based Color PDA, etc.
as a single word (called acronym): laser [’leizə] < Light
Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation; UFO
[’jufəu] – Unidentified Flying Object; SALT [sa:lt] – Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks; Yuppie < Young Urban Professional;
WASP [w‫כ‬sp] – White Anglo-Saxon Protestant; etc.
o
abbreviation only in writing, but full pronunciation:
terms referring to human beings or professions: Col.
(Colonel); Gen. (General); Hon. (Honourable); Lieut.
(Lieutenant); Mr. (Mister); Prof. (Professor); etc.
units of measurement: ft – foot/feet, oz. – ounce; etc.
terms related to the process of writing: vol. = volume; p =
page; e.g. (< exempli gratia) = for example; i.e. (< id est)
= that is; etc.
o
abbreviation based on homonymy; it is often used:
in Internet or mobile telephony communication: CUL8R (=
see you later); ICQ ([ai’si:kju] = I seek you); FAQ (!!!); etc.
72
by advertisers, to produce special effects: Str8 [streit] – a
perfume for men who are straight (i.e. not gay); BU [bi:
ju] – a women’s perfume that urges ‘you’ to be you(rself).
2.1.2.5
Onomatopoeia and ablaut
Onomatopoeia and ablaut are techniques of word coinage which
rely on phonologic principles.
Onomatopoeia consists in building new words by imitation of
natural sounds. The sound chains thus coined carry their own meaning.
Onomatopoeic words can function as:
nouns: buzz, cuckoo, crack, plop, snap, splash, swish, etc.
adjectives: teeny, wee, crunchy, chewy, yummy, etc.
verbs: to crack, to growl, to swish, to snap, to snarl, to
squeak, to whine, to whoop, to yelp, etc.
interjections: ouch, wow, yuck, etc.
Ablaut, or gradation, is closely related to deflection; but unlike
the latter, it is still productive today.
Ablaut relies on a pattern alternation of the root sound. Today,
it is productive in the form of onomatopoeic compounds (usually
rhyme-motivated): brain-drain, chit-chat, flip-flop, hokey-pokey,
pitter-patter, riff-raff, teeny-weeny, zigzag, etc.
2.1.2.6
Word coinage
Word coinage (or word manufacture) involves building new
words ex nihilo.
Great writers are artists of the language: they mould it like
clay in daring, imaginatively, and often whimsical ways. To name
realities in their fictitious world, they often make up new words,
e.g. see Lewis Carroll’s blends quoted above.
Shakespeare is considered to be one of the greatest creators
of words in English: he borrowed, affixed, converted, compounded
and clipped words, and even invented some, e.g. auspicious,
dauntless, to accost (somebody), to dwindle, etc. (Levitchi, 1970).
Another good example is Jonathan Swift who, for his Gulliver’s
Travels, invented a plethora of new terms: Lilliput is inhabited by
very small people, the Lilliputians, who are organized into two
highly competitive political parties, the Tramecksan and the
Slamecksan; they measure the world in blusturgs and drurrs, etc.
How far Swift took his creativity can be seen when analysing a
word such as Houyhnhnms (to name the horses endowed with
73
reason): one may suspect that Swift produced a random chain of
letters, to which he gave an arbitrary pronunciation, merely to
impress and puzzle his readers.
Among the modern writers who exploited creatively the
potentialities of the English language, mention should be made of
James Joyce, of Anthony Burgess, of George Orwell, etc. (see
Annexes 2 and 5).
Joyce wrote his Finnegans Wake with the declared intention to
baffle his readers and puzzle his critics; while few ordinary readers
have completed the tedious task of reading the novel, critics have
been analysing it for decades without reaching unanimous
conclusions. For A Clockwork Orange, Burgess made up a polyglot
teenage argot he calls Nadsat. The main source for the new words
is Russian1, but there are also contributions from Gypsy, French,
Cockney/English slang and other miscellaneous sources, such as
Malay and Dutch, as well as his own imagination. Although at first
sight the novel seems quite difficult to read, it gradually opens up
to the reader, who is taken into an extremely lively, though
appalling, world. Equally appalling is Orwell’s world in Nineteen
Eighty-Four: the communist London he describes is a realm of
terror, of physical and moral deprivation. To cope with such a
world, an army of linguists is working at creating a new language –
Newspeak – whose ‘principles’ Orwell2 describes in a detailed
Appendix to his novel.
Scientists are also great creators of terms required to cover
the new realities in the field. The unprecedented development of
science and technology in modern times makes it necessary to
create thousands upon thousands of terms that did not exist before.
Many new scientific terms are coined with the help of the
Greek vocabulary, by affixation (e.g. bifocal < Gk. bi- = two) or
composition (e.g. telephone < Gk. tele/teleos + phon(é) = sound,
voice); etc.
Others are borrowed from various fields:
o
o
1
2
in physics: force, mass, orbit, spin, etc.
in mathematics: group, function, analytic, regular, etc.
The large number of Russian words in Nadsat is due to the cold war, which
held the world in its grips at the time when Burgess wrote the novel.
Orwell was a keen analyst of the English language, whose flaws and
misuse he bitterly deplored. See also text D in Annex 7.
74
Still other new words are abstracted, by blending or
acronyming, from long technical phrases: e.g. pemoline –
phenilimino-oxazolidinone.
The most recent type of word coinage is that accomplished
with the help of computers. Numerous brand names (e.g. Kodak,
Krylon, Orlon, Teflon) are computer-devised. The ending –on,
which merely looks like a suffix, endows the word with a scientific
look/sound, connoting high technological achievement. Given its
great productivity today, however, the ending is gradually
acquiring the status of a suffix, signifying ‘artificial’ or ‘synthetic.’
Euphony (i.e. the smooth phonetic flow of the word) is also
very important when naming a new object or idea. The word roller
coaster, for instance, was carefully elaborated, on considerations
of rhyme, rhythm, and length. The smooth roll of the machine is
suggested by the rhythmic occurrences of the rolling consonant [r]
(three times) and of the closing diphthong [əu] (twice); the word
is also long enough (four syllables) to connote a long and
enjoyable experience.
Given the intentional character of word manufacture, the name
of the term’s creator and the date of its creation are often known.
Thus, for instance, the word robot was coined by the Czech writer
Karel Capek for the play R.U.R. (1920), from the Slavonic base
robot- (<robota = compulsory labour, or robotník = peasant owing
such labour). Or, the word cybernetics (= the study of the control
of and communication with machines) was coined in 1947 by
Norbert Wiener from the Greek word kubernetes (= a steersman);
in 1960, the word triggered another neologism: the blend cyborg
(cybernetic + organism).
2.1.3
Lexicalization
It was discussed in the previous sections that languages change at
a steady pace and that words are created to reflect the changes
that occur in the world. As people begin to use them, these words
are gradually assimilated by the language.
All lexemes have a past, a history. Some terms have remained
unchanged in form and meaning for several centuries: words
denoting family relationships (father, mother), everyday ‘objects’
(book, house, man), activities (to eat, to drink, to sleep) or
qualities (good, bad, long), the lower numerals (e.g. one, two),
etc. The ‘history’ of others is extremely short, e.g. words such as
75
television, laser, broadcast or space-flight have been introduced
into the language but a short while ago.
Let us investigate briefly the process by which neologisms are
gradually assimilated by the language.
2.1.3.1
The functions of neologisms
Neologisms are borrowed or coined for various reasons. On the
world scene there may be an important event, for which people
borrow the key words to be able to refer easily and expertly to it:
Glasnost, Taliban, etc. Science or technology may need a term to
name a new concept or device: e.g. to freeze-dry was coined to
name a new procedure to preserve foods, blood plasma,
antibiotics, etc.; with the development of information technology,
terms such as motherboard and search engine, to log on/off and to
Google were introduced. The media may require new words to
name their products, e.g. highbrow or tabloid (newspapers), sitcoms, etc. Advertisers may create a new term to serve as an
appropriate ‘label’ for a new idea they want us to associate with the
product, e.g. iPod, smartphone, touchscreen, etc.
Thus, the basic role of words is ‘to name the world,’ i.e. to
assign linguistic ‘labels’ to objects, qualities, or activities. As a
result, neologisms extend the conceptual system of the language.
But words are more than mere labels for naming things. Leech
describes the creation of new words as a process of
prepackaging, i.e. he views the word as ‘a package into which a
particular semantic content is placed, so that it can henceforward
be manipulated and shunted about as an indivisible unit of
meaning’ (Leech: 1981: 30).
As such, neologisms have several basic functions.
First of all, lexical items – and hence, neologisms also – have a
concept-defining role. Words ‘call into existence’ and define
concepts, i.e. categories that exist in the world. From the earliest
days of civilisation, speakers needed words such as man, house,
bread, to live, and to eat to be able to refer concisely and
accurately to those real-world objects and activities. As society
progressed, new words were required to name more recent
realities, so that words such as train and submarine, spaceflight
and aerobatics, computer and Internet, etc. were coined.
Secondly, words have an abbreviatory function: they give a
succinct and precise linguistic equivalent for some real-world
object or fact that would otherwise require a long definition.
76
There are few lexical items whose meaning can be clarified
with the help of a single-word synonym1, e.g. house – building, to
leave – to depart. Most words require longish ‘definitions’ to
explain their meanings. Therefore, the role of neologisms is to
condense into a single item an idea that could otherwise be only
expressed in a phrase or a whole sentence.
For example, the compound breakthrough condenses in a
single word a ‘significant or sudden advance, development, etc., as
in scientific knowledge or diplomacy, that removes a barrier to
progress’; the word shorthand was created to name ‘a method of
rapid handwriting using simple strokes, abbreviations, or symbols
that designate letters, words, or phrases’; and laptop was coined
to name ‘a portable, usually battery-powered microcomputer small
enough to rest on the lap’ (Webster).
Journalists and advertisers, for whom economy of space and
time is extremely important, are masters of compounding,
blending, clipping and abbreviating. Their often strangely coined
phrases, exploited both for their space-saving value and for their
effectiveness, are meant to convey a lot of meaning as succinctly
as possible, e.g. celebutantes, dawks, etc.
Thirdly, many neologisms have an image-building function,
i.e. they improve the image of both the object described and of the
person using the term. French loans, for instance, endow the
product and their user with connotations of Frenchness and
sophistication, e.g. a chic negligée, or gourmet cuisine, sound
much more refined than ‘a sexy dressing gown’ or ‘good food.’ On
the other hand, high-sounding compounds enhance the
effectiveness of one’s speech and improve the image of the
referent, e.g. a breakthrough sounds more educated than ‘a hit.’
In addition, with the rapid development of science and technology,
new technical terms undergo a fast process of jargonization2, and
knowledge of a domain’s jargon is essential to be viewed as a
member of that specific group. This is the reason why, Romanian
youngsters flaunt their knowledge of the computer jargon,
preferring English terms even when there is a perfectly acceptable
Romanian equivalent (e.g. bolduit, zipat, upgradare).
1
2
But synonyms can only provide approximate meaning equivalents.
Jargon = the language, esp. the vocabulary, peculiar to a particular trade,
profession, or group: medical jargon (Webster).
2.1.3.2
77
The process of lexicalization
Neologisms, whether borrowed from other languages or created
through various techniques of word formation, are not accepted
into the language at once, but undergo a slow process of
lexicalization, which follows a well-defined path1.
At first, the new word sounds rather strange and
listeners/readers receive them with a surprised smile or frown.
Journalists who use the new item generally put it in inverted
commas and add a brief definition of the term, or a comment, such
as ‘what has been called.’ In speech, intonational cues are used to
emphasize the new term. New words often cause heated debates:
linguists may contest its etymological or semantic accuracy,
readers may react to their supposed vulgarity, governments and
individuals may object to loans and insist on translation, etc. But
writers delight in shocking readers with their innovative capacity
and novelty of diction.
At this stage, the term is called a nonce formation.
Subsequently, it may be accepted into the language
(institutionalized), or it may die out as soon as the reality which it
covers fades away. Many of the words coined by writers,
journalists or advertisers are meant to be used only once, for the
sake of fun or shock effect (e.g. Coca-Cola’s freshwards), or in one
specific context (e.g. Swift’s Houyhnhnms). Many nonce words,
however, go on and acquire a stable position in the language.
The new term begins its process of institutionalization when
speakers start repeating a word they know they have already heard.
Gradually, the new term is accepted by society as a label for a
certain real-world entity or process. As time goes on, it is
perceived as monomorphemic, i.e. unitary and unanalyzable.
Take, for example, words such as gentleman or blackboard. A
close look at the words tells us that they are compounds (gentle +
man; black + board). Today, however, we no longer think of the
individual elements, but perceive the words as unitary, i.e.
designed to name a type of person, respectively, object; the
meanings of the adjectives (gentle, respectively, black) are
completely lost, assimilated into the new words (a gentleman need
not be gentle, and a blackboard needn’t be black).
In addition, at this stage, the new terms become typespecific, i.e. conventionally and unambiguously accepted as labels
for a specific type of real-world referent: on hearing the words, the
1
After Bauer, 1983: Chapter 3.
78
receiver visualizes directly the real-world objects thus named. For
example, in principle, the term laptop could be used to designate
any kind of object that one holds on top of one’s lap (e.g. a book
or a briefcase); but every technologically wise speaker knows that
the term refers specifically to a certain type of computer. Similarly,
the term walkie-talkie could designate a variety of items, or even
activities, which bring together walking and talking: a mini
cassette recorder, a special technique of learning or meditation
which involves exchanging ideas while walking, etc.; nevertheless,
the competent speaker knows that walkie-talkie is a device similar
to the telephone that people (e.g. the police) use to communicate
at a certain distance. Or, the verb to sky-dive could be associated
with the flying of birds or airplanes; fans of extreme sports,
however, know precisely that the term denotes the activity of
jumping from an airplane and descending in free fall for a
considerable distance before opening a parachute.
The final stage in the assimilation of a new lexeme is that of
lexicalization1: the new word is completely accepted by society,
established and used as part of people’s ‘standard mental
equipment’ (Leech, 1981: 30). At this stage, the word is treated as
a mere appropriate label for a given concept and behaves like any
other lexeme: it can be
pluralized: e.g. Aspirin > an aspirin – two aspirins (initially a
brand name, i.e. proper noun, it was converted into a
countable common noun)
converted, e.g. from Swift’s Lilliput and Brobdingnag, the
adjectives Lilliputian and Brobdingnagian were derived
clipped, e.g. babysitter – to babysit; or
adapted freely (and often, erroneously) to the new language
environment, e.g. sticksuri, chipsuri (doubly pluralized as
Romanian loans).
A new word is assimilated by the language if people begin to
use it in various contexts. How fast and how completely a new
word is lexicalized depends on several factors, such as:
the status and circulation of the newspaper/TV channel that
launched it: e.g. channels such as Euronews or MTV are
watched by millions of people all around the world;
1
Leech (1981) refers to fully accepted lexical items as frozen or petrified;
Lyons (1977) calls them fossilized.
79
the importance and longstanding effect of the event or
discovery: e.g. Greenpeace’s warning about the depletion of
the ozone layer; words related to international terrorism or
religious fundamentalism, e.g. Intifada, Taliban;
the attitude of society towards the discovery: e.g. words
related to communication (digital telephony, smartphone), to
computers and television (mouse, laptop, VCR, DVD), are
quickly accepted into many languages, as millions of people
use the devices;
the status of the person who coins, or helps to coin, the new
term, e.g. Swift’s Lilliputians; Orwell’s Newspeak; Spielberg’s
E.T.; Marxism; Stalinism; etc.;
the urgency of the need for a new concept to cover the new
reality, e.g. atom bomb, space flight, Euro, etc.
Semantically, lexicalization is generally accompanied by a gradual
loss of transparency1.
Most new terms are transparent, i.e. the meaning of the new
item is obvious and motivated. On hearing words, such as
spaceflight, user-friendly or downsizing, the hearer can guess their
meanings by computing the meanings of the words’ components.
Gradually, by repeated usage, though, the elements become
fused together, so that the receiver no longer perceives, or no
longer thinks of, the individual elements of the compound. For
him, words such as moonstruck, to overcome, skinhead, motherof-pearl, or state-of-the-art (= the latest and most sophisticated
or advanced stage of a technology, art, or science, e.g. a camera
considered the state of the art in design) are semi-transparent
or semi-opaque.
In some cases the fusion is so complete – e.g. e.g. breakfast
(break + fast), mistake (mis + take), etc. – that the receiver no
longer perceives the motivation behind the naming, but views the
term as monomorphemic and completely opaque.
Even newer terms can be (semi-)opaque: on hearing words
such as camcorder or transceiver, the hearer will have to use his
imagination to compute their meaning. But no imagination is
sufficient to guess the meanings of words such as iPod or Bluetooth.
2.1.3.3
Neologisms and change of meaning
Lexical innovation – whether by borrowing or by word formation –
is always accompanied by considerable change of meaning.
1
The issue of transparency will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2.3
– Change of meaning and lexicalization.
80
2.1.3.3.1
The lexicalization of loan words
Along their history, loan words may undergo considerable changes
of meaning. An analysis of the French influence upon the English
language can give us a hint of how extensive the effect of loans
upon the vernacular can be.
Under the influence of a ‘superior’ culture, some Anglo-Saxon
words were actually pushed out of the language: e.g. wlite was
replaced with beauty, cam with uncle, bookhoard with library, etc.
Others, however, continued to exist, but underwent significant
changes of meaning due to the linguistic pressure exerted by the
new loans. For example, in Old English, the word deer (< German
Tier) meant any kind of animal; with the introduction of the French
loan beast, and of the Latin animal, the meaning of the original
word was restricted to a certain category of animal.
The influx of French words also contributed to meaning
differentiation and specialization. A language does not preserve
two items which designate exactly the same thing; one of them is
either pushed out of the language, or changes meaning. When the
members of the synonymic pairs are of different origins (in this
case, of Germanic and, respectively, French), there is not only
considerable difference of meaning, but also some regularity
concerning these differences.
An obvious example of the kind is the coexistence of pairs of
words, one for the live animal, and another for its meat, e.g. pig –
pork; sheep – mutton; cow – beef; calf – veal. The old Germanic
term designates the live animal, the newer French one names the
meat of the same animal. This was mainly due – as a popular joke
of the time explains – to the fact that tending for the animals was
the responsibility of the local peasants (who spoke their old,
Germanic, tongue), while the privilege of eating the slaughtered
animals’ meat came to the ruling classes (at whose tables, French
was being spoken).
Specialization of meaning is visible in the case of other
synonymic pairs, too. Consider the examples:
to ask (G) – to demand (F); to begin (G) – to commence (F); bunch
(of flowers) (G) – a bouquet (of flowers) (F); to come in (G) – to
enter (F); to get out (G) – to exit (F); to go away (G) – to depart
(F); home (G) – residence (F); to put off (G) – to postpone (L); etc.
The Germanic words are short (mono- or disyllabic) and name
objects and activities pertaining to everyday life. Conversely,
French and Latin terms are longer and more abstract in meaning.
81
As a result, Germanic words sound more intimate, while French
loans sound more official.
This characteristic has a direct effect upon the stylistic
distribution of the members of synonymic pairs: informal speech
favours the Germanic variant, while formal language gives
preference to the French loan. Thus, for example, bunch (of
flowers) is used to name an ordinary cluster of plucked plants;
bouquet names a careful and costly arrangement produced for a
sophisticated occasion or person.
Semantically, loans are generally opaque to the great majority of
users. For example, few Romanian users of the computer know (or
think of) the original meaning of words such as mouse (or maus),
net, web, print, motherboard, scan, etc. For them, the words are
type-specific, i.e. they merely designate computer devices or
techniques.
The same thing is true for all languages. Thus, few speakers of
English know that assassin comes from the Arabic hashshashin,
meaning ‘eaters of hashish;’ that fiasco and flask both come from
the Italian word flasca (= bottle), or that bead originally meant
‘prayer.’ The changes are so consistent that no similarity is
retained between the original and the new meaning.
The semantic change that accompanies borrowing sometimes
follows a complex and intricate route. For example, the English
adjective nice comes from the affixed Latin nescius (ne = not +
scius < scire = to know); the word, borrowed through French, first lost
its negative meaning, then underwent semantic and phonetic changes.
Change of meaning can be induced by social attitudes or by
the word’s connotations.
For example, Old English ceorl (today, churl) meant peasant,
farm-labourer or simply, a male human being; the word was replaced
by the French villain (Fr. villein), also meaning farm labourer. As the
upper classes looked down upon such people, the word churl
underwent a gradual degradation of meaning, signifying successively, a
man without rank (1000); a serf (1228); a base fellow, a villain
(1300); and one who is rude in manners (today). In its turn, the
word villain also changed its meaning, signifying successively, one
who does not belong to the gentry; a low-born base-minded rustic
(1303); an unprincipled or depraved scoundrel (today).
Borrowing is often preferred to the vernacular for the
connotations (hence, additional meanings) the loans carry. For
example, French loans (e.g. a bouquet of flowers, a début in
society; a déjà-vu) carry connotations of chic, elegance and style;
82
German loans (diesel, quartz, etc.) – of rigorous order and high
technical achievement; Asian loans (bazaar, caravan, harem) –
convey a sense of romantic mystery; African loans (safari, taboo,
voodoo) – of primitive wilderness, etc.
Connotations can be so powerful that they sometimes
supersede negative semantic features. For example, the French
negligee is used in English to name an elegant women’s dressing
gown, usually made of sheer, soft fabric. In fact, in French, the
word means carelessness and neglect; but the connotations of
elegance carried by the language itself have endowed the new
term, with positive overtones.
2.1.3.3.2
Word formation and lexicalization
Change of meaning is even more obvious in the case of word
formation. Let us analyse some categories.
Words coined by affixation can become so well assimilated by
the language that they are perceived as semantically opaque. In
words such as, depart (de- + part), abuse (ab- + use), mistake
(mis- + take), understand (under- + stand), etc., the prefix is so
thoroughly incorporated into the form of the word that speakers
perceive the affix as an intrinsic part of the word, not as a
separate morpheme. And who would say today that the word
disease is, in fact, a euphemism coined by affixation, i.e. dis- +
ease = lack of ease. Such words are perceived as
monomorphemic, so they can be pluralized (mistakes), inflected
(departed), further affixed (misunderstandings), etc. They are also
type-specific: e.g. a disease is a specific type of ‘lack of ease,’ i.e.
one resulting from an illness.
The same lexical-semantic fusion, accompanied by a loss of
transparency, can be detected in the case of compounds.
Few people stop to think that words, such as butterfly (butter
+ fly), breakfast (break + fast) or understand (under + stand) are
compounds. Such semantically opaque words are obviously
perceived as unitary/monomorphemic and type specific.
Most compounds, however, are semi-opaque/transparent (to
bad-mouth, beat-up, brain-drain, flash memory, to hot-wire (a
car), skinhead, touchscreen, to outdo, rundown, to withhold) or
completely transparent (brain death, cross-modal, cut-throat,
family planning, download, junk food, overcome, policeperson,
spoilsport, to upgrade, user-friendly, water proof); and yet, we can
identify the same conceptual fusion and type specificity.
83
For example, with some effort of imagination, the meaning of
blackmail can be inferred by computing the meanings of the
individual components: black + mail, i.e. letter coming with some
sad (metaphorical interpretation of black) information. The word
blackmail, however, does not designate any kind of sad letter, but
has become type-specific, meaning ‘payment extorted by
intimidation;’ nor is the term strictly related to the mail.
Furthermore, the speaker/hearer no longer perceives the individual
words (black + mail) in the compound, but visualizes the word as
semantically unitary. As a result, it can be inflected (blackmailing),
converted (verb to noun), etc.
Abbreviations, and especially acronyms, undergo an even
more emphasized semantic detachment from the original: people
often forget the individual elements of BBC or MBA, of laser, sonar
or NATO, and use the abbreviated forms as if they were ordinary
lexemes of the language, e.g. My DVD broke down, we say without
thinking what the initial stand for. Such abbreviations can be
pluralized like any common noun (PCs [pi’si:z]; CDs [si:’di:z]),
converted into verbs and inflected (He OK-ed my application; He
was taken to hospital because he OD-ed, i.e. ‘over-dozed’ of drug
abuse), etc.
To show how intricately change of meaning develops, let us take a
phrasal verb.
Formally, phrasal verbs are compounds. Semantically, they can be
transparent or opaque, as well as any shade in between the two
extremes. Many phrasal verbs are polysemantic, which means that,
from the basic meaning, one or several new meanings have evolved.
Consider the following example (after Cambridge International
Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs/Cambridge Advanced Learner's
Dictionary and Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2005):
to lay off
1. to dismiss (an employee), esp. temporarily because of slack business
2. (Informal): to cease or quit
3. (Slang): to stop annoying or teasing
4. (Informal): to stop work
5. to stop or stop using: to lay off drinking
6. to mark off; measure; plot
7. to transfer (part of a wager) to other bookmakers, for protection
against losses
8. to transfer (blame or responsibility) to another
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The processes by which new meanings develop from a lexical
item’s basic/previous meaning(s) will be discussed in the
following sections.
2.2
Transfer of meaning: Figurative speech
It was demonstrated in the first part of this chapter that all lexical
innovation is accompanied by certain change of meaning. But
change of meaning – or rather, transfer of meaning based on
figurative usage – represents in itself an extremely rich source of
enrichment of the vocabulary, being perhaps the most interesting
and productive type of lexical innovation.
Words result from the speaker’s perception of and complex
interaction with the world. But the meaning of lexemes is never
fixed; it exists in the language users’ minds in a dynamic form.
For example, the abstract notion of ‘mouth’ was encapsulated
for the English language in the word mouth; the abstraction then
enabled the speaker to apply the lexical item to other, similar
objects or experiences, e.g. the mouth of a river or another mouth
to feed (= another child). Most words naming parts of the body
have been used in this way to name parts of objects whose
position or shape they recall: head – to name the upper part of an
object (headline); nose – to name an item which sticks out (the
nose of a ship); legs – to designate the part which supports the
whole system (the legs of the table);
The new words thus obtained can also be converted, thus
expanding the conceptual system of the language even further:
foot: the foot of the hill (n.) → to foot the bill (vb.) = to
sign/pay the bill;
shoulder: shoulder to shoulder (n.) = side by side → to
shoulder an expense (vb.) = to assume responsibility; etc.
The transfer of meaning thus accomplished is figurative (or
metaphoric1) in character. Rhetorical devices – the metaphor,
metonymy, hyperbole, etc. – are not restricted to the field of
literature2; ordinary communication practically swarms with
figurative usage of the language. Take the examples above: when
1
2
Linguists often use the term ‘metaphor’ to refer generically to all types of
figurative usage. While accepting the term in its generic sense, in this
chapter we shall analyse types of figurative usage more thoroughly.
See Annex 4, illustrating figurative speech.
85
we speak of the nose of a ship, or the foot of the hill, we hardly
notice that we are using the words figuratively. There are also
metaphorical phrases which are so completely lexicalized that we
no longer perceive their figurative character, e.g. by the way, on the
other hand, to change one’s mind, to have a splitting headache, etc.
It was shown earlier in this chapter that the world and society
are in a continuous change and development, so that new words
are permanently required to name those new realities. On the
other hand, the relation between words and reality is not stable,
but ceaselessly reinterpreted by the speaker in unexpected and
creative ways: it is much easier to modify and adapt the meanings
of already existing items, than to invent new ones.
As a result, transfer of meaning is a highly efficient and
economical way of expanding the vocabulary of a language.
2.2.1
86
Leviţchi (1970: 73-75) tells us that there are two main types of
connection between the original and the new meanings of words:
radiation and concatenation.
radiation, i.e. the new meanings derive from the original one,
like the rays of the sun:
Meaning 2
Meaning 1
Meaning 4
Diachronic change of meaning
Lexemes can change their meaning unpredictably and more or less
independently of one another: each word has a history of its own.
This is because meaning is dynamic in character, subject to
numerous language-internal, cultural, and purely accidental factors.
Transfer of meaning may follow various directions:
o from concrete to abstract, as in:
to grasp: 1. to seize, to clutch; 2. to understand (e.g.
to grasp the meaning)
road: 1. a long, narrow stretch made for travelling, a
street or highway; 2. a means to achieve something
(e.g. the road to success)
o from particular to general, as in:
home: 1. the building where one lives; 2. one’s country
background: 1. the ground or scene situated in the
rear; 2. one’s origin, education, experience, etc.
o from one domain to another: the development of a new
domain induced borrowings from similar domains, as in:
aviation from navigation: e.g. to sail, cockpit, pilot,
steward(ess), etc.
Change of meaning is often induced by the context in which
the word appears; conversely, the context helps the receiver to
pick out the correct reading for terms, e.g. in We know nothing
about this person’s background, the context indicates that
background is used to refer to the person’s origins and education.
Meaning 3
Meaning 5
leg (n.) 1. one of the parts of the body by means of which
men and animals stand and walk; 2. the part of the
garment covering the leg; 3. a bar or pole used as a
support or prop; 4. one of the supports of a piece of
furniture; 5. one of the branches of a forked or jointed object.
concatenation, i.e. the new meanings are successively added to
one another:
Meaning 1
Meaning 2
Meaning 3
Meaning 4
gold (n.) 1. (basic meaning) a precious metal; 2. gold
coin; 3. money; 4. riches, wealth; etc.
Combinations of radiation and concatenation are also common:
board (n.): 1. a board, a plank; 2. an extended surface of
wood; 3. a table; 4. the food served at a table; 5. meals
provided regularly for pay; 6. a council table; 7. a council;
8. the side of a ship; etc.
radiation: 1-2; 2-3, 2-8; 3-4, 3-6;
concatenation: 1-2-8; 1-2-3-4-5; 1-2-3-6-7;
Meaning 1
Meaning 2
Meaning 8
Meaning 3
Meaning 4 Meaning 6
Meaning 5 Meaning 7
The original meaning(s) of the term can coexist with the new ones,
or they may die out. From another perspective, the directions in which
change of meaning operates can be:
o
extension (or generalization) of meaning, i.e. the sense or
senses of a word is/are enlarged or enriched, as in:
o
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person: in ancient times, the Latin word persona
designated a mask worn by actors on stage; with time,
the word came to be used to refer to the human being
behind the mask then, by extension, to any human being
place: the Latin word platea meant ‘broad street’; by
gradual generalization, the word came to signify ‘a
particular portion of space, or space in general.’
narrowing of meaning is the process by which a word’s sense
is narrowed down and restricted to something less than its
originally meaning, as in:
room: in older times, the word room meant space
(unrestricted); today it is used to name a strictly
delimited kind of space, enclosed within four walls
car: initially, the word was used with reference to any
kind of vehicle, while a four-wheeled engine-driven
vehicle was a motor-car; gradually the initial part of
the compound was discarded, and today the word has
become type-specific
o
degradation of meaning is the process by which a neutral
word becomes deprecating, as in:
knave: in Old English, it meant boy (< German
Knabe); due to the superior attitude of the upper
classes, it became gradually a term of contempt; and
today it means an unprincipled, untrustworthy or
dishonest person
gay: not so long ago, the term meant cheerful; at
present, it is used almost exclusively to mean homosexual
o
elevation of meaning is the reverse phenomenon: the new
word is higher in status than its original meaning, as in:
steward: the Old English word stign meant ‘sty-warden,’
i.e. a person looking after the pigs in the sty; today, it
names an employee in charge of the table, wine, servants,
etc., in a club or restaurant, or on a ship, train, or
airplane; a feminine noun was also derived (stewardess)
to name a ‘flight attendant’
minister: in olden times, it meant ‘servant’; today it is
used to mean either a member of the clergy, or a member
of the government
villa: originally, the word meant ‘shanty, crudely built
hut’; today it designates an imposing country or suburban
home of wealthy persons.
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2.2.2 Figurative transfer of meaning
Leech (1981: 37) describes transfer of meaning as ‘tampering with the
rules of the language and playing language games.’
Figurative usage of the language is a major source of linguistic
creativity. Writers produce figures of speech to enhance the beauty and
value of their work. Journalists and advertisers indulge in word-play for
the sake of interestingness and memorability. Ordinary communicators
often speak figuratively to make their speech more powerful or funny.
Figures of speech represent an intrinsic (and consistent)
component of ordinary communication. Some types of figurative usage
are innovative and colourful. Others (e.g. figurative idioms) are so
thoroughly lexicalized that the speaker doesn’t even perceive their
figurative character.
Comprehensive dictionaries list a number of figurative meanings
and idiomatic uses for most headwords. Let us analyse the meanings of
the word chair as listed by Webster:
chair (châr) n., v. <chaired, chair-ing>
n. 1. a seat, esp. for one person, usu. having four legs for support and a rest for the back
and often having rests for the arms
2. a seat of office or authority
3. a position of authority, as of a judge or professor
4. the person occupying a seat of office or authority, esp. the chairperson of a meeting
5. (in an orchestra) the position of a player, assigned by rank; desk
6. <the chair> Informal. ELECTRIC CHAIR
7. CHAIRLIFT
8. SEDAN CHAIR
vbt. 9. to place or seat in a chair
10. to install in office
11. to preside over; act as chairperson of
12. Brit. to carry (a hero or victor) aloft in triumph
v.i. 13. to preside over a meeting, committee, etc.
Idiom: 14. <take the chair> to open or preside at a meeting; act as chairperson
Of the six meanings listed for chair as a noun, only meaning 1
defines its basic sense, of object used for sitting on. Meanings 2 to
5 diverge gradually by metaphoric or metonymic extension,
referring to a certain location, a position/authority, the person
occupying the position, or his place/rank among his peers.
Meanings 6 to 8 illustrate narrowing of meaning: the term chair is
used in type-specific senses, the headword standing metonymically
for, or being part of, various compounds of the word.
As a transitive or an intransitive verb, the dictionary lists five
further meanings of the word chair. Of these, only the first is nonfigurative: meaning 9 defines the act of placing somebody in an
89
object as the one described by meaning 1. Meanings 10 to 13 are
related to the figurative meanings of the noun. The idiomatic
phrase provided – i.e. to take the chair – is also figurative.
This shows that, by endowing old words with new meanings,
figurative usage enriches the dictionary and enlarges its scope.
In the following sections we shall survey the main types of
figurative speech, grouped according to two basic criteria:
•
•
the relations between the world and the dictionary; and
the semantic relations that arise among lexical items.
2.2.2.1
Relations between signifier and signified
Some figures of speech (e.g. the simile, metaphor or
personification) are based on a comparison the speaker establishes
between two real-world entities. With others (e.g. the euphemism,
hyperbole or litotes), the emphasis falls on vagueness or
exaggeration.
2.2.2.1.1
Comparison
Not all comparisons are figurative: by comparing two notions that
are similar (e.g. David is as tall as John, where both elements are
[+HUMAN]), we merely make a comparison, which is not
figurative. To produce a figure of speech, we need to compare
items which are dissimilar.
90
explicit term of comparison (the comparative phrase as … as is
missing).
Therefore, the metaphor is an implied simile. According to
Cruse (1986: 42), the metaphor ‘induces the hearer to view a
thing or state of affairs as being like something else, by applying
to the former linguistic expressions which are normally employed
with reference to the latter.’ In other words, the metaphor
compares in an implicit way two (or more) items/concepts which
are essentially dissimilar.
The metaphor does more than merely compare two dissimilar
things: it achieves a transfer of meaning, from one real-world
entity to another belonging to a different semantic field, on the
basis of a certain similitude that exists between them, i.e. it
identifies them by treating one as though it were the other (John
is a mountain).
Metaphor accounts for numerous cases of lexical incongruity
that we encounter in ordinary language use. To decode them
correctly, receivers must rely on their encyclopaedic knowledge.
For example, a sentence such as She sweated blood is
semantically incongruous (there is a conceptual clash between the
verb to sweat and its object, blood). And yet, world-wise receivers
know that in this case, blood stands metaphorically for great
effort.
Levinson (1983) distinguishes three main types of metaphor:
nominal, predicative and sentential:
o
2.2.2.1.1.1
Simile and metaphor
By comparing two elements which do not belong to the same
category, and linking them explicitly with a comparing phrase (e.g.
as … as or like), we produce a simile. For example, the sentence
David is as tall as a mountain is a simile, because the items
compared belong to different categories ([+HUMAN] and
respectively [-HUMAN]), and there is also an explicit comparative
phrase (as tall as). The simile is a highly popular figure of speech
in English, especially in colloquial speech, and has given rise to
numerous idioms, e.g. as busy as a bee, as poor as a church
mouse, strong as a horse, shy as a rabbit, as pretty as a picture,
etc. (see also section 3.1.3 – Idioms and figures of speech).
On the next level, the comparison is merely implied. For
example, David is a mountain is a metaphor because the
elements compared are dissimilar ([±HUMAN]) and there is no
the nominal metaphor endows the person, object or
phenomenon designated by a noun with the characteristics of
something else, e.g. He is a pest (= a nuisance); She’s such a
bee (= hardworking); a wolf in sheep’s clothing (= a friendly
person who is in fact dangerous); a couch potato (= a lazy
person who prefers watching TV to being active); glass ceiling
(= an upper limit to professional advancement, esp. as
imposed upon women, that is not readily perceived or openly
acknowledged); etc.
Nominal metaphor is often used to refer indirectly, perhaps
poetically, to:
famous persons: the Prince of Denmark (Hamlet); the Iron
Lady (Margaret Thatcher); etc.;
important historical periods: the Renaissance; the Age of
Reason; etc.
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persons/objects which recall strong feelings (either
positive or negative): the joy of my life (with reference to
one’s child); the cross I have to wear (e.g. a severely
handicapped child); dark-green (= a person holding
radically ‘green’ political beliefs); etc.
brand names are often metaphoric (e.g. Opium, Spring
Sensation – for perfumes; Jaguar, Eagle, Safari – for cars)
for the positive connotations the words carry.
o
the predicative metaphor presents an action/state as if it
were some other action/state: to be lost (= confused); to step
into action; to take something for granted; She is
floating/flying (= very happy); etc.
many verbal collocations and phrases are metaphorical: to
catch a cold; to step into action; to jump to conclusions; to
run a risk; to take chances; to weigh the facts; to fall
behind (with one’s work); etc.
o
the sentential metaphor transfers the meaning of a whole
sentence on the figurative level, e.g. to kill a bottle of bourbon
(= to drink up, to finish); to drown one’s sorrows (= to drink
so as to forget one’s troubles); to twist somebody’s arm; to
burn one’s boats; to make someone’s blood boil/freeze; to
keep an ear to the ground; to have a narrow escape; etc.
Sentential metaphors are generally:
idioms: to be born with a silver spoon in one’s mouth (=
born to wealth and comfort); to stir up a hornet’s nest (=
to produce trouble); to kill the goose which lays the golden
eggs (= to destroy the source of one’s future income); to
cast pearls before swine (= to give something valuable to
someone who does not appreciate it); to kill two birds with
one stone (= to achieve two things with one act); etc.;
proverbs: Don’t count your chickens before they are
hatched; Blood is thicker than water; Let sleeping dogs lie;
Birds of a feather flock together; Still waters run deep; The
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush; His bark is worse
than his bite (= He always threatens, but rarely punishes);
etc.
The metaphor is the most productive figure of speech. It
expands the meaning of words and makes the ideas expressed
more vivid. In addition, many other figures of speech rely on
metaphoric principles, e.g. He’s a giant is a metaphoric hyperbole.
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2.2.2.1.1.2
Zoosemy, antonomasia, personification
Zoosemy is a special type of nominal metaphor that draws on the
animal world: it consists of using animal nouns for characterizing
human beings. For example, a cunning person is called a fox; a
silly young woman is a chicken (or a chick, in colloquial speech); a
heavy, awkward person is a bear; a stupid one is an ass; a person
who spends a lot of time reading is a bookworm; politicians are
referred to as doves (the good ones) or hawks (the bad ones), etc.
Antonomasia, i.e. the use of the name of a person/character
noted for a particular trait to designate a person/class having the
same characteristic, is also a type of nominal metaphor.
For example, a rich person may be called a Croesus/a
Rockefeller; a shrewd ruthless politician is a Machiavelli (hence,
Machiavellian); a womanizer is a Casanova or a Don Juan; a
dreamer is a Don Quixote; a jealous husband is an Othello; a
woman dedicated to caring for others is a Florence Nightingale;
young lovers are referred to as Romeo and Juliet; etc.
Personification, i.e. the representation of a thing or abstraction
in the form of a person, is a rhetorical device frequently employed
by writers and often used in ordinary communication.
We often say that My heart tells me that …; that My feet took
me …; that Her eyes were begging me …; that The wind is raging;
or that The forest is singing; etc. There are also numerous
idiomatic phrases where objects, animals, or parts of the body are
endowed with qualities characteristic of human beings, e.g. to get
to the heart of something (an object has a heart); at death’s door
(death has a house with a door, just like all humans); My heart
went into my mouth/boots; Heaven knows!; etc.
If zoosemy and antonomasia are forms of nominal metaphor,
personification may be a verbal or sentential metaphor.
2.2.2.1.2
Vagueness and exaggeration
A number of other rhetorical devices rely on pragmatic synonymy
and belong to the metaphoric family, in the sense that ‘something
is compared to something else.’ But in these cases, more
important than the comparison is the vagueness or exaggeration
of the expression.
2.2.2.1.2.1
93
94
Euphemism and circumlocution
The euphemism, or ‘wellspeaking’ (Gk < euphemos = of good
sound or omen; euphemismos = to use a good or auspicious word
for an evil or inauspicious one), is ‘the practice of referring to
something offensive or indelicate in terms that make it sound
more pleasant or becoming than it really is’ (Leech, 1981: 45).
Euphemistic ideas are often expressed by paraphrase (i.e. the
same idea expressed in other words) or circumlocution (i.e. a
roundabout/indirect way of speaking, using more words than are
necessary to express an idea).
Some factual realities – e.g. those related to race, to disease
and death, to physical or moral handicaps, to sex or the excretive
processes of the body – have a high potential of embarrassing or
hurting feelings (both the speaker’s and the receiver’s). In their
desire to ‘purge the subject of its damaging affective associations’
and refer to the factual reality in a more tactful and delicate way,
speakers often use euphemistic purr words whose aim is to
minimize the unpleasant associations of the term, e.g. secondhand instead of ‘used;’ senior citizens instead of ‘old people,’ etc.
Leech (1981: 45) compares euphemism to a ‘linguistic
disinfectant’: a lexical item with unpleasant or offensive
connotations is replaced with one that makes no reference to the
unpleasant aspect of the subject. Thus, for example, the
euphemism contributions (= ‘taxes’) avoids reference to the
compulsory character of the payment; intoxicated (= drunk)
makes no reference to alcohol, and seems to suggest some
accident; etc.
In other words, the euphemism is a pleasant metaphoric label
for some real-world thing or situation which is perceived as
unpleasant, likely to embarrass or hurt feelings.
Among the most productive fields for euphemistic phrases are:
o
racial issues: e.g. the word ‘Negro’ (which stirs
dissatisfaction among the members of the race) is eluded by
using phrases such as coloured people or Afro-Americans; in
apartheid, i.e. the practice of racial discrimination formerly
practiced in South Africa (< apart = separate, thus
‘separatehood’), there is no reference to the different colour of
skin of those ‘set apart,’ and thus discriminated; etc.
o
terms denoting physical or mental ailments:
the word cripple is replaced by circumlocutions, such as: a
(physically) handicapped person; a person with a
o
(physical) handicap; a physically disabled/impaired
person; a physically challenged person; etc.
the lunatic asylum is called a psychiatric ward; terms
referring to mental insanity are also elusive: insane (i.e.
in+sane = not sane); demented (de+mentia = out of
mind);
mentally
deranged/disturbed/impaired;
unbalanced; not in one’s right mind; out of one’s senses;
etc.
death is something we do not like to discuss, so people have
invented a wide choice of terms which help us to avoid any
direct reference to the act of dying:
demise (slightly archaic); to decease; to expire; to
succumb; to pass away; to be gone; to be no more; to
close one’s eyes; to depart (this life); to give up the ghost;
to go the way of all flesh; to join the majority; to meet
one’s Maker; to bite the dust; to push up the daisies; to
put to sleep (an animal); etc.
o
the ‘taboo-ridden subjects’ of bodily functions:
the terms water closet is replaced by: bathroom; lavatory;
loo; rest-room; cloak room; powder room; toilet; the
ladies’/gentlemen’s
room;
Ladies/Gents;
public
convenience; public bathroom; etc.
scatological vocabulary (i.e. words denoting excremental
processes) is skilfully eluded by indirect description of the
act (e.g. to pass water for ‘urinate’), or by reference to the
place where the process takes place (e.g. go to the loo; to
wash one’s hands; etc.).
o
unemployment
in their desire to disguise the unpleasant reality of firing
employees, companies have invented an entire jargon
meant to tone down the painful truth: people are not
‘fired,’ they are dismissed (dis + miss); laid off or made
redundant for reasons of negotiation (whatever that might
mean), or of downsizing/rightsizing/smartsizing the
company. Redeployment of staff; force shaping, workforce
adjustment/optimization; etc. are other elegant labels for
the same painful reality.
Many euphemisms have become part of the language and are
presently shared by the great majority of users. Some are
95
lexicalized so thoroughly that they have become completely
opaque, e.g. disease, demented, water closet.
As the examples show, there is not one, but a whole range of
euphemistic synonyms used to refer tactfully to a reality that is
perceived as delicate or likely to embarrass. This has two basic
causes.
On the one hand, euphemisms have a very short life because
they undergo a rapid process of degradation: the new term is soon
contaminated by the unpleasant reality behind it. This is because
what is perceived as shameful is not the word, but the reality
behind it.
For example, water closet may have sounded euphemistic and
elegant in its early days; but as soon as the phrase became strictly
associated with a specific place and kind of activity, the label got
polluted, so that another ‘positive misnomer’ had to be invented.
And yet, whatever euphemism is imagined, however nicely it
circumscribes the ‘shameful’ reality, the term is continuously
exposed to contamination by the very object of its description.
Whether you talk of the water closet, bathroom, lavatory, lady’s
room, or restroom, the reality behind it is the same. As a result, if
the speaker wants to speak delicately, he must find yet another
indirect linguistic form to put his ideas into, e.g. a lady may excuse
herself by saying that she wants to refresh herself, or to powder
her nose.
On the other hand, the speaker knows only too well the
importance of keeping social relations in good repair. He knows
that use of the wrong word in the wrong place may not only hurt
the listener’s feelings, but also affect his own social status1. To
protect the receiver’s sensitivity, and at the same time, his own
image, the speaker must find tactful ways to refer to things that
may be embarrassing.
This is also the reason why certain terms fall out of ordinary
usage once they begin to be used euphemistically. To this category
belong the terms describing sexual relations. For example, the
basic meaning of intercourse is ‘dealings/communication between
individuals, groups, countries; interchange of thoughts, feelings.’
With the invention of the euphemism sexual intercourse (the first
term of the collocation was gradually dropped), today intercourse
is generally avoided in polite conversation. Words such as erection,
ejaculation or cock underwent a similar process.
1
Strategies of politeness represent the subject of Chapter 8.
96
Thus, the main function of euphemisms is of down-toning or
concealing the negative traits of the referent. But euphemisms
also have an important positive, image-building function.
It is generally acknowledged that figures of speech enhance
the effectiveness of one’s speech. For example, the comparison
involved in the simile (e.g. as cross as nine highways), or the
exaggeration contained in the hyperbole (e.g. I nearly froze to
death) make the description more vivid. Metaphors are both
suggestive and elusive, and endow the referent with a whole range
of possible meanings, e.g. by calling a politician a hawk you
suggest a number of specific features: bird of prey, voracious,
dangerous, but also powerful and magnificent. In addition, with
their indirect allusiveness, they invite the listener to contribute
meaning and personal interpretation.
In the same way, the euphemism is often employed to
enhance the image of the referent. For example, by recalling
discrimination, the word race has acquired negative connotations;
conversely, the euphemism diversity connotes variety and freedom
of choice.
In some cases, the attempt to provide a positive misnomer for
a disagreeable subject is so exaggerated that the euphemism is
actually outrageous. For example, in the phrase concentration
camp introduced by the Nazis, the item camp was meant to
suggest a pleasant place to spend one’s time; yet, the term proved
to be in sharp contrast with reality.
In everyday American English there are numerous imagebuilding euphemisms. Many modest positions or professions in the
U.S.A. are compounds of:
lady: a title of nobility in the UK, the term is used
indiscriminately in the USA, in compounds such as: sales lady,
lady doctor, lady inspector, etc.
engineer:
appearance
engineer
(Br.
‘Hairdresser’);
exterminating engineer (Br. ‘rat-catcher’); etc.
operative (= worker) or director: cleansing department
operative (Br. ‘garbage collector’); funeral director (Br.
‘undertaker’); etc.
academy:
driving
academy/a
riding
academy
(Br.
driving/riding school); etc.
parlor: beauty parlor (Br. ‘beauty salon/shop’), pizza parlor;
etc.
artist/stylist: tonsorial artist/hair stylist (Br. ‘barber’); etc.
97
This stands proof of the great sensitivity Americans manifest
concerning their personal image1. Romanians also follow the
American line, in many cases, by simply adopting the
English/American term, e.g. manager, stilist, director de
marketing, etc. The foreign language further improves the image
of the referent.
Euphemistic ideas can be expressed with the help of other
devices, such as:
circumlocution, e.g. to commit a nuisance (= a theft, a crime);
a bad outcome (= any kind of tragic result); to take seniority
status (= to retire); It’s quite interesting (= I don’t like it);
etc.
litotes (i.e. understatement), e.g. He’s had a glass (= He is
quite drunk); I’ve spent a buck or two (= I’ve spent a lot of
money); etc.;
negative litotes (i.e. grammatical understatement), e.g. It’s
not too safe (= It’s quite dangerous); etc.
irony (= saying the opposite of what one means): a fine
achievement/a great success (= a failure); a real giant (=
quite small); etc.
banter (i.e. good-natured raillery or fun): tired and
overemotional (= drunk);
laughing academy (= lunatic
asylum); taken to the cleaners (= defrauded, robbed, cheated,
conned); Excuse my French (= swearwords); etc.
the use of grandiloquent or elegant terms: the Great Atom
Smasher (= death); the country’s premier fashion designer;
etc.
the use of a foreign-language equivalent, e.g. a tour de force;
en vogue (hence vogueing); world cuisine; It's too nouveau;
etc.
Paraphrase and circumlocution may originate in the speaker’s
desire:
o
o
1
to avoid referring directly to an embarrassing fact/situation,
e.g. a host may ask her guests whether they would like to
refresh themselves; etc.
to avoid saying something unpleasant (see also chapter 8),
e.g. This is a very interesting X. We’ll have to analyse it more
See also the discussion regarding face sensitivity in section 8.2 – Face
and face management.
98
o
o
carefully some day, instead of ‘I don’t like it’ or I’m not
interested’; etc.
to improve their image by appearing educated, e.g. to render
inoperable instead of ‘to spoil/ruin’; to lend assistance instead
of ‘to give help’; etc.
to make the message more interesting and alluring, e.g. in
advertising, We see you floating in tender clouds, instead of
‘We see you dressed in fine clothes.’
2.2.2.1.2.2
Ellipsis and substitution1
Ellipsis is based on elision of certain linguistic items whose
meaning can be retraced from some previous text. This way it
suggests that something is so well known that repetition is
unnecessary, e.g. the butcher’s (shop); St. Paul’s (Cathedral);
When in doubt (about something), leave (it) out; The sooner (you
do something/something occurs), the better (it is).
In figurative speech, though, the elided item is not always
unambiguously clear: the intentional absence of some information
induces a sense of mystery and innuendo, or of in-group
membership (knowledge shared by a small group of initiates). This
is often exploited in advertising, as for instance in:
Aviva (insurance). This ad will be here tomorrow. Will you?
