Independent Aviation Study

Transcription

Former Plymouth City Airport Site:
Independent Aviation Study Technical Evidence
For Sutton Harbour Holdings plc
March 2014
1
Prepared by: Alex Lake (Fjøri Limited)
Rev No
V8
Draft
Comments
Report finalised
Issued for comment
Checked
by
HA
DB
Approved
by
AL
AL
Date
21.03.14
01.02.14
24 Greville Street, London EC1N 8SS
Website: http://www.fjori.com
Job No: 1055
Date Created: March 2014
This document is confidential and the copyright of Fjøri Limited. Any unauthorised
reproduction or usage by any person other than the addressee is strictly prohibited.
This document has been prepared by Fjøri Limited (“Fjøri”) for the sole use of our
client Sutton Harbour Holdings plc and in accordance with generally accepted
consultancy principles, the budget for fees and the terms of reference agreed
between Fjøri and the Client. Any information provided by third parties and
referred to herein has not been checked or verified by Fjøri, unless otherwise
expressly stated in the document.
No third party may rely upon this document without the prior and express written
agreement of Fjøri.
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Executive Summary
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II
Executive Summary
I. The former Plymouth City Airport (PLH) had one of the shortest and weakest
runways of all of the UK’s mainland regional airports. It was a constraint that meant
that growth at the airport was not only stifled, but with a failing demand for air
services locally, with better routes and frequencies offered by other nearby airports,
the fate of the airport at Plymouth was ultimately sealed. This independent report
has been commissioned by Sutton Harbour Holdings plc, which has a legal interest in
the site, in order to test some of their assumptions in reaching the decision to
declare the airport non-viable as a commercial enterprise. In writing this report, the
status of the airport is deemed to be one of a former airport on the basis that all
relevant CAA licences have now been revoked and consideration has been given to
the aviation opportunities and constraints that might exist should a new operator
come forward with a view to re-opening and operating the former airport site.
II. It has also been noted that, Plymouth City Council (PCC), which also has a legal
interest in the site, has stated a series of tests, or challenges, that any future
operator of the airport must meet should they wish to re-open the airport as a viable
proposition. The key challenges are to provide commercially viable passenger air
services for the people of Plymouth showing that there is demand for such air
services. We understand that there is no opportunity whatsoever for public
investment, a stance that has been publically reinforced by the Central Government
th
Transport Minister, Simon Burns, on 28 January 2013. It is also evident that the
provision of an airfield for private general aviation purposes would not meet the test
for provision of ‘air services’ for the benefit of the Plymouth population.
III. Commercial air transport passenger or public transport passenger flight can only
operate at a licensed aerodrome. Additionally, due to the location of the airport
within a ‘congested area’ any resurrection of flying operations at the airport would
trigger the need to re-licence the aerodrome.
IV. During the preparation of this report, CAA has confirmed to us both verbally and in
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writing that any re-introduction of commercial passenger air services to PLH will
1
CAA Letter 20th February 2013; Reference F0001465; CAA:Fjøri
III
require a new licence application and no pre-existing Licence Variations nor
dispensations will be permitted. Therefore, a number of pre-existing License
Variations and dispensations with CAA licensing requirements would fall away,
resulting in the mandatory provision of compliant Runway End Safety Area (RESA)
lengths, new Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) facilities, alterations to the NonDirectional Beacon (NDB) aerial and revised emergency services Rendezvous Point
(RVP).
V. Even if a basic re-opening was contemplated as a licensed airfield with visual
operations, it must be borne in mind that this is in the context of its location within
an urban area and the ramifications of potential objections from local residents to
noise and air quality issues. To re-capture the airport’s all-weather instrument flight
status, its controlled airspace and/or its facility to provide fuel, a period of
inspection, recalibration, overhaul and re-commissioning of the existing
infrastructure would be required.
VI. Any application to re-licence the airport would require new RFFS equipment,
appliances and building (the former location not meeting mandatory requirements),
grooving of the runway, and maintenance to obstacles that may have encroached
into the obstacle limitation surfaces. The need for CAA compliance will also require
works to runway markings and potentially the runway surface.
VII. Any aspiration to offer passenger services, although not a specific relicensing matter,
would require the terminal to be re-equipped and commissioned with particular
emphasis on meeting Department for Transport security criteria and levels of
resilience, Building Control criteria and passenger health and safety.
VIII. The declared distances for the former PLH runway were already some of the shortest
at any active commercial regional airport in mainland UK; in fact PLH has the lowest
Take-Off Run Available (TORA) in comparison to the comparator UK regional airports
reviewed in this report, and the second lowest runway strength. To compound this,
without extension to the airport boundary, the provision of compliant RESA lengths
will result in reductions in the previous declared distances (assuming a code 2
instrument runway is to be maintained).
IV
IX. Any phased approach to re-introducing air services to PLH would require a similarly
phased re-assessment of the risks at each runway end. This will most likely result in
the requirement for compliant 120m RESA lengths at each runway end; if not upon
the initial application, then almost certainly upon the assessment of any runway
extension due to the change in aircraft types and payloads. The CAA has confirmed
that any new licence application would, as a minimum, require 90m RESAs at each
runway end in the initial case.
X. New technologies aimed at assisting airports with RESA length deficiencies will not
benefit Plymouth Airport, as the emerging CAA policy indicates that Engineered
Material Arresting Systems (EMAS) will not provide any future PLH operation with a
means to reduce RESA lengths
XI. Therefore, the runway at PLH will always be constrained in length. The existing
runway 31 at PLH was safeguarded to Code 2 instrument runway standards. Based
on meeting compliance with CAP168, it is very unlikely that CAA would permit any
Code 2 runway at PLH to have declared TODA or ASDA exceeding 1,199m.
Insufficient lands exist to provide a Code 3 instrument runway at PLH which would
require an increased strip width and significant compulsory purchase of properties
near to the existing airport boundary. For any credible commercial operations, an
instrument runway would be an imperative. Provision of the maximum 1,199m
ASDA and/or TODA would in itself require an extension to the physical runway
pavement and airfield boundary.
XII. It is evident from the experiences of other regional airports, to make a serious entry
into the low cost airline market, PLH would need a runway with a minimum TORA of
approximately 1,700m to 1,800m, which cannot be achieved within the current
restrictions. Indeed there are no UK regional airports outside of the London airport
network managing to achieve overall arriving and departing passenger numbers
greater than 100,000 per annum with a runway length less than 1,800m length. The
constrained runway length is further exacerbated by it being the only runway, which
is not ideally aligned with prevailing winds for lighter aircraft making this a less
desirable aerodrome to base flying clubs than perhaps other nearby aerodromes.
V
XIII. Given these limitations on runway length, we consider that whilst the existing
runway at PLH has previously supported 50-seat turboprop aircraft, the requirement
to satisfy minimum RESA lengths and the consequent loss in declared distances will
significantly decrease the range and passenger uplift for nearly all of these aircraft.
The 70-80 seat turboprop aircraft range would be further payload and/or range
restricted or unable to land altogether and the 90-seat stretch versions would have
similar if not worse restrictions if and when these come to market. This means that
the requirement for a runway extension would become even more essential if
commercial passenger operations using such aircraft were to be considered. Even
with an extension, the aspiration for 100-seat regional jet aircraft does not appear to
be a practical solution due to their predicted performance from a runway with
declared distances being restricted to 1,199m (based upon the pre-requisite of
offering an instrument runway). With a declared landing distance (LDA) of circa
1,319m some of the regional jets such as the Embraer 170/175 could be
accommodated, but with restrictions on either payload or range.
XIV. The existing runway pavement at PLH is one of the weakest regional airport runways
in the UK. Whilst the runway has sufficient strength to accommodate typical 50-80
seat turbo prop commercial airliners at maximum take-off weight, the current
runway would have insufficient strength to accommodate typical 100-seat regional
jet aircraft both due to their overall load and tyre pressures.
XV. The southwest is already served by good direct rail services to London and air
services have proven to be a poor competitor to rail services in the southwest;
neither Bristol nor Exeter airports offer a direct London air service.
XVI. Additionally, albeit the Newquay airport to Gatwick route ceased in May 2013, this
has subsequently been reinstated with Flybe now providing a three times daily
service to Gatwick providing air services access to London within the sub-region.
XVII. Previous withdrawals of direct air services to London at PLH certainly impacted the
2
airport’s traffic figures historically. However, experience of operating these services
2
Air Southwest route operated between PLH and London City Airport
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also showed only a limited take-up at the beginning and the end of each week, with
poor uplifts in between. Reinvigorating a direct air service to London will be difficult
given the lack of capacity at the more attractive airports, and very costly given the
value placed on slots at peak times. .
XVIII. In order for Plymouth to have sustainable air links, it must first attract one or more
airlines to establish a base and to create the foundations for a critical mass of
operations. There is little in the analysis undertaken within this report that suggests
that any UK or non-UK airline would be interested in operating from PLH. In our
estimation there is only one ‘potential’ candidate out of 18 airlines analysed, and
that is a virtual airline. Indeed, during the writing of this report, one of those airlines
has already withdrawn from Oxford Airport due in part to low passenger uptake.
This analysis is corroborated by PCC’s own advisors, Oriens, who concluded that
there were “insufficient profitable routes” and that, therefore, “there is no evidence
of a commercially viable future for PCA that can be put in place in the short term or
3
without some form of capital or revenue subsidy.”
XIX. Whilst PLH could attract air taxi services, its single runway is not ideally aligned for
lighter aircraft. Furthermore, the air taxi sector is a niche market that has suffered a
significant downturn during recent years due to the economic conditions and
appears to be quite susceptible to such external factors. The air taxi industry
remains optimistic, however, for the coming years. It should be noted that air taxi
ticket prices will likely result in this remaining a premium form of travel for
businesses and those with high disposable income, rather than a basis for any form
of mass transit for the benefit of the Plymouth population.
XX. Another alternative revenue stream for a future PLH might be commercial helicopter
passenger services. However, these are not popular with passengers; they inflict
high noise levels on local residents under flight paths and have almost always proven
unsuccessful when not underpinned by specific industry or social needs, such as
offshore access or a Public Service Obligation.
3
Briefing Note Plymouth City Airport Plymouth City Council; September 2012
VII
XXI. The potential for business aviation at a future PLH has also been considered in this
report. Unfortunately, given the decline in the business aviation market, the nearby
competing airports and the uncertainty over local demand for such services, it is
considered that business aviation at PLH could not be cultivated to a sustainable
level in the short to medium term unless a compelling offer could be made to the
business aviation community in terms of incentives, services and operating
environment that would attract such (declining) traffic away from other nearby
airports. Should those nearby airports become capacity constrained then business
aviation opportunities might spill over towards PLH. However, this is not the case,
and is unlikely to be the case for the foreseeable future with both Exeter and
Newquay airports having significant spare capacity and greater runway length and
strip widths.
XXII. PLH is also not well suited to sustain any significant levels of air cargo activity. Given
that the Royal Mail already has an established feeder hub in Devon at Exeter Airport,
the major integrators such as FedEx, UPS and DHL operate aircraft too large for the
runway at PLH, and the fact that historically PLH has not been an airport that has
been open to night flights (and the noise consequences to local residents), the
potential for growth in airfreight and airmail at PLH would be extremely limited. This
is further evidenced by the lack of recorded interest for such services at PLH.
XXIII. Our conclusion with regard to private general aviation flying (GA) and its potential for
growth at PLH is that, whilst there are limited GA facilities in the Plymouth area and
the former airport itself has fuel storage and an all-weather runway (surfaced), other
airfields already exist in the locality suitable for GA activity such as those at
Eggesford, Belle Vue near Bideford, Exeter, Bodmin, Truro and Newquay.
Furthermore, the non-preferred alignment of the single runway at PLH and the
stringent controls on weekend flight training coupled with the general demise in the
sector means that any prospect of developing any significant scale in the GA market
would be extremely limited against other less restricted GA airfields.
XXIV. Notwithstanding the conclusions reached on the potential for PLH to once again
attract commercial air services, because the longer-term layout of any relicensed
airport at PLH is likely to result in operations that have changed from those
undertaken previously, any new operator would need to explore the restrictions that
VIII
might be imposed on operations in order to achieve a balanced approach to the
noise objectives contained within the EC Directive 2002/49/EC. Such restrictions
may in fact prove to be an even greater constraint than the physical attributes of the
airport.
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Contents
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2
2.1
3
Introduction ............................................................................................. 2
Current Ownership and Management .................................................................................. 2
Background to Current Airport Status................................................................................... 2
The Current Declared Position of the Majority Freeholder ........................................... 3
The Current Declared Position of the Minister for Transport ....................................... 4
The Advisory Study Brief............................................................................................................ 4
The Advisory Study Methodology .......................................................................................... 6
Existing Reports and Documentation ........................................................ 9
Existing Reports ............................................................................................................................ 9
Technical and Operational Review .......................................................... 12
3.1
Independent Overview............................................................................................................ 12
3.1.1
Aerodrome Licensing ............................................................................................................12
3.1.2
Aerodrome Safeguarding ....................................................................................................18
3.1.3
Aerodrome Safeguarding Criteria ...................................................................................18
3.1.4
Declared Distances.................................................................................................................22
3.1.5
Runway End Safety Areas ...................................................................................................22
3.1.6
EMAS and the Proposed Changes to CAP168 .............................................................27
3.1.7
Aircraft Performance ............................................................................................................29
3.1.8
Description of Former Airfield Facilities ........................................................................37
3.1.9
Former Airport Operational Licence Variations and Dispensations ..................38
3.1.10 Current Status and Condition of Facilities ....................................................................40
3.1.11 Runway Strength ....................................................................................................................42
3.1.12 Aerodrome Noise ....................................................................................................................44
3.1.13 Minimum Requirements to Re-licence the Airport ...................................................46
3.2
New EASA Regulations - 2014 ............................................................................................... 52
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4.1
4.2
5
5.1
5.2
Benchmarking Against Similar Airports ................................................... 57
Independent Overview of Smaller UK Regional Airports ............................................. 57
Comparison of Runway Physical Characteristics ............................................................ 75
Local Demand ........................................................................................ 84
Passengers per head of city population............................................................................. 88
X
6
6.1
7
Published Passenger Forecasts ............................................................... 92
Airline Operator Demand ......................................................................105
7.1
Independent Overview..........................................................................................................105
7.1.1
Aircraft Fleets ........................................................................................................................ 105
7.1.2
UK Airlines .............................................................................................................................. 109
7.1.4
Non-UK airlines..................................................................................................................... 120
7.1.5
The Orien Advisors Report ............................................................................................... 125
7.1.6 Route development - London ............................................................................................. 127
7.1.7
Air Taxi Services.................................................................................................................... 132
7.1.8
Commercial Helicopter Operations .............................................................................. 134
7.1.9
Business Aviation Operations ......................................................................................... 135
7.1.10 Cargo/Airfreight Operations ........................................................................................... 138
7.1.11 General Aviation .................................................................................................................. 141
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Conclusions ...........................................................................................148
9
Glossary of Common Terms ...................................................................153
10
Principal CAA Documents ...................................................................163
XI
01 Introduction
XII
1
1 Introduction
This Independent Aviation Study Report has been prepared for Sutton
Harbour Holdings Plc (SHH) by Fjøri Ltd in accordance with SHH
instructions dated 19th October 2012.
1.1 Current Ownership and Management
At the time of closure, Plymouth City Council (PCC) was the majority
freeholder of the former airport site but the controlling legal interest
remained with SHH following the creation of a 150-year lease in 2004.
1.2 Background to Current Airport Status
Plymouth City Airport (PLH) officially closed in December 2011. The City
Council, as majority freeholder, confirmed non-viability in August 2011
at a Cabinet meeting having taken independent advice from Berkeley
Hanover and Grant Thornton who both ratified this decision.
Under SHH's agreements with PCC, SHH is obligated to seek best value
through alternative use or uses. Since the beginning of 2012, SHH has
been supporting the City Council in fighting a planning appeal in respect
of a site called the North West Quadrant where the applicant wishes to
locate a District Centre (to include a significant amount of retail space)
on the site. At the same time, the Council was promoting its own Seaton
Barracks site. Both these sites are in the Derriford and Seaton area of
Plymouth, which also encompasses the Former Airport Site (FAS). The
Council, from a planning policy perspective, has subsequently issued its
draft Area Action Plan for the Derriford and Seaton area for
consultation. As part of this, SHH has promoted the FAS as a 113 acre
site which is ideally placed to deliver much, if not all, of the AAP’s
development aspirations.
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SHH has made the author aware that they are facing increased public,
and now business opposition to the site being allocated for alternative
uses in spite of its well-documented failure as a sustainable commercial
airport.
SHH’s QC is understood to have recommended that an independent
report is obtained from an aviation expert to independently examine the
information being put into the public domain.
The draft Area Action Plan became subject to an Examination in Public
which took place during Spring 2013. It is understood that the Inspector
subsequently found the document unsound and it has now been
withdrawn by PCC.
1.3 The Current Declared Position of the Majority Freeholder
PCC have issued a briefing note that has stated that the Council
“remains supportive of achieving a viable commercial airport in
Plymouth if this is possible”. It goes on to say that it “does, however,
recognise that the lessons and evidence which emerged from … recent
reviews which repeat conclusions from earlier reviews should be used to
provide a clear signal to potential future operators”.
Importantly, the Council have set out the main issues that they consider
should be addressed in order to achieve a viable operation. They state
that “for a viable operation a future operator would need:





