Chapter Five - Center for Politics, University of Virginia

Transcription

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Sabato Highlights
5
The 2001General Election
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Democrats Recapture Governorship after Eight Years Out
Overall
er eight years out of power, the Democrats reclaimed the governorship
☑ Aft
with Mark Warner and also secured the lieutenant governor’s post with Tim
Kaine. Both won narrow victories, 52.2 percent for Warner and 50.3 percent
for Kaine.
Republicans triumphed in down-ballot races, however. Jerry Kilgore cap☑ The
tured the office of attorney general with the largest statewide percentage of the
winners, 60 percent. And the GOP collected a startling 64 seats out of 100 in
the House of Delegates (66, counting two conservative Independents who usually vote with the Republicans). It was only in 1999 that Republicans elected
their first House of Delegates majority, a “mere” 53 seats. Redistricting earlier
in 2001 produced most of the electoral gains, of course.
Statewide Offices
1.9 million Virginians cast ballots in 2001, an eight percent gain from the
☑ Over
last governor’s election in 1997 but only 46 percent of registered voters and 36
percent of those aged 18 and older.
and Kaine won over six in ten votes in the more liberal central cities,
☑ Warner
but McEachin secured a surprisingly low 54 percent in the cities. Warner narrowly won suburban Virginia and also scored a breakthrough in the rural areas,
with over 51 percent of their votes. Kilgore swamped McEachin in both the
rural areas and the suburbs. Katzen garnered small margins in both rural and
suburban areas, but it could not overcome Kaine’s large central-city majority.
three Democrats exceeded 90 percent in black-majority precincts across
☑ All
Virginia. Mark Earley had won 16 percent in his successful contest for attorney
general in 1997, but that proportion declined to seven percent in 2001.
Election Day “exit poll” showed a substantial gender gap, as usual. Warner
☑ One
won women, 53 percent to 39 percent, with men favoring Earley by a smaller
49 percent to 44 percent. Earley won the votes of whites by just 50 percent to
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44 percent; a Democrat in Virginia needs only about 40 percent of the white
vote to win statewide.
tiny four percent of Democrats defected to Mark Earley, but 11 percent of
☑ ARepublicans
voted for the Democrat Warner. Warner also carried Independents
by 56 percent to 34 percent.
House of Delegates
amazing 278 collective years of seniority was lost to the House of Delegates
☑ An
in a single election. Of the 100 incumbents, just 78 were returned to office (17
had voluntarily retired, and another 6 were defeated at the polls—5 of the 6 in
the general election).
the fifth consecutive legislative election, Republicans secured an absolute
☑ For
majority of the statewide vote and their largest proportion ever (55.5 percent).
Democrats recorded their lowest percentage in modern times (39.1 percent).
Campaign Finance
six statewide candidates on the November ballot spent a massive $39 mil☑ The
lion—a 59 percent increase over 1997.
outspent Earley by $19.9 million to $11.5 million, and once all Warner
☑ Warner
campaign committees are added to the mix, his money edge grew to $22.5 million to $11.5 million (approaching a two-to-one ratio).
$13.4 million was spent on all campaigns for the House of Delegates
☑ Nearly
in 2001; when added to the statewide candidates’ war chests, the year’s total
reached a staggering $53 million, easily an all-time record.
House of Delegates candidates outspent the Democrats by 56 per☑ Republican
cent to 39 percent—a proportion very close to the percentage of votes received
by each legislative party.
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Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002
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The 2001General Election
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Democrats Recapture Governorship
after Eight Years Out
ver the course of the last decade, the Virginia Republican party won just about everything: all presidential contests; the governorship, lieutenant governorship, and
attorney general’s post; both U.S. Senate seats; eight of eleven U.S. House seats; and
both houses of the General Assembly. Democrats had begun to despair that Virginia
had moved so strongly into the GOP column that its nominees were no longer competitive. The 2001 elections proved those fears exaggerated. Mark Warner rescued
his party from a dismal fate and carried in a Democratic lieutenant governor with
him. Still, Republicans had reason to be pleased, or less displeased than they would
otherwise have been. The race for governor was closer than many polls had predicted,
and the lieutenant governor’s election was a squeaker. The Republican candidate for
attorney general captured the only landslide of Election Day, and Warner’s coattails
proved completely insufficient to do anything about a Republican near-sweep of close
House of Delegates contests; the GOP captured a massive 64 seats, a gain of 12—a
greater total than their own party leaders had dreamed possible.
Both parties could be partly satisfied with the 2001 results, then, and so could
the citizenry, since vigorous two-party competition is one major key to long-term
good government. For Democrats, though, the victories were especially sweet.
Written off as a spent force only a year earlier, they proved fully capable of capturing
the state’s highest office against the odds in conservative Virginia.
The Virginia Democratic breakthrough had regional and national implications, too. Combined with Democrat James McGreevey’s landslide victory in the
nation’s only other gubernatorial contest in New Jersey, Warner’s triumph suggested
that Democrats could win under the most hostile of conditions—in a time of war,
with the Republican president at stratospheric popularity levels, and (in Warner’s
case) in a conservative, Republican-leaning state.
Regionally, there was also good news for Democrats. The 2001 result in Virginia
meant that for the first time since 1994, Democrats would control a majority of the
Southern governors. Just since 1998, moderate-conservative Democrats wrested statehouses from Republicans in Alabama (1998), South Carolina (1998), Mississippi
(1999), and Virginia (2001), while losing only one Southern governorship to the
Republicans, Florida in 1998. This substantial comeback for the Democrats was especially noteworthy since the South is clearly the most Republican of all American geographic regions in modern times. Yet that nature reasserted itself in 2002 and 2003, when
the GOP reclaimed the governorships in Alabama, South Carolina, and Mississippi.1
O
1. The successful Democrats, other than Warner, were Don Seigelman (Alabama), Jim Hodges
(South Carolina), and Ronnie Musgrove (Mississippi). Jeb Bush is the GOP exception in Florida. But
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General Election Campaign
Even before September 11 irrevocably changed the political climate, and most everything else in America, the 2001 campaign for governor in Virginia was unusually
quiet, even dull. Partly, this was by Democratic design. Simply by virtue of being a
Democrat, Mark Warner was presumed to be on the wrong side of many social and
economic issues in conservative Virginia. “Quiet” meant that Warner was steadily
reassuring voters that he would not raise broad-based taxes, would not spend money
recklessly, would preserve Second Amendment rights, would uphold the traditional
family, and generally would govern as a classically cautious Virginia businessman:
no tumult, no upheaval, and “bipartisan administration.” Even on abortion, his one
truly liberal position, Warner pointed to the Republican legislature and suggested
he would not change the status quo and might merely veto further restrictions on
abortion. Except on economic development, education, and transportation, Warner
seemed to be saying, “You won’t even know that I’m there.” His well-funded and organized campaign methodically reached out to every identifiable Democratic, independent, moderate Republican, and nonpartisan constituency. He started substantial
television and radio advertising in August, and save for the period immediately after
September 11, never went “dark” (off-air) until November 6.
Particularly memorable was Warner’s outreach to rural Virginia, where Democrats
had been electorally hammered statewide since 1989. In his Senate run in 1996, Mark
Warner had done better than expected, winning 50.8 percent of the rural vote. However,
an angry Oliver North constituency was somewhat responsible; the 1994 North voters, concentrated in downstate rural areas, were determined to seek revenge against
U.S. Senator John Warner, who abandoned Republican Senate nominee North in order
to back Independent Marshall Coleman.2 In 2001, Warner reconnected with rural citizens through extensive campaigning in Southside and Southwest localities. He focused
on their economic plight and relatively high unemployment rates. He became the most
pro-gun rights Democratic candidate for governor since Gerald Baliles in 1985, knowing that hunting and fishing is a way of rural life. He organized an active “Sportsmen
for Warner” group, and their blaze orange signs seemed to be everywhere. His colorful
Roanoke supporter, Dave “Mudcat” Saunders, wrote a bluegrass song that was omnipresent on appropriate TV and radio media markets. The lyrics, sung to “Dooley,” hailed
Warner as a “good ol’ boy from up in Nova-ville,” and went in part:
Mark Warner is ready to lead our Commonwealth,
He’ll work for mountain people and economic health.
Get ready to shout it, from the coalmines to the stills,
“Here comes Mark Warner—the hero of the hills!”
Warner . . . for public education,
Warner . . . what a reputation,
Warner . . . vote in this election,
To keep our children home.
As the election results would show, all the effort worked well enough. It added
a few percentage points in most rural cities and counties, substantially cutting the
usual GOP margins there.
in 2002 Seigelman lost to Bob Riley (R) and Hodges was denied a second term by Mark Sanford (R). In
2003 Musgrove lost a re-election bid to Haley Barbour (R).
2. See: Chapter 4 of Larry J. Sabato’s Virginia Votes 1991–1994 (Weldon Cooper Center for
Public Service: 1995), pp. 91–132.
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Meanwhile, Mark Earley was much less visible. He was broke early on from the
contested nomination battle—and also from his lack of attention to serious fundraising during his first years as attorney general. His party was divided both because
of the budget impasse and his battle with John Hager. Earley made both situations
worse for himself along the way. First, he refused to take much of a public stand
on the budget, other than (without fanfare) urging the factions to settle. Arguably,
Earley would have been better off either, siding fully with Governor Gilmore and
making the car tax cut battle his own, or more likely, by insisting that Gilmore agree
to perhaps a 60 percent car tax cut—halfway between the GOP Senate’s preferred
50 percent and Gilmore’s 70 percent. If he had followed Gilmore, Earley could have
more credibly campaigned as Gilmore’s natural successor, the populist fighter for the
“working people of Virginia.” If he had forged a compromise, then Earley would have
been viewed as courageous, willing to turn up his nose at the substantial campaign
cash from Gilmore’s Republican National Committee in order to do the sensible
thing in the face of economic uncertainty. (It is questionable whether Gilmore could
have denied him the RNC money anyway, especially if Earley’s poll ratings had improved as a result of his stand.)
Even more inexplicably, Earley refused to intercede to strengthen his own
ticket. Once John Hager accepted the likelihood of his defeat for the gubernatorial slot, he privately made clear to Earley and others that he was willing to run for
re-election as lieutenant governor. A quirk in the party rules permitted him to do
so,3 and the combined strengths of the Earley and Hager delegates—even with substantial defections—could have engineered this ticket. Virtually everyone outside
of a few holdouts in the Earley camp, including a concerned Warner campaign, understood that Hager’s re-nomination would dramatically strengthen and reunite the
GOP ticket. This was especially true given that the only other candidate for the second slot was a weak candidate, Jay Katzen, whose constituency in the Republican
right-wing heavily overlapped Earley’s own. Once again, Earley’s innate cautiousness
(and perhaps his dislike for Hager) prevented him from acting in his own self-interest.
Earley said nothing, Hager persisted in a divisive battle, a second-rate candidate was
nominated for lieutenant governor, and many of Hager’s business backers proceeded
to give money and support to Warner in the general election. Boldness is required to
win a difficult election, and in the cases of the budget impasse and the nomination for
lieutenant governor, Earley proved himself completely bereft of that crucial quality.
The floundering Earley effort made a critical mid-summer decision that further weakened his cause. Instead of telling Earley’s remarkable personal story and
selecting one or more policy issues as the positive centerpiece of the campaign, the
Earley high command decided to go heavily negative. Their goal was simple: to define Warner and his running mates as “the most liberal ticket in Virginia history.” A
detailed mailer replete with dozens of newspaper citations that enforced this message was widely circulated to the press and activists. But there were several problems.
While Warner’s primary ticket nominees were quite liberal on issues such as the death
penalty, gay rights, and gun control, Warner had taken great pains—literally from
primary election night—to separate himself from their views. They were on their
3. The Republican Party of Virginia scrapped rules that had required Republican candidates to
formally file for the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general by February 1, 2001.
A lawyer for the party determined that GOP officials had violated the rules by failing to publish a legal
notice at least seven days before the filing deadline. The committee decided to open the nominating
process to other candidates, giving Hager the maneuvering room he needed to run again for lieutenant
governor. For more information, see: Michael Sluss, “Hager Still in Race for Governor Nomination;
Rules Fumble Allowed Bid for Re-election as Lieutenant Governor,” Roanoke Times, May 8, 2001, B1.
CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election
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own, said Warner, and they’ll have to defend their views by themselves. The move
may have been unpleasant for Kaine and McEachin, but it was effective for Warner.
Secondly Warner had worked for years to build up rural credibility on guns and other
conservative lightning rods, and his credibility seemed to hold. Thirdly the GOP
booklet crudely exaggerated the views of the Democrats in some cases, using ellipses
to leave out qualifying phrases in quotations.4 Roundly condemned by newspapers
of all stripes, the Earley gambit failed miserably, and gave Warner the justification
to attack Earley throughout the fall as a “negative campaigner” with no positive vision for Virginia. Warner had claimed the high ground and weathered the inevitable
broadside against his newfound conservatism. On Labor Day, Warner had a lead in
the polls and was on the offensive. And then came September 11. Naturally, as the
nation reeled from the shock and horror of a modern Pearl Harbor, all conventional
politics ceased. In Virginia, as in New York City and New Jersey, the candidates
withdrew their advertisements and themselves, entering into a “Twilight Zone” of
seclusion. (Eerily, the three locales with the highest profile elections in 2001 were
the ones most affected by 9-11.) Both Virginia “Marks” cautiously avoided crass commentary, quietly assessed the implications for their candidacies, and privately sought
expert opinions on when to resume their electoral ventures. Views were sharply divided. Some believed that Warner would benefit since he was ahead and the campaign had been frozen in place, preventing any Earley attempts to make up ground
quickly by means of hard-hitting negative attacks. Others saw an opening for Earley.
As President Bush’s and Governor Gilmore’s ratings soared, fellow Republican Earley
could possibly get a lift. Also, as citizens rallied around tested leaders, especially incumbents, the nominee of the incumbent party might finally be able to capitalize
on the contrast between his fourteen years in public office and Warner’s absence of
elective experience. Similarly, pundits disagreed on the electorate’s taste for politics in
a post 9-11 world. Some said the campaign was effectively over, as voters would tune
out everything but the war on terrorism, resulting in a dramatically lower turnout.
Others insisted a wave of patriotism would encourage voters to pay closer attention
and turn out to vote in record numbers.
As it happened, not much happened. Just 7 days after 9-11, the candidates tentatively reappeared on the campaign trail, speaking at forums and airing mild, positive, unity-oriented television ads. Within two weeks, negative ads were popping up
again on both sides. The issues barely changed, and both candidates seemed to agree
on backing President Bush, supporting the war, and developing security plans for the
state. Moreover, as we shall see, turnout was fairly stable compared with the past three
gubernatorial elections, neither expanding nor withering much. In essence, the voters
apparently indicated that the work of democracy must continue, and they were able to
separate the overriding federal security issue from the separate state issues of education,
transportation, taxes, and the like. Two debates helped to re-start the conventional
campaign. The first, held October 3 in Richmond, was moderated by the alwayscolorful former Governor L. Douglas Wilder. According to the Warner campaign,
the Democratic nominee (who served as Wilder’s nominal 1989 campaign manager)
had already received private assurances of Wilder’s endorsement once the debate was
4. For example, Mark Warner is quoted as saying in an October 2, 1996 issue of The Virginian-Pilot:
“We’ve got to put off tax relief …” Those little ellipses turn out to be crucial. What Warner actually said
was: “We’ve got to put off tax relief until we’ve got our fiscal house in order.” See the Virginian-Pilot editorial from September 1, 2001 entitled “Abortion, Gay Rights Aren’t What This Election Is About,” p.
B8. See also: Michael Sluss, “Democrats Decry Republican Ad Campaign; Warner Cites Brochure With
Out-of-Context Quotes, Unexplained Excerpts,” Roanoke Times, September 8, 2001, p. A1.
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over. To Warner’s surprise, though, Wilder pummeled Warner during the debate, interrupting him repeatedly and demanding that he clarify his somewhat murky positions
on taxes and guns, among other things. Wilder barely laid a glove on Earley, a much
smoother debater who was the consensus winner in this two-against-one match-up.
The last debate, and the only one scheduled for statewide television and CSPAN broadcast, was to occur on October 7, an unusually early finale preferred by the
Warner team. The start of the war in Afghanistan caused a last-minute cancellation,
however, and the debate sponsors, the Virginia Capitol Correspondents Association
and the University of Virginia Center for Politics, were forced into round-the-clock
renegotiations for a make-up date. Mark Warner attempted to use the cancellation as
an excuse to duck a prime-time, statewide television encounter, but almost universal
press condemnation forced him to capitulate. The debate was held in Roanoke at
host station WDBJ7 (CBS) on October 10. This time, ironically—given his reluctance to come—Warner improved his performance and fought to a draw with Earley.
The draw stopped dead any momentum Earley may have generated in the Wilder
debate. The next day, in a press conference announced just before the second debate,
Wilder endorsed Warner to be his successor as governor.5
The final month of the campaign lacked real drama and seemed to be on autopilot, much to the advantage of Mark Warner. His massive spending, with a twoto-one lead over Earley, enabled the Democrat to dominate the airwaves. (Financing
will be discussed later on.) The editorial press was substantially on the Democrat’s
side, especially the Washington Post. The 800-pound gorilla of journalism in Virginia
was even more emphatically Democratic than usual; the Earley campaign insisted
that the editorial spin was fully matched by a bias that resonated in the news pages
throughout the election.6 Joining the Post in endorsing the Democrat were two other
large-circulation downstate papers, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot and the Roanoke
Times. (Earley was favored by the more conservative Richmond Times-Dispatch and
the Washington Times.) The newspaper polls were also unanimous in showing a
Warner lead, with the Post and the Times-Dispatch showing a massive Warner margin
that did not materialize on Election Day. (Polling is dissected in a subsequent section.) Finally, manifestations of the GOP split were everywhere in the final weeks.
Moderate-to-liberal Republican politicians, such as Senator Warren Barry of Fairfax,
Delegate Panny Rhodes of Richmond, and former Governor Linwood Holton, publicly endorsed the Democrat. (Holton’s son-in-law was Tim Kaine, and Holton had
backed Democrats before; nonetheless, his TV ad for Warner was widely cited as
effective and persuasive with the old “mountain-valley” Republicans whence Holton
came.) Many of John Hager’s business supporters not only defected to Warner, they
contributed money to him. A large committee of Republicans and Independents
called “Virginians for Warner,” headed by former GOP National Committeewoman
Judy Peachee Ford—who had once played a major role in electing Governor Mills
Godwin in 1973, U.S. Senator John Warner in 1978, and U.S. Senator Paul Trible in
5. The Warner campaign shrewdly scheduled the Wilder endorsement at this time in order to
blunt any advantage gained by Earley in the second debate, had the latter won it. Wilder’s unqualified
backing of Warner generated even larger headlines than usual because of his roughing up of Warner in
the first debate. It may also be true that Wilder, who had publicly asked to host the last debate but was
rebuffed by Warner, may have been evening up the score in his debate—as Wilder has been wont to do
over the years. Machiavellian politics are alive and well in Virginia, as everywhere else.
6. This is hardly the first time serious charges of news bias have been leveled at the Washington Post
in a Virginia campaign. See for example the analysis of the Post’s own ombudsman, Richard Harwood,
concerning the paper’s pro-Wilder spin in the 1989 gubernatorial election: Richard Harwood, “Tilt!
Tilt! Tilt!” Washington Post, November 19, 1989, p. D6.
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1982—had a high media profile. There was no comparable “Democrats for Earley,”
though a group of 16 African American ministers did support his candidacy.7
Of great importance, President Bush declined to campaign for his party’s candidates in Virginia—a stunning abandonment that left many senior Republicans
grumbling privately. While Bush, hovering from 80 to 90 percent in job approval
after September 11, did send out a letter to activists and record a get-out-the-vote
telephone message, his failure even to cut a TV or radio spot for Earley was a clear signal of the White House’s lack of confidence in the nominee’s ability to win. The Bush
staff cited the president’s busy schedule—though he went to a World Series game and
continued to exercise one to two hours per day. They also pointed to Bush’s desire to
stay above the partisan fray in wartime; however, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman,
Richard Nixon, and George H.W. Bush had campaigned extensively for their party’s
candidates during foreign conflicts, with no ill effects. True, Bush never appeared for
the GOP candidates in New York or New Jersey either, but Bush had far more pull
in GOP-leaning Virginia than in the heavily Democratic Northeast. More likely, one
suspects that Bush simply did not want to be associated with a loser. Republican
National Committee polls, helpfully leaked directly to a receptive Washington Post
reporter by a close Gilmore associate at the RNC, showed Earley behind Warner by
10-12 percentage points as the campaign drew to a close.
Whether Bush could have elected Earley with a one-day downstate stumping tour of Hampton Roads, Richmond, and Roanoke is unknowable but tantalizing. Chances are that the president would at least have made the contest closer, and
possibly given a tight race to GOP lieutenant governor candidate Katzen. Instead,
Earley was reduced to airing on the final weekend an unconvincing endorsement
spot from New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani. It was obvious that Giuliani barely knew
Earley. The Yankee mayor of the New York—while a national hero—could barely
swing an election for mayor in his own city, much less Virginia. Virginians might give
money to Rudy for his city, but they were unlikely to give his candidate their votes in
a state they knew far better than he possibly could.
Bellwether Localities
Prior to Election Day, many reporters, analysts, and political junkies were busy handicapping the race for governor. Polling, of course, is one way to predict the outcome.
But polling changes with the wind and more often than not misses the mark. Another
way to try to figure out what is likely to happen is by looking at history.
There are “bellwether” cities and counties that always or almost always have
voted with the winner of the Governor’s Mansion in Virginia’s modern two-party
era, which began in 1969 with the election of the state’s first Republican governor
since the 1880s, Linwood Holton. Out of the 95 counties and 39 independent cities that currently exist in the Commonwealth, exactly TWO localities had gotten it
right every single time.8
Surprisingly, these localities are not found in the Old Dominion’s heartland,
but in the region considered—at least by down-staters—to be the most liberal and
7. Tyler Whitley, “Black Pastors’ Group Backs Earley,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 5,
2001, p. B4.
