east35_Pp_40-43_INGLEWeb

Montenegro’s Djukanovic
Plays the EU Game
As a former president and prime minister, Montenegro’s Milo Djukanovic knows when to
stand up and when to duck.
.
The embattled politician recently resigned as prime
minister to help facilitate Montenegro’s European Union chances.
was surrender power, which he has jealously guarded for 20 years.
series of carefully orchestrated domestic
.
De Mutiis
Epa / Corbis / C. Karaba
by Riccardo
40 . east . europe and asia strategies
What he didn’t do
He’s betting that a
ecember 2010 will probably be remembered as a
decisive period in the evolution of national policy
in Montenegro. Over the course of seven days three
events serves as lightening rods for global analysts: the
submission of the Adriatic country’s candidate status as
part of its effort to join the European Union (Dec. 17), the
resignation of Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic (Dec. 21),
and finally the arrest of Budva Mayor Rajko Kuljaca (Dec.
23). The events, intimately connected, representing a
telling sequence for outsiders attempting to study the fate
of the country, and its ambitions.
In recent years, Brussels clearly suggested that the
recognition of Montenegro’s EU candidate status was conditional and depended on improvements in the country’s
domestic situation, both in terms of the conduct of its judiciary, considered non-independent and unprofessional, rife with incompetent and corrupt judges in the hands
of government officials, and in terms of the conduct of
public policy, seen as seriously hindered by the widespread presence of organized crime.
And, they added, the European Union certainly could
not tolerate a candidate country whose a leader, in Djukanovic, had been openly charged of having links to organized crime (Djukanovic was under investigation by
magistrates in Bari, Italy examining international trafficking in cigarettes). According to the charges, the traffic produced millions of dollars in recycled cash. The charges
D
moves will help his country look better as
the EU comes to a decision.
.
.
were filed in 2009 on procedural grounds, for lack of jurisdiction, since Djukanovic had become the Montenegrin head of state and as such enjoyed immunity from
prosecution.
Faced with an edgy situation that required a daring and
polished response, lest European integration be interrupted, Djukanovic went to work. He resigned as prime
minister four days before Montenegro submitted its EU
candidate status. He sacrificed his institutional role to ensure his country’s candidate status.
But it was a strategic retreat. Despite the resignation, Djukanovic remained the atop the country’s largest party,
the Social Democratic Party, and the owner, through his
brother Aco, of the largest national bank, the Prva Banka.
Djukanovic yet again proved his worth as a political
poker player. He waived his institutional role to ensure
that the EU recognized his country’s bid, but retained key
positions of political and economic power over which
Brussels has no control and cannot veto.
Just six days after the formalization of EU candidate
status, Montenegro also moved on the corruption front
with the arrest of Budva Mayor Kuljaca. The city is Montenegro’s economic mainstay and has long been the subject of intense construction activity intended to transform
it into an international tourist attraction. The arrest was
explained, somewhat flimsily, in terms of a probe into potential building permit issuance violations.
tenegrin politics, though several rungs down from the
almighty Djukanovic.
The arrest of Dragan Marovic implicitly means his
brother is being reigned in. The consequences were immediate. Svetozar Marovic candidate to take over for Djukanovic, the mayor of Podgorica Mugosa, was defeated. The winner was a Djukanovic ally, 34-year-old former
Finance Minister Igor Luksic.
So Djukanovic kills two birds with one subtle stone. To
show off his desire for European integration, he presents
himself as a champion of democracy by stepping down
as prime minister while at the same time appearing to pioneer the country’s fight against corruption (and humbling potential competitor Svetozar Marotic).
The unconventional power play is in perfect harmony
with Djukanovic’s long-time political strategy, which has
been characterized by attention to pragmatism – dealing
with issues shrewdly - and no-nonsense cynicism, which
ut the Montenegrin judiciary is known to have
ties with the executive branch, and its move against Kuljaca was not only a signal of a willingness to give some satisfaction to the international community, but also contained a secondary, domestic meaning that became clear when Kuljaca’s deputy Dragan
Marovic was also arrested.
Dragan is the brother of Svetozar Marovic, the last president of the Union of Serbia-Montenegro (the incipient state that succeeded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and lasted from 2003 until 2006, when Montenegro became independent). He was particularly influential in
Budva and considered the number two figure in Mon-
B
Epa / Corbis / W. Thieme
EUROPE
View of the old section of Budva, Montenegro.
Milo Djukanovic,
Since Montenegro declared its independence in 2006,
the former prime minister of Montenegro,
vacationers have increasingly picked
seen addressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in June 2010.
the country as an inexpensive destination.
number 35 . april 2011 . 41
valued Yugoslav dinar with the German mark in November 1999.