To acquire ownership of the Airport and its associated infrastructure;
To operate commercially ie without public subsidy;
To demonstrate an ongoing commitment to air services;
To have a robust fully funded business plan; and
To clearly evidence demand and provision of Plymouth Air Services”
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1.4 The Current Declared Position of the Minister for Transport
PCC met with the Minister for Transport, Simon Burns, in January 2013
to discuss the possibility of taking the airport back into State ownership.
At that meeting the minister confirmed the Government’s position
regarding the future of PLH.
The minister is understood to have stated that the Government would
not nationalise the airport and that this would require a change in
legislation. He also said there was only limited scope available to
provide Government assistance, which he said in the case of Plymouth
City Airport was “in any case irrelevant".
The minister told PCC that Plymouth [residents] should use Exeter
Airport, saying: "There is not enough demand for a Plymouth airport as
borne out by the low passenger numbers."
1.5 The Advisory Study Brief
In order that SHH could demonstrate its own case in relation to the
Derriford and Seaton AAP response (dated November 2012), SHH
requested independent advice on the following aspects, forming the
body of this report:
A. Technical and Operational Aspects: An independent review of all
pertinent operational and technical matters. SHH has stated that
now that the airport has closed it would be difficult for new
aerodrome licenses to be issued now that many of the historic
dispensations agreed between the original airport Director and the
CAA has been lost. A new licence would likely require the historic
dispensations to be addressed. This matter has formed one of the
specific focal areas of the review and has required discussion with the
CAA to independently review this assumption.
4
B. Benchmarking Against Similar Airports: An independent review of
the current status of regional aviation and the performance of
airports of a similar size to PLH.
C. Local Demand: An independent review of the likely local demand for
air services within the regional population focussing on whether the
population of the southwest region (Bristol westwards) could support
four airports (Exeter, Bristol, Plymouth and Newquay). The potential
additional effects of the ongoing operations at Bournemouth and
Cardiff Airports will also be reviewed.
D. Published Passenger Forecasts: A review and commentary on the
CAA’s own current passenger forecasts and whether these show a
decline or an increase regionally / nationally with a specific view
towards Plymouth.
E. Airline Operator Demand:
An independent review of any
commercial airline operators who would wish to operate from an
airport at Plymouth. It is understood that SHH tried to identify
potential airlines prior to the airport closure but this proved to be
unsuccessful. This task will necessarily be integrated with aspects of
the runway technical capabilities (see task A above) and the outputs
of the Orien Advisors Report (see below) which is reviewing the
potential for scheduled services based around smaller aircraft.
It should be noted that this report will make an assessment of neither
planning policy matters nor airport economics and will be restricted to
matters of a technical, operational and demand nature.
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1.6 The Advisory Study Methodology
This independent study has been prepared by Mr Alex Lake and Mr
David Bentley. Mr Lake has twenty years’ experience within the airport
infrastructure sector at multiple regional and hub airports worldwide.
He regularly advises airport purchasers, vendors and operators on
capital investment strategies, and represents the Institution of Civil
Engineers on its activities with the Davies Commission, reviewing
runway capacity issues in the southeast. Similarly, Mr Bentley has over
twenty years’ experience advising airports and airlines on airline route
potential and forecasting.
This report has been written to respond to specific questions raised by
SHH. The report does not cover airport business plan economics, town
planning, legal, ecological or socio-environmental aspects all of which
may or may not have a further bearing on the viability of any future
commercial airport enterprise operating from the former airport site.
Where possible, to assist in the development of this report, contact has
been made with third parties in order to validate and corroborate the
opinions stated in this report. Our observations and opinions are based
upon specific regulatory documentation, publically available statistics,
aircraft manufacturers’ performance data, historic reports of relevance
and market intelligence.
On this latter point, whilst every effort has been made to ensure that
this report reflects the current market and known future
trends/forecasts, such forecasts may be affected by factors not within
our contemplation such as global events and changes in Government
policy and legislation and thus the views expressed within this report are
relevant to current and forecast conditions.
6
02 Existing Reports and Documentation
7
8
2 Existing Reports and Documentation
2.1
Existing Reports
The following reports were procured by the PCC in response to SHH’s
Closure Notice:
 Plymouth City Airport – Economic Study into Air Services for
Plymouth; Berkeley Hanover (August 2011);
 Grant Thornton - due diligence of PCA Ltd company accounts;
 Orien Advisors Ltd – soft testing of possible scheduled air services
using smaller aircraft 20-seater aircraft in preference to 50-seaters
aircraft;
 PCC Briefing Note (Coomber/Payne) regarding Plymouth City Airport
(September 2012);
The following report was produced on behalf of SHH with respect to
representations made with respect to the Derriford-Seaton Area Action
Plan (DSAAP):
 Appeal By Wharfside (Regeneration) Devon Limited Site At North
West Quadrant, Derriford Road, Plymouth - Planning Proof of
Evidence of Will Edmonds; Montagu Evans (August 2012)
The following report was produced by Viable Plymouth Ltd (VPL) in
response to the representations made by SHH to the DSAAP:
 Revised Pre-Submission Draft – Derriford & Seaton Area Action Plan
2012 – Response to Representations made by Sutton Harbour
Holding’s “Airport Masterplan”; Viable Plymouth Ltd (November
2012)
The above reports provide background to this study. However, the
purpose of this study is not to provide a critique of those reports. In
addition, at the time of writing it should be noted that the Orien
Advisors report has not been made publically available.
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03 Technical and Operational Overview
10
11
3 Technical and Operational Review
Core Task – An independent review of all pertinent operational and
technical matters. SHH has stated that now that the airport has closed it
would be difficult for new aerodrome licenses to be issued now that many of
the historic dispensations agreed between the original airport Director and
the CAA has been lost. A new licence would likely require the historic
dispensations to be addressed. This matter has formed one of the specific
focal areas of the review and has required discussion with the CAA to
independently review this assumption..
3.1 Independent Overview
3.1.1 Aerodrome Licensing
Figure 3.1 – Aerial view of Runway 31 Approach showing
proximity of industrial estate (circa 2006)
Photograph Courtesy of Sutton Harbour Holdings plc
Although a CAA Licence is not necessarily required for certain flying
activities in ‘uncongested’ areas, the CAA is still the responsible regulatory
body for all matters affecting the safety of aircraft at aerodromes in the UK
through its regulation of aircraft operations and maintenance. The CAA
publication CAP7934 ‘Safe Operating Practices at Unlicensed Aerodromes’
(CAP793) provides guidance on the recommended layout, physical
characteristics and visual aids appropriate to safe operating practices at
unlicensed aerodromes.
Licensing an aerodrome was, until recently, necessary if flying training was
carried out. However, with effect from April 2010 the CAA has changed the
rules on this and it is now possible to conduct flying training at unlicensed
airfields. The commercial carriage of passengers by ‘air taxi’ style
operations would generally also be conditional on the airfield being
licensed, except in circumstances where aircraft of less than 2.7 tonnes
maximum take-off weight are used during daylight hours and in good
weather.
4
CAP 793, Safe Operating Practices at Unlicensed Aerodromes, CAA, July 2010.
12
However, it is considered that the location of PLH would in fact prohibit any
contemplation of operating the airport unlicensed, even temporarily. Rule
3 (low flying prohibitions) of the Rules of the Air Regulations (RoAR) 20105,
amongst other requirements, states that flights below 1,000 ft over
'congested' areas are prohibited except when aircraft are taking off or
landing in accordance with normal aviation practice. Additionally, it is an
important safety consideration stated within CAP793 that climb out,
approach and circuit paths at unlicensed aerodromes do not overfly builtup areas. These Congested Areas are legally defined in Article 255 of the
ANO 2009 as ‘in relation to a city, town, or settlement, any area which is
substantially used for residential, industrial, commercial or recreational
purposes;...’.
Therefore, the re-establishment of any flying at PLH would require the
aerodrome to operate under a licence granted by the CAA.
The requirements for an aerodrome to be licensed are described in Article
208 of the Air Navigation Order (ANO), but may be summarised as applying
to those aerodromes where flights for the purpose of the commercial air
transport of passengers or the public transport of passengers, and/or flying
training in aircraft above specified maximum total weights (above
Maximum Take-Off Mass (MTOM) of 2,730kgs and helicopters and
gyroplanes with a MTOM of 3,175kgs), are authorised to take place.
For aerodrome licensing purposes, public transport includes any flight
where passengers are carried for a fare, but does not include flights where
passengers agree to share the cost of fuel. Corporate aircraft do not hold
an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and they do not carry fare-paying
passengers, so are not considered public transport flights. In noncongested areas, licensing an aerodrome would not necessarily be required,
therefore, for corporate aircraft (i.e. aircraft owned by a company and
operated for business purposes). Except, the site of the former PLH is
considered to be a ‘congested area’.
5
Rules of the Air Regulations, Department for Transport, 2007 (amended 2010)
13
Other uses such as aircraft maintenance/repair, aircraft sales and storage
are not governed by aerodrome licensing considerations. They may,
however, be covered by other CAA or European regulations on approved
maintenance standards, as well as UK planning legislation. Flying training
operations include any activity connected with acquiring or altering a Pilot’s
licence. It does not include any pleasure flights where a passenger, who is a
permanent or temporary member of a flying club, may briefly take the
controls of an aircraft, for example a glider.
It is the responsibility of the CAA to ensure that the holders of an
aerodrome licence are competent and suitable persons to exercise the
privileges of that licence. The CAA uses CAP 1686 in support of the granting
of an aerodrome licence in accordance with Article 211 of the ANO. CAP
168 implements the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
applicable to aerodromes. Where a SARP is not implemented in CAP 168,
ICAO Annex 14 will apply. Other CAA documents outlining mandatory
requirements in connection with the safe operation of a licensed
aerodrome are listed in section 10 of this report.
Types of Aerodrome Licence:
The two types of Aerodrome Licence that could be applicable to the relicensing of PLH are the Public Use Licence and the Ordinary Licence. These
are described below.
Public Use Licence: The hours of availability of the aerodrome must be
notified in the UK Aeronautical Information Publication (CAP 32) and the
aerodrome must be available to all persons (users) permitted to use it on
equal terms and conditions.
Ordinary Licence: Relates only to use of the aerodrome by the holder of the
licence and persons specifically authorised by him/her. The holder of an
Ordinary Licence is not obliged to notify the hours of availability in the UK
6
CAP 168, Licencing of Aerodromes, CAA, April 2011
14
AIP but, if he/she does so, the aerodrome must remain open throughout
the notified hours irrespective of traffic requirements. If the hours are not
notified, the availability of the aerodrome and its facilities can be shown in
the UK AIP as ‘by arrangement’, but if this is the case then the protection of
an Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ) may not be provided.
Airspace:
On the closure of PLH, and the revocation of the aerodrome licence, the
Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZ) for PLH were necessarily withdrawn.
Therefore, whilst it would be theoretically possible for an unlicensed airfield
to be supported by a nearby Air Traffic Control (ATC) to provide regulatory
oversight of the local airspace, it would be considered more appropriate to
re-establish the ATZ for PLH as part of any re-licensing application or where
flying training might take place.
The CAA requirements state that if any flying training was to take place, or
if the site has complex airspace, applicants will have to satisfy the CAA that
they have established adequate means to secure the airspace, and the
visual traffic pattern is safe for use by aircraft. Normally this is best
achieved by the establishment of an ATZ. Applications for an ATZ must be
addressed to CAA.
Under European Law, ATC could only be provided by a certified Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP). This involves significant chargeable
work by the CAA and ANSP, and includes the development and deployment
of a Safety Management System, Quality Management System and Security
Management System as well as the development of suitable procedures for
provision of Air Traffic Control services (including arrangements with
adjacent units/airports) and for the support of equipment required to
enable these services.
If this application was successful, the re-establishment of the ATZ would
pass regulatory oversight of the airspace back to PLH, but would require, as
a very minimum, suitable robust radio communication between the ground
(ATC) and the aircraft. The CAA uses Articles 205 and 206 of the Air
15
navigation Order (ANO) 2009 to approve equipment once it is satisfied that
a robust safety case is in place, statutory requirements are met, and
equipment is fit for purpose. At the present time it is understood that the
original ATC equipment remains at the former PLH airport site, but its
condition and suitability is not known.
The CAA has stated to the authors of this report that Air Traffic Controller
training will be a significant issue and Greenfield site exemptions will be
required. It will, therefore, become necessary for the Air Navigation Service
Provider (ANSP) to recruit and retain sufficiently experienced staff to be
issued with a Greenfield Site Exemption, which is a technical judgement
made by the allocated CAA Inspector for the aerodrome. If the
establishment of an ATZ was not practicable, applicants would be required,
through other equivalent means, to satisfy the CAA on their competence to
secure the safety of airspace
Process:
Re-licensing the aerodrome would be possible at any time, subject to
meeting the conditions set out by the CAA publication CAP1687. An
applicant for an aerodrome licence must demonstrate to the CAA that he or
she is competent to conduct aerodrome operations safely. Once a licence is
granted, a licence holder must continue to satisfy the competency criteria
whilst the licence remains in force.
The cost of licensing the airfield is difficult to determine without
undertaking a survey of the condition of the existing infrastructure so as to
understand what needs to be addressed (refer to the section below
regarding the current status and condition of facilities at PLH).
It is important to note that the licensing of an aerodrome is independent of
the planning process. Attaining a minimum licensed status sufficient for
visual operations would not necessarily require planning permission for
works inside or outside the airport boundary, if operations were restricted
7
CAP 168, Licensing of Aerodromes, CAA, April 2011.
16
to daytime Visual Flight Rules (VFR). However, additional or replacement
lighting and navigational aids may be required by some commercial
operators of air taxis or corporate aircraft to give confidence in their ability
to operate at night or in poor visibility. Depending on location and scale,
such facilities might require planning permission if they have to be reerected, although given that the infrastructure has previously been in place
for a number of years, planning approval may not be required.
Statutory requirements of other bodies:
The submission of a license application or the grant of an aerodrome
license does not exempt applicants from meeting the statutory
requirements of other bodies including local planning authorities and the
Environment Agency. The existence of an aerodrome is primarily a local
planning matter and the planning process also may examine the
environmental impact of proposed aerodrome operations on the local
community. If planning permission, where required, is not granted, it is
understood that it would be unlikely that any new operator would be able
to use the site for more than 28 days a year, whether it is licensed or not.
C1: A commercial air transport passenger or public
transport passenger flight (i.e. scheduled and chartered
airline services, many air taxis/executive charter and
pleasure flights) can only operate at a licensed
aerodrome. Additionally, due to the location of the
former airport site within a ‘congested area’, any new
operation of the airfield would require it to be relicensed in accordance with the Air Navigation Order.
In addition, the noise boundary conditions of the former airport were
known to be extremely onerous and in the view of independent airport
noise specialists unworkable for a commercial airport. The key existing
planning condition being number 61, which sets a boundary noise level limit
and ties it to noise from engine testing, taxiing, helicopter hover taxiing and
also general aircraft apron activities. The independent noise specialists
know of no other airport in the UK where such controls are applied and,
given the day-to-day variability in noise conditions that will occur for a
whole variety of reasons at an airport, a fixed boundary noise limit is not
considered to be workable in any event. This is without taking into account
that the engine test bay on any future airport layout would likely be located
next to or very close to the operational boundary.
The CAA considers that it would normally be appropriate for applicants to
apply for planning permission, where required, and to have a reasonable
17
expectation that such permission will be granted, before applying for an
aerodrome license.
3.1.2 Aerodrome Safeguarding
A relevant planning consideration is the safeguarding of the aerodrome.
Safeguarding is the collection of information required to make a formal
assessment of the impact of any proposed developments or construction
on an airfield’s safe operation. Whilst not obligatory for unlicensed airfields,
the CAA nevertheless recommends that all aerodromes should be
safeguarded8. The actual criteria are outlined below.
3.1.3 Aerodrome Safeguarding Criteria
In the UK, Aerodrome Safeguarding criteria are set out by the Civil Aviation
Authority within document CAP 168 Licensing of Aerodromes. The
following paragraphs provide guidance on some of the key criteria that
would affect a re-licensed Plymouth City Airport, including specific issues
relating to improvement of the declared distances, by reference to the
current edition of CAP 168.
At the time of writing the CAA has proposed specific alterations to CAP 168
some of which may have a direct bearing on the matters described below.
The proposed amendments are outlined in CAA Notice of Proposed
Amendment 01/2013. The consultation period commenced on 2 January
2013 and will end on 27 February 2013 and subject to any material
objections/amendments will likely come into force thereafter. The full
details of the specific amendments of interest are outlined below in 3.1.6.
Aerodrome (Runway) Reference Code
To determine the extent of the lateral, longitudinal, and sloping planes of
the airspace and ground surfaces surrounding any runway that should be
8
CAP 738, Safeguarding of Aerodromes, CAA, December 2006.
18
kept free of obstacles, a reference code is established from Table 3.1 of
CAP168. This code comprises:
a) a number determined by selecting the higher value of declared Take Off
Distance Available (TODA) or Accelerate Stop Distance Available (ASDA).
b) a letter which corresponds to the wingspan or main gear outer-wheel
span, whichever is the more demanding, of the largest aircraft likely to be
operating at the aerodrome.
The determination of a runway’s reference code is for the identification of
the horizontal and vertical parameters of the surfaces associated with that
runway, and is not intended to influence the pavement strength. The CAA
will determine the runway reference code in consultation with the
aerodrome licensee.
Prior to closure, runway 13/31 at Plymouth City Airport had a maximum
TORA and ASDA of 1169m and 1109m respectively and was therefore
designated as a Code 2C runway (Code 2 runways having a maximum TODA
or ASDA of no more than 1,199m). Reference should be made to section
3.1.4.
Runway Strip
A runway is a rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the
landing and taking-off of aircraft. Separate criteria apply to a runway
serving as a visual runway and to a runway serving as an instrument
runway. The ability to meet the criteria will determine what length of
runway may be declared for what purpose. The length of runway provided
is not directly determined by the Code. The aerodrome authority should
declare distances for each runway direction (see paragraph 13). The
declared distances are to be approved and promulgated by the CAA.
A runway strip is an area enclosing a runway and any associated stopway.
Its purpose is to:
19

reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft running off the runway by
providing a graded area which meets specified longitudinal and
transverse slopes, and bearing strength requirements, and

protect aircraft flying over it during landing, balked landing or take-off
by providing an area which is cleared of obstacles except permitted
aids to air navigation.
The runway strip which encloses a precision instrument runway should
extend each side of the centreline and extended centreline of the runway
from 60 m before threshold to 60 m beyond the end of the declared landing
distance for a distance of at least:


150 m where the code number is 3 or 4;
75 m where the code number is 1 or 2.
With the prior approval of the CAA, when the highest value of TODA or
ASDA falls in the bottom third of code number 3 (eg. 1200m to 1400m), the
width for a non-precision instrument approach runway strip may be
reduced to not less than 105 m either side of the centre line and extended
centre line of the runway.
At Plymouth City Airport the operation of runway 31 was served by an
Instrument Landing System (ILS) enabling all-weather operability, rendering
this an instrument runway, which for a Code 2 runway designation requires
a runway strip width of 75m each side of the centre line. It should be noted
that all-weather capability would be an almost essential pre-requisite to
attract any new airlines to fly scheduled services from PLH. The alternative
would be an unpalatable risk of disruption to airline schedules (and the
associated passenger diversion and compensation) due to low visibility
conditions.
In strict accordance with CAP 168, should a runway extension option be
considered that results in declared distances increasing beyond the Code 2
20
limit of 1,199m, then a strip width of 150m each side of the instrument
runway centerline would become mandatory. However, at Plymouth City
Airport, adjacent development has gradually encroached closer to the
runway strip enclosing runway 13/31, resulting in a situation where
expansion of the runway strip beyond the existing 75m width either side of
the centerline would require an impractically large amount of land and
residential and commercial property compulsory purchased , highway
realignment and significant earthworks.
In a small number of cases in the UK, the CAA has accepted a 10%
enhancement on the maximum declared distances, resulting in an informal
maximum declared distance of 1,319m before the increased strip width
requirement is invoked. In at least one of those examples, Oxford Airport,
necessary widening of the strip has been carried out in order to remove this
dispensation and wider constraint on declared distances. Whilst PLH was
operational, it had been intended by the airport to attempt to adopt this
precedent to increase declared distances to 1319m (1199m x 110%)
without requiring the need to increase the runway strip width.
C2: The existing runway 31 at PLH was safeguarded to
Code 2 instrument runway standards. It is very unlikely
that CAA would permit any Code 2 runway at PLH to have
declared TODA or ASDA exceeding 1,199m. Insufficient
lands exist to provide a Code 3 instrument runway strip at
PLH. For credible commercial operations, an instrument
runway would be an imperative.
However, through consultation with the CAA during the preparation of this
report, CAA has confirmed unequivocally that any re-establishment of air
services at PLH would be subjected to a full new license application and full
compliance with CAP168 would be mandatory. It has also been confirmed
that the 10% enhancement on declared distances, that a small number of
existing aerodromes have been historically permitted, has now been
rescinded and as such could not be applied to PLH as it will be treated as a
new aerodrome.
21
3.1.4 Declared Distances
Table 3.1 – Former Declared Distances at PLH
Source: UK-AIP (NATS)
FORMER RUNWAY
Runway Designator
TORA
TODA
ASDA
LDA
13
31
1109
1102
1169
1168
1109
1102
1027
1045
C3: The declared distances for the former PLH
runway were some of the shortest at any active
commercial regional airport in mainland UK.
Aerodrome declared distances constitute the relevant distances for the
application of the weight and performance requirements of the Air
Navigation (General) Regulations in respect of aircraft flying for the purpose
of public transport. The distances are illustrated in figure 3.2, and are
defined as:
a) Take-Off Run Available (TORA). This is the length of runway available and
suitable for the ground run of an aircraft taking-off.
b) Accelerate Stop Distance Available (ASDA). This is the length of TORA
plus the length of any associated stopway.
c) Take-Off Distance Available (TODA). This is the length of TORA plus the
length of any associated clearway.
d) Landing Distance Available (LDA). This is the length of runway available
and suitable for the ground landing run of an aircraft
Prior to closure of the airport, the declared distances for each runway
direction were as shown in table 3.1.
3.1.5 Runway End Safety Areas
Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) are intended to minimise risks to aircraft
and their occupants when an aircraft overruns or undershoots a runway. In
accordance with CAA criteria, these areas should be provided at each end
of the runway strip enclosing all runways where the code number is 3 or 4,
and instrument runways where the code number is 1 or 2 (as was the case
at PLH).
RESAs should be considered for visual runways where the code number is 1
or 2, particularly where there are movements by jet aircraft not using public
22
transport performance factors, or a high proportion of runway-limited
movements at the higher weights.
Figure 3.2 – Diagram of Declared Distances
The length of RESA needed for a specific runway will depend on a number
of variables, such as the type and level of aircraft activity, and local
conditions. The minimum requirement is 90 m for all code 3 and 4 runways,
and code 1 and 2 instrument runways. The RESA width should be that of
the associated cleared and graded area, with a minimum of twice runway
width, symmetrically disposed about the extended centreline of the
runway.
The minimum RESA dimension relevant to a Code 2 Instrument runway, as
at the former PLH, would be 90m length x 60m width (2 times the runway
width of 30m).
At PLH, the CAA had historically accepted the provision of a 90m x 90m
RESA at the far end of runway 31 adjacent to the A386. At the opposite
end, adjacent to the industrial estate, the RESA was much less than the
minimum dimensional requirements, at 30m length at its shortest point,
and remained so at the time of the airport closure. This is a situation that
had been historically accepted by the CAA but was understood to be
becoming more pressing as traffic numbers grew. The CAA had been having
a number of discussions with PLH over the years immediately prior to the
airport closure in order to establish a forward plan of action to rectify this
non-conformity with the licensing requirements.
C4: During the preparation of this report, CAA
has confirmed that any application to re-open
the airport at PLH would be treated as an
entirely new license and as such compliant
RESA lengths would be mandatory.
Furthermore, licensees cannot assume that the minimum distance of RESA
will necessarily be sufficient, particularly where there have been changes to
the environment on or around the aerodrome, or to the type or level of
traffic; RESAs should extend to at least 240 m for code 3 and 4, and up to at
least 120 m for code 1 and 2 instrument runways, wherever practicable and
reasonable. If any new operator is able to provide sufficient evidence of
mitigating factors (see list below) then the CAA may accept the minimum
RESA provision as stated above. This would require the review and
determination on a regular basis of the RESA distance required for
23
individual circumstances, taking into account in that risk assessment factors
such as:
a) the nature and location of any hazard beyond the runway end;
b) the type of aircraft and level of traffic at the aerodrome, and actual or proposed
changes to either;
c) aerodrome overrun history;
d) overrun causal factors;
e) friction and drainage characteristics of the runway;
f) navigation aids available;
g) scope for procedural risk mitigation measures; and
h) the net overall effect on safety of any proposed changes, including reduction of
Declared Distances.
If a RESA beyond the 90 m minimum is deemed necessary but there are
physical constraints to achieving the desired distance, the CAA state that
Declared Distances should be reduced unless other mitigation measures
can be demonstrated to achieve an equivalent safety result for the same
set of operational circumstances. Mitigation measures that may be
acceptable, singly or in combination, as alternatives to the reduction of
Declared Distances, include:
a)
improving runway surfaces and/or the means of recording and indicating
rectification action, particularly for contaminated runway states – this means
having a detailed understanding of the runway and its condition and
characteristics in precipitation – at PLH it is known that the vertical alignment
of the runway in conjunction with the prevailing wind could result in
contamination (a wet runway). Any application including minimum RESA
lengths would need to be supported by a programme of either runway
resurfacing and realignment, or runway grooving. The existing materials
would need to be carefully evaluated as not all existing runway surfaces can
be grooved successfully;
b)
ensuring that accurate and up-to-date information on weather, the runway
state and characteristics is notified and passed to flight crews in a timely way,
particularly when flight crews need to make operational adjustments;
24
c)
improving the aerodrome management’s knowledge, recording, prediction
and dissemination of wind data, including wind shear, and any other relevant
weather information, particularly when it is a significant feature of an
aerodrome’s weather pattern. This is an important issue at PLH due to the
runway alignment and propensity for wind shear;
d)
minimising the obstruction environment in the area beyond the RESA;
e)
upgrading visual and instrument landing aids to improve the accuracy of
aircraft delivery at the correct landing position on runways (including the
provision of Instrument Landing Systems) – PLH has ILS installed on runway 31
but not on runway 13 and reliance on smaller aircraft as the predominant
carrier fleet at the airport will reduce the opportunity for tailwind landings
and thus exacerbate the deficiency of only having ILS located in one runway
direction;
f)
formulating, in consultation with aircraft operators, adverse weather and any
other relevant aerodrome operating procedures or restrictions, and
promulgating such information appropriately;
g)
installing suitably positioned and designed arrester beds, to supplement the
RESA where appropriate, taking account of other risks that they may
introduce. Reference should be made to the updated guidance on Engineered
Material Arresting Systems (EMAS) in the next section; and
h)
publishing the RESA provision in the AIP.
Comparing against the principal risk factors listed above, it can be seen that
the nature and location of hazards at either end of the runway could be
considered unfavourable, being a major arterial public highway at one end
and an industrial estate at the other end. At the time of writing, the level of
occupancy of the industrial estate is not known, nor the constraints on
further tenancy or development in that area. The arterial public highway
represents a significant risk.
After a number of overrun and undershoot incidences, most notably the
Boeing 777 undershoot at Heathrow in 2008, the CAA has taken a stricter
view on RESA compliancy. In 2012 CAA updated its guidance requiring
25
aerodrome holders to specifically re-assess the risk of a runway overrun or
undershoot when there are:







