Measuring Revenue Performance

Transcription

Measuring Revenue Performance
Final Report
Mobilizing Resources through
Reform of State Non-tax Sources
for Plan Development
Mahesh C Purohit
Vishnu Kanta Purohit
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research
New Delhi-110052
Final Report
Mobilizing Resources through Reform of State
Non-tax Sources for Plan Development
(Study Sponsored by the Planning Commission, Government of India)
Mahesh C Purohit
Vishnu Kanta Purohit
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research
133, SFS, Ashok Vihar-IV
New Delhi-110052
Phone: 27305008; 27301758
Fax: 27302802
e-mail: [email protected]
website : www.fpepr.org
Research Team
Dr. Mahesh C Purohit
Project Leader
Dr (Mrs) Vishnu Kanta Purohit
Hon. Consultant
Dr. Amrat L Meena
Research Associate
Ms Madhulika
Research Associate
Soumya Ranjan Biswal
Research Associate
CONTENTS
Sl. No.
List of Tables
List of Exhibits
Preface
1
Introduction
Page
iv
v
vi
1
Objectives of the Study
Taxonomy of Non-tax Resources
Scope of the Study
User Charges
Optimal Recoveries on Public Services: A Theoretical
Perspective
Methodology of the Study
Sources of Data
Scheme of Presentation
2
Annexure A.1.1 Classification of Non-tax Revenue in State
Budgets
12
Fiscal Significance of States’ Own Non-tax Sources
14
Composition and Trends in States’ Own Non-tax Revenues
Components of States’ Own Non-tax Revenues
Receipts from General Services
Receipts from Social Services
Receipts from Economic Services
Components of Social Services
Components of Economic Services
Summing-up
i
3
Pricing Strategy for Non-tax Sources
46
Introduction
Issues in Utility Pricing
Theories of Utility Pricing
Concept of Costs
Problems of Measurability
Designing User Charges
Conclusion
4
Revenue Realization from Non-tax Sources
67
Issues in Determination of User Charges
Actual Cost Recovery
Desired Percentage of RR/RE
Conclusions
5
Annexure A.4.1 (a) RR/RE of Different Components of Social
Services
Annexure A.4.1 (b) RR/RE of Different Components of
Economic Services
Annexure A.4.2 (a) Regression Results for Phase I
Annexure A.4.2 (b) Regression Results for Phase II
Annexure A.4.3 (a) Regression Results with Dummy Variables
for Phase I
Annexure A.4.3 (b) Regression Results with Dummy Variables
for Phase II
91
Rationalising Structure of Non-tax Sources
96
92
94
94
95
95
Education
Medical and Public Health
Water Supply and Sanitation
Forest and Wild life
Irrigation
Royalty on Mines and Minerals
Roads and Bridges
6
Procedural Reforms for Non-tax Revenue and Issues in
Delivery of Services
123
Complexities in Procedures in Delivery of Services
ii
Education
Medical and Public Health
Water Supply and Sanitation
Rationalisation of Procedures in Delivery of Services as Fiscal
Measure
Conclusion
7
Summary of Conclusions and Policy Imperatives
134
Annexures
141
Annexure A.1: Questionnaire for Collecting Data for a Study
on Non-tax Sources For Planned Development
Annexure A.2: Rates of User Charges for Different Services
for Select States
Annexure A.3: Constitutional Provision Related to Regulation
and Development of Mines and Mineral Sector
Annexure A.4: Rates of Royalty and Dead Rent for Minerals
(2000-01)
142
Appendixes
194
Appendix A: Revenue Receipts Tables for 15 Major States
Budget Data (1993-96 and 2001-04)
Appendix B: Revenue Expenditure Tables for 15 Major States
Budget Data (1993-96 and 2001-04)
Appendix C: Tables from RBI Revenue Receipts from 1993-94
to 2003-04
Appendix D: Tables from RBI Revenue Expenditure from
1993-94 to 2003-04
200
References
283
163
189
190
219
253
273
iii
Table No.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
2.11
2.12
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.10
4.11
4.12
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
List of Tables
Title
Non-tax Revenue in Different Countries
All-States Own Non-tax Revenue and its Composition
State-wise Own Non-tax Revenue and its Composition
The Role of Education etc. in Social Services, SONTR and
GSDP
The Role of Medical and Public Health in Social Services,
SONTR and GSDP
The Role of Urban Development in Social Services and
SONTR
The Role of Water Supply and Sanitation in Social Services
and SONTR
The Role of Forestry and Wildlife in Economic Services,
SONTR and GSDP
The Role of Irrigation Projects in Economic Services and
SONTR
The Role of Major and Medium Irrigation in Economic
Services and SONTR
The Role of Minor Irrigation in Economic Services and
SONTR
The Role of Industries in Economic Services and SONTR
RR/RE for Social and Economic Services
Average RR/RE of Select Services
Deviation from Norms for Public Works
Deviation from Norms for Education, Sports, Arts and
Culture
Deviation from Norms for Medical and Public Health
Deviation from Norms for Water Supply and Sanitation
Deviation from Norms for Forestry and Wildlife
Deviation from Norms for Major and Medium Irrigation
Deviation from Norms for Minor Irrigation
Deviation from Norms for Industries
Deviation from Norms for Royalties on Mines and Minerals
Deviation from Norms for Roads and Bridges
RR/RE from Elementary, Secondary and Higher Education in
Major States
Household, Public and Total Health Expenditure in India
(2004-05)
Forest Cover in Different States in India
Methods for Valuing Forest Benefits
Toll Collection of Major States
Page
32
35
36
38
38
39
39
40
40
41
41
42
78
79
81
81
82
82
83
83
84
84
85
85
118
119
120
121
122
iv
List of Exhibits
S. No.
Title
Page
2.1
Components of All-States Own Non-tax Revenue
43
2.2
(a) Share of Components of Social Services (1993-94)
44
(b) Share of Components of Social Services (2003-04)
44
(a) Share of Components of Economic Services (1993-94)
45
(b) Share of Components of Economic Services (2003-04)
45
4.1
Deviation from Norms for Public Works
86
4.2
Deviation from Norms for Education etc.
86
4.3
Deviation from Norms for Medical and Public Health
87
4.4
Deviation from Norms for Water Supply and Sanitation
87
4.5
Deviation from Norms for Forestry and Wildlife
88
4.6
Deviation from Norms for Major and Medium Irrigation
88
4.7
Deviation from Norms for Minor Irrigation
89
4.8
Deviation from Norms for Industries
89
4.9
Deviation from Norms for Royalties on Mines and Minerals
90
4.10
Deviation from Norms for Roads and Bridges
90
2.3
v
Preface
The Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research is an autonomous, non-profit
organization whose major functions are to carry out research, undertake consultancy work, and
conduct training in the area of public economics and policy.
The Foundation undertook this study at the instance of the Socio Economic Research Division
of the Planning Commission, Government of India. The main objectives of this study are to analyze
the existing structure of non-tax sources in the Indian States and to recommend requisite changes in its
structure, so as to enable the States to mobilize resources for development.
This study is the result of the collective effort of the project team of the Institute under the
guidance of Mahesh C. Purohit, who prepared the final draft of the study. We acknowledge the
valuable contributions made by the other members of the team, especially Dr. (Mrs) Vishnu Kanta
Purohit who contributed to the study tremendously and provided unstinting support, including the
preparation of the draft of some of the chapters.
The authors are grateful to the Socio Economic Research Division of the Planning
Commission for sanctioning this study and providing them with an opportunity to give a mid-term
presentation of the study.
Thanks are due to Dr. Amrat Lal Meena and Ms Madhulika who provided excellent research
assistance through out the tenure of this study and helped in the analysis of relevant data and issues.
Dr. Amrat Lal Meena, along with. Mr Varun Aggarwal and Ms Shikha Goel, specially contributed in
collection, collation and analysis of relevant data from the Reserve Bank of India Bulletins and the
State Budget Documents. Ms Madhulika, in addition to analysis of data, contributed to preparing the
base material for the report and also prepared preliminary draft of a few chapters. Competent research
assistance provided by Mr Soumya Ranjan Biswal, at the later stage of this study, is also gratefully
acknowledged.
Collection of data on user charges and an in-depth understanding of the procedural aspects
required visiting the State capitals of Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka and West Bengal. The
authors want to express their gratitude to the Secretaries of the select services of the respective State
Governments, who spared time in discussing the issues related to revenue receipts from these services.
The authors want to express their gratitude to Drs. D N Rao, Gautam Naresh and G. L.
Aggarwal for their valuable insights during the course of work on the project. They are also thankful to
Shri R. Sridharan, K M Alimalmigothi, A K Panda, O P Shemar (Planning Commission) and to Shri V
S Senthil (Ministry of Finance) for their suggestions made during the course of the mid-term
presentation at the Planning Commission. Special thanks are due to Drs. Anwar Shah, Arindam Das
Gupta, and Brijesh C Purohit for their comments on the methodology and the results of the study.
The Governing Body of the Foundation does not bear any responsibility for the contents or
views expressed in the report. The responsibility rests with the authors, in particular, the leader of the
team.
New Delhi
December 22, 2006
Mahesh C Purohit
Director
1
Introduction
Augmenting resources for the States is an intricate exercise involving balancing current
revenues, economic growth and the political economy of the system. Mobilising resources is
not a pure economic exercise; it has political dimensions as well. The political economy of
mobilising resources, therefore, has to consider issues related to both - the economic effects
and the fall out in terms of politics.
Mobilising resources through reforms in non-tax sources serves the twin purpose of
having a rational non-tax structure and generating greater means to achieve economic growth.
Irrational structure of non-tax sources has adverse economic effects that invalidate growth
objectives. From the economic point of view, therefore, one has to keep in mind the objectives
of equity, efficiency and neutrality; especially the impact of these on the economic growth of
the economy. To fulfil these objectives, one often tends to adopt an economically rational
structure of non-tax sources that may not be palatable politically. A popularly elected
Government, therefore, has to adopt a balance between the two.
Objectives of the Study
Given the political economy of mobilising resources, this study aims at presenting
measures for mobilising resources via reforms in non-tax sources. In doing so, it adheres to the
objectives of:
a.
analyzing the structure of States’ non-tax sources,
b.
examining the structural reforms and suggesting a rational non-tax structure;
which should be economically viable and should yield larger resources;
c.
suggesting fiscal measures in terms of procedural reforms for removing
harassment to consumers of utilities, making structural reforms politically
palatable; and
d.
recommending reforms related to institutional preparedness - a pre-requisite for
mobilising additional resources.
Thus, this study hypothesizes that the non-tax revenues should form a sizable portion of
the States’ own revenues in India. The current contribution of States own non-tax revenues is
about 19 percent of the States own revenue receipts. It is, therefore, appropriate that attention is
gradually turned to measures to increase non-tax revenues. This is imperative given the
widening revenue expenditure gaps in the States’ budgeting and the growing public resentment
against attempts to raise more revenue through taxation.
The structural reforms in tax administration in the country has led to a wide-spread
demand to reduce the quantum of subsidy and to meet the cost of public services through
proper pricing, wherever this is feasible. The general perception is that ‘free of user charges’
public services should not exist. The user charges should be fixed according to the economic
status of the user and the nature or type of the commodity. This should be such that the cost is
met and the market price of the commodity does not lead to over-consumption of such services
and wasteful use of scarce resources.
Taxonomy of Non-Tax Resources
Non-tax sources are defined, as payment made to the Government for which there is a
quid pro quo 1 . However, these non-tax sources do not have similar features and are classified
into three categories:
First, there are some sources that are compulsory and requited payments. These sources
include penalties (other than penalties on non-compliance of taxes)2 and fines.
The second category consists of voluntary and unrequited receipts. These payments
include donations and contributions made to the Government or any unclaimed funds lying
with the Government.
The third category comprises voluntary and requited payments, including revenue
earned from the resources owned by the Government such as forest, marine, riparian habitats
and wildlife. This category also has revenue earned by sale of usage rights, admission fee, as
well as the royalties and rental payments received by the Government. Income earned in the
form of dividends and the interest receipts from investments made by the Government also fall
into this category.
1
This is in contrast with the definition of tax as a compulsory payment made to the Government for which there is
no quid pro quo. See Dalton, Huge. 1949. Principles of Public Finance. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., p.32.
London.
2
Musgrave, Richard A. and Peggy B Musgrave. 1989. Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 5th edition,
McGraw Hill Book Company, Boston.
2
Scope of the Study
Though the term ‘non-tax revenue’ encompasses all the above components, some of the
non-tax sources (payments made to the Government for which there is a quid pro quo) are not
included in this study. This has been done to delimit the scope of this study and to have a
thorough analysis of some of the services.
First, payments made to the Government in the form of subscription to a loan or to a
long-term saving scheme, which is repayable by the Government in the future (that is, the
payment made to the Government is requited by future payments or by transfer of other assets)
is considered as ‘capital receipts’ and is not included in the scope of non-tax revenue. The
other similar receipts excluded from the purview of this study are Government borrowings,
money creation or proceeds of disinvestments.
Second, revenue receipts of the Government through the sale of goods and services
(that are commercial in nature) are also not included in the scope of this study. In this context,
it is important to point out that it is possible to alter the legal scope of Governmental activities
and thereby, the scope of non-tax revenue, without in anyway modifying the underlying
economic reality. For example, it is possible to transfer a departmental undertaking (e.g. Milk
Scheme run by the Government) as a public sector organisation, which subsequently affects the
flow of non-tax revenue of the Government without in anyway altering the economic scope of
the governmental activities. The problem arises when one State Government includes such an
organisation as part of the budget while another State does not. For example, the Punjab
Roadways run by the department is a part of the governmental non-tax sources while the
PEPSU Road Transport Corporation (a non-departmental organization) is not a part of the nontax sources. Differences in the scope of Government across the States, therefore, limit the
comparability of data from all States. Hence, this study excludes such services.
Thirdly, in some non-tax receipts it is observed that not all receipts by the Government
are accounted for in its consolidated fund, e.g. in education, although the students pay a variety
of fees, only the tuition fees are credited to the treasury 3 . Similarly, in medical and public
health, it is observed that in some States the user charges paid by out-door patients are not put
into the consolidated fund. In Rajasthan this is credited to the welfare of the hospital staff and
in Tamil Nadu it is considered to be a part of the maintenance expenditure of the hospital. Such
variations inhibit a comparative analysis of recovery rate of different services. It is, therefore,
desirable to include all non-tax receipts in the consolidated fund.
Fourthly, the revenue from lotteries is netted out because the purpose of this activity is
not to provide any public service but to generate revenue. In many States, a major chunk of the
revenue from lotteries is used to make payment for lottery prizes. Only a very small proportion
of this revenue remains with the State Government. The same holds true for other commercial
3
Tilak, J B G. 1993. “Financing Higher Education in India: Principles, Practice and Policy Issues”. Higher
Education. Netherlands. 26(1), July: 43-67.
3
activities. Therefore, this study uses the concept of net non-tax revenue i.e. gross non-tax
revenue minus expenditure for these commercial activities.
Finally, notional receipts are excluded from the purview of this study, e.g. interest on
capital works in irrigation, which is matched by contra-entry in many States (signifying
notional expenditure).
Thus, the term non-tax revenue in this study comprises revenue receipts (i.e. noncapital receipts) excluding accruals and taxes of all the tiers of Government, as well as notional
receipts matched by contra-expenditure.
The study, however, confines its scope to only those non-tax sources, which originate
from the administrative departments and departmental undertakings. These are of a noncommercial nature. Therefore, sources such as interest, profits and dividends arising from the
States’ commercial undertakings are beyond its scope.
The non-tax sources covered in the study include the following:
Administrative Non-tax Receipts
This source accounts for about three-fourths of the States’ own non-tax revenue. In the
future, this is likely to be the most productive and reliable source of non-tax revenues for the
States.
There are over 100 departmental sources of non-tax revenues in different States which
are classified under three dozen heads. Thus, in attempting a broad study of all the items under
non-tax sources, the effort is to cover some aspects from each of the three broad components of
administrative receipts, viz. general services, social services, and economic services.
A. Receipts from General Services
These comprise receipts from Public Service Commission, Police, Jails, Supplies and
disposals, Stationery and printing, Public works, Other administrative services, Contribution
and recoveries towards pension and other retirement benefits, and Other miscellaneous general
services.
Details regarding revenue from General Services are listed below:
(a) Revenue accrues from fees charged from candidates appearing for various
competitive examinations and interviews conducted by the Public Service Commission (PSC).
The volume of the receipts under this head directly depends upon the nature and the number of
examinations held by the Commission during a year and the number of candidates appearing
for the examination.
(b) Police comprises reimbursement receipts from the Government of India and other
States towards the cost of police supplied (forming the bulk of the revenue under the major
4
head), cost of police supplied to autonomous bodies, private companies and persons, receipts
under the Arms Act, as well as sale proceeds of unserviceable articles, collection of payments
for services rendered, recovery of overpayments and miscellaneous receipts and so on.
(c) Jails comprise receipts from sale of articles manufactured in jail factories and farm
produce of the jails.
(d) Stationery and Printing department comprise sale proceeds of stationery supply to
Government departments run on commercial lines, sale proceeds of State Gazette, printing
charges for Government departments and other miscellaneous receipts.
(e) The Public Works Department (PWD) has rental income from Government
buildings, hire charges of machinery supplied to the contractors as well as the percentage
charges.
(f) Revenue from other administrative sources consists of receipts pertaining to
administration of justice, elections, civil defence, fire protection etc.
(g) Pension contributions from other Governments, autonomous bodies, local bodies
etc. in respect of Government servants placed on deputation fall in this category. It also
includes Government share in Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) and interest thereon.
(h) Other miscellaneous general services include numerous small receipts from sources
such as unclaimed deposits, allotment and sale of land, receipts relating to guarantees given by
Government, sale of old stores, shares and materials, urban assessments etc.
A substantial portion of the general services revenue comes from numerous other
administrative services and other miscellaneous receipts including written off loans. However,
if these are excluded, the major receipts are from police, public works, and pension funds.
B. Receipts from Social Services
The major items that come under this class are (a) Education, sports, arts and culture,
(b) Medical and public health, (c) Family welfare, (d) Water supply and sanitation, (e)
Housing, (f) Urban development (g) Information and publicity, (h) Labour and employment, (i)
Social security and welfare, and (j) Other social services.
The main receipts from these social services are given below:
(a) Receipts from tuition and other fees realized from students in Government
educational institutions, public contributions to the educational institutions, receipts of
museums and archaeological monuments.
5
(b) Receipts from Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC), medical receipts
including contributions from patients, and tuition fees from the medical colleges, wherever
located.
(c) Family welfare receipts are contribution of the users, and receipts on account of
strengthening of family welfare.
(d) The water supply and sanitation receipts comprise service fees, percentage charges
from other Government departments, and receipts from water schemes.
(e) Housing receipts are the rental receipts for the quarters constructed under the
industrial housing scheme under the charge of PWD. Other items are receipts accruing from
the sale of master plans, license fees from cinema halls, rental incomes of Devasthans as also
various fees under the labour and trade laws.
A major portion of the receipts from social services is due to water supply and
sanitation charges. Another substantial part is derived from education, sports, art and culture
(ESAC) services (this share has fallen over time), and medical and public health services.
There has been rapid growth in the receipts from water supply and sanitation, medical and
public health, urban development and family welfare services.
C. Receipts from Economic Services
Major items under this class are (a) Crop husbandry, (b) Animal husbandry, (c) Dairy
development, (d) Fisheries, (e) Forestry and wild life, (f) Co-operation, (g) Other agricultural
and rural programmes, (h) Special area programmes, (i) Major and medium irrigation, (j)
Minor irrigation, (k) Village and small scale industries, (l) Industries, (m) Non-ferrous mining
and metallurgical industries, (n) Roads and bridges, (o) Tourism, and (p) Others.
In many of the States, the largest contributor under the category of economic services is
receipt from the mines and mineral department, which accounts for over a half of the total
receipts from this category. Other major contributors are receipts from irrigation, industries,
forestry and wild life, and agricultural services. However, there has been a phenomenal
increase in receipts accruing from roads and bridges, area development services, irrigation,
cooperation and agriculture.
Excluding the other administrative and miscellaneous sources from the general services
category, there appears to be just ten major individual contributors to the States’ non-tax
revenue.
In view of the strategic importance of some of the services in the overall non-tax
sources, the study has taken the following ten services for an in-depth analysis:
(1)
Public works,
(2)
Education, sports, art & culture,
6
(3)
Medical, public health and family welfare,
(4)
Water supply and sanitation,
(5)
Forestry and wild life,
(6)
Major and medium irrigation,
(7)
Minor irrigation,
(8)
Industries,
(9)
Mines and minerals, and
(10)
Roads and Bridges.
These accounts for about 2/3rd to 3/4th of the administrative component of the non-tax
revenue in different States.
This study makes a detailed analysis of the structure of revenue realized (RR) from
these services in each State. It has also collected information on the user charges of these
services for a few select States. The selected States are Rajasthan (Northern Zone), Karnataka
(Southern Zone), Maharashtra (Western Zone) and West Bengal (Eastern Zone).
User Charges
The non-tax revenue in lieu of the provision of goods and services by the Government
is derived through ‘user charges’. These charges indicate payments that are administratively
determined for the goods and services provided by the Government 4 . As stated by the OECD,
these are requited payments. However, the link between payments and services provided may
vary considerably in terms of degree of cost recovery. These include payments in exchange for
non-capital goods and services—e.g. charges for education and health; entry charge for
museum, parks, etc.; and rent for housing.
However, the OECD definition is subject to some ambiguities as it distinguishes
between capital, and non-capital goods and services. The Government is providing capital
goods in the form of urban infrastructure. These are used for domestic as well as for industrial
purposes and accordingly, the user charges should also vary.
More specifically, use of ‘user charges’ recognizes the necessity to include internal
recharges between Government departments in order to avoid multiple counting 5 .
Optimal Recoveries on Public Services: A Theoretical Perspective
Government intervention in providing goods and services for public welfare can be
justified on the grounds of market imperfection in provisions of these goods. The magnitude
4
Price is determined by market forces whereas user charges are fixed administratively; generally on principles
different than those applied to price determination.
5
Stephen, Bailey J. 1994. “User charges for urban services”. Urban Studies, Vol. 31(4/5): 745-765.
7
and the mix of these goods provided by the Government will depend on the level of economic
development and market imperfection.
‘Pure’ public goods are the ones having features of:
(a) non-excludability i.e. where A’s consumption is made contingent on A’s paying the
price, while B cannot be excluded for not paying the price, and
(b) non-rival consumption / joint consumption i.e. A’s partaking of the consumption
benefits do not reduce the benefits derived by all others. The same benefits are available to all,
without mutual interference.
In fact very few public goods are pure public goods. Firstly, the joint consumption
property might be partly violated. Although all individuals may consume the services in the
same quantity, the benefit obtained may be reduced as more persons have a share in its
consumption. This phenomenon is known as congestion or partial rivalness. A number of
authors 6 have distinguished between this type of public good on the basis of variability in the
use or no variability in the use of public services. The variability in the use occurs due to some
amount of opportunity cost involved in the use of these public services. Secondly, goods
provided by the Government may have joint consumption features but these may be
excludable. Such goods and services may be termed as ‘price-excludable public goods’7 . These
are television and radio transmission and services provided by the transportation facilities,
entertainment facilities (theatres, museum), recreational facilities (national parks, stadium) and
information services.
Theoretical foundations seem to have little impact on the charging practices for the
goods and services provided by the Government in the developed/developing countries.
Economists have pointed out the sharp contrast between the economic theory of pricing and
lack of its application in practice. Public sector pricing theory recommends that prices be set
equal to long-run marginal cost (e.g. long term incremental capital and running cost) so as to
achieve an efficient allocation of resources. The optimal two-part tariff has both a fixed
component (to recover capital cost) and a variable component (to meet the recurring costs).
However, there are both theoretical and practical problems related with marginal cost pricing.
Firstly, the assumptions on which the theory of allocative efficiency is based generally do not
hold; and secondly, implementation may not be feasible.
The earlier view of financing of Government expenditure through budgetary resource
was justified on the ground that the benefit of pure public goods are expected to accrue to the
society as a whole. Therefore, the marginal cost pricing principle that is generally applicable
for the pricing of private goods and services could not be applied to public goods. Government
6
Oakland, W.H. 1987. “Theory of Public Goods.” In Handbook of Public Economics ed. Auerbach, A.J. and M.
Feldstein, Vol. II, Amsterdam, North Holland: 485-536.
7
Burns, E. Michael and Walsh, Cliff. 1981. “Market Provision of Price-excludable Public Goods: A General
Analysis”. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89(11).
8
is expected to recover the cost either through taxes or public borrowings. The marginal cost
pricing approach implies that in general (a) the marginal benefit to the society exceeds the
marginal cost, and (b) the marginal benefits of financing the service is at least equal to the
possible marginal benefits from other competing investments. The unit marginal cost to the
society is the opportunity cost of allocating the resources.
The marginal cost theory 8 requires that there should not be any external effects in
consumption and production, and competitive forces should operate throughout the economy.
None of these exist in practice. Services such as health and education have a profound, though
intangible, effect on society and economy. Also equity and constitutional factors magnify the
problems for marginal cost pricing, as well the lack of accurate information and data. “Free
rider” problem may also exist for local public goods such as street lighting, defence, and law
and order. Besides, if provisioning of services is related to willingness to pay, it will result in a
very complex discriminatory fare structure.
For goods and services that do not have any externalities, some percent of the average
cost may be fixed as user charge. The services having positive externalities may have to be
subsidized by the Government to some extent i.e. user charges may not help to recover the full
cost. The positive externalities may be limited within the jurisdiction or may have a spill over
effect outside the jurisdiction. Such services include education, health, and sanitation etc 9 .
The Government has to provide some of the important services that fall in the category
of merit goods. These include improved water supply, sanitation, and electricity services.
These are associated with improving productivity and living standards in several ways. First,
provision of these services has strong and direct links to improvement in health. Waterborne
diseases in the developing world exact a high cost in terms of death, malnutrition, stunting, and
reduced productivity. Electricity enables improved health service delivery. Access to these
services improves education level in the developing world 10 . Millennium Declaration of the
United Nations General Assembly 11 suggests that some of the targets for growth are
infrastructure services such as electricity, transport, and telecommunications. These are widely
acknowledged as the key factors for achieving improved health, education, income, and
poverty goals.
Methodology of the Study
Given the growing importance of non-tax revenue in the fiscal structure and the
increasing emphasis on the cost recovery through the imposition of ‘user charges’, this study at
the outset proposes to examine the fiscal significance of the States own non-tax sources over a
8
This and the other theories related to fixing user charges are discussed in detail, later in chapter 3.
Downing, Paul B. 1992. “The Revenue Potential of User Charges in Municipal Finance.” Public Finance
Quarterly, Vol. 20 (4): 512-527.
10
Komives, Kristin - (et. al.). 2005. Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies.
Directions in Development, Energy and Water Division, World Bank.Washington, D.C.
11
UN Millennium Project. 2005. Investing in development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium
Development Goals. London Earthscan. Available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org.
9
9
period of time. In doing so, it covers all the States, with special emphasis on 15 major States 12 .
In addition to examining the trend rate, it estimates buoyancy of all the major non-tax sources
and provides a comparative picture of all the States.
To analyze the efforts of the States in collecting appropriate user charges for the
services provided, the study presents an estimate of the revenue realized (RR) from services as
percent of revenue expenditure (RE) incurred on providing these services. To facilitate
comparison between RRi (revenue realized from the ith service) amongst the States, the study
presents a normative approach to estimate ‘norms’ of RR for each of the services by using
panel data models.
To appraise the performance of the States in collecting RR for the select services, the
study attempts to analyse difference between the actual and normative RR (estimated through
the regression approach) for each of the select services. This is done by taking RR of a specific
service as a function of related independent variables.
Efforts have been made to identify the factors responsible for lack of growth of non-tax
sources in the States. Policy imperatives are put forth for exploring the scope for rationalizing
rate structures and thereby, improving the overall budgetary position of the States as well as
efficiency in resource use. In doing so, the study takes into account the variations in the RR of
select non-tax sources for each major State. Also, it looks into the issues related to delivery of
services by the Government. Special emphasis is laid on analyzing user conveniences for some
of the services, viz. education, health care, water supply, and roads and bridges.
Sources of Data
This study makes use of all available sources of data for the analysis of non-tax sources
in Indian States. Primarily, the study uses data from Reserve Bank of India (RBI), State Budget
Documents, Central Statistical Organization, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, the various
State ministries dealing with different non-tax services etc.
RBI presents a rich source of data on State finances. Due to various reasons regarding
comparability, however, data on revenue from non-tax sources in RBI documents are not
presented in sufficient details. Hence, this study uses RBI data to have a macro analysis only.
For the purpose of disaggregated analysis of each of the minor heads of non-tax
sources, as shown in Annexure A.1.1, the State budget documents are used. From these
documents, we have collected details of the revenue and expenditure on non-tax sources for the
select services, at a highly disaggregated level. Unfortunately, even in the budget documents,
items such as lotteries, interests, departmental undertakings, etc. are not reflected correctly.
Hence, necessary adjustments have been made, wherever required.
12
The major States include Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal.
10
In all, this study uses two major sources to collect the basic data for non-tax sources.
These are given below:
a. Time series data for the period 1993-94 to 2003-04 is collected from the various
issues of the Reserve Bank of India titled Study of State Finances. Data pertains
to States’ own tax revenue, non-tax revenue, revenue expenditure, and capital
expenditure (at four digit level). It covers 15 major States under broad heads.
b. Data for two points of time, i.e. the first three years of the study (1993-94 to
1995-96) and the last three years of the study (2001-02 to 2003-04) have been
collected from the respective State Budget Documents for 15 major States for ten
select services. The information is collected for all the components or the subheads at a four-digit level for all the selected non-tax sources. The effort has
been to collect data relating to the base and current rates as well as data on other
related variables for each of the non-tax sources.
Scheme of Presentation
The sequence of presentation of the Report is as follows: Chapter 2 analyses fiscal
significance of States’ own non-tax sources. In doing so, it examines the role of various social
and economic services in the budget. The next chapter delves into the theories of utility
pricing. It presents a review of literature related to utility pricing. Chapter 4 presents estimates
of revenue realised as a percent of revenue expenditure for the select general, social and
economic services. These are based on, the data available from the RBI and also from the State
budget documents. The chapter also puts forth norms for revenue realized (RR) based on
regression technique using panel data models. Norms are presented for the select services.
Using the benchmark of norms, efforts are made to present the gap in the actual and estimated
RR for each service as well as for each State. The next chapter (chapter 5) presents areas of
reforms in the structure of non-tax sources in the Indian States. Chapter 6 analyses issues
related to procedures and delivery of services. Finally, chapter 7 presents a summary of
conclusions and policy recommendations.
11
Annexure A.1.1
Classification of Non-tax Revenue in State Budgets
Sources of Non-tax Revenue with Budget Heads in Indian State Government Accounts
Sl. No.
1
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
24.1
24.2
24.3
Description
Compulsory, requited payments to government
Earmarked taxes
Fines and penalties
Police fees, fines and forfeitures
Judicial fines and forfeitures
Other fines and forfeitures
Voluntary, unrequited payments to government
Donations
Unclaimed deposits and excess payments
Voluntary, unrequited payments to government
Revenue from assets
Interest receipts
Dividends from public undertakings
Dividends from other investments
Mineral concession fees, rents and royalties
Public works (rents on buildings, hire charges for equipment, etc.)
Housing
Fishery rents
Environmental, forestry and wildlife
Major and medium irrigation projects (1)
Minor irrigation projects (1)
Petroleum
Roads and Bridges (1)
Revenue from regulated activity and sale of permits, goods and
services
General Services (2)
Public service commission
Police (except 055-103 above)
Jails
Stationery and printing
Other administrative services
Miscellaneous general services (excluding 0075-101, 0075-103)
State lotteries
Social Services
Education, sports, art and culture
Elementary education
Secondary education
University and higher education
Budget
Head
0055-103
0070-01102
Various
0075-101
0049
0050-101
0050-200
0853-102
0059
0216
0405-011
0406-02
0701
0702
0802
1054
0051
0055
0056
0058
0070
0075
0075-103
less 2075103
0202
0202-101
0202-102
0202-103
12
24.4
25
25.1
25.2
25.3
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
32.1
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Technical education
Medical and public health
Urban health services
Medical education, research and training
Public health
Family welfare
Water supply and sanitation
Urban development
Information and publicity
Labour and employment
Social security and welfare
Other social services
Welfare of SC, ST and OBC
Economic Services
Crop husbandry
Animal husbandry (3)
Dairy development
Fisheries (excluding 0405-011)
Forestry (4)
Plantations
Food storages and warehousing
Cooperation
Other agricultural programme
Land Reforms (5)
Other rural development programmes
Other special areas programmes
Power (1)
Village and small industries
Non-ferrous mining and metallurgical industries (excluding 0853-102)
Other industries
Ports and lighthouses
Civil aviation
Road transport
Other scientific research
Tourism
Civil supplies
Other economic services
0202-02
0210
0210-01
0210-03
0210-04
0211
0215
0217
0220
0230
0235
0250
0250-102
0401
0403
0404
0405
0406-01
0407
0408
0425
0435
0506
0515
0575
0801
0851
0853
0875
1051
1053
1055
1425
1452
1456
1475
Notes: The Budget head numbers in the table are based on the Budget for Gujarat for 2005-06. There
is some variation in items included in minor budget heads across States and years.
(1): May include contra entries.
(2): Head 0071 less head 2071, pertaining to pensions and retirement benefits, is omitted as
being conceptually capital receipts.
(3): Includes head 0403-110, Grants from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, which
should be netted out to calculate a State's own non-tax revenue.
(4): Mainly consists of 0406-01, sale of timber and other forest produce.
(5): Includes 0506-103, receipts from maintenance of land records.
13
2
Fiscal Significance of States’
Own Non-tax Sources
Non-tax revenue is one of the constituents of the revenue receipts of the Indian States.
In the decade of the nineties, States own non-tax revenue constituted between 13.7 and 17.7
percent of the total revenue receipts and between 9.2 and 13.1 percent of the total receipts of
the States. These proportions have since then declined considerably. States own non-tax
revenue as percent of the total revenue receipts is reported to be 12.1 percent and as percent of
total receipts of the States as 2.9 1 percent in 2003-04.
Non-tax revenue as a percentage of GSDP is an indicator of the efficiency in
mobilization of these revenues in the total revenue receipts. While the proportion of States own
non-tax revenue to GSDP in Indian States has varied between 1.5 and 2.4 percent over the
years, it may be useful to note the non-tax mobilization by other countries in a comparative
context. Data on non-tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 2 bring out the fact that Botswana has
the highest ratio of the order of 29 percent in 1998. Countries like Singapore, Egypt and Iran
having 10 percent non-tax revenue to GDP ratio can provide some useful lessons in non-tax
revenue mobilization (Table 2.1).
Composition and Trends in States’ Own Non-tax Revenues
Trends in own non-tax revenue (Ontr) of the Indian States indicate that while there is
an increase in absolute terms over the years, as percent to aggregate receipts, it has gradually
declined from 11.6 percent in 1993-94 to 8.4 percent in 2002-03 and further to 2.9 percent in
2003-04 (Table 2.2). It has recorded a growth rate of only 7.9 percent per year 3 while
1
While in absolute terms the own non-tax revenues have gone up, the decline in the proportion is primarily due to
a major increase in capital receipts of the states.
2
International Monetary Fund. 2006. Government Finance Statistics, June. Washington, D C.
3
The growth rate is estimated over a period of time by fitting the following relationship: R = abt, where b = (1+r),
b is the value of growth character of R, and t varies from 1 to n.
exhibiting buoyancy 4 of less than 1 over the period. On the other hand, although its share in
total non-tax revenue increased marginally from 42.4 percent in 1993-94 to 42.7 percent in
2003-04, its contribution to current account receipts and GDP has gone down from about 14.8
percent and 2 percent in 1993-94, respectively to 12.1 percent and 1.5 percent in 2003-04,
respectively. Also with respect to States own revenue, Sontr has exhibited a decline to 19.3
percent in 2003-04 as compared to 25.1 percent in 1993-94 (Table 2.2).
In terms of contribution of own non-tax revenue to GSDP, some of the States indicate
an increasing trend. Goa, for example, recorded Ontr of 5.7 percent of GSDP in 1993-94,
which increased to 14.1 percent by the year 2001-02. However, it recorded a decline thereafter
and rested at the level of 7.5 percent in 2003-04. This fall in the percentage share could,
however, be attributed to a fall in the growth rate of Goa’s Ontr during the second time period,
i.e. when period under consideration is bifurcated into two time periods, viz. 1993-94 to 199899 and 1999-00 to 2003-04, it is observed that Goa has witnessed a steep fall in growth rate of
Ontr, from 39.9 percent during first time period to 5.5 percent during second time period.
Consequently, the buoyancy of the Ontr declined from 1.8 to 0.7 between the two time periods
resulting in the buoyancy value of 1.4 for the whole period, (i.e. 1993-94 to 2003-04).
The three other States that have witnessed rising trend in the share of States’ Ontr to
GSDP are Gujarat, Punjab and Tamil Nadu, whereas rest of the States exhibited a declining
trend. Their average contribution to GSDP stood at about 2.5 percent, 4.3 percent and 1.1
percent per annum, respectively (Table 2.3). Over the period while Punjab has recorded an
increase in Ontr at the rate of 17 percent per annum, it was 12.1 percent and 11.8 percent per
annum in case of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, respectively. Considering the growth rate and
buoyancy between the two time periods, it may be observed that all the three States, (i.e.
Gujarat, Punjab and Tamil Nadu) have witnessed a fall in growth rate to 4.1 percent, 18.3
percent and 10 percent, respectively in the second phase from 14 percent, 22.3 percent, and
10.9 percent per annum in the first phase. On the other hand, while Punjab and Tamil Nadu
exhibited a rise in the buoyancy of States Ontr, it declined in Gujarat. All the three States
registered buoyancy in the Ontr for the whole period.
All the other major States have exhibited a gradual decline in their share of Ontr to
GSDP from the level that was obtained in the early 1990’s. The States, which exhibited fall of
more than half in the ratio, during the period, are Haryana, Maharashtra, West Bengal and
Madhya Pradesh. These States occupy the lowest rank in terms of Ontr--GSDP ratio. Even
when all non-special category States (includes all major States and three States of
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and NCT Delhi), are analysed, it shows a decline in the Ontr from 1.6
percent in 1993-94 to 1.3 percent in the year 2003-04, recording a growth rate of 7.5 percent
per annum with rather less buoyant (0.7) Ontr.
4
Buoyancy coefficient is a measure of the degree of responsiveness to changes in income. It is expressed as: δ =
(dY/dX)*X/Y and estimated by following relationship: ln Y = α + β ln X where X is independent variable
(income) and Y is dependent variable (tax revenue).
15
Components of States’ Own Non-tax Revenue (Ontr)
Revenue from interests, dividends and profits, general services, economic services and
social services; forms key constituents of the Ontr of the Indian States. As it may be observed
from Table 2.2 that while States’ Ontr as percent to total non-tax revenue has increased only
marginally over the years; its share has declined as a percent of aggregate receipts as well as
percent of current account receipts & GDP. However, this decline can be attributed to the
slowdown in the rate of growth of components of Ontr, particularly, revenue earned from
interest receipts and social services. For an overall analysis of States’ Ontr, these sources are
analysed below in detail in respect of their contribution to revenue in each State.
The interest receipts component of States’ Ontr is often misleading in nature as it
merely denotes book transfers and that too internal transfer from other States Government
departments. Apart from being so, interest receipts grew only at 7.1 percent per annum and
therefore create sluggishness in the growth of non-tax revenue in the States. The average rate
of return on capital invested in the State Electricity Boards, which accounts for the bulk of the
State investment in public sector undertakings, had been persistently negative as they defaulted
in interest payment and loan repayment regularly5 . Their contribution to the all-States’ Ontr
went down steadily from 30.4 percent in 1993-94 to 22.6 percent in 2003-04 (Table 2.2).
Revenue from dividends and profits arise from the State Government’s investment in
the shares of co-operative institutions, statutory corporations, Government companies and
other joint stock companies. However, in majority of cases no dividend is received due to nonavailability of surpluses or due to losses. Though dividends and profits exhibit an impressive
growth rate of 16.4 percent per annum, its share as percent to States’ Ontr has always remained
less than 1, except in the year 2003-04 in which case its percentage share increased to 1.02
percent (Table 2.2). Consequently, the share of this source is quite negligible.
Thus, the above two sources of non-tax revenues, i.e. interest receipts, profits and
dividends, can hardly be relied upon for the growth of non-tax revenue sources.
Other components of States’ Ontr are recoveries from services rendered by the
Government, which broadly may be grouped as (1) general services, (2) social services, and (3)
economic services. About two-third of the States’ Ontr accrues from these services. The share
of these services has shown a rising trend during the past few years, not so much due to the
absolute rise in this source, but because of the decline in other sources. Among these three
services, the share of economic services has remained highest, while social services have
contributed the least.
Social services and economic services have exhibited an upward trend with respect to
States’ Ontr, while general services have shown considerable fluctuations. Economic services,
which were contributing about 44.5 percent to States’ Ontr in 1993-94, had fallen considerably
5
See Government of India. Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission. New Delhi. p.47.
16
in 1997-98 to 34.1 percent. However, this share reverted and reached around its initial level by
2003-04 (Table 2.2). Among these services, the general services have been the least consistent,
followed by social services and economic services. As percent to aggregate receipts and
GSDP, all three services have shown decline during the period from 2.2 percent to 0.7 percent
and from 0.38 percent to 0.37 percent, respectively for general services, from 0.7 percent to 0.3
percent and 0.12 percent to 0.13 percent, respectively for social services and from 5.2 percent
to 1.2 percent and 0.9 percent to 0.7 percent in case of economic services (Table 2.2). On the
other hand, as percent to current account receipts and States’ own revenue, while both general
services and economic services have shown a declining trend over the years, the social services
have exhibited an upward trend although its share is minimum in States own revenue that has
varied from 1.5 percent in 1993-94 to 1.7 percent in 2003-04. As percent to total non-tax
revenue also, while general services and social services displayed a rise in their share (from 8.0
percent and 2.5 percent, respectively in 1993-94 to 10.5 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively
in 2003-04), economic services exhibited a modest decline from 18.8 percent in 1993-94 to
18.5 percent in 2003-04 (Table 2.2).
Receipts from General Services
Receipts from general services originates from (a) public service commission, (b)
police, (c) jails, (d) supplies and disposals, (e) stationary and printing, (f) public works, (g)
other administrative services, (h) contribution and recoveries towards pension and other
retirement benefits, and (i) other miscellaneous general services.
The revenue from general services as percent to States’ Ontr has shown downward
trend over the years. While its yield in 1993-94, in absolute terms, was only Rs 2,947.23 crore,
it increased to Rs.9,372.43 crore in 2003-04, registering growth rate of 6.4 percent per annum.
Also, the share in Ontr increased to the level of 24.5 percent in 2003-04 from 18.9 percent in
1993-94, after reaching a peak of 33.3 percent in the year 1995-96. As a result it indicates lack
of buoyancy (0.5) (Table 2.2).
On classifying the States according to the level of income, i.e. into the category of high
income States, middle income States, and low income States, it may be observed that the
average percentage share of general services in States’ Ontr is highest for high-income States
(31.2 percent) and lowest for middle-income States (14.8 percent). The share of low-income
States is 17.4 percent (Table 2.3). It may also be observed that while high-income and lowincome States exhibited a declining trend over the years, middle-income States exhibited a
rising trend. However, in terms of growth rate and buoyancy, in middle-income States it has
been growing at the highest rate (18.3 percent) while remaining buoyant for the period under
consideration. On the other hand, in high-income States it has been growing at 7.3 percent per
annum while in the low-income States it exhibited a declining growth rate of -5.0 percent,
exhibiting buoyancy value of 0.7 and -0.6, respectively (Table 2.3). Taking two time period
under consideration, viz. 1993-94 to 1998-99 and 1999-00 to 2003-04, it may be noted that in
all three income categories of States, there has been an improvement in growth rate of general
receipts in second time period as compared to the level reached during first time period. The
17
same is true with buoyancy values.
A rising trend in revenue from general services has been displayed in 11 of the 15
major States while the remaining 4, i.e. Haryana, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh,
recorded a declining trend. A comparative analysis across the States and amongst the highincome States indicates that the revenue from general services in Punjab has exhibited the
highest average share (55.9 percent) in States’ Ontr. It increased from 16.3 percent in 1993-94
to whooping 55.6 percent in 2003-04. However, Punjab’s maximum share in States’ Ontr was
80.2 percent in 1994-95 and lowest share of 8.6 percent in 1996-97. Over the years revenue
from general services in Punjab has grown at the rate of 27.3 percent while exhibiting a
buoyancy of 2.4 (Table 2.3). In 1993-94, Haryana contributed about 64.4 percent of general
revenue to States’ Ontr (which was the highest share amongst the States). However, it declined
over the years and Haryana contributed roughly half of its initial share (about 30.5 percent) in
2003-04; whereas Punjab had the largest share of about 55.6 percent. Nevertheless, on an
average, Haryana contributes about 51.1 percent per annum to the States’ Ontr. Amongst the
high-income States, on the other hand, Goa has been the least consistent State contributing on
an average about 35.8 percent to States Ontr. The revenue from general services in Goa was
only 2.8 percent of States’ Ontr in the first two years, which varied between 36 and 56.7
percent.
Middle-income States, on the other hand, showed a rising trend over the years. In the
year 1993-94, Kerala’s revenue from general services as percent of States’ Ontr was highest
amongst the middle-income States. This, however, declined over the years and Karnataka’s
share of revenue from general services to the States’ Ontr was the highest (60.3 percent) in the
year 2003-04; though the average contribution of Kerala’s share remained higher than the
Karnataka’s share (Table2.3). In Kerala it was contributing about 27.8 percent to States’ Ontr
in 1993-94, which increased to 38.1 percent in 2003-04; rising at the rate of 11.7 percent per
annum while remaining perfectly elastic for the whole period. Average contribution of revenue
from general services to GSDP stood at 0.3 percent over the years.
On the other hand, Karnataka was contributing about 9.5 percent to States’ Ontr, which
increased to 27.3 percent in 2002-03. However, it almost doubled in 2003-04 and stood at 60.3
percent. In Karnataka, revenue from general services has been rising at the rate of 24.2 percent
per annum, exhibiting the buoyancy of 1.7 for the whole period. The rate of growth and
buoyancy for the second time period was 74 percent and 7.2, respectively, which was much
higher than the first time period (12.2 percent and 0.8, respectively). Its average contribution to
GSDP stood at 0.3 percent per annum. It must be noted that it is the State amongst middleincome States, which has been the least consistent over the years.
The rest of the middle-income States, viz. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and West
Bengal have contributed on an average about 5.5 percent, 16.3 percent and 25.5 percent,
respectively to States’ Ontr. However, as percent to GSDP, their respective share was 0.1
percent, 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively (Table 2.3).
18
Three of low-income States have shown a rise in their share over the years while the
rest have exhibited a decline. However, in three States it has exhibited the declining trend in
their revenue from general services. Amongst the low-income States, in Uttar Pradesh revenue
from general services has been the highest contributor to the States’ Ontr. Its average share in
States’ revenue stood at 26.3 percent per annum. Its share was almost 50 percent of States’
Ontr in 1993-94, which increased to 55 percent in 1995-96, and declined thereafter to 12.5
percent in 2003-04. Thus, it has shown high variation amongst the low-income States. The
State with second highest average share in States’ Ontr is Rajasthan, which contributed about
22.8 percent per annum. Rajasthan is followed by States like Bihar, Orissa and Madhya
Pradesh. Their contribution to own non-tax receipts stood at 15 percent, 9.2 percent and 8.4
percent per annum, respectively. In the low-income States, revenue from general services
constituted 0.4 percent of GSDP, where Rajasthan has contributed highest (0.7 percent),
followed by Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa (Table 2.3).
Receipts from Social Services
Revenue contribution of social services was least, although it grew at the highest rate
among other services - at 14.5 percent annually and these receipts were buoyant (1.2) at allStates level. As percent of States’ Ontr, receipts from these services increased from 5.9 percent
in 1993-94 to 8.6 percent in 2003-04 (Table 2.2).
Amongst the three income-category States, viz. high, middle and low income category,
the share of social services in Ontr was highest in middle-income category States (9.1 percent),
followed by high-income (5.6 percent) and low-income (4.5 percent) States in 1993-94.
However, by the year 2003-04 low-income States become the highest contributor (contributing
about 12 percent), followed by middle-income States (10.6 percent) and high-income States
(7.1 percent). In terms of growth rate and buoyancy, not only all the three income categories
exhibited a growth rate of almost 14 percent but also remained buoyant for the period under
consideration.
Amongst major States, revenue from social services in West Bengal has contributed the
most to its Ontr (about 19.2 percent) in 1993-94, followed by Kerala (13.0 percent), Tamil
Nadu (12.5 percent), and Punjab (11.0 percent). The States that made the least contribution are
Madhya Pradesh (3.7 percent), Uttar Pradesh (3.7 percent), Bihar (3.5 percent) and Haryana
(3.0 percent) (Table 2.3). The rest of the States made contributions in the range of 5 percent to
7 percent, except Goa, which contributed around 9.5 percent of the States’ Ontr. On the other
hand in 1993-94 revenue from social services as percent of GSDP was highest in Goa among
high-income States as well as in all other States.
Amongst middle-income States, the percentage share in Kerala (0.16) was the highest
while it was Rajasthan (0.24) amongst low-income States. Taking revenue of social services
from all-States as percent of GSDP into account, one finds that the proportion is meager, just
about 0.12 percent, whereas in all non-special States it stood at 0.10 percent. This implies that
the share in all special category States is not more than 0.02 percent of GSDP.
19
In the year 2003-04, on the other hand, Bihar is the State whose revenue from social
services as percent of States’ Ontr was highest (28.1 percent) followed by Tamil Nadu (22.8
percent); whereas as percent of GSDP, Goa has the highest ratio accounting about 0.8 percent
of GSDP. Seven out of 15 major States contribute about 10 percent to 16 percent of States’
Ontr. Remaining States show this percentage varying between 2 percent and 6 percent (Table
2.3).
In all non-special category States, receipts from social services increased from
Rs.88,587 lakh in 1993-94 to Rs.307,543 lakh in 2003-04, registering a growth rate of 14.2
percent per annum (whereas exhibiting fall in rate between the two time periods from 15.1
percent during first time period to 9.5 percent during the second time period). Its share in
States’ Ontr have exhibited upward trend, rising from 6.0 percent in 1993-94 to 8.8 percent in
2003-04 (Table 2.3). The buoyancy coefficient has also remained more than 1 between the two
time periods and over the period.
Receipts from Economic Services
The revenue from economic services, in absolute terms, at the all-States level increased
from Rs.6,921.13 crore in 1993-94 to 16,525.45 crore in 2003-04, while growing at the rate of
8.4 percent per annum. However, as percent to States’ Ontr, it exhibited a modest decline from
44.5 percent in 1993-94 to 43.3 percent in 2003-04 (Table 2.2). On an average, 38.7 percent is
drawn from economic services as percent of all-States’ Ontr.
In fact, revenue from low-income States contributed the most (52.2 percent) over the
years, showing signs of increasing share in States’ Ontr (from 49.5 percent in 1993-94 to 50.5
percent in 2003-04). In high-income and middle-income States there has been a decline to 38.8
and 33.7 percent, respectively in 2003-04 from the level of 38.9 and 38.7 percent, respectively
in 1993-94 (Table 2.3). However, as a percent of GSDP all three-income categories showed a
decline in their share over the period. In terms of growth rate and buoyancy, in high-income
States it was 9.3 percent per annum and 0.8, respectively followed by middle-income States
(9.7 percent per annum and 0.8, respectively) and low-income States (1.2 percent per annum
and 0.2, respectively) (Table 2.3).
Amongst the low-income States, although the average share of revenue from economic
services in Sontr has been significant in Madhya Pradesh followed by that of Orissa and Bihar;
in all three States it exhibited a declining trend during the period. In Madhya Pradesh revenue
from economic services contributed about 74.9 percent of States’ Ontr in 1993-94, which
increased further to 84.2 percent by 2003-04. This was 62 percent and 61.3 percent,
respectively in Orissa (Table 2.3). Contribution from economic services to the States’ Ontr was
highest in Bihar. It contributed about 90.1 percent in States’ Ontr in 1993-94. But this declined
drastically to 38.1 percent in 2003-04. Due to the declining growth rate (-16.3 percent per
annum) over the years Bihar’s contribution was on an average about 62.8 percent to States’
Ontr. It has also shown enormous variations among the low-income States.
20
On the other hand, in three of middle-income States, the revenue from economic
services has exhibited an upward trend over the years. In four out of five middle-income
States, it has contributed more than 35 percent of the States’ Ontr. It may be observed that the
share of revenue from economic services in States’ Ontr is highest in Kerala, contributing on
an average 43.2 percent per annum, while growing at the rate of 4 percent per annum.
However, in Karnataka it has been growing at the fastest rate (12.2 percent per annum);
contributing about 37.7 percent on an average over the years while remaining highly buoyant
for the whole period. Also, the State exhibited least consistency over the years as compared to
other States under middle-income category.
In the high-income States, revenue from economic services has exhibited the rising
trend only in Haryana and Gujarat. Their average contributions to States’ Ontr were 28.0 and
33.4 percent, respectively, while growing at the rate of 9.4 and 14 percent per annum,
respectively (Table 2.3). In Goa, the share has remained highest over the years followed by
Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Haryana. Its share was 85.4 percent of States’ Ontr in 1993-94
which increased to about 88 percent by 2003-04, (on an average it contributed about 56.4
percent to States’ Ontr), growing at the rate of 19.8 percent per annum. In Punjab, the share
stood at 54 percent of States’ Ontr in 1993-94, which declined to 18.6 percent in 1998-99.
However, it declined considerably by the year 2003-04 and reached the level of 10.7 percent of
Ontr, contributing on an average 16 percent to Sontr. Because of high fluctuations, it has been
the least consistent State among the high-income category States.
Components of Social Services
The major items that fall under this service are: (a) Education, sports, arts and culture,
(b) Medical, public health, and Family welfare, (c) Water supply and sanitation, (d) Housing,
(e) Urban Development, (f) Labour and employment, (g) Social security and welfare, and (h)
Other social services. The share of these components in social services in the beginning of the
period under consideration and at the end of the period can be seen in the Exhibit 2.2.
Amongst these components of social services, initially the share of revenue from
medical, public health and family welfare as percent to revenue from social services was the
highest. However, by the end of the period under consideration revenue from education, sports,
arts and culture becomes the chief contributor. Also, the revenue from urban development and
water supply and sanitation were the other fast growing components of social services. All
these components constitute the major portion of receipts from social services for all-States.
However, the revenue from each service varies from one State to another.
The relative importance of these select activities and changes in their relative share in
social services for all 15 major States, during the year 1993-94 and 2003-04, are shown in
Tables 2.4 to 2.7.
Education, arts, sports and culture
The substantial part of budgeted non-tax receipts under this head comes from secondary
21
education and most of the receipts are accounted for by general and technical education.
However, the share of general education has declined over the years, from 84.4 percent in
1993-94 to 58.1 percent in 2003-04 while the share of technical education has increased
substantially from only 9.4 percent to 37.3 percent.
Despite the active involvement of the private sector in most areas of education and
research in India for decades, Government still plays a key role in the sector. It runs core
institutions offering general education at primary, secondary and higher levels. It has also a
dominant presence in almost all areas of professional and technical education including the
subjects like art, culture and drama. Government exercises control over almost all the
regulatory functions that need to be performed for ensuring the quality of education.
Revenue receipts from education accrue mainly from user charges levied for services
directly supplied by State run institutions. Another source of non-tax revenues are the fees and
penalties arising out of the regulatory functions performed by Government in the field of
education. Revenue from education, sports, arts and culture is one of the major components of
revenue from social services. It constitutes, on an average, about 26.5 percent of social services
in all-States. Over the years, revenue from this sector increased from Rs.219.4 crore in 1993-94
to Rs. 1,033.1 crore in 2003-04 (for all-States). This revenue source had a growth rate of 17.5
percent per annum and remained buoyant for the whole period for each category of States. As a
percent to receipts from social services, it increased from 24 percent in 1993-94 to 31.5 percent
in 2003-04.
However, during the same time period the receipts from education, sports, arts and
culture in all the States other than special category States, increased from 24.0 percent to 30.1
percent; growing at 16.8 percent per annum (Table 2.4). It shows that the share of all special
category States in revenue from education, sports, arts and culture is quite insignificant.
Amongst the major States, revenue from education, sports, arts and culture in highincome States exhibited a declining trend over the years. However, the other two categories
displayed an upward trend. It is observed that the share in low-income States increased
substantially over the years, while in high-income States it has increased only marginally. The
share of the middle-income States’ reverted to 30.5 percent in 2003-04. This had initially
declined to 24.1 percent of revenue from social services in 1998-99 from 31.6 percent in 199394. On the other hand, the average contribution of revenue from education, sports, arts and
culture as percent to revenue from social services has been highest in middle-income States
(32.1 percent). This was 30.9 percent for low-income States and only 17.2 percent for highincome States. In terms of growth rate and buoyancy, the growth rate of receipts from
education, sports, arts and culture has been highest in low-income States (20.6 percent), along
with highest buoyancy (1.9). Middle-income States and high-income States had a growth rate
and buoyancy of 16.7 percent & 1.3; and 11.3 percent & 1.0, respectively (Table 2.4).
Of the 15 major States, ten contributed to the rise in all-States’ revenue from education,
sports, arts and culture. Of these, four were high-income States (Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and
22
Punjab) and four were low income States (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan & Uttar
Pradesh). Only two middle-income States (Kerala and West Bengal) showed an increasing
trend. In 1993-94, revenue from education, sports, arts and culture in 8 States contributed more
than 20 percent to social services; whereas in 2003-04 two more States joined the group.
As percent to States’ Ontr, the contribution of majority of the States has been less than
2 percent over the period. On an average, revenue from education, sports, arts and culture was
highest in Kerala, followed by Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, whereas the least was collected
in Goa, Maharashtra, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh etc. Also, while the all three income
categories exhibited a rise in their share in Sontr for the period under consideration, the
average contribution was highest for middle-income States followed by low-income States and
high-income States (Table 2.4).
In this analysis of revenue from education, sports, arts and culture as a percent of
GSDP, it has been observed that the percentage share of this component of social services in
GSDP in all States has risen from 0.03 percent in 1993-94 to 0.04 percent in 2003-04. The
same trend is seen in case of all non-special category States. Amongst the major States, in
1993-94 the share in middle-income States has remained higher than in other two categories.
However, in the later period it is the low-income category States whose share in GSDP was the
highest (0.07 percent) (Table 2.4).
Medical, public health and family welfare
Non-tax revenues accruing from the health sector are accounted for from rural and
urban health services, medical education and public health. The revenue from this sector
indicates that the major part is drawn from the urban health services. In 1993-94, this revenue
contributed about 87.8 percent of health services. However, this declined over the years and
stood at about 71 percent in 2003-04. Also, share of public health services was 6.4 percent in
1993-94, which increased to 14.6 percent by the year 2003-04.
Medical, public health and family welfare is another significant component of social
services. However, revenue from this sector in all-States has exhibited a declining trend over
the years. As a percent of revenue from social services, its share declined to half, i.e. from 34.9
percent in 1993-94 to 17.7 percent in 2003-04, contributing on an average 25.1 percent per
annum. In all-States, it has been rising at the rate of 9.1 percent per annum, while remaining
less buoyant for the whole period (Table 2.5). It exhibited declining growth rate from 8.0
percent in first time period to 4.9 percent per annum in the second time period. On the other
hand, as percent to States’ own non-tax receipts, revenue from health services in all-States
showed an upward trend with share declining from 2.1 percent in 1993-94 to 1.5 percent in
2003-04 (Table 2.5).
It may be noted that as percent to revenue from social services, the revenue from health
services exhibited a declining trend in all the three income categories; whereas as percent to
States’ own non-tax receipts, it registered an upward trend only in low-income States. Their
average contribution to social services stood at 29.1 percent, 30.0 percent and 16.0 percent;
23
respectively while as percent to States’ Ontr it was 1.5 percent, 2.9 percent and 1.3 percent;
rising over the years at the rate of 7.9 percent, 8.9 percent and 8.6 percent per annum,
respectively (Table 2.5).
State wise analysis indicates that each of the major States demonstrated a declining
trend over the years, whereas Goa (high-income States), Andhra Pradesh (middle-income
States) and Bihar (low-income States) showed utmost variation with respect to social services.
The average share of revenue from medical, public health and family welfare in social services
was highest in West Bengal (59.4 percent) amongst the States. It has been rising at the rate of
5.2 percent per annum while exhibiting negative growth rate and buoyancy between the two
time periods. It is followed by States like Punjab, Maharashtra, and Gujarat with the average
share of 38.8 percent, 32.8 percent and 32.7 percent, respectively. On the other hand, as a
percent of States’ Ontr, the highest average share was 8.3 percent in West Bengal. A rise in the
share of receipts from health services as percent to States’ Ontr is seen only in five States, viz.
Haryana, Maharashtra, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
As percent to GSDP, revenue from medical, public health and family welfare in allStates constituted only 0.02 percent in 2003-04 and it was never more than 0.04 percent for the
period under consideration. There has been a fall in this revenue in every State except in Goa
where it has increased from 0.06 percent in 1993-94 to 0.08 percent in 2003-04. In no State has
the share of medical, public health and family welfare as percent to GSDP crossed the mark of
1 percent level. This shows that the revenue from this service forms very minuscule part of
GSDP due to the nature of service, which is highly subsidized (Table 2.5).
Urban development
In all-States, revenue from urban development contributed substantially to social
services. Its share as percent to social services increased to 13.5 percent in 2003-04 from mere
3.1 percent in 1993-94, while growing at the rate of 20.5 percent per annum (Table 2.6).
Among different income category States, the average share of high-income States in revenue
from social services has been the highest (about 11.9 percent) followed by middle-income
States (6.3 percent) and low-income States (1.2 percent). However, all three income-categories
exhibited a rise in revenue from urban development as a percent of revenue from social
services. While in high-income States and middle-income States, this increased from 6.6
percent and 1.3 percent (1993-94), respectively to 21.3 percent and 19.0 percent (2003-04),
respectively; in low-income States it has increased by only 0.5 percent, from 1.2 percent to 1.6
percent for the same period (Table 2.6). This trend is due to the relationship of this service with
the stage of economic development of the State.
Over the years, share of receipts from urban development in both States’ Ontr and
GSDP has risen in high, middle and low-income States. In terms of consistency, it has been
found to be least consistent in middle-income States with respect to all three elements: as
percent of social services, as percent of State Ontr and as percent of GSDP. However, in terms
of growth rate and buoyancy, it may be observed that in low-income States it has recorded the
highest growth rate (23.9 percent), followed by high-income (22.8 percent) and middle-income
24
States (11.1 percent). However, the buoyancy was highest in high-income States (2.0) and the
lowest in middle-income States (0.9). Low-income States showed the buoyancy of the order of
1.98 (Table 2.6).
Urban development in Haryana has been the main contributor to social services
revenue. On an average it has contributed 31.5 percent to social services. Its share in 1993-94
was 7.7 percent. This increased to about 50 percent in 1997-98, but declined to 32.8 percent by
the year 2002-03. However, within one year, its share again rose to 53.9 percent of social
services. Due to these high fluctuations, Haryana has been least consistent among the highincome States. The other least consistent States are Gujarat and Maharashtra. Another
noticeable feature about Haryana is that during first time period, (i.e. 1993-94 to 1998-99),
revenue from urban development has been growing at the remarkable rate of about 95 percent
whereas during the second phase the growth rate declined to 21.7 percent, recording growth
rate of 39.6 percent per annum for the entire period. This source has remained highly buoyant
in Haryana as compared to other high-income States (Table 2.6).
On the other hand, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are the middle-income States, which
have shown maximum variations in revenue from urban development. While in Karnataka the
share was 0.6 percent of social services in 1993-94, it increased to 47.9 percent in 1995-96 but
declined thereafter to 1.9 percent in 2003-04. Whereas its share in Tamil Nadu was 0.7 percent
in 1993-94, it increased to 40.8 percent by the end of the period. On the whole the growth rate
in the middle-income States was 11.1 percent per annum (Table 2.6).
Thus, the revenue from urban development in high-income States is highly responsive
to change in GSDP and these States’ share in social services revenue is the highest. The share
of low-income States is highly consistent (both as percent to social services and as percent to
GSDP) and is growing at the highest rate per annum. However, in the share of middle-income
States it has witnessed considerable fluctuations.
Water supply and sanitation
Though the share of revenue from water supply and sanitation in social services in allStates was negligible during the initial period, it contributed about 12.3 percent of social
services in 2003-04. In absolute terms, the revenue from this source increased to Rs.40,350
lakh in 2003-04 from negligible amount in 1993-94. On an average, its share in social services
has been 10.6 percent. The State in which revenue from water supply and sanitation
contributed the most is Goa followed by States like Rajasthan and Orissa. The average
contribution of these States during the period was 67.4 percent, 57 percent and 23.3 percent,
respectively (Table 2.7). Also, these were the States with high inconsistency.
Considering the high, middle and low income categories States, on an average, the
percentage share of revenue from water supply and sanitation in social services was maximum
in low-income States (20.2 percent) followed by high-income (9.8 percent) and middle-income
States (2.2 percent). Also, in terms of consistency of revenue, the low-income States were least
consistent; middle-income States were highly consistent. However, in terms of their share as
25
percent to GSDP, there has been high variation in high-income States while it was least in
middle-income States.
Growth rate and buoyancy for the period 1995-96 to 2003-04 has been highest for highincome States, 16.5 percent and 1.7, respectively; followed by middle-income and low-income
States 6 (Table 2.7). Goa contributed highest share amongst the high-income States. It grew at
the rate of about 19.3 percent per annum. In Punjab, its share has also been quite significant in
this income category. Water supply and sanitation has, on an average, contributed 14.3 percent
to revenue from social services. Its share was about 25.3 percent in 2003-04, which increased
from 4.7% in 1993-94. In Punjab, however, revenue from this source has been rising at a much
higher rate as compared to Goa, at about 29.4 percent per annum and a buoyancy of 2.9.
In case of middle-income States, the average share of Andhra Pradesh was significant,
although it declined from 8.4 percent to 2.5 percent over the years. The scenario was the same
in the low-income States of Rajasthan and Orissa. Revenue from water supply and sanitation in
West Bengal as percent of social services stood at 6.7 percent in 2003-04. This was only 3.2
percent in 1995-96. In West Bengal it exhibited a rising trend over the years; and has been
growing at the rate of 25.2 percent per annum, though there has been a high variation during
the period under consideration.
Components of Economic Services
The revenue from economic services comprise receipts from (a) Crop husbandry, (b)
Animal husbandry, (c) Fisheries, (d) Forestry and wild life, (e) Co-operation, (f) Other
agricultural and rural programmes, (g) Major and medium irrigation, (h) Minor irrigation, (i)
Village and small scale industries, (j) Industries, (k) Plantations, (l) Power, (m) Petroleum, (n)
Ports and Light Houses, (0) Road Transport, (p) Tourism and, (q) Others.
Amongst the major constituents of economic services, the share of industries & forestry
and wildlife was the highest. On the other hand, revenue trend of forestry and wildlife has
exhibited the highest variability. There were also fluctuations in revenue from power, major
and medium irrigation projects and roads and bridges. All these components together constitute
more than 75 percent of economic services. Exhibit 2.3 shows the percentage share of each of
select component of economic services for the years 1993-94 & 2003-04.
Forestry and wildlife
Forestry is the second largest land-use in the country following agriculture. It provides
livelihood to an estimated 275 million people in rural areas, which includes a high portion of
tribals and poorest and most vulnerable groups in society.
Under forestry, revenue is mainly realized from forests on Government lands. Forest
produce is directly exploited and sold by the Government. Revenue from different items from
forests by Government is derived principally from timber, followed by firewood and charcoal,
6
Growth rate and buoyancy could not be calculated for the entire period for all states in want of data.
26
eucalyptus, driftwood, bamboo, sandalwood, grass and sandal oil. Government exercises a
regulatory function by levying fines for violations of rules on both Government and private
land and collecting permit and license fees. In case of private forests, revenue is earned
through fees levied under the Tree Preservation Act, seignorage on reserved trees, fees for
activities like stamping logs etc. Also, in order to conserve biodiversity in the animal world in
a natural environment, wildlife is protected by reserving land for National Parks and
Sanctuaries and protecting them.
Forests account for around 67 million hectares, i.e. nearly 20.6 percent of the land area
in India. In addition, there is another 2.5 percent of land in the country under tree cover. Thus
23 percent of the country is under forest and tree cover. Bulks of the forests in the country are
located in the Western Himalayas, East Deccan, North Eastern region and the Western Ghats.
The inter-state distribution of forests is quite skewed and therefore, the revenue from forestry
and wildlife may vary from State to State as one State may have huge area under forestry and
wild life, (e.g. Madhya Pradesh) while another State may have a very thin forest cover area,
(e.g. Bihar).
Amongst the three income-categories States, the middle-income States have maximum
forest cover area. Then comes the low-income and high-income States. As a percent of revenue
from economic services, it is maximum in middle-income States (23.7 percent) as compared to
other two categories. The major source of revenue of forest departments is from auctioning and
sale of timber, which is a Government monopoly. However, except Bihar, almost all the States
exhibited a declining trend in their receipts from forestry and wildlife. According to a Supreme
Court ruling, silviculture and timber exploitation cannot be undertaken by a State in a forest
zone until it has in place “scientific” work plans covering the zone. The failure of some States
to draw up work plans is the chief cause of severely declining forest revenues. The decline is
particularly marked in States like Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. Though States like Orissa and
Madhya Pradesh (in the low-income category) account for the maximum forest cover, nearly
37.3 and 31 percent of their geographical area, respectively, it is State of Kerala whose average
revenue from forest and wildlife as percent of revenue from economic services is highest (59.4
percent) (Table 2.8).
All-States’ revenue from forestry and wildlife as percent to States’ Ontr has declined
over the years, (from 9.6 percent in 1993-94 to 5.1 percent in 2003-04). To this, the share in
low-income States is highest (12 percent) followed by middle-income (8.2 percent) and highincome (1.8 percent) States. The average contribution from forestry and wild life in Madhya
Pradesh is the highest (27.7 percent). The revenue in West Bengal was least consistent over the
period, contributing 7.9 percent on an average. In 1993-94, Madhya Pradesh was the State with
highest share in States’ Ontr (35.1 percent). It maintained its position even in the year 2003-04,
contributing 33.6 percent to States’ Ontr. The next big contributor is Kerala (Table 2.8).
As percent to GSDP, on the other hand, the average revenue from forest and wildlife
stood at 0.25 percent in low-income States while it was 0.11 percent and 0.05 percent in case
of middle-income and high-income States, respectively. In no State the average share
27
constitutes 1 percent of GSDP during the period. In terms of growth rate and buoyancy, 7 out
of 15 major States exhibited a negative growth rate and buoyancy value (Table 2.8).
Irrigation
Irrigation projects are important national assets, created by pumping in huge
investments, whose benefits cannot be evaluated in terms of direct financial returns. They
generate social benefits in the form of better health and hygienic standards, higher literacy,
better habitats etc., culminating in overall better standards of life, particularly in neglected rural
communities, leading to higher productivity of water and land and human resources.
Based on the area irrigated, these irrigation projects have been classified by the Central
Government as major, medium and minor. Those with ayacuts above 10,000 hectares are
treated as major projects, those with ayacuts between 2,000 hectares and 10,000 hectares are
treated as medium projects and others are classified as minor projects. Minor irrigation projects
irrigating areas less than 4 hectares have been placed under the management of taluk
panchayats and those irrigating areas between 4 hectares and 40 hectares are managed by zila
panchayats.
The financial returns from irrigation in 15 States shows that there was a net loss of
Rs.577.10 million in the form of interest on capital 7 . This was mainly because the approach
towards irrigation works was based on commercial norms. However, the rainy season lasts for
a short spell of 90 to 100 days over most parts of India. It is not possible to have either
productive or protective irrigation without storage reservoirs. Once this realization dawned on
policymakers, a sea change in irrigation development was seen in India only after the advent of
storage based irrigation projects.
Rural and agricultural water use has wide variations across the States. Over the years
the revenue from irrigation are puzzling--increasing but not up to the mark 8 . Nevertheless, as
far as revenue from irrigation across the States is concerned, there has been an increase in
revenue from 9 States amongst the 15 major States; 8 States showed an increase in revenue
from irrigation as percent of revenue from economic services while 9 States reported an
increase as percent to States’ Ontr.
Between 1993-94 and 2003-04, receipts from irrigation system (total of major, medium
and minor irrigation system) for all-States increased by about 112.1 percent, while increasing
7
Government of India. 1972. Report of the Second Irrigation Commission. New Delhi.
Important reasons include political problems related to cost recovery from farmers, especially in years of poor
agricultural performance, poor water delivery management by irrigation departments, poor state of maintenance of
irrigation works, inaccuracy of published technical data on these works and allegedly widespread corruption in
irrigation departments, particularly in the case of new irrigation projects. An additional problem is infrequent
revision of water rates in most states due to their political sensitivity and thus revenue from irrigation system has
not been significant nor have they led to any improvement in the financial performance of the states. The allround deterioration in the financial performance of irrigation projects is stark and nearly universal. See for details
supra chapter 6.
8
28
at the rate of 6.8 percent per annum over the years. On the other hand, in case of major and
medium irrigation it increased by 121 percent and in minor irrigation it showed an increase to
the extent of 59.2 percent. However, as percent to revenue from economic services at allStates’ level, revenue irrigation projects had exhibited a mild decline, from 7.95 percent in
1993-94 to 7.1 percent in 2003-04 (Table 2.9). To this decline revenue from middle-income
States have added the most, while high-income and low-income States exhibited a rising trend.
The same trend is observed for irrigation revenue as percent of States’ Ontr. While in middleincome States it exhibited a sharp decline from 8.9 percent of economic services and 3.4
percent of States’ Ontr in 1993-94 to 2.4 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively in 2003-04. On
the other hand, in high-income States’ share in revenue from irrigation projects increased from
7.2 percent to 11.9 percent of economic services and from 2.8 percent to 4.6 percent of States’
Ontr for the period under consideration (Table 2.9).
Over the years, the average contribution by major, medium and minor irrigation in
high-income States, as percent to economic services, has been 7.5 percent and 0.6 percent
respectively. In middle-income States the share of major and medium irrigation’s was 3.7
percent, while 0.9 was of minor irrigation’s contribution. For low-income States 6.3 percent
was contributed by major and medium irrigation while minor irrigation contributed about 1.7
percent. However, these figures are almost reversed in case of revenue from irrigation as
percent of States’ Ontr, where the average share in low-income States was highest (4.1 percent)
followed by high-income States (2.4 percent) and middle-income States (1.7 percent) (Table
2.9). The respective contribution of major and medium irrigation, and minor irrigation to Sontr
and to economic services, across the States, is given in Tables 2.10 and 2.11.
Over time, when all the States are taken into consideration, receipts by way of revenue
from irrigation show wide variations. Goa, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh
and Orissa contribute less than 4 percent of economic services while the States like Gujarat,
Bihar, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh contribute more than 10 percent to economic services and
rest fall in the range of 4 to 10 percent. Amidst all the 15 major States, Uttar Pradesh’s average
share of revenue from irrigation in economic services is the highest, i.e. about 23 percent – (18
percent was revenue from major and medium irrigation, and 5.0 percent from minor irrigation).
Goa’s contribution was least (about 0.8 percent). However, in Goa its contribution has
increased with highest rate of growth (36.2 percent per annum) and showed a buoyancy of 1.9
during the period. Bihar has been the least consistent State. In spite of there being an upward
trend, there were wide fluctuations in its revenue from irrigation over the years. Its share was
only 2.3 percent of revenue from economic services in 1993-94, which increased to whooping
46.5 percent by 1997-98 only to decline to 4.7 percent in 1999-00. Thereafter, it increased
again to 26.2 percent in 2001-02 but settled at 18.2 percent in the year 2003-04.
