Alfaro, et al. and UTLA v. LAUSD

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2nd Civil No. 8224951
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE
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•
YANlRA ALFARO, et al.,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
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•
)
)
)
Court of Appeal Case No. 8224951
) · Superior Court Case No. BS124207
)
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
/
_____________________ )
Respondents/Defendants.
VtJ-'
<§l'IJ1P~'-t:-tc
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
CASE NO. BS124207
(cJt~;11
HONORABLE ALAN J. ROSENFIELD
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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Richard J. Schwab (SBN 72566)
TRYGSTAD, SCHWAB & TRYGSTAD
1880 Century Park East, Suite 1104
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Tel: (310) 552-0500
Fax: (3 10) 552-1306
Laura P. Juran (SBN 199978)
CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
1705 Murchison Drive
Burlingame, CA 94010
Tel: (650) 552-5440
Fax: (650) 552-5019
Jesus E. Quinonez (SBN 106228),
HOLGUIN, GARFIELD, MARTINEZ &
QUINONEZ, APLC
HOLGUIN, GARFIELD, MARTINEZ
& QUINONEZ, APLC
800 W. Sixth Street, Suite 950
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Tel: (213) 623-0170
Fax: (213) 623-0171
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs,
YANIRA ALFARO; SALVADOR
DEL TORO; DEBORAH V.
HARRISON; ELISA THOMAS; RON
DEL CID; and, UNITED TEACHERS
LOS ANGELES
2"d Civil No. B224951
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE
YANIRA ALFARO, eta!.,
)
Court of Appeal Case No. 8224951
)
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
•
v.
)
)
Superior Court Case No. BS124207
)
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, eta/.,
Respondents/Defendants.
____
)
)
)
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
CASE NO. BSl24207
HONORABLE ALAN J. ROSENFIELD
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
•
Richard J. Schwab (SBN 72566)
TRYGSTAD, SCHWAB & TRYGSTAD
1880 Century Park East, Suite 1104
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Tel: (310) 552-0500
Fax: (31 0) 552-1306
Laura P. Juran (SBN 199978)
CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
1705 Murchison Drive
Burlingame, CA 94010
Tel: (650) 552-5440
Fax: (650) 552-5019
Jesus E. Quinonez (SBN I 06228),
HOLGUIN, GARFIELD, MARTINEZ &
QUINONEZ, APLC
HOLGUIN, GARFIELD, MARTINEZ
& QUINONEZ, APLC
800 W. Sixth Street, Suite 950
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Tel: (213) 623-0170
Fax: (213) 623-0171
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs,
Y ANIRA ALFARO; SALVADOR
DELTORO; DEBORAH V.
HARRISON; ELISA THOMAS; RON
DEL CID; and, UNITED TEACHERS
LOS ANGELES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
I.
INTRODUCTION .................................................... 1
II.
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY ............................... 4
III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IV.
V.
..................................... 4
A.
Procedural History .......................................... 4
B.
Statement of Facts ........................................... 5
1.
Voters Passed Bond Measures to Construct
Facilities to Relieve Overcrowded Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.
District Solicited Bids to Operate Sites
Built to Relieve Overcrowding at
Designated Schools ...................................... 7
3.
District Awarded Sites to Charter Operators without Applying the
Teacher Petition Mandate of §47605(a)(2) ................... 9
ARGUMENT .................................................... 15
A.
Standard of Review ......................................... 15
B.
The Trial Court's Judgment Was Erroneous Because, As a Matter of
Law, the District Violated Its Duty to Comply with the Teacher
Petition Mandate of Education Code §47605(a)(2) Governing Partial
Conversions of Existing Schools ............................... 15
I.
Statutozy Scheme and Legislative History ................... 17
2.
The Charter Petitions at Issue Are Partial Conversion Petitions .. 22
CONCLUSION ................................................... 32
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Page No.
Accord Wilson
75 Cal.App.4th at 1135 .......................................... 22, 27
California Schl. Bds. Assn. v. State Bd. ofEducation
(2010) 186 Cai.App.4th 1298, 1314-15 ............................ 15,29
Hernandez v. County ofLos Angeles
(2008) 167 Cai.App.4th 12, 18
...................................... 15
JnreJ.W:
(2002) 29 Cal. 4th 200, 209-10 ....................................... 29
Sequoia Union High School District v. Aurora Charter High School
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 185, 188-89 .................................. 19
Sustainability ofParks, Recycling & Wildlife Legal Defense Fund v.
County ofSolano Dep 't of Resource Mgmt.
(2008) 167 Cal. App.4th 1350, 1357 .................................. 15
Wells v. One20ne Learning Foundation
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1201 ................................. 17, 23,30
Wilson v. State Bd. ofEducation
(1999)75 Cai.App.4th 1125, 1135 ............................. 17, 19,29
STATUTES
Education Code §47600 et seq . ............................................. 1
Ed. Code §47605 .................................................... 10, 17
Education Code §47605(a) ........................................... 18,21
Education Code §47605(a)(l) .................................. 2, 10, 16, 18, 20
Education Code §47605(a)(2) ........................... 2-5, 10,14-22,26,27, 31
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(cont'd)
Page No.
Ed. Code §§47605(a)(3) ............................................... 18, 19
Ed. Code §47605(b) .................................................. 21,29
Ed. Code §47605(b)(3) .................................................. 21
Ed. Code §47605(d)(l) .................................. 2, 9, 10, 18,21-23,27
Ed. Code §§47605(d)(2) ............................................... 9, 22
Ed. Code §§47605(d)(2)(A) ............................................... 27
Ed. Code §47607 ....................................................... 17
Ed. Code §47608 ....................................................... 17
Education Code §47632.5 ............................................. 23, 26
California Code of Civil Procedure §1085 .................................... 2
California Code of Civil Procedure § 108S(a) .................................. 4
C.C.P. §1086 ........................................................... 4
Cal. Rule Ct. 8.204(a)(2)(B) ............................................... 4
S Cal. Code Regs. §11967.5.l(d) ........................................... 21
5 Cal. Code Regs. § 11969.9(a) ............................................ 29
5 Cal. Code Regs. §11969.9(b) ............................................ 29
OTHER
AB 544, Stats. 1998, chap. 34 ............................................. 22
lll
I.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from an action brought by United Teachers Los Angeles
("UTLA") and individual teachers who work at long-overcrowded schools in the Los
Angeles Unified School District ("District"). To relieve overcrowding at the individual
Plaintiffs' schools and other District schools, Los Angeles voters approved bond
measures to fund construction of new school facilities that would specifically relieve the
overcrowded schools. The District has built, and is building, new reliever facilities with
those bond monies. The District also has instituted a formal school reconfiguration plan
by which portions of the student bodies at the existing, overcrowded schools have
transferred, and will continue to transfer, to specifically-designated new facilities in order
to relieve overcrowding at the existing schools.