Changes to the declared distances;
New or larger aircraft types;
Changes to the number of movements;
Changes to the traffic mix;
Runway resurfacing projects;
Proposed changes or projects involving the surrounding infrastructure;
Changes to Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures.
Therefore, any introduction of passenger jet aircraft into Plymouth would
require a careful review of the risks associated with such an operation.
Whilst modern jet aircraft are statistically safer than older turboprops, if
they overrun or undershoot the runway their area of destruction is notably
larger. With the proximity of the Oakwood Primary School only 750m from
the end of the runway, the revised risk contours would need to be
considered very carefully.
C5: Any phased approach to re-introducing air services to PLH would
therefore require a similarly phased re-assessment of the risks at each
runway end. In our view this will most likely result in the requirement
for compliant 120m RESA lengths at each runway end; if not upon the
initial application, then almost certainly upon the assessment of any
runway extension due to the change in aircraft types and payloads.
The CAA has confirmed that any new licence application would as a
minimum require 90m RESAs at each runway end in the initial case.
26
3.1.6 EMAS and the Proposed Changes to CAP168
Figure 3.2 – EMAS
For airports with insufficient RESA length, systems have been developed
that are now entering use in the UK. Engineered material arresting systems
(EMAS) have been in use at a number of runway ends in the USA for a
number of years. EMAS is composed of a bed of customised cellular
concrete material, designed to crush under the weight of an aircraft, thus
providing predictable, controlled deceleration. Once stopped, EMAS allows
passengers and crew members to exit the aircraft safely and for the aircraft
to be removed from the arresting system easily, with minimal effects. Each
EMAS application is engineered and customised in length, depth and
strength to provide optimum performance for the aircraft mix at each
location. These systems have not been approved for use in the UK until
recently. Figure 3.2 shows the system after an aircraft has overrun. Figure
3.3 shows a typical plan for the system.
In October 2010, CAA altered its policy with regard to engineered material
arresting systems (EMAS). CAA policy is:
(a) to permit the installation of EMAS at UK licensed aerodromes as an
alternative where a 240 m RESA cannot be achieved;
(b) to accept the FAA performance specification and guidance material as
suitable for use in EMAS design in the UK, subject to a suitable safety
assessment by each aerodrome on their own circumstances (i.e. where to
site the system, dimensions, operating conditions etc.);
Figure 3.3 – EMAS Plan View
(c) to permit EMAS to be located within the runway strip or RESA as
determined by the design assessment;
(d) to permit an increase in runway declared distances that can be
achieved from the installation of EMAS only where installation of EMAS
has provided the equivalent to a 240 m RESA and 60 m strip end (a full
length EMAS for the design size aircraft).
At the time of writing, CAA has published a notice of proposed amendment9
9
CAA Notice 01/2013
27
to CAP168 which outlines proposed changes to a number of facets of the
licensing document. Consultation on the proposed amendments will
conclude in late February 2013. The most material item within the
proposed alterations to CAP168 relates to the provision of arresting
systems such as EMAS stating that:






C6: Therefore it is our consideration that the emerging
CAA policy indicates that EMAS systems will not provide
any future PLH operation with a means to reduce RESA
lengths.
Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS) may be installed at UK
licensed aerodromes as an alternative where a 240 m RESA cannot be
achieved;
EMAS may be located within the runway strip or RESA as determined by
the design assessment;
The CAA will permit an increase in runway declared distances that can be
achieved from the installation of EMAS only where installation of EMAS
has provided the equivalent to a 240 m RESA and 60 m strip end (a full
length EMAS for the design size aircraft).
Should arresting systems other than EMAS be considered the license holder
needs to be aware of the risks to aircraft and possible increase in Rescue
and Fire Fighting provision that their establishment may introduce.
Arresting systems may be sited inside the RESA only where their
performance and frangibility has been demonstrated.
Soft ground arrester beds are not intended to replace RESA and, therefore,
should not be located within the minimum RESA distance.
These proposed amendments seek to clarify the use of these systems. It is
clear that CAA policy will be to permit these systems to as justification only
for reductions from the preferred RESA length, and not necessarily for
reductions from the minimum RESA length. Furthermore, it is also
apparent that the use of the systems is applicable to reducing the 240m
RESA requirement and thus applicable to code 3 and 4 runways.
28
Figure 3.4 – Option 1 (modified) developed by SHH
3.1.7 Aircraft Performance
The following section utilises aircraft performance data and analysis
developed by consultants Faber Maunsell (now AECOM on behalf of
Plymouth City Airport Ltd in 200810 in addition to further analysis based on
updated aircraft data. The Faber Maunsell analysis formed part of the
assessment of additional capabilities that a runway extension at the runway
31 threshold might provide.
At that time analysis was carried out on the following scenarios:




Existing runway configuration – based upon existing declared
distances;
Option 1 (modified) – this option includes 90m minimum RESAs
with an approximate 80m physical extension to the runway
pavement at the runway 31 threshold, a 60m extension to the
pavement at the runway 13 threshold and impacts on only one of
the industrial area plots;
Option 2 (modified) – This option includes 90m minimum RESAs
with an approximate 180m physical extension to the runway
pavement at the runway 31 threshold, a 60m extension to the
pavement at the runway 13 threshold and impacts on three
industrial area plots;
Option 3 – This option includes 120m recommended RESAs with an
approximate 250m physical extension to the runway pavement at
the runway 31 threshold with considerable earthworks beyond
impacting on four industrial estate plots, three significantly and one
only marginally.
It should be noted that option 3 was reliant upon a dispensation from
CAP168 that had been applied by CAA in certain circumstances historically.
This dispensation is of importance to PLH, as without it the physical
restrictions on runway strip width will always restrict the declared distances
10
Plymouth City Airport –Masterplan; October 2008
29
Table 3.2 – Runway Option Declared Distances
(*Declared TODA constrained)
EXISTING RUNWAY
Runway Designator
TORA
TODA
ASDA
LDA
13
1109
1169 1109 1027
31
1102
1168 1102 1045
OPTION 1 (Modified) – Extension/minimum impact
Runway Designator
TORA
ASDA
LDA
13
1160 1199* 1160
31
1180 1199* 1180
OPTION Ex90 – Existing + Minimum RESAs
1040
1040
Runway Designator
LDA
TORA
TODA
TODA
ASDA
13
1049
1169 1049 967
31
1102
1168 1102 985
OPTION Ex120 – Existing + Recommended RESAs
for ASDA (and thus TORA) and TODA to 1199m. In a small number of cases
in the UK, the CAA had historically accepted a 10% enhancement on the
maximum declared distances, resulting in an informal maximum declared
distance of 1,319m for Code 2 runways before the increased strip width
requirement for a Code 3 runway is invoked. It is this precedent that would
have provided the former PLH with the opportunity to apply for increased
declared distances to 1,319m through runway extension without requiring
the need to increase the runway strip width.
However, since 2008, the CAA has taken a more stringent view on runway
excursions and the informal “+10% dispensation” is no longer available to
airport operators, having been rescinded. Therefore, the analyses for
options 2 and 3 are not evaluated further in this report.
The following additional scenarios are also considered with each based on
maintaining the current runway pavement length and based on
modifications to declared distances necessary to meet either minimum or
recommended RESA distances (refer to section 3.1.13) but without
extension to the former airfield boundary:
Runway Designator
TORA
TODA
ASDA
LDA

13
31
1019
1072
1169
1168
1019
1072
907
925

Option Ex90 – Existing runway declared distances modified through
provision of minimum 90m RESAs at each runway end; and
Option Ex120 - Existing runway declared distances modified
through provision of recommended 120m RESAs at each runway
end;
Performance Analysis
Differing aircraft will perform quite differently when operating on each
runway option. It is important therefore to consider carefully the potential
aircraft performance from each option.
The principal parameters of interest to airline operators and airports will be
the available range of the aircraft and the potential passenger uplifts
30
(expressed as a percentage of the maximum seating capacity of the
aircraft). Clearly range and uplift are inextricably linked.
Aircraft performance is restricted by maximum take-off and landing
weights, each governed by available runway length. Where take-off weight
is restricted, the payload, which is made up of passengers, cargo and fuel,
must likewise be restricted and thus one or more of the three payload
components must be limited.
Different aircraft have widely varying performance characteristics and
therefore in order to carry out a meaningful assessment of the effect of
each runway extension option on aircraft performance, it is necessary to
select a suitable range of aircraft for assessment.
For each of the above options, consideration is given to the operation of
eight specific aircraft and seat configurations typically operating within the
UK:








ATR-42-400/500 (48 seats)
ATR-72-212A (66 seats)
Dash-8 Q300 (50 seats)
Dash-8 Q400 (74 seats)
Fokker 50 (50 seats)
Saab 340B (34 seats)
BAe Jetstream 31 (19 seats)
BAe Jetstream 41 (30 seats)
Additionally, for the extension option 1, we consider the capability of three
typical regional jet aircraft (these are not considered for the other options
as by inspection they cannot be accommodated on the existing runway with
any meaningful payload, let alone with reduced declared distances):



Embraer 170LR (78 seats)
31
In order to establish a common baseline for comparison of all the different
aircraft, the following parameters were adopted:








