HERE - Bristol 2014

37 HOWITZER BATTERY, ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY - AUGUST 1914
by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Watson,
Section Commander, 93 Le Cateau Battery RA, 1964 to 1966.
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction. [It is alleged that, on Wednesday 19 August 1914, the German Emperor,
Kaiser Wilhelm II, ordered the German Army to walk all over the contemptible little British
Army. Therefore, those members of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), who served in
France, between 4 August 1914 and 22 November 1914, became renown as “The Old
Contemptibles”. From 1924 until its disbandment in 1974, the Old Contemptibles Association
was a highly respected British institution.] In late August 1964, 93 Le Cateau Battery, Royal
Artillery (RA) of 25 Medium Regiment RA marched into Le Cateau led by their Battery
Commander (BC), Major Bill Bayly to be presented with the Freedom of the Town. This was
one of the very few Old Contemptibles 50th Anniversary events held in France that year.
2. Aim. The aim of this paper is to give an insight into the actions of 37 Howitzer Battery,
Royal Field Artillery (RFA), now 93 Le Cateau Battery RA, when it fought at Le Cateau on
Wednesday 26 August 1914, as related by some of the veterans of 37 Howitzer Battery and
XV Field Brigade RFA at Le Cateau during August 1964.
3. Limitation. This paper is primarily written as a colloquial, rather than an academic, history
for the benefit of the recently reactivated 93 Le Cateau Battery RA of 5 Regiment RA. Its main
source is the “Martin Gale” pamphlet – further details at Para 58
4.
Format.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
This paper is divided into five parts:
Part 1. - The Artillery Battle on the Right Flank at Le Cateau on Wednesday 26
August 1914. (Para 5 to 17)
Part 2. – The Aftermath. (Para 18 to 26)
Part 3. - The Operational Background of August 1914. (Para 27 to 37)
Part 4. – Overview of RA in UK circa 1914. (Para 38 to 55)
Part 5. - Sources. (Para 56 to 59)
PART 1 - RIGHT FLANK ARTILLERY BATTLE, LE CATEAU, 26 AUGUST 1914
5.
Contents – Part 1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Introduction. – Para 6 and 7.
The Preliminaries. – Para 8 to 10.
The Attrition Phase. – Para 11 and 12.
The German Break In. – Para 13 and 14.
The Recovery of F Sub-section Gun. – Para 15 to 17.
BACKGROUND
6. Battle of Le Cateau – Deployment. The intention of the Commander 2 British Corps,
Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, was to check the momentum of the German
follow-up forces and, then, break clean along the ridgeline running South of the Cambrai
Road between Cambrai and Le Cateau – see sketch map at Enclosure 1. Hence there were
neither any identified Corps or Divisional reserves, nor much depth to the British deployment
at Le Cateau. On the right flank, 37 Howitzer Battery, XV and XXVIII Field Brigades were
deployed in the open either side of the Roman Road within half a mile South of Quatre Vaux
cross roads. It is what the veterans called, “Being The Cheese in the Le Cateau Mouse-trap.”
The Battle of Le Cateau took place on Wednesday 26 August 1914, along a 15 mile front
along the Cambrai Road between Cambrai and Le Cateau, see sketch map at Enclosure 1:
a. 1 German Army. 1 German Army deployed four up, Right to Left:
i. Right: 3 and 4 German Corps advancing astride the Roman Road.
ii. Centre: 4 German Reserve Corps advancing towards Caudry.
iii. Left of Centre: 2 German Cavalry Corps providing an aggressive screen to the
West towards Cambrai.
b. 2 British Corps. 2 British Corps deployed three up with its HQ at Bertry, Right to Left:
i. Right: – 5 Division. West of Le Cateau.
ii. Centre: – 3 Division. Area of Caudry.
iii. Left: – 4 Division. Area of Haucourt.
and mistook the left flank of 1 Cavalry Brigade screen covering the 10 mile gap
between the two British Corps, as 1 British Corps securing their right flank.
c. 19 Independent Brigade. 19 Independent Brigade were resting in Le Cateau, having
covered the withdrawal of General Headquarters (GHQ) BEF to St Quentin, and came
under command 2 British Corps early on the morning of the battle.
7. Right Flank, Le Cateau – Ground.
map at Enclosure 2:
a.
The Right Flank Ground - Right to Left, see sketch
Right: The low ridge along the right bank of the River Selle.
b.
Right Centre: The Selle Valley with Le Cateau and Montay built-up areas, the
brickworks and wood.
c.
Centre and Left: A low horseshoe shaped feature with a hillock in its centre North
of the main ridgeline – marked as Waldron‟s Post.
d.
Roads. The Cambrai and Roman Roads cross at Quatre Vaux; there is also with a
network of farm-tracks that cross the ridges in cuttings as well as a Sunken Lane South
of the Cambrai Road. [Most of these tracks and cuttings have disappeared due to post
WW2 deep ploughing.]
e.
Railways. A single-track branch line, which ran beside the Cambrai Road, has long
since disappeared.
THE PRELIMINARIES
8. Le Cateau - Artillery Battle – Preliminaries.
On Wednesday 26 August 1914, the
Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) 5 Division, Brigadier General John Headlam, planned to
support the continuation of 5 Division‟s Retreat from Mons along the Roman Road by
supporting a short-check battle-position, North of the main ridgeline and South of the Cambrai
Road, near Quatre Vaux. Apparently, a severe thunderstorm prevented him from recceing the
ground before last light, Tuesday 25 August 1914. There was neither a 5 Division Artillery
Operations Order nor a XV Field Brigade Defensive Fire Fireplan were prepared before the
battle. The CRA 5 Division appeared to have delegated command of his three Field Brigades
[Currently, Regiments RA] to their respective Commanding Officers (CO) on the
understanding that they were to be seen to give their supported infantry their full support in
accordance with the then Artillery Training and Doctrine concerning a retreat.
However,
the CRA started intervening and imposing his demands on his CO. At around 0400 hrs,
Brigadier General John Headlam, CRA 5 Division, deployed 37 Howitzer Battery personally
straddling a track North East of the hillock, marked as Waldron‟s Post.
So they had time
to start digging in and dumping some ammunition near their gun-line. Around 0430 hrs, on the
own initiative of their BC, 11, 52 and 80 Field Batteries deployed in dead ground South of the
hillock. As dawn started breaking at about 0500 hrs, the Staff Captain RA 5 Division, Captain
Bartholomew insisted, on behalf of his CRA, that 11, 52 and 80 Field Batteries redeploy
forward of the hillock - over ruling all of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Steven‟s objections. All
they could do was to a camouflage their gun-shields with corn-stooks. XV and XXVIII Field
Brigade and 37 Howitzer Battery were now deployed in an open line either side of the Roman
Road, forming “The Cheese in the Le Cateau Mouse-trap.” See sketch map at Enclosure 2.
[Fifty-eight of the remaining seventy-four 5 Division Artillery (Div Arty) guns were sandwiched
between the Infantry (Inf) Firing Line and Inf Support Line – accepted practice for a
disengagement action, if command was delegated to CO level or below. 119 Fd Bty RFA lost
two guns at Elouges, Mon 24 Aug 14, when their BC, Maj Ernest Alexander, won the
Gunners‟ first VC of WW1. 3 Div Arty deployed only four guns of their seventy-six guns that
far forward and 4 Div Arty none!]
9. Le Cateau – A Belated Change of the Aim!
Just after first light at 0530 hrs,
Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Commander 2 British Corps, learnt that 3
Division in the Centre was still occupying its positions and was in no fit state to withdraw
promptly. Hence, his famous remark, “If they won‟t march; then they‟ll fight”. The 2 British
Corps Aim was changed from Check and Break to Deliberate Defence. This order filtered
down the chain of command slowly and often too late. [It also meant that the deployment of
the three Right Flank Field Brigades (Fd Bde) RFA did not conform to the current Artillery
Training and Doctrine in support of a deliberate defence, as they were sandwiched between
the Infantry (Inf) Firing and Support Line battalions (Bn). They should have been deployed
behind the Inf Support Line Bn]. Brigadier General Stuart Rolt, Commander 14 Infantry
Brigade, informed CO XV Field Brigade that this change of plan meant “No Retirement” and
also, added wrongly, that the troops on the East bank of the River Selle were 1 British Corps
securing their right flank. In fact, they were elements of 1 Cavalry Brigade screen that were
covering the Western half of the 10 km or so gap between the two British corps. III Brigade,
Royal Horse Artillery supported 1 Cavalry Brigade. [3 RHA: D and E Batteries RHA – each
with six 13 pdr Fd Guns]. See Sketch – 5 Division Artillery deployment at Enclosure 2 and 3.
10. Battle of Le Cateau – Initial Contacts.
By 0630 hrs, German Infantry started
approaching Le Cateau so 19 Independent Brigade pulled out South West down the Selle
valley, instead of along the Roman Road as planned. On the right bank of the River Selle East of Le Cateau, the 2 Corps Rear-guard, now consisting of: HQ 14 Infantry Brigade (less
their commander) and six companies [four coy, 1 DCLI and two coy, 1 E Surrey] side-stepped
the German pincer movement around Le Cateau; and headed South taking no further part in
the battle. 2 Duke of Wellington‟s Regiment, 13 Infantry Brigade, were deployed in front of 14
Infantry Brigade and were tasked with denying the Quatre Vaux cross roads to the Germans
until 0730 hrs as part of the original Check and Break plan. The order to change to Deliberate
Defence did not reach them until after they pulled back. All morning the German infantry
advances were kept in check by 5 Divisional Artillery shrapnel and Infantry Battalion Machine
Gun (MG) fire, as well as the famous “Mad- minute” of aimed shots of the British Regular
Infantry. The low railway embankment between the River Selle and Le Cateau wood also
interfered with the cohesion of the initial German attacks to the South of Le Cateau. [This
branch line has long since been closed and the embankment lost within the subsequent
South Western development of Le Cateau.] However, from mid morning onwards, the
German Divisional MG teams started establishing firebases in the brickworks, Le Cateau
wood and, allegedly, in Le Cateau church towers. [Each BEF Inf Bn and Cav Regt had two
MG in their MG Pl/Tp; whereas each German Div had a Div MG Coy of twelve MG.]
THE ATTRITION PHASE
11. German Artillery – Effect. As the mist cleared, at about 0600 hrs, the 150mm German
Depth Fire artillery, sweep and search harassment, fire started and continued all morning
virtually unchecked. The veterans referred to this counter-battery fire as “„hosepiping‟”.
Occasionally, German Air Observers, in aircraft, used coloured streamers to signal
adjustments to the fall of shot. All forms of tactical communication and resupply were severely
hampered by it. Within an hour, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stevens and his RSM as well as
Major Eustace Jones, Battery Commander (BC) 37 Howitzer Battery, and his BSM were all
badly wounded in their Command/Observation Post (CP/OP).
Figure 2. GUNNER CASUALTIES, LE CATEAU 1914
The Gunners accepted seeing men being killed and wounded but the sight of wounded and
dying horses upset them far more. [The Germans had at minimum one eighteen-gun 150mm
Medium (Med) Depth Fire Arty Bn per division – known to the veterans as “5/9s” (5.9 inch
How). It is thought that were at least two such German depth fire artillery groups drawn from
the three German infantry divisions engaging the British Right Flank, one near the Farm, and
the other near the village of Montay; see sketch map at Enclosure 2. The Germans also had a
77 mm Fd Bty in support of each Inf Regt, each of three Bn. Initially, on the Right Flank, 5 Div
Arty may have had an advantage of sixteen Fd Guns but, by midday, the Germans are
thought to have had an advantage of fifty 5/9s (Med guns).] Around 0900 hrs, the Wagon
Lines were moved from behind the hillock over the ridge to Reumont because of the frequent
German artillery hose piping. During this move, Battery Quartermaster Serjeant [WW1
spelling] (BQMS) O‟Keefe of 37 Howitzer Battery posted the Battery Captain‟s (BK)
Trumpeter, Boy Trumpeter Badgie Waldron, with his and Captain Douglas Reynolds' horses,
beside the hillock at Waldron‟s Post to await Captain Douglas Reynolds‟ appearance; see
sketch map at Enclosure 2.
12. 37 Howitzer Battery – Mid Morning. At some stage, 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle got fed up
of tripping up over his sword and threw it away. About mid-morning, BK 52 Field Battery,
Captain William Barber-Starkey strolled past 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line on his way to the
CP/OP, as though he were still on The Curragh, and called out, “Hot work today boys!” He
was given three cheers by 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line much to the annoyance of Captain
Douglas Reynolds, BK 37 Howitzer Battery, who was a rather serious officer. Around noon,
37 Howitzer Battery saw, to their right, BK 80 Field Battery, Captain Archie Higgon lead a
successful ammunition resupply of his Battery but this must have alerted the Germans.
Shortly afterwards, to their left, BK 52 Field Battery, Captain William Barber-Starkey led a
similar gallant attempt to resupply 52 Field Battery but it was halted by German shell-fire.