The Independent (newspaper). It is θ. Are you θ?
The Aviva ad uses ellipsis to make receivers meditate: it points
to the idea that life is transitory and that man (i.e. you) can die
unexpectedly. In opposition with the durability of the non-animate
world (the poster will be here), the ephemeral character of human
life appears even more painful.
The Independent ad is based not only on ellipsis, but also on
pun and metonymy. In the context, it is unclear what/who is
independent: the product or its user.
Substitution of a lexical item accomplishes co-reference, i.e.
various ways to ‘refer’ to the same real-world referent (see also
section 5.2). In most cases, the substitution is pronominal:
personal (you, he, they), possessive (my, his, theirs),
demonstrative (this, that), or it can be accomplished by using
deictic words (here, now, there, then, the), comparatives (same,
such, other, better, less, the same, …), etc. For example:
1
See also section 4.5.1 – Text and textness.
99
Boreal (sports shoes). Before you put your life in your hands, put your
feet in ours
Obviously, the pronoun ours substitutes the noun hands, so that
its function is to avoid repetition. But the substitution also induces
a certain degree of ambiguity (… put your feet in our hands?). On
the pragmatic level, though, things become untangled: the pairing
of the idiomatic-metaphoric phrase to put one’s life in someone’s
hands (= to entrust something valuable), with the type of product
(shoes), triggers the reading ‘entrust the comfort of your feet in
us.’
In other cases, an item in the text is replaced by a pro-form
term, as in:
100
Litotes (or understatement) is the opposite, in the sense that it
diminishes the designated object or its qualities for reasons of
o
o
o
o
o
2.2.2.1.2.3
Hyperbole and litotes, irony and banter
The hyperbole, which relies on an intentional and obvious
exaggeration for the sake of emphasis (not deception) holds a very
important place in ordinary communication: exaggeration is a
characteristic feature of human nature. Therefore, hyperbolic
phrases, such as I’m starving, It’s freezing, It nearly killed me, or I
nearly died, are common in ordinary speech.
Many hyperbolic phrases have been assimilated by the
language, becoming idiomatic, e.g. a thousand thanks, scared to
death, to shed floods of tears, wet to the bone, full to the brim,
frightened out of one’s wits, etc.
Diachronically, hyperbole accounts for the change of meaning
of a number of lexical items by addition of modal connotations.
Thus, shows Leviţchi (1970: 72), the prefixes e- or extra-,
originally meant ‘out of’, and words thus prefixed were affectively
neutral. Gradually, they took on hyperbolic dimensions, so that
today they connote something so excessive that it excites our
wonder, indignation, or contempt. For example, enormous (ex- +
norma = norm, standard) initially meant ‘out of norm, out of
standard,’ e.g. an enormous appetite meant an appetite that was
out of the norm; today it refers to something which greatly
exceeds the common size, extent, amount, or degree.
Extraordinary (extra + ordine) and extravagant (from extra +
vagans = to wander) underwent a similar process.
modesty, e.g. a bit of luck, a bite to eat, I only want a moment
of your time, etc.
negative exaggeration, e.g. not to have an ounce of energy
left, not to have had a wink of sleep, not to lay a finger on
someone, etc.
euphemistic circumlocution, e.g. to have had a glass (too
many), etc.
Negative
litotes
(i.e.
expressing
an
affirmative
grammatically negating its contrary) is often used to express:
Aviva. Thinking ahead? So are we.
The ad, which asks the receiver whether he is thinking ahead,
asserts – with the help of the pro-form so – that the company is
also thinking ahead, i.e. trying to find solutions for his problems.
by
modest understatement, e.g. Not too bad, is it?; I’m not
exactly a pauper; etc.
irony or banter1, e.g. Not too successful, were you?; Not
exactly what you expected, is it?, etc.
In most cases, the difference between irony and banter
resides not so much in the words used, as in the speaker’s
paralanguage (tone of voice, smile, etc.).
Leech (1983: 144) considers that banter bears a great weight
in casual linguistic conversation, particularly among youngsters; in
the black community of New York, for example, there is a
ritualized form of banter, called ‘sounding’: it is a language-game
consisting of a ceremonial exchange of insults recognized by both
parties as untrue, therefore not to be taken for insults.
2.2.2.2
Sense relations
Figurative speech often exploits conceptual sense relations –
synonymy, hyponymy, opposition of meaning – to accumulate
weight. By enlarging and developing his ideas, the speaker
enhances the effectiveness of his message.
2.2.2.2.1
Synonymy
It was shown in section 2.2.2.1.1.1 that the metaphor relies on an
imagined/supposed similitude between the object named and the
object referred to (fox for a cunning person). In other words, the
metaphor relies on pragmatic synonymy. This kind of synonymy is
deployed on the paradigmatic axis (i.e. one item instead of
1
Banter = a kind of mock-irony.
101
another). On the syntagmatic axis there are also numerous figures
of speech that exploit conceptual or pragmatic synonymy:
tautology, repetition, ellipsis, etc.
2.2.2.2.1.1
Tautology
By the juxtaposition of two synonyms within the same sentence,
the tautology is conceptually uninformative. However, on the
pragmatic/figurative level, the very repetition of an item carries
additional meaning, e.g. He is his father’s son suggests that he is,
in certain respects, very much like his father.
Tautologies are frequent in idiomatic and colloquial speech:
e.g. What’s yours is yours (i.e. You have qualities that are quite
remarkable); If you must, you must (i.e. Do it, although I think
you are wrong); What’s done is done (= You can’t change what
happened); Business is business (= In business you must not
allow your feelings to interfere); etc.
2.2.2.2.1.2
incremental (or cumulative) repetition, e.g. Those days,
those days, those wonderful days; etc.
chain repetition, i.e. the symmetrical repetition of (groups
of) words in initial and final positions: e.g. He decided he
would wait for just a moment; the moment extended into an
hour; the hour into a day, and the day turned into long-long
weeks and months; etc.
refrain (or chorus), i.e. a word/phrase is repeated several
times, obsessively, e.g. Work, work, work, nothing but long,
long days of hard work; etc.
quantitative hendiadys, i.e. the association of two or more
synonyms linked with the copulative conjunction and: e.g. one
and only; each and every; my lord and master; far and away;
dust and ashes; ashes to ashes; etc.
balanced sentence, or syntactic parallelism, i.e. the
repetition of a syntactic pattern, e.g. The more he read, the
more he wanted to know. The balanced sentence is typically
used in proverbs: e.g. The sooner, the better. The more, the
merrier; Well begun is half done; etc.
Some of the examples are from Leviţchi, 1975.
enumeration, i.e. the listing within same sentence of various
elements of a certain whole: e.g. Nothing could please him, his
clothes, his cars, his horses, his art collection, everything
seemed to bore him after a while.
climax (or gradation), i.e. an ascending succession, e.g. The
more he read, the more he wanted to know, and soon he
spent most of his waking hours reading.
Hyponymy: the metonymy
With metonymy (Gk. meta = change + onoma = name), ‘the
name of an object is replaced by one of its significant attributes,
by some function that it discharges, etc.’ (Leviţchi, 1970: 81-2)
While the metaphor relies on a similitude between the signifier
and the signified, with the metonymy the relationship is factual:
the term used designates a real-world aspect, attribute, or
instrument of the referent. For example:
the material instead of the object that is made of it, as in:
iron, i.e. the name of the metal used for the appliance
gold (= money), i.e. the name of the metal instead of
the product made of it; etc.
the name of an instrument for the agent (i.e. the person to
whom it is related):
crown or throne for ‘king’; sword instead of ‘army,’
e.g. The crown relied on the sword to win the battle.
the name of a typical attribute of the referent:
from the cradle to the grave (i.e. cradle = birth; grave
= death); etc.
bars instead of ‘prison’: to put someone behind bars
the holder for the thing held:
the police for ‘the men in the police’; the gallery for
‘the men in the gallery,’ The gallery cheered their
team.
the church for ‘clergy’: The history of England witnessed
many conflicts between the throne and the Church.
the maker’ name used for the object made:
Picasso for ‘painting by Picasso,’ e.g. The Picasso was
sold for $100,000.
the producer’s name for the product range, e.g. a
Versace (dress); an Armani (suit); a Dior (perfume); etc.
1
2.2.2.2.2
Repetition, accumulation, gradation
Repetition, accumulation and gradation1 - which build up tension
and enhance the impact of the message – are of several types:
102
the place of origin instead of a object coming from it:
103
champagne (< Champagne), holland (= a kind of linen <
Holland); china (= porcelain < China); etc.
a part for the whole, or the whole for a part:
sail for ‘ship,’ e.g. The sails left the harbour.
a hand for ‘a worker’ (a hired hand), or ‘person’ (to give
somebody a hand);
finger for ‘physical violence,’ e.g. to have a finger in
every pie; etc.
the special for the general, or the general for the special:
a leaf of grass for ‘nature’, e.g. Every leaf of grass must
be protected.
nature for a limited surface, e.g. a park.
The last two categories mentioned above belong to a subcategory of metonymy, i.e. synecdoche. However, most linguists
include the synecdoche under the heading metonymy.
2.2.2.2.3 Opposition of meaning
Other figures of speech exploit lexical, grammatical or pragmatic
opposition of meaning.
2.2.2.2.3.1 Antithesis
Antithesis is larger than antonymy in that involves a pragmatic
opposition of ideas, as in:
a tiny man with a huge appetite
The harder we tried, the less successful we were
By contrasting opposite ideas, antithesis conveys a powerful
message. In strategic communication, such as advertising, it
sometimes contains an added element of ambiguity based on double
meaning (pun), as in:
Phillips. We’ve made the concept of small really big
Volvo. Oceans away you’re close to a great deal
The conceptual contradiction inherent in the antonymous pairs
of adjectives (small and big) and, respectively, adverbs (away and
close) induces semantic anomaly. On the pragmatic level,
however, the ads are funny and meaningful: to make something
big can be interpreted as ‘increasing the size of an object,’ or as
‘great achievement in a certain field;’ and a great deal can mean ‘a
lot of things,’ but also ‘a great business opportunity.’
104
2.2.2.2.3.2
False homology: Ambiguity and paradox
False homology draws on the opposition between appearance and
reality. There are two main types:
o
o
ambiguity, which under the appearance of similarity conceals
an actual difference; and
paradox, which relies on the actual similarity of two
apparently opposite notions or objects.
A. Ambiguity and the pun
Ambiguity is based on a breach of the rules of conceptual
normality, the message allowing at least two readings.
If,
in
ordinary
speech,
people
sometimes produce
unintentionally utterances that are less than clear, in figurative
speech, the ambiguity is always intentional, strategically exploited
for the linguistic effect.
The pun (or conundrum), the most popular figure of speech
based on ambiguity, is caused by polysemy or homonymy. Many
jokes and advertisements derive their humour from the double
meaning of polysemous words, or from the similar pronunciation of
different words, as in:
Change is inevitable ... except from vending machines
It is estimated that there are ten million over-weight women. These of
course are round figures
The examples allow at least two readings: change means
‘transformation, modification,’ but also ‘money returned when the
sum offered in payment is larger than the sum due’ (which should
come from vending machines, but does not always come). Round
figures can mean ‘approximately’ – with reference to the estimated
number of over-weight women, but it can also refer to the rotund
shapes of the fat ladies discussed.
Homonymy is also the source of a joke that circulated shortly
after the election of Barack Obama as President of the U.S.A.:
They once said that a black man would be President when pigs flew.
His first 100 days and – wham!! Pig's flu!
The nearly simultaneous occurrence of a disease that terrified the
entire world (pig’s flu) and the election of the first coloured
president of the USA reminded the joke’s creator of a popular
idiom (when pigs fly = never); tragic moments are well known to
produce examples of excellent (black) humour.
Conversion can also trigger grammatical ambiguity, as in:
105
John Players Special (cigarettes): Players Please
Lucky Strike (cigarettes): Get Lucky.
(movie): Crossing Jordan
In the first example, please can function as an adverb, in
which case the ad reads ‘Please give me …,’ or as a verb, which
triggers the reading ‘… are satisfying.’ Get Lucky can be
interpreted as ‘Become lucky,’ in which case lucky is an adjective,
or ‘Obtain/Buy Lucky cigarettes,’ in which case it is a proper noun.
The movie title exploits both lexical ambiguity (homonymy)
and our knowledge of the world: from the Bible we know of the
Jordan river, whose waters were crossed (= traversed) by the
early Christians; but in the movie, Jordan is a young policewoman
whose sharp mind and quick temper makes it unwise for people to
cross (= irritate) her.
Antanaclasis, which also relies on lexical and grammatical
ambiguity and on double meaning, involves the repetition of a
word, with changed meaning and sometimes of grammatical
category:
(a bank ad): Bank on a bank that’s decisive
(Insurance company): Derek died broke. And that broke his wife
The ads rely on conversion and homonymy. In the first, bank
is first a verb in the imperative (meaning here ‘to choose’), then a
noun (= a financial institution). In the insurance ad, broke is first
an adjective (to be broke = to be penniless) and then the preterit
of the verb break, broke, broken (meaning here ‘overwhelmed,
destroyed’).
B. Paradox and oxymoron
Just like ambiguity, the paradox draws on the opposition between
appearance and reality and on double meaning. But unlike
ambiguity, which under the appearance of a similarity of form
conceals an actual difference of meaning, paradox focuses on the
actual similarity of two apparently opposite notions or objects.
Furthermore, just like ambiguity, the paradox exploits not only
the rules of the dictionary, but also those of nature: the lexical
opposition is annihilated by the logic of the real world, so that the
seemingly absurd assertion becomes truthful.
Life is killing me
Art tells the truth by lying
(tourist agency ad): Some of our public beaches can be very private
106
At first sight, the sentences are illogical: they bring together
words whose conceptual features exclude each other: life excludes
the act of killing, truth conceptually contradicts the act of lying,
and public-private form an antonymous pair. But pragmatically,
the ideas make sense, although on different principles.
In the first example, the phrase is killing me is used
idiomatically, meaning ‘to annoy,’ ‘to wear out.’ The second
summarizes in a sophisticated way the very essence of Art: in this
elusive and illusive realm, truth and lies can not only coexist, but
one is the very essence of the other.
In the third example, the paradox is doubled by a
pun/conundrum. Public and private have opposite meanings with
reference to ownership (beaches can be both publicly and privately
owned). But private is polysemous: it can also mean ‘intimate’ or
‘free from intrusion’ (an essential feature in the context of
tourism), so that the contradiction is pragmatically annihilated.
The oxymoron is a special type of paradox: it is based on the
juxtaposition of two antonyms, as in:
a poor rich (girl); to act naturally; almost exactly; I clearly
misunderstood; cruel kindness; a definite maybe; found missing; a
genuine imitation; living dead; a paid volunteer; passive aggression;
peace force; pretty ugly; terribly pleased; a small crowd; a silent
scream; a working vacation; sweet sorrow; etc.
Although conceptually such phrases are dissonant, on the
pragmatic level they are not anomalous: there are quite a few
poor rich girls (very unhappy, in spite of their riches); a peace
force is often required to stop the fights; working vacations are not
really unusual; etc.
There are also phrases which are considered to be
pragmatically oxymoronic, although their components are not
conceptual opposites, e.g. diet ice cream; temporary tax increase;
truthful advertising; etc.
2.2.2.2.4
Semantic anomaly: Zeugma and bathos
The paradox and the oxymoron have introduced a type of
apparently
dissonant construct which, on the pragmatic level,
proves to be true. Dissonant utterances breach the laws of
semantic well-formedness blatantly; and yet, they manage not
only to convey logical meaning, but also to do so in a funny and
attention-catching way.
107
This shows that semantic anomaly is often exploited by gifted
communicators, or professional creators, to achieve humorous
effects while conveying additional meaning. With the zeugma and
the bathos, the utterances are even more dissonant; and yet, their
message is clear, intelligent, and immensely funny.
The zeugma (or syllepsis) draws on polysemy and on semantic
incompatibility: it involves the simultaneous use of the same word
with two senses (and sometimes with different grammatical
functions) to modify or govern two or more words to which it is
appropriate, but in a different way, as in:
He caught a trout and a bad cold
He took his hat and his leave and went out
He was wearing a scarf and a look of embarrassment
Paul and his driving license expiated last week
Each of the examples contains two semantically well-formed
collocative groups: you can catch a trout, and you can also catch a
bad cold; you can take your hat, and you can take your leave; you
can wear a scarf, and you can wear a look of embarrassment; etc.
But these collocative groups are mutually incompatible: the
[CONCRETE] feature of trout clashes with the [-CONCRETE]
feature of cold; the [CONCRETE] feature of hat clashes with the [CONCRETE] feature of leave; etc. A [CONCRETE] and a [CONCRETE] object cannot modify the same verb in the same
context. In the same way, the verb expiate in the last example
collocates correctly both with Paul and with driving licence: a
person can expiate (= die), and so can a driving license (= cease
to be valid). The clash between the [ANIMATE] feature of Paul and
the [-ANIMATE] feature of driving licence makes the sentence
dissonant but funny. That is why the zeugma is highly appreciated
in jokes.
The bathos (or anticlimax) relies on a similarly unexpected
‘second part’ in the sentence. It is based on ‘a ludicrous descent
from the exalted or lofty to the commonplace’ (Webster), as in the
following two 19th century ads (quoted by Dyer, 1982: 30):
A Beautiful Young Girl Strangled
a cry of admiration when she saw our new blouses.
The Duke of Wellington Shot
108
display – with the first part of the sentence written above the
second and in bigger letters – contributes to the shock effect.
2.2.3
Change of meaning and lexicalization
Figurative speech can also undergo a process of lexicalization:
certain figurative usages have been assimilated so thoroughly by
the language that they are now part of the dictionary.
According to their degree of assimilation by the language,
figures of speech can be described as live, degraded or dead.
Figures of speech which are perceived as fresh and poetic, are
referred to as live, e.g. live metaphors or live similes.
To illustrate live metaphors1, we should leaf through the
writings of great poets, whose figures of speech have remained
fresh in spite of their age. To give just one example, take Kipling’s
lines, If you can fill the unforgiving minute/With sixty seconds’
worth of distance run (fill the minute – verbal metaphor;
unforgiving minute – epithet and personification).
The life of live figures of speech is, however, short. Some are
produced specifically for one occasion (e.g. advertising metaphors)
and die out as soon as the text is no longer valid. Others remain
restricted to a certain domain (e.g. those of literature). Still others
are institutionalized, becoming part of the language.
Institutionalized figures of speech are degraded: they are still
perceived as figurative, but they are so well known and so
frequently used that they are conventionally accepted by the entire
language community. Degraded figures of speech thus assimilated
are listed in the dictionary in the form of idioms, which will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Thus, many currently used idiomatic phrases are, in fact,
degraded metaphors: e.g. to make head or tail of something; to
fall in love; a broken heart; a splitting headache; butterflies in
one’s stomach; to jump out of one’s skin; to wear one’s heart on
one’s sleeve; etc. Many euphemisms have undergone the same
process and are now institutionalized, e.g. African-American; to
close one's eyes; to pass water; to use the bathroom; to downsize
staff; etc.
Similes can also be fresh and poetic (i.e. live), e.g. as bright as
a day of spring; as dull as a cloudy day; but many have been
degraded, becoming idiomatic phrases frequently repeated by
a glance of admiration at our hats.
By the sudden ‘descent’ from the tragic into the common-place,
the bathos is a source of great fun. Obviously, the inventive
1
See also the texts in Annex 4.
109
English speakers: as fresh as a daisy; as dark as pitch; to drink
like a fish; as drunk as a lord; (as) green as grass; like a cat on
hot bricks; as poor as a church mouse; as plump as a partridge;
(as) red as a lobster; thick as thieves; etc.
Degraded hyperboles are also common, e.g. to freeze to
death; to shed floods of tears; frightened out of one’s wits; to be
in the seventh heaven; wet to the bone; etc.
The choice of the figurative images is quite arbitrary: there is
often no logical explanation why certain figurative images have
been assimilated by the language the way they have. For example,
shows Leech (1981: 227), the fox has been conventionally
accepted as metaphor for the cunning person, although it could be
used as well to name one who is red-haired, or one who has a
pointed face. In the same way, the hard-working person is called a
bee, although the donkey is also a hard-working animal; but
donkey is used to name the stubborn person. And nobody can
reasonably explain why the lord is the ‘measure’ for drunkenness.
The conventional character of figurative images becomes
obvious if we compare languages. Different languages have
conventionalized the same idea by using different figurative
images: Romanians name the person who reads a lot ‘library
mouse’ (şoarece de bibliotecă); the English compare him to a
worm (bookworm). Or, there is no logical explanation why the
measure for blindness in English is the bat (i.e. as blind as a bat),
while in Romanian it is the mole (i.e. orb ca o cârtiţă).
Some popular metaphors produced by great writers have also
undergone certain degradation. Shakespeare’s famous All the
world’s a stage, for instance, has been repeated so often that, if
one person begins the phrase, another will continue it.
To achieve special effects, advertisers often indulge in
revitalizing degraded metaphors, e.g. you can actually see a
person’s eyes popping out, money flowing down the drain, people
flying (of happiness), etc.
On the third level of assimilation, figures of speech are viewed as
figuratively dead1, i.e. their present form and meaning no longer
recalls their figurative origin.
1
According to some linguists (e.g. Leviţchi, 1970), dead metaphors are
those whose figurative character can no longer be retraced by the
ordinary speaker, as in the examples quoted here. Other linguists (e.g.
Leech, 1981) call ‘dead’ all those figures of speech that have been
completely assimilated by the language.
110
In every language there are words and phrases whose
figurative character is lost to the ordinary speaker. Few people
today know, for example, that window, daisy and husband were
originally metaphorical compounds: they come, respectively, from
Old English windes eage (= the wind’s eye), daeges eage (= the
day’s eye), and hus bonda (= house master).
With some dead metaphors, the figurative usage has pushed
out the original (concrete) meaning, e.g. to thrill originally meant
‘to bore holes’; today it means ‘to delight.’ With others, the
original meaning is preserved, but the figurative usage is so well
established that people no longer perceive the link, e.g. the crane
(i.e. the machine used for lifting and moving heavy weights) got
its name from the delicate long-necked bird which bears the same
name. The same thing happened in the case of words transferred
from one domain to another: the nose of a ship; the airplane pilot
navigates/sails his vehicle; we navigate on the Internet and use
search engines; the web (Internet) has world wide dimensions;
etc.
The analysis points to the fact that, just like in the case of word
formation, lexicalization of figurative speech is accompanied by
loss of transparency. Most live figures of speech – which are not
lexicalized at all – are transparent: the speaker/writer/poet may
want to make his text more interesting, but he wants his message
to get through. Conversely, dead metaphors – which have been
completely lexicalized – are opaque: neither the speaker nor the
receiver knows where the words/phrases come from, so they
cannot retrace their original meanings.
Between the two extremes, transparency comes by degrees.
The dictionary provides hosts of semi-transparent or semi-opaque
phrases: a hard nut to crack; to swallow the bitter pill; to be
knocked up (= to become pregnant); etc.
When the lexicalization of newly coined words was discussed
(see section 2.1.2.3.2) it was mentioned that new words may be
more of less opaque (e.g. Bluetooth). In the same way, it would
be a mistake to say that the opacity of a word/phrase is a direct
consequence of its advance in age or its degree of assimilation. In
the case of figurative speech, the criterion according to which a
phrase is labelled as transparent, semi-transparent, semi-opaque
or opaque is the semantic link the speaker perceives between the
metaphorical expression and its literal equivalent.
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Thus, if the relation is obvious and the language user can get
the meaning of the phrase by computing the meanings of its
components, then the phrase is considered transparent and wellmotivated, e.g. as soft as silk; to get to the heart of something;
etc.
Conversely, if the link is perceived as non-existent and the
language user cannot decode the meaning of the phrase by
computing the meanings of its components, the phrase is labelled
as opaque, i.e. not motivated, e.g. to be yellow bellied (=
extremely timid or cowardly); the apple of one’s eyes (= a much
beloved child); blowing smoke (= boasting without being able to
back it up); etc.
In between is the great mass of semi-transparent or semiopaque phrases. Naturally, what may appear as ‘obvious’ and
motivated (i.e. semi-transparent) to one receiver may appear as
‘vague’ and non-motivated (i.e. semi-opaque) to another.
Lexicalized metaphors cover all degrees of transparency.
They can be transparent, e.g. to earn one’s keep; to keep in
touch; to give someone the green light; etc. Most similes are
transparent, as the equivalence they are based on is explicit, e.g.
as fresh as a rose; as pretty as a picture; etc.
A great number of metaphors are semi-transparent or semiopaque, allowing the receiver to infer their meaning by effort of
imagination and knowledge of the world, e.g. to bring home the
bacon; to cry over spilt milk; to turn a deaf ear; to give a hand; to
take something for granted; to give somebody a dirty look; to cut
one’s nose to spite one’s face; etc.
Numerous metaphors are completely opaque, e.g. to chew the
fat (= to talk about unimportant things); to put on the dog (= to
act as if one were rich); to be green about the gills (= looking as
though one is about to be sick); red tape (= bureaucratic routine
required before official action can be taken); as thick as two short
planks (= very stupid); etc. With opaque metaphors, the receiver’s
knowledge of the world and imagination are useless: the individual
elements provide no clue regarding the meaning of the phrase.
Lexicalization has turned them into complex dictionary entries,
which have to be learned as such.
In conclusion, language and meanings are continuously on the
move. New words are borrowed and/or coined every day, to cover
the new realities of the world. But change of meaning is by far the
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most productive word formation technique: new contexts endow
existing terms with meanings that they did not possess before,
and figurative transfer offers a valuable instrument to the creative
speaker. To become part of the conceptual system of the
language, though, the new words must undergo a process of
lexicalization.
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something (= to be good at); to have one’s head screwed the
right way (= to be sensible); to bury one’s head in the sand (=
to refuse to face a difficult situation); to have something
hanging over one’s head (= to be in constant danger); etc.
Chapter 3
eyes: not to see eye to eye about something (= to disagree);
to be up to the eyes in work (= very busy); to open someone’s
eyes (= to make someone become aware of something); to
keep an eye on someone/something (= to watch); to catch
someone’s eye (= to attract someone’s attention); to have an
eye for something (= to have good appreciation for things of
value); to turn a blind eye (= to ignore behaviour which is
against the rules or illegal); in the public eye (= well known,
often appearing in public); to have eyes only for someone; to
make eyes at someone (= to show overtly one’s liking for a
person of the opposite sex); etc.
nose: to poke one’s nose into other people’s business (= to
interfere); to turn up one’s nose at something (= to
scorn/reject something); to keep one’s nose to the grindstone
(= to keep working); can’t see beyond/further than the end of
one’s nose (= to be incapable of predicting obvious
consequences); to look down one’s nose at someone (= to
disrespect); with one’s nose in the air (= conceited); to follow
one’s nose (= to follow one’s instinct); etc.
shoulder: shoulder to shoulder (= together, side by side); a
shoulder to cry on (= someone sympathetic, who will listen to
you when you are in trouble); to take the burned off one’s
shoulders (= to help someone out); to put one’s shoulder to
the wheel (= to help, to contribute to the effort); to give
someone the cold shoulder (= to reject, especially a member
of the opposite sex); to rub shoulders with (= to be overfriendly with, to meet socially); etc.
tongue: to hold one’s tongue (= to keep silent); to have a
sharp tongue (= to speak harshly and offensively); a slip of
the tongue (= something said/revealed by mistake, when
something else was intended); to find one’s tongue (= to begin
to talk after a long silence); it’s on the tip of my tongue (= I
know it, but I cant remember its name); to speak with one’s
tongue in one’s cheek (= said in a way which is not meant to
be taken seriously); etc.
Idiom and style
3.1
Idiomatic speech
Idiomatic speech is characteristic to the native speaker’s instincts
of the language. Idioms combine existing words in ways which
often upset the rules of logic and grammar to create new phrases
whose meaning is often puzzling, being partially or completely
opaque.
The English language is particularly rich in idioms – there are
thousands of long-lived groups of words whose meaning has little
or nothing to do with the meaning of the individual words. A large
number of idioms are associated with informal or colloquial
speech, and many sound slangy and playful. Some have become
popular because of their euphony, e.g. they are based on rhyme
(snug as a bug in a rug) or alliteration (spick and span). Others
are well-known proverbs or maxims that express basic practical
truths, or folksy sayings used in particular regions or local
dialects. Sports terms, technical jargon, legal words, business
vocabulary, military slang, nautical expressions, and practically
every facet of human activity, have found their way into idiomatic
English. This is because idioms, more than individual words,
mirror and embody the life and soul of the people who speak the
language. Without idioms English would lose much of its variety
and humour, both in speech and writing. All dialects of English
have different sets of idioms; some idioms, however, belong to
world-wide English.
There is practically no aspect of human life that should not
have produced its plethora of idioms. For example, every part of
the human body has triggered numerous idiomatic phrases:
the head: pig-headed (= stubborn); to lose one’s head; to fall
head over heels in love; to take something into one’s head
(= to insist); to be/pass above one’s head (= to be beyond
one’s ability to understand); to have a (good) head for
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dangerous situation); to go through/put someone through the
mill (= to experience/make someone experience something);
easier said than done (= giving advice is easy, doing things is
quite difficult); the chief stumbling block (= the main
difficulty); teething troubles (= difficulties arising at the
beginning of activity); the fly in the ointment (= something
unpleasant); a hard/tough nut (to crack) (= a difficult
problem); etc.
Animal idiom is also extremely rich, as the examples below – for
horse and dog – show:
horse: horse sense (= common sense); to horse around (= to
play or joke in a rough or noisy way); to work like a horse (=
to work very hard); to ride one’s horse to death (= to
overwork, e.g. a servant); to ride the high horse (= to be
proud and arrogant); to look a gift horse in the mouth (= to
criticize a gift); to get something straight from the horse’s
mouth (= to get information directly from the source); to
change horses midstream (e.g. to change a minister when he
had barely started his reforms); to put the cart before the
horse (= to do things in the wrong order, e.g. to get pregnant
before getting married); to lock the stable door after the horse
is stolen (= to take safety measures when it is too late); You
can lead a horse to the water, but you can’t make it drink (=
you cannot force people do things); to die in harness (= to be
active till the end of one’s days); etc.
dog: to be dog-tired (= very tired); to work like a
horse/dog/slave (= to work very much); to lead a dog’s life (=
a hard life); (the) top dog (= a VIP; the boss); to lead a cat
and dog life (= about a married couple who are always
fighting); to give a dog a bad name (= to be very bad, worse
than dogs); to help lame dogs over stiles (= to look after
unhappy or unlucky people); to go to the dogs (= to be ruined
through one’s own fault); never had a dog’s chance (= was
always unlucky); misfortune has always dogged his footsteps
(= has always been unlucky); his bark is worse than his bite
(= he always threatens, but rarely punishes); Let sleeping
dogs lie (= Don’t stir up trouble); You can’t teach an old dog
new tricks (= it is difficult for old people to develop new
abilities); etc.
Idioms can also be grouped by the notions and functions they
express, as in:
difficulty: takes a lot of doing (= difficult); to learn/find
out/discover something the hard way (= to learn from one’s
own experience and mistakes); to get (oneself) into a fix/in a
tight squeeze (= to get in a difficult situation); to have one’s
hands full (= to be very busy); to take the bull by the horns (=
to deal with a difficult situation in a bold and direct manner);
to have one’s back to/against the wall (= to be in a difficult or
ease: a piece of cake/child’s play (= very easy); a soft job (=
easy); to take the line of least resistance (= to take the easiest
way of doing something); to make a short work of something (=
to finish something quickly); a sitting duck (= an easy target);
to be able to do something standing on one’s head/with one
hand/arm (tied) behind one’s back (= able to do something
easily); to win hands down (= to do something without
difficulty); to cruise (home) to victory (= to win easily); to
go/run like a clock (= to go/run smoothly); to take to something
like a duck to water (= to do something easily and naturally);
Easy come, easy go (= easily earned or obtained, and easily
spent or lost); And Bob’s your uncle! (= That’s it – used as a
comment at the end of a simple, practical task); etc.
3.1.1
Defining idiom
To understand what idiomatic language means, we must first
define the notion of idiom.
Oxford Concise Dictionary (2002) defines idiom as:
1. a group of words established by usage as having a meaning not
deducible from those of the individual words, e.g. over the moon;
2. a form of expression natural to a language, person, or group.
In Hornby’s Advanced Learners’ Dictionary of Current English
(1958), the definition is only slightly different:
1. a group or succession of words that must be learnt as a whole
because it is difficult or impossible to understand the meaning
from a knowledge of words considered separately, e.g. to give
way, in order to;
2. a form of expression peculiar to a people, country, district,
group of people, or to one individual, as the French idiom (the
language) or Shakespeare’s idiom (the method of expression
used by him and which is peculiar to him).
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Thus, both dictionaries – as most others – view the notion of
idiom from two basic perspectives:
on the one hand, the term idiom is used to name a linguistic
expression (phrase) commonly used by a certain group of
people, whose meaning is different from the meaning of the
individual items;
on the other hand, idiom refers to the manner of speaking of
a nation, an ethnic or social group, a person of great fame or
status, etc.
While the second sense of the term pertains to socio-linguistics
or stylistics, it is the first sense which represents the object of
semantics and of the present chapter. However, defining the term
idiom – even in this restricted sense – is not easy, and linguists
have various, often conflicting, views.
For example, Cruse (1986: 38) defines the term idiom as ‘a
lexical complex which is semantically simplex.’ According to this
extremely simple but highly suggestive definition, idioms have two
basic characteristics:
•
•
structurally, idioms are complex, i.e. they are composed of
more than one lexical item;
semantically, they are simplex, i.e. they function as a single
lexeme because they have a unitary meaning.
In accordance with this definition, many compounds could be
included within the category of idiom. For instance, compound
nouns, such as merry-go-round, mother-of-pearl, skinhead, or
breakthrough, are made up of several lexemes, but have a unitary
meaning. Similarly, phrasal verbs (e.g. to bring about; to drop off;
to fall behind; to see through) or verbal phrases (e.g. to break
free, to give way, to turn sour) have a complex structure and a
unitary meaning. Such compounds also abide by the condition
imposed by the Oxford and Hornby definitions: the meaning of the
word group (or phrase) is different from the meaning of the
constituent items. Compounds, however, are not idioms.
Most linguists agree that an idiom is a familiar, ready-made
phrase or commonplace expression thus established by long-term
usage. This definition brings us close to the notion of collocation,
i.e. to traditional co-occurrences of lexical items. Many phrases
rely on collocation: if the expression is heard often, the words
become glued together in our minds, e.g. crystal clear, bread and
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butter, to take a holiday, to pay a visit, etc. However, with
collocations, each element of the group preserves its own
meaning; conversely, the idiom has by definition a unitary
meaning which involves an actual phraseological fusion. Thus,
for example, the collocation How are you? is a question concerning
the interlocutor’s personal health (i.e. the speaker is asking the
listener how he is/feels, and the latter is expected to answer, Very
well, thank you, or Not so well, I’m afraid). The idiom How do you
do!, on the other hand, is no longer a question about how the
receiver is/feels, but has become a formulaic expression, a mere
greeting (similar to Good morning! or Good afternoon!); the
expected answer is How do you do!, which shows that the meaning
of the individual items has been lost altogether.
Linguists also agree that idioms are stable phrases with a
fixed lexical and grammatical content and structure. They are
indivisible and indecomposable units of language, characterized by
internal cohesion. Idioms resist interruption, e.g. to fit like a glove
is an idiom (meaning ‘to fit perfectly’); but ‘to fit like a leather
glove’ may be grammatically and semantically correct, but is not
an idiom. Nor do idioms accept reordering, e.g. to be black and
blue = to be bruised; ‘to be blue and black’ is again grammatically
and semantically well-formed, but it is not idiomatic. The meaning
of such phrases depends on the context.
It is often difficult to say whether we are dealing with a
collocation or an idiom. For example, the phrase to hit the high
spots sounds highly idiomatic. However, the verb to hit often
collocates with place names to convey a meaning of speedy and
hurried visit (e.g. to hit the road, to hit the town, to hit
London/Paris), so that it preserves its own meaning. This
contradicts the requirement of unitary meaning, basic for the
idiom. On the other hand, the phrase to hit the high spots has a
figurative sense that is unitary (= to get into high society), so that
it cannot be denied the status of idiom. Therefore, we must
acknowledge the fact that there are numerous borderline cases, of
phrases which do not enjoy the status of pure idioms, but still
must be included in the category of idioms.
The idea of a strictly fixed form of idioms must be
reconsidered, too. Some idioms have two or three variants (pairs
or triplets), e.g. to spread/stretch one’s wings (= to try out one’s
abilities); to bury the tomahawk/hatchet (= to make peace); to
never/rarely/seldom miss a trick (= to be alert); etc.
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Such variants, determined by differences of register, dialectal
usage, etc. seem to upset the requirement for a fixed form; but in
terms of meaning, they are all simplex and the variants carry the
same unitary meaning.
Elision is another phenomenon that affects the fixedness of
form of idioms. Some phrases are so well known and widely
circulated that one part of the phrase is often dropped. For
example, the phrase with no strings attached is often abbreviated
to no strings; to swallow the bitter pill becomes to swallow the pill,
or just a bitter pill; a hard nut to crack is often shortened to a
hard nut; The last straw that broke the camel’s back becomes the
last straw; A bird in the hand is worth two in a bush becomes A
bird in the hand … or, in shorthand variant, bird in hand; instead
of to draw a red herring across the track (= to distract and
confuse) people may simply say a red herring; etc.
3.1.2
The origins of idioms
The origins of idioms are most diverse and it is often hard to
establish the true history of a particular expression. Linguists who
study the sources of idiomatic expressions do not always agree.
Some idioms, however, have a fairly well known origin.
Idioms come from all kinds of sources: from the Bible to the
world of business, from ancient fables to modern slang. Some
were coined by famous authors (e.g. Homer, Aesop, Chaucer, or
Shakespeare); the popularity of their works made the expressions
popular, too. Some go back in time to ancient Greece and Rome;
others are more recent.
For example, the Bible has inspired or originated idioms such
as: a thorn in the flesh (Corinthians, 12:7) = a persistent
difficulty; an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth (Luke, 24:44) = to
pay for one’s deeds; to bite the dust (Psalms, 122:6) = to die or
to be humiliated; blind leading blind (Matthew, 15:14) = an
unprepared person gives advice to another just like him; the
writing is on the wall (Daniel, 5:5) = an unavoidable disaster is
foretold; etc.
Shakespeare also produced a great number of idioms, such
as: All that glisters is not gold (The Merchant of Venice); for ever
and a day (As You Like It) = always; flesh and blood (Hamlet) =
the relatives; neither here nor there (Hamlet) = nowhere; etc.
Some idioms recall historical or literary figures of antiquity, e.g.
to cross the Rubicon (= to take a decisive and irrevocable step)
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reminds us of Julius Caesar; to eat one’s heart out (= to make
oneself sick with grief and worry) was first used by Homer in the
Odyssey. Sour grapes comes from Aesop’s fable The Fox and the
Grapes, in which the fox, who cannot jump high enough to reach a
bunch of grapes she yearns for, gives up saying they were sour
anyway. Other idioms are related to certain specialized domains, e.g.
The exception proves the rule has been shortened from the legal
maxim The exception proves the rule in cases not excepted.
Numerous idioms have been borrowed as translation loans
from other languages. For example, the idiom blue blood (= of
high or noble birth) has been translated from Spanish, where
aristocrats used to boast that their skin was light (the veins show
through a fair skin and are blue in colour) because they had not
intermarried with the darker-skinned Moors. Or, from an old
German saying we have Blood is thicker than water, meaning
‘family ties cannot be denied,’ i.e. since water can evaporate
without leaving a trace, whereas blood leaves a stain, the saying
suggests that relatives (blood) are more important (thicker) than
people who are not related (water).
Many English idioms come from the old traditions of various
peoples who speak it. A great number are originally British, e.g. to
carry coals to Newcastle (= to do something useless); to kick the
bucket (= to die) comes from Norfolk, England, where ‘the bucket’
was a beam from which they hanged by its hind feet a pig about
to be killed (the nervous reflexes of the dying pig caused it to kick
the bucket); dressed to a tea (= well dressed, with attention to
details) appeared in Victorian times, when the custom of having
high tea was a formal affair and people dressed with great care for
it. Some idioms are related to real persons, e.g. to be in the
crapper (= to be soiled or hopelessly irretrievable) comes from the
name of Sir John Crapper, the designer and implementer of
modern indoor plumbing (public bathrooms in England are still
referred to as the john or the crapper).
The number of idioms coming form America is also large, e.g.
to bury the hatchet (= to stop the war) originates from the
customs of the American Indians for whom the undigging of the
hatched signified a declaration of war and the act of burying it
meant making peace; a happy hunting ground (= a place where
one goes to obtain something or to make money) derives from the
term used by American Indians for paradise; to bark up the wrong
tree (= to do something in the wrong way or from the wrong
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direction) originates from the practice of raccoon-hunting, in which
dogs were used to locate raccoons up in trees; to paddle one’s
own canoe (= to do one’s own work, to be independent) is an
American idiom of the late 18th/early 19th century.
Some idioms are related to or created by famous people. For
example, to have an axe to grind (= to have a personal, often
selfish, reason for being involved in something) allegedly comes
from a story told by Benjamin Franklin about a man who, having
an axe to sharpen, asked him to demonstrate how his father’s
grindstone worked.
Like the entire vocabulary, idioms are dynamic and subject to
rapid change: new idioms are continuously created, old ones fade
away as rapidly, and numerous idioms change their meaning.
For example, the phrase Eat, drink, and be merry comes from
the Bible (Luke 12:19): Jesus tells a parable about a man who
stores up food for the years to come and tells himself, Soul, you
have many goods laid up for years to come; take your ease, eat,
drink, and be merry. In the parable, Jesus presents the man as a
fool (his life ends that very day, and he cannot take with him to
the grave the food he has stored up); but today, the phrase is
used in a positive sense. The phrase There is no love lost between
them underwent a similar change of meaning: in the original
version, the persons liked each other very much; today’s version is
ironic: the words convey the opposite meaning.
Numerous idioms are opaque and baffling, as there is no
perceivable relationship between the meaning of individual words
and the overall meaning of the phrase. A glimpse into their history
(or story), however, can often explain things. Consider the
following random list of examples:
blowing smoke (= boasting without being able to back it up)
comes from the practice of magicians, who use smoke in their
performance to conceal a bit of trickery.
Break a leg! (= a wish of good luck) is rooted in the old belief
in Sprites and a kind of medieval reverse psychology. Sprites
were spirits or ghosts believed to enjoy wreaking havoc and
causing trouble. If the Sprites heard you ask for something,
they were reputed to try to make happen the exact opposite.
Telling someone to ‘break a leg’ was, therefore, an attempt to
outsmart the Sprites and bring about a good outcome.
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1
to chew the fat (= to talk about unimportant things) derives
form the Inuit1, who used to chew on pieces of whale blubber
(almost like chewing gum) while doing other things.
to bust someone’s chops (= to harass): At the turn of the
century the fashion was to wear very long sideburns, called
‘mutton chops’ or ‘lamb chops’, so that ‘a bust in the chops’
meant a hit in the face.
a cat bird seat (= a highly advantageous position) comes from
the mocking bird, also called ‘cat bird,’ which typically sits at the
top of a tree; hence ‘a cat bird seat’ is a position at the top.
to have a clean bill of health (= to be found healthy) has
its origins in the Bill of Health, a document issued to a ship,
showing that the port it sailed from suffered from no epidemic
or infection at the time of departure.
Close, but no cigar (= nearly achieving success, but not quite):
Carnival games of skill, particularly shooting games, once gave
out cigars as a prize. A contestant who did not quite hit the
target did not get a cigar, no matter how ‘close’ he was to it.
dead as a door nail (= dead, with no chance for recovery).
Nails were once hand-made and expensive, so that when an
old cabin or barn was pulled down, the nails were salvaged to
be reused. When building a door, however, carpenters often
drove the nail through, then bent it over, so that it could not
be salvaged and was considered ‘dead’.
to put something down the hatch (= to drink or eat): The
expression probably originates from the practice of loading sea
freighters, where the cargoes are lowered into the hatch for
transport below deck; the freight thus lowered seems to be
actually gobbled up by the ship.
dressed to the nines (= dressed elegantly and expensively):
They say that the best suits are made from nine yards of
fabric – more than is ordinarily required – because a good suit
has all the fabric cut in the same direction (with the long
strands parallel with the vertical line of the suit). There is a lot
of waste, but the clothes made in this way are of top quality.
raining cats and dogs (= raining very hard): It seems that
in olden times people, especially sailors, thought that cats had
an influence over storms, and that dogs were symbols of
storms. When a particularly violent tempest occurred, people
A people related to the Eskimos.
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said it was caused by cats (bringing the rain) and dogs (the
wind). In spite of its popularity among learners, the phrase
has fallen out of use in England today.
In earlier centuries, when Britain was the greatest world
power, British English represented the major source of idioms.
Today, most new idioms are born in the U.S.A. and become
rapidly popular and established in world-wide English.
In the old days, the main source from which idioms originated
was the written language (the Bible, novels, poems, plays). Today,
there is a significant turn towards an oral influence.
3.1.3
Idioms and figures of speech
Most idioms are basically figurative. Generically called
‘metaphorical,’ they are based on various figures of speech:
•
•
•
an eager beaver = a person who is always eager to work
or do something extra
a hard nut to crack = something or someone difficult to
understand or do
a wolf in sheep’s clothing = a person who pretends to be
good but really is bad
a sacred cow = a person/thing that is never criticized/
replaced even though he/it should be
a white elephant = something extremely valuable but useless
a cold fish = person who is unfriendly or doesn’t mix with others
to cry wolf = to give a false alarm, to warn of a danger
that is not there
to kill two birds with one stone = to achieve two aims with
one effort/action
to have a heavy heart = to be unhappy
to have a change of heart = a change in the way someone
feels about something
to open one’s heart = to confide in someone
to put one’s foot in one’s mouth = to say something that
is the wrong in a situation
to wear one’s heart on one’s sleeve = to show one’s
feelings openly
idioms based on simile:
like a bull in a china shop = an awkward or tactless person
to fit like a glove = to fit perfectly
•
as plump as a partridge = fat
as fit as a fiddle = in perfect health
as like as two peas = very much alike
mad as a hornet = very angry, in a fighting mood
mad as a hatter/nutty as a fruitcake = crazy
to drink like a fish = to drink a lot
to feel like a million dollars/bucks = to feel wonderful
as cross as nine highways = very angry
to look like the cat that swallowed the canary = to look guilty
to act like a cat on a hot tin roof = to be fidgety
snug as a bug in the rug = cosy, comfortable
as lazy as Ludlam’s dog, that leaned his head against the
wall to bark = very lazy
idioms based on metonymy:
metaphorical idioms:
to go under the knife = to be operated on in surgery
not lay a finger on someone = not touch or bother someone
to have sticky fingers = to be a thief
to have burned one’s fingers = to have learned caution
through an unpleasant experience
to have an itching palm = to be greedy, to wish for money
to save one’s neck = to save oneself from danger or trouble
to give a hand = to help someone with something
to keep one’s nose out of something = to keep out of or
away from something
to lead someone by the nose = to make/persuade
someone to do anything you want
to turn a deaf ear to something = to pretend not to hear,
not pay attention
to have eyes bigger than one’s stomach = to wish more
food than one can eat
to have one foot in the grave = to be nearing death
penny-wise and pound foolish = careful about small things
and careless about important ones
idioms based on euphemisms:
It fell off the back of the lorry = it was stolen
to feel under the weather = not feeling well
to throw up = to vomit
to take a turn for the worse = to become sicker
one of those days = a bad day where nothing goes right
•
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six feet under = dead and buried
to breathe one’s last (breath) = to die
birds and bees = facts about sex and birth
in one’s birthday suit = completely naked
to make a mountain out of a molehill = to exaggerate
to feel on top of the world/to be on cloud number nine/in
the seventh heaven = to be very happy
dressed to kill = to wear very fine and sexy clothes
chilled to the bone = to be very cold
to jump out of one’s skin = to be badly frightened, very
surprised, or very happy
Many hyperbolic idioms are basically similes, metaphors, or
metonymies:
o
o
o
simile: e.g. as black as coal; as white as snow; to eat like
a horse; etc.
metaphor: to have a splitting headache; to freeze to the
bones; to be dying of hunger; etc.
metonymy: to give one’s right arm (to give something of
great value); to pay an arm and a leg for something (to
pay a very high price); to lose one’s shirt (to lose all or
most of one’s money); to bet one’s bottom dollar; etc.
idioms based on quantitative hendiadys:
•
not to make head or tail of something = not to
understand, to find no meaning in something
from head to toe = entirely
from stem to stern = thoroughly, completely
neither here nor there = nowhere; etc.
idioms based on hyperbole:
•
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safe and sound = healthy in body and mind
soft and tender = careful
each and every = all of it, everyone
one and only = the only person or thing
on and off = intermittently
at sixes and sevens = in a state of confusion
through thick and thin = through all types of situations,
good and bad
ashes to ashes and dust to dust = everything turns back
where it came from
idioms based on opposition of meaning:
not to know chalk from cheese = unable to recognize
common things
the short and the long of it = the summary
for better or for worse = in good times and in bad times
in black and white = in writing
3.1.4 The transparency and lexicalization of idioms
Oxford Concise Dictionary insists that the meaning of idioms is ‘not
deducible from those of the individual expressions,’ i.e. that all
idioms are opaque. True, many idioms (or pure idioms) are
semantically unmotivated (i.e. opaque), the meaning of the
individual words providing no clue for the overall meaning of the
idiom, e.g. to spill the beans (= to reveal a secret); to pull
someone’s leg (= to make gentle fun of someone); to give
somebody the needle (= to annoy somebody); to smell a rat (= to
perceive treachery or treason); etc.
But dictionaries also list under the heading ‘idiom’ phrases that
are completely transparent1: the meanings of as soft as silk; to
fit like a glove; to keep in touch; for better or for worse; at death’s
door; to do one’s best; to earn one’s bread/keep; to fall in love; to
give/teach somebody a lesson; etc. can be easily inferred by
computing the meanings of their components.
Obviously, transparency is a graded phenomenon: between
the two extremes is the mass of more or less semi-transparent
and semi-opaque idioms2:
1
semi-transparent: to add fuel to the fire; to lose one’s head;
to skate on thin ice; to go downhill; to live a dog’s life; to give
somebody a dirty look; to kill two birds with one stone; to
have a finger in every pie (= to intrude in other people’s
affairs); etc.
semi-opaque: to cry over spilt milk (= to grieve over something
that cannot be undone); to throw pearls before swine (= wasting
money, time or energy on somebody who does not appreciate it);
to put a spoke in somebody’s wheel (= to try to stop somebody
Transparent phrases are also called Dah! – an interjection used by native
speakers to show that something said is obvious.
2
Naturally, what is perceived as semi-transparent by one person may be
viewed as semi-opaque by another, so that you may disagree regarding
the category in which one or another of the idioms was included.
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from achieving something); to take a toll on (a person’s energy)
(toll = a payment or fee exacted for some right or privilege, as
for passage along a road or over a bridge); etc.
Idioms often take the form of proverbs or sayings. Since their
specific function is to teach a lesson, even the more indirect
proverbs preserve a certain degree of transparency, as the
examples below show:
transparent: Better safe than sorry; Never put off till
tomorrow what may be done today; If at first you don’t
succeed, try, try, try again; Haste makes waste; If you wish
good advice, consult an old man; Beware the little expenses;
Clothes make the man; Let bygones be bygones; etc.
semi-transparent: Easy come, easy go; Actions speak louder
than words; Practise what you preach; He who laughs last,
laughs longest; In the country of the blind the one eyed man
is king; There are none so deaf as those who won’t hear; Who
chatters to you will chatter of you; etc.
semi-opaque and opaque: Every cloud has a silver lining;
You can lead a horse to the water, but you can’t make it drink;
Don’t count your chickens until they’re hatched; He who pays
the piper calls the tune; The pot calling the kettle black (=
You’re criticising me, but you’re no better than I am); etc.