Airfield elevation –
Temperature –
Runway Gradient Fuel Reserves –
Diversion allowance –
Loss of runway length due to alignment –
Runway surface condition –
Wind conditions –
472ft
ISA + 10°C
0.95% rising to the Northwest
JAR-Ops-1
100 – 150 nautical miles
Aircraft specific
Dry
Zero wind
Airfield Elevation. This has been taken from the originally published AIP as
472ft. In aeronautical terms this elevation is close to sea level and
consequently has minimal effect on aircraft performance.
International standard atmosphere (ISA). The ISA is a set of formulas that
define a certain temperature and pressure as a function of altitude. For
example, at zero altitude, the ISA temperature is 15 degrees centigrade,
and the ISA pressure is 1013.25 millibars. As the altitude increases, the ISA
temperature decreases. The adoption of ISA + 10°C is in accordance with
normal airline planning procedures in the UK, and is a sensible value to use
for forward planning.
Fuel Reserves. Where known from manufacturer’s data, fuel reserves to
account for taxiing and en-route diversions have been included. Diversions
of up to 150 nautical miles have been allowed for.
Loss of runway length due to alignment. The length of the runway which is
declared for the calculation of TODA, ASDA and TORA does not account for
the line-up of the aircraft in the direction of take-off on the runway in use
and as such the analysis has factored this additional length into the final
32
results. This alignment distance depends on the aircraft geometry and
access possibility to the runway in use. At Plymouth City Airport all aircraft
are required to perform a 180° turn at either end of the runway. This
results in an effective loss of runway length due to alignment and these
have been worked out approximately, in accordance with ICAO Annex 14.
CAA has recently made such adjustments to the declared distances due to
alignment mandatory (they were not when previous studies were
undertaken). It is therefore mandatory to account for them in future
planning.
Runway Surface Condition. This has been taken to be ‘dry’ on the basis that
a new grooved asphalt runway surface would be provided. If this action is
not taken then the runway surface condition may have to be considered as
‘wet’ on occasion. The implications of this are outlined below.
Wind Condition. The adopted wind condition is ‘zero wind’ representing
the worst-case condition for aircraft performance on take-off.
Uplift. This parameter represents the number of passengers as a
proportion of the total seating capacity of the aircraft, expressed as a
percentage. The viability of routes will be dependent on achieving
minimum uplifts consistently. The actual uplift that achieves the breakeven
point for any given route is a complex issue and beyond the scope of this
report. However, the analyses carried out have considered both 80% uplift,
representing a sensible target for any airline, and 100% uplift in order to
determine the ranges available to the aircraft on the basis of unrestricted
passenger uplift
Wet Runway
The wet runway condition is considered only pertinent to the existing
runway pavement options (including also options 4 and 5 which are
contained within the existing airport boundary) as it is very likely that in
order to progress with Option 1, the CAA will require that mitigating
33
measures are provided due to the adoption of the minimum RESA size.
Such mitigating measures would most appropriately be the exclusion of
'slippery when wet' conditions through the provision of a grooved asphalt
surface. The wet runway condition does not affect take-off performance,
as under JAR-OPS the pilot should not take-off if such conditions prevail.
It follows therefore that the principal effect will be on landing weight. This
was separately analysed to check that the landing weights do not become
constricted to the point that the desired passenger uplifts can no longer be
achieved (on the basis that at the very least the airline has to land with the
passenger weight and the weight of the aircraft, along with a minimum fuel
quota).
The analysis indicated that should a wet runway condition prevail on the
existing runway, the Dash-8 Q400 and both the ATR 42 and 72 would be
affected and may therefore have difficulty landing even with 80% passenger
uplift.
Similarly, for Option 1 (Modified), the analysis indicates that the Q400 will
have difficulty landing at uplifts of 80% and greater.
A summary of the performance analysis results is tabulated overleaf. It
should be noted that the depth of performance data readily available for
separate aircraft types varies between manufacturers and as such some of
the following calculated ranges are approximate. The calculation of
passenger trip miles is intended only to provide an indication of
‘opportunity’ in the context of interest to airlines.
Additionally, Option 1 modified but with an extension of suitable length to
provide a 1,319m Landing Distance Available (LDA) is considered for those
aircraft that were constrained by landing distance without the extension.
Other aircraft remain as per the Option 1 modified results as they are not
LDA constrained.
34
Table 3.3 – Aircraft Performance
Runway Option
Existing
Aircraft
Passenger
Seats
Configuration
ATR-42-400/500
48
ATR-72-500
66
Dash-8 Q300
50
Dash-8 Q400
74
Fokker 50
50
Jetstream 31
19
Jetstream 41
30
Saab 340B
34
Embraer 170
70
Embraer 175
88
Embraer 195
122
a.
b.
c.
d.
Option 1 (modified)
Uplift
Option Ex90
(Existing + 90m RESA)
Option Ex120
(Existing + 120m RESA)
Option 1 (modified)
with 1,319m LDA
Range (nm)
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
80%
100%
Restricted
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Not viable
Restricted
Not viable
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Restricted
Not viable
Restricted
Restricted
Severely Restricted
Severely Restricted
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Restricted
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Restricted
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Restricted
Not viable
Not viable
Restricted
Not viable
Restricted
Restricted
Severely Restricted
Severely Restricted
80%
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
100%
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Not viable
Runway Options – Existing=declared distances at time of closure; Option 1 (modified)=proposed maximum extension; Option Ex90=Existing runway with 90m RESAs applied; Option
Ex120=Existing runway with 120m RESAs applied
At these runway lengths the Q400 is generally very close to the Maximum Landing Weight with little margin for spare fuel. In wet conditions the Q400 will struggle to land at uplifts of 80%
and above;
Based on the aircraft planning manual, the Dash-8 Q400 will have difficulty landing at the existing PLH with any payload.
The Embraer 170 and 175 can make take-offs with restricted payloads/fuel from these runway lengths but are significantly restricted on landing and therefore not viable on some options;
35
From table 3.3 it can be seen that the 50-seat range of turbo-prop airliners,
such as the ATR-42, Fokker 50 and the Dash-8 Q300 would be payload
and/or range restricted from the existing runway, a situation that would be
exacerbated with further constraints on declared distances imposed by
increasing RESA lengths with the existing boundary.
C7: Given these limitations on runway length, we
consider that whilst the existing runway at PLH has
previously supported 50-seat turboprop aircraft, the
requirement to satisfy minimum RESA lengths and the
consequent loss in declared distances will significantly
decrease the range and passenger uplift for nearly all
of these aircraft.
The 70-80 seat turboprop aircraft range would be
further payload and/or range restricted or unable to
land altogether and the 90-seat stretch versions
would have similar if not worse restrictions if and
when these come to market. This means that the
requirement for a runway extension would become
even more essential if commercial passenger
operations using such aircraft were to be considered.
Even with an extension, the aspiration for 100-seat
regional jet aircraft does not appear to be a practical
solution due to their predicted performance from a
runway with declared distances being restricted to
1,199m (based upon the pre-requisite of offering an
instrument runway).
It is considered that the 70-80 seat aircraft, such as the ATR-72 and the
Dash-8 Q400, would be much more constrained in terms of range until such
time as the runway is extended and even then we have significant doubts
that the Dash-8 Q400 could land within the available LDA on all options
presented. It is noticeable that the 19-seat and 30-seat Jetstreams, with
their poor runway length performance, would likely have constraints on
either passenger uplift or fuel/range, or both. The standard take-off field
length requirement for the Jetstream 31 at sea level is approximately
1199m.
All of the runway options fail to provide either sufficient take-off or landing
distance for unrestricted use of the Embraer variants investigated. These
are typical of modern regional jets, and in our view the use of these at PLH
would require a more significant extension of the runway, which would
necessarily include an uprating of the runway code in accordance with
CAP168.
The potential for larger turbo-prop aircraft has been discussed in relation to
PLH and the possibility of these providing increased possibilities for air
services into Plymouth. However, we consider whilst there is certainly a
wider aspiration in the market with manufacturers such as Bombardier and
ATR considering such aircraft presently, there remain two principle
concerns at the time of writing:
I. Whilst both manufacturers have been openly discussing the
development of their own 90-seat turboprop aircraft, neither has
reached the stage of formally launching a programme.
The
development of ‘stretch’ versions of aircraft does not take as long as
bringing an entirely new aircraft to market, but it will still take a number
36
of years before these aircraft are available and there can be no surety
even then that the airlines that purchase them would be looking
towards offering services from the southwest of England;
II. On the evidence of the performance characteristics of the current
available 70-80 seat aircraft, it would appear to be unlikely that the
runway at PLH, even if extended to 1,199m, would be able to
accommodate the 90-seat stretch variants. This is of course dependent
upon the nature of the aircraft development and subject to the inclusion
of larger wing area and/or engine thrust.
3.1.8 Description of Former Airfield Facilities
The former airport has a single runway, 13/31, situated on a northwest
southeast alignment. Runway 13/31 is set on a gradient of 0.95%,
decreasing in height from the north to the south. The historic crosswind
runway (06/24) was converted into a taxiway (Charlie) in 2008 with part of
the airport land being given over to private development. The remaining
airport infrastructure is located to the south of taxiway Charlie and the west
of runway 13/31.
The remaining airport infrastructure comprises:
a) Main Terminal Building
b) Runway 13/31 (asphalt), within Code 2 grassed runway strip and
RESAs;
c) Airport Apron (situated between the main terminal building and
taxiway Charlie)
d) Maintenance Hangar
e) Engine Testing Bay
f) Fire Station
g) Fire Training Facility
h) Control Tower
37
i) Fuel Storage Facility
j) Navigation and Visual Aids
k) Approach Lighting (both within and outside of the airport
boundary)
3.1.9 Former Airport Operational Licence Variations and Dispensations
The CAA carries out annual inspections of licensed aerodromes to audit the
facilities against the requirements of CAP168 and advises on any noncompliances. From the historical audit data supplied by SHH it is evident
that the former airport was operating with the dispensations and Licence
Variations sanctioned by the CAA (but subject to a programme of
improvement being in place) outlined below. Consultation with the CAA
Senior Inspector of Aerodromes during the preparation of this report
confirmed that due to the length of time elapsed since the closure of the
airport and the ongoing changes to the airport fabric, any relicensing
application would be treated as an application for an entirely new airport
and all historic Licence Variations and dispensations would fall away. The
CAA has subsequently provided this advice in writing to the author11.
Non-compliant Runway End Safety Area (RESA) length;
For many years PLH had non-compliant RESAs at both ends of the main
runway 13/31. In 2004, the A386 Tavistock road was diverted and the RESA
at the northern end of the runway (runway 31 overshoot RESA) extended
by approximately 60m in order to provide the minimum overall 90m RESA
length required by CAA safety criteria.
At the opposite end, adjacent to the industrial estate, the RESA was much
less than the minimum dimensional requirements, at 30m length at its
shortest point, and remained so at the time of the airport closure. This is a
situation that had been historically accepted by the CAA through
agreement of a formalized Risk Assessment, but was understood to be
11
CAA Letter 20th February 2013; Reference F0001465; CAA:Fjøri
38
becoming more pressing as traffic numbers grew. The CAA had been having
a number of discussions with PLH over the years immediately prior to the
airport closure in order to establish a forward plan of action to rectify this
non-conformity with the licensing requirements. In their letter of 15
September 208 the CAA determined that “the opportunity to provide
compliant RESA should be a high priority in future development”.
During preparation of this report, CAA has confirmed that “the previous
License Variation for the RESA would not be applicable to a new license as
current safety data and understanding of accidents has influenced UK and
international requirements to consider this to be an inadequate RESA”.
Fire Station Non-Compliance with ICAO Criteria;
During 2008 the CAA inspector raised concerns over the existing rescue and
firefighting service (RFFS) facilities at the airport. During the period 2008 to
2009 the CAA clarified their concerns regarding the existing RFFS facilities
due to its location. The existing facility (which remains) is located within
the terminal building at the rear of the main apron.
Due to this location, when aircraft are taxiing to and from the aircraft
parking stands to the runway, there existed the potential to compromise
response times. The location of the former fire station also conflicted with
one of the main criteria specified in CAP 168 Chapter 8, regarding the
positioning of fire stations; “The fire station should be located so that the
access for rescue and fire fighting vehicles is direct an clear, requiring a
minimum number of turns”. Therefore even if a new airport operator were
to refurbish the existing facility, it would not negate this issue.
It is considered therefore that any newly licensed aerodrome would require
the new fire station to be in place, with the appropriate category for the
level of operation and type of aircraft. It is also noted that there is evidence
from the correspondence that the RFFS equipment was potentially in need
of renewal.
39
C8: In conclusion, after discussion with the CAA it is clear
that any re-introduction of commercial passenger air
services to PLH will require a new licence application and
no pre-existing Licence Variations nor dispensations will
be permitted. This will require compliant RESAs at each
runway end, a new RFFS facility and a revised RVP.
Rendezvous Point (RVP) for Emergency Services;
In the 2011 CAA audit report, the RVP was noted as being “unable to
provide sufficient area to enable the emergency services to carry out their
duties in a safe and coordinated manner”. If the airport were to
recommence operations, this would require immediate attention with a
suitable area being provided with suitable access to the airfield. This would
form part of the core requirement to provide an acceptable Aerodrome
Emergency Plan as part of the licensing process.
3.1.10 Current Status and Condition of Facilities
SHH has confirmed that the principle aerodrome infrastructure remains in
place. The principal items that remain are confirmed to be:
 Runway 13/31 (and associated strip, approach lighting and airfield
ground lighting and signage, DfT compliant boundary fence);
 Taxiway Charlie and Apron (and associated airfield ground lighting and
signage);
 Navigation Aids (Distance Measuring Equipment, Non-Directional
Beacon, RW31 Instrument Landing System antenna and glideslope
including all connections back to the tower);
 Air Traffic Control Room and Tower (including all navigational
equipment feeds, weather station, cloud base recorder, AGL system
control, CCRs, voice switches, voice recorders, navigation analyser,
oscilloscope, signal generator and other ancillary items);
 Refuelling station with pumps, tanks (90,000 litres combined capacity)
and hose reels;
 Generator;
The condition of these assets is not known at the time of writing, but given
that they have not been used for over 2 years, it should be anticipated that
each would require a full system integrity check and recertification by
trained technician, and all navigation and visual aids would need to be
checked by flight survey and recalibrated if necessary.
40
The fuel systems would likely require draining, cleaning, re-commissioning
re-certifying and any fuel decanted from the tanks checked to ensure that it
is not contaminated or silted in any way if it is to be placed back in the
tanks and used. It should be noted that we are not aviation fuel specialists
and this particular asset would require more detailed consideration by a
fuel technician.
It is understood that the RFFS equipment and appliances no longer remain,
and the majority of the equipment in the passenger terminal has been
removed, including baggage handling, security, check-in, flight information
displays, furniture and catering facilities. It is not known what the status of
de-icing fluid/granules storage and snow-clearing equipment is, and this
may need to be re-provided.
C9: In conclusion, with limited overhaul the existing airfield assets could
provide the base requirement for an unlicensed airfield with visual
operations. However, it must also be borne in mind that this is in the
context of its location within an urban area and the ramifications of
potential objections from local residents to noise and air quality issues. To
re-capture the airport’s all-weather instrument flight status, its controlled
airspace and/or its facility to provide fuel, a period of inspection,
recalibration, overhaul and re-commissioning would be required.
Any application to re-licence the airport would also require new RFFS
equipment, appliances and building (the former location not meeting
mandatory requirements), grooving of the runway, and maintenance to
obstacles that may have encroached into the obstacle limitation surfaces.
Any aspiration to offer passenger services, although not a specific
relicensing matter, would require the terminal to be re-equipped and
commissioned with particular emphasis on meeting Department for
Transport security criteria and levels of resilience, Building Control criteria
and passenger health and safety.
41
3.1.11 Runway Strength
Table 3.4 – Comparison of Aircraft ACN and Tyre Pressures
Weight
Max
(kN)
Passenger
Seat
range
Tyre
Pressure
(MPa)
ACN
ATR 42-500
182
42-50
0.72
9
ATR 72-500
211
68-74
0.79
11
383
70-82
0.82
17
Avro RJ85*
424
85-100
0.93
21
Avro RJ100*
444
100-112
0.99
23
BAe Jetstream 31*
69
18-19
0.39
3
BAe Jetstream 41*
107
29-30
0.83
5
Bombardier Dash 8-Q300*
195
50-56
0.80
9
Bombardier Dash 8-Q400
292
68-80
0.90
15
Embraer 170LR
373
70-80
0.91
17
Embraer 175LR
390
78-88
0.96
18
Embraer 190LR
505
94-114
1.03
26
Embraer 195LR
510
106-122
1.06
24
Saab 340B*
131
37
0.82
6
Saab 2000*
226
50
0.69
11
Aircraft
Avro RJ70*
BAe146
* No longer in production
The strength of aircraft pavements in the UK is classified in accordance with
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) system known as
Pavement Classification Number (PCN). This system also ascribes each
aircraft a specific load factor known as an Aircraft Classification Number
(ACN). Collectively the system is referred to as the ‘ACN-PCN’ system.
By the definition of the ACN-PCN method, the PCN is the ACN of the aircraft
that imposes a severity of loading equal to the maximum permitted on the
pavement of unrestricted use. In the UK each airport declares the PCN for
each of the main runways, taxiway and apron groups within the specific
aerodrome Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). This then allows
aircraft operators to make an evaluation of the strength of the aerodrome’s
pavements in relation to the load of their aircraft.
The classification method also includes specific letter codes that relate to
the type of pavement (Rigid or Flexible), the strength of the underlying
ground (A-D), any restriction on tyre pressures and (W-Z) and the basis of
evaluation (User or Technical).
Prior to closure, PLH was declaring a runway PCN value of 14 F/A/Y/T. This
indicates a relatively weak flexible (asphalt on unbound granular materials)
pavement on a strong foundation but with asphalt materials that would
require a restriction on aircraft tyre pressures to 1.0MPa.
Table 3.2 shows the ACN and tyre pressures of a selection of the most
relevant aircraft relevant to the reported ground conditions to be found
beneath the runway. Some of these aircraft would have difficulty operating
from the existing runway length at PLH, but are included for comparison
purposes. It should be noted that it is accepted practice to permit aircraft
to operate within a 10% overload condition (e.g. where the ACN is up to
10% greater than the PCN). Table 3.4 indicates those aircraft that are
42
sufficiently light to use the runway at PLH (green and bold), and those that
would constitute a more significant overload (red).
From table 3.2 it can be seen that although the existing runway is one of
the weakest regional airport runways in the UK, it can still accommodate
typical 50-seat aircraft operating in the current market. However, in order
to safely accommodate larger aircraft, notwithstanding any need to extend
the runway, the existing runway would need to be strengthened. This
would be achieved by overlaying an additional thickness of asphalt above
the existing runway. We estimate that in order to maintain a balance
between runway length and runway strength, a sensible target PCN for the
runway at PLH would be 26, but assumed to be carried out in conjunction
with a runway extension (note that a lower PCN target could be adopted
depending upon the agreed design aircraft). At the same time the runway
materials would need to be upgraded in order to accommodate higher tyre
pressure operations.
C10: In conclusion, the existing runway pavement at PLH
is one of the weakest regional airport runways in the UK.
Whilst the runway has sufficient strength to
accommodate typical 50-80 seat turbo prop commercial
airliners at maximum take-off weight, the current runway
would have insufficient strength to accommodate typical
100-seat regional jet aircraft both due to their overall
load and tyre pressures.
We calculate that the thickness of asphalt overlay required to enhance the
PCN from 14 F/A/Y/T to 26 F/A/X/T would be 60mm – 75mm depending on
future frequency of use. 12 The existing wearing course would also need to
be removed or hot in-situ recycled prior to overlay in order to eliminate the
tyre pressure restrictions at that depth. For the purposes of this report, it is
assumed that the required strengthening would involve removal of the
existing 40mm thick wearing course and reinstatement with 60mm binder
course and a new 40mm wearing course.
12
Based on analysis using Defence Infrastructure Organisation document DMG27
43
3.1.12 Aerodrome Noise
Although it is beyond the remit of this study to provide any detailed
evaluation in noise resulting from possible future airport operational
scenarios, the following points outline the present approach to dealing with
noise at aerodromes. It should also be noted that a separate independent
noise analysis has been carried out by airport noise specialists Bickerdike
Allen Partners, and that report13 is available separately to this report.
The extent to which noise from aircraft might impact the local community is
usually the most common cause of concern when new airport operations
are being proposed. The Government’s land use planning policies for
aircraft noise are set out in Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) note 24:
Planning and Noise.
The Aerodromes (Noise Restrictions) (Rules and Procedures) Regulations
2003 transposed the EC Directive 2002/49/EC into UK law and reflect the
adoption of a balanced approach to achieving noise objectives. The
regulations also set out the procedures, which airports should follow when
considering noise related operating restrictions. These Regulations apply to
City Airports (those located in the centre of large conurbations) and to any
other UK civil airports that have more than 50,000 movements of civil
subsonic jet aircraft per calendar year. It is likely therefore that PLH would
fall within these criteria.
The principles of a ‘balanced approach’ to achieving noise objectives would
therefore apply at PLH. The main categories of approach are defined as:


Reducing noise at source – i.e. encouraging the use of quieter aircraft;
Land use planning and management – such as actions that help
minimize the spread of ground noise across the boundaries of the
airport site;
13
Former Plymouth Airport Site Airport Re‐Opening Feasibility Noise Issues; Bickerdike Allen
Partners; February 2014
44


Noise abatement operational procedures – the rules and regulations
that might apply to the operation of aircraft such as the routes
permissible over local areas or procedures for training aircraft;
Operating restrictions – the setting of restrictions on the use of the
airfield by particular aircraft types or by hours of operation etc.
If the new operations at PLH were to initiate the requirement to re-assess
the operational conditions of the airport, with regard to noise, a number of
commonly adopted measures exist as potential controls that might be
applied:





C11: Because the layout of any relicensed airport at PLH
is likely to result in operations that have changed from
those undertaken previously, any new operator would
need to explore the possible restrictions that might be
imposed on operations in order to achieve a balanced
approach to the noise objectives contained within the EC
Directive 2002/49/EC. Such restrictions may in fact prove
to be an even greater constraint than the physical
attributes of the airport.
Aircraft movement limit;
Hours of operation limit;
Aircraft type limit;
Operations type limit; and/or
Application of specific operational procedures
As has been noted earlier in this report, independent noise specialists
Bickerdike Allen Partners consider that the existing noise boundary
conditions placed upon the former airport were “extremely onerous and
unworkable for a commercial airport”. The key condition is number 61,
which sets a boundary noise level limit and ties it to noise from engine
testing, taxiing, helicopter hover taxiing and also general aircraft apron
activities. There is not thought to be any other airport in the UK where
such controls are applied and, given the day to day variability in noise
conditions that will occur for a whole variety of reasons at an airport, a
fixed boundary noise limit is not considered to be workable in any event.
This is without taking into account that the engine test bay would be
located next to or very close to the operational boundary.
There are ways of applying such a limit in a more practical way, for
example, at London City (by way of a Section 106 Agreement rather than by
planning condition), a noise limit close to residential development is applied
to engine ground running only but this limit is applied to the worst month
of activity of the year, spread over the days of the month. So, if there is no
45
activity on a given day of the month, this dilutes the noise exposure level
when compared against the boundary limit. Also, this is assessed by
calculation using engine testing logs, not by monitoring. The planning
condition for Plymouth however makes no mention of any such averaging
and it can only be concluded, particularly when reading Condition 50 about
noise monitoring, that the intention is to apply a noise limit based on
activities taking place on a given day or night, or at a given moment. In the
view of Bickerdike Allen Partners this is actually unworkable.
3.1.13 Minimum Requirements to Re-licence the Airport
In order to re-licence PLH, any new operator would need to satisfy the CAA
with regard to the following criteria and demonstrate that each meets the
requirements of CAP 168.
Airfield Physical Characteristics:
Within any new aerodrome licence application, it will be necessary for the
airfield physical characteristics to comply with CAP 168. This includes
predominantly runway and taxiway horizontal and vertical geometries, strip
widths and runway end safety areas. This will also include the condition of
the runway and taxiway pavements and the demonstration of suitable
gradients and friction characteristics on the runway particularly.
Given that the original declared distances included one of approximately
30m in length and another set at the minimum permissible length of 90m,
the revised declared distances are shown in table 3.5. These are based on
the assumption that there is no extension to the airfield boundary in the
initial phases. The following alternative scenarios are presented.

Scenario 1 – Code 2 Non-Instrument Runway – existing RESA lengths
adopted;
46
Table 3.5 – Revised Declared Distances at PLH (no extension)
Runway
Designator
13
31
13
31
13
31
Scenario
TORA
TODA
ASDA
LDA
1
1
2
2
3
3
1109
1102
1049
1102
1019
1072
1169
1168
1169
1168
1169
1168
1109
1102
1049
1102
1019
1072
1027
1045
967
985
907
925