[Martin Gale disputes the assertion that BK 52 Fd Bty was mortally wounded on the gun-line
during the afternoon. Instead, they thought that Capt William Barber-Starkey was severely
wounded when leading an ammunition resupply detail at midday. He died of his wounds in Le
Cateau Hospital, 11 Sep 14.]
THE GERMAN BREAK IN
13. XV Field Brigade RFA – Early Afternoon. By 1300 hrs, the continuing German Depth
Fire artillery „hosepiping‟, as well as the German machine-gun fire from the brickworks, Le
Cateau wood and, allegedly, Le Cateau church towers, started winning the fire-fight. So 6, 7
and 8 German Infantry Divisions started preparing to over-run 13 and 14 Infantry Brigade of 5
Division either side of the Roman Road; see sketch map at Enclosure 4. About 1345 hrs,
when the General Officer Commanding 5 Division, Major General Sir Charles Fergusson,
permitted the guns to retire, the CRA decided to abandon the six guns of 52 Field Battery and
galloped off to supervise the withdrawal of the eighteen guns of XXVIII Field Brigade from the
West side of the Roman Road. Leaving his BMRA, Major Hercules Tailyour, to sort out the
recovery of XV Field Brigade Group from the East of the Roman Road. [Three Fd Bty (11, 52,
80) and one How Bty (37). Subsequently, this became the standard establishment for all
composite Fd Bde RFA on the Western Front.] After seeing 122 Field Battery suffered heavy
casualties withdrawing only two guns because they were deployed in or forward of the
Sunken Lane and now under direct German MG and rifle fire, the CRA 5 Division had no
option but to abandon the remaining sixteen guns of XXVIII Field Brigade. Meanwhile, Farrier
Quartermaster Serjeant (FQMS) Watts recovered four guns of 11 Field Battery from the very
far right of the Gun Lines, nearest to Le Cateau, on a call from the senior surviving No1,
Serjeant Hopper.
At Reumont Wagon Lines, Major Hercules Tailyour, Brigade Major Royal
Artillery (BMRA) [Currently, SO2 Arty Ops] 5 Division, placed 52 Field Battery teams on
standby to assist then led the 80 Field Battery teams forward, who recovered five guns, with
three 37 Howitzer Battery teams led by BQMS O‟Keefe, who recovered two howitzers. [It
should be noted that the Roman Road was the direct route between the Gun Lines and the
Wagon Lines at Reumont. It was inclusive to 13 Inf Bde and, therefore, also to XXVIII Fd Bde.
However, 14 Inf Bde and XV Fd Bde were able to take advantage of the lie of land in their
sector to move under better cover along the lanes and tracks between their Gun Lines and
Reumont.]
14. Distribution of the Retirement Order. There is still controversy concerning the circulation
and distribution of the retirement order to the XV Field Brigade Group Gun Lines on the
afternoon of Wednesday 26 August 1914. In accordance with Martin Gale, this paper
assumes that Major Hercules Tailyour, BMRA 5 Division, circulated the order to retire
verbally. He led 80 Field Battery teams towards their Gun Lines, before passing by and
alerting 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line on his way to 52 Field Battery Gun Lines and ending up
thoroughly exhausted and collapsing at the XV Field Brigade Group CP/OP.
a.
11 Field Battery.
FQMS Watts and the 11 Field Battery teams had already left
Reumont on the call from the surviving No1, Serjeant Hopper as all the officers were
seriously wounded or killed. [Much to Brig Gen John Headlam‟s annoyance and
disapproval, Maj Philip Henning, BC 11 Fd Bty is thought to have initiated the phrase,
“Cheese in the Le Cateau Mousetrap.”]
b.
37 Howitzer Battery. Captain Douglas Reynolds wrote that he first became aware
of the retirement order when a Serjeant No1 and then a subaltern [possibly Lieutenant
Stanley Custance] reported that a senior officer had just ridden by calling out, “The order
is to retire.” [As BMRA, Maj Tailyour would have been wearing a red RA staff officer‟s
hatband on his khaki No 2 SD dress hat and an RA staff officer‟s arm brassard.
Therefore, he could have been easily mistaken for “a Senior Officer”.]
c.
52 Field Battery.
Apparently, at about the same time, as Major Hercules
Tailyour brought the retirement order forward with the 80 Field Battery teams from
Reumont, Lieutenant Robert Rome went to the CP/OP to request BC 52 Field Battery‟s
permission for the guns of 52 Field Battery to retire. Major Arthur Nutt refused point
blank to give his consent because of Brigadier General Stuart Rolt‟s previous “No
Retirement” order – see Para 9 above. Meanwhile, the BMRA arrived at the 52 Field
Battery Gun Lines. It is assumed that, on the BMRA‟s authority, 2nd Lieutenant Richard
Neve ordered all the remaining ammunition to be fired off and the guns to be disabled
before the Gunners pulled back to Reumont. When Major Arthur Nutt and the Field
Officers of XV Field Brigade at the CP/OP learnt of this, they were incensed. [The XV Fd
Bde Field Officers considered 2Lt Richard Neve‟s actions to be, at minimum, gross
disobedience. The Martin Gale team considered this a gross injustice. From his PoW
Camp in Germany, Maj Arthur Nutt initiated an unfortunate correspondence about this
matter. It would appear that this led to the only award to 52 Bty being Maj Nutt‟s DSO.
Maj Gen John Younger was of the opinion that the Svy Sjt 52 Fd Bty, Sjt Campbell (?),
should have received some official recognition for running the 52 Fd Bty CP/OP for two
to three hours in the mid-morning while both BC and BSM 52 Fd Bty were wounded and
unconscious.]
d.
80 Field Battery.
Major Richard Birley, BC 80 Field Battery, had established his
CP/OP near his Gun Line because 80 Field Battery was ordered to be a “Zones” Battery
[Superimposed (?)]. He greeted the arrival of the 80 Field Battery teams with the cry of
“What the hell are you doing here!” Before there was any chance to reply to him, Major
Richard Birley was silenced badly wounded and silenced by a shell burst. [In 1917, Maj
Birley was repatriated to UK because of a gangrenous leg wound. On arrival in
Switzerland, his leg was amputated.]
e.
XV Field Brigade RFA.
As 37 Howitzer and 52 Field Batteries were “On Task”
batteries, their BC‟s Parties were collocated with XV Brigade Main HQ in a CP/OP area
amongst 2 Suffolks – near where the Suffolk Memorial was built. [Only the Bde Comd,
14 Inf Bde and one staff officer, on loan from 19 Indep Bde, were collocated with these
XV Fd Bde CP/OP staff. The HQ 14 Inf Bde staff were still isolated with the Corps Rear
Guard on the far bank of the Selle.] They understood they were under the remit of
Commander 14 Infantry Brigade‟s No Retirement order and, therefore, required a written
confirmatory order to withdraw. Hence, the CO as well as BC 37 Howitzer and 52 Field
Batteries refused to accept the BMRA‟s verbal command to retire. [There was also a
Gunner Regimental protocol that commanders did not leave their CP/OP until they had
confirmed that all their guns were out of action.]
Lieutenant John Younger, Orderly
Officer, XV Field Brigade, volunteered to ride back to HQRA 5 Division at Reumont to
get a signed statement. He was ordered not to do so by Lieutenant Colonel Charles
Stevens, CO XV Field Brigade. Similarly, when 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle made his way
with a horse to the CP/OP, as ordered to do so by Captain Douglas Reynolds, the
wounded Major Eustace Jones, BC 37 Howitzer Battery, dismissed his offer of
evacuation out of hand because E and F Sub-section guns had not moved from the 37
Howitzer Battery Gun Line.
THE RECOVERY OF F SUB-SECTION GUN, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA
RA Institute
Figure 1: THE RESCUE OF F SUB-SECTION SECTION GUN, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY
RFA, LE CATEAU 26 AUGUST 1914 by Terrence Cuneo, 1964
Left - E Sub-section: Left - 2Lt Earle.
E Sub-section Limber: Sjt Bower, Gnr Fraser, Gnr Robertson and Gnr Turner – none shown
E Sub-section Drivers: Lead - Dvr Trelaor; Centre - Dvr Hall; Wheeler - Dvr Prior.
Right – F Sub-section Drivers: Right to Left: Dvr Job Drain; Capt Douglas Reynolds; Dvr Ben
Cobey; Dvr Fred Luke;
F Sub-section Limber: Sjt Jumbo Butterworth, Gnrs Baker and Garlick – one not shown.
15. XV Field Brigade RFA – Mid Afternoon. The increasing stream of wounded and
stragglers, heading towards Reumont through the 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line, raised the
tension amongst the Gun Numbers. This situation worried, the normally taciturn, Captain
Douglas Reynolds seriously, so he grabbed a rifle, and ordered the Gun Line to “Stand Fast!”
On learning of the order to retire indirectly, Captain Douglas Reynolds started off on foot
towards Reumont Wagon Lines without seeing BQMS O‟Keefe and his teams coming the
other way. Fortunately, Captain Douglas Reynolds came across his Trumpeter, Badgie
Waldron, all alone and wounded, but still hanging onto their two horses, where BQMS
O‟Keefe had posted him earlier that morning beside the hillock - marked as Waldron‟s Post on
the sketch-map at Enclosure 4. [At aged 15 years, Boy Trumpeter Badgie Waldron may be
the youngest Gunner to be awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM).] Then, BK 37
Howitzer Battery spied two Left Section Gunners, amongst some stragglers. So he and
Badgie Waldron escorted these two Gunners back to the 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line before
galloping back to the Wagon Lines at Reumont and commandeering two more teams, one
each from 52 and 80 Field Batteries, before recovering a further pair of 37 Howitzer Battery
howitzers. While at the Gun Lines, Captain Douglas Reynolds detailed off 2nd Lieutenant Eric
Earle to take a horse up to the CP/OP and persuade Major Eustace Jones, BC 37 Howitzer
Battery, to retire. The BC 37 Howitzer Battery flatly refused to do so until all six 37 Howitzer
Battery howitzers had been withdrawn. Meanwhile, Left Section removed the breechblocks
and gun-sights from E Sub-section and F Sub-section; then, all those fit enough to do so
marched off to Reumont under the command of Lieutenant Stanley Custance, the recently
joined Right Section Commander, 37 Howitzer Battery. All the XV Field Brigade, 37 Howitzer
Battery and 52 Field Battery command parties refused to withdraw from their CP/OP without
sight of a signed retirement order because they felt bound by the Commander 14 Infantry
Brigade‟s No Retirement order. Hence, all the XV Field Brigade Field Officers including BC 37
Howitzer Battery, Major Eustace Jones, and BMRA 5 Division were: either captured there, or
at the Reumont church first aid post later that evening. XV Field Brigade Group lost 10 guns,
nearly three-quarters of their officers and half of their horses but fewer than 20% of their men.
So that is how 26 of 36 British guns lost at the Battle of Le Cateau 1914 were sited a couple
of hundred yards either side of the Roman Road near Quatre Vaux. See Enclosure 4.
[Subsequently, all references to “Cheese in the Le Cateau mousetrap” were deleted from the
RA Archives, Woolwich in the 1920s when the official Gunner Historian for World War 1,
Major General Sir John Headlam - the erstwhile CRA 5 Division, “sanitised” the WW1 records.
He remained „sensitive‟ about the high proportion guns lost under his command at Le Cateau.
Having deployed fifty-eight of his seventy-four remaining guns amongst the forward Inf Bn, he
continued to be an advocate of deploying guns very far forward in order to boost the infantry‟s
morale – see also Para 39. 119 Fd Bty, XXVII Fd Bde RFA, had already lost two guns at
Elouges, Mon 24 Aug 14 when Maj Ernest Alexander won the first Gunner VC of WW1.
Martin Gale considered CRA 5 Div responsible for the loss of 11 Fd Bty RFA at „Givenchy‟,
(probably Battle of La Basse) October 1914 where the Battery was once again deployed too
close to the Inf Firing Lines. Hence one of the reason why the Martin Gale team wrote their
account – see Para 58. Brig Gen John Headlam was promoted to become MGRA 2 BR Army.
At that time, it was an advisory and not a command appointment. Subsequently, he served in
the equivalent of the British Defence Liaison Staff, Washington, USA. Both Brig Gen
Frederick Wing, CRA 3 Div - who was killed in command of 12 Inf Div at the Battle of Loos
1915, and Brig Gen George Milne, CRA 4 Div – who became FM Lord Milne of Salonika,
deployed their guns behind the Inf Support Line, except for four single guns within 3 Div. They
covered the vital ground with fire and observation reasonably effectively despite the
limitations of their main means of communication which were runners, heliographs and field
telephones.]