This case was filed after the District passed a Resolution in which it put out to bid
by any interested parties, including independent charter operators, the operation of26
new reliever facilities that were built with the bond monies and scheduled to open in the
2010-11 school year. Plaintiff teachers and UTLA (also "Petitioners" or "Appellants")
asserted that the District was essentially splitting up the existing, overcrowded schools
under the reconfiguration p !an and, therefore, that a charter petition to take over one of
the 26 new facilities slated to relieve an existing, overcrowded school was a petition to
partially convert that existing, overcrowded school within the meaning of the Charter
Schools Act of 1992, Cal. Education Code §47600 et seq.
The District did not (and could not) dispute that the Charter Schools Act sets forth
only two ways in which a district charter school may be established in California: through
a start-up petition pursuant to Education Code §47605(a)(l) or a conversion petition
pursuant to §47605(a)(2). 1 While a start-up charter petition may be signed by interested
parents or teachers from outside the district (see Ed. Code §47605(a)(l )), a petition to
partially or entirely convert an existing public school, on the other hand, must be signed
by "not less than 50 percent of the permanent status teachers currently employed at the
public school to be converted." Ed. Code §47605(a)(2); see also Ed. Code §47605(d)(l).
The Act expressly recognizes that a conversion petition can effect either a partial or an
entire conversion of an existing school. See Ed. Code §47605(d)(l).
Notwithstanding the teachers' contention that the overcrowded schools were being
partially converted within the meaning of the Charter Schools Act, the District refused to
treat charter petitions submitted under the reconfiguration plan as petitions to partially
convert the existing, overcrowded schools.
Thus, Petitioners brought a petition for a writ of mandate under California Code of
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Civil Procedure §I 085 and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that
the District and Superintendent Ramon Cortines (collectively "District" or
"Respondents") were converting parts of their overcrowded schools to charter schools
1
All further statutory references are to the California Education Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
without complying with the mandatory teacher-signature requirement set forth in
§47605(a)(2). As further discussed below, the District's failure to comply with this
statutory mandate denied permanent teachers at the overcrowded schools a voice in
whether a portion of their school community should convert to charter status, even though
those teachers were intimately familiar with the needs and educational experiences of the
students who would be transferring to the newly-constructed reliever facilities, they were
exposed to potential job loss as a result of the conversions, and they had been actively
involved in the reconfiguration planning for the reliever facilities.
In an order dated April 2, 20 I 0, the trial court denied the writ petition and the
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. Joint Appendix, Vol. II ("JA II") 592- 599.
The trial court misconstrued Petitioners' fundamental legal contention, which is that,
under a careful examination of the statutory language, the legislative history, the purposes
behind the teacher-signature petition requirement of §47605(a)(2), and the facts of the
reconfiguration plan, a charter petition to take over one of the 26 newly-constructed
reliever facilities is best viewed as a petition to partially convert the overcrowded
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school(s) that the reliever facility is specifically slated to relieve. The trial court, like
Respondents, incorrectly focused on whether the new facilities were themselves
"existing" schools being converted to charters (see JA II 596), when Petitioners instead
contended, and contend here, that the long-overcrowded schools are the existing schools
undergoing partial conversions.
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The key facts are undisputed and the case presents a discrete legal issue of first
impression regarding what it means under the Charter Schools Act, and under the
particular facts involved, to establish a charter school through the "partial conversion" of
an existing public schooL As we show below, charter petitions to operate the newlyconstructed facilities under the school reconfiguration process are most fairly viewed as
petitions to partially convert the overcrowded schools being relieved, and, therefore, the
District should have applied the teacher-signature requirement of §47605(a)(2) to those
petitions. Because the District failed to apply the teacher-signature petition requirement,
Petitioners' writ should have been granted, and the trial court's decision should be
reversed.
II.
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY
This is an appeal from a final judgment and, accordingly, this Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal. See Cal. Rule Ct. 8.204(a)(2)(B).
III.
A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
Petitioners brought a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to C.C.P. §1085(a) and
§I 086, which included claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, on December 21,
2009. Joint Appendix, Vol. I ("JA I") 1-31. Petitioners filed an amended writ petition
and complaint on March 2, 20 I 0. JA I 181-204. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus
directing Respondents 1) to apply the conversion requirements of Education Code
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§47605(a)(2) to each petition to establish a charter school at a reliever facility under the
District's reconfiguration process, and 2) to refrain from granting a petition to establish a
charter at a reliever facility unless acting upon a charter petition with the signatures of
50% or more of the permanent status teachers at the corresponding overcrowded school(s)
being converted. JA I 198-199. Petitioners also sought declaratory and injunctive relief
to the same effect. JA I 199.
In connection with filing the amended writ petition, Petitioners moved for issuance
of a peremptory writ of mandate and asked that, if the trial court were to take the matter
under submission for any significant length of time, a preliminary injunction be issued to
preserve the status quo pending the court's resolution of the writ motion. JA I 205-206.
The trial court held a hearing on the writ motion on Apri12, 2010. JA II 592-593.
That same day, the trial court issued a written ruling in which it denied the requested writ
as well as the related requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. JA II 592-599. Notice
of entry of final judgment was filed on May 20, 2010, and this timely appeal followed.
JA II 615,621.
B.
Statement of Facts
1.
Voters Passed Bond Measures to Construct Facilities to Relieve
Overcrowded Schools.