Industries
Revenue from industries constitutes an essential and major part of economic services. It
comprises about 40 percent of revenue from economic services. It includes revenue from
industries (under departmental undertakings), non-ferrous mining and metallurgical industries,
29
and other industries. However, out of these, revenue from minerals and mining constitute the
major source of revenue from industries, as the bulk of non-tax revenue from industries is from
mining in several States. It constitutes the bedrock of industrial development as these activities
provide the basic raw materials for most of the industries. India produces as many as 84
minerals - 4 fuels, 11 metallic, 49 non-metallic industrial and 20 minor minerals. The
distribution of the value of mineral production shows that fuel minerals accounted for about 82
percent (of which solid fuels yield 44 percent and liquid/gaseous fuels 38 percent), metallic
minerals about 8 percent, non-metallic minerals 4 percent and the balance 6 percent is
contributed by minor minerals.
The 9,244 mining leases are spread over 21 States on about 13,000 mineral deposits
buried in 0.7 million hectares, i.e. 0.21 percent of the total land mass of the country. However,
different States are rich in different minerals. The legal framework for mines and minerals are
given in the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development (MMRD) Act, 1957. In
particular, this Act distinguishes between major and minor minerals, classified as per the
decision of the Parliament. However, the States get receipts from these minerals. The Centre
has royalty rate setting powers for the former, while States have it for the latter.
Revenue generation from industries as a percent of revenue from economic services
shows an upward trend. However, the average ratio varies widely across States from as low as
1.3 percent in case of Punjab to as high as 74.2 percent in case of Rajasthan over the years
(Table 2.12).
Ten out of 15 major States have exhibited a rising trend in revenue from industries. In
1993-94, the share of revenue from industries as a percent of economic services was highest in
Bihar (84.5 percent) followed by Gujarat (80.4 percent), Rajasthan (72.7 percent), and Andhra
Pradesh (52.9 percent); Orissa took over the lead position in the year 2003-04 contributing
about 82.2 percent followed by Rajasthan (78 percent) and Gujarat (72.8 percent) (Table 2.12).
Amongst 15 major States, the average contribution of 5 States was less than 20 percent to
economic services while in other 6 States it contributed more than 50 percent.
The average share of revenue from industries in economic services is highest in lowincome States (57.5 percent). The share of middle-income States was 34.8 percent and that of
the high-income States 29.1 percent. In terms of growth rate, in low-income States it was the
least (less than 1 percent), while the middle-income and high-income States had a growth rate
of 12.6 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively. Amongst these categories, while the middleincome States are the most invariant States; low-income States are the most consistent. As a
percent to States Ontr, revenue from industries has been highest in low-income States. These
States contributed on an average about 30.1 percent per annum while middle-income States
and high-income States contributed 12.5 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively (Table 2.12).
Further, in almost all States share of revenue from mining and minerals is more than 95
percent of revenue from industries. The mining and minerals industry contributes to the Centre
and State Government revenue through payments of royalty, dead rent, cess, sales tax, excise
30
duties and custom duties. It may be observed that the average percentage increase in revenue
from mining and metallurgical is highest in case of middle-income States (156.5 percent). This
was 142.7 percent in high-income States, whereas the low-income States saw a decline of -10.7
percent in their average percentage share. Across the States, the highest percentage increase
was in Haryana, Punjab, Kerala and Tamil Nadu while the States of West Bengal, Bihar and
Madhya Pradesh exhibited a decline.
Looking at the components of the non-ferrous and metallurgical industries, the rise in
average percentage share in mineral concession fees and royalties is highest in the State of
Orissa (526.7 percent). This was 368.4 percent in Punjab & 348.9 percent in Karnataka. Three
States of West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh showed a decline in their average percentage
share. In case of other receipts, 5 out of 15 major States exhibited decline in their average
percentage share, while there was an increase in the rest of the States. The increase was highest
in Kerala followed by Goa and West Bengal. However, the average percentage change in
revenue from carbide of calcium rules and mines department cannot be calculated because of
their negligible share over the year.
Summing-up
The foregoing analysis of the fiscal significance of States Ontr clearly reveals that own
non-tax sources are not fiscally significant in the overall fiscal map of the States vis-à-vis other
State level aggregates, namely, States’ own tax revenue etc. These are neither growing to keep
pace with other components of resources nor showing any significant buoyancy. Their receipts
are dependent on various policy decisions, which are less economic and more political.
Basically, on economic fronts, the cost recovery policies are somewhere falling too short of
expectations. They are, in turn, dependent on how the pricing policies are determined. Every
service needs its own tailored mechanism, keeping in views the social welfare objective of the
Government. It is not out of place to emphasize that potentials are there but the dire need is to
take a firm decision and to implement them firmly. A viable cost recovery may turn the poor
quality of service delivery into reliable and dependable one.
31
Table 2.1
Non-tax Revenue in Different Countries
Name of Country
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Cote d'lvoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Hungary
India
Current Non-tax Revenue
(Percentage of GDP)
1990
1998
0
4.5
0
1.5
1
1.2
2.1
1.6
3
2.5
0
1.1
0.5
2.1
1.5
0.7
5.2
2.4
23.4
29.5
3.7
0
12.6
6.9
0.8
0
1.9
1
4.3
0
2.7
0
0.5
0
4.3
3.6
2.4
0.2
2.1
1.4
0.7
1
7.8
22.8
3.3
3.2
2.1
0.6
1.1
2.1
0
1.1
5.5
0
1.2
1.4
0.4
0
6.2
9.7
0.6
1.8
5.1
0
2.8
3.9
2.8
2.6
0
1
1.4
5.1
1
0
2.3
2.4
0
0
4.6
0.4
8.2
4.2
2.4
3
Non-tax Revenue as Percentage of
Total Revenue
1998 1999 2000
2001
2002
23.38
10.02
9.46
6.33
5.94
5.44
6.51
1.62
19.11
16.29
23.4
6.46
8.58
17.91
5.96
14.36
7.84
77.43
9.72
4.88
4.28
11.79
7.78
9.03
29.43
13.16
15.94
6.98
9.48
3.9
10.68
22.69
32
Name of Country
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic, Rep.
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Current Non-tax Revenue
(Percentage of GDP)
1
1.2
10.8
15.3
2.4
1.6
5.7
6.4
1.2
2.9
7.5
6.7
0
0
2.2
3.7
1.7
2.7
0
0
0
0
0
3.8
0
4.3
4.3
9.8
2.6
1.3
0
0
2.1
0.2
2.7
0
7.5
4.1
1.6
1.7
0
0
2.7
6
3.5
0
4.3
3.3
4
0
1.4
1.8
4.2
3
6.2
2.1
4.3
0
10.2
9.1
5.8
3.3
7.9
7
5.2
0
3.1
0
0.6
2.3
2.1
2
0
2.9
4
3.6
3.5
2.1
0
0
0
0
0.2
0.3
11.5
8.4
0
0
0
0
2
1.7
1.6
2
Non-tax Revenue as Percentage of
Total Revenue
36.09
58.65
6.89
12.2
24.24
14.88
17.76
90.01
17.04
7.01
27.97
21.9
8.78
3.12
10.46
10.41
24.69
15.5
43.43
8.37
16.36
6.15
8.69
19.59
8.52
37.33
3.73
41.02
13.82
12.59
11.47
9.7
14.48
16.25
4.3
33.75
11.08
6.29
4.97
33
Current Non-tax Revenue
Non-tax Revenue as Percentage of
Name of Country
(Percentage of GDP)
Total Revenue
Sri Lanka
2
2.7
11.53
Sweden
5.8
4.5
11.29
Switzerland
1.4
1.7
7.05
Syrian Arab Republic
5.1
7.8
27.2
Tajikistan
0
0
8.76
Thailand
1.5
1.8
17.5
Tunisia
6.7
4.8
8.85
Turkey
2.1
2.8
16.14
Uganda
0
0
0.97
Ukraine
0
0
28.18
United Kingdom
3.2
2
4.89
United States
1.5
1.4
6.37
Uruguay
1.3
2.3
7.25
Venezuela, RB
5.3
4.6
42.23
Vietnam
0
2.4
15.92
Yemen, Rep.
8.3
23.1
60.3
Zambia
0
0
3.63
Zimbabwe
2.4
3
Source: International Monetary Fund. 2006. Government Finance Statistics, June. Washington D C.
34
Table 2.2 All-States Own Non-Tax Revenue and its Composition
Rs. in Crores
Particulars
States’ Own Non-Tax Revenue
1993-94
2003-04
As % of AR
1993-94
As % of CR
2003-04
1993-94
As % of NTR
2003-04
1993-94
2003-04
As percent of GDP
1993-94
2003-04
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
As % of SOR
1993-94
2003-04
G*
B*
15568.83
38188.57
11.60
2.87
14.75
12.06
42.37
42.65
1.99
1.52
100
100
25.11
19.28
7.85
0.66
4725.44
8616.59
3.52
0.65
4.48
2.72
12.86
9.62
0.60
0.34
30.35
22.56
7.62
4.35
7.07
0.62
62.03
390.68
0.05
0.03
0.06
0.12
0.17
0.44
0.01
0.02
0.40
1.02
0.10
0.20
16.37
1.31
(iii) General services
2947.23
9372.43
2.20
0.70
2.79
2.96
8.02
10.47
0.38
0.37
18.93
24.54
4.75
4.73
6.44
0.54
(iv) Social Services
912.41
3282.92
0.68
0.25
0.86
1.04
2.48
3.67
0.12
0.13
5.86
8.60
1.47
1.66
14.48
1.18
6921.13
16525.45
5.16
1.24
6.56
5.22
18.84
18.46
0.89
0.66
44.46
43.27
11.16
8.34
8.39
0.69
(i) Interest Receipts
(ii) Dividends and Profits
(v) Economic Services
Notes: Abbreviations AR = Aggregate Receipts, CR = Current Receipts, NTR = Non-Tax Revenue, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, SONTR = States’ Own Non-Tax Revenue, SOR
= States Own Revenue, GDSP = Gross State Domestic Product.
Avg. in a table is the average of the head for the period 1993-94 to 2003-04.
G* in a table is the Growth Rate of that Particular Head for the period 1993-94 to 2003-04.
B* in a table is the buoyancy of the particular head w.r.t. GSDP for the period 1993-94 to 2003-04.
@ In Table 2.7 Growth Rate and Buoyancy has been calculated for the period 1995-96 to 2003-04 due to the lack of availability of data. Also, the average has been taken for the same
period.
Source: RBI, “State Finances: A Study of Budgets”, Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, (Table 2.2 to Table 2.12).
35
Table 2.3 State-wise Own Non-Tax Revenue and its Composition
States
1993-94
SONTR as percent of GSDP
2003-04
Avg.
G*
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
B*
General Services
As % of GSDP
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
G*
B*
High Income States
2.61
2.17
2.79
7.89
0.73
21.46
31.56
31.20
0.56
0.68
0.89
7.29
0.69
1. Goa
5.68
7.50
9.72
21.01
1.35
2.84
1.25
35.75
0.16
0.09
3.97
27.53
2.05
2. Gujarat
2.84
1.96
2.54
12.08
1.01
3.81
9.11
9.61
0.11
0.18
0.25
24.06
1.99
3. Haryana
6.06
3.01
5.40
-2.86
-0.23
64.36
30.51
51.11
3.90
0.92
3.30
-12.56
-1.10
4. Maharashtra
2.10
1.07
1.82
5.79
0.55
9.66
27.52
12.07
0.20
0.29
0.20
15.48
1.36
5. Punjab
1.37
5.75
4.32
17.00
1.58
16.31
55.58
55.93
0.22
3.20
2.54
27.34
2.43
Middle Income States
1.45
1.32
1.27
10.29
0.84
10.04
28.65
14.79
0.15
0.38
0.19
18.26
1.42
6. Andhra Pradesh
2.34
1.95
1.98
10.92
0.90
3.91
7.61
5.51
0.09
0.15
0.11
13.88
1.15
7. Karnataka
1.79
2.23
1.71
8.44
0.72
9.47
60.30
16.53
0.17
1.35
0.29
24.16
1.73
8. Kerala
1.23
0.90
1.04
6.79
0.58
27.55
38.05
33.92
0.34
0.34
0.34
11.74
0.96
9. Tamil Nadu
1.22
1.24
1.12
11.79
1.03
10.43
16.29
16.25
0.13
0.20
0.18
18.39
1.59
10. West Bengal
0.58
0.32
0.49
10.48
0.79
18.97
29.54
25.49
0.11
0.09
0.12
12.15
0.94
Low Income States
2.91
1.39
2.03
1.01
0.12
22.60
14.35
17.37
0.66
0.20
0.39
-5.00
-0.63
11. Bihar
3.89
0.79
2.43
-8.43
-0.79
2.65
27.09
14.95
0.10
0.21
0.21
22.22
2.24
12. Madhya Pradesh
3.70
1.46
2.87
-0.06
0.07
5.98
8.49
8.38
0.22
0.12
0.22
8.81
0.88
13. Orissa
2.24
2.03
1.99
7.33
0.73
9.99
5.13
9.19
0.22
0.10
0.18
2.75
0.33
14. Rajasthan
3.58
1.98
2.50
2.71
0.24
22.23
22.73
22.83
0.80
0.45
0.68
-5.64
-0.59
15. Uttar Pradesh
2.13
1.06
1.34
1.66
0.10
49.79
12.46
26.29
1.06
0.13
0.43
-11.33
-1.46
All Non-Special States
1.61
1.26
1.45
7.53
0.68
19.27
24.70
23.21
0.31
0.31
0.34
5.85
0.52
All States
1.99
1.52
1.79
7.85
0.66
18.93
24.54
24.59
0.38
0.37
0.45
6.44
0.54
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
36
Table 2.3 Contd….
States
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
Social Services
As % of GSDP
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
G*
B*
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
Economic Services
As % of GSDP
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
G*
B*
High Income States
5.60
7.10
5.30
0.15
0.15
0.14
13.96
1.23
38.94
38.80
29.94
1.02
0.84
0.80
9.26
0.82
1. Goa
9.51
10.47
7.02
0.54
0.79
0.64
21.27
1.32
85.39
87.97
56.38
4.85
6.60
5.05
19.8
1.21
2. Gujarat
5.00
5.96
5.19
0.14
0.12
0.13
16.76
1.30
34.04
56.59
33.38
0.97
1.11
0.82
14
1.16
3. Haryana
3.00
11.98
6.58
0.18
0.36
0.25
18.86
1.47
23.88
35.82
28.02
1.45
1.08
1.13
9.41
0.76
4. Maharashtra
6.25
10.76
6.79
0.13
0.11
0.12
10.77
1.00
45.01
51.13
39.00
0.95
0.54
0.68
5.32
0.49
11.02
2.27
3.34
0.15
0.13
0.12
9.32
0.86
54.04
10.73
15.95
0.74
0.62
0.54
5.37
0.50
Middle Income States
9.14
10.64
9.80
0.13
0.14
0.12
13.97
1.12
38.66
33.71
36.15
0.56
0.44
0.45
9.66
0.78
6. Andhra Pradesh
5.25
6.91
6.13
0.12
0.14
0.12
19.86
1.57
38.61
33.67
35.88
0.90
0.66
0.70
8.38
0.68
7. Karnataka
7.23
4.17
8.68
0.13
0.09
0.14
9.67
0.82
36.64
31.20
37.65
0.65
0.70
0.61
12.2
0.99
8. Kerala
12.96
15.82
12.65
0.16
0.14
0.13
10.38
0.81
49.73
39.64
43.17
0.61
0.36
0.44
3.97
0.35
9. Tamil Nadu
12.46
22.77
15.13
0.15
0.28
0.17
15.77
1.35
35.95
34.21
33.05
0.44
0.43
0.37
12
1.03
10. West Bengal
19.15
15.62
13.93
0.11
0.05
0.07
8.18
0.62
38.23
36.59
37.45
0.22
0.12
0.17
10.2
0.75
Low Income States
4.52
11.95
8.31
0.13
0.17
0.15
13.55
1.33
49.46
50.46
52.19
1.44
0.70
1.01
1.21
0.17
11. Bihar
3.55
28.06
10.51
0.14
0.22
0.15
11.79
1.14
90.10
38.12
62.76
3.50
0.30
1.66
-16.3
-1.68
12. Madhya Pradesh
3.67
5.49
3.95
0.14
0.08
0.11
6.56
0.70
74.91
84.15
77.61
2.77
1.23
2.18
-0.26
0.05
13. Orissa
6.76
5.90
7.23
0.15
0.12
0.14
11.63
1.09
62.00
61.33
70.44
1.39
1.25
1.40
6.6
0.67
14. Rajasthan
6.63
12.21
10.02
0.24
0.24
0.23
10.99
0.97
19.11
31.86
27.62
0.68
0.63
0.63
10.6
0.94
15. Uttar Pradesh
3.74
15.66
12.08
0.08
0.17
0.14
19.73
1.94
25.52
42.69
33.99
0.54
0.45
0.41
8.24
0.81
All Non-Special States
6.02
8.76
6.97
0.10
0.11
0.10
14.18
1.24
42.85
41.55
37.98
0.69
0.52
0.54
7.95
0.70
All States
5.86
8.60
6.70
0.12
0.13
0.12
14.48
1.18
44.46
43.27
38.72
0.89
0.66
0.67
8.39
0.69
5. Punjab
37
Table 2.4 The Role of Education etc. in Social Services, SONTR and GSDP
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Social Services
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
18.73
19.05
17.15
2.94
15.16
4.94
25.87
32.64
25.17
30.01
12.26
19.57
15.60
17.32
14.78
12.51
20.10
16.46
31.56
30.51
32.12
42.32
28.57
44.38
33.32
24.40
21.80
51.96
64.13
56.85
28.29
25.71
25.49
7.45
22.41
16.86
21.14
43.80
30.90
16.75
46.70
22.64
9.73
11.18
16.00
33.92
18.57
31.70
4.94
31.15
11.40
46.57
63.70
51.94
24.01
30.07
26.46
24.04
31.47
26.53
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
1.05
1.35
0.89
0.28
1.59
0.37
1.29
1.95
1.27
0.90
1.47
1.08
0.97
1.86
0.99
1.38
0.46
0.52
2.89
3.25
3.19
2.22
1.98
2.99
2.41
1.02
1.82
6.73
10.14
7.26
3.53
5.85
3.82
1.43
3.50
2.27
0.96
5.23
2.74
0.59
13.10
3.29
0.36
0.61
0.62
2.29
1.10
2.28
0.33
3.80
1.22
1.74
9.98
6.49
1.45
2.63
1.87
1.41
2.71
1.80
As % of GSDP
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.12
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.08
0.09
0.07
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.02
0.10
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.08
0.03
0.04
0.11
0.07
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
G*
11.29
30.19
15.47
9.64
7.48
12.18
16.71
21.48
10.74
12.56
15.84
18.21
20.58
12.19
7.31
7.42
22.55
23.51
16.82
17.49
B*
1.01
1.72
1.28
0.78
0.69
1.14
1.30
1.71
0.82
0.96
1.28
1.28
1.94
1.25
0.91
0.67
1.86
2.22
1.44
1.38
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
Table 2.5 The Role of Medical and Public Health in Social Services, SONTR and GSDP
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Social Services
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
39.53
22.36
29.08
11.59
9.62
10.11
46.33
21.95
32.74
31.08
12.06
18.69
39.04
27.61
32.78
46.10
39.23
38.77
40.91
19.10
30.01
27.28
11.85
20.66
42.82
36.75
31.28
72.81
22.47
33.81
18.94
18.88
19.65
24.75
35.10
34.90
26.82
21.68
13.92
50.73
11.18
15.37
14.97
11.68
6.48
12.08
18.01
17.70
30.34
29.17
27.70
59.37
16.00
30.03
18.56
16.23
10.98
16.09
25.31
25.08
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
2.21
1.59
1.50
1.10
1.01
0.71
2.32
1.31
1.60
0.93
1.44
1.13
2.44
2.97
2.19
5.08
0.89
1.35
3.74
2.03
2.91
1.43
0.82
1.13
3.10
4.76
3.90
13.94
1.02
1.20
0.69
1.28
1.30
0.93
2.11
2.05
1.12
3.43
3.17
7.92
1.34
4.31
0.82
0.69
0.79
1.89
1.58
1.52
2.64
3.65
4.09
8.28
1.27
2.75
0.73
1.18
1.05
1.76
1.72
1.64
As % of GSDP
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.08
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.03
G*
B*
7.85
17.68
5.19
13.24
6.85
9.82
8.88
10.93
0.70
1.11
0.42
1.05
0.64
0.88
0.73
0.89
8.75
6.58
12.22
5.24
8.57
9.90
5.60
9.18
4.92
11.32
8.82
9.05
0.70
0.53
1.10
0.40
0.85
0.97
0.57
0.85
0.36
1.18
0.78
0.74
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
38
Table 2.6 The Role of Urban Development in Social Services and SONTR
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Social Services
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
6.60
21.32
11.85
0.00
0.03
0.02
6.85
11.56
6.03
7.71
53.90
31.47
8.31
13.21
9.03
1.53
1.89
2.72
1.30
19.01
6.25
1.65
1.79
2.82
0.57
1.87
12.24
4.23
1.30
3.45
0.68
40.83
4.11
0.41
0.66
0.96
1.15
1.63
1.17
0.70
0.01
0.81
4.10
1.51
1.80
1.07
0.03
0.33
0.29
0.38
0.27
0.08
3.40
1.68
3.16
14.25
6.61
3.07
13.46
6.36
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
0.37
1.51
0.65
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.34
0.69
0.31
0.23
6.46
2.53
0.52
1.42
0.62
0.17
0.04
0.08
0.12
2.02
0.59
0.09
0.12
0.15
0.04
0.08
1.12
0.55
0.21
0.40
0.09
9.30
0.90
0.08
0.10
0.14
0.05
0.19
0.11
0.02
0.00
0.05
0.15
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.53
0.27
0.19
1.25
0.47
0.18
1.16
0.44
G*
B*
22.78
0.00
20.19
39.61
9.61
8.00
11.09
13.11
2.02
-12.00
37.18
12.26
23.90
-8.16
2.54
-12.00
0.00
79.03
20.35
20.47
2.03
0.00
1.64
2.88
1.00
0.80
0.87
1.07
0.48
-0.98
2.48
1.02
1.98
-1.10
0.13
-1.48
0.00
5.54
1.82
1.67
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.12
Table 2.7 The Role of Water Supply and Sanitation in Social Services and SONTR@
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Social Services
1995-96
2003-04
Avg.
10.02
12.70
9.80
80.73
72.01
67.40
0.91
0.52
0.56
24.95
14.01
15.97
2.10
2.73
1.96
4.65
25.30
14.28
2.82
2.11
2.17
8.36
2.48
4.20
1.56
0.49
1.00
0.41
2.15
1.19
2.07
1.42
2.07
3.19
6.66
2.42
28.78
21.95
20.18
4.57
0.35
2.59
20.46
24.18
13.60
21.53
37.39
23.34
65.08
57.83
57.04
0.08
0.81
0.24
13.03
11.65
10.35
13.34
12.29
10.61
As % of SONTR
1995-96
2003-04
Avg.
0.39
0.90
0.54
3.86
7.54
4.36
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.60
1.68
1.15
0.12
0.29
0.14
0.10
0.57
0.37
0.24
0.22
0.22
0.32
0.17
0.24
0.13
0.02
0.09
0.05
0.34
0.16
0.28
0.32
0.32
0.46
1.04
0.32
1.17
2.62
1.81
0.15
0.10
0.20
0.53
1.33
0.57
1.02
2.21
1.76
3.36
7.06
6.08
0.00
0.13
0.03
0.65
1.02
0.76
0.64
1.06
0.74
G*
B*
16.53
19.32
-0.56
12.94
1.14
29.43
14.74
12.54
-7.40
32.06
15.96
25.16
10.07
2.03
10.84
16.45
9.24
NC
12.74
13.53
1.67
1.34
0.16
1.11
0.29
2.88
1.26
1.13
-0.63
2.72
1.52
1.81
1.15
0.38
1.10
1.74
1.03
NC
1.27
1.24
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
39
Table 2.8 The Role of Forestry and Wildlife in Economic Services, SONTR and GSDP
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Economic Services
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
7.68
3.06
6.04
0.99
0.28
0.54
3.20
2.69
2.71
3.70
3.20
4.17
12.68
4.76
9.95
2.36
1.61
3.14
26.70
17.59
22.73
13.50
7.66
13.02
34.22
19.57
23.45
64.05
58.52
59.40
21.84
12.59
20.45
27.50
20.74
20.73
30.23
19.29
23.01
8.76
12.36
6.09
46.80
39.89
35.58
38.62
7.25
19.58
24.48
13.67
20.14
27.64
6.26
17.97
21.58
11.18
16.31
21.58
11.67
16.50
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
2.99
1.19
1.77
0.84
0.25
0.33
1.09
1.52
0.91
0.88
1.15
1.15
5.71
2.43
3.87
1.28
0.17
0.45
10.32
5.93
8.23
5.21
2.58
4.75
12.54
6.11
8.43
31.85
23.20
25.84
7.85
4.31
6.78
10.51
7.59
7.85
14.95
9.73
11.95
7.89
4.71
3.74
35.06
33.57
27.73
23.94
4.44
13.78
4.68
4.35
5.54
7.05
2.67
5.80
9.25
4.64
6.17
9.59
5.05
6.37
As % of GSDP
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
0.08
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.12
0.03
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.15
0.08
0.11
0.12
0.05
0.09
0.22
0.14
0.14
0.39
0.21
0.28
0.10
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.02
0.04
0.43
0.14
0.25
0.31
0.04
0.10
1.30
0.49
0.81
0.54
0.09
0.28
0.17
0.09
0.13
0.15
0.03
0.08
0.15
0.06
0.09
0.19
0.08
0.12
G*
B*
-0.48
-1.53
10.51
8.14
-4.61
10.83
2.29
-3.93
2.96
1.61
9.98
-0.58
-2.19
0.00
-3.16
-2.82
9.98
-4.15
0.49
1.50
-0.04
-0.17
0.89
0.68
-0.45
1.04
0.19
-0.32
0.24
0.15
0.86
-0.12
-0.23
0.00
-0.37
-0.35
0.77
-0.35
0.04
0.12
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
Table 2.9 The Role of Irrigation Projects in Economic Services and SONTR
As % of Economic Services
States
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
G*
B*
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
7.24
11.88
8.01
2.82
4.61
2.44
13.42
1.15
0.29
6.96
0.75
11.54
0.81
12.48
0.25
2.37
0.66
6.53
0.45
4.06
36.23
22.84
1.85
1.88
3. Haryana
6.38
23.00
9.13
1.52
8.24
2.82
20.16
1.53
4. Maharashtra
8.33
13.85
6.59
3.75
7.08
2.69
6.19
0.50
5. Punjab
7.41
2.51
7.53
4.00
0.27
1.21
-5.39
-0.57
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8.86
2.37
4.56
3.43
0.80
1.68
-7.58
-0.74
16.73
5.30
1.40
1.74
6.30
4.03
6.46
1.94
0.47
0.54
2.49
1.50
-22.42
3.55
-2.30
0.32
1.77
2.34
1.90
0.88
0.93
0.81
7.94
0.67
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
2.32
2.75
2.58
0.83
0.94
0.84
11.71
1.03
10. West Bengal
5.92
9.15
5.45
2.26
3.35
2.02
7.36
0.54
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
9.78
8.82
7.96
4.84
4.45
4.12
2.26
0.21
2.27
3.06
18.16
3.62
12.24
3.26
2.05
2.30
6.92
3.04
4.88
2.52
2.53
0.37
0.31
0.12
13. Orissa
2.47
5.37
3.05
1.53
3.30
2.10
17.16
1.62
14. Rajasthan
13.89
9.31
11.10
2.65
2.97
2.91
4.21
0.40
15. Uttar Pradesh
41.78
15.87
22.99
10.66
6.78
7.50
0.79
-0.03
All Non-Special States
8.70
7.90
7.00
3.73
3.28
2.67
6.58
0.55
All States
7.95
7.06
6.40
3.53
3.06
2.48
6.76
0.52
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
40
Table 2.10 The Role of Major and Medium Irrigation in Economic Services and SONTR
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Economic Services
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
6.62
11.28
7.46
0.15
0.46
0.54
6.51
10.95
12.02
6.37
22.98
9.05
7.30
12.71
5.77
7.33
2.49
7.10
7.46
1.48
3.70
14.72
1.28
5.62
5.04
1.28
3.59
1.47
1.91
1.58
1.45
1.77
1.79
1.96
1.80
1.71
8.11
7.51
6.25
1.88
17.66
11.41
2.21
3.04
2.59
2.14
4.81
2.64
8.82
6.55
6.54
36.78
13.97
17.96
7.45
7.06
5.94
6.81
6.30
5.42
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
2.58
4.38
2.28
0.13
0.41
0.28
2.22
6.20
3.90
1.52
8.23
2.81
3.29
6.50
2.36
3.96
0.27
1.16
2.88
0.50
1.37
5.68
0.43
2.23
1.85
0.40
1.33
0.73
0.76
0.67
0.52
0.61
0.58
0.75
0.66
0.63
4.01
3.79
3.23
1.69
6.73
4.52
1.66
2.55
2.01
1.32
2.95
1.81
1.69
2.09
1.72
9.39
5.96
5.91
3.19
2.93
2.27
3.03
2.73
2.11
G*
B*
14.37
31.73
23.61
20.44
7.46
-4.83
-9.96
-22.89
1.70
8.10
14.47
4.68
3.09
2.57
-0.13
18.20
4.34
2.57
7.52
7.70
1.23
1.62
1.93
1.55
0.61
-0.53
-0.96
-2.37
0.17
0.69
1.29
0.35
0.27
0.31
0.09
1.68
0.44
0.06
0.62
0.59
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
Table 2.11 The Role of Minor Irrigation in Economic Services and SONTR
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Economic Services
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
0.62
0.60
0.55
0.14
0.28
0.27
0.45
0.59
0.46
0.02
0.02
0.08
1.03
1.14
0.82
0.07
0.03
0.43
1.40
0.89
0.86
2.01
0.12
0.68
0.26
0.46
0.44
0.30
0.43
0.32
0.87
0.97
0.79
3.96
7.34
3.74
1.67
1.31
1.71
0.39
0.50
0.83
0.85
0.58
0.67
0.33
0.56
0.41
5.07
2.76
4.56
5.00
1.90
5.03
1.24
0.85
1.06
1.14
0.76
0.97
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
0.24
0.23
0.16
0.12
0.25
0.16
0.15
0.33
0.16
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.46
0.58
0.33
0.04
0.00
0.05
0.54
0.30
0.31
0.78
0.04
0.26
0.10
0.14
0.17
0.15
0.17
0.14
0.31
0.33
0.26
1.51
2.69
1.38
0.83
0.66
0.89
0.36
0.19
0.37
0.64
0.49
0.51
0.21
0.35
0.29
0.97
0.88
1.19
1.28
0.81
1.59
0.53
0.35
0.40
0.51
0.33
0.37
G*
B*
0.66
32.17
7.34
-0.74
-3.60
-8.30
1.50
-19.31
18.34
7.77
6.25
8.34
-1.06
2.46
1.91
9.73
3.05
-6.95
1.03
1.21
0.08
1.69
0.73
0.08
-0.39
-0.76
0.08
-1.89
1.47
0.61
0.50
0.61
-0.05
0.34
0.20
1.11
0.24
-0.58
0.11
0.11
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
41
Table 2.12 The Role of Industries in Economic Services and SONTR
States
High Income States
1. Goa
2. Gujarat
3. Haryana
4. Maharashtra
5. Punjab
Middle Income States
6. Andhra Pradesh
7. Karnataka
8. Kerala
9. Tamil Nadu
10. West Bengal
Low Income States
11. Bihar
12. Madhya Pradesh
13. Orissa
14. Rajasthan
15. Uttar Pradesh
All Non-Special States
All States
As % of Economic Services
1993-94
2003-04 Avg.
25.11
34.62 29.06
7.99
3.05
4.97
80.44
72.84 73.90
5.84
9.70 12.53
13.29
26.59 20.72
0.46
2.17
1.32
30.55
42.09 34.76
52.85
64.50 57.81
18.71
25.13 24.87
3.15
5.78
5.75
21.74
52.73 31.95
15.15
8.04
9.79
54.60
54.89 57.45
84.48
44.28 66.76
45.61
52.13 51.19
50.94
82.24 66.92
72.70
77.95 74.24
14.52
25.78 28.28
39.21
48.11 43.50
36.25
43.67 40.43
As % of SONTR
1993-94
2003-04
Avg.
9.78
13.43
8.72
6.82
2.68
2.88
27.38
41.23 24.80
1.39
3.47
3.96
5.98
13.60
8.06
0.25
0.23
0.17
11.81
14.19 12.54
20.40
21.72 20.54
6.86
7.84
9.18
1.57
2.29
2.44
7.81
18.04 10.74
5.79
2.94
3.61
27.00
27.70 30.05
76.11
16.88 48.34
34.17
43.87 39.77
31.59
50.44 46.97
13.89
24.84 20.64
3.71
11.01
9.58
16.80
19.99 16.53
16.12
18.90 15.65
G*
11.67
7.21
12.12
21.22
9.07
22.03
12.62
11.44
11.39
12.09
19.99
-3.85
0.61
-18.67
-0.08
12.46
11.52
10.72
9.34
9.47
B*
1.02
0.46
1.02
1.66
0.86
1.98
1.00
0.93
0.93
1.02
1.68
-0.30
0.13
-1.93
0.09
1.25
1.02
1.10
0.82
0.77
Note: For meaning of abbreviations see notes at the end of Table 2.2
42
Exhibit 2.1 Components of All-States Non-tax Revenue
50.00
45.00
44.46
As percent to States Own Non-tax Revenue
43.27
40.52
40.00
37.10
35.76
40.08
38.85
36.86
38.49
36.44
35.00
34.08
33.71
33.34
30.00
26.27
25.00
22.63
20.00
24.67
24.54
7.96
24.54
22.41
20.08
18.93
19.35
15.00
8.60
10.00
5.86
5.00
4.45
4.78
5.10
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
7.45
7.35
7.92
6.90
7.33
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
0.00
1993-94
General Services
Social Services
2002-03
2003-04
Economic Services
Source: RBI, “State Finances: A Study of Budgets”, Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
43
Exhibit 2.2(a) Share of components of Social Services (1993-94)
Other Social Services
19%
Water supply and
sanitation
0%
Social security and
welfare
8%
Labour and
employment
5%
Education,sports,arts
and culture
24%
M edical,public
health and family
welfare
35%
Urban development
3%
Housing
6%
Exhibit 2.2(b) Share of components of Social Services (2003-04)
Other Social Services
7%
Water supply and
sanitation
12%
Education,sports,arts
and culture
32%
Social security and
welfare
6%
Labour and
employment
4%
Urbal development
13%
Housing
8%
M edical,public health
and family welfare
18%
Source: RBI, “State Finances: A Study of Budgets”, Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
44
Exhibit 2.3(a) Share of components of Economic Services (1993-94)
Road transport
6.21%
Forestry and wild
life 21.58%
M ajor and medium
irrigation projects
6.81%
M inor irrigations
1.14%
Industries 36.25%
Power 3.89%
Exhibit 2.3(b) Share of components of Economic Services (2003-04)
Road transport
6.28%
Forestry and wild life
11.67%
M ajor and medium
irrigation projects
6.30%
M inor irrigations
0.76%
Power 7.13%
Industries 43.87%
Source: RBI, “State Finances: A Study of Budgets”, Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
45
3
Pricing Strategy for
Non-tax Sources
Introduction
The analysis in the previous chapter clearly highlights the fiscal significance
of the States’ own non-tax sources. The trend indicates that while non-tax sources are
one of the constituents of total revenue receipts, but these do not play a very
significant role in financing State expenditure. The growth of receipts from own nontax sources has neither kept pace with receipts from the other revenue sources nor is it
showing the requisite buoyancy needed for an efficient fiscal system. In fact, politicoeconomic considerations play a decisive role in the growth of non-tax revenue
receipts.
At present, the ‘user’ charges for the services provided by the Government are
negligible or non-existent. Hence, it is generally believed that the user charges must
be augmented to reduce the burgeoning Government subsidies.
The Government provides a variety of heterogeneous services. All of them are
not amenable to cost recovery. While some services could have a price recovering the
cost incurred, others may be priced just to cover a part of the expenditure incurred in
their provision. Also, there are few services for which consumers are not charged at
all. The policy to recover expenses should depend upon the type of services provided
as there cannot be any universal policy prescription for all the services provided by
the Government.
Keeping this in view, this chapter presents a review of literature covering
pricing strategy for public utilities. The effort is to analyse the intricacies of the
theoretical issues confined to services falling in different categories, viz. (i) social
services- education; medical healthcare; water supply etc. and (ii) economic servicesirrigation; power; road transport etc. Thus, this analysis is confined to the pricing
strategy for publicly provided private goods and public utilities only; other forms of
non-tax receipts in the nature of interest, dividends etc. are not analysed 1 . Therefore,
this chapter presents an analysis of the principles of user charges for recovering fully
or partially the cost of provision of these services by the Government. The analysis
also includes a review of various theories of utility pricing dealing with costs and
problems in price measurement as well as issues involved in designing the user
charges.
Issues in Utility Pricing
The main issue confronting utility pricing policy relates to the question as to
what services should be charged and through which principle.
This brings us to the issue of determination of user charges, which relates to
the theory of utility pricing for goods and services provided by the Government for
maximizing benefits accruing to the community. It is generally accepted that from the
angle of social welfare, public goods should be financed through taxes. However,
there are goods and services which are like public goods. These need to be partly
subsidized. However, services having the features of private goods must be charged
fully at cost price.
In the initial phase of the evolution of the theory of utility pricing (in the
1930's and 1940's), the general view that prevailed was that the utility prices should
be equal to marginal cost (MC), as was propounded by Clark 2 . The Government has
to provide subsidy if the MC is less than average cost (AC). Hotelling 3 brought this up
as an economic issue and pronounced that the market price is determined at a point of
equilibrium of demand (based on marginal utility) and supply (determined by
marginal cost). This view, however, did not take into account the stimulus to ‘correct’
the price if consumers were unwilling to pay the total cost. It also ignored the
probable effects on the administrative structure when State enterprise superceded
decisions taken by private enterprise and centralized operations superceded
decentralized operations. Also, this principle involved a redistribution of income in
favor of consumers of products produced in conditions of decreasing costs. It did not
take into account the misallocation of resources resulting from the additional taxation
necessitated by subsidies.
The theory of public goods, developed by Samuelson 4 , suggested that the
goods consumed by each and every individual in the society, in the same quantity
1
It may be noted that revenue from interests and dividends are the returns from public investments in
public sector enterprises whose recoveries are based on different principles. Penalties are imposed on
law breaking and royalty rates are determined by the State and Central Governments depending on the
nature of extracted items.
2
Clark, J.M. 1911. “Rates for Public Utilities”. American Economic Review, I, September: 473-87.
3
Hotelling, H. 1939. “The Relation of Prices to Marginal Cost in an Optimum System”. Econometrica.
7: 151-5.
4
Samuelson, Paul A. 1954. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”. Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 36 (4) Nov.: 387-389.
47
with no exclusion for any individual, have the property of joint consumption or nonrivalness. In addition, a pure public good exhibits another characteristic called nonexcludability, i.e. it is not possible to exclude any individual from consuming the good
irrespective of his non-payment. Such goods and services, called ‘pure’ public goods,
have to be financed through taxes.
Quasi-public goods, (i.e. merit goods having one of the features of pure public
goods) could be subsidised or regulated by the Government through the pricing
mechanism. If these goods are provided by the market, they may be under-consumed
because individuals typically consider the gains or benefits at the micro/individual
level; they do not consider the benefits generated at the macro level for others in
society. In economic terms, consumers do not internalize the positive externalities of
the consumption of the goods. Such goods, which include education, preventive
healthcare etc., are important examples of producing positive externality. This is
clearly demonstrated by telecommunication and transportation, especially in a federal
system where each new user is linked to a network, all the users benefit as the range
of potential interchange is expanded. Such merit goods are a good case for imposition
of user charges but the structure of the charges must be designed keeping in view the
essentiality and externalities of these goods.
The provision of public goods by the Government, which is taken as
negatively derived in market economies, is classified into three categories:
First, given the cost differences (a higher cost of provision of goods by the
Government coupled with institutional failure causing private under
provision), the provision of optimal quantity of goods by the Government will
be below the level that prevails when its costs are identical to that in the
private sector.
Secondly, where the goods relate to joint supplies and costs, (i.e. when a good
is supplied to and paid for by several users), any increase in the quantity of the
good supplied is equally available to all users. In this case, as proposed by
Coase 5 , each user should pay according to the social incremental costs related
to the individual’s demand. However, it is very difficult to clearly define
incremental cost when there are joint costs. Also, given the assumptions of
classical theories, this theory is at par with the theory of MC; however, the
decreasing cost conditions result in different prepositions. In spite of these
variations, the concept of incremental cost implies that, at the optimum
investment level, the user charges should be equal to the marginal cost. This is
the necessary condition for welfare maximization. The mix of goods that the
5
With perfect knowledge, zero transaction costs, no income effects, and well-specified property rights,
market allocation is the same no matter which economic agent has the initial title to the property rights
of the traded goods (Coase, R. H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost”. Journal of Law & Economics,
3, (1): 1-44.
48
Government should optimally provide will depend upon the extent of market
imperfections and the stage of economic development.
Thirdly, an acceptable rationale for Government provision of a good, even if
the private sector can provide the good efficiently, is when the public
provision (say through a public sector undertaking) is the least cost alternative
for raising revenue needed to provide other Government goods optimally.
It may be noted that though there are a few purely private or purely public
goods, there exist numerous "mixed" goods that may need to be subsidized by the
Government. In view of the pressure coming from various interest groups, politicians
may be deterred from making decisions on cost recovery schemes in spite of these
proposals for user charges being based on rational economic policy decisions.
In the case of mixed goods, the first important issue is determining the proper
domain of the goods to be charged. The appropriate domain is determined by the
characteristics of the activities in question and the nature of the "market" for the
service. The second issue relates to the proper design for such user charges. Ideally,
pure "public" goods should be financed by taxes and the pure “private” goods through
user charges. Mixed goods may be financed partially by user charges and partly
through a combination of both, i.e. subsidy and taxes.
The primary economic reason for the levy of user charges on the direct
recipients of public services is to ensure optimal and efficient use of available
resources. This is important when the general fund for financing is scarce. The
objective is to recover costs and at the same time, to improve efficiency with which
Government uses its resources. Also, it is one of the important elements of financing
the increasing demand for these services in the long run.
The user charges are intended to defray a part or total of the costs of a service
provided and are related to the amount of services consumed. In contrast to the simple
cost-recovery approach to setting fees, user charges should be approximately at the
level of private sector competitive prices, with no special tax or subsidy element
included. In some instances - for example, with respect to economic rent - the
appropriate user charges may be determined according to "what the market will bear".
This could be determined by the "mapping of demand". Sometimes the user charges
could differ from the competitive level due to public policy considerations
(externalities, socio-political objectives, specific characteristics of consumption or
production) or problems due to insufficient information. Instances of such differences
occur in publicly provided services that confer external benefits on non-users.
Immunization Programme is one such case where the user charges could be less than
MC.
Theories of Utility Pricing
49
Based on the pricing principles and given that the Government is a natural
monopoly, various models of utility pricing have been developed, keeping in mind the
social welfare function 6 that maximizes conceivable, hypothetically feasible welfare
measures for members of the society and the utility function 7 of consumption of real
goods.
Apart from equity, adopting MC principle may ensure efficiency. Also, the
principle of average cost (AC) pricing ensures that there is some profit margin. The
best solution would be when MC=AC. The theory of price discrimination is a
combination of the two, i.e. MC and AC. The relative rationale behind these theories
is important. Some of the aspects of these theories are discussed below 8 .
Theory of Marginal Cost (MC) Pricing:
Clark initiated the discussion in favour of MC and formulated sound intuitive
theories for most of the basic issues in public utility economics. He begins with a
definition of two important principles underlying pricing (rate-making) in public
utilities.
The first principle is of justice (or equity), i.e. each group of consumers should
pay the costs without cross-subsidization. He does not consider the issue of pricing
policy against the background of income distribution.
6
A social welfare function can be defined as a real-valued function that maximizes conceivable,
hypothetically feasible welfare measures of members of the society given an ordering of the
corresponding social States. In using individual welfare measures as input, the social welfare function
is individualistic in form. Necessary general conditions of a social welfare function are that at the
maximum value of the function:
•
The marginal "rupee’s worth" of welfare is equal for each individual and for each commodity.
•
The marginal "dis-welfare" of each "rupee's worth" of labor is equal for each commodity
produced of each labor supplier.
•
The marginal "rupee" cost of each unit of resources is equal to the marginal value productivity
of each commodity.
A social welfare function provides a kind of social preference based on only narrowly defined
individual utility functions, whereas in others it includes cardinal measures of social welfare not
aggregated from narrow individual utility functions.
7
The utility function expresses utility as a function of consumption of real goods (in pounds, gallons,
kilograms, litres) as opposed to nominal goods (in rupees, dollars, euros). A utility is a numerical rating
assigned to every possible outcome that faces a decision-maker may be faced with. In a choice
between several alternative prospects, the one with the highest utility is always preferred. To qualify as
a true utility scale however, the rating must be such that the utility of any uncertain prospect is equal to
the expected value (the mathematical expectation) of the utilities of all its possible outcomes (which
could be either "final" outcomes or uncertain prospects themselves).
8
In the literature on the issue of pricing of public utilities, a number of theoretical variants have been
discussed. They are named as: cost-based pricing, cost sharing, efficient pricing, declining block tariff,
demand compatible prices, flat rate tariff, fully distributed cost, fully separating tariff, n-part tariff,
optimal non-uniform price schedule, optimal Pareto dominating incentive compatible tariff, optimal
two part tariff, optional tariff, Pareto dominating incentive compatible tariff, Ramsey uniform pricing,
etc.
50
The second principle relates to efficiency in resource allocation. He gives a
clear, intuitive explanation of the willingness to pay for incremental output with costs
that lead to efficient use of productive capacity. Further, he recognizes that this may
lead to determination of price at a level lower than AC. This gives leeway to fix the
charges according to what the traffic will bear in order to cover the costs. In this
sense, Clark anticipated the idea of Ramsey pricing. Of course, the concepts of issues
like outlays, capital or current etc gave rise to further complications.
Clark’s MC pricing policy gained favour among economists. It was the basis
for price discrimination in specific utilities, given the existing target groups and the
prevailing Government’s philosophy.
However, the MC theory has a number of restrictive assumptions, which are
also its limitations 9 . These are summarized below:
1. The demand for the service should respond to price changes; that is, it should
not be perfectly price-inelastic;
2. There should be perfect information on the part of the users regarding future
costs and price changes;
3. No externalities should result from the provision or consumption of the
service;
4. There should be no distortion anywhere else in the economy;
5. The prices of inputs used in the production of the service, and the prices of
substitutes or complements to the service should not be distorted by taxes,
subsidies, or externalities;
6. Whenever the rule results in a financial surplus or deficit for the service, nondistorting subsidy or tax schemes should be made available so that it is
possible to absorb the surplus or deficit without affecting the allocation of
resources in the economy;
7. There should be no administrative or transaction costs associated with
implementing this rule; and
8. Production should be efficient so that the cost of producing a given unit is
minimized.
Inspite of these limitations, it is important to note that the MC principle
remains relevant in utility pricing under various conditions, as are given below:
9
Bahl, R.W. and J.F. Linn. 1992. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries. World Bank.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
51
i. The MC principle is concerned with the opportunity costs incurred by
greater use of a service. This may or may not equal historical costs because various
features (such as economies of scale, technological advances, natural resource
constraints, factor prices and service standards) may change the MC over time.
ii. Consumers should be charged a uniform rate for the services consumed
unless the service necessitates the imposition of a differential MC. Rising (or falling)
user charges may not be justifiable on grounds of efficiency because the MC must be
matched by the price. Quantity discounts or surcharges could, however, be justified
on grounds of efficiency.
iii. The MC pricing policy needs to be adjusted during the inflationary
periods. If the underlying real cost structure does not change over time and if a user
charge has been correctly set at a particular time, rapid inflation could make the
nominal user charge diverge considerably from the efficient charge over time.
iv. If the demand for the public service shows some price-elasticity, then
efficiency will be affected irrespective of whether or not the service is priced at MC.
If the demand for a service is perfectly or almost perfectly inelastic, the quantity
consumed will not change in response to a change in price. Therefore, the use of
economic resources will not be affected by the price and subsequently, no loss or gain
in efficiency will result from setting prices above or below MC.
v. User charges might differ in developing and developed countries. The
developed countries could have more efficient user charges to check the excess
provision of public services (which is encouraged by pricing policies geared to satisfy
non-economic objectives) or to control environmental hazards, particularly water and
air pollution 10 .
Given that it is not optimal to set utility prices equal to MC while covering
resulting deficits by discretionary taxation, there are two alternative feasible pricing
policies that can be adopted.
Boiteux Pricing:
The first, adopted by Boiteux 11 , was to consider each utility as having its own
profit constraint, and then search for welfare optimal prices. It led to peak load
pricing, where Boiteux 12 assumed that MC pricing is optimal, and derived the
structure of MC based prices when demand varied cyclically over a time period, given
the fixed capacity. The assumption of constant returns implies that these prices should
break even. These results can be extended to encompass Ramsey pricing policy.
10
Kneese, A.V. and C.L. Schultze. 1975. Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
11
Boiteux, M. 1971. “On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject to Budget Constraints”.
Journal of Economic Theory. 3: 219-40.
12
Boiteux, M. 1960. “Peak Load Pricing”. Journal of Business. 33, (2), April: 157-79.
52
Ramsey Pricing:
The second is the Ramsey theory 13 that sees the problem as one of optimal
commodity taxation. There is a Government revenue requirement, which may be
much greater than the amount required just to cover public utility deficits, and the
problem is to find taxes, or mark ups on MCs, for all goods (except a numeraire), that
generate the required revenue with minimum aggregate welfare loss. Now, Boiteux’s
problem can be viewed as a sub-case of Ramsey’s: if the utility’s deficits are to be
met out of taxation, then its optimal prices are not necessarily those which lead to
break even for the utility itself, but are simply those that incorporate the optimal
commodity taxes. That is, the revenue generated by a utility when its prices embody
optimal taxes could be greater or less than its costs.
The question that the Ramsey raises is whether the Government monopolist
should set its prices to maximize social welfare (efficiency), subject to an overall
budget constraint? The rule states that the price markup should be inverse to the price
elasticity of demand. The more elastic is the demand for the product, the smaller will
be the price markup. This is applicable to public utilities or for regulation of natural
monopolies. In other words, the percentage deviation of the price of a good from its
MC should be inversely related to its elasticity of demand. Ramsey pricing is a linear
pricing scheme designed for the multi-product natural monopolist.
Theory of Average Cost (AC) Pricing:
This refers to making the product price equal to the AC of production. The AC
pricing guarantees the public utility a normal profit but as the determined price is
greater than MC, the public utility is not operating according to the rule of efficiency.
This approach estimates the total financial cost of providing a particular
service and divides the total cost by the number of units being provided. In doing so,
when costs decline as output increases, the price will be too high and the output
remains much lesser than what the society really wants. Conversely, when costs
increase as output expands, the price will be too low; too much of the service in
question will be demanded and resources will be misallocated. This is especially true
if the "excess" demand at the unduly low price is taken as an indication that output
should be increased - for example, by new investment. The AC pricing will be
efficient if unit costs are constant, so that marginal and average costs are equal.
The second problem with AC pricing (assuming costs are not constant) is that
the setting of such prices effectively requires estimating responsiveness of demand to
price changes. Suppose a particular service, such as a national park, has previously
13
Ramsey, F.P. 1927. “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”. Economic Journal. 37, March: 4761.
53
been supplied free, or at a charge well below a realistic price. Assume that the
variable costs of operating that particular park (i.e. the costs to keep it open and
operating at some level) - can be estimated without great difficulty. The number of
persons using the park is also known. Clearly, dividing this cost by the number of
people is unlikely to result in full "cost-recovery”.
Setting average prices to recover operating costs thus requires not only
information on how unit costs change as the number of users change, but also on how
the number of users will change as prices change. Such information is not easy to
obtain, and even if it is available, the resulting prices are not likely to provide an
efficient allocation of resources (because of the first problem mentioned above) or any
useful information on whether access to the park should be extended or eliminated
(because the "fixed cost" aspect has not been factored into the calculation).
However, in spite of these difficulties in estimation, AC pricing is probably
the most common way of setting user charges. Moreover, the "costs" taken into
account are usually financial and not social, as discussed above. Presumably, this
inefficient practice is followed because such prices are easier to calculate and
compelling to powerful client groups, in spite of the economists' preference for the
MC pricing approach. Such reasoning is understandable, and in many cases, AC
pricing is acceptable.
Price Discrimination: In practice, the above stated principles may not yield
desirable solutions. Therefore, a mix of these price policies is applied for different
utilities. This could result in arbitrariness in pricing policy. Refinement of MC and
AC pricing policies leads to the development of other models of utility pricing or
price discrimination. These theories consider all the dimensions of public service
output and costs, variations in costs across space, time, and consumer classes. These
take into account externalities, distortions in input and output prices, imperfect
consumer information, administrative and transaction costs, capital indivisibility,
efficiency in production and fiscal considerations. These also take into consideration
the fact that full cost pricing has an impact on multi-part tariffs, uniform tariffs, as
well as on income distribution. Some of these price theories are:
Economic Pricing: Saleth and Dinar 14 propounded their price theory in the
context of water pricing. They argued that economic pricing of water is necessary not
only for improving the financial viability and efficiency in water use but also for
providing incentive for private initiatives, especially in the form of inter-household
and inter-sectoral water exchanges and joint ownership and management of ground
water wells and other water supply sources by user groups. Their results reveal that
under the existing price structure, characterized by increasing intervals between
14
Saleth, R.M. and A. Dinar. 1997. Satisfying Urban Thirst, Water Supply Augmentation and Pricing
Policy in Hyderabad City, India. World Bank Technical Paper No. 395. Washington DC: The World
Bank.
54
successive consumption slabs and slab-specific constant water rates, the water
consumption decision is not affected by the MC price but only by the AC pricing.
Another example of water pricing is the declining block tariff. Nordin 15
suggested it in his analysis of the water demand function given the block tariffs. This
theory is applied only when aggregate data (values of marginal price and price
differences faced by the average user) are compared with the theoretically correct
data. The latter uses the average marginal price of the block and the average price
difference, these averages being weighted by the proportion of users per block. The
availability of data on the proportion of users per block also permits the explicit
modeling of the choice of block. The results show that, in the sample analyzed, the
values of price elasticity under the traditional specification and the more innovative
one are not significantly different.
Fully Distributed Cost Pricing: User charges could be based on fully
distributed costs (FDC) pricing method. Under this method, regulators allocate shared
production costs to individual services. Each service is then required to generate
revenues that will cover all of the costs associated with that service. Braeutigam 16 has
argued that there is no sound economic rationale for FDC pricing and that this
practice has economic consequence for regulated industries.
In practice, there are three variants of FDC rules:
First is the distribution of shared costs on the basis of some common indicator
of utilization or consumption 17 . In this method, known as the relative output method,
shared costs are allocated in proportion to the number of units of output of each
service.
15
Nordin used aggregate data from North-West of Spain for the analysis. See Nordin, J.A. 1976. “A
Proposed Modification on Taylor’s Demand–Supply Analysis: Comment”. The Bell Journal of
Economics. 7(2): 719–721.
16
Braeutigam, R.R. 1980. “An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated Industries”. Bell
Journal of Economics. 11 (1) Spring: 182-196. This paper examines the economic consequences of
allocating common costs by (1) gross revenues, (2) directly attributable costs, and (3) relative output
levels (such as ton-miles) to determine fully distributed cost prices for regulated firms. The analysis
characterizes FDC tariffs by examining the nature of the economic inefficiency associated with the
rules and explains how opportunities for entry by unregulated firms might change if Ramsey optional
pricing was used instead of FDC pricing.
17
Kahn, A. 1970. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. Vol 1. New York: Wiley
and Sons.
55
The second approach is known as attributable cost 18 method. These are the
costs, which cease if a particular service is discontinued.
The third method, known as gross revenue approach or the relative money
value method, requires allocation of shared costs in proportion to the gross revenues
generated by each service.
A variance of these approaches may be used depending upon the nature of the
services. These variants have certain features that need to be kept in mind:
1) FDC bears no direct relationship to MCs; hence, there is no basis for economic
efficiency in FDC pricing.
2) There exists no unique acceptable rule. Friedlender 19 has noted that there are
various ways of ‘pro-rating’ the common or joint costs, but all of them have an
arbitrary element and hence, are dangerous to use in prescribing rates.
3) On grounds of economic efficiency, it may be desirable to set a price for some
service so that the revenues generated by that service do not cover its FDC.
4) As the determination of FDC is somewhat arbitrary, there is no economic
basis for concluding that a service is being subsidized by other services if its
revenues are less than its FDC.
5) FDC pricing is anti-competitive since it prevents a supplier from offering a
service at a proposed tariff less than an FDC price; particularly if the proposed
tariff exceeds the MC of providing the service. And
6) There is circular reasoning behind the FDC practice. Tariffs, which are
determined to be appropriate at a given time, may depend on the existing
levels of output or revenues, and these, in turn, depend on previous tariffs.
Thus, FDC may depend on the acceptance of a prior tariff structure.
Also, it is important to note that there are some issues that have to be kept in
mind with regard to FDC pricing policy. Thus, should the FDC of a service reflect the
extent to which the historical total costs of the firm were affected by the presence of
18
Attributable cost is the cost, which ceases if a particular service is discontinued. Calculating
attributable cost requires identification of all network elements that would become redundant if the
service was discontinued. Attributable cost is the cost inherent in maintaining these network elements.
A yardstick for predatory prices based on attributable or incremental cost makes economic sense:
should an undertaking not even cover the specific cost of the specific network elements that production
of a certain service requires, it would be better off not supplying the service. Continuing the service
goes against the economic interest of the service provider and forecloses efficient competitors. On the
other hand, a standard based on attributable cost does not aim to destroy synergies or economies of
scope that a multi-service undertaking achieves in providing several services, on a common
infrastructure.
19
Friedlender, A.F. 1969. The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution.
56
the service? On the other hand, should current replacement costs be used instead of
historical costs?
Subsidy-free Pricing: Another variant of this pricing system is subsidy-free
prices. The constrained market pricing approach to regulate monopolies maintains
that prices should be subsidy-free, lying between the expansive bounds of stand-alone
and incremental costs. Using a simple two-good/two-period model of a monopolist
subject to a zero profit constraint, it is shown that subsidy-free prices are those which
rise to the amortized opportunity cost of the currently optimal asset configuration
required to meet both current and future demand. In some circumstances, this
reasoning provides justification for accelerated depreciation. Such inter-temporal
subsidy-free prices recognize that the stand-alone cost of existing assets to current
consumers depends on the value of those assets to future consumers. Hence, if a
feasible resale price for the fixed costs of capacity exists within or between the
periods, then inter-temporal stand-alone costs and inter-temporal incremental costs are
driven to equality.
Application of FDC pricing is seen in Jha et al 20 where cross-subsidy-free/First
Best Prices policy has been applied to postal services in India. This service has the
characteristic of joint production of several items with increasing returns to scale
leading to the emergence of a ‘natural’ monopoly. In this case, each item must have
adequate incentive to stay with the ‘monopoly’ or alternatively, be able to face the
competition from another agency that may be supplying the same item or a subset of
such items. In this situation, it may be difficult or even impossible to a priori allocate
the costs amongst the various products. The thumb-rule in such a situation is that
cross-subsidy-free prices for a public utility with joint production are the First Best
Prices or Pareto optimal prices. The issues involved in this are
(a) Cost sharing: The prices of various items of a multi-product are such that they
cover the full cost of production.
(b) Rescaling: If the scales of measurement of commodities are changed, then the
prices are changed accordingly.
(c) Consistency: Each unit of the same good has the same price, if prices depend
only upon cost functions and not demand functions.
(d) Positivity: If a cost function ‘A’ increases as rapidly as the cost function ‘B’
with respect to quantities of commodities, then the prices determined for ‘A’
should be at least as high as those determined for ‘B’. And,
(e) Additivity: If a cost function can be broken down into two components say A
and B (e.g., management and production), then the calculation of the price
20
Jha, R.S., M.N. Murthy and S. Paul. 1990. Pricing of Postal Services in India. New Delhi: National
Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
57
(determined by the cost function) for any level of production can be done by
adding the price determined by A and B respectively for that level of
production. The cross-subsidy-free prices can be computed given the long run
cost functions of a multi-product public utility.
The second best or Ramsey prices are not cross-subsidy-free. For a welfare
maximising public utility with a balanced budget, these prices are inevitable. Given
the alternative sources of revenue like commodity taxes and income taxes to finance
the public utility production, the welfare maximising prices for such utility services
may not be globally optimal. The social cost of raising revenue, through prices (of
public utility services, and other public sector commodities) and taxes (income taxes,
commodity taxes etc.), to fund public utility production have to be considered while
fixing globally optimal utility prices.
They have suggested a pricing scheme for public utility services that takes
cross-subsidy-free prices as the “first best producer prices” and the subsidised or tax
inclusive prices as the “consumer prices”. In an economy having a public utility with
increasing returns to scale and a private sector with constant returns to scale, crosssubsidy-free prices for the public utility and prices that are equal to MC (constant) for
private sector commodities are the Pareto optimal prices 21 for that given level of
production of public utility services. Given these prices for public utility services and
private sector commodities, the second best prices a’ la Ramsey can be determined by
the welfare maximising Government with revenue, efficiency and equity objectives.
Demand-Compatible Prices: In the case of mixed cost allocation problems,
i.e. joint costs, there are two types of heterogeneous outputs: divisible and indivisible
output. There are a set of axioms, which characterize a family of price mechanisms
for consumption goods, including MC prices and Aumann-Shapley prices 22 . By
strengthening one of the axioms, MC prices are characterized by requiring that cost is
shared as per the Aumann-Shapley price policy of cost sharing mechanism. It is
derived from a set of natural axioms. The model considers one producer with a given
technology who has fixed input prices and produces a finite number of consumption
goods. Thus, a unique vector can be derived as the cost function that describes the
MC of producing a given vector of consumption goods.
Uniform Pricing: Brito and Oakland 23 have come out with three principal
findings.
21
Pareto optimality or efficiency is referred to as the efficient allocation (system, taxes or prices) where
no person can be made better off without making another person worse off. Sometimes efficiency is
referred to as Pareto optimality after the Italian economist Vilfred Pareto (1848-1923), who first
developled the formulation.
22
Aumann-Shapley price system is the mechanism of sharing costs among various products.
23
Brito, DL and WH Oakland. 1980. “On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods”.
The American Economic Review. Vol. 11, No. 1 (September): 691-706.
58
(a) Whether or not it is constrained to a single uniform price, a monopoly will
produce a sub-optimal level of public goods and inefficiently exclude some
consumers from part of the output actually produced. Three principal
conclusions of the uniform price model are:
(i) Consumers will be divided into two classes: those, which are rationed
by price, and those rationed by output.
(ii) Only those consumers who are rationed by output will be relevant to
the output expansion decision, and their demands will be reflected by
price rather than marginal revenue.
(iii)The solution will not be Pareto efficient. The allocation of existing
output will be inefficient because some consumers are excluded from
consuming some of the total amount of the good available. The level of
output will be sub-optimal because the profits of the firm fail to reflect
the excess demand price premiums of some of the consumers.
(b) In general, a monopolist will find it profitable to vary price with the level of
the service provided to a particular customer. In a wide range of cases, the
marginal price will be declining with respect to units of the service provided.
(c) If prices vary with units of service, the monopoly price schedule will lie above
the corresponding competitive price schedule and the monopoly output will
fall short of the competitive level of output.
Non-Uniform Pricing: While MC and AC pricing theories recommend one
price for the services to be provided, a frequent assumption made in non-uniform
pricing relates to the fact that local maximizing conditions need to be met exactly
once for each purchasing consumer; no consumer can be indifferent between two nonadjacent usage levels. Each consumer then responds to a change in marginal price
only by incrementally reducing his usage. More realistically, maximizing conditions
are sometimes twice met by some interior users, who can be indifferent between nonadjacent usage levels and may, therefore, jump discretely if marginal prices change at
either level. A monopolist's generalized price schedule may be derived under these
circumstances and shows that marginal price may fall below MC.
Multi-part Tariff: A basic principle behind restructuring of rates is to increase
economic efficiency. Changes in rate structures are a necessary element in increasing
economic efficiency. An efficient rate structure requires that prices paid by the
consumer more closely reflect the MC of the services provided. A multi-part tariff is
one mechanism by which efficient pricing can be implemented. A multi-part tariff
reduces the perverse effect that existing rate structures have on the incentives of
regulated utilities and their affiliates to provide energy efficient services. As long as
marginal rates exceed MC, utilities will incur a loss when their customers conserve
more energy.
59
There is a problem in implementing a multi-part tariff. Here, the fixed portion
of the tariff prevents customers, who might otherwise realize benefits in excess of
MCs, from hooking up. This does not help in raising the overall economic efficiency.
Therefore, there might be justification for lower fixed charges for low-income
customers on the basis of efficiency rather than on equity.
Two Part Tariff: Criticizing MC pricing when losses had to be covered out of
taxation, Coase 24 proposed two-part pricing as an alternative. This is a price
discrimination technique in which the price of a product or service is composed of
two parts - a lump-sum fee as well as a per-unit charge. As with all price
discrimination techniques, it may only occur in partially or fully monopolistic
markets. It is designed to enable the firm to capture more consumer surplus than it
otherwise would have in a non-discriminating pricing environment.
The lump-sum fee charged varies depending on the homogeneity of demand.
The rational firm will set the per unit charge above or equal to the MC of production,
and below or equal to the price the firm would charge in a perfect monopoly.
This two-part tariff price policy is still a form of price discrimination. An
important feature is that the product or service offered by the firm must be identical to
all consumers. The price charged may vary, but this is not due to different costs borne
by the firm, as this would otherwise mean a differentiated product.
Myopic Pricing Rules: Gronau 25 , suggested that congestion and road damage
is associated, in general, with different types of vehicles. He analysed the user charges
in the context of the road sector. Congestion is an urban phenomenon associated with
private cars. It is mainly the heavy vehicles on inter-urban roads which cause road
damage. The different externalities call for different charges on heavy vehicles and
private cars. In the case of road services, it is useful to note that cost of providing road
differs according to its use. Economic efficiency calls for charging different prices for
these services, based on short-run MCs. These costs vary by type and density of
traffic, and according to the maintenance and investment policies adopted by the road
authority. Whether or not the charges, set equal to short-run MCs, cover maintenance
and capital costs depends on the returns to scale in the production of road services; the
returns to scope; and the maintenance and capital outlay policies adopted.
In simple terminology, a road offers two basic services: access and loading
capacity. The MC of producing these services depend on two different attributes of
the road: its capacity (width) and its durability (strength). The wider and stronger the
road, the cheaper it is to produce vehicle services. Different users (for example,
private cars and heavy vehicles) require these services in different proportions and
should be charged different prices for using them.
24
Coase, R. H. 1946. "The Marginal Cost Controversy". Economica, New Series. Vol 13(51): 169-182.
Gronau, R. 1994. “Fuel Taxes and Road-User Charges in LDCs: Some Lessons from Sub-Saharan
Africa”. The Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. September: 255-273.
25
60
In the context of developing countries, the factor most often emphasized is the
loading factor. The heavier the vehicle, the more will be the road deterioration. This
results in an increase in vehicles operating costs to all users. The damaging effect of a
vehicle depends on the road authority’s maintenance and capital outlay policy. The
damage can be contained by an appropriate maintenance policy or by building a
stronger road; or it can go unchecked if maintenance and capital outlay are insensitive
to road conditions. In view of this, the user charges for different types of transport
should be determined on the basis of congestion and damage done to the road.
Spot Pricing: It is, of course, impossible to forecast future demand and
capacity availability with perfect certainty. This, therefore, raises the possibility that,
given rigid maximum capacity in the short run, demand at the planned price may be
greater or less than capacity. Where price is perfectly flexible in the short run, ‘spot
pricing’ can be used to maintain the equality between capacity and demand. However,
this is subject to technological, regulatory or political constraints which prevent the
spot price from being used to fulfill its rationing function to a sufficient extent.
Therefore, there will be excess capacity in low demand/ low capacity regions, and
non-price rationing in high demand/ low capacity regions.
Concept of Costs
It is clear from the foregoing discussions that critical to pricing is the concept
of costs. Costs as viewed by economists (advocating MC pricing) are quite different
from the costs facing public sector managers, even those operating activities already
structured as "cost centres". The notion of cost in financial accounting is simply
identifiable monetary outlays incurred in the process of carrying out a particular
activity. Such costs include wages, rent, utilities, transportation, supplies etc. These
costs reflect actual financial outlays made in some particular time period. It can be
difficult to allocate such costs to any particular service activity. Cost accountants have
developed various methods, albeit sometimes arbitrary, to deal with the problem of
allocating such joint or overhead costs.
Economic costs are not simply accounting costs. The fundamental economic
concept is of opportunity cost, or the value of the benefits that could have been
obtained had the inputs been used for another purpose. From this perspective, the cost
of a park does not simply consist of tangible, recorded construction and operating
costs. Instead, the relevant cost is the (highest) value that the land could have realized
had it been used for some other purpose, such as logging or residential development.
Thus, an effective MC pricing policy requires estimating of social or
opportunity costs. This may be a difficult task, as estimating the MC of another unit
61
of a particular service requires identifying all additional costs resulting from this
incremental expansion 26 .
Problems of Measurability
Even without conceptual problems, there may be problems of measurability.
Relevant market prices can often be found - for example, the value of land used for a
park if it were to be logged, or built on. However, such prices can be used to measure
socially relevant MC only if it can be assumed that market prices are good
approximations to MC prices. For this assumption to be valid, the market from which
the information is derived should be close to perfectly competitive - that is, private
sellers set prices close to MC (including a "normal" rate of return on capital).
If MC-based user charges can be calculated, and applied, by definition the
amount charged for providing an additional unit of any particular service will just
equal the benefit that society, as a whole, derives from the provision of that unit. In
practice, however, it is often necessary to estimate the effects of price changes on
demand to determine the desirable level of such charges. While there are various
methods of obtaining this information - for example, by using market information on
substitute or complementary activities (e.g., travel costs in the case of recreational
facilities) or by carefully structured surveys (e.g., contingent valuation analysis) - it is
generally more difficult to get reliable information on demand than on cost.
Further, there are several additional issues that must be settled. One of the
most important is the possible inclusion of “fixed costs" (investment costs). In
principle, short-run MC (SRMC) prices should be imposed to ensure efficient
allocation of resources. When such charges are used, it must be assumed that the size
of a facility is optimal. This condition requires one of two improbabilities: the initial
investment decision was based on correct social cost-benefit principles, taking pricing
into account. Otherwise, the SRMC prices will be altered as usage changes. That is,
when there is excess capacity, no charge will be imposed. However, as the usage level
rises, user charges will reflect increasing congestion costs. Thus, when the time comes
to replace the facility, the funds will be available to do so.
The problem with this solution is twofold. First, congestion costs are difficult
to estimate. Second, even if such costs can be estimated, established user charges tend
to be difficult to alter without major political and administrative effort. Such efforts
are unlikely to be successful in raising prices to pay for a deteriorating level of
service. However, if long run MC (LRMC) is used in the initial pricing calculation,
overbuilt facilities will be even more under-used and managers will not have demand
information with which to work.
26
Congestion, for example, in transport facilities clearly gives rise to real social costs, but it may be
hard to convert such costs of waiting into monetary values. This must be done, however, in the process
of determining efficient prices.
62
Many public activities face decreasing average costs. That is, as output
expands, the cost per unit falls. If average costs are decreasing, then MC must, by
definition, be below average costs. There are facilities with large "sunk" costs and
high economies of scale- such as hydro-electric plants and telecommunication
networks. In such cases, applying MC pricing means the user charge will be less than
average cost, which in turn means that efficient charges will result in financial
deficits.
Properly designed user charges will often require the collection of complex
and difficult-to-obtain information. How costly is it for the manager to charge? 27
Indeed, the costs of pricing may be so high as to make it unfeasible to apply user
charges. The costs of obtaining the necessary detailed cost and demand information
may exceed any conceivable benefits from applying even the best-designed charges.
In all these cases, such costs (like the actual costs of implementing charges and the
(less visible) costs of ensuring compliance) should be factored into the final ‘price’
determination.
Costs of many public sector activities - for example, admitting a person to a
facility in the off season - may readily be calculated. But the cost of collecting the
charge may exceed this amount. If so, no charge should be levied. Every road could
be a toll road, but the high cost of collecting all those tolls would make it impractical.
Designing User Charges
Certain characteristics of monopoly pricing have to be reviewed before
designing user charges, since the Government is deemed to be a natural monopolist in
providing certain public utilities. These are:
(i) In order to maximize profits, the firm must set the price of the last unit of
output equal to MC of production.
(ii) The monopolist will choose a level of output, which is sub-optimal in the
Pareto sense. This implies that consumers would be capable of bribing the
firm to produce additional units of output. They cannot do so, however,
because this would require personalized prices. The firm, by assumption,
must charge the same price schedule to all customers.
(iii) If income function of the consumer is continuous and it is desirable to
exclude some individuals entirely from the consumption of the public
good, the profit-maximizing price schedule does not contain a fixed
charge.
27
That is, to collect the information required to derive an appropriate user charge regime, and the cost
of collecting the user charge.
63
(iv) If the utility function is separable and the density is differentiable and
non-decreasing; consumption of the private good will be strictly nonincreasing in the time period and the marginal price will be falling.
(v) The monopoly marginal price schedule lies somewhere above and
nowhere below the competitive solution.
(vi) Monopoly output will always fall short of competitive output. It states
that underproduction is made even worse by the monopoly provision. The
problem of under-utilization is also exacerbated because of the higher
prices; monopoly will result in greater exclusion from the stock of goods
in existence. While the result that monopoly is less efficient than
competition is not new in economic analysis, it is important that it be
rigorously demonstrated in the case of excludable public goods.
Although user charges are sometimes perceived as a form of taxation, they
differ clearly in that they are linked to specific benefits which are over and above
those enjoyed by the general public. In other words, taxes are used to fund programs
for all citizens, whereas user fees are directed to recovering the costs of specific
private goods and services.
A policy that emphasizes user charges is not designed to obtain revenue, or
even to obtain revenue in a way perceived to be fair. Rather, it is designed to redefine
Government priorities by incorporating more feedback from citizens with respect to
the services they want and for which they are willing to pay. From this perspective,
what matters is not just to impose charges but also to levy the correct charges.
Let us sum up the rules.
First Best Solutions: Taxation and subsidization: Prices be set equal to
marginal costs, and revenue shortfalls need to be recovered through non-distortionary
taxation policies. It may be criticized on grounds of (i) an inadvertent redistribution of
income, (ii) income taxes that are distortionary, and (iii) misallocation of resources.
The Coase Two Part Tariff: each consumer would be charged a single price according
to P=MC, but would also pay a lump-sum or fixed charge for the opportunity to be
able to buy any unit of the service. It is also criticized on account of misinterpretation
of the problems accruing from increasing returns to scale.
Second Best Solutions: (i) Ramsey prices: Attempt to maximize welfare
subject to full-cost recovery, through the use of inverse elasticity rule, i.e. charging
consumers with inelastic demands a higher price relative to consumers with elastic
demands. The use of Ramsey pricing may lead to problems of equity. (ii) Nonlinear
pricing: Refers to any case in which the tariff is not strictly proportional to the
quantity purchased. Consumers act as price takers, given the pricing schedules: If
offered a menu of prices and corresponding charges, each consumer chooses a
preferred quantity and pays the associated charge.