This triggers the conclusion that Oxford Dictionary’s insistence
on the opacity of idioms cannot be taken so strictly. Hornby’s
definition, on the other hand, admits that idioms can be partially
opaque: ‘it is difficult or impossible to understand the meaning
from a knowledge of words consisted separately.’
It was discussed in the previous chapter (section 2.2.3) that
the criterion according to which a phrase is labelled as
transparent, semi-transparent, semi-opaque or opaque is the
distance perceived between the literal reading of the phrase
(obtained by computing the meanings of the individual components)
and its idiomatic reading. If this relation is obvious, then the phrase is
considered (semi-)transparent and (well-)motivated. If the link is
vague or non-existent, the phrase is labelled as (semi-)opaque,
i.e. little or not-at-all motivated.
For example, an idiom such as to give someone the green light
(= to allow someone to start an action) is quite transparent to any
hearer who knows about traffic lights. Similarly, the link between
the real-world image and the metaphorical meanings of phrases
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such as to go downhill (= to deteriorate), or in the same boat (=
in the same situation), is fairly obvious.
But on hearing a phrase, such as to give somebody the
needle, the receiver may not even understand that the phrase is
metaphorical; and even if he perceives its metaphorical character,
he will have no way of guessing its meaning. The phrase appears
as completely unjustified: there is no obvious logical relationship
between the object needle and the act of annoying somebody.
Opaque idioms – e.g. to paint the town red (= to go out and have
great fun); to give one’s eye-teeth for smth. (= to want smth.
very much); to spill the beans; as thick as two short planks; etc. –
have lost all apparent relationship between the literal meaning of
the phrase and the meaning of the idiom, which is perceived as
totally unmotivated and semantically undecodable.
The idiomatic character of a phrase results from its
‘conventionalization’ due to its frequent and long-standing use by
a social group, and its subsequent lexicalization.
For example, at the beginning, a phrase such as to chew the
fat was a live metaphor, used by a small language community (the
Inuit). As the phrase was taken up and used regularly by other
categories of speakers, it was gradually assimilated by the
language. Today people know neither the story that generated the
phrase nor its initial meaning, but use it under its conventionally
accepted meaning.
Through overuse, some idiomatic phrases have been so
completely assimilated by the language that communicators no
longer perceive their metaphorical character or the link with the
original expression. When uttering a phrase, such as by the way,
on and off or on the other hand, for instance, the speaker does
not think of them as metaphoric.
The examples suggest that the lexicalization of idioms is
accompanied by two types of losses: of figurative perception
and/or of transparency.
For example, on uttering the phrase by the way, the speaker
uses it as a mere monolexemic cliché, unaware of its metaphorical
character. But if someone tells him specifically that the phrase is a
metaphor, he will be able to perceive the parallelism (= the utterance
that follows the phrase is not related to the subject under discussion,
it is not ‘on the road’ the conversation is following, it is by the main
road/way). This shows that, although the phrase is completely
lexicalized, it still preserves some degree of transparency.
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Conversely, a phrase such as to chew the fat was obviously
metaphorical in the early days (chewing whale blubber is an
insignificant activity, and so is the act of talking about
unimportant things). Today, no effort of imagination can tell us
what the phrase means, but we still know that it is metaphorical
(at least because nobody around us actually chews fat). In other
words, the phrase is a dead metaphor, it is perceived as figurative
and opaque.
Many opaque idioms allow two types of reading, a literal one and a
figurative one, i.e. they can be used and interpreted at face value
in certain contexts, and figuratively in others.
Take, for example, the phrase to kick the bucket. In the
sentence, She kicked the bucket and spilled all the milk, the words
must be interpreted at face value (= a female person hit an object
called bucket with her foot), while in, John kicked the bucket and
they buried him next day, the context (buried) prompts a
figurative reading (= he died). Sometimes, when the context is
insufficient, ambiguity may arise. For example, to spill the beans
induces a literal (non-idiomatic) reading in the context, She spilled
the beans all over the table (= a female person scattered some
actual beans all over the table), while in She spilled the beans all
over the town, the idiomatic interpretation is the correct one (=
she revealed secrets to people everywhere in town). However, the
sentence, She spilled the beans all over the room is ambiguous,
allowing both a literal and a figurative interpretation. Further
context is required to point to the correct reading.
The opacity of idioms is often motivated by historical or social
circumstances: images which are clear at one historical stage, or
in a certain geographic area, may be obscure and opaque at some
later moment, or in a distant region, when/where those
circumstances do not exist. For instance, the image to skate on
thin ice (= to court danger) is transparent for a person who lives
in a temperate climate and knows the dangers involved in the act,
but it may be obscure to a person living in the tropical climate. Or,
the phrase the penny dropped (= s/he suddenly understood;
Romanian equivalent: ‘i-a picat fisa’) was clear in the times when
pay phones in England charged a penny, but it may no longer be
transparent in the age of magnetic cards.
With many old idioms, the link between the literal and the
metaphoric usage has been broken because the things they were
related to have disappeared altogether from common usage. In
the early days, the phrase may have been used literally, but as
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the realities behind the phrase faded away, it underwent a gradual
metaphoric transfer.
For example, the phrase to pull someone’s leg (= to make
gentle fun of someone) is believed to come from the old practice
of pulling the legs of a man in the process of being hanged, so as
to speed his death and reduce his agony. Or, the phrase to take
someone for a ride means today ‘to trick, cheat or deceive
someone;’ in the 1920s when the phrase appeared, its meaning
was quite literal (even if strategically elliptic and indirect): it was
the period of the American Prohibition, of Al Capone’s gangsters
and their organized crime. The idiom appeared as gangster slang
(there was also the variant take someone for a one-way ride) to
describe the common practice of killing undesirable people in a
moving car. Similarly, the phrase to be on the breadline appeared
in the period of the Great American Depression of 1929-1936,
when unemployment reached 13 million people (one fourth of the
labour force). To help thousands of poor people survive, soup
kitchens were opened by organizations such as the Red Cross and
Salvation Army, and the poorest people queued in breadlines,
waiting for free food from soup-kitchens. As breadlines began to
disappear, the phrase gradually took on a figurative meaning, i.e.
‘with barely enough money to live on.’
Idiomatic speech is an essential component of the fluent speaker’s
linguistic competence. ‘Natural’ for the native speaker, it
represents one of the great challenges the learner has to cope
with. This is not only because idioms are hard to learn (much
harder than single words); the great difficulty consists in the fact
that idioms have a very powerful social component. This aspect of
idiomatic speech brings it close to the subject of the next section,
which focuses on register and style.
3.2
Register and style
The vocabulary we use and the intricacy of our utterances are
greatly influenced by the situational context in which the utterance
is produced. The situational context (see also section 5.1 –
Language in context) includes features such as the speaker’s own
social status, that of the person addressed, the activity type, etc.
When addressing his interlocutor, the speaker assesses the
main features of the context (e.g. the social relationship between
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himself and his addressee) and formulates his address more or
less carefully in terms of word choice and grammatical complexity.
The speaker’s deference, or lack of it, is most obvious in direct
address.
In languages which have the T/V pronominal distinction1,
selection of the pronoun of address (tu or vous) grammaticalizes
the speaker’s social considerations in the most evident way: the
singular form (tu) is restricted to familiar address, while the plural
(vous in French and dumneavoastră in Romanian) marks the
speaker’s deference. Romanian also has a medium-deference
term, dumneata.
In the same way, when addressing a person whom he views as
his social superior, the speaker selects his vocabulary carefully
(e.g. using neologisms and educated words), and he also uses
markers of deference, e.g. titles of address and honorifics: Sir
and Madam, Professor, Doctor, etc. Vocative terms (e.g. pal,
man, love) or greetings (Hi! vs. How do you do!) also convey a lot
of information regarding the social distance between the
communicators. Such words/phrases carry intrinsic social
meaning2.
Grammatical complexity also mirrors the speaker’s deference:
e.g. Give me that! – familiar; Could you hand me that book? –
neutral; Would you be so kind as to hand me that book? –
deferential. A familiar direct imperative may also be accompanied
by familiar paralanguage (a nervous gesture and an upset tone of
voice); with deferential addresses, the paralinguistic message is
minimal, educated social behaviour urging for strictly controlled
body language.
And yet, the general rule, according to which the speaker uses
deferential language to address persons who are socially superior,
and vice-versa, is often upset by the conventions of certain
discourse types. Advertising, for example, addresses perfect
strangers informally, and Internet communication, even among
total strangers, is typically informal too. Conversely, the
speaker/writer may use the language strategically, e.g. employ a
formal style to address a close friend or a child, to obtain special
effects, such as irony or rejection. How the speaker uses language
1
From the French tu (2nd pers. sg.) – vous (2nd pers. pl. or sg. polite); see
also section 5.2.1 – Person deixis.
2
See also sections 2.2.1 – Social meaning, and 5.2.2 – Social deixis.
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to ‘build up’ his own position and obtain real-world advantages will
be discussed in Chapters 6 to 8.
3.2.1
The formality scale
Register, i.e. ‘the style of language grammar and words used for
particular situations’ (Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary),
names the speaker’s range of formality. Just like in music, where
register refers to ‘all the notes a voice or a musical instrument can
produce, from the highest to the lowest,’ stylistic register
distinguishes various degrees of formality, from deference – at
its highest point, to familiarity – at its lowest.
For most communicative purposes (oral or written), we
distinguish three degrees of formality in the speaker’s register:
formal, neutral and informal. Formal terms are those used in
polite or official situations; informal ones are used to convey a
casual, friendly attitude; neutral terms complete the spectrum
and find their place both in informal and formal situations. For
example, the terms human being and individual are formal; man
and person are neutral; guy and chap are informal. The neutral
terms are acceptable both in formal and informal situations.
These three levels of formality, however, give a rather limited
view of social relations, which should be viewed in terms of moreor-less (in)formal, rather than either/or. The dictionary provides a
wide spectrum of synonymic variants, which can be placed at
different levels of a scale, as they express various degrees of
formality, ranging from literary and archaic – at the top of the
scale, to taboo and slang – at the lower end.
It is not always easy to choose the most appropriate word.
Take, for example, the following synonymic ranges:
criminal, law-breaker, convict, crook, culprit, delinquent, felon,
outlaw, etc.
to steal, to rob, to thieve, to filch, to loot, to pilfer, to swindle,
to plunder, to dilapidate, etc.
loot, booty, prize, plunder, pillage, spoils, seizure, etc.
The first range designates the person who has committed a
crime and provides several variants for each level of formality:
criminal and convict are neutral; crook is informal; law-breaker
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and delinquent are formal; culprit and felon are legalese; outlaw1
sounds archaic and is used especially in literature. The second
range names the act committed and is equally rich in choices for
all stylistic levels: to steal, to rob, to swindle and to plunder are
neutral (they name different types of stealing) and can also be
used in formal situations; to filch, to loot and to pilfer are informal
and slangy; to dilapidate is formal; to thieve sounds slightly
archaic and literary. The third range, designating the goods stolen,
is also colourful; it is your turn to determine the level of formality
of the terms included.
Comprehensive dictionaries provide suggestions concerning
the formality of lexical entries. While neutral is understood by
default (i.e. need not be mentioned), other stylistic levels may be
described as:
o
o
o
o
o
o
archaic (or arch.), e.g. perchance (= perhaps); thou [ðau] (=
you); etc.
poetic (or literary), e.g. foe (= enemy); winged [’wingid],
e.g. E.A. Poe speaks of the winged seraphs of heaven; etc.
euphemisms (or euph.), e.g. senior citizens (= old people);
intoxicated (= drunk); workforce adjustment (= firing people); etc.
informal (or Infml.), e.g. kid (= child); chum (= close
companion or friend); to hang out with (= to associate in
casual companionship); etc.
slang (or Sl.), e.g. creepy (of a person) (= obnoxious, weird);
fuzz (= the police, police officers collectively, a police officer or
detective); etc.
taboo (or vulgar), e.g. piss (= urine); to piss off (= to get
lost); etc.
Further explanation may also be provided, e.g. crony (Infml.,
often derogatory) = a close friend or companion; scuzz (also
scuzz-ball) = a dirty or sordid person or thing; etc.
Certain polysemantic words can have both formal and informal
usages, change of style bringing about change of meaning, which
the dictionary points out, e.g. criminal = involving crime, guilty of
crime; Infml. = exorbitant, outrageous: e.g. criminal prices.
Thus, the stylistic choices the dictionary provides range from
elevated, beyond formal (e.g. poetic, archaic) – at the top of the
scale, through formal terms (e.g. euphemism, officialese), via a
1
The derived terms, felony and to outlaw, are currently used in formal
and, respectively, legal discourse.
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wide choice of neutral words, through informal and colloquial
vocabulary, to slang and taboo words at the bottom of the scale.
3.2.1.1
Formal and ‘beyond formal’
At the peak of the formality scale stand those words and phrases
which are viewed as beyond-formal. To this category belong the
archaic and poetic/literary terms. Such words are restricted in
usage – we encounter expressions such as fair maiden (= young
unmarried woman), or grammatical forms such as quoth he (= he
said) in the Bible, in ballads, in historical novels, or in poems
whose elevated atmosphere takes us closer to the heavens than to
the earth. If the writing is contemporary, the writer is probably
trying to recreate the atmosphere of older times. In ordinary
contexts, archaic or poetic terms may be used in irony or banter,
e.g. one’s overweight middle-aged bullying female boss may be
described as the fair maiden who haunts the office.
Formal style is generally used for serious communication
among strangers. Formal vocabulary is generally neutral, but
preference may be given to longer, Latinate words, which sound
more elevated or sophisticated, pointing to the speaker’s/writer’s
education (e.g. to depart instead of ‘leave’ or ‘go away’; education
instead of ‘school,’ to operate/perform instead of ‘to do,’ etc.).
Even within formal vocabulary we can distinguish several
layers of above-formal style, i.e. words which sound extremely
formal or specialized in some way. To the former category belong
the euphemisms; the latter is the domain of the professional
jargons (officialese). Use of euphemisms or of officialese depends
on the social situation in which the exchange occurs, on the
activity type, the type of discourse, etc.
It was shown in chapter 2 (section 2.2.2.1.2.1) that the role of
euphemism is to obscure the negative traits of the referent and
to enhance its positive traits. Consequently, the speaker uses
euphemistic speech so as to purge his address of any possible
offensive overtones and, at the same time, to improve the image
of the referent, as well as his own image. However, when using
euphemistic terms (to operate instead of ‘to do’), the speaker runs
the risk of sounding pompous and misplaced.
The other category of elevated vocabulary, the so-called
officialese, consists of bureaucratic terms, or terms related
strictly to a certain profession (e.g. legal or medical vocabulary).
Such words are more appropriate in writing and are rarely used in
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ordinary communication. In legal vocabulary (legalese), for
instance, husband/wife are referred to as spouse, a relative is a
kin (as in next of kin), a child may be called offspring, etc.
Some jargons, however, are quite widespread, because the
activity they are related to is quite popular among ordinary users.
Such is the jargon of computer technology, whose terms are on
the lips of many people, e.g. motherboard, to download, search
engine, etc.
Naturally, different social contexts deal with the same linguistic
situation differently. For example, a word such as piss, viewed as
taboo and avoided in polite conversation, is replaced by a
euphemism in social environment (e.g. to use the bathroom) and
by jargon in a medical context (e.g. to urinate); in a mixed
environment (e.g. a doctor-patient conversation), an amalgamated
form – a euphemistic kind of jargon – may be used: to pass water.
Leech (1981: 35) shows that great writers have ‘waged a
valiant war against jargon and cliché.’ George Orwell, for example,
warned of the dangers of doublespeak, i.e. the practice of using
evasive, ambiguous, or high-flown language intended to deceive or
confuse. In his essay Politics and the English Language, Orwell
compares the direct language and simple style of the Bible with
the ‘degenerate language’ of modern times. The excerpt below is
from Ecclesiastes:
I returned and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor
the battle to the strong, neither yet the bread to the wise, nor yet
riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but
time and chance happened to all.
In Orwell’s parody, this becomes:
3.2.1.2
Objective consideration of contemporary phenomena compels the
conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no
tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a
considerable element of the unpredictable must invariably be taken
into account.
Neutral and informal
Further down the scale of formality come the words which are
viewed as stylistically neutral. Neutral words represent a large
section of the vocabulary and can be used in a wide range of
communicative contexts. Exchanges among chance acquaintances
are generally viewed as neutral, but neutral terms are also
appropriate for other types of situations: words such as friend,
wife, house, to eat, to go, to learn, good, nice, etc. are elegant
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enough to be used in formal exchanges, and they can be used in
informal situations, too, because they do not sound ‘chosen’ or
sophisticated. Nor do they carry extra connotations that can affect
the exchange either positively or negatively.
Informal address is used in casual conversation among
friends or intimates and, since such exchanges represent a wide
section of human relationships, informal terms have a high
frequency. Use of informal words is often essential to make the
conversation sound friendly, to create a casual atmosphere, to
enhance the feeling of closeness among the interactants. For
example, my folks is friendlier than my parents; my kids is more
affectionate than my children. Furthermore, informal terms also
contribute to the economy of the conversation, as they often cover
a wide range of referents. Thus, boss can stand for ‘employer,’
‘manager,’ ‘superior,’ etc.; my ex can mean ‘my former
girlfriend/boyfriend/husband/wife.’
But just like the degree of intimacy among people, informal
vocabulary is also graded, from merely casual (i.e. informal), to
intimate (i.e. colloquial or familiar). The term friend, for
example, is perceived as neutral, pal – as informal, while chum is
colloquial. Or, to save one’s skin is perceived as neutral, to save
one’s neck – as informal, and to save one’s bacon – as familiar.
Many of the terms generally considered slang, are listed in the
dictionary as informal, but their use is restricted to the lower level
of informality. Slangy terms, such as guy, bloke or chap (for the
neutral term man); crooks (for criminals); booze and broads (for
drink and women); blockhead, dunce or ass (for fool or idiot); cops
or coppers (for policemen); etc. are frequently used to make
colloquial conversation friendlier.
3.2.1.3
Colloquial speech and slang
English has always been a rather informal language, and
colloquial speech is richly sprinkled with slangy terms.
Colloquial speech is based on vocabulary situated in the lower
range of the formality scale. Grammatically, colloquial utterances
are quite simple, there are numerous elliptical sentences,
reformulation, false starts, etc. The (more or less numerous)
slangy terms make the conversation sound relaxed and cosy.
Use of slang is generally restricted to certain communicative
circumstances and to certain categories of partners. Typically,
people use slang in informal environments and avoid it in formal
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settings, because use of slang in formal circumstances could result
in the speaker being evaluated negatively. In terms of partner,
slang is most often spoken among friends and close social peers;
excessive use of slang in addressing a mere acquaintance or a
stranger is almost always viewed unfavourably and disapproved.
As a result, speakers assess the situation and the person(s) they
are addressing, and choose to use slang or not to do so.
Furthermore, slang is not a complete language: it does not
contain terms for everything the members of the group may want
to discuss, so that slang terms appear in conversation among
standard and informal ones.
There is a lot of disagreement among linguists when it comes
to defining slang. In practice, there are many borderline cases, as
well as examples of terms which are (in)formal in one context, and
slangy in another. That is why, it is necessary to analyse the main
characteristics of slang.
Slang is a kind of language (more common in speech than in
writing) that is not only very informal, but also typically restricted
to a particular context or group. Use of slang terms endows
communication among the members of a group with extra
meaning and emotional charge.
Slang words and phrases are novel-sounding synonyms for
standard English terms, and are ‘characteristically more
metaphorical, playful, elliptical, vivid, and ephemeral than ordinary
language’ (Webster).
The term slang is basically a noun naming non-standard
terms, or non-standard usages of standard terms. Slang terms
may be invented (e.g. groaty or grotty = unkempt, slovenly), but
in most cases they follow the more popular patterns of lexical
innovation. Metaphorical transfer of meaning is especially
productive: e.g. buck (= dollar); kid (= child); dog (= friend); etc.
There are also different types of slang: euphemistic (a
pleasant name for something unpleasant); pejorative (insulting);
clique (used by a small exclusive group of people); media
(propagated by the media); technological (related to the world of
technology); workplace jargon (created to add some fun to the
workplace); imported (e.g. from the U.S.A., via television); absorbed
(used also by other groups than the one who initiated it); etc.
But slang – or slanguage – is more than just a noun; it is also
a verb, as well as an entire process. The process of ‘slanging’
involves both the use and the creation of slang. Slanging involves
the use of both verbal and nonverbal cues, e.g. the intonation with
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which a term (e.g. trip, wasted) is uttered can transfer it from
standard English to slang. Slanging is enjoyable and amusing to
both the speaker and the listener: it is a form of play, it is
creative, often humorous, and thus highly entertaining.
Slang entails an important social dimension: it is a kind of
code invented by the members of a particular group, who enjoy
using their own special vocabulary. Slang also has an important
affective component: it bonds people together as a group, while
baffling outsiders and keeping them at a distance. There are as
many different types of slang as social categories, e.g. college
slang, artists’ slang, gangster slang, etc.
Slang reflects the experiences, beliefs and values of its
creators and users: slang terms are invented to name things that
are especially important to the life of their creators. Convicts, for
example, have many slang terms to name the police, weapons,
and fighting. College slang reflects school life and the youngsters’
interest in eating, drinking, and sex1. Teenagers have a great
number of terms used to express approval, to evaluate a person
positively or negatively, to say that something is good or bad, that
a performance is effective or ineffective. Terms, such as cool, brill,
heavy, ace, triff, def, wicked, awesome, tight, dope, fun, sick, or
da bomb etc. were in great fashion in the late 1990s.
Slang also has the merit of making communication among peers
efficient. Drawing upon mutual social and emotional background
experiences (which need not be spelled out), slang terms are a kind
of shorthand used to conceptualize things and convey emotions (A:
How's going, Yo?/B: Just chillin' around). Consequently, slang not
only makes communication more effective, but also reinforces the
feeling of closeness and intimacy by sending out the unstated
message that the speaker considers his addressee to be a peer.
Slang often involves a rebellious kind of attitude against the
establishment2. That is why, slangy terms are described as words
with an attitude3.
1
2
3
Among the slang terms for sex, few can be quoted in civilized
communication, e.g. cave exploring; the horizontal tango; the wild monkey
dance; gettin’ some hay for your donkey; the Woo Hoo, etc.
The verb to slang is defined by Oxford Dictionary as ‘to attack (someone)
using abusive language.’
Read, for example, the introductory lines of Salinger’s The Catcher in the
Rye (see section 4.5.2.2 – Oral texts): the slangy terms Holden Caulfield
uses give voice to his feelings of frustration, anger and dissatisfaction.
139
Slang also allows the speaker to be in tune with the times and
his social group. A slangy utterance carries not only information and
emotion, but also a message concerning the speaker’s identity.
Slang is subject to fashion and extremely ephemeral: what
yesterday was new and fresh, may be off today. Using outdated
slang1 will backfire, bringing about social sanctions: it shows that
the speaker is no longer in touch with the group (the young
addressee will probably raise an amused eyebrow at the ‘oldie’ who
is trying to put on a show of being still young and knowledgeable).
In other words, the slang scene is extremely dynamic: terms
come and go at great speed, because speakers feel the need for
innovation and change, and because new, attention-grabbing,
expressions improve the speaker’s image.
Linguistics Professors Pamela Munro and Connie Eble, who
study college slang at UCLA and, respectively, at the University of
North Carolina, show that many terms that were popular in the
early 1990s (e.g. gimme five, how’s it hanging, whatever blows
your hair back, pestilence, woman of the 80s, Baberaham Lincoln,
etc.) were old skool by the end of the 20th century. Other slang
words of the 90s, though, were still popular and had the same
meaning among college students: e.g. ace, all-nighter, barney,
blow away, bogus, check it out, chick, cool, dude, freak, funds,
geek, gross, grub, hang out, ho, jam, munchies, nerd, piss off,
psycho, split, tits, toasted, trip, twisted, wasted, what’s up, yack,
zone out, etc.
The status of a slang word is estimated according to its
frequency of use and the number of meanings and uses it takes
on. According to these criteria, trip and dog stand out as ‘the
hardest working’ terms in college slang.
Thus, the term trip was used:
in the 1960s, to mean ‘an LSD (= drug) experience’: e.g. He’s
on a trip.
in 1972, to mean a very good/very bad experience, We had a
trip at school yesterday.
Today, the word is used to mean:
1
something unusual, strange or extreme: e.g. That dude’s a trip.
to overreact: e.g. My rents started to trip when I said I needed
more k to get that book.
Due to the transient nature of slang, some of the terms listed here may have
‘hit the skids’ by the time this book, or any dictionary of slang, is published.
140
an outrage or raging: e.g. He tripped when I told him the
concert was gonna be two hundred bucks.
someone acting out of character: e.g. He’s always on time but
today he was trippin’.
not making sense: e.g. I know I’m going to fail the test
because I was trippin’ when I was writing the essays.
disagreement: e.g. Why are you trippin’ about my idea?
being overwhelmed: I’ve got 4 midterms this week and I’m
trippin’.
a state of excitement and craziness: e.g. She always trips out
when she sees him.
being intoxicated (on drugs or alcohol): e.g. Everybody at the
party was trippin’.
Along the decades, the word dog was used with both positive and
negative connotations:
around the turn of 20th the century, young people used it to
mean ‘careful dressing.’
in the 1920s, it was used to mean ‘feet.’
in 1972, it meant ‘an unattractive female.’
Today, college students use the word dog to mean:
feet: My dogs are barking (= hurting).
friend: He’s my dog.
to stand someone up: She dogged me last night.
a woman user: Don’t date him; he’s a dog.
a liar: She’s such a dog; she said she got an A on that test.
to criticize someone sharply: My boss dogged me for being 10
minutes late.
an unattractive person: Did you see his date? She’s a dog!
a bad thing: That exam was a dog.
to tease: They were dogging me about my ride.
According to Munroe and Eble, at the turn of the 21st century,
da bomb was the most popular college slang term, used to show
one’s appreciation of something. Surveys show that the longeststanding slang word on campuses is cool: the term originated in
the 1930s in New York jazz clubs, and has been popular on
campuses ever since the 1940s. Many terms come back in fashion
after a while, and they may disappear again as fast. For example,
groovy was popular in the 1960s, made a comeback in the 90s,
and is out again today.
141
In their early days, slang expressions are generally restricted
in usage to a small group or community, whose members use
them conventionally, to identify themselves as members of that
specific group. Gradually, though, they may spread over to other
groups and achieve regional, national, or even global recognition.
College slang, for instance, may spread from one campus to
another through e-mail, telephone conversations or direct contact,
gain popularity and become part of the pop culture. Other terms,
however, never leave the group that originated them.
Each ethnic group has its own specific slang. In the U.S.A., for
example, Black-slang has probably produced the largest number of
slang terms. This is largely due to the degree of social awareness
and dissatisfaction of coloured people and to their rebellious
attitude. The vehicle that has made Black slang so widely popular
is music, especially rap music. Black slang includes a great number
of blues terms, but also a lot of radical vocabulary which dates
back to the 1960s. Italian slang is also rich (e.g. terms describing
the mob = Mafia), and so is Jewish slang (e.g. terms naming
foods), and recently there is an upsurge of Hispanic slang.
Today, a great amount of slang comes from generally
accessible entertainment media, from popular music, movies or
television. Movies, for example, have had a major role in
disseminating and popularizing slang: e.g. from The Flintstones we
have betty (= a good-looking female) and barney (= a person who
tries to be like someone else); Hawaii Five-O gave the term Five-O
(= policemen); The Dukes of Hazzard produced daisy dukes (=
short-shorts, as worn by the character named Daisy); etc. Words
heard repeatedly, in movies, on TV, or in songs, get adopted
(especially by youngsters), receive a wide circulation and, in due
course, may be adopted into the vernacular. Movies and song are
also the reason why the volume of American slang used by
European youngsters is vast. With media-originated slang, it is
often hard to tell which social group they belong to.
As shown before, slang words and phrases remain ‘slang’ only
for a very short time. A significant amount is assimilated by the
informal vocabulary, probably because the terms are economical
and sound colloquial (e.g. the large number of slangy words
termed ‘informal’ by dictionaries). Some may even be accepted as
standard terms, because there is no other word to name the new
reality. For example, terms belonging to the financial jargon may
sound rather slangy at first (e.g. megabucks = a lot of money)
but, as they represent an easy and economical way to refer to a
given reality, they are gradually accepted into the basic vocabulary.
142
3.2.1.4
Slang, argot and taboo
Slang is not stylistically unitary, but covers a wide register, from
colloquial and friendly, to derogatory and abusive.
For instance, bad-mouthing the police and everything they
stand for is a major source of slang. Of the rich variety of slang
created over the years in the U.K. and the U.S.A. to name police
officers or special groups of the police, here are a few: bobby,
buttons, dick, hawkshaw, pigs, scuffer, bogey, filth, mingra, plod,
shamus, busy, gum-shoe, fuzz, house peeper, mug, sweeney,
copper, grog, peeler, rozzer, the law, hammer and saws (rhyming
slang for laws); etc. Some of these terms are merely informal, e.g.
bobby, buttons, hawkshaw, shamus, copper; others – e.g. dick,
pigs, filth, fuzzy, sweeney (< German Schweine = pigs) carry
strong derogatory connotations.
The lower level of the slang vocabulary merges into argot.
It was suggested in the previous section that slang is a type of
coded communication; in most cases, slangy/argotic terms are in
fact standard terms (words, phrases, or even mathematical figures)
to which some new meaning has been attributed, e.g. buck =
dollar; dog = friend; 6 = Attention!. Slang symbols, therefore,
represent a kind of parallel lexicon, carrying coded meanings, as
well as connotations of informality and in-group membership.
The coded character of slang is most obvious at the lower end
of the scale (argot), where their function is to communicate secret
messages and keep outsiders at bay: take, for example, the terms
used by gangsters or prisoners to convey hidden messages: a
clubhouse = a police station; the can = the jail; bracelets =
handcuffs; to be grilled = to be questioned; to be in stir = to be in
jail; a bean-shooter = a gun; droppers or hatchetmen = hired
killers or gunmen; 911 = a warning that a correctional officer is
coming; a long ride = doing life; a chester = a child molester;
berries = dollars; a C or a C-note = $100 (also called a century); a pair
of C's = $200; etc.
Slang is traditionally associated with the male sex, the lower
classes, and the young categories of age. This is because the
activity types which have produced the greatest number of slang
terms (e.g. sex, alcoholism, drinking, sports, physical violence and
fighting) are typically associated with men of those classes, who
indulge in and brag openly about their exploits. Conversely,
women use and produce smaller amounts of slang, since heavy
indulgence in slang triggers social stigma.
143
At present, a large proportion of slang and argot originate
from the areas of the gay world, the drug scene, and the world of
music – all dominated by teenagers and the younger generations.
For example, the gay scene has produced terms such as:
yeomanette (= a young homosexual in the Navy, age 17 to 22;
source: [mid 1960's]); F2M (= transsexual; a person, who is
preparing to undergo or has undergone female to male sexual
reassignment surgery); forty-four (= a male prostitute [state of
Texas]); to fool around (= to have gay sex1); etc.
As any coded language, the gay vocabulary was conceived as a
mark of identification and exclusion: the long-standing persecutions
against homosexuality made the gays invent their own, special,
language to communicate freely. Today, however, many prejudices
have fallen, and social or sexual minorities are viewed with greater
tolerance. As a result, subjects that were formerly viewed as taboo
are openly discussed.
Taboo terms stand at the bottom of the formality scale; they are
avoided in polite, and often even in informal, conversation.
Among the generally acknowledged taboo areas, sexual
activity and excretion hold first place: the ‘four-letter words’ which
populate these areas have been downgraded to ‘coarse’ and bear
social stigma. And yet, in earlier times (in the Middle Ages), almost
all the four-letter words of the sexual and scatological vocabulary
(e.g. fuck, shit, balls, etc.) were Standard English: they were the
only terms the language provided. As people began to invent
euphemistic synonyms for them, the former Standard English
words came to be regarded as vulgar, and were gradually pushed
into the field of taboo.
Death and disease are also taboo areas. To avoid direct
reference to such unpleasant subjects, educated speakers have
learned to use euphemistic terms and indirect reference.
3.3
The formality of idioms
Idioms, with their figurative character and degrees of opacity,
provide a valuable tool for speakers to make their communication
more interesting and allusive. On the other hand, just like slang,
idioms function as a powerful cohesive tie among the members of
a speech community. Like any coded language, idioms are both
shared and secretive: a manifestation of their social identity,
1
The ‘gay slang’ meaning of the phrase may induce a process of degradation,
causing its traditional meaning (= to pass one’s time idly) to die out.
144
idioms bind the members of a group together, and at the same
time keep out intruders by their opacity.
Idiomatic speech is not restricted to one or another level of
formality: there are idioms, or idiomatic variants, for all levels, as
the examples below show:
•
formal and beyond formal/poetic
by the skin of one’s teeth = barely, with great effort
the apple of one’s eye = a cherished person/object
to cast pearls before swine = to waste something on someone
who won’t be thankful
to handle something with kid gloves = to treat gently and carefully
once in a blue moon = rarely, not very often
to take one’s hat off to someone = to admire/respect/praise
someone
to earn hardly enough money to keep body and soul together
= to earn very little money
•
neutral
to do something behind someone else’s back = secretly,
without one’s knowledge
to bail someone out = to help or rescue so. with financial problems
to be back on one’s feet = recovered from sickness or trouble
to cut one’s losses = to do something to stop losing money or
something else
to catch someone red-handed = to catch someone while doing
something wrong
to be back to square one = to be back where one started
not to lift/raise a finger = to do nothing to help; not to do
one’s share
to live from hand to mouth = to live on very little money
to put two and two together = to make a correct guess
in short supply = not enough, in less than the amount needed
to be in two minds about something = to be uncertain or
undecided about something
noise that sets one's teeth on edge = very unpleasant noise
•
informal
to let the cat out of the bag = to reveal something that is
supposed to be a secret
off the wall = eccentric or non-traditional
to get cold feet = to lose courage or nerve
•
145
to knock one off one’s feet = to surprise someone so much
that they don’t know what to do
to keep one’s fingers crossed for someone/something = to
wish for good luck
to turn one’s back on someone = to refuse to help someone in
trouble or need
to get something off one’s chest = to tell something to
someone so it doesn’t bother one anymore
to get someone off one’s back = to stop someone from
bothering one
a pain in the neck = an obnoxious or bothersome person/event
to deliver the goods = to succeed in doing what is expected
to roll up one’s sleeves = to get ready for a hard job, to
prepare to work hard
to pull something out of a hat = to get smth. as if by magic, to
invent or imagine
a card up one’s sleeve = another plan/argument kept back
and produced if needed
to die with one’s boots on = to die while still active in one’s work
to fill so. else’s shoes = to take the place of another and do as well
stick one’s neck out = to do something dangerous or risky for so.
to be blue in the face = very angry or upset, excited, very emotional
Put your money where your mouth is! = Back your statements
with some money
colloquial
a cash cow = a good way to make money
a dumb bunny = a stupid or gullible person;
to go ape = to become highly excited or angry
to cut off one's nose to spite one's face = to do a foolish thing
Cat got your tongue! = can’t speak because of shyness
to sell like hotcakes = to sell very quickly
to keep one’s shirt on = to calm down, to keep calm
to kick up one’s heels = to have a good time, to celebrate
to nose about/around = to look for something private or
secret, to pry
to run around like a chicken with its head cut off = confused,
not knowing what to do
to tell someone where to get off = to speak angrily to
someone because of his bad behaviour or rudeness
to have a bone to pick with someone = to have a reason to
complain about or argue with someone
Shake a leg! = Get going!
with a hand caught in the cookie jar = caught in the act
146
When pigs get wings/can fly! = never
taken to the cleaners = defrauded, robbed, cheated, conned
to drink like a fish = to drink heavily
•
slang
a big gun/cheese = an important person, a leader
a high pillow = a person at the top, in charge
duck soup = easy, a piece of cake
the butter and egg man = the man with the bankroll
to horse around = rough or noisy play
to be on the nut = to be broke
to be round the bend/twist/to have a screw missing = crazy
to have the bees = to be rich
to kick up a fuss/a row = to complain noisily
to pay through the nose = to pay at a very high price/too much
not to have/stand a cat in hell’s chance = to have/stand no
chance to succeed
to hang around bars = to spend a lot of time in bars
to grease palms = to give a tip or a bribe for a special favour
459 = burglary or intrusive behavior1, e.g. Don't 459 my convo.
Your barn door’s open = Your fly is open.
taboo
a pain in the ass = an obnoxious or bothersome person or event
to have shit for brains = to be very stupid
to shack up with some girl = to start a relationship and live
together without being married
to screw things up = to make a mess of things; etc.
For further illustration of idiomatic speech and of formality levels,
see Annexes 6 and 7.
The first three chapters of this book have pointed to the various
ways by which lexical items create and convey meaning. But
meaning is not carried by isolated lexical items: just as language
comes in a continuous flow of sounds/words/utterances/etc.,
meaning results from the paradigmatic choices and syntagmatic
combinations produced in longer stretcher of language, e.g.
clauses, utterances, and texts.
1
From California's Penal Code section 459.
148
Chapter 4
The text
It was discussed in the Introduction that de Saussure presents
communication as a three-level process of encoding-decoding
(meaning-structure-form – for the speaker; form-structure-meaning
– for the hearer), that, according to him, form and structure bear
no meaning. This view, however, is only partly correct.
Take, for example, the ‘minimal signs,’ i.e. the individual
phonemes and graphemes. It is well known that graphologists can tell
us a lot of things about the writer of a letter or a document by the
shape, regularity and disposition of his letters. In the same way, the
quality of the speaker’s allophones carries a lot of information about
his regional and educational background, or about the social situation
in which the exchange takes place. In addition, phoneme clusters
may have onomatopoeic qualities, often exploited for their
suggestiveness, e.g. ping-pong, swish, bang. In writing, display is
sometimes manipulated to convey special effects, e.g. Lewis Carroll
wrote The Mouse’s Tale in the form of a mouse’s tail (thus
humorously exploiting the homophony of tale and tail), and
Apollinaire’s Caligrammes take the shape of rain drops, of the Eiffel
Tower, etc. according to the title of the poem; advertising also
exploits display to convey additional meanings.
Furthermore, meaning is also carried by the linguistic structure,
e.g. by the grammatical organization of the sentence. Take, for
example, voice opposition (active vs. passive), as in:
They built the house in 1885
The house was built in 1885
Although the meaning of the two sentences is similar, the main
information is different: while the first puts emphasis on the doers of
the action, the second foregrounds its object.
To get a closer insight into the way individual items and structures
are handled by the sender of the message to convey specific
Meaning and communication
meanings, let us adopt the Functional Sentence Perspective
(FSP1), or functional grammar.
While the Saussurian view starts from the form of a word or
sentence to get to its meaning, the FSP analysis goes from meaning
to form: it surveys the way information (meaning) is distributed in
the sentence and the way it is carried by its meaningful elements.
Taking the clause as central unit, the FSP analyzes the way the
levels ‘below’, ‘above’, ‘around’ and ‘beyond’ the clause affect the
meaning of the te
xt.
Below
the
clause
are
the
basic
constituents
(phonemes/graphemes) and the grammatical groups (nominal,
verbal, etc.); above it are the clause complexes (sentences2); around
it are the cohesive devices that turn isolated lexical items into
coherent texts (discourses); and beside and beyond the clause are
the intonational patterns and metaphorical modes that affect the
meaning of the text (language in use).
Thus, with functional grammar, forms represent ‘a means to an
end, rather than an end in themselves’ (Halliday, 1994: xiv). In other
words, ‘language is interpreted as a system of meanings,
accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be realized.’
The task of the analyst is to establish how these meanings are
expressed.
Moreover, the FSP views communication as dynamic: a change –
even a slight one – in the nature of one element can bring about
significant changes of meaning: imagine a scientific speech uttered in
dialectal pronunciation.
According to FSP, each element in the language performs a
certain function in the larger unit. In addition, the speaker uses one
specific element instead of all the others available to him, or
manipulates the structure of his sentences, so as to convey a certain
meaning, to enhance that meaning, and ultimately, to obtain the realworld effect he is aiming at.
The next sections present3 briefly the way various levels of the
language carry meaning.
1
2
3
FSP was first explored by the Prague linguists, in the 1930s, but the most
influential work is M.A.K. Halliday’s An Introduction to Functional
Grammar, first published in 1985, with a second revised edition in 1994.
For simplification, I shall use the term ‘clause’ to refer specifically to the
structure that has one predicate, either expressed or elided. The term
‘sentence’ will be used both to refer to compound and complex sentences
(or ‘clause complexes,’ in Halliday’s terminology), and in a generic sense.
After Halliday (1994), with my own examples.
Chapter 4: The text
4.1
149
Constituents: Minimal groups
The basic constituents of the language are the phonemes (for oral
language) and the graphemes (for writing).
The number of phonemes/graphemes is limited; but in actual
usage, they function as an infinite number of variants of the same
basic signs. For example, the actual shape of the letters we write
(by hand or by computer) is infinite: e.g. the letter a can be
written as capital A, it can be italic or bold, imitate handwriting a,
different typefaces can be used, a, a or a, etc.
In the same way, in speech we pronounce an infinite variety of
allophones of the same phonemes. They may come as regional
variants (e.g. /r/ is lateralized in England, but it is trilled in
Scotland), there are numerous personal differences (e.g. a child
may pronounce /r/ as a lippy /w/), differences induced by the
condition of the speaker (slurred speech, if the person is drunk), etc.
Such variants do not prevent communication, but may
influence the meaning of the message. For example, variants of
/æ/ or /r/ can suggest both the geographical and the social background of the speaker: British or American, educated or not, etc.
In their desire to improve their social status, class-conscious
speakers often embrace very careful pronunciation. Consider the
following excerpt, from Kurt Vonnegut’s Bluebeard (1987: 175):
My accent was as synthetic as […] Marilee’s. […] Marilee and I, a coal
miner’s daughter and an American shoemaker’s son, […] had sense
enough not to pretend to be upper class British. We obscured our
humble origins in vocal tones and inflections which … are known as
“trans-Atlantic” – cultivated, pleasant to the ear, and neither British
nor American. Marilee and I were brother and sister in that regard:
we sounded the same.
Choice of allophones also depends on the discourse type:
standard allophones are used in formal speech; group-specific
allophones or clipped forms, are typical for colloquial conversation.
In writing, the situation is similar: careful handwriting
suggests formal address (e.g. a letter of congratulation); typed
messages belong to official relationships (e.g. a letter of
application for a job); the aspect of a piece of writing can tell us a
lot of things about the type of person who has done it, male or
female, child or adult, tidy of messy, etc.
Larger units are also included among constituents. The phonemes/
graphemes are organized into higher-level signs, words, which
are the meaningful units of the language. In writing, word
150
boundaries are marked off with a space. From the perspective of
their meaning, though, it often happens that a number of words
are fused together into larger units (e.g. idioms, see section
3.1.1), even though there is no formal mark of their unity.
In speech, there is no word boundary: speech comes in a
continuous, but rhythmic and melodic, flow. The rhythm of speech
is provided by the unit above the phoneme, i.e. the syllable, and
that above the syllable, i.e. the foot, which is defined as ‘the
structural unit formed by one strong/salient syllable + the weak
syllable(s) depending on it’ (Halliday, 1994: Chapter 8).
As the succession of salient/stressed syllables occurs at
roughly regular intervals, the rhythm of speech endows the text
with a certain musicality, as in:
// see that old / house// ^ it / looks so / fine //
Above the foot is the tone group, which is the melodic unit of
the language. The notation used for separating the feet is the
single slash (/), while tone groups are separated by a double slash
(//). The tonic (salient) syllables are emboldened; the silent beat
before the syllable is market with a caret (^).
The tone group is not only a phonological constituent; it also
functions as unit of information in the discourse. Grammatically,
the tone group often corresponds to the clause, so that it will be
discussed again in the section dedicated to the clause as message
(see section 4.2.1).
Words combine to form word groups (phrases), the combination
of which produces clauses and sentences.
Again, it would be a mistake to assert that the minimal
element of grammar, the morpheme, carries no meaning: -s
shows plurality or 3rd person singular speaker; -ed carries the
meaning of preterity, etc. But the full meaning of morphemes
results from the paradigmatic choices and syntagmatic
combinations the speaker makes.
The three main categories of word classes – nominals (the
noun, the adjective, the numeral and the pronoun), verbals (the
verb and the preposition) and adverbials (the adverb and the
conjunction) – combine to produce word groups/word
complexes or phrases1.
1
Halliday insists on the term ‘word group/complex,’ and not phrase,
because the phrase is ‘the contraction of a clause,’ while the word
group/complex is ‘the expansion of a word.’ He admits, though, that they
‘achieve roughly the same status on the rank scale,’ i.e. ‘intermediate
Chapter 4: The text
151
Word groups can be labelled according to the class they belong
to: the nominal group (noun phrase), the verbal group (verb
phrase), the adverbial group (adverbial phrase), the conjunction
group (conjunction phrase) and the prepositional phrase. Or, they
can be classified according to the function they perform1, i.e.
Subject, Object, Complement, Modifier, Auxiliary, etc.
The development of words into word groups is basically a process
of modification, by which the Head is semantically expanded by
the addition of premodifying and/or post-modifying elements.
1. The nominal group (noun phrase) is built around a Head
word (referred to as Thing), preceded and/or followed by other
words that modify it, as in:
those two
splendid old
sports cars with broken headlights
Deictic Numerative Epithet1 Epithet2 Classifier Thing Qualifier
Modifier
Head Postmodifier
The Deictic element – which can be a demonstrative (this,
these, which[ever]), a possessive (my, his, whose, John’s) or
a non-specific element (each, both, neither) – ‘relates the
group to the speaker and environment.’
The Numerative ‘indicates some numerical feature,’ e.g. one,
two, the first, the preceding, etc.
The Epithet indicates some quality of the subject,’ e.g. good,
old, cool, etc.
The Classifier ‘indicates a particular subclass of the Thing in
question,’ e.g. toy train, shaving cream, etc.
The Qualifier, which comes after the Head, further expands the
information; it can be a clause (which has …) or a prepositional
phrase (with…), etc.
152
The Event is a lexical verb in a non-finite form, either
perfective (e.g. sleep, to sleep) or imperfective (sleeping, slept).
For example:
couldn’t
Finite
a Finite element, which carries the tense and modality of the
message, and thus ‘relates the process to the speaker and
speech event’, and
an Event, which expresses the type of process/action performed.
The Finite can be an auxiliary or a modal verb.
1
sleeping
Event
3. The adverbial group (adverbial phrase) has an adverb as
Head; it may be preceded and/or followed by elements which premodify/post-modify it. For example:
much
Modifier
better
Head
than you think
Postmodifier
4. Conjunctions and prepositions can also form groups by
modification: e.g. by the time (Modifier + Head), as soon as
(Modifier + Head + Postmodifier), right behind (Modifier + Head),
immediately in front of (Modifier + Head + Postmodifier), etc. In
addition, the prepositional phrase may consist of a preposition
+ a noun phrase, as in the Complement element below:
the car
Subject
4.2
rolled
Finite: past
Predicator : roll
along the highway
Complement
The clause
From the perspective of the FSP, the clause is analysed as three
sets of functions1, namely:
o
o
between clause and word.’ Still, the term ‘phrase’ has gained a quasi
general usage in grammatical analyses.
In practice, the same unit can perform various functions, or several
functions at the same time.
been
aux2
Finites mark contrastive tense (present vs. past) and/or
modality (real vs. possible) by a set of three systems: System I
(am/is/are, have/has, do/does, can/could, etc.) vs. System II
(was/were, had, did, could have, etc.), and System III (non-finite
and modalized forms, e.g. Having arrived …; must have arrived).
Finites can also mark polarity, i.e. opposition between negative
and positive forms (has, hasn’t).
The Finite and the Event are fused in the case of the present
and past tense simple, e.g. went is both Finite (carries the function
‘past’) and Event (lexical verb/Predicator: go).
2. The verbal group (verb phrase) consists of
have
aux1
1
Participants, i.e. the human or non-human elements that
take part in the action – generally expressed by noun phrases
Processes, i.e. the action performed – generally realized by
verb phrases
After Halliday, 1994, Chapters 3-5.
Chapter 4: The text
o
153
Circumstances, i.e. the situational conditions in which the
participants interact – generally expressed by adverbial or
prepositional phrases.
In their turn, the Participants can take on three types of functions,
which trigger three types of subjects:
a Psychological Subject, called THEME, i.e. ‘that which is the
concern of the message’
a Grammatical Subject, called SUBJECT, i.e. ‘that of which
something is predicated’
a Logical Subject, called ACTOR, i.e. the ‘doer of the action’.
Take, for example:
The teacher told my son a story
My son was told a story by the teacher
The story was told my son by the teacher
In the first sentence, the teacher takes on all three subject
functions; in the second, the grammatical subject and the Theme
are my son while the Actor is the teacher; in the third, the Theme
is the story, the Actor is the teacher, and the Subject is my son.
These subjects have distinctive functions in the clause, namely:
o
o
o
The Theme functions as MESSAGE of the clause, as ‘point of
departure’
The Subject represents an EXCHANGE; it is ‘responsible for the
validity of the act,’ its degree of realism
The Actor – i.e. the active participant – functions as its
REPRESENTATION.
In accordance with these functions, the clause develops three
different kinds of meanings:
o
o
o
clause as message, i.e. ‘how the clause relates to the
surrounding discourse and to the context of situation in which
it is produced’
clause as exchange, i.e. ‘the clause organized as an interactive
event, … a verbal exchange between speaker and audience’
clause as representation, i.e. ‘what the clause is about’:
type of process, participants and circumstances.
These lines of meaning correspond to three largely independent
sets of semantic structures, each with a very specific function:
Theme structures, i.e. how the message is organized, how the
speaker foregrounds his ‘main character’
154
Mood structures, i.e. ‘what the clause is doing’: giving or
demanding (goods/services, information)
Transitivity structures, i.e. what the clause ‘is about’:
processes, participants and circumstances.
4.2.1
Clause as message
Halliday (1994: Chapter 3) presents the Thematic structure of the
clause as consisting of a Theme and a Rheme. The Theme is the
Topic, the ‘main character’ of the clause; the Rheme is ‘the
remainder of the message, the part in which the Theme is
developed.’ For example:
The teacher
The teacher
My son
The story
Theme
told my son a story
told a story to my son
was told a story by his teacher
was told my son by the teacher
Rheme
The Theme generally occupies first position in the clause: the
speaker begins his sentence with what he considers to be the most
important. But initial position is not the only thing that makes it
Theme: by bringing a certain item forward, grammar foregrounds
that element as starting point.
Thematic structure goes hand in hand with the phonological
organization of the clause, which roughly corresponds to the tone
group. The tone group, the melodic unit of the language, also
functions as unit of information.
// it’s great / to build / a house //
Each information unit has two constituents: the Given (i.e. the
old information, what we already know) and the New (the
information freshly introduced). The Given is in initial position
(where the Theme is also located), while the New is towards the
end of the clause (in the Rheme); the tonic foot in the Rheme
marks the ‘culmination of the New.’
For example, in the first example above, the teacher is the
Theme and the Given, the New is a story (i.e. a story, not
something else). In the second, the Theme and Given element is
the teacher, the New is my son (to my son, not to someone else).