The facts before the trial court were undisputed. For many years, District schools
have suffered from significant overcrowding. As a result, the District instituted in
numerous schools multi-track year-round calendars, in which three separate tracks of
5
teachers and students take turns rotating through a school site on a continuous basis,
rather than one group of teachers and students utilizing each school on a traditional twosemester basis. See JA I 38-39. The multi-track year-round calendar produces various
harmful impacts on students, such as denying equal access to high-level courses,
disrupting the curriculum and learning environment on a regular basis, and limiting access
to enrichment and extracurricular programs because of the calendar's failure to coincide
with the traditional school year. !d.; JA I 175-177,226-228,233-235. Accordingly, since
1997, the District has raised over $20 billion in construction bond revenues specifically to
relieve overcrowding at existing District schools and allow those schools to return to
traditional two-semester calendars. JA I 38-39.
The bond measures generating these revenues include Proposition BB in 1997
($2.4 billion), Measure Kin 2002 ($3.35 billion), MeasureR in 2004 ($3.87 billion), and
Measure Yin 2005 ($3.985 billion). JA I 86,88-91,93-96,98-101. Voters adopted each
of these bond measures to raise funds to build new neighborhood District schools that
would relieve overcrowding at existing schools and allow those schools to return to a
traditional two-semester calendar. MeasureR, for example, which was referred to as the
''Safe and Healthy Neighborhood Schools Improvement Act of 2004," was passed to
address the fact that more than fifteen thousand students could not attend neighborhood
schools due to overcrowding. JA I 93-96. Voters passed Measure Y, the "Safe and
Healthy Neighborhood Schools Repair and Construction Measure of2005," to enable the
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District to construct twenty thousand classroom seats needed to alleviate overcrowding
and accommodate future emollment. JA I 98-101.
All of the school bond measures identified the purposes of the bond monies and
the procedure through which bond funds were to be expended. The bond measures
allotted a total of$570 million to provide furniture, equipment and portable classrooms
for the approximately 160 charter schools in the District. However, the bond measures
included no funding for the construction of new charter school sites. JA I 103, 163.
2.
District Solicited Bids to Operate Sites Built to Relieve Overcrowding at
Designated Schools.
With the revenues generated by these bond measures, the District built and opened
approximately 75 new District schools before the 2009-10 school year. JA I 38-39.
Those new neighborhood schools enabled many students to attend District schools closer
to their homes, and they successfully incorporated many of the academic and enrichment
programs from the previously-overcrowded schools that they relieved. JA I 252-253.
An additional 26 neighborhood school sites- all built with the above-described
bond monies, and for the purpose of relieving overcrowding at existing schools- were
scheduled to open for instruction in the 2010-11 school year (and over the following three
years at least fifty more school sites built with these bond monies will open in the
District). JA I 38, 75-84. But this time, the District solicited and accepted bids from
various third parties, including independent charter operators, to take over operation of
the 26 additional school sites. The District invited charter operators to bid on these
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reliever sites even though the District's construction plans and reports consistently
describe these new sites as regular (non-charter) District schools, intended to relieve
overcrowding at designated existing District schools, and even though the District's
Charter School Expansion Program neither covers nor refers to these new sites. See JA I
40-41.
The bidding process was set in motion on August 25, 2009, when the District's
Board of Education ("Board") passed a Resolution entitled "Public School Choice: A
New Way at LAUSD" ("Resolution"). The Resolution instituted a reconfiguration of
numerous District schools that included putting the newly-constructed sites out to bid by
third parties. JA I 38, 75-80. The Resolution states, as the bond measures mandate, that
the additional neighborhood school sites will "relieve overcrowding at existing schools,
thereby enabling the existing [relieved] schools to return to a traditional school year." !d.
In implementing the Resolution, the District and Superintendent Cortines
specifically identified each existing school that was being relieved of overcrowding as
well as each additional school site that was relieving that school. See JA I 38, 82-84, 256,
281-291. While the District initially identified 24 additional school sites that were
scheduled to open for instruction in 20 I 0-11, the District subsequently announced that
two more new school sites would open in that school year, and it added those two sites to
the reconfiguration process as well. JA I 256,281-291.
The Resolution expressly required that third parties who wanted to operate any of
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the 26 additional school sites "must guarantee that the new school will enroll the requisite
number of students from the impacted campuses that the new school is intended to
relieve, and that students coming from the attendance areas of the designated,
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overcrowded schools will be served first and foremost." JA I 38, 75-80. The District
made clear that any entity applying to run one of the additional sites- including every
charter school applicant- must promise to give this attendance preference to all students
living within the attendance boundary of the overcrowded school that the new site was
slated to relieve. JA I 40, 147-161. 2
3.
District Awarded Sites to Charter Operators without Applyin~r the Teacher
Petition Mandate of §47605(a)(2).
The District required third parties to file a "notice of intent" by November 16,
2009, to indicate their interest in applying to operate one of the additional school sites
originally subject to the Resolution. Approximately twenty-five charter school operators
ftled letters of intent. JA I 39-40, 123-130. The District, through orientation sessions and
2
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As discussed below, this attendance preference requirement, which
comports with the intent of the bond measures, is consistent with
Appellants' view that petitions to establish charter schools at the reliever
sites are subject to the conversion petition requirement of the Charter
Schools Act. The Act expressly requires a charter school resulting from a
partially or entirely converted public school to give an admission
preference to students from the attendance area of the school that was
converted. Ed. Code §47605(d)(l). In sharp contrast, a charter school
established independently from existing public schools as a result of a
start-up petition is expressly prohibited from granting any such admission
preference. See Ed. Code §§47605(d)(2) and infra pp. 21-22.
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other communications, informed charter applicants that to be awarded one of the
additional school sites they must submit both a Resolution application and a "startup"charter petition to the District's Charter Schools Division. JA 141, 165-168.
