Growing pains : binding constraints to productive - Inter

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Growing Pains
Inter-American Development Bank
1300 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20577
2009
Growing Pains 6-3-09 final.indd 430
6/4/09 4:21:11 PM
Growing Pains
Binding Constraints to Productive
Investment in Latin America
Manuel Agosin
Eduardo Fernández-Arias
and Fidel Jaramillo
Editors
©2009 Inter-American Development Bank
1300 New York Avenue, NW
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views and policy of the IDB or its Board
of Directors.
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the
Felipe Herrera Library
Growing pains : binding constraints to productive investments in
Latin America/Manuel Agosin, Eduardo Fernández-Arias, and Fidel
Jaramillo, editors.
p. cm.
ISBN: 1-59782-096-2
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Economic development—Latin America. 2. Exports—Latin America I. Agosin, Manuel. II. Fernández-Arias, Eduardo. III. Jaramillo,
Fidel. IV. Inter-American Development Bank. Research Dept.
HC130.E5 G59 2009
Table of Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Chapter 1.
Binding Constraints to Growth in Latin America:
An Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Manuel Agosin, Eduardo Fernández-Arias, and Fidel Jaramillo
Chapter 2.
Identifying the Most Binding Constraints
to Growth and Competitiveness in Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Gabriel Sánchez and Inés Butler
Chapter 3.
What is Impeding Growth in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111
Juan Blyde, Armando Castelar Pinheiro,
Christian Daude, and Eduardo Fernández- Arias
Chapter 4.
Ecuador: Binding Constraints to Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165
Simón Cueva, Vicente Albornoz, and Leopoldo Avellán
Chapter 5.
Tearing Down the Walls:
Growth and Inclusion in Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Daniel Artana, Sebastián Auguste, and Mario Cuevas
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 6.
Growth Diagnostic: Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .273
Ricardo Hausmann and Bailey Klinger
Chapter 7.
Nicaragua: Remembrance of Growth Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313
Manuel R. Agosin, Rodrigo Bolaños, and Félix Delgado
Chapter 8.
Trinidad and Tobago: Economic Growth in
a Dual Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .365
Daniel Artana, Sebastián Auguste, Ramiro Moya,
Sandra Sookram, and Patrick Watson
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .421
Foreword
During the past five years, most countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean registered significant economic growth rates and showed
a dynamism that has been absent for much of the past 25 years. Although the region has not been immune to the effects of the current
global financial crisis, economic reforms in recent decades have left
most countries better positioned to weather the storm. Despite these
positive signs, the region’s growth still lags behind other emerging
economies, varies widely within the region and is largely explained
by extremely favorable external conditions that have now taken a
dramatic turn for the worse.
In this context, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
joined with Harvard University’s Center for International Development and various research institutes in Latin America and the Caribbean in an ambitious research project to understand the factors
inhibiting higher levels of productive investment and rapid, sustainable growth rates in the region.
Following a methodology developed by Ricardo Hausmann,
Dani Rodrik and Andrés Velasco, the project included “growth diagnostics” for 14 countries in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago. The
focus was on identifying the binding constraint to growth, that is,
the barrier whose removal would yield the greatest benefit in terms
of growth. The results of this research study are compiled in this
book, which features seven of the country case studies.
This project was coordinated by Manuel Agosin, Eduardo
Fernández-Arias, and Fidel Jaramillo, who are also the editors of
vi
FOREWORD
the book. Ricardo Hausmann and Peter Montiel served as academic
advisors for the project. The editors would like to thank Christian
Daude and Alfie Ulloa, as well as the participants in the discussion
workshops in Washington on May 3–4 and September 20–21, 2007,
for all their contributions.
Eduardo Lora
Chief Economist and General Manager
of the Research Department a.i.
Preface
A typical medical researcher asks questions along these lines: does
molecule x affect the level of variable y in the average person of a
certain population? X could be salt and y could be blood pressure. X
could be an analgesic and y could be a headache. A typical medical
doctor asks the question: what should I give this particular patient
to make him healthier. The two questions are not totally unrelated,
but they are quite distinct.
Similarly, an economic researcher could ask the question, does
variable x affect the rate of growth of the average economy chosen
at random from a certain population? X could be the level of inflation, the average tariff rate, the level of spending in schools, or the
independence of the central bank. An economic advisor would ask
the question: for this particular country, at this particular time, what
should the government do to achieve sustained and shared growth?
Again, the two questions are not completely independent, but neither
are they the same question—not even by a very long shot.
Much of the empirical research on growth has been addressed
to the question of what variables are causally associated with growth
in the average country. A workhorse of this research agenda has been
the Barro-style (1991) cross-country growth regression. Millions of
regressions have been run with all sorts of explanatory variables,
including a wide variety of geographic, institutional, demographic,
and policy variables.
It seems obvious to take one of those estimated regressions and
use it to design a growth strategy for a country. Suppose the equation
had two variables that are difficult to change, such as geographic
latitude and the average age of the population. Disregard them and
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PREFACE
focus on those that seem more amenable to be influenced by policy.
Credit to the private sector as a share of GDP and secondary school
enrollment may be two variables that appear to be statistically and
economically significant and potentially amenable to policy change.
Why not base a growth strategy on a mix of education and finance
policies?
There are two reasons that might give pause. The first is that
governments do not decide either how much credit the private sector
will receive from private banks or how many students stick around
until they reach high school. The second reason is that while in the
average country a higher level of credit to the private sector may be
associated with higher growth, there is no certainty that a country
is an average country in this particularly respect. Similarly, while
aspirin may relieve pain for the average patient, a doctor might
think twice before giving it to a particular patient if he suffers from
stomach ulcers.
So, would this country be expected to be average in terms of
its reaction to credit easing or educational improvements? One quick
test is to see whether the country’s low private credit ratio is related
to low supply or low demand. One is distinguished from the other by
looking at the interest rate. If supply (demand) were limited, then
the interest rate would be high (low). If education were an important limitation on growth, returns to schooling would be high, as
estimated, for example, through a Mincer regression.
In other words, it is erroneous to start from the assumption
that if a variable is associated with growth in the average country,
then it would be associated with growth in this particular country.
This is just like realizing that an aspirin is unlikely to make an ulcer
patient feel any better, even if many other patients do appreciate its
effects.
This is the idea behind growth diagnostics. As a good doctor, it
is important to know much more about a patient than about the average man in the street. Do not suppress information about a patient
when interpreting evidence coming from other unknown people. In
other words, just because that information was not available for all
PREFACE
the other patients in the regression, do not disregard it when thinking about a particular patient.
Anna Karenina starts with the famous line: “Happy families are
all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Paraphrasing Tolstoy: All rich countries are the same; each poor country may
be held back by very different things. The point of growth diagnostics
is to find out what these are, in a particular country context.
The right way to start is by obtaining as much information as
possible. A poor country is not expected to have rosy indicators;
but not all dimensions are expected to be equally binding. Yes,
infrastructure is substandard, banks are not Swiss, and schools
leave a lot to be desired. This does not mean that all are equally
binding. Education may be poor but other things may be so much
worse that high-skilled individuals are either leaving the country
or driving taxis. Banks may look small, but they are full of liquidity and desperate to find sound customers to lend money to at very
sensible interest rates. Why there are so few takers may be the
question to ask.
So, if all possible constraints are not equally binding, which
ones might be more binding? Which one, if relaxed, might allow for
the biggest bang for the effort? This becomes a question worthy
of Sherlock Holmes. And it becomes an exciting whodunit for the
economic analyst.
Here is where some tricks of the trade become useful. First, if
something is a binding constraint on growth, it should be expected
to have a high actual or shadow price. If education is binding, the
returns to those few lucky people that received a good education
should be very high. If instead, the highly educated are leaving the
country, something else must be even more binding.
Second, movements on the presumptive binding constraint
should show up in movements of the aggregate growth rate. For
example, if the hypothesis is that availability of finance is the binding constraint, changes in the observed market interest rates should
be reflected in the rates of growth or investment. But if growth and
investment fall at precisely the same time that interest rates are
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x
PREFACE
falling and banks are full of liquidity, it would be hard to argue that
lack of loanable funds is the problem.
Third, if something is really holding a society back, members of
the society must be finding ways around it. If poor provision of property rights is the binding constraint, then people would flock around
those with political power and offer them shares in any new endeavor
in exchange for protection. If finance is the binding constraint, then
those with profitable activities would become conglomerates that
reinvest their profits in all sorts of activities.
Fourth, it is instructive to reflect upon what underpins the
performance of the most successful parts of an economy. In what
resources are they least intensive? If the question is why there are
so few animals in the Sahara, for example, it helps to note that the
few animals found there tend to be camels and not hippos. The camel
can be expected to thrive in areas where water is scarce. It is safe
to infer that the few things that survive in the Sahara are those that
are least intensive in the resource that is missing: water.
Fifth, it has become common practice in economics to blame
people’s credibility and expectations for the way things turn out in
life. If a country is not growing, it is easy to argue that people do not
invest because they do not believe that the future will be as good as
the present. Since it is impossible to know what people think about
the future, this appears to be, at first sight, an explanation that is
plausible but hard to verify. However, the experienced Sherlock would
realize that if the argument is based on the idea that investors are
scared by the possibility that something bad might happen in the
future, it is important to check that profits today are reasonably high.
So, current earnings would be expected to be fine, but the price/
earnings ratio to be low. This would signal that today’s earnings are
not expected to last.
Finally, a constant cannot explain a variable. China’s Confucian
history and cultural tradition cannot be used simultaneously to explain
why growth there has been so high since 1978 and so low from 1500
to 1978. The difference between Latin America’s current low savings rate relative to East Asia cannot be explained by longstanding
PREFACE
cultural differences because the savings rates in Latin America in
the 1960s were substantially higher than those in East Asia.
Armed with these and other tricks, the economic Sherlock
would use all of his knowledge and skills to look for plausible binding constraints. Once he has stumbled onto a possible candidate,
it is useful to try to posit a syndrome: that is, an overall explanation
or story that can account for why that particular constraint binds.
This syndrome should explain the observed symptoms but should
also have some other testable implications. The good analyst would
check for these implications in order to convince himself that he has
a robustly tested explanation for what is wrong with the country he
is examining.
Take the case of Brazil. Interest rates have been incredibly high
for much of the recent past. The Central Bank of Brazil thinks that in
order to keep inflation from creeping above the target, it is forced to
set interest rates at levels that would generate a profound recession in
any other country. One can only imagine how much Brazilians would
invest if they faced the interest rates paid by Chileans or Salvadorans.
Thus, it would appear that, in spite of low educational attainment,
poor infrastructure, and incredibly high tax rates, Brazilians would
be happy to invest more if they could obtain funds at reasonable rates.
To prevent them from doing so in order to keep aggregate demand
and inflation in check, the Central Bank is forced to set very high
rates. Why is this the case? My personal view is that the overall story
of Brazil starts with a government that collects the highest level of
taxes as a share of GDP of any developing country and is unable to
save any of it. The overall fiscal deficit of the country has exceeded
the dismal rate of public investment, meaning that fiscal savings
are negative in spite of surprisingly low public investment and high
tax revenues. Moreover, the tax and spending structure is such that
those with a capacity to save are taxed and the money is transferred
to pensioners who have a much higher propensity to spend. So, the
government starves the economy of savings.
This is not the conclusion reached by the authors of the chapter
on Brazil in this volume. Why? The deep answer is that growth diag-
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xii
PREFACE
nostics is still a young practice with evolving methods and limited
tools. Moreover, it resembles more the case of a civil suit than a
criminal case. In the former, the decision criterion is “the preponderance of the evidence.” In the latter, it is “beyond reasonable doubt.”
A policymaker cannot avoid making decisions, and will have to do so
with the best available information and analysis—even if he would
have wished to be more certain than he is. Economic analysis in the
real world seldom provides enough information to satisfy all doubts.
Cogent arguments may exist for an alternative story and it may be
hard to tell them apart. The role of the responsible analyst is neither
to hide the doubts so as to create a wrong sense of infallibility nor to
avoid decisions. Instead, he should state the story he thinks is most
plausible, describe the alternative stories that may account for the
known facts, and try to think through the strategies that could tell
them apart. In addition, he could think of policy interventions that
are expected to be appropriate for each scenario and ideally find a
strategy that may work under all the possible alternatives.
In the case of Brazil, it seems plausible to think that if the savings constraint were lifted, the economy would accelerate and soon
the country would hit the infrastructure constraint, given that the
government has invested so little in the sector over the years. Thus,
a strategy that would raise public savings would be useful whether
the constraint is aggregate savings or infrastructure. For the story
based on low aggregate savings, the ideal use of the increased public
savings would be to reduce the public deficit and let interest rates
come down. This would trigger more private investment. If the
problem were infrastructure, one would expect to use the increased
public savings for that purpose. If the policymaker is uncertain, he
would split the difference.
The approach ends up being very Bayesian. Look for symptoms
or signals that may be orienting. Look at all prices and quantities
available. To interpret the information, it is useful to remember
the Bayesian equation. Start from certain prior beliefs of what the
problem is; then find a symptom. Update beliefs about what the right
story is depending on the ratio of the conditional probability that
PREFACE
the symptom would be observed if the story is right relative to the
unconditional probability that the signal is observed.
Consider an example. Suppose the question is whether a particular air passenger is a terrorist. The test is whether he is carrying
a bomb. A typical passenger would not be expected to be carrying a
bomb, but there is a very high probability that a terrorist would be
carrying bombs. Bayes’ formula says that beliefs should be updated
according to the ratio of the probability that a terrorist carries a bomb
relative to the unconditional probability that any random person is
carrying a bomb. Since priors are such that a normal passenger is
not expected to be carrying a bomb but a terrorist is expected to be
carrying a bomb, then finding a person with a bomb significantly
changes the view as to whether he is a terrorist or not. By contrast,
many terrorists have beards, but so do many nonterrorists. Thus,
finding a person with a beard does not change priors by as much as
finding him with a bomb because the difference in the probabilities
along the hypothesis is much smaller.
Unfortunately, in real life it is difficult to find single symptoms
that pin down a diagnostic unequivocally. One must rely on all the
signals possible and try to make the most of it. Suppose insufficient
aggregate savings is the suspected constraint to growth in a particular
country. For this to be true, lending interest rates should be high,
indicating that society is willing to pay a high price for more of the
missing factor. But interest rates can be high for many reasons. For
it to be a constraint in aggregate savings, the deposit interest rates
or the rates paid by the government on its debt should also be high.
Otherwise, the problem might be bad financial intermediation. But if
aggregate savings are low, why can’t an investor get funds from the
international market? Why doesn’t the country borrow more from
abroad to complement its meager domestic savings? The answer
may be that the country as a whole already did borrow too much
and that it has reached a credit ceiling. But then one would like to
confirm this by showing that either the current account deficit or
the accumulated debt is high and that country risk is particularly
high. Moreover, one would want to show that movements in this
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PREFACE
constraint are reflected in the level of domestic investment. This is
what one finds in the current decade for Brazil, where interest rates
skyrocketed in 2002, causing a collapse in subsequent investment
and growth. By contrast, in the same period, interest rates in Mexico
fell, but so did investment. Brazil and Mexico would be expected to
be quite different in this regard. And yet, this may not be enough
to settle the issue, and more sources of evidence might be useful to
further corroborate the story.
I find it useful to start a growth diagnostic with a good description of the growth process that includes not just the long view but
also the fluctuations, as these may be indicative of movements in
the binding constraint. I then like to move down a certain decision
tree, which may be similar to that proposed in Hausmann, Rodrik
and Velasco (2005) or some other version constructed ad hoc for the
issue in question. After I locate where I think I am in the decision
tree, I like to formulate a syndrome: a story that helps explain what
the binding constraint is, and also what causes it. Savings may be
the binding constraint because the government overborrows. Such
a syndrome would predict that savings is the binding constraint but
would also have testable implications about a country’s fiscal indicators. It also would suggest a political economy story behind this
fact. So, once I posit a syndrome, I like to check for the additional
testable implications that emerge from it.
This book is a collection of efforts at applying this approach to
a set of Latin American countries. It is interesting on two grounds.
First, it is informative about the countries in question. Second, it is
useful because it expands the set of tools and practices of the method.
As such, it is an important contribution in both dimensions. However,
this effort is still a work in progress. Only through further practice can
the more complete set of tools that this task requires be developed.
But this book is an excellent contribution to that agenda.
Ricardo Hausmann
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
CHAPTER 1
Binding Constraints
to Growth in Latin America:
An Overview
Manuel Agosin, Eduardo Fernández-Arias,
and Fidel Jaramillo*
The Region’s Growth Record in a Comparative Setting
Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean has fallen far behind
that of the fast-growing countries of Asia.1 Many analysts attribute
the shortfall to differences in investment rates. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP in Latin
America has been considerably lower than that of East Asia and the
Pacific. Moreover, over the past two decades, investment in Latin
America as a percentage of GDP has fallen below the levels of the
1970s. Investment in 2006 was 5 percentage points below its peak
level 30 years earlier. When compared to East Asia and the Pacific,
the contrast is even sharper. Even at the height of the financial
crisis during the late 1990s, investment in East Asia and the Pacific
exceeded that in Latin America by 10 percentage points. At present,
the gap is still larger, as average investment in Asia is almost double
that of Latin America.
* Manuel Agosin is with the Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile.
Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Fidel Jaramillo are with the Inter-American Development Bank.
1
Unless otherwise specified, the term “Latin America” will refer henceforth to
both Latin America and the Caribbean.
MANUEL AGOSIN, EDUARDO FERNÁNDEZ-ARIAS, AND FIDEL JARAMILLO
FIGURE 1.1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, East Asia & Pacific and
Latin America, 1970–2006
(percent of GDP at 2000 prices)
40
East Asia & Pacific
Latin America & Caribbean
35
30
25
20
15
5
1970–9
26.0
21.6
1980–9
28.4
20.1
1990–9
31.9
18.9
2000–6
33.5
18.2
1994
Region
East Asia & Pacific
Latin America & Caribbean
1990
Average by Decade
10
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1992
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
0
1970
2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Penn World Tables and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
Clearly, a major reason why Asia’s growth rate has outpaced
Latin America’s relates to Latin America’s poor investment performance. This book focuses on this link between investment and
growth, explaining what is holding back investment, particularly
private, productive investment. While public investment has varied
significantly in the region due to its more volatile growth pattern,
the big difference between Asia and Latin America lies not in the
rate of public investment but in the rate of private investment. During the current decade, the ratio of private investment to GDP has
averaged about 32 percent in Asia, compared to only 14 percent in
Latin America.
In part as a result of lackluster private investment, the growth
of output per worker in Latin America has lagged behind that of the
rest of the world. Figure 1.2 summarizes the evolution of GDP per
worker for the typical country over 45 years (1966 to 2000), using
ten-year rolling averages to smooth out cyclical fluctuations. Even
leaving aside the 1980s, a decade lost to the debt crisis, growth in
worker productivity has always come up short of the rates in the rest
of the world, including the 1960s and 1970s, when growth was more
robust. The impression that old times were better tells a misleading
BINDING CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW
FIGURE 1.2 Growth of GDP Per Worker, Latin America and
the Rest of the World, 1966–2000
(percent)
4%
Latin America
Rest of the World
3%
2%
1%
0%
–1%
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
–2%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Penn World Tables and WDI. Ten-year rolling averages are used to smooth out cyclical fluctuations.
story of economic success in the region. Latin America grew quickly
when the entire world grew quickly; but when compared to growth in
the rest of the world (or other reasonable benchmarks), the region’s
growth has been consistently subpar.
In the long term, incomes in Latin American countries have
failed to catch up with those of the world’s leading economies. Table
1.1 shows per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in current U.S.
dollars as a percentage of U.S. per capita GDP for the larger Latin
American countries from 1960 to 2006. Data for the fast-growing
Asian exporters of manufactures and Ireland and Mauritius are
shown as benchmarks. 2
The results are so strong that they hold even when taking into
account possible measurement errors derived from constructing
2
Ireland is a suitable benchmark for the more developed countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay), while Mauritius provides an interesting comparison for countries in Central America and the
Caribbean. Like Central America and the Caribbean, the Mauritian economy was
based until the late 1970s on the export of a single commodity (sugar). Since then,
it has become an exporter of manufactures, first of garments in export processing
zones (EPZ) and later of more sophisticated goods. Like its counterparts in Central
America and the Caribbean, tourism plays an important economic role.
3
4
TABLE 1.1 Lag in Per Capita Incomes in Latin America and the Caribbean,
1960–2006
(GDP per capita, PPP, as a percentage of U.S. GDP per capita)
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2006
Latin America and the Caribbean
Trinidad & Tobago
41.9
Chile
39.5
Argentina
60.2
Uruguay
46.9
Panama
19.9
Costa Rica
34.0
Venezuela
42.1
Mexico
28.5
Dominican Republic
17.2
Brazil
20.3
Colombia
20.9
Peru
24.2
Ecuador
20.9
El Salvador
25.1
Paraguay
17.3
Jamaica
26.3
Guyana
—
Guatemala
21.0
Nicaragua
32.2
Bolivia
17.3
Honduras
12.5
Haiti
—
40.8
37.9
55.1
36.2
24.9
31.8
36.8
28.9
16.0
23.2
19.2
27.5
18.1
23.0
16.3
24.4
16.8
19.4
32.5
15.3
10.6
9.2
83.2
31.2
50.1
38.5
25.8
31.6
41.4
34.7
18.8
32.0
22.2
24.3
28.8
20.3
22.0
16.6
15.8
18.5
23.4
15.4
10.9
10.4
39.5
26.4
30.3
29.5
21.1
22.8
29.3
25.3
15.3
25.7
19.6
13.3
17.9
13.1
18.7
16.7
7.3
12.5
14.2
9.9
8.5
6.9
43.0
33.3
33.0
31.3
23.1
24.3
21.3
23.5
18.9
20.9
17.7
12.2
12.6
13.8
14.4
13.2
10.9
11.2
10.0
8.5
6.5
6.0
64.1
37.5
35.9
30.0
26.5
25.2
23.6
23.1
21.3
21.1
18.1
13.5
13.2
13.2
12.8
12.0
10.9
10.5
9.8
8.7
6.6
5.1
Asia
Hong Kong
Singapore
Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
China
Indonesia
India
23.4
31.3
10.7
15.3
9.0
3.4
5.4
6.7
38.7
36.1
14.2
13.7
11.4
2.8
4.7
6.4
61.7
58.8
21.1
24.2
13.7
3.8
9.4
6.0
84.2
71.8
38.2
24.5
18.8
6.3
10.6
6.9
79.3
85.7
45.7
33.2
18.8
11.6
11.0
7.7
90.4
81.2
51.4
37.4
21.9
17.6
11.9
10.0
Other benchmark countries
Ireland
Mauritius
40.7
29.1
44.5
23.0
47.9
27.1
51.8
36.0
72.6
44.0
80.0
49.0
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Penn World Tables and WDI.
Note: Countries are ordered according to GDP per capita in 2006.
—not available
national accounts at the individual country level or translating into
internationally comparable figures. According to this measure, no
Latin American country, with the possible exception of Trinidad &
Tobago, has been gaining on U.S. income levels. Even Chile’s performance, one of the best in Latin America since 1990, pales over the
longer run when compared to Asian country performance or even to
Mauritius. In 1960, Chile’s GDP per capita was three to four times
that of Korea’s (in current PPP dollars). By 2006 Korea’s GDP per
capita exceeded half of the U.S. level, while Chile’s GDP per capita
was barely 37 percent of the U.S. level and even lower than it had
been almost half a century earlier.
A comparison between Chile and Ireland is equally instructive.
Though in 1960 the countries had similar per capita GDPs, now Ireland’s GDP per capita is four-fifths the level of U.S. per capita GDP.
Comparing Ireland and Argentina is even more dispiriting. In 1960,
Argentina and Ireland had per capita incomes equivalent to 60 and
40 percent of the United States’ income, respectively. Argentina’s
per capita income is now less than half that of Ireland’s.
Comparisons between the Central American countries and
Mauritius yield similar results. Countries with initially similar resource endowments and economic structures ended up with very
different levels of income per capita, with Latin American countries
at the lower end of the spectrum. Overall, Latin American growth has
been very disappointing. This book attempts to answer the question:
what is holding back private investment and growth?
Table 1.2 examines GDP and export growth rates and presents
a picture of long-term performance. Growth rates of GDP and exports in Latin America have indeed lagged behind those of the fastgrowing Asian exporters of manufactures. GDP and export growth
rates in the Asian countries have doubled those in Latin America in
both periods shown in the table: 1961–90 and 1991–2006. These two
periods contain years of poor Latin American performance (the “lost
decade” of the 1980s) and years of slow growth in Asia (the years
following the Asian crisis of 1997–98). Nonetheless, even taking
into account crises of varied origins, growth in the Asian countries
5
6
TABLE 1.2 Growth of GDP and Exports in Latin America and Benchmark Countries
(annual percentage change)
GDP
Export volume
1961–90
1991–2006
1961–90
1991–2006
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
3.4
1.9
2.3
5.4
3.7
4.8
4.8
5.3
4.5
2.6
4.0
0.6
1.4
4.2
1.9
5.1
2.2
4.6
5.4
2.8
2.7
1.5
2.9
3.5
4.2
3.6
2.7
5.6
3.1
5.1
5.5
3.1
3.8
3.6
3.6
-0.7
3.6
1.9
3.1
3.3
5.0
2.2
4.3
5.3
2.8
3.0
4.7
6.0
2.9
8.2
7.1
5.3
7.9
3.9
7.4
3.5
5.0
–1.6
—
5.1
—
8.6
4.4
1.6
8.2
2.4
4.4
5.5
–0.7
6.7
7.1
6.6
8.0
8.0
5.2
9.0
6.0
6.4
9.3
3.6
11.2
—
3.3
—
10.4
8.4
3.7
4.4
8.6
6.9
5.9
1.5
Asia
China
Hong Kong, China
India
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand
7.1
6.8
8.6
4.3
6.2
8.1
6.8
8.7
7.7
6.1
10.2
4.7
6.2
4.6
5.6
6.3
6.5
4.8
10.2
7.4
11.6
7.1
5.1
20.6
8.2
—
11.5
11.6
17.5
9.4
14.0
7.1
13.9
9.9
—
9.1
Ireland
Mauritius
4.2
5.9
6.5
4.8
8.5
9.2
12.5
4.5
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on WDI.
Note: Growth rates of exports refer to exports of goods and services, in terms of volume. Regional averages are unweighted.
— not available
always outstrips that of Latin America countries. While growth of
output and exports accelerated in the latter period in several Latin
American countries, they remained well below the averages recorded
for most Asian countries.
The country studies included in this book address the issues
of growth and export composition in detail in the context of evaluating the ability of countries to identify and develop new competitive
activities, or pursue intensive self-discovery. Self-discovery refers to
the efforts of entrepreneurs to discover profitable opportunities by
producing goods or services that are new to the country in question,
although they are produced elsewhere in the world (Hausmann and
Rodrik, 2003). As discussed later in this chapter and in the country
studies, the paucity of self-discovery is a significant constraint to
growth in several countries.
A starting point is a useful, albeit imperfect, approximation of the
extent to which Latin American countries have been lagging behind
Asian countries in the realm of self-discovery and export concentration. As shown in Table 1.3, Asian countries have considerably more
diversified export baskets than most Latin American countries. This
is due partly to the heavy commodity concentration of exports in
Latin America and the greater presence of manufactures in Asia. But
that fact in itself is interesting to note. Manufactures per se tend to
be more diversified than commodities. However, there are countries
such as Australia and New Zealand, whose exports are also dominated
by agricultural goods (and minerals, in the case of Australia), and
that, at the same time, export a much greater variety of goods than
most Latin American countries. The figures on export concentration
for these two natural resource–based developed economies suggest
that it is possible to move away from the heavy export concentration
that characterizes commodity exporters toward a more diversified
export pattern dominated by more sophisticated goods, even if they
are related to a primary products base. It also suggests that vigorous
self-discovery is not the monopoly of manufacturing exporters.
Not only has income growth been slower in Latin America than
in Asia, but it has also been more volatile, judging by the coefficient
7
8
TABLE 1.3 Export Concentration: Latin America, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand
(Hirschman-Herfindahl Indexes estimated at the three-digit SITC level)
1995
2000
2003
2006
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
0.30
0.13
0.22
0.09
0.31
0.24
0.30
0.22
0.38
0.35
0.28
0.38
0.54
0.48
0.12
0.27
0.36
0.34
0.24
0.36
0.17
0.52
0.29
0.14
0.20
0.09
0.29
0.30
0.30
0.23
0.45
0.21
0.22
0.36
0.30
0.55
0.14
0.32
0.27
0.34
0.23
0.40
0.18
0.62
0.29
0.16
0.26
0.09
0.26
0.21
0.26
0.20
0.41
0.12
0.15
0.32
0.23
0.64
0.13
0.22
0.39
0.42
0.25
0.35
0.19
0.80
0.31
0.13
0.40
0.09
0.39
0.21
0.23
0.16
0.53
0.15
0.17
0.29
0.28
0.58
0.15
0.29
0.36
0.32
0.26
0.42
0.23
0.91
Asia
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
0.14
0.07
0.09
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.18
0.22
0.11
0.09
0.16
0.08
0.11
0.13
0.13
0.16
0.22
0.28
0.17
0.11
0.15
0.10
0.13
0.12
0.12
0.15
0.22
0.25
0.15
0.09
0.17
0.11
0.19
0.16
0.19
0.16
0.19
0.27
0.13
0.14
Other
Australia
New Zealand
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.19
0.14
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2007.
(http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=1687).
Note: Regional averages are unweighted.
of variation of annual growth rates. 3 From the data in Table 1.4,
it would seem that higher output volatility is strongly associated
with greater volatility in the terms of trade. Access to international
financing, as measured by the ratio of the financial account of the
balance of payments to the broad money supply (M2), has also
been more volatile in Latin America than in Asia or the developed
countries (see Table 1.5).4 In part, the higher volatility of growth in
Latin America than in Asia may also be the consequence of more
frequent crises.
The evidence shows that Latin America and the Caribbean
has been the region with the highest incidence of output collapses
in the developing world over the last 50 years (see Blyde, Daude
and Fernández-Arias, 2008). Furthermore, growth spells have been
shorter and frequently were unsustainable (see Berg, Ostry and
Zettelmeyer, 2008). It is highly likely that output instability is associated with lower long-term growth. The channels through which
volatility affects growth could include hysteresis effects such as the
destruction of installed capacity, which is difficult or impossible to
rebuild, and the deskilling of the labor force through protracted
unemployment.
The shortfall in growth rates in Latin America relative to the
rest of the world and, particularly, to the fast-growing countries of
Asia, is due not only to lower investment rates but also to differences
in the growth of total factor productivity (TFP), which measures
the efficiency with which factors of production (capital and labor)
are transformed into final output. Apart from its technological com-
3
When it comes to output growth, in order to come up with a meaningful indicator of volatility, the standard deviation is normalized by the average growth rate.
This is because there are significant differences between countries in average
long-run growth. By contrast, the average change in the terms of trade over long
periods should be zero. Technically, the change in the terms of trade, as a relative price, is, in the long run, a stationary variable with zero mean. Therefore, an
appropriate volatility measure for this variable is just the standard deviation of
annual changes.
4
See also Broner and Rigobón (2006) and Agosin and Hauita (2008).
9
10
TABLE 1.4 Measures of GDP and Terms of Trade Volatility
Coefficient of variation
of GDP growth
1961–90
1991–2006
Standard deviation
of terms of trade change
1961–90
1991–2006
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
137
286
188
88
146
39
77
121
84
196
77
940
274
79
295
73
362
110
75
200
193
278
145
94
160
41
72
57
85
54
62
102
52
27
105
–634
66
125
102
68
54
108
85
78
204
245
16.1
5.1
11.7
14.5
6.6
13.9
14.5
14.2
14.1
35.2
36.9
—
13.4
16.7
—
14.6
22.3
8.3
24.7
10.2
13.1
12.3
20.0
8.8
4.8
11.2
18.8
10.7
7.7
5.4
5.2
10.2
10.4
8.4
1.2
5.9
11.2
7.1
2.7
11.1
9.6
8.4
10.0
8.4
4.8
21.0
Asia
China
Hong Kong, China
India
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand
58
134
55
78
53
40
42
48
34
62
20
76
37
112
70
71
61
103
7.4
8.2
1.8
12.5
12.9
3.4
10.8
2.3
7.1
5.7
3.5
1.1
9.4
19.4
4.2
2.7
1.4
3.4
55
37
44
22
3.0
11.0
2.9
5.0
Ireland
Mauritius
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on WDI data.
Note: Coefficient of variation of GDP growth: standard deviation of average annual growth rate, divided by average annual growth rate,
multiplied by 100. Standard deviation of terms of trade change: taken over annual percentage changes in the terms of trade. All regional
averages are unweighted.
TABLE 1.5 Level and Volatility of the Financial Account of the Balance of Payments
in Emerging and Developed Economies, 1975–2004
(financial flows as a share of M2)
1975–82
1983–89
1990–7
1998–2004
Region and country
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
Latin America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
18.6
1.0
32.3
29.2
12.3
13.7
22.8
27.9
16.6
26.9
8.1
14.1
13.9
7.1
8.0
23.0
10.7
21.5
12.4
7.2
11.1
28.7
17.9
5.4
–8.2
–8.2
–10.2
–12.4
15.4
–17.4
4.3
–38.9
–3.3
–14.3
–10.3
5.5
16.3
18.8
18.8
20.0
10.5
6.0
6.2
36.8
9.1
26.7
19.5
6.6
9.1
13.1
5.1
17.5
15.6
3.8
2.0
10.2
16.7
–4.6
18.8
2.1
12.1
23.6
7.6
6.6
16.1
6.6
8.4
13.4
13.8
13.1
18.3
5.4
2.2
–14.4
6.9
4.4
5.2
7.3
12.3
–25.8
12.5
10.1
7.5
–1.2
15.9
37.1
7.7
2.3
6.2
5.2
13.3
78.1
1.9
9.4
3.0
10.8
Asia
Bangladesh
China
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Turkey
16.6
21.0
—
—
19.4
11.7
25.2
19.9
13.8
5.1
6.0
7.7
—
—
6.7
7.2
8.3
3.1
4.5
4.5
7.7
13.1
1.9
19.2
–0.1
8.2
7.4
8.6
8.0
3.3
7.7
4.6
2.1
11.2
11.2
11.9
10.0
8.8
4.6
5.0
6.9
4.5
3.1
7.9
4.8
11.1
16.3
–2.6
10.7
6.2
5.9
3.9
2.1
3.9
4.6
7.4
3.8
9.5
8.2
9.6
–3.9
–0.7
0.9
–7.4
1.5
–4.8
–3.8
–14.7
–6.6
0.8
4.0
1.8
1.0
5.9
3.3
2.1
3.3
5.6
3.7
9.3
Developed countries
Germany
Austria
Finland
France
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Australia
Canada
Denmark
Japan
Norway
2.4
0.4
2.8
5.6
0.3
2.2
–1.9
3.1
7.4
7.2
8.5
–0.4
8.5
3.5
0.9
2.4
6.1
1.2
3.5
2.7
1.1
5.4
4.8
3.6
1.3
10.2
2.2
–4.0
0.3
5.2
0.9
2.8
–3.2
3.1
12.5
4.9
7.2
–2.5
3.4
3.3
2.9
1.1
5.7
1.1
2.5
2.8
3.4
3.4
3.7
5.2
1.1
5.7
1.3
0.8
1.6
1.5
–0.8
1.4
–3.3
2.6
6.6
2.3
–0.2
–1.6
–2.0
3.2
2.6
1.3
8.6
2.1
4.6
1.5
3.1
2.0
3.1
5.5
0.7
6.1
–0.5
–1.0
0.5
–10.9
–2.2
–0.8
–2.2
1.1
6.6
–2.0
–0.9
–0.9
–11.9
3.2
1.9
1.8
5.4
2.5
3.1
1.4
2.8
2.5
1.8
5.7
1.2
12.0
(continued on next page)
11
12
TABLE 1.5 Level and Volatility of the Financial Account of the Balance of Payments
in Emerging and Developed Economies, 1975–2004 (continued)
(financial flows as a share of M2)
1975–82
1983–89
1990–7
1998–2004
Region and country
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
New Zealand
United States
United Kingdom
–2.2
–0.9
–1.9
6.3
1.1
3.0
–0.1
2.7
0.8
3.9
2.0
4.5
5.9
2.5
1.2
4.1
1.1
1.5
3.4
5.8
1.5
0.9
2.5
0.9
Source: Agosin and Huaita (2008).
Note: All regional averages and standard deviations are unweighted. Countries included in Latin America and Asia are only those that
are engaged with private international capital markets. The average for developed countries includes Greece, Portugal, and Switzerland,
data for which are not shown for reasons of space.
— not available
ponent, productivity is also affected by the efficiency with which
markets work and are served by public services: external constraints
on technologically advanced firms may also produce inefficient aggregate results in terms of low TFP. With some wrinkles, TFP is
calculated in a fairly standard way (see Appendix A for technical
details). Figures 1.3A and 1.3B show the growth gap in output per
worker and in TFP in the average Latin American country relative
to the rest of the world (as in Figure 1.2) and also to the typical developed country. Relative to the rest of the world and to developed
countries, factor accumulation has been consistently slower over
time, but its direct effect in growth accounting terms would explain
only about half a percentage point of the annual growth gap, which
is around 40 percent and 30 percent of the total shortfall, respectively. This result of the primacy of slower productivity growth as
an explanatory growth factor in an accounting sense also holds for
the most recent period (the decade around 2000) and for almost
all countries, including the faster-growing Chile (see Figure 1.4
for a country break-down relative to the typical country in the rest
of the world).
Productivity and factor accumulation interact in complex ways
that are important to understand in order to find the causes of their
FIGURE 1.3 Average Growth Gaps between Latin America and other Countries,
1961–2004
a. Rest of the World
0.0%
–0.5%
–1.0%
–1.5%
–2.0%
–2.5%
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1968
1966
–3.5%
1970
$ŷ
$Â
–3.0%
b. Developed
0.0%
–0.5%
–1.0%
–1.5%
–2.0%
–2.5%
$ŷ
$Â
–3.0%
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
–3.5%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Penn World Tables and World Bank, World Development Report, various years.
joint underperformance. On the one hand, factor accumulation is
important for the evolution of productivity and thus entails an indirect
effect on growth. For example, the misallocation of investment due
to policy distortions or lack of policies supporting socially productive investments entails low aggregate output and therefore low TFP.
Furthermore, new technology is embodied in new capital vintages,
which are therefore key for TFP growth. This line of reasoning justifies a focus on the process of investment even when low TFP growth
is a clear symptom. On the other hand, low aggregate productivity
(and low public investment and human capital) leads to low returns
to investing physical capital and lower private investment. While in
this case the driver of growth underperformance is a productivity
13
14
FIGURE 1.4 Growth and TFP Gaps by Country Relative to Rest of the World
(1995–2004)
Dominican Republic
Chile
Costa Rica
Panama
Bolivia
Barbados
Peru
Brazil
Honduras
El Salvador
LatinAmerica
Nicaragua
Mexico
Colombia
Guatemala
Uruguay
Jamaica
Ecuador
Argentina
Paraguay
Venezuela
ˆ
–3.5% –3.0% –2.5% –2.0% –1.5% –1.0% –0.5%
$Â
$ŷ
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Penn World Tables and WDI.
shortfall rather than inefficient investment, the root of the problem
may be better identified by looking at its implications for private
investment. As explained in detail in the next section, the basic
methodology utilized in the country studies relies on the power of
analyzing impediments and disincentives to private investment to
find the overall constraints to growth.
Summarizing, long-term growth in Latin American countries
has been relatively poor in comparison with more dynamic regions
and individual countries, due to both slower productivity growth
and factor accumulation. Countries in Latin America are not closing
the gap that separates them from the developed countries; export
growth has been modest in comparison with other regions of the
world; their export structures tend to remain concentrated in primary products instead of becoming more sophisticated as in more
dynamic countries; the terms of trade and financial conditions are
more unstable than in other emerging economies; and output is
highly volatile and prone to collapses.
Growth Diagnostics Methodology
The country studies in this book seek to understand the underlying constraints to economic growth in individual Latin American
countries. In a recent paper, Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (HRV,
2005) proposed a new approach to inform policy-oriented research on
how to foster a country’s economic growth. They call this approach
growth diagnostics methodology (GDM). They focus on what they
call binding constraints to growth: that is, the constraints whose
removal would have the largest payoff in terms of growth.
This binding constraints approach posits that the development
process is a succession of bottlenecks, which evolve over time as they
are overcome, leading to a different set of binding constraints. In the
normal course of successful economic reform, binding constraints
are removed and the economy grows until a new binding constraint
limits it. Moreover, even when no binding constraint is removed,
political/economic events or shocks can be such that new binding
constraints supersede earlier ones.
As a consequence, it is argued, cross-country growth regressions fail to deliver adequate diagnoses because the marginal effect
of traditional explanatory variables vary dramatically, depending
on interactions and country circumstances that cannot be captured
within the assumptions of separability and linearity needed to
implement this statistical method. Furthermore, the measurability
required in regression exercises forces the analyst to use outcome
variables as regressors, which cannot be translated into policy recommendations unambiguously. In addition, simple growth accounting
suffers from an extreme form of this weakness: even leaving aside
well-known measurement errors, the diagnostic information it provides does not allow the analyst to pinpoint underlying problems
and policy solutions.
The conventional way of diagnosing a country’s inability to
raise investment and grow faster may be conveniently labeled the
“kitchen sink” or “laundry list” approach. This approach to reforms
does not pay enough attention to interactions and sequencing; even
15
16
if validated by serious growth regression exercises, reforms are
bound to fail. In the best case, they would deliver little; in the worst
case, they could lead to counterproductive policies. In this view,
the implementation of the Washington Consensus was doomed
from the start. By contrast, the growth diagnostics approach calls
for country-specific analyses and conclusions, for country-tailored
“clinical economics,” searching for specific binding constraints and
the corresponding policies to relax them.
The discussion turns now to the methodology utilized in the
country studies included in this book to identify the most severe constraints to growth (actual and potential) in the spirit of the binding
constraints approach, primarily based on HRV and supplemented
by other new methodological developments.
This book shows that the growth diagnostics methodology does
yield innovative growth diagnoses. The most successful studies posit
and test a syndrome underlying the observed binding constraints in
the context of a rich narrative of the growth process. 5 The diagnostic
work in these studies starts from an examination of impediments to
growth by reviewing their proximate determinants. It then assesses
their relative importance in order to focus on the most informative
constraints in the diagnosis and most promising for policy action,
and finally identifies the specific distortions that lie behind these key
impediments or binding constraints. Below an outline of the kinds
of techniques utilized in the country studies to implement this approach is presented. While these techniques fall short of constituting
a full-fledged methodology, they do provide tools and a discipline for
examining the growth policy problem of countries.
The key question that the methodology tries to answer is why a
country exhibits low rates of private investment, or more generally,
what it would take to obtain higher productive private investment.
5
The notion of “syndrome” is taken from medical terminology. A set of causes
may be considered a syndrome if one is unlikely to observe its effects when it is
absent. On the other hand, one is highly likely to observe its effects when the
causes it describes are present.
Starting from a growth model, HRV derive an equation for the (constrained) balanced growth path and for the return on capital.
The balanced-growth path of capital (k) is given by:
.
kt
S ¨ªr 1 T R ·¹ ,
kt
(1.1)
r r A ,Q , x (1.2)
where
s = elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
r = gross social rate of return on capital
t = tax rate on capital (including “implicit” taxation)
r = cost of capital (which can be proxied by the international interest
rate adjusted for country risk)
a = total factor productivity
q = index of externalities
x = availability of complementary factors of production (such as
infrastructure or human capital).
These equations represent the entry point to the problem of
growth diagnostics. The growth of the capital stock, and of income,
may be low for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the gross social
rate of return may be low [equation (1.2)], owing to low TFP or the
unavailability of key complementary inputs (infrastructure or skilled
labor). On the other hand, the effective or private rate of return may
be low because of low appropriability of returns [in the very stylized
formulation of equation (1.1), a high t or high q]. Low appropriability
may be due to government failures such as high taxation, corruption, or poor rule of law, or to the market’s failure to take advantage
of potential externalities (which require centralized decisions). For
a given private rate of return, when capital accumulation is higher,
the cost of capital r is lower.
Improvement in any of these parameters in given country circumstances can be expected to be helpful for inducing higher productive
private investment. In an extreme case, some parameters would be
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18
relevant (binding constraints); others would be irrelevant. The policy
counterpart to this notion of binding constraint is the question of what
changes would bring the most growth bang for the buck; or, in other
words, which policies have the lowest cost/benefit ratio.
The transition from this abstract model to an examination of
real life problems of individual economies is effected with the use
of a decision tree that organizes thinking around specific types of
binding constraints. This allows the analyst to run through a large
variety of candidate causes and look for symptoms that would allow
one to accept or reject a particular cause. The analyst is likely to
discard a large number of potential causes because the evidence indicates that they are not binding in the period for which the analysis
is undertaken, even if the particular problem is found to be present.
For example, in practically all Latin American countries, the labor
force suffers from low skill levels, school enrollment rates are low,
and educational accomplishments are unremarkable. However, low
skills may not be a binding constraint if there is little demand for
skilled labor. One would have to look elsewhere to find what is holding back investment and growth. The decision tree used by HRV and
adopted in the country studies is presented in Figure 1.5.
FIGURE 1.5 Decision Tree Approach for Finding the Binding Constraint to Investment
Low private investment
Low return to private physical investment
Low social returns
poor
geography
Low appropriability
bad
infrastructure
government failures
low human
capital
High cost of finance
bad international finance
market failures
information
externalities:
"self discovery"
micro risks,
property rights,
corruption taxes
Source: Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005).
macro risks,
financial, monetary,
fiscal inestability
bad local finance
coordination
externalities
low
domestic
saving
poor
intermediation
Going down the decision tree in an orderly manner, the questions to be asked concerning private investment fall into two general
categories:
1. Does the country face low returns to domestic investment?
Following the left branch of the tree, a positive answer
leads to the examination of social returns, or investment
potential, and of the degree to which those returns can be
appropriated in the form of private returns, or investment
incentives.
1a. Is the problem one of low social returns? If so, is it
because of (inter alia):
t Scarcity of human capital or entrepreneurship
t Poor infrastructure, or high transport, telecommunications, or trading costs
t Lack of other public goods to complement private
investment (for example, are supporting financial
markets, such as insurance, available for most types
of commercial risks)
t The manner in which the country has integrated into
the world economy through trade (for example, are
export baskets subject to Dutch disease or more generally are they not supporting structural transformation toward higher development, or is access to new
technology poor)?
1b. Is the problem one of low private appropriability of
investment returns? If so, it is useful to distinguish
between government failures that impede adequate
appropriability and market failures that do not provide
the necessary private incentives to carry out investment
initiatives with high social returns.
Are there important government failures, such
as:
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20
t High tax rates and/or inefficient tax structures affecting private investment
t Overregulation of labor or product markets
t Lack of law enforcement (weak property rights, informality of the economy and labor force) or risk of
creeping or outright expropriation
t Macroeconomic risks (financial, monetary, and/or
fiscal instability)?
Are there substantial market failures, such as:
t Large positive investment spillovers external to individual investors (lack of protection of intellectual
property rights, or information externalities that account for low levels of pioneering self-discovery 6)
t Returns that cannot be captured by individual investors because they require coordination among many
actors, the absence of which prevents the emergence
of new activities (coordination failures)?
2. Does the country face a high cost of financing domestic
investment? Following the right branch of the tree, a positive answer to this question can be further decomposed into
sub-questions such as:
t Does the country have a low domestic propensity to
save and/or problems accessing international finance
(high country risk, unattractive conditions for foreign
direct investment, macroeconomic risk)?
t Does the country have problems with the domestic
financial system (inefficient/costly financial intermediation, poor creditor protection, absence of key
segments of the capital market, poor bank regulation,
prevalence of related-party lending, absence of institutions that lend to innovators or newcomers)?
6
See Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
What symptoms would be informative of binding constraints in
one or more of these areas? The decision tree assumes that growth
impediments are reflected in low private investment rates. The question is then how to identify weak links in the investment process
depicted in the tree: that is, constraints that are binding, and that
can be substantially relaxed.
Given a list of potential constraints, the search for those that
are binding involves qualitative investigation to test each constraint
against the implications that would be observed if it were binding.
Investigations of this sort are, like all scientific inquiry, such that
each hypothesis can be rejected, but none can be “proven.” Instead,
when a hypothesis is tested against multiple implications and is not
rejected under any of them, then there is a degree of confidence that
a binding constraint has been identified. More realistically, given the
substantial margins of error in these procedures, conclusions are
generally derived based on the preponderance of the evidence discovered. In this context, a Bayesian assignment of weights indicates that
country-specific shortfalls are more informative of binding constraints
than generic problems to be expected in developing countries, which
matches the tailored diagnostics encouraged by this approach.
Detecting the Symptoms
In the original formulation, HRV advanced the proposition that the
key to identifying binding constraints was to observe relative prices
and determine whether they appeared to be out of line with those in
undistorted economies. If the cost of capital (interest rates) is high
relative to the international interest rate, allegedly this is an indication
that capital is relatively scarce (a binding constraint) in that country.
If it is not, then it can be inferred that the private returns of available
investment opportunities are generally low. For example, prices may
reveal that certain factors complementary to investment are scarce,
such as a high premium to education (as detected, say, in Mincer
regressions). Other impediments may also be mapped into the price
space, such as the incidence of taxes or risks. Where markets do not
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22
exist, as in the case of public infrastructure, the analyst may try to
infer implicit prices from usage data.
The studies in this book make ample use of the information
embedded in price signals to reveal the importance of constraints,
as opposed to the traditional analysis based almost exclusively on
quantities and their comparison to inaccurate benchmarks. Prices are
summary statistics that reveal scarcity in the market. For example,
direct observation of a wage skill premium is more precise than a
judgment of whether the share of skilled workers appears adequate.
However, unfiltered prices may be misleading: for example, if appropriability is an important problem, social scarcity would not be reflected
in market prices, and shadow prices (a theoretical construct) would
be needed. Furthermore, in some cases, markets are notoriously
incomplete or nonexistent (such as markets for long-term or venture
capital, or the unit costs of nonexistent infrastructure). Where prices
do not tell the whole story or are not an accurate gauge of scarcity,
researchers can also look at quantity data. In particular, stock estimates may be required to supplement flow data to reveal quantity
imbalances. For example, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2004) and
Blyde and Fernández-Arias (2005) utilize quantity data of the kind
traditionally used in growth accounting, based on stock data of factor inputs, to uncover constraints. Furthermore, the judicious use of
enterprise opinion survey data may add information on constraints
to investment and is utilized in some of the country studies.
Whether using price, quantity, or qualitative information, most
of the studies use a common principle to detect binding constraints:
when altered, these constraints are expected to provoke substantial
changes in observed investment and growth. If interest rates fall over
time while growth does not accelerate, it is difficult to argue that the
cost of financing is a binding constraint. If the education premium
falls without a growth response, there is no case for a human capital
binding constraint.
Another technique used to detect the presence of binding
constraints in each one of the branches of the decision tree is the
analysis of the adaptations they induce in the agents’ behavior. For
example, if financing is a binding constraint, then large firms and
conglomerates can be expected to represent a large share of the
economic structure. If lack of public goods is a binding constraint,
successful producers are expected to exhibit an unusually high level
of cooperation to overcome this handicap. If fear of expropriation
is an important impediment to investment, then observed profit
margins are expected to be high without triggering investment or
entry. Correspondingly, the toolkit employed by the researchers who
conducted the studies in this book also included the examination
of microeconomic information available at the enterprise level. In
addition to the detailed industrial surveys in some countries, recent
World Bank surveys at the firm level convey relevant information
on the investment decisions of firms that has not yet been fully analyzed.7 The surveys cover a wide variety of establishments in different
industries, including information on whether a firm exports or not,
its size, its financial position, and its interactions with government
agencies and financial institutions.
In particular, techniques similar to those used in Rajan and
Zingales (1998) to tease out the relevance of financial development
are used in these country studies to infer binding constraints from
the structure of production. For example, the hypothesis that road
infrastructure is a binding constraint can be tested by looking at
whether the country is underspecialized in products or sectors that
use roads intensively. Similarly, if financing is a binding constraint,
a positive shock to financing costs would be expected to entail
growth biased in favor of sectors whose firms are more dependent
on external financing.
Market Failures and Structural Transformation
Another way to look at constraints to growth in the framework of
the decision tree is to move the issue down to the sector level and
7
See World Bank, Investment Climate Surveys, http://www.enterprisesurveys.
org/portal/.
23
24
ask why certain products that would be expected to be produced
and exported by a country are not in its product and export basket.
This method is used heavily in the country studies included in this
volume. A starting point is to analyze the evolution of the stock of
discoveries in each country’s exports over time and see the extent to
which their revealed comparative advantage is consistent with their
income per capita (see Appendix B). The notion in this test is that
an export basket associated with more underdeveloped countries is
a sign of growth obstacles because countries “become” what they
export (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2005).
A refinement to this approach is to examine the potential for
the export basket to transform itself into a better basket (the value of
its “open forest”; see Hausmann and Klinger, 2006). The idea is that
structural transformation in exports is not random, but follows patterns
that are endogenous to the development process. Once a country has
become competitive in a certain product or product group, there is a
higher probability (based on patterns of world revealed comparative
advantage) that it will become competitive in certain products but not
in others. For example, competitiveness in grape exports is likely to
lead to competitiveness in other fruits for which the complementary
inputs are the same or highly similar (cold storage and transport,
quality certifications), but highly unlikely to lead to competitiveness
in information technology; competitiveness in computer chips may
well lead to competitiveness in cell phone production. In other words,
where a particular country is located in the world’s product space
and how well it is making use of the location that it has to advance
in the sophistication of its product and export basket has been found
to be positively correlated to overall economic growth. Some of the
country studies in this volume assess growth potential based on this
theory (for technical details, see Appendix B).
Methodological Limitations and Extensions
The application of the growth diagnostics methodology based on
the above framework led to new insights in the countries studied.
Relative to cross-country regressions, it added the use of prices and
other information-rich, country-specific knowledge to illuminate
the problem, without imposing a structure that would filter out the
specificity and nonlinearity of the growth process. Relative to growth
and development accounting, it added deeper exploration of underlying determinants without reliance on the accuracy of capital stock
estimations. By and large, conclusions are richer and in many cases
embedded in a compelling narrative of the underlying syndromes
in these countries. In fact, the posing of a syndrome that may be
manifested in multiple findings discovered in the analysis lends
credibility to the overall diagnosis. In practice, country studies did
not conclude with a “silver bullet” or a set of binding constraints
rendering most weaknesses irrelevant; rather they yielded a parsimonious prioritization of the importance of multiple constraints that
vary substantially from country to country.
At the same time, the above framework was sometimes found lacking. The premise that binding constraints to growth are to be discovered
in binding constraints to private investment overlooks the possibility
that the investment level may be high and yet yield low growth. For
example, investment may be misallocated across economic activities.
Misallocation may result from misguided public investment or because
public policy subsidizes private investment in the wrong places. Misallocation may also result from a segmented financial system in which
some highly productive sectors may be left out, even when other less
productive investment is being supported. Thus, it would be important
to analyze investment as a heterogeneous phenomenon.
If investment tends to flow to sectors or activities with low
spillovers or even worse, negative spillovers, misallocation would
result even with undistorted markets. Several growth and development accounting exercises have consistently shown that total factor
productivity (TFP) is the most important factor explaining long-run
differences in growth rates and in income levels across countries. 8
8
See, for example, Prescott (1998); Hall and Jones (1999); Easterly and Levine
(2001).
25
26
In the GDM framework, the effects of TFP on growth are detected
through its indirect impacts on the investment rate. Since low
investment may fail to signal weak TFP growth, a careful analysis
of productivity issues is warranted, particular for economies in
which investment is found to be strong, yet growth remains unsatisfactory.
In addition, the finding that a particular factor represents a
binding constraint may be somewhat misleading. There may be
some underlying reasons why a particular economy exhibits certain
shortcomings, so that the binding constraint is not really what is
manifested at the surface but rather at a deeper level. For example,
in Guatemala, the lack of physical infrastructure and the low levels of
human capital are found to be binding constraints to investment and
growth. At a deeper level, however, the authors find that the inability
of the economy to supply infrastructure and human capital is due
to the extremely low tax burden, one of the lowest in the region and
much lower than would be expected based on the country’s per capita
income level. But why can’t the tax burden be raised? Here is the
real binding constraint: the resistance to tax increases on the part
of those who are in a position to do so successfully.
Finally, binding constraints should not be looked at in isolation.
They may very well compound each other. It may be more accurate
to speak of low-growth syndromes, in which several constraints play
a role. For example, low levels of self-discovery may coexist with, or
in some cases be due to, severe financial intermediation problems,
so that small and medium-sized firms have very inadequate access
to financial resources outside the firm.
Obstacles to Investment and Growth: What the Studies Show
General Conclusions
The thirteen country studies that were undertaken for this research
endeavor allow some conclusions to be made with regard to the
binding constraints on growth in Latin America and the Carib-
bean. 9 The major constraints identified by the country studies are
shown in Table 1.6.
A number of generalizations can be drawn from the studies.
First, not surprisingly, there is no single constraint that dominates
all others across countries. The problems of competitiveness and
growth are very country-specific. The binding constraints take on
very specific forms in each country. Second, every country seems
to be afflicted by a syndrome, rather than by a single ailment. The
basic motivation behind HRV does hold: not all shortcomings bite
at the same time, and policymakers need to tackle constraints in
a sequence rather than every problem at once. Nonetheless, in no
single country is growth held back by a single constraint. Third,
binding constraints can and do change over time.
Most of the studies conclude that the main constraints faced
by the countries in the region refer to the branch of the tree of low
appropriability of social returns, particularly to government failures,
with an important contribution from market failures (coordination and
self-discovery problems). Government failures are overwhelmingly
in the category of weak institutions, although poor economic policies
of various kinds, a specific form of government failure, also seem to
play an important role. In a sense, these findings do not depart much
from the conventional view of why countries do not grow: they are
held back by poor governance or poor policies.10
Government failure, in the form of weak institutions, is the
most important category of constraint overall and the leading constraint in ten of the thirteen countries for which country studies
were prepared. Weak institutions cover a wide range of problems,
9
The study covers Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Trinidad & Tobago.
This volume presents the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, and Trinidad & Tobago. The rest of papers can be found at http://
www.iadb.org/res/pub_List.cfm?pub_type_id=CSI
10
Of course, poor policies may well be due to poor governance and to politicaleconomy issues, which highlights one of the weaknesses of the HRV framework:
many constraints are interrelated and arise due to more basic causes that are
usually not included in the decision tree.
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28
TABLE 1.6 Constraints on Investment Identified in the Country Studies
Constraint
I. Low returns
1. Weak institutions
Country study
Argentina (property rights, fiscal)
Colombia (property rights in conflict areas)
Ecuador (several dimensions)
El Salvador (crime)
Guyana (several dimensions)
Guatemala (property rights, justice)
Nicaragua (property rights, corruption, government
effectiveness)
Panama (corruption)
Paraguay (corruption, regulatory quality)
Trinidad & Tobago (crime)
2. Economic policy failings
Argentina (fiscal sustainability)
Brazil (high and distortionary taxes)
Nicaragua (fiscal sustainability)
Panama (labor regulations)
Trinidad & Tobago (fiscal sustainability)
3. Coordination and self-discovery issues
Guyana
Chile
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Peru
Trinidad & Tobago
4. Poor infrastructure
Argentina (oil and gas underinvestment)
Ecuador (transport)
Colombia (transport)
Guatemala (transport)
Nicaragua (transport, electricity, telecom)
Paraguay (transport)
5. Low human capital
Brazil
Chile (quality)
Guatemala
II. High cost of finance
1. Domestic finance
Brazil (financial segmentation)
Colombia
Ecuador
Nicaragua
Source: National studies. http://www.iadb.org/res/pub_List.cfm?pub_type_id=CSI
from corruption and crime to weak political institutions and ineffective protection for property rights, either because they are not
in themselves protected legally or because the judicial system does
not work or is heavily politicized.
In what represents a departure from previous studies, market
failures were found to play an important role in a significant number
of countries. In fact, the second most important constraint is the
weakness of coordination and self-discovery, as discussed later in
this chapter.
Three additional sets of constraints highlighted by the country
studies are inadequate human capital; to a lesser extent, infrastructure (in the branch of the decision tree concerned with low social
returns); and poor local finance (in the branch that relates to the
high cost of finance). However, these are by and large of a secondary
order of importance.
The next section briefly summarizes some of the constraints
that impede investment in the thirteen countries included in this
project. Each constraint is discussed in its order of importance
in the decision tree, as indicated in the country studies. The first
three are the most often flagged by the country studies. Of the six
constraints discussed below, the first five belong to the low returns
branch of the decision tree, and only one (poor domestic finance)
refers to the high cost of finance branch.
Government Failure: Weak Institutions
The major problem in most countries seems to be government failure.
Business firms do not invest because investment is unduly risky owing to poor contract enforcement, shaky rule of law, political capture
of the courts, government ineffectiveness, and corruption. The case
studies show that this is a problem in ten of the thirteen countries:
Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad & Tobago.
In Argentina, the lack of respect for property rights appears to
be a severe problem. The recent crisis of 2001 is an example of this.
29
30
The convertibility program, which fixed the price of the U.S. dollar at
one peso and adopted a currency board as the exchange rate regime,
encouraged agents to engage in financial transactions denominated
in dollars. When the currency board had to be abandoned at the end
of 2001 and the peso was allowed to float, the government decreed
a transformation of dollar debts and deposits into pesos, using different exchange rates for different types of debt. As a result, some
creditors transferred massive unanticipated amounts of wealth to
some debtors. Since the economy had been subjected to other such
transfers in the past, it is not surprising that the two studies undertaken for this project showed that economic uncertainty related to
the unpredictable application of the rule of law was one of the major
constraints to investment.
Significant changes in the rules of the game that do not respond
to a clear economic rationale are a milder form of violations of contractual agreements. The price setting arrangements agreed to when
public utilities and oil and gas were privatized called for tariff and
price adjustments that were changed unilaterally by the government
following the crisis of 2001. These changes have caused large price
distortions that have been partially compensated by public subsidies
on an ad hoc basis. As a result, oil and gas companies have not made
the investments that would have been required to keep supply expanding with demand. Meanwhile, demand has grown more than it
would have, had prices risen to reflect opportunity costs.
In Colombia, the protracted civil war with the guerrillas has
affected property rights in conflict areas. This may have lowered
the rate of investment not only in those regions but in others as
well. To a very large extent, investment and growth are dependent
on whether the government can eradicate the threat posed by the
armed insurrection.
The study for Ecuador shows that the major constraint on
investment is a complex combination of governance problems. The
country’s history has been characterized by extreme political instability, with very few presidents ending their constitutional term. In
addition, frequent changes to the constitution conspire against the
stability of the rule of law that is required for dynamic private investment. In addition, government effectiveness is weak, the quality of
regulation is poor, and corruption is a serious problem.
Guyana, Guatemala, and Paraguay exhibit problems similar to
Ecuador. By contrast, in Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, and El Salvador,
the weak institutions constraint appears to be more circumscribed. In
Panama, corruption is a serious impediment to growth. In Trinidad
& Tobago and El Salvador, crime is the most important governance
problem. Other dimensions of the governance issue seem to be not
that problematic in these last three countries. Crime, of course,
represents an important government failure, since a society where
it is as rampant as it is in El Salvador discourages investment and
imposes costs in the form of private protection services that conspire
against the competitiveness of firms.
Nicaragua is another case where the governance problem is
multifaceted. The changes in the fundamental model of society that
the country has experienced since 1979—from market-oriented and
private property–based, to socialist and government-directed, and
back—certainly do not favor private investment. Although the country
appears to have reaffirmed its choice for a market-oriented system
respectful of private property in 1990 with the return to democracy,
this has not allayed fears regarding the security of private property.
In addition, the protection of property rights is weak and subject to
political interpretation by the courts. Corruption and government
ineffectiveness are also serious problems.
The weak government constraint is not easy to lift. Policymakers
cannot improve the way institutions operate by decree. If the courts
are unduly swayed by political considerations, for example, it is for
a reason: there are powerful actors who benefit from the current
situation. There may be other reasons why governance is defective.
Weaknesses in the quality of government may be the product of low
wages in the public sector or simply of the low quality of education
prevailing in the country.
None of these problems is amenable to quick fixes. One solution that some countries have embraced is to carve out areas of the
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32
economy where governance works well. An example is the creation
of export processing zones in the countries of Central America and
the Caribbean. In these zones, certain governance problems that
affect the economy at large are solved by: the elimination of the
need to waste time and resources obtaining the multiple necessary
permits (and thus the need to pay bribes); and insuring the supply
of electricity, the quality of ports and roads for accessing ports, the
quality of customs procedures (another important source of bribes),
and even property rights. Some of the studies advocate this type
of solution as an intermediate step to solving the problems in an
economy-wide manner.
Government Failure: Poor Policies
Government failures related to poor policies take a number of forms.
In some countries, fiscal policy is clearly problematic since the current
fiscal stance could well lead to fiscal unsustainability at some point
in the future. This may be the case in Argentina, which depends on
taxes on foreign trade that are probably not sustainable to achieve
fiscal balance. Nicaragua, likewise, has not made a significant correction in its fiscal policies. Its improved fiscal position is the result of
multilateral and bilateral debt forgiveness, rather than tax reform or
better use of fiscal revenues. Trinidad & Tobago is overly dependent
on transitory revenues from oil and gas for fiscal sustainability.
That poor policies take many forms is also revealed by the studies. For example, very high tax rates are a constraint to growth in
Brazil, which has a tax burden (between 35 and 40 percent of GDP)
that is higher than those of some developed countries. A cascading
sales tax, the lack of coordination of tax policy between state and
federal authorities, a pension system in dire need of reform, and
inefficient expenditures contribute to a fiscal policy constraint in
Brazil. In the case of Panama, labor regulations that are particularly
onerous to employers without necessarily protecting employees seem
to discourage business investment in those segments to which they
apply (all sectors except the Canal, the Colón Free Zone, and the
offshore banking facilities), but especially in manufacturing and
retail commerce.
Market Failure: Coordination and Self-discovery Issues
Many of the 13 countries have not been able to discover new comparative advantages, as have, for example, the fast-growing Asian
countries (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and, more recently, China and Vietnam). The self-discovery
obstacle involves two separate market failures that must be solved
by collective action. One is the paucity of investments to build new
comparative advantages, because of the externalities involved in
successfully developing new products for exports. The other market failure is the absence of coordination needed to establish new
activities. Any self-discovery requires the coordination of private
sector activities (especially those producing non-tradables) and
the provision of sector-specific public goods, without which those
activities simply cannot occur. Many Latin American countries have
not been successful in dealing with these two dimensions of policies to promote growth and competitiveness. In others, the primary
constraint—often institutional—does not even allow them to try
policies of this nature.
Why Latin American countries have been unable to solve these
market failures and Asian countries have again harks back to political
economy issues not dealt with directly in the HRV framework. Most
indicators of governance tend to be better in the Asian countries that
export manufactures than in Latin American countries, at least as
measured by the widely used World Bank database constructed by
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006). This is another source of
interdependence between constraints that is difficult to disentangle
and ultimately translate into useful policy prescriptions.
Self-discovery is not an easy problem to solve in countries that
are poorly positioned in the world product space. That is, many, if not
most, Latin American countries produce and export goods (primary
commodities with little processing or low-value garments assembled
33
34
with imported parts) that require a set of public goods (infrastructure,
quality control, technological services, phytosanitary regulations,
even specific forms of property rights) and suppliers of non-tradable
inputs that are not very useful for the production of other goods. Put
another way, the production and export of goods and services that
are not being produced at present require a different set of public
goods and non-tradable inputs than exists now, which renders the
coordination problem a particularly difficult one to solve. In order
to move to other sectors where they might develop a comparative
advantage, these countries have to start building institutions and
investing in sector-specific public goods basically from scratch.
Accepting the conclusions of Hausmann and Klinger (2006),
the capacity of countries to engage in vigorous self-discovery ought
to be positively correlated with where they are located in the product
space. In other words, those countries whose production and export
baskets are close to a large number of other goods that have a high
value (that is, they are goods exported by higher-income countries),
and that avail themselves of the opportunity to learn to produce and
export those goods, ought to experience significant self-discovery
and high growth rates (unless, of course, their growth is constrained
by some other factor).
This is captured by the notion of “open forest,” which is the
number and “value” of the goods that are not being exported by a
country but which are “close” to those that are already in the country’s
export basket. Proximity is measured by the fact that, in the international economy, countries exporting a particular good have a high
probability of also exporting a set of specific other goods. The notion
of “value” of any such good is measured by the weighted per capita
incomes of the countries that do export those goods (PRODY).
The number and value of the products in the open forest in
the countries included in this volume are shown in Table 1.7, which
also includes a comparison of per capita GDP in purchasing power
parity (PPP) terms and EXPY. This latter variable is the “value” of
a country’s export basket, where each commodity (at the four-digit
level) is weighted by the average per capita GDP (in PPP terms) of
TABLE 1.7 Per Capita GDP (in PPP terms), EXPY, and Open Forest, Latin America and
Selected Benchmark Asian Countries, 1980 and 2000
(in year 2000 US$; value of open forest in thousands of year 2000 US$)
1980
Per capita GDP
(PPP)
EXPY
2000
Open forest Per capita GDP
Open forest
Number Value
(PPP)
EXPY Number Value
Countries in project
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
8,928
6,752
4,776
3,828
5,128
4,148
4,266
2,389
2,754
5,356
3,600
5,377
10,128
8,938
7,774
6,254
4,457
5,940
4,530
5,445
4,999
5,156
7,693
4,858
6,481
8,164
100
129
60
68
32
75
89
27
58
64
34
70
21
1,015
1,370
584
670
288
739
878
251
562
625
310
679
204
12,095
7,154
9,132
5,974
3,230
4,597
4,048
3,922
3,131
6,048
4,165
4,724
9,092
10,155
11,307
8,160
8,715
7,005
6,327
5,775
6,355
5,404
9,559
6,598
7,713
9,103
123
144
82
99
56
43
57
23
38
82
60
90
30
1,548
1,833
1,006
1,228
651
499
661
256
430
985
721
1,097
355
Asian benchmarks
China
Hong Kong
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand
873
13,461
5,394
4,553
10,433
2,873
7,436
8,706
8,844
5,505
8,874
5,182
157
132
163
55
113
106
1,677
1,365
1,721
547
1,172
1,063
3,940
26,214
16,149
8,573
23,594
6,321
11,864
12,171
13,909
13,138
14,495
12,157
144
116
133
80
82
137
1,890
1,460
1,663
1,001
1,067
1,725
Source: Hausmann and Klinger (2006) database and WDI.
Note: EXPY is a measure of the productivity level associated with a country’s export basket.
the countries exporting that commodity. A finding of the literature is
that countries with index values for the level of productivity in their
export basket (EXPY) that are greater than their per capita GDPs
tend to grow more rapidly than those with relatively low EXPYs.
How do the countries studied for this project stand in this
respect? The first thing that should be noted is that the Asian countries were in a much denser part of the product space in both 1980
and in 2000. Both the number of products in the open forest and the
value of the open forest were much larger than for the Latin Ameri-
35
36
can countries. That means that businesses in the Asian countries
must have found it easier to jump to new products that they were
not producing in either 1980 or in 2000. Second, with the exception
of the more developed Hong Kong and Singapore, the other Asian
countries exported a higher-value basket relative to their per capita
GDPs than their Latin American counterparts.
In respect to individual Latin American countries, the situation
is very heterogeneous. Argentina, Brazil, and, to a lesser extent,
Colombia enjoy a favorable location in the product space, with open
forests that approximate those found in Asia, both in number and
value. Moreover, their open forests have been increasing in terms
of the number of products and their value over time. Thus, these
countries have considerable unexploited potential for self-discovery
that they are not utilizing to foster growth.
The situation is quite different for Chile, Ecuador, Guyana,
Peru, and Trinidad & Tobago, countries that are located in a considerably less favorable place within the world product space. Exports
in these countries are concentrated in primary products, with few
links to other export goods that could promote more rapid long-term
growth. Therefore, the efforts at self-discovery will have to be more
determined in these countries. And the risk of making costly errors
(in terms of public investments in sector-specific public goods that
prove to not stimulate private investment) is also larger than for other
countries with more diversified export structures.
Something similar can be said for the Central American countries included in the study (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua),
which appear to be located in a very sparse region of the product space
dominated by few, low-value products: in particular, the assembly of
low-value garments. Moreover, this group of products is coming to
be dominated by China and other lower-cost Asian producers.
Low Levels of Human Capital
Human capital appears to be a binding constraint only for Brazil,
Chile, and Guatemala. In the first two countries, the problem is basi-
cally the scarcity of skilled labor; in the case of Chile, this shortage
is clearly associated with the low quality of education. In Guatemala,
the problem seems to be one of both quality and quantity. Guatemala
has very low school enrollment levels, which are more like those
in low-income countries than in the lower-middle income group to
which the country belongs. The same can be said about the average
years of schooling in the labor force.
The findings of the country studies are broadly consistent
with the results that can be found in the vast literature on returns
to education. Table 1.8 shows the returns to an additional year of
education (obtained from Mincer equations) drawn from Bils and
Klenow (2000) and from Hausmann and Rodrik (2006). The latter
also report data on returns to completing primary, secondary, and
higher education. Bils and Klenow’s (2000) data are for 1988/89, and
Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2006) are for 1998. Guatemala exhibits the
highest returns to education by any measure, making human capital
scarcities a primary candidate for the most binding constraint. It is
closely followed by Ecuador and Brazil.
TABLE 1.8 Returns to Education
One additional year of education
Country
Guatemala
Ecuador
Brazil
Paraguay
Peru
Chile
Colombia
Panama
Nicaragua
El Salvador
Argentina
Bils and Klenow Hausmann and Rodrik
(2000)
(2006)
0.142
0.098
0.154
0.103
0.085
0.121
0.145
0.126
0.097
0.096
0.107
0.136
0.135
0.132
0.129
0.129
0.123
0.119
0.116
0.110
0.105
0.091
Finishing (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006)
Primary
Secondary
Higher
0.841
0.681
0.622
0.665
0.474
0.341
0.449
0.483
0.574
0.557
0.422
1.347
1.310
1.138
1.181
0.990
0.761
0.908
1.015
0.860
1.027
0.789
1.991
1.833
1.922
1.662
1.459
1.458
1.668
1.559
1.636
1.482
1.127
Source: Bils and Klenow (2000); Hausmann and Rodrik (2006). Data from Bils and Klenow are for 1988/89, and from Hausmann and
Rodrik are for 1998.
37
38
Even though it may not be a binding constraint today, if a country
succeeds in accelerating growth, it is likely to come up against a human capital constraint. Therefore, investments in education appear
to be a must in all countries that want to sustain growth beyond the
spurt that lifting the current binding constraint can give them.
Poor Infrastructure
Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay
could accelerate their rate of capital accumulation if they were to
build more and better infrastructure. The absence of good roads
and ports are a serious constraint to investment in all of the countries mentioned, with perhaps the exception of Argentina. Underinvestment in oil and gas appears to be an important constraint to
future growth in Argentina.
Some of these countries, particularly Nicaragua, have serious
difficulty supplying electricity to their populations and business
firms. Since the shortages have occurred as a result of government
policies of fixing electricity rates (at a time of rapid increases in
international energy prices), the shortfalls in energy supplies are in
part an economic policy and a governance problem and are related
to weak institutions, the first category of constraints.
Poor Domestic Finance
As noted, the findings of the country studies indicate that, by and
large, access to finance, or even the cost of finance, is not a binding constraint to private investment. Given the importance that the
development literature gives to this subject, an attempt was made to
corroborate this finding by looking at the World Bank’s Investment
Climate Surveys (ICS), available for almost all of the countries.11
These surveys, which cover between 450 and over 1,000 firms per
country, and in some countries have been administered in two or
11
See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/portal/.
more different years, contain a list of 18 obstacles to investment.
The interviewees are asked to rank them from 0 to 4, depending on
the degree to which the obstacles are effective constraints to their
firms’ investment decisions.12
The findings based on the ICS largely corroborate our country
studies. Finance is not uppermost in the minds of respondents as
an obstacle to investment (see Table 1.9). Respondents are apparently more concerned with other more immediate obstacles. When
finance is listed as an obstacle (that is, it appears on the list of the
first three most important obstacles), it is more likely to refer to cost
rather than access.
In Brazil, Guyana, and Nicaragua, business people are worried
about the cost of finance and place this issue among the three most
important obstacles to investment. As regards access to finance,
only in Ecuador and El Salvador was this as an important issue for
business people, and only back in 2003. By 2006, it had disappeared
from the list of the top three obstacles in these two countries.13
The relative unimportance of finance is perhaps not surprising
in a period like the past few years, in which most countries have
enjoyed ample access to external finance at favorable terms. These
conditions may have hidden the shortcomings of domestic savings
and financial intermediation, which may resurface in a less favorable
12
The list of obstacles is the following: 1. telecommunications; 2. electricity;
3. land; 4. taxes; 5. tax administration; 6. customs and trade regulations; 7. labor
regulations; 8. inadequately educated labor force; 9. licensing and permits; 10.
access to finance; 11. cost of finance; 12. political instability; 13 macroeconomic
instability; 14. economic and regulatory policy uncertainty, 15. corruption; 16.
crime, theft, and disorder; 17. anticompetitive or informal practices; and 18. legal
system/conflict resolution. Beginning in 2006, the cost of finance was dropped as
a specific obstacle and was subsumed in a general category of access to finance.
13
The case of Brazil illustrates an important limitation of the ICS. The survey
was conducted in 2003, a year of extraordinary uncertainty due to the political
transition that was primarily reflected in a large hike in country risk, interest rates,
and a depreciation of the exchange rate. Thus, while interest rates are generally
high in Brazil, the responses in 2003 are likely to be influenced by this extreme
event. Given that the surveys are not available on an annual basis, it is very difficult
to draw strong conclusions from the survey in this case.
39
40
TABLE 1.9 Access and Cost of Credit as Obstacles to Investment
Access to credit
Country and Survey Year
Argentina 2006
Brazil 2003
Chile 2004
Chile 2006
Colombia 2006
Ecuador 2003
Ecuador 2006
El Salvador 2003
El Salvador 2006
Guatemala 2003
Guatemala 2006
Nicaragua 2003
Nicaragua 2006
Panama 2006
Paraguay 2006
Peru 2002
Peru 2006
Guyana 2004
Cost of credit
Average score
Rank
Average score
Rank
1.637
2.579
1.123
1.145
1.528
1.811
1.433
1.361
1.367
1.632
1.193
2.227
1.240
0.753
1.536
2.013
1.333
1.361
5
5
4
6
6
3
5
3
6
6
6
4
4
6
4
4
6
5
—
3.253
1.020
—
—
1.800
—
1.359
—
1.890
—
2.443
—
—
—
2.428
—
2.380
—
2
5
—
—
4
4
4
—
4
—
2
—
—
—
3
—
1
Source: World Bank, Investment Climate Surveys, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/portal/
Note: Answers to the question: To what extent are access and cost of credit obstacles to investment? Scores are: not an obstacle (0), a
minor obstacle (1), a moderate obstacle (2), a major obstacle (3), or a very severe obstacle (4). Rank refers to ordering of the obstacle
in a list of 18 obstacles (17 for 2006).
— not available
external financial environment, as explicitly noticed in the Brazil
study.14 It could also be that finance will become a binding constraint
if and when investment picks up.
This issue, like most of those discussed in this book, is a complex one. When a study comes to the conclusion that a country’s
problem is one of self-discovery, this could be for a very large number of reasons: the exchange rate does not favor investment in new
tradables, coordination problems have not been solved, or firms and
14
As of the time this book was being edited, the prospect of a global financial
and economic crisis makes the return of a binding financial constraint in most
countries in the region a distinct possibility in the short term.
individuals with good ideas do not have access to financing. This is
another example of possible interactions between binding constraints,
something GDM does not explicitly take into account.
