Summary - Queensland Parliament

Transcription

Drink Safe Precincts
Final evaluation: 24 months of the trial
NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY
Acknowledgements
Criminal Justice Research would like to acknowledge those local stakeholders from each of the trial
sites who contributed to this research. We thank them for their valuable contributions and insights
into the operation and effect of the trial in each area. We would also like to acknowledge ex-CJR
staff, Zoe Ellerman, Katherine Pike and Chloe Cave, who made significant contributions to the
development and implementation of the evaluation and thank them for their assistance.
© The State of Queensland (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) 2013.
Published by the Queensland Government, December 2013, 100 George Street, Brisbane Qld 4000.
The Queensland Government supports and encourages the dissemination and exchange of information.
However, copyright protects this document. The State of Queensland has no objection to this material being
reproduced, made available online or electronically but only if it is recognised as the owner of the copyright
and this material remains unaltered. Copyright enquiries about this publication should be directed to the
Department of the Premier and Cabinet, by email to [email protected] or in writing to PO Box
15185, City East Qld 4002.
For additional information on this document, email [email protected] or telephone (07) 3003 9379.
Contents
Executive summary ...................................................................................................................... 7
Key themes & recommendations ................................................................................................ 12
Overview of the report............................................................................................................... 15
Section 1 Background ................................................................................................................. 16
Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 16
Why was the Drink Safe Precinct (DSP) trial introduced? ............................................................ 17
What are DSPs? What has the DSP trial involved? ....................................................................... 20
Why evaluate the DSP trial? ......................................................................................................... 22
How has the evaluation been conducted? ................................................................................... 23
Limitations of the data and analysis ............................................................................................. 28
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 29
Chapter 2 Alcohol consumption ....................................................................................................... 31
Who drinks? How much? How often? .......................................................................................... 31
Type of alcohol .............................................................................................................................. 32
Where do people usually drink? ................................................................................................... 32
How do we compare to other countries? ..................................................................................... 33
Has alcohol consumption changed over time? ............................................................................. 34
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 36
Chapter 3 Harms and benefits associated with alcohol ................................................................... 38
Health ............................................................................................................................................ 38
Social ............................................................................................................................................. 40
Economic ....................................................................................................................................... 46
Are the harms associated with alcohol increasing?...................................................................... 50
How do alcohol-related harms compare to illicit drug harms? .................................................... 50
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 52
Chapter 4 What works to reduce alcohol-related harms? ............................................................... 54
Controls on the availability of alcohol .......................................................................................... 56
Design interventions ..................................................................................................................... 59
Service interventions .................................................................................................................... 60
Licensed venue staff education and enforcement ....................................................................... 62
Stakeholder initiatives .................................................................................................................. 66
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 69
Drink Safe Precincts - Final evaluation: 24 months of the trial
Not Government Policy
3|Page
Section 2 DSPs in action ............................................................................................................. 72
Chapter 5 Key features of the DSP areas .......................................................................................... 73
Fortitude Valley ............................................................................................................................. 73
Surfers Paradise ............................................................................................................................ 76
Townsville ..................................................................................................................................... 78
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 81
Chapter 6 Governance and coordination ......................................................................................... 83
Local DSP committees ................................................................................................................... 83
Local management plans .............................................................................................................. 85
Dedicated DSP Inspectors ............................................................................................................. 85
Perceptions of governance and coordination............................................................................... 85
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 86
Chapter 7 DSP policing ...................................................................................................................... 87
Increased police presence............................................................................................................. 87
High visibility ................................................................................................................................. 91
Emphasis on de-escalation and diversion ..................................................................................... 96
Perceptions of DSP policing .......................................................................................................... 99
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 100
Chapter 8 Support services ............................................................................................................. 101
Rest and recovery support services ............................................................................................ 101
Amount and type of support provided ....................................................................................... 104
Perceptions of support services .................................................................................................. 110
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 111
Chapter 9 Use of banning orders .................................................................................................... 113
Types of banning orders available .............................................................................................. 113
Banning orders imposed as part of a sentence .......................................................................... 114
Licensee and liquor accord bans ................................................................................................. 118
Perceptions of banning orders .................................................................................................... 120
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 120
Chapter 10 Other DSP strategies .................................................................................................... 122
Transport..................................................................................................................................... 122
Rubbish ....................................................................................................................................... 129
Public toilets and public urination .............................................................................................. 130
Lighting and public space upgrades ............................................................................................ 133
4|Page
Crowding and queuing ................................................................................................................ 134
CCTV and radio networks ............................................................................................................ 134
OLGR compliance activity ........................................................................................................... 137
Perceptions of other strategies .................................................................................................. 144
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 145
Section 3 Results of the DSP trial .............................................................................................. 150
Chapter 11 Ambulance calls for service .......................................................................................... 152
Context: Calls for service in DSPs and EPs .................................................................................. 153
Results: Change in calls for service after the introduction of the trial ....................................... 156
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 172
Chapter 12 Hospital emergency presentations .............................................................................. 174
Context: Emergency presentations to DSP and EP hospitals ...................................................... 175
Results: Change in emergency presentations after the introduction of the trial ....................... 178
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 184
Chapter 13 Police crime reports ..................................................................................................... 185
Context: Offences in the DSPs and EPs ....................................................................................... 186
Results: Change in offences after the introduction of the trial .................................................. 194
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 221
Chapter 14 Summary of results by trial site ................................................................................... 225
Fortitude Valley ........................................................................................................................... 225
Surfers Paradise .......................................................................................................................... 229
Townsville ................................................................................................................................... 232
Section 4 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 236
Chapter 15 Precinct management .................................................................................................. 238
Governance and coordination .................................................................................................... 238
Police presence and high visibility policing ................................................................................. 241
De-escalation and diversion ........................................................................................................ 250
Support services .......................................................................................................................... 250
Banning orders ............................................................................................................................ 252
Toilets and public urination ........................................................................................................ 259
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 266
Chapter 16 Broader policy issues.................................................................................................... 269
Recent trends in alcohol policy reform ....................................................................................... 270
Improving planning and liquor licensing frameworks ................................................................ 272
5|Page
Education and social marketing .................................................................................................. 280
Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA).......................................................................................... 284
Advertising .................................................................................................................................. 289
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 289
Chapter 17 Considerations for future evaluations ......................................................................... 292
Data collection ............................................................................................................................ 292
Evaluation design ........................................................................................................................ 294
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 298
References............................................................................................................................... 300
6|Page
Executive summary
Background
Public concern about alcohol-related violence, and a number of traumatic and tragic deaths and
injuries led to the (then) Queensland Government’s request that the bipartisan parliamentary Law,
Justice and Safety Committee (the Committee) conduct an inquiry into alcohol-related violence. The
Committee’s report was delivered in 2010 and made 68 recommendations to address alcohol-related
violence, including that entertainment precincts should have management plans to ensure adequate
policing, security and public transport.
In response to the committee’s findings, the Government announced a two-year trial of Drink Safe
Precincts (DSPs). The DSP trial is a pilot program which aims to reduce alcohol-related violence, and
improve community safety and public amenity by employing place-based management strategies in
three high-volume entertainment precincts – Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise and Townsville.
The trial was originally to operate from December 2010 until November 2012. In July 2012, the
Attorney-General and Minister for Justice announced that the DSP trial would be extended until
February 2013 in order to ensure that additional protections were in place during the summer holiday
and festive season, and allow the government to consider the long term future of the DSPs in late
2012. Following consideration in late 2012 of the DSP interim evaluation report covering the first 14
months of the trial, the trial was further extended until 30 September 2013 to enable the evaluation
of the two-year trial period and further development of future policy options.
Criminal Justice Research within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet has led the coordination
of the evaluation of the DSP trial. Independent data analysis has been provided by the University of
Queensland’s Centre for Youth Substance Abuse Research and Health LinQ. Data was provided by a
number of key agencies including the Queensland Police Service, Queensland Ambulance Service,
Queensland Health, Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation and Department of Transport and Main
Roads (including Translink). The funded non-government organisations (NGOs) support services and
local governments have also provided data throughout the trial.
In December 2012, the Government published the interim evaluation report that covered the first 14
months of the trial. The interim report provided a comprehensive assessment of the trial to date at
that point, based on both qualitative data; gained through stakeholder and patron surveys and
interviews, participation in the local committee meetings and observations from the precincts during
the trial; and quantitative data; including measures showing police, support service, transport and
liquor compliance activity, and measures showing the impact of the trial on ambulance calls for
service, police crime reports and hospital emergency department presentations. The evaluation
update released in May 2013 provided an update of the key activity and impact measures over an 18month trial period (December 2010 to May 2012).
This final evaluation report for the DSP trial represents a collation of the information, data and
findings presented in the interim evaluation report, supplemented with the results of the latest data
analysis covering the two-year trial period (December 2010 to November 2012). The longer data
period for the trial (24 months compared to 14 or 18 months previously) has allowed for some
7|Page
Executive summary
additional analysis to be performed, as well as produced some changes in existing analysis compared
to previous results. The results of the analysis from the two-year trial period represent the most
conclusive findings possible for the DSP trial, interpreted with consideration of all the other
information and data presented in this report. These results are summarised by location below, along
with a final overall conclusion.
Summary of key results by location
Fortitude Valley Drink Safe Precinct
The findings from the Fortitude Valley DSP suggest there has been a downward trend in violence and
severity of injuries among patrons. Comparing a three-year baseline period to the two-year trial
period, police crime statistics show reductions in the rate of all types of offences (by 11.5%), good
order offences (by 20.5%) and offences against police (by 29.5%) per weekend drinking night.1 The
rate of assault offences increased by 4.0%, which for the most part is likely to be an increase in
‘grievous serious’ assault offences. The analysis of the rates per weekend drinking night was
supported by the analysis of percentages occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of all hours
and days) and the times series analysis.
Ambulance statistics showed that, compared to the baseline period, the rate of total ambulance calls
for service per weekend drinking night decreased (by 4.2%). The percentage of ‘most relevant’2 calls
for service occurring during weekend drinking nights also decreased (by 7.9 percentage points), while
alcohol-related presentations at the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital (RBWH) remained stable
(decreased by 0.1 percentage points). The impact of the trial on emergency presentations is unclear
as the RBWH does not record the location or time of an injury.
Consistent with stakeholder perceptions and evaluation observations, the activity data indicates that
the police in the Fortitude Valley Drink Safe Precinct have remained committed to high visibility
policing (for example, 7640 walkthroughs of licensed venues and 7223 street checks were conducted
during the two-years of the trial), and the use of de-escalation techniques and diversionary strategies
(conflict intervention and tactical communication strategies were utilised 6071 times to resolve
incidents and 1897 people were diverted to a DSP support service or other designated placed of
safety).
Over the two years of the trial, support services in the Fortitude Valley Drink Safe Precinct remained
active and well utilised by patrons. For example, the support services provided care or assistance to
over 6000 clients (n = 4897) and close to 145 000 free waters to patrons.
Finally, the impact of the Drink Safe Precinct trial on surrounding areas is difficult to interpret. Over
the two years of the trial, the Brisbane CBD and Caxton Street entertainment precinct has seen an
increase in the rate of calls for ambulance services (by 4.4%) and a decrease in offending behaviour
(decreases in rate of offences per weekend drinking night: all types of offences – 12.4%, assault –
13.8%, good order – 24.9% and offences against police – 47.3%). The data currently available does not
make it clear whether this reflects a change in policing practices or other strategies in that area, a local
1
Weekend drinking nights refer to 6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday nights.
2
A grouping of ‘Assault/Sexual Assault’, ‘Overdose/Poisoning (ingestion)’ and ‘Unconscious/Fainting (or near
faint)’ coded calls for service.
8|Page
Executive summary
trend of reducing alcohol related violence or a diffusion of benefits from the DSP trial to surrounding
areas.
Surfers Paradise Drink Safe Precinct
The findings for the Surfers Paradise DSP suggest there has been a decrease in violence and in the
severity of injuries sustained by patrons. Police crime statistics show a reduction in offending
behaviour in the precinct area during the trial compared to the baseline period (decreases in rate of
offences per weekend drinking night: all types of offences – 22.6%, assaults – 23.7%, good order
offences – 24.3% and offences against police – 41.9%). The analysis of the rates per weekend drinking
night was supported by the analysis of percentages occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of
all hours and days) and the times series analysis.
Compared to the baseline period, the rate of total ambulance calls for service per weekend drinking
night decreased during the trial period (by 3.1%), as did the percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls for
service occurring during weekend drinking nights (reduced by 12.3 percentage points). Time series
analysis also revealed there has been a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of
‘assault/sexual assault’ calls for service occurring during weekend drinking nights. The rate of alcoholrelated presentations during weekend drinking nights at Gold Coast Hospital remained stable (0.1
percentage point increase).
In the Surfers Paradise Drink Safe Precinct, the activity data indicates that the police have remained
committed to high visibility policing (for example, police conducted 6299 walkthroughs of licensed
venues and 7282 street checks during the two years of the trial), with particular emphasis on road
safety (conducting 3423 random breath tests and issuing 1250 Traffic Infringement Notices) and the
use of de-escalation techniques and diversionary strategies (conflict intervention and tactical
communication strategies utilised to resolve incidents 1458 times and 1403 people diverted to a DSP
support service or other designated placed of safety).
Over the two year trial period, support services in the Surfers Paradise Drink Safe Precinct remained
active and well utilised by patrons, with the support services providing care or assistance to over 5386
clients and handing out nearly 115 000 free waters to patrons. These findings suggest that police may
be diverting people into support services and de-escalating serious incidents where possible which
may be associated with the reduction in more serious behaviour.
Finally, the impact of the Drink Safe Precinct trial on surrounding areas is less clear. Over the two years
of the trial, the Broadbeach entertainment precinct saw an increase in the rate of calls for ambulance
services (by 13.6%) and an increase in offending behaviour (increases in rate of offences per weekend
drinking night: all types of offences – 60.8%, assault – 2.0%, good order – 146.3% and offences against
police – 51.5%). The data currently available does not make it clear whether the improvements in the
Surfers Paradise entertainment precinct are in contrast to any local or regional trend, whether the
increases in the Broadbeach CBD EP suggest that the DSP trial has displaced alcohol related violence to
the surrounding areas or if they reflect changes in patron behaviour, policing practices or other local
strategies in that area.
Townsville Drink Safe Precinct
The findings for the Townsville DSP provide some signs of reduced violence and severity of injuries in
the Townsville Drink Safe Precinct. Police crime statistics show an increase in the rate of all types of
9|Page
Executive summary
offences per weekend drinking night (by 1.5%), including in particular good order offences (by 18.4%)
and offences against police (by 3.6%). There has been a decrease in the rate of assault offences (by
25.3%), driven in part by a decrease in the percentage of ‘grievous serious’ assaults occurring during
weekend drinking nights. On its own, this data suggests the focus of policing activity remains on a ‘low
tolerance’ approach, although it is worth noting that this focus may be preventing or deterring more
serious and violent behaviour.
Compared to the baseline period, the rate of total ambulance calls for service per weekend drinking
night increased (by 35.7%, although this only represents a shift from 3.4 to 4.2 calls per weekend
drinking night); however the nature of calls for service appears to be changing. The percentage of
‘most relevant’ ambulance calls for service occurring during weekend drinking nights has reduced (by
5.4 percentage points), including a reduction (by 4.7 percentage points) in ‘assault/sexual assault’
calls. Time series analysis of the percentage of ‘most relevant’ ambulance calls for service occurring
during weekend drinking nights further demonstrates that following a rise at the outset of the trial,
these calls for service have trended down for the remainder of the trial period. The rate of alcoholrelated presentations during weekend drinking nights at Townsville Hospital was relatively stable (0.1
percentage point increase).
Unfortunately, police data recording issues have impeded attempts to estimate police use of deescalation and diversionary strategies in this precinct, and the data is therefore not available to
support a finding that these strategies have been key elements of the trial. It is understood that this
issue has now been addressed, and will be reflected in the data available from after the two-year trial
period.
The provision of support services in the Townsville Drink Safe Precinct has continued to grow during
the two years of the trial, following an initial start up period. During the first seven months of the trial
(December 2010 to June 2011) the Townsville DSP support service assisted or provided free water to a
total of 2927 patrons. In the remaining 17 months of the two-year trial (July 2011 to November 2012),
the Townsville support service assisted 1013 clients with significant issues and handed out over 44 000
free waters.
The Townsville DSP results may continue to be impacted on by factors identified in previous
evaluation reports, in particular, the limited late-night transport options other than taxis and the lack
of public toilets within the DSP. The patron dynamics are also substantially different in Townsville with
large numbers of ‘fly-in, fly-out workers’ and army personnel from the local barracks visiting licensed
venues within the DSP.
Conclusions
The initiatives implemented through the DSP trial appear to have been successful as a precinct
management strategy designed to respond to the violence and safety problems faced in these areas.
The local committees have improved coordination and communication within each area, although
overarching governance and communication between areas could be improved to strengthen the
roles of the local committees. Rest and recovery support services funded through the trial remain
active and well utilised. Police in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs continue to utilise deescalation and diversion strategies. Data recording issues during the trial have prevented firm
conclusions being made about the use of these strategies in the Townsville DSP.
10 | P a g e
Executive summary
Court orders banning violent offenders from the DSPs have been well utilised by police, and have wide
stakeholder and patron support. However, issues were raised about the lack of understanding as to
why a large proportion of police applications were being rejected by Magistrates, and the restrictions
on information police are able to share with licensees limiting efforts to enforce the orders.
The results from the analysis of the police and ambulance data suggest that DSP trial-related initiatives
may be having a positive impact on reducing the amount of violence and the severity of injuries
sustained by patrons across the three DSP sites. There is little evidence about the impact on
emergency department presentations across the three sites because the limitations of hospital data
have prevented detailed analysis.
While the DSP trial may have achieved some positive results in the trial areas, more comprehensive
solutions that consider the broader alcohol policy issues are required to achieve outcomes sustainable
in the medium to long-term. For example, strengthening information sharing powers for the police
would enable greater enforcement of banning orders and assist in making individuals more
responsible for their behaviour; better targeted education campaigns, responsible service of alcohol
training and compliance monitoring could reduce levels of intoxication; and improving and integrating
local planning and liquor licensing frameworks may assist local communities to control the availability
of alcohol and develop diverse night-time economies.
Consideration of these broader alcohol policy issues is also essential to address the financially
unsustainable nature of the DSP model trialled; a model which has proven too expensive to be
continued in full in the trial sites and even more challenging to expand to any of Queensland’s other
entertainment precincts.
11 | P a g e
Key themes & recommendations
The interim DSP evaluation report covering the first 14 months of the trial made 31
recommendations designed to assist Queensland to ‘get it right’ in the future when it comes to
alcohol, the growth of the night economy, and the health and safety of our communities (see
Appendix A). The results of the final DSP evaluation report covering the two years of the trial add
further support to these recommendations without any considerable changes. Therefore, rather
than publish a new or revised set of recommendations, this report reiterates the interim evaluation
report’s 31 recommendations, and emphasises the need for continued action in responding to them.
A consideration of the key themes of the final evaluation report should help focus attention on the
core issues that the government should consider in developing the future models for the DSPs and
responding to alcohol-related violence in Queensland’s other entertainment precincts. There are
also considerations for future evaluations of a similar initiative.
The key themes of the final evaluation report for the DSP trial are:

The initiatives implemented through the DSP trial have been successful in terms of precinct
management.
The key strengths of the precinct management strategies have been:
o
Local committees and management plans in each DSP area improving communication
and problem-solving between state and local government, licensees, venue managers,
security providers, taxi and other transport providers, support services and others.
o
Police DSP Inspectors playing a crucial role in the successful local governance and
coordination of the trial in each DSP, and for providing leadership to the police working
in the DSPs.
o
High visibility and increased police presence enabling proactive policing and rapid
response to incidents, preventing them from escalating further into serious incidents
and contributing to improved feelings of safety within the DSPs.
o
Use of de-escalation and diversion where appropriate by police to resolve minor
incidents, leading to a reduction in injuries and reduced pressure on ambulance services.
o
Provision of rest and recovery support services to respond to minor incidents and
providing a diversionary option for police, appearing to lead to a reduction in demand or
better use of police and ambulance services.
The precinct management initiatives implemented could be strengthened through:
o
Clearer communication paths for the local committees (between local areas as well as
an avenue to escalate issues) to better enable them to resolve issues.
o
Ensuring continued and/or further use of high-visibility vests by police, taxi marshal and
security staff to emphasise the presence of ‘capable guardians’ within the precincts.
12 | P a g e
o
Resolution of issues with police sharing banning order information (including photos and
licence numbers) with licensees to improve the enforcement of these orders, including
allowing for links with ID scanner systems where practical.
o
Providing adequate public toilet facilities within each precinct to minimise public
amenity problems and good order offences, allowing police time and resources to better
spent on other tasks.
It is important to note that local DSP committees are not, however, a ‘one size fits all’ solution.
Alternative models for delivering local-level precinct management that could be considered
include:

o
utilising existing structures such as liquor accords. For example, the Sunshine Coast
Collaborative Approach to Liquor Management (CALM) accords.
o
local governments leading similar committees with a focus on precinct management and
stakeholder collaboration. For example, the local government led, community based
‘Cairns Model’.
There are broader alcohol policy issues beyond the precinct management strategies that have
a considerable impact on the ability to achieve reductions in alcohol-related violence within
Queensland’s entertainment precincts.
The broader alcohol policy issues that require further consideration include:

o
The ability for local communities to control the availability of alcohol in their local areas
and grow diverse night time economies through improving and integrating local
planning and liquor licensing frameworks. The availability of quality liquor licensing data
and other data is crucial to enabling better informed planning and decision-making.
o
The role of education and social marketing campaigns in driving cultural and behavioural
change to reduce alcohol-related harms.
o
Additional monitoring of drink serving practices, such as through the use of ‘pseudopatron’/’mystery-shopper’ strategies to ensure consistent compliance with Responsible
Service of Alcohol (RSA) requirements.
o
The link between advertising and people’s alcohol consumption, particularly young
people, and the appropriateness of the different regulatory regimes covering ‘pubs and
clubs’ and ‘bottle shops’, including the extent to which the differences may have the
unintentional effect of encouraging ‘pre-loading’ drinking behaviour.
The evaluation of the DSP trial represents an important first step in addressing the lack of
reliable data or research in Queensland into alcohol-related violence. However, a number of
challenges were faced by the evaluation and remain to be considered by future evaluations.
o
Government administrative data (e.g. ambulance calls for service, hospital emergency
department presentations, police crime reports) while providing a ready, routinely
collected source of data, lacks quality ‘alcohol or drug flags’ or location data in some
instances. Some improvements to these systems are underway, however, more could be
done to streamline data entry to capture more useful data and improve linkages
between systems.
13 | P a g e
o
Sufficient time needs to be provided for data extraction and data cleaning, and the
resolution of any resulting problems encountered. The occurrence or extent of these
problems could be reduced with improvements to data systems and extraction
procedures.
o
The timeliness (and timing) of reporting has been a critical challenge for the DSP
evaluation, highlighting key issues around expectations of the evaluation, access to
reliable data extracts and necessary timeframes for robust data analysis and reporting.
o
The DSP evaluation utilised a common methodology across the three DSP sites to assess
the effectiveness of the trial as a package of strategies implemented in the three trial
sites. This reflected that the core elements of the trial were consistently implemented
across the trial sites. However, it has therefore not been able to distinguish the impact
of individual strategies. This limitation was clearly communicated from the outset, but
nonetheless remained an expectation for some stakeholders.
o
An alternative approach to this methodology would have been to have the evaluation
planned and conducted at a ‘place-based’ level, with the key benefit of better reflecting
the intention of the trial to deliver ‘local solutions to local problems’. Place-based
evaluations require additional resources, such as for local-level data collection, which
needs to be considered in the design of future evaluations. Other issues that also require
further consideration include the ability to distinguish individual impacts when the trial
implements a package of strategies and the availability of appropriate control sites or
groups.
o
The DSP evaluation measured outcomes in a number of ways and through triangulating
multiple data sources to ensure that a robust assessment of the initiative was made.
Specific targets for each data measure were not set as there were no reliable previous
results or clear pattern in other research to develop these from. Further evaluations are
required to allow for the setting of realistic evidence-based benchmarks.
o
A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) was not conducted as it
was outside of the scope of the evaluation. Preliminary exploration of the feasibility of
conducting a CBA or CEA indicated that Queensland’s service delivery agencies
responsible for responding to alcohol-related violence (e.g. police and ambulance
services) would need to undertake a substantial amount of detailed analysis to provide
the ‘cost per incident’ data that is essential to any form of cost analysis. Although it is
more commonly becoming an expectation of evaluations, CEA/CBAs require specific
technical expertise and the identification of the appropriate agency/organisation to
conduct such an analysis is important.
These key themes are discussed in more detail in Section 4.
14 | P a g e
Overview of the report
This report is large and will not be read from start to finish by all its readers. This overview of the
report is intended to assist some readers who may wish to identify the information that is most
relevant to them and start there.
Section 1 provides general information relevant to the trial and its evaluation. It includes:

the introduction of the trial and how the evaluation has been conducted (Chapter 1)

existing research about:
o
o
o
patterns of alcohol consumption in Australia and Queensland (Chapter 2)
the harms and benefits associated with alcohol (Chapter 3)
initiatives intended to reduce alcohol-related harms (Chapter 4).
Section 2 provides a description of the strategies and activities conducted (including analysis of the
data collected), and feedback about how these strategies were perceived, in the three DSP sites. It
includes information describing the:

the key characteristics of each of the trial sites (Chapter 5)

governance and coordination mechanisms, and perceptions of these mechanisms (Chapter 6)

key policing strategies of increased, high visibility police presence and use of diversion and deescalation strategies (Chapter 7)

use of NGO rest and recovery support services (Chapter 8)

use of banning orders (Chapter 9)

other actions including: Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) compliance activity;
transport; rubbish; toilets and public urination; and lighting (Chapter 10).
Section 3 presents the results of the analysis of 24 months of trial data from the three key
administrative data sources that are central to determining the impact of the trial. The results are
presented for each data source and then as a summary by each trial site:

ambulance calls for service (Chapter 11)

hospital emergency presentations (Chapter 12)

police crime reports (Chapter 13)

summary of results by trial site (Chapter 14); this chapter draws upon information presented in
Section 2 to suggest how the results might best be interpreted.
Section 4 provides a discussion drawing together the information presented in Sections 1 to 3
around:

precinct management (Chapter 15)

broader alcohol policy issues (Chapter 16)

considerations for future evaluations (Chapter 17).
15 | P a g e
Section 1 Background
Chapter 1 Introduction
Entertainment precincts, or areas containing a high concentration of pubs and nightclubs, can be
exciting places to visit, particularly at night for many young people. The consumption of alcohol can
facilitate fun, communication, positivity, social connection and bonding between individuals and
groups of people going out to these areas. In addition, entertainment precincts also deliver a great
deal of economic benefit. The night time economy in these areas directly employs many people in
roles such as bar staff, security, cleaners, taxi drivers and bus drivers.
However, vibrant night life areas that bring together large concentrations of people, many of whom
are young and drink to excess, are associated with considerable negative impacts that demand
careful management and carry costs. At the most extreme end of the scale is the small number of
tragic cases where the ultimate price for a fun night out is paid with the loss of a life. Recently, for
example, was the outpouring of community grief and disbelief at the death of an 18-year old who
was king hit in an unprovoked attack while walking on the street at 10pm in the Kings Cross
entertainment precinct in Sydney. While such devastating events are the rare extreme of
entertainment precinct violence, it is cases such as these that galvanise community concern about
the management of alcohol in these areas; we are all afraid that this could happen to our friend, our
son, or our daughter.
The vast majority of patrons in entertainment precincts do not come to any harm and behave well.
The proportion of people socialising in pubs and nightclubs who run into trouble is small. Yet even
this small proportion, in terms of raw numbers, still represents a substantial drain on the State’s
resources when the trouble they get into demands an ambulance, hospital or police service
response due to extreme intoxication, alcohol-associated injuries, violence or crime. For example, if
the crowd in and around Surfers Paradise nightclubs is around 35 000 on a peak night, and just 1% of
this number require a police, hospital, or an ambulance response, this would mean 350 people
requiring these state government services. Similarly, council costs, such as for cleaning up the litter,
public urination and vomit associated with such large concentrations of drinkers can be substantial.
The multiple uses of entertainment precinct space add further complexity to their effective
management. Located in urban areas, such precincts may be busy 24 hours a day accommodating a
night time economy centred on a concentration of licensed premises, day time businesses,
residential and other recreational uses. Behaviour commonly associated with drinking around pubs
and clubs, including drinking to excess, can create conflicts between the interests of those who use
the area at different times and for different reasons. For example, in the Surfers Paradise precinct,
early morning joggers, walkers and young families may head to the beach foreshore from around
5am. These people may be residents or visitors from interstate or overseas who are unlikely to
appreciate finding the area covered in stumbling drunks, rubbish from late night fast food outlets,
vomit or urine. Likewise, day time retail traders or market stall owners in Fortitude Valley would not
16 | P a g e
Section 1 Background - Chapter 1 Introduction
appreciate regularly starting their work day by cleaning up the ugly bodily side effects of drinking
that may only just be drawing to a close.
In vibrant modern cities, governments must work to develop and manage entertainment precincts
and integrate their multiple uses. Governments must also protect the public from the possible
antisocial aspects of public intoxication, including by regulating and restricting drinking and drunken
behaviour in public places, and in pubs and nightclubs.
Such management and regulation involves a balancing act. Firstly, the interests of all the users of
these key public spaces must be considered and support offered to enable them to co-exist relatively
harmoniously. Secondly, a balance must be achieved in relation to liquor licensing and law
enforcement. The government must avoid the pitfalls of creating a ‘wowser’ nanny state and give
people freedom to enjoy a drink out with friends. But it must also provide the rules and restrictions
necessary to protect people from harm and to ensure individuals and communities—drinkers and
licensees included—take responsibility for safe drinking behaviour.
The Drink Safe Precinct (DSP) trial is one important step that will improve Queensland’s knowledge
about working together to achieve this balance. It represents a state and local government effort to
work with industry and community to minimise conflicts between the interests of the multiple users
of these spaces and to promote healthy and vibrant night time economies where people can relax
and have fun in a safe environment.
Why was the Drink Safe Precinct (DSP) trial introduced?
In Queensland, there has been longstanding public concern about alcohol-related violence in our
community. This concern has intensified from time to time, often in response to traumatic and tragic
events. For example, concern about aggressive and violent behaviour associated with pubs and clubs
reached a peak in Brisbane in 2005 after the deaths of two young men, one killed at an inner city cab
rank and the other who was murdered while sitting on a bench outside a city hotel. These events led
to the development of the Brisbane City Safety Action Plan and the introduction of the statewide
‘lockout’ (Queensland Government 2006). The lockout was put in place to prevent patrons from
entering or re-entering venues after 3am and thus reduce the movement of people between venues
during the early hours of the morning. The statewide 3am lockout is still in place.
Since the mid 2000s, glassings have particularly attracted media, public and political concern in
Queensland and elsewhere in Australia. For example, headlines in Queensland highlighting glassings
include: ‘Glassing attacks on the rise’ (Kidman 2008), ‘Must it be death before glass ban’ (Bedo
2009), ‘Man blinded in Queensland pub glassing attack’ (The Australian 2011), and ‘Judge blasts grog
culture of glassing’ (Keim 2011).
In Queensland in May 2009, while there continued to be a great deal of attention about the
apparent increase in glassings, a 20 year-old man was murdered when he was stabbed with a
hunting knife at the Alexandra Hills Hotel in Brisbane. This tragic death, and the spate of glassings
reported around this time, intensified the level of anxiety about alcohol-related violence in general,
and glassings in particular. The (then) Queensland Government responded to concerns in a number
of ways, including:
17 | P a g e

Introducing a range of strategies, particularly from late 2009, to reduce the incidence and
severity of glassing assaults in and around pubs and clubs in Queensland. These strategies
include the categorisation of certain venues as ‘high risk’ and requiring those venues to remove
glass. Harm minimisation strategies were also implemented at the same time.

On 4 August 2009, the Legislative Assembly asked the bipartisan Law, Justice and Safety
parliamentary committee to conduct an inquiry into alcohol-related violence (‘the Inquiry’) (see
Bligh 2009a).
The Law, Justice and Safety Committee’s Inquiry into Alcohol-Related
Violence (‘the Inquiry’)
The Inquiry’s terms of reference required the following be considered:

best practice harm minimisation measures in other Australian and international jurisdictions,
including specific measures such as restrictions on the use of glass

the impact of late opening hours on incidence of alcohol-related violence

flow-on issues resulting from alcohol-related violence for emergency service workers, police and
frontline health workers

education campaigns and their role in cultivating effective social change in terms of community
attitudes to alcohol consumption

the role of parents in influencing the attitudes of young Queenslanders towards alcohol
consumption

the economic cost of alcohol-related violence.
The Inquiry received public submissions and conducted consultations with community leaders,
educators, law enforcement, medical professionals and the liquor industry.
The Inquiry provided its final report in March 2010, which included 68 recommendations to
government (Law, Justice and Safety Committee 2010a). The Committee Chair, Ms Barbara Stone
MP, stated that in making its recommendations, ‘the Committee has balanced the expectations of
the community, the importance of the liquor industry both as an employer and to the economy, and
the need for higher penalties and stronger enforcement’ (Law, Justice and Safety Committee 2010b).
The report noted that:
Alcohol has always been accepted as part of the traditions of celebrations and part of our
socialising as the majority of Australians drink in moderation. It is also a provider of
employment and trade…
But it also expressed concern about the:
…growing culture of drinking to harmful levels, without any pride or self-respect. Vomiting,
falling over, and creating a nuisance in public are not seen as shameful but to some are
badges of honour. A lack of self-respect and respect for others seems entrenched. If we want
to change this culture it is now up to all of us to start the discussion and have the alcohol
debate just as we started the tobacco debate more than twenty years ago.
18 | P a g e
The report identified that action was required at a state and local government level to respond to
alcohol-related violence. It identified that the state government must respond to transport issues,
the need for better enforcement of liquor laws, and give support to the community and industry in
entertainment precincts. It said that local government must provide more public toilets and street
lighting, and commit to identifying and managing entertainment precincts. Specific
recommendations included:

trading hours for pubs, clubs and bottleshops should be reduced to 2am on weekdays and 4am
on weekends in entertainment precincts, and 1am on weekdays and 3am on weekends
elsewhere

those areas that are declared to be entertainment precincts should be required to have a
management plan to ensure there is adequate public transport, policing and security

a 2am lockout should apply to all venues

bottle shop trading hours should be reduced so that they close at 9pm rather than 10pm

the levels of police resources should be increased

penalties and enforcement action against offenders should be increased to curb alcohol-related
violence by strengthening individual responsibility

the availability of public transport and public toilets should be improved

use of tempered glass or polycarbonate after midnight should be mandatory for all venues other
than those deemed to be low risk

all venues should be required to provide free water.
After the release of the Inquiry’s final report, the Queensland Government conducted further
consultation with industry and the community about the Inquiry’s recommendations in order to
develop its response.3
The Queensland Government’s 2010 response to the Inquiry included as its ‘centrepiece’ the
announcement of a two year trial of DSPs with the aim of reducing alcohol-related violence in the
key entertainment precincts of Surfers Paradise, Townsville and Fortitude Valley (Queensland
Government 2010).
Further strategies arising from the Inquiry
At the time the DSP trial was announced, the Queensland Government also introduced other
strategies state wide to reduce alcohol-related violence. These included:

strengthening legislation to ensure people who commit acts of alcohol-related violence can be
banned from venues and entertainment precincts

introducing legal requirement for venues to make free drinking water available to patrons.
When announcing the DSP trial, the Queensland Government noted that, contrary to the
recommendations of the alcohol-related violence Inquiry, it would maintain during the trial:
3
As part of this consultation an online survey was conducted, which received about 16 000 responses.
19 | P a g e

existing lockout laws preventing patrons from entering or re-entering licensed venues after 3am

the moratorium on extended trading hours applications.
Maintaining the status quo on these major aspects of liquor licensing policy was justified on the
basis that this would provide certainty to licensees and patrons, and allow time for the new placebased management approach to be trialled and evaluated through the DSPs (see e.g. Bligh & Lawlor
2010).
Box 1. The current Queensland moratorium on extended trading hours
On 16 September 2009, the then Premier of Queensland announced a temporary prohibition until 31
December 2013 on all applications for extended hours between midnight and 5am, except for applications
relating to venues within certain designated areas under s.89 Liquor Act 1992.
The areas excluded from the moratorium are the entertainment precincts of: Brisbane CBD and Caxton
Street, Fortitude Valley, Broadbeach CBD, Bundaberg CBD, Cairns CBD, Ipswich CBD, Mackay CBD,
Rockhampton CBD, Surfers Paradise CBD, Toowoomba CBD, and Townsville CBD (see Liquor Regulation
2002).
The moratorium was said to be a ‘bid to further crack down on alcohol-fuelled violence’ (Bligh 2009b). It
took effect immediately upon announcement and was originally to be in place for 12 months. However, it
was first extended to 15 December 2010 pending the outcomes of the Law and Justice and Safety
Committee’s Inquiry into alcohol-related violence, and was extended again until 31 December 2013 when
the government response to the Inquiry and the DSP trial was announced.
The freeze applied to all new and existing extended hours applications that were before the Office of
Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR). Many of the applications that were on foot have not been
withdrawn and are still pending.
What are DSPs? What has the DSP trial involved?
The DSP trial in Townsville, Surfers Paradise and Fortitude Valley, commenced operation in each
precinct in December 2010, and was originally to continue to operate until November 2012. In July
2012, the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice announced the DSP trial would be extended
until February 2013 in order to ensure additional protections are in place during Schoolies and the
festive season, and allow the government to consider the long term future of the DSP in late 2012
(Bleijie 2012). Following consideration in late 2012 of the DSP interim evaluation report covering the
first 14 months of the trial, the trial was further extended until 30 September 2013 to enable the
evaluation of the full two-year period.
The DSP trial aims to provide better place-based management to coordinate the resources of state
and local government, industry and community, and to address local issues relating to alcoholrelated violence with practical local solutions. At the time the trial was announced, parallels were
drawn between the trial and the way that major sporting events are run in terms of better
coordinating policing, security and support services (see Bligh & Lawlor 2010).
20 | P a g e
Three key features of the trial that have been implemented across each of the three sites are:
1. Increased police presence and high visibility policing on busy drinking nights (e.g. proactive
patrols of precincts and conducting walk-throughs of venues).
2. Support/rest and recovery services provided by non-government organisations (NGOs) on busy
drinking nights (Chill Out Zone, ChaplainWatch, Anglicare and Townsville Street Chaplains).
3. Improved coordination between venues, police, ambulance, community support services and
transport providers. Police appointed DSP Inspectors to assist with coordination, and local DSP
committees were convened to make decisions about strategies tailored to the needs of their
area to improve coordination. These committees include representation from the local council,
licensees, security providers, government agencies and community groups.
Strategies that have varied across the trial sites have sought to improve:

taxi zones and their supervision

transport information and way-finding signage

lighting and other Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) initiatives

issues such as crowding and footpath queuing

access to public toilets.
Section 2 provides details of initiatives implemented in each DSP area throughout the trial period.
Funding
The trial initially received $8.534M of Queensland Government funding over two years, with
$6.282M provided for additional police numbers/hours and $2.252M for the Department of
Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services (DCCSDS) to fund NGOs to provide the rest and
recovery support services.4 Since then, the government has provided an additional $563,000 to the
DCSSDS to fund the provision of the support services during the extension of the trial. The high
visibility policing has been provided by the Queensland Police Service (QPS) within their existing
resources for the extension of the trial.
A range of other state government agencies made important contributions throughout the trial, but
were required to do so with no additional funding and within the constraints of existing resources.
For example:

in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise, Translink has installed light projections on to the
footpath outside late night trading venues directing patrons to public transport and taxi services
(GoBo projections)

in each of the three DSP areas the Department of Transport and Main Roads (DTMR) has taken
steps to provide extra taxi marshals and security guard services at taxi ranks in key locations.
4
At the outset of the DSP trial half of this funding was allocated to support the increased police presence and
the community support services during the first 12 months of the trial. This was described as funding to
‘kickstart’ the trial. The two year trial was said to be required for reasons including that it would allow time for
discussion with industry about the future arrangements for resourcing the model (Bligh & Lawlor 2010).
21 | P a g e
Local governments and other non-government stakeholders have also provided crucial support to
the DSP trial:

at the outset of the trial, the Brisbane City Council (BCC) undertook a major upgrade of existing
lighting and also installed additional lighting to improve safety and amenity within the Fortitude
Valley precinct.

in response to the DSP online survey results and feedback from stakeholders, the Gold Coast City
Council (GCCC) trialled an additional night time rubbish service, and a 12-week portable toilet
trial on Friday and Saturday nights.

in Townsville, the Late Night Traders have provided funding to support a security guard
dedicated to liaise between venues on Flinders Street East, the rest and recovery support service
and the police. The security guard maintains radio communication with all licensed premises to
ensure efficient police response to incidents.
Why evaluate the DSP trial?
The government response to the Inquiry into alcohol-related violence that established the DSP trial,
also included a commitment to evaluate it. A further commitment was made to improve data
collection and the evidence base about what works to reduce alcohol-related violence in
Queensland over the long term (Queensland Government 2010).
Despite the importance of alcohol-related issues for the community, there is lack of clear evidence
about what works to reduce alcohol-related violence. The Inquiry expressed frustration over the lack
of reliable data available in Queensland to inform key policy considerations (Law, Justice and Safety
Committee 2010a).
Evaluating whether the DSP trial achieves its aims of reducing alcohol-related violence and
improving community safety and amenity is an important step in building better evidence to inform
ongoing decision-making about alcohol policy in Queensland. It will also inform the way forward to
improve the quality of data available about alcohol-related violence in Queensland.
During the trial, feedback from stakeholders has been overwhelmingly positive, particularly as the
trial has progressed beyond its initial phase. The effort that has been put in to the trial by a large
number of individuals, agencies and organisations is highly commendable. There is no doubt that the
trial has helped strengthen and build positive working relationships in each of the three DSP sites.
However, while the trial has certainly provided much for its partners to feel good about, such
feelings and perceptions do not necessarily mean the trial has been successful in terms of bringing
about measurable reductions in alcohol-related violence. This evaluation considers both stakeholder
perceptions of the success of the trial and objective measures of a range of outcomes, in order to
determine whether the trial was successful in achieving its aims.
The importance of properly evaluating the trial has been widely acknowledged. There has been a
high level of support and ‘buy in’ regarding the DSP evaluation from all stakeholders involved and
without this high level of cooperation the successful evaluation of the trial would not have been
possible.
22 | P a g e
How has the evaluation been conducted?
The implementation of the DSP trial across the three sites has been reliant on a multi-agency
approach between: the Department of Justice and Attorney-General through the Office of Liquor
and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) as the lead agency for the trial and liquor licensing in Queensland;
the QPS as the agency with responsibility for DSP policing and chairing the local committees; and the
DCCSDS as the funding agency for the NGO support services. Other government agencies, such as
the DTMR and the Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS), local governments and licensees also hold
important roles in the trial with responsibility for many actions outlined in each of the DSP local
management plans.
Reflective of the trial itself then, the evaluation has involved a collaborative approach involving a
number of stakeholders; with coordination of the evaluation being led by Criminal Justice Research
within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet. All partner agencies have played a key role as
data and information providers, in particular the QPS, QAS, Queensland Health, OLGR and DTMR
(including Translink). The funded NGO support services, local governments and other local DSP
committee representatives have also been involved in the evaluation, providing data and other
information throughout the trial. Finally, the evaluation has established a partnership with the
University of Queensland’s Centre for Youth Substance Abuse Research (CYSAR) and Health LinQ to
provide independent, high-level statistical data analyses.
An interim evaluation report was published on the OLGR website in December 2012 that covered
the first 14 months of the trial.5 The interim evaluation report, in detail, set the context for the trial
and the evaluation; reported on activity within the DSPs; analysed the results of the trial to date; and
discussed the implications of these results for both the DSP trial itself and broader liquor policy
issues in Queensland. The interim evaluation report was not only an important milestone for the
evaluation of the DSP trial, but also a crucial first step in addressing what the parliamentary inquiry
into alcohol-related violence described as an “apparent lack of comprehensive, reliable data relating
to alcohol-related violence” (Law, Justice and Safety Committee 2010, p. 15).
In May 2013, an evaluation update covering 18 months of the trial was also published on the OLGR
website.6 It provided an update on the key data trends reported in the interim evaluation published
in December 2012, including identifying where trends have remained consistent, and where issues
have been identified with respect to implementation or the data being provided, which has
impacted upon the trends being observed.
This report is the final evaluation report for the Drink Safe Precincts trial, collating the information
reported previously (particularly in the interim evaluation report) and providing the activity and
impact data across the full two-year trial period (December 2010 – November 2012). It provides the
best answer possible to the seemingly simple, yet ever complex question asked of all trials, ‘did it
work?’, but as importantly, it also provides a framework to build upon and strengthen for future
evaluations of similar initiatives in Queensland.
5
http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/liquor/responsible/drink-safe/index.shtml
6
ibid
23 | P a g e
The evaluation of the Drink Safe Precincts trial has not considered the extension of the trial period
(December 2012 onwards) as this was out of scope, and was not included in the planning for the
extension of the trial. The extension period has seen quite different operating methods established
in each of the precincts – more so then during the original two-year trial period – to ensure that the
key elements of the trial could continue to be delivered within the available limited resources. These
modifications would require the extension period to be evaluated separately from the original trial
period, rather than as additional trial period for the current evaluation project.
Key question and target outcomes
The key question for the evaluation is: Did the trial succeed in bringing about a reduction in alcoholrelated violence, improved community safety and improved amenity in the trial areas?
Key target outcomes for the DSP trial were developed at the outset in close consultation with the
local DSP committees. These target outcomes include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
a reduction in alcohol-related offences and improved community safety
improved public amenity
better patron behaviour in the precinct
improved/coordinated transport.
Appendix B provides a table detailing the target outcomes mapped against potential data measures
and sources, as planned at the outset of the evaluation. The evolving nature of the evaluation means
that these measures have been subject to some degree of change.
Data sources
The evaluation of the DSP trial brings together a broad range of information and data from multiple
sources in order to determine whether the trial has been a success. This includes a range of
administrative data for activity measures (key DSP activity during the trial) and impact measures
(comparison of a baseline period to the trial period).
The administrative data sources are supplemented by information obtained through stakeholder
engagement, including consultations, interviews and surveys.
Administrative data sources
The administrative data sources for the evaluation include:

for activity measures
o
QPS returns sheet data collected throughout the trial from each DSP site
o
use of banning orders within the DSPs and EPs data collated by the QPS’s Drug and
Alcohol Coordination Unit
o

support service activity data from the Chill Out Zone, Chaplain Watch, and Anglicare
rest and recovery services
o OLGR compliance activity.
o bus and taxi transport patronage data from DTMR
for analysis considering the impact of the trial (impact datasets)
24 | P a g e
o
o
o
QPS – Queensland Police Record and Information Management Exchange (QPRIME)
crime report data
Hospital Emergency Department Information System (EDIS) emergency presentations
data.
QAS – Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) calls for service data
Each of these impact administrative datasets has their own strengths and weaknesses which are
summarised below (see page 28) and detailed in the separate chapters on each measure.
As has been the case for the interim evaluation considering the first wave of 14 months of trial data
and the evaluation update analysing 18-months of trial data, the analysis of the 24 months of the
trial has been conducted immediately upon that data becoming available.7 In comparison to the two
previous reports, the analysis of the full two-year trial period will provide the most clarity or
certainty possible for the DSP trial results and conclusions. However, it is still flagged for some
results, in particular the time series analysis, that a longer time period would be needed for the
analysis to provide meaningful results given the high variability of the data.
Consultations and focus groups
A great deal of consultation has occurred during the DSP trial in order to inform the evaluation. This
has included informal consultation occurring, for example, while spending time with police officers
and support services in the DSP areas at night and while participating in all local committee
meetings. We have also conducted formal face-to-face consultations, semi structured interviews and
focus groups with:


licensees, managers of licensed premises and security providers in each of the DSP areas
police, including the serving DSP Inspector, officers working DSP shifts and Liquor Enforcement
and Alcohol Proactive Strategy (LEAPS) officers in each of the DSP areas.
Surveys
Online surveys have been conducted at two intervals during the trial period, and these provide an
important source of information and another avenue for a broad range of stakeholders to have their
say. Some of the target outcomes that local DSP committees wanted to achieve through the trial
(e.g. improvements to perceptions of safety, public amenity issues, awareness of initiatives, and
perceptions of effectiveness of DSP initiatives) cannot be easily or comprehensively measured
through administrative data sources (such as QPS or QAS data). The surveys help to determine
whether the DSP trial is seen as successful in achieving these aims.
Surveys were developed targeting five key groups of stakeholders in the DSPs:
7
Each dataset has a ‘settling period’ to ensure the reliability and accuracy of data extracted. This settling
period allows time for data to be entered, updated and edited if required to ensure its accuracy. The length of
the settling period depends on the data source and the processes involved in data collection. For example, 24
months of DSP trial data was required for this report from 1 December 2010 to a 30 November 2012 cut off, so
a settling period after 30 November 2012 was required before data could be extracted. Police crime report
data takes four to six weeks to settle to allow crime reports to be entered by officers or completed following
further action/investigation. Police crime report data could therefore not be extracted until mid January 2013.
25 | P a g e
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
patrons
residents
businesses
licensees/approved managers
service providers (e.g. police officers, ambulance paramedics, transport drivers and bar staff).
This use of an online survey method means the results should not be considered to be
representative of the attitudes and experiences of any stakeholder group; we have considered the
survey information in addition to other consultation information, as providing an indication of some
people’s views. Appendix C provides further details of the survey administration.
Round 1 and Round 2 survey results have been published online at the Department of Justice and
Attorney-General’s website. Key results from these surveys are summarised throughout the report
where appropriate (particularly in Section 2). Detailed results are available online at
http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/liquor/responsible/drink-safe/index.shtml.
Analytical strategy
The analysis of the impact of the trial across the three impact datasets has been conducted by
comparing a baseline period of up to three years pre-trial (December 2007 – November 2010) with
the 24-month trial period (December 2010 – November 2012) for each of the DSP sites.
As well as comparing outcomes before and during the trial period for each of the DSP sites, the
evaluation also compares the trends between DSP areas and other designated Entertainment
Precincts (EPs) (prescribed by regulation) throughout the state. The EP areas under the Liquor Act
1992 are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Brisbane CBD and Caxton Street
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD. 8
Other designated EP areas throughout Queensland were primarily used for comparison only and to
explore if there was any state-wide trend regarding alcohol-related violence across the baseline and
trial period. Their value as true ‘control sites’ is limited given the inability for the evaluation or DSP
trial to manage any activities that go in these areas, or match them to the DSP areas based on
demographic, social, cultural or economic factors. In other words, it is not possible to definitively
view the EP areas as examples of what would have happened in the DSP sites had the trial not been
conducted.
8
See Liquor Regulation 2002 for designation and maps. These entertainment precincts are distinct from the
‘Special Entertainment Precincts’ that can be created under the Local Government Act 2009.
26 | P a g e
The Brisbane CBD and Caxton Street EP and Broadbeach EP are also of interest as EPs adjacent to or
nearby the Fortitude Valley DSP and Surfers Paradise DSPs (respectively). Analysis of these two EPs
will help consider the impact of local or regional trends in alcohol-related violence for these two
DSPs, as well as assess the extent to which any spatial displacement or diffusion of benefits has
occurred.9
This comparison of the baseline and trial periods for the DSP and EP sites has focused on those times
(6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday nights) that are consistently considered across each of the DSP
and EP sites as the peak periods for alcohol-related violence. These are referred to as ‘weekend
drinking nights’ throughout the report.10
In broad terms, the comparisons of the ambulance, police and hospital impact datasets have been
statistically analysed in two ways:


firstly, in terms of the percentage of incidents (calls for service, emergency department
presentations or police crime reports) occurring during weekend drinking nights
secondly, the rates of incidents per weekend drinking night.
The analysis of rates was conducted, as changes in the percentages of incidents occurring during
weekend drinking nights may reflect changes occurring at other times (e.g. if other week nights or
the day time becomes busier and more offending or injury occurs at these times, this can show up as
a decrease in the weekend drinking nights percentage).
Interrupted time series analysis was also conducted. Analysing the full trial period (24 months) has
resulted in some additional statistically significant trends (increases or decreases) being found
compared to the 14 and 18 month analyses.
This technical analysis of the impact datasets was reported to CJR in CYSAR’s Technical Report 3
(White, Baker, Plotnikova, Connor and Kisely 2013).
9
Spatial and temporal displacement refers to the possibility that the implementation of the DSP trial may
result in the targeted behaviour shifting to another location or time, e.g. if patrons choose to go to the
Brisbane CBD instead of Fortitude Valley because of the DSP. Diffusion of benefits refers to the opposite
potential impact, i.e. the DSP trial may produce benefits for other areas or times, e.g. if patrons overestimate
the area of the Fortitude Valley DSP and thus believe there are more police in the Brisbane CBD, they may
change their behaviour as a result.
10
The Surfers Paradise and Townsville DSP trials also operated to some extent on other nights (Thursday and
Tuesday respectively), and other EPs may also identify other nights are particularly busy. However, for the
purposes of consistency and to reflect the ‘core’ elements of the trial, the analysis focuses on weekend
drinking nights.
27 | P a g e
Box 2. What is time series analysis?
Time series is a form of longitudinal study where information on different cases or people is collected over
several time periods.
The DSP evaluation uses an ‘interrupted time series analysis’ that measures these different cases (e.g.
ambulance calls for service) periodically over many time points, with an interruption (e.g. the start of the
trial) occurring in the midst of these repeated measures.
The interrupted times series analysis compares this series of observations before and after the introduction
of the trial, and uses statistical methods to account for seasonal effects, and to test whether the
introduction of the trial had an impact (e.g. did the start of the trial change the trend in ambulance calls for
service).
The smoothed trend line on the time series charts demonstrates the analysis of the series of observations,
discounting seasonal effects in order to best isolate any impact of the trial.
Box 3. What does statistically significant mean?
In research, a result is called statistically significant if it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. That is, the
change observed (e.g. a 5% decrease) is likely to be real and not some random variation in the data.
A statistically significant change might be a large change or it might be a small change, it just depends on
sample size. For example, the difference between an IQ score of 98 for males and 100 for females could be
statistically significant if you had surveyed 1000 people, but not if you had surveyed only 25 people. This is
because the amount of data tested (number of people surveyed) impacts on the ability to detect that a
change is likely to be real (statistically significant) rather than possibly just the result of chance (not
statistically significant). This is evident in this report where some larger changes are not statistically
significant while smaller changes are statistically significant.
(See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significance, http://www.statpac.com/surveys/statisticalsignificance.htm and http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/glossary-ofterms/?pageaction=showterm&termid=67) for further discussion).
Limitations of the data and analysis
As discussed above, the evaluation of the Drink Safe Precinct trial has been conducted in the context
of what the parliamentary inquiry into alcohol-related violence described as an “apparent lack of
comprehensive, reliable data relating to alcohol-related violence” (Law, Justice and Safety
Committee 2010, p. 15).
While providing an opportunity to work on addressing this issue in Queensland, the evaluation has
had to contend with, and respond to, the limitations relating to the data that can be accessed and
the analysis that can be performed. Further details (including mitigation strategies) for each specific
data source are included in the relevant chapters, but in summary these limitations include:

for the Queensland Ambulance Service calls for service data – no ready identifier to indicate
that a particular call for service is alcohol or drug related; baseline data is limited to a 26
month period pre-trial as a result of a change in CAD systems used.

for the hospital emergency presentations data – the location data collected is limited to a
patient’s residing postcode; no data on the location, date or time of the injury that led to the
28 | P a g e
presentation is recorded; baseline data is limited to a 24 month pre-trial period as a result of
changes to data recording policies.

for the police crime reports data – the susceptibility of some types of crime to
underreporting (e.g. non-fatal violent offences11); that changes in crime report data may also
reflect changes in police numbers and policing strategies and the impact of police exercising
their discretion when deciding which offences should be formally charged.
The evaluation of the DSP trial, as with all evaluations of this nature, has been designed to suit the
program design and implementation of the trial, data availability, resources allocated and
timeframes for reporting. Although the methods adopted are believed to be the strongest possible,
and a first for this kind of trial in Queensland, there are inherent limitations that the design raises.
These include:

The use of standard target outcomes, key performance indicators and data measures for
each of the three DSP sites may not entirely reflect the place-based, locally driven nature of
the trial. Although the DSP trial involves several key common elements across the three
sites, substantial variation in the delivery of these still exists at a local level between the
sites. An evaluation of this nature cannot fully account for these differences.

Success ‘benchmarks’ (e.g. reduction in assaults by 20%) could not be identified during
development of the evaluation framework as there is no reliable evidence or clear
patterns/trends to base these upon. Nor can the results be compared to the results of a
similar trial as there no comparable evaluations of like trials available.

The conditions of the entertainment precinct comparison sites could not be controlled as
neither the trial nor the evaluation could manage the activities that occur in these areas. The
entertainment precincts could not be matched to the DSP areas based on patron numbers,
demographic, social, cultural or economic factors either as no such data exists at the
precinct level.

The effectiveness of individual, local strategies cannot be distinguished from the broader
DSP trial as the design of trial is centred on a package of strategies being implemented in
each site, rather than individual strategies being trialled in different sites.
While it is recognised that definitive conclusions about the success of the DSP trial cannot be drawn,
the findings nonetheless provide the best available indication of the possible impact of the DSP trial
in each site.
Summary
Longstanding public concern about alcohol-related violence, and a number of traumatic and tragic
deaths and injuries led the then Queensland Government to have a bipartisan parliamentary
committee conduct an inquiry into alcohol-related violence. The two year trial of DSPs was
announced in response to the Inquiry’s findings, with the aim of implementing place-based
strategies to reduce alcohol-related violence in key entertainment precincts.
11
Crime victim surveys would suggest that in Australia only about 50% of robberies, 30% of assaults and 20%
of sexual assaults are reported to police (Weatherburn 2004).
29 | P a g e
The trial commenced in December 2010 in Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise and Townsville and was
to continue to operate until November 2012. It has now been extended to end in September 2013.
In addition to a range of site specific strategies, three key strategies have been implemented across
the three sites as part of the trial:
1. the use of increased police presence and high visibility policing
2. support/rest and recovery services provided by NGOs
3. improved coordination between venues, police, ambulance, community support services and
transport providers.
The government response to the Inquiry also included a commitment to evaluate the DSP trial, in
order to provide much needed evidence about what works to reduce alcohol-related violence in
Queensland and assist key policy decisions in the future.
The evaluation draws upon information from consultations, focus groups, and surveys— together
with analysis of administrative data from police, ambulance and hospitals—to determine whether
the trial is succeeding in bringing about a reduction in alcohol-related violence and improving
community safety and amenity in the trial areas.
30 | P a g e
Chapter 2 Alcohol consumption
The consumption of alcohol is a widely accepted and normal part of Australian culture. There are
occasions and contexts where drinking and drunkenness are not only socially accepted in Australia,
but may also be expected.
There is little doubt that there is also widespread concern about the problems associated with
excessive alcohol consumption in Australia. For example, according to the 2010 National Drug
Strategy Household Survey results, among Australians aged 14 years or over, excessive alcohol use
was mentioned more often than other drugs as being the most serious concern to the community
(42%) (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2011a). In terms of the public debate, and
at the political level, it would appear that we are particularly concerned about the excessive drinking
behaviours of young people. For example, in 2008 the then Australian Prime Minister announced a
new national strategy to address the ‘binge drinking epidemic among young Australians’ (National
Preventative Health Taskforce 2008).12
While there may be widespread concern about excessive alcohol consumption in our community,
especially in relation to the binge drinking habits of our young people, there does not appear to be a
strong consensus about what amount of alcohol constitutes too much on a night out. For example,
the release of the new Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) alcohol
guidelines in 2009 triggered community and political debate about whether drinking more than four
standard drinks in a night should be considered ‘binge’ drinking.13 The guidelines recommend that
men and women drink no more than four standard drinks on a single occasion to reduce the risk of
alcohol-related injury arising from that occasion.
On release of the proposed guidelines the then president of the Australian Medical Association
(AMA) stated that this new level of recommended drinking ‘is just like when we started talking about
smoking being bad for you’ and ‘will certainly make people think twice about having that fifth drink…
[and perhaps make people] think twice about having the third one’ (ABC News 2008). Others,
however, felt that the guideline made no sense, and that drinking four standard drinks in an evening
was acceptable, normal behaviour that should not be problematised (see e.g. Abbott cited in
Bachelard & Gilmore 2008).
In this section we present a brief summary of research showing the key patterns of alcohol
consumption in Queensland and Australia.
Who drinks? How much? How often?
Patterns of frequent and high alcohol consumption are deeply ingrained in our way of life in
Australia and Queensland. On a typical day, Australians aged 14 years and over consume a total of
12
There is no consensus on the definition of ‘binge drinking’, and this term has been used differently over
time. Binge drinking in the past often referred to going on a two-or three-day bender, but now more usually
refers to heavy drinking, often with the intention of getting drunk, over an evening or similar time span.
13
The NHMRC guidelines themselves talk about drinking too much ‘on a single occasion of drinking’ rather
than ‘binge drinking’ (NHMRC 2009).
31 | P a g e
Section 1 Background - Chapter 2 Alcohol consumption
28 million standard alcoholic drinks (AIHW 2010). According to the 2010 National Drug Strategy
Household Survey results, among Australians aged 14 years or over:

40% drank alcohol recently (within a week)14 (for Queensland it was 41%)

7% drink alcohol on a daily basis (for Queensland this figure is 8%)

around one in five people drink at levels that puts their health at risk over their lifetime (on
average, over two standard drinks a day)15

about one in six people (16%) consume alcohol in quantities that place them at risk of an
alcohol-related injury from a single drinking occasion at least once a week (more than four
standard drinks per session)

males were far more likely than females to consume alcohol in risky quantities

those aged 18-29 were more likely than any other age group to consume alcohol in risky
quantities (AIHW 2011a).
Type of alcohol
The 2010 National Drug Strategy Household Survey results also show that in Australia:
 regular strength beer is the type of alcohol consumed most often by male recent drinkers (i.e.
last 12 months) aged 14 years and over (34%)

bottled wine is the type of alcohol consumed most often by female recent drinkers aged 14
years and over (47%)

pre-mixed spirits (also called ‘ready-to-drink’ (RTD) beverages or ‘alcopops’) were preferred as
the main drink for those aged 12-17 years, but females were much more likely to nominate this
preferred drink (62%) than males (38%)

there has been a shift away from pre-mixed drinks; 7% of recent drinkers, especially people aged
less than 29, changed their drink preference in the past 12 months, with one-third of these
people choosing to shift away from pre-mixed drinks (AIHW 2011a).16
Where do people usually drink?
Drinking most frequently occurs in private homes. The 2010 National Drug Strategy Household
Survey results indicate that among Australians aged 14 years or over, the most common place for
drinking is in the person’s own home, with drinking at a friend’s house, private parties and licensed
premises being the next most usual locations in descending order. The results show:
 about four in five (79%) recent drinkers usually drink in their own home
14
For illicit drugs (excluding pharmaceuticals) 5.3% reported using within the last week.
15
The results presented about the risks associated with alcohol consumption in the 2010 National Drug
Strategy Household Survey are based on the current Australian Alcohol Guidelines (NHMRC 2009).
16
In April 2008 the tax payable on pre-mixed alcoholic drinks or ‘alcopops’ was increased, making it equal to
the tax payable on spirits (see Hall & Chikritzhs 2011; Kisely, Pais, White, Connor, Quek, Crilly & Lawrence
2011; Skov, Chikritzhs, Kypri, Miller, Hall, Daube & Moodie 2011).
32 | P a g e

those aged 18-19 (71%) were the only age group more likely to usually drink at licensed premises
than in their own homes

a high percentage of those aged 20-29 (63%) also indicated they usually drink at licensed
premises, however, a higher proportion of this age group indicated that they usually drink at
home (71%) (AIHW 2011a).17
How do we compare to other countries?
In 2011 the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimated alcohol consumption globally by comparing
the total consumption of pure alcohol per person in each country aged 15 years and older. Of the
191 countries that were included in the study, Australia ranked 45th in terms of alcohol
consumption, with a consumption of 10.02 litres of pure alcohol per capita.
The Australian level of consumption is considered high as it ranks above the global average of 9.82
litres per capita, the United States (US) with 9.44 litres per capita, and New Zealand with 9.62 litres
per capita. The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain and Ireland, however, are all amongst
countries ranked higher in terms of per capita consumption of alcohol. Table 1 below presents
various countries and their respective alcohol consumption.
Table 1. Alcohol consumption per capita by country (litres)
Country
Australia
Canada
China
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Ireland
New Zealand
Russia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Source: WHO (2011).
Alcohol consumption per capita (litres)
10.02
9.77
5.91
13.66
12.81
10.75
10.7
14.41
9.62
15.7
11.62
10.3
13.37
9.44
It is important to consider how people drink in addition to how much they drink; national drinking
cultures must be taken into account. For example, some people distinguish two broad types of
drinking cultures:
1. ‘Wet’, ‘integrated’, ‘moderate’, ‘Mediterranean’ or ‘nontemperance’ drinking cultures are said
to be characterised by the integration of alcohol into everyday situations and where
drunkenness is not necessarily the goal of activities. Alcohol is generally thought of as food
substance and consumed with meals. Strong social norms curb overtly drunken behaviour.
Southern European countries are said to display this approach.
17
Respondents could select more than one response.
33 | P a g e
2. ‘Dry’, ‘nonintegrated’, ‘immoderate’, ‘Nordic’, ‘temperance’ or ‘ambivalent’ cultures are said to
be characterised by the segregation of alcohol consumption to specific times and places, with
drunkenness often featuring as the main aim of drinking. Heavily proscriptive laws about
drinking may exist on the one hand, while on the other, social norms are permissive and tolerant
of drunken behaviour. Northern European countries are said to show this approach (Stockley &
Saunders 2011).
The country comparison data provided by WHO shows that some European countries, such as
France, have high alcohol consumption per capita but have low heavy episodic drinking and/or low
risky drinking patterns. These data provide support for the notion that in some countries, at least,
high alcohol consumption per capita is driven by a culture of more regular but moderate drinking
patterns.
In contrast, the Australian drinking culture would appear to fall within the second broad
categorisation above. This is supported by WHO data suggesting that Australia has more risky
drinking patterns than a number of southern and western European countries who have higher
levels of alcohol consumption per capita (WHO 2011).
Has alcohol consumption changed over time?
Australians’ long term alcohol consumption patterns show changes over time. The Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) (2012a) considered the apparent consumption of alcohol18 in Australia over the
past 50 years, revealing:

the fluctuation of the total consumption of pure alcohol per capita:
o from the early 1960s onwards the apparent per capita consumption increased steadily,
peaking at 13 litres per person in 1974-75
o apparent consumption per capita then remained stable for 5-10 years, before declining
over the following decade to reach 10 litres per person in 1995-96
o since then, consumption has remained fairly stable at around this level ;19 current levels
of alcohol consumption are similar to those in the late 1950s

the pattern of consumption of types of alcohol has changed substantially:
18
Estimates of 'apparent consumption' are derived using information related to supply (that is, data on
domestic sales of Australian produced wine, excise data on alcohol produced for domestic consumption, data
on imports and an estimated component for home production), as opposed to actual consumption from a
survey.
19
Patterns of illicit drug use may show a different trend. For example, the 2010 National Drug Strategy
Household Survey shows in Australia recent cannabis use increased (from 9.1.% in 2007 to 10.3% in 2010), but
has declined in the longer term (from 12.7% in 1993). Other illicit drugs where use has increased since 2007
were cocaine, hallucinogens and inhalants. In the longer term, cocaine use was four times higher in 1993,
while use of hallucinogens and inhalants has returned to 1993 levels, having peaked in 1998, and dropped in
2004 and 2007. Recent use of ecstasy was lower in 2010 than in 2007, after increasing steadily since 1995.
There was no change in the recent use of meth/amphetamines, heroin, ketamine, GHB and injecting drug use
(AIHW 2011a).
34 | P a g e
o the proportion of pure alcohol available for consumption in the form of beer has
decreased from 76% to 42%
o the proportion of wine has increased from 12% to 37%
o the proportion of spirits (including RTDs) has increased from 12% to 20%.
Price and availability
Alcohol in Australia today is more affordable and more available than it has been in the past. The
real price of alcohol in Australia has remained relatively low compared to other commodities; in
some cases the price has dropped. For example, the most recent information available from the ABS
shows that a glass of wine costing $1 in June 1999 dropped in price in real terms to $0.90 in March
2008. In terms of price relative to income, although the per capita consumption of alcohol has
changed little, the proportion of average weekly expenditure by Australian households on alcoholic
beverages in 1984 was 3.4% ($12.30) compared to 2.6% ($23.32) in 2003-04 (National Preventative
Health Taskforce 2008).
The general physical availability of alcohol has increased in developed nations over past decades.
Considerable deregulation of liquor licensing has occurred across Australia since the 1980s, resulting
in increases in outlet20 density in many areas and reduced restrictions on outlet trading hours (Loxley
et al 2004; Stockwell & Gruenewald 2004).
Is the drinking behaviour of young people in Australia getting worse?
There is a common perception, and it is frequently reported in the media, that the drinking
behaviours of young people are becoming more extreme (see Farouque 2012; University of New
South Wales (UNSW) 2012).
A recent WHO (2011) global survey of young people, which did not include Australia in its survey
sample, sought to ascertain the global drinking trends of young people over time.21 The results
suggest that harmful and hazardous drinking patterns, including that of binge drinking, appear to be
increasing among young people from a cross-national perspective. Out of the 73 countries
worldwide who responded to the study, 71% indicted an increase in the level of binge drinking, 4%
indicated a decrease, 8% were stable, and 16% showed inconclusive trends. The report suggests this
may be a result of the increase in the prevalence of ‘alcopops’ drinks on the market in recent years
as these can have implications for the amount of alcohol that can be consumed and an individual’s
perceived level of drunkenness (WHO 2011).
In Australia, according to the 2010 National Drug Strategy Household Survey, around two-thirds of
males aged 18-19 and more than half of young men aged 20-29 put themselves at risk of an alcoholrelated injury at least once a month. This has been described as a ‘wake-up call for all of us’ (AIHW
2011a; UNSW 2012). However, whether the problem of excessive alcohol consumption, particularly
for young people, is worse than it was in the past is a moot point as there is not a great deal of
20
Outlet refers to both on-premise licensed venues and takeaway bottle shops (also referred to as offpremises licenses).
21
These results were obtained through a school-based survey conducted over a five year period with differing
cohorts.
35 | P a g e
empirical information to allow us to compare the drinking habits of young people in Australia over
the long term. When we compare the results of the National Drug Strategy Household Surveys
conducted in 2001, 2004 and 2007, drinking trends tend to remain fairly stable (i.e. the increase
seen is justifiable when considered in terms of the increasing Australian population). The data also
show that, over the years 2001–2007:

there is a decline in the number of people aged 29 years or less who reported they had recently
consumed alcohol, whereas there was a slight increase among the older age groups

there is some evidence that suggests that the proportion of younger Australians that drink
frequently (i.e. at least weekly) has declined since 2001, with a corresponding increase in
drinking less than weekly

the proportion of drinkers aged 20-29 that drink at a ‘risky’ or ‘high-risk’ level for long term
harm, increased from 2001 (14.7%) to 2007 (16%)

there was little change in the proportion of those aged 20-29 years that drink alcohol at ‘risky’ or
high-risk’ levels for short term harm (AIHW 2010).22
Summary
Probably more than ever, there is widespread concern about the problems associated with excessive
alcohol consumption in Australia, although our relationship with alcohol also appears to be deeply
ingrained. The 2010 National Drug Strategy Household Survey revealed that:

a considerable proportion of Australians, aged 14 years or over, drink at levels that puts their
health at risk over their lifetime or puts them at risk of an alcohol-related injury

beer for males, wine for females, and pre-mixed spirits for those aged 12-17 years are the most
preferred drinks by Australians

the most common place for drinking is in the person’s own home, however, those aged 18-19
are more likely to drink at licensed premises.
Further causes for concern include:

Australia currently ranks 45th out of 191 in the world in terms of alcohol consumption, with a
high consumption level of 10.02 litres of pure alcohol per capita
22
These risk categories are based on the 2001 Australian Alcohol Guidelines (NHMRC 2001a, 2001b). The 2001
guidelines divide alcohol consumption risk into two categories: long term and short term risk. Long term risk is
the risk level associated with regular daily patterns of drinking, defined by the total amount of alcohol typically
consumed per week. Excessive alcohol consumption over time increases the risk of developing some cancers,
cirrhosis of the liver, cognitive problems and dementia, and alcohol dependence. The short term risk relates to
the risk of harm (particularly injury, motor vehicle accidents or death) in the short term that is associated with
certain levels of drinking on a single day. Alcohol consumption beyond these limits corresponds to a greater
risk of injury, certain medical conditions, or the aggravation of certain psychological disorders. In 2009 the
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) released new guidelines regarding safe drinking levels.
The questions used in the most recent 2010 National Drug Strategy Household Survey reflect the new NHMRC
guidelines and therefore these results cannot be compared with previous surveys in 2001, 2004 and 2007 to
ascertain whether young people’s drinking consumption has changed over time.
36 | P a g e

there is some support for the notion that in some other countries at least, high alcohol
consumption per capita is driven by a culture of more regular but moderate drinking patterns
whereas Australian drinking culture tends to support more extreme patterns

total per capita consumption of alcohol in Australia has remained relatively stable over the past
decades, but there has been a shift away from beer to wine and other drinks, including premixed spirits

alcohol in Australia today is more affordable and more available than it has been in the past

there appears to be a commonly held view that harmful and hazardous drinking patterns,
including binge drinking, are increasing among young people.
The information in this chapter highlights that a relatively high level of alcohol consumption is
common within Australian society. It also suggests that drinking patterns—or how we drink, and not
just how much we drink—is an important factor to be taken into account in considering alcohol and
its role in Australian social life.
37 | P a g e
Chapter 3 Harms and benefits associated with
alcohol
Despite alcohol consumption being a pleasurable and sociable activity, it is also a known
contributing factor to health and social problems and is associated with a considerable amount of
harm to the community—especially when consumed at risky levels (Graham & Homel 2008; WHO
2002; NHMRC 2009). In economic terms, there are also benefits and costs associated with the
consumption of alcohol. All these factors need to be considered and weighed up in deciding the
appropriate public policy response to reduce alcohol-related harms.
Health
The health impacts of alcohol are not entirely negative. At low doses, the immediate direct effects of
alcohol produce mild euphoria, reduce tension and inhibitions, and usually make people feel more
talkative, relaxed or excited—these effects indeed provide positive incentives for people to drink. At
low levels of consumption, evidence also suggests that over the longer term alcohol may provide a
cumulative cardiovascular benefit, but that these cardiovascular benefits from alcohol can also be
gained from other means, such as exercise or diet modification.
The negative health impacts can be more extreme, for example:

Nearly 4% of all deaths worldwide are related to alcohol. Most alcohol-related deaths result
from injuries, cancer, cardiovascular diseases and liver cirrhosis (WHO 2011).

In Australia, alcohol is second only to tobacco as a preventable cause of drug-related death and
hospitalisation (English, Holman & Milne 1995; Mathers, Vos and Stevenson 1999; Higgins,
Cooper-Stanbury and Williams 2000; Ridolfo & Stevenson 2001):

o
between 1992 and 2001, more than 31,000 deaths were attributed to risky or high-risk
alcohol consumption (Chikritzhs, Catalano, Stockwell, Donath, Ngo, Young et al 2003)23
o
in the eight years between 1993–94 and 2000–01, over half a million completed hospital
episodes were associated with alcohol (Chikritzhs, Catalano, Stockwell, Donath, Ngo, Young
et al 2003).
Alcohol accounts for 13% of all deaths among 14–17 year old Australians — it has been
estimated that one Australian teenager dies and more than 60 are hospitalised each week from
alcohol-related causes (Chikritzhs, Pascal and Jones 2004).
In Australia, the National Preventative Health Taskforce (2008) estimates that alcohol accounts for
just over 3% of the disease and injury burden—5% in males and 2% in females (National
Preventative Health Taskforce 2008).
It is not just the amount of alcohol consumed by an individual that influences alcohol-related harm.
There is also a complex interaction between the consumption of alcohol and a variety of other
factors. These factors include biological and physiological factors such as sex, age, weight, body mass
23
As defined by the 2001 NHMRC Guidelines.
38 | P a g e
Section 1 Background - Chapter 3 Harms and benefits associated with alcohol
index, experience/tolerance of drinkers, genetics and general health (NHMRC 2009). Individual
personality, social and cultural norms, the social environment, and drinking patterns (including food,
drink and drug intake), are also factors that may affect the impact of alcohol consumption (Stockley
& Saunders 2011).
The adverse impacts of alcohol, immediate and cumulative, are summarised briefly below.
Immediate impacts
At higher doses, alcohol consumption is associated with less desirable effects, including lack of
coordination, slurred speech, memory loss, drowsiness, slow thought-processing, depressed reaction
time, nausea and vomiting (Carlson 2008; NHMRC 2009; Stockley & Saunders 2011). In the most
extreme cases, the immediate direct effects of alcohol intoxication can include death by alcohol
poisoning, overdose, suffocation and inhalation of vomit (NHMRC 2009).
Alcohol also impairs brain function and affects coordination and reaction to stimuli (Carlson 2008).
These effects increase the risk of accidents and injury during a drinking occasion and immediately
after. Alcohol consumption has been associated with accidents and injuries occurring in a variety of
settings including falls, fires, drowning, sports and recreational injuries (see NHMRC 2009). The risk
of injury from alcohol increases even after consuming a few drinks. For example, numerous studies
considering hospital emergency data show that higher levels of alcohol consumption are associated
with more serious injury presentations (see Johnson & McGovern 2004; Poynton at al 2005; Roche
at al 2001; Watt, Purdie, Roche and McClure2004).
Road-related accidents, injuries and fatalities
Perhaps the most extensive evidence available demonstrates the strong connection between alcohol
consumption and road related accidents, injuries and fatalities. There are many studies that
demonstrate this association. For example:

blood alcohol concentrations (BAC) as low as 0.04 to 0.05 have been shown to impair necessary
psychomotor skills and significantly increase the risk of road crashes (see e.g. Chrikritzhs et al
2003; Loxley et al 2004; WHO 2004)

a large study across Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia revealed that drivers with a
BAC <0.05 per cent were 1.2 times more likely to be responsible for the accident, while drivers
with a BAC over 0.20 per cent were found to be 24 times more likely to be responsible
(Drummer et al 2004).
While each additional drink consumed increases the risk of injury to the drinker, other people may
also suffer the negative consequences of the drinker’s alcohol-related accident or injury. For
example:

in Queensland, over 600 people were killed as a result of crashes involving drink drivers in the
eight years prior to 30 June 2009. This represents, on average, 23% per cent of all road fatalities
in Queensland for that period (Department of Transport and Main Roads 2010)

for Australian men, about one-third (33%) of motor vehicle deaths and one-quarter (25%) of
motor vehicle injuries have been attributed to alcohol consumption; for women the figures are
11 per cent in each case (Ridolfo & Stevenson 2001; NHMRC 2009)
39 | P a g e

for pedestrians, alcohol accounts for 40% of male and 17% of female deaths, and 37% of male
and 6% of female hospitalisations (Ridolfo & Stevenson 2001; NHMRC 2009; see also Lang et al
2003).
Alcohol outlet density and trading hours
Research also shows an association between the spatial density of alcohol outlets and drink driving,
crashes and pedestrian injuries. These alcohol-related harms have been shown to be more common
in areas that have a greater density of bars and where the population reported drinking larger
amounts of alcohol (Gruenewald, Johnson and Treno 2002; LaScala, Johnson and Gruenewald 2001;
Treno et al 2003). Other research has also shown a correspondence between later trading hours and
road crashes (Chikritzhs et al 2006).
Cumulative impacts
Harmful use of alcohol is a major contributing factor to mortality and morbidity and is one of the
most important contributors to the global burden of disease (Carlson 2008; WHO 2010a). Alcohol
has been causally linked to more than 60 different chronic medical conditions, including stroke,
heart and liver disease, cancers, diabetes and foetal alcohol spectrum disorder (Chikritzhs et al 2003;
National Preventative Health Taskforce 2008; NHMRC 2009).
Alcohol is ranked third out of 26 risk factors in terms of contribution to disease, disability and
mortality—ahead of high cholesterol, body mass index, low intake of fruit and vegetables, physical
inactivity and illicit drugs (WHO 2002).
There is evidence regarding the link between alcohol and mental health conditions. For example:

there is growing evidence that alcohol increases the risk of conditions such as depression and
anxiety in some people (Loxley et al 2004)

data from the 2007 Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing indicates that
substance abuse disorders were one type of mental disorder commonly reported among young
people aged 16–24 years (13%) (this was particularly true for males (16%)); alcohol was also the
most common drug of concern, accounting for 77% and 78% of substance abuse disorders in
males and females respectively (AIHW 2011b)

alcohol use is associated with self-harm and suicide—32% of all episodes of deliberate self-harm
injuries and suicides in men, and 29% in women, have been linked to alcohol consumption
(Ridolfo & Stevenson 2001; see also McCloskey & Berman 2003; NHMRC 2009).
Overall, it is suggested that more people die from the acute effects of alcohol than the long term or
cumulative effects (Chikritzhs et al 2003).
Social
Alcohol plays an important social role and helps to facilitate many positive social interactions and to
transform relationships. Many of us can recount occasions when we have relaxed, had fun, danced
and talked in ways that we may have been too inhibited to do without the involvement of alcohol.
Many of us have also made friends, or connected with our partners and lovers with some assistance
from alcohol. Indeed, one of the stakeholders described the night time economy in Fortitude Valley
40 | P a g e
as providing a ‘huge dating service’ and studies have shown that other people really do appear more
attractive to those that are drunk (Parker et al cited in Fox 2012).
On the other hand, the harmful effects of alcohol consumption extend to a range of social
consequences that can impact on the drinker, on family members and the community in general.
These social consequences of drinking include ones that cannot be easily quantified, such as
excessive noise, litter, offensive behaviour, vandalism or reduced feelings of safety in an area (Loxley
et al 2004). However, perhaps the most substantial and widely documented social harm related to
alcohol is the link between drinking and violent, abusive or other criminal behaviour. Studies
generally suggest that alcohol is involved in up to half of all violent crimes (including domestic
violence) and a lesser but still substantial proportion of other crimes. For example:

alcohol is associated with approximately 17% of male homicides (Mouzos & Seagrave 2004)

alcohol has been implicated in both domestic violence and sexual assault (Lievore 2003)

47% of all perpetrators of assault and 43% of all victims of assault were intoxicated at the time
of the assault (English, Holman & Milne 1995)

homicide offenders, regular violent offenders and non-regular offenders were more likely to
implicate alcohol in their offending (Gaffney et al 2010).
Experience of alcohol-related crime or aggression is common. For example, the results of the 2010
Australian National Drug Strategy Household Survey show that:


among Australians aged 14 years or over, in the previous 12 months:
o
8% were a victim of alcohol-related physical abuse
o
24% were the victim of alcohol-related verbal abuse
o
14% were ‘put in fear’ in an alcohol-related incident (AIHW 2011a)24
among recent drinkers aged 14 years and over, in the past 12 months, while under the influence
of alcohol:
o
6% verbally abused someone
o
4% created a disturbance, damaged or stole goods
o
1% physically abused someone (AIHW 2011a; see also ABS 2012; Laslett et al 2010).
There are a number of other lines of evidence that demonstrate the relationship between alcohol
consumption and the risk of criminal violence or other antisocial behaviour/disorder. For example,
behavioural experiments show that:

alcohol consumption increases aggression
24
The survey results also show males and people aged 18-19 were more likely than their counterparts to be
the victims of verbal and physical alcohol-related abuse. Females were more likely than males to report the
perpetrator of the alcohol-related incident was their spouse or partner, while males were more likely to report
the perpetrator was a stranger. Five per cent of people suffered a non-self inflicted injury as a result of an
alcohol-related incident, most commonly bruises or abrasions.
41 | P a g e

self-report surveys show ‘heavy’ drinkers report committing more violent offences than ‘light’
or non-drinkers

high rates of alcohol use in an area are correlated with high rates of physical violence

incidents of violence are frequently concentrated around licensed premises.
Concentration of licensed premises, violence, crime and disorder
The concentration of crime, violence and disorder in and around licensed premises is of particular
importance to the DSP evaluation. There is a great deal of Australian empirical research that
demonstrates the concentration of crime, violence and disorder on and around licensed premises.
For example, a range of self-report survey data shows a substantial proportion of violent crime takes
place at licensed premises. The National ABS surveys reveal:

according to the results of the Multipurpose Household Survey, in Australia 2010-11, 17% of
physical assaults on males and 8% of physical assaults on females occurred at a place of
entertainment/recreation, including pubs and nightclubs (i.e. 13% of physical assaults on people
occurred at a place of entertainment/recreation) (ABS 2012)

the results of the ABS’s 2005 Personal Safety Survey show that for men who had experienced
physical assault by a male perpetrator in the 12 months prior, 35% (148,900) occurred in the
open and 34% (145,300) occurred at licensed premises (ABS 2006).
Administrative data also reveal a pattern of the concentration of violent crime in and around
licensed premises. For example:

An Australian study examining the relationship between licensed premises and rates of violent
crime found that over 40 per cent of all assaults occurred either in or around a licensed premise
(Ireland & Thommeny 1993). The same study found that 60 per cent of all police attended
alcohol-related assaults in Sydney occurred in or around a licensed premise.

Queensland police data also shows that for the key public disorder offence of ‘public nuisance’:

o
about three-quarters of ‘public nuisance’ incidents recorded by police involve alcohol
o
a quarter of public nuisance offences were associated with licensed premises
o
most public nuisance incidents occur in areas that are considered to be major
entertainment precincts such as the Brisbane CBD, Fortitude Valley, Cairns and Surfers
Paradise, and are associated with events such as schoolies week and the Indy carnival at
the Gold Coast (Crime and Misconduct Commission, Queensland Alcohol and Drug
Research and Education Centre, and Australian Centre for Prehospital Research 2008)
nearly 10% of assaults recorded by police in NSW occur on licensed premises (Fitzgerald, Mason
& Borzycki 2010).25
25
A sizeable body of high quality research has been published by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and
Research documenting the relationship between licensed premises and crime in NSW (see e.g. Briscoe and
Donnelly 2001a; 2001b; 2003; Jones et al 2009; Moffatt et al 2009; Poynton et al 2005).
42 | P a g e
Research also shows that alcohol-related harms are not evenly distributed amongst licensed
premises. That is, the type of licensed premises is a factor with hotels and nightclubs the most
problematic for violence on licensed premises (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001a). This study also found that
a minority of licensed premises accounted for the majority of alcohol-related problems; 12% of
hotels in inner city Sydney accounted for approximately 60% of all assaults at licensed venues, while
in Newcastle 8% of venues accounted for 80% of assaults.
Management practices of licensee and venue managers within an area may also be a factor
contributing to higher crime rates (e.g. irresponsible serving practices and excessive consumption
promotions) (Lugo 2008).
Notable Queensland research from the Surfers Paradise Action Project, established in 1993, showed
that high numbers of violent incidents typically coincided with peak crowds, high levels of
intoxication, and substantial patron movement (Graham & Homel 2008). Furthermore, the larger
proportion of violent crime, criminal damage and anti-social behaviour occurred in the streets,
rather than within licensed premises themselves (Graham & Homel 2008; see also Mazerolle et al
2012). Observational analysis also revealed a number of cluster points (i.e. where people gather and
remain for a period such as takeaway food outlets) and congestion points (i.e. places where large
groups of people are moving through and may come in to conflict) where a greater proportion of
violent incidents occurred (MacIntyre & Homel 1997). Despite occurring in an area densely
populated with licensed premises, the evaluators observed that the greater proportion of violent
incidents was accounted for by a small proportion of nightclubs. The authors concluded that while
the occurrence of densely populated licensed premises has the potential to generate high incidence
of alcohol-related violence, not all premises are equally troublesome (Graham & Homel 2008;
Graham et al 2006).
Alcohol outlet density
Since the early 1990s, there has also been a growing body of evidence showing that increased
availability of alcohol in an area, in terms of the density of alcohol outlets, and hours of sale and days
of trade, has an adverse impact on overall alcohol consumption and damage from alcohol. More
than 50 research papers have been published in Australia since this time with many of them
demonstrating an association between alcohol availability and levels of crime, violence and disorder
specifically (see Connor et al 2011; Popova et al 2009).26 For example, research published by the
NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research Bureau shows:

Across NSW, respondents who live closer to liquor outlets were more likely to report problems
in their neighbourhood from drunkenness and property damage, even after controlling for sociodemographic factors. Those who live in areas with a higher density of licensed premises were
26
These studies involve a range of methods (including cross-sectional, longitudinal and quasi-experimental)
and data sources (including archival data on alcohol sales and alcohol outlet density, crime and other
administrative data, and survey data) (see Popova et al 2009). While there is a growing body of Australian
research in this area, there is none that uses Queensland data; this may be due, at least in part, to the
difficulty in accessing accurate information about the number and type of licensed premises in Queensland,
particularly historically.
43 | P a g e
also more likely to report problems in their neighbourhood from drunkenness (Donnelly et al
2006).