64
An additional factor in determining user charges is the cost of changing public
prices once they have been set. So long as an agency is in the public sphere, the price
it sets inevitably reflects the outcome of a political and administrative process and not
a pure "market" or economic process. Thus, user charges are a political tool and
hence, inherently "sticky" or hard to change. Once set, they tend to prevail until
political circumstances permit or compel change. This situation is observed most
readily when prices are first set on a service that was previously provided free, but
this also applies in varying degrees to all changes in public prices. For this reason, it is
particularly important to set economically efficient prices.
Conclusion
It may be realised that the aim of the cost recovery policy should be: to have
efficient allocation of resources (i.e. to eliminate the excess demand that often exists
with "free goods", given the supply and demand); and to promote equity in financing
Government programs, mandatory or otherwise, by charging beneficiaries an equal or
higher rate than those enjoyed by the general public. This may allow a greater share of
general tax money to be devoted to activities that benefit the general taxpayer, or to
reduce the debt. It may also facilitate improvements in the delivery of specific costrecovered services; and to earn a fair return for the public for access to or exploitation
of the publicly-owned or controlled resources.
The principles of cost recovery may be based on certain normative principles:
(i) Equity- implying that beneficiaries of services should contribute towards their cost.
(ii) Efficiency- that is market tests of the demand for services should help determine
the quantity and quality of their supply.
(iii) Accountability and service standards- which imply that it is the cost recovery that
emphasizes the accountability of Government departments to fee-payers for the
delivery of services as per the overall public policy objectives of the service and the
explicit standards set for its improvement.
(iv) Partnership, i.e. the decision to produce a service through the application of user
fees implies consultation and partnership with beneficiaries both at the stage of fee
setting and in the ongoing management of the program, leading to satisfaction in the
accountability and standard of the service.
(v) Cumulative impact- which involves setting fee levels; departments and agencies
reviewing and taking into account the effects on clients of not only of the specific fees
they propose, but also the cumulative direct and indirect impact of other federal fee
setting activities.
Tariffs should be transparent and should not affect the quality of the service.
There must be penalties for sub-standard quality and service; cross subsidies should
65
be removed from the tariff structure; and targeted explicit subsidies for the needy
should be clearly targetted. The tariff structure should provide flexibility to users.
Given the politico-economic situation of an economy, it is difficult to apply a
purely economic rational policy for user charges. If the consideration is that the
service providing units, not covered by the budgetary mechanism, should be fully
responsible for maintaining the desired level of service delivery, then it should be
obligatory on the part of the Government to compensate them for the possible losses
due to the subsidised element of cost recovery. If the Government has to maximize its
objective function of social welfare and utility, it has to share the burden of financing
it e.g. minor irrigation, education and health are cases of merit goods but are also the
inputs for economic development and human resource development, which affect the
overall development of the economy indirectly.
The variations of practices in cost recovery policy coupled with the stated
objective functions of respective States bring out the differences in cost recovery
ratios (norms). It would be interesting to see what would be the likely fiscal scenario
in the States if there were uniformity in such a policy. Two extreme options may be,
either to follow the leader or adhere to the rule of averages. The simulated exercise
may help in some convergence of policies and practices. It could also teach a lesson to
others who do not tread the chosen policy path.
66
4
Revenue Realization from
Non-tax Sources
The trends in revenue from non-tax sources (Chapter 2) clearly bring out the need to
improve the growth of non-tax revenues in most of the Indian States. The comparative picture
that emerges from a study of non-tax sources in different countries also indicates the need for
giving a boost to the efforts at mobilizing non-tax sources in India. The fact remains that most
of the user charges for Government services in Indian States are fixed at an abysmally low
level or remained practically non-existent.
The theories of utility pricing (Chapter 3) point out that an efficient allocation of
resources and equity in financing Government services is possible. Government is required to
focus on cost recovery for its services.
While it is important to aim at appropriate cost recovery, it is useful to keep in purview
the following features that characterize the services provided by the Government:
(1) These services are characterized by externalities. The goods and services provided
by the Government benefit the society as a whole, irrespective of whether these are being
targeted at any specific individual or group. These services also have the quality of ‘nonrivalness’, i.e. the consumption or enjoyment of these goods and services by one individual or
one group does not affect their availability and satisfaction for the others. In addition, the
goods and services provided by the Government enjoy scale of economies in their provision.
Efficient production or supply of these goods is not viable for small private producers. Hence,
these services are treated as a natural monopoly of the Government.
(2) There is an unending debate on the nature of goods and services provided by the
Government. While the benefits of public goods are expected to accrue to the society as a
whole, all the goods and services provided by the Government cannot be treated as pure public
goods-- the benefits of these goods and services are enjoyed by both the targeted and nontargeted groups. Hence, it is difficult to classify Government goods and services as pure public
goods or quasi-public (or mixed goods).
Although many of the goods and services provided by the State Governments may not
be ‘pure public goods’ and could accrue to non-targeted groups in the society, it is a widely
held belief that it is the targeted sections who enjoy better access to the services. Hence, part of
the cost of these services should be recovered from the target groups by the imposition of
appropriate user charges. However, the ‘marginal cost pricing’ principle, generally applicable
to pricing of ‘private’ goods and services, may not be appropriate for pricing such goods and
services as this would imply negligible or zero recovery through user charges 1 . This view has
got an added impetus with the structural reforms adopted in the country. The trend is towards
reducing the quantum of subsidy and levying appropriate user charges for the provision of
public services. User charges will be determined according to the economic status of the user
and the type of the commodity. The user charge will be such that the cost is met and the price
of the commodity does not lead to over-consumption of such services and hence, to a wasteful
use of scarce resources.
Issues in Determination of User Charges
The million-dollar question is how does the Government fix user charges for non-tax
sources? Appropriate user charges serve the twin purposes of having a rational non-tax
structure and generating greater means to achieve economic growth. Irrational structure of nontax sources causes adverse economic effects, invalidating the growth objectives. From the
point of view of economics, therefore, one has to keep in mind the objectives of fixation of
user charges.
•
Firstly, the objective of equity advocates equalization of benefit to each segment
of the society. If the marginal benefits are not equal, then the society’s total
welfare can be increased by reassigning the service usage amongst the different
sections of the society;
•
Secondly, objective of ensuring consumer acceptability refers to having a
simple pricing system, which is easily comprehensible and acceptable to the
consumers of the services at large. Therefore, the pricing system should not be
complex;
•
Thirdly, the concept of administrative feasibility points out that discrimination
of rates should be administratively feasible and hence, there should be a limit to
the rate differentiation; and
1
In the literature on public finance, it is largely accepted that the marginal cost pricing principle is applicable to
the provision of Government services so long as (i) the benefits of the service accrue to the masses, and the
marginal expenditure exceeds the marginal cost and (ii) the marginal benefits of financing the service is equal to
the possible marginal benefit from other competing investments. See for details infra Chapter 3.
68
•
Finally, environmental considerations suggest that the pricing system should be
such that it encourages and promotes the efficient use of environmental
resources.
To fulfill the above objectives, the Government has to adopt an economically rational
structure of non-tax sources that may not be palatable politically. A popularly elected
Government, therefore, has to adopt a balance between the two.
The determination of user charges largely depends upon the degree of publicness of
these goods. If the goods and services provided by the Government were purely “public” in
nature, it would be difficult to recover their full cost; if these goods and services are “private”
in nature, the willingness to bear the cost will be almost zero. Also, in quasi-public services,
the unit cost of providing the services depends upon the amount of funds the society is willing
to pay and the form financing of the service. The willingness to pay for the service will depend
upon the usefulness of the service; the more useful the service, the higher will be the
willingness to pay by the society.
Actual Cost Recovery
The actual cost to the Government of providing the public service will be reflected by:
•
budgetary allocation from the general pool of Government resources, reflecting
the society’s willingness to absorb the cost through the voting process;
•
actual cost recovery through user charges; and
•
unrecovered costs due to market inefficiencies.
The actual revenue realization as a percent of revenue expenditure (RR/RE) 2 , however,
varies according to the type of service. The Government will have to look into the preferences
of the society, by making use of empirical surveys. Such surveys (i) reveal the overall
preferences of the society for each service given the choice between the financing of the
service through budgetary allocations and through the user charges 3 , and (ii) help in making
comparisons between the actual RR/RE through user charges and the desired level of RR/RE.
In this analysis of the efforts of the States in collecting appropriate user charges for
services provided, the study presents an estimate of the percentage share of revenue realized
(RR) from a service to the revenue expenditure (RE) incurred on providing that service. An
attempt is then made to compare RR/RE of different services among the States.
2
Hereafter, Revenue Receipts as percent of Revenue Expenditure will be denoted as RR/RE.
In Berkeley, California (USA), for example, a survey was conducted to find out from the society whether the
BART (train service like Metro in Delhi) railway line be underground (requiring the society to pay more) or over
ground (incurring less cost and consequently lower user charges). The society preferred that it be underground in
the city areas.
3
69
The study, however, confines its scope to only those non-tax sources, which originate
from the administrative departments and departmental undertakings of a non-commercial
nature. Therefore, sources such as interest, profits and dividends arising from the States’
commercial undertakings are beyond its scope. As stated in chapter 1, the non-tax sources
covered in the study include some select administrative non-tax receipts from general, social,
and economic services.
In view of the strategic importance of some of the services in the overall non-tax
sources, the study attempts to measure RR/RE for the following ten services:
(1)
Public works,
(2)
Education, sports, art & culture,
(3)
Medical, public health and family welfare,
(4)
Water supply and sanitation,
(5)
Forestry and wild life,
(6)
Major and medium irrigation,
(7)
Minor irrigation,
(8)
Industries,
(9)
Mines and minerals, and
(10)
Roads and bridges.
The above ten sources account for about 2/3rd to 3/4th of the administrative component
of the non-tax revenue of different States.
While each State is taken up for a detailed analysis of the structure of user charges, an
effort has also been made to collect information on these charges from all the States. For
collecting such information, a detailed questionnaire was prepared and sent to all the States 4 .
However, in the attempt to analyse a few crucial aspects of user charges, efforts were also
made to collect information from a few select States. The selected States were Rajasthan
(Northern Zone), Karnataka (Southern Zone), Maharashtra (Western Zone) and West Bengal
(Eastern Zone). Efforts were made to collect information directly from these States by visiting
the respective State capitals. The information on user charges so obtained from these States is
given in Annexure A.2.
Actual Revenue Realization from Select Services:
In analyzing the select services, the study takes note of two time periods. The first time
period is 1993-94 to 1995-96 and the second refers to the period from 2001-02 to 2003-04.
4
See Annexure A.1 for details of the questionnaire.
70
While presenting a comparative analysis, this study refers to them as the first and the second
phase.
The actual revenue realization of non-tax revenues as a percent of the corresponding
revenue expenditure 5 was calculated from the RBI publications 6 . Table 4.1 gives RR/RE for
social services and economic services across the States for the years 1993-94, 1998-99 and
2003-04. Further details for different components of social and economic services (based on
data collected from the RBI) are given in Annexure A.4.1 for the same years, i.e. 1993-94,
1998-99 and 2003-04.
In Table 4.1, all-States RR/RE from economic services has been higher than social
services in all the three years, in spite of its decline from 21.7 percent in 1993-94 to 19.5
percent in 2003-04. On the other hand, the rate was always less than 3 percent in the case of
social services for all these years, however, there was a meager increase from 2.3 percent in
1993-94 to 2.7 percent in 2003-04.
Among the major States, Goa’s RR/RE from social services as well as from the
economic services has been highest as compared to the other States. While RR/RE from social
services in Goa increased from 7.8 percent in 1993-94 to 13.5 percent in 2003-04; in the case
of economic services, it increased to an exceptionally high level of 103.2 percent in 2003-04
from the prevailing high of 81.3 percent in 1993-94 and 87.3 percent in 1998-99 (Table 4.1).
In economic services, after Goa come the States of Orissa (60.1 percent), Punjab (38.7
percent), Bihar (36.6 percent) and Haryana (36.5 percent) in the year 1993-94. This order was
maintained in the year 2003-04 also as shown in Table 4.1. On the other hand, with respect to
RR/RE in social services, most of the States lagged far behind Goa in the year 1993-94; Punjab
(4.7 percent), Haryana (4.6 percent) and Rajasthan (3.6 percent). In 1998-99, while Haryana
exhibited an increase in recovery and the other two States showed a decline, in 2003-04, all
these States exhibited a rise from the 1998-99 level, though these were still less as compared to
the initial levels (Table 4.1).
As the data available from the RBI sources are at an aggregated level, the results of the
RR/RE cannot be used for policy purposes. Hence, for a detailed analysis this study uses data
collected from the State Budget Documents.
Making use of the data collected from State Budget Documents, Table 4.2 gives the
percentage share of RR/RE of ten select components of social and economic services at a
5
Logically, one should take revenue expenditure plus annualized capital expenditure for each of the major
services. However, in this study we have taken only revenue expenditure as the denominator assuming that at least
this could be first met as a target for achieving the desired RR/RE.
6
RBI presents a rich source of data on State finances. Due to various reasons of comparability, however, data on
revenue from non-tax sources in RBI documents are not presented in sufficient details. Hence, this study uses RBI
data for only a macro analysis.
71
disaggregated level 7 . On the basis of this data, the study presents the average percentage share
of RR/RE for each of the select non-tax sources for the two phases, i.e. the first three years of
the study (1993-94 to 1995-96) and the last three years of the study (2001-02 to 2003-04) for
the 15 major States.
In the case of public works, only three States (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu)
have exhibited a rise in average RR/RE between the two phases, as shown in Table 4.2. While,
in Andhra Pradesh the rate increased from 14.1 percent in the first phase to 17.3 percent in the
second phase; in Bihar and Tamil Nadu it increased from 1.2 percent and 5.3 percent,
respectively during the first phase, to 1.3 percent and 11.6 percent respectively, during the
second phase. Maharashtra and Rajasthan are the States that have maximum RR/RE during
1993-94 to 1995-96; about 43.9 percent and 42.4 percent, respectively. However, during the
second phase, this proportion declined to 19.9 percent and 35.3 percent respectively; though it
was still the highest amongst all the other States.
RR/RE has risen between the phases in a majority of the States in services like
education, sports, arts and culture; and minor irrigation. Except for Uttar Pradesh, the average
RR/RE of education, sports, art and culture was never more than 2.5 percent for both the
phases. Uttar Pradesh recorded an average RR/RE of 3.4 percent during the period 2001-02 to
2003-04. In minor irrigation, on the other hand, while 11 States exhibited a rise in their average
RR/RE between the phases; States like Goa, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu demonstrated quite a
significant increase during the two phases: from 7.6 percent, 2.01 percent and 5.9 percent
respectively, in the first phase, to 15.3 percent, 4.3 percent and 12.9 percent respectively,
during the second phase (Table 4.2).
RR/RE was highest in the non-ferrous mining and metallurgical industries. Among the
States, it was as high as 98 times in Bihar in the first phase. However, during the same phase, it
was as low as 181.0 percent in West Bengal. In the second phase it was at a maximum of 85
times in Andhra Pradesh and a minimum of 4 times in West Bengal.
Apart from non-ferrous mining and metallurgical industries, many of the States have
earned good revenue from forestry and wild life. In six of the States, the average percentage
share of revenue receipts to revenue expenditure was more than 100 percent in the first phase;
the number declined to two States during second phase. (Table 4.2).
In medical, public health and family welfare, while the RR/RE was in the range of 2
percent and 10 percent; in the case of water supply and sanitation, only a few States have
exhibited a significant recovery of revenue expenditure, (e.g. Goa and Rajasthan) for both the
periods. In case of majority and medium irrigation, and roads and bridges, on the other hand,
majority of states have seen decline in their average recovery rate between the phases. The
7
From these documents, data related to each of the sub-items of revenue and expenditure on non-tax sources for
the select services (at a very disaggregated level) have been collected. Unfortunately, even in the Budget
documents, some of the items such as lotteries, interests, departmental undertakings, etc. are not reflected
correctly. Hence, necessary adjustments have been made, wherever required.
72
States that have witnessed a rise in RR/RE are Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa and
Tamil Nadu for major and medium irrigation, while it was Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka,
Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal for roads and bridges.
Thus, on the whole, the actual average RR/RE has risen only for two services in all the
major 15 States: (i) education, sports, arts and culture and (ii) water supply and sanitation. This
average ratio increased from 1.04 percent and 5 percent respectively, during 1993-94 to 199596; to 1.5 percent and 7.3 percent respectively, during 2001-02 to 2003-04. The average
RR/RE, however, was the highest for non-ferrous mining and metallurgical industries in the
ten select services, followed by forestry and wildlife (Table 4.2).
Desired Percentage of RR/RE:
Desired RR/RE is “the rate” which the States should aim at and make continuous
efforts to attain. By estimating the desired revenue realization as a percent of revenue
expenditure using the normative approach, an appraisal of the performance of the various
States in collecting RR/RE could be made. Adopting a normative approach, the study presents
estimated ‘norms’ of RR/RE for each of the services. The desired level of RR/RE could have
been empirically derived from the historical trend. However, this differs from one place to
another due to the following factors:
•
differences in the population density;
•
levels of living;
•
stage of development;
•
the socio-cultural factors; and
•
other region specific factors.
It is necessary to fix the norms for the collection of non-tax revenues by States. Only
then it is possible to judge the relative efficiency of various States in their efforts to collect
non-tax revenues. The non-tax revenues of States include the earnings of public sector
enterprises by way of prices for their products (fixed by regulatory authorities) or amounts
recovered as user charges from a large number of public services. In fact, the State
Government may be viewed as a multi-service provider. In determining the prices for the
outputs of regulated firms and services provided by public enterprises, economic theory
suggests marginal cost pricing or Ramsey price as the “optimal pricing rule”. User charges are
price-like instruments that emerge naturally for financing of services via which its use can be
restricted to only the paying consumers.
Ramsey’s principle of pricing of goods and services incorporates the inverse elasticity
rule and this yields Ramsey prices that are known to be efficient. These can be computed
73
separately for each of the component service or commodity 8 . The Ramsey prices thus derived
are normative. However, a considerable amount of information is required to compute the
Ramsey prices for each service. It requires the average long run and short run marginal costs of
production of each service in each State. Given the resource constraint faced by the States, one
of the objectives in such an exercise of normative price fixing is the recovery of costs.
However, apart from this informational requirement, it is a known fact that the Ramsey prices
do not fully cover the costs.
In addition to costs that are directly attributable, a service may also be assigned a
portion of the costs that cannot be clearly associated with any particular service. This kind of
pricing policy may best be described as the “zero-profit fully-distributed-cost pricing rule”.
To estimate the RR/RE, it is possible to use regression method by using panel data of
major States for selected years. In such an exercise, the dependent variable will be the
proportion of revenue receipts to the revenue expenditure. The independent variables can be
population density, per capita income, proportion of relevant sectoral income in total GSDP,
urbanization, literacy and availability of medical facilities etc. Our use of panel data models
uses “fixed effect” types of regressions and also presumes that the desired cost recovery is net
of the State specific factors. This implies that these State specific factors are either fixed for the
last three years or the pattern of change has been fixed. On the other hand, factors like effects
of production inefficiencies and imperfections are built into the model as random fluctuations.
However, it is generally recognized that the estimated RR/RE are either approximately
equal or more than the actual RR/RE. This is due to the differences that exist in the States’s
perception regarding the degree of “publicness” of different services. These differences are
conditioned by various socio-economic factors 9 . It is due to these differences in the socioeconomic factors across the States that there exist substantial variations in non-tax recoveries
and the desired RR/RE. In the case of the services, where the desired RR/RE are higher than
the actual RR/RE, scope for upward revisions exists. The difference in the actual RR/RE and
the desired RR/RE indicates the inefficiencies in the recovery enforcement. In such cases, there
is need to revise the rates upwardly.
Given this framework of conceptual and practical limitations, this study uses the
following two steps for estimating norms for desired RR/RE.
First, the econometric technique for fixing norms for non-tax revenues is as follows:
The econometric model for fixing norms of non-tax revenues could be described as
follows:
8
Jha, Raghabendra, M.N. Murty and Satya Paul. 1999. Pricing of Postal Services in India. National Institute of
Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.
9
This is illustrated by the fact that States like Rajasthan, Bihar and Orissa are rich in mineral, whereas the States
of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Uttranchal have dense forest areas. Other States do not have an abundance
of both these resources.
74
Let Yi (where i=1, 2, ..n) denote the non-tax revenue on a particular item collected by
the ith State whose GSDP is Xi.
Let Zi denote a vector of characteristics of the ith State which are considered important
for determining the level of collection of non-tax revenues for a particular service. We fit a
model having the following functional form:
(1) Yi = α + β Xi + γ Zi + ui, where α, β, and γ are constants and ui is a random variable
that takes only positive (non-negative) values.
The above function in equation (1) can be estimated from the data for different States
for each component of non-tax revenue and the fitted value, viz.:
(2) Ŷi = α^ + β^ Xi + γ^ Zi can be taken as the norm for that particular component of
non-tax revenue.
To estimate the norms for ten select services, the following equations were set up:
Equations for Regression
1
recpwd = {pcgsdp, gsdpcons}
Same for both the phases
2
recedn = {pcgsdp, urban}
For Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
{pcgsdp, urban, sch, tch}
3
recmed = {pcgsdp, nodoc}
{pcgsdp, nodoc, beds, hosp, dis}
For Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
For Phase I
For Phase II
4
recwss = {pcgsdp, urban}
Same for both the phases
5
recfor = {pcgsdp, gsdpfore, areaufor}
For Phase I
{pcgsdp, gsdpfore, areaufor, valfor}
For Phase II
6
recmajir = {pcgsdp, gsdpagr, grsirrarea}
Same for both the phases
7
recminirr = {pcgsdp, gsdpagr}
For Phase I
{pcgsdp, gsdpagr, grsirrarea}
For Phase II
8
recinds = {pcgsdp,gsdpagr, gsdpindus,gsdpmfg}
Same for both the phases
9
Recmin = {pcgsdp, gsdpmin}
For Phase I
{pcgsdp, gsdpmin, valmin}
For Phase II
75
10
Recroad = {pcgsdp, gsdptran, rdl}
{pcgsdp, gsdptran, rdl, nov}
For Phase I
For Phase II
Where,
recpwd = RR/RE for public works department;
recedn = RR/RE for education, arts and culture;
recmed = RR/RE for medical and public health;
recwss = RR/RE for water and sanitation;
recfor = RR/RE for forest;
recmajir = RR/RE for major irrigation;
recminirr = RR/RE for minor irrigation;
recindus = RR/RE for industry;
recmin = RR/RE for mines and minerals; and
recroad = RR/RE for roads and tolls.
In the above equations, for each of the ten select services, the percentage share of
revenue realized to the corresponding expenditures has been calculated for the two phases
(1993-94 to 1995-96, termed as phase I) and 2001-02 to 2003-04 (termed as Phase II), across
the 15 major States. The average RR/RE is then obtained for each of the service for both the
phases. The change in this average percentage share in the two phases indicates the efforts of
the major States in mobilizing resources through non-tax sources. The details of the actual
average calculations of RR/RE of each of the service are shown in Table 4.2.
These regression equations give estimated RR/RE for each select service by using the
average of actual percentage share of revenue receipts of a service to the corresponding
revenue expenditures for the concerned service provided by the Government as the dependent
variable. The independent variables are: per capita income (pcgsdp), proportion of relevant
sectoral income in total Gross State Domestic Product (gsdpcons for construction, gsdpagr for
agriculture, gsdpfore for forest, gsdpmin for minerals, gsdptran for transport, gsdpindus for
industry), urbanization (urban), availability of educational facilities (sch for schools, tch for
teachers), availability of medical facilities (nodoc for number of doctors, beds for beds in
hospitals, hosp for hospitals, dis for dispensaries), area under forest (areaufor), value of forest
(valfor), gross irrigated area (grsirrarea), value of minerals (valmin), road length (rdl), number
of vehicles (nov) etc. Also, 15 State-wise dummy variables have been applied to get the Statewise estimated RR/RE for each service. The results of the regression using different variables
and dummies have been shown in Annexure A.4.2 and A.4.3, respectively.
The all-States norm is calculated by using the ‘Normative Approach’ in the above
regression equations. This method, thus, estimates the ‘Norm’ for RR/RE of each of the service
76
by taking the deviation from the all-States average. The difference between the actual RR/RE
for each service across the States and the desired RR/RE for each service from the all-States
average gives the magnitude by which the States need to increase their existing recoveries. The
results of the above regressions, fitted for all the services in the 15 major States, yield the
norms for all the services. These are shown in Tables 4.3 through 4.12. The exhibits through
4.1 to 4.10 indicate the shortfall of the states actual RR/RE for a services from the desired allstates RR/RE.
As the second step, the study then adopts a method of comparing the adequacy of the
actual average RR/RE with the actual RR/RE of the best performing State from amongst all the
States. For each of the selected service, the norm can be the State with the highest RR/RE
among the major States. Thus, in the case of education, the desired RR/RE of Haryana is
highest in the first phase of our study and maximum for Uttar Pradesh in the second phase
(Tables 4.4). These are taken as the norm for the education in this study. The same
methodology is adopted for all the ten services. The results are shown in Tables 4.3 through
4.12.
The norms estimated on the basis of the related variables determine the relative
efficiency of States when the State Government is viewed as a multi-service provider and the
user charges as price-like instruments, which restrict the use of the service to only the “paying”
consumers.
Conclusions
The services provided by the Government are characterized by externalities. Many of
the services fall in the category of quasi-public services. Notwithstanding the characteristics of
the services provided by the Government, the fact remains that most user charges for the
Government services in Indian States are at an abysmally low level.
Actual revenue realization as percent of revenue expenditure (RR/RE) varies according
to the type of service. RR/RE for economic services have been higher than social services.
Among the major States, Goa’s recovery from social services as well as from the economic
services has been highest as compared to other States. At disaggregated level RR/RE has risen
for only two services (education and roads and bridges) in all States. Goa has the highest
percentage increase in medical followed by Tamil Nadu in public works, Bihar in education
and Kerala in water supply and sanitation, Karnataka in major and medium irrigation, Tamil
Nadu in minor irrigation etc.
Following normative approach in calculating ‘norms’ of RR/RE and the difference
between the actual and desired RR/RE for each service for all-States gives us the rate by which
the States need to increase their existing recoveries. As a next step, the study adopts a method
of comparing the adequacy of the actual average RR/RE with the estimated RR/RE of best
practicing State. The study, therefore, makes an effort at estimating relative efficiency of States
when the State Government is viewed as a multi-services provider and the user charges as
price-like instruments.
77
Table 4.1 RR/RE for Social and Economic Services
Social Services
Major States
1993-94
1998-99
Economic Services
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
2003-04
Andhra Pradesh
2.40
1.05
2.43
20.72
12.83
16.51
Bihar
1.30
2.05
2.40
36.61
38.09
8.38
Goa
7.75
13.19
13.45
81.22
87.28
103.21
Gujarat
3.00
1.95
2.76
18.07
12.72
33.50
Haryana
4.60
6.15
8.89
36.53
23.10
29.42
Karnataka
2.23
2.35
1.77
14.92
16.73
19.84
Kerala
2.36
1.97
2.54
19.86
9.93
10.66
Madhya Pradesh
1.92
1.22
1.53
40.83
42.03
19.83
Maharashtra
3.21
2.80
2.39
24.53
25.09
30.84
Orissa
2.90
1.54
1.74
60.08
33.60
37.90
Punjab
4.67
1.93
3.15
38.70
21.93
20.86
Rajasthan
3.57
3.22
3.54
13.14
19.96
20.27
Tamil Nadu
2.45
2.83
5.54
9.84
9.77
15.55
Uttar Pradesh
1.59
2.50
3.45
12.46
9.99
5.14
West Bengal
2.19
1.22
1.18
7.42
5.28
7.28
Major 15 States
2.55
2.29
2.96
22.26
19.25
17.64
All States
2.34
2.16
2.74
21.71
18.84
19.53
Source: RBI, “State Finances: A Study of Budgets”, Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
78
Table 4.2 Average RR/RE of Select Services
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Major 15 States
Public Works Department
1993-96
2001-04
% Change
14.10
17.34
23.03
1.22
1.25
1.73
8.49
6.35
-25.26
19.11
16.98
-11.18
8.21
7.19
-12.37
6.34
6.28
-0.89
8.19
4.16
-49.16
15.80
14.02
-11.25
43.93
19.92
-54.66
21.67
9.27
-57.21
7.68
6.64
-13.56
42.40
35.33
-16.68
5.28
11.61
119.86
11.42
4.51
-60.50
6.06
3.20
-47.25
14.37
9.65
-32.85
Education, Sports, arts and culture
1993-96
2001-04
% Change
1.54
2.49
61.49
0.15
0.84
473.38
0.58
2.11
264.27
1.11
1.61
45.62
2.30
1.84
-20.01
1.09
1.01
-8.13
2.01
2.33
15.92
0.44
0.48
8.69
0.90
0.57
-36.95
1.32
1.11
-15.67
0.79
0.83
4.98
0.51
1.26
144.31
1.44
2.20
53.10
1.40
3.38
141.33
0.45
0.58
28.51
1.04
1.51
44.62
Medical and public health
1993-96
2001-04
% Change
3.59
3.48
-3.10
2.59
3.65
41.25
4.83
6.97
44.38
8.46
5.72
-32.34
9.19
10.32
12.27
6.00
6.22
3.73
5.82
3.76
-35.45
2.26
2.48
9.60
8.69
6.31
-27.38
2.59
2.55
-1.63
8.68
6.54
-24.68
3.88
2.72
-29.88
5.86
7.15
22.11
2.24
3.05
36.30
6.53
4.04
-38.12
5.29
4.76
-9.87
Water Supply and Sanitation
1993-96
2001-04
% Change
1.92
5.32
177.55
1.33
0.26
-80.35
45.65
61.75
35.26
0.14
0.50
257.53
8.51
11.13
30.78
0.81
0.38
-53.06
0.10
1.20
1121.96
4.08
5.66
38.77
3.04
0.85
-71.98
6.71
11.23
67.21
10.31
9.58
-7.09
23.08
19.03
-17.56
1.03
3.77
265.02
0.04
0.26
615.37
0.94
1.37
45.14
5.00
7.27
45.32
Forestry and Wildlife
1993-96
2001-04
% Change
127.56
29.02
-77.25
67.07
36.78
-45.17
31.59
12.95
-59.01
25.12
28.71
14.30
29.32
28.12
-4.11
63.85
43.15
-32.42
213.99
106.58
-50.20
150.57
87.54
-41.86
72.07
35.77
-50.37
168.62
89.19
-47.10
30.46
13.90
-54.36
14.77
31.46
112.95
129.72
130.96
0.96
102.35
53.76
-47.48
50.89
30.83
-39.42
98.83
55.02
-44.33
79
Table 4.2 (Contd……)
Major and Medium irrigation
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Major 15 States
1993-96
15.04
28.68
17.24
6.07
7.17
4.85
7.09
23.46
8.37
17.74
21.21
6.83
0.28
19.49
3.51
8.67
2001-04
0.74
12.72
54.09
16.20
27.66
26.55
6.59
13.75
6.05
32.16
6.12
4.28
0.41
10.78
2.45
7.57
% Change
-95.09
-55.66
213.77
166.85
285.74
446.83
-7.11
-41.39
-27.72
81.32
-71.14
-37.31
48.38
-44.66
-30.05
-12.67
Minor irrigation
1993-96
14.66
0.61
7.63
2.82
0.22
2.01
1.35
18.30
7.04
2.21
0.94
32.82
5.86
5.94
4.78
6.53
2001-04
1.26
0.79
15.32
4.97
0.36
4.26
1.88
26.55
5.47
3.15
0.26
34.29
12.92
6.03
4.02
5.91
% Change
-91.42
30.48
100.84
76.13
61.02
111.77
39.88
45.06
-22.27
42.35
-72.07
4.47
120.72
1.52
-16.06
-9.53
Non-Ferrous and Metallurgical
industries
Industries
1993-96
0.36
2.26
1.73
15.18
4.00
17.95
1.99
12.88
2.13
6.67
0.10
3.34
0.94
14.96
18.12
7.03
2001-04
18.92
0.40
0.46
3.61
1.10
21.07
0.30
24.92
2.43
5.12
181.88
3.12
0.96
0.05
4.13
5.34
% Change
5204.29
-82.19
-73.23
-76.23
-72.55
17.36
-84.89
93.41
13.98
-23.29
191262.59
-6.53
2.14
-99.66
-77.19
-24.06
1993-96
7993.63
9873.52
3828.88
5131.86
2231.52
2095.97
322.02
9175.76
5068.65
2188.27
323.61
616.51
2661.12
2357.62
181.02
3328.31
2001-04
8532.85
1151.41
3038.33
7463.21
1254.16
2983.19
679.23
5698.55
679.31
3678.95
968.81
1733.77
6325.34
2651.92
397.37
2612.74
% Change
6.75
-88.34
-20.65
45.43
-43.80
42.33
110.93
-37.90
-86.60
68.12
199.38
181.22
137.69
12.48
119.52
-21.50
Roads and bridges
%
1993-96
2001-04
Change
8.16
7.94
-2.65
6.73
4.83
-28.27
24.15
12.07
-50.03
0.88
2.61
196.33
0.12
0.64
434.84
3.57
7.34
105.49
8.36
4.76
-43.03
5.63
1.56
-72.27
58.62
0.12
-99.79
5.00
9.38
87.59
0.81
0.41
-49.28
1.81
1.94
6.87
5.60
7.12
27.18
6.18
4.03
-34.86
7.24
8.43
16.54
5.33
4.57
-14.31
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years
80
Table 4.3 Deviation from Norms for Public Works
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
14.10
-1.38
-29.83
1.22
-14.25
-42.70
8.49
-6.98
-35.43
19.11
3.64
-24.81
8.21
-7.27
-35.72
6.34
-9.14
-37.59
8.19
-7.29
-35.74
15.80
0.32
-28.13
43.93
28.45
0.00
21.67
6.19
-22.25
7.68
-7.80
-36.25
42.40
26.92
-1.53
5.28
-10.20
-38.65
11.42
-4.05
-32.50
6.06
-9.42
-37.87
15.48
43.93
1.23
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm
from Max.
4
5
6
17.34
5.98
-17.98
1.25
-10.12
-34.08
6.35
-5.02
-28.98
16.98
5.61
-18.35
7.19
-4.17
-28.14
6.28
-5.08
-29.04
4.16
-7.21
-31.17
14.02
2.66
-21.31
19.92
8.55
-15.41
9.27
-2.09
-26.06
6.64
-4.73
-28.69
35.33
23.96
0.00
11.61
0.24
-23.72
4.51
-6.85
-30.82
3.20
-8.17
-32.13
11.37
35.33
1.25
Table 4.4 Deviation from Norms for Education, Sports, Arts and Culture
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
1.54
0.47
-0.76
0.15
-0.93
-2.16
0.58
-0.49
-1.73
1.11
0.04
-1.20
2.30
1.23
0.00
1.09
0.02
-1.21
2.01
0.94
-0.29
0.44
-0.63
-1.86
0.90
-0.17
-1.40
1.32
0.25
-0.98
0.79
-0.29
-1.52
0.51
-0.56
-1.79
1.44
0.37
-0.87
1.40
0.33
-0.90
0.45
-0.62
-1.85
1.07
2.30
0.15
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm
from Max.
4
5
6
2.49
0.98
-0.89
0.84
-0.67
-2.54
2.11
0.60
-1.27
1.61
0.10
-1.77
1.84
0.33
-1.54
1.01
-0.50
-2.37
2.33
0.82
-1.05
0.48
-1.03
-2.90
0.57
-0.94
-2.81
1.11
-0.39
-2.27
0.83
-0.68
-2.55
1.26
-0.25
-2.12
2.20
0.69
-1.18
3.38
1.87
0.00
0.58
-0.93
-2.80
1.51
3.38
0.48
81
Table 4.5 Deviation from Norms for Medical and Public Health
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
3.59
-1.89
-5.60
2.59
-2.89
-6.61
4.83
-0.65
-4.36
8.46
2.98
-0.74
9.19
3.71
0.00
6.00
0.52
-3.20
5.82
0.34
-3.37
2.26
-3.22
-6.93
8.69
3.21
-0.50
2.59
-2.89
-6.60
8.68
3.20
-0.51
3.88
-1.60
-5.31
5.86
0.38
-3.33
2.24
-3.24
-6.95
6.53
1.05
-2.66
5.48
9.19
2.24
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
4
5
6
3.48
-1.54
-6.84
3.65
-1.36
-6.67
6.97
1.96
-3.35
5.72
0.71
-4.60
10.32
5.31
0.00
6.22
1.21
-4.10
3.76
-1.26
-6.56
2.48
-2.53
-7.84
6.31
1.30
-4.01
2.55
-2.46
-7.77
6.54
1.53
-3.78
2.72
-2.29
-7.60
7.15
2.14
-3.17
3.05
-1.96
-7.27
4.04
-0.97
-6.28
5.01
10.32
2.48
Table 4.6 Deviation from Norms for Water Supply and Sanitation
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
1.92
-5.35
-43.74
1.33
-5.94
-44.33
45.65
38.38
0.00
0.14
-7.13
-45.51
8.51
1.24
-37.14
0.81
-6.46
-44.85
0.10
-7.17
-45.56
4.08
-3.19
-41.57
3.04
-4.23
-42.61
6.71
-0.56
-38.94
10.31
3.04
-35.34
23.08
15.81
-22.58
1.03
-6.24
-44.62
0.04
-7.23
-45.62
0.94
-6.33
-44.71
7.27
45.65
0.04
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
4
5
6
5.32
-3.59
-56.43
0.26
-8.65
-61.49
61.75
52.84
0.00
0.50
-8.41
-61.25
11.13
2.22
-50.62
0.38
-8.54
-61.37
1.20
-7.71
-60.55
5.66
-3.25
-56.09
0.85
-8.06
-60.90
11.23
2.31
-50.52
9.58
0.67
-52.17
19.03
10.11
-42.73
3.77
-5.14
-57.98
0.26
-8.65
-61.49
1.37
-7.54
-60.38
8.91
61.75
0.26
82
Table 4.7 Deviation from Norms for Forestry and Wildlife
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
127.56
42.32
-86.43
67.07
-18.17
-146.92
31.59
-53.66
-182.41
25.12
-60.12
-188.88
29.32
-55.92
-184.67
63.85
-21.39
-150.15
213.99
128.75
0.00
150.57
65.33
-63.43
72.07
-13.17
-141.93
168.62
83.38
-45.37
30.46
-54.79
-183.54
14.77
-70.47
-199.22
129.72
44.48
-84.27
102.35
17.10
-111.65
50.89
-34.35
-163.10
85.24
213.99
14.77
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
4
5
6
29.02
-21.48
-101.95
36.78
-13.72
-94.19
12.95
-37.55
-118.02
28.71
-21.78
-102.26
28.12
-22.38
-102.85
43.15
-7.35
-87.82
106.58
56.08
-24.39
87.54
37.05
-43.42
35.77
-14.73
-95.20
89.19
38.70
-41.77
13.90
-36.59
-117.06
31.46
-19.03
-99.50
130.96
80.47
0.00
53.76
3.26
-77.21
30.83
-19.66
-100.13
50.49
130.96
12.95
Table 4.8 Deviation from Norms for Major and Medium Irrigation
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
15.04
2.47
-13.64
28.68
16.11
0.00
17.24
4.67
-11.44
6.07
-6.50
-22.61
7.17
-5.40
-21.51
4.85
-7.72
-23.83
7.09
-5.48
-21.59
23.46
10.88
-5.23
8.37
-4.20
-20.31
17.74
5.16
-10.95
21.21
8.64
-7.47
6.83
-5.74
-21.86
0.28
-12.29
-28.41
19.49
6.92
-9.19
3.51
-9.07
-25.18
12.57
28.68
0.28
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
4
5
6
0.74
-15.52
-53.35
12.72
-3.53
-41.37
54.09
37.84
0.00
16.20
-0.05
-37.89
27.66
11.41
-26.43
26.55
10.29
-27.54
6.59
-9.66
-47.50
13.75
-2.50
-40.34
6.05
-10.20
-48.04
32.16
15.91
-21.93
6.12
-10.13
-47.97
4.28
-11.97
-49.81
0.41
-15.84
-53.68
10.78
-5.47
-43.30
2.45
-13.80
-51.64
16.25
54.09
0.41
83
Table 4.9 Deviation from Norms for Minor Irrigation
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
14.66
7.49
-18.16
0.61
-6.56
-32.22
7.63
0.46
-25.20
2.82
-4.35
-30.00
0.22
-6.95
-32.60
2.01
-5.16
-30.81
1.35
-5.82
-31.48
18.30
11.13
-14.52
7.04
-0.13
-25.79
2.21
-4.96
-30.61
0.94
-6.23
-31.88
32.82
25.65
0.00
5.86
-1.32
-26.97
5.94
-1.23
-26.89
4.78
-2.39
-28.04
7.17
32.82
0.22
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm
from Max.
4
5
6
1.26
-6.96
-33.03
0.79
-7.43
-33.50
15.32
7.10
-18.97
4.97
-3.25
-29.32
0.36
-7.86
-33.93
4.26
-3.96
-30.03
1.88
-6.34
-32.41
26.55
18.33
-7.74
5.47
-2.75
-28.82
3.15
-5.07
-31.14
0.26
-7.96
-34.03
34.29
26.07
0.00
12.92
4.70
-21.37
6.03
-2.19
-28.26
4.02
-4.20
-30.27
8.22
34.29
0.26
Table 4.10 Deviation from Norms for Industries
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
0.36
-7.18
-17.76
2.26
-5.28
-15.86
1.73
-5.80
-16.39
15.18
7.64
-2.94
4.00
-3.53
-14.12
17.95
10.42
-0.17
1.99
-5.54
-16.13
12.88
5.35
-5.24
2.13
-5.40
-15.99
6.67
-0.86
-11.45
0.10
-7.44
-18.03
3.34
-4.19
-14.78
0.94
-6.59
-17.18
14.96
7.43
-3.16
18.12
10.59
0.00
7.53
18.12
0.10
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm
from Max.
4
5
6
18.92
0.50
-162.97
0.40
-18.02
-181.48
0.46
-17.95
-181.42
3.61
-14.81
-178.28
1.10
-17.32
-180.79
21.07
2.65
-160.82
0.30
-18.12
-181.58
24.92
6.50
-156.97
2.43
-15.99
-179.45
5.12
-13.30
-176.76
181.88
163.46
0.00
3.12
-15.30
-178.76
0.96
-17.46
-180.92
0.05
-18.37
-181.83
4.13
-14.29
-177.75
18.42
181.88
0.05
84
Table 4.11 Deviation from Norms for Royalties on Mines and Minerals
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
7993.63
-26.21
-1879.89
9873.52
1853.68
0.00
3828.88
-4190.96
-6044.64
5131.86
-2887.98
-4741.66
2231.52
-5788.32
-7642.00
2095.97
-5923.87
-7777.55
322.02
-7697.82
-9551.50
9175.76
1155.92
-697.76
5068.65
-2951.19
-4804.87
2188.27
-5831.57
-7685.24
323.61
-7696.23
-9549.91
616.51
-7403.33
-9257.01
2661.12
-5358.72
-7212.40
2357.62
-5662.22
-7515.90
181.02
-7838.82
-9692.50
3633.06
9873.52
181.02
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm
from Max.
4
5
6
8532.85
5362.11
0.00
1151.41
-2019.34
-7381.45
3038.33
-132.41
-5494.52
7463.21
4292.47
-1069.65
1254.16
-1916.58
-7278.69
2983.19
-187.55
-5549.67
679.23
-2491.51
-7853.62
5698.55
2527.81
-2834.30
679.31
-2491.43
-7853.54
3678.95
508.21
-4853.90
968.81
-2201.93
-7564.04
1733.77
-1436.98
-6799.09
6325.34
3154.60
-2207.51
2651.92
-518.82
-5880.93
397.37
-2773.37
-8135.48
3170.74
8532.85
397.37
Table 4.12 Deviation from Norms for Roads and Bridges
States
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
15 Major States Norm
Maximum
Minimum
Phase I (1993-94 to 1995-96)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm from Max.
1
2
3
8.16
-1.46
-50.47
6.73
-2.88
-51.89
24.15
14.54
-34.47
0.88
-8.73
-57.74
0.12
-9.49
-58.50
3.57
-6.04
-55.05
8.36
-1.25
-50.26
5.63
-3.98
-52.99
58.62
49.01
0.00
5.00
-4.61
-53.62
0.81
-8.80
-57.81
1.81
-7.80
-56.81
5.60
-4.02
-53.03
6.18
-3.43
-52.44
7.24
-2.38
-51.39
9.61
58.62
0.12
Phase II (2001-02 to 2003-04)
Actual
Deviation
Deviation
RR/RE
from Norm
from Max.
4
5
6
7.94
2.97
-4.13
4.83
-0.14
-7.24
12.07
7.10
0.00
2.61
-2.36
-9.46
0.64
-4.32
-11.42
7.34
2.37
-4.73
4.76
-0.21
-7.31
1.56
-3.41
-10.51
0.12
-4.85
-11.95
9.38
4.41
-2.69
0.41
-4.56
-11.66
1.94
-3.03
-10.13
7.12
2.15
-4.95
4.03
-0.94
-8.04
8.43
3.46
-3.63
4.97
12.07
0.12
85
Exhibit 4.1 Deviation from Norms for Public Works
-8.17
-9.42
-6.85
WBL
UPR
-4.05
0.24
TN
-10.20
23.96
RAJ
-7.80
-4.73
26.92
PNB
-2.09
ORS
6.19
8.55
MAH
MPR
-7.21
-7.29
-5.08
-9.14
-4.17
-7.27
0.32
KER
KAR
HAR
5.61
3.64
GUJ
-10.12
-5.02
-6.98
-20.00
-15.00
GOA
BIHAR
-1.38
APR
-14.25
-10.00
28.45
2.66
-5.00
5.98
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
Exhibit 4.2 Deviation from Norms for Education, Sports, Arts and Culture
-0.93
WBL
-0.62
UPR
0.69
TN
-0.25
-0.56
-0.68
-0.29
-0.39
-0.94
1.87
0.33
0.37
RAJ
PNB
ORS
0.25
MAH
-0.17
MPR
-1.03
-0.63
0.82
0.94
KER
-0.50
KAR
0.02
0.33
HAR
GUJ
-0.93
-0.49
-0.67
0.60
GOA
BIHAR
APR
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
1.23
0.10
0.04
0.98
0.47
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
86
Exhibit 4.3 Deviation from Norms for Medical and Public Health
-0.97
WBL
-1.96
-3.24
1.05
UPR
2.14
TN
-2.29
0.38
RAJ
-1.60
1.53
PNB
-2.46
-2.89
3.20
ORS
1.30
MAH
-2.53
3.21
MPR
-3.22
-1.26
KER
0.34
1.21
KAR
0.52
5.31
HAR
GUJ
-1.36
BIHAR
-1.54
-1.89
-3.00
2.98
1.96
-0.65 GOA
-2.89
-4.00
3.71
0.71
APR
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
Exhibit 4.4 Deviation from Norms for Water Supply and Sanitation
-7.54
-6.33 WBL
-8.65
UPR
-7.23
-5.14
TN
-6.24
10.11
RAJ
15.81
0.67
3.04
2.31
PNB
-8.06
ORS
-0.56
MAH
-4.23
-3.25
MPR
-3.19
-7.71
KER
-7.17
-8.54
KAR
-6.46
HAR
-8.41
-7.13
2.22
1.24
GUJ
52.84
GOA
38.38
-8.65
-5.94 BIHAR
-3.59
APR
-5.35
-20.00
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
87
Exhibit 4.5 Deviation from Norms for Forestry and Wildlife
-19.66
-34.35
WBL
3.26
UPR
17.10
80.47
TN
-19.03
-70.47
-36.59
-54.79
44.48
RAJ
PNB
38.70
ORS
83.38
-14.73
MAH
-13.17
37.05
MPR
KER
65.33
56.08
128.75
-7.35
-21.39
-22.38
-55.92
-21.78
-60.12
-53.66
-37.55
KAR
HAR
GUJ
GOA
-13.72
-18.17 BIHAR
-21.48 APR
-100.00
-50.00
42.32
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
Exhibit 4.6 Deviation from Norms for Major and Medium Irrigation
-13.80
WBL
-9.07
-5.47
-15.84-12.29
-11.97
UPR
6.92
TN
-5.74
-10.13
RAJ
PNB
8.64
ORS
-10.20
15.91
5.16
-4.20 MAH
-2.50
MPR
10.88
-9.66 -5.48
KER
10.29
KAR
-7.72
11.41
-5.40 HAR
-6.50
-0.05
GUJ
GOA
-3.53
37.84
4.67
BIHAR
-15.52
-20.00
APR
-10.00
0.00
16.11
2.47
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
88
Exhibit 4.7 Deviation from Norms for Minor Irrigation
-4.20
WBL
-2.39
-2.19
-1.23 UPR
4.70
-1.32 TN
26.07
25.65
RAJ
-7.96
-6.23
-5.07
-4.96
PNB
ORS
-2.75
MAH
-0.13
18.33
MPR
-6.34
-5.82
KER
-3.96
-5.16
KAR
-7.86
-6.95
HAR
-3.25
-4.35
GUJ
GOA
-7.43
-6.56
-6.96
-10.00
11.13
7.10
0.46
BIHAR
APR
-5.00
7.49
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
Deviation from Norm
Phase I
Phase II
Exhibit 4.8 Deviation from Norms for Industries
-14.29
WBL
-18.37
UPR
10.59
7.43
-17.46
-6.59TN
-15.30
-4.19RAJ
-7.44 PNB
163.46
-13.30ORS
-0.86
-15.99 MAH
-5.40
6.50
5.35
MPR
-18.12
KER
-5.54
2.65
10.42
KAR
-17.32
HAR
-14.81
-3.53
GUJ
7.64
-17.95 GOA
-5.80
-18.02BIHAR
-5.28
-7.18APR
-50.00
0.50
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
89
Exhibit 4.9 Deviation from Norms for Royalties on Mines and Minerals
-2773.37
-7838.82
WBL
-518.82
UPR
-5662.22
3154.60
TN
-5358.72
-1436.98
RAJ
-7403.33
-2201.93
PNB
-7696.23
508.21
ORS
-5831.57
-2491.43
MAH
-2951.19
2527.81
MPR
-2491.51
1155.92
KER
-7697.82
-187.55
KAR
-5923.87
-1916.58
HAR
-5788.32
4292.47
GUJ
-2887.98
-132.41
GOA
-4190.96
-2019.34
BIHAR
1853.68
5362.11
APR
-26.21
-10000.00
-8000.00
-6000.00
-4000.00
-2000.00
0.00
2000.00
4000.00
6000.00
8000.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
Exhibit 4.10 Deviation from Norms for Roads and Bridges
-2.38 WBL
-0.94
-3.43 UPR
-4.02 TN
-3.03
-7.80
RAJ
-4.56
PNB
-8.80
-4.61ORS
-4.85MAH
3.46
2.15
4.41
49.01
-3.41
-3.98 MPR
-1.25 -0.21
KER
-6.04 KAR
-4.32
HAR
-9.49
-2.36
GUJ
-8.73
2.37
7.10
GOA
14.54
-0.14
-2.88 BIHAR
-1.46 APR
-20.00
-10.00
0.00
2.97
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
Deviation from the Norm
Phase I
Phase II
90
Annexure A.4.1
(a) RR/RE of Different Components of Social Services
Major States
Education, Sports, Art
and Culture
1993
1998
2003
-94
-99
-04
Medical, Public Health
and Family Welfare
1993
1998
2003
-94
-99
-04
Water Supply and
Sanitation*
1998
2003
-99
-04
Housing
1993
1998
-94
-99
2003
-04
Urban Development
1993
1998
2003
-94
-99
-04
Labour and Employment
1993
19982003
-94
99
-04
Social Security and
Welfare
1993
1998
2003
-94
-99
-04
Andhra
Pradesh
2.06
1.01
1.53
3.75
2.27
2.00
0.52
2.58
8.08
0.74
34.32
1.70
1.14
0.78
22.64
23.66
11.31
0.88
0.51
0.54
Bihar
0.38
0.87
1.65
2.33
2.54
2.74
2.30
0.33
228.26
83.45
783.33
0.68
0.03
0.01
5.56
4.33
1.32
4.83
12.82
7.57
Goa
0.42
0.74
4.10
4.35
6.35
7.16
73.16
68.30
16.52
8.44
8.33
0.00
0.27
0.10
4.05
3.96
16.82
0.49
0.09
0.38
Gujrat
1.32
0.99
1.73
9.10
4.66
4.88
0.29
0.45
4.23
3.72
2.95
10.32
2.93
5.52
7.94
6.31
10.04
4.92
2.74
1.96
Haryana
2.62
1.56
2.13
12.72
5.96
9.16
11.49
10.56
14.17
17.33
13.10
36.13
138.24
249.83
5.01
5.39
9.16
1.38
2.98
2.84
Karnataka
1.38
0.67
0.80
5.80
4.82
3.45
1.04
0.18
12.22
6.83
22.46
1.08
1.33
0.80
12.71
13.43
15.69
0.92
14.28
1.37
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
1.90
1.80
2.66
5.41
3.95
3.33
0.57
1.19
4.04
2.99
3.26
19.22
2.01
1.41
4.09
6.37
4.61
0.29
0.04
0.61
0.40
0.43
0.39
2.42
1.37
1.60
1.83
7.95
12.77
6.23
19.70
4.98
1.11
0.87
8.16
7.66
6.09
6.77
1.89
1.80
Maharashtra
0.86
0.68
0.70
8.33
7.22
5.96
1.65
1.10
11.59
7.41
6.21
7.72
4.37
8.18
9.65
13.05
16.76
10.48
9.21
5.78
Orissa
1.60
0.84
0.64
4.50
2.03
1.65
5.58
11.43
41.34
32.89
29.69
2.32
0.15
0.04
4.51
3.58
21.10
1.33
0.18
0.44
Punjab
0.92
0.51
1.02
12.31
3.02
6.83
7.84
10.38
27.27
22.41
7.07
14.14
11.60
10.65
4.45
11.13
18.68
9.73
2.95
NC
Rajasthan
0.31
0.30
2.17
4.00
1.83
1.62
21.91
18.53
5.64
5.94
7.36
1.07
0.19
0.90
4.13
4.99
6.48
1.69
1.98
1.33
Tamil Nadu
1.43
0.99
2.94
5.00
5.76
5.51
1.20
2.67
37.26
24.69
20.05
0.72
0.34
106.61
13.41
20.15
16.25
5.94
9.96
3.19
Uttar Pradesh
1.27
1.77
3.64
1.72
3.55
2.46
0.04
0.71
38.10
25.82
59.23
0.18
0.03
11.67
4.24
11.64
8.72
2.02
4.55
4.34
West Bengal
Major 15
States
0.27
0.19
0.47
8.49
3.13
3.54
0.42
2.20
16.97
20.57
22.18
0.14
0.23
0.09
2.02
1.85
2.07
1.52
2.32
1.05
1.10
0.92
1.65
5.27
3.83
3.74
5.17
6.94
13.44
8.08
15.96
3.84
4.25
12.41
8.81
10.16
10.72
4.12
5.90
2.79
All States
1.02
0.86
1.58
4.77
3.53
3.38
4.78
6.18
12.52
10.07
15.10
3.33
3.44
10.01
8.46
9.58
10.02
3.70
5.42
2.64
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
* RR/RE of Water Supply and Sanitation for the year 1993-94 could not be calculated for non-availability of data.
NC = Not Calculable
91
A.4.1 (b) (Contd…)
(b) RR/RE of Different Components of Economic Services
Crop Husbandry
Major States
Andhra
Pradesh
1993-94
1998-99
Animal Husbandry
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
Fisheries
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
Forestry and Wildlife
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
Co-operation
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
2003-04
1.97
1.55
1.20
1.59
2.44
0.70
14.01
11.01
8.89
97.58
54.88
29.33
10.66
16.42
39.38
Bihar
1.93
2.70
2.18
1.23
0.91
0.56
43.96
38.20
38.18
109.26
22.69
43.03
17.89
3.91
8.85
Goa
11.01
10.33
8.67
7.16
18.35
8.59
8.83
12.00
8.30
35.00
30.26
10.55
16.48
11.58
8.13
Gujarat
3.08
2.53
3.04
4.11
4.07
5.77
16.98
9.30
15.48
29.06
14.38
35.55
5.05
21.70
31.61
Haryana
4.22
2.60
3.30
8.61
2.98
1.87
11.81
12.11
9.84
25.37
28.33
35.01
25.61
34.20
30.74
Karnataka
2.91
4.36
4.12
3.09
3.47
3.03
17.53
32.89
13.72
66.75
38.63
53.82
36.42
33.66
28.77
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
5.56
8.59
13.16
10.36
7.89
6.50
4.13
2.65
7.59
214.41
116.10
126.23
29.59
55.64
62.60
3.71
4.10
3.66
3.21
1.25
1.18
14.60
7.57
7.04
153.48
83.26
91.23
21.87
30.34
47.16
Maharashtra
6.32
3.74
4.28
3.71
3.86
6.00
11.72
12.68
17.47
70.82
41.37
25.73
39.83
26.83
24.09
Orissa
6.81
2.55
1.39
2.47
1.34
0.98
22.06
6.58
8.10
443.67
130.96
58.70
8.75
3.14
7.54
Punjab
14.71
7.38
10.59
9.65
2.32
2.18
97.48
32.68
20.19
75.64
15.40
8.33
18.30
12.06
6.86
Rajasthan
1.40
2.17
3.34
1.83
3.15
1.83
41.34
82.70
86.82
13.84
17.16
28.18
5.90
19.81
28.92
Tamil Nadu
9.71
7.81
15.04
5.94
5.10
6.10
6.85
4.00
30.79
132.92
78.76
98.90
17.58
25.97
7.94
Uttar Pradesh
4.75
4.20
33.39
3.26
4.76
4.78
5.77
14.39
10.50
123.24
69.84
51.52
10.80
8.97
13.70
West Bengal
Major 15
States
2.43
2.46
3.49
3.43
3.67
3.11
6.74
4.99
38.71
45.27
17.28
36.41
12.06
9.02
17.92
5.84
4.94
9.48
3.96
3.40
3.30
13.52
11.41
19.53
104.48
57.29
55.00
16.03
21.96
22.33
All States
5.46
4.69
8.36
3.90
3.33
3.11
12.15
10.75
16.34
94.87
50.10
49.90
15.50
20.19
20.12
92
A.4.1 (b) (Contd…)
Major States
Major and Medium
Irrigation projects*
1998-99
Andhra
Pradesh
2003-04
Minor Irrigations*
1998-99
Power
Village and Small Industries
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
2003-04
Industries
1993-94
Road Transport
1998-99
2003-04
1993-94
1998-99
2003-04
0.49
0.90
4.39
2.01
58.20
81.35
2.74
5.77
3.66
1.28
801.80
630.02
1058.63
0.00
0.00
Bihar
46.26
17.37
0.53
0.65
0.00
30.60
NC
1.30
1.43
1.51
2262.82
2443.33
301.08
0.00
9.62
0.00
0.01
Goa
3.95
43.82
2.79
29.48
105.51
114.79
140.57
1.70
4.05
10.65
2322.50
1521.52
302.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
Gujarat
10.08
94.56
1.57
7.39
0.02
0.01
3.01
1.20
0.23
5.36
2835.01
1081.55
1452.91
0.03
0.00
0.00
Haryana
23.40
48.06
1.78
1.47
0.00
0.04
0.23
6.57
14.56
45.33
252.70
218.38
387.22
523.46
230.97
387.13
3.77
18.69
3.72
4.79
87.16
10.36
1.65
19.28
14.09
8.60
63.90
206.13
922.19
0.00
0.00
0.02
15.86
7.51
0.77
2.04
NC
NC
0.00
5.49
6.10
6.22
23.92
36.58
19.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
14.27
16.88
13.64
17.41
0.02
0.00
0.00
7.94
8.81
5.31
2049.53
2721.20
4581.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
2.26
153.12
7.87
10.64
324.64
443.65
0.38
5.92
26.63
11.71
764.81
370.16
277.05
0.00
0.02
Orissa
19.13
42.66
3.08
5.02
0.52
14.94
10.79
8.19
1.54
0.26
3338.93
1806.21
3994.79
0.00
0.00
0.00
Punjab
8.76
3.11
0.39
0.29
NC
NC
0.00
15.63
8.64
4.56
190.74
29.79
1157.45
193.98
162.69
630.12
Rajasthan
4.42
6.29
27.33
30.92
0.00
0.00
0.00
10.57
6.79
1.39
249.64
315.27
872.74
0.00
2.03
0.00
Tamil Nadu
Uttar
Pradesh
2.83
2.83
3.64
18.33
NC
NC
0.06
3.93
4.15
9.71
433.75
370.23
1997.41
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.98
12.18
5.64
7.56
-0.06
NC
0.00
2.63
1.71
6.49
506.36
640.27
203.14
0.05
0.31
15.31
West Bengal
Major 15
States
2.09
2.81
3.14
6.75
0.04
0.04
3.33
2.20
1.16
-1.41
68.86
32.16
18.43
0.00
0.02
0.00
6.48
16.32
5.42
7.72
7.36
10.71
2.64
6.59
5.60
5.98
708.64
672.35
643.16
16.64
16.77
22.81
All States
6.47
16.86
4.92
6.58
8.62
11.60
3.92
5.95
5.09
4.85
550.13
577.18
679.33
15.51
14.74
18.39
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
* RR/RE of Major & Medium and Minor Irrigation for the year 1993-94 could not be calculated for the non-availability of data.
NC = Not Calculable
93
Annexure A.4.2
Regression Results for Phase I
Constant
pcgsdp
gsdpcons
urban
nodoc
gsdpfore
areaufor
gsdpagr
Public Works
37.86
-0.0015396
Education
-0.47
-0.0000133
Medical
16.38
-0.0010195
Water Supply
26.28
-0.0001266
Forest
Major & Medium
Irrigation
45.72
-0.0020562
-9.90
0.0011747
Minor Irrigation
11.88
-0.0001781
4.52E-06
Industries
10.21
-3.59E-04
-1.71E-06
2461.28
-0.1003922
27.92
0.0004574
Mining
Road & Bridges
grsirrarea
gsdpindus
gsdpmfg
gsdpmin
gsdptran
rdl
r-square
0.000058
0.82
3.90
0.93
0.25
0.88
-144.09
0.99
0.0005355
0.0263
0.95
-0.0000136
0.00408
0.8
0.93
0.000177
-9.29E-07
0.83
0.027
0.98
-0.000085
0.0907853
0.96
Regression results for Phase II
Const.
pcgsdp
gsdpcons
urban
sch
tch
nodoc
beds
hosp
dis
gsdpfore
areaufor
valfor
gsdpagr
grsirrarea
Pwd
0.09
-0.000210
Edn
0.21
0.000101
Med
0.70
-0.000194
Wss
11.86
0.000063
-2.52
-0.000255
-38.82
0.001432
0.000019
-0.00507
0.00701
For
Majir
gsdpmin
valmin
gsdptran
rdl
nov
R2
0.89
-11.72
0.32
0.68
0.09
-0.03
1.43
0.06
0.89
-74.87
0.99
0.000214
-0.000422
0.0000903
0.87
-82.53
0.001532
-8.22E-06
indss
-30.26
-0.000975
7.63E-06
-8135.42
0.151967
5.38
-0.000122
Road
gsdpmfg
0.0000107
Minirr
Min
gsdpindus
0.78
0.91
0.000184
-3.02E-06
0.77
0.005006
0.000206
0.81
3.59E-06
0.000792
-0.092
94
0.86
Annexure A.4.3
Regression Results for Dummy variables for Phase I
Particulars
Public Works
APR
Education
Medical
-11.30
-1185.86
Industries
Road & Bridges
GUJ
HAR
KAR
KER
MPR
MAH
5.70
-10.29
-17.45
-30.32
-27.12
-21.69
-0.29
0.45
2.06
0.51
1.57
-0.19
-8.47
6.56
-22.23
-1.71
82.43
24.73
19.63
20.45
14.07
-336.22
-4.95
-865.93
-129.09
-3498.82
-20.61
15.85
Minor Irrigation
Mining
GOA
-35.89
1.11
Water Supply
Forest
Major & Medium
Irrigation
BIHAR
-28.99
-696.47
ORS
PNB
RAJ
TN
UPR
WBL
-12.10
-13.98
-2.38
-36.28
-39.35
-33.79
0.10
1.38
0.34
0.21
0.70
1.15
-0.03
-6.75
-9.34
-16.04
-24.56
-12.54
-21.44
-14.12
-16.38
23.56
33.72
0.19
28.05
29.51
26.68
3.88
14.66
-1174.57
-1138.79
-21.09
-393.94
-361.34
-844.37
-222.05
20.38
30.67
3.29
-3.51
11.71
13.68
19.81
17.71
19.80
3.23
0.65
1.11
0.78
17.43
-4.68
-15.52
-12.41
-13.58
-14.92
-12.20
1.22
-12.30
-12.11
-14.98
16.39
-10.11
-20.43
-13.62
-2.24
-5.28
2286.99
7657.26
3236.31
11.56
-58.00
-103.57
-191.52
0.77
-5.74
-2.17
4.10
3.01
5.68
-1.36
-4.87
-1.26
11.78
5.84
1091.58
-346.48
-1245.44
3686.68
1680.01
-2855.06
-565.66
-3493.66
156.54
-1640.36
-3584.42
-80.44
-84.97
-334.87
-78.11
-143.30
-127.32
-56.19
-96.51
-81.36
-69.88
-53.34
Regression Results for Dummy variables for Phase II
APR
Public Works
Education
BIHAR
11.30
2.54
Medical
GOA
19.04
1.15
GUJ
HAR
16.79
1.61
0.72
KAR
KER
MPR
MAH
ORS
11.02
2.62
0.06
10.52
0.37
2.03
2.25
1.49
8.81
5.05
0.67
15.35
14.04
16.04
9.10
11.05
PNB
RAJ
TN
UPR
WBL
8.45
29.77
4.39
-5.12
-2.69
0.59
0.53
1.01
2.74
2.60
0.76
0.45
-0.52
3.04
2.37
2.33
2.91
8.29
17.16
21.18
17.27
1.89
8.48
88.83
7.75
-25.16
110.43
13.63
-4.65
-12.13
11.30
-12.29
Water Supply
12.62
76.41
10.87
13.85
11.08
8.71
Forest
Major & Medium
Irrigation
21.38
28.49
30.09
23.30
-6.37
86.63
-34.45
32.26
13.98
15.16
5.80
-10.98
10.96
-46.00
41.22
Minor Irrigation
42.81
56.67
39.36
13.65
49.49
52.87
73.22
43.87
59.43
5.10
64.26
48.22
60.50
Industries
35.49
23.86
48.70
52.21
62.02
49.20
52.02
48.14
39.09
219.12
33.85
51.20
26.42
7534.22
4330.14
4552.87
4587.17
1498.22
-3320.01
147.28
4400.77
942.61
6698.62
2168.17
-830.61
3.73
-0.80
6.12
4.92
-0.54
0.48
8.58
2.23
4.74
Mining
Road & Bridges
93.66
6486.75
6.68
13.19
-0.77
-42.53
95
5
Rationalising Structure of
Non-tax Sources
The analysis, presented in the preceding chapter, clearly highlights the fact that
revenue realisation as percent of revenue expenditure (RR/RE) in most services is
abysmally low as compared to the norm. Also, the RR/RE varies among services as also
among States. This, to a certain extent, can be attributed to the socio-economic factors of
different States, yet it requires a review of the user charges of some of the services. It is
essential both for rationalising non-tax structure and for mobilizing further resources for
planned development. However, while doing so it is important to keep in view the
objectives of equity and efficiency. With this objective in view, this chapter presents an
analysis of a few select services.
Education
Education is a merit good. It is heavily subsidized by the State, which is justified
on the ground that it is capable of producing a wide spectrum of impact and large
externalities. Also, it is considered a ‘basic human need’ and, therefore, it is presumed
that the Government should make provision for this.
Notwithstanding the vital role of education as an important instrument for
promoting socio-economic development, in recent years, Government’s ability to
continue the expansion of education has diminished due to adverse macroeconomic
conditions and keen intersectoral competition for public funds. Also, the return on
investment in education is affected by misallocation of resources among different types
of education, inefficient use of resources within individual schools, inequality in the
distribution of educational costs and benefits among various income groups.
In view of this, it is generally suggested that the user charges for higher education
should be raised to mobilize more resources. This is based on the belief that given the
excess demand for higher education, rationalizing user charges for education through a
small rise in fee would not cause a large proportion of those currently enrolled to drop
out. Ultimately, it would generate additional revenues without in any way adversely
affecting it.
A selective approach for some specific fields in higher/secondary education may
be highly profitable from the social point of view. Unless a majority of children of school
going age are actually able to go through school, the expenditure on higher education can
never be equitable, as those would be for privileged few who complete schooling 1 .
However, how much primary education investment is required varies from State to State
and depends upon the level of development of the State. Thus the decision to allocate
resources should be based on social rates of return from different levels of education and
requirement of the State.
It is, however, important to keep in mind that increasing user charges in higher
education is not based on any firm evidence to support the postulate of a significant
disequalizing effect of public subsidy to higher education. If there is such an effect at all,
it appears to be stronger in the developed countries than in the less developed countries 2 .
Although externalities associated with basic education are higher than in case of
higher education, it must be realized that higher education produces dynamic
externalities, which are important for development of the societies, including specifying
for rapid economic growth. It is strongly felt that essentially due to public subsidization
of higher education, today higher education in India is no more elitist; it is somewhat
democratized with a large proportion of socioeconomic weaker sections participating in
higher education. This also helped in the creation of a large reservoir of scientific and
technical personnel.
The increase in the user charges for greater return to education is also not found to
be proper. Private rates of return will decline if public subsidies are drastically reduced or
altogether withdrawn, making investment in education unattractive from individual point
of view. More importantly, it is now well noted that the social rates of return to education
are not true social returns: except for tax benefits, no other social benefits are considered
in the estimation of social rates of return to education. And hence it is not justifiable to
argue against public subsidies in higher education. Many people now realize that higher
education is no more as anti-poor as it was in the past, it is not regressive in effect, and
also clearly realize that higher education is a critically important factor of economic
growth, besides social mobility. It is, therefore, imperative to adopt the following policy
prescriptions:
First, there is a need to mobilize resources through increase in cost recovery from
education. In this context, it is important to indicate that there are three levels of
education, namely, primary, secondary and higher education. In India, as in other most
developing countries, all types of education are heavily subsidized. A comparative
analysis of the revenue realization from education (as tution fee etc.) as percent of
revenue expenditure incurred on education (RR/RE) indicates that it is highest for
secondary education, followed by higher education and elementary education (Table 5.1).
The RR/RE in the elementary education was maximum in Haryana (2.7 percent) in the
first phase followed by States of Orissa (0.9 percent), Andhra Pradesh (0.6 percent) and
1
Sundaram, K. 2006. “On Backwardness and Fair Access to Higher Education: Results from NSS 55th
Round Surveys, 1999-2000”. Economic and Political Weekly, December 16-22, pp. 5173-5182.
2
Ram, Rati. 1982. “Public Subsidization of Schooling and inequality of Educational Access.” Comparative
Education Review, 26 (1), February, p. 36-47.
97
Gujarat (0.4 percent). However, in the second phase though Haryana maintained its
position with RR/RE of 2.3 percent, the States, which followed it were Rajasthan (1.6
percent), Gujarat (1.4 percent) and Orissa (1.01 percent). Ten out of 15 major States, on
the other hand, exhibited increase in RR/RE between the phases. The above trend
indicates that there is a need to rationalize the user charges in such a way that primary
education is fully subsidized and the user charges are designed for secondary and higher
education in such a way that these are progressive according to the income-group of the
user.
Second, in higher education it would be desirable to encourage greater private
financing with the provision of widely available student loans and a limited number of
selective scholarships. Loans enable students to finance their current studies against
future income. Thus selection would not be limited to applicants with the necessary funds
at the time of enrollment. This can be coupled with selective scholarships that are
awarded on the basis of economic need and academic potential. Such a package provides
performance incentives to all students in higher education and also helps ease the
financial burden of students from poor families. Under an ideal loan scheme, students
should be allowed to borrow to finance both tuition charges and their living costs. It is
however, important to keep in mind that the existing system of grant of loan for education
from commercial banks is not convenient for students to make use of it. The procedures
call for collateral (certificate of income, documents for ownership of house or personal
surety), which are difficult to comply with for resourceless students. The Government
must provide the financial assistance directly through study loans/ scholarships on the
basis of potential income.
Finally, the involvement of private sector in providing education is welcome but
the regulatory mechanism of the Government in all the aspects of education must be very
strong. As in many other countries, in India too, the private sector will respond well in
meeting the excess demand for public education 3 . However, the State should continue to
take a major responsibility of subsidizing education. All other sources of finances,
including fees, should be viewed only as peripheral ones, supplementing public
expenditures. Hence, all efforts of mobilization of resources have to be made extremely
cautiously, so that aspects relating to equity, efficiency and excellence in education in
India are not adversely affected.
Medical and Public Health
Good health status of the society is vital in improving socio-economic conditions
of a country, which ultimately influences economic outcomes 4 . It results in qualitative
labour force and contributes to higher economic growth 5 .
3
Tan, J P. 1985. “Private Education: Some Macro Trends on Enrollment and Expenditures”. International
Review of Education, 3(1),pp 103-17.
4
Bloom, D., D. Canning, and J. Sevilla, 2004. “The Effect of Health on Economic Growth: A Production
Function Approach.” World Development Report 2004; 32:1-13, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
5
Barro, R., and X. Sala-i-Martin. 2004. Economic Growth. 2nd Edition, Prentice-Hall of India, New Delhi.
98
In India, health is a State subject but the Central Government has jurisdiction over
infectious diseases, medical education and research, population control etc. With the
given jurisdiction of the Centre and the States, the basic premise of the health policy has
been to provide health care facility for every individual through the State. In the period
prior to 2000, health facilities witnessed an expansion of primary health care in rural
areas, and implementation of National Health Programmes (NHPs) for controlling
diseases under various centrally sponsored schemes. This forced the States for increasing
accountability and efficiency in resource use. The post-2000, has been witnessing shift in
the health sector: the Government is encouraging the participation of private sector to
address the health problems, liberalising the insurance sector to provide new avenues for
health financing and redefining the role of the State from being a provider to a financer of
health services as well.
India has a vast and widespread public health system that has grown over time 6 .
There are various departments in the Central and State Government to look into the
health issues: Department of Health, Family welfare and Ayurveda, Yoga and
Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy (AYUSH). This has helped in increasing
the public sector coverage in ensuring better health to the general public but this is not
enough as though the access rate has increased; satisfaction level has declined. The
structural mismatch in the institutional arrangements of these departments is resulting in
negative impact on the integration of inter-health programmes.
The health system in India has been decentralised to devolve the authority and
power to local bodies for better governance and implementation of the NHPs. With this,
the State Governments provide the local bodies the space to take decision on their
revenue generation and expenditure. At the same time local bodies are responsible and
accountable to the community for the service delivered. But, to what extent the
Government is providing local bodies the space to operate efficiently and effectively and
how far, they are successful in ensuring better facilities to general public is still a matter
of question.
Public health sector in India has been facing lots of problems such as inadequate
revenue, lack of public investment, inadequate improved facilities, less health coverage,
increase in medical cost, more exploitation of the private sector, reduction in public
utilisation etc. It also lacks the availability of medication, consumables, maintenance, and
repairs of buildings, medical equipments, staff motivation and consistent absentees
among the doctors and other personnel. These outcomes may be attributed to low level of
resource allocation for the health sector. The increase in user charge raises the cost of the
utilisation capacity of the poor in the public health care; as a result, they switch over to
6
In 2001-02 there were 137,311 sub centres; 22,842 Primary Health Centres (PHCs); 3043 Community
Health Centres (CHCs) and 4048 hospitals with a workforce of 345,514. See Govt. of India. 2005.
“Financing and Delivery of Health Care Services in India.” Background paper for National Commission on
Macro Economics and Health (August). New Delhi. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. pp. 43-64.
99
self-medication or remain sick 7 . To overcome this if more subsidies are provided to
health sector in general, this will lead to market failure and the non-poor get more
benefits than the poor. Because, the rich enjoy the service more frequently than the poor
and at the same time spend a higher fraction of their income on health than the poor do.