16. 37 Howitzer Battery – Recovery of F Sub-section Gun – The Preliminaries. 37 Howitzer
Battery were unique amongst the other batteries on the Right Flank at Le Cateau because,
having just reached safety at Reumont with four of their howitzers, they were the only battery
to make a further attempt to recover their remaining guns; see sketch map at Enclosure 3 and
4. For some unexplained reason, 37 Howitzer Battery occupied their Gun Line, before dawn
in the dark, in reverse order. [Lack of training at night in Ireland (?)] So during the initial
recovery of the guns, as per Battery gun-drill, Driver Job Drain [Lead Driver] led his team,
Drivers Ben Cobey [Centre Driver] and Fred Luke [Wheeler Driver], to recover the left hand
gun which was not their F Sub-section gun but the A Sub gun! At Reumont, the A Sub gun
was transferred to a 52 Field Battery limber to enable Job, Fred and the F Sub-section team
to make another attempt to recover their F Sub-section howitzer. So that is why the F Subsection team were involved a second attempt to recover their F Sub-section gun. The drivers
knew exactly what to expect and decided amongst themselves that the momentum of their
team had to be maintained to be at all costs. Having gained the CRA‟s permission to attempt
to recover the Left Section howitzers, Captain Douglas Reynolds got an immediate and
positive response from the Battery when he called for volunteers to attempt the rescue. [Fred
Luke implied that Capt Douglas Reynolds assumed that the Left Section Drivers would take
part without being asked. These drivers knew better than to argue with or offer suggestions to
any of their superiors, particularly Capt Douglas Reynolds. These young Drivers knew exactly
what to expect on their return to the Gun Position, so they decided secretly to carry out an
unauthorised stunt.] He selected mainly Gunners of Left Section because it was E and F Subsection guns that required recovering. At the last minute, Captain Douglas Reynolds invited
2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle “To come along in case there was any trouble!”
17. 37 Howitzer Battery – Recovery of F Sub-section Gun – Execution. Driver Fred Luke
recalled the grim silence as the volunteers set off at a steady trot over the ridge from
Reumont for a final time. His team was led 2nd Lieutenant William Morgan and the other by 2nd
Lieutenant Eric Earle with Captain Douglas Reynolds following close behind. With a 200
yards to go; they broke into a gallop; Driver Fred Luke thought the nearby Germans started
cheering them on but with hindsight they may have been calling on them to surrender. Driver
Job Drain as the Lead Driver of the F Sub-section team, with Drivers Ben Cobey [Centre
Driver] and Fred Luke [Wheeler/Rear Driver], approachedin a C- shaped swerve from the left;
bounced the offside limber wheel over the box-trail and halted the limber with its hook, 40 feet
behind Job, directly over the gun trail-eye, see Enclosure 4. A superb piece of driving but an
unauthorised stunt – used back in the Curragh Camp in Ireland, when the gun-teams would
race one another back from the parade-square to the gun-sheds after gun-drill for a
sweepstake - providing of course Captain Douglas Reynolds was out of sight! This enabled
Serjeant Jumbo Butterworth, Gunners Baker and Garlick to limber the F Sub-section gun up
immediately. As they started off, the Germans opened fire killing the Centre Driver, Ben
Cobey, who threw his whip in the air as he died. It was caught by Douglas Reynolds, who
galloped beside the Centre pair of horses, controlling them with Ben‟s whip. Meanwhile, the E
Sub-section team kept to the gun-drill manual and made G-like approach from the left - as
they halted and slowly backed the horses and limber towards the E Sub-section gun. The
Germans shot and killed the horses. As 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle called out to the E Subsection team “To clear out!” a shot broke his arm. Instead of doubling back with the others,
Gunner Jock Fraser dashed over to the limber to grab his greatcoat. Distracted by Fraser‟s
foolhardy action, 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle turned to watch him. As he did so, a second bullet
hit him a glancing blow across his forehead and went out thorough his eye. The Germans let
all the surviving Gunners escape on foot. Despite, the hectic drama of the rescue, Serjeant
Jumbo Butterworth‟s most vivid recollection of the incident was on their return to Reumont
when Captain Douglas Reynolds saw the blood-covered Sgt Bower, who had just rescued 2nd
Lieutenant Eric Earle and Gunner Fraser, was riding on F Sub-section‟s gun-trail. He ordered
him to get off the trail immediately and walk! [It is thought that Capt Douglas Reynolds did not
mention Sjt Jumbo Butterworth in his report because at least one member of F Sub-section
disobeyed Capt Reynolds‟ order to “Stand Fast”. It is also thought that there may have been
some antipathy between the BK 37 How Bty and the No1 F Sub-section. Later in WW1, Sjt
Jumbo Butterworth was awarded a DCM and given an AER (Wartime) commission. He left
the Army after WW1 and became an RSPCA Inspector. See lists at Appendix 2 to Annex A
and Appendix 2 to Annex D.]
PART 2 - AFTERMATH
18. Contents – Part 2.
a.
b.
c.
d.
Casualties. – Para 19 to 21.
Honours and Awards. – Para 22.
Victoria Crosses. – 37 Howitzer Battery RFA – Para 23 to 25.
Conclusion. – Para 26.
CASUALTIES
19. Le Cateau – Aftermath. Within days, the Germans cleared the battlefield using
conscripted local labourers, who buried all the dead in unmarked graves where they were
killed. They did their best to record the names of the British casualties. The citizens of Le
Cateau appreciated that the 5 Division‟s sacrifice at Le Cateau made their subsequent French
victory on the Marne possible. Uniquely they, and not the Commonwealth War Graves
Commission, built the Suffolk Memorial near the site of XV Field Brigade Group CP/OP – one
side of which is dedicated to and records the names of the fallen Gunners of the Royal Field
Artillery, including eight of 37 Howitzer Battery – see list at Table 11, Appendix 2 to Annex A.
[Five Gunners, who died of wounds in Le Cateau hospital, are buried in the Commonwealth
War Graves Commission (CWGC) section of the Le Cateau community cemetery including
Captain William Barber-Starkey, BK 52 Fd Bty.] 19 year old Driver Ben Cobey has no known
grave; therefore his name is recorded on the Retreat from Mons Memorial at La Ferte sous
Jouare. [The CWGC Retreat from Mons equivalent to the Menin Gate Memorial at Ypres.]
20. Le Cateau 1914 – Casualties. Initially, GHQ BEF thought that the 2 British Corps
suffered about 15000 casualties at Le Cateau. Hence General Sir John French‟s,
Commander BEF, immediate efforts to distance himself from Lieutenant General Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien‟s decision to stand and fight. Once most of the stragglers were gathered in, it
was revised down to 7500 of which 2500 were PoW. It is uncertain how many casualties the
Germans suffered at Le Cateau. It must have been a significant number of casualties
because they failed to press home their advantage and turn the Retreat from Mons into a
rout. [The 1933 German Staff Battlefield Guide indicates that the Germans lost about 9000
killed and severely wounded ie: lost a limb or sight. The British equivalent casualty figure
would have been half that at fewer than 2000 killed and severely wounded plus 2500 PoW.]
21. XV Field Brigade – Officers Subsequently.
It is thought that the official archive
copies of the XV Field Brigade and 37 Howitzer Battery nominal rolls for August 1914; may
have been destroyed by incendiaries during WW2. Therefore, the only contemporary nominal
records are only for the officers as listed in the RA Blue List 1914 and Kane‟s List of RA
Officers, Volume 2 1862 – 1914; see Table 13 at Annex C.
Of interest, these sources
indicate that of the 23 Officers of XV Field Brigade Group; three were killed in action or died of
wounds Le Cateau; six more were captured there and four more were killed later on in the
war. Of the Field Officers, only Major Arthur Nutt, BC 52 Field Battery, completed a full career
and retired as a Colonel in 1928. Most of the others were had been pensioned off by 1920 several of them with disability gratuities. In 1916, Major Douglas Reynolds was the last of the
“Right Flank, Le Cateau” Captains to die – each one of them was a great loss to our
Regiment. Of the 13 subalterns: three were killed in action in World War 1; three became
Major Generals and two Brigadiers in World War 2 – see col (e), Table 13 at Annex C.
HONOURS AND AWARDS
22. 37 Howitzer Battery – Honours and Awards.
Some people thought that award of all
three Gunner Victoria Crosses for Le Cateau to 37 Howitzer Battery was unfair; see Annex D
for details. The veterans accepted this view stoically and said that Le Cateau was a frontline
gunners‟ battle in which all the Gunners fought hard much to the admiration of the supported
infantry. The GOC 7 German Infantry Division and some of his senior commanders and staff
officers, who fought at Le Cateau, visited Torgau Officers PoW Camp in late 1914 to discuss
the battle with the British PoW, also admired their determination. [Torgau Castle (?) on the
Elbe]. Or, as Fred Luke said in his typical self- facing way, “We got the VCs because General
Headlam watched us from the ridge; saw what we did and was surprised that we ever got
back!” Their greatest regret was that poor Ben Cobey was not even Mention in Dispatches let
alone being awarded a posthumous VC. [It should be noted that the Military Cross (MC) and
Military Medal (MM) were instituted later in WW1, circa 1915/16. In 1964, Martin Gale
discovered a copy of Capt Douglas Reynolds‟s Post Battle Report. He made 12
commendations for “Conspicuous Bravery” – Ben Cobey‟s name was not mentioned; see
Table 15, Appendix 2 to Annex D. The CRA 5 Div supported seven of these
recommendations of which only Sjt Bower did not receive an award. Capt Douglas Reynolds
wrote a letter to 2Lt Eric Earle‟s parents stating that he had recommended 2Lt Eric Earle for a
VC. 2 Lt Eric Earle‟s sword was acquired as a battlefield souvenir by a German officer; on his
death, it was returned to Brig Eric Earle by the German officer‟s family. Brig Eric‟s son, Lt Col
D E M Earle, commanded 32 Regt RA in the mid 1960s.]
VICTORIA CROSS RECEIPIENTS, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA
Cigarette Card
Figure 3: DRIVER JOB DRAIN VC, 1915
23. Driver Job Drain VC. Job Drain was born in Barking in the East End of London, on 15
October 1895, where a statue has been raised to his memory. He was the Lead Driver of the
F Sub-section Recovery Team and left the Army as a Driver Serjeant in 1919. Eventually, he
became a bus driver for London Transport and, subsequently, worked for the London
Electricity Board. Fred Luke used to meet Job at the annual VC and GC Reunions in London
in the 1960s. Sadly, he did not wish to attend any Gunner reunions. The veterans accepted
Job‟s decision without any comment whatsoever; this was typical of the tremendous loyalty
amongst all ranks of the Old Contemptibles Chums. Whenever the Sergeants Mess of 93 Le
Cateau Battery tried to find out any further details, the veterans closed ranks and, without
batting an eyelid, simply drank our Sergeants under the table! [No mean feat!] At age 18
years, 10 months and 11 days, Job is still the youngest Gunner recipient of a Victoria Cross.
Gunner Magazine
Figure 4: DRIVER FREDERICK LUKE VC, 1964
24. Driver Frederick Luke VC. Fred was born at West Tytherley, Hampshire, [Near Romsey]
29 September 1895, 17 days before Job Drain. On leaving school, aged 12 years, he worked
as under-gardener in a country-house near Romsey, Hampshire. He joined up in January
1913 aged barely 17. [His elder brother, William, who died of his wounds as a Serjeant (No1
4.5” How) at Passchendaele, 1917, was already serving in the RFA.] Fred was the Wheeler
Driver of the F Sub-section Recovery Team. He regarded his VC as being awarded to himself
on behalf of the Battery and flatly refused to take any advantage from it. Fred kept his medals
in a yellow Gold Flake cigarette tin; his VC is now part of the Ashcroft Collection on display in
the Imperial War Museum, London. In early December 1915, King George V presented Fred
and Job with their Victoria Crosses on parade in a field near Bethune, France. The King
warned them not to lose their valuable medals in all this damned mud! [Fred and Job received
their medals before their awards were published in the London Gazette. Some years later,
when Fred attended a Buckingham Palace Garden Party, King George V greeted Fred with
the words, “Well done Luke for not losing your medal in all that damned mud!”] Fred was
gassed at the Battle of Loos 1915, recuperated in Glasgow and married there. [Contrary to
popular opinion, Fred was only Scots by marriage! His grandson, Barry, who is Scots by birth,
and great-grand daughters, Jo and Sue, now live near Taunton, Somerset.] In 1918, Fred
returned to the Western Front as Driver Serjeant of D Howitzer Battery, 180 Field Brigade
RFA (AER). After he was demobbed at the end of World War 1, it is thought that he became a
caretaker, or janitor, of Glasgow Grammar School for Girls. In WW2, Fred served as an RAF
Regiment Sergeant and afterwards became a technical storeman for an engineering firm. [By
1939, most other rank Old Contemptibles were at least 40 years old, so were considered too
old to be reenlisted for active military duty during WW2.] He was one of nature‟s gentlemen, a
small, unassuming man who mixed freely and charmingly with everyone. Fred survived on his
state Old Age Pension and was always willing to visit 93 Le Cateau Battery on his terms:
a. Being billeted in the Warrant Officers and Sergeants Mess;
b. Travelling by standard and not 1st Class rail;
c. Met at the station by the duty truck and not by an officer in a staff car.
[When Fred Luke died in March 1983, he was the longest surviving Old Contemptible VC.]