Under the Charter Schools Act, a local school board cannot authorize
establishment of a charter school unless, among other requirements, the person seeking to
establish the charter school submits a valid charter petition. See Ed. Code §47605. If the
charter petition seeks to "convert," either partially or completely, an existing public
school to a charter, the petition must be signed by at least 50% of the permanent teachers
at the school(s) to be converted. Ed. Code §47605(a)(2); see also §47605(d)(l) (referring
to an existing school "converting partially or entirely" to charter status). On the other
hand, if the person seeks independently to create a "start-up" charter school entirely
unrelated to existing public schools, the person must submit a petition signed by at least
50% of parents of pupils that the charter school estimates it will enroll or by at least 50%
of teachers that the school estimates it will employ. Ed. Code §47605(a)(I). A petition to
create a start-up charter is neither associated with, nor reliant upon, any existing public
schools. Instead, such a petition, as the District itself has described it, seeks
independently to create a new school "from scratch," regardless of the existence or
configuration of any existing District schools. JA I 41, 147-161.
Some charter school operators submitted letters of intent under the Resolution
indicating that they were collecting signatures from parents to support their charter
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petitions for new sites. JA I 41-42. None ofthe letters of intent submitted by charter
•
operators stated that the charter applicant was collecting signatures from permanent status
teachers at the relieved school(s) affiliated with the new site. /d. No charter applicant
asked teachers at those relieved schools- teachers who in some cases had been looking
fmward to moving with a portion of their students to the new site - to participate in the
formation of its charter bid; nor did any charter applicant ask these teachers to sign a
petition in support of turning the associated new site into a charter school. JA I 175-180,
228-230, 236-237.
UTLA notified the District that charter petitions to operate the additional school
sites constituted petitions to partially convert the designated overcrowded schools that
would send students to those additional school sites. The District disagreed, and it
declined to instruct charter applicants that they needed to submit partial conversion
petitions (rather than start-up petitions) to obtain control of a newly-constructed reliever
•
site under the Resolution process. JA I 42, 170-171.
Multiple charter operators submitted bids to take over the additional school sites.
JA I 255. Consistent with the District's decision to treat their charter petitions as start-up
petitions, none of the charter applicants submitted a partial conversion petition signed by
permanent status teachers at the corresponding overcrowded school(s) being relieved. JA
I 39.
The District also received bids from groups of teachers and parents who belong to
11
the communities at the existing schools being relieved. Long before the Resolution's
passage, the District had given the good news to these communities that the additional
school sites were being constructed to relieve chronic overcrowding at their schools, and
it had promised that teachers and students would be able to move to the new school sites.
JA I 228-229, 235-236, 178. Many teachers and parents became upset when they later
learned that the District was putting the school sites that were promised to them out to bid
by third parties from outside the District. JA l 229-230, 236, J78-179. Teachers at the
existing relieved schools- who are deeply familiar with the needs and backgrounds of the
students being impacted by the reconfiguration- decided to fonnulate and submit
detailed proposals under the Resolution to administer the new school sites that are slated
to relieve their overcrowded schools. JA I 179, 229, 236.
After the bid deadline passed, the District obtained advisory vote recommendations
from parents, employees, community members and others regarding the bids that were
submitted. JA I 255. Advisory voters overwhelmingly favored the proposals submitted
by teachers employed at the overcrowded schools to be relieved. See JA I 229-230, 236.
On February 23,2010, the Board voted to award four of the additional school sites to
charter operators. 3 None of those charter operators submitted a conversion petition to
3
The four additional school sites that were awarded to charter operators
are (I) Gratts Primary Center; (2) Central Region Elementary School #15;
(3) South Region Elementary School #4; and (4) a learning center at South
Region Middle School #2. JA J 255, 266-267.
12
establish a charter at the awarded site. JA I 255-256. [!d. at ~4.] Nor did the District
require those charter operators to submit a conversion petition.
One ofthe four additional school sites that the District awarded to a charter
operator is Gratts Primary Center ("Gratts PC"). This site was built specifically to relieve
severe overcrowding at Gratts Elementary School, a K-5 school that suffered the
detrimental consequences of a year-round multi-track calendar for many years. JA I 226-
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228. The District built the new Gratts PC just two blocks away from Gratts Elementary
School. JA I 228-229. The District had informed teachers and parents that the lower
grades at Gratts Elementary School would move to the new site just down the street,
while the upper grades would remain at the existing facility. Teachers had been thrilled
to hear about this apportionment, because whether they would move to the new site for
the lower grades or remain at the existing site, they would be able to teach smaller classes
and teach on a two-semester calendar without lengthy, disruptive breaks throughout the
year. Further, the close geographic proximity of the two sites would ensure that the
existing Gratts community could be maintained and that teachers could commnnicate
easily about fostering a smooth curricular transition from Gratts PC to Gratts Elementary.
JA I 228-230.
After the Resolution was adopted and Gratts PC was put out to bid, Gratts
Elementary School teachers submitted a proposal to operate Gratts PC as a bilingual
District school that would prepare students to perform at a high level when they reached
13
•
Gratts Elementary School. JA I 229. However, the District decided to hand over Gratts
PC to an outside charter operator; and it did not consider that charter operator's petition
for the site to be a petition to partially convert Gratts Elementary School, requiring the
support ofGratts Elementary School's permanent teachers. JA I 255-256. The District
instead treated that charter petition as a start-up petition, wholly unrelated to Gratts
Elementary School, which could be supported by potential parents or potential teacher
employees from anywhere in or outside the District. Thus, the District gave Gratts PC to
a charter operator in violation of the rights of Gratts Elementary School teachers to
participate in determining whether the reliever site should become a charter.
Similarly, the District gave three other reliever sites to charter operators, without
affording teachers at the corresponding overcrowded schools an opportunity to vote
(through the majority signature requirement under §47605(a)(2)) on whether the school
relieving their site should become a charter school, and even though for years District
administrators had promised these teachers that they would be able to move with their
students to the new sites. JA I 235-237; see also JA I 178- I 79.
Teacher plaintiff.<; and UTLA then brought this lawsuit to prevent the District from
partially converting an overcrowded existing school, such as Gratts Elementary School, to
a charter school unless the charter petition was signed by at least 50% of the permanent
teachers at the site being partially converted. Plaintiffs sought, and here seek,
enforcement of teachers' statutory right under §47605(a)(2) to participate in the decision
14
as to whether their school should be partially converted to a charter school.'
IV.
A.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
The issue in this case ~ whether the District had a statutory duty to treat the charter
petitions at issue as partial conversion petitions under Education Code §47605(a)(2)- is a
question oflaw, which is subject to de novo review. Sustainability of Parks, Recycling &
•
Wildlife Legal Defense Fund v. County of Solano Dep 't ofResource Mgmt., 167 Cal.