8. Excerpts of this article were originally published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch: “Look To
Bellwethers For Trends,” September 23, 2001, p. E1. For more information, see the UVa Center for
Politics’ website, http: // www.centerforpolitics.org under “Featured Publications.”
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least representative, Northern Virginia. The small city of Fairfax and the gargantuan
county of Fairfax have picked every governor in the eight elections between 1969
and 1997.
In addition to the twin Fairfaxes, there were 18 near-bellwethers going into the
2001 election. Five cities and thirteen counties had chosen the winner in seven of eight
elections: the cities of Franklin, Galax, Lexington, Newport News, and Salem, and the
counties of Bedford, Bland, Fluvanna, Gloucester, Lunenberg, Madison, Middlesex,
Montgomery, Orange, Prince Edward, Prince William, Southampton, and Wythe.
In most cases, these localities have a closely split political personality. They are competitive with a substantial base of support for both Democrats and Republicans, yet
neither party claims a solid majority of residents. Swing Independents, moving from
side to side with regularity, determine the identity of successful candidates there.
Also, with the exceptions of the city of Newport News and Montgomery County, the
near-bellwethers are not heavily populated, and they are geographically scattered.
At the other end of the spectrum were the eight anti-bellwethers: Charles City,
Greensville, New Kent, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Prince George, and Surry.
These three cities and five counties had the state’s worst record for picking winners—
just three of the last eight governors between 1969 and 1997. With the exceptions of
New Kent and Prince George counties, the anti-bellwethers were heavily Democratic
with a large African American constituency; they voted only for the three successful
Democratic governors in the 1980s.9
The odds were substantial that, as a group, the bellwethers and near-bellwethers
would probably be right again. Thus, the press and academics were justified in
sending reporters and researchers into these localities to test sentiments before the
November vote.
However, consider this: before the 1997 election, there were four, not two,
perfect bellwethers. Even though Governor Jim Gilmore carried the vast majority of
all the state’s localities (106 of the then-135), he lost the small cities of Franklin and
Lexington, which since 1969 had been totally on the money. Great confidence in any
single bellwether, then, is misplaced. Even in the most accurate localities, the proportion of the votes given to the winning candidates has often not closely mirrored the
statewide vote. For instance, Galax was 13.4 percent under the statewide average for
Doug Wilder in 1989; Fairfax County voted 6.7 percent under the statewide average
for George Allen in 1993; and Prince William was 7.2 percent over the average for
Jim Gilmore in 1997.
Still, the crown heading into 2001 belonged to “Fairfax squared,” and it is an
impressive and highly selective title in Virginia. Our neighbor to the south, North
Carolina, has many more bellwethers. Twenty-six counties there have picked the
presidential winner consistently from 1968 to 2000.10 (There are 100 counties in
North Carolina, only a slightly larger number than in Virginia.)
How did the bellwethers perform in 2001? Once again, both Fairfax city and
county correctly picked the winning candidate, retaining their perfect record. Of the
18 near-bellwethers, nine improved on their record to 8 of 9: Galax, Prince Edward,
Salem, Montgomery, Newport News, Lunenberg, Southampton, Franklin city and
Lexington. Buoyed by a Democratic victory, 6 of the 9 localities on the other end
of the scale (Greensville, Surry, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Petersburg, and Charles City)
9. See the UVa Center for Politics’ website, http: // www.centerforpolitics.org, for a more accurate listing of the localities, in the order of most bellwether-like (Fairfax County) to least (Charles
City County).
10. See: Eric Johnson, “North Carolina’s Presidential Bellwethers,” N.C. Data Net (June 2001): 1–3.
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picked up a win in 2001 and shed their “anti-bellwether” label. The Virginia localities
that have the worst record since 1969 in gubernatorial elections are the counties of
New Kent and Prince George, and the city of Poquoson.11
The Ten Keys to the Governor’s Mansion
The fundamentals of the fall campaign are summarized in the “Ten Keys to the
Governor’s Mansion,” a predictive tool that made its debut in the 1993 Virginia Votes
analysis. Since 1969, the party with a net advantage among the ten keys has invariably
captured the governorship (see Table 5.01).12
The keys once again pointed the way to victory, though it took longer than usual
for all these indicators to become clear, in part because the race was exceptionally slow
to jell and also due to the tragic events of September 11. Prior to 9-11 the economy
was unquestionably weakening—never a good omen for a party in power—but after
the terrorist attacks the state and national economy took a quick slide into full-blown
recession. Whatever their cause, bad times breed a desire for change in the electorate.
Democrat Warner also had significant advantages in party unity, campaign money,
and perhaps most of all, one of the election’s dominant circumstances: the GOPinduced budget impasse which was an embarrassing, indelible scarlet letter for Earley
from start to finish. Also notable were two normally Republican keys which Warner
turned neutral for the ’01 campaign. The Democrat’s overflowing war chest helped
his party compensate for its usual lack of a first-rate canvassing and get-out-the-vote
effort to match the time-tested GOP machinery. Also Governor Jim Gilmore, despite
soaring popularity in the wake of 9-11, was unable to transfer any of it to his party’s
chosen successor. Wisely or unwisely, Earley consistently kept his distance from the
budget-scarred executive, and Gilmore himself demonstrated something of a paradox
in public and private opinion polls: a large majority approved of his job performance,
but a plurality also thought the state was on the wrong track and wanted a change at
the top. (Much the same mix-and-match views were observed in the 2000 presidential election, with the electorate simultaneously satisfied with President Clinton’s job
performance but weary of the scandalous aspects of his tenure.)
In any event, Gilmore—who was deeply frustrated at Earley’s obvious reluctance to bring him into the battle—could do little more than shovel RNC money
in Earley’s direction during fall 2001. The campaign featured no “scandals” lasting
more than a news cycle or two, and neither of the candidates had a special edge in
personality appeal. Earley’s governmental experience and articulate delivery were
offset by Warner’s stress on his business background and his high-energy search to
be “hired” for the job. The Republican was not without his keys, foremost among
them his long apprenticeship in elective office. Virginians are an orderly, hierarchical
people who normally prefer their governors well trained. In the whole of the 20th
century, only three times did men without a public office background capture the
governorship: Henry Carter Stuart (D) in 1913,13 Westmoreland Davis (D) in 1917
11. Poquoson was not incorporated as a city until 1975, and therefore can be measured as winning only 3 of the last 7 gubernatorial elections
12. See Virginia Votes 1991–1994, pp. 74–78. Footnote 26 on page 75 discusses one published
antecedent for the phrase, “Keys to the Governor’s Mansion.”
13. Stuart was elected a delegate to the 1901–1902 Constitutional Convention, but did not
serve in any other elected office prior to his term as governor.
130
TABLE 5.01
The Ten Keys to the Governor’s Mansion, 2001
YEAR
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
Gubernatorial Winner
Linwood Holton Mills Godwin John Dalton Charles Robb Gerald Baliles
(Party)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(D)
(D)
[Winning %]
[52.5%]
[50.7%]
[55.9%]
[53.5%]
[55.2%]
PREVAILING CONDITIONS—GENERAL ELECTION FOR GOVERNOR
Which party had the advantage? (D) = Democrat (R) = Republican (N) = No strong advantage to one side
ECONOMY1
D
R
R
N
D
1989
Douglas Wilder
(D)
[50.1%]
1993
George Allen
(R)
[58.3%]
1997
Jim Gilmore
(R)
[55.8%]
2001
Mark Warner
(D)
[52.2%]
D
R
R
D
PARTY UNITY
R
R
R
D
D
D
R
N
D
SCANDAL
N
D
N
N
N
N
R
N
N
CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION
AND TECHNOLOGY
N
R
R
D
D
N
N
R
N
CAMPAIGN MONEY
N
N
R
N
N
N
D
R
D
CANDIDATE PERSONALITY
AND APPEAL
R
N
R
D
N
D
R
D
N
PRIOR OFFICE EXPERIENCE
OF CANDIDATES2
N
R
N
N
D
N
D
R
N
RETROSPECTIVE JUDGMENT
ON PREVIOUS GOVERNOR
D
R
R
R
D
D
R
R
N
PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY3
R
D
R
R
R
R
R
N
R
SPECIAL ISSUES AND
DOMINANT CIRCUMSTANCES
NET ADVANTAGE
R
D
D
D
N
Time for change
mood plus extreme
factionalism
among Democrats
propelled Holton.
Watergate
helped Henry
Howell reach his
high watermark,
but it was not
enough.
Democrats
divisive primary
& campaign
errors took their
toll.
R
Democrats
moderated
while GOP
factionalism
emerged
Diverse
Democratic
ticket attracted
new Virginia
suburban
support
Abortion issue
helped Wilder in
campaign, but
race hurt him on
Election Day.
Crime issue and
a yearning for
change from
the Robb/
Wilder/ Clinton
Democrats aided
Allen.
Gilmore’s
car tax cut
easily trumped
Beyer’s
emphasis on
education,
environment
and abortion.
GOP budget impasse hurt Earley
badly; Sept.
11 dominated
fall, keeping
campaign on
back burner.
R (+2)
R (+2)
R (+8)
D (+2)
D (+5)
D (+3)
R (+5)
R (+4)
D (+2)
1
As measured by changes in per capita income and the unemployment rate in the twelve months prior to Election Day.
2
Prior statewide elective office is given more weight than a district or local office.
3
As measured by public opinion poll ratings for the six months prior to election day.
R
R
D
and A. Linwood Holton (R) in 1969. Mark Earley also had an exceptionally valuable
card in President George W. Bush’s popularity. But as we discussed previously, it was
never played. Thus did the 2001 election continue an extreme oddity in Virginia
politics: in every gubernatorial election beginning in 1977, Virginians have chosen as
governor the candidate representing the party opposite to that of the President. This
occurs whether state voters like the president (Reagan, Bush Sr., Bush Jr.) or dislike
him (Carter, Clinton).
The “Ten Keys to the Governorship” is a parlor game, of course, but after all,
politics is a vital form of entertainment. And once again, the keys have helped explain
how the out-of-power party picked the lock of the Executive Mansion in Virginia.
131
FIGURE 5.01
The 2001 Gubernatorial Election, by Counties
FIGURE 5.02
The 2001 Gubernatorial Election, by Cities
SOURCE: Official Election Results provided by the State Board of Elections.
General Election Results
Election night brought both joy and unhappiness to both parties in different measures. The Democrats won the top two prizes, though in closer than expected contests. Mark Warner captured the governorship with 52.2 percent to Mark Earley’s
47.0 percent, with less than one percent for Libertarian William Redpath. Tim
Kaine edged Jay Katzen for lieutenant governor, 50.3 percent to 48.1 percent, with
132
FIGURE 5.03
The 2001 Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, by Counties
FIGURE 5.04
The 2001 Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, by Cities
1.6 percent for Libertarian Gary Reams. In Virginia, it is fair to say that a majority of
any size for Democrats is a triumph, and party activists were cheered by their doublebarreled victory. Republicans found the other returns more palatable. Jerry Kilgore
won the attorney general’s post in a landslide, 60 percent to 39.9 percent—an unexpected blowout. Democrats had hoped that coattails would give them the sweep
enjoyed by the GOP four years earlier, but Warner apparently was not even wearing
a coat. Kilgore captured 123,000 more votes than Warner, and he was the only 2001
133
FIGURE 5.05
The 2001 Attorney General Election, by Counties
FIGURE 5.06
The 2001 Attorney General Election, by Cities
candidate to secure more than one million ballots. Of course, Kilgore’s highly professional campaign deserved most of the credit, but McEachin ran a campaign even
worse than Mark Earley. The Democrat also never recovered from the badly split
Democratic primary vote, nor did he receive much help, financial or otherwise, from
Mark Warner and other major Democrats—save Doug Wilder. But Wilder’s assistance was a double-edged sword, reminding Virginians of the controversial career of
the only other successful statewide African American candidate and re-emphasizing
134
TABLE 5.02
Election Results for Statewide Office, 2001
Candidate (Party)
Total Number of Votes
Percent
GOVERNOR
Mark R. Warner (D)
Mark L. Earley (R)
William B. Redpath (Libertarian)
Write-ins
TOTAL
984,177
887,234
14,497
813
1,886,721
52.2
47.0
0.8
0.0
100.0
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
Timothy M. Kaine (D)
Jay K. Katzen (R)
Gary A. Reams (Libertarian)
Write-ins
TOTAL
925,974
883,886
28,783
490
1,839,133
50.3
48.1
1.6
0.0
100.0
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Jerry W. Kilgore (R)
A. Donald McEachin (D)
Write-ins
TOTAL
1,107,068
736,431
1,282
1,844,781
60.0
39.9
0.1
100.0
SOURCE: Official Election results provided by the State Board of Elections
TABLE 5.03
Virginia Governors’ Percentage of Vote, 1961–2001
Year
Winning Candidate
Percent of Vote
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
Albertis S. Harrison
Mills E. Godwin (D)
Linwood Holton (R)
Mills E. Godwin (R)
John N. Dalton (R)
Charles S. Robb (D)
Gerald Baliles (D)
L. Douglas Wilder (D)
George Allen (R)
Jim Gilmore (R)
Mark Warner (D)
63.8
47.9
52.5
50.7
55.9
53.5
55.2
50.1
58.3
55.8
52.2
(subliminally) the always-present issue of race. After all, under ideal conditions,
Wilder had barely won his 1985 and 1989 contests.14
Returning to Warner’s top-of-the-ticket win, his vote proportion was by no
means lackluster when compared to four recent predecessors, as Table 5.03 shows.
Mills Godwin in both 1965 and 1973, as well as Doug Wilder in 1989, attained a
lower percentage of the vote than Warner. Appropriately enough, Warner’s 52.2 was
closest to Linwood Holton’s 52.5 percent in 1969; Holton (a Republican in 1969)
backed Warner, as noted earlier.
In addition, Warner’s statewide vote plurality of 97,000 was close to Democrat
Chuck Robb’s 1981 margin of 101,000 votes, though Robb’s 53.5 percent victory
was larger. Five other modern governors exceeded Warner’s showing by four to twelve
14. It should be noted that judging McEachin through the lens of Wilder’s record is as “just” as
measuring any white candidate’s potential by the record of any other Caucasian politician. But life isn’t
fair, and politics is arguably the least fair part of life.
135
TABLE 5.04
General Election Results for Statewide Offices, by Congressional District, 2001
Governor*
Congressional District
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
Total Vote
Percent of Registered Voting
Warner (D)
Earley (R)
Kaine (D)
Katzen (R)
Kilgore (R)
McEachin (D)
189,318
123,060
128,474
173,233
178,856
172,622
229,704
176,952
154,232
213,841
165,219
45.5
40.0
44.4
46.9
50.3
50.6
51.7
45.8
45.8
43.9
44.1
48.6
49.6
71.3
53.5
52.4
48.7
44.0
62.0
52.3
44.9
55.5
50.7
49.8
28.0
45.9
46.2
50.5
55.1
37.3
46.8
54.4
43.7
45.8
47.2
72.6
53.5
47.3
44.5
46.6
60.8
48.8
41.5
53.6
52.5
51.6
26.1
45.4
49.7
53.8
52.1
38.0
49.1
57.1
45.0
65.7
64.3
36.8
57.0
62.2
66.8
70.4
43.3
68.6
64.9
51.3
34.2
35.6
63.0
42.9
37.7
33.1
29.6
56.6
31.4
35.1
48.6
SOURCE: Official election results provided by the State Board of Elections.
*Percentages do not total 100 since Libertarian Party and write-in votes are not listed in the table.
TABLE 5.05
Change in Democrat Percentage for Governor, by Congressional District, 1997–2001
District
Beyer ’97
Warner ‘01
Percentage Change
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Statewide
38.2
41.6
66.6
40.9
39.6
38.0
34.1
54.7
40.9
36.7
46.9
42.6
48.6
49.6
71.2
53.5
52.4
48.7
44.0
62.0
52.3
44.9
55.5
52.2
10.4
8.0
4.7
12.6
12.8
10.7
9.9
7.3
11.4
8.2
8.6
9.6
percentage points: Albertis Harrison (D), John Dalton (R), Gerald Baliles (D),
George Allen (R), and Jim Gilmore (R).
As usual, the Democrats in 2001 ran more strongly in the cities than the counties. As Figures 5.01 through 5.06 illustrate, Warner carried 45 of 95 counties and 29
of 39 cities; Kaine won only 36 counties but 26 cities; and McEachin could muster
majorities in a mere 6 counties and 9 cities. Kilgore’s 89 counties and 30 cities well
reflected his landslide.
Table 5.04 breaks the 2001 vote down by congressional district. Warner
captured six districts, two by landslides—the African American 3rd and the liberal Northern Virginia 8th. Healthy Warner majorities were also recorded in the
Tidewater 4th (Earley’s home district), the Southside 5th, the Southwest 9th, and
the Northern Virginia “swing” 11th district. The 5th and 9th have usually backed
Republicans, so Warner’s triumph in them was considerable. Earley won healthy
margins in just two districts, the heavily Republican Piedmont 7th and ShenandoahNorthwestern 10th. Slim GOP pluralities were amassed in the Hampton-Newport
News-Northern Neck 1st, the Norfolk-Virginia Beach 2nd, and the Roanoke 6th, all
136
TABLE 5.06
Voter Participation in Gubernatorial Elections in Virginia, 1953–2001
Year
Total Potential
Voting Population
Total Registered
Population
Total Votes
Cast
Total Vote Change From
Preceding Election
Votes Cast as Percentage
of Potential Vote
Votes Cast as Percentage
Registered Population
1953
1957
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2,107,600
2,222,700
2,356,700
2,540,600
2,738,800
3,234,000
3,590,000
3,857,000
4,276,000
4,586,800
4,924,000
5,126,000
5,263,000
—
944,627
1,052,255
1,363,849
1,732,822
2,035,375
2,022,619
2,215,081
2,597,904
2,737,340
2,975,777
3,565,139
4,109,127
414,025
517,655
394,490
562,789
915,764
1,035,495
1,250,940
1,437,382
1,377,966
1,821,242
1,817,777
1,764,476
1,905,511
—
25
–23.8
42.7
62.7
13.1
20.8
14.9
–4.1
32.2
–0.2
–2.9
7.9
19.6
23.9
16.7
22.2
33.4
32.0
34.8
37.3
32.2
39.7
36.9
34.4
36.2
—
54.8
37.5
41.3
52.8
50.9
61.9
64.9
53.0
66.5
61.1
49.5
46.4
SOURCES: Total potential voting population for all years was based on population estimates provided by either the Taylor Murphy Institute, University of Virginia, or the U.S. Bureau of the Census; figures for total registered population and total votes cast for all years were provided by the State Board of Elections.
NOTES: Total potential voting age from 1953–1969 includes all persons aged 21 and over, while figures after 1969 include all those aged 18 and above. Total registered population figures from 1957–1969 are official estimates
provided by the State Board of Elections; after 1970 the State Board collected exact tabulations of registered voters by locality. For gubernatorial elections prior to 1957, reasonably accurate estimates of registered voters by city
and county do not exist. Also, the total registered population from 1973 to 1977 declined because of purges of the electoral polls.
of which have regularly yielded substantial Republican majorities until 2001. Warner
demonstrated major gains over 1997 Democratic nominee Don Beyer in the 5th,
4th, 9th, 6th, 1st, and 7th (see Table 5.05).
Kaine carried only four congressional districts; the 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 11th.
Katzen was able to snatch two Warner-majority districts, the 5th and the 9th. Kilgore
won all but the heavily Democratic 3rd and 8th, though the 11th was also close.
Voter turnout in the congressional districts was reasonably similar to other recent elections, with the 5th, 6th, and 7th (in ascending order) producing the highest
participation rates, and the lowest rates recorded in the 2nd, 10th, 11th, and 3rd.15
Overall, 2001’s turnout in Virginia displayed a glass half-full, glass half-empty
quality. After declines in the absolute turnout in 1993 and 1997 from 1989’s high
watermark of 1,821,000, the state finally topped 1.9 million in a gubernatorial election in 2001 (see Table 5.06). Over 141,000 more Virginians cast a ballot in 2001
than four years earlier (an 8 percent gain), possibly because of a patriotic response
to the September 11 terrorist attacks, or maybe due to the intensified get-out-thevote (GOTV) efforts of the Democratic Party. Still, this improved participation rate
for governor—36 percent of those citizens aged 18 and over—was far below the
53 percent of Virginians who showed up to vote in the 2000 presidential election.
About 46.4 percent of registered voters cast a 2001 ballot, but this represented a
decline from 1997’s 49.5 percent. This drop, however, may simply reflect the broader
registered voter pool generated by the so-called “motor-voter” law of 1993, which in
recent years has added hundreds of thousands of “casual citizens” to the rolls. These
citizens may register to vote incidentally at the Division of Motor Vehicles and elsewhere, but they may actually have little resolve to show up at the polls.
15. For more information, see: Larry J. Sabato, Virginia Votes 1995–1998 (Weldon Cooper
Center for Public Service, 1999), pp. 151–152.
137
TABLE 5.07
Voter Turnout in Virginia, 1976–2001
Year
Chief Contest
1976
1977
1978
1980
1981
1982
1984
1985
1988
1989
1990
1992
1993
1994
1996
1997
2000
2001
President/Senator
Governor
Senator
President
Governor
Senator
President/Senator
Governor
President/Senator
Governor
Senator
President
Governor
Senator
President/Senator
Governor
President/Senator
Governor
% of All Adults
% of Registered
48.6
34.8
32.7
48.9
37.3
34.7
51.9
32.2
50.0
39.7
26.4
54.5
36.9
41.8
47.6
34.4
52.8
36.2
80.8
61.9
60.3
81.4
64.9
63.4
81.5
53.0
77.6
66.5
45.8
84.5
61.1
69.3
74.3
49.5
68.5
46.4
Political Map of Virginia
People vote, not trees, or rocks, or territory.16 This is the theory behind the “Political
Map of Virginia,” which was updated in the spring of 2001 to reflect the 2000 census.
