identity of parties and counsel

FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS, TEXAS
___________________
NO. 05-11-00593-CV
___________________
STEVE KING, TIMM BAUMANN AND DAVID WILLIAMS
Defendants-Appellants
v.
PARK CITIES BANK
Plaintiff-Appellee
___________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE 193RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
___________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS,
STEVE KING, TIMM BAUMANN AND DAVID WILLIAMS
James H. Baumgartner, Jr.
BAUMGARTNER, BILLINGS & BLOOM, L.L.P.
14901 Quorum Drive, Suite 740, LB 156
Dallas, TX 75254-7524
Telephone: 972-364-1151
Facsimile: 972-387-0096
[email protected]
Attorney for Steve King, Timm Baumann
and David Williams, Defendants-Appellants
5th Court of Appeals
FILED: 7/20/11
14:00
Lisa Matz, Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
THE PARTIES’ DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Steve King
Timm Baumann
David Williams
Savannah Homes, LP (Dismissed)
Steve King Custom Homes, Inc. (Dismissed)
THE PARTIES’ PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
Park Cities Bank
Final Judgment Entered by the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas, Texas
COUNSEL
James H. Baumgartner, Jr.
Texas Bar No. 01933000
Baumgartner, Billings & Bloom, L.L.P.
14901 Quorum Drive, Suite 740, LB 156
Dallas, TX 75254-7524
Telephone: 972-364-1151
Facsimile: 972-387-0096
Email: [email protected]
Jennifer L. Owen
Texas Bar No. 15369050
Higier Allen & Lautin, P.C.
5057 Keller Springs Road, Suite 600
Addison, TX 75001
Telephone: 972-716-1888
Facsimile: 972-716-1899
Email: [email protected]
Attorney for Defendants-Appellant
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
/s/ James H. Baumgartner, Jr.
JAMES H. BAUMGARTNER, JR.
-i-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ................................................................................ i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................. ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................ iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................................................................2
ORAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................2
ISSUES PRESENTED...................................................................................................................2
Issue One............................................................................................................................2
Issue Two ...........................................................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................................3
ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................4
Issue One - Restated...........................................................................................................4
Issue Two – Restated .........................................................................................................7
PRAYER......................................................................................................................................10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................................................................................................11
APPENDIX..................................................................................................................................12
-ii-
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) ...................................................5
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981)..................................................7
Clark v. Walker, 689 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.)......................................................................................................................8
City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111, S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003) .........................................4
DLB Architects, P.C. and David Boeck v. Blair Weaver, Weaver
Construction Co., Inc. and Cool Water Development,
305 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) .........................................................6
FDIC v. Attayi, 745 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) ..................9
Fireman’s Fund Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hidi, 13 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. 2000) ..............................5
Fitzgerald v. Advance Spine Fixation System, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999)..................6
Garth National Bank v. Burge, 29 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) ..............9
Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp. 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981) .....................................6, 7
In re: Will Clay Perry, 425 B.R. 323 (S.D. Tex. Houston—2010) .................................................8
Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1998) ........................................................................4
Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1995)...........4, 6
LaSalle Bank National Association v. Sleutel, 289 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. Tex. 2002) ..................3, 6, 8
Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. 2008).....................................................................5
McKnight v. Virginia Mirror Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. 1971).....................................8
Noland Casualty Co. v. Turner Construction Co., 335 S.W.3d 698
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011)..........................................................................................9
Old Colony Ins. Co. v. City of Quitman, 163 Tex. 144, 325 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1961)............9
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water,
2011 Tex. LEXIS 192; 54 Tex. Supp. J. 642 (Tex. March 11, 2011)..............................................4
Segal v. Emmes Capital, LLC, 155 S.W.3d at 278 ..........................................................................8
-iii-
Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) ......................................................................7
State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 287; 2006 Tex. LEXIS 577; 49 Tex. Supp. J.
769 (Tex. 2006)................................................................................................................................5
Strauss-Frank Co. v. Hughes, 138 Tex. 50, 156 S.W.2d 519, 521
(Tex. Comm’n at 1941, opinion adopted)........................................................................................9
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tracey D. Suttles, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60914..............................................8
Vastine v. Bank of Dallas, 808 S.W.2d 463, 464-465 (Tex. 1991) .............................................8, 9
STATUTES
Texas Property Code § 51.003
Texas Finance Code (2011) § 34.307
-iv-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS, TEXAS
___________________
NO. 05-11-00593-CV
___________________
STEVE KING, TIMM BAUMANN AND DAVID WILLIAMS
Defendants-Appellants
v.