Between July 2007 and June 2008, more than half of the assaults recorded by police in the
Sydney CBD occurred within 50 metres of a liquor outlet, and whilst only 3% of the Sydney Local
Government Area (LGA) is within 20 metres of a liquor outlet, 37% of assaults in the Sydney LGA
occurred in this space (Burgess & Moffatt 2011). This analysis also suggested that each
additional alcohol outlet per hectare in Sydney LGA will result on average, in 4.5 additional
assaults per annum.27
Very few studies have differentiated the effects of different types of alcohol outlets. The density of
bars and bottle shops has been shown to be more strongly associated with increases in violence
while the opposite is true of restaurants (Gruenwald et al 2006; Lipton & Gruenewald 2002). This
research also found that increases in bars in adjacent areas (i.e. side by side) were more strongly
associated with increases in violence than increases in bars over broader areas.
Trading hours
In terms of hours of sale and days of trade, Australian and international evidence generally suggests
that there are adverse affects that result from increased hours, and benefits that result from
reduced hours (Popova et al 2009; Stockwell & Chikritzhs 2009). More specifically:

One Australian study found that following the introduction of extended trading hours permits,
there was a significant increase in the monthly assault rates for hotels with late trading hours
and this relationship was largely accounted for by the higher volume of alcohol sold (Chikritzhs &
Stockwell 2002). A subsequent study found that later trading hours corresponded with a
significant increase in monthly crash rates (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2006, 2007).

Hotels with extended or 24-hour trading have been shown to record a greater number of
assaults compared with those trading under standard hours (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001b).

Two studies have focused on the changes in closing times in the United Kingdom (UK) that
occurred in 2005 when restrictions were abolished and 24-hour trading was permitted. One
study focused on pubs and conducted qualitative interviews with 105 business owners. A slight
fall in alcohol consumption was reported by respondents who indicated that customers were
coming out later with peak hours being pushed back. No obvious impact on crime or violence
was noted. In contrast, a cohort study considering alcohol-related hospital attendees before and
after implementation of the change, showed alcohol-related injuries, admissions and overnight
stays for assault all increased after the change (cited in Popova et al 2009).
Assaults can of course occur on any day of the week and at any time of day or night. However,
assaults are most likely to occur when venues are busy and crowded—not just during late trading
hours (Homel, McIlwain & Carvolth 2004).
27
These two pieces of research were not able to consider the impact of different licence types on these
results.
44 | P a g e
What explains the association between alcohol, violence and crime?
There are likely to be a number of causal and contributory factors involved in the association
between alcohol, violence, crime and disorder. There is no single explanation or causal chain that
accounts for all individuals or types of violence. Alcohol may increase the risk of violent behaviour
only for certain individuals, or for a section of the population only in some situations and with
certain social/cultural influences. The majority of people who drink are never violent and even those
who do become aggressive won’t do so all the time.
The ‘loss of inhibitions hypothesis’ explains how the direct effects of alcohol on the brain may
contribute to the connection between alcohol, violence and crime. A number of studies show that
alcohol use increases the risk of aggression and violence behaviour due to its disinhibiting effects.
For example, alcohol:

increases levels of aggression (Bushman 1996)

increases the likelihood of people engaging in risky behaviour (Pihl, Peterson & Lau 1993)

decreases a person’s ability to control their impulses (Fillmore & Weafer 2004)

heightens emotions and sensitivity (Graham & Wells 2003)

impairs executive functioning and alters the ability to make rational decisions (Graham & Wells
2003).
According to the ‘disinhibition hypothesis’, therefore, alcohol weakens brain mechanisms that
normally restrain impulsive behaviours, including inappropriate aggression. By impairing information
processing, alcohol can also lead a person to misjudge social cues, and thereby overreact to a
perceived threat. Simultaneously, a narrowing of attention may lead to an inaccurate assessment of
the future risks of acting on an immediate violent impulse (Gustafson 1994).
It may also be the case that violent people are more likely than nonviolent people to select or
encounter social situations and subcultures that encourage heavy drinking (see Treno et al 2007).
For some, abuse of alcohol and a propensity for violence may stem from a common cause such as a
temperamental trait, a risk-seeking personality, or a social environment (e.g. peer influence) that
encourages or contributes to these behaviours.
In pubs, clubs and entertainment precincts
Drinking environments themselves can certainly impact on the chances of a person becoming
aggressive when drinking. Several studies in a number of countries have found that drinking in public
venues is particularly associated with heavy drinking and intoxication, and the link between violence
in and around licensed premises may be partly attributable to people consuming more alcohol in
these areas (Demers et al 2002; Martin, Wyllie & Casswell 1992; cf Casswell, Zhang & Wyllie 1993).
The size and types of venues, and patron characteristics are likely to have an impact. Venues that
attract large groups of young men are more likely to witness aggressive behaviour than those with
mixed groups and couples, while licensed venues that offer some form of entertainment rather than
just drinking are less likely to see fights and aggression (Connor et al 2011; Graham & Homel 2008;
Wells et al 2005).
45 | P a g e
As discussed above, characteristics of the physical environment, both inside and outside the venues,
may also contribute to crime and violence. Packed, noisy bars and clubs, overcrowding and loud
music can be triggers for violent encounters. Bumping into people, spilling someone’s drink inside a
venue or competing for space on narrow footpaths, in crowded queues to gain entry, or for a limited
number of taxis to get home, can also lead to confrontation. Being in a crowd creates opportunities
for frustration and conflict with others (Graham & Homel 2008).
The sheer number of people visiting entertainment precinct areas may also be a significant factor in
the generation of the level of crime and disorder in such areas. However, understanding how many
crimes occur per head of population is difficult because large numbers of people flood these areas
on busy nights and the size of the crowds involved can vary widely. This also makes it difficult to
establish crime rates and accurately compare levels of violence and disorder with areas where
drinking may primarily occur inside people’s homes or at private parties.
Certainly it is clear that the violence and disorder that occurs in and around licensed premises is
often the most obvious and public form of alcohol-related harm, and as such, there are
opportunities for strategies to be put in place to reduce the factors that can cause or contribute to
these harms.
Economic
The economic cost of alcohol use and abuse to Australian society is estimated to exceed billions of
dollars every year. On the other hand, alcohol also generates revenue through sales turnover, jobs
and taxation.28
Australian work by Collins and Lapsley (1996, 2002, 2008) explores the direct tangible (e.g. medical)
and intangible (e.g. pain and suffering) costs attributable to alcohol use and abuse across a range of
systems.29 Their results suggest that the cost of alcohol misuse to the Australian community exceeds
billions of dollars and that this has been increasing over time. For 2004-05, Collins and Lapsley (2008)
estimated that alcohol abuse cost $15.3 billion dollars (as compared to tobacco abuse, $31 billion
and illicit drug use, $8 billion).The total cost to policing alone across Australia from crime
attributable to alcohol is around $747 million dollars annually (Collins & Lapsley 2008).
28
For example, in 2001 the value of the UK alcohol drinks market was estimated to exceed £30 billion and was
estimated to provide just under 5% of the tax revenue generated by government (Institute of Alcohol Studies
(IAS) 2007). It was also estimated that the alcohol industry generated one million jobs across the whole supply
chain (IAS 2007). In America the revenue raised from state and local alcohol taxes has continued to grow from
$4 billion in 1997 to just under $6 billion in 2009 (Tax Policy Centre 2011). In Australia, the revenue produced
by sales tax on beer, wine and spirits has also increased over time from $1.3 billion in 1995-96 (Wilkinson
1997) to around $5.5 billion in 2007 (Stark 2007).
29
The work of Collins and Lapsley (1996, 2002, 2008) is unlike a great deal of other work that seeks to estimate
the economic costs of alcohol-related harm by considering the economic costs associated with alcohol use and
abuse for only one system (e.g. hospital emergency departments or employers) or single event (e.g. a death).
For example, a Western Australian study considering the cost of admissions to hospitals for alcohol-related
causes estimated that from 2005-09 admissions to Western Australia hospitals for alcohol-related causes
(including assault, road injuries, alcohol-related diseases, falls, suicides and other alcohol-related injuries) cost
$379M (Drug and Alcohol Office WA 2011).
46 | P a g e
More recently, research commissioned by the Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation Foundation
(AER) (Laslett et al 2010)30 attempted to measure more indirect costs not included in the calculations
of Collins and Lapsley (2008), such as the costs of victimisation that is linked to alcohol, and hidden
costs of alcohol abuse for friends, family, work colleagues and strangers impacted by drinkers. The
report found these indirect costs exceeded the direct costs of alcohol abuse estimated by Collins and
Lapsley (2008). In 2007, the harm to others indirectly caused by alcohol misuse is estimated to have
cost Australia $20 billion,31 including:


$14.2 billion in tangible costs:
o
$13.43 billion in out-of-pocket costs and foregone wages32
o
$765 million in estimated hospital and child protection costs
$6.4 billion in intangible costs.33
Calculating the total direct and indirect cost of alcohol to Australian society requires more than
simply adding the total estimates reported here of Laslett et al (2010) and Collins and Lapsley (1996,
2002, 2008).34 Independently, however, these estimates reveal that the direct and indirect costs of
alcohol in economic terms are likely to be many billions of dollars.
Place-based estimates
As is the case with alcohol more broadly, entertainment precincts generate revenue through sales
turnover, jobs and taxation. Costs typically associated with the establishment, maintenance and
operation of entertainment precincts include the provision of public order and safety services,
health services, local authority administration, and transport services. Costs include staffing costs
(i.e. number of staff and hours worked) and other operational costs (e.g. buildings, cars and
equipment). However, precise costs associated with a particular entertainment precinct are
extremely difficult to estimate.35 Very little work has been done to identify and measure the
30
The cost estimates were based on data collected by government agencies and services (e.g child protection,
health, law enforcement and family services), population surveys, as well as results from a 2008 national
survey of more than 2,600 Australian adults.
31
This figure does not include costs of governmental services such as the police, courts, social welfare (other
than child protection).
32
Estimates based entirely on self-report and includes costs to the ‘other’ person which may be repaid by
insurance of some other means of social cost-sharing.
33
This figure reflects costs associated with the drinking of a single heavy drinker in the last year known to the
respondent in the year prior to the 2008 national survey. Intangible costs include estimated value of fear, pain
and suffering and lost quality of life. Method of calculation relies on respondents’ self-reports. Data was not
available to estimate intangible costs to due to others’ drinking for alcohol-related morbidity/mortality,
alcohol-related child protections, workplace costs, known person or stranger drinking or service utilisation.
34
Due to difference in definitions and counting methodologies, double counting may result.
35
Reasons for this include:
services delivered to the precinct may comprise only some proportion of the same service used in general
maintenance of the urban environment (e.g. policing services)
 an event (e.g. offence) that occurs in the precinct may not be directly related to participation in the
entertainment options provided by the precinct

47 | P a g e
economic costs and benefits associated with particular night time economies/entertainment
precincts.
City of Sydney, New South Wales
The City of Sydney Council commissioned a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the Sydney night
time economy (Bevan, Turnham & Lester 2011).36 The report states:
No previous study of a night time economy within a large global city economy has attempted
to identify and measure the detailed activities of that part of an economy which is ‘after
dark’ and then examine and compare the benefits of that economy with the related costs
that interact and surround its activities.
The report reveals that the estimated sales turnover in 2009 of the core activities that occur as part
of the night time economy (e.g. restaurants, bars, clubs and theatres) in the City of Sydney is a key
economic driver. In 2009, these core activities are estimated to have generated a total sales
turnover of $2.7 billion (3.2% of the total sales turnover of the economy of the local government
area). The estimated sales turnover in 2009 for non-core activities (e.g. accommodation or
transport) was found to have contributed a further $12.478 million dollars to the City of Sydney
economy.
Other economic benefits associated with the night time economy in the City of Sydney included:

27,115 jobs to the local economy as a direct result of core activities (7% of all jobs in the City of
Sydney) and a notable portion of a further 82,000 jobs in non-core activities

$227 million in tax revenues through personal taxation on wages

$200 million in direct and indirect taxation of businesses engaged in core activities

$26 million in estimated property taxes to the City of Sydney Council.
The most important core activity in the City of Sydney night time economy (by employment and
value) in both 2006 and 2009 was found to be food-led trade (including cafes and takeaway food as
well as sit down restaurants). Food-led trade in the City of Sydney accounts for by far the largest of
the core activities with just over 50% of all employment. This finding is said to be similar to the
statistics from major night time economies in the UK.
In comparison, policing, health, transport and other public service costs associated with supporting
the operation of the City of Sydney night time economy were estimated to be in the order of $125
million.37 Broadly this was found to be made up of the following:

an event (e.g. offence) that occurs outside the precinct may be directly related to participation in the
entertainment options provided by the precinct (e.g. domestic violence following intoxication in the
precinct).
36
The authors consulted with a broad range of government and industry representatives. The key data used in
the report was sourced from independent organizations including, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Bureau of
Transport Statistics, Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Dun & Bradstreet Australia and Sydney City
Council.
48 | P a g e

policing costs: $24.8 million

health costs: $4 million

transport costs: $64.8 million

other public service costs: $31 million.
The research conducted for the City of Sydney reveals that, for every dollar spent in supporting its
entertainment precincts in 2009, $22 was returned to the local economy.
Surfers Paradise
An economic impact assessment of the Surfers Paradise night time economy, commissioned by the
Surfers Paradise Alliance Limited (AEC Group 2012),38 estimated that the annual night time economy
provided:

$1.6 billion in true net economic contribution and 6.8% of the total Gold Coast net economic
activity in 2010-1139

$3.5 billion in direct and flow-on output40

$946 million in wages and salaries to paid workers employed by the night time entertainment
industry or a similar industry benefiting from the night time entertainment industry

19,038 full-time equivalent employees (both directly and indirectly through flow-on activity),
which equates to approximately 7.3% of total Gold Coast employment in 2010-11.
Patron expenditure in the precinct was estimated to amount to $1.1 billion across three peak nights
(Thursday, Friday, Saturday) and $400 million across off-peak nights (Sunday to Wednesday).
Spending on alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks represented the highest proportion of this
37
The authors note the calculations of the policing and health costs are ‘imprecise’ and therefore this figure
may not be an accurate reflection of the true cost of supporting the night time economy. The authors do state,
however, that they believe the quantum is on a realistic scale.
38
The AEC Group report was based on self-report surveys with 423 Surfers Paradise patrons conducted in two
locations over three peak periods (Thursday, Friday, Saturday between 9pm and 1 am). This sample size
reflects 1.5% of the estimated peak period patron population. The Surfers Paradise study used a less
comprehensive methodology than the City of Sydney study, relying on patron surveys and assumptions of
estimated crowd numbers without any assessment of actual crowd numbers. The City of Sydney study mapped
business activity using data from a number of independent sources and also conducted pedestrian counts to
estimate crowd numbers. These differences in approaches to night time economy studies suggest a need to
refine and adopt a strong and standard methodology that can be replicated in all areas.
39
Referred to in the report as gross value added and includes ‘the value of output after deducting the cost of
goods and services inputs in the production process. Value added defines the true net economic contribution
and is subsequently the preferred measure for assessing economic impacts’ (AEC Group 2012: 13).
40
‘Output refers to the gross value of goods and services transacted, including the costs of goods and services
used in the development and provision of the final product. Output typically overstates the economic impacts
as it counts all goods and services used in one stage of production as an input to later stages of production,
hence counting their contribution more than once’ (AEC Group 2012: 13).
49 | P a g e
expenditure at $584.63 million or 39% of estimated annual expenditure (day and night) within the
Surfers Paradise area.
In summary, while scant, existing research suggests that the night time economy in entertainment
precincts areas makes a substantial economic contribution in terms of employment, sales and
taxation. In Surfers Paradise this contribution has been estimated to be $1.6 billion dollars annually,
and for the City of Sydney the estimate is $2.7 billion dollars (AEC 2012; Bevan, Turnham & Lester
2011). In comparison, the cost of supporting the City of Sydney night time economy (including
policing, health and transport services), is estimated to be in the order of $125 million annually.41
These findings suggest that, in purely financial terms, the benefits gained from strong night time
economies outweigh the financial costs.
Are the harms associated with alcohol increasing?
Despite the relatively stable patterns of consumption of alcohol per capita presented in the previous
chapter, it would appear that the harms associated with alcohol have increased over the past
decade. For example, a recent report of the Victorian Auditor-General shows that the level of
reported alcohol-related harm in Victoria has increased significantly over the past 10 years:

alcohol-related ambulance attendances in metropolitan Melbourne more than tripled between
2000–01 and 2010–11

alcohol-related assaults in Victoria increased 49% over the period (Victorian Auditor-General
2012).
This is consistent with apparent increase in community concern about alcohol-related crime and
disorder over the same period.
How do alcohol-related harms compare to illicit drug
harms?
Compared to alcohol, there is less research showing the harms associated with illicit drug.42 The
research that is available, however, suggests that illicit drug use also has a wide range of health,
social and economic effects. The harms associated with illicit drugs vary in nature and severity
depending on the type of drug used, the amount used and the duration of use. Similarly to alcohol,
common harms associated with illicit drug use include health and psychological impacts, social
consequences that can affect family life, work and schooling, including violence and crime, and
economic costs to the community (AIHW 2007; Drug Info Clearinghouse 2008).
41
Based on an area the size of Sydney City (population of 4.5 million) in which four recognised entertainment
precincts operate.
42
Illicit drugs include illegal substances (e.g. amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana/cannabis), legal substances
that are used for non-medical purposes (e.g. pain-killers and tranquillisers) and other substances when used
inappropriately (e.g. inhalants) (Drug Info Clearinghouse 2008).
50 | P a g e
For example, in 2003, it was estimated that 2% of the burden of disease in Australia was attributable
to drug use and in 2005 it was estimated that just under half of all injecting drug users (46%) had
overdosed at some point in their lifetime (AIHW 2007).
The links between illicit substance use and crime extend well beyond the crime of the use of the
substance itself:

drug users are between 2.8 and 3.8 times more likely than non-drug users to be involved in
criminal offending (Bennett, Holloway & Farrington 2008)

60% of police detainees who had used drugs and reported committing crimes in the last 12
months identified that they believed their drug use and criminal behaviour were connected—
among those, 80% reported that they had committed crimes to obtain money so that they could
purchase the drugs (Bennett & Holloway 2006)

43% of drug users in Australia, interviewed as part of the Illicit Drug Reporting System, reported
that they had engaged in some form of criminal behaviour within the month prior to being
interviewed. Of those:
o
67% were involved in drug dealing
o
51% committed property crime
o
16% were involved in violent crime.
There is also some evidence to suggest an association between illicit drug use and violent
behaviour—especially among amphetamine users. McKetin, Kelly and McLaren (2006) suggest that
amphetamine use is linked to violence in the context of methamphetamine-induced psychosis. The
effects of amphetamine use have been identified as possible risk factors for violent behaviour. These
effects include agitation, depression, paranoia, psychotic behaviour, and hallucinations (Australian
Crime Commission 2010; Boles & Miotto 2003). Amphetamine use has also been linked to episodes
of unpredictable, hostile and violent behaviour (Topp et al 2002; McKetin , McLaren, Riddell and
Robins 2006).
When comparing the scale of harms related to alcohol and illicit drugs, research consistently shows
that alcohol is the most harmful substance of the two—in terms of the amount of physical, social
and psychological harms caused to individual users and to others (Laslett et al 2010). For example,
the Independent Scientific Committee on Drugs in the UK conducted an assessment on the harms
caused by the misuse of drugs (Nutt, King & Phillips 2010). As part of their assessment, they
considered the harms associated with consumption to the user, as well as the wider impact of drugs
on society, including:

mortality, morbidity and injury

dependence

impairment of mental functioning

loss of tangible assets (e.g. income, housing, job, educational status)

family break down

economic costs (e.g. healthcare, social services)
51 | P a g e

crime levels.
Applying a technique called multi-criteria decision analysis modelling, drugs were scored out of 100
points, and the criteria were weighted to indicate their relative harm. The study showed that:

heroin, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine were the most harmful drugs to individual users

alcohol, heroin, and crack cocaine were the most harmful to others

overall, alcohol was rated as the most harmful drug (overall harm score 72), with heroin (55) and
crack cocaine (54) in second and third places (see also Gable 2004; Murphy 2007; Nutt et al
2007; van Amsterdam at al 2010).
Other evidence that suggests alcohol is more harmful than other substances includes:
1. Alcohol contributes to more hospitalisations than illicit drug use. For example, using Data from
the National Hospital Morbidity Database, Roxburg and Degenhardt (2008) found that, in terms
of the number of hospitalisations per million persons in Australia, alcohol accounted for the
highest number of hospitalisations, followed by sedatives and hypnotics.
2. Alcohol is associated with a larger proportion of injuries, emergency department presentations
and road crash accidents compared to illicit drugs (Drummer et al 2004).
3. Beyond the offences associated with the illicit drugs themselves, alcohol is more likely than any
other substance to be associated with crime, and in particular violent crime (Payne & Gaffney
2012).
Despite the considerable amount of research that suggests that alcohol contributes to larger
amounts of harm compared to illicit drug use, a number of factors need to be considered. Firstly,
significantly more people consume alcohol than illicit drugs. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that
proportionately more people will be affected by alcohol than illicit drugs. Secondly, drug use is a
largely hidden activity and more difficult to detect (e.g. alcohol can usually be detected through
smell, physical appearance of the consumer, particular behaviours).
Summary
Alcohol is associated with a number of health-related, social, and economic harms and benefits.
Health:

at low doses, alcohol can produce mild euphoria, reduce tension, make people feel more
talkative, relaxed or excited, and may even provide a cumulative cardiovascular benefit over the
longer term

at higher doses, alcohol is associated with less desirable effects, including lack of coordination,
slurred speech, memory loss, drowsiness, slow thought-processing, depressed reaction time,
nausea and vomiting, and in extreme cases death by alcohol poisoning, overdose, suffocation
and inhalation of vomit. It also makes people more prone to accidents and injuries

harmful use of alcohol is a major contributing factor to mortality and morbidity and is one of the
most important contributors to the global burden of disease, including chronic medical
conditions and mental health conditions.
52 | P a g e
Social:

alcohol can play an important social role and help facilitate many positive social interactions and
transform relationships

the harmful social effects of alcohol consumption may include excessive noise, litter, offensive
behaviour, vandalism, reduced feelings of safety, and even violent, abusive, or criminal
behaviour.
Economic:

alcohol generates revenue through sales turnover, jobs and taxation

the economic cost of alcohol use and abuse to Australian society is estimated to exceed billions
of dollars every year, and is increasing over time

although scant, existing research suggests that, in purely financial terms, the benefits gained
from strong night time economies in entertainment precincts outweigh the financial costs.
There is some evidence to suggest that the harms associated with alcohol have increased over the
past decade, despite the relatively stable patterns of per capita alcohol consumption. Certainly such
evidence would appear to be consistent with heightened community concern about binge drinking
and alcohol-related violence and disorder around pubs and clubs.
Though less research exists examining the harms associated with illicit drug use, the available
evidence suggests that illicit drug use also has a wide range of health, social and economic effects,
mostly harmful. These include health and psychological impacts, social consequences that can affect
family life, work and schooling, including violence and crime, and economic costs to the community.
In terms of costs, research has consistently shown that alcohol contributes to larger amounts of
harm compared to illicit drug use. However, this may be influenced by the fact that more people
consume alcohol than illicit drugs and the fact that drug use is a largely hidden activity and thus
more difficult to detect.
53 | P a g e
Chapter 4 What works to reduce alcohol-related
harms?
There is a growing body of international scientific evidence that shows ‘what works’43 to reduce
alcohol-related harms. It is a widely held view that reducing alcohol-related harm requires the
implementation of a mix of strategies that are effective in reducing overall alcohol consumption
levels in a general population, as well as targeted interventions aimed at specific populations who
abuse alcohol and individuals who are dependent on it. Research also shows that those
interventions that target the whole population (universal interventions) generally have higher
effectiveness ratings and are less costly to implement and maintain, on average, than those
targeting high-risk groups.
While not all strategies are equally socially or politically palatable, the strongest strategies to reduce
alcohol-related harm, based on their proven effectiveness through rigorous evaluation research, are:

Taxation and pricing policies. Price is an important determinant of alcohol consumption and the
extent of alcohol-related problems.44 Considerable evidence has accumulated to support the use
of tax changes as a means of influencing price (Babor et al 2003; British Medical Association
2008; Loxley et al 2004; National Preventative Health Taskforce 2009; Toumbourou et al 2007;
WHO 2010b).45

Controlling the availability of alcohol. Restrictions on the sale of alcohol include the age of
consumers, the type of retail establishments that can sell alcohol, licensing limits on hours and
days of sale, and regulation of vendors and the density of outlets (Babor et al 2003; British
Medical Association 2008; Loxley et al 2004; National Preventative Health Taskforce 2009;
Toumbourou et al 2007; WHO 2010b). Australian state governments appear to be showing an
increasing willingness to exert control over the availability of alcohol in order to reduce alcoholrelated harms, such as through the placing additional license restrictions on ‘high risk’ venues.

Drink driving countermeasures. In the words of one review ‘Drink-driving laws and the
associated programs of enforcement and social marketing are considered to be one of the great
public health success stories of the late 20th century’ (National Preventative Health Taskforce
2009, page 27). Australia has been a world leader in reducing rates of drink driving through the
43
Evidence about ‘what works’ is generally used to refer to high quality evaluation evidence that establishes
the effectiveness of an initiative or indicates that the initiative showed promising results.
44
In 2012 the Scottish government announced it will introduce a minimum alcohol price of 50p per unit. A
minimum unit price for alcohol has also been announced in the UK for England and Wales (Home Office 2012).
45
While alcohol taxation is one of the most effective policy interventions to reduce the levels of alcohol
consumption and related problems, it is the responsibility of the Australian Government rather than the
Queensland Government. The current taxation regime applying to alcohol in Australia has been described as
seriously flawed. The 2010 ‘Henry Review’ of Australia’s tax system concluded that the current taxes on beer,
wine and spirits are ‘incoherent’ and ‘not well suited to reduce alcohol-related harm’. Alcohol is not currently
taxed according to its alcohol content level and the Henry Review recommended that changes should be made
to tax all alcoholic beverages on a volumetric basis as a matter of priority (Henry 2010).
54 | P a g e
Section 1 Background - Chapter 4 What works to reduce alcohol-related harms?
use of random breath testing (RBT), low Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) limits for all drivers, and
the lowest BAC for young drivers (Babor et al 2003; British Medical Association 2008; Loxley et al
2004; National Preventative Health Taskforce 2009; Toumbourou et al 2007; WHO 2010b).

Treatment and early intervention. Early identification and effective treatment in health-care
settings of alcohol-use disorders, also in patients with co-morbid conditions, can reduce
associated morbidity and mortality and improve the well-being of affected individuals and their
families. Treatment is most effective when supported by sound policies and health systems and
integrated within a broader preventive strategy (Babor et al 2003; British Medical Association
2008; Loxley et al 2004; National Preventative Health Taskforce 2009; Toumbourou et al 2007;
WHO 2010b).
The types of interventions that have somewhat less evidence of effectiveness to support them are:

Altering the drinking context. Measures such as proactive policing, banning service of intoxicated
people, Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA) programs, and liquor accords or voluntary codes of
bar practice are common strategies that seek to minimise alcohol-related harm. Effective law
enforcement is a key element of many of these strategies.

Addressing marketing of alcoholic beverages to ensure responsible retailing and industry
practices in the advertising and sale of alcohol. This may include controls or partial bans on
volume, placement and content of alcohol advertising, especially to protect adolescents and
young people from the pressure to start drinking.

Education and health promotion strategies include mass media and social marketing campaigns,
education in schools and colleges, parent education, warning labels and drinking guidelines. As
summarised in one review of the evidence, ‘even with adequate resources, such approaches
have limited potential for success on their own. Part of the reason for this is the counter effect
of powerful forces that underpin unsafe and unhealthy drinking cultures, such as the price,
availability and promotion of alcohol products’ (National Preventative Health Taskforce 2009:
35) (see also Babor at al 2003; British Medical Association 2008; Loxley et al 2004; National
Preventative Health Taskforce 2009; Toumbourou 2007; WHO 2010b).
Strategies implemented in Queensland to reduce alcohol-related harm in and around pubs and clubs
often seek to control the availability of alcohol (e.g. statewide 3am lockout) or alter the drinking
context (e.g. RSA training, and policing strategies). The DSP trial has concentrated on altering the
drinking context outside venues, including through provision of an increased, and high visibility,
police presence, and through provision of support services to provide welfare and basic first aid to
patrons.
The remainder of this chapter provides some further details of the evidence for those initiatives that
are most relevant to the DSP trial strategies or strategies otherwise in place in Queensland. We do
not unpack the broad evidence for the full suite of interventions briefly noted above, even though all
these strategies are important. The strategies most relevant to the DSP trial are grouped as follows
and the evidence for each is briefly summarised below:

controls on the availability of alcohol

altering the drinking context
55 | P a g e
o
design interventions
o
service interventions
o
licensed venue staff: education and enforcement
o
stakeholder initiatives.
Controls on the availability of alcohol
Lockouts
Under lockout conditions:

no new patrons are admitted to a premises after a certain hour (e.g. 3 am)

patrons inside the venue may remain until closing

patrons who leave the venue are not allowed to return after lockout.
The introduction of lockouts in some Australian states is relatively new and is typically implemented
as part of a suite of initiatives (KPMG 2008). As such, the evidence of the effectiveness of lockouts is
quite limited and difficult to disentangle from other initiatives that may be operating simultaneously.
Furthermore, outcomes from existing research are mixed and there is no conclusive evidence
concerning their effectiveness.
Some argue they are unlikely to prevent violence caused by the mass movement of intoxicated
persons but instead simply shift the time at which this occurs (Hadfield 2011). It is important,
therefore, that the introduction of lockouts be supported by other mechanisms that will address
movement issues (e.g. effective supply of late night transport both at the beginning and end of
lockout periods) (Hadfield 2011).
Table 2 below describes the research outcomes for lockout initiatives implemented in three
Australian states.
56 | P a g e
Table 2. Outcomes for lockout initiatives implemented in Queensland, Victoria and New South
Wales
Queensland
Description
Statewide lockout from 3 am
introduced in 2005
Outcomes
Gold Coast
 Following the introduction of the lockout, there was a statistically
significant reduction in the number of alcohol-related offences
between 3am-6am
Fortitude Valley and Brisbane
 Although there were increases in the numbers of both alcohol and
non-alcohol offences following the lockout, none of these differences
were significant.
In two entertainment areas the lockouts were found to have cut the level
of violent crime inside licensed premises by half. There was no evidence
that the lockout had any impact on violence on streets and footpaths
outside licensed premises where more than 80% of entertainment district
violence occurred.
Fortitude Valley
 average number of assaults per month within premises decreased from
2.8 to 1.3 following the lockout
Airlie Beach
 average number of assaults per month within the premises decreased
from 0.55 to 0.22 following the lockout
Generally
 no change in the average number of assaults per month outside
premises following the lockout
Author
Palk, Davey & Freeman
2008
Mazerolle, White,
Ransley & Ferguson
2012
Victoria
Description
Trial period June 2003 – June
2004
Lockout from 3am
Trial period June 2008 –
September 2008
Lockout from 2am
Outcomes
Ballarat
 47% reduction in assaults in licensed premises
 34% reduction in street assaults
 40% reduction in assaults overall
 15% reduction in property damage in the CBD
 downward trend had already started to emerge six months prior to the
introduction of lockouts
 contribution of other policing activity which commenced in early 2003
could not be accounted for
Melbourne, Port Phillip, Yarra & Stonnington
 18% reduction in assaults in the City of Melbourne
 36% reduction in assaults in the City of Port Phillip
 15% reduction in assaults in the City of Stonnington
 5% reduction in assaults in the City of Yarra
 19.3% reduction in assault-related emergency department
presentations
 a decrease in alcohol-related call outs for police, including a 38%
decrease in Stonnington and 19% decrease in Port Phillip
Author
Drugs and Crime
Prevention Committee
2006
Outcomes
Restrictions imposed on 48 high risk premises

decrease in the number of assaults inside venues following
restrictions

decrease in the number of assaults inside venues not subject to
restrictions
Restrictions imposed on 48 high risk premises

prior to restrictions there was an underlying upward trend of 4.8
additional assaults recorded after midnight each month across all
locations

following the restrictions the trend reversed with 10.4 fewer assaults
each month across all locations
Author
Moffatt, Mason,
Borzycki &
Weatherburn 2009
KPMG 2008
New South Wales
Description
Commenced 2008
Range of licence restrictions
(including 2am lockouts,
cessation of alcohol service 30
minutes prior to closing, no
shots and drink purchase limits
after midnight) imposed on 48
high risk licensed premises
Moffatt &
Weatherburn 2011
57 | P a g e
Commenced 2008
Compulsory 1.30am lockout for
14 high risk premises in
Newcastle CBD
Newcastle CBD

the introduction of these measures was associated with a 37%
reduction in assaults

approximately 33 assault incidents per quarter were prevented as a
result of the changes
Kypri, Jones, McElduff
& Barker 2010 Jones,
(see also Jones, Kypri,
Moffatt, Borzycki &
Price 2009)
Closing times were also
restricted from 5am to 3.30am,
or from 3am to 2.30am
Lockouts were introduced with
other measures (e.g. sale of
alcohol to cease 30mins before
closing time; prohibition after
10pm on the sale of shots,
mixed drinks with more than
30mls of alcohol, and ready
mixed drinks with more than 5%
alcohol)
This information shows that lockouts have been associated with both increases and decreases in
assaults in entertainment precincts, and that including a lockout as one feature of a broader
violence-reduction strategy may be more successful than introducing a lockout alone.
Staggering lockout times/changing trading hours
In addition to introducing lockouts in an attempt to reduce alcohol-related violence, staggering and
changing the time that particular premises close has been trialled. These approaches are loosely
based around the belief that staggering the closing time of venues lessens the burden on public
transport and decreases the number of people loitering in the public domain at the one time.
A review by Loxley et al (2004) revealed that there is little evidence to suggest that staggering
trading hours assists patrons when exiting licensed premises. Further, in Manchester it was found
that staggering closing times was associated with an increase in the occurrence of alcohol-related
incidents (including assaults and criminal damage) (Greenaway & Conway 2006).
Overall, the evidence to suggest that staggering or changing trading hours in entertainment
precincts reduces rates of alcohol-related violence is mixed.
Changing venue density
Research to date has shown there is some association between venue density and alcohol-related
violence, but nothing has yet tested whether reducing venue density can reduce violence in an area
(Hadfield 2011).
Banning orders
A number of Australian States and Territories and countries overseas have increased police powers
and introduced specific laws to ban or remove people from licensed premises or entertainment
precincts. Some variations of these powers include exclusion orders, move-on orders, drinking
banning orders, and anti-social behaviour banning orders. Banning orders are based on the
assumption that removing troublesome people from precincts and controlling their access to
venues, reduces the amount of disorder occurring in that area.
58 | P a g e
Although there is information showing that these powers are being used where they have been
introduced, no evidence exists for the effectiveness of these powers in reducing alcohol-related
harm (Home Affairs Committee 2005).
Design interventions
Physical characteristics of venues and street scapes have been linked to increased levels of violent
behaviour. Such factors include poor lighting, overcrowding and poor maintenance and cleanliness
(Graham & Homel 2008; MacIntyre & Homel 1997). Design improvements and innovations impacting
on the physical environment, such as to increase surveillance, may reduce alcohol-related violence
around pubs and clubs.
Street lighting
There is a strong evidence base which shows improved street lighting reduces crime and improves
feelings of safety (Hadfield 2011). Improved street lighting is thought to increase the potential for
surveillance. It can also deter crime by demonstrating investment in an area, heightening feelings of
community pride, cohesiveness and informal social control. Establishing clear standards for lighting
in entertainment precincts (e.g. high-colour rendering white light including LED or Sulphur Plasma
lighting) and conducting regular audits to make sure these standards are met is a feasible, effective
and inexpensive method of reducing crime (Hadfield 2011).
ID scanners
ID scanners aim to deter individuals from committing crime and allow police to identify suspects
after an offence has occurred. Palmer, Warren and Miller (2011) have conducted the only evaluation
of ID scanners to date. Their research evaluated the effectiveness of the use of ID scanners in the
Geelong district and concluded that the use of ID scanners:

increased public perceptions of safety

had positive value in terms of the identification of offenders by police after an event

may have provided a deterrent effect as fewer incidents of violence were recorded

may have had a displacement effect; while fewer incidents of violence were recorded in the
research locality, hospital admissions due to alcohol-related injuries doubled during the study
period

did not raise major privacy concerns for patrons (such as the potential for venues to share
patrons’ information).
CCTV cameras
The use of closed circuit television (CCTV) to monitor and detect violence in and around licensed
precincts has become widespread across Australia and countries overseas (Welsh & Farrington
2009). CCTV surveillance aims to reduce crime in public spaces through deterring potential
offenders, facilitating a rapid response to incidents and reminding potential victims of the risk of
crime in that area (Armitage 2002).
A number of studies have evaluated the effect of CCTV cameras on reducing disorder in public
spaces. For example, Sivarajasingam, Shepherd and Matthews (2003) evaluated the effect of CCTV
59 | P a g e
surveillance on levels of assault and violence detection in ten English cities (five with CCTV
surveillance and five without). Their study found that CCTV was associated with increased detection
of violence by police, and reductions in injury and severity of injury. Similarly, Welsh and Farrington
(2009) who conducted a meta-analysis on the effectiveness of CCTV, found that CCTV schemes have
a significant (albeit modest) effect on decreasing crime.
Other studies, however, have failed to find strong evidence for the effects of CCTV surveillance on
reducing personal crime and public order offences (Phillips 1999), finding instead that CCTV is most
effective in reducing property crime (Hadfield 2011).
Overall, the results for the effectiveness of CCTV in reducing violence and disorder are mixed. The
benefit of CCTV in responding to violent crime appears to be its capacity to quickly direct police to an
incident and help to identify the participants (Hadfield 2011).
Management of glassware
The use of drink glasses and bottles as weapons often results in serious outcomes, including blunt
trauma, heavy blood loss, stitches to the face, eye or body, or surgery. The available evidence
suggests that rapid removal techniques and the introduction of glass alternatives, such as
polycarbonate vessels, has limited impact on glassing incidents. Glass alternatives can, however,
reduce the extent of injuries sustained as a result of glassings (e.g. Forsyth 2007; Anderson et al
2009; Hadfield 2011).
Service interventions
Service interventions may involve improving policing, transport or other support services to respond
to patrons’ needs.
Increased police presence inside venues
The famous Torquay experiment involved uniformed police visiting licensed premises that had high
rates of violence and disorder two or three times a week without giving prior notice (Jeffs &
Saunders 1983). During their visit, police would observe the number of intoxicated and underage
patrons in these venues.
A comparison of crime rates to a control area in the same city revealed that the intervention
reduced arrests by approximately 20%. In the 12-months following the intervention, during which
police presence returned to normal, crime rates relapsed to the baseline figures. The initial decline
in crime rates were attributed to the deterrence effect of the increased police presence (Jeffs &
Saunders 1983).
Replications of the Torquay experiment in Sydney (see Burns & Courmarelos 1993) and more
recently New Zealand (see Sim, Morgan & Batchelor 2005) failed to produce statistically significant
reductions in crime rates.
Overall, initiatives based on increased police presence have generally proven to be effective,
particularly in terms of improving serving practices inside licensed venues. However, often the
effects of policing strategies have been quite small and not sustained following the completion of
the project.
60 | P a g e
Increased police numbers
The Australian Institute of Criminology (Smith, Morgan & McAtamney 2011) reported on the impact
of increased police presence on reducing alcohol-related violence in and around licensed premises in
popular night-spot areas in the ACT. The report noted that visible presence of police within nightspot areas did not serve as a deterrent for alcohol-associated violence and behaviour. The authors
attributed this outcome to the disinhibiting effects of alcohol in facilitating violent behaviour. The
report did note the success of police crackdowns, in which increased police presence is matched
with regulation and a zero tolerance strategy towards offending (Smith, Morgan & McAtamney
2011).
Improved access to transport
Disputes over access to and use of transport (e.g. taxis, taxi queues) can lead to the occurrence of
disorder and violence in night time economies (Hadfield 2011). Addressing transport issues may be
one way to reduce the number of people waiting to access transport and improve the efficiency with
which people are removed from the precinct. Unfortunately, this approach has rarely been
independently evaluated. Police statistics in England have shown, however, that improvements to
late night bus services were associated with reduced levels of assault (Hadfield 2011).
A variety of measures have also been introduced to improve the safety of patrons waiting to access
transport services. These have included improving street lighting, installing CCTV cameras and
employing taxi marshals or security staff to manage queues (Hadfield 2011).
An evaluation of a taxi marshal scheme in Manchester found increased perceptions of safety among
patrons and drivers as well as a 50% decrease in crime at the marshalled ranks compared with the
year preceding the initiative (Wheater et al 2005 cited in Hadfield 2011). A similar, although more
extensive, scheme in Glasgow was also associated with a decrease in police recorded violent crime
following the introduction of taxi marshals (FMR 2009 cited in Hadfield 2011).
Street wardens or support services
Street warden or support service initiatives involve the use of paid or volunteer members of the
public, working to augment the police presence in entertainment precincts. Street Wardens:

support the reduction of incidents of crime and disorder

improve public reassurance and work to reduce fear of crime

support the work of other service providers in the precinct (e.g. taxi marshals, security guards,
police, health professionals)

improve the safety of all patrons within the precinct area (e.g. remove empty bottles and other
litter)

escort vulnerable or at risk people to places of safety (e.g. chill-out zones, public transport)

have a broad responsibility for problem solving.
Recent research has found that conciliatory interventions by third parties in potentially violent
interactions can prevent aggression escalating into more violent situations (Levine, Taylor & Best
2011). Local evaluations of third party policing initiatives, such as the Street Pastor project in the UK,
61 | P a g e
have found they have the potential to play a key role in preventing alcohol-related violence (Cornish
2009; Hampshire Police Authority 2009, as cited in Hadfield 2011). Further peer-reviewed
evaluations are needed (Hadfield 2011).
Mobile Medical Response Unit
The Mobile Medical Response Unit (MMRU) is a City of Cardiff initiative that deploys a paramedic,
technician and ambulance to a central city location between 2am and 4am on Friday and Saturday
nights. The role of the MMRU is to provide immediate patient assessment and treatment so as to
reduce demands on both the ambulance service and hospital emergency departments. An
evaluation of the scheme in 2007 (as cited in Hadfield 2011) found it resulted in significant resource
and financial savings for the City of Cardiff as it reduced:

the number of ambulances called to the city centre

the time spent by hospital staff in providing treatment for alcohol-related injuries

the time spent by police responding to injured people.
Licensed venue staff education and enforcement
Education and enforcement strategies often provide licensees and venue staff with training, or
venue-specific information about incidents of alcohol-related violence and education materials, to
promote compliance with licensing regulations and responsible service of alcohol.
Training bar staff in the responsible service of alcohol
There is little evidence that responsible service of alcohol training on its own has an impact on
serving practices. There is some evidence to suggest that when covert monitoring by police occurs or
pseudo-patrons are used to test compliance, responsible service improves. For example, a Michigan
initiative trained bar staff in the responsible service of alcohol and used covert police to monitor
their serving practices and patron behaviour. Evaluations showed bar staff were less likely to serve
‘pseudo patrons’ (actors pretending to be intoxicated) after this occurred (Levy & Miller 1995;
McKnight & Streff 1994).
In Australia, Scott et al (2007) followed up an earlier 2002 study by examining young adults’
experiences of responsible service practice in NSW. Though some improvement in dealing with the
most intoxicated patrons of licensed premises was found, over half of this group still reported being
permitted to make further alcohol purchases at the bar. This finding supports the argument by
Stockwell (2001) that factors other than a skill deficit may account for continued service to
intoxicated patrons, including competitive markets (e.g. profit making) and ineffectual and/or
inconsistent regulation and enforcement.
Just as various factors may influence the serving practices of staff, intoxication is likely to be only
one among several factors (such as staff behaviour, environmental conditions, and behavioural
norms) that contribute to bar violence (Graham et al 2006). Programs that aim to reduce
intoxication of patrons by training staff in the responsible service of alcohol may only be addressing
one facet of the problem.
62 | P a g e
Brennan et al (2011) concluded from their review of the literature that, while server training courses
designed to reduce disorder have some potential, there is a lack of strong evidence to support their
use to reduce intoxication.
The Stockholm Prevents Alcohol and Drug Problems (STAD) project
In response to a variety of community concerns surrounding alcohol regulation and consumption in
Stockholm, the Stockholm Prevents Alcohol and Drug Problems (STAD) project was launched in
1995. It is based on a long term (10 plus years) partnership of all stakeholders as well as a
sophisticated regulatory model that incorporates evidence-based practice and balances
organisational capacity building, training and enforcement. The initiative is world renowned because
it is said to be the only alcohol-related prevention program that has achieved sustainable reductions
for over a decade in alcohol-related violence and crime (Graham & Homel 2008).
The initiative surveyed owners of licensed premises about the seriousness of serving alcohol to
underage or intoxicated persons and engaged a stakeholder action group to develop a strategy for
the responsible service of alcohol. Stakeholders were asked to sign an agreement committing them
to the longevity of the project. The main components of the STAD strategies include:

Community coalition - a patron study conducted as part of STAD, found respondents were in
favour of drunken patrons being refused entry or refused service. This finding was important in
helping to convince bar owners that most patrons object to severely intoxicated people and
further facilitate community coalition and mobilisation. Community mobilisation occurred with
the goal of increasing knowledge and awareness about the problems with alcohol consumption
at licensed premises and sought support for actions to decrease the problems among important
community groups (Wallin et al 2003).

Pseudo-patron studies - actors pretending to be intoxicated were sent to licensed premises to
determine how often bar staff refused service. The actors modelled carefully agreed and
practiced scenarios of severe intoxication warranting refusal of service that included the pseudopatron stumbling and dropping coins on approach to the bar, slurred speech when ordering,
falling asleep on the bar and then waking up to order another drink. Initially, very few such
pseudo-patrons were refused service.

Media - the results of the pseudo-patron studies were widely publicised by the media. The role
played by the media in this respect was thought to be critical to gaining widespread support for
the project and sowing the seeds of cultural change.

Enforcement - previously police were not very involved in enforcement and only attended
licensed premises if called there because of a crime. Licensing inspectors were at the bars during
office hours only. With STAD, police became active in visiting licensed premises and reporting
their observations (e.g. patrons sleeping and broken glass) to the liquor licensing board who
wrote notification letters to the premises.

Training - a two-day training course in responsible service of alcohol for security staff, owners
and servers in licensed premises. Initially training copied the United States’ Responsible Service
of Alcohol (RSA) manual, however, it was soon discovered that it is ‘tricky to transport
interventions across cultural boundaries’. Using feedback from the initial participants and the
Advisory Group (consisting of representatives from a number of key players such as the police,
63 | P a g e
licensing board, health, trade union, and restaurant owners), training was tailored for local
audiences. The training bought key players together and trained them in responsible beverage
service (e.g. ways to refuse service to drunken patrons) and the need to check age identification.

Follow up - evaluation has been based on the package as a whole, rather than assessing the
effectiveness of the individual components, and found a reduced level of intoxication and a
reduction in assaults.
Police reports revealed a 29% reduction in violent crime following the completion of the project. In
comparison, the rates of violent crime in the control area had increased over the same period.
Results also revealed that refusal of service to intoxicated patrons had increased (5% to 70%) and
that for every dollar spent on the initiative 39 dollars was saved by the community (Månsdotter et al
2007).
Training bar staff beyond responsible service of alcohol
Safer Bars, a training program developed by the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Canada,
specifically aims to prevent violence in licensed premises rather than more generally training with
respect to the responsible service of alcohol. Safer Bars trains bar staff to manage problem
behaviour, conduct premises risk assessments and promote violence reduction strategies (Hadfield
2011). The program involves three main components:
1. A three-hour training program for staff and management aiming to develop strategies to
reduce, prevent and manage aggression. For example, the training provides bar staff with
techniques for managing potential problem behaviour and teaches them strategies to reduce
risks of injury and legal problems in their premises.
2. A risk assessment workbook comprising 92 questions for managers/owners to identify and
address aspects of their premises which facilitate violence and/or aggression (including entry,
bar operations, atmosphere and physical layout).
3. A legal pamphlet that outlines bar staff and managers’ legal responsibilities to prevent violence
and aggression.
Unlike responsible service of alcohol training, Safer Bars would not necessarily be expected to
reduce the incidence of intoxication or inappropriate consumption of alcohol within licence premises
(Hadfield 2011).
Safer Bars is a rigorously evaluated, publically available, training initiative (Graham, Bernards,
Osgood, Homel & Purcell 2005; Graham & Purcell 2005). Evaluation of the Safer Bars training
program suggests that training bar staff in managing and reducing violent behaviour can reduce the
number of incidents of aggression in and around licensed premises. Based on observations, incidents
of aggression decreased from 18 to 13 per 100 nights of observations. Bar staff found the training to
be effective and said they would recommend it to others.
Evaluation on the program’s ability to sustain effects in the long term is necessary, particularly if the
program is delivered on a continuous basis rather than just as a single intervention. As Graham et al
(2008, p. 39) state, ‘High [staff] turnover can mitigate the long term impact of an intervention that is
delivered on a one-time basis (as in the present study) rather than implemented as part of an
64 | P a g e
ongoing training/licensing process. Therefore, the present results might underestimate the potential
effects of the Safer Bars programme’.
The Injury Control Council of Western Australia are currently piloting a Safer Bars program in Perth
(Hadfield 2011).
Education of licensees and police enforcement
The Alcohol Linking program in NSW is a long term initiative aiming to permanently change policing
practices. The project increased the presence of police in and around venues that generated high
rates46 of police call-outs for alcohol-related incidents. Police have also engaged licensees in
discussions about preventing alcohol-related violence through strategies such as:

providing a report to licensed premises outlining the number of police-attended alcohol-related
incidents involving their premises for the previous four months

a police audit measuring responsible service of alcohol and management practices (made
available to licensees)

a workshop that allowed police and licensees to discuss progress and ways to improve
management and responsible service of alcohol practices.
Evaluations of this project revealed a 36% reduction in alcohol-related incidents for the experimental
group compared to a 21% reduction in the control group (Wiggers 2007).
Because the project was promising, it has been implemented state-wide in New South Wales, as well
as in other states and territories in Australia and New Zealand. A subsequent evaluation conducted
in Newcastle showed a 10% reduction in the number of people who had consumed alcohol
becoming involved in a police-related event compared with 6.7% in a comparable area (Wiggers et al
2009). The success of the program has been attributed to its focus on problematic licensed premises,
engaging licensees and attempts to permanently change routine police practices in the area.
A similar initiative, the ‘Responsible Liquor Licensing Project’, was implemented in the ACT between
September 2009 and January 2010. This project over the summer months engaged licensees and
stakeholders in workshops and training seminars, pre-arranged visits to licensed premises to
conduct compliance reviews, and enforcement of liquor licensing legislation through random visits.
The project was evaluated using observational data and liquor licensing breaches recorded over the
study period. Quantitative data revealed that random visits to licensees resulted in 12 breaches of
compliance and the apprehension of four underage drinkers. Qualitative data suggested that prearranged audits and random visits improved compliance with the regulations as bar and security
staff were more active in checking identification and maintaining cleanliness, for example.
Authorities noted that the process of dealing with breaches was time-consuming as they could not
issue on-the-spot fines. They also did not consider the penalties imposed to be proportionate to the
amount of money licensees made during opening hours. The evaluation concluded that the penalties
available to authorities to enforce liquor licensing restrictions would only have a marginal deterrent
46
Premises were identified using ‘last drinks data’ (i.e. the last place that an alcohol affected person who came
to the attention of the police was drinking at).
65 | P a g e
effect. Due to resource constraints, continued high-level enforcement could not be sustained (Smith,
Morgan & McAtamney 2011).
The outcomes of this research are promising. Police have previously reported difficulty in enforcing
liquor licensing laws as it depends on them being able to prove alcohol was served knowingly to an
intoxicated person (Hadfield 2011). Research conducted in NSW (Briscoe & Donnelly 2003)
concluded that licensing enforcement is often not seen as a police priority and therefore frequently
lacks the necessary resources to mount successful operations.
Education of licensees and threat of media exposure
The Tackling Alcohol-related Street Crime project in Cardiff, UK used emergency department data to
identify licensed premises that generated a large proportion of alcohol-related assaults (Hadfield
2011). The 10 premises identified as generating the highest proportion of alcohol-related injuries
were subjected to increased police presence. As well as this, medical staff from the hospital
presented graphic details of injuries sustained to two top club managers and informed them they
would be auditing violence in their premises and sending this audit to the media in six months time
(Warburton & Shepherd 2006). On average, a 30% reduction in violent incidents was noted.
However, caution should be exercised when interpreting the findings of this study as they are based
on a very small number of premises.
The Cardiff Model has since been adopted by London’s Regional Health Group and is supported by
the College of Emergency Medicine. This has improved data collection and sharing within and
between emergency and community safety agencies for use in informing violence reduction
initiatives (Hadfield 2011).
Training security staff
Most training programs aimed at preventing violence in licensed premises target security guards
(e.g. programs aimed at increasing access control). At present, however, there is no evidence of the
effectiveness of these initiatives for reducing alcohol-related violence (Graham & Homel 2008).
There is, however, some evidence to suggest that security staff are involved in a substantial
proportion of violent incidents in licensed premises (Maguire & Nettleton 2003). For example, 12%
of assaults recorded on licensed premises by the New South Wales police in 2007-08 were reported
to have been committed by security or other bar staff (Fitzgerald, Mason & Borzycki 2010).
Stakeholder initiatives
Locally-based initiatives typically include efforts to engage licensees in improving standards and
practices around service of alcohol, and regulatory measures designed to limit patron numbers
within or outside venues.
Voluntary codes of practice
To coincide with implementation of the Licensing Act 2003 in England and Wales, a set of voluntary
Social responsibility Standards were published by 16 trade associations and organisations in the
alcohol industry. The standards documents were intended to provide a comprehensive statement of
the rules, regulations and additional commitments to which various parts of the alcoholic drinks
66 | P a g e
industry had agreed in relation to production, distribution, marketing and retailing of alcohol
(including the promotion of responsible drinking) (Hadfield 2011).
The UK Home Office commissioned systematic observational fieldwork in January 2008, involving
nearly 600 licensed premises across eight English towns, to determine which licensed premises and
bottle shop vendors adhered to the standards and whether the standards contributed to a reduction
in alcohol-related harm (KPMG LLP/Home Office, as cited in Hadfield 2011). The report concluded
that, while some excellent self-regulatory activity had occurred, poor practices were also apparent,
especially in licensed premises in entertainment precincts. The UK Home office since replaced the
voluntary standards with a set of mandatory codes (Hadfield 2011).
The research to date shows that enforcement is more effective than voluntary schemes for
encouraging compliance with licensing regulations. To be effective, enforcement strategies must be
sustainable and sustained (Hadfield 2011). In restricted economic contexts this can prove difficult.
Accords
Liquor accords are Australian voluntary industry associated partnerships, which aim to identify and
address alcohol-related issues at the local level. They often include members from the local business
community, council, police, relevant government departments and other community groups.
To date, three Australian accords have been evaluated: Geelong (Felson et al 1997; Rumbold et al
1998), Fremantle (Hawks et al 1999) and Kings Cross (McCarthy 2007). The results of all three
evaluations indicate that accords have very little effect on alcohol-related violence. It has been
suggested that accords are largely ineffective at reducing alcohol-related violence because voluntary
compliance with good practice by itself does not produce strategies that are powerful enough to
reduce violence (Hadfield 2011). The Australian findings about accords are generally consistent with
the findings of the UK research investigating the outcomes of voluntary codes of practice (e.g.
Graham & Homel 2008).
On the other hand, there are examples of accords that appear to have been successful. One such
example in Queensland in recent years are the Collaborative Approach to Liquor Management
accords (CALM liquor accords) funded and coordinated by the Sunshine Coast Regional Council, in
partnership with the QPS, Queensland Health, Queensland Transport and the Office of Liquor and
Gaming Regulation. The first was established on the Sunshine Coast at Mooloolaba in 2007 with 18
members, and there are now seven CALM accords on the Sunshine Coast with a total of 120
licensee, business, government and non-government members.
CALM has won several recent awards including the ‘Excellence in Alcohol Management’ category of
the 2011 National Awards for Local Government, a Meritorious Police Certificate at the 2011
Australian Crime and Violence Prevention Awards, and a Queensland Public Sector Excellence Award
in 2010 from the Institute of Public Administration Australia, for the category of ‘Best Practice in
Local Government’. Whole of community benefits have been realised through CALM’s contribution
to significant reductions in alcohol-related crime and violence and complaints received about
licensed premises since the introduction of the accords.
67 | P a g e
Premises-based reward and accreditation schemes
Reward and accreditation schemes are designed to recognise and reward good working practices for
licensed premises, rather than concentrating on enforcement and punishment. Premises are
assessed against compliance with statutory obligations and license conditions. Those premises that
comply are given plaques and award logos to include in their promotional materials.
There have been very few evaluations of the initiatives. Those which do exist have found the
schemes are limited in their effectiveness at reducing violence and disorder (Hadfield 2011).
Nonetheless, this approach is receiving an increasingly high profile in the UK. This may be because of
decreasing enforcement budgets and an increasing need to do something in response to alcoholrelated violence.
Queensland Community Safety Action Projects
Community action projects have been trialled and evaluated in four locations throughout
Queensland, including: Gold Coast, Mackay, Townsville and Cairns (Hauritz et al 1998a, 1998b;
Homel et al 1997; Homel, McIlwain & Carvolth 2004). Each evaluation has shown clear
improvements in the number of aggressive and violent incidents following the implementation of
the Community Safety Action initiative.
Community Safety Action Projects are conducted in four stages:
1. the establishment of a community forum to lead task groups and safety audits
2. development and implementation of risk assessments and a code of practice for place managers
3. training programs for staff
4. improved external regulation of licensed premises by police and liquor licensing inspectors.
Subsequent evaluations have used observational, security and police data to explore project
outcomes.
An evaluation of the Gold Coast Community Safety Action plan revealed improvements in service
procedures (e.g. access to the bar), cleanliness within venues, and public transport services (Homel
et al 1997). Furthermore, the researchers observed a decrease in the number of:

aggressive or violent incidents (52%)

verbal abuse among patrons (81.6%)

arguments among patrons (67.6%).
These findings were further supported by quantitative data which showed a 28.2% reduction in
incidents recorded by security personnel in the first three months of the trial and a further 18%
reduction in the subsequent three months. Similarly, police data indicated a 34% decrease in the
number of recorded assaults in the final three months of the project.
Hauritz et al (1998a, 1998b) assessed the impact of Community Safety Action Projects in Cairns,
Townsville and Mackay. The authors found:
68 | P a g e



in Mackay
o
74.8% reduction in physical assaults
o
48.3% reduction is verbal aggression
o
56% reduction in all incidents involving aggression and violence.
in Cairns
o
o
7.4% reduction in verbal aggression
o
39.7% reduction in all incidents involving aggression and violence
in Townsville
o
o
50% reduction in verbal assaults
o
51.5% reduction in all incidents involving aggression and violence.
Observational data also revealed a general decrease in male drunkenness and increases in
sociability, friendliness and host responsibility.
However, observational data collected two years later suggested that violence returned to preintervention levels, compliance with the code of practice had almost ceased and that ‘only a system
of regulation that integrates self-regulation, community monitoring, and formal enforcement can
ensure that the achievements of community interventions are maintained on an indefinite basis’
(Homel et al 1997: 36).
Communities Mobilising for Change on Alcohol
The Communities Mobilising for Change on Alcohol (CMCA) program is designed to reduce young
people’s access to alcohol from both retail establishments and adults in the community (Hadfield,
2011). It was developed and evaluated using a 15-community randomised trial by the Alcohol
Epidemiology Program at the University of Minnesota, School of Public Health. The intervention
involved:

action by communities

changes in local public policies

changes in practices of community institutions (e.g. law enforcement, licensing departments).
The evaluation revealed the CMCA program limited the accessibility of alcohol to teenagers, by
reducing consumption (e.g. reduction in retail sales and increased identification checking) and
communicating a clear social norm that underage drinking was unacceptable (as cited in Hadfield
2011).
Summary
There is a growing body of evidence as to the effectiveness of various strategies that aim to reduce
alcohol-related harms. Those that are most relevant to the DSP trial are:
69 | P a g e
Controlling the availability of alcohol

lockouts may be effective in reducing incidents of alcohol-related violence where they form part
of a broader intervention strategy

evidence about the use of staggered closing times as a mechanism for easing public transport
demands and reducing the opportunity for interaction between intoxicated patrons is mixed

research has clearly established a positive association between the number of licensed premises
in an area and incidents of violence; research is still needed to determine whether deliberately
reducing venue density (or venue type) is an effective strategy in reducing violence

the impact of banning orders, as a mechanism for addressing alcohol-related violence, needs
further research.
Altering the drinking context


Design interventions (e.g. street lighting, ID scanners, management of glassware, CCTV cameras)
o
there is a strong evidence base that shows improved street lighting reduces crime and
improves feelings of safety, while the evidence for CTTV is more mixed (although there are
clear benefits from CCTV in terms of the detection and prosecution of offences)
o
there has been little evaluation to date of the introduction of ID scanners and management
of glassware to reduce alcohol-related violence, disorder and other harms in and around
pubs and clubs.
Service interventions (e.g. training bar staff beyond responsible service of alcohol, increased
police presence inside venues, improved access to transport, street wardens/city ambassadors,
mobile medical response unit, training security staff, increased police numbers)
o
there is a lack of evidence to support the effectiveness of the responsible service of alcohol
training at reducing violence or levels of intoxication
o
initiatives based on increased police presence have proven effective at improving serving
practices inside licensed venues, however, these effects are quite small and have not been
sustained following the intervention
o
while some research notes the success of police crackdowns, some studies have found that
increased police presence does not serve as a deterrent for alcohol-associated violence and
behaviour
o
the STAD project, which involved a range of strategies including the use of ‘pseudo patrons’
to test licensees’ responsible service of alcohol, and a ‘make every second a water
campaign’, is said to be the only alcohol-related prevention program that has achieved
sustainable reductions over the long term
o
while addressing transport issues has seen some improvements in safety and crime, this has
rarely been independently evaluated
o
research has found that street wardens/support services can play a positive role in
preventing aggression and alcohol-related violence; further peer-reviewed evaluations are
needed
70 | P a g e
o


the City of Cardiff’s Mobile Medical Response Unit (MMRU) initiative resulted in significant
resource and financial savings, suggesting that providing immediate patient assessment and
treatment support may be an effective strategy for entertainment precincts.
Licensed venue staff: education and enforcement (e.g. training in the responsible service of
alcohol, education of licensees and police enforcement, education of licensees and threat of
media exposure)
o
evidence to support the impact of staff training on serving practices and reduced
intoxication is unclear
o
educating licensees and police enforcement have produced positive results, however require
a continued infusion of resources
o
education of licensees and threat of media exposure may be effective at reducing violent
incidents however further research is needed
o
while security staff are involved in a large proportion of violent incidents in licensed
premises, there is no evidence supporting the effectiveness of training security staff to
reduce alcohol-related violence.
Stakeholder initiatives (e.g. voluntary codes of practices, premises-based reward and
accreditation schemes, accords, Queensland Community Safety Action projects, Communities
Mobilising for Change on Alcohol)
o
enforcement is more successful than voluntary schemes or awards based systems in
encouraging compliance with licensing regulations
o
accords have little effect on alcohol-related violence, as voluntary compliance with good
practice by itself does not produce strategies that are powerful enough to reduce violence
o
the Queensland Community Safety Action Projects saw clear improvements in the number of
aggressive and violent incidents following the implementation of the initiative
o
overall, findings from evaluations of community mobilisation initiatives suggest that
sustained reductions in rates of alcohol-related violence is a result of the combination of
community engagement, formal and informal enforcement regulation and is couched within
the context of the local environment.
Many initiatives have resulted in a reduction of alcohol-related violence in the short term. Rarely are
initiatives sustained over an extended period of time, and few initiatives are able to demonstrate
long term effects. The STAD project is the only initiative that has proven sustained reductions in the
prevalence of alcohol-related violence over a substantial period of time. However, two other
projects, Safer Bars Staff Training and the Alcohol Linking Project, are notable examples of other
initiatives that have demonstrated reductions in violence, and if maintained and evaluated over a
longer period such programs may be able to deliver long term benefits. Unlike other projects, these
three projects involved community engagement, input from a wide range of stakeholders in the
community and were altered to suit the local context and environment.
71 | P a g e
Section 2 DSPs in action
The two year trial of Drink Safe Precincts (DSPs) in Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise and Townsville
is focused on the implementation of a ‘place-based’ management approach to deliver practical local
solutions to reduce alcohol-related violence (Queensland Government 2010). Place-based
approaches recognise that entertainment precinct areas have unique features that must be taken
into account when finding on-the-ground solutions to address issues of alcohol-related violence in
and around pubs and clubs. The challenges and opportunities of managing the night time economy
in any area will depend on the history of development and particular character of that area.

For example, the Surfers Paradise and Fortitude Valley DSP areas are located in high density
commercial and residential spaces. Each of these areas has a busy day time economy and a
substantial number of residents living in high rise buildings within the DSP area. Surfers Paradise
has the added dimension of being a major national and international tourist destination for a
wide range of people.

In the Townsville DSP, the concentration of late trading licensed venues in the Flinders Street
East area means that these venues are relatively segregated from residential development.
Being located on the fringe of the CBD in a regional city, however, means that the Townsville
DSP is not well serviced by public transport.
As each of the DSP areas is different, the strategies implemented in each site have also varied.
Chapter 5 provides a brief summary of the history, development, and features of each DSP area.
Chapters 6 to 10 describe details of the DSPs in action, including the key strategies and activities that
have been implemented on-the-ground across the DSP trial areas. These chapters outline what has
occurred in terms of:

governance and coordination of the trial

increased police presence and high visibility policing

support/rest and recovery services provided by NGOs (Chill Out Zone, Chaplain Watch, Anglicare
and Townsville Street Chaplains)

the use of banning orders to exclude violent offenders from licensed venues or areas around
licensed venues.
Chapter 11 provides information about other strategies and DSP activities, particularly in the area of
transport.
Where relevant, Section 2 includes consultation feedback and DSP online survey results showing
how stakeholders perceived the key DSP strategies.
72 | P a g e
Section 2 DSPs in action - Chapter 5 Key features of the DSP areas
Chapter 5 Key features of the DSP areas
Fortitude Valley
History and background
Fortitude Valley–or the Valley as it is known locally–was among the first sites to be developed in
Brisbane. Throughout its colourful history it has played a key role in the development of Brisbane’s
commercial life and its character more broadly. A very brief history of the area includes the following
key events and developments:

In Brisbane’s early history, Fortitude Valley rivalled the CBD in terms of providing the city’s
commercial and governing hub. The area went through a period of decline from the 1970s, with
major retailers such as David Jones and Myer abandoning the area.

In 1973, the Valley was the site of the greatest mass murder in Queensland’s history after two
petrol bombs were put in the foyer stairwell of the Whisky A Go-Go night club (ABC 2012).

In the 1970s and 1980s, the area was known for its brothels, illegal casinos and nightclubs. A
number of Valley venues came to be synonymous with the political and police corruption
revealed in the Fitzgerald Inquiry, which concluded in 1989.

The area’s diverse and multicultural character continued to develop with the opening of the
Chinatown Mall in 1987.

The post-Fitzgerald revitalisation of Fortitude Valley from the 1980s was largely driven by the
development of a thriving live music scene and nightclub district. In the 1980s and 1990s, the
Valley fostered some of the country’s most successful bands, including Powderfinger and
Regurgitator.

During the 1990s, the Brisbane City Council led a concerted urban renewal campaign in the area,
encouraging high density residential development around the suburb.

In 1999, residents’ complaints about live music in the area threatened the closure of the Empire
Hotel and the Press Club, two established venues. Musicians and their fans revolted through the
‘Save the Music’ campaign and, with 20 000 signatures, petitioned Brisbane City Council and the
State Government to address the emerging problem. In 2005, Australia's first ‘Special
Entertainment Precinct’ was created to protect live music and new residents, including through
special planning provisions.47 Since the 1980s and 1990s, the Valley’s live music scene has
changed, but it remains an important feature in many venues.
47
The Fortitude Valley's Special Entertainment Precinct exempts entertainment venues within the area from
the amplified noise requirements of the Liquor Act 1992, and allows council to manage amplified music noise
under the Amplified Music Venues Local Law 2006. It also requires new residential and accommodation
development construction to achieve a minimum noise reduction of 25 decibels in the 63 hertz frequency
band.
73 | P a g e
The DSP and Fortitude Valley today
The Fortitude Valley DSP extends from Saint Paul’s Terrace to Robertson Street, and includes the
Brunswick Street and China Town Malls (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Map of the Fortitude Valley Drink Safe Precinct area
Source:
Map Data ©2012 GBRMPA, Google, Whereis®, Sensis Pty Ltd.
While the area has transformed from its Fitzgerald era past, it retains something of its colourful,
gritty and diverse character. Just over 5000 residents live in the Fortitude Valley suburb, and it is
estimated that up to 50 000 people are attracted to Fortitude Valley on a busy Friday or Saturday
night. Day and night, the Valley provides a melting pot of people from all walks of life, perhaps more
so than any other single geographic location in the state. The night time economy also attracts a
diverse ‘party crowd’ from Brisbane and the surrounding regions, as well as those visiting from
further afield.
74 | P a g e
Fortitude Valley is relatively well serviced by public transport as it is a major hub close to the CBD.
There are other design and infrastructure challenges, however, that reflect the area’s age and
history.

The Fortitude Valley area is bisected by two major arterial roads of Wickham and Ann Streets.
These roads are large, and busy day and night as they provide a major thoroughfare for cross
town traffic, including a great deal of heavy vehicle transportation.

Other than in the pedestrian-only Brunswick Street and China Town mall areas, the footpaths
are narrow. For the night time economy, pedestrian congestion and safety is a very real issue,
and there has been a history of concern about the number of pedestrian accidents in the area
(see The Courier Mail 2010).
The Valley’s night time economy has rapidly expanded over the past 10-15 years, and the number
and type of licensed venues in the area over this time has also rapidly increased. 48, 49 In 2011, there
were 73 licensed venues in the DSP area, which includes most of the late night trading licensed
venues in Fortitude Valley. While the area has seen significant shifts in the live music and band
scene, bands and DJs remain an important part of the Valley mix. The Valley is also home to a
number of small bars, very large venues (or megaclubs), gay friendly venues, and strip clubs. Figure 2
provides a breakdown of the trading hours of licensed venues in the DSP.
Figure 2. Trading hours of licensed venues in the Fortitude Valley DSP
40%
46%
(n = 29)
(n = 34)
14%
(n = 10)
12 midnight or earlier
Source:
up to 2am or 3am
up to 5am
Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) November 2011.
48
Includes all businesses that may obtain a license to sell or supply liquor, including restaurants, hotels, pubs,
nightclubs and sporting/community clubs. In Queensland, licenses for bottleshops (sale of takeaway or
packaged liquor) are contained with a Commercial Hotel liquor license so are not listed as separate licensed
venues.
49
OLGR’s administrative databases are unable to provide accurate figures of the number of licensed venues in
the area over time; however, current point in time extraction of this kind of information is possible.
75 | P a g e
As shown in Figure 2, of the venues in the Fortitude Valley DSP:

twenty-nine venues (40%) are licensed to trade past the 3am lockout until 5am

ten venues (14%) close at 2am or at 3am

thirty-four venues (46%) trade until midnight.
Surfers Paradise
Surfers Paradise—also known simply as Surfers—is a central suburb at the heart of the Gold Coast.
The Gold Coast is the sixth largest city in Australia and one of the fastest growing regions in our
country (ABS 2012b). This rapid growth is a key feature of the area and from the outset, hotels,
hospitality, tourism, and family fun have all featured heavily in the Surfers story. A brief history of
the area includes the following key developments:

Jim Cavill built the original Surfers Paradise Hotel in the 1920s and for many years the venue
included a famous beer garden and a zoo.

Clubs, pubs, and restaurants grew along with the surrounding high rises from the 1960s. By the
1960s and 1970s, Surfers Paradise had already established a reputation for its nightlife across
the nation.

Seaworld was established on the Gold Coast in the 1970s. Other major family entertainment
developments were to follow in the 1980s, including Dreamworld, and Grundy’s Entertainment
Centre on the beachfront in Surfers Paradise.

The 1980s brought strong Japanese investment in Surfers Paradise, with a large number of
significant buildings added to the growing skyline.

By the 1980s, the Surfers Paradise area was already synonymous with ‘Schoolies’ week, a weeklong celebration in which those graduating from school party and celebrate.

The 1990s saw the beginning of a new era of large international hotel developments in Surfers,
which continues today.

In 1991, the Gold Coast Indy 300 was first held in Surfers Paradise. Since then, major motorsport
events like the Gold Coast leg of the global open-wheel IndyCar Series and now the GC600 part
of Australia’s V8 Supercars competition have continued to be held annually.
There has been longstanding concern in Surfers about the problems of alcohol-related disorder and
violence. Surfers has a more significant history of interventions aiming to reduce such problems than
any other single area in the state. The Gold Coast City Council, in partnership with the Queensland
Government, has been particularly active in seeking to reduce alcohol-related violence in response
to local concerns. For example, key interventions that have been implemented in Surfers Paradise
include:

In 1993, the Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project was developed to reduce violence in and
around licensed venues. This community-based initiative was developed in partnership between
Griffith University and Gold Coast Council, the Queensland Department of Health, community
76 | P a g e
groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, and venue managers (see Section 1 for details of the
evaluation conducted).

In 2002, the Gold Coast Schoolies Week Three-Point Plan was developed and implemented,
followed by the broader Keeping Surfers Safe Project in 2004 for general and year round
application (McIlwain & Thompson 2004).

The development of the Gold Coast City Council Surfers Paradise Strategic Safety Plan 2010-20
includes a focus on late night entertainment related issues and identifies projects to be
undertaken in Surfers Paradise over the next ten years. These include the development of an
Alcohol Management Plan, a Surfers Paradise Cumulative Impacts and Saturation Study, and
Party Cruise and Pub Crawl Regulations (Richards 2011).
The DSP and Surfers Paradise today
The Surfers Paradise DSP covers the area between
Cypress Avenue and Hamilton Avenue and Ferny
Avenue and the Surfers Paradise Esplanade along the
beachfront (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Map of the Surfers Paradise Drink Safe
Precinct area
Surfers Paradise continues to be one of the county’s
major tourist destinations. It attracts a wide range of
Australian and international visitors, some of whom
are attracted to the night life and want to let their hair
down away from home, others of whom are families
with young children.
The DSP area is very densely developed with many
high-rise apartment buildings and also includes the
major shopping precinct of Cavill Mall and Cavill,
Orchid, and Elkhorn Avenues. Major construction is
constant within the precinct; major redevelopments
completed during the trial include the large
international hotels of Soul by Juniper and the Hilton
Surfers Paradise. Public space redevelopment along
the beach foreshore has also been completed during
the DSP trial in 2011. The Gold Coast light rail project
to be completed by June 2014 will significantly
improve public transport in the area. The Gold Coast is
to host the Commonwealth Games in 2018 and this
will trigger a great deal of construction and an influx of
people.
It is estimated that 35 000 people visit the Surfers
Paradise precinct on an average Friday and Saturday
night, with these numbers increasing during major
events such as the Gold Coast 600 (formerly Indy),
Source:
77 | P a g e
Schoolies, and New Year’s Eve.
Footpath crowding and pedestrian safety is an issue as the pace of growth and development has
outstripped the capacity of the infrastructure and limits of early planning. The Cavill and Orchid
Avenue roads are narrow roads that pass through the entertainment precinct, which are congested
with taxis, cars, and pedestrian traffic spilling onto the roads in some areas.
The Cavill and Orchid Avenue precinct is said to have had the highest concentration of licensed
venues in Queensland (Gold Coast City Council 2010). During the DSP trial, in 2011, there were 96
licensed venues in the Surfers Paradise DSP. Figure 4 provides a breakdown of the trading hours of
licensed venues in the DSP.
Figure 4. Trading hours of licensed venues in the Surfers Paradise DSP
15%
(n = 14)
24%
61%
(n = 23)
Source:
(n = 59)
up to 2am or 3am
up to 5am
As shown in Figure 4, in the Surfers Paradise DSP:

fourteen (15%) venues have licenses to trade past the 3am lockout until 5am

twenty-three venues (24%) trade until 2am or 3am

fifty-nine venues (61%) close at midnight or earlier.
Townsville
Townsville is Australia's largest urban centre in the north. It is also an area experiencing rapid
growth. In 2001, the local government area had an estimated residential population of 144 789; by
2005, it had grown to 160 220; and in 2010, the estimated population was 185 768 (ABS 2010).
Between June 2005 to June 2010, Queensland had an average annual growth rate of 2.5% compared
to 3.0% for the Townsville local government area (ABS 2010).
78 | P a g e
Townsville hosts a significant number of government, community, and major business offices for the
northern half of the state. The Townsville economy is diverse and has benefited from the resources
boom in recent years. It is also a popular destination with tourists drawn to Magnetic Island and the
Great Barrier Reef.
Townsville has a younger population than the Australian and Queensland average (ABS 2011a,
2011b, 2011c). Traditionally the city has had a large number of short to medium term residents,
including military personnel, university students, government employees and more recently, fly
in/fly out mining workers.
Townsville regularly hosts special events such as the Townsville V8 Supercars, Townsville Cup races,
National Rugby League team (the Cowboys) home games, and National Basketball League team (the
Crocs) home games.
The Flinders Street East area, which lies at the heart of the DSP, was the original commercial centre
of Townsville with a large number of historical buildings dating from the 1880s.
The DSP and Townsville today
The Townsville DSP covers a widespread area around the central business district and adjoining
commercial, recreational, and residential areas. Just fewer than 2500 people reside in the Townsville
City suburb (ABS 2010). Estimated patron crowd numbers in the Townsville DSP area are largely unestimated, but may be in the vicinity of 10 000 people on Friday and Saturday nights.
The DSP area includes several distinct areas of activity (see Figure 5). The Flinders Street East area is
the heart of the DSP and is Townsville’s main entertainment and nightclub strip. The Flinders Street
East area is dominated by pubs and clubs, with little residential and limited other commercial
occupancy. This area has a relatively broad street and wide footpaths.
Portions of the following areas are also included in the DSP area:

Flinders St West, which has two hotels, a nightclub and a number of high rise residential units

Palmer St, which is principally a restaurant precinct interspersed with numerous high rise
residential units

The Strand, which borders the seaside foreshore in the suburb of North Ward, and has a number
of high rise residential and holiday units, restaurants, cafes, and bars.50
50
The Townsville DSP boundary includes The Strand up to the corner of Gregory St.
79 | P a g e
Figure 5. Map of the Townsville Drink Safe Precinct area
Source:
DSP venues attract a large number of university students living in Townsville and also many of the
Australian Army personnel stationed at the large Lavarack Barracks army base.
Being in a regional city, and located on the fringe of the CBD, the Townsville DSP is not well serviced
by public transport. On the other hand, the Townsville DSP does not have the density of
development seen in the Valley or in Surfers, and the footpaths and general congestion is not as
pronounced as in the other DSP sites.
The Townsville DSP attracts large numbers of patrons every weekend and especially after events.
‘Cheap Tuesday’ in Townsville is also said to generally be a busier night. In 2011 there were 55
licensed venues in the Townsville DSP. Figure 6 provides further breakdown of the trading hours of
licensed venues in the DSP area.
80 | P a g e
Figure 6. Trading hours of licensed venues in the Townsville DSP
16%
(n = 9)
13%
(n = 7)
71%
(n = 39)
Source:
up to 2am or 3am
up to 5am
As can be seen in Figure 6, in the Townsville DSP:

nine venues (16%) trade past the 3am lockout until 5am

seven venues (13%) close at 2am or 3am

more than half of these venues close at or before midnight (71%, n = 39).
Summary
The challenges and opportunities in relation to the management of the night time economy in any
area will depend on the history of development and particular characteristics of that area. Key
features of each of the three DSP areas relevant to the DSP trial.
Fortitude Valley:

just over 5000 residents

up to 50 000 patrons on a busy Friday or Saturday night

night time economy attracts a diverse ‘party crowd’

relatively well serviced by public transport

some design and infrastructure challenges:
o
two major arterial roads bisect the area
o
pedestrian congestion and safety is a real issue, exacerbated by narrow footpaths

night time economy has rapidly expanded over the past 10-15 years

73 licensed venues (as per 2011).
81 | P a g e
Surfers Paradise:

sixth largest city in Australia and one of the fastest growing regions

major tourist destination, accommodating both partygoers and families with young children

features include hotels, hospitality, tourism, and family fun

longstanding concern over alcohol-related disorder and violence—Surfers has a more significant
history of interventions aiming to reduce such problems than any other single area in the state

DSP area is very densely developed with high-rise apartment buildings and shopping malls

major construction and public space redevelopment is an almost constant factor within the
precinct

35 000 patrons on an average Friday and Saturday night


o
footpath crowding and pedestrian safety
o
congestion with taxis, cars, and pedestrian traffic spilling onto the roads in some areas
96 licensed venues (as per 2011), highest concentration of licensed venues in Queensland.
Townsville:

Australia's largest urban centre in the north

younger population than the Australian and Queensland average

large number of short to medium term residents, including military personnel, university
students, government employees, and fly in/fly out mining workers

2500 residents in Townsville City suburb

DSP venues attract a large number of university students and Australian Army personnel


o
not well serviced by public transport
o
footpaths and general congestion not as pronounced as in the other DSP sites
55 licensed venues (as per 2011).
82 | P a g e
Chapter 6 Governance and coordination
A key aim of the DSP trial was to improve the on-the-ground coordination across a large range of
stakeholders. The establishment of local DSP committees in each trial site, and the development of a
local management plan by each of the committees, were the key tools used in the DSP trial to
improve the collaboration needed to bring about effective action to address local issues. In addition,
a dedicated police ‘DSP Inspector’ in each DSP area has been supported through the Queensland
Government’s DSP funding allocation to the QPS. The DSP Inspectors have played a critical role in
leading and coordinating the DSP trial, both within the QPS and also across other stakeholders.
Local DSP committees
A local DSP committee, coordinated by the state government, has been the key governance
structure for the development and implementation of the trial in each DSP. The membership of the
local DSP committees includes representation from a broad range of relevant state government
agencies, local government, licensed venues, and other business and community groups (see Table
3). The local DSP committees have met regularly (every one to three months) as required. Members
of the local committees have supported each other to:

collaboratively develop a local DSP management plan

oversee and coordinate the implementation of the management plan

provide input into the evaluation of the trial.
During the planning phase, when the management plan was being developed for each site, the
committees were chaired and convened by the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR).51
The exception was the Fortitude Valley committee, which was sometimes chaired by the former
Attorney-General. After the initial planning phase, and when the development of a local
management plan had been completed, the responsibility for chairing and convening the local
committees transitioned from OLGR to the Queensland Police Service (QPS). A senior ranking
commissioned police officer has since led each local committee through the
implementation/operational phase.
Various sub-committees or working groups were formed to address particular issues that required
longer term planning and action, and for which there was no immediate strategy available to resolve
the issue in the initial planning phase. For example, the Townsville Local DSP Committee has had an
active transport sub-committee, chaired by the representative from the Townsville City Council. This
subcommittee has developed options that could be considered by the local DSP committee to try to
resolve transport issues in the area.
Committee members have been expected to manage their own responsibilities for commitments
included in the management plans to ensure they are actioned. The management plans were
generally revisited at each meeting of the local DSP committee, where agencies were asked to
report back regarding progress and action taken against the plan. Committee members have been
51
Now part of the Department of Justice and the Attorney-General (DJAG).
83 | P a g e
Section 2 DSPs in action - Chapter 6 Governance and coordination
encouraged to communicate outcomes of the local DSP committee meetings within their own
organisations/networks.52 The state government and the Brisbane City Council also used other
internal governance structures to provide central coordination and communication within their own
organisations. The state government DSP CEOs Committee was chaired by the Director-General of
the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and provided representation from each relevant state
government agency.53 The Brisbane City Council also convened a Project Control Group Committee
(which included state government participation as required) in order to assist with the coordination
of the Fortitude Valley trial.
Table 3. Organisational membership of the local DSP committees
Fortitude Valley
Department of Justice and AttorneyGeneral – Office of Liquor and Gaming
Regulation & Office of Fair Trading
Department of the Premier and
Cabinet
Department of Transport and Main
Roads
TransLink Transit Authority
Queensland Rail
Queensland Police Service
Department of Communities, Child
Safety and Disability Services
Queensland Health
Queensland Ambulance Service
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service
Brisbane City Council
Valley Malls Advisory Committee
Valley Chamber of Commerce
Incorporated
Valley Liquor Accord
Liquor, Hospitality & Miscellaneous
Union
Taxi industry
Security providers
Chill Out Zone
ChaplainWatch
Surfers Paradise
Cabinet
Roads
Queensland Health
Gold Coast City Council
Surfers Paradise-Broadbeach Chamber
of Commerce
Surfers Paradise Licensed Venues
Association Incorporated
Liquor Industry Consultative
Association
Liquor, Hospitality & Miscellaneous
Union
Taxi Industry
Surfside Bus Lines
Security Providers
Surfers Paradise Police Community
Consultative Committee
Surfers Paradise Alliance
Chill Out Zone
Townsville
Cabinet
Roads
Queensland Health
Australian Defence Forces Military
Police
Townsville City Council
Townsville Chamber of Commerce
Townsville Late Night Traders
Taxi Industry
Townsville Sunbus
Security Providers
AngilCare Rest & Recovery
Townsville Street Chaplains
52
It was the aim at the outset of the trial that other coordinating groups in existence prior to the
establishment of the DSP trial - such as the various liquor accord or licensed venue groups or chambers of
commerce – should be recognised and respected in each precinct.
53
The Under Treasurer, Police Commissioner and Directors-General of the Department of Communities,
Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Queensland Health, Department of Community Safety
(Ambulance) and Department of Transport and Main Roads were represented on the DSP CEOs committee.
The Brisbane City Council also convened a Project Control Group Committee, which included state government
participation in order to assist with the coordination of the Fortitude Valley trial.
84 | P a g e
Local management plans
In all three sites, strategies were developed under the four core objectives in the local management
plans:
1. improve community safety
2. improve public amenity
3. improve patron behaviour in the precinct
4. improve/coordinate transport.
The Fortitude Valley DSP management plan also included an objective to improve partnerships
across government, industry and community.
Dedicated DSP Inspectors
In each DSP area, a dedicated police ‘DSP Inspector’ has been supported through the Queensland
Government’s DSP funding allocation to QPS. The QPS has rotated individuals through this DSP
Inspector position about every six months.
The DSP Inspectors have provided leadership in terms of on-the-ground communication and
coordination with other stakeholders. For example, the DSP Inspectors lead the operational planning
that occurs in relation to upcoming events and anticipated ‘big nights’ to ensure that venues,
security staff, and support services are well coordinated. The police DSP Inspectors provide an
important single point of contact for the QPS regarding DSP issues.
Perceptions of governance and coordination
Throughout the trial, participation in each of the local committees has been a key element of the
evaluation project’s activity. This has provided a valuable source of information and effective means
of communication for evaluation updates, but it has also offered the opportunity to observe how
well the committees have functioned, the importance of the local management plan and quality of
leadership provided by the DSP Inspectors. Consultations with key stakeholders have highlighted and
largely confirmed the perceptions drawn by the evaluation from these observations.
The key messages about governance and coordination from participation in local DSP committees,
and from consultations with stakeholders include:

The local committees have provided a vital and widely appreciated forum for the discussion and
resolution of issues, ranging from the simple to the complex. Participation in the committee and
open communication has helped improve the stakeholder’s understandings of each others’
roles. It was noted that the flexibility for the committee to adapt to local settings was critical,
and would be crucial to any expansion of the trial. The ability to ‘share learnings’ across the DSP
local committees, and the need to clarify the function of the CEOs Committee (including
interaction with the local committees) were areas noted for improvement. This communication
gap between the local committees was noted to limit their ability to learn from each other’s
successes and mistakes; while the lack of a overarching governance structure for the trial
85 | P a g e
sometimes frustrated committee members who were unsure of how to ‘escalate’ an issue that
could not be resolved at the local committee level.

The local management plans provided a solid reference point for action to be taken by each
agency, ensuring that the committee was about more than ‘just talk’. Although, regular reviews
of progress against the management plan are essential to ensure continued and comprehensive
action against all items. The structuring of local committee meetings around outstanding action
items from the management plan in the Fortitude Valley DSP was observed as particularly
effective.