In the third example, my son is the Theme and Given, the New is
the teacher (by the teacher, not by someone else). Etc.
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Chapter 4: The text
4.2.2
Clause as exchange
Since language is the main instrument for human communication,
the clause is organized as an interactive event, too.
In the act of communication, the speaker ‘adopts for himself a
particular speech role and, in doing so, assigns to the listener a
complementary role which he wishes him to adopt’ (Halliday,
1994: Chapter 4).
Halliday argues that there are two fundamental speech
functions: giving and demanding.
In what concerns the items that are ‘given’ or ‘demanded,’
they can be grouped under two heading: goods/services and
information (see also 6.4.2.3 – Size of imposition).
For example, asking for the price of a commodity represents a
demand for information. Conversely, by warning someone that it
will rain, we are providing (giving) a service.
The clause as exchange can also be divided into two parts: the
Mood and the Residue, as in:
Margaret
Mood
Subject
will
Finite
buy
Residue
Predicator
a house
for her daughter
Complement
Adjunct
a. The Mood element consists of
o
o
a Subject – usually a nominal group, and
a Finite operator, i.e. a verbal element which expresses:
tense, i.e. past, present or future at the moment of speaking
- verbal operators: did(n’t), was, had, used to, does, is, will…
modality, i.e. ‘the speaker’s judgement of the probabilities,
or the obligations, involved in what he is saying’
- modal operators: can(’t), may, could, …
polarity: negative vs. positive; etc.
b. The Residue may consist of:
o Predicator – a verbal element in a non-finite form
o Complement – generally a noun phrase, a Participant in the
clause that could be the Subject but is not
o Adjunct – an adverbial or prepositional phrase showing
circumstance (in spring, at home), modality (probably,
actually, occasionally), etc.
The Finite elements can be fused with the Predicator, e.g. buys or
bought, in which case the notation is ‘Predicator: buy.’
156
We must also mention here cases of ellipsis: the fact that the
speaker drops the Subject, Predicator, or some other element in
the clause does not prevent the message from being meaningful.
Minor sentences (without a predicate, e.g. You OK?) and non-finite
constructions (with the subject elided, e.g. Bought it cheaply) are
in abundance in colloquial oral communication.
4.2.3
Clause as representation
Man perceives experience as a set of process types – material,
mental, relational, etc. – which he communicates linguistically by
the grammatical system of transitivity.
A process consists of three elements, associated with typical
grammatical classes:
the process itself – a verbal group
the participants that take part in the process – a nominal group
the circumstances associated with the process – an adverbial
or a prepositional phrase
For example:
the man
warmly
congratulated
Participant Circumst. Process
nominal group adv. group verbal group
his friend
for his success
Participant Circumstance
nominal group prep. phrase
Among the main types of processes Halliday describes (1994:
Chapter 5), let us mention:
a. Material processes, or processes of ‘doing.’ The two
participants are the Actor (the ‘doer’ of the action) and the Goal
(the participant the action is directed at/extended to), as in:
the teacher
my brother
Actor
explained
has bought
Process : material
the lesson
a new car
Goal
Grammatically, material process clauses can be active (above)
or passive (below), which points to their transitivity:
the lesson
a new car
Goal
was explained
has been bought
Process : material
by the teacher
by my brother
Actor
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Chapter 4: The text
b. Mental processes are processes of cognition or affection, i.e.
of ‘sensing’ (knowing, thinking, feeling, seeing, etc.). The
Participants in a mental process are the Senser (the conscious
participant) and the Phenomenon (the participant that is
thought, seen or felt), as in:
they
I
Senser
they
it
Senser
we
I
Senser
know
believe
Process : cognition
didn’t like
hurts
Process : affection
felt
could hear
Process : perceptive
(that)
you
(Phenomenon)
their new school
(my eyes)
(Phenomenon)
the cold
the noise
Phenomenon
In most cases, utterances carry intricate embeddings, as in:
it
puzzles
Pr: affection
Phe-
me
Senser
how strange everything is
-nomenon: fact
or
Can
Pro-
you
Senser
see
that man
Phenomenon
cess: perception
3. Relational processes are processes of ‘being.’ The English
grammar provides three types of relational processes, namely:
a.
b.
c.
intensive, which present one of the participants as though it
were the other, i.e. x is a;
circumstantial, which describe the circumstances of the main
participant, i.e. x is at/on/for/with… a;
possessive, which show what the main participant has, i.e. x has a.
Each of these categories can function in two variants, namely:
o
attributive:
intensive: John is clever.
circumstantial: The car is over there.
possessive: Peter has got a new car.
o
identifying:
intensive: John is the boss.
circumstantial: Tomorrow’s Tuesday.
possessive: The pet is Peter’s.
158
With attributive processes, the participants are the Carrier
(the main participant) and the Attribute (the features/items that
describe it), as in:
Mary
is/looks
beautiful
the day
seems
cold
Carrier
Process : intensive
Attribute
the show
is
on Sunday
my paper
concerns/is about
the Tudor dynasty
Carrier
Process : circumstantial Attribute
that man
owns
this building
the house
has
beautiful windows
Carrier/Possessor
Process
:
possessive
Attribute/Possessed
the house
belongs to
that man
Carrier/Possessed
Process
:
possessive
Attribute/Possessor
With identifying processes, the participants are the
Identified (the main participant) and the Identifier (the
items/features that stand at the basis of the identification), as in:
the man
he
Identified
she
sorrow
Identified
the car
the decision
Identified
is
plays
Process : intensive
resembles
followed
Process : circumstantial
is
is
Process : possessive
an engineer
Othello
Identifier
her mother
the joy
Identifier
Peter’s
theirs
Identifier
Relational processes can be active (as in the examples
above), or passive (as those below), which points to their
transitivity:
the engineer
Othello
Identified
the joy
Identified
John’s
the car
Identified
is
is played by
Process : intensive
was followed
Process : circumstantial
is
is owned
Process : possessive
that man
him
Identifier
by sorrow
Identifier
that car
by him
Identifier
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Chapter 4: The text
d. Existential processes are also processes of ‘being,’ but unlike
relational processes, they are impersonal in character, as in:
there
was
a fire
there
Process
Existent: event Circumstance
there
’s
a picture
on the wall
What happened
there
Process
Existent: entity
circumstance
e. Behavioural processes show how a human participant behaves,
i.e. they present physiological or psychological processes, e.g. crying,
laughing, dreaming, etc., as in
she
she
Behaver
behaved
was dreaming
Process
very badly
at the party
about her future
Circumstance
Circumstance
f. Verbal processes are processes of ‘saying.’ The Participants are
the Sayer (the participant who is quoting or reporting) and the
quoted or reported Process, as in:
he
Sayer
he
Sayer
said
Process
urged
Process
‘Do it at once!’
Quoted
us
to do it at once
Receiver/Target Reported
The relations established among the elements of the clause can be:
o
o
ideational (external), linking processes or
interpersonal (internal), setting up relations between the
participants.
For example:
Mike works hard but he doesn’t always succeed
I can help you with your lessons
In the first example, the relation is established between the two
material processes (work and succeed). In the second, the relation
links the participants (I and you).
4.3 Intonation and key
It was shown in section 4.2.1 that the Thematic organization of the
clause (into Theme and Rheme) is doubled by the phonological
organization of the tone group (into Given and New information), and
that the tone group also functions as unit of information in discourse.
160
The tone group is carried by intonation (or tone), realized with
the help of the pitch contour i.e. the direction of the voice: falling,
rising, level, or mixed (falling-rising, rising-falling).
Each tonic group carries a pitch contour, which generally
corresponds to the type of sentence: declarative sentences are
uttered with a falling tone, interrogatives with a rising one, etc. But
the speaker can manipulate his tone to convey various attitudes:
doubt, irritation, encouragement, etc.
Thus, apart from their textual function, tone groups also have an
interpersonal function. The key of the speaker’s address (i.e. his tone
choice or intonation) carries a lot of meaning – a meaning that is
closely related to the system of Mood.
Halliday (1994: 302) enumerates five basic tones: Tone 1:
falling pitch; Tone 2: rising pitch; Tone 3: level tone; Tone 4:
falling-rising; and Tone 5: rising-falling. Compound tones are also
frequent, e.g. Tone 13 (‘one three’): fall-level; or Tone 53 (‘five
three’): rise-fall-level, etc. Some of the tones can be further
subdivided, e.g. Tone 1 may be uttered with a low fall (Tone 1) or
high fall (Tone 1+, where the + indicates emphatic fall, depending on
the initial pitch level of the voice); similarly, Tone 2 can be
pronounced as (Tone 2+, with + indicating high/emphatic rise).
In their basic usage, the tones are unmarked: e.g. a yes-no
question is generally uttered with Tone 1, a WH- question is
pronounced with Tone 2. Conversely, use of an emphatic or a
contrastive tone is viewed as marked and carries additional
meanings.
For example, a declarative sentence is generally uttered with a
low-fall Tone 1 (unmarked); a high fall of the voice (Tone 1+) shows
emotional involvement, irritation, impatience (marked). High fall is
unmarked (i.e. typical) for imperative sentences; uttering an
imperative with a low fall Tone 1 (marked) conveys indifference, noninvolvement. Or, using Tone 2 after a declarative sentence (marked)
conveys the speaker’s uncertainty. For example:
Nothing of the kind
This is not so
Do you know me?
The first example, a declarative sentence, should be uttered with
Tone 1 (unmarked); but if the speaker is upset and wants to negate
emphatically, he will use a high-falling pitch (Tone 1+).
The second utterance is also a declarative (unmarked with Tone
1); but if the speaker is not certain whether ‘it is so or not,’ he may
use a Tone 2, or a compound Tone 4 (both viewed as marked, but
each conveying a slightly different meaning/attitude).
Chapter 4: The text
161
The third example, a yes-no question, is unmarked if pronounced
with low-rising Tone 2; but if the speaker’s attitude is tentative (he is
not sure who his interlocutor is), he may use a marked rise-fall-level
Tone 53.
4.4 Clause complexes and sentences
The development of clauses into clause complexes and sentences
is basically a process of modification similar to that which occurs in
the case of word complexes, where the Head is semantically
expanded by addition of premodifying and/or post-modifying
elements. But with clause complexes, the connection between the
clauses gains two further dimensions: of interdependency (or
taxis), and of logical-semantic relation.
I. There are two type of interdependency between clauses:
a. Parataxis (or ‘coordination’), which arises between elements
of equal status – notation: 1 2 3 4 …
b. Hypotaxis (or ‘subordination’), i.e. the relation between the
‘dominant’ (or ‘primary’) clause and a dependant (or
‘secondary’) one – notation:
…. (the letters of the
Greek alphabet).
Parataxis is
o symmetrical, i.e. the elements are interchangeable: I ate a
sandwich and drank a coke means the same thing as I drank
a coke and ate a sandwich; and
o transitive: I needed something to read and I bought a book
imply together that I needed a book.
Hypotaxis is
o non-symmetrical: I go shopping when I need a dress does
not imply I need a dress when I go shopping; and
o non-transitive: I love fast cars and I bought a car do not
imply together I bought a fast car.
II. The logical-semantic relations between a primary and a
secondary clause are also of two types, namely:
a.
b.
Expansion, i.e. the secondary clause develops the idea
expresses in the primary clause by elaborating, extending or
enhancing it
Projection, i.e. the secondary clause is ‘projected through
the primary clause’ as a locution (what the speaker says) or
as an idea (what the speaker thinks).
162
Both expansion and projection can be realized either by parataxis
or by hypotaxis, as in:
a. Expansion:
elaboration (notation =), i.e. rephrasing, clarifying: in other
words, i.e., that is, to be precise, viz., a non-definite relative
clause, etc.
extension (notation +), i.e. ‘adding to’: and, or, e.g., in
addition, but, whereas, instead of, etc.
parataxis:
He hadn’t seen the car (1); he didn’t know how beautiful it was (=2)
hypotaxis:
He didn’t like the car ( ); which surprised everybody (= )
parataxis:
He saw the car (1) and liked it very much (+2)
hypotaxis:
I liked the dress ( ), whereas my husband hated it (+ )
enhancement (notation x), i.e. enlarging the idea by
making reference to time, place, manner, cause, condition:
so, yet, then, for, but, yet, still, meanwhile, otherwise,
therefore, however, etc.
parataxis:
He liked the car, so he took it for a test drive. (x 2)
hypotaxis:
He took the car for a test drive ( ) because he liked it (x )
Explicit connective are not essential to signal expansion; what is
important is the underlying semantic relation, as in:
Having seen the car (after I had seen), I was eager to try it out
The dependant expanding clause can also be embedded in the
main clause, as in:
The company (that was) advertising the car claimed that …
b. Projection:
locution, i.e. the speaker’s words are reproduced exactly; it
is signalled with the notation “ (double quotation mark):
parataxis:
He said: ‘I like that car’ (“2)
hypotaxis:
I promise ( ) I’ll do it (“ )
Chapter 4: The text
163
idea, i.e. the speaker’s unuttered words are quoted; the
notation is ‘ (simple quotation mark):
parataxis:
He though to himself: ‘I like that car’ (‘2)
hypotaxis:
He decided he would buy that car (‘ )
Thus, grammatically, projection is done by:
o by direct speech for parataxis; signalled in oral communication
with intonational clues, e.g. an audible pause between the two
clauses, the projecting clause is less salient than the projected
clause; and
o by indirect speech for hypotaxis; pronounced without specific
intonational clues.
A third, intermediary category can be added, that of free indirect
speech, as in:
164
4.5 The text
The development of clauses into sentences gives us an idea about the
way stretches of language combine to produce larger meaningful
units. Analysis of full texts takes these factors into consideration. But
such relations alone cannot account for the unity of meaning of full
texts.
4.5.1 Text and textness
When reading a piece of literature or an article in the newspaper, the
term ‘text’ comes as a natural label: a text is traditionally viewed as a
continuous sequence of sentences that covers a certain physical
location (e.g. a sheet of paper) or time span (e.g. the text of a song).
But we may wonder whether sequences of apparently non-related
successions of words, such as:
He could do it, he thought/said to himself
Locutions or ideas can be embedded in the sentence, too, e.g.
projected by verbal/mental process nouns, as in:
The claim that he is the best is highly exaggerated
Groups/phrases can also develop by expansion and projection:
•
•
•
Expansion – parataxis:
o nominal groups: either you or him; a beautiful and shiny car;
etc.
o verbal group: (he) hoped, dreamed of it; neither liked nor
disliked; tried but failed; etc.
o adverbial/prepositional phrase: alone, without friends;
calmly, although not without …; etc.
Expansion – hypotaxis:
o nominal group: the car with the smashed windshield; etc.
o verbal group:
perfective: tried to sleep; would like to sing; managed to
do;
imperfective: tried relaxing; likes singing; succeeded in
doing, etc.
Projection – hypotaxis:
o verbal group
with want: she wants to do it (offer); she wants him to
do it (demand); etc.
with decide: she decided to go there; etc.
Chivas Regal. When you know
Citizen Vagary. Aquadiver. I play it my way. Surprising till the bottom
Wella. Shockwaves. Power Hold Spray. Summer proof. Heat proof.
Still totally hot
should be called texts or not. They consist of orthographic sentences
(separated by full stops), but few among them have a predicate,
while others are mere noun phrases, and there are absolutely no
explicit connective devices.
And yet, the receiver views them as unitary1 not only because
they are placed on the same sheet of paper and in sequential order,
but because such ‘texts’ are typical for the discourse of advertising.
To explain how and why such pieces of language are viewed as
unitary and meaningful, functional grammar surveys what goes on
‘around the clause,’ focusing on notions such as cohesion and
discourse.
The text, i.e. ‘the verbal record of a communicative event,’ relies on
‘principles of connectivity … [which] bind a text together and force cointerpretation’ (Brown & Yule, 1983: 190).
Analysis of ordinary linguistic interactions – i.e. of the ‘texts’2
produced by native speakers in their everyday communication – have
made discourse analysts realize that the texts normally encountered
‘show a minimal amount of formal cohesion, assume massive
amounts of existing background knowledge and normally require the
1
2
In fact, receivers generally refuse to accept the idea that they are facing
a meaningless succession of words, so that they make efforts to discover
their unitary meaning, whenever possible.
Texts can be oral or written.
Chapter 4: The text
165
166
reader to make whatever inferences he feels willing to work for in
order to reach an understanding of what is being conveyed’ (Brown &
Yule, 1983: 269-270).
Communication represents knowledge transfer, i.e. transmission
and reception of information. But much of the information to be
transmitted is not expressed in words. In the texts produced by
competent communicators, especially in oral communication, there
are numerous missing links, i.e. factual gaps that must be filled in
by the receiver of the message (see also section 1.2.3 – Pragmatic
meaning).
Factual gaps can be based on the communicators’ shared
background knowledge, or on their knowledge of the world. For
example, when the speaker says, We went to Tony’s last night, he
does not need to mention that Tony’s is a restaurant or a mutual
friend; he simply expects the receiver to know it.
In other cases, the missing links are induced by the very nature
of communication. For instance, in face-to-face conversation there
are many cases where two adjoining utterances seem to be
unrelated, as in:
A: Let’s go for a walk
B: I’m expecting a call
the ads quoted above). But our previous encounter with similar texts
tells us that they belong together, as forming meaningful texts.
As a general rule, Brown & Yule (1983: 190) suggest that ‘in
sequential utterances relevance holds unless clearly specified.’ In
other words, they are meaningfully related to one another, forming
together a text.
A text has ‘texture,’ i.e. it is perceived as unitary (coherent) and
connected (cohesive).
The coherence of a text is its ‘overall quality of unity and
meaning.’ Its cohesion (or ‘continuity’) is provided by the relations
that bind together the apparently isolated chunks of language.
Coherence and cohesion are the two key factors that turn a
random succession of lexical strings into a meaningful text.
In written language, many sentences are linked by explicit
cohesive ties, e.g. conjunctions. The coherence and cohesion of a
text is supported by such connectives, but is not created by them:
the connectedness of a piece of language is semantic and discoursal,
not grammatical.
In the exchange, the two interlocutors seem to be talking about
different things: A – about a walk, B – about a call. Still, A
understands that B’s utterance is related to his invitation, that it
represents a refusal and that it also provides a reason for the refusal.
Linguists refer to such pairs of utterances (where the first
represents a question or an invitation, and the second and answer to
it) as the adjacent pair formula.
In non-dialogic texts, too, adjoining sentences are interpreted as
belonging to the same text. For example, in:
I. With reference (or co-reference1), ‘a participant or
circumstantial element introduced at one place in the text [is] taken
as reference point for something that follows’ (Halliday, 1994: 309).
Co-reference can be achieved by:
What a fine weather. I don’t feel like working
the speaker does not have to say that he does not feel like working
because the weather is fine: no formal marker is needed to indicate
that the two sentences are meaningfully related. The ability to fill in
such missing links belongs to the speakers’ linguistic competence.
Their density is manipulated by the sender according to his audience
and to his linguistic aims.
In other cases, the missing links are induced by the nature of the
discourse they belong to. The discourse of advertising, for example, is
typically ‘fragmented’ into elliptical orthographic sentences (e.g. see
Halliday (1994: Chapter 9) suggests that the cohesion of a text is
based on four factors: reference, ellipsis, conjunction and lexical
organization.
•
•
•
•
pronominal substitution of a lexical item
o personal: he, she, they, …
o possessive: mine, his, theirs, …
o demonstrative: this, that, those, …
deictic words: here/now, there/then, the …
comparatives: same, such, other, better, less, the same, …
a pro-form term:
o for the nominal group: so, one, any, etc.
o for the verbal group – a Finite operator: can, do, have, ...
For example:
1
We visited London and were impressed by its beautiful sights
We visited London and we impressed by the sights we saw there
I am tired and so are you
For reference and ellipsis, see also section 2.2.2.1.2.2 – Ellipsis and substitution.
Chapter 4: The text
167
In most cases, co-reference works anaphorically, the word
referring back to something that has already been mentioned – as in
the examples above. In other cases, it is used cataphorically, i.e.
looking forward, as in:
II. With ellipsis, or ‘zero substitution’1, ‘a clause, or a part of a
clause, or a part […] of a verbal or nominal group [is] presupposed at
a subsequent place in the text by the device of positive omission, that
is, by saying nothing where something is required to make up the
sense’ (Halliday, 1994: 309).
Ellipsis (notation θ) is based on the formal absence of something,
rather than on its presence; and yet, it constitutes a powerful
cohesive device. For example:
Is it OK? It is θ
I couldn’t go to university when I was your age, so I worked hard to
make sure you can θ
Written discourses make little use of ellipsis – the sentences are
complex and fully articulated. Conversely, face-to-face interaction
makes extensive use of it: in direct conversation there is no need to
express things that are mutually perceived by the participants in the
discourse. Ellipsis also implies shared knowledge, so that it connotes
closeness and intimacy.
III. In the case of conjunction, ‘a clause or clause complex, or
some longer stretch of text, [is] related to what follows it by one or
other of a specific set of semantic relations’ (Halliday, 1994: 309).
Conjunction involves contiguous elements and, in the absence of
structural relations, it accounts for the logical relations between
clauses, sentences or paragraphs.
Of the two types of logical-semantic relations analyzed in
section 4.4, expansion is by far the more productive.
Explicit formal markers of conjunctive relations link the new
information to what has already been said. They can be:
o
o
o
o
1
There is, however, no one-to-one relationship between markers and
relations: e.g. and can be used for all types.
Markers of cohesive relations are among the most frequent
‘missing links’ in oral communication. In a sentence, such as:
Is it new, that car?
The actual form of the referring expression depends on its
referential function, i.e. on the speaker’s intention on the particular
occasion of use.
168
additive: and, similarly, in addition, etc.
adversative: but, on the other hand, nevertheless, etc.
causal: so, consequently, for this reason, etc.
temporal: then, after that, an hour later, finally, etc.
Halliday includes ellipsis in the category of substitution.
Buy it, θ it’s worth the money
the causal connective ‘because’ is missing; and yet, the message is
clear enough to all rational communicators.
On the other hand, the opposite phenomenon is equally
productive in oral communication: the speaker may begin an
independent clause with a connective, thus suggesting that he is
continuing an idea. For example:
As I was telling you, …………………..
Because that’s what I think
Conjunction can link:
•
•
Processes, in which case, we have an ideational conjunction
(e.g. They tried but failed.); or
Participants, in which case the conjunction is interpersonal (e.g.
I know that you want it).
IV. Lexical cohesion establishes continuity by choice of words.
Lexical cohesion can be based on substitution or ellipsis, on
repetition of a lexical item or pattern, on collocation, on sense
relations, etc. The lexical chains which result carry the idea forward.
For example, in:
One of the trickier aspects of speaking a foreign language is knowing how
to choose the most appropriate word when there are several which seem
to have the same meaning. In casual conversation, for example, we may
talk about crooks instead of criminals. Instead of a man we might say
guy, bloke or chap or an older person might say fellow.
(Donald Watson, Ladies and Gents...)
we encounter:
the lexical chain foreign languages – word – meaning –
conversation – say – talk about
a case of ellipsis (…when there are several θ)
repetition of instead of
chains of synonyms used to illustrate the idea (crook – criminal;
man – guy – bloke – chap – fellow)
hyponymy (the most appropriate word – several which …)
Cohesion is also supported by other structural relations, such as:
consistency of tense – in this case, the present
consistency of mood – in this case, lowered modality, due to may
and might
Chapter 4: The text
169
consistency of stylistic choice – in this example, formal style, due
to the academic character of the writing; etc.
4.5.2 Written and spoken discourses
Traditionally, the term ‘text’ is viewed as a written piece of language.
However, oral exchanges also display the typical characteristics of
textness.
There are significant differences between spoken and written
texts1.
Written texts are highly organised. The writer has the time to
plan his message thoroughly, to go back, review and reformulate
what he already said. Consequently, the structure of the written
discourse is well organised, the vocabulary is rich, and the
information is highly concentrated. Heavy premodification (e.g. with
noun phrases) is typical and the structure of the sentences is
complex, with intricate subordination. As a consequence, written texts
display numerous metalingual markers (e.g. that complementisers),
temporal markers (when, while), logical connectors (besides,
moreover, in spite of, etc.). The rhetorical organization of written
texts and, as a result their impact, depends on the writer’s intentions,
talent and inventiveness.
Spoken texts, on the other hand, display a much looser
organization and the information is less densely packed. Syntactically,
the structure of oral texts is much simpler, there is little
subordination, metalingual markers and connectors are often dropped
(e.g. Come here. Don’t argue.), and there are few passive
constructions.
Spoken texts are organised by the speaker as the conversation
goes on, so that there is little time to plan ahead. The message is
formulated according to the receiver’s reaction and meaning is
negotiated among the interactants. Moreover, in the case of oral
communication, the speaker may rely heavily on objects from his
environment and on paralinguistic clues to convey his meaning. As a
result, oral texts contain all kind of interactive markers and planning
fillers (err…, I mean …), many sentences are incomplete (elliptical,
minor, or simply unfinished), there are frequent interruptions (even of
major syntactic units), pauses, tongue slips, repetitions and
reformulation, etc. In intimate circumstances, speakers exploit
dialectal and accent features to reduce social distance and convey a
sense of in-group membership.
1
After Brown & Yule, 1983: 15-17.
170
Informal written texts (letters to friends), or strategic ones
(advertisements or literature), often display characteristics of the
spoken discourse: short (often elliptical) sentences, few connectives,
repetitions, dialectal features, etc. With strategic communication, the
semblance of orality is a trick aimed at creating an intimate
atmosphere.
Analysis of the (shorter or longer) texts quoted so far in this
chapter has revealed the fact that the sense of ‘textness’ a piece of
language conveys relies to a great extent on the explicit or implicit
cohesive ties. But to provide a thorough analysis of a text, and see
what meanings it actually conveys, we must go beyond cohesive
devices.
Halliday (1994) argues that the ‘textness’ and the overall
meaning of a text result from the interplay of six factors: theme,
focus (of information), cohesion, mood, key and transitivity.
4.5.2.1 Written texts
Let us analyze the following text along these lines:
Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised
to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism. In the year
1984 there was not as yet anyone who used Newspeak as his sole means
of communication. … The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide
a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to
the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought
impossible.
(Orwell George, Nineteen Eighty-Four)
Cohesion: Since it is a highly elaborate piece of writing, the text has
a complex structure. Its consistency of style (formal) is supported by
careful word choice (formal lexis, long words of Latin/French origin:
devised, purpose, provide, devotees), by educated sequence of
tenses (anteriority: was – had been), as well as by complex clause
and sentence structure. Conjunction (both paratactic and hypotactic)
is accomplished by elaboration (Ingsoc, or English Socialism), by
extension (… was not anyone who could…) and enhancement (was
not only to provide…, but to make…), and there are formal markers of
conjunction (additive: and; who; alternative: or; adversative: not
only to…, but to…), etc. Co-reference by pronominal substitution (…
anyone who…), ellipsis (Newspeak was… and θ had been…), lexical
chains (Newspeak – language – communication – medium of
expression; ideological needs – Ingsoc – English Socialism – modes of
thought), and sense relations (synonymy: Ingsoc – English Socialism;
hyponymy: language – Newspeak), carry the ideas smoothly forward
and ensure the logical connectedness of the sentences.
Chapter 4: The text
171
172
Theme and Focus: The Theme and main character of the first
sentence – and of the entire paragraph/text1 – is Newspeak; by
elision, it functions as Theme for the second clause, too. But
Newspeak is treated as Given (i.e. old information), while the New
(and thus, the Focus of the utterances) are Oceania and, respectively,
Ingsoc, which bear the main intonational weight. In the third unit of
the sentence, the apposition which reformulates (elaborates on) the
grammatical subject, English Socialism is both its Theme and Focus.
The second sentence foregrounds the date as Theme, treating anyone
(negated) and communication as Focus. The first tone group in
sentence 3 highlights purpose as Theme, and as Focus it offers the
word devotees; the second emphatically foregrounds the words all
other and focuses on impossible, thus pointing to the all-annihilating
effect of the language.
its Finite + Predicator element (was – Past) puts a distance between
the story and the reader. Impersonal there was… in the next
sentence, and further tense contrasts by System I (was, used, had
been devised) sustain the sense of objective distancing. Most
processes in the text are relational intensive identifying (e.g.
Newspeak = Identified, the language of Oceania = Identifier) or
existential (… there was not as yet anyone… Existent: entity), which
convey a sense of inflexible status quo. The few material processes,
which could induce some sense of closeness and dynamism, are
either passive (… had been devised…) or of negative polarity (… not
yet anyone who used…). The last sentence conveys the same sense
of cold detachment: impersonal Subjects (purpose), tense contrast by
System III (perfective – to provide, to make); negative polarity (…
was not only…, to make impossible).
Key: The first orthographic sentence contains three tone groups
corresponding to two coordinated clauses and an apposition. The
clauses are declarative and pronounced with an unmarked falling
pitch (Tone 1) because the speaker’s attitude is neutral (he is merely
conveying some information). Sentence 2 introduces an important
piece of information (the date), so that it begins with a rise, to
continue with a fall on the second part of the tone unit. The tone is
unmarked (Tone 5) because the negation renders the information of
little significance. It is only in sentence 3 that we feel the speaker’s
emotional involvement: the Tones are emphatic and marked. Of the
two tone groups, the first (The purpose… English Socialism)
introduces the problem; it is uttered with an emphatic compound
Tone 53+ (high rise-fall-level); the second (but to … thought
impossible) gives the solution: it is uttered with a marked Tone 5+
(high rise-fall).
Thus, by skilfully manipulating the six factors of textness, Orwell
managed to produce a highly powerful and persuasive text. No single
element could have accomplished the same overwhelming effect.
Mood and transitivity: The function of the text is to provide (give)
expert information regarding Newspeak, the imaginary language of
an equally imaginary Oceania. To render his fiction believable, Orwell
places the modality of the text in the field of the real but distal2. The
Subject of the very first Mood element (Newspeak) imposes an
impersonal attitude (non-human protagonist) and the Past Tense of
1
2
These are the first lines of Orwell’s Appendix to his novel 1984. A larger
excerpt from the same Appendix is reproduced in Annex 3.
Published in 1949, the novel 1984 describes a dreadful communist
England. The action of the novel is presented as taking place in 1984;
and yet, the tense Orwell uses is the past, not the present. In this way,
he strategically distances himself (lowers the modality) from the subject and
object of his description.
4.5.2.2 Oral texts
With oral texts, especially those produced in face-to-face
conversation, there are few connective ties and utterances seem to
be unrelated. And yet, they are perceived as unitary thanks to the
underlying semantic relations, and their cohesion is also supported by
other textual factors.
Let us consider the following text:
Chris: Hey Yo son, What's up man?
Tommy: It's all good. See the game last night? It's sweet Yo.
Chris: Hell yeah, that joint tight.
Tommy: See that dude number 19? That's my dog.
Chris: That dude's cool, man.
Tommy: So, How's going, Yo?
Chris: Just chillin' around, not much.
(College slang: By Bryan Elie, Knight-Ridder Tribune, 08.27.2001)
Cohesion: The text is full of missing links, but they are easily retrieved
by the competent communicator. The first thing that must be
considered is the sequential nature of the utterances and the type of
discourse, i.e. a dialogue, where a question is generally followed by an
answer. In this way, seemingly isolated utterances (e.g. ‘What’s up,
man?’ ‘It’s all good.’) are viewed as related. Co-reference if
accomplished by substitution (the game – it; that dude – that;
son/man-Yo), by pragmatic or contextual synonymy (son-man; dudedog; game-joint; What’s up – How’s going), and by lexical chains (son
Chapter 4: The text
173
– man – dude – dog – dude – man; game – joint), which carry on the
interlocutors’ ideas. The text is also consistent in terms of tense
(present), of grammatical structure (simple sentences) and, most
importantly, of style: slangy words (dude, joint, dog, chillin’ around),
elliptical utterances ([Did you] see the game?, That joint θ tight.),
group specific pronunciation (Yo, chillin’).
Theme and Focus: Unlike the previous text, this one does not have a
unitary Theme. This is because the interlocutors do not have one
unitary subject, but several successive ones – as it often happens in
face-to-face conversation. After the group-specific greeting, there
comes a question-answer exchange, both with fused and marked
Theme and Focus: What’s, and respectively, all. By marking
(emphasizing and foregrounding) them, the speakers want to show
that they are emotionally involved (i.e. they are interested, they care)
in the ongoing dialogue. The next subject discussed regards a certain
game, so that the word game is treated as Theme, with a Focus on last
night – the New information. The Focus of information of the following
two utterances falls on the adjectives used to characterize the game
(sweet and tight); this way, the speakers give voice to their opinions
and feelings concerning the game. In the first clause (It’s sweet…), the
adjective represents jointly the Theme and Focus of the utterance. In
the second (That dude’s…) the Theme (and Given) is the demonstrative
that, deictically pointing to one specific item of the category. Etc.
Key: To show their affective involvement in the conversation, the two
youngsters use emphatic tones. In opposition with the written text
discussed earlier, in this case the utterances, and therefore, the tone
groups are very short, and numerous tone groups correspond to
interjections/vocative terms and appositions (Hey Yo, Yo, man). This
attests to the highly emotional and vociferous character of the
exchange. The first two utterances – Chris’s greeting and his yes/no
question – are uttered with an emphatic Tone 4+ (high fall-rise).
Tommy’s answer is equally emphatic: Tone 5+ (high rise-fall). The
affective involvement is slightly reduced in his yes/no question
regarding the game (pronounced with an unmarked Tone 2), but then
again we get several highly emotional utterances – three tone units
pronounced with: Tone 4+ (high fall-rise) – for Tommy’s identification
of his friend); emphatic Tone 53 (rise-high fall-level) and Tone 1+ –
(for Chris’s words of admiration and his apposition). Etc. The rhythm
and music induced by brevity of the tone groups, the alternation of falls
and rises, of marked and unmarked Tones, endow the text with a
sense of vigorous interaction and strong emotions.
174
Mood and transitivity: the clauses provide a variety of process types:
material (chillin’ around), mental perceptive (See the game…?, See that
dude…?), existential (What’s up…? How’s going…?), relational intensive
identifying (That’s my dog), relational intensive attributive (It’s all good;
It’s sweet; that joint tight; That dude’s cool), whose interplay endows the
text with a sense of variety and dynamism. Attributive processes are by
far the most numerous, which suggests that the youngsters are keen to
express their feelings and attitudes; second come the existential and
relational identifying processes – which shows that they are eager to
establish their social status and group membership; thirdly come the
processes of perception – by which they present their experiences; and
only last come the material processes (in fact only one, and even that
with negative polarity – Just chillin’ around, not much) – which suggests
that ‘doing’ (i.e. action) is not in the centre of such youngsters’ attention.
In terms of Mood, it is interesting to note that any Subject that should
make direct reference to the sender (the I of conversation) is elided, as
though the speaker would want to make himself less conspicuous. Most
subjects are impersonal (it, that), which also attests to the speaker’s
strategy of non-involvement. Reference to the other participant in the
conversation is more intricate, but similarly evasive: Yo, man, son, never
first name address. The Finite element (What’s up …?) conveys a sense
of immediacy (‘here and now’), but even that is often by default (e.g.
elided: [I] [am] just…), pointing again to the speaker’s preference for
vagueness and indeterminacy.
The absence of the Mood element and of deictic terms brings the
text close to what Halliday calls ‘little texts’ (see section 4.5.2.4).
The last utterance shows clearly how the interplay of textual factors
helps to bring forth the emotions and attitudes of the interactants:
[I]
[am]
Mood
Subject
Finite
Actor
Process:
just
chill in[g]
Theme
Rheme
Residue
Adjunct
Predicator
Circumstance
material
around
Adjunct
Circumstance
The cohesive ties which link the utterance to the previous ones in
the text are
co-reference by elision: elided Subject I
consistency of tense: the present
a rather loose lexical chain: going – chillin’
the adjacent pair formula, where a question is followed by an
answer
consistency of style
Chapter 4: The text
175
Consistency of style also disambiguates the meaning of the
utterance: Webster gives as first meaning for the noun chill ‘an
uncomfortably penetrating coldness’; as an intransitive verb, we get
the definition ‘to become cold,’ and as an transitive verb, ‘to affect with
cold.’ In the context of slangy speech, we accept the definition for chill
out, i.e. ‘to calm down; relax’ and infer that the meaning of to chill
around is ‘spend time leisurely, with friends.’
In the absence of the Mood element, the utterance is vague and
indeterminate: there is no explicit Subject, and there is no word to tell
us the exact circumstances of the action: its when (am/was/will be
chilling…) or how (must be/could be/should be chilling).
Furthermore, the Actor of this material process is elided, and its
Goal1 is altogether absent. The highlighted terms are just
(foregrounded as Theme), whose function is to reduce/minimize the
meaning/effect of the following words), and chill (the phonologically
emphasized/tonic syllable and the Focus of the utterance), whose
negative connotations2 convey a sense of detachment. The intonation –
Tone 53 (rise-fall-level) – support the sense of vagueness and
detachment.
4.5.2.3 Speech in writing
Strategic texts, such as those of literature or advertising, often upset
the standards of the discourse to which they belong. One such
frequently used trick is to endow the written text with a sense of
orality.
Take, for example, the following text:
'If you really want to hear about it, the first thing you'll probably want to
know is where I was born, and what my lousy childhood was like, and how
my parents were occupied and all before they had me, and all that David
Copperfield kind of crap, but I don't feel like going into it, if you want to
know the truth. In the first place, that stuff bores me, and in the second
place, my parents would have about two hemorrhages apiece if I told
anything pretty personal about them. They're quite touchy about
anything like that, especially my father. They're nice and all – I'm not
saying that – but they are also touchy as hell. Besides, I'm not going to tell
you my whole goddam autobiography or anything. I'll just tell you about
this madman stuff that happened to me around last Christmas just before
I got pretty run-down and had to come out here and take it easy.
(J.D. Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye)
1
2
The term is very appropriate for these youngsters’ lack of purpose.
Cold is perceived as negative (e.g. degrees -), vs. warm, viewed as
positive (e.g. degrees +).
176
Cohesion: The first sentence of this text is in fact the first sentence of
Salinger’s famous novel, The Catcher in the Rye. But conditional if
which marks its beginning (a connective used to begin a sentence)
suggests that the writer is continuing an idea discussed previously, and
the adverb really emphasizes this idea. In addition, the words hear (…
want to hear…), say (I'm not saying that) and tell (I’m not going to tell
you) suggest that we are faced with a text ‘spoken’ to us, ‘listeners.’
A sense of orality is also conveyed by the slangy words and phrases
(lousy, goddam, that stuff, kind of crap, madman stuff), by words
and phrases typical for face-to-face interaction (if you want to know
the truth, and all, etc.), used singly or repeatedly. They suggest
young speaker, intimate social distance and casual conversation
about personal problems. Deictic terms (my parents, before I got …,
last Christmas) anchor the conversation in place and time, i.e.
around the speaker and the events he is preparing to talk about. The
structure of the sentences is also typical for oral interactions: there
are numerous cases of coordination (paratactic extension:
independent sentences connected by and or but; paratactic
enhancement: Besides…) and few cases of subordination (e.g.
hypotactic enhancement: before they had me), etc. Consistency of
style, of tense, co-reference and lexical chains, account for the sense
of cohesion and unity of meaning the text conveys.
Hand in hand with the orality of the text goes the key, which also
simulates oral interaction. We can practically hear Holden Caulfield
begin with an unmarked Tone 2 (low rise) for the first clause/tone
group (If you…), followed by an unmarked Tone 1 (low fall) for the
second (you’ll probably…). The tentative beginning is however
followed by a succession of six emphatic Tone 2+ (low fall)
utterances: the first four (where I was…; what my lousy…; how my
parents…; all that…) enumerate the things the receiver would
probably expect to ‘hear’ about; the last two (but I…; if you…) point
to the speaker’s emotional dislike of discussing such matters. The
next sentence (In the first place …, which presents the reasons for the
speaker’s objections) consists of two tone groups, each uttered with a
marked Tone 5+ (rise-high fall), pointing to the strength of the
speaker’s emotional attitude. Etc.
The Themes and Focuses of the utterances are skillfully
manipulated to foreground (and respectively, background) various
pieces of information. Initial position in the sentence/paragraph/ text
turns if into its Theme, thus lowering the modality of the entire text
(it is conditioned by the reader’s willingness to ‘listen’), and the Focus
of the tone group is a vague and unclear it, which in fact stands for
the whole story. Furthermore, unlike traditional autobiographic
Chapter 4: The text
177
stories, which begin with ‘I was born… ,’ i.e. with the writer (I) as its
Theme and main character, in this case the protagonist is completely
absent from the first clause, but the receiver (you) is invited to
participate. The protagonist himself shows up in the next sentences,
but indirectly (Genitive my, not Nominative I), under various guises:
the place of his birth, his childhood, his parents. The first clause in
which he appears as Theme/Subject of the clause is where he
expresses his feelings (I don’t feel like…), but by the negative polarity
of the verb, the protagonist is pushed back, rather than
foregrounded. Nor does the writer feature himself/his story as Focus
of his utterances. By all the items he suggests as Focus (born,
childhood, parents, etc.), and then rejects, he is in fact postponing
the moment of tackling the actual Focus of the story: that madman
stuff… that happened to him.
Salinger exploits Mood and Transitivity with similar skill. The
story-teller is offering to give us some information, but the modality
of his utterances is lowered by the modal operators (would have) and
adjuncts of modality and condition (probably, if), by the negative
polarity (don’t feel like, I’m not going to), by the past tense used in
the initial sentences, etc. And yet, the conversation unfolds in the
present and is looking towards the future, so that the second part of
the paragraph takes on a slightly more realistic modality. Still, the
speaker uses the Future (you’ll … want, I’ll tell you), not the Present,
the actual time of ‘the real.’ The same opposition (of lowered modality
– for the first part of the paragraph, and of more realistic modality –
for the second) is carried by the types of processes: while those
based on the past tense are mostly mental processes (want, feel like,
bores me) and relational ones (was, would have), those looking
forward belong to the category of material processes (I’m going to tell
you, I’ll tell you). The ‘oral’ tone is also justified by text’s focus on
interpersonal relations (on a dialogue between I and you), rather than
on ideational ones (between processes).
4.5.2.4
The grammar of ‘little texts’
Telegrams, headlines and titles, product labels, signboards, short
advertising texts, etc. belong to the category which Halliday calls
‘little texts.’ Their shortness is induced by their function in the specific
situational and discoursal context: they must provide as much
information as possible, they must save space and money, they must
attract attention, etc. As a result, such texts ‘retain all the lexical
words and leave out all the grammatical ones’ (Halliday, 1994: 392).
Short advertising texts illustrate most of the basic features of
‘little texts.’ For example:
178
o
absence of deictic elements for the nominal group:
o
absence of the Finite element of verbal groups:
o
Nightology by J&B
Toyota. Moving forward
absence of the Mood component; since there is no Subject and
no Finite, such cases ‘simply evade choice of mood’:
o
Paciotti. Style 4 US
Alcott. Good life. Space for your style
Tissot. More than a watch
G-STAR RAW. Just the product
unattached nominals:
Givenchy. Hot couture
Miss Sixty. Elixir. The fragrance potion
From the perspective of traditional grammar, such ‘little texts’ are
obviously non-wellformed. And yet, they make up coherent and
meaningful texts because their cohesion runs at a deeper level than
that of the lexical-grammatical structure.
In some cases, we can easily fill in the missing links, as in:
Toyota [is]. Moving forward
Nightology [is made] by J&B
But even in such cases, the meaning conveyed is much more
complex. For example, it is only natural that Toyota (a car) should be
‘moving forward’; but since cars also move backwards, we
understand that the phrase must be interpreted metaphorically. In
addition, since we have two orthographic sentences, not one, the
second can be viewed as an independent clause with no Mood
component. As a result, the Subject is unclear (who is ‘moving
forward,’ the car, the company, the reader?), and the absence of the
Finite element also allows for some temporal shifts (is/was/will be
moving…?).
In the J&B example, elision of the Finite and of the Predicator
induces a significant stylistic change: ‘made’ recalls industrial
production; conversely, ‘by’ connotes artistic achievement1. The
‘artistic’ perception the clause conveys, however, clashes with the
scientific sonority of the Subject induced by the Greek suffix –ology
(as in ‘graphology,’ etc.). Considering the type of product (a
whiskey), the mix suggests a high (‘scientific’) standard of having fun.
1
The ‘by…’ phrase often collocates with the creator of a work of art, as in
Hamlet, by W. Shakespeare.
Chapter 4: The text
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In terms of effect, the funny juxtaposition of the opposing types of
connotation produces a humorously memorable text.
It is precisely the non-wellformedness of such texts which
communicates a more subtle and a more complex meaning: it
conveys a sense of orality, of face-to-face conversation, of intimacy
and sensuality, of dynamism and aspiration, etc.
Let us analyse the following ad along the six dimensions that
work together to ensure its textness:
Eighth Sin. Denim from the Hell. Eden can wait
Cohesion: The first two orthographic sentences are mere
noun phrases: in the first, the Head (Sin) is premodified with a
Numerative (Eighth); in the second, the Head (Denim) is
postmodified with a prepositional phrase (consisting, in its turn, of a
premodified noun, Hell). The third clause is a full sentence, with
Subject and Predicate. The lexical chain sin – Hell – Eden links
together the three apparently independent units. Our knowledge of
advertising texts tells us that, of the first two units, the former names
the product, the latter describes it, so that Eighth Sin and denim
(from the Hell) function as pragmatic synonyms. Sentences 2 and 3
are connected by the antonymic pair Hell and Eden, which ensures
some continuity and unity of meaning, but not sufficient. To
understand the text’s message, we must rely on our knowledge of the
world: the Bible tells us of ‘seven capital sins;’ the eighth offered here
exceeds those seven (i.e. hyperbole). That is, the jeans are presented
as so exceptional and rewarding that they make us even forget for
some time the greatest promise a man can get: that of Eden.
Theme, Focus and Key: The three clauses correspond to three tone
units. In the first, the word Eighth functions as displaced Focus (it
bears the main stress), while Sin is the displaced Theme/main
character, thus conveying the idea that a New (enhanced, more
attractive) way of sinning is being offered. The second clause offers
Denim as Theme, but the word comes as Given (old, known
information), the Focus of the utterance falling on Hell, whose dark
connotations are strangely attractive. The Theme of the third tone
group (Eden) is again treated as Given, the Focus being placed on
wait, i.e. the ad urges receivers to stay young and enjoy life. In terms
of intonation, the three tone units are pronounced with an unmarked
Tone 1, which suggests that their function is basically informational;
the emotional charge is carried paralinguistically, by the speaker’s
husky and sensual (probably female) voice, by her languorous look
and facial expression, her sensuous movements, etc.
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Mood and transitivity: In the absence of a Mood component, the
first two clauses ‘simply evade choice of Mood.’ But this absence only
enhances the semantic charge of the text by allowing several possible
interpretations: ‘Eighth Sin is/are …’, or ‘Buy Eighth Sin because …,’
etc. The modality of the text is low, due to the metaphorical character
of the brand name, as well as of the other two utterances. The
present tense form of the modal operator (can) softens to a certain
degree this sense of unreality. By filling in missing links, the text can
be turned into a complex sentence – Eden can wait [because] Eighth
Sin [products are] denim from Heaven. The elements are in a relation
of subordination and of intransitivity (‘Because Eden can wait,
Eighth Sin products are …’ has a different meaning).
In numerous cases, it is practically impossible to fill in the missing
links of advertising texts. For example:
Unless the reader has some additional information regarding the nonlinguistic context in which the utterance occurs (e.g. the type of
product), the text does not make any sense.
This shows that, in order to analyse the meaning of texts, we
must also take into considerations features that do not pertain to
language, but to the non-linguistic context in which the utterance
occurs. The role and effect of the context of utterance, as well as that
of other pragmatic factors, will be discussed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 5
Context and reference
The analyses of texts undertaken in the previous chapters tell us
that the Saussurian view regarding communication – as a matter
of encoding and decoding is too narrow. Developments in the field
of linguistics lead to the same conclusion.
In the traditional view, meaning was perceived as a separate
component of lexical items, while form and structure carried no
meaning. But the FSP has demonstrated that meaning is carried
by every level of the language – constituents, minimal groups,
intonational patterns, etc. – and that the speaker builds up the
meaning he wants to convey by manipulating not only his linguistic
choices, but also the form and organization of his utterances.
The following scheme (after Crystal, 1987: 83) can give us a
general idea of the linguistic levels required for a more complex
analysis of language and communication:
LANGUAGE
(linguistics)
organization
form
(oral)
structure
(grammar)
use
meaning
pragmatics
phonetics morphology syntax semantics discourse
analysis
phonology
Obviously, the linguistic levels thus presented are organically
connected; for reasons of analysis, though, language is broken
down into artificially isolated components, and each level is
surveyed separately.
Matching de Saussure’s encoding-decoding view with the
scheme above, we can see that it covers only the organizational
part of language. The scheme, however, tells us that there are two
basic levels of meaning: word meaning, and discoursal meaning.
Furthermore, we are shown that, to study discoursal meaning, we
must take into account pragmatic factors, which can be cognitive,
psychological, social, affective or interpersonal. Discoursal
meaning depends on the complex interplay of various features of
the situational context in which the utterance takes place. It is the
task of pragmatics to analyse the way the situational context
affects the meaning of an utterance.
The present chapter will try to explain how various features of
the context of utterance affect the meaning of those utterances,
and how the speaker anchors his utterance in the real-world
context in which the interaction takes place.
5.1
Language in context
It was discussed in the previous chapters that semiotic systems,
and consequently language also, make meaning by paradigmatic
choice and syntagmatic combination. Selection of one lexical item
instead of another influences the meaning of what the speaker
says, e.g. He is not here, She is not here, It is not here.
On the other hand, it is only in combination with other words
that individual items acquire their full meaning. Take, for instance,
the English word get: it means one thing in I got the car from my
father, another in We got it cheaply, another in He got up late, etc.
In other words, the meaning of words depends on the context.
But the term context is not simple, either: it functions on two
levels.
First of all, there is a linguistic context, consisting of the
words, sentences or paragraphs that precede and/or follow a
certain linguistic item and together with which it conveys a
coherent message. With the help of the linguistic context, the
competent speaker can disambiguate ambiguous constructs.
Consider the following joke:
A panda bear goes into a fast food, orders a hamburger, eats it, shoots
several people and leaves the place. A man who happened to see it
all, asks in surprise, ‘Why did you do that?’ ‘Look up “panda” in the
dictionary,’ replies the bear. The man goes home, looks up ‘panda’ in
the dictionary and reads: ‘panda = animal that eats shoots and leaves.’
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The panda bear in the joke is obviously not a competent
speaker of English. He is unable to handle the ambiguity that
results from:
lexical homonymy: shoot (1. to hit/wound with a missile; 2.
young plant’); leaves (1. pl. of leaf, i.e. expanded organ of
plants; 2. departs).
grammatical homonymy: shoots (verb, present, 3rd pers. sg.;
or noun, plural); leaves (i.e. noun, meaning ‘part of a plant;’
leaves: verb, meaning ‘to depart’, present, 3rd pers. sg.).
Those who enjoy the joke are obviously better speakers of
English than he is. But to enjoy the joke, the receiver must also
rely on his knowledge of the world and of society: panda bears do
not speak, they are unlikely to go into a fast food or to have a
gun, etc.
In ordinary face-to-face communication, the linguistic context is
essential to help the hearer to make sense of individual
utterances. As Corder (1981) shows, ‘well-formed sentences
produced by native speakers are mostly ambiguous when taken
out of context.’ To illustrate this idea, read again the ‘college
slang’ text reproduced in section 4.5.2.2.