PARK CITIES BANK
Plaintiff-Appellee
___________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STEVE KING, TIMM BAUMANN AND DAVID WILLIAMS
___________________________________________
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT
OF TEXAS AT DALLAS, TEXAS:
For the purpose of clarity, the parties will be referred to as they appear in the Trial Court:
Steve King, Timm Baumann and David Williams ......................................................“Defendants”
Appellant, Steve King, an individual..................................................................................... “King”
Appellant, Timm Baumann, an individual......................................................................“Baumann”
Appellant, David Williams, an individual ...................................................................... “Williams”
Appellee, Park Cities Bank .......................................................................................... “Park Cities”
-1-
The following stipulated exhibits are attached hereto as an Appendix to this Brief for the
convenience of the Court:
Final Judgment [C.R. 152-154] .......................................................... Appendix Exh. No. 1
Text of § 51.003 of the Texas Property Code..................................... Appendix Exh. No. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a suit for a deficiency judgment by Park Cities against the guarantors
[Defendants] on four promissory notes [C.R. 32-45; Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition].
The trial court granted Park Cities’ Motion for Summary Judgment [C.R. 46-76; Park Cities’
Amended Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment] on February 22, 2011 when it entered
Final Judgment [C.R. 152-154; Appendix Exh. No. 1]. It is from the summary judgment that
Defendants have prosecuted this appeal [C.R. 159-160; Notice of Appeal].
ORAL ARGUMENT
This cause is a case of first impression before this Court, and oral argument should be
granted as the Court’s decision will construe the terms of § 51.003 of the Texas Property Code
[Appendix Exh. No. 2] which deals directly with the rights of the citizens of the State of Texas.
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE ONE
Section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code cannot be waived.
ISSUE TWO
Should § 51.003 be construed to be subject to waiver, the
waiver provision must specifically provide that the “right of
offset” is waiver.
-2-
STATEMENTS OF FACT
Park Cities brought suit for a deficiency judgment against the makers and guarantors of
four separate promissory notes and guaranty agreements, all of which had the identical terms
[C.R. 32-45; Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition]. Defendants contended § 51.003 could
not be waived, or alternatively that if § 51.003 were subject to waiver, that the waiver language
had to specifically address the “right of offset” as the statute specifically provides for “an offset”
against the deficiency [C.R. 26-31; Defendants’ First Amended Original Answer]. Park Cities
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [C.R. 46-76], and ultimately the Court granted the
summary judgment on February 22, 2011 [C.R. 152-154; Final Judgment; Appendix Exh. No. 1].
It is from this Final Judgment that Defendants have prosecuted this appeal [C.R. 159-160; Notice
of Appeal].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The case before the Court is one requiring this Court’s statutory interpretation of
§ 51.003 of the Texas Property Code. The section contains no provision which provides that it
can be waived. Defendants maintain that the language of § 51.003 is clear and there exists no
reason or basis to read the waiver provision into the section, or as the Fifth Circuit undertook to
do in LaSalle Bank N.A. as Trustee v. Sleutel, 289 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2002), when the court
literally read a waiver provision into the statute that did not otherwise exist.
Defendants
respectfully submit there is nothing in § 51.003 of the Texas Property Code that is confusing or
requires any interpretation other than the words themselves. Under these circumstances, the
Texas courts have consistently held that no additional words shall be read into the statute unless
it is necessary to fulfill the legislature’s intent. The intent is clear in § 51.003 of the Texas
Property Code, and there is no legitimate basis or justification for the courts to add words where
the words are already clear and unequivocal.
-3-
Alternatively, if for any reason the Court should find a basis for determining that
§ 51.003 has or could have been subject to waiver, Defendants respectfully submit that in this
case, as they are before the Court as guarantors, the absence of language in the guaranty
agreements that would provide for the guarantors’ “waiver” of the “right of offset,” the
guarantors cannot be held liable for the reason that “offset” was never included in their guaranty
at all. The guarantors’ liability cannot be extended beyond that which they contracted for, and
the guaranty does not include “offset.”