Finally, the financial constraint is relative. All firms in all economic environments are potentially constrained by their access to
external financial resources. The pioneering articles of Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) put this
issue on the table. For Latin America, Schiantarelli and Galindo
(2003) showed the multifaceted nature of the problem. Therefore,
the finance problem should be framed in terms of the extent to which
business firms in a particular environment, given their degree of
financial development, are constrained in investing by a lack of access to financial resources from outside the firm. In addition, the
question to ask is, who in that environment is financially constrained
and to what extent? Since small and new firms are the ones likely
to engage in self-discovery, the finding that these firms experience
greater restrictions in their access to finance could be important in
explaining why there are, generally, such low levels of self-discovery
activity in most developing countries. In other words, small firms in
all countries are probably finance-constrained, with adverse consequences for economic development.
41
42
References
Agosin, M., and Huaita, F. 2008. “Why Emerging Economies Should
(Still) Concern Themselves with Capital Inflows.” Working
paper No. 268. Santiago, Chile: Department of Economics,
Universidad de Chile.
Berg, A., Ostry, J.D. and Zettelmeyer, J. 2008. “What Makes Growth
Sustained?” Working paper No. 08/59. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Bils, M. and Klenow, P. 2000. “Does Schooling Cause Growth?”
American Economic Review. 90: 1160–83.
Blyde, J., and Fernández-Arias, E. 2005. “Why Latin America is Falling Behind.” In: E. Fernández-Arias, R. Manuelli, and J. Blyde,
editors. Sources of Growth in Latin America: What is Missing.
Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Blyde, J., Daude, C. and Fernández-Arias, E. 2008. “Output Collapses
and Productivity Destruction.” Working paper No. CSC-08-003.
Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. 2001. “It´s Not Factor Accumulation:
Stylized Facts and Growth Models.” World Bank Economic
Review. 15: 177–219.
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard R.G., and Petersen, B.C. 1988. “Financing
Constraints and Corporate Investment.” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity. 1:141–95.
Hall, J. and Jones, C., 1999. “Why Do Some Countries Produce So
Much More Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal
of Economics. 114: 83–116.
Hausmann, R. and Klinger, B. 2006. “Structural Transformation and
Patterns of Comparative Advantage in the Product Space.” Working paper No. 128. Cambridge, MA: Center for International
Development, Harvard University.
Hausmann, R. and Rodrik, D. 2003. “Economic Development as Selfdiscovery.” Journal of Development Economics. 72: 603–33.
. 2006. “Doomed to Choose: Industrial Policy as Predicament.”
Cambridge, Massachusetts: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Unpublished document.
Hausmann, R., Hwang, J. and Rodrik, D. 2005. “What You Export
Matters” . Working paper No. 123. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
United States: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University.
Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D. and Velasco, A. 2005. “Growth Diagnostics.” Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.
Kaufmann, J., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. 2006. “Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996–2005.” Policy research
working paper No. 3450. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Klenow, P., and Rodríguez-Clare, A. 2004. “Externalities and Growth.”
Working paper No. 11009. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Prescott, E.C. 1988. “Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity.”
International Economic Review. 39: 525–52.
Rajan, R., and Zingales, L. 1998. “Financial Dependence and Growth.”
Schiantarelli, F. and Galindo, A., editors. 2003. Credit Constraints and
Investment in Latin America. Washington, DC: Latin American
Research Network, Inter-American Development Bank.
Stiglitz, J.E., and Weiss, A. 1981. “Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information.” American Economic Review. 71:
393–410.
UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2007. (http://stats.unctad.org/
Handbook/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=1687).
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enterprisesurveys.org/portal/.
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World Bank. Various years. World Development Report. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank.
43
CHAPTER 2
Identifying the Most Binding
Constraints to Growth and
Competitiveness in Argentina
Gabriel Sánchez and Inés Butler *
Current and Past State of the Economy
Argentina in the Medium Run
Argentina’s growth performance in the medium run has been very
poor, especially since 1974, when it started to diverge from world
trend growth, as proxied by the United States per capita growth
(see Figure 2.1). While world trend growth has been an average
of 0.4 percent a year per capita since then, Argentina’s growth has
fluctuated at much lower levels.
As a result, Argentina has increasingly fallen behind many
relevant comparator countries, including some in Latin America.1
*
Gabriel Sánchez and Inés Butler are with IER AL (Instituto de Estudios sobre
la Realidad Argentina y Latinoamericana)-Fundación Mediterránea. The authors
are very grateful to Joaquín Berro-Madero, Delfina Cavanagh, Ignacio FernándezDussaut, Guadalupe González, and Eliana Miranda for their research assistance, and
to María Laura Alzúa for her useful advice and suggestions on human capital and
econometrics issues. Mauro Alem was a key contributor to the analysis of financial
constraints. The authors also thank Christian Daude, José María Fanelli, Eduardo
Fernández-Arias and the participants at the IDB Workshops on Competitiveness
and Growth in Latin America for their useful comments and suggestions.
1
While Argentina’s per capita GDP in 1960 was 60 percent that of the United
States, and much greater than the per capita GDPs of Japan, East Asia (excluding
GABRIEL SÁNCHEZ AND INÉS BUTLER
FIGURE 2.1 Real Per Capita GDP and the Long-run Trend, Argentina versus World,
1960–2006
(1960 = 100)
260
Per capita GDP, Argentina
Per capita GDP trend, United States
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988
1984
1980
1976
1972
1968
80
1964
100
1960
46
Source: IERAL based on Ministerio de Economía.
This divergence from world growth is contrary to what has been
observed for most countries (Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 2005).
While Argentina’s slowdown in productivity since 1975 has been
shared by most Latin American economies, except for Chile and
the Dominican Republic (Solimano and Soto, 2004), Argentina’s
slowdown has been more pronounced.
Argentina in the Short Run
Not only has trend growth been very low since 1974, but there has
also been remarkable volatility in short-run growth. Between 1960
and 2002, Argentina has had 18 years of growth crisis (defined as
years of negative growth by Solimano and Soto, 2004). Fourteen of
those crises took place between 1975 and 2002.
At times, Argentina has managed to ignite brief periods of recovery to potential trend output (as defined by U.S. trend growth).
China), Latin America, and the world, by 2006 per capita income had fallen to 30
percent relative to the United States, 44 percent relative to Japan, 53 percent relative
to East Asia, and had lost very significant relative ground vis-à-vis Latin America
and the world (World Bank, World Development Indicators, WDI).
IDENTIFYING THE MOST BINDING CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS IN ARGENTINA
However, these takeoffs have never materialized into bigger trend
growth or sustained growth accelerations. Using the metrics defined
by Hausmann, Pritchet and Rodrik (2004), this study identifies two
unsustained accelerations in the past few decades: 1960–74, and
1991–98. 2 The second acceleration was followed by the 1999–2002
collapse, when per capita income fell 27 percent. Following this
collapse, another acceleration began in 2003. It remains to be seen
whether it will be sustained, with per capita GDP growing at an
average annual rate of 7 percent and per worker GDP growing at 3
percent on average. 3
Hausmann, Pritchet and Rodrik (2004), Jones and Olken (2005),
and Solimano and Soto (2004) have identified the roles played by
different variables in triggering growth accelerations and in making them sustainable regime shifts toward greater trend growth. A
comparison of the growth episodes in Argentina with those analyzed
by these authors suggests that Argentina’s growth spurts appear to
have been short-run fluctuations around a low medium-run trend
caused by changes in the terms of trade, financial liberalization,
global financial shocks, and domestic adjustments to fiscal and external imbalances (see Table 2.1).4 These triggers are typical of the
2
Hausmann, Pritchet and Rodrik (2004) define “growth accelerations” as episodes
where growth is greater than 3.5 percent per year for eight years, and accelerates
by 2 percent per year or more on average (relative to the previous six or eight years
on average). Additionally, post growth output must exceed the pre-episode peak.
They also distinguish between sustained and unsustained accelerations.
3
Growth exceeded 3.5 percent per year from 2003 to 2008. The growth acceleration has been 8.5 percent per year for 2003–06 (7 percent growth on average),
compared to –1.6 percent growth on average for 1994–98. The pre-episode peak
(in per capita terms) of 1998 was surpassed by the end of 2006.
4
The onset of the 1991–98 episode featured a current account reversal from a large
surplus (that financed a big capital outflow) during 1988–90, together with positive
terms of trade and global financial shocks. The continuing presence of a large current account deficit during this period, together with a worsening fiscal deficit and
a fixed exchange rate, increased the probability of a new current account reversal,
which finally occurred after 1999 in a context of contagion from similar reversals
in neighboring countries and negative global financial shocks. Growth resumed in
2003 after the large fiscal and external adjustments of 2001–2, when Argentina was
also favored by positive terms of trade and global financial shocks.
47
48
TABLE 2.1 Quantities and Prices of Potentially Binding Constraints on Investment,
1991–2006
1991–98
1999–2002
2003–06
1991–2006
I/GDP (%)
Average period
Avg (1988–90)
1991
1998
19.0
16.7
15.9
21.1
Average period
1999
2001
2002
16.0
19.1
15.8
11.3
Average period
2002
2003
last available
18.4
11.3
14.3
21.7
18.1
National
savings/GDP
(%) a
Average period 16.4
Avg (1988–90) —
1991
—
1998
16.1
Average period
1999
2001
2002
15.6
13.6
14.2
20.1
Average period
2002
2003
last available
21.4
20.1
19.7
23.7
17.3
Public
investment/
GDP (%)a
Average period 1.58
Avg (1988–90) —
1991
—
1998
1.63
Average period
1999
2001
2002
1.16
1.67
1.11
0.73
Average period
2002
2003
last available
1.72
0.73
1.21
2.23
1.48
Real exchange
rate
Average period
Avg (1988–90)
1991
1998
1.03
2.32
1.22
0.97
Average period
1999
2001
2002
1.17
0.88
0.88
2.03
Average period
2002
2003
last available
1.88
2.03
1.87
1.85
1.28
Current account/ Average period –3.0
GDP (%)
Avg (1988–90) 3.5
1991
–0.1
1998
–4.8
Average period
1999
2001
2002
0.0
–4.2
–1.4
8.9
Average period
2002
2003
last available
3.8
8.9
6.4
3.8
–0.5
Capital account/ Average period 4.9
GDP (%)
Avg (1988–90) –3.1
1991
4.0
1998
6.1
Average period –1.4
1999
4.9
2001
–2.0
2002
–11.6
Average period –0.5
2002
–11.6
2003
–2.5
last available
–2.7
1.9
Total external
debt/ export
(%)
Average period
Avg (1988–90)
1991
1998
508.9
598.2
528.3
558.4
Average period
1999
2001
2002
619.3
653.9
624.8
609.7
Average period
2002
2003
last available
393.0
609.7
556.9
235.9
507.5
Fiscal result/
GDP (%)
Average period
Avg (1988–90)
1991
1998
–1.0
–3.1
–0.4
–1.4
Average period
1999
2001
2002
–2.2
–1.7
–3.2
–1.5
Average period
2002
2003
last available
1.7
–1.5
0.5
1.8
–0.6
Credit to non
financial private
sector/GDP
(%) b
Average period 17.5
Avg (1988–90) —
1991
11.2
1998
21.4
Average period
1999
2001
2002
20.8
23.3
21.3
15.8
Average period
2002
2003
last available
8.6
15.8
8.4
9.7
16.1
TABLE 2.1 Quantities and Prices of Potentially Binding Constraints on Investment,
1991–2006
1991–98
1999–2002
2003–06
1991–2006
Credit
(excluding
consumption)/
GDP (%) c
Average period 17.6
Avg (1988–90) —
1991
—
1998
18.7
Average period
1999
2001
2002
17.8
20.2
18.0
13.7
Average period
2002
2003
last available
6.9
13.7
7.3
7.2
13.4
Labor income/
GDP (%) a
Average period 38.5
Avg (1988–90) —
1991
30.8
1998
38.3
Average period
1999
2001
2002
39.5
40.7
42.1
34.6
Average period
2002
2003
last available
36.3
34.6
34.3
38.6
38.3
Real active
interest rate
Average period
Avg (1988–90)
1991
1998
9.3
—
—
9.6
Average period
1999
2001
2002
18.7
11.6
27.5
23.9
Average period
2002
2003
last available
0.2
23.9
4.3
–3.5
9.4
Net interest
margin d
Average period
Avg (1988–90)
1991
1998
3.4
—
—
3.2
Average period
1999
2001
2002
6.9
3.2
10.5
10.9
Average period
2002
2003
last available
4.4
10.9
8.7
2.5
4.8
Country risk
Average period 718.0
Avg (1988–90) —
1991
—
1998
718.0
Average period
1999
2001
2002
2160.8
718.3
1542.6
5713.4
Average period
2002
2003
last available
3463.4
5713.4
5572.4
2721.5
2579.4
Source: IREAL-Fundación Mediterránea based on Statistics Insitute (INDEC) and Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA).
— not available
RER = real exchange rate
WL = labor income
a. 1993–2005.
b. 1991–2006.
c. 1997–2006.
d. 1994–2006.
e. 1998–2006.
unsustained liberalizations identified by Hausmann, Pritchet and
Rodrik (2004). None of these accelerations displayed the increases
in investment, total factor productivity (TFP) growth, trade, and
manufacturing that are associated with sustained accelerations and
regime shifts.
For instance, during the 1991–98 unsustained acceleration,
the investment rate rose only 9 percent compared to the previous
four years, much less than the 16 percent benchmark in Hausmann,
Pritchet and Rodrik (2004). In addition, the trade share increased
only 5.6 percent relative to the previous growth phase, much less
49
50
than the average 13 percent increase that Jones and Olken (2005)
find in the immediate five years after the regime break.
The current episode is still characterized by insufficient
increases in trade relative to GDP (1.7 percentage points, pp), in
manufacturing and in the investment rate (15 percent) to qualify
as a typical sustained acceleration. In addition, it was triggered by
a combination of a positive terms of trade shock, a global financial
shock, and the boost to domestic savings given by the real exchange
rate devaluation and public debt restructuring, which countervailed
the backlash on reform and a partial reversal in financial liberalization. The expansion is currently being led by highly procyclical
fiscal and monetary policies, which may undermine the availability
of savings. Hence it still looks more like a typical unsustainable
acceleration.
Sources of Growth
A growth accounting exercise yields the observation that the very
poor per worker GDP growth between 1960 and 2006 (0.8 percent
per year) was driven mostly by a very low TFP growth (which accounted for 85 percent of growth), with a very modest contribution
of investment per worker. 5 Indeed, TFP shows a growing divergence
from the world technology frontier (proxied by U.S. TFP) since the
mid-1970s (see Figure 2.2). Argentina has experienced a huge productivity slowdown: productivity in 2006 was only 8 percent greater
than in 1974 and 63 percent greater than in 1960.
Since 1980, a trend decline in capital per worker has occurred
(see Figure 2.3). This made a negative contribution to growth during the mediocre growth era of 1991–2006. During this period, 120
5
The contribution of TFP is reduced to 33 percent of per worker output growth
if the growth of human capital per worker is introduced to the sources-of-growth
analysis. Human capital per worker is calculated using H = hL = exp(fs)L, where
f = 0.085 is the Mincerian return to schooling estimated by Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos (2002), and s is the years of schooling for the population 25 and older,
obtained from Barro and Lee (2000).
FIGURE 2.2 TFP and Long-run Trend, Argentina versus United States, 1960–2004
(1960 = 100)
200
Argentine TFP
Trend TFP
180
160
140
120
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988
1984
1980
1976
1972
1968
1964
80
1960
100
Source: IERAL based on Mecon.
percent of per worker growth was explained by the sluggish TFP
growth—which did not suffice to compensate for the observed reduction in capital per worker.6
During the recent growth and collapse episodes, changes in
factor utilization have played a leading role in explaining the growth
fluctuations, whereas TFP growth—and, especially, investment—
played a much lesser role than in the growth regime transitions
identified by Jones and Olken (2005) and Solimano and Soto (2004).
For instance, during the shift from the 1999–2002 collapse to the
current growth acceleration, the increase in TFP growth explains 46
percent of the growth acceleration, while the decline in capital per
worker accounts for –46 percent. Increased capital and employment
utilization jointly explain 100 percent of the growth acceleration.
This does not fit the finding of Jones and Olken (2005) that in the
short run (five years after the regime shift), increased TFP growth
explains 83 percent of a typical sustained acceleration, while capital
per worker accumulation explains only 7 percent. These findings are
consistent with the observed insufficient increase in productivity-
6
When an adjustment is made for human capital per worker, TFP growth during
1991–2006 declines to 1.16 percent per year.
51
FIGURE 2.3 Capital per Worker, 1960–2006
(thousands of constant pesos)
75
70
65
60
55
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988
1984
1980
1976
1972
1968
45
1964
50
1960
Thousands of constant Pesos
52
Source: IERAL-Fundación Mediterránea based on Mecon.
enhancing activities (trade and manufacturing) compared to the
typical sustained accelerations.
Hence this study is concerned with identifying the most binding
constraints on investment and on productivity-enhancing activities
that hinder the shift to bigger trend growth regimes both in the short
and the medium runs.7 Whether the biggest payoffs for growth will
come from boosting investment or productivity-enhancing activities
or both is also analyzed.
Identification of the Most Binding Constraints on Growth
The approach in this study differs from Hausmann, Rodrik and
Velasco (2005) in that these authors focus on the role of investment
in a neoclassical growth model with exogenous technical change.
Here the analysis is based instead on a Schumpeterian growth model
with endogenous technological change, such as the ones proposed
by Howitt (2000) and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005), in which
7
Argentina was not alone in this lackluster investment and TFP performances.
Solimano and Soto (2004) find a decline in capital accumulation in 1980–2002 in
all Latin American countries except Chile. They also find that most of the decline
in growth in Latin America during that period is associated with declining TFP.
investment in physical capital and in the accumulation of knowledge
are distinct, but complementary decision variables chosen to optimize
long-run welfare. Hence there is a need to consider separate trees
for productivity-enhancing activities. The latter include: structural
transformation of exports toward activities with greater income
content (as defined by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2005) and/
or greater technological convergence possibilities (as defined by
Hwang, 2006); and research and innovation.
Binding Constraints on Investment
Research shows that the most binding constraints on investment
are poor infrastructure and low appropriability of returns arising
from both government and market failures. If these constraints were
alleviated and investment was to increase significantly, then two
latent constraints would become binding: low access to international
finance and poor financial intermediation.
Infrastructure
Argentina faces binding constraints on investment in the areas of
generation, transportation and distribution of energy, and transportation infrastructure. By contrast, telecommunications and information
infrastructure, while lagging behind developed country standards,
are ahead of most Latin American countries—although the sluggish
investment in this sector since devaluation in 2001 is worrisome.
Transportation infrastructure
Argentina fares relatively well vis-à-vis other Latin American countries
in terms of indicators such as paved roads per km 2 , railroad lines
per km 2 , port efficiency, and airfreight per capita. However, South
American countries fare very poorly relative to developed countries
and to middle-income European countries (see De Ferranti et al.,
2002). In addition, Argentina has significantly less paved roads and
railroads per km 2 than larger surface industrialized countries such
53
54
as the United States. 8 If the “price” of transportation is proxied by the
average international transport costs (proxied by the ratio between
CIF and FOB prices that the International Monetary Fund proposes),
De Ferranti et al. (2002) show that Argentina’s transportation costs
are 24 percent lower than the South American average, but 77 percent higher than the developed countries average. While a large
part of these high transportation costs can be attributed to distance
(Argentina is the Latin American country that is farthest from major markets), its transportation costs are 63 percent higher than for
Uruguay, which is almost as far from major markets as Argentina but
has much more efficient ports (see De Ferranti et al., 2002). Hence
transportation infrastructure appears to be “scarce.” Further support for the conclusion that transportation infrastructure is currently
scarce in Argentina can be found in the investment/amortization ratio
of Argentine public offer firms in the area of transportation services,
which has fallen from 406 percent in 1998 to less than 100 percent
since 2003, and reached a minimum of 10 percent in 2006.
Information and telecommunications infrastructure
Argentina exceeds the South American average for information and
telecommunications (ITC) infrastructure (telephone mainlines per
capita, cellular phone lines per capita, personal computers per capita),
but lags behind the average of developed countries. The cost of access
to internet broadband services (the proxy used in this study for the
“price” of telecommunications infrastructure) is cheaper than, or at
least as cheap as, in the rest of Latin America. When the different
indicators of quantity and prices of ITC infrastructure for different
countries are plotted, Argentina’s indicators are better or equal than
8
For instance, Argentina has only 0.17 km of paved roads per km 2 , more than
large-surface Latin American countries such as Brazil (0.11) but less than Mexico
(0.6), and much less than France (1.81), the United Kingdom (1.54), Spain (1.32), or
the United States (0.67), which has a much larger surface. Additionally, Argentina
only has 0.97 km of railroads per km 2 , more than Brazil (0.4), but less than Mexico
(1.4), and significantly less than France (5.4), the United Kindgom (7.06), Spain
(2.74), the United States (1.51), and Turkey (1.11) (World Bank, World Development Indicators).
those expected for its level of development. However, the investment/
amortization ratio of Argentine public offer telecommunications firms
has been below 50 percent since 2003, much less than the 102 percent
observed in 1998, raising concerns about the future availability of
an adequate telecommunications infrastructure.
Energy
Argentina faces bottlenecks at the levels of production, transportation, and distribution of energy (electricity, natural gas, liquid
fuels)—especially liquid fuels, which have generated shortages in
the supply of energy to business firms. Figure 2.4 illustrates the
very large demand rationing for natural gas that occurs during demand peaks. While prices of energy to manufacturing firms have
been rising, energy prices in Argentina are still distorted by various policies. Energy prices do not reflect the true scarcity of this
factor and have promoted overuse. For instance, in 2004 Argentina
had the cheapest electricity of the entire region, even though it has
frequently imported electricity from Brazil and Paraguay. 9 The price
distortion is reflected in the conspicuous decline in the investment/
amortization ratio for public-offer firms in the energy sector since
2002. This is especially true for the electricity companies, whose
investment/amortization ratios have fallen from 264 percent in 1998
to less than 75 percent since 2003.
The distortions in energy prices subsidized investment by
manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2005, but the discretionary
increases in these prices for industrial activities since 2006, together
with frequent energy rationing, have changed the subsidy to an
implicit tax. As a result, there has been a reversal in the pattern of
investment across manufacturing industries. While more energyintensive industries expanded their capacity to a greater extent in the
2002–06 period, since 2006 the restriction on energy use had become
9
According to OLADE (Organización Latinoamericana de Energía), the price
of electricity for industrial firms in Argentina (US$3.07 per KWh) was the lowest
in Latin America: lower than in Paraguay (3.92) and Brazil (4.42), and much lower
than in Chile (5.75), Mexico (7.46), and Peru (7.49).
55
FIGURE 2.4 Natural Gas Demand Rationing, 2004–7
(percent of overall consumption)
A. Industrial Users
35
% of overall consumption
30
25
20
15
10
Jul-06
Oct-06
Jan-07
Apr-07
Jul-07
Jul-06
Oct-06
Jan-07
Apr-07
Jul-07
Apr-06
Jan-06
Oct-05
Jul-05
Apr-05
Jan-05
Oct-04
Jul-04
Apr-04
0
Jan-04
5
Apr-06
Jan-06
Oct-05
Jul-05
Apr-05
Jan-05
Oct-04
Jul-04
Apr-04
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Jan-04
B. Production of Electricity
% of overall consumption
56
Source: IEREAL-Fundación Mediterránea based on RD-Consultores.
binding and those industries have expanded their capacity less (see
Figure 2.5). Hence while energy infrastructure was not binding until
2005, it has become a binding constraint since then.10
10
This is reflected in the shortages in the provision of natural gas and electricity
to the manufacturing sector during the winter of 2007. Shortages are likely to recur
at times of extreme temperatures. For instance, these shortages led to a significant
manufacturing production slowdown during July 2007, when output grew only 2.3
percent year-on-year, much less than in the first half of 2007 (6.4 percent) and the
second half of 2006 (8.8 percent). This slowdown was greatest for energy-intensive
activities such as the production of chemicals and automobiles.
FIGURE 2.5 Investment and Energy Consumption by Industry
Annual Percentage Change, 2002–06
8
7
Investment
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
6.0
7.0
Energy consumption
Annual Percentage Change, 2006–07
16
14
Investment
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
Energy consumption
Source: IERAL-Fundación Mediterránea based on MIPAr-97 and INDEC.
Infrastructure was not a binding constraint during the unsustained acceleration of 1991–98 and did not cause the 1999–2002
growth collapse. Privatizations and massive investments in this
area during that decade contributed to an adequate provision of
infrastructure. However, infrastructure was a binding constraint
on growth during the 1980s, when energy shortages were frequent
and public utility companies were run by the government, and prices
were set in a distortionary fashion using political-economic criteria
in an attempt to tame inflation (see Givogri, 1990).
57
58
Low Appropriability
The other most binding constraint on investment is the inability to
appropriate the private and/or social returns to investment adequately
because of microeconomic risks arising from government failures
and because of market failures.
Microeconomic risks
Institutional failures that introduce covert and discretionary taxes
on capital and reduce the ability of private firms to appropriate the
private returns of their endeavors are a binding constraint to investment in Argentina. This result is supported by the comparison of
international indicators of institutional quality. It is also supported,
although indirectly, by econometric analyses of two factors. The
first is the negative effects on investment of the “regime change”
that followed the abandonment of the convertibility regime and its
associated rules and institutions. The second is the limited ability
of Argentine firms to capture a greater market value from their
investment in intangible assets and the negative impact of this low
pass-through on their investments in physical assets. Narrative
analytics based on the literature of institutional development of
Argentina also lend support to this hypothesis, and suggest that
poor institutional design is at the root of both macroeconomic and
microeconomic risks.
Argentina has always scored very low in institutional quality
indicators such as the World Bank Governance Indicators of rule
of law and control of corruption, which are usually found to be
strong predictors of growth. Its relative standing has deteriorated
significantly since 2002 (see Table 2.2). Argentina also scores very
poorly in respect to most of the institutional quality indicators of the
Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Ranking, and especially
the property rights indicator.
This unfavorable change in ranking is consistent with the contract violations and discretionary changes in policies and institutions
during the 2001–02 crisis and recent years, which have included
TABLE 2.2 Governance Indicators, 1998 and 2005
Rule of Law
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
India
Spain
United States
2005
Control of Corruption
1998
2005
1998
Est.
S.E.
N.
Est.
S.E.
N.
Est.
S.E.
N.
Est.
S.E.
N.
–0.56
–0.41
1.20
–0.47
–0.71
0.09
1.13
1.59
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.14
15
15
15
15
16
14
12
11
0.06
–0.17
1.18
–0.35
–0.72
0.13
1.33
1.66
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.19
0.18
0.18
0.20
0.20
11
12
11
10
12
11
10
10
–0.44
–0.28
1.34
–0.69
–0.22
–0.31
1.34
1.56
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.14
0.12
0.15
0.15
12
11
12
12
13
12
10
10
–0.29
0.03
1.13
–0.20
–0.67
–0.24
1.52
1.89
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.17
0.19
0.16
0.21
0.21
10
11
10
9
11
11
9
8
Source: World Bank, Governance Indicators, 2006.
Est. = estimate
S.E. = standard error
N = number of sources
price controls, deposit freezes, the “pesification” of public and private
debts with domestic residents,11 discretionary distortionary changes
in labor market regulations, reneging on contracts in the area of
public utilities, and uncertainty regarding court decisions related
to work-related illnesses and accidents. Some of these risks of low
appropriability may be endogenous and associated with macroeconomic instability, but others arise from poor institutional design and
may be binding constraints at all times.
This study also constructed a market-based measure of the
degree of appropriability of returns to investment in Argentina,
which is based on the literature on the market valuation of research
and development (R&D) and investment in other intangible assets
by individual firms (Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Hall and Oriani,
2004). This literature derives a regression equation for the market
valuation of a firm (Tobin’s Q) as an increasing function of its investments in R&D and in other intangible assets relative to its investment in tangible assets. In this framework, a low market valuation
11
By executive decree billions of US dollar-denominated bank deposits were
converted into pesos.
59
60
of the investment in R&D signals a low appropriability of the social
returns to this activity arising from poorly functioning intellectual
property rights and other spillovers. Low appropriability of private
returns arising from government failures will also reduce the market valuation of the investment in intangibles such as trademarks,
licenses, patents, and advertising. In the case of Argentina, separate
data are not available for capitalized R&D expenditures and other
intangible assets. The estimation in this study thus provides a joint
measure of low appropriability due to microeconomic risks and
market failures.12
This equation was estimated using a panel of public offer firms
with yearly data for 1990–96. A very small elasticity (0.014) of market valuation to intangible assets was found: much smaller than the
elasticities estimated for several European Union (EU) countries by
Hall and Oriani (2004), which range from 0.11 to 0.36. Hence appropriability of the returns on investments in intangible assets appears
to be small in Argentina. The elasticity was bigger and statistically
more significant in 1991–2001 than in 2003–06. This result reveals
that appropriability was low before the 2001–02 macroeconomic
crisis, and even lower after that.
Since data on “prices” of appropriability are not available, econometric analysis was used to measure the impact of low appropriability
on investment in physical assets. This is a complicated challenge,
as a panel data set is not available that includes both investment by
Argentine firms or industries and the exogenous appropriability
shocks or threats of expropriation that these firms face. Hence more
indirect procedures were used to gauge the effects of low appropriability on investment.
In the time series regression analysis of the determinants of
aggregate investment during 1993–96, the hypothesis of a structural
12
The exercise involves estimating the following regression equation: log (qit)
= lt + μ i + dlog[K it/Ait], where qit is firm i’s Tobin’s Q, Ait is tangible capital, Kit is
intangible capital and d is its shadow value, lt is an overall market index, and μ i is
a firm-specific component. The Tobin’s Q is measured as [(total assets – capital
stock) + market capitalization]/total assets].
break after the first quarter of 2002 cannot be rejected. This would
support the view that there was a regime change for the behavior of
investment. The introduction of a 2003–06 dummy variable in the
time series regressions that proxies for this regime change yields
a negative, significant, and robust coefficient, which is also very
significant in economic terms. Holding everything else constant,
the investment rate could now be up to 28 percent higher than it is
currently if the regime change had not occurred. While this dummy
variable could be capturing a lot of different things, its effect is
nevertheless consistent with the observed changes in the perceived
protection of property rights, rule of law, market valuation of intangibles, and other institutional quality indicators.
Next consider the effect that the degree of appropriability of
the returns on intangible assets (elasticities of market value to investment in intangible assets) has on the investment in fixed assets
by public offer firms.13 This approach requires first estimating how
appropriability varies by sector (introducing industry and size dummies), and then constructing hedonic measures of Tobin’s Q for each
public offer firm, which is the Tobin Q that can be expected based
on the ability to capture returns on intangible assets and the size of
these rents.14 The impact of the hedonic Q was then estimated on
investment at the firm level. It has a positive and significant coef-
13
The ability to appropriate the returns from investing in entrepreneurial assets
differs by industry and/or by size because of reasons related to political economy,
market structure, and technology. These coefficients may differ because of the
different mechanisms through which the rents that these assets generate can be
effectively protected and appropriated by the firm (Rumelt, 1984; Villalonga, 2004).
These mechanisms include the ability to introduce barriers to entry (technology,
scale, branding, patents), to lobby for favorable policies (or the ability to protect
the firm from expropriation or unfavorable discretionary policies), or to avoid the
diffusion of industrial secrets. As such, matters like the legal system, industrial
organization, firm size, technological characteristics of each industry, and political
economy considerations may affect appropriability differently by sector.
14
These hedonic Q measures are obtained by fitting the estimated regression
equation using the observed intangible to tangible asset ratios for each firm and
the sector to which it belongs, and the estimated coefficients. (For the derivation
of this estimation procedure, see Villalonga, 2004.)
61
62
ficients for the hedonic Q measures, signalling that the bigger the
appropriability, the bigger the investment. The result holds for both
the hedonic Q’s that are based on industry differences and on size
differences. Hence low appropriability reflected in this synthetic
measure of microeconomic risk and market failures is seen to bring
down investment.
Institutions and government failures in Argentina
Several authors, using empirical analysis, or narrative analytics,
or both, have found that Argentina lacks the right institutions that
would secure sustainable growth and insulate the society from the
voracity of politicians and rent seekers, and that institutional failures in Argentina go beyond what would be predicted by the usual
determinants (Della Paolera and Gallo, 2003; Spiller and Tommasi,
2003; Mody and Schindler, 2004).
Spiller and Tommasi (2003) point out that Argentina started
with an early history of wars, and peace and confederation came
at the expense of overrepresentation of small jurisdictions, which
generated a first instance of inadequate checks and balances. These
inadequate arrangements have persisted, and in recent decades
the legislature, judiciary, and bureaucracy have been ineffective in
providing checks and balances.
According to these authors, no single feature of the political
system can be singled out to explain distortionary policy outcomes in
Argentina, which result from past historical instability, constitutional
provisions, and the evolution of constitutional practices that led to an
amateur legislature, an ineffective judiciary, and a weak bureaucracy.
Weaknesses in the bureaucracy have arisen from the lack of long-term
perspective in the bureaucracy, which has led to unclear accountability, a parallel bureaucracy that is installed by each new executive
through the nomination of large numbers of political appointees,
and a high turnover through frequent rotation at the ministerial and
secretarial levels. As a consequence, unchecked unilateral moves
by the president alternate with periodic impasses in a system where
provincial governors exercise considerable veto power.
These weaknesses have been exacerbated by the transitions
between military and civilian governments and the high rate of turnover of key decision makers, leading to policies that are characterized either by excess volatility or by a high degree of rigidity. In this
setup, professional politicians are beholden to provincial governors,
and become amateur legislators who rarely invest in the skills and
knowledge required to fashion laws effectively.
An important issue is to what extent the microeconomic risks
are associated with economic crises (and hence would be eliminated
with macroeconomic stability) or are a more permanent feature of
the Argentine economy that gets exacerbated at times of crisis. The
analysis of institutional development suggests that an inadequate
institutional design is at the root of both recurrent instability and
expropriation risks.
Latent Constraints on Investment: The Cost of Finance
Investment in Argentina is currently financed by domestic savings,
which is not a binding constraint, as there is a significant slack
between both variables (the country is running fiscal and current
account surpluses). However, if investment were to overcome other
binding constraints and increase significantly, then domestic savings would become binding, as international finance is currently not
accessible. It is also possible that domestic savings would decline
because future export prices might decline and/or fiscal results might
deteriorate. Should this occur, the level of domestic savings would
become a binding constraint on the current investment levels.
Moreover, financial intermediation is very poor, and investment
is being self-financed in the largest firms with internal funds. While
real interest rates are relatively low because demand for credit is
currently low, this study finds evidence that firms are financially
constrained (investment is highly responsive to firms’ profits and
liquidity). Hence if investment were to rise significantly and/or firms’
internal funds were to decline, poor financial intermediation would
become a binding constraint.
63
64
Domestic Savings
Taylor (1998) shows that investment in Argentina was highly correlated
with domestic savings during 1960–90 (the correlation was 0.95), and
that savings were a highly binding constraint on investment, which
was reflected in a high relative price of capital. During the 1990s
this correlation declined to a much lower level (0.54) than during
the previous three decades, thanks both to Argentina’s own financial
liberalization and to the increased financial globalization that started
in the late 1980s. However, the correlation has returned to close to
unity since 2003, associated both with the Argentine debt crisis and
with the large boost in domestic savings experienced since 2002.
Low national savings appear to have been a truly binding constraint between 1991 and 2001, when high positive real interest rates
and current account deficits coexisted with growing foreign indebtedness, and a growing fiscal deficit (see Table 2.1). This constraint
was especially binding during 1999–2001 and lowered investment
when foreign savings ceased to be available and forced a current account reversal. Low national savings appears to have ceased being a
binding constraint after 2002, when domestic savings were boosted
by a combination of a positive terms of trade shock, devaluation, and
debt restructuring. Since then, the country has had negative real
interest rates (for depositors) and low interest rates (for creditors),
together with a current account surplus and a fiscal surplus.
The importance of the boost to domestic savings for improving
investment is confirmed by a time series regression analysis of the
determinants of aggregate investment and of investment in machinery
and equipment in 1993–2006, which shows that the fiscal result has
a positive, robust, and significant effect on both types of investment,
while the terms of trade have a positive and significant effect on
investment in machinery and equipment.15 A counterfactual analysis
15
There are two mechanisms through which external prices may feed into savings. First, the permanent income theory of consumption suggests that positive
temporary shocks to the terms of trade would not be consumed, hence leading
using the coefficients estimated in this regression analysis reveals
that if the fiscal result reverted to its 1993–2001 level, investment
would decline from 21.7 percent of GDP in 2006 (at 1993 prices) to
18.5 percent of GDP. In the same vein, a reversal to the 1993–01
average terms of trade would lower the machinery and equipment
investment rate by 1 percentage point (12 percent).
However, the future prospects of domestic savings are uncertain. On the one hand, public debt restructuring sizably reduced the
future interest burden and financing needs, which favors future public
savings. Moreover, the large complementarity with fast-growing
Asian economies introduces the expectation of sustained high export
prices.16 On the other hand, all the institutional features that have
generated fiscal crises in the past (lack of checks and balances on
the executive branch, and the combination of fiscal decentralization with overrepresentation of smaller jurisdictions, together with
large dependence of local governments on central funds and a large
autonomy to borrow) remain in place, facilitating procyclical public
spending that may jeopardize future fiscal sustainability and the
maintenance of a depreciated real exchange rate.
International Finance
Access to foreign savings was not a binding constraint during
1991–98, when the country was running capital account surpluses
(see Table 2.1). The cost of international finance (proxied by the
sovereign country risk) was neither too high nor too low during this
to greater savings. Second, the combination of higher export prices with the
introduction of export taxes in 2002 generated a new source of public revenues
for the central government, which are not shared with the provinces and which
contribute to more than half of the primary public surplus.
16
The average financing needs of the central government amount to 5.6 percent
of GDP for 2008–09, and then decline to 4 percent for 2010–12, 2.2 percent for
2013–18, 0.5 percent for 2019–31, and 0.3 percent for 2032–45. On the other hand,
the average interest payments on public debt represent 1.5 percent of GDP for
2007–10, and then decline to less than 1 percent of GDP after 2012, continuously
declining until they become nil around 2040.
65
66
period, reaching its minimum value during the second half of 1997
(see Table 2.1). Poor access to foreign finance became a binding
constraint during 1999–2001 when capital inflows started to decline
and reverted in 2001. The country risk premium stayed high during
1998–2000 and skyrocketed in 2001.
This constraint appears to not be binding at present. Today’s
declining capital outflows more likely result from a low demand for
international finance than from an increase in its supply. As a result,
the sovereign country risk has fallen significantly since the 2001–02
debt crisis (see Table 2.1). However, this country risk is relatively
expensive, as Argentina sovereign bonds face larger spreads than
Brazilian and Mexican bonds.
Additionally, Argentina has always had a very high external
debt/export ratio, which has made foreign financing relatively expensive (see Table 2.1). This ratio declined significantly after the
foreign debt restructuring in 2004, but is still rather large, which
puts a relatively high ceiling on the cost of international finance.
According to the 2007 Banco Central de la República Argentina
(BCR A) statistics on private sector foreign debt, the relative importance of international finance for the private sector in Argentina has
been declining steadily since 2002. Between the end of 2001 and the
end of 2006, the stock of net external private debt fell by 40 percent,
from 0.7 percent of GDP to 0.2 percent of GDP. The BCR A report
reveals that this decline in the relative importance of private external
debt is largely due to a large debt restructuring process that took
place mostly in 2004. The report also shows that while Argentine
firms have been mostly paying back and refinancing their outstanding debts since 2002, they are currently seeking new international
financing. Foreign financing remains relatively low.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has fallen as a share of total
investment, and Argentina’s shares in FDI flows to the world and to
Latin America have declined significantly (see Figure 2.6).17 This
17
FDI relative to total investment in Argentina declined from 23 percent in 2000
to 12 percent in 2006.
is a potentially binding constraint, as Taylor (1998) has shown that
FDI, together with international corporate bond equity issuance,
have become the predominant forms of international financing since
the 1990s.
Taylor (1998) documents how Argentina’s financial autarky
between 1910 and 1990 has been one of the largest hindrances
to economic growth for this country. This autarky was caused by
“unwilling foreign creditors in the 1910s and 1920s, capital controls
in the 1930s and 1940s, capital price distortions in the 1950s and
1960s, and wayward monetary policies in the 1970s and 1980s.”
Taylor claims that the financial liberalization in Argentina in the
1990s, together with the financial globalization of that decade, would
have helped Argentina escape from this autarky trap. However,
since 2002, a backlash against Argentina’s financial liberalization
has occurred, with the reintroduction of capital controls, the still
unsettled debt with private and sovereign creditors (some $20 billion in nonrestructured debt with private bondholders and $6 billion
in outstanding debt with Paris Club members remains unsettled),
and other market unfriendly interventions in financial and goods
markets.
FIGURE 2.6 Argentina’s Participation in FDI Flows to the World and to
Latin America, 1997–2005
(percent)
2.5
35
Argentina/LAC
Argentina/world
30
2.0
25
1.5
20
1.0
10
0.5
0.0
5
1997
1998
1999
2000
Source: IERAL-Fundación Mediterránea based on Mecon.
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
0
67
68
Poor Financial Intermediation
From a quantity point of view, financial intermediation in Argentina
would appear to be rather poor. Banking credit to the nonfinancial
private sector and stock market capitalization are very low from an
international perspective (see Table 2.3).18 What is more, banking
credit to the nonfinancial private sector is significantly smaller than
it was during the 1990s, when it was already low by international
standards.
However prices tell a different story. Argentina is experi-
TABLE 2.3 Domestic Credit, Claims
on Private Sector, 2005
encing very low (even negative)
Countries
% GDP, 2005
interest margins (see Table 2.1),
11.4
21.1
32.7
41.2
57.9
70.1
93.5
112.2
146.0
suggesting that access to finance
Argentina
Colombia
Brazil
India
United States
Chile
Korea. Rep. of
China
Spain
Source: IERAL-Fundación Mediterránea based on IMF, International Financial Statistics.
real interest rates and very low
would not appear to be a binding constraint on investment
currently, and that the very low
intermediation results mostly
from a low demand for credit.
Indeed, Argentine firms’ cash
f lows between 2003 and 2005
were historically large, helping
them self-finance their invest-
ment.19 By contrast, during the 1990s Argentina faced a rather high
cost of credit (large real interest rates and net interest margins),
suggesting that this was a binding constraint on growth (and probably that firms’ cash flows were relatively small). This was especially
true for 1999–2002.
18
The stock market valuation in Argentina was 72 percent of GDP in 2001 and
33 percent in 2005. On the other hand, market capitalization in 2005 represented
60 percent of GDP in Brazil, 118 percent in Chile, and 136 percent in the United
States.
19
The corporate income/capital stock ratio in Argentina was 14.5 percent in
1998, 11.3 percent in 2002, and 15.5 percent in 2006.
Econometric analyses of the determinants of investment at the
aggregate, industry, and firm levels yield either no effects or negative effects of the stock of credit on output from 1993 to 2006. This
is consistent with the possibility that the large and expensive stock
of debt (possibly greater than the optimal levels of indebtedness)
that manufacturing firms had accumulated in the predevaluation
period generated very large financial costs that prevented the allocation of internal funds to the financing of investment. Under this
interpretation, the devaluation and pesification of corporate debts in
2002 (which has since generated a large decline in the credit/GDP
ratio) may have yielded significant financial relief to manufacturing
firms, which facilitated the self-financing of their investments in the
short run.
On the other hand, all the regression analyses of this study
show a positive and significant effect of current sales and profits on
investment, which is usually associated with financial constraints
on investment. Hence this study tested formally for the possible
existence of these financial constraints. To this end, panel data regressions were run for the determinants of investment in net fixed
assets using annual data from financial statements of public offer
firms for 1990–2006. The regressors include, in addition to variables
related to profit maximization, financial variables such as cash flow
or leverage in the investment equation, as proposed in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). 20
Capital market imperfections can come from various sources,
such as information asymmetries, costly monitoring, and contract
enforcement problems. Thus in a financially constrained context,
20
Based on Gilchrist and Himmelberg’s (1998) set up, and assuming quadratic
and persistent adjustment costs as in Love (2003), an investment equation of the
following form can be obtained:
Iit/Kit = b1 (Iit–1/Kit–1) + b2 MPK it + b3 (FINit–1/ K it–1) + b4 (LEVit/Kit) + f i + d t + eit ,
where i denotes the firm; t, the year; I, investment; K, capital stock; MPK, marginal
productivity of capital; FIN, a proxy for liquidity; LEV, leverage; f, a firm-specific
effect; and d, a time dummy.
69
70
the signs of profit and liquidity variables in the equation should be
positive. The sign for leverage cannot be determined a priori. The
standard proxies for liquidity, cash flow or stock of liquidity (current
assets minus current liabilities), are used. A specification was also
estimated that tests the interaction of profits, liquidity, and leverage
for different periods and stratifies by firm size to capture whether
financial constraints have tightened in recent years and if they are
particularly relevant for smaller firms. Both fixed effects and GMM
estimations were undertaken.
The results confirm the premise that firms in the sample face
financing constraints, as the estimated coefficients for the proxies for
both profits and liquidity are significant and positive in each of the
alternative model specifications, particularly for the smaller firms in
terms of assets. The coefficient for leverage is significantly negative
under the GMM estimation and under OLS for smaller firms. This is
consistent with most of the previous empirical literature, indicating
that very indebted firms do not get credit easily, 21 or that very indebted
firms prefer to invest less, as the resulting profits would end up in
creditors’ hands rather than being distributed as dividends.
The coefficient on profits is augmented in the 2002–06 period
under the GMM estimation, which suggests that firms are facing
more stringent financing constraints in the growth environment
experienced in the last five years. When the sample is stratified by
firm size in terms of assets, results under both estimation methods
point out that the relatively smaller firms seem constrained by insufficient liquidity (cash flows) or overindebtedness. Larger firms
seem to face constraints against keeping their investment growing
at the same rate as sales.
The results thus confirm that Argentine firms are financially
constrained, and more so in the present, but that the larger firms
have been able to circumvent these constraints with the greater
availability of internal funds.
21
See Gallego and Loayza (2000) and Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989), among
others.
Binding Constraints on the Structural Transformation of Exports
The structural transformation of exports toward more sophisticated
activities with greater possibilities for technological convergence
affects growth positively through two complementary channels.
First, it favors investment by opening new opportunities that offer
higher returns than the traditional production and export activities.
Second, it relocates resources to activities that contribute to greater
TFP growth via technological catch-up and generates more attractive opportunities for research and innovation. Hence the binding
constraints on this productivity-enhancing activity are analyzed
separately. The potential constraints are in two areas: low social
returns to export innovation (caused by poor accumulated capabilities and opportunities for structural transformation); and low
appropriability of the social returns to this activity, caused either
by market failures (coordination and information externalities) or
by government failures (anti-export bias of domestic trade policy,
inadequate opening of foreign markets).
The main findings are that structural transformation has been
scarce in Argentina, resulting in relatively low levels of sophistication
of exports and specialization in activities that appear to offer relatively
little scope for technological catch-up to the world frontier. This lack
of transformation cannot be attributed to insufficient or inadequate
accumulated capabilities for discovering new exports. Instead the
most binding constraints are the market failures (coordination and
information externalities) that hinder the discovery of modern export activities. Domestic and foreign trade policies do not favor this
discovery process, but are not the most binding constraints.
Structural Transformation of Exports in Argentina
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) estimate that the more sophisticated the country’s export basket vis-à-vis its per capita income,
the greater its subsequent growth. The sophistication of the export
basket is measured as the income content of the products exported
71
72
by a country. 22 Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik attribute the positive
growth effect of export sophistication to the associated learning
economies or potential catch-up effects a nation gains by specializing in sets of goods similar to those of more advanced countries.
However, they do not test for this effect at the microeconomic level
and obtain the result in a black box fashion. Hence the growth effect
of greater export sophistication could be capturing other growthfriendly effects of exporting a rich country’s export basket, such as
the greater stability in the terms of trade that is usually associated
with the export of more sophisticated manufacturing goods, which
face more stable world demand. In either case, greater export sophistication is bound to have significant growth-enhancing effects.
Hwang (2006) finds that fast-growing developing countries
thrive by widening the pattern of specialization toward goods that
are produced initially at a relatively low quality vis-à-vis a distant
world technology frontier, hence gaining access to bigger catch-up
possibilities. He also finds that increasing convergence possibilities
is greatly facilitated by greater export diversification, a greater similarity to the export structure of advanced countries, and by greater
export sophistication (as defined by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik,
2005). The distance between the quality of the domestic good being exported and the international quality frontier is proxied by the
distance between the unit export prices for that good in the country
of interest and in the OECD countries.
Argentina has had a lackluster growth in the sophistication of its
exports, measured as suggested by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik.
The income content of Argentine exports has grown only 15 percent
between 1975 and 2000, and Argentina’s current per capita income
lies above its export sophistication, suggesting that its current export
22
The measure of snophistication of country’s export basket in Hausmann,
Hwang and Rodrik (2005), EXPY, is calculated as the share weighted average
of the PRODY of each component of country’s export basket, where PRODY
measures the productivity associated with the good, calculated as the revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) weighted average of the level of income per capita
of the countries that export that good.
FIGURE 2.7 Export Sophistication Relative to Per Capita GDP,
Selected Countries, 1975–2000
9,000
EXPY, US$(2000) final
8,000
EXPY Argentina
EXPY Brazil
EXPY Chile
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Source: IERAL-Fundación Mediterránea.
basket will not offer a positive contribution to growth. During the
same period, the income contents of the exports of Brazil and Chile
grew 100 percent and 50 percent, respectively (see Figure 2.7).
Focusing on the quality upgrading of A rgentine exports,
proxied by the evolution of unit export prices, it is clear that while
Argentina’s exports rose sevenfold between 1986 and 2006, most of
this growth was explained by a rise in quantity, with only a negligible
contribution from changes in export value. Hence, Argentina does
not appear to have experienced a quality upgrading of its exports.
Table 2.4 further shows that there was little quality convergence of
Argentine exports to the OECD frontier between 1994 and 2005, as
proxied by the evolution of relative unit export prices vis-à-vis the
OECD prices for the same export baskets. This relative unit price
of exports actually declined during this period. On the other hand,
the unit price of new exports relative to the frontier was smaller than
that of traditional exports, and rose relative to the frontier. However,
this growth was very small (0.46 percent per year). 23 Results are
23
To identify new exports at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS)
that emerged between 1993–94 and 2003–04, the following criteria were used.
Exports should have grown at least 300 percent during this period—so as to
73
74
TABLE 2.4 Relative Export Prices, Argentina to OECD, 1994 and 2005
Overall and new exports
1994
2005
Total
Total without NE
NE
MOA
MOA NE
MOI
MOI NE
0.866
0.809
0.871
0.799
0.817
0.855
0.853
0.757
0.808
0.805
0.854
0.786
0.779
0.787
Source: IERAL-Fundación Mediterránea based on World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).
MOA = agriculture manufactures
MOI = industrial manufactures
NE = new exports
similar with respect to traditional and new exports of industrial
manufactures. 24 Hwang (2006) also shows that in 1989–91 Argentina
had a relatively high unit price for its manufacturing exports to the
United States (much bigger than the unit export prices of Brazil,
China, the Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, and
the Netherlands), which helps explain its relatively low per capita
GDP growth, in international perspective, from 1991 to 2004.
Argentina has one of the most diversified export structures
in Latin America with a Herfindahl index for exports of 2.9 percent
(De Ferranti et al., 2002). It is also much more diversified than the
average of the Hwang (2006) sample of 117 countries for 1984–2000,
whose Herfindahl index is 23 percent, compared to 77 percent for
Argentina. Its export structure is also much more similar to the
include sectors that have increased beyond average export growth (154.7 percent)
and median export growth (263 percent). The exports also must have reached a
minimum level of at least US$10 million in the average of 2003–04 and a maximum level of US$1 million in the average of 1993–94. This criterion yields only
87 products that meet all the requirements (out of 4,198 products at this level of
disaggregation that showed positive exports in 2004).
24
There has been divergence in quality in the case of processed foodstuffs, both
for total exports and for new exports (although less for new exports). This is the
opposite of what Hwang (2006) finds for a cross-section of countries. In the case
of industrial manufactures, there was also quality/price divergence for total exports, despite the small convergence for new industrial exports (unit prices grew
0.1 percent per year vis-à-vis the frontier). New industrial exports started with a
lower relative price than traditional exports of industrial manufactures.
OECD structure than the average of Hwang’s sample. 25 This means
that the problem does not lie in the extent of diversification but in the
likelihood that Argentina has diversified its exports toward activities
with low catch-up possibilities, which is consistent with the lack of
export sophistication.
Hence, while there have been important changes in the composition of exports between 1993 and 2005, with a significant increase
in the importance of new export activities (87 new goods at the sixdigit level, now representing 20.9 percent of all exports), these new
exports have offered very little improvement in sophistication and
in possibilities for technological convergence.
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik’s (2005) econometric estimations
suggest that if the export sophistication of Argentina had been 60
percent higher at the onset (so as to the replicate the ratio of export
income content to per capita income of Brazil in 1975), its GDP growth
rate for 1975–2000 would have been 3 percentage points higher than
the observed level. This finding is consistent with Hwang’s (2006) estimates, which suggest that a 60 percent increase in the income content
of Argentina’s exports would yield a bigger catch-up space (the distance
between its unit export prices and those of the OECD), which would
improve the rate of growth of export prices by 6 percentage points
per year and per capita GDP growth by 2 percentage points. Hwang’s
estimates also show that Argentina’s catch-up space in 1994 predicted
a 0.26 percent per capita GDP growth per year. Instead, if Argentina’s
catch-up space had been similar to that of Brazil, its per capita GDP
growth rate would have been 2 percentage points higher.
Capabilities and Opportunities for Structural Transformation
Thus, the lack of structural transformation cannot be attributed to
inadequate accumulated capabilities and opportunities for develop-
25
The export similarity index takes a value of 0 when there is no overlap and 1
if a country exactly matches the OECD’s distribution of export shares. While the
Hwang sample average index is 0.14, Argentina’s index is 0.29.
75
76
ing new valuable exports. Indeed, the “open forest” measure of
option value for structural transformation developed by Hausmann
and Klinger (2006) is not unfavorable for the acquisition of greater
export sophistication. 26 Argentina’s open forest has been growing
over time at rates comparable to those of Brazil and Chile (see Figure 2.8). Additionally, Argentina had a bigger initial open forest and
per capita GDP than these other two countries, which nevertheless
managed to increase their export sophistication significantly over
time. Hence it does not appear that Argentina’s initial open forest
was an impediment for export sophistication growth. Indeed, if the
coefficients econometrically estimated by Hausmann, Hwang and
Rodrik (2005) for the effects of open forest are used on subsequent
export sophistication growth, Argentina’s initial open forest should
have led to a 22–37 percent increase in export sophistication between
1975 and 2000, much greater than the increase actually observed (15
percent), and similar to levels predicted for Korea using the same
estimated coefficients. In addition, Argentina’s open forest in 2000
was not significantly smaller than it was for China, Finland, India,
or Indonesia.
26
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) found that the capability of structural transformation depends negatively on the distances between the products in which the
country has a revealed comparative advantage and those products that are not
being exported. These authors measure distance between two products as the
minimum probability that each of these products will be exported conditional
on the other being exported as well. They use these measures of distance to
construct measures of “density” for each product that a country is not currently
exporting, which aggregate the distances between each of these products and the
goods that the country is currently exporting. These density measures capture
the capabilities for structural transformation. These authors additionally measure
the attractiveness of structural transformation by evaluating the “price” of the
products that are close (in the Hausmann and Klinger sense) to current exports.
This price is measured by the productivity associated with the good, calculated
as the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) weighted average of the income
per capita of the countries that export that good. The prices and densities of the
nonexported goods are aggregated into a variable called “open forest,” which
measures the option value of structural transformation. Intuitively, the closer and
pricier the nonexported goods are, the bigger the attractiveness of, and capability
for, structural transformation toward a more sophisticated export basket.
FIGURE 2.8 Open Forest Dynamics in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
2,000
Thousands, US$(2000)
1,800
1,600
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) ’s econometric analysis at the
product level finds that the likelihood of jumping to a new export
good is positively affected by the distance between the value (income content) of the new good and that of the current export basket
(sophistication). They also find that “density” (their measure of the
probability of exporting the good conditioned by the current export
basket) has a positive and significant effect on the probability of
jumping to new goods. When Hausmann and Klinger’s estimations
are replicated for the individual case of Argentina, “density” or proximity is found to be a stronger determinant of discovery than it was
for the average country in the Hausmann and Klinger sample. In the
individual case of Argentina, the income content of the new goods
has a significant but very small impact on structural change. This
suggests that proximity is more important than value for discovering
new goods, which is consistent with the finding of no growth in the
unit prices of Argentine exports and little growth in the sophistication of Argentine exports.
This finding is further supported by product-level analysis of
the roles played by proximity and attractiveness in shaping recent
discoveries and conditioning future new exports. This analysis
shows that newly discovered exports between 1993 and 2005 have
a productivity or income content that is 50 percent greater than that
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78
of traditional exports. These discoveries have already exploited the
small quality convergence possibilities that they had at the onset (see
Table 2.4). Higher income content than that of traditional exports
has played some role in the discovery of new exports, but these
new activities did not contribute significantly to improve export
sophistication because they represent a small share of total exports.
In addition, these goods were located close to the previous export
basket in the product space, suggesting that proximity played a key
role in developing these new exports.
On the other hand, while the open forest is, on average, favorable for structural transformation, the 25 most attractive goods
(in terms of greater income content and/or quality convergence
possibilities) not yet exported are relatively far away in the product
space, suggesting that the capabilities for discovering new valuable
exports are good but not great.
The Role of Trade Policies
Domestic trade policies that change the domestic relative price
in favor of import substitution will discourage the discovery of
new exports in the presence of fixed costs of entry into new markets and coordination and information externalities. In addition,
discriminatory foreign trade policies reduce the expected profits
of discovery, especially in the case of differentiated goods with
downward sloping foreign demands, and also reduce the ability
to converge to higher levels of quality if the markets for higher
quality are closed.
Relatively low tariff discrimination by members of the North
American Free Trade Area (NAF TA) and the European Union (EU)
appears to have facilitated recent discoveries of new exports, as
these exports face lower NAF TA and EU trade restrictions than
any other group on average—although they face relatively high
tariff peaks. East Asia and Latin America are natural markets for
new goods. However, tariff discrimination in these regions is relatively high and may have conditioned the attractiveness of the new
exports. 27 Domestic trade policy did not discourage these discoveries
at the onset, either. This group of exports enjoyed relatively high
protection at home, although at the time of the discovery they faced
no export taxes (which were introduced in 2002), which resulted in
a low relative price of import substitution (1.14). Since export taxes
have been introduced, the relative price of import substitution has
risen to a high 1.23. 28 This raises a potential problem of time inconsistency of trade policy that may discourage future discoveries.
The most attractive goods (in terms of income content and/
or possibilities for technological convergence) not yet exported are
not discriminated against by the average NAF TA and EU tariffs
(although they face high tariff peaks in these blocs). They are,
however, punished by relatively high East Asian and Latin American
barriers to imports. 29 The discovery of this group does not appear
to be discouraged by domestic trade policy, as it faces a low relative
price of import substitution (similar to that enjoyed by new discoveries at the onset).
Hence current domestic trade policies do not appear to play
a significant role in the lack of discovery of the most attractive potential new exports. However, the time inconsistency of domestic
trade policy may be contributing significantly to insufficient structural transformation. NAF TA and EU tariffs are not too harmful for
27
Average tariffs on new Argentine exports were 1.2 percent in NAF TA countries,
3.6 percent in the EU, 10 percent in East Asian countries, and 8.9 percent in Latin
America. The largest tariff peaks were those observed in NAF TA countries (43.5
percent) (WITS). For the importance of East Asian and Latin American markets
for the exports of new differentiated goods, see Sánchez et al. (2007).
28
The relative price of import substitution is computed as (1 + import tariff)/
(1 – export tax). New exports face 14 percent average domestic import tariffs,
zero initial export taxes, and 7.3 percent final average export taxes (with peak 26
percent final export taxes) (WITS).
29
Average import tariffs in the EU and NAF TA countries for the goods with the
most sophistication and/or best possibilities for convergence do not exceed 3.8
percent (except for the 13.5 percent EU import tariffs on the goods with largest
technological frontier). Asian and Latin American import tariffs on these goods
are in the range of 8.9–10 percent (except for the low 4 percent Asian tariffs on
the goods with the largest technological frontier) (WITS).
79
80
structural transformation either. On the other hand, Asian and Latin
American import tariffs discriminate strongly against the exports
of all groups.
The Role of Market Failures
The findings regarding trade policies and capabilities suggest that
information externalities and coordination failures are the most
binding constraint on structural transformation. The case studies
of new successful export activities in Argentina undertaken by
Sánchez et al. (2007) provides some preliminary support to this
hypothesis. 30
This hypothesis was evaluated by analyzing whether the
emergence of new export activities since 1993 more closely fits the
case of widespread discovery and diffusion (in which case market
failures are not very important) or the case of limited discovery and
diffusion. The findings confirm that coordination and information
externalities are indeed a binding constraint on structural transformation. Discoveries do occur, but mostly when the pioneer can
introduce barriers to entry that block diffusion, and the discoveries
tend to have relatively little value (income content or convergence
possibilities). As a result, many activities where the pioneer cannot
introduce barriers to entry and/or cannot, on their own, provide
the required industry-specific public goods fail to be discovered.
30
Sánchez et al. (2007) analyze a series of case studies where the emergence
of new successful modern export activities in Argentina often occurs in sectors
where the pioneer can capture monopoly rents (at least temporary) by introducing
barriers to entry, thus compensating for the knowledge externality. Additionally,
where coordination failures may be important, the pioneer tends to be a relatively
large firm, with previous experience and scale in horizontally or vertically related activities, which can engage in vertical integration and/or self-provide the
required industry-specific public goods, and self-finance this investment. This in
turn leads to relatively small or slow diffusion. This suggests that there are many
profitable activities that fail to be discovered because of the absence of targeted
policies that facilitate experimentation (quite the opposite of Chile) and because
the poor functioning of many trade-related institutions unduly raises the cost of
experimentation.
Additionally, many discoveries of low value survive because of the
privately generated protracted monopoly power.
There are several relevant stylized facts about discovery and
diffusion in Argentina:
t The frequency of emergence of new export activities in Argentina during the past 15 years does not appear to be small
relative to other countries. 31
t The inter-industry pattern of investment in manufacturing
activities since 2002 is negatively associated with the frequency of emergence of new exports by sector, suggesting a
bias against investing in activities that are exposed to bigger
coordination and information externalities. There is a –71.8
correlation between sectoral investment and frequency of
discoveries
t The new export activities show very little diffusion. 32 The
concentration of exports, proxied by the export share of
the largest exporting firm, was very large at the onset, as
one would expect, but it was even larger at the end. 33 This
suggests that discoveries are associated with the private
introduction of protracted barriers to entry and with the
internal provision of industry-specific public goods.
t There is a negative correlation between discovery and diffusion at the sectoral level, signalling that discoveries emerge
more frequently when entrepreneurs can introduce barriers
31
Using the metrics of Klinger and Lederman (2004), 2 percent of the total
number of Argentine exports at the HS six-digit level are new exports: the same
percentage as in Chile and in China, and greater than Spain (1 percent) and the
United States (0 percent), but less than Colombia, India, and Korea (3 percent),
Turkey (8 percent), and Indonesia (9 percent).
32
The largest exporter accounted for 69 percent of the total exports of each new
good on average at the onset (1994), and 70 percent of total exports of each new
good at the outset (2005).
33
To measure export concentration at the product level, Customs Office data
were used for firm-level exports by product (which can be disaggregated up to
the eight-digit level) for 1994–2004.
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to entry. To see this, this study computed different measures
of the extent of diffusion per sector and estimated their correlations with the number and the frequency of new exports
in those sectors. This was always found to be negative and
very often statistically significant, especially regarding the
number of discoveries per sector. 34
The Argentine pattern of intermediate number of discoveries,
very limited diffusion and low export sophistication growth and
poor quality catch-up in the presence of a reasonable open forest and
relatively large diversification is consistent with the lack of government intervention to compensate the coordination and information
externalities, together with cross-industry differences in the ability of pioneers to introduce barriers to entry and self-provide the
required public goods.
Binding Constraints on Research and Innovation
The most recent theoretical and empirical growth literature shows
that most countries appear to grow at the same long-run growth
rates, which are determined by world TFP growth, and that differences in investment and in research and innovation rates only
34
The diffusion indicators computed include: a) the share of export growth
explained by an increase in the number of local exporters, measured as the ratio
between growth in the number of exporting firms per sector and the percentage
growth in total sectoral exports (dN/dX ) (the larger this indicator is, the bigger
the diffusion); b) the change over time in the sectoral export share of the firm
that had the largest export share in 1993 (dsharepioneer) (if it increases, there
is more concentration); c) the export share of the largest exporting firm in 2004
(share-endleader); and d) the Herfindahl Index of concentration in the number of
exporters in 2005. These indicators were compared to two indicators of discovery:
the number of new exports by sector (#NE), and the number of new exports relative
to the total number of exported goods by sector (%NE). All the correlations have
negative signs. The largest ones are those between the number of new exports
by sector and the contribution of new exporters to export growth (–0.49) and
between the number of new exports by sector and the Herfindahl index for the
firm concentration of exports (–0.52).
explain differences in long-run income (Howitt, 2000; Klenow and
Rodríguez-Clare, 2005). In the proposed Schumpeterian endogenous
growth framework, investment in physical capital and innovation
are complementary activities, where innovation is defined as all
the expenditure decisions geared toward tapping the world stock of
knowledge with the goal of improving the country’s own technology.
World TFP growth results from the spillovers from the research
undertaken by all countries. 35 Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005)
introduce the additional possibility that each country has its own
technology frontier, which differs from the world frictionless frontier
because of barriers to “engagement” (through FDI, trade, capital
goods imports from technologically advanced countries, and quality of communication infrastructure). In this framework, domestic
research determines the distance between the country’s long-run
productivity and its own frontier, with the technological frontiers for
all countries growing at the same steady state rate as the frictionless
rate. The closer the country is to its technology frontier, the smaller
the social rate of return to innovation.
In this framework, divergence from world TFP growth, such as
the gap observed in Argentina, would be due to transitional dynamics
toward a new steady state with a bigger gap between the country’s
productivity and its own technology frontier, or toward a new steady
state with a new and lower technology frontier.
The potential constraints are found in three main areas: low
social returns to technological innovation (caused by low engagement
in the world flow of ideas, low human capital, and low complementary
investment); low appropriability of the social returns to this activity (caused either by market failures in the form of technological
externalities, or by government failures, including R&D taxes and
capital income taxes); and high cost of finance (low availability of
venture capital and poor government financial support).
35
Keller (2004) provides a summary of the compelling recent empirical evidence
on the large extent of international technology diffusion and of the mechanisms
through which it occurs.
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Research and innovation activities in Argentina are relatively
scarce from international and intertemporal perspectives. However,
the social rate of return to these activities is very low, signalling
that Argentina has a very low technological frontier and that its
current technological knowledge is close to this frontier. Indeed,
the divergence from world TFP growth between 1980 and 2000
can be fully explained by a decline in research intensity, which is
caused to a large extent by an inadequate engagement in the world
flow of ideas at a time when technological knowledge has become
more global. This disengagement appears to be due to insufficient
participation in FDI flows and imports of capital goods from knowledge-abundant countries and specialization in export activities with
low technological frontiers, together with local inadequacies in the
areas of human capital and information technology and telecommunications infrastructure. As a result, the technological frontier
that Argentina faces has contracted. Poor indicators in the area
of intellectual property rights also contribute to the low research
intensity. Financing does not help either, but the other binding
constraints are more important.
The Scarcity of Innovation in Argentina
Argentina’s indicators of innovative activity are very poor relative
to other relevant countries, in terms of either pure R&D intensity,
which reaches a meagre 0.44 percent GDP (see Table 2.5), or total
firm spending on innovation relative to sales. 36 R&D intensity has
declined greatly since 1975–79, when it reached 0.94 percent of GDP—
which at the time compared very favorably to other countries that
have overtaken Argentina, such as Brazil, India, Ireland, Korea, and
Taiwan. A disproportionately large share of the total research effort
36
Sánchez, Nahirñak and Ruffo (2006) find that the average amount spent on
innovative activities by Argentine firms relative to sales was 1.7 percent in 2001,
much less than in Brazil (4 percent). The maximum amount spent by Argentine
innovative firms was 2.15 percent of sales, much less than the maximum amount
spent in Brazil, which reached 7.8 percent of sales.
in Argentina has been undertaken
by the public sector. 37
In order to gauge whether
research and innovation are truly
sc a rce, t his st udy est i mated
their social rate of return (SRR)
in Argentina by running a panel
data regression of TFP growth at
the industry level for 1991–2006
on the initial R&D intensity per
TABLE 2.5 Innovation Indicators,
Selected Countries, 2004
Countries
R&D spending as % of GDP
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombiaa
Spain
USA
0.44
0.91
0.70
0.17
1.07
2.66
Source: RICyT
a. Data for Colombia are for 2001.
industry. 38 The results show that
R&D investment in the Argentine manufacturing sector has a negligible and insignificant social rate of return (0.1–0.6 percent)—much
smaller than in the United States (25–35 percent), which is much
closer to the world technology frontier.
This finding contrasts very starkly with the SRR that arises from
the calibration of the Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) model of
productivity and research for the year 2000, assuming that Argentina’s
frontier is the frictionless world technology frontier. In such case, Ar-
37
Lederman and Saez (2005) show that in 1975–79, R&D expenditures relative
to GDP in Brazil, India, Korea, Taiwan, and Ireland represented 0.61 percent, 0.43
percent, 0.53 percent, 0.83 percent, and 0.68 percent, respectively. In 1995–99,
those expenditures relative to GDP had risen to 0.84 percent, 0.62 percent, 2.57
percent, 1.9 percent, and 1.34 percent, respectively. The R&D expenditures of the
private sector in Argentina never exceeded 25 percent of the total R&D expenditures, whereas in Brazil they exceeded 35 percent, and in the other comparator
countries they exceeded 50 percent (except in the case of India).
38
See Jones and Williams (1998) for methodological discussions. This study
made use of the National Innovation Survey (ENICT), which contains data on
R&D and other types of innovation expenditures for a representative sample of
manufacturing firms for 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2001. Labor productivity per industry
was computed using the data from the Monthly Industrial Survey. As TFP data
were not available, a regression was run of labor productivity growth at five-year
intervals on the initial R&D intensity for each industry and on the growth of capital per worker, which was proxied by a time dummy. A panel data regression was
run with T = 4, corresponding to 1992–97, 1996 –2001, 1998–2003, and 2001–06.
A distinction was made between investment in R&D and investment in innovative
capital goods (with embodied technological knowledge).
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gentina’s own knowledge stock (proxied by TFP) would be 51 percent
of the world frontier, and its SRR to innovation would be in the range
of 46–100 percent, depending on the underlying parameter values.
Hence the estimated low SRR can only be reconciled with the technological backwardness of Argentina if one allows for the possibility
that Argentina has undergone a disengagement process such that its
technology frontier is much lower than the world frictionless frontier,
and that it has a relatively small gap vis-à-vis its own low frontier.
Indeed, when the productivity gap was calibrated relative to
the own frontier that would be required to equate the calibrated and
the estimated SRRs, the steady-state TFP relative to the own frontier
would be 88.61–91.99 percent depending on the underlying parameter
values. This would imply that Argentina’s own technology frontier is
55–57 percent of the world frictionless frontier: a very low level.
Research, Investment, and Productivity Divergence
The steady state productivity gap in the Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare
(2005) model is a decreasing function of: the country’s research
intensity; the country’s steady state capital per effective worker;
the marginal productivity of research; and the ability to capture the
sources of technology diffusion from abroad that do not depend on
domestic research efforts.
This model was calibrated to analyze whether the observed
decline in the Argentine TFP distance vis-à-vis the frictionless world
technology frontier can be a transition toward a new steady state gap
caused by changes in the steady state capital per effective worker
and/or in the research intensity. Between 1980 and 2000, the TFP
distance to the frictionless frontier increased 13.8 percentage points
(from 64 percent to 51 percent of the world largest TFP at each date).
Capital per effective worker, as defined by Klenow and RodríguezClare (2005), increased 5.6–9.9 percent depending on the underlying
parameter values, while the recorded research intensity fell 0.52
percentage points (more than half) vis-à-vis 1975–79. The observed
widening in the TFP gap relative to the frictionless frontier cannot
be explained by the change in the level of capital per effective worker
alone, maintaining the 2000 research intensity unchanged—as in
this case the slight capital deepening should have led to some small
convergence. The model fits the actual gap in 1980 very precisely
when the 1975–79 data are used for research intensity. 39 Hence it
can be concluded that the decrease in the observed TFP relative to
the world frictionless frontier was largely driven by the observed
collapse in research intensity.
In the Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) framework, this
collapse in research intensity can result from higher capital income
taxes, lower R&D subsidies, and/or greater research spillovers that
reduce the appropriability of the social returns to innovation, or from
disengagement with the world flow of ideas that reduces the country’s
own technology frontier relative to the frictionless frontier.
Argentina’s lackluster TFP growth since 1975 can be explained
as the result of a reduction in engagement with world technology
flows, leading to transitional dynamics toward a lower steady state
technology frontier, and hence to a transitional decline in TFP visà-vis the world’s frictionless frontier until the new steady state is
reached. This also led to a reduction in research and innovation
intensity to accommodate to the country’s new lower frontier and
to the decline in the SRR to R&D.
Technological Disengagement
The survey on international technology diffusion (ITD) by Keller
(2004) reveals that inward flows of foreign technological knowledge
are an increasing source of domestic productivity growth.40 While in
the past technology creation and diffusion was highly concentrated
39
The authors consider the 1975–79 data to be more representative of the actual
1980 figure, given that the collapse in research intensity in 1980–4 was most likely
driven by the 1982 debt crisis.
40
For instance, between 1983 and 1995 the contribution of technology diffusion
from G-5 countries was on average almost 90 percent of the total R&D effect on
productivity in nine other OECD countries (Keller, 2001a).
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88
on a geographic basis, there is compelling evidence that the rate at
which knowledge spillovers decline with distance fell substantially
between the mid-1970s and the 1990s (Keller, 2001a,b). There is an
increasingly common pool of global technology, and countries that
are not sufficiently integrated in terms of world trade and investment
fall behind, having access to a smaller technological frontier. The
delocalization of technological knowledge has favored those countries
that have become more integrated since the mid-1970s.
International knowledge flows appear to be the result of deliberate activities geared toward learning and conforming to international
standards via the interaction with foreigners and local efforts of
technology adoption. The available empirical evidence reveals the
following channels for international technology diffusion:
t Imports of capital goods with embodied technological
knowledge originating in high- knowledge countries (Coe,
Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1997; Xu and Wang, 1999; Eaton
and Kortum, 2001; Blyde, 2004).
t Inward flows of FDI from high-knowledge countries that
are combined with a relatively high absorptive capacity, as
measured by the country’s own R&D investments (Kinoshita,
2000).
t High quality information and telecommunications infrastructure that facilitate communication between geographically
distant persons, and the transmission of codified knowledge
as well as some tacit knowledge.
Keller (2001b) attributes more than half of the total international
knowledge flows to imports, and the rest in equal parts to FDI and
communication links. The available empirical evidence also reveals
that the major determinants of successful technology diffusion from
abroad include:
t The level of development. International knowledge flows from
high-knowledge countries have stronger effects on growth
in the relatively rich countries compared to those they have
in the poorer countries (Keller, 2001b).
t The abundance and quality of human capital (Eaton and
Kortum, 1996; Xu, 2000; Caselli and Coleman, 2001).
t Indigenous adaptive R&D (Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen,
2000; Kinoshita, 2000).
t The pattern of specialization: the strength of international
technology diffusion for certain types of high-tech products
could be easily two to three times higher than for the average
manufacturing good (Keller, 2004).
t Policies and institutions. Well-functioning markets and an
undistorted trade and FDI regime are conducive to bigger
learning effects (Keller, 2004).
The empirical evidence available for A rgentina suggests
that the country has failed to acquire the levels of trade and FDI
integration with high-knowledge countries that are required to successfully tap the increasingly common global stock of technological
knowledge:
t Argentina imports of capital goods relative to its GDP are
below what is expected for its level of development. While
the average developing country, with a PPP $1,800 per capita
GDP, has a 5.92 percent capital goods import/GDP ratio,
Argentina, with a PPP $4,470 per capita GDP, has a capital
goods import/GDP ratio that reaches only 3.55 percent.
t While in 1995, 66 percent of all Argentine capital goods imports came from the EU and the United States, nowadays only
30 percent originate from those regions, while the share of
imports from Brazil has risen from 10 percent to 32 percent.
Some of this diversion was due to the formation of Mercosur
in 1995 and some to the currency devaluation in 2002.
t FDI flows to Argentina are low compared to other Latin
American countries (see Figure 2.6). Low FDI flows are
combined with low local R&D intensity.
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t The indicators for information and telecommunications (ITC)
infrastructure are usually greater or equal than what would
be expected for its level of development, although they are
worse than those of industrialized countries.
t Argentina has specialized in export activities with low sophistication, as defined by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik
(2005), and with a small frontier for technological catch-up,
as defined by Hwang (2006).
t Argentina not only faces policy distortions that discourage
capital goods imports from high-knowledge countries, but
also distortions that affect efficient allocations in factor
markets, and that prevent the displacement of obsolete jobs
by new jobs in technologically upgraded activities (see Sánchez and Butler, 2004).41 These authors found that creative
destruction was constrained by the protectionist bias of trade
policies and by rigid labor markets.
Hence the process of unilateral trade liberalization that took
place in the late 1980s appears to not have been sufficient or adequate
for large ITD toward Argentina. One important reason is that it
has mostly signed regional trade agreements with low-knowledge
countries (like those in Mercosur). Another important reason is that
the policy and regulatory environment toward FDI shifted from unwelcoming in the 1980s to friendly in the 1990s and to less favorable
in the aftermath of the 2001–02 crisis. This seesaw attitude toward
FDI has limited the extent of progress in the telecommunications
infrastructure after all the improvements in the 1990s. Moreover,
while the 2002 currency devaluation appears to have been important
in alleviating savings constraints, it has come at the price of raising
the relative price of imported capital goods, promoting a switch to
imports from low cost, low-knowledge countries.
41
Haltiwanger et al. (2004) show that Argentina’s gross reallocation of manufacturing between 1990 and 2000 was 14.1 percent: far smaller than in Brazil (32.1
percent), Chile (23.8 percent), Colombia (19.8 percent), and Mexico (27.9 percent),
and higher only than in Uruguay (13.8 percent).
Human Capital
The available evidence reveals a relative scarcity of human capital
for research activities in the business sector, which is reflected
both in its price and quantity. This scarcity also contributes to the
disengagement from the world flow of ideas.
Argentina has a relatively greater participation of researchers and graduates in engineering in its labor force (3.64 percent)
vis-à-vis other countries that have a higher R&D intensity (Brazil,
for instance, has only 1.91 percent of researchers and engineers in
its labor force). However, only 10 percent of all Argentine researchers are in the business sector. By contrast, in countries with lower
innovation-related human capital but higher R&D intensity, there is
a much greater allocation of researchers to the business sector (19
percent in the case of Brazil, for instance).
The relatively high wages of university professors and chemical
engineers vis-à-vis industrial workers in Argentina when compared
to other relevant countries suggest that human capital could be a
binding constraint on innovation in Argentina.42 Nevertheless the
relative abundance of public sector researchers could eventually be
transformed into a relative abundance of business sector researchers, provided other binding constraints on innovation are alleviated
first.43 Thus far there appears to be a malfunctioning of the national
innovation system that creates a wide gap between research activities in Argentina and the productive sector research needs.
42
For instance, the relative wage of chemical engineers vis-à-vis industrial
workers is 2.02 in Argentina, 1.59 in China, 0.88 in the United Kingdom, 0.54 in
Nicaragua, and 0.53 in Germany..
