Transatlantischer Freihandel: Gewinner, Verlierer und

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THE ECONOMICS OF TTIP
Prof. Gabriel Felbermayr, PhD
Ludwig Maximilians Universität München
OeNB
Wien, June 14, 2016
Ifo Center for International Economics
G. Felbermayr
TTIP AGENDA
Market access
• Tariffs, quota, services, public procurement, …
• Numerous exceptions
Regulatory cooperation
• Unnecessary, discriminatory non-tariff barriers
• Sectoral heterogeneity
Investment
• Access regulation
• Protection: ISDS
Rules
Competition, labor law, data, environment, SMEs,
IPR, corruption (?)
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MODELS CONSENSUS
?
?
?
G. Felbermayr
3
TTIP EFFECTS: HOW CAPTURED
Effect often captured
Effect sometimes or partly captured
Tariff
reductions
(intensive margin)
Effect generally not captured
NTB
reductions
Follow-up
trade
liberalization
Tech &
knowledge
transfer
Increased
domestic
market
efficiency
(intensive margin)
TTIP
Dynamic
productivity
gains
Synergies
with other
structural
reforms
Source: Henn, 2016 (IMF Reference Note).
Extensive
margin
Investment
G. Felbermayr
HOW OLD SCHOOL MODELS FAIL
NAFTA’s Impact on Openness (percent change in trade/GDP ratios)
Source: Kehoe (2003, 2005). Similar for Europe: Corcos et al. (2012)
4
G. Felbermayr
5
TTIP: THE TRAGEDY OF NUMBERS
The profession has failed to convey its message
CEPR
Forecast
• In an ex ante analysis?
• NTBs: bottom-up, narrow
• Small, but realistic?
ifo-BM, KOF, …
Potential
• NTBs: top-down, broad
• TTIP not comparable?
• Large, but unrealistic?
Micro
• RoOs not captured
• No extensive margin
• Realistic ?
Macro
• RoOs: maximum strength
• Extensive margin
• Unrealistic?
Calibrated
• Parameters from various
sources
• Scenario: expert-driven
Estimated
• Full integration of theory,
estimation, and scenario
definition
G. Felbermayr
6
ESTIMATES OF TTIP‘s IMPACT
% of baseline real GDP/capita
CEPR / WTI
USA
EU
Austria
Germany
France
UK
Non-TTIP
Indonesia
China
World
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.9
0.0
0.3
Source: Felbermayr, 2016.
G. Felbermayr
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Aichele et
CEPR / WTI
al. (2014)
USA
EU
Austria
Germany
France
UK
Non-TTIP
Indonesia
China
World
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.9
0.0
0.3
2.7
2.1
2.4
2.6
2.2
2.3
0.4
-0.1
-0.3
1.3
G. Felbermayr
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Aichele et Egger et
CEPR / WTI
al. (2014) al. (2015)
USA
EU
Austria
Germany
France
UK
Non-TTIP
Indonesia
China
World
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.9
0.0
0.3
2.7
2.1
2.4
2.6
2.2
2.3
0.4
-0.1
-0.3
1.3
1.0
2.3
1.4
1.3
1.8
0.4
-0.3
G. Felbermayr
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Aichele et Egger et ifo-BM / Felbermayr
CEPR / WTI
al. (2014) al. (2015)
et al. (2015)
USA
EU
Austria
Germany
France
UK
Non-TTIP
Indonesia
China
World
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.9
0.0
0.3
2.7
2.1
2.4
2.6
2.2
2.3
0.4
-0.1
-0.3
1.3
1.0
2.3
1.4
1.3
1.8
0.4
-0.3
4.9
3.9
2.8
3.5
3.5
5.1
-0.9
-0.1
-0.5
1.6
G. Felbermayr
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Positive net global effects
+2,7%
+2,1%
Ø Non-TTIP: -0,03%
Source: ifo 2, Aichele et al., 2014.
G. Felbermayr
GROWTH VERSUS LEVEL EFFECTS
How DIHK and BDI got the interpretation wrong
11
G. Felbermayr
12
WHO UNDERSTANDS THE NUMERAIRE
CGE Models: only relative prices matter. TTIP not inflationary!
Real per capita income
0.6
0.3
Source: WTI (2016).
CPI
Ifo Institut
MORE MISUNDERSTANDINGS
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• Ifo assumes an overoptimistic scenario.
WRONG. The scenario is benchmarked to the average of other
agreements and describes, by construction, feasible potentials.
• Because current US-EU trade is low, welfare gains from TTIP cannot
be large.
WRONG. In all trade models, initial trade volumes correlate
negatively with the size of potential gains from trade.
• The size of ifo gains is implausibly high.
WRONG. Modern data-based research attributes the gains
from trade for Germany at 30-50%.
• Bilateral trade effects are inconsistent with the welfare effects.
WRONG. What matters for welfare is not the value (price x
quantity) of trade flows, but alone quantity and quality.
Ifo Institut
AND WHAT THE DISPUTE PRODUCED …
Source: November 18, 2014 by Russia Today
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Transatlantischer Freihandel: Gewinner, Verlierer und

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