App.4th 1350, 1357 (2008) (statutory interpretation question in mandamus appeal
presents legal question subject to de novo review); Hernandez v. County ofLos Angeles,
167 Cai.App.4th 12, 18 (2008) (legal determination reviewed de novo). Because the
District's conduct involves statutory interpretation, this Court should conduct an
"independent review" and consider the context of the District's view of the statute. See
California Schl. Bds. Assn. v. State Bd. ofEducation, 186 Cai.App.4th 1298, 1314-15
(2010).
B.
The Trial Court's Judgment Was Erroneous Because, As a Matter of
Law, the District Violated Its Duty to Comply with the Teacher
Petition Mandate of Education Code §47605(a)(2) Governing Partial
4
Plaintiff teachers worked in the 2009-l 0 school year at overcrowded
schools that were scheduled to be reapportioned under the Resolution
beginning in the 20 I 0-11 school year. The District is continuing to
reapportion, and will reapportion, numerous other overcrowded schools
pursuant to the Resolution in the following years, when approximately
fifty more sites built with the bond monies are scheduled to open for
instruction and relieve those other overcrowded schools. JA I 38, 75-84.
15
Conversions of Existing Schools.
Plaintiff teachers and UTLA make one legal contention: Under the Resolution
process, the District has allowed existing, overcrowded schools to be partially converted
to charter schools without compliance with the teacher-petition mandate of §47605(a)(2).
The central issue in this case is the meaning of "partial conversion" under the Charter
Schools Act, and whether the District's school reconfiguration process is most fairly
viewed as effecting partial conversions of existing overcrowded schools for purposes of
the Act.
As further discussed below, under common rules of statutory interpretation and the
particular facts of this case, the District has allowed overcrowded schools such as Gratts
Elementary to be partially converted to charter status. Charter petitions to take over the
corresponding reliever sites (such as Gratts Primary Center) sought to operate the portions
of the overcrowded schools that were being assigned to those reliever sites. Thus, the
District should have treated those charter petitions as conversion petitions subject to the
teacher-signature requirement of §47605(a)(2) (rather than as "start-up" petitions subject
to §47605(a)(l)), and the District violated the Charter Schools Act by not applying that
teacher-signature requirement to the charter petitions at issue. 5
5
At the trial court level, both the trial judge and the District erroneously
focused on whether the 26 new sites built with bond monies were
themselves "existing" schools undergoing conversions under the Charter
Schools Act. But Petitioners never argued that the newly-constructed sites
(continued... )
16
1.
Statutory Scheme and Legislative History
To decide the legal question presented in this case, it is helpful first to review
relevant statutory provisions and pertinent legislative history.
The Charter Schools Act, first enacted in 1992, sets forth a detailed legislative
scheme which, among other things, establishes the procedure that must be followed to
establish a charter school in California. See generally Ed. Code §§47605-47608. A
charter school is one that is operated by an entity other than a school district (often a
private non-profit corporation), which operates outside the legal framework that governs
public schools, but that nevertheless receives public funding. See, e.g., Wells v. One20ne
Learning Foundation, 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1201 (2006) (charter schools are exempt from
laws governing school districts, and their sole relationship with chartering district is
through the charters governing their operation). Further, " ... charter schools are strictly
creatures of statute. From how charter schools come into being, to who attends and who
can teach, ... the Legislature has plotted all aspects of their existence." Wilson v. State
Bd. ofEducation, 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 (1999) (emphasis in original).
The Charter Schools Act requires that a person seeking to establish a charter
( ... continued)
are the "existing" schools being converted to charters under the
Resolution. Rather, Petitioners contended, and contend here, that the
overcrowded schools- which are being relieved pursuant to the bond
measures and the District's reconfiguration process- are the existing
schools that the District is allowing to be partially converted to charter
schools.
17
school must submit a signed petition to the school district. As originally enacted, the law
required that any petition to establish a charter school within a school district had to be
signed by at least I 0% of the teachers currently employed by that district or at least 50%
of the teachers currently employed at one school in that district. Former Ed. Code
§47605(a).
In 1998, the Legislature amended that requirement (AB 544, Stats. 1998, chap. 34)
•
and drew a distinction between a charter petition effecting "the conversion of an existing
public school" and what is commonly referred to as a "start-up" charter petition. See Ed.
Code §§47605(a)(J), (2). In the District's own words, a start-up petition seeks to
establish a charter school wholly "from scratch." See supra p.lO. Start-up petitions-
•
unlike the charter petitions at issue here- are neither connected with, nor related to,
existing district schools, and they are independently brought by persons or organizations
who want to compete for students from existing district schools. ld.
Under the revised statutory language, a start-up petition can be signed by parents
or teachers (even from outside the district) who are interested in sending their children to,
or teaching at, the charter school. Ed. Code §§47605(a)(l), (3). On the other hand, a
petition to convert an existing public school, whether partially or entirely, must be signed
by "not less than 50 percent of the permanent status teachers currently employed at the
public school to be converted." Ed. Code §47605(a)(2); see also Ed. Code §47605(d)(J)
(expressly recognizing that an existing school may convert "partially or entirely" to a
18
charter school).6 The teachers' signatures on the conversion petition must be preceded by
a statement attesting that each signer is meaningfully interested in teaching at the charter
schooL Ed. Code §47605(a)(3).
In amending these petition provisions in 1998, the Legislature opened the charter
signature process in the start-up context to parents and teachers who need not have any
relationship whatsoever with the district, while at the same time the Legislature expressly
•
retained the requirement that any type of conversion petition must be signed by current
teachers at the District. Ed. Code §47605(a)(2). The Legislature specifically retained the
limitation on an outsider's ability to convert existing public schools (even partially) to
charters by requiring that any petition to convert an existing public school be signed by at
least 50% of the permanent teachers at that school. I d. In fact, rather than eliminating the
current-teacher petition mandate in the conversion context, the Legislature tightened that
mandate by requiring that a conversion petition- whether effecting a partial or complete
conversion- be signed by at least 50% of the permanent status teachers employed at the
school being partially or completely converted. ld The statute requires a person seeking
to convert an existing public school to obtain the buy-in of a majority of the permanent
status teachers at that schooL I d.