43
When analyzing the emergence of biotechnology applied to human health as
a successful new export activity, Sánchez et al. (2007) find that one of the keys
for this success was the possibility of tapping into a relatively large endowment of
life science researchers in the public sector and universities that had previously
been devoted to academic research. While their suitability for the new activities
was initially conditioned by their lack of experience in commercially oriented
research, these scientists eventually adapted to commercial R&D, and Argentine
expatriate scientists provided the required training.
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Low Appropriability
Poor intellectual property rights (IPRs) are a highly binding constraint on research and innovation in Argentina, and regulatory and
policy barriers to creative destruction (such as trade policies and
labor market regulations) also have a deleterious effect on innovation. The potential important role of poor IPRs was also highlighted
by the previous finding of a very low market valuation of intangible
assets in Argentina.
This study explored the extent to which the currently low R&D
effort can be due to low appropriability by conducting a cross-country
econometric analysis for the year 2000 that is based on the prediction in Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) for the determinants of
research intensity in steady state: capital income taxes, R&D taxes,
the inability to appropriate the social returns to innovation (poor
IPRs), and the stock of capital per effective worker. The software
piracy rate from Business Software Alliance was used as a proxy
for IPRs.44
The most significant explanatory variable is the software piracy
rate, which has a significant and robust negative effect on research
intensity. The very high piracy rate explains 98 percent of the Argentine below-average research intensity, and these poor IPRs matter
much more for the Argentine low research intensity than in other
research-poor countries such as Chile and Malaysia.
Finance
This analysis of binding constraints on investment revealed that Argentine firms are financially constrained for any kind of investment.
In this vein, the National Innovation Survey (ENICT) for 1998–2001
reveals that financing was the main hurdle to research and innovation for 69 percent of all the Argentine manufacturing firms and
for 75 percent of the small firms. By contrast, the IBGE Innovation
44
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Survey in Brazil shows that financing was the main constraint on
investment for only 60 percent of all firms and for 60 percent of the
small firms.
The Argentine Growth Syndrome:
A Ranking of the Most Binding Constraints
To identify the most binding constraints on growth, it is necessary
first to analyze the potential contributions to growth that can be
derived by eliminating constraints on investment and on productivityenhancing activities, and then determine how feasible or costly it is to
do so. The ideal thing would be to measure the size of the Lagrange
multipliers for binding constraints on growth—which cannot be done.
Instead this study undertakes a more heuristic approach that entails
assessing how costly or feasible it would be to remove one constraint
compared to how much it would contribute to higher growth.
To this end, a target for GDP per capita growth is set at 4 percent
per year. This is the level that is estimated to cut poverty rates in
half after 10 years using the methodology proposed by Bourguignon
(2001).45 Then the required investment rate and/or TFP growth rate
is examined.
A growth accounting exercise shows that if the current investment rate (21.7 percent of GDP at 1993 prices) and TFP growth (1.3
percent per year) were sustained, then per capita GDP would grow
at 2.9 percent per year. If TFP growth were not to improve from current levels, in order to raise growth to 4 percent per year, investment
would be required to rise to 30 percent of GDP (see Table 2.6). In
turn, domestic savings would have to rise from the current level of
23.8 percent of GDP to 32.4 percent of GDP (to accommodate the rise
in the relative price of investment caused by the 2002 devaluation).
This does not appear to be a feasible goal, given that the very high
45
This estimation assumes that income distribution improves during this time
span, until it recovers its best level in the past 20 years (the 0.45 Gini coefficient
for 1993–95).
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TABLE 2.6 Investment and TFP Growth Requirements for 4 Percent Growth
Per Capita
Strategy
Investment
Investment + TFP
TFP
Investment rate
(percent)
Savings rate
(percent)
TFP growth
(percent)
Feasibility/
desirability
30.0
24.2
22.0
32.4
26.1
23.8
1.3
2.0
2.4
3
1
2
increase in savings (from 16 percent of GDP in 2001) was caused
by the combination of a large currency depreciation, sovereign debt
restructuring, and the introduction of new distortionary taxes, and
there is not much economic and/or social scope for further resorting
to these instruments. Additionally, not much relief can be expected
from international finance. Even at times of significant financial integration like the 1990s, international finance represented at most 5
percent of GDP, which would not be enough to finance the required
increase in investment.
A more feasible scenario would involve elevating TFP growth to
2 percent per year, in which case the required increase in the investment rate would be only from 22 percent of GDP to 24.2 percent of
GDP. This appears to be feasible in terms of the required increase in
savings (from 23.8 percent of GDP to 26.1 percent of GDP), and can
be more easily satisfied with modest access to international finance
(see Table 2.6). A final possibility is that if investment were not to
rise, then TFP growth would be required to rise to 2.4 percent per
year. If one plausibly assumes that Argentina has already completed
a transition initiated circa 1980 toward a new steady state with a bigger productivity gap (and/or with a lower technology frontier) and
that TFP growth has a steady state component like the 1.3 percent
currently observed, then one must determine what kind of improvement is required from productivity-enhancing investments to add
an extra 0.7 percent TFP growth (or 1.1 percent).
This study finds that in order to generate the extra 0.7 percent
(1.1 percent) of TFP growth, Argentina should increase its long-run
TABLE 2.7 Improvements in Productivity-enhancing Activities for Extra 0.7 Percent
TFP Growth
Improvement required
For extra 0.7%
TFP growth
For extra 1.1%
TFP growth
Export
Sophistication
16%
25%
Distance to
technological
frontier
From 78% to 52%
From 78% to 41%
From 0.41% to
0.68% GDP
From 0.41% to
0.97% GDP
R&D + innovation
Required strategy
Feasibility/
desirability
Subsidy to self-discovery,
provision of ISPG*, facilitation
of experimentation, proexport policies, foreign
market opening
1
FDI and trade with high
knowledge countries, ITCs,
export pattern, human capital,
IPRs
1
ISPG = industry-specific public goods
productivity by 24 percent (39 percent) over a 30-year transition
period. If this greater TFP growth were to come solely from more
innovation, calibrating the Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) model,
R&D intensity would have to rise to 0.68 percent (0.97 percent) of
GDP from the current 0.41 percent of GDP (see Table 2.7).
If improved export sophistication were to be the only source
of higher productivity growth, the required improvement can be
calculated by using the coefficients estimated by Hausmann, Hwang
and Rodrik (2005) in their panel data growth regressions. To generate the required 0.7 percent (1.1 percent) TFP growth increase, the
median required improvement in export sophistication would be
15.8 percent (24.7 percent), which is not too large. However, such
changes take some time to occur. For instance, in the case of Brazil,
where export sophistication has been growing relatively quickly,
the income content of exports on average rose 15 percent every five
years between 1975 and 2000.
If instead the extra 0.7 percent (1.1 percent) TFP growth
were to come from improving the technology frontier of Argentine
exports, using Hwang’s (2006) estimated coefficients, the required
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structural transformation of Argentine exports is such that the unit
export price relative to the OECD (the proxy for the quality/technology gap) becomes 57 percent (45.5 percent) instead of the current
87 percent (see Table 2.7). This may prove to be a more challenging task, as the top 25 goods that are closest in the product space
have a rather poor technology frontier, while the goods with large
technology frontiers are farther in the product space. Nevertheless,
relatively small improvements (like improving the technological
frontier to 71 percent) would provide half the required improvement
in TFP growth.
Hence while greater investment can contribute to reaching the
desired growth rate, relieving the constraints on domestic savings
and international finance that would hamper the required increase
in investment appears to be either too costly or unfeasible because of
political economy considerations. It appears more promising to aim
at marginally improving current investment (from 21.7 percent of
GDP to 24.2 percent of GDP), which would secure a 3.3 percent per
capita growth rate, and to get the extra kick from removing binding
constraints on productivity-enhancing activities. Even if investment
were to not rise from current levels, the desired greater growth could
be achieved via improvements in technological and export innovations that are not too large, and hence are feasible. The intuition for
this result is straightforward: the elasticity of output per worker to
technological change is equal to 1, while the elasticity with respect
to capital per worker is sizably smaller (about 0.45 in the case of
Argentina). Hence the observed technological stagnation is more
costly in terms of growth than the observed capital shallowing.
It is thus not advisable to rely on alleviating constraints on
only one activity, especially given their complementary natures.
Each of these channels (investment and the different productivityenhancing activities) has diminishing returns when undertaken
separately.46 A bit of everything is advisable, but more is required
46
Capital has the typical diminishing returns. Innovation has lower returns as
an economy moves closer to the frontier (Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 2005).
from the activities that have fallen further behind: technological
and export innovation.
Maintaining or marginally improving the investment rate demands improving appropriability and infrastructure, and taking care
of the latent constraints associated with poor financial intermediation
and poor access to international finance. There is no single bullet, as
improving infrastructure without reducing the risk of expropriation
(or vice versa) may not suffice by itself, although it would help to
some extent. Nevertheless, the reliance on complementary improvements in productivity-enhancing activities reduces the sizes of the
required improvements in infrastructure and appropriability.
The most binding constraints on research and innovation are
the barriers to international technology flows (barriers to FDI and
capital good imports from high-knowledge countries, and to developing new exports with large technology frontiers), and the poor
IPRs. The current infrastructure in the area of information and
telecommunications technology is not very favorable for tapping the
world stock of knowledge, but it is not the most binding constraint.
Finally, the most binding constraints for the structural transformation of exports are the market failures associated with coordination
and information externalities.
Nonbinding Constraints
The current nonbinding constraints on investment include human
capital and government failures, which lead to macroeconomic risks
and volatility, high and volatile taxes, and high transaction costs.
Argentina ranks among the top countries in Latin America in
terms of educational attainment, and its tertiary education attainment indicators are similar to those of Ireland and Spain and close
Technological convergence at the product level slows as an economy gets closer
to the frontier (Hwang, 2006). Capital accumulation and investment and complementary activities, and the steady state productivity gap, get smaller, the bigger
the accumulated capital per effective worker becomes (Howitt, 2000; Klenow and
Rodríguez-Clare, 2005).
97
98
to those of Australia. Argentina also presents relatively good educational quality indicators, as its students score better than those
in most Latin American countries in Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) tests, although these scores are still
lower than in relevant OECD comparators. In addition, the Mincerian
returns to education are lower in Argentina than in most relevant
Latin American comparators, except for Uruguay. Hence human
capital does not appear to be a binding constraint on investment.
This is confirmed by this study’s cross-country regressions for the
determinants of investment at the firm level using the World Bank
Doing Business Survey. The analysis shows that the coefficient for
an inadequately educated labor force is negative, but statistically
insignificant. Nevertheless it is still possible that human capital has
low returns not because it is abundant but because there has not
been a structural transformation toward more sophisticated export
activities that demand greater skills.47
Uncertainty regarding macroeconomic aggregates (GDP, inflation, real exchange rate, terms of trade, interest rates, and the relative
price of capital goods) may have a negative impact on investment
through a variety of channels.48 In addition, high macroeconomic
volatility is likelier to lead to higher probabilities of contract breaches,
drastic discretionary policy changes and government intervention in
goods and factors markets, and high and variable taxes: that is, to a
lower appropriability of the returns to investment. The econometric
analysis of the determinants of investment finds direct evidence that
terms-of-trade volatility appears to have been a binding constraint
on investment in the past, but that this volatility is currently relatively low and does not seem to be a binding constraint. There is
no direct evidence supporting a negative impact of other types of
macroeconomic volatility. In any case, most types of macroeconomic
47
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) find that human capital is positively
associated with their measure of export sophistication.
48
See Dixit and Pindick (1994); Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990); Appelbaum and
Katz (1986).
volatility are currently low and certainly much lower than in the
past.49 However, the lack of institutional reforms aimed at addressing
the ultimate political-economic sources of volatility make it unclear
whether macroeconomic volatility has been permanently reduced
in Argentina. This may rely on the circumstantial agenda set by
the current government, together with new distortionary taxes and
exceptionally high export prices.
The maximum statutory corporate income tax rate is in an
intermediate position relative to other relevant comparator countries, although effective corporate income tax rates can differ
significantly, depending on issues such as the treatment that each
country gives to depreciation deductions, valuation of inventories,
and the sources and cost of financing. The corporate income tax
rates are 35 percent in Argentina, but can reach much higher levels
because firms are not allowed to adjust their stocks with inflation
(the tax rates on actual profits may reach up to 50 percent). On the
other hand, many firms have been able to write off tax obligations
with the big losses that they endured during the 2001–02 crisis. The
discretionality of tax policies may be more harmful for investment
than the level of taxation. The econometric analysis shows that tax
burden volatility appears to have been a binding constraint in the
recent past (2002–4), but this constraint seems to have been alleviated in the present. However, because of the discretionary nature of
the policymaking process in Argentina and the lack of checks and
balances for the executive branch, the possibility can not be ruled
out of a return to more volatile taxation in response to a weakening
of the fiscal result and/or distributive tensions.
Considering several indicators of transaction costs (such as
time and cost to start a new business or to close a business, enforcing
49
In the same vein, according to Mody and Schindler (2004), Argentina’s low
average growth rate during 1960–2000 can be explained in the context of a crosscountry study as resulting from its high level of fiscal volatility. However, fiscal
volatility in Argentina, as measured by these authors, appears to be declining over
time and is currently below the Latin American average, hence suggesting that
this is no longer an important constraint on medium-run growth.
99
100
contracts, and paying taxes), Argentina appears to be in a relatively
favorable position vis-à-vis Latin America in some areas and in a less
favorable position regarding others. 50 It compares relatively well with
East Asian countries (except in the area of paying taxes), but ranks
unfavorably vis-à-vis the OECD countries in all these indicators.
The cross-section regressions for firm-level investment based on
the World Bank Doing Business Survey yield negative but statistically insignificant coefficients for most transaction cost indicators. 51
Hence transaction costs appear to be a nuisance for investment, but
not a binding constraint.
The nonbinding constraints on the structural transformation
of exports include the capabilities and opportunities for developing
new exports, proxied by the “open forest” measure of Hausmann,
Hwang and Rodrik (2005), which were shown above to be somewhat
favorable on average. Domestic trade policies do not seem to be unfavorable either, except for the time inconsistency of export taxes.
Average EU and NAF TA tariffs on imports of the most attractive
goods not yet exported by Argentina have not been binding constraints
either (although there are sizable tariff peaks), but the high average
tariffs imposed by East Asian and Latin American countries—more
natural markets for new modern Argentine exports—could be more
harmful.
50
For instance, starting a business in Argentina involves more procedures than
in the average Latin American country, the OECD, and East Asia, but costs less
(in terms of per capita gross national income) than in all these regions, except for
the OECD. Paying taxes in Argentina is more costly, in terms of money and time,
than in the average Latin American country, the OECD, and East Asia. On the
other hand, enforcing contracts in Argentina involves less time and money and
fewer procedures than the Latin American average, and more than in the OECD,
and while it takes longer to enforce than in East Asia, it is cheaper to do so. Finally,
closing a business in Argentina is cheaper and usually takes less time than in these
other regions, except for the OECD. World Bank. Doing Business Survey.
51
They only yield a negative and significant statistical and economic effect on
private investment of the share of managerial time that is spent in dealing with
government regulations. The average time spent in dealing with regulations is
13.7 percent of the managerial time. If this time were cut in half, the regressions
suggest that investment would be boosted by 6 percent.
Lack of a venture capital market is a binding constraint on
research and innovation, but this constraint is of a second order relative to poor intellectual property rights and low engagement in the
world flow of ideas. Additionally, this insufficient private financing
is partially substituted by government financial support programs
like FONTAR and FONCYT. 52 The tax treatment of research and
innovation is neutral. Lack of adequate human capital for business
sector research and innovation may be a binding constraint to this
activity. However, the presence of a relatively large stock of researchers and scientists in the public sector can be tapped to generate the
required human capital, provided the other binding constraints are
removed first. While this is not a trivial process, it can be done—as
has been shown in the case of the development of the biopharmaceutics export industry (see Sánchez et al., 2007).
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Argentina’s growth problems involve a very low trend growth and an
inability to turn its periodic growth accelerations into a sustained shift
toward bigger trend growth. These factors have led to a divergence
from world income and productivity growth during the past three
decades. Both low investment and poor TFP growth arising from
insufficient structural transformation of exports and research and
innovation have contributed to this outcome. This study suggests
that the biggest payoffs for greater growth come from maintaining
or marginally improving the current investment rate and from undertaking relatively small, and easier to finance, improvements in
productivity-enhancing activities.
Relieving binding constraints on all the sources of growth is
advisable, but more is required from the activities that have fallen
further behind: technological and export innovation. This recom-
52
FONTA R ( Fondo Tecnológico A rgentino) finances innovation projects.
FONCyT (Fondo para la Investigación Científica y Tecnológiica), finances scientific
and technological research.
101
102
mendation follows from the facts that investing in capital accumulation and in technological knowledge acquisition are complementary
activities, and that each of these investments has diminishing returns
on its own. Argentina’s observed technological backwardness has
higher growth costs than capital shallowing because of the greater
elasticity of output to TFP than to capital. In addition, while greater
investment, by itself, could contribute to reaching the desired growth
rate, generating the domestic savings and access to international
finance to finance the required increase in investment appears to
be either too costly or unfeasible because of political economy considerations.
Modestly increasing investment rates demands preserving
macroeconomic stability (so as to reduce the probability of discretionary policies and expropriation shocks), providing adequate
infrastructure, and taking care of the latent constraints associated
with poor financial intermediation and poor access to international
finance. The removal of the more permanent sources of low appropriability that result from poor institutional design may prove very
difficult, at least in the short run.
Regarding infrastructure, the priorities for investment appear to be in the area of energy generation, transportation, and
distribution, followed by transportation. There is an obvious tradeoff between direct government investment in infrastructure and
maintaining fiscal sustainability (a requirement for macroeconomic
stability). Hence greater private sector investment in infrastructure
is recommended. Improving financial intermediation requires
maintaining macroeconomic stability and would benefit strongly
from the continuation of government-supported financing products
aimed at alleviating the credit market imperfections that generate
financial constraints, especially on small and medium enterprises.
Programs aiming at providing tax relief can also help by enhancing
the availability of internal funds to finance investment. More emphasis should be given to targeting these programs toward financing
investments in new, sophisticated, export-oriented activities. Taking
steps toward creating deeper capital markets and especially toward
improving access to international financial markets are also highly
recommended.
The small required improvement in research intensity would
demand policy and regulatory changes that enhance Argentina’s
engagement in the world flow of ideas (more capital good imports
and FDI from high-knowledge countries, better ITC infrastructure,
relocating researchers from the public sector to private firms) and
that improve appropriability (through better protection of intellectual property rights). While this strategy promises large payoffs, it
nevertheless demands a sizable coordination effort for the provision
of the required public goods, adequate design of the programs to
subsidize and/or finance research and innovation (and information
gathering), and macroeconomic sustainability.
The attraction of more FDI from high-knowledge countries is
conditioned by the local investment climate and by the nature of the
preferential trade agreements of the particular country. Increasing
capital good imports from high-knowledge countries is contingent
on the nature of the international trade agreements and also on the
real exchange rate. The reallocation of public sector researchers
to the private sector demands improving the functioning of the
national innovation system allowing and promoting steps such as
getting researchers involved in internships in business firms, undertaking consulting, and creating their own commercially oriented
spin-offs.
Since this is an activity that is fraught with externalities, sizable government intervention would be required. When designing
programs that support R&D and innovation, special care should
be given to evaluating the technological frontier of the supported
projects (for instance, the initial quality gap with the exports of industrialized countries), and to promoting better access to, and use
of, information and telecommunications technology infrastructure
(an important source of access to world knowledge flows). These
programs should also promote the incorporation of public sector
researchers to private sector endeavors, and evaluate the sensitivity
of the projects to intellectual property rights. A lot can be learned
103
104
from the experience of countries like Israel that actively promoted
research and innovation through support programs and institutions
that used tournaments to choose among competing projects. 53
Finally, the promotion of the development of more sophisticated
exports with bigger technological frontiers requires policies and
institutions that address the coordination and information externalities that hamper them. The policy agenda for dealing with these
market failures may include direct government involvement—as in
the case of Fundación Chile, which got involved in public-private joint
ventures to “discover” the salmon and berries sectors in Chile—or
through targeted contingent subsidies and financing. This agenda
may also involve dealing with coordination failures through the
direct provision of industry-specific public goods or through the
coordination of their provision by the private sector.
The choice of projects to support should take into account the
export sophistication and technological frontier involved, the adequacy of the underlying accumulated capabilities, and the barriers
to access foreign markets, as well as the nature of the externalities
involved (whether they are related to local costs of production, foreign
demand, and/or best commercialization strategies, or the provision
of industry-specific public goods). These factors will condition the
expected growth effects of the projects, and also the choice of optimal support instruments.
One important issue is at what stage the government should
promote these new exports: from scratch, or after some precompetitive investments by the private sector had shown great promise. The
case studies analyzed by Sánchez et al. (2007) favor the latter view,
showing how investment in experimentation, provision of industryspecific public goods, and diffusion could have been optimized
through a timely government intervention after private entrepre53
See Trajtenberg (2005) for an enlightening discussion of the hits and misses
of the Israeli institutions and support programs for R&D. For instance, while the
programs were very successful in furthering R&D and innovation in the information and telecommunications technology sector, they failed to foster technological
change in the rest of the economy due to design problems.
neurs had discovered the profitability of the new export activity. In
this vein, the design of tournaments that—based on accumulated
capabilities and expected social returns—choose among competing projects that already have some precompetitive development
could be an adequate mechanism for the required transmission of
information to policymakers.
Beyond the possibility of establishing targeted support programs, there is a more basic and horizontal agenda that would help
reduce the cost of experimentation: improving the functioning of
government agencies that are involved with technical assistance
to, and regulation of, agricultural and industrial activities, such as
the food safety agency, the national industrial technology and agricultural technology institutes, and the metrology bureau. Different
cases where these agencies’ intervention has added incremental
costs to the discovery process are illustrated in Sánchez et al. (2007).
The discovery process would also be facilitated by avoiding timeinconsistent trade policies, reducing the anti-export bias of domestic
trade policies, and gearing international trade negotiations toward
opening markets for new sophisticated goods, rather than focusing
exclusively on current exports. This last recommendation applies
especially to regional trade agreements with Latin American and
East Asian countries.
The policy agenda for promoting technological and export innovation is less straightforward than removing the binding constraints
on investment (infrastructure, volatility, financing), as it entails
substantial information gathering, capacity building, and resolution
of coordination externalities. Hence perhaps a bigger constraint lies
in the capabilities of policymakers and the time required to build
these capacities.
105
106
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CHAPTER 3
What Is Impeding Growth
in Brazil?
Juan Blyde, Armando Castelar Pinheiro,
Christian Daude, and Eduardo Fernández-Arias*
Overview of the Brazilian Economy
In the first eight decades of the twentieth century, Brazil had one
of the highest growth rates in the world. From 1930 to 1980, in
particular, it managed to reduce its per capita income gap vis-à-vis
industrialized economies and seemed poised to escape underdevelopment early in the twenty-first century. However, this dream never
materialized. Brazil’s growth performance deteriorated sharply over
the following quarter century, never fully recovering from the second oil shock and the foreign debt crisis (Figure 3.1). In this period,
Brazil experienced much lower and more volatile growth, with its
long-term annual growth rate (ten-year moving average) fluctuating in the 2 to 3 percent range, well below the 6 to 10 percent range
that prevailed in 1950–80. Brazil reacted by embarking on reforms,
from trade liberalization to changes in fiscal and social policies.
*
Juan Blyde, Christian Daude, and Eduardo Fernández-Arias are with the InterAmerican Development Bank.Armando Castelar Pinheiro is affiliated with the
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) and the Instituto de Economia
da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (IE-UFR J).The authors are grateful to
Peter Montiel and Mauricio Mesquita Moreira for helpful discussions and suggestions and to Maria Fernández-Vidal for excellent research assistance.
JUAN BLYDE, ARMANDO CASTELAR PINHEIRO, CHRISTIAN DAUDE, AND EDUARDO FERNÁNDEZ-ARIAS
FIGURE 3.1 Real GDP Growth, 1950–2005
(percent)
15.0
Annual change
10-year moving average
12.5
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
0.0
2005
2002
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
1978
1975
1972
1969
1966
1963
1960
1957
1954
–5.0
1951
–2.5
1948
112
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estadística (IBGE).
Policies improved, especially after price stabilization in 1994, and,
if anything, have been better than through most of the high growth
period, but apparently to no avail. Something happened in this later
period that prevented Brazil from regaining the rapid growth that it
had exhibited previously. What might it have been?
The original slowdown of the Brazilian economy took place
in a period in which other countries were also forced to lower their
growth rates in adjusting to the second oil shock, the tightening
of the U.S. monetary policy, and the ensuing debt crisis. Although
not all countries were equally hurt by these shocks, with Chile and
Korea being notable exceptions, world GDP growth declined quite
considerably in 1981–94, dropping by a third from its 1951–80 level.
Latin America suffered even more, with growth rates falling to less
than half their previous average level. Brazil was even more intensely
affected, with GDP growth declining by 5.4 percentage points, almost
twice as much as the Latin America average and more than three
times the drop in world growth.
The timing of Brazil’s slowdown seemed to confirm that it
stemmed largely from a high sensitivity to the performance of the
world economy, exacerbated by its dependence on import substitution, industrialization, oil imports, and foreign savings. This view
WHAT IS IMPEDING GROWTH IN BRAZIL?
was reinforced, with somewhat different undertones, by the failure
to accelerate growth in 1995–2002, when Brazil suffered several
shocks in financial markets, including Mexico’s forced devaluation in
December 1994, the difficult political transition in Brazil, the Asian
crisis, Russia’s default, and Argentina’s complicated abandonment
of the convertibility regime. In particular, this sensitivity to shocks
in international financial markets seemed to confirm that growth
in Brazil, as well as in most of Latin America, was hindered by its
low domestic savings, which put it at the mercy of foreign savers’
willingness to bank the country’s large external financing needs.
However, given the performance of the economy in 2003–06, it
is doubtful whether these externally based explanations can account
for Brazil’s failure to recover its past dynamism. Brazil, as well as
the rest of the region, has especially benefited from the upswing in
the world economy, which boosted the demand and prices of commodities. However, its GDP growth accelerated only slightly, and
less than in the rest of the region and the world as a whole. Moreover, this period has witnessed a large expansion in international
liquidity and in the appetite for emerging market risk. While Brazil
has been able to tap international financial markets at a declining
cost, it became a net foreign saver, with an average current account
surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP in 2003–06, in contrast to a deficit
more than twice as large in 1996–2002. This suggests that Brazil’s
poor economic performance stems from more than just a reaction
to adverse external shocks, and that whatever was lost in the early
1980s had probably not been recovered by 2003–06.1 In particular,
this suggests that the current binding constraints on growth are
more likely to be in the domestic side of the economy than in its
interactions with the rest of the world.
1
Incidentally, note the likeness between Brazilian and Mexican growth rates,
which suggests that despite relatively divergent paths in the last decade, the two
countries might face similar impediments to growth. In particular, their experiences coincide in suggesting that price stability, sound external accounts, and
trade openness were not sufficient to bring growth back to the previous levels.
113
114
These constraints should be able to specifically account for
Brazil’s low rate of capital accumulation, which is responsible for a
large share of the observed contraction in GDP growth (Table 3.1).
Four-fifths of this contraction came from the sharp drop in labor productivity growth and the other fifth stemmed from lower employment
growth. Using a Solow-type growth accounting decomposition, it is
estimated that the slowdown in labor productivity from the 1961–80
to 1981–94 periods—that is, the slowdown in the expansion of GDP
per worker in the more recent period—resulted in roughly equal
parts from slower growth of capital per worker and the reduction
in the growth rate total factor productivity (TFP). In turn, the partial recovery in 1995–2006 resulted entirely from the acceleration
in TFP growth. This indicates that growth has been constrained
primarily by a low rate of capital accumulation, which has failed to
resume the pace it achieved before the foreign debt crisis—even
after price stabilization, structural reforms, and expanded access
to foreign financing.
The slowdown in capital accumulation reflected, in turn, the
decline in the rate of investment. In current prices, the rate of investment plunged from 21 percent of GDP in 1968–78, the period of
fastest GDP growth, to 16 percent of GDP in 2003–05 (16.8 percent
of GDP in 2006). Because the relative price of investment goods
vis-à-vis the price of consumption goods and services increased
between these two periods, the real drop in investment was even
TABLE 3.1 Decomposition of Growth in GDP per Worker
(average annual change in variables, percent)
Variables
GDP/worker
Capital/worker
TFP
Labor
1947–60
1961–80
1981–94
1995–2006
4.5
7.4
1.0
2.5
4.0
5.0
1.7
3.1
–0.2
0.7
–0.5
2.1
0.5
–0.7
0.9
2.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The analysis uses a Solow decomposition with labor and capital shares of 0.531 and 0.469, respectively, estimated from average
shares in value added in 2000–04.
more significant than suggested by the current price figures. When
measured in “constant” 1980 prices, the rate of investment fell from
22.8 percent of GDP in 1968–78 to 13.3 percent of GDP in 2003–05.
Half this decline resulted from the rise in relative prices, with the
other half stemming from the contraction in the investment effort:
that is, the rate measured at current prices.
Two stylized facts are worth noting about this contraction in
the investment rate: 2
t The decline in the rate of investment resulted essentially
from a major contraction in public investment. The rate of
investment of public administration fell by 2.3 percent of
GDP between 1967–78 and 2003–05, while that of federal
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dropped by 2.9 percent of
GDP in the same comparison. 3 By these accounts, the public
effort to support investment faltered by more than 5 percent
of GDP and would fully explain the decline. Although part
of the decline in SOE investment stems from changes in
classification, as a result of privatization, the bulk of it had
already happened by 1990–94, before the peak of privatization in 1996–98. Indeed, the decline in public investment is
underestimated, for it does not take into account the contraction in investment by state and municipal SOEs. The main
consequence of this decline in public investment has been
2
Data for the relative price of investment goods in 1987–89 and, to a lesser
extent, in 1990–94, are apparently distorted, possibly due to measurement problems stemming from the very high inflation observed in this period. Due to the
way investment and savings were estimated in that period—from investment at
constant prices to investment in current prices, then equated to total savings,
from which foreign savings were subtracted—this study abstains from analyzing
these variables in these two periods.
3
Gobetti (2006) and Afonso, Biasoto and Freire (2007) note that the decline in
public investment has been even more significant than captured in the official statistics because part of the capital expenditures counted in one year are disbursed
only in the following years. For the federal public administration alone, this meant
that the actual investment in 2004–05 was 0.14 percent of GDP lower than shown
in the national accounts statistics.
115
116
the deterioration in the quantity and quality of infrastructure,
an issue discussed later in this chapter.4
t There was a major contraction in domestic savings from
1967–78 to 1995–2002, largely explained by the decline in
public savings. In 2003–05 there was a substantial increase
in private savings, which compensated for the decline in
foreign savings, which in this recent period turned negative.
Thus, while the rate of investment declined by 4.9 percent of
GDP between 1967–78 and 2003–05, public savings dropped
by 5.2 percent of GDP, foreign savings fell by 2.8 percent of
GDP, and private savings rose by 3.1 percent of GDP. These
figures suggest that there is a reasonable scope to finance
an increase in the rate of capital accumulation by raising
public and foreign savings, as long as they do not crowd out
private savings.
Recent papers have linked the decline in public investment to the
effort to generate large primary surpluses. Fay and Morrison (2005, p.
8), for instance, argue that in “most Latin American countries, public
investment, particularly in infrastructure, bore the brunt of fiscal
adjustment.” Easterly and Servén (2003) make a similar argument
and ask whether the strategy to sustain large primary surpluses is
not self-defeating, since by compressing public investment, notably
in infrastructure, growth decelerates and makes fiscal discipline
more difficult to sustain. In this sense, the effort to cut down the
fiscal deficit in the early 1980s may have prompted governments to
lower public investment, including that of SOEs, a more politically
palatable policy than cutting salaries, especially while the country
was returning to a democratic regime; however, it is much harder
to use the same argument to explain more recent cuts and, indeed,
why public investment has not returned to previous levels. Between
1995 and 2003 current government revenues increased by 7.2 per-
4
Indeed, the bulk of federal SOE investment in recent years has been in the oil
sector, not infrastructure.
cent of GDP, whereas the primary surplus went up by 2.7 percent of
GDP and investment came down by 0.8 percent of GDP. That is, the
increase in revenues went well beyond what was needed to increase
the primary surplus, yet public investment continued to fall. This
pattern continued in the years that followed, with the tax burden
reaching an estimated 35.3 percent of GDP in 2006 and the primary
surplus 3.9 percent of GDP.
This expansion in current expenditures, on the back of continued increases in the tax burden and the lowering of public investment, might have compromised growth in different ways, including
indirect channels such as the increase in informality discouraging
productivity growth and human capital accumulation (McKinsey,
2004) and the burden of monetary policy as a policy instrument for
economic stabilization, which would contribute to macroeconomic
instability and boost interest payments on the public debt, thus discouraging investment and growth (Adrogué, Cerisola and Gelos,
2006). Ferreira and Nascimento (2005) estimate that the decline in
public investment has diminished annual GDP growth by about 0.4
percentage points, while the rise in taxes, by substantially increasing
the capital tax rate, reduced incentives to invest and lowered annual
GDP growth by about 1.5 percentage points. 5 Not surprisingly, the
World Bank’s 2003 Investment Climate Survey (ICS) in Brazil reveals
that firms rate the high tax burden as the most important obstacle
to their growth and mention the high cost of finance as the second
most important (World Bank, 2003).
Following this preliminary overview of the Brazilian economy,
the next sections proceed to analyze these and several other hypotheses regarding the binding constraints on an acceleration of Brazil’s
GDP growth within the theoretical framework, or growth diagnostic
5
See World Bank (2007a) for further evidence on the negative impact on growth
of the rise in the tax burden and the changed composition of government spending. In particular, the study argues that “the long-run elasticity of per capita GDP
with respect to the public capital stock is larger than of the private capital stock”
(page 27) and that higher taxes reduce GDP growth by depressing private capital
accumulation.
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118
methodology (GDM), proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco
(2005). The interested reader can find a more detailed version of
this research in the working paper version.
Hypotheses Testing: Low Returns to Private Physical Investment
Low Appropriability
Private physical investment and growth are limited by the inability
of private investors to capture the totality of the social return produced. This study found evidence that high and inefficient taxation
in Brazil imposes severe disincentives to investment and is a binding
constraint on growth. However, contrary to alternative views, the
diagnostics work did not find constraints in the so-called investment
climate or impediments induced by the high level of informality to
be severe. Furthermore, the analysis did not find noteworthy distortions in investment that would result in weaknesses in the patterns
of economic structural transformation or innovation.6
Distortionary Taxes
Complaints about the high tax burden in Brazil are generalized
across the country. Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the tax burden.
While it was around 25 percent in the 1970s, 1980s, and part of the
1990s, it has been rising almost continuously since then. Starting
in 1996, the tax burden has increased by around 1 percent of GDP
every year. In 2006 it reached 34.5 percent, a very high rate by international standards. Figure 3.3 shows the tax burden for several
developed and developing countries, together with the levels of GDP
per capita.7 Brazil’s tax burden looks high for its level of income. A
country with the income of Brazil would typically have a tax burden
6
On the latter, the interested reader is referred to the working paper version
of this study.
7
Data range from 2002 to 2005.
FIGURE 3.2 Evolution of the Tax Burden in Brazil, 1970–2006
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
20
Source: IBGE and Instituto Brasileiro de Planejamento Tributario (IBPT).
FIGURE 3.3 Tax Burden, Selected Countries, 2002–5
(percent of GDP)
0.5
Brazil
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
6
7
8
9
10
11
GDP per capita (in logs)
Source: IBPT, World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), and Penn World Tables (PWT).
that is around 10 percentage points of GDP lower. The question then
is whether this high tax burden is harming the country’s economic
growth.
The endogenous growth theory provides the appropriate framework to link taxes and growth. Under this framework, a tax on capital
income would lower its after-tax return, creating a disincentive to
accumulate capital. Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) (HRV)
recognize that there is a high level of taxation in Brazil, but they tend
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120
to downplay the disincentive effect on growth. Rather, they focus
on the income effect of a very large part of national income being
taxed away in order to finance the high levels of entitlements and
social transfers. The central HRV story in this regard is a story of a
macroeconomic distortion of low disposable income (there are not
enough savings to invest due to the high tax burden on domestic
income)—not one of a microeconomic distortion, in which high taxes
reduce the incentives to invest because they depress the returns to
capital. That is to say, they view the tax system as transferring funds
from high-saving to low-saving agents, lowering aggregate savings,
and in this way limiting investment levels.
The argument that taxes affect growth by reducing disposable
income and thus constraining the available resources for investment
is in principle plausible. For example, according to the Instituto
Brazileiro de Planejamento Tributario (IBPT), if one adds the taxation incidence on wages (the employee’s responsibility) to that on
consumption, on average, 35 percent of the wage-earned incomes
gets deducted at the source or included as taxes on the acquired
products and services. The incidence on company earnings can be
even higher. There is one factor, however, that weakens this hypothesis. If a country has full access to international capital markets,
then the decisions for savings and investment should be independent
from each other. As discussed later, this has not necessarily been
the case for Brazil in the past, but since 2003, external financing
conditions have not seemed to be a major constraint on economic
growth. Therefore, the story of low disposable income from high
taxation might be less relevant today than in the recent past.
The above argument does not imply, however, that taxes have
ceased to be a constraint and are not affecting economic growth
in Brazil today. To start, it is worth exploring how the high level of
taxation may have significantly lowered the incentives to invest by
affecting the private returns to capital. According to the Investment
Climate Survey for Brazil, for example, entrepreneurs in Brazil view
the high tax rate as the number one obstacle to firm’s investment
and growth. It is possible that the majority of firms in the country
FIGURE 3.4 Percentage of Firms Indicating “Tax Rates”
as a Major or Severe Obstacle to Growth, Selected Countries, 2000–1
90
BrazilBrazil
80
70
%
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
6
7
8
9
10
11
Source: Authors’ calculations employing 68 Investment Climate Surveys.
view the tax rate as a very important limitation on growth simply
because it is such a tangible factor relative to other obstacles included in the survey. If so, however, this would be observed for other
countries, too. Figure 3.4 indicates that this is not the case. In some
countries, the percentage of firms indicating that the tax rate is a
major problem for growth is as low as 10 percent (far lower than
many other factors). According to the figure, there is also a stable
relationship where the higher the income of the country, the lower
the percentage of firms in that country that complain about the tax
rate, while Brazil is way above the curve, scoring second among the
68 countries surveyed.
One outcome of the uneven Brazilian tax system is the large
variability in the tax burden that exists across sectors of the economy.
The analysis that follows takes advantage of this variance to ascertain
whether there is an association between the sector’s tax burden and
its economic performance. There is a negative relationship between
the tax burden of the sector and the growth rate of its value added. 8
8
The sector tax burden is calculated as a percentage of the sector’s value added.
Data is for the 2000–1 period. The source of this variable is Fundação Getulio
Vargas. The growth rate for the sectoral value added is taken from IBGE.
121
122
(This relationship is statistically significant at conventional levels.
While no causality can be alleged from this relationship, the result
clearly is in line with the arguments made above.) A similar exercise was performed at the firm level. Using the Investment Climate
Survey for Brazil, the firms responding that the tax rate is a major
problem for growth were separated from the rest and the average
growth rates of sales of the two groups was compared. The firms
indicating that the tax rate is a problem grew on average 6 percentage points more slowly than their counterparts. This is not a major
problem (the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level). This relationship also holds within sectors. In six of the nine
sectors, firms indicating that the tax rate was a major problem grew
on average more slowly than their counterparts within that sector.
Once again, this is not a formal proof of the effect of taxes on firms’
performance, but the evidence appears to support the hypothesis
that the high level of taxation in Brazil lowers the returns to capital
and thus the incentives to invest and grow.
The problems with the high tax rates are exacerbated if taxpayers must spend a considerable amount of time and effort paying
the taxes. For instance, according to the IBPT, Brazil has 68 taxes
and 3,200 tax codes, including laws, provisional measures, decrees,
regulations, and institutions. There are also multiple tax rates and
bases for calculation as well as several tax agencies. The high cost
of complying with tax obligations in Brazil due to the existing tax
complexities could be another factor hampering investment and
growth. The amount of time that firms in Brazil spend on paying
taxes and complying with tax regulation is not only the greatest
in the entire sample of 173 countries, but also exceeds the sample
average by more than seven times!
Figure 3.5 presents information from the Investment Climate
Survey about tax administration (a reflection of the inefficiencies
of paying taxes) as a constraint to growth. The percentage of firms
indicating “tax administration” as a major obstacle to growth is once
again extremely high, particularly when Brazil’s level of income is
taken into consideration.
FIGURE 3.5 Percentage of Firms Indicating “Tax Administration”
as a Major or Severe Obstacle to Growth, Selected Countries, 2000–1
90
Brazil
80
70
%
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
6
7
8
9
10
11
Source: Authors’ calculations employing 68 Investment Climate Surveys.
A significant distortion in the Brazilian system relates to indirect taxes on goods and services, the most significant of which
is the imposto sobre circulação de mercadorias e serviços (ICMS), a
type of value-added state tax that has over 50 different rates. Within
certain limits, each state is free to determine its rates. There is one
tax code for each state (27), which complicates the tax administration
of the entire system, particularly for contributors in more than one
jurisdiction. Besides creating incentives for fiscal wars among states,
the ICMS subjects interstate trade to many different and complex
rules, probably limiting the free flow of inputs, goods, and services
across the territory. Daumal and Zignago (2005), for example, show
that market fragmentation in Brazil is high in comparison with other
countries. For instance, a Brazilian state trades 11 times more with
itself than with another Brazilian state. The equivalent figures in
France, the United States, Canada, and Russia are 6, 4, 2, and 2,
respectively.
This section has not presented a thorough evaluation of the
impacts of Brazilian taxation on economic performance, which would
go beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, some simple benchmarks
and associations have been presented to highlight the potential se-
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124
verity of the problem. The hypothesis of a binding constraint cannot
be proven, only rejected. Although a more complete investigation
on the incidence of taxation in Brazil is required in order to fully
grasp the microeconomic impacts of taxes on growth, the evidence
presented does not allow one to reject the hypothesis that the size
and complexity of taxes are binding constraints on economic growth
in Brazil. More research on this point is warranted.
Other Less Important Investment Disincentives
Business environment. Recent studies highlight the importance of
entry and exit dynamics of firms to promote growth and job creation in industrial and developing countries. 9 The key is to have
an investment climate that promotes this process.10 Countries can
exhibit business environments in which it is costly to start up a business, costly to adjust employment, costly to close a business, and
difficult to enforce contracts, among other things. These aspects
tend to discourage investment and limit productivity growth. This
section investigates whether Brazil has an inadequate business
environment, and if so, whether this is a binding constraint on its
economic growth.
Brazil does not rank well globally with respect to regulations
and policies that affect the entry and exit of firms. In several indicators for starting and closing a business, for example, Brazil falls
behind even the Latin American average. Brazil also performs poorly
in terms of labor market flexibility, with recent analyses suggesting
that job security could be a potential barrier to rapid labor reallocation, particularly during recessions. Enforcement of creditors’ rights
is another potentially important factor fostering market entry and
performance. Countries with highly effective creditor rights normally
9
See, for example, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, Scarpetta (2004).
10
“The investment climate is the set of location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, and expand.
Government policies and behaviors exert a strong influence through their impact
on costs, risks, and barriers to competition” (World Bank, 2005).
show lower credit volatility, which is central to planning investment
(Galindo, Micco and Suárez, 2004). There is still plenty of space to
improve Brazil’s creditor rights and, in general, the enforcement of
contracts.
This preliminary assessment suggests that Brazil faces some
limitations in its business environment that may be hindering competition and firm dynamism. The question is whether these limitations
represent a binding constraint on economic growth today. One initial
way to explore this question is to see whether Brazil’s shortcomings
are remarkably large relative to its level of development. To this end,
business environment indicators were regressed on GDP and an
assessment was made as to whether there is a Brazil gap. The first
principal component of several “Doing Business” indicators from the
World Bank were examined, along with a measure of the quality of
regulation taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), and
a measure of the rule of law, also taken from the same authors. In
all cases, these measures are associated with income. In each case,
Brazil underperforms relative to what would be expected at its level
of income, but the gap is not statistically significant.11 This evidence
suggests that there is probably a moderate weakness.
Another way to explore whether an inadequate business environment is an important constraint to growth is to look directly at
the opinions of plant managers regarding the limitations to growth
faced by their firms. The World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey
for Brazil was used to this end. One caveat to this exercise is that
some distortions of the business environment might not appear as
problems for the firms. For instance, entrepreneurs might not view
distortions affecting creditors rights as problems because these
distortions mostly affect creditors; however, they could have an
indirect impact through the high cost of finance.
Table 3.2 indicates the percentage of firms that consider a
particular obstacle to the expansion of their business as a “major”
11
A test based on a linear combination of these three differences also turned
out to be insignificant.
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126
or “severe” constraint.12 The table shows the results for the overall
sample as well as for large firms and for a group including medium
and small enterprises. According to the survey, obstacles related to
the business environment are not at the top of the list. Labor regulations and anti-competitive practices are ranked 8th and 9 th respectively.
Concerns about the enforcement of contracts, which are related to
the legal system and conflict resolution, are ranked 14th. A proxy for
cost of entry is given by the difficulty of obtaining business licenses
and operating permits. This obstacle is ranked 15th. Only “economic
and regulatory policy uncertainty” appears high in the list, but the
concern here seems to be centered on policies’ “uncertainty” rather
than on their contents. Only the high cost of financing could be
related to problems in the business environment if they reflect, for
instance, distortions affecting creditors’ rights (as argued before).13
According to this evidence, it seems that other obstacles, different
from the government failure to provide an environment that facilitates competition and firm dynamism, might be more significant in
limiting growth in Brazil today.
It should be pointed out that these surveys could exhibit some
bias. That is, an inadequate business environment might have already
limited the existence or growth of industries that are sensitive to
this problem and thus they are not observed in the sample, while
the ones being observed are the firms or industries for which this
problem is not particularly important. For reasons of data availability, the exercise is focused on one particular area of the business
environment: labor regulation.
There is a widespread notion that stringent labor regulations
that increase the cost of hiring and firing affect firm dynamism in
Brazil by limiting the possibility of adjusting employment when
12
The precise question is “Please tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the operation and growth of your business. If an issue poses a problem,
please judge its severity as an obstacle on the following scale: 0 = No obstacle,
1 = Minor, 2 = Moderate, 3 = Major, 4 = Severe.”
13
The hypothesis of high cost of finance as a binding constraint is considered
more thoroughly in the next section.
TABLE 3.2 Entrepreneurs’ Perceptions of Obstacles to Growth, 2000–1
(percent)
Obstacles to growth
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Tax rates
Cost of financing (interest rates)
Economic and regulatory policy uncertainty
Macroeconomic instability (inflation, exchange rate)
Corruption
Tax administration
Access to financing (such as collateral)
Labor regulations
Anticompetitive or informal practices
Crime, theft and disorder
Skills and education of available workers
Customs regulations
Trade regulations
Legal system/conflict resolution
Business licensing and operating permits
Electricity
Access to land
Transportation
Patents and registered trademarks (INPI)
Standards and quality (INMETRO)
Telecommunications
All firms
Large firms
SMEs
84.46
83.18
75.90
74.89
67.20
66.14
60.46
56.87
56.36
52.23
39.61
37.76
34.78
32.84
29.83
20.29
19.86
19.26
16.09
15.89
6.16
81.33
81.33
70.67
7.33
45.33
60.00
50.67
57.33
48.00
40.00
29.33
36.99
34.72
30.67
21.33
18.67
8.11
25.33
9.33
8.33
1.33
84.61
83.27
76.15
74.78
68.25
66.43
60.93
56.85
56.77
52.82
40.10
37.80
34.78
32.95
30.24
20.37
20.43
18.97
16.42
16.25
6.39
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Survey.
needed. To test this hypothesis, and at the same time to control for
survey bias leading to underrepresentation of those firms (and/or
industries) suffering from an inadequate business environment, an
additional exercise was performed in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998). There is considerable natural variation in the degree
of labor turnover across industries (see Bartelsman, Haltiwanger
and Scarpetta, 2004), which ought to interact with stringent labor
regulation, leading to a disproportionate effect on industries that
depend more on a flexible labor market. The question is whether
Brazil is particularly underspecialized in those industries. This would
be a sign that some aspects of the business environment—in this
particular case, inadequate labor regulation—might be a significant
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128
FIGURE 3.6 Estimated Coefficient on Country/labor Turnover Interaction,
Selected Countries
Thailand
Indonesia
Brazil
Jordan
Senegal
–1.2
–1
–0.8
–0.6
–0.4
–0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
distortion in factor allocation and therefore a significant constraint
on growth in Brazil.
Estimates by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1998) of job creation
and job destruction by industries for the United States were employed
to construct a measure of industry-specific labor turnover. With this
measure and with data for 38 countries and 19 industries (taken from
UNIDO), the percentage of total value added of industry i in country
c was regressed on industry dummies, industry dummies interacted
with GDP per capita (to control for differences in the structure of
production between developed and developing countries), the aforementioned measure of the industry’s labor turnover, and the interaction
between this variable and a dummy for the country of interest: in this
case, Brazil.14 The estimated coefficient on this interaction variable is
negative but not significantly different from zero, indicating that there
is no evidence to conclude that Brazil’s labor markets are remarkably rigid and possibly a binding constraint on growth. Therefore,
Brazil is not particularly underspecialized (or overspecialized) in
industries that are prone to suffer more from rigid labor regulations.
14
The country’s dummy variable also enters in the regression without interaction.
For comparison purposes, the result for Brazil is presented together
with the results for other countries where this effect turned out to be
statistically significant. This is shown in Figure 3.6.
To summarize, this section has presented a battery of indicators
and tests to analyze whether an inadequate business environment
that limits competition and firm dynamism is a binding constraint
on growth in Brazil. Based on the analysis, one can conclude that
while Brazil’s business environment is weak, it is not currently a
binding constraint on its economic growth.
Informality. There are several channels through which informality
could limit the prospects for economic growth. Informal firms engage
in only limited investment to avoid becoming “visible.” At the same
time, because they cannot take advantage of scale economies, they
tend to exhibit low productivity. Also, by avoiding taxes, ignoring
product quality and safety regulations, and infringing copyrights,
they can gain a cost-advantage and compete successfully with firms
in the formal sector. This may lead firms in the formal sector to lose
market share and invest at a suboptimal level. There is also a fiscal
impact, as the presence of informal firms implies lower receipts
(a macro problem) and higher taxes on the formal firms (a micro
distortion problem). All in all, the overall efficiency in the economy
would fall, contributing to a problem of low social returns.
Brazil’s informal economy is around 39.8 percent of gross
national income,15 higher than the world average of 32.5 percent
and well above other Latin American countries including Mexico
(30.1 percent), Argentina (25.4 percent), and Chile (19.8 percent).
Some studies suggest that Brazil’s high level of informality imposes
a major obstacle to the country’s growth (see McKinsey, 2004). Assessing whether informality is really a binding constraint in Brazil
requires an exploration of its types and causes.16 Data on informal-
15
16
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Indeed, it would be important to differentiate whether this is truly a binding constraint or is just the outcome of a binding constraint that may reside elsewhere.
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130
ity are notoriously difficult to obtain. This study employs the 2003
survey of the “Urban Informal Economy” by the Instituto Brasileiro
de Geografia e Estadística (IBGE) and McKinsey’s studies (2004,
2006) of informality in Brazil and other countries.
According to the McKinsey report, close to 56 percent of the
population employed in Brazil in 2002 was in the informal sector. However, informality in Brazil entails a substantial amount
of workers in precarious situations with low human capital and
no access to formal jobs. Even if the firms associated with these
workers have a cost advantage by avoiding taxes and regulation,
it is hard to imagine that they can compete successfully with their
formal peers. At least part of the informality in Brazil seems to
not be not a matter of choice but rather the option of last resort for
otherwise low-skilled unemployed workers who enter the sector
involuntarily while queuing up for salaried jobs.17 Therefore, given
the apparently low capacity to compete, it is not clear that the presence of informal firms in Brazil slows down the overall growth of
the economy by disrupting incentives in the formal economy in
any significant way.
More generally, evidence of aggregate growth effects of informality is scarce in the literature. For example, while some of the early
studies, like Loayza (1996), found a negative relationship between
informality and growth in cross-country regressions, they have
been later criticized for not controlling for the relevant correlates
of growth, such as regulation, human capital, and initial GDP per
capita (Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004). Once these other aspects
are considered, the estimated coefficients tend to be fragile (see
World Bank, 2007c). The McKinsey report argues that there is a
negative association between the extent of informality and the level
of productivity at the industry level in Brazil. However, this correlation does not prove causality and is subject to the same criticisms
made by Schneider and Klinglmair.
17
Neri et al. (1997) show that there is a relatively high rate of transition from
formal to informal jobs and vice versa. See also Reis and Ulyssea (2005).
In summary, although the presence of informal firms might
be associated with some inefficiencies related to their small size, it
appears difficult to argue that they significantly disrupt the incentives of the formal firms to invest and innovate. Therefore, one can
rule out the hypothesis that informality, as reflected in the nature
of labor contracts or the sheer size of companies, is a binding constraint on economic growth in Brazil.18 At the same time, the data
only allows an empirical assessment of informality focused on labor
contracts, and thus fails to consider potentially more damaging types
of informality, such as not paying taxes or not respecting product,
workplace, and environmental regulations.
Structural transformation. Finally, this study analyzes whether lack
of coordination and low self-discovery are constraints on growth
in Brazil by considering the “stock” of discovered products from
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) and its structural transformation over time. In the Hausman, Hwang and Rodrik framework,
what a country exports matters for growth. A measure of the level
of sophistication of the export basket of a country is given by EXPY,
the income level associated with a country’s export package.19 Brazil
has a high value of EXPY given its level of income, meaning that it
has discovered a relatively high-valued export package.
Besides measuring the level of sophistication of the export
basket, this study also analyzes the concept of the product space
in Hausmann and Klinger (2006) to examine Brazil’s structure of
production and the opportunities for future discovery and growth. 20
The application of this methodology suggests that the product
space of Brazil is well configured for prompt growth through a
18
In this regard, it is important to consider the definition of “informal” firm
used in IBGE’s 2003 survey (economic units consisting of the self-employed and
employers with up to five workers), which on the one hand includes firms that are
perfectly formal and on the other excludes medium and large informal firms.
19
See Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) for details on this variable.
20
See Hausmann and Klinger (2006) for details.
131
FIGURE 3.7 Open Forest for Brazil and Select Countries
2002
Mexico
South Africa
Malaysia
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
1978
2,000,000
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
1975
132
Source: Based on Hausmann and Klinger (2006).
process of structural transformation, mainly because it has successfully penetrated the industrial core. According to Hausman
and Klinger, when a country is producing goods in a dense part of
the product space, then the process of structural transformation is
easier because the set of acquired capabilities can be redeployed
to nearby products. Density of the product space, however, says
nothing about how valuable the expansion opportunities are. A
comprehensive measure of the degree to which the current export
basket is connected with valuable new productive possibilities is
the so-called value of the “open forest.” 21 Figure 3.7 shows that
Brazil’s open forest compares very well with its Latin American
peers and even with other countries like Malaysia. Therefore, the
preliminary picture that emerges from this analysis is that Brazil
has a relatively well-positioned pattern of comparative advantage
and that the opportunities for future growth through structural
transformation are open.
Thus the analysis indicates that Brazil’s current export basket is
relatively sophisticated, that the production structure has penetrated
21
See Hausmann and Klinger (2006) for details on the construction of this
measure.
the industrial core, and that it is well-positioned in the product space.
This suggests that Brazil’s current growth is not being held back by
a lack of discovery of newer higher-value goods and that the binding
constraints on growth lie elsewhere. This conclusion confirms that
lack of innovation is not the key.
Low Social Returns
Apart from appropriability, the social returns to private physical
investment are themselves constrained by a number of factors
complementary to private investment. In this regard, convincing
evidence was found to conclude that the stock of human capital is
a binding constraint and that infrastructure, especially electricity
and transformation, is a potentially strong constraint threatening
growth sustainabililty.
Human Capital
Human capital has long been recognized as an important engine
for economic development. 22 According to the data set in Barro and
Lee (2000), Brazil has a relatively low level of skilled labor when
compared to other countries of the region, and is similar to that of
Central American countries, which is an early indication that it might
have a problem in this area. This section looks at several indicators
to analyze whether the shortage of human capital is a binding constraint in Brazil today.
A high level of education in the majority of the population might
not be feasible for many countries or adequate in several cases. For
instance, Acemoglu, Aghion and Ziliboti (2006) argue that institutions and policies best suited to countries at the leading edge of the
technological frontier need not be the right ones in less advanced
places. In the case of education, the authors argue that the closer
a country is to the frontier, the more growth depends on having a
22
See, for example, Lucas (1988) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
133
FIGURE 3.8 Secondary Education and Development
80
% of pop. with secondary completed
134
60
40
20
Brazil
0
7
8
9
10
11
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from Barro and Lee (2000) and WDI.
highly educated workforce. In fact, higher-income countries exhibit
larger proportions of their populations with complete tertiary and
secondary education. 23 In both cases, Brazil underperforms what
would be expected at its level of income (see for example the gap in
completed secondary education in Figure 3.8, which is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level). This provides some evidence that
even after controlling for level of development, Brazil still has some
scarcity of skilled labor.
Another way to identify the scarcity of human capital is to
analyze the returns to investment in human capital. High returns
together with a low level of human capital would strongly indicate
that the constraint is tight. Evidence is presented in Figure 3.9, in
which Brazil is shown to be an outlier in the context of Latin American
countries, using average years of schooling on one axis and returns
to schooling on the other for the period 1996–97. 24 Judging by the
high returns of the few who get educated, the figure indicates that
the constraint of human capital is binding. The Brazil gap in terms of
23
24
Education data are for the year 2000.
The returns represent how much an additional year of schooling increases
the real salary on average.
FIGURE 3.9 Returns to Education and Years of Schooling, Selected Countries
BRA
Returns to schooling
13
COL
PRY
PER
BOL
MEX
PAN
CHL
11
NIC
9
CRI
VEN
SLV
ECU
URY
ARG
HND
7
DOM
5
4
6
7
8
9
Average years of schooling
Source: Years of schooling of population age 25 and over are taken from the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset. Returns to education are
taken from Menezes-Filho (2001).
FIGURE 3.10 Returns to Education and Development, Selected Countries
20
Brazil
Mincers returns
15
10
5
0
6
7
8
GDP per capita ( in logs)
9
10
Source: Mincer returns are taken from Psacharapoulos and Patrinos (2002) and GDP per capita from WDI.
Mincerian returns to education 25 for 70 countries (for various years)
is also significantly large (at the 10 percent level) after controlling
for the country’s level of income (Figure 3.10).
An additional way to explore the importance of human capital
as a constraint on growth is to analyze how measures of investment
25
In particular, the average change in real wages due to an additional year of
education is reported.
135
136
in human capital and their returns are evolving over time. Brazil’s
Mincerian returns to education for males (corrected for the cycle
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter) fell from 1981 to 2000, which could
actually be consistent with the relationship shown in Figure 3.10,
as returns tend to fall with the level of development. Barros (2006)
shows that the decline in the return to education has accelerated
since early in this decade, falling to roughly 12 percent in 2004.
Ulyssea (2007) shows that under a number of specifications, this
trend had continued into 2005. The trend has been accompanied by
an increase in the supply of human capital during the same period,
which may have released pressure on the returns (Menezes-Filho,
2001). If the high returns signal a binding constraint but they are
falling over time, perhaps the problem of low human capital is on
its way to being corrected, following the long gestation period of
knowledge accumulation, with no immediate policy implications.
To shed some light on this issue, the number of years that
would be required for the returns to converge to the level predicted
by the regression line in Figure 3.5 was calculated, assuming that
they continue to fall at the current rate. It would take around 60 years
for the returns to converge to the predicted line, assuming the GDP
per capita of 2000, and more than 90 years if the GDP per capita is
allowed to grow at an annual rate of around 1.5 percent. 26 Even accounting for the possibility that the decline in returns is accelerating,
this best case scenario would still point to a minimum of one to three
decades for the gap to disappear. Although these are only back-ofthe-envelope calculations, they are indicative of the persistence of
the problem if things were not to change more rapidly.
Another exercise to analyze this convergence issue is to look
at the evolution of quantities, instead of prices, with respect to other
countries over time. The benchmarks are the OECD countries
(OECD), Latin America (LAC), and an overall group of 98 countries
including developed and developing countries (WORLD). With the
26
Note that the predicted level of returns falls with the level of income, so more
years would be required to converge at the same speed.
FIGURE 3.11 Differences between Brazil and Benchmarks in Secondary Level of
Education Completed, 1960–2000
5
0
–5
–10
–15
–20
–25
–30
–35
OECD
LAC
WORLD
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Average years of schooling
Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from Barro and Lee (2000) dataset.
exception of the share gaps in the stocks of primary level of education that seem to have stabilized during the 1990s, the initial differences in the stocks of secondary levels (shown in Figure 3.11) and
tertiary levels of education have widened over time. This is true not
only with respect to the OECD but also with the other benchmarks.
This is another indication that human capital in Brazil is probably
not increasing at a sufficiently rapid pace, despite the 27 percent rise
in average schooling of workers in the last decade.
From the previous analyses it can be concluded that Brazil’s
lack of skilled labor is likely to be a binding constraint on growth. 27
In this sense, the scarcity of human capital may be putting a brake
on the capacity of the economy to expand, which can be inferred
from the high levels of the returns of the few that get educated. The
returns are surprisingly high even for Brazil’s level of development.
27
Along the previous lines of reasoning, there is also some more anecdotal
evidence that supports the view that human capital is a serious constraint on
economic growth in Brazil. For example, a recent survey of the national industry
confederation (CNI) shows that around 56 percent of firms consider the lack of
skilled labor to be a problem.There is also an important variation across firms of
different sizes, with small firms being more worried about the lack of skilled labor
than large firms. Thanks to Wagner Guerra for suggesting this evidence.
137
138
Returns are decreasing, which is consistent with the gradual rise in
the stock of human capital. However, this is taking place at a pace
that may not relax the constraint any time soon.
Inadequate Infrastructure
In the growth diagnostics model framework, the quality of capital
infrastructure affects the social return on private physical investment
by influencing its productivity. For instance, good roads speed up
the transportation of goods, allowing the same number of trucks to
transport a larger volume of freight. They also lower depreciation
and maintenance costs. Good telecom infrastructure allows transactions to be carried out with greater speed and reliability, and in many
cases make personal contact unnecessary. Electricity supply is vital
for most machinery and equipment to operate: when not provided by
regular electricity companies, electricity must be generated by the
firms themselves, at a higher cost and lower quality.
To what extent is infrastructure a binding constraint on growth
in Brazil? The slowdown in economic growth coincided with a
significant drop in the pace of expansion in infrastructure stock.
Reforms clearly failed to reverse this process, except for telecommunications, which experienced a boom especially after the sector
was opened to private investors (1996) and the former state monopoly
privatized (1998). In electricity, the expansion of generation capacity
accelerated slightly in 1995–2004 after the remarkable slowdown in
1981–94—but this only after the ruinous power shortage of 2001–02,
which exactly reflected the failure of output capacity to accompany
the growth of consumption.
This power shortage is the most eloquent example of how the
slow expansion in Brazilian infrastructure stock can be a binding
constraint on an acceleration of growth, a phenomenon that may recur,
given the long implementation periods of power generation projects. 28
28
The Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (2005), the government institution in
charge of planning the expansion of the electricity sector, estimates a 6 percent
Meanwhile, the private sector is penalized by the low quality of electricity supply with frequent brownouts and blackouts, which damage
electrical equipment and stop production, keeping resources idle.
According to the World Bank’s 2003 Investment Climate Survey,
losses due to power outages range from 0.8 percent of annual output
in electronics to 3.5 percent in footwear (World Bank, 2007b). The
same survey revealed that over 15 percent of the Brazilian firms use
their own power generators to deal with these problems, a proportion
that rises to 50 percent among large firms. Diseconomies of scale
make this electricity much more expensive than that generated by
large power plants.
The most significant slowdown occurred in the expansion of
the road network, both regarding its total extension, which virtually
stagnated, and the proportion of paved roads. In 2006, the National
Confederation of Transport (CNT, Confederação Nacional dos Transportes) assessed the quality of roughly (the main) half of the paved
roads in Brazil, classifying 25 percent as good or excellent, 38 percent
as inadequate, and 37 percent as bad or very bad. In addition to causing
hundreds of deaths every year, the poor condition and high congestion
of Brazil’s roads reduces the productivity of private investment. The
World Bank (2007b) reports that this adds $US500 million a year in
vehicle operational costs alone. Moreover, the Investment Climate
Survey revealed that losses due to poor transportation infrastructure
range from 2.2 percent of annual output in electronics to 4.7 percent in
auto parts. Small and medium-sized firms in labor-intensive industries
suffer the most from inadequate infrastructure services. 29
After reaching 5.4 percent of GDP in 1971–80, when measured
in constant 1980 prices, the rate of infrastructure investment dropped
annual rise in the consumption of electricity for an annual expansion of 5 percent
in GDP. Associação Brasileira da Infra-Estrutura e Indústrias de Base (ABDIB,
2006) points out that to grow 3.5 percent per year, Brazil needs to add 4,000 MW
to its generating capacity, against an average estimated increment of only half
that amount projected for 2006 –12.
29
See World Bank (2007b) for further evidence on the negative effects of Brazil’s
infrastructure on firms’ productivity and competitiveness.
139
140
by a third in the following decade, and fell an additional 50 percent
by the mid-1990s, when it reached just a third of the level recorded
in the 1970s (see Table 3.3). This contraction in infrastructure investment reflected the retrenchment in public investment, including
both the government per se and its companies, and the failure of the
privatization cum regulatory reform to reverse this decline. 30 Because
the private sector invested nearly nothing in infrastructure until the
second half of the 1990s, the decline shown in Table 3.3 between the
1970s and 1995–96 can be entirely attributed to lower public sector
investment. Public infrastructure investment declined further from
1999 onward, largely due to the reclassification of state enterprise
investment as a result of privatization. In the telecom sector alone,
investment fell by 0.8 percent of GDP with the sale of Telebras. Yet
the further contraction in public investment in transport and electricity in 2002–03 cannot be attributed to accounting, since there have
been virtually no privatizations in either sector since 2000. 31
To foster private investment in infrastructure, substantial
ownership and regulatory changes were implemented in 1996–2000.
Yet the expansion in the stock of infrastructure continued at a slow
pace. ABDIB (2006) estimates that in recent years actual investment covered only 65 percent of the needs for capital accumulation
in the telecom sector, 45 percent in transportation, and 33 percent
in sanitation. At least three factors contributed to these frustrating
results. First, private investment in infrastructure in the 1990s was
largely geared to buying the companies being privatized, not to
expanding the existing capital stock; greenfield projects accounted
for less than a quarter of the total volume of private investments
in infrastructure (World Bank, 2007b). Second, in comparison to
30
See Pinheiro (2006) for a discussion of the factors leading to the contraction
in public infrastructure investment and the failure of privatization and regulatory
reform to spur greenfield investment projects.
31
In transport, in particular, privatization took place in areas that historically had
seen little investment, such as railways, yet investment by the federal government
in transport dropped from an average 1.44 percent of GDP in 1976 –78 to a mere
0.13 percent of GDP in 2002–04 (Frischtak and Gimenes, 2005).
TABLE 3.3 Investment Breakdown
(as percent of GDP, in constant 1980 prices) a
Year
Total
Residential building
Petroleum
Public sector b
Infrastructure
Electricity
Telecommunication
Transport
Sanitation
Others
1971–80
1981–9
1990–4
1995–6
1997–8
1999
2000
23.50
4.95
0.95
3.00
5.42
2.13
0.80
2.03
0.46
9.18
18.00
4.71
0.88
1.43
3.62
1.47
0.43
1.48
0.24
7.36
14.90
4.03
0.39
1.86
2.16
0.85
0.50
0.69
0.07
6.46
17.00
3.99
.35
1.65
1.79
0.52
0.66
0.48
0.13
9.22
16.40
4.24
0.36
1.68
2.77
0.79
0.98
0.68
0.32
7.35
16.10
3.97
0.45
1.10
2.70
0.77
1.17
0.56
0.20
7.88
16.50
3.60
0.51
1.20
2.58
0.67
1.07
0.63
0.21
8.61
Source: Bielschowsky (2002, pp. 25–9).
a
Does not take into account 2007 revision in national accounts.
b
Public sector = nonfinancial public sector; excludes transport.
other countries within or outside Latin America, the participation of
private investors in infrastructure in Brazil is relatively low (World
Bank, 2007b). Third, ownership and regulatory reforms succeeded
in increasing productivity and investment, but from low levels; investment in particular was largely concentrated on the rehabilitation
and modernization of existing facilities. The only exception was
the telecom sector, in which output capacity increased annually at
double-digit rates. 32
Ferreira and Nascimento (2005) estimate that the decline in
public investment since the early 1980s, largely concentrated on
infrastructure, lowered annual GDP growth by about 0.4 percentage
points. 33 The authors conclude that a return of the public investment
rate to its pre-1980 level would have sizeable effects on output growth.
32
There are signs that this may be changing, typically in cases in which firms
provide infrastructure services for their own use. In rail transportation, for instance,
the rate of investment stayed around 0.06 percent from 1997–98 to 2002–03, but in
2004–05 rose to 0.14 percent of GDP, while going from being predominantly public
to become entirely private (Frischtak and Gimenes, 2005). In ports, too, companies
have started to invest more intensely (Estado de São Paulo, April 8, 2007).
33
See World Bank (2007a) for further evidence in this regard.
141
142
According to Calderón and Servén (2003), 35 percent of the increase
in the gap of GDP per worker between Brazil and East Asia since the
early 1980s resulted from this slower accumulation of infrastructure
capital. In another study, Calderón and Servén (2004) estimate that
if the stocks and quality of Brazilian infrastructure rose to the level
of Costa Rica, the country with the best infrastructure in Latin
America, its annual GDP growth rate would rise by 2.9 percentage
points. 34 Ferreira and Araújo (2006) find that in Brazil long-run output elasticities are especially large for infrastructure investments
in electricity and transportation. Using data from the Investment
Climate Assessment, Escribano et al. (2005) show that infrastructure is one of the main determinants of total factor productivity
(TFP) in Brazil and other selected countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean. Without necessarily subscribing to any one of these
findings in particular, these pieces of evidence appear collectively
compelling in identifying infrastructure as a potentially important
binding constraint on economic growth in Brazil. 35
However, there are three main arguments against this conclusion. First, different business surveys show that firms do not
perceive infrastructure as the main factor constraining their competitiveness or limiting their expansion. In the World Bank’s 2003
Brazil Investment Climate Survey, electricity, transportation, and
telecommunications were three of the four least important obstacles
to growth out of a list of 21 potential constraints: a fifth or less of the
managers interviewed considered them a major or severe obstacle
to growth. 36
34
Income distribution would also improve substantially. Bringing Brazil’s infrastructure to the standards observed in Korea (the median of East Asia and the
Pacific) would increase its growth rate by 4.4 percentage points.
35
Cited in World Bank (2007b). Similar, if less strong evidence, is reported by
Subramanian, Anderson and Lee (2005).
36
This micro evidence must be taken with a grain of salt, though. It is possible
that firms react in this way because poor infrastructure affects them all in the same
way and thus does not affect their ability to compete—unlike high taxes, ranked
as the most important obstacle, which drive a wedge between the competitiveness
of formal and informal firms.
Second, the stock of Brazilian infrastructure compares well with
that of other countries in the region, and with emerging economies
in general, with the noteworthy exception of the proportion of paved
roads. The deficiencies in infrastructure become more evident,
though, when Brazil is contrasted with Chile and Korea. Nevertheless, current stocks of infrastructure largely reflect the high investment levels dating back to the 1950–85 period. If it keeps the recent
investment rates, Brazil’s infrastructure is likely to lag behind that
of other large emerging economies, such as China and India.
Third, there is no evidence that sectors that use infrastructure
services more intensely have grown less than those that do not. In
particular, there is no clear association at the sector level between the
rate of sector growth in value added in 1996–2004 and the intensity
of consumption of infrastructure services in 1995, measured as the
ratio of consumption of public utility services to value added. There
is no association for the consumption of public utility services, which
basically reflects how intensely the sector uses electricity. Likewise,
a regression of average sector growth (AVGGRO) against the consumption of communications, transport, and public utility services
does not suggest that sectors that rely more intensely on these inputs
grew less than those that do not depend so much on them:37
AVGGRO = 2.05 – 38.0 * Com – 0.20 * FServ + 6.45 * Ins – 0.06 *
(3.65)(–1.49)
(–0.04)
(0.27)
(–0.02)
Putil + 12.5 * Transp – 0.79 * Exp
(3.14)
(–0.59)
R 2 = 0.194
This study also examined whether, in 1997–2004, the GDP of
municipalities further away from the state capital grew less than
37
Based on data extracted from IPEADATA. Estimated using data for 42 sectors
and least squares estimation, with White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard
Errors & Covariance. Variables defined as intermediate consumption as a proportion of value added. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
143
144
those nearer the capital, which in most cases are the largest markets.
If this were the case, it could be an indication that Brazil’s poor road
conditions were hurting growth. No indication of such a negative
influence was found: on the contrary, municipalities located further
from the state capital performed better, on average, after controlling
for initial per capita GDP and size (measured by population). Using
an index reflecting the cost of transportation from the municipality
center to the closest state capital yields a coefficient that is not statistically significant (see working paper for regression details).
In sum, to accommodate higher growth rates, Brazil needs to
improve its transport infrastructure, enhance investment in electricity generation, and expand access to clean water and improved
sanitation facilities, which would possibly most benefit the poor. But
considering the preponderance of the evidence, the authors tend to
share the view expressed in World Bank (2007b, p. 6) that although
“evidence shows that higher infrastructure investments may lead to
higher growth rates and better social indicators,” it is not possible to
uphold the claim that infrastructure is a binding constraint on higher
sustainable growth rates in Brazil—especially when compared to high
current expenditures and high levels and incidence of taxation. This
is not to say, of course, that it may not become a binding constraint if
infrastructure investment rates stay at their current low levels.
The High Cost of Finance
This section explores the factors that might act as a constraint on investment by increasing the cost of funding of investment projects rather
than affecting the private return of these investments. 38 The section is
structured in the following way. First, the “traditional” analysis of the
cost of financing focuses on the private commercial banking sector,
and shows that from this point of view Brazil is an outlier compared
38
The hypothesis that returns are low because the price of capital goods is high
was explored and discarded. The interested reader is referred to the full working
paper version.
with other developing countries. The extremely high real lending
rates in the banking sector make financing a prime candidate for a
binding constraint on investment. A more comprehensive analysis of
the cost of investment financing then looks in more detail at private
bank credit as well as public banks and nonbank financing to show
that high cost of finance is much less prevalent than it appears. While
the high cost of financing may be relevant for a segment of the market
and possibly induces distortions overall, it does not appear to be a key
binding constraint on investment and growth in the aggregate.
The rest of the section is devoted to explaining why investment
financing is expensive or not available to certain segments of firms.
First, the argument of HRV (2005) that low domestic aggregate savings is behind the high cost of financing is explored. While such a
constraint may have been active in the past, at a time when access
to external financing was limited, evidence is presented showing
that neither low domestic savings nor limited access to external
finance is a binding constraint in the more recent period analyzed.
Nevertheless, domestic savings are low and high growth may be
impeded in the future if access to international financial markets
deteriorates. 39 Therefore the high cost of finance remains a potential binding constraint threatening growth sustainability. Finally,
the analysis turns to the financial intermediation costs that explain
the observed high financing costs: both high risk premiums and
intermediation spreads.
A good starting point for a discussion on investment financing
cost in Brazil is the well-documented stylized fact of the Brazilian
economy that real interest rates are extremely high, which has often
been considered a major suspect, and culprit, for Brazil’s lackluster
growth performance. This feature shows up when considering lending rates by commercial banks (Figure 3.12). Even when compared
to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, which historically
faced high interest rates, Brazil is an outlier with extremely high real
39
The global financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2008, at the time of
final writing, may reimpose this constraint in the short term.
145
FIGURE 3.12 Ex Post Real Lending Rates in Latin America and the Caribbean,
2005
ARG
50
BRA
40
Real lending rates
146
30
PRY
DOM
20
10
BOL
HTI
PER
HND
ECU
NIC
0
7.5
8.0
GUY
GTM
JAM
BLZ
COL
PAN
CRI
URY
VEN
MEX CHL
TTO
ARG
8.5
9.0
9.5
GDP per capita (log)
Source: WDI, World Bank.
domestic lending rates. According to the data presented in Figure
3.12, real lending rates in Brazil were above 45 percent, more than
twice the rates in Paraguay and Dominican Republic, which are also
extremely high. The corresponding ex ante real interest rates, net
of inflation expectations, have also been between 40 and 50 percent
since 2001 (when data became available). This indicator alone makes
financing constraints a likely candidate for being a major constraint
to economic growth in Brazil.
Are financial constraints relevant? A way to explore the relevance
of financial constraints for investment is a test in the spirit of Rajan and
Zingales (1998) on whether industries that rely heavily on external financing are significantly smaller in Brazil compared to other countries.
This hypothesis was tested using data from the UNIDO database and
involve 20 sectors in 38 countries.40 The evidence produced by this test
casts doubt on finance being a binding constraint in Brazil.41 Furthermore a simple correlation analysis using the time series of investment
40
See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for more details on the external financing
variable.
41
However, a major limitation of the previous analysis is that it focuses only on the
manufacturing sector, leaving out other industries, the services sector, and agriculture,
which represent 11 percent, 64 percent, and 6 percent of total GDP, respectively.
and ex ante interest rates in Brazil yields a similar conclusion. The
correlation is insignificant, contrary to the strong positive co-movement
one would expect if financing were a binding constraint.42 More details
on these tests can be seen in the working paper version.
The discussion that follows examines several specificities
of Brazilian financial markets that might mitigate the picture that
emerges from Figure 3.12 regarding the high cost of financing faced
by firms and explains why it may have limited overall relevance. In
particular, some of these aspects show that the overall cost of credit
that firms actually face may be much lower than is indicated by the
initial analysis in the traditional approach, which is based on average interest rates.
The first potentially mitigating factor is the existence of a
significant amount of directed credit, which still represents a large
share of total credit in the economy (about one third).43 A large share
of these earmarked funds consist of compulsory savings collected
by quasi-taxes, like the Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador (FAT) and
Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço (FGTS), and development
funds like the Fundo de Garantia para a Promoção da Competitividade (FGPC). The public sector—especially the national development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (BNDES)—plays
an important role in the allocation of credit in the economy. In 2006
alone, the disbursements made by BNDES to the manufacturing
sector amounted to almost US$12 billion, which represents more
that 9 percent of the value added created by total manufacturing.
Therefore, the presence of a large fraction of directed credit might
actually make the previous analysis more informative regarding the
presence of financial constraints.
42
However, Terra (2003) estimates investment equations at the firm level in Brazil
and finds that firms in sectors classified as intensive in external financing by Rajan
and Zingales (1998) are significantly more financially constrained than those in
sectors that require less external funding. Thus, this micro evidence goes in the
direction of confirming that financing might be a binding constraint.
43
The data presented on interest rates in this section in general refers to credit
operations regarding non-earmarked funds.