A similar map was produced in 1988 to show the effects of growth particularly in
Northern Virginia, but also in the Richmond and Tidewater areas. The regular map
of Virginia displays the territorial boundaries of the 39 cities and 95 counties that
comprise the Commonwealth of Virginia. Each of these cities and counties has been
expanded or contracted to demonstrate its real proportion of the statewide electorate
in the political map. Thus, the giant county of Fairfax, Virginia’s largest jurisdiction
with a population of over 1 million people, is the most prominent feature (see Figure
5.07).
Northern Virginia as a whole is a substantial portion of the map, accounting
for nearly 30 percent of the potential votes to be cast in any statewide election. Also
of great importance is the growth of the Richmond and Tidewater areas. While the
central cities of Richmond, Norfolk, and Portsmouth have either declined in population or grown only slightly, the surrounding suburbs have exploded in growth.
The big political losers are of course Virginia’s rural areas, which take up far
less space on the political map of Virginia than they do on the territorial map. This
decline has been observed since the 1960’s and it is proceeding apace, though a few
rural localities are gaining population and becoming new suburbs—from Northern
Virginia’s Spotsylvania and Stafford counties to the Charlottesville area’s Greene and
Madison counties, and the city of Suffolk in Tidewater.
From the look of the political map, it would appear that the urban / suburban
areas would always dominate Virginia politics. But the reality is that even within
a geographic area, the more liberal central cities (including Alexandria, Norfolk,
Charlottesville, and Richmond) have conflicting interests with their suburban
16. Excerpts of this article were originally published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch: “Notes
on the State of Virginia in the 21st Century,” April 29, 2001, p. F7. For more information, see the UVa
Center for Politics website, http: // www.centerforpolitics.org under “Featured Publications.”
138
FIGURE 5.07
The Political Map of Virginia: All Counties and Cities of Virginia Scaled in Proportion to Population
neighbors, including Fairfax, Henrico, Chesterfield, Virginia Beach, and Albemarle,
to name a few. Similarly, rural areas are so scattered around Virginia that even though
they may have lifestyle issues in common, regional differences make it difficult for
them to unite. If somehow they could unite, rural Virginia would not be as minor a
force on Election Day as it often appears to be. Such a joining of forces would be one
way for Southside and Southwest Virginia to reverse their shrinking influence.
Figure 5.08 shows the localities won by Warner and Earley on the political map
of Virginia. The political map of Virginia, since it is based on population, more accurately displays Warner’s win and the overall closeness of the race than a geographical map. Warner carried the notable heavyweights of Fairfax, Arlington, Alexandria,
Richmond, Henrico, Newport News, and Norfolk, while Earley posted wins in the
suburban giants Prince William, Chesterfield, Chesapeake, and Virginia Beach.
It is impossible to predict future trends for certain, but it is likely that suburban growth will continue, especially in Northern Virginia. To denizens of the “real
Virginia” south of the Occoquan River, Fairfax’s domination of the “Political Map of
Virginia” may be a bitter pill to swallow. Nonetheless, when the next political map is
drawn in 2011, it is likely that Fairfax will have extended its reach again.
The Urban and Rural Vote
As long ago as the 1960’s, Virginia’s voting majority shifted from its once-dominant
rural areas to its metropolitan cities and suburbs. Urban Virginia now heavily dominates the state’s politics, as Table 5.08 suggests. Six out of every ten votes in November
2001 came from the Urban Corridor, comprised of Northern Virginia-RichmondTidewater area, and nearly eight in ten originated in the Metropolitan Statistical
139
FIGURE 5.08
The Political Map of Virginia, 2001 Gubernatorial Election
TABLE 5.08
The Urban and Rural Vote, Virginia General Elections, 2001
Urban Measure
Urban Corridor a
Metropolitan Statistical Areasb
Central Cities
Suburbs
Rural Areasc
Percent of
Total Votes
61.2
78.0
16.2
61.8
21.7
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Warner (D) Earley (R) Kaine (D) Katzen (R)
53.2
52.4
64.6
49.2
51.3
44.7
45.7
34.6
48.6
47.7
52.7
51.2
63.8
48.0
47.0
46.1
47.4
34.6
50.7
51.2
Attorney General
McEachin (D) Kilgore (R)
13.1
41.3
53.9
38.0
34.9
56.8
58.7
46.0
62.0
65.1
SOURCE: Compiled from official election results from the State Board of Elections.
NOTES: a Includes cities of Alexandria, Chesapeake, Colonial Heights, Fairfax, Falls Church, Fredericksburg, Hampton, Hopewell, Manassas, Manassas Park, Newport
News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Richmond, Virginia Beach, and Williamsburg; and the counties of Arlington, Caroline, Charles City, Chesterfield,
Clarke, Dinwiddie, Fairfax, Fauquier, Hanover, Henrico, James City, Loudoun, New Kent, Prince George, Prince William, Spotsylvania, Stafford, and York.
b
The eight current Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) for Virginia, as established by the U.S. Census Bureau, are Charlottesville, Danville, Johnson CityKingsport-Bristol, Lynchburg, Washington, D.C., Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Richmond-Petersburg, and Roanoke. “Central Cities” and “Suburbs”
are included in the MSA figures. The Charlottesville and Danville MSAs were first designated after the 1980 census. Various other MSAs have been expanded
each decade, with new cities and counties added to them. Therefore, this grouping of MSAs in substantially, but not entirely the same as that listed in previous
editions of Virginia Votes.
c
All Virginia localities not included in either an MSA or the Urban Corridor.
Areas designated by the U.S. Census Bureau. Not surprisingly, all three winners carried both the Urban Corridor and the MSAs.
In 16 percent of the statewide vote generated by the central cities, Warner and
Kaine garnered over six in ten votes, while McEachin won just 53.9 percent. The
ever-growing suburbs comprised 61 percent of the 2001 statewide vote, and both
Warner and Katzen edged their foes here. Nonetheless, a tie or near-tie for Democrats
in the usually GOP suburbs is a major achievement. Kilgore swamped McEachin in
suburbia, 62 percent to 38 percent. The rural areas still produce over a fifth of the
statewide vote, and Warner’s breakthrough in this demographic division secured
140
TABLE 5.09
Metropolitan Proportions of Statewide Vote in Virginia, 1969–2001
Percent of Statewide Vote
Election
GENERAL ELECTIONS
1969 Governor
1970 U.S. Senator
1971 Lieutenant Governor
1972 President
1973 Governor
1976 President
1977 Governor
1978 U.S. Senator
1980 President
1981 Governor
1982 U.S. Senator
1984 President
1985 Governor
1987 Lottery Referendum
1988 President
1989 Governor
1990 U.S. Senator
1992 President
1993 Governor
1994 U.S. Senator
1996 President
1997 Governor
2000 President
2001 Governor
DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES
1969 Governor (first primary)
1969 Governor (runoff )
1977 Governor
1988 President
1994 U.S. Senator
2001 Lieutenant Governor
2001 Attorney General
REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES
1988 President
1989 Governor
1996 U.S. Senator
1997 Attorney General
2000 President
Central Cities
Suburbs
21.5
22.6
18.6
21.7
22.0
20.1
20.6
19.8
17.0
17.8
18.0
16.8
17.1
15.1
15.0
22.5
13.5
13.7
18.1
17.9
17.2
17.2
15.7
16.2
35.0
35.4
28.4
41.2
37.6
41.5
39.0
39.1
44.3
46.5
46.9
49.3
47.5
48.5
52.6
48.6
61.0
60.0
58.2
59.6
60.6
58.6
62.1
61.8
28.1
27.3
26.9
25.4
24.4
38.6
38.3
26.3
28.8
37.8
45.5
48.2
45.3
44.9
13.6
15.0
19.1
17.1
14.3
59.7
55.6
64.5
64.6
69.6
him a narrow majority (51.3 percent) in small-town and agricultural Virginia. No
Democratic gubernatorial candidate since Gerald Baliles had carried the rural vote.
Katzen maintained a GOP rural edge, with a four percent victory, while Kilgore
overwhelmed McEachin, 65.1 percent to 34.9 percent. Note that Warner exceeded
the recent Democratic performance in all demographic sectors of Virginia.
Predominantly African American Precincts
The 44 predominantly black precincts in Table 5.10 show a strong Democratic performance across the board. All three Democrats gained 92-93 percent of the almost
24,000 votes cast in these precincts. That is an impressive proportion, of course,
141
TABLE 5.10
Voting in Selected Predominantly Black Precincts in Virginia Cities, General Election for Statewide Offices, 2001
Governor
City
Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
Number of Precincts
Total Votes Cast
Percent of Registered Voting
Warner (D)
Earley (R)
Kaine (D)
Katzen (R)
McEachin (D)
Kilgore (R)
1
1
1
2
8
10
4
2
15
44
530
410
123
2,561
3,083
6,071
1,911
2,184
7,701
23,865
32.7%
40.0%
36.0%
41.3%
34.0%
33.4%
44.9%
52.8%
44.1%
39.5%
86.0%
92.6%
87.5%
87.5%
92.1%
92.1%
93.7%
94.9%
91.4%
92.0%
12.6%
7.1%
12.5%
12.1%
4.6%
7.0%
5.8%
5.0%
7.9%
7.4%
84.7%
93.8%
88.7%
87.8%
95.7%
94.7%
92.7%
96.3%
91.7%
92.9%
12.2%
6.2%
10.4%
10.9%
3.3%
4.5%
6.7%
2.8%
7.1%
6.1%
82.7%
93.9%
87.2%
84.0%
94.9%
93.2%
97.2%
96.5%
90.2%
91.9%
16.4%
6.1%
12.8%
15.7%
4.8%
6.2%
5.8%
3.4%
10.5%
8.4%
BLACK PRECINCTS
Charlottesville a
Chesapeake b
Emporia c
Hampton d
Newport News e
Norfolk f
Petersburg g
Portsmouth h
Richmond i
Total or Average
a
Charlottesville: Tonsler precinct
b
Chesapeake:
South Norfolk Fire Station precinct
c
Emporia:
Precinct 2
d
Hampton:
Pembroke and Phenix precincts
e
Newport News: Chestnut, Dunbar, Hutington, Jefferson, Magruder, Marshall, Newsome Park, and Washington
f
Norfolk:
Berkley, Bowling Park, Brambleton, Campostella, Chesterfield, Monroe, Park Place, Rosemont, Union Chapel, and Young Park Precincts
g
Petersburg:
5th Ward-1st Precinct, 5th Ward-2nd Precinct, 6th Ward-1st Precinct, and 6th Ward-2nd Precinct
h
Portsmouth:
Precincts 26 and 27
i
Richmond:
Precincts 301, 303, 304, 306, 602, 604, 606, 608, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 707, and 802
though hardly a record. For example, in 1989 Doug Wilder garnered 96 percent in a
very similar set of precincts (see Table 5.11).
Notable was Mark Earley’s decline from nearly 16 percent in these precincts
(when he was elected attorney general in 1997) to less than half that, 7 percent, in
2001. A lifetime member of the NAACP, Earley had been proud of his outreach to
the black community during his career, but his inept campaign never managed to
communicate his history to African Americans (or much of anyone else).
Turnout in the black precincts was low, as usual—about 7 percent below
the overall turnout. (The last time black turnout exceeded overall turnout was for
Wilder’s 1989 gubernatorial election—see Table 5.12.) At the same time, the black
precinct turnout in 2001 was closer to the statewide average than any year since 1994
(the Robb-North U.S. Senate contest). This is additional evidence that Warner’s
Democratic GOTV had at least a marginal effect.
Ballot Fall-Off
The remarkable aspect about ballot fall-off in 2001 was that there was so little of
it. As readers of this series know, ballot fall-off (or drop-off ) is the tendency of a
few percent of voters to cast a ballot for the top office (usually) but not to complete
the ballot. (see Tables 5.13 and 5.14). In 2001, 99 percent of voters cast a ballot for
governor, 96.5 percent for lieutenant governor, and a slightly larger 96.8 percent for
attorney general. There was not much variance among the congressional districts,
except that fall-off was somewhat higher in the Southside 5th.
The most fascinating ballot fall-off numbers come from the African American
142
TABLE 5.11
Major Statewide Elections in Virginia By Demographic and Black Voting Patterns, 1969–2001
Percent for Winner
Election
GENERAL ELECTIONS
1969 Governor, Linwood Holton (R)
1970 U.S. Senator, Harry Byrd, Jr. (I)
1971 Lt. Governor, Henry Howell (I)
1972 President, Richard Nixon (R)
1972 U.S. Senate, William Scott (R)
1973 Governor, Mills Godwin (R)
1976 President, Gerald Ford (R)
1976 U.S. Senate, Harry Byrd, Jr. (I)
1977 Governor, John Dalton (R)
1977 Lt. Governor, Charles Robb (D)
1977 Attorney General, Marshall Coleman (R)
1978 U.S. Senate, John Warner (R)
1980 President, Ronald Reagan (R)
1981 Governor, Charles Robb (D)
1981 Lt. Governor, Dick Davis (D)
1981 Attorney General, Gerald Baliles (D)
1982 U.S. Senate, Paul Trible (R)
1984 President Ronald Reagan (R)
1985 Governor, Gerald Baliles (D)
1985 Lt. Governor, Douglas Wilder (D)
1985 Attorney General, Mary Sue Terry, (D)
1988 President, George Bush, (R)
1988 U.S. Senate, Charles Robb (D)
1989 Governor, Douglas Wilder (D)
1989 Lt. Governor, Donald Beyer (D)
1989 Attorney General, Mary Sue Terry (D)
1992 President, George Bush (R)
1993 Governor, George Allen (R)
1993 Lt. Governor, Donald Beyer (D)
1993 Attorney General, James Gilmore (R)
1994 U.S. Senate, Charles Robb (D)
1996 President, Robert Dole (R)
1997 Governor, James Gilmore (R)
1997 Lt. Governor, John Hager (R)
1997 Attorney General, Mark Earley (R)
2000 President, George W. Bush (R)
2000 Senate, George Allen (R)
2001 Governor, Mark Warner (D)
2001 Lt. Governor, Timothy Kaine (D)
2001 Attorney General, Jerry Kilgore (R)
Central Cities
Suburbs
Black Vote
50.9
52.2
50.6
60.3
42.5
43.2
43.6
51.4
47.9
61.2
47.7
45.4
41.3
64.5
67.2
62.7
39.6
47.9
57.6
66.2
64.4
71.3
45.2
76.1
68.5
64.9
72.7
78.0
33.1
46.5
64.6
46.1
59.2
46.6
45.0
43.7
38.8
48.0
38.8
38.5
64.6
62.1
41.2
56.5
55.9
39.8
70.1
52.7
54.6
53.9
55.9
59.9
51.1
56.6
53.7
58.4
49.5
52.3
45.4
55.1
66.8
72.9
51.5
48.8
58.6
63.4
70.3
47.0
53.4
61.6
80.9
47.1
59.9
54.2
57.7
43.5
51.1
56.0
58.3
53.3
59.9
54.4
53.8
49.2
47.1
61.0
37.2
3.0
91.7
8.8
6.7
5.7
5.0
4.4
5.0
94.9
32.7
7.1
3.4
96.4
95.5
95.9
5.7
8.2
21.2
94.1
96.6
95.6
8.6
83.7
96.2
87.8
94.7
64.2
7.0
11.4
90.9
10.6
93.4
4.8
11.6
11.2
9.1
15.6
5.5
8.1
92.0
92.9
8.4
(continued )
precincts. Normally, these precincts exhibit a high degree of fall-off. But in 2001,
just as in 1985 and 1989, an African American candidate on the ballot made a clear
difference. Black voters in 2001 were almost as likely to vote for attorney general
as for governor. The highest rate of fall-off in the black precincts was recorded
for the lieutenant governor contest—and even here, only about 8 percent failed
to vote.
143
TABLE 5.11
Major Statewide Elections in Virginia By Demographic and Black Voting Patterns, 1969–2001 (continued)
Percent for Winner
Election
DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTIONS
1969 Governor, William Battle (first primary)
1969 Governor, William Battle (runoff )
1977 Governor, Henry Howell
1977 Lt. Governor, Charles Robb
1977 Attorney General, Edward E. Lane
1988 President, Jesse Jackson
1994 U.S. Senator, Charles Robb
2001 Lt. Governor, Tim Kaine
2001 Attorney General, Donald McEachin
REPUBLICAN PRIMARY ELECTIONS
1988 President, George Bush
1989 Governor, Marshall Coleman
1996 U.S. Senator, John Warner
1997 Attorney General, Mark Earley
2000 President, George W. Bush
Central Cities
Suburbs
Black Vote
31.8
40.7
59.6
35.0
37.8
64.1
68.5
32.9
38.1
40.6
51.2
50.6
39.1
32.0
38.2
61.3
42.6
32.5
11.8
4.8
86.1
26.6
15.8
93.8
82.9
22.9
77.3
54.5
34.6
75.1
36.9
49.6
52.5
35.9
64.7
38.0
51.4
37.7
42.8
84.6
38.5
31.4
TABLE 5.12
Voter Turnout in Selected Black Precincts vs. Statewide Turnout in Virginia, 1976–2001
Year
Election
1976
1977
1978
1980
1981
1982
1984
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
1992
1993
1994
1996
1997
2000
2001
President
Governor
U.S. Senator
President
Governor
U.S. Senator
President
Governor
Lottery/Gen. Assembly
President
Governor
U.S. Senator
President
Governor
U.S. Senator
President
Governor
President
Governor
Overall Turnout
(% of Registered)
Selected Black Precincts
(% of Registered)
% Black Turnout Exceeds (+) or
Underachieves (–) Overall Turnout
80.8
61.9
60.3
81.3
64.9
65.1
81.5
53.0
59.1
77.6
66.5
45.8
84.5
61.1
69.3
74.3
49.5
68.5
46.4
76.4
62.8
56.4
75.4
67.5
68.9
72.6
53.9
49.6
64.4
72.6
31.7
72.0
50.5
64.0
64.0
41.1
56.4
39.5
–4.4
0.9
–3.9
–5.9
2.6
3.8
–8.9
0.9
–9.5
–13.2
6.1
–14.1
–12.5
–10.6
–5.3
–10.3
–8.4
–12.1
–6.9
Election Day Polls and Demographic Breakdowns
For the first time since 1981 in a Virginia gubernatorial election, no Election Day
exit poll was conducted at the polling places throughout the state. These surveys have
been under a dark cloud after their Florida errors in the 2000 presidential race,17 but
they are actually the most accurate polls of all since they sample only those who turn
17. See chapters by Larry J. Sabato and Diana Owen in Overtime! The Election 2000 Thriller,
(Longman: 2001).
144
TABLE 5.13
Ballot Fall-off, Virginia General Election (All Voters), 2001
Percent of Votes Cast for Office of Total Persons Voting
Congressional District
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Statewide
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
98.6%
99.1%
98.3%
98.8%
98.9%
99.2%
99.4%
99.0%
99.1%
99.2%
99.3%
99.0%
96.4%
97.0%
96.3%
95.9%
93.2%
96.2%
98.0%
98.2%
94.1%
97.6%
98.1%
96.5%
96.4%
98.0%
96.6%
96.7%
93.5%
96.5%
97.9%
97.9%
96.0%
97.4%
97.9%
96.8%
TABLE 5.14
Ballot Fall-off in Virginia Gubernatorial Elections, 1977–2001
Percent Votes Cast for Office to Total Persons Voting
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
Year
All Voters
Black Precincts
All Voters
Black Precincts
All Voters
Black Precincts
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
98.5
98.8
97.5
98.2
98.7
98.4
99.0
97.6
97.0
91.6
97.9
95.3
95.8
97.0
94.7
94.2
95.9
94.8
95.7
94.9
96.5
88.5
86.5
94.2
83.0
86.6
88.7
91.5
90.8
93.2
96.3
95.2
94.0
94.0
96.8
82.3
82.3
89.5
88.4
82.2
89.3
94.7
up to cast a ballot; all pre-election polls must guess which respondents will truly vote
in the end. Nonetheless, no media organizations decided to undertake an exit poll in
2001—citing the cost, the risk, and the supposed lack of public interest in the contest. For some of the same reasons, almost all Virginia television stations abandoned
the standard wall-to-wall election night coverage of the gubernatorial election on
November 6. Instead of continuous 7:00–11:30 p.m. coverage, news of the results
was generally restricted to trailers at the bottom of TV screens and a brief “news at
11 p.m.” wrap-up, even on stations in the state capital.
Fortunately, a somewhat less-accurate substitute is available for our purposes
of analysis: an Election Day telephone survey of 500 self-reported “actual” voters
(with a margin of error of plus or minus 4.4 percent) conducted for the National
Republican Congressional Committee by Public Opinion Strategies, a well-known
national GOP firm. The Democrats did not conduct an Election Day poll, but their
internal polling throughout the campaign will be discussed later.
The Republican survey suggests underlying conditions that should have favored
Mark Earley (see Table 5.15). Fully 61 percent of the respondents thought Virginia
was “on the right track,” while only 25 percent believed the state had “gotten seriously
off on the wrong track.” President Bush had an approval rating of 88 percent and
Governor Gilmore had a substantially lower, but still positive, favorability rating of
56 percent. Party identification among the voters leaned strongly to the Republicans,
with 45 percent picking the GOP label with various degrees of enthusiasm to just
145
TABLE 5.15
Election Day Poll from the National Republican Congressional Committee
Candidate
Warner (D)
Earley (R)
46
51
49
46
44
44
44
53
49
39
44
73
50
18
11
94
56
86
4
34
23
66
82
71
29
8
44
61
50
32
50
47
49
45
44
44
21
95
75
3
38
73
57
21
AGE
18–34 (14)
35–54 (49)
55+ (34)
GENDER
Male (48)
Female (52)
RACE
White (76)
Black (15)
PARTY
Republican (45)
Democrat (34)
Independent (17)
IDEOLOGY
Conservative (42)
Moderate (39)
Liberal (13)
CURRENTLY MARRIED?