6
See also Wilson, 75 CaLApp.4th at I 132 ("Petitions for the conversion
of an existing public school to a charter school must be signed by at least
half of the permanent status teachers currently employed at the schooL")
(citation omitted); Sequoia Union High School District v. Aurora Charter
High School, l12 CaLApp.4th 185, 188-89 (2003) (same).
19
During the trial court proceedings, Respondents cited bill analyses submitted to
legislators in 1998 regarding the proposal to eliminate the current-teacher signature
requirement (see JA II 517), but Respondents failed to clarifY that this particular proposal
applied only to start-up petitions and that the bill in fact tightened the current-teacher
signature requirement in the conversion context. Further, the legislative history regarding
the 1998 amendments specifically refers to "start-up charter schools" and distinguishes
those schools from charter schools established as a result of a "conversion" of an existing
public school. See JA II 384, 421. Thus, the legislative history shows- as the statutory
language itself shows -that lawmakers intended to apply the new petition requirements of
§47605(a)(l) to "start-up" petitions, and to apply the teacher-petition mandate of
§47605(a)(2) to conversion petitions.
While the legislative history provides no specific explanation of the Legislature's
intent in requiring current, permanent District teachers to sign conversion petitions, the
teacher-signature requirement for conversions serves several self-evident purposes. It
gives District teachers, who are familiar with current students' needs and have a stake in
the process, a voice in whether part or all of their existing District school should be
converted to a particular charter school. It recognizes that pennanent teachers have
constitutional and statutory rights in their employment, and thus reasonably should have a
say in whether their schools convert to charter status. Further, by requiring teachers to
support the charter effort, the requirement helps ensure that a conversion to charter status
20
will be successful. In addition, the requirement protects the public's resources from being
appropriated by entities that need not have any meaningful connection to the school
community or to the school district.
Section 47605(d)(l) of the Charter Schools Act specifically recognizes that an
existing public school may be "partially or entirely" converted to a charter school. Thus,
under the statutory scheme, a conversion petition pursuant to §47605(a)(2)- properly
signed by a majority of permanent teachers at the existing school to be converted- can
effect either a partial or a total conversion of the existing school. See Ed. Code
§47605(a)(2); §47605(d)(l).
A school district may only hold a public hearing and consider a charter petition if
that petition was properly submitted "in accordance with [§47605] subdivision (a)" and
its signature requirements. Ed. Code §47605(b). And even if the district conducts a
hearing and reviews the petition, the district must deny the petition if it did not contain the
number of signatures required by §47605(a)(2) at the time it was submitted. See Ed.
Code §47605(b)(3); 5 Cal. Code Regs. §IJ967.5.l(d).
When a charter operator submits a petition to partially or completely convert
existing public schools, that charter operator seeks to establish a new charter school as a
result of a partial or complete change in existing public schools. If the school board
grants the conversion petition, a new charter school will be created.
In addition to the teacher-signature petition requirement set forth in §47605(a)(2),
21
the Legislature placed one other restriction on public school conversions to charter status:
The law protects the attendance rights of students by requiring a school "converting
partially or entirely to a charter school" to grant an attendance preference to students
•
residing in the attendance area of the existing school being converted. Ed. Code
§4 7605( d)(!). Start-up charters, by contrast, are prohibited [rom granting such an
attendance preference, and they must admit students without regard to their place of
residence. Ed. Code §§47605(d)(l), (d)(2).
The comprehensive provisions of the Charter Schools Act require strict
compliance. Accord Wilson, 75 Cal.App.4th at 1135. Under §47605(a)(2) of that Act,
the District has a clear, present, and ministerial duty not to credit as legally snfficient a
petition to partially convert an existing public school to a charter school unless that
petition has been signed by at least 50% of the permanent status teachers at the site being
partially converted.
2.
The Charter Petitions at Issue Are Partial Conversion Petitions.
Neither the trial court nor the District offered an assessment of what constitutes a
"partial conversion" of an existing school, even though this is the key statutory term in the
case. The legislative history sheds no light on the distinction between a "partial"
conversion of an existing school and an "entire" conversion, and the statute does not
define "conversion" or what it means to "partially" convert existing schools (and no
published court decision addresses the issue). But ordinary rules of statutory
•
22
interpretation and a logical assessment of legislative purpose support Appellants' view
that, under the particular facts of this case, charter petitions to operate the reliever sites
under the District's reconfiguration process arc most appropriately viewed as petitions
effecting a partial conversion of the overcrowded schools being relieved.
a.
First, as discussed, the Charter Schools Act explicitly
recognizes that an existing school may be partially (or entirely) converted to a charter
school. Ed. Code §47605(d)(l). The overcrowded schools being relieved under the
Resolution, such as Gratts Elementary School, are undisputedly "existing" District
schools.
Statutory terms are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning, construed in
context, and interpreted in a manner that furthers legislative purposes. See, e.g., Wells, 39
Cal.4th at 1190. To "convert" part of an existing school simply means to change a
portion of that school to charter status. 7 While a partial conversion could entail dividing
one school facility into two separate operating entities - a charter and a non-charter- that
share the same campus, it could also entail, as here, splitting up or extending an existing
school and assigning a portion of its operations to another site. Nothing in the statute
precludes either type of "partial" conversion.
7
Education Code §47632.5, which also uses the term "conversion,"
refers to converting an existing school "to charter status." Thus, this
Section further shows that a conversion is nothing more than a change in
status (either partially or entirely) from a non-charter to a charter. See Ed.
Code §47632.5.
23
For example, the District occasionally operates different schools (or "learning
centers") on the same campus. If the District had built the new Gratts PC on the same
campus, or directly across the street from, where Gratts Elementary School is located, it
would have been even more obvious, due to sheer proximity, that the charter operator's
petition to take over the portion of Gratts Elementary assigned to Gratts PC was a petition
involving a partial conversion of Gratts Elementary. But nothing in the statute requires a
•
different result simply because the District was sending a portion of Gratts Elementary
School students to a site that is two blocks away. The key fact is that the District has
consciously split up Gratts Elementary and other existing schools, and has allowed charter
operators, without submitting partial conversion petitions, to assume control of the parts
•
of those schools slated to go to the designated reliever sites .
b.