RA Institute
Figure 5: CAPTAIN DOUGLAS REYNOLDS VC RFA, 1915
25. Captain Douglas Reynolds VC RFA. Douglas Reynolds, BK 37 Howitzer Battery, was
the leader and instigator of the F Sub-section Recovery. He was born in Clifton, Bristol; his
parents were Lieutenant Colonel Henry and Mrs Sarah Reynolds. Shortly afterwards, the
Reynolds family moved to Cheltenham. So, Douglas was educated at Cheltenham College as
well as “The Shop,” Woolwich. He did not seek popularity but was greatly respected for his
professionalism. Douglas Reynolds was a rather serious officer who proved to be not only
personally very brave but was also the lynch pin of the Battery throughout the Retreat from
Mons. He left 37 Howitzer Battery when wounded in mid September 1914. His Victoria Cross
citation not only refers to his gallantry at Le Cateau but also to a separate incident at
Pisseloup on the Marne a fortnight later, when he led a fighting patrol and silenced a German
battery holding up the British advance.
Therefore, it is thought that Captain Douglas
Reynolds might be the Gunner who has got closest to being awarded a bar to his Victoria
Cross. In 1915, he returned to the Western Front as a Battery Commander was gassed and
died in Trouville hospital in February 1916. [His only son, also Douglas Reynolds, was born
after his father died. In May 1940, he also died of his wounds while serving as a Lieutenant, 2
Irish Guards near the Dunkirk bridgehead. Job Drain‟s and Fred Luke‟s Victoria Crosses are
part of the Ashcroft Collection in the Imperial War Museum, London. Douglas Reynolds‟ VC is
displayed at the Firepower Museum, Woolwich.]
CONCLUSION
26. Conclusion. Initially, General Sir John French, Commander BEF and a cavalryman,
thought Le Cateau was a British defeat saved by the intervention of Sordet‟s French Cavalry
Corps on the left flank near Cambrai. Today, the Battle of Le Cateau 1914 is recognised as
an outstanding British rear-guard action. [Contrary to the recommendation of Gen Sir John
French, Comd BEF, FM Lord Kitchener appointed Lt Gen Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien as the
new Comd 2 BR Corps. Gen French‟s preferred choice was Lt Gen Sir Herbert Plumer.
Hence, Gen French always belittled Gen Smith- Dorrien‟s achievements; see Para 34 below.
This antipathy was based upon their opposing views concerning the on-going debate about
the future of the cavalry as mounted infantry as well as their views of the “Curragh Mutineers”
of Spring 1914 – officers declining to take action against opponents of Irish Home Rule. The
following year, FM Lord French succeeded in engineering Gen Smith-Dorrien‟s removal from
command of 2 BR Corps shortly before his own dismissal as Comd BEF.] It is hoped that this
summary of the disjointed, and sometimes conflicting records, of the Artillery battle on the
Right Flank at Le Cateau, 26 August 1914 gives an insight into the gallantry of 37 Howitzer
Battery RFA – now 93 Le Cateau Battery RA as well as the distinguished role of all the other
Right Flank Gunners who fought so bravely at Le Cateau, 1914. The esprit de corps fostered
by Fred Luke, the Martin Gale team and all the 37 Howitzer Battery veterans continues to
thrive despite 93 Le Cateau Battery RA being subsumed within J (Sidi Rezegh) Battery RHA
in 1983. [The 25 Wake (old 25 Regt RA OCA), including members of the former 93 Le Cateau
Bty, meets annually in the RA WO and Sgts Mess, Larkhill under the presidency of Lt Gen Sir
Edward Burgess - a former CO 25 Regt RA.]
PART 3 - OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND – AUGUST 1914
27. Contents – Part 3.
a.
b.
c.
d.
Overview – XV Field Brigade Group RFA – Para 28 to 31.
Sunday 23 August 1914 – Para 32 and 33.
Monday 24 August 1914 – Para 34.
Tuesday 25 August 1914 – Para 35 to 37.
OVERVIEW – XV FIELD BRIGADE GROUP RFA
28. Preliminaries – August 1914. General Headquarters British Expeditionary Force (GHQ
BEF) was based on HQ Aldershot Command. The Corps level of command had only been
introduced because of the 1904 Entente Cordiale to reflect the French chain of command.
The Corps Headquarters were unestablished and the CRA at Corps HQ [Not CCRA] was the
Corps Commander‟s Artillery Advisor and not a Commander in his own right. Therefore the
Divisional CRAs acted independently of them. Initially, the BEF contained two corps of four
regular divisions; 1, 2 and 3 Divisions were stationed on mainland UK and 5 Division,
including 5 Division Artillery, in Ireland. 5 Division Artillery, including 37 Howitzer Battery,
disembarked at Le Harve from Dublin on Tuesday 18 August 1914; as well as five
independent cavalry brigades – formed into 1 Cavalry Division by 31 August 1914. The sketch
map, at Enclosure 5, also illustrates why Emperor William 2 of Germany thought that the BEF
was a Contemptible Little Army. In August 1914, seven German Armies faced six French and
Belgian ones along the Franco German border; each one of these armies was at least twice
as big as the original, 100,000 strong BEF – who revelled in their nickname of The Old
Contemptibles – see also Para 1. The German Strategic Schlieffen Plan for the Western Front
was for their 1, 2 and 3 German Army‟s to outflank the French forces along the FrancoGerman border by invading neutral Belgium and heading for the River Seine between Rouen
and Paris. The German General Staff overlooked the ability of Britain‟s small all Regular BEF
to punch above its weight amongst these large conscripted Continental armies. 1 German
Army was taught this lesson firstly by the BEF infantry at Mons on Sunday 23 August 1914
and secondly by the BEF Gunners at Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 August 1914. The time
bars, see Table 9 at Annex B, indicate some of the challenges faced by 5 Division Artillery,
including 37 Howitzer Battery, during August 1914 as they deployed from rural Ireland to the
coalfields of the Franco-Belgian frontier.
29. August 1914 - Week 1. War was declared on Tuesday. [At the outbreak of WW1, an
officer‟s personal weapon was a sword and not a pistol or a rifle. One of the first actions was
for all officers‟ swords to be handed into the Unit Armouries for sharpening and dulling.] Units
required a draft of quarter of their wartime establishment to bring them up to full strength. The
reinforcements and reservists start arriving at the weekend in accordance with the „War
Book‟. [Contingency Plans for Transition to War] When they reported for duty, most reservists
were unfit and under-fed. A few were Regulars officers on mid tour UK furlough - 6 months
UK leave from their duty station during 5 year overseas secondment; including: Captain
Archie Higgon of the Gold Coast Artillery - BK 80 Field Battery who became Acting CO XV
Field Brigade by teatime 26 August 1914 and also Lieutenant Stanley Custance, Right
Section Commander 37 Howitzer Battery.
30. August 1914 - Week 2. Week 2 was taken up moving from Ireland to France. British
SNCOs were particularly adept at loading and unloading their units on and off trains –
providing the offices did not interfere. The Army was less well practiced in loading their horses
and equipment onto shipping. The shipping was probably made up of small, chartered, 5000ton coal-burning cargo-ships with a speed of about 5 knots; the voyage from Dublin to Le
Havre took three days. Some horses died while embarking at Dublin docks; many others got
stressed during the voyage so some also died at sea.
31. August 1914 - Week 3. They landed at Le Havre from Dublin on Tuesday 18 August
1914. Le Harve Dock facilities struggled to cope with their disembarkation. All units took the
best part of a day to unload all their equipment and horses before waiting in transit areas on
the local downs before moving by rail on one of 144 trains per day [Approximately one every
20 minutes!] to the BEF concentration area between Le Cateau and Avenses on either 19 or
20 August 1914. It is remarkable how well the French railway system coped with the
mobilisation and deployment of 1.5 million French servicemen as well as the deployment of
the BEF while under the immediate threat of a German invasion. So far, the troops were able
to take advantage of the latest early 20th Century transport technology to get them to the front
but from here on in, they were reliant upon their own determination and stamina as well as
those of their horses for movement and supplies. In much the same as the Wellington‟s
Waterloo veterans did 99 years previously 30 miles to the North East of Mons. The remainder
of Week 3 was taken up with shaking out in the BEF Concentration Area near Le Cateau and
preparing for the Battle of Mons and then starting the Retreat from Mons as may be seen on
the sketch map at Enclosure 6.
SUNDAY 23 AUGUST 1914
32. Battle of Mons. On Sunday 23 August 1914, 1 German Army were checked by the 2
British Corps screen along the Mons Canal. The BEF made their presence felt that day. The
Germans suffered over 15000 casualties to fewer than 4000 British ones. [German casualty
returns recorded killed and disabled only; British casualty returns included all types of
casualties] There was relatively little artillery involvement because of the short lines of sight
and limited fields of fire in what was then the grim industrial landscape of the Franco Belgian
Coalfield so unlike the British rural training areas that the troops were accustomed to.
However, Major Ernest Alexander, BC 119 Field Battery, XXVII Field Brigade, who won the
Gunners‟ first Victoria Cross of World War 1 (WW1) while in close support of 1 Cheshires
gallant last-ditch rear-guard action at Elouges that enabled 5 Division on the left flank of 2
British Corps to break clean.
33. Retreat from Mons – Phase 1. That night, the planned main battle of Mons was
cancelled because of the unexpected withdrawal of 5 French Army who were deployed to the
immediate East, between Maubeuge and Namur fortresses. Both British Corps started pulling
back independently. 1 British Corps moved on the East side of the Mormal Forest along the
reasonably maintained old Napoleonic Grand Route. While the main-body of 1 German Army
pursued 2 British Corps, including 5 Division, along the far rougher old Roman Road to the
West of the Mormal Forest. The rapid embodiment of the Territorial Force, now known as the
Territorial Army, enabled them to take over the UK Home Defence role from 4 Division. So 4
Division stared arriving from England at the railhead of Solesmes on Monday 24 August 1914,
much sooner than expected, and were placed under command of 2 British Corps.
MONDAY 24 AUGUST 1914
34. Battle of Le Cateau – Preparations. Now, barely three weeks since war was declared
and the start of their second week in France, the Battle of Le Cateau was about to begin. The
weather was warm with frequent thundershowers so the troops were drenched. On Monday
24 August 1914, the new Commander 2 British Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Horace SmithDorrien started planning to check the momentum of the German follow-up along the ridgeline
South of the Cambrai-Le Cateau road; see sketch map at Enclosure 1. [The original Comd 2
BR Corps, Lt Gen Sir James Grierson - a Gunner and the British Army‟s authority on the
German Imperial Army, had died of natural causes at Amiens on Monday 17 August 1914. He
always outmanoeuvred Lt Gen Sir Douglas Haig during the pre-war annual Army exercises in
England. His portrait hangs in the East Anteroom of the RA Mess, Larkhill.]
TUESDAY 25 AUGUST 1914
35. Tuesday 25 August 1914. On Tuesday 25 August 1914, GHQ BEF moved from Le
Cateau - 20 miles to the South - to St Quentin covered by 19 Independent Brigade. The only
telecoms link to GHQ BEF was the single telephone in each railway station that had to be
shared with the French railway officials who were intent on coordinating all the additional
troop trains, bring 4 Division in and elements of the 5 French Army out. [At this stage of the
war, the only alternative was the Royal Automobile Club Volunteer Despatch Service made
up of a dozen or so peers, with their chauffeur driven Rolls-Royce cars, and a small pool of
dispatch-rider motor-cyclist. The existing HF Morse radio sets were cumbersome and best
suited to support HQ during static warfare. It also took a significant amount of time to
establish a working radio telecommunications network in the field.] On Tuesday 25 August
1915, under Sapper supervision, local French labourers prepared some earthworks and
trenches but the siting of some of these defences was compromised because the locals
insistence on not disturbing their own unharvested crops.
36. Evening, Tuesday 25 August 1914. All day on Tuesday 25 August 1914, 52 Field
Battery was in close support of the 2 British Corps Rear-guard provided by 14 Infantry
Brigade. It was the only unit of the rear-guard to make its way to the main battle position
successfully. [No mean feat considering that 4 DG, with a strength of 250 sabres, lost over
150 stragglers including most of their echelon in three hours trying to make their way through
Le Cateau that night.] By last light, XV Field Brigade, less 52 Field Battery, had established
their field brigade leaguer to the East of the Roman Road approximately 200 yards South
West of Waldron‟s Post, see sketch map at Enclosure 5. It is thought that 52 Field Battery
eventually re-joined XV Field Brigade in their field brigade leaguer during the night.
37. 1 British Corps – Evening Tuesday 25 August 1914. Meanwhile, that evening, at
Landrecies - 10 miles North East of Le Cateau, Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Haig,
Commander 1 British Corps, was dining with HQ 4 Guards Brigade in the town centre – when
a German infantry regiment allegedly dressed in French uniforms and singing a French song,
possibly the Marseillaise, bounced the Guards rear-guard on the outskirts of the town. It took
The Coldstream Guards four hours of fierce close-quarter night-fighting to defeat this German
initiative during which time a reservist, Lance Corporal Wyatt - who only three weeks
previously had been a Police Constable on the beat in Barnsley, earned a Victoria Cross. In
the meantime, General Haig demanded that 2 British Corps come to the immediate aid of his
1 British Corps. By the time, this message reached HQ 2 British Corps at Bertry, via GHQ
BEF at St Quentin; the Battle of Le Cateau had already begun!