Within the linguistic context, each lexical item functions as
element of the context to which it belongs; together they build up
the text, giving it coherence and cohesion, i.e. ‘textness’ (see
section 4.5.1.).
At discoursal level, however, the linguistic context is generally
insufficient. Linguists are careful to point out that ‘language is
always in context and there are no acts of communication without
participants, intertext, situation, paralanguage and substance’
(Cook, 1992: 2). As a result, ‘discourse is text and context
together, interacting in a way which is perceived as meaningful
and unified by the participants (who are both part of the context
and observers of it)’ (Cook, 1992: 2, my emphasis).
This triggers the conclusion that, for an analysis of discourse
and of discoursal meaning, we must employ pragmatic tools.
Take, for example, the first two texts analysed in section 4.5.2.
In the case of the text about Newspeak, we can tell that it was
written by an educated man, with the purpose of providing
information for an equally educated reader; even if we cannot
actually see them, we can visualise a highly formal setting and a
rigorous activity type (e.g. the writer, sitting at his desk and
writing an article, or as a speaker in a conference room,
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addressing an educated audience); we can practically see the
speaker’s strict clothes, we can hear his educated pronunciation,
his serious tone of voice, the silence in the room, etc.
Conversely, the ‘college slang’ text gives us a completely
different picture: highly informal setting (in the street), young
speakers (typical slang, characteristic pronunciation), intimate
social distance (in-group markers), etc., and we can easily
visualize the youngsters’ clothes, their posture, gestures, etc.
Such information comes as ‘real-world background’ to the text.
It often happens that, without such background information,
we can understand neither the meaning of the individual elements,
nor that of the whole text.
Take, for example, the two ads reproduced at the end of the
previous chapter:
To make head or tail of the texts, the receiver needs additional
information, such as: the type of discourse1; the function of the
text; the meaning/referent of the Subject; etc. Knowledge of these
elements can help him to get to the text’s actual meaning. For
example, if he is told that the texts belong to the discourse of
advertising, the receiver will understand that their function is to
promote a product. As a result, he will interpret the proper noun
Subjects as the names of certain products, while the words style,
elixir and fragrance help him to disambiguate the text by telling
him what types of products they are (an item of clothing,
respectively, a perfume). Knowledge of the discourse type and
product will also help the receiver to deal with the grammatical
ambiguity of style (verb in the imperative or noun) and to
interpret the connotations of elixir and potion (‘magical’). Etc.
Thus, discoursal meaning is contextual meaning: the
(linguistic) text is embedded in its situational (non-linguistic)
context. As a result, correct interpretation of a text depends on
the real-world environment in which it is produced. The pragmatic
features of that context affect its meaning and interpretation.
1
People produce countless discourse types and genres, from political
speech to telephone conversation, from sermons to newspaper articles,
etc., and each may come in several varieties.
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In linguistics, the non-linguistic (pragmatic) context is referred
to as situational context, or context of utterance1.
To summarize in a user-friendly way the main features of the
situational context which are grammaticalized in the language and
which are likely to bring about change of meaning, Hymes (1974)
proposes the ‘S-P-E-A-K-I-N-G’ model2 – an acronym for:
Setting and Scene, i.e. the physical or psychological/cultural
location of the interaction: at home or in an official place; at a
joyful anniversary or a commemorative event; etc.
Participants, i.e. the sender of the message (the
speaker/writer), the addressee (the person the message is
produced for), the receiver (who may not be the addressee,
but an ‘overhearer’)
Ends, i.e. the purposes, goals and outcomes of the exchange,
e.g. to inform, to amuse, to criticize, etc.
Act Sequence, i.e. the form of the utterances and the order
of the events: the sequence of events is generally implied in
the order of the sentences, e.g. He got home and went to
bed.3
Key, i.e. paralinguistic (intonational or gestural) clues for the
tone and spirit of the text, e.g. angry or joyful voice.
Instrumentalities, i.e. the style and register of the text, e.g.
group membership markers, dialect features, etc.
Norms, i.e. the social rules characteristic for the setting, e.g.
formal – for an official activity; collaborative – for group work.
Genre, i.e. the type of discourse, speech act or event, e.g. an
anecdote, a moralizing story, a formal lecture, etc.
According to other linguists (Cook – 1992, Levinson – 1983,
Thomas – 1995, etc.), among the main social constraints that
govern linguistic exchanges are:
o
1
2
3
the interlocutors, i.e.
the sender of the message (speaker or writer), whose
text is marked by his own psychological features,
educational level, his present mood or state of mind, etc.
As basic unit of analysis, pragmaticians take the utterance, viewed as
‘the pairing of a sentence and a context’ (Levinson, 1983, quoting Bar Hillel).
To show that his model was not designed exclusively for the English
language, Hymes (1974, p.62) proposed a similar model for French, i.e.
P-A-R-L-A-N-T: participants, actes, raison (resultat), locale, agents
(instrumentalities), normes, ton (key), types (genres).
See also section 7.3.1.4 – Observing the maxim of Manner.
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the receiver of the message (listener or reader), who
interprets the message according to his own capacity and
willingness to understand the speaker’s intended meaning
the social distance between the interlocutors: i.e. the
receiver’s social status (equal or superior) and his role relative
to his own (e.g. adviser–confident, doctor–patient) make the
speaker formulate his message in a more or less formal way
the social constraints that make the sender formulate his
message in a particular way: setting, activity type, discourse
type, etc.
the situation/setting, i.e. the time and place where the
exchange occurs, e.g. during a meeting (in which case the
language is formal) or after it (informal register)
the activity type, e.g. shopping, teaching, bargaining, etc.
the type of discourse/genre, e.g. political speech,
highbrow or tabloid article, formal or casual conversation,
a joke, etc.
the function of the message, i.e. the sender’s intention: to
praise or to criticise, to inform or to persuade, etc.
the sender’s paralanguage, i.e. the speaker’s meaningful
behaviour; paralanguage can support or contradict the
linguistic message, e.g. the sender can say Thank you! with a
cheerful, or a mocking voice; etc.
o
o
o
o
David Crystal (1987: 120) argues that, although theoretically we
can say anything, in practice our linguistic performance is
constrained by a large number of social rules, norms of formality
and politeness, etc. As people learn these rules at a very early age
(e.g. to say Please! and Thank you!), they become part of our
ordinary linguistic behaviour.
For example, the personality of the interactants has a great
bearing on the form of the message.
The sender’s educational level influences the range of his
vocabulary (poor or rich), the grammatical accuracy of his
sentences (numerous grammatical mistakes, if the speaker is
uneducated, e.g. double negation), his pronunciation (groupspecific allophones), etc. Furthermore, the receiver’s psychological/
educational features also affect the way in which the speaker
formulates his message, e.g. when talking to a child, he does not
use elevated words.
In addition, in social interactions, the speaker always assesses
his social status relative to that of his interlocutor. This estimation
is reflected (‘grammaticalized’) in his choice of vocabulary (e.g.
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titles of address, the proper variant of the T/V pronominal system),
grammatical structure (e.g. longer and more elaborate sentences if
the hearer is socially superior), formality and style (more formal –
when addressing a person perceived as socially superior; informal
register – when talking to a peer), etc.
The physical (spatial and temporal) setting constrains the way
individuals speak, too. For example, in class (situation), when the
teacher talks about Shakespeare (function: information), the speaker
cannot use colloquial language and casual style, but must choose his
words carefully, build up long and elaborate sentences, use a serious
tone of voice, etc.
On the other hand, the interactants’ personality and status also
affect the meaning of the message: the same utterance may carry
different meanings if produced by different types of persons. For
example, I go to school every day, means one thing, if uttered by an
adolescent boy, or by a fifty year old gentleman. Or, I declare war to
Russia has one meaning and effect if carried by the voice of a child, or
that of President Obama.
Similarly, the same utterance may have a different meaning and
effect depending on the personality of the addressee. I’ll knock you
out means one thing if said by a fighter to his opponent, another if
addressed by a father to his son, or yet another if said by a son to his
father.
The meaning of an utterance also depends on the discourse type
and its function. For example, always in Always Coca-Cola! actually
means ‘Buy Coca-Cola!’ (even though semantically there is absolutely
no relationship between the words always and buy); this is because
the utterance belongs to the discourse of advertising, whose function
is to promote sales. Conversely, an utterance such as Always
Democrat!, uttered in the context of a political speech, means ‘Vote
for the Democrats!’ because the function of political speeches is to
persuade audiences to follow and elect the members of the party the
speaker belongs to.
The role of paralanguage in shaping the meaning of an
utterance is equally important.
Oral paralanguage is carried by the speaker’s tone (or timber) of
voice and by his ‘body language.’
Voices can convey a wealth of meanings: they can be cold, soft or
sexy, domineering or tender, critical or understanding, they can invite
or reject, etc. Various emotions and attitudes are also conveyed by
the tempo of the speech or the loudness of the units, e.g. fast speech
or an extra loud word may show irritation, impatience or delight.
188
In the same way, body language – carried by the speaker’s facial
expression, his eye contact or its absence, gestures, body posture,
etc. – emphasizes, supports or contradicts the meaning of the words.
In writing, paralanguage comes under various forms: the quality
of the paper (substance), the shape and size of the letters,
typographical display, innovative layout, accompanying picture, etc.
Take, for example, a printed text. Change of type face may trigger
consistent change of meaning. A standard typeface (e.g. Arial)
connotes seriousness; one that imitates handwriting produces a sense
of intimacy. Choice of the wrong type face may convey a different
meaning and trigger social sanctions: imagine a letter of condolences
written in Comic San MS.
Research has shown that the weight of the paralinguistic message
is greater than that of the linguistic message: if the sender says
Thank you! with a mocking voice, the receiver understands that the
sender is not grateful at all for what he has received. The weight of
the written paralanguage is also greater than that of language:
imagine a love letter scribbled on a crumpled sheet of paper, a
congratulatory note written on a postcard featuring a monkey, or a
scientific report adorned with drawings of flowers and hearts.
A change in any of the features of the situational context can trigger
serious changes of meaning.
Take, for example, the utterance, I have no knife. In a restaurant
(setting), spoken by a guest (speaker) who wants to have a meal
(activity type) and addressed to a waiter (addressee), it means
‘Please bring me a knife,’ i.e. with his utterance, the speaker makes a
request (function). Conversely, if the speaker is caught (activity type)
in a dark alley (setting) by the police (addressee), it means ‘Please
don’t shoot;’ by stating that he is unarmed, the speaker is trying to
defend himself (function). Or, if the utterance comes in response to a
request to cut the strings on a box (setting, activity type), it means ‘I
can’t’ (function: refusal and excuse); etc.
It is equally true that the way people use the language
influences events: at a serious meeting, a good joke can relieve
the tension and make the atmosphere friendly.
5.2
Reference and deixis
The presentation above has pointed to the idea that the context
in which the interaction takes place is an essential component of
any linguistic exchange. Face-to-face communication implies the
simultaneous presence at the same location of two or more
189
participants, a physical environment that contains all kind of
objects, shared knowledge of previous events, etc. With written
communication there is no simultaneous presence (therefore no
shared time and place) for the interactants; still the interlocutors
share a lot of common background knowledge and experience.
The most direct way by which language encodes
(grammaticalizes) that background is by the procedure of reference.
The participants in the conversation ‘anchor’ their contribution
to the linguistic exchange in the immediate spatial, temporal,
social and discoursal environment by referring to certain items
linguistically or gesturally. In other words, the speaker ‘refers’
to persons or objects around himself, or to events previously
mentioned, by using expressions and/or gestures. In this way, he
encodes in the language those elements of the situational context.
For example, the speaker may use the demonstrative pronoun
this to encode an object placed in his vicinity, and at the same
time point with his hand to the object; the word today is used to
refer to the day when the conversation is taking place; the speaker
uses the pronoun I to refer to himself, and you is employed to
refer to the addressee; etc.
On the other hand, linguistic items such as this or today are
used to encode different information, depending on the time
and/or place when/where they are uttered. The word this, for
instance, can be employed to refer to a book, a picture or an
event; today can refer to Monday, June 17th, or Thursday, May
14th. The pronoun I changes referent according to the person who
pronounces it, and the referent of you is whoever the speaker’s
addressee is; etc.
In what concerns the relation between the referring expression and
its referent, earlier linguists distinguished two types of reference:
o
o
endophoric, i.e. the linguistic expression (e.g. pronoun) is used
to reiterate the reference of a previous expression (e.g. a noun
phrase) within the discourse, e.g. I met Mary yesterday and
she told me that …; and
exophoric, i.e. the linguistic expression is used to refer to
something or someone not mentioned previously in the discourse,
but mutually known to the participants, e.g. She is my sister (the
reference to the real-world person is probably gestural).
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reference is made to real-world entities, not to lexical units in
the text. That is to say, all reference is exophoric.
From another perspective, reference – or rather, co-reference
– can be1:
anaphoric, i.e. the expression makes reference to something
that has already been mentioned in the text, as in the example
above; or
cataphoric, when the main referring expression follows a
secondary one, as in He is my brother, that man.
The most obvious way in which language encodes reference to the
surrounding context is by way of deixis.
Deixis (Gk. = pointing, indicating) concerns the way in which
languages ‘encode or grammaticalize features of the context of
utterance or speech event’ (Levinson, 1983: 54, original emphasis).
In the language, deixis takes the form of deictic or indexical
terms/expressions, whose function is to encode within the
utterance the multitude of factors existing around the utterance.
Deictic terms can encode the place of utterance (here, there), the
time (now, yesterday), the person (I, you), the moment in the
discourse (the former, so far), or the social status of the
participants (honorifics: Madam, Your Honour). Gestural deixis
(e.g. pointing to an object) functions as a parallel paralinguistic
message whose function is to emphasize or clarify the meaning of
the linguistic text.
With indexical terms, as with any other category of words,
their ‘logical’ or conceptual meaning is essential: words such as
there, now or yesterday can be found in the dictionary,
accompanied by accurate definitions of their meaning(s). These
conventional aspects of meaning are known to all the people who
share the same language and are valid across contexts. But an
essential feature of indexical terms is that they do not name the
same stable entity on all occasions of use: their meaning varies
according to the situational context, the person who uses them,
the time and/or place of their use, etc.
For instance, third person sg. he refers to one person, if the
word is used to refer to John Smith, and another if the referent is
Ed Pope. The word is a variable, i.e. one of the numerous
expressions the speaker can use to refer to a specific item in the
Today, however, linguists argue that it is incorrect to say that
she in the first example ‘refers back’ to the word Mary: all
1
See also section 4.5.1 – Text and textness.
191
world. As Levinson (1983) puts it, the deictic terms is ‘a placeholder for some particular entity given by the context.’
On the other hand, it is not the expression used that performs
the reference. The speaker uses one of many expressions he has
available to indicate his intention to refer to a certain entity in the
world. To achieve what linguists call successful reference, it is
essential that the hearer should be able to interpret the speaker’s
reference correctly. For example, the speaker can say That boy or
The boy over there or simply The boy; what counts is his intention
to refer to a certain boy, as well as the hearer’s ability to identify
the real world person referred to.
For decoding indexicals, it is often enough to have a general
knowledge of the speech event. For example, if one knows when
and where the action of a narrative takes place, and who the
characters are, it is easy to interpret terms like yesterday, here,
and I. This type of deictic usage is called symbolic.
Yet, it often happens that indexicals can be interpreted only in
relation with the physical environment in which the activity takes
place. For example, that (in Give me that) or he (in He hit me)
must be accompanied by a gesture indicating the object or person
referred to, otherwise the utterance is uninformative. In the same
way, utterances like Cheers! or Here you are! require physical
contribution to make the message complete. This type of deictic
usage is known as gestural.
Some aspects of deixis are deeply grammaticalized. The verbal
category of tense, for example, is employed by speakers to refer
to actions that are previous, simultaneous or subsequent to the
moment of utterance, and morphological agreement encodes the
number of participants.
To the three traditional categories of deixis – person, time and
place deixis – Levinson (1983: 62-5) suggests the addition of two
more: discourse deixis and social deixis.
5.2.1
Person deixis
Person deixis concerns ‘the encoding of the role of the
participants in the speech event in which the utterance in question
is delivered’ (Levinson, 1983: 62-3), i.e. it refers to the ways in
which language mirrors/grammaticalizes the relative roles of the
participants in the discourse.
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Person deixis1 is directly reflected in the grammatical category
of person.
The pronominal system is the most obvious way to encode
participant roles. The first person grammaticalizes ‘the speaker’s
reference to himself,’ the second encodes ‘the speaker’s reference
to one or more addressees,’ while the third encodes ‘the reference
to persons and entities which are neither speakers nor addressees
of the utterance in question.’
Conceptually, the relationship between the pronominal system
and the participants in the discourse can be summarized as
follows: first person denotes speaker inclusion [+S]; second
person points to addressee inclusion [+A]; third person denotes
both speaker and addressee exclusion [-S] [-A].
In its handling of the pronominal system, English makes a
three-way distinction: first, second and third person. To this, the
categories of gender (for the third person singular) and that of
number (for the first and third person) are added.
Different languages encode social status differently, e.g. in
English there is only one second person pronoun (i.e. you), while
French and Romanian have a T/V distinction2: tu/vous,
respectively, tu/dumneavoastră; in addition, Romanian has a
medium-politeness second person singular pronoun, dumneata.
Romanian and French also have a masculine/feminine opposition
for the third person plural (i.e. French ils, elles, Romanian ei, ele),
but no common or neutral third person singular pronoun
(corresponding to the English it).
It must be noted that we does not mean plural speaker, i.e. it
does not consist of I + I + I + I … but of I + you or I + him, etc.
This also shows that we may include the addressee or may exclude
him from the act or event mentioned in the utterance. Yet,
semantically and grammatically no distinction can be made
between we-inclusive-of-addressee and we-exclusive-of-addressee.
For example, the sentence We’ve been there, asserts that the
speaker has been there, but it does not specify whether the
addressee has been there or not. Nevertheless, pragmatically it is
quite easy to make the distinction: the addressee (at least) knows
1
2
For the sections regarding Person deixis and Social deixis, see also
sections 1.2.2.1 – Social meaning and 3.2 – Formality and style.
In other languages the pronominal system is much more complex. For
example, in Japanese, pronouns are distinguished also with respect to
sex of speaker, social status of referent, degree of intimacy with
referent, degree of relative rank, etc. (Levinson, 1983).
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about his inclusion in or exclusion from his interlocutor’s reference
on the basis of his actual participation in or absence from the place
or event mentioned by the speaker.
One should also keep in mind the fact that, with written
communication especially, the speaker/spokesman can be different
from the addresser (the source of the message) and the addressee
(the targeted person) can be different from the hearer of the
message. In the case of a television commercial, for instance, the
speaker is usually an actor, but the source of the message (the
addresser) is the manufacturer or distributor. In the same way,
the recipient or hearer of the message can be distinct from the
intended audience: I may hear a cigarette ad but, since I don’t
smoke, it is not addressed to me.
The pronominal system goes hand in hand with a corresponding
morphological agreement. Verbal inflections encode person and
number, but they can also encode degrees of politeness. For
instance, the French Vous voulez…? is ambiguous between second
person plural or polite second person singular. The Romanian
Vreţi…? is similarly ambiguous. The difference consists in the fact
that, in Romanian, the pronoun/subject is usually elided; if it is
present, it disambiguates the meaning: Voi vreţi…? (plural)/
Dumneavoastră vreţi…? (singular polite). Or, if there is a
predicative element, it tells in both languages whether the
addressee is singular, higher in rank, or plural, male or female,
e.g. Vous êtes gentil/le/s or Sunteţi amabil/ă/i, etc.
In some languages, the polite pronoun of address is borrowed
from the third person singular (the Italian lei, or the German Sie),
with corresponding predicate agreement. In such cases, it is ‘as if
[the speaker] can only politely enter into conversation with [the
hearer] through the evasive tactic of pretending that [the hearer]
is a listener, but not the addressee’ (Leech 1983: 141).
Person deixis can also be marked with the help of vocative terms.
Vocatives, i.e. noun phrases used to refer to the addressee, are
set apart from the rest of the sentence by means of prosody and
punctuation. Some such vocatives – called summonses or calls –
are used sentence-initially and gesturally, e.g. Hey you, come here
quickly, or Listen pal, … . They function as independent speech acts1
and are rather informal (used only between close friends).
1
See section 6.3 – Speech acts.
194
Others – called addresses – are parenthetical, e.g. To tell you
the truth, my friend, I don’t really think… . Stylistically, they have
a wider acceptability.
Greetings are also vocative in nature. To help the speaker to
cope with various types of social relations, the language has
produced a wide range of stylistic variants: How do you do!
(formal); Good morning
(neutral); Hello! (informal); Hi!
(familiar).
5.2.2
Social deixis
In close connection with person deixis is social deixis, which
concerns ‘the encoding of social distinctions that are relative to
participant-roles, particularly aspects of the social relationship
holding between speaker and addressee(s) or speaker and some
referent’ (Levinson, 1983: 89).
In other words, social deixis concerns the way utterances
mirror/encode certain realities of the social situation in which the
communicative exchange occurs.
Obviously, oral and written discourses exploit differently the
ability of the language to express the relation between the speaker
and his social environment, but there are also a number of
common features.
Just as in the case of person deixis, social indexical items (e.g.
polite pronouns, vocatives, titles of address) function as ‘placeholders’ for certain participant roles. Levinson (1983: 89) is,
however, careful to restrict the notion of social deixis to ‘those
aspects of language structure that encode the social identities of
the participants…, or the social relationship between them, or
between them and persons and entities referred to.’ This means
that ‘social deixis’ must be restricted to those aspects of the
language which grammaticalize social relations.
The importance of social deixis becomes obvious when
analysing Oriental languages, where social ranking is deeply
rooted and strictly observed. As Levinson (1983: 94) points out,
‘there is scarcely a single sentence of, for example, Japanese,
Javanese or Korean, that can be properly described from a strictly
linguistic point of view without an analysis of social deixis.’ The
English language, however, is poor in manifestations of social
deixis: there is not even a pronoun for polite address. Romanian is
not very subtle in mirroring social relations either.
195
Social deictic information can be expressed in two basic ways:
absolutely and relationally.
Forms of address, such as Your Honour, or Mr. President are
examples of absolute social deixis, the persons addressed in this
way being ‘authorized recipients’ of the title. Expressions that
mention the addressee’s sex (as in Your Ladyship!) also belong to
this category.
Relational social deixis relies on the relationship that exists
between the speaker and the other person(s) involved in the
conversation or referred to, or that between himself and the
setting in which the linguistic exchange unfolds.
In his communicative exchanges, the speaker relates himself
to three categories of participants:
o
o
o
the addressee, i.e. the person addressed
the referent, i.e. the person/object/event the speaker is
referring to
the bystander, i.e. the non-participant ‘overhearer’
The speaker’s estimation of his position within the act of
communication results in a certain attitude he embraces, which in
its turn is reflected in the personal and social deictic terms he
uses, as well as in his lexical choices and his stylistic register.
For example, titles of address (Sir, Madam) reflect the
speaker’s perception of his own social inferiority in relation with
the addressee or referent, or in relation with the act of
communication. Honorifics (Captain, Doctor, Your Honour!), or
euphemistic terms (e.g. the Superstar), give voice to the sender’s
respect and recognition of his own inferior status.
In official circumstances, the speaker may employ a honorific
term to address a person otherwise socially close to him. For
example, in class, a son may address his father as Teacher, and a
formerly close friend may address the chief of state as Mr.
President! In this way, they give voice to their awareness of the
latter’s social superiority.
At the other end of the scale are the ‘dishonorifics’ (i.e.
derogatory terms used to refer to an addressee or referent the
speaker does not like, e.g. He’s a pest!) and the intimacy markers
(e.g. darling, sweetheart, honey, my pet). Although the two
categories give voice to feelings and attitudes in total opposition,
their effect is similar: they reduce social distance (obviously, in
different ways).
Vocatives, used for summonses or addresses, represent
another social deictic category whose function is to carry along the
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speaker’s attitude: Hey you! or Excuse me, Sir! give voice to very
different kinds of attitude.
Estimation of the social distance between himself and his
addressee affects not only the speaker’s lexical choices, but also
the grammatical complexity of his utterances. For example, if the
speaker who wants to ask his interlocutor for help may formulate
his request as Give me a hand, will you? – if he perceives the
social distance as close; or as I’m so sorry to bother you, but I
really can’t do it by myself – if the relationship is distal.
The speaker’s lexical and stylistic choices are also affected by his
perception of the relationship between himself and the setting in
which the speech event takes place. A high-distance setting
(church, courthouse, hospital, a job interview) will make the
speaker lower his voice, select his vocabulary carefully, build up
his sentences carefully and polish his style. Conversely, a lowdistance setting (among friends, at a party) may urge him to
indulge in group-specific vocabulary and pronunciation, elliptical
sentences, informal style and extensive paralanguage.
The examples show that social deictic information ‘can be encoded
just about anywhere in the linguistic system’ (Levinson, 1983: 92).
It can be expressed lexically or morphologically, by choice of
vocabulary or level of formality, by phonological or prosodic
emphasis and, in most cases, by a combination of several of these
factors.
Obviously, the speaker’s social deictic choices are controlled by
the non-written laws of social interaction. Like with all pragmatic
phenomena, the speaker knows that disregard of those rules may
trigger serious negative consequences.
Moreover, the speaker’s formulation of his utterance results
not only from his estimation of the social distance between himself
and his addressee/setting, but also from the real-world goal he
wants to accomplish. Thus, for example, if the speaker wants to
ask for a favour, he will formulate his request more carefully, so as
to gain the addressee’s good will, even if he does not consider him
socially superior.
The domain of social deixis is definitely close to that of
sociolinguistics. The difference lies in the fact that, while
sociolinguistics studies the way certain categories of people use
language to express social realities, social deixis – as part of
pragmatics – analyzes the way people intentionally and
strategically exploit the possibilities of the language in order to
achieve certain real-world aims.
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How the speaker uses the language strategically to foster his
real-world aims will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapters.
5.2.3
Place deixis
Place (or space) deixis concerns the encoding in the language of
the spatial location of a certain item in relation to the location of
the speaker at the time of the utterance.
There are a number of pure place-deictic words:
demonstrative pronouns (e.g. this, that), or deictic adverbs (e.g.
here, there). Such terms encode the distinction between proximal
(i.e. close to the speaker – this, here), and distal (i.e. located
away from him – that, there). But in utterances such as, This is it!
or That’s it! the proximal/distal dimension is neutralized.
Furthermore, in English, the interaction between deictic and
non-deictic factors may take on puzzling forms. For example, in
There is a famous statue over there, the first occurrence of there
is non-deictic (there is has a unitary meaning that does not convey
a locative meaning); only the second there is deictic.
Place deictic items can be used symbolically, i.e. in general
terms, as in This is a nice place, or gesturally, as in This is a nice
picture. In the former case, the meaning of the word pragmatically
includes the location of the speaker, while in the latter, the word
refers to the location of an object that is close to that of the
speaker.
Demonstrative determiners can combine with other non-deictic
terms denoting spatial organization (surface, top, back, etc.) to
point to the location of a person/object relative to that of the
speaker, e.g. This side of the mountain.
Motion verbs, such as come and go, bring and take away, etc.,
also have in-built deictic components. Thus, come shows motion
towards the speaker, while go shows movement away from him.
As a result, and utterance such as I’m coming (i.e. speaker’s
motion towards the addressee) seems to be anomalous. Such
deictic shifts are motivated by reasons of politeness (see also
Chapter 8).
5.2.4
Time deixis
Time deixis encodes in the language ‘the physical time in which
certain events took place and present them as previous,
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simultaneous with, or subsequent to the time at which an
utterance was spoken (or a written message inscribed)’ (Levinson,
1983: 93).
The most frequent encoders of time deixis are adverbs of time
(e.g. now, then, yesterday, this year). The category of tense also
serves to grammaticalize time.
Time deictic items can refer to periods/spans of time (as in I’ll
be away on Monday) or to restricted moments (as in He called me
up on Monday).
Our usage and understanding of time and time deixis is
considerably influenced by the way our society conceptualizes the
logical notion of time.
For measuring time, the natural cycles of day, week, month
and year are generally taken for granted. By using the calendar,
we can locate events in time non-deictically, i.e. in an absolute
way (e.g. July, 15th, 1998). Deictic temporal location is relative to
the speaker and speech event: with words, such as today,
yesterday, tomorrow, their absolute value is insignificant; what
matters is their relative, or deictic, value. Or, in a phrase such as
next Monday, there is an interaction between a non-deictic and a
deictic usage: Monday is not deictic in itself; it is the deictic
modifier next which makes the expression relative. By saying next
Monday, the idea of comparison with the present moment
becomes more powerful than that of the specific day of the week.
Some utterances may be restricted in time. For example, a
greeting such as Good morning, is restricted in use to the logical
stretch of time corresponding to the part of the day called
morning.
Since deixis involves a perception of relativity, and since the
sender of the message and its receiver may not be simultaneously
present, two notions have to be clarified: that of coding time
(CT), i.e. the temporal location when the speaker makes his
utterance, and that of receiving time (RT), i.e. the temporal
location when the receiver intercepts it. With oral exchanges, CT
and RT are simultaneous; in the case of written texts, however,
the receiver is not present at the time of the encoding. In the case
of a novel, for example, the writer may be talking about now, but
that now is not part of the RT.
The example also shows that the category of tense is an
important deictic feature, highlighting the relationship of a given
action to the deictic centre: simultaneous (He is a student),
anterior (He was a student) or posterior (He will be a student).
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Difference must also be made between the logical notion of
time, a purely deictic concept, and its linguistic realisation, i.e. the
grammatical category of tense. With a sentence such as, The earth
is round, we can say that the verb is marked morphologically
(present tense), while conceptually it is unmarked (its roundness
is not restricted to the present).
Grammatical tense may also carry an extra load of aspectual
and/or modal features, e.g. This time tomorrow I’ll be flying to
London; or He may have seen the film.
5.2.5
Discourse deixis
Discourse (or text) deixis encodes ‘the reference to portions of
the unfolding discourse in which the utterance (which includes the
text referring expressions) is located’ (Levinson, 1983).
Discourse deictic expressions indicate the relationship between
the individual utterance and the rest of the discourse that contains
that utterance. Discourse particles (e.g. well, anyway, therefore or
still), or phrases (e.g. in the last paragraph, in the next chapter, or
in conclusion), indicate the place of the utterance within the text.
These examples point to the fact that time deictic last and next
can also be used discourse deictically, which seems natural if we
think that discourse develops in time. Place-deictic this and that
can also be used discourse deictically, as in the exchange A: Mary
lied to me about X. B: I’m surprised to hear this.1
There are numerous words and phrases which show the
relationship between an utterance and the rest of the discourse.
Terms, such as but, still, however, besides, after all, well, so,
actually, in conclusion, etc. indicate to the hearer how he should
interpret the utterance prefaced by one of those items. For
example, utterance-initial anyway seems to suggest that the
utterance that contains it is not related to the immediately
previous one, but to something that has been said a little earlier;
In conclusion indicates the end of something; yet is used to
introduce the utterance that will effect that end; etc.
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Word order plays an important discourse deictic role: it
mirrors not only the linguistic organization of the utterance, but
also its logical and informational organization.
It was shown in the section dedicated to clause as message
(section 4.2.1) that the left-most element represents the Theme
and introduces the old information (the Given), while the New is
placed in the Rheme, towards the end of the utterance. This
natural word order is often overthrown, a certain item being
forcibly placed in Theme position, e.g. That, I’m really sorry about,
or A pest, that’s what he is. The role of such left dislocated
constructions is to foreground a certain element of the utterance.
Naturally, the basic deictic categories often overlap, i.e. they can
function differently in different contexts. Thus, for example,
vocatives can express either person or social deixis, greetings can
function as temporal, person, or discourse deixis, demonstratives
can be used space-deictically or person-deictically, etc.
5.3
In this example, use of this seems anaphoric, i.e. referring back to the
referent of another word in the previous sentence. The difference lies in
the fact that, while anaphora refers to some real-world entity to which a
previous linguistic expression also referred, in this case this refers to the
entire previous piece of discourse, i.e. to the fact that Mary lied to me
about X.
Manipulation of deixis
Lyons (1977, 637-8) suggests that, as far as deixis is concerned,
the grammaticalization of deixis can be best understood in relation
to face-to-face conversation, which unfolds in what he calls the
canonical situation of utterance.
Face-to-face interaction is organized in an egocentric way
(i.e. around the speaker), everything else being described
according to its location relative to the speaker. Consequently,
even when the text contains no deictic items, the deictic centre for
ordinary conversation is viewed as based on the following coordinates:
o
o
o
o
1
o
the central person is the speaker
the central time is the time at which the speaker produces the
utterance
the central place is the place where the speaker is at the
moment of the utterance
the discourse centre is the point in the discourse the speaker is
just uttering
the social centre is the speaker’s social status, relative to the
addressee’s social status
We must remember that, in conversation, speakers change
roles all the time and at great speed. When he has finished his
part, the speaker relinquishes the floor and takes on the role of
201
listener; then the other person becomes the deictic centre of the
conversation, only to relinquish this role as soon as he has finished
speaking, etc. Writing is different in this respect: with written
messages, the sender produces longer stretches of text
uninterruptedly, and there may be a considerable lapse of time
between CT and RT.
To enhance the impact of their message, writers often
manipulate deixis.
Most written messages are organized egocentrically. A letter,
for example, has an easily identifiable writer, who often talks
about the circumstances valid at the moment of his writing the
letter (CT). In this case, the reader’s time (RT) and place coordinates are completely different, i.e. the now and here in the
letter do not correspond to the original ones.
In the case of narratives, writers often organize their plot
around the protagonist, so that the now and here of the text
correspond to the character’s co-ordinates, not to those of the
writer. In such cases, we speak of a deictic projection, i.e. there
is a shift in the point of view.
Take, for example, the excerpt from Salinger’s Catcher in the
Rye reproduced in section 4.5.2.3. The protagonist ‘tells’ his story
in the present (If you really want to hear …), and there are also
two person-deictic shifts: first, the writer tells his story in the first
person singular (… I don’t feel like…), i.e. he identifies himself with
his protagonist; secondly, the novelist addresses the reader (one
reader at a time) directly (If you really want…). The reason for
such deictic shifts lies in the writer’s desire to reduce the social
distance between his protagonist/his story and the reader. This
way, he strategically brings his narrative closer to the reader,
makes it more vivid, and thus enhances its impact.
Another discourse type which accomplishes special effects by
manipulation of deixis is advertising.
Advertising is incontestably written communication, the texts
being generally produced by entire groups of copywriters. But in a
desire to enhance its impact, advertising struggles to convey a
sense of orality, of closeness and immediacy. As a result, it
imitates oral communication.
The ad copy-writer is anonymous and unimportant, and so is
the time when the message was written. What matters is the
receiver and the impact the message has upon him, so that the
deictic centre is projected upon the receiver. As a result, if the
reader comes across the urge to Call now!, he does not have to
think of the moment in which the message was written (CT), but
202
of the very moment he is reading it (RT). In this context, the value
of now is repeatedly and continuously postponed: whenever the
receiver reads the message (even if he reads it several times),
now is supposed to be valid.
Place deictic items may also contribute to reducing distance.
Presented visually – in the form of an alluring picture, and
linguistically (as this …), the product enters the home and intimacy
of the receiver while s/he watches TV or leafs through a magazine
during his/her leisure hour.
Manipulation of person and of social deixis ad further
dimensions. The receiver is addressed directly (as in face-to-face
conversation), with the 2nd person singular variant of the pronoun
(in the languages which have the T/V distinction). In this way, the
speaker/the character in the TV spot appears as ‘socially close.’
Social distance is also conveyed visually, by the type of person the
protagonist embodies (young and fun-loving – for teenage
audiences, feminine and sexy – for adult target customers, etc.),
by the role the latter takes on (peer, confident, adviser, etc.).
Discourse deixis generally appears in the form of … your old X
– for the first section of the text (representing an earlier stage in
one’s life), and now we have… – for the present section of the text
(and standing for a new life stage in one’s existence).
The present chapter has provided some explanation of how the
situational context can affect the meaning of an utterance/a text,
and it has also thrown some light on the way the speaker
manipulates the language so as to enhance the impact of his
message and obtain certain real-world advantages. But neither
context nor deixis can explain the great gap that often exists
between the lexical meaning of certain sentences/utterances and
their actual message.
The following chapter will therefore focus on another essential
pragmatic phenomenon: on how the speaker uses the language ‘to
do things’ with it.
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Chapter 6
Language in use:
Speech acts and indirectness
6.1 Linguistic competence vs. linguistic performance
It was discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.3) that pragmatic
meaning is based on the speakers’ knowledge of the world. In
Chapter 5 (section 5.1) it was argued that pragmatic meaning is
contextual, i.e. it is subject to all kind of language internal and
language-external factors.
But analysis of large samples of language produced in various
types of real-world situations revealed that neither the dictionary,
nor the context can account for the great richness and variety of
human communication. Because meaning is use, as the great
Austrian-British philosopher of the mind and of the language,
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), suggests.
Even early-day linguists realized that there is a serious gap
between what the dictionary and grammar tell us regarding the
language, on the one hand, and the way people use the language, on
the other. As a result, they concluded that, if they wanted to
explain how a language actually works, they must survey the
native speaker’s competence along two levels:
•
•
what he knows about the language, i.e. his intuitive grasp of
the language; and
what he can do with the help of the language, i.e. the way he
uses the language to interact with his social group.
To mark this distinction, de Saussure proposed the term
langue – for the former, and parole – for the latter. Building on
de Saussure’s distinction, Chomsky proposed the term linguistic
competence – for people’s knowledge of the language, and
linguistic performance – for the way they use it. While
competence is a psychological process (an innate faculty of the
human mind), performance is pragmatic by nature.
Going back to the scheme regarding the levels of linguistic
analysis presented in Chapter 5, we can see again that linguistic
competence roughly covers language ‘organization,’ while linguistic
performance pertains to language in use, and that it is the role of
pragmatics to link the two components. Obviously, this can occur
only at discoursal level, where texts are produced and received in
well-defined (linguistic and non-linguistic) contexts, which
generate and control those pragmatic features.
Chomsky described linguistic competence as the fluent
speaker's ability to recognize and produce, with the help of a finite
number of lexical items and grammar rules, an infinite number of
grammatically and semantically well-formed (i.e. accurate)
sentences1, including sentences that are totally new.
Chomsky admitted that, in their linguistic performance, native
speakers often make mistakes and produce utterances that are
less-than-perfect (e.g. elliptical and minor ones). However, he
considered that such constructs should be discarded as unworthy
of the linguist's interest and suggested that linguistic wellformedness be taken as basic criterion for linguistic analysis.
There are, however, at least three major aspects concerning
the ways speakers use the language which contradict this view:
1. It often happens (especially when learning a foreign
language) that perfectly well-formed utterances make no sense2.
2. In ordinary face-to-face interactions people often make
mistakes or leave their sentences unfinished; and yet, in spite of
their non-wellformedness, the utterances are still meaningful and
the message manages to get through.
3. People use the language differently in different situations,
and they often indulge in complicated linguistic strategies, instead
of communicating facts simply and straightforwardly.
The answer to the first question lies in the context of
utterance. It was discussed in the previous chapter that, if he does
not have sufficient information regarding the features of the
situational context, the receiver is often unable to interpret
utterances that were produced in it. Similarly, political jokes,
articles, talk shows, etc. are frequently beyond the understanding
1
2
A sentence such as, He is a boy, is both grammatically and semantically
well formed; *He has some air, may be grammatically well formed, but
semantically it is anomalous.
Remember Corder’s assertion reproduced in section 5.1, according to
which ‘well-formed sentences, produced by native speakers are mostly
ambiguous when taken out of context.’
Chapter 6: Language in use: Speech acts and indirectness
205
of those who do not have knowledge of the physical and social
environment in which they were produced.
In answer to the second question, linguists concluded that
non-wellformedness actually belongs to the fluent speaker's
knowledge of the language. Memory limitations, distractions, shifts
of attention and interest, errors in applying knowledge, etc. are
typical for human communication. As a result, (casual)
conversation abounds in broken sentences; false starts and hedges
(well, you know…) fill the space and help the speaker gain time;
and reformulations enable him to express his thoughts more
clearly and more convincingly.
Thirdly, linguists realized that the complex ways in which
people build up their messages is generally determined by social
considerations. According to Dell Hymes (1927 –), one of the
pioneers of sociolinguistics, the competent speaker knows to use the
language not only correctly, but also appropriately with respect to
context, addressee, situation and activity type. He insisted (1966)
that ‘there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar
would be useless,’ and he even argued that ‘some occasions call
for being appropriately ungrammatical.’
Therefore, rejecting Chomsky’s distinction between competence
and performance as narrow and artificial, Hymes proposed the
term communicative competence.
Obviously, communicative competence relies on the rules of
the language; but pragmatic factors, including principles of
language usage and interpretation, may have an even greater role
in shaping the form and meaning of the speaker’s utterance, or
the receiver’s interpretation of that utterance.
In addition, the real-world context (physical, psychological, social or
interpersonal) is reflected in the language structure in two major ways:
•
•
by the way the speaker grammaticalizes the social context and
adapts his message to the situation; and
by the way he exploits his knowledge of the language to
achieve a particular real-world goal.
How the speaker grammaticalizes the context of his utterance
was discussed in the previous chapter. In the section dedicated to
manipulation of deixis (see section 5.3), some examples were
given of how the ‘speaker’ (e.g. novelist or advertising copywriter)
can manipulate deixis to accomplish certain real-world aims.
Since pragmatic factors result from people’s interaction with the
world, pragmatics studies ‘the factors that govern our choice of
206
language in social interaction and the effect of our choice on
others’ (Crystal, 1987: 120).
We must emphasize again (see section 5.2.2) that, unlike
sociolinguistics, which is interested in the fixed, stable, systematic
characteristics embedded in a person’s linguistic output,
pragmatics studies the variables: it focuses on the way the
producer of the message intentionally adapts it to the situation,
the way he exploits his linguistic repertoire in order to achieve a
particular real-world goal. In other words, pragmatics focuses on
what linguists call strategic communication.
But strategic exploitation of the language is much more
complex. The study of the texts produced in ordinary face-to-face
communication has revealed the fact that people rarely express
their thoughts and ideas in a simple and direct way; in most cases,
their words carry their message indirectly. In numerous cases, the
speaker’s utterance is so indirect that he seems to be saying one
thing when in fact he means something entirely different.
Before we can discuss the strategies of linguistic indirectness,
we must first say a few words about the functional potential of
the language and the theory of speech acts.
6.2 Language functions
Although a superficial inspection might urge us to say briefly that
people use the language to convey and exchange information, the
role of language is much more complex.
Leech (1981: Chapter 4) suggests that language has five basic
functions, namely:
a neutral-informational function, i.e. people use the language
to convey and receive information; this may seem to be the
most important function of the language, yet utterances are
often subordinated to other aims
a directive (or conative) function, i.e. the speaker uses the
language to influence the behaviour or attitudes of others: we
tell others what to do, we inquire and request, demand or
command, etc.
an expressive function, i.e. the speaker uses the language to
express his feelings and attitudes: his likes or dislikes, wishes
and desires, fears and hopes, etc.
an aesthetic function, i.e. people often use the language ‘for
the sake of the linguistic artefacts itself:’ they construct their
utterances so as to please the ear, rather than for the
information their words carry
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a phatic function1, i.e. the speaker often uses the language
merely for ‘keeping communication lines open […] and social
relationships in good repair’ (Leech, 1981);’ in numerous cases,
what one says is of lesser importance than the fact that one
says it: not greeting, not inquiring about our interlocutor's
well-being, or not congratulating him on his birthday, can be
perceived as a ‘virtual offence,’2 i.e. non-communication of a
polite attitude is viewed not only as the absence of that
attitude, but as an aggressive attitude.
According to another approach (Brown & Yule, 1983: 1-3), the
communicative functions of language can be grouped into two
basic categories3:
the transactional function, i.e. using the language to express
content and information; and
the interactional function, i.e. using the language to express
social relations, personal feelings and attitudes, etc.
Matching the two approaches, Leech’s neutral-informational function
would correspond to Brown & Yule’s transactional function, while the
interactional function would generally cover the other four categories.
Indeed, people use language and other communicative
systems ‘to express content and information.’ But a great deal of
human communication is interactional, rather than informative: in
everyday conversations, much is said without any information
conveyed. At parties, people tell jokes so as to attract attention
and fill the time – silence can be devastating, and listeners make
all kind of ‘interested noises’ (e.g. oh, hmm) either to take
somehow part in the conversation, or simply to show that they are
interested. With written texts, the transactional function of the
language seems to be primordial; but letters are often written
primarily for interactional purposes, too.
6.3
Speech acts
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Austin, philosopher of the language at Oxford University,
developed his ideas gradually, first in a series of lectures at
Oxford, then at Harvard. His ideas were published posthumously in
1962, under the title How to Do Things With Words1.
Austin developed his ideas in reaction to logical positivism and
to truth-conditional semantics.
Oxford-based logical positivists, such as Bertrand Russell,
viewed everyday language as ‘a rather debased vehicle, full of
ambiguities, imprecision and contradictions’ and set out ‘to refine
language, removing its perceived imperfections and illogicalities’
(Thomas, 1995: 29) in the hope to create an ‘ideal language’ –
hence the name ideal language philosophers.
In response, Austin and his group2 argued that, no matter how
deficient or defective language might be, it serves ordinary people
perfectly well. Therefore, they suggested, instead of trying to rid
the language of its imperfections, linguists should study the
linguistic output of ordinary interactants, trying to understand how
they manage to communicate so efficiently and economically. As a
result, Austin’s group came to be known as ordinary language
philosophers.
Austin also reacted against the truth-conditional approach to
semantics advocated by logical positivists.
When Austin began developing his ideas, the focus in semantics
fell exclusively on conceptual meaning and on the truth or falsehood
of utterances (hence truth-conditional semantics). Logical positivists
upheld the idea that a statement is only meaningful if it is analytic
or can be tested empirically. For example, A dog has four legs is
true, and A ball is square is false, because the truth or falsehood of
those utterances can be verified; but a statement such as, The king
of France is bald is meaningless, because there is no king of France.
Truth-conditional semantics also endeavoured to present the
perceptions of native speakers regarding the consonance or
anomaly of sense relations (see section 1.3.4).
In close connection with the functional potential of the language is
the theory of speech acts, developed by the father of pragmatics4,
J. L Austin.
1
1
2
3
4
The term was introduced by Malinowski, as ‘phatic communion.’
The term was introduced by Goffman, 1967.
Halliday uses the terms ideational (or reflective) and interpersonal (or active).
Even though the works of other philosophers of the time, such as G.E.
Moore’s, or Wittgenstein’s later works, contain similar views, Austin’s
2
great influence is probably due to the fact that he developed a consistent
line of thought.
At Austin’s sudden death in 1960, his ideas were still unpublished. The
book was edited by his student J.O. Urmson, based on Austin’s lecture
notes and recordings of the lectures.
Among Austin’s group was also his student H.P. Grice whose theory of
conversational implicature (see Chapter 7) took the study of pragmatics
to a further level.
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But Austin realized that, in ordinary communication, we often
come across utterances which are false or illogical by the
standards of truth-conditional semantics, yet they make perfect
sense to ordinary communicators (e.g. the vast amount of
figurative utterances in ordinary speech). He also noticed that
people use the language in complex ways, to convey much more
information than is carried by the semantic load of the words.
It was mentioned before that Austin developed his theory of
‘words as actions’ along two series of lectures. On the way, he often
modified his views (whenever new examples contradicted his former
assertions). But if we want to understand how and why pragmatics
came into being, we should follow Austin’s course of thought.
To begin with, Austin noticed that some1 utterances have no
truth-condition at all, i.e. you simply cannot categorize them as
true or false, so that he made a distinction between:
Constatatives, e.g. He goes there every day; I’m a student;
The colour of that car is white; etc.
Performatives, e.g. I apologize; I bet you $5; I name the
child John; etc.
A performative utterance is built with the help of a
performative verb – hence, Austin’s performative hypothesis.
In the case of the former category, one can verify whether the
statement is true or false (e.g. whether the car is actually white or
not). With the latter category, though, one cannot say ‘It is (not)
true.’ Rather, such utterances are perceived as ‘doing’ something,
performing an action.
Thus, Austin argued, people use the language not only to say
things, but also to do things. In other words, utterances not only
convey meanings, they can also perform actions. For example, by
saying I apologise, the speaker expresses a meaning, and at the
same time performs the action of apologising; by saying I promise
to do it, he also performs the act of promising; the utterance I
warn you…! actually does the act of warning; etc.
Austin identified several categories of performative verbs:
o
o
o
metalinguistic performatives: say, protest, declare, object,
apologize, deny, promise, etc.
ritual performatives: name, baptize, pronounce, absolve,
sentence, etc.
collaborative performatives: bet, challenge, bequeath, etc.
1
I apologize for that
At a later point, Austin realized that most utterances have no truth condition.
210
I absolve you from your sins
I bet you five pounds
The fact that utterances can do things becomes obvious if we
look at ritual performatives. Some utterances can actually perform
official acts, e.g. by saying, I now pronounce you husband and
wife!, or, I absolve you from your sins!, a priest can actually unite
a couple in holly matrimony, and respectively, absolve a penitent
from his sins.
Austin termed the utterances that can perform actions,
speech acts.
For a speech acts to be successful, certain felicity conditions
must be met. For example, in the case of the marriage ceremony,
the person pronouncing the utterance must have the proper legal
authority, the parties to be joined in matrimony must be present
and willing to be united, the words must be the exact ones that
are supposed to be uttered, etc. Similarly, if a person says to the
other, I forgive you, he must truly want to forgive him. Failure to
meet the felicity conditions will cause the action to misfire: the
people will not be legally married if the person performing the
ceremony does not have the legal right to perform the act; nor will
the marriage be legal if the ceremony is performed on stage,
during a theatrical performance; and there will be no forgiveness if
the speaker who utters the words does not truly mean them; etc.
In the first stage, Austin restricted the notion of speech acts to a
relatively small set of utterances: affirmatives that contained a
performative verb (e.g. say, declare, promise, etc.) in the active
mood and simple present tense, with a first person singular
subject, and suggested that performative utterances can be
tested with the adverb hereby inserted between the subject and
the verb, as in:
I hereby apologize for that
I hereby absolve you from your sins
I hereby bet you five pounds
At a later point, though, he realized that these conditions are
not exclusive: performative utterances can have a first person
plural or a group subject, and the verb can in the present
continuous or passive etc., as in:
I’m (hereby) denying that
The court (hereby) finds you not guilty
Your employment is (hereby) terminated
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On the other hand, the fact that an utterance contains a
performative verb is no guarantee that the action is performed, as in:
I swear I’ll kill you if you don’t shut up
Moreover, Austin realized that things can be done with the
language without the respective performative verb, e.g. that you
can apologize/congratulate someone by saying:
I apologize
I’m so sorry
I didn’t mean to hurt you. Etc.
Congratulations!
You did it!
I’m so proud of you! Etc.
As a result, Austin made a distinction between primary
performatives (for those utterances which contain a performative
verb) and secondary performatives (for those which do not).
Levinson (1983) marks the distinction by proposing the terms
explicit performatives and implicit performatives
Furthermore, Austin noticed that, in daily communication,
people often say one thing (i.e. their utterance performs one kind
of act by its conceptual content) and mean another (i.e. by their
intended meaning, they perform another type of act). For
example, the teacher who says, I have no pen, seems to be
stating a fact (i.e. performing the act of providing information); in
fact, he is indirectly asking for a pen (i.e. performing the act of
requesting). Or, if the speaker says, You’ll be there on time!, his
words (by their conceptual content) give us information concerning
the receiver’s presence at a certain place and at a certain time;
the real meaning (the action) of his utterance, though, is that of a
warning (‘Be there, or you’ll be punished!’).