Yes (67)
No (29)
EDUCATION
High school graduate or less (27)
Some college (20)
College graduate or more (51)
VOTE FOR PRESIDENT IN 2000
Bush (54)
Gore (36)
RIGHT DIRECTION
Right Direction (61)
Wrong Track (25)
34 percent for the Democrats. (About 17 percent were Independent or third-party,
with 4 percent declining to say.) Moreover, 42 percent were conservative in ideology,
compared to 39 percent moderate and just 13 percent liberal.
Yet despite all this good news for Mark Earley, Mark Warner was able to cobble
together a majority, and the poll results suggest some of the reasons. First, Earley’s
central campaign theme—that Warner’s support for a possible Northern Virginia
referendum to raise the local sales tax for roads and schools made him a “big-taxer”—
was simply rejected by a sizeable majority. Just 34 percent agreed with Earley that
“Warner was supporting a nine hundred million dollar tax increase,” while 56 percent
believed that “all [Warner] was doing was supporting the right of people to choose to
tax themselves in a vote . . .”
There was also a clear indication that the strong Democratic canvass and
GOTV operations had an effect. Marginally more voters reported that they had been
contacted by telephone and mail originating in the Warner campaign than Earley’s
organization. The demographics of the electorate on November 6, 2001 also worked
to Warner’s advantage. Women were 52 percent of the Election Day turnout, and
they favored Warner by 53 percent to 39 percent for Earley. Men were in Earley’s
corner, by a relatively narrow 49 percent to 44 percent. This ten-point “gender gap”
is a relatively standard one in politics across the country; in this particular case,
146
TABLE 5.15
Election Day Poll from the National Republican Congressional Committee (continued)
Candidate
Warner (D)
Earley (R)
FOR WHOM DID YOU VOTE IN THE RACE FOR GOVERNOR?
Mark Earley
49
44
Mark Warner
FOR WHOM DID YOU VOTE FOR IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES IN THIS DISTRICT?
Republican candidate (48)
19
77
Democratic candidate (36)
92
5
DID MARK EARLEY’S CAMPAIGN CONTACT YOU BY . . .
Telephone (27)
48
47
In person or by staffers/volunteers (19)
39
56
Mail (55)
44
49
DID A VOLUNTEER FROM MARK EARLEY’S CAMPAIGN KNOCK ON YOUR DOOR OR LEAVE LITERATURE AT YOUR DOOR THIS WEEKEND?
Yes (11)
56
38
DID MARK WARNER’S CAMPAIGN CONTACT YOU BY . . .
Telephone (31)
66
28
In person or by staffers/volunteers
67
26
Mail (58)
54
41
DID A VOLUNTEER FROM MARK WARNER’S CAMPAIGN KNOCK ON YOUR DOOR OR LEAVE LITERATURE AT YOUR DOOR THIS WEEKEND?
Yes
62
32
WHAT STATEMENT COMES CLOSER TO YOUR POINT OF VIEW?
Mark Earley said by supporting the initiatives, Mark Warner was supporting a $900
21
66
million tax increase. (34)
Mark Warner said that all he was doing was supporting the right of the people to
88
7
choose to tax themselves for more roads and schools. (56)
SYMPATHETIC TO THE NRA
Yes (48)
31
65
No (43)
70
24
women’s strong preference for the Democrat won out over a male predisposition for
the Republican.
African Americans were also 15 percent of Election Day turnout, a proportion
that argues success in that portion of Warner’s GOTV effort. The GOP survey shows
Warner winning blacks 73 percent to 18 percent for Earley, but the margin of error
for this small subsample is in double-digits; the sample black precincts presented
elsewhere in this chapter would suggest that Warner was closer to 90 percent of the
black vote, with Earley’s backing just over 10 percent. Among whites, with a large,
reliable subsample, Earley edged Warner by only 50 percent to 44 percent. Normally,
a Democrat needs just over 40 percent of the white vote to win statewide, assuming a
solid black turnout, and that is precisely what Warner achieved.
The Gilmore factor is especially interesting in this survey. Just as with Bill
Clinton in 2000, the electorate appeared to be saying about the incumbent governor:
We approve of the job you have been doing, overall, but we are ready for a change.
Not only did a third of Warner’s vote come from voters who had a favorable opinion of Gilmore, but in a head-to-head election match-up of Mark Warner and Jim
Gilmore, Warner prevailed over the incumbent by 47 percent to 45 percent, with the
remainder unsure or refusing to answer. (That is, had Gilmore been seeking a second
term, this GOP survey suggests he would have LOST to the Democrat by about 51
percent to 49 percent.)
Also worth noting is the Bush factor, or rather, non-factor. Thanks to the president’s decision to leave his party’s candidate to his own devices, Warner was able to
win over a fifth of the 2000 Bush voters, as well as 95 percent of the Gore voters.
147
Among those who approved of Bush’s performance as president, Earley won just a
narrow 50 percent to 44 percent edge. How might these numbers have changed had
Bush campaigned for the Republican gubernatorial nominee?
Warner succeeded not only with his own partisans to a greater degree than
Earley, but he won Independents overwhelmingly. Just 4 percent of Democrats defected to Earley, while 11 percent of Republicans cast a ballot for Warner. Warner
captured Independents by 56 percent to 34 percent. Similarly, a quarter of conservatives defected to Warner, while Earley—a lifetime member of the NAACP and
someone who was on reasonably good terms with organized labor—won only 8
percent of liberals. Moderates cast ballots for Warner by better than a two-to-one
margin (66 percent to 29 percent).
One of the most tortured campaign sub-plots was the National Rifle
Association’s hemming and hawing about their endorsement. Warner and his
“Sportsmen” subgroup undertook to secure a detente with the NRA. It worked well
enough so that, despite heavy GOP pressure, the NRA delayed any action until the
campaign’s final weeks, and then managed only a non-endorsement “recommendation” of Earley in a letter to members.18 This had an impact, apparently. Almost a
third of NRA-sympathizers in the Virginia electorate voted for Warner.
Some poll findings are unsurprising but worth noting. Warner emphasized
education and the economy, and sure enough, he won close to two-thirds of voters
who said those issues were their top concerns. Earley concentrated on taxes, and he
garnered almost three-quarters of the voters who were worried on that score. The
incumbent party usually wins a majority of those who believe the state is on the right
track: Earley captured 57 percent of them. Warner won fully 73 percent of the voters
who thought Virginia had gone off on the wrong track.
Tracking the voters’ minds is also fascinating. Perhaps indicative of the underlying Republican leanings of Virginians, Earley won most voters who had firmly and
“finally ma[d]e up” their minds about the election before October. But October was
all Warner’s: he got about 56 percent of October deciders. Earley caught up a bit
among those who chose a candidate on the last weekend or on Election Day itself: the
two candidates essentially split those voters. Overall, about 4 in 10 voters decided before October; another 4 in 10 decided during October; and the final 2 in 10 decided
right at the campaign’s end.
Pre-Election Public Polls
Far less useful, indeed sometimes very misleading, were the pre-election public polls
taken mainly by news media organizations. With one main exception, these polls
tended to inflate Mark Warner’s lead (or at least his eventual margin of victory). The
polls were not among Mark Earley’s primary problems, but they did make it more difficult for him to stage an upset, raise money, and attract President Bush to the state.
Naturally, reporters tended to frame their coverage around the apparent Warner lead,
with frequent and prominent notations of Earley’s “lagging campaign, behind in the
polls.” Speculative stories were even written about Warner’s presumed ability to carry
Republican suburbs in Northern Virginia (such as Loudoun and Prince William
counties, both of which Warner lost on November 6).
Most damaging to Earley was a late August poll published on the front page by
18. See: Jeff Schapiro and Tyler Whitley, “Earley Gains NRA Support; Ratings: Earley, A-Minus;
Warner, C,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 26, 2001, p. B4.
148
the Republican Party’s frequent nemesis, The Washington Post—unquestionably, the
newspaper most supportive of Warner and hostile to Earley in 2001. This survey was
the first public poll to show Earley well behind Warner, and by the stunning margin
of 14 percentage points, with Warner having already reached an absolute majority
among registered voters (51 percent to 37 percent).19
The GOP stronghold of the Shenandoah Valley was actually shown to be comfortably in the Warner camp, by 52 percent to 38 percent. Even the Warner staff
never believed their candidate to be ahead there, and on Election Day, Earley won the
region by a very large margin. In the same poll, Warner led in every region by at least
8 percentage points, and the Democrat was given an eye-popping 29 percent lead in
the Southwest—which he eventually won by a mere five points. Any knowledgeable
student of Virginia politics knew instantly that such regional margins in any vaguely
competitive race were preposterous, whether in an August poll or on Election Day.
Until the Post poll, the accepted view in the political community was that
Warner was ahead but not by a crushing margin and not with majority support. That
is precisely what a June Mason-Dixon survey had shown, with 45 percent for Warner
and 40 percent for Earley. With a long and arguably the most accurate polling record
in Virginia—as previous editions of Virginia Votes have indicated—Mason-Dixon
was remarkably stable from March through October, and Warner’s lead varied between three and seven points consistently (and always below 50 percent). So dominant is the Post, however, that Mason-Dixon’s better overall record could not compete with the D.C. press giant’s numbers. A Richmond Times-Dispatch / Channel 12
survey in mid-September, giving Warner only a three-point edge, seemed to do little
to change the hardening consensus that Warner was far ahead. Also ignored were
several WJLA-TV (Channel 7 in D.C.) polls that had the race very close. (One of
them, taken October 6-7, had the contest tied at 48 percent each).
Two late surveys, one by the Post giving Warner a 10-point lead with majority support and the other from the Times-Dispatch/Channel 12 showing Warner up 13 percent
(46 percent to 33 percent), made the idea of an Earley upset seem almost comical.
Oddly, the Post published no polling at all in the races for lieutenant governor
and attorney general, so it is impossible to say if its inflated Democratic lead was specific to the governorship or applied to the sample generally. All the other polls listed
in Table 5.16 did include the other statewide elections, and here their track record
was better. Tim Kaine always led Jay Katzen for lieutenant governor, though by very
small margins in the general election period—precisely the final result. And Jerry
Kilgore had at least a ten-point lead in every single poll taken after Labor Day, though
no poll forecast his twenty-point blowout.
Incidentally, every public poll except for the Washington Post’s had a relatively
small sample (379 to 633) and a margin of error ranging from 4 percent to 5.1 percent. The Post polls had by far the largest samples (1,312 and 1,010) and the smallest
margin of error (3 percent), presumably making it most likely to be on target.
Mark Warner’s Horserace Polling
Public news media surveys are intermittent, often small-sample polls that may or may
not reveal the underlying trend in an election contest. The candidates themselves
19. The “likely voter” lead was at 11 percent, 53 percent for Warner to 42 percent for Earley—a
total which was reported second, after the larger registered voter lead in the story. See R.H. Melton and
Claudia Deane, “Warner Has Wide Lead, Poll Shows,” Washington Post, August 26, 2001, p. A1.
149
TABLE 5.16
Public Opinion Polls, Virginia Statewide Elections, 2001
Richmond Times-Dispatch/
NBC 12 Poll
Mason Dixon
Candidates
Warner
Earley
Other/Undecided
Kaine
Katzen
Other/Undecided
Kilgore
McEachin
Undecided
Margin of Error
(plus or minues)
Sample Size
Washington Post
March 26–27
June 13–15
Sept. 10, 14–15
Oct. 15–17
Oct. 29–30
Sept. 10, 13–19
Oct. 26–Nov. 1
Aug. 19–23
Oct. 22–25
44
37
19
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
45
40
15
38
27
35
34
30
36
46
40
14
37
32
31
39
29
32
45
42
13
38
36
26
41
31
28
48
42
10
42
40
18
46
35
19
39
36
17
35
33
20
42
30
17
46
33
21
35
30
35
45
32
23
51
37
12
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
51
41
8
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
4.0
625
4.0
625
4.0
625
4.0
625
4.0
633
5.1
379
4.6
481
3.0
1,312
3.0
1,010
have a much greater incentive to spend generously on thorough, large-sample surveys,
assuming they have the war chest to do so. Mark Warner had both the incentive and
the financing, and his campaign has shared with us the head-to-head poll results of its
private surveys from February to November 2001 (see Table 5.17).
While Warner always had at least a slight lead in his polling, the contest started
out essentially tied in February, 40 percent for Warner to 37 percent for Earley, with
a margin or error of 3.5 percent. By June, after the budget impasse and as more people
began to see, hear, and read about the two gubernatorial candidates, Warner built
a sizeable twelve percentage point lead, 45 percent to 33 percent. By July, though,
Virginia’s underlying Republicanism—and perhaps fading memories of the budget
impasse—had enabled Earley to close the gap considerably, with Warner ahead by
just four points, 43 percent to 39 percent. Within a month, Warner began to launch
a major wave of television advertising, which Earley did not or could not match, and
by the end of August, as the traditional Labor Day launch approached, Warner had
jumped back up to a twelve-point lead, 49 percent to 37 percent.
Then came September 11. As noted in an earlier section, most observers believed that the horrible events of that day gave Earley two chances to rebound: first,
because the terrorist attacks shook up the race, potentially erasing memories of what
had come before and diminishing in importance all other factors (such as the budget
impasse), and second, since the public’s new insecurity and shock might encourage people to rally around symbols of security (incumbent officeholders) and put
a premium on public office experience, which Earley had and Warner did not. Sure
enough, the first private survey taken a week after September 11 showed Warner’s
lead shrinking considerably, to seven points (43 percent to 36 percent), with the undecided proportion mushrooming from 14 percent to 21 percent.
For whatever combination of reasons, Earley failed to take advantage of the opportunity. Yes, Earley did begin to stress his experience somewhat more, but Warner
was quick to emphasize on television and the stump that he “backed President Bush”
and that Virginia’s pressing agenda was different than the federal government’s. By late
September, the number of undecideds declined again, and Warner’s lead gradually grew
to eight points in early October and a fairly steady ten points for much of the remaining
time before the general election. Keep in mind, though, that Warner never crossed the 50
percent-majority threshold at any point. Virginia does not easily embrace a Democrat.
Warner’s surveys, like all but the Mason-Dixon poll, over-estimated his eventual
150
TABLE 5.17
Mark Warner’s Private Campaign Polling, The Horserace for Governor, February 2001—November 2001
Candidate
Mark Earley
Mark Warner
Undecided/Other
Margin of Error (+ or –)
Sample Size
Feb ’01 June ’01 July ’01 Aug 9 ’01 Aug 30 ’01 Sep 18 ’01 Sep 26 ’01 Oct 4 ’01 Oct 11 ’01 Oct 18 ’01 Oct 19 ’01 Oct 25 ’01 Nov 1 ’01
37
40
23
3.5
800
33
45
21
3.5
800
39
43
18
3.7
705
38
45
17
4.0
600
37
49
14
3.5
803
36
43
21
4.0
600
40
47
13
4.0
600
38
47
15
4.0
600
37
47
16
4.0
600
37
47
16
4.0
600
37
48
15
4.0
600
38
46
16
4.0
600
38
48
14
4.0
600
victory margin. It may be that the 14 percent “undecided” close to Election Day broke
heavily for Earley, and indeed Warner’s pollsters found these lingering undecideds
to be heavily Republican-leaning. It may be that the polls did not effectively screen
for non-voters who claimed they would cast a ballot (and this category may have
been disproportionately Democratic). It may be that the underlying Republicanism
of many voters reasserted itself on Election Day, especially with party labels on the
gubernatorial ballot for the first time and a very strong GOP down-ticket that might
have created a “coattail updraft” that benefited Earley (and Katzen). Or it may be
none of these factors. The substantial error opportunities built into the sampling,
interviewing, and polling analysis process may be all the explanation we need—and
yet more warning for us in future campaigns before we take more polls as holy writ.
2001 House of Delegates Elections: A Republican Landside
One of the biggest surprises of election night was the Republican House tide that swept
the GOP to its largest majority ever in the House of Delegates. Having only won majority control of the House two years earlier, with a slim 52-seat margin (53 counting
GOP-leaning Independent Lacey Putney of Bedford), Republicans were jubilant as they
watched their slate capture 64 House berths on November 6. In addition, the two independent winners, Putney and former Democrat Watkins Abbitt, Jr. of Appomattox,
were also viewed as belonging to the GOP conservative camp. This nearly two-thirds
majority was considerably more than House Republican leaders (or anyone else) predicted on election eve. Since the GOP exceeded 55 seats, the “power-sharing” agreement negotiated in 1998 by the two parties was voided, giving the Republicans complete House power for the first time in history.20 It was a stunning reversal of fortune. As
late as 1967, Democrats held 85 of the 100 House seats, and twenty years later, in 1987,
they still held 64. Fourteen years afterwards, the Republicans had flipped that total.
The main explanation of course was redistricting, carried out solely by the GOP
in the legislature for the first time in 2001 (backed up by a Republican governor).
The artfully drawn districts encouraged many senior and junior Democrats to retire,
as discussed in the primary chapter earlier. But there was more to the story than the
GOP’s revenge for past Democratic line-drawing bludgeoning. Under Speaker Vance
Wilkins, the Republicans had long focused on intense, supportive recruitment of
strong candidates. By contrast, Democrats had let their “feeder system” atrophy, leaving many younger Democrats around the state disillusioned and unenthused about
seeking office. This clearly showed in the party slates in 2001. Moreover, Wilkins
20. The GOP never enjoyed a majority of the House of Delegates, even during the Reconstruction
era. For more information on the power sharing agreement of 1998, see: Tyler Whitley, “House Majority
Likely for GOP; Power-Sharing Arrangement in Effect Since 1998 Could End,” Richmond TimesDispatch, October 14, 2001, p. A1.
151
and GOP operatives had used their majority control skillfully to raise money from
most groups and individuals with legislative interests—all of whom knew that, whatever the margin, they would still be dealing with a GOP House come January 2002.
Finally, the underlying conservatism of Virginia voters outside Northern Virginia
and the central cities was on display in the 2001 House results. Mark Warner’s fivepoint victory had no coattails at all for Democratic House candidates, even in suburban and rural locales where he did well. Perhaps GOP attorney general candidate
Jerry Kilgore acted as a kind of “circuit breaker” for coattails as he swept to victory
with a margin far larger than Warner’s.
Forty 2001 House races were not races at all, with 25 Republicans, 14 Democrats,
and independent Putney unopposed. (Thirty-eight of these lucky delegates were
incumbents, while two Republicans, Bill Janis of Goochland and Thomas Gear of
Hampton, had a free November ride after winning intra-party contests.) But among
the sixty opposed House elections, there were four significant incumbent upsets:
Delegate William P. “Billy” Robinson (D-Norfolk), who succeeded his father
and had served twenty years as a leading African American member of the House,
was defeated by Republican Winsome Sears. A conservative Christian and ex-Marine,
Sears had a couple of firsts: the first Republican African American woman ever elected
to the Virginia General Assembly and the first black Republican in modern times to
win in a majority-black district. In addition, Sears is one of the few and possibly only
current black Republican woman to represent a black-majority state legislative district in the country.21 Robinson nearly lost to Republican Michael Ball in 1999, and
in recent years he had been weakened by legal ethics charges and other controversies,
even spending a night in jail just a few days before the 2001 election.22
Delegate James M. Shuler (D-Blacksburg), first elected in 1993, lost to
Republican David Nutter, the public spokesman for Virginia Tech in the newlydrawn 7th district. (Republican redistricting had forced Shuler to change residency
and run in the new district.) In an odd twist of fate, however, Shuler stayed in the
House of Delegates. The death of Senator Emily Couric (D- Charlottesville) on
October 18, 2001 left an opening in the 25th Senatorial district. A special election to
fill the seat was held on December 18, 2001, and Delegate Creigh Deeds (D-Bath),
a ten-year veteran of the House, won in a landslide over Republican Jane Maddux
in the new district. On January 8, 2002, the day before the General Assembly session opened, Shuler defeated Republican Larry Linkous for the House seat vacated
by Deeds with a whopping 71 percent of the votes. Shuler in effect reclaimed the
seat he had held for 8 years. Delegate John H. Tate (D-Tazewell), who had served
3 terms, became the second Democratic casualty in Southwest Virginia, defeated
by Republican C.W. “Bill” Carrico, a former state trooper. Delegate John H. Rust
(R-Fairfax) became the GOP’s only loss of the night. The influential 4-term delegate
succumbed to the combined effects of a moderate-liberal constituency and a determined young foe, Democratic attorney J. Chapman Petersen.
These and other notable House races are listed in Table 5.18. The Republicans
squeezed out plurality victories in two hotly-contested, multi-candidate contests.
In the 96th district, incumbent Republican Melanie Rapp of Yorktown overcame
21. The National Conference of State Legislatures, The Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies, and the National Black Caucus of State Legislators were contacted regarding Sears’ status as
the only African American female Republican representing a majority African American district in the
country. The groups were not sure, but knew that this was a very rare if not unprecedented event.
22. Marc Davis, “Veteran Sees Challenge from Newcomer in 90th,” The Virginian-Pilot, October
29, 2001, p. B1.
152
TABLE 5.18
Selected Results, General Election, Virginia House of Delegates, 2001
Area (District No.)