Scenario 2 – Code 2 Instrument Runway – minimum14 90m RESA lengths
adopted;
Scenario 3 – Code 2 Instrument Runway – required 120m RESA lengths
provided;
We would consider that scenario 1 could represent a compliant basis for
only an early stage in any new operator’s business plan period as the
development of commercial flight opportunities will in reality necessitate
an instrument runway. There is no guarantee that CAA would accept a new
licence application predicated on the minimum RESA lengths in scenario 2
and whilst mitigating factors could be presented, it is considered prudent to
plan on the basis of scenario 3.
Note that no Code 3 instrument runway options are considered as this
infers a runway extension and would necessitate a runway strip width that
cannot be accommodated within the available undeveloped land at the
former airport site. It would be possible to accommodate a non-instrument
Code 3 runway strip within the existing airport boundary, but this is not
considered to be a realistic scenario as the primary driver behind any
runway extension would be to accommodate larger commercial aircraft and
it would be unlikely that airlines would be attracted to an airport offering
only non-instrument runway facilities.
Outline Obstacle Limitation Surfaces Assessment:
Surrounding a licensed runway is a series of imaginary lateral, longitudinal
and sloping planes and ground surfaces that should be kept free from
obstacles; the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS). This is particularly
important, as the operation of an aerodrome can be affected by either
natural or man-made obstructions inside or outside its boundary. Such
obstacles could, for instance, restrict the take-off or landing distance
available or the navigational aids that can be installed.
14
Only permissible with mitigations set out in CAP168
47
The historical obstacle environment at PLH included both fixed structures
and trees. The obstacle environment may have altered since the closure of
the airport. In conjunction with any aerodrome licence application, the
obstacle environment would need to re-surveyed in accordance with CAA
survey criteria15 and any obstacles recorded and/or lit in accordance with
CAP 168.
Aeronautical Ground Lighting:
In terms of attracting a wider spectrum of user types, the re-use of the
runway and approach lighting at PLH would be commercially advantageous.
It would give the airfield the increased capability to handle aircraft, which
would otherwise have to use or divert to other airfields when darkness falls
or in reduced visibility. This is particularly the case if PLH was to try to
attract corporate aviation users, which rely heavily on the ability to land at
a time of their choosing and to return to the airfield of original departure.
It is also key to attracting scheduled carriers who need the confidence that
their schedules will not be disrupted by poor visibility conditions.
The former airport site already has existing approach and ground lighting,
including control system and constant current regulators (CCRs) although
these may not have been maintained since the closure of the airport and it
is not known what condition these were in at the time of closure. In terms
of the lighting arrangement, it is understood that this was compliant with
CAP 168 at the time of closure. Therefore subject to a detailed condition
survey, the physical requirement that might be expected is a period of recommissioning with the expectation that some replacement lamps and
cabling may be necessary. However, it may be a reasonable expectation
that the majority of the system remains in working order.
Notwithstanding the above, the new licence would need to be
accompanied by a Safety Assurance Document setting out the risks and
mitigations associated with the new operation with particular reference to
15
CAP 232 Aerodrome Survey Information, CAA, January 2008.
48
visual and navigation aids. The CAA sets out the requirements within CAP
72816.
Rescue and Fire Fighting:
It is mandatory that a licensed aerodrome provide a minimum Rescue and
Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) appropriate to the use of the site. The level of
RFFS has to be commensurate with the size of the aircraft using the
aerodrome, and should be organised, equipped and trained to ensure rapid
and effective deployment in the event of an accident or emergency.
The category of RFFS provision is determined by the overall length and
maximum fuselage width of the largest aircraft expected to use the
aerodrome regularly. At PLH this could range for example from Category 1
to cover for most piston singles and twins, small turboprops and very light
jets, to Category 3 and 4 for larger business and commercial turboprops,
light to mid-size business jets. For a typical 19+2 seat turboprop aircraft
such as the Jetstream 31, the RFFS category required would be category 3
for example. For typical passenger turboprop aircraft such as the
Bombardier Dash 8-Q300 (2+50 seats typically) and Dash 8-Q400 (2+78
seats typically) the RFFS category would rise to 5 and 6 respectively.
Prior to the closure of the airport, the declared RFFS category for PLH was
Category 3 (Category 5 by prior arrangement). However, prior to closure,
the CAA had expressed continual concerns regarding the location of the
existing RFFS (refer to earlier section outlining former airport operational
dispensations) and it is very unlikely that the original facility could be
reused within any new licence application.
Therefore, the provision of a new RFFS facility and associated equipment
and staff would be a necessary pre-requisite to any successful licensing
application. A commercial decision would need to be made by the
operators with regard to the initial category to be provided, but this would
be linked to the aircraft to be accommodated at the airport and would
16
CAP 728 Management of Safety, CAA, March 2003.
49
ideally need to be in place in order to attract commercial operators. In
broad terms the requirement would be for a new facility to house up to two
fire appliances (foam producing), including facility for maintaining and
storing the appliances and equipment, staff accommodation and welfare.
The facility would need unimpeded access onto the airside areas so a
degree of roadway and vehicular apron would likely need to be provided.
The provision of either one or two appliances would be dependent upon
the RFFS category.
Navigational Aids:
There is no specific requirement by the CAA linking the provision of
navigational aids (navaids) to the licensing of aerodromes. The level of such
aids that is desirable will be dependent on the type of operations attracted
to the airfield. If PLH was to operate as a GA airfield then from a review of
other GA airfields around the UK, a Non Directional Beacon (NDB) and
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) would likely be sufficient.
In the longer term, the possible increasing use of the airfield by business
and commercial aviation operators would almost certainly require the
recalibration and overhaul/replacement of the existing Instrument Landing
System (ILS) at PLH (the airport has ILS on runway 31) to provide the
necessary level of service.
Increasingly however, ground based navaids such as Non-Directional
Beacons (NDB) are being supplanted by the use of Global Positioning
Systems (GPS). Consequently, the installation of new NDB units as
navigational aids at airfields is becoming less common.
Other
developments such as the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay
Service (EGNOS) would have future benefits as this GPS based navigation
system is reliant on equipment within the aircraft and requires relatively
little infrastructure on the ground. It is in effect the first pan-European
satellite navigation system. It augments the US GPS satellite navigation
system and makes it suitable for safety critical applications such as flying
aircraft.
50
Notwithstanding the above, the new licence would need to be
accompanied by a Safety Assurance Document setting out the risks and
mitigations associated with the new operation with particular reference to
visual and navigation aids. The CAA sets out the requirements within CAP
728.
Fuelling Facilities:
There is no specific requirement by the CAA linking the provision of aircraft
fuelling facilities to the licensing of aerodromes. The level of such facilities
that is desirable will be dependent on the type of operations attracted to
the airfield. However, in our experience where airfields do not supply fuel,
the ability to attract business from even general aviation traffic becomes
very limiting.
C12: Any application to re-licence the existing airfields
at PLH will require full compliance with the criteria set
out in CAA document CAP168, resulting in reductions in
the previous declared distances if a code 2 instrument
runway is to be maintained. The need for CAA
compliance will require works to obstacles outside of
the airport boundary, RFFS, AGL, runway markings and
potentially the runway surface. To establish a credible
level of facilities, additional investment will be required
to re-commission and recalibrate navigation aids and
fuelling facilities.
The status of the existing fuel facilities at the former airfield site are not
known, but if the facility has remained unmaintained for any period it will
almost certainly need overhauling and cleaning through. The minimum
recommended facilities would be to provide storage at a similar capacity (as
a minimum) to that previously provided for both Jet-A1 (120,000 litres) and
AVGAS (28,000 litres). Two airside refuelling bowsers should also be
considered as necessary for any new commercial operation. The new
storage facilities would need to comply with Loss Prevention Council (LPC),
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and CAA17 requirements and would need
to be located at a location suitable for recharging by road going tanker
deliveries.
Importantly, the storage and dispensing of AVGAS from an aerodrome
requires the operator or owner of the installation to hold the appropriate
Petroleum Licence issued by their local Unitary Authority or branch of the
Environment Agency.
17
CAP 748 Aircraft Fuelling and Fuel Installation Management, CAA, July 2004.
51
3.2 New EASA Regulations - 2014
In this section we evaluate the forthcoming rules to be applied to UK
aerodromes by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
Some aerodromes in the UK now fall within the scope of EASA and will be
subject to regulations set by EASA in the future. The EASA regulations are in
the process of being drafted and are expected to come into force in 2014.
Aerodromes fall within the scope of EASA if they meet all of the following
requirements:
a) Open to public use and which serve commercial air transport and
where operations using instrument approach or departure procedures
are provided, and:
b) have a paved runway of 800 metres or above; or
c) exclusively serve helicopters. The CAA has compiled a list of UK
licensed aerodromes that currently fall within the scope of EASA. This
list is our current estimate based on our knowledge to date.
The former Plymouth City Airport is listed as one of those aerodromes
falling into this category, and it can be seen that any newly licensed
aerodrome at the FAS will do once again.
Aerodrome regulations in the form of Implementing Rules (IR), Acceptable
Means of Compliance (AMC) and Certification Specifications (CS) are
currently being drafted and are expected to come into force on 1 January
2014. Aerodromes that fall within the scope of EASA will follow regulations
published by EASA and not CAP168. However, importantly it should be
noted that the CS will be set by compliance with International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) criteria for aerodromes set out in ICAO Annex 14.
CAP168 is the UK CAA interpretation of ICAO Annex 14 and therefore in
reality it is not expected that the EASA CS requirements will deviate
appreciably from present CAP168 criteria. As UK CAA states “Licensed
52
aerodromes in the UK currently follow the requirements specified in CAP 168
that closely match the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP)
published in ICAO Annex 14 – Aerodromes. It is not envisaged that new
EASA aerodrome regulations will be more onerous than the SARPs currently
specified in ICAO Annex 14.”
Therefore, although at the time of writing we do not have sight of the
proposed CS that will be applied, we have no reason to believe that they
will be fundamentally different to those presently being applied through
CAP168. The principal changes will be in connection with the processes
adopted to deal with existing variances and dispensations and therefore
should not be taken as a charter to discard the existing safety criteria and
licensing requirements.
Once in force, aerodromes will be able to request that existing variations
and dispensations are considered by way of an ‘Alternative Means of
Compliance’ (AMC). There is no apparent suggestion that this will be
applied to new development proposals (such as a runway extension) but
rather to existing non-compliances that cannot practically be avoided.
What is clear is that ‘grandfathering’ rights will fall away (and in the case of
the FAS this has been confirmed in writing by CAA).
Within the new EASA certification process, "grandfathering", a process
applied in other aviation sectors, cannot be applied to aerodromes, as there
is no single set of harmonised requirements against which aerodromes have
been licensed/certificated. Indeed, in some Member States aerodromes
have not been certificated at all. It will therefore become necessary to carry
out a "conversion" process on all aerodromes within scope. EASA has
indicated that all aerodromes with existing licenses will be eligible for an
initial certificate under the EASA system (if they fall into the EASA scope).
There will be a conversion process, which involves building a Certification
Basis that takes into account existing exemptions and variations by the use
of three options, the options being an Equivalent Level of Safety, Special
Condition or the Deviation Acceptance and Action Document (DAAD).
53
However, given that the FAS is not licensed, and it could not count on any
existing grandfathering rights within any new licensing process, it appears
to be very unlikely that the process of conversion would be available to a
new operator as a mechanism to then introduce new variances to the
certified specification (CS). Therefore, to put this into context, it does not
appear that the new EASA certification process would provide any means
by which a new variance in runway strip width for runway lengths (TODA or
ASDA) in excess of 1,199m could be applied.
Whilst this appears to be the emerging position, should the EASA
certification process alter over the coming months such that a new variance
at the FAS could be applied through the conversion process, this variance
could only become acceptable through demonstration of an equivalent
level of safety (ELOS). This would mean that examples of similar variances
at other aerodromes coupled with suitable mitigation measures would
need to be demonstrated as part of an overall risk assessment to literally
show how an equivalent level of safety to the certified specification is being
provided. We cannot find any other aerodrome examples within the UK
where declared runway distances of 1,319m are being applied in
conjunction with residential areas at only 100m from the runway
centerline. Refer also to the commentary on comparisons being made with
London City Airport in earlier sections of this report.
54
04 Benchmarking Against Similar Airports
55
56
4
Benchmarking Against Similar Airports
Table 4.1 – Selected Comparator Airports
Airport
Blackpool
Bournemouth
Carlisle
Coventry
Durham Tees Valley
Glasgow Prestwick
Gloucestershire
Humberside
Ipswich
Manston (Kent)
Norwich
Swansea
Plymouth
Code
Local City
18
Population
Passengers
19
(2012)
BLK
BOH
CAX
COV
MME
PIK
GLO
HUY
Closed
MSE
NWI
Closed
PLH
(Closed)
148,000
188,000
75,000
326,000
48,000
592,000
136,000
285,000
145,000
41,000
187,000
180,000
257,000
235,000
690,000
0
0
165,000
1,067,000
15,000
234,000
0
8,000
397,000
0
20
128,603
Core Task – An independent review of the current status of regional
aviation and the performance of airports of a similar size to PLH.
4.1 Independent Overview of Smaller UK Regional Airports
The majority of UK airports in 2012 found it difficult to increase passenger
traffic. Average growth in the eight months January to August at 38
reporting airports was 0.53%21.
This overview does not include airports that are now closed to scheduled
commercial traffic, e.g. Sheffield City (2008) and Coventry (2009, reopened
2010). It focuses on airports that are located in similar city-regions in terms
of population size in the UK.
The population of Plymouth is around 257,000 and the aggregate
population of Devon and Cornwall is 1,672,000. The airports that have
been analysed are shown in table 4.1 with 2011/12 data shown. It should
be noted that Plymouth City Airport closed in 2011 and as such the traffic
data from the last full year of operation, 2010, is used. In this year 128,603
passengers passed through the former airport. The local city population (for
the nearest city) is shown only for information and comparison, as it is
often stated by some commentators as being a significant statistic when in
fact it is sometimes of little relevance. In reality the factors that affect
passenger demand and/or behaviour in a particular location include the
wider catchment, surface access, competing airports within that catchment,
18
2011 Census data
19
CAA Published Statistics for 2012
20
2010 statistics – last full year of operation
21
The source of most airline route data in this section is anna.aero and correct at
the time of document preparation, January 2013.
57
disposable income, the ability to supply suitable routes at affordable ticket
prices and the frequency/timing of those services.
In the following sections, for each airport, the principal runway code, length
(critical main runway TORA in metres) and the limiting Pavement
Classification Number (PCN) are provided. It should be noted that routes
and airline activity from airports is a highly fluid issue, and the following is
correct at the time of writing.
Durham Tees Valley Airport (MME)
TORA=2,291m, 4E, 70/F/C/W/T
Durham Tees Valley Airport (MME) is a regional airport serving the
industrial Teesside region in north-east England. The airport is owned by
Peel Airports. Part of the Peel Group, which also owns Doncaster-Sheffield
Airport and which retains a minority share in Liverpool Airport).
The immediate conurbation served by the airport is Teesside, made up of
the towns of Middleborough, Stockton-On-Tees, Thornaby, Billingham, and
surrounding settlements; also the city of Darlington. Teesside has a
population of approximately 480,000 and Darlington of 106,000. The
catchment area overlaps that of Leeds-Bradford airport to the south but in
both that direction and to the west the population is very thinly spread in
rural communities. It does not encompass cities to the north (e.g. Durham,
despite that city’s name being part of the airport’s name) because of the
market power of Newcastle Airport in that direction. The total catchment
area does not exceed 700,000.
Figure 4.1 – Durham Tees Valley Airport
Source: NATS
Teesside remains an important centre for heavy industry, although it has
declined. Traditional industries with large workforces, primarily in steel
making and chemical manufacture have been replaced to a large extent by
high technology activities, science development and service sector roles but
unemployment remains high.
58
The airport has seen marked falls in traffic figures in recent years, which
minority owner Vantage Airports Group was attempting to tackle before it
sold its equity back to the Peel Group in 2012. Immediately prior to that
equity transfer DTVA had been up for sale.
The decline in the UK economy was particularly felt in the Cleveland (county
authority) area and on Teesside. MME lost its air link to London (bmi) and
was unable to replace it.22 Subsequently it lost its few Ryanair services in a
dispute over a passenger levy and because of poor loads, and services by
bmibaby even before that airline closed down following the takeover of bmi
by British Airways. Essentially the airport’s business strategy is underpinned
principally by several daily flights to and from Amsterdam by KLM, which are
a legacy of the chemical industries in the area, once owned by the British
firm ICI but now by the Dutch AkzoNobel company. The KLM flights also
feed a critical global hub/gateway at Amsterdam (Air France-KLM/SkyTeam)
in lieu of London. Following a promotional campaign in 2012 this service is
understood to be performing well. Apart from these services the only other
routes at MME presently are Aberdeen (Eastern Airways), Flybe (a seasonal
route to Jersey on behalf of tour operators) and three seasonal Spanish
routes operated by Thomson Airways.
There is little inbound leisure travel to Teesside, even for Durham, one of
England’s finer cities, and York, only 50 miles (80 km) to the south, in
comparison with other airports. The reason is that there are bigger, more
modern and/or expanding airports with better facilities at Newcastle to the
north of MME, and Leeds-Bradford to the south.
Newcastle Airport in particular benefits from a better terminal, more shops,
the impact of global carriers like Emirates (which has vastly increased
inward investment and trade to the Tyneside area), even Christmas
shopping trips on Jet2.com to New York. Leeds Bradford, which has just
22
The bigger Leeds Bradford Airport to the south also lost its bmi Heathrow service. After three years,
at the end of 2012, British Airways commenced a four times daily LBA-Heathrow service but will reduce
to three times daily from March 2013.
59
opened a GB£11 million terminal extension, is a base both for Jet2.com and
Ryanair, and, in 2013, for Monarch Airlines.
MME, which is limited to the few scheduled services referred to previously
and a handful of seasonal charter flights – a medium that is declining
throughout the UK generally – cannot easily compete.
Moreover, regular and fairly fast trains leave Middlesbrough and other
towns in the area directly to Manchester Airport each day, where the choice
of both flights and facilities is vastly greater than at any of these. MME does
have a railway station of its own but it is situated a 15-minute walk from the
terminal building and is used by only two trains a week. Local efforts to
increase the number of services and to reposition the station have failed.
Passenger numbers have fallen from over 900,000 in 2006 to just 161,000 in
2013, which, is the lowest annual total since 1975.
KLM introduced a twice-daily cargo flight from and to Amsterdam in 2010
but it has since been withdrawn. It is understood that MME would like to
develop a cargo village on spare land but needs a critical mass of cargo
services to underpin it. Beyond the cargo village concept it has been the
intention for over a decade to build a business and technical park on the 150
acres of land but the airport has consistently been denied a share in the
government’s GB£350 million Regional Growth Fund. We understand that
MME will resubmit its bid.
Glasgow Prestwick Airport (PIK)
TORA=2,986m, 4E, 113/R/C/W/U
Glasgow Prestwick Airport is situated to the southwest of Glasgow and the
Strathclyde metropolitan region and is situated 32 miles from central
Glasgow. Until recently under private ownership, it has changed hands
several times, from Stagecoach, via Omniport to Infratil, a New Zealand
investment fund. In November 2013 the Scottish Government took the
60
airport, which was losing £7m a year, back into public ownership to avert its
closure and safeguard 1,400 jobs, including 300 at the airport.
The population of Glasgow is 592,000, in an urban conurbation of 2.3
million. Prestwick was once a major UK gateway and one of only two
designated category A intercontinental gateway airports outside London,
with Manchester. However, the designation of Glasgow Abbotsinch airport
(eight miles from the centre of Glasgow) as Glasgow International and the
relocation of intercontinental (North American) services, set in motion a
decline of full service carrier operations in favour of low cost ones at what
became a secondary level airport. There are low cost services at Glasgow
International Airport (e.g. easyJet, Jet2.com) but they are comparatively
under-developed when referenced to, say, Edinburgh Airport.
Because of this market power, Prestwick was for a time among the fastest
growing airports in the UK, fuelled by growth from low-cost carriers
including Ryanair and Wizz Air. However, it was the market power of
Ryanair that has the biggest recent effect. Ryanair was able to exclude all
its rivals except Wizz Air (with which it cooperates at most airports where
both are in evidence) and now controls 94% of all seats at Prestwick. In fact
Ryanair will soon control almost all of the seats as Wizz Air has decided to
move its operations to Glasgow International Airport.
Figure 4.2– Glasgow Prestwick Airport
Source: NATS
Arguably no other airline wishes to compete head-to-head with Ryanair
but, conversely, Ryanair has not been growing at Prestwick in recent years
on account of factors such as the imposition of an ever-increasing UK Air
Passenger Duty. It has consistently reduced services overall though it
indicated an expanded flight programme for summer 2013 and is expected
to do so again for 2014. Since 2007 there has been a significant reduction in
passenger traffic with less than 1.07 million passengers passing through the
airport in 2012. The passenger numbers had more than halved since 2007,
the best ever year (2,421,000). Traffic figures for 2013 indicate the annual
total has climbed by circa 10% to 1.15 million passengers.
61
Prestwick Airport is still an important cargo airport in Scotland. Air France
and Cargolux collectively account for 15% of aircraft movements though
this could decline as Manchester Airport’s expanded World Freight Centre
and Airport City start to compete with it.
Manston Airport (MSE)
TORA=2,748m, 4E, 75/F/B/W/T
Manston Airport (MSE) is located on the east coast of Kent, close to
Ramsgate and the rejuvenated holiday town of Margate.
The population of Margate, Ramsgate and Broadstairs totals only 121,000
but several other towns and cities such as Canterbury, Herne Bay,
Whitstable, Sandwich and Deal are within its catchment area and Kent
overall is a heavily populated county of over 1.7 million. No other
commercial airport serves Kent directly apart from Lydd Airport on the
south coast, which whilst being limited by a short runway, won its case at
Planning Inquiry in April 2013 to extend it.
MSE claims a catchment area of 1,616,000 (almost the whole of Kent) and
that figures indicate 3.8 million passengers using the London airports had