In addition, charter bids to assume operations of the reliever sites under the
Resolution bear the attributes of conversion petitions much more than they resemble start-
•
up petitions. A start-up petition is one that is signed by individuals who need not have
any connection to any District school or to the District at large, and that seeks to establish
a charter school wholly from scratch, without any relation to the public school system.
Start-up petitions are neither tethered to, nor associated with, existing District schools.
They are brought independently by persons or organizations who want to compete for
students from regular District schools. See supra p. I 0.
The Resolution charter petitions, by contrast, are part of a District-initiated school
24
reconfiguration plan that is specifically intended to relieve overcrowding by dividing up
existing District schools and assigning a portion of those schools' students to the reliever
schools. Charter petitions for the reliever sites are directly tied to the existing schools
being relieved, as those reliever sites are expected to receive students from the designated
relieved schools and, in fact, must guarantee that they will grant an attendance preference
to students living in the attendance area of the relieved schools. See supra pp.8-9.
Here again, the reconfiguration of Gratts Elementary School exemplifies the
partial-conversion nature of the charter petitions submitted under the Resolution. The
District specifically built Gratts Primary Center to relieve overcrowding at Gratts
Elementary and to allow Gratts Elementary to return to a two-semester calendar. The
District informed teachers and parents that the lower grades at Gratts Elementary would
be transferred to Gratts Primary Center, just two blocks away. See supra p. 13. The
District granted Gratts Elementary students an attendance preference at Gratts Primary
Center. It solicited the active participation of Gratts Elementary teachers in the
reconfiguration planning, and it led teachers to believe that they would be able to move to
the new site with their students. See supra p. 13. This reflects a reapportionment and
extension of Gratts Elementary, which is why a charter petition to take over the portion of
Gratts Elementary transferring to Gratts PC resembles a partial conversion petition more
than a start-up petition.
c.
Treating the charter petitions at issue as partial conversion petitions also
25
comports with inferable statutory purpose. It would make little sense, and would be
•
contrary to legislative purpose, for charter operators, who are obligated to receive
students from the relieved schools, to be able to create a charter school under the
Resolution by submitting a petition signed by parents from outside the relevant attendance
area or perhaps from outside the District itself- parents who have no connection
whatsoever with the overcrowded schools that are, at long last, to enjoy a reconfiguration.
It makes much more sense that, consistent with statutory conversion requirements, the
charter operators should have to obtain the support of teachers at the relieved schools,
who are familiar with their students' needs and educational experiences, who have an
obvious stake in the process, and who have been actively involved in the reconfiguration
planning. See supra pp. ll-12. The Legislature intended to restrict the ability of persons
who need not have any connection with a school community to convert an existing school
-even in part- to charter status. Ed. Code §47605(a)(2). Enforcing the teacher signature
requirement in the context of the Resolution process furthers this self-evident legislative
purpose. 8
8
The District asserted that the conversion requirements of §47605(a)(2)
should not apply to the charter petitions at issue because, except for Gratts
PC, the other additional school sites awarded to charters were designated
to relieve two existing schools rather than one. But the Charter Schools
Act expressly contemplates that a charter operator may "convert[] to
charter status a single existing public school or multiple existing public
schools." Ed. Code §47632.5 (emphasis supplied). Further, the District
cannot legitimately complain about any logistical difficulties associated
(continued ... )
26
d.
Plaintiff teachers and UTLA argued below tbat unless the charter petitions
were construed as conversion petitions, the District would be permitting the establishment
of charter schools that violate the attendance requirements of the Charter Schools Act. As
previously noted, the law protects the attendance rights of students in the conversion
context by requiring a school "converting partially or entirely to a charter school" to grant
an attendance preference to students residing in the attendance area of the school being
converted. Ed. Code §47605(d)(l). In contrast, all charter schools established outside tbc
conversion context are prohibited from granting such an attendance preference and must
generally admit students who reside anywhere in the state. Ed. Code §§47605(d)(l),
(d)(2)(A). Thus, the fact tbat the District was requiring charter operators to give an
attendance pre terence to students from the relieved schools (in accordance with the bond
measures) is consistent with Appellants' view that these are conversion petitions, not
start-up petitions to create schools that by law are prohibited from granting such an
attendance preference.
Appellants have been informed that, after the trial court's ruling, tbe District
8
•
( ••• continued)
witb the teacher petition mandate when the District itself is responsible for
creating a situation in which multiple existing schools arc undergoing
partial conversions simultaneously. The teacher-signature requirement of
§47605(a)(2) contains no exceptions and should be strictly enforced.
Accord Wilson, 75 Cal.App.4th at J 135. Thus, if a charter petition seeks
to effect the partial conversion of multiple existing schools, that petition
must be signed by at least 50% of the permanent teachers at each of those
existing schools .
27
attempted to circumvent this problem by obtaining a waiver from the State Board of
Education ("SBE") of the statutory requirement that a start-up charter must admit students
regardless of their place of residence. 'The District evidently obtained a waiver that
allows the charter operators who were awarded reliever facilities to grant an attendance
preference to students residing in the attendance areas of the existing, overcrowded
schools that the reliever facilities were assigned to relieve.
Under Appellants' statutory interpretation, if the District had properly viewed the
charter petitions as partial conversion petitions rather than start-up petitions, the District
would not have needed to obtain such a waiver from SBE because the statute requires
conversion charters to grant this attendance preference. In any event, SBE did not
•
analyze the underlying issue of whether charter petitions submitted under the Resolution
process were partial conversion petitions or start-up petitions. Appellants maintain that
they are partial conversion petitions and that the District had a duty to treat them as such .
•
e.
The view of Plaintiff teachers and UTLA is also consistent with voter intent.
Voters approved billions of dollars in bond expenditures to build new neighborhood
•
District schools, specifically to relieve harmful overcrowding at existing schools and
allow those schools to return to two-semester calendars. See supra pp. 5-7. None of the
bond money was designated for construction of new charter schools. See supra p. 7. Yet
the District now believes charter operators may promptly lay claim to the new reliever
sites without complying with statutory conversion requirements - a result neither
28
•
presented to, nor contemplated by, the voters.
f.