The role of the dedicated DSP Inspector in providing leadership and facilitating the functioning of
the local committee was an important element of the trial, and informally the individuals
appointed to these roles by the QPS were largely and regularly praised. More formally, at the
DSP forum held in the Fortitude Valley DSP in October 2012 stakeholders commented that the
DSP Inspectors had provided great, professional leadership; ‘setting the right tone’ for the
officers that work in the DSP and helping to foster the de-escalation and diversionary approach
to policing in a DSP-type environment.
Summary
The local DSP committees have been the key governance structure for the development and
implementation of the trial in each DSP. They include representation from a broad range of relevant
state government agencies, local government, licensed venues, and other business and community
groups. They work to:

collaboratively develop a local DSP management plan

oversee and coordinate the implementation of the management plan

provide input into the evaluation of the trial.
Various sub-committees or working groups were also formed to address particular issues, such as:

those that require longer term management

those for which there is no immediate strategy available to resolve the issue in the initial
planning phase.
The DSP Inspectors provide single point of contact within the QPS for each DSP area, and they have
played an important role in improving the coordination and on-the-ground communication and
collaboration between stakeholders.
86 | P a g e
Chapter 7 DSP policing
Increased police numbers, high visibility policing, and an emphasis on de-escalation and diversion
have been key features of the DSP trials. These strategies aim to reduce alcohol-related violence by
deterring potential trouble makers and providing police with options other than arrest to deal with
people who are intoxicated or aggravated, while ensuring that patrons are aware that if they offend,
it is likely that they will be caught and be made to face the consequences.
Increased police presence
In addition to the dedicated police ‘DSP Inspectors’ that have been supported through the
Queensland Government’s DSP funding allocation to QPS, the DSP trial has provided a substantial
boost to police numbers on the streets on busy nights in each of the three DSP areas. For patrons
and other stakeholders on-the-ground, this would be the most noticeable impact of the trial in each
precinct.
Following the first extension of the trial from November 2012 to February 2013, the structure of the
increased police presence was changed in order for the QPS to deliver it within their existing
resources. These variations came into effect from July 2012. While the number of officers on duty on
any given night will always vary according to operational need, the changes in the police presence
from before the DSP trial to during the first 19 months of the trial (December 2010 to June 2012),
and from then until the end of the two-year trial period (July 2012 to November 2012) are described
in general below.54
Fortitude Valley DSP
In Fortitude Valley, the rostering of police between 10pm and 6am would usually provide the
following:

before the DSP trial on Fridays, 20-24 police; increasing to approximately 35 police during the
DSP trial

before the DSP trial on Saturdays, 14-16 police; increasing to approximately 42 police during the
DSP trial.
From 30 July 2012, to support the extension of the trial until February 2013 the police rostering
between 10pm and 6am was adjusted to:

28-30 officers on Fridays

maintain 42 police on Saturdays.
Surfers Paradise DSP
In Surfers Paradise, the rostering of police between 10pm and 6am would usually provide the
following:
54
The second extension of the trial to September 2013 also required QPS to provide the policing presence
within existing resources. This necessitated further adjustments to the policing model. However, these
changes are outside the two-year trial period evaluated.
87 | P a g e
Section 2 DSPs in action - Chapter 7 DSP policing

before the DSP trial, an average 20 officers on Thursday; during the trial, an additional 17
officers (working between 3 and 6 hrs overtime)

before the DSP trial, an average of 24 officers on Fridays and Saturdays; during the trial, an
additional 26 officers (working between 3 and 6 hrs overtime)
From 1 July 2012, to support the extension of the trial until February 2013, the police rostering was
adjusted to:

no additional staff on Thursdays

8-10 additional officers on Fridays and Saturdays (working an average of 5 hours overtime).
Townsville DSP
In Townsville, the rostering of police between 10pm and 6am would usually provide the following):

before the DSP trial, no rostered staff on Tuesdays; for the two-year trial period this has
increased to between 6 and 8 police

before the DSP trial, 8 police on Fridays; for the two-year trial period this has increased to
between 12 and 14 police

before the DSP trial, 8 police on Fridays; for the two-year trial period this has increased to
between 12 and 14 police.
The overtime model used to support increased DSP policing
The DSP trial delivers the increased police numbers by providing extra planned overtime shifts or
hours—that is, police officers are paid ‘overtime’ rates to work extra hours in the DSP in addition to
their regular rostered shifts. The particular arrangements used in terms of planning overtime hours
have varied across the DSP sites in order to meet local needs. In each area, steps have been taken to
ensure DSP overtime is allocated on an equitable and fair basis, and to ensure compliance with QPS
fatigue management policies (which imposes limits on the number of weekend shifts that officers
can work, for example). Officers receive approximately $88.26 per hour on overtime; however, this
amount will vary as a function of rank.
Concerns about the sustainability of the overtime model through which the increased police
presence in the DSP has been provided, were raised at the outset of the trial. For example, the QPS
was concerned that the heavy reliance on overtime over the two year trial would lead to increased
levels of fatigue, sick leave, and risks to officer safety. These concerns have abated as the trial has
progressed.
The use of the overtime model has made DSP policing attractive for police and enabled the extra
police numbers to be easily obtained as required. There are a number of reasons that the overtime
policing model has worked so well. For example:

it has made DSP policing financially rewarding for police

it has demonstrated to police that this type of policing activity is valued and considered
important by the public and the government.
88 | P a g e

it has allowed extra DSP hours to be performed by a combination of general duties officers,
specialist groups (e.g. Public Safety Response Team (PSRT),55 Mounted Unit), traffic and plain
clothes officers, and general duties police from neighbouring divisions where appropriate.
However, the sustainability of the overtime model has been further questioned through the
extensions of the trial. The decision to extend the trial without additional funding for the QPS has
required the QPS to explore alternatives to the overtime model for providing the increased police
presence.
Police operations in the DSPs
Police officers working in DSPs are organised into teams (usually three or four officers). Typical
duties of officers working DSP shifts include:
 conducting foot patrols throughout the area with a community interaction focus

conducting walk-throughs of licensed venues

proactively identifying prospective problems and applying a preventative focus

managing potentially volatile crowds, including by moving-on bystanders to ensure crowd safety

containing and dealing with violent events and offenders, assisting injured and distressed
individuals, obtaining witness details and other evidence

diverting traffic where necessary.
In addition, some teams will be allocated specific duties, such as ‘van crews’ who transport offenders
arrested within a DSP to the closest watchhouse for processing and holding.
General duties officers in the DSPs are supported by QPS officers from the relevant Liquor
Enforcement and Proactive Strategies (LEAPS) units.56 LEAPs officers provide expert knowledge,
analysis, and follow up of incidents attended by police relating to licensed venues. The LEAPS units
work collaboratively with licensed venues and other government agencies, such as OLGR, to resolve
issues and progress positive strategies aimed at harm-minimisation and reducing the number of
alcohol-related incidents that police attend.
In order to maximise the time that officers spend on the street in the DSP areas, the police make the
best possible use of the facilities available in each DSP locality to assist to process offenders. For
example:

In Fortitude Valley, police operate primarily from the Fortitude Valley Police Beat. The Police
Beat, or shopfront, includes a front counter/communications room with CCTV, limited holding
cells, office space with computer access, and staff facilities. Where an offender is to spend a
longer period in detention they will be transported to the Brisbane City Watchhouse.
55
PSRT is a full-time squad of 46 specially trained officers used for crowd management, policing public
gathering and crisis deployment (e.g. during natural disasters).
56
The Fortitude Valley DSP is located within the Fortitude Valley Police Division; the Surfers Paradise DSP
within the Surfers Paradise Police Division; and the Townsville DSP is within the Townsville Police Division.
89 | P a g e

In Surfers Paradise, police operate from the Surfers Paradise Police Station which is centrally
located within the DSP. The station includes a front counter and communications room, holding
cells, office space with computer access and staff facilities. Where an offender is to spend a
longer period in detention they will be transported to the Southport Watchhouse.

In Townsville, police operate from an empty lot/car park area on Flinders Street East. Police here
use a ‘brawler’ van as a ‘Forward Command Post’. The van includes two caged transport cells,
lighting, CCTV, and limited space to set up laptops with mobile connectivity to the police
network (see Figure 7 below). If offenders are to be detained by police for any length of time,
they are transported to the Townsville City Watchhouse.
The different facilities available to support policing operations in each DSP can impact on the time
police must be off the street processing offenders. This can impact on the attractiveness, or
otherwise, of providing certain police responses to some offenders. For example:

In the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs, a great deal of offender processing can occur
at the Police Beat or Station. Some offenders detained by police may calm down after being held
briefly in the holding cells. If it is appropriate in the circumstances, these offenders will be
processed entirely at the Police Beat or Station, issued with a notice to appear or an
infringement notice, and then released (and directed to head straight for home). Offenders who
are to be detained by police for longer, and who are to be held in a watchhouse until they
receive bail or appear in court, may receive preliminary processing at the Police Beat or Police
Station and then be handed over by the arresting officer to a ‘van crew’ who transport the
offender to the watchhouse. This ‘speed-processing’ helps to keep police in the DSP and on
patrol in the streets as much as possible.

In contrast, the ‘brawler van’ mobile facility in the Townsville DSP offers more limited
opportunities to process offenders within the DSP area. Some offenders may be entirely
processed in the van while they are held briefly in the caged area of the vehicle (e.g. if the
offender is calm and there is room in the caged transport cells) and they are then released with
a notice to appear or infringement notice. More commonly, the ‘brawler’ van is used to hold
offenders temporarily while details of the offence are obtained. The offender is then
transported by the arresting officers to the watchhouse for further processing. Watchhouse
transportation and processing can take the officers out of the DSP for up to an hour.
90 | P a g e
Figure 7. Police operations in the Townsville DSP
Source:
Queensland Police Service (2012).
The office space and computer facilities available within the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise
DSPs allow the senior officer in charge of the DSP operations to complete reports and update data
collection during the night, whilst remaining at the DSP site. The mobile facilities in the ‘brawler van’
in the Townsville DSP are intended to allow for this, however, issues connecting to the police
network often hinder this from occurring. The lack of staff facilities, such as toilets or a meal room,
add further difficulties to DSP policing in Townsville; officers must travel to the police station outside
of the DSP or else use the venue toilets.
High visibility
In addition to the higher numbers of the police on the street, other high visibility strategies used in
the DSPs include:

regular and continuous patrols throughout the public space outside licensed venues

regular walk-throughs of the licensed venues

wearing high visibility vests.
Regular and continuous patrols outside licensed venues
Public spaces outside of licensed venues that are regularly and continuously patrolled include
streets, roadways, and pedestrian areas, around food outlets and convenience stores, alleyways,
vacant lots, small parks, and transport hubs (bus stops, taxi ranks, and train stations). This patrolling
provides a visible deterrent to potential offending, and assists to ensure that there will be police
nearby who can provide a rapid reactive response to incidents as required.
Patrolling by multiple police teams is a consistent feature across the DSP sites, with slight variations
to suit local needs:

Fortitude Valley – all police teams patrol the entire DSP on foot, with the exception of the ‘van
crews’ transporting offenders to the watch house

Surfers Paradise – foot patrols by police teams are supplemented with the support of an
expanded Bike Squad who patrol the extremities of the DSP
91 | P a g e

Townsville – foot patrols are targeted at the Flinders Street East focal point, with vehicle patrols
covering the outer areas of the entire DSP.
Police patrols may provide a rapid reactive response to any of the following triggers:

observations while on patrol

requests for assistance made through radio networks that can link licensed venues, security,
support services, police, and the CCTV control room (see further details below)

routine or emergency calls for assistance coordinated through the centralised Police
Communication Centres (e.g. 000 calls)

members of the public bringing matters directly to the attention of police while on patrol

phone calls or ‘walk-ins’ to the Fortitude Valley Police Beat, Surfers Paradise Police Station, or
Townsville DSP Forward Command Post.
The use of the radio networks, in particular, enables police to respond rapidly to incidents reported
by licensed venues or observed through CCTV monitoring.
Regular walk-throughs of licensed venues
The proactive policing of licensed venues in order to prevent crime and violence through deterrence
involves police teams regularly walking-through venues. Walkthroughs promote the presence of
police to patrons and venue staff, and aim to deter offending by demonstrating a high likelihood of
apprehension of any wrongdoing. A walk-through involves:

the police team making contact with the security, venue staff and/or duty manager at the entry
of a licensed venue and then making their way through the venue

officers observing key locations within the venue (e.g. dance floor and toilets) and monitoring
patron behaviour and the operations of the venue (e.g. Responsible Service of Alcohol)

police taking action in response to any issue identified; this may include discussions with the
duty manager, enforcement action or notification of OLGR for information or further action.
Figure 8 presents the QPS Returns Sheet data57 on the number of walk-throughs and associated
activities conducted by police patrols during the two years of the DSP trial. Comparisons to a ‘pretrial’ period are not possible as walk-through activities are not routinely recorded by police.
57
The QPS has collected ‘Returns Sheet’ data for the DSP trial for internal monitoring (Returns Sheets have
previously been used by the QPS to record activities relating to some special operations (e.g. Operations Merit
and Unite)). Each police team working on a DSP night fills out a Returns Sheet to record the policing activities
they have undertaken. Some information included in the Returns Sheet duplicates official data recoded in
QPRIME (e.g. number of arrests) and for these items, QPRIME data should be considered more accurate and
authoritative. However, for other items the Returns Sheet data provides a measure of police activities that is
not otherwise recorded (e.g. police exercise of tip out powers, use of tactical communication skills to deescalate a situation, and walk throughs of licensed venues).
92 | P a g e
Figure 8. Number of high visibility policing activities conducted at licensed venues from December
2010 to November 2012
Walk throughs
Licensed premise compliance audits
Liquor incident reports
Breaches against licensed premises
0
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
Fortitude Valley
Breaches against
licensed premises
588
Liquor incident
reports
180
Licensed premise
compliance audits
239
Surfers Paradise
555
147
244
6299
Townsville
26
26
0
5244
Source:
Note:
Walk throughs
7640
Queensland Police Service (2011-2012) – Returns Sheets, all days and hours of operations.
1. ‘Breaches against licensed venues’ includes police taking the following enforcement actions: issuing of a Liquor
Infringement Notice to a licensee or approved manager/staff member, and the filing of a Breach Report with OLGR for
further action.
2. Liquor Incident Reports are notifications to OLGR of events—positive or negative—that have occurred at a licensed venue
and are for information only and are not intended for further action.
As can be seen in Figure 8, during the two-years of the trial:

police conducted nearly 20 000 walk-throughs of licensed venues across the three DSP sites

a total of 1169 breaches against licensed venues were detected during the walk-throughs

353 Liquor Incident Reports were filed with OLGR.
Other high visibility strategies
Police may also conduct a variety of other activities to ensure their presence is noted by patrons and
potential offenders, increase people’s perception of the risk of apprehension and enforce the law.
Figure 9 presents QPS Returns Sheet data by DSP site on the number of Traffic Infringement Notices
(TINs) issued, Random Breath Tests (RBTs), and street checks conducted on DSP nights during the
two-years of the trial.
93 | P a g e
Figure 9. Number of other high visibility policing activities from December 2010 to November 2012
TINs issued
RBTs conducted
Street checks conducted
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Fortitude Valley
Street checks conducted
7223
RBTs conducted
706
TINs issued
503
Surfers Paradise
7282
3423
1250
Townsville
1560
227
394
Source:
8000
As shown in Figure 9, during the two-years of the trial:

police working in the three DSP sites conducted 16 065 street checks, 4356 RBTs, and issued
2147 TINs

the activity levels for conducting street checks, RBTs, and issuing infringement notices varied
markedly across the DSP sites.
The variation between the DSP sites may reflect differences in the numbers of police and patrons
across the three sites, differences in Returns Sheet recording practices, or different emphases on
these policing activities across the three DSP sites.
High visibility vests
In addition to increasing the numbers of police and proactive patrolling in the Fortitude Valley and
the Surfers Paradise DSPs, police officers wore high visibility vests to help them stand out from the
crowd (see Figure 10). A similar practice is commonly adopted in many other entertainment
precincts in other jurisdictions, and in Queensland for the policing of major sporting events, festivals,
or public demonstrations. The high visibility vests were not used in Townsville, however, for reasons
including the heat and unsuitability of the design.
As the trial has progressed, however, it has also become less common for police officers to wear
high visibility vests in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs. This is due to the increasing use
of load bearing vests (LBVs) by QPS officers to carry some of their standard equipment (e.g. radio,
baton, OC spray) (see Figure 11). The LBVs provide important benefits to officers as a more
ergonomic way of distributing the weight of their equipment, however, they do have the
disadvantage of not being ‘high visibility’, and is not possible to wear a high visibility vest over the
top as it would restrict access to the equipment.
94 | P a g e
Figure 10. Police wearing high visibility vests in the Fortitude Valley
Source:
Figure 11. Police wearing a load bearing vest on trial
Source:
95 | P a g e
Emphasis on de-escalation and diversion
Police in the DSPs have also been encouraged to exercise their discretion to resolve matters through
de-escalation and diversion when possible. Diversion and de-escalation strategies can be highlyeffective in diffusing potentially volatile or dangerous situations. As well as benefiting offenders by
avoiding formal contact with the criminal justice system, such strategies can be a more efficient way
for police to deal with some issues (e.g. keeping the police on patrol on the street and available to
respond to other incidents).
Police exercise a considerable amount of discretion in deciding how to respond to people in many
cases. This discretion is particularly wide when dealing with those whose behaviour falls at the most
minor end of the offending spectrum. Police may wish to respond to behaviour that is of concern,
but may not wish to criminalise the behaviour or take formal action against the person. For example,
police may be concerned and want to act, when a person’s pedestrian behaviour on or near a road
raises doubts about whether their level of drunkenness allows them to stay safe, or when it appears
that a person may be heading for trouble later from their level of intoxication, aggressive language
or body language/gestures. In such situations, good public order policing requires police to consider
the circumstances and assess their options, including whether it is appropriate to:

Deal with a person who has offended by taking formal enforcement action. This may be done by
way of arrest, a notice to appear in court, or an infringement notice (i.e. a ticket).58

Use communication skills to de-escalate and informally resolve, with no further action.

Divert people away from trouble and the criminal justice system by suggesting, for example, that
a person go directly home in a taxi, or by referring them to the NGO support services.59
The use of diversionary strategies to deal with minor offending (such as those acting disruptively or
requiring care and monitoring) has been emphasised by police as a key feature of DSP policing.
Figure 12 presents QPS Returns Sheet data about the number of police de-escalations and diversions
during the two-years of the DSP trial. As the use of de-escalations and diversions is not routinely
recorded police data, no pre-trial comparisons are available.
58
Police action taken in relation to offences and offenders are well recorded in the usual police databases. See
Section 3.
59
Being drunk in a public place is an offence in Queensland, but where police action must be taken to ensure
the safety or welfare of a drunk person, police must consider diversion of the person to a place of safety to
recover as an alternative to arrest. A place of safety may include a diversion home (see s. 10 of the Summary
Offences Act 2005, s. 378 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000).
96 | P a g e
Figure 12. Number of police de-escalation and diversionary activities from December 2010 to
November 2012
Conflict intervention/ tactical
communication
Taken to designated rest and recovery
areas
Drunk diversion - designated place of
safety
Breaches of the peace - detention only
Other de-escalation
0
Other deescalation
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Taken to
Conflict
Breaches of the Drunk diversion
designated rest intervention/
peace - designated
and recovery
tactical
detention only place of safety
areas
communication
293
986
911
6071
Fortitude Valley
2797
Surfers Paradise
711
301
919
484
1458
Townsville
219
13
52
23
37
Source:
Note:
Some interventions may involve more than one person. For example, tactical communication may have been used to deescalate a possible assault occurring between two or more persons.
As is clearly shown in Figure 12, Fortitude Valley DSP police have recorded the most use of deescalation and diversionary strategies of the three DSP sites, while the Surfers Paradise DSP police
have also retained a strong focus on these strategies. However, this is not reflected in the data
presented for the Townsville DSP policing.
The interim evaluation report noted that “the differences between the DSP areas are so substantial
that they are unlikely to be accounted for by differences in the number of patrons in the DSP areas”,
and that “different recording practices in Townsville may be a factor”. Since the publishing of the
interim evaluation report, inconsistencies have been identified in the data recording practices of the
QPS in the Townsville DSP compared to the Fortitude Valley or Surfers Paradise DSPs. Only a small
proportion of de-escalation and diversionary activity has been recorded for the Townsville DSP. It is
understood that this issue now has now been addressed by the QPS who have addressed
deficiencies in their data recording practices for the Townsville DSP. This is reflected in the data for
the Townsville DSP following the end of the two-year trial period (see Figure 13).
97 | P a g e
Figure 13. Number of police de-escalation and diversionary activities in the Townsville DSP from
December 2012 to April 2013
Conflict intervention/ tactical communication
Taken to designated rest and recovery areas
Drunk diversion - designated place of safety
Breaches of the peace - detention only
Other de-escalation
0
Other deescalation
Townsville
Source:
Note:
1007
200
400
Breaches of the Drunk diversion peace - detention designated place
only
of safety
19
91
600
800
Taken to
designated rest
and recovery
areas
164
1000
1200
Conflict
intervention/
tactical
communication
703
Queensland Police Service (2013) – Townsville DSP Returns Sheets, all days and hours of operations.
Some interventions may involve more than one person. For example, tactical communication may have been used to deescalate a possible assault occurring between two or more persons.
Figure 13 presents the Townsville DSP de-escalation and diversionary activities data for December
2012 to April 2013. It shows a much greater level of this activity then previously reported for the
two-year trial period.
98 | P a g e
Perceptions of DSP policing
Police and other stakeholders across the precincts noted that, prior to the DSP trial, police were very
busy and resources were stretched to the limit. The result of this was that they were not always able
to provide a rapid response when a new incident was reported. Often, teams were said to be already
responding to other matters when they received a request for assistance.
In contrast, all stakeholders agreed that during the trial the increased police presence meant that
the capacity of police to respond, and respond quickly, had been substantially improved. It was also
generally agreed that the increased police presence and high visibility strategies were effective in
deterring people from offending. The information provided during consultation included that:






Licensees and staff of licensed venues, security, CCTV operators and others noted and expressed
appreciation for the very good response times that police have been able to provide during the
trial.
Police indicated their strong view that having the capacity to provide a rapid response at the
earliest opportunity prevents matters from escalating to a more serious level. Other
stakeholders agreed that if police are able to provide a rapid response to a disturbance between
two individuals or groups, for example, this can prevent the situation escalating into a violent
fight that may draw in other bystanders.
Many police said that one of the key differences they had observed since the commencement of
the trial was that there was not the same large scale brawling between groups of people and
that this could be attributed to the success of early intervention.
Police provided accounts where responding immediately to an incident had made a real
difference to results on-the-ground, including lives saved. They noted that this may have not
have been possible without the extra numbers.
Many officers felt that conducting walk throughs of venues relatively early on in the night helped
to make sure that people were aware of the police presence and ensured the strategy had a
maximum deterrent effect.
The wearing of high visibility vests by police in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs
was observed to have had a great impact on patrons noticing the presence of police, helping to
mediate behaviour and improve safety. The police also added that it improved safety for them
as they were much easier to identify on CCTV footage or for back-up to find them in a crowd.
However, in the later stages of the trial a stakeholder from the Surfers Paradise DSP local
committee questioned whether the high visibility policing was still occurring and why the highvisibility vests weren’t being worn anymore, noting that the patrol teams had become much less
obvious when out in the DSP – “you just cannot see them anymore”.
We received little negative feedback about the increased and high visibility police presence during
the consultations. A small number of licensees reported that some patrons do comment, and
suggested the police presence is ‘pretty full-on’. One licensee commented, ‘they see all the police
and we get asked “is this a war zone?”’ One licensee also suggested that on quiet nights, when there
are few people in the venues, the number of officers in a team and the number of walk-throughs
could feel excessive: ‘the police can outnumber the patrons... it’s not really the atmosphere we’re
after.’ However, the same licensee agreed that, when it was a busy night, the numbers of police in
the DSP were absolutely needed.
99 | P a g e
The online survey results reinforce the clear message from consultations that the increased police
presence was clearly noticeable on-the-ground and was, in general, very well received. For example:

in Round 1of the online DSP survey, two-thirds of patron respondents indicated they believed
that the visible presence of police is effective at reducing alcohol-related violence and improving
community safety (66.9%, n = 541)

in Round 2 of the survey, just over two-thirds of patrons indicated that they believed the visible
presence of police was an effective strategy (67.7%, n = 272).
Positive comments were also made by patrons about the increased policing. For example:
I've noticed that police are all over violence or threatened violence within seconds in the
Valley Mall, and that's freaking awesome. They're so quick to get on top of it, it really gives
me confidence.
Police presence is on the rise which is great.
Some survey respondents commented, however, that they thought more police were still required:
We need more cops...[and] better training for police to deal with large angry violent men.
A much stronger police presence is needed, not only in the so called drink safe precinct but on
the fringes of the precinct.
Summary
Increased police numbers and high visibility policing have been the key, and probably the most
noticeable, features of the DSP trials. These policing strategies aim to reduce alcohol-related
violence by deterring potential trouble makers and making patrons aware that there will be
consequences if they offend. In particular, policing strategies during the DSP trial include:

a substantially increased police presence during the busiest times/nights of the week

high visibility strategies, which involve:

o
regular and continuous patrols throughout the public space outside licensed venues
o
regular walk-throughs of the licensed venues
o
the wearing of high visibility vests police , although this has become less common
de-escalation and diversion techniques, which allow police to:
o
diffuse potentially volatile or dangerous situations
o
minimise offenders’ formal contact with the criminal justice system
o
more efficiently attend to their duties by keeping them on the street and available to
respond to other incidents.
Consultation with stakeholders and survey responses revealed that that the visible presence of
police was commonly thought to be an effective strategy to improve the safety in the DSPs. The
increased presence of police was clearly noticeable on-the-ground and was mostly very well
received. Some survey respondents commented that they thought more police were still required.
100 | P a g e
Chapter 8 Support services
In addition to increased police presence and high visibility policing, the Queensland Government also
provided funding support for rest and recovery support services in each DSP. These services aim to
reduce the burden on police and emergency services by assessing and assisting people on-theground in the precinct and diverting people away from these government services where this is
appropriate.
This chapter describes each of the support services that formed a key element of the DSP trial in
each of the sites. We also present data provided by the support services that describes the amount
and type of assistance provided to people during the trial.
Although not a support service, another innovate strategy was also trialled in the Fortitude Valley
DSP by the Queensland Ambulance Service for the 2011 New Years Eve celebrations– the Ambulance
Treatment Centre. With an underlying rationale similar to the support service model, the treatment
centre aimed to reduce the pressure on ambulance and emergency departments by assessing and
assisting people in the precinct where possible. Information about this innovation is also included in
this chapter.
Rest and recovery support services
The role of rest and recovery support services is to:

identify vulnerable people and potential safety issues

assist with dispersing people from the precinct

de-escalate volatile situations where appropriate (with support worker safety being paramount)

increase the safety and well-being of vulnerable and intoxicated people

seek assistance for people who are at risk of harm to themselves or others.
The support services rely on police and emergency services to respond when situations are violent or
there is serious risk to a person’s health. Protocols with police and emergency services have been
established to ensure rapid and integrated responses.
To deliver the support services, funding was provided to the Department of Communities, Child
Safety and Disability Services, who entered into service agreements with the following NGOs:

Fortitude Valley – Chill Out Zone-Gold Coast Youth Service (rest and recovery, foot patrol) and
ChaplainWatch (foot patrol).
o
For the Chill Out Zone this meant establishing a new service for the Fortitude Valley at
the outset of the trial, although the Chill Out Zone clearly benefited from its long history
of operation in Surfers Paradise prior to the commencement of the DSP trial.
o
ChaplainWatch, on the other hand, had a long history of providing its services in the
Valley prior to the DSP trial commencement. The DSP money was provided to extend
and enhance these services.
101 | P a g e
Section 2 DSPs in action - Chapter 8 Support services

Surfers Paradise – Chill Out Zone-Gold Coast Youth Service (rest and recovery, foot patrol).
o

In the Surfers Paradise DSP, the Chill Out Zone has a long history of operation prior to
the commencement of the DSP trial. DSP funding allowed this service to be extended
and enhanced during the trial period.
Townsville – AngliCare North Queensland (rest and recovery).
o
For AngliCare and the Townsville DSP, the provision of support services was an entirely
new innovation brought about through the DSP trial. Neither the service nor the area
had any prior history of service delivery of this kind.
These services have been supported with DSP funds to operate, at a minimum, on Friday and
Saturday nights in each precinct from approximately 11pm to 5am the following morning. The
services can operate for an additional six nights per year to cater for special events at the direction
of the local DSP committee. The Surfers Paradise support service can also operate on Thursday
nights during the busier times of the year (around September to March).
A foot patrol for the Townsville DSP is provided by volunteers from the Townsville Street Chaplains,
but this service was not funded as part of the DSP trial. The AngliCare Rest and Recovery service has
developed a collaborative and successful working relationship with the Townsville Street Chaplains,
underpinned by a memorandum of understanding.
A memorandum of understanding has also been established between the Fortitude Valley Chill Out
Zone and ChaplainWatch that formalises how they work in partnership to deliver their overlapping
responsibilities for foot patrols in the Fortitude Valley DSP.60
60
The extension of the trial with reduced funding beyond November 2012 until February 2013 initially, and
then September 2013 has lead to ChaplainWatch assuming responsibility for all support service operations
(rest and recovery, and foot patrols) in the Fortitude Valley DSP from December 2012. The Chill Out Zone now
only operates in the Surfers Paradise DSP.
102 | P a g e
Box 4 to Box 6 provide a summary of the services offered by Chill Out Zone, Chaplain Watch and
Anglicare North Queensland.
Box 5. Chill Out Zone
Box 6. ChaplainWatch – NightWatch project
Chill Out Zone provides an innovative service that
others around the world are keen to replicate.
The NightWatch Chaplains assist people in crisis, at
risk, or in need. They provide a pro-active mobile
patrol, mobile rapid response, incident defusing and
debriefing, and secondary victim response and
support.
The Chill Out Zone offers welfare and first aid
assistance. It provides a static service from a
purpose built van parked in the precinct. The static
service offers timeout space, care for intoxication,
first aid, and drinking water. Clients are able to sit
or sleep in the van as necessary until they recover.
The service also offers a foot patrol that walks
around the precinct to identify people who may be
at risk, and to check known trouble spots.
The Chill Out Zone uses professional, paid staff
from a number of relevant disciplines and
backgrounds. Staff have expertise in mental
health, alcohol and drugs, homelessness, local
services, youth work, welfare, health care, and
other disciplines. This ensures they are able to
cater to the diverse client group that frequents
late night precincts.
The Chill Out Zone was initially developed in
Surfers Paradise in 1998 after extensive
community and stakeholder consultation about
the problems associated with public intoxication in
that area.
ChaplainWatch emphasise the importance of providing
a non-authoritarian service, encompassing crisis and
conflict de-escalation and diversion, first aid, victim
support, and welfare assistance. The service works in
partnership with other agencies—police, ambulance,
Brisbane City Council, venue management and
security, taxi operations, and other stakeholders.
NightWatch Chaplains are volunteers from a diverse
range of backgrounds. They are trained to handle
incidents in the busy, and sometimes volatile,
entertainment precincts.
ChaplainWatch is an independent Brisbane based
charity, which was established in 2004 to address
public safety in public spaces. The NightWatch
Chaplains are the highest-profile project of
ChaplainWatch.
ChaplainWatch has a long history of providing a proactive patrol in the Brisbane CBD, Fortitude Valley and
Caxton Street entertainment precincts, on Friday and
Saturday nights.
Box 4. Anglicare North Queensland – Drink Safe Precinct service
The Anglicare rest and recovery support service identifies potential safety issues and vulnerable people at risk of
harm to themselves or others, and assists with their dispersal from the Townsville DSP. The service aims to
increase the overall safety of the area and protect the wellbeing of patrons.
The Anglicare support service is coordinated by professional, paid staff who also work on rostered shifts in the
DSP. The remainder of the rostered staffing for the rest and recovery service is supported by volunteers from
the Townsville Street Chaplains. Anglicare and the Townsville Street Chaplains have entered into a
memorandum of understanding that underpins their strong, effective working relationship.
In 1985, Anglicare North Queensland Limited began as a volunteer youth service covering the Anglican Diocese
of North Queensland. Since then, it has grown to become a large organisation, delivering 18 services across the
far northern region of Queensland, including Cairns, Mackay, Mt Isa, and Townsville. Though the DSP support
service was an entirely new program for Anglicare, the organisation had the advantage of past experience in
delivering state funded programs aiming to assist vulnerable youth and deal with the harmful effects of
substance misuse.
103 | P a g e
Amount and type of support provided
Fortitude Valley
Figure 14 to Figure 17 present the amount of support delivered by these support services during the
two-years of the DSP trial. Due to variations between the NGOs in the classification of clients and
counting rules (and changes during the trial period within the Townsville Support Service), it is not
possible to compare the results of each service.
Figure 14. Number of clients and cases of assistance offered by Fortitude Valley Chill Out Zone
from December 2010 to November 2012, Friday & Saturday nights, and special events
0
20 000
40 000
Number of waters
60 000 80 000 100 000 120 000 140 000 160 000
Waters
144 125
Minor Assistance
795
Assisted Clients
2 408
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Number of clients
Source:
Note:
Chill Out Zone (2011- 2012) – Quarterly Reports, all days and hours of service provision.
1. ‘Minor assistance’ refers to patrons who require a minimal level of support, such as a free band-aid or use of a mobile
phone
2. ‘Assisted clients’ refers to patrons who require a higher level of care, such as first-aid for an injury, or care and monitoring
due to illness and intoxication.
Figure 15. Number of clients and cases of assistance offered by Fortitude Valley ChaplainWatch
from December 2010 to November 2012
Minor Assistance
1730
Client Intervention
1600
1648
1620
1640
1660
1680
1700
1720
1740
Number of clients
Source:
Note:
ChaplainWatch (2011- 2012) – Quarterly Reports, all days and hours of service provision.
1. ‘Minor assistance’ refers to those clients supported who did have a physical or mental injury or illness, or were being
primarily cared for by another service (e.g. QAS).
2. ‘Client intervention’ refers to clients with a physical or mental injury or illness that required a higher level of care.
As shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, during the two years of the trial, over 6000 clients (n = 6581)
received care or assistance (i.e. minor assistance, assistance, or intervention) from support services
104 | P a g e
in the Fortitude Valley DSP. Figure 14 shows that the Chill Out Zone provided over 144 000 waters to
patrons during this period.
Further analysis of detailed client level data was performed for the interim evaluation report and
considered those people who were classified as ‘assisted clients’ by the Fortitude Valley Chill Out
Zone on Friday and Saturday nights only (special events excluded) during the first 14 months of the
trial (n = 1799). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4 to Table 6.
Table 4. Clients receiving assistance from Fortitude Valley Chill Out Zone by intoxication type from
December 2010 to January 2012, Friday & Saturday nights
Intoxication type
Alcohol
Alcohol and drugs
Drugs
Possible drink spike
Not intoxicated
Unknown
Total
Source:
Number of clients
1352
138
18
24
157
110
1799
%
75.2%
7.7%
1.0%
1.3%
8.7%
6.1%
100.0%
Chill Out Zone (2012) – Client level dataset, Friday and Saturday nights only (special events excluded).
Table 5. Clients receiving assistance from Fortitude Valley Chill Out Zone by injury type from
Injury type
Not injured
Accident
Assault
Existing complaint
Self harm
Unknown
Total
Source:
Number of clients
1188
242
181
136
15
37
1799
%
66.0%
13.5%
10.1%
7.6%
0.8%
2.1%
100.0%
Table 6. Type of assistance provided by Fortitude Valley Chill Out Zone from December 2010 to
January 2012, Friday & Saturday nights
Assistance provided
Chill out
First aid
Welfare
Safe space
Refused assistance
Other/unknown
Total
Source:
Number of clients
933
569
149
98
32
18
1799
%
51.9%
31.6%
8.3%
5.4%
1.8%
1.0%
100%
As shown in Table 4 to Table 6:

three-quarters (75.2%) of assisted clients presented with alcohol intoxication

consumption of illicit drugs was suspected to be a contributing factor in 8.7% of assisted clients,
with or without alcohol

accidents were the most common form of injury for assisted clients (13.5%) followed by assaults
(10.1%)
105 | P a g e

the majority (83.5%) of assisted clients were provided with ‘chill out’ care and monitoring.61
Additionally, between December 2010 and January 2012, only a very small proportion of assisted
clients (n = 85, 4.8%) required ambulance transportation to a hospital and a further 15 assisted
clients (0.8%) were assessed by ambulance paramedics but not transported.
Table 7 presents a further breakdown of the ChaplainWatch data, showing the kinds of minor
assistance given to the services’ clients over the two-years of the DSP trial. Table 8 provides details
of patrons’ conditions for those cases where ChaplainWatch has provided some intervention.
Table 7. Minor assistance provided by Fortitude Valley ChaplainWatch from December 2010 to
November 2012
Minor assistance provided
Number of clients
%
Safety advice
706
40.8%
Conflict diversion
646
37.3%
Supported services
378
21.8%
1730
100.0%
Total
Source:
As shown in Table 7, during the two years of the DSP trial:

minor assistance clients seen by ChaplainWatch were primarily given safety advice (n = 706,
40.8%) or diverted from conflict (n = 646, 37.3%).

the remaining 378 minor assistance clients (21.8%) were assisted by ChaplainWatch as
secondary support to another service (e.g. Chill Out Zone or QAS).
Table 8. Primary condition of clients receiving intervention from Fortitude Valley ChaplainWatch
Primary condition
Number of clients
%
Alcohol intoxicated
855
51.9%
Drug affected
101
6.1%
Alcohol & drugs
17
1.0%
Injury by assault
267
16.2%
Injury by accident
199
12.1%
Injury by self harm
8
0.5%
Medical condition
154
9.3%
Mental health
33
2.0%
Unknown
14
0.8%
1648
100.0%
Total
Source:
Notes:
Primary condition missing for 82 client records.
61
Provision of a safe space, such as seat or bed, for the person to wait, relax or rest. While in this space, the
clients are monitored by staff to ensure they are not ill or injured.
106 | P a g e
As shown in Table 8, during the two years of the DSP trial, of the 1648 patrons of the Fortitude
Valley DSP that required a higher level of care (client intervention) from the ChaplainWatch support
service, over half (n = 855, 51.9%) presented with alcohol intoxication as their primary condition.
Surfers Paradise
Figure 16 presents the amount of support delivered by the Chill Out Zone in Surfers Paradise during
the two-years of the DSP trial.
Figure 16. Number of clients and cases of assistance offered by Surfers Paradise Chill Out Zone
from December 2010 to November 2012, Friday & Saturday nights, and special events
0
20 000
40 000
Number of waters
60 000 80 000 100 000 120 000 140 000
Waters
114 450
Minor Assistance
1593
Assisted Clients
3793
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Number of clients
Source:
Note:
Chill Out Zone (2011- 2012) – Quarterly Reports, all days and hours of service provision.
1. ‘Minor assistance’ refers to patrons who require a minimal level of support , such as a free band-aid or use of a mobile
phone
2. ‘Assisted clients’ refers to patrons who require a higher level of care, such as first-aid for an injury, or care and monitoring
due to illness and intoxication.
As shown in Figure 16, during the two years of the trial:

over 3700 patrons (n = 3793) in the Surfers Paradise DSP received minor assistance or assistance
from the Chill Out Zone

during this period the Chill Out Zone also provided more than 114 000 waters to patrons.
Further analysis of detailed client level data was performed for the interim evaluation report and
considered those people who were classified as ‘assisted clients’ by the Surfers Paradise Chill Out
Zone on Friday and Saturday nights only (special events excluded) during the first 14 months of the
trial. Table 9 to Table 11 present the results of this analysis.
107 | P a g e
Table 9. Clients receiving assistance from Surfers Paradise Chill Out Zone by intoxication type from
Intoxication type
Alcohol
Alcohol and drugs
Drugs
Possible drink spike
Not intoxicated
Unknown
Total
Source:
Number of clients
1776
186
22
57
187
89
2317
%
76.7%
8.0%
0.9%
2.5%
8.1%
3.8%
100.0%
Table 10. Clients receiving assistance from Surfers Paradise Chill Out Zone by injury type from
Injury type
Not injured
Accident
Assault
Existing complaint
Self harm
Unknown
Total
Source:
Number of clients
1253
389
480
127
31
37
2317
%
54.1%
16.8%
20.7%
5.5%
1.3%
1.6%
100.0%
Table 11. Type of assistance provided by Surfers Paradise Chill Out Zone from December 2010 to
January 2012, Friday & Saturday nights
Assistance provided
Chill Out
First aid
Welfare
Other/Unknown
Source:
Note:
Number of clients
1033
1036
204
6
%
44.6%
44.7%
8.8%
0.3%
1. Multiple responses are allowed for this field, so will not total to 2317 or 100%.
As shown in Table 9 to Table 11:

three-quarters (76.7%) of assisted clients presented with alcohol intoxication

consumption of illicit drugs was suspected to be a contributing factor in 8.9% of assisted clients,
with or without alcohol

assaults were the most common form of injury for assisted clients (20.7%), followed by accidents
(16.8%)

the majority (89.3%) of assisted clients were provided with ‘chill out’ care and monitoring62 or
first aid.63
62
Provision of a safe space, such as seat or bed, for the person to wait, relax or rest. While in this space, the
clients are monitored by staff to ensure they are not ill or injured.
63
Help given to a sick or injured person until full medical treatment is available
108 | P a g e
Additionally, between December 2010 and January 2012, only a very small proportion of assisted
clients (n = 129, 5.6%) required ambulance transportation to a hospital. A further 34 assisted clients
(1.5%) were assessed by ambulance paramedics but not transported.
Townsville
Figure 17 presents the amount of support delivered in Townsville during the two years of the DSP
trial.
Figure 17. Number of clients and cases of assistance offered by Townsville support service from
December 2010 to November 2012, Friday & Saturday nights, and special events
0
Number of waters
20 000
30 000
10 000
40 000
Waters
(July 2011 onwards)
50 000
44 206
Significant issue clients
(July 2011 onwards)
1013
Assisted clients
(Dec 2010 - June 2011)
2927
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of clients
Source:
AngliCare (2011-2012) – Quarterly reports, all days and hours of service provision.
As shown in Figure 17:

the Townsville DSP support service assisted and provided water to nearly 3000 (n = 2927)
patrons during the first seven months of their service (December 2010 to June 2011)

in the remaining 17 months (July 2011 to November 2012), the Townsville support service
handed out over 44 000 (n = 44 206) waters and cared for 1013 clients with significant issues.
Additionally between December 2010 and November 2012 the Townsville DSP support service
received 543 referrals from police for clients requiring minor or significant levels of care. These
referrals have steadily increased through the trial, rising from an average in the first year of the trial
of 1.4 per night to nearly 4 (n = 3.8) per night of service in the second year of the trial.
The significant increase in activity following the first few months of the trial reflects the progress
made in developing the support service from its infancy at the start of the DSP trial. In particular, the
increasing activity is likely to reflect the addition of new equipment (e.g. greater water storage),
recruitment of staff, and the building of trust with patrons and key stakeholders (e.g. police and
licensed venues).
109 | P a g e
Perceptions of support services
Throughout consultations with stakeholder groups in each DSP, there was a strong and consistent
view that the support services were effective. For example,

Surfers Paradise licensees described the Chill Out Zone as an ‘incredible’ and ‘excellent service’,
one for which they ‘can’t give enough praise’.

Townsville ambulance paramedics noted that the support service is effective at providing the
lower level of care for incidents that would otherwise come through to the ambulance as an
‘unconscious’ patient. These calls are often not serious, but can necessitate—in the interests of
a cautious, patient safety focused response system—an urgent, first priority response by an
ambulance crew.

The police also identified that the support services provide a ‘softer side’ that allows for the
diversion of drunks and minors, until they can be collected by parents and friends or
transported home some other way. Surfers Paradise police and licensees also noted that there
was growing collaboration between licensed venues and the Chill Out Zone. They observed that
security staff now walk patrons to the Chill Out Zone, rather than just telling them to leave the
venue. This, in turn, prevents security staff being tied up at the venue dealing with a
troublesome patron and frees up security and police resources.
DSP support services have also been well received by patrons. The Townsville support service noted
that patron comments have been very positive, even that ‘hugs [from patrons] are an occupational
hazard in this job’.
Awareness of the support services amongst patrons was low at the outset of the trial. This appears
to have improved as the trial has progressed. For example:
 in Round 1 of surveys, just over one-third of patrons (36.1%; n = 294) had noticed the presence
of support services
 this increased to over half of patrons (59.2%; n = 238) noting their presence in Round 2 of
surveys.
As the Townsville support service suggested during consultations, it is likely that some patrons may
remain unaware of support services if they have not needed their care.
The DSP survey also asked patrons how effective they believed the support services to be as a
strategy. Again, the results suggest that patrons may have increasingly perceived the support
services to be an effective strategy as the trial progressed:
 in Round 1 of the surveys, just over one third of patrons (37.7%; n = 304) thought the support
services were an effective strategy
 this increased to half of patrons (50.2%; n = 202) in Round 2.
Patrons also commented positively on the benefits of the coordination and integration of the
support services with other elements of the DSP trial:
The positive presence of the Police and ChaplainWatch, with support of the Chill Out Zone,
has improved overall safety of Patrons and improved capacity to keep [the] public safe…
110 | P a g e
Box 7. The Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) treatment centre trial
During the DSP trial, the QAS trialled the establishment of an Ambulance Treatment Centre in the Fortitude
Valley DSP for the 2011 New Year’s Eve (NYE) celebration. The trial recognised the significant demand placed
on QAS and hospital emergency department resources during NYE celebrations that were predicted to
attract approximately 200 000 people to the City and Fortitude Valley areas.
The Ambulance Treatment Centre trial was developed to provide short term care to patients suffering from
minor trauma to limbs and persons affected by alcohol and/or illicit drugs with no complicating factors. The
aim was to divert patients with a low level of acuteness from hospital emergency departments—principally,
the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital (RBWH).
A Forward Commander, Intensive Care Paramedic Triage Officer and paramedics from QAS staffed the
treatment centre, alongside St John Ambulance volunteer first-aiders who also provided a foot patrol and
response team for the DSP. The DSP support services—Chill Out Zone and ChaplainWatch—operated as
normal and referred to the treatment centre as appropriate. The QAS also diverted some low acuteness
alcohol-affected only patients from the centre to the Chill Out Zone for assistance.
On the night:
 a total of 29 patients were treated and observed in the Ambulance Treatment Centre. These included
persons who were referred to the centre by the foot patrol team (who responded to five calls for
assistance via the QPS) and members of the public. Others were referred by the Chill Out Zone, or
diverted by QAS units, or QPS teams from other locations

the majority (n = 27, 93%) were treated/observed in the centre and then provided with alternative
transport home, arranged through the Chill Out Zone
 only two patients (7%) were transported to the RBWH.
The trial of the Ambulance Treatment Centre was deemed successful by QAS in reducing patient access
blockages at hospital EDs and the RBWH reported no ‘ramping’ of ambulances for the night. The efficient
diversion of patients, and avoidance of ‘ramping’ at hospitals, improved the availability of the QAS and QPS
teams. It allowed the QAS and QPS to continue to deliver typical response times on a recognisably busy
night.
Based on the success of the trial, the DSP Inspector successfully sought funding through an Australian
Government grant to continue the treatment centre for 2012-13 NYE celebrations, as well as six other major
event nights where the estimated demand justifies such a response. The support services funded as part of
the DSP trial remain the most appropriate response on busy nights generally, and indeed were
complemented rather than replaced by the Ambulance Treatment Centre during the 2011 NYE event.
Summary
Support services aim to reduce the burden on police and emergency services by diverting people
away from those services. The role of rest and recovery support services is to:





identify vulnerable people and potential safety issues
assist with dispersing people from the precinct
de-escalate volatile situations where appropriate (with support worker safety being paramount)
increase the safety and well-being of vulnerable and intoxicated people
seek assistance for people who are at risk of harm to themselves or others.
111 | P a g e
The support services rely on police and emergency services when situations are violent or there is
serious risk to a person’s health.
The DSP support services have been very successful. Data presented in this chapter shows that the
NGO support services have been well used across the DSP areas during the two years of the trial. For
example:




In Fortitude Valley, the Chill Out Zone and ChaplainWatch provided care or assistance to 6581
patrons.
In Surfers Paradise, the Chill Out Zone provided a care or assistance to 5386 patrons.
The Townsville DSP support services provided care or assistance to 3940 patrons.
Across all three DSPs, the support services handed out over 300 000 free cups or bottles of
water.
Consultations revealed:

there was a strong and consistent view among stakeholders across each DSP that the support
services make a positive contribution to the safety and wellbeing of patrons in the DSP areas
 the services have been well received by patrons
 though patron awareness of the support services was low at the outset of the trial, this seems
to have improved during the trial.
During the DSP trial, the QAS trialled the establishment of an Ambulance Treatment Centre in the
Fortitude Valley DSP for the 2011-12 NYE celebration to reduce the demand on QAS and hospital
emergency department resources. Patient access block issues were seemingly reduced with the
Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital reporting no ‘ramping’ of ambulances for the night. The
efficient diversion of patients, and avoidance of ‘ramping’ at hospitals, also improved the availability
of the QAS units and QPS teams, allowing them to deliver typical response times on a recognisably
extraordinarily busy night. Based on the success of the trial, the Australian Government provided a
grant to fund the treatment centre operations at the 2012-13 NYE event and six other major events
in the Fortitude Valley DSP. Other entertainment precincts that are impacted by major events may
also benefit from trialling a similar model.
Overall, the DSP support services have been very well received and have integrated well with other
elements of the DSP trial.
112 | P a g e
Chapter 9 Use of banning orders
As a result of the recommendations of the Inquiry into alcohol-related violence, the DSP trial was
complemented by the expansion of powers to impose ‘banning orders’ on violent offenders (Law,
Justice and Safety Committee 2010a). The strengthening of banning order powers at the time the
trial commenced was intended to ensure patrons who endanger public safety through violence can
be held accountable and be prevented from returning to the area where they have been violent.
Banning orders also aim to improve safety by deterring people who are intent on causing violence,
from entering or offending in licensed venues or areas around licensed venues. In this it was hoped
they would drive behaviour and cultural change.
In order for banning orders to change behaviour or deter unwanted patrons from an area, people on
whom a banning order has been imposed must feel compelled to comply with the ban. This may
occur, for example, if they fear that they will be caught for any breach. Significant penalties apply
for contravening a banning order (e.g. maximum $4000 fine or 1 year imprisonment).
Types of banning orders available
Legislative changes introduced in December 2010 made two key types of court or police imposed
banning orders available anywhere in Queensland. These are:
1. As part of a sentence imposed by a Magistrates Court, or a higher court, on conviction of an
offence relating to violence in, or in the vicinity of, any licensed venue (ss.43G-43O Penalties and
Sentences Act 1992). Banning orders may be imposed as part of a sentence as a result of an
application seeking a banning order by the prosecution, or by the court on its own motion
2. As a condition of bail where a person is accused of an offence relating to violence in, or in the
vicinity of, any licensed venues, but the person is to be released into the community on bail to
await for court (s. 11(3) Bail Act 1980). Banning orders may be made a condition of bail by the
court on application from the prosecution, on its own motion, or by a police officer granting bail.
These types of banning orders can apply for up to 12 months and can exclude people from inside
and outside of venues. There are significant penalties that can apply to people who contravene a
banning order. Penalties include a fine of up to $4000 or up to one year imprisonment. Any breach
of a ban made through bail conditions may also have serious consequences for the individual,
including having their bail revoked.
As there is no centralised data source that records all banning orders imposed as a condition of bail
by the police or a court, we do not report further on the use of banning orders imposed as a
condition of bail.64 The banning order data presented below refers to banning orders imposed by the
courts as part of an offender’s sentence when they are convicted with an offence.
At the same time as legislation was amended to expand statewide banning orders, changes were
also made to allow civil banning orders to be imposed specifically in a DSP area, as a result of acts of
violence. For a civil banning order to be imposed under the Liquor Act 1992, an application must be
64
It is likely that where police have granted bail to an offender but bring an application for a banning order to
be imposed as part of a sentence, police would have imposed a banning order as a condition of bail.
113 | P a g e
Section 2 DSPs in action - Chapter 9 Use of banning orders
made to a Magistrates Court by either a police officer or the chief executive of the Department of
Justice and Attorney-General. Civil banning orders do not necessarily require that a person be
charged with or convicted of a criminal offence. However, the court must be satisfied that a person
has committed an act of violence (so there may be little practical difference) (s. 173X Liquor Act
1992).
No civil banning orders were issued during the first 14 months of the trial. This suggests that civil
banning orders are not necessary or are not a practical option for dealing with troublemakers in the
DSPs. There is no further discussion of civil banning orders in this section of the report, although
Section 4 includes further discussion supporting a recommendation made on the basis that these
types of banning orders have not proven to be useful.
Banning orders imposed as part of a sentence
Statewide
Table 12 presents statewide data (of DSP and all other areas) of police applications made, and
banning orders imposed by the court when sentencing offenders.
Table 12. Banning order applications and court orders made statewide for offences committed
between December 2010 to November 2012
Application/order made
Police applications for banning order
Banning order issued
DSP
non-DSP
347
(53.8%)
164
(40.0%)
298
(46.2%)
246
(60.0%)
Total –
statewide
645
(100.0%)
410
(100.0%)
41
(16.1%)
205
(30.9%)
213
(83.9%)
459
(69.1%)
254
(100.0%)
664
(100.0%)
No police application for banning order
Total banning orders issued
% of total statewide
Source:
Notes:
Queensland Police Service – Drug and Alcohol Coordination Unit. As at 8 August 2013.
Data based on application/order relating to an offence committed during the period December 2010 to November 2012.
Subsequent updates to the data may result in minor changes to the statistics for this period if they are again reported at a
later date.
As shown in Table 12, for offences committed between December 2010 and November 2012:

664 banning orders have been made by the courts across the state; 205 of these relate to DSPs
and 459 have been imposed elsewhere65

of the total 664 banning orders made:
o
410 were made upon police application. The majority of these police applications relate
to the three DSP areas (n = 347, 53.8%). This indicates that police in the DSPs are actively
seeking to issue banning orders when prosecuting offenders. Although the DSP
65
Further analysis shows that banning orders have most frequently been imposed in the following areas
outside of the DSPs: Gladstone (n = 180, 39.2%), Mackay (n = 96, 20.9%), and Toowoomba (n = 57, 12.4%).
114 | P a g e
proportion has decreased from 68% (n = 172) during the first 14 months of the trial, this
does suggest that police in the non-DSP areas are increasingly making applications.
o
254 were made without a police application (i.e. the order was made by the court on its
own motion). The majority of these banning orders relate to areas outside DSPs (n =
213; 83.9%). This may reflect that banning orders do not have the same profile across
the state as they do for police in the DSP areas, although (as above) it does appear that
this has changed during the trial period.
Banning orders in the DSPs
Number and proportion in each DSP
Table 13 provides details for each DSP of the number and proportion of police applications made,
police application refused, and banning orders imposed by the court when sentencing offenders,
between December 2010 and November 2012.
Table 13. Banning order applications and court orders made in DSPs for offences committed from
December 2010 to November 2012
Application/order made
Fortitude
Valley
167
Surfers
Paradise
106
71 (42.5%)
Banning order refused
Police applications
Matter pending
No police application
Banning orders issued
Banning orders issued – total
(with and without police
application)
% of total for DSPs
Source:
Notes:
Townsville
Total
74
347
58 (54.7%)
35 (47.3%)
164 (47.3%)
87 (52.1%)
37 (34.9%)
32 (43.2%)
156 (45.0%)
9 (5.4%)
11 (10.4%)
7 (9.5%)
27 (7.8%)
27
98
(47.8%)
13
71
(34.6%)
1
36
(17.6%)
41
205
(100.0%)
Data based on application/order relating to an offence committed during the period December 2010 to November 2012.
later date.
 The Fortitude Valley DSP has had the highest number of police applications for banning orders (n
= 167), but the lowest percentage of success in terms of the court order being made (n = 71,
42.5%). The Surfers Paradise DSP had the greatest percentage of police applications for banning
orders issued (54.7%, n = 58).
 The Townsville DSP had the lowest number of police applications for banning orders (n = 74) and
the lowest number of banning orders issued by the court without a police application (n = 1).
Further analysis shows this is due to a substantial drop in police applications during the second
half of the trial. Comparisons to the results presented in the interim evaluation report showed
that police have only made 10 banning order applications in the final 10 months of the trial
compared to 64 applications during the first 14 months of the trial. Follow-up with the
Townsville Police suggested that the lower number of applications for banning orders in the
115 | P a g e

second half of the trial reflected the officers’ views that patron behaviour and compliance had
improved, giving rise to less circumstances where a banning order application would be
warranted.
A substantial number of police applications for banning orders were refused in each DSP (and
increasingly so in terms of the percentage of all police applications within each DSP compared to
the first 14 months of the trial): in Fortitude Valley n = 87 (52.1%, up 20.4 percentage points); in
Surfers Paradise n = 37 (34.9%, up 2.5 percentage points); and in Townsville n = 32 (43.2%, up
10.8 percentage points).
Length of banning orders imposed
The court may impose a banning order, as part of an offender’s sentence, that will apply for up to 12
months. The length of the banning order imposed will depend on the circumstances and severity of
the offence. Table 14 presents information about the length of the banning orders made in the DSPs.
Table 14. Length of banning orders in DSPs for offences committed from December 2010 to
November 2012
Length of order
1
Less than 6 months
6 months
>6 months, < 12 months
2
12 months
Total
Source:
Note:
Fortitude
Valley
18 (18.8%)
28 (29.2%)
16 (16.7%)
34 (35.4%)
96 (100.0%)
Surfers
Paradise
2 (2.9%)
9 (12.9%)
8 (11.4%)
51 (72.9%)
70 (100.0%)
Townsville
Total
8 (22.2%)
5 (13.9%)
0 (0.0%)
23 (63.9%)
36 (100.0)
28 (13.9%)
42 (20.8%)
24 (11.9%)
108 (53.5%)
202 (100.0%)
Queensland Police Service – Drug and Alcohol Coordination Unit. As at 2 February 2012.
1. Data based on application/order relating to an offence committed during the period December 2010 to November 2012.
later date.
2. Calculated based on number of days between date of issue and expiry date. There was data missing on date of expiry or
issue for 3 records.
3. A banning order may appear to be in effect for longer than 12 months from the date of issue if the order is scheduled to
commence following a term of imprisonment.

the Fortitude Valley DSP, banning orders imposed by the court ranged in length from less than 6
months (n = 18, 18.8%) to 12 months (n = 34, 35.4%)

in the Townsville DSP, the length of banning orders also varied, although the majority were for
12 months (n = 23, 63.9%)

for the Surfers Paradise DSP, banning orders were mainly for the maximum 12 months (n = 51,
72.9%).
Offence behaviours associated with the banning orders
The manner in which a banning order is centrally recorded by the QPS does not make it readily
accessible for analysis of the offences involved. However, analysis of the offences associated with
the banning order applications (issued, refused or pending) and orders made (without police
application) was conducted for the interim evaluation report covering the first 14 months of the
trial.
116 | P a g e
The results of this analysis showed that the three offences most commonly associated with
applications for banning orders, and banning orders imposed as part of a sentence, in each DSP are:

in the Fortitude Valley DSP:
1. assault occasioning bodily harm (n = 42, 31.8%)
2. public nuisance (n = 26, 19.7%)
3. common assault (n = 13, 9.8%)

in the Surfers Paradise DSP:
2. affray (n =11, 29.7%)
3. assault occasioning bodily harm (n = 8, 21.6%)

in the Townsville DSP:
2. assault occasioning bodily harm (n =17, 25.8%)
3. obstruct police (n = 16, 24.2%).
While multiple offences were frequently associated with many of the applications and orders made,
some were observed to include only a single, relatively minor offence, such as public nuisance.
See Table 26 in Appendix F for further details of this analysis.
Breaches of banning orders
Table 15 shows the breaches of those banning orders that were issued during the two years of the
trial, as at 8 August 2013.
Table 15. Banning orders breached in DSPs from December 2010 to August 2013
Fortitude
Valley
Banning orders breached
(% of banning orders issued)
Source:
6
(6.1%)
Surfers
Paradise
2
(2.8%)
Townsville
2
(5.6%)
Total
10
(4.9%)
As shown in Table 15, a small number of banning order breaches have been detected within the
DSPs (n = 10, 4.9%). During consultations, police and licensees commented that offenders who
contravene a banning order are unlikely to be picked up unless:

their behaviour again attracts the attention of police

they are recognised by officers or others with knowledge of the original incident that led to the
banning order being imposed.
This could be viewed as a substantial limitation on the enforceability of the banning orders. On the
other hand, the fact that only a small number of banning order breaches has been detected may
indicate that, even if these offenders breach their banning order, they are behaving appropriately so
117 | P a g e
as not to attract the attention of police. Section 4 provides further discussion of the issues that have
been raised during the trial about the enforceability of banning orders.
Table 16 presents the penalties imposed for breaches of banning orders in each DSP.66
Table 16. Penalties imposed for breaches of banning orders in DSPs from December 2010 to
January 2012
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Penalty imposed for breach of a banning orders (by order)
1. $300 fine with 3 days default imprisonment
2. $250 fine and 10 days imprisonment
3. $200 fine with 8 days default imprisonment
4. $300 fine
5. $250 fine
6. Conviction recorded, no further details available.
Surfers Paradise
1. 3 successive breaches on separate occasions
a.
$750 fine
b.
No penalty, conviction recorded
c. 3 months imprisonment
2. $500 fine and 5 days default imprisonment
Townsville
Source:
1.
$350 fine
2.
$200 fine
As can be seen in Table 16, the penalty imposed for breaches of banning orders has typically
consisted of a fine, and stipulated term of imprisonment in the event that the offender does not pay
the fine (default imprisonment). One offender was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment after
breaching their banning order for a third time. No penalties reached the maximum $4000 fine or 12
month imprisonment.
Licensee and liquor accord bans
In addition to the banning orders referred to above, there are other (pre-existing) methods that can
be used by licensees statewide to ban people for violent or other inappropriate behaviour. For
example:

A licensee has the right to exclude people exhibiting disorderly or other inappropriate behaviour
from their venue by removing them or refusing entry (ss. 165 & 165A Liquor Act 1992). While
this removal or refusal cannot be discriminatory in nature, it is a broad power and is consistent
with a licensee’s general duty to maintain a safe venue.

Licensees can also rely on their private rights to prevent a person from entering or remaining in
their venue:
66
Offenders may have also been penalised for other offences.
118 | P a g e
o
licensees can rely on this private right to impose a venue-specific ban on a patron
indefinitely, or for a specified period of time, due to violence or other inappropriate
behaviour
o
licensees can also rely on this private right to impose collective group-venue bans where
a number of licensees (usually members of a liquor accord) ban patrons from all
participating venues indefinitely or for a specified period of time, due to violence or
other inappropriate behaviour.
Over 30 liquor accords throughout Queensland have adopted some form of collective banning as a
way of deterring antisocial behaviour and improving safety in and around licensed venues.
Once a person has been banned by a licensee, they may face prosecution for trespass, under the
Summary Offences Act 2005, if they are found to have breached the ban imposed.
The text box below provides brief details of a recent Queensland Supreme Court decision that
refused a challenge to a ban imposed on a person in North Queensland by licensees.
Box 8. Licensee ban case study: Owens v Normanton Liquor Accord & Ors [2012] QSC 118
In November 2011, the Normanton Liquor Accord imposed a 12 month ban on Trevor James Owens,
prohibiting him from any licensed premises in Normanton, in far North Queensland. Members of the
Normanton Liquor Accord, including licensees, had previously documented their commitment to working
together to developing and implementing proactive strategies to enhance safety and minimise the impact
of alcohol on the community. The accord document included a number of provisions about banning people
from licensed premises for three to 12 months as a result of school truancy, or acts of violence (including
domestic violence).
At a meeting of the Normanton Liquor Accord its members decided to impose a ban on Mr Owens for
alcohol-related violence occurring at Mr Owens’ private residence. There was no suggestion that any
violence at or around licensed premises had occurred.
Mr Owens applied to the Supreme Court of Queensland to have the ban overturned.
Justice Henry noted that ss. 165 and 165A of the Liquor Act 1992 give licensees broad discretion to remove
or refuse entry to patrons. However, he also suggested these sections cannot be relied on for the power to
ban a patron for a defined future period. He further noted that the act of removing or refusing entry under
ss. 165 and 165A appears to require a temporal connection with the condition or behaviour of the patron
at the time of their removal or refusal of entry.
It was concluded that the licensees, like any other occupier of private land, could rely on an unfettered
common law right to refuse entry to any member of the public. It was noted that this common law right of
exclusion could be limited by legislation (e.g. if the exclusion is in breach of the anti-discrimination laws).
However, no discrimination issues arose on the facts of this matter.
Mr Owens’ application against the ban was refused.
As there is no centralised data collection in relation to licensee imposed patron bans, no data can be
presented to show how frequently such bans are used in the DSPs. From our consultations with
licensees, it is clear that some venues do impose such bans on patrons.
119 | P a g e
Perceptions of banning orders
During consultations, stakeholder comments on banning orders primarily focused on two key
themes:
1. Banning orders are a welcome additional penalty for serious offenders and a useful tool for
keeping troublemakers out of the precinct.
2. The enforcement of banning orders is severely limited by the limited information police are
permitted to share with licensees and security staff.
These issues are discussed further in Section 4.
Survey results indicate that patron views about banning orders appear to be similar to the other
stakeholder groups. There was some indication of a low level of awareness of banning orders among
patrons, particularly toward the outset of the trial. Low awareness may impact on the ability of
banning orders to be an effective deterrent. The survey showed that:

around half of patrons rated being banned from the entire precinct as an effective measure to
reduce alcohol-related violence Rounds 1 and 2 of the surveys (53.6% (n =431) and 50.7% (n =
204), respectively).

awareness of the potential to be banned from the precinct was low in Round 1 of the survey
(39.4%, n = 321) but did improve in Round 2 (49.3%, n = 198).
Summary
Banning orders aim to improve safety by:

increasing personal responsibility for violent behaviour and preventing such offenders from
returning to the area in which they were violent

deterring people who are intent on causing violence from entering or offending in licensed
venues or areas around licensed venues.
From December 2010, the expansion of court and police imposed banning order powers has meant
that across Queensland people can be banned for up to 12 months:
1. As part of a sentence imposed by a Magistrates Court, or higher court, on conviction of an
offence relating to violence in or around a licensed venue.
2. As a condition of bail where a person is accused of an offence relating to violence in or around a
licensed venue.
Legislative changes at this time also allowed for civil banning orders to be imposed, but no such
orders have been made.
Regarding banning orders in DSPs, clear differences in police approaches to banning order
applications were apparent across the DSPs:

Fortitude Valley has had the highest number of police applications for banning orders (n = 167)
but the lowest proportion of success in terms of the court order being made (42.5%, n = 71)
120 | P a g e

Surfers Paradise has had the greatest percentage of police applications for banning orders
issued (54.7%, n = 58; out of 106 police applications)

Townsville has had the lowest number of police applications for banning orders (n = 74), with
far fewer in the second half of the trial, and around half of the orders issued (n = 47.3%, n = 35).
Townsville police have suggested that the reduced number of police applications for banning
orders reflects improved patron behaviour and compliance with the law.

Court issued banning orders without a police application are uncommon, with the most being
issued in Fortitude Valley (n = 27), followed by Surfers Paradise (n = 13) and only one in
Townsville.
During the first 14 months of the trial, the offences most commonly associated with banning orders
are:

Fortitude Valley – assault

Surfers Paradise – public nuisance

Gold Coast – public nuisance.
As of 8 August 2013, only 10 banning order breaches have been detected in DSPs. This may be
because:

offenders who are subject to a banning order behave appropriately so as not to attract the
attention of police

offenders have not been recognised by officers or others who know of their banning order.
Consultations with stakeholders revealed:

perceptions of banning orders are mostly positive

there is a great deal of concern that the enforcement of banning orders is not effective because
of the limited information police are able to share with licensees and security staff

patrons low level of awareness about banning orders may also limit their effectiveness.
121 | P a g e
Chapter 10 Other DSP strategies
This chapter describes the other actions taken across the DSP areas in addition to the key strategies
that aim to improve governance and coordination, policing, support services, and promote the use
of banning orders. Across the DSPs, additional strategies focused on addressing the key themes of:

transport (taxis, buses, and trains; way-finding signage)

rubbish

toilets

lighting and public space upgrades

surveillance

communication.
The Office of Liquor and Gaming (OLGR) are the agency primarily responsible for the administration
and enforcement of the Liquor Act 1992. OLGR undertakes a range of compliance activities, including
inspections and investigation of complaints about venues. OLGR compliance activity was identified
as a key action in the local management plans in each DSP and OLGR compliance activity undertaken
during the trial is described in this chapter.
Transport
The need for adequate and safe transport has been a key concern throughout the DSP trial. By
ensuring patrons are able to get home as quickly as possible, the opportunities for frustration,
conflict, and offending are reduced. Responsibility for the coordination of public transport services
(including taxis, buses and trains) across the trial sites rests with the Department of Transport and
Main Roads (DTMR), incorporating the TransLink division.67
Taxi services
Each DSP is serviced by taxis that operate from secure taxi ranks, which are jointly funded and
coordinated by DTMR and the taxi industry. Taxis provide the main and preferred mode of transport
to and from the DSP areas.
The secure taxi ranks are staffed by experienced taxi rank marshals and security guards, and have
CCTV surveillance (fully monitored in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs). More specifically:

the Fortitude Valley DSP includes three secure taxi ranks that operate on Friday nights and six
secure taxi ranks that operate on Saturday nights

two secure taxi ranks operate on Friday and Saturday nights in the Surfers Paradise DSP
67
On 31 July 2012, the Minister for Transport and Main Roads announced that a restructure of the TransLink
Transit Authority (TTA) and DTMR would lead to TTA no longer operating as a Statutory Authority, but be
incorporated as a division within DTMR. The new TransLink division would retain all existing TTA functions as
well as ‘oversee the qconnect bus network, TravelTrain services and school bus services, along with subsidised
regional airline, coach and ferry services’ (Emerson 2012).
122 | P a g e
Section 2 DSPs in action - Chapter 10 Other DSP strategies

one secure rank operates in the Townsville DSP

additionally, a ‘FlatFare’68 taxi rank also operates on
Friday and Saturday nights in the Fortitude Valley and
Surfers Paradise DSPs.
Figure 18. Secure Taxi Rank signage –
Townsville DSP (photo)
Improvements to taxi services were completed in the
Fortitude Valley DSP during the first 14 months of the DSP
trial. Three additional taxi ranks were established by DTMR
as part of the DSP trial, to operate on Saturday nights. This
was to cater for larger crowds, typical on Saturday nights,
to ensure a more efficient use of available taxis and
greater options for the travelling public.
The creation of an additional secure taxi rank was also
considered at length by the Surfers Paradise local DSP
committee, in particular by DTMR, GCCC, and Gold Coast
Cabs. However, a suitable location with sufficient kerbside
space to accommodate a taxi rank could not be found
within the DSP. Space for such facilities as taxi ranks is
particularly limited by the narrow roadways and high
levels of construction activity within the Surfers Paradise DSP.
The Townsville local DSP committee also considered options for better utilising taxi services and
improving taxi patronage. In particular, the trial of a FlatFare rank was considered the best option.
However, the implementation of the trial relied on state government funding, which could not be
sought until details of the proposal had been finalised. The proposal was subsequently put on hold
pending the outcomes of the state and local government elections.
The number of trips and passengers that depart the secure taxi ranks is recorded by the rank
marshals each night. The passenger data collected on Friday and Saturday nights (and not special
events) during the two years of the DSP trial from the DSP secure taxi ranks is presented in Figure
19.
68
The FlatFare initiative provides a ‘share ride’ taxi service that allows passengers to pay a flat fare rate to
share a ride home with other people going in the same direction.
123 | P a g e
Figure 19. Taxi patronage departing secure ranks within the DSPs from December 2010 to
November 2012, Friday and Saturday nights
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
0
Friday
Saturday
Source:
Note:
200 000
400 000
600 000
800 000
1000 000
1200 000
1400 000
Townsville
100 421
Surfers Paradise
190 615
Fortitude Valley
450 731
117 887
391 047
853 259
Department of Transport and Main Roads (2011-2012) – passengers departing from secure taxi ranks on Friday and Saturday
(midnight - 6am).
1. Friday: Fortitude Valley – 104 nights; Surfers Paradise – 104 nights; Townsville – 103 nights.
2. Saturday: Fortitude Valley – 100 nights; Surfers Paradise – 104 nights; Townsville – 102 nights.
As shown in Figure 19, during the two-years of the DSP trial:

around 1.3 million passengers (n = 1 303 950) departed the secure ranks in the Fortitude Valley
DSP on Friday and Saturday nights.

just over 580 000 passengers (n = 581 662) departed the secure ranks in the Surfers Paradise
DSP on Friday and Saturday nights.

over 200 000 passengers (n = 218 308) departed the secure ranks in the Townsville DSP on
Friday and Saturday nights.

in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs, Saturday nights were considerably busier than
Friday, with Saturday nights accounting for 65% of Fortitude Valley passengers and 67% of
Surfers Paradise passengers across the weekend. Saturday nights were only slightly busier in the
Townsville DSP than Friday nights (54% of passengers versus 46%, respectively).
Passenger data for the secure ranks located within the DSPs was also analysed for a three year
baseline period prior to the trial and compared to the two years of the DSP trial. Figure 20 presents
data on the average number of passengers per night departing the secure ranks within the DSPs on
Friday and Saturday nights.
124 | P a g e
Figure 20. Average taxi patronage per night departing secure ranks within the DSPs from
December 2007 to November 2012, Friday and Saturday nights
8000
7000
6000
5000
Passengers per night 4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Source:
Baseline Year 1
(Dec '07 Nov '08)
Baseline Year 2
(Dec '08 Nov '09)
Baseline Year 3
(Dec '09 Nov '10)
Trial - Year
1
(Dec '10 Nov '11)
Trial - Year
2
(Dec '11 Nov '12)
Fortitude Valley
3797
3626
4519
5992
6769
Surfers Paradise
2520
2983
3334
2981
2616
Townsville
1030
1267
1146
1021
1107
Department of Transport and Main Roads (2011-2012) – passengers departing from secure taxi ranks on Friday and Saturday
(midnight - 6am).
Figure 20 shows some different trends in average passengers per night from the secure ranks in the
DSPs. Most notably, in the Fortitude Valley DSP a considerable increase (78.3%) from 3797
passengers departing secure ranks per night in year 1 of the baseline (December 2007-November
2008) to 6769 during the second year of the trial (December 20011-November 2012).
Buses
Bus services in the Fortitude Valley DSP are funded through TransLink in partnership with Brisbane
City Council. In addition to regular services, ‘NightLink’ bus services covering many popular routes
depart the DSP between 1am and 5am on Saturday and Sunday mornings, while the ‘CityGlider’
service operates 24 hours on Friday and Saturday nights. The ‘NightLink’ and ‘CityGlider’ services
operate from two stops in the Fortitude Valley DSP.
TransLink funds the bus services in the Surfers Paradise DSP under its bus services contract. In
addition to regular services, two ‘NightLink’ bus services, supported by GCCC funding, depart the
DSP between 2.30am and 5.30am on Saturday and Sunday mornings and public holiday mornings.
The ‘NightLink’ services depart from two locations in the Surfers Paradise DSP, depending on the
route. The regular services also include Route 700, which operates 24-hours, 7 days a week along the
Gold Coast Highway.
Security is provided at the bus stops and on board the buses for passenger and driver safety for all
late night bus services in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs.
The implementation of the DSP trial did not result in any changes to the number or type of late night
bus services provided to the Fortitude Valley or Surfers Paradise DSPs. The Fortitude Valley DSP
Management Plan actioned the re-location of the Fortitude Valley ‘NightLink’ bus stops in order to
125 | P a g e
separate the bus stop queues from patrons queuing for entry into licensed venues. The separation of
the queues improves security and safety by reducing congestion on the footpath and conflict with
patrons evicted from licensed venues.
The Townsville DSP bus services are coordinated and funded through the DTMR qConnect initiative.
The Townsville DSP is serviced by a limited number of regular bus services that operate between
6am and 11.30pm on weekdays and weekends. After these times, one bus route operates with a
service departing every half-hour from the Townsville DSP, between midnight and 5am on Saturday
and Sunday mornings.
The Townsville Local DSP committee extensively considered options to improve public transport
usage from the DSP by increasing the number of services. Following the formation of a subcommittee to investigate the issue and develop solutions, a trial of additional bus services was
proposed, incorporating either:

buses running on routes stopping at designated taxi ranks throughout the city

buses running on routes but stopping anywhere along the proposed routes rather than only
feeding taxi ranks.
The trial was to be funded by the Late Night Traders group and by passengers paying a flat fare, with
the amount and payment method to be determined. Ongoing discussions were being lead by the
Townsville CBD Liquor Accord69. However, a decision was made in August 2013 to put progression of
the trial on hold. This was apparently due to unresolved logistical and contractual issues with the
proposed trial model.
Bus patronage data for the three DSPs is shown in Figure 21. For the Fortitude Valley and Surfers
Paradise DSPs, the bus patronage data is based on the number of people boarding services at bus
stops located within the DSPs, between the hours of midnight on Friday or Saturday night to 6am
the following morning. For the Townsville DSP, the bus patronage data is based on the number of
people boarding the late night bus service from the DSP.
69
On 8 August 2012, the Townsville CBD Liquor Accord covering licensed venues within the DSP and
surrounding CBD area was formed out of the existing Late Night Traders group.
126 | P a g e
Figure 21. Bus patronage departing the Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise and Townsville DSPs
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
0
Friday
Saturday
Source:
Note:
20 000
40 000
60 000
80 000
100 000
120 000
140 000
Townsville
12 250
Surfers Paradise
28 949
Fortitude Valley
48 383
17 616
40 050
75 150
Department of Transport and Main Roads (2011-2013).
Passengers departing from bus stops within the Fortitude Valley or Surfers Paradise DSPs, or passengers boarding the late
night service from the Townsville DSP between midnight and 6am on Friday and Saturday.
As shown in Figure 21, during the two-year DSP trial, between midnight and 6am:

over 120 000 (n = 123 533) bus passengers departed from the Fortitude Valley DSP.

nearly 70 000 (n = 68 999) bus passengers departed from the Surfers Paradise DSP.

nearly 30 000 (n = 29 866) utilised the late night bus service departing the Townsville DSP.

Saturday nights were consistently busier than Friday nights across all three precincts, with
Saturday nights accounting for around 60% of total passengers across the weekend.
Bus patronage data for two years prior to the trial as also been analysed and compared to the two
years of the DSP trial in terms of the average number of passengers per Friday or Saturday night
(midnight to 6am the following morning). Figure 22 presents this analysis for each of the DSPs,
covering the four years from December 2008 to November 2012.
127 | P a g e
Figure 22. Average bus patronage departing stops on Friday or Saturday nights within the DSPs
700
600
500
400
Passengers per
night
300
200
100
0
Baseline Year 1
(Dec '08 - Nov
'09)
Baseline Year 2
(Dec '09 - Nov
'10)
Trial - Year 1
(Dec '10 - Nov
'11)
Trial - Year 2
(Dec '11 - Nov
'12)
Fortitude Valley
551
502
574
608
Surfers Paradise
540
433
346
314
Townsville
139
133
142
144
Source:
Note:
Department of Transport and Main Roads (2011-2012); TransLink Transit Authority (2011-2012).
1. Passengers departing from bus stops within the Fortitude Valley or Surfers Paradise DSPs between midnight and 6am on
Friday and Saturday.
2. Passengers boarding the late night service from the Townsville DSP between midnight and 6am on Friday and Saturday.
Figure 22 shows:

in the Fortitude Valley DSP a slight increase (10.2%) from 551 bus passengers per Friday or
Saturday night in year 1 of the baseline (December 2008-November 2009) to 608 during the
second year of the trial (December 2011-November 2012).

a considerable decrease (41.9%) in the Surfers Paradise DSP from 540 bus passengers per Friday
or Saturday night in year 1 of the baseline (December 2008-November 2009) to 314 during the
second year of the trial (December 2011-November 2012).

little change (3.2% increase) in the Townsville DSP from 139 passengers per Friday or Saturday
night in year one of the baseline (December 2008-November 2009) to 144 during the second
year of the trial (December 2011-November 2012). Interestingly, further analysis showed that
while overall patronage across the weekend remained relatively stable, there were underlying
changes with Friday night patronage increasing 38% and Saturday night patronage decreasing
12% (baseline year 1 to trial year 2).
Train
The Fortitude Valley DSP is the only DSP site that includes a train station. Regular train services on
Friday and Saturday nights generally finish by 1am; last services on some lines finish prior to
midnight. At around 4am, additional train services run on the Ipswich, Caboolture and Beenleigh
lines.
128 | P a g e
Some improvements to train services in the Fortitude Valley DSP were made at the outset of the trial
to address concerns raised about after-hours access to the Fortitude Valley Railway Station.
Monitors displaying real-time timetable information were installed outside the railway station and
the opening times of the station were increased from 10 minutes to 20 minutes before the next
Nightlink service to ensure all passengers could safely get to the platform in time for their next train.
Way-finding signage
Given the distribution of public transport options across the DSP areas, the need to improve public
transport ‘way-finding’ signage within the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs was identified
as a priority by the local committees.
Typical, permanent metal signs fixed to street poles (see Figure 18 above) were considered
unsuitable. This was because the signs were only to be relevant to the night time economy during
the late night weekend hours, and they also needed to be highly visible, clear and easy to
understand.
TransLink proposed an innovative solution – the use of an electronic light projection (known as a
‘gobo’) onto a footpath. A series of ‘gobo’ projectors were supplied by TransLink and installed by the
Brisbane and Gold Coast city councils on council owned assets and, with the cooperation of owners,
outside licensed venues in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs (see Figure 23).
Figure 23. Improved way-finding signage for transport using ‘gobo’ projections
Source: TransLink Transit Authority (2011).
Rubbish
Improving public amenity within the DSP sites was also a key aim for the trial. This is consistent with
crime prevention principles that suggest that keeping an area maintained and clean can improve
community safety by giving the impression of an environment that is well cared for, has high
standards and that does not tolerate anti-social behaviour. Public amenity issues within the DSP sites
largely related to rubbish and public urination.
Throughout the trial in the Fortitude Valley DSP, the BCC expressed a strong commitment to
addressing the issue of rubbish. To deal with the issue, regular sweeps of the DSP are conducted by
rubbish collectors. Litter and local laws patrols, including education and issuing infringement notices,
129 | P a g e
are also conducted on Friday and Saturday nights in partnership with the QPS. A BCC compliance
officer is partnered with a police officer who provides security for the council officer when dealing
with drug and alcohol affected persons and assists when littering suspects refuse to provide their
name and address.
In October 2012, Brisbane City Council started ‘pressure-cleaning’ the Brunswick Street Mall each
Saturday and Sunday morning between 5am and 6am to improve its cleanliness ahead of the
daytime trading (e.g. Saturday and Sunday markets). Exemplifying the crime prevention principles
mentioned above, the DSP Inspector has praised this additional cleaning stating it has markedly
reduced violence in the area after 5am by encouraging patrons loitering around to move-on and
head home.
The accumulation of rubbish was raised as an issue in the Surfers Paradise DSP. In response to these
concerns being raised through the local DSP committee, the GCCC has been trialling an additional
late night rubbish collection sweep.
Litter issues were not raised in the Townsville DSP and seem to be managed sufficiently with the
existing rubbish collection sweeps and cleansing conducted in the early hours of the morning. It was
noted by local police during consultations, however, that the timing of the sweeps could be better
targeted. Currently, they run prior to 5am and therefore miss the accumulation of rubbish that
follows the 5am closure of licensed venues and food outlets.
Public toilets and public urination
Public urination and the availability of public toilets were key issues for each of the local DSP
committees. The majority of stakeholders reported concerns about:

the amount of public urination

the substantial impact this had on the image and smell of the precinct

the possibility for it to lead to the further anti-social behaviour (for example, damage to
property in alleyways or conflict when others take offense to the public urination).
In each DSP site, the problems around public urination have been linked to a lack of available, safe
and clean public toilets:

there is one block of 24 hour unisex public toilets in the Fortitude Valley DSP

three blocks of 24 hour public toilets are located within the Surfers Paradise DSP—only one is
close to the concentration of nightclubs, pubs, food outlets, and taxi ranks

there are no 24 hour public toilets in the Townsville DSP.
Each of the DSP areas responded differently to the issue of public urination and inadequate toilet
facilities.
Surfers Paradise
During the DSP trial, the GCCC responded to concern about toilet facilities and public urination by
conducting a 12 week trial of a portable toilet unit on Friday and Saturday nights during the peak
holiday season from Friday 15 December 2011 to Saturday 3 March 2012.
130 | P a g e
A combination portable unit was chosen which included male (1 cubicle, 4 urinals and wash basins)
and female (3 cubicles, and wash basins) toilets with a waste collection capacity of 5200L (see Figure
24).The unit was placed in the Cavill Avenue Mall, adjacent to the corner of Orchid Avenue, and was
delivered to the site each Friday afternoon (around 3pm) and removed Sunday mornings (6am). The
unit was cleaned and serviced each Saturday morning, then locked throughout the day and reopened on Saturday night. The cost of the unit, including delivery and servicing was $2580 per
week—a total cost of $30,960 for the 12 week trial (Gold Coast City Council 2012).
Figure 24. Public toilet trial in the Surfers Paradise DSP
Source:
Gold Coast City Council (2012).
The results of the trial show a moderate to high use of the toilet unit. Stakeholders reported a
noticeable improvement to the amenity of the area while the portable toilet unit was available.
Specifically:

The amount of liquid collected showed that, on most occasions, the tank was approximately
half-full, indicating a high-level of consistent use. On one occasion – NYE 2011-12 – the tank was
almost full, and on the remaining occasions the tank was filled under half of the capacity (Gold
Coast City Council 2012).

Queensland police data indicated there was an increase in the number of public urination
offences during the trial period compared to the same period the year before. However, a
number of confounding factors are thought to have potentially contributed, including increased
police patrols in the precinct, and police officers being less likely to show discretion to offenders
because public toilet facilities were available close by.

Reports from the Queensland Police Service, the GCCC City Cleaning Unit, the Surfers Paradise
Alliance and Coates Hire suggest the trial was a success. For example, the GCCC City Cleaning
Unit indicated that the trial seemed to have an impact on public urination and the alleyways of
the precinct smelt better. However, they also raised some concerns about rubbish being
discarded around the unit and the smell of the unit itself.