Moreover there is no such accepted set of standard prevailing in the country to measure
the quality of service. This is becoming the stumbling block in fixing price for a disease.
If the Government does want to ensure health for all, then it has to strengthen itself to
balance the demand side (the general public and the ways in which they want to access
the health care) and supply side (the health system and the overall operation of the
organisation).
Expenditure on Public Health in India: Health being a State subject, the sector is
primarily financed by the State Government, which spent their revenue on these
following heads i.e. nearly 12% is allocated for drugs, medicines, supplies, and
consumables; 8% for purchase of machinery and equipment, and nearly 5% for
maintenance of equipment, building, electricity, rent, taxes etc., 5% on other routine
expenditure and the remaining portion of the budget allocation goes to pay the salary of
the employees. On the other hand the Central Government health expenditure constitutes
the spending on infectious diseases, medical education, population control etc. The per
capita total health spending was estimated to be around US$23 during 1997-2000, which
is much less compared to the neighbouring countries 8 . Though the public sector spending
accounts less than a quarter of the total health spending in India (Table 5.2), it plays a
major role in terms of planning, regulating and shaping the health services delivery
system. Therefore, the Government has to take note that public expenditure in the health
sector can achieve the important goals like improving health outcomes, promoting nonhealth aspects of well being, and redistributing welfare among the poor 9 .
User Charges- An Assessment: User charge is a contribution to cost by individual
user in the form of a charge per unit of service consumed. These charges supplement the
declining public budgets and therefore enhance the quality and coverage, improving
efficiency and promoting equity. While it is useful to enhance user charges to have more
resources for the service, this might deter access of the poor to both public and private
health care, and then the goal of raising resources proves to be counter-productive as it
potentially worsens health outcomes. The poor cannot afford the higher price of health
care. Studies indicate that low economic status households have lower recourse to
medical services and higher rates of self-medication 10 . Thus, increasing cost of care could
push them not to consider themselves sick. With respect to user charge a study conducted
7
Levesque, Jean-Frederic, Slim Haddad, Delampady Narayana, and Pierre Fournier. 2006. “Outpatient
Care Utilisation in Urban Kerala, India”. The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Oxford
University Press, London.
8
World Development Report. 2003. Sustainable Development in Dynamic World. World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
9
Gertler, P., and J. Hammer. 1997. “Strategies for Pricing Publicly Provide Health Services.” A Working
Paper, Public Economics Division, Policy Research Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
10
Levesque, Jean-Frederic, et.al. 2006. op. cit.
100
in Andhra Pradesh witnessed three important aspects: first, user charge is not an
independent, supplementary source of revenue; second, the aggregate utilisation of funds
from user charges is low; and third, the number of poor accessing public health facilities
is falling, particularly the in-patient services 11 . And this underutilisation resulted into lots
of other problems. Therefore, user fee strategy has to ensure the following three areas;
identification of the beneficiaries, its potential impact in providing in-patient care to the
general public and utilisation of funds collected from such fees.
Recognizing the fact that optimal policy to finance the health sector depends on
the behaviour of consumers, private providers and civil servants, any increase in user
charges must accompany rise in subsidies for poor and children to correct health care
market failure and improve welfare. If the demand is less price elastic and more quality
elastic, then more fees can be raised to finance quality improvement. And if the demand
is more price elastic, then the Government has to allocate more subsidies as mobilisation
of private sources is less. These subsidies can be shifted from low priority care to higher
priority.
When the Government provides subsidies to the sector in its totality, everybody
tries to become free rider and thereby non-poor get the subsidies more frequently than the
poor. Therefore, a policy of price discrimination should prevail that maximally improves
health and redistributes subsidies towards the poor depending on its ability to identify the
poor under the following four grounds, i.e. individual means testing, geographical
targeting, self selection, and indicator targeting 12 .
The ideal method for minimizing the revenue loss and economic resources is to
identify those people who need subsidies for health services while others will be charged.
But the rules and regulation to certify the poor people has to be strict and ‘at any cost
non-poor cannot avail it’, should be the ideal norm. The Government has to decide the
basis for measuring the poor. The price has to be charged according to the service
consumed by the non-poor.
Generally most of the poor live in rural areas, so it is good to locate more
facilities closer to the rural area and charge zero or lower fees from them. However,
facilities that serve primarily the non-poor households should have to be charged higher
fees. But the difficulty is that there are some non-poor in the rural area and some poor in
the urban area and thus a proper identification is required to make sure that targeted
people are benefiting the most while the non-poor are paying for availing the service.
The Government should introduce low subsidies for services valued and used
more by the non-poor and high subsidies for services often used by the poor. Mostly
these are the services for which demand is income inelastic.
One specific group that may be able to afford health care is the insured
population. Insurance status is a good indicator of those people who are most able to pay
11
12
Govt. of India. 2005. op. cit. pp. 268-272.
Gertler, Paul J., and Jeffrey S. Hammer. 1997. op.cit.
101
simply because the insured are wealthier than the general population. By charging full
cost of care to insured patients, public system can reduce subsidies to the non-poor and
reallocates them to services used by the poor.
The National Health Policy 2002 and the National Common Minimum
Programme 2004 have emphasised to increase the public sector spending on health.
However, mere increase in health spending will not commensurate perceived results in
the health care system unless and until equal level of investment are made in the sector
like employment and income, water, sanitation, nutrition, primary schooling and road
connectivity.
Finally, as in most other countries, public-private partnership in health care must
be encouraged. The two sectors can complement and supplement each other. 13 . User
charge may not negatively affect utilisation of service by the poor if it is accompanied by
quality improvement. In fact the poor are likely to respond more strongly to quality
improvement. Several studies have found that user charge is an effective way of raising
revenues and since demand for health services is income inelastic will not be affected
much by price increase 14 . Thus user fees have the potential of improving the efficiency in
the health care system 15 . Moreover, a user fee regime with an insurance regime can beget
good results but it is really a difficult and expensive task for India to implement the
universal health insurance scheme. The Government can try its best to move on this
desired path. Notwithstanding increase in user charges, a strong public sector would play
a vital role in curbing the undesirable effects of private sector 16 .
Water Supply and Sanitation
Water is indispensable to human life. Every individual has a right to sufficient,
physically accessible, safe, acceptable and affordable water. However, most people in the
rural areas do not have access to potable water and sanitation services.
In India, water supply has confronted severe scarcity syndrome and quality
deterioration in recent times. On the one hand, the urban population has been rising at the
rate twice the rural population growth; on the other hand, urban water accounts for 5-6
percent of the total water consumption in the country, which is grossly inadequate in
13
At present the Government is involving the private sector in achieving the public health goals in medical
treatment as per pre-fixed rates; support/ancillary services (laundry, security, drug management, canteens,
sanitary services, landscaping, etc) etc. See for details Govt. of India. 2005. op. cit., pp. 89-123.
14
Gupta, I., and P. Dasgupta. 2000. “Demand for Curative Health Care in Rural India: Choosing Between
Private, Public and No Care.” A Discussion Paper, Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi.
15
In fact optimal fee structure vary from country to country due to the size and performance of the public
and private sector, nature of market insurance, credit and medical care and finally the administrative
capacity of public sector to regulate the health sector. See Gertler, Paul J., and Jeffrey S. Hammer. 1997.
op. cit.
16
Levesque, Jean-Frederic, et.al. 2006. op.cit.
102
relation to water demand. Yet, the plan outlay allocation for water supply and sanitation
(WSS) has been low and decreasing substantially 17 .
Pricing of Water: Issues of urban water have, in recent years, acquired increasing
importance due to continuing pressures of urbanization and the limited supply of water
for urban use. Most households face limited hours of service and low pressure, and 20-60
percent of water is lost in the distribution system and to unauthorized use by urban
households. Many cities and towns provide water supply for one or two hours per day
during normal periods and only one or two hours twice a week during lean periods. The
intermittent supply and insufficient pressures keep the pipelines dry in many areas for
larger durations. Low-income households and slum dwellers are the worst affected in
periods of water scarcity. Given the supply constraint, the consumers tend to adjust the
consumption of water up to a certain limit. But the consumption of water below a basic
minimum adversely affects the health and hygiene creating environmental problems. As a
result, many high-income households, industrial and business users either invest in
developing their own water sources or buy water from private sources.
As in most other countries, in India too, water is supplied free of charge or at a
minimal price. This is based on the ground that poor households would be unable to
afford these services if not subsidized. This approach to allocation of water is typically
based upon the concept of meeting “basic needs”. At the same time, subsidy engenders
distortions in the use of water, thereby leading to an inefficient use of resources and thus
indirectly raising the costs of service provision. Subsidies can also induce inefficiency in
utility operations, as utility managers face soft budget constraints. Consequent
deficiencies in service provision most severely impacts vulnerable socio-economic
groups, who are also the least equipped to access services through alternative means.
Furthermore it fails to prevent the over-consumption of and wastage of water. Finally, it
fails to recognize that high subsidization of water often benefits the middle and upper
classes, rather than poor.
Thus, the water supply and sanitation being merit goods, adequate public
investments are required. Indian policy makers are facing a challenge of designing
innovative instruments to achieve sustainable development and to enhance investment on
environmental protection. But they are unable to provide the services satisfactorily. This
can mainly be attributed to inefficient cost recovery; under-investment led inefficiency,
increasing cost of supplying water services, subsidy, etc.
Structure of Urban Water Charging: There are three types of charges for water:
connection fee or fixed access charge; water tax unrelated to water use; and water rates
designed as a charge on consumption. In addition there are minor charges such as meter
rent, a license fee, a water cess, a meter maintenance charge where meters are provided
by the water supplying agency, development charges and fixed charges for capital
renovation of the water system, which are used for operating water supply systems.
17 Mathur, O.P., 2001. “Coming to Grips with Issues of Pricing Urban Water and Intra-City Bus
Transport”. Discussion Paper No. 5, December, National Institute of public Finance and policy, New Delhi.
103
In India, the existing water charges are very low. The consumers pay a nominal
price, which is unlinked and unrelated to financial and economic cost of water supply.
The prices are fixed at the rate frequently below the marginal cost price level. This causes
erosion to the revenue base for the water supply agencies to the extent that even the
annual maintenance expenditure is not met, which raises serious concerns about the
financial viability and sustainability of urban water utilities. This has affected the
finances of State Governments, which have either absorbed the losses of water utilities by
meeting a part of their recurrent expenditure or adjusted the losses by reducing the capital
account support to them for capacity expansion. It is, therefore, suggested that the pricing
of water should be appropriate, which will yield more revenue to be spent on improving
the quality and delivery of water.
The effective price should be the one that includes the water charge, surcharge
and water pollution surcharge and other charges wherever applicable. The user charge
based pricing of water is an important instrument of management of the water resource.
However, in a country like India, with highly skewed income distribution, the uniform
water pricing for all the sections of the society is not only Pareto inefficient but also
would not be welfare maximizing.
There is no national policy on urban water resource because of the diverse
geographic, climatic and other dominant location specific factors. Even though it is a
State subject, in many occasions, peculiar location specificity does not permit even the
State level price policy to take care of all the variables. The individual board or
municipality has the power to exercise autonomy to fix the water rates suitably.
Urban water being a State subject, institutional arrangements for its pricing vary
across States. At one level, price structures distinguish metered connections from
unmetered supplies as also bulk provision from non-bulk provision. At another level,
price discrimination is common with (a) categories of water users which comprise not
only the principal categories of domestic users and non-domestic users but also assorted
categories consisting of water use for washing motor vehicles, passages and stalls, cattle
sheds, stables, and the like, and (b) income group of households, assumption being that
low-income households use less quantities of water and high income households have
higher consumption levels. Water pricing also differs with the quality of water supplies,
e.g. filtered, unfiltered, tube-well supplies and the like. Furthermore, several types of
water tariff are used in this sector. A price differential exists between industry and
domestic consumers. The industries are charged with economic prices where as domestic
water supply is highly subsidized. Thus, there is a need to have lesser rate categories
which are transparent in nature for the ease of management as different rates which are
uniquely and unilaterally fixed by individual water agencies complicate the
generalisability of the system.
It is believed that an effective management of the water boards has potential to
enhance own resources up to an extent as high as one third of the total revenue. The
enhanced recovery at the margin would improve the viability of the municipal water
104
services to a great extent. The failure of the existing tariff structure to provide sufficient
incentives for economizing water use has necessitated the need for rationalization of
prices. Among the other things, accurate measurement of water on a volumetric basis is
an important requisite for an effective pricing policy. Therefore all water connections
must be metered for the success of the full cost recovery. A perfect metering system also
helps in conservation strategy to benefit the society in the long run. The existence of nonmetered water connections as well as non-functioning water meters is an obstacle to
efficient planning for water resource. Non-functioning meters offer a payoff to the
household, as these are usually charged on the basis of an arbitrarily fixed flat monthly
charge.
Sanitation
Compared with water supply, the sewerage service has a distinctly larger
externality and hence the case for Government intervention in the management of
wastewater (WW) and sewerage needs adequate emphasis. About 80 percent of the water
used enters into the WW stream. Urban India is by and large, deficient in infrastructure to
provide adequate treatment facilities for huge quantities of WW and sewage. In absence
of adequate treatment facilities WW and sewage are disposed of in the creeks or into
rivers and the sea directly. As a result there is deterioration in the quality of water in
natural water bodies.
In the context of the deteriorating urban environmental quality and the need for
augmenting the resources of municipal bodies, there is a case for rationalizing user
charges by linking the charges to the quantity of WW generated.
To correct market failure, a policy of charging economic price from the urban
non-poor and an affordable price from the urban poor (second best pricing) is desired and
would be efficient. There is an urgent need for reforms in the water delivery system.
Following measures can be taken into account to bring about the relevant changes in
management of the water:
1. The first relates to the relevance and effectiveness of the existing pricing
systems and structures. As shown earlier, the pricing structures of urban water are in
several parts, which are differentiated according to the nature or users, quality, quantity,
and several other factors. Apart from complex structures these pricing structures are
obsolete, and need to be replaced with structures that are simple, easy to apply, and
transparent.
2. Cost recovery requires the technical and administrative ability to operate an
effective pricing system. If the system is to be based upon the User-Pays principle, then a
reasonably accurate metering system must be installed and maintained for those direct
water users, and a timely billing and collection system has to be in place. Most
importantly, there has to be a mechanism to enforce payment of accounts within a
reasonable period of time. For cost recovery purposes, the prices should cover the
replacement cost of the supply, including capital, operation, maintenance and
105
administration. This is the difference between the concern of a utility to remain
financially viable and the economic efficiency concerns of the Government.
The increasing block-rate tariff structure may be adopted where the water
requirements for meeting basic needs are made available at a low price while higher
amounts are charged at the full costs of supply. Also, if price of industrial use were based
on the full costs, it would encourage conservation and recycling of water.
3. The third issue is linked to the unbalanced revenue base of water utilities, with
much of the burden currently being borne by the non-domestic sector. The finance data of
urban water utilities has clearly brought out the extent of cross-subsidies that exists in the
water sector. It has two adverse impacts: (a) the non-domestic users, mainly industry and
commerce, pass on the costs associated with higher tariff to domestic users in the form of
higher prices of their products; (b) lower prices for households mean larger wastage of
water. It is imperative for water utilities to move towards a more rational pricing structure
which may yield a positive net benefit as the non-domestic users may be expected to pass
on the cost savings associated with lower water prices in the form of lower output prices.
Also, the provision of drinking water has a strong element of a public good mostly in
terms of public health; it often makes sense to subsidize lifeline consumption for those
who might otherwise be unable to afford it. The subsidies would need to be well targeted
and phased out over an agreed period.
With a view to improving resource use efficiency and sustainability of the
environmental quality the following specific reforms could be useful: To increase the
accountability of institutions to improve the reliability of service; having private sector
participation; to improve financial sustainability of the service; to create financial
incentives to reduce O&M, capital and financing costs; to improve the environmental
sustainability of service; and to have participation of the community groups. Therefore,
using above suggested ways can satisfy the motto of efficient economic instruments for
sustainable resource use with improved level of services for basic needs.
Forest and Wildlife
Forests are an important natural resource and play a key role in the development
of a country providing ample amount of economic and non-economic benefits to the
human kind through various goods like timber, fuel wood, fodder, and other non-timber
food products. They are a source of natural habitat for bio-diversity, repository of genetic
wealth and opportunity for eco-tourism and help in watershed development such as
regulating water, conserving soil, controlling floods, and contributing to the process of
carbon sequestration 18 . They are a treasure house of energy, environment, tourism,
industries, employment opportunities, other miscellaneous things, and above all revenue
generators of the States.
18
Mathur, S. Archana, and Arvinder S. Sachdeva. 2003. “Towards an Economic Approach to Sustainable
Forest Development.” Working Paper No. 2/2003-PC, Planning Commission, Govt. of India, New Delhi, p.
2.
106
The management of forests falls under the Concurrent List of the Constitution,
which provides the States to earn revenues within the ambit of National Forest Policy.
Forests account around 67 million hectares, i.e. nearly 20.64% of the total land
area in India. In addition to that another 3.04% is under tree cover. Thus around 23.68%
of area is under forest and tree cover and of the total forest 61.7% are categorised as
dense forest. Table 5.3 provides the information about the forest coverage of the various
States in India. Madhya Pradesh accounts for the maximum forest cover; Arunachal
Pradesh is having 2.5% of country’s geographical area but contributing 10.1% of the total
forest cover of India. While Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and
Gujarat put together account 8.2% of the total forest area of India while covering 29.4%
of the geographical area. Madhya Pradesh, Chhattishgarh and Arunachal Pradesh
accounts for nearly 1/3rd of dense forest in the country.
Expenditure on forest relates to the cost incurred in its cultivation, maintenance,
restoration, depreciation, and other miscellaneous costs to obtain the timber, non-timber
forest products, eco-tourism and other benefits 19 . Also there are direct as well as indirect
costs involved to keep the wildlife in the various protected areas. The input cost for
plantation, extraction cost, market expanses for forestry products and direct expenditure
on afforestation. Apart from these direct costs, there are certain indirect costs like
infrastructure cost for promoting eco-tourism, markets for timber and non-timber forest
products etc. Most of these investment and expenditure in forests is undertaken by public
agencies.
The expenditure on forest is minimal of total plan outlay of the State
Governments. As the States are running out of fund, they have been seeking assistance
from the Central Government to bear their forest expenditure. The financial support of
the Central Government to the forest and wild life is less than 1% of the total budget of
the five year plan. It was around 4% of the GDP in 2002-03 20 , most of which relates to
afforestation and eco-development, forest and wild life, national river conservation, and
environment. However, the total available funds are not enough to conserve and protect
the forest and wild life in India. To ensure a sustainable forest management it is required
that the Central Government should make efforts to increase its investment in forest
having long gestation period.
The major sources of forest revenue are timber and fuel wood, besides these there
are bamboo, sandal wood and oil, ringal, katha, resin, thatching grass, gum, honey, wax,
hides and horns, cane, tendu and kendu leaves, medicinal herbs, fodder grass, boulder,
bazri, stones, lime and lime stones etc. Timber and fuel wood provides inputs to various
industries such as; ply wood, match box, sports goods, pencil, packing case, agricultural
19
Mathur, S. Archana, and Arvinder S. Sachdeva. 2003. “Towards an Economic Approach to Sustainable
Forest Development.” A Working Paper No. 2/2003-PC, Planning Commission, Govt. of India, New Delhi,
pp. 6-7.
20
Government of India. 2006. Report of the National Forest Commission. Ministry of Environment and
Forests, New Delhi, Chapter-21.
107
equipments, manufacturing industries, and railway etc 21 . Forest also raise revenue from
tourism through the biosphere reserves, sanctuaries, national parks and zoos and revenue
from fines and forfeitures, receipts for compensatory plantations and other items 22 .
However, there are supply side problems of low productivity occurring due to
reduction in forest area (development activity, encroachment), technological gap, overextraction, over-grazing, fire, inadequate implementation of management prescription etc.
that need to be tackled 23 . It is felt, that the community based joint forest management
could enhance the revenue of the States if these difficulties like bureaucratic permits,
legal support to sell certain species and complete information about the markets, channels
and prices will be regulated.
Wild life Conservation
India has about 89451varieties of animals comprising 7.28% of the total animals
in the world and reported to have 16500-19400 varieties of plants, around 7% of the
world 24 . To protect the wild animals and plants the Government resorted to vast areas of
forest in the form of biosphere reserve, national parks and zoos, sanctuaries etc.
Currently, there are 597 national parks and sanctuaries encompassing 154572 sq km or
4.74% of the country’s total geographic area. The Wildlife Protection Act 1972 is a
positive policy framework for the conservation of the endangered species within a
protected area. The purpose of the biosphere reserve is to conserve all forms of life, along
with its support system, in its totality, so that it could serve as referral system for
monitoring and evaluating changes in natural eco system. In this respect the Supreme
Court has banned the removal of dead or fallen trees from the protected area of forests
but extraction of bamboo and other non-timber forest produce is permissible from
deciduous forest. Forest and wild life are listed in the concurrent list vis-à-vis the Central
Government deal with the policy and State Governments implement those policies. Wild
life wing of Government of India has 3 divisions, i.e. (i) Project tiger division (ii) Project
elephant division (iii) Wildlife division. The authorities of these divisions are looking
after the administration and control. Government of India provides a part of financial
support to the States through certain centrally sponsored schemes (scheme for national
park, sanctuaries, project tiger, project elephant, eco-development, tribal development);
others are borne by the States. Though the Central assistance is increasing in absolute
terms but in relative terms it is hovering around below 1% of the plan periods. Therefore,
the total outlay of both the Governments are not sufficient to keep the endangered species
within these protected areas.
21
Joshi, A., and P.N. Pande. 1991. “Forest Policy and its Impact on the Rural Population in Uttar Pradesh
Hills.” A working Paper, Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow, Chapter-III.
22
Govt. of Karnataka. 2003. First Report of Revenue Reforms Commission. Finance Department,
Bangalore, pp. 221-272.
23
Govt. of India. 2006. Report of the National Forest Commission. Ministry of Environment and Forests,
New Delhi, Chapter-3, 6 & 7.
24
ibid. Chapter-9.
108
The Supreme Court of India have passed an interim order in 2001 restraining the
Government of India from regularisation of encroachments and issued directives in
prohibiting the diversion of any protected area. Obviously this has given some relief to
the endangered species. Subsequently the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 amended in 2003
with 2 new category of protected area; conservation reserves, community reserves to
provide more space to the wildlife.
Pricing of forestry Benefits: Forest revenues are mainly realised from forests on
Government lands and forest produces are directly being exploited and sold by the State
Government. The benefits of the forest can be categorised as direct and indirect, but so
far only direct benefits are being priced and indirect benefits are ignored 25 . As the scope
of this study is on mobilizing non-tax revenues of the States through user charges, only
direct benefits are looked into.
The main sources of forest revenue through user charges are (i) Sale of timber and
firewood (ii) Sale of seedlings (iii) Grazing fee (iv) Fine on head loaders (v) Issue of
permit / licenses (vi) Penalty / compounding etc26 . But so far only marketed products are
being charged from the stakeholders leaving the non-market benefits of forests 27 . Not
only this, there are significant lacunas in pricing the forest produce. Studies undertaken to
develop methods for valuing non-market benefits indicate various methods of valuation,
as shown in Table 5.4. It is suggested that the technique of Multi Criteria Analysis
(MCA) - a mathematical programming technique to measure specific benefits of the
forests, could be used to raise the user charges for the direct beneficiaries as the cost of
benefit is rising 28 .
The need of the hour is to make a paradigm shift in raising revenue of the forest.
This problem can be catapulted if an earmarked fund is allocated to maintain the forest
for a longer period of time. For this reason some States have raised the issue of
compensation for maintenance of forest cover to the Central Government. Also, the
experiment of Joint Forest Management, as attempted in many of the States could be
rewarding.
Irrigation
Irrigation projects are in the nature of publicly supplied intermediate inputs, for
socio-economic, engineering and institutional reasons, even though they are not pure
25
A study conducted by Madhu Verma (2000) to examine the contribution of forests of Himachal Pradesh
derived the indirect benefits far exceed the direct benefits of the forest, i.e. Rs53000 per hectare and
Rs21000 per hectare respectively.
26
Govt. of Karnataka. 2003. Opcit.
27
In 2002-03 forests contributed Rs27013 crore to India’s GDP at the current price which was 1.2% of the
GDP in that year. The contribution of forest varied from1.0% to 1.5% from 1993-94 to 2002-03.A study by
IGIDR (1999) on Forest Resources Accounts of Maharashtra estimated that the direct benefits of forest
contribute around 2.9% of the net domestic produce of the country.
28
The experience of Karnataka shows that revenue realised through user charges is Rs100 crore per annum
at present, however a rough estimate indicates the possibility of increasing the revenue to more than
Rs1500 crore.
109
public goods. Setting up irrigation projects in the public sector confers substantial
economic benefits on private users. There are also significant externalities (positive or
negative), as a consequence of which the State plays a major role in the sector
Water Rates - The Present Scenario: All the States charge for the use of irrigation
water from public sources, except in Assam and the North-eastern States which do not
levy irrigation rates. These charges are in the form of water rates, levied on area actually
irrigated, differentiated by season and crops. The crop-wise rates, in general, are highest
for perennial cash crops and lowest for irrigated dry seasonals. Also, the rates vary
according to season, with the rates for hot weather seasonals being considerably higher
than during the monsoon season.
In many States, the rates are further differentiated by categories of irrigation
projects to allow for differences in the quality of irrigation as reflected in the quantum,
duration, and assurance of water supplies. For example, Haryana has classified its canal
system into three broad groups for the purpose of rate determination. Rajasthan charges
different rates for irrigation works, constructed before and after 1952.
Besides water rates, a few States levy general or special purpose cesses on
irrigated areas/crops (Annexure A.2). Also, lift irrigation from public sources Government canal or public tube wells - are invariably engaged at higher rate than for
surface irrigation. In the case of tube-wells, changes being on the basis of hours of
watering rather than area appointment to volumetric pricing.
Basis for Existing Rates: The water rates are fixed by the Central Water
Commission (CWC) that takes certain considerations into account while determining
these rates 29 . The considerations include quantum of water consumed, paying capacity of
irrigations, assurance of supplies and need to cover annual costs incurred in providing
irrigation. However, there is no uniformity or consistency of practice among the States in
this. Consider, for example, the relation between rates and water requirements. It has
been observed that crops consuming more water irrigation also pay more per hectare.
However, the rate per unit volume of water consumed varies greatly across crops. In no
State does the gross receipt by way of water charges per hectare account for more than 3
percent of the gross productivity per hec. of irrigated area. This and the wide variability
in the level and structure of rates per hec suggest that there is scope of rationalization of
the rate structure.
Reasons for low recovery: Revenue generation from the irrigation projects,
however, has not kept pace with the creation of potential. Revision of water rates has
been infrequent, hesitant and very much less than the increase in costs. The all-round
deterioration in the financial performance of irrigation projects is stark and nearly
universal. The total unrecovered costs on account of major and minor irrigation works
has increased magnificently over the years. This resulted in a huge financial crisis for the
29
Government of India. 1992. Report of the Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Water. Planning
Commission, GOI. New Delhi.
110
Government. Thus there is an urgent need of a serious and detailed scrutiny of the
accounting of the costs and revenue of minor irrigation works to determine the order of
subsidies involved.
Cost recovery in irrigation has been a major problem in rural and agricultural
water use in India. Important reasons include poor water delivery management by
irrigation department, poor State of maintenance of irrigation works, in accuracy of
published technical data on these works and allegedly widespread corruption in irrigation
departments. Among the other underlying causes, huge and soaring ‘subsidies’, mostly in
the form of unrecovered costs of goods and services provided by the public sector, is the
main reason for financial crisis confronting the Central and the State Governments 30 . This
resulted in a loss of irrigation potential in some completed irrigation projects. Moreover,
though, unrecovered costs are essentially subsidies, but one must not assume that the
entire subsidy accrues to users of irrigation. Part of it represent the costs of inefficiency in
producing and distributing irrigation services on account of defective design, inordinate
delays in completing projects, over-extended distributary systems, waste, and other
factors which inflate capital costs; and overmanning, relatively high administrative costs,
avoidably high costs of repair works and other factors which raise operating costs, and/or
affect the efficacy of assessment and collection of revenue. It is not possible to determine
how much of the implicit subsidy is attributable to inefficiency and how much really
benefits farmers because of the under-pricing of water.
The other main reason for revenue deterioration is that raising water rates is seen
as invitation to electoral disaster to the political parties and thus few Governments,
irrespective of party affiliation, are willing to take risk. Revision of water rates has been
infrequent, hesitant and very much less than the increase in costs. The rates increase were
themselves rather modest and no State has accepted, very few implemented the Irrigation
Commission recommendations by reviewing and adjusting rates every 5 years. The
experience has also shown that neither rates are raised nor the enforcement of the
prescribed rates is strict. There is ample scope in the existing arrangements for collusion
between officials and farmers leading to under statement of area irrigated, especially of
area under crops carrying higher rates. Laxity in assessment is compounded by laxity in
collection which resulted in phenomenal increase in losses on account of irrigation.
Moreover, the capital cost of irrigation projects has risen over the years because
of three factors: general inflation; new projects being in more difficult locations; and
higher costs of borrowing. According to CWC estimates between 1976-77 and 1993-94
there was a four-fold increase in construction costs due to increases in prices of material
and labor. Adjusting for inflation, the average investment per hectare of addition to
irrigation potential rose by two and a half to thrice times. All these factors, among other,
resulted in inadequacy of funds for working expenses (operation and maintenance costs)
which invariable cited as the reason for deterioration of systems and the quality of
services the Government offer.
30
Vaidyanathan, A. Irrigation Subsidies. Madras Institute of development studies, Chennai.
111
Policy Implications: Irrigation is one of the key inputs for crop production in as
much as the productivity impact of better seeds, fertilizers arid other input is critically
dependent on the way water is used. It is, therefore, both legitimate and necessary to
address the pricing of this input as one of the first steps and an integral component in the
process of rationalizing the totality of the price structure and raising the efficiency of
water.
Efficient water use: The upward revision of water rates does not necessarily mean
increase in cost of production as more efficient water-use reduces the quantum of water
per unit area without affecting output per unit area and which may lead to reduction in the
real burden of water charges. Hence, keeping the prices of inputs much below their cost
and unrelated to their consumption leads to inefficient water-use.
Towards Full Cost Recovery: Irrigation, especially, major and minor irrigation
absorbs a large amount of resources mobilized at high cost by the Government. The
benefits, however, accrue only to a limited area and population. In such a situation, the
possibility of extending the benefits of irrigation to new and wider areas will be severely
constrained if people who are already benefiting from public investments do not bear the
costs of the services that they receive. Any policy that may result in greater potential
benefit for large number of farmers can surely be expected to be politically more
acceptable than the continuance of the present system of heavily subsidizing the service
to a relatively small number of beneficiaries. A revision in the level and structure of
water rates is thus, necessary in the interest of both efficiency and equity.
Need to Improve Quality of Services: At present the management of canal system
are unable to accept any obligation regarding the quality of water supply or to make sure
that systems are constructed and managed as economically as possible for a given
standard of service; sizeable segments of the command do not get any water at all or get
much less water than their crops need; the supplies tend to be quite unreliable in terms of
quantum and timing; there is hardly any cost consciousness. Typically systems are over
capitalized; huge time and cost over-runs are allowed to pass without much scrutiny;
over-manning and relatively high overheads inflate operational costs. These problems are
compounded by the adoption different cropping pattern by the farmers from those
assumed at the time of project formulations. The users of public irrigation will be willing
to pay much more for water, provided they are assured of a better quality of services
(covering quantity, duration and schedule of water supply) and the rate are linked to this.
It is far too simplistic to view the problem as merely one of revising the level and
structure of water rates to cover O&M and part or all of the capital costs. Revision of
water rates should go hand in hand with measures to improve the quality of service and to
keep a check on costs.
Pricing for Domestic and Industrial Use: A part of irrigation water is used for
domestic purposes and industrial uses (including thermal power stations). However, in so
far as non-irrigation uses are not charged the full cost of providing water and total
revenues from irrigation projects are expected to cover overall costs, the rates charged for
112
irrigation will be higher than they should be. This inequity will be aggravated if the
volume consumed by domestic and industrial uses increases rapidly. In light of such an
agreement, the rates for non-agricultural uses should be revised so that the costs are fully
recovered and arrangements built into the supply contracts for ensuring full and prompt
recovery of dues.
Avoiding Complexities: At present water rates are almost everywhere fixed cropwise and with reference to area irrigated. Under this system, it is essential to record and
verify whether or not each individual plot comprising the command received irrigation
and for what crop and in which season. The assessment and collection of charges from
individual farmer is based on this record. The number of plots to be checked and the
number of farmers with whom the Department has to deal being enormous, such a system
is very expensive and inherently difficult, to manage. Moreover, area irrigated is a poor
indicator of the services provided by irrigation systems as the water requirements of
crops vary on account of differences in (a) duration (b) cultivation seasons; and (c) needs
for non-consumptive users. These differences are not systematically or adequately taken
into account while fixing rates per unit of irrigated area under different crops. Further, the
productivity impact of irrigation varies greatly depending both on what crops are grown
and on how much irrigation is available, in what quantities and when.
All this argues strongly for a system, which makes water charges explicitly a
function of the volume and season. Under such a system, the amount farmers have to pay
gets linked to the quantities of water used by them and the quality of service. This will
put pressure on managers of the system to rationalize water allocation procedures and
make sure that they provide the designated volume of water according to a specified
schedule. Making rates a function of predictability of supplies (in respect of quantum,
frequency and season) also takes care of the productivity aspect to a substantial extent;
and it obviates the need for elaborate records of area irrigated by crop.
Royalty on Mines and Minerals
Minerals are vital ingredients in shaping the socio-economic development of
States that are rich in these resources 31 . In the past, the mineral sector in India was
completely under the public sector. Even now, approximately 80% of the total value of
minerals originates from it. However, with the opening up of the economy and reforms in
various sectors, efforts are on to have more and more private sector participation in the
mineral sector.
Management of mineral resources is the responsibility of the Central and State
Governments as per Entry 54 of the Union List, and Entry 23 and 50 in that of the State.
Mineral resources are, therefore, regulated by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1957. According to this Act, the major minerals are under the Central
31
Important minerals include coal, iron ore, bauxite, mica, manganese, gypsum, chromite, copper,
dolomite, barytes, gypsum, graphite, ilmenite, lead and zinc, kaolin, limestone, limited reserve of gold and
diamond.
113
Government and minor minerals are under the State Governments. The details of the
Constitutional provisions relating to mines and minerals are given in Annexure A.3.
The National Mineral Policy recognizes the fact that mines and minerals are nonrenewable sources of energy and a valuable natural resource. The Policy ensures that
there is optimal exploration of reserves, the maximising of mineral rents, compliance to
environmental standards, incentives for reinvestment of mineral rents and to the displaced
community.
Mining and Mineral Sector in India: The Present Scenario: India produces as
many as 84 minerals comprising 4 fuels, 11 metallic, 49 non-metallic and 20 minor
minerals. The aggregate value of mineral production in India was around Rs 696 billion
in 2003-04, contributed by more than 3123 mines. Fuel minerals contribute around 80%,
metallic minerals 8%, non-metallic minerals 3% and minor minerals 9%. The
contribution of the public sector was around 80%. About 85% of the reporting mines are
concentrated in 10 States, viz. Madhya Pradesh, Chattishgarh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Andhra
Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.
Non-tax Structure in Indian Mines and Mineral Sector: In addition to taxes 32
being levied on mines and mineral sector in India, non-tax levy of royalty and other
cesses are levied to maintain the sustainability of the resources for the future generations.
Royalty and dead rent on major minerals are governed and fixed by the Central
Government, and for minor minerals by the State Governments. The yield of both (major
and minor) minerals accrues to the States. The rates of royalty vary according to the type
of minerals (Annexure A.2). Also, there are miscellaneous non-tax imposts on various
activities of mining such as pre-extraction, extraction, semi-processing, marketing and
transportation. However, most of these are levied at the first two stages of the mining
activity. The details of these imposts are given below:
Reconnaissance permit fee is levied at the time of demarcation of an area as a
possible mine, and when the mine lease is sanctioned. The applicant has to submit the
application with a non-refundable fee, at the rate specified by the respective State along
with a refundable security for the observance of terms and conditions for mining of the
permitted area.
Prospecting and mining lease fee is paid by the bidder under a prospecting
license. The holder of the prospecting license is required to pay in advance an annual
prospecting fee at a rate fixed by the State Government on a per hectare basis. The
payment is independent of the mineral extraction activity. If a quantum of the mineral is
removed at the prospecting stage itself for commercial purposes, then royalty has to be
32
There are various types of taxes on mineral activity and these are levied by the three layers of
Government i.e. Central, State and local. The taxes are corporate income tax, union excise duties, custom
duties and Central sales tax imposed by the Central Government, stamp duties, registration fees, road tax
and VAT imposed by the State Governments, property tax, octroi / entry tax, and various rural taxes levied
by the local Government.
114
paid at the specified rate for the removed amount. After successful prospecting, the lessee
applies for grant of mining lease by paying a fee specified thereof.
If the extraction has not commenced and the mine is lying untapped, dead rent has
to be paid by the holder of the mining lease for the area of mining lease granted to him.
This is fixed by the Central Government like royalty and revised every three years but it
is collected by the State Government. Dead rent is a deterrent against the tendency of the
lessee to corner leases and keep them idle to prevent competitors from accessing mineral
bearing areas. It is paid before actual production and varies according to the lease period
and area brought under the lease. When the lessee becomes eligible to pay royalty, he
pays either of the two, whichever is higher.
A mineral lessee is also required to pay a surface rent in respect of the area used
by the lessee for the mining operation. This rent is fixed at a rate not exceeding the land
revenue specified by the State Government. It is levied on the basis of area assessed as
non-agricultural area and used for mining activities.
The holder of the mining lease pays a royalty in respect of any mineral removed
or consumed from the leased area. In India, royalty for minerals is charged on a quantity
basis (specific-rated) or on a sale price basis (ad valorem). The royalty rate for the major
minerals is revised every three years by the Central Government. Currently, royalty of
most of the minerals are levied on an ad valorem basis and only a few are assessed on
quantity basis (Annexure A.4).
Apart from royalty, the State Governments levy some cesses (having different
names) on major minerals. Cess is a kind of levy charged for meeting some specified
expenditure like welfare, education, health, construction of roads etc. It is levied either on
the royalty payable or the quantity of mineral production. Royalty linked cesses were
struck down by the Supreme Court of India except for the State of West Bengal in 1992.
There are also several other specific levies which are imposed by the State Governments,
e.g. State water pollution consent fee, State air pollution consent fee, local area welfare
development charge, environment and forest charge, safety zone charge for mining
operation and so on. All these levies and their rates vary from State to State.
Revision of royalty needs to be viewed along with the movement of prices,
production, and productivity. Royalty is an important source of non-tax revenue to the
mineral producing States. The potential to increase revenue through royalty is quite
significant. However, the present level of this source of non-tax revenue is very low. The
grading of minerals, rates of royalty, periodicity of revision of royalty rate, basis of
royalty, and the type of royalty all influence the level of revenue accruing to a mineral
producing State. If the rates of royalty remain unchanged for a long time, the real value of
royalty declines significantly due to rising inflation and the States lose considerably.
Finally, as recommended by Anwarul Hoda Committee, the royalty rates should be based
on the value base of the mined minerals rather than on tonnage system.
115
Roads and Bridges
Road system is an important component of infrastructure. Development of roads
in India is under the jurisdiction of both the Center and the States; the Centre is
responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the national highways and
scheduled roads, and the States for all the other roads. Presently, the length of the
national highways is 58,000 kms, and State highways is 1,36,000 kms. Together they
constitute less than 10% of the total road network (3.5 million km), and account for over
75% of the total road based traffic. After Independence, Indian planners gave more
importance to railways than roads resulting in the slow expansion of the road network in
India. Over the years, road transport has emerged as a dominant mode of transport, but
the funding as well as provision of services has been insufficient. In 1985, the
Government initiated the private-public partnership (PPP) to finance, build and operate
toll roads of their choice. The offer was under the BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer)
approach, which did encourage the private sector to mobilize resources to set up toll
roads. At the State level, some States have been trying to promote private sector
participation on a BOT basis.
Financing of India’s road network: The Government of India’s expenditure on
road is 12% of capital expenditure and 3% of total expenditure; still road maintenance is
grossly under-funded, which has resulted in low standard of roads. In India, roads are
treated as a public good. Roads are financed mainly from general revenues with little
support from user charges, fuel cesses, tolls, substantial private sector funding, market
borrowings and external assistance. The gap between the total inflow and projected
outflow is met from market borrowings where the Ministry of Finance guarantees the
borrowings. Borrowings can be raised by assigning the toll revenues of National
Highway Authority of India (NHAI) and if necessary, the toll account can be placed in an
escrow account. A borrowing limit has to be fixed whereby the debt service obligation
will not exceed 50% of the projected annual cess revenue. The interest on market
borrowings has been calculated at the rate of 9% per annum. Additional budgetary
support is restricted to the North East Region, some specific region defined by the
Government of India or any additional project undertaken during the eleventh plan. The
sole objective of the creation of NHAI was to commercialise the highway projects.
The Road User Non-tax Charge in India: At present, toll revenue and cess on fuel
are the two major source of non-tax revenue in India.
Revenue from cess: - A special cess of Rs1.50 per litre on High Speed Diesel and
Motor Spirit has been applied under the Act of Central Road Fund, 2001. Some States,
like Uttar Pradesh, levy an additional tax on transport fuel sales. This type of cess
supports the development/maintenance of national and State highways as well as the
development of rural roads. The growth rate has been assumed to be 3% per annum.
There was a provision for earmarking of a cess that could be used to bridge the gap of
BOT (Tolls) and the surplus realized could be used in construction contracts, annuity
116
repayments, land acquisition etc. It must be pointed that the entire cess (up to 2029-30) is
assigned for debt service.
Toll revenue: - This is one of the major non-tax sources of revenue for the States
(Table 5.5). States like Gujarat, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Orissa, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu
are showing an increasing trend in toll revenue during the same time period. However,
few States are declining in toll revenue collection, e.g. Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and
Uttar Pradesh. These major States are putting their focus on other sources of non-tax
revenue. Tolls have a tremendous potential to increase the revenue raising capacity of
roads and bridges of the States. However, the toll collection needs sufficient up-gradation
and mechanisation to collect more revenue.
All future phases of NHs and State highways are on the basis of Public-PrivatePartnership (PPP) or Construction Contract (CC). There are three forms of PPP- BOT
(Toll) system, BOT (Annuity) system, Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) system. Under the
BOT (Toll) system the concessionaire undertakes construction and maintenance of the
road during the concession period at the expiry of which assets are transferred to the
Government. The budgetary support of Government can not exceed 40% of the cost of
each project. Private funding is sustained by revenue from a specified toll structure for
which they get the tolling right for that concession period. Award for BOT (Toll) are
made through competitive biddings on the basis of minimum grant or the shortest
concession period. The system of BOT (Annuity) has the provision of concession, which
includes building the road and having its maintenance for a fixed period. But there is no
upfront tolling right. It is NHAI’s annuity payments over the concession period that
makes private funding financially viable. Award of the project is made through
competitive bidding in respect of minimum annuity payments. NHAI fixes the concession
period uniformly for 15 years. The SPV is a joint venture company set up by two or more
promoters to execute some projects. It is generally used for toll road projects and is partly
funded by user entities. Finance is funded by insurance companies, pension funds and
other institutions having long term funds at their disposal.
With the Government keen on private sector participation in the roads sector, a
new Model Concession Agreement (MCA) has been finalised to streamline publicprivate-partnership (PPP) projects in the State highways sector. Many States requested
the Government to evolve an MCA for State highways, as in case of NHs, to sustain
investor interest in the up-gradation and maintenance of State highways on BOT basis.
To improve the toll collection, it is recommended that the Government should
start a system of electronic toll collection either through microwave technology or
through infrared technology. This will be able to solve the problem of congestion due to
toll collection. Microwave technology, which is commonly used throughout the world, is
based on radio frequency waves which will provide information to the toll collection
plaza about the vehicle. Infrared, used mostly in remote controls, is relatively a new
technology for toll collection. By using this technology, the processing of toll collection
can be completed within a fraction of a second.
117
Table 5.1: RR/RE from Elementary, Secondary and Higher Education in Major States
RR/RE from Elementary
Education
RR/RE from Secondary Education
1993-96 2001-04
% Change
1993-96 2001-04
% Change
Andhra Pradesh
0.60
0.57
-6.11
3.39
2.26
-33.21
Bihar
0.00
0.10
NC
0.08
0.10
27.57
Goa
0.01
0.04
512.23
0.02
0.59
2856.12
Gujarat
0.39
1.36
247.20
0.64
0.74
15.24
Haryana
2.68
2.31
-13.91
2.55
0.82
-67.70
Karnataka
0.05
0.40
752.54
2.47
1.96
-20.89
Kerala
0.06
0.08
24.06
4.09
3.63
-11.37
Madhya Pradesh
0.02
0.01
-55.74
0.12
0.27
129.65
Maharashtra
0.24
0.27
11.47
0.11
0.07
-39.96
Orissa
0.91
1.07
17.94
0.04
0.14
258.12
Punjab
0.22
0.47
116.81
0.97
0.52
-46.77
Rajasthan
0.34
1.56
355.30
0.64
0.59
-8.22
Tamil Nadu
0.00
0.21
6877.37
2.78
3.50
25.88
Uttar Pradesh
0.12
0.01
-91.78
3.74
2.88
-23.03
West Bengal
0.01
0.01
127.87
0.03
0.02
-36.20
15 Major States
0.25
0.48
92.94
1.54
1.25
-18.95
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note: NC = Not calculated
States
RR/RE from University and
Higher Education
1993-96 2001-04
% Change
0.58
0.47
-18.80
0.00
4.01
NC
0.69
8.36
1114.50
4.06
2.30
-43.30
0.95
0.42
-55.74
0.34
0.00
-100.00
2.73
3.05
11.89
0.83
0.87
4.54
0.47
0.24
-48.19
0.58
0.35
-39.97
0.89
1.45
62.09
0.75
0.60
-20.33
1.80
1.70
-5.34
1.11
0.00
-99.97
0.21
0.09
-56.35
1.03
1.04
1.24
118
Table 5.2: Household, Public and Total Health Expenditure in India (2004-05)
(Rs. Crores)
States
Household
Govt.
Other
Total
HE as% of
Exp.
Exp.
Exp.
Health
THE
Exp.
PE as% of
THE
OE as% of
THE
Central Govt.
0
14819
730
15549
0
95.3
4.7
Andhra Pradesh
6441
1696
640
8777
73.38
19.39
7.29
Bihar
11854
1091
202
13147
90.17
8.3
1.53
Goa
524
116
22
662
79.17
17.48
3.35
Gujarat
4893
996
424
6313
77.51
15.78
6.71
Haryana
3385
421
175
3981
85.03
10.56
4.4
Karnataka
3847
1267
353
5467
70.36
23.18
6.46
Kerala
8373
1048
281
9702
86.3
10.8
2.9
Madhya Pradesh
6432
1051
228
7711
83.41
13.63
2.96
Maharashtra
11703
3527
726
15957
73.34
22.1
4.55
Orissa
2999
684
111
3795
79.04
18.02
2.93
Punjab
3493
827
273
4593
76.05
18
5.95
Rajasthan
3399
1190
267
4855
70
24.5
5.5
Tamil Nadu
3624
1590
760
5974
60.67
26.61
12.72
Uttar Pradesh
17158
2650
550
20359
84.28
13.02
2.7
West Bengal
7782
1715
433
9929
78.38
17.27
4.36
All States
109308
17965
5906
133178
Grand Totals
109308
32784
6636
148727
73.5
22
4.46
(GOI+States)
Source: - National Health Accounts (NHA) (2001-02)
Notes:
(i) Household expenditure based on NHA for the year 2001-02 and extrapolated for 2004-05.
(ii) Central Govt. expenditure includes transfer to states, other central ministries and central PSUs; and data obtained
from demand for grants (provisional), Govt. of India.
(iii) Govt. expenditure includes Central, States, Local Govts and PSUs; data obtained from state finances
(provisional), RBI, various issues.
(iv) Other includes foreign agencies, private firms and NGOs; data relates to 2001-02 which is subsequently
extrapolated for 2004-05.
(v) HE as% of THE- Household Expenditure as % of Total Health Expenditure; PE as% of THE- Public expenditure
as % of Total Health Expenditure; OE as% of THE- Other Expenditure as % of Total Health Expenditure.
119
Table 5.3: Forest Cover in Different States in India
(Sq. K.M.)
States:
Geographical
Area
Actual Forest
Cover
2003-04
Total Forest
Area
275069
44419
63821
Bihar
94163
5558
6473
Goa
3702
2156
1224
Gujarat
196022
14946
19113
Haryana
44212
1517
1558
191791
36449
43084
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
38863
15577
11268
Madhya Pradesh
308245
76429
95221
Maharashtra
307713
46865
61939
Orissa
155707
48366
58136
Punjab
50362
1580
3084
Rajasthan
342239
15826
32488
Tamil Nadu
130058
22643
22877
Uttar Pradesh
240928
14118
16826
West Bengal
88752
12343
11879
Kerala
Source: - State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India.
120
Table 5.4: Methods for Valuing Forest Benefits
121
Table 5.5: Toll Collection of Major States
(Rs. ‘000)
States
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
103708
151136
134881
372864
263060
130493
79105
4148
3579
658
7600
121463
74699
8472
2762
966
11816
188223
0
10368
8680
3193
15674
206226
4241
98
13473
2213
18665
35548
410
307
16655
399
22369
29353
99
76
246982
0
18955
30242
7407
8198
11778
2580
152931
3947
1336
7361
10199
1153
158242
17524
57201
9296
13013
167
149022
21777
1233
5979
21847
136
91904
80497
849
5884
25850
0
59028
97275
301
19112
52734
3727
24774
118623
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Finance Accounts, Budget Documents of Different
States, Relevant Years.
122
6
Procedural Reforms for Non-tax
Revenue and Issues in Delivery of
Services
The analysis, presented in the preceding chapter, clearly highlights the fact that it is the
Government that has to mobilize resources through the increase in user charges of the goods
and services provided by it. However, the delivery of services by the Government, especially
in the areas of education, water supply, power, sanitation, and health services etc, face
enormous pressures owing to the fact that the capability of the public sector has not kept pace
with the services demanded by its citizens. There is a growing awareness that the ability of
existing institutions to deliver the quality of services is deteriorating. It is, therefore, extremely
important that the procedures for the delivery of some of the services, viz. education, health
and infrastructure etc, that have a direct interaction with the society are improved considerably.
These should be designed in a suitable way for use by the masses. This will make the delivery
of services effective and adequate 1 .
Complexities in Procedures in Delivery of Services
There is a wide gap between the efforts made by the Government in providing services
and citizen “satisfaction” from the quality and reliability of services. For example, a
nationwide survey done on the quality of the public distribution system (PDS) revealed that
while 72 percent of households used the PDS, less than 10 percent were fully satisfied with the
quantity, quality, or fairness of the system 2 . In a ranking of the quality of service delivery
across 15 major States, the States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Rajasthan, and West Bengal were
1
World Development Report. 2004. “Public Sector Underpinnings of Service Reform”. In Making Services Work
for Poor People. The World Bank, Washington, DC.
2
Paul, S., S. Balakrishna, K. Gopakumar, S. Sekhar, and M. Vivekananda. 2004. “State of India’s Public
Services: Benchmarks for the States”. Economic and Political Weekly, February 28, pp. 90-34.
placed in the lowest tier. Likewise, in most of the services provided by the Government, it is
often the targeted group (the poor people) who do not get access to them in requisite quantity
and quality.
While many of the services provided by the Government contribute to improving
human welfare and quality of life, this chapter focuses on services that bring people into direct
contact with the Government (having interaction with the officials) for delivery of the service.
These include education services, health services and infrastructure services such as water
supply and sanitation services.
Education
Education is a medium through which the people come to know their socio-cultural
background that helps them to identify themselves with their own country. It develops human
resources for different levels of economic activity and helps them to undertake the necessary
research and development needed to attain the perceived national goals. Investment in
education, therefore, is significant to regulate the present and the future.
In spite of the significance of this service, even after almost sixty years of
Independence, India still is in need of a tangible mechanism in the educational system to
transcend its 35 percent of illiterate population. Though many reforms have taken place over
the years, the “three R’s” of Amartya Sen, (i.e. Reasons, Reachness and Range) have not yet
been fully achieved. The delivery of service of education faces a variety of problems. These
are mentioned below:
Unaffordable Access: Most of the poor people, especially the rural poor, are not yet
able to have access to school facility simply because they can not afford its opportunity cost in
terms of money that the poor children have to forgo while studying in the school instead of
helping their parents in the field or doing other manual work. Although universal literacy is the
heart of Government education policy, despite repeated rhetorical commitments to universal
enrollment, even the modest goal of universal primary school completion has not been
realized. This is mainly because of the limited reach of the service to the targeted population.
The children still have to walk a long way even to reach the nearest primary school, as
sometimes there is no clear-cut short route to the school. In addition, there still exist social
stigmas, e.g. the caste system that prevents the lower caste children’s entry into the village
school.
Dysfunctional Schools and Low Quality of education: Completion of schooling and the
learning process falls short of expectations because the providers (school or college) are
dysfunctional. While most of the teachers try conscientiously to do their jobs, some of them
remain absent or do not attend to their work carefully 3 . Low capability, weak motivation, the
3
PROBE Team in association with Centre for Development Economics. 1999. Public Report on Basic Education
in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi; Aruna R. 1999. “Learn Thoroughly: Primary Schooling in Tamil
Nadu”. Economic and Political Weekly, May 1, pp. 1011-1014; EPW Research Foundation. 1994. ‘Social
124
lack of complementary inputs and an ineffective regulatory mechanism makes the quality of
teaching abysmally low. This makes the future prospects of learning outcomes very dismal.
Low Client Responsiveness: When communities are not involved in establishing,
supporting, or overseeing a school, the school is often seen as an entity to which they cannot
relate. People often complain of absent teachers and the demand for illegal fees to get their
children into school or to influence the examination results 4 . Villagers refer to the school as
“the Government’s school” and not as “our school”. As poor people are not aware of their
rights and cannot voice their opinion, they have no expectations from the Government schools
and prefer shouldering the burden themselves 5 . They become the victim of the chauvinist
attitude of the educated mass and the so-called policymakers.
Medical and Public Health
The public health sector in India has been facing lots of problems such as inadequate
facilities, less health coverage, and an increase in medical cost 6 . Although India has a
Constitutional commitment to universal provision of health care, the ratio of Government
health expenditure to total expenditure on health is only 21 percent - half the public spending
ratio of the developed/ “free market” countries such as the United States (45 percent) or Chile
(44 percent). If one takes expenditure as a measure, India has one of the most “privatized”
health systems in the world - of the 195 countries listed in the World Health Report 2005, only
five had a ratio of public to private spending lower than India.
Although the public health delivery system consists of a large number of dispensaries,
primary health care institutions, small hospitals providing specialist services, large hospitals
providing tertiary care, medical colleges, paramedical training institutions, laboratories etc.,
there has been a clear absence of any deliberate strategy to use specialized organizational tools
for achieving public health goals. Recently a survey 7 was conducted to track the public
facilities in Rajasthan continuously for a year. It was found that despite huge investments in
expanding the access to public health care, the use of these public health facilities is low for all
Indicators of Development for India – II: Inter-State Disparities”. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXIX,
No. 21, May 21, (Special Statistics – 8); Dreze, J. and A. Sen. 1995. India: Economic Development and Social
Opportunity. Oxford University press; Kumar, R., S. Santra, A. Mukherjee, T. Banerjee, and M. Kundu. 2005.
“Public-Private Interface in Primary Education: A Case Study in West Bengal”. Economic and Political Weekly,
April 9, pp. 1550-1555; Mehrotra, S. (et. al.) 1998. “Reallocating Public Spending for Basic Social Services in
Developing Countries”. Economic and Political Weekly, July 4, pp. 1717-1724.
4
Narayan, Deepa, and Patti Pettesch. 2002. From Many Lands: Voices of Poor. World Bank, Oxford University
Press, Washington, DC.
5
Daramola, A G, Hawa A Biu, Ogoh Alubo, Agi S P I Shebu, Uchenne M Nzewi, and Paul Francis. 1998. Hard
Lessons: Primary Schools, Community, and Social Capital in Nigeria. World Bank, Washington, DC.
6
Purohit, Brijesh C. 2004. “Inter-State Disparities in Health Care and Financial Burden on the Poor in India”.
Journal of Health and Social Policy, Vol. 18 (3), pp. 37-60, Howarth Press, USA; Purohit, Brijesh C. 1997.
"Structural Adjustment and Health Care Sector in India: Some Policy Issues in Financing". QEH Working Paper
No.2 (on Internet), April, University of Oxford.
7
Banerjee, A., E. Duflo, and A. Deaton. 2004. “Health Care Delivery in Rural Rajasthan”. Economic and
Political Weekly, February 28, pp. 944-950.
125
income groups. It was observed that the poor relied on traditional healers and made rare visits
to these facilities. However, there are several reasons for the poor quality of delivery of health
services in India. The three main factors are – (i) poor governance and dysfunctional role of the
state; (ii) unrealistic goal setting and lack of a strategic vision; and (iii) weak management.
Poor governance and dysfunctional role of the State: No system, however well
designed it may be, can function without a guiding, regulatory force and a strong ‘politicalwill’. Comprising of both the political and administrative class, this ‘combined’ control
mechanism is needed to effectively translate policy aspirations into actions. Further, unlike the
other services, governance of health is difficult as it is intertwined with socioeconomic and
cultural factors. As a result of this, health personnel have little control over final outcomes.
This is made more complex by various ministries administering to matters that directly affect
population health without any coordinating mechanism in place. The health system comes
under three categories-- primary, secondary and tertiary. These are administered and monitored
by different bodies, none of which work in co-ordination with the other. As a result of this,
there has been dilution in the concept of health care, where curative services are supposed to
imply continuum of preventive and promotive health care. Such a fragmentation has negative
effects that make the integration of health services problematic. Also, it weakens the technical
capacity to think holistically and results in the duplication of scarce resource use.
Inadequate Goal-setting: Weak evidence base for strategic vision: The absence of good
quality research for evidence-based policy formulation is one of the reasons for the poor goalsetting and program designing in health. Neither the Ministry at the Centre nor at the State
level has adequate in-house capability to design research studies, collate data and analyze
research findings of the various health programmes to enable evidence-based policy-making.
Hardly any importance is given to the collection and review of health data nor to its analysis
for future reference. Substantial resources are being spent on programmes and interventions
that have a poor evidence base. For example, there is no evidence to indicate the current
burden of malaria, or maternal mortality. Similarly, hardly any studies are available to assess
the efficacy of the use of a drug or its treatment protocol under different settings and
conditions. This is crucial for formulating differential medical strategies to suit the diverse
conditions prevailing in India.
In eight of the States, substantial investments were mobilized from the World Bank to
upgrade, strengthen and establish hospitals at the district, sub-district and block levels.
However, while the projects undertaken were successful in improving the quality of health care
in urban and semi-urban areas, the “expected” outcomes, (e.g. increase in institutional
deliveries) were not realized. Had the focus been on establishing the referral system and
linking the other disease control measures with the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH)
projects, investments made for strengthening the health systems would have had a measurable
impact on reducing maternal, neonatal and infant deaths. This experience clearly demonstrates
that mere increase in investments in infrastructure does not automatically translate into better
public health outcomes. It also underscores the urgent need for conceptual clarity on the
126
expectations of the organizational structures that have been established and the urgent need for
standardization of facilities across the country.
While it is clear that infrastructure development had little linkage to goal setting, it is
also seen that policy intervention per se often lacked focus. These were not based on hard
evidence, and had weak institutional capacity to translate policy into action.
Management Failures: There are various factors that are responsible for the failure of
health management systems in India, viz. low budgets; untimely and irregular supplies; and
corrupt practices. The dispersed and disaggregated administrative responsibilities, plus the
conflicting job profiles, make accountability a difficult proposition. All these factors have
serious implications for the quality of management and efficiency. A majority of doctors opt
for specialization and/or urban practice. Their reluctance to serve in rural areas has become a
major impediment in the Government’s ability to provide health services to the rural
population. The desire for an increase in earnings and fear of career stagnation compels many
of the doctors to opt for a private practice. As a result, the absenteeism of doctors and frontline workers from their place of work is very high. Various studies conducted by Indian
experts 8 , including those by the World Bank 9 , indicate that absenteeism among doctors
working in primary health centres ranges from 40 to 50 percent. The recruitment policy is a
contributory factor for the lack of motivation among doctors to provide services in rural areas
as very often, postgraduate students are recruited by the Governments and placed at PHCs
where the skills acquired by them during post graduation are of little relevance.
Vehicles without POL 10 budgets, beds without washing allowances, X-ray machines
lying idle for the want of consumables or maintenance budgets, delay in delivery of drugs etc.
also contribute to management failure. In addition, the quality of service delivery is also
perceived to be low due to the unfriendly, rude, corrupt behaviour of the personnel working in
these facilities, distance, inconvenient timings, and lack of reliability in the availability or the
skill of the provider etc. also reflect management failure. The most demotivating factor is the
lack of appropriate facilities and required inputs. These are crucial to motivate a qualified
doctor to do his best for his patient and derive job satisfaction. The working condition for
nurses and/or midwives is worse due to inadequate and unreliable supply of inputs; absence of
supervision and technical guidance; and the limited opportunities for career advancement.
There exist many corrupt practices within the health system, e.g. prevalence of unauthorized
private practice, the issuing of fake medical certificates, transfers, posting, recruitment,
‘tolerating’ absenteeism etc. It is these, which make the health system ineffective.
8
Mohan P., S. Iyengar, S.B. Mohan, K. Sen. 2003. “Daily Up-Down”. Why Should an Auxiliary Nurse-Mid-wife
(ANM) of Rajasthan Prefer to Reside Within Her Work-Area? Udaipur: Action Research and Training for Health;
Rangarao, A.P. 2003. Report on Role and Efficiency of ANM and Male Worker in Primary Health Care. Andhra
Pradesh: A Qualitative Study funded by DFID. (Unpublished paper commissioned by DIFD, New Delhi, India).
9
World Bank. 2004. State Health System Development Projects II. Implementation Completion Report, World
Bank; Washington, USA, September.
10
POL indicates petroleum, oil and lubricant.
127
Water Supply and Sanitation
The daily supply of piped water in urban areas is much lower in India than in other
developing countries. Moreover, the availability of water has been declining and people deal
with this problem in a variety of ways. At many places the true total costs of coping with the
“inadequate” water supply is often found to be much higher than the monthly water bill (as
people invest assets or time in coping with the irregular water supply). Full-pressure, i.e.
“24/7” water supply remains a pipe dream in many cities. Moreover, the limited number of the
network of water access points has to be widely shared, which increases the waiting time and
very often, this simply overwhelms the system.
Poor people bear a disproportionate share of the impact of inefficient water and
sanitation services. Very few of the poor are connected to a network. When they do have
access, the installation has to be shared with many more people. The prices they pay are among
the highest, generally more than those paid by the more affluent households who have water
pipe connections. The inefficient price differential results in inequitable practice of subsidizing
piped water, lack of scale economies for independent providers, or what is even worse, the
providers taking advantage of the poor people’s lack of choice.
In general, the standards of maintenance of the water supply and sanitation facilities are
poor. Very little of the expenditure goes for maintenance and hardly any for replacement. The
poor maintenance of the system results in cost escalation and shortens the life of the system
causing high failures rates. Thus, the major difficulties that the public and water management
bodies facing today are the following:
•
Increasing scarcity of water resources (often of bad quality) requiring water
resource management;
•
Increasing water demand (especially in the urban centres) which requires more
water to be produced, distribution systems to be developed, and also water
demand management;
•
Increasing demand for a better service (water quality, water quantity, pressure)
and thus, an improved operation and management of the water system, in
contrast with the preparedness of the existing systems which are in need of
rehabilitation;
•
Scarcity of traditional financing sources in the context of the general increase
in construction and operation costs.
Owing to lack of treatment facilities, a great proportion of untreated waste and sewage
water flows into open drains. Heavily loaded with pollutants, this wastewater and sewage
water enters the water distribution system. This occurs especially during the monsoon season,
giving rise to many water-borne diseases such as cholera, gastro-enteritis and dysentery. These
128
diseases take a heavy toll of human lives and give rise to severe health hazards 11 . Existing
control measures, regulation and fiscal instruments have failed to contain the deteriorating
water utility services and pollution abatement in the urban areas.
Rationalisation of Procedures in Delivery of Services as Fiscal Measure
When one observes failure in services provision, it is very easy to point a finger at the
frontline provider for the inefficient delivery of services. The proximate causes of this failure
can be categorized into the following four categories12 : lack of knowledge, lack of capability,
lack of assets or inputs, or lack of motivation. However, a focus on the proximate causes of
failure in delivery of a particular service can lead to a counterproductive tendency to put the
“blame” for the failure on the individual provider, rather than identify the systemic issues that
trap even the best and highly capable people within dysfunctional systems. No system creates
good services by attacking or undermining the frontline providers of those services.
Thus, the enforcment of good management and governance is absolutely essential in
these sectors. Corrupt practices in these sectors hurt persons who are poor and cannot afford
the alternative means of dealing with the problem. No market can function or sustain itself
unless there is a minimal level of integrity, fair play and rule of law. Thus, the time is ripe to
review the existing arrangements keeping in view the long-term perspective. Policymakers and
observers of contemporary India acknowledge that strengthening service delivery in India
requires not just new schemes or better logistics or managerial fixes but radical reforms in
institutional arrangements. It is the politicians and policymakers who can make reforms
happen. However, reforming institutions is a long-term process. It requires the initiation of a
sequence of reform measures that will ultimately bring about radical institutional reforms in
the long run. The challenge India faces is to identify the weakest link in the chain of
accountability. This is the starting point to develop initiatives that will ultimately contribute to
the larger reform agenda for institutional change. The basic services like education, water
supply and sanitation, and health system need to achieve greater efficiency in some of the
aspects given below:
Regulation and enforcement: The primary role of a Government should be to protect
people’s welfare. This is done by instituting regulations and rigorously monitoring their
enforcement. The objective of regulations must be to increase awareness and create a sense of
accountability among providers regarding the quality of service delivered. This should not be a
routine application of a standard or a rule. Thus, supervision needs to be supportive and not
perspective or fault-finding, as the objective is not to drive away the providers but to persuade
them to adhere to quality and safety of the service. This calls for regulations related to
11
Purohit, Brijesh C. and T. Siddiqui. 2004. “Environmental Determinants of Disease and Mortality Pattern in
India: A Factor Analytic Approach.” In Chugan P.K and M. Mallikarjun (Eds.), Managing Trade,Technology and
Environment , , New Delhi: Excel Books,
12
World Development Report. 2004. Opcit..
129
intensive training programmes and performance monitoring system. Supportive supervision is
a new skill that needs to be nurtured in the Government sector 13 .
Thus, in the health sector, the key challenge to governance is the enforcement of
regulations related to the “quack” or the unqualified practitioner in the villages. Good
governance would require a political will to resolutely enforce discipline and make the public
health system work, besides educating the people on the rational use of medical practices or
drug use. Also, given the wide variations across the States, it is necessary to undertake a
comprehensive assessment of the adequacy of the existing laws, identify the gaps and come up
with a package to improve the service delivery to the targeted people. On the other hand, what
successful education systems share is a working structure of accountability: clear objectives,
adequate resources, and capable and motivated providers. Clarifying objectives and the role to
be played by policymakers and providers is the first step towards good governance.
Devolution of authority: Decentralization has to be viewed in the context of devolving
authority and power to the States by the Centre, to the districts by the States and from the
districts to the multi-layered local bodies. But success depends on how responsibly and with
how much accountability the task is performed. If decentralization just replaces the functions
of the Central ministry with a slightly lower tier of Government, while everything else remains
the same, viz. the relationship between the people and the government; and between the
government and the providers, there is little reason to expect a positive change. However, a
clear-cut delineation of duties and functions to be carried out by the local bodies at different
levels vis-à-vis the Government departmental hierarchies; the financial implications of those
functions and systems for utilization and reporting; and the kind of authority, powers, or
control these local bodies have on the functionaries (responsible for discharging those duties)
will help in the early realization of the goals for which the services are being provided.
For example, in education the operation of schools is highly centralized which restricts
the functioning of the community-run and private schools. It also discourages them from
making their contribution to development of education. On the other hand, easing these
controls mobilizes additional private and local resources for education without excessively
increasing the Government’s fiscal burden. Greater decentralization, including giving more
leeway for private and community schools, would also improve efficiency within the schools
by encouraging greater competition amongst them. It would also develop managerial
accountability within the schools as the system would be more organized.
Stimulating Competition in and for the Market of Services: In India, the Government
has the virtual exclusive monopoly, which does not provide services to many - especially the
13
Mills, A., R. Brugha, K. Hanson, and B. McPake. 2002. “Approaches for Improving Delivery in the Non-State
Sector: What Is the Evidence on what works, where and why? ” Paper presented at the Making service Works for
the Poor Conference. Eynsham Hall, Oxfordshire. November 4; Purohit Brijesh C. 2001. “Structural Adjustment,
Private Initiatives and Policy Options: A Case of the Indian Healthcare Sector”, Health Policy and Planning,
16(1), January-March, 87-97, Oxford University Press, U.K., Purohit Brijesh C. 1996. “New Directions for
Public Health Financing” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXI (8), Feb. 24: pp. 450-453.
130
poor - and provides poor quality services to those who do have access. The situation in India
remains one in which the public monopolies face no competition either ‘in the market”, or “for
the market”. However, given the global revolution sweeping today’s world, competition does
matter in the provision of public services. This would have the following implications:
1. It would require a clear contract between the bulk provider and the nongovernmental provider which would define the rights and responsibilities of
both parties 14 .
2. It would require a clear contract between the provider and those who receive
services. The absence of such contracts is one of the major reasons why the
monopoly-providers remain unaccountable to users, and information remains so
poor and opaque.
3. It would require that costs are “revealed”, and the distinction between legitimate
costs and those costs (such as massive over-staffing), which should not be
passed on to the users.
The entry of private and other non-governmental providers would naturally lead to
comparisons between the costs and quality of services provided by different providers. This
will put pressure on public providers to improve their performance. The States need to
surrender those tasks, which they need not perform to others. On the other hand, the State
needs to develop the capacity to do many things, which only the State can do 15 .
Use of IT for Better Decision-Making: Effective leadership rests on access to organized
information, which is increasingly becoming possible due to e-governance. This information
(about inputs and outcomes, and achievement of targets and goals) is necessary for formulation
of policies and monitoring activities. This may be related to technology, human resources, or
infrastructure. The use of IT cannot be over-stated as it is fundamental to curbing errant
behaviour. IT should be used for record maintenance, monitoring supply and inventory control,
tracking events and disseminating information to consumers. This would place vast power in
the hands of the Government to guide, monitor and correct the system Such data analysis also
reduces subjectivism in transfer policies and personnel development, and ensures transparency
in all transactions. This is the only check to abuse of discretionary power.
On the other hand, despite being one of the world’s IT centers, India has been slow and
uneven in adapting to this change in the information environment. Also, there has been a
severe decrease in the data collected owing to political and institutional instability, economic
14
Such a contract exists between the Delhi Jal Board and the private operator of the Sonia Vihar water treatment
plant in Delhi. Delhi Jal Board is responsible for ensuring the bulk water supply for the plant. It has to pay a fine
of Rs. 50,000 a day if bulk supply is not provided. This has led to the DJB making unusually energetic efforts to
ensure provision of bulk water supply for the plant and coincidentally, for the people to be served.
15
World Bank. 2005. “An Invigorated Indian Water State for the 21st Century”. In India’s Water Economy:
Bracing for a Turbulent Future. Document of the World Bank. Report No. 34750-IN.
131
problems, budget constraints and lack of professional education etc 16 . As in the case of health,
technology has a role to play even in patient care through the use of telemedicine, or the
establishment of call centres for giving instant advice on coping with a small emergency or
advise as to which hospital to check into etc.
Similar is the case regarding water management. All the relevant information hydrological, performance, planning – must be made available publicly on the web, which is
widely being done in all the developed countries. The denial of information naturally leads to
suspicions about “secret plans” and about incompetence and poor performance hiding behind
the mantra of “national security”. Thus, increased investment in the basic hydrological data
collection network is needed to provide information to prevent gross errors in water resources
decision-making given the uncertainties of the distant future. On the other hand, the change
will stimulate a chain reaction of accountability, participation, and demand for more and better
data that would transform the culture of water management as well as the management of other
services in the country.
Improving Performance of Existing Agencies: One of the most critical factors
responsible for the current breakdown of accountability relationships between the Government
and the providers is the frequent transfer of civil servants, often for blatantly political
motivations. There is no shortage of thinkers, policymakers, Government agency staff,
politicians or academicians proposing ways to improve the public sector. Reducing transfers in
the civil service, therefore, should be a priority issue on any reform agenda.
Second major problem that Government agencies face is the overlapping of the
regulatory and operational functions of policymakers and providers. This tends to diffuse these
accountability relationships, particularly for infrastructure-dominated activities such as
provision of water, sanitation, and electricity. Often the politics of patronage results in the
provider losing its autonomy and acting as an extension of the policymaker. Similarly,
providers may acquire political influence and capture the policymaking process 17 . In such
circumstances, reform instruments that aim to separate the roles of the policymaker and
provider can go a long way toward improving relations between the two. Regulatory functions
could include delegation of responsibilities and finance; and information about performance
and enforcement.
Improving the Client-Provider Relationship: Improving service means making the
interests of poor people matter more to providers. By engaging clients in an active role - as
purchasers, as monitors, and as co-producers – the Government can improve performance of
these services tremendously. Clients are usually in a better position to see what is going on
than most of the supervisors in Government hierarchies. When the policymaker-provider link
is weak because of scarce or difficult-to-manage supervisory staff, clients may be the only ones
16
United Nations - Water. 2006. “Enhancing Knowledge and Capacity”. In Water: A Shared Responsibility. The
United Nations World Water Development Report 2.
17
World Development Report. 2004. Op.cit. pp. 159-79.
132
who regularly interact with the providers. For example, improvements in basic education have
often depended on participation by parents. Although parents cannot monitor all aspects of
education, they can monitor attendance by teachers and even illiterate parents can tell if their
children are learning to read and write. Similarly, for some collective action problems,
Governments may not be located at the correct level to solve them, no matter how willing they
are to pursue the interests of the people. A more active role of communities is needed to ensure
that everyone uses the service in a desirable manner at a given place.
Conclusion
Governments and providers have tried to make services that contribute to human
development, work better for the people - in many cases they have succeeded in doing so. But
too often, these services have failed in reaching out to the poor people. Services are failing
because they are falling short of their potential to improve outcomes. They are often
inaccessible or prohibitively expensive. But even when accessible, they are often
dysfunctional, extremely low in technical quality, and unresponsive to the needs of a diverse
clientele. The result of this is that many people bypass the closest public facility. They prefer
going to more costly private facilities or choose a better quality of service at more distant
public facilities. Also, innovation, and evaluation to increase productivity are rare.
Thus, the Government should take the initiative or responsibility to make services work
in order to promote health and education. Making services work requires improving the
institutional arrangements through instituting regulations and rigorously monitoring their
enforcement for producing the services. There needs to be a proper decentralization of powers
from Centre to the States, to the districts by the States and from the districts to the multilayered local bodies. This has to be done with the appropriate devolution of duties, functions
and finances.
Creating a new information system using IT technology will result in greater
transparency, accountability, and visibility. This will definitely alter the political power
equations. It can challenge conventional wisdom on program performance, ensure new
resource allocation decisions, and call into question the leadership of those responsible. On the
other hand, the client power- the relationship between beneficiary and service provider - tends
to be weak in many developing countries. Promoting or engaging clients in an active role - as
purchasers, as monitors, and as co-producers - can improve performance of these services
tremendously.