Candidates
Expenditures
No. of Votes
% of Votes
Tazewell (5)
C. William Carrico (R)+
John H. Tate, Jr. (D)*
Write-Ins
Totals
$85,444
$172,151
11,561
8,072
5
19,633
59%
41%
0%
100%
David A. Nutter (R)+
James M. Shuler (D)*
Write-Ins
Totals
$94,256
$189,308
8,603
7,821
0
16,424
52%
48%
0%
100%
9,959
10,899
13
20,871
48%
52%
0%
100%
3,429
7,529
13
10,971
31%
69%
0%
100%
8,774
7,926
20
16,720
52%
47%
0%
100%
9,038
6,406
10,788
5
26,237
34%
24%
41%
0%
100%
10,451
5,016
1,611
21
26,237
61%
29%
9%
0%
100%
6,696
6,017
4
12,717
53%
47%
0%
100%
8,175
9,888
3,144
208
16
21,431
38%
46%
15%
1%
0%
100%
Roanoke (7)
Fairfax (37)
Fairfax (49)
Petersburg (63)
Richmond (68)
Charles City (74)
Norfolk (90)
York (96)
$257,595
$283,564
John H. Rust, Jr. (R)*
J. Chapman Peterson (D)+
Write-Ins
Totals
$284,203
$166,740
Edgar L. Gonzalez (R)
L. Karen Darner (D)*+
Write-Ins
Totals
$102,879
$49,919
Fenton L. Bland, Jr. (D)+
Rosalyn R Dance (I)
Write-Ins
Totals
$61,321
$54,487
$450,943
$152,798
$115,808
Edward B. Barber (D)
John Conrad (I)
Bradley Marrs (R)+
Write-Ins
Totals
$183,753
$158,632
$217,832
Floyd H. Miles, Sr. (D)+
Terone B. Green (I)
Victor A. Motley, Sr. (I)
Write-Ins
Totals
$55,526
$84,004
$1,555
$560,217
$560,217
Winsome E. Sears (R)+
William P. Robinson, Jr. (D)*
Write-Ins
Totals
$73,946
$149,194
Patrick Pettitt (D)
Melanie Rapp (R)*+
Dick Ashe (I)
Robert L. Stermer III (L)
Write-Ins
Totals
$94,440
$139,440
$29,664
$2,134
$223,140
$265,678
SOURCE: Official election results provided by the State Board of Elections. Expenditures information provided by Virginia Public Access Project.
* indicates incumbent, + indicates winner
153
TABLE 5.19
Candidates by Party, Virginia General Assembly Elections, 1967–1999
DEMOCRATS
Year
Senate
House
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1982
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
38
98
96
96
86
95
92
91
90
85
81
79
77
78
83
78
80
70
66
69
—
39
—
40
—
39
—
—
38
—
36
—
38
—
28
—
24
—
REPUBLICANS
Total %
a
136 (58.4)
96 (60.0)
135 (51.5)
86 (46.7)
135 (60.3)
92 (57.5)
130 (57.0)
90 (54.2)
85 (53.5)
119 (56.4)
79 (55.2)
113 (55.4)
78 (52.3)
121 (51.7)
78 (42.2)
108 (43.5)
70 (43.5)
90 (39.6)
69 (40.1)
Senate
House
21
57
55
72
60
48
53
63
58
66
55
59
53
61
64
77
85
68
72
81
—
26
—
20
—
26
—
—
23
—
23
—
30
—
35
—
33
—
INDEPENDENTS
Total %
a
78 (33.5)
55 (34.4)
98 (37.4
60 (32.6)
68 (30.4)
53 (33.1)
89 (39.0)
58 (34.9)
66 (41.5)
78 (37.0)
59 (41.3)
76 (37.2)
61 (40.9)
94 (40.2)
77 (41.6)
120 (48.4)
68 (42.2)
105 (46.3)
81 (47.1)
Senate
House
Total %a
6
13
9
22
38
12
15
6
18
8
11
5
9
10
11
30
14
23
25
22
19 (8.1)
9 (5.6)
29 (11.1)
38 (20.7)
21 (9.3)
15 (9.4)
9 (3.9)
18 (10.8)
8 (5.0)
14 (6.6)
5 (3.5)
15 (7.4)
10 (6.8)
19 (8.1)
30 (16.2)
20 (8.1)
23 (14.3)
32 (14.1)
22 (12.8)
—
7
—
9
—
3
—
—
3
—
6
—
8
—
6
—
7
—
SOURCE: Compiled from official election results provided by the State Board of Elections.
NOTE: Senate elections are held every four years; thus, no Senate elections occurred in 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001.
a
TABLE 5.20
Re-election Rates, Virginia General
Assembly Elections 1979–2001
Election
Year
House of
Delegates
State
Senate
1979
1981
1982
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
96.6
86.4
88.0
95.9
95.8
93.6
93.5
91.8
96.7
96.7
97.8
97.9
94.0
91.9
154
—
—
97.2
—
89.5
—
78.1
—
81.6
Percent of total number of candidates for each election year.
Democrat Patrick Pettitt (whom she had defeated by 2 percentage points in a
December 2000 special election to replace now- Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis),
Libertarian Robert Stermer, and H.R. “Dick” Ashe, an Independent who described
himself throughout the campaign as a Republican. The feud between Ashe and Rapp
was more than political. Rapp publicly questioned the moral integrity of a man who
was not married to the woman with whom he was living. Ashe, in turn, publicly
pointed out that Rapp is a single adult woman living with her parents, and said that
raised questions about whether she had the experience to play an effective role in
the Assembly.23 Although Ashe won the editorial endorsement from the Daily Press,
Rapp retained her seat by posting 46 percent of the vote.
The retirement of maverick Republican Panny Rhodes (a moderate who
had butted heads with Gilmore throughout her terms in the House and openly
supported Warner in 2001) created an open-seat race in the Richmond-area 68th
district. Republican lawyer Bradley Marrs, Democrat Edward Barber, and Rhodessupported former Richmond Vice-Mayor John Conrad (a Republican who ran as
an Independent) created one of the most widely watched House races of the year.
Endorsed by Gilmore, Marrs ran on a conservative social platform and triumphed
over his more moderate opponents.
Additionally, the GOP almost won a second seat for a Republican-backed
African American woman, Independent Rosalyn Dance of Petersburg. She lost narrowly to Democrat Fenton Bland in a black-majority district. Bland thus succeeded
white Democrat Jay DeBoer, increasing the Legislative Black Caucus in the House
by one new seat. Another African American Democrat, Floyd Miles of Charles City
—
94.9
—
23. Andrew Petkofsky, “96th House Race Offers a Plethora of Candidates,” Richmond TimesDispatch, October 29, 2001, p. B4.
TABLE 5.21
Election Results in Open Seats, Virginia House of Delegates, 2001
District
Defending Party
Winner (Party)
Loser (Party)
Change
14
16
18
20
31
58
60
63
67
68
74
78
86
88
94
97
D
New
D
D
R
R
D
D
R
R
D
R
D
D
D
D
Danny W. Marshall III (R)
Robert Hurt (R)
C.L. Athey Jr. (R)
Chris B. Saxman (R)
L. Scott Lingamfelter (R)
Rob B. Bell III (R)
Clarke N. Hogan (R)
Fenton L. Bland (D)
Gary A. Reese (R)
Bradley Marrs (R)
Floyd H. Miles Sr. (D)
John A. Cosgrove Jr. (R)
Thomas Davis Rust (R)
Mark L. Cole (R)
G. Glenn Oder (R)
Ryan T. McDougle (R)
Joyce E. Glaise (D)
Randy W. Collins (D)
Peter B. Schwartz (D)
Tracy C. Pyles Jr. (D)
Michele D. Krause (D)
Charles S. Martin (D)
Brad J. Wike (D)
Rosalyn R. Dance (I)
Gayla G. Schoenborn (D)
Edward B. Barber (D)
Terone B. Green (I)
JoAnn H. Huskey (D)
James G. Kelly (D)
Wililam L. Jones (D)
John C. Miller (D)
John W. Montgomery Jr. (D)
R
R
R
R
NC
NC
R
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
R
R
R
R
County, easily held the seat of Delelgate Donald McEachin, the party’s losing candidate for state attorney general. Lastly, the Republicans’ attempt to elect a Hispanic
candidate in a new Hispanic-minority “influence district” failed in Northern
Virginia. Incumbent white Democrat Karen Darner of Alexandria easily maintained
her post against Republican Edgar Gonzalez.
Redistricting years usually produce a high number of retirements, and such was
the case in 2001, with 17 delegates voluntarily deciding not to run again. Fully 12 of
these 17 were Democrats, with 208 years of seniority lost in one fell swoop; the remaining 5 were Republicans, with just 36 years of seniority. Of the 83 delegates who
ran for re-election, five were defeated in either the primary or general elections (three
Democrats, two Republicans). This added another 26 years of seniority lost for the
Democrats, and 8 years for the Republicans.24 The total years of seniority drained
from the House of Delegates and its institutional memory in 2001 was 278.
With 78 of the 83 delegates successfully seeking another term at the polls in
2001, the re-election rate was a healthy 94 percent. As Table 5.20 indicates, this rate
is actually lower than most election years but higher than the three previous redistricting years of 1981, 1982, and 1991.
Most of the change in the House of Delegates in 2001 came not from incumbent defeats but from “open seats” where no incumbent was running. As Table 5.21
indicates, the sixteen open seats were fertile ground for the Republicans, who won
nine of them. The other seven seats did not change party hands (with Republicans
winning five of those, too).
Table 5.23 demonstrates that the House membership turnover in 2001 (22)
was almost the same as in two previous redistricting years (1991—21, and 1981—
23). But the turnover was far less than in the tumultuous redistricting years of 1965
(35) and 1971 (38). As usual, the more populous urban areas, with far more seats, lost
more delegates in turnover than the rural areas; in 2001, sixteen new urban delegates
were elected, compared with just six new rural delegates. Hampton Roads, Southside,
24. Delegate Jim Shuler, an eight-year veteran of the House, was defeated in the November election for the 7th district, but won a special election on January 8, 2002 and returned to the House,
representing the 12th district. His service is not included in the number of years seniority lost to defeat
and retirement.
155
TABLE 5.22
Party Representation, Virginia General Assembly, 1967–2001
Democrats
Republicans
Independents
Year
Senate No.
House No.
Senate No.
House No.
House No.
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1982
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
34
33
33
34
35
34
31
31
31
32
32
30
30
22
22
20
20
19
18
85
75
73
65
78
76
74
66
65
65
65
64
59
58
52
52
51
47
34
6
7
7
6
5
6
9
9
9
8
8
10
10
18
18
20
20
21
22
14
24
24
20
17
21
25
33
34
34
33
35
39
34
47
47
48
52
64
1
1
3
15
5
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
TABLE 5.23
Membership Turnover, Virginia General Assembly, 1965–2001
Number of New Members in the General Assembly
SENATE
HOUSE
ENTIRE ASSEMBLY
Year
Urban
Rural
Total
Urban
Rural
Total
Urban
Rural
Total
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1982
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
1
5
—
9
—
5
—
3
—
—
3
—
5
—
10
—
7
—
3
—
9
4
—
8
—
5
—
3
—
—
2
—
1
—
5
—
2
—
0
—
10
9
—
17
—
10
—
6
—
—
5
—
6
—
15
—
9
—
3
—
14
5
17
20
16
12
14
11
15
12
6
5
6
21
6
9
18
7
3
4
4
8
7
0
3
6
6
5
7
3
2
4
6
35
11
26
68
23
15
18
15
23
19
6
8
12
14
21
13
8
9
8
22
15
20
17
29
16
17
14
14
15
12
9
5
11
8
26
6
12
7
7
16
30
10
9
26
7
8
4
7
8
7
2
3
7
6
10
7
5
2
4
6
45
30
26
55
23
25
18
21
23
19
11
8
18
14
36
13
17
9
11
22
16
6
5
7
4
16
and the Richmond area accounted for fifteen of the new delegates, with Northern
Virginia and the Southwest adding three each.
Most observers can only marvel at the remarkable performance of the GOP
in the House races. In the mid-1970s the Republicans were kept to 28 percent to 29
percent of the statewide vote (considering all 100 House races together). By contrast,
156
in every one of the five consecutive General Assembly elections beginning in 1993,
the Republicans have achieved an absolute majority of the statewide legislative vote,
with their largest proportion in history (55.5 percent) recorded in 2001. Again for
the first time ever, Democrats were pushed below the 40 percent mark in 2001 (39.1
percent). Independents secured 5 percent of the total vote. Considering only the
fifty-one party-contested districts in 2001, the Republicans also hit a new high in the
proportion of total votes cast (52.9 percent) and the Democrats sunk to a new low
(45.6 percent).
Women and Minorities
The 2001 election saw the number of female legislators in the House remain the
same (15), with all 14 incumbent women running for re-election holding their seats.
The only change in membership was the retirement of moderate Republican Panny
Rhodes of Richmond, and the addition of African American Republican Winsome
Sears in the Norfolk-area 90th. Of the 15 female delegates, seven are Democrats, and
eight belong to the GOP. With the seven women who serve in the Senate of Virginia
(all Democrats), the 22 total female legislators comprise 15.7 percent of the General
Assembly.25
The number of African American delegates increased by one in 2001, raising
the total to ten. Two prominent black legislators left the General Assembly, each
for different reasons—Delegate Donald McEachin, a six-year veteran of the House,
retired from his seat to pursue (unsuccessfully) the position of Attorney General,
and Delegate Billy Robinson of Norfolk (as discussed in the previous section) was
defeated soundly in his bid for an eleventh term. Both delegates were replaced by
African Americans: Democrat Floyd Miles of Charles City won in the 74th (where
25. The 15 women serving in the Virginia House of Delegates following in the 2002 session
were:
Name
Party District
Kristin Amundson
D
Mount Vernon—44
Viola Baskerville
D
Richmond—71
Kathy Byron
R
Lynchburg—22
Mary Christian
D
Hampton—92
Flora Davis Crittenden
D
Newport News—95
Karen Darner
D
Arlington—49
Jeannemarie Devolites
R
Vienna—35
Thelma Drake
R
Norfolk—87
Michèle McQuigg
R
Woodbridge—51
Melanie Rapp
R
Yorktown—96
Winsome Sears
R
Norfolk—90
Beverly Sherwood
R
Winchester—29
Terrie Suit
R
Virginia Beach—81
Marian Van Landingham D
Alexandria—45
Vivian Watts
D
Annandale—39
The 7 women serving in the Senate of Virginia in the 2002 session were:
Name
Party District
Leslie Byrne
D
Falls Church—34
Janet Howell
D
Reston—32
Louise Lucas
D
Portsmouth—18
Yvonne Miller
D
Norfolk—5
Linda Puller
D
Mount Vernon—36
Patsy Ticer
D
Alexandria—30
Mary Margaret Whipple D
Arlington—31
157
TABLE 5.24
Membership Turnover by Regional Areas, Virginia General Assembly, 1965–2001
Election Year
Regional Area
Northern Virginia
Piedmont
Northern Neck &
Eastern Shore
Richmond
Hampton Roads
Tidewater (minus
Hampton Roads)
Southside
Southwest
Western
Shenandoah Valley
1965* 1967* 1969 1971* 1973 1975* 1977 1979* 1981 1982 1983* 1985 1987* 1989 1991* 1993 1995* 1997 1999* 2001
4
1
3
2
11
1
9
3
4
2
7
0
7
3
7
0
8
2
2
2
3
1
2
0
3
1
2
1
10
3
2
0
4
2
2
1
4
1
3
1
3
4
7
1
5
10
0
3
3
0
5
10
2
3
4
0
5
4
2
3
1
1
0
5
1
3
2
1
4
2
0
2
3
0
0
3
0
2
5
0
3
1
1
4
7
0
1
2
0
1
3
1
1
2
1
0
3
0
4
6
2
6
10
1
7
0
4
2
2
1
2
3
3
0
0
1
10
7
5
4
2
1
1
2
1
0
2
2
1
4
0
2
0
0
0
1
3
1
2
1
0
3
2
1
1
0
2
4
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
0
0
1
0
3
3
0
1
0
2
4
1
0
1
4
1
3
2
0
2
4
1
1
0
2
2
0
3
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
5
3
0
0
NOTE: For an exact measure of the regional areas used in this table, see the author’s Aftermath of Armageddon: An Analysis of the 1973 Virginia Gubernatorial Election (Charlottesville: Institute of Government, 1975), Figure 1.
Starred (*) election years are those in which members of both the Senate and House of Delegates were elected.
Unstarred election years are those in which only members of the House of Delegates were elected.
he faced two other black candidates in the open-seat race), and Republican Winsome
Sears defeated Robinson in the 90th. The other new African American legislator is
Democrat Fenton Bland of Petersburg, who narrowly overcame a tough challenge
from Independent Rosalyn Dance (also an African American who had GOP support) to replace the retiring Jay DeBoer. In addition to the ten African Americans in
the House, there are five African American senators, raising the total of black legislators to 15, or 10.7 percent of the General Assembly.26
In an interesting note, much was made in the press during the redistricting session
of the new majority-minority district drawn in Northern Virginia. The 49th House
district was adjusted to include portions of Arlington, Alexandria, and Fairfax, and
was approximately 41 percent Hispanic. The GOP nominated Salvadoran-American
businessman Edgar Gonzalez, who was recruited by Speaker Vance Wilkins and publicly supported by Congressman Tom Davis and Delegates Jeannemarie Devolites
26. The 10 African Americans serving in the Virginia House of Delegates in the 2002 session
were:
Name
Party District
Viola Baskerville
D
Richmond—71
Fenton Bland
D
Petersburg—63
Mary Christian
D
Hampton—92
Flora Davis Crittenden D
Newport News—95
Dwight Jones
D
Richmond—70
Jerrauld Jones
D
Norfolk—89
Kenneth Melvin
D
Portsmouth—80
Floyd Miles
D
Richmond—74
Winsome Sears
R
Norfolk—90
Lionell Spruill
D
Chesapeake—70
The 5 African Americans serving in the Senate of Virginia in the 2002 session were:
Name
Party District
Benjamin Lambert
D
Richmond—9
Louise Lucas
D
Portsmouth—18
Henry Marsh
D
Richmond—16
Henry Maxwell
D
Newport News—2
Yvonne Miller
D
Norfolk—5
158
TABLE 5.25
Vote by Parties, Virginia General Assembly Elections, 1967–1999
PERCENT OF VOTE
STATEWIDE
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1982
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
STATEWIDE
Democratic
Republican
Independents
Write-ins
Totals
60.0
37.1
2.8
0.1
100.0
58.6
34.6
6.8
0.0
100.0
55.9
31.7
12.4
0.0
100.0
66.9
28.1
4.9
0.1
100.0
66.6
29.7
3.7
0.0
100.0
62.0
36.5
1.5
0.0
100.0
59.6
36.5
3.9
0.0
100.0
56.9
40.8
2.2
0.9
100.0
61.5
36.1
2.4
0.0
100.0
58.3
39.5
2.1
0.1
100.0
59.9
35.8
4.2
0.1
100.0
52.6
44.8
2.4
0.2
100.0
54.3
42.1
3.4
0.2
100.0
44.6
51.2
4.2
0.0
100.0
44.3
53.0
2.5
0.2
100.0
44.9
50.7
3.9
0.5
100.0
40.7
54.9
3.8
0.5
100.0
39.1
55.5
5.0
0.4
100.0
PARTY CONTESTS
Democratic
Republican
Independents
Write-ins
Totals
56.9
39.9
3.2
0.0
100.0
55.3
37.1
7.6
0.0
100.0
54.6
32.6
12.8
0.0
100.0
57.3
40.0
2.7
0.0
100.0
61.8
36.2
2.0
0.0
100.0
56.3
43.4
0.3
0.0
100.0
51.9
46.6
1.5
0.0
100.0
52.6
46.8
0.5
0.1
100.0
54.4
45.0
0.6
0.0
100.0
54.0
45.9
0.1
0.0
100.0
52.8
46.3
0.9
0.0
100.0
50.3
49.3
0.3
0.1
100.0
47.6
49.6
2.7
0.1
100.0
48.5
50.0
1.8
0.0
100.0
51.4
48.1
0.4
0.1
100.0
49.0
49.7
1.2
0.1
100.0
46.7
52.1
1.2
0.1
100.1
45.6
52.9
1.5
0.1
100.1
NOTE: Totals may exceed 100 percent due to rounding error.
TABLE 5.26
Campaign Spending, Virginia House of Delegates, 2001 Elections
Total Campaign Expenditures
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (PARTY-CONTESTED DISTRICTS ONLY; N = 51)
Democrats
Republicans
Independents/Others
TOTAL
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (ALL DISTRICTS; N = 100)
Democrats
Republicans
Independents/Others
TOTAL
Percent of Expenditures
$4,242,976
$5,291,701
$214,398
$9,749,075
43.5
54.3
2.2
100.0
$5,279,739
$7,520,245
$563,825
$13,363,809
39.5
56.3
4.2
100.0
SOURCE: Official Election results provided by the Virginia Public Access Project.
and Jack Rust.27 On Election Day, however, the overwhelmingly Democratic nature
of the district prevailed, as incumbent Democrat Karen Darner won in a landslide.
Campaign Finance: Statewide Campaigns
Campaign money flowed like mother’s milk in 2001, as the grand total for all statewide candidates on the November ballot topped an incredible $39 million—a 59
percent increase over the $25 million spent in 1997. The Warner-Earley race accounted for $31.4 million of the total, a 77 percent increase over 1997 (see Table
5.26). Warner outspent Earley by close to two-to-one, $19.9 million to $11.5 million. Earley was no laggard, spending over a million dollars more than Jim Gilmore
did to win the governorship four years earlier (though Earley had a contest for the
nomination and Gilmore did not). But Warner essentially tripled the money spent
by the Democratic nominees for governor in 1989, 1993, and 1997. Warner’s bulging
27. Ann O’Hanlon, “GOP Picks Gonzalez to Run in 49th,” Washington Post, July 22, 2001,
p. C1.