To accommodate those utterances which ‘do one thing by
means of another,’ the American linguist J.R. Searle proposed the
term Indirect Speech Acts (ISA). At a later point, however, the
idea of Indirect Speech Acts was discarded, linguists arguing that
all speech acts are more or less indirect1.
It must also be mentioned that many utterances have been
lexicalized as performing other acts than those carried by their
words. For example, Can you open the window? rarely functions as
1
Austin himself abandoned the distinction between constatatives
(statements) and performatives, considering that statements have a
performative aspect, too.
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a request for information concerning the person’s ability to open the
window; it is conventionally used as a request to actually open it.
6.3.1
Locution – illocution – perlocution
Austin suggested that a speech act works on three levels, or
rather, that the speaker performs three distinctive kinds of acts:
•
•
•
a locutionary act, consisting of the actual words uttered, with
their sense and reference
an illocutionary act, i.e. the action performed by the speaker
by uttering those words, and
a perlocutionary act, i.e. what is achieved by virtue of the
force of the utterance, the real-world effect of the utterance.
Take, for example, the utterance:
•
o
o
o
I have a headache
Its locution is the actual wording, whose meaning results from
the conceptual and contextual meaning of the lexical chain, in
this case, I + have + headache.
Its illocution is the action performed by the speaker with the
help of that locution, in this case, it may be a request to be
given an aspirin.
Its perlocution, i.e. the real-world effect the speaker
accomplishes, in this case, he is (not) given an aspirin.
In other words, locution regards the utterance proper: the
lexical items the speaker uses and the way he organizes them to
convey his message.
The illocution (or illocutionary force, or simply force) of the
utterance depends on the speaker’s intention, on what he wants to
do with the help of his utterance.
The perlocution is the real-world result that is accomplished.
Perlocutionary effect is the reason which makes the speaker build
up his utterance in a certain way, e.g. more or less indirectly, so
as not to hurt his interlocutor’s feelings.
Thus, locution depends on the speaker’s knowledge of the
language and of the context of utterance, whose various aspects were
discussed in the previous chapters. Perlocution pertains to the real
world, so that it is not the object of linguistics. It is the role of
illocution to bring together form and effect: the speaker, who has a
clearly defined aim in mind, evaluates the situation and formulates his
utterance in such a way as to serve best his real-world aim.
Therefore, illocutionary force – which regards language use and
strategic communication – is an essential feature of pragmatics.
213
214
The notion of illocutionary force explains how the speaker can
convey more meaning than, or a meaning that is different from,
the semantic load of his utterance. This is because the relationship
between locution and force is complex.
On the one hand, the speaker can endow the same utterance
with various illocutionary forces, i.e. the same locution can be
used to perform different speech acts (illocutions).
For example, the utterance Can you do it? can be used as a
mere question regarding the hearer’s ability to do something
(illocutionary force: request for information), or as a request for
the receiver to actually do it (illocutionary force: request for
performance of an action). Or, by saying The door is open, the
speaker can be making an observation (illocutionary force: giving
information), a request for the receiver to close it (illocutionary
force: request for an action), or as an urge that the receiver
should leave the room (illocutionary force: a threat).
On the other hand, the speaker can perform the same speech
act by using different locutions1. For instance, I apologize and
I’m sorry both perform the act of apologising. Or, the three
utterances – Give me that pen!, Will you please give me that pen!,
and I have no pen! – have the illocutionary force of a request.
In fact, the same locution can be used to perform opposite
speech acts. For example, if the speaker says Great! in response
to the receiver’s important achievement, the action he does is that
of praising and congratulating. Conversely, if Great! is said in
response to some mischief or failure, the action performed is that of
criticising and scolding. Obviously, paralanguage (e.g. tone of voice,
facial expression) has an important contribution in helping both the
speaker in his performance of the speech act, and the receiver in his
correct interpretation of the speaker’s intended meaning.
Interpreting correctly the force of an utterance depends largely
on the speech event or activity type1. The social situation, or
the culturally recognized social activity going on, creates a certain
framework of expectations. According to it, the hearer interprets
the utterance, attributes a certain meaning and force to it, and
reacts in a certain way.
For example, if at a tea party (activity type), a lady tells
another one, That’s a nice dress, the latter interprets it as a praise
(its force) and will answer Thank you! (its perlocutionary effect).
But if the same utterance is spoken by a lady customer in a shop
(activity type), the shop-assistant will interpret it as a request to
see/purchase it (its force), so that she will take it down and ask
whether the lady would like to try it on (its effect). In the same
way, a waiter serving you in the restaurant will interpret the
utterance, I have no knife, as a complaint or a request for a knife;
conversely, in a hold-up, the utterance is perceived as a request
not to be hurt; nor will the police shoot if the robber holds up his
arms and claims by uttering those words that he is unarmed.
Utterances are said to initiate actions: receivers interpret the
illocutionary force of the speaker’s utterance and respond in a
certain way (perlocutionary effect). For example, if your guest
says she likes your salad very much, you will interpret it as a
request for more and offer her another helping2.
When interpreting a text – especially an ambiguous one – the
receiver must analyze it along the three levels, so as to pick out
the speaker’s meaning (i.e. his communicative intention, the
force of his utterance) from a whole range of ‘possible’ meanings.
At the level of abstract/lexical meaning (denotation), the
hearer processes the dictionary meanings of the individual lexical
items, identifies the cases of polysemy or homonymy, etc., and
determines what the sentence could mean.
For example, on reading the sentence (see also section 1.3.3.1)
The customer has a right to clear information
1
2
In my book, Working with advertisements (2009) I have suggested the
idea that all selling ads, no matter how they are formulated, perform the
same speech act: that of urging us to buy.
Your interpretation, though, may be incorrect: your guest doesn’t want
more salad, or perhaps she didn’t even like your salad; she only wanted
to be polite and say something nice, i.e. a linguistic strategy used for
keeping social relations in good repair (see chapter 8).
6.3.2
Levels of meaning
The previous section has pointed out the idea that, between what
the speaker says and what he means there may be a serious gap:
the speaker may say I have no pen and mean ‘Give me a pen,
please’; he may say I have no knife and mean ‘Please don’t shoot’;
he may say Thank you and mean ‘I don’t want it’; etc. This is
because texts convey meaning on three levels (Thomas, 1995: 2):
•
•
•
1
an abstract/lexical meaning
a contextual/utterance meaning, and
the force of the utterance
The term speech event was introduced by Hymes. Levinson (1983: 368)
considers that activity type is more comprehensive.
215
the receiver will first establish the dictionary meanings of the
lexical items (customer + have + right…), identifying the cases of
polysemy (right and clear have at least two meanings) and of
grammatical ambiguity (clear can be an adjective or a verb). In
this case, the hearer will conclude that the sentence could mean
‘Customers have a right to receive clear information,’ or ‘… to
erase information.’
The second level, that of contextual (or utterance) meaning,
implies assigning sense and reference to the individual elements in
the utterance, as well as determining the best interpretation for
the utterance in the given context.
In this case, the receiver must first of all think of the
discoursal context in which the utterance was produced: the text
belongs to a site of the EU aimed at teaching customers of their
rights (which also disambiguates the meaning of right =
entitlement). In this context, the referent of the word information
is ‘data regarding products or services, their qualities, etc.,’ so that
the obvious contextual sense of clear is ‘comprehensible, unambiguous’
(customers need to receive such information, not to erase it).
The third level involves decoding the force of the utterance,
i.e. the action performed by the speaker, his intended meaning. In
the case of this text, the receiver understands that, in the context
of consumer education, the utterance performs the speech act of
informing him, a customer, of his right to be treated truthfully and
respectfully by those who provide the goods he needs and who
also benefit from his purchases.
In the same way, on hearing the utterance I have no pen, the
receiver first interprets the dictionary meaning of the words (which
pose no problem to the competent speaker). Then he assesses the
situational context, e.g. the speaker – a teacher – is preparing to
write something; he is uttering those words in the presence of
several of his students. Thirdly, the hearer asks himself why the
speaker is uttering those words, what perlocutionary effect he
wants to accomplish. As the desired effect is obvious, the receiver
(each of the students present) will understand that the teacher’s
intended meaning is ‘Give me a pen, please,’ i.e. that his utterance
has the force of a request. Whether the perlocutionary effect is
accomplished or not (i.e. whether the teacher gets the pen or not)
depends on several real-world factors, which do not pertain to the
field of linguistics.
Understanding correctly the force of speaker’s utterance is very
important when the speaker words are completely different from
what he means.
216
For example, John is told that he will have to work extra hours
and he says, I’m delighted; in fact, he is quite upset.
In such cases, the first level of meaning is clear.
It is the second level which makes the receiver doubt that
John’s intended meaning coincides with that carried by the
conceptual load of his words. The clues are provided by the nonlinguistic context: the speaker’s paralanguage (sarcastic tone of
voice and facial expression), the interlocutors’ shared background
knowledge (the receiver knows that the speaker wants to get home
early to his wife and children), the setting (it is Friday night), etc.
Having decoded the contextual meaning of John’s utterance,
the receiver can get to the third level and interpret the speaker’s
intended meaning, i.e. what he wants to do with his words. In this
case, John’s communicative intention is obvious: by the irony of
his words, he wants to express his utter dislike of the situation and
to criticise his boss.
Identifying the speaker’s intended meaning and the force of
his utterance is not always easy. Take, for instance, the utterance
where the speaker is complaining about his headache: the receiver
has no problem in assigning sense to the individual words (have,
headache), and the referent of I is also obvious. Furthermore, if
the utterance comes in face-to-face conversation, the situational
context is also obvious: a common physical location (e.g. at
home); an activity in which they are both involved (e.g. doing
homework), the paralanguage is obvious (complaining tone of
voice), etc. And yet, the receiver may not be able to identify the
speaker’s communicative intention or its illocutionary force: is he
asking for help? asking for an Aspirin? asking to be excused?
trying to get out of a job he does not like? Etc.
6.4
Indirectness
In social interactions, people do not do and do not say things at
random, but always with a more or less clear aim in their mind:
we provide information because we know/think our interlocutor
needs it; we congratulate him because we are pleased with his
success, or simply because we know he would feel hurt if we did
not; at parties we tell jokes because we want to make a good
impression, or simply to avoid silence; etc.
Nor do people always say things directly and straightforwardly:
the examples above show clearly that there is often a serious gap
between what the speaker says and what he means.
217
In the pragmatics of communication, participants use
indirectness so as to say more, or to convey a meaning that is in
some way different from the meaning of the utterance.
Weizman1 (1989) describes indirectness as a ‘lack of
transparency’, in the sense that the speaker’s message does not
convey its meaning in an obvious and unambiguous way. But it is
important to understand that, ‘as a pragmatic phenomenon,
indirectness is not just a non-intentional lack of transparency. […]
The key notion here is that of intended exploitation of a gap
between the speaker’s meaning and the utterance meaning’
(Weizman, 1989: 73, original emphasis).
Surveying the way ordinary communicators use the language
for every-day purposes, linguists realized that indirectness is a
typical feature of ordinary communication.
6.4.1
Speech acts and indirectness
It was mentioned in section 6.3 that the same speech act can be
performed by uttering various locutions, that speech acts can be
more or less indirect.
In the following list of utterances,
Open the window
Will you open the window? / Would you open the window?
Can you open the window? / Could you open the window?
Wouldn’t/Couldn’t you please open the window?
I really hate to bother you, but would you mind terribly if I asked you
to open the window?
It’s quite hot in here, don’t you think?
each is more indirect than the one before it.
The first utterance is the most straightforward: it gives voice
to the speech act (a request) with the help of an imperative verb.
But whether or not ‘please’ is added, imperative utterances are
perceived as rather rude, so that they are generally avoided.
The following two utterances enquire about the receiver’s
willingness to open the window, the difference between the two
forms being that would is perceived as more polite than will.
The utterances containing can/could are more indirect: they no
longer enquire about the receiver’s ‘willingness,’ but about his
ability to open the window. The difference between can and could
encodes again a further degree of politeness.
1
Quoted by Thomas, Meaning in Interaction, 1995: 133.
218
The negation added to the modal verb (Couldn’t/Wouldn’t you…)
confers even more tentativeness, thus, more politeness, to the
request: the speaker does not take it for granted that the speaker
can/wants to perform the action (see also section 8.2.2 – Negative
politeness).
The next utterance presents the request in an indirect and
very polite way: the select lexis and complex grammatical
structure make the style formal, so that the request sounds
elegant and tentative, rather than directive. In fact, by introducing
a conditional if, the speaker practically avoids making a request:
he seems to say, ‘I’m not asking you…, but if I did, would you
mind terribly…?’
The last utterance is completely indirect: the speaker does not
even mention the window which he wants opened, he merely
mentions the fact that the situation is not exactly as it should be.
The final question tag seems to invite the listener to express his
own opinion; in fact, it invites him to make inferences regarding
the sender’s actual meaning.
Indirectness is often triggered by the speaker’s desire to make
his message more interesting and enhance its effectiveness. All
figurative language is basically indirect. Euphemism, irony, jokes,
etc. are more likely to attract the listener’s attention and/or
dispose him favourably in the direction of fulfilling the speaker’s
wish. In the case of irony or banter, the speaker’s words can mean
the exact opposite of what he means. For example, he may say
I’m delighted when in fact he is quite upset; or, he may say You’re
horrible! and actually mean ‘You’re great!’ In the first case, the
speaker’s words convey a positive meaning, while the force of his
utterance is negative. In the second, the lexical meaning of the
utterance is negative, while its force is positive. Obviously, what
counts is the speaker’s intention, which is carried by the
illocutionary force of his words, not by the words themselves.
Thus, indirectness, as an intrinsic feature of strategic
communication, involves a gap between what the speaker says and
what he means. The speaker can use a variety of forms – more or
less indirect – to perform the same speech act.
In terms of grammatical construction, indirect utterances generally
have a more complex sentential structure. The direct imperative
formulation is the simplest. Modal constructions (of the can/could
you or will/would you type), or modal negatives (of the
Couldn’t/Wouldn’t you type) conventionally signal indirect requests
and function as clues for requestive interpretation. Carefully
219
worded, long and intricate utterances (e.g. I really hate to bother
you. Would you mind if I used your phone?) give voice to the
speaker’s feeling that he is asking for some favour. Tag questions
appended to the utterance complicate its structure, but at the same
time, reduce social distance by involvement of the receiver in the act.
But lexical and grammatical complexity is not necessarily a
sign of deference: if the speaker wants to make fun of his
employee, he may phrase his utterance very pompously, saying
the opposite of what he means, e.g. It’s so kind of you to finally
make your appearance.
The illocutionary force of indirect utterances is often unclear: it is
up to the receiver to decide how to interpret it.
Leech (1977: 99) suggests that ‘… the rhetoric of speech acts
often encourages ambivalence: Would you like to come in and sit
down?, depending on the situation, could be an invitation, a
request or a directive. Or, more important, it could be deliberately
poised on the uncertain boundary between all three.’
Linguists insist that ‘it is often in the speaker’s interest, and in
the interest of politeness, to allow the precise force of speech acts
to remain unclear’ (Leech, 1977: 99). It is also in the receiver’s
interest that the force of utterance should be negotiable.
For example, the speaker who needs to borrow some money is
unlikely to approach his interlocutor with a direct Give me $1000!,
not only because such an address is rather rude, but also because
he knows that, to obtain the money, he must gain his
interlocutor’s good will. On the other hand, the speaker tries to
avoid both having to ask for a big favour and the possibility of
being rejected – both of which are perceived as terribly unpleasant.
Conversely, if the request is formulated with Can/Could you…?,
it gives some space to both the receiver – who can say politely,
I’m sorry, I can’t! – and to the speaker himself – who understands
that the receiver’s refusal is due to the latter’s inability, not to his
lack of volition.
If, on the other hand, the speaker begins by saying that I’m
going out of my, I’ve got to pay the last instalment for the house
by Friday and there’s also John’s hospital bill (no request is
actually formulated), the receiver is allowed to ‘understand’ the
force of his utterance correctly (and give him the money), or
simply (pretend) not (to) understand it. In such cases, neither the
speaker nor the receiver has any reason for embarrassment: since
there was no request, there can be to refusal.
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Thus, if the speaker employs this last variant, he does so
specifically and intentionally, i.e. he uses the language
strategically so as to achieve so real-world aim or to avoid
negative consequence. What tells him how (in)directly to formulate
his message is his assessment of the situational context and the
real-world aim he wants to accomplish.
Thomas (1995) warns that indirectness is both costly and risky.
It is costly, because it involves greater effort on the part of the
speaker, who must construct his position carefully and still obtain the
desired results. It is also costly to the hearer, who must make an effort
of interpretation regarding the speaker’s communicative intentions.
On the other hand, indirectness is risky due to the gap
between what the speaker says and what he actually means. As a
result, the receiver may not understand (or may not want to
understand) the illocutionary force of the speaker’s utterance.
Indirectness is also risky when exploited for the sake of
interestingness. For example, if person A asks B how he likes his
new office building and the latter answers, It’s like the Pompidou
Museum1 (instead of saying simply ‘I like/don’t like it’), A must not
only visualize the building to see where the similarities may lie,
but also make guesses whether the speaker is praising the building
or criticizing it.
Indirectness is a universal phenomenon: all over the world
people indulge in complex strategies of roundabout speech.
Nevertheless, indirectness also implies important individual and
especially cultural differences. For example, Americans consider a
direct, straightforward approach honest, therefore recommended;
conversely, Asian cultures insist on elaborate strategies of indirectness.
6.4.2
Factors that govern indirectness
It was shown in section 6.3.1 that the speaker can perform the
same speech act with the help of various locutions, e.g. Help me!,
Could you give me a hand here?, or This bag is too heavy for me!
are only some of the ways in which the speaker can request for
help. The difference between them is that each in the succession is
more indirect than the one before it.
The question then arises, what are the considerations that
make the speaker decide upon the required degree of indirectness
of his speech act? Linguists have dedicated a lot of time and
1
A rather strange and heatedly debated construction.
221
energy to identifying the reasons for the intricate ways
communicators use the language.
Analysing the linguistic behaviour of ordinary communicators,
linguists have reached the conclusion that the factors that govern
indirectness are universal, i.e. ‘they capture the types of
consideration likely to govern pragmatic choices in any culture’
(Thomas, 1995: 124), but the way they are applied and exploited
in communicative exchanges varies.
Thomas (1995: 124) suggests that the indirectness of
utterances is governed by four main factors1:
1. The relative power (P) of the speaker over the hearer.
2. The social distance (D) between the speaker and the hearer.
3. The degree to which X is rated (R) an imposition in culture Y;
4. Relative rights and obligations between the speaker and the hearer.
6.4.2.1
Power
The relative power of the receiver over the speaker (P) – such as
exercised by the father over his son, by the teacher over his
student, the employer over his employee, or the role model over
his fan – is an essential factor for explaining the degree of
indirectness that the speaker uses to address his interlocutor. That
is, it has been noticed that people use a greater degree of
indirectness with people who have some power or authority over
them. Power can rely on considerations of age, education,
authority, social position, etc.
Power is of several types2:
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The speaker looks up at or fears people who possess one or
another type of power. As a result he will formulate his request
more tentatively, i.e. indirectly. For example, in:
1
2
Coercive power is in the hands of those who have access to
instruments of coercion and who can punish.
Reward power involves the ability to offer the speaker things
he might want: a job, money, grades, etc.
Legitimate power is an asset of the person who has the right
to prescribe or request certain things by virtue of his role, age,
status, etc., e.g. parents are legal guardians and providers.
Referent power belongs to those whom you admire: role
models, actors, politicians.
Expert power is an asset of the person who has special
knowledge or expertise in a certain field, e.g. a teacher, a
doctor, or a scientist.
Brown & Levinson ([1978] 1987) refer to only three factors: relative
power (P), social distance (D) and rating or ranking of imposition (R).
Thomas (1995: 126-7), quoting Spencer-Oatey’s doctoral thesis (1992).
I was wondering if you could perhaps tell me…
the speaker avoids a direct (imperative) request by questioning
the act (I was wondering…), by using the past (was), by lowering
the modality of his utterance (modal could, not ‘would’), by
introducing an additional low-modality marker (perhaps), by using
a soft and tentative tone of voice, etc.
6.4.2.2
Social distance
The social distance (D) between the speaker and the hearer is
another sociological factor that determines the degree of
indirectness employed by the speaker to address his ‘partner’ in
the conversational exchange.
Social distance relies on the participants’ relative social status
and position (e.g. employer-employee, teacher-student), but it
also derives from considerations of age, sex, degree of intimacy,
etc., e.g. whether the employer is young and a close personal
friend or a senior citizen whom you have just met. Together these
factors determine the speaker’s attitude and respectfulness
towards the addressee.
Language mirrors social distance in the choice of vocabulary and
formality of style. We can distinguish several levels of social
distance, namely:
•
•
•
•
Intimate language – i.e. the kind of language used in the
family and among close friends – is minimally articulated, most
of the message being carried by half words and non-verbal
expressions.
Personal language – i.e. the type of language used by peers
and close co-workers – is casual and colloquial, often slangy,
and non-verbal expression still carries much of the message.
Social language – i.e. the language used by distant coworkers and chance acquaintances – is formal, but it can still
be casual and easy-going.
Public language – i.e. the language of official encounters, of
formal addresses and speeches, the language used to address
people you are unlikely to meet personally – is written out in
advance even when spoken; it is fully articulated and explicit,
the vocabulary is formal, the syntax is complex, etc.
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Formality (see also section 3.2), as reflected in the linguistic
choices made by the speaker, is a sign of deference (as opposed
to familiarity).
Degrees of deference are expressed with the help of deference
markers (e.g. address forms or honorifics – Professor, Doctor,
Your Lordship/Ladyship, Your Honour, etc.), lexical choice and
formality of style, and are also built into the grammar of the
language, e.g. in the pronominal system (the T/V distinction).
Since in English the opposition familiar/deferential is unmarked in
the pronominal system, English speakers signal deference at many
other linguistic levels: phonetic (careful pronunciation and
intonation as opposed to non-standard, ‘stigmatized’ usage);
semantic (choice of lexis); pragmatic (manipulation of
indirectness); discoursal (granting high P speakers more speaking
time, non-interruption, etc.) etc.
It is often difficult to distinguish between power and social
distance, as they usually co-occur: generally, a marked power
difference (high P) also involves social distance (high D). For
example, an employer-employee relationship involves both relative
power and social distance. And a high P person uses social
language, and so do high D speakers.
It may also seem paradoxical that there is a great similarity
between the language used in cases of marked power difference
(high P) and that employed in relationships of equality and
intimacy (low D). ‘Both generate bald statements and commands,
physical proximity without apology, the broaching of intimate
subject matters, interruption and abrupt topic switch’ (Cook, 1992:
151). For example, the high P person can use a direct imperative
(Hand me that!) without having to fear the consequences; not do
low D situations require a lot of indirectness.
Conversely, there is a difference between deference (high P)
and mutual formality (high D). In the first case, the speaker
considers his interlocutor superior and worthy of his respect, so
that he constructs his speech very carefully and employs a high
degree of indirectness (i.e. implying rather that saying things).
The second person’s attitude will probably be much more informal
and straightforward, as the latter acknowledges his own superior
status. With mutual formality, the two persons are socially distant
and the participants’ formality and indirectness results from their
desire to preserve social distance, from their refusal of informality
and intimacy.
Register and deference are sociolinguistic phenomena. In
deciding upon the formality of their address, speakers have little
choice: they have to go along with the unwritten laws of the
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society they live in. For example, in French as in Romanian, the
choice between the T/V pronoun variants is compulsory, strictly
regulated by sociolinguistics norms. The speaker’s choice reflects
his estimation regarding his place and role in the linguistic
exchange, as regulated by social conventions. The rule cannot be
broken unless the speaker is willing to risk social sanction.
But speakers can manipulate the language so as to affect and
change the receiver’s perception of the P and D factors and thus
change participant relationships.
Power and social distance are not pre-determined: nobody can
say exactly, ‘how superior/inferior’ or how distant/close his
interlocutor is. Power and social distance are negotiated by the
interlocutors along the communicative exchange, i.e. the speaker’s
formality of style, paralanguage, attitude, etc., will influence the
receiver’s perception of the relative P and D.
For example, if a high P (a boss) tells his employee, Call me
Chuck! he does so in order to reduce social distance and make the
latter feel at ease. The D factor can be reduced in the opposite
direction also: if a high P person uses the polite pronoun to
address a low P person, his aim is to make the latter feel
important and respected.
In other cases, speakers manipulate the D factor to their own
advantage. For example, a low D speaker may address his higher
D interlocutor by his first name; if the latter does not object, the
attempt was successful; but if he continues to call the speaker by
his last name, it shows that he refuses to reduce D (i.e. he does
not want to be on familiar terms with him). By the force of his
words, and especially of his paralanguage, an equal P speaker can
force him into a low P status: the receiver is so inhibited that he
cannot assess the social distance accurately.
6.4.2.3
Size of imposition
Another factor that governs indirectness is the size (or rating) of
imposition (R): the speaker formulates his utterance more or less
(in)directly depending on how great he estimates his request to
be, or how seriously he considers he is intruding into the receiver’s
personal life.
To estimate the size of one’s imposition, let us consider
Goffman’s (1967) categorization of free and non-free goods1.
According to this, free goods are those that are freely available
(i.e. no payment – financial or other – is required for them), e.g.
1
See also section 4.2.2 – Clause as exchange.
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asking for the salt in a restaurant, or using someone’s bathroom.
In such cases the speaker does not need to make his request too
polite; a direct, Pass me the salt, please! will do. But even in such
situations the speaker may be tempted to utter a more intricate
sentence (e.g. Would you kindly pass me the salt?), or really
indirect ones (e.g. My steak is not salty enough). Such
indirectness may be triggered by considerations of politeness.
The activity type and the situation of the linguistic exchange
greatly influence the status of the goods (i.e. free or non-free)
and, consequently, the R factor. Thus, at home, you can ask for
some more food without ‘imposing’ – you consider it ‘natural’ and
your ‘right’. But if you are a guest for lunch, you cannot ask for
another helping without risking consequences, whether in the form
of embarrassing your host (who has no more food to offer), or of a
silent disapproval by the other guests.
Lakoff (1974) points out that the term ‘goods’ does not refer
exclusively to material objects; it can also include the category of
services. For example, asking someone to tell you the time or to
show you the way to the station involves no material object to be
handed over. In such cases, the ‘cost’ your interlocutor will have to
pay in order to satisfy your request is the effort necessary for
carrying out the act. Nevertheless, in this case, too, the size of
imposition is calculable and it depends directly on the relative
power and social distance between the interlocutors, on the
situation and activity type, etc. Thus, a student interrupting the
professor’s lecture and asking him what the time is will have to
bear the consequences of his highly inappropriate act, although
the service requested is ranked among the category of ‘free goods.’
Size of imposition is also culturally determined. There are
cultures that favour high involvement, i.e. it is nice to inquire
about your interlocutor’s family and occupation. Others give
preference to non-involvement and consider questions concerning
one’s personal life and affairs rather intrusive. That is why people,
and especially students of foreign languages, have to learn how to
use the language appropriately, so as not to make blunders in the
target language environment.
6.4.2.4
Rights and obligations
The degree of indirectness the speaker estimates as required for
his utterance also depends on whether he is asking for something
that he considers to be his right, or is asking for a favour.
For example, in class the teacher is entitled to give certain
orders to his students, so that a direct Stand up! is appropriate;
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but if a host wants her elderly guest to stand up so that she can
open the door behind her, an indirect utterance (e.g. Would you
mind terribly if I asked you to move over a bit?) is a better choice.
On the other hand, the speaker’s indirectness also depends on
his estimation whether the act belongs to his interlocutor’s duties,
or the latter will have to do him a favour. For example, if you are
in a shop and want to see a certain item that you may want to
buy, you will simply ask the shop assistant, Show me that lamp,
please!1 But if you are visiting someone’s home, and would like to
see a particular object that you heard was very valuable, you must
phrase your request indirectly (I was wondering, could I see that
exquisite lamp of yours I’ve heard so much about?), because
showing it to you does not represent your host’s duty.
Obviously, the overall indirectness of an utterance results from the
speaker’s estimation of the composite value of the four factors.
For example, if a middle aged lady wants to ask a young man in
the street to give her some change for a slot machine, she will
have to make her request indirect (e.g. I’m terribly sorry to bother
you but couldn’t you by any chance …) because, although he is low
P (male and younger), there is high D (they are total strangers),
he has nothing to gain from the act of giving her what she is asking
for (it is a ‘high cost’ request), and she is asking for a favour.
Conversely, if the young man, on noticing that the lady needs some
change, offers her some, he may say simply Let me give you some!,
because he is providing a service (very low R) which is not his duty.
In conclusion, the way people use and interpret the language is affected
by factors pertaining to the communicators’ knowledge of the world and
of society, as well as of the unwritten laws that govern linguistic
exchanges, which are pragmatic by nature. Pragmatic knowledge relies
on context-dependent aspects of language structure, but also on
principles of language usage and interpretation.
1
Even in such a case you may be tempted to say, Could you please show
me that lamp? or I’d like to see that lamp, so as to avoid the act of
requesting (people do not like to ask for a favour).
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Chapter 7
Cooperation and inferential communication
7.1
Meaning in interaction
The previous chapters have led us to three non-exclusive
descriptions of ‘pragmatic meaning.’ They have shown that
pragmatic meaning involves:
knowledge of the world (Chapter 1)
language in context (Chapter 4)
language in use (Chapter 6)
•
•
•
It was also shown in Chapter 6 that the actual meaning of an
utterance can be quite different from that carried by the lexical
meanings of its words, and that no matter how the speaker might
formulate his utterance, what matters is his communicative intention.
Thus, meaning is not inherent in the vocabulary alone. The
overall meaning of the speaker’s message depends on the
meaning potential of its individual items, but it is also influenced
by concrete factors of the situational context. Thirdly, there is also
the illocutionary force of the utterance, which results from the
speaker’s communicative intention.
To bridge the gap that exists between the speaker’s words
and the force of his utterance, the listener must make use of his
own linguistic, pragmatic and psychological abilities, and at the
same time, take into consideration the main features of the
conversation going on. This leads us to the conclusion that
meaning – or rather, ‘making meaning’ – is a dynamic process.
The approach to meaning as a dynamic thing is not new; it
was already suggested in the late 1920s, by the Russian linguist
and literary theorist Bakhtin1, who said:
•
1
Meaning does not reside in the word or in the soul of the
speaker or in the soul of the listener. Meaning is the effect
of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the
material of a particular sound complex. It is like an electric
spark that occurs only when two different terminals are
hooked together. Those who […], in attempting to define
Quoted by Cook, 1992: 182, original emphasis.
the meaning of a word, approach its lower, stable, selfidentical limit, want, in effect, to turn on a light bulb after
having switched off the current. Only the current verbal
intercourse endows a word with the light of meaning.’
In the same way, Thomas (1995: 22-3) considers that ‘meaning is
not […] produced by the speaker alone, nor by the hearer alone.
Making meaning is a dynamic process, involving the negotiation of
meaning between speaker and hearer, the context of utterance
(physical, social and linguistic) and the meaning potential of an
utterance.’
’Negotiation of meaning’ is a metaphor which recalls the marketplace, where the seller sets a price for his wear (usually higher than its
true value), the buyer retaliates by offering a price that is much lower
(probably lower than its worth), etc., until they finally reach a sum that
is acceptable for both. In the same way, in communication, the two
communicators ‘bargain’ until they finally settle upon a mutually
agreeable set of ideas. Such meaning negotiation is induced by the
typical features of face-to-face communication – time pressure, a rapid
change of roles (the speaker becomes hearer, then again speaker,
etc.), the existence of a non-linguistic context, the need to capture the
interlocutor’s attention, etc. – which induce the all kind of information
gaps.
One such type of gap are the missing links (discussed in 1.2.3 –
Pragmatic meaning): relying on his interlocutor’s supposed knowledge
of the world and on a mutual background, the speaker leaves a lot of
factual information unsaid, to be filled in by the receiver.
Another type of gap is that between adjacent utterances (see
section 4.5.1 – Text and textness).
To illustrate the gap between two adjacent utterances,
Levinson (1983: 97) gives the following example:
A: Can you tell me the time?
B: Well, the milkman has come
The two utterances seem to be completely unrelated: B’s words do
not seem to come in reply to A’s question. Nevertheless, A
interprets them as a meaningful answer: he understands that B
does not know what the time is but, in his desire to be helpful, he
is offering some information that might serve his interlocutor as a
clue for the information he needs, i.e. the milkman’s round usually
follows an exact time schedule, so the information that he has
already been around can provide the approximate time.
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Or, in the exchange (Levinson, 1983: 102),
A: Where is Bill?
B: There’s a yellow VW outside Sue’s house
the second sentence does not seems related to the first. And yet,
person A will interpret B’s answer as providing the information
required: he will infer that the car is the very place where John is.
The examples also illustrate a third type of gap, i.e. that between
what the speaker says and what he means (says: There’s a yellow
VW…; means: ‘He’s in that yellow VW’). This type of gap was
discussed with relation to speech acts (see section 6.2): the speaker’s
words say one thing, but the illocutionary force of the utterance
conveys another meaning. The gap between the lexical meaning of
the utterance and the speaker’s intended meaning results from the
strategies of indirectness (see section 6.4) the speaker employs for
achieving various real-world goals. Considerations of social distance,
or the speaker’s desire to ‘be interesting,’ may urge him to avoid
direct reference, hence he will prefer to hint (imply), rather than
express things plainly and straightforwardly.
To explain how ‘by means of shared rules of conversation,
competent language-users manage to understand one another’
(Thomas 1995: 56), Grice proposed his Cooperative Principle
with its four maxims of conversation.
7.2
Indirectness and implicature
H.P. Grice’s (1913-1988) theory of conversational implicature
(or simply, implicature) is ‘one of the single most important ideas
in pragmatics’ (Levinson, 1983: 97).
Grice, who was first Austin’s student, then worked with Austin
at Oxford in the 1940s and 1950s, belonged to the same tradition
of ordinary language philosophy. Grice first presented his theory of
implicature in a series of lectures he delivered at Harvard in 1967.
In 1975, he published it in Logic and conversation, and expanded
it in 1978 and 1981, but he never fully developed it.
Just like Austin, Grice reacted against the limitations of truthconditional semantics and against the views of ideal language
philosophers (in the tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski), offering
functional explanations to linguistic phenomena.
What Grice attempted to do was to reconcile the views of ideal
language philosophers, who viewed language as a formal system,
with those of ordinary language philosophers, whose object of
study was ‘natural’ language, i.e. actual linguistic usage.
230
On the other hand, Grice tried ‘to relieve the semantics of
natural language of whatever can be best explained at the
pragmatic level’ (Sperber & Wilson, 2005: 471). Ordinary language
philosophers considered that there was an unbridgeable gap
between the semantics of formal languages and that of natural
languages. Grice argued that the gap could be considerably
reduced if a clear cut distinction was made between sentence
meaning and speaker’s meaning. Then the linguist could explain
how, in context, relatively simple utterances could be used by
speakers to convey richer and fuzzier meanings, consisting not
only of what was said, but also of what was implicated.
This, according to Sperber & Wilson (2005: 468), represents
the foundation of modern pragmatics.
Thus, just like Austin, Grice was interested in the intentionally
produced gap between what the speaker says and what he means,
i.e. between the literal meaning of an utterance and the speaker’s
intended meaning. But they investigated the phenomenon from
different perspectives.
Austin was interested in the action performed by the speaker
by means of his utterance, i.e. its illocutionary force. As a result,
the theory of speech acts focuses exclusively on the speaker’s
ability to convey some additional meaning (says: There’s a yellow
VW…; means: ‘Bill is in that yellow VW’), or some meaning that is
different from the logical meaning of his words (says: I’m
delighted!; means: ‘I’m terribly upset!’).
Grice accepted the idea that the speaker indirectly conveys
more meaning than what is carried by the semantic load of his
words, or a meaning that is different from it, and he agreed that
the speaker produces his own (intended) meaning. But unlike
Austin, Grice insisted that the hearer, too, produces his own
meaning. In the felicitous cases, the receiver’s meaning coincides
with that of the speaker (in the cases mentioned above, the hearer
understands that ‘Bill is in that yellow VW,’ respectively, that the
speaker is quite upset). In other cases, though, he may
misunderstand the speaker’s intended meaning.
Thus, Grice argued, for a theory that wants to explain how
communication works and how meaning circulates between a
sender and a receiver who interact with the help of the language,
a further dimension must be added: that of the receiver, who must
make an effort to interpret the speaker’s words and intentions.
For discussing the contributions of the two parties to the
communicative exchange, Grice proposed two sets of conceptual
231
tools: to imply/implicature – for the speaker, and respectively,
to infer/to make inferences – for the hearer.
The speaker, Grice suggested, rarely puts his ideas into words
directly. In most cases, he intentionally implies (or implicates)
more meaning than is carried by the conceptual content of his
words, or a meaning that is totally different from it.
To cover this intentionally conveyed additional communicative
load, Grice proposed the term conversational implicature, or
simply, implicature.
In his turn, the receiver who wants to determine correctly the
speaker’s intended meaning must make inferences (educated
guesses) as to what the speaker actually wanted to say. To
retrieve the additional communicative load, the hearer must not
only process the utterance itself, but also take into consideration
the significant features of the situational context.
In short, focussing on both parties that take part in the
communicative act, Grice’s theory of implicature attempts to
explain how implicatures are generated by the speaker and how they
are interpreted by the hearer.
7.3 Cooperation and inferential communication
In a theory outlined before that of implicature, Grice proposed the
notion meaning-nn (non-natural), i.e. a meaning the speaker
intends the hearer to recognize as ‘having been intended.’ The
theory of implicature relies exactly on such types of meanings,
conveyed indirectly and specifically by the speaker, with the
intention of being recognized by the receiver as ‘intended meaning.’
But the theory of implicature is much more complex than
that. A theory of how people use language, it is based on the idea
that ‘there is a set of over-arching assumptions guiding the conduct
of conversation. These arise, it seems, from basic rational
considerations and may be formulated as guidelines for the efficient
and effective use of language in conversation to further co-operative
ends’ (Levinson, 1983: 101).
Grice’s Cooperative Principle explains, among other things,
how and why interlocutors interpret adjacent sentences that seem
to be unrelated as meaningful and belonging to the same discourse.
It also gives an account of how the receiver manages to retrieve the
whole communicative content of the utterance by bridging the gap
between what is said (the expressed/literal meaning) and what is
meant (the implied/intended meaning).
232
Grice based his Cooperative Principle on the idea that
communicators are rational individuals who use the language in a
cooperative way. The participants in the exchange cooperate, i.e.
they behave along well defined (though unwritten) lines that govern
communication. In these cooperative exchanges, speakers
imply/implicate more information than what they actually say by
virtue of the literal meaning of their words, and listeners interpret
this additional information by virtue of the inferences they make
concerning that additional message.
The Co-operative Principle says:
•
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged.
It is interesting to note that Grice formulated the Cooperative
Principle and its Maxims in the form of imperative sentences (Make
your contribution …!). This, however, does not mean that he, the
philosopher of the language, is telling the speaker how to behave
in conversation. Rather, it is a sort of internal monologue, e.g. as
though the speaker is repeating to himself some unwritten rule
according to which he knows he should behave, e.g. ‘I should try
to make my contribution …’.
In other words, the Principle tells us that, to contribute with
maximal efficiency to a conversation, the speaker should speak:
in the way it is required, e.g. he should try to say what his
interlocutor needs to know
at the moment when it is required, e.g. when his interlocutor
needs to know it, and
according to the purpose or direction of the conversation going on,
i.e. because his interlocutor needs that specific piece of information.
But Grice does not want to suggest that speakers always
behave in this way. In most ordinary conversations, the speaker
does not spell out all the information he wants to convey, nor does
he convey the information directly and straightforwardly.
The additional information is merely implied, i.e. conveyed by
means of conversational implicature.
For instance, in the exchange:
A: Did Jane buy those shoes?
B: Well, the money’s gone
B does not say anything about shoes; and yet, his utterance
represents his cooperative contribution to the linguistic exchange,
an attempt to provide the information required: since he does not
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know for sure whether Jane bought the shoes or not, he is offering
some information that may serve A as a clue. Obviously, the utterance
conveys only part of the speaker’s meaning by its logical content: what
the speaker says is that
[pragmatically interpreted particle]1 there is no more money
What the speaker means is:
… which probably means that Jane bought the shoes
This additional meaning represents the speaker’s implicature.
On the other side of the communicative exchange is the
‘cooperative’ receiver. On receiving an answer which seems to be
unrelated to his own question/request, the hearer does not discard it as
meaningless. ‘In most ordinary kinds of talk […], when talk does not
proceed according to their specifications, hearers assume that, contrary
to appearances, the principles are nevertheless adhered to at some
deeper level’ (Levinson, 1983: 102).
This shows again that Grice does not mean that people always
follow the principle on a superficial level; rather, he suggests that,
whenever it is possible, receivers consider that what was said respects
the provisions of the principle on some deeper level.
In other words, no matter how strange or unrelated to the
conversation the speaker’s utterance might be, the hearer still assumes
that his interlocutor is a rational being who is contributing cooperatively
to the exchange. As a result, he makes inferences to work out the
speaker’s actual meaning. To do so, he asks himself a set of four
questions:
why is my interlocutor saying
this very thing
right now, and
to me?
For the examples above: why is B talking about money, now when I
am asking him about the shoes? Or why is B talking about the milkman
when I am asking him about the time? Making the correct inferences,
the receiver bridges the gap between the speaker’s words and his
intended meaning, and also between the two adjacent utterances.
Let us analyse from this perspective three of the utterances in the list
of locutions presented in section 6.4.1:
1
Open the window!
Could you open the window?
It’s quite hot in here, don’t you think?
The particle well is discussed in section 7.4 – Types of implicature.
234
The imperative Open the window! carries the speaker’s
intended meaning as directly as possible. In this case, what the
speaker says coincides with what he means.
In the question Could you open …?, the speaker is asking the
hearer politely if he is able to open the window; in fact, the
illocutionary force of his utterance is that of a request. This means
that the utterance carries some additional meaning: the
implicature, ‘If you are (able), then please do it.’
The last utterance in the series is entirely (and strategically)
indirect. What the speaker says is that it is warm in the room;
what he means, however, is completely different. Having the same
illocutionary force as the previous example, the two utterances
also carry similar implicatures: ‘Please open the window!’
This also shows that implicatures ‘are not semantic inferences,
but rather inferences based on both the content of what has been
said and some specific assumptions about the co-operative nature
of ordinary interaction’ (Levinson, 1983: 104).
The Co-operative Principle is detailed in four maxims – of Quality,
of Quantity, of Relevance and of Manner – each with one or several
sub-maxims. They describe in more detail how the speaker generally
behaves (or how he should behave) in ordinary communicative
exchanges, and what expectations the receiver has when interpreting
the speaker’s words so as to draw the right inferences.
1. The maxim of Quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically
(i) do not say what you believe to be false
(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
2. The maxim of Quantity
(i) make your contribution as informative as is required
for the current purposes of the exchange
(ii) do not make your contribution more informative than
required
3. The maxim of Relevance
Make your contributions relevant
4. The maxim of Manner
Be perspicuous, and specifically:
(i) avoid obscurity
(ii) avoid ambiguity
(iii) be brief
(iv) be orderly
235
Grice also suggested that the speaker can contribute cooperatively
to the discourse in two major ways:
o
o
Observing the maxims
When observing the maxims, the speaker contributes directly and
straightforwardly to the conversation, providing as much
information as is required, at the time when it is required,
speaking truthfully, clearly and unambiguously, etc. Still, he may
implicate some additional meaning.
To get to the speaker’s intended meaning, the rational and
cooperative hearer, who assumes that the speaker is following the
maxims, amplifies what has been said and makes inferences
regarding that additional meaning.
For implicatures that result when the speaker follows the maxims,
Levinson (1983: 104) proposed the term standard implicatures.
7.3.1.1
Observing the maxim of Quality
The maxim of Quality suggests that, for efficient communication,
the speaker should tell the truth (or at least to believe sincerely in
the truth of what he is saying), that he should not say things that
he believes to be false (sub-maxim 1), that he should refrain from
saying things for which he lacks adequate evidence (sub-maxim 2).
For example, when the speaker says,
He’s at home right now
he is supposed to know for a fact, or at least to believe so, that
the person mentioned is at home; were he not certain of it, he
would use a modal verb (‘He may be at home’), or some hedging
expression (‘Well, perhaps…’). In the absence of such clues, the
utterance thus carries the implicature ‘I believe he is at home and
I have adequate evidence that he is.’
Similarly, when hearing the speaker say,
John got married last night
the receiver assumes that the speaker knows it is so, e.g. because
he was at the wedding, or because he got reliable information.
A term proposed by Levinson (1983: 104), after Grice’s ‘flouting.’
The same thing happens when there is an information gap
between two adjacent utterances, as in:
A: Do you have a pen?
B: Look on my desk
by observing1 the maxims, and
by deliberately flouting (violating, breaching) the maxims.
7.3.1
1
236
Semantically, A’s utterance represents a question whether B has a
pen or not; pragmatically, it implicates ‘…if you do, please give it
to me’ (illocutionary force: request). B amplifies A’s utterance and
makes the correct inference, i.e. that A is asking for a pen. When
his turn comes to become speaker, B conveys his intended
meaning indirectly, too: he implicates that ‘I know/think that on
my desk there is a pen and you can take it.’ In doing so, both
speakers abide by the maxim of Quality: A is asking for a pen
because he (probably) needs one; B is offering (information
regarding) a pen that he knows/thinks is on his desk.
7.3.1.2
Observing the maxim of Quantity
The maxim of Quantity suggests that the speaker generally says
neither less nor more than is required within the conversation. For
example, the utterance:
Today is sunny
implies that on the day of the utterance, the sun is shining and
there are no clouds.
The maxim of Quantity explains how the pragmatic context
can endow the semantic content of words with additional features.
For example, in the exchange:
A: Do you have children?
B: I have a son
a son in B’s utterance implies ‘only one son,’ or ‘no more than
one,’ although semantically, in the absence of the word only, the
utterance could accept ‘I have a son, if fact, I have three (sons),’
or ‘… and I also have a daughter.’
Traditionally, when faced with such examples, semanticists
had a problem to solve: semantically, sunny means that ‘the sun is
shining,’ but that does not exclude the existence of some clouds in
the sky. In the same way, conceptually, ‘having a son’ does not
exclude having several sons/children. As a result, semanticists
would differentiate between the meaning of ‘wholly sunny’ and
‘partially sunny,’ between ‘one’ and ‘only one.’
With the help of Grice’s maxims, this puzzle of semanticists
could be solved. As Levinson (1983: 99) puts it,
•
237
… from this set of dilemmas the notion of implicature offers
a way out, for it allows one to claim that natural language
expressions do tend to have simple, stable and unitary
senses (in many cases anyway), but that this stable
semantic core often has an unstable, context-specific
pragmatic overlay – namely a set of implicatures.
The maxim of Quantity also suggests that the speaker makes the
strongest statement possible. For example, on hearing the utterance:
He had an accident and broke his arm
the receiver makes the inference ‘no more than a broken arm, he
did not die.’ This is because, according to the maxim, the speaker
is expected to make the most powerful and informative assertion
possible (in this case, the worst thing that happened).
The degree of informativeness of one’s message contains further
implicatures. If the speaker says more than necessary, the listener is
tempted to ‘read more’ into the utterance than what has been said.
7.3.1.3
Observing the maxim of Relevance
In discussing semantic anomaly, Leech (1981, Chapter 1) is
careful to point out that ‘the human mind abhors vacuum of
sense;’ whenever the hearer ‘is faced with absurd sentences [he]
will strain his interpretative faculty to the utmost to read them
meaningfully.’
In the same way, on encountering adjacent utterances whose
elements seem to be unrelated, communicators strain their minds
to identify the most likely link.
The maxim of Relevance explains best how and why seemingly
unrelated adjacent utterances are interpreted as belonging to the
same text. Consider, for example, the exchange above, where A is
asking for a pen and B is talking about his desk. Or, in Levinson’s
milkman example, A can draw the proper inferences concerning
B’s implied meaning only by considering his words as relevant to
the context of communication, i.e. related to it and meaningful.
In the same way, in:
A: Can you lend me $10?
B: We’re going on a trip next week
the two utterances seem to be totally unrelated: A is asking for a
loan, B is talking about a trip. But the maxim of Relevance tells us
that the rational and cooperative speaker contributes to the
conversation that is going on (not to some imaginary conversation
in his head), adding meaning to it.
238
With such considerations in mind, A assumes that ‘relevance
holds,’ i.e. that the two utterances belong to the same text; that B
is implying more meaning than is carried by his words, a meaning
that is related to the question/request that he has made. This way,
he makes the connection between his own request and his
interlocutor’s utterance, and makes the inference, ‘I cannot lend
you the money because….’ In other words, far from being
irrelevant in the context, B’s words represent not only an answer
to A’s request (illocutionary force: refusal), but also provide
indirectly a reason for that refusal.
The maxim of Relevance also explains why imperative utterances
do not need specifications of time, e.g. when then speaker says,
Give me that!
he does not need to say ‘now’: the item is relevant/important to
him at that very moment.
7.3.1.4
Observing the maxim of Manner
The maxim of Manner tells us that, for efficient communication,
the speaker should try to express his ideas briefly and clearly, that
he should ‘avoid obscurity’ and ‘ambiguity,’ that he should ‘be
brief’ and ‘orderly.’
Generally in communication, it is in the speaker’s best interest
to present his ideas clearly, so that the receiver should understand
his message correctly. For example, when mother wants her
daughter to go shopping for her, for maximum efficiency, she
makes a clear and unambiguous list of the products she needs,
presented by categories, so that her daughter should not have to
run from one type of shop to another and back, etc. In the same
way, when exposing his ideas, the speaker usually presents them
as clearly as possible, trying not to confuse the listener.
For example, in the exchange:
A: How do you like that painting?
B: It’s beautiful
B answers A’s question briefly and unambiguously. Whenever the
maxim is not strictly observed, the receiver is entitled to make
inferences and discover some additional meaning. For example, in:
A: How do you like that painting?
B: It’s quite interesting
the very fact that the speaker does not express his liking directly
bears the implicature that he does not really like it.
239
In the same way, as he knows that the receiver may not be
inclined to listen to him for a long time, the speaker usually
presents his ideas succinctly, in the order in which they occurred
or that of their importance (sub-maxim 4: be orderly).
With the fourth sub-maxim, Grice managed to solve another of
the puzzles of semanticists: the fact that the word and has
different meanings in different contexts. Consider the example:
My son is an engineer and my daughter is a doctor
Mary opened the door and stepped into the room
Since and is a copulative conjunction, the two elements linked by it
are of equal syntactic value, so that they should be interchangeable.
This, however, works in the first case (‘My daughter is… and my son
is…’), but not in the second (*Mary stepped into the room and
opened the door). To semanticists, this triggered the conclusion that
and in the first example is different from and in the second, whose
meaning is ‘and then’ (see also section 7.3.2.4). But this way, the
number of meanings of simple words would proliferate unlimitedly
(consider also the cases discussed in relation to the maxim of
Quantity, ‘totally/partially sunny’ and ‘only one son’). Again, Grice’s
maxim provide the solution: words have a stable semantic core, but
they may also have an unstable context-dependent pragmatic
overlay of implicatures.
In most cases within conversational exchanges, several maxims
work together. For example, in:
A: Where are you going?