The next step could only be the secession of Montenegro. Djukanovic sought an independence referendum in
2004, but European Union insisted on a moratorium of
several years, which is said was necessary based on the
overall instability of the Balkan region.
he new referendum date was set for November
2006 referendum. The faction that favored maintaining the union with Serbia believed that the
right to vote should be extended to the many Montenegrins and non-citizens who had resided in Serbia for
decades (there are more in Belgrade than the entirety of
Montenegro). The idea was to use the voting power of
these transplanted Montenegrins who felt themselves
Serbian by blood, friendship and workplace context.
They were seen as unlikely to be sensitive to the motion
of independence.
The European Union in turn proposed restricting the
right to vote only to citizens of Montenegro. At the same
time, it said any independence proclamation would require 55 percent of the vote, and not a simple majority. Djukanovic accepted the unusual demand, despite its
risks, and was again proved right. The pro-independence
T
LEFT
Newly-appointed Prime Minister Igor Luksic, right,
raises a glass with his predecessor
and mentor Milo Djukanovic in Podgorica
in December 2010. Djukanovic stepped down
after nearly 20 years in office.
FACING PAGE
Djukanovic wipes his eye during
Afp / Getty Images / S. Prelevic
a December press conference in Podgorica .
42 . east . europe and asia strategies
He resigned only days after the Balkans state
was given formal status as a European Union
candidate. Djukanovic, a pioneer of Montenegrin
independence, is the only Balkan leader
to have held on to power
since the collapse of former Yugoslavia.
tally was 55.4 percent, meaning the different between yes
and no was down to 2,300 votes.
And if independence has so far been the most important game played by Djukanovic so far, it certainly hasn’t
been the only one.
In 2008, Kosovo, the former autonomous province of
the Republic of Serbia, declares its own independence.
According to political commentators, Montenegro, itself newly independent and not yet fully emancipated at
the international level, wouldn’t dare stand in the way of
Serbia and Russia, both of which strongly opposed Kosovo independence.
Montenegro wouldn’t risk vexing Russia, the star of
massive real estate and industrial investments in Mon-
tenegro, which couldn’t accept the Kosovo declaration of
independence lest it be applied as a paradigm for Chechnya and other sub-state entities with ethnic or separatist
ambitions from Russia (including Tatarstan and the Caucuses).
Yet again, Djukanovic surprised observers. He backed
the Kosovo move and recognized the country’s incipient
status, a move that provokes protests in Podgorica among
Serbs and frayed diplomatic relations with Belgrade.
he decision, by contrast, was welcomed by European Union member states, which mostly recognized Kosovo.
Many had feared that Montenegro was falling inexorably into the Russian economic sphere
of influence, a prologue to the emergence political subordination to Moscow. Djukanovic’s risky choice, like
those in the past, brought with it rewards. The recognition of Kosovo has
helped facilitate the path of Montenegro’s European integration, and, despite
criticism from the Kremlin, has not damaged economic relations with Russian or
hindered Russian investment efforts in
Montenegro.
Though Djukanovic has been a master
of the road less traveled, he’s always
made the trip work to his advantage. The
examples are in black and white. He
broke from Milosevic but managed to defeat the Serbian leader’s anointed candidate. He replaced the dinar with the
mark, electoral victory against the
dauphin of these, Bulatovic, replacing
the dinar first with the mark and later
with the euro, bold but successful decisions.
He seemed at first on the “wrong” side
in backing Kosovo independence, but
what many saw as a botched choice
turned out to be astute.
Now, observers are watching for the
outcome of the “razor’s” latest bet, namely that Montenegro will soon be a member of the European Union.
T
Afp / Getty Images / S. Prelevic
earned him the nickname “britva,” or razor.
Djukanovic is considered the nation’s lord and master
in both political and economic terms. He was president
or prime minister of the Adriatic republic for two
decades. He forged a close alliance with Yugoslavia Communist Party chief and later president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic. Djukanovic faithfully did whatever Milosevic told him as it regarded Montenegro. He supported
the late Serbian leader through his darkest moments,
namely the civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia.
But Djukanovic isn’t an altruist. Backing Milosevic
came with the expectation of later reward. He received
political and financial freedom of action, within limits,
in all matters concerning Montenegro.
Djukanovic was also forward-looking in terms of policy. He realized that Milosevic’s policies were pushing Yugoslavia toward economic disaster and international isolation and began to distance itself from the Serbian leader,
leaving the Socialist Party. In 1997, he won the presidential election over Milosevic candidate Miomir Bulatovic
by the slimmest of margins.
The victory gave him his nickname “Milo,” or “on the
edge.”
The most important decision taken by his first Montenegrin government was to replace the many-times de-
.
number 35 . april 2011 . 43