133
7
Summary of Conclusions and
Policy Imperatives
Introduction
Non-tax revenue is a significant source of budgetary receipts for State Governments. Its
importance is now being realized in the context of fiscal deficits and the heavy financial
requirements for upgrading and modernizing basic infrastructure. It is also needed for human
resources development. Non-tax revenues ensure that the sources of revenue to the State
exchequer are broad-based and buoyant. Unlike tax revenues, in the case of non-tax revenues,
the agencies of the Government first provide a service and then collect the user charges.
The study began by giving the taxonomy of non-tax resources, where it is defined as
payment made to the Government for which there is a quid pro quo. These are classified into
three categories: (i) compulsory and requited payments; (ii) voluntary and unrequited
payments; and (iii) voluntary and requited payments. However, to delimit the scope of this
study, some of the non-tax sources have not been included in its analysis. Thus, the non-tax
revenue in this study comprises revenue receipts, (i.e. non-capital receipts) excluding the
accruals and taxes of all the tiers of the Government as well as the notional receipts matched
by contra expenditures.
A major part of non-tax revenue is raised through the collection of user charges, which
are administratively determined for the goods and services provided by the Government. The
Government intervention in the provision of these “public” goods and services is justified on
the grounds of imperfect market conditions that prevail in the supply of these goods and
services. However, economists have pointed out the sharp contrast between the pure economic
theory of pricing and lack of its application in the real market. The marginal cost pricing
principle, which is generally applicable for pricing of “private” goods, and services cannot be
applied to “public” goods. Marginal cost pricing requires that there should be no externalities
in consumption and production, and also presumes competitive forces operate throughout the
economy. However, none of these conditions exist in the market. Also, the problems faced in
marginal cost pricing get magnified due to equity and constitutional factors, as well the lack of
accurate information and data.
The study limits its scope to only those non-tax sources, which originate from the
administrative departments and departmental undertakings that are of a commercial nature.
Therefore, it does not take into account the sources such as interest, profits and dividends
arising from the States’ commercial undertakings. The non-tax sources covered in the study
include: the general services, social services and economic services. Of these, only ten major
components of these services have been taken for an in-depth analysis. To conduct the study,
data has been taken from Reserve Bank of India (RBI), State Budget Documents, Central
Statistical Organisation, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, various State ministries dealing
with different non-tax services etc.
Fiscal Significance of States’ Own Non-tax Sources
This chapter deals with the fiscal significance of the States’ own non-tax sources in
India and in other countries. Trends in own non-tax revenue of the Indian States indicate that it
has grown at the rate of 7.9 percent over the given period. However, when taken as a percent of
aggregate receipts, it has declined from 11.6 percent in 1993-94 to 2.9 percent in 2003-04.
The main constituents of the States own non-tax revenues are receipts from interests;
dividends and profits; and the recoveries from general services, economic services and social
services. As interest receipts, and dividends and profits can hardly be relied on for the growth
in non-tax revenue receipts, it is the recoveries from services rendered by the Government
which make a significant contribution to non-tax revenues. These constitute nearly two-third of
the States’ own non-tax revenue. Of these, social services and economic services exhibited an
upward trend with respect to the States’ Ontr, while general services showed considerable
fluctuations. At the same time, general services receipts were the least consistent, followed by
social services and economic services.
In the case of general services, the revenue as a percent of States’ Ontr has shown an
upward trend over the years, it registered an annual growth rate of 6.4 percent per annum.
Also, its share in Ontr increased from the level of 18.9 percent in 1993-94 to 24.5 percent in
2003-04. Amongst the States (classified according to the level of income), in middle-income
States the revenue from general services has been growing at the highest rate (18.3 percent,)
while in high-income States the growth rate was 7.3 percent per annum. On the other hand, in
the case of low-income States there was a negative growth rate of -5.0 percent. In 11 out of the
15 major States, revenue from general services displayed a rising trend. It showed a downward
trend in rest of the States.
Revenue contribution of social services was the least, but it grew at the highest rate as
compared to the other services - at 14.5 percent per annum. It was also income-buoyant (1.2) at
the all-State level. Amongst the major States, revenue from social services in West Bengal
made the highest contribution to its Ontr (about 19.2 percent) in 1993-94, followed by Kerala,
Tamil Nadu and Punjab. However, in 2003-04, Bihar had the highest revenue from social
services, followed by Tamil Nadu etc. Among the major constituents of social services, (i.e.
medical, public health and family welfare; education, arts and culture; urban development, and
135
water supply and sanitation), the revenue from medical, public health and family welfare was
highest in the first period. However, by 2003-04, the revenue from education, sports, arts and
culture became the chief contributor to the State exchequer.
Economic services share in States’ Ontr exhibited a modest decline from 44.5 percent
in 1993-94 to 43.4 percent in 2003-04. On an average, it contributed about 38.7 percent to the
States’ Ontr which is very significant. The highest contribution to revenue from economic
services came from the low-income States, followed by high-income and middle-income
States. Amongst the major components of economic services, the share of industries and
forestry & wildlife in revenue from economic services is the highest. Forestry is the second
largest land-use in the country following agriculture and a major source of revenue from the
forest department is from auctioning and sale of timber (a Government monopoly). On the
other hand, revenue from industries constitutes about 40 percent revenue of economic services,
of which the revenue from mines and minerals is the key contributing factor.
Revenue from irrigation projects is also an important component of economic services.
However, there exists a wide variation across the States in revenue receipts from irrigation.
The problem related to cost recovery in irrigation can be attributed to poor agricultural
performance; poor water delivery management by irrigation department; widespread
corruption in irrigation projects etc. Nevertheless, nine States out of 15 major States have
exhibited an improvement in revenue from irrigation for the given time period.
Thus, the analysis of the States’ Ontr reveals that these are not fiscally significant in the
States’ budget and their growth is not keeping pace with other components of revenue receipts.
These have the potential of being a major source of revenue. The dire need is to take firm
policy decisions and implement them so that this becomes a reality.
Pricing Strategy for Non-tax Sources
This chapter deals with the issue of pricing strategy that has been adopted in public
utilities over time. The determination of user charges so as to have requisite cost recovery
relates to the theory of utility pricing. This refers to the fixation of prices of goods and services
provided by the Government (public sector) in order to maximize the benefits to the
community.
In answer to the question as to what services should be charged and through the
adoption of which principle, Samuelson stated that pure public goods have to be financed
through taxes while the quasi-public goods (those having one of the features of pure public
goods) could be subsidized or regulated by the Government through a pricing mechanism. On
the other hand, mixed goods may be financed partially by user charges and partly through a
combination of subsidy and user charges.
Based on these pricing principles and considering the Government as a natural
monopoly, various models of utility pricing have been developed. These are marginal cost
136
(MC) pricing theory, average cost (AC) pricing theory and Price Discrimination theory (a
combination of MC and AC pricing theories). Clark applied the MC pricing principle to the
public utilities keeping in view the objectives of equity and efficiency. However, the
application of the MC theory requires a number of restrictive assumptions. These restrictive
assumptions are its limitations also and hence, MC pricing is not optimal. The other two
feasible price theories are Boiteux and Ramsey pricing.
The AC pricing principle is not efficient but ensures some profit margin. This approach
estimates the total financial cost of providing a particular service divided by the total number
of units using the service. However, there are certain problems in the estimation of this cost as
the setting of such prices effectively require estimating the responsiveness of demand to price
changes. Recovery of operating costs entails information on how unit costs change as the
number of users change, as well as how the number of users will change as the price changes.
Such information is not easy to obtain, and even if available, such prices are not likely to
provide an efficient allocation of resources.
In practice, these above stated principles may not result in desirable solutions.
Therefore, a mix of them is applied for different utilities. Combinations of MC and AC pricing
result in other models of utility pricing based on price discrimination, viz. economic pricing,
fully distributed cost pricing, demand-compatible pricing, uniform pricing, non-uniform
pricing, multi-part tariff, two-part tariff, myopic pricing rules, spot pricing etc. In determining
the form of price discrimination, the effort is to see where and how these principles can be
made applicable.
Apart from these principles for pricing the utilities, the determination of user charges
depends on certain factors. Properly designed user charges will often require the collection of
complex and “difficult-to-obtain” information. The cost of collection of this necessary
information or the cost of pricing may be so high as to make it unfeasible to apply user
charges. Also, if the cost of collecting the charge exceeds the cost of providing the service,
then no charge should be levied. An additional factor in determining user charges is the cost of
changing public prices once they have been set. The prices set by the Government agency
reflects the outcome of a political and administrative process and is not a pure “market” or
economic process. These politically set prices are inherently “sticky” (or hard to change) and
prevail only under a given political climate.
User charges are sometimes perceived as a form of taxation but they differ as they are
linked to specific benefits, which are over and above those enjoyed by the general public.
These are designed to redefine Government priorities by incorporating more feedback from
citizens with respect to the services they want and are willing to pay for. From this perspective,
what matters is not just to impose charges but to levy the correct charges.
RR/REs in Non-tax Sources
As each State collect an appallingly low level of user charges, it needs to put in greater
137
effort to increase its own revenue. Thus, the Government needs to aim at appropriate cost
recovery. This has to be done keeping in mind that the goods provided by them are
characterised by externalities. There is also no clarity regarding the nature of these goods and
services. However, fixation of user charges for non-tax sources is a complex issue. While
rational user charges can generate means to achieve a greater growth rate, an irrational
structure can cause adverse economic effects which invalidate growth objectives. Therefore, it
is important to keep the objectives of equity, consumer acceptability, administrative feasibility,
environmental issues etc. in view while fixing the user charges.
In presenting the actual revenue realized as percent of revenue expenditure (RR/RE) for
the select time period, this study has taken ten select services, which are public works,
educations, sports, arts and culture; medical, public health and family welfare; water supply
and sanitation; forestry and wild life; major and medium irrigation; minor irrigation; industries;
mines and minerals; and roads and bridges. The RR/RE for the given time period, has risen
only for two services in all the major States, viz. education, sports, arts and culture; and roads
and bridges.
In an attempt to determine the rate at which a service can increase its recovery, a
desired RR/RE has been estimated using the regression technique. This desired RR/RE is an
average of the State-wise desired RR/RE for each select service and will give a use all-States’
norm to be compared with actual RR/RE of each service across the States. In other words, the
difference between the all-States’ rate of recovery for each select service (taken as the ‘Norm’)
and the actual RR/RE of that particular service in each of the States will indicate the rate by
which a State needs to make an effort to achieve that “desired” level.
Issues in Delivery of Services
Contemporary needs of the people significantly raise the pressure on the Government to
deliver its services effectively and efficiently with respect to quantity and quality. However,
these are greatly influenced by complexities in the procedure of delivery of services, resulting
in undermining the real purpose of service delivery, especially its access to the needy.
Thus, in education there is low accessibility by the poor due to its high cost,
dysfunctional school and other constituents, low quality of education, low client
responsiveness, and stagnant productivity. This indicates Government investment is not
properly channeled. Similarly, medical and public health is facing problems of inadequate
facilities, lack of doctors and other human resources, shortage of various instruments etc.
compelling the client to prefer the private sector for acquiring these “public” facilities. Also,
the Government health structure itself lacks co-ordination amongst different Ministries and
bodies. This is another reason for its failure to sustain the integral nature of health care.
The Government does not have a proper strategic vision to achieve the desired goal of a
welfare State. Undoubtedly, the management of health care does not fulfill the required needs
of the people. This is primarily due to low budget, irregular supplies of medicines, other
138
products and instruments; low salaries paid to the doctors; and the widespread prevalence of
corrupt practices. Thus, the quality of services delivery is substandard. The same holds true for
water supply and sanitation.
All that is needed is a minimal level of integrity, fair play, and rule of law. These utility
services require rational procedures in delivery of services and appropriate fiscal measures to
supplement the existing need for that service. Proper regulation and enforcement is needed to
raise awareness levels and to create a sense of accountability amongst providers regarding
quality of the service. The publicly provided services have to be improved (in a competitive
sense) in the market for such services. There is an urgent need to raise the performance of the
existing bodies. This can be achieved effectively with the use of Information Technology (IT)
to guide, monitor and correct the system thus ensuring efficient service delivery to the clients.
The process of decentralisation can play a bigger role in service management. This will
help in establishing good governance in the State at large and sufficiently ensure the existence
of co-operation between the client (in getting the service) and the Government (in delivering
the service), consequently, helping in strengthening the client-provider relationship. Thus the
service delivery can be achieved efficiently, effectively and economically.
Policy Imperatives
In face of the severe revenue crunch for meeting revenue expenditure faced by all the
States, there are few policy prescriptions for select services given for mobilising additional
resources for planned development:
Education: As education plays vital role in promoting socio-economic development of
a country, it is of utmost importance that primary education is fully subsidized and user
charges for secondary and higher education are so designed that these are progressive
according to the income group of the user. Also, credit market should be regularized for
financing higher education by making procedures simple so that it is accessible to both poor
and non-poor. This would also help in increasing tuition fee collection to state exchequer.
Medical and Public Health: Any increase in user charges for this service can result in
lower recourse to medical services and higher rates of self-medication among the poor. Thus it
is essential to differentiate between the poor and the non-poor availing the medical facilities.
One way could be to locate more facilities closer to the rural areas, as most of the poor people
live in rural areas, and charge zero or lower fees from them. On the other hand, insurance
status is a good indicator of those people who can afford the medical care and so full cost
should be charged from insured persons. Also, as demand for this facility is price inelastic, a
little increase in user charge from non-poor would not affect the demand for the service.
Water Supply and Sanitation: In this, water rate structure should be rationalized for
better recovery of cost. Also, reasonably accurate metering system must be installed and
maintained for those direct water users, and a timely billing and collection system has to be in
139
place. Also, there should be lower water rate charge for non-domestic users as compared to
domestic users. Among the other things, accurate measurement of water on a volumetric basis
is an important requisite for an effective pricing policy. With a view to improving resource use
efficiency and sustainability of the environmental quality the following specific reforms could
be useful: to increase the accountability of institutions to improve the reliability of service; to
encourage private sector participation; to improve financial sustainability of the service; to
create financial incentives to reduce O&M, capital and financing costs; to improve the
environmental sustainability of service; and to have participation of the community groups.
Forest and Wild life: There is a need to make a paradigm shift in raising revenue of
the forest. This problem can be catapulted if an earmarked fund should be allocated to maintain
the forest for a longer period of time. Some States have raised the issue of compensation for
maintenance of forest cover to the Central Government. Also, the experiment of Joint Forest
Management, as attempted in many of the States could be rewarding.
Irrigation Projects: In irrigation projects increase in water rates was rather modest and
State have not accepted, Irrigation Commission recommendations of reviewing and adjusting
rates every five years. There is an urgent need to increase the user charge rates. Also, at present
water rates are almost everywhere fixed crop wise and with reference to area irrigated.
However, many considerations like linking water rates to quality of irrigation services,
rationalizing rate structure and reducing cost of assessment and collection argue strongly for a
system which makes water charges explicitly a function of volume and season. Thus,
volumetric pricing should be adopted for better recovery of cost, though it can only be adopted
in phased manner.
Mines and Minerals: Royalty is an important source of non-tax revenue to the mineral
producing States. However, if the rates of royalty remain unchanged for a long time, the real
value of royalty declines significantly due to rising inflation and the States lose considerably.
Thus, it is recommended that royalty rates should be increased with due interval of time. In
addition, the royalty rates should be based on sale price system as against on quantity basis.
Roads and Bridges: To improve the maintenance of roads it is recommended that the
Government should start a system of electronic toll collection either through microwave
technology or through infrared technology. This will be able to solve the problem of
congestion due to toll collection. Microwave technology, which is commonly used throughout
the world, is based on radio frequency waves, which will provide information to the toll
collection plaza about the vehicle. Infrared, used mostly in remote controls, is relatively a new
technology for toll collection. By using this technology, the processing of toll collection can be
completed within a fraction of a second.
140
ANNEXURES
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Annexure A.1
I. Public Work Department
I.a Machinery Hire Charges of the Public Works Department
Without POL *
Name of Machine
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
Idle
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1.For Departmental
Works
Rollers
Truck and Trailor
Tractors and Trolly
Trees and Plant
Tar Boiler and Storage
Stone Crushers and
Granulators
Water Pumps
Generators
Air Compressors
Boring Machine
Earth moving machinery
Other machines
*
POL indicates petrol, oil and lubrication.
142
2003-04
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Without POL *
Name of Machine
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
Idle
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2. For Contractors
Rollers
Truck and Trailor
Tractors and Trolly
Trees and Plant
Tar Boiler and Storage
Stone Crushers and
Granulators
Water Pumps
Generators
Air Compressors
Boring Machine
Earth moving machinery
Other machines
143
2003-04
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
II Education
II. a Fee Rate Structure of Education
Girls
Boys
Education Level for
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1. Non-Income Tax Payers
upto Rs. 30000 p.a. (or BPL
level)
I to VIII Class
IX Class
X Class
XI Class
XII Class
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
LL.B.
L.L.M.
M. Phil
Ph.D
144
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Girls
Boys
Education Level for
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Others
2.Non-Income tax Payers
above Rs. 30000 p.a.
I to VIII Class
IX Class
X Class
XI Class
XII Class
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
LL.B.
L.L.M.
M. Phil
Ph.D
Others
145
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Girls
Boys
Education Level for
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
3. Income tax Payers
I to VIII Class
IX Class
X Class
XI Class
XII Class
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
LL.B.
L.L.M.
M. Phil
Ph.D
Others
146
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Girls
Boys
Education Level for
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
4. Students belonging to
Scheduled Caste and
scheduled Tribe
I to VIII Class
IX Class
X Class
XI Class
XII Class
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
LL.B.
L.L.M.
M. Phil
Ph.D
Others
147
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
ii.b. Art & Culture
Existing Visiting Fees to Museums and Archaeological Monuments
Year
Fees
Visitors
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Rate for Ordinary tourist visits
Non Student
Student
Visit for other purpose ( Filming purposes)
Indian
Foreign
State
Other Cultural Purposes
TV Film Shooting
Indian
Foreign
State
148
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Medical and Public Health
Charges in the Public Hospitals
(1) District Hospital
(a) Outpatient Visits
(i) Outpatient charges
(ii) Laboratory tests
(iii) Diagnostic tests
(b) Charges for Inpatient services
(i) Admission charges
(ii) Surgery charges
(iii) Delivery charges
(iv) Inpatient stay charges
(2) City Hospital
(a) Outpatient Visits
(i) Outpatient charges
(ii) Laboratory tests
(iii) Diagnostic tests
(b) Charges for Inpatient services
(i) Admission charges
(ii) Surgery charges
(iii) Delivery charges
(iv) Inpatient stay charges
(3) Specialty Hospital
(a) Outpatient Visits
(i) Outpatient charges
(ii) Laboratory tests
(iii) Diagnostic tests
(b) Charges for Inpatient services
(i) Admission charges
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
149
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
(ii) Surgery charges
(iii) Delivery charges
(iv) Inpatient stay charges
(4) Village (area) hospital
(a) Outpatient Visits
(i) Outpatient charges
(ii) Laboratory tests
(iii) Diagnostic tests
(5) Community health centre
(a) Outpatient Visits
(i) Outpatient charges
(ii) Laboratory tests
(iii) Diagnostic tests
( 6) Dispensaries (city)
(a) Outpatient Visits
(i) Outpatient charges
(ii) Laboratory tests
(iii) Diagnostic tests
150
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Existing Rates of Sanitation
Years
Items
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Domestic Rate
Commercial Rate
Industrial Rate
Minimum Rate (applicable to all other categories)
Existing Water supply rates for other than Irrigation purpose
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Items
Urban areas
Domestic Rate
Commercial Rate
Industrial Rate
Minimum Rate (applicable to all other categories)
Rural areas
151
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Domestic Rate
Commercial Rate
Industrial Rate
Minimum Rate (applicable to all other categories)
Other Purposes
Brick making
Laying/concrete/ and brick or stone masonry
Metalling Roads
Consolidation of Kutcha service Road
- Water Supplies in bulk for:(a) Industrial purpose
(b) drinking purpose
© other purposes
152
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
IV. Forestry and Wild life
Forest Products
1993-94
1994-95
Quantity Sold
1995-96 2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
Value Received
1995-96 2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Timber wood
Timber wood
Fuel wood
Khair
Sandalwood
Teak
Non-Timber
Bamboo and resin
Tendupatta
Saaiseed
Grass and Grazing
Medicine & herbs
Others
153
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
III. Major, Medium, and Minor Irrigation
III. a Water Rates for Major and Medium, and Minor Irrigation
Major & Medium Irrigation
Name of Scheme
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
Minor Irrigation
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
A Scheme † (Water Rate)
Name of the Crop
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
†
Scheme here refers to a particular irrigation plan/ project in the state. For example Indira Gandhi canal project in Rajasthan
154
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Major & Medium Irrigation
Name of Scheme
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
Minor Irrigation
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
(x)
B Scheme (Water Rate )
Name of the Crop
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
155
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Major & Medium Irrigation
Name of Scheme
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
Minor Irrigation
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
C Scheme (Water Rate)
Name of the Crop
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
D Scheme (Water Rate)
Name of the Crop
156
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Major & Medium Irrigation
Name of Scheme
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
Minor Irrigation
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
E Scheme (Water Rate)
Name of the Crop
(i)
(ii)
157
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Major & Medium Irrigation
Name of Scheme
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
Minor Irrigation
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
158
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
V. Industries
Quantity Sold
Types of Industries
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
Value Received
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1.
(Type of Product Sold)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
2.
(Type of Product Sold)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
3
(Type of Product Sold)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
159
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
Quantity Sold
Types of Industries
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
Value Received
2002-03
2003-04
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
4.
(Type of Product Sold)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
5.
(Type of Product Sold)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
6.
(Type of Product Sold)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
160
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
VIII. Royalty Rate-Structure of Important Minerals
Royalty Rates
Minerals
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Major Minerals
Minor Minerals
161
Foundation for Public Economics and Policy Research, Ashok Vihar, Delhi
Phone: 011- 27305008, 27301758 ; Fax 011- 27302802, e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
Questionnaire for Collecting data for a Study on Non-tax Sources for Planned Development
Sponsored by the Planning Commission
IX. Roads and bridges
Toll Tax Rates
Rate per vehicle
Categories of Vehicles
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
162
Annexure A.2
USER CHARGES IN SELECTED STATES
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
Rajasthan
A.
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Rollers
NA
NA
NA
320
320
320
Truck and Trailor
NA
NA
NA
1400
1400
1400
Tractors and Trolly
NA
NA
NA
220
220
220
410
Without Petrol, Oil & Lubrication (POL)
1
2
B.
For Departmental Works
Trees and Plant
NA
NA
NA
410
410
Tar Boiler and Storage
NA
NA
NA
55
55
55
Stone Crushers and Granulators
NA
NA
NA
650
650
650
Water Pumps
NA
NA
NA
95
95
95
Generators
NA
NA
NA
125
125
125
Air Compressors
NA
NA
NA
290
290
290
Boring Machine
NA
NA
NA
220
220
220
Earth Moving Machinery
NA
NA
NA
375
375
375
Other Machines
NA
NA
NA
615
615
615
Rollers
NA
NA
NA
355
355
355
Truck and Trailor
NA
NA
NA
1600
1600
1600
Tractors and Trolly
NA
NA
NA
250
250
250
440
For Contractors
Trees and Plant
NA
NA
NA
440
440
Tar Boiler and Storage
NA
NA
NA
85
85
85
Stone Crushers and Granulators
NA
NA
NA
740
740
740
100
Water Pumps
NA
NA
NA
100
100
Generators
NA
NA
NA
130
130
130
Air Compressors
NA
NA
NA
320
320
320
Boring Machine
NA
NA
NA
245
245
245
Earth Moving Machinery
NA
NA
NA
500
500
500
Other Machines
NA
NA
NA
705
705
705
Idle
1
2
For Departmental Works
Rollers
NA
NA
NA
155
155
155
Truck and Trailor
NA
NA
NA
400
400
400
Tractors and Trolly
NA
NA
NA
100
100
100
Trees and Plant
NA
NA
NA
180
180
180
Tar Boiler and Storage
NA
NA
NA
0
0
0
Stone Crushers and Granulators
NA
NA
NA
220
220
220
Water Pumps
NA
NA
NA
75
75
75
Generators
NA
NA
NA
80
80
80
Air Compressors
NA
NA
NA
110
110
110
Boring Machine
NA
NA
NA
145
145
145
Earth Moving Machinery
NA
NA
NA
175
175
175
Other Machines
NA
NA
NA
210
210
210
Rollers
NA
NA
NA
0
0
0
Truck and Trailor
NA
NA
NA
600
600
600
Tractors and Trolly
NA
NA
NA
135
135
135
For Contractors
163
Trees and Plant
NA
NA
NA
220
220
220
Tar Boiler and Storage
NA
NA
NA
0
0
0
Stone Crushers and Granulators
NA
NA
NA
355
355
355
Water Pumps
NA
NA
NA
80
80
80
Generators
NA
NA
NA
90
90
90
Air Compressors
NA
NA
NA
145
145
145
Boring Machine
NA
NA
NA
165
165
165
Earth Moving Machinery
NA
NA
NA
0
0
0
Other Machines
NA
NA
NA
210
210
210
Maharashtra
Name of the Machine
With POL (Rate in Rs.)
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
For Departmental Works
Rollers (Per Hour)
7.5 Ton Trucks (Per K.M.)
186
197
15.25
137
Tractors and Trolly (Per Hour)
200
310.5
325
343
16.2
19
29.6
30.97
33
144
145
235
248
264
Trees and Plant
Tar Boiler and Storage
Stone Crushers and Granulators
Water Pumps
Generators
Air compressors
Boring Machine
Earth Moving Machinery
Other Machines
Name of the Machine
With POL (Rate in Rs.)
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
For Contractors
Rollers (Per Hour)
7.5 Ton Trucks (Per K.M.)
Tractors and Trolly (Per Hour)
225
238
242
376
393
415
18
20
23
36
37
40
166
174
175
284
300.08
319
Trees and Plant
Tar Boiler and Storage
Stone Crushers and Granulators
Water Pumps
Generators
Air compressors
Boring Machine
Earth Moving Machinery
Other Machines
* POL indicates petrol, oil and lubrication
164
GENERAL EDUCATION, SPORTS AND ART & CULTURE
Rajasthan
III
EDUCATION
A.
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
IX Class
18
18
18
180
180
180
X Class
18
18
18
180
180
180
XI Class
48
48
48
360
360
360
XII Class
48
48
48
360
360
360
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
84
84
84
360
360
360
360
BOYS
1
Non-Income Tax Payers (upto Rs. 30000 p.a.)
I to VIII Class
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
2
Non-Income Tax Payers (above Rs. 30000 p.a.)
I to VIII Class
IX Class
X Class
84
84
84
360
360
XI Class
120
120
120
720
720
720
XII Class
120
120
120
720
720
720
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
3
Income Tax Payers
I to VIII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
IX Class
120
120
120
600
600
600
X Class
120
120
120
600
600
600
XI Class
180
180
180
1200
1200
1200
XII Class
180
180
180
1200
1200
1200
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
4
Students belonging to SC / ST
I to VIII Class
165
IX Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
X Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XI Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
I to VIII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
IX Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
X Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XI Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
I to VIII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
IX Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
X Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XI Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
B.
GIRLS
1
Non-Income Tax Payers (upto Rs. 30000 p.a.)
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
2
Non-Income Tax Payers (above Rs. 30000 p.a.)
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
3
Income Tax Payers
I to VIII Class
IX Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
X Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XI Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
166
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
4
Students belonging to SC / ST
I to VIII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
IX Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
X Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XI Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XII Class
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
2
2
5
5
5
5
NC
NC
2
2
2
2
1st Years TDC
2nd Years TDC
3rd Years
Post Graduate
L.L.B.
L.L.M.
M.Phil
Ph.D
Others
II.2
A.
ART & CULTURE
Rate for Ordinary Tourist Visits
Non Student
Student
B.
Visit for other purpose(Filming purposes)
Indian
250
250
500
500
500
500
Foreign
500
500
1000
1000
1000
1000
State
125
125
250
250
250
250
5000
5000
15000
15000
15000
15000
10000
10000
20000
20000
20000
20000
2500
2500
10000
10000
10000
10000
C.
Other Cultural Purposes
D.
TV Film Shooting
Indian (per day charge)
Foreign (per day charge)
State (per day charge)
NOTES: - NC: No Charge, NA: Data Not Available.
167
Punjab
Existing Visiting Fees to Museums and Archaeological Monuments
Visitors
Fees in Rs.
1995-96
2000-01
Rate for Ordinary tourist Visits
2005-06
5
10
10
Non Student
5
5
5
Student
2
4
4
Visit for other Purpose(Filming Purpose)
Indian
Foreign
State
Other Cultural Purposes
T V Film Shooting(Monument)
5000 (per day)
Indian
Foreign
State
Model Gallery PTA
Student (Below 12 Years)
Photography in museums
10
20
20
5
5
10
1000 (each)
1000 (each)
MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Rajasthan
III
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Charges in the Public Hospitals
A.
District Hospital
1
Outpatient Visits
i
Outpatient Charges
NC
NC
NC
2
2
2
ii
Laboratory Tests
NC
NC
NC
25
25
25
Diagnostic Tests
40
50
50
60
60
60
iii
2
Charges for Inpatient Services
i
Admission Charges
NC
NC
NC
5
5
5
NC
i
Surgery Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
iii
Delivery Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
iv
Inpatient Stay Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
B.
City Hospital
1
Outpatient Visits
i
Outpatient Charges
NC
NC
NC
2
2
2
ii
Laboratory Tests
NC
NC
NC
25
25
25
Diagnostic Tests
40
50
50
60
60
60
iii
2
Charges for Inpatient Services
i
Admission Charges
NC
NC
NC
5
5
5
NC
ii
Surgery Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
iii
Delivery Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
iv
Inpatient Stay Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
2
2
2
C.
Specialty Hospital
1
Outpatient Visits
i
Outpatient Charges
168
ii
iii
2
Laboratory Tests
NC
NC
NC
25
25
25
Diagnostic Tests
40
50
50
60
60
60
Charges for Inpatient Services
i
Admission Charges
NC
NC
NC
5
5
5
NC
ii
Surgery Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
iii
Delivery Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
iv
Inpatient Stay Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
D.
Village (area) Hospital
1
Outpatient Visits
i
Outpatient Charges
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
ii
Laboratory Tests
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Diagnostic Tests
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
iii
E.
Community Health Centre
1
Outpatient Visits
i
Outpatient Charges
NC
NC
NC
2
2
2
ii
Laboratory Tests
NA
NA
NA
NC
NC
NC
iii
Diagnostic Tests
NA
NA
40
50
50
50
NC
NC
NC
F.
Dispensaries (city)
1
Outpatient Visits
i
Outpatient Charges
NC
NC
NC
ii
Laboratory Tests
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
iii Diagnostic Tests
NA
NA
NA
Notes: - Laboratory Tests mean TLC, DLC ESR, B.T., C.T. etc, Diagnostic Tests mean X-ray test.
NA
NA
NA
169
WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION
Rajasthan
Existing Rates of Water Supply (Water
Charges)
A.
199394
199495
199596
NA
NA
NA
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Gross Rate per 1000 litres (Rs.)
1
Domestic Rates
i
ii
for consumption upto first 15000 litres
for consumption exceeding 15000 litres and upto
40000 litres
1.56
1.56
1.56
NA
NA
NA
3.00
3.00
3.00
for next consumption above 40000 litres
Minimum Charges per month for Domestic
Category
NA
NA
NA
4.00
4.00
4.00
i
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
20.00
20.00
20.00
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
120.00
120.00
120.00
370.00
iii
2
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
370.00
370.00
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
870.00
870.00
870.00
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
1120.00
1120.00
1120.00
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
2245.00
2245.00
2245.00
vi
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
4495.00
4495.00
4495.00
vii
for 150 mm service line
Flat Rate Charges for 15 mm domestic
connection (unmetered)
NA
NA
NA
11245.00
11245.00
11245.00
3
i
for each connection per family upto two taps
NA
NA
NA
20.00
20.00
20.00
ii
for each additional tap
NA
NA
NA
Deleted
Deleted
Deleted
NA
NA
NA
4.68
4.68
4.68
4
Non Domestic Rates
i
ii
for consumption upto first 15000 litres
for consumption exceeding 15000 litres and upto
40000 litres
NA
NA
NA
8.25
8.25
8.25
for next consumption above 40000 litres
Minimum Charges per month for Non
Domestic Category
NA
NA
NA
11.00
11.00
11.00
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
51.00
51.00
51.00
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
120.00
120.00
120.00
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
370.00
370.00
370.00
iii
5
i
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
870.00
870.00
870.00
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
1120.00
1120.00
1120.00
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
2245.00
2245.00
2245.00
vi
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
4495.00
4495.00
4495.00
vii
for 150 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
11245.00
11245.00
11245.00
6
Industrial Rates
NA
NA
NA
11.00
11.00
11.00
i
ii
for consumption upto first 15000 litres
for consumption exceeding 15000 litres and upto
40000 litres
NA
NA
NA
13.75
13.75
13.75
for next consumption above 40000 litres
Minimum Charges per month for Industrial
Category
NA
NA
NA
16.50
16.50
16.50
i
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
120.00
120.00
120.00
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
240.00
240.00
240.00
480.00
iii
7
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
480.00
480.00
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
875.00
875.00
875.00
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
1125.00
1125.00
1125.00
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
2250.00
2250.00
2250.00
vii
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
4500.00
4500.00
4500.00
viii
for 150 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
11250.00
11250.00
11250.00
8
Fixed Charges per month
NA
NA
NA
10.00
10.00
10.00
9
Meter Service Charge per month
170
i
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
5.00
5.00
5.00
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
15.00
15.00
15.00
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
20.00
20.00
20.00
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
30.00
30.00
30.00
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
40.00
40.00
40.00
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
75.00
75.00
75.00
vii
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
125.00
125.00
125.00
viii
for 150 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
200.00
200.00
200.00
10
Sewerage Tax
For PHED water supply 20% of the water
charges mentioned above, wherever sewer
system exists, subject to the usual rebate
applicable for timely payment of water
charges.
For own water supply where PHED sewer
system exists
NA
NA
NA
31.25
31.25
31.25
(a)
(b)
i
Hotel (per room / month)
ii
Restaurant (per month)
NA
NA
NA
200.00
200.00
200.00
iii
Cinema (per month)
NA
NA
NA
400.00
400.00
400.00
iv
For Car (truck service station per month)
NA
NA
NA
200.00
200.00
200.00
v
For Scooter service station per month
For other industrial, commercial establishment
per room per month
NA
NA
NA
62.50
62.50
62.50
NA
NA
NA
12.50
12.50
12.50
Domestic Use
Minimum charges for houses with plot area
above 200 sq. mtr. the rates per 100sq. mtr. of
the plot area
Net Rate per 1000 litres allowing 20% rebate
if payment is made within prescribed due date
(Rs.)
NA
NA
NA
12.50
12.50
12.50
NA
NA
NA
6.25
6.25
6.25
NA
NA
NA
1.25
1.25
1.25
vi
vii
(c)
B.
1
Domestic Rates
i
ii
iii
2
for consumption upto first 15000 litres
for consumption exceeding 15000 litres and upto
40000 litres
NA
NA
NA
2.40
2.40
2.40
for next consumption above 40000 litres
Minimum Charges per month for Domestic
Category
NA
NA
NA
3.20
3.20
3.20
16.00
i
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
16.00
16.00
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
96.00
96.00
96.00
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
296.00
296.00
296.00
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
696.00
696.00
696.00
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
896.00
896.00
896.00
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
1796.00
1796.00
1796.00
vi
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
3596.00
3596.00
3596.00
vii
for 150 mm service line
Flat Rate Charges for 15 mm domestic
connection (unmetered)
NA
NA
NA
8996.00
8996.00
8996.00
3
i
for each connection per family upto two taps
NA
NA
NA
16
16
16
ii
for each additional tap
NA
NA
NA
Deleted
Deleted
Deleted
NA
NA
NA
3.75
3.75
3.75
NA
NA
NA
6.6
6.6
6.6
for next consumption above 40000 litres
Minimum Charges per month for Non
Domestic Category
NA
NA
NA
8.8
8.8
8.8
41
4
Non Domestic Rates
i
ii
iii
5
for consumption upto first 15000 litres
for consumption exceeding 15000 litres and upto
40000 litres
i
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
41
41
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
96
96
96
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
296
296
296
171
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
696
696
696
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
896
896
896
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
1796
1796
1796
vi
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
3596
3596
3596
vii
for 150 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
8996
8996
8996
6
Industrial Rates
NA
NA
NA
8.8
8.8
8.8
i
ii
for consumption upto first 15000 litres
for consumption exceeding 15000 litres and upto
40000 litres
NA
NA
NA
11
11
11
for next consumption above 40000 litres
Minimum Charges per month for Industrial
Category
NA
NA
NA
13.2
13.2
13.2
i
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
96
96
96
iii
7
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
192
192
192
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
384
384
384
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
700
700
700
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
900
900
900
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
1800
1800
1800
vi
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
3600
3600
3600
vii
for 150 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
9000
9000
9000
8
Fixed Charges per month
NA
NA
NA
10
10
10
9
Meter Service Charge per month
for 15 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
5
5
5
i
ii
for 20 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
15
15
15
iii
for 25 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
20
20
20
iv
for 40 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
30
30
30
v
for 50 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
40
40
40
vi
for 80 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
75
75
75
vii
for 100 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
125
125
125
viii
for 150 mm service line
NA
NA
NA
200
200
200
10
Sewerage Tax
For PHED water supply 20% of the water
charges mentioned above, wherever sewer
system exists, subject to the usual rebate
applicable for timely payment of water
charges.
For own water supply where PHED sewer
system exists
(a)
(b)
i
Hotel (per room / month)
NA
NA
NA
25
25
25
ii
Restaurant (per month)
NA
NA
NA
160
160
160
iii
Cinema (per month)
NA
NA
NA
320
320
320
iv
For Car (truck service station per month)
NA
NA
NA
160
160
160
v
For Scooter service station per month
For other industrial, commercial establishment
per room per month
NA
NA
NA
50
50
50
NA
NA
NA
10
10
10
Domestic Use
Minimum charges for houses with plot area
above 200 sq. mtr. the rates per 100sq. mtr. of
the plot area
NA
NA
NA
10
10
10
NA
NA
NA
5
5
5
vi
vii
(c)
172
Maharashtra
Water Rates for Water Supply to Industrial Use (except Industries Mineral Water etc.) (Rs./10,000 liters.)
Sr. No.
from
from
from
1.7.2000
1.9.2001
1.7.2002
Type of Use
Industrial Use
A)
If dam is constructed
1 From upstream of storage
10.9
22
25
2 From Canal(by gravity or lift)
a) if storage tank is there as per yard sticks
21.8
45
51
b) if there is no storage tank as per yard sticks
27.25
54
62
3 From river down stream of dam
a) as above
16.35
35
41
b) as above
27.25
54
62
If dam is constructed by the user agency or proportionate cost
4 of construction in proportion of water use is given
3.65
7.5
8.7
B)
If there is no dam on river upstream to lifting point from river
3.65
7.5
8.7
from
1.7.2003
29
60
71.5
47
71
10
1
Water Rates for Water supply to Industrial use where water is used as raw material (e.g. cold drinks, bruaries, mineral water or
similar for drinking purpose) (Rs./10,000 liters)
Sr. No.
Type of Use
from
1.7.2000
from
1.9.2001
from
1.7.2002
from
1.7.2003
Industrial Use
A)
If dam is constructed across river
1
From upstream of storage
2
From Canal(by gravity or lift)
10.9
110
125
145
21.8
220
250
290
27.25
275
315
360
a) if storage tank is there as per yard sticks
16.35
165
190
220
b) if there is no storage tank as per yard sticks
If dam is constructed by the user agency or proportionate cost
of construction in proportion of water use is given
27.25
275
315
360
3.65
40
45
50
If there is no dam on river upstream to lifting point from river
3.65
40
45
50
a) if storage tank is there as per yard sticks
b) if there is no storage tank as per yard sticks
3
4
B)
From river down stream of dam
Water Rates for water Supply for Domestic Use (Rs./10,000 liters.)
Sr. No.
Type of Use
from
1.7.2000
from
1.9.2001
from
1.7.2002
from
1.7.2003
Industrial Use
A)
If dam is constructed across river
1
From upstream of storage
2
From Canal(by gravity or lift)
3
4
1.00
1.15
1.3
a) if storage tank is there as per yard sticks
1.2
2.5
3
3.25
b) if there is no storage tank as per yard sticks
1.8
3.5
4
5
0.95
From river down stream of dam
a) if storage tank is there as per yard sticks
B)
0.5
2
2.25
2.5
b) if there is no storage tank as per yard sticks
If dam is constructed by the user agency or proportionate cost
of construction in proportion of water use is given
1.8
3.5
4
5
0.35
0.75
1
1.15
If there is no dam on river upstream to lifting point from river
0.35
0.75
1
1.15
173
Orissa
Existing Water Supply Rates for Other than Irrigation Purpose
Years
1993-94
(in Rs.)
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Items
Urban areas
Domestic Rate per 1000 liters.
0.7
0.7
1.5
2.42
2.42
2.42
Commercial Rate per 1000 liters.
1.65
1.65
3.5
5.63
5.63
5.63
Industrial Rate per 1000 liters.
Minimum Rate (applicable to all other categories)
tap basis for domestic only
1.32
1.32
3
4.83
4.83
4.83
7.5
7.5
7.5
48
48
48
Rural areas
Domestic Rate
Commercial Rate
Industrial Rate
Minimum Rate(applicable to all other categories)
Other Purposes
Brick making
Laying, concrete and brick or stone masonry
Metaling Roads
Consolidation of Kutcha Service Road
Water supplies in bulk for
a) Industrial Purpose
b) Drinking Purpose
c) Other Purpose
Existing Rates of Water Supply and Sanitation (in Rs.)
Years
1995-96
2000-01
2005-06
Items
Domestic Rate
20
20
20
Commercial Rate
20
20
200(for 100mm dia sewer line)
Industrial Rate
20
20
200(for 100mm dia sewer line)
Flat Rate
Minimum Rate(applicable to all other categories)
174
IRRIGATION RATES
Rajasthan
Gang Canal, Bhakra,
Ghaggar, Rajasthan Canal,
Chambal Canal (Irrigation
under perennial channel (per
acre)
Pre-1952 Irrigation
work except inundation
irrigation work (per
acre)
Pre-1952
inundation
works (per acre)
Irrigation Rates (3-3-1982)
Sl. No.
Name of Crops
1
Sugarcane
58
50
21
2
Rice
40
23.1
10
3
Cotton
36
29
18
4
Maize
18
10
8
5
Bajara
18
10
8.06
6
Jawar
18
10
8
7
Pulses
21
18
13
8
Garden (per year)
73
49
23
9
Guwar
21
18
10
10
Simmhemp & Grass
18
18
13
11
Vegetables
29
20
11
12
Other Kharif Crop
23
18
13
13
Wheat
30
21
13
14
Barley
21
15
10
15
Gochani & Bejar
29
21
15
16
Gram (1st Watering)
20
18
10
(or more watering)
29
25
18
Palewa
9
6
18
Fodder
18
18
19
Oil seeds
23
18
13
20
Water Nuts
36
25
13
21
Indigo & other dyes
36
18
13
22
Tobacco
36
21
13
23
Lucerne & Poppy
36
21
11
24
Zeera
36
19
11
25
Other Rabi crops
26
18
13
17
Gang Canal, Bhakra,
Ghaggar, Rajasthan Canal,
Chambal Canal (Irrigation
under perennial channel (per
acre)
Pre-1952 Irrigation
work except inundation
irrigation work (per
acre)
.10
Pre-1952
inundation
works (per acre)
Table of Irrigation Rates (24-051999)
Sl. No.
Name of Crops
1
Sugarcane
100
116
2
Rice
46
80
20
3
Cotton
58
72
36
4
Maize
15
27
12
5
Wajara
15
27
12
6
Jawar
15
27
12
7
Pulses
27
32
20
8
Garden (per year)
98
146
46
9
Guwar
27
32
15
10
Simmhemp & Grass
27
27
20
11
Vegetables
30
44
17
12
Other Kharif Crop
36
46
26
13
Wheat
42
60
26
14
Barley
23
32
15
15
Gochani & Bejar
32
44
23
16
Gram (1st Watering)
27
30
27
42
175
Karnataka
Major, Medium and Minor Irrigation Rates
Name of Scheme: Flow Irrigation
Table of Major, Medium and Minor Irrigation Rates (Rs./Acre)
Name of the crop
1
2
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
Sugarcane (within 12 months
150
150
150
12 months within 18 months
225
225
225
2002-03
2003-04
400
400
400
100
100
100
60
60
60
35
35
35
Paddy (for 1st crop)
35
35
35
(for 2nd & subsequent crops)
40
40
40
2
Wheat&Sunflower
22
22
22
3
Groundnut
24
24
24
4
Cotton
40
40
40
5
Jowar
20
20
20
6
Maize, Navane, Ragi & Srmi dry crops
20
20
20
7
Pulses
15
15
15
35
35
35
8
Tobacco
24
24
24
35
35
35
Garden crops
40
40
40
60
60
60
8
8
8
15
15
15
9
10
Manurial crops
11 Other crops
20
20
20
35
35
35
Note: Water rate for lift irrigation schemes are 3 times the water rates flow irrigation schemes for Paddy and Sugarcane and 2 times the
water rates of flow irrigation for crops other than paddy and sugarcane.
Maharashtra
Revised Water Rates for Canal Flow Water Use by Different Crops by Different Seasons (on major, medium &
minor projects)
Sr.No.
Name of Crop of Season
A).
(water rates in Rupees per hectare)
from
from
from
1/7/00
1/9/01
1/7/02
from
1/7/03
Kharif season
1
Kharif seasonal (including hybrid),
120
180
207
238
Kharif rice (on contract)
2
Kharif rice (on demand)
Kharif groundnut hybrid seeds and kharif support
crops
240
360
414
476
3
Advance watering (in kharif season for rabi crops)
60
90
104
119
B).
Rabi season
4
Rabi seasonal (excluding wheat and groundnut)
180
270
311
357
5
Rabi wheat
Kharif & rabi Cotton , rabi groundnut rabi-HW
rice, hybrid seeds & rabi support crops
Late watering (given for kharif crops in rabi
season)
240
360
414
476
365
548
630
724
60
90
104
119
6
7
C).
Hot weather season
8
Hot weather seasonal
365
548
630
724
9
HW groundnut, HW Cotton (from April 1)
725
1088
1251
1438
HW Cotton (from March 1)
Advance watering (1 watering given in Hot weather
season)
Late watering (1 watering given in HW for rabi
crops)
970
1455
1673
1924
180
270
311
357
90
135
155
178
In Kharif & rabi
180
270
311
357
In rabi & hot weather
305
458
526
605
10
11
12
D).
Two seasonal crops
13
E).
Two seasonal e.g. Tur, Potato etc
Perennials(flow)
176
14
Sugarcane and Banana
15
16
Fruit crops, Lucerne etc.
sugar beet(excluding advance & late irrigation
given), rabi vegetables
17
Kharif vegetables
18
20
Hot weather vegetables
Onion in Kharif & rabi seasons, Onion in Kharif &
rabi seasons, given with one late irrigation
Onion in Kharif & rabi seasons and in HW season
given more than one irrigation
21
Onion in rabi and HW season
F).
3175
4763
5477
6297
3175
4763
5477
6297
1081
Other Perennials(flow)
545
818
940
365
548
630
724
1360
2040
2346
2697
910
1365
1570
1805
1270
1905
2191
2519
1450
2175
2501
2876
Kharif
155
233
267
307
Rabi
265
398
457
526
23
Adsali in January
635
953
1095
1259
24
Adsali in February
690
1035
1190
1368
25
Adsali in March
1200
1800
2070
2380
26
Adsali in April
1490
2235
2570
2955
27
Suru upto February for every month
265
398
457
526
28
Suru in March
910
1365
1570
1805
29
Suru in April
1055
1583
1820
2092
19
G).
Extended(flow)
22
H).
Adsali upto December for every month
Crop Block rates(flow)
30
Sugarcane block 1:4
1045
1568
1803
2073
31
Fruit block
3175
4763
5477
6297
32
Garden block
1235
1853
2130
2449
33
Garden seasonal block
1325
1988
2286
2628
34
Three seasonal block, two seasonal block
455
683
785
902
35
Rabi block
320
480
552
635
2920
3180
3657
4205
2920
3180
3657
4205
I)
Perennials(Drip & Sprinkler)
36
Sugarcane & Banana
37
38
Fruit crops, Lucerne etc.
Sugar beet(excluding advance & late irrigation
given)
365
548
630
724
39
Kharif vegetables
240
360
414
476
40
rabi Vegetables
365
548
630
724
41
Hot weather Vegetables
910
1365
1570
1805
42
605
908
1044
1200
665
998
1147
1319
44
Onion in Kharif & rabi seasons
Onion in Kharif & rabi seasons given with one
late irrigation
Onion in Kharif & rabi seasons & in HW season
given more than one irrigation
850
1275
1466
1686
45
Onion in rabi and HW seasons
970
1455
1673
1924
Kharif
105
158
181
208
Rabi
175
263
302
347
47
Adsali in January
425
638
733
843
48
Adsali in February
460
690
794
912
49
Adsali in March
800
1200
1380
1587
50
Adsali in April
990
1485
1708
1963
51
Suru upto February for every month
175
263
302
347
52
Suru in March
605
908
1044
1200
53
Suru in April
705
1058
1216
1398
J)
Other Perennials(Drip & Sprinkler)
43
K)
Extended irrigation(drip & sprinkler)
46
Adsali upto December for every month
177
L)
Crop Block rates(drip & sprinkler)
54
Sugarcane block 1:4
55
Fruit block
700
1050
1208
1388
2120
3180
3657
4205
56
Garden block
825
1238
1423
1636
57
Garden seasonal block
885
1328
1527
1755
58
Three seasonal block, two seasonal
305
458
526
605
59
Rabi block
215
323
371
426
60
Sugarcane
5900
8850
10178
11701
61
Other perennials
4990
7485
8608
9897
62
Kharif seasonal
240
360
414
476
63
Rabi seasonal
365
548
630
724
64
Wheat
515
773
888
1021
65
Hot weather crops, rice (follow on)
910
1365
1570
1805
66
Cotton , groundnut
1270
1905
2191
2519
N)
Water rates for sewage water
Water rates/royalty rates for water supplied on volumetric basis from canals/from reservoirs constructed from funds of water
users. (Rs. per thousand cubic meter)
Rates of
from
from
from
01/07/00
1/9/01
1/7/02
1/7/03
Sr.No.
Location
Season
1
1
2
3
2
From canal at minor head(water
rates)
3
From canal at outlet (water rates)
Reservoir constructed by water
users (royalty charges)
4
5
6
7
Kharif
24
36
41.4
47.6
rabi
36
54
62.1
71.4
hot weather
73
109.5
125.9
144.8
Kharif
27
40.5
46.6
53.6
rabi
40
60
69
79.4
hot weather
80
120
138
158.7
For all seasons
12
18
20.7
23.8
Water Rates for Lift Irrigation Schemes from 01-07-2001 (for Water Use of Private Lift Irrigation Scheme)
(Rs. per hector)
Sr.No.
Location of lift irrigation
Sugarcane & Banana
drip
irrigation
flow
1
1
2
3
4
2
Canal
Reservoir/dam/elevated
bandhara
Within boundaries of command
area in back water areas of river
bandharas where dam water is
not released
First bandhara on river/nalla or
lift irrigation from areas beyond
dam, diversion bandhara in
kharif
Kharif
crops
Other perennials
Rabi
crops
Hot
weather
drip
irrigation
flow
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1495
995
995
665
65
100
200
755
495
500
330
35
50
100
375
255
255
165
30
30
50
125
75
80
55
nil
20
20
178
Water rates for lift irrigation Schemes from 01-07-2002(for water use of private lift irrigation scheme)
(Rs. per hector)
Sugarcane & Banana
Sr.No.
Other perennials
Kharif
crops
Location of lift irrigation
flow
1
2
1
Canal
2
3
Reservoir/dam/elevated bandhara
Within boundaries of command area
in back water areas of river
bandanas
where dam water is not released
First bandhara on river/nalla or
lift irrigation from areas beyond
dam, diversion bandhara in kharif
4
drip irrigation
flow
Rabi
crops
Hot
weather
drip irrigation
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1645
1095
1090
730
75
110
220
825
555
550
365
35
55
110
410
280
280
180
30
30
55
135
80
90
60
nil
20
20
Water rates for lift irrigation Schemes from 01-07-2003(for water use of private lift irrigation scheme)
(Rs. per hector)
Other perennials
Sugarcane & Banana
Sr.No.
Location of lift irrigation
flow
1
1
2
3
4
2
Canal
Reservoir/dam/elevated bandhara
Within boundaries of command area
in back water areas of
river bandharas where dam water is
not released
First bandhara on river/nalla or lift
irrigation from areas beyond dam,
diversion bandhara in kharif
drip irrigation
flow
Kharif
crops
Rabi
crops
Hot
weather
drip irrigation
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1810
1205
1200
805
85
120
240
910
610
605
400
40
60
120
450
310
310
200
35
35
60
150
90
100
65
nil
20
20
179
Service Charge for lift irrigation schemes above 30 meters under jurisdiction of Irrigation Department and Irrigation
Development Corporation
(Rupees per hectare)
Sr. No.
Rates of
01/07/00
Season and Crops name
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
From 01/09/01
From 01/07/02
From 01/07/03
3
4
5
6
1) Tur
250
375
431
496
2) Turmeric/Chillies
3) LS cotton and Groundnut(hot weather
& kharif)
345
518
595
685
725
1088
1251
1439
Two seasonal Crops
Perennial crops(flow)
1) Sugarcane/banana
3290
4935
5675
6531
2) Other perennial crops
3) Extended cane & banana(rate for one
watering)
2290
3435
3950
4556
115
173
198
228
1) Sugarcane/banana
2195
3293
3786
4357
2) Other perennial crops
3) Extended cane & banana(rate for one
watering)
1525
2288
2631
3027
75
113
129
149
526
Perennial crops(drip)
Kharif crops
1) Rice
265
398
457
2) Other food grain and fodder crops
150
225
259
298
3) Other cash crops
210
315
362
417
1) Wheat
335
503
578
665
2) Other food grain and fodder crops
200
300
345
397
3) Other cash crops
425
638
733
844
1) Cash crops
725
1088
1251
1439
2) Follow on hot weather rice
835
1253
1440
1657
1) Kharif
280
420
483
556
2) Rabi crops
425
638
733
844
3) Hot weather
Advance and late watering (each
watering)
725
1088
1251
1439
Rabi crops
Hot weather crops
Vegetables
1) Food grain crops
50
75
86.3
99.2
2) Cash crops
65
98
112.1
128.9
180
Service Charge for lift irrigation schemes below 30 meters under jurisdiction of Irrigation Department and
Irrigation Development Corporation
Sr. No.
Season and Crops name
1
1
2
3
4
5
2
7
8
From
01/07/03
3
4
5
6
1) Tur
240
360
414
476
2) Turmeric/Chillies
3) LS cotton and Groundnut(hot weather
& kharif)
335
503
578
664
605
908
1044
1200
Two seasonal Crops
Perennial crops(flow)
1) Sugarcane/banana
2725
4088
4701
5405
2) Other perennial crops
3) Extended cane & banana(rate for one
watering)
1880
2820
3243
3729
90
135
155.3
178.5
1) Sugarcane/banana
1815
2723
3131
3600
2) Other perennial crops
3) Extended cane & banana(rate for one
watering)
1255
1883
2165
2489
60
90
103.5
119
Perennial crops(drip)
Kharif crops
1) Rice
180
270
311
357
2) Other food grain and fodder crops
150
225
259
297
3) Other cash crops
210
315
362
416
270
405
466
535
Rabi crops
1) Wheat
6
(Rupees per hectare)
From
From
01/09/01
01/07/02
Rates of
01/07/00
2) Other food grain and fodder crops
180
270
311
357
3) Other cash crops
425
638
733
843
Hot weather crops
1)Hot Weather food grains/hybrid jowar
365
548
630
724
2) Cash crops
605
908
1044
1200
3) Follow on hot weather rice
455
683
785
902
1) Kharif
270
405
466
535
2) Rabi crops
425
638
733
843
3) Hot weather
Advance and late watering (each
watering)
605
908
1044
1200
1) Food grain crops
50
75
86.3
99.2
2) Cash crops
65
97.5
112.1
128.9
Vegetables
West Bengal
The water rates prevailing in West Bengal since 1.7.1977 are uniform throughout the state in all project which are as follows:
Season
Kharif
Rabi
Boro
Rate per ha.
Rs. 37.06
Rs. 49.42
Rs. 123.55
181
STATE WISE POSITION ON OTHER LEVIES/CESSES ON IRRIGATION AREA
State/ Item
1
1) Karnataka
2) Maharashtra
Water
Rate*
2
Yes
Yes
Betterment
Levy
3
3) Rajasthan
4) West Bengal
Yes
Yes
Rs. 400(for
cultivable lands)
Rs. 570(for
waste lands)
(Rate Rs. per ha)
Any Other Charges having bearing on
Irrigation
6
Irrigation
Cess
4
Crop Cess
5
Local Cess on
Water rates @
20 paise per
rupee
Education
Employment
Guarantee
Cess
(a) Education Cess:
i) Sugarcane=Rs.190 per ha.
ii) Banana= Rs.110
iii) Cotton=Rs.40
iv) Groundnut=Rs. 40
(b) Employment guarantee Cess at Rs.25 per
ha. on all agricultural lands on which
irrigated crop are grown.
-
-
-
* Water Rate of these States is given above this table.
INDUSTRIES
Rajasthan
VIII
1993-94
INDUSTRIES
A.
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Quantity sold
1
Salt (in quintals)
2
Crude (in metric tonnes)
3
Textile (in lakhs kgs)
B.
378905.6
1392875
1585470
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
2617
2887
4137
4324
1913
1443
181.87
172.3
180.01
98.78
136.79
95.51
57.83
199.2
219.9
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
21.2
18.01
27.76
32.44
14.71
9.09
8829.86
11917.11
13586.2
7388.69
9599.4
9029.62
Value Received (Rs. in lakhs)
1
Salt
2
Crude(M.T.)
3
Textile
MINES AND MINERALS
Rajasthan
MINES AND MINERALS
IX
Royalty Rate Structure
of Important Minerals
A.
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
Agate
Major Minerals
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
i
Apatite
NA
NA
NA
5% ad
5% ad
5% ad
ii
Rock Phosphate:
Above 25% P2O5
NA
NA
NA
11% ad
11% ad
11% ad
Upto 25% P2O5
NA
NA
NA
5% ad
5% ad
5% ad
Chrysotile (Rs. per tonne)
Amphibole (Rs. per
tonne)
NA
NA
NA
726
726
726
NA
NA
NA
35
35
35
Barytes
Bauxite, Laterite
(percent of London
Metal Exchange
Aluminum metal price
chargeable on the
contained aluminum
metal in ore produced)
NA
NA
NA
5.5% ad
5.5% ad
5.5% ad
NA
NA
NA
0.35%
0.35%
0.35%
1
2
(a)
(b)
3
(b)
5
2002-03
2003-04
Asbestos:
(a)
4
2001-02
182
6
Brown
Ilmenite(Leucoxene),
Ilmenite,Rutile and
Zircon
NA
NA
NA
2% ad
2% ad
2% ad
7
Cadmium
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
8
Calcite
Chinaclay/Kaolin(inc
ballclay, white shale &
white clay)
NA
NA
NA
15% ad
15% ad
15% ad
Crude (Rs. per tonne)
Processed (washed) (Rs.
per tonne)
NA
NA
NA
21
21
21
NA
NA
NA
75
75
75
Chromite
NA
NA
NA
7.5% ad
7.5% ad
7.5% ad
Coal
Coal produced in all
States & Union
Territories except the
State of West Bengal
Group I Coals: (Rs. per
tonne)
NA
NA
NA
250
250
250
NA
NA
NA
165
165
165
NA
NA
NA
115
115
115
NA
NA
NA
85
85
85
NA
NA
NA
65
65
65
NA
NA
NA
65
65
65
NA
NA
NA
50
50
50
NA
NA
NA
90
90
90
9
(a)
(b)
10
11
A.
i
(a)
Coking Coal
Steel Grade-I
Steel Grade-II
(b)
ii
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
iii
(a)
(b)
iv
(a)
(b)
v
(a)
(b)
vi
Washery Grade-II
Hand picked coal
produced in the States of
Arunachal Pradesh,
Assam, Meghalaya and
Nagaland
Group II Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Coking Coal Washery
Grade-II
Coking Coal Washery
Grade-III
Semi-Coking Coal GradeI
Semi-Coking Coal GradeII
Non-Coking Coal Grade
A
Non-Coking Coal Grade
B
Ungraded Run of Mine
Coal produced in the
States of Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam,
Meghalaya and Nagaland
Group III Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Coking Coal Washery
Grade-IV
Non-Coking Coal Grade
C
Group IV Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Non-Coking Coal Grade
D
Non-Coking Coal Grade
E
Group V Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Non-Coking Coal Grade
F
Non-Coking Coal Grade
G
Lignite
Group VI Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
183
B.
i
(a)
Coal produced in all State
of Andhra Pradesh
Coal produced in the
State of West Bengal
Group I Coals: (Rs. per
tonne)
NA
NA
NA
7
7
7
NA
NA
NA
6. 5
6. 5
6. 5
NA
NA
NA
5. 5
5. 5
5. 5
NA
NA
NA
4. 3
4. 3
4. 3
NA
NA
NA
2. 5
2. 5
2. 5
Coking Coal
Steel Grade-I
Steel Grade-II
ii
(a)
(b)
(c)
iii
(a)
(b)
iv
(a)
(b)
v
(a)
(b)
12
Washery Grade-I
Group II Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Coking Coal Washery
Grade-II
Coking Coal Washery
Grade-III
Semi-Coking Coal GradeI
Semi-Coking Coal GradeII
Non-Coking Coal Grade
A
Non-Coking Coal Grade
B
Group III Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Coking Coal Washery
Grade-IV
Non-Coking Coal Grade
C
Group IV Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Non-Coking Coal Grade
D
Non-Coking Coal Grade
E
Group V Coals: (Rs.
per tonne)
Non-Coking Coal Grade
F
Non-Coking Coal Grade
G
Copper (percent of
London Metal Exchange
copper metal price
chargeable on the
contained copper metal
in ore produced)
NA
NA
NA
3.20%
3.20%
3.20%
13
Corundum
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
14
Diamond
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
15
Dolomite (Rs. per tonne)
NA
NA
NA
40
40
40
16
Felspar
Fireclay (inc plastic,
pipe, lithomargic and
natural pozzolanic clay)
Fluorspar (also called
fluorite)
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
NA
NA
NA
12% ad
12% ad
12% ad
NA
NA
NA
5% ad
5% ad
5% ad
17
18
19
Garnet:
(a)
Abrasive
NA
NA
NA
3% ad
3% ad
3% ad
(b)
Gem
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
Gold:
Primary (percent of
London price chargeable
on the contained gold
metal in ore produced)
By-product gold (percent
of London price
chargeable on by-product
gold metal actually
NA
NA
NA
1.50%
1.50%
1.50%
NA
NA
NA
2.50%
2.50%
2.50%
20
(a)
(b)
184
produced)
21
(a)
(b)
(c)
Graphite:
With 80% or more fixed
carbon (Rs. per tonne)
With 40% or more but
less than 80% fixed
carbon (Rs. per tonne)
With less than 40% fixed
carbon (Rs. per tonne)
22
Gypsum
23
Iron ore:
i
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
ii
(a)
(b)
(c)
iii
24
26
(a)
(b)
27
28
29
30
32
33
34
Fines
With 65% Fe content or
more (Rs. per tonne)
With 62% Fe content or
more but less than 65%
Fe (Rs. per tonne)
With less than 62% Fe
content (Rs. per tonne)
Concentrates prepared
by beneficiation and/or
concentration of low
grade ore containing
40% Fe or less (Rs. per
tonne)
Kyanite
Lead (percent of
London Metal Exchange
Lead, metal price
chargeable on the
contained lead metal in
ore produced)
25
31
Lumps
With 65% Fe content or
more (Rs. per tonne)
With 62% Fe content or
more but less than 65%
Fe (Rs. per tonne)
With 60% Fe content or
more but less than 62%
Fe (Rs. per tonne)
With less than 60% Fe
content (Rs. per tonne)
Limestone:
L.D. grade (less than one
and half percent silica
content) (Rs. per tonne)
NA
NA
NA
225
225
225
NA
NA
NA
130
130
130
NA
NA
NA
50
50
50
NA
NA
NA
20% ad
20% ad
20% ad
NA
NA
NA
24.5
24.5
24.5
NA
NA
NA
14.5
14.5
14.5
NA
NA
NA
10
10
10
NA
NA
NA
7
7
7
NA
NA
NA
17
17
17
NA
NA
NA
10
10
10
NA
NA
NA
7
7
7
NA
NA
NA
3
3
3
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
NA
NA
NA
5%
5%
5%
NA
NA
NA
50
50
50
Others (Rs. per tonne)
Lime Kankar (Rs. per
tonne)
Limeshell (Rs. per
tonne)
NA
NA
NA
40
40
40
NA
NA
NA
40
40
40
NA
NA
NA
40
40
40
Magnesite
NA
NA
NA
3% ad
3% ad
3% ad
Manganese Ore:
(a)
Ore of all Grades
NA
NA
NA
3% ad
3% ad
3% ad
(b)
Concentrates
Crude Mica, Waste and
Scrap Mica
Monazite (Rs. per
tonne)
Nickel (percent of
London Metal Exchange
nickel, metal price
chargeable on the
contained nickel metal
in ore produced)
NA
NA
NA
1% ad
1% ad
1% ad
NA
NA
NA
4% ad
4% ad
4% ad
NA
NA
NA
125
125
125
NA
NA
NA
0.12%
0.12%
0.12%
Ochre (Rs. per tonne)
NA
NA
NA
12
12
12
185
35
Pyrites
NA
NA
NA
2% ad
2% ad
2% ad
36
Pyrophyllite
Quartz, silica sand,
moulding sand and
quartzite (Rs. per
tonne)
NA
NA
NA
15% ad
15% ad
15% ad
NA
NA
NA
15
15
15
38
Ruby
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
39
Sand for Stowing
40
Selenite
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
41
Sillimanite
NA
NA
NA
2.5% ad
2.5% ad
2.5% ad
NA
NA
NA
5%
5%
5%
5%
37
42
(a)
(b)
Silver:
By-product (percent of
London price chargeable
on by-product silver metal
actually produced)
Primary Silver (percent of
London Metal Exchange
silver metal price
chargeable on the
contained silver metal in
ore produced)
NA
NA
NA
5%
5%
43
Slate (Rs. per tonne)
NA
NA
NA
40
40
40
44
Talc/Steatite/Soapstone:
Tin (percent of London
Metal Exchange tin
metal price chargeable
on the contained tin
metal in ore produced)
Tungsten (Rs. per unit
percent of contained
WO3 per tonne of ore
and on pro rata basis)
NA
NA
NA
15% ad
15% ad
15% ad
NA
NA
NA
5%
5%
5%
NA
NA
NA
20
20
20
45
46
47
Uranium
NA
NA
NA
5*
5*
5*
48
Vermiculite
NA
NA
NA
3% ad
3% ad
3% ad
49
Wollastonite
Zinc (percent of London
Metal Exchange Zinc
metal price chargeable
on the contained Zinc
metal in ore produced)
All other minerals not
herein before specified
Minor Minerals (Rs. per
tonne)
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
NA
NA
NA
6.60%
6.60%
6.60%
NA
NA
NA
10% ad
10% ad
10% ad
55
50
51
B.
i
Sandstone
NA
45
45
55
55
ii
Limestone
NA
45
45
50
50
50
iii
Marble serpentine
NA
100
100
250
250
250
iv
Granite
Chips & powder making
minerals
NA
75
75
100
100
100
NA
18
18
40
40
40
vi
Masonary Stone
NA
5
5
5
5
5
vii
Bajri Kankar
Brick earth, Murram
Surkhi
NA
5
5
6
6
6
NA
5
5
6
6
6
ix
Phyllite & Sehist
NA
12
12
15
15
15
x
Fuller's earth
NA
25
25
35
35
35
xi
Bentonite
NA
35
35
45
45
45
v
viii
xii
Salt Stone
NA
25
25
36
36
36
Notes:- Pvt: Privatised, ad: Sale price on ad valorem basis, * Rupees for dry ore with U3O8 content of 0.05% with pro rat increase/decrease
at the rate of Rs. 1.50 per metric tonne of ore for 0.01% increase /decrease
186
Karnataka
ROYALTY RATE-STRUCTURE OF IMPORTANT MINERALS
Major Minerals
Royalty Rates
1993-94
Maior Minerals w.e.f.
17-2-1992
1994-95
Same as
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
11/4/1997
12/9/2000
0.40% of LME
15% of sale
price
Rs.23/-
1993-94
1) Bauxite & Laterite
Rs. 34/- .
Rs.41/-
2) Calcite
Rs.41/-
Rs.48/
0.35% of LME
15% of sale
price
Rs.14/-
Rs.18/-
Rs.21/- P.T.
Same as
14-10-
2001-02
2004
3) China Clay 1 Kaolin
a) Crude
b) Processed
4) Chromite
Rs.62/-
Rs.68/-
Rs.75/- P.T.
Rs.85/-
Rs.23 to
Rs. 250/-
7 .5% of
sale price
7 .5% of sale
price
7 .5% of
sale price
5) Copper
6) Corrundum
Rs. 17/- per ton
Rs.210/-
0.75% of LME
Rs.231/-
3.2% of LME
10% of sale
price
3.2% of LME
10% of
sale price
7) Dolomite
8) Felspar
Rs.25/- P.T.
Rs.15/-
Rs.28/- P.T.
Rs.17/-
9) Fire Clay
Rs.13/-
Rs.17/-
Rs.40/- P.T.
10% of sale
price
12% of sale price
Rs.45/- P.T.
10% of
sale price
12% of sale
price
1.5% of LME
1.5% of LME
2.5% LME
2.5% of LME
10) Gold
a) Primary
Rs.l1/-per gm.
b) By product gold
RS.10/-per gm.
1.5% of sale
price
2.5% of sale
price
11) Iron ore
Lumps a) 65% Fe or more
Rs.18/-
Rs.21.50
Rs.24.50
Rs.27/-
b) 62% - 65%
Rs.l0/-
Rs.12/-
Rs.14.50
Rs.16/-
c) 60% - 62%
Rs.7/-
Rs.8.50
Rs.10.00
Rs.11/-
d) Less than 60%
Rs.5/-
Rs.6/-
Rs. 7 -00
a) 65% Fe or more.
Rs.13/-
Rs.15.50
Rs.17.00
b) 62% - 65%
Rs.7/-
Rs. 8.50
Rs.10.00
Rs.11/-
c) Less than 62%
Rs.5/-
Rs.6-00
Rs.7-00
Rs.8/-
Concentrates
Rs.2.25
Rs.2.5
Rs.3.00
12) Kyanite
Rs. 85/-
10% of sale price
Rs.4/10% of sale
price
13) Lime stone
a) LD Grade (less than 1.5 % of
silica)
Rs.50/-
Rs.50/-
Rs.50/-
Rs.55/-
b) Others
Rs. 25/-
Rs.32/-
Rs40/-
Rs.45/-
14) Lime Kankar
Rs.50/-
Rs.50/-
Rs.40/ -
Rs.45/-
15) Lime shell
Rs.25/-
Rs.28/-
Rs.40/-
Rs.45/-
Rs.107/-
Rs.112/-
3.5 % of sale
price
3% of sale price
Rs.2/-
1.5% of sale
price
1% of sale price
Rs.12/-
Rs.13/-
Rs.15/-
Rs.20/-
Rs.3.40 per kg
of metal
5% of sale
price
5% of LME
5% of LME
Fines
Rs.19/-
16) Manganese Ore
a) All grades
b) Concentrates
17) Quartz, Silica Sand, Moulding
sand &Quartzite
18) Silver
a) By product
187
b) primary Silver
Rs.3.40 per kg
of metal
5% of sale
price
Minor Minerals w.e.f
5% of LME
28-5-94
5% of LME
2/6/2003
1) Ornamental
a) Black Granite
Rs.1500-2000/
M3
Rs. 20002500/ M3
b) Other varies of dykes
Rs. 1000/-per
M3
c) Pink & Red granites
Rs.1000-2000/ M3
d) Grey & White Granites
Rs.600-1500/M3
Rs.1000/- per
M3
Rs.10002000/M3
Rs.10001500/M3
2) Fuller's Earth
Rs.80/- tonne
Rs.150/-MT
3) Shahabad Stone
Rs. 3 0/- per 10 M2
Rs.50/-10 M2
4) Limestone (Non cement)
Rs.15/- tonne
Rs.15/- MT
5) Ord. Building stone
Rs.l0/- tonne
Rs.15/- MT
6) Limeshell
Rs.25/- tonne
Rs. 50/- MT
7) Lime Kankar ( Non-cement)
Rs.10/- tonne
Rs.20/-MT
8) Ordinary sand
Rs.15 - 25 tonne
Rs.25/- MT
9) Bricks earth
Rs.10/- tonne
10) Murrum
Rs.2/-tonne
Rs.5/- MT
Notes: LME: London Metal Exchange, MT: Metric Tonne.
ROADS AND BRIDGES
Rajasthan
Toll Tax Rates
Categories of Vehicles
Rate per vehicle
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
Car
3
3
Jeep
3
3
3
5
5
5
Mini Bus
5
5
5
10
10
10
Truck
10
10
10
15
15
15
Bus
10
10
10
15
15
15
5
5
5
10
10
10
Troll
10
10
10
15
15
15
Roller
10
10
10
15
15
15
Earth moving machine
10
10
10
15
15
15
5
5
5
10
10
10
Tractor and Trolley
Small Commercial Vehicle
Muli-excel vehicle
Two wheeler
5
2003-04
3
5
5
10
10
10
15
15
15
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
188
Annexure A.3
Constitutional Provision Related to Regulation and Development of Mines and Mineral
Sector.
The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution List II (State List) Entry 23 relates to
regulation and development of mines and minerals; however it is subject to the provisions of
Union list with respect to regulation and development. Entry 50 includes taxes on mineral
rights, Entry 53 List I gives the power to Centre to regulate and develop oilfields and
minerals and Entry 54 of the Union List enunciates regulation and development of mines and
minerals would be under the control of the Central Government if Parliament made a law to
be expedient in the public interest. Thus the Constitutional arrangements regarding the
regulation of mines and minerals development are on the lines of Government India Act,
1935, except the oil fields that has been dealt in a separate entry (53) of the Union List of the
Constitution. Subsequently Parliament has enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1957 to provide the regulation and development of minerals under the
control of the Union in public interest.
This gave rise to lots of conflicts and disputes with respect to tax imposition between
the States and the Central Government, therefore, the issues needs to be examined and the
Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to
limitation imposed by the latter part of the Entry. If Parliament by its law has declared that
regulation and development of mines and minerals should be under the control of the Union,
to the extent the jurisdiction of State Legislature is excluded. The State Legislature has no
jurisdiction to pass a law in this respect. Subsequently the Supreme Court has given
precedence to Parliament over States. As a result Parliament has occupied the entire field and
the State Legislature lacks legislative competence and executive authority in regard to
regulation and development of mines and minerals. Therefore where a law is attributable in
pith and substance to entry 23 of the State list, it would not be valid as long as Parliament has
occupied the field.
State Governments are competent to give licenses for prospecting and granting
mining leases but they can not grant or renew, prospecting licenses or mining leases without
the prior permission of the Union Governments but not apply to minor minerals. By
notification in the Official Gazette the State Governments may make rules for regulating
grant of quarry-lease, mining-lease or other concessions in respect of minor minerals. From
independence a list of amendment took place in mines and mineral sector in India.
1. The MMRD Act, 1958 (15 of 1958).
2. The Repealing and Amending Act, 1960 (58 of 1958).
3. The MMRD Amendment Act, 1972 (56 of 1972).
4. The Repealing and Amending Act, 1978 (38 of 1978).
5. The MMRD Amendment Act, 1986 (37 of 1986).
6. The MMRD Amendment Act, 1994 (25 of 1994).
7. The MMRD Amendment Act, 1999 (38 of 1999).
189
Annexure A.4
Rates of Royalty and Dead Rent for Minerals (2000-01)
Rates of Royalty in Respect of Minerals at Item 1 to 10 and 12 to 38 and 40 to 51 Applicable in All States and Union
Territories Except West Bengal.