147
148
These compulsory savings are channeled to firms by public
federal banks at the interest rate paid on these funds plus a spread
that includes a risk premium and administrative costs.44 Although
an average rate is not available for these lending operations, there
are certain caps for the risk premium (currently 4 percent per
year) and other associated costs. A reasonable approximation of
the overall spread is 4.5 percent on top of the funding rate. Therefore, the Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo (TJLP) has always been
significantly below the policy target rate, SELIC (Sistema Especial
de Liquidação e de Custódia). While the SELIC rate is currently
around 12 percent, the TJLP is only 6.5 percent. Given that inflation expectations are currently around 3.7 percent for the next 12
months, the latter implies a real interest rate of 2.7 percent. If the
estimated 4.5 percent spread on these operations is included, the
resulting interest rate firms pay for these funds would be about
7 percent, way below the prevailing rates for credit from private
banks discussed above.45
It could be argued that subsidized credit lines are infra-marginal
and therefore not relevant when considering the marginal cost of finance as a restriction to investment in Brazil. However, this argument
is valid only in the absence of market segmentation. Thus, while not
all borrowers, particularly small and medium firms, have unlimited
access to these funds, most medium and large firms, which account
for the bulk of investment in Brazil, do. Although the distribution
of investment by company size is itself endogenous, and could be a
consequence of limited access to finance by smaller companies, the
evidence of excess funds in BNDES in recent years indicates that
there is insufficient demand for credit at the current rates. This leads
to the conclusion that at least in that segment, rates for financing
investment are not particularly costly.
44
The relevant funding rate is the long-run interest rate Taxa de Juros de Longo
Prazo (TJLP), which is computed following the National Monetary Committee’s
inflation target for the next 12 months plus a premium.
45
Clearly, this low rate of funding implicitly carries a subsidy.
Moreover, most of the credit that firms receive from banks goes
to finance working capital and current operations rather than investment in physical capital, which represents only around 6.9 percent of
total bank credit to firms. Thus, the non-earmarked funds available
in the banking system are allocated only marginally to investment.
This also implies that the share of subsidized credit represents a
dominant share of investment credit (85 percent)—much larger than
the one third considered above (although some financing for working
capital may hide investment financing to small firms).
An additional indicator that is useful in evaluating the financial
environment of firms is the way their working capital is financed.
In theory, in the presence of information asymmetries, the pecking
order for investment financing would be first to use internal funds,
then debt, and finally equity. In addition, tax treatment issues might
make comparisons of investment financing difficult to interpret
across countries. However, in the case of working capital, whenever
information frictions in credit markets induce the pecking order with
regard to investment funding, firms would want to rely on external
funding to finance working capital. Thus, a comparison of the fraction of working capital financed with retained earnings and other
internal funds could be very informative regarding the relevance of
financing constraints. This indicator is reported by the Investment
Climate Surveys of the World Bank for a group of 100 countries (see
working paper version for details). Brazilian firms at all size levels
rely relatively little on internal funds to finance working capital
compared to other countries with similar levels of development.
The share of internal funds is well below that expected for Brazil’s
GDP per capita and ranks best among countries in Latin America
for small, medium, and large firms. Thus, this information again
provides evidence that financing constraints currently do not seem
to be a major constraint on average for Brazilian firms. In addition,
there are no significant differences by firm size in the case of Brazil
for this latter indicator.
Furthermore, focusing on the banking sector, the Brazilian
system is relatively underdeveloped, with credit to the private
149
150
sector representing around 35 percentage points of GDP in recent
years. This level of financial development in the banking sector is
slightly below that of the average country in the region and compares especially poorly to Chile, where credit to the private sector
is around 70 percent of GDP. However, capital market development
indicators do not show such a poor picture. In terms of the size and
liquidity of the stock market, market capitalization and turnover
of equity, Brazil is above the average level in the region and is also
comparable to East Asia and the Pacific—the region that is, by far,
the most financially sophisticated among developing and emerging
economies. This evidence also shows that relying only on information
from the banking sector leaves out an important part of the sources
of finance for firms.
Summing up, traditional indicators suggest that financing
constraints are binding and hold back economic growth in Brazil,
but more detailed analysis casts doubts on whether the high cost
of financing is a binding constraint overall, at the aggregate level.
At the same time, it may be very relevant for certain segments of
firms with limited access to finance. The discussion now turns to
an examination of the factors underlying the high cost of finance
where it exits.
Low Domestic Savings and Access to International Finance
The starting point is the analysis in HRV on Brazil. HRV point
out that Brazil’s growth performance moves pari passu with the
tightness of the external constraint through the cost of financing
channel. HRV see the Brazilian case as a prototypical example
of a savings-constrained country; they argue that ameliorating a
number of other problems that harm the Brazilian economy, such
as a more pro-business fiscal stance (lowering taxes, for example),
will at best be innocuous and at worst further depress overall savings and consequently growth. The discussion that follows revisits
these issues with the benefit of writing after the Brazilian economy
adjusted to the 2002–03 political transition, international liquidity
expanded significantly, and the national accounts revision improved
the quality of savings and investment statistics.
Aggregate savings. Brazil’s saving rate over the last ten years has
been significantly below its expected level, given its level of development. In particular, while gross national savings represented an
average of only 14.7 percent of GDP, countries with similar levels of
development in East Asia like Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand saved
more than 30 percent of their GDP on average.46 Thus, Brazil ranks
low regarding domestic savings. However, this does not necessarily
imply that low domestic savings is currently a binding constraint on
investment in Brazil.
Although there is plenty of evidence that Brazil continues to
be a low savings country for the reasons raised by HRV, the same is
not true of their contention that the country’s growth performance
is bound by its low availability of savings. A clear indication that low
savings is currently not binding is the fact that from 1999 to 2006,
the savings rate increased from a mere 12 percent of GDP to 17.6
percent, mainly due to a rise in private savings. Meanwhile, fixed
investment has increased by merely a percentage point to 16.8 percent
in 2006. As a result, currently Brazil has excess national savings that
are being invested abroad.
Access to international finance. In theory, access to international
capital markets is very important for developing countries, given
that external financing allows the country to allocate resources to
investment without necessarily inflicting the pain of reducing current
consumption to induce savings to finance these investments internally.
This means that if a country has full access to international capital
markets, savings and investment decisions are independent from
each other. Given that Brazil is currently exporting capital, despite
its low level of overall investment, it must be the case that returns
46
While Brazil compares favorably to Latin American countries, those countries
in general exhibit low domestic savings.
151
152
are low or that the financial sector is incapable of absorbing these
additional savings and channeling them efficiently to the firms with
the most profitable investment projects.
Even if domestic savings were not excessive, they could be a
binding constraint on investment only in the presence of impediments to tapping foreign savings. In the context of an open economy,
the domestic saving rate determines the equilibrium value of the
real exchange rate, given the external real interest rate facing the
country. For any given real interest rate, there is a real exchange
rate that makes that level of the real interest rate consistent with
the goods market equilibrium at full employment. Holding real
output constant at its potential level, a sustained reduction in domestic saving must give rise to a more appreciated real exchange
rate so as to sustain the equilibrium of the goods market. Viewed
from a saving-investment perspective, the key point is that the
real exchange rate appreciation generates exactly as much foreign
saving (through an increased current account deficit) as required
to offset the reduction in domestic saving. From an open economy
perspective, then, the issue is not so much the quantity of domestic saving, but the terms on which the world is willing to finance
domestic investment.
Therefore an indication that domestic savings are not a constraint on investment is that Brazil currently has ample access to
international finance markets at low spreads. In this sense, spreads
on sovereign debt have declined since the 2002 crisis from above
2000 basis points (bps) to around 150 bps in 2007. Although spreads
are still above those of investment-grade countries in the region,
like Mexico (76 bps), current rates are historically the best conditions Brazil has faced in credit markets in recent times. While the
general reduction in financing costs across emerging markets is
partially caused by high levels of liquidity and lower investors’ risk
aversion, investors also perceive a steady improvement in economic
fundamentals in Brazil over the past few years. For example, S&P
ratings increased from B + with a negative outlook in July 2002 to
BB + with a positive outlook in May 2007.
Clearly, the preceding discussion does not imply that Brazil is
immune to international capital market shocks or that in the future
market access will not be a constraint.47 Despite the fact that the
current fiscal position, in terms of the primary surplus, the overall
fiscal balance, and external debt have turned more solid in the recent
period, the overall debt burden is still high compared to international
standards. Thus, Brazil remains in a vulnerable position, especially
because of the short-term maturity and duration of its domestic debt.
Nevertheless, the current situation shows that access to international
finance is currently not a binding constraint on economic growth.
That said, there are reasons for concern that if other constraints
on investment are lifted, low savings may again become a binding
constraint: with a domestic savings rate of less than 17 percent of
GDP, there is little room for Brazil to expand investment significantly
without running a large current account deficit and risking another
external crisis and suffering the loss of access to external financing. Moreover, although there are reasons to expect that improved
economic performance may help expand savings, there are also
factors that could further reduce the country’s savings rate in the
future (such as a rising share of elderly citizens in the population
and a higher degree of urbanization).
Poor financial intermediation. To the extent that there are segments
of investment with inadequate access to financing, it is also important to analyze the efficiency of financial intermediation in Brazil.
The discussion that follows focuses on financial intermediation
costs in credit markets, especially lending by commercial banks. A
distinction is made between costs associated with attracting savings
related to risks to savers (the deposit rate) and banking costs (the
lending-deposit rate spread).
Concerning deposit rates, currently, the real ex ante cost of
funding is around 8 percent per year, which is also very close to the
47
The global financial crisis erupting at the time of final writing may reimpose
such a constraint in the short term.
153
SELIC rate. Brazil is not only an outlier regarding the high level of
its lending rate, as shown in Figure 3.13, but its deposit rate is also
very high in real terms (although the difference with other countries
in the region is not as large as for the case of lending rates). Several
explanations have been advanced to explain the anomalously high
real money market interest rates in Brazil in terms of risks to savers. These explanations include fiscal and monetary policy in the
context of weak economic fundamentals, jurisdictional uncertainty
(Arida, Bacha and Lara-Resende, 2004), and a trade-off between
financial de-dollarization and real interest rates (Bacha, Holland
and Gonçalves, 2007).
Explanations based on weak fiscal and monetary macroeconomic policies can be rejected but evidence of jurisdictional and
anti-dollarization effects can be found (see working paper version).
Nevertheless, in actuality their contribution to lending rates is minor compared with the intermediation spread. The main proximate
cause of high lending rates by commercial banks is large intermediation spreads. While the marginal cost of funds for banks has been
decreasing from a maximum of around 16 percent in mid-2003 to
almost 8 percent in May 2007 along with lending rates, the implied
spreads—defined as the difference between the lending and the
FIGURE 3.13 Ex Post Real Spreads in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2005
40
BRA
154
30
PRY
20
HTL
BOL
10
JAM
HND
NIC
GUY
PER
GTM
ECU
DOM
COL
PLZ
7.5
8.0
8.5
Source: WDI, World Bank.
TTO
MEX
PAN
CHL
VEN
0
CRI
URY
9.0
ARG
9.5
deposit rate—have remained fairly stable, around 25 percent. Figure
3.13 compares Brazil’s extremely high ex post real spreads with those
from other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
According to World Bank (2006), banking spreads are high
mainly because the domestic money market rate is high and its effect on the lending rate is more than proportional. 48
However, a regression analysis shows that such an explanation
is misleading.49 A simple regression of the spreads on the SELIC for
data from November 2001 to May 2007 yields the result:50
Real_spread = 22.70 + 0.14 Real_SELIC
(0.46) (0.03)
R-squared = 0.14
While this regression confirms that the spread and the money
market rate are indeed systematically—and positively—related, the
large constant term and the R 2 both suggest that the key is elsewhere.
Our analysis concludes that the explanation of these high spreads
is a combination of factors that include lack of competition and low
efficiency, as well as weak information and enforcement of creditor
rights (see working paper for details).
In summary, financing costs can be extremely high in Brazil
for certain segments of firms. The high lending rates observed
in commercial banks are mainly driven by a high intermediation
spread in the banking system that can be traced to microeconomic
distortions and institutional weaknesses more than macroeconomic
circumstances.
48
There are many potential explanations for why a higher money market interest
rate could have an impact on spreads. For example, higher lending rates induce an
adverse selection problem. In turn, a higher proportion of risky loans will result
in a larger risk premium, which is reflected in the spread.
49
The authors thank Peter Montiel for this observation.
50
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
155
156
Conclusion: From Symptoms to Syndromes
This chapter began by showing that in the last quarter century Brazil
experienced a severe drop in economic growth, after an excellent
performance in the previous five decades. Leaving aside the lost
decade of the debt crisis of the 1980s and its aftermath, a supply side
growth decomposition revealed that the main difference between
economic performance in the period following price stabilization
(1995–2006) and the previous high-growth era has been the much
slower pace of capital accumulation.
The previous two sections have extensively analyzed various
potential constraints on investment that could explain slow economic
growth in Brazil. The exercise reveals the complexity of performing
an in-depth GDM analysis because the available evidence is not always
indicative of the relative importance of a particular constraint vis-à-vis
other problems identified in the analysis. This study of the Brazilian
case does not point toward a “smoking gun” that can be blamed as
the sole culprit of Brazil’s poor growth performance. Nevertheless,
the analysis sheds light on the severity of the various problems and
therefore allows for a tentative ordering of the constraints.
Strong evidence was found that the most severe constraints on
growth currently are human capital as well as high and inefficient
taxation because they significantly reduce the returns on investment
and thus hold back growth. The analysis identified a second group of
problems as potentially strong constraints, which may become binding over time. They include infrastructure (especially in electricity
and transportation) and financing. Domestic savings may be too
low to sustain higher growth and may choke investment if access to
international financial markets deteriorates. There is also evidence
that Brazil has poor bank intermediation that impedes certain investment activities; is still fragile regarding macroeconomic stability
and access to international capital markets; is lagging behind in its
business environment; and is burdened by a large informal economy.
While these factors are relevant, at the present time they seem to
be milder constraints. Finally, although there is ample room for
improvement in the areas of innovation and structural transformation, these factors also do not appear to be binding constraints on
economic growth. 51
The analysis has also shown that the most binding constraints
exhibit common features, which points toward a principal syndrome:
an overspending state. This syndrome is consistent with the timing
of the Brazilian economic slowdown; if the drop in growth rates in
the early 1980s is ascribed to the debt crisis and to the fact that
growth has been hindered mainly by a failure to resume rapid capital
accumulation. The main picture that emerges from the analysis is
that of a public sector that has been rapidly increasing taxation on
the private sector to finance ever-expanding current expenditures,
especially social security outlays, and underinvesting in public infrastructure and education (human capital) for a long time. As coined
by Pinheiro et al. (2006) the Brazilian state can be characterized
as a “dysfunctional” state, in the sense that the quality and quantity
of public goods it provides is not commensurate with the size (and
complexity) of the tax burden it imposes on its citizens.
The sharp increase in public expenditure, as shown in Figure
3.14, coincides with the new constitution of 1988, which established
large entitlements of publicly guaranteed services and rights (especially more generous public and rural pension schemes), without
providing an answer as to how they would be financed. In addition,
the call for more decentralization implied that the responsibility for
providing education, health care, and transportation shifted to the
states and municipalities, while the federal government remained
responsible for financing them. As Figure 3.14 shows, this implied a
very rapid increase of public consumption as a share of GDP from a
long-run average of around 11 percent of GDP for 1947–80 to around
20 percent for 1995–2006. 52
51
The hypothesis that low investment is caused by high investment prices was
also discarded.
52
Considering all levels of government and expenditures, the total public expenditure in Brazil amounted to around 42.5 percent of GDP in 2006.
157
FIGURE 3.14 Public Consumption, 1947–2007
(percent of GDP)
25
20
15
10
5
2001
2004
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
0
1947
158
Source: IPEA, based on Banco Central do Brasil (BCB).
Such an increase in current expenditures had to create a major
disruption in the economy. During the 1980s Brazil was basically
excluded from international credit markets, following the debt crisis, so the government resorted primarily to inflation to finance the
increase in expenditures. Thus, the symptoms of the overspending
state syndrome during the 1980s basically were macroeconomic
instability. After several failed attempts, the Plan Real was successful in reducing inflation. However, the expansion in expenditures
required an important increase in the tax burden, as well as debt
financing. Debt dynamics were increasingly regarded as unsustainable and the inconsistency behind the exchange rate regime and
fiscal policy implied the collapse of the pegged exchange rate regime
in early 1999. Again, macroeconomic instability—especially fiscal
unsustainability—turned out to be the main constraint during these
years. In addition, the increase in current public expenditure, and the
consequent drop in public savings, was so large that it could be accommodated only by reducing public investment, creating potentially
important bottlenecks in the energy sector and road infrastructure
that were not remediated by privatizations.
During the 2000–03 period, access to international financial
markets was limited due to market concerns regarding the sustain-
ability of debt. Thus, investment was limited by domestic savings. In
turn, domestic savings were low—indeed, lower than in the past and
than in most of the region, probably because of the high tax burden
and negative public savings. The result was low investment, constrained by exclusion from international capital markets. Moreover,
Brazil misallocated investment by underinvesting in areas in which
social returns tend to exceed private returns, such as infrastructure
(notably roads) and basic education, which further constrained
growth. Finally, over the past few years, the government has been
trying to attain fiscal sustainability by reducing the debt burden.
However, the consistently positive and high fiscal surpluses attained
were produced by increasing the tax burden even more, rather than
adjusting expenditures, which aggravated the high tax distortion.
Thus, currently the overspending state syndrome is reflected
primarily in a very high and complex tax burden that limits the private returns on investment. Meanwhile, there is little fiscal space
to finance important investments in infrastructure and education
due to the continuing increases in current expenditures, especially
social security. To put this into perspective, while coverage is low
and demographics are very favorable (the population is still very
young, compared to OECD countries), Brazil currently spends a
similar fraction on social security as developed countries with older
populations and almost universal coverage. There will be little space
to catch up and grow at a faster steady-state rate without a resolution
of these underlying problems, which keep pressing for an unsustainable increase in current expenditures. Long-run growth in Brazil
will benefit from the dismantling of the overspending state, which
will require drastic pension reform.
159
160
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. 2007c. Informality, Exit and Exclusion. World Bank Latin
American and Caribbean Studies. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
CHAPTER 4
Ecuador:
Binding Constraints to Growth
Simón Cueva, Vicente Albornoz, and Leopoldo Avellán*
Introduction
This document assesses the underlying constraints on economic
growth in Ecuador through a systematic examination of the potential
reasons behind low growth, using a decision tree approach, and following the growth diagnostics methodology developed by Hausmann,
Rodrik and Velasco (2005). Ecuador has been an average growth
performer within Latin America, with a slightly higher average growth
than the region over the last 50 years, attributable to the discovery
of vast oil reserves in the 1970s. Like most countries in the region,
it has failed to ensure sustainable and high growth rates that would
help make strong steps toward poverty reduction. This study finds
that micro risks and infrastructure weaknesses constitute key binding constraints on growth. Macroeconomic risks and the high cost
*
Simón Cueva is with Universidad de las Américas. Vicente Albornoz is with
Corporación de Estudios para el Desarrollo (CORDES). Leopoldo Avellán is with
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas (CIEC), Escuela Superior Politécnica del
Litoral (ESPOL). The authors acknowledge research assistance from Lorena
Andrade, Salomón García, Sandra Guamán, Andrea Heredia, José Hidalgo, Felipe
Hurtado, David Molina, and María Caridad Ortiz. They thank Manuel Agosín, Edna
Armendáriz, Eduardo Fernández-Arias, Fidel Jaramillo, Bailey Klinger, Daniel
Lemus, Marcela Meléndez, Alberto Melo, Erik Neira, Xavier Ordeñana, Pablo
S. Proaño, Gustavo Solórzano and participants in the IDB Growth Diagnostics
seminars in Washington for their comments.
166
SIMÓN CUEVA, VICENTE ALBORNOZ, AND LEOPOLDO AVELLÁN
of finance, arising from high country risk and poor intermediation,
are significant binding constraints, as well. Although human capital
and geography pose important challenges for policymaking, they
are not binding constraints at the moment.
The study is structured as follows. The second section presents some stylized facts about the Ecuadorian economy. The third
section discusses key binding constraints on growth. The fourth
section reviews the constraints that might not be the tightest ones
at this time, but that eventually must be relaxed in order to achieve
sustained growth in the future. The fifth section reviews some constraints that are not binding, and the sixth and final section provides
some conclusions and policy recommendations.
Ecuador’s Economic Performance: Stylized Facts
The Role of the External Sector
With a per capita GDP estimated at US$3,173 for 2007, Ecuador is
a medium-income country within Latin America. Over 1951–2005,
Ecuador posted an average 4.9 percent real growth rate, which is
relatively high by Latin American standards during that period,
though lower than for the best performers such as the Dominican
Republic, Costa Rica, or more recently Chile. This relatively favorable
performance is largely attributable to the oil boom, which boosted
Ecuador’s average annual growth to 10.4 percent in the 1970s—the
region’s highest. Except for that decade, Ecuador posted growth
rates very close to the region’s average, except for a very weak performance during the 1990s, mainly due to the 1999 financial crisis.
Ecuador’s growth over 2000–05 was again one of the highest in the
region—especially reflecting the boost to oil production in 2004,
once the new heavy oil pipeline was in place—before becoming low
by regional standards. Ecuador’s per capita growth is largely similar
to the performance of other Latin American economies, with a 2.4
percent average per capita growth over 1951–2005. However, Latin
America’s growth performance has been rather disappointing and
ECUADOR: BINDING CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH
below the world average (De Gregorio and Lee, 2003). As a result,
Ecuador’s growth performance has been poor in comparison to some
of the best performing economies, such as Korea or Spain.
Ecuador’s economic performance has been characterized by
significant volatility and a marked dependence on diverse primary
export commodities. In the early years of the twentieth century, the
Ecuadorian economy was largely based on agricultural products,
particularly cocoa, coffee, and related products. Their share of the
economy has gradually declined since the middle of the last century,
despite some occasionally favorable times (in the late 1940s, mid1950s, mid-1960s, and mid-1970s). From the late 1940s to the 1960s, the
banana boom was critical to help modernize the Ecuadorian economy.
In 1954, Ecuador became the world’s leading banana exporter, with
export proceeds representing over half the country’s total exports in
the mid-1960s. Despite a declining share as a result of the subsequent
oil boom, bananas remain an important export product, accounting
for around 18 percent of total exports in the last decade.
Oil has become a critical sector for the economy since the exploitation of important oil reserves in the early 1970s. The oil boom
was extremely abrupt, with the export share of oil export proceeds
jumping from less than 1 percent in 1971 to 66 percent five years later.
Oil production deeply modified the economy, prompting an urbanization process and the emergence of a middle class, as well as giving
the government a much larger economic role. Since the mid-1970s, oil
export revenues have evolved in line with international oil prices and
the country’s ability to develop its reserves further, but have never been
lower than 19 percent of total exports. More recently, a few commodities, such as shrimp and flowers, have also achieved a non-negligible
share of the country’s exports and boosted growth. However, oil has
been the main overall driver of economic fluctuations.
Investment and Savings
In recent years, the average investment rate in Ecuador as a percent
of GDP has been relatively large by regional standards. The Eco-
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168
nomic Commission of Latin America (Machinea, 2006) points to high
investment/GDP ratios for Ecuador in recent years (the highest out
of 19 Latin American economies), while UTEPI (2007) refers to a 15
percent annual growth of gross domestic investment over 2000–04,
a faster pace than for the region. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) figures on gross investment for 13 Latin American countries,
including the largest ones, show that gross investment as a percent
of GDP has indeed been large in Ecuador in recent years: the corresponding rate reached 21.6 percent on average in 2000–06, compared
to 18.5 percent for 12 other comparator countries (see Zettelmeyer,
2006). However, this trend is mostly recent: Ecuador’s investment
rates over 1979–2006 have been only marginally larger than the
regional average, as investment was comparatively low during the
1980s and the 1990s. The recent surge in investment has been driven
by private investment, which added up to 18.3 percent of GDP during
2000–06, compared to 14.1 percent of GDP in 1979–99.
Investment rates were relatively high during the 1960s and
1970s. According to De Gregorio and Lee (2003), Ecuador’s average
investment rate during 1965–95 (near 24 percent of GDP) was lower
only than that of Guyana among a large subset of Latin American
countries. Similarly, UTEPI (2007) estimates that point to capital
stock figures for Ecuador were only lower than Nicaragua among
17 Latin American countries: with a permanent inventory methodology, the results suggest that investment rates—used in the study to
estimate the initial capital stock in 1980—were indeed large before
then. As a result, Ecuador’s capital stock has since remained larger
than for most countries in the region, with even a slightly faster build
up than for other countries.
Although the high levels of Ecuadorian capital stock may be
related to the weight of the oil sector, both because of the large oil
investments during the 1970s and early 1980s and because of those
related to the heavy oil pipeline in early 2002, the available data on oil
and non-oil investment—building on the data provided by Espinasa
(2007)—suggests that only some 13 percent of gross investment was
related to oil during 1993–2006, except for the years when the heavy
oil pipeline was built (2001–03). Thus, at least part of the relatively
high capital stock levels could reflect some over-investment in lowproductivity sectors, as a result of specific protection.
Gross investment trends are more volatile in Ecuador than in
the region, mostly reflecting and amplifying the larger swings of the
country’s overall economic activity. Meanwhile, Ecuador’s domestic
savings, which were low by regional standards from the mid-1980s
through the mid-1990s, have consistently grown and are now among
the highest in the region. These trends reflect, in the late 1990s,
the impact of the economic crisis on the private sector, forcing it to
increase private savings and, in the early 2000s, the favorable impact
of oil prices, allowing improved public savings. Overall, for the past
two decades and despite large swings, Ecuador’s domestic savings
have remained close to the Latin American average.
Key Binding Constraints on Growth
Infrastructure: Critical Needs in Key Areas
Beyond the oil and energy sectors, Ecuador faces many additional
challenges regarding infrastructure—although actions are being
taken gradually to address those shortcomings. The World Bank’s
enterprise surveys show mixed results in terms of Ecuador’s rankings
within Latin America (Table 4.1). While delays to obtain an electric
or telephone connection are longer and the impact of electric outages
TABLE 4.1 Infrastructure Indicators, 2005
Infrastructure
Delay in obtaining an electrical connection (days)
Number of electrical outages (days)
Value lost due to electrical outages (% of sales)
Number of water supply failures (days)
Delay in mainline telephone connection (days)
Firms using the Web in interaction with clients/suppliers (%)
Source: World Bank enterprise surveys.
Ecuador
Region
All countries
29.54
9.47
5.04
4.12
92.65
55.41
25.75
13.50
3.66
-9.13
54.32
43.92
25.82
23.46
3.93
11.68
34.41
44.67
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170
greater than the regional average, water supply failures or the average
number of electric outages are moderate in regional terms.
According to the 2006 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Fact Book, the share of Ecuador’s roads that are paved is
close to 17 percent, a relatively low share by Latin American standards, partly reflecting the country’s geographical diversity and
the natural obstacles posed by the Andean mountains. However,
UTEPI mentions that 3 percent of the road network is now under
concession, a relatively high number by regional standards, which
ensures enhanced maintenance of the roads. Meanwhile, Ecuador
has the lowest number of airplane departures per million habitants,
which may partly reflect its relatively high population density in
South America, which facilitates land transportation. However, the
recent renovation of Guayaquil airport and the ongoing construction
of the new Quito airport suggests than improvements are underway.
In a similar vein, the granting of concessions to recognized foreign
companies for the operation and renovation of the ports of Guayaquil
and Manta signal an improvement in the coastal infrastructure.
Regarding telecommunications, according to the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI) and UTEPI (2007), in 2004 Ecuador ranked 10 th out of 17 Latin American economies, with 124 fixed
phone lines per 1,000 habitants, while it ranked 5 th (with a remarkable improvement from 15th place in 2000), with 348 mobile lines per
1,000 habitants. As discussions are underway for the renewal of the
existing mobile phone concession contracts, mobile telecommunications continue a dynamic expansion. Access to personal computers
and to the Internet remains relatively difficult for Ecuadorians, with
the country ranking in the lowest half of the region, despite some
improvement in recent years. Telecommunications and transportation, while regarded as a business constraint in the World Bank’s
Investment Climate survey, are not considered critical problems, with
only 18.1 and 10.6 percent of respondents, respectively, considering
them to be severe or very severe obstacles.
The remainder of this section focuses on two critical sectors for the Ecuadorian economy: oil and energy. Both are largely
controlled or dominated by the public sector, thus highlighting the
importance of appropriate decisions on public investment (or lack
of it) for growth. Both sectors are also characterized by highly inefficient sectoral strategies, which have failed to foster the relevant
sector’s development.
Oil Sector Development:
Investment, Governance, and Natural Resources Issues
Oil has had a very significant role in Ecuador’s economy in recent
decades. During 1980–2006, oil-related GDP represented 12.8 percent
of total GDP on average (measured in constant prices). In recent
years (2000–06), this share has risen to 17 percent. The importance
of oil is also reflected in trade composition. Oil exports accounted for
48.1 percent of total exports on average during 1980– 2006. Finally,
oil is critical for fiscal accounts: from 1980 to 2006, oil revenues
represented 36.5 percent of central government revenues, with some
decline of the corresponding share (to 29.5 percent) in recent years.
However, these figures, taken from official sources, underestimate
oil revenues, as increasingly large subsidies on oil derivatives are
directly financed from oil proceeds, before oil revenues are transferred (on a net basis) to the central government. The subsidies—not
included in central government revenues—have been rapidly rising
in recent years, reaching about 6 percent of GDP in 2007.
Since oil extraction started in Ecuador’s Amazonian region in
the early 1970s, production grew constantly until 1994, when state
oil production (managed by Petroecuador) started to fall, while
private production increased. Between 1994 and 2006, state oil
production fell at a relatively constant pace, with an annual average
rate of decline of 4.5 percent. At the same time, private production
posted moderate growth (16.6 percent annually, during 1994–2000),
before increasing its pace (to 38.2 percent annually in 2002–04) and
subsequently almost stagnating (with a 2.7 percent annual growth
in 2004–06). These numbers exclude the production of Bloque 15
oil field, which was operated by the U.S. firm Occidental until April
171
FIGURE 4.1 Daily Oil Production, 2000–7
(thousand barrels)
600
Petroecuador
Private companies
Total
500
400
300
200
100
Jan-07
Sep-06
Jan-06
May-06
Sep-05
May-05
Jan-05
Sep-04
Jan-04
May-04
Sep-03
Jan-03
May-03
Sep-02
May-02
Jan-02
Sep-01
Jan-01
May-01
Sep-00
Jan-00
0
May-00
172
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.
Note: Data exclude the impact of the decision to rescind the Occidental contract in April 2006.
2006, when the Ecuadorian government took control of it, alleging
contract infringement. Petroecuador has operated the field since
then. The decline in state production, combined with the recent
stagnation of private production, clearly reveal the limitations faced
by the oil sector (Figure 4.1).
Different sources provide somewhat diverse estimates for Ecuador’s crude oil reserves. Even with the most pessimistic estimate,
and assuming no new oil fields discoveries, Ecuador could maintain
its 2006 production level for 23 years. According to crude reserves
projections by the Oil & Gas Journal, world proved reserves grew by
2.7 percent annually during 1980–2006, while Ecuadorian reserves
increased by 5.7 percent over the same period. With a shorter time
frame (2000–06), the average growth of Ecuador reserves (13.9 percent) is even larger than for world’s reserves (4.1 percent). As a result,
the share of Ecuador reserves in the world doubled (from 0.17 to 0.34
percent) from 1980 to 2006. All in all, this suggests that the availability
of oil reserves is not a constraint on the sector’s growth.
Regarding transportation capacity, Ecuadorian crude oil lies almost exclusively in the country’s Amazonian region. Thus, the presence
of an oil transportation system to the Pacific Ocean, through the Andes,
is essential. The light crude oil pipeline (Oleoducto Trans-Ecuatoriano,
SOTE) has been functioning since 1975 with a transportation capacity,
after several expansions, of 390,000 barrels per day (b/d). Transportation capacity was a key constraint to production growth until late 2003,
when the heavy crude oil pipeline (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados,
OCP) started to operate, with a capacity of 450,000 b/d. This allowed
a significant increase in private production, particularly in 2004. Since
January 2004, following an initial step-up, private production has
barely grown. Despite the 160,000 b/d step-up in production, the OCP
excess transportation capacity (290,000 b/d) remains quite large, at 35
percent of the pipeline’s capacity. In addition, the gradual reduction in
public production explains why the capacity utilization of the existing
pipelines has been close to 59 percent, on average since January 2005.
In summary, transportation capacity has not been a constraint to the
growth of production in the sector, at least since late 2003.
In addition, between 1999 and 2006 the average price of Ecuador oil exports rose from US$9.2 per barrel to US$50.8 per barrel.
Over the same period, state production declined from 277,000 b/d
to 188,000 b/d. In other terms, production fell by 32 percent while
export prices increased by a factor of five. Overall, it appears that
oil prices do not explain the sector’s mediocre performance.
Turning now to institutional limitations, the main problems
hampering the oil sector’s ability to grow in line with its potential
mainly reflect legal limitations, the absence of a clear sectoral strategy, Ecuador’s limited attractiveness to foreign investors, and the
lack of conditions fostering open competition in diverse areas (see
Albornoz, Cueva and Gordillo, 2006).
Since the termination of the oil exploration contract with Texaco
in 1992, the existing regulatory framework has not included a way
to allow private investments in oil fields operated by Petroecuador.
The implementation of shared-management contracts, approved
in August 2000, has not been possible, as the Constitutional Court
declared them unconstitutional in December 2000.
The absence of a clear national strategy and an independent
business-style management of Petroecuador toward oil production
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174
growth are critical. This absence largely results from the significant
political instability that Ecuador has experienced in recent years,
which has led to a very rapid changeover in sector authorities and
the lack of continuity in policies. The oil sector is probably the worst
hit sector in this regard.
The negative impact of this lack of a clear strategy has been
reinforced by the perception among foreign investors that some
recent decisions have hampered legal stability. Over and above
concerns about diverse legal interpretations, the perception of unilateral changes in contracts implies that it will be difficult to restore
the confidence of either firms currently operating in the sector, or
of potential new serious partners. This highlights the importance
of clear guidelines and national objectives reflected in priorities for
public investment decisions; measures to provide some certainty
for decisions in the oil sector beyond potential political changes; an
enhanced negotiation capacity for the public sector with respect to
private companies; and building the status of the state as a strategic
partner in critical areas.
A third key area is related to the strong constraints against free
competition in several subsectors as a result of the state monopoly
position and the existence of heavily regulated prices. Areas that are
particularly affected include oil refining, oil derivatives commercialization, and oil derivatives imports for domestic markets. Beyond
legal limitations or the related large fiscal costs, price regulations
on oil derivatives have restrained any significant role for the private
sector in those areas, thus limiting the room for new private investments and explaining the obsolescence of oil infrastructure.
The recurrent underinvestment in the oil sector, particularly
by Petroecuador, explains the persistent decline in state production,
as well as the obsolescence of existing infrastructure in many areas
(refining, derivative transportation, stocking). In addition, Petroecuador uses relatively old technology in comparison with private
companies, and its operations have a high environmental impact.
Behind institutional problems and underinvestment, vested
interests combined with coordination failures are partly to blame
for the production decline and infrastructure limitations. Inefficient
and nontransparent markets have allowed the maintenance of some
profitable and noncompetitive businesses. Aging refineries increase
the need to import derivatives. The postponement in the construction
of pipelines for transporting derivatives has permitted costly road
transportation schemes to persist. Limitations for stocking derivatives have increased the need to make use of privately controlled
stocking and sea transportation systems. The continued use of a
sea oil terminal, which was expected to be temporary back in 1977,
results in the need for manual support for oil derivative loading and
unloading operations. The growing costs of subsidies for domestic
consumption of oil derivatives are the key driver of smuggling activities to neighboring countries.
The impact of the oil sector’s inefficiencies for economic growth
passes through at least two channels. First, the sector’s growth has
been rather lackluster in the context of historically high international prices, despite existing reserves. Second, as the sector is a
key provider of public revenues, these inefficiencies have had huge
opportunity costs in terms of public savings and public expenditure,
in turn restraining the possibility of fostering appropriate growthenhancing and poverty-reducing policies. Unlike electricity, oil is not
per se a significant input for other economic activities, except for oil
refining. Oil derivatives prices are low by international standards
because of high state subsidies; thus there is no direct impact in
terms of high costs, but there are obvious inefficiencies in terms of
the best and more equitable use of public funds.
Overall, development of the oil sector has been mediocre because of institutional limitations, the lack of long-term state policies,
underinvestment, and the presence of strong interest groups that
benefit from the lack of transparency. The inability of successive
governments to tackle the inefficiencies in those sectors has been
an important constraint to the country’s economic growth.
In 2006, average daily oil production in Ecuador was 536,000
barrels. In order to achieve an increase in production, large investments are required. Espinasa (2007) presents a scenario whereby
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176
the exploitation of existing light and semi-light oil fields is optimized,
in order to reach and maintain a daily level of oil production close to
890,000 barrels. Reaching such levels would imply investment and
maintenance outlays of about US$4.7 billion over five years. A second
scenario would include the start of operations in the heavy crude
oil field IT T, requiring additional investments of US$3.9 billion and
providing about 200,000 barrels per day. In summary, reaching a daily
average production of 1,090,000 barrels would require investments
of about US$8.6 billion—and, according to Espinasa, is achievable
within eight years.
The Electricity Sector:
Inappropriate Regulation and Business Environment
The most vulnerable aspect of Ecuador’s infrastructure is probably
the electricity sector. Electricity supply is a major problem and a
source of large distortions. Electricity rates are high compared to
the region (only lower than in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama)
despite being subsidized. The high costs, by regional standards,
of electricity tariffs in Ecuador, coupled with repeated blackouts,
have hampered the private sector’s competitive position in several
sectors. The country has been constantly under the threat of power
outages because of the lack of generation. Electricity is the business
obstacle most commonly cited as a severe or very severe problem (by
28.3 percent of respondents) in the World Bank’s investment climate
survey. Moreover, it seems that the sector’s problems have become
recurrent enough so as to be considered by some respondents to be
the norm for the country’s environment, which would explain why
some firms, despite not citing the issue as an obstacle, report having
sales losses because of electricity outages.
Distribution utilities face large and recurrent efficiency issues.
Ecuador ranks first among Latin American countries in terms of
energy losses (by 2004, almost 42 percent of the transmitted and
distributed energy was lost), a problem that has become more critical
in recent years (see Figure 4.2). As Neira and Ramos (2003) note,
FIGURE 4.2 Energy Transmission and Distribution Losses, 1971–2003
(percent of output)
45
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Average
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
0
1971
5
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. Average includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
and Uruguay.
such a situation is due to both technical reasons (factors inherent
to energy transportation, which partly reflect underinvestment in
transportation facilities) and nontechnical ones (energy smuggling,
equipment obsolescence, inefficient business management).
The expensive energy costs are largely related to the growing
dependence on thermoelectric- rather than hydroelectric-generated
electricity; the former has much higher marginal costs. Hydroelectric production fell from nearly 86 percent to only 59 percent of total
production from 1989 to 2004. Meanwhile, the share of oil-related
generation grew from 14 percent in 1989 to almost 33 percent in
2004. Many large energy generations projects, which were expected
to move forward according to the 2000 official electric plan, have
been postponed or have not started (see Table 4.2). These trends do
not reflect natural resource constraints but mostly underinvestment
for hydroelectric plants. According to OLADE, Ecuador uses about
7 percent of its hydroelectric generating potential, and the country’s
energy demand is growing faster than the added supply capacity,
implying the growing need to import even more costly energy from
Colombia and, more recently, Peru.
The energy sector is largely dominated by the public sector. As
pointed out by IDB (2001), Ecuador has the lowest level of private
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178
TABLE 4.2 Electric Generation Projects and Implementation since 2000
Project
Generation type
Estimated
operation
Annual
generation (GWH)
EDC1
EDC2
EDC3
Termoriente
Gas
Heat
Combined cycle
Thermoelectric
Jan. 2002
July 2002
July 2003
Jan. 2003
838
634
789
2,010
San Francisco
Hydroelectric
May 2004
1,103–1,403
Mazar
Molino Mazar
Hydroelectric
Hydroelectric
Jan. 2006
Jan. 2006
569–744
677–1,042
Current status
Operating since Aug 2002
Postponed until 2008
Postponed until 2011
Construction not started;
concession in process
Partially started, to be
completed by 2008
Expected by March 2009
Will start in March 2009,
depending on Mazar a
Source: CONELEC, 2000 and 2006 electric plans.
Note: Annual generation ranges are for medium and dry hydrology for hydroelectric projects.
investment in electricity and one of the lowest levels of private sector participation in generation and distribution in the region, while
transmission operations are state-controlled.
Twenty firms take care of energy distribution. All are under
heavy public sector control. For instance, 19 of the 20 firms have a
Solidarity Fund, a public entity dependent on the presidency, as their
main shareholder, with other minority shareholders, including local
governments and regional chambers of commerce.
State-controlled distribution utilities are characterized by
consistent energy losses. Such inefficiencies reflect a combination
of inadequate investment, lack of competition, political interference,
management and governance issues, and regulatory shortcomings.
Underinvestment, particularly for transmission operation, is
a partial cause of growing energy losses. According to the World
Bank (2005), the electricity sector received investments adding up
to only 0.16 percent of the country’s GDP over 1996–2000.
A portion of the growing debts to energy suppliers run up by
the most inefficient utilities can be attributed to the government’s
decision to maintain a subsidy on final energy prices, without proper
and prompt compensation to distribution utilities. Debt built up to
about US$1 billion through 2006 is expected to be taken over by the
central government in line with a new energy law. In turn, the growing debt that generation firms have run up with their main supplier
of oil derivatives, Petroecuador, has hurt the national oil company’s
financial situation, aggravating the already low investment in oil
production. Through renewed emergency decrees, successive governments have maintained Petroecuador’s provision of oil derivatives to
over-indebted generation utilities, mitigating the risk of large energy
blackouts but boosting the costs of oil derivative imports.
Management and collection procedures vary widely for different regional firms and explain a large share of distribution inefficiencies. The appointment scheme for the companies’ boards and
managers—by direct nomination from political authorities—raises
governance issues. Regional, industrial, and business leaders usually play a role in such nominations, while they are also some of the
larger electricity customers. As a result, enhancing the firms’ poor
collection procedures (which would help in reducing energy losses
and recovering longstanding debts) is challenging. The new energy
law called for an open system for the nomination of the board and
managerial positions in the distribution firms, with the aim of ensuring more professional and independent management. However,
the legal reforms have not been implemented so far, as the general
prosecutor has issued a statement establishing that electric utilities
must follow the legal provisions that regulate private businesses
instead of the energy law.
The regulatory framework for energy pricing exacerbates
existing problems. There are two wholesale markets for electricity:
long-term contracts agreed between production and distribution utilities, and the spot market. With a clear and recurrent segmentation,
efficient firms typically rely on long-term contracts, ensuring them a
more predictable and cheaper provision of electricity. Inefficient utilities depend more heavily on the spot market, where electricity prices
are based on the marginal producing cost for each time period, and
the most efficient producers are called first to supply energy at each
period. Spot prices can vary widely from soft-demand periods, when
hydroelectric utilities are the main providers, to peak hours, when
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all production utilities, including expensive thermoelectric ones, are
working. Thus, lower-cost generating firms—hydroelectric—make
their largest profits during peak periods and have little incentive to
increase their production capacity, as this would push out high-cost
generating firms from the market, lowering their own profits. Some
private thermoelectric projects—which generally require much
lower initial investments and have a shorter investment recovery
horizon—have been developed to take advantage of the high spot
prices resulting from the sector’s underinvestment and inefficiencies. Some have faced challenges in collecting debts from inefficient
utilities (the ones mostly relying on the spot market). This has led
to legal actions and has worsened the environment for new private
investment. Meanwhile, hydroelectric plants—which require large
initial investments and long horizons for investment recovery—have
been held back, both because they have not been made a priority
for public investment and because private projects face many unknowns, including reliance on inefficient utilities, growing debts,
state-controlled prices, and legal uncertainty.
Meanwhile, energy demand continues to grow, while cheap
supply has not necessarily followed. In recent years, some private
businesses have decided to build their own generation facilities to
meet their own energy needs, highlighting the lack of confidence
in the public sector’s ability to ensure credible and efficient service.
Finally, the risk of energy blackouts remains, as the country depends
heavily on weather factors during some months to ensure adequate
coverage of energy demand.
Electricity represents a non-negligible input for several economic sectors. According to the 2005 national accounts figures,
the combined value-added for the 22 economic sectors for which
electricity represents at least 2 percent of intermediate production
costs added up to 46.6 percent of national GDP. Of those 22 sectors,
17 (with combined value added equivalent to 78.9 percent of the 22
sectors) have witnessed growth rates below the national average
during 2000–05 (see Figure 4.3). In addition, at least two of the remaining five sectors (with average annual growth rates faster than
FIGURE 4.3 Real Growth and Electricity-intensive Sectors, 2005
(percent)
14
12
10
8
6
2000–05 average annual real
4
2
0
–2
Hotel & restaurants
Vegetal & animal oils
Chemical products
Paper & related products
Public admin. & defense
Drinks
Financial intermediation
Mining
Flower crops
Cocoa, chocolate & sweets
Textiles
Plastic & rubber products
Manufacturing industries
Social & health services
Other social & pers. Services
Machinery & equipment
Post & telecom
Wholesale & retail trade
Other business activities
Teaching
Non metallic mineral prod.
Electricity and water
–4
Source: Central Bank national accounts and authors’ estimates.
the overall economy) have benefited from specific conditions (the
boom of mobile telecommunications from limited coverage five years
ago; weather-specific and trade preference advantages for flower
crops) explaining their positive performance.
In summary, public sector management of the electric sector
has resulted in a highly inefficient sector, with high costs, subsidized
but expensive tariffs, a growing dependence on expensive thermoelectric energy, entrenched vested interests, financial constraints
for Petroecuador and the development of the oil sector, and a clear
impact on the overall economy. It is vital for Ecuador to build new
plants with low marginal costs in order to reduce generation costs
and enhance its competitiveness. The weak business environment,
combined with inefficiencies and political interference in the operation of power distribution plants, have hampered the country’s ability
to attract private investment for hydroelectric generation, despite
Ecuador’s favorable natural environment for such plants.
Overall, infrastructure—particularly in the oil and energy
sectors—appears to be a key binding constraint on Ecuador’s growth.
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182
However, removing the barriers to ensure an efficient implementation of new investment projects involves addressing institutional
and legal constraints.
Micro Risks: The Weakest Link?
Almost every international survey or competitiveness assessment of
Ecuador emphasizes weak institutions and governance issues, which
are the focus of this section. Other sources of micro risks—output
concentration and the potential lack of competition that could arise
from it or from weak government regulation—are also discussed.
Since becoming the first country in the region to return to
democracy in 1979, Ecuador has had more favorable political rights
and civil liberties than the Latin American average—which improved
with some lag compared to Ecuador. Despite some deterioration in
recent years—reflecting a period of political instability with some
presidential transitions characterized by flexible legal interpretations of the constitutional mandate—Ecuador remains one of the
most developed democracies in the region, from the standpoint of
individual liberties.
Nonetheless, a comparative analysis of World Bank indicators on governance issues—including political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption—points to a relatively weak position for Ecuador within
the region (see Figure 4.4). Ecuador has performed worse than the
average Latin American country for all indicators since 1996. The
differences are larger for some specific indicators, such as government effectiveness and control of corruption.
The unfavorable perceptions of the country’s institutional environment result from several factors. With eight presidents since
1996, instability has become a hallmark of Ecuadorian politics.
Following the overthrown of former President Bucaram in 1997, no
elected president has finished his constitutional mandate so far. Such
instability has also reached key ministries and the management of
public enterprises, hindering government effectiveness. Combined
FIGURE 4.4 Governance, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness, 1996–2005
a. Political Stability
0.5
Latin America Average
Ecuador
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2003
2004
2005
2003
2004
2005
b. Government Effectiveness
0.5
Ecuador
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
1996
1998
2000
2002
c. Regulatory Quality
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
Ecuador
–1.5
1996
1998
2000
2002
with a large financial crisis in 1999, the recurrent political changeovers have reduced the credibility of regulatory bodies as effective
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184
FIGURE 4.4 Governance, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness, 1996–2005
d. Rule of Law
0.5
Ecuador
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2003
2004
2005
e. Control of Corruption
0.5
Ecuador
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
1996
1998
2000
2002
Source: WDI, 2000–5.
Note: An increase in the index means an improvement.
and independent institutions. Successive governments have lost
bargaining power with different interest groups, including business
groups and workers’ unions.
Corruption is also generally viewed as an important weakness for Ecuador (see Table 4.3). The country ranks poorly in the
Transparency International index on perceptions of corruption. The
Investment Climate Assessment highlights the issue, while a survey
conducted by the World Bank points to corruption as one of the top
three factors inhibiting private investment.
This problem is worsened by the lack of confidence in the judicial system. The unequal prevalence of the rule of law appears to be
TABLE 4.3 Ecuador and Latin America: The Judiciary and Corruption
Type of corruption
Payment required by a typical firm to get things done (% of sales)
Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax inspectors (%)
Value of gift expected to secure a government contract (% of contract)
Confidence level in the judiciary system (%)
Time spent resolving a dispute (weeks)
No resolution in courts for overdue payments (%)
Ecuador
Region
All countries
2.8
1.4
7.3
29.2
—
71.5
1.5
5.9
4.1
55.5
7.7
78.1
1.2
30.4
2.2
59.0
12.3
68.8
Source: World Bank.
a recurring problem in the country, reflecting the instability in the
judicial system and the lack of consensus regarding its legitimacy.
Since 1997, Ecuador has had several supreme courts, which have
partly reversed decisions made by their predecessors and have faced
diverse criticisms regarding their legitimacy. Crime rates also have
gone up, and security costs are relatively high in Ecuador.
Institutional Weaknesses that Harm the Business Environment
Legal and political instability, including frequent legal changes and
diverse legal interpretations, reduce Ecuador’s attractiveness for both
national and foreign private investment. This includes difficulties
enforcing creditor rights and pursuing legal procedures to recover
assets. According to the Heritage Foundation indexes, Ecuador’s performance in respect to property rights and the quality of the business
environment is rather disappointing. The country has been posting
growing lags with Latin America trends, especially after 2000.
The recent decisions to force changes to the contracts with
private oil companies through a new law, and to rescind the contract
with U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Co., have further eroded the
attractiveness of the country to foreign investment. After Argentina,
Ecuador is the country facing the largest number of arbitration procedures on foreign investment issues before the World Bank-affiliated
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) to Ecuador
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186
has been largely concentrated in primary sectors—93.4 percent,
according to UTEPI (2007)—especially oil, and has been extremely
low in other areas, such as manufacturing industries.
The trade openness index shows an improvement in import and
export swiftness/facilities compared to the region average, reflecting the adoption of new trade agreements that reduced barriers and
enhanced customs administrative processes. Since 1995, Ecuador
has signed a relatively low number of trade agreements and now has
higher average tariffs than the region average, with a reduction in
the trade openness ratio from 68.1 percent of GDP in 2000 to 55.4
percent of GDP in 2004 (see UTEPI, 2007).
While the global tax burden is not unduly large by regional
standards, the tax environment is not the most favorable for attracting foreign investment. Tax-related paperwork involves about 600
working hours per year per business, while the tax burden on gross
profits is about 34 percent. The efficiency of the tax structure can be
questioned. Corporations complain that the legal obligation to share
15 percent of their profits with the labor force is equivalent to a tax on
firms’ earnings, which is not always eligible to be used for tax credit
overseas. Also, export drawback procedures are cumbersome and
involve discretionary decisions. Tax-related problems are mentioned
as severe or very severe business constraints by the respondents to
the investment climate survey, in terms of both tax administration
procedures (28.5 percent) and tax rates (34.1 percent).
Customs efficiency is harming Ecuador’s competitiveness,
as a result of bad practices and corruption, which tend to increase
import and export costs. Rodríguez (2006) highlights the existing
limitations and weaknesses, including an outdated legal framework,
heavy political intervention in the daily management of customs, the
lack of harmonization of internal procedures with international best
practices, weak control procedures, and a limited use of technological
procedures. Customs and trade regulation are cited by 24.9 percent of
the investment climate survey respondents as a severe or very severe
obstacle to doing business, an issue that appears to be more sensitive for medium and large firms. Ecuador posts weak indicators in
respect to trade procedures, with longer delays for exports clearance
and even much longer delays for import procedures than the region
averages—themselves already low by international standards.
Even within Latin America, Ecuador performs poorly in respect
to many indicators related to microeconomic risks and appropriability. The worst areas appear to be governance, the rule of law and
law enforcement, corruption, and political instability. In turn, these
factors have been hampering a stronger business environment, the
predictability of investment decisions, and the country’s attractiveness to new businesses. This area is clearly a binding constraint on
growth. However, overcoming such constraints will be a difficult
and long-term challenge.
The Role of Powerful Groups in Affecting Market Competition
In a country with weak institutions, high inequality, and no antitrust
regulation, the presence of strong economic groups with extensive
involvement and influence over political decisions could result in inefficient public decisions, in terms of ensuring a reasonable framework
for free market competition in diverse economic sectors (see Box 4.1).
Firms associated with powerful interest groups could become local
monopolies—thus producing less output than the optimal amount
under perfect competition—and use favorable regulation or decisions on tariff and nontariff barriers to deter entry and competition.
Public policies could provide undue protection to specific sectors,
lead to privileged financing, or encourage overinvestment in certain
sectors that might have poor rates of returns and productivity but
are able to influence public policies through their political power.
However, the presence of powerful groups controlling large sectors
of the economy, with concentration of economic assets, does not
necessarily result in low growth, as the examples of Chile or South
Korea can attest. Also, output concentration and market power might
not be undesirable if natural monopolies exist.
Based on firm-level data from the Firms Superintendency’s
indicator database, which includes balance sheets and income state-
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188
ments from 27,606 active firms in Ecuador, the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index for market concentration can help identify sectors where some
economic groups have significant market power. Within private sectors, output concentration is not large for 43 sectors (7 percent), is
moderate for 64 sectors (10 percent), and is significant for 527 sectors
(8 percent). The latter sectors account for 40 percent of total sales
in the sample. From another perspective, among the top 50 sectors
in sales (adding up to 70 percent of total sales), 21 sectors are classified as concentrated, 9 sectors are moderately concentrated, and
20 do not show evidence of concentration. Not surprisingly, all the
state-controlled or state-regulated sectors are either concentrated or
moderately concentrated, suggesting some evidence of government
failure to foster competition in those areas.
The firm-level data in the indicator database reveal that the
degree of output concentration is positively correlated with the return on assets and the return on equity, with statistically significant
results. As expected, sectors with higher concentration are more
profitable than others. However, the interpretation of this result is
ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher concentration, related to
stronger market power, may allow higher margins and increased
profitability. On the other hand, more profitable firms may grow
faster, thus increasing their market share within their sector, leading to more concentration. In addition, the estimates do not find
a significant link between investment rates—measured by assets
growth or by net fixed assets growth—and output concentration. In
a competitive environment, profitability should translate into higher
investment rates, which in turn would help firms grow faster. The
results suggest that this is not occurring. A potential explanation
is that firms may be holding large market power for other reasons
(including some overprotection from public policies), and that power
would allow them to increase profitability without necessarily investing more. However, the results should be taken with caution because
of reverse causality issues.
An additional way to assess the preferred economic interpretation is to observe whether public regulation could explain the degree
of market concentration. Thus, to assess to what extent powerful
economic groups might limit competition within their sectors through
unfair regulation, different measures of trade protectionism were
constructed, as proxies of the state’s decision to protect specific sectors. Using Clasificación Industrial Internacional Uniforme (CIIU)
data at the four-digit level, the variables that capture some degree of
protection include: the average tariff by sector; the ratio of mean tariffs to the tariff range by sector; an index of trade protection for each
sector negotiated under the draft agreement in the free trade area
(F TA) negotiations with the United States; a similar index of trade
protection for each sector under the CAN-MERCOSUR agreement;
and an index including the share of forbidden-import merchandise
within each sector. The correlations between the protection measures
and the market concentration index are not statistically significant,
suggesting that those sectors with a stronger output concentration
are not necessarily better protected under trade agreement negotiations or through tariff decisions.
Alternatively, trade policy may have been used to protect
products or sectors with strategic value, in the Hausmann, Hwang
and Rodrik (2005) perspective. As for import substitution policies,
trade policy has long been considered a powerful policy tool to
protect domestic industries against foreign competition until local
industries reach levels of development similar to their competitors.
Trade protection indicators and the Hausmann and Klinger (2006)
data are combined to assess whether trade policy has been somehow
effective in terms of protecting those sectors with strategic value. As
measures of product sophistication and density in the product space,
the prody and density variables were used, as defined by Hausmann
and Klinger. The prody variable captures the degree of revealed
sophistication implicit in each export product. The density variable
assesses the likelihood that a specific product might be exported, by
looking at its proximity to a group of products where a comparative
advantage has already been established. Those two variables have
been aggregated to a CIIU four-digit level classification, for which
trade protection variables are available.
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190
BOX 4.1 Vested Interests and Growth
Vested interests can play a role in influencing public policies in order to maintain existing
privileges, overprotect existing industries, reduce competition, or push for investment in
nonpriority areas. Several facts suggest that Ecuador may be more vulnerable than other
countries in these areas:
r8IJMFUIFñOBODJBMDSJTJTSFTVMUFEGSPNTFWFSBMGBDUPSTXFBLSFHVMBUPSZTUBOEBSET
macroeconomic shocks, and financial dollarization—special interests played a key role,
including an undue influence on key legislative and executive decisions, related lending,
and some capture of regulatory institutions (see De la Torre, García-Saltos and Mascaró,
2001; Jácome, 2004).
r5IFQSFTFODFPGMBSHFPJMSFWFOVFTFOIBODFTUIFSJTLTPGTUBUFDBQUVSFCZTQFDJBMJOUFSFTUTGPS
the sake of controlling significant rent-related revenues. The influence of special interests in
exacerbating budget rigidities and fiscal pro-cyclicality, and distorting expenditure decision
during the budget process, is discussed in the macroeconomic section of this study.
r5IFPJMBOEFMFDUSJDJUZTFDUPSTTVíFSGSPNJOFîDJFOUBOEOPOUSBOTQBSFOUNBSLFUTXIJDIIBWF
facilitated the survival of lucrative and noncompetitive businesses, large-scale smuggling,
regressive subsidies, and nonrecovered debts. Inefficiencies in these sectors have impeded
faster growth and more progressive fiscal policies.
r4FWFSBM FDPOPNJD TFDUPST BSF TVCKFDU UP TJHOJñDBOU NBSLFU DPODFOUSBUJPO 1BOFM EBUB
suggest that output concentration is related to higher profitability but not necessarily to
(indirectly measured) investment rates. A potential explanation would be that firms having significant market power and high profitability benefit from some policy protection
shielding competition, despite limited investments in the sector. However, this study did
not find convincing evidence that highly concentrated sectors have benefited from special
protection under trade agreements.
r5IFBCTFODFPGTUSPOHSFHVMBUPSZJOTUJUVUJPOTQFSDFJWFEBTUFDIOJDBMMZESJWFOBOEJOEFpendent has undermined the ability to foster social consensus on sound macroeconomic
policies, as well as the state’s capacity to provide public goods conducive to growth.
While the quantitative evidence on the impact of vested interests remains limited, these
factors show that they can potentially amount to a significant constraint on growth. This
implication highlights the importance of efforts to enhance transparency in public decisions,
improve the accountability of private businesses, and minimize the risks of capture of critical
institutions by special interests.
The correlation results suggest that: if anything, trade policy
is aimed at protecting the “wrong” sectors, in terms of the sectors’
strategic value or sophistication; and trade policy is protecting sectors with some export potential. However, as Hausmann and Klinger
point out, a country might be exporting goods with low strategic
value; thus a higher density level may not necessarily correspond
to products with high sophistication. Hence the last result should
be interpreted with caution.
Access to Finance
Financing costs could be an important constraint to Ecuador’s growth.
Private sector surveys have usually pointed to the high cost of finance
as a major complaint within the private sector. Access and cost of
finance are high on the list of business constraints identified as severe or very severe in the World Bank investment climate survey (by
45 percent and 46 percent of the survey respondents, respectively).
In addition, the Proyecto Salto survey on microenterprises clearly
points to credit access as a significant business constraint.
In spite of the current favorable international conditions, 14.2
percent of firms responding to the World Bank´s enterprise survey
FIGURE 4.5 Top Ten Constraints for Firms Investing in Ecuador, 2005
(percent of respondents listing the constraint as severe or very severe)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Source: World Bank enterprise surveys.
Electricity
Tax administration
Legal system/
conflict resolution
Tax rates
Access of financing
Cost of financing
Anti-competitive or
informal practices
Corruption
Macroeconomic
instability
Economic and
regulatory policy
0
191
192
perceive “access to and cost of financing” as a major or severe obstacle,
a level which is above the Latin American median (and topped only by
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Argentina). Moreover, access and cost of
finance are relatively more binding in Ecuador than for the average
country in the region. Based on the enterprise survey results, the
ratio of average rankings for financial constraints (average and cost
of finance) with respect to average rankings for all growth obstacles
place Ecuador relatively high within the region.
International Financing
Political and macroeconomic instability, including a weak credit
history, have resulted in high costs of international finance for Ecuador. The country has gone through several episodes of foreign
debt default or rescheduling over recent decades. Ecuador has the
highest sovereign country risk within Latin America, as measured
by EMBI+ indexes, after having peaked above 4,400 basis points (bp)
in mid-2000, in the context of a deep financial crisis. With a 689bp
average during January–October 2007 (including a period of high
volatility reflecting contradictory statements regarding the payment of interest coming due in mid-February), Ecuador’s sovereign
risk was, on average, 490bp higher than the Latin American index.
While some particularities of Ecuadorian sovereign bonds—such
as the option for the sovereign to buy back at par the bonds at any
of the biannual interest due dates—may partly explain the high risk
premium, the difference is large enough to suggest that external
financing is much more expensive for an Ecuadorian firm or bank
than for its competitors in other countries in the region.
In the same vein, Ecuador ranks poorly in credit ratings if
compared with other countries in the region. Although the oil
boom makes it easier for the government to service its debt, some
announcements threatening international creditors with initiating
an unfriendly restructuring process harmed Ecuadorian creditworthiness in international markets. Investment banks have reacted by
downgrading sovereign bonds.
Despite high international financing costs, their actual impact
on domestic creditors and domestic lending rates remains somewhat
limited, at least for now. On the one hand, the stock of private foreign
debt has been growing markedly in recent years, suggesting that
foreign financing availability is not scarce. Moreover, a large share of
it (though no official data are available) relates to operations backed
by foreign deposits, which isolates the country risk impact.
On the other hand, banks’ financial obligations (including liabilities with foreign financial institutions or multilaterals) represent
a limited share of the banks’ total liabilities (see Figure 4.6). This
reflects the upward trend of bank deposits over recent years, which
has allowed a significant increase in bank lending.
Meanwhile, high international oil prices boosted Ecuador’s
exports and allowed an unusual external current account surplus
in recent years. Overall, foreign financing costs or availability do
not appear to represent a constraint to igniting further growth for
now. However, Ecuador’s economic history clearly shows that the
country’s difficult access to foreign financing has been an important
component of some of its worst crises. In view of the current benign
international environment (which could be reversed by recent tur-
FIGURE 4.6 Share of Financial Obligations over Total Liabilities
(percent)
15
Large banks
Medium banks
Small banks
Total
12
9
6
Source: Banking Superintendency.
Mar-07
Feb-07
Jan-07
Dec-06
Nov-06
Oct-06
Sep-06
Aug-06
Jul-06
Jun-06
May-06
Apr-06
Mar-06
Feb-06
Jan-06
3
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194
bulence in mortgage operations), one cannot discard the risk of a
reversal of the situation at some moment, when high country risk
and inconsistent policies regarding foreign financing could increase
financing costs. In that regard, high international financing costs can
be viewed as a moderately high binding constraint on growth.
Domestic Financing
While business and microentrepreneur surveys emphasize respondents’ perceptions of limited access to financing or financing that is
too costly, data on credit and interest rates point to a lesser actual
constraint—although financial intermediation remains limited in
Ecuador. The World Bank Doing Business survey suggests that access and cost of finance are important limitations. Banking credit is
a significant source of funds. Combined with leasing arrangements,
development financing, trade lines (supplier or customer credit), and
credit card financing, it represents 46 percent of working capital
financing requirements and 41 percent of new investments’ financing (see Figure 4.7). Large firms perceive access to financing (for
example, collateral) as a less sensitive issue, with a statistically
significant difference.
A deeper analysis of the survey results tends to confirm that
those firms that mention financing constraints actually perceive the
impact of such constraints in their day-to-day business activities and
change their business decisions accordingly (while such matching
does not necessarily apply to other constraints). For example, firms
with different perceptions about access or cost of finance as a business constraint allocate, on average, statistically different shares of
internal funds or retained earnings to finance working capital and
new investments. They also statistically differ, on average, on their
relative use of local banks’ loans or trade credit to finance working
capital or new investments.
The 17,626 microenterprises covered by the Proyecto Salto/
Habitus survey on microenterprises place access to affordable credit
as the most critical requirement for business success, by far. Some
FIGURE 4.7 Source of Funds for Working Capital and New Investments
a. Sources of Funds for Working Capital
3%
b. Sources of Funds for New Investments
2%
3% 4%
3%
2%
16%
43%
1%
3% 4% 1%
3%
10%
1%
1%
47%
2%
0%
4%
26%
2%
Internal funds or retained earnings
Local commercial banks
Foreign owned commercial banks
Leasing arrangement
Investment funds/ special development financing
Source: World Bank.
39.4 percent of the firms state their need for credit to finance intermediate goods and merchandise, while 12.0 percent need credit for
equipment, machinery, and facilities. The survey’s universe differs
markedly from the larger firms covered by the World Bank survey:
90.4 percent of the microenterprises finance their activities internally
through sales, following by customer credit (2.8 percent), and supplier
financing (1.8 percent), while financing from any type of financial
institution is negligible. Cumbersome and long procedures (38.7
percent), excessively high collateral requirements (26.3 percent)
and high interest rates (21.9 percent) are referred to as the most
critical problems with banking loans. Finally, 50.1 percent of those
surveyed would take a loan with a 20 percent annual interest rate.
Statistical tests tend to confirm that those factors that firms declare
to be crucial for success—particularly credit constraints—are indeed
correlated with business assessment, business expectations, sales
problems, or the willingness to take a loan.
While survey results emphasize credit constraints, credit to the
private sector has grown at double-digit levels in Ecuador over the
last five years (by more than 22 percent in 2006), in a similar trend
to that of bank deposits, once customers regained confidence in the
banking sector after the 1999 crisis. However, financial intermedia-
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196
FIGURE 4.8 Financial Intermediation, Selected Countries, 2006
(bank deposits as percent of GDP)
Chile
Uruguay
Honduras
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Bolivia
Colombia
Guatemala
Venezuela
Paraguay
Argentina
Ecuador
Peru
Mexico
Dom. Rep.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Source: FELABAN, ECLAC.
tion, measured as deposits as percent of GDP, remains rather low by
regional standards (see Figure 4.8). The overall impression is that
access to credit has been clearly expanding within the economy,
though a large chunk of the economy—mostly informal—remains
limited in credit access.
The favorable trends for deposit and credit growth in recent
years have coincided with a very healthy international environment,
including global growth trends, favorable terms of trade for Latin
America, and abundant liquidity. The enhanced credit access over
the expansionary phase of the business cycle has coincided with a
faster growth rate for non-oil investment (see Figure 4.9). When subtracting oil investments, as measured by Espinasa (2007), from the
central bank figures on gross fixed capital formation, there appears
to be a negative (–0.8 percent) average annual growth for non-oil
investment over 1994–98, before becoming positive (12 percent) in
the post-crisis years (2000–06). A potential explanation might be
that the lack of credit was one of the driving forces behind the low
non-oil investments in the 1990s, suggesting that access to credit
can indeed be a binding constraint on growth.
The aftermath of the 1999 financial crisis led, following some
initial reluctance, to a gradual recovery of depositor confidence in
financial institutions. As Ecuador’s history shows, should the inter-
FIGURE 4.9 Gross Non-Oil Investments
(constant 2000 US$, thousands; growth rates in percent)
6,000,000
30
Growth rate (right axis)
Non-oil gross Investment (left axis)
5,000,000
20
10
4,000,000
–10
0
3,000,000
–20
2,000,000
–30
1,000,000
–40
–50
2006
2005
2004
2003
2005
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
0
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and Espinasa (2007).
national environment deteriorate, the country could face sudden
difficulties in access to finance, while weakness on the medium-term
fiscal front and the rigidities imposed by dollarization would amplify
financing troubles.
Between 2002 and 2006 (data prior to 2002 are not comparable
to recent data), bank credit grew by $4.1 billion. Of this amount,
the largest share was channeled to services, commerce, and industry. Those sectors were the most important destinations of credit
in Ecuador, even before 2002. Growth rates for bank credit have
been high for services, transportation, and construction, including
infrastructure. Bank credit has grown at relatively low rates from
already initially low levels for agriculture, energy, and mining. No
data are available to distinguish real estate loans from productive
investments.
Regarding the cost of financing, real lending rates appear to be
relatively low, in the lower range of Latin America (see Figure 4.10).
Real rates have been declining gradually but continuously since the
country adopted dollarization in 2000.
However, these figures are masking part of the costs of financing since the use of banking fees and other costs has gradually been
more tolerated against the backdrop of a weak regulatory environment
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198
FIGURE 4.10 Real Lending Interest Rates, Latin America, 2006
(percent)
Argentina
Venezuela
Nicaragua
Trinidad & Tobago
Bolivia
El Salvador
Mexico
Ecuador
Panama
Guatemala
Paraguay
Colombia
Bahamas
Dominican Rep.
Costa Rica
Chile
Honduras
Jamaica
Peru
Haiti
Uruguay
Brazil
–10
Regional unweighted
average (8.97)
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Source: ECLAC.
and the limited financial sophistication of the average customer. An
imperfect proxy for actual credit costs can be obtained by comparing
several items in the banks’ income and losses accounts (including
interest revenues, and fees, as well as financial advisory and other
service revenue) with the stock of their credit portfolio (see Figure
4.11). Such an exercise for the end of March 2007 reveals an “implicit
interest rate” of 22.5 percent for the overall financial system, though
these costs may be overestimated by including some transaction-related
(but not credit-related) fees. However, for financial institutions mainly
specialized in microcredit or small consumption credit markets (that
offer very limited financial transactions beyond credit), the ratio varies
from 28 to 84 percent. This clearly suggests that the size of implicit
banking costs charged to customers through indirect means can be
substantial. Thus, the system’s lack of transparency has made it difficult for the final borrower to assess the actual borrowing costs.
Recent efforts by the Banking Superintendency have helped
clarify the actual costs of credit. As expected, they point to a highly
segmented credit market, with rates widely different depending on
the existence of valuable collateral (such as mortgages) and customer
FIGURE 4.11 Real Cost of Credit, 2007
(percent)
50
40
Consumer lending
Commercial
Mortgages
30
20
10
Micro credit
0
Source: Banking Superintendency.
Note: Including fees, insurance, and other costs for 19 banks as of May 2007.
informality. Microcredit rates show a wide variance, partly reflecting very diverse groups, from the rural or very informal market
where the costs of putting together credible financial information of
the borrower are very high relative to the size of the loan, to small
consumer lending.
Finally, financial intermediation services are an important input
for several economic sectors. An approach similar to that proposed
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) could be developed to evaluate the potential impact of financing constraints on other economic sectors.
According to the 2005 national accounts, the combined valueadded of the seven economic sectors for which financial intermediation represents at least 1 percent of their intermediate production
costs added up to 11 percent of national GDP. Of these seven sectors,
three (with combined value added equivalent to 40 percent of the
seven sectors) have witnessed growth rates below the national average during 2000–06, two sectors posted growth rates close to the
national average, and two sectors (post and telecom, and financial
intermediation) posted growth rates much larger than the country’s
average (see Figure 4.12).
A few considerations appear relevant to help put together the
different pieces of the financing puzzle:
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FIGURE 4.12 Real Growth and Sectors Relying on Financial Intermediation
(Percent real growth)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
–2
Health & social services
Teaching
Insurance and pensions
Financial intermediation
Post and telecom
Hotel & restaurants
National average growth rate
Flower crops
200
Source: Central Bank national accounts and authors’ estimates.
Note: Real growth, 2000–2006, for those sectors where financial intermediation represents 1 percent or more of their intermediate consumption.
The 1999 financial crisis—explained by weak regulatory standards for the sector, entrenched vested interests in the financial
sector regulatory agencies during the 1990s, and the combination of
macroeconomic and external shocks—led to high borrowing costs
for the private sector.
Since the financial crisis, the financial indicators of the banking system as a whole have gradually improved, in terms of liquidity, profitability, operational costs, and credit quality. However,
the individual situation of diverse financial institutions is rather
heterogeneous, while depositor concentration remains quite high,
reflecting the country’s inherent income inequality. These two elements emphasize the system’s vulnerabilities.
The absence of a modern and comprehensive legal and regulatory environment for financial institutions’ resolution procedures
and depositors’ protection, particularly in a dollarized economy, has
resulted in the decision by private banks to build up large liquid
assets funds for precautionary reasons, thus resulting in higher
financing costs.
The orientation of existing banking rules to formal sector customers, while banks face a significant informal market tends to widen
the segmentation between microcredit markets and traditional banking markets further. In this context, asymmetric information tends
to make it harder to ensure credit access to the informal sector.
The weak enforcement of creditor rights—not only in the
existing legal framework but, more importantly, as a result of the
delays in the judicial system related to the collection of arrears or
to the seizure of collateral—plays a significant role in increasing
financing costs.
Overall, the general impression regarding domestic financing,
both in respect to access and to the cost of credit, is that the market
remains highly segmented, with a much more limited access to
credit by informal and small businesses. In addition, several institutional drawbacks (weak regulation, limited transparency, informality, imperfect functioning of the legal system, and creditor rights
mechanisms) appear to be critical factors perpetuating the still-high
financing costs for some market segments, while macroeconomic
weaknesses are largely to blame for the high costs of access to international finance. All in all, though its weaknesses largely reflect
flaws in other areas, domestic financing is indeed a non-negligible
constraint on growth.
Macroeconomic Environment: Hard-to-reach Social Consensus
Since its return to democracy in 1979, Ecuador has faced recurrent
difficulties in reaching a sustainable consensus on fiscal policy management. This can be observed through the various legal reforms
related to fiscal management, some of which have been very shortlived. One of the reasons for this instability is the mistrust between
the different actors involved in fiscal matters, which is evident in
the high number of earmarking regulations related to both fiscal
revenues and expenditure.
Ecuador’s adoption of full dollarization has helped the country
stabilize its economy, expand the time horizons of economic agents—
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particularly through the availability of longer term loans—and
ensure low inflation. However, dollarization implies medium-term
risks and rigidities for macroeconomic management. So far, Ecuador has benefited from a benign international environment and the
depreciating trend of the U.S. dollar. These factors have helped the
country maintain its external competitiveness, despite the real appreciation trends related to high domestic inflation in the post-1999
years, which counterbalanced the initially very high real depreciation
observed during 1999–2000, when Ecuador witnessed a large nominal
depreciation of its currency before adopting dollarization. Indeed,
real exchange rate figures show that the multilateral real exchange
rate so far in 2007 is, on average, 5.5 percent more depreciated than
it was in 1998, before the financial crisis took place.
However, the lost margin of maneuver for monetary and exchange rate policies would imply a larger dependence on fiscal and
labor flexibility to adapt to an external shock, should such a shock
occur. This section discusses the issue of political instability and its
impact on fiscal issues, fiscal procyclicality, the budgetary process,
and labor regulation.
Unstable Political Equilibriums and Vulnerable Fiscal Fundamentals
The relative powers of players involved in the preparation, approval,
and implementation of the budget have changed significantly in
recent years. In 1998, the Constituent Assembly introduced deep
constitutional reforms giving the president greater powers over
budget issues while limiting congressional attributions. Congress
was forbidden from increasing total public revenues or expenditures
and was only allowed to introduce budgetary changes at the level of
sectoral expenditures.
Such changes were accompanied by modifications to the electoral process that changed the regional perspective of members of
congress (they became more related to provincial constituencies,
as national parliamentarians disappeared) and lengthened their
tenure (from two years to four). According to Mejía Acosta et al.
(2006), those reforms combined in unintended and perverse ways.
While presidential powers were strengthened (thus removing some
incentives for the president to work with legislative coalitions), the
reforms also impeded the parliamentarians from building up formal
links with their constituencies through the budgetary process, as
deputies lack any legal option to direct public funds to their provinces.
As a result, political parties were weakened while local governments
were strengthened, as their responsibilities as intermediaries between the population and the central administration increased. Such
changes rendered the management of the budget more complex, as
distributional aspects of the budget are no longer solved through
the budget approval process but keep reappearing throughout the
process of budget implementation, when local authorities press for
additional financing for local purposes. Thus, the budget ends up
being modified extremely often (see Cueva, 2007).
One of the clearest examples of the unstable equilibriums
achieved on budgetary issues is the Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law. Approved in 2002, the law was issued to limit the risks
that additional oil revenues could lead to large and risky increases
in public expenditures. The law was passed in a period when oil production was expected to grow (thus boosting fiscal revenues), given
that the construction of a new heavy crude oil pipeline was moving
ahead. Also, parliamentarians still had clear memories from the 1999
financial crisis. As the legal reforms were to become binding only
after the then-president and parliamentarians would end their tenure
by 2003, none of the players involved was constrained in his or her
ability to direct such funds for various electoral purposes, including
deputies’ potential reelection. Three years later, by 2005, the economic
environment had changed, mainly because oil prices had increased
significantly. Both the Palacio administration and the congress then in
place felt constrained by the law and pushed for large reforms, including the rolling back of some critical aspects of the law. Legal changes
were quickly approved, allowing the changes to be effective for the
approval of the latest annual budget under the Palacio administration,
as well as the latest budget approval by the parliamentarians who
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agreed to the changes. A budget was then approved with a marked
increase in public expenditure (13 percent in real terms), improving
the electoral chances of the actors in place. This story is intended to
illustrate the instability of fiscal consensus, political agents’ behavior
with respect to a sustainable policy, and the vulnerability of policies in
the face of the changing incentives of political actors. These political
difficulties in achieving fiscal consensus have contributed in part to
Ecuador’s fiscal vulnerabilities.
Fiscal Procyclicality
In recent years, and following the 1999 financial crisis and the country’s adoption of dollarization, macroeconomic risks have become less
important, at least in the short run. Favorable oil prices, a benign international environment, and large remittances from workers abroad have
helped maintain generally positive macroeconomic indicators, even
in periods of political turmoil. Like other Latin American countries,
Ecuador is thus facing a particularly favorable international environment, which may be masking underlying macro vulnerabilities.
Despite these recent improvements, Ecuador’s history shows
that the country is vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. Growth
trends clearly show the risks that financial or fiscal/external crisis
imply for medium-term growth prospects. The combination of a volatile political environment with an economy subject to external shocks
and dependent on natural resources makes it critical to ensure that
mechanisms for prudent macroeconomic management are in place
and are working. Economic crises in Ecuador have often occurred
as a result of weakened fiscal and debt sustainability, declining and
relatively low prices of key commodities, and tightening constraints
for attracting foreign savings. In addition, dollarization has reduced
the margins of maneuver for monetary policy and amplified the risks
arising from foreign developments that could reduce access to international markets while increasing interest rates. In this context,
building liquidity and a fiscal cushion in good times would enhance
the country’s ability to address potential shocks successfully.
An obvious step to mitigate macroeconomic risks would be
to build savings funds or to repay public debt in good times, so as
to set up a cushion for risky situations. (Another one would be to
strengthen the banking system and bank resolution procedures.)
However, Ecuador has not been characterized by a countercyclical
fiscal policy and by effective mechanisms to channel extraordinary
fiscal resources to debt reduction or savings funds. These shortcomings in fiscal policy are clearly one of the issues that the country
could address to reduce growth volatility and the large costs related
to recurrent macroeconomic crises.
For the period 1990 to 2006, there is a clear correlation between
real per capita GDP growth and real per capita public spending for
the nonfinancial public sector (lagged for one period, with a corresponding correlation coefficient of 0.45). This suggests that a year
of faster economic growth is typically followed by a year of faster
public spending growth. Thus, public spending policies do not appear
to follow a countercyclical path. Instead, public expenditure tends
to reflect the availability of existing funds, which in turn depend on
economic activity.