The majority of traders in the area felt the trial was a success, and that a more permanent
solution was needed. It was noted that Surfers Paradise is a world-class tourist destination and
that the public urination issue should be managed accordingly (Gold Coast City Council 2012).
131 | P a g e
In our consultations, some concern was expressed with the look of the portable toilet unit. It was
suggested such facilities might be seen by some as inconsistent with the ‘high end’ businesses that
are the focus of recent Surfers Paradise redevelopment.
Fortitude Valley
During the DSP trial in Fortitude Valley, the Valley Chamber of Commerce’s Safety Audit highlighted
the need for additional public toilets within the precinct, and improvements required for the existing
facilities. Whilst the existing facilities were recognised as being clean and presentable, many did not
subscribe to Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, meaning they may
be unsafe and potential locations for crime and anti-social behaviour.
The safety audit highlighted that only one of these facilities is open 24 hours a day and that this was
not adequate for the precinct. The audit suggested that the additional temporary public toilets on
Friday and Saturday nights should be removed on other week nights when there are fewer patrons
in the precinct.
In February 2013, the Lord Mayor of Brisbane, Graham Quirk, announced that the 24 hour public
toilets in the Brunswick Street Mall (within the Fortitude Valley DSP) would be upgraded to separate
males and females, and public art installed to cover graffiti (Moore 2013).
Townsville
In Townsville, the complete lack of public toilets was identified as a very serious issue. The lack of
public toilets was rated the most serious issue by survey responders who live and work in the
Townsville DSP (89.6%, n = 52). In the online patron survey, 63.9% of respondents (n = 69) reported
that public urination was the main public amenity issue in the Townsville DSP. Townsville patrons
frequently commented on the issue of public toilets, including:
Public toilets are needed to stop public urination; I don't believe you can fine someone for
using the footpath as a toilet when there are absolutely no public toilets within Flinders St
after lockout!!!
It's frustrating when you leave a club after lock out to find a giant cab line and suddenly
nowhere to urinate. I can 100% understand why people urinate in gardens, and laneways but
this could be avoided by having ANY public toilets in the Townsville Drink Safe Precinct.
The issue of the lack of public toilets was frequently discussed by the local DSP committee and was
identified in the management plan as an issue requiring action. A proposal to build more public
toilets in the Flinders Street East precinct was identified as being a ‘longer term’ action, with the
design, funding and tender for the toilets to be finalised by the Townsville City Council (TCC).
In consultation with the Townsville local DSP committee, the TCC has been pursuing the construction
of public toilets within the DSP site. However, media reports have indicated that the project to
construct the toilets – despite being well advanced – will not be put out to tender by the TCC as an
agreement could not be reached with licensees in Flinders Street East for the cleaning and
maintenance of the facilities (Templeton 2012).
132 | P a g e
Lighting and public space upgrades
Within the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs, regular safety audits of the DSP areas are led
by the Valley Chamber of Commerce and GCCC respectively. These safety audits involve teams of
people scanning the streets, footpaths and buildings at night for safety risks, according to CPTED
principles. They identify and record issues such as poor lighting caused by broken lights, trip hazards
due to cracked footpaths, or entrapments points created by plant foliage. The BCC and GCCC, and
other relevant agencies, receive the audits results and act to remedy issues. A night time safety audit
was conducted in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise during the trial period.
Lighting is an important element of situational crime prevention. A major upgrade to street lighting
at 147 sites within the Fortitude Valley DSP was undertaken early in the DSP trial by the BCC. Local
stakeholders to the Fortitude Valley DSP, including local police, noted the significant improvements
that the lighting upgrades delivered, allowing for greater visibility in the area and easier
identification of people (see Figure 25).
Figure 25. Lighting upgrades in the Fortitude Valley DSP
Before – Ann Street
After – Ann Street
Source: Brisbane City Council (2011).
Although the foreshore area is not at the heart of the Surfers Paradise DSP, an upgrade of the
foreshore area within the DSP also occurred during the trial period. The GCCC made substantial
improvements to the lighting as well as the design of footpaths in this area and the provision of new
toilet facilities on the foreshore. Upgrades to the Cavill Avenue Mall commenced in March 2012 and
were completed in December 2012, delivering similar improvements to this busy central area of the
DSP helping to improve pedestrian flow and safety. Funding for lighting upgrades in the main strip
along Orchid Avenue in the Surfers Paradise DSP has also been identified by the GCCC.
The central area of the Townsville DSP benefited from upgrades to Flinders Street East that aimed to
restore the historic character of the area and improve lighting, as part of broader redevelopment
works lead by the TCC.
133 | P a g e
Crowding and queuing
The challenges of crowding and queuing in public space (e.g. on the footpaths) are different in each
DSP. In the Townsville DSP, crowding and queuing issues are limited by the wide footpaths,
concentration of licensed venues within one or two street blocks, and relatively moderate patron
numbers. However, frustration at long waits for taxi or bus services, and the lack of public toilets, do
impact on patron queuing behaviour and elevate the risk of violence at these locations in the
Townsville DSP.
In contrast, the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs are characterised by limited footpath
space, large crowds, competing demands for kerbside space and high amounts of vehicle traffic.
These characteristics combine to create potentially volatile situations with conflict arising between
pedestrians, patrons queuing for entry to licensed venues and those waiting for transport to get
home.
Recognising the varied nature and extent of crowding and queuing issues in each DSP, it is important
that solutions be locally driven. The Fortitude Valley local DSP committee progressed action to
resolve these issues. In particular, relocating the NightLink bus stops from directly outside licensed
venues to a more appropriate location in the precinct has substantially reduced the potential for
conflicts between queuing patrons and passengers.
Additionally, following the presentation of research into crowding and queuing issues in the public
space in the Fortitude Valley DSP, the Valley Liquor Accord committed to explore these issues
further with venues and develop ‘best practice’ guidelines for its members. There has also been
collaboration between licensed venues and the BCC on the best placement of bins on the footpaths.
While appearing to be a trivial issue, the location of these large and potentially obtrusive objects is
important as they can easily create ‘choke’ points on already busy and narrow footpaths.
The Surfers Paradise DSP management plan identified the development of a footpath strategy to
ease crowds blocking footpaths and facilitate easy movement around the precinct, including
consideration of shared pedestrian-vehicle roadways, pedestrian fencing near venues where
appropriate and defined pedestrian crossings. However, it is unclear what progress has been made
on this action item.
CCTV and radio networks
CCTV
The use of CCTV surveillance is critical in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers DSPs for
evidentiary/prosecution purposes, and to ensure that a rapid response to incidents is provided as
they unfold. In Townsville, the CCTV is not actively monitored, and so footage is useful primarily for
evidentiary/prosecution purposes.
The Fortitude Valley DSP is covered by the BCC’s comprehensive CCTV network (CitySafe), which is
monitored by dedicated licensed operators 24 hours a day from a central control room. The CitySafe
network incorporates over 56 cameras across the city and Fortitude Valley. Some of these have
speakers attached for the broadcasting of messages by the control room (such as warnings to
troublemakers that they are being monitored and that police will be notified).
134 | P a g e
The Surfers Paradise DSP is covered by the GCCC’s very well developed Safety Camera Network. The
network includes over 50 cameras in Surfers Paradise that are monitored 24 hours a day by
dedicated licensed operators from a central control room. The continuous active monitoring of the
comprehensive CCTV networks covering the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs by
experienced staff greatly enhances the detection of and response to incidents within these DSPs.
The Townsville DSP is covered by the TCC’s network of CCTV cameras. Footage from the cameras is
passively monitored at the council’s operations centre and the Police Operations Centre.
The BCC’s CitySafe control room maintains a log of all incidents they observe through their
monitoring of the network or from requests by police. Figure 26 and Table 17 present information
from this log regarding the number and type of incidents observed between 6pm Friday and
Saturday nights and 6am the following morning within the Fortitude Valley area.
Figure 26. Summary of the CitySafe CCTV Incident Log for Fortitude Valley from December 2007 to
November 2012
1200
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Source:
Note:
Baseline - Year Baseline - Year Baseline - Year
1
2
3
(Dec '07 - Nov (Dec '08 - Nov (Dec '09 - Nov
'08)
'09)
'10)
Trial - Year 1
(Dec '10 - Nov
'11)
Trial - Year 2
(Dec '11 - Nov
'12)
Friday
708
784
811
738
717
Saturday
783
893
1020
1020
974
Incidents/Night
(Combined)
14
16
18
17
16
Brisbane City Council (2011-2012).
Incident log for Fortitude Valley between 6pm and 6am on Friday and Saturday.
135 | P a g e
Table 17. Incidents recorded in the CitySafe CCTV Incident Log for Fortitude Valley from December
2007 to November 2012
Incident type
Alcohol offences
Baseline – 3 years
(Dec 2007 – Nov 2010)
583
11.7%
Trial – 24 months
(Dec 2010 – Nov 2012)
375
10.8%
Accident
30
0.6%
25
0.7%
Drug offences
56
1.1%
20
0.6%
Fire
9
0.2%
5
0.1%
Medical
207
4.1%
125
3.6%
Offence - person
388
7.8%
188
5.4%
Offence - property
88
1.8%
70
2.0%
Police request
609
12.2%
209
6.0%
Public order offence
2891
57.8%
2372
68.4%
Sexual offences
15
0.3%
4
0.1%
Social issues
107
2.1%
64
1.8%
Weapons possession
16
0.3%
11
0.3%
4999
100.0%
3468
100.0%
Total
Source:
Note:
Brisbane City Council (2011-2012).
Incident log for Fortitude Valley between 6pm and 6am on Friday and Saturday.
As shown by Figure 26 and Table 17:

during the two-years of the trial, the CitySafe control room observed a total of 3468 incidents on
Friday and Saturday nights between 6pm and 6am the following morning within the Fortitude
Valley area—an average of 16-17 incidents per night. This is similar to the three years preceding
the trial, where the average number of incidents observed per night ranged between 14 and 18.

public order offences continued to be the most commonly observed incident during the trial
period (68.4%), and during the three years preceding the trial (57.8%).
Radio networks
A radio network, linking licensed venue security staff, support services, and police, operates in some
form in each precinct. This forms a critical aspect of on-the-ground communication and ensures a
rapid response to incidents as they occur. The DSP management plans have highlighted these radio
networks as integral strategies to the DSP trial, and the local committees have facilitated access to
the networks for other agencies, such as the support services.
For the Fortitude Valley DSP, the CitySafe control room coordinates a radio network that links
themselves, the licensed venues, DSP Support Services (Chill Out Zone and ChaplainWatch) and
police together. A police officer on DSP overtime is placed in the CitySafe control room, enabling
them to communicate messages from the CitySafe control room directly to officers on-the-ground
through the police radio network.
The Gold Coast City Council operates a similar network in conjunction with their Safety Camera
Network that covers the Surfers Paradise DSP. However, this network has well established links to
the licensed venues through the Surfers Paradise Licensed Venues Association (SPLVA). Direct
communication with police is facilitated through the posting of a police officer on DSP overtime to a
communications position in the Surfers Paradise Police Station who the Safety Camera Network
control room can contact directly. The Chill Out Zone support service also utilises the radio network.
136 | P a g e
In Townsville, the coordination of the radio network is lead by the Street Security Guard, funded by
the Late Night Traders group. The Street Security Guard liaises face-to-face and via radio with the
licensed venues, support service and police to ensure an efficient and coordinated response to
incidents. The police are linked into the network through the Street Security Guard’s or support
service’s communication with the Townsville DSP Forward Command Post.
OLGR compliance activity
Throughout the DSP trial OLGR continued to undertake its range of typical compliance activities,
including inspections of venues (proactive) and the investigation of complaints (reactive) made
about venues (e.g. by the police or members of the public).
OLGR has adopted a risk based approach to its proactive inspections of venues to utilise limited
resources in the most efficient and effective manner. Under this approach, a minimum frequency of
visits is set for broad groups of venues based on factors such as trading hours, licence type and any
relationship to restricted areas (i.e. those subject to an Alcohol Management Plan). For example,
venues that are licensed to trade after 3am are subject to a minimum of 2 proactive inspections
each year (plus the reactive investigation of any complaints). Venues that present specific risk
factors may then be the subject of additional inspections.
During the proactive inspections of the venues, OLGR compliance officers assess adherence with a
range of legislative requirements and special conditions intended to achieve the ‘harm-minimisation’
objective of the Liquor Act 1992. The types of matters assessed include:

Licence Conditions and authority - ensuring compliance with the conditions imposed on the
licence, including: noise; security numbers and CCTV. Also it is ensured that the licensee
management is aware of the authority of the licence issued for the respective premises.

CCTV - if the licensee is required to have CCTV at the premises - ensuring that the CCTV is
operational and recording during the required times, including ensuring that CCTV images
are retained as required.

Patron Behaviour and Responsible Service of Alcohol - observations in respect to patron
behaviour on the premises, including: whether minors are on the premises; any issues with
intoxication; any issues with disorderly patrons on the premises and observations of
responsible service of liquor.

Fire Safety - ensuring that the fire exits on the premises are operational and provide a clear
path of travel for patrons and staff to the outside safe area.

Incident Registers / Crowd Controllers - ensuring that licensed crowd controllers are
employed on the premises (if required) and that incidents are correctly recorded in the
Incident Register.
Reflective of OLGR’s risk based approach, OLGR compliance activity was identified as a key action
item in each of the DSP local management plans. An outline of the OLGR compliance activity
undertaken was regularly reported back to the local committees to assist with facilitating interagency coordination, information sharing, and communication about liquor compliance issues.
137 | P a g e
Figure 27 presents the number of OLGR inspections, investigations, and breaches of licensed venues
in each DSP during the 24 months of the trial.
Figure 27. Number of OLGR compliance activities undertaken in DSPs from December 2010 to
November 2012
Inspections
Investigations
Possible breaches detected
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Fortitude Valley
Possible breaches detected
566
Investigations
142
Inspections
543
Surfers Paradise
538
172
610
Townsville
379
104
323
Fortitude Valley
Source:
Notes:
Surfers Paradise
700
Townsville
Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (2012).
1. Counts of ‘Inspections’ and ‘Investigations’ based on ‘allocated date’.
2. Count of ‘possible breaches detected’ based on ‘final outcome date’.
As shown in Figure 27, OLGR officers undertook a total of 1476 planned ‘inspections’ of licensed
venues in the Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise and Townsville DSPs during the two-year DSP trial. In
addition to the inspections, OLGR also carried out 418 ‘investigations’ of complaints (raised by
police, members of the public, and others—see further information below). A total of 1483 possible
breaches were detected against licensed venues and finalised between December 2010 and
November 2012.
Figure 28 provides a further breakdown of the type of inspections conducted during the two years of
the DSP trial.
138 | P a g e
Figure 28. Number of OLGR inspections undertaken from December 2010 to November 2012
Day Time
After Hours
Targeted
Other
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Fortitude Valley
Other
183
Targeted
3
After Hours
326
Day Time
31
Surfers Paradise
207
85
298
20
Townsville
133
6
157
27
Source:
Note:
1. ‘Day time’ and ‘after hours’ inspections include OLGR’s regular compliance activities that focus on a particular set or
number of licensed venues.
2. ‘Targeted’ inspections are compliance activities OLGR lead or participate in as part of an additional inspection program,
such as DSP operations.
3. ‘Other’ inspections include risk assessment, self assessment, early intervention, and government/industry forum
compliance activities.
Figure 28 shows that, across the DSPs, the majority of inspections were conducted ‘after hours’ (n =
781, 52.9%), reflective of the peak trading hours for licensed venues in the DSPs. The high number of
‘other’ inspections (n = 523, 35.4%) indicates a strong emphasis by OLGR on educating and
communicating with licensed venues before strict enforcement of the legislation.
Figure 29 provides a further breakdown of OLGR investigations within the DSPs during the two years
of the trial. It presents information about whether the investigation was conducted in response to a
complaint from the police, member of the public, or any other source.
139 | P a g e
Figure 29. Number of OLGR investigations undertaken from December 2010 to November 2012
Complaint - Police
Complaint - General Public
Complaint - Other
High Risk Investigation
0
10
Fortitude Valley
High Risk
Investigation
22
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Source:
Note:
20
30
40
50
60
18
Complaint - General
Public
39
17
64
38
50
5
15
33
51
Complaint - Other
70
Complaint - Police
61
1. The ‘other’ source of complaints includes those from unplanned inspections of licensed venues by OLGR compliance
officers (e.g. a possible breach is observed while walking past the venue or conducting a planned inspection of another
licensed venue), complaints from staff in other government agencies, and complaints from licensees against other licensees.
2. ‘High-risk investigations’ involve the investigation of alleged ‘glassings’ or an unacceptable level of violence under the
Liquor Act 1992 (s. 97).

investigations were commonly conducted as a result of complaints from police against licensed
venues (n = 162, 39.2% of all investigations)

the Fortitude Valley DSP recorded the highest number of complaints made by police (n = 61) and
the public (n = 39)

complaints from ‘other’ sources were substantially higher in the Surfers Paradise DSP (n = 64,
37.9% of Surfers Paradise investigations) compared to either Fortitude Valley (n = 18, 12.9%) or
Townsville (n = 15, 14.4%)

the Fortitude Valley DSP recorded the highest number of high risk investigations (n = 22) (e.g.
investigations of glassings).
Figure 30 presents the outcomes of OLGR compliance activity conducted by OLGR in the DSPs, based
on the outcome being finalised between December 2010 and November 2012.
140 | P a g e
Figure 30. Outcomes of OLGR compliance activity in DSPs finalised from December 2010 to
November 2012
Prosecution
Action Taken
Infringement Notice
Caution
Warning
Consultation Conducted/ Resolved by Negotiation
Referrals
Refer to Licensing/ Investigations
Refer to other agency/ other
No Breach Detected/ Not Substantiated/ Withdrawn
0
50
Referrals
No Breach
Consultation
Refer to
Detected/ Not Refer to other
Conducted/
Licensing/
Substantiated/ agency/ other
Resolved by
Investigations
Withdrawn
Negotiation
Fortitude Valley
334
46
176
147
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Action Taken
Warning
Caution
Infringement
Notice
Prosecution
112
53
23
9
Surfers Paradise
406
66
151
107
158
28
28
0
Townsville
148
87
92
36
119
43
2
0
Source:
Note:
Outcomes are based on breaches finalised and will not equal the total number of inspections and investigations as one
inspection or investigation may lead to several breach outcomes being recorded.
As shown by Figure 30:

‘no breach detected/not substantiated/withdrawn’ was the most common outcome of
compliance activity undertaken by OLGR in all three DSPs

referrals by OLGR compliance officers to the OLGR licensing division and other agencies
accounted for a large proportion of compliance activity outcomes70
70
For example, compliance officers will refer a risk assessment that ‘passes’ inspection to the licensing division
for further processing of an application, or they may refer a possible breach of fire safety regulations to the
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service.
141 | P a g e

where action was taken by OLGR in the Fortitude Valley DSP this most often involved
consultation or the issue being resolved through negotiation with venue management and/or
the complainant in the Fortitude Valley DSP (n = 147). In the Surfers Paradise and Townsville
DSPs, the most common action taken was issuing a warning (n = 158 and n = 119, respectively)

the majority of infringement notices were issued to licensed venues in the Surfers Paradise DSP
(n = 28, 52.8% of infringement notices issues)

prosecutions recommended were rare (n = 9) and all related to venues in the Fortitude Valley
DSP.71
Figure 31 below presents a breakdown of the types of breaches arising where OLGR’s compliance
activity leads to action being taken against licensed venues.72 It shows that:

unlawful and unlicensed trading, which typically relates to compliance with advertising, signage,
approved manager and management practice regulations, was the type of breach most
commonly resulting in OLGR action within each of the three DSPs.

breaches identified as part of the compliance self-assessment program were the next most
common type of breach for which OLGR action was taken in the Fortitude Valley (n = 63) and
Surfers Paradise (n = 55) DSPs. OLGR did not record any compliance such breaches in Townsville;
instead safety issues (n = 25) (e.g. assaults, fire hazards, glassings) were the second most
common type of breach.

Responsible Service of Alcohol breaches (e.g. supplying or allowing supply of alcohol to an
unduly intoxicated person, water availability or management practices) were not often the
subject of OLGR compliance action in any of the three DSP areas.
71
Further analysis of these prosecutions (not presented) shows that five of these prosecutions were against
one licensed venue and a further three prosecutions against one other venue.
72
Action taken includes prosecution, infringement notice, caution, warning, consultation conducted/resolved
by negotiation (see Figure 30 for numbers per outcome and DSP) as the best indicators that an actual breach
was detected.
142 | P a g e
Figure 31. Type of breach arising from OLGR compliance activity from December 2010 to
November 2012
Unlawful/ Unlicensed Trading
Responsible Service of Alcohol
Safety
Minors
Noise
Security Provider
Licensed Premises & Special Conditions
Compliance Plan
Other
0
Other
Licensed
Compliance Premises &
Special
Plan
Conditions
63
42
20
40
Security
Provider
60
Noise
80
100
120
Minors
Safety
140
160
180
Responsible Unlawful/
Service of Unlicensed
Alcohol
Trading
Fortitude Valley
8
5
1
7
47
17
154
Surfers Paradise
13
55
56
2
17
19
25
26
108
Townsville
2
0
12
1
15
4
25
16
125
Source:
Note:
1. Based on compliance activity that leads to action being taken against licensed venues.
2. Action taken includes prosecution, infringement notice, caution, warning and consultation conducted/resolved by
negotiation as the best indicators that an actual breach was detected.
3. ‘Unlawful and unlicensed trading’ usually relates to compliance with advertising, signage, approved manager and
management practice regulations.
4. ‘Safety’ breaches relate to assaults, fire hazards, glassing, patron behaviour, over-crowding and other management
practices.
5. ‘Compliance plan’ breaches relate to follow up action taken as a result of licensed venue self assessments and desk audits
of compliance plans.
6. ‘Licensed premises & special conditions’ breaches include breaches for failing to accurately maintain the approved
manager or security provider registers, and breaches of special conditions such as trading hours on the Good Friday public
holiday.
7. ‘Other’ includes action following ‘meetings’ (exclusively ‘consultation conducted’) and ‘power of investigator’ breaches
(e.g. fail to provide name/address when required).
143 | P a g e
Joint enforcement operations
OLGR plan, coordinate, and participate in joint enforcement operations targeting licensed venues in
each DSP. As part of the DSP trials, the concentration of such operations has been higher in the
DSPs. The joint enforcement operations involve OLGR, Office of Fair Trading, QPS, Queensland Fire
and Rescue Service, and local government to ensure compliance across a number of areas including:

liquor regulations

fire safety

security providers

workplace health and safety

local laws (e.g. cleanliness, patron safety, and lighting).
During the two years of the DSP trial, a total of 65 joint enforcement operations were conducted—
23 in the Fortitude Valley DSP, 24 in the Surfers Paradise DSP and 18 in the Townsville DSP.
Perceptions of other strategies
Consultation with stakeholder groups in each of the DSPs consistently reinforced two key themes:

limited transport options (predominately bus and taxi services) were a major issue in each of the
DSPs, with long waits causing frustration and conflict

the lack of an appropriate number of public toilet facilities, or any at all in the Townsville DSP,
was identified as the main cause of public urination and was considered unacceptable given the
large numbers of people visiting the areas each weekend.
Patrons also raised public toilet and transport issues as key concerns. For example:

in Round 1 of the survey, the majority of patrons identified the lack of public toilets (71.9%, n =
719) and public transport (63.6%, n = 780) as serious issues

these results were higher in Round 2 of the survey, for both lack of public toilets (87.1%, n = 350)
and lack of public transport (86.1%, n = 346).
Some of the frustration experienced by patrons is represented by their comments provided in the
surveys:
[There are] huge cab lines, not enough taxi ranks, not enough regular buses and absolutely
no trains.
There needs to be public toilets available – of course people are going to publically urinate if
they have nowhere else to go. I myself have had to publically urinate because it was past
lockout and there was nowhere else for me to go.
During consultations, licensees commented that they felt OLGR compliance activity is often focused
on breaches for administrative errors or oversights, such as failing to complete a security or
approved manager register correctly, rather than the more fundamental issues of Responsible
Service of Alcohol and the unsafe management of a licensed venue. During consultation, however,
licensees also commented that ‘we are getting constantly bashed on the head by OLGR for people
144 | P a g e
who have pre-loaded before coming’. These comments suggest that OLGR has taken enforcement
action for safety breaches but that some licensees feel it is unfair for them to be held responsible for
these breaches, a view that is likely to reflect natural tensions between an industry and its regulator.
The focus of OLGR compliance activity on inspections after-hours also suggests that the primary
intent of the compliance inspections is not to detect administrative breaches, as these could be
easily detected during day-time inspections that are less resource intensive.
Licensees also commented that they felt it can be difficult to get a clear, consistent ruling or
explanation from OLGR on some matters, in particular, advertising. For example, licensees suggested
that it took OLGR two years to explain issues around the advertisement of drink specials by staff
from licensed venues using their personal social media accounts, rather than official venue accounts,
and without direction from the licensee. Although, other comments made by licensees indicated a
level of confusion about other matters (e.g. the Owens vs. Normanton Liquor Accord – see Box 8)
despite clear communication from OLGR to licensees.73
Licensees also commented that in their view OLGR seemed to follow the media interest and respond
harshly with extra conditions (raising the ‘high risk’ classifications in response to glassings as an
example), rather than proactively identifying emerging issues and working with licensees to find
solutions. However, it is unclear how willing or able licensees are to voluntarily and proactively
respond to issues. For example, when OLGR and the local police in Surfers Paradise raised the
emerging issue of the dangers associated with mixing alcohol and energy drinks they were met with
scepticism from licensees, who argued that there was no evidence to support the concerns raised.
As a result, no collaborative way forward was found. On the other hand, at the recent Harm
Minimisation Forum, organised by the QPS in Surfers Paradise, the large number of licensed venues
present unanimously agreed to restrict the sale of discount drinks to before midnight from 2
October 2012 to help reduce binge drinking (Queensland Police Service 2012). Again, however, it is
understood that this agreement broke down as the voluntary nature meant there could be no threat
of enforcement action or other consequences for breaches so individual venues soon returned to
selling discounted drinks.
Summary
Transport
Taxis provide the main and preferred mode of transport from the DSP areas, and as such, they were
an area of focus by local DSP committees. Specifically:

Three additional taxi ranks were established in the Fortitude Valley to operate on Saturday
nights to cater for larger crowds and ensure a more efficient use of available taxis and greater
options for the travelling public.
73
For example, in July 2012, OLGR published a special edition of the Queensland Liquor Accords newsletter
outlining the issues raised in the Owens vs. Normanton Liquor Accord case and the impact of the Court’s
decision. See http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/resources/liquorDocs/QldLiquorAccordsSpecialEditionJuly2012.pdf
145 | P a g e

The creation of an additional secure taxi rank was considered at length by the Surfers Paradise
local DSP committee. However, a suitable location, with sufficient kerbside space to
accommodate a taxi rank, could not be found within the DSP.

The Townsville local DSP committee considered options (such as the trial of a FlatFare rank) for
better utilising taxi services and improving taxi patronage. However, the proposal was put on
hold pending the outcomes of the state and local government elections. Since then, agreement
has not been reached on the suitability or viability of this option.
The implementation of the DSP trial did not result in any major changes to bus services provided in
DSPs. However:

‘NightLink’ bus stops in the Fortitude Valley DSP relocated to separate the bus stop and licensed
venue queues. This separation improves security and safety by reducing congestion on the
footpath and conflict with patrons evicted from licensed venues.

A trial of additional bus services was proposed for the Townsville DSP. However, legal and
contractual conflicts have prevented the local liquor accord from progressing this option.
Fortitude Valley DSP is the only DSP site that includes a train station.
Given the scattering of public transport options throughout DSPs, the need to improve public
transport ‘way-finding’ signage within the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs was identified
by both local committees. To address this, ‘GoBo’ (electronic light) projectors have been installed by
the Brisbane and Gold Coast city councils. These project light onto footpaths to indicate which
direction to go for different public transport options.
Public amenity
Improving public amenity within the DSP sites was a key aim for the trial. Public amenity issues
within the DSP sites focused on litter/rubbish and public urination/public toilets.
To address the issue of litter:

Regular sweeps of the DSP are conducted in the Fortitude Valley DSP. In addition, litter and
local laws patrols, including education and issuing infringement notices, are conducted on
Friday and Saturday nights in partnership with the QPS. ‘Pressure cleaning’ of the pedestrian
mall in the heart of the Fortitude Valley DSP was credited with greatly improving safety in the
early hours of the morning as loiterers were forced out.

The GCCC has been trialling an additional late night rubbish collection sweep in the Surfers
Paradise DSP.

While litter issues were not raised in the Townsville DSP and seem to be managed sufficiently, it
was noted that the timing of the sweeps could be better targeted.
In each DSP site, the problems around public urination have been linked to a lack of available, safe,
and clean public toilets. Each of the DSP areas responded differently to the issue of public urination
and inadequate toilet facilities. For example:
146 | P a g e



In the Surfers Paradise DSP, a 12 week trial of a portable toilet unit was conducted. Results
showed a moderate to high use of the toilet unit and stakeholders reported a noticeable
improvement to the amenity of the area while the portable toilet unit was available.
In the Fortitude Valley DSP, only one facility is open 24 hours a day. Action around public toilets
has been suggested for the precinct.
In Townsville, the complete lack of public toilets in the DSP area was identified as a very serious
issue. The TCC was considering the construction of public toilets within the DSP site, however,
the project was suspended by TCC after they failed to reach an agreement with the local liquor
accord for the cleaning and security of the toilets.
Community safety
Given that the level of lighting is an important element of situational crime prevention initiatives to
improve community safety, various upgrades to DSPs were made to cater for this. These included:

In the Fortitude Valley DSP, a major upgrade to street lighting at 147 sites was undertaken.
Local stakeholders, including local police, noted the significant improvements that the lighting
upgrades delivered, allowing greater visibility in the area and easier identification of people.

In the Surfers Paradise DSP, an upgrade of the foreshore area occurred during the trial period.
The GCCC has made substantial improvements to the lighting as well as the design of footpaths
and the provision of new toilet facilities. Upgrades to Cavill Avenue Mall commenced during the
trial including the installation of new lighting, and funding for lighting upgrades along Orchid
Avenue.

The central area of the Townsville DSP benefited from upgrades to Flinders Street East, which
aimed to restore the historic character of the area and improve lighting.
Crowding and queuing were also points of concern for some DSPs. Specifically:

Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs are characterised by limited footpath space, large
crowds, competing demands for kerbside space, and high amounts of vehicle traffic. This
creates a potentially volatile situation for pedestrians, patrons queuing for entry to licensed
venues, and those waiting for transport to get home.

The Fortitude Valley local DSP committee progressed action to resolve these issues. In
particular, relocating the NightLink bus stops from directly outside licensed venues to a more
appropriate location has substantially reduced potential conflicts between queuing patrons and
passengers.

As part of the Surfers Paradise DSP management plan, a footpath strategy was to be developed
to manage crowding and pedestrian congestion, however, it is not clear what progress has been
made to date.

In the Townsville DSP, the existing footpaths, concentration of licensed venues within one or
two street blocks, and relatively moderate patron numbers, limit the extent of crowding and
queuing issues.
CCTV surveillance is another important strategy employed to improve safety in DSPs. For example:
147 | P a g e

In the Fortitude Valley and Surfers DSPs, the use of CCTV surveillance is critical for
evidentiary/prosecution purposes, and to ensure that a rapid response to incidents is provided
as they unfold.

In Townsville, footage is useful for evidentiary/prosecution purposes as the CCTV is not actively
monitored.
A radio network, linking licensed venue security staff, support services and police, operates in some
form in each precinct. This forms a critical aspect of on-the-ground communication and ensures a
rapid response to incidents as they occur.
OLGR compliance activity
OLGR are the agency primarily responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Liquor Act
1992. As part of its role as the regulator of licensed trade, OLGR undertakes a range of compliance
activities, including proactive inspections of venues and reactive investigations of complaints made
about venues by the police, members of the public and others. Between December 2010 and
November 2012:

OLGR officers undertook a total of 1476 planned ‘inspections’ of licensed venues in the
Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise, and Townsville DSPs, the majority during ‘after-hours’
appropriately reflecting the peak trading hours for venues within the DSPs

OLGR also carried out 418 ‘investigations’ of complaints

A total of 1483 breaches were detected against licensed venues and finalised during the period.
During consultations, licensees made various comments about OLGR. These included:

That OLGR compliance activity is often focused on breaches for administrative errors, such as
failing to complete a security or approved manager register correctly, rather than the more
fundamental issues of Responsible Service of Alcohol and the unsafe management of a licensed
venue. However, the compliance activity data shows a focus from OLGR on ‘after-hours’
inspections, suggesting that detecting administrative breaches (that could be detected at any
time) is not the main intent of the inspections.

That OLGR seemed to follow the media interest and respond harshly with extra conditions,
rather than proactively identifying emerging issues and working with licensees to find solutions.
Interestingly, when OLGR and the local police in Surfers Paradise raised the emerging issue of
mixing alcohol and energy drinks, they were met with scepticism from licensees, who argued
that there was no evidence to support the concerns raised.

That they ‘are getting constantly bashed on the head by OLGR for people who have pre-loaded
before coming out’.
OLGR also plan, coordinate, and participate in joint enforcement operations. As part of the DSP
trials, these joint enforcement operations have increasingly focused on the DSP areas. These involve
a number of agencies targeting licensed venues in each DSP, namely OLGR, Office of Fair Trading,
QPS, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, and local government. The agencies work cooperatively to
ensure compliance across a number of areas, including liquor regulations, fire safety, security
148 | P a g e
providers, workplace health and safety, and local laws. Between December 2010 and November
2012, a total of 65 joint enforcement operations were conducted.
Perceptions of other strategies
Consultation with stakeholder groups in each of the DSPs consistently reinforced two key themes:

Limited transport options (predominately bus and taxi services) were a major issue in each of
the DSPs, with long waits causing frustration and conflict.

The lack of appropriate public toilets was identified and is considered unacceptable given the
large numbers of people visiting the areas each weekend.
Patrons also identified public toilet and transport issues as key concerns in the surveys.
149 | P a g e
Section 3 Results of the DSP trial
The focus of the Drink Safe Precincts (DSP) evaluation is to examine the overall impact of the DSP
trial on alcohol-related incidents using a variety of data, while also drawing upon a range of
qualitative information obtained through consultations with stakeholders (including surveys, focus
groups, and other consultations). In this section, we present the quantitative findings associated
with key outcomes expected at the commencement of the DSP trial. The results cover the two-year
trial period from 1 December 2010 to 30 November 2012.
The trial aims to reduce alcohol-related violence and divert people to rest and recovery support
services within the DSPs, in order to reduce offending, ambulance call outs, and hospital emergency
department presentations. Therefore, we have focused on the analysis of the three administrative
datasets most central to evaluating these aims:
1. Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) – Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) calls for service data
2. Queensland Health and Mater Hospital – Emergency Department Information System (EDIS)
emergency presentations data
3. Queensland Police Service (QPS) – Queensland Police Record and Information Management
Exchange (QPRIME) crime report data.
Using such a broad range of administrative data to evaluate the DSP initiative makes this study the
first of its kind in Queensland.
Analyses of these data to determine the impact of the trial has included:
 comparing before (baseline) and after the introduction of the trial for each site
 comparing the trends in the DSP areas with those in control sites.
Wherever possible data was extracted for a three year baseline period, however, due to some
limitations with the data impacting on the time series, a more limited two year baseline was
generally used for QAS and EDIS data.
Other designated entertainment precincts (EPs) throughout the state were used as the evaluation’s
control sites.74 These EP sites are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Brisbane CBD and Caxton Street (excluding the Fortitude Valley DSP area)
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD.
74
Throughout this section the terms ‘designated entertainment precincts’ (EPs), ‘non-DSPs’, and ‘control sites’
are used interchangeably to describe these sites included in the analysis for comparison with the DSP sites.
150 | P a g e
Section 3 Results of the DSP trial
In broad terms, the ambulance, police and hospital datasets have been statistically analysed in two
ways:


firstly, in terms of the percentage of incidents (ambulance calls for service, emergency
department presentations or police crime reports) occurring during weekend drinking nights
secondly, the rates of incidents per weekend drinking night.
The analysis of rates was conducted, as changes in the proportions of incidents occurring during
weekend drinking nights may reflect changes occurring at other times (e.g. if other week nights or
the day time becomes busier and more offending or injury occurs at these times, this will show a
decrease in the weekend drinking nights proportion).
The percentage of incidents occurring during weekend drinking nights has been further analysed
using interrupted time series analysis. With the longest length of trial data possible analysed in this
report, new statistically significant trends (increases or decreases) were found while others
previously reported have changed. Other issues (e.g. displacement and diffusion of benefits)75 have
also been further considered in this final analysis of the data.
Analysis of the three central datasets is presented in Chapters 11 to 13. Each of these chapters
includes an initial ‘context’ sub section that provides some descriptive/contextual information that
can be drawn from the data sample. The results of the statistical analysis to determine the impact of
the trial (comparing pre and post trial and comparing the patterns in the DSP sites with the patterns
in the control sites) are then presented in the ‘results’ sub section. Chapter 14 provides a summary
of the results by each site and draws information from Section 2 to suggest what the best
interpretation of the results by site might be.
The results of the data analysis presented in this section should be considered in conjunction with
other information presented in Sections 1 and 2 of this report in order to get a broader perspective
on the impact of the trial. The mixed models evaluation, including quantitative and qualitative data,
was designed to reflect the overall impact of the trial, taking into account patron, licensees, and
community input. In Section 4, we consider all the evaluation information in order to provide
discussion that supports the recommendations made for future action.
75
Spatial and temporal displacement refers to the possibility that the implementation of the DSP trial may
result in the targeted behaviour shifting to another location or time, e.g. if patrons choose to go to the
Brisbane CBD instead of Fortitude Valley because of the DSP. Diffusion of benefits refers to the opposite
potential impact, i.e. the DSP trial may produce benefits for other areas or times, e.g. if patrons believe there
are more police in the Brisbane CBD as well as the Fortitude Valley DSP and change their behaviour as a result.
151 | P a g e
Chapter 11 Ambulance calls for service
An analysis of ambulance calls for service data was conducted to determine if the DSP trial has
impacted on the QAS workload in the three DSP sites. A reduction in ambulance calls for service, or a
change in the nature of the calls, may indicate reductions in alcohol-related violence and injury in
these sites.
Most of the analysis compares a two year and two month baseline period for QAS data (1 October
2008 to 30 November 2010)76 to the 24-month DSP trial period (1 December 2010 to 30 November
2012). However, the time series analysis has been conducted using a variable baseline of up to three
years for some areas, including the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs.77
The other designated entertainment precinct (EP) areas throughout Queensland are considered
throughout this analysis for limited comparison and primarily to explore if there was any state-wide
trend regarding ambulance calls for service across the baseline and trial period. The Brisbane CBD
and Caxton Street EP and Broadbeach EP are also of interest as EPs adjacent to or nearby the
Fortitude Valley DSP and Surfers Paradise DSPs (respectively).
The key strength of QAS calls for service data for the DSP evaluation is that it provides precise ‘X’ and
‘Y’ coordinates for the location to which the ambulance was dispatched. This allows for all incidents
resulting in calls for service to the DSP and EP areas to be identified with certainty. However, the key
limitation of the QAS calls for service data for the purpose of the DSP evaluation is that it does not
record whether a call for service was alcohol or drug related.78 For this reason, several strategies
were used to reduce the ‘noise’ in the QAS calls for service data and focus the analysis:

The key analyses are restricted to consideration of calls for service data during ‘weekend
drinking nights’—that is, Friday and Saturday nights: 6pm to 6am the following morning. Based
on available historical data, it is during weekend drinking nights that people are most likely to
experience alcohol-related harm. It is also during these weekend drinking nights that the key
76
QAS calls for service data was extracted for a three year baseline period. However, due to data limitations
impacting on the time series, only two years and two months of baseline data could be used. Prior to
September 2008, the QAS regions of Mackay, Rockhampton, Toowoomba, Townsville, and Cairns (regions 1, 2,
3 & 7) used RightCAD. As a result of the statewide changeover to the current QAS CAD System (VisiCAD) from
September 2008, there are some missing calls for service data for these areas for the period between
December 2007 and September 2008 that may result in these data being misleading.
77
A variable baseline was used in this analysis due to QAS database recording problems. The first year of data
(December 2007 to November 2008) was removed from the analysis of Townsville, Rockhampton, Cairns,
Mackay, Bundaberg, and Toowoomba. All other regions (including Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise)
retained data from December 2007 onwards. It is possible that the variable baseline may create
inconsistencies in the time series analyses. For example, for Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise, different
sites will be used for the combined EPs for the first year versus subsequent years.
78
QAS calls for service data records dispatch and incident details so that requests for assistance can be
responded to appropriately and swiftly. QAS also maintains the electronic Ambulance Report Form (eARF)
database that includes clinical notes and demographic patient details, however, calls for service data is not
routinely linked to eARF records.
152 | P a g e
Section 3 Results of the DSP trial - Chapter 11 Ambulance calls for service

strategies, such as increased police presence/high visibility policing and NGO support services,
were in place across the three DSP trial sites. For these reasons, restricting the key analysis to
weekend drinking nights is more likely to isolate any impact of the trial on alcohol-related
violence and other harm.
The types of QAS calls for service likely to be most indicative of cases that result from antisocial
behaviour and alcohol and/or drug misuse were identified.79 They included: Assault/Sexual
Assault, Overdosing/Poisoning (Ingestion), and Unconscious/Fainting (or Near Faint) calls for
service. The analysis also considered a small number of other types of calls for service to be
relevant, but less reliable indicators of injury or accident arising from antisocial behaviour and
alcohol and/or drug misuse (Falls, Haemorrhage/Lacerations, Sick Person (Specific Diagnoses),
and Stab/Gunshot/Penetrating Trauma).
The analysis of QAS calls for service data is focused on determining whether there is any detectable
change in the number, percentage and type of calls for service most likely to reflect alcohol-related
harm after the introduction of the trial.
Context: Calls for service in DSPs and EPs
The total sample of QAS calls for service data for the DSP and EP areas included 62 165 calls for
service across the baseline and 24-month DSP trial period. Of these total calls for service, 16 766
were made during weekend drinking nights (forming the primary dataset for analysis); representing
27.6% (n = 8396) of all calls for service during the baseline period and 26.4% (n = 8370) during the
trial period.
DSP and EP share of ambulance calls for service
In order to understand the QAS workload arising from the night time economy in each DSP and EP
area better, Figure 32 shows the percentage of the total of calls for service made for each EP or DSP
area during weekend drink nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday). This figure presents combined
data from the baseline and 24-month trial period.80
79
One of 32 Medical Priority Dispatch Codes (MPDS) is assigned based on the caller’s response to structured
questioning by an emergency call taker. The codes contained in the MPDS provide a systematic framework for
appropriately resourcing ambulance cases at the point of call taking, but are not validated or changed after
clinical assessment on-scene by paramedics . Codes to be considered in the analyses were identified based on
QAS advice and initial analysis of the data. QAS advised that during high alcohol times within the DSP and EP
areas, dispatch codes for Assault/Sexual Assault, Overdose/Poisoning (Ingestion), Unconscious/Fainting (or
Near Faint), and Stab/Gunshot/Penetrating Trauma are those most likely to result from antisocial behaviour
and alcohol and/or drug misuse.
80
The analysis of the workload combines baseline and trial data as they are intended to provide some
description of information regarding characteristics of our sample and are not part of the key comparative preand post-analysis. Analysis presented in the ‘context’ subsection has not been relied upon in drawing
conclusions or making recommendations.
153 | P a g e
Figure 32. Ambulance calls for service – DSP and EP percentages of total calls for service during
weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), total baseline to trial (October 2008
to November 2012)
Rockhampton
10%
Toowoomba
3%
(n = 542)
(n = 1680)
Fortitude Valley
DSP
19%
(n = 3187)
Mackay
6%
(n = 976)
Ipswich
2%
(n = 340)
Cairns
6%
Surfers Paradise
DSP
14%
(n = 996)
Bundaberg
3%
(n = 2399)
(n = 423)
Broadbeach
6%
(n = 1072)
Brisbane CBD &
Caxton St
21%
Townsville DSP
10%
(n = 1729)
(n = 3421)
As seen in Figure 32 the Brisbane and Caxton St EP accounts for the highest percentage of calls for
service (21%) to an EP or DSP area during weekend drinking nights. The three DSP sites are the next
busiest in terms of QAS workload occurring on weekend drinking nights and located within an
entertainment precinct.
What time of day or night do calls for services occur?
The percentage of calls for service was considered by time of day/night to examine the distribution
of QAS workload for DSP and EP sites at night. Figure 33 shows the total number of QAS calls for
service over a 24-hour period in each of the DSPs and combined EP sites.
154 | P a g e
Figure 33. Ambulance calls for service – percentage of total calls for service by time of day – DSPs
and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
22
23
0
1
2
21
22
3
20
23
0
1
2
21
4
3
20
4
19
5
19
5
18
6
18
6
17
7
17
7
16
8
15
16
9
14
13
12
11
8
15
10
9
14
13
12
11
10
Fortitude Valley DSP - Baseline
Surfers Paradise DSP - Baseline
Fortitude Valley DSP - Trial
Surfers Paradise DSP - Trial
22
23
0
1
2
21
22
3
20
23
0
1
2
21
4
3
20
4
19
5
19
5
18
6
18
6
17
7
17
7
16
8
15
9
14
13
12
11
10
16
8
15
9
14
13
12
11
10
Townsville DSP - Baseline
Combined EPs - Baseline
Townsville DSP - Trial
Combined EPs - Trial
Note: See Table 3 in Appendix D for detailed data.
The distribution of QAS calls for service is very similar to the previous analysis of 14- and 18-months
of trial data. As can be seen in Figure 33:

in Fortitude Valley, the majority of calls for service occur between 1am and 3am, revealing that
the night time economy is the key driver of total calls for service to this area

in Surfers Paradise, calls for service are mostly made late in the evening and early in the
morning
155 | P a g e

the pattern is more generalised for Townsville and the combined EP group. This suggests that
the ambulance workload is more equally driven by the day time economies in these areas.
Of particular interest is that there is a reduction in the percentage of calls for service to DSP sites
made between midnight and 5am. No such change is apparent in the combined EPs, suggesting that
the trial may have had a positive effect. This conclusion is supported by further analysis below.
Results: Change in calls for service after the introduction of
the trial
In order to examine the impact of the DSP trial on calls for service, analysis focused on calls for
service by weekend drinking nights. The analysis has been performed in terms of the percentage
occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of all hours and days), rates per weekend drinking
nights and time series analysis.
This analysis of ambulance calls for service during weekend drinking nights is presented by:

all types of calls for service

‘most relevant’ calls for service

‘relevant’ calls for service
All types of calls service
Percentage of calls for service during weekend drinking nights
Figure 34 and Figure 35 presents QAS calls for service that occur during weekend drinking nights as a
percentage of the total calls for service (all days and hours), comparing the baseline and trial period
for DSPs and EPs.
% of calls for service during weekend
drinking nights
Figure 34. Ambulance calls for service – during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) as a percentage of total calls for service (all days and hours) – DSPs and combined EPs,
baseline vs. trial
60%
50%
48.7%
44.1%
40%
31.2%
30%
28.0%
25.0%23.1%
23.5% 23.8%
Townsville
Combined EPs
20%
10%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
Note: see Table 4 in Appendix D for details of data and analysis.
156 | P a g e
Figure 35. Ambulance calls for service – during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) as a percentage of total calls for service (all days and hours) – individual EPs, baseline vs.
trial
23.9%
23.5%
Brisbane CBD & Caxton St
25.9%
25.7%
Broadbeach CBD
21.2%
Bundaberg CBD
18.9%
28.4%
27.5%
Cairns CBD
18.3%
Ipswich CBD
21.7%
21.9%
23.6%
Mackay CBD
21.5%
22.8%
Rockhampton CBD
25.4%
25.6%
Toowoomba CBD
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
% of calls for service during weekend drinking nights
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
25%
30%
Note: see Table 5 in Appendix D for details of data and analysis.
As shown in Figure 34, the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs experienced statistically
significant decreases in the percentage of calls for service during weekend drinking nights from
baseline to trial (4.6 and 3.2 percentage points81, respectively). The Townsville DSP also experienced
a reduction (1.9 percentage points), but it was not statistically significant.
81
In this report, a change in rates is described as a percentage change. For example, if a rate increases from 80
to 120 then this can be described as a 50% increase in the rate. Increases in percentages, however, are not as
straightforward. A change in a percentage from 50% to 60% is a 20% increase. It is recognised though that this
may be confusing to some readers who are not familiar with data, and who may see it not as a 20% increase,
but rather as an increase of 10 percentage points. In order to address this issue, and ensure that the data
being presented in the report is easily understood by all relevant stakeholders, this report will use percentage
point change when describing changes in percentages.
157 | P a g e
The relatively consistent reduction in the QAS workload accounted for by DSPs during weekend
drinking nights differs from the relatively constant trend for combined EPs. This suggests that the
reductions seen in the DSP areas cannot be accounted for by a more widespread state-wide trend
across EPs and the effects of the DSP trial appear to have been positive.
There were no statistically significant differences in the percentage of calls for service during
weekend drinking nights across the individual EPs. The Brisbane CBD and Caxton St EP (0.4
percentage point decrease) and Broadbeach CBD EP (0.2 percentage point increase) both remained
relatively stable.
Rate of calls for service per weekend drinking night
The rate of calls for service per weekend drinking night was calculated to assess how the DSP trial
has affected demand for ambulance services. As the rates are low in some precincts (< 1.0), the
difference between baseline and trial period can be large when represented as a percentage, while
the relative change in actual call outs can be quite low. Rate of change data should also be
interpreted with caution as it does not take into account seasonality. These data can be useful when
interpreted in light of other evaluation data.82
Table 18 presents the number and rate of calls for service per weekend drinking night for the
baseline and trial period across DSPs and comparison EPs. These are then presented graphically in
Figure 36 and Figure 37.
82
Statistical significance testing of the percentage change for the rates was conducted as part of the interim
evaluation’s consideration of the 14-month technical data analysis; although the change in sample size to the
number of weekend drinking nights from number of calls for service meant large changes were required to
reach statistical significance. Based on subsequent advice from the DSP evaluation technical partners, CYSAR,
the significance of the percentage change in the rates were not calculated for this round of the analysis.
158 | P a g e
Table 18. Ambulance calls for service – rate per weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) – DSPs and EPs, baseline vs. trial
Ambulance Calls for Service
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
% change
Oct 08 – Nov 10
(226 weekend drinking
nights)
Dec 10 – Nov 12
nights)
Baseline to 24-month
trial
7.5
(n = 1693)
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Entertainment Precinct
Brisbane CBD and Caxton St
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
Combined EPs – Total
Note:
7.2
-4.2%
(n = 1494)
5.6
5.4
(n = 1270)
(n = 1129)
3.4
4.6
(n = 769)
(n = 960)
7.7
8.1
(n = 1745)
(n = 1676)
2.3
2.6
(n = 524)
(n = 548)
1.0
0.9
(n = 231)
(n = 193)
2.2
2.4
(n = 488)
(n = 508)
0.7
0.9
(n = 152)
(n = 188)
2.0
2.5
(n = 449)
(n = 527)
3.6
4.2
(n = 813)
(n = 867)
1.2
1.3
(n = 262)
(n = 280)
20.6
23.0
(n = 4664)
(n = 4787)
-3.1%
35.7%
4.4%
13.6%
-9.2%
13.1%
34.4%
27.5%
15.9%
16.1%
11.7%
Rates have been rounded to one decimal place for presentation.
Percentage change is calculated on the difference between the full rates with no rounding.
159 | P a g e
Rate of calls for service per weekend drinking
night
Figure 36. Ambulance calls for service – rate per weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
25
23.0
20.6
20
15
10
7.5
7.2
5.6
5.4
5
3.4
4.6
0
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
Figure 37. Ambulance calls for service – rate per weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) – individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
7.7
Brisbane CBD & Caxton St
8.0
2.3
2.6
Broadbeach CBD
1.0
0.9
Bundaberg CBD
2.2
2.4
Cairns CBD
0.7
0.9
Ipswich CBD
2.0
Mackay CBD
2.5
3.6
Rockhampton CBD
4.2
1.2
1.3
Toowoomba CBD
0
2
4
6
8
Rate of calls for service per weekend drinking night
Baseline
10
Trial - 24 months
160 | P a g e
As can be seen in Table 18, Figure 36, and Figure 37:

following the introduction of the DSP trial, there was a reduction in the rate of ambulance calls
for service per weekend drinking night being made to the Fortitude Valley (by 4.2%) and Surfers
Paradise (by 3.1%)

Townsville, on the other hand, showed a 35.7% increase in the rate of calls for service per
weekend drinking night

the reductions seen in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs were in contrast to an
average 11.7% increase across combined EPs. Notably:
o
the Brisbane CBD and Caxton Street EP experienced a 4.4% rise
o
the Broadbeach EP experienced a 13.6% rise
o
the Bundaberg CBD EP was the only non-DSP site to record a decrease with a 9.2%
reduction in the rate of calls for service per weekend drinking night.
‘Most relevant’ calls for service
Further analysis was conducted to consider whether a change could be detected in the type of calls
for service made to the QAS since the introduction of the DSP trial.
The following three types of calls for service were classified as ‘most relevant’ as they were
considered the most likely to have resulted from antisocial behaviour and alcohol and/or drug
misuse:



assault/sexual assault
overdosing/poisoning (ingestion)
unconscious/fainting (or near faint).
The ‘most relevant’ calls for service represented 34% (n = 4003) of calls for service to the three DSP
precincts during all hours, across the baseline and trial period. However, during weekend drinking
nights these types of calls for service made up 49% (n = 3614) of calls for service to the three DSP
precincts.
Percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls for service during weekend drinking nights
For each DSP, Figure 38 shows the ‘most relevant’ group of calls for service as a percentage of all
calls for service during weekend drinking nights for the baseline and trial period.
161 | P a g e
% of 'most relevant' group of calls for service
during weekend drinking nights
Figure 38. Ambulance calls for service – ‘most relevant’ group during weekend drinking nights
(6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total ‘most relevant’ group (all days and
hours) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
70%
60.0%
60%
52.1%
54.3%
50%
42.0%
45.1% 43.4%
41.0%
40%
35.6%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
Note: see Tables 6 to 9 in Appendix D for details of data and analysis.
Comparing baseline to the 24-month trial period, Figure 38 shows:

there was a reduction in the percentage of the ‘most relevant’ types of calls for service during
weekend drinking nights to each of the DSPs:
o Fortitude Valley DSP by 7.9 percentage points
o Surfers Paradise DSP by 12.3 percentage points
o Townsville DSP by 5.4 percentage points.
Further analysis revealed these reductions in the DSPs were statistically significant.
Changes during weekend drinking nights in the individual MPDS codes within the ‘most relevant’
group from the baseline period to trial period were also analysed, revealing in the:

Fortitude Valley DSP, a 5.8 percentage point statistically significant reduction in
‘overdosing/poisoning (ingestion)’ calls for service
 Surfers Paradise DSP there were statistically significant reductions in ‘assault/sexual assault’ and
‘overdose/poisoning (ingestion)’ calls (6.9 and 5.8 percentage points, respectively)
 Townsville DSP, a 4.7 percentage point statistically significant decrease in ‘assault/sexual
assault’ calls.
Further analysis also showed that when the combined other EP areas throughout the state were
considered, no statistically significant changes in the overall percentage of ‘most relevant’ types of
calls for service could be detected. This suggests that the changes found within the DSPs were
probably not part of a broader statewide trend common to EP areas.
162 | P a g e
More specifically, in other EPs there was a 3.2 percentage point statistically significant reduction in
‘overdosing/poisoning (ingestion)’ calls for service during the trial period.
Time series analysis
Time series analysis examined monthly calls for service during weekend drinking nights and the
percentage of ‘most relevant’ callouts for the DSPs and combined EPs. This analysis allows us to see
whether any variations in mean trends are due to the DSP intervention after adjusting for seasonal
variations (e.g. summer and schoolies). As identified earlier, a variable baseline was used for this
analysis with up to 12 months less baseline data available for the Townsville DSP and some
comparison EPs.83 This may create inconsistencies in the time series analysis and limit the ability to
identify significance results in the Townsville DSP.
A seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) intervention analysis was also
conducted on DSPs and combined EPs to pick up on any overall factors that might be influencing
trends in both.
Figure 39 shows the ‘most relevant’ group of QAS calls for service during weekend drinking nights
from baseline to trial as a percentage of the total ‘most relevant’ group (all days and hours).
83
A variable baseline was used in this analysis due to QAS database recording problems. The first year of data
(December 2007 to November 2008) was removed from the analysis of Townsville, Rockhampton, Cairns,
Mackay, Bundaberg, and Toowoomba. All other regions (including Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise)
retained data from December 2007 onwards. It is possible that the variable baseline may create
inconsistencies in the time series analyses. For example, for Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise, different
sites will be used for the combined EPs for the first year versus subsequent years.
163 | P a g e
Figure 39. Ambulance calls for service – time series analysis, ‘most relevant’ group during weekend
drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total ‘most relevant’ group
(all days and hours) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
See Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix D for details of data and analysis.
Baseline period: Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise; December 2007 – November 2010.
Baseline period: Townsville; December 2008 – November 2010.
Inspection of Figure 39 and further analysis shows:

in the Fortitude Valley DSP, a decrease during the first year of the trial, rising again late in the
second year of the trial but remaining below the stable baseline trend. The difference between
the baseline and trial period trends was statistically significant (highlighted below in Figure 40).

in the Surfers Paradise DSP, a sustained decrease in the percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls
occurring during weekend drinking nights since the introduction of the trial. The trial period
trend was not statistically significantly different from the baseline period trend.

in the Townsville DSP, a slight rise initially in the percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls occurring
during weekend drinking nights after the introduction of the trial, followed more recently by a
164 | P a g e
decrease. This trend had a statistically significant difference from the baseline period trend
(highlighted below in Figure 41).
Figure 40 and Figure 41 highlight the statistically significant trends found in the Fortitude Valley and
Townsville DSPs, mentioned above.
(all days and hours) – Fortitude Valley DSP vs. combined EPs, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
Baseline period: December 2007 – November 2010.
165 | P a g e
(all days and hours) – Townsville DSP vs. combined EPs, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
Time series analysis was also performed on the individual MPDS codes within the ‘most relevant’
group of ambulance calls for service during weekend drinking nights.
Figure 42 to Figure 43 show the noteworthy trends observed from this analysis of the individual
MPDS codes within the ‘most relevant’ group.

In the Fortitude Valley DSP there were statistically significant trends in ‘overdose/poisoning
(ingestion)’ and ‘unconscious/fainting (or near faint)’coded calls for service (see Figure 42 and
Figure 43, respectively). However, it is not clear from visual inspection of these trends if they
represent real or meaningful changes.
166 | P a g e

In the Surfers Paradise DSP there was a statistically significant change in the trend for the
‘assault/sexual assault’ coded calls for service, from baseline to trial. A clear reduction from
baseline to trial is observed from visual inspection of the trend (see Figure 44).

In the Townsville DSP there was a statistically significant change in the trend for the
‘overdose/poisoning (ingestion)’ coded calls for service, from baseline to trial. Visual inspection
of the trend (see Figure 45) suggests an increase during the trial period, although the limited
baseline period makes assessments more difficult.
Figure 42. Ambulance calls for service – ‘overdose/poisoning (ingestion)’ callouts during weekend
drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total ‘overdose/poisoning
(ingestion)’ callouts (all days and hours) – Fortitude Valley DSP and combined EPs, baseline (pretrial) vs. trial
Note:
167 | P a g e
Figure 43. Ambulance calls for service – ‘unconscious/fainting (or near faint)’ callouts during
weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total
‘unconscious/fainting (or near faint)’ callouts (all days and hours) – Fortitude Valley and combined
EPs, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
See Tables 10 and 15 in Appendix B for details of data and analysis.
168 | P a g e
Figure 44. Ambulance calls for service – ‘assault/sexual assault’ callouts during weekend drinking
nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total ‘unconscious/fainting (or near
faint)’ callouts (all days and hours) – Surfers Paradise DSP and combined EPs, baseline (pre-trial)
vs. trial
Note:
See Tables 10 and 16 in Appendix B for details of data and analysis.
169 | P a g e
Figure 45. Ambulance calls for service – ‘overdose/poisoning (ingestion)’ callouts during weekend
drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total ‘overdose/poisoning
(ingestion)’ callouts (all days and hours) – Townsville DSP and combined EPs, baseline (pre-trial)
vs. trial
Note:
170 | P a g e
‘Relevant’ calls for service
The following types of calls for service were classified as ‘relevant’ as they were considered to also
possibly be the result of antisocial behaviour and alcohol and/or drug misuse:




falls
haemorrhage/lacerations
sick person (specific diagnoses)
stab/gunshot/penetrating trauma.
The ‘relevant’ calls for service represented 19% (n = 4267) of total calls for service to the three DSP
precincts, and during weekend drinking nights these types of calls for service made up 18% (n =
1290) of calls for service to the three DSP precincts.
Percentage of ‘relevant’ calls for during weekend nights
Figure 46 shows the ‘relevant’ group of calls for service during weekend drinking nights as a
percentage of the total (all days and hours) ‘relevant’ group of calls for service.
% of 'relevant' group of calls for service during
weekend drinking nights
Figure 46. Ambulance calls for service – ‘relevant’ group during weekend drinking nights (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total ‘relevant’ group (all days and hours) – DSPs and
combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
30%
27.5%
25%
22.8%
20.2%
20%
15.8%
15%
20.1%
18.1%
15.9%
13.5%
10%
5%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
Note: see Tables 6 to 9 in Appendix D for details of data and analysis.
Comparing baseline to the 24-month trial period:

the percentage of aggregated ‘relevant’ calls for service occurring during weekend drinking
nights increased for the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs (by 2.3 percentage points
and 2.2 percentage points respectively), although further analysis revealed that neither of these
changes were statistically significant

in Townsville, there was a statistically significant increase in these types of calls (7.3 percentage
points)
171 | P a g e

when other EP areas throughout the state were considered, the percentage of ‘relevant’ calls
for service had a statistically significant increase (by 2.7 percentage points). This suggests that
the non-significant changes found within the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs may be
reflective of a broader state-wide trend common to EP areas.
More specifically, there were the following statistically significant changes after the introduction of
the trial in individual MPDS codes within the ‘relevant’ group of calls for service during weekend
drinking nights:




Fortitude Valley DSP – increase (3.1 percentage points) in ‘sick person (specific diagnoses)’ calls
for service
Surfers Paradise DSP – increase in ‘falls’ (3.0 percentage points) and decrease (2.5 percentage
points) in ‘Haemorrhage/lacerations’ calls for service
Townsville DSP – increase (6.0 percentage points) in ‘sick person (specific diagnoses)’ calls
other EPs – increase in ‘sick person (specific diagnoses)’ calls (2.7 percentage points).
Summary
The results of the analysis of the ambulance calls for service data suggest that the DSP initiatives
may have had an impact on the QAS workload in each of the three DSPs. The actual volume of calls
for service appear to have reduced in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs, while in the
Townsville DSP results previously suggesting a possible change in the nature of the calls for service
have strengthened.
In terms of ‘all types’ of ambulance calls for service:

There were statistically significant reductions in the percentage of ambulance calls for service
occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of all days and hours) in the Fortitude Valley and
Surfers Paradise DSPs (4.6 and 3.2 percentage points, respectively) following the
implementation of the DSP trial. The Townsville DSP also experienced a reduction (1.9
percentage points), although it was not statistically significant. The reductions seen in the DSPs
areas could not be accounted for by any widespread trend across the comparison EPs. The
Brisbane CBD and Caxton St EP (0.4 percentage point decrease) and Broadbeach CBD EP (0.2
percentage point increase) both remained relatively stable.

There was also a reduction in the rate of ambulance calls for service per weekend drinking night
being made to the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs (by 4.2% and 3.1%, respectively)
during the trial period compared to the baseline period. Alternatively, the Townsville DSP
experienced an increase (35.7%) following the implementation of the DSP trial. The reductions in
the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs were in contrast to an average 11.7% increase
across the combined EPs, including rises in the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St, and Broadbeach
CBD EPs (by 4.4% and 13.6%, respectively).
A sub group of those ambulance calls for service that are possibly ‘most relevant’ to anti-social
behaviour and alcohol or drug misuse within the DSPs and EPs (i.e. assault/sexual Assault,
overdose/poisoning and unconscious/fainting (or near faint)) were also analysed. The analysis
revealed:
172 | P a g e

For each of the DSPs there were statistically significant reductions from baseline to trial in the
percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls for service occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of
‘most relevant’ calls for service across all days and hours)
o

Fortitude Valley DSP by 7.9 percentage points for the group; driven by a 5.8 percentage
point statistically significant reduction in the ‘overdosing/poisoning (ingestion)’ coded
calls for service
o Surfers Paradise DSP by 12.3 percentage points for the group; driven by statistically
significant reductions in ‘assault/sexual assault’ and ‘overdose/poisoning (ingestion)’
calls (6.9 and 5.8 percentage points, respectively)
o Townsville DSP by 5.4 percentage points for the group; driven by a 4.7 percentage point
statistically significant decrease in ‘assault/sexual assault’ calls.
There were no statistically significant changes for the combined comparison EPs, suggesting that
the DSP changes were not part of a broader statewide trend.
Time series analysis of the percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls for service occurring during weekend
drinking nights (out of ‘most relevant’ calls for service during all days hours and hours) was also
conducted. This analysis and inspection of the trends showed:

a statistically significant reduction during the trial period compared to the baseline period for
the Fortitude Valley DSP, although the trend was not consistent across the trial period.

a sustained decreased in the Surfers Paradise DSP during the trial period compared to the
baseline period, although this trend was not statistically significant. Within the ‘most relevant’
group, the trend for the percentage of ‘assault/sexual assault’ calls for service occurring during
weekend drinking nights also showed a statistically significant reduction from baseline to trial.

in the Townsville DSP a slight rise initially following the implementation of the DSP, followed
later in the trial period by a decrease. This trend was statistically significantly different from the
baseline period trend.
Analysis was also conducted of a further sub group of ‘relevant’ ambulance calls for service for that
may have resulted from anti-social behaviour and alcohol or drug misuse (i.e. falls,
haemorrhage/lacerations, sick person (specific diagnoses), stab/gunshot/penetrating trauma).
The only statistically significant changes were observed in the Townsville DSP:

an increase (7.3 percentage points) in the percentage of ‘relevant’ calls for service during
weekend drinking nights (out of ‘relevant’ calls for service during all days and hours) from
baseline to trial.

an increase (6.0 percentage points) in ‘sick person (specific diagnoses)’ calls for service during
weekend drinking nights (as a percentage of ‘sick person’ calls for service during all days and
hours) from baseline to trial.
Small changes (between 2 and 3 percentage points) in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise
DSPs, and combined EPs were not found to be statistically significant.
173 | P a g e
Chapter 12 Hospital emergency presentations
Queensland Health Hospital Emergency Department Information System (EDIS) data was evaluated
to see whether there was any change in alcohol-related injuries and trauma presentations to
emergency departments (EDs) after the introduction of the DSP trial.
The consideration of ED data was flagged as important to the DSP evaluation from the outset of the
trial through stakeholder feedback about the planned evaluation. A significant amount of media
reporting has focused on concerns about the impact that alcohol-related injuries in entertainment
precincts have on frontline health staff and hospital resources. For example, media articles in
Queensland have cited doctors stating they are they are ‘fed-up’ (Sandy 2012), that ‘hospitals
struggle to deal with the regular flow of the weekend wounded’ (Miles 2012) and highlighting ‘the
shocking cycle of drunken violence that fills the state’s emergency wards with assault victims every
weekend’ (Lauth & Murray 2012).
The evaluation considered a two year baseline period for EDIS data (1 December 2008 to 30
November 2010),84 to compare to the 24-month DSP trial period in this report (1 December 2010 to
30 November 2012).
EDIS data is clinically focused and includes information about patient demographics and clinical
diagnoses. From a DSP evaluation perspective EDIS data is limited in the following key ways:



The location data collected in EDIS is limited to the patients’ residing postcode. Analysis of EDIS
data cannot identify whether an emergency presentation was related to an injury sustained
within a DSP or EP area, or not. Therefore a proxy (or estimate) measure of hospitals located
near the DSP and EP sites were selected for inclusion in the analysis:
o EDs located proximal to DSPs (termed EDs servicing DSPs or DSP EDs): Royal Brisbane
and Women’s (RBWH), Gold Coast and Townsville Hospital
o EDs located proximal to other EPs (referred to as comparison EDs or non-DSP EDs):
Bundaberg, Cairns Base, Ipswich, Mackay Base, Princess Alexandra (Brisbane), Robina,
Rockhampton and Toowoomba Hospitals.
The location of the Brisbane CBD and Caxton EP adjacent to the Fortitude Valley EP is a
confounding factor, as RBWH would receive cases from both areas. Similarly, the Gold Coast
Hospital receives patients from incidents occurring in the Surfers Paradise DSP and also the
nearby Broadbeach EP. This weakens the relevance of data from these sites to the DSP
evaluation. Whilst the Townsville hospital does not receive cases directly from another
recognised entertainment precinct, the confounding factors of it being the only public hospital
for the City of Townsville and a major referral hospital for the region are present.
EDIS data focuses on recording clinical diagnosis of a patient (e.g. facial fracture), rather than
how an injury was obtained or whether alcohol was a factor (i.e. there may be no clinical
purpose for recording information about the surrounding circumstances, e.g. alcohol-related
84
EDIS data was extracted for a three year baseline period, however, due to missing data within the EDIS
dataset and some limitations with the QAS data impacting on the time series, only two years baseline data was
used for consistency with the QAS calls for service analysis.
174 | P a g e
Section 3 Results of the DSP trial - Chapter 12 Hospital emergency presentations

assault). Prevalence of alcohol-related injuries are therefore consistently underreported across
ED data collection systems (Barker et al 2011; Kisely et al 2011). It has been accepted practice to
recognise these data limitations and estimate if trends of these consistently underreported
presentations change over time though specific interventions (e.g. Kisely et al 2011).
EDIS does not reliably record what time the injury occurred. For EDIS, the time data collected
relates to ED presentation time, rather than the time the injury occurred, and a person may not
immediately seek treatment.
For these reasons, and again in order to limit as far as is possible the ‘noise’ in the EDIS data, the
evaluation has used the following strategies:



The analysis is limited to emergency presentations during weekend drinking nights, when it is
most likely that alcohol-related injury and trauma in the DSPs or EPs would occur (e.g.
Humphrey, Casswell and Han 2003; Kisley et al 2011).
Emergency data has been sampled on the basis of meeting the criteria of having an International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) diagnosis code matching a list developed as being ‘narrowly
alcohol-related’.85, 86
o For the analysis of the data in this report, it was decided to focus on only the narrowly
defined list of directly alcohol-related ICD-10 codes, and not the broader alcohol-related
and injury-related list of codes used for the 14-month and 18-month analysis (and
presented in evaluation reporting to date). This ensures that the final analysis of the DSP
trial represents as accurately as possible the alcohol-related ED presentations, although
it does have the consequence of making comparisons to the 14-month and 18-month
analysis not possible.
Age of patient has been restricted to between 12 and 64 (inclusive).
Context: Emergency presentations to DSP and EP hospitals
Within the total EDIS data sample there were 888 015 emergency presentations recorded across the
baseline and trial period. From this total EDIS data sample, 121 236 emergency presentations were
identified that occurred during weekend drinking nights. Of these cases that presented during
weekend drinking nights, 7657 were classified as potentially alcohol-related and for patients aged
12-64; forming the primary dataset for analysis.
85
The narrow definition of alcohol-related ICD-10 codes includes only those that were solely associated with
alcohol: F10, Y90-91.9, T51.0, T51.9, R78.0 and Z04.0-.5. In addition, F19.- codes for mental and behavioural
disorders due to multiple drug use and use of other psychoactive substances were also included to capture
alcohol and other drug use.
86
Other methods of measuring emergency alcohol-related trauma and injury were considered, including:
 the use of aetiological fractions to estimate the contribution that alcohol makes to emergency
presentations in Australia (Evans, Pascal and Chikritzhs 2011; Kisley et al 2011); Australia’s aetiological
fractions at time of analysis are not universally accepted for all ICD-10 codes
 text assessment to identify cases of alcohol involvement through manual and automated analysis of the
text description fields extracted from the emergency records (McKenzie, Harrison & McClure 2010).
These options were not considered to be currently practical for the DSP evaluation.
175 | P a g e
DSP and EP share of alcohol-related emergency presentations
Of the 7657 emergency presentations occurring during weekend drinking nights that were classified
as alcohol-related:




RBWH accounted for 25% (n = 943) during the baseline period, and 24% (n = 926) during the
trial period.
the Gold Coast Hospital accounted for 11% during both the baseline and trial periods (n = 420
and n = 442, respectively).
the Townsville Hospital for accounted for 10% (n = 369) during the baseline period, and 11% (n
= 406) during the trial period.
other EP hospitals accounted for the remaining 55% (n = 2077) during both the baseline and
54% during the trial period (n = 2074).
The small percentage differences between the baseline and trial periods were not statistically
significantly.
Who are the patients of the DSP and EP alcohol-related emergency
presentations?
Across each of the DSPs and the combined EPs, the demographic profile of the emergency
presentations during weekend drinking nights for alcohol-related matters shows the patients are
most likely to be aged 18-30 years and male. Across the baseline and trial periods, emergency
presentations were mainly:

at the RBWH, male (50.2%, n = 938) and aged between 18-30 years (66.9%, n = 1251).

at the Gold Coast hospital, male (53.2%, n = 459) and aged between 18-30 years (51.2%, n =
441).

at the Townsville hospital, male (54.5%, n = 423)and aged between 18-30 years (50.4%, n =
391).

at the other EP EDs, male( 55.4%, n = 2299) and aged between 18-30 years (52.1%, n =
2163).
See Table 18 in Appendix E for further details.
What time of day or night do alcohol-related cases occur?
Figure 47 shows the ED presentations over a 24-hour period in DSPs and combined EPs. The figures
present alcohol-related presentations as a percentage of the total hourly presentations (i.e. the
percentage of all presentations that are alcohol-related in each particular hour).
176 | P a g e
Figure 47. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a percentage of hourly total
presentations (all types) by time of day – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
22
23
0
1
22
2
21
1
2
3
20
4
4
19
5
19
5
18
6
18
6
17
7
17
7
16
16
8
15
13
12
11
8
15
9
14
9
14
10
13
12
11
10
RBWH - Baseline
Gold Coast - Baseline
RBWH - Trial (24 months)
Gold Coast - Trial (24 months)
22
23
0
1
2
21
22
3
20
23
0
1
2
21
4
3
20
4
19
5
19
5
18
6
18
6
17
7
17
7
16
8
15
9
14
Note:
0
21
3
20
23
13
12
11
10
16
8
15
9
14
13
12
11
10
Townsville - Baseline
Townsville - Trial (24 months)
Combined EPs - Trial (24 months)
See Table 19 in Appendix E for detailed data.
As can be seen in Figure 47:

across both the baseline and trial period at the Gold Coast hospital, alcohol-related
presentations are uncommon during daytime hours, with the most likely time being from
midnight to 5am; although individual peak hours fluctuated between the baseline and trial
period

the Townsville and Combined EP hospitals show a similar pattern with only a small percentage
of daytime presentations being alcohol-related. The most likely time for alcohol-related
177 | P a g e
presentations is between 1am and 5am, increasingly so for the Townsville hospital from the
baseline to trial period

for both the baseline and trial period, the RBWH shows a different pattern, with a greater
percentage of daytime presentations being alcohol-related, including an obvious peak
(increasing for the trial period) between 8am and 9am.87 A peak at 2am during the baseline
period is not evident during trial period.
Results: Change in emergency presentations after the
introduction of the trial
In order to determine if there was any detectable impact of the DSP trial on ED presentations,
analyses were conducted of alcohol-related cases by weekend drinking nights for hospitals servicing
the DSP areas and other EP areas across the state. Alcohol-related presentations were analysed in
terms of the percentage occurring during weekend drinking nights, rate per weekend drinking night
and time series analysis.
Alcohol-related emergency presentations
Percentage of alcohol-related presentations during weekend drinking nights
Figure 48 presents the percentage of total presentations during weekend drinking nights that were
alcohol-related cases for the combined DSP and combined EP (Non DSP) hospitals, before and after
the introduction of the DSP trial.
87
The spike in alcohol-related presented at 8am and 9am is likely to be related to presentations for a RBWH
alcohol service that only assesses admissions through the RBWH ED.
178 | P a g e
Narrow
Figure 48. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a percentage of all types of
presentations during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – combined
DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP), baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
Baseline (pre-trial) period is from December 2008 to November 2010; Trial period is from December 2010 to November 2012.
Consistent with the interim evaluation results, the percentage of alcohol-related cases during
weekend drinking nights increased in EDs servicing the DSP areas after the trial commenced. This
trend was not observed for the EDs servicing the comparison EP areas throughout the state.
The time series analysis presented in a later part provides more detailed analysis of the percentage
of alcohol-related cases occurring during weekend drinking nights.
Rate of alcohol-related presentations per weekend drinking night
To provide another assessment of how the DSP trial may have affected demand for ED services, the
evaluation considered alcohol-related cases as a rate per weekend drinking night. As the rates are
low in some precincts (< 1.0), the difference between baseline and trial period can be large when
represented as a percentage, while the relative change in presentations can be quite low. Rate of
179 | P a g e
change data should also be interpreted with caution as it does not take into account seasonality.
These data can be useful, however, when interpreted in light of other evaluation data.88
The rates analysis is presented in Table 19 and Figure 49 for each of the hospitals proximal to the
DSP sites and the comparison entertainment precincts.
88
180 | P a g e
Table 19. Emergency presentations – rate of alcohol-related presentations per weekend drinking
night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and EPs, baseline vs. trial
ED Presentations
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
(RBWH)
Surfers Paradise
(Gold Coast Hospital)
Townsville
Mater Adults
(South Brisbane)
Princess Alexandra
(South Brisbane)
Robina
(Gold Coast)
Bundaberg
Cairns Base
Ipswich
Mackay Base
Rockhampton Base
Toowoomba
Note:
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
% change
Dec 08 – Nov 10
nights)
Dec 10 – Nov 12
nights)
trial
4.5
4.4
-2.3%
(n = 943)
(n = 926)
2.0
2.1
(n = 420)
(n = 442)
1.8
1.9
(n = 369)
(n = 406)
0.5
0.3
(n = 110)
(n = 67)
1.6
1.8
(n = 336)
(n = 374)
0.9
1.0
(n = 182)
(n = 210)
0.9
0.9
(n = 178)
(n = 189)
1.8
1.8
(n = 370)
(n = 370)
1.1
0.9
(n = 226)
(n = 192)
1.0
1.0
(n = 215)
(n = 201)
1.3
1.4
(n = 275)
(n = 296)
0.9
0.8
(n = 185)
(n = 175)
10.0
9.9
(n = 2077)
(n = 2069)
4.7%
9.5%
-39.4%
10.8%
14.8%
5.7%
-0.5%
-15.5%
-7.0%
7.1%
-5.9%
-0.6%
Minor variations in the baseline data presented compared to the 14-month Interim Evaluation Report are due to data
settling or minor analytical changes.
Analysis of individual EP proximal hospitals not performed for 14-month analysis.
181 | P a g e
Figure 49. Emergency presentations – rates of alcohol-related presentations per weekend drinking
night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Rate of alcohol-related presentations per
12
10
10
9.9
8
6
4.5
4.4
4
2
2.1
2
1.8
1.9
0
RBWH
Gold Coast
Baseline
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
As can be seen from Table 19 and Figure 49:

the RBWH, Gold Coast, Townsville and combined EP rates of presentations per night have all
remained almost stable (decreased or increased by 0.1 presentations per night).

the RBWH is the busiest of the hospitals analysed for alcohol-related ED presentations with
around 4.5 presentations per night, compared to around 2 alcohol-related ED presentations per
night in the Gold Coast and Townsville hospitals, and less than 2 alcohol-related presentations
per at any of comparison EP hospital EDs.
Time series analysis
Figure 50 plots the percentage of alcohol-related cases that occur during weekend drinking nights
for each of the DSP and the combined EP hospitals from baseline to trial.
182 | P a g e
Narrow
Figure 50. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a percentage of all types of
presentations during weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSP hospitals
and combined EP hospitals, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
Baseline (pre-trial) period is from December 2008 to November 2010; trial period is from December 2010 to November 2012.
Statistical analysis of the trends from the time series plots illustrated in Figure 50 revealed a
statistically significant change in the percentage of alcohol-related presentations occurring during
weekend drinking nights for the Gold Coast hospital. Visual inspection of this trend (noting the tight
scale applied to the figure) shows a continual decline over the two baseline years, followed by a
sustained increase over the two years of the trial, returning at the end of the trial to the same level
as the beginning of the baseline years.
Further analysis of the emergency presentation data was also conducted by attempting to ‘match’
DSPs hospitals with similar EP site hospitals (based on geographical proximity) rather than combining
all comparison EP sites. The DSP sites and the matched comparison EDs were:
183 | P a g e

for the Fortitude Valley DSP (RBWH): Ipswich, Princess Alexandra and Mater Adults

for the Surfers Paradise DSP (Gold Coast): Ipswich, Robina and Toowoomba

for the Townsville DSP: Cairns Base, Mackay Base, Rockhampton Base.
The results of this analysis are presented in Figures 1 to 3 in Appendix E.
As raised previously in the Evaluation Update report, without a thorough analysis of the conditions
in each comparison site and ED, the appropriateness or validity of the matches used (and therefore,
reliability of this model of analysis) is unclear. As such, the results of the analysis should not be relied
upon in drawing conclusions about the impact of the trial. However, in principle and if it were
possible, it would seem that a more refined, robust matching of the DSP EDs to a small number of
comparison EDs would provide for improved analysis of the data that accounts for regional trends,
rather than crudely combining all eight comparison EDs which can present a distorted and confusing
overall picture.
Summary
Emergency Department Information System (EDIS) data was analysed to assess the impact of the
DSP trial on presentations at hospital emergency departments (EDs). However, the capacity to assess
the impact of the DSP trial is limited as emergency presentations data does not allow for the
selection/isolation of cases isolated that arise from any incident/event that occurred within the
boundaries of a particular DSP or EP area. Additionally, recognised data limitations of all emergency
records, including underreporting of alcohol-related presentations via ICD-10 codes and no time
record of the actual injury event, further reduce measurement validity. Nonetheless, emergency
presentations data was considered important and examined to assess whether comparable patterns
to those observed in other ‘impact’ datasets would emerge.

Analysis showed increases in the percentage of alcohol-related presentations occurring during
weekend drinking nights (out of alcohol-related presentations during all days and hours) in EDs
servicing the DSP areas after the trial commenced. This trend was not observed for the EDs
servicing the comparison EP areas throughout the state.

In terms of the rate of emergency presentations per weekend drinking night, the RBWH, Gold
Coast, Townsville and combined EPs have all remained almost stable (decreased or increased by
0.1 presentations per night).

Time series analysis of the percentage of alcohol-related presentations during weekend drinking
nights (out of alcohol-related presentations during all days and hours) was also conducted and
showed a statistically significant change for the Gold Coast hospital. However, it was unclear
from visual inspection of the trend if this represented a real or meaningful change.
The lack of clear changes or trends in the analysis of the data suggests that the DSP trial has had no
discernible or obvious impact on overall alcohol-related presentations to EDs, although given the
confounding factors this was unlikely to be measured. The limitations associated with the
emergency presentations data have meant that it is not possible to more specifically analyse the
impact of the DSP trial on emergency presentations resulting from incidents within the DSPs.
184 | P a g e
Chapter 13 Police crime reports
Crime reports recorded by police in the Queensland Police Records Information Management
Exchange (QPRIME) provide the main source of information about crime in Queensland. QPS crime
report data provides information about offences, offenders and victims of crime and includes
whether the offender appeared to be affected by alcohol. Crime data recorded by police therefore
provides a very important source of data in order to assess whether the DSP trial is effective in
reducing alcohol-related violence.
The analysis of police crime report has been conducted in order to understand the impact of the
DSP trial on the workload of the increased number of police in the trial sites. Analysis was also
conducted to determine if there was evidence of a reduction in alcohol-related violence after the
introduction of the trial.
A three year pre-trial baseline period (from 1 December 2007 to 30 November 2010) is used for
comparison with the 24-month trial period (from 1 December 2010 to 30 November 2012) for the
three DSP sites.
Other designated entertainment precinct (EP) areas throughout Queensland were used for limited
comparison and primarily to explore if there was any state-wide trend regarding police crime reports
across the baseline and trial period. The Brisbane CBD and Caxton Street EP and Broadbeach EP are
also of interest as EPs adjacent to or nearby the Fortitude Valley DSP and Surfers Paradise DSPs
(respectively).
Police crime report data provide a very useful and reliable guide to crime incidence (number of
crimes occurring) and crime prevalence (percentage of population affected by crime) for some
offences but not all, given their susceptibility to underreporting. Changes in crime report data may
also reflect changes in police numbers and policing strategies. Key features and limitations of the
police crime report data that have been considered throughout the DSP evaluation include:

It is likely that there is a very high level of reporting of serious violent crime to police, such as
homicides (which are very hard to hide), non-fatal shootings and armed robberies on banks,
convenience stores and other commercial premises. However, reporting to police of other nonfatal violent crimes is lower. Crime victim surveys would suggest that in Australia only about 50%
of robberies, 30% of assaults and 20% of sexual assaults are reported to police. Police crime
reports therefore underestimate the true incidence and prevalence of these offences. In general,
the less serious the offence, the less likely it is to be reported and the less reliable police data
becomes as a guide to underlying trends (Weatherburn 2004).
While noting the low reporting rates for these offences, assuming there is no large change in the
willingness of people to report offences to police (i.e. level of underreporting stays consistent),
changes in actual incidence through time will be reflected in police figures. Similarly, assuming
there is no difference between two areas in the willingness of people to report crime, then the
differences in crime rates between the areas will also be reflected in the police crime reports.

Willingness to report is not such an issue for other types of crime as they are generally recorded
when police themselves detect them, e.g. good-order offences, drug offences and drink driving
185 | P a g e
Section 3 Results of the DSP trial - Chapter 13 Police crime reports
offences. However, as a result, it is difficult to tell from police crime statistics whether there has
been a change in the actual incidence of these types of crime or whether the amount of time
and effort police put into detecting these crimes has changed. This is particularly important to
consider in the DSP evaluation as a key strategy of the trial has been an increased, high-visibility
policing presence. For this reason it is important that the DSP evaluation is able to draw on other
data sources and other information in order to interpret the patterns seen in the crime report
data after the implementation of the trial.