B: To school
B answers A’s question truthfully (observes the maxim of Quality),
clearly (observes the maxim of Manner), giving the right amount
of information (observes the maxim of Quantity). Moreover, the
two utterances being adjacent, A will assume that B’s words come
in answer to his question (observing the maxim of Relevance).
7.3.2
Flouting the maxims
In ordinary communication, speakers generate massive amounts
of implicatures by observing the cooperative principle and its
maxims. In numerous cases, though, the speaker’s contribution is
intentionally and obviously false, ambiguous, or irrelevant for the
conversation going on. In other words, the speaker is deliberately
and blatantly breaking/breaching the rules of logical communication
by violating/infringing one or another of the maxims.
240
Grice considers that the main reason for such intentional
floutings of the ‘rule’ is the speaker’s desire to make his
contribution more interesting or more suggestive.
Take, for instance, the example discussed before, where the speaker
says, I’m delighted! when in fact he is quite upset (see sections
6.3.2 and 7.2). His utterance is obviously and intentionally false
(i.e. he is flouting the maxim of Quality); in fact, what he says is
the exact opposite of what he means.
In such cases, even though the utterance seems absurd, the
receiver will still assume that his interlocutor is rational and
cooperative. As a result, he will stretch his imagination and make
inferences so as to retrieve the speaker’s intended meaning. As
Levinson (1983: 102) puts it, ‘… when talk does not proceed
according to specifications, hearers assume that, contrary to
appearances, the principles are nevertheless being adhered to at
some deeper level.’
In other words, even when the speaker’s utterance deviates
‘drastically and dramatically’ from maxim-type behaviour, the
receiver still presumes that he is contributing cooperatively to the
conversation, so that he will make an effort of imagination to
retrieve the speaker’s intended meaning.
7.3.2.1
Flouting the maxim of Quality
‘Flouting the maxim of Quality’ is a euphemism for ‘telling a lie.’
Yet, in most cases, these lies are so blatantly false that nobody in
his right mind would believe them. It is, therefore, logical for the
hearer to assume that the speaker wants to convey some other
meaning, or perhaps a meaning that is the very opposite of what
has been said.
In such cases, the receiver is expected to make other kinds of
inferences concerning the speaker’s intended meaning.
Flouting the maxim of Quality shows how irony works, e.g. in:
Son: Dad, could you give me some money?
Father: Sure, I’m Bill Gates
the father is telling a blatant lie (he is obviously not Bill Gates). As
a result, the son understands that he must make inferences: first
he identifies the feature that sets the two persons apart (i.e.
[+WEALTH] for Bill Gates, [-WEALTH] for the father); then he
infers that, since the father is asserting the opposite of what he is
(that he is rich), he must interpret the other words in the
utterance to have the opposite meaning, i.e. that sure actually
implicates ‘of course not.’
241
The competent speaker’s capacity to make inferences also
accounts for the receiver’s ability to interpret semantic anomaly.
Faced with an anomalous construction, such as:
He is advancing by walking in circles
(where advance involves the feature [+FORWARDS], while in
circles definitely excludes that feature), the pragmatically
competent speaker will not reject it as void of sense; rather, he
will stretch his imagination and dodge and bend some rules, both
of the dictionary and of logic, to grasp the message's intended
meaning. In this case, the contradiction will make him conclude
that the person is not advancing at all.
The example suggests that a massive amount of figurative
speech relies on violation of the maxim of Quality, the falsehood
involving a clash between some conceptual feature(s) of the word
or utterance.
For example, the falsehood inherent in the nominal metaphor,
The Iron Lady (of Margaret Thatcher)
involves a clash in between the features [-HUMAN] of iron, and
respectively, [HUMAN] of lady.
Similar conceptual clashes occur in the case of the predicative
or sentential metaphor. For example, in:
He is climbing the stairs of immortality
the action of the verb (to climb) requires a [+CONCRETE] object,
but immortality is obviously [-CONCRETE]. Since the clash triggers
a logical/conceptual impossibility, the receiver will infer that the
term climb is used metaphorically.
Metaphor is perhaps the most obvious example of the difficulty
the receiver may encounter in decoding correctly the speaker’s
intended meaning. Take, for instance, the example given in section
6.4.2, where the speaker compares a building to the Pompidou
Museum: the hearer may infer that the speaker is praising the new
building, while in fact the speaker’s implicature is negative.
7.3.2.2
Flouting the maxims of Quantity
The maxim of Quantity says that the speaker makes his
contribution as informative as necessary. As a result, whenever
the maxim is violated (i.e. the utterance is more or less
informative than required), the speaker is probably trying to
convey some additional meaning. Thus, for example, in:
I have no more than one car
242
by emphasizing no more than (i.e. saying more than necessary),
the speaker (e.g. a politician) is implying that somebody has made
contrary (and false) accusations.
Saying less also triggers implicatures. For example, in:
A: What are you looking for?
B: Some stuff
by refusing to tell A what he is looking for, B is conveying the
implicature ‘none of your business.’
Tautology is also based on flouting the maxim of Quantity.
Apparently uninformative from a conceptual point of view (the two
elements in the utterance have the same truth value), the
tautology acquires additional meanings by pragmatic implications
and conversational implicatures.
Take, for example, the tautology:
Boys will be boys
Since the phrase is uninformative from a semantic point of
view, the receiver will have to resort to his knowledge of the
world, which tells him that boys are generally naughty. On the
next level, that of cooperative communication, the receiver will
make inferences based on the assumption that the speaker is
contributing meaningfully to the exchange. Bridging the gap
between the speaker’s words and his communicative intentions
(including the illocutionary force of the utterance: of resigned or
amused acceptance), the receiver will draw the inference ‘Boys will
always be naughty, there is nothing you can do about it.’
Many tautologous phrases – What’s yours is yours, If you
won’t, you won’t – have become lexicalized.
7.3.2.3
Flouting the maxims of Relevance
Speakers often blatantly violate the maxim of Relevance: they say
something completely and outrageously out of line with the
conversation going on.
Take, for example, the exchange:
A: My boss is a jerk
B: Lovely weather, isn’t it?
It is at such moments, more than in most other cases, that the
hearer must ask himself the four questions: why is the speaker
saying this, now and to me? Since there is no relation whatsoever
between a boss being a jerk and the weather, the receiver will
conclude that the speaker is trying to communicate some other
meaning. The most common inference is that his friend is trying to
signal that someone is listening, or that the boss has just entered
243
the room. Obviously, it may be the wrong inference, e.g. B just
wanted to signal that he did not want to talk about the subject.
The speaker may flout the maxim of Relevance for other
reasons. For example, in:
A: Come and give me a hand here
B: Will you teach me how to do X?
by asking A to teach him to do something, B hopes to extricate
himself from a chore he does not feel like doing.
Or, take the example:
A: Mom, can I go out?
B: Have you finished cleaning your room, Billy?
B’s question concerning the cleaning of his room is obviously not
the answer Billy expected. But since it comes in response to his
request, he must interpret it as related to it and relevant. No great
knowledge of the world or of the rules of conversation is required
to tell the receiver what inference to make in such cases.
This also shows that numerous implicatures/inferences,
especially those related to the maxim of Relevance, are contextdependent (see also Particularized implicatures in section 7.4).
7.3.2.4
Flouting the maxims of Manner
The maxim of Manner tells us that the speaker tries to make his
message brief and orderly, and that he tries to avoid obscurity or
ambiguity. But in daily exchanges, speakers often violate the
maxim of Manner by being deliberately vague or ambiguous.
For example, when the speaker considers it unsafe to express
a clear-cut opinion, he may say something like:
Well, you know, I sort of…
244
If reversed,
She got married and got pregnant
She got pregnant and got married
the utterance triggers a different implicature: that the pregnancy
appeared out of wedlock and the marriage took place afterwards,
so as to settle an unpleasant situation. This shows that the
sequential nature of utterances generally corresponds to the
natural order of events and explains the effect of pragmatic
features upon the semantic content of and.
Grice distinguishes four types of non-observance of one or another
of the maxims (flouting, violating, opting out, and infringing a
maxim); a fifth type was later proposed (suspending a maxim).
Briefly, the differences run along the following lines1:
o
o
o
o
o
Or, in the exchange,
A: How do you like X’s new house?
B: It is the sort of museum only rich men can put together
by flouting the sub-maxim ‘Be brief,’ B is implying that the house
is neither beautiful nor in good taste. Furthermore, by saying more
than is necessary, the example also flouts the maxim of Quantity;
which shows that the maxims work together, that it is often hard
to distinguish the separating lines.
Non-observance of the sub-maxim ‘Be orderly’ explains the
importance of sentence order in the case of utterances coordinated
by and (see also section 7.3.1.4). Take, for instance, Grice’s example,
Flouting a maxim, i.e. deliberately and blatantly breaking one
or another of the maxims, e.g. Sure, I’m Bill Gates.
Violating a maxim, i.e. an unostentatious non-observance of
a maxim, as in not telling the whole truth: e.g. the husband
asks his wife whether there is another man in her life and she
replies, ‘No, there isn’t another man.’ But this is not the whole
truth: in fact, she is having an affair with a woman.
Infringing a maxim: in this case, the speaker has neither the
intention to lie, nor to generate an implicature; the inferences
result from the speaker’s inability to express his ideas clearly,
e.g. because he does not speak the language well, because he
is drunk, nervous or excited, etc.
Opting out of observing a maxim is the ‘No comment’ type of
behaviour, e.g. a doctor, a lawyer or a priest may claim that
he cannot talk openly about things told him in confidence.
Suspending a maxim: an expression that is supposed to be
unlucky is often avoided, e.g. among British actors there is the
superstition that uttering the name of Shakespeare’s Macbeth
brings bad luck, so they call it ‘the Scottish play’ (i.e. they fail
to Observe the maxim of Quantity).
Grice was not consistent in these distinctions, and the terms
flouting/violating/infringing are often used in free variation.
7.4 Types of implicature
Grice proposed the term implicature as ‘a general cover term, to
stand in contrast with what is said or expressed by the truth condition
of expressions, and to include all kinds of pragmatic (non-truth1
After Jenny Thomas, 1995: 72-78.
245
246
conditional) inference discernable (Levinson, 1983: 127). But he felt it
important to make at least two distinctions.
On the one hand, he distinguished between:
•
generalized implicatures, i.e. those types of implicature that do
not require any particular context or special scenario; e.g. in:
I walked into a house
Some of them are on holiday
a house always implicates ‘not my house,’ and some of them
always implicates ‘not all of them.’
•
particularized implicatures, i.e. the types of implicature that
arise only in specific contexts/scenarios, e.g. the utterance
B: Lovely weather, isn’t it? (see 7.3.2.3)
bears the implicature ‘Attention, your boss can hear you,’ only if
preceded by an utterance meaning something like My boss is a
jerk, and in the situational context where the person is close by.
Implicatures that are both derived from observing the maxims
and are generalized are often hard to distinguish from the semantic
content of the linguistic expressions. Formal pragmatists focused
primarily on this type of implicature, narrowing considerably the
domain of research of pragmatics.
The number of particularized floutings and exploitations of the
maxims has a much great weight in language use than that of
generalized implicatures. For example, ironies, or utterances related
to the maxim of Relevance, require particular background
assumptions that should rule out or contradict their literal
interpretation.
Another distinction Grice made was that between conventional
and conversational implicature.
Conventional implicatures are also non-truth-conditional:
expressions such as but, moreover or so contribute to what is
‘conventionally implicated,’ rather than ‘what is said.’ The implicature
is simply ‘attached by convention’ to the lexical item, contaminating
the context in which it appears. Such expressions are used to perform
‘higher-order’ speech act, such as contrasting, adding or explaining,
in addition to the basic speech act of ‘saying.’
Take, for example, the copulative conjunction but. It is often used
in contexts where, from a truth-conditional perspective, the
copulative conjunction and would be the correct choice, as in1:
1
The examples are from Thomas, 1995: 57.
… poor but honest
… small, but perfectly formed
… unmarried, but far from stupid
She is 37, but still attractive
There is no logical reason why a person who is poor should not be
honest, that a small (child) should not be perfectly formed, that an
unmarried woman should be stupid, etc. Grammatically and truthconditionally, ‘poor and honest,’ ‘37 and still attractive,’ etc. would be
equally correct. What the adversative conjunction accomplishes is to
convey the additional implicature that the elements of the group are
in contrast. Replacing but with and results in the loss of the
conventional implicature (poor and honest does not preserve the
implicature of oppositeness).
Linguists have identified few carriers of conventional implicature –
but, therefore, even, yet, for (as in, She plays chess well, for a girl –
Thomas, 1995: 57). But, as Levinson (1983: 128-9; 162) shows, a
large number of deictic expressions carry conventional implicature,
especially person deixis (the T/V pronominal system), social deixis
(e.g. Sir, Madam, mate, sonny, hey, etc., when used in addresses)
and discourse deixis (e.g. however, moreover, besides, anyway, well,
still, furthermore, although, oh, etc.).
For example, the vous variant of the 2nd person pronoun, or the
deictic word Sir, conventionally implicates social distance and higher
social status of addressee. Discourse particles indicate for the receiver
how he should interpret the speaker’s utterance. Thus, the discourse
particle well (in one type of usage) shows1 that the speaker is aware
that he is unable to provide a completely satisfactory answer, hence
the word typically occurs in partial answers:
A: Do you like him?
B: Well, he’s nice
Or, anyway conventionally implicates that an utterance prefaced with
it is closer to a prior utterance than to that immediately preceding it.
Conventional implicature is also carried by longer phrases. For
example, as it was asserted before, Can/Could you...? questions have
been lexicalized as meaning ‘Please (help me/tell me)…’
In opposition, conversational implicature is non-conventional,
i.e. it is not part of the ‘conventionally accepted’ meaning of the
linguistic expression.
1
After R. Lakoff (1973), quoted by Levinson (1983: 162).
247
For example, the utterance (Levinson, 1983: 114)
Herb hit Sally
conversationally implicates ‘Herb didn’t kill Sally by hitting her’:
semantically, hit and kill belong to related linguistic fields, but the
speaker who abides by the maxim of Quality mentions the worst thing
that happened.
Another characteristic feature of conversational implicature is that
it is cancellable or defeasible. For instance, in:
John works 10 hours a day
the implicature of ‘no more than 10’ (maxim of Quantity: the
strongest assertion) is suspended by addition of an if clause (if not
more), of in fact (in fact more), of and maybe (and maybe more),
etc.
Conversational implicature is also non-detachable1: no matter
what linguistic expression the speaker might use, the implicature is
still conveyed. For example,
John works 10 hours a day
John spends a lot of time in his office
John rarely has time for his children
John is so lazy, he only works 10 hours a day etc.
all convey the same implicature of ‘John works a lot.’
This also shows how implicature differs from other pragmatic
phenomena, such as presupposition. Presupposition is attached to
(carried by) the conceptual content of the lexical item itself: e.g. He
tried to do it, presupposes that ‘he didn’t manage to do it.’
Implicature is a kind of intentional indirectness, a type of
strategic manipulation of the language, so that it is indeterminate
and unstable (even if not always). Just like speech acts, where the
same expression can be used to perform various actions, the same
utterance can give rise to different implicatures, according to the
context of utterance.
For example, the utterance Thanks a lot! implicates ‘I’m grateful’
– if uttered by Mary on receiving a present; ‘I’m quite upset’ – when
uttered in response to some mischief (her son just broke her
favourite vase); ‘I no longer need it’ – if her daughter offers to help
her when she is about to finish the work; etc.
This also shows that implicatures are calculable: on the basis of
what the speaker has said in the given context, and on the
assumption that he is following the cooperative principle and its
maxims, the receiver can construct a logical argument to establish
1
With the exception of the maxim of Manner, where meaning is carried by
the very form of the utterance.
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what inferences he should make so as to work out the speaker’s
intended meaning.
Thus, for the first variant of the example, Mary’s interlocutor has
no reason to doubt her sincerity, so he interprets the utterance at
face value (that Mary is pleased with the present). In the second
case, Mary’s son knows quite well that his mother is not pleased, so
that he makes the inference that her intended meaning is the very
opposite of what she has said (flouting the maxim of Quality). In the
third, it is the non-linguistic context which helps the receiver to
interpret the message correctly: Mary’s daughter can see that the
work is almost finished. Obviously, the role of paralanguage is quite
important: the negative paralanguage is more powerful than the
positive message.
Naturally, receivers can make the wrong inferences and
misinterpret the speaker’s meaning. Therefore, we should distinguish
between actual implicatures and potential implicatures. Actual
implicatures are conveyed intentionally (as in the case of Mary’s
mocking Thank you! to her daughter). Potential implicatures, on the
other hand, are ‘produced’ by the receiver in his process of making
inferences. Some potential implicatures may be correct; others are
merely imagined, e.g. on hearing the speaker say, I’m so proud of
you!, the receiver imagines that the speaker is telling the truth; in
fact, he is making fun of him.
Implicature, like all forms of strategic communication, is a typical
feature of language in use. It is the gradual institutionalization of
implicatures that contributes to change of meaning. For example,
many euphemisms begin as polite metaphors, but they get
conventionalised (e.g. lady, bathroom). Lexicalization also affects
idioms, which gradually lose their transparency (e.g. by the way), or
change their meaning (e.g. Eat, drink, and be merry; There is no love
lost between them – see section 3.1.2 – The origins of idioms).
The great merit of Grice’s theory is that his principles can be applied
to a great variety of apparently unrelated linguistic facts: how the
simplest words (e.g. and) can mean different things in different
contexts, how speakers can mean more than what they say, how
hearers retrieve that additional meaning, how metaphors and
tautologies work, etc.
Obviously, as Levinson (1983: 104) points out, ‘a purely
conventional or rule-based account of natural language usage can
never be complete, and […] what can be communicated always
exceeds the communicative power provided by the conventions of the
language and its use.’
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Chapter 8
Strategies of politeness
Austin’s theory of speech acts and Grice’s theory of implicature
had a great impact on the study of language and of linguistic
behaviour. By investigating the way people use the language in
ordinary communication, they explain to some extent how and
why speakers convey more information than, or an information
that is different from, that carried by the linguistic content of their
words. They also explain how receivers interpret this additional
semantic load to retrieve the speaker’s intended meaning.
Grice suggested that the main reason for indirectness is the
speaker’s desire to make his contribution more interesting or more
suggestive. But linguists realized that this cannot be the only
reason for the vast amount of indirectness that characterizes
ordinary communicative exchanges. Nor can the two theories
explain the intricate ways in which people use the language.
Some linguists suggested that such manipulations of the
language exploit polite obliquity, i.e. hinting strategy, or
indirectness employed for reasons of politeness. They also
suggested that indirectness is triggered by more than just
linguistic factors, and that a more general theory of social
interaction is required to explain them.
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the emergence of several
theories of politeness that attempted to ‘help out’ Grice’s theory
by analyzing the social constraints governing utterance production.
The most popular among them are those developed by R. Lakoff
(1973), G. Leech (1977 and 1983) and P. Brown & S.C.
Levinson ([1978] 1987).
All theories of politeness have as starting point the importance
of social order: their aim is to explain how communicators use the
language to preserve good social relations1 and a favourable
atmosphere.
The basic idea of the theories of politeness is that people
formulate their utterances in a certain way for fear they might
1
Hence, the factors the govern indirectness (see section 6.6) are a central
issue within these theories.
intrude, embarrass or hurt their interlocutors’ feelings, but also to
protect themselves from being hurt or embarrassed.
For example, when a person asks for some good or service
(e.g. for a loan, or for directions in the street), he knows that, by
requesting a favour, he is intruding upon the other person’s
privacy. As a result, he builds up a long and intricate sentence so
as to signal that he appreciates the effort his interlocutor is
making to provide him with the answer.
On the other hand, the speaker also wants to protect his own
safety and image. To avoid the embarrassment of being refused or
rejected, for instance, he formulates his request very politely (a
polite request is less likely to be refused) of very indirectly (he
does not actually ask, so that there is no refusal if the receiver is
not willing to comply).
Thomas (1995: 150-5) is careful to point out that pragmatics
does not view politeness as a real-world attitude; it merely refers
to the way people use language strategically so as to appear
polite. She also emphasizes the difference between deference and
register, on one side, and politeness, on the other. In the case of
deference/register, the speaker has little choice: if he does not use
the proper markers of deference, or the proper level of formality,
he will be sanctioned by society for his non-adherence to the social
norms. Conversely, politeness as a pragmatic phenomenon refers
to the speaker’s strategic use (i.e. exploitation, manipulation) of
the language in order to obtain a certain real-world advantage, or
to avoid unpleasant consequences.
8.1
Politeness: Principles and maxims
R. Lakoff (1973) suggested that the speaker who knows the
importance of preserving a favourable atmosphere and good social
relations generally follows three unwritten principles of politeness:
i.e. he generally tries
•
•
•
to avoid imposing
to make his hearer feel good
to give him options whether to perform or not a certain action
Thus, for example, the speaker does not like to ask for favours
because he knows that, by his request, he is imposing upon the
hearer. But if he has no choice, he makes his request either very
polite (e.g. I’m terrible sorry to bother you but, …), or very
indirect (e.g. It’s quite hot in here, see section 6.4.1). By being
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very polite, the speaker signals his respect and appreciation for
the receiver and the effort the latter is making – and thus, makes
him ‘feel good.’ By being indirect, the speaker relies on the hearer
to make the correct inferences. Speakers generally avoid direct
requests because a direct request requires a direct answer – which
can be either positive or negative – and a straightforward refusal
would embarrass the speaker himself. The formulation
Can/Could/Couldn’t you…? is often the best choice: it is indirect,
thus perceived as polite; it gives the listener the option to perform
the action or not; it avoids the risk that the hearer will not
understand the illocutionary force of the utterance correctly.
In the same way, Leech (1983, Chapters 4-6), who argued that
cooperation is just one aspect of what he calls Interpersonal
Rhetoric, suggested the introduction of a Politeness Principle ‘to
rescue’ Grice’s Principle of Cooperation.
Just like Grice’s Cooperative Principle, the Principle of
Politeness investigates the gap between what is said and what is
meant. But while Grice focuses primarily on the communicative
content of the message, Leech concentrates on the way the
speaker’s indirectness serves his main communicative goal, i.e. his
desire to preserve good interpersonal relations.
According to Leech’s Politeness Principle, people generally tend
•
•
to minimize the expression of impolite beliefs
to maximize the expression of polite beliefs
In other words, whenever the speaker has to say something
unpleasant for the hearer, he says as little as he can, or does it as
indirectly as possible. For example, when a teacher asks a student
how he likes his course, the latter may say, It is quite interesting,
but rather difficult for me or I generally prefer literature to
linguistics (even if neither assertion is true). To correct the
negative impression, he may also add, I liked the section about X
very much (even if that is not true either).
The example shows clearly that linguistic politeness is not as a
real-world attitude: it merely concerns expressions of polite/
impolite beliefs aimed at establishing and preserving good social
relations, i.e. the communicative strategies the speaker employs
so as to maintain amiable social relations.
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8.1.1
Tact and Generosity
According to Leech (1983: 107), tact – ‘perhaps the most important
kind of politeness in English-speaking society’1 – is essential for
explaining why people often express their thoughts so indirectly.
The maxim of Tact says that people generally try ‘to
minimize the expression of beliefs which imply cost to other2 and
to maximize the expression of beliefs which imply benefit to other.’
Leech (1983, 123) argues that the ‘tactfulness’ of the
speaker’s utterance results from the interplay of three scales:
o
o
o
the cost-benefit scale, i.e. the speaker assesses the cost or
benefit to himself and to the hearer that his utterance incurs
the indirectness scale, i.e. ‘the length of path from his
illocutionary act to its illocutionary goal’
the optionality scale, i.e. the speaker decides on the amount
of choice he wants to allow the receiver.
That is to say, the speaker assesses the size of imposition of
his request/offer on a cost-benefit scale and grades the
indirectness of his utterance accordingly: the higher the cost/the
lower the benefit for the hearer, the more indirect his utterance
will be.
For example, an utterance such as:
Have a sandwich
needs no indirectness because the act is beneficial for the hearer.
But if the speaker asks the hearer to give him something, or to
help him do something, he will have to say something like,
Would you be so kind as to hand me that book?
Couldn’t you please give me a hand here?
because the request implies an effort (i.e. a cost) by the hearer.
The three examples also suggest that the speaker’s
formulations give the receiver various amounts of options3
whether to perform the action or not.
If there is no option for the hearer in the case of the direct
imperative (example 1), it is because the act is beneficial for the
hearer. Even if the latter decides to refuse the sandwich, there is
1
Leech’s Politeness Principle is detailed in six maxims, i.e. of Tact,
Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement and Sympathy.
2
3
Leech also shows that, with some Oriental cultures (e.g. Japanese or
Chinese), the maxim of Modesty bears a far greater weight.
The terms ‘self’ and ‘other’ are used to refer to the speaker and,
respectively, to the hearer.
Leech’s ideas do not contradict Lakoff’s, but rather, develop them.
253
254
no real harm: his polite Thank you but I’ve already eaten will not
hurt or embarrass either him or the speaker.
The second example formulates the request in a very polite
and rather indirect way. Asking the receiver about his willingness
to help incurs some risk, though. As a rule, English yes/no answers
contain the auxiliary used in the question1. According to this rule,
the answer to Will you…? is, No, I will not, i.e. ‘I don’t want to’ – a
refusal on account of lack of volition, which is rather rude. But the
speaker’s request (handing over a book) does not represent a
serious imposition upon the receiver, so that the speaker knows he
is not running a real risk.
Asking for help (example 3) represents a much more serious
imposition, so that the speaker formulates his request by using
modal interrogative negative Couldn’t you…? This way, he is not
only polite, but also gives the receiver an additional degree of
optionality: if he refuses, it is on account of his lack of ability (I’m
sorry, I can’t) – a highly acceptable way for the receiver to opt out
of performing the action. This kind of refusal is also ‘tactful’ with
respect to the speaker, who ‘understands’ that the reason why his
interlocutor is not complying with his request is his inability, not
his lack of volition.
maximizer important, and the fact that the speaker is mentioning a
big favour he has done for the receiver (high cost to speaker/high
benefit to hearer), prepare the ground for a serious request.
The Generosity maxim regards the speaker’s presentation of his
own costs/benefit, so that it stands at the opposite pole on the
cost-value scale. The maxim shows that speakers generally
minimize the expression of benefit to self and maximize the
expression of cost to self.
To make the perception of cost to hearer/benefit to himself
look smaller, speakers use minimizers or hedges, as in:
Even silence is preferable to open criticism. But then, silence
carries its own risks (see the Phatic Maxim below).
8.1.2
Leech’s next two maxims – of Approbation and Modesty –
develop Lakoff’s assertion that speakers generally want to make
their interlocutor feel good.
The maxim of Approbation suggests that the speaker tends to
maximize expressions of praise of other/to minimize expressions
of dispraise of other. To get the desired effect, the speaker shows
great interest in and appreciation for his interlocutor’s
achievements, looks or clothes. If he finds nothing good to be said,
he tries to conceal his dislike and to avoid open criticism.
Linguistically, he accomplishes this by subtle indirectness, as
in the exchange,
A: How do you like it?
B: It’s quite interesting
or
B: Well, it’s not exactly what I expected
At the opposite pole is the maxim of Modesty, which shows that
the speaker tends to minimize expressions of praise of himself and
to maximize expressions of dispraise of himself.
Even small children know that it is not nice to brag about one’s
own performances, therefore utterances of self-appreciation are
quite rare in educated circles.
As for compliments, in English-speaking societies it is polite to
accept them ‘graciously’1, with a modest Thank you, or with a form
of understatement, as in:
Just have a look
I only want a minute of your time
By using just, and respectively, only, the speaker suggests that
the request is minor, i.e. that it involves no high cost from the
hearer and no high benefit for himself.
Conversely, a perception of high benefit to the hearer/high
cost to the speaker can be achieved with the help of maximizers.
For example, in:
Not bad, is it?
where the negative form is strategically used to actually highlight
the person’s possessions, qualities or performances.
Remember that important paper you had to hand in last Monday?
I helped you, didn’t I?
1
1
Approbation and Modesty
Naturally, this rule of grammar is often ignored by actual language
usage: in ordinary communication we often come across the adjacent
pair, ‘Will you …?’ ‘I’m sorry, I can’t.’
Leech (1983: 137) suggests that the Tact Maxim dominates Interpersonal
Rhetoric in the case of English speaking societies. Conversely, with some
oriental cultures, the Modesty Maxim is the most powerful. Thus, Japanese
women must refuse compliments, declaring themselves unworthy for them.
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In the Western world, humour has a great role in negotiating
approbation and modesty.
Irony (see section 2.2.2.1.2.3) can be used to be impolite
while seemingly saying the right thing, e.g.
How nice of you to come!
when a student or employee is late again.
Conversely, banter sounds impolite, but the participants know
they should not take the words at face value: the rude words are
no more than friendly teasing. ‘Dishonorifics’ (e.g. old rascal, old
chum) also belong to this category.
8.1.3
Agreement and Sympathy
The Agreement maxim shows that speakers generally minimize
expressions of disagreement between self and other and maximize
expressions of agreement between self and other. One can often
hear people begin their answers with:
Yes, but…
The speaker obviously disagrees with what he has just heard; but
politeness urges him not to express his disagreement too bluntly.
As a result, he hedges his answer with an affirmative Yes, at the
beginning of his utterance.
The Sympathy maxim shows that utterances mirror the
speaker’s attempt to minimize the antipathy that may exist
between himself and his interlocutor and to maximize the
sympathy existing between them.
Sympathy for the receiver can be expressed in various ways.
Choice of vocabulary is a key factor. For example, one never
addresses one’s interlocutor as ‘My enemy’ (except jokingly); but
you can often hear speakers say:
This, my friend, is…
even when the rest of the message is unpleasant or hostile.
In his attempt to maximize sympathy, the speaker may
strategically reduce the social distance between himself and the
hearer, e.g. by manipulating the T/V system, by using terms of
endearment (e.g. dear, darling) or words denoting social closeness
(e.g. my friend/pal), in-group identity markers (e.g. slang or
dialect), paralanguage (e.g. touching). This way, the speaker
creates a bond between himself and the receiver.
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8.1.4
Other maxims
Leech (1983: 139) also suggests a Phatic Maxim1 – a maxim that
refers not to the content of the message, but ‘to the way the
conversation is managed and structured by the participants.’ For
example, shows Leech, ‘speaking at the wrong time (interrupting)
or being silent at the wrong time has impolite implications.’
According to this maxim, in social circumstances, the reason
people keep talking is often merely to avoid silence, which can be
either embarrassing (at a party) or insulting (not greeting).
Leech’s view regarding the ‘impolite implications of silence’ recalls
Goffman’s ‘virtual offence’ (see section 6.2 – Language functions).
Leech also mentions lesser principles, such as the Principle of
interest, that urges the speaker to make his presentation as
attractive as possible, and that of optimism (or the Pollyanna
Principle2), which relies on the idea that optimism is a general
tendency of the human personality, so that people prefer pleasant
topics of conversation to unpleasant ones. This is also the reason
why speakers often understate the degree to which things are bad,
invent euphemisms to disguise unpleasant subjects, etc. The
multitude of ‘minimalizing’ adverbials of degree (e.g. a bit, a little,
a tiny bit) also stands proof for man’s attempts to avoid or ignore
the unpleasant.
It is, however, questionable whether optimism is a general
characteristic of human exchanges: some discourses rely on
exploiting man’s enjoyment of tragedy and of the out-of ordinary,
e.g. journalism thrives on ‘the bad’ and the sensational, which
represent probably the easiest way to enhance the readers’ interest.
Leech argues that the speaker’s decision to follow one or the other
of the principles (of cooperation or politeness) depends on the
actual situational context, so that it is determined on a case-tocase basis: when the speaker’s basic aim is to convey information,
he gives preference to the Cooperative Principle; when his main
concern is good interpersonal relations, he follows the Principle of
Politeness.
For example, if a friend asks me to go shopping with her and
help her choose a dress for a party, I shall give her my honest
opinion concerning the best buy (I observe the maxim of Quality).
But if she asks me what I think of the dress she is wearing – a
1
2
See also section 6.2 – Language functions.
The name comes from one of Eleanor H. Porter’s characters.
257
dress I find shapeless and tasteless, I shall try to find something
positive to say, e.g. praise its colour or the quality of its material,
so as to boost my friend’s self confidence (i.e. I observe the
Principle of Politeness).
Sometimes there is a clash between the two principles: the
speaker may have to decide whether to tell the truth (behave
cooperatively) and run the risk of hurting the hearer’s feelings, or
to tell a white lie (follow the Politeness Principle) and preserve
positive social relations. In the case of the example above, for instance,
a speaker who is determined to always tell the truth will obviously hurt
the hearer’s feelings if she tells her that her dress is horrible, or
that it makes her look like a sack of potatoes. But hearing the
truth may be the lesser evil for the receiver than embarrassing
herself in front of a larger audience: on hearing the truth, she may
decide not to wear the dress at the official ball organized by her
husband’s firm.
8.2
Face and face management
Just like Leech, Brown & Levinson ([1978] 1987) also built their
theory of politeness around Grice’s theory of cooperation; but they
supplemented it with Goffman’s theory of ‘face.’
Goffman (1967), who borrowed the term from the English folk
expression to lose face, interprets ‘face’ as the individual’s public
self-image, his reputation and good name. Within theories of
politeness, ‘face’ is viewed as the individual’s self-image, his
feeling of self-worth and self-esteem.
Brown & Levinson take up Grice’s idea that meaning circulates
among communicators on the basis of the cooperation between
the speaker and the hearer. But unlike Grice, who focuses on the
success of the communicative exchange, Brown & Levinson – who
consider that the indirectness of communicative exchanges is
largely due to a mutual awareness of face sensitivity – focus their
attention on the reasons that make the speaker grade the
indirectness of his utterances. These reasons, they show, reside in:
1
the speaker’s need to save his face, i.e. to maintain his
reputation intact or to enhance it
the speaker’s fear of losing face, i.e. of getting his image damaged1
The fear of losing face is often stronger than the desire to improve one’s image:
the idea that we might say something stupid and others might laugh
often reduces us to silence, even though we would like to participate in
the conversation.
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In addition, they argue, in social interactions everyone’s face
depends on everyone else’s face being maintained: as a result, the
speaker indulges in intricate strategies of politeness so as:
o
o
to avoid losing face
to avoid hurting other people’s face
In other words, the speaker is polite first of all because he
wants to make sure that he will not be shamed (refused/rejected
or insulted): if I am polite, my interlocutor is expected to comply
with my wishes, or at least, to be polite, too.
On the other hand, the speaker is polite because he does not
want to hurt his interlocutor’s feelings. He may do so out of a real
desire to be tactful; in numerous cases, though, it is mere
strategic behaviour aimed at avoiding negative consequences: e.g.
a person who has been hurt is likely to take revenge; or, if the
speaker (accidentally) shames his interlocutor in front of his friends,
others might disapprove, and then the speaker himself will lose face.
In his turn, the hearer expects both cooperation and strategies
of politeness, so that he makes his inferences concerning the
speaker’s intended meaning accordingly.
There are two types of face wants:
o
o
Positive face, i.e. one’s desire to be liked, approved of,
respected and appreciated by others
Negative face, i.e. one’s wish for freedom of action and
freedom from imposition, i.e. to be able to act according to
one’s wishes, without being impeded or imposed upon.
Face wants are universal in character; but there are also
important cultural, as well as individual differences.
Some utterances, argue Brown & Levinson, have a high likelihood
of causing displeasure: they are face threatening acts (or
FTAs). Imperative utterances, for example, are intrinsically face
threatening, i.e. they will probably hurt either the hearer’s or the
speaker’s face. Others (indirect ones) are perceived as more
tactful and their face threatening quality is less powerful.
When faced with the need to do an FTA, the speaker must first
decide whether to do the act at all and risk the consequences, or
not to do it. Obviously, he must make his decision fast, and on a
case to case basis.
For example, if you know that your boss’s wife is having an
affair with the leader of a competing firm, you evaluate the
259
consequences of both telling him (he will feel embarrassed and
angry with you), and of not telling him (his wife’s affair is
prejudicing the company, and thus, your own position). To make
things safer, you will begin by making hints about unfaithful wives
jeopardizing their husband’s position. But when the situation has
reached a stage where the company’s very existence is under
question, you know that you had better open your mouth and
shout the truth in your boss’s face.
Thus, the speaker evaluates the situation and selects his FTAs
accordingly (grading their indirectness). In cases of immediate
urgency, he will use the highest degree FTAs (imperatives)
because there is no time to formulate elaborate and roundabout
constructions. Conversely, in cases such as that regarding the
boss’s wife, the speaker knows that he should get the message
through (and thus save his interlocutor’s face and position), but do
it tactfully (i.e. indirectly), so as to avoid negative consequences.
Obviously, the P, D and R factors1 play an essential part in the
speaker’s assessment of the communicative situation: the overall
indirectness of the utterance results from the speaker’s estimation
of the composite value of relative power, social distance and the
rating of imposition on the cost-benefit scale.
On the basis of such observations, Brown & Levinson concluded
that, in cases where there is a high likelihood that the utterance
will damage either the hearer’s or the speaker’s face, the latter
usually indulges in face-preserving strategies, i.e. complex
linguistic ‘lines of attack’ meant to diminish the face threat. By
indulging in such strategies of indirectness, the speaker
manipulates the P, D and R factors and, consequently, the
listener’s perception of the speech act performed.
The table2 on the next page summarises the strategies for doing
FTAs. (S and H stand for the speaker and, respectively, the hearer.)
According to the table, whenever the speaker must do an FTA
(i.e. say something that might hurt his interlocutor’s feelings, he
can choose between not doing the act at all (Don’t do the FTA3),
although it may be important, or doing it (Do the FTA), even
though he risks social sanctions.
1
2
3
See section 6.6 – Factors that govern indirectness.
Adapted after Brown & Levinson ([1978] 1987): 69, 102, 131, 214.
If Grice’s or Leech’s imperative constructions can be viewed as a kind of inner
voice, with Brown & Levinson’s approach they can be interpreted as a parent
or an educator advising his child or pupil on correct behaviour.
260
261
Thus, estimation of risk of face loss results in selection of
communicative strategy: the more indirect the speaker will make
his utterance.
In the event when the speaker decides to do the FTA, he can
do it on record (i.e. directly), or off record (i.e. indirectly), in all
kind of different ways and by using various strategies.
Furthermore, on record performance of an FTA can be carried
out baldly, without redressive action, or with redressive action.
In a situation of extreme urgency (e.g. if your boss is about to
step into a deep hole in the asphalt), the speaker has no time to
formulate an elaborate or roundabout utterance: urgency requires
efficiency and, even if it implies some face risk, nothing is more
efficient than directness. Direct, imperative utterances represent
the bold on record performance of an FTA.
In cases where there is no urgency, but the message can still
cause face damage, the speaker can do his FTA on record, but
soften it with redressive action, i.e. an additional act performed
by the speaker to indicate that no face-threat is intended or
desired. This way, the threat contained in the act is alleviated.
The speaker’s redressive actions depend primarily on the social
distance between himself and his addressee: his estimation of the
D factor will urge him to embrace positive politeness (basic for
familiar behaviour) or negative politeness (basic for an attitude
of respect).
Whatever approach the speaker might choose, he must grade
and adapt his address according to the receiver of the message
(the P and D factors), the size of imposition of his request (R), the
activity type, etc. Too much politeness can be as harmful and face
damaging as no manifestation of politeness at all. As Leech (1983:
144) points out, ‘overpoliteness […] can have the effect of
signifying
superiority
or
ironic
distance.’
Conversely,
underpoliteness can have the effect of ‘establishing or maintaining
a bond of familiarity. […] The more intimate the relationship, the
less important it is to be polite. Hence lack of politeness in itself
can become a sign of intimacy; and hence, the ability to be
impolite to someone in jest helps to establish and maintain such a
familiar relationship.’
8.2.1
Strategies of positive politeness
Positive politeness is that of a jovial attitude, of friendliness and
intimacy. When the speaker embraces positive politeness, he
wants to show that he considers the listener to be socially close, a
262
friend, a member of the same social group (equal P and low D). By
using strategies of positive politeness, he creates an atmosphere
of cosy friendliness and lively optimism.
In the context of positive politeness, the speaker presents a
request as ‘no big deal.’ Needless to say, the request may be quite
significant (e.g. the speaker is asking for a big loan); but the
sender manipulates the language so as to reduce the R factor.
The main lines of appeal of positive politeness1 are:
I. Claim common ground with H:
a. Convey X is admirable, interesting, etc.
1. Notice H, attend to his interests, wants, needs, goods
2. Exaggerate interest, approval, sympathy with H
3. Intensify interest of H, make your story interesting
b. Claim in-group membership with H:
4. Use in-group identity markers: dialect, slang,
diminutives, ellipsis
c. Claim common opinions, points on view, attitudes, knowledge:
5. Seek agreement
6. Avoid disagreement, hedge your opinions
7. Presuppose/raise/assert common ground
8. Joke, tease H
II. Convey that S & H are co-operators
a. Indicate S knows H’s wants and is taking them into account
9. Assert/presuppose S’s knowledge of and concern for
H’s wants
10 Offer, promise, even if falsely
b. Claim Reflexivity
11. Be optimistic
12. Include both S and H in the activity
13. Give/ask for reasons
c. Claim Reciprocity
14. Assume/assert reciprocal rights/obligations;
III. Fulfil H’s want for some X:
15. Give gifts to H: goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation
As the list shows, Brown & Levinson’s theory tries to explain
not only how speakers use the language to preserve good social
relations, but also what they speak about to preserve and improve
those relations. Such usage of the language exploits its phatic
potential.
Let us illustrate briefly the authors’ points.
1
The lists follow those proposed by Brown & Levinson’s ([1978] 1987).
263
The speaker who is keen on establishing good relationships
with his interlocutor and decides to use a friendly approach
(positive politeness) can claim common ground with the receiver.
He can achieve this by expressing his admiration for the latter
How are those great kids of yours?
by claiming in-group membership
Our friends would laugh at that
common opinions
As you said, this is far from perfect
or common background knowledge
When we were kids…
Another handy strategy positive politeness is to show interest in
the latter’s preoccupations, wants, or goods
You’ve got a new dress/hairdo
Even negative aspects can be noted, but jokingly
You aren’t really in your best mood today, are you?
Speakers often exaggerate in their display of interest in, sympathy
with, or approval of their partners’ actions. Even when they are
not really curious about what the latter is up to, the devastating
effects of silence, or the need to maintain good social links,
requires that the speaker should ‘say something nice.’ Body
language (e.g. eye contact, touching) and paralanguage (e.g.
exaggerated intonation, concerned voice) are quite important in
conveying the speaker’s emotional involvement. Etc.
In-group identity markers (e.g. dialect, group specific
slang, abbreviated forms, diminutives, etc.) enhance the feeling of
closeness between speaker and receiver. In the same way, ellipsis
– typical for spoken communication – suggests shared background
knowledge, thus intimacy.
Common opinions can create a cordial atmosphere;
therefore, seeking agreement or, at least, avoiding disagreement,
is very important. This can be achieved by broaching safe topics
(e.g. the weather in England) or expressing one’s point of view
and attitudes tentatively, e.g. hedging one’s opinions, as in:
Well, you know, I don’t quite think …
Presupposition of common ground
You know what I mean…
264
or manipulation of deixis
Let’s agree that…
can enhance the feeling of familiarity, too. As for humour and a
good joke, they can be priceless assets in the speaker’s strategic
attempt to put his listener at ease.
Another tactic of positive politeness is to convey the idea that
the speaker and the hearer are cooperators, i.e. that they are
both interested/involved in a certain type of activity.
The speaker can obtain his partner’s good will by showing that
he is aware of and concerned about the latter’s wants and needs.
Saying or hinting that
I know that you want X and I’ll help you to get it
will make your interlocutor feel cheerful and optimistic.
Claiming reciprocity, e.g. reciprocal rights and obligations,
as in,
Remember who stood by you when …
(i.e. ‘you should also stand by me’) suggests equal P, therefore
closeness and informality. An address, such as:
You’ve got to admit it, it’s…,
conveys a sense of mutual support, of confidence and optimism.
Fulfilment of the receiver’s wants gives an easy access to
the latter’s heart, therefore giving gifts to the latter can be helpful.
Naturally, these gifts can also belong to the category of free
goods, e.g. those fulfilling human-relation wants, such as
sympathy, the desire to be liked and cared about, etc.
8.2.2
Strategies of negative politeness
If speakers manipulate positive politeness for the sense of
intimacy and optimism it conveys, negative politeness is based
on formality and restraint and its function is to minimise
imposition (R). It is the approach used in high P, high D and/or
high R situations. While still observing Grice’s conversational
maxims, the user of negative politeness goes at great lengths of
indirectness in order to avoid hurting or imposing.
Even in cases of extreme urgency it is not recommended to
perform strategies of negative politeness on record. Whenever
urgency dictates rapid action (e.g. there is a gas leak and the
window must be opened without delay, there is no time to waste),
265
the speaker will try to replace the direct command (imperative)
with an indirect speech act of conventionalised indirectness:
Could you please move over so that I can open the window?
i.e. a grammatical interrogative, conventionally accepted as an
indirect request.
In most cases, negative politeness is accompanied by
redressive action, with the help of which the speaker signals that
he does not mean to impinge upon the hearer’s wants.
The following lines of appeal for negative politeness should
be considered:
I. Don’t presume/assume: make minimal assumptions about
H’s wants:
II. Don’t coerce H:
Give H option not to do act:
Don’t assume H is willing/able to do X
Assume H is not likely to do X
Doubt H’s willingness /ability to do X
Minimise threat – make explicit P, D, R values:
Minimise imposition
Give deference
III. Communicate S’s want not to impinge on H:
Apologise, admit impingement, indicate reluctance to
impinge, beg forgiveness, etc.
Dissociate S, H from the particular infringement:
Impersonalize S and H
State the FTA as a general rule
Nominalize
IV. Compensate, fulfil H’s other wants:
Go on record incurring a debt
Thus, when addressing a high P high D receiver, the speaker is
careful about the way he formulates his utterance because the
latter is not likely to forgive a strategic error. Therefore, in most
cases, the form and content of his utterance is the exact opposite
of what was suggested for positive politeness.
For example, if positive politeness recommends that the speaker
should indicate that he knows what the hearer wants and likes,
negative politeness urges him to make minimal assumptions
concerning the listener’s wants or preferences. A boss who is keen
on preserving social distance, for example, would consider it
impertinent if you talked about his wants in public (e.g. ‘I know
you like X’); with such a person, even if circumstances are quite
informal, the speaker should question his likes and wants:
266
I was wondering, do you like X?
Hedging is another means to soften one’s assertions: hedging
adverbs – well, perhaps, by any chance, somehow, etc. – are
useful when the speaker does not want to express his ideas too
bluntly. An utterance such as:
Well, I don’t really think this is the case
is a much more acceptable way to inform your boss that he is wrong.
Just like Lakoff and Leech, Brown & Levinson insist that the
speaker must not coerce the receiver; on the contrary, he must
give the latter the option not to do the act. An utterance such as:
I was wondering whether you could do X for me
is much more strategic than ‘Do X!’ because the receiver is given
the option whether to do the act or not. A polite speaker will not
assume that his interlocutor is willing or able to do something for
him (i.e. assertions, such ‘I know you will/can help me’ are not
recommended). Neither should he declare straightforwardly what
the latter is likely to do: such situations require polite pessimism,
as in:
You are not free this afternoon, are you?
where the speaker avoids expressing his assumption that the
receiver will be there to help him1.
The speaker who knows the importance of face and how easily
it can be damaged, is generally careful about minimizing face
threat, therefore he makes explicit his perception of the P, D and R
values, especially if he is low P. He gives expression of his place in
the exchange, compared to that of the hearer, as for example:
You’re the specialist in this field
as well as of his estimation of the size of his imposition, as in:
I have a big favour to ask you
Deference markers – e.g. the polite variant of the T/V system,
titles of address and honorifics – make explicit the speaker’s
perception of his own social status. Euphemisms, disclaimers (e.g.
in advertising), minimizers and diminutives, etc., are also meant
to reduce imposition, as in:
1
Just call and you’ll get it free
This also shows why negative constructions are perceived as more polite
than positive ones.
267
Another tactic of negative politeness is to dissociate both the
speaker and the hearer from the particular infringement. This is
achieved by impersonalizing both the participants, e.g. by use of
the passive voice, as in:
268
association clues. For example, a young couple who want to spend
the evening out and do not have money for a babysitter may ask
their parents:
It was asserted that…
or by presenting the FTA as a general rule, as in:
It is required that…
Customers must…
Nominalisations, as well as use of the verbal Past Tense, also
contribute to a point-of-view distancing.
8.2.3
His contribution was highly appreciated
Off record strategies
Both positive and negative politeness can be used to exploit
indirectness as polite obliquity. But the most indirect hinting
strategies are those which do the FTAs off record.
Off record strategies, which rely on conversational
implicature triggered by flouting the Gricean maxims, are even
more avoidance-based than those of negative politeness.
In everyday life, speakers often violate the maxims in order to
make their message more interesting. But quite often, the reasons
for flouting the maxims can reside in considerations of politeness.
Here is the basic system of off record strategies:
I. Invite conversational implicatures, via hints triggered by
violations of Gricean Maxims:
Violate Relevance Maxim
Give hints, give association clues, presuppose, understate
Violate Quantity Maxim
Overstate, use tautologies, use contradictions
Violate Quality Maxim
Be ironic, use metaphors, use rhetorical questions
II. Be vague or ambiguous
Violate Manner Maxim
Be ambiguous, be vague, over-generalize,
displace H, be incomplete, use ellipsis
When flouting the Gricean maxims for reasons of politeness,
speakers express their thought indirectly so as to avoid
endangering their own face or hurting their interlocutor’s feelings.
According to the Relevance maxim, when speakers do not
want to convey their message directly, they make hints or give
Mum, the kids would like to see the latest box office hit and there’s
something wrong with our DVD. Would you mind it we sent them
over…? There’s no school tomorrow, so could they also sleep over?
Violation of the Quantity maxim can be achieved by
overstating, by using tautologies or contradictions, etc., as in:
A: I can’t get along with my son lately
B: Boys will be boys
When violating the Quality maxim, speakers can be ironic; or
they can use figures of speech to avoid open rudeness, as in:
I’m so happy you allow me to take part in the teamwork
says Mike, who has already finished his part of the work and sees
that, if he wants to see the project finished in time, he will have to
do some more work.
Violating the Manner maxim results from being ambiguous or
vague, from over-generalizing or being incomplete, etc.
A: How did you find their suggestion?
B: Well, I don’t really know, it may be a good idea…
says Mary, who does not like the idea at all.
The importance of politeness in ordinary communication is
unquestionable, and language has a major role in conveying a
sense of tactfulness: many conflicts have been avoided by skilful
manipulation of linguistic strategies.
To see how a native speaker tells us to use the language so as
to appear polite, read Annex 12.
270
9.
Conclusions
Language and thought
By pointing to the gap between what the speaker says and what
the speaker means, Austin, and especially Grice, opened a new
perspective for the study of language and communication. They
showed that, to survey meaning, the analyst needs to employ not
only semantic, but also pragmatic tools, because the speaker’s
message depends not only on the logical content of his words, but
also on the way he uses them and on his communicative intention.
Grice’s theory also contradicts the Saussurian code model of
communication, according to which utterances are signals that
encode the speaker’s message, and comprehension is achieved by
decoding those utterances. According to the inferential view
advocated by Grice and his followers, utterances are not signals,
but pieces of evidence regarding the speaker’s meaning. For
comprehension, the hearer makes inferences regarding the meaning
the speaker wants to convey, based not only on evidence from the
utterance itself, but also from the situational context. Recognition of
the speaker’s intention is a key factor for successful communication.