A potential explanation for such trends is the lack of clear incentives for governments to adopt any kind of countercyclical fiscal policy
to boost savings during economic booms. On the contrary, public
spending tends to follow the availability of public funds, reflecting
the lack of social consensus for prudent fiscal policies.
Budget Rigidity
Public spending in Ecuador is characterized by a highly rigid
structure, impeding government from implementing active fiscal
policies or significantly modifying fiscal priorities within the general
budget. In recent years, at least three separate studies have reached
similar conclusions regarding budget rigidities. World Bank-IDB
(2004) mentions earmarking rules and other inflexible elements
in the short-run as adding up to 98 percent of the overall budget,
while Almeida, Gallardo and Tomaselli (2005) estimate that share
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at 92 percent. Finally, Cueva (2007) estimates the budget rigidity
at about 96 percent, depending on the level of fuel subsidies. This
high rigidity implies that regardless of their ideological preferences,
governments have hardly any margin of maneuver to change the
structure of public expenditures. Much of that inflexibility arises
from legally established and hard-to-change earmarked revenues
or expenditures. Thus, the recurrent annual budgets reproduce the
earmarking of previous years, perpetuating a rent-based system
whereby every agent with some political influence tries to ensure
some earmarking procedure to lock in revenue flows without any
results-oriented system. The earmarking system is one of the main
factors behind the deceiving quality of public expenditure, which
partly reflects a natural resource curse.
In recent years, subsidies on the domestic prices of oil derivative products have become an increasing source of public spending
rigidity. In 2007, the total (implicit and explicit) costs of oil derivative subsidies were estimated at US$2.3 billion, equivalent to 28.7
percent of the general budget. In 2002, the subsidies added up to only
US$160 million, equivalent to 3.3 percent of the general budget. Such
impressive growth of subsidy-related costs can be explained, as the
consumer prices of gasoline and diesel have remained unchanged
since January 2003 and that of cooking gas has not moved since
February 2001. As international oil and oil derivative prices have
markedly increased in recent years, the government has covered the
growing difference between producer and consumer prices, reflecting
political difficulties in gradually adjusting consumer prices.
In view of hard-to-reach political agreements over fiscal policies,
can budget rigidities and earmarking act as second-best alternatives
to limit procyclical fiscal trends, thus reducing macroeconomic volatility? This view can only be partially supported, for several reasons.
Budgetary earmarking implies a reduced margin for governments to take advantage of favorable economic cycles to develop
much-needed infrastructure in sectors with high public participation, such as oil and energy. As a result, long-term growth and fiscal
revenues are harmed.
While budget rigidity hampers an open and transparent discussion of budgetary priorities, it is combined with a highly discretionary
budget implementation system, whereby agents with strong political
powers, including regional leaders, end up obtaining the largest
share of the pie. As growth-enhancing or poverty-reducing programs
may end up being sidelined throughout the budget implementation
process, they can still face larger constraints in the economic busts
and suffer from fiscal procyclicality more than other areas.
Finally, the procyclicality of fiscal policies is one of the main
reasons behind the recurrent political pressures to introduce earmarking schemes and encourage budget rigidity. Regional entities
and diverse public sector institutions look to some earmarking
features to protect their revenues, as they fear being left out in bad
economic times. From a political standpoint, a reduction of budget
rigidity would probably not be sustainable unless some mechanism
ensuring some stability of fiscal accounts could be put in place, so as
to provide assurances to the relevant actors that their fiscal-related
revenues would not be overly affected in case of a shock. Thus, one
could suggest that, should some initial political agreement be built
around it, a Chilean-style scheme aiming at a structural fiscal target
could reduce incentives for the tendency to add earmarks.
In sum, Ecuador’s history highlights the risks of macroeconomic
instability for medium-term growth arising either from fiscal or financial flaws. From that perspective, macroeconomic stability remains an
Achilles’ heel for the country. While the current benign environment
may have reduced its visibility, this is a potentially significant binding
constraint on the country’s sustained growth prospects.
Nonbinding Constraints
Geographical or Natural Resources Impediments
Ecuador has diverse and abundant natural resources, both for mining and oil-related activities, which have been critical to sustaining
fiscal revenues and external accounts. Land in Ecuador is mostly
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productive and the country has a variety of regions with different
features that enable the production of different types of crops all year
round. Diverse agricultural sectors (cocoa, coffee, bananas, shrimps,
flowers) have been drivers of economic activity at different times.
A comparison with other countries, based on available data, shows
that Ecuador ranks favorably in terms of agricultural area, arable
land, forested areas, water resources, and hydroelectric generation
capacity. Ecuador ranks very high in terms of biodiversity, as well
as in terms of its oil reserves.
However, Ecuador’s diversity is also a source of geographical
constraints. With four highly different areas and despite a relatively
high population density within South America, the country’s fragmentation implies higher transportation and infrastructure costs,
particularly to overcome natural obstacles in the highlands. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions have also affected economic growth
and infrastructure over time. Moreover, geographical differences
partly account for cultural conflicts and regional antagonism, with
a tradition of bi-centralism around the two largest cities and growing calls for increased decentralization. If not properly managed,
such tendencies could cause further strains on medium-term fiscal
stability.
Overall, natural resources do not appear to be a key binding
constraint on growth, though geography plays a role in explaining
the country’s large, and not always fulfilled, infrastructure needs.
Low Human Capital
According to WDI data for 2004, the country ranked in the top half
of Latin American countries in terms of primary education coverage (with a 99.5 percent rate as of 2004), at the region’s average for
literacy rates (92.7 percent of the population older than 15 was literate in 2004), but in the lowest half for secondary education coverage
(with 52.2 percent coverage in 2004) and tertiary education (with 21.8
percent coverage, according to measures available from the “Sistema
Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador” for 2001). World
Bank WDI estimates that for 2001, 42 percent of the workforce had
primary education, 32 percent had secondary level education, and
24 percent had university-level studies. UTEPI estimates show that
the share of workers in manufacturing industries with universitylevel studies varies from 8.4 percent in low-technology industries
to 12.6 percent in natural resource-based sectors, and up to 26.6
percent in medium and high-technology sectors. While Ecuador
ranks poorly within Latin America for R&D spending, research and
publications, and the number of U.S. or European patents or ISO
certifications obtained, it is relatively well-positioned in terms of
training provided by firms to their employees, according the World
Business Environment Survey referenced in IDB (2001). In addition,
according to the World Bank 2006 enterprise survey, 629 of 652
firms consider that the skills of available workers are not an obstacle
to the firm’s growth, and the remaining 23 firms consider the skills
of available workers to be a minor obstacle. Overall, while education
quality is weak, the available evidence suggests that human capital
does not appear to be a key constraint on growth.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This review of potential binding constraints on growth in Ecuador suggests some areas that do not appear to be critical for limiting economic
growth (natural resource endowment, geographical impediments,
human capital, domestic savings, and market failures), though this
does not mean they do not face challenges and shortcomings. Other
issues, such as macro stability or access to domestic or international
finance, suffer from weaknesses that could potentially present serious
constraints if no corrective actions are undertaken. A few hot points—
mostly related to institutional weaknesses and infrastructure—are
hampering the appropriability of private investment returns and the
potential for more dynamic entrepreneurship. Some policy recommendations can thus be proposed within these lines.
Problems related to access to finance reveal weaknesses in
terms of high country risk, as well as a regulatory and market envi-
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ronment, that are not conducive to effective creditor rights and deep
financial intermediation. These areas, which currently benefit from
a favorable world economic cycle and terms of trade developments,
could become more critical over time if no remedial actions are
undertaken to reduce vulnerabilities.
The benign international environment may be hiding some
of the vulnerabilities resulting from the markets’ perceptions of a
level of country risk which is very high even by regional standards.
Building some bridges with international financing providers—
either international institutions or market players—may help repair
the recent difficult relations and overcome concerns related to the
country’s history, and could potentially be critical to ensuring access to international financing in case of a reversal of the current
favorable environment.
High financing costs and limited access to finance—repeatedly
noted in business surveys as critical constraints, especially for small
and medium-sized firms—largely reflect underlying factors, such
as the limited credibility of the judiciary, weak creditor protection,
informality, and the lack of transparency. Those issues—closely
related to micro risks and business environment aspects—require
long-term and comprehensive efforts to be overcome.
Efforts to improve financial market transparency—with some
limited but positive steps taken recently to limit abuses from some
participants and address the public’s lack of financial sophistication—
along with steps to strengthen modern and efficient mechanisms
for banking regulation, as well as early prevention and resolution
procedures, and efforts to increase attractiveness to foreign private
financial institutions, would surely help reduce credit costs and
increase access to finance.
Macroeconomic stability remains critical for limiting the risks
of large crisis episodes, which have been too common in Ecuador’s
history. The stylized facts of economic growth highlight the country’s vulnerability to external shocks, which in turn can imply large
setbacks in terms of medium-term growth. In addition, a reversal of
the benign international environment cannot be discarded. Thus,
advances in developing a wider consensus around sound fiscal policies
with properly designed countercyclical features and strengthening
the financial system are important for lowering the risk of economic
instability and lessening its potentially large negative impact on
medium-term growth.
The development of consensus on prudent fiscal policies with
countercyclical features would greatly help reduce the country’s
vulnerabilities, while social protection and pro-poor spending should
be undertaken during economic recessions. However, some of the
structural characteristics of the Ecuadorian budget process make
it difficult to ensure sound fiscal policies. In particular, the significant earmarking of tax revenues, the growing trends toward fiscal
decentralization, political instability, limits on transparency and a
results-oriented perspective in the budget procedures, and weak
prioritization of policies regarding public investment restrain the
ability of the central government to implement active fiscal policies
in line with the government’s political priorities.
A sound fiscal reform toward more prudent fiscal policies cannot
be achieved without a well-designed scheme providing some assurance to the relevant actors that their fiscal-related revenues would
somehow be protected in case of economic downturns. Otherwise,
pressures for added and continued earmarking schemes will remain.
A Chilean-style system targeting a structural fiscal balance could
potentially help achieve that aim, although its political feasibility is
currently problematic.
Despite the large economic costs of the 1999 financial crisis,
Ecuador has made little progress since then to buttress the regulatory policies related to the financial system and to ensure a sound
financial safety net. This has become particularly critical, as dollarization has significantly limited the central bank’s ability to act
as a lender of last resort, and in view of the maintained deposit concentration in the banking system. The country still lacks a comprehensive legal framework combining a transparent and well-financed
depositor protection scheme with modern and efficient procedures
for bank resolution. Despite some progress in recent years, banking
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supervision remains subject to institutional weaknesses. Achieving
broader consensus in relation to reforms necessary for building a
sound regulatory environment for the financial system would be
important for limiting the risks of a potential financial crisis over
the medium term, which could rapidly unravel any previous growth
achievements.
Infrastructure remains a critical constraint for some sectors. Oil and energy are clear examples of the potential impact of
underinvestment and inadequate regulation of growth and fiscal
revenues—both for the sector itself and for its consequences in the
overall economy, either through lost fiscal revenues or through the
impact on other sectors.
Ecuador must find ways to channel resources for infrastructure
investments into some key areas, including oil, energy, and to a lesser
extent, telecommunications, without hampering fiscal stability. The
current fiscal environment provides a real opportunity to prioritize the
use of oil-related revenues for hydrocarbon and energy infrastructure,
which have been neglected for many years. However, such efforts
may be ineffective if they are not accompanied by sectoral reforms
to increase the transparency and enhance the administrative and
technical efficency of publicly- controlled enterprises. Transparency
and accountability obligations for publicly-controlled enterprises
should be raised to match international best practices, independent
of whether such companies have any private shareholders.
Addressing the large, regressive, and non-targeted oil derivative
and electric tariff subsidies, as well as the existing cross-debts in the
energy sector, would be important to eliminate significant distortions,
reduce the incentives for smuggling, and gradually establish a real
competitive environment conducive to new investments.
Introducing a business-oriented and more professional management for energy distribution utilities also implies addressing
governance issues and appointing professional managers, with actual
independence from the large debtors with the sector.
Microeconomic environment and appropriability issues are
critical areas that need structural solutions, which will be difficult to
implement. Ecuador performs poorly in terms of governance, institutions, property rights and legal stability, even within a region with
performance that is below the world average. All relevant indicators,
as well as general perceptions, stress the importance of these areas,
with institutional weaknesses hampering the business environment,
along with financial intermediation and access to finance. However,
addressing these issues requires a major overhaul of institutional
constraints and requires difficult political changes.
With those large caveats, policy recommendations would
include:
t Institutional strengthening through continued reforms in
the areas of the judiciary and customs.
t Actions to enhance transparency in public decisions, in
terms of both the use of fiscal resources and the efficiency
of public investment. Along those lines, fostering accountability and transparency for public spending can be partially
obtained through an enhanced budget process, including
a modern financial management system, results-oriented
practices, easily understandable budget objectives (for
example, in terms of education or health coverage rates,
or specific infrastructure projects and timeframes), better
integration between planning and budgeting activities,
and transparent rules for the granting of concessions in
public markets.
t Building stronger regulatory institutions that can be widely
perceived as technically driven and independent. This step
is critical in order to minimize the risks of capture by special interests. In parallel, supporting the development of
databases to better assess market concentration, corporate
governance, and the accountability of private businesses
would be an important action.
These steps would better position Ecuador for strong and
equitable growth.
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en el Ecuador y su potencial de crecimiento.” Estudios Sectoriales RED 2006. Caracas, Venezuela: Corporación Andina de
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Almeida, M. D., Gallardo, V. and A. Tomaselli. 2005. “Gobernabilidad
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Cueva, S. 2007. “Transparencia Presupuestaria en el Ecuador.” Temas
de Economía y Política No. 11. Quito, Ecuador: CORDES.
De Gregorio, J. and J. W. Lee. 2003. “Economic Growth in Latin
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De la Torre, A., García-Saltos, R. and Y. Mascaró. 2001. “Banking,
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Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (June).
Hausmann, Ricardo, Hwang Jason, and Rodrik, Dani. 2005. “What
You Export Matters.” Working paper No. 11905. Cambridge,
Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D. and A. Velasco. 2005. “Growth Diagnostics.” Cambridge, MA. Mimeographed document.
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Jácome, L. 2004. “The Late 1990s Financial Crisis in Ecuador:
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Mejía Acosta, A., Araujo, M. C. and V. Albornoz. 2006. “The Political Economy of the Budget Process: The Case of Ecuador.”
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Rajan, R. and L. Zingales. 1998. “Financial Dependence and Growth.”
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215
CHAPTER 5
Tearing Down The Walls:
Growth and Inclusion
in Guatemala
Daniel Artana, Sebastián Auguste, and Mario Cuevas*
Introduction
Guatemala is the largest country in Central America in terms of
population (almost 13 million) and GDP (over US$32 billion). With
a GDP per capita at around US$2,500, it is a middle-income country
(MIC). The population is growing rapidly (around 2.5 percent per
year) and is relatively young (about half the population is under
18 years of age). About 40 percent of the population is indigenous
and lives in rural areas. Commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing
are the mainstays of economic activity. Economic growth has been
steady but low: 4 percent per year since 1950 and only 1.3 percent
per year in per capita terms. At this rate, Guatemala would need
54 years to double its current GDP per capita.
As a result of slow growth, the country has been falling behind
internationally: its current share of world GDP is 21 percent below
*
Daniel Artana and Sebastián Auguste are affiliated with the Fundación de
Investigaciones Económicas in Buenos A ires, A rgentina, and Mario Cuevas
is affiliated with the Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales of the
Universidad Francisco Marroquín in Guatemala City, Guatemala. The authors
thank Hugo Maul for his guidance in the preparation of the section on informality; Jaime Díaz for able and dedicated research assistance; and peer reviewers
Manuel Agosín, Ronan Le Berre, Osmel Manzano, Ernesto Stein, and Alfie Ulloa
for very useful comments.
218
DANIEL ARTANA, SEBASTIÁN AUGUSTE, AND MARIO CUEVAS
that in 1980. The comparison is even less favorable relative to highgrowth emerging economies. Singapore, for instance, currently has
a GDP per capita almost seven times larger than Guatemala, while
at the end of the 1950s they were at similar levels.
Guatemala, consequently, can be characterized as a case
of slow growth, with a mix of low productivity growth and slow
physical and human capital accumulation. In addition, there are
shortcomings in several inputs complementing private capital,
including institutional quality and investment climate. Human
capital is extremely poor, even compared to economies with the
same income level. Infrastructure is also not well developed. In addition, several factors affect risks and the appropriability of private
returns; notably problems with property rights, crime, instability,
and corruption.
Social indicators do not compare favorably, even with countries
with a similar income level. Over half the population lives below the
poverty line; the income-based Gini coefficient (0.57) is the second
highest in Latin America and one of the highest in the world. Education attainment is extremely low, even for a middle-income country
and despite recent advances. Average schooling is between four and
five years, and the illiteracy rate is close to one-third of the total adult
population. Health indicators are similarly poor: only two-thirds of
the population has access to basic health care, the child malnutrition
rate is high, and maternal and infant mortality rates are among the
worst in Latin America.
Guatemala has suffered the devastating effect of a long-lasting
civil war that began in 1960 and finished in 1996 with the signing
of the Peace Agreement. The conflict deepened historical divisions,
thwarted institutional development, and weakened governance. The
Peace Agreement sought to establish an agenda of public policies to
develop the country and reduce inequality, emphasizing social policies
targeted to those who were historically marginalized (indigenous
and rural populations). The Agreement did not provide a detailed
roadmap on how to achieve the objectives. Coordination among different interest groups and the design of those policies has proven to
TEARING DOWN THE WALLS: GROWTH AND INCLUSION IN GUATEMALA
be very difficult; thus little progress has been made so far in terms
of reaching the Agreement’s goals. As a consequence, and despite
several economic reforms, economic growth has not recovered the
rates achieved before the 1980s.
There is an international consensus that the most immediate challenge for Guatemala is improving the provision of public
goods, which almost unavoidably requires overcoming strong
domestic opposition to improving tax collection. The Peace
Agreement set a tax revenue target of 12 percent of GDP to be
reached by 2002, a significant increase from the level existing
at the time of the Agreement (7.9 percent). Unfortunately, progress in terms of collecting tax revenues has been slow, limiting
the implementation of public policies and leaving little room for
increasing investment in key public goods, such as education,
security, and infrastructure.
This study analyzes the challenges Guatemala faces to achieving
faster growth, applying the growth diagnostic methodology (GDM)
(see Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 2005). Following a “clinical
economics” approach (Sachs, 2005), a set of questions about constraints to competitiveness and growth is formulated. Then micro
and macro evidence is examined to identify “binding constraints
to growth,” understood as those constraints whose removal would
yield a large payoff in terms of growth. This requires first identifying the problems and second ranking those problems to provide
clear policy recommendations. In doing so, the growth diagnostic
decision tree shown in Figure 5.1 will be followed, adapted to the
case of Guatemala.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The second
section briefly analyzes the Guatemalan economy and its recent
evolution. The third section describes the growth process in Guatemala, showing that economic growth and capital accumulation
is slow across the board and that several reforms across the years
(against the market in the 1950s and 1960s, and pro-market in the
late 1980s and 1990s) have not been able to boost economic growth,
illustrating that the binding constraints must be something more
219
220
FIGURE 5.1 Growth Diagnostic Tree for Guatemala
-PXHSPXUI
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)JHIQSJWBUFSFUVSO
but barriers to investment
Costly international
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Poor public debt management
FDI conditions unattractive
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Costly local
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to boost savings
r )JHINJDSPSJTL
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-FHBMJOTUBCJMJUZ
3. Corruption
r -PXTVQQMZPG
complementary inputs:
)VNBODBQJUBM
r 1PPSJOUFSNFEJBUJPO
(high spreads)
-JUUMFDPNQFUJUJPO
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r )JHINBDSPSJTL
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crisis
'PSFJHOFYDIBOHFSJTL
r )JHIUSBOTQPSU
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or shipping costs
r )JHIUBYSBUFTPSJOFîDJFOU
UBYTUSVDUVSF
r &YUFSOBMJUJFTTQJMMPWFST
and coordination failure
r -PXDPNQFUJUJWFOFTTEVFUP
1. Appreciated foreign
FYDIBOHFSBUF%VUDI%JTFBTF
problem originated by
remittances)
-BDLPGBDDFTTUP
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r -BDLPG3%
r 1SPQFSUZSJHIUTCBEMZ
EFñOFEPSFOGPSDFE
r 5PPMJUUMFTFMGEJTDPWFSZ
r *OGPSNBMJUZ
Source: Authors’ compilation.
fundamental and affecting all sectors. The fourth section presents
evidence on barriers to investment, finding that although there are
several micro problems, access to finance is not currently a (most)
binding constraint. The fifth and sixth sections explore the lack of
opportunities, first analyzing factors reducing social returns (finding
that human capital is one of the most bindings constraints) and then,
in the sixth section, analyzing to what degree those social returns
can be appropriated by private investors, noting that appropriability
is another important problem in Guatemala. Finally, the seventh
section summarizes the most important conclusions and discusses
policy prescriptions.
Guatemala at a Glance
Economic Performance: Steady but Slow
Guatemala has broadly followed the same pattern as the rest of
Latin America, although inflation has been low by Latin American
standards and Guatemala has not endured many macroeconomic
crises. During the 1960s and 1970s economic growth was fairly
rapid. It slowed in the 1980s and rose again in the 1990s, but it did
not reach pre-1980s levels. Many other countries in the region, such
as Costa Rica and Chile, not only recovered their pre-1980s growth
rates, but are now growing much faster. In Guatemala no economic
sector has recovered to the pre-1980s growth rates. Thus growth is
slow across the board.
Why has Guatemala been unable to restore its growth record after
the “lost decade”? What has changed in the world? What has changed
in the country? The answer seems to be a combination of factors, as will
be shown throughout this work. First, the terms of trade deteriorated.
The exports-to-GDP ratio declined from about 25 percent just before
the crisis of the early 1980s to just 15 percent after the crisis; exports
in constant prices grew at 7 percent per year pre-crisis and now grow
at just 4 percent. Second, the prolonged civil war slowed the process
of human and social capital accumulation. Although schooling has
been increasing, it has increased at a much lower rate than in other
countries and quality has remained lower. Other social indicators
related to human capital, such as health, have also improved at a slow
pace. Third, investment in physical capital has been historically low,
and it has not recovered to the pre-1980s levels. In simple terms, this
suggests that Guatemala has not been investing enough in adapting
itself to and taking advantage of a globalized world.
In the past 40 years, Guatemala has undertaken several structural changes that led to fluctuations in relative prices (for example,
the creation and elimination of price distortions, or the adoption
of trade reforms that opened or closed the economy). However, no
significant changes in product composition or differential changes
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222
in long-run trends at the sector level can be observed. It appears that
the factors behind the country’s poor economic performance are
common to all sectors. In other words, the fact that the removal of
many price distortions (introduced in the import substitution phase)
did not substantially change growth trends in any particular sector
seems to show that the binding constraints (following removal of price
distortions) are common to all sectors, and include such factors as
poor complementary inputs and an unfavorable business climate.
Slow Policy and Structural Change
Economic policies in Guatemala have closely followed the trend
observed in other Latin American countries. For example, in the
1950s and 1960s Guatemala introduced import substitution policies,
controls on interest rates, a fixed exchange rate, credit targets, and
large-scale infrastructure investments. As in other countries, import
substitution turned out to be unsustainable and created rigidities in
the economy. When policy reforms were introduced in the 1980s and
1990s, the growth balance changed. The GDP shares of manufacturing and agriculture have fallen steadily, while the service sector has
grown at a relatively fast rate. Agriculture, nonetheless, has remained
an important sector in the economy, particularly in terms of employment generation. The services sector currently includes the most
dynamic activities in the Guatemalan economy, notably commerce,
transport, power, telecommunications, and banking.
The Benefits and Challenges of Economic Diversification
The Guatemalan economy is now less volatile than it used to be. A
more stable growth pattern can in part be traced to a more diversified
economy, but it is also due to responsible macroeconomic management and the adoption of policies that have dampened the impact of
external shocks, such as interest rate liberalization and a floating
exchange rate. As a result, the growth and inflation volatilities of the
Guatemalan economy are lower than the regional averages.
On the up side, economic diversification is already pointing
to factors that may be important for sustaining future growth. For
example, demand for a better quality labor force and modern infrastructure has increased, along with pressure to strengthen the
policy and institutional framework. Unfortunately, deep structural
imbalances remain to be addressed, since current trends do not
seem to be promoting the fuller integration of domestic markets by
reducing the growing gap between the formal and informal sectors
or fostering rural development.
Uneven Responses and Linkages to the External Sector
Despite progress in reducing tariffs and liberalizing trade and developments in maquilas and exports of other nontraditional products,
total exports are not growing quickly. In the last five years, the export
share of GDP has stagnated at around 17 percent. Guatemala remains
a relatively closed country. The ratio of trade flows (exports plus
imports) as a percentage of GDP increased from 39 percent in 1991
to 46 percent in 2006, almost exclusively because of the increase in
imports. This ratio is still the lowest in Central America.
The stagnant export ratio of recent years is the result of major
divergences in the trends of the three leading export sectors. The
first is the maquila sector, which has benefited greatly from U.S.
trade preferences and the relative success of the Free Trade Zone
(F TZ) regimes in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The
second is the group of traditional exports (such as coffee, bananas,
and sugar), whose trade volumes fell steadily during the 1990s because of slow demand growth and low commodity prices. The third
is nontraditional exports (including flowers, vegetables, fruits, and
organic crops), which developed rapidly in the 1990s.1 As a result
1
Growth of services exports has accelerated recently. A recent study Cuevas and
Bolaños (2007) highlight the growth in services exports such as business process
outsourcing, medical services, medical tourism, and long-term care. Two out of
the six industrial clusters supported by the National Competitiveness Program
are in the services sector (tourism and software).
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224
of these diverging trends, the Guatemalan export basket diversified
despite stagnation in export values relative to total GDP.
The rapid growth of nontraditional agricultural exports is generally attributed to previous agricultural policies to promote diversification; access to long-term financing from public credit programs;
and investments in infrastructure facilities such as irrigation, roads,
and electricity. In addition, private organizations and trade associations like the Exporters’ Association (AGEXPORT) have played a
catalytic role in promoting nontraditional exports.
Policy Reforms in Overlapping Waves
The transition to democracy in the mid-1980s triggered successive
waves of overlapping policy reforms. In the last 20 years, the country has undergone three major phases of policy reforms. First, the
trade regime was liberalized in the mid- to the late-1980s, especially,
although not exclusively, in the context of the Central American
Common Market (CACM). Tariffs were reduced and exchange
controls and many nontariff barriers were eliminated. Fiscal incentives through tax and duty exemptions were granted to maquilas
and nontraditional agricultural exporters. During the first wave
of reforms, the country joined the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GAT T), entered into several trade agreements, and was
included in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The first wave of
reforms deepened in the 1990s with the removal of export taxes,
reductions in tariffs—the (unweighted) average tariff was reduced
to less than 10 percent—and further exchange rate liberalization.
The first wave of policy reforms opened up the economy and signaled
a drastic departure from the import substitution model.
The second wave of policy reforms was meant to liberalize the
financial sector. Beginning in the early 1990s, interest rates were
liberalized, the independence of the Central Bank was strengthened,
standardized reserve requirements were introduced, compulsory
lending was eliminated, supervision of the banking sector was
improved, and a deposit guarantee scheme was introduced. These
policies were also meant to enhance competition and facilitate restructuring of the banking sector through mergers and acquisitions.
These reforms deepened financial markets and facilitated the expansion of available services (for example, financial depth measured by
the ratio of broad money to GDP rose from 22 percent in 1990 to 29
percent in 2006). Further legal and policy reforms in the financial
sector were introduced in 2002.
The third wave of reforms, which started in the late 1990s,
increased the participation of the private sector in infrastructure
and modernized the regulatory framework. The reforms included
privatization of power and telecommunications, concessions for the
operation of the rail network and road construction, a management
contract for mail services, and further liberalization of foreign investment. The third wave of reforms facilitated the acceleration of
growth in the nonfinancial services sector and set the stage for the
subsequent recovery of the construction sector.
Together, the three waves of policy reforms overhauled public
policy in Guatemala. However, as will be discussed later, there are
still important reforms left to be implemented, which are critical for
realizing the full benefits of previous reforms.
Adjustment to Economic Shocks
In recent years, Guatemala has been subjected to several economic
shocks, both internal and external. In the late 1990s, the terms of
trade were negatively affected as a result of a severe and protracted
collapse in the international price of coffee; export revenues fell by
half between 1999 and 2002, harming an estimated 600,000 people
directly or indirectly involved in the coffee business. Subsequently, an
economic slowdown in the United States and other trading partners
in 2000–02 again hit export revenues, especially maquila products.
More recently, the sharp increase in the price of oil has led to a rising fuel import bill and deteriorating terms of trade.
Guatemala has adjusted to both internal and external shocks.
Despite the stagnation in the level of real per capita GDP, consump-
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226
tion has continued to increase. This is in part the result of foreign
exchange inflows that have softened the impact of external shocks.
Such inflows include remittances (rising from around US$400 million
in 1997 to around US$3.6 billion in 2006) and external financing for
the private sector. Other types of flows have likely cushioned the
impact of external shocks, including (possibly) revenues from the
trafficking of illicit goods and money laundering. Internal shocks have
also taken place. The central bank fell into a policy trap by seeking to
sterilize financial inflows while simultaneously emphasizing controls
on money aggregates and fostering nominal exchange rate stability,
thus leaving little room for responding to real shocks. Political conditions during 2000–04 also slowed growth, since tensions between
the government and the private sector led to a deterioration in the
investment climate and delays in the reform agenda.
The end of the negative terms of trade shock, improved economic
performance in the United States and other trading partners, and
the rapid growth of international liquidity set the stage for recovery
starting in 2004. More recently, positive expectations fueled by
the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
(CAF TA-DR) have increased investor confidence and monetary easing domestically (responding to external conditions) has validated
the economic recovery in terms of low real interest rates.
Policy Reform Agenda
The most important topics on the policy reform agenda are policy, education, health, infrastructure, and domestic security. In addition, the
exchange rate is generating concern in Guatemala, since remittances
and private financial inflows, as well as flows associated with illegal
activities, are driving a sustained real exchange rate appreciation.
One initiative of policy reform, named “Plan Visión de País,”
aims at building and strengthening a broad consensus among political actors on the key principles that should guide policy reform in
the next several years (in education, security, health and nutrition,
rural development, macro-fiscal policy, and intercultural relations).
The Plan was promoted by a particular segment of the business
community and a committee of senior public figures. Following
complex negotiations, all political parties with representation in
Congress signed a declaration of principles. Unfortunately, the Plan
was temporarily shelved after falling victim to the complex political
environment prevailing in Guatemala.
The Pacto Fiscal has also been revived to review and strengthen
the country’s faltering tax “policy.” The current Pacto Fiscal follows
several attempts at building a consensus on tax reform and is supported by various political actors, interest groups, and the government. Its aim is to find a more sustainable solution to long-standing
shortcomings in fiscal policy since some of the temporary patches
introduced by the previous Pacto Fiscal expire in 2008. The current
Pacto Fiscal is emphasizing transparency in fiscal policy, especially
with regard to expenditures, to complement tax reforms.
Low Economic Growth and Investment
Low Productivity Growth
Harberger (2005) and Loening (2002) have analyzed the sources of
growth in Guatemala, finding that the physical capital contribution
has been low and has fallen in recent decades (see Table 5.1). Generally, labor has been more important than physical capital as a growth
factor, but what really changed after the “lost decade” is the real cost
reduction (in Harberger’s terms), which is growing at barely half
the rate that prevailed prior to the 1980s. Since 1990, the real cost
reduction 2 gains in Guatemala have been very low when compared to
successful countries in the region: on average, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Guatemala has been 1.7 percent yearly, whereas
in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Chile, TFP has grown
at 2 percent, 3 percent, and 3 percent, respectively.
2
Real cost reduction refers to the TFP in Harberger’s paper or TFP plus education in Loening’s work.
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228
TABLE 5.1A
TFP Estimations
Update of Loening’s TFP Estimation Approach, Guatemala, 1951–2005 (percent)
Contribution of
GDP growth
rates
Period
1951–55
1956–60
1961–65
1966–70
1971–75
1976–80
1981–85
1986–90
1991–95
1996–2000
2001–05
Average
Capital
Education
Labor
TFP
0.7
2.1
1.4
2.0
1.9
2.9
0.8
0.5
1.1
1.8
1.5
1.5
39%
0.2
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.1
3.8
–0.2
2.1
0.8
1.4
2.0
1.8
48%
–0.9
1.6
1.5
1.4
0.8
2.1
–0.8
1.2
0.5
0.3
0.5
0.7
19%
2.3
–1.1
–0.4
–0.4
0.6
–3.2
–1.2
–1.0
1.9
0.4
–1.5
–0.3
–9%
2.3
5.3
5.3
5.8
5.6
5.7
–1.1
2.9
4.3
4.0
2.5
3.8
100%
Source: Authors’ calculations following approach in Loening (2002).
TABLE 5.1B
TFP Estimations
Harberger’s TFP Estimation, Guatemala, 1960–2001 (percent)
GDP growth
Capital contribution
Labor contribution
Real cost reduction
High growth
1960–80
Low growth
1980–1986
Other
1986–2001
5.6
0.8
1.4
3.4
–0.9
0.1
1.3
–2.4
3.8
0.6
1.6
1.7
Source: Harberger (2005).
Low Capital Accumulation
The current total investment ratio in Guatemala (around 13 percent)
is below the average in Latin America (23 percent) and below fastgrowing economies in East Asia (22 percent). In the last 35 years,
Guatemala has been one of the countries in Latin America with the
lowest ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP. This is due to
deficiencies in both private and public sector capital formation.
Public investment represented on average 5 percent of GDP in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, but fell to half this level in the 1980s
and most of the 1990s as a consequence of fiscal constraints. There
was a short-lived surge in public investment right after the signing
of the Peace Agreements, peaking at 3.5 percent of GDP in 1999,
but it went back to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2004, and currently stands
at around 2 percent of GDP.
For the private sector, the ratio of gross private fixed capital
formation to GDP was on average 10 percent in Guatemala between
1970 and 2003, well below the 16 percent average in the region. The
civil conflict affected the accumulation process. The ratio fell to
7 percent when the armed conflict worsened during the 1980s. Since
the conflict ended, the increase in private accumulation has not been
enough to compensate for the previous losses. More recently, even
this mild recovery stopped, and since 2000, there has been a declining trend, and the rate has not reached the pre-1980s levels. 3
Labor Productivity, Reallocation, and Growth
Following the shift-share analysis in Hopenhayn and Neumeyer
(2004), this study first analyzes whether price distortions have
historically affected economic growth in Guatemala, exploring
how labor has been allocated across sectors (since data on capital
stock are not available at the sector level). Following this approach
(see Hopenhayn and Neumeyer’s paper for further details on the
methodology), labor productivity is decomposed into:
t Within-change or shift component, which is a weighted
average of the increment in TFP, capital stock per worker,
and average human capital in the sector, assuming constant
returns to scale. This term should explain all of the variation
in output per capita under balanced growth.
3
The private investment ratio peaked at almost 14.8 percent of GDP in 1999 but
fell back to around 12 percent of GDP in 2001, and stayed at approximately that
level for several years.
229
230
t Between-change or share component, capturing the growth
in GDP per worker, corresponding to the reallocation of
labor across sectors (with constant output). If labor goes
from sectors with low to high labor productivity, the term
should be positive.
t An interaction effect, which is negative if labor goes from a
sector with growing average productivity to a sector where
output per worker is falling.
The exercise yielded the following findings:
t Labor reallocation has been stronger than output reallocation, which explains why labor productivity lags behind
output growth.
t The general pattern is that employment flowed from agriculture and mining to services; the share of total employment
in agriculture and mining, for instance, declined from 52
percent in 1960 to 14 percent in 2005.
t Except for the 1960s, the within-change has been the most
important factor explaining output per capita growth.
t Between-changes have been always positive except during
1970–5, showing that labor has moved from low to high labor productivity sectors. The interaction effect has always
been negative, showing that labor has flowed from sectors
where average productivity is rising to sectors where average productivity is falling.
The fact that the within-change is the most important factor suggests that the economy has had a balanced but slow economic growth. In
countries where price distortions had a significant effect on the economy,
such as Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s, the most important factor
was a negative interaction effect, indicating the misallocation of factors.
In Argentina, when the price distortions were eliminated in the 1990s,
the economy had important gains just from reallocating the resources
efficiently. By contrast, the pattern of balanced growth observed in
Guatemala resembles the type found in more successful economies
(such as Chile) or developed countries, where deepening capital and
rising productivity account for most of the economic growth.
This evidence suggests that price distortions are not hindering
resource allocation in Guatemala.4 The evidence is clear that the slow
growth in Guatemala is not caused by a high level of investment that
is poorly allocated, but rather by a low level of investment, which
should be explained either by the high costs of financing or the lack
of opportunities, which are analyzed next.
Barriers to Investment: Credit Market Imperfections
Macro Evidence
Table 5.2 presents some stylized facts about investment in Guatemala’s
formal sector since 1960. Guatemala’s national saving rate is low.
Although it has risen to around 15 percent of GDP since 2002 from a
typical level of around 12 percent, it remains lower than the average
for Latin America and the Caribbean (20 percent) and for fast-growing
countries in South Asia (26 percent). However, external sources of
financing are readily available. Evidence of this is the availability of
large foreign exchange inflows in the form of private remittances
(which have increased sevenfold since 2001, and now represent 11
percent of GDP) and private external debt (official international reserves increased from US$1 billion at the end of the 1990s to US$4
billion in 2006, which suggests an abundance of resources).
On the other hand, remittances are not invested or saved but
rather immediately consumed (and mainly in nondurables). The
country is not attractive to foreign direct investment (in the 2000s,
FDI flows have represented only 1 percent of the GDP, which is very
low by Latin American standards). Country risk is relatively high for
4
This does not mean that price distortions in Guatemala are absent, but rather
that the distortions have not had a significant role in the observed growth pattern,
and therefore cannot be a binding constraint.
231
232
TABLE 5.2 Stylized Facts of Investment in the Formal Sector, 1960–2006
(percentage)
Real domestic credit to
private sector
(growth, percentage)
Domestic credit to
private sector/GDP
Real interest
rate
Gross capital
formation/
GDP
7.07
6.64
5.14
6.09
12.3
16.4
8.3
15.9
8.92
7.91
7.93
8.26
12.26
16.36
18.35
15.85
1960–75
1976–85
1986–2006
1960–2006
Source: Authors’ calculations using Banco de Guatemala (BANGUAT) data.
a country that has not faced large macroeconomic shocks, financial
crises, or public debt defaults, and the capital market is very much
underdeveloped. 5 Domestic credit to the private sector represented
just 16 percent of GDP in the last 40 years, which is very low even by
regional standards (the increase observed in the last 15 years has
barely met the levels reported before the “lost decade”). Interest
rate spreads are also high by regional standards.
Micro Evidence
Domestic saving and financing patterns are distorted because
creditor protection is poor, bank regulation is weak, and equity and
venture capital outside certain narrow circles are scarce. There is no
framework for business or individual bankruptcy, either. Uncertainty
regarding property rights in many areas of the country also distorts
access to credit. Therefore, from a macroeconomic perspective the
country does not seem to face financial constraints, but some micro
factors might be explaining why these resources do not subsequently
materialize as credit and investment. However, the low credit to GDP
ratio is not necessarily a reflection of credit constraints, as it could be
that the available portfolio of investment projects is very narrow.
5
The ratio of market capitalization to GDP is just 1.24 percent, well below
countries with similar GDP (35.9 percent, on average) and Latin American and
Caribbean (32.6 percent, on average).
To better understand the availability and terms of financing in
Guatemala, a comparison was made between conditions in Guatemala
and conditions in other similar countries, following a cluster analysis
using the World Development Indicators database.
Some 129 countries were first clustered into three groups:
low-cost, high-cost, and extreme-imbalance countries, using a quadratic Euclidean distance rule along three dimensions:6 the spread
between deposit and loan rates, real interest rates, and the savingsto-GDP ratio (see Table 5.3). Guatemala is in the high-cost cluster,
with countries such as Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Georgia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Toga, Uganda, and Zambia.
No developed country falls in this group, but some relatively highgrowth countries such as Costa Rica do. In these countries, the savings rate is low, the cost of financial intermediation is high, and the
real rate of interest on loans is also high—but Guatemala has somewhat better conditions than the archetypical high-cost country.7
Second, 162 countries were clustered in three groups: low,
medium, and high financial depth, according to: the ratio of broad
6
Cluster analysis helps in discovering structures in data without explaining them.
As an exploratory tool, cluster analysis groups objects into categories on the basis
of their similarity. Specifically, country observations like those in this study can be
sorted into groups in such a way that the association between two observations is
high if they belong in the same group and low otherwise. Distance in n-dimensional
space is used as a clustering rule for grouping objects. By this methodology, the
hierarchy is constructed from the individual elements by progressively merging
clusters. Obviously, the results of cluster analysis (country groupings) depend
on the choice of variables used in the analysis. The most straightforward way of
computing distances in n-dimensional space is to calculate Euclidean distances.
Standard Euclidean and quadratic Euclidean distances are the two most common
clustering rules; quadratic distance places greater weight on observations that
are further apart. Quadratic Euclidean distance is computed as:
D( x, y ) ¤ xi yi
2
i
7
This holds for a macro analysis of the financial markets, but it does not necessarily mean that individual enterprises or groups of enterprises do not face problems
accessing resources. For more information, refer to the informal economy and
institutional analysis presented in this study.
233
234
TABLE 5.3 International Clustering by Financing Conditions
(unweighted averages)
Repressed
High cost
Variable
Guatemala
Low cost
10.0
8.5
13.8
—
6.3
5.6
25.0
79
Percentage
Spreads
Real interest rate
Saving/GDP
Number of countries
66.6
–16.8
8.2
2
13.0
13.3
10.4
48
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)
(corresponding to 2004–05). Data on high-cost cluster and on Guatemala are italicized.
— not available
money (M2) to GDP and the ratio of credit to the private sector to
GDP (see Table 5.4). Guatemala is in the low-financial depth group,
together with Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Turkey, and Venezuela, as well
as Albania, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Haiti, Mali, Sierra Leone, and
Uganda. This is a very diverse group that includes large emerging
markets such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico, as well as small
impoverished countries such as Mali and Sierra Leone. Guatemala is
a very “typical” member of the third group, as the country average
M2/GDP ratio is very close to the group average, and the credit/
GDP ratio is 2 percentage points above the group average.
The third piece of evidence at the micro level is based on the
World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment survey. Some 4,719
firms from Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua were clustered into three clusters: firms facing
TABLE 5.4 International Clustering by Availability of Credit
(unweighted averages)
Variable
Low
Guatemala
Moderate
High
M2/GDP
CSP/GDP
Number of countries
29
18
100
29
20
—
67
56
43
113
126
19
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of WDI data.
— not available
TABLE 5.5 Cross-Country Clustering of Firms by Terms of Financing
(firms as percentage of country total)
Country
Unfavorable
Intermediate
Benign
Total
Guatemala
Brazil
Chile
El Salvador
Ecuador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Total
0.44
3.30
0.32
0.65
5.23
0.45
2.88
2.01
33.19
14.89
4.47
20.47
53.72
45.70
30.82
22.53
66.37
81.81
95.21
78.88
41.05
53.85
66.30
75.46
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on World Bank Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) survey.
Note: The variables used in the multivariate cluster analysis were firm size, collateral as financial constraint (dummy variable), and
financial cost.
relatively adverse terms of financing, with both access and cost
of financing being cited as constraints; firms with better terms of
financing; and firms with relatively benign terms of financing (in
the sense that firms are less likely to cite either the cost or access
to financing as a binding constraint) (see Table 5.5).
The results show that two-thirds of Guatemala firms fell into
the cluster associated with relatively benign financing conditions
(both cost and access to financing). Similarly, nearly one-third of
Guatemalan firms in the ICA survey reported “intermediate” terms of
financing. Only a very small percentage of Guatemalan firms belong
in the cluster associated with adverse terms of financing.
Returns to Investment in Physical Capital vs. Cost of Financing
Following an iterative approach using national accounts data for the
period 1950–2006, the (social) rate of return of aggregate private
investment in Guatemala was estimated. 8 The average rate was found
8
This method measures the internal rate of return (IRR) of yearly aggregate
investment, not the average rate of return on existing physical capital. This means
that the IRR is likely to be more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions than
measures based on returns to the capital stock.
235
236
to be 28 percent (in real terms). 9 This high rate is not surprising
since capital is scarce in Guatemala, and the rate computed shows
the average return for existing capital and not for new investment
(which is relevant for growth).10
What is important is to analyze the evolution of the rate of
return, which varied considerably over the 50 years. In the 1960s
and 1970s, when the economy was growing fast, the rates of return
were exceptionally high. The rates of return collapsed in the early
1980s, recovered following the transition to democracy, peaked
right after the signing of the Peace Agreement, and declined
again in subsequent years. The rates declined in a period in which
financial conditions were more favorable (after the capital account
liberalization and modernization of financial infrastructure). The
decline was not due to an increase in the stock of capital, since it
has been almost constant. In this sense, the evolution of the capital
stock and the rate of return seem to not be consistent with a financial
constraint story.
Summing up, the fact that remittances are consumed and foreign access to credit is not exploited; that individual firms report
relatively good financing conditions; and that investment did not pick
up when the financial conditions improved show that costly financing
is not the most binding constraint in Guatemala. The little formal
lending going on in the country is more related to the demand for
credit (and the availability of profitable projects) than the supply of
funds. These findings lead to an analysis of the lack of opportunities
branch of the tree in the remainder of this chapter.
9
An estimation of the aggregate production function with time series suggests
a similar value: a social return on private capital of around 30 percent.
10
Remember that private investment is driven by private IR R. It does not
necessarily follow from high social IRRs that the risk-adjusted private IRR is
high. This is a common fact in Latin America. Higher risk demands compensation
and this discourages some investment projects. In a world of high mobility of
capital, this higher cost is shifted to more immobile factors (like labor) or to
consumers.
Social Returns to Economic Activity
Human Capital Accumulation
Of the 124 countries included in the Global Competitiveness Index
(GCI), Guatemala ranks 75. Other countries in the region, such
as Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama, rank higher. Among the
nine so-called pillars in the index, Guatemala’s worst rankings are
in higher education and training (94), followed by institutions (81).
The best rankings are obtained in business sophistication (60) and
technological readiness (71).
Guatemala has a GCI ranking in line with its level of development
(GDP per capita in PPP US$) for most of the components except for
higher education and training (fifth pillar), suggesting that human
capital might be a binding constraint.
The effect of investment in education on economic growth and
development has been studied at least since Denison (1962, 1967) and
currently no economist could neglect its importance. The channels
through which education investment influences growth are more controversial, however. To mention just a few possible channels: human
capital might be needed to catch up with foreign technological progress
and the creation of domestic technology (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2003);
education might exhibit strong externalities (such as allowing better
institutions and better functioning of the democratic process); and
education might also affect the efficiency of the educational system
(better qualified teachers offer better education quality, even for the
same number of years of schooling).11 Obviously, investment is just a
portion of the story because what matters is how well investment is
allocated (its efficiency), since increases in years of schooling could
be attained at the expense of reducing the quality of education.
11
Lucas (1990), for instance, argues that one reason why physical capital does
not flow to poor countries may be the fact that these countries are typically poorly
endowed with factors complementary to physical capital, such as human capital,
thereby reducing the rate of return.
237
238
Guatemala has made some efforts in recent years to increase
the average years of schooling and education in general. Due to
a significant increase in recent years, net enrollment in primary
school in 2004 was in line with comparable countries. In 1990 the
net enrollment ratio in primary school was just 64 percent, but
increased to 93 percent by 2004. In secondary education net enrollment ratios have increased significantly, from 19.5 percent in
1985 to 48.6 percent in 2004, and the proportion of pupils reaching
fifth grade (from the same cohort) increased from 39.1 percent in
1985 to 77.9 percent in 2004. Other indicators, such as the intake
rate, primary completion rate, and ratio of pupils to teachers, have
improved significantly, too. As a result of this effort, the adult illiteracy rate fell from 39 percent in 1990 to 30.9 percent in 2004.
Although the situation has been improving, Guatemala is still well
behind countries with similar GNI per capita,12 and behind Latin
America. In particular:
t Guatemala has a high rate of illiteracy (30.9 percent), the
highest in Latin America (the regional average is 9.8 percent)
and one of the highest among countries with similar GNI
per capita (the average is 10.6 percent).
t The net enrollment ratio in primary school is similar to
the regional average and the average for countries with
12
The set of middle-income countries includes: Algeria, American Samoa,
Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Cuba, Djibouti,
Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gaza Strip, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia,
Iran Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Macedonia FYR,
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia Fed. Sts., Morocco, Namibia, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, West Bank, and Yugoslavia.
The set of Latin American countries includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
similar GNI per capita. The progression from primary to
secondary school is among the highest for both sets of
comparator countries. This shows that the high illiteracy
rate is in part due to the burden inherited from previous
years, and that the situation for primary school pupils has
improved.
t Nevertheless, the gross enrollment ratio in primary school
is in line with the regional average for both sets of countries, so Guatemala is not catching up to the rest in terms
of educating adults.
t Both the net and gross enrollment ratios for secondary school
are low relative to the set of comparator countries (in fact,
they are the lowest in Latin America).
t The gross enrollment ratio for tertiary education is also the
lowest in Latin America.
t Guatemala is allocating resources to public education at a level
well below the regional average and the average of countries
with similar GNI per capita. Guatemala’s public expenditure
in education (as a percentage of GDP) represents only 40
percent of the Latin American (weighted) average.13
Figure 5.2 shows how Guatemala compares to various international education benchmarks.
The average rates conceal important gender and racial differences in education: 58 percent of indigenous people are illiterate, and
among indigenous women the rate is 69 percent. For non-indigenous
groups, the rates are 25 percent for women and 16 percent for males,
also showing a gender bias.
In addition to poor education, Guatemala also reports poor
health indicators when compared to the average of Latin America
13
Although the private sector has a larger participation in education in Guatemala
than in other countries of the region (particularly in secondary school), private
sector spending on education is not likely to be enough to compensate for the lack
of public expenditure in this sector.
239
FIGURE 5.2 International Benchmarks, 2004
A. Literacy Rates
Lower-middle-income countries
90
GNI per capita
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
Guatemala
4,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
40
0
50
3,000
Guatemala
2,000
70
1,000
80
60
Latin America and Caribbean
Literacy rate
Literacy rate
100
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
0
110
GNI per capita
Net enrollment ratio,
secondary school (%)
7,000
8,000
8,000
6,000
5,000
7,000
GNI per capita
4,000
2,000
1,000
0
Guatemala
3,000
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
Guatemala
1,000
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Net enrollment ratio,
secondary school (%)
B. Net Enrollment Ratios for Secondary School
GNI per capita
C. Gross Enrollment Ratios for Tertiary Education
70
GNI per capita
20
2,000
Guatemala
1,000
0
0
5,000
10
4,000
3,000
1,000
0
10
2,000
Guatemala
30
GNI per capita
6,000
20
40
5,000
30
50
4,000
40
3,000
Gross enrollment ratio,
tertiary education (%)
60
50
0
70
60
Gross enrollment ratio,
tertiary education (%)
240
FIGURE 5.2 International Benchmarks, 2004
(continued)
5
4
3
2
7,000
8,000
8,000
6,000
7,000
5,000
4,000
2,000
1,000
GNI per capita
3,000
Guatemala
1
0
Public expenditure in education
as a % of GDP
6
0
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
7
Guatemala
1,000
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
Public expenditure in education
as a % of GDP
D. Public Expenditure in Education as a Percentage of GDP
GNI per capita
Guatemala
70
60
50
40
30
20
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
0
1,000
10
0
Private enrollment as % of total
enrollment, secondary school
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
GNI per capita
80
Guatemala
1,000
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
Private enrollment as % of total
enrollment, secondary school
E. Private Enrollment as a Share of Total Enrollment in Secondary School
GNI per capita
Source: World Bank, EdStats.
and Caribbean countries and high-income countries (see Table 5.6).
For instance, life expectancy at birth is 68 years, while the average in
Latin America is 72, and infant mortality rate is 39 per 1,000, while
the regional average is 29.6. The immunization rate is 76 percent.
Compared only to Central American countries, Guatemala performs
poorly. For instance, El Salvador, which also suffered the devastating
effects of a long-term civil war and has a GNI per capita similar to
Guatemala, has an infant mortality rate of 29 per 1,000, an immunization rate of 97 percent, and life expectancy of 71 years.
241
242
TABLE 5.6 Health Indicators, Guatemala vs. Latin American and High-income
Countries
Guatemala
Average for
Latin America and
the Caribbean
High-income
countries
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
GNI per capita, Atlas method
(current US$)
1,740
2,400
3,679.4
4,007.7
26,527.7
35,130.5
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
66.3
68
71.2
72
78
79
Mortality rate, infant
(per 1,000 live births)
39
—
29.6
—
6.5
—
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)
53
—
35.7
—
—
—
Immunization, measles
(% of children aged 12–23 months)
76
—
89.1
—
90.8
—
Prevalence of HIV, total
(% of population ages 15–49)
—
0.9
—
0.57
—
0.37
Source: World Bank.
— not available
Returns to Schooling
The fact that the stock of human capital is low does not mean that
human capital is scarce or that more investment in this sector pays
off. But, in Guatemala it is clear that human capital is scarce since
an additional year of schooling yields high returns compared with
other countries. Bils and Klenow (2000), for instance, rank Guatemala
6th out of 50 countries in terms of the rate of return to schooling.
Hausmann and Rodrik (2005) show that Guatemala has the highest
returns to schooling in Latin America.
According to Bils and Klenow (2000), the recovery in growth
rates in the 1990s should have pushed the returns to schooling
upward, thus causing more schooling; by contrast, an increase
in human capital (holding growth constant) is expected to push
returns down. In the case of Guatemala, the relatively shallow
decrease in returns to schooling between 1989 and 1998 seems
to show that the increase in schooling has not been enough, com-
pared to other countries, to accommodate demand for this factor
(see Table 5.7).
In 1989, with a literacy rate of 61 percent, one additional year
of schooling had a return of 0.142, but in 2004, with a literacy rate
of 69.1 percent, the return fell to 0.124. The decline in returns to
schooling is stronger at lower levels of education. For instance, the
net enrollment ratio in primary school increased from 64 percent
in 1990 to 93 percent in 2004, and the returns to finishing primary
school fell 28 percent between 1998 and 2004. For higher levels of
education, the declining trend is not so clear; in fact, the return to
finishing higher education has not fallen but has increased in the last
decade, even in a context in which enrollment in tertiary education
has increased by 15.7 percent.
The very high returns to schooling for Guatemala are consistent with the fact that Guatemalan workers are among the least
educated in Latin America, and the fact that education has improved
significantly but returns have not fallen drastically (as happened in
other Latin American countries that reported significant increases
in education, such as Honduras). As the reported increase in human
capital did not depress returns, this suggests that human capital has
been a binding constraint.14
Another piece of evidence is Loening (2002), who analyzes the
relationship between economic growth and education in Guatemala
using time series analysis and an error correction model. In the time
series analysis, average years of schooling are strongly correlated
with per capita growth. The results, according to the author, are that
a better-educated labor force appears to have a positive and significant impact on economic growth: both through factor accumulation
14
Since these are private returns to schooling, one might think that the private
sector could close the gap through private schooling. This trend is not observed
in Guatemala, but several factors limit the expansion of private schooling. Perhaps
the most important (as in any other country) are the imperfections in credit markets (people cannot normally borrow to accumulate human capital; accumulation
is restricted only to relatively rich individuals, thus perpetuating a very unequal
income distribution). In addition, health problems (such as malnutrition) might
significantly limit the accumulation for poor individuals.
243
244
TABLE 5.7A
Returns to One More Year of Schooling or Finishing Primary or Secondary School or Higher Education
Bils and Klenow
(2000), based
mainly on
1998–9 data
Hausmann and
Rodrik (2005),
based on
1998 data
One more
year of
schooling
One more
year of
schooling
Finished
primary
school
Finished
secondary
school
Finished
higher
education
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Paraguay
Uruguay
Venezuela
Latin America average
0.107
0.073
0.154
0.121
0.145
0.105
0.078
0.098
0.096
0.142
0.172
0.141
0.097
0.126
0.085
0.103
0.09
0.084
0.112
0.091
0.113
0.132
0.123
0.119
0.098
0.068
0.135
0.105
0.136
0.104
0.126
0.11
0.116
0.129
0.129
0.084
0.085
0.114
0.422
0.781
0.622
0.341
0.449
0.326
0.281
0.681
0.557
0.841
0.467
0.709
0.574
0.483
0.474
0.665
0.427
0.351
0.52
0.789
1.283
1.138
0.761
0.908
0.684
0.377
1.31
1.027
1.347
1.003
1.225
0.86
1.015
0.99
1.181
0.765
0.622
0.97
1.127
1.425
1.922
1.458
1.668
1.22
0.896
1.833
1.482
1.991
1.506
1.732
1.636
1.559
1.459
1.662
1.079
1.076
1.493
Taiwan
Thailand
United States
Maximum
Minimum
N.A.
0.091
0.093
—
—
0.067
0.192
0.12
0.192
0.067
0.257
0.915
0.186
0.915
0.186
0.5
1.827
0.553
1.827
0.377
0.826
2.361
0.98
2.361
0.826
Country
Hausmann and Rodrik (2005),
based on 1998 data
Source: Bils and Klenow (2000); Hausmann and Rodrik (2005).
Note: Returns to schooling correspond to the OLS coefficient in a standard Mincer equation. In the case of years of schooling, this coefficient
shows the proportional change in wages when the individual has one more year of education. In the case of the dummy for finishing
primary school, it shows the proportional change in wages for those whose maximum level is finished primary school compared to
those who have not finished.
TABLE 5.7B
Recent Evolution
Year
One more year of
schooling
Finished primary
school
Finished secondary
school
Finished higher
education
1989
1998
2002
2004
0.142
0.136
0.137
0.124
—
0.841
0.727
0.656
—
1.347
1.407
1.321
—
1.991
2.413
1.988
Source: Bils and Klenow (2000), for 1989 results; Hausmann and Rodrik (2005), for 1988 results; values for 2002 and 2004 were estimated
based on the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos (ENEI), 2002 and 2004 (in both cases, the results were expanded using the frequency
weight of the stratified sampling estimated by ENEI).
Note: The returns are calculated as a simple Mincer equation (a standard OLS regression of the natural log of total labor income on age,
age squared and schooling) (years of schooling in one case, and dummies for highest level of education reached).
and through the evolution of total factor productivity. An increase by
1 percentage point in average years of schooling would raise output
per worker by about 0.16 percentage points (a large effect compared
to the results obtained for other countries). Growth accounting shows
that economic growth in Guatemala has been historically driven by
factor accumulation and not TFP growth. Loening suggests that the
poor performance in TFP growth is related to Guatemala’s poorly
developed human capital. These results suggest that social returns
to schooling are very high too.
Human Capital and Indigenous Groups
The origins of rural poverty in Guatemala can be traced to a long
history of social discrimination and inequality. Indigenous groups
have traditionally been excluded from the social, economic, and political mainstream of the country. This situation has been exacerbated
by Guatemala’s complex topography, as high mountains and dense
forests have kept these mainly indigenous communities remote from
the rest of the country. In addition, more than three decades of civil
conflict had devastating consequences for the rural population.
Indigenous communities speak a wide range of languages
and dialects (many do not speak Spanish) and live in rural areas,
245
246
and this has kept them further marginalized. Today, although indigenous communities make up 43 per cent of the population, they
account for less than a quarter of Guatemala’s total income and
consumption. They not only have problems with access to education, but also have extremely limited access to basic services and
infrastructure.15
Schooling among indigenous people is lower than the national
average, particularly among women. However, education does not
seem to be the only factor explaining lower income for indigenous
groups, since in a standard Mincer equation indigenous individuals
have a strong and significant negative premium even after controlling for education. This is not related to location, since including a
dummy for rural or urban location does not change the coefficient
associated with belonging to an indigenous group. What explains
the negative premium on education? A simple answer could be
discrimination, but it is also possible that the quality of education
among indigenous groups is poorer and that having a mother tongue
other than Spanish is a disadvantage in a Spanish-based education
system and in the formal sector of the economy.
To compare the differences in human capital among indigenous
and non-indigenous people, a Mincer equation was first estimated
using Heckman’s two-step methodology (to control for the endogenous decision to participate in the labor force) using as controls:
age, age squared, dummy for whether part of an indigenous group,
dummy for gender, dummy for whether the person was educated in
a rural area or urban area, and five dummies indicating the level of
education. With the estimated coefficients and the characteristics
of the entire population (15 years or more), the human capital stock
was estimated. The results show that the indigenous distribution
is stochastically dominated by the non-indigenous distribution, the
15
The systematic decline of the traditional agricultural sector has led to a decline
in income and nutritional levels among poor indigenous rural people. In addition,
pressure on the land has resulted in deforestation and soil erosion, and this has
affected the rural indigenous communities.
FIGURE 5.3 Distribution of the Human Capital Stock in Guatemala, 2004
Indigenous Groups
Non-indigenous Groups
1.5
1.0
0.8
Density
Density
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
6
8.5
7
8
Fitted values
Fitted values
Formal Sector
Informal Sector
1.0
9
10
9
10
0.8
0.8
Density
Density
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
Human capital
6
7
8
Human capital
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the ENEI, 2002 and 2004.
mean is lower, it has more weight in the lower tail, and just a few
reach high levels of human capital (see Figure 5.3).
The same procedure was applied to view differences in human
capital accumulation between formal and informal workers (see
Figure 5.3). The Mincer equation was first estimated using the Heckman procedure, and the graphs for each subsample were compiled.
The mean between both groups does not differ much, although the
distribution in the informal sector is more skewed to lower educational levels. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the increase in
informality has been neutral in terms of stimulating human capital
accumulation. More research is needed to better understand the
link between informality and growth.
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248
The Relatively Poor Quality of Schooling
Not only is the quantity of schooling poor, but so is the quality. Guatemala has not participated in any international test. However, an
alternative measure can be found in Bratsberg and Terrell (2002),
who analyze the quality of education estimating the returns to schooling for immigrants to the United States who have studied in their
countries of origin (using U.S. Census data). Guatemala ranks 64
(both with 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census data) out of 67 countries in
terms of quality. Only Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador
have lower returns to education in the United States than Guatemala
(that is, lower quality). Whereas the returns to one additional year
of schooling for the entire set of immigrants between 1980 and 1990
increased by 23.1 percent, Guatemala’s rate of return increased only
7 percent, below the average improvement in Central America (36.4
percent) and South America (11.4 percent).
The low return for Guatemala means that the country is not
educating its workers in the same way as other countries, at least
according to market needs in the United States. There might be two
reasons for this: one is that education is very country-specific; the
other is that quality is poor.16 One specificity is language, but it has
been shown (see Hendricks, 2002) that the differences in returns
using the Mincerian approach are robust to the number of years the
worker has been living in the United States and the age the immigrant
moved to the United States (one might expect that the younger the
immigrant, the easier it would be for him or her to learn English, and
the longer the stay in the United States, the less limiting should be
the language learned at home). Another piece of evidence showing
that the difference should be interpreted more as a difference in
quality than educational specificities is that Guatemala also ranks
poorly when compared to Latin American countries with similar
16
Hanushek and Kim (1999) find a strong correlation between the implicit quality
index obtained from a Mincer equation for immigrants in the United States who
have studied in their countries of origin and direct measures of school quality
(standardized tests).
characteristics (including language). The evidence thus shows that
Guatemala not only has a problem with the quality of education but
also that the gap has been increasing relative to other countries.
Since quality tends to reduce the returns to schooling (because
an additional year of low quality education is not the same in terms
of labor income as an additional year of high quality education),
the already high returns to schooling found in Guatemala would be
even higher if quality were more in line with international levels. For
instance, if Guatemala’s education quality equaled the world average
(the average for the 67 countries analyzed in the study), returns to
education would be 2.2 times higher than the return estimated in
this study. This reinforces the idea that human capital is definitely
a binding constraint on growth in Guatemala.
Infrastructure
This analysis focuses on four areas of “core infrastructure,” which
are especially important in terms of the facilitation (or obstruction)
of investment and growth economy-wide: telecommunications, electricity, roads, and seaports. A summary of findings follows:
Telecommunications
t Guatemala has a liberal regulatory environment for telecommunications and the provision of services is entirely private
(except for investment in rural telephony).
t Access to telephone services has increased substantially in
the last few years, but starting from a very low penetration.
Thus Guatemala is still well behind the average in Latin
America.
t In terms of costs, telecom tariffs are relatively low. The average local telephone tariffs are around US$0.02 per minute
and the price of international calls (to the United States)
ranges from US$0.10 to US$0.40 per minute, depending on
the choice of operator—a tariff similar to that of New Zea-
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land, but above the countries in the region such as Brazil,
the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Uruguay.
t Guatemala has a very low Internet connectivity rate. According to the World Report on Information Technology (released
in early 2007), Guatemala ranks behind El Salvador, Costa
Rica, and Panama in the use of information technology,
although it still places ahead of Honduras and Nicaragua.
Although Guatemala’s ranking in Central America remained
unchanged between 2006 and 2007, it improved significantly
from a global perspective, moving from a ranking of 98 to 79
from 2006 to 2007. Recent estimates show that only 1.5 percent of the population enjoys regular access to the Internet,
a level similar to El Salvador but very low when compared to
Mexico (almost 5 percent) and Costa Rica (over 9 percent).
The ratio of Internet users is around 7 percent (since many
access the Internet through Internet centers), still very low
when compared to the region (see Figure 5.4).
Electricity
t Electricity coverage has increased significantly since Guatemala restructured the sector in the early 1990s, particularly
after the enactment of the 1996 Electricity Law.17 The installed
17
The 1996 Law introduced: unbundling into generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization; competition in generation and commercialization;
unrestricted access to the transmission network; partial consumer freedom to
choose a supplier; and freely determined generation prices, together with regulated
transmission and distribution prices. Energy prices and adjustments for capacity
are passed through to consumers on a quarterly basis, taking into consideration
the costs of fuel and exchange rate fluctuations. By contrast, network rates follow
a price cap reset every five years. The Law also created both the National Electrical Energy Commission (CNEE) and the Administrator of the Wholesale Market
(AMM). Together with the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM), the CNEE
and AMM are responsible for sector policy and regulation. The CNEE is a semiautonomous status entity attached to the MEM but enjoys budgetary independence
(it is financed with a tax on electricity sales).
FIGURE 5.4 Internet Users in the Americas, 2007
(per 100 inhabitants)
United States
Canada
Jamaica
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Chile
Argentina
Mexico
Peru
Brazil
Dominican Rep.
Colombia
El Salvador
Venezuela
Panama
Guatemala
Bolivia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Honduras
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Source: International Telecommunication Union.
capacity increased by 44 percent between 1996 and 2004,
but at a lower pace than demand. Despite this unbalanced
growth, private participation in generation has substantially
reduced the incidence of capacity shortfalls and the associated blackouts common in the pre-reform years.
t There are some distortions in the price structure since
medium-sized users finance the stranded costs of existing
contracts and cross-subsidize social tariffs. The social tariff
makes the current system unsustainable, but there is opposition to changing the situation. As a consequence, Guatemalan
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) pay between
25 and 70 percent more for electricity than equivalent enterprises elsewhere in Central America. Price distortions,
sustainability, and political pressure are the most significant
vulnerabilities of the system today. On the whole, the legal,
regulatory, and institutional amendments have served the
country well since the 1996 reforms, and the distortions and
political vulnerabilities have not been a barrier to growth and
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252
investment until now. Nevertheless, sector constraints may
become more of a drag in the next few years.
Transportation
t Guatemala has a low density of roads and restricted access to
transportation services (0.13 km of roads per km 2 and about 1.3
km per thousand people). An estimated 13 percent of households
still have no access to roads (paved or unpaved). Because of
geography, it would be very expensive to expand the network.
However, the roads that do exist are likely to be of somewhat
better quality than regional comparators since Guatemala has
the highest proportion of paved roads in Central America.
t Several major road projects are on the drawing board, but they
have not taken off due to financing constraints in the public
sector and an unfavorable framework for private participation,
which has resulted in a lack of interest by investors.18
t The road network and nationwide transportation infrastructure in general,19 seem to be a binding constraint on growth
and further investment. Existing infrastructure is serving
the interests of large businesses fairly well (especially the
largest ones, such as the sugar mill industry) so that the
business community is generally satisfied with improvements in roads since the 1980s. Nonetheless, substantially
18
This includes two of the so called ìmega-projectsî: the Transversal del Norte (a
highway that would connect key areas in northern Guatemala and which taxpayers have paid for in full more than once, although the road has never been built)
and the Anillo Metropolitano (the outer ring of the transportation system around
Guatemala City).
19
The railway never really took off and a decade-old attempt at privatizing it has
proven to be unsuccessful. A foreign company that had acquired some rail assets is
now suing the government for nonfulfillment of its obligations under the contract,
which in their view has impeded their exploitation of rail assets and compliance
with the company’s obligations stipulated in the contract. The government has
said that the contract was against the public interest and rescinded it. Legal action
is ongoing, with both parties blaming each other for the failure.
expanding investment and economic activity in Guatemala
would require increasing access to more extensive road and
transportation networks.
Ports
t Corruption, lack of security, and low efficiency in port operations are the three top concerns voiced by port users. 20
Security concerns include both the time that freight spends
in port premises as well as during subsequent transportation. This has caused diversion of container traffic away
from Guatemalan ports, for example, as Salvadoran exporters sometimes choose to use Puerto Cortés in Honduras to
avoid Guatemalan territory. Private sector participation in
ports is limited. Puerto Barrios is private, while both Puerto
Quetzal and Santo Tomás de Castilla are managed by state
enterprises. The absence of a clear regulatory and institutional environment is a major barrier to private activity in
ports. It thus appears that port operations may be a binding
constraint on growth and investment in Guatemala.
The infrastructure sector in Guatemala is a clear example
of incomplete liberalization and reform. Whereas telecommunications and electricity boomed following liberalization in the
1990s, roads and seaports remained stuck in the past and failed
20
There are three active ports in Guatemala: Santo Tomás de Castilla and Puerto
Barrios on the Atlantic, and Puerto Quetzal on the Pacific. Freight handled in
Guatemalan ports has been increasing quickly, particularly in Puerto Quetzal
(the largest port in Guatemala by tonnage). However, ports are very specialized
in terms of the types of products which can be handled: containers and crude oil
in Santo Tomás, bananas in Puerto Barrios, and sugar in Puerto Quetzal. Puerto
Quetzal and Santo Tomás de Castilla rank fourth and fifth in Central America,
respectively, after Puerto Limón in Costa Rica, Manzanillo in Panama, and Puerto
Cortés in Honduras. The occupation rates are relatively low in Santo Tomás and
Puerto Barrios (under 50 percent, against 60 –70 percent for equivalent ports
elsewhere), while the occupation rate in Puerto Quetzal exceeds 80 percent.
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254
to live up to their full potential. Progress in the first two subsectors serves to make the underperformance of the latter two more
noticeable.
Although the infrastructure sector is a significant binding
constraint on economy-wide growth and investment, the assertion
needs to be qualified somewhat in view of the earlier discussion.
The infrastructure sector is characterized by successes, vulnerabilities, and failures. The specific pockets of failure and vulnerability that have been identified threaten the sustainability of
the progress made elsewhere in the economy. Thus they should
be treated as binding constraints under the growth diagnostic
methodology.
Incomplete Linkages to the External Sector
Guatemala has made some progress in terms of trade openness, but
progress is poor in comparison with other countries in the region.
The country’s export basket is still too concentrated and the share of
sunset products remains high. The stagnation of export flows since
1990 and the sub-par economic growth record of the past few years
suggest that the potential for trade in the Guatemalan economy has
yet to be fully exploited. Even the dynamic maquila sector, which
relies greatly on imported inputs, has not developed strong linkages
with the rest of the economy.
Exporters in Guatemala complain about the real exchange
rate. Given the nature of the inflows (remittances), however, there is
little room for sustained monetary policy intervention. The growth
in productivity has been too slow to compensate for the lack of competitiveness from the nominal side. Cuevas and Díaz (2007), based
on a time series analysis, suggest that the view that sustained real
exchange rate depreciation could boost exports in the long run is
not supported by the data.
A key challenge for the future is to boost and diversify trade in
order to improve economic growth and alleviate poverty. Growth of
nontraditional agricultural exports has been attributed to policies to
promote diversification, access to long-term financing from public
programs, and investments in infrastructure (irrigation, roads, and
electricity). In this regard, private organizations and trade associations like the Exporters’ Association (AGEXPORT) have played an
important role too.
Open Forest Analysis
On the basis of the open forest measure (Hausmann, Hwang and
Rodrik, 2007; Hausmann and Klinger, 2006), Guatemala appears to
be in a relatively good position compared to other countries in the
region (see Figure 5.5). Possibilities are similar to those of Argentina
and Chile, but below El Salvador. The question, therefore, is why Guatemala is not exploiting these opportunities on a larger scale. 21
Klinger and Lederman (2006) find that Guatemala was very
active from 1997 to 2002 in exporting “new products” (defined as a
product that is new in the export basket, with more than $US1 million in exports). In the analyzed period, Guatemala exported 106 new
products, a number that was very close to that of the top performers
in the world, and better than all countries in the region. 22
In this sense, the actual export basket per se does not seem
to be a binding constraint to growth. The question is why a jump in
total exports has not occurred—especially given that the government has been very active in promoting exports, creating numer-
21
The EXPY measure is not favorable in the case of Guatemala because the
degree of export sophistication is relatively poor: on average, its value is about
US$6,544 at PPP, while Brazil’s is US$9,342, Panama’s is US$ 8,074, and El
Salvador’s is US$7,775. This is related to the fact that in Guatemala commodities
make up a large share of total exports; in 2006, sugar, cafe, oil, and bananas
represented 20 percent of total export value, and textiles (mainly maquilas),
27 percent. In terms of regional diversification, Guatemala’s exports depend
heavily on the United States, representing 51 percent of total exports in the
past five years.
22
Top world performers included Indonesia (119) and Jordan (102). Regional
performers included Bolivia (89), Colombia (74), Ecuador (58), El Salvador (46),
Honduras (59), Panama (51), Nicaragua (55), and Uruguay (63).
255
FIGURE 5.5 Open Forest Analysis
A. Open Forest
B. Export Productivity (EXPY) (current US$)
3,000,000
10,000
9,000
2,500,000
8,000
2,000,000
7,000
1,500,000
6,000
5,000
1,000,000
(*)
3,000
BRA
JAM
PAN
SLV
ARG
COL
TTO
CHL
GTM
ECU
NIC
GUY
500,000
4,000
BRA
SLV
ARG
GTM
CHL
COL
GUY
NIC
PAN
ECU
JAM
TTO
256
(*)
Source: Hausmann and Klinger (2006).
ous free trade zones (F TZs), and establishing a special regime for
maquila enterprises, offering a mix of tax exemptions and other
fiscal incentives. 23
Why then are exports not growing faster? Between 1950 and
2006, exports at constant prices grew at an average rate of 4.5 percent, similar to the 4 percent growth rate of real GDP. The pattern
resembles that of GDP growth; exports grew at a fast rate between
1950 through 1980 (7.1 percent annually), slowed between 1981 and
1986, and started growing again but at a lower rate (4.4 percent
yearly). It thus seems that the same factors that are thwarting real
GDP growth are at work in slowing export growth.
The Role of Service Exports
A drawback of the open forest analysis is that it does not take into
account services, which have considerable potential in Guatemala
(tourism, call centers, business process outsourcing, and medical
23
The Export Promotion and Maquila Law (Law 29–89) applies only to exports
outside the Central American Common Market (CACM), while the Free Trade
Zones Law (Law 65-89) refers to exports produced in special zones.
services). As Cuevas and Bolaños (2007) point out, trade in services
requires rethinking the trade paradigm and the development channels. Trade in services requires and promotes the accumulation of
human capital, and thus complements the country’s poverty reduction
strategy. It facilitates decentralization of socio-economic activities
and helps rebuild the country’s social fabric. Moreover, the production of services is generally clean and does not lead to significant
environmental degradation.
The general conclusion is that international trade in services
has great potential to contribute to the country’s development, but
only if international negotiations are conducted judiciously and
successfully, and if binding constraints arising at home (such as
labor market rigidity, poor education outcomes, and uncertain rule
of law) are also addressed as a part of a comprehensive program for
sustainable development.
The issue is how Guatemala can take advantage of the emerging opportunities. Some weaknesses and potential barriers arise as
a result of: policies, laws, norms, standards, and practices in partner
countries; and internal constraints such as poor human capital, weak
rule of law, lack of quality standards, and the poor image of the country. The government has a lot of room to improve the climate in this
sector, aiming at the removal of barriers such as unduly restrictive
prudential regulations (for example, in the financial sector), licensing
and permits (for example, in the provision of professional services),
discriminatory procurement processes (in the case of public sector
entities in trade partners), tax discrimination (for example, in the
repatriation of profits), restrictions on the entry and presence of
business persons, and unnecessarily restrictive quality standards
and requirements concerning commercial presence.
Adoption of New Technologies
Patenting activity and ISO certification are very limited in Guatemala,
below what can be expected from a country of its size and level of
development. In general, Guatemala’s low capacity to absorb tech-
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258
nology available elsewhere, as well as the lack of innovation in the
economy represents a barrier to growth and investment. Guatemala’s
low level of integration into international trade and low level of FDI
reduces its access to new technology. In addition, the scarcity of appropriate inputs and the lack of incentives to do so creates internal
constraints to the adoption of new technologies.
Guatemala is also characterized by low research & development
(R&D) expenditures and efficiency. Only four of the nine universities
have developed an interest in technology and innovation. Enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in Guatemala remains
weak, mainly due to limited institutional capacity (registering a
trademark takes about one year, while registering a patent takes
three to four). The 2003 ICA undertaken by the World Bank shows
that 26 percent of businesses think that patent/trademark regulation is a problem for business in Guatemala, against 18 percent on
average in Central America.
Factors Lowering the Appropriability of Investment Returns
Following the recursive IRR approach, this study found a reasonably
high social rate of return to investment. However, private investment
is not motivated by social returns but by private ones. Also, private
investors are concerned with returns on investment after risks
have been taken into consideration: that is, private investors look at
risk-adjusted returns. This section analyzes factors that lower the
appropriability of investment returns and make investment relatively
risky, thus lowering overall investment incentives.
Quality of Governance
Guatemala performs poorly on international governance indexes
(ranking 111 out of the 163 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index). Guatemala also has a low ranking on general
property rights indicators (scoring 61.3 in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, with 0 the maximum and 100
the minimum protection of property rights). Guatemala also scores
poorly on the recently created International Property Rights Index
(ranking 68 out of 157 countries).
The World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey (ICS) explores
businesses’ perceptions of the investment climate. Guatemala scores
favorably on several criteria, including the number of inspections
per year and the number of days needed to register a business. The
elimination of red tape is one area where Guatemala compares well
internationally. In addition, the country has made some efforts to
reduce red tape: for example, through the enactment of a Foreign
Investment Law that replaced a variety of instruments that had
regulated foreign investment.
However, businesses still voice many concerns, including corruption, crime, regulatory and policy uncertainty, and macroeconomic
instability (see Table 5.8). Guatemala scores poorly in terms of the
bribe tax (corruption), time tax (regulatory burden), and confidence
in the judiciary and property rights.
TABLE 5.8 Investment Climate from an International Perspective
Labor
Unpredictable
Lack of
Avg. loss Avg. days Skills as regulation
interpretation Avg. bribe confidence from crime to clear
major
as major
of regulations (% of sales) in courts (% of sales) customs constraint constraint
Country Percentage
Brazil
China
Czech Rep.