PART 4 – ROYAL ARTILLERY, UNITED KINGDOM – circa 1914
38. Contents – Part 4.
a. Background - General Staff. – Para 39 to 45.
b. Background - Adjutant General. – Para 46 to 51.
c. Background - Quartermaster General Staff. – Para 52 to Para 54
BACKGROUND - GENERAL STAFF (G) / (G2/G3)
39. Field Artillery Tactics 1914 – Summary. The other major units of 5 Division Artillery were
equipped with 18 pounder Field Guns; they were XV Field Brigade at The Curragh, XXVII
Field Brigade at Newbridge and XXVIII Field Brigade at Dundalk. The pole-trail and fixed
charge system limited the range-coverage of the 18 pounder Field Guns. [Despite the gently
undulating nature of the local Cambresis landscape, some 18 pdr Fd Guns were partially
crested and limited to a minimum range of 1200 yards.] During pre-war exercises, 18 pounder
batteries were sometimes deployed amongst the supported infantry battalions in hull-down,
firing-positions rather than the conventional rear-slope, dead-ground, gun- positions. This
concept was put to the test in action at Le Cateau by Brigadier General John Headlam. Unlike
CRA 3 and 4 Division, as well as contrary to Artillery Training and Doctrine, he deployed fiftyeight of the seventy-four remaining guns of 5 Division Artillery between the Infantry Firing and
Support Lines „to bolster the infantry‟s morale.‟ While the supported infantry appreciated the
nearby Gunner firepower, they were annoyed by the muzzle-blast from the nearby British
guns and loathed the collateral effects of the devastating German 150 mm „Jack Johnson‟s‟.
[Universal rounds – HE and Shrapnel] counter-battery fire aimed at the nearby guns instead
of the largely ineffectual Whizz- bangs or Pip-Squeaks. [The German 77mm Fd Gun
Universal rounds bursting too high.]
Figure 6. BEF INFANTRY, August 1914
40. Field Brigade Command and Control.
In August 1914, it would appear that an RFA
Field or Howitzer Brigade HQ deployed in the field as a Main and Rear HQ. These HQ did not
have the capability to support continuous operations at an intense rate for a prolonged period.
There is no indication of an established post of Second in Command, Brigade RFA [Regiment
RA]. The Main HQ contained the equivalent of a Tactical HQ and Fire Direction Centre; it was
deployed forward and collocated with the supported brigade HQ and not with a supported
infantry battalion HQ. It should be noted that HQ XV Field Brigade – Main was isolated
throughout the Battle of Le Cateau, 1914 because HQ 14 Infantry Brigade failed to collocate
with them. HQ 14 Infantry Brigade remained isolated with the 2 British Corps Rear-guard on
the East bank of the River Selle until the late afternoon of Wednesday 26 August 1914. So
Brigadier General Stuart Rolt, Commander 14 Infantry Brigade, attempted to command his
brigade with one staff officer, on loan from HQ 19 Independent Brigade. Apart from a brief
appearance near daybreak, HQ XV Field Brigade did not see him for the remainder of the
battle! The Rear HQ/Brigade [Regimental] Office was deployed in the Wagon Lines [Echelon]
under the command of the Adjutant. [As yet, no mention of Gunner QM officers at Le Cateau
has been found; it is thought that QM were present but, as they were not commissioned
officers, they may have been regarded as „Honorary Lieutenants.‟ The QM commission was
introduced in 1917. Martin Gale refers only to RSM Goble and BSM Morrow; Warrant Officer
status was introduced in 1915. The tactical communication links were heavily reliant on
„Runners‟ and heliographs. They were neither robust nor battle worthy and were also of
limited value at night. There were no tactical radios; the telephone lines were cut by shellfire
and there is no mention of using either heliographs or signalling lamps. By November 1914,
on the Western Front, the HQ of Fd Bde RFA reorganized their deployment into a Tactical
HQ, Main HQ and Rear HQ.]
41. Battery Command and Control. Similarly, an RFA Field and Howitzer Battery HQ split
into a Command/Observation Post (CP/OP) [Current Tac and Bty FDC] at the OP end with a
Battery Office in the Wagon Lines [Echelon]. On 26 August 1914, 37 Howitzer and 52 Field
Batteries were on „Tasks‟, while 11 and 80 Field Batteries were on „Zones‟. The batteries
were deployed appropriately. [A Bty HQ did not appear to have the capability of supporting
continuous 24-hour operations for a prolonged period. Batteries were allocated to „Tasks‟ –
presumably „Close-support‟ and „Zones‟ – presumably „Superimposed‟. An „On Task‟ Bty
CP/OP collocated with its RFA Bde Main HQ and supported Inf Bde HQ. While, an „On Zones‟
Bty CP/OP deployed near and upwind of its Gun Line. During 1915, on the Western Front,
RFA Fd Bty command groups were reorganized into an observation post (OP) party led by a
subaltern, a supported-arm liaison officer usually a subaltern, a Bty CP at the Gun Line
manned alternately by the BC or BK and a subaltern as well as a Bty Office at the Wagon
Lines manned alternately by the BC or BK and a subaltern recovering from a day at the OP.]
See Battery Deployment Sketch at Enclosure 2.
42. Application of Fire. The Right Flank Batteries deployed before first light and waited for
the morning mists to clear to reveal opportunity targets for immediate neutralisation. Maps of
Ordnance Survey quality were in short supply and credible battlefield intelligence was almost
non-existent at Le Cateau. [Lt Rory Macleod stated that 80 Fd Bty had only three sets of
maps on deploying from the BEF Concentration Area; their Guns and Wagon Lines relied on
guides for all movement.] So, there was no attempt to coordinate either a Defensive Fire Plan
or predict prophylactic Artillery Fire Missions. Fire discipline protocols demanded that, even if
a battery Gun Line position located the source of German counter battery fire positively, it
required the BC‟s personal permission to engage it. At Le Cateau, the telephone lines as well
as the semaphore flag and “runner” links were neutralised by the German artillery „hosepiping‟
[Sweep and Search Harassment] fire. This meant that the senior officer at the Gun Line of the
two On Task Batteries had to report to their BC at the CP/OP personally to request
permission for their Battery to engage on a counter Battery Target [Current Fire Mission
Battery], before returning to their Gun Line to execute it.
Table 1: UK IN BARRACKS ROUTINE circa 1914
Ser
(a)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Timings
(b)
0530 hrs
0600 – 0700 hrs
0730 hrs
0800 – 0900 hrs
0930 – 1130 hrs
1130 – 1230 hrs
1300 hrs
1400 – 1600 hrs
1600 – 1700 hrs
1730 hrs
Additional
Event
(c)
Reveille
Stables - First Parade
Breakfast
Interior Economy
Gun drill Parade
Stables – Morning Parade
“Dinner”
Individual Training/Saturday Sports
Stables – Last Parade
“Teameal”
Fatigues, Guards and Pickets
43. Peacetime Training. Table 1 above shows a generic Edwardian era in- barracks daily
routine for a UK based field battery. Note, the extensive time spent looking after horses - most
junior ranks would be responsible for the care of two horses each. Gun drill was a formal daily
drill parade with similar ethos to “square-bashing.” [A concept of generic training capable of
being applied to any operational scenario.] Afternoons involved individual trade training and
education as well as general lectures given by an officer. The annual firing camp lasted only
one week each year. There appeared to be little or no thought given to either training for night
operations or fighting in a built up area.
RA Archives
Figure 7: 18 POUNDER FIELD GUN DRILL, 1914
The only training in the dark took place in the winter months to allow the subalterns to go
hunting see Para 44 below. Although he was an exceptional horseman, Captain Douglas
Reynolds was one of the very few officers who thought that battery gun-drill was more
important that riding to hounds. Much to the bewilderment of his fellow officers, Douglas
Reynolds refused to participate in any form of social or sporting equitation. He knew the gundrill manual by heart; trained 37 Howitzer Battery hard in all weathers but not at night!
44. Equitation.
There was a marked difference between the attitude of 37 Howitzer
Battery to XV Field Brigade regarding foxhunting – [Symptomatic of „Professionalism‟ versus
„Panache‟!] The XV Field Brigade officers were encouraged to take every opportunity to ride
to hounds providing they fulfilled their duties somehow! It was possible for a Gunner officer
stationed on The Curragh to ride out up to six days a week: four with a local hunt and two with
the harriers - providing of course he was not posted to 37 Howitzer Battery. During the
hunting season, XV Field Brigade officers would hold their gun-drill parades at 0630 hrs
wearing greatcoats over their hunting pinks, if necessary by the light of the gun sheds lamps.
Before going off following the hounds all-day and returning to give their afternoon training
lectures in the evening at 1830 hrs followed by a formal dinner in Mess Dress at 2000 hrs
sharp! [Under the Reserve Remount Scheme, officers could claim a grant of £75 to buy their
own horses – the cost of a first class hunter in Ireland – they were far more expensive in
England! It also entitled these horses to in-barracks stabling providing the officers contributed
towards their horses‟ feed and insurance. In Ireland, most Gunner officers bought several
hunters each under this scheme. The major disadvantage was that all Reserve Remounts
were requisitioned on the declaration of war. An officer had very little choice in which horse he
retained as his own military mount.]
BACKGROUND - ADJUTANT GENERAL (A) / ADMINISTRATIVE (G1)
RA Archives
Figure 8: FIELD BATTERY RFA, 1919
45. Officers - XV Field Brigade Group. In the field, XV Field Brigade Group consisted of 37
Howitzer Battery and 11, 52 as well as 80 Field Batteries of XV Field Brigade. [Subsequently,
this became the standard grouping for all Fd Bde RFA on the Western Front.] The officers of
VIII Howitzer and XV Field Brigades messed together in Kildare RA Station Mess so they
knew one another extremely well. The XV Field Brigade Group Officers‟ Nominal Roll is Table
8 at Annex A. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stevens, CO XV Field Brigade had very little
influence on the battle as he was badly wounded very early on; it was thought that, at aged
48, he was past his prime. The field officers, in their early 40s, were also starting to feel their
age after only five days of intensive campaigning. All the Battery Commanders had all seen
active service in both India and Africa and were wounded and captured at Le Cateau. The
Captains had seen action in South Africa as mounted infantry in the closing stages of the
Boer War and as Gunners in India. They made their presence felt throughout their batteries
from the CP/OP through the Gun Lines to the Wagon Lines regardless of the battle. Sadly,
Captain Cully Buckle and Captain William Barber-Starkey were both severely wounded by
midday and subsequently died of their wounds. While Captain Douglas Reynolds and the
newly joined Captain Archie Higgon were outstanding; all of them were dead by February
1916. None of the subalterns had been in action before. All of them were greatly impressed
and influenced by the general conduct and example set by each one of the Captains at Le
Cateau for the remainder of their military service and continued to remember them with great
pride.
Table 2: 1915 ESTABLISHMENT SCALE – MANNING - FIELD BATTERY, SIX GUNS
Ser
(a)
1
2
3
4
5
6
Note.
1. Link
Main Body
All Ranks
Men
(b)
(c)
Officers
5
BSM, BQMS, Sjts
11
Artificers
9
Rank and File (1)
168*
Trumpeters
2
Sub Total
195
Ser
(e)
Horses
(d)
5
11
0
150
2
168
1
2
3
4
5
6
Rank and File Annex (1)
Rank
Men
(f)
(g)
Corporals
7
Bombardier
11
Gunners
74
Drivers
71
Batmen
5
Sub Total
168*
46. XV Field Brigade – Establishment. [In 1914, there was a major reorganisation of the
British Army‟s unit establishments. These reforms included the reorganisation of Inf Bn from
two flank companies of two platoons each to four rifle companies of four platoons. It is thought
that most Inf Bn had little practical experience of this reorganisation in the field prior to the
outbreak of WW1. It was also unfamiliar to the reinforcing reservists who made up between
25% and 70% of the unit strength of a BEF Inf Bn. Six-gun Fd Bty RFA were already well
established but the 60 pdr Hy Bty RFA were still manned according to a four gun unit
establishment.] The RA Archives, Woolwich holds only the 1915 six-gun Field Battery
Establishment Table – see Table 2 above and the Western Front Volume of the Regimental
History also includes a table ammunition scales for the 1914 in service RHA and RFA artillery
equipment. Martin Gale states that 37 Howitzer Battery had 200 men and 170 horses on
leaving The Curragh. [During 1915, the How Bde RFA were disbanded and the 4.5 inch How
Bty became the fourth gun battery of composite Field Brigades RFA for the remainder of
World War 1. 8 How Bde RFA was disbanded circa 1915 when Fd Bde RFA were
reorganised into units of three 18 pdr Fd Bty and one 4.5 How Bty. 37 How Bty RFA became
the fourth Bty of XXVII Fd Bde and did not join XV Fd Bde RFA. In 1922, it was retitled 37 Fd
Bty, 27 Fd Bde RA. In 1938 it was altered to 37 Fd Bty RA, 27 Fd Regt RA, as such, it served
in Burma during WW2. Under the 1947 Laws‟ List Retitles, 37 Fd Bty RA, 27 Fd Regt RA
became 93 Fd Bty, 25 Fd Regt RA. Circa 1948, 25 Fd Regt RA was posted to Hong Kong
with 93 Fd Bty detached to Malaya. As a result of the sudden surge of insurgency activity, 25
Fd Regt RA joined 93 Le Cateau Bty in Malaya. In August 1954, the Battery was still serving
in Malaya when it was awarded the honour title Le Cateau.]