But, as Sperber and Wilson (2005: 500) show, ‘as pragmatics
developed, it has become increasingly clear that the gap between
sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is wider than Grice
himself thought.’
Unanimously accepted as basis for the inferential view of communication, and hence, for the science of pragmatics, Grice’s Principle of
Cooperation was developed by later linguists in various directions1.
9.1
Explicit vs. implicit communication
It was shown in section 7.2 that, with his theory of implicature,
Grice was trying to remove from the semantics of natural language
those features that can be best explained at pragmatic level. To do
so, he made a clear-cut distinction between what the speaker says
and what the speaker means. To refer to this distinction, later
linguists introduced the terms explicit meaning – for the meaning
encoded in the speaker’s words, and implicit meaning – for the
propositions that result from inferential processes. Explicit
meaning pertains to (truth-conditional) semantics. Implicit meaning,
which includes all pragmatically derived inferences, belongs to the
field of pragmatics and to a much wider theory of communication.
But as linguistic research developed it became obvious that
there is a further gap between the lexical meaning of the utterance
and what the speaker actually says, so that from sentence
meaning to speaker’s meaning we can distinguish three levels:
(a) sentence meaning, i.e. the meaning encoded in the speaker’s words
(b) what the speaker says, i.e. the full proposition carried by his words
(c) what the speaker means, i.e. his communicative intention
As main sources for the linguistic underdeterminacy1 (i.e.
insufficient semantic content) of what the speaker says,
disambiguation and reference assignment are unanimously
acknowledged. To decode the meaning of the utterance:
He is heading for the bank now
the receiver must disambiguate heading and bank, and assign
referents to he and now.
Other sources of linguistic underdeterminacy (Carston, 2002:
19-28) are:
• the linguistic expression may come in a subpropositional logical
form (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95: 188), or a propositional
radical/a fragment of a proposition (Bach, 1994:269), as in:
It’s the same
[as what?]
She’s leaving
[from where?]
• the unspecified scope and context-sensitivity of certain linguistic
items, e.g. the linguistic expression does not provide a clear
measure for the state of things, as in:
That is difficult
(relative to what?)
It is serviceable
(vague)
• the underspecificity or weakness of the encoded conceptual
content, in which case the utterance requires some enrichment
(e.g. the first example below) or narrowing (e.g. the second):
Something has happened (obvious truth) Something [bad/strange]
There’s nothing on telly tonight (obviously false) …nothing [interesting]
• the overspecificity or narrowness of the encoded conceptual
content, in which case the utterance requires a process of
adjustment, e.g. narrowing (as in the first example below), or
widening (as in the second):
Ann wants to meet a bachelor (not any bachelor, but one who is
heterosexual and interested in marriage)
The steak is raw
(raw must be adjusted to be applicable to foods)
1
1
For example, the theories of Politeness, discussed in the previous chapter.
Underdeterminacy is different from (conceptual or predicational)
indeterminacy, which is viewed as vagueness or generality of sense.
Conclusions
271
To make the distinction and fill the gap between the lexical
meaning of the speaker’s utterance and what the speaker actually
says various terms have been proposed, such as ‘saying’ and ‘what
is said’, ‘proposition expressed’, ‘truth-conditional content’, or
Bach’s (1994) ‘impliciture’ (< implicit meaning). The most widely
accepted term, however, is Sperber & Wilson’s ‘explicature’, a
term coined to stand in opposition with Grice’s ‘implicature’.
Sperber & Wilson (2005: 472; 500) argue that the ‘speaker’s
explicit meaning goes well beyond the minimal propositions arrived
at by disambiguation and reference assignment’ and that
‘pragmatic inference contributes not only to implicit content, but
also to truth-conditional aspects of explicit content’. For
example, when the speaker says:
I’ll bring a bottle to the party
he does not mean ‘any bottle,’ but specifically, ‘a bottle full of
alcohol.’ Such information, which comes in the form of
inferential enrichment, is needed to bring the semantically
fragmentary and incomplete sentence meaning to a fully
propositional form. This shows that the speaker’s utterance (i.e.
what the speaker says) contains more explicit information than
is carried by the semantic load of his words, information that
cannot be retrieved by decoding, disambiguation or referent
assignment; to recover it, some pragmatic inferential process is
required.
For the amount of information explicitly communicated by
the speaker, Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) proposed the term
explicature, insisting that ‘a proposition communicated by an
utterance is an explicature if and only if it is a development of a
logical form encoded by the utterance’ (my emphasis). In
opposition, ‘all the other propositions that make up the
speaker’s meaning’ represent implicatures.
The authors illustrate this with the following example:
Lisa drops by her neighbours, the Joneses, one evening as they are
sitting down to supper
Alan Jones: Do you want to join us for supper?
Lisa: No thanks. I’ve eaten
What Lisa’s utterance says – according to the Gricean view – is
that she has eaten something or other at some time or other. In
fact, she is asserting explicitly that she has eaten supper on the
evening of the utterance. It is only by supplying those pieces of
information that the meaning of the utterance acquires its fully
propositional form.
272
Thus, Lisa’s utterance carries the explicature supper and
tonight. In addition, it carries the implicature ‘I do not want to
join you for supper because I have already had supper tonight.’
Since explicit truth-conditional content falls within the scope
of negation and other logical operators, while implicatures do
not, standard tests can be employed to check whether some
part of the speaker’s meaning is an explicature or not. For
example, negation of the utterance does not cancel out
explicatures (constancy under negation), but it annuls
implicatures: if Lisa had said
I haven’t eaten
she would still be talking about supper and tonight (i.e. the
explicatures are preserved). Conversely, the implicature (that
she does not want to join the Joneses) would be suspended.
Carston’s examples for enrichment, narrowing and
adjustment are also cases of explicature.
The relevance-theoretic approach also insists on the existence
of
higher-level
types
of
explicature,
triggered
by
propositional-attitudinal verbs (e.g. think, believe, doubt) or
adverbials (illocutionary adverbials: frankly, confidentially;
attitudinal
adverbials:
happily,
unfortunately;
evidential
adverbials: obviously, possibly; etc.), etc. The function of such
expressions, Blackmore (1987) suggests, is procedural, rather
than conceptual: they indicate, guide, constrain, or direct the
inferential process, telling the receiver how to interpret the
utterance.
In addition, Wilson & Sperber argue, ‘various elements of
linguistic form, including indicative, imperative or subjunctive
mood, rising or falling intonation, inverted word order, and
some particles and markers like “please” and “let’s”, constrain
the process of inferring the higher-level explicatures.’ Their
function is to express ‘the speaker’s propositional attitude and
speech act’ (Carston, 2002: 162).
In this context we should also mention a principle proposed by
Recanati (1989, 1993) – the Availability Principle – which tells
us that the communicators’ intuition often contradicts the
truth-conditional content of an utterance. For example,
although the truth-conditional interpretation of Lisa’s utterance
I’ve eaten would be indeterminate (‘I’ve eaten at some time or
other’), there is no intuitive basis for such an interpretation,
argues Recanati, because neither the speaker nor the hearer is
aware that this proposition is part of ‘what is said’; the
Conclusions
273
propositions they are both aware of are ‘I’ve eaten supper
tonight’ and ‘I don’t want to join you.’ Consequently, the author
suggests, ‘in making a decision concerning what is said, we
should always try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuitions on the
matter’ (Recanati 1989: 310; 1993: 248).
This shows that many features of linguistic communication
stand on the semantic-pragmatic interface, so that a
comprehensive survey of meaning requires both semantic and
pragmatic tools.
9.2
Relevance
One of the most influential theories of the post-Gricean age is Dan
Sperber and Deidre Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1986), which
proposes a simplification of the maxims as means of assessment.
Taking up Grice’s view of communication as recognition of
intention, and speaker’s meaning as ‘an overtly expressed intention
which is fulfilled by being recognized’ (Sperber & Wilson, (2005: 469),
the authors distinguish two types of intention:
an informative intention
a communicative intention, i.e. having the informative
intention recognized as intention.
According to the way the speaker handles his communicative
intention, an utterance can be
o overt (ostensive1), when the speaker signals his intention
to communicate some extra meaning, e.g. communication
that observes Grice’s maxims, cases of irony resulting from
flouting the maxims2 (e.g. of Quality, as in Father: Sure,
I’m Bill Gates – see section 7.3.2.1)
o covert, when the speaker’s communicative intention is not
manifest, e.g. violating or infringing the maxims (see
section 7.3.2.4), exploitation of social taboos or sexual
innuendo in advertising, etc.
1
2
In Carston’s (2002: 116) definition, ‘the set of assumptions (propositions)
ostensively communicated are those for which the communicator’s stimulus
(utterance) makes it mutually manifest (to communicator and audience) that
she intends to make them manifest (or more manifest) to the audience.’
Obviously, metaphorical usage is ostensive because ‘the speaker makes
mutually manifest her intention to make manifest to the addressee that
P’ (Carston, 2002: 116), where P stands for the speaker’s intended meaning.
274
Relevance-theoretic pragmatics focuses on ostensive stimuli
(i.e. on ostensive linguistic utterances), on what they
ostensively communicate and on how this is achieved.
The Theory of Relevance departs from the Gricean view both
in terms of utterance production and interpretation (Sperber &
Wilson, 2005: 468-501).
In terms of utterance production, the authors argue that
‘relevance-oriented inferential processes are efficient enough to
allow for a much greater slack between sentence meaning and
speaker’s meaning.’
In what concerns the receiver, the authors consider that his
expectations regarding the speaker’s meaning do not derive
from principles and maxims; ‘… the very act of communicating
raises precise and predictable expectations of relevance, which
are enough on their own to guide the hearer towards the
speaker’s meaning’ (my emphasis).
In other words, the speaker does not need to restrict the
gap between his words and his intended meaning to
‘reasonable’ dimensions: all rational communication bears in
itself the assumption that the utterance is relevant for the
conversation going on. In his turn, in his interpretation of the
speaker’s meaning, the receiver is guided by a similar
assumption/ expectation, so that no matter how unrelated to
the conversation going on the speaker’s words might seem, he
will try to bridge the gap between what the latter said and what
he meant so that it should match the logical thread of the
conversation.
The Theory of Relevance proposes two basic claims
regarding the role of relevance in cognition and communication:
•
•
Cognitive Principle of Relevance
o Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of
relevance.
Communicative Principle of Relevance
o Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of
its own optimal relevance.
Thus, the cognitive principle of Relevance tells us that people
tend to pay attention to what is most important (i.e. maximally
relevant) to them at a specific moment. Therefore, if the
speaker wants his utterance to be successful, he must make the
receiver perceive the utterance as relevant enough to be worthy
of attention. Or, as the communicative principle of Relevance
shows, by the very act of communicating, the speaker indicates
that his utterance is optimally relevant.
Conclusions
275
On the other side of the communicative exchange, the
hearer’s expectations of relevance are triggered by the utterance
itself; these expectations are predictable enough to guide the
receiver towards the speaker’s meaning. Presumption of
optimal relevance, a key notion in the Relevance Theory, tells
the hearer not only that utterance is ‘relevant enough to be
worth processing,’ but also that ‘it is the most relevant one
compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences.’
Based on the presumption that the utterance is optimally
relevant, Sperber & Wilson developed a relevance-guided
comprehension heuristic, which suggests that the receiver
‘follow[s] the path of least effort in constructing an interpretation
of the utterance’ and that he ‘stop[s] when [his] expectations of
relevance are satisfied.’
This shows clearly that communication is different from scientific
research: while in scientific research ‘all facts’ must be considered, to
process the data provided him by the speaker, the hearer must
search for the path of ‘least effort’ (i.e. for a meaning that is obvious
and relevant), and to stop his search when his expectations of
relevance are satisfied (i.e. when he perceives the link between what
the speaker is saying and the conversation going on). This is because,
while in other fields of research the data are provided by an impassive
source (e.g. nature), the data for utterance interpretation come from
a speaker who is cooperating and who wants his message to be
understood correctly. Obviously, the shorter time span for utterance
interpretation also restricts the hearer’s analytic process.
It was discussed in the previous section that, according to
Relevance Theory, the speaker may communicate two classes of
assumptions (propositions): explicature and implicature.
The content of explicature comes from two distinct sources:
the linguistic expression (which must be decoded) and the
context. For example, to interpret the utterance1
He’s in the grip of a vice
the hearer will have to make several types of contextual
contributions to retrieve the speaker’s explicit meaning:
assigning referent to He, identifying the temporal context, and
disambiguating the meaning of vice (literal or metaphorical
meaning) in the context.
The additional information, the implicature carried by the
utterance, resides in the speaker’s communicative intention and
1
Grice’s example, quoted by Carston, 2002: 105.
276
is retrieved by pragmatic inference. The reason that has made
the speaker produce the utterance, i.e. its relevance for the
communicative exchange, represents an important clue to guide
the hearer in making his inferences.
Thus, to retrieve the full meaning of the speaker’s utterance,
Relevance Theory tells us that the receiver follows the path of least
effort and stops when his expectations of relevance are fulfilled.
For example, to interpret the second utterance in the
exchanges below (from Carston, 2002: 143-5), the hearer will
probably follow the paths:
Ann: Shall we play tennis?
Bob: It’s raining
Explicature: It’s raining at locationA/B
Implicated premise: If it’s raining in locationx then it’s not possible to play
tennis at locationx
Implicated conclusion: Ann and Bob can’t play tennis at locationA/B
or
Passer-by: I’m looking for Whitby Street. Can you tell me where it is?
Speaker: It’s the second one down on the left
a. S has uttered sentence with logical form: [it’s the second one down on
the left] (Output of linguistic decoding)
b. S’s utterance is optimally relevant to me (Presumption of optimal
relevance)
c. S’s utterance will achieve relevance by providing an answer to my
question (Standard expectation created by the asking of a question)
d. Whitby Street is the second street on my left as I proceed down
Hinkley Road (First accessible reference assignment which will yield an
answer to question)
Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory is a theory of the mind,
rather than of language. With it, they refute the positions of
linguists such as Donald Davidson (1986), Noam Chomsky
(1992), or Jerry Fodor1 (1983, 1987), who consider that, to
develop a theory of the interpreter would amount to creating ‘a
theory of everything, the pursuit of which would lead to a theory
of nothing’ (Carston, 2002: 1, quoting Chomsky, 1992).
1
And yet, Jerry Fodor’s view of the modular structure of the human mind
stands at the basis of Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory.
277
Annexes
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: English – a crazy language
Task 1. Discuss what is strange in each case. Use the dictionary if
you don’t know what they mean. Give the correct form wherever
necessary (the * shows that the form is not correct).
Task 2. Identify words/phrases which carry associative meanings
and discuss their function.
Text A. English is the most widely used language in the history of our
planet. One in every seven human beings can speak it. More than half
the world's books and three quarters of international mail are in English.
Of all languages, English has the largest vocabulary – perhaps as many as
two million words – and one of the noblest bodies of literature.
Nonetheless, let's face it, English is a crazy language.
There's no egg in eggplant, neither pine nor apple in pineapple,
and ham in a hamburger. English muffins weren't invented in England
or French fries in France. Sweetmeats are candy, while sweetbreads
(which aren't sweet) are meat.
We take English for granted. But when we explore it's paradoxes,
we find that quicksand works slowly, boxing rings are square, public
bathrooms have no bath, and a guinea pig is neither a pig, nor is it
from Guinea.
And why is it that a writer writes, but grocers don't *groce and
hammers don't *ham?
If the plural of tooth is teeth, shouldn't the plural of booth be
*beeth? One goose two geese, so why not one mooth and two
*meeth? One index two indices ['indisi:z], so why not one Kleenex two
*Kleeneces?
If the teacher taught, why isn't it true that the preacher *prought?
If you wrote a letter, perhaps you also *bote your tongue. If a vegetarian
eats vegetables, what does a humanitarian eat?
Isn't it a bit loopy that you can make amends but not just one
*amend? That you comb through the annals of history but not just one
*annal?
If a horse hair mat is made from the hair of horses, and a camel's
hair coat from the hair of camels, from what is a mohair coat made?
Perhaps all English speakers should be committed to an asylum for
the verbally insane. In what other language do people drive on the
parkway, yet park on the driveway? recite at a play yet play a recital?
ship by truck yet send cargo by ship? have noses that run and feet
that smell?
278
How can a slim chance and a fat chance be the same, whilst a
wise man and a wise guy are opposite?
How can overlook and oversee be opposites, while quite a few and
quite a lot are alike?
How can the weather be hot as hell one day and cold as hell the next?
Did you ever notice that we talk about certain things only when
they are absent?
Have you ever seen a *horseful carriage or a *strapful gown?
Met a *sung hero or experienced *requited love?
Have you ever run into someone who was *gruntled, *ruly or
*peccable?
And where are the people who are *spring chicken or who *would
hurt a fly?
I meet individuals who can cut the mustard and whom I would
touch with a ten-foot pole, but I cannot talk about them in English!
You have to marvel at the unique lunacy of a language in which
your house can burn up as it burns down; in which you fill in a form by
filling it out; in which your alarm clock goes off by going on?
English was invented by people, not computers, and it reflects the
creativity of the human race (which, of course, isn't a race at all!).
That is why, when I wind up my watch I start it, but when I wind
up my speech, I end it. Thank you.
Text B.
This I have never understood:
We chop down trees but chop up wood;
We draw down wrath, we draw up wills,
We run down foes, we run up bills;
We eat food up, we down a drink,
Which is a little strange, I think.
We turn down offers, turn up noses
Just one last thought and then this closes:
We should remember, we poor clowns,
That life is full of up and downs.
Task 3. After you have read section 2.1.2 of Chapter 2, select five
of the lexical items you find more interesting and analyze the
technique of word formation they are based on.
Task 4. After you have read section 2.2 of Chapter 2, select five
lexical items based on transfer of meaning and discuss them
Task 5. After you have read section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2, select five
lexical of the lexical items you find more interesting and analyze
the process by which they were assimilated by the language.
Task 6. After you have read Chapter 3, select five idioms and
analyze them in terms of transparency and register.
279
Annexes
ANNEX 2: Lexical innovation and associative meaning
Text A: Read the text below and pick out the words which do not
sound English. Do you think words such as droog, crast or deng
exist in the English lexicon? What kind of words are they? What
does Burgess want to achieve by including such words in his
novel? What kind of society do you think the characters live in?
Identify as many lexical items that carry associative as you can and
explain their function.
A Clockwork Orange
By Anthony Burgess
'What's it going to be then, eh?'
There was me, that is Alex, and my three droogs, that is Pete,
Georgie, and Dim, Dim being really dim, and we sat in the Korova
Milkbar making up our rassoodocks what to do with the evening, a
flip dark chill winter bastard though dry. The Korova Milkbar was a
milk-plus mesto, and you may, O my brothers, have forgotten what
these mestos were like, things changing so skorry these days and
everybody very quick to forget, newspapers not being read much
neither. Well, what they sold there was milk plus something else.
They had no licence for selling liquor, but there was no law yet
against prodding some of the new veshches which they used to put
into the old moloko, so you could peet it with vellocet or
synthemesc or drencrom or one or two other veshches which would
give you a nice quiet horrorshow fifteen minutes admiring Bog And
All His Holy Angels and Saints in your left shoe with lights bursting
all over your mozg. Or you could peet milk with knives in it, as we
used to say, and this would sharpen you up and make you ready for
a bit of dirty twenty-to-one, and that was what we were peering
this evening I'm starting off the story with.
Our pockets were full of deng, so there was no real need from
the point of view of crasting any more pretty polly to tolchock some
old veck in an alley and viddy him swim in his blood while we
counted the takings and divided by four, nor to do the ultra-violent
on some shivering starry grey-haired ptitsa in a shop and go smecking
off with the till's guts. But, as they say, money isn't everything.
Read the vocabulary, then rewrite the text in Standard English
Vocabulary: crast = to steal or rob; robbery; deng, pretty polly = money;
horrorshow = good, well; mesto = place; peet = to drink; pol = sex; ptitsa =
chick; mozg = brain; rassoodock = mind; skorry = quick, quickly; vellocet,
synthemesc = drug; tolchock = hit or push; blow; beating; veck (<chelloweck)
= person, man fellow; veshch = thing; viddy = to see or look; etc.
280
Text B. Read text 1 and discuss Joyce’s lexical creativity: identify
types of lexical innovation and express your opinion concerning the
writer’s possible reasons for it. Seamus Dean’s comments (text 2) may
help you.
Finnegans Wake
By James Joyce
1. riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings
us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs.
Sir Tristram, violer d'amores, fr'over the short sea, had passen-core rearrived
from North Armorica on this side the scraggy isthmus of Europe Minor to
wielderfight his penisolate war: nor had topsawyer's rocks by the stream Oconee
exaggerated themselse to Laurens County's gorgios while they went doublin their
mumper all the time: nor avoice from afire bellowsed mishe mishe to tauftauf
thuartpeatrick: not yet, though venissoon after, had a kidscad buttended a bland
old isaac: not yet, though all's fair in vanessy, were sosie sesthers wroth with
twone nathandjoe. Rot a peck of pa's malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight
and rory end to the regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaface.
The fall (bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthunntrovarrhounawnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!) of a once wallstrait oldparr
is retaled early in bed and later on life down through all Christian minstrelsy.
The great fall of the offwall entailed at such short notice the pftjschute of
Finnegan, erse solid man, that the humptyhillhead of humself prumptly sends an
unquiring one well to the west in quest of his tumptytumtoes: and their
upturnpikepointandplace is at the knock out in the park where oranges have
been laid to rust upon the green since dev-linsfirst loved livvy.
2. The first thing to say about Finnegans Wake is that it is, in an
important sense, unreadable. In order to pay it the attention it so
impertinently and endlessly demands, the reader must forego most
of the conventions about reading and about language that constitute
him/her as a reader. The advantage to be gained from doing so is
considerable; the conventions survive but they are less likely thereafter
to dwindle into assumptions about what reading or writing is. Joyce's
last great work is an extraordinary performance, a transcription into a
miniaturized form of the whole western literary tradition; it is Joyce's
outstanding mastery of that form and his amazing powers of
transcription that show this to be an unrepeatable, solo performance
that need, in a sense, only be looked at rather than 'read' to provide a
sufficient impression of its radical, unique status. ….
Th e l an gua ge of the Wake is a c om posit e of w or ds an d
syllables combined with such a degree of fertile inventiveness that new
sounds and new meanings are constantly ingeminated. Joyce involves himself
and us in an extremely complex series of translations that are endless
because there is no original and no target language to supply a limit to
the visual and sonar transactions that are negotiated by the text.
(Introduction to Finnegans Wake, by Seamus Dean)
Annexes
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282
ANNEX 3: Sense relations
ANNEX 4: Figurative speech
Read the jokes and say what makes them funny. Decide whether
they exploit semantic or pragmatic sense relations. Mention the type.
In the text below, find examples of figurative phrases, give their nonfigurative meaning, and analyse them in terms of figurative category
and transparency, as in the models:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
When I said I wanted to marry her she asked for something more
concrete, I wondered what cement.
I figured a married man may be down but he’s never out.
Grammarians tell us matrimony is more than a serious word – it’s a
full sentence! It puts the period on many men’s lives.
Marriage is a wonderful state of matrimony! Sometimes it is more than
a state, it is a whole territory!
“I’m still mad on matrimony and I’d leave my bride tomorrow if it
weren’t for her enormous figure! I mean her figure in her bank book!”
The newlyweds went to a lake resort for their honeymoon. The next
day they went for a boat ride. The bride’s mother received a postal
card saying: “Arrived safely. Grand row before dinner.” “What a shame,”
the mother murmured, “to think they'd start quarreling this soon!”
Don't sweat petty things....or pet sweaty things.
Plan to be spontaneous tomorrow.
Registrar (to imposing bride and diminutive bridegroom): “And now I
pronounce you wife and man.”
Henpecked Harry: “But, my dear, you’ve been talking for a whole hour
and I haven’t said a word. Hardboiled Joan: “No, you haven’t said
anything, but you’ve been listening in a most aggravating manner!”
Experience is something you don’t get until just after you need it.
A conclusion is the place where you got tired of thinking.
For every action, there is an equal and opposite criticism.
He who hesitates is probably right.
Success always occurs in private, and failure in full view.
The colder the X-ray table, the more of your body is required on it.
The hardness of the butter is proportional to the softness of the bread.
The severity of the itch is proportional to the reach.
To steal ideas from one person is plagiarism; to steal from many is research.
The problem with the gene pool is that there is no lifeguard.
The sooner you fall behind, the more time you'll have to catch up.
A clear conscience is usually the sign of a bad memory.
Always try to be modest. And be damn proud of it!
If you think nobody cares about you, try missing a couple of payments.
How many of you believe in telekinesis? Raise my hand....
I'd kill for a Nobel P(e)ace Prize.
Everybody repeat after me....."We are all individuals."
Death to all fanatics!
Don't be sexist; broads hate that!
Love may be blind, but marriage is a real eye-opener.
A conscience is what hurts when all your other parts feel so good.
Bills travel through the mail at twice the speed of checks.
Hard work pays off in the future. Laziness pays off now.
Eagles may soar, but weasels aren't sucked into jet engines.
MODELS:
o
noise and haste = the troubles of life; metonymy; live; semi-transparent
o
go placidly = live your life calmly; verbal metaphor; live; semi-transparent
Desiderata
By Max Ehrmann
Go placidly amid the noise and haste,
And remember what peace there may be in silence.
As far as possible without surrender
be on good terms with all persons.
Speak your truth quietly & clearly;
and listen to others,
even the dull & ignorant;
they too have their story.
Avoid loud & aggressive persons,
they are vexations to the spirit.
If you compare yourself with others,
you may become vain & bitter;
for always there will be greater and lesser persons than yourself.
Enjoy your achievements as well as your plans.
Keep interested in your own career, however humble;
it is a real possession in the changing future of time.
Exercise caution in your business affairs;
for the world is full of trickery.
But let this not blind you to what virtue there is;
many persons strive for high ideals;
and everywhere life is full of heroism.
Be yourself.
Especially, do not feign affection.
Neither be cynical about love;
for in the face of all aridity & disenchantment
it is perennial as the grass.
Take kindly the counsel of the years,
gracefully surrendering the things of youth.
Nurture strength of spirit to shield you in sudden misfortune.
But do not distress yourself with imaginings.
Many fears are born of fatigue & loneliness.
Beyond wholesome discipline,
be gentle with yourself.
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Annexes
ANNEX 5: Meaning and thought
In Nineteen Eighty-Four (written in 1949), George Orwell imagines a
Stalinist regime established in a hypothetical England of the future. In
a country where Big Brother is watching your every move, a new
language – Newspeak – is being invented, so that 'the Party' can
control people’s thoughts.
1. Identify techniques of word formation and cases of meaning transfer.
2. Identify words with associative meanings and discuss their function.
The Principles of Newspeak
I. [The] vocabulary [of Newspeak] was so constructed as to give exact
expression to every meaning that a Party member could wish to
express, while excluding all other meanings. This was done partly by
the invention of new words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable
words and by stripping [the] words [that] remained of unorthodox
meanings. For example, the word free still existed in Newspeak, but it
could not be used in its old sense of 'politically free' or 'intellectually
free,' since political and intellectual freedom no longer existed as
concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless.
Newspeak words were divided into three distinct classes, known as
the A vocabulary (the vocabulary of everyday life), the B vocabulary (the
political vocabulary), and the C vocabulary (the technical vocabulary).
II. The A vocabulary consisted of the words needed for everyday
life. It was composed almost entirely of words that we already possess
– words like hit, run, dog, tree, sugar, house, field – but in comparison
with the present-day English vocabulary their number was extremely
small, while their meanings were far more rigidly defined.
The grammar of Newspeak had two outstanding peculiarities.
The first of these was an almost complete interchangeability
between different parts of speech. Any word in the language could be
used either as verb, noun, adjective, or adverb. There was no such
word as cut, its meaning being sufficiently covered by the noun-verb
knife. Adjectives were formed by adding the suffix -ful to the nounverb, and adverbs by adding -wise. Thus for example, speedful meant
'rapid' and speedwise meant 'quickly'.
In addition, any word could be negatived by adding the affix unor could be strengthened by the affix plus, or, for still greater
emphasis, doubleplus-. Thus, uncold meant 'warm' while pluscold and
doublepluscold meant, respectively, 'very cold and 'superlatively cold'.
By such methods it was found possible to bring about an enormous
diminution of vocabulary.
The second distinguishing mark of Newspeak grammar was its
regularity: all inflexions followed the same rules. Thus, in all verbs
preterite and the past participle were the same and ended in -ed. The
preterite of steal was stealed, the preterite of think was thinked, and
so on, all such forms as swam, gave, brought, spoke, taken, etc.,
being abolished. The only classes of words that were still allowed to
inflect irregularly were the pronouns, the relatives, the demonstrative
adjectives, and the auxiliary verbs.
284
III. The B vocabulary consisted of words which had been deliberately
constructed for political purposes: words which were intended to impose a
desirable mental attitude upon the person using them.
The B words were a sort of verbal shorthand, often packing whole
ranges of ideas into a few syllables. The B words – all compound words –
consisted of two or more words or portions of words, welded together
in an easily pronounceable form. The resulting amalgam was a nounverb inflected according to the ordinary rules. For example, goodthink
meant roughly 'orthodoxy', or, as a verb, 'to think in an orthodox
manner.' This inflected as follows: noun-verb, goodthink; past tense and
past participle, goodthinked; present participle, good-thinking; adjective,
goodthinkful; adverb, goodthinkwise; verbal noun, goodthinker.
Some of the B words had highly subtilized meanings, barely
intelligible to anyone who had not mastered the language as a whole.
Consider, for example, such a typical sentence from a Times leading article
as Oldthinkers unbellyfeel Ingsoc. The shortest rendering in Oldspeak
would be: 'Those whose ideas were formed before the Revolution cannot
have a full emotional understanding of the principles of English Socialism.'
But this is not an adequate translation. To begin with, in order to grasp the
full meaning of this Newspeak sentence, one would have to have a clear idea
of what is meant by Ingsoc. And in addition, only a person thoroughly
grounded in Ingsoc could appreciate the full force of bellyfeel, which
implied a blind, enthusiastic acceptance; or of the word oldthink, which was
inextricably mixed up with the idea of wickedness and decadence.
But the special function of certain Newspeak words was not so much
to express meanings as to destroy them. Countless words, such as
honour, justice, morality, democracy, science, and religion had simply
ceased to exist. A few blanket words covered them, and in covering
them, abolished them. All words grouping themselves round the
concepts of liberty and equality, for instance, were contained in the
single word crimethink, while all words grouping themselves round the
concepts of objectivity and rationalism were contained in the word
oldthink. Greater precision would have been dangerous. In Newspeak it
was seldom possible to follow a heretical thought further than the
perception that it was heretical. The Party member knew what
constituted right conduct. His sexual life, for example, was entirely
regulated by the two Newspeak words sexcrime (sexual immorality) and
goodsex (chastity). Sexcrime covered all sexual misdeeds: fornication,
adultery, homosexuality, and, in addition, normal intercourse practised for
its own sake. They were all equally culpable, and, in principle, all
punishable by death. He also knew what was meant by goodsex: normal
intercourse between man and wife for the sole purpose of begetting
children, and without physical pleasure on the part of the woman.
(Orwell George, Nineteen Eighty-Four, abridged)
Annexes
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286
ANNEX 6: Idioms and style
ANNEX 7: Register and style
Read the following examples, then find at least ten other idioms
and analyse them in the same way:
Read the texts and match each of them with the discourse type and
stylistic level, according to the model:
to be all ears = to listen attentively
• Romanian equivalent: a fi ochi numai şi urechi
e.g. The children were all ears when their father told them the story.
• figure of speech: metonymy
• stylistic level: neutral and informal speech
to keep an ear to the ground = to be alert to all that is happening/being said
•
Romanian equivalent: a fi cu ochii-n patru
e.g. He kept an ear to the ground hoping he might find out something useful.
• figure of speech: metaphor
• stylistic level: literary or neutral speech
as black as the ace of spades = very black, very dirty
• Romanian idiomatic equivalent: 'negru ca tăciunele, foarte murdar';
e.g. After cleaning up his garage, John was as black as the ace of
spades.
• figure of speech: simile
• stylistic level: can be used in neutral, informal speech and slang.
to chase rainbows = to think about things one can’t obtain
• Romanian equivalent: a visa cai verzi pe pereţi
e.g. He’s not very realistic; he chases rainbows all the time.
• stylistic level: formal/poetic
to get to the heart of something = to get to the essence of a problem
• Romanian equivalent: a pătrunde în miezul problemei, a merge la ţintă
e.g. Right now you are getting to the heart of the whole situation.
• figure of speech: personification
• stylistic level: formal or neutral speech
glass ceiling = an upper limit to professional advancement, esp. as imposed
upon women, that is not readily perceived or openly acknowledged
• Romanian equivalent: barieră profesională, nu e pentru femei
e.g. Mary's very good at her job, but she won't get the promotion. You
know, the glass ceiling.
• stylistic level: formal and neutral speech
to be wet behind the ears = young and without much experience in life
•
Romanian equivalent: a fi cu caş la gură
e.g. I shouldn’t have given him that difficult job: he's still wet behind the ears.
• figure of speech: metonymy
• stylistic level: colloquial speech
Heaven knows = 'I don’t know';
•
Romanian idiomatic equivalent: Dumnezeu ştie!
e.g. 'Where did John go? ' 'Heaven knows!'
• figure of speech: personification
• stylistic level: standard and neutral speech
Text: 1.political speech; 2.academic writing; 3.journalistic article; 4.text
of song; 5. letter to friend; 6. literature.
Style: a.elevated; b.formal, c.neutral, d.informal, e.colloquial, f.slangy.
MODEL: A-1-b
A. I have a dream, that one day my four little children will one day live in a
nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the
content of their character. […] With this faith we will be able to work
together, play together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up
for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day. […] And when this
happens – when we let freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village
and every hamlet, and from every state and every city, we will be able to
speed up that day when all of God’s children, black men and white men, Jews
and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in
the words of the old Negro spirituals: "Free at last! Free at last! Thank God
almighty, we are free at last!"
B. I pulled out my report card. I showed it to Mama and to Aunt Carrie.
They couldn’t read hardly at all, but they knew what an A looked like. I’d
got A in geography, spelling, reading, arithmetic, and history. The only
other mark I got was a D in English, which I didn’t bother to point out. So
when Mama and Aunt Carrie saw all them A’s they said I was a good boy.
The trouble kicked up when I showed my report card to Aunt Matty. …
“You got D in English!”
The way Aunt Matty took on, it must have been the first D anybody
ever got, because it sure gave her the vapors…. Like she seen a ghost. …
Well, I thought to myself, I’ve done it. Brung disgrace on my family’s house.
Appeared a D in English was so dark a deed that no one could live it down.
C. Writers have always considered themselves the determined enemies of
jargon and cliché. A notable instance of this is the crusade George Orwell
carried out against degenerate language, especially against 'journalese'
and 'officialese.' …
Orwell deplores the habit of what he calls 'gumming together long
strips of words which have already been set in order by somebody else and
making the results presentable by sheer humbug.’ Particular targets of his
scorn were cliché phrases containing dying metaphors, like toe the line,
play a leading part in, militate against, and stand shoulder to shoulder with, and
vague grandiloquent phrases which can be replaced by a simple, more
direct word, as render inoperable can be replaced by spoil or ruin, or take
into consideration can be replaced by consider. … Orwell saw this trend not
just as an invitation to slovenly thought, but as an insidious influence on
the intellectual, aesthetic, and moral life of the community: 'Language
becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the
slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have vicious thoughts.'
287
Annexes
D. Text
Translation
Got 30 down at the bottom, 30 mo' at
the top
All invisible set in little ice cube blocks
I've got 30 diamonds covering my
bottom teeth and 30 more at the top
They have invisible settings and look like
little ice cube blocks
If I could name my mouth the way we
name alcoholic drinks, I'd call this
jewelry a "Smile on the Rocks"
If I could call out a price, I would tell you
that it cost a lot
I have platinum and white gold,
traditional gold
I change my dental jewelry every day
the way rapper Jay-Z changes clothes
I might be wearing some beautiful
dental jewelry while in my white t-shirt,
Or I could be on South Beach wearing
my wife beater (sleeveless t-shirt)
The diamonds on my teeth are
excellent quality, as you can see
You understand, my grandmother hates
me to wear them, but my girlfriend loves it
If I could call it a drink, call it a "Smile
on da Rocks"
If I could call out a price, let's say I
call out a lot
I got like platinum and white gold,
traditional gold
I'm changin' grillz er'day, like Jay
change clothes,
I might be grilled out nicely (oh) In
my white tee (oh),
Or on South Beach (oh) in my wife b.
VVS studded, you can tell when they
cut it
Ya see my grandmama hate it, but
my lil' mama love it
E. Dear Lorna, A quick note – long overdue – to say thanks for your lovely
letter. It arrived ages ago, but in the excitement and hassle of getting
here and settling in I don't seem to have had two minutes to put pen to
paper. We've moved all our stuff in – the boxes from Britain finally turned
up! – so we feel a bit more at home. I have to say I have been feeling
dreadfully homesick for my home, friends and family, but there are
compensations (the swimming pool and lovely weather, for a start). We
also wanted you to be one of the first to know that I'm expecting a baby –
due in May! So I'm feeling as sick as a dog, as well as homesick (but very
excited, too)!! When you last wrote, you were just about to go off to
university. I bet you're having a great time! You will drop us a line soon
and give us all your news, won't you? You are coming over at Easter, by
the way? Lots of love, Karen. P.S. Alex sends his love.
F. On the afternoon of Tuesday, October 17, 1989, the city of San Francisco
was preparing for another game of baseball World Series between the
hometown Giants and the Oakland Athletics. There was a festive
atmosphere to San Francisco that day … It was a long time since the Giants
had played for the championship and everyone wanted to join in the
celebration. Then, at 5:04 p.m., the earth began to move. At first it seemed
like just another minor earthquake, the sort of thing to which Californians
have long been accustomed. But this one kept on getting bigger, building in
intensity and power – for 15 agonizing seconds. When it was finished, a 40foot section of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge had collapsed, as well
as many buildings. Further south, in Santa Cruz and Watsonville (the
epicenter of the quake), houses had been wrenched off their foundations
and streets ripped apart by the massive tremor…. For the second time in 83
years, San Francisco had been hit by the Big One.
The texts: A. Speech by Martin Luther King; B. Peck R.N., A Day No Pigs
Would Die; C. from Geoffrey Leech, Semantics, Chapter 3 (abridged);
D. Nelly featuring Paul Wall, Ali and Gipp: Grillz; E. Form Matters. Longman.
2000:29; F. From Speak Up, October 1991 (abridged).
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ANNEX 8: The text
Analyse the following texts from a functional perspective:
A. 1. I don’t like that!
2. You may be right.
3. Where can one find such a rare object?
4. Could you show me how that works?
5. I don’t think that would be the best solution.
B. 1. Deborah (mascara). Gives color to your life
2. Andrea Moda (boots). The character is woman
3. Stella Artois (beer). Perfection has its price
4. South African Airways. Snuggle Up in Flat-Out Luxury
5. Hertz (car rental). Hertz has more new cars than Avis has cars
C. George: Hello, darling, did you have a good day?
Lorna: Not bad. The usual sort of thing. Meetings, phone calls, letters. You know.
George: Did you see anybody interesting?
Lorna: Well, Chris came into the office this morning. We had a long talk.
George: Oh, yes? What about?
Lorna: Oh, this and that. Things. You know.
George: I see.
Lorna: And then Janet turned up. As usual. Just when I was trying
to finish some work.
(M.Swan & C.Walter, The Cambridge English Course, Student’s Book 2, p.16)
D. Clinton's Choice: Tell All or Just a Bit
WASHINGTON – President Bill Clinton has had extensive discussions
with his inner circle of advisers about a strategy of acknowledging to a
grand jury on Monday that he had sexual encounters with Monica
Lewinsky in the White House, senior advisers have said.
Although Mr. Clinton has not settled on this approach, discussions
have centered on a plan that would allow him to acknowledge a
specific type of sexual behavior while still maintaining that he told the
truth when he testified in January that he had never had ''sexual
relations'' with the former White House intern, the advisers said.
(R.L. Berke, in International Herald Tribune, Aug. 15, 1998)
E. Aerosmith, Eat the Rich
Well I woke up this morning
On the wrong side of the bed
And how I got to thinking
About all the things you said
About ordinary people
And how they make you sick
And if callin’ names kicks back on you
Then I hope this does the trick
Annexes
289
290
ANNEX 9: Meaning in context
ANNEX 10: What words do!
Analyse the way in which the context affects the meaning and
message of the following texts. How would different features of the
context affect their meaning?
Read the text and comment on the way women are supposed to
use the language to do things:
A. 1. You don’t have to do it if you don’t want to.
2. She’s such a great help to all of us!
3. I wonder where that could have come from.
4. I’m sure you don’t mean that!
5. John is so clever. He already knows the numbers.
Female keywords and their meanings
1. 'Fine: This is the word women use at the end of any argument
when they feel they are right but can't stand to hear you argue
any longer. It means that you should shut up. (NEVER use 'fine' to
describe how she looks. This will cause you to have one of those
arguments.)
B. 1. Audi. Never follow
2. Danza Vodka. Made to Chill
3. Givenchy AMARIGE (perfume). Forever and a day
5. Pantène (shampoo). Enjoy a new sensation of fullness.
7. Le Fabbier (furniture) Kiss price.
C. Dulux (paint)
Treacle Tart: Calm, sensual personality looking for partner to
spend time in the bedroom.
Brooklyn Nights: Cool, calm individual, great in the bedroom,
living room, bathroom.
colors: rich, fresh, warm, calm
At Dulux we know that Treacle Tart and Brooklyn Nights go
together because they come from the same mood group in our
new Colour Co-ordination System. This system groups colours into
four separate moods: rich, fresh, warm, calm, so when you pick
colours from the same mood you can be confident that they’ll go
together. …
D. "Er – Petunia, dear – you haven't heard from your sister lately,
have you?"
As he had expected, Mrs. Dursley looked shocked and angry. After
all, they normally pretended she didn't have a sister.
"No," she said sharply. "Why?"
"Funny stuff on the news," Mr. Dursley mumbled. "Owls... shooting
stars... and there were a lot of funny-looking people in town
today..."
"So?" snapped Mrs. Dursley.
"Well, I just thought... maybe... it was something to do with... you
know... her crowd."
(J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone, Chapter One)
2. 'Five minutes': This is half an hour. It is equivalent to the five
minutes that your football game is going to last before you take
out the trash, so women feel that it's an even trade.
3. 'Nothing': 'Nothing' means something and you should be on
your toes. 'Nothing' is usually used to describe the feeling a
woman has of wanting to turn you inside out, upside down, and
backwards. 'Nothing' usually signifies an argument that will last
'Five Minutes' and end with the word 'Fine.'
4. 'Go ahead' (with raised eyebrows): This is NOT permission; it's
a dare! If you mistake it for permission, the result will be the
woman will get upset over 'Nothing' and you'll have a 'five-minute'
discussion that will end with the word 'Fine.'
5. 'Go ahead' (normal eyebrows): This is NOT permission, either.
It means 'I give up' or 'do what you want because I don't care.'
You will get a raised eyebrow 'Go ahead' in just a few minutes,
followed by 'Nothing' and 'Fine' and she will talk to you in about
'Five minutes' when she cools off.
6. Loud sigh: This is not actually a word, but is still often a verbal
statement. Very frequently misunderstood by men. A 'loud sigh
means she thinks you are a complete idiot and wonders why she is
wasting her time standing here and arguing with you over
'Nothing!'
7. Soft sigh: Again, not a word, but a verbal statement. 'Soft
sighs' are one of the few things that some men actually
understand. It means she is momentarily content. Your best bet is
to not move or breathe in the hope that the moment will last a bit
longer.
8. 'Oh': This word, followed by any statement, is trouble, e.g.:
'Oh, we talked about you last night.' If she says 'Oh' before a
Annexes
291
statement, run to the nearest exit. She will tell you that she is
'Fine' (when she is done tossing your clothes out the window), but
do not expect her to talk to you for at least two days. ('Oh' is the
lead to a sentence that usually signifies that you are caught in a
lie. Do not try to lie more, or you will get a raised eyebrows 'Go
ahead,' sometimes followed by acts so unspeakable that I can't
bring myself to write about them.
9. 'That's Okay': This is one of the most dangerous statements
that a woman can say to a man. 'That's Okay' means that she
wants to think long and hard before deciding what the penalty will
be for whatever you have done. 'That's Okay' is often used with
the word 'Fine' and in conjunction with a raised eyebrow 'Go
ahead.' Once she has had time to plan it out, you are in for some
mighty big trouble.
10. 'Please do': This is not a statement, it is an offer. The woman
is giving you the chance to come up with an excuse for what you
have done. In other words, a chance to get yourself into even
more trouble. If you handle this correctly, you shouldn't get a
'That's Okay.'
292
ANNEX 11: Lexical meaning vs. speaker’s meaning
Analyse the following from the perspective of the Cooperative Principle:
What the Doctor Really Means
Says: 'Let me check your medical history.'
Means: 'I want to see if you've paid your last bill before spending any
more time with you.'
Says: 'Welllllll, what have we here...'
Means: Since he hasn't the foggiest notion of what it is, the Doctor is hoping you
will give him a clue.
Says: 'Hmmmmmmmm.'
Means: Since he hasn't the faintest idea of what to do, he is trying to
appear thoughtful while hoping the nurse will interrupt.
Says: 'This should be taken care of right away.'
Means: 'This is so easy and profitable that I want to fix it before it
cures itself.'
Says: 'That's quite a nasty looking wound.'
Means: 'If you are scared, you won't realize that you are paying too much.'
Says: 'Let's see how it develops.'
Means: Maybe in a few days it will grow into something he can recognize.
11. 'Thanks': The woman is thanking you. Don't faint and don't
look for hidden meaning. Just say, 'You're welcome.'
Says: 'This should fix you up.'
Means: The drug salesman guaranteed that it kills all symptoms.
12. 'Thanks a lot': 'Thanks a lot' is dramatically different from
'Thanks.' A woman will say 'Thanks a lot' when she is really ticked
off at you. It is usually followed by the 'Loud sigh.' This signifies
that you have hurt her in some callous way. Be careful not to ask
what is wrong after the 'Loud sigh,' as she will only tell you
'Nothing.'
Says: 'I'd like to prescribe a new drug.'
Means: 'I would like to use you for a guinea pig.'
Says: 'If it doesn't clear up in a week, give me a call.'
Means: 'I don't know what the hell it is. Maybe it will go away by itself.'
Says: 'Let me schedule you for some tests.'
Means: 'I have a 40% interest in the lab.'
Says: 'I'd like to run some more tests.'
Means: 'I can't figure out what's wrong. Maybe the kid in the lab can
solve this one.'
Says: 'We'll see.'
Means: 'First I have to check my malpractice insurance.'
Says: 'We have some good news and some bad news.'
Means: The good news is the drug salesman's got some expensive new
drug nobody knows very much about, and the bad news is
you're going to pay for it.
Says: 'Why don't we make another appointment later in the week.'
Means: 'I'm playing tennis this afternoon, and I can't stay here with
you.' – or – 'I need the money, so I'm charging you for another
office visit.'
(from LaughNet, Aug. 2004)
(from LaughNet, Aug. 2004)
Annexes
293
294
We seem to have a problem. (= ‘Obviously we have a problem.’)
Secret Number 4: use not very/entirely/completely/wholly + a
ANNEX 12: Diplomatic language1
A native speaker gives us the following advice about how to be polite:
Actually or As a matter of fact, can indicate: ‘I’m going to
contradict you.’
A: ‘The population of Hungary is 6,000,000.’
B: ‘Actually, it’s nearer 10,000,000!’
I’m afraid means: ‘I’m sorry to have to say this, but….’
‘I’m afraid we’ll have to close the factory and make everybody
redundant.’
With respect means: ‘I don’t feel respectful at all. I want to
say something very strong, but I must not be impolite.’
‘With respect that’s not what I thought you said yesterday!’
(= ‘You have changed your line!’)
To be honest means: ‘OK, let’s cut the diplomacy.’ – or ‘I’m trying to sound sincere.’
A: We could never persuade the workforce to do that.
B: To be honest, I can’t see the problem.
(= ‘You’re exaggerating and we both know it!’ or ‘Even if
there is a problem I’m not admitting it.’)
To put it bluntly means: ‘OK, I’ve tried to be diplomatic, now
I’m going to say what I really mean!’
A: I feel the company has been unfair to me.
B: ‘To put it bluntly, you haven’t exactly been the best employee!’
If I could just means: ‘Do this very quickly.’
A: I must go soon.
B: If I could just ask you to sign this before you leave…
Conditional forms using modals sound less direct, and therefore, to a
native English speaker, more polite.
That would be difficult. (= ‘That is too difficult.’)
That would not be acceptable. (= ‘That is not acceptable.’)
We would need to see some proof. (= ‘We need to see some proof.’)
the message softer.
There might be a short delay. (= ‘There will be a delay. We hope it
won’t be too long…’)
I may be a little bit late. (= ‘I will be late.’)
That might be rather difficult. (= ‘We can’t do that.’)
•
After © Rita Baker, Lydbury English Centre
Secret Number 6: Avoid taking personal responsibility for
something you find difficult to say.
I’m afraid I am unable to agree to that. (= ‘I don’t want to agree to that.’)
We’re not in a position to go ahead yet. (= ‘We’re not ready yet’, ‘We
don’t want to do it yet.’)
Secret Number 7: Put the negative first.
I don’t think he’s coming. (= ‘I think he isn’t coming.’)
•
Secret Number 8: Use a question form to make a suggestion.
Could we do that later? (= ‘I think we should that later.’)
Is it OK if we stop for lunch now? (= ‘I think we should stop now.’)
•
Secret Number 9: Make the suggestion even more indirect by
•
putting the question negatively.
Wouldn’t it be better to finish it tomorrow? (= ‘I think it would be better
to finish it tomorrow.’)
Can’t we change the timetable? (= ‘I think we should change the
timetable.’)
•
Secret Number 10: Use comparatives.
Wouldn’t it be better if we changed the timetable? (= ‘Let’s change the
timetable.’)
Would you be more prepared to move if we increased your salary? (= ‘We
know you don’t want to move; would you change your mind if…?’)
Secret Number 11: The -ing form in the past indicates that you
•
are prepared to be flexible.
We were hoping to finish today.
(= ‘We would prefer to finish today if possible.’ ‘We are hoping
to finish today’ is a firmer statement of intent.)
We were wondering if you liked it. (= ‘We’d like to know if you like it.’)
Secret Number 3: Use seem; meaning: ‘It’s obvious!’
With respect, you don’t seem to understand.
(= ‘Obviously you don’t understand, or you’re pretending you
don’t understand.’)
We seem to be in agreement.
(= ‘Obviously, this agreement is good for us all.’)
positive adjective to express something negative!
That might not be very convenient. (= ‘That is not convenient.’)
I’m not entirely convinced. (= ‘I’m not at all convinced’)
That wouldn’t seem to be very helpful. (= ‘That is unhelpful.’)
Secret Number 5: use ‘qualifiers’ in addition to modals to make
•
Secret Number 2: Use would
•
1
Secret Number 1: Use ‘cushions.’
•
•
•
Secret Number 12: Indirect questions sound more diplomatic
•
than direct ones.
I wonder what the time is. (= ‘What is the time?’)
Please could you tell me where the office is? (= ‘Where is the office?’)
295
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Adriana Vizental Meaning and Communication From

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