Another problem relating to the interpretation of police crime report statistics is that the legal
definition of what constitutes some types of crimes can be broad and/or overlapping. For
example, Queensland’s main good order offence of ‘public nuisance’ can be used by police to
respond to a range of behaviour from offensive language against police, through to threats of
violence and actual violence that could alternatively be dealt with as assault. There is a wide
scope for police discretion in dealing with some offence behaviours and changes in such
offending may reflect changes in policing practices. Again, it is for this reason that talking to
police themselves and drawing on other data sources and information, is important in
interpreting the patterns seen in the recorded crime data after the implementation of the trial.
A key strength of QPS crime report data for the DSP evaluation is that it provides precise ‘X’ and ‘Y’
location coordinates identifying where the offence occurred.89 This allows for all offences recorded
in the DSP and EP areas to be identified with certainty.
Police officers also report their subjective impressions of whether an offender has been affected by
alcohol or drugs. Nonetheless, as with ambulance and hospital data, the key analysis was restricted
to weekend drinking nights to assist to isolate any impact of the trial on alcohol-related violence and
other harm. It is at these times that alcohol-related violence and disorder is most likely and at these
times that the key strategies such as increased police presence and support services were
consistently in place across the three DSP trial sites.
Context: Offences in the DSPs and EPs
Within the total sample of police crime report data for the DSP and EP areas there were 157 462
offences recorded across the baseline and 18-month trial periods. Of this total sample of police
crime reports, 72 580 offences occurred during weekend drinking nights (forming the primary
dataset for analysis); representing 46.5% (n = 44 937) of all police crime reports during the baseline
period and 45.5% (n = 27 643) during the trial period.
DSP and EP share of offences
In order to better understand the QPS workload arising from the night time economy in
Queensland’s entertainment ‘hotspots’ Figure 51 shows the percentage of the total offences for
89
QPS crime report data includes longitude and latitude coordinates that are based on the street address
entered and then derived from a property centroid (centre of a property lot) where possible, or the nearest
road intersection or middle of street block.
186 | P a g e
each EP or DSP area during weekend drink nights (Friday and Saturday, 6pm to 6am). This figure
presents combined data from the baseline and 24-month trial period.90
Figure 51. Police crime reports – DSP and EP percentages of all offences during weekend drinking
nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), total baseline to trial (December 2007 to May 2012)
Toowoomba
6%
Rockhampton
7%
Fortitude Valley
DSP
23%
(n = 4652)
( n = 4995)
(n = 17 034)
Mackay
6%
(n = 4337)
Ipswich
3%
(n = 1830)
Cairns
6%
( n = 4427)
Bundaberg
3%
(n = 2287)
Broadbeach
5%
Surfers Paradise
DSP
18%
(n = 3546)
(n = 13233)
Brisbane and
Caxton St
14%
Townsville DSP
9%
(n = 9792)
(n = 6317)
As shown in Figure 51, the three DSP sites are among the busiest in terms of QPS workload during
weekend drinking nights. The highest percentage of offences was encountered by Fortitude Valley
90
The analysis of the workload combines baseline and trial data as they are intended to provide some
description of information regarding characteristics of our sample and are not part of the key comparative preand post-analysis. Analysis presented in the ‘context’ subsection has not been relied upon in drawing
conclusions or making recommendations.
187 | P a g e
DSP (24%), Surfers Paradise DSP (18%), and Brisbane and Caxton St EP (14%). The Townsville DSP
accounted for 9% of total offences during weekend drinking nights.
Who are the offenders in DSP and EP areas?
Offender demographics – gender, age and Indigenous Status
For the trial period only, the evaluation considered the demographic profiles of offenders for those
offences committed in the DSPs and during weekend drinking nights. These findings are presented in
Table 20.
Table 20. Police Crime Reports – Offender demographics for offences committed during weekend
drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs, trial period
Offender
demographics
Gender
Male
Female
Age
12-17 yrs
18-25 yrs
26-30 yrs
31-40 yrs
41+ yrs
Indigenous status
Indigenous
Non-Indigenous
Not stated
Fortitude Valley
DSP
Surfers Paradise
DSP
Townsville DSP
Combined EPs
88.4%
89.6%
85.8%
85.2%
(n = 3965)
(n = 3169)
(n = 1865)
(n = 9723)
11.6%
10.3%
14.2%
14.7%
(n = 519)
(n = 363)
(n = 308)
(n = 1681)
2.6%
6.8%
2.3%
6.1%
(n = 115)
(n = 239)
(n = 51)
(n = 694)
62.2%
63.5%
54.7%
55.2%
(n = 2787)
(n = 2246)
(n = 1190)
(n = 6302)
18.3%
16.5%
19.8%
17.3%
(n = 821)
(n = 584)
(n = 431)
(n = 1974)
12.6%
10.1%
16.1%
14.7%
(n = 563)
(n = 358)
(n = 351)
(n = 1674)
4.4%
3.1%
6.9%
6.8%
(n = 198)
(n = 110)
(n = 151)
(n = 771)
8.5%
2.3%
21.3%
17.2%
(n = 381)
(n = 82)
(n = 464)
(n = 1959)
89.4%
94.8%
76.4%
81.3%
(n = 4010)
(n = 3354)
(n = 1661)
(n = 9283)
2.1%
2.9%
2.3%
1.5%
(n = 93)
(n = 101)
(n = 49)
(n = 173)
As can be seen in Table 20, for offences occurring during weekend drinking nights and the 24 month
trial period:

offenders in each DSP were predominantly male.

across all DSPs, the largest percentage (over half) of offenders were aged 18-25 years.
188 | P a g e

in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise, a small percentage of offenders were Indigenous (8.6%
and 2.3%, respectively). Townsville had a larger percentage of Indigenous offenders (22.3%).
These variations may be reflective of the different Indigenous populations in each area.91
No substantial differences in offender demographics were observed compared to the baseline
period (See Table 27, Appendix F for baseline data).
Offender substance use
Figure 52 shows for the baseline and period the percentages of offenders judged by police officers to
have used alcohol prior to committing offences in the DSPs and combined EPs during weekend
drinking nights.
Further detail on offender substance use is provided in Table 21 shows for the baseline and trial
periods the substance use of offenders for those offences committed in the DSPs and combined EPs
during weekend drinking nights as reported by police officers.
Figure 52. Offender alcohol use – weekend drinking nights (6am to 6pm, Friday and Saturday) –
DSPs, baseline vs. trial period
68.9%
80.1%
84.3%
80.3%
89.0%
Townsville DSP
91.6%
82.8%
Combined EPs
84.7%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Baseline
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Trial
91
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people represent about 1.4% and 1.3% of residents within the Brisbane
and Gold Coast local government areas respectively, compared to 6.1% in Townsville.
189 | P a g e
Table 21. Offender substance use – weekend drinking nights (6am to 6pm, Friday and Saturday) –
DSPs, baseline vs. trial period
Offender
substance use
Fortitude
Valley DSP
Surfers
Paradise DSP
Townsville DSP
Combined EPs
Baseline
Dec 07- Nov 10
Trial
Dec 10- Nov 12
Alcohol
Other Drug
No substance
use
Alcohol
Other Drug
No substance
use
68.9%
2.4%
15.2%
80.1%
2.6%
8.7%
(n = 6007)
(n = 210)
(n = 1324)
(n = 3591)
(n = 115)
(n = 391)
84.3%
1.8%
6.0%
80.3%
2.6%
7.3%
(n = 6136)
(n = 132)
(n = 434)
(n = 2841)
(n = 92)
(n = 257)
89.0%
1.1%
4.2%
91.6%
1.1%
2.4%
(n = 2908)
(n = 35)
(n = 138)
(n = 1991)
(n = 24)
(n = 52)
82.8%
1.2%
7.9%
84.7%
1.3%
6.3%
(n = 14 732)
(n = 207)
(n = 1400)
(n = 9668)
(n = 145)
(n = 722)
As highlighted in Figure 52 and shown in Table 21 the majority of offenders were reported as having
had alcohol prior to committing an offence:

in the Fortitude Valley DSP, 68.9% of offenders were reported to be affected by alcohol during
the baseline period, increasing to 80.1% of offenders during the trial period.

in the Surfers Paradise DSP, 84.3% of offenders were reported to be affected by alcohol during
the baseline period, decreasing to 80.3% of offenders during the trial period.

in the Townsville DSP, 89.0% of offenders were reported to be affected by alcohol during the
baseline period, increasing to 91.6% of offenders during the trial period.

in the combined comparison EPs, 82.8% of offenders were reported to be affected by alcohol
during the baseline period, increasing to 84.7% of offenders during the trial period.
The baseline to trial period changes in alcohol use were all statistically significant.
In each of the DSPs and the combined EPs only a small percentage of offenders were reported as
having had taken illicit drugs during either the baseline or trial period. Although, in the Surfers
Paradise DSP the increase from 1.8% of offenders reported as using illicit drugs during the baseline
period to 2.6% during the trial period was statistically significant.
A relatively small number of offenders were reported as not being affected by alcohol or drugs.
Notably, in the Fortitude Valley DSP there was a statistically significant decrease from 15.2% of
offenders reported as having no alcohol or drug use during the baseline period to 8.7% during the
trial period.
The place of an offender’s ‘last drink’, and who purchased the drink, is also captured by police.
However, substantial data quality issues were found, rendering this data not useful for analysis. For
190 | P a g e
example, during the trial period there were large proportions of ‘not known’ or ‘not stated’
responses for the ‘last drink place’ field.92 Similar results were also found for the ‘last drink
purchased by who’ field.93
What action do police take against offenders in the DSPs and EPs?
From police crime reports data on offenders we also analysed what action police took against those
offenders who committed offences during the weekend drinking nights in the DSPs and Combined
EPs. This data was analysed for the baseline and trial periods. However, comparisons between the
two periods to assess changes associated with the DSP trial are not meaningful as on 8 November
2010 police powers to issue ‘on-the-spot fines’ (infringement notices) for public nuisance/good
order offences were expanded statewide. This has caused a substantial change in policing practice
for taking action against offenders during the DSP trial period.
Figure 53 shows the police actions taken against offenders for offences committed during weekend
drinking nights for the two-year trial period, for the DSPs and combined EPs. Further data, including
for the baseline period is available in Table 28 of Appendix F.
92
Fortitude Valley DSP: Not known – 45.1% (n = 2024), not stated – 18.8% (n = 842); Surfers Paradise DSP: Not
known – 43.4% (n = 1563), not stated – 18.2% (n = 643); Townsville DSP: Not known – 49.4% (n = 1074), not
stated – 7.5% (n = 164); Combined EPs: Not known – 38.0% (n = 4334), not stated – 14.5% (n = 1660).
93
Fortitude Valley DSP: Not known – 46.1% (n = 2069), not stated – 19.2% (n = 860); Surfers Paradise DSP: Not
known – 35.0% (n = 1239), not stated – 18.3% (n = 647); Townsville DSP: Not known – 52.9% (n = 1149), not
stated – 7.9% (n = 171); Combined EPs: Not known – 43.3% (n = 4945), not stated (14.8%, 1692).
191 | P a g e
Figure 53. Police crime reports – actions taken against offenders – weekend drinking nights (6am
to 6pm, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, trial period
63.4%
Townsville DSP
54.7%
36.2%
Combined EPs
0.0%
10.8%
14.2%
13.8%
30.9%
48.3%
49.3%
22.1%
26.4%
10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0% 100.0%
Arrest
Note:
20.5%
Notice to Appear
Infringement Notice
See Table 28 in Appendix F for further data.
Other actions: Fortitude Valley DSP – 1.8%; Surfers Paradise DSP – 2.3%; Townsville DSP – 1.6%; Combined EPs – 2.7%.

police action against offenders in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs on weekend
drinking nights primarily consisted of arrests (63.4% and 54.7%, respectively).

in the Townsville DSP, police more commonly took action through issuing an infringement notice
(48.3%) than arrest (36.2%).

arrests accounted for nearly half (49.3%) of police actions taken in the combined DSPs.
What time of day or night do offences occur?
To consider the distribution of QPS workload arising for the DSP and EP sites at night, total offences
were considered by time of day/night. Figure 54 shows the total offences over a 24-hour period in
each of the DSPs and the combined EPs, comparing the baseline period to the trial period.
192 | P a g e
Figure 54. Police crime reports – percentage of total offences by time of day – DSPs and combined
EPs, baseline vs. trial
22
23
0
1
2
21
22
3
20
0
1
2
21
4
3
20
4
19
5
19
5
18
6
18
6
17
7
17
7
16
8
15
16
13
12
11
8
15
9
14
9
14
10
13
11
12
10
Fortitude Valley DSP - Baseline
Surfers Paradise DSP - Baseline
Fortitude Valley DSP - Trial
Surfers Paradise DSP - Trial
22
23
0
1
2
21
22
3
20
23
0
1
2
21
4
3
20
4
19
5
19
5
18
6
18
6
17
7
17
7
16
8
15
9
14
Note:
23
13
12
11
10
16
8
15
9
14
13
12
11
10
Townsville DSP - Baseline
Townsville DSP - Trial
Combined EPs - Trial
See Table 29 in Appendix F for details of date and analysis.
As can be seen in Figure 54, the majority of offences in Fortitude Valley occur between midnight and
4am. Similarly, Surfers Paradise calls for service were more likely to be made in the evening and
early morning. The pattern for the Townsville DSP and combined EPs is more generalised with
recorded offences being driven to a slightly larger degree by the day time economies in these areas,
however, there is still a clear peak at midnight tapering off to 4am.
193 | P a g e
Results: Change in offences after the introduction of the
trial
In order to determine if there was any detectable impact of the DSP trial on offences, analysis was
conducted of offences occurring on weekend drinking nights in the DSPs and EPs, before and during
the trial. The evaluation considered the number of offences both in terms of percentages and as a
rate per weekend drinking night to provide a clearer picture of how the DSP trial has affected
offending.94 As the rates are low in some precincts (< 1.0), the difference between baseline and trial
period can be large when represented as a percentage, while the relative change in actual offences
can be quite low. Rate of change data should also be interpreted with caution as it does not take
into account seasonality. These data can be useful when interpreted in light of other evaluation
data.95
Analysis of the percentage and rates of reported offences per weekend drinking night is presented
by:




all types of offences
assault offences
good order offences
offences against police.
The two-year trial period has also produced sufficient data to allow for time series analysis of the key
police crime reports data covering the assault offences, good order offences and offences against
police during weekend nights.
Two other areas of analysis have also been explored that attempt to investigate more subtle
changes in the nature or severity of offences recorded in the DSPs and combined EPs:


co-occurrence of public nuisance offences and offences against police
severity of violence.
94
When looking at percentages of offences then the population that these percentages are based upon do not
matter. For example, if 20% of patrons in the Fortitude Valley got into fights in 2000 and still 20% of patrons
were fighting in 2012, then we could say not much had changed, even though the numbers of people fighting
would have increased because the overall numbers of patrons in the Fortitude Valley has increased
significantly over the past 12 years. However, when we look at a rate per night, then the number of patrons
becomes important, but we do not have any reliable measures of patron numbers over the years. Thus, while
we acknowledge that the number of patrons has probably increased since 1 December 2007, we have chosen
this smaller baseline window in order to try to minimise the effect of changes in patron numbers.
95
194 | P a g e
All types of offences
Percentage of all types of offences during weekend drinking nights
Figure 55 presents the percentage of all types of offences in the DSPs and combined EPs during
weekend drinking nights for the baseline (from December 2007 to November 2010) and 24-month
trial period. Figure 56 presents the same data for each individual EP site.
Figure 55. Police crime reports – all types of offences during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total offences (all days and hours) – DSPs and combined
EPs, baseline vs. trial
% of all types of offences during weekend
drinking nights
70%
63.7% 64.6%
60%
49.8%
50%
44.2%
46.6%
42.4%
40.6% 40.4%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Note:
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
See Tables 30 and 31 in Appendix F for details of data and analysis.
195 | P a g e
Figure 56. Police crime reports – all types of offences during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total offences (all days and hours) – individual EPs,
baseline vs. trial
34.6%
30.6%
Brisbane CBD and Caxton St
43.7%
Broadbeach CBD
59.7%
45.7%
41.2%
Bundaberg CMD
35.3%
35.0%
Cairns CBD
40.0%
37.5%
Ipswich CBD
45.3%
46.5%
Mackay CBD
38.5%
37.8%
Rockhampton CBD
68.0%
68.3%
Toowoomba CBD
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
% of all types of offences during weekend drinking nights
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
Note:
As can be seen in Figure 55:

in Fortitude Valley, 63.7% (n = 10 728) of offences occurred during weekend drinking nights in
the baseline period and 64.6% (n = 6306) during weekend drinking nights in the 24-month trial
period. Though an increasing trend is noted, this was not found to be statistically significant.

in Surfers Paradise, 49.8% (n = 8737) of offences occurred during weekend drinking nights in the
baseline period compared with 44.2% (n = 4496) during weekend drinking nights in the 24month trial period. This 5.6 percentage point decrease was statistically significant.
196 | P a g e

in Townsville, 42.4% (n = 3773) of offences occurred during weekend drinking nights in the
baseline period compared to 46.6% (n = 2544) during weekend drinking nights in the 24-month
trial period. This 4.2 percentage point increase in recorded offences was statistically significant.

in the combined EPs, 40.6% (n = 21 699) of offences occurred during weekend drinking nights in
the baseline period and 40.4% (n = 14 297) during weekend drinking nights in the DSP trial
period. The slight decrease was not found to be statistically significant.
There were also statistically significant changes in the percentage of offences occurring during
weekend drinking nights out of total offences (all days and hours) between the baseline and trial
period for four of the eight comparison EPs (see Figure 56), specifically:

a 4.0 percentage point decrease in Brisbane CBD and Caxton St

a 16.0 percentage point increase in Broadbeach CBD

a 4.5 percentage point decrease in Bundaberg CBD

a 2.5 percentage point decreased in Ipswich CBD. This is a change from the finding based on 18months of trial data where the smaller 1.4 percentage point decrease observed was not
significant.
In the 18-month analysis, a 2.6 percentage point increase in Mackay CBD was found to be
statistically significant. However, in the 24-month trial period data analysis this has reduced to a 1.2
percentage point increase which was not found to be statistically significant.
No discernible statewide trend was evident.
Rate of all types of offences per weekend drinking night
Analysis of all types of offences in terms of rates per weekend drinking night is presented in Table
22, Figure 57, and Figure 58.
197 | P a g e
Table 22. Police crime reports – rate of all types of offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs & EPs, baseline vs. trial
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Brisbane CBD and Caxton
Street
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
Note:
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
% change
Dec 07- Nov 10
(313 weekend drinking nights)
Dec 10 – Nov 12
trial
34.3
30.3
-11.5%
(n = 10 728)
(n = 6306)
27.9
21.6
(n = 8737)
(n = 4496)
12.1
12.2
(n = 3773)
(n = 2544)
19.8
17.3
(n = 6190)
(n = 3602)
5.5
8.8
(n = 1714)
(n = 1832)
4.9
3.6
(n = 1538)
(n = 749)
8.7
8.2
(n = 2727)
(n = 1700)
4.1
3.2
(n = 1287)
(n = 673)
8.2
8.5
(n = 2560)
(n = 1777)
9.4
9.9
(n = 2933)
(n = 2062)
8.8
9.1
(n = 2750)
(n = 1902)
69.3
68.7
(n = 21 699)
(n = 14 297)
-22.6%
1.5
-12.4%
60.8%
-26.7%
-6.2%
-21.3%
4.5%
5.8%
4.1%
-0.9%
Minor variations in the baseline data presented compared to the 14-month Interim Evaluation Report
are due to data settling or minor analytical changes.
198 | P a g e
Figure 57. Police crime reports – rates of all types of offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Rate of all types of offences per weekend drinking
night
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Trial - 24 months
Townsville DSP
Combined EPs
Rate of all types of offences per weekend drinking night
Figure 58. Police crime reports – rates of all types offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) – individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
25
20
15
10
5
0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Trial - 24 months
Brisbane City & Caxton St
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
199 | P a g e
Findings from the analysis presented in Table 22, Figure 57, and Figure 58 revealed:





there was a reduction in the rate of all types of offences per weekend drinking night in the
Surfers Paradise (by 22.6%) and Fortitude Valley (by 11.5%) DSPs during weekend drinking nights
following the introduction of the DSP trial
Townsville, on the other hand, showed a slight increase (1.5%) in the rate of all types of offences
per weekend drinking night
these reductions in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs were in contrast to a
relatively stable average statewide trend (0.9% decrease in the rate of all types of offences per
weekend drinking night)
findings for comparison EP sites were mixed with four sites experiencing reductions and four
experiencing increases
the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St CBD showed a 12.4% decrease in the rate of all types of offences
per weekend drinking night, while the Broadbeach CBD showed a 60.8% increase.
Assault
Percentage of assault offences during weekend drinking nights
Analysis of the sub-category of assault offences96 comparing baseline to trial is shown in Figure 59
and Figure 60.
% of assault offences during weekend drinking
nights
Figure 59. Police crime reports – assault offences during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total assault offences (all days and hours)– DSPs, baseline
vs. trial
30%
25%
28.4%
24.7%
20%
16.0%
13.5%
15%
10%
8.2%
5%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Note:
6.8%
Townsville
Trial - 24 months
96
Based on the QPS offence subdivision of ‘assault’, which includes the offences of grievous assault, serious
assault, serious assault (other) and common assault.
200 | P a g e
Figure 60. Police crime reports – assault offences during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total assault offences (all days and hours) – individual EPs,
baseline vs. trial
17.0%
16.2%
Brisbane & Caxton St
4.3%
4.9%
Broadbeach CBD
2.6%
2.8%
Bundaberg CBD
6.9%
7.4%
Cairns CBD
3.1%
2.9%
Ipswich CBD
5.3%
6.1%
Mackay CBD
7.5%
7.3%
Rockhampton CBD
4.3%
3.6%
Toowoomba CBD
0%
5%
10%
15%
% of assault offences during weekend drinking nights
Baseline
Note:
20%
Trail - 24 months
As demonstrated in Figure 59 and Figure 60, analysis of the percentage of assault offences occurring
during weekend drinking nights from baseline to trial revealed:



in the Fortitude Valley DSP, a 3.7 percentage point increase. Further analysis showed that
this increase was statistically significant
in the Surfers Paradise and Townsville DSPs, decreases by 2.5 and 1.4 percentage points
respectively, with further analysis showing that only the Townsville DSP decrease was
statistically significant
overall, there was no discernible statewide change amongst combined EPs, and none of the
EP changes were statistically significant.
201 | P a g e
Rate of assault offences per weekend drinking night
Analysis of assault offences in terms of rate per weekend drinking night is presented in Table 23,
Figure 61, and Figure 62.
Table 23. Police crime reports – rates of assault offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday) – DSPs & EPs, baseline vs. trial
Assault offences
Baseline
Dec 07- Nov 10
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
St
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
Note:
Trial - 24 months
% change
Dec 10 – Nov 12
Baseline to 24-month trial
2.8
2.9
4.0%
(n = 865)
(n = 598)
1.8
1.4
(n = 560)
(n = 284)
0.9
0.7
(n = 288)
(n = 143)
1.9
1.6
(n = 595)
(n = 341)
0.5
0.5
(n = 152)
(n = 103)
0.3
0.3
(n = 90)
(n = 59)
0.8
0.7
(n = 243)
(n = 155)
0.4
0.3
(n = 110)
(n = 61)
0.6
0.6
(n = 185)
(n = 129)
0.8
0.7
(n = 261)
(n = 154)
0.5
0.4
(n = 152)
(n = 75)
5.7
5.2
(n = 1788)
(n = 1077)
-23.7%
-25.3%
-13.8%
2.0%
-1.4%
-4.0%
-16.6%
4.9%
-11.2%
-25.7%
-9.4%
202 | P a g e
Figure 61. Police crime reports – rates of assault offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
Rate of assualt offences per weekend drinking night
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Trial - 24 months
Townsville DSP
Combined EPs
Rate of assualt offences per weekend drinking night
Figure 62. Police crime reports – rates of assault offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Trial - 24 months
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
203 | P a g e
Findings from the analysis presented in Table 23, Figure 61, and Figure 62 revealed:





there was a reduction in the rate of assault offences per weekend drinking night in the Surfers
Paradise (by 23.7%) and Townsville (by 25.3%) DSPs following the introduction of the DSP trial
Fortitude Valley, on the other hand, showed a 4.0% increase in the rate of assault offences per
drinking night
these changes can be contrasted to a more widespread average statewide trend across other EP
areas of a 9.4% decrease in the rate of assault offences
six of the eight comparison EP sites recorded reductions in the number of assault offences
following the start of the DSP trial
the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St CBD showed a 13.8% decrease in the rate of assault offences per
weekend drinking night, while the Broadbeach CBD showed a 2.0% increase.
Time series analysis of assault offences during weekend drinking nights
The impact of the DSP trial on assault offences has also been analysed through time series analysis
of the percentage of assault offences occurring during weekend drinking nights out of all assaults.
Figure 63 presents this analysis for the DSPs and combined EPs.
204 | P a g e
Figure 63. Police crime reports –assaults offences occurring during weekend during nights as a
percentage of all assault offences, time series analysis – DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP),
baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
Analysis of the trends presented in Figure 63 showed that none of the pre-trial to trial changes in the
DSPs trends were statistically significant. Visual inspection of the trends (noting the tight scale
applied) suggests:

a stabilising trend for the Surfers Paradise DSP following a peak during the pre-trial years

a declining trend compared to the pre-trial years for the Townsville DSP during the first year of
the year then stabilising during the second year of the trial

increasing trend throughout the pre-trial years for the Fortitude Valley DSP, stabilising in the first
year of the trial and then declining.
205 | P a g e
Good order
Percentage of good order offences during weekend drinking nights
Analysis of the sub-category good order97 offences comparing baseline to trial is shown in Figure 64
and Figure 65.
Figure 64. Police crime reports – good order offences during weekend drinking nights (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total good order offences (all days and hours) –
DSPs, baseline vs. trial
% of good order offences during weekend
drinking nights
0
21.9%
0
21.8%
18.6%
17.6%
0
11.6%
9.2%
0
0
0
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Note:
Townsville
Trial - 24 months
97
Based on the QPS ‘good order’ subdivision, which includes public nuisance offences (and historical
antecedents of disorderly etc); Public Urination; disobey a move on direction; resist, hinder, incite or obstruct
police.
206 | P a g e
Figure 65. Police crime reports – good order offences during weekend drinking nights (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total good order offences (all days and hours) –
individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
10.9%
8.7%
2.4%
Broadbeach CBD
6.4%
3.9%
Bundaberg CBD
2.8%
6.6%
6.1%
Cairns CBD
3.2%
3.0%
Ipswich CBD
5.7%
Mackay CBD
7.5%
6.7%
Rockhampton CBD
7.7%
7.7%
Toowoomba CBD
10.0%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
% of good order offences during weekend drinking nights
Baseline
Note:
Trial - 24 months
Figure 64 and Figure 65 shows:



Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs experienced statistically significant decreases (3.3
and 5.2 percentage points, respectively) in good order offences from baseline to trial
Townsville DSP, on the other hand, showed a statistically significant increase (2.4 percentage
points)
comparison EP sites showed mixed results, although did tend towards an increase. There were
four sites with statistically significant increases (Broadbeach CBD, Mackay CBD, Rockhampton
CBD and Toowoomba CBD) compared with two sites with statistically significant decreases
(Brisbane CBD & Caxton Street and Bundaberg CBD).
207 | P a g e
Rate of good order offences per weekend drinking night
Table 24, Figure 66 and Figure 67 present the analysis of good order offences in terms of rate per
weekend drinking night.
Table 24. Police crime reports – rates of good order offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs & EPs, baseline vs. trial
Good order offences
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
St
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
Note:
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
% change
Dec 07- Nov 10
nights)
Dec 10 – Nov 12
nights)
trial
16.5
13.1
-20.5%
(n = 5150)
(n = 2722)
16.3
12.4
(n = 5115)
(n = 2574)
6.9
8.2
(n = 2166)
(n = 1704)
8.2
6.1
(n = 2556)
(n = 1275)
1.8
4.5
(n = 573)
(n = 938)
2.9
1.9
(n = 905)
(n = 403)
5.0
4.3
(n = 1554)
(n = 898)
2.4
2.1
(n = 761)
(n = 441)
4.3
5.3
(n = 1339)
(n = 1100)
5.0
5.4
(n = 1563)
(n = 1122)
5.8
7.0
(n = 1821)
(n = 1456)
34.5
36.7
(n = 11 072)
(n = 7633)
-24.3%
18.4%
-24.9%
146.3%
-33.0%
-13.0%
-12.8%
23.6%
8.0%
20.3%
3.7%
208 | P a g e
Rate of good oder offences per weekend drinking night
Figure 66. Police crime reports – rates of good order offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Townsville DSP
Trial - 24 months
Combined EPs
Rate of good oder offences per weekend drinking night
Figure 67. Police crime reports – rates of good order offences per weekend drinking night (6pm to
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Trial - 24 months
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
209 | P a g e
Findings from Table 24, Figure 66 and Figure 67 revealed:





there was a reduction in the rate of good order offences per weekend drinking night in the
Fortitude Valley (by 20.5%) and Surfers Paradise (by 24.3%) DSPs following the introduction of
the DSP trial
Townsville, on the other hand, showed a 18.4% increase in the rate of good order offences per
these changes can be contrasted to a more widespread average statewide trend across other
EPs of a 3.7% increase in the rate of good order offences
findings are mixed for comparison EPs , with four of the eight sites recording reductions in the
rate of good order offences
the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St CBD showed a 24.9% decrease in the rate of good order
offences per weekend drinking night, while the Broadbeach CBD showed a 146.3% increase. 98
Time series analysis of good order offences during weekend drinking nights
Time series analysis of the percentage of good order offences occurring during weekend drinking
nights out of all good order offences was also conducted to assess the impact of the DSP trial. Figure
68 presents this analysis for the DSPs and combined EPs, baseline to trial.
98
Results for the Broadbeach CBD EP, including in terms of the potential for displacement or diffusion of
benefits from the Surfers Paradise DSP, are discussed in Chapter 7.
210 | P a g e
Figure 68. Police crime reports – good order offences during weekend drinking nights as a
percentage of all good order offences, time series analysis – DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP),
baseline (Pre Trial) vs. trial
Note:
Technical analysis of the trends for good order offences shown in Figure 68 revealed:

that the baseline to trial change in the trend for the Fortitude Valley DSP was nearing statistical
significance (p = 0.051). Visual inspection of the trend suggests that the percentage of good
order offences occurring during weekend drinking nights was declining slightly during the
baseline years and has continued to decline (possibly at a greater rate) during the two-year trial
period.

a statistically significant change in the trend for the Surfers Paradise DSP baseline to trial with a
clear decline in the percentage of good order offences occurring during weekend drinking nights
from the baseline to trial period.
211 | P a g e

no statistically significant change in the trend for the Townsville DSP. It appears from the figure
that the percentage of good order offences during weekend drinking nights has increased
throughout the baseline years and first-year of the trial, and then tapers off in the second year.
Offences against the police
Percentage of offences against police during weekend drinking nights
Analysis of offences against police99 comparing baseline to trial for DSPs and EPs is shown in Figure
69 and Figure 70, respectively.
% of offences against police during weekend
drinking nights
Figure 69. Police crime reports – offences against police during weekend drinking nights (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total offences against police (all days and hours) –
DSPs, baseline vs. trial
30%
24.7%
25%
20%
19.8%
18.7%
18.1%
15%
11.5%
8.5%
10%
5%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Note:
Townsville
Trial - 24 months
99
Based on the QPS ‘offences against police’ categorisation that includes offences relating to resist, incite,
hinder or obstruct police; and assault – police.
212 | P a g e
Figure 70. Police crime reports – offences against police during weekend drinking nights (6pm to
6am, Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of total offences against police (all days and hours) –
individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
11.0%
7.5%
3.0%
Broadbeach CBD
5.9%
4.8%
Bundaberg CBD
4.2%
5.7%
Cairns CBD
5.0%
2.7%
Ipswich CBD
3.2%
9.3%
Mackay CBD
11.5%
6.4%
Rockhampton CBD
10.6%
4.3%
Toowoomba CBD
3.8%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
% of offences against police during weekend drinking nights
Note:
As shown in Figure 69 and Figure 70:

Surfers Paradise DSP experienced a 6.0 percentage point, statistically significant decrease in
offences against police during weekend drinking nights from baseline to trial

Townsville DSP had a statistically significant increase (3.0 percentage points)

Fortitude Valley DSP had a 1.7 percentage point decrease from baseline to trial, which was not
found to be statistically significant

for comparison EPs, Brisbane CBD and Caxton St recorded a statistically significant decrease (3.5
percentage points) while the Broadbeach CBD (2.9 percentage points), Mackay CBD (2.2
percentage points) and Rockhampton CBD (4.2 percentage points) EPs had statistically
significant increases.
213 | P a g e
Rate of offences against police per weekend drinking night
Table 25, Figure 71 and Figure 72 present the analysis of the sub-category offences against police in
terms of rate per weekend drinking night.
Table 25. Police crime reports – rates of offences against police per weekend drinking night (6pm
to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and EPs, baseline vs. trial
Offences against police
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Brisbane CBD and
Caxton St
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
Note:
Baseline
Trial - 24 months
% change
Dec 07- Nov 10
Dec 10 – Nov 12
(208 weekend drinking nights
trial
3.1
2.2
-29.5%
(n = 980)
(n = 459)
3.9
2.3
(n = 1225)
(n = 473)
1.4
1.4
(n = 424)
(n = 292)
1.7
0.9
(n = 545)
(n = 191)
0.5
0.7
(n = 148)
(n = 149)
0.8
0.5
(n = 236)
(n = 107)
0.9
0.6
(n = 281)
(n = 126)
0.4
0.4
(n = 133)
(n = 81)
1.5
1.4
(n = 461)
(n = 292)
1.0
1.3
(n = 316)
(n = 270)
0.7
0.5
(n = 211)
(n = 96)
7.4
6.3
(n = 2331)
(n = 1312)
-41.9%
3.6%
-47.3%
51.1%
-31.8%
-32.5%
-8.4%
-4.7%
28.6%
-31.5%
-15.3%
214 | P a g e
Figure 71. Police crime reports – rates of offences against the police per weekend drinking night
(6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Rate of oder offences against police per weekend
drinking night
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Trial - 24 months
Townsville DSP
Combined EPs
Rate of offences against police per weekend drinking
night
Figure 72. Police crime reports – rates of offences against the police per weekend drinking night
(6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
3
2
2
1
1
0
Dec 2007- Nov 2008
Dec 2008- Nov 2009
Dec 2009- Nov 2010
Trial - 24 months
Broadbeach CBD
Bundaberg CBD
Cairns CBD
Ipswich CBD
Mackay CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
215 | P a g e
The findings shown in Figure 71 and Figure 72 revealed:




in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs, the rate of offences against police per
weekend drinking night decreased (by 29.5% and 41.9%, respectively) between the baseline and
trial period
the Townsville DSP, the rate of offences against the police increased (by 3.6%) following the
introduction of the DSP trial compared to the baseline period
the EP comparison sites showed mixed results, although they tended towards reductions with
five of the eight sites recording reductions in the rate of offences against police. Overall, the EP
comparison sites decreased by 15.3% from the baseline to trial period
the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St CBD showed a 47.3% decrease in the rate of offences against
police per weekend drinking night, while the Broadbeach CBD showed a 51.1% increase.
Time series analysis of offences against police during weekend drinking nights
Time series analysis of the percentage of offences against police occurring during weekend drinking
nights out of all offences against police was also conducted to assess the impact of the DSP trial.
Figure 73 presents this analysis for the DSPs and combined EPs, baseline to trial.
216 | P a g e
Figure 73. Police crime reports – offences against police during weekend drinking nights as a
percentage of all offences against police, time series analysis – DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP),
baseline (Pre Trial) vs. trial
Note:
Technical analysis of the offences against police during weekend drinking nights trends shown in
Figure 73 revealed that only the Surfers Paradise DSP baseline to trial change was statistically
significant. Visual inspection of the Surfers Paradise DSP suggests change from a steady decline or
stable trend over the baseline years to a sustained, considerable decline over the two-year trial
period. In addition to the Surfers Paradise DSP, the trends for Townsville DSP and combined EPs also
declined sharply in the second year of the trial; this followed an increase in the first year of the trial
for the Townsville DSP.
217 | P a g e
Co-occurrence with public nuisance
The policing of public order offences, such as public nuisance, is a contentious matter. A previous
review of Queensland’s public nuisance laws found that, in some circumstances, the policing of
public nuisance can lead to escalating conflict between the offender and police, resulting in charges
for both the public nuisance offence and offences against police (Crime and Misconduct Commission
2008).
The DSP trial clearly involves a significant amount of public nuisance policing (see rates of good
order offences above), resulting in a high potential for increasing conflict between the offenders and
police officers. The extent to which this has actually happened can be examined through analysis of
the police data to identify cases where a public nuisance offence was accompanied with an offence
against police (co-occurrence), and is important to assess in developing a fuller understanding of the
impacts of the trial on reducing confrontation within the precincts.
Figure 74 presents the percentage of public nuisance incidents involving co-occurrence with an
offence against police for the three DSPs during weekend drinking nights, baseline versus trial.
Figure 74. Police crime reports – percentage of public nuisance incidents with co-occurrence with
offences against police during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), DSPs,
baseline vs. trial
% of public nuisnaceincidents with cooccurence with offences against police
8%
7.1%
7%
6.4%
5.8%
6%
5%
4.5%
4.3%
4.1%
3.9%
4%
3%
2.8%
2%
1%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Note:
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
See Table 42 in Appendix F for details of data and analysis.
Comparing the baseline to the trial period, Figure 74 shows that:

in the Fortitude Valley DSP, the percentage of public nuisance incidents co-occurring with an
offence against police has decreased 1.3 percentage points, with a 2.1 percentage point
decrease in the Surfers Paradise DSP. Further analysis showed these changes were statistically
significant.

however, in the Townsville DSP, co-occurrence of offences against police with a public nuisance
incident increased by 1.3 percentage points. Further analysis showed this change was
218 | P a g e
statistically significant. The Townsville DSP recorded the highest percentage of co-occurrence
during the trial period, and was the only DSP to experience an increase.

across the combined EPs, there was a statistically significant, slight reduction (0.6 percentage
points) in the percentage of public nuisance incidents co-occurring with an offence against
police.
Severity of violence
A change in the severity of violence within the DSPs is difficult to analyse as it is not directly
recorded through any measure. However, for incidents involving an assault, the specific type of
assault the incident is classified as can be an indicator of the severity of violence. Relying on this, the
DSP evaluation has analysed the occurrence of QPS ‘common minor’100 and ‘grievous serious’101
assault offences as a percentage of all types of offences during weekend drinking nights in each DSP
and EP sites, pre- and post-trial (see Figure 75 and Figure 76, respectively).
% of grievous serious assaults during weekend
drinking nights
Figure 75. Police crime reports – ‘grievous serious’ assaults as a percentage of all types of offences
during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), DSPs and combined EPs,
baseline vs. trial
7.0%
6.1%
6.0%
5.1%
5.0%
4.7%
4.6%
4.1%
4.0%
3.9%
3.3%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Note:
4.7%
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
100
Grouping created for statistical analysis includes offences for assault-police, assault-minor, assault-common
and assault-aggravated (non-sexual).
101
Grouping created for statistical analysis includes offences for grievous bodily harm, wounding, assaultoccasioning bodily harm and assault-serious (other).
219 | P a g e
% of common minor assaults during weekend
drinking nights
Figure 76. Police crime reports – ‘common minor’ assaults as a percentage of all types of offences
during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), DSPs and combined EPs,
baseline vs. trial
4%
4%
3.5% 3.4%
3%
2.3% 2.4%
3%
2.8%
2.3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
0%
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Baseline
Note:
3.1%
2.9%
Townsville
Combined EPs
Trial - 24 months
As shown in Figure 75 and Figure 76:

the Fortitude Valley DSP had a 1.5 percentage point increase in ‘grievous serious’ assaults after
the introduction of the DSP trial. Further analysis showed that this change was statistically
significant.

the Surfers Paradise DSP experienced little change, with only a 0.2 percentage point decrease in
‘grievous serious’ assaults after the introduction of the DSP trial. Further analysis showed that
this change was not statistically significant.

the Townsville DSP had a decrease of 1.4 percentage points in ‘grievous serious’ assaults.
Further analysis revealed that this change was statistically significant.

The Combined EPs had a 0.4 percentage point decreased in ‘grievous serious’ assaults. Further
analysis revealed this change was not statistically significant.

for ‘common minor’ assaults there were slight decreases in the Townsville DSP (0.6 percentage
points) and combined EPs (0.3 percentage points). The Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise
DSPs experienced only minor fluctuations (0.1 percentage point decrease and increase,
respectively). Further analysis did not show any of these changes to be statistically significant.
220 | P a g e
Summary
The interpretation of the results of the analysis of the police crime report data is not straightforward. The increased police numbers and deployment of high visibility policing strategies in each
of the DSPs could have lead to an increase in offences being recorded by police due to greater
detection and more reporting of crimes to police. However, the DSP analysis shows that the trends
across the three DSP areas are different, suggesting that there are other factors (such as different
policing practices, local/regional trends) in addition to the high visibility presence of police that have
impacted on the crime patterns seen after the introduction of the trial.
Police crime reports analysis considered all types of offences and three subgroups of offences:
assaults, good order offences and offences against police.
Analysis of the percentage of all types of offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of
all types offences occurring during all days and hours) revealed:

relative stability in the Fortitude Valley DSP, with a 0.9 percentage point increase from baseline
to trial not found to be statistically significant.

a statistically significant 5.6 percentage point decrease in the Surfers Paradise DSP from baseline
to trial.

a statistically significant 4.2 percentage point increase in the Townsville DSP from baseline to
trial.

in the combined EPs, relative stability (0.2 percentage point decrease) from the baseline to trial
period. Although, when individual EPs were analysed a 4.0 percentage point decrease in the
Brisbane CBD and Caxton St EP, and a 16.0 percentage point increase in the Broadbeach CBD
were found to be statistically significant.
The rate of all types of offences per weekend drinking night was also analysed, revealing:

reductions during the trial period compared to the baseline period for the Fortitude Valley and
Surfers Paradise DSPs (11.5% and 22.6%, respectively)

a slight increase (1.5%) in the Townsville DSP

relatively stability in the combined EPs, with an average 0.9% decrease across the eight sites.
Although, large changes were observed in the Brisbane CBD & Caxton Street EP (12.4% decrease)
and Broadbeach CBD EP (60.8% increase).
Assaults
Analysis of the percentage of assaults occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of assaults
occurring during all days and hours) revealed:

a statistically significant 3.7 percentage point increase in the Fortitude Valley DSP from baseline
to trial
221 | P a g e

decreases from baseline to trial in the Surfers Paradise and Townsville DSPs (2.5 and 1.4
percentage points, respectively); only the change in the Townsville DSP was found to be

no discernible trend or statistically significant changes in the comparison EPs.
Assault offences were also analysed as a rate per weekend drinking night, comparing the two-year
trial period with a three baseline period. This analysis showed:

a 4.0% increase in the Fortitude Valley DSP

decreases in the Surfers Paradise and Townsville DSPs (23.7% and 25.3%, respectively)

across the combined EPs, an average of a 9.4% decrease, with Brisbane CBD & Caxton St CBD EP
showing a 13.8% decrease and a 2.0% increase in the Broadbeach CBD EP.
For the subgroups of offences, including assaults, time series analysis was also performed on the
percentage of offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (out of all days and hours). For
assault offences, the analysis and visual inspection of the baseline to trial trends showed:

increasing trend throughout the baseline years for the Fortitude Valley DSP, stabilising in the
first year of the trial and then declining

stabilising trend for the Surfers Paradise DSP following a peak during the baseline years

declining trend compared to the baseline years for the Townsville DSP during the first year of the
year then stabilising during the second year of the trial

none of these changes in the trends from baseline to trial were statistically significant.
Good order offences
Analysis of good order offences occurring during weekend drinking nights as a percentage of total
good order offences (all days and hours) revealed, from baseline to trial:

statistically significant decreases in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPS (3.3 and 5.2
percentage points, respectively)

statistically significant increase (2.4 percentage points) in the Townsville DSP

mixed results for the comparison EP sites, tending towards an increase (four sites with
statistically significant increases compared with two sites with statistically significant decreases).
Changes in the rate of good order offences during weekend drinking nights from baseline to trial
were also analysed, showing:

reductions in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs (by 20.5% and 24.3%, respectively)

an 18.4% increase in the Townsville DSP

no clear pattern for the combined EPs with 3.7% increase on average but large variations
between individual EPs, including a 24.9% decrease in the Brisbane CBD & Caxton St EP and a
146.3% increase in the Broadbeach CBD EP.
222 | P a g e
Time series analysis of the percentage of good order offences occurring during weekend drinking
nights (out of all days and hours) showed:

in the Fortitude Valley DSP, a slightly declining trend across the baseline years continuing, and
declining more rapidly during the trial years. The difference between the baseline and trial
period trends was nearly statistically significant (p = 0.051).

a statistically significant, clearly declining trend for the Surfers Paradise DSP from the baseline to
trial.

no statistically significant change in the trend for the Townsville DSP.
Offences against police
Analysis of offences against police occurring during weekend drinking nights as a percentage of total
offences against police (all days and hours) revealed, from baseline to trial:

a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the Fortitude Valley DSP, which was not found to be

a statistically significant decrease (6.0 percentage point) in the Surfers Paradise DSP

a statistically significant increase (3.0 percentage points) in the Townsville DSP

for the combined EPs, no obvious statewide pattern; with one statistically significant increase in
the Brisbane CBD & Caxton Street CBD EP (3.5 percentage points) and three EPs with statistically
significant decreases (including the Broadbeach CBD, 2.9 percentage points).
Changes in the rate of offences against police during weekend drinking nights from baseline to trial
were also analysed, showing:

decreases in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs (by 29.5% and 41.9%, respectively)

a small increase (3.6%) in the Townsville DSP

the comparison EP sites tending towards decreases, with five of the eight EPs showing a
decrease and an average of a 15.3% decrease, including a 47.3% decrease in the Brisbane CBD &
Caxton Street CBD EP. Although, the Broadbeach CBD EP showed a 51.1% increase.
Time series analysis of the percentage of offences against police occurring during weekend drinking
nights (out of all days and hours) showed:



no discernible or statistically significant trend for the Fortitude Valley DSP
a statistically significant change in the Surfers Paradise DSP trend from a steady decline or stable
trend over the baseline years to a sustained, considerable decline during the trial years
the trends for the Townsville DSP and combined EPs, also showed declines in the second year of
trial compared to the baseline years (following an increase in the first year of the trial in the
Townsville DSP).
223 | P a g e
Co-occurrence with public nuisance
Policing public nuisance consumes a large portion of police activities in the DSPs, and given the
circumstances of the offences, creates a high potential for conflict between the offenders and police
officers. The extent to which this has actually happened (and changes in this) was examined through
analysis of the percentage of public nuisance offences that were accompanied with an offence
against police during weekend drinking nights (co-occurrence). This analysis showed:


statistically significant decreases in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs, baseline to
trial (1.3 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively). This is contrasted with a statistically significant
increase (1.3 percentage points) in the Townsville DSP from baseline to trial.
across the combined EPs, there was a statistically significant, slight reduction (0.6 percentage
points).
Severity of violence
As an indicator as to whether the severity of violence has changed within the DSPs analysis of the
‘common minor’ and ‘grievous serious’ assault offences as a percentage of all types of offences
occurring during weekend drinking nights was conducted. Comparing baseline to trial, it was shown
that:

for ‘grievous serious’ assaults, there were statistically significant changes in the Fortitude Valley
DSP (1.5 percentage point increase) and Townsville DSP (1.4 percentage point decrease)

for ‘common minor’ assaults, there were minor changes across each of the DSPs and combined
EPs, none of which were statistically significant.
224 | P a g e
Chapter 14 Summary of results by trial site
In comparing the baseline to the trial period it must be remembered that the baseline period was
longer in some cases (up to three years depending upon which data are being considered) compared
to the two-year trial period. No direct comparison can be made relying on actual number of calls
outs, emergency presentations or offences. For this reason the DSP evaluation has focused on
whether there has been a shift in:

the percentage of ambulance calls outs, emergency presentations or offences occurring on
weekend drinking nights

the rate of ambulance calls outs, emergency presentations or offences per weekend drinking
night

interrupted time series analysis of ambulance calls outs, emergency presentations or offences
per weekend drinking.
The difficulty with relying on percentages is that they can be considerably impacted on by other
factors. In the evaluation of the DSP trial, the focus is on pre and post trial changes in percentages of
ambulance call outs, offences or emergency presentations occurring during weekend drinking nights.
However, it is possible that changes in these percentages may reflect changes occurring at other
times (e.g. if other week nights become busier and more offending or injury occurs at these times, or
during the day, this will cause (show) a decrease in the weekend drinking nights percentage). This is
why it is important to also analyse the data using rates.
Although, as the rates are low in some precincts (<1 per weekend drinking night) the differences
between pre and post trial can be large when represented as a percentage, while in terms of actual
calls outs, emergency presentation or offences, the relative change can be quite low. Nonetheless,
these data represent a trend change that can be interpreted in light of other evaluation data.
In this chapter the data analysis for each of the three DSP sites is considered and suggestions
provided for how they might be interpreted in order to understand the apparent impact of the trial
for each site. The results of the analysis of comparison entertainment precincts (EPs) have been
considered throughout each of the chapters on each data source. No broad, overall statewide trends
were found that could be impacting on the DSP trial. However, of particular interest are the trends in
Brisbane City and Caxton St EP and Broadbeach EP, as EPs nearby the Fortitude Valley and Surfers
Paradise DSPs (respectively). Therefore, the results for these two EPs are also considered below.
Fortitude Valley
Police and support service activity
Overall, the activity measures indicate that the high visibility policing presence has been sustained
and well-targeted throughout the two-year trial in the Fortitude Valley DSP. For example, 7640
walkthroughs of licensed venues and 7223 street checks were conducted by police in the Fortitude
Valley DSP during the trial.
225 | P a g e
Section 3 Results of the DSP trial - Chapter 14 Summary of results by trial site
The Fortitude Valley DSP police have also recorded the most use of de-escalation and diversionary
strategies of the three DSP sites, with conflict intervention and tactical communication strategies
used to resolve incidents over 6000 times (n = 6071) and diverted over 1800 people (n = 1897) to a
DSP rest and recovery support service or other designated placed of safety.
A slight reduction in the number of additional officers on Friday night was observed in the last four
months of the trial as rosters were adjusted to cover the initial 3-month extension of the trial.
However, the variation was unlikely to be substantial enough during this period to effect the DSP
trial results.
The Fortitude Valley DSP support services, provided by the Chill Out Zone and ChaplainWatch during
the two years of the trial, have been active and well utilised. The support services provide care or
assistance to over 6000 clients (n = 4897) and close to 145 000 free waters to patrons.
Key results – impact of the trial
Ambulance
Consistent with the previous evaluation findings, the analysis of the ambulance calls for service to
the Fortitude Valley DSP revealed that total calls for service during weekend drinking nights had
reduced during the trial period compared to baseline period, shown by:

a statistically significant 4.6 percentage point decrease in the percentage of calls for service
during weekend drinking nights from baseline to trial

a reduction by 4.2% in the rate of ambulance calls for service per weekend drinking.
Furthermore, the nature of the ambulance calls for service appears to have changed, observed
through:

a statistically significant reduction by 7.9 percentage points in the percentage of the ‘most
relevant’ types of calls for service during weekend drinking nights.
o

a result supported by the time series analysis demonstrating a statistically significant
decrease in the percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls occurring during weekend drinking
nights since the introduction of the trial.
an increase by 2.3 percentage points in the percentage of aggregated ‘relevant’ calls for service
occurring during weekend drinking nights, although further analysis revealed that this change
was not statistically significant
Hospital emergency presentations
Presentations to the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital emergency department (ED) (as the
closest ED to the Fortitude Valley DSP) were also considered, although interpretation of the results
as being linked to the DSP trial is very limited given the location or time of an injury that leads to a
presentation cannot be identified.
The percentage of alcohol-related presentations during weekend drinking nights increased in EDs
servicing each of the DSP areas after the trial commenced. The trend for the RBWH was only found
to be statistically significant when compared to the ‘matched’ comparison EPs, however, it was not
226 | P a g e
clear whether these small changes represent real or meaningful changes in the percentage of
alcohol-related presentations.
The rate of alcohol-related presentations per weekend drinking night for the RBWH was also
considered and was observed to have remained almost stable (decrease by 0.1 percentage point).
This was the same result as the previous evaluation reports.
Police crime reports
The level of offending in the Fortitude Valley DSP has been assessed through analysis of police crime
reports data, comparing a three year baseline period (December 2007 – December 2010) to the two
year trial period. The results show, in the Fortitude Valley DSP:

a slight increase (0.9 percentage points, not statistically significant) in the percentage of total
offences occurring during weekend drinking nights from the baseline period compared to the
two-year trial period. However, it is possible that this increase is caused by shifts in total
offences outside of weekend drinking nights as there was a 11.5%.reduction in the rate of total
offences per weekend drinking night.
 a statistically significant 3.7 percentage point increase in the percentage of assaults occurring
during weekend drinking hours; supported by a 4.0% increase in the rate of assault offences per
o time series analysis demonstrated that following sustained increases over the
baseline years, the DSP trial may have stabilised the trend and begun to reduce
assaults during the second year of the trial
o further, the increase in assaults appears to be driven by ‘grievous serious’ assaults,
with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the percentage occurring during weekend
drinking nights (a statistically significant change), while the percentage of ‘common
minor’ occurring during weekending drinking nights was stable.
 a 3.3 percentage point, statistically significant decrease in the percentage of good order offences
occurring during weekend drinking nights; supported by a 20.5% reduction in the rate of good
order offences per weekend drinking night
o time series analysis showed a slight decline over the baseline years, accelerating
during the two years of the trial, with the change in trend very nearly statistically
significant (p = 0.051).
 a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the percentage of offences against police occurring during
weekend drinking nights, which was not found to be statistically significant; the time series
analysis was also unclear and not statistically significant, although a 29.5% reduction in the rate
of offences against police per weekend drinking night was observed
o the percentage of public nuisance incidents co-occurring with an offence against
police has also decreased 1.3 percentage points (to 2.8%), a statistically significant
change.
227 | P a g e
Displacement or diffusion of benefit?
What happened in the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St EP?
As an entertainment precinct nearby the Fortitude Valley DSP, the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St EP is
of particular interest for comparison of local or regional trends, but also to potentially assess the
impact of the DSP trial in terms of possible displacement or diffusion of benefit.
Individual analysis of the EP sites, including the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St EP, was conducted as
part of the DSP evaluation across a range of measures. The results for the Brisbane CBD and Caxton
St EP showed a slight increase in the ambulance calls for service and large decreases in offences,
including:





a 0.4 percentage point decrease in the percentage of ambulance calls for service occurring
during weekend drinking nights, however, this change may be driven by calls for service outside
of weekend drinking hours. Further analysis found a 4.4% increase in the rate of calls for service
per weekend drinking night, indicating that the ambulance workload has increased in the EP.
a statistically significant 4.0 percentage point decrease in the percentage of total offences
occurring during weekend drinking nights; supported by a 12.4% decrease in the rate of total
offences per weekend drinking night.
a 13.8% decrease in the rate of assault offences per weekend drinking night.
a 24.9% decrease in the rate of good order offences per weekend drinking night
a 47.3% decrease in the rate of offences against police per weekend drinking night.
There are multiple possible interpretations of these results, however, with the data currently
available (e.g. lack of licensed venue patron numbers) and confounding factors (e.g. extent to which
individuals patronise both precincts) it is not possible to determine which of the following, if any, is
most likely to be accurate:



The results in the Brisbane CBD and Caxton Street EP reflect changes in that area in patron
behaviour, policing practices or other local strategies.
The decreases in the Fortitude Valley DSP may be part of local or regional trend of reducing
alcohol-related violence in Brisbane’s entertainment areas.
The DSP trial has achieved positive results in the Fortitude Valley area, and there has been a
diffusion of this benefit to the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St area.
Conclusions
Consistent with the evaluation findings to date, analysis of the police crime report and activity data,
along with the support service activity data, support the view that overall offending has reduced,
and that the Fortitude Valley DSP police appear to be diverting people into support services and deescalating less serious incidents while stricter enforcement action is being pursued for those more
serious incidents, such as assaults. The emphasis from police on de-escalation and diversionary
strategies may have also helped reduced confrontations with offenders often born out through
public order policing.
When considered along with the police activity and crime reports data, the analysis of the
ambulance calls for service suggests that the introduction of the DSP trial in the Fortitude Valley may
228 | P a g e
be associated with a reduction in violence and the severity of injuries. The DSP support services may
also have assisted through the provision of first aid and more accurate information to the QAS when
requesting an ambulance (call for service).
The results of the analysis of the emergency presentations have remained unclear and, as
anticipated at the outset of the trial, the extent to which they could inform the evaluation has been
very limited. Although, to the extent to which there has been no considerable changes in alcoholrelated emergency presentations at the RBWH during the trial period, it would appear that the
Fortitude Valley DSP trial has had no major, obvious impact.
It is not possible to determine whether the implementation of the Fortitude Valley DSP trial
specifically has had any impact on the Brisbane CBD and Caxton St EP, although from the
considerable decreases in offences during the trial period it is clear that some change has occurred
in that entertainment precinct.
Surfers Paradise
Overall, the activity measures indicate that the Surfers Paradise DSP high visibility policing presence
has been sustained and well-targeted throughout the two-year trial period. For example, the Surfers
Paradise DSP police conducted 6299 walkthroughs of licensed venues and 7282 street checks during
the two years of the trial. The Surfers Paradise DSP police also maintained a strong focus on road
safety, conducting 3423 RBTs and issuing 1250 Traffic Infringement Notices during the trial. The
Surfers Paradise DSP police continued to record strong use of de-escalation and diversionary
strategies, with conflict intervention and tactical communication strategies used to resolve incidents
nearly 1500 (n = 1458) times and around 1400 people (n = 1403) diverted to a DSP rest and recovery
support service or other designated placed of safety.
The Surfers Paradise DSP support services, provided by the Chill Out Zone during the two years of
the trial, have been active and well utilised. The support services provide care or assistance to over
5300 clients (n = 5386) and handed out nearly 115 000 free waters to patrons.
Ambulance
Consistent with previous evaluation findings, the analysis of the ambulance calls for service to the
Surfers Paradise DSP revealed that total calls for service during weekend drinking nights had reduced
during the trial period compared to baseline period, shown by:

a 3.2 percentage point, statistically significant decrease in the percentage of calls for service
during weekend drinking nights; supported by a reduction of 3.1% in the rate of ambulance calls
for service per weekend drinking night being made to the Surfers Paradise DSP.
The reason for the ambulance calls for service appears to have changed also, observed through:

a 12.3 percentage point, statistically significant reduction from baseline to trial in the percentage
of the ‘most relevant’ types of calls for service occurring during weekend drinking nights
229 | P a g e
o

time series analysis also demonstrating in the Surfers Paradise DSP a sustained decrease in the
percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls occurring during weekend drinking nights since the
introduction of the trial
o

driven by statistically significant reductions in ‘assault/sexual assault’ and
‘overdose/poisoning (ingestion)’ calls (6.9 and 5.8 percentage points, respectively).
the trend for the percentage of ‘assault/sexual assault’ calls for service occurring
during weekend drinking nights also showed a statistically significant reduction from
baseline to trial.
the percentage of aggregated ‘relevant’ calls for service occurring during weekend drinking
nights remained relatively stable with only a 2.2 percentage point increase observed, that was
not found to be statistically significant.
The percentage of alcohol-related cases during weekend drinking nights increased after the trial
commenced in EDs servicing the DSP areas, such as the Gold Coast Hospital. The trend for the Gold
Coast hospital was found to be statistically significant (both when compared to the combined
comparison EPs and matched comparison EPs), however, it is not clear whether these small changes
represent real or meaningful changes in the percentage of alcohol-related presentations.
Furthermore, the Gold Coast Hospital rate of alcohol-related presentations during weekend drinking
nights has remained relatively stable with only a 0.1 increase during the trial period compared to the
baseline period.
Analysis of police crime report data was performed to assess the impact of the trial on offending
within the Surfers Paradise DSP. The analysis compares a three year baseline period (December
2007 – December 2010) to the two-year trial period. The results show, in the Surfers Paradise DSP
from baseline to trial:




a statistically significant, 5.6 percentage point decrease in the percentage of total offences
occurring during weekend drinking nights, from the baseline period to trial period. This
percentage reduction is supported by a 22.6% reduction in the rate of total offences per
weekend drinking night in the Surfers Paradise DSP following the introduction of the DSP trial.
a statistically significant 2.5 percentage point decrease in the percentage of assaults occurring
during weekend drinking hours; supported by a 23.7% reduction in the rate of assault offences
o time series analysis showed a fairly stable trend for the trial period compared to a
considerable spike during the baseline years.
a statistically significant 5.2 percentage point reduction in the percentage of good order offences
occurring during weekend drinking nights; supported by a 24.3% reduction in the rate of good
order offences per weekend drinking night.
a statistically significant 6.0 percentage point decrease in offences against police during
weekend drinking nights; supported by a 41.9% decrease in the rate of offences against police
per weekend drinking night .
230 | P a g e
o
the percentage of public nuisance incidents co-occurring with an offence against
police has decreased by 2.1 percentage points (to 4.3%). This decrease was
statistically significant.
Displacement or diffusion of benefit?
What happened in the Broadbeach EP?
As the Broadbeach CBD EP is located nearby the Surfers Paradise DSP it is of particular interest for
consideration of any local or regional trends, and also to assess the potential for the DSP trial to
have a displacement or diffusion of benefit impact.
Individual analysis of the EP sites, including the Broadbeach CBD EP, was conducted as part of the
DSP evaluation across a range of measures. The results for the Broadbeach CBD EP showed a slight
rise in ambulance workload and considerable increases in some offences, including:

a 0.2 percentage point increase in the portion of ambulance calls for service during weekend
drinking nights; supported by a 13.6% rise in the rate of calls for service per weekend drinking
night, suggesting that the ambulance workload has increased.

a 16.0 percentage point increase in the percentage of total offences during weekend drinking
nights ; supported by a 60.8% increase in the rate of total offences per weekend drinking night.

a 2.0% increase in the rate of assault offences per weekend drinking night.

a 146.3% increase in the rate of good order offences per weekend drinking night.

a 51.5% increase in the rate of offences against police per weekend drinking night.
There are multiple possible interpretations of these results, however, with the data currently
available (e.g. lack of licensed venue patron numbers) and confounding factors (e.g. extent to which
individuals patronise both precincts) it is not possible to determine which of the following, if any, is
most likely to be accurate:



The results in the Broadbeach CBD EP reflect changes in that area in patron behaviour,
policing practices or other local strategies.
The improvements in the Surfers Paradise DSP are in contrast to any local or regional trend
of increasing alcohol-related violence in Gold Coast’s entertainment areas.
The DSP trial has achieved positive results in the Surfers Paradise area, but there has been a
displacement of the issue to the Broadbeach EP area.
Conclusions
Consistent with the evaluation findings to date, analysis of the police crime report and activity data,
along with the support service activity data, support the view that overall offending has reduced,
and that the Surfers Paradise DSP police are diverting people into support services and de-escalating
serious incidents where possible which may be associated with a reduction in more serious
behaviour. The emphasis from police on de-escalation and diversionary strategies may have also
helped reduced confrontations with offenders often born out through public order policing.
231 | P a g e
When considered along with the police activity and crime reports data, the analysis of the
ambulance calls for service suggests that the introduction of the DSP trial in the Surfers Paradise may
have reduced violence and the severity of injuries. The DSP support services may also be assisting
through the provision of first aid and more accurate information to the QAS when requesting an
ambulance (call for service).
The results of the analysis of the emergency presentations are unclear and, as anticipated at the
outset of the trial, the extent to which they could inform the evaluation has been very limited. It
would appear that the Surfers Paradise DSP trial has had no major, obvious impact on emergency
department presentations at the Gold Coast Hospital with only small changes observed in the data.
It is not possible to determine whether the implementation of the Surfers Paradise DSP trial
specifically has had any impact on the Broadbeach CBD EP, although with large increases in some
offences within the EP it is clear the some change has occurred during the trial period.
Townsville
The policing activity data presented for the Townsville DSP suggests that the high-visibility policing
has been sustained at a level appropriate for the size of the precinct compared to the other sites. For
example, during the trial period police in the Townsville DSP performed over 5200 (n = 5244)
walkthroughs of licensed venues and conducted over 1500 street checks (n = 1560).
Due to data recording issues, the policing activity data presented for the Townsville DSP does not
reflect that a focus on de-escalation and diversion has been a key element of the trial. During the
two-year trial period only a small proportion of de-escalation and diversionary activity has been
recorded for the Townsville DSP (e.g. only 37 uses of conflict intervention/tactical communication
were recorded). It is understood that this issue now has now been addressed by the QPS and that
more recent data is likely to be more accurate. For example, in the period December 2012 to April
2013, around 700 (n = 703) uses of conflict intervention/tactical communication were recorded, a
much greater level of activity then previously reported for the two-year trial period.
The Townsville support services, provided by Anglicare North Queensland, have continued the
ramped up service provision since their initial delayed establishment. During the first seven months
of their service (December 2010 to June 2011) the Townsville DSP support service assisted and
provided water to nearly 3000 (n = 2927) patrons. Since then, in the remaining 17 months of the
two-year trial (July 2011 to November 2012), the Townsville support service has cared for 1013
clients with significant issues and handed out over 44 000 free waters.
Ambulance
Consistent with previous evaluation findings, the analysis of the ambulance calls for service to the
Townsville DSP revealed that total calls for service during weekend drinking nights had increased
during the trial period compared to baseline period, shown by:
232 | P a g e

a 35.7% increase in the rate of ambulance calls for service per weekend drinking night. A
reduction of 1.9 percentage points in the percentage of ambulance calls for service occurring
during weekend nights was observed, but was not found to be statistically significant, and is
likely (given the increase in rate per weekend drinking night) to reflect changes in the
percentage occurring outside weekend drinking nights.
However, confirming the results presented in the evaluation update, the nature of the calls for
service is possibly changing. This is shown through:

a statistically significant 5.4 percentage point decrease in the percentage of ‘most relevant’
group of calls for service occurring during weekend drinking nights
o

time series analysis demonstrating that during the trial period a slight rise initially in the
percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls occurring during weekend drinking nights has been followed
more recently by a decrease. This trend was statistically significantly different from the baseline
trend
o

driven by a statistically significant decrease of 4.7 percentage points in the
percentage of ‘Assault/Sexual Assault’ calls (part of the ‘most relevant’ group)
occurring during weekend drinking hours.
of the individual codes within the ‘most relevant’ group, time series analysis
identified a statistically significant change in the trend for the ‘overdose/poisoning
(ingestion)’ coded calls for service, from baseline to trial. However, the limited
baseline period made determining the direction of the trend difficult.
a statistically significant increase by 7.3 percentage points in the percentage of aggregated
‘relevant’ calls for service occurring during weekend drinking nights
o
this increase is likely to be driven by a statistically significant 6.0 percentage point
increase in the percentage of ‘Sick Person (Specific Diagnoses)’ calls occurring during
weekend drinking nights.
The percentage of alcohol-related cases during weekend drinking nights increased after the trial
commenced in EDs servicing the DSP areas, such as the Townsville Hospital. The trend for the
Townsville hospital was not found to be statistically significant (when compared to either the
combined comparison EPs or matched comparison EPs) and it is not clear whether these small
changes represent real or meaningful changes in the percentage of alcohol-related presentations.
The rate of alcohol-related presentations per night for the Townsville Hospital was also assessed and
found to be relatively stable with only an increase of a 0.1 percentage point.
The level of offending in the Townsville DSP has been assessed through analysis of police crime
reports data, comparing a three year baseline period (December 2007 – December 2010) to the twoyear trial period. The results show, in the Townsville DSP:

a 4.2 percentage point increase in the percentage of total offences during weekend drinking
nights, from the baseline period to trial period. This increase was statistically significant. This is
233 | P a g e
somewhat supported by a 1.5% increase in the rate of total offences per weekend drinking
night.
 a statistically significant 1.4 percentage point decrease in the percentage of assaults occurring
during weekend drinking nights; supported by a 25.3% reduction in the rate of assault offences
o time series analysis of assaults also revealed a considerable decline during the first
year of the trial compared to the baseline period, which then stabilised and was
sustained during the second year of the trial. The differences in the baseline to trial
trends were not found to be statistically significant
o the decrease in assaults overall is driven in part by a statistically significant decrease
of 1.4 percentage points in the percentage of ‘grievous serious’ assaults occurring
during weekend drinking nights.
 a statistically significant increase of 4.2 percentage points in the percentage of good order
offences occurring during weekend drinking nights; supported by a 18.4% increase in the rate of
good order offences per weekend drinking night
o time series analysis of good order offences also suggested an increase during the
trial period compared to the baseline period, although the change was not
statistically significant.
 a 3.0 percentage point, statistically significant increase in the percentage of offences against
police occurring during weekend drinking nights; supported by a 3.6% increase in the rate of
offences against the police per weekend drinking night
o time series analysis of offences against police suggests that the increase may have
been confined to the first year of the trial with a sharp decline observed in the
second year of the trial (in support, the rate of offences against had increased by
10.2% during the first 14 months of the trial, considerably higher than the 3.6%
increase noted above)
o in the Townsville DSP, co-occurrence of offences against police with a public
nuisance incident also increased by 1.3 percentage points. At 7.1% of public
nuisance incidents co-occurring with an offence against police during the trial
period, the Townsville DSP recorded the highest percentage of co-occurrence of the
three DSPs.
Conclusions
The lack of reliable policing de-escalation and diversionary activity data from the two-year trial
period limits the ability to interpret the police crime reports data and draw any definitive
conclusions regarding de-escalation and diversionary strategies. However, for the final evaluation
data has become available following improvements to QPS’ recording processes after the end of the
trial. Consideration of this data, although from outside the trial period evaluated, along with the
support service activity data suggests that police may be diverting some people into support services
and de-escalating some minor situations. However, a strong focus of the policing activity remains on
a ‘low tolerance’ approach with an increase in good order offences and offences against police. The
reduction in assaults suggests that this policing strategy may be preventing or deterring more
serious, violent behaviour. Although, as has been found to occur outside of the DSP trial, the strong
emphasis on the policing of good order offences (public order policing) may also be increasing
confrontation with patrons. The Townsville DSP experienced an increasing incidence of public
234 | P a g e
nuisance and offences against police co-occurrence during the trial period (to the highest
percentage of all three DSPs).
With only unclear or slight changes in results it seems unlikely that the Townsville DSP trial has had
any substantial, obvious impact on emergency department presentations at the Townsville Hospital.
The analysis of the ambulance calls for service showed clearer and stronger results suggesting a
change in the nature of the calls for service. These results, when considered along with the police
activity and crime reports data, provide greater strength to the interpretation suggested in the
evaluation update that the introduction of the DSP trial in Townsville has shown positive signs of
reduced violence and severity of injuries. The increases in total ambulance calls for service are most
likely to be driven by the support services provision of improved care for injured, ill or distressed
patrons; reflected in the reasons for the ambulance calls for service possibly becoming less serious.
It also possible that the DSP support services, as well as providing first-aid, are able to provide more
accurate information to the QAS when requesting an ambulance (call for service).
The previous evaluation reports have also highlighted several factors distinctive to Townsville that
may have substantially impacted the results and operation of the trial, including the ability for police
to fully utilise diversionary and de-escalation strategies. Many of these factors have remained for the
two years of trial, including:





No resolution of outstanding precinct management issues, particularly including the limited late
night public transport services other than taxis and lack of public toilets.
The first-ever provision of NGO support services dedicated to the precinct which led to some
initial delays in establishing the services in the DSP.
Police operations in the Townsville DSP are based out of a van operating as a basic forward
command post with limited capacity to securely hold offenders.
Flinders Street East, the focal point of the Townsville DSP, is almost exclusively licensed venues
and has very limited aspects of a mixed night time economy.
The presence of large numbers of fly-in fly-out workers, large numbers of defence force
personnel at Lavarack Barracks (including those returning direct from active duty) and a large
university population.
235 | P a g e
Section 4 Discussion
Sections 2 and 3 of this report have shown that the DSP strategies appear to have assisted to better
manage and respond to the alcohol-related violence associated with the concentration of pubs and
clubs in each of the DSP areas. At the local level the DSP trial has helped to ensure there is a better
and faster response to incidents when they do occur in these areas, both from police and support
services. It appears that in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise the increased police presence and
support services have been effective in reducing the demand for ambulance services to the precinct
by effectively intervening early and preventing serious injury or harm.
Patrons, licensees, police and other stakeholders have responded in a largely positive way to the key
DSP strategies. For example, around two-thirds (67.7%; n = 272) of patrons in the latest round of the
survey indicated support for the high visibility policing model as an effective strategy, while over half
of patrons (59.2%; n = 238) noted the presence of support services. Stakeholders have also reported
improving perceptions of safety within the DSP areas, with two-thirds (66.4%; n = 267) of patrons
reporting being not worried about being assaulted.
There are positive results from each of the DSPs that the trial may have reduced alcohol-related
offending and violence, however, there is considerable variation in the extent and nature of the
change. These results, while encouraging do not overwhelmingly or definitively demonstrate that
the implementation of the key DSP strategies will necessarily lead to a reduction in alcohol-related
offending, harm or violence. The capacity to achieve results is still largely impacted by the way in
which the key strategies are implemented and local factors (e.g. a lack of public toilets, density of
licensed venues). The evaluation of the DSP trial shows that it has been effective in terms of short
term crisis management, but that on their own such precinct management strategies are not
sufficient to completely address the underlying problem of high levels of alcohol-related violence.
This section highlights the key areas that have emerged through the DSP trial to date as needing
further action in Queensland. The discussion supports the key themes and recommendations that
are designed to assist Queensland to ‘get it right’ in the future when it comes to alcohol, the growth
of the night time economy, and the health and safety of our communities. Information in this section
is presented in three chapters:
A. Chapter 15 addresses what more can be done to improve precinct management for the future in
our trial sites, and lessons that can be learnt from the DSP trial to inform strategies to be
implemented elsewhere.
B. Chapter 16 goes beyond precinct management strategies to consider broader alcohol policy
issues. While the key DSP precinct management strategies (increased and high visibility police
presence, enhanced NGO support services, and improved coordination of services and
strategies) are important – we must also tackle the broader alcohol policy issues in order to find
long term, sustainable solutions to help us drive down alcohol-related violence and other harms
associated with Queensland’s pubs and clubs.
236 | P a g e
Section 4 Discussion
C. Chapter 17 considers the challenges faced by the DSP evaluation as a crucial step in addressing
the dearth of Queensland alcohol-related violence research or evaluation. It is hoped that
openly discussing these challenges will provide an opportunity to strengthen future evaluations
in this field.
237 | P a g e
Chapter 15 Precinct management
At the precinct management level, the initiatives that have been implemented in each of three trial
sites are in line with current best practice. For example, Ms Suzi Matthews, Manager, Late Night
Economy for the City of Sydney, visited the Fortitude Valley precinct in July 2012 and commented
that, despite the extensive work that has been done in Sydney to consider the long term
development of its night time economy, it planned to ‘steal’ some of the DSP trial’s core initiatives
because they were so impressive. The ‘street pastors, chill out zones and guarded taxi ranks’ were
specifically highlighted as innovations that could usefully be implemented in Sydney (cited in Feeney
2012).
While in terms of precinct management the DSP trial has had successes, this does not mean that the
existing DSP precinct management strategies cannot be improved. Indeed some changes must be
made in order for these strategies to be sustainable in the existing DSP sites, and to inform the
ongoing management of other entertainment areas throughout the state.
Despite the improved coordination, increased and high visibility police presence and introduction of
support services in the Townsville DSP, the evidence presented in Sections 2 and 3 suggests that this
area has not seen as clear and obvious reduction in alcohol-related violence and disorder as desired
by local stakeholders. In Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise where the key DSP strategies appear
to have had a stronger impact, alcohol-related violence and disorder still remains a problem.
Queensland must continue to improve its response to alcohol-related violence through precinct
management strategies, and solutions must be found in Townsville to resolve on-going issues in
order to show that the key trial strategies can be consistently applied to drive down alcohol-related
harms.
The following discussion builds upon information presented in the report so far to highlight the
strengths and weaknesses, and recommend ways forward, in relation to each of the following key
DSP strategies:

governance and coordination

police presence and high visibility policing

support/rest and recovery services

banning orders

public urination and toilets.
Governance and coordination
Local DSP committees
The creation of local DSP committees has improved on-the-ground coordination in each of the three
trial sites. The range of interests represented on the local committees is broader than the usual
membership of local liquor accords, for example, and in this way the committee allows the right
people to hear about the range of issues that impact on precinct safety and who can take action to
have those issues addressed. Outside of the formal local DSP committee meetings and processes,
238 | P a g e
Section 4 Discussion - Chapter 15 Precinct management
informal communication and problem-solving has also improved, simply because all the local
stakeholders know each other and have a key point of contact in relation to any issue through a
committee representative (e.g. relating to taxi ranks, licensees, or policing).
Although local DSP committees have not been supported with any additional funds, they have
proven to be an effective way to improve communication between state and local governments,
licensees, venue managers, security, taxi and other transport providers, support services and others.
It is important to note that local DSP committees are not, however, a ‘one size fits all’ solution.


Local DSP committees will not always be needed
in every area that has a concentration of pubs and
clubs. In some places existing structures such as
liquor accords may already be working well to
facilitate on-the-ground coordination and
problem-solving across a range of stakeholders.
The Collaborative Approach to Liquor
Management (CALM liquor accords) on the
Sunshine Coast provides an example of a
successful approach in recent years (see Box 9
opposite).
Box 9. Collaborative Approach to Liquor
Management (CALM liquor accords)
A liquor accord is a voluntary industry-based
partnership working in a local community to
introduce practical solutions to alcohol-related
problems. The Sunshine Coast Regional Council
funds and co-ordinates successful CALM liquor
accords on the Sunshine Coast, in partnership
with the QPS, Queensland Health, Queensland
Transport and the Office of Liquor and Gaming
Regulation.
The first was established on the Sunshine Coast
at Mooloolaba in 2007 with 18 members, and
there are now seven CALM accords on the
Sunshine Coast with a total of 120 licensee,
business, government and non-government
members.
Responsibility for convening local DSP-style
committees need not always rest with the state
government. During the DSP trial, the local DSP
committees were initially convened by OLGR and
CALM’s work includes the development of
strategies to address increases in population of
the Office of Regulatory Policy, who have lead
up to 500 000 people, four times a year during
responsibility for liquor related regulation and
peak tourist seasons on the Sunshine Coast.
policy respectively in Queensland. The operational
CALM has won several recent awards including
phase was then led by police. In other
the ‘Excellence in Alcohol Management’ category
jurisdictions it is noted that similar committees
of the 2011 National Awards for Local
have been led by local government, and that this
Government, a Meritorious Police Certificate at
the 2011 Australian Crime and Violence
may increasingly be appropriate if Queensland
Prevention Awards, and a Queensland Public
moves toward a framework that provides local
Sector Excellence Award in 2010 from the
government and local communities with more say
Institute of Public Administration Australia, for
the category of ‘Best Practice in Local
about the availability of alcohol in their local areas
Government’.
(see below). The ‘Cairns Model’ is also an example
Whole of community benefits have been realised
of a research led cross government partnership,
through CALM’s contribution to significant
implementing community-based crime prevention
reductions in alcohol-related crime and violence
responses to alcohol-related violence and public
and complaints received about licensed premises
safety concerns (see Box 10 below on page 240).
since the introduction of the accords.
The Liquor Accord and existing community safety
networks led by local government were a critical component in this project.
The establishment and operation of local committees could be strengthen through ensuring that
there are clear communication paths between the various different areas to ensure they can share
in each others ‘learnings’ – good and bad. The local committees would also benefit from the
239 | P a g e
establishment of a clear way for the committees to ‘escalate’ issues they feel cannot be resolved at a
local level, although this should not seek to diminish the ability or motivation of members to resolve
issues locally wherever possible.
Box 10. The ‘Cairns Model’: community-based crime prevention in the night-time economy
The coastal, regional centre of Cairns in far north Queensland is a popular tourist destination attracting over
550 000 visitors each year, with a large portion of those being backpackers. Amongst the Cairns CBD’s retail
shops, restaurants and tourist accommodation providers lies the late-night entertainment precinct with around
26 licensed premises within a 0.8 square kilometre area. Cairns, and the late-night entertainment precinct in
particular is regularly identified as hotspot for alcohol-related violence.
Responding to the concerns about alcohol-related violence, four key elements can be identified that underpin
the ‘Cairns Model’ of community-based crime prevention in the night-time economy:




co-ordinated quantitative data collection at close-to-real-time through engagement of Emergency
Department staff, Police, CCTV and licensed venues
comprehensive CCTV network, which is continuously monitored and has real-time communication links to
police and private security
contracted street-security teams
close inter-agency communication and collaboration.
The Cairns Regional Council (CRC) operates a comprehensive CCTV network of digital cameras covering the
Cairns CBD’s retail shops, restaurants and late-night entertainment precinct, as well as the adjacent seafront
esplanade. Under contract for the CRC, the CCTV network is monitored 24/7 by at least one dedicated camera
operator, with an additional operator rostered during peak periods.
In addition to the camera monitoring, the CRC has also contracted the private company to provide up to eight
guards as a ‘street security team’ for the late-night entertainment precinct. The ‘street security team’ are in
constant, direct radio contact with the camera monitoring room and provide a rapid-response capability for
incidents observed through the CCTV network.
A recent evaluation of the model found that the CCTV network monitoring combined with the street security
team’s rapid-response has supported intervention in 40% of assaults observed through the network, either
possibly reducing the severity of injuries. Preliminary cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis suggests this
model is cost-neutral to the Cairns community. The CRC CCTV system has also benefited from rigorous
assessment using Realist Evaluation in a continuous quality improvement process, identifying its strengths (e.g.
professional management & operation, real-time and strategic communication with police and other
stakeholders, accuracy of incident report data) and areas for improvement (e.g. better defining system aims and
incident types, training of operators, regular internal audit and external evaluation, community education).
The implementation of the ‘street security teams’ has also involved overcoming challenges commonly related to
the use of private security to ‘police’ the public space. For example, to overcome the public police
officer/private security personnel divide, both parties attended joint procedural and good practice models
training workshops. Further, the abilities of the security personnel to recognise and respond to alcohol-related
violence were improved through training in body language; neurological effects of alcohol and detecting levels
of intoxication; attention, vision and perception; and the non-aggressive handling of aggressive, intoxicated
patrons.
Collaboration and communication between stakeholders have also been vital elements of the Cairns Model
through various forums, such as the local liquor accord, Cairns CBD Safety Summit and the Community Safety
Committee. These groups engage a wide variety of stakeholders including the police (beat, tactical/planning,
liquor enforcement and management), security providers, licensees and venue managers, OLGR, council and
transport providers. Memoranda of Understanding signed between stakeholders (government and nongovernment) formalise these working relationships, including operational procedures and data/information
sharing.
References:
Pointing, Hayes-Jonkers & Clough 2012; Pointing, Hayes-Jonkers, Bohana & Clough 2012; Hayes-Jonkers,
Poinitng & Clough 2012
References:
Pointing, Hayes-Jonkers & Clough 2012; Pointing, Hayes-Jonkers, Bohana & Clough 2012
240 | P a g e
DSP Inspectors
The police DSP Inspectors have been very important to the successful governance of the trial and
improving on-the-ground coordination of all stakeholders. Licensees, venue managers and security
staff have noted the benefit of having this clear line of communication to a senior police officer, who
has a dedicated focus on the policing and operation of the DSP. It has also been observed that:

There has been some exceptionally energetic and skilled DSP Inspectors appointed throughout
the trial. It is a testament to the skills and attributes of these DSP Inspectors that they have been
able to quickly establish strong professional relationships, trust and rapport with the broad
range of local stakeholders involved, in order to communicate effectively and carry out their
role.

Having regular rotations of officers through a DSP Inspector role helps to prevent any real or
perceived conflicts of interest. As the DSP Inspector role requires regular and close
communication with venues, this rotation of officers assists to ensure that police are not, and
are not perceived to be, ‘too close’ to the liquor industry.

There have been some challenges presented by the regular rotation of officers through the DSP
Inspector position. The success of such an arrangement obviously depends on a strong handover
process at the local level. However, in one DSP it appears a new DSP Inspector was unaware for
some time of the existence of the management plan formulated by the local DSP committee,
despite the DSP Inspector role having a great deal of responsibility for its oversight and
implementation.
Given the size and scope of alcohol-related violence problems in each DSP area described in Sections
2 and 3, the continuation of the dedicated DSP Inspector positions is clearly warranted in these
areas. It may be that the size and scope of the problem in some other entertainment areas
throughout the state also warrants a dedicated DSP-type Inspector. For example, the Brisbane City
and Caxton Street area would appear to warrant such consideration.
Local management plans
The local management plans developed by the local DSP committees have proven to be a useful tool
in order to have issues in the precinct discussed, and actions agreed, implemented and followed up.
They have also been useful to ensure longer term issues for which there was no immediate solution,
have remained on the agenda for further discussion and if possible, action. Development of a local
management plan may assist in other areas facing alcohol-related violence problems.
Police presence and high visibility policing
As described in Section 2 of this report, the DSP trial has provided a substantial boost to police
numbers on busy nights in each of the three DSP areas, and these extra numbers have allowed
police to use a range of high visibility policing strategies. Proactive visible policing is vital to
managing the night time economy well – it involves nipping bad behaviour in the bud and setting the
tone for expected behaviour in an area. Police play an important preventative role – focusing
targeted effort to reduce problems and prevent the need for more serious enforcement action later
on.
241 | P a g e
The increased police presence and high visibility policing has been well received. During
consultations and through the online surveys, patrons, licensees and others provided
overwhelmingly positive feedback about the police presence in the DSPs and the ability of police to
rapidly respond to incidents. The benefits of the increased police presence are said to include that
on busy nights police have been able to:
1. Provide an appropriate and rapid response when there are multiple events occurring
simultaneously within the DSP. During consultations we frequently heard from police across
each of the DSPs that prior to the trial they simply did not have capacity to respond when
multiple incidents were occurring at the same time.
2. Minimise injury to officers and others.

Some police suggested that officer safety prior to the introduction of more police was a very
serious issue. The analysis of crime report data in Section 3 shows that there was a clear
reduction in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs in offences against police
between the baseline and trial periods (by 29.5% and 41.9% respectively), which suggests
that officer safety has improved during the trial period. In the Townsville DSP, offences
against the police increased slightly (by 3.6%) following introduction of the DSP trial, with
time series analysis suggesting a decrease in the second year of the trial.

The analysis of ambulance call out data in Section 3 provides a strong indicator in terms of
injury to other people – this analysis suggests that the DSP trial appears to have reduced the
overall QAS workload in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs, and a decrease in
cases more likely to be associated with alcohol-related violence in the Townsville DSP.
3. Maintain the safety of volunteers operating in the trial areas. Both support services and the
police have expressed the view that a certain level of policing is vital for the safety of support
service workers operating in the precincts, and that the support services rely upon a rapid
response from police when dangerous incidents arise.
4. Maintain a capacity to respond to normal calls for service outside precinct areas. Without the
increased police numbers, we were told that due to the demand on police in DSP areas officers
often were called in from nearby areas to assist with policing the DSP areas, and that this can
have negative flow-on effects in terms of the ability of police in other areas to provide a rapid
response to calls for service.
In addition to the increased police numbers, the use of high visibility strategies including regular
venue walk-throughs, was generally felt to have also made a valuable contribution to the success of
the trial and the confidence people expressed in the policing, safety and security of the DSP areas.
The police wearing of high visibility vests in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSPs also appears
to have made an important contribution to the positive results in these areas. High visibility vests
provide a very obvious signal to patrons and others that police are out in the DSP areas in substantial
numbers, and that troublemakers are highly likely to be apprehended. The vests also assist CCTV
operators and others to easily identify police officers in the precinct.
While it is acknowledged that the heat and breathability of the vests was an issue in the Townsville,
this could be easily overcome. It may be that wearing high visibility vests in the Townsville DSP could
help to improve the results of the trial in the area. There is also a broader issue for the QPS to
242 | P a g e
resolve with the growing use of load bearing vests (which are not high visibility) by officers
preventing the wearing of high visibility vests. There are practical solutions available, such as the
issuing of the load bearing vest in a high visibility material.
While in the DSP areas taxi marshals and some security staff at venue doors also wear high visibility
vests, this practice could be further extended as it has been in similar areas overseas. For example,
the successful STAD project in Stockholm that is described in Section 1 involved having all security
staff wear high visibility vests in addition to police. Having security staff standing on the street at
venue doors routinely wear high visibility vests may further increase the general confidence in the
security and safety of an area, and will also have the added benefit of allowing these people to be
more easily identified at a distance, including on CCTV.
Overtime model
The use of the overtime model to support the increased police presence made DSP policing more
attractive for a range of reasons outlined in Section 2. Consequently, there were not any difficulties
filing the DSP shifts, or with police calling in sick due to fatigue issues. The overtime policing model
that supports the increased police presence in the DSP, however, is a relatively expensive policing
model that cannot be sustained, or expanded to other entertainment precinct areas, because of its
cost.
Nonetheless, ongoing growth in the night time economy in many parts of the state is expected and
desired. All stakeholders are obliged to respond to the high levels of community concern about
alcohol-related violence and disorder in such precincts. A sustainable and affordable model for
policing in entertainment precincts is required.
The costs associated with the policing of entertainment areas could be reduced in the short/medium
term through using one or more of the following four options:
1. Creating community support officers, with limited police powers and employed by police.
2. Increasing the involvement of personnel not employed by police, such as support service
personnel, security personnel or RSA hosts.
3. Through the redirection of existing resources within the QPS.
4. By developing a ‘user pays’ model similar to the model through which policing services at major
supporting events in Queensland are provided, and along the lines used in some entertainment
precincts in other parts of the world.
Creating a Community Support Officer role employed by police
A more affordable policing presence could be achieved by creating a ‘community support officer’
role to decrease the demand on fully sworn police officers, as has been done in some overseas
jurisdictions. Community support officers would be employed by police, and would have limited
powers. The role of community support officers would be to respond to anti-social behaviour and
improve police-community relations. Community support officers would work under the supervision
of sworn officers and would work alongside them in entertainment precinct areas where a stronger
policing presence is needed. Training received by these officers should be specific to the issues
identified in any given location (e.g. use of de-escalation techniques and managing groups of
drunken young people).
243 | P a g e
In the United Kingdom, Community Support Officers (CSOs) have been used since 2002.102 The
number of CSOs increased after their introduction, to 6000 in 2006 and over 13 500 in 2007. CSOs
were introduced in the UK specifically to tackle anti-social behaviour and disorder (including a focus
on drinking offences), to provide a visible policing presence, and to improve community confidence
in the service. CSOs are not sworn police officers but are uniformed, patrol-based members of police
staff with limited powers which are only enforceable when they are on duty and within areas
allocated. CSOs can issue fixed penalty notices where appropriate (e.g. litter and graffiti), for
example, although the level of other powers they are afforded (e.g. detaining suspects) varies across
police forces in the UK. In the UK CSOs cannot be members of the Police Federation, although they
can join other trade unions (Paskell 2007).
A number of evaluations of the CSO program have produced favourable findings including that CSOs
can offer high visibility policing which would not otherwise be available, improve community
relations and reduce fear of crime. Furthermore, CSOs have been found to have significantly
improved efficiency, increase the number of cases solved, and to have been positively received by
victims of crime.
Difficulties associated with CSOs include that there has been a lack of support from police unions
due to a belief that CSOs constituted ‘policing on the cheap’, would tarnish the reputation of sworn
officers, and would not have sufficient skills, training, or authority to manage conflict and anti-social
behaviour. In the UK CSOs were found to account for more than half of the gross misconduct cases
reported in 2008-09, despite only comprising 1/5 of the UK police workforce. Other negative findings
include that CSOs have been found to experience boredom, a lack of motivation, and a lack of
training to manage some incidents they come across (Loveday, Williams & Scott 2007).
In Queensland there already exist a number of civilian or limited powers/quasi policing type roles
that involve some street policing functions.103 The introduction of community safety officers would
102





Similar initiatives used elsewhere include:
Safer Neighbourhood Response Teams (Dorset), as opposed to sworn police, SNRT respond to petty crime
incidents where there is no forensic or other evidence to be collected
Local Authority Street Wardens who generate local intelligence in areas where police have found it
difficult to penetrate
Community Safety Officers (Canada)
Community Safety Officers (USA)
Agents De Surveillance De La Voie Publique ASVP (France).
103
For example, the QPS employs Police Liaison Officers (PLOs) to assist police to reduce and prevent crime,
divert people from the criminal justice system, advise and educate QPS officers on cultural issues, and improve
community knowledge of law and order issues. The primary role of PLOs is to establish and maintain a positive
working relationship between culturally specific communities and the QPS. PLOs do not have police powers
but may be called on to support police with law enforcement tasks in some circumstances. PLOs therefore
differ from CSOs serving in UK police departments. The QPS has also employed Queensland Aboriginal and
Torres Strait islander Police (QATSIP) since 1999 in a small number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
communities. QATSIP have limited powers so that they can take an active role in enforcement.
Throughout the 2000s the QPS has been undertaking a program of civilianisation, identifying those positions
that do not require specialist police knowledge, training or powers and therefore could reasonably be filled by
244 | P a g e
represent a significant expansion of the street policing functions that could be performed by those
other than fully-sworn police officers in Queensland.
Increasing the involvement of personnel not employed by police
Due to the high and rising costs associated with policing, a trend that can be seen in various
locations across the globe is to try to reduce these costs by supplementing police with other roles
more strongly focused on prevention/early intervention rather than enforcement, or increasingly
‘outsourcing’ roles traditionally performed by police. In some cases this involves the granting of
police-like powers, in other cases these roles do not rely on the exercise of formal powers but
instead rely on the use of strong communication skills and other expertise.
The management of alcohol-related crime and disorder has been one area in which personnel not
employed by police are increasingly engaged in conducting street patrolling functions. In addition to
the Queensland support service/rest and recovery model described in Section 2 and discussed
further below, other parts of Queensland outside of the DSPs and other jurisdictions have made
more use of private security personnel or RSA Hosts to decrease the demand on police resources in
areas around pubs and clubs. In some areas local councils or businesses themselves have supported
personnel not employed by police to undertake street patrolling functions. For example:

Private security patrols: Cairns, Queensland. The Cairns Regional Council has contracted a
private company to provide up to eight guards on weekend nights as a ‘street security team’ for
the late-night entertainment precinct. The ‘street security team’ are in constant, direct radio
contact with the camera monitoring room and provide a rapid-response capability for incidents
observed through the 81-camera CCTV network (Pointing, Hayes-Jonkers & Clough 2012;
Pointing, Hayes-Jonkers, Bohana & Clough 2012). See Box 10 for further details of the ‘Cairns
Model’.

Private security street patrols: Kings Cross, New South Wales. In Sydney, private security
providers have been used to patrol public spaces in the Kings Cross area to supplement policing
services. A group of 15 licensed venues originally employed private security guards as a three
month trial in 2010 to provide a ‘rapid response team’ to support licensed venue staff and patrol
the streets on Friday and Saturday nights (The Daily Telegraph 2011). This team operate on their
own radio channel, allowing licensed venue security staff to contact them directly and
facilitating an immediate response to incidents of violence or anti-social behaviour. The team
assist the police with violent altercations and crime scene preservation (Howden 2011). The
team has continued to operate for more than two years (Carson 2012).104

RSA Hosts/the Hangover Squad, Sydney. RSA ‘Hosts’ , or the ‘Hangover Squad’, have been
employed by some venues in Sydney from 2009 to focus on ‘the responsible consumption of
civilian employees. No street policing functions or positions have been identified as being suitable for
civilianisation in Queensland to date.
104
A formalisation of the ‘rapid response team’ proposed by the former NSW government in March 2011
would have seen funding for the team split 50/50 between the government and late-trading licensed venues in
Kings Cross to employ 10 security guards to 5am on Friday nights and 14 security guards until 6am on Saturday
nights. Control of the team would have also been the responsibility of the local police (Howden & Ralston
2011).
245 | P a g e
alcohol’ in a fun and non-confrontational way with patrons. People working as an RSA Host
emphasise conversation with the drinking customer, provide water, remind people to have
something to eat, and get rapid drinkers to slow down. The City of Sydney is currently
considering expanding the use of the RSA Hosts/Hangover Squad to include key public spaces
and public events (pers. comm., City of Sydney 2012) (see also further information below under
RSA).