For the reasons set forth, Defendants respectfully submit the judgment of the trial court
should be reversed and rendered; and the trial court instructed to provide for Defendants
attorneys’ fees in connection with their successful defense to liability.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE ONE
(Restated)
Section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code cannot be waived.
The Texas Supreme Court in the recent case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas
Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 192; 54 Tex. Sup. J. 642 (Tex.
March 11, 2011), wrote an extensive opinion explaining the proper method of undertaking
statutory interpretation, stating:
. . . We generally avoid construing individual provisions of a
statute in isolation from the statute as a whole. See City of San
Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111, S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003). We
therefore ‘read the statute as a whole and interpret it to give effect
to every part.’ Id. (quoting Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432
(Tex. 1998) (per curriam)). When the legislature uses a word or
phrase in a portion of a statute but excludes it from another,
the term should not be implied where it has been excluded.
Laidlaw Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659
(Tex. 1995). Had the legislature intended for the Commission and
the TCEQ to entertain traffic-related evidence in their public
interest inquiries, it would not have needed to amend the statute to
-4-
expressly require the TCEQ to consider a well’s impact on traffic
in certain situations. See Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790
S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) (‘a statute is presumed to have
been enacted by the legislature with complete knowledge of the
existing law and with reference to it.’) See also Leland v.
Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. 2008). [emphasis added]
Accord Fireman’s Fund Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hidi, 13 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. 2000) (per
curriam) (‘when the legislature has employed a term in one section of a statute and excluded it in
another, we presume that the legislature had a reason for excluding it.’); State v. Shumake, 199
S.W.3d 279, 287; 2006 Tex. LEXIS 577; 49 Tex. Supp. J. 769 (Tex. 2006) (observing the
statutory construction rule of giving effect to all words and not treating any statutory language as
surplusage).
Without regard to whether or not the legislature may have used the word “waiver” or
“waived” in one portion of the Texas Property Code, it clearly excluded the issue of waiver from
§ 51.001 through § 51.005 of the Texas Property Code. A careful review of § 51.003 of the
Texas Property Code [Appendix Exh. No. 2] reveals that in subparagraph (a) that if the price at
which property is sold at foreclosure was less than the unpaid balance, the foreclosure sale “is
governed by this section.” In subsection (b) the legislature specifically provided that any
person against whom a deficiency judgment is sought may by motion request that the court in
which the action is pending determine the fair market value shall determined by the finder of
fact. The use of “shall be” is historically mandatory in judicial construction and is mandatory in
subsection (b). In subsection (c) the legislature unequivocally provides that if the court were to
determine that the fair market value is greater than the sales price of the real property at
foreclosure, the person against whom the recovery of a deficiency is sought is “entitled to an
offset” against the deficiency. Finally in subsection (d) the legislature specifically provides that
any money received by a lender from a private mortgage guaranty insurer is to be credited to the
-5-
account of the borrower prior to the lender bringing any action for any deficiency allegedly owed
by the borrower.
The legislature did not provide for any waiver of § 51.003 of the Texas Property Code
[Appendix Exh. No. 2]. As the above review discloses, the language of the statute is clear and
unequivocal. The Texas Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, specifically noted and held
that:
Courts should not insert words in a statute except to give effect
to clear legislative intent. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp.,
620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981); accord Laidlaw Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. City of Wilmer, Texas, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1995);
DLB Architects, P.C. and David Boeck v. Blair Weaver, Weaver
Construction Co., Inc. and Cool Water Development, 305 S.W.3d
407, 409 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied). [emphasis added]
At page 409 of the DLB Architects P.C. opinion, supra, the court succinctly restates the rules of
statutory construction stating:
When construing the statute we attempt to give effect to the
legislature’s intent. See Fitzgerald v. Advance Spine Fixation
System, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999). To determine
legislative intent, we look to the plain and common meaning of the
words the legislature used. Id. Every word of a statute must be
presumed to have been used for a purpose, and every excluded
word from a statute must also be presumed to be excluded for a
purpose. See Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904
S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1995). Only when it is necessary to give
effect to the clear legislative intent may we insert additional
words into a statutory provision. See Hunter v. Fort Worth
Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981). There is no
necessity to insert any words with regard to ‘wavier’ because the
legislative intent is clear, and every word excluded from the
statute, including ‘waiver’ must also be presumed to be excluded
for a purpose. [emphasis added]
Defendants respectfully submit the Fifth Circuit erred when it rendered its decision in
LaSalle Bank National Association v. Sleutel, 289 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. Tex. 2002) when it held:
Although § 51.003 does not address waiver, other provisions of the
Texas Property Code do address waiver and specifically prevent
waiver of those provisions, in all or in some situations. Under the
-6-
principal of inclusion umus est exclusion alterius, we considered
this as evidence that the Texas legislature knows how to preclude
waiver of a statutory provision when it so desires, and the fact that
it did not do so in this case indicates that it intended to allow this
provision to be waived. . . . [citations omitted]
The Fifth Circuit’s construction is diametrically opposed to the construction mandated by the
Texas Supreme Court. “The issue of waiver” should be excluded from any statutory construction
of § 51.003 of the Texas Property Code [Appendix Exh. No. 2], and the courts should not
interject language in the statute that is not clearly intended by the legislature. Accordingly, this
Court should find that § 51.003 of the Texas Property Code does not provide for waiver and no
waiver provision should be interpreted as if set forth in the statute.
In Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981), the court held:
It is a rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute
must be presumed to have been used for a purpose. Likewise we
believe every one excluded from a statute must also be presumed
to have been excluded for a purpose.
***
When the legislature employs a term in one section of a statute and
excludes it in another section, the term should not be implied
where excluded. Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex.
1980). This principal is related to a more general rule that
courts should not insert words in a statute except to give effect
to clear legislative intent. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp.
620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981). The guarantees in this case
provide that guarantor’s obligation . . . shall not be reduced
because of any existing or future offset . . . [emphasis added]
ISSUE TWO
(Restated)
Should § 51.003 be construed to be subject to waiver,
the waiver provision must specifically provide that the “right
of offset” is waived
The language of Park Cities’ guaranty agreement addresses the right of setoff, but does
not address the right of offset. Typically the right of setoff deals with a bank’s right to setoff
-7-
against an existing account, to satisfy a default upon an existing debt [see: § 34.307 Tex. Finance
Code (2011). However, the equitable right of offset occurs after the total debt is determined, and
offset is then exercised by the debtor, not the creditor.
Should § 51.003 be construed to be subject to waiver, the waiver provision must
specifically provide that the “right of offset” is waived. Should the Court, for any reason, be of
the opinion that § 51.003 can be waived, Defendants respectfully submit the language “right of
offset” must be contained to create any effective waiver. Section (c) of § 51.003 provides that
persons against whom recovery of the deficiency is sought are entitled “to an offset against the
deficiency.” Of significant import is the fact that the guarantees provided for a waiver offset in
the LaSalle Bank case, 289 F.3d 840; [. . . any defense, right of offset, or other claim]; in
Segal v. Emmes Capital, LLC, 155 S.W.3d at 278 [guarantor hereby waives all rights, remedies,
claims and defenses based upon or related to §§ 51.003, 51.004 and 51.005 of the Texas
Property Code] and U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tracey D. Suttles, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60914, p. 5
[“defendant waives his right of an offset under § 51.003(c). The guarantees in this case
provide that guarantor’s obligation . . . shall not be reduced because of any existing or future
setoff . . .”].
The only case of record known to Defendants that does not contain the language of right
of offset is the bankruptcy case of In re: Will Clay Perry, 425 B.R. 323 (S.D. Tex. Houston—
2010). However, in the Clay case the Bankruptcy Court relies upon LaSalle, but failed to
appreciate the significance of the language regarding the right of offset.
In this cause, Defendants were guarantors, and Texas law is unequivocally clear
regarding the rights of all guarantors. In Vastine v. Bank of Dallas, 808 S.W.2d 463, 464-465
(Tex. 1991) the court stated:
Texas courts apply the rule of strictissimi juris in interpreting
guaranty agreements to refrain from extending the guarantor’s
-8-
obligation by implication beyond the written terms of the
agreement. Clark v. Walker, 689 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). It is well settled in
Texas that a guarantor may rely and insist upon the terms and
conditions of the guaranty being strictly followed, and if the
creditor and principal debtor vary in any material degree from the
terms of their contract, then a new contract has been formed and
the guarantor is not bound to it. McKnight v. Virginia Mirror Co.,
Inc., 463 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. 1971). The guaranty agreement
signed by Vastine does not provide that the creditor and principal
debtor may alter the contract without Vastine’s consent, thus we
cannot imply that Vastine has waived his suretyship defense of
material alteration.