Ecuador
Guatemala
Honduras
Indonesia
Malaysia
Nicaragua
Peru
Philippines
Russia
66.0
33.7
56.0
68.0
89.5
65.9
56.0
—
66.4
78.7
49.1
75.1
Percentage Percentage Percentage
—
2.6
2.9
5.4
7.4
6.0
4.6
—
7.0
—
4.0
2.3
39.6
17.5
47.1
70.8
71.3
56.1
40.8
19.1
60.4
34.7
33.8
65.3
Source: Investment Climate Assessment survey, World Bank.
— not available
2.8
2.6
3.1
3.5
4.8
3.1
3.1
3.0
7.0
10.2
4.2
2.9
Days
13.8
7.9
4.4
16.4
9.4
5.1
5.8
3.6
5.8
7.9
2.8
6.9
Percentage Percentage
39.6
30.7
9.1
22.3
31.4
26.4
18.9
25.0
17.0
12.5
11.9
9.9
56.9
20.7
3.5
14.1
16.7
14.2
25.9
14.5
6.9
—
24.7
3.3
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260
The indicators of the quality of governance, based on Kaufmann,
Kraay and and Mastruzzi (2005) show that Guatemala performed
worse than other countries with similar levels of GDP per capita
on all of the components except for regulatory quality. Guatemala’s
indicators deteriorated steadily between 1996 and 2005.
Guatemala has no clearly articulated competition policy and
no competition law. The constitution protects freedom of enterprise,
commerce, and labor, and prohibits monopolies and privileges. However, no specific law or regulation has been approved to develop these
principles and there is no institution responsible for the promotion
and protection of competition.
There is widespread skepticism concerning the capacity of the
judicial system to enforce contracts and resolve conflicts. Given the
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the judiciary, larger businesses
opt to use alternative mechanisms to resolve conflicts. However,
due to the relative high cost of alternative mechanisms, small and
medium-sized enterprises are more likely to remain at the mercy of
an inefficient and ineffective judiciary.
Since governance is an area in which Guatemala performs
poorly, an improvement in overall governance would likely have a
large pay-off.
Crime
Guatemala is one of the most violent societies in Latin America. 24
There is a significant concern in Guatemala about the high and
growing level of crime. The internal conflict lasted more than four
decades, with a wide variation in the level of violence over that time.
24
Measuring the economic cost of violence is notoriously difficult and there
are many alternative ways of measuring it. Balsells (2006) estimates that the
economic cost of violence in Guatemala was more than 7 percent of GDP in 2005.
Using a consistent methodology, CIEN (2002) estimated that the cost of violence
in Guatemala approached 7 percent of GDP, compared with 1.4 percent in Peru and
Brazil, 3.6 percent in Mexico, 4.9 percent in El Salvador, 6.4 percent in Colombia,
and 6.6 percent in Venezuela.
Several years after the transition to democracy and the signing of
the Peace Agreement, violence remains at the top of the country’s
agenda. The World Bank’s ICA (2003) indicates that 4 out of 10 entities had been the victim of at least one criminal act in the last year,
with larger firms reporting a higher incidence of crime. The vast
majority of firms surveyed thought that the authorities responsible
for public security were very inefficient.
Organized and street crime are considered to be major obstacles
for business operation. The incidence of homicide is very high, but
such incidents are not distributed homogeneously within the country.
Violence in Guatemala is not exclusively an urban phenomenon, unlike Brazil or Colombia. This might simply reflect the fact that the
country’s level of urbanization is still relatively low. Another issue
is that organized crime is often related to drug-dealing and money
laundering, since Guatemala is known to be a major transshipment
point for drugs. Youth gangs known as maras, which emerged in
Guatemala in the 1980s, are extremely violent and have the capacity to terrorize entire neighborhoods in several urban centers. So
far, there is no promising government strategy to address rampant
crime, violence, money laundering and drug dealing associated
with organized crime, nor is there a strategy aimed at resolving the
socioeconomic factors that lend support to the maras.
Inflexible Labor Market with Scarcity of Skills
Labor markets are inflexible and there are substantial barriers to
market exit (firing costs are twice the Latin America and Caribbean
average, and more than 3 times the OECD average). This biases the
investment mix and drives a wedge between investment returns in
the formal and informal sectors. Not only are firing costs high, but
hiring costs are also twice the regional average. Labor costs are in
line with the regional average, and lower than other countries in the
Central America region (except for Honduras).
The poor enforcement of labor market regulations does not mean
that restrictive regulations do not distort resource allocation and do
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262
not bias investment returns. In fact, the choice of level of formality
by firms and households depends in part on the perception that the
formal labor market is too rigid and distorted.
The demand for skilled labor seems to be higher than in neighboring countries, but since Guatemalan firms have more difficulties
in finding skilled workers than comparable firms in Central America,
the searching and training costs are higher. For instance, a typical
Guatemalan firm takes twice as long as a typical Central American
business to fill a vacancy for production workers and up to 30 percent
longer to find a technician.
To mitigate the scarcity of skilled labor, Guatemalan manufacturing firms are investing more heavily in training than comparable
businesses in neighboring countries. Labor training is in many ways
a substitute for poor formal education.
The Tax Structure
The very low level of tax pressure in Guatemala is preventing the
provision of public goods. More than the tax structure, the binding
constraint in Guatemala is the difficulty that the government has in
collecting taxes. In the Peace Agreement, the government established a goal for a tax burden of 12 percent of GDP (excluding social
security and municipal taxes). To meet this goal, the government
implemented several reforms that initially allowed it to increase tax
revenues. However, since the end of 2002, tax revenues have fallen
(see Figure 5.6). As of 2005, they were 9.6 percent of GDP. Several
decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal and other actors reduced
tax revenues: elimination of the recently created tax on implicit income (impuesto a la renta presunta, IEMA); reduction of the rates
for several specific consumption goods (alcoholic beverages and
gasoline), and modification of income tax rules. 25
25
For more on the tax reforms in Guatemala and their impact, see Auguste and
Artana (2005).
FIGURE 5.6 Tax Revenues as a Percentage GDP, 1960–2004
11
10
As a % of GDP
9
8
7
6
5
4
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Source: Banco de Guatemala. Tax revenues exclude social security contributions.
Expropriation Risk
The threat of expropriation by the government is remote in Guatemala, as the assets held and owned by both national and international
investors are strongly protected by an absolutist interpretation of
property rights in the country’s constitution. However, the framework
for the protection of property rights is often ineffective, inefficient,
and corrupt, and creates an environment that has the same type of
impact on economic decision-making as if the threat of expropriation
by the government was widespread. Moreover, most individuals and
households in rural areas simply do not enjoy ownership rights over
the assets they control—a situation that influences their economic
decisions in ways that do not differ much from an actual threat of
expropriation.
Externalities, Spillovers, or Coordination Failures
According to the 2004 Guatemala ICA, training externalities seem
to be an important limitation, especially for large and medium-sized
firms. The lack of funds for training seems to be an important constraint for micro and small firms.
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264
The low stock of human capital in the economy is one factor
that limits the dissemination of information. In the case of Guatemala, the lack of economy-wide access to information is probably a
greater concern than the exploitation of information externalities
by free riders.
Conclusion
Guatemala faces several constraints to growth, and thus its underperformance relative to other countries is not surprising. Not only is
Guatemala’s recent growth record poor when compared internationally, but it is also poor when compared to its own track record. After
the lost decade of the 1980s, Guatemala has not been able to recover
its pre-1980s average growth rate. From 2002 to 2007 when the world
economy was growing rapidly, Guatemala’s GDP per capita (in PPP)
almost stagnated (annual growth was 0.1 percent). Moreover, annual
per capita GDP growth averaged just 0.87 percent in the last decade.
Several factors underlie Guatemala’s slow economic growth. The
stock of human capital is extremely low when compared to other
economies, even economies at the same income level. Infrastructure
and financial markets are not well developed. Corruption is high and
many areas of the investment climate are not good. Violence and
poverty are ever-present risk factors in Guatemala.
While it is easy to list constraints on growth in Guatemala, it
is considerably more difficult to establish which constraints are the
most binding. Knowing to what extent a constraint is binding helps
in designing an optimal sequencing of policy reforms. In many ways,
the structural break observed before and after the early 1980s is the
key to understanding what the reform priorities should be. Why has
Guatemala been unable to recover its previous growth rate, even after
a series of pro-growth reforms? What changed in Guatemala or the
world? Why have pro-growth reforms failed to deliver substantially
faster economic growth rates?
The main constraint (set at the top of the GDM decision tree)
is a lack of investment opportunities from the perspective of private
investors. Although there are problems in financial markets, these
are not binding on formal investment—and thus on growth. Also, it is
clear that abundant remittances inflows are mostly consumed and are
not invested. Thus private investors are not currently finding many
sufficiently profitable opportunities for investment in Guatemala, so
they either look for investment opportunities elsewhere or choose
to consume their resources immediately. The role of the informal
sector, which has a very low propensity to invest, should also be
taken into consideration as a factor in constraining investment.
This does not happen by accident. The first thing to understand
about Guatemala is that three decades of civil strife have had adverse
effects on human and social capital accumulation. Schooling indicators are very poor, the quality of schooling is even worse, and the
wage premium for educated people is extremely high, showing that
human capital is indeed scarce. The country’s income distribution
is very unequal, poverty is widespread, and the illiteracy rate is the
highest in Latin America. The world economy has changed in the
last 30 years. While countries such as Costa Rica and Chile were accumulating human and social capital, strengthening institutions, and
fighting corruption, Guatemala was in the midst of a civil war. While
other countries in the region were better prepared to take advantage
of a globalized and more competitive world economy, Guatemala’s
economic structure and capital mix remained stuck in the past. As a
result, the Guatemalan economy has been slow in responding to the
process of economic liberalization and reform that followed the transition to democracy in the 1980s and the Peace Agreements in 1997.
Nevertheless, Guatemala has some fundamental advantages
that can help in overcoming binding constraints. First, its geographic
location is very close to the largest economy in the world (the United
States). Guatemala has made important improvements in terms of
global competitiveness and the current export basket suggests that
there are good prospects for increasing the product space and producing higher value-added products. In fact, Guatemala is among
the countries of the world that have discovered more new export
products in the last ten years.
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266
The analysis also suggests that Guatemala needs to improve
governance and strengthen the rule of law, fight corruption, and tackle
violence and organized crime. In other words, it needs to provide
higher quality public goods, which, in turn, would increase private
returns to capital on a risk-adjusted basis, thus boosting economywide investment. But the government is not able to collect enough
resources to provide an adequate level of public goods to complement
private capital. This discourages private capital accumulation. The
meager supply of public goods also reduces incentives to enter the
formal sector, thus enlarging the ranks of the informal sector, which
makes it even more difficult for the government to collect taxes. How
can the government increase the supply of public goods if it cannot
collect enough resources to invest?
Guatemala is now constrained by decades of underinvestment
and political turmoil. Most of the badly needed reforms and investments do not mature in the short run and relatively long waiting
periods are required to see any effects on growth. Unfortunately, it
is hard to improve the business environment and quality of governance with such a poor human capital base—a situation that creates
another vicious cycle.
Guatemala has implemented policies to favor investment in industries intensive in unskilled or semi-skilled labor, the maquilas, but
these steps have not been enough to revitalize the whole economy. The
very high returns to schooling show that the economy is demanding
better-educated people. Could this be a starting point, a first priority
for reform? The challenge remains: how can the government invest
in human capital if its fiscal constraints are severe. It is tempting to
call for more taxes, but this is what Guatemala has tried since 1996
with little success (through a series of Pactos Fiscales). In turn, it
could be claimed that the answer is enforceability (of taxation), but
weak enforcement is a direct result of the quality of government,
which also needs to be improved.
It appears that, even if reforms can be prioritized on lifting the
constraints that hinder economic growth the most, it does not follow
that the optimal reform sequencing is likely to be politically viable.
It is also true that those reforms that are politically viable may be
insufficient to address the fundamental barriers to improving growth
performance in the long run.
The design of an optimal policy mix to accelerate growth and
reduce poverty is not an easy task. More and better education and
infrastructure, better rule of law, and a reduction in crime all demand
a higher budget, and this requires a higher tax burden. However,
since the Peace Agreement, the country has failed to achieve a
sustained improvement in tax revenues.
A strategy to “pick the winners” seems doomed to fail because,
as empirical evidence suggests, better institutions would be necessary for this policy to be successful. With low public revenues,
there is a relatively low potential in Guatemala to support relatively
large-scale investments in “strategic” sectors through tax breaks
or government subsidies.
It follows that those policy reforms that demand little or no
budget effort should be included at the top of the list. In this light,
the following steps are recommended:
t Increasing the tax burden has proven to be a major task in
Guatemala, but the goal should not be abandoned. It would
be presumptuous to make a serious tax proposal following a
methodology focused on economic growth, but tax revenues
would be easier to increase if these additional revenues
came from taxes that are easy to collect. Tax bases should
be enlarged, although eliminating privileges is not an easy
task in any country. Moreover, easy-to-collect taxes such as
value-added taxes (VAT) or excise taxes might be difficult to
implement politically, and they do not help improve income
distribution.
t Expenditure of additional government revenues can be
done in a very progressive way, thus compensating for
the lack of progressivity of the tax structure. Indeed, the
type of investment the government needs to undertake,
such as investment in education and health, typically im-
267
268
proves the income distribution. To implement a reform of
this type successfully, there should be a credible political
compromise to ensure that the additional resources will
indeed be spent on public education and health for the poor
(especially for the indigenous population), better public
infrastructure (that can not be privatized), and better law
enforcement.
t Consensus on fiscal reform will be difficult to achieve if
society perceives that the public sector is corrupt and inefficient. Although new “special” agencies and earmarking
are usually bad ideas for the budget process, they might be
analyzed in Guatemala as a potential vehicle to overcome
the public’s perception that higher tax payments would end
in a “dark hole.”
t The authorities should also focus on reducing the rate of
informality. A first step would be an improvement of the
labor code that introduces more flexibility in formal labor
markets. Efforts to improve human capital and reduce the
educational gap between indigenous and non-indigenous
populations should be strengthened.
t A sound and professional regulation of infrastructure should
be encouraged. Given the lack of resources, involving the
private sector is a way to improve infrastructure. But as
the Guatemalan experience shows, for this strategy to be
successful, it is necessary to first develop the appropriate
institutional framework, which is not so costly in terms of
resources but otherwise very difficult to implement. User
fees that compensate for economic costs charged by private
(or public) companies are even more relevant in a country
where increasing tax revenues is very difficult.
Guatemala is in a vicious cycle. The economy needs more and
better public goods to overcome the binding constraints, but the
government does not have the resources to provide them. On the
other hand, historically poor governance and an absent state do not
encourage the private sector to pay more taxes. The country needs
to break this cycle. Even with low resources, there are many things
than can be done to improve the situation. What the country needs
is the political decision (from the government and the private sector)
to implement the necessary reforms. Unfortunately, this is easier
said than done.
269
270
References
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de la Reforma Fiscal 2004 y de Algunas Propuestas Recientes.”
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Balsells, E. 2006. “El Costo Económico de la Violencia en Guatemala.” Guatemala City, Guatemala: United Nations Development
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Benhabib, J. and Spiegel, M. 2003. “Human Capital and Technology
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Bils, M. and Klenow, P. 2000. “Does Schooling Cause Growth?”
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Bratesberg, B., and Terrel, D. 2002. “School Quality and Returns
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Cuevas, M. and Díaz, J. 2007. “Exports and the Real Exchange Rate
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. 1967. Why Growth Rates Differ. Washington, DC: Brookings
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Hausman, R. and Klinger, B. 2006. “Structural Transformation and
Patterns of Comparative Advantage in the Product Space.”
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Hausmann, R. and Rodrik, D. 2005. “Self-discovery in a Development
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Hendricks, L. 2002. “How Important Is Human Capital for Development? Evidence from Immigrant Earnings.” The American
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Loening, J. 2002 “The Impact of Education on Economic Growth
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Sachs, J. 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our
Time. New York, New York: The Penguin Press.
CHAPTER 6
Growth Diagnostic:
Peru
Ricardo Hausmann and Bailey Klinger*
Peru’s Growth Story
By many measures, times are good in Peru. From 2005 to 2008,
Peru has been among Latin America’s best performing economies in
terms of GDP growth, with low inflation and a stable exchange rate.
Although poverty rates remain high (above 50 percent of the population in 2004, using the national poverty line), they have been slowly
falling. The country has enjoyed robust economic growth since 2002,
and would appear to be in the midst of a growth acceleration.
Yet it is important to put this boom into historical perspective.
Figure 6.1 shows GDP per capita in Peru over the entire twentieth
century. Except for a moderate output collapse and recovery in the
1930s, around the time of the Great Depression, Peru followed a steady
upward trend in output per capita until the mid-1970s, when growth
stopped, and then collapsed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Considering Peru’s long-term growth history, it becomes clear
that the current growth acceleration is actually a recovery from
this growth collapse. Importantly, as of 2005, the country had yet
to return to its historical peak GDP per capita of 30 years before, in
*
Center for International Development, Harvard University. The authors thank
Felipe Kast, Reinier Schliesser, Alfie Ulloa, Rodrigo Wagner, and Andres Zahler
for excellent research assistance.
RICARDO HAUSMANN AND BAILEY KLINGER
FIGURE 6.1 Peru’s Economic Performance, 1890–2004
1990 International GK dollars
4000
GDP per capita
274
3000
2000
1000
0
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Year
Source: Maddison (2007).
Note: Figures are in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars (see Maddison 2007 for greater detail).
spite of the fact that global technology has allowed other countries
to achieve productivity levels that are substantially higher.
This characterization of Peru’s output dynamics is critical for
diagnosing the constraints to future economic growth. The country is
a clear case of a growth collapse. Moreover, this collapse was drawn
out, and recovery has been both slow and as of yet incomplete.
These dynamics allow one to reject many potential explanations for Peru’s growth constraints. For example, neither human
capital nor physical infrastructure suffered a significant shock in
the mid- to late-1970s that could have caused the growth collapse.
In fact, school attainment levels have risen significantly. Moreover,
this was not a period of significant political shocks. The growth
collapse occurred in the context of a transition to democracy, and
the political instability and damage to human and physical capital
caused by the rise of the Shining Path guerilla movement occurred
after this growth collapse.
The growth collapse was accompanied, but not precipitated,
by a balance of payments crisis, an acceleration of inflation, and a
debt crisis. Could such macroeconomic issues explain the slow and
partial recovery from the deep and protracted growth collapse and
GROWTH DIAGNOSTIC: PERU
constitute the current constraint on growth, even if they did not
cause the collapse? Consider an analogy: when a fan belt fails in an
automobile, the collateral damage can include the virtual melting of
the engine. In this case, the fan belt may be the cause of the car’s collapse, but a new fan belt will no longer cure the problem, as damage
has spread to other aspects of the automobile. Similarly, although
Peru’s growth collapse may have been caused by something else
which then led to macroeconomic instability, such instability could
very well be the current binding constraint, even though it was not
the original cause of the growth collapse.
But for Peru, this is clearly not the case. Peru has now gone
through more than a decade of macroeconomic stability, fiscal
consolidation, and external creditworthiness that represents
a substantial improvement vis-à-vis the situation 30 years ago
when GDP per capita peaked. If macroeconomic instability was
the binding constraint on growth, then a prolonged period of
dramatic improvements in this area should have allowed a full
recovery. After all, there is ample evidence that recoveries from
macroeconomic crises tend to be relatively rapid (Calvo, Izquierdo
and Talvi, 2006).
In addition, the country now has more education, more physical
infrastructure, and more political stability than in the late-1970s and
has still to see a full recovery. As will be argued in greater detail
in a later section, these are not convincing constraints to economic
growth in Peru.
A much more convincing explanation can be found in a careful examination of Peru’s export dynamics. Figure 6.2 shows the
evolution of exports per capita on the x-axis and GDP per capita on
the y-axis. This figure shows two significant export collapses, the
first starting after 1979 and the second after 1984. These export
collapses preceded the two periods of sharp output decline. Peru’s
post-1980 woes were brought about by an export collapse, which
then led to balance of payments problems and financial crises, later
accompanied by political turmoil, violence, and destruction of the
capital base.
275
FIGURE 6.2 The Evolution of Output and Exports Per Capita
GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$, log)
276
1981
1982
1974
1977
1978
19732003
1972
1971 1997
2002
1970
2000
1967
1985
1998
19992001 1984
1966
1996
1995
1969
1968
1983
1965
1964
1994
1963
1962
1989
1961
1975
1987
3.70
1986
1988
3.65
3.60
3.55
1993 1991
1990
1992
5.2
1980
1976
2004
1979
1960
5.4
5.6
5.8
6.0
6.2
Exports per capita (in constant 2000 US$, log)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
This export collapse was quite significant. From 1979 to 1983,
exports per capita fell by 40 percent, and from 1979 to 1993, by over
80 percent. In 1985, the government attempted to recover output
through an expansion of domestic demand. However, this was accompanied by falling exports and the situation became externally
unsustainable in 1987, which lead to a very large collapse in output
during the following three years.
What caused this export collapse? It was first and foremost a
terms of trade shock. Exogenous shocks to international prices in
Peru’s primary export sectors, notably mining and plantation agriculture, caused a steep decline in export incomes after 1980, which
then led to an output collapse and significant collateral damage to
the political and financial systems. Figure 6.3, which depicts the
evolution of Peru’s terms of trade, shows the dramatic collapse in
the terms of trade of Peru after the East Asian crisis, which corresponds to an “interruption” of Peru’s recovery from the deep growth
collapse two decades earlier.
It is clear that output dynamics in Peru are closely linked to the
export sector. Moreover, a significant cause of the export collapse
was the terms of trade shocks the country suffered in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Since the early 1990s, the macroeconomic, finan-
FIGURE 6.3 Terms of Trade, 1980–2007
(logs)
2.4
2.2
2.0
NBTT WDI
NBTT EIU
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1.8
Source: WDI and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).
NBTT – net barter terms of trade
cial, and political situations, which were somewhat chaotic after the
export collapse, have improved significantly. Moreover, since 2004,
the terms of trade have recovered to levels not seen since the early
1980s. Yet Peru is barely back to its historical levels of output per
capita, and relative to the rest of the world, it is well below its position
in the late 1970s. True, the terms of trade are not back to the levels
of the late 1970s, but over the course of almost three decades the
country could have moved to other more attractive products.
This study finds that in the face of a terms of trade shock, there
was no structural transformation in Peru, despite decades where
relative prices, in terms of a much more depreciated real exchange
rate and lower prices for traditional exports, favored the movement
to new export sectors. The country was not able to discover new
export activities to compensate for those that faced international
headwinds. Instead, Peru simply sat in a collapse until international
prices in mining and fuels improved.
This can be seen clearly in the composition of the export basket and how it changed during this growth collapse and recovery.
Figure 6.4 examines two periods: 1979 to 1993 (collapse) and 1993
to 2005 (recovery).
277
278
FIGURE 6.4 The Export Collapse and Recovery, 1979–2005
CHL
A. Decomposing the Export Collapse, 1979–93
Metal goods 0.5%
Non-metal mining 1.8%
Chemicals 1.9%
Textiles 5.1%
Non-traditional fish 2.1%
Non-traditional agriculture 0.2%
Machinery and equipment 2.1%
Other 5.0%
Traditional fish 2.6%
Traditional agriculture 12.2%
Hydrocarbons 23.4%
Mining 43.1%
– 1979 Exports per capita (real $): 522
– 1993 Exports per capita (real $) 176
– Fall in exports per capita: $346
– 81% of the fall was due to traditional products
B. Decomposing the Export Recovery 1993–2005
Metal goods 1.6%
Non-metal mining 0.7%
Chemicals 3.6%
Textiles 6.4%
Non-traditional fish 0.8%
Non-traditional agriculture 6.1%
Machinery and equipment 1.0%
Other 0.8%
Traditional fish 3.0%
Traditional agriculture 1.7%
Hydrocarbons 10.6%
Mining 63.6%
– 1993 Exports per capita (real $): 176
– 2005 Exports per capita (real $) 547
– Increase in exports per capita: $346
– 78% of the recovery was also due to traditional products
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (BCRP) and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica (INEI), Peru.
These figures show that traditional agriculture, hydrocarbon
products, and mining were the export sectors that collapsed to the
greatest degree. If Peru underwent structural transformation in
response to the collapse in its key export sectors, different sectors
would be expected to fuel the recovery. But the sectors that led
the recovery in Peruvian exports between 1993 and 2005 were the
hydrocarbons and mining sectors, followed by traditional agricul-
ture. These are the very same sectors that collapsed in the 1970s
and 1980s! Peru underwent very little structural transformation in
response to its export collapse.
Figure 6.5 shows exports by sector in 2005 as a percentage of
exports in 1979. Of Peru’s previously dominant sectors, traditional
agriculture did not recover from the export collapse, and the hydrocarbons sector has not completely recovered (although it should do
so upon the completion of the Camisea natural gas project). Fishing
and mining have now completely recovered their previous levels.
There was no reorientation of productive capacities during this
recovery with one exception: the emergence of the nontraditional
agriculture sector, which is more than three times as large in 2005
as it was in 1979 (in per capita terms). However, Figure 6.4 shows
that the nontraditional agriculture sector was of minor importance
in the export recovery post-1993, contributing only 6.1 percent of
the export growth. In terms of the overall export basket in 2005,
nontraditional agriculture amounts to only 5.8 percent. Although
a positive development, it is a small portion of the overall export
FIGURE 6.5 Exports Per Capita by Sector, 2005 as a Percent of Exports in 1979
300
0
Source: BCRP and INEI.
Traditional fish
Non-metal mining
Hydrocarbons
Traditional agriculture
20
Other
40
Machinery & equipment
60
Non-traditional fish
80
Textiles
100
Metal goods
120
Mining
140
Chemicals
160
Non-traditional agriculture
180
279
package, which remains concentrated in those sectors that collapsed
during the 1980s.
This discovery of nontraditional agriculture was not nearly
enough to affect the macro numbers. Compare this to the cases of
Mexico or Indonesia, where a slew of new sectors were discovered
that more than offset the negative effects of the decline in oil prices.
Peru’s dominant export sectors continue to be mining and hydrocarbons, which as of 2005 represented over two-thirds of exports,
despite the incentives for discovery created by the terms of trade
shock and the subsequent real depreciation.
A lack of new export sectors appearing in Peru’s aggregate
production function is a key drag to growth. But what constraints
are to blame? This study argues that this is in part due to the nature
of Peru’s specialization. First, consider the country’s export sophistication, which has been shown elsewhere as a key driver of growth
(Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2006). This is measured simply as
the GDP per capita of countries with a similar export package, called
EXPY. Figure 6.6 shows actual income levels and the sophistication
of the export basket (EXPY) for a cross-section of countries.
Given its level of income, Peru is specialized in an unsophisticated export basket. Moreover, since 1975, the process of “upgrad-
FIGURE 6.6 Relationship between Per Capita GDP and EXPY, 2003
10
LUX
IRL
log EXPY (2003)
280
MEX
SVK PRT
EST
HRY BRB GRC
LTU
ARG
COL GRD TTO
NGA MDA
SYR ALB
CIVSEN
PAN
BHR
ECU
PER BLZ
TGO CMR
NIC
KGZ
HND
GUY DMA
KEN
MNG
MWI MDG
UGA SDN PNG
TZA
RWA
9.5
IND
9
8.5
8
ETH
6
ARM
CHN
PHL
BIH THA
TUR
AUS
NOR
NER
7
8
9
log GDP per capita (2003, PPP)
Source: Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006).
10
11
ing” the export package and moving to newer, more sophisticated
products has lagged in Peru. Peru began 1975 with the same level of
export sophistication as Brazil, and almost a 50 percent higher value
of EXPY than Colombia, but has since fallen behind both of those
countries. Consistent with the evidence that Peru did not adjust its
export basket in response to changes in relative prices, it has been
largely stuck in an unsophisticated export package since 1975 that
will not drive future growth.
Why has Peru been unable to discover a sophisticated export
basket that could fuel future growth? Hausmann and Klinger (2006)
investigate the determinants of the evolution of the level of sophistication of a country’s exports, and find that this process is easier
when moving to “nearby” products. This is based on the idea that
every product involves highly specific inputs such as knowledge,
physical assets, intermediate inputs, labor training requirements,
infrastructure needs, property rights, regulatory requirements, or
other public goods. Established industries somehow have sorted out
the many potential failures involved in assuring the presence of all of
these inputs, which are then available to subsequent entrants in the
industry. But firms that venture into new products will find it much
harder to secure the requisite inputs. For example, they will not find
workers with experience in the product in question or suppliers who
regularly furnish that industry. Specific infrastructure needs such
as cold storage transportation systems may not exist, regulatory
services such as product approval and phyto-sanitary permits may
be underprovided, research and development capabilities related to
that industry may not be there, and so on.
Those firms moving to new activities will therefore have to adapt
to whatever capabilities exist. This study finds evidence supporting the view that the assets and capabilities needed to produce one
good are imperfect substitutes for those needed to produce another
good, but this degree of asset specificity will vary. The probability
that a country will develop the capability to be good at producing
a particular new good is therefore related to its installed capability
in the production of other similar, or nearby, goods for which the
281
282
currently existing productive capabilities can be easily adapted. The
barriers preventing the emergence of new export activities are less
binding for nearby products that require only slight adaptations of
existing capacity.
This is found by developing a measure of “near” using the
probability of exporting both with comparative products, calculated
using international data. These distances condition the process of
discovery.
It is possible to visualize these distances by drawing a map of the
international product space, which is shown in Figure 6.7. Each node
is a product, its size determined by its share of world trade (Feenstra
et al., 2005). In these graphs, “nearness” is shown by color-coding
the linkages between pairs of products. A light-blue link indicates
a proximity of under 0.4, a beige link a proximity between 0.4 and
0.55, a dark-blue link a proximity between 0.55 and 0.65, and a red
link a proximity greater than 0.65. Links below 0.55 are only shown
if they make up the maximum spanning tree, and the products are
color-coded based on their Leamer (1984) commodity group.
Figure 6.7 makes clear that the product space is highly heterogeneous. There are peripheral products that are only weakly
connected to other products. There are some groupings among
these peripheral goods, such as hydrocarbons products (the large
red nodes on the left side of the network), seafood products (below
hydrocarbons products), garments (the very dense cluster at the
bottom of the network), and raw materials (the upper left to upper
periphery). Furthermore, there is a core of closely connected products in the center of the network, mainly of machinery and other
capital intensive goods.
This heterogeneous structure of the product space has important implications for structural transformation. If a country is
producing goods in a dense part of the product space, then the
process of structural transformation is much easier because the
set of acquired capabilities can be easily redeployed to other nearby
products. However, if a country is specialized in peripheral products,
then this redeployment is more challenging, as there is not a set of
FIGURE 6.7 A Visual Representation of the Product Space
Not Classified
Petroleum
Raw Materials
Forest Products
Tropical Agriculture
Animal Products
Cereals
Labor Intensive
Capital Intensive
Machinery
Chemical
Source: Hidalgo et. al. (2007)
products requiring similar capabilities. The process of structural
transformation can be impeded due to a country’s orientation in
this space.
Figure 6.8 shows Peru’s evolution in this product space, where
a black square on top of a product indicates that it is exported with
comparative advantage.
These figures show that Peru’s exports are highly peripheral.
More importantly, as seen in the export data examined above, there
was little very little change in the deployment of Peru’s productive
capabilities in the product space between 1975 and 2000, a period
that saw a huge export collapse and recovery. Compare this to Malaysia, which has moved significantly and purposively through the
product space in the same period (Figure 6.9).
As can be seen in the figures for both Peru and Malaysia, black
squares tend to emerge closer to other black squares, meaning
283
284
FIGURE 6.8 Peru’s Evolution in the Product Space, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2000
A. Peru 1975
B. Peru 1985
FIGURE 6.8 Peru’s Evolution in the Product Space, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2000
(continued)
C. Peru 1995
D. Peru 2000
Source: Authors’ calculations using UN COMTRADE.
285
286
FIGURE 6.9 Malaysia’s Evolution in the Product Space, 1975 and 2000
A. Malaysia, 1975
B. Malaysia, 2000
structural transformation favors nearby products. This fact is shown
econometrically in Hausmann and Klinger (2007), and it implies
that Peru’s opportunities for structural transformation after its main
exports suffered headwinds in the late 1970s and early 1980s and
were limited to what was nearby.
The country-level measure of how many attractive products
are near the existing export package is called the open forest. The
open forest is highly significant in determining the future growth
of export sophistication (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006). Countries
with a high level of open forest enjoy faster subsequent growth
in export sophistication and overall economic growth. Moreover,
Hausmann, Rodriguez and Wagner (2006) show that countries with
a higher level of open forest experience shorter growth collapses:
they are able to redeploy their productive capabilities to new export
activities more quickly and easily. This is critical, as Peru is a clear
case of a growth collapse with little structural transformation in
response.
Figure 6.10 shows the open forest on the y-axis against the
log of GDP on the x-axis, in 1980. Around the time Peru suffered its
export collapse, it had a lower value of open forest. This figure sug-
FIGURE 6.10 GDP Per Capita vs. Open Forest, 1980
2500000
Open forest (units)
2000000
KOR
CHN
1500000
MEX
BRA
IND
THA
1000000
PAK
KEN
500000
0
6
7
8
GBR
JPN
ITA
SWE
AUT
CAN USA
NLD
HKG
FIN
HUN
PRT
DNK
BGR
ARG
ZAF
PHL
TUR
GTM
HTI
SLV
PER
COL
MAR DOMCHL
MYS
SEN LKA
MOZ
SYR
ZWE
MWI BFA
EGY
BOL
ECU
IDN
BGD
MDG
NPL
SDN
CIV
MLI
CMR
ZMB
RWA
BDI
GHA
NGA NER
ESP
GRC
NOR
AUS
IRNDZA VEN
9
10
287
FIGURE 6.11 Open Forest vs. GDP Per Capita, 2000
2500000
POL
CZE
ESP ITA
AUT
DEU
GBR
NLD USA
SVK
HUN
TUR
SWEDNK
PRT
BRA
GRC
CAN
JPN
THA HRV
ROM
KOR
IDN
FIN
ZAF ARG
MEX
ISR HKG
AUS
COL
EGY
RUS
PER
SGP
MDA
JOR
CHL
MYS
LBN
MAR
NOR
PAK
LKAPHL
KGZGEO ZWE
DOM
PRY
KAZ
BLR
BOL ECUGTM
KEN
MOZ
VEN
AZE
TZA
MDG
NPLBGD GHA HND
SLV
NIC
SLE
MLI
CIV
TJK BFA
SEN
SYR
HTI
ZMBBEN
IRN
TKM
ETH
MWI
UGA SDN PNG
GIN
DZA
NERNGA RWA TGOCMR
BDI
2000000
Open forest (units)
288
IND
1500000
1000000
500000
0
6
7
CHN
UKR
8
9
10
11
gests that Peru did not have a very valuable option set for structural
transformation when it suffered its export shock, and—consistent
with the findings of Hausmann, Rodriguez and Wagner (2006)—this
led to a protracted growth collapse.
What about the role of coordination failures today? Figure 6.11
shows the equivalent plot for 2000.
Peru’s open forest improved between 1980 and 2000. Although
in terms of export sophistication (EXPY), Peru has fallen behind,
in terms of opportunities for future structural transformation (open
forest), relative performance is not as bad. This suggests that there
are more nearby export sectors today that the country could move
toward, even though it has yet to do so. Nevertheless, Peru’s option
set for future structural transformation remains below that of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and even Colombia.
For the purposes of deriving policy implications, it is useful
to examine what sectors make up that set of attractive nearby opportunities. Table 6.1 provides the main contributors to Peru’s open
forest as of 2004. These are the existing sectors in Peru that have
the largest number of unexploited sectors nearby, to which Peru
could conceivably move.
TABLE 6.1 Top Contributors to Open Forest, 2004
Product code
Product name
Contribution (US$)
Exports (M)
(US$ millions)
7228
Other bars and rods of alloy steel
32,408
23
307
306
713
511
305
Molluscs & aquatic invertebrates
Crustaceans, fresh, chilled or frozen
Dried leguminous vegetables, shelle
Animal products, nes
Fish, salted, dried...; smoked fish
29,532
27,000
24,907
23,178
22,176
123
26
15
6
6
2835
Phosphinates, phosphonates
20,822
9
304
712
711
703
Fish fillets and other fish meat
Dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced
Vegetables provisionally preserved,
Onions, shallots, garlic, leeks...etc.
18,093
17,524
17,315
15,947
48
14
10
14
9608
2833
Ball point, felt, porous-tipped pens,
Sulphates; alums; peroxosulphates
14,998
13,530
7
7
811
801
710
901
Fruit and nuts, frozen
Coconuts, Brazil nuts and cashew nut
Vegetables, frozen
Coffee; coffee husks and skins
13,514
13,050
13,017
12,017
5
10
22
290
As highlighted by the rectangles, the top contributors to open
forest are almost all concentrated in seafood, fruits and vegetables,
and processed food products. Most of these products are in the
nontraditional agriculture sector, which was the new contributor
to the export recovery in the 1990s. This evidence suggests that
unexploited opportunities remain in this sector, which continues to
represent a small proportion of overall exports.
However, one potential difficulty is that many of the activities
in this sector are intensive in rural employment, whereas a large and
increasing share of Peruvians live in urban zones. According to the
World Bank World Development Indicators, well over 50 percent of
the population lived in rural areas in 1960, but today that number
is nearing 25 percent.
Not only are these “higher-potential” new sectors a mismatch
with Peru’s labor market, but the existing export sectors are, as
289
290
well. Mining, which is leading the export recovery, is extremely
unintensive in labor. Even though mining contributes 60 percent of
exports, it represents less than one-half of one percent of (direct)
employment. Furthermore, while mining exports skyrocketed
from 1991 to 2000, employment in the mining sector as a share of
the working age population actually decreased from 0.7 percent
in 1991 to 0.4 percent in 2000 (Encuestas Nacionales de Niveles
de Vida).
Even compared to mining-focused Chile, Peru’s export basket
is particularly unintensive in labor. Figure 6.12 shows the labor intensity of exports, constructed using labor shares from the United
States input-output table by product, weighted by their share in
overall exports. Peru’s export basket is less intensive in labor than
Thailand’s and Brazil’s, but also less intensive than Chile’s, whose
export composition is dominated by copper, but compensated for by
other, more labor-intensive sectors.
These dominant export sectors in Peru’s economy generate
little employment. This is important because unlike nontradable
sectors, export sectors are highly scaleable. At international prices,
demand is almost infinite from the point of view of Peru, meaning
FIGURE 6.12 Labor Intensity of the Export Basket, 2005
0.16
0.15
0.14
0.13
0.12
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.08
Uruguay
Peru
Chile
Thailand
Brazil
Source: UN COMTRADE and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Labor’s share in total value added taken from the 1997 United States input-output table, as this is the most disaggregated source by
product (241 NAICS sectors). This is translated to SITC revision 2 coding system, giving a labor share value for each export. Country values
are taken as the export-share weighted value of these intensities, for the 2005 export basket.
that if the sector is moderately labor-intensive, it could contribute
significantly to employment generation.
Instead, mining is highly capital-intensive. Moreover, much
of this capital is in the form of foreign investment, and, therefore,
the returns accrue to foreign owners of that capital. This can be observed in the differences in growth rates of gross domestic product
(GDP) and gross national income (GNI). Since 2001, the growth
rate of overall GDP has been much faster than GNI. As such, this
gap in growth rates has been increasing, and as of 2005 was well
over 100 basis points, indicating a larger share of domestic product
is accruing to foreigners.
The social impact of the current growth spurt has been muted
because the leading sectors have been capital-intensive. This can
be seen by looking at the evolution of GDP per capita in comparison
with consumption per capita or the real wage bill per capita (from
national accounts). Figure 6.13 shows index numbers for the three
series (2001=100). Consumption has grown more slowly than aggregate output. Wages have grown at an even slower pace, and actually
declined between 2004 and 2005, at the same time that economic
growth was accelerating.
To summarize, this analysis reveals three key findings related to structural transformation. First, the lack of new export
FIGURE 6.13 Economic Performance in Peru, 2001–5
120
115
GDP per capita
Consumption per capita
Wages per capita
110
105
100
95
2001
Source: BCRP.
2002
2003
2004
2005
291
292
activities appearing in Peru’s export basket is due in no small
part to the nature of Peru’s specialization. When the country’s
main exports faced international price shocks, there were few
nearby goods to move to, and consequently the country suffered a
growth collapse. Second, unlike in the 1980s, Peru is in a slightly
better position today to discover new export activities, with new
export sectors nearby. However, these nearby opportunities are
concentrated in certain sectors that use more rural labor in an
increasingly urbanized country, and the existing export activities require very little labor and are intensive in foreign capital.
Structural transformation in the direction of new sectors intensive
in urban labor will require longer jumps, which are difficult to
achieve. The final section on policy implications provides some
guidance in this regard.
In addition to the lack of new goods appearing in Peru’s production function, which appears to be the most significant constraint to
growth, some constraints on the aggregate production function that
restrict the expansion of existing sectors can be identified: namely,
uncertainty due to Peru’s history of appropriation in the natural
resource sector.
A symptom of this constraint is the muted supply response to
the recent improvement in the terms of trade. Figure 6.14 shows
recent overall export growth and the component of that growth that
is through an increase in quantities, first from 1993 to 1997, then
from 2001 to 2005. Very little of the current growth in exports is
from increased production.
More revealing, Manzano and Winkleried (2006) show that
Peru lost market share in the main export products that were hit by
adverse prices. If the export collapse was purely due to a deterioration in the terms of trade, earnings should fall but market share
should remain constant. In fact, given that Peru was in such a poor
position to move to any alternative export goods, and failed to do
so, its market share, in theory, should have increased as other more
nimble countries moved to new export activities in response to the
change in relative prices. What actually happened was that Peru lost
FIGURE 6.14 Overall Export Growth (left) Decomposed into Quantity Changes (right)
180.0%
160.0%
Total export growth
Quantity effect
140.0%
120.0%
100.0%
80.0%
60.0%
40.0%
20.0%
0.0%
1993–1997
2001–2005
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics (IFS).
market share, indicating that it was not only an exogenous shock
that brought exports down.
Instead, a history of expropriation seems to precede these collapses. For example, in the agriculture sector, the agrarian reform
of 1969, which by 1975 affected nearly all plantations, preceded
the cotton and sugar collapse in the early 1980s. Fishing collapsed
in 1972 for environmental reasons, but Peru nationalized the industry and went on to create PescaPeru in 1973 and then had to
abandon it in 1976 as it was never able to return to previous levels of
production. In the mining sector, the government began revoking
concessions in the 1970s, and created Minero Peru. In 1973, the
government completely nationalized the mining complex in Cerro
de Pasco. Due to the development of the Cuajone mine in 1976, a
decline in production was not immediate, but by the 1980s, copper
and silver mining collapsed. The Marcona mining company, which
exported iron ore, was expropriated in 1975. Iron ore production
declined until its complete collapse in 1990. The same cycle can be
observed in the hydrocarbons sector. First came the nationalization
of the hydrocarbons sector and the creation of PetroPeru in 1968,
which expanded significantly in the 1970s, thanks to the opening
of the northern pipeline. But after 1980, hydrocarbons production
fell significantly.
293
294
Nationalizations left a property rights regime that made
it essentially impossible for international investors to invest in
exploration or production in the mining or energy sectors in response to the export collapse in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover,
potential investors in other sectors were aware of this history of
expropriation. Hence, investment in these sectors did not recover
until the government improved the property rights regime and
adopted generous levels of taxation and guarantees of tax stability
for foreign investors.
The difficulty is that these concessions do not recover much
of the natural rent that the government could receive from natural
resource exports, limiting the impact of these activities on national
income and the social benefit that could potentially be derived from
it. This in turn limits the long-term political sustainability of such
concessions, as could be seen in the most recent electoral cycle,
where natural resource rents were a key area of contention. The
perceived low sustainability of generous concessions increases the
long-term risk of appropriation facing foreign investors, who then
demand more attractive concessions to invest in so that they can
be sure to recoup their investment before they are expropriated.
This creates a vicious cycle that is difficult to break, and is a key
constraint in the natural resource sector of the economy, particularly mining and hydrocarbons. Another piece of supporting evidence is that the only new activities to emerge (the nontraditional
export sector) are in areas not affected by the agrarian reform and
in smaller landholdings, which are not as sensitive to large-scale
expropriation.
Nevertheless, in many other potential export activities, there
is little history of expropriation. Moreover, as discussed below, Peru
fares quite well in terms of investor confidence and governance
indicators. Therefore, this study finds this constraint to be second
order, and the principal binding constraint on growth to be the lack
of structural transformation and few nearby urban labor-intensive
export sectors.
Incompatible Constraints
This section explores other potential obstacles to growth. Few arguments are found to support the argument that inadequate access to
savings has been a major constraint to growth in Peru in the recent
past, as investment has been unresponsive to the greater availability
of finance. There is little evidence that inadequate human capital is
an obstacle, as the levels of education have increased very rapidly
and the returns to schooling have remained relatively low and stable
in spite of the recovery in growth.
Other potential binding constraints are explored and are found
to be less relevant to the current situation of Peru. Ideally, one would
want to show that changes in the binding constraint have large effects on growth. This is found in the dynamics around the export
sector, but is not found in aspects such as labor regulation, taxation,
macroeconomic stability, and crime (post Sendero Luminoso).
Bad Finance
As noted, problems with external balance, government debt, inflation, and the financial system happened after the export-led growth
collapse. Over the past 15 years, the current account has been narrowing, the level of debt to GDP has fallen, and the cost of capital
has declined. This suggests that access to savings has not been a
binding constraint since 2000, as the country has had more access
to finance than it has been willing to use.
Moreover, the country is not facing expensive foreign finance
due to a high risk of default. The country’s debt trades as if it were
investment grade, and it is not far from formally achieving this status.
The Economist Intelligence Unit risk score for its sovereign debt
is well below other Latin American countries such as Argentina,
Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela, and is second only to Chile and
Mexico.
But most importantly, investment is not sensitive to the interest
rate. Figure 6.15 shows investment on the x-axis and the lending
295
FIGURE 6.15 Peru’s Interest Rate vs. Investment, 1997–2007
1999
30
Lending interest rate (%)
296
1998
1997
2000
25
20
2001
15
2002
2003 2004
16
18
2005
2007
2006
20
22
24
Gross fixed investment (% of GDP)
Source: EIU.
interest rate on the y-axis. From 1997 to 2004, the interest rate fell,
and at the same time investment fell. This indicates that it was not
the cost of finance that brought down the investment rate, but rather
the low level of expected returns. Then from 2004 to 2007, investment rose significantly, with scant movement in interest rates. This
suggests that something other than the cost of finance is limiting
investment. Changes to the binding constraint should lead to large
changes in growth, as the binding constraint should have a large
Lagrangian multiplier. But here the opposite is seen, suggesting
that although the current government’s desire to achieve investment grade is not a bad idea, it is not targeting a binding constraint,
and therefore will not have much of a growth impact. In fact, the
difference between the cost of capital in Peru and investment-grade
Mexico is now barely 20 basis points (EMBI differential, BCRP,
June 2007), which is miniscule relative to the changes in interest
rates already seen.
In Peru, a lack of aggregate finance is clearly not the problem.
Investment is low despite good access to external finance, a low current account deficit, and little responsiveness of lending to interest
rate changes. This is consistent with the detailed analysis in Braun
and Serra (2006), who find that the bulk of recent GDP performance
is not explained by financial development. Therefore, this side of
the decision tree can be abandoned and the discussion can move
on to low returns.
Labor and Business Regulations
The evidence in this area of the decision tree is mixed. Figure 6.16
shows that the cost of labor in Peru is high, given productivity levels.
Unit labor costs are at the same levels of those in Malaysia, Portugal,
and even Singapore, but productivity is much lower.
Also telling are the rates of informality in Peru. During the
export and output recovery in the 1990s, the share of dependent
workers (as opposed to the self-employed or employers) without
social security rose from 48 percent to 57 percent of the working
age population from 1991 to 2000. Meanwhile, in the same period,
the percentage of those with social security fell, from 14.7 percent
to 10.4 (Encuestas Nacionales de Niveles de Vida).
Yet Peru’s EIU rating for “restrictiveness of labor laws” is very
good: 3 out of 5, with 5 being the least restrictive. The Philippines
is the only country in the world with a similar GDP per capita but a
better rating (4), and Peru’s rating is much better than that of China
Overall unit labor costs level (index, US=100)
FIGURE 6.16 Labor Costs vs. Labor Productivity
150
Denmark
Switzerland
South Korea
Japan Sweden
Norway
Germany
Belgium
United
Kingdom France Netherlands
New Zealand
Finland
Ireland
Canada
Spain Australia
Singapore AustriaUnited States
Malaysia
Portugal
Peru
Italy
Brazil
Israel
Colombia
Czech Republic
Taiwan
Kazakhstan
Slovakia
Romania
Venezuela
Hong Kong Greece
China
Chile Poland Hungary
Ukraine Russia
Philippines
Mexico
Thailand
Ecuador
Argentina
Bulgaria
Indonesia
100
50
0
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
Overall productivity of labor (GDP at PPP, per worker, US$)
Source: EIU.
80,000
100,000
297
298
and India (1). Other available metrics of labor market inflexibilities,
drawn from Heckman and Pages (2003), show that required social
security contributions as a percentage of wages in Peru are average.
At just over 20 percent, they are higher than the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela, on par with Chile and Mexico, but well below those
in Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Bolivia.
Dismissal costs in this dataset are quite low.
On the whole, there is some evidence that this constraint is
binding. In particular, it may affect activities that are exposed to
international competition, and hence disproportionately affect the
sectors that are required for structural transformation to take place.
The fact that manufacturing activities have not become internationally competitive, in spite of a rising urban population with improved
educational attainment—a population that is currently employed
in low productivity activities in the informal sector—points to the
possibility that the current labor code is particularly constraining
for this sector.
Crime and Corruption
Crime levels in Peru do not seem particularly high at present given
the level of income per capita. The presence of Sendero Luminoso
in the 1980s and early 1990s must have helped explain the poor
output performance in that period, but much of the pay-off from
the increase in security was probably already reaped in the 1990s.
In the area of corruption, plenty of countries have similar or worse
indicators, including Mexico and Argentina, which are significantly
better-off than Peru.
Moreover, investors do not seem to find corruption a problem, as
evidenced in the World Bank Investment Climate Assessment (ICA),
as well as the World Bank (Kaufman) governance indicators.
Finally, both the timing and the severity of the collapse and
recovery of exports and output are not consistent with a story of
crime and corruption. Appropriability concerns due to crime and
corruption do not seem to be important in the case of Peru.
FIGURE 6.17 Perceptions of Crime, Corruption, and the Courts
A. Perceptions of Crime, Theft, and Disorder
Guatemala (2003)
Honduras (2003)
Brazil (2003)
Peru (2002)
El Salvador (2003)
Nicaragua (2003)
Ecuador (2003)
China (2003)
0
20
40
60
% of managers citing as major or sever obstacle
80
100
80
100
Source: ICA, 2002.
B. Perceptions of Government Corruption
Guatemala
Brazil
Nicaragua
Honduras
Peru
Ecuador
China
0
20
40
60
% of managers citing government corruption
Source: WDI, 2002 –3.
C. Lack of Confidence in the Courts
Guatemala
Ecuador
Nicaragua
Honduras
Brazil
Peru
China
0
20
40
60
% of managers lacking confidence in courts to uphold property rights
Source: WDI, 2002 –3.
Source: Cubillos, Hazlitt and Lopez-Silva (2005).
80
299
300
Taxes
Informality in the labor force could be due to labor market restrictions, but also to other regulatory burdens, one of which is taxes.
However, Peruvian tax rates are simple, stable, and not high by international standards. There is only one VAT tax rate, compared to
three in Argentina and two in Uruguay, which at 19 percent is also
lower than those two countries (Cubillos, Hazlitt and Lopez-Silva
2005). Corporate income is taxed at 27 percent, which is higher than
Chile (16.5 percent) and Bolivia (25 percent), but lower than Colombia
(38.5 percent), Costa Rica (36 percent), Uruguay and Argentina (35
percent), and Mexico and Brazil (34 percent) (Cubillos, Hazlitt and
Lopez-Silva 2005). These figures make it hard to argue that Peru is
a high-tax environment.
The constraint may not be the current tax rate, but perceived
risks of this tax rate changing in the future. However, the EIU measure
of tax policy risk is lower for Peru than for Brazil, India, Turkey, the
Ukraine, Indonesia, Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, and
Argentina. Mexico and Chile are the only countries with a lower risk
rate (EIU), suggesting that appropriability concerns due to taxes
are not a binding constraint on growth in Peru.
Macroeconomic Risks
Macroeconomic volatility has been quite low, particularly since
2000. Moreover, while perceptions of political risk rose in the 1990s
with the events leading to the closure of parliament in 1992 and the
resignation of Alberto Fujimori in 2002, so did foreign investment
and overall investment. This is a signal that such changes were not
perceived as threatening to economic activity.
One area of concern, however, is the level of the real exchange
rate and its effects on the returns to exploring new tradable activities.
Unlike infrastructure, which is highly specific to particular activities, the real exchange rate affects all tradable activities. But like
infrastructure, the real exchange rate is a potential explanation for
FIGURE 6.18 PPP Adjustment vs. Log GDP per Capita, 2004
BDI
ETH
ZAR
GDP per capita (PPP, log)
2.0
GMB
KHM
RWA
UGA GHA
TKM
ERI NPL GIN
VNM
IND
MRT
UKR
BGD
LAO
KGZTCD NIC GUY
PHLCHN
MOZ HTI
TGO
SLE
UZB
LKA
AZE
GNB
PRY
MWI
EGY
TJK SLB
PNG
ARM
SDN
PAK
TON
DOM
LSO
MDGCAF
BIH
MNG
COL
NER
BFA COM
THA ARG
IRN
IDN
SYR CPVBLR
MDA BOL
HND
KAZ
TUN
GEO MAR WSM
MKD
BGR
MLI
DZA
ROM
URY
BRA
MUS
RUS
ZAF
NAM
CMR
SENDJI
SWZ
PER
JOR
TZA
KEN
SLV
CRI LVA
NGA
MYS
ALB
POL
LTU
VUT GTM
FJI TUR
SYCCZE
CHL
GRD
SVK
BWA
ZMBBEN
VCT
BLZ
ESTHUN
ECU
CIV
PAN MEXHRV
AGO
KNA
DMA
KOR
VEN
MLT
ISR HKG
YEM
LCA
JAM
SVN
GAB
TTOSAU PRT
GRC
CYPSGP
LBN
ATG
ESPCANUSA
AUS
NZLITA
BEL
AUTIRL
NLD
COG
FRA
GBR
DEU
FIN
JPN
ISL
SWE
DNK
NOR
CHE
1.5
1.0
0.0
–5.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
LUX
5.0
PPP adjustment
Source: WDI.
the lack of movements to new, nearby export activities, identified
above.
Figure 6.18 uses the purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustment
as an internationally comparable indicator of the level of the real
exchange rate. It is clear from the figure that Peru does not have a
weak real exchange rate that would help in the process of discovering
new export opportunities. Therefore, this may be an area of concern.
At the same time, it is difficult to argue that the exchange rate is
overvalued, which would discourage export diversification.
Education
As evidenced by the years of education among Peruvians of different
ages, the supply of education among those entering the workforce
increased sharply between 1975 and 2005. Those born in 1940 had
an average of 6.2 years of schooling, whereas those born in 1980
had an average of 10.8 years. This compares very favorably with
the same 1980 cohort in Mexico with 9.9 years, and Colombia with
9 years (Encuestas Nacionales de Niveles de Vida).
But while the supply has risen, the market “price” of education
has not. The returns to education are neither high by international
301
302
FIGURE 6.19 Mincerian Returns to Education, Urban Males
18.0%
Paraguay
Mexico
Peru
Colombia
16.0%
14.0%
12.7%
12.4% 12.0%
11.7%
12.0%
11.4%
10.7%
10.0%
8.0%
6.0%
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Source: Encuestas Nacionales de Niveles de Vida.
standards nor rising significantly. Indeed, returns to education for
urban males in Peru fell in the second half of the 1990s, and are lower
than those of Mexico, Colombia, and Paraguay (see Figure 6.19).
This is inconsistent with the fact that the shadow price of a binding
constraint should be high and rising: if the supply of skilled workers was binding, firms would be offering such workers increasingly
higher wages. This is not the case in Peru.
These figures are difficult to reconcile with a hypothesis that
the provision of education is a binding constraint to Peru’s economic
growth.
Infrastructure
The possible role that infrastructure may play in the story is worth
pondering. In some benchmarks, infrastructure quality does not
seem terrible. Given its level of income per capita, Peru’s infrastructure quality rating by the EIU is exactly what would be expected.
Moreover, in Peru’s Investment Climate Assessment, the average
ratings for the degree to which telecommunications, electricity, and
transportation were a constraint to growth were all less than 1.
In other benchmarks, however, Peru fares worse. In the World
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (2005), Peru is
well below the Latin American average in all types of transportation
infrastructure. In rail the gap is minimal: 1.6, compared to 1.64 for
Latin America as a whole. But in ports, Peru rates 2.1, compared to
3.06 for Latin America as a whole. In air, Peru rates 3.2, compared
to 4.3 for Latin America as a whole.
Moreover, public investment in Peru is less than 30 percent of
its historical peak levels in the 1970s. Although it is true that many
areas of investment reflected in the 1975 figures are now in the private
sector, public investment in Peru remains low internationally. As a
share of GDP, it is less than two-thirds that of Chile and Korea (see
Figure 6.20). This does not capture the deterioration in the public
capital stock over the past 30 years.
This suggests that there might have been a significant reduction
in the effective supply of infrastructure, as the cumulative amounts
seem insufficient to maintain the public capital stock.
But most importantly, when considering coordination failure,
much of the coordination already discussed was in determining what
sector-specific public goods are required by a particular activity. Infrastructure is a major public good that is highly sector-specific. A clear
example is in the gas industry, where pipelines and ports are highly
FIGURE 6.20 Public Investment as a Share of GDP, 2001
4.50%
4.00%
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
Peru
Ecuador
Chile
Korea
Bolivia
Colombia
Source: World Bank WDI and IMF Government Finance Statistics.
Note: Data are for 2001, with the exception of Bolivia, which is for 1994, and Korea, which is for 1997 (the most recent year available).
Calculated as central government capital expenditures from IMF Government Finance Statistics divided by GDP from WDI, all in current local
currency units (LCU).
303
304
specific and generate few positive spillovers for other activities. The
types of infrastructure needed by nontraditional agriculture in terms of
roads and logistics is very different from those that would be required
by an urban-based manufacturing industry such as automotive, electronics, and apparel, or by a service outsourcing sector. Even within
the nontraditional agriculture sector, requirements are diverse: the
type of infrastructure needed for fresh fruit is quite different from that
needed for paprika. Therefore, these two constraints—infrastructure
and coordination failures—are highly related, as it is sector-specific
infrastructure that must be coordinated by the government to allow
structural transformation to occur, particularly when there is the need
to move to products that are farther away in the product space. Given
the government’s limited capacity to provide requisite infrastructure
and sector-specific public goods, this may have limited the capacity
of the economy to achieve structural transformation. In this sense,
infrastructure and structural transformation may be constraints
reflective of a similar underlying problem.
However, the fact that the main urban center is next to a port, as
opposed to the case of Colombia, Mexico, or South Africa, suggests
that the required infrastructure for an urban-based manufacturing
process should not have been hard to achieve—further suggesting
that the dominant constraints may have been elsewhere.
Policy Implications
Peru’s recent growth performance has been impressive, with growth
in per capita GDP hovering around 5 percent per year in 2004–6. But
that performance has been deteriorating over time. Over the past
decade (including 2004–6), per capita GDP grew at about 2 percent.
Over the long run, Peru is reaching the levels of GDP per capita it
had already achieved in the 1970s. This has happened in spite of
massive improvements in human capital, macro stability, and financial markets. Moreover, GDP per capita overstates the improvement
in welfare, as it has grown much faster than consumption, formal
employment, real wages, and national income.
The recent recovery in GDP has been fuelled by a recovery in
exports that are highly capital-intensive, as exemplified by the mining sector. Despite massive growth in mining output, employment
in this sector has actually declined. Moreover, since much of the
invested capital is foreign-owned, the income accrues to foreigners
thereby limiting its impact on national income.
Just as the growth recovery was export-led, the previous collapse
between 1979 and 1993 was also export-led. With the exception of
nontraditional agriculture, the sectors that collapsed and those that
recovered were much the same. Moreover, the mining and gas sectors
are trapped in a vicious circle where low tax and royalty rates are
required to compensate foreign investors for the expropriation risk
they perceive, given Peru’s history and recent political rumblings.
But low tax and royalty rates increase the incentives for the polity
to vote for expropriation. The appropriability risks probably also
help explain the growth collapse and its duration, as it must have
discouraged supply in the traditional industries, which lost market
share, and in structural transformation precisely at the time when
the export collapse required the economy to discover new products
through which to integrate to the global economy.
Overshadowing the problems of appropriability is the main
binding constraint on growth: a lack of discovery of new export
activities that are intensive in urban labor. If these activities were
identified, the fact that the global market is so large means that the
activities could be scalable and represent significant additions to
the demand for labor. If Peru were to achieve a significantly sized
urban-based export sector, the marginal productivity in that sector
would determine the dollar wage rate for the country: the higher the
productivity of that sector, the greater the standard of living of the
labor force, independently of the sector of employment.
Ideally the object of policy is to identify the potential new areas
of export dynamism and provide them with the requisite general and
specific public inputs that may be required. This information is not
readily available and requires entrepreneurs to risk their capital to
find out. The willingness of entrepreneurs to engage in such activi-
305
306
ties depends on the expected returns and on their appropriablility.
In general, these activities suffer from coordination and information
externalities. Coordination externalities imply a chicken- and-egg
problem in which providers of the required specific nontradable
inputs for new activities do not exist because there is no demand for
the inputs they produce. But without these inputs, the activity that
would demand them cannot exist. This is particularly serious for
publicly provided inputs (such as specific property rights, regulations,
market access rules, and infrastructure), as the government must
solve an information problem (it does not know what is needed) and
an incentive problem (even if there is a need, what are the incentives
to respond to the need and mobilize the required resources).
Since the first best is not attainable, the second best is characterized by distortions or interventions that increase the expected
return of these activities. One such variable is the real exchange
rate. It acts as a production subsidy on all tradable activities.
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) present a model where a
temporary real depreciation triggers search for higher productivity tradable activities and causes faster growth. A recent paper by
Rodrik (2007) shows empirically that undervaluation does promote
economic growth.
Having said this, it is clear that the real exchange rate is an
endogenous variable. Influencing it requires acting on its determinants. In the context of a floating exchange rate with an inflationtargeting regime, the real exchange rate will be affected by the
balance between fiscal and monetary policy: a tighter fiscal policy
means that the interest rate required to achieve the inflation target
can be lower, and this tends to imply a weaker exchange rate. Hence,
the macroeconomic strategy can help. In addition, the empirical
evidence suggests that central banks have certain degrees of freedom, especially in circumstances in which the domestic currency
is not a perfect substitute of the dollar. In this case, the composition
of base money—whether it is backed by foreign assets or domestic
credit—does matter for the level of the exchange rate. As shown by
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007), central banks that intervene
to prevent appreciation tend to achieve a more competitive exchange
rate and this leads to higher growth.
As discussed above, the level of the real exchange rate in Peru
is not particularly weak for a country at its income level. A strategy
to achieve a more competitive rate, compatible with the inflation
target, should be part of the country’s macro strategy.
Besides the exchange rate, the total cost of labor in terms not
only of direct wages but also levies on the wage rate and onerous
dismissal procedures may discourage formal employment—and this is
the kind of employment contract that an exporting firm needs to have.
While in the nontradable sector the cost of labor can be passed on
to the consumer, in the tradable sector it limits expected profits.
However, while formal employment is low and declining as
a share of total employment, and while this may bind more in the
tradable sector, the evidence of the importance of this constraint for
Peru is mixed. The overall restrictiveness of the labor market appears
to be average, but dismissal costs and social security contributions
appear relatively high. Further studies may be required to identify
potential reforms in this area.
The real exchange rate and the labor market rules affect activities across the board. But the problems faced by structural transformation may require a more focused set of interventions that allow
the government to learn the sector-specific goods required by new
activities and create the incentives to provide them. If the obstacle
is the inadequate provision of a specific public good, no amount of
depreciation will overcome this.
Hence, a second line of action is to develop the capacity of
the state to identify and solve potential coordination failures. This
requires a form of public-private cooperation that allows for the
identification of those obstacles and a system of incentives for the
government to react. It will also require the fiscal space to do so.
More importantly, it requires a framework that will make such cooperation legitimate vis-à-vis the rest of society. The pitfalls to avoid
are capture, rent-seeking, and the generalized perception that such
a policy constitutes welfare for the rich. Instead, a focus on exports
307
308
and jobs, especially urban export jobs (that is, jobs that are not dependent on natural resources), should constitute that focus of the
cooperation. Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) and Hausmann, Rodrik
and Sabel (2007) have a set of recommendations in this regard.
The analysis of the product space suggests that the nearby
products are in nontraditional agriculture, seafood, mining, and
food processing. Promoting these areas is likely to become feasible
as obstacles and opportunities are identified through dialogue with
participants in existing activities. Issues such as transport infrastructure, logistics, sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulation, food safety
standards, agricultural research, and international market access
negotiations are likely to be relevant.
However, this strategy is unlikely to be sufficient, as the position
of Peru in the product space does not offer a “stairway to heaven” in
terms of structural transformation. Moreover, the nearby products
generate few urban jobs where the bulk of the additional labor supply will be concentrated. Small jumps to new sectors that are nearby
will not solve the problem: new areas of the product space must be
explored. Because they are far away from current production, many
of the necessary inputs in terms of property rights, skills, infrastructure, and regulation will not exist.
Therefore, the third priority area for policy is to encourage
strategic jumps by encouraging investors to search for opportunities
in Peru. Here a public sector development bank that could act as a
public venture capitalist might be quite beneficial.
The development bank would have the role of scannning the
opportunity set of new activities and and socializing part of the risk.
Through its willingness to participate, it would garner the attention
of potential entrepreneurs in exploratory activities whose costs need
to be discovered. As part of the public sector, it could inform the rest
of the government when it found obstacles that could be removed
through the adequate provision of public inputs. Fundación Chile
is a good example of such an entity. In other settings, the purposeful promotion of certain sectors such as the electronics cluster in
Malaysia and Israel, the tourism industry in Mexico, the automotive
industry in Thailand, and the promotion of foreign investment in
Ireland attest to the importance of creating the specific conditions
required for particular sectors to operate at world-class productivities.
Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel (2007) propose the use of development
lending to create the interest in this exploration, inform the public
sector about opportunities and obstacles, and help coordinate the
requisite public inputs.
Finally, the history of nationalization, collapse, and privatization
with highly generous terms to private investors to compensate for the
uncertainty must be broken. The achievement of a more sustainable
property rights regime for foreign investment is required to depoliticize the issue and create a more secure basis for future investment.
Highly generous concessions to foreign firms are not politically
sustainable in the longer term, even though they were required to
regain international confidence. However, unilateral changes to previous agreements will serve only to increase the negative impact of
uncertainty about appropriability. Therefore, the government should
continue to work with this sector to grandfather existing agreements
with some marginal gains, but to create a more sustainable environment for new investments. These policies are underway, and should
continue, along with efforts to build public support, with the aim of
ensuring long-term political sustainability.
309
310
References
Braun, M. and Serra C. 2006. “Understanding Economic Growth
in Peru, 1970–2005: The Financial Sector.” Paper prepared
for the Center for International Development/CAF workshop,
November 16, Cambridge, MA.
Calvo, G., Izquierdo A. and Talvi, E. 2006. “Sudden Stops and Phoenix
Miracles in Emerging Markets.” American Economic Review.
96(2): 405–10.
Cubillos, N., Hazlett, C. and Lopez-Silva, M. 2005. “Growth Diagnostics: The Case of Peru.” Paper presented in PED309, November 4, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA.
Feenstra, R., Lipsey, R., Deng, H., Ma, A. and Mo, H. 2005. “World
Trade Flows: 1962–2000.” Working paper No. 11040. Cambridge,
. 2007. “The Structure of the Product Space and the Evolution
of Comparative Advantage.” Working paper No. 146 (extended
and revised version of working paper No. 128). Cambridge, MA:
Center for International Development, Harvard University
Hausmann, R. and Rodrik, D. 2006. “Doomed to Choose: Industrial
Policy as a Predicament.” Blue Sky Conference Paper (September). Cambridge, MA: Center for International Development,
Harvard University
Matters.” Working paper No. 11905. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Hausmann, R., Rodriguez F. and Wagner, R. 2006. “Growth Collapses.” Working paper No. 136. Cambridge, MA: Center for
International Development, Harvard University.
Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D. and Sabel, C. 2007. “Reconfiguring
Industrial Policy.” Cambridge, MA: Center for International
Heckman, J. and Pages, C. 2003. “Law and Employment: Lessons from
Latin America and the Caribbean.” Working paper No. 10129.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau for Economic Research.
Hidalgo, C., Klinger, B., Barabasi, A.-L. and Hausmann, R. 2007.
“The Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations.”
Science Magazine. 317(5837): 482–7.
Leamer, Edward E. 1984. Sources of Comparative Advantage: Theory
and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Levy-Yeyati, E., and Sturzenegger, F. 2007. “Fear of Appreciation.”
Policy research working paper No. 4387. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
Maddison, A. 2007. “World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP
1–2003 AD.” Groningen, The Netherlands: Groningen Growth
and Development Centre, University of Groningen. (http://
www.ggdc.net/maddison/)
Manzano, O. and D. Winkelried. 2006. “Natural Resources, Primary
Exports, and Comparative Advantage.” Prepared for the CID
Peruvian Growth Puzzle Conference, November 16, Cambridge,
MA.
Rodrik, D. 2007. “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth.”
Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Mimeographed document. (http://ksghome.
harvard.edu/~drodrik/RER%20and%20growth.pdf).
World Bank. 2005. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
World Economic Forum. 2005. Global Competitiveness Report. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Economic Forum.
311
CHAPTER 7
Nicaragua:
Remembrance of Growth Past
Manuel R. Agosin, Rodrigo Bolaños, and Félix Delgado*
Introduction
Nicaragua has the lowest per capita GDP in Latin America after
Haiti. This has not always been the case. In 1960, Nicaragua’s per
capita income almost matched that of Costa Rica, which was the most
economically advanced country in the Central American region. Its
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms was about
one-third the U.S. level. By 2006, Nicaragua’s GDP per capita had
dropped to just 10 percent of the U.S. level.1
In the early 1970s and the late 1990s, Nicaragua had to cope
with two huge natural disasters: the 1972 earthquake and Hurricane Mitch in 1998. In between, the country experienced a sociopolitical catastrophe: much of the backwardness of Nicaragua can
be accounted for by the events that took place during the 1980s,
when the country underwent a civil war and a very traumatic attempt to change the economic and social rules of the game on a
grand scale.
*
Manual R. Agosin is with the Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile.
Rodriqo Bolaños is an independent consultant based in San José, Costa Rica.
Félix Delgado is with the Consejeros Económicos y Financieros S.A., San José,
Costa Rica.
1
Penn World Tables and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
314
MANUEL R. AGOSIN, RODRIGO BOLAÑOS, AND FÉLIX DELGADO
However, even after the reestablishment of democracy and a
full market economy in 1990, the rate of growth has continued to
be unsatisfactory. The average annual growth of per capita GDP
in the 1994–2006 period was scarcely 2 percent, and it has proven
impossible to go back to the per capita output growth of the 1961–77
period (3 percent).
In order to explain the country’s poor growth performance,
this study uses the decision tree approach of Hausmann, Rodrik and
Velasco (2005, HRV), while modifying it in some ways to take into
account Nicaragua’s specific characteristics and problems. Given the
paucity of data, the use of sophisticated statistical or econometric
techniques is not very plausible. Consequently, the study is supported
by economic intuition and interpretation of the scant information
available. Though the study looks at the most important prices,
which indicate where the most important distortions are, the focus
extends beyond price data, since there are constraints that are not
related to any observable market price. 2
The chapter addresses the main candidates to be considered
binding constraints. The sections that follow analyze the costs of,
and access to, credit, macroeconomic risks, governance problems,
self-discovery (in the terminology of Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003)
and the problems of coordination, human capital, and infrastructure.
But before each of these potential constraints is discussed, the study
examines what Nicaraguan businessmen have to say about the problems they face when making investment decisions. The last section
presents the conclusions.
The Stylized Facts of Nicaraguan Development
Despite the economic recovery observed since 1994, per capita
GDP in 2006 was 15 percent lower than that attained in 1960 and
2
For example, entrepreneurs could face interest rates that are too high relative
to investment returns, but they may also simply lack access to credit—even if they
were willing to pay market interest rates.
NICARAGUA: REMEMBRANCE OF GROWTH PAST
FIGURE 7.1 Trends in GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1960–2007
(1993=100)
300
GDP per capita
GDP
250
200
150
100
50
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1994
1996
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
0
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua.
only half of that of 1977 (Figure 7.1). The entire drop in GDP is
due to the decrease that took place during 1978–93. This period
was marked by acute internal conflicts, including a civil war, and
changes in the definition of the basic rules of the game of the economic system. The turmoil experienced during the 1980s, with a
severe drop in production and a financial crisis marked by hyperinflation, exemplifies the combination of factors that discourage
investment and impede economic growth. Although this period was
particularly traumatic, subsequent growth was unable to replicate
performance achieved during 1961–77, nor was the country able
to recover the ground lost in per capita output during the 1978–93
period (Table 7.1).
TABLE 7.1 Growth of GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1960–2006
(annual average, in percent)
Period
GDP
GDP per capita
1961–77
1978–93
1994–2006
6.3
–3.0
4.1
3.0
–5.5
2.0
315
FIGURE 7.2 Total and Per Capita Exports of Goods and Services, 1960–2006
1400
1200
Exports
Exports
Exports
Exportsper
percapita
capita
1000
800
600
400
200
0
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
316
Note: Total exports (left axis) are in US$(2000) millions. Per capita exports (right axis) are in US$(2000). Nominal values were deflated by
the U.S. producer price index (2000=100).
Data for labor productivity are available only from 1980 onward.
During the 1980–94 period, labor productivity in the economy as
a whole dropped to less than half, and has recovered only slightly
since then.
The behavior of exports has been even more dramatic than that
of output. Exports per capita in 2000 dollars peaked in 1977 (US$466)
and dropped dramatically until reaching only U$61 in 1992 (Figure
7.2). Even in 2006 they had not recovered the 1977 levels. Not even
total exports had been able to do so in real terms.
It is virtually impossible to make a reasonably sensible decomposition of growth between the accumulation of physical and human
capital, the increase in the labor force, and the increase in total factor productivity (TFP). The disturbances of the economy between
1977 and 1993 make it very risky to make this type of calculation.
Even for more recent years, the quality of the data leaves much to
be desired. A very broad calculation reveals that the increase in TFP
has been practically zero since 1993 and that the two most important
factors accounting for growth are physical capital accumulation and
the increase in the years of schooling of the labor force (see Agosin,
Bolaños and Delgado, 2008).
Trends in private investment and total investment, beginning in
1970, can be observed from Economic Commission of Latin America
(ECLAC) data. Since 1994, there have been important increases in
both private and total investment (Table 7.2). These increases occurred over and above the abnormal increases in public and private
investment made in 1998–2000 to meet the reconstruction requirements that followed Hurricane Mitch. It is difficult to fully understand the increase in private investment. Part of it corresponds to
investments in the export processing zones (EPZ) in the assembly
of clothing with foreign parts (the so-called maquiladoras). Another
part is due to investment in nontradables, which are very visible in
the city of Managua (malls, hotels, residential construction). These
two sectors are dominated by foreign investors.
In any event, as shown in Table 7.2, private investment has
not exceeded 16 percent of GDP once investments associated with
reconstruction after Hurricane Mitch are subtracted. This amount is
not that large considering that 1994–2006 was a period of recovery
from a real economic catastrophe, a period in which all aggregate
magnitudes contracted dramatically. In light of this fundamental
trait of the Nicaraguan economy, the rate of private investment can
in no way be considered as satisfactory. With a more certain, stable,
and supportive business climate, Nicaragua could have experienced
a much more important recovery of private investment than actually took place. To make things worse, public investment figures
TABLE 7. 2 Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Total, Private, and Public, 1970–2005
(as a percent of GDP at 1994 prices)
Period
Total
Public
Private
1970–77
1978–93 a
1994–2005
1994–2005 b
16.7
16.4
23.0
21.9
6.2
8.2
6.1
6.0
10.5
6.8
17.0
15.9
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ECLAC figures.
a
Public and private investment averages exclude 1984–9.
b
Excluding figures for 1998–2000, the reconstruction period after the Hurricane Mitch.
317
318
in Nicaragua are artificially high, since much of what is classified
as capital expenditures (perhaps as much as one third of the total
during 1990–2006) are actually current expenses.
The country has been, and continues to be, very vulnerable
to shocks in the terms of trade. Until the beginning of the current
decade, coffee dominated the exports basket. Currently, clothing
maquila is the main export item, while the behavior of the price
of oil is the most important factor that determines the evolution
of the terms of trade. Nicaragua does not produce oil; morever,
it depends heavily on oil imports for the production of its energy.
Hydrocarbons represent 12 percent of total imports. On the other
hand, China’s eruption in the international markets has represented
a strong negative shock to Nicaragua’s terms of trade by reducing
the prices of clothing and increasing the price of raw materials,
particularly oil.
Nicaragua’s terms of trade have gradually deteriorated since
1997, the first year for which data are available from the Central
Bank of Nicaragua. The strong deterioration in 2001 reflects the
world coffee crisis. The recovery in the terms of trade in 2002 and
2003 was cut short beginning in 2004, due mainly to the escalation
of oil prices.
Another important feature of the Nicaraguan economy has been
the increase of remittances. In 2000 they represented 8.2 percent
of GDP; by 2006 they had increased to 12.2 percent. Finally, Nicaragua is the country in the region that is most dependent on official
development assistance from developed countries; at present, these
flows represent 3.0 to 3.5 percentage points of GDP. Approximately
80 per cent of the investments in education, health, housing, and
water and sanitation are financed with foreign grants and soft loans
from bilateral donors or multilateral financial agencies. This high
dependency is reflected in the large and chronic twin budget and
current account deficits.
Both remittances and official development assistance tend to
appreciate the real exchange rate. The authorities have tried to keep
the real exchange rate constant by means of monthly devaluations.
However, the deterioration in the terms of trade has made real exchange rate depreciation unavoidable. The trend toward depreciation
in 2001–05 reversed slightly in 2006, perhaps because of the high
levels of remittances.
Summing up, Nicaragua’s growth experienced a strong set-back
in the 1980s. The growth rate since then has been lower than during
the period prior to the convulsions of the 1980s. When corrected for
possible overestimation, private investment has been modest. The
terms of trade have been very unfavorable over the last decade, and
the economy and the public sector continue to be highly dependent
on external aid. Without such additional resources, it is likely that
both the economy and the public sector would be affected very
adversely.
What Do Nicaraguan Entrepreneurs Have to Say?
It is important to ask the interested parties (that is, the entrepreneurs) why private investment is low. However, this inquiry has
limitations and biases that need to be taken into account. In the
first place, entrepreneurs are aware of the private cost that the
constraints to investments impose on them, but not necessarily of
their social costs (that is, the costs borne by other agents in the
economy). Second, it is important to adjust the answers to account
for what has been termed the “kvetch factor”: the propensity such
agents have to complain about practically every issue. Finally, any
questionnaire leaves out those entrepreneurs who are truly affected
by constraints to investment: those who are not around to reply to
the questionnaire.
With these caveats in mind, information contained in the World
Bank’s Productivity and Investment Climate Private Enterprise Survey (ICS) was examined: specifically, two surveys on Nicaragua, one
conducted in 2003 and the other in 2006. Responses to the module
on constraints to investment were tabulated with a view to determining the order of importance of the constraints faced by the firms.