Kent as their origin/destination in 2009.
Figure 4.3– Manston Airport
Source: NATS
An ex-military airfield with a long runway and situated some 70 miles from
central London, it was operated by an ambitious private company,
Planestation, as a commercial airport with its own in-house carrier, EuJet,
after the 2003 UK government White Paper on airport identified it as having
a role in meeting local demand. At that time it acquired the name ‘London
Manston’ airport though that has subsequently been dropped. However,
the airline over-expanded and allegedly brought down Planestation with it.
Its assets were subsequently acquired by Infratil, which at that time was
embarked on its own rapid extension of airport assets in the UK and
mainland Europe.
62
Despite both human and capital investment by Infratil, MSE was unable to
sustain scheduled passenger services. Flybe introduced services to
Manchester, Edinburgh and Belfast – but low passenger loads and yield
meant they were quickly cancelled. Neither Ryanair nor easyJet, for their
own reasons, has shown any propensity yet towards considering MSE
services.
The airport has been able to operate and sustain several seasonal series or
standalone charter routes and has been able to build up a fairly substantial
cargo business, partly by obtaining a licence to operate as a designated
Border Inspection Post. This has given it an advantage in, for example, the
handling of animals. Currently six cargo airlines are using it.
At present only one commercial airline operates scheduled services at MSE
(a seasonal route to Jersey) but the management has been able successfully
to negotiate the commencement of twice daily services from Amsterdam by
KLM, commencing in April 2013.
Moreover, the government is in talks about plans to extend Kent’s highspeed rail line (HS1) from Ashford to Ramsgate in order to cut the journey
time between London and MSE. These latter developments and the lack of
hub runway capacity in the London network have prompted a pressure
group, ‘Why Not Manston?’, to promote greater use of Manston as an
additional airport in the south-east. On the other hand, operations at the
airport do have an inevitable noise impact on Ramsgate as the approach
and departure for aircraft is directly over the town.
In the face of reported losses of over GB£12 million annually throughout
the Infratil Europe airports group, Infratil placed Manston Airport for sale in
March 2012, along with Glasgow Prestwick. In October 2013 the airport was
sold to Ann Gloag the co-founder of the transport company StageCoach.
Annual passenger numbers in 2013 were 40,391 and freight volume is in
the range 3-4,000 tonnes per annum.
63
Bournemouth Airport (BOH)
TORA=2,026m, 4E, 46/F/A/X/U
Bournemouth Airport (BOH) is owned (100%) by Manchester Airports
Group (MAG). It has a single runway of 2,271 metres and a GB£45 million,
three million ppa terminal that opened in 2010.
Bournemouth is a large coastal town in Dorset, and which is well-known as
a location for retirement as well as for vacations. It is regarded as a highincome area. The population is around 188,000, making it the largest town
between Southampton and Plymouth. Together with nearby Poole and
Christchurch, Bournemouth forms the South East Dorset conurbation with a
population of approximately 400,000.
BOH is in direct competition with Southampton Airport (owned by
Heathrow Airport Ltd., previously BAA)23 and which is approximately 25
miles to the northeast. Between 2012 and 2013 Southampton Airport has
seen a small 2% rise in passengers to 1.722 mppa. BOH however has
experienced a 5% decline in passenger numbers in the same period to
660,272 ppa.
Figure 4.4– Bournemouth Airport
Source: NATS
BOH sees the majority of its traffic in the summer months, when Thomson
Airways serves the airport, operating to Europe and North Africa and a
cruise charter to Barbados. All but three of Thomson’s services are
seasonal. Until 2010 the local company Bath Travel operated its own
charter flights under the brand name Palmair. These services are suspended
until the UK economic climate improves. Although Palmair operated only
one leased aircraft it was highly regarded and had a comprehensive
schedule. Its demise had a clearly negative impact on the airport’s image in
the catchment area.
23
It is anticipated Southampton Airport may be sold in the next 2-3 years
64
There is also a significant presence from Ryanair, which has a 16-route base.
In addition there is a seasonal route operated by easyJet and a regular
Dublin flight operated by Aer Arann. Ryanair’s route portfolio has varied
significantly during the last three years. It cancelled all its winter routes,
reducing capacity at the airport virtually to zero then reinstated them,
increasing their number. In the 2012/13 winter season Ryanair threatened
to pull out for a longer period still. For the time being MAG is committed to
BOH and relations with Ryanair should be healthy as a result of better
liaison at the core (Manchester) airport and now at Stansted Airport, of
which MAG took control in February 2013.
The result is a skewed operating environment, with traffic reductions
recorded in the winter months and quite large gains in the summer. For
example, the average monthly traffic growth in the first nine months of
2012 (January-September) was 6.9% but that varied between -8.8% in
January and +19.3% in June. For several years BOH has been a seasonal
(summer) airport. These challenging trading conditions were compounded
by the propensity for airline operators to consolidate into larger airports.
In 2011 there were 614,000 passengers (-18.3%) the lowest total since 2004
and the third successive year of double-digit decreases. Since that time
there has been evidence of passenger numbers showing a modest increase
into 2012, except that another fall has been experienced in 2013. The
highest passenger total recorded was 1,083,000 in 2007. There is negligible
airfreight.
It is reported that the owners of BOH believe that there are signs that
market conditions are now strengthening and the airport is seeing positive
indications that growth will return from both the full service scheduled and
low cost sectors in the long run. MAG is also investing heavily in a 10-year
plan for the development of 540,000sqft of new business space at its
Aviation Business Park at BOH.
65
Humberside Airport (HUY)
TORA=2,070m, 4E, 54/R/B/X/T
The majority of the equity within Humberside Airport (HUY) was owned by
Manchester Airports Group (MAG) having been purchased as part of its
defence mechanism against the perceived development first of Sheffield
City Airport and then of Doncaster-Sheffield Airport. But resulting from
relatively poor performance and lack of expansion potential at Humberside,
and from MAG’s decision to focus on the core Manchester Airport product
and on a bid to acquire Stansted Airport, an already delayed decision to sell
the Humberside Airport equity to the parent company of Eastern Airways,
which is based at Humberside, was taken in 2012. The local North
Lincolnshire District Council remains a minority shareholder.
The airport has two asphalt runways. The longer one is 2,196 metres.
HUY is a regional airport serving the Humberside region, including the cityregion of Hull, and North Lincolnshire, including the steel and chemical
town of Scunthorpe. Apart from Hull, Scunthorpe and Grimsby it is a lightly
populated area. The population of Humberside, which no longer exists as an
authority, was around 850,000 and of North Lincolnshire (a unitary
authority), it is 167,000. The catchment area therefore may be determined
as approximately one million people.
It is in competition with Doncaster-Sheffield Airport, which is less than 30
miles away, also Leeds-Bradford and East Midlands airports, both around 70
miles and in all cases accessible from the catchment area by motorway.
Manchester Airport is more distant but as in the case of Durham Tees
Valley Airport there are quite fast and frequent rail services there from
throughout Humberside’s catchment area.
Figure 4.5– Humberside Airport
Source: NATS
There is a large amount of general aviation activity. The majority of
commercial passenger traffic has tended to be in the summer months,
when charter airlines operated, but this activity has now been consolidated
into other airports with only niche seasonal services remaining.
66
Table 4.2 –
Norwich International Airport Passenger Traffic 2009-2011
Source: NIA
NIA Pax
Traffic
Scheduled
Traffic
Charter
Traffic
Gas
Platforms &
Domestic
Charter
Total
Passengers
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
278,985
271,848
266,372
67,052
105,994
70,994
62,212
417,031
440,054
84,770
77,037
427,909
Humberside is the UK’s second-largest heliport, serving the offshore oil and
gas industry in the North Sea. Some of the fixed wing scheduled services
also reflect this oil industry activity, for example an Eastern Airways service
to Aberdeen. As with two other airports mentioned in this section of the
report, Humberside is highly reliant on daily services from and to
Amsterdam Schiphol Airport.
There is one significant cargo schedule, operated by Icelandair, on account
of the location of 500 food-related businesses in the Grimsby region, many
of them devoted to fresh and frozen fish distribution.
Until 2012 annual passenger traffic has been in consistent decline since
2006 when there were 521,000. In 2012 the total had fallen to 234,142 but
during 2013 there has been s small 1% rise in passenger numbers to
236,083. The start-up airline JetXtra.com, which intends to operate from
Humberside to Alicante and Palma in summer 2013 has helped to stem the
decline in numbers.
Cargo tonnage was growing rapidly and had increased from a low of 114
tonnes in 2005 to 1132 tonnes in 2011, almost doubling between 2010 and
2011. However, cargo has seriously declined once more at HUY with
reported tonnages of only 153 tonnes carried in 2013.
Norwich International Airport (NWI)
TORA=1,841m, 4E, 56/R/D/W/U
Norwich International Airport (NWI) is located just to the north of the city
of Norwich. It is majority owned by the small airport operator Omniport,
which also operates Maastricht Airport in the Netherlands and which
previously owned and operated Glasgow Prestwick Airport. There is a single
1,841 metre runway.
NWI serves one of the largest catchment areas in the UK for a small airport,
stretching from the Wash to the Suffolk/Essex border. It is in competition
67
primarily with London Stansted Airport, which momentarily caters mainly to
low cost services, and Cambridge Airport, which is being developed as a
commercial airport under new ownership, targeting regional and charter
airlines.
The population of Norwich itself is 187,000, and of the travel to work area
around 365,000. The county of Norfolk, which includes the economically
significant (offshore gas industry), Great Yarmouth, is 850,000 but the
county has the 10th lowest population density in the country. NWI itself
claims a catchment area of 1.5 million people within a 90-minute drive,
which covers Norfolk, Suffolk and North Cambridgeshire.
For a small airport handling less than 500,000 passengers per annum NWI
has a broad range of scheduled and charter services. On the scheduled side
they are underpinned by the oil industry along the UK’s east coast and in
the Netherlands. In common with several other airports along the coast
there are multiple daily services by KLM to and from Amsterdam Schiphol
Airport. Flybe extended its Manchester service in April 2013 through to Den
Helder, on the Dutch coast.
Figure 4.6– Norwich International Airport
Source: NATS
Flybe had a significant presence at NWI, flying to several European cities,
until five years ago, when leisure demand from the thin population proved
to be insufficient to sustain them with Stansted Airport around two hours
away by car. The viability of NWI without these services was questioned.
But NWI has been able to compensate by building up a seasonal charter
operation that is not restricted to one carrier. Airlines operating there in
2013 include Thomas Cook and Thomson Airways (Greece, Spain and
Turkey), Air Europa, Air Malta, BH Air (Bulgaria), Orbest Orizonia Airlines,
Freebird Airlines and Corendon Airlines, operating on behalf of tour
operators to Turkey. Passenger numbers have remained stable in 2009-11
having fallen by 30% between 2008 and 2009 as Flybe withdrew routes,
with an average of 428,000. Within those figures, scheduled traffic was very
stable with charter traffic rising then falling quite dramatically (see table). In
2012 passenger numbers declined to 396,676 but bounced back in 2013
with a 17% growth to 463,401 passengers.
68
Blackpool Airport (BLK)
TORA=1,869m, 4E, 33/F/A/W/T
Blackpool International Airport (BLK) is a regional airport serving the city of
Blackpool and the surrounding region of Lancashire including the city of
Preston. The population of Blackpool is 148,000, and of the 13-mile long
Fylde Coast area, 320,000. Including the city of Preston and its sub-region
(335,000) and peripheral areas such as Lancaster & Morecambe and the
rural communities around these built-up areas, the catchment area is
estimated to be 750,000.
Blackpool is one of the UK’s leading holiday resorts.
The airport traditionally existed to service general aviation (it remains one
of the busiest airports by aircraft movements in the UK) with a small
number of scheduled services on important tourist routes such as Belfast,
Dublin and the Isle of Man. There are also occasional charter services, such
as outbound to Jersey, and inbound from countries like Iceland to support
international dancing competitions. BLK’s main runway has sufficient length
to handle aircraft including the Boeing 737 and 757 but the runway
strength implies that the B737 will not be operating at maximum take-off
weight (thus restricted on range and/or payload).
But a large population base that is often transient (for example several
thousand small hotel owners who often leave the UK for warmer climates
during the winter) prompted BLK for a time to gain popularity with several
low-cost carriers, including Jet2.com, which operates a base at the airport,
Ryanair and Monarch Airlines. For a short period in the early 2000s it posed
a competitive threat to the neighbouring Manchester and Liverpool
airports.
Figure 4.7 – Blackpool Airport
Source: NATS
69
However, this growth was founded on a false promise. It was not so much
to serve the outbound market, as in anticipation of Blackpool being
awarded the single (national) licence to operate a ‘Super Casino’ that would
establish the town as the Las Vegas or Atlantic City of the UK. Blackpool
was reportedly favourite to be chosen but the award was actually made to
Manchester. Subsequently local Government leadership changes resulted in
the Super Casino concept being cancelled altogether.
In the following period Monarch Airlines stopped its scheduled services,
along with Ryanair (Dublin and Stansted).
Since then passenger traffic has been in decline, having peaked at slightly
over 550,000 in 2006 and 2007. Numbers shrank from 276,866 in 2009 to
235,682 in 2011; a 14.02% reduction. Numbers in 2012 remained static, but
2013 has witnessed a 12% increase in passengers to 262,630.
Airlines currently serving BLK are:
• Jet.2.com (three regular and eight seasonal routes);
• Aer Lingus Regional (Dublin);
• CityWing (Belfast, Isle of Man);
• Monarch Airlines charter (1 route);
• Bin Air charter (1 route);
• Travelfly charter (2 routes)
There has been negligible airfreight activity in recent years, with no air
freight at all recorded in 2012 and 2013.
Helicopter operations serve the offshore oil & gas facilities in the Irish Sea
and the large and growing offshore wind farms. Executive flights are
operated and it is likely there will be an increase of these and potentially
also scheduled services if and when the industrial gas ‘fracking’ industry
gets into full swing. The Fylde Coast area close to the airport has been
70
identified as a major source of reserves that can be accessed through this
technology.
BLK’s ownership has changed several times in recent years. With aviation
roots that trace back to 1909, Blackpool Airport was one of the first aviation
sites in the UK. The ownership was transferred from 100% municipal to City
Hopper Airports Limited (95%) with Blackpool Borough Council retaining
5%, then in 2007. MAR Properties Ltd agreed terms to take over full control
of the airport. In May 2008, Balfour Beatty, which also own Exeter Airport,
purchased MAR Property's 95% stake in the airport, in conjunction with
Churchill Airports.
Carlisle Lake District Airport (CAX)
L=1,649m (TORA), 1,311m (LDA), 3C, PCN not reported but limited to
aircraft of max 12,500kg.
Carlisle Airport (CAX) has two asphalt runways. It’s principle runway has a
declared take off run available (TORA) of 1,649m, although the limiting
landing distance available is somewhat shorter at 1,311m due to
displacement of the thresholds. The runway strengths at CAX are such that
there is a restriction on maximum aircraft weight (public transport) of
12,500kg, limiting the possible types of passenger aircraft significantly. This
weight restriction is approximately equivalent to declaring a Pavement
Classification Number (PCN) of less than 10.
CAX serves the city of Carlisle in Cumbria (population 75,000), and the
surrounding area of northwest England and southeast Scotland, also to the
east towards Newcastle.
Figure 4.8 – Carlisle Airport
Source: NATS
Its total catchment area is estimated to be not in excess of 500,000 people.
There are some significant industries in the area. For example the Sellafield
nuclear reprocessing plant and the transport logistics company Eddie
Stobart, which owns the airport and which is headquartered in the city.
71
However, the greatest opportunity for CAX lies with its ability to establish
itself as ‘Lake District Airport’ to reflect its position on the northern edge of
the Lake District national park, one of England’s most important tourist
areas and which receives many domestic and international visitors each
year. While the potential to build a critical mass of international flights is
limited, there are two UK cities that could supply domestic services with
international connections, namely London and Manchester.
Originally a military airfield, CAX was owned and operated by Carlisle City
Council, which had limited ambitions for it (declining to support an
application for four times daily service to London City Airport in 1996), until
2000. It was used mainly by flying clubs although a number of commercial
airlines attempted to maintain scheduled routes to cities including Belfast,
Isle of Man, Leeds-Bradford, London Luton, London Heathrow, London
Stansted, Aberdeen, Glasgow, Dundee and Jersey in the period to 1993. For
a variety of reasons none of these services lasted very long and the airport
operated at a permanent deficit.
In 2000 the airport was sold to Northern Ireland’s Haughey Airports on a
150-year lease and subsequently (following infrastructure investment
totalling GB£4 million) to WA Developments, parent of Eddie Stobart Ltd,
and which has since gone on to acquire London Southend Airport through
the vehicle Stobart Airports. Planning permission was granted for runway
resurfacing work and a new terminal but was subsequently contested on
environmental grounds. In 2011 Stobart Airports submitted a planning
application for a 36,000 square metre airfreight distribution centre and to
relocate all Stobart Carlisle operations there. In tandem, scheduled flights
to London Southend airport would commence, by Aer Arann, in which
Stobart Group has a minority stake. This route, and one to Dublin, remain
‘planned’ for 2013/14, to be operated by an ATR-42 (presumably payload
restricted until such time as the runway is strengthened) which would be
based at CAX.
There is scope for selected scheduled operations at CAX, to embrace both
passenger demand that would be identified as much by incoming tourists as
72
by outgoing businesspeople and residents, as well, potentially as airfreight,
which Stobart Group is well placed to develop. The difficulty the airport
faces is to differentiate itself from Newcastle Airport, which is located
approximately 50 miles away, less than the distance between Plymouth and
Bristol and slightly greater than the distance to Exeter.
From the west side of Northumberland, Newcastle Airport can be difficult
to access during the winter months on account of bad weather but
traditionally people in the Carlisle catchment area are drawn to it first,
followed by Manchester and Glasgow airports (it is equidistant between the
two and accessible directly by motorway in both cases; also Leeds Bradford
and Glasgow Prestwick airports. Newcastle Airport offers a range of
scheduled services to and via hubs such as London, Amsterdam, Paris,
Brussels, New York (from winter 2013) and Dubai; is a base for easyJet and
also for two large charter airlines.
Gloucestershire (Staverton) Airport (GLO)
TORA=1,271m, 3C, 16/F/B/W/U
The municipally owned Gloucestershire Airport (GLO) at Staverton,
between Gloucester and Cheltenham, is close to the M5 motorway, which
runs between Birmingham and Bristol and on to Exeter. It is used as a
general aviation and training facility, also for executive transport in respect
of businesses in the area such as Messier Dowty, Smiths Aerospace,
Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society (Lloyds TSB) and the
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The closure of
Bristol’s Filton Airport will assist it in this respect.
Figure 4.8 – Gloucestershire (Staverton) Airport
Source: NATS
There are three runways at GLO, the longest being 1,431 metres overall and
which was recently extended to offer landing distances increased by up to
150 metres (the limiting TORA now being 1,271m), described by the
management as “making a huge difference to the operators of the larger
aircraft that currently use the airport and capable of generate additional
business for us, as these aircraft generate significantly higher landing fees
73
and greater fuel sales ". The final stage of the runway project has been the
installation of an Instrument Landing System in 2013, enabling aircraft to
land in bad weather. Tests and safety checks are currently taking place.
The main runway at GLO has a low pavement strength, similar to that at
PLH. However, the recent runway extension at GLO has made their
commercial airline activities a more viable proposition.
The three runways enable the airport to support the activities of smaller
turboprop aircraft which would otherwise have difficulty operating in
strong crosswind conditions.
The airport services a local population in Gloucester and Cheltenham of
240,000, within an overall population for Gloucestershire of 860,000. The
main commercial airports for the region are Bristol and Birmingham but
GLO is also likely to be impacted by the growth of charter and scheduled
services at the more ambitious and aggressive Oxford Airport, which is only
40 miles distant.
Various UK and Irish scheduled services have been attempted since the
1950s. Like CAX, historically there appears to have been ‘constrained’
ambition. Indeed the management has gone out of its way to assure the
local population that the improved runway and aids will lead to only a
handful of extra flights, on weekdays.
The only commercial operator at present is Citywing, which has daily flights
between GLO and the Isle of Man with less frequent services to Belfast City,
and which recently had a management buyout and rebranding of the
incumbent Manx2 airline. There are also seasonal charter flights to Jersey.
Gloucestershire Airport claims to have the fastest landing to baggage
retrieval time in the world, of less than five minutes. Passenger numbers,
have however fallen from a peak of 21,933 in 2009 to 14,168 in 2013 whilst
those at nearby Bristol Airport have risen by 9% in the same period. The
74
difference in fortunes of these two nearby airports demonstrates the
gradual consolidation of services into low cost carriers at the larger regional
airports.
4.2 Comparison of Runway Physical Characteristics
In considering the comparator airports, it is useful to compare the runway
physical characteristics of each and PLH’s current standing in relation to
these airports and what this actually means. For comparison purposes, the
principal runway characteristics considered are:
 Limiting Take Off Run Available (TORA) – the minimum declared TORA,
ignoring intermediate runway entries, demonstrating a useful
comparator of runway length;
 Pavement Classification Number (PCN) – a measure of runway strength,
here the numeric element alone is considered to give an approximate
comparison of strength, but it is acknowledged that subgrade strength
variations will have a slight bearing on the true comparison. However,
for the purposes of this report this basis of comparison is considered to
be of satisfactory accuracy to demonstrate the issues.
Comparison of PCN against TORA – Figure 4.9 shows the broadly linear
relationship that one might expect between runway strength and runway
length, with heavier aircraft requiring both increase TORA to perform
successful take-off and increase strength to permit a suitable frequency of
traffic without unduly stressing the runway pavement. In itself this
comparison is not surprising. However, what can be seen from this graph is
the relative position of PLH in both these regards when compared with
other comparator airports. Notably PLH has the lowest TORA in
comparison to the comparator airports and the second lowest runway
strength. Notably, the airport with the lowest reported runway strength,
Carlisle, has a public transport weight limit of 12,500kg applied by the CAA
75
and plans have been prepared by the airport to carry out strengthening as
this is a constraint on their future growth.
Comparison of TORA against PAX – Figure 4.11 provides a graphic
representation of how important TORA is to the ability to generate high
levels of passenger traffic (based on 2010 statistics being the last full year of
operation at PLH). As is explained elsewhere in this document, the
passenger growth within the UK regional airport market in recent years has
been dominated by the low cost carrier (LCC) market with airlines such as
Ryanair and Easyjet capturing significant proportions of the market. These
carriers, and most others like them, operate fleets of Code C aircraft,
typically Boeing 737-800/900 or Airbus A319/320/321 types.
These aircraft require a minimum TORA of approximately 1,700m to
1,800m based on commercially viable payloads. It is no coincidence
therefore that figure 4.10 shows a sudden jump in annual passenger
numbers at those airports where TORA lengths are in excess of this figure.
In simple terms, it is these airports that have been able to capture this
opportunity and grow into significant regional airports by being able to
offer airlines this facility. The TORA offering is exacerbated by the fact that
many charter airlines such as Thomsonfly, often an essential revenue