Finally, the District and the trial court both misconstrued the logical effects
of treating charter petitions submitted under the Resolution as start-up petitions rather
than conversion petitions.
If the District's view were accepted, then every time a school district in California
is in the process of building a new school site for its students, a private corporation could
immediately step in and insist on taking over that new site by proffering a "start-up"
charter petition signed by parents. The Charter Schools Act affords limited discretion to
school boards in denying validly-presented charter petitions. See Ed. Code §47605(b);
see also California Schl. Bds. Assn., 186 Cai.App.4th at 1318; Wilson, 75 Cai.App.4th at
1132. Thus, if a start-up petition were deemed a legally effective vehicle for charter
operators to appropriate brand new public school sites, school districts would lose the
ability to maintain control over the operation of their new school sites. Every time a new
public school was constructed and slated to open, a third party operator could appropriate
use of that facility simply by presenting a petition that meets the statutory requirements of
a start-up petition (particularly if the charter operator also submits a timely facilities
request under Proposition 39; see 5 Cal. Code Regs. § 11969.9(a), (b)). Such a result is
absurd and cannot have been intended by the Legislature. See In re J. W., 29 Cal.4th 200,
209-10 (2002) (court should avoid interpreting statute in manner that produces absurd
results).
29
The trial court decision failed to address this argument. Instead, the trial court
stated, wrongly, that the teachers' interpretation of the statute would "seemingly eliminate
the whole 'start-up' category in that most new [charter] schools arc established in some
degree to serve as an alternative to an existing school and/or to alleviate its burden." JA
II 597. This reasoning is incorrect and unsupported by the evidence. Treating the
particular charter petitions at issue as partial conversion petitions would in no way
•
"eliminate" the start-up category of charter petitions.
California Supreme Court case law already recognizes that charter schools
"compete" with regular District schools for students and "receive [public) funding based
on the number of students they recruit and retain;" and, if a charter school ceases to exist,
"its pupils are reabsorbed into the district's mainstream public schools." Wells, 39
Cal.4th at 1202, 1203-04. While start-up charter schools may provide additional
educational opportunities to students, they do not exist to "alleviate" any burdens on
existing schools. The Legislature did not enact the Charter Schools Act to "alleviate"
burdens on traditional public schools; and, in fact, charter schools categorically do not
"alleviate" burdens on existing schools- indeed, because charters receive public funding
on a per-student basis (see id. at 1186), they drain funding from regular public schools for
each student they recruit.
The charter petitions submitted pursuant to the Resolution process are unique
because they seek to operate facilities that voters and the District had built specifically to
30
relieve overcrowding at existing District schools. The trial court failed to recognize that,
under the critical facts of the school reconfiguration involved, the reliever sites are
expressly tied to overcrowded schools and serve a relief/school-extension function that
(as previously discussed) in no way resembles a start-up charter school. It is because of
this reapportionment context that the charter petitions at issue are best viewed as effecting
partial conversions of the overcrowded schools.
In sum, taxpayers expected the reliever sites, like the 7 5 new sites previously
opened and now successfully in operation, to open as neighborhood District schools.
Current teachers, parents and students at the overcrowded schools had long looked
forward to the opening of these school sites, which the District's own construction and
bond documents describe as District schools. See supra pp. 5-7, 11-12. Through its
Resolution, the District has been reapportioning existing District schools and assigning
part of their operation to new reliever sites that everyone had considered to be District
•
school sites. Under these facts, only one conclusion can be drawn: Establishing charter
schools at the reliever school sites can be effectuated only through conversion petitions,
not start-up petitions.
The trial court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous and should be reversed. The
District had a clear, present, and ministerial duty under Education Code §47605(a)(2) not
to partially convert existing public schools to charters without the support of 50% of the
permanent teachers at the schools being partially converted; and the District violated that
31
duty by not applying the teacher signature requirement of that statute to the charter
petitions submitted under the Resolution. Accordingly, the petition for a peremptory writ
of mandate should have been granted.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the trial court erred in denying the writ of mandate and in
dismissing the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The judgment should
be reversed.
Dated: December 20, 20! 0
Respectfully Submitted,
HOLGUIN, GARFIELD, MARTINEZ &
QUINONEZ, APLC
By:
Jesus E. Quinonez
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
•
WORD COUNT CERTIFICATE
Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.204(c)(l), I certifY that the foregoing
Appellants' Opening Brief contains 8119 words (including footnotes, and excluding
tables and this certificate), as calculated by the WordPerfect word processing program
used to prepare this brief.
Executed on December 21, 20 I 0, in Los Angeles, California.
Jesus E. Quinonez
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
33
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
)
)
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over
the age of 18 and declare that I am not a party to the within action; my business
address is 800 W. 6th Street, Suite 950, Los Angeles, California 90017.
On December 21,2010, I served the attached APPELLANTS' OPENING
BREIF on the interested parties as follows:
_1 copy(ies):
.L copy(ies):
Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant,
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT. RAMON COR TINES; LOS
ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION
Honorable Alan S. Rosenfield
Los Angeles Superior Court, Central
District
Ill N. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
David R. Holmquist, General Counsel
Mampre R. Pomakian, Associate
General Counsel
Office of the General Counsel
Los Angeles Unified School District
333 South Beaudry Avenue, 20th
Floor
Los Angeles, CA 900 17
T: 213-241-7600
F: 213-241-3311
_1_ copy( ies):
Clerk
California Supreme Court
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102-4797
I deposited the number of copies indicated above, the address(es) designated by
said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing the copies of same, enclosed in a
postpaid properly addressed UPS wrapper, personally pi eked up by a UPS
representative under the exclusive custody and care of UPS, within the State of
California.
AND:
I declare that on December 21,2010, the original and four copies have
been hand delivered for filing on this date to:
Clerk
California Court of Appeal
Second Appellate District
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 900 13
I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of this
Court at whose discretion the above service was made. I declare under penalty of
perjury under the laws of the United States of America
e foregoing is true
and correct.
Isabel Montoya
•