1. Agate
Ten percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
2. (i) Apatite
Five percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
(ii) Rock Phosphate
3. Asbestos
(a)above 25 percent P2O5
Eleven percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
(b)upto 25 percent P2O5
Five percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
(a) chrysotile
Seven hundred and twenty six rupees per tonne
(b) amphibole
Thirty five rupees per tonne
4. Barytes
Five and half percent of sale price on ad valorm basis
5. Bauxite, Laterite
Zero point three five percent of London Metal Exchange Aluminium
metal price chargeable on the contained Aluminium metal in ore
produced
6. Brown ilmenite (Leucoxene,
Ilmenite, Rutile and Zircon)
Two percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
7. Cadmium
Ten percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
8. Calcite
Fifteen percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
9. China clay/Kaolin: (including
ball clay, white shale and white
clay)
(a) Crude
Twenty one rupees per tonne
(b)Processed(including washed)
Seventy five rupees per tonne
10. Chromite
Seven and half percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
11. Coal (including lignite)
*
12. Copper
Three point two percent of London Metal Exchange Copper metal
price chargeable on the contained Copper metal in ore produced
13. Corundum
Ten percent of sale on ad valorem basis
14. Diamond
Ten percent of sale on ad valorem basis
15. Dolomite
Fifty rupees per tonne
16. Felspar
Ten percent of sale on ad valorem basis
17.FireClay(Including
plastic,pipe,lithomargic and natural
pozzolanic clay)
Twelve percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
18. Flurospar
Five percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
19. Garnet
20. Gold
(a) abrasive
Three percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
(b) Gem
Ten percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
(a) Primary
(a) One and half percent of London bullion market association price
chargeable on the contained Gold metal in ore produced
(b) By-product
(b) Two and half percent of London bullion market association price
chargeable on the by-product Gold metal actually produced
190
21. Graphite
(a) with 80% or more fixed carbon
Two hundred and twenty five rupees per tonne
(b) with 40% or more but less than 80%
fixed carbon
One hundred and thirty rupees per tonne
Fifty rupees per tonne
(c) with less than 40% fixed carbon
22. Gypsum
23. Iron ore
Twenty percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
Lumps:
(a) with 65% Fe content or more
Twenty four rupees and fifty paise per tonne
(b) with 62% Fe content or more but less
than 65% Fe
Fourteen rupees and fifty paise per tonne
(c) with 60% Fe content or more but less
than 62% Fe
Ten rupees per tonne
(d) less than 60% Fe content
Seven rupees per tonne
Fines:(including interalia, natural fines
produced incidental to mining & sizing of
lumpy ore)
(a) with 65% Fe content or more
Seventeen rupees per tonne
(b) with 62% Fe content or more but less
than 65% Fe
Ten rupees per tonne
(c) less than 62% Fe content
Seven rupees per tonne
Concentrates prepared by beneficiation
and/or concentration of low grade ore
containing 40% Fe or less
Three rupees per tonne
24. Kyanite
Ten percent of sale price in ad valorem basis
25. Lead
Five percent of London Metal Exchange lead metal price chargeable
on the contained Lead metal in ore produced
26. Limestone
(a)L.D.Grade (less than 1.5% silica content
Fifty rupees per tonne
(b) others
Forty rupees per tonne
27. Lime kankar
Forty rupees per tonne
28. Lime shell
Forty rupees per tonne
29. Magnesite
Three percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
30. Manganese Ore
(a) Ore of all grades
(a) Three percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
(b)Concentrates
(b) One percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
31. Crude Mica, Waste and Scrap
Mica
Four percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
32. monazite
One hundred and twenty five rupees per tonne
33. Nickel
Zero point one two percent of London Metal Exchange nickel price
chargeable on contained Nickel metal in ore produced
34. Ochre
Twelve rupees per tonne
35. Pyrites
Two percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
36. Pyophyllite
Fifteen percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
37. Quartz, Silica sand, Moulding
sand and Quartzite
Fifteen rupees per tonne
191
38. Ruby
Ten percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
39. Sand for stowing
**
40. Selenite
Ten percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
41. Sillimanite
Two and half percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
42. Silver
(a) By-products
(b)Primary silver
(a) Five percent of London Metal Exchange silver metal price
chargeable on by product silver metal actually produced
(b) Five percent of London Metal Exchange silver metal price
chargeable on the contained silver metal in ore produced
43. Slate
Forty rupees per tonne
44. Talc, Steatite and Soapstone
Fifteen percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
45. Tin
Five percent of London Metal Exchange Tin metal price chargeable
on the contained Tin metal in ore produced
46. Tungsten
Twenty rupees per unit % of contained WO3 per tonne of ore and on
pro rata basis
47. Uranium
Five rupees for dry ore with U3O8 content of 0.05% with pro rata
increase/decrease @Re.1.50 per metric tonne of ore for 0.01%
increase/decrease
48. Vermiclite
Three percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
49. Wollastonite
Ten percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
50. Zinc
Six point six percent of London Metal Exchange Zinc metal price
chargeable on contained Zinc metal in ore produced
51. All other minerals not here-inbefore specified
Ten percent of sale price on ad valorem basis
* Rates of royalty in respect of item 11 relating to Coal Including Lignite can be revised through a separate notification by the Ministry of
Coal.
** Rates of royalty in respect of item 39 relating to Sand for Stowing can be revised through a separate notification by the Ministry of Coal.
Note: The rates of royalty for the state of West Bengal in respect of the minerals except item 11 shall remain same as specified in the
notification of Govt of India in 1987.
Note: The Second Schedule was amended earlier vide notification numbers:1. GSR No. 175(E) dated 31st March, 1975.
2. GSR No. 407(E) dated 14th July, 1975.
3. GSR No. 584(E) dated 13th December, 1975.
4. GSR No. 321(E) dated 12th June, 1978.
5. GSR No. 2(E) dated 1st January, 1979.
6. GSR No. 67(E) dated 13th February, 1979.
7. GSR No. 63(E) dated 12th February, 1981.
8. GSR No. 449(E) dated 23rd July, 1981.
9. GSR No. 458(E) dated 5th May, 1987.
192
10. GSR No. 856(E) dated 14th October, 1987.
11. GSR No. 516(E) dated 1st August, 1991.
12. GSR No. 100(E) dated 17th February, 1992.
13. GSR No. 748(E) dated 11th October, 1994.
14. GSR No. 27(E) dated 13th January, 1995.
15. GSR No. 214(E) dated 11th April, 1997.
Rates of Dead Rent
(Applicable for All States and Union Territories except the State of West Bengal)
(Rates of Dead Rent in Rupees per hectare per annum)
Item
Category of The mining lease
Number
1st year of the
2nd to 5th year of the
6th to 10th year of the
11th year of the lease and
lease
lease
lease
onwards
(a)
Lease area upto 50 hectares
Nil
70
140
200
(b)
Lease area above 50 hectares but
Nil
100
200
280
Nil
140
230
350
not exceeding 100 hectares
(c)
Lease area above 100 hectares
Source: - Ministry of Mines, Government of India, 2000.
(1) The rates of dead rent applicable to the leases other than those obtained for supply of raw material to the industry owned by the
concerned lessee.
(2) In the case of lease obtained for the supply of raw materials for the industry owned by the concerned lessee, the rates of dead rent would
be applicable as given in respect of item number (a) above, irrespective of the lease area and the value of the mineral.
(3) One and half times the rates specified in item numbers (a), (b) and (c) above in case of leases granted for medium value minerals.
(4) Two times the rates specified in item numbers (a), (b) and (c) above in case of leases granted for high value minerals.
Note: For the purpose of this notification:(1) (a) “High value minerals” means gold, silver, diamond, ruby, sapphire, emerald and all other gemstones (precious, semi-precious stones),
copper, lead, zinc, asbestos (chrysotile variety), corundum, mica.
(b) “Medium value minerals” means agate, chromite, manganese ore, sillimanite, vermiculite, magnesite, wollastonite, perlite, diaspore,
apatite and rock phosphate, fluorspar, barites.
(c) “Low value minerals” means minerals other than high value minerals and medium value minerals.
(2) The rates of dead rent for the state of West Bengal shall remain the same as specified in the notification of Govt of India in 1987.
Note: The Third Schedule was amended earlier vide notification numbers:1. GSR No. 458(E) dated 5th May, 1987.
2. GSR No. 856(E) dated 14th October, 1987.
3. GSR No. 214(E) dated 11th April, 1997.
193
APPENDIXES
STATISTICAL TABLES
…….
Tables Prepared from State Budget Documents
Table
No.
Page No.
Title of Table
A
Revenue Receipts Tables for 15 Major states Budget Data (1993-96 and 2001-04)
200-218
1
Revenue from Total Public Works (Rs. in 000’)
200
1a
Revenue from Hire Charges(102) and Centage of Recovery Charges(103) (Rs. in 000’)
200
1b
Revenue from Public Works -(102+103) (Rs. in 000’)
201
2
Revenue from Education, Sport, Art and Culture (Rs. in 000’)
201
2a
Revenue from General Education (Rs. in 000’)
202
2b
Revenue from Technical Education (Rs. in 000’)
202
2c
Revenue from Art and Culture (Rs. In 000’)
203
203
2d
Revenue from Education, Sports, Art & Culture - (Sports & Youth Services + Art &
Culture) (Rs. in 000’)
2e
Revenue from Sports and Youth Services (Rs. in 000’)
204
2f
Revenue from Elementary Education (Rs. in 000’)
204
2g
Revenue from Secondary Education (Rs. in 000’)
205
2h
Revenue from University and Higher Education (Rs. in 000’)
205
2i
Revenue from Adult Education (Rs. In 000’)
206
3
Revenue from Medical and Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
206
3a
Revenue from Urban Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
207
3b
Revenue from Rural Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
207
3c
Revenue from Medical Education, Training and Research (Rs. in 000’)
208
3d
Revenue from Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
208
3e
Revenue from General Medical service (Rs. in 000’)
209
4
Revenue from Water Supply and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
209
4a
Revenue from Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
210
4b
Revenue from Sewage and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
210
4c
Revenue from Rural Water Supply (Rs. In 000’)
211
4d
Revenue from Urban Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
211
5
Revenue from Forestry and Wildlife (Rs. in 000’)
212
5a
Revenue from Total Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
212
5b
Revenue from Total Environmental Forestry and Wildlife (Rs. in 000’)
213
5c
Revenue from Sale of Forest Products (Rs. in 000’)
213
5d
Revenue from Total Environmental Forestry and Wildlife (Rs. in 000’)
214
195
6
Revenue from Major and Medium Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
214
7
Revenue from Minor Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
215
7a
Revenue from Total Surface Water (Rs. In 000’)
215
7b
Revenue from Total Ground Water (Rs. In 000’)
216
7c
Revenue from Total Water Tanks (Rs. in 000’)
216
7d
Revenue from Revenue from Total Lift Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
217
8
Revenue from Industries (Rs. in 000’)
217
9
Revenue from Non Ferrous and Metallurgical Industries (Rs. in 000’)
218
10
Revenue from Roads and Bridges (Rs. in 000’)
218
219-252
B
Revenue Expenditure Tables for 15 Major States Budget Data (1993-96 and 200104)
1
Revenue Expenditure on Public Works (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
219
Revenue Expenditure on Public Works (Machinery & Equipment &Maintenance &
Repairs) (Rs. in 000’)
219
2
Public Works (excluding Machinery & Equipment and Maintenance & Repairs) (Rs. in
000’)
220
3
4
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu., Sports, Art & Culture (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
220
5
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
221
6
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
221
7
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
222
8
Revenue Expenditure on Technical Edu (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
222
9
Revenue Expenditure on Technical Edu (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
223
10
Revenue Expenditure on Technical Edu (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
223
11
Revenue Expenditure on Sports & Youth Services (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
224
12
Revenue Expenditure on Sports & Youth Services (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
224
13
Revenue Expenditure on Sports & Youth Services (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
225
14
Revenue Expenditure on Art & Culture (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
225
15
Revenue Expenditure on Art & Culture (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
226
16
Revenue Expenditure on Art & Culture (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
226
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu, Sports, Art & Culture [excl. Sports + Art &
Culture] (Rs. in 000’)
227
17
18
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Elementary Edu: TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
227
19
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Elementary Edu: Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
228
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Elementary Edu: excluding Assistance) (Rs. in
000’)
228
20
196
21
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Secondary Edu: TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
229
22
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Secondary Edu: Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
229
230
23
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Secondary Edu: excluding Assistance) (Rs. in
000’)
24
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Uni. & Higher Edu: TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
230
25
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Uni. & Higher Edu: Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
231
231
26
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Uni. & Higher Edu: excluding Assistance) (Rs.
in 000’)
27
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Adult Edu: TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
232
28
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Adult Edu: Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
232
29
Revenue Expenditure on General Edu (Adult Edu: excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
233
30
Revenue Expenditure on Total Medical And Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
233
31
Revenue Expenditure on Total Urban Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
234
32
Revenue Expenditure on Urban Health Services Allopathy (Rs. in 000’)
234
33
Revenue Expenditure on Urban Health Services Other Systems (Rs. in 000’)
235
Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Urban Health Services Other Systems (Rs. in
000’)
235
34
236
35
Revenue Expenditure on Urban Health Services Other Systems - Assistance (Rs. in
000’)
36
Revenue Expenditure on Total Rural Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
236
37
Revenue Expenditure on Rural Health Services Allopathy (Rs. in 000’)
237
38
Revenue Expenditure on Rural Health Services Other Systems (Rs. in 000’)
237
39
Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Rural Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
238
40
Revenue Expenditure on Rural Health Services - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
238
41
Revenue Expenditure on Medical Education, Training and Research (Rs. in 000’)
239
42
Revenue Expenditure on Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
239
43
Revenue Expenditure on Total Water Supply and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
240
44
Revenue Expenditure on Total Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
240
45
Revenue Expenditure on Total Sewage and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
241
46
Revenue Expenditure on Total Urban Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
241
47
Revenue Expenditure on Total Rural Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
242
48
Revenue Expenditure on Total Assistance to Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
242
49
Revenue Expenditure on Water Supply - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
243
50
Revenue Expenditure on Total Assistance To Sewage and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
243
51
Revenue Expenditure on Sewage and Sanitation - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
244
197
52
Revenue Expenditure on Total Forestry and Wildlife (Rs. in 000’)
244
53
Revenue Expenditure on Total Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
245
54
Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
245
55
Revenue Expenditure on Forestry - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
246
56
Revenue Expenditure on Environmental Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
246
57
Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Environmental Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
247
58
Revenue Expenditure on Environmental Forestry - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
247
59
Revenue Expenditure on Total Minor Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
248
60
Revenue Expenditure on Surface Water (Rs. in 000’)
248
61
Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Surface Water (Rs. in 000’)
249
62
Revenue Expenditure on Ground Water (Rs. in 000’)
249
63
Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Ground Water (Rs. in 000’)
250
64
Revenue Expenditure on Water Tanks (Rs. in 000’)
250
65
Revenue Expenditure on Industries (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
251
Revenue Expenditure on Non Ferrous Mining & Metallurgical Industries (TOTAL) (Rs.
in 000’)
251
66
67
Revenue Expenditure on Roads & Bridges (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
252
Tables Prepared from RBI Data Source
Table
No.
Page No.
Title of the Table
C
Tables from RBI Revenue Receipts from 1993-94 to 2003-04
253-272
1
Total State Own Revenue (Tax +Non-tax) (in Rs. Lakh)
253
2
States’ Own Non-Tax Revenue (in Rs. Lakh)
254
3
Interest Payments (in Rs. Lakh)
255
4
Dividends and Profits (in Rs. Lakh)
256
5
Revenue from General Services (in Rs. Lakh)
257
6
Revenue from Social Services (in Rs. Lakh)
258
7
Revenue from Education, Sports, Art and Culture (in Rs. Lakh)
259
8
Revenue from Medical, Public Health and Family Welfare (in Rs. Lakh)
260
9
Revenue from Housing (in Rs. Lakh)
261
10
Revenue from Urban Development (in Rs. Lakh)
262
11
Revenue from Water Supply and Sanitation (in Rs. Lakh)
263
198
12
Revenue from Economic Services (in Rs. Lakh)
264
13
Revenue from Forestry and Wildlife (in Rs. Lakh)
265
14
Revenue from Major and Medium Irrigation projects (in Rs. Lakh)
266
15
Revenue from Minor Irrigations (in Rs. Lakh)
267
16
Revenue from Power (in Rs. Lakh)
268
17
Revenue from Petroleum (in Rs. Lakh)
269
18
Revenue from Village and Small Industries (in Rs. Lakh)
270
19
Revenue from Industries (in Rs. Lakh)
271
20
Revenue from Road Transport (in Rs. Lakh)
272
D
Tables from RBI Revenue Expenditure from 1993-94 to 2003-04
273-282
1
Revenue Expenditure on Social Services (Rs. in lakh)
273
2
Revenue Expenditure on Education, Sports, Art and Culture (Rs. in lakh)
273
Revenue Expenditure on Medical and Public Health and Family Welfare
(Rs. in lakh)
274
3
4
Revenue Expenditure on Water supply and Sanitation (Rs. in lakh)
274
5
Revenue Expenditure on Housing (Rs. in lakh)
275
6
Revenue Expenditure on Urban development (Rs. in lakh)
275
7
Revenue Expenditure on Labour and Labour Welfare (Rs. in lakh)
276
8
Revenue Expenditure on Social Security and Welfare (Rs. in lakh)
276
9
Revenue Expenditure on Economic Services (Rs. in lakh)
277
10
Revenue Expenditure on Crop Husbandry (Rs. in lakh)
277
11
Revenue Expenditure on Animal Husbandry (Rs. in lakh)
278
12
Revenue Expenditure on Fisheries (Rs. in lakh)
278
13
Revenue Expenditure on Forestry and Wild Life (Rs. in lakh)
279
14
Revenue Expenditure on Co-operation (Rs. in lakh)
279
15
Revenue Expenditure on Major and Medium Irrigation (Rs. in lakh)
280
16
Revenue Expenditure on Minor Irrigation (Rs. in lakh)
280
17
Revenue Expenditure on Power (Rs. in lakh)
281
18
Revenue Expenditure on Village and Small Industries (Rs. in lakh)
281
19
Revenue Expenditure on Industries (Rs. in lakh)
282
20
Revenue Expenditure on Roads and Bridges (Rs. in lakh)
282
199
Table 1: Revenue from Total Public Works (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
60451
64786
66990
48027
64965
Bihar
5740
7109
6022
7846
11080
Goa
6910
5775
8726
12029
9466
Gujrat
100706
92704
88216
134916
117209
Haryana
25118
25665
21128
62101
39795
Karnataka
73664
87120
62187
145290
111038
Kerala
13184
15718
17720
15631
21464
Madhya Pr.
73774
76242
103686
67524
85659
Maharashtra
389582
457384
452223
627125
543104
Orissa
50769
76091
75455
139875
136937
Punjab
49992
62561
47345
78311
110925
Rajasthan
107798
123036
179082
174908
196860
Tamil Nadu
43812
42486
47864
87337
87317
Uttar Pr.
149214
137889
258488
146591
252638
West Bengal
42983
40683
64558
55200
47752
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
71056
11483
14060
185301
32141
121224
28977
90938
652562
150553
101681
164510
118205
199199
63943
Table 1a: Revenue from Hire Charges (102) and Centage of Recovery Charges (103) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
29374
22760
23957
3899
2695
462
Bihar
0
0
0
0
0
0
Goa
2402
1995
2648
1128
1885
3647
Gujrat
32039
25411
24588
9847
14278
20683
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
2392
0
3232
2421
7343
3123
Kerala
150
332
137
0
0
54
Madhya Pr.
31497
34813
25119
7671
11308
24342
Maharashtra
216208
238850
220624
262896
238326
289661
Orissa
0
0
7846
21639
13544
15975
Punjab
40574
51481
33110
44002
48759
44931
Rajasthan
75759
78816
96096
107018
129597
96530
Tamil Nadu
13600
9858
7260
9278
12985
8299
Uttar Pr.
14632
14426
30219
6226
127682
28778
West Bengal
2672
4128
10050
15876
9254
7263
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
200
Table 1b: Revenue from Public Works -(102+103) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
31077
42026
43033
44127
62270
Bihar
5740
7109
6022
7846
11080
Goa
4508
3780
6078
10900
7580
Gujrat
68667
67293
63628
125069
102931
Haryana
25118
25665
21128
62101
39795
Karnataka
71272
87120
58955
142869
103695
Kerala
13034
15386
17583
15631
21464
Madhya Pr.
42278
41430
78567
59852
74352
Maharashtra
173374
218534
231599
364229
304778
Orissa
50769
76091
67609
118236
123393
Punjab
9418
11080
14235
34309
62166
Rajasthan
32039
44220
82986
67890
67263
Tamil Nadu
30211
32629
40605
78059
74331
Uttar Pr.
134583
123463
228269
140365
124956
West Bengal
40311
36554
54509
39324
38498
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
70594
11483
10413
164618
32141
118101
28923
66596
362901
134578
56750
67980
109906
170421
56679
Table 2: Revenue from Education, Sport, Art and Culture (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
300540
227148
223374
924474
Bihar
28142
19481
29880
549569
Goa
3841
4401
9663
20793
Gujrat
180905
153850
197355
393487
Haryana
120735
123562
135366
214018
Karnataka
176683
157910
150297
355595
Kerala
217699
283175
290799
535631
Madhya Pr.
50050
63274
74667
129895
Maharashtra
232306
285254
314049
330283
Orissa
95193
112301
115821
249791
Punjab
57113
60265
67323
138783
Rajasthan
38644
67078
119530
342680
Tamil Nadu
248179
295533
296836
657883
Uttar Pr.
299391
412346
493808
1376635
West Bengal
44025
60542
137806
396138
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1476653
83557
31702
675045
281317
433106
634095
103862
583266
243055
143920
173284
894959
2553486
172816
2003-04
7
712148
41095
115110
636624
326614
300702
818627
90766
661211
120020
212977
788114
1225765
2276789
211969
201
Table 2a: Revenue from General Education (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
281856
213171
206716
654452
Bihar
0
0
8414
547721
Goa
1793
1491
1527
4263
Gujrat
153478
131222
166713
302744
Haryana
115877
116903
133793
161317
Karnataka
111127
124795
116133
250348
Kerala
188336
241408
234677
367522
Madhya Pr.
46735
54604
62108
123135
Maharashtra
144762
174134
184995
179577
Orissa
90860
102508
108002
235748
Punjab
52888
52916
60635
106034
Rajasthan
33640
60247
108941
295335
Tamil Nadu
210246
249165
234912
479991
Uttar Pr.
294856
407105
481244
1301178
West Bengal
41014
52015
128801
357370
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
489494
73865
8478
606178
215152
366654
501708
92407
397904
231497
109662
131709
698432
2356367
146602
2003-04
7
516529
39750
88088
565011
254188
223661
637583
81614
491523
97675
150339
735532
917898
0
163120
Table 2b: Revenue from Technical Education (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
10407
11898
14937
26480
Bihar
0
0
0
862
Goa
1797
2582
3797
14858
Gujrat
12760
15142
15675
14143
Haryana
905
5866
0
52601
Karnataka
46639
12589
11592
90488
Kerala
22823
31997
33220
145394
Madhya Pr.
1660
6492
6891
5753
Maharashtra
54296
72589
90524
128296
Orissa
3775
5865
6711
11103
Punjab
2228
4187
4567
28204
Rajasthan
2347
3137
3904
10858
Tamil Nadu
33568
36144
52096
152976
Uttar Pr.
2561
4086
4011
61707
West Bengal
617
1562
1579
11770
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
30774
9153
21046
10647
65910
54672
101942
9890
145806
10050
30585
9281
155929
197120
7042
2003-04
7
77863
376
24449
16408
68850
65170
153084
4720
153756
1873
55703
12893
259941
2276789
13154
202
Table 2c: Revenue from Art and Culture (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
1825
1827
1523
231953
Bihar
52
44
61
514
Goa
242
261
290
1244
Gujrat
8978
4955
13385
72357
Haryana
1845
793
1573
6
Karnataka
13335
12619
19125
4579
Kerala
6139
8146
10495
16277
Madhya Pr.
1132
1282
1664
1007
Maharashtra
31401
35229
31742
13079
Orissa
558
3928
653
2940
Punjab
1066
868
1455
2695
Rajasthan
2657
3694
6685
34972
Tamil Nadu
2331
2364
2794
9635
Uttar Pr.
477
422
2486
11950
West Bengal
388
1139
824
6423
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
954416
297
1438
55788
21
3978
20997
269
22638
1508
1797
31763
25410
0
5696
2003-04
7
14292
704
1527
48652
477
8479
24797
4361
12661
310
3598
39216
28344
0
12905
Table 2d: Revenue from Education, Sports, Art & Culture - (Sports & Youth Services + Art &
Culture) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
292263
225069
221653
680932
520268
594392
Bihar
0
0
8414
548583
83018
40126
Goa
3590
4073
5324
19121
29524
112537
Gujrat
166238
146364
182388
316887
616825
581419
Haryana
116782
122769
133793
213919
281062
323038
Karnataka
157766
137384
127725
340836
421326
288831
Kerala
211158
273405
267897
512915
603650
790667
Madhya Pr.
48395
61096
69000
128888
102296
86334
Maharashtra
21048
34058
51994
105886
106250
137824
Orissa
94635
108373
114713
246851
241547
99548
Punjab
55117
57103
65203
134238
140247
206042
Rajasthan
35987
63384
112845
306193
140990
748425
Tamil Nadu
243815
285309
287008
632967
854361
1177839
Uttar Pr.
297417
411191
485255
1362885
2553486
2276789
West Bengal
41631
53577
130380
369140
153644
176274
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
203
Table 2e: Revenue from Sports and Youth Services (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
6452
253
198
11589
Bihar
28090
19437
21405
473
Goa
10
67
4049
428
Gujrat
5689
2531
1582
4243
Haryana
2108
0
0
94
Karnataka
5582
7907
3447
10180
Kerala
402
1624
12407
6439
Madhya Pr.
523
896
4003
0
Maharashtra
1847
3302
6788
9331
Orissa
0
0
455
0
Punjab
931
2295
665
1851
Rajasthan
0
0
0
1515
Tamil Nadu
2033
7860
7034
15281
Uttar Pr.
1498
733
6068
1801
West Bengal
2007
5827
6602
20575
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1969
243
739
2432
234
7802
9447
1297
16918
0
1875
531
15188
0
13476
2003-04
7
103464
265
1046
6553
3099
3392
3163
71
3271
20162
3337
473
19582
0
22790
Table 2f: Revenue from Elementary Education (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
46956
38380
38315
85627
Bihar
0
0
0
9523
Goa
36
5
19
28
Gujrat
34094
27035
39502
141498
Haryana
95968
92568
10885
154904
Karnataka
3674
5999
854
2327
Kerala
2953
4430
4398
10062
Madhya Pr.
0
3869
0
0
Maharashtra
17930
22458
57662
41442
Orissa
57413
1230
62986
139982
Punjab
4671
4457
6340
31455
Rajasthan
12832
18117
50458
213970
Tamil Nadu
315
117
363
11838
Uttar Pr.
11025
14471
27135
10295
West Bengal
161
741
262
3207
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
57845
9562
231
428759
144907
-1
8349
1210
123306
176203
19728
51034
10728
0
1317
2003-04
7
161951
31236
492
199224
176778
223661
9751
1742
191998
19606
21921
638743
88802
0
2025
204
Table 2g: Revenue from Secondary Education (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
210971
148578
146128
160462
Bihar
0
0
8414
3492
Goa
59
109
126
76
Gujrat
29570
29750
39954
50026
Haryana
14671
21533
108992
3513
Karnataka
95137
109569
115279
248021
Kerala
146422
180814
150960
267116
Madhya Pr.
4512
126
6291
6340
Maharashtra
12664
18538
7967
9988
Orissa
1277
151
901
18708
Punjab
33748
37084
39639
56720
Rajasthan
16602
35484
40358
66066
Tamil Nadu
179748
200879
197716
382457
Uttar Pr.
199904
390061
450248
765706
West Bengal
3176
1347
2553
3359
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
331467
5819
4063
86630
58211
366655
349074
10000
7235
0
67180
65343
604151
810679
983
2003-04
7
340458
6536
20472
114502
66174
0
390719
13664
54340
83
58056
67703
715525
0
7129
Table 2h: Revenue from University and Higher Education (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
21489
21049
16167
29768
Bihar
0
0
0
416616
Goa
703
976
1047
3619
Gujrat
62574
55775
57647
60393
Haryana
5385
2182
14198
3239
Karnataka
11793
8648
0
0
Kerala
38990
56235
79320
90099
Madhya Pr.
12514
12483
14851
46639
Maharashtra
12801
14230
14707
20136
Orissa
9437
2041
9846
20186
Punjab
9543
8053
10817
15498
Rajasthan
3599
5873
15719
14260
Tamil Nadu
23285
46532
33205
76285
Uttar Pr.
83927
2562
3808
51
West Bengal
4359
4897
5178
5181
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
37167
26476
3563
55667
10470
0
143636
19496
21803
8768
19265
13738
68650
0
4596
2003-04
7
47360
1781
66813
113662
11193
0
236815
8577
20333
349
62980
20949
100430
0
6556
205
Table 2i: Revenue from Adult Education (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
0
6
0
13
3
Bihar
0
0
0
12532
190
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
0
0
0
0
0
Haryana
0
807
0
308
1564
Karnataka
523
579
0
0
0
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
0
2
Maharashtra
965
509
501
97
227
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
160
231
1
62
168
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
486
61
359
4383
5393
Uttar Pr.
0
11
41
6065
1721
West Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 3: Revenue from Medical and Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
192311
146661
135074
485265
380548
Bihar
96928
56046
91673
165033
139191
Goa
14939
15676
21931
46720
69379
Gujrat
317710
275335
278988
472607
390175
Haryana
124526
86232
102390
283184
283767
Karnataka
223663
228133
213568
591763
563775
Kerala
153087
113799
235258
198459
281591
Madhya Pr.
83371
75352
87252
161433
203557
Maharashtra
572732
628839
562401
1097763
958894
Orissa
49967
46069
34591
101497
112411
Punjab
207807
208723
112735
290000
412957
Rajasthan
152491
99264
164851
245717
223958
Tamil Nadu
273170
282245
336483
653242
830671
Uttar Pr.
147697
189444
137903
311437
414359
West Bengal
427279
274236
223145
456304
486197
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
40
0
0
0
200
0
0
0
123
0
0
0
4291
0
0
2003-04
7
292987
119670
73016
415981
319635
317805
276116
109760
915300
75108
414382
162796
601091
426906
477069
206
Table 3a: Revenue from Urban Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
163823
126791
104334
401861
262415
Bihar
31095
15752
45020
32037
11874
Goa
13975
13092
16043
28888
46337
Gujrat
290870
234763
212521
347661
243940
Haryana
123006
83949
90291
230445
228652
Karnataka
219883
222975
208063
537095
506029
Kerala
138437
91029
212888
135607
191276
Madhya Pr.
80388
71754
80920
50179
6005
Maharashtra
504548
535876
449839
830381
642501
Orissa
41802
39188
26954
56941
60360
Punjab
195900
193527
94409
168764
371642
Rajasthan
150421
98604
163404
169273
163111
Tamil Nadu
252015
244195
305504
540716
707549
Uttar Pr.
35665
173592
106063
309888
414359
West Bengal
425839
273690
221195
452577
480000
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 3b: Revenue from Rural Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
Bihar
51448
30142
34900
757
1176
Goa
334
483
658
2171
2401
Gujrat
214
91
24
9334
5632
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
89
150
1562
0
Kerala
697
777
753
1843
2317
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
Maharashtra
4310
2780
6489
3600
13255
Orissa
4298
3140
4400
11500
17058
Punjab
381
2284
6930
45585
3026
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
West Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
215243
31075
47945
267190
238999
224363
188013
8275
465148
35353
333561
103397
512228
426906
450300
2003-04
7
0
0
3101
4488
450
774
3051
37
44190
231
9081
0
0
0
0
207
Table 3c: Revenue from Medical Education, Training and Research (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
8814
11177
15721
37170
41634
38541
Bihar
8655
5200
6148
1042
4158
11652
Goa
380
983
2403
7942
12426
13505
Gujrat
2029
6641
3851
20451
18650
14862
Haryana
146
115
112
49001
51276
76673
Karnataka
2334
1925
2050
18350
22258
64754
Kerala
7301
12920
11596
21219
41364
50375
Madhya Pr.
38
84
79
818
568
25973
Maharashtra
27572
49365
49967
108589
103691
102419
Orissa
583
1933
1560
10118
10545
0
Punjab
2183
3270
3958
1166
26148
59262
Rajasthan
1118
147
284
11395
10665
19121
Tamil Nadu
7172
13068
13182
23543
25963
32641
Uttar Pr.
427
901
352
70
0
0
West Bengal
909
135
1842
3466
5722
15234
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 3d: Revenue from Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
6374
6321
6015
39606
72419
Bihar
5520
4753
5386
8634
5148
Goa
252
1131
2845
7590
8315
Gujrat
4046
4349
5625
33534
83227
Haryana
1374
2168
11987
3737
3839
Karnataka
1446
3144
3305
34756
35488
Kerala
2442
2373
2589
27253
29868
Madhya Pr.
2945
3515
6253
110436
196984
Maharashtra
36302
40818
56106
155193
199447
Orissa
3284
1808
1677
22938
24448
Punjab
1944
2146
5751
474
1362
Rajasthan
952
513
1163
65049
50182
Tamil Nadu
13984
24981
17797
88983
97158
Uttar Pr.
111605
14950
31487
1479
0
West Bengal
531
411
108
261
475
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
34162
16204
8500
91987
3513
27914
16941
75412
303543
39524
5843
40278
56222
0
11535
208
Table 3e: Revenue from General Medical service (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
13300
2372
9004
6629
Bihar
210
199
218
122562
Goa
-2
-14
-17
130
Gujrat
20551
29491
56967
61628
Haryana
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
Kerala
4210
6700
7432
12537
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
0
Maharashtra
0
0
0
0
Orissa
0
0
0
0
Punjab
7399
7497
1687
74010
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
West Bengal
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
4081
116834
-100
38726
0
0
16766
0
0
0
10779
0
0
0
0
2003-04
7
5041
60739
-35
37454
0
0
17736
63
0
0
6635
0
0
0
0
Table 4: Revenue from Water Supply and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
39895
48235
51738
90944
Bihar
16524
9869
13380
3579
Goa
106817
112655
155043
531344
Gujrat
564
5055
6251
4962
Haryana
80982
109245
130540
287037
Karnataka
6979
19019
15964
18636
Kerala
42
106
2545
12776
Madhya Pr.
151445
131253
94476
115126
Maharashtra
107023
111815
34442
50882
Orissa
56878
59431
63992
189588
Punjab
62113
77995
85579
153109
Rajasthan
556830
654806
757623
1398262
Tamil Nadu
24973
40165
23673
88476
Uttar Pr.
798
871
829
1582
West Bengal
7714
11840
15236
36706
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
163524
2576
557115
12226
358175
11521
26843
193853
27046
232902
219677
1430039
82584
64
30142
2003-04
7
61746
3243
546647
10145
373117
6093
27427
196395
104184
241626
268068
1462966
67451
29032
63005
209
Table 4a: Revenue from Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
30688
133
15102
47967
163516
Bihar
1790
9869
2452
3579
2576
Goa
103515
110615
152972
524689
552007
Gujrat
564
5055
6251
4962
12226
Haryana
80542
108187
129044
266159
342397
Karnataka
6979
19019
15964
18636
11521
Kerala
0
61
2501
12776
26843
Madhya Pr.
132772
122332
74149
87986
153280
Maharashtra
104632
103567
33778
30231
22803
Orissa
45556
59431
63992
189588
199644
Punjab
62113
77995
85579
153109
219677
Rajasthan
501897
564424
647166
1253136
1292763
Tamil Nadu
24970
40154
23243
88458
82584
Uttar Pr.
798
871
829
1582
64
West Bengal
7710
11825
15068
36692
30092
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 4b: Revenue from Sewage and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
9207
48103
36636
42977
8
Bihar
14734
0
10929
0
0
Goa
3302
2040
2071
6655
5108
Gujrat
0
0
0
0
0
Haryana
440
1059
1496
20878
15778
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
41
45
45
0
0
Madhya Pr.
18673
8921
20327
27140
40573
Maharashtra
2391
8248
664
20757
4243
Orissa
11322
0
0
0
33258
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
54933
90382
110457
145126
137276
Tamil Nadu
3
11
431
17
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
West Bengal
4
15
169
14
51
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
54585
3243
504103
10145
357875
6093
99
177753
38422
241560
268068
1308773
67451
29032
62663
2003-04
7
7161
0
42544
0
15242
0
27328
18642
65762
66
0
154193
0
0
341
210
Table 4c: Revenue from Rural Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
30522
5
14905
44381
65227
Bihar
0
0
0
1494
1639
Goa
19318
15678
20667
120517
129787
Gujrat
222
435
0
0
672
Haryana
579
962
488
29963
33090
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
0
1
0
0
1
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
4
4306
Maharashtra
143
1199
0
2642
466
Orissa
705
58664
862
3516
3978
Punjab
29481
37706
38866
112163
168669
Rajasthan
93698
103654
111819
234170
240124
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
West Bengal
2
7
16
2
1
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 4d: Revenue from Urban Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
71
106
197
40
2
Bihar
842
8279
0
75
705
Goa
78792
91708
120735
378297
400283
Gujrat
0
0
0
0
1645
Haryana
12653
17528
30770
161911
148038
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
0
0
0
9
14471
Madhya Pr.
94973
71760
40609
60511
127449
Maharashtra
250
448
2274
63
0
Orissa
44834
767
54307
156637
195666
Punjab
3758
5448
11261
14543
18003
Rajasthan
405259
456741
532257
1011753
1035806
Tamil Nadu
16135
38536
22707
2639
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
West Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
54585
543
136990
7920
56505
0
23
48
1757
4296
204996
253509
0
0
2
2003-04
7
0
118
341311
243
172286
0
22
155002
40
183014
29389
1042201
0
0
0
211
Table 5: Revenue from Forestry and Wildlife (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
704390
1028611
1447604
462041
710972
Bihar
389227
369055
273376
170704
100366
Goa
11482
13887
13882
11793
7305
Gujrat
152339
167516
147232
283399
324857
Haryana
118482
133603
178007
245332
289682
Karnataka
919799
950793
1060910
1009008
1015229
Kerala
1029584
1368849
1607654
1137026
1495799
Madhya Pr.
4921154
5231477
5738382
3064501
4973028
Maharashtra
1360464
1927965
1439812
1341420
1045786
Orissa
994715
1188017
682624
879496
970416
Punjab
52826
51469
68547
151164
158154
Rajasthan
112947
136464
135979
448245
416302
Tamil Nadu
552670
648061
579660
970398
1574363
Uttar Pr.
1211593
818935
1010808
683114
862714
West Bengal
324433
446093
442698
267185
565222
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 5a: Revenue from Total Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
703728
1028463
1440481
462106
710825
Bihar
389227
369055
273376
134274
94653
Goa
11482
13887
13882
11793
7305
Gujrat
151177
166452
145657
282326
320430
Haryana
118177
133093
177632
245332
289682
Karnataka
917310
947766
1057331
1000913
1006936
Kerala
1029584
1368849
1607654
1137026
1495799
Madhya Pr.
4921154
5231477
5738382
3064501
4973028
Maharashtra
1250157
1920929
1426246
1341816
1031186
Orissa
993260
1183652
678901
871722
961614
Punjab
52826
51469
68547
151164
158154
Rajasthan
109884
132725
130641
426597
401904
Tamil Nadu
552670
648061
579131
970398
1574363
Uttar Pr.
1087761
812113
1003269
683114
862714
West Bengal
319449
441794
439399
245708
548776
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
929466
62884
18057
498567
254798
1806563
1871833
4967478
863250
486372
80834
395329
902127
609607
459744
2003-04
7
928994
37664
18057
490874
254796
1797745
1871833
4967478
847083
478612
80834
358573
902127
609607
436875
212
Table 5b: Revenue from Other Sources (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
21384
162064
153739
126156
194139
Bihar
77641
94453
38935
76202
63719
Goa
889
1046
10827
6127
6309
Gujrat
19187
21282
27973
58643
49822
Haryana
42449
57115
64618
234060
257385
Karnataka
80095
95770
123830
281935
257733
Kerala
31132
43867
59760
60776
42675
Madhya Pr.
4597834
4888188
5392798
2697504
4528005
Maharashtra
298039
527820
240462
107569
75102
Orissa
13975
98853
24985
41664
100281
Punjab
7929
11365
12659
23331
105353
Rajasthan
38358
45235
53404
156591
170189
Tamil Nadu
375720
425713
410824
269180
315220
Uttar Pr.
142609
157033
175604
683114
862714
West Bengal
54656
56338
88866
56882
122733
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 5c: Revenue from Sale of Forest Products (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
682344
866400
1286742
335950
516686
Bihar
311586
274602
234442
58072
30934
Goa
10592
12841
3056
5666
996
Gujrat
131989
145170
117684
223684
270608
Haryana
75728
75978
113014
11272
32297
Karnataka
837215
851996
933501
718978
749203
Kerala
998453
1324982
1547894
1076250
1453124
Madhya Pr.
323320
343289
345584
366997
444996
Maharashtra
952118
1393109
1185784
1234247
956084
Orissa
979285
1084799
653916
830058
861333
Punjab
44897
40104
55888
127833
52801
Rajasthan
71526
87490
77237
270006
231715
Tamil Nadu
176950
222348
168308
701218
1259143
Uttar Pr.
945152
655080
827665
0
0
West Bengal
264793
385456
350533
188826
426043
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
240180
22659
15992
107753
119613
1170860
70650
4564100
69365
105122
29556
123433
440193
609607
69516
2003-04
7
688814
15005
2065
383121
135183
626885
1801183
403378
777718
373490
51278
235140
461934
0
367358
213
Table 5d: Revenue from Total Environmental Forestry and Wildlife (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
662
148
7124
-65
148
472
Bihar
0
0
0
36430
5713
25220
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
1163
1064
1575
1073
4427
7693
Haryana
306
510
375
0
0
2
Karnataka
2489
3027
3579
8095
8293
8818
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
0
Maharashtra
110307
7036
13566
-396
14600
16167
Orissa
1455
4365
3723
7774
8802
7760
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
3063
3739
5338
21648
14398
36756
Tamil Nadu
0
0
528
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
123832
6822
7539
0
0
0
West Bengal
4983
4299
3299
21477
16447
22870
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 6: Revenue from Major and Medium Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
767947
1038048
946123
102671
Bihar
180238
161337
308012
155790
Goa
1774
8478
4709
136961
Gujrat
309868
425904
372244
1320860
Haryana
203822
191920
210025
685064
Karnataka
135517
131934
169287
205641
Kerala
23557
17936
26630
29933
Madhya Pr.
232412
401943
364856
271296
Maharashtra
782886
709854
770174
860345
Orissa
54989
49293
111864
165342
Punjab
164121
314564
301415
163332
Rajasthan
199235
210938
214423
184297
Tamil Nadu
36679
36447
37127
105059
Uttar Pr.
1612310
654816
1039534
1157584
West Bengal
23057
30417
27985
36720
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
84700
154338
42568
2672334
520454
209323
36510
246363
1130511
225297
244710
207403
95204
901217
34918
2003-04
7
155239
262230
29351
2027755
1829962
118097
61011
377985
2306917
322908
124438
432338
127106
1360978
40017
214
Table 7: Revenue from Minor Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
101324
81354
73995
16276
Bihar
12168
3575
4131
8041
Goa
1551
1980
1554
1960
Gujrat
21312
34531
38140
27988
Haryana
623
552
571
1079
Karnataka
7040
9023
12208
31769
Kerala
4746
5624
4630
8226
Madhya Pr.
89827
88687
77438
120218
Maharashtra
110753
170117
145931
55521
Orissa
8648
7682
19183
17033
Punjab
1578
2542
2846
1169
Rajasthan
114351
171182
232101
191564
Tamil Nadu
21897
25809
32269
29666
Uttar Pr.
219103
279404
405829
177312
West Bengal
46702
52875
50556
73739
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
13280
4551
113080
48004
686
35415
10369
105811
78294
19840
1334
267283
31678
121120
69181
2003-04
7
14437
16302
18065
108912
1229
42609
13833
72176
207033
37754
1358
182315
69675
185270
162817
Table 7a: Revenue from Total Surface Water (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
12069
4650
1335
170
Bihar
0
3575
0
4627
Goa
739
1761
971
1790
Gujrat
3842
7216
4993
14428
Haryana
623
552
571
1079
Karnataka
2575
2591
4605
20361
Kerala
4384
4973
4529
4547
Madhya Pr.
89827
88687
77438
119804
Maharashtra
110753
170117
145931
55521
Orissa
8648
7682
19183
17033
Punjab
9
906
693
263
Rajasthan
9500
9546
10307
11948
Tamil Nadu
127
2
672
3572
Uttar Pr.
210706
259862
207733
107788
West Bengal
42295
44512
45539
57183
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
105
3948
113001
27765
686
35438
7365
105811
78294
19840
11
11114
0
36639
53687
2003-04
7
564
8185
18012
92778
1229
39875
9121
72176
207033
33525
251
10831
0
185270
114061
215
Table 7b: Revenue from Total Ground Water (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
2253
2580
3878
431
999
Bihar
12168
0
4131
3412
421
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
2086
2592
712
1336
-768
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
4579
6539
7708
15304
0
Kerala
49
79
98
2980
1954
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
1
0
Maharashtra
0
0
0
0
0
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
204
1392
448
474
630
Rajasthan
104851
161636
221794
179616
256169
Tamil Nadu
21527
25791
31579
25651
31678
Uttar Pr.
4507
19541
198096
32568
9984
West Bengal
1491
5136
1536
13484
14708
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 7c: Revenue from Total Water Tanks (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
2762
2544
266
24
120
Bihar
0
0
0
1920
2246
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
604
3013
2056
5303
18144
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
0
20361
21400
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
Maharashtra
223
2207
362
5319
7325
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
1
0
263
6
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
-2468
1775
5448
West Bengal
8509
9310
8613
11442
13406
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
5491
7631
0
3847
0
2758
4688
0
0
245
782
171484
69675
0
43239
2003-04
7
44
1488
0
74642
0
0
0
0
47473
0
224
0
0
122216
26440
216
Table 7d: Revenue from Total Lift Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
1904
2024
1055
119
Bihar
0
0
0
155
Goa
393
1089
335
538
Gujrat
149
3506
2353
3755
Haryana
623
552
571
1079
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
Kerala
1955
1761
1490
1438
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
0
Maharashtra
441
398
404
447
Orissa
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
127
2
0
510
Uttar Pr.
166372
195775
201392
3094
West Bengal
33633
33054
36792
40985
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
236
264
107145
5228
686
0
1889
0
1301
0
0
0
0
7114
33390
2003-04
7
517
7
12146
11462
1229
0
1629
0
7168
3777
7
0
0
63053
65565
Table 8: Revenue from Industries (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
743
733
3460
91185
Bihar
3456
1915
2846
1608
Goa
64
6
41
10
Gujrat
12646
8945
21144
28686
Haryana
2881
4195
1545
1624
Karnataka
90617
174559
85468
-36618
Kerala
3600
2937
2760
1361
Madhya Pr.
24052
26497
38568
23068
Maharashtra
9227
9780
26639
1955
Orissa
1169
966
1739
832
Punjab
118
236
420
7061
Rajasthan
10924
26123
27158
7815
Tamil Nadu
2084
2147
2214
1764
Uttar Pr.
8265
16385
16440
413
West Bengal
75780
51955
53793
31297
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
5603
451
45
62475
306
36810
855
20895
976
952
1377
6464
1266
181
22801
2003-04
7
111438
266
329
65386
2668
97749
1207
24642
70267
229
151
8754
1759
356
39029
217
Table 9: Revenue from Non Ferrous and Metallurgical Industries (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
2756389
2849544
3575742
5991178
7796594
7715675
Bihar
6785420
7043479
7690875
392001
612033
733443
Goa
92878
91685
101064
131352
157811
193916
Gujrat
3810441
4104869
4266914
7345758
10728282
13423429
Haryana
184099
226509
231284
1398735
1188760
769835
Karnataka
411863
614473
1048311
1471318
1575533
2221480
Kerala
47031
54143
60582
162920
187606
183651
Madhya Pr.
4751152
5885088
8009416
21077
5906865
6467113
Maharashtra
1416111
2270250
2846513
3471661
4006057
4755013
Orissa
1310985
1700534
2417366
3785566
4435774
5520562
Punjab
10207
17842
18383
36997
74603
108654
Rajasthan
1630430
1827506
2145222
4129780
4493767
5136959
Tamil Nadu
535725
630278
672058
1603966
1810860
3775385
Uttar Pr.
611561
1203111
1481080
1901865
2625383
2510475
West Bengal
102896
121314
80583
79519
68688
139099
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Table 10: Revenue from Roads and Bridges (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
Andhra Pr.
103708
161247
134881
383259
462626
Bihar
79105
76746
91195
40521
104206
Goa
16036
19056
27209
33132
27822
Gujrat
20023
25691
26127
61317
44772
Haryana
439
531
1133
8302
7995
Karnataka
36920
54037
60103
192930
179222
Kerala
75081
80510
114343
141463
203037
Madhya Pr.
123204
189971
208052
35980
31374
Maharashtra
41662
70964
140777
5337
3758
Orissa
40118
46328
62979
130224
112482
Punjab
4715
13472
2340
910
10816
Rajasthan
19466
23660
38256
27849
39794
Tamil Nadu
155015
161557
121492
255538
266320
Uttar Pr.
173164
181818
160192
162653
179744
West Bengal
93874
80161
81512
204193
222988
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2003-04
7
274206
106263
40768
293623
6687
338036
186785
32596
6402
129031
1401
59494
245983
417926
220775
218
Table 1: Revenue Expenditure on Public Works (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
402062
468774
492689
422127
Bihar
458618
539596
542415
635696
Goa
72678
88403
90974
182602
Gujarat
354947
426921
691506
769393
Haryana
226060
340856
309287
375593
Karnataka
1055443
1138888
1322929
1926144
Kerala
135829
160348
273365
446629
Madhya Pr.
575149
387084
643665
489681
Maharashtra
1257440
563283
1136860
3616085
Orissa
181515
330607
421393
2417909
Punjab
448238
1001682
632842
1341161
Rajasthan
366399
267966
332412
543332
Tamil Nadu
760324
813782
967395
746678
Uttar Pr.
1522521
1440366
1813399
4809175
West Bengal
704754
829550
912901
1889625
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
252138
876513
183565
947587
796538
1981131
619733
556483
2593645
-243566
1449339
477807
956170
3702692
1614055
2003-04
7
386840
928180
193848
859528
691513
2101875
521418
694882
2941928
714209
1593206
496872
820496
4750345
1719727
Table 2: Capital Expenditure on Public Works (Machinery & Equipment and Maintenance &
Repairs) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
179379
192033
209136
71777
Bihar
19635
195880
129848
202094
Goa
36598
36301
41437
80557
Gujarat
243161
279771
201896
462756
Haryana
76665
80720
82288
89256
Karnataka
103265
113006
131847
401965
Kerala
90052
94571
127086
190716
Madhya Pr.
286676
304269
362736
268094
Maharashtra
1149615
1144351
1195308
1148948
Orissa
184497
206042
246549
509209
Punjab
238676
240601
261542
349055
Rajasthan
212317
247400
236166
299111
Tamil Nadu
338631
404125
499380
313101
Uttar Pr.
151493
148022
174744
167421
West
Bengal
473100
540071
511485
775380
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
94072
422176
83321
611087
96007
473966
432501
320985
1165394
337619
342011
244395
601098
233627
2003-04
7
9393
505461
89423
540297
104261
557148
213358
362337
1478762
436329
69610
263375
821415
296155
604553
652525
219
Table 3: Capital Exp. on Public Works (excluding Machinery & Equipment and Maintenance &
Repairs) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
222683
276742
283553
350350
Bihar
438983
343716
412567
433602
Goa
36080
52102
49537
102045
Gujarat
111786
147151
489610
306637
Haryana
149395
260136
226999
286337
Karnataka
952179
1025882
1191082
1524180
Kerala
45777
65778
146279
255913
Madhya Pr.
288473
82816
280929
221588
Maharashtra
107825
-581069
-58448
2467137
Orissa
-2982
124565
174843
1908700
Punjab
209562
761081
371301
992106
Rajasthan
154082
20566
96246
244222
Tamil Nadu
421693
409657
468015
433577
Uttar Pr.
1371028
1292344
1638656
4641754
West
Bengal
231654
289479
401415
1114245
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
158065
454337
100244
336500
700531
1507165
187232
235498
1428251
-581185
1107328
233413
355072
3469065
2003-04
7
377447
422719
104425
319231
587252
1544727
308060
332545
1463166
277880
1523596
233497
-919
4454190
1009502
1067202
Table 4: Revenue Expenditure on General Education, Sports, Art & Culture
(TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
14593866
16895224
17152478
37942024
Bihar
15637237
17023721
20090671
24781305
Goa
912028
990705
1194060
2376114
Gujarat
13692049
15609754
18711691
32581543
Haryana
4602491
5360323
6512960
14761448
Karnataka
12781222
14481330
17029522
35014063
Kerala
11454999
13510750
14351342
24709968
Madhya Pr.
12426705
13638200
16503104
21100399
Maharashtra
26470657
29948553
35980482
93819809
Orissa
6881552
8152360
9424832
17333443
Punjab
6876841
7656630
8954758
18322904
Rajasthan
12286696
14522764
16977895
34309775
Tamil Nadu
17409210
19203415
21805917
42928688
Uttar Pr.
23580826
28664045
33831738
60423781
West
Bengal
16334189
17793833
19569438
45434129
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
40257366
27035118
2775990
36239832
14471810
35640113
29675613
22955795
89371019
18827919
20918434
33105439
41453271
60670518
2003-04
7
46657704
28217622
2806175
36834003
15358726
37660212
30801187
23553393
94323003
18818334
20803782
36348853
41750611
62545827
44008066
45191912
220
Table 5: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
13829133
16116128
16338290
35933271
Bihar
15357578
16740037
19778938
24489163
Goa
822257
889427
1053082
2059251
Gujarat
13100439
14955497
17956316
31359383
Haryana
4363770
5064142
6191995
14010404
Karnataka
12108624
13689949
16118351
33563170
Kerala
10767711
12738521
13478721
23080581
Madhya Pr.
11765407
12833656
15498071
20062352
Maharashtra
24596140
27967346
33858863
90451220
Orissa
6598971
7744328
9006075
16942629
Punjab
6476554
7060732
8329093
17622896
Rajasthan
11914345
14112317
16531033
33591331
Tamil Nadu
16510928
18080189
20594635
41117249
Uttar Pr.
22506469
27516542
32550864
59067661
West
Bengal
15761946
17138034
18885735
43859842
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
37909119
26728430
2423794
34816856
13799523
33996388
27875829
21614098
85380642
18370146
20131001
32424351
39539279
59168323
2003-04
7
42895581
27776291
2415908
35255414
14606361
36099357
28866226
22303232
90142004
18339405
20019267
35649424
40048250
61063474
42677084
43871367
Table 6: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
9320898
11265449
11451664
24016045
Bihar
2162972
1908693
2171970
3154757
Goa
409813
454940
531293
1081592
Gujarat
5401813
6044615
7719168
12648571
Haryana
576285
648266
786067
1795696
Karnataka
9895841
11446388
13407206
28487125
Kerala
6575915
7734673
8008821
14722629
Madhya Pr.
1252976
1459902
2231366
2801791
Maharashtra
23160104
26893281
32654714
89104750
Orissa
1854957
2474063
3005737
2818319
Punjab
1078846
1221659
1403998
2235636
Rajasthan
3759529
4651542
5451794
11453741
Tamil Nadu
5872313
6540887
7361904
15253814
Uttar Pr.
19523692
23924286
27210419
53564457
West
Bengal
9173063
10151101
17458537
39476135
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
25585083
3910428
1359772
14984083
1572533
28537225
18231934
4033511
83590204
2133899
2679237
10309543
14893205
53401289
2003-04
7
29426484
4759456
1252279
15484797
1786369
29911004
18806218
4673733
88284388
2204921
2168541
11790611
14559925
55960890
38883807
40282314
221
Table 7: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
4508235
4850679
4886627
11917226
Bihar
13194606
14831345
17606968
21334406
Goa
412444
434488
521788
977659
Gujarat
7698625
8910882
10237148
18710812
Haryana
3787485
4415876
5405929
12214709
Karnataka
2212783
2243561
2711145
5076046
Kerala
4191796
5003848
5469899
8357951
Madhya Pr.
10512431
11373754
13266705
17260561
Maharashtra
1436036
1074064
1204149
1346470
Orissa
4744014
5270265
6000338
14124310
Punjab
5397708
5839073
6925095
15387260
Rajasthan
8154816
9460775
11079238
22137590
Tamil Nadu
10638615
11539302
13232730
25863434
Uttar Pr.
2982777
3592256
5340445
5503205
West
Bengal
6588883
6986932
1427198
4383708
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
12324037
22818001
1064022
19832774
12226990
5459163
9643895
17580586
1790439
16236247
17451764
22114808
24646074
5767033
2003-04
7
13469097
23016835
1163629
19770617
12819992
6188353
10060008
17629499
1857616
16134484
17850726
23858813
25488325
5102584
3793277
3589053
Table 8: Revenue Expenditure on Technical Education (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
445468
463353
482814
876813
1229056
1036296
Bihar
184693
188593
196946
148111
157401
253032
Goa
40438
47284
72993
141943
152365
161347
Gujarat
390741
437619
504103
896678
1058520
1119347
Haryana
123595
152801
162354
385736
386757
427616
Karnataka
310051
382222
409341
734855
873985
695463
Kerala
486639
550361
592180
1176601
1204747
1303543
Madhya Pr.
439535
533427
670567
676809
889828
787806
Maharashtra
1106669
1478255
1530647
2394350
2787068
2721577
Orissa
147506
246865
257180
191179
236165
227158
Punjab
186208
348646
380399
228278
323978
366917
Rajasthan
191595
229681
241728
406475
366085
346323
Tamil Nadu
585452
616894
638041
1256690
1141446
1059765
Uttar Pr.
678974
751684
823516
754439
693870
664990
West
Bengal
318557
364455
373872
757289
675126
615546
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Finance Accounts, Different States, Relevant
Years.
222
Table 9: Revenue Expenditure on Technical Education (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
133970
150297
153003
247001
271668
226566
Bihar
25217
24714
27392
30087
27938
19829
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujarat
11456
14542
18806
36718
43010
45767
Haryana
25831
33649
32176
112291
141213
172323
Karnataka
121652
119294
118167
327968
447926
252407
Kerala
162242
170673
176106
352585
376061
417354
Madhya Pr.
139808
147139
189358
209381
428970
337451
Maharashtra
597296
669838
880115
1411548
1798022
1608036
Orissa
12530
22331
9020
10685
2020
1349
Punjab
15414
31161
21132
20630
47993
0
Rajasthan
83636
102131
119949
165557
166596
137169
Tamil Nadu
122132
124421
125967
307353
251408
219227
Uttar Pr.
277649
300631
284549
192384
140871
123439
West
Bengal
69028
73352
69878
135292
115160
128569
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 10: Revenue Expenditure on Technical Education (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
311498
313056
329811
629812
Bihar
159476
163879
169554
118024
Goa
40438
47284
72993
141943
Gujarat
379285
423077
485296
859960
Haryana
97764
119152
130178
273445
Karnataka
188399
262929
291174
406887
Kerala
324397
379688
416074
824016
Madhya Pr.
299728
386288
481209
467429
Maharashtra
509373
808417
650531
982802
Orissa
134976
224534
248160
180494
Punjab
170794
317485
359267
207648
Rajasthan
107960
127550
121778
240918
Tamil Nadu
463320
492473
512074
949337
Uttar Pr.
401325
451053
538967
562055
West
Bengal
249528
291102
303994
621997
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
957389
129464
152365
1015510
245544
426059
828686
460858
989046
234145
275985
199489
890038
552999
2003-04
7
809730
233203
161347
1073580
255293
443056
886189
450355
1113541
225809
366917
209154
840538
541550
559966
486977
223
Table 11: Revenue Expenditure on Sports & Youth Services (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
167176
152122
167686
808124
Bihar
70387
68809
83862
97636
Goa
25565
28727
31279
102387
Gujarat
128566
137763
155410
192228
Haryana
104158
130934
143076
300247
Karnataka
171930
213603
266215
304934
Kerala
112983
115325
149546
214517
Madhya Pr.
137884
189100
221969
170026
Maharashtra
598750
278878
342875
532457
Orissa
94953
114973
114794
107077
Punjab
184205
212880
203436
310172
Rajasthan
111273
108083
117429
161787
Tamil Nadu
138264
244221
354504
224165
Uttar Pr.
296533
307648
322136
374222
West
Bengal
178767
208919
224625
687675
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
792824
102231
115162
217332
242139
298157
293375
249407
688682
113304
227701
178158
329234
446027
2003-04
7
2357913
99804
132769
232542
256740
354839
299224
248086
713369
125113
203427
211151
290838
447553
476156
541014
Table 12: Revenue Expenditure on Sports & Youth Services (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
0
399
27
85304
128960
141502
Bihar
0
0
0
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujarat
786
943
55
2213
2585
4956
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
35012
40988
44390
42304
37944
38288
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
10494
13486
19272
0
0
2847
Maharashtra
1231
3269
1730
11085
5313
10212
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
1795
2050
1690
1250
1150
1050
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
0
West
Bengal
275
271
264
12127
4629
812
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
224
Table 13: Revenue Expenditure on Sports & Youth Services (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
167176
151723
167659
722820
Bihar
70387
68809
83862
97636
Goa
25565
28727
31279
102387
Gujarat
127780
136820
155355
190015
Haryana
104158
130934
143076
300247
Karnataka
136918
172615
221825
262630
Kerala
112983
115325
149546
214517
Madhya Pr.
127390
175614
202697
170026
Maharashtra
597519
275608
341145
521372
Orissa
94953
114973
114794
107077
Punjab
184205
212880
203436
310172
Rajasthan
109478
106033
115739
160537
Tamil Nadu
138264
244221
354504
224165
Uttar Pr.
296533
307648
322136
374222
West
Bengal
178493
208648
224361
675548
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
663865
102231
115162
214747
242139
260213
293375
249407
683369
113304
227701
177008
329234
446027
2003-04
7
2216411
99804
132769
227586
256740
316551
299224
245239
703157
125113
203427
210101
290838
447553
471528
540202
Table 14: Revenue Expenditure on Art & Culture (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
152088
163621
163688
323816
Bihar
24579
26281
30924
46395
Goa
23768
25267
36707
72533
Gujarat
72303
78875
95862
133254
Haryana
10968
12447
15535
65060
Karnataka
190618
195556
235615
411103
Kerala
87666
106543
130896
238269
Madhya Pr.
83878
82017
112498
191212
Maharashtra
169098
224075
248097
441783
Orissa
40121
46194
46783
92558
Punjab
29873
34372
41830
161557
Rajasthan
69482
72683
87706
150182
Tamil Nadu
174565
262111
218738
330584
Uttar Pr.
98850
88171
135222
227459
West
Bengal
74919
82425
85206
129322
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
326366
47057
84669
147125
43391
471582
301662
202463
514627
108303
235754
136844
443312
362298
2003-04
7
367914
88495
96150
226700
68009
510553
332194
214269
746053
126658
214171
141955
351758
369811
179699
163986
225
Table 15: Revenue Expenditure on Art & Culture (Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
0
420
0
0
1050
1050
Bihar
191
250
271
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujarat
5655
6249
5266
11326
10881
11775
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
1162
0
0
931
Kerala
0
0
1
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
5841
3174
6548
5800
9835
6934
Maharashtra
27461
35804
-1106
3529
0
12040
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
0
West
Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 16: Revenue Expenditure on Art & Culture (excluding Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
152088
163201
163688
323816
Bihar
24387
26031
30653
46395
Goa
23768
25267
36707
72533
Gujarat
66648
72626
90596
121927
Haryana
10968
12447
15535
65060
Karnataka
190618
195556
234454
411103
Kerala
87666
106543
130895
238269
Madhya Pr.
78038
78843
105951
185412
Maharashtra
141637
188271
249203
438255
Orissa
40121
46194
46783
92558
Punjab
29873
34372
41830
161557
Rajasthan
69482
72683
87706
150182
Tamil Nadu
174565
262111
218738
330584
Uttar Pr.
98850
88171
135222
227459
West
Bengal
74919
82425
85206
129322
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
325316
47057
84669
136244
43391
471582
301662
192628
514627
108303
235754
136844
443312
362298
2003-04
7
366864
88495
96150
214925
68009
509622
332194
207335
734013
126658
214171
141955
351758
369811
179699
163986
226
Table 17: Capital Expenditure on General Education (Secondary Education: TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
14274602
16579481
16821104
36810084
Bihar
15542271
16928630
19975884
24637274
Goa
862695
936712
1126074
2201194
Gujarat
13491180
15393116
18460419
32256061
Haryana
4487365
5216943
6354349
14396141
Karnataka
12418675
14072172
16527692
34298025
Kerala
11254350
13288882
14070900
24257182
Madhya Pr.
12204943
13367083
16168638
20739161
Maharashtra
25702809
29445600
35389510
92845569
Orissa
6746477
7991192
9263255
17133808
Punjab
6662762
7409378
8709492
17851174
Rajasthan
12105941
14341997
16772760
33997805
Tamil Nadu
17096380
18697083
21232675
42373938
Uttar Pr.
23185443
28268226
33374380
59822100
West
Bengal
16080503
17502488
19259607
44617132
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
39138176
26885831
2576159
35875376
14186280
34870374
29080576
22503926
88167710
18606312
20454979
32790437
40680725
59862193
2003-04
7
43931877
28029323
2577256
36374761
15033977
36794820
30169769
23091038
92863581
18566563
20386184
35995747
41108015
61728463
43352210
44486912
Table 18: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Elementary Education: TOTAL) (Rs. in
000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
6050368
7223097
7246894
16594274
Bihar
9923184
11192364
13502031
15850801
Goa
247095
270924
317689
589290
Gujarat
7316769
8452588
9873067
17651539
Haryana
2053233
2388894
2998619
6664859
Karnataka
6511001
7165647
8581860
17847388
Kerala
5247841
6539234
6723372
10460522
Madhya Pr.
7442009
8092194
9848563
13504375
Maharashtra
11619958
12751815
16061336
50072055
Orissa
3882118
4450596
5094293
9826086
Punjab
2174516
2260310
2657588
4589245
Rajasthan
6461951
7912907
9396401
18874781
Tamil Nadu
8087916
8868284
9972429
18752839
Uttar Pr.
11165784
15122580
19132186
37515134
West
Bengal
5598502
5869922
6578739
15417538
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
17286863
17314910
591708
19581278
6868824
17957800
12356315
14512406
40755799
10774161
5796795
18751186
17806156
34588596
2003-04
7
20103213
17501003
530281
19240216
7122594
20242846
12847327
15754025
41144047
10831111
5074466
20335942
17521479
36035379
14221743
14926704
227
Table 19: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Elementary Education: Assistance) (Rs. in
000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
4902813
6006940
6030806
12819634
13585226
15996709
Bihar
184099
150000
165663
65723
308292
253382
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujarat
175227
211771
375322
389495
788821
624476
Haryana
30434
33085
35695
91807
87015
72926
Karnataka
5478627
6295162
7274069
16084410
15926240
17639288
Kerala
3124068
3826581
3828673
6560174
8019413
8278285
Madhya Pr.
355013
430166
846905
1683901
2371334
3404753
Maharashtra
11141490
12332414
15561654
49151289
39311236
39546327
Orissa
123509
237279
229974
272451
138124
210021
Punjab
16636
20016
23014
61034
34364
70000
Rajasthan
2690265
3441999
4065035
8625876
8177827
9372798
Tamil Nadu
2608984
2886607
3213590
5979756
5531623
5395706
Uttar Pr.
10159447
13909674
16930125
35693559
32855639
34833417
West
Bengal
0
0
6271921
13450619
12873558
13466387
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 20: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Elementary Education: excluding
Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
1147555
1216157
1216088
3774639
Bihar
9739086
11042364
13336368
15785078
Goa
247095
270924
317689
589290
Gujarat
7141542
8240817
9497745
17262044
Haryana
2022799
2355809
2962924
6573052
Karnataka
1032373
870485
1307791
1762978
Kerala
2123773
2712653
2894699
3900349
Madhya Pr.
7086996
7662028
9001658
11820474
Maharashtra
478468
419401
499682
920766
Orissa
3758609
4213317
4864319
9553635
Punjab
2157880
2240294
2634574
4528211
Rajasthan
3771685
4470908
5331366
10248905
Tamil Nadu
5478932
5981677
6758839
12773083
Uttar Pr.
1006337
1212906
2202061
1821576
West
Bengal
5598502
5869922
306818
1966919
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
3701637
17006618
591708
18792457
6781809
2031560
4336902
12141071
1444563
10636037
5762431
10573359
12274532
1732956
2003-04
7
4106504
17247621
530281
18615740
7049668
2603558
4569042
12349272
1597720
10621090
5004466
10963144
12125773
1201962
1348185
1460317
228
Table 21: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Secondary Education: TOTAL) (Rs. in
000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
4413144
5146237
5370811
11105837
Bihar
3275056
3405742
3879598
5145516
Goa
437500
480021
557899
1184899
Gujarat
4373171
4934608
6179798
10422207
Haryana
1607801
1866587
2229036
5238859
Karnataka
3652132
4217694
5067352
10582603
Kerala
3339515
4009045
4334067
7552272
Madhya Pr.
2773580
3041326
3573816
3768775
Maharashtra
9660729
11431253
13578976
31468894
Orissa
1657760
1920039
2282198
3708955
Punjab
3318620
3667400
4372825
11189190
Rajasthan
4189737
4764170
5466836
10947377
Tamil Nadu
6140937
6810886
7858700
16271270
Uttar Pr.
8311201
9213105
10293185
16049196
West
Bengal
7740057
8506375
9390800
21431305
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
12190865
5144904
1493510
11528087
5025413
10542663
9563024
3767017
34285719
4783763
11596557
10882846
16157882
19374205
2003-04
7
13500098
5300186
1499026
12049851
5287347
10288741
10640226
3688938
39755528
4709394
12359809
12010962
16225403
19347684
21558986
22159303
Table 22: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Secondary Education: Assistance) (Rs. in
000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
3495095
4177066
4374320
8715519
Bihar
166073
162799
110000
118602
Goa
364256
402089
465865
928330
Gujarat
4058536
4547641
5710104
9320774
Haryana
108603
119930
121507
589186
Karnataka
2953051
3409074
4130541
8657896
Kerala
1697875
2177593
2354768
4130521
Madhya Pr.
423068
529262
679236
283620
Maharashtra
9486016
11632272
13957585
32167960
Orissa
1221691
1436936
1764373
757880
Punjab
365412
384622
437390
1029328
Rajasthan
370133
425928
477992
1098522
Tamil Nadu
2116807
2371259
2742435
5951139
Uttar Pr.
6699762
7352531
8001474
13505413
West
Bengal
7368522
7938008
8939330
20462559
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
9497666
148931
1177890
10921720
336000
8582214
5451890
438211
34989051
350409
962752
972091
5886371
16509025
2003-04
7
10400259
241132
1069355
11447914
320228
8271705
6296496
469415
40492077
361994
964454
1090532
5914891
16611196
20509475
21366059
229
Table 23: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Secondary Education: excluding
Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
918049
969171
996491
2390318
Bihar
3108982
3242942
3769598
5026914
Goa
73244
77931
92034
256569
Gujarat
314636
386966
469694
1101433
Haryana
1499198
1746657
2107529
4649673
Karnataka
699081
808620
936811
1924707
Kerala
1641640
1831452
1979298
3421751
Madhya Pr.
2350512
2512065
2894580
3485156
Maharashtra
174713
-201019
-378609
-699067
Orissa
436068
483102
517825
2951075
Punjab
2953207
3282778
3935434
10159862
Rajasthan
3819603
4338242
4988844
9848855
Tamil Nadu
4024130
4439627
5116265
10320130
Uttar Pr.
1611439
1860574
2291711
2543782
West
Bengal
371535
568367
451470
968747
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
2693199
4995974
315621
606367
4689413
1960449
4111134
3328805
-703331
4433353
10633805
9910755
10271511
2865180
2003-04
7
3099839
5059054
429671
601937
4967119
2017036
4343730
3219523
-736549
4347400
11395355
10920430
10310512
2736488
1049511
793244
Table 24: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Uni. & Higher Education: TOTAL) (Rs. in
000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
3104706
3482103
3504443
7650210
Bihar
1843297
1642088
1927801
3093453
Goa
116382
121553
158153
249692
Gujarat
1236840
1366392
1730917
3084830
Haryana
653765
741392
899825
2014135
Karnataka
1765274
2012078
2185477
4450604
Kerala
2080492
2093288
2220871
4885656
Madhya Pr.
1390844
1522050
1873851
2672025
Maharashtra
2649916
3050477
3259120
8028655
Orissa
937689
1258126
1511372
3205460
Punjab
917792
1049514
1210691
1715066
Rajasthan
982312
1108385
1275318
3217918
Tamil Nadu
1729763
1887631
2103859
4901614
Uttar Pr.
2740941
2878884
2502190
4742822
West
Bengal
2033611
2376857
2558536
6105834
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
7843518
3585504
290920
3401632
1821176
4764683
5509144
3146234
9297108
2639922
2591663
2279101
4884849
4461732
2003-04
7
8701973
4421202
344991
3491590
2097169
4760152
5012172
2766285
8476329
2640481
2437779
2712073
4608735
4971071
6002480
5957304
230
Table 25: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Uni. & Higher Education: Assistance) (Rs.
in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
922787
1075269
1046478
2456573
Bihar
1805549
1580761
1868838
2970432
Goa
101257
101050
134938
204299
Gujarat
1162589
1279673
1628278
2889056
Haryana
437249
495251
628865
1114703
Karnataka
1431722
1650624
1803907
3608069
Kerala
1753973
1730500
1825177
4031935
Madhya Pr.
423068
529262
679236
283620
Maharashtra
2505333
2896040
3075932
7731247
Orissa
502413
795346
1000095
1764133
Punjab
696799
817021
943593
1145273
Rajasthan
695493
779226
902321
1719829
Tamil Nadu
1145417
1282226
1404795
3322919
Uttar Pr.
2628207
2658605
2278125
4365485
West
Bengal
1802683
2165414
2224799
5561990
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
2491249
3453206
243082
3196191
1149518
3884767
4760631
438211
8995398
1625152
1682121
1147202
3475211
4036625
2003-04
7
3019431
4264942
274710
3263876
1393215
3854485
4231437
469415
8178725
1623706
1134087
1313279
3249328
4516277
5499774
5449217
Table 26: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Uni. & Higher Education: excluding
Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
2181920
2406835
2457965
5193636
Bihar
37749
61327
58963
123021
Goa
15126
20502
23215
45393
Gujarat
74251
86718
102639
195774
Haryana
216516
246141
270960
899433
Karnataka
333551
361454
381570
842535
Kerala
326519
362788
395694
853721
Madhya Pr.
967776
992789
1194615
2388406
Maharashtra
144583
154437
183189
297408
Orissa
435276
462780
511277
1441327
Punjab
220993
232493
267097
569793
Rajasthan
286820
329160
372997
1498088
Tamil Nadu
584346
605405
699064
1578695
Uttar Pr.
112734
220279
224065
377337
West
Bengal
230928
211443
333737
543844
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
5352269
132298
47838
205441
671658
879916
748513
2708023
301710
1014770
909542
1131899
1409637
425106
2003-04
7
5682542
156260
70280
227714
703954
905667
780735
2296870
297604
1016775
1303692
1398794
1359407
454794
502706
508087
231
Table 27: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Adult Education: TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
114629
99555
36860
231952
Bihar
38295
93688
125575
37827
Goa
10225
5345
5739
7158
Gujarat
56133
64172
61987
9033
Haryana
11363
16358
12666
9636
Karnataka
86447
97545
72611
44617
Kerala
16044
10306
6079
3819
Madhya Pr.