stream for some of the less trafficked regional airports such as Durham
Tees, have fleets that are predominantly (although not exclusively) Code C
and Code D aircraft.
From figure 4.11, PLH presently has the shortest TORA in comparison with
the comparator airports. Increasing the runway length at PLH to provide a
TORA of 1,800m would be a significant undertaking and therefore runway
length at PLH is considered to be a significant constraint on growth that
other comparator and nearby airports do not have.
Comparison of PCN against PAX – Figure 4.12 provides a graphic
representation of annual passenger numbers against runway strength.
What can be seen from this graph is the wide spread of results without the
pronounced relationship otherwise shown on figure 4.11. In short, runway
76
Figure 4.9 – Plymouth Area Wind Rose
strength is not the leading factor in securing a market, but runway length is
certainly important. Runways can be relatively easily strengthened to meet
airline fleet demands. From figure 4.12, whilst PLH evidentially has a low
strength runway, this should not be seen as a constraint to growth as it can
be strengthened.
Source: Met Office
Comparison of Runway Alignment – Runway alignment is an important
consideration to airlines whose fleets may consist of lighter aircraft which
could potentially be disrupted by heavy crosswind conditions.
The runway direction at PLH is WNW to ESE, or 13/31 in aviation terms.
Although it would ideally be aligned WSW/ENE to face the prevailing winds
(see wind rose for Plymouth in figure XX), this is not a constraint for larger
aircraft such as those that had been operating scheduled services at PLH
prior to its closure. However, some light aircraft would have occasional
difficulty in landing or taking off if there is a strong crosswind (typically
greater than 33 knots for many light aircraft, or even as low as 10 knots for
some tail-wheel aircraft) that would take them beyond their operating
limits.
The original Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) for PLH provides
pilots with the following caution regarding operations off runway 13/31; “In
strong wind conditions' windshear and turbulence may be experienced on
the approach to or climb out from any runway. Downdraught effect and
sudden changes in wind velocity are possible in light wind conditions.
Significant differences may occur between the surface wind velocity
reported by ATC and the actual wind at approximately 100 ft aal”.
For any future PLH business case options that are reliant upon smaller
aircraft, such as air taxis, general aviation and turboprop business aircraft,
this could become a material consideration for pilots choosing to operate
out of the airport. From our review of other single-runway airports with
restricted runway length, PLH is the only candidate that appears to have an
undesirably oriented runway. It should be noted however that this would
not cause a continual disruption to operations, but could result in a certain
77
number of days each year where wind conditions are unsuitable for lighter
aircraft operations.
Other similar single-runway low-TORA airports include Coventry (low TORA
in one direction only), Dundee and Lydd airports all of which have much
better aligned runways than that at PLH.
C15: In conclusion, PLH has the lowest TORA in comparison to the
comparator UK regional airports and the second lowest runway
strength. Whilst PLH evidentially has a low strength runway, this
should not be seen as a constraint to growth as it can be
strengthened. However, to make a serious entry into the low cost
airline market, PLH would need a runway with a minimum TORA
of approximately 1,700m to 1,800m, which cannot be achieved
within the current restrictions. The constrained runway length is
further exacerbated by it being the only runway, which is not
ideally aligned with prevailing winds for lighter aircraft making
this a less desirable aerodrome to base flying clubs than perhaps
other nearby aerodromes.
The experiences of other regional and city airports with runways
shorter than 1,700m outside of the London airport network shows
a pattern of either airline failure, passenger traffic decline, airport
closure or an inevitable reliance on general aviation traffic,
including at airports such as Gloucester, Sheffield, Coventry,
Carlisle and others where the ability to retain sustainable
passenger services has proven to be challenging
78
Figure 4.10 – Graph of PCN vs TORA
120
113
100
80
75
PCN
70
62
60
56
46
40
48
5354
51
46
39
38
33
20
14
16
10
0
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
TORA (m)
79
PAX (2013):CAA vs TORA (note PLH 2010 figures shown)
1,400,000
1,200,000
PAX (2013)
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
TORA
80
PAX (2013):CAA vs PCN - (note PLH 2010 figures shown)
1,400,000
1,200,000
PAX (2013)
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
PCN
81
05 Local Demand
82
83
5
Local Demand
Core Task - An independent review of the likely local demand for air
services within the regional population focussing on whether the
population of the southwest region (Bristol westwards) could support
four airports (Exeter, Bristol, Plymouth and Newquay). The potential
additional effects of the ongoing operations at Bournemouth and Cardiff
Airports will also be reviewed.
There are nine official regions of England. The Southwest is the largest, with
an area of 9,200 square miles (23,830 square kilometres). It comprises
Bristol, a city and unitary authority; also Gloucestershire, Dorset, Wiltshire,
Devon, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly
The population of the southwest of England is 5,289,00024 and, setting
aside the Isles of Scilly (population 2000) and the small airport there, but
including Lands End Airport, there are six airports with scheduled airline
service: Bristol; Gloucestershire; Exeter; Bournemouth; Newquay; and
Lands End.
There is one airport for every 881,500 people and the population density is
575 people per square mile. These statistics compare with other English
regions as shown in table 5.1.
Figure 5.1 – The Nine Regions of England
(Southwest Highlighted)
Using this simple measure, the Southwest England region clearly offers the
greatest number of scheduled airports per capita and by some margin. The
next ranked region has more than 40% more population for the available
airports. It does not take into account catchment area overlap, nor the fact
that primary airports like London Heathrow attract passengers from all over
the country and primary regional ones (including Bristol and to a lesser
24
Regional populations are taken from the 2011 Census.
84
degree Cardiff ) also have a much broader catchment base. But even so it
does indicate the region is well served, especially in light of the relatively
slim population density, without Plymouth Airport.
Table 5.1 – Regional Density of Scheduled
Airports (Southwest Highlighted)
Region
Population
Area
sq m
Number
of
Scheduled
airports
within
region
Population
density
per sq m
Population
per airport
Rank –
best
served by
number of
airports
Southwest
England
Southeast
England
Greater
London
West
Midlands
East
Midlands
East of
England
Northwest
England
(not incl.
the Isle of
Man)
Northeast
England
Yorkshire
and
Humber
5,289,000
9,200
6
575
888,150
1
8,635,000
7,373
6
1170
1,439,165
3
8,174,000
607
2
13,466
4,087,000
7
5,602,000
5,020
1
1,115
5,620,000
9
4,533,000
6,033
1
751
4,533,000
8
5,847,000
7,382
4
790
1,461,750
4
7,052,000
5,469
3
1,290
2,350,666
6
2,597,000
3,317
2
780
1,298,500
2
5,284,000
5,953
3
890
1,761,333
5
England as a whole has 45 scheduled airports for a population of
53,013,000 in a landmass of 50,346 square miles or one airport for every
1,178,066 people. France has 60 airports for a population of 65,350,000
85
(1,089,166) but the area of France is 260,558 square miles, more than five
times larger than England. The Republic of Ireland has seven airports for a
population of 4,588,000 (655428) in an area of 27,000 square miles, which
is a better ratio than Southwest England, but it is acknowledged by the Irish
government that there are too many airports and consolidation is likely.
England is comparatively well served by airports and statistically the
Southwest England region is best served of all.
Despite this light population density, airports in the Southwest England
region are well spaced out. The largest areas without easy access to an
airport are in North Devon and in the triangle between Exeter, Bristol and
Bournemouth. Even so, regional air passengers are rarely located more
than 50 miles from an airport that offers direct flights or the opportunity to
connect through another airport. In some other regions (e.g. East of
England, Yorkshire and Humberside, even Northwest England), those
distances can be greater. In Wales and Scotland it is possible to live in a
sizeable community and still be 100 miles from the nearest airport.
The largest airport in the Southwest region is Bristol Airport, with 5,768,000
passengers in 2011, overall growth of +2% in the first nine months of 2012
and services to in excess of 100 cities. Alone amongst the region’s airports
Bristol has a vision of becoming a (quote) “world leading regional airport
with ten million passengers passing through it each year".25 Plans for the
development of the airport to meet this goal were approved by North
Somerset Council in February 2011. In the medium term, the airport is
looking to open more routes to Scandinavia, and cities in Germany, the
Middle East and North America.
Bristol Airport already has a broad mix of airline types, being a large base
for both easyJet and Ryanair, but also with two large charter operators and
services to two of the four major European mainland gateways (Paris and
25
Source: Bristol Airport Chief Executive, November 2012.
86
Amsterdam) by full service carriers. This state of affairs results from
decisions taken by previous owners not to “put all their eggs in one basket”
during the period of rapid growth by low cost airlines. It has previously
hosted air service by Continental Airlines (now United Airlines) but is yet to
attract any of the three main Gulf carriers.
In October 2012 a refinancing deal covering previous debt of GB£279
million from 2005 was concluded with a consortium of banks. Shortly after,
it presented its case to the British government on its Draft Aviation Policy
Framework with five recommendations to deliver benefits for airports in
the regions, the wider economy and passengers across the country. While
the then management of Cardiff Airport presented an ambitious plan to
build a much larger facility there to relieve pressure on the Southeast
England airports, Bristol Airport was produced a less explicit document,
similar to that of Birmingham Airport, which would have the effect of
helping to ‘rebalance the economy’ - which is a stated objective of the
coalition government.
For these and other reasons Bristol Airport will command the attention of
the government in what will be a period of transition for British airports.
The growth of the low cost airlines in the UK and Europe has long since
reached maturity and the consensus of opinion amongst airline managers
and academics alike is that they will consolidate, possibly to the extent that
only two important ones remain in Europe; Ryanair and easyJet. Moreover,
the continuing expansion of global alliances, which are now absorbing
budget airlines as well (e.g. airberlin into oneworld), indicates a trend
towards further consolidation into larger primary airports that have the
capacity to expand rapidly. It is for this reason that financial analysts in
general agree that regional airports have the best investment prospects
given that presently the very biggest airports in the UK – Heathrow and
Gatwick – simply do not have that level of capacity, although future
decisions on runway capacity in the southeast could change that situation.
The conclusion must be therefore that Bristol Airport will continue to
expand, at the expense of regional secondary and tertiary level airports.
87
This is already happening in other regions (e.g. the Northwest, where
Manchester Airport is expanding again at the expense of Liverpool and
Blackpool airports and the Midlands, where Birmingham is expanding at the
expense of East Midlands airport).
Bristol Airport figures indicate that while 45% of its passengers are from
the area of the former county of Avon, at least 13% emanate from Devon.
Of the other airports in the Southwest region the future of Exeter Airport is
bound up to a large degree with the prospects for Flybe, which may choose
to concentrate any future expansion outside of the UK.
Newquay Airport has a 30-year master plan which is presently under
review. But while it has the ability to handle much more traffic (especially
low cost traffic) than it does now to an area of the UK that is highly
regarded for tourism purposes, a series of factors including the imposition
of an airport development fee did not endear it to those airlines. Attraction
and retention of those carriers has been hit and miss therefore. However, in
2013 the airport has managed to retain and build on the new easyJet
services from Liverpool and also those to Manchester and London Gatwick
serviced by Flybe.
5.2 Passengers per head of city population
One approximate measure of current, or recent demand is to consider the
passenger traffic at particular airports relative to their population. This is a
crude measure, but nonetheless can be illuminating when considered in
high level terms.
In 2010, the year before closure was announced, 128,603 scheduled
passengers and 5,779 military passengers used the airport. Per head of
local population (based upon official labour market statistics) in 2010 the
number of scheduled passengers per year at PLH represented 0.50 pax per
head of city population. This is compared to a ratio of 6.33 at Exeter Airport
and 13.42 at Bristol Airport. Whilst this is only an indicator, it is evident
88
that compared to the size of the local population, for a regional airport
Plymouth City Airport was very little used indeed even before the economic
downturn. This is not an accurate measure of demand, as the number of
passengers will naturally be determined by the routes and fares offered,
but it is certainly a relative indicator of demand for the services at each
airport.
C16: England is comparatively well served by airports and
statistically the Southwest England region is best served of all.
However, by head of city population, the historical traffic from the
former Plymouth City Airport was statistically very low when
compared to the same measure for Exeter and Bristol, indicating
that whilst demand may exist, passengers were not flying from the
former airport.
89
06 Published Passenger Forecasts
90
91
6
Core Task – Published Passenger Forecasts: A review and
commentary on the CAA’s own current passenger forecasts and
whether these show a decline or an increase regionally / nationally with
a specific view towards Plymouth.
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Average
Rank
Table 6.1: ACI traffic forecast 2012-2016 - total passenger
growth, by region (%)
Region/year
4.8
4.8
6.2
5.7
5.5
5.4
4
7.0
7.7
7.6
7.3
7.1
7.34
1
2.0
3.6
4.2
3.7
3.4
3.38
5
5.3
6.8
6.4
6.0
5.5
6
3
7.0
7.3
6.3
5.7
5.3
6.32
2
2.8
2.8
2.9
2.5
2.3
2.66
6
4.1
5.1
5.2
4.8
4.8
4.8
Africa
Asia Pacific
Europe
Latin
Am/Caribbea
n
Middle East
North
America
WORLD
Table Source: ACI World
Published Passenger Forecasts
The World Bank estimates global GDP grew by 2.3% in 2012 and forecast
2.4% growth in 2013. The Bank estimated developing-country GDP
increased 5.1% in 2012 and forecast growth of 5.5% in 2013. High-incomecountry GDP was estimated to have increased 1.3% in 2012 and was
forecast to grow by the same amount in 2013. GDP growth by in the
‘Europe and Central Asia’ region is described as follows:
‘GDP growth in Europe and Central Asia is estimated to have slowed
sharply to 3% in 2012 from 5.5% in 2011 as the region faced significant
headwinds, including weak external demand, deleveraging by European
banks, summer drought and commodity-price induced inflationary
pressures. Growth slowed most in countries with strong economic linkages
to the Euro Area, while it was relatively robust in resource-rich economies
that have benefited from high commodity prices. GDP growth in the region
is projected to rebound to 3.6% in 2013 and 4.3% by 2015. Medium-term
prospects for the region will critically depend on progress in addressing
external (large current account deficits) and domestic (large fiscal deficit,
unemployment, and inflation) imbalances, lack of competitiveness, and
structural constraints.’
Airports Council International (ACI), the global representative organisation
for airports and advisor to the UN Agency the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO), has released in January 2013 its most recent Global
Traffic Forecast26, for the period 2012 – 2031. While no reference is made
26
Global Traffic Forecast 2012-2031; Airports Council International; January 2013
92
here to similar forecasts created by the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), the Director of Economics at ACI has assured Fjøri that
the forecasts are broadly similar throughout both documents.
The forecast anticipates that in the immediate five-year period 2012-2016
Europe will have the slowest growth rate of passengers after North
America, with an annual average rate of 3.38%.
Plymouth Airport if operational, and indeed all of the four commercial
airports in Southwest England with the exception of Bristol, will see their
traffic growth, or lack of it, determined in the main by economic and
political issues in Europe, which are taken into account as far as possible in
ACI’s forecasts, because their traffic essentially is, or has been, of a UK
domestic or European nature. Those issues include, inter alia, GDP growth
(the potential for a triple dip recession in the UK and the stagnant GDP
growth rates in Europe); inflation; employment levels; aviation taxes (of
which the UK has the highest in the world); and overall consumer
confidence.
Additionally, ACI identifies both Europe and North America as more mature
markets, in which traditionally, growth rates stabilise and begin to fall.
ACI has a further forecast, through to 2021 and 2031. Assessing growth in
the period 2011 through 2031 in both cases Europe and North America
continue to have the lowest growth rates and Europe’s rate falls to +2.9%.
Examining airfreight growth by region, once again Europe is the second
worst in the period 2011-2016, with +2.5% (compared with +5.9% in the
Middle East) and by 3% in the period to 2031 (cf. +5.8% in Asia Pacific. ACI
once again highlights the comparative maturity of European markets in this
respect.
93
In terms of air traffic movements the picture is very similar, with Europe
growing by +2% (2012-16) and +2.1% (2012-2031); the second lowest of the
world regions.
With specific regard to Europe, ACI states:
“With low cost development and the expansion of the EU, European
aviation has experienced sustained passenger growth during the last
decade. Until 2011, despite the European debt crisis, air traffic demand
remained strong. But by early 2012 demand started to contract and in the
short and medium term, experts fear that the debt crisis will only deepen,
further impacting travel demand. European economic growth is projected to
remain below the global average (1.9% vs. 2.9%) over the next two decades
and air travel demand is projected to grow annually by 2.9%, led by Russia
and Turkey which will offset slower growth in the more mature EU countries
such as the United Kingdom.
Europe’s dense population coupled with short travel distances means that
surface modes of transport, such as high speed trains, will continue to
provide competition to the air transport industry. This, coupled with the fact
that most domestic markets are well served, will
Translate into limited growth for the domestic market (2.0% p.a.).
International travel in Europe has always been dominated by IntraEuropean travel. In recent years it has greatly benefitted from the EU
expansion, which has facilitated an east-west network expansion. However,
large Intra-European routes are today, for the most part, well-served and
face competition from surface modes of transport, meaning that during the
next two decades only limited growth is projected (3.2% p.a. over 20 years).
Potential for future traffic development remains for flows between Western
and Eastern Europe as well as within Eastern Europe. Intra-European travel
will remain the single largest international market in the region, accounting
for roughly 60% of international passengers (compared to about 70% in
2011).”
94
Figure 6.1, provided by Airports Council International Europe, which uses
and endorses data provided by ACI World in its own forecasting activities,
emphasises the comparative growth of other world regions vs. that of
Europe.
The organisation Eurocontrol, which manages European airspace, published
a seven-year forecast of flight movements for the period 2012-2018 in
October 2012.
Eurocontrol notes that over the summer 2012months, European traffic has
been quite close to the last forecast published. Nevertheless, very high oil
prices, a weaker economic outlook and other recent events (airline failures,
slower-than-expected recovery from the Arab Spring etc) have all led to a
downwards revision of the forecast overall.
Figure 6.1 - Air Passenger Traffic 2011 vs. 2031 - Global Shift
Source: ACI Europe
The forecast update is for 1.5% fewer flights in 2012 and stagnation in 2013,
due to the factors mentioned above, marking a double-dip after the first
plunge in 2008/09. By 2018, the forecast anticipates 11.1 million IFR
(Instrument Flight Rules) movements in Europe, just 14% more than in
2011. From 2014, the growth returns but slower when compared to pre2008 average growth rates. Growth averages 1.9% per year for the whole
2012-18 period.
These statistics support those published by ACI.
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) does not produce air traffic
forecasts.
The Department for Transport (DfT) produced a document “UK Aviation
Forecasts” (‘the document’) in August 2011 as part of the Government’s
commitment to produce a sustainable framework for UK aviation to replace
The Future of Air Transport White Paper published in 2003. The updated
forecasts presented in the report represent the DfT’s assessment of how
activity at UK airports is likely to change into the future, given existing
policy commitments. Their primary purpose is to inform long-term strategic
95
aviation policy. The report updated ‘UK Air Passenger Demand and CO2
Forecasts, 2009’27, published under a previous administration alongside the
announcement of its decision to confirm support for a third runway at
Heathrow airport.
A further updated document was published by the DfT within the first
quarter of 2013.
The updated forecasts reflect several key developments since 2009, some
of which are of particular relevance to Plymouth and the region. They
include:
 The Government’s policy not to support new runways at Heathrow,
Gatwick or Stansted;
 The Government’s policy to support the development of a high
speed rail route running from London to Birmingham, Manchester
and Leeds;
 Changes to Air Passenger Duty rates;
 Changes to projections of economic growth and oil prices
The forecasts are presented as ranges to reflect the inherent uncertainty
involved in forecasting to 2050. Low and high forecasts were defined to
represent either end of a range of reasonably likely outcomes, and a central
forecast has been defined to lie broadly in the middle of the range. All
aspects of the DfT’s forecasting methods used to produce the updated
forecasts were subject to independent peer review.
The number of air passengers using UK airports was forecast in the
document to recover from the recent downturn, rising from 211 million
passengers per annum (mppa) in 2010 to 335mppa in 2030 (within the
range 300mppa to 380 mppa), and to 470mppa in 2050 (within the range
380mppa to 515 mppa). These forecasts imply average annual growth in
27
2
The emissions (CO ) aspect of the document is not dealt with here.
96
Table 6.2: Increase in ATM and Terminal Capacity (PLH data
from 2011 forecast) Source: DfT
Airport
ATM
000s
(2008)
ATM 000s
(2050)
150
150
75
89
226
150
75
102
Bristol
Exeter
Newquay
Plymouth
Terminal
capacity
mppa
(2008)
10
2
1
1
Terminal
capacity
mppa
(2050)
12
4
3
4
Table 6.3: Constrained Maximum Use (mppa)
Source: DfT
Airport
London
Annual growth
rate %
Others
Annual growth
rate %
Total
Annual decennial
growth rate %
2011
128
2020
158
2030
186
2040
193
2050
199
2.4
1.6
0.4
0.3
81
97
2.0
127
2.7
179
3.5
248
3.3
209
255
313
372
447
2.2
2.0
1.7
1.9
passenger numbers to 2050 of 2.0% (within the range 1.0-3.0%)
significantly lower than the 5% average seen over the past forty years.
A comparison of ‘constrained’ and ‘unconstrained’ forecasts shows that the
number of UK air passengers is forecast to be constrained by airport
capacity. If there are no new runways in future, by 2050 the number of
passengers is forecast to be 50mppa (within the range 20mppa to
185mppa) lower than it would have been if there were no airport capacity
constraints. Capacity constraints have a greater effect at the airport level.
For example, the central forecasts suggest that without new runways the
three largest London airports will be at capacity by 2030, and all growth
beyond 2040 will occur at regional airports.
It should be noted, as the report was prepared during 2012, that the range
of forecasts reflects different assumptions about the extent to which there
will be a ‘bounce-back’ of the exceptional loss of demand following the
2008 financial crisis. Even when outturn data for all the key drivers of
demand were input into the model, the forecasts of UK air passenger
numbers for 2009 and 2010 exceed observed passenger numbers. This
forecasting error indicates that UK passenger numbers have been
significantly affected in the past two years by a factor (or factors) that is not
included in the forecasting models.
It is necessary to take a view as to whether the factor that has caused
passenger numbers to be below the levels implied by the forecasts has
changed temporarily, and passenger traffic will bounce-back, or whether it
has changed permanently. The central forecasts and lower bound of the
forecast range reflect the cautious view that the effect is permanent, while
the upper bound of the forecast range reflects the assumption that there is
a complete and swift bounce-back of demand.
For the purposes of regional demand forecasting, DfT employed a model
that split the UK into 455 zones and which assumed that the share of
travellers originating in, or destined for, each zone would potentially travel
via one of the 31 modelled airports, depending on factors that included:
97
Table 6.4: Constrained Terminal Passenger Forecast (NAPM
Central Forecast) – PLH data from 2011 Forecast