Entrepreneurs were asked to rate 18 constraints (decreased to 16 in
319
320
TABLE 7. 3 Degree of Restrictiveness of Eighteen Factors in Nicaragua’s
Business Climate
(average reply according to size of business)
2006
Variable
Corruption
Electricity
Economic and regulatory uncertainty
Economic instability
Anti-competitive practices
Access to financing
Tax rates
Crime, theft, and disorder
Transport
Training of workers
Permissions and leaves of absence
Access to the land
Legal system/resolution of conflicts
Regulation of customs and trade
Labor regulation
Tax management
Cost of financing
Number of firms
Small
2.67
2.49
2.35
2.03
1.84
1.41*
1.28*
1.21
0.99*
0.94*
0.79
0.71
0.69*
0.69*
0.52*
—
—
308
Medium
2.55
2.74
2.44
2.18
1.76
1.37
1.58
1.29
1.31
1.34
0.89
0.53
1.00*
0.92*
0.72
1.24
—
128
2003
Large
2.35
2.88
2.51
2.18
1.54
1.31
1.83
1.33
1.69
1.74
1.32
0.88
1.76
1.45
1.02
1.68
—
42
Small
*
2.70
1.57*
2.46
2.39
2.20*
2.30
1.49
1.91
0.62*
0.89
0.46*
0.90
1.13*
0.39*
0.47*
0.83*
2.46
289
Medium
*
2.73
2.03
2.55
2.38
2.38*
2.19
2.04
1.83
0.89*
1.40
0.95
0.99
1.91
0.95
0.73
1.27
2.51
128
Large
2.17
2.37
2.51
2.09
1.54
1.80
1.89
1.37
1.40
1.20
0.91
0.86
2.06
1.31
0.94
1.37
2.09
35
Source: World Bank (2007c, 2003 and 2006 surveys).
Note: 0 indicates that the factor is not a constraint and 4 that the constraint is very important.
— not available
*
The average for small or medium-sized firms differs from the average for large firms at a 5 percent level of significance.
the 2006 survey), ranging from 0 for those that were not significant
to 4 for those that were very important. 3
Table 7.3 presents the answers for Nicaraguan firms, classified
according to size into three groups: small firms (from 1 to 20 employees); medium-sized firms (from 21 to 99 employees); and large
firms (more than a 100 employees).
3
Unfortunately, one of the obstacles eliminated in the list for 2006 was the cost
of credit, a factor that the entrepreneurs had identified as important in the 2003
survey. The other was telecommunications, which Nicaraguan businessmen did
not mention as an important obstacle in the 2003 survey.
The responses are arranged from the highest to the lowest score
in 2006 for small firms. The four most important constraints (in the
order assigned by small firms) are: corruption; electricity; economic
uncertainty and economic regulation; and macroeconomic instability. Access to financing does not appear among the most important
obstacles in 2006, although it was in 2003. As is to be expected,
the importance of this obstacle increases as firms diminish in size.
Interestingly, in 2003, small and medium-sized firms, though not
the large ones, stated that the cost of financing was one of the most
important obstacles to investment. It is not clear how perceptions
evolved with respect to this factor because it was not included in the
2006 questionnaire. Access to financing seems to have improved,
or other factors appear to be more relevant for entrepreneurs in
2006 than in 2003. On the other hand, as the problems associated
with the cost and access to electricity have become more acute,
the importance that entrepreneurs assign to them as an obstacle to
investment has increased. So much so that in 2006, medium-sized
and large firms mention it as the main obstacle to investment, while
small firms mention it as the second obstacle.
Some obstacles appear as significantly less important for small
firms (and, to a certain extent, for medium-sized firms) than for large
firms. These include the legal framework and the resolution of conflicts, tax rates, customs regulations, and labor regulation. It should
be expected on an a priori basis that these factors would be more
important for large firms, which must contend with them more often
in the courts of law, have a far greater tax burden, or must resort to
the customs office more often. But, in general, these problems do not
appear to be of major importance in entrepreneurs’ perceptions.
The obstacles that affect entrepreneurs have a common denominator: the weakness of the rule of law, which, as discussed
later, is reflected not only in areas strictly related to legal matters
or corruption but also in the stalemate surrounding the issue of the
supply and cost of electricity.
Even though the topic of road infrastructure does not seem to
be important for any group of firms, it is worth noting that large firms
321
322
accord it a degree of importance (tenth constraint), while small and
medium-sized firms placed this factor almost at the end of their lists.
The value of the indicator is not only greater, but the difference with
that of the smaller firms is statistically significant. The shortcomings in infrastructure affect exporters or firms with a nationwide
customer base; it is possible that most of them are large.
As will be discussed later, these responses are quite consistent
with those that are obtained from growth diagnostics following the
HRV methodology. One constraint that receives little attention from
firms (except the large ones) but that does seem to be important is
the infrastructure of roads, ports, and airports. This may be due to
the fact that the firms surveyed are located mainly in urban areas.
Rural producers likely would have ascribed a far greater importance
to these shortcomings.
The Cost of Financing and the Constraints to Credit:
Are They Binding Constraints to Investment?
To an important extent, the cost and availability of credit determine
the level and composition of investment. Assuming that there are
good investment projects in the country, the capacity of the private
sector to undertake them will depend on the interest rate at which
entrepreneurs can obtain credit. It is quite obvious that interest rates
vary according to the characteristics of potential debtors and the
collateral that they can post. Larger firms and those with a stronger
credit record, or those that can post appropriate collateral, will have
privileged access to credit. The first step in analyzing this subject
is to observe the behavior of interest rates. Subsequently, the issue
of access to credit is examined.
Interest Rates
The Nicaraguan financial system features a high rate of dollarization of assets and liabilities. In March 2007, 83 percent of the portfolio of credit of the banking system was denominated in dollars.
Therefore, to answer the question whether interest rates are high
or low it is necessary to examine dollar rates. As can be seen in
Table 7.4, lending rates for credits denominated in dollars are high,
though not excessively so. The last figure available when this study
was being prepared (January 2007) was nearly 12 percent, which
represents a margin of 3.5 percentage points above the lending rate
in the United States (prime rate). The spread between lending and
deposit rates in dollars was also quite significant (5 percent), but
much lower than what is observed in other countries (see details
below).
The lending rate showed a meaningful downward trend from
2001 to 2004. Through early 2007, the rate increased gradually,
reflecting the economic recovery and more restrictive monetary
policy. However, the spread with regard to the United States prime
rate has continued to decrease until very recently. The recent spread
between lending and deposit rates has been well below the levels
prevailing during the 1990s, although it also has increased gradually
in the recent past.
TABLE 7. 4 Interest Rates, 1994–2006 (US$)
Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007 (Jan)
Deposit
Lending
U.S. prime rate
Spread with
U.S. prime
Domestic spread
7.0
8.1
10.3
9.8
10.0
10.5
10.8
10.5
8.6
7.4
6.0
6.1
6.5
6.9
14.6
15.9
18.7
18.2
18.1
14.8
15.7
17.2
14.0
11.4
10.6
10.7
11.0
11.9
7.1
8.8
8.3
8.4
8.4
8.0
9.2
6.9
4.7
4.1
4.3
6.2
8.0
8.3
7.5
7.1
10.4
9.7
9.8
6.8
6.5
10.3
9.3
7.3
6.3
4.5
3.0
3.6
7.6
7.8
8.4
8.3
8.1
4.3
5.0
6.8
5.5
4.0
4.6
4.6
4.5
5.0
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua and International Monetary Fund (2007).
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TABLE 7. 5 Financial Indicators, Nicaragua and Lower-middle-income Countries
(2003–2005 averages)
Variable
GDP (PPP) per capita (current U.S. dollars)
Real lending interest rate (percent)
Interest rate spread (percent)
Credit to private sector (percent of GDP)
M2 (percent of GDP)
Gross fixed investment (percent of GDP)
Gross internal saving (percent of GDP)
Private
Public
Nicaragua
Lower-middle-income countries a
3,495
6.0
8.9
25.8
39.2
26.7
10.1
10.8
–0.7
3,351
10.7
10.2
25.2
41.7
23.5
—
12.4
—
Source: World Bank (WDI, 2007d) and Central Bank of Nicaragua.
— not available
a
Countries with per capita GDP (at PPP) of US$2,000–$5,000.
What is really surprising is that the figures for interest rates
and spreads are not higher. This is confirmed when comparing Nicaraguan interest rates with those of countries having a similar level
of income. Table 7.5 shows ex post real lending rates (the nominal
rate minus the increase of consumer prices in the same year) for Nicaragua and for a group of 26 lower-middle-income countries, whose
per capita PPP incomes were between US$2,000 and US$5,000 in
2003–05. Nicaragua’s real lending rate and spread are substantially
lower than the countries against which it is compared. Nicaragua
does not seem to have a high cost of credit, at least for firms that
have access to the formal financial system.
Credit and Financial Depth
Financial markets tend to ration credit.4 Thus, in order to find evidence
that access to credit is a binding constraint on growth, it is necessary
to go beyond the observation of interest rates and evaluate a series
4
There is a wealth of literature on this topic. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988); Hubbard (1998). For several countries in Lain
America, see Galindo and Schiantarelli (2003).
of quantity indicators. Estimating an investment model with credit
constraints (as done by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, 1988) would
shed light on this important subject. It is already a stylized fact of this
literature that small firms face access constraints to external funds that
are far greater than those faced by large firms. Stated in a different
manner, small firms resort to a greater extent to cash flow to finance
investment than large firms. This study tried to estimate an investment
equation for Nicaragua with data from the ICS survey. Unfortunately,
however, that survey does not contain complete data on investment,
making it impossible to estimate a model of this nature.
The survey does contain information about the proportion of
internally generated cash flow that is used to finance working capital
and new investments. Resorting to this information, an econometric
exercise was performed for all the firms in the surveys available as of
September 2007 (144 surveys in 74 countries, totaling 65,632 observations). In Nicaragua’s case, two surveys are available, one for 2003
and the other for 2006. The literature on this topic concludes that all
firms, regardless of size or the degree of development of the country
in which they operate, face financing constraints in their investment
decisions and must resort first and foremost to internally generated
resources to finance investments. This is all the more true if the firm
is small in size, as small firms usually do not have collateral or a credit
record that would give them access to domestic financial markets. It is
to be expected that liquidity constraints will be greater the lower the
degree of development of the country’s financial markets. Indicators
of financial development tend to be correlated with per capita GDP.
This is the case with credit to the private sector relative to GDP, the
relative size of stock exchanges, or the variety of financial instruments
that are available to firms and households. 5 It could well be that access constraints are reflected to a greater extent in the proportion of
5
The econometric analysis controlled for the level of development in an indirect
manner, including country fixed effects and a dummy variable to reflect the per
capita income group to which the country belongs (according to the World Bank’s
classification).
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326
internal resources that finance working capital, since, as a rule, firms
would rather have lines of credit for this type of expenditure.6
The purpose of this exercise was to ascertain whether there is an
inverse relationship between the size of a company and the percentage of internally generated resources used to finance working capital
and new investments. Within this context, an attempt was made to
determine whether Nicaraguan firms in 2003 and 2006 on average
used a greater proportion of internal resources than firms from other
countries included in the sample, after controlling for factors that
might affect the use of internally generated resources. This would
indicate that access to credit in Nicaragua is a greater obstacle to
investment than in other countries included in the sample.
Table 7.6 shows the results. The exercise classifies firms into
the following size categories: microenterprises (with fewer than 10
workers), small firms (11–50), medium-sized firms (51–200), large
firms (201–500), and very large firms (more than 500 workers). The
ordinary last squares (OLS) estimations used sample fixed effects (that
is, for each combination of country and year for which the sample was
taken) and fixed effects by economic sector. Other dummy variables
included one for export-oriented firms, one for foreign-owned firms
(with at least 10 percent foreign ownership), and a set of dummies
for the country’s level of development. To control for the degree of
development of financial markets, the proportion of credit to the private
nonbanking sector to GDP was added as an explanatory variable.
The relationship between a firm’s size and use of its own resources is inverse; the larger the firm, the lower its use of internally
generated resources and the greater its use of resources obtained
from financial markets to finance working capital and new investments. Export firms have better access to financial markets than
firms that do not export: foreign firms resort more to the financial
resources generated internally, probably contributed by the parent
company. All these effects are very significant statistically and very
robust to changes in the equation’s specification.
6
The authors thank Christian Daude for this observation.
TABLE 7. 6 Equations Explaining the Proportion of Internal Resources Used to
Finance Working Capital and Investment
(ordinary least squares)
Working capital
Investment
Constant
73.95
(22.51)**
59.31
(13.06)**
Credit to GDP
–0.08
(–3.28)**
0.04
(1.07)
5.13
(1.11)
31.42
(5.82)**
Low-income countries
–18.83
(–3.31)**
–11.78
(–1.23)
Higher-middle-income countries
9.31
(2.31)*
7.20
(1.15)
Microenterprises
5.2
(10.86)**
5.84
(9.00)**
Medium-sized firms
–2.46
(–4.65)**
–2.57
(–3.81)**
Large firms
–3.44
(–4.83)**
–4.74
(–5.36)**
Very large firms
–4.84
(–5.83)**
–5.59
(–5.47)**
Export firms
–1.76
(–4.08)**
–1.23
(–2.18)*
Firms with foreign capital a
1.55
(3.12)**
3.43
(5.28)**
Nicaragua, 2003
5.35
(0.96)
(22.44)
(2.34)*
Nicaragua, 2006
19.59
(3.80)**
21.18
(2.31)*
R2
Number of observations
0.191
35,545
0.149
39,457
Source: Authors’ estimations based on World Bank (2007c).
Note: Fixed effects by sector are not shown. Country-year fixed effects by country are not shown, except for Nicaragua. Omitted
variables: Small firms, other industries, and high-income countries. Countries are assigned to income levels according to the World
Bank classification.
a
Foreign ownership is at least 10 percent.
**
The respective parameters differ from zero at the 1 percent level of significance.
*
The respective parameters differ from zero at the 5 percent level of significance.
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328
The results relative to the depth of financial markets and the
country’s level of development are less robust.7 The ratio of credit to
GDP is inversely related to the proportion of a firm’s own resources
used to finance working capital by the firms in a country, though
the quantitative effect is small: an increase of 10 percentage points
in the share of credit to the private sector in GDP induces firms in
that country to reduce the use of their own resources for financing
working capital by less than 1 percent. The effect of changes in the
ratio of credit to GDP is not significantly different from zero in the
equation that explains the proportion of firms’ own resources used
in financing investment.
There is also evidence that the level of development of a country
has an impact on the use of internally generated resources. Firms in
low-income countries use a considerably higher proportion of their
own resources to finance investment than firms from higher-income
countries, whereas firms in lower-middle-income countries resort
considerably less to their own resources than the firms located in
poorer or wealthier countries.
The firms in Nicaragua resort to a considerably higher percentage of internally generated resources than the firms in other countries. While in 2003 Nicaraguan firms did not use more of their own
resources to finance working capital than firms in other countries (the
coefficient for the fixed effect “Nicaragua 2003” is not significantly
different from zero), in 2006 they did so. The coefficient for Nicaragua
2006 is positive and significant. In financing working capital, the
Nicaraguan firms used 20 per cent more of their own resources, on
average, than firms in other countries, after controlling for all other
variables that might affect the use of such resources. In respect to
the financing of new investments, the Nicaraguan firms used 22
percent more internally generated resources than the average for all
the other firms in the surveys, again after controlling for variables
7
Of course, these variables are correlated: the higher the country’s level of
development, the higher will be its financial depth, measured as the proportion
of credit to GDP or in some other manner.
that might affect the use of internally generated resources. As the
coefficients associated with firm size for Nicaragua turned out to be
not significantly different from zero (for all sizes other than small
firms), it would seem that neither larger firms nor microenterprises
differ much from firms in other countries. Any liquidity constraints
that are more intense in Nicaragua than in other developing countries
are concentrated in Nicaragua’s small firms.
An indirect way to infer whether the growth of an economy
could be constrained by access to credit is to measure its degree
of financial depth. Table 7.5 compares Nicaragua to countries of
its own income group with respect to two indicators of financial
depth: credit to the private sector as a proportion of GDP and the
stock of money and quasi-money (M2), also as a proportion of GDP.
Both variables, as well as other indicators of financial depth, are
strongly correlated with the level of per capita income. For instance,
in developed countries, these variables usually exceed the value of
GDP. In the case of Nicaragua, the two indicators are quite close
to the mean for lower-middle-income countries. It seems that the
financial constraint that Nicaraguan entrepreneurs might be facing
is not more acute than the constraint faced by their counterparts in
countries of the same income level. This, obviously, does not mean
that Nicaragua is not facing problems of access to financing for
investment. It only indicates that the problem is not greater than
the norm; it is generalized among developing countries and tends
to be more acute in those cases in which the degree of financial
development is lower.
Combining these two results, it can be said that, even though
firms in Nicaragua in general seem to not face liquidity constraints
that are greater than those encountered by firms in countries with
the same level of economic development, its small firms could have
more difficulties in obtaining external financial resources than firms
from countries with similar income levels.
This analysis might seem to contradict the responses given
by business people to the World Bank survey, in which access to
financing does not appear among the obstacles that concern them
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330
most. Moreover, access to financing occupied a less prominent place
among the concerns of business people in 2006 than in 2003. However,
it is important to note that the newer surveys deleted the question
regarding the cost of financing, which in 2003 was included among
the obstacles highlighted by business people. Moreover, subjectively,
other barriers could appear as more significant nowadays—which does
not mean that investment is not constrained by access to financing.
Table 7.5 shows that domestic saving in Nicaragua is lower
than in other countries with similar income levels. Specifically,
public saving is highly negative. The unavoidable conclusion is that
it is necessary to strengthen saving, beginning with public saving.
This is a conclusion derived from looking at figures on flows. If one
looks at stocks, it is important that the volume of public debt held
by domestic banks should diminish gradually, so as to leave those
banks with more resources to lend to the private sector. 8
Of course, an increase in domestic saving does not necessarily
mean that financial resources will reach small and medium-sized businesses that currently have no access to credit. To this end, measures
having a more direct bearing on the problem will be needed.
In conclusion, Nicaragua has levels of financial depth that are
comparable to those of countries with similar levels of income. In addition, firms in general do not seem to be more constrained in terms of
access to credit than those in countries with similar levels of development. However, there is some evidence that small firms use a larger
proportion of internally generated resources to finance working capital
and investment than firms with similar characteristics in developing
countries generally. Moreover, small and medium-sized firms perceive
the cost of and access to credit as one of the main limitations to their
growth. National savings are low, the financial system is highly dollarized, and public sector borrowings from the banking system are
important, which is probably crowding out credit to the private sector. In other words, the banking system might be more aggressive in
8
When the discussion turns to the problem of public debt, the issue of public
debt held by domestic private banks will be addressed.
seeking private customers if it did not have in its portfolio a significant
proportion of public securities yielding high returns.
Is External Saving Insufficient?
As mentioned, Nicaragua is highly dependent on external saving in
the form of bilateral grants or soft credits from the multilateral banking system, plus direct foreign investment. The public sector does
not have access to private international capital markets; indeed, as a
condition for having accepted debt relief recently, it has deliberately
foregone tapping private international markets. In the private sector, only the very large entrepreneurial groups have ready access
to international capital markets.
Private external financial resources are not available for those
sectors that could contribute most to growth by discovering new export opportunities (“self discovery,” in the terminology of Hausmann
and Rodrik, 2003) because they are dominated by small firms that
are least likely to have any access to international financial markets.
This is a task in which multilateral financial institutions might play
an important role and that has not been addressed adequately.
In the past, Nicaragua has been quite attractive to foreign direct
investment (FDI), which is the most significant item of the financial
account of the balance of payments. In the 1997–2005 period, with
the sole exception of 2001, Nicaragua received a net annual volume
of FDI of more than US$200 million, which represented between 5
and 9 percentage points of GDP. As a proportion of output, FDI to
Nicaragua by far exceeds the average for Central America as well
as that of any individual country in that region.
Low Private Returns for Economic Activity:
Are Macroeconomic Risks Binding Constraints?
There is no doubt that Nicaragua is exposed to a series of important
macroeconomic risks. The question is whether these macroeconomic
risks are binding constraints on economic growth. To answer that
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332
question, this section analyzes the constraints that may arise from
that source. The discussion is focused on external equilibrium,
reflected in the current account deficit as well as in the evolution
of fiscal deficit and public debt. It is in these two aspects, external
and fiscal equilibrium, that the country shows its greatest macroeconomic vulnerabilities. 9
External Vulnerability
Macroeconomic instability—particularly in small and open economies
such as Nicaragua—is often the result of the size and volatility of
the current account deficit.
The problem of Nicaragua’s external sustainability has gradually moderated since the beginning of the 1990s, when the current
account deficit exceeded 40 percent of GDP. In recent years, the
deficit has been on the order of 16 percent of GDP, which represents
progress toward sustainability; however, this level is in itself too high
and depends to a great extent on the goodwill of bilateral donors and
on multilateral soft loans.
Although Nicaragua has had a high level of external debt (which
will be discussed in the next section), its influence on key variables
(economic growth and price stability) has been limited because the
debt has not been served according to the original contractual terms.
The persistent reduction of the current account deficit has gone hand
in hand with the processes of debt relief of bilateral and multilateral
external debt, which have benefited Nicaragua. In addition, part of the
still huge external imbalance is financed by official development assistance; to the extent that this assistance may not continue indefinitely,
it constitutes an important source of macroeconomic vulnerability.
Nicaragua’s current account deficit has been exceeded only
by small island economies such as Grenada, Sao Tome & Principe,
and St. Kitts & Nevis. Its exceptionally high level, shown in Figure
9
After the hyperinflation of the 1980s, the inflation rate in Nicaragua fell and
has fluctuated around the 10 percent per year mark in recent years.
FIGURE 7.3 Balance of Payment Current Account Balance (average 1996–2005)
versus Logarithm of Real GDP Per Capita (2004), corrected by PPP
Current account balance /GDP
30
All countries
Lower-middle income countries
Latin America
All countries
20
10
0
–10
–20
Nicaragua
–30
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
Per capita GDP 2004 PPP (ln)
Source: World Bank (WDI, 2007d).
7.3 and, above all, the underlying causes of the imbalance, make
Nicaragua relatively more vulnerable than other countries of the
same income group.10
Public Debt as a Source of Vulnerability
The burden of external debt on macroeconomic conditions has been
very high over the last 20 years. In 1990, external debt represented
nearly eleven times real GDP. The substantial decrease that took place
in 1995 in the ratio of external debt to GDP which was associated to
a great extent with debt forgiveness on bilateral debt by countries
in the former Soviet bloc, still left the level of external debt close
to two times GDP, which allowed Nicaragua to be included in the
Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
As mentioned, the vulnerability derived from the problem of
public debt has gradually diminished because of the relief provided
10
While interest payments in the current account may be largely eliminated
under the various schemes of multilateral debt relief already approved or in the
works, such payments are already less than 1 percent of GDP; hence, debt relief
would have a relatively small effect on that deficit.
333
334
under HIPC and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI),
led by the Inter-American Development Bank. These initiatives allowed Nicaragua to reduce its balance of external public debt from
160 percent of GDP in 2000 to 68 percent of GDP by 2007 (US$3.85
billion).11 On the other hand, within the context of the Paris Club,
Nicaragua is negotiating an additional write-off of the remainder of
its outstanding bilateral debt, consisting mainly of commercial debt.12
If all these negotiations were to come to fruition, external debt would
decline to 35 percent of GDP. Total public debt would then be on the
order of 58 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2007a, p. 21).
Domestic debt is a risk factor insofar as the fiscal accounts and
contingencies that hinge upon them may accelerate its future growth.
According to the Central Bank of Nicaragua, by the end of 2006 domestic debt reached US$1.233 billion (23 percent of GDP), although it has
been falling from the more than 30 percent of GDP level existing before
2004. For the most part, domestic debt instruments are indexed to the
U.S. dollar. Most of this debt (81 percent) is a government liability and
the remainder corresponds to the central bank. These amounts do not
consider the internal debt of other public sector agencies.13
The main source of these obligations originates in the Bonos
de Pagos de Indemnización (BPI), which the government issued at
the beginning of the 1990s to compensate the parties affected by
the seizure of their properties in the 1980s. Another component
corresponds to the domestic debt of the central bank in the form of
11
The information on external debt comes from estimates by the Central Bank
of Nicaragua, and by Consejeros Económicos y Financieros S. A. (CEFSA, San
José, Costa Rica). These estimates do not consider all the relief foreseen in the
framework of HIPC, but do include the relief that Nicaragua had obtained in the
framework of MDRI, as of April 2007.
12
Debt relief on close to US$1.5 billion of bilateral debt is still pending. Added
to total relief, this would bring the balance of external debt to slightly less than
40 percent of GDP. Of this, 40 percent (US$610 million) corresponds to debt with
Costa Rica and 14 percent (US$216 million) to debt with Honduras. Debt to Libya,
Iran, and Algeria is about US$589 million.
13
Information from the Central Bank of Nicaragua and the Ministry of Finance
and Public Credit (2007a, b) and World Bank (2007a).
Certificados Negociables de Inversión (CENI), issued by the Bank
as part of its open market operations and also as liabilities issued in
connection with the rescue of the banking system in the aftermath
of the banking crisis of 2000–01.
It should be expected that the government would attempt to
restructure private debt with banks. This was carried out once without
any major problems in 2003 and should not face any major complications this time. This would be akin to a game with a cooperative
solution having the highest payoff for both parties. The importance
of reducing internal debt is clear in light of the fact that in 2005 its
service involved 21 percent of the income of the nonfinancial public
sector.
Discouragement of future private investment would probably
not come from the high level of public debt, which is falling because
of debt relief, but from the institutional weaknesses that led to the
high debt levels in the past and that have not gone away. There is
still a risk that these weaknesses could lead to new episodes of
unsustainable external indebtedness and to the accumulation of
an ever-growing domestic public debt. To this must be added the
contingent debt of the pension system, the commitment to transfer
fiscal resources to municipalities (without a corresponding transfer
of spending obligations), and the growing subsidies for electricity
and public transport. Moreover, banking supervision and regulation
do not yet ensure against new banking crises, which would lead to
renewed calls on public resources. New expropriations leading to
higher levels of debt cannot be ruled out, either.14
Dependence on Foreign Aid
Foreign aid, frequently for the financing of investment projects, represents more than 60 percent of gross fixed capital formation. This is the
highest proportion among Latin American and Caribbean countries,
and one of the highest in the group of lower-middle-income countries
14
See World Bank (2007a, pp, 20–4) and Bolaños (2006, pp. 21–30).
335
to which Nicaragua belongs. In general, external aid finances a high
proportion of public expenditures. Figure 7.4 compares the ratio of
foreign aid to public expenditures for Nicaragua and a group of 76
countries for which there is information for the 1996–2005 period.
The proportion in Nicaragua, close to 100 percent, is not only the
highest among lower-middle-income countries and countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean, but also one the highest of all 76
countries in the sample.
To sum up, the dependence on foreign aid is quite high in
Nicaragua and could become an important source of economic vulnerability because its availability depends on unilateral decisions of
countries and agencies that grant foreign aid. This is in addition to
the macroeconomic risks discussed earlier related to the fiscal situation and its contingencies. Economic agents in Nicaragua may face
important constraints on investment if they perceive these risks as
potential taxes on the returns to investment. As can be seen in Table
7.3, firms of all sizes include uncertainty regarding the economic
and regulatory environment and macroeconomic instability among
their four main constraints.
FIGURE 7.4 Foreign Aid as a Percentage of Public Expenditures versus Logarithm of
Real GDP Per Capita PPP 2004
Foreign aid as a percentage of public expenditures
336
140
120
Nicaragua
All countries
All countries
100
80
60
40
20
0
6
7
8
9
Logarithm of GDP per capita PPP
Source: World Bank (WDI, 2007d).
Note: Foreign aid as a percentage of public expenditures is the average for 2000–4. The logarithm of real GDP per capita PPP 2004 is
expressed in international US$(2000).
10
Low Returns to Economic Activity: Governance and Corruption
The problems of governance and corruption are central to considerations about the private appropriability of returns to investment in
Nicaragua. Several studies have argued that there are serious problems in Nicaragua regarding governance and corruption, which have
a negative bearing on growth and development because they diminish
the profitability of investment in fixed physical, human, technological,
and organizational capital.15 Furthermore, business people, academics, politicians and intellectuals, in various interviews, state that this
topic has the highest importance among the constraints to growth.
This study draws on the data on governance and corruption in
the World Bank governance indicators for 1996–2006 (Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a, b), which in turn use a great number
of indexes constructed by the World Bank and many other agencies around the world.16 All these indexes are closely and positively
correlated with social and economic development; therefore this
study has attempted to locate Nicaragua in relation to its level of
per capita income (in PPP terms).17 The finding that Nicaragua is
below the trend line in some of these indexes would be evidence
that this aspect is particularly problematic for the performance of
private investment.
The three panels of Figure 7.5 were developed on the basis
of the six average governance and corruption indexes of the World
15
See World Bank (2004, p. 34). This study finds that the problems in the field
of governance are not due so much to problems in laws or regulations as to inefficient public administration and to a civil service that is unable to enforce laws
and regulations. The civil service is highly politicized and the hiring, permanence,
and incentives of the public bureaucracy are not results-based. Furthermore, the
politicization of the judiciary and supervisory agencies, together with disputes
among powers, lead to inconsistent and changing rules, recurrent crises, and high
levels of corruption in the use of public resources.
16
The indexes are calculated for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and
2006. The averages shown in the figures that follow include the years available.
17
For per capita GDP, the measure expressed in international US$(2000) from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators is used.
337
338
Bank for the 2005–6 period. They attempt to place Nicaragua in the
context of a regression between each index and per capital GDP.18
For three of these indicators, Nicaragua does not differ substantially
from what could be predicted for its per capita income. These indicators are voice and accountability (political rights, civil liberties,
and independence of the press); political stability (the possibility
that government may be overthrown or replaced by unconstitutional
means); and regulatory quality (the incidence of anti-market policies,
inadequate financial supervision, or excessive regulation).
Nicaragua falls well below what could be expected for its
relative level of economic development for three other governance
indicators:
1. Government effectiveness (Panel A): The quality of state
bureaucracy, competencies and independence of civil servants, and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to execute its policies.
2. Rule of law (Panel B): The degree to which citizens trust and
respect the laws, including perceptions regarding the incidence of violent crimes, the effectiveness and predictability
of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.
3. Control of corruption (Panel C): Respect by citizens and the
state for government institutions, including measurements
of the perception of corruption, defined as the exercise of
public power for an individual’s personal benefit.
These three governance problems are intimately related. Controlling corruption would improve the rule of law and the quality of
bureaucracy. Improving the quality of bureaucracy would improve
the rule of law. Encouraging meritocracy and discouraging the
18
From the World Bank data covering 216 countries, data was used for the 158
countries for which fairly complete information was available. The data are from
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007b) and the methodologies used to obtain
the indexes are described in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007a).
FIGURE 7.5 Governance Indexes in which Nicaragua Lags, 2005–6
A. Government Effectiveness versus Log of Real Per Capita GDP Corrected for PPP
Index of govermental effectiveness
3.0
2.0
All countries
Regression (all countries)
1.0
0.0
–1.0
–2.0
6.0
y = 0.735x – 6.2934
R 2 = 0.7526
Nicaragua
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
Log of real GDP per capita corrected for PPP [average US$(2005–6)]
B. Rule of Law versus Log of Real Per Capita GDP Corrected for PPP
2.5
Rule of law index
1.5
All countries
0.5
–0.5
–1.5
–2.5
6.0
y = 0.6874x – 5.9672
R 2 = 0.6773
Nicaragua
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
C. Control of Corruption versus Log of Real Per Capita GDP Corrected for PPP
Control of corruption index
2.5
1.5
All countries
0.5
–0.5
–1.5
–2.5
6.0
y = 0.6913x – 5.9853
R 2 = 0.6625
Nicaragua
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on information in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007b).
10.5
11.0
339
340
politicization of the bureaucracy and the judiciary would control
corruption, improve the quality of the bureaucracy, and strengthen
the rule of law.
This analysis, and available evidence confirm one of this study’s
hypotheses: reforms to increase governance and reduce corruption
in Nicaragua could be some of the most effective in lifting binding
constraints on growth. It is quite likely that other reforms—including
improving infrastructure, lowering the cost of credit, improving
access to financing for small and medium-sized firms, and greater
macroeconomic stability—may not achieve the desired effects on
economic growth without steps to improve governance and reduce
corruption. Improvements in governance in the areas in which
Nicaragua has gaps would help increase the profitability of private
investment by lowering the premiums that investors demand in order
to offset the risks that stem from weak governance.
Self-discovery Coordination Problems:
How Important Are They and What Is the Main Problem?
Given the quality of data for Nicaragua, it is not possible to determine the strength of self-discovery or to undertake a very sophisticated analysis of the determinants of recent discoveries. Following
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), this study will focus on an analysis
of exports to try to determine if any export diversification has occurred in recent years. There is evidence of an interesting, though
somewhat incipient, process of export diversification centered on
agriculture and agribusinesses.
Traditionally, Nicaragua was an open export economy. Its most
important export products until the end of the 1970s were coffee,
meat, and sugar. The economic disruptions of the 1980s had a very
strong impact on exports. As shown in Table 7.7, Nicaragua emerged
from that period with a ratio of exports to GDP of about 15 percent
(measured in 1994 with the national accounts in 1996 córdobas). This
ratio must be considered extremely low, in the light of the small size
of the country’s population (5.6 million inhabitants in 2006).
TABLE 7.7 Ratio of Exports to GDP and Rates of Annual Growth of Exports and GDP
(percent)
Ratio of exports to
Rates of growth
Year
GDP
GDP
Exports
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
15.6
18.0
19.7
21.6
22.1
23.2
25.0
26.1
25.0
26.6
29.4
29.8
30.9
—
5.9
6.3
4.0
3.7
7.0
4.1
3.0
0.8
2.5
5.1
4.0
3.7
—
22.1
16.2
14.4
5.8
12.4
12.5
7.3
-3.5
9.2
16.1
5.3
7.8
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua Web site.
Note: Prices are in 1996 córdobas.
—not available
Since the recovery took hold in the mid-1990s, exports have led
growth. While GDP grew at an average annual rate of slightly more
than 4 percent between 1995 and 2006, exports grew by more than
10 percent over the same period. This is the reason why the ratio of
exports to GDP has doubled and is now above 30 percent.
Though an important part of this story is the clothing maquila
boom, other new exports have appeared, and some traditional exports, such as coffee and meat, have rebounded. Complete data for
exports or a long series that could serve to perform a more detailed
analysis are not available. However, CETREX (Centro de Trámites de
Exportaciones, the Exports Expediting Center) publishes figures for
the 20 most important exports and for a variety of products under the
heading “others.” These figures are shown in Table 7.8. The products
are arranged according to their export value in 2006.
Both maquila and agricultural products take advantage of the
country’s comparative advantage: its unskilled labor force and rich
341
342
TABLE 7. 8 Twenty Main Exports, Maquila and “Others,” 2000–2006
(US$ million)
Product
2000
2002
2004
2005
2006
Net maquila
“Others”
Coffee
Beef
Milk products
Gold
Cane sugar
Lobsters
Peanuts
Beef cattle
Farmed shrimp
Beans
Tobacco
Fish
Other soda beverages
Instant coffee
Metals and their manufactures
Sea shrimp
Bathroom appliances
Wheat products
Oil derivatives
Bananas
Total, including net maquila
Total, excluding net maquila
76.1
103.5
165.4
49.5
25.0
27.4
36.4
71.4
29.6
25.7
33.8
7.5
13.5
11.2
2.8
7.2
3.2
20.2
5.5
0.9
6.3
11.3
733.5
657.4
76.1
103.5
165.4
49.5
25.0
27.4
36.4
71.4
29.6
25.7
33.8
7.5
13.5
11.2
2.8
7.2
3.2
20.2
5.5
0.9
6.3
11.3
733.5
657.4
167.0
149.2
125.9
110.0
30.9
48.0
34.4
46.7
40.4
36.4
27.3
20.2
18.5
13.1
0.5
9.2
7.9
12.4
10.9
12.7
9.5
14.1
945.2
778.2
222.2
185.7
125.8
118.9
31.2
44.1
69.4
36.6
44.5
43.0
35.7
27.5
17.6
17.1
8.0
11.1
6.9
18.9
10.7
10.2
12.1
14.0
1,111.1
889.0
262.0
211.8
210.3
151.3
62.5
58.3
55.5
46.8
44.6
39.3
39.2
37.1
19.9
18.6
17.5
13.3
11.8
11.4
11.4
10.4
5.1
3.2
1,341.3
1,079.3
Source: CETREX Web site.
agricultural land. It is particularly interesting that exports have
diversified without any deliberate decision by the government. The
growth of agricultural products has occurred spontaneously, without any support from the authorities other than keeping the real
exchange rate fairly constant.19
19
The nominal exchange rate has been adjusted periodically in Nicaragua so as
to keep the real exchange rate constant. The monetary authority announces an
advanced adjustment relative to expected inflation for the following period. Despite
this, the authority was unable to avoid an important depreciation of the effective real
On the other hand, since the 1990s, the government has encouraged the growth of maquilas through policies favoring export
processing zones (EPZ), which allow firms within the zones to import
inputs free of duties. In addition, those firms are exempt from income
tax, as in many Latin American and Caribbean countries. This sector
has also benefited from a series of international trade preferences.
Until 2005, this sector grew under the protection of restrictions
imposed by the United States on textile and apparel imports under
the Multifiber Arrangement. This agreement expired on January
1, 2005, with a commitment by the importing countries to convert
quantitative restrictions into tariffs. It must be borne in mind that
the Central American countries had privileged, though restricted,
access to the U.S. market within the framework of the Caribbean
Basin Initiative and its successors. Therefore, an important part of
the growth of maquila should be considered trade diversion favoring
Central America and the Caribbean countries—to the detriment of
Asian countries, whose exports were often strongly restricted by
quotas. Consequently, maquila exports cannot be considered a real
export discovery.
The dismantling of the quota system in textiles and apparel
and the entry of China (and more recently, Vietnam) to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has had a negative impact on the export
of clothing to the United States originating from the entire Central
American and Caribbean region, with the exception of exports
from Nicaragua. The adverse effect on Central America and the
Caribbean was mitigated when the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (DR-CAF TA, which includes the Dominican Republic)
liberalized the access of apparel to the North American market (with
some transitory exceptions). The Agreement required that fabrics
originating from either the region or the United States be used in
their manufacture, providing that such fabric is made with thread
exchange rate from 2001 to 2005. Since then, the effective real exchange rate has
appreciated moderately. The levels of the real exchange rate since the mid-1990s
do not seem to have been an obstacle to the development of new exports.
343
344
from the region or the United States. Since neither the region nor
the United States produces fabrics or thread at competitive costs,
this restriction has not favored the competitiveness of the apparel
produced in Central America or the Dominican Republic. As the less
developed country within DR-CAF TA, Nicaragua benefits from the
preferential treatment given by a larger quota to make use of fabrics
originating outside the region (which, in practice, means China).
This, and low Nicaraguan labor costs, have contributed to the strong
growth of apparel exports since 2005.
In recent years, some firms producing other goods have moved
into the EPZ, notably producers and exporters of electric cables for
vehicles. These products do not have the problems of competitiveness that the apparel industry faces and they are genuine export
discoveries. Obviously, these exports include an element of subsidy
because producers are not subject to the income taxes that are levied
on firms that are not located within EPZ. This subsidy could be seen
as a temporary boost to the discovery of new export possibilities.
To be so, it must eventually be withdrawn.
The very concept of the EPZ can be seen as a creative way of
solving problems of governance (uncertainty of property rights)
and coordination between the ultimate exporter and the producers
of nontradable services and sectoral public goods—problems that
normally conspire against the development of new export sectors.
Within the EPZ, firms face less red tape; do not have to worry about
property rights for land; and have ready access to electricity, urbanized land, and port services. The existence of the enabling EPZ and
the economies of agglomeration promote investments in nontradable
services that cater to their needs.
Although hard evidence is not available, the fact that exports
have been able to grow and diversify in recent years, despite the obstacles faced by businesses (particularly if they are small and are in
the agricultural sector), would seem to be evidence of a remarkable
effort at self- discovery. In other words, there is no dearth of entrepreneurship in Nicaragua. The scarcity lies in the enabling environment
that would support an even stronger increase in exports.
Therefore, the fundamental market failure impeding new
exports in Nicaragua seems to be coordination. Public and private
decisions need to be coordinated better to remove the main stumbling blocks that cannot be addressed by individual producers: the
absence of sectoral public goods (ensuring food safety, complying
with phytosanitary standards in destination countries); poor logistics (the difficulties of purchasing produce from small producers,
cold storage, contacts with importers in destination countries,
quality consistency); the poor quality of rural infrastructure; the
limited capacity of airports and ports; the scarcity or nonexistence
of credit; and so forth. Farmers who produce export goods depend
on distributors, as they themselves do not have a scale of production sufficient to export directly. Therefore, marketing and extension services are essential to the take-off of these sectors. If these
problems were resolved, it is possible that a great deal of additional
self-discovery could occur. In other words, the basic problem is one
of coordination, and here public officials and business associations
have a large role to play.
As mentioned, the problems related to poorly defined property
rights are an important obstacle to growth in Nicaragua. These
problems cannot be solved quickly nationwide. But in agriculture,
the titling of land (and the payment of compensation when appropriate) could be an important impetus to the development of activities
that could turn out to be very dynamic. Regularizing property rights
in agriculture and carrying out a cadastre would be very important
steps forward. The clarification of property rights could help relax
credit constraints, since it would enable farmers to use their property as collateral.
Public and private coordination is also lacking in tourism, a
nascent sector in Nicaragua. Conditions for tourism are interesting
and varied; they resemble those of other countries in the region
that have been successful in this sector, particularly Costa Rica.
Some hotels that are part of international chains have started to
install facilities along the Pacific coast. What is needed is infrastructure, a legal framework, credit, and so forth: the same type
345
346
of coordination that is holding back the development of agroindustrial exports.
Social Returns: Is Education a Binding Constraint?
To determine whether education, or the availability of human capital,
is a binding constraint in Nicaragua, this study begins by examining
the available quantitative indicators of education. As shown in Table
7.9, in 2000, Nicaragua’s share of the population aged 15 or older
who had attended primary education (43.1 percent) was slightly
above the 41.5 percent level reported for all lower-middle-income
countries (LMIC). However, the share of those who had completed
primary education (9.6 percent) was slightly below the share for
lower-middle-income countries (13.1 percent). The figures for Latin
American and Caribbean countries (LAC) were similar to those of the
LMIC. The situation is about the same in the case of post-secondary
and tertiary education.
However, for secondary education, the percentages for Nicaragua are lower than those for the lower-middle-income and LAC
countries. For the total population aged 15 or older, 19.8 percent had
some secondary education (3.0 percent had complete secondary education) in Nicaragua, while the percentage in LMIC was considerably
higher (28.1 percent, with 8.4 percent having completed secondary
education). The percentages for LAC and LMIC almost match, while
the indicators for Nicaragua are similar to those of Central America
and the Dominican Republic (CA&DR). The scarcity of workers with
secondary education may be an obstacle to investment in manufacturing sectors for export. 20
If the scarcity of human capital were a constraint to growth, it
should be reflected in high rates of return to education, particularly
secondary and higher education. Table 7.10 presents data for some
countries with the rates of return for primary, secondary, and higher
20
The figures for women are similar to those for men. However, the differences
with the comparable countries are less.
2,913
34,171
2,218
31,426
37,915
49,758
19,688
156,206
27,229
14,662
20,242
150,252
7,694
3,970
28.9
22.8
15.4
3.3
52.0
21.6
8.7
21.3
5.7
15.7
31.6
48.9
45.4
23.4
Without
schooling
(percent)
43.1
35.2
27.4
27.9
33.1
41.5
39.9
42.2
35.6
45.1
31.0
24.8
36.4
46.2
Total
9.6
12.8
13.2
14.9
7.8
13.1
16.7
19.2
20.8
12.7
10.5
8.3
8.1
11.8
Complete
Primary (percent)
Source: Barro and Lee (2000).
Total = percentage of people who indicated that the corresponding level is higher than what they reached, whether or not they completed it.
Complete = percentage of people who indicated that they had completed the corresponding level.
Nicaragua
All countries
High income, OECD
High income, non-OECD
Low income
Lower-middle-income income (LMIC)
High-middle-income
Eastern Asia and Pacific
Europe and Central Asia
Middle East and Northern Africa
Southern Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central America and Dominican Republic
Group, region, country
Population
15 years and
older
(thousands)
TABLE 7. 9 Schooling of Total Population, Male and Female, 15 Years and Older, 2000
19.8
31.2
42.1
45.6
13.3
28.1
40.4
29.2
47.2
28.2
28.0
23.6
16.4
19.0
Total
3.0
11.2
17.3
21.2
3.0
8.4
13.6
10.8
15.7
8.5
9.0
7.8
3.5
6.2
Complete
Secondary (percent)
8.3
10.8
15.1
23.2
1.6
8.8
11.0
7.4
11.5
11.0
9.4
2.8
1.8
11.4
Total
4.3
4.9
7.3
9.5
0.8
4.2
5.8
3.7
7.5
5.0
4.0
1.4
0.8
5.2
Complete
Tertiary (percent)
4.6
6.3
7.8
9.6
2.8
5.8
7.8
5.9
8.7
6.2
5.4
3.8
3.4
5.4
Average
years of
schooling
347
348
education taken from the World Bank’s data base (EdStats, World
Bank 2007b). It presents estimates for 1985 onward (the most recent
data are for 1999). The observations for Nicaragua correspond to 1996
and the values are 13.6 percent for primary education, 10.4 percent
for secondary education, and 14.7 percent for higher education. Even
though intercountry comparisons must be made with great caution
due to differences in methodology and the years for which the estimates are available, the data for Nicaragua would seem to be close
to the average for all the countries in the sample. In any case, they
are not the highest shown in the table.
What is striking is that the return to secondary education is
not high enough, judging by the low levels of secondary education
suggested by the figures in Table 7.9. This result may be due partly
to low educational quality. The Public Expenditure Reviews for Nicaragua (World Bank 2001, 2007a) identify problems of this type.
For instance, in secondary education the proportion of teachers
with a low level of training has been increasing, while in primary
education, the proportion of teachers with a low level of training has
been decreasing. 21
In conclusion, although the indicators of human capital accumulation in Nicaragua are below those of comparable countries,
returns to education suggest that Nicaragua is not facing a binding
constraint stemming from the availability of educated workers. The
binding constraints must be sought elsewhere.
Low Social Returns: Is Infrastructure a Constraint?
Developing the infrastructure of developing countries can yield high
economic and social returns, several studies have found. However,
in many of these countries, fiscal adjustment has tended to reduce
public investment rather than current expenditure. In many cases,
this has led to a decrease not only in the rate of economic growth,
but also of the solvency of the government, as it reduces or does
21
See World Bank (2007a, p. 31).
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Korea, Rep. of
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Spain
United States
Estonia
Ethiopia
Philippines
The Gambia
Greece
Honduras
Country
TABLE 7.10
North America
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Region
High-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
High income, OECD
High-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
High income, OECD
High income, OECD
High-middle-income
Low income
Lower-middle-income
Low income
High income, OECD
Lower-middle-income
Income group
Rates of Return to Education by Level, Various Years
CA&DR
CA&DR
CA&DR
1989
1990
1989
1989
1993
1989
1986
1989
1987
1990
1991
1987
1995
1996
1988
1997
1993
1989
Year
8.4
13.0
35.6
8.1
14.4
20.0
—
11.2
14.7
16.4
7.4
—
14.0
14.9
13.3
33.5
—
18.2
Primary
7.1
6.0
5.1
11.1
12.9
11.4
8.8
14.4
12.7
13.3
8.5
10.0
2.2
14.4
8.9
12.1
6.5
19.7
Secondary
7.6
13.0
21.4
14.0
11.3
14.0
15.5
9.0
9.9
8.0
13.5
12.0
10.3
11.9
10.5
—
5.7
18.9
Higher
349
Southern Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Hungary
Indonesia
Jamaica
Mexico
Nepal
Nicaragua
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
United Kingdom
Singapore
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zimbabwe
Source: World Bank (2007b, 2007d).
— not available
Region
High-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Higher-middle-income
Low income
Lower-middle-income
High income, OECD
Low income
Lower-middle-income
High income, OECD
High-middle-income
High-middle-income
High-middle-income
Low income
Lower-middle-income
Low income
Income group
CA&DR
CA&DR
Rates of Return to Education by Level, Various Years (continued)
Country
TABLE 7.10
1993
1989
1989
1992
1999
1996
1991
1986
1990
1986
1998
1987
1989
1989
1992
1986
1987
Year
— 6.0
—11.0
17.77.9
11.8
15.78.1
13.610.04
—12.4
12.819.4
20.312.7
8.67.5
16.710.1
——
21.68.1
23.410.2
13.54.5
3.32.3
11.247.6
Primary
2.6
5.0
—
14.611.1
9.1
14.7
9.5
8.4
10.8
6.5
13.9
8.5
10.3
6.2
3.1
3.1
–4.3
Secondary
Higher
350
not improve the government’s long-term payment capacity. Slower
economic growth and lower public investment have led to lower
fiscal revenues, due to lower rates of growth in tax collection or in
revenues for the sale of public services. 22
Electricity is one problem area. The increase in the price of
hydrocarbons and opaque and ineffective subsidy policies have resulted in a combination of very high prices for nonsubsidized users
and in blackouts and interruptions in the supply of electricity. This
situation is an important constraint on investment in manufactures
for export and the domestic market, as well as in the generation and
transmission of electricity. It also contributes to the fiscal vulnerabilities that were discussed earlier.
In addition, Nicaragua is suffering from transportation bottlenecks. Port services are insufficient; in many cases, it is cheaper for
Nicaraguan producers to take their products to ports in neighboring
countries. The network of well-paved and well-maintained roads is
limited. These problems increase transport costs and constitute
binding constraints on growth.
Most infrastructure indicators are lower in Nicaragua than in
countries with a similar degree of development. This may be one
of the stumbling blocks faced by the rural sector in diversifying its
production and exports. Furthermore, some of the problems are
related to the lack of private investment due to the microeconomic
risks mentioned earlier.
Table 7.11 shows infrastructure indicators for energy, telecommunications, and transport for Nicaragua and compares them
against indicators for the relevant income group (LMIC) and LAC
for 2000 and 2004.
Table 7.11 presents only those infrastructure indicators for
which the World Development Indicators data base had observations for Nicaragua, LMIC, and LAC in 2000 and 2004. 23 The last
22
23
See Easterly and Servén (2003).
In accordance with World Bank methodology, the aggregate data weigh the
values of each country on the basis of its participation in the regional value of the
351
352
four columns show how Nicaragua compares against the LMIC and
LAC countries. A plus sign (+) indicates that Nicaragua has a better
indicator than the region or income group against which it is compared. A minus sign (–) indicates that it has a worse indicator. The
minus signs predominate. Public and private infrastructure appear
to be strong binding constraints on growth.
The discussion that follows highlights problems in the most
urgent areas: electricity, roads, and ports. Shortcomings in telecommunications are also huge, as Table 7.11 shows.
Electricity Infrastructure
Nicaragua’s problems in the electric energy sector have become
even more acute over the past two or three years. Generation and
distribution problems have led to a decrease in supply, which has
led to expanded periods of rationing and has worsened disputes
between the government and some private firms that participate in
different parts of the supply system. Constraints arising from the
lack of investment in infrastructure may well be interacting with
constraints on growth stemming from microeconomic risks (such
as governance, stability of the rules of the game, and the reliability
of the judiciary).
The installed capacity for electricity generation is low. Moreover, Nicaragua’s use of its hydroelectric potential is inefficient. As
a result, it has one of the world’s highest dependencies on oil and
its derivatives as sources of electricity generation and some of the
highest electric energy costs (see OLADE, 2004).
The above-mentioned characteristics of the Nicaraguan electric
energy system are reflected in high electricity prices to end users,
variable. When data are missing, they are estimated with the information available for the country so as to maintain the comparability of the series. See the
ìaggregation rulesî of the WDI in http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20452046~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:6413
3150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. The table also presents other
unweighted indicators.
186.8
431.9
2.1
2.9
1,447.7
10.0
23.4
8.0
4.5
2004
127.0
203.8
26.9
2.7
Telecommunications, general
Investment in telecommunications (percent of income)
Revenues from telecommunications (percent of GDP)
Telecommunications, telephony
Main telephone lines (for every 1000 people)
Subscribers to fixed lines and mobile phones
(for every 1000 inhabitants)
Population covered by mobile telephones (percent)
Average cost of telephone call to the USA
(US$ for every 3 minutes)
1,490
11.9
23.2
6.8
–4.1
Energy
GDP per unit of energy used
(constant US$ PPP at 2000 per equivalent kg. of oil)
Electricity
Consumption of energy (KWh per capita)
Transmission and distribution losses (percent of output)
Electricity produced from hydroelectric sources
Electricity produced from oil (percent of total)
2000
Lower-middleincome
countries (LMIC)
2.5
145.0
266.1
26.3
3.1
1,584.5
16.3
60.2
17.3
6.2
2000
33.4
51.8
3.2
89.9
1.8
5.9
2.6
349.4
29.9
9.2
81.6
5.9
60.0
41.9
186.0
416.6
24.4
11.4
75.2
5.2
2004
Nicaragua
2000
177.4
495.9
4.3
1,673.8
16.7
56.3
14.0
6.2
2004
Latin America
& Caribbean
countries (LAC)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
+
2000
LMIC
–
–
–
–
–
–
+
2004
LAC
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
2004
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
2000
Nicaragua versus
Infrastructure Indicators for Nicaragua, Lower-middle-income Countries, and Latin American and the Caribbean, 2000 and 2004
Variable
TABLE 7.11
353
Source: World Bank (2007d); Estache and Goicoechea (2005).
Blank cells=data not available
Other indicators
Households with television ( percent)
Personal computers (for every 1000 people)
Paved roads ( percent of total)
73.2
15.0
1.5
14.4
Telecommunications, Internet
Internet users (for every 1000 people)
Broad band subscribers (for every 1000 people)
Safe Internet servers (for every million inhabitants)
International voice traffic (for every 1000 people)
84.8
29.1
16.7
24.7
0.1
9.8
44.8
444.0
245.1
8.3
27.0
187.9
76.9
10.1
2004
2000
Variable
Lower-middleincome
countries (LMIC)
77.7
48.7
38.7
38.2
0.4
24.5
244.5
121.1
15.7
2000
88.3
117.0
9.6
8.5
9.1
318.6
9.5
2004
Latin America
& Caribbean
countries (LAC)
58.5
24.4
11.1
35.6
10.2
0.1
113.8
18.4
17.7
2000
39
24.4
1.0
2.7
65.0
16.0
144.2
13.1
4.8
2004
Nicaragua
–
–
–
–
+
–
–
–
2000
LMIC
–
–
–
–
+
–
–
–
–
2004
–
–
+
–
–
–
–
–
2000
Nicaragua versus
LAC
Infrastructure Indicators for Nicaragua, Lower-middle-income Countries, and Latin American and the Caribbean, 2000 and 2004
Telephone failures (for every 100 lines)
Telephone subscribers per employee
Mobile telephone subscribers (for every 1000 people)
Price of fixed telephone residential package
(US$ per month)
Price of mobile telephone package (US$ per month)
TABLE 7.11
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
2004
354
regardless of whether they are industrial commercial or residential
customers. Table 7.12 compares prices in Nicaragua to those of LAC
and Central America and the Dominican Republic (CA&DR).
Since 1994, prices to end-users have been significantly higher
than those of the other regions against which Nicaragua can be
compared. Moreover, as is shown in the lower half of Table 7.12, the
relative price differences between Nicaragua and LAC and CA&DR
have increased significantly between 1994 and 2004, as the annual
growth rates in prices have been much higher in Nicaragua than in
the average for these two regions.
For instance, the prices in Nicaragua for the industrial sector in
1994 were 1.4 times higher than the weighted average of the region
(LAC), and that ratio increased to 2.4 times by 2004. Without any
weighting, the increase is not as dramatic (from 1.0 to 1.5 times). 24
The comparison with CA&DR is similar, with the indicators moving
from close to 1.0 to between 1.4 and 1.5. This trend is also confirmed
by the comparisons with prices of other lower-middle-income countries. 25 Nicaragua not only has electricity prices that are among the
highest in the world, but the difference has grown with time.
Available evidence indicates that coverage and quality of electric services in Nicaragua are not good. Figure 7.6 shows, based on
data for 2004, that Nicaragua has a low per capita level of electricity consumption relative to its per capita GDP (the observation for
Nicaragua is below the trend line calculated for all countries). Also,
the percentages of energy losses in transmission and distribution
are higher in Nicaragua than in countries with a similar per capita
income (see also Table 7.11, which shows that losses in Nicaragua
are 2.5 times greater than those of LMIC and 1.5 times greater than
those of LAC). One of the main complaints of Unión FENOSA, the
private company that operates an important concession for the dis-
24
The drops in prices in Argentina and Venezuela during that period explain a
good part of the difference.
25
Unfortunately, most LMICs for which information on energy prices is available
in the WDI are in LAC.
355
Source: Authors’ elaborations, based on OLADE (2003, 2004) reports.
Note: Each country is weighted by its energy consumption.
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean
CA&DR = Central America and the Dominican Republic
Relative prices
Nicaragua/LAC (weighted)
Nicaragua/LAC (unweighted)
Nicaragua/CA (unweighted)
Nicaragua/CA&DR (unweighted)
without Nicaragua
CA&DR (unweighted) without Nicaragua /LAC (weighted)
CA&DR (unweighted) without Nicaragua/LAC (unweighted)
Average prices
Nicaragua
LAC (weighted)
LAC (unweighted)
CA&DR (weighted)
CA&DR (unweighted)
Region
2004
Annual growth rate
1994–2004 (percent)
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.1
0.9
0.9
1.5
1.5
11.0
10.9
11.0
10.3
10.1
1.4
1.0
0.9
0.9
8.5
6.1
8.6
9.1
9.2
1.0
0.8
1.3
1.1
1.3
1.3
10.2
7.7
9.0
7.9
7.6
1.7
1.1
2.4
1.5
1.3
1.4
12.9
5.4
8.5
9.8
9.3
1.2
1.0
1.9
1.5
1.4
1.5
16.6
9.0
11.0
11.9
11.1
1.4
1.1
1.8
1.4
1.2
1.3
14.3
8.1
10.4
11.5
11.0
1.4
0.9
4.4
3.5
4.1
4.2
–1.3
–0.1
0.7
0.1
2.8
0.9
4.3
2.7
3.3
4.2
–1.9
–0.1
1.5
0.9
3.3
2.3
1.9
–0.3
–0.4
3.4
0.5
1.5
3.7
3.8
Industrial Commercial Residential Industrial Commercial Residential Industrial Commercial Residential
1994
TABLE 7.12 Electricity Prices by Consumption Sector and Rates of Growth, Latin America, 1994 and 2004
(current US cents per KWh and percent)
356
FIGURE 7.6 Per Capita Consumption of Electricity and GDP Per Capita, 2004
[international US$(2000)]
Log of per capita electricity consumption
in year 2004 (KWh)
100,000
10,000
All countries
1,000
100
y = 0.0294e1.244x
R2 = 0.8167
Nicaragua
10
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
Log of real per capita GDP in 2004, corrected for PPP [constant international dollars (2000)]
Source: World Bank (2007d).
tribution of electric energy, is related precisely to high energy losses
and to the fact that energy theft goes unpunished. This problem of
losses and energy theft may in part explain the high prices, which
are needed to recover the costs of the energy that is actually sold to
and paid for by consumers.
Nicaragua has severe limitations in its supply of electric
energy. Low installed capacity and a high concentration in one
of the most expensive sources to generate electric energy, along
with serious problems of losses in transmission and distribution,
have made electricity prices in Nicaragua among the highest in the
world. Given the lack of incentives to invest and the sector’s opaque
institutional arrangements, it does not seem that this constraint will
be mitigated in the foreseeable future. The policy conclusion is that
clarifying the institutional framework could well be an investment
with high returns.
Road, Highway and Port Infrastructure
Public infrastructure in transport in Nicaragua also faces serious
limitations. Table 7.13 shows that Nicaragua has a density of roads
357
358
TABLE 7.13 Density of Roads by Population and Territorial Extension, 2002
Density of roads
per population
(km of roads for
every 1,000 inhabitants)
Density of roads by
geographic extension
(km of roads for
every 1,000 km 2)
Region or group of countries
2002
2002
Nicaragua
All countries
High income, OECD
Low income
Lower-middle-income (LMIC)
High middle-income
Eastern Asia & Pacific
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
Middle East and Northern Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central America and Dominican Republic
3.5
10.5
5.7
22.9
5.2
4.9
12.6
6.4
10.4
6.7
2.4
2.8
6.3
6.2
154.1
1,276.6
5,109.4
1,296.5
255.0
254.9
1,240.5
275.5
701.9
990.4
187.8
435.8
291.0
422.8
Source: Estache and Goicoechea (2005).
Note: The data are simple averages of the individual observations of the countries that make up each group or region. Therefore, they
cannot be compared to the data shown in tables based on the WDI, where the aggregate data are weighted.
far below that of comparable countries (LMIC, LAC, and CA&DR).
The density, as of 2002, was especially low when measured in terms
of geographic extension—and the most recent information available does not show any contrary trend. Nicaragua has a density of
154 km of road for each 1000 km 2 of extension: 50 percent of the
level in LMICs, only 16 percent of that observed in LAC, and nearly
one-third of that in CA&DR. The most severe lack of roads is in the
rural areas, where the problem of poverty is all the more acute. For
all the above reasons, roads also show important deficiencies that
limit economic growth in Nicaragua.
Summing up, the indicators examined show that Nicaragua
faces serious problems due to the lack of basic infrastructure. The
two categories of infrastructure that show the greatest deficits, and
that can be considered binding constraints on growth and private
investment, are the supply and cost of electricity and the availability
of adequate roads, highways, and ports.
Conclusion
A useful way to begin this concluding section is by stating which
problems do not seem to be binding constraints to growth. The
macroeconomic problems faced by the country seem to be solvable:
recent debt relief has reduced the burden of debt service and the
efforts at fiscal adjustment have reduced the intensity of the macroeconomic imbalance. Inflation has decreased and is now within
tolerable limits. However, this does not mean that the country is not
facing macroeconomic problems. If fiscal efforts are not intensified,
particularly in relation to increasing the tax burden and reducing
the weight of the actuarial deficit of the pensions system and other
contingent public liabilities, public debt could once again become
unsustainable. This was an agonizing problem for the government
until only recently. Furthermore, a reduction of external aid, very
unlikely though always possible, could have very serious consequences for public investment, particularly in the social sectors, and
would call for adjustment to cut the current account deficit, given
the country’s limited access to international capital markets. This
lends urgency to efforts to place the operations of the public sector
in good financial standing.
The high levels of dollarization of financial liabilities and assets make the macroeconomic system very vulnerable to shock
in the terms of trade, which have been very frequent in the past.
Therefore, a high priority for the authorities should be to reduce
the dollarization of the financial system, perhaps by introducing a
financial instrument indexed to inflation. The long-term solution is
to eliminate fiscal unsustainability, which is the cause of the public’s
preference for assets denominated in foreign currency.
In a lower-income country like Nicaragua, both the availability
and quality of education are barriers to growth in the long term. But
the moderate returns to education do not suggest that education is a
359
360
binding constraint to growth. If the country manages to accelerate
growth, the availability of human capital will undoubtedly become
a constraint to continuing to make progress. Hence the efforts in
education made in recent years must be continued. But at this time,
the availability of human capital is not retarding growth.
It does not seem that Nicaragua’s access to external financial
resources is blocked. Foreign direct investment has been quite
robust (though unstable) over the last decade. The evidence is less
clear with respect to the access and cost of credit from domestic
sources, particularly for businesses beyond the few large groups.
There is also some evidence that small firms in Nicaragua have
less access to credit than firms of the same size in other countries,
after controlling for other factors affecting the use of credit. But it
is more useful to examine this topic not as a constraint in itself but
as an element of the syndrome that appears to be one of the major
constraints on growth: the coordination problem that affects the
development of new activities.
Uncertain property rights, the lack of clarity regarding the
rules of the game, the weak rule of law, the politicization of the judiciary and other powers of the state, as well as corruption, seem to
be more serious problems in Nicaragua relative to other countries
with similar per capita incomes. Of course, the mere identification
of these problems will not solve them. They are complex and there
are powerful interests that generate and sustain them. Nor do they
have a technocratic or immediate solution.
On the other hand, some problems associated with infrastructure seem to be particularly serious. Cases in point are the supply
and cost of electricity, the discouragement of investment in electricity
generation, and the poor quality and insufficient coverage of road,
port, and airport infrastructure. Once again, the magnitude of the
problems seems to be such that they do not lend themselves to an
easy solution.
In some countries, researchers have detected that the absence
of self-discovery—that is, activities that detect new comparative
advantages that countries can explore and develop—is a binding
constraint to private sector investment. In the case of Nicaragua, the
development of an important number of new exports (and of tourism
services, though still at a lower scale) in the current decade suggests
that there is no scarcity of good ideas among small and medium-sized
entrepreneurs, particularly in the rural sector. The main problem
seems to be the small relative size of each one of these new products
and exports. This would indicate that investment and growth are
being held back by a coordination problem between private agents
and the state, which must provide the sectoral public goods without
which development of the sector becomes impossible.
Perhaps an incremental way of broaching the set of problems
that have been identified as binding constraints is to focus attention
on this coordination problem in specific sectors, particularly agriculture and tourism. It could well be that the problems of governance,
infrastructure, and credit, overwhelming if they are considered for
the entire economy, may be easier to handle from the standpoint
of the sectors with an export potential. This would imply steadfast
action on many fronts: granting property titles to rural tenants;
orienting investments in infrastructure to those areas where the
centers of production are located; facilitating the investment of firms
that may act as marketing agents and exporters of these products;
improving ports and airports with the infrastructure that these
producers need; strengthening the state agencies responsible for
enforcing the standards of quality and safety of exported foodstuffs
(or, what is probably more effective, promoting this same activity
through business associations such as APENN); and concentrating
the improvement of access to credit in the rural sector. The latter
would tend to occur spontaneously with a successful program to
grant property deeds in both rural and tourism areas.
This does not mean that no attention should be paid to other
sectors. There has also been an increase in exports from the EPZ
that are no longer the conventional maquila. But with a state, like
Nicaragua, that has such limited capacities, it is far better to concentrate on public actions in a limited number of activities with a
very high social return.
361
362
References
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CHAPTER 8
Trinidad and Tobago:
Economic Growth in a
Dual Economy
Daniel Artana, Sebastián Auguste, Ramiro Moya,
Sandra Sookram, and Patrick Watson*
Introduction
Trinidad and Tobago is a middle-income,1 energy-rich country with
relatively strong institutions and political stability. It is the most
industrialized economy in the English-speaking Caribbean, with
a population of 1.3 million and a territory of 5,128 km 2 . It is part
of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional cooperative
Trade and Common Market agreement that became operational in
August 1973. Its energy sector accounts for more than 40 percent of
GDP and 80 percent of exports, but only 5 percent of employment.
It is the most important world provider of ammonia and methanol,
as well as the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas to the United
States. The country is currently enjoying a period of unprecedented
prosperity because of high energy prices: economic growth has averaged 7.7 percent per year since 1994 and socioeconomic indicators
are improving.
*
Daniel Artana, Sebastián Auguste, and Ramiro Moya are affiliated with the
Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL) in Buenos
Aires, Argentina. Sandra Sookram and Patrick Watson are affiliated with The
University of the West Indies.
1
Per capita GDP was US$10,440 in 2005.
366
DANIEL ARTANA, SEBASTIÁN AUGUSTE, RAMIRO MOYA, SANDRA SOOKRAM, AND PATRICK WATSON
Trinidad and Tobago has the features of a dual economy. The
energy sector is a source of self-financed investment, making it
independent of national savings and fiscal revenues. However, the
benefits of large investments in the sector do not easily spill over to
the rest of the economy. Beyond the labor-intensive plant construction phase, the booming energy sector is not creating a comparably
large number of jobs. This duality results in a wealthy sector with
excellent growth prospects, with the rest of the economy lagging
behind.
Many of the economic problems and constraints to growth
that the country has faced historically are common to other oiland-gas-rich countries: problems such as elevated macro volatility
and underdevelopment of the non-energy private sector. In addition,
the country in the past has had a highly procyclical fiscal policy,
which exacerbated the macro volatility and underinvestment in
infrastructure.
An important puzzle to be solved is why resources from the oil
and gas sector do not flow to the non-oil tradable sectors. These two
sectors are not independent: the abundance of natural resources and
the development of the oil and gas sector might be the most important cause for the underdevelopment of other sectors, a phenomenon
called Dutch Disease. However, the problem of countries abundant
in natural resources is more general than the Dutch Disease problem. For instance, the fact that most of the government’s revenues
comes from oil and gas, and not from general taxes, might affect
fiscal responsibility, public expenditure might be more inefficient,
and institutions might be weaker. Any growth-related problem associated with natural resource abundance will be referred to as the
“natural resource curse.”
The country has made some effort to diversify the economy
and reduce the macro volatility during the last 12 years. There have
been several reforms in an attempt to avoid procyclical fiscal policy
and a stabilization fund has been created. The current government
has actually outlined a program to achieve a Vision 2020 goal to
become a developed country by 2020. A key objective of Vision 2020
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A DUAL ECONOMY
is sustained and balanced growth, where the benefits from growth
spread out to the entire population. What additional steps should
Trinidad and Tobago make to achieve sustainable growth? How can
the country achieve balanced growth? How can the country benefit
the most from oil and gas revenues? Is it possible that the current
macro prosperity is concealing constraints on growth? What are the
risks that Trinidad and Tobago faces in achieving sustained growth?
These are the type of questions that this chapter addresses, using
the growth diagnostic methodology (GDM) developed by Hausmann,
Rodrik and Velasco (2005). According to this methodology, to identify
policies that foster economic growth, it is necessary first to identify
the constraints that limit investment, and then establish a priority
order. The most binding constraints are defined as those that, once
removed, will have the largest impact on economic growth.
The set of binding constraints is not static, but changes as the
economy evolves. After the elimination of one binding constraint,
new binding constraints might emerge. It is therefore possible that
the numerous reforms Trinidad and Tobago has undergone in the
last two decades have modified the set of constraints on growth,
and new constraints are now binding, or may become binding in
the near future. For this reason it is important to analyze the case
of Trinidad and Tobago in a dynamic setting, to further understand
the history of the economy and its future. Further, the current high
energy prices and strong economic growth might be concealing
constraints that could be binding or could become binding if the oil
price boom ends or oil reserves are depleted.
A shortcoming of the growth diagnostics methodology is that
it does not provide guidance on how to identify potential binding
constraints so as to permit policy design that can curtail the effect
of such constraints. Since the constraints are identified using stock
and flow variables, only those binding constraints that are reflected
in the data today can be identified. Because the growth process
results from past and current decisions, which have been taken
in different economic environments, the signals being sought in
the data contain information about old and new constraints, and
367
368
some of them might no longer be binding. For these reasons, the
signal extraction should be based on decisions made under recent
conditions: more than analyzing the actual growth process, this
study will focus on the most recent decisions of firms and families
to identify the current binding constraints. To do this, this study
will complement the standard GDM analysis with a business survey
particularly targeted at the non-energy sector. The justification for
making a specific differentiation between the energy and non-energy
sectors lies in the fact that these sectors might face different binding
constraints. The energy sector is robust enough, with a production
technology different enough, to overcome several constraints. If
Trinidad and Tobago wants to achieve more balanced economic
growth and reduce dependence on energy, it has to identify the
constraints facing the non-energy sectors. This is the main objective of this study.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next
section briefly describes the main characteristics of the economy
of Trinidad and Tobago. The third section briefly summarizes the
growth diagnostic framework used in this study and the prior beliefs
regarding Trinidad and Tobago’s problems, using a growth decision
tree. The fourth section analyzes the binding constraints on growth
from the business perspective, where it is shown that most of the
business concerns are related to the lack of opportunities. The fifth
section analyzes the access to and cost of financing. The sixth section explores the binding constraints through the analysis of survey
data. The seventh section examines the issue of social returns. The
eighth section looks at appropriability. The ninth section attempts
an open forest analysis of the country’s potential for diversification.
The tenth section looks at the issues of capacity, innovation, and
learning. The eleventh section concludes the paper.
Trinidad and Tobago: Stylized Facts
The sugar-based economy of the nineteenth century became oil-based
in the twentieth century, with the discovery of oil in Trinidad. Oil
and oil-related exports eventually dominated the economy, which
resulted in the transformation of much of the population from a
rural to an urban one. Trinidad and Tobago has frequently escaped
the wrath of major devastating hurricanes and the major shocks the
economy has suffered have almost always been related to energy
price fluctuations.
The economy of Trinidad and Tobago is highly dependent on
the oil and gas industry. In 2006, the petroleum industry (including petrochemicals) accounted for approximately 45 percent of
GDP, in current prices and at factor costs (or 41.2 percent, in real
T T$.). Services are the other important sector, with a GDP share
of 48.7 percent (government services represent 14.6 percent of total
services). Manufacturing and agriculture, together, account for the
remaining 6.3 percent of GDP.
The recent economic history of Trinidad and Tobago shows a
period of relatively high growth with stable international oil prices
(1950–73), a period of high growth with high oil prices (1974–82),
a long period with negative (per capita) real growth (1983–93), and
the recent growth boom.
The share of the petroleum industry in total GDP (on average,
34 percent in the last 40 years) has increased significantly in the
current boom, from a relatively low 25 percent in 1985–1994 to 45
percent at present. By contrast, the share of the nonpetroleum sector has been steadily decreasing. Although the petroleum share has
been positively correlated with energy prices, the current situation
is more related to new discoveries in gas-related industries (the
discovery of new gas reservoirs, but also new products such as urea,
liquefied natural gas, ammonia, and methanol), rather than prices.
Since 1991, 90 percent of net capital formation has been directed to
the petroleum industries. As a consequence, the dependency on the
energy sector has increased.
As a result of the dependence on energy, the Trinidad and
Tobago economy has been very volatile, both in nominal and real
terms. Per capita real GDP in the last 50 years has been one of the
most volatile among a set of comparable economies (only Kuwait
369
370
and Saudi Arabia, other oil producer countries, are as volatile as
Trinidad and Tobago). Economic cycles also have a peculiar shape,
with large amplitudes and long recovery periods. The recent development of the gas industry might not be strong enough to isolate
the economy from energy price shocks, since prices are highly
correlated
While its business platform is sound, Trinidad and Tobago
firms lack the necessary strength, and with the exception of the
energy sector, no healthy clusters have been developed and few
local firms can provide sophisticated services to foreign energy
companies (Fairbanks et al. 2006). Energy income has not led to
the development of world-class companies. Whereas oil and gas
revenues have financed local consumption, they have contributed
little to investment in the country’s future productive capacity. The
country gains a considerable amount of revenue from the oil and
gas-related industries, but sophisticated upstream energy industries (such as geological modeling, deep-sea drilling, or equipment
manufacturing) have developed little, and downstream industries
have focused on low-end commodity goods (such as PET plastic to
create inexpensive patio furniture).
Trinidad and Tobago has been enjoying trade and current
account surpluses and large inflows of foreign direct investment.
Although the central bank has been accumulating reserves, 2 there
has been a moderate real exchange rate appreciation, mainly through
inflation.
The energy and non-energy sectors grew fairly evenly until the
late 1990s. The strong increase in energy prices accelerated growth,
but distorted the balance. Since 2000 the growth rate of the energy
sector has been almost double the rate of the non-energy sector. The
average growth rate for the non-petroleum sector in the 2000–04
period was 3.75 percent, compared to 6 percent in the 1994–09 period. Some sectors such as tourism fell from a 4.9 percent annual
2
Foreign assets increased from US$1.4 billion in January 2000 to US$8.6 billion
in January 2007.
growth rate for 1994–09 to –3.4 percent in the 2000–04 period. In this
period, the petroleum sector alone accounted for almost 65 percent
of total GDP growth, and, together with the services sector, for 93.5
percent of real GDP growth.
Is this a break in the balance or just a temporary situation?
What particular conditions does the non-energy sector face so
that it does not grow at the same rate even when oil prices are
skyrocketing? Is there any relationship between the energy sector’s fortunes and the deceleration in the non-energy sectors? Is
this a sign of Dutch Disease? This interrelationship between the
energy and non-energy sector, and the particular conditions in the
non-energy sector long-run growth, are the keys to understanding
Trinidad and Tobago.
Growth Diagnostic Methodology
The growth diagnostic methodology (GDM), proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2004), decomposes economic growth
in the following way:
«
®
®
g
S
1
T)
R
¬ (
M
M
® appropriability social returns cos t of
Economic growth
®
private return to accumulation
º
®
®
rM
».
financing accumulation ®
®
¼
In the case of a dual, natural resource-abundant economy
such as Trinidad and Tobago’s, an aggregate view is not enough to
understand the growth opportunities and binding constraints: the
growth opportunities of each sector and their interactions need to
be understood, since the constraints may be different for non-energy
and energy activities. The main features of the dual economy and
growth are summarized in Figure 8.1.
A major concern for Trinidad and Tobago is the diversification
of economic activity, and preparing for the time when oil and gas
reserves are depleted. The binding constraints on growth in the
371
372
FIGURE 8.1 Duality and Economic Growth in Trinidad and Tobago
Petroleum Sector
Nonpetroleum Sector
Currently high growth and high investment
Currently high growth boosted by the high international
prices for oil and gas.
Growth opportunities depend on international price for oil
and gas, and proven reserves (currently 12 years)
Growth possibilities in services related to the petroleum
sector and downstream industries
The government objective, as stated in Vision 2020, is to
develop downstream petrochemical plants that use
semi-processed inputs (under the assumption that they
could be imported once energy reserves are exhausted).
Growth in this sector is due to services (which explains
almost 80 percent of the accumulated growth in the
non-petroleum sector between 2002 and 2006)
Lack of growth autonomy (growth has been highly
dependent on the petroleum sector)
Tradable sector underdeveloped.
Source: Authors.
FIGURE 8.2 Growth Diagnostic Tree for Trinidad & Tobago
gσ<¢τ
ρ¢r>
)JTUPSJDBMMZMPXHSPXUIBOEMPX
*(%1JOUIFOPOQFUSPMFVNTFDUPS
#BSSJFSTUP
JOWFTUNFOU
$PTUMZJOUFSOBUJPOBM
ñOBODFm)JHIDPVOUSZSJTL
r 1PPSQVCMJDEFCUNBOBHFNFOU
QBSUJDVMBSMZJOUIFTBOE
T5IFEFCUUP(%1SBUJPIBT
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OPOQFUSPMFVNEFñDJUBCPVU
QFSDFOUPG(%1
JTJODSFBTJOHMZ
NBLJOHEFCUTVTUBJOBCJMJUZNPSF
EFQFOEFOUPOPJMQSJDFT
$PTUMZMPDBM
ñOBODF
8FBLSFHVMBUJPO
5IFCBOLJOHTZTUFNJTXFMMDBQJUBMJ[FE
CVUJUSFNBJOTWVMOFSBCMFUPEFDMJOFT
JOFOFSHZQSJDFT
5IFMFHBMSFHVMBUPSZBOETVQFSWJTPSZ
GSBNFXPSLHPWFSOJOHUIFñOBODJBM
TFDUPSTIPVMECFNPEFSOJ[FEUPMFBE
UPBTPMJEñOBODJBMDFOUFS
-BDLPGPQQPSUVOJUJFT
-PXBQQSPQSJBCJMJUZ
-PXTPDJBMSFUVSOT
r )JHINJDSPSJTL
Corruption."MUIPVHIMPXFSUIBO
UIFSFHJPOBMBWFSBHFJUIBTCFFO
JODSFBTJOHSFDFOUMZ
r Low supply of
complementary inputs:
1. Human capital
r )JHINBDSPSJTL
1PPSCBOLJOHSFHVMBUJPOT
IJHISJTLPGCBOLJOHDSJTJT
3JTLPGñOBODJBMPSñTDBMDSJTJT
3. Foreign exchange risk: DPVOUSZ
WVMOFSBCMFUPTIBSQ
NPWFNFOUT%VUDI%JTFBTF
r )JHIUSBOTQPSU
telecommunications,
or shipping costs
r Tax pressure is not high, increasing
the nonpetroleum deficit
5IFBDUVBMTQFOEJOHQBUIXPVME
JNQMZBTIBSQñTDBMBEKVTUNFOU
PODFFOFSHZSFTPVSDFTBSFEFQMFUFE
1VCMJDTQFOEJOHJTBSPVOEQFSDFOU
PGUIFOPOQFUSPMFVN(%1DSPXEJOH
PVUQSJWBUFJOWFTUNFOU
r Externalities, spillovers and
coordination failure
r $SJNF
r -PXDPNpetitiveness due to:
1. Appreciated foreign
exchange rate originated
by remittances)
2. Lack of access to international
markets for nonpetroleum
goods.
r 5PPMJUUMFTFMGEJTDPWFSZ
Informality
non-energy sector in Trinidad and Tobago are outlined in Figure 8.2.