47. Other Rank – Overview. The men of 37 Howitzer Battery did not mix readily with the
Gunners of XV Field Brigade because of inter-unit rivalry and living in separate lines in The
Curragh Camp - 40 miles West of Dublin. The Gunners and the Drivers were separate trade
groups and had their own separate career paths until the reorganisation of the Gunners in
1922. The Junior Non Commissioned Officers (JNCO) would be in their mid twenties; the
Senior Non Commissioned Officers (SNCO) in their late twenties and thirties. [The Drivers
apparent rank ceiling was Driver Serjeant with some limited opportunities for further
promotion mainly in the Brigade Ammunition Columns (BAC). In gun batteries, Gunner
Serjeants were the preferred choice for BSM and BQMS. This was one of the reasons why
both Fred Luke and Job Drain left the Army as Driver Serjeants in 1919. In 1922, the semiautonomous Corps of RA Drivers was integrated within the mainstream RA.]
Each
battery had two trumpeters on Boy‟s Service with a minimum age 14; they entered man‟s
service on their 18th birthday. According to Jimmy Naylor, who as a Boy Trumpeter sounded
“Cease Firing” at the Elouges action, Monday 24 August 1914, the Royal Artillery Boy
Trumpeters were stationed at the Boys Battery, Woolwich when war was declared. After
petitioning the Battery Commander of the Boys‟ Battery, they all wrote to gain their parents‟
permission to join their affiliated batteries. There was a public and Parliamentary outcry when
it was realised that 15 year olds were being killed and wounded in action at Mons. A minimum
age of 19 years for overseas service was introduced forthwith for all HM Land Forces. [It
would appear that this did edict did not apply to the Royal Navy, as 16 year old RN Boy John
Cornwell of HMS Chester won a posthumous VC at the Battle of Jutland, 1916. So in mid
September 1914, when 37 How Bty‟s surviving trumpeter, 15 year old Badgie Waldron,
reached Soisson - the turning point of the Mons Retreat. He was sent back to the RA Depot,
Exeter where he remained until his 19th birthday in the summer of 1918 – when it is thought
he was posted to 3 RHA
Table 3: ARMY RECRUIT 1914 – INITIAL ENTRANCE CRITERIA
Ser
(a)
1.
Criteria
(b)
“APPARENT” AGE
2.
HEIGHT
Comments
(c)
Men: 18 to 38 years
Boys: 14 to 18 years
Minimum: 5 foot 3inches = 1.60m
3.
EYES
Sees required distance with either eye
4.
HEART and LUNGS
Healthy
5.
JOINTS and LIMBS
Moves independently
6.
“FITS”
Declares none
48. Recruiting Criteria 1914. For interest, the 1914 Army recruiting criteria are at Table 3
above. No supporting documentation was needed – not even a birth certificate. The amazing
fact is that over half of those young men who entered an Army Recruiting Office in 1913 failed
to meet these lax criteria! Despite all those who stated that they were 16 or 17 years old but
looked 18 being told by the Recruiting Sergeant to come back tomorrow when they were 18!
A sad reflection upon the general state of British public health and well being before World
War 1. [This is how both Job Drain and Fred Luke were able to enlist when they were both
aged barely 17 years old. The Army authorities thought they were aged 20, when they won
their Victoria Crosses at Le Cateau, but they were actually both under 19 years old. This
discounted any service prior to their 18th birthday towards their pay or gratuities. Appeals
could be countered with a threat of a charge of false testimony on enlistment.]
RA Archives
Figure 9. 18 POUNDER FIELD GUN DETACHMENT circa 1916
49. Physical Characteristics. The photograph, Figure 9 above, shows a complete a gun
sub-section and indicates why, traditionally, a Gunner No1 was a Serjeant and not a
Bombardier. In 1914, he was responsible for 16 men and their small arms; 11 horses; a gun,
a limber and two General Service (GS) wagons. [In 1915, the manning scale of Fd Bty RFA
was increased by 20 men. By 1916, these additional men were integrated within gun
detachments.] As compared to an Infantry Section Commander Corporal who, at that time,
was responsible for 12 men and 12 rifles. It is not readily apparent that these men are
between 5 feet 3 inches and 5 feet 7 inches tall [1m 60 to 1m 70]. Until one starts comparing
the height of the rear rank with the diameter of the gun carriage wheels which is 4 feet 6
inches [1m 37]. A typical Gunner would have only weighed around 8.5 stones [55kg]. All the
veterans were short wiry men, except for some of the officers and Sjt Jumbo Butterworth, all
of whom were less than 6 foot tall. In 1964, they were in their early 70s and they were still
pretty fit even though they smoked like chimneys and, if put to the test, could hold their drink
impeccably – see Para 23! That said, each one of the veterans, no matter their rank, was
always well-turned-out and ready on parade whenever required, as well as behaving with
both humour and dignity at all times. It was a privilege to meet each one of them.
50. RA Pay Scale 1914. The 1914 RA Pay Scale is shown in Table 4, column (c) above.
There was a flat rate of pay for each rank. There is also no overlap between officer and OR
pay scales; a Battery Serjeant Major (BSM) is paid £80 pa - Serial 6(c) and a subaltern £102
pa – serial 5(c). An approximate comparison with current net pay scales is shown in column
(e). [Note: The current overlap between officer and OR pay-scales; today, a Warrant Officer
Class 2 (Battery Sergeant Major) may be paid £35,000 per annum gross while a 2 Lt is paid
£25,000 per annum gross. Of interest, in 1914, Gunner Officers‟ Mess Subscriptions were £6
per month and the Batting Charges a further £1 per month. There was an established scale of
one Gunner Groom/Batman (an officer‟s personal servant) for each officer on the established
strength of the Battery. Therefore, a Gunner subaltern had only £1 or £2 per month of his
military pay to spend on any other personal incidental expenses. In 1913, an MS study
concluded that it was highly desirable for an RHA or an RFA officer, but not necessarily an
RGA one, to have a private income in the order of £160 pa net - much more than a
subaltern‟s Army pay and equivalent to around £15,000 pa net today!]
Table 4: EXTRACT RA PAY SCALES 1914
Ser
(a)
Rank
(b)
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Captain
Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
BSM/BQMS
Serjeant
Corporal
(Lance) Bombardier
Gunner/Driver
1914 Gross Pay
Scale
(c)
£420 pa
£291 pa
£211 pa
£124 pa
£102 pa
£80 pa
£58 pa
£47 pa
£40 pa
£20 pa
(1) 1914 Net
Equivalent Pay
(d)
£37,300 pa
£26,300 pa
£19,200 pa
£11,300 pa
£9,300 pa
£7,300 pa
£5,300 pa
£4,300 pa
£3,600 pa
£1,800 pa
(2) Current Net
Estimate Pay
(e)
£37,000 pa
£25,000 pa
£20,000 pa
£12,000 pa
£9,000 pa
£18,000 pa
£15,000 pa
£14,000 pa
£8,000 pa
£4,000 pa
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes:
1. In 1914, £1 equivalent to approximately £91; Income Tax = 6% on over £250 pa; Rations
and Accommodation Charge: Nil.
2. Income Tax and Rates approximately 35%; Rations and Accommodation Charge: £15 to
£25 per day.
BACKGROUND - QUARTERMASTER GENERAL (Q) / LOGISTICS G4
RA Archives
Figure 10: 18 POUNDER QF FIELD GUN Mark 1 AND LIMBER, FRANCE 1914
Range: 6500 yards
51. Guns – Introduction. Both 4.5 inch Howitzer and 18 pounder guns were mounted on a
Gun Carriage and towed by a Limber and a team of six Horses with three Drivers - a total
weight 1.5 tons and no road brakes! When under any threat, the drivers had to remain
mounted for up to 8 hours at a time to stop their horses from bolting. Especially, when it came
to an ammunition resupply detail to a gun position under fire. Due to inter-unit rivalry, neither
37 Howitzer Battery nor 52 Field Battery appeared to be aware that their limbers were
capable of towing each other‟s guns. [A 4.5” How had different sized gun-trail eye to an 18
pdr Fd Gun.] This became a source of friction between the two batteries when it came to
recovering the guns and continued to rankle the 37 Howitzer Battery veterans thereafter.
RA Archives
Figure 11: 4.5 inch QF HOWITZER Mark 1
Range: 6000 yards Shell: 35 Ibs
Table 5: EXTRACT – RFA AMMUNITION SCALES, 1914
Ser
Location
4.5 inch How RPG
(a)
(b)
(c)
1. Limber
12
2. Battery Wagon Lines
96
3. Brigade Ammunition Column, RFA
48
4. Division Ammunition Column, RFA
44
5. Division Ammunition Park, RAOC
80
6. In-theatre Ammunition Depot, RAOC
520
7. Total – In-theatre Ammunition Holdings
800
Note:
Ammunition Holdings: HE: 30%; Shrapnel: 70%
18 pdr Fd Gun
(d)
24
152
76
126
150
472
1000
52. Equipment and Ammunition – 4.5 inch Howitzer.
37 Howitzer Battery of 8 Howitzer
Brigade was equipped with 4.5 inch QF Howitzers, see Figure 11 above, and not the classic
British 18 Pounder QF Field Gun. Its distinctive features included a box-trail, a gun- barrel
mounted above the recoil recuperator and a high-angle capability. In 1914, it fired a 35 lbs
shell to a range of 6000 yards; see ammunition holdings at Table 5 above and illustration at
Enclosure 6. It was the predecessor of the World War 2 25 pounder QF Gun/Howitzer. The
ammo scale at Table 5 above was designed to support low-intensity colonial campaigns
rather high-intensity war-fighting. [Subsequently, the range of the 4.5” How Mk 2 was
extended to 7200 yards. Once the momentum of the German invasion of France was checked
on the Marne in October 1914 and the Germans started digging in, 18 pdr Shrapnel as well as
both 13 pdr HE and Shrapnel rounds proved ineffective against any form of earthworks.
Thereafter, HE Graze or Delay became the predominant field artillery ammunition for the
remainder of the World War 1. Presumably because they were cheaper and more easily
massed-produced as well as minimising complex fuze setting drills in poor weather or
indifferent visibility.
Table 6: AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE – RIGHT FLANK BATTERIES, LE CATEAU, 26
August 1914
Ser
(a)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Battery
(b)
11 Fd Bty
37 (How) Bty
52 Fd Bty
80 Fd Bty
122 Fd Bty
123 Fd Bty
124 Fd Bty
Rounds
(c)
Not Recorded
550x 4.5inch
1100 x 18 pdr
456 x 18 pdr
600 x 18 pdr
456 x 18 pdr
Not Recorded
Comment
(d)
35 lbs shell
Estimate
Estimate
53. Ammunition - Comments.
Much is made of the fact that 52 Field Battery claimed to
have fired an estimated 1100 x 18 pounder rounds on Wednesday 26 August 1914 about
double that of the other right flank 18 pounder batteries. Martin Gale claims that this is a
misinterpretation of 2nd Lieutenant Richard Neve‟s report, one of the two surviving subalterns,
that 52 Battery fired off all the available ammunition on its gun position. In view of Captain
William Barber-Starkey‟s gallant failure to resupply 52 Field Battery with three wagon loads
(250 rounds) about midday, it is thought the figure was probably no more than 750 rounds. Of
interest, 37 Howitzer Battery brought down almost the same weight of fire – 550 x 35lbs, 4.5
inch rounds. See Table 6 above. The Gunners took great pride and satisfaction in the
accuracy of their fuse settings under fire throughout the battle, as they often had problems
with faulty fuse setting while live firing during practice camp in Ireland. At this stage of the
war, the RFA Division and Brigade Ammunition Columns were responsible for the delivery of
both artillery and small arms ammunition to their respective formation ammunition points.
54. Logistics – Rations and Fodder.
It is interesting to note that despite all prolonged
barrages and fire plans throughout World War 1, a great weight of horse fodder than
ammunition was shipped from UK to France – 5,438,600 tons of fodder to 5,253,360 tons of
ammunition. A field battery‟s daily fodder ration of hay/bran and oats filled one GS Wagonload and weighed about 2 tons. The logistical resupply system broke down as the Mons
Retreat started so both men and horses were on very short rations from Sunday 23 August
1914 for the next three weeks. Attempts were made to pre-dump stores along the line of
march with mixed results. They benefitted the local French people and following German
forces as much as the BEF troops. As it was harvest-time, the horses barely survived on oatstraw and the men likewise on apples. There was also a severe shortage of drinking water for
both men and horses throughout the entire Retreat from Mons because some townships
removed the handles from the public water-pumps, as they were concerned about preserving
their own water sources from being drained away by excessive demands from both the
transiting British and German troops. Both troops and horses had to rely on water from
dewponds and shallow streams.