Private security street patrols: Auckland, New Zealand. The Auckland Council and CBD
businesses fund patrols of the CBD by teams of private security guards (Heart of Auckland City
n.d.). The City Watch program was established in 2004 in response to public concerns about
safety in the CBD. Seven security guards operate across day and night, including until 4am on
Wednesday, Friday and Saturday nights, and are focused on monitoring and assisting police in
responding to anti-social behaviour, as well as enforcing the public space liquor ban (Auckland
Council 2011). Recently, in response to sustained concern regarding alcohol-related harm in the
Auckland CBD, the Council committed to providing an extra City Watch team to improve
enforcement of the public space liquor ban (Auckland Council 2012).
There are also recent Australian examples that involve outsourcing to others roles traditionally
performed by police, and providing these people with substantial powers. These examples focus on
safety on public transport, rather than relating directly to the policing of pub and club areas.

Protective Services Officers, Victoria. In 2011, the Victorian Government announced an
expansion of the Victoria Police Protective Services Unit to include transit Protective Services
Officers (PSOs) (Victoria Legal Aid 2012; Victoria Police 2012). The transit PSOs were introduced
in response to heightened public concerns about safety at railway stations, including anti-social
behaviour, alcohol and drug related offences, weapon offences, property damage and acts of
violence. The transit PSOs are not sworn police officers but have been granted similar powers
that go beyond those previously held by PSOs responsible for security at court houses and other
government buildings. PSOs have the power to:
o
arrest people found to be drunk and disorderly, in breach of bail conditions or subject of an
arrest warrant
o
detain those suspected of committing a serious offence
o
issue 'move on' directions
o
conduct searches where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting a person has a weapon
o
issue infringements for graffiti offences
o
prevent an alcohol or drug-affected person from driving a vehicle
o
require a minor suspected of consuming alcohol to provide their name, age and address
o
seize alcohol from minors (Victoria Police n.d.).
Unlike a sworn police officer, PSOs powers are limited to while they are on-duty and working
within the railway stations or car parks. PSOs are, however, similarly equipped as police officers
with a firearm, capsicum spray and baton (Silvester 2011).
246 | P a g e

Senior Network Officers, Queensland. From late 2010, transit officers with increased powers
have worked on the TransLink South East Queensland public transport network (O’Loan 2010).
These transit officers have the power to:
o
detain a person until they can be handed over to a police officer suspected of committing a
detainable offence within the public transport network or in breach of an court ordered
exclusion from the public transport network
o
use reasonable force, including hand cuffs, to affect the detention
o
search detained persons, including to conduct ‘frisk’ body searches and inspect belongings, if
they suspect the person is carrying a weapon (Queensland Parliamentary Library 2008).105
The then Minister for Transport, Honourable Robert Mickel, stated that the increased powers
were intended to allow transit officers to take a stronger stand against ‘troublemaking’ and
respond better to serious offenders who were threatening to injure people or damage property
(Queensland Parliamentary Library 2008). As of 1 March 2012, TransLink had employed 33
Senior Network Officers with the ability to use their additional powers on railways and other
public transport under the Transport Operations (Passenger Transport) Act 1994 (Translink
2012). The Act identifies that the approved training program must cover all functions and
powers granted to a transit officer, be comparable to police service training, and teach:
 appropriate use of force, including when and how to use handcuffs

de-escalation strategies

particular strategies for dealing with children, impaired persons and other vulnerable
persons

fair and respectful search methods (see Queensland Parliamentary Library 2008).
Changing the mix of services, to increase the use of support service personnel, security personnel, or
RSA hosts, for example, could assist to decrease the demand on policing resources and provide a
more affordable model of policing in Queensland.
Increased police presence to be provided using existing resources
The third option available is that police be asked to provide the increased police presence in
entertainment areas where it is warranted within existing resources; this essentially would require
that police reprioritise resources that are already available to them. It is likely that this would require
the QPS to utilise a combination of strategies, including:
 Increasing the police presence in entertainment areas receive priority as one of the outcomes to
be achieved through the Queensland Government’s 2012 commitment to increase police
numbers by 1100 over four years.
 Re-prioritisation of other resources to ensure frontline policing in entertainment precinct areas
receives appropriate priority in terms of staffing allocations and rostering.
105
For these powers, detainable offences are restricted by the Transport Operations (Passenger Transport) Act
1994 to: wilful damage of property; assault occasioning bodily harm of a person; assault of a person for the
purpose of stealing something from the person; rape and sexual assault offences under chapter 32 of the
Criminal Code.
247 | P a g e


Cross district rostering be used where possible to assist to provide the police numbers necessary
in entertainment areas. This will be easier to achieve in metropolitan areas and may not be a
feasible option in some other regional centres.
Rostering and overtime practices be altered to reduce the number of officers rostered on in
periods of limited crime and disorder (e.g. during the day from 7am-5pm), and instead ensure
that as many police as are needed are working at times that reflect the peak periods in crime
and disorder coinciding with busy nights/times in entertainment precinct areas (e.g. 10pm-5am).
User pays
The need for an increased police presence on the streets at night to manage the problems from
alcohol puts pressure on state government and local council resources. In other areas ‘user pays’
systems have been developed to ensure that businesses that sell alcohol late into the night
contribute toward the cost of policing and other services such as council cleaning. For example:

In the mid 2000s the City of Greater Geelong introduced an increased rates charge for properties
with late night liquor licenses. The higher rates were said to reflect the additional costs to
council in managing the waste and public space impacts of these premises (Allen Consulting
Group 2009; Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy 2006).

In the UK from October 2012, a new late night levy will empower local areas to make those
businesses that sell alcohol late into the night contribute towards the cost of policing and wider
local authority action. This change is intended to help enable visible and proactive policing at
targeted locations where there are local needs (Home Office 2012).
The most efficient way for the Queensland Government to administer such a user pays contribution
would be through scaling of licensing fees. For example, the Gold Coast City Council has previously
recommended that license fee revenue be allocated to support the Chill Out Zone services in Surfers
Paradise (Gold Coast City Council 2008).
The existing risk based licensing fee structure in Queensland, however, does not raise enough
revenue for a contribution to be made toward the cost of policing and support services. Licensees
pay around an extra $20,000 for an extended trading hours permit that allows them to trade until
5am. The revenue raised through this licensing system is far outstripped by police, ambulance and
other costs borne by the State of Queensland or councils in servicing this early hours trade. Further
changes to the structure of licensing fees in Queensland, however, must take into account the
consequences for businesses in terms of affordability and viability.
248 | P a g e
Box 11. Risk based licensing fees: Victoria and Queensland
In 2008, Queensland introduced a risk-based fee structure for liquor licensing. The annual licensing fees
paid by licensees are determined based on the assessed risk of each licence. The risk assessment considers
licence type, trading hours, provision of food and compliance history. In this way, the costs of liquor
regulation are apportioned to licensees on the basis of identified risk factors. A licensees’ annual licensing
fee is comprised of a base fee (which varies depending on premises type), as well as any additional fees,
which are levied on the basis of these risk factors.

Licence type — the base fee for a liquor licence varies across different licence types are: commercial
(hotel, casino or other); community (club — large); small club (other); and bottle shops.

Trading hours — licensees that trade extended hours pays a premium for each extended hours period
that it operates. ‘High risk permits’ are needed to trade between 12am–3am, and ‘elevated risk
permits’ between 3am–5am.

Food — there are five levels of risk, with two that apply for off-site sales and businesses where the
provision of alcohol is subsidiary to the primary business. The other levels are ‘prepared meals’ (a meal
is prepared on premises), ‘prepared snacks’ (finger food prepared on premises), or ‘no food’.

Compliance history — each licensed premise’s compliance history during the last financial year is
evaluated. Types of compliance activity, such as warning letters to management, infringement notices,
and prosecution or disciplinary action, comprise the scale for risk criteria.
In addition to these risk factors, all new or varied licences must complete and maintain a Risk Assessed
Management Plan (RAMP). A RAMP details information relating to a licensee’s management practices for
matters prescribed in regulation. A RAMP includes information relating to: operating hours; responsible
service of alcohol initiatives; security arrangements; provision of food; staff training; lighting; and other
factors.
In 2010, Victoria also introduced a risk-based licensing fee structure to ensure that licensees associated
with the most harm pay a commensurate fee (Allen Consulting Group 2009).
During the DSP consultations it was clear that business and other stakeholders have difficulty
understanding ‘where the money goes’ that is raised by the state from licensing fees, and efforts to
increase transparency and understanding in this respect would be well received by industry.
One complaint that was made during the DSP consultations from some licensees is that
Queensland’s risk based licensing fees place too much emphasis on the trading hours of a venues
and do not consider other factors such as venue size. A small bar that wants to stay open until 5am,
will pay the same extended training hours permit fee as one of the very large ‘mega’ clubs.
Another factor to be taken into account in considering any user pays scheme must be any other
special levies imposed on businesses in these areas. For example, the Valley Malls area has a special
levy in terms of an increased rates charge, although this levy has been imposed for some time and
was not developed because of, and does not specifically relate to the Valley’s night time economy.
249 | P a g e
De-escalation and diversion
The results of the DSP trial to date suggest that police having a strong emphasis on de-escalation and
diversion may have a substantial positive impact in terms of preventing injuries and taking the
pressure off ambulance services.
The data presented in Section 2 of this report suggest that police in the Fortitude Valley and Surfers
Paradise DSP areas in particular are commonly de-escalating situations using conflict
intervention/tactical communication. The DSP results presented in Section 3 suggest this model is
having positive effects with statistically significant decreases in ambulance calls for service to the
Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise DSP occurring during weekend drinking nights, and a
statistically significant reduction in offending on weekend drinking nights in the Surfers Paradise
DSP. In the Townsville DSP, accurate police de-escalation and diversionary activity data was not
available for the trial period. Data from after the end of the trial period following improvements to
QPS’ data recording practices were implemented does demonstrate a reasonable level of police deescalation and diversionary activity, however, much focus remains on a ‘low tolerance’ approach in
the Townsville DSP. Unlike previous evaluation findings, more recent ambulance calls for service
data suggest that this may be having a positive effect in reducing severe violence, while the police
crime reports data suggests a broader reduction in assaults.
Despite the difficulties and problems associated with the recording of de-escalations and diversion in
the Returns Sheets data (created for the QPS’ own internal monitoring purposes for the DSP trial),
we believe that the recording of these important aspects of police work is critical. Unless these
activities are recorded on Returns Sheets for the DSP trial, these activities go completely unrecorded
by the QPS. This means the QPS and the community remain virtually blind to those aspects of
policing that do not result in formal enforcement action being taken.
Consideration ought to be given to establishing a streamlined and centralised recording process to
capture de-escalations and diversions as they are important policing activities routinely conducted
as part of good street policing. Recording these practices in the central QPRIME database could
assist the QPS to demonstrate, monitor and reinforce good policing practices across the state.
Support services
The NGOs operating support/ rest and recovery services for patrons through foot patrols and from a
static service in a van in each trial site have been an integral element of the DSP trial. This model of
NGO support services developed in Queensland is unique and it represents an important innovation.
The feedback we have received throughout the trial to date indicates that the Chill Out Zone,
Chaplain Watch and the Townsville support services enjoy very high levels of support and trust
across all major stakeholders, including patrons, the police, OLGR, licensed venues and their
Accords, local councils and the ambulance service. For example, through the online surveys and
consultations:

Surfers Paradise licensees described the Chill Out Zone as an ‘incredible’ and ‘excellent service’,
one for which they ‘can’t give enough praise’.
250 | P a g e

Townsville ambulance paramedics noted that they felt the support service was effective at
providing the lower level of care for incidents that would otherwise place a strain on their
resources.

Patrons commented positively on the benefits of the coordination and integration of the support
services with other elements of the DSP trial:
The positive presence of the Police and ChaplainWatch, with support of the Chill Out
Zone, has improved overall safety of Patrons and improved capacity to keep [the] public
safe…
Awareness of the support services amongst patrons was low at the outset of the trial. However,
comparisons of results from the first to second round of online surveys indicates an improvement
(36.1% [n = 294] to 59.2% [n = 238] of patrons noticing the presence of support services). Some
patrons may remain unaware of the support services simply because they have not needed their
care, although it is important that awareness continue to be improved to ensure that patrons know
where they can go for support if the need arises.
The data from the police and support services presented in Section 2 of this report suggest that
police in the DSP areas are commonly referring people to the support services. The DSP results
presented in Section 3 suggest this model is having positive effects with statistically significant
decreases in the percentage of ‘most relevant’ ambulance calls for service to the Fortitude Valley,
Surfers Paradise and Townsville DSPs occurring during weekend drinking hours, and a statistically
significant decrease in offending on weekend drinking nights in the Surfers Paradise DSP. Overall the
conclusion that can be drawn is that the support services, together with the policing approach taken
in the DSPs, appear to have made a positive contribution to a reduction in the demand on
ambulance and policing services.
Although, the results may not be as strong in Townsville where it should be noted that the support
services took longer to get established in the precinct. These kinds of services were entirely new for
Townsville and did not have the opportunity to leverage off the previous provision of such services
as did the Chill Out Zone and Chaplain Watch in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise.
There is little doubt that the provision of support services is relatively inexpensive compared to the
cost of a police service or ambulance response to an individual. As stated by the Chill Out Zone:
As a community based organization, the service is able to offer cost−effective service delivery
that reduces strain on statutory, State Government funded services within each precinct. The
Chill Out Zone is funded approximately $4427 for each night of service (including
coordination and support), each hospital admission, police… [action] or ambulance transport
is costed at over $1000 per incident. (correspondence dated 4 September 2012 from Chill
Out Zone)
This means that in order to be cost effective, the Chill Out Zone needs only to prevent a small
number (four or five) of calls for ambulance services, or presentations at emergency departments, or
police enforcement actions on each night of its operation.
Given the economic benefits associated with well managed night time economies in which patrons,
residents and others feel safe, providing ongoing support to the NGO support services operating in
251 | P a g e
these areas would seem to be an absolute must if we are to maintain effective precinct management
strategies in our key entertainment precincts.
Each of these services had some establishment costs required at the start of the trial for the services
to become operational which they were able to absorb within the already allocated DSP funding.
Without these ‘up-front costs’, modest cost reductions compared to the amount of funding provided
for the two-year trial may be achievable to continue to provide these services without compromising
the quality of the services.
Banning orders
Use of banning orders
As described in Section 2, from December 2010, the expansion of court and police imposed banning
order powers has meant that across Queensland people can be banned for up to 12 months:
1. Under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 as part of a sentence under imposed by a
Magistrates Court, or higher court, on conviction of an offence relating to violence in or around
a licensed venue.
2. Under the Bail Act 1980 as a condition of bail where a person is accused of an offence relating
to violence in or around a licensed venue.
Other legislative changes also introduced at this time allow for civil banning orders to be imposed in
the DSP areas. However, no civil banning orders have been made to date.
In terms of banning orders that can be imposed on convicted violent offenders under the Penalties
and Sentences Act 1992 as part of their sentence:

police in the three DSPs made 347 applications to the court for a banning order over the two
years of trial

based on these applications and those where the court imposed a banning order without any
such application being made, there were 205 banning orders issued by a court in the DSPs,
primarily (47.8%) within the Fortitude Valley DSP.
During consultations police and licensees expressed some disappointment with the level at which
banning orders have been imposed on those with eligible convictions since the new powers were
introduced in December 2010. In particular, the number of police applications seeking that a
banning order be imposed on an offender that are refused by courts was a source of frustration for
some police (in the DSPs, 156 police applications were refused by the courts in the two years of the
trial, that is, in 45.0% of matters where a police application for a banning order was made, the
application was refused). Section 2 provides details of banning order applications and orders made.
The Queensland Police Service (QPS) has undertaken a range of initiatives that aim to increase the
number of such banning order applications made and reduce banning order refusals. This includes:

promotion of banning orders and associated legislation through a state wide email (June 2012)

promotion of banning orders state wide through information posters (June 2012 – every station)
252 | P a g e

incorporation of banning order legislation/application procedures into Liquor Enforcement and
Proactive Strategies (LEAPS) training (3 day course)

incorporation of banning order legislation/application procedures into LEAPS ‘train the trainer’
course (5 day course)

state and regional LEAPS coordinator/s (and DSP Inspectors) perform quality assurance of
banning order applications through QPRIME

Deputy Commissioner/s to discuss banning orders at Queensland Magistrates State Conference
2012.
Police have suggested that some magistrates appear reluctant to impose banning orders as part of
sentences, even though the application appears to meet the legislative requirements. Police have
also noted that there is often little reasoning provided when a banning order application is refused,
and that this makes it difficult to understand why an application has been refused, how to
improve/better target applications, and provides little incentive for investing time in making future
applications for banning orders.106, 107
A number of suggestions of ways to increase the number of banning order applications and their
success were made during consultations. These included that:

paperwork for banning order applications could be streamlined to reduce the police workload

more training and education be provided for police officers, particularly younger/less
experienced officers, about the availability of banning orders, the process for making an
application to the court and best practice examples of strong applications.
Some police also suggested that convictions for any violent behaviour in a DSP area ‘should
automatically come with a banning order’. Other police suggested that – although they already have
the ability to impose a banning order as a condition of bail, or issue a move on direction to exclude
people from an area for up to 24 hours – police ought to be able to directly impose banning orders
on people who behave unacceptably, without any need for a conviction or involvement of the
courts. It was acknowledged that such a scheme would need to be restricted to officers of
appropriately senior rank (e.g. at District Officer level) and that it would be important for people to
106
Most banning order applications are dealt with in the Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court deals with a
very high volume of matters relatively quickly and no reasoning or very limited reasoning may be by provided
for decisions to grant or refuse banning order applications in the Magistrates Court. Further, decisions made in
the Magistrates Court are not routinely reported in the same way as matters heard in the higher courts may
be. This means that even when reasons are provided in the court as to why a banning order application was
granted or refused it is difficult for others to access this reasoning afterwards.
107
In imposing a sentence, magistrates can consider a wide range of factors when deciding if is appropriate to
apply a banning order in the circumstances. The Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) provides that the
overarching objectives of sentencing are the appropriate punishment and the rehabilitation of an offender, as
well as the protection of the Queensland community. The Act also sets out sentencing guidelines which outline
the principles and factors that should be taken into account when making a sentencing decision. The principles
and factors that a court must consider when making a sentencing decision can be categorised according to the:
offence; impact of the offence; conduct of the offender in relation to the offence; offender’s background and
circumstances; and community interest.
253 | P a g e
have a right of review/appeal. The South Australian model for police imposed ‘barring orders’ was
cited as an example of such a scheme already in existence. In South Australia the Commissioner of
Police has the power to bar a person from a venue, type of venue, or all venues within an area, for
extended periods of time on ‘any reasonable ground’ and other senior police can bar people for
shorter periods (see Box 12) .
Box 12. South Australian ‘barring order’ police powers
The South Australian Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) explicitly provides ‘barring order’ powers to the
Commissioner of Police to ban a person indefinitely or for a specified period of time from a venue, type of
venue or venues within an area. A person can be barred on ‘any reasonable ground’. The Commissioner
can delegate this power to a Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner. The details of such a bar
must be served in writing on the person.
A South Australian police officer can ban a person for a specified period of time from a venue, type of
venue or venues within an area, with the authorisation of a senior officer (usually above the rank of
Sergeant if the ban is for less than 72 hours, and above the rank of Inspector if ban is for more than 72
hours). These bans can be given orally or in writing, although a record must be kept by police. These bans
can be imposed:
 where there a welfare concerns relating to the consumption of alcohol for the person or someone
residing with the person

if the person commits an offence, or behaves in an offensive or disorderly manner in or around a
licensed premises

on any other reasonable ground.
A ‘barring order’ varies in maximum length depending on the situation and rank of the issuing police
officer, as follows:
 police Sergeant: 72 hours

police Inspector:
o
first offence – three months
o
second offence – six months
o
third offence – indefinite.
A person who breaches the bar can be fined up to $1250. A licensee who ought to have known a person
was barred can also be fined up to $1250 in relation to a breach.
As police in Queensland already have the power to impose a banning order as a condition of bail
where appropriate, and can also issue shorter term move on directions to exclude people from an
area, it would appear that on balance no further banning powers for police are required in
Queensland at this stage. It also appears appropriate that such a major limitation on a person’s
freedom is imposed by a court upon conviction of a relevant offence and that the courts should
continue to have a level of discretion about whether a banning order should be imposed in the
particular circumstances of the case before them, rather than a banning order being mandatory
upon conviction.
254 | P a g e
Enforcement of banning orders
Views provided through consultations and the DSP survey results show that stakeholders are broadly
supportive of banning orders; they are seen as helping to improve the safety of areas around pubs
and clubs, and at ensuring the legal system can provide an appropriate response to individuals to
hold them accountable for unacceptable behaviour. Police and licensees agree that banning orders
provide a good additional tool that can help to manage high risk individuals. However, a number of
concerns were commonly raised about difficulties relating to the enforcement of banning orders.
As reported in Section 2, there have been just ten breaches of banning orders recorded across the
DSP areas (4.9% of orders issued) and five statewide outside of the DSPs areas (1.1% of orders
issued) since the strengthened banning order powers were introduced across the state in late 2010.
Consultation with stakeholders revealed that these breaches of banning orders had been detected
either:

by the same venue where the initial incident that initiated the banning order had occurred

when a banned person came to the attention of the police for further inappropriate behaviour.
The low number of breaches detected can be viewed in two ways:
1. On one view, the low number of breaches detected may be evidence of the practical difficulties
associated with enforcing banning orders. People the subject of banning orders may not be
complying with their orders and may be visiting the area from which they are banned, but these
breaches are not being detected.
2. The other view is that as so few people have been identified by police as breaching their banning
order, this suggests either: people on banning orders are complying with the order and no
longer visiting the area from which they are banned; or they are not complying with the order
and visiting the area, but are behaving appropriately and not coming to the attention of the
police. In either case, it can be argued that the banning order has achieved the goal of improving
community safety.
Given the high number of police in the DSPs and the likelihood that any troubling behaviour would
attract the attention of the police, it seems that the second scenario may provide the better
explanation. However, this may not be the case in non-DSP areas, for example, where without the
same level of high visibility police presence banned patrons may believe there is little risk of being
apprehended by police for a breach of the order.
Certainly, there are very real practical difficulties associated with the enforceability of banning
orders, and action should be taken to improve their enforceability.
What difficulties are there with enforcement of banning orders?
Currently there are practical difficulties associated with identifying banned persons in order to
enforce a ban. For police, a photograph of banned persons may be distributed to officers working
on DSP shifts as well as details of the banning order to assist in the identification of banned persons.
However, the number of different police officers who work in the DSP areas and large crowds makes
‘proactive’ identification of banned persons by police difficult. Unless a police officer has prior
personal knowledge of the person and the ban, or they happen to pick up a banned person through
255 | P a g e
some other policing interaction (e.g. when they check the QPS database for records relating to a
particular person), it is unlikely that banned persons present in the DSP will be detected by police.
Potentially it is not police but licensed venue staff (in particular, security and door staff) who are
best placed to identify banned persons contravening an existing order at the point that they seek to
enter a venue at the door. However, for privacy reasons the practice that has been adopted by
police has been that licensees are provided with only limited personal information about people on
whom a banning order has been imposed. This means that licensees must rely on the name and date
of birth details of a banned person to try and identify if that person is seeking entry into their venue.
Photos and license numbers are not currently provided to licensees to assist to enforce banning
orders. Further, as no access to a centralised database of banning order information is provided to
licensees, each licensee must maintain their own records or register of banning orders in order to
provide an up-to-date list of names to its door staff.108
During consultations it was suggested that the task of identifying banned patrons would be much
easier if changes were made to:

Provide access to a centralised up-to-date database so that venues could access the name, date
of birth, driver’s license number and a photo of any currently banned persons where the ban is
relevant to their premises.

Allow for a photos and/or driver’s license numbers of banned persons to be distributed with
name and date of birth information to those venues relevant to the ban imposed. It was
suggested that, at a minimum, providing a driver’s licence number would assist those venues
with ID scanners in use.
Although there are privacy concerns that must be taken into account in relation to police providing
licensees with photo and/or driver’s license number, it must also be remembered fair and
transparent justice means that the names and identity of offenders is generally available to anyone
who wishes to walk into our courts, and that licensees are provided with personal information of
offenders only for the purpose of assisting to enforce the law.
Can ID scanners assist?
ID scanning technology can be used to assist to enforce banning orders where such systems are used
as part of the routine door procedures. In this way banned people can be efficiently and easily
detected when they attempt to gain entry to a venue in breach of a banning order. The use of ID
scanning technology by licensed venues in general, however, raises privacy and security risks in
relation to the potential misuse of personal information which could cause financial and other
harm.109
108
Police officers have also raised concerns regarding the storage of banning order information on the QPRIME
police records database and the ability to search for current banning orders in QPRIME. It was noted by Surfers
Paradise police, for example, that they found it ‘virtually impossible to maintain a file of [current] banning
orders’. It is understood that QPS, however, is already taking steps to ensure these operational issues are
addressed.
109
Queensland’s Inquiry into alcohol-related violence conducted by the bipartisan Law, Justice and Safety
parliamentary committee recommended in 2010 that licensees trading after midnight should be encouraged
256 | P a g e
A number of different types of ID scanning systems are currently in operation in Australia and the
privacy and security risks associated with these systems can vary.

The most basic system uses a video camera that takes rolling footage of drivers’ licenses as
patrons pass through the venue door. Such systems provide no more than a record of the
‘scanned’ ID that can be manually checked if required for evidentiary purposes, for example.

A typical, quality ID scanning system uses a digital camera linked to a computer to scan and store
a photo of a driver’s licence or other ID card as well ‘reading’ and storing other information off
the card such as name, date of birth and document number. With this kind of system ID
information is scanned in and the system can use the information collected to search its
database to determine if there is a match between a person and a list of banned persons. It can
also detect if the person is underage, if the ID has already been presented by another patron
that night or if the ID has expired.

Other more sophisticated systems take an additional photo and use software to link that image
with one from a scanned ID card such as a licence. The additional photo provides a current
record of the person’s appearance. The most sophisticated systems can also store biometric
fingerprint information and link it to personal information collected from the person’s ID card
for future reference. 110
ID scanners can operate either ‘in house’, that is, they are not linked to a centralised database, or
they may share information between venues, and sometimes police, across a networked system in
real time. Such systems that share information can also share banning information, meaning a ban in
one venue can result in the person being refused entry into any other venue linked to the ID
scanning network. For example, Geelong, Western Australia and the Northern Territory have
implemented this kind of ID scanning system that provides a centralised database of people banned
throughout the entire jurisdiction (Palmer et al. 2010).
While many venues have designed their use of ID scanning technology with the Commonwealth’s
privacy principles in mind (White 2009), the current system does largely rely on venues adopting
best practice and there is little formal regulation of the way that personal information is collected
and stored by venues.111 Concerns have been raised about the lack of regulation in this area and the
associated privacy and security risks. For example:
to install ID scanner systems (Law, Justice and Safety Committee 2010a). The Queensland Government
response noted that privacy and security of the information stored by ID scanners is important and an
undertaking was given to work with stakeholders to develop best practice standards for the use of ID scanners,
taking into account research that was then underway regarding their use in Geelong (Queensland Government
2010).
110
New technology is also emerging that includes fingerprint scanning that scans the fingerprint and converts
it to a unique 300 digit pin number and links this to the scanned ID. Once the PIN is formulated the fingerprint
image is deleted.
111
Businesses with an annual turnover of more than $3 million, including pubs and clubs, are required to
comply with national privacy legislation that protects people’s personal information (the Privacy Act 1988
(Commonwealth)). Smaller pubs and clubs are not covered by the Privacy Act, and compliance with the
principles merely represents good privacy practice for these venues. The Privacy Act 1988 requires that
257 | P a g e

Specific concerns have been raised about the potential for venue staff to access the personal
information of patrons including address details, which can then be used in relation to the
commission of a crime (e.g. the residence could be robbed while it is known the person is not at
home).

When the Valley Liquor Accord announced in late 2009 that about 15 to 20 clubs in the Valley
planned to implement or upgrade their scanning systems to include new fringerprint scanners,
the Queensland Council for Civil Liberties commented that ‘There will be absolutely no privacy
safeguards in place…It’s all very well for a relevant licensee to say [the personal information will]
be properly stored, but Queensland doesn’t have any privacy laws against which their storage
records and procedures can be managed’ (cited White 2009).
In Queensland, advice regarding ID scanners and privacy and security issues is provided to venues in
the document Towards best practice for safety in licensed venues (OLGR 2012). This best practice
document suggests that the use of an ID scanning system can improve patron behaviour by
removing anonymity and advises that venues should develop and maintain a privacy policy, and
should keep personal information on banned people secure in accordance with their privacy policy.
Staff training on operational procedures and the basis of the privacy policy are also recommended.
During our consultations only a small number of stakeholders expressed concerns that the
development and adoption of ID scanning technology by licensed premises has outstripped the pace
at which the regulation and good governance of their use has been considered. Otherwise views
provided to the DSP evaluation generally indicated that ID scanners were another important tool
that could be used as part of the response to alcohol-related violence, and that ID scanning provides
reassurance to people that all possible steps are being undertaken in order to safely manage venues.
It was noted, however, that the use of ID scanning systems may not be suitable for all licensed
venues or in all circumstances. Some venues, particularly smaller venues, for example have
suggested ID scanners would be inappropriate for their type of venue and are not necessary given
the small number incidents they experience. ID scanning systems may also impose substantial costs,
with the systems costing around $10 000, although it has been suggested that some systems are
now available for around $3500. Surfers Paradise licensees during consultations also highlighted the
shortcomings in the technology in that it can limit how quickly patrons can be processed through the
door and that this can impact on the ability of licensed venues to manage queues for entry into their
venue. One suggestion that was made by licensees was that where ID scanning systems are used,
licensees should receive some discount off their licensing fees by way of incentive.
In summary, it seems that ID scanners can make a strong contribution to the enforcement of
banning orders, providing up to date banning orders for input into the ID scanning system. Pubs and
clubs require the collection and storage of personal information for security reasons and in order to
personal information be collected, used and disclosed in accordance with the 10 National Privacy Principles
which would require that businesses must tell people why they are collecting the information, what it will be
for and who has access to it. The principles would also require that businesses must limit the ways they use the
information and have strict security measures to prevent the misuse of personal information and delete the
information when it is no longer necessary for the business to have it.
258 | P a g e
exclude banned problem patrons. As long as pubs and clubs take appropriate steps to protect and
secure information, privacy issues associated with ID scanning can be appropriately managed.
Box 13. Compulsory use of ID scanning systems in Geelong, NSW
Do ID scanners improve safety in licensed venues? The evidence from Geelong, Victoria
In November 2007, the city of Geelong, Victoria – a city of about 205,000 people and one of the first in
Australia to implement a Liquor Accord – introduced a mandatory condition requiring all licensed venues
that trade after 1am to implement a networked ID scanning system.
The ID scanners were introduced in conjunction with banning orders to address excessive alcohol
consumption, maintain social order and reduce violence. Using the ID scanner network, information about
people banned from one licensed venue is shared with police and other venues in real time.
The research regarding the system suggests:

ID scanners in Geelong had little, if any, overall impact on antisocial behaviour or alcohol-related
violence, despite the common perception that they are effective (including amongst patrons). The
research found that despite the introduction of scanners in Geelong alcohol-related injuries ‘remain
prominent’.

The scanners were effective for identifying patrons subject to a banning orders and excluding them
from licensed venues. They were also helpful to police for retrospectively identifying a person when
an offence has occurred, or in order to impose a banning order on a troublemaker. The scanners were
also seen as a method of deterring underage drinkers and protecting licensees from fines and
liabilities.

The effectiveness of scanners rest on their capacity to be networked to other participants to assist in
enforcing banning orders or relaying movements of troublesome patrons between venues.

It was noted that there was little or no regulatory oversight of ID scanning systems and the
information collected and used by them in most jurisdictions. In Geelong, few privacy concerns were
raised although the research states reasons for this are not clear. It is thought that perhaps the
perceived benefits of the ID scanner were thought to outweigh the perceived privacy concerns
(Palmer et. al 2010)
The consistent use of ID scanners through a precinct would greatly assist in the enforcement of
banning orders. Such measures alone, however, are unlikely to produce any appreciable difference
to the level of alcohol-related violence, although they can also certainly assist to achieve successful
prosecutions of offenders after an incident has occurred.
Toilets and public urination
Public urination is a problem in entertainment precincts in Australia and around the world. It is often
the key amenity impact for residents and day time business in and around night time entertainment
precincts. As was discussed in Section 2, none of the three DSP sites has enough public toilets to
service the crowds that gather in these areas on peak nights, and this is clearly a frustration for all
involved. In Townsville the situation is most extreme with there being no public toilet facilities
available at all. Both the Surfers Paradise and Fortitude Valley DSPs effectively have only one toilet
block with a small number of toilets available to service the average estimated crowds on Friday of
259 | P a g e
Saturday of around 35 000 and 50 000 respectively. As one licensee in Surfers Paradise put it, ‘you
would never be able to open a venue or run an event for 35 000 people and provide two toilets. It is
crazy this is what people have to put up with here’.
These issues have been longstanding matters of concern in each of the three DSPs, although they
have been exacerbated after the introduction of the statewide 3am lockout as patrons now do not
even have the option of re-entering a venue to use the toilets after this time. The toilet and public
urination problems were not resolved through the DSP trial, although the Gold Coast City Council
conducted an important trial of a portable toilet block in that area (see Section 2 for details).
Policing of public urination
Police time and resources are spent responding to this issue, when arguably these resources could
be better spent doing other police work. In Queensland public urination is an offence, although it is
at the more ‘trivial’ end of the spectrum and police have substantial discretion as to how they will
respond. Police can ignore the behaviour, or the person may be informally cautioned or warned,
asked to move-on, or they may be formally prosecuted for an offence by way of ticket, notice to
appear or arrest.
The policing of public urination is a risky area for the police in terms of the potential for these
policing interactions to escalate into conflict and offences against police, as patrons often feel
unfairly treated by police when enforcement action is taken against them for what may be perceived
as a trivial or justifiable offence in the circumstances. We have seen this occurring in the DSP areas
when:

police initially intend to give someone a ticket for urinating in the street

that person or their friend/s becomes agitated asking police ‘haven’t you got anything better to
do with your time?’

the interaction escalates into aggression and an arrest situation, involving the officers in a use of
force and the offender/s being restrained in hand cuffs

a substantial amount of time may be spent while the arresting officer (and sometimes other
members of their team) wait with the offender/s for the van to collect them to take them to the
station, where initial processing occurs

after initial processing the matter may proceed by way of ticket, or through the court system ;
the very likely outcome for the offender is a fine (approximately $200).
For the purposes of the interim evaluation report, public urination offences were analysed in more
detail. During the first 14 months of the trial, there were 1250 public urination offences recorded
across the three DSPs sites.112 Of these offences, 824 (65.9%) occurred during weekend drinking
nights with:

Fortitude Valley accounting for 331 of these offences
112
In Queensland a person may be charged with the distinct offence of ‘public urination’. Alternative charges
also exist and these may include ‘public nuisance’ and ‘wilful exposure’ (see Summary Offences Act 2005 (ss. 6,
7 & 9).
260 | P a g e

Surfers Paradise accounting for 342 of these offences

Townsville accounting for 151 of these offences.
Figure 77 to Figure 79 below present QPS QPRIME crime report data of the location of public
urination offences recorded during the DSP trial in each of the trial areas.
Figure 77. Location of public urination offences – Fortitude Valley DSP, December 2010 to January
2012
Source: QPS QPRIME data . Map Data ©2012 GBRMPA, Google, Whereis®, Sensis Pty Ltd. Markers constructed with www.batchgeo.com.
261 | P a g e
Figure 78. Location of public urination offences – Surfers Paradise DSP, December 2010 to January
2012
Source: QPS QPRIME data . Source: Map Data ©2012 GBRMPA, Google, Whereis®, Sensis Pty Ltd. Markers constructed with
www.batchgeo.com.
262 | P a g e
Figure 79. Location of public urination offences – Townsville DSP, December 2010 to January 2012
Source: QPS QPRIME data . Source: Map Data ©2012 GBRMPA, Google, Whereis®, Sensis Pty Ltd. Markers constructed with
www.batchgeo.com.
As can be seen in Figure 77 to Figure 79, public urination offences in Fortitude Valley DSP were far
more dispersed than in the other two DSPs, with the two most likely places for public urination
offences occurring being on Brunswick Street around the train station, and in Marshall Street where
there is a small patch of parkland. Figure 78 shows that the bulk of offences in Surfers Paradise DSP
occurred in Orchid Avenue. Figure 79 shows that the bulk of offences in the Townsville DSP occurred
in Flinders Street East.113
113
QPS crime report data includes longitude and latitude coordinates that are based on the street address
entered and then derived from a property centroid (centre of a property lot) where possible, or the nearest
road intersection or middle of street block.
263 | P a g e
What has been done elsewhere?
There are many practical and relatively cheap options, particularly for ‘pissoirs’ (urinals in the
street), that have been used successfully elsewhere. In London, for example, portable pissoirs are
used in combination with permanent pissoirs and or hydraulic ‘pop up’ pissoirs. These pop up
pissoirs may be more discrete as a permanent solution, but they are also much more costly.
Within Australia, the City of Sydney has been very active and conducted trials based on the models
operating in Amsterdam , London and Canada. In Sydney progress began in April and May 2011 with
a four week trial of portable urinals in five sites in entertainment precincts with major public
urination issues. The public urinals were delivered to each site between 7pm and 9pm each Friday
and Saturday night, and were removed the following morning between 6am and 8am. Hourly
security patrols were provided by a private security company. The supply cost of the urinals was
$12,000 which included rental, delivery and pick up each weekend. The security patrols cost a
further $3000 (City of Sydney 2011).
Overall, 1600 litres of urine was collected in the urinals and therefore diverted from the streets. This
equates to an estimated 5500 individual uses. Feedback from residents generally indicated that the
urinals seemed to reduce public urination, but there was a desire for a more permanent solution.
Feedback was also generally positive from businesses and services but again, many pressed for more
permanent services. Cleansing and Waste Services indicated reductions in soiling around buildings
and odours in the city, and no increases in litter (City of Sydney 2011).
The City of Sydney now continues to provide portable urinals in key locations over the summer
months, until such a time as more permanent solutions are implemented. Over time the best
locations for the units have been refined and acceptance of the urinals also appears to have grown.
The portable urinals are now located alongside Town Hall for instance and this has not raised
eyebrows. One of the key lessons that the City of Sydney learned was the need for good
communication with local business and residents about the plans to provide portable toilets as, at
least initially, ‘no one wants to be next to a toilet’. The City of Sydney has implemented a process
whereby businesses and residents are informed about what to expect when portable urinals
installed, and then to proactively elicit feedback after the conclusion of the exercise (pers. comm.
City of Sydney 2012).114
114
In Victoria, Canada the same portable urinals as are used in London, Amsterdam and then Sydney, have
also been trialled for over a year with successful results, after which permanent urinals were installed in 2011.
264 | P a g e
Figure 80. ‘Pop up’ public urinal in London
Figure 81. Pissoir in Copenhagen
Figure 82. Type of portable public urinal used in
many places, including London and Sydney
Figure 83. Permanent public urinals in Victoria,
Canada
Figure 84. Pissoir in Amsterdam
The City of Perth has also recognised the need to respond to the problem of public urination. In
Perth, there has been a great deal of discussion about a trial of temporary public toilets within the
Northbridge entertainment precinct. It has been suggested that in Perth either the same portable
urinals as trialled in Sydney will be used, or newer more discrete models, which can be stored
underground during the day and appear out of the ground in the busy late night periods.
265 | P a g e
The inadequacies of the public toilet facilities in each of the DSP is an issue that quite simply, has
been left unresolved for far too long. Cost effective solutions must be found for implementation in
each of the existing DSP sites. If red tape is an issue in terms of the design and planning issues that
need to be confronted, then a way must be found of cutting through this in order to resolve the
problem.
Although public toilets are ordinarily an issue that would clearly be a local council responsibility, in
this case some joint council and state government action is warranted in order to get these issues
resolved. As the financial burden of the current situation is principally felt by the state through the
drain on police time and resources (although councils would also incur additional cleaning costs), it is
in the Queensland Government’s interest to work collaboratively with councils in order to get
solutions implemented as swiftly as possible.
Summary
While in terms of precinct management the DSP trial has been a clear success, this does not mean
that the existing DSP precinct management strategies cannot be improved.
Governance and coordination
Local DSP committees: Although local DSP committees have not been supported with any
additional funds, they have proven to be an effective way to improve communication between state
and local governments, licensees, venue managers, security, taxi and other transport providers,
support services and others. Improved communication paths for the local committees would further
strengthen their ability to resolve issues.
DSP Inspectors: The police DSP Inspectors have been very important to the successful governance
of the trial and improving on-the-ground coordination of all stakeholders, and the continuation of
the dedicated DSP Inspector positions is clearly warranted in the DSP areas. It may be that the size
and scope of the problem in some other entertainment precinct areas throughout the state also
warrants a dedicated DSP-type Inspector.
Local management plans: The local management plans developed by the local DSP committees
have proven to be a useful tool in order to have issues in the precinct discussed, and actions agreed,
implemented and followed up.
Police presence and high visibility policing
Proactive visible policing is vital to managing the night time economy well. Police play an important
preventative role – focusing targeted effort to reduce problems and prevent the need for more
serious enforcement action later on. The benefits of the increased police presence are said to
include that on busy nights police have been able to:
1. Provide an appropriate and rapid response when there are multiple events occurring
simultaneously within the DSP.
2. Minimise injury to officers and others.
3. Maintain the safety of volunteers operating in the trial areas.
266 | P a g e
4. Maintain a capacity to respond to normal calls for service outside precinct areas.
In addition to the increased police numbers, the use of high visibility strategies including regular
venue walk-throughs, was generally felt to have also made a valuable contribution to the success of
the trial and the confidence people expressed in the policing, safety and security of the DSP areas.
High visibility vests provide a very obvious signal to patrons and others that police are out in the DSP
areas in substantial numbers, and that troublemakers are highly likely to be apprehended. The vests
also assist CCTV operators and others to easily identify police officers in the precinct.
The practice of having taxi marshals and security staff at venue doors also wear high visibility vests,
should also be further encouraged as it may increase the general confidence in the security and
safety of an area, and will allow these people to be more easily identified at a distance, including on
CCTV.
Overtime model: The use of the overtime model to support the increased police presence was
successful, however, it is a relatively expensive policing model that cannot be sustained, or
expanded to other entertainment precinct areas, because of its cost. There are a number of options
available to reduce the costs associated with the policing of entertainment areas in the
short/medium term.
De-escalation and diversion
The results of the DSP trial to date suggest that police having a strong emphasis on de-escalation and
diversion may have a substantial positive impact in terms of preventing injuries and taking the
pressure off ambulance services. A greater use of these techniques in the Fortitude Valley and
Surfers Paradise may explain their better results in comparison with Townsville.
Difficulties and problems associated with the recording of de-escalations and diversion for the DSP
trial were noted. A streamlined and centralised recording process to capture de-escalations and
diversions should be established as they are important policing activities routinely conducted as part
of good street policing.
Support/rest and recovery services
The NGO operating support/ rest and recovery services for patrons through foot patrols and from a
static service in a van in each trial site have been an integral element of the DSP trial. This model of
NGO support services developed in Queensland is unique and it represents an important innovation.
The conclusion drawn from the data is that the support services, together with the policing approach
taken in the DSPs, appear to making a positive contribution to a reduction in the demand on police
and ambulance services in these areas. These services only have to prevent a small number of calls
for ambulance services, or presentations at emergency departments, or police enforcement actions
to be cost effective.
Banning orders
Enforcement of banning orders: There are very real practical difficulties associated with the
enforceability of banning orders, and action should be taken to improve their enforceability.
Can ID scanners assist?: ID scanning technology can be used to assist to enforce banning orders
where such systems are used as part of the routine door procedures. As long as pubs and clubs take
267 | P a g e
appropriate steps to protect and secure information, privacy issues associated with ID scanning can
be appropriately managed.
Public urination and toilets
The inadequacies of the public toilet facilities in each of the DSP is an issue that quite simply, has
been left unresolved for far too long. Police time and resources are spent responding to this issue,
when arguably these resources could be better spent doing other police work. Cost effective
solutions must be found for implementation in each of the existing DSP sites.
268 | P a g e
Chapter 16 Broader policy issues
Throughout the DSP trial one reoccurring theme that was commonly raised across all three sites and
across all stakeholders, was that the Australian drinking culture itself is a key issue that has not been
addressed through the trial strategies. Australian social norms provide a good deal of support for
heavy drinking. Having a ‘big night’, a ‘bender’, or getting ‘plastered’ or ‘shitfaced’ is a widely
accepted rite of passage for many occasions including birthdays, end of year celebrations, or for
some, any Friday or Saturday night out. Some have even suggested that Australian norms around the
consumption of alcohol have ‘turned drinking into an extreme sport’ (Australian Broadcasting
Commission 2012). Common drinking behaviours certainly include ‘drinking to get drunk’ and people
deliberately accelerating or intensifying their drunkenness through choosing to drink heavily before
going out, by having shots, or mixing alcohol and energy drinks (e.g. Jägerbombs or Energy Bombs)
to sustain energy and be able to consume more alcohol on a longer night out.
Australian drinking habits also often involve patterns of reciprocity, ‘shouts’ or drink for a drink
among friends and associates. On the positive side these drinking habits represent generosity and
camaraderie. On the other hand, such drinking behaviours can serve to reinforce that only a narrow
spectrum of drinking behaviours can constitute ‘belonging’ to the group, and people may fear being
considered ‘soft’ or ‘straight’ if they do not participate/keep up with the drinking of their friends and
associates.
In terms of our attitudes to drunken behaviours, it is largely considered ‘acceptable’ in Australia to
stumble out of pubs or clubs in the early hours of the morning—many even wear their drunkenness
as a badge of honour when recounting events. Where such drunkenness also involves falling asleep,
vomiting and urination before making it home, this is still likely to be considered pretty normal for a
big night out. A clear breach of what is ‘acceptable’ usually occurs, however, when drunkenness is
associated with antisocial and problematic behaviour such as, drink driving and alcohol-related
violence. Unfortunately, for some relatively small sub-groups of young men, drink driving may still be
considered ok, and fighting too may be considered part of the ‘sport’ of a big night out.
Given this, it may be that the most effective way to reduce alcohol-related violence in Australia is to
fundamentally shift attitudes to drinking, away from ingrained patterns of ‘drinking to get drunk’,
especially among our young people. The normalisation of ‘binge’ drinking habits, however, may be
difficult to change. Many people have commented in the course of the DSP evaluation, that while
cultural change is clearly needed, there is little chance that this can achieved as Australian drinking
behaviours and attitudes are so deeply ingrained (typified by people saying there is ‘fat chance’ of
shifting cultural attitudes, or stating that cultural change is what is needed but stating ‘good luck’ in
achieving this).
The evidence would suggest that having the right broad policy settings when it comes to alcohol can
bring about real change in the culture of drinking and drunkenness over the long term. The
challenges of increasing urbanisation and managing growth in night time economies are being faced
in cities across the globe. The same issues that we are grappling with in Queensland, are also being
tackled in areas such as the Champs Elyses in Paris, the Lower East Side in New York, West End and
Camden Town in London, and entertainment precincts in Berlin, Edinburgh and Amsterdam. At a
269 | P a g e
Section 4 Discussion - Chapter 16 Broader policy issues
national level, Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and other cities are also increasingly working to find the
right balance to control the harm associated with the availability of alcohol.
Recent trends in alcohol policy reform
In Australia and elsewhere, deregulation and liberalisation of the liquor industry through the 1980s
and 1990s has led to substantial growth in alcohol availability, both in terms of the number of
outlets and hours of trade. Along with this increasing availability, however, there is evidence that the
harm relating to alcohol has also increased (see e.g. Victorian Auditor General 2012). Certainly, since
the early 2000s growing media and public concern about night time violence in and around pubs and
clubs has highlighted that there is a need for a new direction in alcohol policy.
Decisive action to overhaul alcohol licensing to tackle the crime and disorder associated with
alcohol, and the health and social impacts, is increasingly being undertaken in other jurisdictions.
This new era of alcohol reform includes a common pattern of giving local communities more control
over the availability of alcohol in their area.
Major reforms to alcohol policy, for example, are currently being undertaken:


In the UK, The Government’s Alcohol Strategy was released in 2012 and provides the framework
for radical change ‘to turn the tide against irresponsible drinking’ including legislative changes to
introduce:
o
a minimum unit price for alcohol in England and Wales to reduce alcohol consumption
and curb pre-loading
o
stronger powers for local areas to restrict opening and closing times, control the density
of licensed premises and introduce a late night levy to help cover the cost of policing the
late night economy
o
innovative sobriety schemes to challenge alcohol-related offending
o
red tape reductions for responsible and low risk business that provide minimal alcohol
sales and are not impacting on crime and disorder.
In New Zealand, the government response to the Law Commission’s 2010 report ‘Alcohol in Our
Lives: Curbing the Harm’ (Law Commission 2010) has resulted in a program of reforms to the
country’s alcohol laws.115 The reforms include:
o
maintaining the purchase age for off-licence premises (bottleshops) at 18 years, but
making it an offence to supply alcohol to a person under the age of 18 (unless they are
the parent or guardian of the young person, or they have their consent)
o
empowering local communities to decide on the concentration, location, and hours of
alcohol outlets for both on and off-licences. Local authorities can now, in consultation
115
On 11 December 2012, legislation was passed by New Zealand Parliament which introduced reforms to the
country’s alcohol laws. Known initially in the early stages of the Parliamentary process as the as the Alcohol
Reform Bill, the legislation was later split into three bills during the Committee of the Whole House stage - the
Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012, Local Government (Alcohol Reform) Amendment Act 2012 and Summary
Offences (Alcohol Reform) Amendment Act 2012.
270 | P a g e
with their community, prepare a local alcohol policy to amend the sale and supply of
alcohol in their local area (e.g. to restrict or extent trading hours). To control for the
abuse of these powers, local alcohol policies must be reasonable and consistent with the
object of Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act (2012)
o
expanding matters to be considered in liquor licensing decision-making to include local
alcohol policies, and the impact on the local amenity
o
strengthening laws regulating alcohol promotions
o
investigating a minimum pricing regime, including the power for companies selling
alcohol to supply sales data to the Chief Executive
o
requiring on-premise licensed venues to supply to make available water, low-alcohol
beverages, food and information about safe transport options.
(Ministry of Justice 2012a & 2012b)
In Queensland, previous governments have failed to tackle many of the key issues relating to alcohol
and urban growth. For example, in 2009 Queensland imposed a temporary moratorium on extended
trading hour permits from 12am to 5am, everywhere except in existing designated entertainment
precincts. At the time there were 127 extended trading applications on foot, the vast majority of
which were not in ‘already established nightclub areas’ but in locations in the suburbs of Brisbane
and other Queensland cities (Bligh & Lawlor 2009). The Government of the day explained its decision
to impose the moratorium as follows:
We are continuing to witness a tide of anti-social, alcohol-fuelled behaviour in our pubs and
it is a situation being faced on a weekly basis by our law enforcers, our health workers,
publicans and parents and families across Queensland...
In those circumstances the community... is telling us enough is enough...
We have real, legitimate concerns about the impact of extended trading hours on local
communities, particularly in the outer suburban areas but at the same time, we recognise the
need to maintain the opportunity for Queenslanders to enjoy a vibrant night life. (Bligh &
Lawlor 2009)
The moratorium, however, provides only a short term solution to respond to proposed growth at
odds with community wishes. The blanket application of the moratorium across the State does not
allow new late night trading even in locations and circumstances where it may be appropriate.
Further, the exclusion of entertainment precinct areas from the moratorium means that in these
areas where the moratorium does not apply, stakeholders, including local councils governing such
areas, have only a limited ability to influence the growth of late night economies in accordance with
community wishes, local plans or to promote a healthy mix of night time activity in the long term.
Neither maintaining the existing moratorium, nor simply removing it, is likely to provide a
sustainable solution. A more nuanced and long term framework to guide the expansion of late night
trade is needed in Queensland. Ultimately the goal in Queensland should be to develop vibrant
entertainment precincts that:

contribute to the development and expression of a city identity
271 | P a g e

provide additional opportunities for businesses through extended operating hours

encourage responsible drinking patterns and discourage potentially harmful drunken behaviour

revitalise towns and cities by attracting community members and consumers

create new forms of engagement and participation in community life

provide solutions to law and order problems by increasing the type and frequency of human
traffic in underused spaces

promote culture and the arts precincts (Rowe et al 2008).
In Queensland there is work to be done to make ensure that we have the right framework in place to
ensure liquor licensing decisions provide the best outcomes for our communities in the future. To
achieve this goal, the following key areas require attention and reform:
1. Planning and liquor licensing frameworks to:
o
provide more control to local communities so that they can manage the concentration
of licensed premises in an area through mechanisms such as cluster control, saturation
zone or cumulative impact provisions
o
promote diverse and mixed night time economies, even in our key entertainment
precincts.
2. Effective education and social marketing to assist to change social norms around drinking to
excess.
3. Changes to the way Responsible Service of Alcohol is managed and enforced to assist to change
the drinking culture.
4. Current advertising restrictions to assist ensure there is a level playing field for businesses and
address issues associated with cheap booze and pre-loading.
Improving planning and liquor licensing frameworks
Improved council and community control over the availability of alcohol in
local areas
Outlets that sell liquor are required to have both a planning permit from the local council and a
liquor licence from OLGR. Both the planning approval and liquor licensing approval processes
provide an opportunity for the impact of the outlet to be a considered in decision-making to a
certain extent. However, the feedback we have received through DSP consultations strongly
indicates that local communities should be given more say regarding the development of their local
night time economies than is provided for in by the current legislative frameworks.
Limits may be required on the expansion of the night time economy, even in designated
entertainment precincts, for reasons that include the following:

In Section 1 of this report we have outlined the growing body of evidence that demonstrates an
association between the concentration of licensed premise in an area and a range of alcohol-
272 | P a g e
related harms. If governments are to tackle alcohol-related harm, including crime and disorder,
limits on such concentration must be imposed.

If we consider key recreational areas in our own cities and towns that have been developed with
a more mixed day and night time economy, where alcohol is one integrated feature but not the
dominant one - such as at Southbank in Brisbane – these areas do not have the same association
with alcohol-related crime and disorder as those areas that are much more heavily focused on
drinking alone. Nor do these areas require the intense police and ambulance response required
in Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise or Townsville, even when large crowds of people are
gathered for celebratory occasions.

Imposing limits on the growth of licensed premises may be required when an area has reached
the limits of its infrastructure. For example, in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise the road and
footpath congestion at night raises the possibility that - unless there are infrastructure changes
or innovative (and expensive) new measures taken (such as night time road closures) - on this
basis alone these areas may have reached the limits of the existing infrastructure.

Imposing limits on the growth of licensed premises may also be required to ensure an area can
retain its character as mixed day time and night time economy in line with the wishes of its local
community and council. For example:
o
In the Broadbeach area of the Gold Coast there may be a desire to control or cap the growth
in licensed premises in order to maintain that area’s character and reputation as having a
large al fresco dining market. During consultations concern was expressed that some 3am
licenses in the area have recently been extended to late trading 5am licenses as the
Broadbeach entertainment precinct is excluded from the current moratorium on late night
trading licenses.
o
Currently, however, it is felt that there is little that can be done to prevent the area from
becoming increasingly becoming dominated by licensed venues, providing applications meet
the current requirements.
Planning and liquor licensing frameworks should also provide the ability to ensure that areas
undergoing renewal and involving a rapid growth in the night time economy, do not become
peppered with ‘dead zones’ or places where the concentration of licensed premises is such that the
character of an area is lost and there are spaces that only really come alive at night.
In Brisbane, areas of the city that have emerging night time economies include, for example, Oxford
Street in Bulimba and Boundary Street in West End. At the moment these areas retain a mixed day
and night use, with an important focus on food and dining at night. Working with local councils,
businesses and communities, planning and liquor licensing decisions should be able to control the
development of such areas to ensure that the character of an area is not completely transformed
against the wishes of the local community and that the local green grocer and other shops, for
example, are not replaced by a large concentration of licensed venues (or late night traders) allowed
to open because it would be anti-competitive to do otherwise.
Councils are often the key source of local community input into liquor licensing decisions. Currently,
however, the capacity for councils or community interests to influence liquor licensing decisions is
relatively limited. For example, during consultations we heard that councils, in particular, felt it was
273 | P a g e
very difficult to have the issues of outlet density taken into account under the existing planning or
liquor licensing frameworks. Further, it was felt there was little point in trying to limit the growth of
licensed trade as even if a decision was made to refuse a license on the basis of council’s
submissions, the matter would be likely to ‘end up at the Queensland Civil and Administrative
Tribunal’ (QCAT).116 Existing case law does suggest it may be difficult to successfully limit licenses or
extended trading hours applications, except in particular circumstances. This is because of the
limited opportunity and ability to demonstrate that ‘cumulative’ impact or ‘saturation’ needs to be
taken into account in refusing a liquor license or extended trading hours permit.
For example, one case that did consider the issue of outlet density involved a decision by OLGR to
provisionally grant an on-premises (cabaret) license and extended hours permit for a proposed
premises to be known as ‘The Consortium’ which was to open in the Flinders Street East
entertainment precinct in Townsville (Townsville CBD Licensees Safety Association Inc v Chief
Executive, Liquor Licensing Division, Tourism, Fair Trading & Wine Industry Development and Amigos
Leisure Hospitality Pty Ltd [2007] QCCTL 4 (18 July 2007)).117 The original decision was appealed by a
group of concerned licensees operating in the area.

On first hearing the appeal, a study by Donnelly et al (2006) was referred to. This research shows
that that outlet density is an important factor to consider when trying to minimise alcoholrelated harm ([2007] QCCTL 2 (19 February 2007) [at para 96]). The Tribunal, however, found
that there was inadequate information about the situation in the Flinders Street East area and
ordered that OLGR obtain a report from QPS about alcohol-related incidents in this
entertainment precinct.

Following the receipt of the police report the matter came before the Tribunal again. The report
showed that there had been an increase in crime in the area, however, the Tribunal agreed with
a suggestion from police that this may be linked to other factors such as an increased police
presence in the area. The Tribunal felt that there was no indication that Flinders St East was
reaching saturation and granted the license for the Consortium. 118
116
QCAT has the power to review liquor licensing decisions under s. 21 of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld). Prior to
the introduction of QCAT, such appeals were heard by the Queensland Liquor Appeals Tribunal.
117
This case was prior to the 2009 amendments that introduced consideration of ‘community impact’ rather
than ‘public interest’ and prior to the introduction of QCAT.
118
The Australian evidence has expanded since this matter was dealt with. However, the evidence remains
unclear about whether there is some precise threshold level of density of alcohol outlets where assaults
become a serious problem.
 The analysis of Burgess & Moffatt (2011) of the central city area of Sydney suggests that there is a strong
linear association between the concentration of licensed premises and the number of assaults. Assuming
the association is causal, doubling the number of licensed premises in an area is likely to result in doubling
the number of assaults, whereas halving the number of licensed premises would halve the number of
assaults. This linear association suggests that there is not a threshold and that the effects are not
dependant on a particular level of base rate.
 In contrast, Livingston (2007) who analysed data from greater Melbourne (excluding the CBD), suggests a
non-linear relationship and that as the outlet density of pubs in an area increased, it reached a critical
point after which violence rose sharply.
274 | P a g e
While Queensland’s moratorium on extended trading hours has provided a temporary and partial
solution to this issue, a long term solution must be found.119 A range of solutions are being
implemented elsewhere using the following mechanisms:
1. Saturation Zone provisions. The creation of saturation zones has been used to limit the number
of new licenses granted in some areas of Cardiff in the UK and Vancouver in Canada, for
example. In these areas local government has been devolved licensing authority powers. In
Cardiff ‘saturation zones’ can be established by the local authority, in conjunction with police, to
respond to concerns over the number of licensed premises and crime rates. Such zoning makes
it harder for new liquor licenses to be granted within the saturation area. Within the saturation
zone, there is a presumption that new licenses will be refused. A license will only be granted if
the applicant can demonstrate the proposed venue will have no detrimental effect on the
objectives of: prevention of crime and disorder; public safety; prevention of public nuisance or
protection of children from harm.
2. Anti clustering provisions. Such provisions apply to certain types of premises in some areas of
Vancouver, Paris and New York (Matthews 2009). For example:

Under by laws enacted by the City of Vancouver, new premises within 50m or 5000m of
existing premises are restricted.

In some areas of New York a ‘500ft’ rule applies to prohibit bars within a 500ft radius of
three or more existing such licenses. This rule has assisted to control the rapid expansion of
the night time economy in some areas. The concerns were twofold. Firstly, this growth led to
an increase in rents and a reduction in small grocery stores and other neighbourhood
retailers that had historically been the mainstay of the economy in the area and were
integral to the area’s character. Secondly, this growth was generating street frontages which
were only truly active at night.

In Edinburgh planning policies have the capacity to declare an area is at ‘saturation’ with
licensed premises or is an ‘area of sensitivity’.

In Paris in a ‘protected area’ determined under national legislation, no new licenses can be
issued within 75m of an existing licensed premises, hospital or church. The administration of
liquor licenses is overseen by police.
3. Cumulative impact provisions.

In the UK, the latest round of alcohol reforms seek to strengthen cumulative impact
provisions so that liquor licensing decisions can be ‘rebalanced’ in favour of the community.
Changes will ensure, for example, that cumulative impact policies can be used more
effectively to manage growth by reducing the evidentiary burden associated with the
119
Similar temporary freezes apply elsewhere. In Kings Cross in Sydney a freeze has applied since 2009 to new
liquor licenses and extended trading hours. In November 2012, this freeze was extended until December 2015
and a range of other restrictions introduced. A freeze on issuing new late night liquor licences applied to four
local government areas in Victoria (Melbourne, Stonnington, Yarra and Port Phillip) was also extended.
275 | P a g e
decision to apply the policy and ensuring that the cumulative impact applies to both on and
off license trade. In an effort to give local communities more input into decisions, local areas
also are to have more ability to restrict alcohol sales late at night if they are causing
problems.

Since 2008 Victoria has been developing its system to allow cumulative impact to be
considered in decisions (see Liquor Control Reform Act 1998). Cumulative impact refers to
both positive and negative impacts that can result from clustering a particular land use or
type of land use. Cumulative impact is a product of the number and type of venues present,
the way they are managed, and the capacity of the local area to accommodate those
venues. It should be noted that the poor quality of data available on alcohol-related harms
in an area can hinder the effectiveness of cumulative impact provisions (Victorian Auditor
General 2012).
This issue is also currently under consideration in NSW, where the state government through OLGR
has engaged the Allen Consulting Group to release a discussion paper and undertake a research
project to identify the positive and negative impacts that may result from the clustering of licensed
premises/liquor outlets within a location. It states ‘The challenge facing the NSW Government is
balancing the economic and social benefits of a vibrant hospitality industry while minimizing the
harm associated with alcohol consumption... This research forms part of a work program that is due
to be completed by the end of 2012 ... [to] provide a robust evidence base for policy formulations
into the future’ (Allen Consulting Group 2012). This work has lead to the development of an
Environment and Venue Assessment Tool (EVAT) which will be trialled for new liquor licence
applications in the City of Sydney and City of Newcastle for one year from early 2013. The EVAT
provides a weighted, structured assessment of location risk (which includes both external and
market factors) and venue risk. These risk assessments are then considered as part of determining
whether a licence should be granted or not, or what special conditions should be placed on the
approval (Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing 2013).
Internationally, it should be noted that very often local councils have a great deal more control,
including the power of veto, over the availability of alcohol than is currently the case in Queensland.
In our consultations local governments, in particular, told us they need to be given a greater say in
determining when an area has reached saturation point in terms of licensed premises, and to ensure
that areas are able to be developed in a way that prevents licensed premises from becoming the
dominating use and main character of key public spaces. Having noted that, councils also stated that
they would not want to be lumbered with liquor licensing responsibility without financial
compensation.
Better integrating liquor licensing and planning frameworks
Currently, there is a lack of alignment between development and planning approval process, and
liquor licensing processes. The two separate processes of Council’s land use approval and liquor
license approval are not integrated.
During consultations we heard a range of concerns about the lack of integration between planning
frameworks and liquor licensing processes/frameworks. For example:
276 | P a g e

The Gold Coast City Council has argued over a long period that there is a need for greater
integration between councils development assessment/land use processes and liquor licensing
frameworks and processes (Gold Coast City Council 2009). For example, problems have arisen in
the past where an applicant has obtained council development application approval for a land
use that is not indicative of/consistent with a licensed venue (e.g. ‘indoor recreation’), but the
applicant may still apply for and obtain a liquor license from OLGR that allows them to operate
as a pub or club. As the licensed use of the land use was not foreseen by council during the land
use assessment, the council has not been able to apply any land use conditions to mitigate
potential impacts.

A number of stakeholders in the Valley also expressed concern about the number of different
legislative/regulatory boundaries defining different parts of the Valley for different purposes. For
example, each of the areas is defined for regulatory purposes within the Valley but they do not
share a common boundary:
o
the Special Entertainment Precinct area regulates live music and noise
o
the Valley Malls Advisory area which relates to Brisbane City Council rates and levies
o
the Brisbane City, Caxton St and Fortitude Valley Entertainment Precinct area defines
that part of the Valley excluded from the current moratorium on extended trading hour
permits
o
the DSP boundary primarily defines the area that is the focus of the increased police
presence and high visibility policing strategies during the DSP trial)

The Valley Chamber of Commerce, in particular, has suggested that a simplified
and unified policy and legislative framework would provide more integrated and
holistic economic development and management of the day and night time
economies of the area.
Mixed night time economies in entertainment precincts
Having licensed premises, and late trading premises, concentrated in entertainment precinct areas
can provide multiple advantages. Having a cluster of many venues of various styles, sizes and
atmosphere can be fun and can certainly add to the interest and excitement of an entertainment
precinct area. This concentration of venues arguably also allows for the more efficient provision of
key services and infrastructure such as policing and transport to assist to manage drunkenness,
crime and disorder. Defined entertainment precincts are able to coordinate licensees, police and
other stakeholders in order to provide a range of ‘event style’ precinct management strategies (as
described above in the DSP trial).
Such a rationale underlies the imposition of the current late night trading hours moratorium and the
exclusion of entertainment precinct areas from this moratorium. In this way suburban areas are
protected from the crime, litter, vandalism, noise and other drunken behaviour that can be
associated with the increased availability of alcohol, especially with large nightclubs and pubs that
trade until late. Whereas entertainment precinct areas have been segregated as areas where the
night time economy can be allowed to expand, sometimes despite a community desire to see this
expansion occur in a particular way. Even in designated entertainment precincts there may be a
277 | P a g e
need for limits to be imposed on the expansion of licensed premises (especially late night or large
sized venues).
Around the world there is a strong trend toward ensuring that planning and liquor licensing
decisions can promote the development of mixed use areas and impose limits on the dense
concentration of licensed premises, even in entertainment precinct areas.120 For example, Suzie
Matthews, Manager, Late Night Economy for the City of Sydney Council received a Churchill
Fellowship in 2009 to talk with a range of professionals about the management of night time
economies across the globe; she visited and spoke to experts in Canada, the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Germany. She concluded that policy
makers, police and academics interviewed supported the development of frameworks that promote
a more dispersed rather than concentrated night time economy (Matthews 2009; pers. comm.
2012).
While there is not necessarily a ‘one size fits all’ solution, the existing evidence suggests that in some
areas, night time economies in Queensland could benefit from frameworks that allow their further
diversification. The Brisbane City Council has been active in trying to encourage the development of
a vibrant and mixed economy in the Fortitude Valley area. In Surfers Paradise, the Surfers Paradise
Alliance Limited121 commissioned an economic impact assessment of the Surfers Paradise night time
economy (AEC 2012). It indicates that patron expenditure in the precinct was estimated to amount
to $1.1 billion annually across three peak nights (Thursday, Friday, Saturday) and $400 million across
off-peak nights (Sunday to Wednesday). Spending on alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks represented
the highest proportion of this expenditure at $584.63 million or 39% of estimated annual
expenditure (day and night) within the Surfers Paradise Precinct. The next highest proportion of
annual expenditure is food ($177.97 M, 12% of total expenditure) and shopping, excluding food and
drink ($158.58, 11%). The survey also revealed 70% (n = 296) of respondents were in the precinct
during the peak night time period primarily to visit pubs and clubs.122
120
There are some areas of Amsterdam that perhaps provide an exception to this general proposition,
however, in these areas of highly concentrated night time activity there are very low levels of residential use,
meaning there are relatively low levels of complaint about noise and other amenity impacts (Matthews 2009).
121
Surfers Paradise Alliance is the official management and marketing authority for Surfers Paradise and is run
by an independent board of five directors representing commercial and tourism interests in the precinct,
including licensed venues, accommodation providers, outdoor amusement industry, architecture and design.
The AER report was released in draft form only in May 2012. Surveys were conducted with 423 Surfers
Paradise Precinct patrons in two locations in Surfers Paradise over three peak periods (Thursday, Friday,
Saturday between 9pm and 1am). This sample size reflects 1.5% of the estimated peak period patron
population of 35 000 and 0.4% of the estimated annual patron population. Respondents were most likely to be
male (n = 239, 56.5%) and aged between 18 and 24 (n = 282, 66.7%). It is not clear to what extent it might be
considered representative of Surfers Paradise entertainment precinct patrons.
122
Similar studies have not been undertaken in Townsville and Fortitude Valley. In Townsville, however, the
Flinders Street East area provides and extended street frontage area that is almost exclusively dominated by
licensed premises with some fast food outlets. While some licensed premises host live music, there is little
diversity in the night time economy in this area of Townsville. The nearby Palmer Street area, however, has
more a more mixed use, and a focus on restaurant dining. The Fortitude Valley area does include many
278 | P a g e
In contrast, evidence from Sydney would suggest that the night time economy there is more
diversified and less dependent on the sale of alcohol. The City of Sydney Council commissioned UK
economic measurement specialists TBR and MAKE associates to produce a cost-benefit analysis of
the Sydney night time economy (Bevan, Turnham & Lester 2011). The report revealed that the
estimated sales turnover in 2009 of the City of Sydney night time economy was $2.7 billion (3.2% of
the total sales turnover) and was considered a key economic driver. Unlike the Surfers Paradise night
time economy which in economic terms appears drink dominated, the most important core activity
in the City of Sydney night time economy, in terms of employment and financial value, is food-led
trade.
The authors of the Sydney study compared the economic activity within the City of Sydney night
time economy with that of Westminster in the United Kingdom, a night time economy of similar size.
Table 26 shows the proportion of this turnover accounted for by expenditure on alcohol is similar
across Westminster and the City of Sydney.
Table 26. Core night time entertainment activities comparison between City of Sydney and
Westminster
Area
Drink (A$M)
Entertainment
(A$M)
Food (A$M)
Total (A$M)
Sydney (working
age population
69,700)
$425.0 (15.7%)
$868.6 (32.1%)
$1,408.5 (52.2%)
$2,702.1
(100.0%)
Westminster
(working age
population
236,000)
$653.1 (14.7%)
$601.9 (13.6%)
$3,168 (71.7%)
$4,422.9
(100.0%)
Source:
Adapted from City of Sydney report (Bevan, Turnham & Lester 2011).
The City of Sydney has recently released a draft strategy and action plan for 2012-2030, Open
Sydney: future directions for Sydney at night. This strategy provides a long term vision for the
development of the city and night, and is strongly focused on activating public space to support a
diverse night time economy (City of Sydney 2012). In developing its long term framework to manage
the growth of its night time economies, it has set targets for mixed and diverse night time business
as follows:

40% of business open after 6pm will be shops

100,000 jobs in Sydney’s night time economy

lower densities of very late-trading licensed premises in key late night areas
restaurants and some performing arts/theatre venues. It also retains an important focus for Brisbane’s live
music scene, although live music may have accounted for a more significant proportion of business in the past.
279 | P a g e

growth in diverse night time economy outside the City of Sydney local government area.
An approach that allows for the development of diverse and mixed night time economies is
consistent with evidence that shows there is an association between the density of licensed
premises and alcohol-related harms; it also assists to provide some greater control to communities
and local councils about how they would like to see areas developed into the future.
By creating a more mixed night time economy, not so heavily focused on drinking as the key activity,
it is also possible that we can also work toward creating a more ‘integrated’ culture of alcohol
consumption in the longer term. Entertainment precincts developed in this way, may include late
opening shops, night markets, restaurants, cinemas, cultural venues, and more alcohol-free activities
to attract a range of people including families and older people undertaking a range of activities into
these spaces at night – not just younger people ‘drinking to get drunk’. This in turn may assist to
bring about some cultural change in the drinking habits of young people over time. In mixed use
areas alcohol can have an important part in recreational life, without its segregation into specific
times and places where drunkenness features heavily as an acceptable and key aim of drinking.
Data, planning and decision making
One of the difficulties for government planning and liquor policy decision-making in Queensland, is
that our liquor licensing data and other data showing the extent of alcohol-related harms lets us
down. For example, our liquor licensing data does not allow the growth in the number and type of
liquor licenses in an area to be tracked easily over time. Nor can liquor licensing data provide
information as to the patron capacity of venues in a particular area. More fundamentally, the
current location data does not allow for accurate spatial analysis to be conducted. This poor quality
data means that councils cannot easily access accurate current or historical information about the
number and characteristics (e.g. trading hours) of licensed premises in their local government area,
or to accurately gauge the prevalence of alcohol-related harms.
OLGR advise that data on the growth of liquor licenses in an area or patron capacities is not currently
readily available in Queensland as there is no legislative provision for OLGR to consider such
information in the liquor licensing application process. However, this lack of data adds to the
difficulties of precinct planning and management (e.g. in terms of ensuring proper infrastructure
development and service provision), and impacts on the ability to make sound liquor policy
decisions, such as determining when there is a need to limit the availability of alcohol in an area.
Without such data it is difficult to see how Queensland can have a fully informed consideration of
these issues.
Education and social marketing
Education
During consultations it was frequently stated that more effort needs to be put into preparing our
young people before they turn 18 about responsible and safe drinking behaviours. Similarly, a recent
media article noted ‘we leave school knowing precisely how to calculate the area of a trapezium, yet
we’re not taught pragmatic methods of controlling our drinking habits when we’re chucked out into
a world where there’s a pub on every street’ (Nunn 2012). During consultations several stakeholders
also noted that despite the need for bar staff to have done Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA)
280 | P a g e
training, there was very little education of young people about the potential effects of alcohol, or
about societal expectations of acceptable and unacceptable drunken behaviour.
Education and persuasion are amongst those interventions for which there is mixed or somewhat
less evidence of effectiveness at reducing alcohol-related harm. The National Preventative Health
Taskforce (2008) considered that based on international evidence, interventions based on education
and persuasion were the seventh most effective of 39 forms of intervention to reduce alcoholrelated harms. In contrast, the British Medical Association (2008) concluded that the use of public
information and educational programs have been found to be largely ineffective at reducing heavy
drinking and alcohol-related problems. Other reviews of the evidence overall suggest that schoolbased education does not reduce alcohol-related harm, although public information and educationtype programs do have a role in providing information and increasing attention given to alcohol on
the public agenda (see e.g. Anderson, Chisholm & Fuhr 2009).
While overall the evidence may be mixed, there are particular education programs that appear to
show promising results.
Box 14. Prevent Alcohol and Risk Related Trauma in Youth (PARTY) program
The Prevent Alcohol and Risk Related Trauma in Youth (PARTY) program is a one day in-hospital program
that educates high school students about risk-taking behaviour and trauma injuries. It currently operates
across five countries and three sites in Australia — Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital (RBWH), Royal
Perth Hospital and Melbourne’s Alfred Hospital. The program commenced in Queensland at RBWH in April
2010 and is offered to groups of 20–30 school students and runs fortnightly during school terms. The
complete cost of running the program is approximately $3000 per session. The RBWH program is funded
through the RBWH foundation, which relies on sponsorship from external agencies (e.g. Queensland Reds
and Broncos). It does not receive funding from the Queensland Health (QH) budget and has not been the
subject of a formal funding request. International and Australian evaluations of the program have found
promising results:

Canada — over a 10 year follow up period participants were significantly less likely than nonparticipants to have speeding offences, alcohol offences, seatbelt offences, any other offences, or a
subsequent collision. Hospital data revealed that participants were also less likely to experience a
traumatic event, took longer to experience an event and experienced events that were less severe.

Royal Perth Hospital — participation increased the proportion of students responding that they would
definitely not engage in specific risk-taking behaviours (e.g. drink driving) immediately after
participating and at a three to five month follow up (Banfield et al 2011; Royal Perth Hospital 2007;
Stallones 2004).
Social marketing
Social marketing involves the application of commercial marketing principles and strategies to
influence behaviours to benefit the wider community and target groups (Donovan & Vlais 2005). Like
commercial marketing which aims to sell goods, social marketing aims to sell socially acceptable
behaviours (Grier & Byrant 2005; Kotler & Lee 2008).
Social marketing campaigns can have positive results in altering social norms, values and behaviours,
even those norms that are entrenched. There is some evidence for the effectiveness of social
marketing campaigns in changing alcohol consumption patterns and strong evidence to suggest that
281 | P a g e
social marketing strategies can reduce the prevalence of other problematic social behaviours — such
as smoking (Gordon, McDermott, Stead & Angus 2006; Zimmerman 1997). For example, a metaanalysis of 48 public health campaigns in the US, found that 9% of the population altered their
behaviour as a result of the campaign (Synder & Hamilton 2002); a further meta-analysis of 72
studies demonstrated positive effects of campaigns on youth in relation to substance abuse
(Andreasen 2004).
Not all social marketing campaigns, however, are successful and very few social marketing
campaigns in Australia have been evaluated. Where campaigns have been evaluated, the evaluation
has tended to focus on the spread of the campaign messages among the target audience rather than
the impact of the campaign on behaviour change per se. The available evidence suggests that:

Campaigns that have positive messages and communicate alternative non-violent behaviours
may be more effective than campaigns that use shock-tactics or alarming messages. For
example, an evaluation of the Victorian Your Moves/Championship Moves campaign,
participants reported being encouraged by the inclusive message in the ‘moves’ and felt that the
campaign was promoting positive behaviour rather than attempting to admonishing negative
behaviours.

Campaigns that engage peers and advocate young people to take responsibility for their friends
are promising. For example, an evaluation of the Your Moves/Championship Moves found that
just under half of respondents understood that the key message was to ‘look after your mates
while drinking’. For example, the ‘Ghost Chips’ drink driving video advertisement run by the New
Zealand Transport Agency reached over one million views within two weeks of being launched
on YouTube (Backhouse 2011). The authenticity of the video, use of humour and ability for
young people to relate to the scenario presented are thought to be the keys to its popularity.
Although the actual behaviour change impact of the video is unknown, the widespread reach
and positive comments posted online recognising the move away from ‘shock’ tactics as having
more impact indicate the potential for success (Johnston 2011).

Campaigns that are anchored in personal choice and advocate personal responsibility warrant
further attention and evaluation. For example, it has been suggested that participants in
initiatives such as the Hello Sunday Morning campaign are more likely to continue with the
program because they have committed themselves to a personal blog and their social networks.
An evaluation of the Drinking Nightmare campaign suggests that educating young people about
alcohol consumption and risk may impact on future drinking behaviours.

Campaigns that include situations which the target audience can readily identify with and relate
to appear to influence the likelihood of young people recalling this information.
One challenge of these kinds of campaigns is that most social marketing strategies rely on at least
one person in a group of young people being sober or in a position to make rational choices, or they
rely on young people remembering these messages and desirable behaviours and initiating them
when they are intoxicated.
The Queensland Government’s largest social marketing campaigns about drinking in recent years
came about largely in response to the tragic death of Paul Stanley's son Matthew, who was 15 when
282 | P a g e
he died after being punched outside a teenager's party in Brisbane's east in September 2006. These
campaigns have included:


The One Punch Can Kill campaign that was launch at the end of 2007. This campaign has aimed
to provide a reminder of the shocking reality that simple acts of violence can have tragic
consequences. The consequences of assault don’t stop at injury or death.
o
Assault can steal your future and your actions could result in negative impacts on your
family; your employment; overseas travel, the guilt of taking another person’s life and
could possibly result in a criminal record.
o
Victims of assault don’t always walk away with just a bruise. Permanent disability,
ongoing care by family and friends, employment and future prospects taken and the
inability to travel overseas can all result.
The Every Drink Counts campaign from 2009 that aimed to curb binge drinking. This campaign
aimed to use confronting images of young men and women in life-threatening situations as a
result of drinking too much alcohol.
Both campaigns have involved cinema advertising, online graphics, posters in toilets, radio and press
advertising.
During the trial, most notably the Valley Liquor Accord (VLA) and the Valley Chamber of Commerce
have promoted the message ‘Your Playground. Play Nice, Play Safe’ and these kinds of local social
marketing campaigns are important and should be supported. In addition, universal campaigns
promoting the current Australian guidelines around safe levels of drinking on any single occasion
(e.g. ‘no more than four’), would be worthy of consideration.
Drinking water
Many people have a general awareness that it can assist to drink water between alcoholic drinks.
The take up of the free water offered by the Chill Out Zone and the feedback provided to us through
our surveys suggests that there is a great deal of support for the provision of free water as a simple
but useful strategy to help reduce drunkenness and alcohol-related harm. In the latest round of the
online survey, 71.4% of patrons (n = 287) indicated they believe the supply of free drinking water
inside licensed venues to be an effective strategy to improve safety.
A social marketing campaign to ‘make every second a water’ is thought to have made an important
contribution to strategies that changed drinking behaviors and reduced alcohol-related crime in the
Stockholm Prevents Alcohol and Drug Problems (STAD) initiative. This initiative is world renowned
because it is said to be the only alcohol-related prevention program that has achieved sustainable
reductions in alcohol-related violence and crime (Graham & Homel 2008). The STAD approach is
based a partnership of more than 10 years of all stakeholders as well as a sophisticated regulatory
model that incorporates evidence-based practice and balances organisational capacity building,
training and enforcement. Key personnel involved in the STAD project credit the ‘make every second
a water’ campaign as one of the critical components that contributed to successfully shifting cultural
attitudes of young people to drinking in Stockholm (pers. comm. Prof. Andreasson 2011).
283 | P a g e
Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA)
The majority of people consume alcohol responsibly and, equally, the majority of retailers take their
responsibilities toward selling alcohol very seriously. However, our policy setting needs to send a
clear message that we will no longer tolerate those who behave drunkenly and unacceptably in
public or those who sell alcohol irresponsibly. Changes to the way responsible service of alcohol
(RSA) is monitored could assist to achieve this and change the levels of tolerance for risky drinking
behaviour.
RSA forms an important part of the management of the availability of alcohol in Queensland given it
is an offence for licensed premises to serve alcohol to intoxicated persons under the Liquor Act 1992.
From 1 January 2009, it became mandatory for licensees and staff involved in the service and supply
of liquor in Queensland to have completed a RSA training course conducted by an approved
trainer.123 RSA training provides information about an important set of strategies for licensed venue
staff to recognise and respond to signs of alcohol intoxication among patrons, including by refusing
service to such patrons. RSA training takes about four or five hours to be completed online or in
person.
The evidence about RSA presented in Section 1 shows that while initial demonstration projects in
the 1980s showed promising results for RSA programs, attempts to broadly implement the RSA
approach throughout communities have proven somewhat more difficult to show the desired
results.

For example, in Western Australia in the 1990s research was conducted using pseudo-patrons to
examine the compliance of bar staff with WA liquor laws prohibiting service to drunken people.
Serving practices were examined during 120 visits to hotel and nightclub bars, and more than
350 drink orders were placed by pairs of pseudo-drunk actors who ordered up to three drinks
each on each visit. Pseudo-drunks were refused service by bar staff on only 12 occasions in only
10% of visits; that is, on 90% of occasions servers failed to comply with the WA liquor law. Partial
interventions by servers, such as offering food or low-alcohol or non-alcoholic drinks, occurred in
only four instances of the 120 visits (Rydon, Stockwell, Lang & Beel 1996).

In NSW, surveys conducted by the NSW BOCSAR suggest that RSA responses in NSW licensed
premises have improved from 2002 to 2011:
o
In 2002, the survey showed that very few respondents (10%) who reported that they were
showing signs of intoxication while drinking at licensed premises (such as slurred speech,
staggering or falling over, spilling drinks, or loud or quarrelsome behaviour) experienced any
of the standard RSA responses that licensed premises staff are supposed to provide.
o
In 2006, a second survey showed improvements in the provision of RSA to those showing
signs of intoxication (15%) after the requirement for mandatory RSA training was introduced
in NSW and the roll-out of the NSW Police Alcohol Linking Project. The Linking Project
requires police to record information about the last place at which offenders reported
123
As of June 2013, responsibility for the regulation of RSA trainers transferred from the state government to
Commonwealth Government.
284 | P a g e
drinking and this information is used to provide licensed premises with routine reports
about incidents involving patrons from their premises.
o
In 2011, a third survey showed a further increase in the provision of RSA responses to
intoxicated patrons (19%) and that intoxicated patrons were more likely to be asked to leave
(12% up from 4% in 2006). Since 2006, NSW has increased enforcement activity on licensed
premises by NSW police and OLGR. From March 2008, BOCSAR also released a running 12
month list of the top 100 licensed premises for assault incidents and the top 48 of these had
license restrictions imposed (Donnelly 2012).
Monitoring compliance with RSA obligations through ‘pseudo-patron’, ‘mystery- shopper’ or ‘test
purchase’ strategies has proven to be an effective way of increasing compliance elsewhere.
Individual company performance has been shown to improve when staff are aware they may be
randomly tested, and these strategies also appear to be successful in ensuring an increased focus on
RSA from management. For example:

As part of the Stockholm Prevents Alcohol and Drug Problems (STAD) initiative actors pretending
to be intoxicated were sent to licensed premises to determine how often bar staff refused
service. The actors modelled carefully agreed and practiced scenarios of severe intoxication
warranting refusal of service that included the pseudo-patron stumbling and dropping coins on
approach to the bar, slurred speech when ordering, falling asleep on the bar and then waking up
to order another drink. Initially very few such pseudo-patrons were refused service showing a
high tolerance of intoxication – Stokholm at the outset of the STAD project had a very permissive
drinking culture. The use of these pseudo-patron studies have, however, attracted controversy
on the basis of allegations of ‘entrapment’ (pers. comm. Prof. Andreasson 201; Wallin,
Gripenberg, & Andreasson 2005).

In the UK the use of ‘mystery shoppers’ or independent test purchases is relatively common. In
these areas the local authority has the power to conduct test purchases that may result in the
loss of a license, and it is considered best practice for businesses themselves to commission
independent test purchases of the sale of alcohol to those underage so that they can measure
and improve their own performance. For example, Serve Legal is one company that provides an
independent test purchase service in the UK. It sends young looking 18 or 19 year old visitors to
enter licensed premises and purchase age-restricted items (e.g. alcohol or cigarettes). Serve
Legal records key information about the transaction including whether ID was requested, a
description of the server, a till receipt (if provided), plus some other key facts. Reports are
provided back to the business (not the regulator) (Serve Legal 2012).
In Sydney a different approach has developed to reinforce the RSA approach. The Hangover Squad
provides venues with RSA ‘Hosts’ who focus not on RSA but on ‘the responsible consumption of
alcohol’. The Hangover Squad work proactively in collaboration with security and venue
management but don’t wear uniforms and are inconspicuously dressed with radios on their belts, an
earpiece and an ID on their belt. The Hangover Squad work to identify people before they get to the
point where RSA would require them to be asked to leave, and they seek to intervene at this earlier
point in a friendly way with those out to have fun. The emphasis is on conversation with the drinking
customer, providing water, reminding people to have something to eat, and getting rapid drinkers to
slow down. In Sydney this ‘RSA Marshall’ role is to be extended from licensed premises to public
285 | P a g e
space and public events to provide water and take a not too serious approach to whether a person
has had enough to drink at an early point than RSA obligations would kick in.
Compliance with RSA requirements in Queensland is currently monitored through OLGR’s proactive
inspections of licensed venues and reactive investigations of complaints. OLGR also reinforce the key
RSA messages through educative strategies, such as the forums held during the trial with staff from
licensed venues within the DSPs (including licensees and managers through to bar staff and
‘glassies’).
There are recognised limitations with this approach, particularly related to the limited time OLGR
compliance officers have to directly (yet covertly or unobtrusively) observe the serving practices of
licensed venue staff. Data collected from OLGR during the DSP trials (see Section 2) demonstrates
that breaches of Responsible Service of Alcohol are not often detected or the subject of
enforcement action. Licensees also commented during consultations that they felt they were
constantly being ‘pinged’ for minor breaches, yet rarely see action for serious breaches observed in
troublesome venues. Given the seriousness of the issues associated with RSA, this is unlikely to
reflect a blasé approach by OLGR to monitoring these obligations. Rather, it most likely reflects the
limitations of the current approaches used to directly monitor compliance with RSA obligations in
Queensland. Given these limitations, it is appropriate to consider alternatives strategies for
monitoring drink serving practices to ensure compliance with RSA requirements, as has happened in
other jurisdictions.
During the trial, the Surfers Paradise DSP local committee was proactive in identifying two emerging
issues – commercial pub crawls and alcohol mixed with energy drinks – as being of concern.
Commercial pub crawls seem to operate in Surfers Paradise on a large scale, making this issue
relatively unique to that area. These two issues both pose challenges for Responsible Service of
Alcohol obligations, as well as the broader ability of agencies to manage the precinct. See Box 15 and
Box 16 for details.
Commercial pub crawls
During the DSP trial, the Surfers Paradise local DSP committee discussed concerns regarding the
impact of pub crawls on safety and amenity within the precinct. In particular, they noted: increased
intoxication levels in pub crawl patrons; and public safety and amenity issues associated with groups
of up to 300 people moving through a busy, congested area with little supervision.
Stakeholders from Gold Coast City Council, Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation and police in
Surfers Paradise have agreed that there is a need to further review what authority currently exists to
regulate the activities of the commercial pub crawl groups. The outcome of this activity in Surfers
Paradise will be important to consider in terms of ensuring that local communities have the ability to
effectively respond to issues within their area.
286 | P a g e
Box 15. Pub crawls
Pub crawls (also known as a bar tour, bar crawl or bar-hopping) involves a group of people moving
between a series of pubs and bars, stopping for a limited period of time in each consume alcohol. A pub
crawl group moves between the venues either by walking or bussing – depending on the distance
between venues and style of pub crawl.
A pub crawl may be organised as either a:

commercial pub crawl tour group

commercial party bus tour group

community event

social group.
Despite an overwhelming amount of literature on many facets of alcohol consumption, drinking cultures
and managing the associated harms, no Australian research into pub crawls could be identified.
Internationally, the research is also limited and unclear. A British study found that high alcohol
consumption was common amongst pub crawl patrons, with around four out of ten participants recorded
as drinking more than recommended weekly limited in one night alone (Quigg, Hughes & Bellis 2011).
However, an American study found that participants in a college campus pub crawl were 70% less likely
to be ‘highly intoxicated’ than other patrons at the same bar who were not part of the pub crawl (Dodd,
Khey & Miller 2012).
Alcohol and energy drinks
Caffeinated drinks such as ‘Red Bull’ and ‘V’ are collectively referred to as energy drinks. The drinks
are regulated as Formulated Caffeinated Beverages under the Australia New Zealand Food Standards
Code (the Code):

The amount of caffeine allowed is a maximum of 320mg per litre so that a 250mL can contains
about 80mg which is about the same amount of caffeine as in a cup of coffee.