The rest of this work will attempt to identify which of these potential
constraints on growth are binding.
Economic Growth and Investment
Trinidad and Tobago’s problem does not seem to be its growth
rate (8 percent on average over the past decade), but its capacity to
achieve sustained, balanced growth and avoid the effects of energy
price shocks (see Figure 8.3). Specialization in the energy sector
is not only a reflection of factor abundance, but also a reflection of
the country’s growth path. If the non-energy, tradable sector grew
at the same rate as in other fast-growing economies (like Korea),
the petroleum sector would account for no more than 20 percent of
GDP today, instead of 50 percent. The fact that copper-rich Chile,
for instance, has at present a relatively well-diversified economy
is a reflection of its success in achieving balanced growth and the
discovery and development of noncopper activities.
It is interesting to compare Trinidad and Tobago’s growth with
that of eight benchmark countries (Elias, Jaramillo and Rojas-Suárez,
2006): the four developed economies of Iceland, Ireland, Norway,
FIGURE 8.3 Growth Rate and Oil Price
10
Per capita Real GDP
470
420
370
5
320
270
0
220
–5
WTI price (*)
–10
170
120
70
–15
1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
2
Source: University of Pennsylvania (Penn World Table Statistics) for 1950–1965; Central Statistical Office for 1965–2006.
Note: Primary axis shows the growth rate of the real GDP per capita (at 1955 prices) and secondary axis the evolution of the price of
* West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) in constant 1955 US$ (index 1995=100).
WTI price
Real per capita GDP growth rate
15
373
374
and Singapore; and the four fast-growing developing economies of
Chile, Costa Rica, Malaysia, and Mauritius. Over the 1970–2006
period, all these countries grew faster, except for Norway. The relative performance of Trinidad and Tobago is highly influenced by the
current growth acceleration process. From 1970 to 1995, Trinidad and
Tobago grew at only 2 percent annually, compared to 5.4 percent or
5.5 percent for the average benchmark economy. Because Trinidad
and Tobago is now growing faster than benchmark countries, it is
catching up with developed economies such as the United States,
but it is still below the maximum relative level reached in the previous oil boom.
A nother interesting comparison is bet ween the share
of petroleum in total GDP and the corresponding share of
nonpetroleum tradable goods and services: whereas the petroleum
industry has sustained its share over the last 50 years (around
30 percent), the nonpetroleum tradable sector shows a sustained
decline, going from almost 20 percent in the early 1970s to 6.2
percent in 2006 (Figure 8.4). This observed trend is consistent with
the predictions of Hausmann and Rigobon (2002). The volatility
of energy prices generates risks in the nonpetroleum tradable
sector, which impedes its development, but at the same time its
shrinking share makes the economy even more vulnerable to
energy price shocks.
Patterns of investment are another story. During the last 15
years, the average ratio of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to
GDP in Trinidad and Tobago was 19.5 percent. For the 1970–2000
period, this ratio was similar to Costa Rica’s and above Chile’s
(these two countries have a higher real GDP per capita average
growth for the same period). But part of this relatively good
performance is the high investment ratios observed in the previous oil boom. When Trinidad and Tobago is compared with the
benchmark countries, its capital formation seems low. Chile, for
instance, had an average ratio of investment to GDP of almost
20 percent between 1985 and 2004, compared to 14.9 percent for
Trinidad and Tobago.
FIGURE 8.4 Share of Petroleum and Nonpetroleum Tradable Sectors of GDP
(at factor cost), 1952–2006
A. Petroleum Industry’s GDP as a Share of Total GDP
45%
40%
35%
30%
Avg 1950s
Avg 1960s
25%
Petroleum
sector
20%
2006
2003
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
1979
1976
1973
1970
1950s
1967
10%
B. Nonpetroleum Tradables GDP as a Share of Total GDP
30%
Avg 1950s
25%
Avg 1960s
20%
15%
10%
Nonpetroleum
tradable sector
5%
2006
2003
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
1979
1976
1973
1970
1950s
1967
0%
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Central Statistic Office public information.
Estimates of the capital stock, based on a method developed by
Watson (1997), show that between 1991 and 2003 the stock increased
by 147 percent. The annualized rate of 7.2 percent exceeds the GDP
growth rate of 5.9 percent per year, which indicates that the economy
is becoming more capital-intensive. A striking feature of the recent
investment process in Trinidad and Tobago is the large heterogeneity by
economic sector: the capital stock in the petroleum sector increased by
388 percent (an annual rate of 14.1 percent) while in the nonpetroleum
sector it increased by only 22 percent (or 1.54 percent annually).
375
FIGURE 8.5 Evolution of the Capital Stock in Energy and Non-energy Industries,
1990–2003
60,000
Millions of TT$, constant 2000 prices
376
Energy sector
50,000
40,000
30,000
Non-energy sector
20,000
10,000
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Authors’ calculations
TT$ = Trinidad and Tobago $
Some non-energy sectors show better (net) investment rates,
such as manufacturing, financial services, and agriculture (accumulated rates of 90 percent, 52 percent, and 32 percent, respectively). Some sectors show strong net reductions, such as tourism,
other services, and infrastructure services (accumulated rates of
–4 percent, –12 percent, and –49 percent, respectively). Even in
the manufacturing sector, the overall high rate is due to high rates
in two subsectors only: the chemical & nonmetallic minerals, and
assembly-type & related industries, the two fastest-growing industries
in this period. The other subsectors show low growth. The rate of
capital formation in the non-energy sector stagnated, with a positive but small growth in 1994–99 and a slight decrease in 2000–3.
Overall growth in both the energy and non-energy sectors reflect
the growth in investment in the respective sectors: it is booming in
the one and sluggish in the other.
The observed pattern of capital formation shows that the
economy, rather than diversifying away from energy industries, is
specializing even more in them. With the low net capital formation
in the non-energy industries (with a few exceptions), it is not surprising that this sector has been growing more slowly in recent years
compared to the mid-1990s.
The pattern of returns to capital in the energy and non-energy
tradable sectors seems to be more in line with a Dutch Disease-type
of problem than a financial constraints problem. This study computed
the rate of return to capital in the petroleum and nonpetroleum
tradable sectors. The rate in the petroleum sector is almost double
that in the nonpetroleum sector. The accumulation of capital stock
is therefore following a reasonable pattern: capital is flowing to the
most profitable sectors. The returns in the petroleum sector have
been more volatile (with a coefficient of variation of 0.35, as opposed
to 0.14 in the nonpetroleum tradable sector), and there is a negative
correlation between both returns (correlation coefficient –0.11).
The petroleum sector has been characterized by high capital
formation and decreasing returns, while the nonpetroleum tradable sector has shown low capital accumulation and flat or slightly
increasing returns. For the entire non-energy sector (tradable and
nontradable), the return to capital shows a slightly increasing pattern
due to a very high increase in the return for services, particularly
in 1998–2003.
The return to capital for the energy and nontradable sectors
(for which the estimation is more reliable) seems high when com-
FIGURE 8.6 Rates of Return for Petroleum and Nonpetroleum Tradable Sectors,
1991–2003
60%
Rate of Return
50%
Energy
Economy
40%
30%
20%
Non-energy tradable
10%
0%
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Note: The non-energy tradable sector includes agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism.
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
377
378
pared to developed economies. Poterba (1997), for instance, reports
an accounting rate of return for business assets in the Group of 7
industrialized countries (G-7) of approximately 15.1 percent for the
1990s, and 14.3 percent for the 1966–96 period. The relative high rate
of return found here is in line with the findings for other developing
economies. Relative risk in G-7 countries, however, as measured
by the Sharpe ratio, 3 is almost half that of Trinidad and Tobago’s
non-energy tradable sector, which means that the relatively high
returns of Trinidad and Tobago are not high enough to compensate
for the risks.
The fact that returns show a different pattern in the non-energy
tradable and nontradable sectors (where investment is low) seems to
be inconsistent with the aggregate financial constraint hypothesis,
since a clear increasing trend in returns would be expected for both
sectors in the event of capital flight.
Identifying Binding Constraints on Growth
Using Micro (Survey) Data
The GDM approach is used to identify the binding constraints on
growth using macro and micro evidence. Business is one of the key
players in the economic growth process and such constraints affect
profitability and growth opportunities. In addition, there could be
important differences in the binding constraints by economic sector. The GDM analysis is therefore complemented with micro data
collected from a survey of 500 firms, mainly in nonenergy sectors.
The sample was designed to capture the opinions of the non-energy
sector, but included a small number of energy sector firms (six companies that provide services in the energy sector).
Firms were asked whether they thought any external factors
were limiting their growth (see Table 8.1). Some 57 percent indicated
that they face constraints on growth that do not depend on firm
3
This is a measure of the risk-adjusted return (ratio of average return to the
standard deviation).
1st
1st or 2nd
1st
1st or 2nd
Small
Source: Authors’ survey.
Large
Ranking
Firm size
13.9
18.0
8.5
17.0
Bad
regulations
Lack of
human capital
18.8
33.6
17.0
29.8
Costly
finacing
31.3
37.4
14.9
27.7
TABLE 8.1 Main Constraint to Growth by Firm Size
(as a percent of firms answering this question)
22.9
38.3
36.2
53.2
Low
profitability
13.6
19.7
21.3
36.2
Poor access to
foreign market
13.3
21.7
10.6
21.3
Poor
infrastructure
31.0
34.2
59.6
66.0
Macro
risks
18.0
24.1
29.8
40.4
Poor
management
3.2
3.8
4.3
4.3
Other
379
380
management. Interestingly, this result is stronger for energy sector firms and manufacturing. The ratio is higher for exporters than
for non-exporters,4 which is consistent with a Dutch Disease–type
of argument: when the energy sector is booming, it imposes more
economic stress on other tradable sectors, limiting their growth opportunities. The ratio also increases with firm size. Since firm size
is related to the age of the firm, an explanation might be the firm
growth curve: as a firm matures, it is more likely to be able to deal
with internal limitations, and the risks and problems it now faces
are more related to factors outside the firm.
The most limiting constraint on growth and development that
firms face in the economic sector in which they operate is “macro
risks” (selected by 38 percent of respondents), followed by “costly
financing” (30 percent) and “low profitability” (25 percent). Although
firms complained about the quality of infrastructure and services,
only a few identified this as the most limiting factor. This answer
may be interpreted as a revealed preference or priority ranking:
infrastructure might be a problem, but it is not the most important
constraint to business growth. The most cited constraints, irrespective of ranking, were “low profitability,” “costly financing,” “lack of
human capital,” and “macro risks,” in that order.
Most firms, regardless of size, selected options from the
“lack of opportunities” branch of the growth-diagnostic tree. Inside this branch, “low returns” dominate over “appropriability” in
importance. If the analysis is restricted to firms that are individually constrained, the results are similar (with low return losing
some weight but remaining the first option). It may be concluded,
therefore, from a business perspective, that the problem for the
non-energy sector is low returns rather than costly financing or
low appropriability.
The smaller the firm, the more weight that survey respondents
place on “costly finance.” The larger the firm, the more weight is
put on “appropriability” and “low profitability.” In terms of the in4
That is, firms oriented to the domestic market.
TABLE 8.2 Distribution of Constraint to Growth by Factor Type
(as a percent of firms reporting a problem)
Costly financing
Ranking
Costly
financing
1st
1st or 2nd
17.6
15.7
Lack of opportunities
Appropriability
29.1
25.0
Poor
complementary
inputs
Low
profitability
Total
39.0
41.8
14.3
17.6
100.0
100.0
Source: Authors’ survey.
dividual factors, for large firms, “macro risks” is the most binding
constraint, followed by “low profitability” and “poor management.”
For small firms, the most binding constraint is “costly financing,”
followed by “macro risks” and “low profitability.” Again, since the
sample is overrepresented by small firms, for the economy as a
whole, the constraints identified may be closer to those identified
by the large firms rather than those noted by the smaller firms in
the sample.
When the analysis is broken down by economic sector, the manufacturing sector (tradable) placed more weight than the distribution
and services sector (nontradable, for the most part) on “appropriability.” “Lack of complementary inputs” is particularly important
for services (which are more labor-intensive than capital-intensive),
whereas “costly financing” is more important in distribution. “Low
returns” represents around 50 percent of the most binding constraints
for the three sectors and is, therefore, the most binding constraint
regardless of economic sector.
When the sample is disaggregated according to exporters and
non-exporters, both select factors related to “low returns” as the most
binding constraints. Exporters put more weight on “macro risks”
and non-exporter firms put more weight on “costly finance.”
In summary, from a business perspective, financing constraints
are not the most binding constraints for Trinidad and Tobago, but
rather the lack of opportunities, regardless of the economic sector
and firm type.
381
382
Financial Constraints
The saving rate in Trinidad and Tobago is above the average for
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and historically exceeds
the gross fixed capital formation rate for the region (that is, it is a net
saver country). It has the highest foreign direct investment (FDI) to
GDP ratio in LAC (an average of 8.4 percent over the 2001–05 period,
compared to the LAC average of 3 percent) and a large capital account
surplus (for 1999–2006). Its sovereign debt attained investment grade
in July 2005 (Standard and Poor’s), 5 its financial system is sound,
and it has never suffered a financial crisis. Its banking system is
relatively sophisticated, dynamic, and well-capitalized; it does not
appear vulnerable to the weaknesses in the regional economies and
it is evolving as a regional financial center (IMF, 2003).
Using the World Development Indicators (WDI) database for
129 countries, countries were clustered into three groups (low-cost,
high-cost, and extreme-imbalance countries). Trinidad and Tobago
belongs to the low-cost group, with a lower-than-world average
interest rate spread, lower-than-world average real interest rate,
and higher-than-world average savings rate. In this group there
are 79 countries reporting the most favorable financing conditions,
including emerging and developed economies such as Australia,
Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland,
and Venezuela, as well as Albania, Argentina, Ethiopia, Honduras,
Nigeria, Thailand, and Vietnam. For the group, the average interest
rate spread is around 6 percent, the real interest rate is close to 6
percent, and savings-to-GDP ratio is around 25 percent.
Within the low-cost group, Trinidad and Tobago is close to the
average, ranking 60 th out of 129 countries with regard to interest rate
spreads, 47th with regard to the real interest rate, and 41st with respect
to savings to GDP ratio. This suggests that Trinidad and Tobago is
not financially constrained, at least from the macro perspective.
5
Only three other countries in the region have this grade: Barbados, Chile,
and Mexico.
Trinidad and Tobago has a relatively mature stock market with
high market capitalization, but only a few local firms are listed: of the
28,621 businesses operating in Trinidad and Tobago in 2005, only
28, or less than 0.1 percent of the total, are listed. The corresponding ratios for the United Kingdom and Canada are 14.3 percent and
11.8 percent, respectively.
The reluctance of Trinidad and Tobago firms to list is a result
of five main factors: the legacy of ownership of firms; the structure
of capital markets; the regulatory framework of the respective domestic capital markets and the perceived risks associated with using
the local securities markets; the fact that markets are nontransparent and are controlled by a few major market actors (interlocking
directors); and the high cost of listing in the local stock exchanges
(Sergeant 2006).
Despite the apparently low percentage of publicly listed firms,
market capitalization as a ratio of GDP is relatively high (115 percent)
and similar to the average for high-income countries (113 percent),
but very biased to the finance sector (68 percent of total market
capitalization, whereas manufacturing and tourism represent only
9 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively). This relatively high market
capitalization is due to cross-listing with other Caribbean countries
and the large increase in firm value since 2000 (at that time, market
capitalization was just 53 percent of GDP).
A Financial Sector Assessment (FSA) carried out in 2006 by
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that increased savings and limited domestic investment were
responsible for the upward pressure on asset prices (and balance
sheet values of pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies). Increases of around T T$90 billion in market capitalization
since 1997 were due mainly to increases in share prices (around
75 percent). Most of the T T$31 billion worth of new equities raised
in the market were bonus issues and overseas cross-listings, and
only 10 percent involved new capital raised by local firms. These
cross-listings have given regional companies access to capital in
Trinidad and Tobago and provided an important outlet for domestic
383
384
savings. It seems that there are enough resources to finance local
firms through the local stock exchange market, but firms are not
using the option.
Using cluster analysis, the 162 countries in the WDI database
were classified into three groups: low, medium, and high financial
depth. Trinidad and Tobago is among the countries with low financial
depth, together with the majority of developing countries, though
it is among the top performers in that group. According to the 2006
Financial Sector Assessment, expansion of financial access has been
limited over the past decade. For instance, credit unions have grown
rapidly, but a large part of the increase in assets has taken the form
of financial investments rather than lending to members. Furthermore, the provision of financial services to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) through other institutional channels has also not
grown significantly because of the high costs and risks associated
with SME lending, as well as profitable investment opportunities
available to commercial banks outside of this sector.
The survey showed that bank loans represent the first option
for financing business activity. On average, 51.8 percent of a firm’s
last investment was financed with bank loans. The most common
case is for banks to finance between 50 percent and 60 percent of
the last investment (64 firms) and 62 percent of the firms financed at
least 30 percent of new investment with bank loans. These findings
suggest that formal credit is available.
The second most common option is retained earnings, which
on average financed 35 percent of new investments. New equity and
informal lenders financed only a small proportion of total investment.
For the other sources of financing (representing 7.1 percent), the most
common case was financing through loans from related companies,
used more frequently by firms in the energy sector.
Some 81 percent of firms using bank loans were small firms
(with fewer than 24 employees), representing 38 percent of the small
firms in the sample. The small firms that did not use bank loans
relied mainly on retained earnings, which represent 75 percent of
the last investment for this subgroup. Medium-sized firms used
bank loans more, and only a small proportion did not use bank loans
at all. A relatively large proportion of large firms did not use bank
loans, but 64 percent of these firms were using loans from related
companies.
Manufacturing firms relied the most on bank loans. Energy
companies relied more on retained earnings and loans from related
companies. New equity represented a small ratio across the board,
and informal lending was relatively important only for services sector firms.
Some 80 percent of all firms were required to provide collateral,
amounting to approximately 80 percent of the total investment,
for their most recent loans (2005–07). They paid an interest rate
of 12.5 percent annually for a 37-month loan and only 10 percent
of the firms took loans denominated in a foreign currency. There
were no differences according to firm size in the proportion of
loans requiring collateral. The larger the firm, the higher was the
value of the collateral required (as a percent of the investment).
Large firms paid an interest rate that was almost 100 basis points
lower than small and medium-sized firms, with a longer duration
but with a higher proportion of the loans denominated in a foreign
currency.
Based on the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey (ICS),
Trinidad and Tobago firms use bank financing more than their counterparts in benchmark (comparator) economies and less retained
earnings and new equity. For the average firm in Trinidad and Tobago, bank loans represent 47 percent of financing, compared to 30
percent in Latin America or 36 percent in East Asia. Informal lending
is also very high in Trinidad and Tobago (5 percent), almost twice
the ratio for East Asia (2.5 percent), which is the region with the
highest ratio. On the other hand, retained earnings and new equity
together represent 48 percent of total financing equity in Trinidad
and Tobago, much lower than in East Asia (62 percent), the region
with the highest ratio.
In addition, the average duration of a loan in Trinidad and
Tobago (37 months) is above the average for the entire ICS survey
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(35 months). More noteworthy, the required collateral for Trinidad
and Tobago firms (77 percent of loan value) is well below the ICS
survey average (150 percent) and is in the lowest 5 percent of the
distribution at the country level.
The macro evidence shows that credit conditions are good in
Trinidad and Tobago: the country has enough resources and financing is relatively cheap. In addition, the micro evidence shows that
a high proportion of new investment in the non-energy sector is
financed through the banking system under reasonable conditions
in terms of interest rates and collateral requirements). Therefore,
credit availability is not a binding constraint on growth. Nevertheless, financial depth and access to finance are somewhat inadequate.
The only explanation for this is that the demand for loans is weak,
indicating that the problem outside the energy sector is the lack of
opportunities.
Social Returns
In the last 30 years, Trinidad and Tobago has attempted to universalize secondary education. Its gross enrollment ratio increased from
68.8 percent at the end of the 1970s to 83.8 percent in 2004. However,
within the Caribbean region, Trinidad and Tobago has educational
indicators close to the regional average, although its income level
is well above the average. Furthermore, it ranks below the regional
average in terms of net and gross enrollment rates for both primary
and secondary education; the duration of compulsory schooling
(7 years compared to the regional average of almost 10 years); average years of schooling (in this case, just below the regional average),
and the ratio of expenditures on education to GDP (4.3 percent while
the regional average is 5.9 percent).
The enrollment ratio in higher education is also low. Just 6
percent of the labor force has higher education, compared to 26
percent in developed countries. Recently, Trinidad and Tobago has
attempted to increase the number of students at the tertiary level by
creating a new university, introducing nontraditional courses, and
eliminating fees at the tertiary level. As a result, the gross enrollment ratio at the tertiary level increased from 6.8 percent in 1990
to 11.9 percent in 2004.
Years of schooling in Trinidad and Tobago are well below the
expected amount for a country of its income. Not only is the level of
schooling the second lowest among the upper-middle-income (UMI)
countries; it is also low compared to LAC and oil-exporting (OIL)
countries. In primary education, there has been almost no improvement in the enrollment ratio in the last 20 years (the net enrollment
ratio increased from 91.6 percent in 1985 to 92.2 percent in 2004).
This ratio is above the average for UMI countries (91.9 percent), but
below the average for LAC (95.3 percent), and below the average for
the Caribbean region (94 percent). In secondary education, the net
enrolment ratio of Trinidad and Tobago is similar to the average of
the three comparator regions, but is below the level expected for its
income category. Most significant is the very low enrollment ratio in
tertiary education: it is the lowest among OIL countries, the second
lowest among countries with a similar income level, and well below
the Latin American average. Finally, public expenditures on education are above the LAC average, and close to the average for UMI
countries, but below the average for OIL countries.
Does the relatively low average years of schooling mean that
Trinidad and Tobago has a scarcity of human capital? This study
expanded the results of Hausmann and Rodrik (2005) to include
Trinidad and Tobago and found that returns to finishing primary
education are among the lowest in Latin America, and very close to
that of a developed economy such as the United States. The returns
to finishing secondary education are also low; only the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean has a lower return. The returns to
finishing higher education depend on how non-university tertiary
education is classified. If it is classified as higher education, the
returns to higher education are very low and among the lowest in
Latin America. If non-university tertiary education is included with
secondary education, or as an entity in its own right, then the return
to higher education is slightly above the Latin American average and
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well above the returns for developed countries such as the United
States. What is significant for Trinidad and Tobago is the difference in returns between university and secondary education. The
additional premium for completing university education is among
the highest in Latin America no matter how non-university tertiary
education is treated.
Returns to education at all levels are higher in the more industrialized island of Trinidad than in Tobago. The difference is
even more striking for those finishing university education. Since
the difference is tantamount to a premium for workers and not for
where the individual was born, the difference in wages is likely
to be related to the difference in GDP composition (or economic
activities). Most of the manufacturing and energy companies are
located in Trinidad, whereas in Tobago 56.8 percent of workers are
employed in the tourism sector and most of the others are employed
in the public service.
Between 1998 and 2004, the returns increased for all levels
of education. This happened in a period when years of schooling
increased because of higher enrollment in secondary and higher
education. Even when the proportion of workers with tertiary education increased by 16 percent between 1998 and 2004, the demand
for educated labor was strong enough to bring about higher returns
in a period of high accumulation of human capital.
The relatively greater returns to higher education seem to contradict the high migration of educated people (brain drain). Defoort
(2006), for instance, found that Trinidad and Tobago has one of the
highest emigration rates for skilled workers in the world, well above
the Central American average. To some extent, the brain drain has
been a common problem for the Caribbean. What is interesting is
that this evidence of brain drain contrasts with the high proportion
of foreigners working in Trinidad and Tobago, particularly among
the most educated individuals. In 1998, 13.2 percent of the workers
with university degrees were foreigners, 6 but as the university level
6
Continuous Sample Survey of Population (1998).
has been increasing its intake of students in Trinidad and Tobago this
ratio has been falling quickly: by 2004 only 8.1 percent of universityeducated workers were foreigners.
Part of the explanation for the high returns and high migration of skilled workers might be due to a problem of mismatching.
For instance, local universities may not be educating professionals
according to local market demand. To test this hypothesis, standard
Mincer equations were independently estimated for the energy and
non-energy sector. Returns are similar between both sectors for
primary and secondary education, and only slightly higher in the
energy sector for university education, which provides very weak
evidence of market segmentation.
Another explanation could be the large difference in real
wages a highly educated individual could obtain in other countries
compared to Trinidad and Tobago. The premium for finishing university in Trinidad and Tobago might be high, but the real wage an
employee obtains in Trinidad and Tobago may be lower than the wage
a worker can obtain abroad, which may be an incentive to emigrate.
If migration possibilities were similar at all levels of education, the
premium in Trinidad and Tobago should be (by arbitrage) similar
to the premium in the developed countries to which they migrate.
Therefore, to observe a high premium for a university degree and
migration of highly qualified workers simultaneously, it must be
the case that migration is more difficult for lower educated workers (a hypothesis that cannot be tested with the available data). A
particular advantage for Trinidad and Tobago migrants is their proficiency in English, which may make them particularly attractive to
English-speaking developed economies such as the United States
and the United Kingdom. Another advantage is that the country is
part of the Commonwealth, which may also facilitate the migration
of educated people.
What about quality issues in education? Trinidad and Tobago
participates in two international performance evaluation exercises
related to the secondary regional examinations of the Caribbean
Examination Council (CXC) in English and mathematics. The results
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of these tests show that Trinidad and Tobago is above the regional
average, but countries with a lower GDP per capita and lower spending per pupil in secondary schools, such as Belize and Dominica,
outperform Trinidad and Tobago on both tests.
The quality of education is one of the most important issues
among the Caribbean countries and high spending has not been
commensurate with educational outcomes (World Bank, 2005). One
way in which the quality of education in Trinidad and Tobago can be
indirectly compared with countries outside of the Caribbean region
is to examine the returns to schooling for immigrants to the United
States (or another large economy) who have finished their studies
in their countries of origin. This is precisely what Bratsberg and
Terrell (2002) did. Since Hanushek and Kim (1999) found a strong
correlation between the implicit quality index obtained from Mincer
equations for immigrants in the United States who have studied in
their countries of origin, while controlling for measures of school
quality (through standardized tests), the difference in returns to
education can be interpreted as differences in education quality. According to this definition of quality, Trinidad and Tobago ranked 56th
out of 67 countries in 1980 and 51st in 1990, so its quality seems to
have improved between both Censuses. Its implicit quality is above
other Caribbean countries, but below the simple average for South
America and even the world average. The comparison is not favorable with respect to the upper-middle-income countries included in
this study (see Table 8.3).
Given these results, the pattern of returns observed in 1998
may have been influenced by the low quality of education in primary
and secondary school, which reduces the premium for these educational levels, but which also affects the transition to post secondary
studies, since the results of the CXC exam determine whether or
not students can attend university. The scarcity of highly educated
workers pushes up the returns for the most educated.
Did expenditure on education contribute to economic growth?
Francis and Iyare (2006) found that, for Trinidad and Tobago, causality
goes from GDP growth to expenditure on education, and not the other
TABLE 8.3 Returns to Education for Caribbean Migrants in the United States
(average return to one additional year of schooling)
Rate of return (%)
Country
1980 Census
1990 Census
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Jamaica
Trinidad and Tobago
1.22
1.19
2.46
2.7
2.10
2.02
3.64
3.75
Regional/world average
Caribbean
Central America
South America
Europe
World
2.1
2.2
3.5
4.7
3.9
2.9
3.0
3.9
5.9
4.8
Source: Based on Bratsberg and Terrell (2002).
way around. The evidence shows that the investment in education in
Trinidad and Tobago has been procyclical and very inefficient: the
increase in the average years of schooling from 11.1 in 1990 to 12.3
in 2004 seems to have been at the expense of quality.
How useful are the skills acquired from the schooling system?
According to the survey undertaken for this study, skilled workers
make up 25 percent of the total labor force. The highest ratio is in the
energy sector, followed by the manufacturing sector, and the lowest
ratio is in distribution. With regard to skilled workers, management
staff, and professionals, the services sector is the most human capitalintensive. The size of the firm does not matter, although smaller firms,
which tend to be in the services sector, employ a larger proportion
of management staff and professionals, while exporting firms tend
to have a higher proportion of skilled workers but a lower ratio of
professionals and management staff.
The survey also shows that it is more difficult to recruit skilled
technicians for firms in the manufacturing and services sector,
smaller firms, and non-exporting firms. Firms in the distribution
sector, smaller firms, and non-exporting firms find it more problematic to fill positions requiring production/service workers. This
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suggests that less educated workers are harder to find than skilled
ones, but this does not necessarily mean that the market for less
educated workers is oversubscribed: it could be that finding this
type of worker is not an easy task for local firms, a result that is
consistent with the fact that workers may not be well prepared for
the available jobs. In Trinidad and Tobago, the time taken to fill a
position for a production/service worker is well above the average
for Latin America (almost double), while the average time to obtain
a qualified worker is close to the mean.
The main reason for the limitation faced in hiring new workers
seems to be “poor labor attitude,” which 70 percent of managers identify as the main problem firms face in hiring new personnel. Another
important reason is “high labor costs,” which is more important
for firms in the energy and manufacturing sectors and for larger
firms, exporters as well as non-exporters. Poor primary schooling
and tertiary-level training are relatively binding for manufacturing
firms and for large enterprises.
Skilled workers may also be hired from abroad. The average
share of foreign workers per establishment in Trinidad and Tobago
is close to the Latin America figure, but below the average for other
regions. However, the percentage of foreign workers differs greatly
among sectors: firms in the energy sector have an average of 10
percent of foreign skilled workers, while in distribution the percentage is almost zero. Further, foreign skilled workers are hired most
frequently in large, exporting firms.
Hendriks (2002) established that about 96 percent of the difference between the wage levels in Trinidad and Tobago and the United
States is due to differences in factor accumulation, both capital and
human, in the two countries. In contrast, the corresponding figure
for the 67 countries in the Hendriks study was 49 percent; for Barbados, 65 percent; for Costa Rica, 62 percent; and for Chile, 50 percent.
When disaggregated further, in the Trinidad and Tobago case, the
differences in human capital accumulation account for 54 percent of
the difference, capital accumulation for 39.9 percent, and the quality
of education 2.4 percent. The difference explained by human capital
accumulation is remarkably high compared to other Latin American
and Caribbean countries (13.8 percent on average) and close to the
mean (2 percent) for the quality of education.
Trinidad and Tobago’s problem is in the accumulation of factors, both capital and human. The problem is not low total factor
productivity, even though high productivity is largely in the energy
sector, or the quality of education, which explains only a very small
portion of the wage differential, as in most countries.
What role by the quality of infrastructure in capital formation?
According to the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), Trinidad and
Tobago has a level of infrastructure in line with that of Caribbean
countries, but poor relative to countries with a similar income level.
Most of the basic infrastructure remains public (including telecommunications), but the efficiency of public administration is considerably better than a typical public company in Latin America.
In the case of telecommunications, deregulation began in the
wireless market when the new telecommunications authority invited
two firms to provide competition for the state-owned monopoly
incumbent (Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and Tobago,
TST T). Long distance cable and Internet services have not yet been
deregulated (though the government has indicated that it will start
deregulating cable TV). Fixed line and Internet services are provided
by TST T. The Trinidad and Tobago External Telecommunications
Company Limited (TEXTEL), co-owned by the government and
Cable & Wireless Limited, is responsible for international communications.
The penetration of fixed and mobile telephones, although high
by Latin American standards, is below the expected level given
Trinidad and Tobago’s income. A striking feature is the low degree
of Internet connectivity. In 2005, only 12.2 percent of the population
used the Internet, well below the regional average of 31.5 percent.
In addition, the 7.9 personal computers per 100 inhabitants was very
low. This low degree of internet connectivity contrasts with the level
of penetration of cellular phones and telephone lines which is among
the highest in LAC. Since human capital is augmented by the use
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of information, this could be considered as indirect evidence of low
human capital.
Electricity access in urban areas is almost 100 percent. The
transmission and distribution lines are reliable and outages are
among the lowest in the Caribbean (7 percent). Electricity generation
is private, whereas transmission and distribution are public. There is
no power pool or wholesale market, nor is there bilateral contracting
in power. Labor productivity is within the average for the Caribbean
region: better than a full public system but worse than full private
systems in the region.
Access to improved water and sanitation facilities is good in
urban areas. The percentage of the population with access to improved
water is above the LAC average, although below the CARICOM
average and that of high-income countries. There is full access to
improved sanitation facilities in urban areas. The system is public
and does not follow a pricing policy of cost recovery. The country
experimented in the mid-1990s by awarding a management contract
to Severn Trent (a U.K. water company), but the government decided
to remove the company once the contract expired (1999). In rural
areas, there are water shortages and inadequate drainage.
In the case of ports and airports, the port of Port-of-Spain and
both international airports remain public, but they follow a nondeficit
pricing policy. In 2000 the opening of the Piarco terminal in Trinidad
resolved the situation partially, and the government plans to expand
the Crown Point Airport in Tobago. A World Bank study comparing
the productivity at the Port-of-Spain port with ports in other countries in the region showed that productivity is very poor as a result
of congestion. The port needs significant investments in additional
port facilities to serve the growing demand (World Bank, 2005).
As far as transportation is concerned, there is an extensive
network of paved roads. Trinidad and Tobago, however, has no mass
transport system and traffic is a worsening problem throughout
Trinidad because the road network is not well suited to the growing volume of vehicles. A multi-year plan for light rail transport has
been announced.
The formation of public capital in the last 30 years has been
low compared to other countries in the region. For the 1970–2002
period, the gross public fixed capital formation as a percentage of
GDP was 4.4 percent, compared to an average for Latin America of
6.3 percent, and for the Caribbean of 9.5 percent. Public capital formation in Trinidad and Tobago has been procyclical, although not as
procyclical as in other Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The government has been investing in infrastructure recently.
According to Central Statistical Office (CSO) statistics, the net fixed
capital formation in the sectors of electricity and water was negative
in the 1980s and early 1990s, changed to positive 1996, and increased
rapidly until 2000, after which it stabilized.
The costs for infrastructure services are relatively high. In
telecommunications, there are cross-subsidies from international
calls to local calls, and the cost per minute for an international call is
above that of other countries in the region such as Guyana, Jamaica,
and St. Kitts & Nevis, and countries with a similar income level.
The cost to local consumers is significantly higher than comparable
services for U.S. consumers (including for fixed line, wireless, and
broadband services). Airport charges in Trinidad and Tobago are
among the highest in the region for both international airports, and
water tariffs are set below operating costs.
The survey results indicate that 70 percent of business establishments view the existing infrastructure services as “not very
appropriate” or “highly inappropriate.” The perception of “inappropriate infrastructure” is stronger for smaller firms: 72 percent of the
smaller firms find the infrastructure inappropriate, compared to 66
percent of the larger firms. This perception is slighter stronger for
non-exporting firms and for non-energy firms.
The most limiting infrastructure seems to be road infrastructure
and transportation, followed by electricity, port facilities, telecommunications, and water. The most common problem (during the last
year) was power outages or surges from the public grid (reported
by 61 percent of the firms), followed by insufficient water supply
(42 percent of the firms), and unavailable internet services (38 percent).
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Most of the “other” difficulties experienced by firms concern port
shut-downs and the Customs and Excise Department. Trinidad and
Tobago performs worse than the average for the Latin America except
for power outages, where only Ecuador has a better performance.
Insufficient water supply seems to be a major problem.
Only 31 percent of the firms surveyed used the World-Wide
Web in interacting with clients and/or suppliers, although 66 percent
regularly use e-mail. The most common reasons advanced for this
were that workers “do not know how to manage e-mails and websites”
and “customers do not use these services.” Only 31 percent of the
firms find there is no limitation.
As for government services, 53 percent of the firms rated them
as either “somewhat inefficient,” “inefficient,” or “very inefficient.”
The proportion is substantially higher for energy sector firms
(79 percent) compared to non-energy firms (52 percent). Firms in
the distribution sector have a more negative opinion (63 percent)
than those in manufacturing or services (49 percent and 45 percent,
respectively) and the proportion is higher for exporters (56 percent
versus 53 percent). Trinidad and Tobago appears to be lagging
behind fast-growing countries such as China and India in terms of
efficiency, but it has a level similar to Mauritius, and is well above
the average for Latin America.
Sixty percent (60 percent) of the establishments agreed that
corruption was a factor hindering them and their business opportunities, with 23 percent of them finding it a major and severe problem.
Energy sector firms have a less negative perception about the effect
of corruption on their business opportunities.
The 2006 Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) indicates that,
among 125 countries, Trinidad and Tobago fell from 66 th place in
2005 to 67th. Within the Caribbean region, Trinidad and Tobago
ranks third after Barbados (31st) and Jamaica (60 th), and is above the
median for the Latin American and Caribbean region. Nevertheless,
when compared to the entire sample of countries analyzed, its ranking is lower than expected given its level of development. Among
the benchmark countries, Malaysia, Chile, and Costa Rica have a
ranking well above the expected level, and Mauritius is quite close
to that. Trinidad and Tobago is one of the countries with the poorest performance given its income level. Looking at the components
that make up the GCI, Trinidad and Tobago’s poorest performance
is in institutions and infrastructure and its best in macroeconomic
strength. Most disturbingly, Trinidad and Tobago ranks lower than
average in health and primary education (both related to human
capital) and is generally lower than countries with similar GDP per
capita in almost all the components.
Appropriability
Following the World Bank governance indicators used by Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), five indicators of the quality of governance are considered: voice and accountability; political stability
and absence of violence; government effectiveness; rule of law; and
control of corruption. The indicators show that when compared to
the LAC region Trinidad and Tobago ranks relatively high and is
above the simple average of all the components except for political
stability. However, Trinidad and Tobago underperforms compared
to countries with similar GDP per capita in every component except
for voice and accountability and regulatory quality. Trinidad and
Tobago experienced a steady deterioration between 1996 and 2005,
particularly in the components of political stability, control of corruption, and the rule of law.
Since 1992, almost all investment barriers in Trinidad and
Tobago have been eliminated and the overall investment climate is
favorable. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey,
Trinidad and Tobago ranks relatively high (59 th out of 175 countries)
and is above the world average on indicators related to starting a
business, employing workers, protecting investors, and trading
across borders.
Trinidad and Tobago ranks among the best country in the region in protecting investors and is even above the average for OECD
countries. This is particularly notable in the case of liability for self-
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dealing, in which it gets almost full points. Shareholders’ ability to
sue officers and directors for misconduct (ease of shareholder suits
index) and the strength of investor protection are also comparative
advantages. Only in the case of transparency (transactions disclosure
index) does Trinidad and Tobago show a relatively weak position.
Other beneficial aspects of doing business in Trinidad and
Tobago are the low cost and few procedures for transactions across
borders and labor regulations (flexible regulations and low hiring
costs): in general Trinidad and Tobago ranks even better than the
OECD countries. Firing costs are the only weak aspect, since they
are higher than the regional average and that of OECD countries.
The indicators related to taxes show that this is not an important
issue in doing business: the effective tax rate is lower than in the
region, as well as the time spent on legal procedures.
In the area of getting credit, Trinidad and Tobago also ranks
relatively well in terms of legal rights, but there are problems in other
areas. For instance, there is no reliable register of debtors and only
a very small fraction of the population has access to credit.
The most negative aspects are registering a property, enforcing contracts, and closing businesses. In enforcing commercial
contracts, Trinidad and Tobago is ranked 156 th out of 157 countries.
The average time to get a payment, from the moment a plaintiff
files the lawsuit, is almost four years. This is a very long period,
even when compared to Latin America and Caribbean countries.
For registering a property, Trinidad and Tobago ranks 154th. The
average time necessary to fulfill the process is again the reason
for this poor performance. According to the World Bank, closing a
business in Trinidad and Tobago by following the bankruptcy law
is a difficult task: the associated costs are high enough to reduce
the recovery rate of the insolvent firm. In the case of licenses, the
necessary time in Trinidad and Tobago is again longer than in other
countries with similar levels of GDP per capita.
The evidence suggests that Trinidad and Tobago, in general,
does not have problems in terms of the rule of law and micro risks,
and that the only potential constraint to investment is the excessive
bureaucracy, which leads to an extreme amount of time and resources
to resolve conflicts and register business. The use of average results,
however, may mask some industry-specific shortcomings. For instance, in the Caribbean region there is strong competition in the
area of tax exemption, which favors the location of new hotels, and
Trinidad and Tobago is the country that least concedes exemptions.
In addition, the procedure involved in obtaining a permit for a new
hotel seems to be the most bureaucratic and costly in the region.
There is some concern in Trinidad and Tobago about the high
and increasing levels of crime. According to the Global Competitiveness
Report of the World Economic Forum, Trinidad and Tobago ranked
87th out of 104 countries in terms of the costs of crime and violence
for business with a score of 2.8 compared to the worldwide average
of 4.4. It ranked 89 th in organized crime with a score of 3.4 against
a worldwide average of 4.8.
From the perspective of businesses, crime is an increasing
problem in Trinidad and Tobago. Around 75 percent of the firms
surveyed believe that crime is affecting business and business opportunities. This share increases to 88 percent for the distribution
sector, in which firms may be more exposed to criminal activity. The
effects of crime are reflected in the security costs for establishments,
which on average represent 3.7 percent of sales, a very high figure
by international standards. Protection costs as a percentage of sales
are on average negligible (0.06 percent) and even low by international
standards, but for large firms this cost is significantly higher (0.46
percent). The proportion of criminal incidents reported to the police
is relatively high; perhaps for this reason the proportion of incidents
solved is much lower by international standards. Again, the distribution of reporting and incidents solved varies considerably by firm
size. Small firms tend to report more to the police than large firms,
and they also spend more on protection, but the share of incidents
solved is significantly higher for large firms (17 percent compared
to 4 percent for small firms).
In a country such as Trinidad and Tobago, the extra resources
generated by the boom presents a policy dilemma: whereas it is
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clear that the country must save part of this windfall, the dilemma
is how much to save. It is an intergenerational issue: if the government spends more today, the economy grows faster and the current
population benefits. However, since this spending is in nontradable goods, the pressure for a real exchange rate appreciation is
more powerful and the non-energy tradable sector becomes less
competitive, which limits its growth and makes the economy more
vulnerable to energy prices shocks. At the same time, the economy
is less prepared for the time when resources will be exhausted, both
because it will not have a tradable structure to replace the energy
sector and because there would be fewer resources to spend on
future generations.
The current inflationary pressure is a reflection of this problem
and it is eroding the external competitiveness of the tradeable sector.
The inflation resulting from the fortunes of the energy sector has
been fuelled by the government’s massive construction expenditure
and its expansionary monetary policy, thus reducing the competitiveness of the economy. According to the latest Corporate Confidence
Index (CCI), local business confidence is falling, due to concerns
about inflation, a shortage of skilled labor, lower investment returns,
and the government’s failure to moderate spending.
Recent estimates by the IMF (2007) indicate that the sustainable non-energy deficit in Trinidad and Tobago should be between
4.4 percent and 10.8 percent of GDP (see Figure 8.7). This figure is
significantly lower than the projected non-energy deficit of 15–16
percent of GDP for the fiscal year 2005/6 and 2006/7. The increase
in the non-oil deficit has been generated both by the increase of
public expenditures and a reduction of tax pressure on non-energy
activities.
Between fiscal year 1997/98 and fiscal year 2005/06, energy
revenues increased from 7.4 percent to 19.4 percent of GDP, while
non-energy revenues fell from 19.9 percent to 11.8 percent of GDP,
or from 33.8 percent to 20.7 percent of the non-oil GDP. As a result,
the government reduced the tax burden on the non-oil private sector.
Expenditure, on the other hand, grew from a low of 24.3 percent of
FIGURE 8.7 Central Government Fiscal Balance
(as percent of GDP)
Energy revenues
16
12
8
4
0
Overall surplus
–4
–8
–12
–16
Non fuel balance
–20
1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF’s Staff Reports.
GDP (in 2003–05) to 28 percent in fiscal year 2006/07. Due to the
outstanding growth in energy revenues, the overall balance remains
positive with a surplus of 3.8 percent, but the balance for the nonpetroleum sector represents a deficit of around 16 percent of GDP.
What these results suggest is that the government is spending part
of the windfall on the current generation. But there is a very important difference between the current boom and the 1970s boom. In
the 1970s fiscal policy was highly procyclical, and the windfall was
inefficiently spent; subsidies eased private investment in declining
industries, and abundant capital inflows were spent. Public enterprise
losses in 1979 were equivalent to 55 percent of oil revenues (Artana,
Bour, and Navajas, 2006).
In the current boom, fiscal policy has been more conservative
through the saving of part of the windfall in a stabilization fund,
although the IMF (2007) figures suggest the fiscal surplus should
be higher than what is being observed. The government has created a Heritage and Stabilization Fund, to be financed from excess
income from oil and gas. Whenever these revenues exceed the
quarterly projected budget by more than 10 percent, 60 percent of
this difference is added to the fund. In the same way, when revenues
are below projections, the government may withdraw funds using
401
402
the same arrangement. Higher-than-budgeted oil prices have built
up the value of the Fund, which totaled US$1.2 billion by the end of
the fiscal year 2005/06.
The Fund combines features of both heritage and stabilization.
This has been the cause of considerable debate and controversy. For
the moment, legislation has not been enacted to establish how the
Fund is going to be operationalized. Details about the Fund’s design
are still under discussion and the objectives are still not clear (is it a
mechanism for intergenerational smoothing or for putting planning
on a predictable base?).7 It seems reasonable to save for the future
when public debt is at sustainable levels, but not otherwise. Trinidad
and Tobago has a ratio of gross debt to GDP of 50 percent (higher
than recommended for an emerging economy with narrow capital
markets). In this sense, it may be worthwhile to reduce debt, as Russia did during the early 2000s, instead of immediately contributing
to the fund.
Several weaknesses persist besides the level of the public
debt, including high interest rates and low tax revenues (as a share
of GDP). Public expenditures have grown to a relatively high level
of almost 50 percent of non-petroleum GDP. The composition has
changed since the 1970s, when windfalls were spent in inefficient
capital outlays. Now more expenditures are directed toward reducing poverty and improving health and education. Transparency is an
issue since there are sizeable off-budget expenditure items, which
distort fiscal statistics.
Unless the economy is able to accumulate sufficient resources
in the stabilization fund, the relatively high non-energy deficit implies
that the government will have to make a drastic fiscal adjustment
when the oil reserves are nearly exhausted. However, improper fiscal
7
Artana, Bour, and Navajas (2006) suggest that an efficient stabilization fund be
designed to improve the existing Revenue and Stabilization Fund (RSF). This fund
should be built not only to enable conservative management of fiscal resources—
saving during the booms and using the resources during the downturns—but also
to avoid Dutch Disease.
management will affect the economy today by increasing risks. On
the other hand, spending part of the windfall today might exacerbate
Dutch Disease-types of problems, affecting the welfare of future
generations: both directly, by lowering the Fund, and indirectly,
through distortions in the productive structure and an excessive
specialization in energy products.
There seems to be a policy conf lict as to whether the oil
wealth should be invested in human capital and infrastructure or
saved for future generations. To achieve the Vision 2020 goal, the
country will have to make investments, and the goal is to develop
a knowledge-based society. However, as Artana, Bour, and Navaja
(2006) argue, the strategy of spending more today carries some
risks. First, spending on current or capital outlays contributes to
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and might worsen the
Dutch Disease problem. Second, it assumes that the social rate of
return of government expenditure is higher than any other feasible
alternative. Third, investing part of the fund today would not automatically diversify the economy and reduce the risks associated
with oil price fluctuations. The evidence for Trinidad and Tobago,
on the contrary, shows that recent export developments moved in
the same direction as previous exports, developing and exporting
oil and gas-related products like petrochemical goods and liquefied
natural gas. Diversification into petrochemicals and other products
has not reduced the country’s exposure to fluctuations in the price
of petroleum and natural gas products.
Policymakers in Trinidad and Tobago must understand that
fiscal policy has a very important function, and spending or not
spending part of the windfall is a policy decision with trade-offs
and risks.
What about tourism, which is one of the largest and fastest
growing sectors in the world and a major driver of growth for Caribbean countries? Trinidad and Tobago seems to be one of the least
developed countries of the region in this area. It ranks 8 th in terms
of tourist preferences in the English-speaking Caribbean nations.
In 2004, Trinidad and Tobago had 439,600 international arrivals,
403
404
but only 52 percent were tourists, resulting in tourism revenues of
US$249 million. In that same year, the Dominican Republic received
3.5 million international tourists and tourism revenues were US$
3.4 billion.
In terms of international tourists per square kilometer, Trinidad
and Tobago has the lowest ratio in the English-speaking Caribbean,
with 86.2 tourists per square km. The second lowest ratio is 221
(Dominica) and the regional average is 933. What is constraining
tourism development in Trinidad and Tobago? Does the country have
any comparative advantage in this sphere?
The tourism industry involves many sectors of the economy and
requires a fair amount of coordination to develop. This is especially
the case with international tourism, since externalities are large
and the economies of scales in some related sectors are also high
(particularly in transportation). The underdevelopment of tourism
seems to be associated with the natural resource curse. The private
sector has not been able to resolve the coordination problems to
develop the sector fully, and exchange rate volatility increases the
risks and volatility of profits. In addition, historically, the government has not paid attention to tourism as a development driver or
as a source of revenue, which has not aided private sector development. Tourism has not been seen as a source of growth, but as a low
value-added sector that pays low salaries. Tourism has made some
strides in Tobago (as opposed to Trinidad), but not at the same rate
as in neighboring countries.
To further efforts to diversity the economy, and perhaps as a
result of the experience of neighboring countries, the government
has taken some initiatives to develop this sector. Steps include
establishing a Ministry of Tourism in 1994, developing and implementing tourism-related projects, building awareness of the tourism
industry, and facilitating tourism investment and development of
the industry.
The Vision 2020 Tourism Development Strategic Plan (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2004) identifies tourism as a growth
driver and a source of diversification away from energy.
FIGURE 8.8 Open Forest Measure
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
BRA
SLV
ARG
GTM
CHL
COL
GUY
NIC
PAN
ECU
JAM
TTO
Open Forest and the “Natural Resource Curse”
The open forest measure is a measure of how easy it is for a country
to diversify its exports (Hausmann and Klinger 2006). As Figure
8.8 shows, Trinidad and Tobago has the poorest open forest in Latin
America and the Caribbean, with only 12 percent of the opportunities available to Brazil for producing new goods. This results from
its specialization in oil-related products. 8
Figure 8.9 plots products for Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil, two
extreme cases, using Leamer’s classification for crossing distances
and the difference between productivity of the good and export basket
productivity (goods over the zero line are considered upscale goods and
those below are considered downscale goods ). Not only are Trinidad
and Tobago’s exports far from almost all kinds of products, but they
are located at the same distance from the groups of low productivity
(downscale) and high productivity (upscale) goods.
Trinidad and Tobago is far away from the densest part of the
forest, and it has a greater distance (the inverse of density) among
products, which means that export products are further away from
8
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) find this characteristic common to most
oil-exporting countries.
405
FIGURE 8.9 Distance and “Upscaling” for Trinidad & Tobago and Brazil
A. Trinidad & Tobago, 2003
2.5
Petroleum
Animal products
Machinery
Raw material
Cereals
Chemical
Forest products
Labor intensive
Tropical agriculture
Capital intensive
ln(PRODY) - ln(EXPY)
1.5
0.5
0.5
–0.5
–1.5
–2.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Density (Inverse)
B. Brasil, 2003
2.5
1.5
ln(PRODY) - ln(EXPY)
406
Petroleum
Animal products
Machinery
Raw material
Cereals
Chemical
Forest products
Labor intensive
Tropical agriculture
Capital intensive
0.5
–0.5
–1.5
–2.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Density (Inverse)
Source: Authors’ calculations
one another in comparison to what obtains regionally. It is important
to point out that even products in the petroleum sector are further
from each other than in other benchmark countries. The closest
groups are raw materials and tropical agriculture.
These findings imply that the degree of sophistication of
Trinidad and Tobago exports will hardly improve unless economic
policies are implemented to overcome the high and growing level
of specialization.
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) found that a one standard deviation increase in open forest size results in an increase of one half
percentage in the average productivity growth rate for the basket.
This suggests that the current pattern of specialization in Trinidad
and Tobago is not only costly in terms of increasing the risk to shocks
in oil prices, but also in achieving long-run balanced growth. As in
the case of most oil- exporting countries, Trinidad and Tobago produces and exports goods with very specific endowments not easily
interchangeable with other kinds of goods. Moreover, considering
the sudden appreciations in the real exchange rate—which usually
occur in economies such as those with fluctuating oil prices—the
development of other nonresource tradable sectors could be a difficult task.
This indicates that Trinidad and Tobago’s problem is not only
related to a cyclical phenomenon of real exchange rate appreciation
during oil price booms, but is more permanent. Historically, exports
of oil and related products have represented between 60 and 70 percent (in constant U.S. dollars) of total exports. As a consequence,
the degree of export diversification (measured in real terms) has not
changed substantially recently, despite the cyclical behavior of the
price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil (the benchmark
for U.S. oil prices).
Capacity, Innovation, and Learning
The survey data show that firms in Trinidad and Tobago produce
fewer products per establishment than firms in other regions, but this
could just be due to economies of scope and local market sophistication. Related to this, they also have a lower amount of new products
introduced per establishment than the benchmark economies.
The percentage of firms using technology licensed by foreignowned companies is similar to that of Latin American countries but
lower than that of East Asia. For the sectors exposed to international
competition, the penetration of foreign-owned technology is widespread among firms in the energy sector and, to lesser extent, in
the manufacturing sector. This finding is confirmed by the results
obtained when the firms are disaggregated into exporting and non-
407
408
exporting firms (32 percent to 10 percent). The rate of introduction
of new products is higher in services than in manufacturing and
energy and there are signs of greater innovation in larger and exporting firms.
However, Trinidad and Tobago underperforms when the quality
of processes and products is evaluated. In fact, the percentage of firms
receiving ISO certification is half the average for Latin American
countries (6.7 percent against 13.3 percent) and it is much lower than
in East Asia. Some 23 percent of the firms in Trinidad and Tobago
acquired technological innovations from 2004 to 2007, a much lower
ratio than in other regions. The percentage of ISO certification and
introduction of new technological innovations is higher for companies
in the energy sector and the larger and exporting firms.
The reasons reported by firms for the limited acquisition of
technological innovations are: the lack of property rights (41 percent
of firms), macro instability (36 percent), and inadequate infrastructure (31 percent). In the energy sector, where the introduction of
technological innovations is most important, the most limiting reason was “the costly training of workers.” In manufacturing, it was
“macroeconomic instability,” and, for the remaining sectors, it was
“the lack of property rights.”
When the results are broken down by size, no important differences in the main causes are reported. On the contrary, the most
binding constraint on innovation for exporting firms is financial cost,
while for the non-exporting companies, it is property rights.
Conclusion
This study has used the growth diagnostics methodology to try to
identify the growth constraints in Trinidad and Tobago and establish
a ranking of their priority—particularly for the non-energy sector, which is key for the country’s diversification efforts. Trinidad
and Tobago’s growth is very unbalanced, and is led by the energy
sector. In the non-energy sector, economic growth is much lower.
The petroleum sector accounts for 29 of the 51 percentage points
of the accumulated growth rate between 2002 and 2006, compared
to private sector services (19 points) and the rest of the economy
(only 3 points). What is even more striking is the low investment in
the non-energy sector: since 1991 capital stock has increased by
7 percent per year, but this was due almost entirely to the energy
sector. In the non-energy sector, the capital stock has grown by a
modest 1.5 percent.
New investment has been directed mainly to the gas industry,
after the discovery of new reservoirs. But the new gas products are
not really providing a strong source of diversification for the economy
since the prices of gas-related products are highly correlated with
the oil-related products. In addition, in the last 50 years the nonenergy tradable sector has been constantly shrinking as a share of
GDP, which makes the economy energy-dependent, increasing the
risks of energy price shocks for the entire economy. The energy
sector currently represents 45 percent of GDP, but this share almost
doubled in the last 15 years, and the pattern of investment for the
last 10 years shows that the actual levels would hold and probably
increase even more. This is contrary to the Vision 2020 plan, which
aims to have Trinidad and Tobago become a developed country by
2020. This plan looks for diversification of the economy away from
the petroleum industries. The puzzle to be solved in Trinidad and
Tobago is why resources are not flowing to the non-energy sector,
particularly the tradable one.
Far from diversifying, the economy is becoming more concentrated in the energy sector, and this is happening even though the
government has implemented several reforms in the right direction.
Because many constraints on growth have already been eliminated,
the case of Trinidad and Tobago is one of fine-tuning, making the
identification of constraints more difficult. It may be that most of the
conditions for the development of the non-energy tradable sector are
already present, but the economy needs more time to show significant
changes. Or it could be that the removal of these constraints is not
enough to boost growth in an economy that has already specialized
in the energy sector. Viewed from this angle, the high exposure to
409
410
energy price shocks might force the non-energy tradable sector to
be even more competitive than in other countries where that risk
does not exist.
The historical correlation between the international oil price and
Trinidad and Tobago’s real GDP, which is close to 80 percent, is a fact
that business managers understand quite well. They know that growth
opportunities could be very path-dependent, and current growth is
limited by previous conditions. Not having a developed non-energy
tradable sector can limit future growth due to the lack of externalities in production, lack of forward and backward linkages, lack of
learning-by-doing, and lack of local entrepreneurship. In this sense,
the curse might be the past rather than current conditions, and the
current success of the energy sector might in itself be a constraint
for the development of the non-energy tradable sector. Although the
government has already created a Heritage and Stabilization Fund,
the problem might be one of credibility. In this economy more than
in others, a very prudent fiscal policy, as well as clear and credible
rules, are necessary to isolate the non-energy sector from the risks
of the energy sector.
Fiscal policy in Trinidad and Tobago has always been very procyclical, exacerbating the Dutch Disease problem. Little progress
has been made recently in the area of prudent fiscal management and
IMF estimates indicate that the non-energy deficit is not sustainable.
There is also evidence that the current growth path of Trinidad and
Tobago shows the symptoms of Hausmann and Rigobon’s (2002)
predictions, particularly a shrinking non-energy sector.
In addition to the macro risk, which business managers consider
one of the most important factors limiting their growth opportunities,
this study has found that the quality of education is relatively poor;
that educational indicators are poorer than expected for Trinidad
and Tobago’s income level and below those of fast-growing countries;
that infrastructure is inadequate and indeed poorer than expected
for the income level, particularly in terms of quality; that the country
has failed to coordinate and develop sectors outside the energy sector, even in areas with clear potential, such as tourism; that crime
is a growing concern; that the export product space is not very well
diversified, and there are not many opportunities to diversify it;
and, finally, that there is a lack of innovation and discovery outside
the energy sector.
All these factors, affecting mainly the non-energy sector, lie in
the lack of opportunities branch of the growth diagnostic tree. Indeed,
for almost all the indicators analyzed (education, infrastructure,
and social indicators), Trinidad and Tobago underperforms when
compared to countries of similar income level, and is more similar to
other Caribbean countries rather than fast-growing and diversified
economies. In other words, Trinidad and Tobago has many constraints
causing reductions in social returns (poor management, low profitability, lack of human capital, poor access to foreign markets, and
poor infrastructure). It also has one very important constraint from
the appropriability side, macro risks—which shows that the growth
constraint for non-energy industries is low risk-adjusted returns,
rather than costly finance. This evidence is based on both macro and
micro data and is in accordance with managers’ opinions.
Prioritizing binding constraints is a very ambitious goal, and it
might not even be prudent, as Rodriguez (2006) has argued. First,
changing one policy at a time will generally be a very inefficient way
of reaching the optimum: it may not only take longer to reach an
optimum, thus generating welfare losses during the transition, but
may also increase the probability of not converging to the optimum.
Second, using this sequential approach poses the risk of getting
stuck at a local rather than at a global maximum.
The most critical element in Trinidad and Tobago is, and has
been, the fiscal management of natural resource revenues. When
the government spends the resources in non-tradable goods and services, it exacerbates volatility and aggravates the underdevelopment
of the non-energy sector, forcing this sector to achieve even larger
productivity gains to overcome the stress of the lack of competitiveness. The complementary inputs the government provides (such as
education and infrastructure) may not be enough to overcome the
lack of competitiveness, making the effort meaningless.
411
412
The challenge Trinidad and Tobago faces is to overcome a
natural tendency to suffer from the natural resource curse and
instead develop strong anti-cyclical fiscal policies (first priority),
while bearing in mind the long-run growth drivers and overcoming
the limitations found in this study (in order to increase the private
returns to investment in the non-energy tradable sector). Trinidad
and Tobago might need to invest more in several areas (such as
core infrastructure and education) to increase productivity in the
non-energy sector, but it must do so in a balanced way. The Vision
2020 goal has identified several potential policies, many of which
seem to be well-oriented and in line with the findings of this study.
Nonetheless, timing might be almost as important as the investment
itself in a country facing the risk of energy price shocks.
References
Artana, D., Bour, J.L. and Navajas, F. 2006. “Designing Fiscal Policy to
Achieve Development.” In: L. Rojas-Suárez and C. Elías, editors.
From Growth to Prosperity: Policy Perspectives for Trinidad and
Tobago. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Bratsberg, B. and Terrell, D. 2002. “School Quality and Returns
to Education of U.S. Immigrants.” Economic Inquiry. 40(2):
177–98.
Defoort C. 2006. “Tendances de long terme en migrations internationales: analyse à partir de 6 pays receveurs.” Université
Catholique de Louvain. Mimeographed document.
Elías C., Jaramillo, F. and Rojas-Suárez, L. 2006. “Introduction.” In:
L. Rojas-Suárez and C. Elías, editors. From Growth to Prosperity:
Policy Perspectives for Trinidad and Tobago. Washington, DC:
Inter-American Development Bank.
Fairbanks, M., Rabkin D., Escobari M. and Rodriguez, C. 2006.
“Building Competitive Advantages.” In: L. Rojas-Suárez and
C. Elías, editors. From Growth to Prosperity: Policy Perspectives
for Trinidad and Tobago. Washington, DC: Inter-American
Development Bank.
Francis, B. and Iyare, S. 2006. “Education and Development in the
Caribbean: A Cointegration and Causality Approach.” Economics
Bulletin. 15(2): 1–13.
Government of Trinidad and Tobago. 2004. Vision 2020 Tourism
Development Strategic Plan. Trinidad and Tobago: Government
of Trinidad and Tobago.
Hanushek E.A. and Kim, J-Y. 1999. “School Quality around the
World: Evidence from U.S. Immigrant Earnings.” Korea’s
Official Pool of International Economists & Regional Experts
No. 2002–15.
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Hausmann, R. and Rigobon, R. 2002. “An Alternative Interpretation of the ‘Resource Curse’: Theory and Policy Implications.”
Working paper No. 9424. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Hausmann, R. and Rodrik D. 2005. “Self-discovery in a Development
Strategy for El Salvador.” Economía. 6(1): 43–101.
. 2006. “Doomed to Choose: Industrial Policy as Predicament.”
Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (September). Mimeographed document..
Matters.” Journal of Economic Growth. 12(1): 1–25.
Harvard University (March).
Hendricks, L. 2002. “How Important Is Human Capital for Development? Evidence from Immigrant Earnings.” The American
Economic Review. 92(1): 198–219.
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2003. Article IV ConsultationStaff Report. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
. 2007. Article IV Consultation-Staff Report. Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. 2005. “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004.” Policy research
working paper No. 3237. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Poterba, J. M. 1997. “The Rate of Return to Corporate Capital and
Factor Shares: New Estimates Using Revised National Income
Accounts and Capital Stock Data.” Working paper No. 6263.
Rodriguez, F. 2006. “Comment on Hausmann and Rodrik.” Economía.
6(1): 90–8.
Sergeant, K. 2006. “Issues in Equities Market Development and Integration.” Trinidad and Tobago. Mimeographed document.
Watson, P. 1997. “Measuring the Capital Stock of Trinidad and
Tobago by Direct Observation.” In: E. Edinval, A. Maurin and
J.G. Montauban, editors. Stratégies de développement comparées
dans la Caraïbe. Paris, France: L’Hermès.
World Bank. 2005. “A Time to Choose: Caribbean Development in
the 21st Century”. Washington, DC: Caribbean Country Management Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank.
415
APPENDIX A
Total Factor Productivity
and Growth Accounting
Construction of Capital Stock and TFP Series
The series for capital stock is constructed from data from the Penn
World Tables, version 6.2. It follows the methodology presented
in Easterly and Levine (2001): a perpetual inventory method to
construct the capital stock. In particular, the capital accumulation
equation states that:
K t 1 K t ( 1 d ) I t ,
(A.1)
where Kt is the stock of capital in period t, I is investment, and d
is the depreciation rate, which is assumed to equal 0.07. From the
capital accumulation equation (A.1) and assuming that the country
is in steady state, the initial capital-output ratio is computed as:
K0
i ,
Y0
gd
(A.2)
where i is the average investment-output ratio for the first ten years
of the sample, and g is a weighted average between a world growth
(75 percent) of 4.2 percent and the average growth of the country for
the first ten years of the sample (25 percent). Multiplying the capital
output-ratio from (A.2) by the average output of the first three years
of the sample yields the initial capital stock K0 .
418
APPENDIX A. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH ACCOUNTING
The series for labor is computed using the data for real GDP
per worker and real GDP (chain) from the Penn World Tables.
To estimate human capital, follow Hall and Jones (1999) and
consider h to be relative efficiency of a unit of labor with E years of
schooling. Specifically, the function takes the form of:
h e F( E ) ,
(A.3)
where the function F(.) is such that F( 0 ) 0 and F a( E ) is the Mincerian return on education. In particular, this function is approximated
by a piece-wise linear function. The following rates of return are
assumed for all the countries: 13.4 percent for the first four years of
schooling; 10.1 percent for the next four years; and 6.8 percent for
education beyond the eighth year (based on Psacharopoulos, 1994).
For each country, the average is computed using the data on years of
schooling in the population from the Barro-Lee (2000) database.1
The TFP series are calculated for each country as a residual
from the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y AK A ( h L )1A ,
(A.4)
where Y represents domestic output, K physical capital, L labor
force, h the average quality of the labor force, and A is total factor
productivity, or TFP. Following standard practice, the capital income
share (a) is set equal to ⅓.
Output per worker is given by:
A
y
¥K´
Y
A ¦ µ h1A AkA h1A ,
L
§ L¶
(A.5)
where A represents the total factor productivity (TFP) and a is ⅓.
In logs:
ln y ln A A ln k ( 1 A )ln h .
1
Linear extrapolations are used to complete the five-year data.
A sample of countries used in estimating growth accounting
gaps is presented in Table A.1.
TABLE A.1 Sample of Countries Used in Estimating Growth Accounting Gaps
Latin America
Argentina
Barbados
Bolivia
Brazil
Guinea
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Leone
Dominican Republic
Africa
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Source: Authors.
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Developed
Other
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Korea, Republic of
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Algeria
Botswana
Cameroon
Fiji
Nepal
Niger
Pakistan
Papua New
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Philippines
Senegal
Sierra
France
Sweden
Iran
South
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Jordan
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Sri Lanka
Syria
Thailand
Togo
Turkey
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
419
420
References
Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee 2000. “International Data on
Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications.” Working
paper No. 42. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Development, Harvard University (April).
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. 2001. “It’s Not Factor Accumulation:
Stylized Facts and Growth Models.” World Bank Economic
Review. 15: 177–219.
Hall, J. and Jones, C., 1999. “Why Do Some Countries Produce So
Much More Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal
of Economics. 114: 83–116.
Psacharopoulos, George, 1994. “Returns to Investment in Education:
A Global Update.” World Development 22(9): 1325–1343.
APPENDIX B
Structural Transformation,
Location in the Product
Space, and the Value of
the Open Forest
Export Sophistication
Recent research by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) finds
that the composition of a country’s export basket has important implications for economic growth. The authors find that it is not only
how much, but also what countries export that matters for growth.
Countries that have a more sophisticated export basket enjoy accelerated subsequent growth.
The level of “sophistication” of exports is measured indirectly
by examining the levels of income of those countries producing them.
It is calculated as follows. First, the authors develop a measure of the
revealed sophistication for each product, which they call PRODY, as
the revealed comparative advantage (RCA)-weighted GDP per capita
of each country that exports the good:
PRODYi ,t ¤
c
xval
¤ xval
i ,c ,t
i
Y
/X / Xc
i ,c ,t
c
,
c
where xvali,c,t equals exports of good i by country c in year t, Xc equals
total exports by country c, and Yc equals GDP per capita of country c.
This is a measure of the GDP per capita of the “typical” country that
exports product i. Richer-country goods are more “sophisticated,”
and are associated with higher wages. It is important to keep in mind
APPENDIX B. VALUE OF THE OPEN FOREST
that this is a measure of sophistication that is inferred from the types
of countries exporting a good. It is not measuring any technological
sophistication directly.
This product-level measure of sophistication is then used to
measure the sophistication of a country’s export basket as a whole.
The authors call this measure EXPY. EXPY is simply the PRODY
of each good (i) that the country c exports, weighted by that good’s
share in the country’s export basket (Xc). It represents the income
level associated with a country’s export package.
¥ xvalc ,i ,t ´
EXPYc ,t ¤ ¦
µ PRODYi ,t .
X c ,t ¶
i §
Not surprisingly, the level of income implied by a country’s
export basket (EXPY) is correlated with actual income. That is, rich
countries produce rich country goods, as illustrated in Figure B1.
FIGURE B1 EXPY (PPP) vs. GDP per capita (PPP), 2001
10
LUX
L
CIRHE
FIN
DE
UE US A
SJPN
W
GBR
AUT
S
GP
AL
DNK
NLD
CKOR
SZEVN E S ITA
BE
PFR
MLT
PHL
ME X S VKHUN
MYS
IS HKG
R C AN
EPOL
ST
PRNZL
C HN
THA
CTYP IS L
HR V
BLR
BRCARLTU
UKR
I
BRBHS
BGR C AUS
ZAF
TUR
R OM UR
LVAY KNA
NOR
AR G BHR
IND IDN JORS LV BGR
R
US
TTO
GR D
C OL
SLBN
W ZDZA
MAC
MKD
PAN
TUN
E
GY
S
M
OMN
W
AR
M
VE N
MOZ
C HL S AU
GTM KAZ
MDA S DNGE O AZE MAR
DOM
BW A MUS
IRNAM
SEN
BOL SLKA
RVC
ATN
E YR
CALB
U PE LC
NGA
GAB
C AF BGDC MR
DMA
LS O NIC PR
C PV
Y
KHM
HND JAM
BLZ
KE N
TGO
GUY
GHA
KGZ
MNG
PNG
UGA
ZMB
GMB
NEMDG
R
ZW E
TZA
BFA
MW I
MLI
GIN
BE N
9.5
9
EXPY (ppp, log)
422
8.5
8
E TH
BDI
7.5
RWA
6
7
8
9
GDP per capita (ppp, log)
Note: EXPY and GDP per capita are in terms of PPP.
10
11
However, there is significant variance in this relationship. Some
countries have managed to discover products that are associated
with a level of income much higher than their own, such as China,
India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, and Ireland. Moreover,
this variance has important consequences: countries converge to
the relative income level implied by their export basket. In essence,
countries become what they export. This means that if a country has
managed to begin exporting a sophisticated export basket relative
to its income level, subsequent growth is higher as GDP converges
to that level. At the other end of the spectrum, countries specialized
in relatively unsophisticated export baskets suffer lagging economic
performance. Put another way, the payoff of exporting more of the
same depends on current export sophistication.
Export Distance
In standard trade theory, structural transformation is a passive
consequence of changing comparative advantage based on factor
accumulation. However, there are many reasons why structural
transformation may be more complicated than this picture suggests.
Several factors may create market failures such as industry-specific
learning by doing (Arrow, 1962; Bardhan, 1970) or industry externalities (Jaffe, 1986). There may also be technological spillovers between
industries (Jaffe, Trajtemberg and Henderson, 1993). Alternatively,
the process of finding out which of the many potential products best
expresses a country’s changing comparative advantage may create
information externalities (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Klinger
2007) as those that identify the goods provide valuable information
to other potential entrepreneurs but are not compensated for their
efforts.
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) investigate the determinants of
the evolution of the level of sophistication of a country’s exports, and
find that these barriers are less binding when moving to “nearby”
products. This is based on the idea that every product involves highly
specific inputs such as knowledge, physical assets, intermediate
423
424
inputs, labor training requirements, infrastructure needs, property
rights, regulatory requirements, or other public goods. Established
industries somehow have sorted out the many potential failures
involved in assuring the presence of all of these inputs, which are
then available to subsequent entrants in the industry. But firms
that venture into new products will find it much harder to secure
the requisite inputs. For example, they will not find workers with
experience in the product in question or suppliers who regularly
furnish that industry. Specific infrastructure needs such as cold
storage transportation systems may be nonexistent, regulatory
services such as product approval and phytosanitary permits may
be underprovided, research and development capabilities related to
that industry may not be there, and so on.
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) find evidence supporting the
view that the assets and capabilities needed to produce one good
are imperfect substitutes for those needed to produce another good,
but this degree of asset specificity will vary. Correspondingly, the
probability that a country will develop the capability to be good at
producing one good is related to its installed capability in the production of other similar, or nearby goods for which the currently
existing productive capabilities can be easily adapted. The barriers
preventing the emergence of new export activities are less binding
for nearby products, which only require slight adaptations of existing capacity.
This is found by first developing a measure of distance between
products. Distance between each pair of products is measured as the
probability that countries in the world export both. If two goods need
the same capabilities, this should show up in a higher probability
of a country having comparative advantage in both. Formally, the
inverse measure of distance between goods i and j in year t, which
the authors call proximity, equals
[ J i , j ,t min P xi ,t | x j ,t , P x j ,t | xi ,t
] ,
where for any country c
«®1 if
x i ,c ,t ¬
®0
RCAi ,c ,t 1
otherwise
,
and where the conditional probability is calculated using all countries
in year t. This is calculated using disaggregated export data across
a large sample of countries from the World Trade Flows data from
Feenstra et al. (2005) and UN COMTR ADE (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, http://comtrade.un.org/ ).
The heterogeneity of the product space can be shown econometrically, yet it is much more revealing to illustrate these pair-wise
distances graphically. Using the tools of network analysis, one can
construct an image of the product space (Hidalgo et al. 2007).
Considering the linkages as measured in the 1998–2000 period,
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) first create the maximum spanning
tree by taking the one strongest connection for each product that
allows it to be connected to the entire product space. This is shown
in Figure B2.
The next step is to overlay this maximum spanning tree with
the stronger links, and color-code the linkages between products,
depending on their proximity. Figure B3 shows the visual representation of the product space. Each node is a product, its size determined
by its share of world trade. In these figures, physical distances between products are meaningless: proximity is shown by color-coding
the linkages between pairs of products. A light-blue link indicates
a proximity of under 0.4; a beige link; a proximity between 0.4 and
0.55; a dark-blue link; a proximity between 0.55 and 0.65; and a red
link, a proximity greater than 0.65. Links below 0.55 are shown only
if they make up the maximum spanning tree, and the products are
color-coded based on their Leamer (1984) commodity group.
From Figure B3, it can immediately be seen that the product
space is highly heterogeneous. There are peripheral products that
are only weakly connected to other products. There are some group-
425
426
FIGURE B2 Maximum Spanning Tree
ings among these peripheral goods, such as petroleum products (the
large red nodes on the left side of the network), seafood products
(below petroleum products), garments (the very dense cluster at the
bottom of the network), and raw materials (the upper left to upper
periphery). Furthermore, there is a core of closely connected products in the center of the network, mainly of machinery and other
capital- intensive goods.
This heterogeneous structure of the product space has important implications for structural transformation. If a country is
producing goods in a dense part of the product space, then the
process of structural transformation is much easier because the
set of acquired capabilities can be easily redeployed to other nearby
products. However, if a country is specialized in peripheral products,
then this redeployment is more challenging, as there is not a set of
products requiring similar capabilities. The process of structural
FIGURE B3 A Visual Representation of the Product Space
Not Classified
Petroleum
Raw Materials
Forest Products
Tropical Agriculture
Animal Products
Cereals
Labor Intensive
Capital Intensive
Machinery
Chemical
transformation can be impeded due to a country’s orientation in
this space.
Density and Open Forest
To measure what is nearby, pair-wise measures of distance must
be used as defined above to calculate the distance of every product
from a country’s export basket as a whole. This measure is called
density. It is the distance of good i from country c’s export basket
at time t. It is the sum of all paths leading to the product in which
the country is present, scaled by the total number of paths leading
to that product. As with proximity, density is based on whether or
not the country has revealed comparative advantage in the product
(RCA≥1). Density varies from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating
that the country has achieved comparative advantage in many nearby
427
428
products, and therefore should be more likely to export that good
in the future.
¥ ¤ J i , k ,t x c , k ,t ´
µ.
densityi ,c ,t ¦ k
µ
¦ ¤J
i , k ,t
µ¶
¦§
k
Density is a key variable in the process of growth diagnostics:
it can be taken as an indicator of the degree of coordination needed
to produce any given product. If the product is very near to the
current export basket, density will be high, meaning that most of
the capabilities needed in the new sector will already exist in other
sectors. If density is low, then the human capital, physical capital,
property rights, infrastructure, and every other sector-specific factor of production that the sector needs will not exist, and cannot be
easily adapted from what does exist.
To measure whether a lack of coordination is holding back
structural transformation, one can use density to determine if there
are many nearby opportunities for structural transformation available,
or if there are simply no nearby products that could fuel structural
transformation in the absence of coordination. In other words, one
can use density to measure the opportunity set for the country as
a whole. This measure, called “open forest,” answers the question
of “how green is your valley.” In other words, is the current export
basket in a part of the product space that is well-connected to other
new and valuable opportunities for structural transformation, or is it
in a sparse, unconnected part of the product space? It is calculated
as follows:
¨
·
J
open _ forestc ,t ¤ ¤ ©© i , j ,t 1 xc , j ,t xc ,i ,t PRODY j ,t ¸¸ .
J i , j ,t
i
j
©ª ¤
¸¹
i
This indicator can be used to compare the value of the product
space of different countries and its evolution.
References
Arrow, K. 1962. “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing.”
Review of Economic Studies. 29: 155–73.
Bardhan, P. 1970. Economic Growth, Development, and Foreign Trade.
NY: Wiley-Interscience.
Feenstra, R., Lipsey, R., Deng, H., Ma, A. and Mo, H. 2005. “World
Trade Flows: 1962–2000.” Working paper No. 11040. Cambridge,
Jaffe, A. 1986. “Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D:
Evidence from Firm’s Patents, Profits, and Market Value.”
Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M. and Henderson, R. 1993. “Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 108(3): 577–98.
Matters.” Working paper No. 123. Cambridge, MA: John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Hidalgo, C., Klinger, B., Barabasi, A. and Hausmann, R. 2007. “The
Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations.” Science.
317: 482–87.
Klinger, B. 2007. “Uncertainty in the Search for New Exports.”
Graduate Student and Postdoctoral Fellow working paper No.
16. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Development,
Harvard University.
Leamer, E.E. 1984. Sources of Comparative Advantage: Theory and
Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
429
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Growing pains : binding constraints to productive - Inter

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