Table 7: UK IN-BARRACKS – DAILY RATIONS -1914
Ser
(a)
1
Meal
(b)
Breakfast
2
“Dinner”
3
“Teameal”
4
Haversack Rations
Menu
(c)
Porridge
Sausage and Mash or Bacon and Beans
Bread and (Spoons, Tea – one of) Marmalade
(Mug of Tea)
(Meat and Offal) Mince or Rissoles, Cabbage or
Beans, Potatoes
“Duff” (Steamed Pudding) and (Watery) Custard
Mug of Tea
Bread and (Spoons, Tea – one of) Jam
(Mug of Tea)
Bully Beef, Hard-tack Biscuits
and (may be) an Apple or Orange
(Bottles, water, 1 pint)
55. Rations 1914 - Comments.
Whatever one may think of the rations shown at Table 7
above, it is worth noting that many of the reinforcing reservists could not afford this quantity or
quality of food at home. Reservists made up approximately a quarter of a unit‟s war
establishment. When they reported for duty, the reservists were unfit and under-fed even
though would be fighting for their lives within three weeks of reporting for duty - an interesting
comparison with the current six-month, pre-operational tour training programmes.
PART 5 – SOURCES
56. Contents – Part 5.
a.
Colloquial. – Para 57.
b.
Documentary. – Para 58 and 59.
M G Watson
Figure 12: VETERANS, LE CATEAU, 1964
Seated – Left to Right: Maj Gen John Younger [Para 57b and 58a]; Parish Priest, Maj Gen
Peter Gillett [2Lt 37 Fd Bty, India 1939 and last CO 5 RHA]; Local; Maj Gen Bill Hughes
[Representing The Master Gunner]; Brig Eric Earle [Para 57c and 58c]; Local; Maj Gen Reay
Mirrlees [Para 57a and 58b]; Comdt Local Airbase; Mayor; Local; Local Comdt; Capt Charles
Butterworth [Para 57e], Mr Walters [Para 57h]; Madame Belmont-Norbert [Para 57i]; Maj
Hopkins [BC 37, 1917]
Some Standing – Left to Right: Maj Oliver Nicholas [BC 93 Des]; WO1 (RSM) Cedric
Ramshall [RSM 25; later Chief Yeoman Warder, HM Tower of London]; Roger Fielding [later
Lt Col RA]; Lt Col John Fielding [CO 25 and former BC P (Dragon) Bty]; Mrs Katie Fielding
Note: Fred Luke [Para 57f], Badgie Waldron [Para 57d] and Sid Spraggon [Para 57g] are
probably under the arch at the back having a smoke and chatting to a group of our 93 Bty
Gunners and some local mademoiselles.
COLLOQUIAL
57. Le Cateau 1914 Veterans. Listed below are some of the veterans who attended the 50th
anniversary celebrations at Le Cateau in 1964:
a.
Major General Reay Mirrlees CB DSO MC: Section Commander, 80 Field Battery,
XV Field Brigade and “Martin Gale” team.
b.
Major General John Younger CB (John): Orderly Officer, XV Field Brigade and
“Martin Gale” team. [Equivalent to today‟s Assistant Adjutant]
c.
Brigadier E G Earle DSO (Eric): Centre Section Commander, 37 Howitzer Battery,
VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade and Hon Secretary, “Martin Gale”
team.
d.
Major S H G Waldron DCM MBE (Badgie): Battery Captain‟s (BK) Trumpeter, 37
Howitzer Battery, VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade. [Subject to
confirmation - during the immediate post WW2 period, Col John Fielding (CO 25 Regt
RA) and Badgie had served together in 3RHA as Adjt 3RHA and QM 3RHA
respectively.]
e.
Captain C A Butterworth DCM (Jumbo): No 1, F Sub-section, 37 Howitzer Battery,
VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade. [DCM not for Le Cateau.
Subsequently, RSPCA Inspector].
f.
Serjeant F Luke VC (Fred): Lead Driver, F Sub-section, 37 Howitzer Battery, VIII
Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade. [Note: pre 1922 spelling of Sergeant].
[From 1962 to 1982, Fred visited the Battery on at least a dozen separate occasions. He
spoke informally to ad hoc groups on many occasions. Therefore, each person who met
him treasures their own personal “Fred story.”]
g.
Mr S Spraggon (Sid): Gunner, 37 Howitzer Battery, VIII Howitzer Brigade detached
to XV Field Brigade. [He was more interested in relating his WW2 worldwide exploits as
a merchant ship‟s Anti-aircraft Gunner of the Maritime Regiment RA.]
h.
Mr Walters: Gunner Clerk, the only 52 Field Battery, XV Field Brigade [now 132
Battery (The Bengal Rocket Troop)] veteran present.
i.
Madame Belmont-Gorbert OBE. [She sheltered Private Fowler, 11th Hussars (11H),
on her smallholding throughout WW1! (Note: In 1922, Private 11H became Trooper
11H.) His comrade, Corporal Hull was sheltered on a neighbouring farm. In 1916, he
was betrayed and shot as a spy because he was not wearing full uniform when
captured. His hosts were incarcerated for the remainder of the war. In mid Oct 18, during
2nd Battle of Le Cateau, 66 British Infantry Division arrested Pte Fowler as a deserter.
Luckily he spotted Maj Drake 11H, his former Tp Comd, who, by then, was 2ic 11H. So
Pte Fowler was released from close arrest and served as 11H Officers‟ Mess Steward
for the remaining weeks of WW1. After WW1, the Belmont-Gorbert family found difficulty
in making ends meet so the War Office paid her 4 years and 2 months Lodging
Allowance at 2d (Approximately 1p!) per day totalling £17 for the period late August
1914 to mid October 1918! It is thought that 11H also donated a day‟s pay
supplemented by voluntary contributions from the members of the Cavalry Club to help
alleviate the Belmont-Gorbert financial difficulties.]
DOCUMENTARY
58. Martin Gale. The “Martin Gale” team – all of whom were subalterns at the battle included:
Gunner Magazine
Figure 13: “MARTIN GALE” - LE CATEAU, 1964
Left: Maj Gen John Younger. Centre: Maj Gen Reay Mirrlees. Right: Brig Eric Earle
a.
Major General John Younger: Orderly Officer XV Field Brigade, who was captured
at the XV Field Brigade CP/OP – (Ser 3, Annexes A and C).
b.
Major General Reay Mirrlees: Another Section Commander of 80 Field Battery,
who was one of the very few XV Field Brigade officers to emerge from the battle virtually
unscathed – (Ser 23, Annexes A and C).
c.
Brigadier Eric Earle: Centre Section Commander 37 Howitzer Battery – (Ser 12,
Annex A and C), who threw away his sword; broke an arm, lost an eye, and was
recommended for a VC by Captain Douglas Reynolds but awarded a DSO instead.
With good reason, see end of Para 15, the Martin Gale team thought that the official accounts
did not reflect their own personal experiences of the battle as subalterns. So in 1963, through
Gunner magazine, they established contact with a dozen or so veterans, including at least
one representative from each of the four XV Field Brigade Group batteries at Le Cateau.
[Including: 11 Fd Bty – Capt Hopper DCM; 52 Fd Bty - Sjt Campbell and Sjt Hewitt] The
following year, their findings were published in an RAA booklet entitled – “The XV Brigade
Group RFA at Le Cateau 26th August 1914” under the pseudonym Martin Gale. [A martingale
is a strap, fitted between the noseband and the girth, to prevent a horse from raising its head
too high.] This booklet was used as the principal reference for this document coupled with the
author‟s recollections of his conversations with the Martin Gale team and the other veterans
whom he met at Le Cateau in 1964.
59. External Sources.
a.
Major A F Becke.
The accepted reference work is “The Royal Regiment of
Artillery at Le Cateau” written by Major A F Becke in 1918 and published in 1919. He
was a retired Gunner officer and a War Office archivist as well as being an expert on the
Battle of Waterloo 1815 and WW1 Orders of Battle and Unit Establishment Tables. He
drew on the personal diaries of Brigadier General John Headlam, CRA 5 Division, and
the often-sketchy entries from whatever unit “War Diaries” were available in London in
1918. [It is thought that this account may have been written by Maj Becke, at the behest
of Maj Gen Sir John Headlam, as part of a lobby campaign to counter the UK
Government‟s cap on Army Recruiting that was introduced in March 1918. Publication
was overtaken by the unexpected Armistice of 11 November 1918; the book was
eventually published in 1919.]
b.
XV Field Brigade RFA – Field Officers.
Meanwhile, in 1918, the following
officers did not have any input into Major Becke‟s book because they were still
incarcerated in Torgau Officers‟ Prisoner of War (PoW) camp near the Elbe or Clausthal
Officers‟ PoW camp in the Harz Mountains:
i. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stevens - CO XV Field Brigade – (Annex C, Ser 1).
ii. Major Hercules Tailyour - BMRA 5 Division.
iii. All four Right Flank BC, including Major Eustace Jones, BC 37 Howitzer Battery –
(Annex C, Ser 9).
These PoW had four years to refine their accounts of the battle while “guests” of the
Germans. Some of these records are held by the Liddle Archives, Leeds - sadly the RA
Archives, Woolwich has none. [His grandson, Brig Robert Tailyour, holds some
postcards sent by Maj Hercules Tailyour from Clausthal PoW camp. He was on parole in
the Netherlands at the time of the Armistice, 11 November 1918.]
c.
Colonel Rory McLeod.
Colonel Rory McLeod, an 80 Field Battery Section
Commander, (Annex C, Ser 22), who did not take part in the Martin Gale project, but
wrote a diary throughout World War 1 and, subsequently, tape-recorded his
reminiscences for the Imperial War Museum. [Brig Robert Tailyour also holds a copy of
Col Rory McLeod‟s WW1 diary.]
d.
Others. Recent accounts that draw on Major Becke‟s book and the Liddle
Archives, include:
i. General Sir Martin Farndale‟s - Western Front volume of the Royal Regiment of
Artillery Regimental History. [Drafted by Brig Gen Edgar Anstey.]
ii. Richard Holmes‟s - Book of the TV series Riding The Retreat
iii. Anthony Bird‟s - Gentlemen, We will Stand and Fight.
Salisbury
1 February 2015
Acknowledgements:
A. “Martin Gale”:
Maj Gen W Mirrlees CB DSO MC
Maj Gen J E T Younger CB
Brig E G Earle DSO
B. Le Cateau Veterans:
Col R MacLeod DSO MC
Maj S F G Waldron DCM MBE
Capt C A Butterworth DCM
Sjt Frederick Luke VC
Gnr Sid Spraggon
C. Technical Advice:
Lt Col Jim Reid MBE – Ammunition and Equipment
Maj Bill Clarke - Equitation
Mr Paul Evans, RA Archives, Woolwich
Annexes:
A.
Appendix 1 - Nominal Roll – Officers XV Bde Gp, Aug 14
Appendix 2 – Outline ORBAT - 37 How Battery, 26 Aug 14
B.
Timebar – XV Bde Group, August 1914
C.
Officers XV Bde Gp - Subsequently
D.