105978
113511
135241
43363
Maharashtra
92132
143893
123424
89573
Orissa
47955
35734
40828
13355
Punjab
4140
14036
5373
2302
Rajasthan
46023
74644
125115
31890
Tamil Nadu
101623
200047
99988
11643
Uttar Pr.
61841
72385
27098
0
West
Bengal
54812
96422
70453
116579
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
119679
89300
7702
11409
7441
54231
1646
39940
100794
18574
11063
29650
9890
0
2003-04
7
119256
37845
6341
11968
7620
53451
2570
15104
98178
17258
7847
32349
5113
0
37154
32298
Table 28: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Adult Education: Assistance) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
203
6147
46
24750
10553
9967
Bihar
7252
15132
27469
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujarat
5150
5000
5000
0
0
0
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
8767
27022
34297
33996
37686
38856
Kerala
0
0
203
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
18851
24584
29878
2273
0
0
Maharashtra
2713
3254
9330
0
0
0
Orissa
2052
2004
6580
2568
5503
3883
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
857
987
1228
1885
2320
2424
Tamil Nadu
1105
795
1084
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
36276
3477
695
0
0
0
West
Bengal
1858
47679
22487
967
1000
652
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
232
Table 29: Revenue Expenditure on General Education (Adult Education: excluding Assistance)
(Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
114425
93408
36814
207202
Bihar
31043
78556
98106
37827
Goa
10225
5345
5739
7158
Gujarat
50983
59172
56987
9033
Haryana
11363
16358
12666
9636
Karnataka
77681
70523
38314
10621
Kerala
16044
10306
5876
3819
Madhya Pr.
87127
88926
105364
41091
Maharashtra
89419
140639
114093
89573
Orissa
45902
33731
34248
10788
Punjab
4140
14036
5373
2302
Rajasthan
45166
73657
123886
30004
Tamil Nadu
100517
199252
98903
11643
Uttar Pr.
25564
68908
26403
0
West
Bengal
52955
48743
47966
115611
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
109126
89300
7702
11409
7441
16545
1646
39940
100794
13071
11063
27330
9890
0
2003-04
7
109289
37845
6341
11968
7620
14595
2570
15104
98178
13375
7847
29925
5113
0
36154
31646
Table 30: Revenue Expenditure on Total Medical and Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
4074686
4379018
4758640
10416268
Bihar
2914654
3106250
3440006
3692750
Goa
334973
349519
403987
829610
Gujrat
2954276
3439655
3917537
6268663
Haryana
982900
1131415
1292400
2652095
Karnataka
3281993
3765595
4049805
7862053
Kerala
2392789
2859158
3375641
6267781
Madhya Pr.
3310308
3712273
3850140
5800443
Maharashtra
5994125
6728672
7582883
15817733
Orissa
1450180
1655699
1936072
3586552
Punjab
1892716
2014375
2188799
5778798
Rajasthan
3079335
3586562
4078206
7676822
Tamil Nadu
4475096
4993877
5758216
9666265
Uttar Pr.
6834578
6501848
7871049
10920197
West
Bengal
4349384
4545678
5265363
11521829
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
10911694
4032154
887185
8468669
2879235
7937081
6663097
6587935
15043290
3869468
5743527
7488458
9499697
12911966
2003-04
7
12003840
3880151
996501
7611073
3059640
7890262
7197515
6759279
16245872
3884036
5562967
8096241
9984620
13922469
11703241
11909378
233
Table31: Revenue Expenditure on Total Urban Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
2095458
2112420
2377312
5275706
Bihar
1040011
1147005
1196301
1122813
Goa
188664
198552
220886
461271
Gujrat
1374828
1585930
1790527
3119421
Haryana
331786
387948
463164
923360
Karnataka
1297146
1416510
1505227
3271007
Kerala
1367424
1652925
1989666
3369747
Madhya Pr.
1434464
1603824
1808568
2405212
Maharashtra
2574562
2817267
3130839
5729500
Orissa
544200
633121
762649
1513510
Punjab
758724
807415
836172
2709362
Rajasthan
1332619
1556084
1738002
3263492
Tamil Nadu
2292897
2611314
3231788
5384865
Uttar Pr.
2360282
2447132
2924135
4257799
West
Bengal
2631450
2706484
3070356
7023618
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
4896644
1495090
473088
3357628
995536
3274899
3703517
2722779
5699463
1321234
2469050
3151686
5582767
4712620
2003-04
7
4764954
1427696
535425
3563910
1083309
3122615
3954963
2898864
6983249
1552567
2474058
3446249
5689993
5501511
7031419
7182057
Table 32: Revenue Expenditure on Urban Health Services Allopathy (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
1970146
1983913
2232637
5006654
Bihar
1010933
1117367
1140886
1072623
Goa
188168
198082
220381
460148
Gujrat
1289410
1490875
1691115
2952226
Haryana
324155
378998
452801
902402
Karnataka
1273589
1395639
1479515
3224614
Kerala
1141984
1378572
1685620
2822266
Madhya Pr.
1361265
1516023
1721182
2240411
Maharashtra
2433232
2672388
2937820
5494296
Orissa
521999
607785
733767
1455951
Punjab
720915
762616
788410
2615422
Rajasthan
1173679
1367717
1523362
2867254
Tamil Nadu
2221419
2530724
3138893
5165543
Uttar Pr.
2188999
2169276
2744898
3953192
West
Bengal
2592409
2658585
3019094
6881740
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
4612199
1487267
471821
3154069
993185
3225796
3057322
2548804
5481288
1261713
2362935
2713432
5359098
4374897
2003-04
7
4460378
1379254
534602
3356535
1056984
3070612
3196896
2717391
6471209
1494686
2366926
3023584
5447920
5132748
6862267
7012337
234
Table 33: Revenue Expenditure on Urban Health Services Other Systems (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
125312
128507
144675
269052
Bihar
29078
29638
55416
50190
Goa
496
470
505
1123
Gujrat
85418
95056
99412
167195
Haryana
7630
8949
10363
20958
Karnataka
23558
20871
25712
46392
Kerala
225440
274353
304046
547481
Madhya Pr.
73199
87801
87386
164801
Maharashtra
141330
144879
193018
235205
Orissa
22201
25336
28882
57559
Punjab
37809
44799
47762
93940
Rajasthan
158940
188367
214640
396238
Tamil Nadu
71478
80590
92895
219322
Uttar Pr.
171284
277857
179237
304607
West
Bengal
39041
47898
51262
141879
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
284445
7823
1267
203559
2351
49103
646195
173975
218175
59521
106116
438255
223669
337724
2003-04
7
304576
48442
824
207375
26325
52003
758067
181473
512040
57881
107132
422665
242073
368764
169152
169720
Table 34: Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Urban Health Services Other systems (Rs. in
000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
0
0
0
36
0
0
Bihar
254
0
1617
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
1518
1865
1965
3340
3985
5049
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
0
0
2112
16940
17167
20232
Madhya Pr.
852
4236
675
0
0
383
Maharashtra
0
0
0
0
0
0
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
23429
27634
32466
66514
66118
73316
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
381
367
544
1021
0
0
West
Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
235
Table 35: Revenue Expenditure on Urban Health Services Other Systems - Assistance (Rs. in
000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
125312
128507
144675
269016
Bihar
28823
29638
53798
50190
Goa
496
470
505
1123
Gujrat
83900
93190
97447
163855
Haryana
7630
8949
10363
20958
Karnataka
23558
20871
25712
46392
Kerala
225440
274353
301934
530540
Madhya Pr.
72347
83564
86711
164801
Maharashtra
141330
144879
193018
235205
Orissa
22201
25336
28882
57559
Punjab
37809
44799
47762
93940
Rajasthan
135511
160732
182174
329724
Tamil Nadu
71478
80590
92895
219322
Uttar Pr.
170902
277490
178692
303586
West
Bengal
39041
47898
51262
141879
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
284445
7823
1267
199574
2351
49103
629028
173975
218175
59521
106116
372136
223669
337724
2003-04
7
304576
48442
824
202326
26325
52003
737835
181090
512040
57881
107132
349349
242073
368764
169152
169720
Table 36: Revenue Expenditure on Total Rural Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
632102
714253
830603
2011496
Bihar
1235532
1282918
1461314
2048348
Goa
71617
71339
84727
154443
Gujrat
618444
704120
821370
1329976
Haryana
232797
274027
339498
726744
Karnataka
43919
49108
38245
159039
Kerala
476550
561885
617701
1232134
Madhya Pr.
933171
1093351
1108791
1935322
Maharashtra
211086
165809
216169
497371
Orissa
485523
519834
606184
1106868
Punjab
709594
767211
894213
2101290
Rajasthan
1032050
1236799
1396255
2985797
Tamil Nadu
798041
856186
990043
1789218
Uttar Pr.
2142103
1752313
2323982
3789525
West
Bengal
737614
802291
960611
2100800
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
2580585
2085746
158043
1650470
768587
290283
1232855
2134412
425432
1417574
2251552
2956690
1518804
4522023
2003-04
7
3257957
1709408
160091
1821856
827738
257082
1340144
2241281
324185
1396829
2060164
3223538
1711224
4820155
2318357
2456684
236
Table 37: Revenue Expenditure on Rural Health Services Allopathy (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
586131
657674
762776
1860684
Bihar
1223242
1269007
1449696
2031310
Goa
71617
71339
84727
154443
Gujrat
593120
665817
779888
1254325
Haryana
172461
205892
255677
557429
Karnataka
37408
41122
29432
141590
Kerala
471293
551034
603614
1162197
Madhya Pr.
708876
853804
817312
1557840
Maharashtra
167017
120129
154918
311283
Orissa
421594
451187
526698
922606
Punjab
646949
704074
803007
1925947
Rajasthan
678582
830490
932252
2008792
Tamil Nadu
755434
808277
936066
1684971
Uttar Pr.
1398998
1357317
1700583
2759409
West
Bengal
691545
745942
843669
1864496
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
2413862
2079250
158043
1546347
590088
272568
1217007
1751151
283759
1219731
2077069
2006205
1404573
3425069
2003-04
7
3089315
1667800
160091
1702771
628527
236908
1322239
1854122
309512
1192041
1878566
2162744
1571229
3665446
2073179
2206492
Table 38: Revenue Expenditure on Rural Health Services Other Systems (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
45971
56579
67828
150812
166724
168642
Bihar
12289
13911
11618
17038
6497
41608
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
25324
38304
41482
75651
104123
119085
Haryana
60336
68134
83821
169315
178499
199211
Karnataka
6511
7986
8813
17450
17715
20174
Kerala
5257
10851
14087
69937
15848
17905
Madhya Pr.
224295
239547
291478
377482
383261
387159
Maharashtra
44069
45680
61251
186088
141673
14673
Orissa
63929
68647
79485
184261
197843
204788
Punjab
62645
63136
91206
175343
174483
181598
Rajasthan
353469
406309
464003
977004
950485
1060794
Tamil Nadu
42606
47909
53976
104247
114232
139995
Uttar Pr.
743105
394996
623399
1030117
1096954
1154709
West
Bengal
46068
56349
116942
236304
245178
250192
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
237
Table 39: Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Rural Health Services (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
3436
3439
3837
33519
35330
103823
Bihar
14542
47351
21170
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
73278
90390
102095
199218
240376
236021
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
180
132
164
345
350
422
Kerala
2717
3012
12642
40410
39944
39418
Madhya Pr.
127661
178162
139432
363453
527828
504388
Maharashtra
0
0
0
1437
1249
1529
Orissa
28795
28358
63709
103147
36464
30615
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
9522
11685
11012
18527
18950
18178
Uttar Pr.
260
0
275
0
211
1311
West
Bengal
10432
11530
14385
51923
135514
116264
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 40: Revenue Expenditure on Rural Health Services - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
628666
710814
826766
1977977
Bihar
1220990
1235566
1440144
2048348
Goa
71617
71339
84727
154443
Gujrat
545166
613730
719274
1130758
Haryana
232797
274027
339498
726744
Karnataka
43739
48976
38081
158694
Kerala
473834
558873
605060
1191724
Madhya Pr.
805511
915189
969359
1571869
Maharashtra
211086
165809
216169
495933
Orissa
456728
491476
542475
1003721
Punjab
709594
767211
894213
2101290
Rajasthan
1032050
1236799
1396255
2985797
Tamil Nadu
788519
844501
979031
1770691
Uttar Pr.
2141843
1752313
2323707
3789525
West
Bengal
727182
790761
946227
2048877
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
2545255
2085746
158043
1410094
768587
289933
1192911
1606584
424184
1381110
2251552
2956690
1499854
4521813
2003-04
7
3154134
1709408
160091
1585835
827738
256660
1300726
1736893
322656
1366214
2060164
3223538
1693046
4818844
2182844
2340420
238
Table 41: Revenue Expenditure on Medical Education, Training and Research (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
357282
402355
431743
932827
Bihar
264948
281929
303801
271891
Goa
36929
40577
45758
100696
Gujrat
314669
367408
427916
887018
Haryana
206874
232399
258613
545769
Karnataka
345107
430214
448318
1266241
Kerala
319402
372752
422392
1146597
Madhya Pr.
235936
301321
286356
475943
Maharashtra
552329
564231
627916
1436048
Orissa
117128
135001
157130
370659
Punjab
183013
189949
207255
571507
Rajasthan
311936
346832
378463
765313
Tamil Nadu
610865
671494
551086
951743
Uttar Pr.
772131
854945
872875
1631957
West
Bengal
336628
373900
478553
1038996
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1061964
345428
117641
984633
656720
1264388
1116847
558748
1443991
305814
592027
730301
1021970
2051908
2003-04
7
1098333
460683
133583
1018835
670902
1177316
1208144
569167
1580411
330411
606815
768919
1029640
1961341
1088944
1099557
Table 42: Revenue Expenditure on Public Health (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
968567
1123530
1095427
1856980
Bihar
374164
394397
478590
249697
Goa
29259
31022
38644
67381
Gujrat
642523
777602
870167
917414
Haryana
203480
228370
221249
427039
Karnataka
265283
319312
331069
453327
Kerala
229414
271596
345746
517607
Madhya Pr.
704258
711434
644426
978753
Maharashtra
2649947
3175199
3600154
8142916
Orissa
288108
350980
390965
561999
Punjab
231615
237234
239306
377686
Rajasthan
402730
446847
565486
662219
Tamil Nadu
761666
842226
971209
1516905
Uttar Pr.
1552097
1439462
1749656
1229322
West
Bengal
636059
655553
747353
1342346
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
2096367
105889
68831
1188308
439369
468847
595691
1161965
7461469
787328
411813
649781
1316747
1613952
2003-04
7
2474261
282364
72149
1186784
454956
513580
689877
1042812
7344244
567103
403439
657535
1343847
1623915
1250496
1155948
239
Table 43: Revenue Expenditure on Total Water Supply and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
1730362
3081922
2483710
1733310
Bihar
929441
1007030
1060822
1077936
Goa
222652
262303
335373
874298
Gujrat
687400
6721345
1024110
1354802
Haryana
761187
1934135
1072819
2575524
Karnataka
1185644
1805437
2210767
3197520
Kerala
832212
883290
1020406
1318686
Madhya Pr.
2763907
3247990
3230626
4159069
Maharashtra
2377731
2643335
3302527
5243830
Orissa
707714
872995
1104517
1766133
Punjab
566030
667175
954816
1848288
Rajasthan
2582195
2733002
3218338
7013261
Tamil Nadu
3276782
2873708
2440523
1629243
Uttar Pr.
1933977
2257017
2564973
4846676
West
Bengal
941422
1446427
1298724
4066050
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1815718
1274692
973333
1851053
3036940
3029099
1952690
2294603
6675724
2035317
2256616
7645750
2163010
2686869
2003-04
7
2393924
1252190
800291
2225329
3534761
3347723
2302998
2470673
9436053
2113575
2582132
7896386
2528419
4065085
2551124
2863432
Table 44: Revenue Expenditure on Total Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
1632143
2863091
2326351
1567083
Bihar
834181
933108
996873
1036353
Goa
204297
243980
303784
753352
Gujrat
563948
6593484
874158
1222858
Haryana
761187
1934135
1072819
2549259
Karnataka
1150174
1762048
2168313
2947278
Kerala
723343
731843
883045
1239335
Madhya Pr.
2664717
3132561
3061401
4078592
Maharashtra
2369111
2636285
3273834
5110574
Orissa
704096
859142
1066271
1706641
Punjab
563576
661913
917198
1811369
Rajasthan
2244919
2384138
2816302
6590220
Tamil Nadu
3196308
2771169
2332326
1559783
Uttar Pr.
1761300
1993714
2285171
4733196
West
Bengal
908324
1395873
1229194
3905652
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1611970
1202563
859823
1672529
3026653
2812999
1781928
2156810
6499158
1984950
2210672
6772388
2056770
2435954
2003-04
7
2227819
1165618
703203
1947763
3502762
3231415
2111202
2211504
9169469
2041087
2565416
6967115
2377808
3527647
2288155
2576544
240
Table 45: Revenue Expenditure on Total Sewage and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
98219
218831
157358
166227
203749
166105
Bihar
95261
73922
63948
41583
72129
86572
Goa
18355
18323
31590
120946
113510
97089
Gujrat
123452
127861
149953
131945
178524
277566
Haryana
0
0
0
26265
10287
31999
Karnataka
35471
43389
42454
250241
216100
116308
Kerala
108869
151447
137361
79351
170762
191796
Madhya Pr.
99190
115429
169225
80478
137794
259169
Maharashtra
8620
7050
28693
133257
176566
266584
Orissa
3618
13854
38246
59493
50367
72488
Punjab
2454
5262
37618
36919
45944
16716
Rajasthan
337276
348865
402037
423041
873362
929271
Tamil Nadu
80474
102539
108197
69460
106240
150611
Uttar Pr.
172677
263303
280801
113481
250915
537438
West
Bengal
33098
50554
69529
160398
262969
286888
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 46: Revenue Expenditure on Total Urban Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
358042
559416
415563
402572
598662
1064652
Bihar
354246
402113
358973
196116
215671
97005
Goa
149252
177306
219556
604665
746038
565606
Gujrat
46828
80204
76504
146967
134579
140763
Haryana
30068
372849
141971
357721
846079
1079683
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
275694
330699
243997
345030
611912
559311
Maharashtra
0
0
0
0
0
0
Orissa
145457
145185
177647
601847
711301
686181
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
1401427
1716961
1952153
4006609
4104692
4185911
Tamil Nadu
2093186
1519834
924450
8733
11079
13442
Uttar Pr.
361705
339325
605313
2182376
966853
756203
West
Bengal
73691
170764
115375
134450
89711
86159
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
241
Table 47: Revenue Expenditure on Total Rural Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1
Andhra Pr.
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pr.
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pr.
West
Bengal
1993-94
2
1193927
477435
22757
79100
390796
165586
0
1196154
1696145
383671
477536
818245
967318
1083700
1994-95
3
2216661
520995
23490
63500
1042903
196737
0
1328940
2032336
356873
209015
621021
1065728
1330881
1995-96
4
1798601
623350
27052
60000
378425
392310
0
1403875
2494775
378190
358420
798384
1211399
970210
2001-02
5
1006231
821071
69243
63781
691170
440410
0
2278967
2146528
481371
911645
2410843
1207267
2539604
2002-03
6
833723
829032
70987
77847
862157
222331
0
646993
1528847
621981
1080162
2515529
1287994
1468783
2003-04
7
795313
669051
64854
132500
1169381
280090
0
644284
2833112
696325
859247
2629846
1671369
2771444
250201
461155
368403
1562279
1036960
1215854
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 48: Revenue Expenditure on Total Assistance to Water Supply (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
18800
17515
38319
11692
41137
223000
Bihar
2500
10000
14550
12500
77935
10000
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
6497
7883
6566
23355
23034
35023
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
902137
1426700
1647406
2456051
2535618
2895086
Kerala
723343
731843
883045
842285
774528
1388792
Madhya Pr.
253465
239684
279494
497956
118242
148263
Maharashtra
668886
600806
780934
2905310
4921100
6284046
Orissa
110360
204344
353292
344997
386143
378897
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
25247
46157
65765
172767
148569
148022
Tamil Nadu
113215
185608
196474
343783
572997
692922
Uttar Pr.
0
175
0
230
318
0
West
Bengal
15409
13120
8937
496093
145199
63642
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
242
Table 49: Revenue Expenditure on Water Supply - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
1613343
2845576
2288033
1555391
1570833
2004819
Bihar
831681
923108
982323
1023853
1124628
1155618
Goa
204297
243980
303784
753352
859823
703203
Gujrat
557450
6585601
867592
1199503
1649495
1912740
Haryana
761187
1934135
1072819
2549259
3026653
3502762
Karnataka
248037
335348
520907
491227
277381
336329
Kerala
0
0
0
397050
1007400
722410
Madhya Pr.
2411252
2892877
2781907
3580636
2038567
2063241
Maharashtra
1700226
2035480
2492900
2205263
1578058
2885423
Orissa
593736
654798
712979
1361643
1598807
1662190
Punjab
563576
661913
917198
1811369
2210672
2565416
Rajasthan
2219672
2337981
2750537
6417453
6623819
6819093
Tamil Nadu
3083093
2585562
2135852
1216000
1483773
1684886
Uttar Pr.
1761300
1993539
2285171
4732966
2435636
3527647
West
Bengal
892914
1382753
1220257
3409559
2142956
2512902
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 50: Revenue Expenditure on Total Assistance to Sewage and Sanitation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
53548
190126
128112
116450
48486
55446
Bihar
50
550
0
1992
12400
400
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
28000
18000
28000
65597
117333
217517
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
34971
43389
42454
15572
16156
1000
Kerala
93760
79310
89010
56900
140125
157905
Madhya Pr.
10164
0
8000
3930
32094
18280
Maharashtra
0
0
0
7146
0
4710
Orissa
720
1188
1000
7004
18318
12496
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
30228
18394
11561
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
69444
77436
12700
0
0
101086
West
Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
243
Table 51: Revenue Expenditure on Sewage and Sanitation - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
44671
28705
29246
49777
155263
110659
Bihar
95211
73372
63948
39591
59729
86172
Goa
18355
18323
31590
120946
113510
97089
Gujrat
95452
109861
121953
66348
61191
60049
Haryana
0
0
0
26265
10287
31999
Karnataka
500
0
0
234669
199944
115308
Kerala
15109
72137
48351
22451
30637
33891
Madhya Pr.
89025
115429
161225
76547
105700
240889
Maharashtra
8620
7050
28693
126111
176566
261874
Orissa
2898
12666
37246
52489
32048
59992
Punjab
2454
5262
37618
36919
45944
16716
Rajasthan
337276
348865
402037
423041
873362
929271
Tamil Nadu
50245
84145
96636
69460
106240
150611
Uttar Pr.
103233
185866
268101
113481
250915
436352
West
Bengal
33098
50554
69529
160398
262969
286888
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 52: Revenue Expenditure on Total Forestry and Wildlife (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
721935
776580
994822
2070746
Bihar
514141
491696
532258
287892
Goa
37972
42482
43816
87212
Gujrat
524023
616122
719465
1220608
Haryana
467077
469155
530551
656290
Karnataka
1378012
1506747
1706568
3024935
Kerala
480189
674473
717393
1334920
Madhya Pr.
3206407
3435708
3911932
4556215
Maharashtra
1921165
2246857
2392818
2841335
Orissa
577169
544179
577951
885300
Punjab
196290
183982
187251
1002938
Rajasthan
815528
1109410
683563
1301468
Tamil Nadu
415814
451107
505552
853187
Uttar Pr.
983067
909567
1078974
1645253
West
Bengal
716641
790919
876320
1627278
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
2005238
300475
90019
1232290
725123
2496782
1408831
4854307
2891842
905483
833446
1300390
866664
1181167
2003-04
7
3169376
319653
109770
1402376
1427647
3356549
1482918
5444997
3354751
828588
970522
1402556
912071
1183250
1301131
1262605
244
Table 53: Revenue Expenditure on Total Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
599655
664058
867544
1907884
Bihar
498676
467223
491069
227992
Goa
31976
32957
37208
65722
Gujrat
441190
534224
643114
1059174
Haryana
454852
454697
513803
630432
Karnataka
1185610
1311943
1470630
2603544
Kerala
410936
593569
642072
1171100
Madhya Pr.
3120685
3345457
3811662
4276016
Maharashtra
1866454
2187186
2317765
2702069
Orissa
563353
509673
541477
784780
Punjab
171182
153502
153241
998382
Rajasthan
710691
987336
539047
1049133
Tamil Nadu
394403
427842
443362
810061
Uttar Pr.
860014
820477
959842
1548925
West
Bengal
601082
649294
745883
1305999
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1833859
268519
68133
1056094
696399
2027361
1240327
4542009
2750120
777144
831542
1034388
819283
1095661
2003-04
7
2998865
269069
77469
1154737
699906
2881338
1324369
5093448
3030494
671503
958884
1099965
863518
1085727
996573
962480
Table 54: Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
3328
2789
2259
3949
36594
144577
Bihar
79112
60855
54717
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
84200
95374
97674
172261
174119
222744
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
221350
267776
273104
375923
319039
1195222
Kerala
43181
58103
70066
51275
64242
77188
Madhya Pr.
230266
289984
351532
319973
340344
636453
Maharashtra
115410
134762
125994
19757
20841
23526
Orissa
115821
54628
48162
19368
698
304
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
117120
165513
60569
36967
33361
34808
Tamil Nadu
17062
7938
19107
25581
24350
22077
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
650
0
0
West
Bengal
47234
63079
93376
66607
49746
15382
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
245
Table 55: Revenue Expenditure on Forestry - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
596327
661268
865285
1903935
Bihar
419565
406368
436352
227992
Goa
31976
32957
37208
65722
Gujrat
356990
438850
545440
886913
Haryana
454852
454697
513803
630432
Karnataka
964260
1044167
1197526
2227621
Kerala
367755
535467
572005
1119826
Madhya Pr.
2890419
3055473
3460130
3956043
Maharashtra
1751044
2052424
2191771
2682311
Orissa
447532
455045
493316
765412
Punjab
171182
153502
153241
998382
Rajasthan
593571
821822
478478
1012166
Tamil Nadu
377342
419904
424254
784480
Uttar Pr.
860014
820477
959842
1548275
West
Bengal
553848
586215
652508
1239391
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1797265
268519
68133
881974
696399
1708322
1176085
4201665
2729279
776446
831542
1001028
794933
1095661
2003-04
7
2854288
269069
77469
931993
699906
1686116
1247181
4456995
3006968
671199
958884
1065157
841441
1085727
946827
947098
Table 56: Revenue Expenditure on Environmental Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
States
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
83346
96134
104359
162862
Bihar
15465
24473
41189
59900
Goa
5996
9525
6608
21491
Gujrat
62598
64215
69351
161435
Haryana
12225
14458
16748
25857
Karnataka
127099
130624
139985
421391
Kerala
66753
76904
75321
163820
Madhya Pr.
85722
90251
100270
280199
Maharashtra
54711
59671
75053
139266
Orissa
13816
34506
36474
100520
Punjab
25108
30480
34009
4556
Rajasthan
104837
122075
144516
252336
Tamil Nadu
21411
23265
26593
43126
Uttar Pr.
123052
89090
119132
96327
West
Bengal
115559
141625
130437
321280
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
171379
31956
21886
176196
28723
469421
168504
312298
141722
128339
1904
266002
47381
85506
2003-04
7
170511
50584
32301
247639
727741
475211
158549
351549
324257
157085
11638
302591
48553
97523
304557
300125
246
Table 57: Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Environmental Forestry (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
0
0
0
2056
1906
993
Bihar
5688
10352
15449
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
1988
1493
1375
1377
2531
3856
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
10303
47603
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
46480
46508
53108
47738
79560
38758
Maharashtra
0
0
0
0
0
0
Orissa
0
2037
3498
4659
11528
7768
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
0
West
Bengal
0
0
0
1435
570
-28
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 58: Revenue Expenditure on Environmental Forestry - Assistance (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
83346
96134
104359
160806
Bihar
9777
14121
25740
59900
Goa
5996
9525
6608
21491
Gujrat
60610
62722
67976
160057
Haryana
12225
14458
16748
25857
Karnataka
127099
130624
139985
421391
Kerala
66753
76904
75321
163820
Madhya Pr.
39243
43743
47162
232460
Maharashtra
54711
59671
75053
139266
Orissa
13816
32470
32976
95861
Punjab
25108
30480
34009
4556
Rajasthan
104837
122075
144516
252336
Tamil Nadu
21411
23265
26593
43126
Uttar Pr.
123052
89090
119132
96327
West
Bengal
115559
141625
130437
319845
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
169473
31956
21886
173665
28723
459118
168504
232738
141722
116811
1904
266002
47381
85506
2003-04
7
169518
50584
32301
243783
727741
427608
158549
312791
324257
149317
11638
302591
48553
97523
303988
300153
247
Table 59: Revenue Expenditure on Total Minor Irrigation (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
629216
514156
607094
1668735
Bihar
1322183
933890
1023079
1246274
Goa
17735
21716
27219
69322
Gujrat
923087
1169808
1235349
1019537
Haryana
218524
472087
89350
200343
Karnataka
443503
506162
454764
859750
Kerala
290936
307146
515380
487112
Madhya Pr.
513331
472640
412738
360168
Maharashtra
1668178
2020619
2376826
2259888
Orissa
514541
474236
617888
791093
Punjab
248444
263934
226021
562651
Rajasthan
519049
524133
533821
681579
Tamil Nadu
386114
519242
460518
290818
Uttar Pr.
3923183
5210191
6097174
2761990
West
Bengal
1021816
993988
1122306
2879662
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
1111770
1346352
68895
1224075
548392
826739
555877
348475
2026025
827266
461361
598719
342693
2811817
2003-04
7
715482
1061166
61418
1474217
81767
889074
677902
414723
1945708
753354
441409
589518
380278
2450520
2323805
2410130
Table 60: Revenue Expenditure on Surface Water (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
328968
182927
224751
1333263
781350
371197
Bihar
4087
3936
3103
0
470
95248
Goa
7544
9140
13129
32739
35682
34933
Gujrat
431412
527805
472051
153605
199995
150034
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
149148
180389
194936
288156
280327
268243
Kerala
252114
245929
423077
409546
465288
575678
Madhya Pr.
371026
324091
193551
78946
52579
52146
Maharashtra
364136
361955
520697
253726
137133
219351
Orissa
412677
421682
556789
529712
445961
556637
Punjab
4668
4666
7513
420885
412284
390214
Rajasthan
165960
215914
191059
305365
251001
211031
Tamil Nadu
200588
306210
266991
21158
101405
150169
Uttar Pr.
415894
401800
505396
1210317
1507172
892610
West
Bengal
408303
431091
538156
794830
805598
822568
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
248
Table 61: Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Surface Water (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
0
0
0
80790
60455
0
Bihar
0
0
0
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
0
0
0
0
0
0
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
0
0
1860
37970
150
0
Madhya Pr.
73277
71326
23770
1261
4749
9141
Maharashtra
0
0
36370
0
5024
18791
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
4448
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
0
West
Bengal
6624
661
675
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 62: Revenue Expenditure on Ground Water (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
170911
207050
235187
160101
153590
173591
Bihar
1318096
929954
1019976
1246274
1345882
965918
Goa
4208
4844
5713
10688
11271
11754
Gujrat
336972
420056
513637
426462
436302
438756
Haryana
39074
294787
59350
88843
155249
81767
Karnataka
36241
35697
39808
104867
83943
91400
Kerala
39285
61496
92812
77639
91208
101196
Madhya Pr.
0
0
0
2192
7697
12051
Maharashtra
167546
120719
67584
93589
91851
99594
Orissa
21000
21000
15910
3655
23138
33954
Punjab
177676
209268
173391
141765
49076
51195
Rajasthan
246725
239850
273864
367224
366363
371044
Tamil Nadu
150342
176465
180401
236856
209871
199529
Uttar Pr.
3429794
4808367
5036238
382815
241397
390727
West
Bengal
348258
355910
369275
709594
718829
709022
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
249
Table 63: Revenue Expenditure on Assistance to Ground Water (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
0
0
0
4502
4752
4815
Bihar
75425
78455
1618
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
0
0
0
0
0
0
Haryana
4704
0
4
10843
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
0
88
81
90
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
73277
71326
23770
1261
4749
9141
Maharashtra
110472
62710
1743
56
178
242
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
0
0
0
West
Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
Table 64: Revenue Expenditure on Water Tanks (Rs. in 000’)
Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Andhra Pr.
309557
167197
205314
1224246
696741
343629
Bihar
0
0
0
0
0
0
Goa
7544
9140
13129
32739
35682
34933
Gujrat
0
0
0
0
0
0
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
94640
116431
104835
223612
169363
190402
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pr.
270503
249976
169781
77685
47830
43005
Maharashtra
0
0
0
0
0
0
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
172405
283204
235634
21158
101405
150169
Uttar Pr.
0
0
0
32099
60191
32442
West
Bengal
12898
8826
16192
25813
25107
25268
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
Note:* implies that the value cannot be calculated because of the average of 1993-96 being zero.
250
Table 65: Revenue Expenditure on Industries (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
311181
432269
640662
420807
Bihar
126479
104883
132780
101353
Goa
1940
2064
2395
11070
Gujarat
76076
147865
146563
2322242
Haryana
65715
73358
76572
120103
Karnataka
757453
647937
548016
620268
Kerala
199608
219272
47688
30788
Madhya Pr.
176714
165272
349747
86508
Maharashtra
147570
860302
1133095
149743
Orissa
4690
32890
20473
8690
Punjab
392829
249455
172263
2439
Rajasthan
403494
618605
900502
178899
Tamil Nadu
126911
339205
217314
61428
Uttar Pr.
84640
85679
104299
474023
West
Bengal
244412
393656
363695
988154
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
509997
387070
14406
1235378
194678
444752
171640
118711
1571907
21277
2201
255122
284778
287983
2003-04
7
650422
90142
57356
782228
104245
194006
934765
70114
1290423
9359
2335
303866
150975
1122793
398636
866185
Table 66: Revenue Expenditure on Non Ferrous Mining & Metallurgical Industries (TOTAL) (Rs. in
000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
32687
36715
45460
80187
Bihar
66657
70316
80982
50821
Goa
2128
2404
2928
4317
Gujarat
59058
67456
110870
100472
Haryana
8247
9339
11180
84557
Karnataka
29812
33197
35974
61516
Kerala
11844
25229
13159
22642
Madhya Pr.
57300
67056
78849
71950
Maharashtra
38874
41734
48280
942984
Orissa
80294
80380
87416
116540
Punjab
4198
4758
5392
7650
Rajasthan
253996
317701
337161
234723
Tamil Nadu
19619
21706
27746
39539
Uttar Pr.
41088
48100
50604
74625
West
Bengal
15065
137132
16181
24424
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
82791
49234
4678
175375
87917
57532
24684
74024
406445
128171
7987
273188
36045
77045
2003-04
7
89029
50845
6904
146190
95221
57553
31318
71538
451333
128817
7098
285767
38089
113712
23713
24164
251
Table 67: Revenue Expenditure on Roads & Bridges (TOTAL) (Rs. in 000’)
Years
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
2001-02
1
2
3
4
5
Andhra Pr.
1576485
1623467
1701781
4744920
Bihar
1134075
1260557
1274318
1260306
Goa
71770
82813
103366
218377
Gujarat
2350392
2810145
2993392
4335315
Haryana
483343
561082
700961
1421647
Karnataka
1323733
1408615
1497706
3639933
Kerala
910265
917180
1401878
2331036
Madhya Pr.
2658397
3121839
3471866
2450748
Maharashtra
-6014
194137
167052
718878
Orissa
858113
1002127
1128641
1301775
Punjab
820771
804991
908349
1071435
Rajasthan
1420291
1430886
1639502
1914787
Tamil Nadu
2354975
2493177
2977569
2631162
Uttar Pr.
2972095
2704151
2656797
5365207
West
Bengal
946400
1146763
1438282
2598735
Source: Budget Documents of Different States, Relevant Years.
2002-03
6
4837997
1915957
283812
5136368
899242
3263889
4480496
2240026
9402494
1403406
1459218
2564500
3662008
6747393
2003-04
7
4522639
2020423
340746
5838091
1245617
2774198
4344767
1707633
2550004
1258707
664741
2084922
4492363
6765903
1919305
3165085
252
Table 1: Total State Own Revenue (Tax +Non-tax) in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94 1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
383293
422743
412044
488183
711355
796137
900860
Bihar
174840
183599
197327
225083
239040
267156
363756
Goa
18772
22600
27170
30273
36530
35721
45849
Gujrat
394172
474286
532287
606595
659106
761578
816173
Haryana
158891
188786
216896
214312
236863
311962
351761
Karnataka
381234
428931
527393
576784
641187
694304
774437
Kerala
234487
279910
338268
389850
450105
464956
519351
Madhya Pradesh
267711
287061
351819
410350
456431
510848
579522
Maharashtra
769620
945462
1093445
1171497
1371926
1420236
1726495
Orissa
85989
92261
112719
134204
142174
148713
170408
Punjab
214964
259906
265099
273466
304467
326248
394747
Rajasthan
195022
230716
273060
312376
361058
393935
453090
Tamil Nadu
480137
583376
715120
798345
868564
962530
1091893
Uttar Pradesh
413201
487831
546892
630597
699796
791011
940091
West Bengal
291294
373027
413287
425891
451677
477446
510083
Total Major States
4463627.00 5260495.00 6022826.00 6687806.00 7630279.00 8362781.00
9638516.00
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
1069519
1069520
211105
253487
294158
308878
343042
Total All Major States
5533146.00 6330015.00 6233931.00 6941293.00 7924437.00 8671659.00
9981558.00
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
363.0
560.0
412,044.0
488,183.0
983.0
1,129.0
1,387.0
Assam
61,281.0
63,221.0
70,245.0
76,690.0
88,194.0
98,256.0
122,476.0
Himachal Pradesh
25,574.0
29,945.0
34,152.0
41,210.0
47,616.0
57,202.0
62,027.0
Jammu And Kashmir
22,465.0
24,369.0
28,479.0
28,927.0
36,741.0
43,660.0
57,764.0
Manipur
1,852.0
2,380.0
2,790.0
1,420.0
3,573.0
3,074.0
3,995.0
Meghalaya
4,793.0
5,627.0
6,626.0
7,737.0
7,355.0
8,836.0
10,299.0
Mizoram
465.0
458.0
578.0
667.0
787.0
920.0
1,073.0
Nagaland
1,825.0
1,930.0
2,080.0
3,135.0
3,350.0
3,533.0
4,315.0
Sikkim
1,430.0
1,375.0
2,072.0
2,170.0
2,743.0
2,843.0
3,122.0
Tripura
3,712.0
4,347.0
4,799.0
6,050.0
7,164.0
8,413.0
10,174.0
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
123760.00
134212.00
563865.00
656189.00
198506.00
227866.00
276632.00
All States
5656906.00 6464227.00 6797796.00 7597482.00 8122943.00 8899525.00 10258190.00
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Notes: * Compound Growth Rate Calculated for the Period from 1993-94 to 2003-04 (except Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttaranchal)
** Buoyancy Calculated for the Period from 1993-94 to 2003-04 (except Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttaranchal)
2000-01
1055192
293475
51480
904682
431148
904267
587026
563958
1972428
218403
489522
529997
1228225
1098000
591757
10919560.00
74968
440062
11434590.00
2001-02
1256366
244237
56934
924681
497243
985327
592342
470232
2128763
246689
482023
567117
1300969
1033018
650513
11436454.00
199313
207595
489675
12333037.00
2002-03
1261755
276471
60219
952046
554968
1043971
730252
617026
2281101
287184
571099
625334
1434170
1276690
704639
12676925.00
232744
227784
532418
13669871.00
2003-04
1380591
336091
71025
1117341
634805
1257012
808877
678876
2516215
330173
614594
724619
1,594,497
1360122
876791
14301629.00
258825
227764
588417
15376635.00
2,069.0
141,293.0
72,841.0
74,805.0
4,907.0
11,862.0
1,443.0
5,621.0
6,582.0
12,558.0
29,529.0
363510.00
11798100.00
3,418.0
156,593.0
91,556.0
85,754.0
5,197.0
13,597.0
1,912.0
5,244.0
8,039.0
15,850.0
89,469.0
476629.00
12809666.00
3654
193451
88,753.0
97,565.0
6,516.0
14,486.0
2797
6189
10553
18,294.0
102169
544427.00
14214298.00
4312
207031
98433
115,194.0
6,917.0
17,769.0
3385
6855
10800
22,146.0
122596
615438.00
15992073.00
253
Table 2: State Own Non-tax Revenue in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
Andhra Pradesh
135,143
153,031
160,547
162,472
178,821
184,696
Bihar
88,684
97,482
91,453
106,134
38,986
114,596
Goa
13,612
14,962
40,187
34,732
58,220
65,058
Gujrat
139,878
148,811
160,117
157,274
222,097
276,649
Haryana
134,055
347,341
218,681
313,267
263,110
151,802
Karnataka
73,357
84,767
123,542
134,231
126,440
146,992
Kerala
32,322
39,635
53,549
51,380
55,210
55,766
Madhya Pradesh
140,373
161,521
177,814
197,494
201,855
178,199
Maharashtra
238,301
290,285
277,539
375,488
364,089
357,270
Orissa
41,545
63,423
62,823
48,178
54,093
55,749
Punjab
41,406
200,362
177,737
194,480
235,653
150,735
Rajasthan
118,137
129,557
225,675
136,112
136,242
135,339
Tamil Nadu
70,389
77,266
85,845
88,545
112,187
115,670
Uttar Pradesh
171,750
188,933
239,941
131,849
129,171
147,506
West Bengal
30,861
34,201
32,748
41,745
44,949
38,450
Total Major States
1,469,813 2,031,577 2,128,198
2,173,381
2,221,123
2,174,477
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
1,669
9,963
6,314
5,574
16,952
18,796
Total All Major States
1,471,482 2,041,540 2,134,512
2,178,955
2,238,075
2,193,273
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
8,517
8,054
8,108
6,498
5,473
6,454
Assam
34,899
32,650
33,560
32,213
38,122
45,197
Himachal Pradesh
12,061
13,274
11,735
14,686
22,204
20,550
Jammu And Kashmir
13,505
15,577
15,798
15,498
27,261
28,326
Manipur
2,797
5,002
4,549
5,915
4,057
3,152
Meghalaya
2,840
3,864
6,692
4,747
2,985
5,146
Mizoram
3,122
3,447
4,586
4,642
4,584
3,616
Nagaland
2,392
6,786
3,410
4,104
4,532
4,492
Sikkim
2,755
33,216
62,673
82,934
92,983
102,092
Tripura
2,513
2,596
3,852
4,066
3,487
4,483
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
85,401
124,466
154,963
175,303
205,688
223,508
All States
1,556,883 2,166,006 2,289,475
2,354,258
2,443,763
2,416,781
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
1999-00
244,155
175,890
63,337
291,927
125,906
161,128
53,072
246,897
393,687
71,648
236,146
157,377
135,685
201,174
58,722
2,616,751
2000-01
274,291
80,587
79,614
334,915
143,939
165,998
65,908
172,433
559,626
68,547
293,523
168,798
171,078
194,465
121,453
2,895,175
28,823
39,785
2,656,536
6,701
44,492
105,624
40,527
4,265
8,386
4,140
4,901
104,275
7,619
330,930
2,987,466
54,835
2,978,833
2001-02
291,764
36,094
113,608
376,094
166,607
109,342
54,338
160,168
465,507
69,175
296,045
150,846
155,673
178,707
77,588
2,701,556
72,238
95943
87,606
2,957,343
2002-03
352,942
32,340
103,917
399,558
180,785
127,766
67,777
163,548
451,747
96,117
403,557
156,900
186,062
191,349
65,433
2,979,798
95,655
95995
82,957
3,254,405
2003-04
360,465
44,559
72,474
327,196
222,306
295,838
80,698
147,982
354,894
109,454
466,553
207,165
209,378
228,208
60,584
3,187,754
112,441
115094
95,034
3,510,323
6,370
52,677
17,697
23,943
4,166
8,666
4,037
4,394
28,903
9,451
6,313
166,617
3,145,450
7,091
53,320
19,833
30,102
2,873
9,407
4,487
4,836
112,821
9,764
16,213
270,747
3,228,090
7,630
69,297
17,549
33,466
5,649
9,279
5,263
4,393
131,585
9,872
37,485
331,468
3,585,873
12,057
94,581
29,176
35,435
4,932
12,895
5,801
6,091
53,729
16,778
37,059
308,534
3,818,857
254
Table 3: Interest Receipts (in Rs. Lakh)
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
Andhra Pradesh
70,553
76,843
71,766
82,408
90,353
114,551
Bihar
3,257
2,893
2,010
5,648
8,780
13,599
Goa
270
247
341
250
276
445
Gujrat
77,753
82,169
85,562
81,614
120,721
159,269
Haryana
11,653
47,609
25,693
23,756
23,707
18,372
Karnataka
33,777
40,264
69,575
67,461
56,252
66,974
Kerala
2,760
3,776
10,032
5,573
5,348
7,095
Madhya Pradesh
21,596
21,311
14,102
26,987
22,325
14,748
Maharashtra
92,861
117,708
127,121
203,453
169,414
165,389
Orissa
8,769
5,366
13,869
1,344
1,869
1,962
Punjab
7,400
8,154
8,705
146,414
98,284
10,486
Rajasthan
61,294
42,287
50,156
62,490
59,813
62,879
Tamil Nadu
27,524
27,879
34,283
34,901
48,625
38,495
Uttar Pradesh
35,478
37,343
46,377
47,897
48,434
42,799
West Bengal
7,121
8,901
5,094
11,275
10,489
4,864
Total Major States
462,066
522,750
564,686
801,471
764,690
721,927
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
535
2,006
713
542
13,283
13,901
Total All Major States
462,601
524,756
565,399
802,013
777,973
735,828
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
409
324
590
653
524
607
Assam
238
215
244
215
214
218
Himachal Pradesh
322
923
2,537
2,435
1,302
940
Jammu And Kashmir
8,178
9,579
9,290
9,997
10,010
8,817
Manipur
190
92
120
102
91
82
Meghalaya
177
169
247
478
408
598
Mizoram
32
42
305
46
42
61
Nagaland
145
150
200
214
200
245
Sikkim
91
35
113
182
6
26
Tripura
161
166
201
760
213
360
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
9,943
11,695
13,847
15,082
13,010
11,954
All States
472,544
536,451
579,246
817,095
790,983
747,782
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
1999-00
142,008
32,854
504
176,454
20,223
80,167
3,731
25,707
172,416
1,946
53,502
67,042
34,679
47,668
11,008
869,909
2000-01
146,566
13,280
285
192,982
23,623
72,118
3,681
18,456
316,163
1,309
70,611
58,955
40,364
52,517
67,360
1,078,270
347
30,077
899,986
423
247
15,951
10,255
69
838
83
300
51
1,162
29,379
929,365
47,728
1,126,345
2001-02
153,855
8,908
217
159,430
33,287
14,192
3,108
24,659
184,560
2,527
55,198
58,378
50,197
54,349
12,290
815,155
4,911
5000
78,982
904,048
2002-03
171,740
2,903
213
168,488
33,427
3,436
3,586
3,205
177,727
7,609
91,337
60,704
56,871
51,538
10,274
843,058
9,565
5603
74,142
932,368
2003-04
181,853
2,998
221
89,712
47,801
11,134
3,240
1,922
35,691
16,438
146,405
68,512
53,253
65,808
11,011
735,999
12,246
5603
86,883
840,731
899
427
1,500
10,499
75
926
312
300
448
1,849
189
17,424
1,143,769
635
309
767
12,405
100
526
145
310
602
358
315
16,472
920,520
597
307
997
13,243
61
466
244
172
717
582
392
17,778
950,146
845
589
1,135
13,107
139
562
327
561
274
367
3,022
20,928
861,659
255
Table 4: Dividends and Profits
States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
Andhra Pradesh
25
395
478
768
534
942
Bihar
29
31
0
5648
0
0
Goa
39
47
36
52
67
44
Gujrat
2126
1408
3400
2277
1449
2238
Haryana
95
702
314
453
238
221
Karnataka
451
652
323
529
544
627
Kerala
393
462
581
392
592
713
Madhya Pradesh
80
79
161
281
155
100
Maharashtra
273
379
416
927
933
601
Orissa
61
-2
215
36
320
28
Punjab
314
785
461
543
299
149
Rajasthan
170
91
594
619
861
800
Tamil Nadu
1441
786
2838
2220
1845
2429
Uttar Pradesh
483
932
346
680
576
619
West Bengal
178
100
40
53
185
44
Total Major States
6158
6847
10203
15478
8598
9555
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
0
285
75
695
444
482
Total All Major States
6158
7132
10278
16173
9042
10037
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
1
2
1
1
0
3
Assam
8
5
3
37
35
2
Himachal Pradesh
19
37
20
58
55
53
Jammu And Kashmir
0
100
0
123
123
391
Manipur
1
2
0
2
0
0
Meghalaya
1
2
3
0
3
3
Mizoram
0
1
0
0
0
0
Nagaland
0
0
0
0
0
0
Sikkim
15
67
20
138
159
123
Tripura
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
45
216
47
359
375
575
All States
6203
7348
10325
16532
9417
10612
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
1999-00
291
35
33
2703
778
624
1001
181
396
11114
915
529
4195
589
123
23507
2000-01
202
5
24
2607
181
275
1264
44
395
3790
233
557
3653
874
318
14422
0
441
23948
0
44
59
773
0
60
0
0
72
0
1008
24956
870
15292
2001-02
57
9
44
2752
40
514
526
164
453
876
109
478
3345
639
377
10383
500
100
717
11700
2002-03
134
9
19
4203
173
1493
961
409
186
15222
91
826
2599
784
138
27247
2557
112
719
30635
2003-04
4868
1
3
2989
411
1690
2003
842
1893
13806
182
244
2720
788
50
32490
3482
112
603
36687
0
73
61
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
2
139
15431
0
83
89
960
0
11
0
0
1
0
2
1146
12846
0
593
61
1289
1
1
0
0
176
0
4
2125
32760
0
688
50
1547
0
18
0
0
74
0
4
2381
39068
256
Table 5: Revenue from General Services in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
5,286
7,399
10,012
11,212
9,230
8,937
10,176
Bihar
2,347
3,489
1,471
2,075
13,169
10,247
17,292
Goa
386
426
22,799
14,732
34,694
31,437
26,332
Gujrat
5,334
7,547
11,344
10,876
25,439
36,541
20,729
Haryana
86,272
259,904
152,098
239,093
180,981
70,605
39,585
Karnataka
6,949
9,734
9,956
12,342
14,229
12,711
15,183
Kerala
8,906
10,820
13,445
15,788
19,000
18,567
21,064
Madhya Pradesh
8,400
10,585
9,359
10,795
13,421
11,078
21,213
Maharashtra
23,008
23,719
30,147
28,810
31,840
28,239
43,398
Orissa
4,149
4,696
8,043
4,877
5,408
5,336
7,062
Punjab
6,754
160,766
139,457
16,717
105,287
106,928
146,366
Rajasthan
26,267
50,946
132,679
24,757
22,353
14,564
27,488
Tamil Nadu
7,345
10,703
11,185
11,623
16,649
18,681
28,040
Uttar Pradesh
85,521
103,410
131,869
19,369
19,174
33,343
33,337
West Bengal
5,855
6,786
8,772
11,052
14,352
13,305
16,092
Total Major States
282,779
670,930
692,636
434,118
525,226
420,519
473,357
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
806
6,554
4,141
2,612
2,216
2,666
5,340
Total All Major States
283,585
677,484
696,777
436,730
527,442
423,185
478,697
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
2,452
2,096
819
789
1,014
1,056
1,350
Assam
1,934
1,902
2,521
1,872
3,357
5,811
5,204
Himachal Pradesh
1,694
1,174
2,366
2,714
3,083
3,174
5,576
Jammu And Kashmir
758
817
965
1,086
9,111
2,412
2,448
Manipur
892
3,074
2,329
3,381
2,309
1,407
1,163
Meghalaya
677
597
1,711
1,928
768
863
1,123
Mizoram
1,177
1,804
1,929
2,482
2,544
1,697
1,126
Nagaland
405
1,357
1,020
980
1,190
1,308
965
Sikkim
874
31,478
60,498
80,116
90,558
99,913
101,180
Tripura
275
415
820
794
578
858
1,104
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
11,138
44,714
74,978
96,142
114,512
118,499
121,239
All States
294,723
722,198
771,755
532,872
641,954
541,684
599,936
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
15,236
16,918
38,058
22,343
47,972
18,980
25,302
18,465
54,684
6,936
183,242
38,256
31,711
26,172
20,514
564,789
861
3,538
569,188
2001-02
18,613
8,384
61,244
79,639
51,834
16,665
21,706
23,045
75,675
6,831
202,764
17,181
32,609
33,360
16,252
665,802
3,061
1842
4,008
674,713
2002-03
17,711
9,946
37,362
56,214
64,178
34,926
26,195
22,602
68,613
6,008
272,355
17,609
38,796
31,477
17,644
721,636
8,324
2064
4,518
736,542
2003-04
27,444
12,073
906
29,803
67,835
178,382
30,704
12,571
97,660
5,620
259,324
47,096
34,099
28,438
17,895
849,850
9,893
2998
4,145
866,886
699
4,270
3,313
1,994
575
798
826
671
25,008
597
809
39,560
608,748
745
1,697
3,206
2,244
338
1,052
919
729
108,187
807
1,831
121,755
796,468
1,093
2,482
3,692
2,369
631
1,511
1,764
667
126,318
660
2,419
143,606
880,148
2,085
3,435
3,708
3,346
435
1,654
1,440
735
48,833
980
3,706
70,357
937,243
257
Table 6: Revenue from Social Services in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
7,101
6,374
6,185
6,772
7,259
7,409
28,140
Bihar
3,147
3,408
2,932
2,425
9,225
7,839
5,941
Goa
1,294
1,372
1,920
2,120
2,373
4,767
4,681
Gujrat
6,993
6,210
6,914
7,740
9,974
10,579
11,998
Haryana
4,022
4,137
5,230
7,349
13,937
12,825
14,095
Karnataka
5,303
5,352
10,225
10,299
16,040
10,945
10,697
Kerala
4,188
4,588
6,094
4,726
6,216
6,614
6,725
Madhya Pradesh
5,148
4,712
4,618
5,679
7,786
6,779
9,353
Maharashtra
14,889
15,729
16,406
17,437
23,066
26,396
31,464
Orissa
2,807
2,936
2,973
3,512
3,989
4,202
5,635
Punjab
4,564
5,008
3,918
5,225
5,237
5,103
6,999
Rajasthan
7,827
10,142
11,641
11,156
14,182
15,877
16,265
Tamil Nadu
8,773
9,754
11,434
12,910
15,532
20,094
22,964
Uttar Pradesh
6,429
8,197
10,156
14,254
16,603
22,177
29,713
West Bengal
5,910
4,890
4,764
4,239
6,061
6,903
8,526
Total Major States
88,395
92,809
105,410
115,843
157,480
168,509
213,196
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
192
720
825
644
691
1,026
2,486
Total All Major States
88,587
93,529
106,235
116,487
158,171
169,535
215,682
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
129
140
89
108
142
165
118
Assam
675
611
682
640
665
913
949
Himachal Pradesh
819
947
936
1,103
7,984
4,815
2,516
Jammu And Kashmir
263
278
297
375
583
808
885
Manipur
176
269
466
287
257
135
591
Meghalaya
100
104
144
267
136
115
119
Mizoram
216
216
263
277
235
262
332
Nagaland
84
90
99
118
127
136
569
Sikkim
32
33
50
42
41
95
82
Tripura
160
243
249
257
206
246
775
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
2,654
2,931
3,275
3,474
10,376
7,690
6,936
All States
91,241
96,460
109,510
119,961
168,547
177,225
222,618
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
18,959
5,121
5,073
24,235
13,262
12,213
7,678
7,483
30,411
6,275
7,327
19,485
22,759
32,563
8,016
220,860
557
1,188
222,605
2001-02
21,358
6,168
6,251
26,365
14,614
14,366
8,182
7,355
33,661
7,192
7,726
20,668
23,600
28,324
10,749
236,579
2,491
2825
1,904
243,799
2002-03
32,500
5,732
6,806
24,176
15,469
18,613
10,627
8,964
33,028
7,543
9,561
19,552
26,159
35,963
8,570
263,263
3,183
3165
2,264
271,875
2003-04
24,923
12,502
7,591
19,506
26,634
12,326
12,764
8,123
38,177
6,462
10,598
25,300
47,670
35,741
9,461
297,778
2,371
5164
2,230
307,543
125
1,154
2,996
1,139
686
156
419
599
159
469
633
8,535
231,140
175
1,323
3,351
1,553
310
168
481
630
183
1,426
2,404
12,004
255,803
417
1,308
3,303
2,267
372
194
475
467
235
1,313
3,357
13,708
285,583
523
4,996
6,214
2,845
492
204
567
390
262
802
3,454
20,749
328,292
258
Table 7: Revenue from Education, Sports, Art and Culture in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
3005
2271
2234
2326
2824
2875
23399
Bihar
527
527
299
324
5660
2230
400
Goa
38
44
97
87
119
148
222
Gujrat
1809
1538
1973
2082
2329
3090
3228
Haryana
1207
1236
1354
1832
1843
1902
2121
Karnataka
1767
1579
1503
1468
1599
1727
2133
Kerala
2176
2832
2908
2616
3048
3534
3918
Madhya Pradesh
501
633
747
1156
1095
1096
2615
Maharashtra
2323
2853
3140
3464
2938
3612
2569
Orissa
952
1123
1158
1126
1265
1249
1511
Punjab
571
603
673
1036
865
881
1289
Rajasthan
387
671
1195
1391
1701
819
771
Tamil Nadu
2482
2955
2968
3157
3313
3829
4486
Uttar Pradesh
2994
4123
4938
5465
9589
10134
13763
West Bengal
440
605
1378
383
606
567
687
Total Major States
21179
23593
26565
27913
38794
37693
63112
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
91
382
160
155
171
250
385
Total All Major States
21270
23975
26725
28068
38965
37943
63497
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
76
102
55
53
63
77
56
Assam
126
122
154
149
134
190
186
Himachal Pradesh
219
266
241
268
613
974
1048
Jammu And Kashmir
19
22
21
23
23
67
60
Manipur
54
60
165
74
62
42
82
Meghalaya
39
47
33
57
53
35
42
Mizoram
44
20
21
19
25
28
34
Nagaland
18
20
21
22
23
24
25
Sikkim
6
12
11
9
10
11
12
Tripura
67
79
112
60
23
34
26
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
668
750
834
734
1029
1482
1571
All States
21938
24725
27559
28802
39994
39425
65068
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
11684
1874
155
3830
2178
3977
4498
1324
3176
1991
1042
2453
5375
17724
1763
63044
91
384
63519
2001-02
9245
400
208
3935
2140
3177
5356
1299
3302
2498
1388
3427
6579
13766
3961
60681
251
481
544
61957
2002-03
14767
400
317
6750
2813
4332
6341
1039
5833
2431
1439
1733
8950
25535
1728
84408
467
539
654
86068
2003-04
7121
5839
1151
6366
3266
3007
8186
908
6612
1200
2130
7881
12258
22768
2120
90813
455
541
669
92478
72
220
1320
110
216
55
31
26
48
71
422
2591
66110
69
277
1528
55
103
62
41
27
41
435
1796
4434
66391
63
292
1462
69
113
75
42
15
41
110
2267
4549
90617
153
3800
4185
88
97
80
69
19
88
128
2128
10835
103313
259
Table 8: Revenue from Medical, Public Health and Family Welfare in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
Andhra Pradesh
1,937
1,473
1,371
1,415
2,204
2,356
2,524
2,501
Bihar
1,064
1,257
917
811
1,147
1,485
2,062
1,601
Goa
150
157
219
222
292
445
374
477
Gujrat
3,240
2,774
2,841
2,557
4,628
3,918
4,171
4,959
Haryana
1,250
900
1,031
1,390
2,073
1,737
2,479
2,355
Karnataka
2,271
2,338
2,145
2,181
3,147
3,416
3,247
2,910
Kerala
1,539
1,145
2,359
1,176
2,201
2,151
1,892
2,071
Madhya Pradesh
975
894
1,031
949
1,545
1,126
1,597
958
Maharashtra
5,813
6,372
5,722
6,159
8,074
8,375
8,728
7,831
Orissa
530
501
359
639
635
814
1,127
1,012
Punjab
2,104
2,106
1,175
1,721
2,126
1,559
3,007
3,001
Rajasthan
1,538
1,043
1,680
981
1,715
1,496
1,247
1,620
Tamil Nadu
2,744
2,847
3,381
3,064
4,211
6,330
7,170
6,183
Uttar Pradesh
1,591
1,976
1,507
2,173
2,578
4,381
5,262
3,255
West Bengal
4,303
3,348
2,260
2,868
3,896
3,545
6,215
4,606
Total Major States
31,049
29,131
27,998
28,306
40,472
43,134
51,102
45,340
Chattisgarh
25
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
49
143
152
168
284
398
466
525
Total All Major States
31,098
29,274
28,150
28,474
40,756
43,532
51,568
45,890
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
5
6
5
6
21
26
8
9
Assam
297
278
254
228
274
355
457
466
Himachal Pradesh
225
220
175
351
235
370
437
510
Jammu And Kashmir
116
146
157
190
227
306
327
472
Manipur
18
17
43
50
20
16
81
26
Meghalaya
28
21
47
142
37
32
33
34
Mizoram
12
15
15
14
27
15
20
27
Nagaland
5
5
5
6
7
9
9
10
Sikkim
14
9
21
11
10
42
14
37
Tripura
23
38
42
35
38
69
95
111
Uttaranchal
66
Total Special category States
743
755
764
1,033
896
1,240
1,481
1,768
All States
31,841
30,029
28,914
29,507
41,652
44,772
53,049
47,658
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2001-02
5,505
2,700
467
4,763
2,872
6,059
1,987
1,655
11,178
1,027
2,919
2,482
6,607
3,163
4,607
57,991
333
591
872
59,787
2002-03
3,867
2,200
694
3,942
2,883
5,789
2,822
2,102
9,848
1,129
4,144
2,269
8,389
4,246
4,896
59,220
254
662
1,242
61,378
2003-04
2,953
1,922
730
4,282
3,211
3,306
2,767
1,216
10,540
755
4,158
1,640
6,634
4,319
4,800
53,233
260
809
1,098
55,400
10
723
347
684
35
41
39
11
35
133
364
2,422
62,209
13
591
323
822
35
55
40
15
36
161
546
2,637
64,015
27
423
343
956
32
62
32
7
44
346
434
2,706
58,106
260
Table 9: Revenue from Housing in Rs.lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
Andhra Pradesh
127
116
106
115
109
122
Bihar
105
110
91
114
126
116
Goa
19
16
15
16
19
19
Gujrat
298
311
329
439
491
642
Haryana
84
95
97
105
109
109
Karnataka
460
441
491
502
554
807
Kerala
86
105
108
147
126
125
Madhya Pradesh
432
408
432
412
431
431
Maharashtra
1,587
963
1,442
970
896
1,784
Orissa
487
505
510
523
569
719
Punjab
57
60
57
59
74
145
Rajasthan
104
113
118
134
147
242
Tamil Nadu
908
1,032
1,013
1,075
1,107
1,837
Uttar Pradesh
418
647
593
498
597
331
West Bengal
413
416
416
563
670
729
Total Major States
5,585
5,338
5,818
5,672
6,025
8,158
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
30
101
351
164
110
152
Total All Major States
5,615
5,439
6,169
5,836
6,135
8,310
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
9
7
6
9
8
9
Assam
65
70
77
68
67
125
Himachal Pradesh
50
54
51
58
6,586
2,903
Jammu And Kashmir
39
36
23
47
112
43
Manipur
16
40
28
31
37
26
Meghalaya
13
15
29
15
16
18
Mizoram
35
24
26
28
32
29
Nagaland
28
28
30
32
34
36
Sikkim
0
0
0
0
0
15
Tripura
16
28
30
15
38
16
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
271
302
300
303
6,930
3,220
All States
5,886
5,741
6,469
6,139
13,065
11,530
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
1999-00
135
150
19
1,133
119
785
140
482
1,049
1,047
235
251
2,558
1,537
739
10,379
2000-01
167
120
23
1,071
125
923
287
1,078
1,089
1,156
170
305
2,553
541
773
10,381
78
119
10,498
8
112
111
55
43
19
30
454
17
51
900
11,398
143
10,602
2001-02
154
116
26
709
128
1,050
183
1,301
1,868
1,170
168
319
2,298
792
793
11,075
163
50
168
11,456
2002-03
2,400
116
21
1,072
147
6,708
176
1,365
1,668
1,245
175
590
2,227
1,005
994
19,909
168
56
174
20,307
2003-04
9,838
141
23
1,052
131
3,814
168
1,401
2,073
1,217
184
416
2,432
1,040
1,112
25,042
169
56
162
25,429
8
120
182
79
58
17
33
477
18
67
43
1,102
11,704
9
152
203
93
100
18
36
501
18
82
116
1,328
12,784
9
193
173
331
75
18
38
225
17
80
140
1,299
21,606
9
192
164
136
93
20
37
219
18
88
156
1,132
26,561
261
Table 10: Revenue from Urban Development in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
117
213
358
468
103
164
107
Bihar
22
23
79
1
41
1
100
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
Gujrat
479
189
443
501
543
521
627
Haryana
310
495
720
1,333
7,068
5,929
5,747
Karnataka
30
4
4,899
4,736
5,299
80
140
Kerala
177
259
445
263
308
296
109
Madhya Pradesh
211
76
44
187
55
102
63
Maharashtra
1,238
994
1,622
2,299
3,380
1,116
3,587
Orissa
30
18
14
9
8
7
13
Punjab
70
140
125
208
51
214
175
Rajasthan
23
21
13
71
0
54
49
Tamil Nadu
60
64
68
34
51
42
42
Uttar Pradesh
5
9
61
3
27
4
67
West Bengal
24
27
31
30
122
107
160
Total Major States
2,796
2,532
8,922
10,143
17,056
8,639
10,986
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
1
0
0
3
0
0
1,293
Total All Major States
2,797
2,532
8,922
10,146
17,056
8,639
12,279
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
Assam
1
2
10
2
0
0
1
Himachal Pradesh
3
1
14
3
5
18
15
Jammu And Kashmir
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Manipur
0
38
10
0
0
0
0
Meghalaya
1
1
4
34
1
2
1
Mizoram
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Nagaland
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Sikkim
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tripura
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
5
46
38
40
10
20
17
All States
2,802
2,578
8,960
10,186
17,066
8,659
12,296
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
302
100
0
729
4,457
233
108
159
1,932
10
389
85
130
3,447
44
12,125
3
2
12,130
2001-02
415
22
2
620
5,338
100
47
121
1,873
16
72
-19
79
669
88
9,443
9
9
86
9,547
2002-03
1,307
22
9
2,662
5,074
112
91
146
2,066
12
254
68
133
330
70
12,356
99
10
33
12,498
2003-04
446
1
2
2,255
14,355
231
166
123
5,043
2
200
95
19,465
1,215
62
43,661
142
10
18
43,831
5
23
21
2
0
22
0
0
0
0
0
73
12,203
0
1
33
0
0
1
0
0
0
29
0
64
9,611
233
3
75
0
0
7
0
131
0
1
0
450
12,948
211
2
125
0
0
1
0
0
0
4
0
343
44,174
262
Table 11: Revenue from Water Supply and Sanitation in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
0
0
517
730
227
354
352
Bihar
0
0
134
130
24
209
275
Goa
0
0
1,550
1,764
1,908
4,119
4,021
Gujrat
0
0
63
146
102
57
52
Haryana
0
0
1,305
1,823
1,929
2,098
2,532
Karnataka
0
0
160
124
111
295
204
Kerala
0
0
25
48
65
86
68
Madhya Pradesh
0
0
945
766
1,026
881
1,231
Maharashtra
0
0
344
514
726
1,176
817
Orissa
0
0
640
961
1,260
1,220
1,406
Punjab
0
0
182
829
784
962
975
Rajasthan
0
0
7,576
7,845
9,679
12,161
12,572
Tamil Nadu
0
0
237
464
290
315
566
Uttar Pradesh
0
0
8
10
200
15
97
West Bengal
0
0
152
85
82
117
70
Total Major States
0
0
13,838
16,239
18,413
24,065
25,238
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total All Major States
0
0
13,838
16,239
18,413
24,065
25,238
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
0
0
12
17
19
27
19
Assam
0
0
26
18
25
46
46
Himachal Pradesh
0
0
339
298
370
439
594
Jammu And Kashmir
0
0
84
102
208
310
386
Manipur
0
0
39
80
87
44
62
Meghalaya
0
0
23
13
17
14
21
Mizoram
0
0
195
203
138
167
233
Nagaland
0
0
30
50
55
58
64
Sikkim
0
0
12
11
14
15
27
Tripura
0
0
11
101
35
63
508
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
0
0
771
893
968
1,183
1,960
All States
0
0
14,609
17,132
19,381
25,248
27,198
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
1,162
184
4,359
44
2,773
62
156
1,115
388
1,732
1,519
13,889
658
1
314
28,356
56
0
28,412
2001-02
909
207
5,314
50
2,870
186
128
1,151
509
1,896
1,531
13,983
885
16
367
30,002
119
89
0
30,210
2002-03
1,635
213
5,571
122
3,582
115
268
1,938
270
2,329
2,197
14,300
826
0
301
33,667
430
100
0
34,197
2003-04
617
44
5,466
101
3,731
61
274
1,964
1,042
2,416
2,681
14,630
675
290
630
34,622
522
674
0
35,818
22
74
513
414
66
21
287
67
38
122
0
1,624
30,036
79
33
848
700
67
26
349
70
43
605
0
2,820
33,030
93
34
976
1,000
144
23
339
63
73
88
0
2,833
37,030
111
359
1,104
1,610
246
29
392
80
74
195
332
4,532
40,350
263
Table 12: Revenue from Economic Services in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99
Andhra Pradesh
52,178
62,020
72,106
61,312
71,445
52,857
Bihar
79,904
87,661
85,040
90,338
7,812
82,911
Goa
11,623
12,870
15,091
17,578
20,810
28,365
Gujrat
47,617
51,464
52,886
54,766
64,511
68,019
Haryana
32,013
34,989
35,346
42,616
44,247
49,779
Karnataka
26,877
28,765
33,463
43,600
39,375
55,735
Kerala
16,075
19,989
23,397
24,901
24,054
22,777
Madhya Pradesh
105,149 124,834 149,574 153,752 158,167 145,493
Maharashtra
107,270 132,747 103,447 124,858 138,834 136,641
Orissa
25,759
50,427
37,723
38,408
42,506
44,220
Punjab
22,374
25,649
25,196
25,581
26,546
28,069
Rajasthan
22,579
26,091
30,605
37,090
39,033
41,219
Tamil Nadu
25,304
28,143
26,105
26,891
29,536
35,969
Uttar Pradesh
43,837
39,048
51,187
49,566
44,314
48,140
West Bengal
11,797
13,524
14,078
15,126
13,861
13,334
Total Major States
630,356 738,221 755,244 806,383 765,051 853,528
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
136
398
560
1,081
315
721
Total All Major States
630,492 738,619 755,804 807,464 765,366 854,249
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
5,526
5,492
6,609
4,947
3,793
4,623
Assam
32,044
29,916
30,110
29,449
33,851
38,253
Himachal Pradesh
9,207
10,193
5,876
8,376
9,780
11,568
Jammu And Kashmir
4,306
4,803
5,246
3,917
7,434
15,898
Manipur
1,538
1,565
1,634
2,143
1,400
1,528
Meghalaya
1,885
2,992
4,587
2,074
1,670
3,567
Mizoram
1,697
1,384
2,089
1,837
1,763
1,596
Nagaland
1,758
5,189
2,091
2,792
3,015
2,803
Sikkim
1,743
1,603
1,992
2,456
2,219
1,935
Tripura
1,917
1,772
2,582
2,255
2,490
3,019
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
61,621
64,909
62,816
60,246
67,415
84,790
All States
692,113 803,528 818,620 867,710 832,781 939,039
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
1999-00
63,540
119,768
31,787
80,040
51,225
54,457
20,551
190,442
146,012
45,891
28,363
46,053
45,804
89,855
22,973
1,036,761
2000-01
93,328
45,263
36,174
92,745
58,901
62,412
27,983
127,982
157,971
50,236
32,110
51,545
72,591
82,268
25,247
1,016,756
27,058
1,438
1,038,199
4,810
38,048
81,522
26,166
2,442
6,246
2,598
3,067
2,890
4,578
172,367
1,210,566
1,511
1,045,325
2001-02
97,881
12,625
45,852
107,905
66,832
63,605
20,816
104,944
171,157
51,748
30,248
54,141
45,921
62,033
37,917
973,625
61,275
86176
1,995
1,123,071
2002-03
130,857
13,750
59,517
146,433
67,538
69,298
26,408
128,367
172,193
59,734
30,213
58,209
61,638
71,584
28,806
1,124,545
72,026
85051
1,314
1,282,936
2003-04
121,377
16,985
63,753
185,175
79,625
92,306
31,987
124,522
181,447
67,128
50,044
66,013
71,632
97,429
22,165
1,271,588
84,449
101217
1,173
1,458,427
4,647
46,753
9,827
10,311
2,830
6,785
2,476
2,824
3,286
6,536
4,680
100,955
1,146,280
5,536
49,907
12,420
12,940
2,125
7,650
2,942
3,167
3,848
7,173
11,659
119,367
1,242,438
5,523
64,606
9,496
14,298
4,584
7,107
2,780
3,087
4,139
7,316
31,313
154,249
1,437,185
8,604
84,872
18,069
14,590
3,866
10,457
3,467
4,405
4,286
14,629
26,873
194,118
1,652,545
264
Table 13: Revenue from Forestry and Wildlife in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
7,044
10,286
14,476
11,589
10,735
10,060
8,461
Bihar
7,000
7,700
2,853
2,365
0
1,824
3,177
Goa
115
139
139
157
114
71
93
Gujrat
1,523
1,675
1,472
1,565
1,967
1,603
2,207
Haryana
1,185
1,336
1,780
2,160
1,743
1,917
2,491
Karnataka
9,198
9,508
10,609
11,335
11,381
10,735
9,488
Kerala
10,296
13,688
16,077
16,200
14,491
12,103
10,988
Madhya Pradesh
49,212
52,315
57,384
55,961
62,585
50,760
31,528
Maharashtra
13,605
19,280
14,398
14,697
14,738
13,031
13,474
Orissa
9,947
11,880
6,826
7,621
7,329
8,730
9,579
Punjab
528
515
689
531
766
652
1,079
Rajasthan
1,129
1,365
1,360
1,889
1,860
1,791
2,298
Tamil Nadu
5,527
6,481
5,797
5,273
4,366
6,400
13,008
Uttar Pradesh
12,116
8,189
10,108
10,451
11,326
12,591
16,052
West Bengal
3,244
4,461
4,427
4,701
3,316
1,921
2,401
Total Major States
131,669
148,818
148,395
146,495
146,717
134,189
126,324
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
1
1
0
2
13
3
3
Total All Major States
131,670
148,819
148,395
146,497
146,730
134,192
126,327
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
3,965
3,489
4,904
2,524
759
1,289
1,623
Assam
2,369
1,702
1,849
1,743
780
959
1,473
Himachal Pradesh
6,536
4,711
4,494
4,119
4,114
998
66,937
Jammu And Kashmir
3,256
3,653
4,158
2,505
5,714
4,570
3,386
Manipur
289
189
230
281
298
71
79
Meghalaya
404
449
517
657
367
464
617
Mizoram
113
163
161
206
130
109
399
Nagaland
350
400
450
480
500
300
350
Sikkim
106
129
194
122
136
160
490
Tripura
298
291
304
270
225
195
244
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
17,686
15,176
17,261
12,907
13,023
9,115
75,598
All States
149,356
163,995
165,656
159,404
159,753
143,307
201,925
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
8,337
3,177
111
1,848
2,588
10,825
14,124
37,256
13,516
8,479
1,437
3,702
13,118
7,687
2,226
128,431
4,577
4
133,012
2001-02
4,620
507
118
2,834
2,453
10,090
11,370
30,645
13,414
8,795
1,512
4,482
9,704
6,831
2,672
110,047
9,893
2200
4
122,144
2002-03
7,110
2,100
73
3,249
2,897
10,152
14,958
49,730
10,458
9,704
1,582
4,163
15,744
8,627
5,652
146,199
10,584
485
9
157,277
2003-04
9,295
2,100
181
4,986
2,548
18,066
18,718
49,675
8,633
4,864
808
3,953
9,021
6,096
4,597
143,541
14,094
282
45
157,962
1,300
1,477
1,654
5,722
97
544
186
250
639
760
3,002
15,631
148,643
2,524
1,525
2,898
7,126
75
782
163
200
665
453
8,070
24,481
146,625
1,561
2,344
3,152
7,269
81
856
380
354
715
409
17,769
34,890
192,167
963
3,676
7,693
5,211
101
1,176
316
343
724
1,470
13,188
34,861
192,823
265
Table 14: Revenue from Major and Medium Irrigation projects in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
7,679
10,380
9,461
6,477
633
510
405
Bihar
1,500
1,700
3,080
3,764
3,572
4,205
5,100
Goa
18
85
47
34
26
23
50
Gujrat
3,099
4,259
3,722
3,753
9,129
13,210
11,068
Haryana
2,038
1,919
2,100
2,430
2,738
6,103
3,830
Karnataka
1,355
1,319
1,693
1,710
1,636
1,845
1,576
Kerala
236
179
266
220
554
671
340
Madhya Pradesh
2,324
4,019
3,649
4,471
2,975
3,735
4,967
Maharashtra
7,829
7,099
7,702
5,800
5,207
3,365
6,163
Orissa
550
492
1,119
654
650
1,117
778
Punjab
1,641
3,145
3,014
2,764
1,069
1,628
1,769
Rajasthan
1,992
2,109
2,144
2,427
2,460
2,340
4,088
Tamil Nadu
367
365
371
464
730
825
985
Uttar Pradesh
16,123
6,548
10,395
10,078
4,086
4,913
4,016
West Bengal
231
304
280
279
242
294
297
Total Major States
46,982
43,922
49,043
45,325
35,707
44,784
45,432
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
21
79
61
60
62
83
523
Total All Major States
47,003
44,001
49,104
45,385
35,769
44,867
45,955
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Assam
17
17
17
11
36
12
16
Himachal Pradesh
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
Jammu And Kashmir
41
41
33
38
41
31
28
Manipur
46
89
31
94
42
19
38
Meghalaya
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Mizoram
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Nagaland
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Sikkim
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tripura
5
0
4
0
1
0
0
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
109
147
85
143
122
64
85
All States
47,112
44,148
49,189
45,528
35,891
44,931
46,040
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
1,143
3,628
22
13,658
5,430
1,846
382
3,955
6,249
1,871
1,168
3,648
931
28,213
399
72,543
1,038
267
73,848
2001-02
1,027
2,900
1,370
13,209
6,851
2,056
299
2,713
8,603
1,653
1,633
1,843
1,051
11,576
367
57,151
3,820
200
258
61,429
2002-03
847
1,400
426
26,723
5,205
2,093
365
2,464
11,305
2,253
2,447
2,074
952
9,012
349
67,915
5,372
2060
191
75,538
2003-04
1,552
3,000
294
20,278
18,300
1,181
610
3,780
23,069
3,229
1,244
4,323
1,271
13,610
400
96,141
4,485
2060
251
102,937
0
15
2
44
31
0
0
0
0
0
223
315
74,163
0
18
1,106
138
31
0
0
0
0
2
679
1,974
63,403
0
28
6
130
24
0
0
0
0
14
1,038
1,240
76,778
0
26
6
140
34
1
0
0
0
0
936
1,143
104,080
266
Table 15: Revenue from Minor Irrigations in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