Guarantors and sureties are bound by only the precise terms of the
contract they have secured and are not obligated to watch over the
contracting parties to see if performance conforms to the terms of
the contract. Old Colony Ins. Co. v. City of Quitman, 163 Tex.
144, 325 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1961). In Old Colony this court
held that sureties are released from liability when there is a
material alteration in and deviation from the terms of the contract
without the surety’s consent and to its prejudice. Id. The same
rules that applies to sureties applies to guarantors. Strauss-Frank
Co. v. Hughes, 138 Tex. 50, 156 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Tex. Comm’n
at 1941, opinion adopted); see FDIC v. Attayi, 745 S.W.2d 939,
944 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
In Noland Casualty Co. v. Turner Construction Co., 335 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011), the court again reaffirms and restates the limits of a guarantor’s
liability in Texas. Accord Garth National Bank v. Burge, 29 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000). In this cause, the subject guaranty agreements contain no provisions with
regard to the “right of offset.” Rather, the guaranty provisions stop well short and while they do
include the right of setoff, the guaranties no where address the issue of the right of offset.
Defendants respectfully submit that as the “right of offset” was not specifically set forth
and contained in the guaranty agreements of this suit, the guarantors, Defendants herein, submit
the guaranty agreements before the Court are materially deficient. No Defendant is liable under
his guaranty, as the “right of offset” is not addressed by Park Cities in the guaranty agreements
used in this cause which provided:
-9-
. . . Guarantor waives any right to require “Lender . . . (C) to resort
for payment or to proceed directly or at once against any person,
including borrower or any other guarantor . . .
***
Guarantor . . . waives any and all rights or defenses arising by
reason of (A) any ‘one action’ or ‘anti-deficiency’ law or any other
law which may prevent Lender from bringing any action, including
a claim for deficiency against guarantor before or after Lender’s
commencement or completion of any foreclosure action, either
judicially or by exercise of a power of sale . . . or (F) any defenses
given to guarantors at law or in equity other than actual payment
and performance of the Indebtedness . . . Guarantor further waives
and agrees not to assert or claim at any time any deductions to the
amount guaranteed under this guaranty for any claim of setoff,
counterclaim, counter demand, recoupment or similar right . . .
[C.R. 36; Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition]
The use of the phrase “right of offset” is not contained within the four corners of the
guaranty agreements, and therefore, under the law of applicable to guarantors within the state of
Texas, guarantors have no liability to Park Cities on the subject guarantees.
PRAYER - CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants-Appellants, STEVE KING,
TIM BAUMANN and DAVID WILLIAMS, respectfully request that based upon the foregoing
authorities the Court immediately and forthwith reverse and render the judgment of the trial
court, determining that no alleged guarantor is liable for any sum to Park Cities Bank, that all
costs of Court be taxed against Park Cities Bank, and that the cause be remanded for the trial
court to determine the appropriate attorneys’ fees recoverable by the Defendants, and for such
other and further relief, both at law and in equity, to which your Defendants may show
themselves justly entitled and for which they will ever pray.
-10-
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ James H. Baumgartner, Jr.
JAMES H. BAUMGARTNER, JR.
State Bar No. 01933000
BAUMGARTNER, BILLINGS & BLOOM, L.L.P.
14901 Quorum Drive, Suite 740, LB 156
Dallas, TX 75254-7524
Telephone: 972-364-1151
Facsimile: 972-387-0096
[email protected]
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded on this the 20th day of July, 2011
via certified mail, return receipt requested, and email to:
Jennifer L. Owen
Higier Allen & Lautin, P.C.
5057 Keller Springs Road, Suite 600
Addison, TX 75001
/s/ James H. Baumgartner, Jr.
JAMES H. BAUMGARTNER, JR.
-11-
APPENDIX
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS, TEXAS
___________________
NO. 05-11-00593-CV
___________________
STEVE KING, TIMM BAUMANN AND DAVID WILLIAMS
Defendants-Appellants
v.
PARK CITIES BANK
Plaintiff-Appellee
Final Judgment [C.R. 152-154] .......................................................... Appendix Exh. No. 1
Text of § 51.003 of the Texas Property Code..................................... Appendix Exh. No. 2
-12-