159
TABLE 5.27
Campaign Spending in Virginia Statewide Elections, 1981–2001
1981
1985
Percent
Change
from 1981
$2,336,000
$2,829,000
$5,165,000
$4,206,000
$3,927,000
$8,133,000
80%
39%
58%
$6,861,000
$9,270,000
$16,131,000
63%
14%
98%
$6,505,000
$5,467,000
$11,972,000
–5%
–41%
–26%
$7,333,057
$10,343,516
$17,676,573
13%
89%
48%
$19,881,944
$11,468,273
$31,350,217
171%
11%
77%
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
Democrat
$339,000
Republican
$341,000
Total
$680,000
$696,000
$882,000
$1,578,000
105%
159%
132%
$2,554,000
$1,429,000
$3,983,00
267%
62%
152%
$1,917,000
$1,543,000
$3,460,000
–25%
8%
–13%
$2,196,408
$2,177,706
$4,374,114
15%
41%
26%
$2,695,350
$1,354,075
$4,049,425
23%
–38%
–7%
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Democrat
$380,000
Republican
$647,000
Total
$1,027,000
Grand Total $6,872,000
$1,318,000
$938,000
$2,256,000
$11,967,000
247%
45%
120%
74%
$1,359,000
$478,000
$1,837,000
$21,951,000
3%
49%
–19%
83%
$1,272,000
$1,161,000
$2,433,000
$17,865,000
–6%
143%
32%
–19%
$1,070,793
$1,472,170
$2,542,962
$24,593,649
–16%
27%
5%
38%
$1,638,589
$2,151,966
$3,790,555
$39,190,197
53%
46%
49%
59%
GOVERNOR
Democrat
Republican
Total
TABLE 5.28
Money Spent Per Vote, Virginia
Statewide Elections, 2001
Candidate
Money Spent Per
Vote Received
Warner
Earley
Kaine
Katzen
McEachin
Kilgore
$20.20
$12.93
$2.91
$1.53
$2.23
$1.94
TABLE 5.29
Expenditures for Television and Radio,
Virginia Statewide Candidates, 2001
Candidate
Amount
Spent
Percent of
Overall
Spending
Warner (D)
Earley (R)
Kaine (D)
Katzen (R)
Kilgore (R)
McEachin (D)
$10,293,163
$6,682,802
$1,180,952
$268,153
$1,145,928
$479,754
52
58
44
20
53
29
SOURCE: Figures provided by the Virginia Public Access
Project.
NOTE: These are not self-reported numbers, but VPAP’s
best interpretation of expenditure information provided
by each candidate.
160
1989
Percent
Change
from 1985
1993
Percent
Change
from 1989
1997
Percent
Change
from 1993
2001
Percent
Change
from 1997
war chest was enhanced further once the non-overlapping expenditures for his separate campaign committees, Victory 2001 ($4.8 million) and Virginians for Warner
($845,000) were added in28 (see Table 5.31). This grand total of $22.5 million is the
largest amount ever spent by a candidate for statewide office in Virginia; the runnerup was unsuccessful Republican U.S. Senate nominee Oliver North in 1994 ($19.8
million). Overall, Warner expended $20.20 per vote received, or if the two other
major Warner committees are added in, an astounding $22.89 per vote. Earley’s more
modest, and losing, allotment per vote was $12.93.
Warner had been a big spender once before, in his unsuccessful bid for the
U.S. Senate in 1996, when he spent $11.5 million to incumbent U.S. Senator John
Warner’s $2.7 million. However, in that campaign, Mark Warner had supplied fully
90 percent of his total from his own enormous $200 million personal fortune. In
2001, the Democrat played a smarter game, one made possible by the very real prospect of his victory throughout the campaign as well as his determination to get large
and small donors to put some skin in his game. Out of his $19.9 million total spent
by the Warner for Governor campaign in 2001, he supplied “only” $4.7 million from
his own bank account; fully 76.4 percent of his total was contributed by other people,
most of them of more modest means. This is unusual human behavior, since few give
willingly to multimillionaires, but Warner’s campaign ran an aggressive outreach to
Democrats hungry for a victory and Independents hoping for a piece of the winner’s
action. Warner received donations from approximately 20,172 people since January
2000. Earley, by contrast, had far fewer financial supporters: 12,457 donors gave to
the Republican nominee.29
28. Gross total spending by Warner for Governor, Virginians for Warner, and Victory 2001 was
$25,573,068. Minus transfers between the committees (Virginians for Warner donated $809,715 to
the campaign committee, and the campaign committee donated $2.2 million to Victory 2001), the net
spending on behalf of Mark Warner totaled $22,523,853. Source: David Poole of the Virginia Public
Access Project.
29. Figures provided by David Poole of the Virginia Public Access Project. The numbers are
probably slightly off because (1) small donors would be double-counted if they gave more than one
donation, and (2) a single donor can give under various names—his individual name and any number
of companies.
Warner effectively sanitized his campaign from the taint of labor money by
directing almost all organized labor contributions to the joint party committee,
Victory 2001. The labor donations to the Warner efforts totaled $1.3 million, with
Warner for Governor taking in $120,595 and Victory 2001 accepting $1,208,159.30
Victory 2001 reported paying 2,740 individuals a total of $352,151 for
GOTV-related expenses. Most of these people were “flushers” in majority black districts, a common practice used by many Democratic candidates. In addition, Victory
2001 paid companies another $448,676 in GOTV-related expenses, including food
($8,850 worth of in-kind Election Day meals from Golden Corral in Virginia Beach)
and phones ($400,000 to Landmark Strategies).31
Interestingly, Mark Earley also had paid flushers, though on a much smaller
scale: Earley reported paying 530 individuals a total of $35,465 for GOTV-related
expenses on his latest report. Table 5.32 shows a similar breakdown for Earley’s campaign, including flushers in rock-solid Republican localities in Chesterfield, Virginia
Beach, Hanover, and Chesapeake, Earley’s hometown. Earley won all four, but
Chesapeake and Virginia Beach voted for him by disappointing margins.
The spending for lieutenant governor and attorney general in 2001 was much
closer to past practice. The total for the No. 2 office actually declined 7 percent from
1997, mainly because the Republican nominee, Jay Katzen, spent just $1.4 million—38 percent less than John Hager had spent four years earlier. Despite his repeated private pleas for assistance, Katzen was unable to get much if any help from national Republican Party committees such as the RNC, chaired by Governor Gilmore.
Within a short time after his narrow defeat on November 6, an unhappy Katzen
was on the phone to some well-connected members of the RNC, informing them
of Gilmore’s actions and urging that he be fired as RNC chairman. Whether this effort had any real impact on Gilmore’s late-November resignation as party chairman
is unknown. Meanwhile, Democrat Kaine was raising and spending $2.7 million, a
23 percent gain over L.F. Payne, the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor in
1997. Kaine had a hotly contested primary, of course, while Payne (and Katzen) were
unopposed in the end for their respective party nominations. Still, Kaine undeniably
outspent Katzen in the general election period. Kaine’s per-vote total was $2.91 to
Katzen’s $1.53.
Donald McEachin had a tough primary in 2001, too, while his GOP opponent
Jerry Kilgore was unopposed for the Republican nod. Yet Kilgore outspent McEachin
$2.2 million to $1.6 million. The 2001 race cost half again as much as the contest in
1997, and McEachin’s votes cost $2.23 apiece to Kilgore’s $1.94.
All three statewide winners spent more than their opponents on television and
radio. Warner spent $10.3 million in this fashion to Earley’s $6.7 million—though
as a proportion of his campaign spending, this was just 52 percent of Warner’s budget
but 58 percent of Earley’s. Kaine massively outspent Katzen for broadcast advertising, $1.2 million to $268,000. Kilgore’s margin over McEachin was almost as large,
$1.2 million to $480,000. Incredibly, Katzen devoted only 20 percent of his budget
to TV and radio, and McEachin just 29 percent. By contrast, Kaine allocated 44 percent and Kilgore 53 percent of their respective budgets to electronic ads.
Direct mail consumed a much smaller percentage of all six war chests, between
4 percent for Kilgore to 11 percent for Kaine. As for every major category of expenditure, Warner spent the most absolute dollars among all the candidates, over $1.6
million.
TABLE 5.30
Expenditures for Direct Mail, Virginia
Statewide Candidates, 2001
Candidate
Amount
Spent
Percent of
Overall
Spending
Warner (D)
Earley (R)
Kaine (D)
Katzen (R)
Kilgore (R)
McEachin (D)
$1,648,180
$413,721
$290,853
$125,406
$84,852
$131,907
8
6
11
9
4
8
SOURCE: Figures provided by the Virginia Public Access
Project.
NOTE: These are not self-reported numbers, but VPAP’s
best interpretation of expenditure information provided
by each candidate.
TABLE 5.31
Spending by Mark Warner’s Campaign
and Related Committees, 2001
Committee
Warner for Governor
Virginians for Warner
Victory 2001
Gross Total Spent
Net Spending
Amount Spent
$19,881,944
$845,409
$4,845,715
$25,573,068
$22,523,853
SOURCE: Virginia Public Access Project
NOTE: The difference between “Gross Total Spent” and “Net
Spending” results from the fact that Virginians for Warner
donated $809,715 to the Warner for Governor campaign
committee, and the Warner for Governor campaign committee transferred $2.2 million to Victory 2001.
30. Figures provided by David Poole of the Virginia Public Access Project.
31. Ibid.
161
TABLE 5.32
Get-Out-The-Vote Expenses, Virginia Gubernatorial Candidates, 2001
Locality
Number of Paid Flushers
Total Spent
Victory 2001 (Warner (D))
Richmond
Norfolk
Hampton
Roanoke
Portsmouth
Petersburg
Newport News
Lynchburg
Chesapeake
Total
843
351
310
295
226
221
208
147
139
2740
$95,764
$28,597
$23,260
$22,507
$18,978
$23,000
$15,350
$7,474
$11,445
$352,151
Earley (R)
Virginia Beach
Chesapeake
Mechanicsville (Hanover Co.)
Midlothian (Chesterfield Co.)
Other
Total
212
101
87
76
54
530
$10,285
$5,040
$4,350
$3,375
$12,469
$23,050
Campaign Finance: House of Delegates Campaigns
Nearly $13.4 million was spent by all candidates running for the House of Delegates
in 2001. When added to the $39.2 million spent by the six statewide candidates, the
total campaign expenditure for Virginia’s general election candidates was a staggering
$53 million.
The House Republicans outspent the Democrats by close to the same margin
of votes they secured in the 2001 elections: $7.5 million for the Republicans to $5.3
million for the Democrats, or 56.3 percent to 39.5 percent. When looking only at the
51 party-contested House contests, the GOP candidates outspent the Democrats by
a slightly smaller percentage, 54.3 percent to 43.5 percent (see Table 5.25).
It is important to note that as impressive as the $13.4 million in total 2001
House expenditures is, it actually represents a drop of 22 percent from the total of
just two years ago. In 1999 the House candidates in all 100 districts spent $16.4 million. The retirement of so many senior incumbent Democrats and the reduction in
competition that came with redistricting may account for the “missing” $3 million
in 2001.
Similarly, the average expenditure for a major-party candidate in a partycontested House district in 2001 was $93,474, a 44 percent decrease from the average
1999 expenditure of $167,020.
The Arrogance of Power
The late U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) wrote a book in 1966 about
the disastrous U.S. involvement in Vietnam, entitled The Arrogance of Power. In the
volume, the veteran legislator who had worked closely with several presidents and
dozens of Cabinet officials described the headiness of power, and the fateful,
162
self-destructive arrogance that sooner or later comes from its full exercise. Virginia’s
modern political history is yet one more example of Fulbright’s axiom.
In 1969, Virginia awoke from a long one-party slumber and threw out the ruling Democrats, electing a young Republican named Linwood Holton to the governorship to replace a six-decade-old oligarchy. The GOP then flourished for twelve
years, installing two more governors, a lieutenant governor, an attorney general, a
U.S. senator, and nine of ten U.S. representatives. Greater power led to GOP factionalism and internal strife, not dissimilar to that which plagued the Democrats in
the 1960s. So in 1981 the Democrats roared back to power in a sweep of top state
offices led by a young, handsome ex-Marine, Charles S. Robb, son-in-law of President
Lyndon B. Johnson. Two more sweeps ensued in 1985 and 1989, and Democrats
began to think the old party order, with a new moderate twist, had been restored. Yet
as if on cue, the arrogance of power re-emerged, and brawls among the Democrats
(Robb, Wilder, and others) became headline staples. A little known and lightly regarded former state legislator and one-year congressman, George F. Allen, became the
giant-killer in 1993, easily dispatching the Democrats’ governor-in-waiting, former
Attorney General Mary Sue Terry. Over the next seven years the Democrats seemed
to fall apart as the Republicans secured every office not absolutely nailed down by
their opponents. The 1990s, like the 1970s, were a Republican “dream come true.”
Just as in 1981, though, the dream turned sour for the GOP, thanks to the arrogance of a Republican-engineered budget impasse, intense party factionalism, and
a disastrous campaign with no sense of mission or purpose other than holding power.
Thus, a Democratic period of power (or power-sharing) has begun anew. Its precise
duration is not yet known, but the arrogance of power will have something to do
with its length. Which party will demonstrate more internal factionalism over time?
Will Democratic executive power generate more excesses than Republican legislative
power, or the reverse? One thing is certain: the voters will remain alert, in charge, and
appropriately vengeful. One would think the parties would learn this lesson over time,
but it is probably not in the nature of power or the ambitious individuals who seek
and gain high office. Virginia’s electorate asserts itself at regular intervals to restore
balance and competition between the parties. Its recurrent message is a welcome and
audible echo of the Commonwealth’s time-tested motto, Sic Semper Tyrannis (“Thus
Ever to Tyrants”)—both the real kind, King George III, and the aspiring sort, namely
parties that arrogantly believe they have a divine right to govern. ★
163
APPENDIX 8
General Election for Governor, November 6, 2001
M. L. Earley (R)
LOCALITY
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
STATE
CITIES
Alexandria
Bedford (City)
Bristol
Buena Vista
Charlottesville
Chesapeake
Colonial Heights
Covington
Danville
Emporia
Fairfax (City)
Falls Church
Franklin
Fredericksburg
Galax
Hampton
Harrisonburg
Hopewell
Lexington
Lynchburg
Manassas Park
Manassas
Martinsville
Newport News
Norfolk
Norton
Petersburg
Poquoson
Portsmouth
Radford
Richmond (City)
Roanoke (City)
Salem
Staunton
Suffolk
Va. Beach
Waynesboro
Williamsburg
Winchester
COUNTIES
Accomack
Albemarle
Alleghany
Amelia
Amherst
Appomattox
Arlington
Augusta
Bath
Bedford (Co.)
1,886,721
557,801
34,802
1,813
4,458
1,455
9,306
52,633
5,473
1,709
13,730
1,535
6,724
3,985
2,222
4,456
1,605
32,392
6,468
4,994
1,629
17,568
1,494
6,543
4,132
37,422
43,293
1,144
8,559
4,171
26,374
3,183
48,537
24,699
8,175
6,437
17,181
93,890
4,911
2,566
6,133
1,328,920
7,374
26,428
5,118
3,565
8,266
4,420
52,719
17,974
1,553
19,547
887,234
234,326
10,810
747
2,268
572
2,316
28,328
3,660
597
6,150
616
3,203
1,326
781
1,679
733
11,592
3,334
2,435
552
8,132
790
3,520
1,346
15,920
14,741
366
1,509
2,656
8,922
1,280
12,432
9,147
4,042
3,256
7,996
49,800
2,777
1,067
2,928
652,910
3,575
11,143
2,044
1,880
4,031
2,090
16,214
11,133
721
11,298
164
M. R. Warner (D)
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
47.0%
42.0%
31.1%
41.2%
50.9%
39.3%
24.9%
53.8%
66.9%
34.9%
44.8%
40.1%
47.6%
33.3%
35.1%
37.7%
45.7%
35.8%
51.5%
48.8%
33.9%
46.3%
52.9%
53.8%
32.6%
42.5%
34.0%
32.0%
17.6%
63.7%
33.8%
40.2%
25.6%
37.0%
49.4%
50.6%
46.5%
53.0%
56.5%
41.6%
47.7%
49.1%
48.5%
42.2%
39.9%
52.7%
48.8%
47.3%
30.8%
61.9%
46.4%
57.8%
–5.0%
–16.0%
–5.8%
3.8%
–7.7%
–22.1%
6.8%
19.8%
–12.1%
–2.2%
–6.9%
0.6%
–13.8%
–11.9%
–9.3%
–1.4%
–11.2%
4.5%
1.7%
–13.1%
–0.7%
5.9%
6.8%
–14.5%
–4.5%
–13.0%
–15.0%
–29.4%
16.7%
–13.2%
–6.8%
–21.4%
–10.0%
2.4%
3.6%
–0.5%
6.0%
9.5%
–5.4%
0.7%
2.1%
1.5%
–4.9%
–7.1%
5.7%
1.7%
0.3%
–16.3%
14.9%
–0.6%
10.8%
26.4%
1.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
3.2%
0.4%
0.1%
0.7%
0.1%
0.4%
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
1.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.9%
0.1%
0.4%
0.2%
1.8%
1.7%
0.0%
0.2%
0.3%
1.0%
0.1%
1.4%
1.0%
0.5%
0.4%
0.9%
5.6%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
73.6%
0.4%
1.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.5%
0.2%
1.8%
1.3%
0.1%
1.3%
984,177
319,384
23,739
1,031
2,166
853
6,781
24,087
1,758
1,071
7,346
912
3,478
2,623
1,434
2,717
866
20,627
3,083
2,467
1,053
9,314
691
2,992
2,769
21,318
28,244
773
7,018
1,489
17,336
1,876
35,558
15,348
4,067
3,141
9,124
43,495
2,109
1,475
3,155
664,793
3,710
14,891
3,018
1,665
4,198
2,268
35,990
6,673
804
8,035
52.2%
57.3%
68.2%
56.9%
48.6%
58.6%
72.9%
45.8%
32.1%
62.7%
53.5%
59.4%
51.7%
65.8%
64.5%
61.0%
54.0%
63.7%
47.7%
49.4%
64.6%
53.0%
46.3%
45.7%
67.0%
57.0%
65.2%
67.6%
82.0%
35.7%
65.7%
58.9%
73.3%
62.1%
49.7%
48.8%
53.1%
46.3%
42.9%
57.5%
51.4%
50.0%
50.3%
56.3%
59.0%
46.7%
50.8%
51.3%
68.3%
37.1%
51.8%
41.1%
5.1%
16.0%
4.7%
–3.6%
6.5%
20.7%
–6.4%
–20.0%
10.5%
1.3%
7.3%
–0.4%
13.7%
12.4%
8.8%
1.8%
11.5%
–4.5%
–2.8%
12.5%
0.9%
–5.9%
–6.4%
14.9%
4.8%
13.1%
15.4%
29.8%
–16.5%
13.6%
6.8%
21.1%
10.0%
–2.4%
–3.4%
0.9%
–5.8%
–9.2%
5.3%
–0.7%
–2.1%
–1.9%
4.2%
6.8%
–5.5%
–1.4%
–0.9%
16.1%
–15.0%
–0.4%
–11.1%
32.5%
2.4%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
0.7%
2.4%
0.2%
0.1%
0.7%
0.1%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
2.1%
0.3%
0.3%
0.1%
0.9%
0.1%
0.3%
0.3%
2.2%
2.9%
0.1%
0.7%
0.2%
1.8%
0.2%
3.6%
1.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.9%
4.4%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
67.5%
0.4%
1.5%
0.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
3.7%
0.7%
0.1%
0.8%
APPENDIX 8
General Election for Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued)
M. L. Earley (R)
LOCALITY
Bland
Botetourt
Brunswick
Buchanan
Buckingham
Campbell
Caroline
Carroll
Charles City
Charlotte
Chesterfield
Clarke
Craig
Culpeper
Cumberland
Dickenson
Dinwiddie
Essex
Fairfax (Co.)