1,049
814
740
696
270
255
255
Bihar
315
331
41
92
59
53
562
Goa
16
20
16
13
19
16
15
Gujrat
213
345
381
330
292
268
274
Haryana
6
6
6
307
7
8
8
Karnataka
70
90
122
156
294
239
203
Kerala
48
56
46
100
92
48
55
Madhya Pradesh
898
887
774
711
627
528
1,718
Maharashtra
1,108
1,701
1,459
952
591
1,985
524
Orissa
86
77
192
201
189
244
259
Punjab
16
25
28
23
1,074
11
12
Rajasthan
1,144
1,587
2,321
2,132
1,609
1,847
919
Tamil Nadu
219
258
323
270
236
246
284
Uttar Pradesh
2,191
2,794
4,058
3,675
3,410
3,509
3,661
West Bengal
467
529
506
578
537
651
666
Total Major States
7,846
9,520
11,013
10,236
9,306
9,908
9,415
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
1
4
3
2
1
2
13
Total All Major States
7,847
9,524
11,016
10,238
9,307
9,910
9,428
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
22
45
27
4
2
0
2
Assam
12
21
12
9
10
7
54
Himachal Pradesh
10
11
13
9
11
16
10
Jammu And Kashmir
12
12
12
11
14
47
49
Manipur
2
2
1
0
3
0
5
Meghalaya
2
3
3
4
3
6
5
Mizoram
2
6
2
0
4
1
2
Nagaland
2
3
3
3
3
1
2
Sikkim
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
Tripura
0
0
1
2
1
4
5
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
64
103
74
43
52
82
136
All States
7,911
9,627
11,090
10,281
9,359
9,992
9,564
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
279
60
35
232
10
332
69
762
569
127
41
2,157
287
1,896
623
7,479
152
14
7,645
2001-02
163
403
20
280
11
318
82
1,202
555
170
12
1,916
297
1,773
737
7,939
518
21
10
8,488
2002-03
133
422
1,131
480
7
354
104
1,058
783
198
13
2,673
317
1,211
692
9,576
458
24
10
10,068
2003-04
144
85
181
1,089
12
426
138
722
2,070
378
13
1,823
697
1,853
1,628
11,259
1,016
48
5
12,328
2
14
20
60
7
3
7
2
23
3
9
150
7,795
2
19
46
105
0
7
4
2
8
3
12
208
8,696
1
29
30
110
2
7
1
1
4
10
22
217
10,285
1
20
24
121
1
6
5
1
6
16
65
266
12,594
267
Table 16: Revenue from Power in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
Andhra Pradesh
1,881
2,089
1,734
10
1,985
4,606
Bihar
0
0
9
31
3
497
Goa
9,939
10,938
13,171
15,578
18,161
25,922
Gujrat
18
8
23
12
266
16
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
30
Karnataka
3,910
205
136
9,476
3,278
6,978
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pradesh
14
3
1
0
1
1
Maharashtra
5,191
5,186
147
12,540
7,070
7,551
Orissa
38
18,765
3,257
33
191
187
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tamil Nadu
3
20
2
2
3
4
Uttar Pradesh
-5
0
1
0
2
4
West Bengal
2
1
1
1
2
2
Total Major States
20,991
37,215
18,482
37,683
30,962
45,798
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total All Major States
20,991
37,215
18,482
37,683
30,962
45,798
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
569
1,004
785
652
649
1,240
Assam
0
0
0
0
0
0
Himachal Pradesh
657
501
-595
-160
-86
55
Jammu And Kashmir
500
549
420
691
820
10,393
Manipur
896
1,012
925
1,630
872
1,304
Meghalaya
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mizoram
884
909
1,022
1,207
1,138
862
Nagaland
914
965
1,300
1,800
1,980
2,079
Sikkim
358
385
608
586
550
644
Tripura
1,136
914
1,641
1,429
1,504
1,991
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
5,914
6,239
6,106
7,835
7,427
18,568
All States
26,905
43,454
24,588
45,518
38,389
64,366
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
1999-00
2,416
400
29,123
6,803
180
4,692
0
47,887
7,542
272
0
0
5
11
2
99,333
2000-01
4,082
500
33,066
6,446
213
4,333
0
29
8,644
320
0
10
3
9
1
57,656
0
0
99,333
708
0
5,328
21,855
2,222
0
1,328
2,200
833
3,393
37,867
137,200
7
57,663
2001-02
4,733
0
41,840
1
215
3,673
0
5
8,570
318
0
2
6
0
1
59,364
0
0
5
59,369
2002-03
3,551
0
54,835
511
195
2,725
0
24
8,579
294
0
140
6
0
1
70,861
0
0
0
70,861
2003-04
4,490
0
59,215
7,708
221
2,839
0
12
132
290
0
2
25
0
1
74,935
0
0
45
74,980
1,207
0
900
3,387
2,633
0
1,778
2,000
1,004
3,535
0
16,444
74,107
1,186
0
713
4,000
1,973
0
2,304
1,900
1,185
4,620
0
17,881
77,250
1,217
0
-8
5,100
4,391
0
1,821
1,959
1,297
5,968
3,501
25,246
96,107
3,362
1
3,501
7,267
3,677
0
2,614
2,930
1,367
12,178
5,977
42,874
117,854
268
Table 17: Revenue from Petroleum in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bihar
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Goa
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gujrat
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Haryana
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Maharashtra
6
22
45
1
1
2
1
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
0
183
252
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttar Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
West Bengal
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total Major States
7
23
46
2
2
186
254
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total All Major States
7
23
46
2
2
186
254
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Assam
25,232
25,756
25,445
24,380
30,196
30,236
31,973
Himachal Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Jammu And Kashmir
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Manipur
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Meghalaya
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mizoram
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Nagaland
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Sikkim
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tripura
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
25,232
25,756
25,445
24,380
30,196
30,237
31,973
All States
25,239
25,779
25,491
24,382
30,198
30,423
32,227
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
313
0
0
1
315
0
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
0
315
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
225
1
0
0
227
0
0
0
227
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
204
1
0
1
209
0
0
0
209
0
0
0
3
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
392
2
0
1
400
0
0
0
400
0
36,804
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
36,804
37,119
0
45,458
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
45,458
45,685
0
57,283
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
57,283
57,492
0
72,103
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
72,103
72,503
269
Table 18: Revenue from Village and Small Industries in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
427
493
626
383
949
448
436
Bihar
26
28
37
23
649
36
50
Goa
9
11
15
14
358
14
12
Gujrat
88
51
287
40
163
44
75
Haryana
73
928
126
113
168
113
61
Karnataka
2,159
3,265
2,236
2,541
2,400
2,400
2,240
Kerala
282
135
321
193
149
520
236
Madhya Pradesh
358
382
880
472
422
524
339
Maharashtra
155
177
234
567
920
839
811
Orissa
117
225
104
60
81
76
9
Punjab
161
429
244
565
263
226
143
Rajasthan
118
238
169
120
96
107
17
Tamil Nadu
711
2,076
509
559
466
964
1,337
Uttar Pradesh
184
144
975
97
131
120
777
West Bengal
109
317
246
184
-31
86
99
Total Major States
4,977
8,899
7,009
5,931
7,184
6,517
6,642
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
24
117
112
621
30
314
472
Total All Major States
5,001
9,016
7,121
6,552
7,214
6,831
7,114
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
52
140
61
56
51
56
37
Assam
133
118
197
215
549
77
50
Himachal Pradesh
19
343
63
47
114
31
26
Jammu And Kashmir
47
52
46
34
44
43
64
Manipur
60
23
66
11
14
12
8
Meghalaya
150
18
10
11
15
18
18
Mizoram
9
10
8
10
5
12
5
Nagaland
2
2
2
2
2
2
10
Sikkim
33
33
54
46
41
50
49
Tripura
45
69
47
64
133
39
17
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
550
808
554
496
968
340
284
All States
5,551
9,824
7,675
7,048
8,182
7,171
7,398
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
528
57
22
42
128
2,395
236
331
734
8
132
33
1,654
149
138
6,587
103
763
7,453
2001-02
236
57
14
21
22
2,190
314
269
322
24
98
39
1,267
153
332
5,358
60
11
748
6,177
2002-03
1,453
59
15
526
61
1,725
125
216
119
10
69
12
3,595
278
113
8,376
83
12
563
9,034
2003-04
171
42
101
482
223
1,766
582
278
311
10
93
25
1,829
595
-100
6,408
73
12
312
6,805
43
110
206
67
6
31
8
10
66
50
5
602
8,055
40
364
63
81
10
40
9
11
64
33
12
727
6,904
62
106
97
91
8
35
6
62
63
9
7
546
9,580
50
36
84
87
11
16
16
25
58
12
48
443
7,248
270
Table 19: Revenue from Industries in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
27,574
28,699
36,000
33,032
45,109
27,135
44,091
Bihar
67,500
74,667
76,937
82,072
30
74,155
105,080
Goa
929
917
1,011
943
1,320
1,202
1,260
Gujrat
38,301
41,139
42,882
44,542
46,414
47,296
53,388
Haryana
1,870
2,357
2,328
4,381
5,395
6,676
8,485
Karnataka
5,030
7,995
11,341
10,282
12,733
11,238
12,136
Kerala
506
597
1,135
1,833
1,459
672
1,524
Madhya Pradesh
47,959
60,273
81,270
85,331
82,351
80,983
87,267
Maharashtra
14,256
22,809
28,736
25,940
26,537
25,693
26,918
Orissa
13,122
17,165
24,191
26,946
31,722
31,410
32,017
Punjab
103
181
188
177
367
353
564
Rajasthan
16,414
18,536
21,724
27,205
29,307
30,480
34,979
Tamil Nadu
5,500
6,342
6,753
7,145
9,159
10,111
11,372
Uttar Pradesh
6,365
12,306
14,989
16,029
15,415
15,040
18,123
West Bengal
1,787
1,733
1,819
2,407
1,573
1,411
1,760
Total Major States
247,216
295,716
351,304
368,265
308,891
363,855
438,964
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
11
18
15
15
16
13
17
Total All Major States
247,227
295,734
351,319
368,280
308,907
363,868
438,981
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
0
103
147
526
99
474
1,089
Assam
1,027
676
28
901
884
3,971
305
Himachal Pradesh
1,022
2,828
1,010
3,243
4,018
9,318
7,927
Jammu And Kashmir
75
26
26
96
106
123
181
Manipur
125
130
0
2
76
30
4
Meghalaya
931
2,126
3,654
902
749
2,367
4,991
Mizoram
323
1
405
51
5
170
348
Nagaland
21
3,329
74
1
1
1
5
Sikkim
4
8
11
16
12
17
3
Tripura
149
180
57
112
200
332
409
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
3,677
9,407
5,412
5,850
6,150
16,803
15,262
All States
250,904
305,141
356,731
374,130
315,057
380,671
454,243
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
2000-01
58,451
35,052
1,597
62,141
10,577
14,524
2,111
72,538
35,371
36,045
354
37,075
38,925
19,804
1,763
426,328
20,311
19
446,658
2001-02
61,001
5,054
1,314
73,745
14,003
14,697
1,664
53,281
34,736
37,864
441
41,376
16,065
19,038
1,144
375,423
45,451
82720
12
503,606
2002-03
78,032
6,055
1,579
107,908
11,891
16,123
1,885
59,298
40,071
44,367
760
45,002
18,128
26,268
951
458,318
53,875
81343
17
593,553
2003-04
78,286
7,521
1,942
134,888
7,725
23,193
1,849
64,917
48,253
55,208
1,088
51,457
37,771
25,118
1,781
540,997
63,025
97562
22
701,606
518
61
5,502
318
2
5,711
8
5
5
551
758
13,439
460,097
448
46
5,868
322
1
6,337
1
372
3
627
1,824
15,849
519,455
749
99
4,904
343
1
5,611
0
1
2
604
2,452
14,766
608,319
1,751
37
5,439
402
4
8,618
3
5
4
561
3,213
20,037
721,643
271
Table 20: Revenue from Road Transport in Rs. Lakh
Major States
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Andhra Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bihar
0
0
47
0
906
820
1,955
Goa
0
0
0
0
190
0
0
Gujrat
6
8
16
1
18
2
1
Haryana
25,299
27,197
27,263
30,736
31,960
33,003
33,640
Karnataka
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kerala
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Madhya Pradesh
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
Maharashtra
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
Orissa
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Punjab
15,654
17,626
17,697
17,534
18,770
21,472
21,095
Rajasthan
0
0
0
0
557
367
0
Tamil Nadu
0
0
0
582
0
0
0
Uttar Pradesh
16
74
91
92
90
99
125
West Bengal
0
0
0
0
8
3
2
Total Major States
40,975
44,905
45,114
48,945
52,500
55,768
56,868
Chattisgarh
Jharkhand
NCT Delhi
0
0
173
181
0
0
0
Total All Major States
40,975
44,905
45,287
49,126
52,500
55,768
56,868
Special Category States
Arunachal Pradesh
410
394
385
470
531
545
607
Assam
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Himachal Pradesh
16
6
8
6
17
9
20
Jammu And Kashmir
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Manipur
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Meghalaya
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
Mizoram
168
146
162
183
212
181
202
Nagaland
400
448
218
461
484
372
430
Sikkim
1,043
819
847
1,379
1,167
749
1,189
Tripura
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Uttaranchal
Total Special category States
2,037
1,813
1,620
2,499
2,411
1,859
2,448
All States
43,012
46,718
46,907
51,625
54,911
57,627
59,316
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Note: NA- Value not calculatiable because of Zero or Negative Figure
2000-01
0
50
0
1
37,856
0
0
0
0
0
24,246
0
0
230
3
62,386
0
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
0
62,386
0
1
0
0
41,074
0
0
0
0
0
22,215
0
0
6,180
0
69,470
0
1
0
69,471
0
1
0
0
45,183
0
0
0
1
0
20,001
0
0
15,298
1
80,485
0
1
0
80,486
0
2
0
0
48,221
5
0
0
0
0
41,884
0
0
10,360
0
100,472
0
1
0
100,473
640
0
1
0
0
0
193
483
1,190
0
1
2,508
64,894
722
1
73
0
0
0
171
605
1,556
0
5
3,133
72,604
697
0
0
0
0
0
203
552
1,726
0
3
3,181
83,667
683
1
107
0
0
0
149
575
1,733
0
51
3,299
103,772
272
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
1994-95
Table 1: Revenue Expenditure on Social Services (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
295348
343920
467147
521598
547392
705571
733169
803357
821058
858575
1026727
241581
281514
325108
322185
359493
382441
622767
582794
442785
470387
520866
16706
18266
21857
25053
31147
36129
41504
43276
47828
54985
56426
233289
262622
312962
342242
423990
543667
622935
771648
772219
653920
707566
299571
87494
116800
159003
139580
157668
208476
225719
250630
272478
280870
Karnataka
237850
275374
325030
370063
413825
465704
547909
613191
642881
632624
696504
Kerala
177655
208254
231051
269108
308336
334916
420637
418836
407583
503829
502520
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
267507
301852
340615
404033
448177
557428
621038
583646
458289
528426
532165
1599032
463131
530548
656821
746786
867133
942781
1118128
1435071
1413681
1421783
Orissa
96670
148977
183467
201535
221288
272269
400211
311596
325983
345955
370961
Punjab
97730
123154
159091
163922
206216
263954
271632
299271
311060
322164
336770
Rajasthan
219102
252585
302438
346773
374354
492334
548623
612780
640458
658561
714219
Tamil Nadu
358607
384762
433289
512135
561345
710134
764383
779221
767706
797405
859777
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
405308
468124
549908
637420
750142
888230
867702
921796
933659
1030804
1035436
759901
803580
Major 15
states
All States
269808
304484
337252
406782
439129
563985
818886
841536
830369
3467786
4021236
4805039
5409215
6109635
7368019
8625243
9268649
9088037
3896061
4490169
5360659
6032756
6831165
8202080
9613797 10450537 10764665 11152844 12002680
9320189 10062120
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Table 2: Revenue Expenditure on Education, Sports, Art and Culture (Rs. in lakh)
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
145939
168952
171525
199348
224293
284066
330825
373881
379420
402574
466577
140136
168264
201326
220686
250700
256280
420508
400688
303340
318100
354693
9120
9907
11941
13821
17810
20103
23680
22609
23761
27760
28062
136920
156097
187117
204990
228964
312463
339295
367236
325815
362397
368340
153587
46025
53603
65130
75368
85518
122099
124907
133062
147615
144719
Karnataka
127812
144813
170295
192980
220125
256096
300090
348261
350141
356401
376603
Kerala
114551
135107
143513
161643
176105
195790
260948
262023
247100
296757
308011
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
124267
136382
165031
189802
198721
257077
302265
274987
211004
229558
235534
943230
269461
304549
366636
421396
487725
531401
727674
940842
938198
893709
Orissa
59440
81524
94255
106610
120839
147969
193037
174158
173334
188279
188183
Punjab
61942
76566
89547
104291
130236
171596
180528
185896
183229
209184
208038
Rajasthan
122867
145228
169779
198304
214709
277320
309199
324281
343098
331054
363489
Tamil Nadu
174092
192034
218059
251687
288957
385303
434872
439600
429287
414533
417506
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
235808
286640
338317
387362
419608
573144
571232
611933
604238
606706
625458
Major 15
states
All States
163342
177938
195694
242013
253034
302348
498928
456430
454341
440081
451919
1931722
2237604
2588165
2970301
3317344
4093055
5017988
5315887
5113921
5221812
5489230
2159353
2497736
2891122
3306431
3715995
4564883
5592980
5982585
6017688
6240656
6543822
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
273
Table 3: Revenue Expenditure on Medical and Public Health and Family Welfare (Rs. in lakh)
Major States 1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
2002-03
2003-04
51616
56019
60493
76909
84804
103885
109763
128609
131425
134460
147608
45704
50531
65948
50415
54730
58546
101620
99643
71348
74349
70157
3450
3628
4169
4961
5673
7011
7659
8236
8538
9208
10198
35605
41320
46787
51677
62564
84059
91313
89375
71548
84687
87813
9829
14276
16006
18567
22308
29168
28393
29091
31441
34268
35042
Karnataka
39124
45775
49645
52510
62437
70841
86829
90357
98632
95365
95893
Kerala
28422
34324
39658
43222
48906
54522
68804
67388
72934
75950
83170
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
40351
44733
46297
55344
58498
82008
83652
83199
66690
76061
76084
69816
75804
88982
100425
109671
115992
135477
159534
178381
165566
176795
Orissa
11773
21572
25483
27377
29698
40121
42567
43311
42144
45958
45881
Punjab
17085
22617
25685
31484
38323
51609
54456
63759
61817
61034
60845
Rajasthan
38457
46087
51463
59052
62540
81948
85803
87760
97321
89899
101388
Tamil Nadu
54912
61001
69818
77386
89956
109978
114148
116049
118439
118788
120296
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
92283
89813
100519
115506
142187
123394
127020
141022
135611
156502
175385
Major 15
states
All States
50688
52624
61750
70815
76348
113271
122750
137662
132279
132907
135479
589115
660124
752703
835650
948643
1126353
1260254
1344995
1318548
1355002
1422034
666938
742853
847877
942987
1071318
1268378
1429807
1540568
1590386
1634138
1717116
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
17304
Table 4: Revenue Expenditure on Water supply and Sanitation (Rs. in lakh)
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
30819
24837
30690
40095
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
67618
39604
22127
17333
18157
23939
13245
9119
9485
11191
10466
7993
9085
22580
20431
13913
15971
Goa
2227
2623
3354
3626
4471
5630
6507
8429
8743
9733
8003
Gujrat
6874
7872
10241
9645
15998
19338
19369
18661
13548
18511
22253
7612
19341
10728
11463
15084
18252
22209
21941
25755
30369
35348
11856
18054
22108
25525
31675
28326
36133
28913
31975
30291
33477
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
8322
8833
10204
10311
14505
14964
18234
16315
13187
19527
23030
27639
32480
32306
37789
40797
48016
49714
47824
41591
22946
24707
94361
23777
26433
33025
46613
68853
71308
71272
83008
52438
66757
Orissa
2665
8730
11043
11200
14617
21870
22193
16663
17699
20353
21136
Punjab
3730
6672
9548
9718
10247
12263
11625
15250
18483
22566
25821
Rajasthan
25822
27330
32183
38477
45451
55493
59811
67005
70133
76457
78964
Tamil Nadu
32768
28737
24405
32410
21799
26333
26108
18070
16292
21630
25284
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
19340
22570
25660
29953
52826
39532
31284
30083
48467
26869
40651
Major 15
states
All States
9414
14464
12987
14786
21864
27889
32274
40570
40660
25512
28634
208469
264443
273820
322672
406275
465917
468917
455290
430217
425649
498853
242442
297999
314058
366779
457388
527751
540794
546274
557939
556103
653157
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
274
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
Table 5: Revenue Expenditure on Housing (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
1994-95
1571
1416
1208
13113
13931
16588
2000-01
7775
2001-02
3686
2002-03
15871
2003-04
16695
28668
46
46
29
30
31
139
119
82
55
69
18
115
120
125
140
159
225
264
277
281
286
276
7046
8799
9789
9142
10735
17266
20337
30634
15873
19789
35713
593
759
702
969
783
629
878
901
971
1064
1000
3765
7163
7426
13619
11080
11809
14078
26339
29531
18650
16984
Kerala
2127
2571
2883
3435
4736
4180
4609
3695
3367
6668
5151
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
3384
3539
3941
3520
4082
6913
6923
6597
6224
6693
7110
13696
13911
17839
15536
18392
24072
21248
30618
19527
39823
33377
Orissa
1178
1954
1911
1924
2150
2186
2458
3095
4657
3697
4099
Punjab
209
214
286
330
290
647
342
0
5
0
0
1843
2128
5518
4900
4827
4077
3626
2596
5663
3774
5654
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
2437
3469
3837
3091
2752
7440
2267
2639
2845
6173
12129
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
1097
1404
1377
1626
1910
1282
1506
1845
1387
1485
1756
Major 15
states
All States
2434
2708
2799
2681
2896
3544
4505
5456
5966
4926
5013
41541
50201
59670
74056
78754
100997
90935
118460
112223
129792
156948
47011
56887
70080
85138
92579
114463
103237
130525
126240
146160
175846
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
1994-95
Table 6: Revenue Expenditure on Urban development (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
6881
6598
5315
6544
7083
14368
3635
10627
34512
42754
57275
3238
3077
2471
3412
3758
3551
3218
4303
5861
8468
11429
400
480
623
548
942
743
832
997
1702
2392
2092
4641
4828
6977
8199
12941
17787
23296
20670
21328
31656
40866
858
1393
2884
3212
3310
4289
5575
6546
4319
5222
5746
2765
4732
11839
9942
9358
6022
9872
8958
9835
8663
28961
921
1206
1354
8381
11735
14759
14672
12159
12259
21929
11733
4233
4632
5224
6846
7039
9188
13116
13911
5758
10099
14059
16040
11954
24634
20898
28192
25554
31111
30699
26800
41437
61649
Orissa
1292
2120
2292
2922
3072
4628
6540
4409
4324
4901
4768
Punjab
990
966
1108
1205
1315
1513
1502
1504
1500
1534
1724
Rajasthan
2155
2772
5135
5187
7541
27803
38460
42165
47454
59686
10571
Tamil Nadu
8349
6025
7052
11066
12960
12409
12961
13164
13294
16550
18258
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
2709
2091
3299
9229
14582
14483
7648
5743
11584
20078
10412
Major 15
states
All States
17287
25662
21932
30976
38132
46133
80197
76167
98727
55084
72222
72759
78536
102139
128567
161960
203230
252635
252022
299257
330453
351765
84193
99604
130985
164901
201273
251451
305161
307779
367767
402861
441188
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
275
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Table 7: Revenue Expenditure on Labour and Labour Welfare (Rs. in lakh)
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
5088
5350
4853
5632
5400
5326
5535
6864
6879
6725
11411
4855
4992
3545
3902
3963
4062
6889
4825
3691
3397
9064
395
414
495
635
729
834
881
968
972
1048
1159
Gujrat
5317
5624
6385
7242
7820
9719
10829
12121
10054
12268
12058
Haryana
2334
2627
3128
3593
3934
5471
5090
5369
5427
5645
5937
Karnataka
2281
2622
2610
2767
3613
4430
6950
6783
7009
6422
6410
Goa
Kerala
3745
4575
5238
5441
10576
5809
8776
8850
6296
6815
9137
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
2598
3056
4483
4354
5156
6217
6610
6209
5294
5621
5748
7811
10435
13740
14682
19765
19032
24153
21284
18246
18922
19416
Orissa
953
1529
1385
1888
1668
2403
2246
2242
2136
2182
2218
Punjab
2217
2659
3016
3620
4347
6110
4989
5269
5114
5361
5940
Rajasthan
1599
1893
2449
2514
2471
3666
3415
3508
3639
3732
3982
Tamil Nadu
5586
6489
7027
7008
7563
9188
10479
10773
10492
11462
14505
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
6412
6894
7211
8329
14486
10650
10762
11292
9140
10573
10824
Major 15
states
All States
3558
2931
3062
3471
3949
5888
6057
5662
5507
5316
5268
54749
62090
68627
75078
95440
98805
113661
112019
99896
105489
123077
58933
67063
74274
81605
103130
107710
122972
123051
116015
122380
141034
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Table 8: Revenue Expenditure on Social Security and Welfare (Rs. in lakh)
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
10128
10623
10985
14896
18734
21210
18451
30413
31216
45931
51296
18457
23327
23095
17469
10256
19087
28284
24262
16509
21181
34331
613
662
693
798
893
1057
1075
1218
3367
3794
5754
3962
4126
4722
5380
7327
10316
12315
16657
12309
25432
17082
Haryana
11030
18216
15970
18427
18327
19591
26592
38020
39450
39580
41966
Karnataka
16214
17323
20592
22084
22312
27042
28683
31134
34168
34432
43475
Goa
Gujrat
Kerala
8310
9455
9568
11813
14738
16073
15980
24566
21772
34476
29301
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
9364
10762
12323
19937
26992
36065
39096
34514
29730
43064
41831
65746
17225
18646
21109
22359
23191
27078
29510
47894
42346
53000
Orissa
6302
10423
11892
14387
14634
14834
15025
19156
20830
22562
37494
Punjab
4496
5191
10267
7339
10729
10299
13526
13370
11299
14315
16943
Rajasthan
4085
4301
4613
4746
5000
6607
10883
14424
14727
15301
15603
Tamil Nadu
19431
20548
23553
26627
45484
53897
57913
66481
68960
62660
83641
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
21988
20241
27859
27385
31909
37754
41543
46336
44754
73490
77536
Major 15
states
All States
10988
11195
15570
16867
18798
27231
33659
40219
49246
47140
55570
162593
185039
212811
230514
269324
328141
372535
448664
440683
536358
617569
186487
214429
242496
269718
307987
363688
413689
497622
513746
623070
723190
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
276
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
1994-95
Table 9: Revenue Expenditure on Economic Services (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
251793
289255
227850
494744
421076
411908
384695
633758
694989
640104
735213
218281
181502
176864
156791
155655
217663
307217
229889
177259
218490
202684
14310
16461
18619
20694
25629
32499
41601
49809
54237
53869
61768
263445
259550
300389
349247
417656
534914
548496
812954
777434
649431
552835
87633
161349
119721
169629
177930
215519
179148
154281
241482
253248
270605
180090
206296
244552
320029
289619
333058
400405
438799
539778
480242
465170
80942
93284
110164
135688
194789
229287
230387
217809
190797
298167
299934
257519
213368
261736
374914
305251
346143
403327
329761
436349
342469
627857
588300
437366
467910
496279
660792
628248
544530
525772
765586
587571
763577
Orissa
42875
111720
124713
113283
105570
131622
154769
153247
153483
160278
177138
Punjab
57811
96115
96203
230793
205967
128011
184635
210051
186568
230995
239940
Rajasthan
171888
171806
184135
189384
169662
206483
224261
231250
234915
278456
325738
Tamil Nadu
257239
278856
295696
351578
383507
368131
431581
462801
424238
626162
460740
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
351758
350374
363484
421613
427624
482077
575235
557203
534973
588320
1896970
Major 15
states
All States
158964
166736
182313
220194
205410
252409
302594
375463
358642
274201
304444
2831914
3064582
3202718
4209373
4113593
4434254
4894123
5622661
5592715
5858009
7209336
3187761
3373578
3566918
4582640
4547370
4983689
5517675
6400887
6589051
6905232
8460464
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
1994-95
Table 10: Revenue Expenditure on Crop Husbandry (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
12463
16622
13799
19933
17719
19426
14298
21676
19792
21063
39899
15210
14649
9542
10691
9193
7958
12906
11371
12514
14176
11680
726
687
737
857
921
969
969
970
1231
1165
1383
12634
11738
12244
13035
13978
15716
20821
23215
49715
21428
27557
5193
4146
4672
5948
5365
7102
7456
7799
8338
8501
8580
17194
12854
14611
16067
17190
20192
22980
23216
21919
24793
32946
Kerala
13629
17454
19107
20373
15609
18404
17373
23779
19633
18904
17259
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
17011
15545
17286
19688
20762
23340
27853
25638
26182
26158
27467
23360
21033
25126
28006
30198
34662
34473
41137
42071
57842
40996
Orissa
4432
8232
9699
13350
13201
16791
16494
15813
14453
15197
32126
Punjab
4242
4529
4799
4756
6518
7267
6471
7028
6601
7648
6525
Rajasthan
9002
10204
12956
13863
12866
15273
12531
13919
14302
13749
15156
Tamil Nadu
78109
91215
63059
70464
84441
94038
144479
75779
61767
53799
40962
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
32893
25463
27587
28084
33743
41709
61690
50137
55063
58313
56527
Major 15
states
All States
11842
6919
7629
9018
9916
13681
16397
18198
17810
16417
16033
257940
261290
242853
274133
291620
336528
417191
359675
371391
359153
375096
291247
288797
273612
308507
330562
380834
467520
414520
450718
442937
475294
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
277
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
1994-95
Table 11: Revenue Expenditure on Animal Husbandry (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
7060
8319
8349
9151
9940
11257
13514
15848
14805
15417
15773
6508
7007
22892
6480
3449
6560
12653
10328
8554
6798
6907
376
393
407
478
512
629
661
687
743
736
838
Gujrat
3335
4183
4873
5124
5576
6957
8071
8265
6548
7649
7732
Haryana
3463
4185
4669
5907
6166
8667
9108
8906
9028
10077
10506
Karnataka
4881
6130
7224
7427
9432
10254
11321
13113
12030
13445
12892
Goa
Kerala
3377
4105
4831
5447
7085
7241
8981
9066
7682
9239
9704
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
7455
8256
9392
10510
10932
15362
15894
17258
13519
14011
14329
7249
8031
9470
10235
12746
13097
15919
19604
20146
17581
17372
Orissa
3241
4581
5022
5354
5972
7589
7926
7510
7341
7687
8088
Punjab
2694
4072
4845
5083
6939
8271
7798
9708
9540
9458
9716
Rajasthan
5574
5479
6074
6744
7860
10056
10255
10466
10184
10169
11339
Tamil Nadu
6972
7471
8248
9038
9519
12285
12436
11336
11482
10996
10506
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
9891
9549
11053
11271
16222
14231
12396
12551
12153
15099
17877
Major 15
states
All States
4808
4876
5454
6610
7016
10973
12461
13929
12357
12245
11989
76884
86637
112803
104859
119366
143429
159394
168575
156112
160607
165568
93742
103440
132101
125921
143302
171069
192294
204770
202113
207901
217634
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
1994-95
Table 12: Revenue Expenditure on Fisheries (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
1256
1060
1162
1231
1803
1472
1457
1806
1904
1755
1867
1100
819
867
768
921
282
945
1823
1655
1204
1155
200
200
190
228
226
265
401
294
284
237
260
1154
1315
1490
1673
2093
2614
2614
2715
1590
1793
3765
381
355
547
533
504
776
740
847
686
845
935
1455
1540
1902
1880
2196
1970
1989
2577
2259
1875
1909
Kerala
2491
2677
3418
3152
5840
5583
6162
4694
3717
5224
3795
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
1212
1187
1305
1824
1633
1796
2082
1615
1231
1324
1336
1280
1431
1555
1748
1874
1971
2652
2369
1693
1766
2210
Orissa
603
1232
1419
1504
1404
1838
1713
2202
1714
2071
2406
Punjab
119
282
263
295
376
508
440
501
527
547
540
Rajasthan
479
525
546
503
486
636
588
591
672
681
660
Tamil Nadu
1722
2723
2295
3584
2419
3572
2943
2775
3323
3245
4265
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
1785
1402
1479
1444
1447
1195
2267
2051
2416
2246
2438
Major 15
states
All States
1944
2289
2695
3612
2239
5014
6501
6997
5360
3468
2821
16900
19085
21034
24132
24822
30155
34372
33689
28580
28232
30307
20962
22586
25000
28580
29993
35192
41090
40680
37636
37075
39631
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
278
Table 13: Revenue Expenditure on Forestry and Wild Life (Rs. in lakh)
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
7219
7766
9948
13080
16468
18332
19381
25582
20708
20052
31694
6407
6450
5282
6959
6234
8038
16795
10986
3919
4466
4880
380
425
438
523
567
673
874
1029
872
900
1098
5240
6161
7195
7533
8933
11145
11522
12037
12206
12323
14024
4671
4691
5306
5104
5297
6767
6039
5634
6563
7251
7277
13780
15068
17066
16711
20529
27792
30070
29065
30249
24968
33566
4802
6745
7174
8704
7957
10425
12610
13348
13349
14088
14829
32064
34357
39119
48327
49303
60964
62999
49550
45562
48543
54450
19212
22469
23928
28268
29286
31497
41339
32321
28413
28919
33548
Orissa
2242
5442
5779
5649
5390
6666
7984
9120
8853
9055
8286
Punjab
698
1840
1873
1873
2134
4235
6040
10442
10029
8334
9705
8155
11095
6836
7451
8255
10440
11685
12481
13015
13004
14026
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
4158
4511
5056
5429
6146
8126
8529
9202
8532
8666
9121
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
9831
9096
10790
12871
16468
18029
19293
18616
16453
11812
11832
Major 15
states
All States
7166
7909
8763
10153
9746
11115
15872
16291
16273
13011
12626
126025
144025
154553
178635
192713
234244
271032
255704
234996
225392
260962
157435
172177
187485
213689
230955
286032
329295
328343
364133
368806
386400
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Table 14: Revenue Expenditure on Co-operation (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
1994-95
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
8285
5389
5977
4960
4095
7949
7343
5628
7127
15007
5858
4577
4655
4397
4829
3972
4219
7810
6609
4016
3599
3298
95
98
117
150
166
209
216
213
224
224
227
15769
4343
3146
4046
3216
4603
5417
4577
3541
4274
4517
Haryana
1101
1511
1646
1749
1457
1845
1829
1882
1901
1939
2137
Karnataka
2732
4162
13882
5034
3698
4061
5109
4205
4121
3986
9010
Goa
Gujrat
Kerala
2541
2996
2999
3138
3164
3429
4281
4480
3414
6876
4364
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
4184
4308
5234
3725
7165
5814
3977
4127
3046
3561
3310
7386
7301
8542
17572
12104
16209
17496
18482
14457
13900
24927
Orissa
1874
1959
5212
2297
2232
3121
3177
3244
3075
3202
3168
Punjab
1497
2128
7935
2492
3260
3857
3473
3862
3730
4066
4183
Rajasthan
5647
4763
3747
2748
2304
2660
2291
2108
2419
2191
2396
Tamil Nadu
7310
5038
6755
6271
7172
8565
9584
10461
16023
15761
21863
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
5535
3023
3679
4031
4786
5151
4761
4826
4543
4889
5526
Major 15
states
All States
1517
1590
1890
2227
2526
4157
4289
3851
3867
3669
3392
70050
53264
75158
65269
61317
75849
81053
78555
75504
87144
98176
75386
58751
83472
73898
69271
83546
89810
88018
88323
99821
113591
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
279
Table 15: Revenue Expenditure on Major and Medium Irrigation (Rs. in lakh)
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
0
Goa
Gujrat
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
0
71182
82010
94439
104891
105318
129539
134213
157446
172656
0
0
8349
10676
3244
9089
21918
21179
19303
18624
17274
0
0
332
445
485
583
637
763
599
658
671
0
0
73174
83467
98151
131096
152620
172900
169414
180751
21445
Haryana
0
0
22733
22638
25332
26081
27791
27965
34477
37189
38074
Karnataka
0
0
34388
41969
47648
48895
59365
65061
6859
6901
6319
Kerala
0
0
3470
3502
3878
4230
4623
5392
4415
6802
8127
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
0
0
17115
17961
20405
26178
27618
27121
21647
21103
22395
0
0
106193
124209
140675
149141
159089
160114
163557
165442
15066
Orissa
0
0
4524
5102
5366
5838
6704
7012
7348
7433
7569
Punjab
0
0
13542
15432
16766
18586
19026
22066
22212
24822
39946
Rajasthan
0
0
33557
37141
40586
52964
55664
58667
62237
61600
68700
Tamil Nadu
0
0
14898
19013
24010
29163
30649
34769
34594
40327
44976
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
0
0
61161
61738
71829
70373
94353
105473
98068
107290
111743
0
0
8562
9979
11133
14077
17189
19087
16139
15182
14218
Major 15
states
All States
0
0
473180
535282
603947
691185
782564
857108
795082
851570
589179
0
0
474182
537757
606968
694607
786977
867100
818458
880362
617259
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
1994-95
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
0
Goa
Gujrat
Table 16: Revenue Expenditure on Minor Irrigation (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
0
6071
4112
7772
5807
7401
11999
16687
11118
7155
0
0
10221
12273
14021
9960
15882
16080
12904
12527
13030
0
0
273
400
396
574
663
962
693
689
614
0
0
12353
10561
13428
17026
21283
19589
10195
12241
14742
Haryana
0
0
894
617
994
449
827
767
2003
5484
818
Karnataka
0
0
4548
5531
6372
6425
7641
8484
8597
8267
8891
Kerala
0
0
5154
4462
3967
6265
5981
5633
4871
5558
6779
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
0
0
4127
4268
4878
3870
3947
4275
3602
3485
4147
0
0
23768
24367
24218
25209
16306
23995
22599
14603
19457
Orissa
0
0
6179
10321
6429
7920
7061
7602
7911
8273
7533
Punjab
0
0
2260
2443
2177
2827
3841
5003
5626
4614
4414
Rajasthan
0
0
5338
5517
5573
6758
6562
7858
6816
5987
5895
Tamil Nadu
0
0
4605
4181
5095
6753
5672
5043
2908
3427
3802
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
0
0
60972
72331
56791
62172
12916
18530
27620
28118
24505
0
0
11224
13016
15970
20748
25855
33195
28797
23238
24101
Major 15
states
All States
0
0
157987
174400
168081
182763
141838
169015
161829
147629
145883
0
0
165924
188519
184793
202724
163853
196950
195928
192519
191465
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
280
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Table 17: Revenue Expenditure on Power (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
1994-95
3232
3765
3381
225221
95803
5662
2000-01
16511
2001-02
79859
2002-03
230470
2003-04
164349
164166
51513
42578
44
0
15627
1624
0
0
0
9989
0
9420
10620
12062
13392
17756
22583
30133
37263
40520
36994
42126
256081
81142
70828
68675
10458
136660
164517
138489
354676
355025
221863
Haryana
6000
45500
21000
63245
67994
84715
41310
14023
79041
84949
97957
Karnataka
4486
15054
30693
96056
60219
67334
77582
92020
232115
190095
172224
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23193
57247
68760
22332
32550
122371
39053
43489
117079
41033
203701
97977
395434
34790
1599
977
1398
90458
1791
1702
2946
239560
71564
75438
Orissa
7271
25169
27143
948
665
1252
344
494
1566
4646
2688
Punjab
0
0
0
133809
87347
0
40368
60458
45000
75200
135122
38572
17815
23217
44773
27530
29780
48085
47826
31810
66200
94314
0
0
0
0
0
0
51
71
3325
200116
43818
8479
0
3430
0
0
0
0
0
35000
41372
1342672
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
Major 15
states
All States
4602
5000
8171
15617
9069
5143
5122
14779
10085
32
30
285076
259658
231764
816348
559514
427801
518020
982062
1339222
1292413
2838669
311976
292523
269305
859372
609290
554777
675319
1190746
1522394
1404871
3007904
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
Table 18: Revenue Expenditure on Village and Small Industries (Rs. in lakh)
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
7399
6169
5889
8256
9298
12239
4475
7631
11118
13005
13396
2007
1313
2945
7536
4256
2513
4539
4679
2421
2509
2778
530
522
735
494
409
346
481
647
1009
1264
948
7350
11541
13350
10404
10653
19010
15144
16753
12291
12559
8986
1111
1214
2331
1733
927
776
491
556
379
878
492
11200
15055
17372
17812
16431
17030
20113
22441
27089
26251
20541
Kerala
5141
6205
9937
12364
9508
8529
9296
7721
10806
9858
9364
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
4508
4659
5887
5962
4576
5948
5865
5965
3828
4691
5237
2619
2725
2674
2828
2809
3151
3010
2795
2373
2835
2656
Orissa
1428
4908
4624
4576
4287
4934
4648
3297
3201
3067
3821
Punjab
1030
1560
1730
1854
2118
2617
2264
2250
2186
2159
2041
Rajasthan
1116
1023
1137
2016
1404
1576
1255
1235
1112
1215
1803
Tamil Nadu
18087
17805
21094
23338
15128
23250
15937
19663
15325
25030
18827
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
7005
4285
8726
8175
6056
7015
7807
9620
6986
8326
9174
Major 15
states
All States
4948
6071
6766
6878
6540
7431
8702
11180
7618
6497
7098
75479
85055
105197
114226
94400
116365
104027
116433
107742
120144
107162
93229
100843
123087
135109
117467
141012
130953
147854
143569
161076
149551
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
281
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Haryana
Karnataka
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
3439
4721
6861
5915
6863
4307
7609
3176
5010
5928
7395
2983
2938
2156
2999
5241
3035
5216
4411
2115
2504
2498
40
44
53
68
67
79
80
89
153
190
643
1351
2153
2574
2388
2754
4373
9298
11802
24227
14108
9284
Goa
Gujrat
Table 19: Revenue Expenditure on Industries (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
1994-95
740
827
878
924
1088
3057
1999
1976
2047
2826
1995
7872
6811
5840
6713
5793
5452
10584
10491
6818
5023
2515
Kerala
2115
2445
609
2337
1377
1837
1714
1263
534
1963
9661
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
2340
2323
4286
2850
7949
2976
2086
2856
1585
1928
1417
1864
9020
11814
17595
7822
6941
6217
1113
10927
15719
17417
Orissa
393
1133
1081
1089
1291
1739
1714
1366
1252
1494
1382
Punjab
54
2542
1723
577
3087
1185
1553
605
101
102
94
6575
9363
12377
11352
10605
9668
6239
4538
4135
5283
5896
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
1268
3609
2451
2076
2404
2731
1045
3157
1011
3208
1891
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
1257
1338
1549
1795
2070
2349
2414
11569
5486
3650
12365
Major 15
states
All States
2595
4074
3799
3722
3968
4388
4405
5786
10126
4223
9662
34886
53341
58051
62400
62379
54117
62173
64198
75527
68149
84115
45608
60197
64881
71680
72063
65954
75873
80422
96149
90834
106228
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Major States 1993-94
Andhra
Pradesh
Bihar
Goa
Gujrat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
1994-95
Table 20: Revenue Expenditure on Roads and Bridges (Rs. in lakh)
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
15765
16235
17018
26358
32008
11060
11485
12752
14877
718
829
1033
810
23504
28101
29934
34807
4833
5611
7010
13237
14087
3484
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
35891
47783
43153
47449
48380
45226
10402
8526
27908
25862
21567
22457
22897
1072
1844
2124
2286
2184
2838
3407
45120
54237
54086
55174
43353
51364
58381
7336
7582
14289
13589
11797
14217
8992
12456
16337
18440
21821
30612
35099
36399
32639
27742
9103
9172
14019
15199
16977
19834
24537
24615
23310
44805
43448
26584
31218
34719
37464
39910
42036
30944
29331
24507
22400
17076
48191
60147
66441
77136
92264
11622
1561
4070
7189
94025
25500
Orissa
8253
10021
11286
11830
10588
10121
13817
14212
12393
14034
12587
Punjab
8070
8050
9083
9091
11379
13198
13794
11117
10714
14592
6647
14203
14309
16395
15682
14411
18085
15385
17993
19148
25645
20849
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
23550
24932
29776
34320
37996
33532
32368
26255
26312
36620
44924
Uttar
Pradesh
West Bengal
29721
27042
26568
29417
30807
31677
43474
52745
53652
67473
67659
Major 15
states
All States
9464
11468
14383
13162
12035
15765
27072
34979
25987
19193
31650
246256
272707
293901
343826
380991
332478
379054
388688
368381
505457
440449
277394
313897
350618
391377
431168
391050
446207
471591
476924
620650
564437
Source: RBI, "State Finances: A Study of Budgets", Various Issues, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
282
References
Ainsworth, M 1984. “User Charges for Cost Recovery in Social Sectors: Current
Practices.” Country Policy Department Discussion Paper, World Bank, Washington.
Alberta H. Charney, Gary C. Woodard. 1984. “A Test of Consumer Demand
Response to Water Prices: Comment”. Land and Economics, 60 (4) Nov.: 414-416.
Amacher, Gregory S, Richard J Brazee and Meindert Witvliet. 2001. “Royalty
Systems, Government Revenues, and Forest Conditions: An Application from Malaysia”
Land Economics 77: 300-313.
Anand, Mukesh and Raghabendra Jha. 2004. “Budgetary Subsidies and Fiscal Deficit:
Case of Maharashtra”. Economic and Political Weekly 39 (August 21): 3827-3834.
Aruna R., 1999. “Learn Thoroughly: Primary Schooling in Tamil Nadu” Economic
and Political Weekly, May 1: 1011-1014.
Augenblick, M., and Scott, C.B.Jr. 1990. The Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT)
Approach to infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries” World Bank Policy
Research and External Affairs Division Working Paper No. 448, Washington, D.C.
Bahl, R.W. and J.F. Linn. 1992. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries. A
World Bank Book. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bailey, Stephen J. 1994. “User Charges for Urban Services.” Urban Studies 31(4/5):
745-765.
Balestrino, Alessandro. 1999. “User Charges as Redistributive Devices”. Journal of
Public Economic Theory: 511-524.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Angus Deaton and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Health Care Delivery in
Rural Rajasthan”. Economic and Political Weekly 39 (February 28): 944-949.
Barah, Bhuban C. 1996. Fiscal instruments for Environmental Sustainability: Reforms
for Urban water utility services and environmental pollution. National Institute for Public
Finance and Policy, New Delhi.
Barro, R., and X. Sala-i-Martin. 2004. Economic Growth. 2nd edition, New Delhi:
Prentice Hall of India
Basu, Rama V. 2003. “Privatisation of Health Services: A South Asian Perspective”,
Economic and Political Weekly 38: (October 18): 4433-4437.
Besley, Timothy. 1991. “Welfare Improving User Charges for Publicly Provided
Private Goods”. Journal of Economics 93: 495-510.
Bierhanzl, Edward J. 1999. “Incentives for Efficiency: User Charges and Municipal
Spending”. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice/Economia Delle Scelte
Pubbliche 17: 19-34.
___. and Paul B. Downing. 1998. “User Charges and Bureaucratic Inefficiency”.
Atlantic Economic Journal 26:175-189.
Bird, R.M. 1976. Charging for Public Services: A New Look at an Old Idea. Canadian
Tax Foundation, Toronto.
283
___. 1997. “Analysis of Earmarked Taxes”. Tax Notes International (June 23): 20952116.
___. 2001. “User Charges in Local Government Finance”. In The Challenge of Urban
Government: Policies and Practices, ed. Mila Freire and Richard Stern, World Bank
Institute of Development Studies, Washington, D.C.
___, and Thomas Tsiopoulos. “User Charging in the Federal Government- A
Background Document.” Downloaded from Internet.
Bloom, D., D. Canning, and J. Sevilla, 2004. “The Effect of Health on Economic
Growth: A Production Function Approach.” World Development Report 2004; 32:1-13,
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Boiteux, M. 1960. “Peak Load Pricing”. Journal of Business, 33, (2), April: 157-79.
___. 1971: “On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject to Budget
Constraints”. Journal of Economic Theory, 3: 219-40.
Braeutigam, R.R. 1980. “An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated
Industries”. Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (1) Spring: 182-196.
Bridger M. Mitchell. 1978. “Optimal Pricing of Local Telephone Service”. American
Economic Review, 68 (4), September: 517-537.
Brito, D.L. and W.H. Oakland. 1980. “On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable
Public Goods”. The American Economic Review, 11 (1) September: 691-706.
Brown, S.J. and D.S. 1996. The Theory of Public Utility Pricing. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Burns, M.E. and C Walsh. 1981. “Market Provision of Price-Excludable Public
Goods: A General Analysis”. Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 89 (11):166-191.
Calthrop, E. and S. Proost. 1998. “Road Transport Externalities: Interaction between
Theory and Empirical Research”. Environmental and Resource Economics 11: 335-348.
Canton, E. 2002. Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right. CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague.
Chamarbagwala Rubiana. 2004. “Returns to Education, Child Labor and Schooling in
India.” Working Paper. Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington.
Chia, Ngee-Choon. 1998. “Singapore: The Significance of Motor Vehicle Taxes in
the Revenue System.” Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin (July): 275-28.
Clark, J.M. 1911. “Rates for Public Utilities.” American Economic Review, I,
September: 473-87.
Coase, R.H. 1946. "The Marginal Cost Controversy". Economica, New Series.
13(51), Aug.: 1-44.
___. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law & Economics, 3(1): 1-44.
Coelli, Tim, Antonio Estache, Sergio Perelman, and Lourdes Trujillo. 2003. A Primer
on Efficiency Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulator, WBI Development
Studies, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Cremer, Helmuth, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. 2003. “Public Goods with Costly
Access.” Journal of Public Economics 87: 1985-2012. Elsevier.
284
Dalton, Huge. 1949. Principles of Public Finance. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul Ltd.: 32.
Daramola, A G, Hawa A Biu, Ogoh Alubo, Agi S P I Shebu, Uchenne m Nzewi, and
Paul Francis. 1998. Hard Lessons: Primary Schools, community, and Social Capital in
Nigeria. World Bank, Washigton, DC.
Das, Jishnu and Jeffrey Hammer. 2004. “Strained Mercy: Quality of Medical Care in
Delhi”. Economic and Political Weekly 39(February 28): 951-961.
Devarajan, Shantayanan and Shekhar Shah. 2004. “Making Services Work for India's
Poor”. Economic and Political Weekly 39 (February 28): 907-919.
Dobbs, Ian M. 1991. “Litter and Waste Management: Disposal Taxes versus User
Charges.” Canadian Journal of Economics 24(1): 221-227.
Downing, P.B. 1992. “The Revenue Potential of User Charges in Municipal Finance.”
Public Finance Quarterly 20: 512-527.
Dreze J. and A. Sen. 1995. “India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity”
Oxford University press.
Dupuit, J. 1844. “On the Measurement of the Utility in Public Works.” Annales des
Ponts et Chausses, Series No. 2, No. 8 (English Translation by R.H. Barback in
International Economic Papers, No. 2, 1952).
Edling, Herbert. “Non-Tax Revenue of Sub-national Governments: Theoretical
Background, Experience from the International Perspective and Recommendations.”
Fiscal Policy Series 105, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
EPW Research Foundation, 1994. “Social Indicators of Development for India – II:
Interstate Disparities” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.XXIX, No 21, May 21,
(Special Statistics – 8).
Ferroni, Marco, and Ashoka Mody, ed. 2002. International Public Goods: Incentives,
Measurement and Financing. World Bank, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Fraser, C.D. 1996. “On the Provision of Excludable Public Goods.” Journal of Public
Economics 60: 111-130.
Fraser, Rob, and Ross KingwelI. 1997. “Can Expected Tax Revenue be Increased by
an Investment Preserving Switch from ad-valorem Royalties to a Resource Rent Tax?”
Resources Policy 23: 103-108.
Fraser, Rob. 1999. “An Analysis of the Western Australian Gold Royalty.” Australian
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 43: 35-50.
Friedlender, A.F. 1969. The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation. The
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Gertler, Paul J., and Jeffrey S. Hammer. 1997. “Strategies for Pricing Publicly
Provided Health Services.” A Working Paper, Public Economics Division, Policy
Research Department, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Global Forum for Health Research. 2004. “Strengthening Health Systems: The Role
and Promise of Policy and Systems Research.” Alliance for Health Policy and Systems
Research, World Health Organisation, Geneva.
Goel, Nihal Chand 2000. Resource Mobilization Strategy for Indian States; Jaipur:
Pointex Publishers.
285
Gokhale, Yogesh, “Reviving Traditional Forest Management”. Economic and
Political Weekly. 39 (July 31): 3556-3559.
Government of India. 1988. Rates for Surface Water in India. Central Water
Commission, New Delhi.
___. 1992. “Pricing of Irrigation Water.” Report of the Committee, Planning
Commission, New Delhi.
___. 2000. “Notification of Rates of Royalty and Dead Rent.” Ministry of Mines,
New Delhi.
___. 2001. “Minor Irrigation for formulation of the Tenth Plan (2002-2007)
Proposals.” Minor Irrigation Division, Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi.
___. 2005. Financing and Delivery of Health Care Services in India. Background
Papers of the National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (August). Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, New Delhi.
___. 2006. “Report of the National Forest Commission.” New Delhi: Ministry of
Environment and Forest.
___. 2006. The Secretariat for the Committee on Infrastructure. Financing of the
National Highway Development Programme. Report of the Core Group, Planning
Commission, New Delhi.
Government of Karnataka. 2000. Karnataka Minerals Policy. Bangalore.
___. 2001. Final Report of the Tax Reform Commission. Finance Department,
Bangalore.
___. 2002. Division: Shaping Education in Karnataka. Bangalore.
___. 2002. Major and Minor Bridges in Karnataka, as on 31st March, 2000. Public
Works Department, Bangalore.
___. 2003. Karnataka Revenue Reforms Commission, First Report, Volumes 1 and 2.
___. 2003. Report of the Task Force on Higher Education. (Restructuring of Grantsin-Aid Policy by the Government of Karnataka), Bangalore.
Government of Rajasthan. 1999. “Issues and constraints”. In Sector Strategy for
Water Supply and Sanitation. Jaipur Water Supply and Sanitation Feasibility Studies,
Jaipur.
___. 2005. “Mineral Policy, 2005.” Department of Mines, Jaipur.
___. 2006. “An Outline of Major and Minor Minerals.” Department of Mines and
Geology, Jaipur.
Government of Uttaranchal 2004-05. Uttaranchal at a Glance; Department of
Planning, Dehradun.
Gronau, Reuben. 1994. “Fuel Taxes and Road User Charges in LDCs: Some Lessons
from Sub Saharan Africa”. In The Environment and Transport, Environmental Analysis
and Economic Policy, ed. Yoshitsugu Hayashi, Kenneth Button and Peter Nijkamp. Vol.
4 Cheltenham: U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar.
Gupta, I., and A. Mitra. 2003. “Economic Growth, Health, and Poverty: An
Exploratory Study in India.” In Mishra R., R. Chatterjee, S. Rao (eds). India Health
Report, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
286
Gupta, I., and P. Dasgupta. 2000. “Demand for Cuartive Health Care in Rural India:
Choosing Between Private, Public and No Care.” A Discussion Paper, Institute of
Economic Growth, New Delhi.
Gwilliam, Kenneth M., and Zmarak M. Shalizi. 1996. “Road funds, User Charges and
Taxes.” TWU Paper, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Heggie, Ian G., and Piers Vickers. 1998. “Commercial Management and Financing of
Roads.” World Bank Technical Paper No. 409, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Hope, R.A 2006. “Evaluating Water Policy Scenarios Against the Priorities of the
Rural Poor.” World Development 34(1): 167-179. U.K.: Elsevier.
Hotelling, H. 1938. “The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of
Railway and Utility Rates.” Econometrica, Vol. 6(3): 139-167.
Hotelling, H. 1939. “The Relation of Prices to Marginal Cost in an Optimum
System”. Econometrica, 7: 151-155.
Hsiao, W., and Y. Liu. 1996. “Economic Reforms and Health: Lessons from China.”
New England Journal of Medicine; 335: 430-432.
Huber, Bernd and Marco Runkel. 2004. “Tax Competition, Excludable Public Goods
and User Charges”. CesIfo Working Paper No. 1172.
Hyde, William F and Roger A Sedjo. 1992. “Managing Tropical Forests: Reflections
on the Rent Distribution Discussion”. Land Economics 68: 343-350.
Jha, Raghbendra, M.N.Murty, and Satya Paul. 1990. Pricing of Postal Services in
India. New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
Jimmenmez, E. 1987. Pricing Policy in the Social Sectors-Cost Recovery for
Education and Health in Developing Countries, World Bank, Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press.
Joshi, A., and P.N. Pande. 1991. “Forest Policy and its Impact on the Rural
Population in Uttar Pradesh Hills.” A Working Paper, Giri Institute of Development
Studies, Lucknow.
Kafoglis, M. 1963. “Highway policy and External Economies.” National Tax Journal,
Vol. 16: 68-80.
___. 1977. “The potential of local service charges.” in Local Service Pricing Policies
and Their Effect on Urban Spatial Structure, edited by Paul B Downing. Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press.
Kahn, A. 1970. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, Vol. 1,
New York: Wiley and Sons
Kattan, Raja Bentaouet, and Nicholas Burnett. 2004. “User Fees in Primary
Education.” Working Paper, World Bank.
Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani. 2004. “Why Do the Poor Receive Poor Services”?
Economic and Political Weekly 39 (February 28): 935-943.
Kneese, A.V. and C.L. Schultze. 1975. Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy.
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Krishnamurthy, M.S. 1999. “Review of Resources from Non Tax Revenue.” Finance
Department, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore.
287
Kumar R., Santra S., Mukherjee A., Banerjee T., and Kundu M., 2005. Public-Private
Interface in Primary Education: A Case Study in West Bengal, Economic and Political
Weekly, April 9: 1550-1555.
Levesque, Jean-Frederic, Slim Haddad, Delampady Narayana, and Pierre Fournier.
2006. “Outpatient Care Utilisation in Urban Kerala, India.” The London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London: Oxford University Press.
Listorti, James A. 1990. “Environmental Health components for Water Supply,
Sanitation, and Urban Projects.” Working Paper No. 121, The World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Mahal, Ajay, Abdo S. Yazbeck, David H. Peters, and G.N.V. Ramana. 2001. The
Poor Health and Service Use in India (March).
Mathur, Archana S., and Arvinder S. Sachdeva. 2003. “Towards an Economic
Approach to Sustainable Forest Development.” Planning Commission Working Paper
2/2003-PC, Government of India, New Delhi.
Mathur, O P. 2001. “Coming to the Grips with Issues of Pricing Urban Water and
Intra-City Bus Transport.” National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.
Mehrotra, S. et al, 1998. “Reallocating Public Spending for Basic Social Services in
Developing Countries.” Economic and Political Weekly, July 4:1717-1724.
Mehrotra, Santosh. 2004. “Reforming Public Spending on Education and Mobilising
Resources: Lessons from International Experience”. Economic and Political Weekly 39
(February 28): 987-997.
Mills, A., R. Brugha, K. Hanson, and B. McPake. 2002. “Approaches for Improving
Delivery in the Non-state Sector: What Is the Evidence on what works, where and why?”
Paper presented at the Making service Works for the Poor Conference. Eynsham Hall,
Oxfordshire. November 4.
Mohan P., S. Iyengar, S.B. Mohan, K. Sen. 2003. “Daily Up-Down”. Why should an
auxiliary nurse-mid-wife (ANM) of Rajasthan prefer to reside within her work-area?
Action Research and Training for Health, Udaipur.
Mookherjee, Dilip and Ivan P.L. Png. 1994. “Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of
Law”. Journal of Political Economy 102: 1039-1066.
Musgrave, Richard A. and Peggy B Musgrave. 1989. Public Finance in Theory and
Practice, 5th edition, Boston: McGraw Hill Book Company.
Narayan, Deepa, and Patti Pettesch. 2002. From Many Lands: Voices of Poor. World
Bank, Washington, DC: Oxford University Press.
Narayana, M.R. 2001. Sub-sector Study on Collegiate Education. Education
Department, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore.
Nellor, David C.L. and Emil M. Sunley. 1994. “Fiscal Regimes for Natural Resource
Producing Developing Countries” International Monetary Fund Papers on Policy
Analysis and Assessment, No. 9424.
Newbery, David M., and Georgina Santos. 1999. “Road Taxes, Road User Charges
and Earmarking.” The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, Vol. 20, No. 2:103-132.
Nordin, J.A. 1976. “A Propsosed Modification on Taylor’s Demand–Supply Analysis:
Comment”. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7(2):719-721.
288
Oakland, W.H. 1987. “Theory of Public goods.” In Handbook of Public Economics
ed. Auerbach, A.J. and M. Feldstein, Vol. II, Amsterdam, North Holland: 485-536.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.). 1987. “Toll
Financing and Private Sector Involvement in Road Infrastructure.” O.E.C.D., Paris.
Osmundsen, Petter. 1998. “Dynamic Taxation of Non Renewable Natural Resources
under Asymmetric Information about Reserves.” Canadian Journal of Economics 31:
933-951.
Pandey, R. 1997. “Water Demand Management: Issues in Pricing and Cost
Recovery.” National Institute for Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.
Patankar, P.G., 1994. “Policy Reforms for Road Development.” Paper presented at
the Seminar on Privatisation of Roads: Need and Issues, Organised by the Indian
Merchants’ Chamber, Mumbai.
Paul, S., S. Balakrishna, K. Gopakumar, S. Sekhar, and M. Vivekananda. 2004. “State
of India’s Public Services: Benchmarks for the States”. Economic and Political Weekly,
February 28: 90-134.
PROBE Team in association with Centre for Development Economics. 1999. Public
Report on Basic Education in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Purohit Brijesh C. 1996. “New Directions for Public Health Financing” Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. XXXI, No. 8, Feb. 24: 450-453.
___. 1997. “Structural Adjustment and Health Care Sector in India: Some Policy
Issues in Financing”, QEH Working Paper No.2 (on Internet), University of Oxford,
April.
___. 2001. “Structural Adjustment, Private Initiatives and Policy Options: A Case of
the Indian Healthcare Sector” Health Policy and Planning, 16(1), January-March, 87-97,
Oxford University Press, U.K.
___. 2004. Inter-State Disparities in Health Care and Financial Burden on the Poor in
India, Journal of Health and Social Policy, Vol. 18(3), 2004: 37-60, Howarth Press, USA.
___. and Siddiqui, T. 2004. “Environmental Determinants of Disease and Mortality
Pattern in India: A Factor Analytic Approach.” In Chugan P.K and Mallikarjun M. (Eds.),
Managing Trade, Technology and Environment, New Delhi: Excel Books.
Purohit, Mahesh C. 1999 “Road User Taxation in India- A Comparative Perspective.”
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation Amsterdam (May).
Rakshit, Mihir. 2006, “Issues in Infrastructural Investment: National Highway
Development Programme.” Money and Finance, Vol. 2, ICRA, New Delhi.
Ram, Rati. 1982. “Public Subsidization of Schooling and inequality of Educational
Access.” Comparative Education Review. 26 (1) (February):36-47.
Ramsey, F.P.1927. “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation.” Economic Journal,
37 (March): 47-61.
Ranade, Rahul and M. Dinesh Kumar. 2004. “Narmada Water for Groundwater
Recharge in North Gujarat: Conjunctive Management in Large Irrigation Projects.”
Economic and Political Weekly 39 (July31): 3510-3513.
289
Rangarao, A.P. 2003. Report on role and efficiency of ANM and male worker in
primary health care. Andhra Pradesh: A Qualitative Study funded by DFID.
(Unpublished paper commissioned by DIFD, New Delhi, India).
Rao, Hemlata. 2003. “Economic and Fiscal Impact of Royalty Rates of Coal and
Lignite in India.” A Working Paper, Institute for Social and Economic Change,
Bangalore.
Rao, M. Govinda and Sudipto Mundie. 1992 “An Analysis of Changes in State
Government Subsidies, 1997-98.” In State Finances in India A. Bagchi, J.L. Bajaj and W.
Byrd eds. New Delhi: Vikas Publishers.
Rao, M. Govinda. 1981. Political Economy of Tax and Expenditure Determination.
New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
Reddy, M.S, Waqif, A.A. 1988. “Non Tax Revenues.” In Multilevel Planning in
India-Process and Perspectives, ed Reddy, Y V, and Kosalram, K., Centre for Economic
and Social Studies, Hyderabad.
Reddy, S., and J. Vandermoortele. 1996. “User Financing of Basic Social Services: A
review of Theoretical Arguments and Empirical Evidence.” UNICEF Staff Working
Paper, United Nations Children’s Fund, Evaluation, Policy and Planning Series, New
York.
Reserve Bank of India. 2005. State Finances: A Study of Budget, Various Issues,
Mumbai.
Rogers, Peter, Ramesh Bhatia and Annetta Huber. 1997. “Water as a Social and
Economic Good: How to Put the Principle into Practice.” Global Water Partnership,
Stockholm.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2001. Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for
Economic Development, Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health.
World Health Organization, Geneva.
Sakthivadivel, R., P. Gomathinayagam and Tushaar Shah. 2004. “Rejuvenating Local
Tanks through Local Institutions.” Economic and Political Weekly: 39 (July 31): 35213526.
Saleth, R.M. and A. Dinar. 1997. “Satisfying Urban Thirst, Water Supply
Augmentation and Pricing Policy in Hyderabad City, India.” World Bank Technical
Paper No. 395. Washington D.C.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1954. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 36 (4) Nov.: 387-389.
Sanan, Deepak. 2004. “Delivering Basic Public Services in Himachal Pradesh is the
Success Sustainable?” Economic and Political Weekly. 39 (February 28): 975-978.
Sankar, Deepa and Vinish Kathuria. 2004. “Health Systems Performance in Rural
India: Efficiency Estimates Across States.” Economic and Political Weekly 39 (March
27): 1427-1433.
Sankar, U. 1992. Public Sector Pricing: Theory and Applications. Indian Economic
Association Trust for Research and Development, New Delhi.
___. and Om Prakash Mathur. 1998. “Urban Water Supply ad Sanitation.” Economic
Instruments for Environment Sustainability, National Institute of Public Finance and
Policy.
290
Sauerborn, Rainer, Claude Bodart, and Rene Owona. 1993. “Provincial Revolving
Drug Funds for the Recovery of Recurrent Health Service Costs in Cameroon.” A
Development Discussion Paper No. 468, Harvard Institute for International Development,
Harvard University, Massachusetts.
Schantz, Radford, Jr. 1994. “Purpose and Effects of a Royalty on Public Land
Minerals.” Resources Policy 20: 3548.
Schmitz, P.W. 1997. “Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under
Private Information.” Public Finance 52: 89-101.
Sepehri, Ardeshir and, Robert Chernomas. 2001. “Are User Charges Efficiency and
Equity Enhancing? A Critical Review of Economic Literature with Particular Reference
to Experience from Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development 13:
183-209.
Shah, Tushaar and Christopher Scott. 2004. “Water Sector Reforms in Mexico:
Lessons for India’s New Water Policy”, Economic and Political Weekly 39 (January 24):
361-370.
Shah, Tushaar, Mark Giordano and Jinxia Wang. 2004. “Irrigation Institutions in a
Dynamic Economy.” Economic and Political Weekly 39 (July 31): 3452-3461.
Shetty, S.A. Finances of State Government in India (Sponsored by Planning
Commission) I/II. Mumbai: EPW Research Foundation.
Singh, Alaka. 2006. “Strengthening Health Systems to Meet MDGs.” The London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London: Oxford University Press.
Sinha, Sidharth. 2004. “Agricultural Insurance in India: Scope for Participation of
Private Insurers”. Economic and Political Weekly. 39 (June 19): 2605-2612.
Small, K. 1983. “The Incedence of Congenstion Tolls on Urban Highways.” Journal
of Urban Economics, Vol. 13: 90-111.
Stephen, Bailey J. 1994.“User Charges for Urban Services.” Urban studies, Vol.
31(4/5): 745-765.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2000. “Public Goods and Publicly Provided Private Goods.”
Economics of the Public Sector, 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Sundaram, K. 2006. “On Backwardness and Fair Access to Higher Education: Results
from NSS 55th Round Surveys, 1999-2000.” Economic and Political Weekly, December
16-20: 5173-5182.
Tan, J.P. 1985. “Private Education: Some Macro Trends on Enrollment and
Expenditures.” International Review of Education. 3(1): 103-17.
Tata Energy Research Institute. 2001. “Overview of Mining and Minerals Industry in
India.” A Working Paper, New Delhi.
Teles, Vladimir Kiihl and Joaquim P. Andrarde. 2004. “Public Investment in Basic
Education and Economic Growth.” A Working Paper, Universidad de Brasilia,
Department de Economic.
Thobani, M. 1983. “Charging User Fees for Social Services-The Case of Education in
Malawi.” World Bank Staff Working Paper No.572, Washington, D.C.
Tilak, J.B.G. 1993. “Financing Higher Education in India: Principles, Practice and
Policy Issues.” Higher Education. Netherlands. 26(1), July: 43-67.
291
___. 1996. “How Free is Free Primary Education?” Economic and Political Weekly.
31 (February 10): 1996.
___. 2004. “Absence of Policy and Perspective in Higher Education”. Economic and
Political Weekly 39 (May 22): 2159-2164.
___. 2004. “Public Subsidies in Education in India”. Economic and Political Weekly
39 (January 24): 343-359.
Tooley, James. 2003. “Grants-in-aid Schools and Colleges in Karnataka”. Report
Prepared for the World Bank.
Train, Kenneth E., Moshe Ben-Akiva, Terry Atherton. 1989. “Consumption Patterns
and Self-selecting Tariffs”. Review of Economics and Statistics, 71 (1): 62-67.
United Nations (UN). 2006. “Enhancing Knowledge and Capacity”. In Water: A
Shared Responsibility. The United Nations World Water Development Report 2.
___ Millennium Project. 2005. “Investing in development: A Practical Plan to
Achieve the Millennium Development Goals.” London Earthscan. Available at
http//www.unmillenniumproject.org
Vaidyanathan, A. ----. “Irrigation Subsidies.” Madras Institute of Development
Studies, Chennai.
Wade, Robert. 1982. “Systems of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal
Irrigation in South India”. Journal of Development Studies. 18: 287-328.
Wagner, Richard E. 1991. Ed. Charging for Government: User Charges and
Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice. London and New York: Rutledge.
Walters, A.A. 1968. “Economics of Road User Charges.” World Bank, staff
occasional paper no.5, Washington, D.C.
Wash, C. 1991. “Public Goods Provision with Price Exclusion: Market Behavior and
Market Performance”. In Retrospective on Public Finance, ed. L. Eden, Duke, London
University Press.
World Bank. 1986. Financing Education in developing Countries: An Exploration of
Policy Options. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
___. 2002. India's Transport Sector: The Challenges Ahead. Volume I, Washington
D.C.
___. 2004. “State Health System Development Projects II.” Implementation
completion Report. Washington, D.C.
___. 2004. India Financing Highways: A Document. Report No. 30363-IN,
Washington, D.C.
___. 2005. “An Invigorated Indian Water State for the 21st Century.” India’s Water
Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future. A Report, Washington, D.C.
___. 2005. Kristin Komives – (et. Al.); with support from Roohi Abdullah “Water,
Electricity and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?” Direction and
Development, Energy and Water Division, Washington, D.C.
___. 2005. State Fiscal Reforms in India: Progress and Prospects. New Delhi:
Macmillan India Limited.
292
___. 2006. India Water Supply and Sanitation: Bridging The Gap Between
Infrastructure and Service. World Bank Report India Country Team, Energy and
Infrastructure Department, South Asia Region, (January).
World Development Report. 2003. Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World:
Transforming Institutions, Growth, and Quality of Life. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
___. 2004. Making Services Work for Poor People. A publication of World Bank and
Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C.
293