These drinks are required to carry a statement on the label that they are not suitable for
children, pregnant women and those sensitive to caffeine.

The label must also state the maximum one day quantity which is two 250mL cans or one 500mL
can.
Caffeine can be added as the pure substance or as extract of guarana, a Brazilian plant.
Energy drinks have become increasingly popular and available in Australia over the past 5-10 years,
as has the consumption of energy drinks with alcohol. This includes both premixed options such as
‘Pulse’, as well as freshly mixed drinks such as ‘Red Bull and vodka’ and ‘Jager Bombs’.
287 | P a g e
Box 16. Alcohol mixed with energy drinks
Energy drinks claim to have benefits to the user in terms of increased energy, endurance, stamina and
performance. Along with a greater than 20% increase in the total volume of energy drinks consumed
between 2009 and 2010 (Haffner 2011), a current trend is the mixing of energy drinks with alcoholic
beverage (AmEDs) in either a pre-mixed or freshly mixed form.
A recent survey by the University of Tasmania of 403 young people (18-35 years old) found that when they
drank AmEDs they had, on average, 2.5 energy drinks with 7 standard drinks of alcohol in one sitting, up to
a maximum of 10 energy drinks and 20 standard drinks of alcohol (Salleh 2012).
Internationally, results from American studies highlight the positive effects youth associate with these
drinks. Youth report consuming AmEDs so they can consume more alcohol, stay awake for longer, have
more energy and more fun, and to hide the taste of the alcohol (O'Brien et al 2008; Gunja & Brown 2012).
The evidence suggests that there are a number of side effects that can arise from consuming energy drinks,
including short term psychological, behavioural and health impacts.

Psychologically – consuming AmEDs can alter a person’s perception of their level of intoxication,
making them more likely to consume more alcohol as they believe they are less intoxicated than they
really are (O'Brien et al 2008; Song et al 2008; Kuhns, Clodfelter & Bersot 2010)

Behavioural –AmED consumers may be more likely to engage in dangerous behaviour, including unsafe
or unwanted sexual activity, drink driving or drug use, and can be more likely to be hurt or injured
compared with others who do not consume these drinks (Miller 2008; O'Brien et al 2008; Song et al
2008; Thombs et al 2008).

Health – the excessive consumption of alcohol due to an altered perception of intoxication can lead to,
on a short term basis, symptoms such as seizures, anxiety, increased heart beat, abdominal pain,
vomiting, nausea, jittering and respiration difficulties Seifert et al 2011).
The long term effects of consuming alcohol and energy drinks are still unknown. The existing research has
not established a clear causal link between consuming AmEDs and alcohol-related violence. Any connection
may be indirect and flow from the increased levels of intoxication that has been associated with consuming
AmEDs.
Recommended daily consumption limits contained on energy drinks currently do not cover situations when
they are mixed with alcohol. Internationally, there have been moves in some jurisdictions to ban the sale of
AmEDs (Oregon Liquor Control Commission 2010; King 5 News 2010; Redwine 2010), mandate the display
of signs warning of the dangers (City Council of Thousand Oaks 2009) or introduce new labelling
requirements (Health Canada 2011).
Within Australia, in 2011 the West Australian Director of Liquor Licensing implemented a ban on the serving
of AmEDs in Perth entertainment districts after midnight (The Advertiser 2011). In February 2011, the
Australian and New Zealand Ministerial Council On Drug Strategy requested the Intergovernmental
Committee on Drugs develop a plan responding to the ‘growing trend’ of AmED consumption and the
‘associated dangers’ (Ministerial Council On Drug Strategy 2011: 1). As a member of this Committee, the
Queensland Government is participating in the review and expects the findings to inform future policy
development in this area.
288 | P a g e
Advertising
There is a link between advertising and people’s alcohol consumption, particularly young people.
Some countries have introduced a complete ban on alcohol advertising (Norway) or a ban on TV
advertising with other controls (France) to tackle this. Alcohol advertising in Queensland is already
subject to controls that seek to prevent advertisers targeting and appealing to young people.
Recently there have been moves to further incentivise sport to break its strong ties with alcohol
advertising, sponsorship and promotion.
During the DSP trial the issue was repeatedly raised about bottleshops being able to advertise cheap
and discounted alcohol much more freely than pubs and clubs. For example, takeaway alcohol prices
may be advertised in newspapers while the prices of alcoholic drinks in a licensed venue must not be
able to viewed from outside the venue. Many licensees strongly believe that there is a need to
create a more level playing field so that these different regulatory regimes are not, in effect,
unintentionally encouraging people to pre-load and purchase large quantities of cheap alcohol from
bottleshops to drink at home or elsewhere before going out to pubs and clubs.
The latest round of the online survey identified pre-loading as a common practice with the vast
majority of patrons reporting that they drink alcohol at least ‘sometimes’ before going out to the
DSP (85.6%, n = 344) – usually (56.7%, n = 228) less than two hours before leaving to go to a licensed
venue and involving consuming 1 to 4 drinks (67.6%, n = 272).
Data on the number of people refused entry by security or door staff to eight different licensed
venues in the Townsville DSP was also supplied to the evaluation for a 22 week period (week ending
21 August 2011 to week ending 15 January 2012). The data showed that during this period a total of
7841 people had been refused entry into one of the licensed venues, an average of 356 per week.
The majority (61.8%, n = 4847) were refused entry due to intoxication.124
Stakeholders also regularly commented on pre-loading during consultations, reflecting their
observations of an increase in pre-loading in recent years. Possible solutions were identified by
stakeholders, such as advertising restrictions, but also including education programs for young
people before they turn 18 about responsible service of alcohol obligations (e.g. so they know they
will be refused service).
Summary
This chapter looked beyond precinct management strategies to consider broader alcohol policy
issues in order to find long term, sustainable solutions to help reduce alcohol-related violence and
other harms associated with Queensland’s pubs and clubs. Australian social norms, which provide a
good deal of support for heavy drinking, are a key issue that has not been addressed through the
trial strategies. The evidence would suggest that having the right broad policy settings when it
comes to alcohol can bring about real change in the culture of drinking and drunkenness over the
long term.
124
The remaining people were refused entry due to ‘other’ reasons (30.0%, n = 2355) – unsuitable for the
venue, nearing intoxication or dress code issues; presenting a fake or unacceptable ID (3.8%, n = 298);
suspected drug use (3.6%, n = 280) or being banned from the venue or precinct (0.8%, n = 61).
289 | P a g e
Improving planning and liquor licensing frameworks
Improved council and community control over the availability of alcohol in local areas: The
feedback we have received through DSP consultations strongly indicates that local communities
should be given more say regarding the development of their local night time economies than is
provided for in by the current planning approval and liquor licensing approval processes.
Better integrating liquor licensing and planning frameworks: The two separate processes of
Council’s land use approval and liquor license approval are not integrated.
Mixed night time economies in entertainment precincts: it is also possible that we can also
work toward creating a more ‘integrated’ culture of alcohol consumption in the longer term by
creating a more mixed night time economy, not so heavily focused on drinking as the key activity.
Entertainment precincts developed in this way, may include late opening shops, night markets,
restaurants, cinemas, cultural venues, and more alcohol-free activities to attract a range of people
including families and older people undertaking a range of activities into these spaces at night – not
just younger people ‘drinking to get drunk’. This in turn may assist to bring about some cultural
change in the drinking habits of young people over time.
Data, planning and decision making: One of the difficulties for planning and liquor licensing
decisions in Queensland is that our liquor licensing data and other data is quite limited. For example,
our liquor licensing data does not allow the growth in the number and type of liquor licenses in an
area to be tracked easily over time. Nor can liquor licensing data provide information as to the
patron capacity of venues in a particular area.
Education and social marketing
Education: Education and persuasion are amongst those interventions for which there is mixed or
somewhat less evidence of effectiveness at reducing alcohol-related harm. However, there are
particular education programs that appear to show promising results.
Social marketing: Social marketing campaigns can have positive results in altering social norms,
values and behaviours, even those norms that are entrenched, including changing alcohol
consumption patterns.
Drinking water: Many people have a general awareness that it can assist to drink water between
alcoholic drinks. The take up of the free water offered by the DSP support services, for example, and
the feedback provided to us through our surveys suggests that there is a great deal of support for
the provision of free water as a simple but useful strategy to help reduce drunkenness and alcoholrelated harm.
Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA)
RSA training provides information about an important set of strategies for licensed venue staff to
recognise and respond to signs of alcohol intoxication among patrons, including by refusing service
to such patrons. RSA training takes about four or five hours to be completed online or in person.
Data collected from OLGR during the DSP trials demonstrates that breaches of Responsible Service
of Alcohol are not often detected or the subject of enforcement action. Given the seriousness of the
issues attached to RSA, this is unlikely to be reflective of a ‘blasé’ approach to compliance from
290 | P a g e
OLGR and more likely to suggest that better targeted compliance strategies may be required.
Monitoring compliance with RSA obligations through ‘pseudo-patron’, ‘mystery- shopper’ or ‘test
purchase’ strategies has proven to be an effective way of increasing compliance elsewhere.
During the trial, the Surfers Paradise DSP local committee was proactive in identifying two emerging
issues as being of concern – commercial pub crawls and alcohol mixed with energy drinks.
Advertising
There is a link between advertising and people’s alcohol consumption, particularly young people.
During the DSP trial the issue was repeatedly raised about bottleshops being able to advertise cheap
and discounted alcohol much more freely than pubs and clubs. Many licensees strongly believe that
there is a need to create a more level playing field so that these different legislative restrictions are
not, in effect, unintentionally encouraging people to pre-load and purchase large quantities of cheap
alcohol from bottleshops to drink at home or elsewhere before going out to pubs and clubs.
291 | P a g e
Chapter 17 Considerations for future evaluations
The evaluation of the DSP trial represents an important piece of work for alcohol-related violence
research in Queensland; a crucial first step in addressing what the parliamentary inquiry into
alcohol-related violence described as an “apparent lack of comprehensive, reliable data relating to
alcohol-related violence” (Law, Justice and Safety Committee 2010, p. 15).
Prior to the conclusion of the trial, in early November 2012, the Queensland Audit Office
commenced an audit of the DSP trial. The final audit report from the Auditor-General was tabled in
parliament on 21 May 2013. Whilst containing only one broad recommendation, the key findings of
the Auditor-General’s report identify some more specific challenges faced by the DSP evaluation
project that would also be faced by any future evaluations of a similar initiative.
This chapter focuses on a consideration of these challenges, informed and supplemented by the
experiences of conducting the evaluation of the DSP trial. It is hoped that this provides a greater
understanding of the challenges faced, and choices to be made in evaluating a trial of this nature;
and ultimately then, a basis for strengthening future evaluations. These considerations are
particularly pertinent for any future roll-out or modification of the DSP model.
The considerations for future evaluations fall under two areas:

data collection – including the limitations of key alcohol-related administrative datasets and how
these might be improved.

evaluation design – the challenges faced by the DSP evaluation that have broader implications
for future evaluations of similar initiatives, and for evaluations more generally.
Data collection
The following key limitations in how data is routinely collected by agencies who are on the frontline
responding to alcohol-related violence and harm were identified (as well as some potential options
to address them):

Queensland Ambulance Service calls for service data – no ready identifier to indicate that a
particular call for service is alcohol or drug related.
o
electronic Ambulance Report Form (eARF) data from the QAS does provide more specific
details about the injuries and condition of a patient, however, it is entered with a clinical
focus, primarily as ‘free-text’ (not structured fields) and on a patient basis rather than
incident/call for service basis (e.g. one call for service could have multiple eARF records
for multiple patients). Regardless, the linking of these two data sources could provide
richer information for evaluations; although this is currently not performed on an
automatic or routine basis.
o
Ambulance calls for service and eARF data could be improved by the automatic
population of the eARF record with the CAD record ID number for a call for service.
292 | P a g e
Section 4 Discussion- Chapter 17 Considerations for future evaluations


Hospital emergency presentations data – the location data collected is limited to a patient’s
residential postcode; no data on the location, date or time of the injury that lead to the
presentation is routinely recorded.
o
The Queensland Injury Surveillance Unit (QISU) has additional data capture screens
implemented in the emergency department computer systems of some of Queensland’s
major hospitals to collect more specific injury cause, type, time, date and location data.
However, this system was not available consistently for the baseline and trial period in
any of the DSP sites.
o
Alternatively, hospital EDIS data could be improved by automatically (or simply)
populating each presentation record (where they presented via ambulance) with the
QAS eARF record ID number (which, as above, should include a link to the call for service
record). This would create a ‘chain of data’ which would enabling the linking of an
ambulance call for service (including the specific date, time and geo-coded location) with
the further injury detailed collected by the responding ambulance officers and finally the
resulting presentation at a hospital ED (if transported to hospital).
Queensland Police Service calls for service – the location data collected is limited to street
addresses (street number and name/intersection & suburb) and is not geo-coded (precise X and
Y map coordinates) and police division/station allocated to the call.
o

Queensland Police Service de-escalation and diversionary activity data – this data is not collected
routinely, but only through the use of special ‘Returns Sheets’ for specific operations or for trials
such as the DSPs. The ‘Returns Sheets’ are not designed for continued, or day-to-day use so they
can be cumbersome to complete and errors with data entry were experienced during the trial.
o

From mid-2011, the QPS has progressively rolled-out a new CAD system (QCAD) to the
police communication centres to significantly improve functionality for calls taken and
dispatch, including using a map-based system. This system may produce higher quality
data for evaluative purposes.
The creation of a streamlined, centralised collection system for this data (focused on
collecting the most relevant data only in the simplest form possible) would assist in
addressing the data entry challenges faced.
Queensland Police Service crime reports data – some types of crime are susceptible to
underreporting (e.g. non-fatal violent offences) and may also be subject to changes in policing
numbers, strategies or their use of discretion. These limitations are common to all police crime
reports data; they are not particular to Queensland. However:
o
This does not make comparisons using crime reports data invalid, particularly where it is
reasonable to assume that the level of underreporting remains constant (over time or
between different areas). In other cases, it is the impact of the change in policing
numbers or practices that are of particular interest to the evaluation; and in such
instances, interpretation and consideration of the results alongside information gained
from other data sources is crucial.
o
Sufficient time also has to be allowed for an appropriate data settling period (minimum
six weeks), data extraction, quality assurance and data cleaning/preparation prior to any
293 | P a g e
technical/statistical analysis. The DSP evaluation encountered repeated problems with
the accuracy of the data extracts provided, in part due to the complex nature of the data
requests. However, these same problems would likely be encountered again by any
project looking at specially designated precincts or areas (although, minor
improvements to QPS data systems and extraction procedures would alleviate some
problems).

Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulations licensing data – historical liquor licensing data is not
currently available in Queensland as the data is only available as a ‘point-in-time’ source. This
restricts analysis of how precincts have grown or developed over time. The details of the venue
approved for a liquor license do not include details of patron capacity or size, so analysis of the
type of venues located within an area is typically limited to licensing categories (e.g. hotel,
restaurant, community club) and trading hours (e.g. midnight, 3am or 5am close).
o
Liquor licensing data could be improved with the inclusion of patron capacity or venue
size information, which may be possible with closer links to fire safety approvals.
In broad terms, the Centre for Youth Substance Abuse Research (CYSAR), in Technical Report 3
(analysis of 24 months of trial data) commented that the “analysis would have been greatly
enhanced if each of the databases included an ‘Alcohol Flag”. By this, they mean “a mechanism by
which police, medical or ambulance staff could quickly and easily record if alcohol had been
involved” (White et al 2013, page 7).
The documenting of these limitations is not to suggest that the analysis of these data sources is
unreliable or unwarranted; as CYSAR also commented in Technical Report 3:
Whilst there has been considerable discussion surrounding the use of administrative
databases, there are several key strengths to this data – it is accessible, uniformly collected
over time and jurisdictions, is cost effective, and represents grass roots activity. Indeed, the
World Health Organisation endorses the use of administrative data for the purposes it has
been used for in this report. (White et al 2013, page 7)
Rather than debates over the merit of using administrative data, the focus should be on how best to
improve the quality of the data so that it allows for reliable reporting on outcomes, not just outputs.
Clearly, ensuring that the focus of ‘frontline’ workers whose responsibility it is to collect this data
remains on service delivery and not data entry must remain the first priority. However, it is possible
to have systems that produce rich, quality data for outcome reporting purposes that are also simple
and quick to use. Improving systems and data can also benefit service delivery as well as assisting in
any evaluation process. Innovations to this effect are already underway for some systems – for
example, the new QCAD system where the map-based system will make call taking and dispatch
easier, while also providing better quality location data for evaluations ; or are available for use
where this is an interest and commitment (e.g. the QISU injury surveillance screens).
Evaluation design
The evaluation of the DSP trial, as with all evaluations of this nature, has been designed to suit the
program design and implementation of the trial, data availability, resources allocated and
timeframes for reporting. Although the methods adopted are believed to be the strongest possible
294 | P a g e
in the circumstances, a number of challenges have been faced that should be considered in
designing future evaluations.
Timeliness
The timeliness (and timing) of reporting has been a critical challenge for the DSP evaluation,
highlighting key issues around expectations of the evaluation, access to reliable data extracts and
necessary timeframes for robust data analysis and reporting.
The typical purpose of an evaluation is to assess whether a trial project or program has achieved its
desired objectives with a consideration then of why or why not. The results of the evaluation can
then inform decision-making about the future of the trial – whether it is continued, varied or ceased.
A complete and valid assessment of a two-year trial period necessitates a final evaluation report
after the conclusion of the trial. Recognising that government decision-making would have to occur
before the end of the trial (at least to implement an interim arrangement), the DSP evaluation
planned for the first analysis of data to cover the first 14-months of the trial period (the minimum
believed to be at all reliable, given peak seasonal effects), a subsequent update of these data
following 18-months of the trial and a final evaluation considering the full 24-months of the trial.
Expectations that the DSP evaluation was intended to inform modifications of the trial within the
two-year trial assume a different purpose for the evaluation. Evaluations can certainly take the form
of ‘action research’ aimed at incorporating a problem solving dimension, but such an approach
raises a different set of challenges, including ensuring that the capacity to assess the impact of the
trial as a whole (i.e. if the program model is constantly modified what exactly is being evaluated
across the two-year trial period?).
Action research or continuous monitoring of the impact of a trial also requires certain conditions to
be met, such as agency data systems and processes supporting ready and timely data access – a
particular challenge for the DSP evaluation. For example, analysis of police crime reports data
involves a six week settling period to ensure that the majority of the data entry has been completed
validated and then several weeks for extraction from the database. Depending on the volume of
data, data cleaning and analysis can take several more weeks. Ultimately the process can take
months, by which time opportunities for progressive problem solving may have been missed.
Common methodology vs. ‘place-based’
The DSP evaluation utilised a common methodology across the three DSP sites to assess the
effectiveness of the trial. This methodology was designed (as mentioned above) to reflect that across
the trial sites the core elements of the trial (i.e. high visibility and increased policing presence, rest
and recovery support services, local committees) were commonly implemented; and the key
administrative data were close to identically collected (e.g. standard procedures for QPRIME crime
report or ambulance calls for service data entry) and available (noting some discrepancies in
baseline data availability). The methodology also reflected what was achievable given the limited
resources available to the evaluation (i.e. a single dedicated project officer).
An alternative approach to this methodology would have been to have the evaluation planned and
conducted at a ‘place-based’ level. The key benefit of such an approach is that the evaluation would
then be more reflective of the ‘place-based’ design of the trial itself, where the focus is on local
295 | P a g e
solutions to local problems. The evaluation would be able to analyse in much more detail the
nuances of how the trial is operating, and its potential impacts at a local level.
Conducting genuine place-based evaluations can be resource intensive, particularly given the need
for local level, primary (first-hand) data collection, however, analysis at this level would help to
answer the question what works, under what circumstances and is particularly valuable for local
level decision-making. This information is less useful, however, in allowing comparisons between
sites to be made, and is therefore limited in terms of informing government decisions regarding the
model as a whole. According to the researchers, the “Cairns Model” place-based evaluation suggests
that the Realist Evaluation methodology has potential to overcome this issue through its cumulative
evidence gathering model.
Even with local-level data collection, it is arguable that a place-based evaluation methodology would
still have features in common with the existing DSP evaluation methodology, including the use of
government administrative data (e.g. police crime reports, ambulance calls for service and hospital
ED presentations) to measure the impact of the trial.
To this effect, the development of a ‘place-based’ evaluation must consider what objectives will be
measured and how will these be compared between sites (including how elements of a trial
common across trial sites are measure consistently for comparability); what valid, reliable data
sources will be relied upon to measure these objectives; and consequently, how it is to be resourced.
The research carried out so far through the evaluation project for the ‘Cairns Model’ for communitybased crime prevention in the night-time economy provides an example of both the benefits of a
‘place-based’ approach and the challenges faced. The ‘placed-based’ approach has enabled the
evaluation projects to be innovative and responsive to local conditions. This has included conducting
detailed observations from the camera network control room and the hospital’s Emergency
Department, comprehensive analysis of the camera network incident log data, collecting licensed
venue security incidents reports and implementing an additional layer of data collection at the local
hospital to identify whether emergency department (ED) presentation was the result of an alcoholrelated assault in the defined entertainment precinct area. In addition to these particular data
sources, regular police crime reports data has also been collected. The combination of such data
collection has allowed the analysis to provide particularly insightful results, such as the finding that
the camera network combined with the street security teams were able to intervene in 40% of
assaults within the entertainment precinct and the matching of ED presentations to alcohol-related
assaults as recorded in camera network, venue security or police data.
However, this approach has required an intensive amount of resourcing (time and funding). The
researchers invested a considerable amount of time in planning the analysis, developing
relationships with the key stakeholders to build trust, designing and implementing the individual
data collections tools in the Emergency Department, Queensland Police Service, CCTV system and
licensed venues. Additionally, regularly feeding back the results to all stakeholders in a transparent
and appropriate way was resource intensive. The “honest-broker” role of university involvement
was also critical. Relationships with stakeholders were vital to accessing the data, such as being
allowed to observe within the camera network control room or implement the additional data
collection in the hospital emergency department – an environment that is, quite justifiably, resistive
of any additional burdens on staff. The intensive level of resourcing required is demonstrated
296 | P a g e
through the limited time periods that the evaluation has been able to cover – 18 hours of camera
room observations, 206 days of camera network incident log data and matching of ED presentations
with alcohol-related assaults recorded by the camera network, security or police over baseline and
follow-up period’s, each of three month duration. This level of data collection has been supported
with various research grants, however, more resources are required to continue or extend the
evaluation project.
Assessing individual strategies
The DSP evaluation has assessed the trial as a package of strategies implemented in the three trial
sites. It has not been able to distinguish the impact of individual strategies from each other (for
example, increased, high visibility policing versus the rest and recovery support services). The project
documentation for the DSP evaluation has been clear from the outset that this was not the intention
of the evaluation. It is also the case that some of the best research of this kind in Australia does not
attempt to do this, with the focus on assessing strategies implemented or policy changes as a whole
(see Burns and Courmarelos 1993; Jones, Kypri, Moffatt, Borzycki and Price 2009; Moffatt, Mason,
Borzycki and Weatherburn 2009). Expectations that even an assessment of individual strategies
would produce pure results and definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of one strategy over
another are unrealistic as all analysis will still be underpinned by some assumptions.
Despite this, it is a common expectation amongst stakeholders that an evaluation will be able to tell
them what parts worked, what parts didn’t work and why. Future evaluations of ‘place-based’ trials
need to continually address these expectations, having regard to the key barriers:

the simultaneous implementation of a package of strategies, not just one strategy – the success
or otherwise of one strategy may be reliant on the performance of other strategy. Attempts to
resolve this by leading the design of a program to suit the needs of an evaluation rather than
address an identified problem raise considerable ethical risks in terms of experimenting with
human beings.

availability of control sites – trials focused on a ‘place-based’ approach have no obvious, valid
control sites as the conditions of another area are highly unlikely to be identical or controllable
so they don’t change for the length of the trial.

availability of control groups – as the trials target particular places not people, it is not possible
to identify a control group of identical people but who are not subject to the trial and assess
them against key objectives for comparison to a ‘trial group’.
Target outcomes
A related challenge is the setting of target outcomes for the trial, or its constituent individual
strategies. The DSP evaluation measured outcomes in a number of ways and through triangulating
multiple data sources to ensure that a robust assessment of the initiative was made. Specific targets
for each data measure were not set as there are no reliable previous results or clear pattern in other
research to develop these from. As CYSAR, in the Technical Report 3 explain, “Neither one dataset
nor one particular analytic approach will provide definitive answers. Rather, it is a process of
bringing together and triangulating findings across evaluation methodologies and data sources”
(White et al 2013, page 7).
297 | P a g e
In addition, the nature of the trial meant that local committees and agencies identified issues and
developed solutions based on their experience and knowledge, rather than to meet any predetermined targets. Successful reductions have been identified as those that can be supported by a
number of data sources, may be statistically significant and are meaningful to the local areas.
The DSP evaluation results may provide some indicative results for future trials and evaluations to
use in considering setting target outcomes. However, the results found through the DSP evaluation
support the position that there are no clear patterns in expected results for trials of this nature – the
results vary considerably between trial sites depending upon the actions taken and historical trends
in each site.
Cost analysis
The DSP evaluation has not included a cost-benefit assessment (CBA) or cost effectiveness
assessment (CEA) within its scope as it was not within the technical expertise of the evaluation team.
While it is becoming more common for evaluations of programs to include an assessment of the cost
impact, it should be recognised by evaluators and understood by stakeholders that conducting a
CBA/CEA requires specialist skills. For the DSP trial it was determined that, although outcomes data
would be available through evaluation (e.g. changes in the rate of incidents per weekend drinking
night) that a CEA/CBA was not possible as much more analysis would need to be conducted by the
relevant agencies to determine a general cost for police (per offence) and ambulance (per call out)
services.
It is also worth noting that while a CBA/CEA would be ideal, they are not common for similar
initiatives in Australia. A recent review of CBA/CEAs and their application to crime prevention and
criminal justice research concludes that very few CBAs and only a few CEAs have been conducted in
the Australian criminal justice field (Dossetor 2011). The majority of CBAs that do exist in this field
relate to the economic assessment of drug courts, focusing primarily on the effectiveness of drug
treatment and recidivism. All the CBAs described in the paper (which are primarily from the UK and
US) have been based on programs that lend themselves to stronger experimental evaluation designs
than the DSP trial.
One example of a cost benefit analysis of a similar place based alcohol-initiative conducted relates to
the Stockholm Prevents Alcohol and Drug Problems (STAD) initiative. This CBA built on an extensive
10 year research partnership that involved an extensive and well resourced academic team; it is
recognised as perhaps the leading example of research in this area (see Månsdotter, Rydberg, Wallin
et al, 2007).
Summary
The evaluation of the DSP trial represents an important first step in addressing the lack of reliable
data or research in Queensland into alcohol-related violence. Notwithstanding this, however, it is
important to acknowledge that the evaluation was subject to some significant challenges that
remain to be considered and taken into account in any future evaluations of similar initiatives:

Data collection – government administrative data (e.g. ambulance calls for service, hospital ED
presentations , police crime reports), while providing a ready, routinely collected source of data
lacks quality ‘alcohol or drug flags’ or location data in some instances. Some improvements to
298 | P a g e
these systems are underway, however, more could be done to streamline data entry to capture
more useful data and improve linkages between systems. Sufficient time also has to be allowed
for data extraction and the resolution of any problems encountered.

Evaluation design – the DSP evaluation methodology was designed to suit the program design
and implementation of the trial, data availability, resources allocated and timeframes for
reporting; and is believed to be the best possible given these considerations. However,
challenges were faced in regards to the timeliness of reporting, adequately reflecting the ‘placebased’ nature of the trial, isolating the individual merit of the implemented strategies and
setting of target outcomes, and the feasibility of a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis.
These challenges have been discussed in detail, informed by the experience of conducting the DSP
evaluation and the findings of the Queensland Auditor-General’s report into the DSP trials, in order
to provide a basis for strengthening future evaluations of this nature. The discussion and questions
raised are particularly pertinent to any future roll-out or modification of the DSP model, as well as
for ensuring more broadly that quality evaluations are conducted of key government policies and
programs.
299 | P a g e
References
ABC News. Binge drinking on people's minds: AMA. ABC News, June 16, 2008. Available from:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-06-15/binge-drinking-on-peoples-minds-ama/2472248
AEC Group. Economic impact assessment of the Surfers Paradise night time economy, draft version
1.0. Gold Coast, QLD: Surfers Paradise Alliance, 2012. Available from:
http://www.surfersparadise.com/about-surfers-paradise/economic-impact-assessment-of-nighttime-economy
Allen Consulting Group. Casinos and the Australian economy. The Allen Consulting Group, April,
2009. Available from: http://www.auscasinos.com/pdf/media/CasinosandtheAusEconomy.pdf
Allen Consulting Group. The cumulative impact of licensed premises in NSW – study brief. Office of
Liquor, Gaming and Racing, NSW Government, 2012. Available from:
http://www.olgr.nsw.gov.au/pdfs/density_impact_study_study_brief.pdf
Anderson, P., Chisholm, D. & Fuhr, DC. Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of policies and
programmes to reduce the harm caused by alcohol. Lancet, 27 June 2009; 373 (9682): 2234-46.
Andreasen. Social marketing: upstream and earlier. Paper presented at the innovations in Social
Marketing conference. Austin, TX: January, 2004.
Armitage R. To CCTV or not to CCTV? A review of current research into the effectiveness of CCTV
systems in reducing crime. London, UK: NACRO, 2002.
Auckland Council. Community Patrols & other Safety Groups: Working with Auckland Council.
Auckland Council, 8 March, 2011. Available from:
http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/SiteCollectionDocuments/aboutcouncil/committees/communit
ysafetyforum/meetings/communitysafetyfmminitem1420110408.pdf
Auckland Council. Progress on tackling central city alcohol issues. Auckland Council, 27 June 2012.
Available from:
http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/newseventsculture/OurAuckland/mediareleases/Pages/pro
gressontacklingcentralcityalcoholissues.aspx
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). ‘On the bus to Brisbane’s underbelly’. Radio National
Law Report, 15 May, 2012. Available from:
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/brisbane-crime-tour/4012816
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2005 Personal safety survey (No. 4906). Canberra, ACT: 2006.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 3218.0 - Regional Population Growth, Australia, 2009-10.
Canberra, ACT: 2010.
300 | P a g e
References
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Census QuickStats for Townsville. Canberra, ACT: 2011a.
Available at
http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/quickstat/31802?ope
ndocument&navpos=220.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Census QuickStats for Queensland. Canberra, ACT: 2011b.
Available from:
http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/quickstat/3?opendoc
ument&navpos=220
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Census QuickStats for Australia. Canberra, ACT: 2011c.
Available at:
http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/quickstat/0?opendoc
ument&navpos=220
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Apparent consumption of alcohol, Australia, 2010-11. Cat. no.
4307.0.55.001. Canberra, ACT: 2012a.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 1301.0 - Year Book Australia, Canberra, ACT: 2012b.
Australian Crime Commission. Illicit drug data report 2008-09. Canberra, ACT: Australian Crime
Commission, 2010.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). Statistics on drug use in Australia 2006. Canberra,
ACT: AIHW, 2007.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). Drinking patterns in Australia, 2001-2007. Cat. no.
PHE 133. Canberra, ACT: AIHW, 2010. Available from: http://www.aihw.gov.au/publicationdetail/?id=6442472461
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). 2010 National drug strategy household survey
report. Drug statistics series no. 25. Cat. no. PHE 145. Canberra, ACT: AIHW, 2011a.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). Young Australians: their health and wellbeing
2011. Cat. no. PHE 140. Canberra, ACT: AIHW, 2011b.
Babor T, Caetano R, Casswell S, Edwards G, Giesbrecht G, Grube J, et al. Alcohol: no ordinary
commodity. New York, NY: World Health Organization and Oxford University Press, 2003.
Bachelard M and Gilmore H. Shock alcohol warning from nation's top health body. Sydney, NSW: The
Sydney Morning Herald, June 15, 2008. Available from: http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/4beers-is-binge-drinking/2008/06/14/1213321683037.html
Backhouse, M. ‘Ghost chips’ ad to reach 1 million views. The New Zealand Herald: 4 November,
2011. Available from: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10763849
Banfield JM, Gomez M, Kiss A, Redelmeier DA and Brenneman F. Effectiveness of the P.A.R.T.Y.
(Prevent Alcohol and Risk-related Trauma in Youth) program in preventing traumatic injuries: a 10
year analysis. Journal of Trauma, 2011.
301 | P a g e
References
Barker R, Swaminathan M, Arora A. Emergency Department Presentations due to Alcohol-Related
Injury in Queensland. Injury Bulletin, No. 111. Queensland Injury Surveillance Unit, Queensland
University of Technology, April 2011.
Bedo S. Must it be death before glass ban? Gold Coast, QLD: goldcoast.com.au, 4 August, 2009.
Available from: http://www.goldcoast.com.au/article/2009/08/04/104435_gold-coast-news.html
Bennett T and Holloway K. Variations in drug users' accounts of the connection between drug misuse
and crime. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 2006; 38(3): 243-254.
Bennett T, Holloway K and Farrington D. The statistical association between drug misuse and crime:
A meta-analysis. Aggression and Violent Behaviour, 2008; 13(2): 107-118.
Bevan T, Turnham A and Lester M. Sydney night time economy: A cost-benefit analysis for the City of
Sydney Council. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: TBR, 2011. Available from:
http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/Business/documents/CityEconomy/LateNightTrading/Website
SydneyNightTimeEconomyCostBenefitAnalysisReport%20.pdf
Bligh A and Lawlor P. Drink Safe Precincts to offer local solutions to local problems. Ministerial Media
Statements, 29 August, 2010. Available from:
http://statements.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementSearch.aspx
Bligh A. Bligh: Parliamentary Inquiry to put alcohol related violence into focus. Ministerial Media
Statements, 20 July, 2009a. Available from:
Bligh A. Moratorium on late trading applications to cut down on alcohol-fuelled violence. Ministerial
Media Statements, 16 September, 2009b. Available from:
Bleijie, J. Drink Safe Precinct Trial extended. Ministerial Media Statements, 24 July, 2012. Available
from: http://statements.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementDisplaySingle.aspx?id=79950
Boles S M and Miotto K. Substance abuse and violence: a review of the literature. Aggression and
Violent Behaviour, 2003; 8: 155-174.
Brennan I, Moore S, Byrne E, Murphy S. Interventions for disorder and severe intoxication in and
around licensed premises, 1989–2009. Addiction 2011; 106: 706–13.
Briscoe S and Donnelly, N. Assaults on licensed premises in inner-urban areas. Alcohol Studies
Bulletin (No. 2). Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2001a.
Briscoe S and Donnelly N. Temporal and regional aspects of alcohol-related violence and disorder.
Alcohol Studies Bulletin (No. 1). Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2001b.
Briscoe S and Donnelly N. Liquor licensing enforcement activity in New South Wales. Alcohol Studies
Bulletin (No. 4). Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2003.
302 | P a g e
References
British Medical Association. Alcohol misuse: tackling the UK epidemic. British Medical Associated
Board of Science, 2008. Available from:
http://www.drugslibrary.stir.ac.uk/documents/Alcoholmisuse.pdf
Burgess M and Moffatt S. The association between alcohol outlet density and assaults on and
around licensed premises. Crime and Justice Bulletin no. 147. Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime
Statistics and Research, 2011.
Burns L and Courmarelos C. Policing pubs: Evaluation of a licensing enforcement strategy. Sydney,
NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 1993.
Bushman B J. Effects of alcohol on human aggression: Validity of proposed explanations. In Recent
Developments in Alcoholism: Alcohol and Violence, Vol XIII, Fuller, D. Dietrich, R. and Gottheil, E.
eds. New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1996.
Carlson NR. Foundations of physiological psychology (7th Ed). Boston, MA: Pearson, 2008.
Carson, V. Ibrahim associate denied gun licence. The Telegraph, 23 August 2012. Available from:
http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/ibrahim-associate-denied-gun-licence/story-e6freuy91226456790694
Casswell S, Zhang JF, Wyllie A. The Importance of Amount and Location of Drinking for the
Experience of Alcohol-Related Problems. Addiction, 1993; 88: 1527-1534.
Cheng H, Kotler P & Lee NR . Social marketing for public health: global trends and success stories.
Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2011.
Chikritzhs T, Catalano P, Stockwell T, Donath S, Ngo H, Young D et al. Australia alcohol indicators:
patterns of alcohol use and related harms for Australian states and territories, 1990-2001. Perth,
WA: Western Australia National Drug Research Institute, Curtin University of Technology, 2003.
Chikritzhs T, Pascal R and Jones P. Bulletin No. 7 – Under-Aged Drinking Among 14-17 Year Olds and
Related Harms in Australia. Perth, WA: National Drug Research Institute, Curtin University of
Technology, 2004.
Chikritzhs T and Stockwell T. The impact of later trading hours for Australian public. Journal of
Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 2002; 63: 591–9.
Chikritzhs T and Stockwell T. The impact of later trading hours for hotels on levels of impaired driver
road crashes and driver breath alcohol levels. Addiction, 2006; 101: 1254–64.
Chikritzhs T and Stockwell T. The impact of later trading hours for hotels (public houses) on breath
alcohol levels of apprehended impaired drivers. Addiction, 2007; 102: 1609–917.
City Council of Thousand Oaks. An Ordinance of the City Council of the City of Thousand Oaks Adding
Chapter 27, to Title 5, Regarding Signs Warning of the Risk of Consuming Alcohol and Energy Drinks.
California Department of Alcohol and Drug Problems: 17 November, 2009. Available from:
http://www.adp.ca.gov/youth/pdf/aed_thousand_oaks_ord.pdf
303 | P a g e
References
City of Sydney. Evaluation report – Portable Urinal Trial 2011. 2011. Available from:
http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/Business/documents/CityEconomy/PortableUrinalEvaluationR
eport.pdf
City of Sydney. OPEN Sydney: Future Directions for Sydney at night. Draft strategy and action plan.
City of Sydney, 2012. Available from:
http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/Business/CityEconomy/documents/OPENSydneydraftstrategyandactionplan.pdf
Collins DJ and Lapsley HM. The social costs of drug abuse in Australia in 1988 and 1992. National
drug strategy monograph series No. 30. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth Department of Human
Services and Health, 1996.
Collins D & Lapsley H. Counting the cost: economics of the social costs of drug abuse in Australia 1998-99
(Vol. 49). Canberra, ACT. 2002.
Collins, DJ and Lapsley HM. The costs of tobacco, alcohol and illicit drug abuse to Australian society
in 2004/05. Canberra, ACT: Department of Health and Ageing, 2008.
Connor JL, Kypri K, Bell, ML and Cousins, K. Alcohol outlet density, levels of drinking and alcoholrelated harm in New Zealand: a national study. Journal of epidemiology and community health,
2011; 65: 841-846.
Crime and Misconduct Commission, Queensland Alcohol and Drug Research and Education Centre
and Australian Centre for Prehospital Research. Exploring drug use II: drug use by hospital
emergency department patients – a follow-up to PADIE I. Brisbane, QLD: Queensland Crime and
Misconduct Commission, 2008.
Demers A, Kairouz S, Adlaf E, Gliksman L, Newton-Taylor B, & Marchand A. Multilevel analysis of
situational drinking among Canadian undergraduates. Social Science & Medicine, 2002: 55(3); 415–
424.
Department of Transport and Main Roads. Drink driving in Queensland: a discussion paper. Brisbane,
QLD: Queensland Government, 2010. Available from:
http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/~/media/f6a8002d-cda6-4c70-9f84b8a886cc51cc/pdf_drink_driving_discussion_paper.pdf
Dodd V, Khey D & Miller EM. Intoxication Levels of Bar Patrons at an Organized Pub Crawl in a
College Campus Community. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2012: 37(2); 246-257.
Donnelly, N. Young adults' experience of responsible service of alcohol in NSW : 2011 update.
Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2012.
Donnelly N, Poynton S, Weatherburn D, Bamford E, and Nottage, J. Liquor-outlet concentrations and
alcohol-related neighbourhood problems. Alcohol Studies Bulletin (No. 8). Sydney, NSW: Bureau of
Crime Statistics and Research, 2006.
304 | P a g e
References
Donovan RJ & Vlais R. VicHealth Review of Communication Components of Social Marketing/Public
Education Campaigns Focusing on Violence Against Women. Melbourne, VIC: Victorian Health
Promotion Foundation, 2005.
Dossetor, K. Cost-benefit analysis and its application to crime prevention and criminal justice
research. Techincal and Background Paper 42. Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. Available
from: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/4/F/%7BA4FA76DE-535E-48C1-9E604CF3F878FD8D%7Dtbp042.pdf
Drug and Alcohol Office WA and Epidemiology Branch of Department of Health WA. Alcohol-related
hospitalizations and deaths: state profile. 2011. Available from:
http://www.dao.health.wa.gov.au/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=C
ore_DownloadEntryId=420PortalId=0TabId=211
Drug Info Clearinghouse. Drug Info, 2008. Available from: http://druginfo.adf.org.au
Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee. Inquiry into strategies to reduce harmful alcohol
consumption. Parliament of Victoria, 2006.
Drummer OH, Gerostamoulos J, Batziris H, Chu M, Caplehorn J, Robertson MD & Swann P. The
involvement of drugs in drivers of motor vehicles killed in Australian road traffic crashes. Accident
Analysis and Prevention, 2004; 36 (2): 239–48.
English DR, Holman CDJ and Milne E. The quantification of drug caused morbidity and mortality in
Australia. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health, 1995.
Emerson, C. 2012 Transport restructure to deliver for Queenslanders, Media release, Minister for
Transport and Main Roads, The Honourable Scott Emerson. Ministerial Media Statements: 31 July,
2012. Available from: http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/Id/80017
Evans M, Pascal R and Chikritzhs TN. South Australian emergency department presentations as
indicators of alcohol-related harm: Feasibility study. Stage 2: Final report. Prepared for the Southern
Adelaide Health Service Incorporated (acting through Drug and Alcohol Services South
Australia). Perth, WA: National Drug Research Institute, Curtin University, 2011.
Farouque F. Alcohol a bigger problem than drugs for young. The Age, 4 June, 2012. Available from:
http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/alcohol-a-bigger-problem-than-drugs-for-young-201206031zq4h.html
Feeney, K. Kings Cross looks to follow Valley’s lead. brisbanetimes.com.au, 24 July, 2012. Available
from: http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/entertainment/restaurants-and-bars/kings-cross-looks-tofollow-valleys-lead-20120724-22mue.html
Felson M, Berends R, Richardson B and Veno A. Reducing pub hopping and related crime. In Homel
R (ed.) Policing for prevention: reducing crime, public intoxication and injury (vol. 7). Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 1997; 115-132.
Fillmore M T and Weafer J. Alcohol impairment of behaviour in men and women. Addiction, 2004;
99: 1237–1246.
305 | P a g e
References
Fitzgerald J, Mason A and Borzycki C. The nature of assaults recorded on licensed premises. Bureau
Brief (No. 43). Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2010.
Forsyth, A. Banning Glassware From Nightclubs in Glasgow (Scotland): Observed Impacts,
Compliance and Patron's Views. Alcohol and Alcoholism: 31 August, 2007. Available from:
http://alcalc.oxfordjournals.org/content/43/1/111.full
Fox A. The origins of drunkenness. In A Fox and M MacAvoy (eds), Expressions of drunkenness (four
hundred rabbits). New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.
Gable RS. Comparison of acute lethal toxicity of commonly abuse psychoactive substances.
Addiction, 2004; 99: 686-96.
Gaffney A, Jones W, Sweeney J and Payne J. Drug use monitoring in Australia: 2008 annual report on
drug use among police detainees. AIC Monitoring Reports. Australian Institute of Criminology.
Canberra, ACT: 2010.
Gold Coast City Council. Response to the proposed Queensland Liquor Reforms. 2008.
Gold Coast City Council. Submission to the Law and Justice and Safety Committee’s Inquiry into
Alcohol-Related Violence. October 2009.
Gold Coast City Council. Submission to the House Standing Committee of Family, Community,
Housing and Youth on the Inquiry into the impact of violence on young Australians. Submission no.
68 (Youth Violence). Parliament of Australia, 3 March, 2010. Available from:
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committe
es?url=fchy/youthviolence/subs.htm
Gold Coast City Council. Evaluation Report – Surfers Paradise Portable Toilet Unit Trial. 2012.
Gordon, R, McDermott, L, Stead, M, & Angus, K. The effectiveness of social marketing interventions
for health improvement: What’s the evidence? Public Health, 2006: 120; 1133-1139.
Graham K, Bernards S, Osgood W, Homel R, and Purcell J. Guardians and handlers: the role of bar
staff in preventing and managing aggression. Addiction, 2005; 100(6): 755-766.
Graham, K, Bernards, S, Osgood, DW, & Wells, S. Bad nights or bad bars? Multilevel analysis of
environmental predictors of aggression in late-night large-capacity bars and clubs. Addiction, 2006:
101; 1569-1580.
Graham K and Homel R. Raising the bar: preventing aggression in and around bars, clubs and pubs.
Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2008.
Graham K, Osgood WD, Zibrowski a E, Purcell J, Gliksman L, Leonard K, Pernanen d K, Saltz RF, and
Toomey TL. The effect of the Safer Bars programme on physical aggression in bars: results of a
randomized controlled trial. Drug and Alcohol Review, 2008; 23 (1): 31-41.
Graham K and Purcell J. Preventing barroom aggression: a summary of the results of the evaluation
of the Safer Bars Program. Ontario, Canada: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, 2005.
306 | P a g e
References
Graham K & Wells S. Somebody’s gonna get their head kicked in tonight: Aggression among young
males in bars - A question of values? British Journal of Criminology, 2003; 43: 546-566.
Grier and Bryant. Social Marketing in Public Health. Annual Review of Public Health, 2005: 26; 319.
Greenaway S and Conway K. Research on alcohol-related harm in Auckland City. Research and
Evaluation, Centre for Social and Health Outcomes, Massey University, 2006.
Gruenewald PJ, Johnson FW and Treno AJ. Outlets, drinking and driving: a multilevel analysis of
availability. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 2002; 63: 460-8.
Gruenewald PJ, Freisthler B, Remer L, Lascala EA, Treno A. Ecological models of alcohol outlets and
violent assaults: crime potentials and geospatial analysis. Addiction, 2006; 101(5): 666-77.
Gunja N and Brown J. Energy drinks: Health Risks and Toxicity. The Medical Journal of Australia,
2012: 46-49.
Gustafson R. Alcohol and aggression. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 1994, 21 (3/4):41-80.
Hadfield P. Night time economy management: International research and practice – A review for the
City of Sydney. City of Sydney, 2011
Haffner R. Energy Drinks Entering a New Phase of Growth. Euromonitor International, 3 November,
2011. Available from: http://blog.euromonitor.com/2011/11/energy-drinks-entering-a-new-phaseof-growth-.html
Hall W and Chikritzhs T. The Australian alcopops tax revisited. The Lancet, 2011: 377 (9772); 11361137.
Hauritz M, Homel R, Townsley M, Burrows T and McIlwain G. Reducing violence in licensed venues
through community safety action projects: the Queensland experience. Contemporary Drug
Problems, 1998a; 25: 511-551.
Hauritz M, Homel R, Townsley M, Burrows T and McIlwain G. An evaluation of the Local Government
Safety Action Projects in Cairns, Townsville and Mackay: a report to the Queensland Department of
Health, the Queensland Police Service and the Criminology Research Council. Brisbane, QLD: Centre
for Crime Policy and Public Safety, School of Justice Administration, Griffith University, 1998b.
Hawks D, Rydon P, Stockwell T, White M, Chikritzhs T and Heale P. The evaluation of the Fremantle
police-licensee accord: impact on serving practices, harm, and the wider community. Perth, WA:
National Drug Research Institute, Curtin University of Technology, 1999.
Health Canada. Health Canada's Proposed Approach to Managing Caffeinated Energy Drinks. Health
Canada: 21 October, 2011. Available from: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/legislation/pol/energydrinks-boissons-energisantes-eng.php
Heat of Auckland City. City Services. Heart of Auckland City, .n.d. Available from:
http://www.hotcity.co.nz/city-infrastructure-services
Henry K. Australia’s future tax system. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 2010.
307 | P a g e
References
Higgins K, Cooper-Stanbury M & Williams P. Statistics on drug use in Australia 1998. Drug Statistics
Series. (AIHW cat no. PHE 16). Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2000.
Home Affairs Committee. Anti-social behaviour. Fifth report of session 2004-05. London, UK: The
Stationary Office, House of Commons, 2005.
Home Office. The Government’s Alcohol Strategy. Her Majesty’s Government, March 2012. Available
from: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/alcohol-drugs/alcohol/alcoholstrategy?view=Binary
Homel R, Hauritz M, Wortley R, McIlwain G and Carvolth R. Preventing alcohol-related crime through
community action: the Surfers Paradise safety action project. In Homel R (ed.) Policing for
prevention: reducing crime, public intoxication and injury. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1997;
35-90.
Homel R, McIlwain G and Carvolth R. Creating safer drinking environments. In Heather N and
Stockwell T (Eds) The essential handbook of treatment and prevention of alcohol problems. West
Sussex, UK: John Wiley Sons Ltd, 2004.
Howden, S. Police back Kings Cross guards who are helping in fight against crime. The Sydney
Morning Herald, 31 October, 2011. Available from: http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/police-back-kingscross-guards-who-are-helping-in-fight-against-crime-20111030-1mqet.html
Howden, S & Ralston, N. Private army of the Cross. The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 March 2011.
Available from: http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/private-army-of-the-cross-20110319-1c1bd.html
Humphrey G, Casswell S, and Han DY. Alcohol and injury among attendees at a New Zealand
emergency department. New Zealand Medical Journal, 2003; 116: U298.
Institute of Alcohol Studies. Factsheet – Economic Costs and Benefits. Institute of Alcohol Studies,
2007. Available from: http://www.ias.org.uk/resources/factsheets/factsheets.html
Ireland C & Thommeny J. The crime cocktail: Licensed premises, alcohol and street offences. Drug &
Alcohol Review, 1993; 12; 143-150.
Jeffs B and Saunders W. Minimising alcohol related offences by enforcement of the existing licensing
legislation. British Journal of Addiction, 1983; 78: 67-77.
Jones C, Kypri K, Moffatt S, Borzycki C and Price B. The impact of restricted alcohol availability on
alcohol-related violence in Newcastle, NSW. Crime and Justice Bulletin. Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau
of Crime Statistics and Research, 2009; 137.
Johnston, K. ‘Ghost chips’ a hit in drink driving campaign. stuff.co.nz: 27 October, 2011. Available
from: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/5864702/Ghost-chips-a-hit-in-drink-driving-campaign
Johnston J and McGovern J. Alcohol related falls: an interesting pattern of injuries. Emergency
Medicine Journal, 2004; 21: 185–188.
308 | P a g e
References
Keim T. Judge blasts grog culture of glassings. The Courier Mail, 21 June, 2011. Available from:
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/judge-blasts-culture-of-glassings/story-e6freomx1226078789168
Kidman J. Glassing attacks on the rise. The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 June, 2008. Available from:
http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/glassing-attacks-on-therise/2008/06/28/1214472834838.html
King 5 News. State Liquor Board Bans Alcoholic Energy Drinks. king5.com: 9 November, 2010.
Available from: http://www.king5.com/news/Vote-may-ban-alcoholic-energy-drinks107008128.html
Kisely SR, Pais J, White A, Connor J, Quek LH, Crilly JL and Lawrence D. Effect of the increase in
‘alcopops’ tax on alcohol-related harms in young people: a controlled interrupted time series.
Medical Journal of Australia, 19 December, 2011; 195 (11-12): 690-3.
KPMG. Evaluation of the temporary late night entry declaration – final report. Report prepared for
Department of Justice, Victorian Government. 2008.
Kuhns J, Clodfelter T, and Bersot H. Examining and Understanding the Joint Role of Caffeine and
Alcohol in Facilitating Violent Offending and Victimisation. Contemporary Drug Problems, 2010: 267289.
Kypri K, Jones C, McElduff P and Barker D. Effects of restricting pub closing times on night-time
assaults in an Australian city. Addiction, 2010; 1-8.
Lang C, Tay R, Watson B, Edmonston C and O’Connor E. Drink walking: an examination of the related
behaviour and attitudes of young people. 2003 Road Safety Research, Policing and Education
Conference. From Research to Action: Conference Proceedings Sydney. NSW Roads and Traffic
Authority, 2003; 164-169.
LaScala, E A, Johnson FW and Gruenewald, PJ. Neighbourhood Characteristics of Alcohol-Related
Pedestrian Injury Collisions: A Geostatistical Analysis. Prevention Science, 2001; 2 (2): 123-134.
Laslett AM, Catalano P, Chikritzhs T, Dale C, Doran C, Ferris J, et al. The range and magnitude of
alcohol’s harm to others. Fitzroy, VIC: Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation Foundation, 2010.
Lauth L and D Murray. ‘Nightclub on frontline of alcohol-fuelled violence’. The Courier Mail, 29 July,
2012. Available from: http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/nightclub-on-frontline-of-alcoholfuelled-violence/story-e6freon6-1226437541663
Law Commission. NZLC R114 Alcohol In Our Lives: Curbing the Harm. New Zealand Government, 27
April 2010. Available from: http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/review-regulatory-framework-saleand-supply-liquor?quicktabs_23=report#node-777
Law, Justice and Safety Committee. Inquiry into alcohol-related violence – final report. Brisbane,
QLD: Queensland Parliament, 2010a. Available from:
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/committees/LJSC/2009/alcohol-relatedviolence/Report74.pdf
309 | P a g e
References
Law, Justice and Safety Committee. Release of report into alcohol-related violence. Media Release,
18 March, 2010b.
Levine M, Taylor P & Best R. Third-parties, violence and conflict resolution: The role of group size
and collective action in the mirco-regulation of violence. Psychological Science, 2011; 22 (3): 406412.
Levy DT and Miller TR. A cost-benefit analysis of enforcement efforts to reduce serving intoxicated
persons. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 1995; 56: 240-247.
Lievore D. Recidivism of sexual assault offenders: rates, risk factors and treatment efficacy. A report
prepared for the Office of the Status of Women. Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Criminology,
2003.
Lipton R and Gruenewald P. Spatial dynamics of violence and alcohol outlets. Journal of Studies on
Alcohol and Drugs, 2002; 63: 187–95.
Livingston M. Alcohol outlet density and assault: a spatial analysis, Addiction, 2007; 103; 619-628.
Livingston M. A longitudinal analysis of alcohol outlet density and assault. Alcoholism: Clinical and
Experimental Research, 2008; 32 (6): 1-6.
Loveday, B., & Williams, S., & Scott, P. Workforce modernization in the police service: prospects for
reform? Personnel Review, 2007; 37 (4): 361-374.
Loxley W, Toumborou WJ, Stockwell T, Haines B, Scott K, Godfrey C, et al. The prevention of
substance abuse, risk and harm in Australia: a review of the evidence. Canberra, ACT:
Commonwealth of Australia, 2004.
Lugo W. Alcohol and crime: Beyond density. Security Journal, 2008; 21 (4): 229-245.
MacIntyre S and Homel R. Danger on the dance floor: a study of interior design, crowding and
aggression in nightclubs. In Homel R (ed.) Policing for prevention: reducing crime, public intoxication
and injury. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1997; 91-114.
Maguire M and Nettleton H. Reducing alcohol-related violence and disorder: an evaluation of the
‘TASC’ project. London, UK: Home Office, 2003.
Månsdotter AM, Rydberg MK, Wallin E, Lindholm LA, Andréasson S. A cost-effectiveness analysis of
alcohol prevention targeting licensed premises. The European Journal of Public Health, 2007; 17 (6):
618-623.
Martin C, Wyllie A, Casswell S. Types of New Zealand Drinkers and their Associated Alcohol-Related
Problems. Journal of Drug Issues, 1992, 22: 773-796.
Mathers C, Vos T & Stevenson C. The burden of disease and injury in Australia. (AIHW cat. no. PHE
17). Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1999.
310 | P a g e
References
Matthews, S. To Compare Regulatory And Planning Models Which Reduce Crime In The Night Time
Economy. The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust of Australia, 2009. Available from:
http://www.churchilltrust.com.au/site_media/fellows/2009_Matthews_Suzanne.pdf
Mazerolle L, White G, Ransley J and Ferguson P. Violence in and around entertainment districts: a
longitudinal analysis on the impact of late-night lockout legislation. Law and Policy, 2012; 34 (1): 5579.
McCarthy P. Accords: Are they an effective means of mitigating alcohol-related harm? Melbourne,
VIC: Drinkwise Australia, 2007.
McCloskey M, and Berman M. Alcohol intoxication and self-aggressive behaviour. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 2003; 112: 306-311.
McIlwain G and Homel R. Sustaining a reduction of alcohol-related harms in the licensed
environment: a practical experiment to generate new evidence. Brisbane, QLD: Key Centre for
Ethics, Law, Justice & Governance, Griffith University, 2009. Available from
http://www.griffith.edu.au/professional-page/professor-ross-homel/pdf/Reducing-Violence-inLicenses-Environments_2009.pdf
McIlwain G and Thompson C. Keeping Surfers Safe: Crime and Safety Profile, Report No. 1, a report
prepared for the Queensland Government and the Gold Coast City Council. Gold Coast City Council,
2004. Available from http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/crime-safety-profile-of-surfers-paradise6125.html
McKenzie, K, Harrison, JE and McClure, RJ. Identification of alcohol involvement in injury-related
hospitalisations using routine data compared to medical record review. Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Public Health, 2010: 34; 146–152.
McKetin R, Kelly E and McLaren J. The relationship between crystalline methamphetamine use and
methamphetamine dependence. Drug & Alcohol Dependence, 2006; 85 (3): 198-204.
McKetin R, McLaren J, Riddell S and Robins L. The relationship between methamphetamine use and
violent behaviour. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Crime and Justice Bulletin. Issue
paper no. 97, August 2006.
McKnight AJ and Streff FM. The effect of enforcement upon service of alcohol to intoxicated patrons
of bars and restaurants. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 1994; 26: 79-88.
Miles J. ‘Hospitals struggle to deal with the regular flow of the weekend wounded at emergency
wards’. The Courier Mail, 23 July, 2012. Available from:
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/hospitals-struggle-to-deal-with-the-regular-flowof-the-weekend-wounded-at-emergency-wards/story-e6freoof-1226432190737
Ministerial Council On Drug Strategy. Communiqué - 25 February 2011. Australian Government, 25
February, 2011. Available from:
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/drugstrategy/publishing.nsf/Content/84C0C8C545067182CA257
846007294DF/$File/feb11.pdf
311 | P a g e
References
Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy. National Alcohol Strategy 2006 – 2009. Australian Government,
May, 2006. Available from:
http://www.alcohol.gov.au/internet/alcohol/publishing.nsf/Content/B83AD1F91AA632ADCA25718E
0081F1C3/$File/nas-06-09.pdf
Ministry of Justice. Factsheet – Changes to sale and supply of alcohol. New Zealand Government, 19
December, 2012a. Available from: http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/sale-and-supply-ofalcohol/PDF%20-%20Whats%20changing%20-%20Factsheet%20-%2019%20Dec%202012.pdf
Ministry of Justice. Factsheet – Local Alcohol Policies: Overview. New Zealand Government, 19
December, 2012b. Available from: http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/sale-and-supply-ofalcohol/alcohol-in-the-community/local-alcohol-policies-laps/PDF%20-%20LAPs%20Overview%20%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%2019%20Dec%202012.pdf
Moffatt S, Mason A, Borzycki C and Weatherburn D. Liquor licensing enforcement and assaults on
licensed premises. Crime and Justice Statistics, Bureau Brief. Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime
Statistics and Research, 2009; 40.
Moffat, S and Weatherburn D. Trends in assaults after midnight. Crime and Justice Statistics, Bureau
Brief. Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2011; 59.
Moore, T. Quirk flushes out mall strategy. brisbanetimes.com.au, 18 February, 2013. Available from:
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/quirk-flushes-out-mall-strategy-201302182elwp.html
Mouzos J and Seagrave M. Homicide in Australia 2002-2003 – National Homicide Monitoring
Program Annual Report. Research and Public Policy Series, Issue paper no. 55. Australian Institute of
Criminology, 2004.
Murphy PN. Assessing drug-related harm. The Lancet, 2007; 369: 1856–57.
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). Alcohol guidelines: Reducing the health
risks. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001a.
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHRMC). Australian alcohol guidelines: health risks
and benefits. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001b.
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). Australian guidelines to reduce health risks
from drinking alcohol. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009.
National Preventative Health Taskforce. Australia: the healthiest country by 2020 – a discussion
paper. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 2008.
National Preventative Health Taskforce. Technical Report No 3: Preventing alcohol-related harm in
Australia: a window of opportunity. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009.
Nunn, G. Cheers for the abstinence advice, but it's not working. The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 July,
2012. Available from: http://www.smh.com.au/executive-style/culture/cheers-for-the-abstinenceadvice-but-its-not-working-20120724-22mnx.html
312 | P a g e
References
Nutt DJ, King LA and Phillips LD. Drug harms in the UK: a multi-criteria decision analysis. The Lancet,
2010; 376 (9752): 1558-1565.
Nutt DJ, King LA, Saulsbury W and Blakemore C. Development of a rational scale to assess the harm
of drugs of potential misuse. The Lancet, 2007; 369: 1047–53.
O'Brien MC, McCoy T, Rhodes S, Wagoner A, and Wolfson M. Caffeinated Cocktails: Energy Drink
Consumption, High-risk Drinking and Alcohol-related Consequences among College Students.
Academic Emergency Medicine, 2008: 453-460.
Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives . Progress of Legislation: Schedule of Bills (as at
28 September 2012). New Zealand Parliament, 4 October, 2012. Available from:
http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/E0CF2667-D888-4B92-A72F2B631EE737AB/246329/ProgressofBills.pdf
Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR), Department of Justice and Attorney-General. 2012
Towards best practice for safety in licensed venues. Queensland Government, 2012. Available from:
http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/resources/liquorDocs/TowardsBestPracLicVenues.pdf
Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing, Department of Trade & Investment. Environment and Venue
Assessment Tool (EVAT). NSW Government, March, 2013. Available from:
http://www.olgr.nsw.gov.au/pdfs/EVAT_FactSheet.pdf
O’Loan, J. Translink safety plan for new transit officers labelled a 'Band-Aid' solution. The Courier
Mail, 2 August ,2010. Available from: http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/translinksafety-band-aid-slammed/story-e6freoof-1225899721786
Oregon Liquor Control Commission. OLCC Commissioners ban Alcoholic Energy Drinks in Oregon.
oregon.gov: 20 November, 2010. Available from:
http://oregon.gov/OLCC/docs/news/news_releases/2010/nr_11_20_10.pdf
Palk G, Davey J and Freeman J. Perspectives on the effectiveness of the late night liquor trading
lockout legislative provision. In: Stockholm Criminology Symposium. Stockholm, Sweden: 16-18 June,
2008. Available from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/13897/
Palmer, D, Warren, I and Miller, P. ID scanners in the night time economy, in ISTAS 2010:
Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society: Social Implications of
Emerging Technologies. Wollongong, NSW: IEEE, 2010; pp. 234-241.
Palmer D, Warren I and Miller P. ID scanners in the Australian night time economy. IEEE Technology
and Society Magazine, 2011; 30 (3): 18-24.
Parliamentary Library. Bill Digest 1814: Alcohol Reform Bill 20120. New Zealand Parliament, 11
November, 2010. Available from: http://www.parliament.nz/enNZ/PB/Legislation/Bills/BillsDigests/b/5/c/49PLLawBD18141-Alcohol-Reform-Bill-2010-Bills-Digest1814.htm#footnote_1
Paskell, C. ‘Plastic Police’ or ‘Community Support’? : The role of police community support officers
within low-income neighbourhoods. European Urban and Regional Studies, 2007; 14 (4), 349-361.
313 | P a g e
References
Payne J and Gaffney A. How much crime is drug or alcohol related? Self-reported attributions of
police detainees. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 2012; 439: 1-6.
Pihl RO, Peterson JB and Lau MA. A biosocial model of the alcohol-aggression relationship. Journal of
Studies on Alcohol, 1993; 54 (Suppl. 11): 128–139.
Phillips C. A review of CCTV evaluations: crime reduction effects and attitudes towards its use. Crime
Prevention Studies, 1999; 10: 123-155.
Pointing, S. Hayes-Jonkers, C & Clough, A. ‘The Cairns Model: Evaluating the context of an openspace, closed circuit television system in an urban centre in tropical Australia’. Crime Prevention and
Community Safety, 14: May 2012, pp. 104-121.
Pointing, S. Hayes-Jonkers, C., Bohanna, I. & Clough, A. ‘The role of an open-space CCTV system in
limiting alcohol-related assault injuries in a late-night entertainment precinct in a tropical
Queensland city, Australia’. Injury Prevention, 18: 2012, pp. 58-61.
Popova S, Giesbrecht N, Bekmuradov D and Patra, J. Hours and days of sale and density of alcohol
outlets: Impacts on alcohol consumption and damage: A systematic review. Alcohol and Alcoholism,
2009; 44: 500–516.
Poynton S, Donnelly N, Weatherburn D, Fulde G and Scott L. The role of alcohol in injuries presenting
to St Vincent’s Hospital Emergency Department and the associated short term costs. Alcohol Studies
Bulletin, Issue paper no.6. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, December 2005.
Queensland Government. Brisbane city safety action plan – report of the Taskforce Committee.
Brisbane, QLD: Queensland Government, 2006.
Queensland Government. Queensland Government response to Law, Justice and Safety Committee’s
final report into alcohol-related violence. Queensland Parliament, 2010. Available from:
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/tableOffice/TabledPapers/2010/5310T2811.pdf
Queensland Parliamentary Library. Transport and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2008 (Qld) –
Extending Transit Officers’ Powers. Queensland Parliament, November 2008. Available from:
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/explore/ResearchPublications/ResearchBriefs/2008/
RBR200837.pdf
Queensland Police Service. Harm Minimisation Forum held on Surfers Paradise. myPolice Gold Coast,
20 September, 2012. Available from: http://mypolice.qld.gov.au/goldcoast/2012/09/20/harmminimisation-forum-held-on-surfers-paradise/
Quigg Z, Hughes K, & Bellis MA. Pub crawl: alcohol use among students attending organised drinking
events. Liverpool, UK: Centre for Public Health, Liverpool John Moore University, 2011.
Richards, S. Surfers Paradise Strategic Action Plan 2010-20: Update Three: Project progress to 30
June 2011. Gold Coast City Council, 2011. Available from
http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/attachment/communityconsultation/sp-action-plan.pdf
314 | P a g e
References
Ridolfo, B and Stevenson, C . The quantification of drug-caused mortality and morbidity in Australia,
1998. Drug Statistics Series No. 7, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2001.
Roche A, Watt K, McClure R, Purdie D and Green D. Injury and alcohol: a hospital emergency
department study. Drug and Alcohol Review, 2001; 20 (2): 155-66.
Rowe D, Stevenson D, Tomsen S, Bavinton N & Brass K. The city after dark: Cultural planning and
governance of the night-time economy in Parramatta (pp.1-37). Penrith, NSW: University of Western
Sydney, 2008.
Roxburgh AD & Degenhardt LJ. 'Characteristics of drug-related hospital separations in Australia',
Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 2008; 92: 149 – 155.
Rumbold G, Malpass A, Lang E, Cvetkovski S and Kelly WM. An evaluation of the Geelong Local
Industry Accord. Fitzroy, VIC: Turning Point Alcohol and Drug Centre and the Victoria Police, 1998.
Rydon P, Stockwell TR, Lang E and Beel AJ. Pseudo-drunk patron evaluation of bar staff compliance
with Western Australian liquor law. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 1996:
20(3); 290-295.
Salleh A. ‘Double edge’ in alcohol and energy drinks. ABC Science, 2012. Available from:
http://www.abc.net.au/science/articles/2012/08/16/3568448.htm
Sandy A. ‘Wind back pub hours to reduce booze-fuelled violence, fed-up doctors say’. The CourierMail, 26 September, 2012. Available from: http://www.news.com.au/national-old/wind-back-pubhours-fed-up-doctors-say/story-e6frfkvr-1226146272543
Scott L, Donnelly N, Poynton S, & Weatherburn D. Young adults’ experience of responsible service
practice in NSW: An update (Alcohol Studies Bulletin No. 9). NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and
Research, 2007. Available from:
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/ab09.pdf/$file/ab09.pdf
Seifert S, Schaechter J, Hershorin E, and Lipshultz S. Health Effects of Energy Drinks on Children,
Adolescents and Young Adults. Pediatrics, 2011: 511-528.
Serve Legal. Our Services – Serve Legal. 2012. Available from:
http://www.servelegal.co.uk/our_service
Silvester, J. Do we really want semi-automatic firearms in the hands of train patrol officers? The Age,
9 April, 2011. Available from: http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/do-we-really-wantsemiautomatic-firearms-in-the-hands-of-train-patrol-officers-20110408-1d7mx.html#ixzz28r8UXrU5
Sim M, Morgan E and Batchelor J. The impact of enforcement on intoxication and alcohol related
harm – Final Report. Wellington, New Zealand: Accident Compensation Corporation, 2005.
Sivarajasingam V, Shepherd J and Matthews K. Effect of urban closed circuit television on assault
injury and violence detection. Injury Prevention, 2003; 9: 312-316.
315 | P a g e
References
Skov SJ, Chikritzhs TN, Kypri K, Miller PG, Hall WD, Daube, MM and Moodie, AR. Is the ‘alcopops’ tax
working? Probably yes but there is a bigger picture. Medical Journal of Australia, 2011; 195(2): 8486.
Smith L, Morgan A and McAtamney A. Policing licensed premises in the Australian Capital Territory.
Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011.
Song EY, Wolfson M, O'Brien MC, Wagoner K, and Alvarez Martin B. Mixing alcohol with caffeine:
Heavy Episodic Drinking, Driving While Intoxicated and Alcohol-related Consequences among Youth.
American Public Health Association, 28 October, 2008. Available from:
http://apha.confex.com/apha/136am/webprogram/Paper184127.html
South Australia Police. Alcohol and crime. South Australia Police, 2010. Available from:
http://www.police.sa.gov.au/public/download.jsp?id=49509
Stallones, L. Evaluation report: Prevent Alcohol and Risk-related Trauma in Youth (PARTY). Student
evaluations: October 2003 – May 2004. McKee Medical Center, November 2004.
Stark J. Alcohol: the problem. The Age, 2007. Available from:
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/alcohol-the-problem/2007/05/04/1177788399047.html
Stockley C and Saunders JB. The biology of intoxication. In Fox A and MacAvoy M (Eds) Expressions
of drunkeness (four hundred rabbits). New York: Routledge, 2011; 13-52.
Stockwell T. Responsible alcohol service: Lessons from evaluations of server training and policing
initiatives. Drug and Alcohol Review, 2001; 20(3): 257–265.
Stockwell T and Chikritzhs T. Do relaxed trading hours for bars and clubs mean more relaxed
drinking? A review of international research on the impacts of changes to permitted hours of
drinking. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 2009; 11: 153-70.
Stockwell Y and Gruenewald P. Controls on the Physical Availability of Alcohol. In Heather N and
Stockwell T (Eds) The essential handbook of treatment and prevention of alcohol problems.
Chichester, England: John Wiley Sons Ltd, 2004; 213-234.
Snyder & Hamilton. A meta analysis of US health campaign effects on behaviour: emphasise
enforcement, exposure, and new information, and beware the secular trend. In RC Hornik (ed.),
Public health communication: evidence for behaviour change. Mahwah, NJ: 2002; 357-84.
Tax Policy Centre. Alcohol Tax Revenue, 1977 – 2009. Tax Policy Centre, 7 December, 2011.
Available from: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=399
Templeton, A. Flinders St public toilets plan flushed. Townsville Bulletin, 13 September, 2012.
Available from: http://www.townsvillebulletin.com.au/article/2012/09/13/360121_news.html
Teno AJ, Grube JW, Martin SE, Alcohol availability as a predictor of youth drinking and driving: a
hierarchical analysis of survey and archival data. Alcohol Clinical Experimental Research, 2003; 27:
835-40.
316 | P a g e
References
The Advertiser. Grog, Energy Drink Mix Faces Ban. Adelaide Now: 26 April, 2011.
http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/grog-energy-drink-mix-faces-ban/storye6frea83-1226044693212
The Australian. Man blinded in Queensland pug glassing attack. The Australian, 20 June, 2011.
Available from: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/man-blinded-in-queenslandpub-glassing-attack/story-fn3dxity-1226078605862
The Courier Mail. Lord Mayor may lower Wickham, Ann street speed limits for bike and pedestrian
safety. The Courier Mail, 25 August, 2010.
The Daily Telegraph. Sydney's mean streets - meet the keepers of Kings Cross. The Daily Telegraph,
18 February, 2011. Available from: http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/sydney-news/sydneysmean-streets-meet-the-keepers-of-the-cross/story-e6freuzi-1226007870111
Thombs DL, O'Mara RJ, Tsukamoto M, Rossheim ME, Weiler RM, Merves ML, et al. Event-level
analysis of energy drink consumption and alcohol intoxication in bar patrons. Additicive Behaviours,
2008: 35(10); 325-330.
Topp L, Degenhardt L, Kaye S and Darke S. The emergence of potent forms of methamphetamine in
Sydney Australia: a case study of the IDRS as a strategic early warning system. Drug and Alcohol
Review, 2002; 21: 341-348.
Toumbourou J, Lyons Z, Loxley W and Bauld C. Research needs analysis and action plan for drug
prevention research in Victoria. Premier’s Drug Prevention Council, Department of Human Services,
Victorian Government, 2007.
Translink. Vigilance nabs serial graffiti offender. Translink Transit Authority, 1 March, 2012. Available
from: http://translink.com.au/about-translink/reporting-and-publications/mediareleases/release/469
Treno AJ, Johnson FW, Remer LG and Gruenewald, PJ. The impact of outlet densities on alcoholrelated crashes: a spatial panel approach. Accident – analysis and prevention, 2007; 39: 894–901.
University of New South Wales (UNSW). Generation bulletproof – are we losing our young people to
alcohol and drugs? Public forum held at Leighton Hall, UNSW Kensington Campus, 26 April, 2012.
van Amsterdam JGC, Opperhuizen A, Koeter M and van den Brink W. Ranking the harm of alcohol,
tobacco and illicit drugs for the individual and the population. European Addiction Research, 2010;
16: 202–27.
Victorian Auditor-General. Effectiveness of Justice Strategies in Preventing and Reducing AlcoholRelated Harm. Victorian Government, June 2012. Available from:
http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/publications/20120620-Alcohol/20120620-Alcohol.pdf
Victoria Legal Aid. Protective services officers – new law. Victoria Legal Aid, 8 February, 2012.
Available from: http://www.legalaid.vic.gov.au/3905.htm
317 | P a g e
References
Victoria Police. PSO Powers. Victoria Police, n.d. Available from:
http://policecareer.vic.gov.au/pso/the-role-of-psos/pso-powers
Victoria Police. Protective Services Officers (PSOs). Victoria Police, 22 February, 2012. Available from:
http://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?Document_ID=35051
Wallin E, Norstrom T and Andreasson S. Alcohol Prevention Targeting Licensed Premises: A Study of
Effects on Violence. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 2003; 271.
Wallin E, Gripenberg J and Andreasson S. Overserving at licensed premises in Stockholm: Effects of a
community action program. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 2005: 66; 806-814.
Warburton AL and Shepherd JP. Tackling alcohol related violence in city centres: effect of emergency
medicine and police intervention. Emergency Medical Journal, 2006; 23: 12-17.
Watt K, Purdie D, Roche A and McClure R. Risk of injury from acute alcohol consumption and the
influence of confounders. Addiction, 2004; 99; 1262-1273.
Weatherburn D. Law and Order in Australia: rhetoric and reality. Sydney, NSW: The Federation Press,
2004.
Wells S, Graham K, Speechly M and Koval JK. Drinking pattern, drinking contexts and alcohol-related
aggression among late adolescent and young adult drinkers. Addiction, 2005; 100: 933–944
Welsh BC and Farrington DP. Public area CCTV and crime prevention: an updated systematic review
and meta-analysis. Justice Quarterly, 2009; 26: 716-745.
White, A, Baker, P, Plotnikova, M, Connor, J and Kisely S. The Queensland Drink Safe Precincts
Initiative: Technical Analysis Report 3. Brisbane, QLD: Centre for Youth Substance Abuse Research
(CYSAR) and Health LinQ, University of Queensland, June 2013.
White, C. Clubbers to have fingerprints scanned. ABC News, 24 November, 2009.
Wiggers J. Reducing alcohol-related violence and improving community safety: the Alcohol Linking
Program. NSW Public Health Bulletin, 2007; 18(5-6): 83-85.
Wiggers J, Jauncey M, Considine R, Daly J, Kingsland M, Purss K, et al. Strategies and outcomes in
translating alcohol harm reduction research into practice: the alcohol linking program. Drug and
Alcohol Review, 2004; 23(3): 355-364.
Wiggers J, Radvan D, Dalton A, Valentine M and Nicholas C. The alcohol linking program: adoption by
NSW Police. Newcastle, NSW: Hunter New England Health, 2009.
Wilkinson, J. Alcohol and Tobacco in NSW: Consumption, Revenue and Concern, Briefing Paper 7/97.
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, 1997. Available from:
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/969abfe557b2f844ca256ecf0
0079b7f/$FILE/07-97.pdf
World Health Organisation (WHO). The world health report 2002: reducing risks, promoting healthy
life. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organisation, 2002.
318 | P a g e
References
World Health Organisation (WHO). The world report on traffic injury prevention. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Health Organisation, 2004.
World Health Organisation (WHO). Global status report on non-communicable diseases. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Health Organisation, 2010a.
World Health Organisation (WHO). Global strategy to reduce the harmful effects of alcohol. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Health Organisation, 2010b.
World Health Organisation (WHO). Global status on health and alcohol. Geneva, Switzerland: World
Health Organisation, 2011.
Zimmerman, R. Social marketing strategies for campus prevention of alcohol and other drug
problems. Newton, MA: The Higher Education Center for Alcohol and Other Drug Prevention, 1997.
319 | P a g e
Final evaluation update: 24 months of the trial
APPENDIX
NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY
Contents
Appendix A
Interim evaluation recommendations .......................................................................... 3
Appendix B
Evaluation target outcomes and potential measures ................................................... 7
Appendix C
Administration of the DSP online surveys..................................................................... 9
Appendix D
Ambulance calls for service......................................................................................... 11
Appendix E
Hospital emergency presentations data ..................................................................... 25
Appendix F
Police Crime Reports ................................................................................................... 34
© The State of Queensland (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) 2013.
Published by the Queensland Government, December 2013, 100 George Street, Brisbane Qld 4000.
The Queensland Government supports and encourages the dissemination and exchange of information.
However, copyright protects this document. The State of Queensland has no objection to this material being
reproduced, made available online or electronically but only if it is recognised as the owner of the copyright
and this material remains unaltered. Copyright enquiries about this publication should be directed to the
Department of the Premier and Cabinet, by email to [email protected] or in writing to PO Box
15185, City East Qld 4002.
For additional information on this document, email [email protected] or telephone (07) 3003 9379.
Appendix A
Interim evaluation recommendations
1
Local DSP committees should continue to operate in the DSP trial sites for as long as local stakeholders feel that
they continue to improve coordination, safety and amenity in the area.
2
Committees involving the broad range of representation included on the local DSP committees could be
effective in other key entertainment areas across the State. Whether such local committees should be
established in other areas should be considered on a case by case basis. New structures should not be created
where they would duplicate a pre-existing structure, or without an appropriate level of local commitment and
support for such a governance and coordination mechanism to be established and maintained. Local
governments should be encouraged to play a key role, but in some cases it may be appropriate for OLGR or the
QPS to convene such a group of stakeholders.
3
That the QPS should continue to support the DSP Inspector role in each of the three DSP areas.
4
Police in other key entertainment precinct areas should consider also nominating a DSP-type Inspector to
provide a dedicated focus on, and responsibility for, the policing occurring in and around licensed venues. Such
an inspector’s role should include taking a lead role for:
1. communication and coordination across stakeholder groups about operations in the precinct
2. setting the right ‘tone’ and approach for public order policing that encourages officers to use their
communications skills, de-escalate situations and divert people from trouble as often as possible.
5
That prior to the completion of the DSP trial, each local DSP committee should review the status of each
strategy included in their local management plan. This process should be used to identify:

challenges to the delivery of ongoing strategies listed in the plan

any unresolved issues requiring action, including issues that cannot be resolved by the local DSP committee
members for which an appropriate course of action should be agreed.
6
That other key entertainment precincts may want to consider developing a local management plan as a tool to
have issues in the precinct discussed, and actions agreed, implemented and followed up.
7
QPS should continue the key policing strategies implemented in the DSP areas, including: increased police
presence and high visibility policing; and whenever appropriate, the wearing of high visibility vests by general
duties officers doing this kind of policing in and around pubs and nightclubs. High visibility vests should be
designed so that officers can wear them even in warmer areas such as Townsville.
8
To increase community confidence in the security and police presence in a DSP area, security providers, taxi
marshals and other personnel working in DSP should also be encouraged to wear high visibility vests, as long as
police remain clearly distinguishable.
Drink Safe Precincts – Final evaluation: 24 months of the trial (Appendix)
3|Page
9
Consideration should be given to developing a sustainable and affordable model for providing an increased
police presence around pub and nightclub areas where it is needed. One or more of the
following options may assist:
a) Establish community support officers to provide increased police presence and high visibility policing around
pubs and nightclubs. These officers are to be employed, trained and supervised by the QPS, with limited powers
for use during peak periods or in certain locations.
b) Increase the use of personnel not employed by police, for example, NGO support service personnel,
Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) triage centre personnel, security personnel, or Responsible Service of
Alcohol (RSA) hosts, to decrease the demand on policing resources.
c) Redirect existing policing resources using a combination of strategies including:

allocating of resources as a result of the existing Queensland Government commitment to employ an
additional 1100 police over the next four years
 reprioritising of other resources to support frontline service delivery in pub and club areas where it is
required
 implementing cross-district rostering, where possible, to bolster police numbers around pubs and clubs
 considering if changes can be made to rostering and overtime practices to support an increased police
in the relevant areas.
Consideration
be given to whether changes can be made to liquor licensing fees or otherwise to implement a
10
‘user pays’ system to offset the costs borne by the state of policing and otherwise servicing night time
economies. This should include consideration of whether changes can be made to enable venues to contribute
according to their size, patron capacity and risk profile (e.g. so that larger late night venues, or those to open in
close proximity to other late night venues, can make a greater contribution to support the increased risk
associated with extended trading hours in such places).
11 For Townsville, the QPS should immediately increase its focus on de-escalation and diversion wherever
appropriate. Results in Townsville should be monitored to see if an increased emphasis on de-escalation and
diversion is associated with any change in results for the DSP area over the remainder of the DSP trial until the
end of February 2013. This new emphasis on de-escalation and diversion should occur in conjunction with
taking a strict law enforcement approach where patrons do behave violently (i.e. prosecuting patrons for
assault offences where warranted rather than good order offences).
12 Consideration should be given to establishing a streamlined and process for recording de-escalation and
diversionary activity undertaken by police so that these very important aspects of policing work can be better
demonstrated, monitored and reinforced.
13 In order to reduce the demand on police and ambulance services, assist licensees and patrons, and promote
safety, ongoing support should be provided for non government organisations to operate rest and recovery,
welfare and first aid services in the DSP areas. The Queensland Government and NGOs should work together to
minimise the cost of providing these services, without compromising their quality.
4|Page
14 Civil banning order provisions could be considered to unnecessarily duplicate the police banning order
provisions in the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 and should be reviewed to determine whether they impose
unnecessary red tape. No civil banning orders have yet been made or sought in Queensland and the civil
banning order scheme does not appear to provide any practical benefits or application. The civil banning order
scheme adds nothing to the other methods that exist to impose a banning order (e.g. as a condition of bail, as a
part of a sentence on conviction, or by licensees).
15 Efforts should be made to streamline the process for police banning order applications to be made and banning
order record keeping systems. In addition, the QPS should consider if it is able to make any further
improvements to provide coordinated statewide training and support material regarding banning orders.
16 Consideration should be given to allowing police officers to provide licensees with a photo and/or license
number of people with a banning order imposed as a condition of bail or by the courts as part of a sentence.
17 Consideration should be given to establishing and maintaining a centralised database of all current banning
orders imposed, and the appropriate lead agency (OLGR or QPS) for this purpose. If established, the database
should be accessible to licensees so that they can maintain their own up to date records (including, if possible,
so that different ID scanning systems can automatically link to and update their own records).
18 Given that ID scanners can assist to ensure that bans imposed on patrons for unacceptable behaviour can be
enforced, and they provide a good tool to assist in the follow up and prosecution of offenders, the use of ID
scanners by licensed venues should be encouraged.
In particular, licensed venues that trade after midnight should be encouraged to use an ID scanning systems
that have capability to be linked to a banned persons list to check patrons as they enter their venue.
19 That the Queensland Government should work with the local council in each DSP area in order to have a joint
solution to the toilet and public urination problems implemented as quickly and cheaply as possible.
20 Consideration should be given to implementing improved planning and liquor licensing frameworks for
Queensland to ensure local governments and communities, in particular, have a stronger ability to ensure the
character of an area can be retained (e.g. as a restaurant strip) and to determine when an area has reached its
limits in terms of the availability of alcohol (e.g. this may be achieved through saturation, anti-clustering or
cumulative impact provisions).
21 Consideration should be given to improving the integration of various regulatory frameworks, including council
land use approval processes and liquor licensing processes. This should include consideration of how the two
separate processes may be streamlined and also whether land use definitions can be better aligned to liquor
license types (e.g. hotel land use approval and hotel license), or to specify what type of land use approvals are
required for each liquor license type.
22 Consideration should be given to improved planning and liquor licensing frameworks, to ensure the
development of more diverse night time economies over the longer term.
5|Page
23 Openness and transparency about liquor licensing and the scope of alcohol-related harms must be improved.
To inform planning, management and decision-making the accuracy and availability of data at the local level
must be improved. Action should include providing better access to accurate and up to date local level data
about:

alcohol outlets in local areas (including number, type and patron capacity for on licenses)

alcohol-related crime and disorder, for example, and other alcohol-related harms.
24 The Queensland Government should continue to monitor data about alcohol-related violence and harm,
especially in Townsville, until the picture there shows improvement. Criminal Justice Research should continue
to look across the State at these data in order to monitor patterns, hot spots and identify emerging problem
areas.
25 Effective education strategies should be part of a mix of strategies that are put in place to shift Australian
drinking norms over the longer term.
26 The Queensland Government should continue to support carefully crafted and targeted social marketing
campaigns as these can play an important role in bringing about a shift in social norms around drinking
behaviours.
27 As part of a range of strategies to be implemented, the Queensland Government should explore how it can
support ‘make every second a water’ campaigns at the local level and encourage people to drink at levels
considered to be safe within the existing Australian guidelines (that is, not more than four standard drinks on a
single occasion).
28 That consideration be given to introducing pseudo-patron compliance testing regime, with the details of any
scenarios thought to clearly demonstrate intoxication beyond the point at which service should occur, to be
developed in close consultation with industry.
29 That the outcome of the consideration by Surfers Paradise stakeholders of the issues relating to pub crawls be
closely monitored in order to determine if any further action is warranted.
30 That the impact of the consumption of energy drinks and alcohol continue to be closely monitored in order to
determine if any further action is warranted to protect consumers from related harms.
31 That the different regulatory restrictions applying to bottleshops, and pubs and nightclubs be reviewed in order
to determine what changes could be made to provide a more level playing field for all these types of business
and to assist in dealing with the issue of pre-loading.
6|Page
Appendix B
Evaluation target outcomes and potential
measures
Target outcome 1: reduced alcohol-related violence in the trial areas
KPI
Reductions in alcohol-related
offences in trial areas
Measures
 Assaults, e.g. by
o
type of assaults (serious and common)
(by high alcohol times)
o
assaults near licensed premises
o
assaults in licensed premises
o
alcohol-related
o
drug-related
o
glassings
o
demographic characteristics of people
involved in assaults
Data source
(QPS) – QPRIME – Crime
reports

Public order offences (including wilful damage,
disobey move-on, public nuisance, public
urination)
Reductions in calls for service
to police

Calls for service to police for alcohol-related
matters or during high alcohol times and days
of week
QPS – CAD – Calls for service
Reductions in Emergency
Department presentations for
alcohol-related injury and
trauma

Alcohol-related accident, injury and trauma
Emergency Department admissions (public
hospitals)
Queensland Health – EDIS –
ED presentations
Reductions in calls for service
for ambulance in trial areas

Ambulance call outs
Reductions in incidents
recorded on CCTV networks

CCTV incident data
Queensland Ambulance
Service – CAD – Calls for
service
Brisbane City Council –
CitySafe – Incident log
Target outcome 2: improved community safety more broadly in the trial areas
KPI
Reductions in alcohol-related
traffic offences and improved
road safety in the trial areas
Reduction in liquor licensing
breaches
Measures
 Drink driving offences

Traffic Infringement Notices

Pedestrian injuries

Number of licensing offences
Data source
QPS – QPRIME – Crime
reports
Department of Transport
and Main Roads – Traffic
Infringement Notices
reports
Office of Liquor and Gaming
Regulation (OLGR)
7|Page
Improvements in perception of
safety in the trial areas

Improvements in perceptions of safety
Improvements with
compliance with Security
Providers Act
Reduction in assaults on
paramedics, police officers,
bus drivers and taxi drivers

Number of breaches recorded

Number of assaults
Surveys and interviews to
consider perceptions of
alcohol-related violence,
safety and amenity.
Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
reports
Taxi companies
Improved coordination
between agencies to ensure
compliance operations of
premises are conducted
Improvement in awareness
and education provided to
licensees, industry groups,
approved managers and event
organisers

Number of combined operations conducted

Number and type of breaches identified during
compliance operations

Provision of education & awareness activities
to industry groups, licensees, approved
managers, and event organises
Survey of stakeholders
OLGR
OFT
Queensland Fire and Rescue
Service
OLGR
Target outcome 3: improved public amenity in the trial area
KPI
Significant improvement in the
provision of public amenities
Measures
 Number of public urination offences

Improvements in the perception of amenity
Data source
reports
Local cab companies
Target outcome 4: better patron behaviour in the precinct
KPI
Introduction of personal
responsibility strategies
Measures
 Use of new banning orders
Data source
QPS – Drug and Alcohol
Coordination Unit
Target outcome 5: improved/coordinated transport
KPI
Significant improvements in
the provision of public
transport and levels of
patronage
Measures
 Number and frequency of rail services

Number and frequency of bus services

Number and frequency of taxi services

Level of patronage on rail services

Level of patronage on other forms of public
transport (e.g. buses)

Level of patronage in taxi services
Data source
Department of Transport
and Main Roads – Taxi
patronage (QLD) and bus
patronage (Townsville)
TransLink – Bus patronage
(SEQ)
Survey of
stakeholders/patrons
8|Page
Appendix C
Administration of the DSP online surveys
Two rounds of surveys have been conducted to date:1

Round 1: March – April 2011
o The Patron Survey was open to the public and the other surveys were password protected to ensure that
responses were from people who know and use these areas.
o Letters from the Deputy Premier informed people who live and work in the DSPs about the Resident and
Business Survey.2 Letters informing licensees about the Licensee/Approved Manager Survey were posted
to licensees.
o Information about how to access the Service Provider Survey was through representatives on the local
DSP committees (e.g. QPS DSP Inspectors, QAS and transport company representatives).
o All five surveys were available through the Queensland Government’s ‘Get Involved’ website. The
surveys went ‘live’ on the website on 22 March 2011 following an announcement from the Deputy
Premier and closed for consultation at midnight Friday, 29 April 2011.
o During the period that the surveys were ‘live’ they were promoted through social networking sites (such
as Facebook and Twitter) and a number of media articles mentioned details about the surveys.