Fauquier
Floyd
Fluvanna
Franklin
Frederick
Giles
Gloucester
Goochland
Grayson
Greene
Greensville
Halifax
Hanover
Henrico
Henry
Highland
Isle of Wright
James City
King and Queen
King George
King William
Lancaster
Lee
Loudon
Louisa
Lunenberg
Madison
Mathews
Mecklenburg
Middlesex
Montgomery
M. R. Warner (D)
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
1,734
10,602
4,350
5,706
3,997
15,743
5,902
7,830
2,391
4,287
80,598
3,727
1,825
8,849
2,632
4,763
6,836
2,651
269,014
16,472
4,493
6,630
13,996
16,499
5,432
9,196
6,537
5,371
3,944
2,709
10,051
30,691
81,903
16,085
1,110
9,471
17,251
2,074
4,291
3,929
4,432
5,484
45,609
7,902
3,652
3,992
3,265
7,541
3,692
20,034
888
5,872
1,491
1,921
1,601
8,366
2,274
4,481
631
2,014
46,160
1,851
887
5,054
1,255
1,837
3,202
1,203
120,799
9,420
2,331
3,425
6,703
9,947
2,276
5,010
3,394
2,824
2,244
841
4,366
18,757
39,215
5,942
568
4,708
8,654
872
2,151
1,960
2,373
2,536
24,372
3,568
1,634
2,121
1,712
3,898
1,861
8,639
51.2%
55.4%
34.3%
33.7%
40.1%
53.1%
38.5%
57.2%
26.4%
47.0%
57.3%
49.7%
48.6%
57.1%
47.7%
38.6%
46.8%
45.4%
44.9%
57.2%
51.9%
51.7%
47.9%
60.3%
41.9%
54.5%
51.9%
52.6%
56.9%
31.0%
43.4%
61.1%
47.9%
36.9%
51.2%
49.7%
50.2%
42.0%
50.1%
49.9%
53.5%
46.2%
53.4%
45.2%
44.7%
53.1%
52.4%
51.7%
50.4%
43.1%
4.2%
8.4%
–12.7%
–13.4%
–7.0%
6.1%
–8.5%
10.2%
–20.6%
–0.0%
10.2%
2.6%
1.6%
10.1%
0.7%
–8.5%
–0.2%
–1.6%
–2.1%
10.2%
4.9%
4.6%
0.9%
13.3%
–5.1%
7.5%
4.9%
5.6%
9.9%
–16.0%
–3.6%
14.1%
0.9%
–10.1%
4.1%
2.7%
3.1%
–5.0%
3.1%
2.9%
6.5%
–0.8%
6.4%
–1.9%
–2.3%
6.1%
5.4%
4.7%
3.4%
–3.9%
0.1%
0.7%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.9%
0.3%
0.5%
0.1%
0.2%
5.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.6%
0.1%
0.2%
0.4%
0.1%
13.6%
1.1%
0.3%
0.4%
0.8%
1.1%
0.3%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.1%
0.5%
2.1%
4.4%
0.7%
0.1%
0.5%
1.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
2.7%
0.4%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
1.0%
835
4,629
2,840
3,746
2,364
7,187
3,590
3,309
1,747
2,202
33,810
1,839
918
3,721
1,315
2,907
3,578
1,436
146,537
6,952
2,093
3,118
7,182
6,433
3,071
4,116
3,091
2,507
1,644
1,859
5,506
11,713
42,089
9,872
533
4,727
8,505
1,188
2,110
1,942
2,025
2,923
20,907
4,244
1,996
1,794
1,516
3,519
1,757
11,154
48.2%
43.7%
65.3%
65.7%
59.1%
45.7%
60.8%
42.3%
73.1%
51.4%
41.9%
49.3%
50.3%
42.0%
50.0%
61.0%
52.3%
54.2%
54.5%
42.2%
46.6%
47.0%
51.3%
39.0%
56.5%
44.8%
47.3%
46.7%
41.7%
68.6%
54.8%
38.2%
51.4%
61.4%
48.0%
49.9%
49.3%
57.3%
49.2%
49.4%
45.7%
53.3%
45.8%
53.7%
54.7%
44.9%
46.4%
46.7%
47.6%
55.7%
–4.0%
–8.5%
13.1%
13.5%
7.0%
–6.5%
8.7%
–9.9%
20.9%
–0.8%
–10.2%
–2.8%
–1.9%
–10.1%
–2.2%
8.9%
0.2%
2.0%
2.3%
–10.0%
–5.6%
–5.1%
–0.8%
–13.2%
4.4%
–7.4%
–4.9%
–5.5%
–10.5%
16.5%
2.6%
–14.0%
–0.8%
9.2%
–4.1%
–2.3%
–2.9%
5.1%
–3.0%
–2.7%
–6.5%
1.1%
–6.3%
1.5%
2.5%
–7.2%
–5.7%
–5.5%
–4.6%
3.5%
0.1%
0.5%
0.3%
0.4%
0.2%
0.7%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
3.4%
0.2%
0.1%
0.4%
0.1%
0.3%
0.4%
0.1%
14.9%
0.7%
0.2%
0.3%
0.7%
0.7%
0.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.6%
1.2%
4.3%
1.0%
0.1%
0.5%
0.9%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
2.1%
0.4%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
1.1%
(continued )
165
APPENDIX 8
General Election for Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued)
M. L. Earley (R)
LOCALITY
Nelson
New Kent
Northampton
Northumberland
Nottoway
Orange
Page
Patrick
Pittsylvania
Powhatan
Prince Edward
Prince George
Prince William
Pulaski
Rappahannock
Richmond (Co.)
Roanoke (Co.)
Rockbridge
Rockingham
Russell
Scott
Shenandoah
Smyth
Southampton
Spotsylvania
Stafford
Surry
Sussex
Tazewell
Warren
Washington
Westmoreland
Wise
Wythe
York
166
M. R. Warner (D)
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
4,513
4,737
3,610
4,355
4,381
7,613
5,757
5,483
17,568
6,957
4,905
7,570
58,342
9,639
2,675
2,242
31,917
5,903
18,472
7,467
6,727
11,263
9,130
4,632
21,283
21,422
2,365
3,124
9,661
7,959
14,808
4,293
9,421
7,869
16,718
1,763
2,532
1,236
2,159
1,824
3,902
3,292
2,775
9,831
4,338
1,967
4,104
30,543
4,411
1,369
1,124
16,713
2,885
11,723
2,907
3,772
6,653
4,354
1,827
11,447
12,019
801
1,134
4,335
4,311
7,972
1,759
3,816
3,991
9,083
39.1%
53.5%
34.2%
49.6%
41.6%
51.3%
57.2%
50.6%
56.0%
62.4%
40.1%
54.2%
52.4%
45.8%
51.2%
50.1%
52.4%
48.9%
63.5%
38.9%
56.1%
59.1%
47.7%
39.4%
53.8%
56.1%
33.9%
36.3%
44.9%
54.2%
53.8%
41.0%
40.5%
50.7%
54.3%
–8.0%
6.4%
–12.8%
2.6%
–5.4%
4.2%
10.2%
3.6%
8.9%
15.3%
–6.9%
7.2%
5.3%
–1.3%
4.2%
3.1%
5.3%
1.8%
16.4%
–8.1%
9.0%
12.0%
0.7%
–7.6%
6.8%
9.1%
–13.2%
–10.7%
–2.2%
7.1%
6.8%
–6.1%
–6.5%
3.7%
7.3%
0.2%
0.3%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
1.1%
0.5%
0.2%
0.5%
3.4%
0.5%
0.2%
0.1%
1.9%
0.3%
1.3%
0.3%
0.4%
0.7%
0.5%
0.2%
1.3%
1.4%
0.1%
0.1%
0.5%
0.5%
0.9%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
1.0%
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
2,681
2,161
2,316
2,166
2,513
3,617
2,443
2,651
7,462
2,558
2,874
3,414
27,297
5,109
1,284
1,101
14,993
2,972
6,642
4,507
2,877
4,531
4,691
2,790
9,742
9,248
1,550
1,924
5,250
3,546
6,703
2,471
5,509
3,822
7,530
59.4%
45.6%
64.2%
49.7%
57.4%
47.5%
42.4%
48.3%
42.5%
36.8%
58.6%
45.1%
46.8%
53.0%
48.0%
49.1%
47.0%
50.3%
36.0%
60.4%
42.8%
40.2%
51.4%
60.2%
45.8%
43.2%
65.5%
61.6%
54.3%
44.6%
45.3%
57.6%
58.5%
48.6%
45.0%
7.2%
–6.5%
12.0%
–2.4%
5.2%
–4.7%
–9.7%
–3.8%
–9.7%
–15.4%
6.4%
–7.1%
–5.4%
0.8%
–4.2%
–3.1%
–5.2%
–1.8%
–16.2%
8.2%
–9.4%
–11.9%
–0.8%
8.1%
–6.4%
–9.0%
13.4%
9.4%
2.2%
–7.6%
–6.9%
5.4%
6.3%
–3.6%
–7.1%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.2%
0.3%
0.8%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
2.8%
0.5%
0.1%
0.1%
1.5%
0.3%
0.7%
0.5%
0.3%
0.5%
0.5%
0.3%
1.0%
0.9%
0.2%
0.2%
0.5%
0.4%
0.7%
0.3%
0.6%
0.4%
0.8%
APPENDIX 9
General Election for Lieutenant Governor, November 6, 2001
T. M. Kaine (D)
168
LOCALITY
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
STATE
CITIES
Alexandria
Bedford (City)
Bristol
Buena Vista
Charlottesville
Chesapeake
Colonial Heights
Covington
Danville
Emporia
Fairfax (City)
Falls Church
Franklin
Fredericksburg
Galax
Hampton
Harrisonburg
Hopewell
Lexington
Lynchburg
Manassas Park
Manassas
Martinsville
Newport News
Norfolk
Norton
Petersburg
Poquoson
Portsmouth
Radford
Richmond (City)
Roanoke (City)
Salem
Staunton
Suffolk
Va. Beach
Waynesboro
Williamsburg
Winchester
COUNTIES
Accomack
Albemarle
Alleghany
Amelia
Amherst
Appomattox
Arlington
Augusta
Bath
Bedford (Co.)
1,839,133
543,130
34,339
1,713
4,289
1,358
9,131
51,101
5,412
1,576
12,409
1,450
6,655
3,947
2,174
4,385
1,553
31,555
6,328
4,621
1,563
17,149
1,422
6,376
3,989
36,645
41,862
1,079
8,317
4,112
25,608
3,089
48,006
23,865
7,947
6,200
16,590
92,115
4,816
2,473
5,911
1,296,003
6,956
25,973
4,717
3,470
8,057
4,050
52,430
17,341
1,439
18,750
925,974
302,929
22,990
877
2,089
743
6,231
23,164
1,999
897
6,133
843
3,367
2,575
1,328
2,611
762
19,725
2,723
2,446
969
8,475
593
2,734
2,404
20,189
26,841
731
6,893
1,265
16,860
1,682
36,549
14,328
3,674
2,662
8,394
40,235
1,970
1,372
2,606
623,045
3,151
13,472
2,492
1,572
3,594
1,826
35,342
5,556
674
6,840
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
50.3%
55.8%
67.0%
51.2%
48.7%
54.7%
68.2%
45.3%
36.9%
56.9%
49.4%
58.1%
50.6%
65.2%
61.1%
59.5%
49.1%
62.5%
43.0%
52.9%
62.0%
49.4%
41.7%
42.9%
60.3%
55.1%
64.1%
67.7%
82.9%
30.8%
65.8%
54.5%
76.1%
60.0%
46.2%
42.9%
50.6%
43.7%
40.9%
55.5%
44.1%
48.1%
45.3%
51.9%
52.8%
45.3%
44.6%
45.1%
67.4%
32.0%
46.8%
36.5%
5.4%
16.6%
0.8%
–1.6%
4.4%
17.9%
–5.0%
–13.4%
6.6%
–0.9%
7.8%
0.2%
14.9%
10.7%
9.2%
–1.3%
12.2%
–7.3%
2.6%
11.6%
–0.9%
–8.6%
–7.5%
9.9%
4.7%
13.8%
17.4%
32.5%
–19.6%
15.5%
4.1%
25.8%
9.7%
–4.1%
–7.4%
0.2%
–6.7%
–9.4%
5.1%
–6.3%
–2.3%
–5.0%
1.5%
2.5%
–5.0%
–5.7%
–5.3%
17.1%
–18.3%
–3.5%
–13.9%
32.7%
2.5%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
0.7%
2.5%
0.2%
0.1%
0.7%
0.1%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
2.1%
0.3%
0.3%
0.1%
0.9%
0.1%
0.3%
0.3%
2.2%
2.9%
0.1%
0.7%
0.1%
1.8%
0.2%
3.9%
1.5%
0.4%
0.3%
0.9%
4.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
67.3%
0.3%
1.5%
0.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
3.8%
0.6%
0.1%
0.7%
J. K. Katzen (R)
G. A. Reams ( L )
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
883,886
232,475
10,944
776
2,145
573
2,330
27,494
3,359
634
5,998
594
3,192
1,312
829
1,664
773
11,363
3,495
2,055
550
8,445
786
3,552
1,533
15,979
14,386
326
1,357
2,787
8,397
1,354
10,792
9,154
4,177
3,444
8,081
50,801
2,785
1,058
3,201
651,411
3,553
11,607
2,075
1,852
4,382
2,100
16,257
11,404
707
11,484
48.1%
42.8%
31.9%
45.3%
50.0%
42.2%
25.5%
53.8%
62.1%
40.2%
48.3%
41.0%
48.0%
33.2%
38.1%
37.9%
49.8%
36.0%
55.2%
44.5%
35.2%
49.2%
55.3%
55.7%
38.4%
43.6%
34.4%
30.2%
16.3%
67.8%
32.8%
43.8%
22.5%
38.4%
52.6%
55.5%
48.7%
55.1%
57.8%
42.8%
54.2%
50.3%
51.1%
44.7%
44.0%
53.4%
54.4%
51.9%
31.0%
65.8%
49.1%
61.2%
–5.3%
–16.2%
–2.8%
2.0%
–5.9%
–22.5%
5.7%
14.0%
–7.8%
0.3%
–7.1%
–0.1%
–14.8%
–9.9%
–10.1%
1.7%
–12.0%
7.2%
–3.6%
–12.9%
1.2%
7.2%
7.6%
–9.6%
–4.5%
–13.7%
–17.8%
–31.7%
19.7%
–15.3%
–4.2%
–25.6%
–9.7%
4.5%
7.5%
0.7%
7.1%
9.8%
–5.3%
6.1%
2.2%
3.0%
–3.4%
–4.1%
5.3%
6.3%
3.8%
–17.1%
17.7%
1.1%
13.2%
26.3%
1.2%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
3.1%
0.4%
0.1%
0.7%
0.1%
0.4%
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
1.3%
0.4%
0.2%
0.1%
1.0%
0.1%
0.4%
0.2%
1.8%
1.6%
0.0%
0.2%
0.3%
1.0%
0.2%
1.2%
1.0%
0.5%
0.4%
0.9%
5.7%
0.3%
0.1%
0.4%
73.7%
0.4%
1.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.5%
0.2%
1.8%
1.3%
0.1%
1.3%
28,783
7,511
384
60
53
42
563
428
49
45
278
12
95
58
16
107
17
446
105
120
44
224
43
90
52
459
597
22
67
59
335
53
660
383
96
90
113
1,039
61
43
103
21,272
252
882
150
46
81
124
815
380
58
426
1.6%
1.4%
1.1%
3.5%
1.2%
3.1%
6.2%
0.8%
0.9%
2.9%
2.2%
0.8%
1.4%
1.5%
0.7%
2.4%
1.1%
1.4%
1.7%
2.6%
2.8%
1.3%
3.0%
1.4%
1.3%
1.3%
1.4%
2.0%
0.8%
1.4%
1.3%
1.7%
1.4%
1.6%
1.2%
1.5%
0.7%
1.1%
1.3%
1.7%
1.7%
1.6%
3.6%
3.4%
3.2%
1.3%
1.0%
3.1%
1.6%
2.2%
4.0%
2.3%
–0.2%
–0.4%
1.9%
–0.3%
1.5%
4.6%
–0.7%
–0.7%
1.3%
0.7%
–0.7%
–0.1%
–0.1%
–0.8%
0.9%
–0.5%
–0.2%
0.1%
1.0%
1.3%
–0.3%
1.5%
–0.2%
–0.3%
–0.3%
–0.1%
0.5%
–0.8%
–0.1%
–0.3%
0.2%
–0.2%
0.0%
–0.4%
–0.1%
–0.9%
–0.4%
–0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
2.1%
1.8%
1.6%
–0.2%
–0.6%
1.5%
–0.0%
0.6%
2.5%
0.7%
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
26.1%
1.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
2.0%
1.5%
0.2%
0.2%
1.0%
0.0%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.4%
0.1%
1.5%
0.4%
0.4%
0.2%
0.8%
0.1%
0.3%
0.2%
1.6%
2.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
1.2%
0.2%
2.3%
1.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.4%
3.6%
0.2%
0.1%
0.4%
73.9%
0.9%
3.1%
0.5%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
2.8%
1.3%
0.2%
1.5%
(continued )
169
APPENDIX 9
General Election for Lieutenant Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued)
T. M. Kaine (D)
LOCALITY
Bland
Botetourt
Brunswick
Buchanan
Buckingham
Campbell
Caroline
Carroll
Charles City
Charlotte
Chesterfield
Clarke
Craig
Culpeper
Cumberland
Dickenson
Dinwiddie
Essex
Fairfax (Co.)
Fauquier
Floyd
Fluvanna
Franklin
Frederick
Giles
Gloucester
Goochland
Grayson
Greene
Greensville
Halifax
Hanover
Henrico
Henry
Highland
Isle of Wight
James City
King and Queen
King George
King William
Lancaster
Lee
Loudoun
Louisa
Lunenburg
Madison
Mathews
Mecklenburg
Middlesex
Montgomery
170
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
1,636
10,163
4,310
5,323
3,869
14,832
5,785
7,564
2,304
3,988
80,036
3,646
1,777
8,483
2,505
4,546
6,595
2,541
266,451
16,319
4,233
6,488
13,401
15,998
4,976
9,048
6,489
5,169
3,725
2,606
9,049
30,495
81,294
14,472
1,087
9,278
17,043
2,002
4,219
3,876
4,379
5,242
45,058
7,514
3,576
3,654
3,006
7,196
3,432
19,682
661
3,971
2,831
3,368
2,167
5,888
3,458
2,707
1,695
1,820
37,209
1,639
791
3,055
1,191
2,629
3,510
1,358
139,870
6,552
1,770
2,827
6,162
5,439
2,621
3,685
3,257
2,097
1,301
1,790
4,335
12,720
45,568
7,816
429
4,309
7,757
1,115
1,905
2,013
2,044
2,660
19,638
3,866
1,965
1,411
1,234
3,022
1,496
10,301
40.4%
39.1%
65.7%
63.3%
56.0%
39.7%
59.8%
35.8%
73.6%
45.6%
46.5%
45.0%
44.5%
36.0%
47.5%
57.8%
53.2%
53.4%
52.5%
40.1%
41.8%
43.6%
46.0%
34.0%
52.7%
40.7%
50.2%
40.6%
34.9%
68.7%
47.9%
41.7%
56.1%
54.0%
39.5%
46.4%
45.5%
55.7%
45.2%
51.9%
46.7%
50.7%
43.6%
51.5%
54.9%
38.6%
41.1%
42.0%
43.6%
52.3%
–9.9%
–11.3%
15.3%
12.9%
5.7%
–10.7%
9.4%
–14.6%
23.2%
–4.7%
–3.9%
–5.4%
–5.8%
–14.3%
–2.8%
7.5%
2.9%
3.1%
2.1%
–10.2%
–8.5%
–6.8%
–4.4%
–16.4%
2.3%
–9.6%
–0.2%
–9.8%
–15.4%
18.3%
–2.4%
–8.6%
5.7%
3.7%
–10.9%
–3.9%
–4.8%
5.3%
–5.2%
1.6%
–3.7%
0.4%
–6.8%
1.1%
4.6%
–11.7%
–9.3%
–8.4%
–6.8%
2.0%
0.1%
0.4%
0.3%
0.4%
0.2%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
4.0%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
0.4%
0.1%
15.1%
0.7%
0.2%
0.3%
0.7%
0.6%
0.3%
0.4%
0.4%
0.2%
0.1%
0.2%
0.5%
1.4%
4.9%
0.8%
0.0%
0.5%
0.8%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
2.1%
0.4%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.2%
1.1%
J. K. Katzen (R)
G. A. Reams ( L )
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
927
5,957
1,447
1,819
1,629
8,560
2,272
4,751
594
2,002
42,140
1,943
952
5,117
1,225
1,882
3,003
1,153
123,454
9,543
2,303
3,484
7,032
10,284
2,188
5,196
3,183
2,995
2,265
790
4,407
17,535
35,040
6,095
637
4,865
9,099
867
2,235
1,829
2,290
2,522
24,826
3,507
1,583
2,096
1,675
3,864
1,823
8,962
56.7%
58.6%
33.6%
34.2%
42.1%
57.7%
39.3%
62.8%
25.8%
50.2%
52.7%
53.3%
53.6%
60.3%
48.9%
41.4%
45.5%
45.4%
46.3%
58.5%
54.4%
53.7%
52.5%
64.3%
44.0%
57.4%
49.1%
57.9%
60.8%
30.3%
48.7%
57.5%
43.1%
42.1%
58.6%
52.4%
53.4%
43.3%
53.0%
47.2%
52.3%
48.1%
55.1%
46.7%
44.3%
57.4%
55.7%
53.7%
53.1%
45.5%
8.6%
10.6%
–14.5%
–13.9%
–6.0%
9.7%
–8.8%
14.8%
–22.3%
2.1%
4.6%
5.2%
5.5%
12.3%
0.8%
–6.7%
–2.5%
–2.7%
–1.7%
10.4%
6.3%
5.6%
4.4%
16.2%
–4.1%
9.4%
1.0%
9.9%
12.7%
–17.7%
0.6%
9.4%
–5.0%
–5.9%
10.5%
4.4%
5.3%
–4.8%
4.9%
–0.9%
4.2%
0.1%
7.0%
–1.4%
–3.8%
9.3%
7.7%
5.6%
5.1%
–2.5%
0.1%
0.7%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
1.0%
0.3%
0.5%
0.1%
0.2%
4.8%
0.2%
0.1%
0.6%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.1%
14.0%
1.1%
0.3%
0.4%
0.8%
1.2%
0.2%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.1%
0.5%
2.0%
4.0%
0.7%
0.1%
0.6%
1.0%
0.1%
0.3%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
2.8%
0.4%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
1.0%
48
235
30
136
73
383
55
106
15
166
662
64
34
311
89
35
82
30
3,063
224
160
177
207
275
165
164
48
77
159
25
306
239
655
561
21
100
180
20
77
34
42
60
580
141
27
147
97
309
113
416
2.9%
2.3%
0.7%
2.6%
1.9%
2.6%
1.0%
1.4%
0.7%
4.2%
0.8%
1.8%
1.9%
3.7%
3.6%
0.8%
1.2%
1.2%
1.1%
1.4%
3.8%
2.7%
1.5%
1.7%
3.3%
1.8%
0.7%
1.5%
4.3%
1.0%
3.4%
0.8%
0.8%
3.9%
1.9%
1.1%
1.1%
1.0%
1.8%
0.9%
1.0%
1.1%
1.3%
1.9%
0.8%
4.0%
3.2%
4.3%
3.3%
2.1%
1.4%
0.7%
–0.9%
1.0%
0.3%
1.0%
–0.6%
–0.2%
–0.9%
2.6%
–0.7%
0.2%
0.3%
2.1%
2.0%
–0.8%
–0.3%
–0.4%
–0.4%
–0.2%
2.2%
1.2%
–0.0%
0.2%
1.8%
0.2%
–0.8%
–0.1%
2.7%
–0.6%
1.8%
–0.8%
–0.8%
2.3%
0.4%
–0.5%
–0.5%
–0.6%
0.3%
–0.7%
–0.6%
–0.4%
–0.3%
0.3%
–0.8%
2.5%
1.7%
2.7%
1.7%
0.5%
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
0.2%
0.8%
0.1%
0.5%
0.3%
1.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.1%
0.6%
2.3%
0.2%
0.1%
1.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
10.6%
0.8%
0.6%
0.6%
0.7%
1.0%
0.6%
0.6%
0.2%
0.3%
0.6%
0.1%
1.1%
0.8%
2.3%
1.9%
0.1%
0.3%
0.6%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
2.0%
0.5%
0.1%
0.5%
0.3%
1.1%
0.4%
1.4%
(continued )
171
APPENDIX 9
General Election for Lieutenant Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued)
T. M. Kaine (D)
LOCALITY
Nelson
New Kent
Northampton
Northumberland
Nottoway
Orange
Page
Patrick
Pittsylvania
Powhatan
Prince Edward
Prince George
Prince William
Pulaski
Rappahannock
Richmond (Co.)