Appendix 1 - Honours and Awards – XV Bde Group, Le Cateau, Wed 26 Aug 14
Appendix 2 – Capt Reynolds‟ Recommendations to Brig Gen Headlam
Enclosures:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Sketchmap – Le Cateau Battlefield
Sketchmap – Initial Contacts, Right Flank and Battery Deployment
Sketch – 5 Div Arty Artillery Situation am Wed 26 Aug 14
Sketchmap – Recovery of E and F Sub; and Escape of the Guns, Right Flank
Sketchmap – Western Front
Sketchmap – Mons Retreat Phase 1
Figures:
1. The Recovery of F Sub-section Gun
2. Gunner Casualties, August 1914
3. Dvr Job Drain VC
4. Dvr Frederick Luke VC
5. Capt Douglas Reynolds VC RFA
6. BEF Infantry, August 1914
7. 18 pdr Gun Drill, 1914
8. Fd Battery, 1919
9. 18 pdr Gun and Limber, France 1914
10. 18 pdr Gun Sub Section, circa 1916
11. 4.5” Howitzer
12. Veterans, Le Cateau, 1964
13. Martin Gale, Le Cateau, 1964
Tables:
1. UK In Barracks Routine circa 1914
2. Establishment Scale – Manning Six Gun Field Battery 1915
3. Army Recruit 1914 – Initial Entrance Criteria
4. Extract RA Pay Scales 1914
5. Ammo Holdings – Six Gun Field Battery, 1914
6. Ammo Expenditure - Right Flank Batteries, Le Cateau 1914
7. In Barracks Rations circa 1914
8. Officers‟ Nominal Roll Aug 14 – Annex A, Appendix 1
9. Outline 37 How Bty, ORBAT Aug 14 – Annex A, Appendix 2
10. Nominal Roll - Left Section Gun Recovery Teams – Annex A, Appendix 2
11. Suffolk Memorial – 37 How Battery Names – Annex A, Appendix 2
12. Timebar August 1914 – Annex B
13. Officers‟ Nominal Roll – Subsequently – Annex C
14. Honours and Awards, XV Field Brigade Group – Annex D
15. Capt Reynold‟s Recommendations for Awards to Brig Gen Headlam – Annex D
APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14
Table 8: NOMINAL ROLL – OFFICERS XV BDE GROUP, AUGUST 1914 (1)
References:
A. Kane‟s List of RA Officers, Vol 2 (1862-1914) – Marked Copy, RA Archives
B. RA Blue List 1914 – Badley Library, Larkhill
C. Martin Gale
Ser
Appt
Rank
Forename
Surname
Age
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
1
CO
Lt Col
Charles Frederick
Stevens
43
2
Adjt
Lt
Cecil John Farran
Leeech
32
3
Orderly Offr Lt
John Edward Talbot
Younger
26
4
BC 11 Bty
Maj
Philip Walter Beresford
Henning
44
5
BK 11 Bty
Capt
Henry “Cully”
Buckle
34
6
Sect Comd
Lt
Jack
Stanford
26
7
Sect Comd
2Lt
Power MacMurrough
Maxwell
22
8
Sect Comd
2Lt
William Humphrey
Coghlan
24
9
BC 37 Bty
Maj
Eustace Henry
Jones
39
10
BK 37 Bty
Capt
Douglas
Reynolds
31
11
Sect Comd
Lt
Stanley Neville
Custance
27
12
Sect Comd
2Lt
Eric Greville
Earle
22
13
Sect Comd
2Lt
William Duthie
Morgan
22
14
BC 52 Bty
Maj
Arthur Charles Rothery
Nutt
41
15
BK 52 Bty
Capt
William Henry Joseph
Barber-Starkey
34
16
Sect Comd
2Lt
Gerard Henry
Broadhurst
22
17
Sect Comd
2Lt
Richard Burra
Neve
21
18
Sect Comd
Lt
Robert Cowper
Rome
25
19
BC 80 Bty
Maj
Richard Archibald
Birley
41
20
BK 80 Bty
Capt
Archibald Bellairs
Higgon
34
21
Sect Comd
2Lt
Arthur George
Hewson
23
22
Sect Comd
2Lt
Roderick
Macleod
22
23
Sect Comd
2Lt
William Henry Buchanan
Mirrlees
21
Note:
1. It is thought that the original Nominal Rolls of XV Fd Bde Group RFA dated August 1914
were deposited in the RA Section of the War Office archives and were destroyed by German
incendiary bombs during WW2.
APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14
Table 9: OUTLINE ORDER OF BATTLE 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA, LE CATEAU, 26
AUGUST 1914
Ser
(a)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Appointment
(b)
Battery Commander
Battery Captain
Right Section Commander
Centre Section Commander
Left Section Commander
Battery Serjeant Major
Battery Quartermaster Serjeant
A Sub-section Commander
B Sub-section Commander
C Sub-section Commander
D Sub-section Commander
E Sub-section Commander
F Sub-section Commander
Driver Serjeant
Signals Serjeant
Survey Serjeant
Rank and Name
(c)
Major Ernest Jones
Captain Douglas Reynolds
Lieutenant Stanley Custance
2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle
2nd Lieutenant William Morgan
Battery Serjeant Major Morrow
Battery Quatermaster Serjeant O‟Keefe
Serjeant Rushton
Serjeant Varley
Serjeant Brown
Serjeant Hunter
Serjeant Bower
Serjeant Butterworth
Not Known
Not Known
Not Known
Table 10: LEFT SECTION, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY, RECOVERY LE CATEAU, pm
WEDNESDAY 26 AUGUST 1914 – NOMINAL ROLL
Ser
(a)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Note:
1. Killed
Officer in Charge: Capt D Reynolds RFA
Role
E Sub-section
F-Subsection
(b)
(c)
(d)
Section Commander
2Lt E G Earle RFA
2Lt W D Morgan RFA
Detachment Commander
Sjt Bower
Sjt Butterworth
Limber Gunner
Gnr Fraser
Gnr Baker
Limber Gunner
Gnr Robertson (1)
Gnr Garlick
Limber Gunner
Gnr Turner
Nil
Lead Driver
Dvr Treloar (1)
Dvr Drain
Centre Driver
Dvr Hall
Dvr Cobey (1)
Wheeler Driver
Dvr Prior
Dvr Luke
Table 11: SUFFOLK MEMORIAL, LE CATEAU 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA
PERSONNEL
Ser
(a)
1.
2.
3.
4.
Rank and Name
(b)
Corporal James Staples
Gunner Walter Arthur Cane
Driver Benjamin George Cobey
Gunner [NYK] Cowley
Rank and Name
(c)
Gunner [NYK] Ellis
Gunner John King Robertson
Driver George Treloar
Gunner Ernest Wiggins
ANNEX B TO
37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14
Table 12: TIMEBAR – 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA, AUGUST 1914
August
1914
XV BDE
GP RFA
Background
August
1914
XV BDE
GP RFA
Background
August
1914
XV BDE
GP RFA
Background
August
1914
XV BDE
GP RFA
Background
Tue
4
WAR
DECLARED
Tue
11
FINAL
PREP
Wed
Thu
Fri
Sat
Sun
Mon
5
6
7
8
9
10
STATIONED
RESERVISTS ARRIVE
THE CURRAGH CAMP,
CO KILDARE, IRELAND
German Invasion of Belgium and Siege of Liege Fortress Starts
Wed
Thu
Fri
Sat
Sun
Mon
12
13
14
15
16
17
DEPART
MOVE TO EMBARK
SEA PASSAGE
THE
DUBLIN
DUBLIN
IRELAND TO FRANCE
CURRAGH
DOCKS
Siege of Liege Fortress continues until
Battle of the [French] Frontiers Starts
Sun 16 Aug 14
Tue
Wed
Thu
Fri
Sat
Sun
Mon
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
ETA LA
MOVE TO AND HARBOUR
BATTLE BATTLE RETREAT
OF
HARVE
LE CATEAU AVENSES AREA
PREP
MONS
Battle of the [French] Frontiers continues until Mon 24 Aug 14
Tue
Wed
Thu
Fri
Sat
Sun
Mon
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
BATTLE
RETREAT
RETREAT PASS ST
RETREAT FROM MONS
OF LE
QUENTIN
CONTINUES
CATEAU
Siege of Maubeuge Fortress continues until Mon 8 Sep 14
ANNEX C TO
37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14
Table 13: OFFICERS XV BDE GROUP, AUGUST 1914 - SUBSEQUENTLY
References:
A. Kane‟s List of RA Officers, Vol 2 (1862-1914) – Marked Copy, RA Archive Woolwich
B. RA Blue Lists dated 1914, 1922 and 1948
C. Martin Gale
Ser
Appt
(a)
1
2
3
4
5
(b)
Rank and Name
26 Aug 14
CO
Adjt
Orderly Offr
BC 11 Fd Bty
BK 11 Fd Bty
(c)
Lt Col C F Stevens
Lt C J F Leech
Lt J E T Younger
Maj P W B Henning
Capt H Buckle
6
7
Sect Comd
Sect Comd
Lt J Stanford
2Lt P MacM Maxwell
(d)
Wounded; PoW
Wounded
Wounded; PoW
Wounded; PoW
Mortally
Wounded; PoW
Wounded
Wounded
8
Sect Comd
2Lt W H Coghlan
Killed
9
Wounded; PoW
10
BC 37 How
Maj E H Jones
Bty
BK 37 How Bty Capt D Reynolds
11
12
13
14
15
Sect Comd
Sect Comd
Sect Comd
BC 52 Fd Bty
BK 52 Fd Bty
Wounded
Wounded
16
Sect Comd
Lt S N Custance
2Lt E G Earle
2Lt W D Morgan
Maj A C Nutt
Capt W H J BarberStarkey
2Lt G H Broadhurst
17
18
19
20
Sect Comd
Sect Comd
BC 80 Fd Bty
BK 80 Fd Bty
2Lt R B Neve
Lt R C Rome
Maj R A Birley
Capt A B Higgon
21
22
23
Sect Comd
Sect Comd
Sect Comd
2Lt A G Hewson
2Lt R Macleod
2Lt W H B Mirrlees
Wounded; PoW
Mortally
Wounded; PoW
Wounded
Wounded; PoW
Wounded
Wounded
Subsequently
(e)
Lt Col DSO
Lt Col MC
Maj Gen CB
Lt Col DSO (Uncfm)
Capt dow Cologne,
Germany 1914
Maj
Maj MC kia France
1917
2Lt kia Le Cateau,
France 1914
Lt Col DSO
Maj VC LdeH dow
France 1916
Maj
Brig DSO
Maj Gen CB DSO MC
Col DSO
Capt dow Le cateua,
France 1914
Lt kia Ypres, Belgium
1915
Capt RGA?
Maj MC
Maj DSO
Maj kia Gallipoli,
Turkey 1915
Brig MC
Col DSO MC
Maj Gen CB DSO MC
APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14
Table 14: HONOURS AND AWARDS – XV BDE GROUP, LE CATEAU, Wed 26 Aug 14
Ser
(a)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Award
(b)
VICTORIA CROSS
DISTINGUISHED
SERVICE ORDER
DISTINGUISHED
CONDUCT MEDAL
LEGION d’HONNEUR
CROIX de GUERRE
Recipient
(c)
Capt Douglas Reynolds RFA
Dvr Job Drain
Dvr Frederick Luke
Lt Col C F Stevens RFA
Maj P W B Henning RFA
[Unconfirmed]
Maj E H Jones RFA
Maj A C R Nutt RFA
Maj R A Birley RFA
2Lt E G Earle RFA
BSM Morgan
FQMS Watts
Sjt Brown
Sjt Brown
Sjt Hopper
Sjt Shufflebottom
Tptr Waldron
A N Other
A N Other
Capt Douglas Reynolds RFA
Sub Unit
(d)
37 How Bty
37 How Bty
37 How Bty
XV Fd Bde
11 Fd Bty
FQMS Watts
Gnr Fraser
11 Fd Bty
37 How Bty
37 How Bty
52 Fd Bty
80 Fd Bty
37 How Bty
80 Fd Bty
11 Fd Bty
37 How Bty
80 Fd Bty
11 Fd Bty
80 Fd Bty
80 Fd Bty
80 Fd Bty
80 Fd Bty
37 How Bty
APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO
37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14
Table 15: 37 HOWITZER BATTERY, RFA, LIST OF COMMENDATIONS FOR BRAVERY
Reference:
A. Report – Capt D Reynolds RFA Dated 23 November 1914
Ser
(a)
1
Rank and Name
(b)
2Lt Earle
Sub Unit
(c)
Centre section
Comment
(d)
Commander. Mentioned and listed;
awarded DSO.
2
Sjt Brown
C Sub-section
Comander/No 1. Mentioned and listed;
awarded DCM - not for F Gun recovery.
3
Sjt Bower
E Sub-section
Comander/No 1. Mentioned and listed;
recommended by CRA 5 Div; no award.
4
Gnr Fraser
E Sub-section
Limber Gunner. Listed; awarded Croix
de Guerre.
5
Gnr Turner
E Sub-section
Limber Gunner. Listed; no award.
6
Gnr Roberton
E Sub-section
Limber Gunner. Listed; no award. Killed.
7
Dvr Treloar
E Sub-section
Lead Driver. Mentioned and listed; no
award. Killed.
8
Dvr Hall
E Sub-section
Centre Driver. Mentioned and listed; no
award. Missing.
9
Dvr Prior
E Sub-section
Wheeler Driver. Mentioned and listed;
no award.
10
Gnr Baker
F Sub-section
Limber Gunner. Mentioned and listed;
no award.
10
Dvr Drain
F Sub-section
Lead Driver. Mentioned and listed;
awarded VC.
11
Dvr Luke
F Sub-section
Wheeler Driver. Mentioned and listed;
awarded VC.
12
Boy Tptr Waldron
Battery Captain‟s Mentioned and listed. Awarded DCM Trumpeter.
not for F Gun recovery
Others Involved Directly in F Gun Recovery
13
2Lt Morgan
Left Section
Commander. Mentioned but not listed.
14
Sjt Butterworth
F Sub-section
Commander/No 1. Neither mentioned
nor listed.
15
Dvr Cobey
F Sub-Section
Centre Driver. Mentioned but not listed.
Killed
Definitions:
1. Mentioned = Mentioned in main report.
2. Listed = Named in“ Conspicious Bravery” list.
ENCLOSURE 1 TO
37 HOW BTY, AUG 1914
ENCLOSURE 2 TO
37 HOW BTY, AUG 1914
ENCLOSURE 3 TO
37 HOW BTY, AUG 1914
ENCLOSURE 4 TO
37 HOW BTY, AUG 1914
ENCLOSURE 5 TO
37 HOW BTY, AUG 1914
ENCLOSURE 6 TO
7 HOW BTY, AUG 1914