Round 2: January – March 2012
o Was conducted in early 2012 to gather data at the ‘mid-point’ of the trial.
o The online administration of the survey was streamlined in response to feedback from Round 1. For
Round 2, all the surveys were accessible through one link (www.qld.gov.au/drinksafe) and with no
password restrictions. From this page, viewers selected the survey that was most appropriate from
following four options:
1. Patron Survey
2. Resident Survey
3. Business and Service Provider Survey3
4. Licensee/Approved Manager Survey.
o Went ‘live’ on the Get Involved website on 23 January 2012 and closed on 6 March 2012.4 The surveys
were extensively promoted to the local DSP committees with stakeholder representatives passing on
these messages to their patrons, staff and members.
o During the six week period, the survey was also promoted through a number of social networking sites,
including the QPS, BCC and licensed venues’ Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, as well as through
1
The surveys relied on ‘snowball sampling’ using a range of promotional strategies to reach as many potential respondents as
possible. Given the sample sizes and the lack of accurate data on the population being sampled (i.e. number and demographics
of DSP patrons) the survey results are only considered as indicative of some stakeholders’ attitudes and experiences, and are not
thought to be representative.
2
We are very grateful to those that provided their time to assist with the distribution of the survey information, in particular the
Volunteers in Policing (VIPs) in each Drink Safe Precinct who volunteered their time to help to distribute these letters and
posters.
3
This merged what had been two surveys in Round 1 given the almost identical nature of the survey questions and structure.
4
See http://www.getinvolved.qld.gov.au/gi/consultation/195/view.html for the survey home page.
9|Page
o
o
venues’ email distribution lists. A Facebook event was also created by Consult Queensland and 114
people RSVPed to attend this event.5
Posters were also distributed to local businesses and licensed venues within each precinct.
A small number of hard-copy surveys were distributed to residents and workers who were unable to
complete the survey online.
Summaries of the sample size for each round of the survey—by respondent group and DSP— are provided in Table 1
and Table 2.
Table 1. Survey responses – round 1 by DSP and response group
Patron
People who live or work
in a DSP
Licensee/approved
manager
Business owner
Workers/service
providers
Resident
Fortitude Valley
974
(75.4%)
75
(33.8%)
3
Surfers Paradise
118
(9.1%)
96
(43.2%)
5
Townsville
Total
200
1292
(15.5%) (100.0%)
51
222
(23.0%) (100.0%)
1
9
7
0
10
17
57
77
34
168
8
14
6
28
Table 2. Survey responses – round 2 by DSP and response group
Patron
People who live or work
in a DSP
Licensee/approved
manager
Business owner,
workers and service
providers
Resident
Fortitude Valley
216
(56.1%)
136
(50.8%)
3
Surfers Paradise
61
(15.8%)
74
(27.6%)
4
Townsville
Total
108
385
(28.1%) (100.0%)
58
268
(21.6%) (100.0%)
6
13
120
52
44
216
13
18
8
39
Detailed Round 1 and Round 2 survey results are available online at
http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/liquor/responsible/drink-safe/index.shtml.
5
A Facebook event is an online invitation to attend a certain ‘event’. The event may be an actual event (e.g. a party) or online
activity (such as a survey). If a person accepts an invite to a Facebook event, an announcement of this acceptance appears on
the user’s profile and appears in the ‘news feed’. The intention of the Facebook event was to increase awareness about the
survey and to have a snowball sampling effect (i.e. a sampling technique where existing subjects, Facebook users who are
friends with Consult Queensland, recruit other Facebook friends, and thus the sample grows, similar to a rolling snowball).
10 | P a g e
Appendix D
Ambulance calls for service
Table 3. Ambulance calls for service – proportion of total calls for service by time of day – DSPs and combined EPs,
baseline vs. trial
Label
at
graph
Time slot
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Total
0:00 - 0:59
1:00 - 1:59
2:00 - 2:59
3:00 - 3:59
4:00 - 4:59
5:00 - 5:59
6:00 - 6:59
7:00 - 7:59
8:00 - 8:59
9:00 - 9:59
10:00 - 10:59
11:00 - 11:59
12:00 - 12:59
13:00 - 13:59
14:00 - 14:59
15:00 - 15:59
16:00 - 16:59
17:00 - 17:59
18:00 - 18:59
19:00 - 19:59
20:00 - 20:59
21:00 - 21:59
22:00 - 22:59
23:00 - 23:59
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
Fortitude
Valley
DSP
Surfers
Paradise
DSP
Townsville
DSP
NonDSP
controls
Fortitude
Valley
DSP
Surfers
Paradise
DSP
Townsville
DSP
NonDSP
controls
%
9.3
10.7
11.2
11.0
6.9
2.9
1.4
1.5
1.8
2.2
2.5
2.4
2.7
2.4
2.1
2.5
2.5
2.6
2.3
2.6
3.0
3.0
4.2
6.3
100.0
%
8.0
8.1
7.8
6.4
4.8
2.5
1.3
1.9
1.7
2.6
2.7
2.9
3.2
3.3
2.6
3.2
2.1
2.4
3.2
3.6
4.4
6.2
7.2
7.9
100.0
%
5.0
5.9
5.6
5.0
4.1
2.5
1.5
2.2
2.9
4.0
3.3
3.7
3.9
4.5
4.5
4.4
4.5
4.4
4.7
4.6
4.6
4.3
4.7
5.2
100.0
%
5.3
4.9
4.8
3.8
2.6
1.6
1.4
2.2
3.3
4.8
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.5
5.3
4.9
4.5
4.0
3.9
3.7
3.9
4.0
4.2
4.7
100.0
%
7.9
9.3
9.7
9.8
5.5
3.6
1.4
1.2
2.1
2.0
2.7
2.9
3.0
2.9
3.2
3.1
3.4
3.0
2.9
3.6
2.7
2.8
4.4
6.9
100.0
%
7.2
8.6
6.8
5.8
4.1
2.2
1.7
2.3
2.2
3.0
3.2
2.9
2.9
3.5
3.2
2.8
2.5
2.8
3.1
4.3
4.8
6.6
6.0
7.6
100.0
%
4.7
5.1
5.1
4.7
3.3
2.4
1.6
2.4
2.9
3.4
4.8
5.0
5.0
4.7
5.4
4.6
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.3
4.1
4.8
4.5
4.4
100.0
%
5.1
5.0
4.8
4.1
2.8
1.8
1.4
2.0
3.4
4.6
5.6
5.9
5.7
5.6
5.3
4.8
4.3
3.9
3.8
4.1
3.7
3.8
4.1
4.3
100.0
11 | P a g e
Table 4. Ambulance calls for service – occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) as a proportion of total calls for service (all days and hours) – DSPs, baseline vs. trial
Drink Safe Precinct
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
Non-WDN
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Note:
WDN
Non-WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
WDN
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
1783
51.3
1693
48.7
1894
55.9
1494
44.1
0.001
2794
68.8
1270
31.2
2907
72.0
1129
28.0
0.001
2308
75.0
769
25.0
3197
76.9
960
23.1
0.061
WDN = Weekend Drinking Nights.
Table 5. Ambulance calls for service – occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) as a proportion of total calls for service (all days and hours) – individual and combined EPs, baseline vs.
trial
Entertainment
Precincts
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
Non-WDN
WDN
Non-WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
WDN
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
5563
76.1
1745
23.9
5460
76.5
1676
23.5
0.580
1497
74.1
524
25.9
1584
74.3
548
25.7
0.869
Bundaberg CBD
858
78.8
231
21.2
827
81.1
193
18.9
0.190
Cairns CBD
1231
71.6
488
28.4
1342
72.5
508
27.5
0.536
Ipswich CBD
680
81.7
152
18.3
678
78.3
188
21.7
0.077
Mackay CBD
1604
78.1
449
21.9
1705
76.4
527
23.6
0.175
2972
78.5
813
21.5
2929
77.2
867
22.8
0.154
771
74.6
262
25.4
815
74.4
280
25.6
0.912
15176
76.5
4664
23.5
15340
76.2
4787
23.8
0.636
Brisbane CBD and
Caxton Street
Broadbeach CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Toowoomba CBD
Combined EPs Total
Note:
12 | P a g e
Table 6. Ambulance calls for service – ‘most relevant’ group, proportion of calls for service during weekend
drinking nights (6pm-6am, Friday and Saturday) – Fortitude Valley DSP, baseline vs. trial
Fortitude Valley DSP Weekend Drinking Hours
MPDS Code Grouping
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
Most Relevant Group
Assault/Sexual Assault
Overdose/Poisoning (ingestion)
Unconscious/Fainting (near)
Relevant Group
Falls
Haemorrhage/Lacerations
Sick Person (Specific Diagnoses)
Stab/Gunshot/Penetrating Trauma
All Other Codes
Note:
N
1015
405
310
300
229
114
68
42
5
449
%
60.0
23.9
18.3
17.7
13.5
6.7
4.0
2.5
0.3
26.5
P-value for
Chi-square
(24 months)
N
%
778
344
187
247
236
101
49
83
3
480
52.1
23.0
12.5
16.5
15.8
6.8
3.3
5.6
0.2
32.1
<0.001
0.551
<0.001
0.375
0.070
0.976
0.270
<0.001
0.595
-
Baseline is 1 October 2008 to 30 November 2010. Trial period is 1 December 2010 to 30 November 2012.
drinking nights (6pm-6am, Friday and Saturday) – Surfers Paradise DSP, baseline vs. trial
Surfers Paradise DSP Weekend Drinking Hours
MPDS Code Grouping
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
Most Relevant Group
Relevant Group
Falls
All Other Codes
Note:
N
690
313
239
138
202
73
74
51
4
378
%
54.3
24.6
18.8
10.9
15.9
5.7
5.8
4.0
0.3
29.8
P-value for
Chi-square
(24 months)
N
474
200
147
127
204
98
37
64
5
451
%
42.0
17.7
13.0
11.2
18.1
8.7
3.3
5.7
0.4
39.9
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.765
0.158
0.005
0.003
0.059
0.609
-
13 | P a g e
drinking nights (6pm-6am, Friday and Saturday) – Townsville DSP, baseline vs. trial
Townsville DSP –
Weekend Drinking Hours
MPDS Code Grouping
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
Most Relevant Group
Relevant Group
Falls
All Other Codes
Note:
N
315
170
56
89
155
76
39
37
3
299
%
41.0
22.1
7.3
11.6
20.2
9.9
5.1
4.8
0.4
38.8
P-value for
Chi-square
(24 months)
N
342
167
73
102
264
96
60
104
4
354
%
35.6
17.4
7.6
10.6
27.5
10.0
6.3
10.8
0.4
36.9
0.023
0.014
0.800
0.532
<0.001
0.936
0.295
<0.001
0.931
-
drinking nights (6pm-6am, Friday and Saturday) – Combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Combined EP Control Precincts - Weekend
Drinking Hours
MPDS Code Grouping
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
N
Most Relevant Group
Relevant Group
Falls
All Other Codes
Note:
2105
958
461
686
939
432
234
259
14
1620
%
45.1
20.5
9.9
14.7
20.1
9.3
5.0
5.6
0.3
34.7
P-value for
Chi-square
(24 months)
N
2077
998
320
759
1092
468
221
395
8
1618
%
43.4
20.8
6.7
15.9
22.8
9.8
4.6
8.3
0.2
33.8
0.088
0.712
<0.001
0.121
0.002
0.395
0.363
<0.001
0.180
-
14 | P a g e
Table 10. Ambulance calls for service – results for the Seasonal ARIMA intervention analyses for the difference
between the percentage of ‘most relevant’ coded calls for service occurring during weekend drinking hours (out of
all hours and days)
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Overdose/Poisoning (Ingestion)
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Unconscious/Fainting (Near)
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
All the ‘Most Relevant’ Codes
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Model Type
Order
P-value
Transfer
Transfer
Regression
(1,1,2)(1,1,1)12
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)12
(0,1,1)(0,1,2)12
0.124
0.01*
0.932
Transfer
Regression
Regression
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)12
(0,1,1)(2,1,1)12
(1,0,2)(1,1,1)12
0.02*
0.524
<0.001**
Transfer
Transfer
Regression
(1,1,2)(1,1,1)12
(0,0,2)(0,1,2)12
(1,0,2)(0,1,1)12
0.001**
0.08
0.609
Transfer
Regression
Transfer
(0,0,2)(1,1,1)12
(0,1,2)(0,1,1)12
(1,1,2)(0,1,2)12
<0.001**
0.138
0.013*
15 | P a g e
Table 11. Ambulance calls for service – ‘most relevant’ group time series analysis, proportion occurring during
weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Month
Year
Dec 2007
Jan 2008
Feb 2008
Mar 2008
Apr 2008
May 2008
Jun 2008
Jul 2008
Aug 2008
Sep 2008
Oct 2008
Nov 2008
Dec 2008
Jan 2009
Feb 2009
Mar 2009
Apr 2009
May 2009
Jun 2009
Jul 2009
Aug 2009
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Fortitude
Surfers
Valley
Paradise
DSP actual DSP actual
50.0
62.5
59.6
50.0
60.9
67.6
51.5
58.3
69.8
57.1
59.4
55.2
59.4
60.0
59.3
54.8
68.1
61.2
63.2
55.0
52.2
55.0
59.3
56.6
57.4
56.8
50.0
57.8
61.2
48.6
68.6
48.8
54.5
68.8
53.8
45.7
69.2
51.7
48.3
44.4
53.8
62.5
75.0
56.1
70.1
63.4
58.2
55.0
59.4
52.9
58.9
43.9
47.7
56.8
61.0
53.1
50.9
51.3
62.3
60.0
66.7
63.3
69.4
61.2
53.8
45.7
62.7
62.8
67.1
61.0
61.3
40.6
53.3
44.1
46.7
46.0
48.0
40.0
59.6
52.1
48.7
41.2
51.1
34.1
67.3
71.0
71.0
40.0
37.2
58.3
45.8
59.5
49.4
32.6
49.2
37.0
Townsville
DSP actual
Non DSP
actual
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
30.8
48.7
43.3
36.4
51.5
43.6
58.8
46.4
50.0
47.4
28.9
37.0
57.1
37.5
38.5
53.8
51.7
30.0
41.2
32.4
57.1
28.6
35.3
48.6
16.3
37.8
38.5
31.4
25.9
38.1
50.0
37.5
42.9
42.9
39.5
38.2
29.6
24.4
27.7
24.0
27.6
23.4
20.6
22.7
25.1
22.2
22.4
20.7
25.2
25.5
26.2
23.1
23.2
25.7
24.2
24.0
22.8
22.6
23.9
23.6
24.6
29.2
25.2
25.0
24.5
24.3
24.6
23.1
23.2
23.3
24.4
24.6
21.9
23.6
26.2
23.2
24.9
21.3
21.2
22.1
20.8
21.6
20.6
20.8
22.5
21.7
Fortitude
Valley
DSP trend
59.7
59.7
59.7
59.7
59.6
59.7
59.7
59.6
59.6
59.5
59.5
59.4
59.2
59.0
58.8
59.0
59.1
59.5
59.9
60.0
60.0
59.8
59.6
59.8
59.9
60.1
60.3
60.2
60.0
59.8
59.7
59.4
59.2
58.8
58.4
57.9
57.5
56.8
56.2
55.3
54.4
53.6
52.9
52.7
52.4
51.9
51.5
50.9
Surfers
Paradise
DSP trend
61.8
61.1
60.4
59.7
59.1
58.5
57.9
57.4
56.8
56.5
56.1
55.8
55.6
55.2
54.9
54.7
54.5
54.3
54.2
54.1
53.9
54.0
54.1
54.5
55.0
55.3
55.7
55.6
55.5
55.0
54.5
53.9
53.3
52.4
51.5
50.6
49.7
49.1
48.6
48.1
47.7
47.0
46.3
45.6
44.9
44.3
43.7
43.2
Townsville
DSP trend
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
43.9
44.1
44.2
44.4
44.5
44.6
44.7
44.9
45.0
45.1
45.1
44.6
44.1
43.5
42.8
42.4
41.9
41.2
40.6
39.7
38.7
37.9
37.0
36.6
36.2
36.3
36.3
36.5
36.7
36.9
37.1
37.4
37.6
37.8
37.9
37.3
36.7
36.0
Non
DSP
trend
24.6
24.5
24.4
24.2
24.1
24.0
23.9
23.8
23.7
23.7
23.7
23.7
23.8
23.9
23.9
24.0
24.1
24.3
24.4
24.4
24.5
24.5
24.5
24.5
24.5
24.5
24.6
24.5
24.4
24.3
24.2
24.0
23.9
23.8
23.6
23.4
23.2
23.0
22.8
22.6
22.4
22.2
22.1
21.9
21.8
21.7
21.7
21.7
16 | P a g e
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
57.9
49.1
50.7
43.3
41.9
48.9
55.9
51.9
63.6
45.7
64.4
54.2
37.2
35.6
33.3
41.7
42.9
40.0
48.8
52.4
42.6
46.2
40.9
28.8
47.1
37.5
25.9
45.3
24.4
31.8
40.3
32.6
30.5
39.6
30.8
31.8
21.7
23.2
21.1
23.4
21.5
20.1
19.5
20.9
19.3
22.0
21.0
21.4
50.4
49.9
49.4
48.9
48.5
48.0
52.0
52.5
52.9
53.4
53.9
54.5
42.6
42.0
41.4
40.8
40.2
39.6
41.0
40.7
40.5
40.3
40.0
39.8
35.3
34.6
33.8
33.0
32.3
31.4
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.5
34.6
21.6
21.6
21.6
21.5
21.5
21.5
21.2
21.2
21.1
21.1
21.0
20.9
Table 12. Ambulance calls for service – percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls for service during weekend drinking
nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Fortitude Valley vs. combined EPs, December 2007 to November 2012
Month Year Fortitude Valley DSP actual Non DSP actual Fortitude Valley DSP trend Non DSP trend
Dec 2007
50.0
27.7
59.7
24.6
Jan 2008
59.6
24.0
59.7
24.5
Feb 2008
60.9
27.6
59.7
24.4
Mar 2008
51.5
23.4
59.7
24.2
Apr 2008
69.8
20.6
59.6
24.1
May 2008
59.4
22.7
59.7
24.0
Jun 2008
59.4
25.1
59.7
23.9
Jul 2008
59.3
22.2
59.6
23.8
Aug 2008
68.1
22.4
59.6
23.7
Sep 2008
63.2
20.7
59.5
23.7
Oct 2008
52.2
25.2
59.5
23.7
Nov 2008
59.3
25.5
59.4
23.7
Dec 2008
57.4
26.2
59.2
23.8
Jan 2009
50.0
23.1
59.0
23.9
Feb 2009
61.2
23.2
58.8
23.9
Mar 2009
68.6
25.7
59.0
24.0
Apr 2009
54.5
24.2
59.1
24.1
May 2009
53.8
24.0
59.5
24.3
Jun 2009
69.2
22.8
59.9
24.4
Jul 2009
48.3
22.6
60.0
24.4
Aug 2009
53.8
23.9
60.0
24.5
Sep 2009
75.0
23.6
59.8
24.5
Oct 2009
70.1
24.6
59.6
24.5
Nov 2009
58.2
29.2
59.8
24.5
Dec 2009
59.4
25.2
59.9
24.5
Jan 2010
58.9
25.0
60.1
24.5
Feb 2010
47.7
24.5
60.3
24.6
Mar 2010
61.0
24.3
60.2
24.5
Apr 2010
50.9
24.6
60.0
24.4
May 2010
62.3
23.1
59.8
24.3
Jun 2010
66.7
23.2
59.7
24.2
Jul 2010
69.4
23.3
59.4
24.0
Aug 2010
53.8
24.4
59.2
23.9
Sep 2010
62.7
24.6
58.8
23.8
Oct 2010
67.1
21.9
58.4
23.6
Nov 2010
61.3
23.6
57.9
23.4
17 | P a g e
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
53.3
46.7
48.0
59.6
48.7
51.1
67.3
71.0
37.2
45.8
49.4
49.2
57.9
49.1
50.7
43.3
41.9
48.9
55.9
51.9
63.6
45.7
64.4
54.2
26.2
23.2
24.9
21.3
21.2
22.1
20.8
21.6
20.6
20.8
22.5
21.7
21.7
23.2
21.1
23.4
21.5
20.1
19.5
20.9
19.3
22.0
21.0
21.4
57.5
56.8
56.2
55.3
54.4
53.6
52.9
52.7
52.4
51.9
51.5
50.9
50.4
49.9
49.4
48.9
48.5
48.0
52.0
52.5
52.9
53.4
53.9
54.5
23.2
23.0
22.8
22.6
22.4
22.2
22.1
21.9
21.8
21.7
21.7
21.7
21.6
21.6
21.6
21.5
21.5
21.5
21.2
21.2
21.1
21.1
21.0
20.9
Table 13. Ambulance calls for service – percentage of ‘most relevant’ calls for service during weekend drinking
nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Townsville DSP vs. combined EPs, December 2007 to November 2012
Month Year Townsville DSP actual Non DSP actual Townsville DSP trend Non DSP trend
Dec 2007
NA
27.7
NA
24.6
Jan 2008
NA
24.0
NA
24.4
Feb 2008
NA
27.6
NA
24.3
Mar 2008
NA
23.4
NA
24.2
Apr 2008
NA
20.6
NA
24.1
May 2008
NA
22.7
NA
24.0
Jun 2008
NA
25.1
NA
23.9
Jul 2008
NA
22.2
NA
23.8
Aug 2008
NA
22.4
NA
23.7
Sep 2008
NA
20.7
NA
23.7
Oct 2008
30.8
25.2
43.8
23.7
Nov 2008
48.7
25.5
44.0
23.7
Dec 2008
43.3
26.2
44.2
23.8
Jan 2009
36.4
23.1
44.3
23.9
Feb 2009
51.5
23.2
44.5
23.9
Mar 2009
43.6
25.7
44.6
24.0
Apr 2009
58.8
24.2
44.7
24.1
May 2009
46.4
24.0
44.9
24.2
Jun 2009
50.0
22.8
45.1
24.4
Jul 2009
47.4
22.6
45.1
24.4
Aug 2009
28.9
23.9
45.1
24.5
Sep 2009
37.0
23.6
44.6
24.5
Oct 2009
57.1
24.6
44.1
24.5
Nov 2009
37.5
29.2
43.4
24.5
18 | P a g e
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
38.5
53.8
51.7
30.0
41.2
32.4
57.1
28.6
35.3
48.6
16.3
37.8
38.5
31.4
25.9
38.1
50.0
37.5
42.9
42.9
39.5
38.2
29.6
24.4
47.1
37.5
25.9
45.3
24.4
31.8
40.3
32.6
30.5
39.6
30.8
31.8
25.2
25.0
24.5
24.3
24.6
23.1
23.2
23.3
24.4
24.6
21.9
23.6
26.2
23.2
24.9
21.3
21.2
22.1
20.8
21.6
20.6
20.8
22.5
21.7
21.7
23.2
21.1
23.4
21.5
20.1
19.5
20.9
19.3
22.0
21.0
21.4
42.8
42.3
41.9
41.3
40.6
39.7
38.8
37.9
37.0
36.6
36.2
36.2
36.3
36.5
36.7
36.9
37.2
37.4
37.7
37.8
37.9
37.5
37.2
36.4
35.6
35.0
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.5
34.6
24.5
24.5
24.6
24.5
24.4
24.3
24.2
24.0
23.9
23.8
23.6
23.4
23.2
23.0
22.8
22.6
22.4
22.2
22.1
21.9
21.8
21.7
21.6
21.6
21.5
21.5
21.4
21.4
21.3
21.3
21.2
21.2
21.1
21.1
21.0
20.9
Table 14. Ambulance calls for service – percentage of ‘overdose/ poisoning (ingestion)’ calls for service during
weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Fortitude Valley and combined EPs, December 2007
to November 2012
Time
Fortitude Valley DSP actual Non DSP actual Fortitude Valley DSP trend Non DSP trend
Dec 2007
8.06
6.92
15.73
5.58
Jan 2008
17.02
6.23
15.90
5.61
Feb 2008
20.29
5.84
16.07
5.64
Mar 2008
18.18
5.05
16.25
5.67
Apr 2008
23.26
5.59
16.44
5.70
May 2008
20.31
4.35
16.66
5.72
Jun 2008
13.04
5.43
16.89
5.74
Jul 2008
11.11
5.32
17.07
5.76
Aug 2008
15.94
6.80
17.25
5.78
Sep 2008
16.18
4.95
17.15
5.85
Oct 2008
13.04
6.71
17.05
5.92
19 | P a g e
Nov 2008
Dec 2008
Jan 2009
Feb 2009
Mar 2009
Apr 2009
May 2009
Jun 2009
Jul 2009
Aug 2009
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
19.75
24.07
13.04
22.45
18.57
16.36
15.38
12.31
10.34
18.75
14.29
20.90
20.90
28.12
14.29
13.85
23.73
16.36
18.84
23.33
18.82
8.75
26.87
22.37
20.00
21.33
10.00
14.67
21.28
11.54
4.44
14.29
6.45
11.63
9.72
10.13
8.47
12.28
5.66
5.97
6.67
6.76
14.89
20.34
20.25
16.67
12.86
16.95
15.25
6.18
6.63
5.91
5.37
6.65
6.86
6.45
6.09
3.07
5.42
5.82
5.81
7.14
5.82
7.26
6.02
5.26
6.67
6.84
5.45
4.62
4.71
7.29
5.62
5.11
5.80
4.66
6.00
5.35
4.84
4.56
5.01
4.68
3.10
2.87
3.66
3.75
4.34
4.79
3.64
3.83
3.88
2.85
2.95
3.28
2.91
5.18
3.95
4.88
16.95
16.84
16.83
16.81
16.83
16.86
16.98
17.10
17.18
17.25
17.43
17.60
17.99
18.38
18.70
19.03
19.17
19.32
19.30
19.28
19.12
18.96
18.60
18.24
17.55
16.85
16.01
15.17
14.28
13.39
12.53
11.67
10.97
10.27
9.76
9.25
9.35
9.45
10.04
10.64
11.43
12.22
12.94
13.65
14.45
15.24
16.08
16.91
17.74
5.97
6.03
6.00
5.98
5.95
5.91
5.91
5.91
5.92
5.93
5.93
5.92
5.93
5.94
5.97
6.00
6.00
6.01
5.96
5.90
5.82
5.74
5.64
5.55
5.45
5.35
5.24
5.13
4.97
4.82
4.67
4.51
4.39
4.26
4.13
4.00
3.88
3.76
3.70
3.64
3.70
3.76
3.82
3.89
3.95
4.01
4.08
4.15
4.23
20 | P a g e
Table 15. Ambulance calls for service – percentage of ‘unconscious/fainting (or near faint)’ calls for service during
weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Fortitude Valley and combined EPs, December 2007
to November 2012
Time
Fortitude Valley DSP actual Non DSP actual Fortitude Valley DSP trend Non DSP trend
Dec 2007
17.74
9.22
19.7
8.36
Jan 2008
19.15
7.17
19.7
8.36
Feb 2008
20.29
10.14
19.7
8.36
Mar 2008
19.70
8.87
19.7
8.37
Apr 2008
25.58
6.09
19.7
8.37
May 2008
9.38
8.45
19.7
8.36
Jun 2008
23.19
8.41
19.8
8.36
Jul 2008
18.52
7.10
19.8
8.35
Aug 2008
20.29
8.63
19.8
8.34
Sep 2008
19.12
7.42
19.8
8.34
Oct 2008
24.64
9.90
19.7
8.34
Nov 2008
16.05
10.37
19.6
8.36
Dec 2008
20.37
8.23
19.5
8.37
Jan 2009
21.74
7.07
19.3
8.36
Feb 2009
22.45
8.53
19.1
8.34
Mar 2009
18.57
7.92
19.0
8.31
Apr 2009
16.36
8.98
19.0
8.28
May 2009
13.85
8.33
18.8
8.28
Jun 2009
21.54
7.09
18.7
8.28
Jul 2009
13.79
9.31
18.3
8.32
Aug 2009
12.50
6.39
17.9
8.35
Sep 2009
30.36
7.60
17.5
8.37
Oct 2009
19.40
9.15
17.1
8.39
Nov 2009
20.90
10.59
16.9
8.39
Dec 2009
15.62
8.51
16.6
8.38
Jan 2010
12.50
7.55
16.5
8.39
Feb 2010
10.77
8.56
16.3
8.39
Mar 2010
18.64
9.20
16.1
8.36
Apr 2010
12.73
9.03
15.9
8.34
May 2010
8.70
6.93
15.8
8.29
Jun 2010
20.00
8.01
15.8
8.24
Jul 2010
16.47
7.60
15.8
8.22
Aug 2010
22.50
8.24
15.9
8.19
Sep 2010
10.45
8.27
15.9
8.15
Oct 2010
19.74
7.26
15.9
8.11
Nov 2010
22.67
8.41
16.0
8.06
Dec 2010
13.33
9.84
16.1
8.01
Jan 2011
11.67
7.53
16.2
7.97
Feb 2011
13.33
8.95
16.3
7.93
Mar 2011
12.77
7.13
16.1
7.90
Apr 2011
15.38
8.03
16.0
7.87
May 2011
17.78
7.86
16.0
7.84
Jun 2011
22.45
6.04
16.0
7.80
Jul 2011
22.58
7.58
16.4
7.80
Aug 2011
9.30
8.41
16.8
7.79
Sep 2011
13.89
7.21
17.1
7.84
Oct 2011
13.92
7.40
17.4
7.89
Nov 2011
16.95
8.74
17.3
7.94
Dec 2011
17.54
7.98
17.3
7.99
21 | P a g e
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
28.30
13.43
26.67
9.46
12.77
20.34
20.25
15.15
11.43
28.81
13.56
7.84
9.14
9.33
8.05
6.86
7.71
8.45
8.74
8.33
7.13
7.94
17.4
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.4
17.3
17.2
17.1
17.0
8.05
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.10
8.08
8.05
8.01
7.98
7.94
7.89
Table 16. Ambulance calls for service – percentages of ‘assault/sexual assault’ calls for service during weekend
drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Surfers Paradise and combined EPs, December 2007 to
November 2012
Time
Surfers Paradise DSP actual Non DSP actual Surfers Paradise DSP trend Non DSP trend
Dec 2007
33.3
11.53
33.7
10.68
Jan 2008
19.4
10.57
32.6
10.51
Feb 2008
43.2
11.67
31.6
10.35
Mar 2008
28.3
9.48
30.7
10.19
Apr 2008
37.5
8.88
29.7
10.04
May 2008
22.4
9.90
28.9
9.91
Jun 2008
29.1
11.25
28.0
9.78
Jul 2008
31.0
9.76
27.2
9.66
Aug 2008
20.4
7.01
26.4
9.54
Sep 2008
20.0
8.33
25.7
9.47
Oct 2008
32.5
8.58
25.0
9.40
Nov 2008
20.9
8.94
24.7
9.41
Dec 2008
20.5
11.31
24.4
9.42
Jan 2009
24.4
10.13
24.7
9.52
Feb 2009
22.9
9.35
24.9
9.63
Mar 2009
22.0
11.09
25.3
9.79
Apr 2009
31.2
8.39
25.7
9.96
May 2009
17.1
9.26
25.8
10.06
Jun 2009
27.6
9.58
25.9
10.16
Jul 2009
22.2
10.19
25.9
10.19
Aug 2009
41.7
12.10
25.8
10.22
Sep 2009
36.6
10.21
26.1
10.23
Oct 2009
29.3
9.65
26.4
10.23
Nov 2009
18.3
11.46
26.9
10.22
Dec 2009
17.6
10.86
27.4
10.21
Jan 2010
14.6
10.14
27.7
10.19
Feb 2010
24.3
9.95
28.0
10.17
Mar 2010
34.4
9.86
27.9
10.12
Apr 2010
30.8
8.92
27.8
10.07
May 2010
30.0
9.31
27.7
10.04
Jun 2010
40.0
9.79
27.6
10.00
Jul 2010
30.6
11.07
27.2
9.99
Aug 2010
28.6
11.44
26.9
9.98
Sep 2010
37.2
9.03
25.9
9.96
Oct 2010
22.0
8.99
24.8
9.94
Nov 2010
10.4
10.11
23.5
9.89
22 | P a g e
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
18.6
20.0
20.0
20.8
11.8
14.6
19.4
20.0
22.2
28.6
11.6
8.0
11.6
20.0
19.4
22.9
17.9
13.3
25.6
26.2
23.4
20.5
20.5
11.2
10.58
11.00
9.93
8.80
8.30
9.71
9.79
9.37
9.11
10.67
11.42
9.26
9.37
10.59
8.36
10.29
9.60
10.35
8.84
9.15
7.67
8.50
9.92
8.60
22.1
21.0
19.9
19.2
18.5
18.1
17.6
17.5
17.3
17.5
17.8
17.9
18.0
18.2
18.3
18.5
18.7
18.8
19.2
19.3
19.4
19.5
19.6
19.6
9.84
9.78
9.72
9.73
9.73
9.74
9.75
9.73
9.70
9.73
9.76
9.82
9.88
9.93
9.98
10.03
10.08
10.13
9.28
9.19
9.11
9.01
8.92
8.83
Table 17. Ambulance calls for service – percentage of ‘overdose/poisoning (ingestion)’ calls for service during
weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Townsville and combined EPs, December 2007 to
May 2012
Time
Townsville DSP actual Non DSP actual Townsville DSP trend Non DSP trend
Dec 2007
NA
6.92
NA
5.58
Jan 2008
NA
6.23
NA
5.61
Feb 2008
NA
5.84
NA
5.64
Mar 2008
NA
5.05
NA
5.67
Apr 2008
NA
5.59
NA
5.70
May 2008
NA
4.35
NA
5.72
Jun 2008
NA
5.43
NA
5.74
Jul 2008
NA
5.32
NA
5.76
Aug 2008
NA
6.80
NA
5.78
Sep 2008
NA
4.95
NA
5.85
Oct 2008
7.69
6.71
8.74
5.92
Nov 2008
12.82
6.18
8.56
5.97
Dec 2008
10.00
6.63
8.37
6.03
Jan 2009
4.55
5.91
8.22
6.00
Feb 2009
3.03
5.37
8.07
5.98
Mar 2009
12.82
6.65
7.94
5.95
Apr 2009
0.00
6.86
7.80
5.91
May 2009
14.29
6.45
7.66
5.91
Jun 2009
11.54
6.09
7.51
5.91
Jul 2009
2.63
3.07
7.55
5.92
Aug 2009
2.63
5.42
7.59
5.93
Sep 2009
11.11
5.82
7.84
5.93
Oct 2009
14.29
5.81
8.10
5.92
23 | P a g e
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
0.00
7.69
7.69
10.34
10.00
8.82
17.65
9.52
0.00
2.94
2.86
0.00
5.41
10.26
5.71
11.11
9.52
3.33
9.38
9.52
14.29
9.30
8.82
7.41
2.22
7.84
2.50
0.00
5.66
14.63
13.64
3.23
4.65
3.39
10.42
7.69
13.64
7.14
5.82
7.26
6.02
5.26
6.67
6.84
5.45
4.62
4.71
7.29
5.62
5.11
5.80
4.66
6.00
5.35
4.84
4.56
5.01
4.68
3.10
2.87
3.66
3.75
4.34
4.79
3.64
3.83
3.88
2.85
2.95
3.28
2.91
5.18
3.95
4.88
8.30
8.51
8.41
8.31
7.94
7.57
7.26
6.94
6.81
6.67
6.52
6.36
6.35
6.33
6.76
7.20
7.70
8.21
8.28
8.35
8.05
7.76
7.59
7.42
7.27
7.13
6.81
6.50
6.71
6.91
7.28
7.65
8.06
8.47
8.91
9.36
9.83
5.93
5.94
5.97
6.00
6.00
6.01
5.96
5.90
5.82
5.74
5.64
5.55
5.45
5.35
5.24
5.13
4.97
4.82
4.67
4.51
4.39
4.26
4.13
4.00
3.88
3.76
3.70
3.64
3.70
3.76
3.82
3.89
3.95
4.01
4.08
4.15
4.23
24 | P a g e
Appendix E
Hospital emergency presentations data
Table 18. Emergency presentations – patient demographics for alcohol-related presentations – DSPs and
combined EPs, baseline and trial combined
Gold Coast
Townsville
Non-DSP controls
Patient
RBWH
Hospital
Hospital
demographics
Gender
Male
50.2%
53.2%
54.5%
55.4%
(n = 938)
Female
Age
12-17 yrs
18-30 yrs
31-64 yrs
(n = 459)
(n = 423)
(n = 2299)
49.8%
46.8%
45.5%
44.6%
(n = 930)
(n = 403)
(n = 351)
(n = 1851)
7.8%
19.4%
14.7%
14.2%
(n = 146)
(n = 167)
(n = 114)
(n = 588)
66.9%
51.2%
50.4%
52.1%
(n = 1251)
(n = 441)
(n = 391)
(n = 2163)
25.3%
29.4%
34.9%
33.7%
(n = 472)
(n = 254)
(n = 270)
(n = 1400)
25 | P a g e
Table 19. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a proportion of hourly total presentations
by time of day – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Label
at
graph
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Time slot
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2008 – 30 Nov 2010)
0:00 - 0:59
1:00 - 1:59
2:00 - 2:59
3:00 - 3:59
4:00 - 4:59
5:00 - 5:59
6:00 - 6:59
7:00 - 7:59
8:00 - 8:59
9:00 - 9:59
10:00 - 10:59
11:00 - 11:59
12:00 - 12:59
13:00 - 13:59
14:00 - 14:59
15:00 - 15:59
16:00 - 16:59
17:00 - 17:59
18:00 - 18:59
19:00 - 19:59
20:00 - 20:59
21:00 - 21:59
22:00 - 22:59
23:00 - 23:59
(24 months)
RBWH
Gold
Coast
Hospital
Townsville
Hospital
NonDSP
controls
RBWH
Gold
Coast
Hospital
Townsville
Hospital
NonDSP
controls
%
13.1
14.6
19.9
15.4
16.2
13.0
10.1
9.4
21.7
22.6
13.3
15.0
15.0
15.1
14.8
14.8
13.9
12.1
10.4
10.6
8.1
7.0
6.8
9.8
%
11.0
13.5
13.7
12.2
11.4
13.4
7.3
3.2
2.1
2.6
1.6
1.8
2.9
3.3
4.1
3.3
3.5
3.1
3.4
3.2
4.0
5.2
6.1
8.5
%
9.7
10.7
11.9
13.0
11.4
10.6
9.5
4.8
2.5
1.3
1.9
1.8
2.0
2.2
3.1
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.0
3.0
2.7
3.7
5.0
6.4
%
9.7
11.3
11.1
12.7
11.8
10.4
7.4
3.1
2.1
1.3
1.4
2.0
1.9
2.3
2.4
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.9
2.9
3.4
4.3
4.5
7.1
%
14.6
17.0
15.9
16.9
18.3
12.2
11.8
7.9
27.3
27.7
16.1
17.1
16.8
14.6
15.1
13.6
12.8
11.9
11.1
10.4
7.4
6.7
7.2
10.1
%
12.1
12.8
14.7
11.8
12.7
11.1
9.7
8.5
4.3
2.9
2.7
3.3
3.1
3.5
3.5
3.3
3.6
4.3
4.9
3.5
3.6
3.8
6.8
9.0
%
10.9
11.2
14.4
14.5
14.1
12.0
11.2
5.4
1.9
2.2
1.4
1.2
2.4
2.7
2.5
3.5
3.0
3.0
2.8
2.9
4.7
4.0
5.9
7.4
%
9.4
11.6
13.1
12.5
10.6
9.8
7.3
3.0
2.0
1.4
1.5
1.8
1.7
2.0
2.5
2.8
2.8
2.6
2.6
3.0
3.4
4.4
4.6
5.9
Table 20. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a proportion of presentations during
weekending drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – combined DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP),
Time
Combined DSP actual
Non-DSP actual
Combined DSP trend
Dec 2008
10.33
9.68
11.8
Jan 2009
10.41
9.26
11.8
Feb 2009
13.19
9.28
11.9
Mar 2009
12.37
8.18
11.9
Apr 2009
9.89
8.62
12.0
May 2009
12.26
9.30
12.0
Jun 2009
13.95
9.33
12.0
Jul 2009
11.92
8.21
12.0
Aug 2009
11.70
8.51
12.1
Sep 2009
13.40
9.54
12.0
Oct 2009
13.64
10.34
12.0
Non-DSP trend
9.08
9.07
9.05
9.04
9.03
9.01
9.00
8.99
8.97
8.93
8.89
26 | P a g e
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
12.99
8.60
12.20
11.64
10.07
12.08
11.98
11.36
10.44
9.98
14.91
9.96
10.85
11.69
9.04
11.04
13.19
8.35
11.84
13.47
12.85
14.50
10.23
12.11
12.88
14.83
13.13
13.56
11.80
12.17
11.15
12.13
13.14
12.07
11.79
10.18
18.04
8.01
10.36
7.57
9.14
9.23
7.65
7.18
9.23
9.00
9.78
9.75
9.43
7.26
10.94
8.72
7.59
8.62
8.19
8.85
7.10
8.38
10.74
9.12
9.52
8.01
9.86
9.60
8.96
8.39
7.75
6.68
8.38
10.00
8.50
9.23
7.98
8.39
11.9
11.9
11.7
11.6
11.5
11.4
11.4
11.3
11.3
11.2
11.2
11.1
11.2
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.5
11.6
11.8
12.0
12.2
12.4
12.5
12.7
12.7
12.7
12.7
12.6
12.6
12.6
12.6
12.6
12.6
12.6
12.6
12.7
12.7
8.86
8.82
8.83
8.84
8.85
8.87
8.87
8.87
8.86
8.86
8.85
8.84
8.82
8.81
8.78
8.76
8.75
8.75
8.76
8.78
8.81
8.83
8.85
8.86
8.84
8.82
8.80
8.78
8.74
8.69
8.65
8.60
8.56
8.52
8.48
8.44
8.40
Table 21. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a proportion of presentations during
weekending drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, December 2008 to May
2012
Month
Year
Dec 2008
Jan 2009
Feb 2009
Mar 2009
Apr 2009
May 2009
Jun 2009
Jul 2009
RBWH
actual
24
27
33
55
28
50
47
29
Gold Coast
Hospital
actual
46
48
55
67
40
76
61
47
Townsville
Hospital
actual
11
16
21
16
14
14
16
17
Non
DSP
actual
87
86
83
83
79
105
80
70
RBWH
trend
34.5
35.3
36.2
37.0
37.8
38.5
39.3
39.9
Gold Coast
Hospital
trend
55.4
55.9
56.4
56.8
57.2
57.5
57.8
58.1
Townsville
hospital
trend
15.0
15.1
15.3
15.4
15.5
15.6
15.7
15.7
Non
DSP
trend
83.3
83.6
83.8
84.0
84.3
84.5
84.7
84.8
27 | P a g e
Aug 2009
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
47
46
51
34
34
44
35
29
39
41
28
40
32
58
42
33
40
29
44
42
31
42
28
53
40
32
42
29
50
38
37
38
32
34
48
40
36
38
31
51
63
58
71
68
43
66
43
47
56
60
41
53
43
66
62
50
54
49
52
58
45
51
52
65
65
43
59
58
65
48
64
62
50
46
64
58
48
57
44
110
14
18
25
11
8
11
26
13
16
18
19
11
14
12
6
9
13
10
13
16
8
16
16
13
13
15
19
23
24
27
16
22
23
18
14
19
19
18
14
17
86
78
111
74
95
76
83
80
77
75
80
93
89
79
94
62
102
93
74
76
84
86
64
97
92
81
99
72
106
95
84
103
78
65
85
92
87
97
76
85
40.5
40.4
40.3
39.8
39.2
38.8
38.3
38.1
37.9
37.8
37.8
37.9
38.1
38.3
38.6
38.7
38.9
38.9
39.0
38.7
38.4
38.4
38.3
38.4
38.5
38.5
38.5
38.5
38.5
38.5
38.5
38.4
38.3
38.4
38.5
38.6
38.7
38.9
39.0
39.1
58.4
58.1
57.8
57.0
56.3
55.6
54.8
54.3
53.7
53.4
53.0
52.9
52.8
52.8
52.8
52.9
53.0
53.4
53.8
54.0
54.3
54.5
54.8
55.2
55.6
56.0
56.5
56.6
56.7
56.6
56.5
56.9
57.3
58.1
59.0
59.9
60.9
61.8
62.7
63.7
15.8
15.8
15.8
15.9
16.0
15.8
15.6
15.2
14.8
14.4
14.0
13.7
13.4
12.9
12.5
12.2
12.0
12.0
12.1
12.6
13.0
14.0
14.9
15.8
16.8
17.6
18.4
18.9
19.4
19.6
19.9
19.6
19.3
19.0
18.7
18.3
17.9
17.5
17.1
16.7
84.9
84.5
84.1
83.6
83.2
83.3
83.4
83.3
83.2
83.1
82.9
83.1
83.3
83.4
83.5
83.4
83.4
83.4
83.4
83.7
84.0
84.5
85.0
85.6
86.3
86.9
87.6
87.7
87.9
87.9
87.9
87.6
87.4
87.2
87.0
86.7
86.5
86.2
85.9
85.7
Table 22. Emergency presentations – seasonal ARIMA intervention analyses for the difference in percentage of
narrowly-alcohol related presentations during weekend drinking hours (out of all hours, days) – DSPs and
matched comparison EPs, baseline vs. trial
Drink Safe Precinct Hospitals
Model Type
Order
P-value
RBWH
Gold Coast Hospital
Townsville Hospital
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
(1,0,2)(1,1,1)12
(0,1,2)(0,1,2)12
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)12
<0.001
<0.001
0.201
28 | P a g e
Narrow
Figure 1. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a percentage of all types of presentations
during weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Fortitude Valley DSP (RB&WH) and matched
EP (non-DSP) hospitals, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
See Tables 22 and 23 for details of date and analysis.
Table 23. Emergency presentations – alcohol-related presentations as a percentage of all types of presentations
during weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) –RBWH and matched non-DSP hospitals,
Month Year
Dec 2008
Jan 2009
Feb 2009
Mar 2009
Apr 2009
May 2009
Jun 2009
Jul 2009
Aug 2009
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
RBWH actual
10.8
10.4
13.6
18.2
10.8
15.7
19.8
12.0
16.7
17.0
16.3
14.9
12.8
17.0
13.6
11.1
14.8
14.6
12.4
13.8
11.8
22.2
12.1
14.5
16.7
10.1
Matched non
DSP actual
10.42
8.44
7.95
6.47
9.40
8.10
8.61
6.94
7.18
8.65
9.81
6.38
11.00
6.27
7.85
8.02
7.60
6.47
6.62
8.36
8.11
4.78
9.75
6.85
8.85
7.98
RBWH trend
Matched non DSP trend
13.1
13.4
13.7
13.9
14.2
14.4
14.7
14.9
15.1
15.1
15.1
14.9
14.8
14.6
14.4
14.4
14.3
14.3
14.2
14.3
14.3
14.3
14.4
14.5
14.5
14.6
8.38
8.35
8.33
8.29
8.26
8.22
8.19
8.16
8.12
8.07
8.02
7.95
7.88
7.84
7.79
7.74
7.68
7.63
7.58
7.55
7.53
7.52
7.50
7.47
7.44
7.41
29 | P a g e
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
16.2
16.3
10.8
16.2
12.1
19.1
16.9
12.6
14.9
13.7
19.1
16.1
15.2
13.2
12.6
14.3
17.8
15.2
14.3
14.1
13.7
19.0
6.50
8.68
7.49
6.69
4.22
7.28
9.03
7.10
7.36
8.71
10.00
6.77
9.32
6.89
7.22
4.71
6.60
8.71
7.77
8.38
7.30
5.87
14.7
14.7
14.7
14.8
14.8
15.0
15.1
15.1
15.2
15.2
15.2
15.2
15.2
15.1
15.1
15.1
15.1
15.1
15.1
15.1
15.1
15.2
7.39
7.40
7.42
7.45
7.48
7.52
7.55
7.57
7.58
7.59
7.59
7.61
7.63
7.61
7.58
7.52
7.46
7.39
7.33
7.27
7.21
7.15
Narrow
during weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Surfers Paradise DSP (Gold Coast) and
matched EP (non-DSP) hospitals, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
See Tables 22 and 24 for details of date and analysis.
30 | P a g e
during weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) –Gold Coast and matched non-DSP hospitals,
Month Year
Dec 2008
Jan 2009
Feb 2009
Mar 2009
Apr 2009
May 2009
Jun 2009
Jul 2009
Aug 2009
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
Gold Coast
actual
11.58
10.99
14.19
6.56
8.33
12.50
8.00
12.24
8.65
8.22
10.10
15.38
5.33
10.73
4.37
10.17
9.55
9.95
8.44
7.93
8.27
6.40
11.30
9.24
7.73
9.52
5.13
9.94
8.14
5.17
15.69
7.64
16.03
6.51
9.60
11.46
9.68
5.88
15.43
12.06
10.91
6.94
9.14
10.65
8.82
11.24
6.99
22.10
Matched non
DSP actual
8.12
8.43
7.80
7.41
8.09
7.34
8.42
6.83
6.37
9.54
8.66
5.61
9.52
5.62
8.89
8.88
6.41
5.31
8.36
10.15
8.74
9.47
8.39
5.60
7.81
7.30
8.00
4.78
7.45
8.16
8.45
8.13
7.23
5.28
8.92
8.37
6.67
7.69
8.47
7.42
7.43
5.03
7.60
7.94
9.45
9.90
8.83
9.20
Gold Coast trend
11.80
11.54
11.29
11.04
10.79
10.53
10.28
10.03
9.78
9.63
9.48
9.40
9.32
9.20
9.09
8.98
8.87
8.79
8.70
8.65
8.60
8.53
8.45
8.46
8.46
8.66
8.86
9.07
9.27
9.39
9.52
9.69
9.85
10.06
10.27
10.30
10.33
10.24
10.15
10.25
10.34
10.54
10.74
10.93
11.12
11.31
11.50
11.71
8.13
8.07
8.01
7.95
7.90
7.85
7.80
7.76
7.71
7.68
7.64
7.64
7.64
7.71
7.79
7.87
7.94
7.94
7.95
7.90
7.85
7.79
7.73
7.71
7.69
7.62
7.55
7.48
7.40
7.41
7.41
7.45
7.49
7.51
7.53
7.50
7.47
7.50
7.54
7.68
7.82
7.97
8.12
8.26
8.40
8.55
8.71
8.87
31 | P a g e
Narrow
during weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – Townsville DSP and matched EP (non-DSP)
hospitals, baseline (pre-trial) vs. trial
Note:
See Table 22 and 25 for details of date and analysis.
during weekend drinking night (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) –Townsville and matched non-DSP hospitals,
Month Year
Dec 2008
Jan 2009
Feb 2009
Mar 2009
Apr 2009
May 2009
Jun 2009
Jul 2009
Aug 2009
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Nov 2009
Dec 2009
Jan 2010
Feb 2010
Mar 2010
Apr 2010
May 2010
Jun 2010
Jul 2010
Aug 2010
Sep 2010
Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Dec 2010
Jan 2011
Feb 2011
Townsville
actual
7.86
9.70
11.80
8.65
9.86
6.73
11.43
11.41
7.33
12.00
12.95
6.92
5.03
6.59
17.11
8.23
10.32
10.06
12.84
6.92
8.43
8.76
3.80
6.43
8.61
6.41
8.02
Matched non
DSP actual
11.50
10.44
13.29
8.43
9.09
12.40
11.60
10.75
10.73
11.26
11.96
10.25
11.21
9.55
11.71
11.54
9.71
7.54
11.92
9.64
10.45
14.18
12.46
8.01
13.48
11.36
7.69
Townsville trend
9.25
9.30
9.36
9.41
9.46
9.50
9.54
9.56
9.59
9.64
9.70
9.76
9.83
9.76
9.69
9.51
9.32
9.15
8.97
8.78
8.59
8.37
8.14
8.10
8.05
8.16
8.27
11.00
11.00
10.99
10.98
10.96
10.95
10.93
10.92
10.91
10.87
10.84
10.78
10.72
10.68
10.65
10.69
10.73
10.77
10.81
10.81
10.81
10.80
10.78
10.78
10.78
10.76
10.74
32 | P a g e
Mar 2011
Apr 2011
May 2011
Jun 2011
Jul 2011
Aug 2011
Sep 2011
Oct 2011
Nov 2011
Dec 2011
Jan 2012
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
11.27
4.57
12.12
13.33
7.51
8.97
9.80
10.27
13.94
13.11
16.36
9.30
9.82
12.64
10.98
7.04
12.34
11.31
9.14
8.92
10.06
12.30
8.84
11.42
8.33
9.53
12.50
13.62
11.51
9.66
11.58
12.84
10.54
8.82
10.24
7.03
10.18
13.08
8.92
8.61
9.25
11.14
8.54
8.81
9.27
9.73
10.18
10.63
10.91
11.18
11.26
11.33
11.34
11.35
11.19
11.03
10.85
10.67
10.47
10.27
10.07
9.88
9.69
10.74
10.73
10.76
10.79
10.83
10.86
10.86
10.85
10.81
10.77
10.70
10.63
10.47
10.32
10.20
10.07
9.96
9.84
9.73
9.61
9.50
33 | P a g e
Appendix F
Police Crime Reports
Table 26. Offences associated with banning order applications and orders made in DSPs from December 2010 to
January 2012
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Offence
Assault occasioning bodily harm
Public nuisance
n
42
26
Offence
Public nuisance
Affray
n
17
11
Common assault
13
8
Obstruct police
11
Assault occasioning bodily
harm
Obstruct police
Drunk disorderly on licensed
premises
Serious assault
Assault police
Contravene banning order
10
premises
Assault police
Common assault
Drunk in public place
5
Resist authorised person
Armed so as to cause fear
2
2
1
1
Grievous bodily harm
Unlawful wounding
State false name address
2
1
1
Drug offences
Resist authorised
person/obstruct licensee
Serious assault
Dangerous operation of a
motor vehicle
Re-enter licensed premises
after ejection
Possess dangerous weapon
Wilful damage
Refused entry into a licensed
premises
1
Source:
Note:
6
5
3
6
2
2
1
1
Offence
Public nuisance
Assault occasioning bodily
harm
Obstruct police
n
38
17
premises
Assault Police
14
Grievous bodily harm
Common assault
Resist authorised person,
obstruct licensee, refuse
eviction
Breach bail conditions
Contravene banning order
6
2
2
Drink driving
Possess dangerous weapon
Serious assault
1
1
1
Wilful damage
1
16
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
Queensland Police Service – Drug and Alcohol Coordination Unit. As at 2 February 2012.
1. Sorted by most common to least common.
2. Based on an occurrence count of the original offences listed for each sentencing banning order. This includes all police applications, whether they
were issued or not, and those issued by the court without a police application. Multiple counts of a particular type of an offence against one
application were only counted once.
34 | P a g e
Table 27. Police Crime Reports – Offender demographics for offences committed during weekend drinking nights
(6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday) – DSPs, baseline period
Offender
demographics
Gender
Male
Female
Age
12-17 yrs
18-25 yrs
26-30 yrs
31-40 yrs
41+ yrs
Indigenous status
Indigenous
Non-Indigenous
Not stated
Fortitude Valley
DSP
Surfers Paradise
DSP
Townsville DSP
Combined EPs
88.4%
89.6%
84.3%
86.0%
(n = 7698)
(n = 3169)
(n = 2755)
(n = 15 286)
11.6%
10.3%
15.7%
14.0%
(n = 1013)
(n = 363)
(n = 513)
(n = 2491)
2.6%
7.7%
2.3%
7.2%
(n = 229)
(n = 561)
(n = 76)
(n = 1289)
64.5%
65.3%
55.5%
56.1%
(n = 5620)
(n = 4753)
(n = 1814)
(n = 9973)
16.4%
15.1%
18.3%
16.5%
(n = 1433)
(n = 1099)
(n = 598)
(n = 2927)
12.5%
9.5%
16.4%
14.0%
(n = 1093)
(n = 694)
(n = 535)
(n = 2496)
3.9%
2.4%
7.5%
6.2%
(n = 338)
(n = 174)
(n = 246)
(n = 1097)
8.9%
2.3%
21.7%
15.3%
(n = 772)
(n = 82)
(n = 710)
(n = 2717)
87.3%
94.8%
75.1%
81.5%
(n = 7606)
(n = 3354)
(n = 2455)
(n = 14 490)
3.8%
2.9%
3.2%
3.2%
(n = 335)
(n = 101)
(n = 104)
(n = 575)
Table 28. Police crime reports – actions taken against offenders – weekend drinking nights (6am to 6pm, Friday
and Saturday) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline and trial period
Action
taken
against
offender
Fortitude
Valley DSP
Surfers
Paradise
DSP
Townsville
DSP
Combined
EPs
Note:
Baseline
Dec 07- Nov 10
Arrest
Notice to Appear Infringement
Notice
Trial
Dec 10- Nov 12
Other
Arrest
63.9%
34.0%
0.3%
1.8%
63.4%
Notice
to
Appear
20.5%
Infringement
Notice
Other
13.8%
2.3%
(n = 5567)
(n = 2965)
(n = 27)
(n = 154)
(n = 2841)
(n = 919)
(n = 617)
(n = 107)
77.3%
18.7%
1.7%
2.3%
54.7%
10.8%
30.9%
3.6%%
(n = 5627)
(n = 1359)
(n = 123)
(n = 172)
(n = 1933)
(n = 381)
(n = 1094)
(n = 129)
47.6%
27.8%
23.0%
1.6%
36.2%
14.2%
48.3%
1.3%
(n = 1557)
(n = 909)
(n = 753)
(n = 50)
(n = 786)
(n = 309)
(n = 1050)
(n = 29)
52.8%
44.1%
0.4%
2.7%
49.3%
22.1%
26.4%
2.2%
(n = 9392)
(n = 7837)
(n = 74)
(n = 479)
(n = 5625)
(n = 2521)
(n = 3013)
(n = 256)
Other = Caution, community conference, warrant and other.
35 | P a g e
Table 29. Police crime reports – proportion of total offences by time of day – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs.
trial
Label
at
graph
24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Total
Time slot
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
0:00 - 0:59
1:00 - 1:59
2:00 - 2:59
3:00 - 3:59
4:00 - 4:59
5:00 - 5:59
6:00 - 6:59
7:00 - 7:59
8:00 - 8:59
9:00 - 9:59
10:00 - 10:59
11:00 - 11:59
12:00 - 12:59
13:00 - 13:59
14:00 - 14:59
15:00 - 15:59
16:00 - 16:59
17:00 - 17:59
18:00 - 18:59
19:00 - 19:59
20:00 - 20:59
21:00 - 21:59
22:00 - 22:59
23:00 - 23:59
(24 months)
Fortitude
Valley
DSP
Surfers
Paradise
DSP
Townsville
DSP
NonDSP
controls
Fortitude
Valley
DSP
Surfers
Paradise
DSP
Townsville
DSP
NonDSP
controls
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
11.9
12.4
12
11.8
7.7
3.7
0.7
0.6
0.9
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.3
1
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.4
1.5
2
2.8
4.1
6.1
10.1
100.0
13.1
12.5
11.8
10.9
6.5
2.7
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.9
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.8
1.6
1.9
2.6
2.9
4.1
6.4
10.6
100.0
9.9
8.9
9.9
9.4
6.9
3.6
0.7
0.7
2.2
1.6
1.9
3.1
2.5
2.8
2.6
2.6
4.2
3.4
3.1
3.2
3.1
3.2
4.5
6
100.0
10.4
8.4
8.3
7.9
4
2
0.8
0.9
2
2.6
2.4
2.7
3.4
3.3
3.6
3.4
3.8
4.4
3.4
2.9
3.4
3.8
5.1
7.1
100.0
12.7
12
11.9
11.7
7.1
2.7
0.6
0.6
1.1
1.2
1.7
1.8
1.3
1.4
1.3
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.9
2
2.8
3
5.6
11
100.0
12.5
12.4
11
9.1
4.5
1.8
0.6
0.5
1.1
1.2
1.5
1.6
1.8
1.2
1.9
1.6
2.2
2
2.3
2.6
3.7
4.9
7.4
10.7
100.0
12.6
11.1
11.2
11.1
7.9
3.1
0.8
0.5
2.1
1.6
1.2
1.6
2.2
1.8
1.6
2.1
5.3
2.5
2.5
2.8
2.3
2.5
3.6
6.2
100.0
10.5
8.5
7.9
7.4
3.8
1.7
0.8
0.9
1.8
2.7
2.6
2.9
3.5
3.5
3.9
3.8
4.2
4.5
3.1
2.9
3.3
3.8
4.7
7.2
100.0
Table 30. Police crime reports –total offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday) as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Drink Safe Precinct
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
Non-WDN
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
WDN
Non-WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
WDN
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
6120
36.3
10728
63.7
3456
35.4
6306
64.6
0.162
8812
50.2
8737
49.8
5676
55.8
4496
44.2
<0.001
5130
57.6
3773
42.4
2917
53.4
2544
46.6
<0.001
Note: WDN = Weekend Drinking Nights.
36 | P a g e
Table 31. Police crime reports – total offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and
Saturday)as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
Entertainment
Precincts
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
Non-WDN
WDN
Non-WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
WDN
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
11689
65.4
6190
34.6
8174
69.4
3602
30.6
<0.001
2210
56.3
1714
43.7
1235
40.3
1832
59.7
<0.001
Bundaberg CBD
1830
54.3
1538
45.7
1067
58.8
749
41.2
0.002
Cairns CBD
4991
64.7
2727
35.3
3164
65.0
1700
35.0
0.662
Ipswich CBD
1930
60.0
1287
40.0
1122
62.5
673
37.5
0.080
Mackay CBD
3086
54.7
2560
45.3
2043
53.5
1777
46.5
0.260
4863
61.5
2933
38.5
3397
62.2
2062
37.8
0.391
Toowoomba CBD
1295
32.0
2750
68.0
881
31.7
1902
68.3
0.755
Combined EPs Total
31714
59.5
21699
40.6
21083
59.6
14297
40.4
0.523
Brisbane CBD and
Caxton Street
Broadbeach CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Note:
Table 32. Police crime reports – assault offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday
and Saturday) as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Drink Safe
Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Note:
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
N
%
N
%
865
24.7
598
28.4
0.001
560
16.0
284
13.5
0.836
288
8.2
143
6.8
0.002
37 | P a g e
Table 33. Police crime reports – assault offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday
and Saturday) as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
Entertainment
Precincts
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
N
%
N
%
595
17.0
341
16.2
0.453
152
4.3
103
4.9
0.331
Bundaberg CBD
90
2.6
59
2.8
0.595
Cairns CBD
243
6.9
155
7.4
0.541
Ipswich CBD
110
3.1
61
2.9
0.613
Mackay CBD
185
5.3
129
6.1
0.179
261
7.5
154
7.3
0.859
Toowoomba CBD
152
4.3
75
3.6
0.155
Combined EPs Total
3501
100.0
2102
100.0
-
Brisbane CBD and
Caxton Street
Broadbeach CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Note:
Table 34. Police crime reports – seasonal ARIMA intervention analyses for the difference between percentage
of four subgroups of offences – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Offences Against the Person
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Assault Offences
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Good Order Offences
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Offences Against Police
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Model Type
Order
P-value
Regression
Regression
Regression
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)(0,1,2)
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)
0.643
0.208
0.203
Regression
Regression
Regression
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)(0,1,2)
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)
0.612
0.061
0.081
Transfer
Transfer
Regression
(0,1,2)(1,1,2)
(1,1,1)(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)
0.051
0.035
0.279
Transfer
Transfer
Regression
(1,0,2)(0,1,2)
(1,0,1)(1,1,1)
(0,1,1)(2,1,1)
0.24
0.003
0.551
38 | P a g e
Table 35. Police crime reports –assaults offences occurring during weekend during nights as a percentage of all
assault offences, time series analysis – DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP), December 2007 to November 2012
MonthYear
Dec
2007
Jan
2008
Feb
2008
Mar
2008
Apr
2008
May
2008
Jun
2008
Jul 2008
Aug
2008
Sep
2008
Oct
2008
Nov
2008
Dec
2008
Jan
2009
Feb
2009
Mar
2009
Apr
2009
May
2009
Jun
2009
Jul 2009
Aug
2009
Sep
2009
Oct
2009
Nov
2009
Fortitude Surfers
Non
Valley
Paradise Townsville
DSP
DSP
DSP
DSP actual
actual
actual
actual
Fortitude
Valley DSP
trend
Surfers
Paradise DSP
trend
Townsville DSP
trend
Non DSP
trend
5.57
5.08
6.19
7.48
5.50
6.45
7.82
9.73
3.93
2.50
13.33
11.28
5.73
6.42
7.66
9.64
9.40
10.67
9.71
9.39
5.95
6.40
7.50
9.55
3.53
7.59
1.74
9.95
6.17
6.37
7.38
9.45
5.09
9.02
5.50
10.56
6.39
6.35
7.26
9.35
7.56
5.22
7.75
8.44
6.60
6.34
7.16
9.25
9.40
7.96
4.27
7.40
6.81
6.33
7.06
9.15
8.85
6.90
4.27
10.53
7.03
6.32
6.97
9.04
5.56
5.02
7.86
8.42
7.24
6.31
6.87
8.92
5.88
5.19
7.23
11.18
7.41
6.30
6.98
8.80
6.19
5.59
6.45
6.54
7.59
6.28
7.09
8.68
9.82
3.95
8.82
8.12
7.64
6.39
7.41
8.63
7.83
4.25
8.16
10.04
7.68
6.49
7.72
8.57
9.38
7.51
6.72
7.64
7.71
6.66
7.95
8.52
6.34
6.42
8.91
6.69
7.73
6.83
8.19
8.47
9.81
8.84
10.53
8.00
7.82
7.03
8.37
8.39
5.37
8.11
6.86
10.66
7.91
7.24
8.55
8.30
8.33
9.64
11.27
8.02
8.00
7.39
8.68
8.24
8.11
7.42
8.05
9.11
8.08
7.55
8.82
8.18
7.26
9.01
6.40
8.39
8.25
7.65
8.76
8.13
8.24
5.86
6.36
6.92
8.42
7.74
8.70
8.08
8.82
10.00
11.49
8.15
8.64
7.73
8.45
8.02
8.71
5.52
9.18
7.04
8.85
7.72
8.21
7.96
8.54
7.59
12.61
9.28
9.07
7.55
7.97
7.85
39 | P a g e
Dec
2009
Jan
2010
Feb
2010
Mar
2010
Apr
2010
May
2010
Jun
2010
Jul 2010
Aug
2010
Sep
2010
Oct
2010
Nov
2010
Dec
2010
Jan
2011
Feb
2011
Mar
2011
Apr
2011
May
2011
Jun
2011
Jul 2011
Aug
2011
Sep
2011
Oct
2011
Nov
2011
Dec
2011
Jan
2012
Feb
2012
Mar
2012
7.49
5.49
7.78
5.86
9.29
7.38
7.73
7.73
13.51
6.67
6.41
7.14
9.44
7.12
7.60
7.67
10.34
10.29
7.69
8.42
9.60
6.86
7.47
7.60
8.52
8.05
6.76
10.34
9.68
6.68
7.43
7.58
10.10
7.38
1.32
7.07
9.76
6.49
7.38
7.56
8.20
5.95
8.16
5.95
9.78
6.38
7.39
7.55
13.08
5.28
5.41
5.43
9.80
6.28
7.41
7.54
9.45
2.73
6.56
9.59
9.74
6.15
7.39
7.53
8.87
6.06
9.52
7.40
9.68
6.03
7.36
7.51
10.18
6.06
6.90
6.78
9.67
5.92
7.26
7.43
7.50
8.21
12.73
7.35
9.66
5.81
7.16
7.34
11.29
4.31
9.82
8.47
9.66
5.83
7.03
7.27
8.43
5.95
9.30
7.45
9.66
5.85
6.90
7.19
10.47
6.40
4.88
7.11
9.62
5.94
6.69
7.15
6.37
3.52
3.77
8.37
9.59
6.03
6.47
7.11
11.28
6.13
4.20
7.13
9.58
6.04
6.15
7.08
12.67
6.40
2.40
4.15
9.57
6.05
5.83
7.06
9.24
8.38
7.69
6.24
9.59
6.06
5.53
7.04
8.80
4.17
3.94
6.42
9.61
6.07
5.22
7.02
8.47
7.83
6.49
8.51
9.63
6.18
5.16
7.05
12.02
8.11
5.65
7.00
9.64
6.29
5.09
7.09
7.30
5.92
3.09
8.04
9.65
6.45
5.16
7.22
8.42
4.43
8.13
6.95
9.66
6.60
5.24
7.34
11.79
5.60
3.41
7.65
9.68
6.68
5.34
7.46
7.94
4.47
3.48
6.43
9.71
6.76
5.45
7.58
10.86
9.09
7.14
7.01
9.74
6.81
5.60
7.64
9.50
5.34
7.23
9.33
9.77
6.86
5.75
7.71
8.91
7.95
4.55
8.36
9.68
6.86
5.81
7.81
40 | P a g e
Apr
2012
May
2012
Jun
2012
Jul 2012
Aug
2012
Sep
2012
Oct
2012
Nov
2012
10.98
9.38
6.52
8.12
9.60
6.87
5.87
7.91
12.32
9.94
2.50
7.16
9.49
6.86
5.90
8.02
7.49
3.88
11.70
7.12
9.38
6.86
5.93
8.13
10.93
7.14
4.17
8.81
9.27
6.85
5.96
8.24
10.03
8.96
7.23
8.24
9.16
6.84
5.98
8.35
7.21
6.80
6.42
7.22
9.03
6.82
5.98
8.46
8.21
4.52
4.82
10.18
8.91
6.81
5.98
8.57
8.50
5.34
6.67
8.82
8.77
6.79
5.95
8.68
Table 36. Police crime reports – good order offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs.
trial
Drink Safe Precinct
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Note:
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
N
%
N
%
5150
21.9
2722
18.6
<0.001
5115
21.8
2574
17.6
0.153
2166
9.2
1704
11.6
<0.001
Table 37. Police crime reports – good order offences occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday)as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
Entertainment Precincts
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
N
%
N
%
2556
10.9
1275
8.7
<0.001
573
2.4
938
6.4
<0.001
Bundaberg CBD
905
3.9
403
2.8
<0.001
Cairns CBD
1554
6.6
898
6.1
0.066
Ipswich CBD
761
3.2
441
3.0
0.223
Mackay CBD
1339
5.7
1100
7.5
<0.001
1563
6.7
1122
7.7
<0.001
Toowoomba CBD
1821
7.7
1456
10.0
<0.001
Combined EPs Total
23503
100.0
14633
100.0
-
Street
Broadbeach CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Note:
41 | P a g e
Table 38. Police crime reports – good order offences during weekend drinking nights as a percentage of all good
order offences, time series analysis – DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP), December 2007 to November 2012
MonthYear
Dec
2007
Jan
2008
Feb
2008
Mar
2008
Apr
2008
May
2008
Jun
2008
Jul 2008
Aug
2008
Sep
2008
Oct
2008
Nov
2008
Dec
2008
Jan
2009
Feb
2009
Mar
2009
Apr
2009
May
2009
Jun
2009
Jul 2009
Aug
2009
Sep
2009
Oct
2009
Nov
2009
Fortitude Surfers
Non
Valley
Paradise Townsville
DSP
DSP
DSP
DSP actual
actual
actual
actual
Fortitude
Valley DSP
trend
Surfers
Paradise DSP
trend
Townsville DSP
trend
Non DSP
trend
53.7
56.4
56.7
54.4
47.2
56.2
55.2
51.6
42.8
57.5
51.1
53.2
47.5
56.4
55.2
51.4
47.4
44.0
53.4
50.5
47.8
56.5
55.3
51.2
51.2
65.8
52.2
49.1
48.0
56.6
55.3
51.0
42.8
52.6
63.3
47.6
48.3
56.7
55.3
50.8
46.5
64.8
54.3
48.6
48.5
56.8
55.3
50.7
50.7
43.6
63.2
54.8
48.7
56.8
55.3
50.5
50.8
62.1
67.5
47.7
48.9
56.9
55.4
50.4
55.1
63.3
58.6
50.4
49.2
57.0
55.4
50.2
45.2
50.2
50.6
52.1
49.3
56.8
55.5
50.3
47.1
54.9
49.5
46.3
49.3
56.7
55.5
50.3
50.3
67.2
38.2
48.9
49.0
56.5
55.2
50.3
60.9
59.2
53.1
53.5
48.8
56.3
54.9
50.3
45.1
52.6
56.3
51.2
48.3
56.2
54.7
50.2
45.9
52.9
63.4
49.7
47.8
56.1
54.5
50.1
50.0
60.5
55.8
54.3
47.5
56.2
54.6
50.2
42.3
46.5
59.8
47.8
47.2
56.2
54.7
50.3
45.3
62.2
56.3
52.5
47.0
56.5
55.3
50.4
43.6
50.7
44.8
41.2
46.9
56.7
55.8
50.6
42.3
55.0
65.1
48.6
46.8
57.0
56.4
50.7
47.4
55.9
57.8
56.3
46.7
57.2
57.1
50.9
48.7
53.9
49.4
50.4
46.9
57.5
57.5
51.1
52.0
61.7
48.0
51.6
47.0
57.7
57.9
51.4
44.3
63.2
56.3
51.7
47.5
58.0
58.3
51.9
42 | P a g e
Dec
2009
Jan
2010
Feb
2010
Mar
2010
Apr
2010
May
2010
Jun
2010
Jul 2010
Aug
2010
Sep
2010
Oct
2010
Nov
2010
Dec
2010
Jan
2011
Feb
2011
Mar
2011
Apr
2011
May
2011
Jun
2011
Jul 2011
Aug
2011
Sep
2011
Oct
2011
Nov
2011
Dec
2011
Jan
2012
Feb
2012
Mar
2012
56.2
67.1
67.8
54.3
47.9
58.2
58.6
52.3
45.3
60.7
67.9
56.3
48.1
58.6
59.0
52.5
44.8
52.2
67.0
47.2
48.4
58.9
59.5
52.7
41.9
53.4
56.8
52.0
48.3
59.3
59.8
52.5
53.4
67.1
51.3
56.3
48.1
59.6
60.1
52.3
52.4
60.0
58.2
55.9
47.8
59.9
60.2
52.0
51.2
44.3
59.5
55.4
47.4
60.1
60.4
51.6
43.6
62.3
71.3
45.8
47.0
60.1
60.4
51.1
46.8
65.4
50.0
51.6
46.6
60.1
60.4
50.7
48.4
57.6
64.4
49.7
46.1
59.8
60.7
50.3
48.1
61.4
59.1
49.4
45.5
59.4
61.1
49.9
37.1
71.6
61.6
50.2
44.9
58.7
61.6
49.7
51.0
66.5
65.1
44.2
44.3
58.0
62.2
49.4
40.3
55.7
60.2
47.4
44.0
57.3
62.9
49.7
42.7
58.5
59.4
49.2
43.7
56.5
63.6
50.0
42.9
49.7
65.5
53.7
43.6
55.9
64.3
50.6
39.3
50.4
65.6
44.5
43.5
55.2
65.1
51.2
39.5
47.5
56.4
52.8
43.3
54.9
65.8
51.8
42.8
52.4
70.1
50.1
43.2
54.6
66.5
52.4
54.1
44.6
77.9
58.4
43.2
54.7
67.2
52.9
39.1
55.1
67.7
57.8
43.2
54.8
67.9
53.5
46.7
54.4
73.2
54.2
43.4
55.1
68.4
53.9
43.2
57.1
67.5
55.5
43.6
55.4
68.9
54.4
42.0
69.7
68.2
54.7
43.7
55.8
69.2
54.7
41.3
63.4
68.7
57.1
43.8
56.3
69.4
55.1
39.8
56.5
63.3
47.4
43.7
56.6
69.4
55.1
47.1
52.7
74.7
54.4
43.6
56.9
69.4
55.2
46.9
60.8
70.0
57.3
43.4
56.9
69.1
55.2
43 | P a g e
Apr
2012
May
2012
Jun
2012
Jul 2012
Aug
2012
Sep
2012
Oct
2012
Nov
2012
47.2
50.0
64.1
58.1
43.2
56.9
68.8
55.3
38.4
51.5
67.5
58.0
42.9
56.9
68.4
55.3
44.2
61.7
74.5
51.9
42.6
56.9
68.0
55.4
43.1
48.4
74.2
56.3
42.3
56.8
67.6
55.5
41.9
56.7
72.3
55.4
42.0
56.8
67.2
55.6
44.3
55.8
62.4
56.7
41.6
56.7
66.8
55.7
44.9
61.9
67.5
54.6
41.3
56.7
66.4
55.8
31.5
64.1
53.3
56.1
40.9
56.6
66.0
55.8
Table 39. Police crime reports – offences against police occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday) as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs.
trial
Drink Safe Precinct
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
Fortitude Valley
Surfers Paradise
Townsville
Note:
P-value for
Chi-square
WDN
N
%
N
%
980
19.8
459
18.1
0.084
1225
24.7
473
18.7
<0.001
424
8.5
292
11.5
<0.001
Table 40. Police crime reports – offences against police occurring during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am,
Friday and Saturday)as a percentage of all offences (all days and hours) – individual EPs, baseline vs. trial
Entertainment Precincts
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
N
%
N
%
545
11.0
191
7.5
<0.001
148
3.0
149
5.9
<0.001
Bundaberg CBD
236
4.8
107
4.2
0.291
Cairns CBD
281
5.7
126
5.0
0.208
Ipswich CBD
133
2.7
81
3.2
0.207
Mackay CBD
461
9.3
292
11.5
0.002
316
6.4
270
10.6
<0.001
Toowoomba CBD
211
4.3
96
3.8
0.333
Combined EPs Total
4960
100.0
2536
100.0
-
Street
Broadbeach CBD
Rockhampton CBD
Note:
44 | P a g e
Table 41. Police crime reports – offences against police during weekend drinking nights as a percentage of all
offences against police, time series analysis – DSPs and combined EPs (Non DSP), December 2007 to November
2012
MonthYear
Dec
2007
Jan
2008
Feb
2008
Mar
2008
Apr
2008
May
2008
Jun
2008
Jul 2008
Aug
2008
Sep
2008
Oct
2008
Nov
2008
Dec
2008
Jan
2009
Feb
2009
Mar
2009
Apr
2009
May
2009
Jun
2009
Jul 2009
Aug
2009
Sep
2009
Oct
2009
Nov
2009
Fortitude Surfers
Non
Valley
Paradise Townsville
DSP
DSP
DSP
DSP actual
actual
actual
actual
Fortitude
Valley DSP
trend
Surfers
Paradise DSP
trend
Townsville DSP
trend
Non DSP
trend
14.37
14.53
15.46
16.07
10.78
16.13
12.16
13.91
10.48
15.83
13.33
13.77
10.73
16.04
12.14
13.59
8.97
14.67
7.77
11.77
10.68
15.94
12.13
13.27
11.18
22.78
9.57
13.79
10.61
15.82
12.10
12.95
8.08
12.78
11.01
13.44
10.54
15.69
12.07
12.64
11.34
16.09
15.50
10.19
10.46
15.54
12.04
12.33
10.07
11.78
16.24
12.88
10.38
15.39
12.00
12.01
12.13
18.53
8.55
12.54
10.31
15.21
12.00
11.71
9.90
18.92
12.14
9.76
10.25
15.02
12.00
11.40
10.43
12.12
8.43
12.30
10.14
14.77
11.96
11.19
6.19
17.43
18.28
8.72
10.04
14.52
11.92
10.97
13.69
11.86
6.62
10.54
9.75
14.36
11.68
10.82
13.17
13.68
13.27
11.90
9.47
14.20
11.44
10.67
7.59
11.56
13.45
8.68
9.17
14.11
11.24
10.59
8.21
12.30
13.86
10.35
8.87
14.03
11.03
10.51
11.71
14.88
10.53
11.83
8.67
13.99
10.85
10.49
5.70
10.27
7.84
8.96
8.48
13.96
10.67
10.46
6.67
19.68
11.27
11.44
8.34
14.00
10.48
10.46
7.09
14.41
5.75
11.61
8.21
14.03
10.28
10.45
4.42
14.41
9.88
9.94
8.11
14.00
10.12
10.43
8.53
14.14
14.45
10.97
8.02
13.97
9.95
10.42
10.46
17.22
6.90
10.92
8.00
13.83
9.82
10.39
7.92
10.34
7.14
8.67
7.98
13.68
9.70
10.36
8.23
13.56
9.24
10.86
8.07
13.45
9.64
10.26
45 | P a g e
Dec
2009
Jan
2010
Feb
2010
Mar
2010
Apr
2010
May
2010
Jun
2010
Jul 2010
Aug
2010
Sep
2010
Oct
2010
Nov
2010
Dec
2010
Jan
2011
Feb
2011
Mar
2011
Apr
2011
May
2011
Jun
2011
Jul 2011
Aug
2011
Sep
2011
Oct
2011
Nov
2011
Dec
2011
Jan
2012
Feb
2012
Mar
2012
9.36
14.51
15.56
9.41
8.15
13.22
9.58
10.16
11.15
9.63
10.26
9.80
8.21
12.97
9.54
9.98
5.17
12.50
12.09
10.32
8.28
12.71
9.50
9.80
7.78
12.64
4.05
9.43
8.26
12.58
9.63
9.63
8.65
12.75
7.89
11.99
8.24
12.46
9.77
9.46
7.89
14.05
13.27
10.08
8.17
12.52
10.06
9.36
8.08
15.45
4.05
8.26
8.09
12.57
10.36
9.26
8.84
7.73
9.84
8.49
8.01
12.75
10.53
9.23
6.48
10.39
9.52
7.84
7.93
12.93
10.69
9.20
8.73
13.33
10.34
8.04
7.86
13.01
10.81
9.17
9.69
15.71
12.73
8.82
7.78
13.08
10.93
9.14
5.38
11.49
23.21
8.88
7.62
12.98
11.02
9.12
8.43
11.35
9.30
8.97
7.46
12.88
11.11
9.09
6.20
19.70
12.20
9.95
7.29
12.65
11.21
9.13
8.61
14.79
8.49
9.00
7.11
12.42
11.31
9.18
9.40
10.43
9.24
13.47
6.99
12.11
11.32
9.26
6.00
10.40
9.60
6.57
6.87
11.81
11.34
9.34
6.16
16.76
7.69
9.00
6.82
11.51
11.32
9.35
3.60
7.14
10.24
8.92
6.77
11.20
11.31
9.37
6.19
7.23
12.34
9.48
6.85
10.99
11.49
9.35
6.98
8.11
12.90
9.73
6.92
10.77
11.68
9.33
6.93
10.06
13.40
9.82
7.01
10.66
11.97
9.38
6.59
11.33
14.63
9.47
7.10
10.56
12.25
9.44
5.66
10.36
9.09
8.99
7.23
10.50
12.51
9.52
7.54
13.01
15.65
8.73
7.36
10.43
12.77
9.60
10.41
9.09
14.29
6.84
7.52
10.34
12.85
9.54
13.22
14.50
13.25
11.09
7.68
10.26
12.92
9.48
4.65
10.80
10.91
11.09
7.72
10.03
12.65
9.28
46 | P a g e
Apr
2012
May
2012
Jun
2012
Jul 2012
Aug
2012
Sep
2012
Oct
2012
Nov
2012
8.54
10.94
13.04
12.55
7.77
9.80
12.38
9.08
3.32
7.60
12.50
8.70
7.76
9.58
12.07
8.90
10.49
10.19
14.89
9.72
7.75
9.36
11.75
8.73
6.11
7.14
11.67
8.96
7.72
9.11
11.42
8.55
10.03
5.97
13.25
7.09
7.70
8.87
11.09
8.37
6.56
8.84
7.34
6.86
7.66
8.62
10.73
8.17
8.70
9.68
10.84
5.09
7.62
8.36
10.36
7.98
5.00
8.01
8.00
8.82
7.57
8.11
9.96
7.76
Table 42. Police crime reports – proportion of public nuisance incidents with co-occurrence with offences against
police during weekend drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), DSPs, baseline vs. trial
Drink Safe Precinct
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
Non-WDN
WDN
Non-WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
WDN
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
8451
95.9
361
4.1
5176
97.2
148
2.8
<0.001
6320
93.6
435
6.4
3458
95.7
154
4.3
<0.001
Townsville DSP
2893
94.2
177
5.8
1898
92.9
146
7.1
0.047
Combined EPs
2893
94.2
177
5.8
11113
96.1
450
3.9
0.010
Note:
Table 43. Police crime reports – ‘grievous serious’ assaults as a percentage of all types of offences during weekend
drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Precinct
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
N
%
N
%
492
4.6
382
6.1
<0.001**
360
4.1
177
3.9
0.612
Townsville DSP
177
4.7
84
3.3
0.007*
Combined EPs
1111
5.1
676
4.7
0.094
Note:
47 | P a g e
Table 44. Police crime reports – ‘common minor’ assaults as a percentage of all types of offences during weekend
drinking nights (6pm to 6am, Friday and Saturday), DSPs and combined EPs, baseline vs. trial
Drink Safe Precinct
Baseline period
Trial period
(1 Dec 2007 – 30 Nov 2010)
(24 months)
WDN
WDN
P-value for
Chi-square
N
%
N
%
373
3.5
216
3.4
0.859
200
2.3
107
2.4
0.742
Townsville DSP
111
2.9
59
2.3
0.134
Combined EPs
677
3.1
401
2.8
0.086
Note:
48 | P a g e

Summary - Queensland Parliament

Transcription

Similar documents

KMT 218 Catalogue

XD-8080

PIEPS DSP PRO Auto-ReveRt SeARch-to-Send (AR)

RoboCam

Stampin` Up Share

full-color brochure

September 1997 - TEAM Security

Elena Ford, Why haven`t you responded to my

Software Defined Radios