Roanoke (Co.)
Rockbridge
Rockingham
Russell
Scott
Shenandoah
Smyth
Southampton
Spotsylvania
Stafford
Surry
Sussex
Tazewell
Warren
Washington
Westmoreland
Wise
Wythe
York
172
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
4,426
4,666
3,379
4,258
4,207
7,336
5,644
4,909
16,426
6,893
4,676
7,513
57,231
9,341
2,659
2,140
31,333
5,692
18,017
7,017
6,099
11,010
8,357
4,516
21,076
21,158
2,276
2,860
9,232
7,612
13,724
4,086
8,520
7,695
16,476
2,452
2,238
1,928
2,061
2,366
3,217
2,152
1,971
6,196
2,665
2,594
3,609
25,535
4,647
1,174
1,005
13,562
2,632
5,402
4,042
2,250
3,639
4,127
2,528
9,246
8,676
1,443
1,674
4,524
2,729
6,014
2,261
4,803
3,443
6,798
55.4%
48.0%
57.1%
48.4%
56.2%
43.9%
38.1%
40.2%
37.7%
38.7%
55.5%
48.0%
44.6%
49.7%
44.2%
47.0%
43.3%
46.2%
30.0%
57.6%
36.9%
33.1%
49.4%
56.0%
43.9%
41.0%
63.4%
58.5%
49.0%
35.9%
43.8%
55.3%
56.4%
44.7%
41.3%
5.1%
–2.4%
6.7%
–1.9%
5.9%
–6.5%
–12.2%
–10.2%
–12.6%
–11.7%
5.1%
–2.3%
–5.7%
–0.6%
–6.2%
–3.4%
–7.1%
–4.1%
–20.4%
7.3%
–13.5%
–17.3%
–1.0%
5.6%
–6.5%
–9.3%
13.1%
8.2%
–1.3%
–14.5%
–6.5%
5.0%
6.0%
–5.6%
–9.1%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.7%
0.3%
0.3%
0.4%
2.8%
0.5%
0.1%
0.1%
1.5%
0.3%
0.6%
0.4%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
1.0%
0.9%
0.2%
0.2%
0.5%
0.3%
0.6%
0.2%
0.5%
0.4%
0.7%
J. K. Katzen (R)
G. A. Reams ( L )
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
1,802
2,362
1,279
2,138
1,734
3,897
3,434
2,760
9,767
4,147
1,969
3,844
30,721
4,456
1,457
1,100
17,400
2,935
12,343
2,798
3,649
7,205
3,958
1,939
11,595
12,177
798
1,050
4,519
4,709
7,411
1,700
3,513
4,137
9,440
40.7%
50.6%
37.9%
50.2%
41.2%
53.1%
60.8%
56.2%
59.5%
60.2%
42.1%
51.2%
53.7%
47.7%
54.8%
51.4%
55.5%
51.6%
68.5%
39.9%
59.8%
65.4%
47.4%
42.9%
55.0%
57.6%
35.1%
36.7%
48.9%
61.9%
54.0%
41.6%
41.2%
53.8%
57.3%
–7.3%
2.6%
–10.2%
2.2%
–6.8%
5.1%
12.8%
8.2%
11.4%
12.1%
–6.0%
3.1%
5.6%
–0.4%
6.7%
3.3%
7.5%
3.5%
20.4%
–8.2%
11.8%
17.4%
–0.7%
–5.1%
7.0%
9.5%
–13.0%
–11.3%
0.9%
13.8%
5.9%
–6.5%
–6.8%
5.7%
9.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
1.1%
0.5%
0.2%
0.4%
3.5%
0.5%
0.2%
0.1%
2.0%
0.3%
1.4%
0.3%
0.4%
0.8%
0.4%
0.2%
1.3%
1.4%
0.1%
0.1%
0.5%
0.5%
0.8%
0.2%
0.4%
0.5%
1.1%
Number
of Votes
169
58
172
57
107
222
56
178
463
81
113
59
971
235
26
35
370
125
265
177
200
161
272
49
231
292
35
136
188
171
298
125
203
107
228
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
3.8%
1.2%
5.1%
1.3%
2.5%
3.0%
1.0%
3.6%
2.8%
1.2%
2.4%
0.8%
1.7%
2.5%
1.0%
1.6%
1.2%
2.2%
1.5%
2.5%
3.3%
1.5%
3.3%
1.1%
1.1%
1.4%
1.5%
4.8%
2.0%
2.2%
2.2%
3.1%
2.4%
1.4%
1.4%
2.3%
–0.3%
3.5%
–0.2%
1.0%
1.5%
–0.6%
2.1%
1.3%
–0.4%
0.9%
–0.8%
0.1%
1.0%
–0.6%
0.1%
–0.4%
0.6%
–0.1%
1.0%
1.7%
–0.1%
1.7%
–0.5%
–0.5%
–0.2%
–0.0%
3.2%
0.5%
0.7%
0.6%
1.5%
0.8%
–0.2%
–0.2%
0.6%
0.2%
0.6%
0.2%
0.4%
0.8%
0.2%
0.6%
1.6%
0.3%
0.4%
0.2%
3.4%
0.8%
0.1%
0.1%
1.3%
0.4%
0.9%
0.6%
0.7%
0.6%
0.9%
0.2%
0.8%
1.0%
0.1%
0.5%
0.7%
0.6%
1.0%
0.4%
0.7%
0.4%
0.8%
173
APPENDIX 10
General Election for Attorney General, November 6, 2001
J. W. Kilgore (R)
LOCALITY
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
STATE
CITIES
Alexandria
Bedford (City)
Bristol
Buena Vista
Charlottesville
Chesapeake
Colonial Heights
Covington
Danville
Emporia
Fairfax (City)
Falls Church
Franklin
Fredericksburg
Galax
Hampton
Harrisonburg
Hopewell
Lexington
Lynchburg
Manassas Park
Manassas
Martinsville
Newport News
Norfolk
Norton
Petersburg
Poquoson
Portsmouth
Radford
Richmond (City)
Roanoke (City)
Salem
Staunton
Suffolk
Va. Beach
Waynesboro
Williamsburg
Winchester
COUNTIES
Accomack
Albemarle
Alleghany
Amelia
Amherst
Appomattox
Arlington
Augusta
Bath
Bedford (Co.)
1,844,781
546,251
34,193
1,684
4,370
1,360
9,146
51,983
5,397
1,574
12,735
1,478
6,646
3,940
2,176
4,368
1,550
31,724
6,335
4,600
1,576
17,213
1,411
6,386
3,994
36,742
42,682
1,130
8,381
4,129
25,778
3,108
47,413
24,005
7,970
6,252
16,655
92,961
4,827
2,482
5,897
1,298,530
6,881
25,943
4,735
3,477
8,084
4,097
52,237
17,483
1,435
18,401
1,107,068
297,145
12,582
1,022
3,412
799
3,273
32,895
4,533
905
7,384
801
3,757
1,516
1,112
2,190
1,025
14,963
4,095
2,951
749
10,284
860
3,913
2,072
20,342
19,716
800
1,882
3,358
11,493
1,846
17,165
12,673
5,502
4,304
9,708
62,830
3,376
1,339
3,718
809,923
4,255
14,598
2,877
2,290
5,278
2,692
18,506
13,552
928
13,436
174
A. D. McEachin (D)
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
60.0%
54.4%
36.8%
60.7%
78.1%
58.8%
35.8%
63.3%
84.0%
57.5%
58.0%
54.2%
56.5%
38.5%
51.1%
50.1%
66.1%
47.2%
64.6%
64.2%
47.5%
59.7%
60.9%
61.3%
51.9%
55.4%
46.2%
70.8%
22.5%
81.3%
44.6%
59.4%
36.2%
52.8%
69.0%
68.8%
58.3%
67.6%
69.9%
53.9%
63.0%
62.4%
61.8%
56.3%
60.8%
65.9%
65.3%
65.7%
35.4%
77.5%
64.7%
73.0%
–5.6%
–23.2%
0.7%
18.1%
–1.3%
–24.2%
3.3%
24.0%
–2.5%
–2.0%
–5.8%
–3.5%
–21.5%
–8.9%
–9.9%
6.1%
–12.8%
4.6%
4.1%
–12.5%
–0.3%
0.9%
1.3%
–8.1%
–4.6%
–13.8%
10.8%
–37.6%
21.3%
–15.4%
–0.6%
–23.8%
–7.2%
9.0%
8.8%
–1.7%
7.6%
9.9%
–6.1%
3.0%
2.4%
1.8%
–3.7%
0.7%
5.9%
5.3%
5.7%
–24.6%
17.5%
4.7%
13.0%
26.8%
1.1%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
3.0%
0.4%
0.1%
0.7%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
1.4%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.9%
0.1%
0.4%
0.2%
1.8%
1.8%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
1.0%
0.2%
1.6%
1.1%
0.5%
0.4%
0.9%
5.7%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
73.2%
0.4%
1.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.5%
0.2%
1.7%
1.2%
0.1%
1.2%
736,431
248,497
21,570
662
957
561
5,848
19,038
859
669
5,348
677
2,887
2,419
1,053
2,167
525
16,696
2,229
1,649
827
6,899
551
2,473
1,920
16,339
22,860
330
6,498
771
14,245
1,262
30,233
11,328
2,468
1,947
6,943
30,020
1,448
1,143
2,178
487,934
2,626
11,324
1,858
1,187
2,806
1,405
33,705
3,931
507
4,965
39.9%
45.5%
63.1%
39.3%
21.9%
41.3%
63.9%
36.6%
15.9%
42.5%
42.0%
45.8%
43.4%
61.4%
48.4%
49.6%
33.9%
52.6%
35.2%
35.8%
52.5%
40.1%
39.1%
38.7%
48.1%
44.5%
53.6%
29.2%
77.5%
18.7%
55.3%
40.6%
63.8%
47.2%
31.0%
31.1%
41.7%
32.3%
30.0%
46.1%
36.9%
37.6%
38.2%
43.6%
39.2%
34.1%
34.7%
34.3%
64.5%
22.5%
35.3%
27.0%
5.6%
23.2%
–0.6%
–18.0%
1.3%
24.0%
–3.3%
–24.0%
2.6%
2.1%
5.9%
3.5%
21.5%
8.5%
9.7%
–6.0%
12.7%
–4.7%
–4.1%
12.6%
0.2%
–0.9%
–1.2%
8.2%
4.5%
13.6%
–10.7%
37.6%
–21.2%
15.3%
0.7%
23.8%
7.3%
–9.0%
–8.8%
1.8%
–7.6%
–9.9%
6.1%
–3.0%
–2.3%
–1.8%
3.7%
–0.7%
–5.8%
–5.2%
–5.6%
24.6%
–17.4%
–4.6%
–12.9%
33.7%
2.9%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.8%
2.6%
0.1%
0.1%
0.7%
0.1%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
2.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.9%
0.1%
0.3%
0.3%
2.2%
3.1%
0.0%
0.9%
0.1%
1.9%
0.2%
4.1%
1.5%
0.3%
0.3%
0.9%
4.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
66.3%
0.4%
1.5%
0.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
4.6%
0.5%
0.1%
0.7%
APPENDIX 10
General Election for Attorney General, November 6, 2001 (continued)
J. W. Kilgore (R)
LOCALITY
Bland
Botetourt
Brunswick
Buchanan
Buckingham
Campbell
Caroline
Carroll
Charles City
Charlotte
Chesterfield
Clarke
Craig
Culpeper
Cumberland
Dickenson
Dinwiddie
Essex
Fairfax (Co.)
Fauquier
Floyd
Fluvanna
Franklin
Frederick
Giles
Gloucester
Goochland
Grayson
Greene
Greensville
Halifax
Hanover
Henrico
Henry
Highland
Isle of Wight
James City
King and Queen
King George
King William
Lancaster
Lee
Loudoun
Louisa
Lunenburg
Madison
Mathews
Mecklenburg
Middlesex
Montgomery
A. D. McEachin (D)
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
1,659
10,138
4,313
5,494
3,877
14,873
5,785
7,639
2,356
3,975
80,127
3,643
1,787
8,402
2,520
4,603
6,641
2,560
266,158
16,196
4,261
6,521
13,448
16,085
4,998
9,083
6,450
5,187
3,760
2,630
9,218
30,381
81,332
14,538
1,082
9,296
16,997
1,994
4,221
3,870
4,383
5,358
44,953
7,603
3,607
3,655
3,024
7,120
3,402
19,655
1,221
7,305
1,816
3,025
2,187
10,608
2,977
5,711
762
2,541
56,413
2,268
1,190
5,866
1,526
2,817
3,910
1,528
140,059
11,083
2,845
4,370
9,129
11,746
3,112
6,431
4,316
3,639
2,762
1,091
5,477
23,515
50,391
8,627
747
5,978
11,314
1,130
2,726
2,542
2,931
3,761
28,447
4,777
2,125
2,518
2,192
4,494
2,384
11,712
73.6%
72.1%
42.1%
55.1%
56.4%
71.3%
51.5%
74.8%
32.3%
63.9%
70.4%
62.3%
66.6%
69.8%
60.6%
61.2%
58.9%
59.7%
52.6%
68.4%
66.8%
67.0%
67.9%
73.0%
62.3%
70.8%
66.9%
70.2%
73.5%
41.5%
59.4%
77.4%
62.0%
59.3%
69.0%
64.3%
66.6%
56.7%
64.6%
65.7%
66.9%
70.2%
63.3%
62.8%
58.9%
68.9%
72.5%
63.1%
70.1%
59.6%
13.6%
12.0%
–17.9%
–5.0%
–3.6%
11.3%
–8.6%
14.8%
–27.7%
3.9%
10.4%
2.2%
6.6%
9.8%
0.5%
1.2%
–1.1%
–0.3%
–7.4%
8.4%
6.8%
7.0%
7.9%
13.0%
2.3%
10.8%
6.9%
10.1%
13.4%
–18.5%
–0.6%
17.4%
1.9%
–0.7%
9.0%
4.3%
6.6%
–3.3%
4.6%
5.7%
6.9%
10.2%
3.3%
2.8%
–1.1%
8.9%
12.5%
3.1%
10.1%
–0.4%
0.1%
0.7%
0.2%
0.3%
0.2%
1.0%
0.3%
0.5%
0.1%
0.2%
5.1%
0.2%
0.1%
0.5%
0.1%
0.3%
0.4%
0.1%
12.7%
1.0%
0.3%
0.4%
0.8%
1.1%
0.3%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.5%
2.1%
4.6%
0.8%
0.1%
0.5%
1.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
2.6%
0.4%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
1.1%
438
2,833
2,491
2,469
1,690
4,261
2,808
1,928
1,594
1,434
23,630
1,374
597
2,536
994
1,785
2,731
1,032
125,976
5,101
1,416
2,151
4,319
4,339
1,885
2,648
2,134
1,548
998
1,538
3,740
6,859
30,818
5,909
334
3,309
5,668
864
1,490
1,323
1,447
1,597
16,459
2,823
1,474
1,137
831
2,625
1,017
7,940
26.4%
27.9%
57.8%
44.9%
43.6%
28.6%
48.5%
25.2%
67.7%
36.1%
29.5%
37.7%
33.4%
30.2%
39.4%
38.8%
41.1%
40.3%
47.3%
31.5%
33.2%
33.0%
32.1%
27.0%
37.7%
29.2%
33.1%
29.8%
26.5%
58.5%
40.6%
22.6%
37.9%
40.6%
30.9%
35.6%
33.3%
43.3%
35.3%
34.2%
33.0%
29.8%
36.6%
37.1%
40.9%
31.1%
27.5%
36.9%
29.9%
40.4%
–13.5%
–12.0%
17.8%
5.0%
3.7%
–11.3%
8.6%
–14.7%
27.7%
–3.8%
–10.4%
–2.2%
–6.5%
–9.7%
–0.5%
–1.1%
1.2%
0.4%
7.4%
–8.4%
–6.7%
–6.9%
–7.8%
–12.9%
–2.2%
–10.8%
–6.8%
–10.1%
–13.4%
18.6%
0.7%
–17.3%
–2.0%
0.7%
–9.1%
–4.3%
–6.6%
3.4%
–4.6%
–5.7%
–6.9%
–10.1%
–3.3%
–2.8%
0.9%
–8.8%
–12.4%
–3.1%
–10.0%
0.5%
0.1%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
3.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.2%
0.4%
0.1%
17.1%
0.7%
0.2%
0.3%
0.6%
0.6%
0.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.2%
0.5%
0.9%
4.2%
0.8%
0.0%
0.4%
0.8%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
2.2%
0.4%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.4%
0.1%
1.1%
(continued )
175
APPENDIX 10
General Election for Attorney General, November 6, 2001 (continued)
J. W. Kilgore (R)
LOCALITY
Nelson
New Kent
Northampton
Northumberland
Nottoway
Orange
Page
Patrick
Pittsylvania
Powhatan
Prince Edward
Prince George
Prince William
Pulaski
Rappahannock
Richmond (Co.)
Roanoke (Co.)
Rockbridge
Rockingham
Russell
Scott
Shenandoah
Smyth
Southampton
Spotsylvania
Stafford
Surry
Sussex
Tazewell
Warren
Washington
Westmoreland
Wise
Wythe
York
176
A. D. McEachin (D)
Total Vote
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
from Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
4,413
4,706
3,335
4,272
4,188
7,292
5,664
4,939
16,656
6,859
4,707
7,505
56,984
9,313
2,646
2,178
31,375
5,701
18,121
7,253
6,594
11,029
8,684
4,522
21,081
21,157
2,290
2,907
9,370
7,487
14,263
4,098
9,078
7,764
16,468
2,374
3,238
1,763
2,738
2,328
4,771
4,027
3,429
11,800
5,288
2,489
4,936
34,336
6,019
1,571
1,518
22,221
3,610
14,235
4,777
5,315
8,277
6,354
2,518
14,224
14,603
1,005
1,382
6,125
5,099
11,093
2,178
6,531
5,721
11,576
53.8%
68.8%
52.9%
64.1%
55.6%
65.4%
71.1%
69.4%
70.8%
77.1%
52.9%
65.8%
60.3%
64.6%
59.4%
69.7%
70.8%
63.3%
78.6%
65.9%
80.6%
75.0%
73.2%
55.7%
67.5%
69.0%
43.9%
47.5%
65.4%
68.1%
77.8%
53.1%
71.9%
73.7%
70.3%
–6.2%
8.8%
–7.1%
4.1%
–4.4%
5.4%
11.1%
9.4%
10.8%
17.1%
–7.1%
5.8%
0.2%
4.6%
–0.6%
9.7%
10.8%
3.3%
18.5%
5.9%
20.6%
15.0%
13.2%
–4.3%
7.5%
9.0%
–16.1%
–12.5%
5.4%
8.1%
17.8%
–6.9%
11.9%
13.7%
10.3%
0.2%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
1.1%
0.5%
0.2%
0.4%
3.1%
0.5%
0.1%
0.1%
2.0%
0.3%
1.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.7%
0.6%
0.2%
1.3%
1.3%
0.1%
0.1%
0.6%
0.5%
1.0%
0.2%
0.6%
0.5%
1.0%
Number
of Votes
Percent
of Vote
Deviation
From Choice’s
State Average
Percent of
Choice’s
State Total
2,035
1,462
1,571
1,529
1,860
2,519
1,626
1,509
4,856
1,571
2,218
2,554
22,639
3,292
1,073
660
9,149
2,090
3,877
2,476
1,278
2,745
2,330
1,998
6,844
6,533
1,284
1,525
3,245
2,385
3,167
1,918
2,547
2,033
4,880
46.1%
31.1%
47.1%
35.8%
44.4%
34.5%
28.7%
30.6%
29.2%
22.9%
47.1%
34.0%
39.7%
35.3%
40.6%
30.3%
29.2%
36.7%
21.4%
34.1%
19.4%
24.9%
26.8%
44.2%
32.5%
30.9%
56.1%
52.5%
34.6%
31.9%
22.2%
46.8%
28.1%
26.2%
29.6%
6.2%
–8.9%
7.2%
–4.1%
4.5%
–5.4%
–11.2%
–9.4%
–10.8%
–17.0%
7.2%
–5.9%
–0.2%
–4.6%
0.6%
–9.6%
–10.8%
–3.3%
–18.5%
–5.8%
–20.5%
–15.0%
–13.1%
4.3%
–7.5%
–9.0%
16.2%
12.5%
–5.3%
–8.1%
–17.7%
6.9%
–11.9%
–13.7%
–10.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.7%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
3.1%
0.4%
0.1%
0.1%
1.2%
0.3%
0.5%
0.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.9%
0.9%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.7%

Chapter Five - Center for Politics, University of Virginia

Transcription

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