The time and money costs of accessing that airport by road or
public transport based on the network of road and rail services, and
using the standard transport modelling approach of combining
journey time, including waiting and interchanging, and money costs
into a single 'generalised cost' measure;

Flight duration and the frequency of the service at each airport;

Travellers’ preferences for particular airports; and,

Travellers’ value of time (which varies by journey purpose, e.g.
business, leisure).
Source: DfT
Airport mppa
London Heathrow
London Gatwick
London Stansted
Manchester
Birmingham
Bristol
Exeter
Newquay
Plymouth*
Cardiff
Norwich
Humberside
Durham Tees Valley
2011
69.4
33.6
18.0
18.8
8.6
5.8
0.7
0.2
<1
1.2
0.5
0.3
0.2
2020
75.5
37.3
25.4
22.1
11.8
6.8
0.7
0.5
<1
0.9
0.4
0.7
0.2
2030
81.8
40.6
35.7
28.1
16.7
9.7
1.1
0.5
<1
1.1
0.6
0.9
0.1
2040
86.9
42.6
36.0
39.0
28.2
12.3
1.7
0.5
1
1.7
1.5
1.0
0.1
2050
92.9
44.2
35.4
55.2
38.3
12.3
3.0
1.2
2
7.8
3.6
3.0
0.4
Table 6.5: Constrained Terminal Passenger Forecast (NAPM
Overall Forecast Range) – PLH data from 2011 Forecast
Source: DfT
Airport mppa
London Heathrow
London Gatwick
London Stansted
Manchester
Birmingham
Bristol
Exeter
Newquay
Plymouth*
Cardiff
Norwich
Humberside
Durham Tees
Valley
Low
2030 2050
80.3
89.1
38.9
41.1
30.5
35.4
24.2
33.5
11.3
19.4
7.7
10.7
1.0
1.7
0.4
0.3
<1
<1
0.9
1.3
0.4
0.8
0.7
0.9
0.0
0.1
Central
2030 2050
81.8 92.9
40.6 44.2
35.7 35.4
28.1 55.2
16.7 38.3
9.7
12.3
1.1
3.0
0.5
1.2
<1
2
1.1
7.8
0.6
3.6
0.9
3.0
0.1
0.4
High
2030 2050
81.6 n/a
41.1 n/a
35.3 n/a
32.3 n/a
25.3 n/a
12.4 n/a
1.2
n/a
0.5
n/a
<1
4
1.2
n/a
1.1
n/a
1.2
n/a
0.1
n/a
In their 2011 analysis, the DfT acknowledged that Coventry and Plymouth
airports had “ceased or are ceasing passenger operations” at the time but
retained them in the National Passenger Allocation Model (NPAM).
DfT calculated that the increase in Air Traffic Movements (ATMs) and
terminal passenger capacity at selected airports appropriate to this report,
between 2008 and 2050, would be as shown in table 6.2. Note that for
those airports other than PLH, the updated DfT data is shown, whereas for
PLH the 2011 forecast data is provided as this is the last time PLH is
represented.
In the same document, DfT forecasts ‘constrained maximum use’ passenger
air traffic at London and the South East airports, and other UK airports
(‘Others’) in the period 2010 to 2050 (all figures mppa) are outlined. These
are abstracted here in table 6.3.
This appears to confirm previous predictions that in the medium to long
term air traffic will grow more quickly outside of the London air traffic
control region, which is struggling to cope with demand, but these figures
are expressly for the entire UK.
98
Table 6.6: Constrained Terminal Passengers (Passengers
with Regional Origin and Destination)
Source: DfT
2020
2030
2040
2050
Northern Ireland
Scotland
North
Midlands
Wales
South West
South East
Total
2010
Region/year
6
20
30
19
4
12
91
181
7
23
35
24
5
14
116
226
9
29
45
30
7
18
143
281
12
34
55
36
8
22
173
341
16
42
66
44
10
26
206
411
%
increase
20102050
st
266 (1 )
th
210 (7 )
th
220 (5 )
rd
232 (3 )
nd
250 (2 )
th
217 (6 )
th
226 (4 )
227
From the same source data, DfT goes into further detail of projected
passenger numbers at regional airports throughout the country, including
the southwest of England.
Table 6.4 shows the abstracted data for the constrained terminal passenger
forecasts of UK airports (the central forecast) using the NPAM. Cardiff,
Norwich, Humberside and Durham Tees Valley are included as they are
considered to be airports similar in scope to Plymouth.
One might conclude from this forecast that DfT identified the Exeter and
Bristol airports as having the greatest potential for traffic growth in the
Southwest region in the period through to 2030. Table 6.5 is for
constrained terminal passengers; overall forecast range, 2030 & 2050
In this longer term forecast Plymouth Airport is estimated to be able to
grow slightly more robustly as the similarly sized Newquay Airport, slightly
more robustly than the larger and more established Bristol Airport, but not
as robustly as Exeter Airport.
Table 6.6 provides data on constrained terminal passengers, regional
origins and surface journeys (applying the central forecast). Concerning
origin and destination (O&D) passengers, which make up the vast majority
of passenger at airports in southwest England (there being little transfer
traffic between airlines there) the DfT envisages that regional O&D
passengers there will grow from 12 million in 2012 to 26 million in 2050
(+217%).
The conclusion is that, over a 40-year period, O&D passengers will grow less
in the Southwest England region than in any other UK region except
Scotland. It is interesting to note that within the previous DfT forecast the
Southwest region was actually predicted to be the second highest UK region
in terms of percentage passenger growth. In the latest forecast this appears
to have reversed.
Data supplied directly by airports to facilitate the DfT forecasting process is
collected and collated by an independent commercial enterprise,
99
anna.aero. During the first production of this report, UK data had been
collated at most airports through to the end of October 2012.
In that eight-month period, collective UK airport traffic (at 37 reporting
airports) grew by 0.54% from the 2011 annual total of 222,333,000 pax.
In the ten-month period the largest increases were recorded at the
statistical outlier Southend (a relatively newly developed commercial
airport) Aberdeen, Inverness and Belfast, all with consistent double-digit
increases. But more airports witnessed large falls in traffic, including Belfast
Harbour; also Cardiff, Durham Tees Valley, (both with consistent doubledigit reduction), Liverpool, Glasgow Prestwick and Newquay.
Forecasts are inherently dangerous as they cannot take into account the
‘unknown unknowns’ in the short, medium, or long term such as terrorist or
military actions, pandemics, currency collapses or significant taxation on air
travel. Even major airlines and airports often do not attempt to take these
matters into account in their planning. Moreover, forecasts have been
widely inaccurate in the past, and should be treated with caution but on the
basis of these statistics the following conclusions might be reached.
Conclusions
 Over a considerable period of time, through to 2030, the mature
European market is set to experience continuing economic stagnation in
the short, or perhaps medium term, and will expand more slowly in the
air transport sector than other world regions. This is of particular
relevance to airports in Southwest England as most of their traffic is of a
UK domestic or European short-haul nature, involving countries that are
also experiencing economic stagnation;
 This slow growth will equally be evident in the air cargo segment;
 This economic stagnation is further compounded in the UK by lack of
consumer confidence and by high aviation taxes, which the government
has given no indication it will reduce in the foreseeable future. The
100
influence of a continuously high rate of aviation taxation applied directly
to the consumer can be gauged from a statement from the German
Airport Association (ADV) in January 2013, which said that the 22
international airports in its membership were forecasting growth of only
0.4% in 2013, the worst level since the economic downturn in 2009. A
variable rate of passenger ‘tourist’ taxation was introduced in Germany
at the beginning of 2011. ADV also forecasted aircraft movements in
Germany to decline by 6.2%, the downward trend in aircraft movements
was continuing through the summer timetable 2013. ADV states that
new airline entry will not compensate for cuts by established airlines,
while noting the financial impact on airports as a result of this
challenged environment. ADV specifically identifies the tourist tax as the
root cause of passenger growth stagnation and losses;
 The continuing expansion of rail travel throughout Europe generally will
impede air traffic growth, coupled with the fact that in most European
countries domestic routes are already well served; leaving little room for
further growth other than on very specific niche routes. Eurocontrol
also perceives reduced air traffic movement growth in the period
through to 2018;
 Department for Transport forecasts in the UK imply average annual
growth in passenger numbers to 2050 of 2.0% (within the range 1.03.0%) significantly lower than the 5% average seen over the past forty
years and upon which the 2006 York Aviation study into PLH was based;
 However, and partly because UK regional airports are far less capacity
constrained than those in the London area, the majority of what little
growth there is can be expected to take place at those regional airports.
Note though that ‘regional airports’ is an ill-defined broad brush
definition that includes the likes of Manchester, Birmingham and
Edinburgh airports as well as the tertiary level ones like Newquay and
Durham Tees Valley.
101
 DfT perceived no restrictions on capacity or its growth at Southwest
England airports in its 2011 forecast for the period to 2050. Even
allowing for the fact that Plymouth Airport was about to be closed when
it produced its 2011 forecast, DfT included Plymouth in its National
Passenger Allocation Model. But DfT identified Exeter and Bristol
airports as having the greatest potential for traffic growth in the
Southwest region in the period through to 2030;
 In a longer-term forecast, through to 2050, DfT identified Plymouth
Airport as having a similar degree of potential to Exeter, Newquay and
Bristol airports to grow in the latter part of the first half of the century.
Why this should be the case in that period is not explained, particularly
as the capability of the airfields at Plymouth’s nearby competitor
airports, and the proximity of the UK motorway network to two of those
airports is considerably better;
 Origin and Destination passenger journeys are expected to grow more
slowly in the Southwest England region than in any other in the UK apart
from Scotland in the period through to 2050;
 During 2012 and 2013 a number of airports similar in size and scope to
Plymouth experienced serious decline in passenger numbers. In some
cases this trend, if continued, may threaten their own viability. An
example of this is Dundee Airport, Scotland, where in December 2013 it
was reported that the only scheduled passenger service is to end in early
2014. Cityjet operates two return flights a day between Dundee and
London City airport but high prices compared to flights from Edinburgh
Airport, some 53 miles away, have reportedly meant the route has
struggled to attract passengers. Loganair withdrew its scheduled
services from Dundee to Belfast and Birmingham in 2012 because of a
decline in passenger numbers. Dundee is similar in many respects to the
former Plymouth Airport in that its runway is short in length and unable
to meaningfully engage in the low cost carrier market.
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07 Airline Operator Demand
103
104
7
Airline Operator Demand
Core Task – Airline Operator Demand: An independent review of any
commercial airline operators who would wish to operate from an airport at
Plymouth. It is understood that SHH tried to identify potential airlines prior
to the airport closure but this proved to be unsuccessful. This task will
necessarily be integrated with aspects of the runway technical capabilities
and the outputs of the Orien Advisors Report which reviewed the potential
for scheduled services based around smaller aircraft on behalf of PCC.
7.1.1
Aircraft Fleets
The key issue for Plymouth Airport, as the 2006 York Aviation report
acknowledged, is the length of its runway and the restrictions this imposes.
Whilst the existing runway length was adequate for operations at that time
and allowed some growth of the route network within the UK and near
Europe using what were then current aircraft types, these aircraft types are
gradually being replaced by larger turbo-prop aircraft and regional jets
which require a longer runway.
Furthermore, the inability to increase aircraft size as demand grows was
identified as acting as a deterrent to expanding operations from Plymouth,
particularly given the relatively close proximity of Exeter and Newquay
Airports. Generally speaking, the cost-per-seat of operating larger aircraft is
lower than smaller aircraft, hence sustaining operations at Plymouth with
very small aircraft “will become uneconomic in the longer term.” York
Aviation anticipated that the current (2005/6) types using Plymouth City
Airport “will become obsolete and that replacement aircraft will be unable
to use the runway at its current length.”
There is an important caveat here. That report was created prior to the subprime mortgage and subsequent credit-crunch inspired global economic
downturn, by a clear two years. As a result of that downturn regional
turboprop aircraft began to reacquire market share from regional jets on
105
Figure 7.1: Fleet Mix Changing – Boeing Predictions, June 2011
Source: Boeing/CAPA
account of their better operating economics (fuel burn) as oil prices climbed
to US$150 a barrel, a figure that is on the very limit of viable airline
operation. Several of their manufacturers also heavily promoted the
environmental benefits of such aircraft, notably Bombardier with the Dash
8 Q400 (which is operated at Flybe at Exeter Airport) and subsequently the
ATR-72 model.
Indeed, in mid-2011 Boeing’s ‘Current Market Outlook’ document
predicted a diminishing role for regional jets. It suggested that after rising
to 15% of the current fleet, regional jets would constitute only 5% of the
fleet by the end of the forecast period and might be eliminated from some
regions such as the Middle East altogether. Their numbers would drop from
1780 aircraft in the 2010 fleet to 760 in 2030.
Boeing was consistent in its estimates. In its mid-2012 Market Outlook
Report (to 2031) it anticipates 6% of the fleet will be made up of regional
jets by that date. It also noted that only the regional jet category had
reported a large percentage decline, down 11 percentage points, since its
previous report.
While Airbus does not go into the same level of detail as Boeing, in its
Global Market Forecast 2011-2030 it predicted that the ‘centre of gravity’
for the single aisle aircraft category will remain at 150 seats. However,
larger capacity types will see more significant volumes than smaller types.
This is broadly supportive of the position taken by Airbus.
Airbus also adds a telling paragraph about low cost carriers: “If world traffic
is segmented by airline type, it can be seen that with 70%, global and major
network carriers will continue to perform most of the world’s traffic. But
the low cost model will continue to grow its share to 19% of RPKs28 by 2030,
indicating that there is still opportunity to expand this model.”
28
Revenue passenger kilometres, a method of assessing airline capacity
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Since these reports were published the oil price has stabilised and there
are new small and regional jets in the market (Sukhoi SuperJet) or soon to
enter it (Mitsubishi Regional Jet, Bombardier C-Series, Comac C919 etc)
but it is less certain than it was in 2006 that the regional turboprop
aircraft will decline.
The manufacturers of these aircraft, unsurprisingly, do not agree with
Boeing and Airbus. Bombardier, for example, which manufactures the
aforementioned Dash 8 Q-400 turboprop as well as the Canadair Regional
Jet and the C-Series jet which will be launched within the next two to
three years, envisages that the 20-149 seat passenger market will grow
from the 11,000 in service in 2010 to 17,400 by 2030, allowing for growth
and retirements. It says in its own market forecast 2011-2030, “The 20- to
59-seat segment remains a key component of the regional airline industry.
Demand for new aircraft in this segment is expected to arise in the latter
half of the forecast period. The 60- to 99-seat segment has established
itself as the new foundation of the regional market. Regional airlines are
shifting their fleets to larger aircraft, both turboprop and jet. These
aircraft offer greater passenger capacity and lower operating costs per
seat while meeting passenger demand for increased frequencies and
schedules to primary, secondary and tertiary airports. The 100- to 149seat segment will exhibit the strongest growth of the three segments we
study in our Forecast”.
The air transport business is an extremely fluid one, replete with
contradictions. During the last three decades for example average aircraft
size as measured by the number of seats has decreased and increased
again on several occasions and no sooner is an academic analysis
complete than it is out of date.
The remainder of this section therefore, continues on the assumption that
previous assumptions about aircraft size, as recently as 2005/6, may no
longer be wholly accurate and that a discernible, if small, market will
continue to exist for the type of aircraft that could use Plymouth Airport
as it is now, or with a modest runway extension. It also takes into account
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the potential - though unlikely - capability of one or more low cost airlines
to use Plymouth Airport in the future. The principal low cost airlines
within Europe predominantly utilise Code C aircraft, typically the Boeing
737 and the Airbus A319, A320 and A321 families. All of these aircraft
would require a significantly longer runway length to both take off and
land than that provided presently at PLH.
The typical minimum take-off runway length at maximum take-off weight
for a Boeing 737-800 with winglets (the only aircraft in the fleet of
Ryanair, all with 189 seats) is 2,166 metres and the landing field length is
1,890 metres29.
Whilst constrained runway lengths can sometimes be tolerated by
operators by constraining passenger uplifts, there is only a small margin of
acceptability before such constraints on uplift render the route as being
commercially unviable.
What carriers might operate from a reopened Plymouth Airport and what
type of passenger would they seek?
In the following sections, the likelihood of those airlines choosing to
operate at Plymouth is very broadly assessed by category: ‘good potential’,
‘potential’, ‘limited potential’, ‘low potential’, ‘negligible potential’ or,
‘never’ and a summary table is provided at the end of the section. No
airline is judged to fall in the ‘very likely’ category.
Furthermore, reference to the ability of aircraft to operate at Plymouth
Airport refers only to runway length at the time the airport closed, not to
width or pavement classification number, which could compromise
operations of some of the aircraft types identified. Refer to Section 3.
29
Source: Boeing. Without winglets, the required speeds will be a little higher
and therefore, the distances required to take off and land will be a little longer.
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7.1.2
UK Airlines
There are currently 11 scheduled and three charter airlines that might
consider Plymouth Airport in an ideal scenario for them. The number of
airlines in the UK has continued to shrink through natural industry
consolidation and failure, the most recent example being the absorption of
bmi into British Airways/IAG in 2012. This trend is likely to continue
throughout Europe, thus continually reducing the size of the target airline
market.
British Airways City Flyer
BA City Flyer (BACF) is a wholly owned subsidiary of British Airways that
emerged from the sale of BA low cost subsidiary BA Connect to Flybe, the
subsequent resurrection of the London Gatwick-based CityFlyer Express and
the wholesale shift of operations to London City Airport (LCY). It is actually
headquartered in Manchester but has made no attempt to commence any
services there since the demise of BA Connect. BACF is entirely committed
to LCY, from where it operates a network of 13 regular (mainly business)
and seven seasonal (mainly leisure) domestic and European routes. The
domestic routes are all to Scotland – Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow. In
May 2012 BACF commenced a route to the Isle of Man which is flown by a
Saab 2000 leased from Eastern Airways.
BACF’s fleet comprises 15 aircraft currently in service: six Embraer 170s,
eight Embraer 190s and the Saab 2000.
BACF follows the mantra introduced by IAG (previously British Airways)
Chief Executive Willie Walsh, of centralising all base/hub activities in
London. Presently there is no prospect at all of an aircraft being based at
any regional UK airport. Depending on the success or otherwise of the Isle
of Man service (current indications are that it is successful) a case might be
made to examine the potential for LCY-Plymouth – which would give
Plymouth a London gateway again - but it must be understood that Isle of
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Man route specifically serves the dual financial communities of London and
the offshore tax haven of the Isle of Man.
Potential for Plymouth operations: Negligible Potential
bmi regional
bmi regional is the rump that remained of bmi following its takeover by BA
in 2012. Subsequently, bmi regional was acquired by the Aberdeen-based
Sector Aviation Holdings on 01 June 2012 and re-launched as an
independent airline. It may be rebranded under another name. Bmi
regional is expanding and taking on more staff. The headquarters remain at
Castle Donington in the East Midlands but the main base is at Aberdeen
Airport from where it operates three domestic (Bristol, Manchester and
Norwich) and two international routes. In total it operates at 17 cities,
most of them primary economic city-regions, but including several that are
similar in classification to Plymouth, such as Norwich, Antwerp, Esbjerg and
Groningen. It will expand its network at Bristol Airport in 2013 with
services to Frankfurt and Hamburg.
The current fleet comprises 18 aircraft in total: four Embraer 135s and 14
Embraer 145s.
If it had appropriate aircraft bmi regional could be asked to consider
extension of Bristol services to Plymouth and/or direct flights to
Manchester and Edinburgh. It presently has no London services.
Potential for Plymouth operations: Limited Potential
Eastern Airways
Eastern Airways contributed to the demise of Plymouth Airport following its
acquisition of Air Southwest, which subsequently closed down, in
September 2010. It is headquartered at Humberside Airport, where its
parent company bought the (majority) equity of Manchester Airports Group
in 2012.
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It is essentially a high cost/price small niche regional business airline
focused (like bmi regional) on operations at Aberdeen Airport where it has
12 routes (11 domestic) and in the eastern part of England, with an
emphasis on linking oil and gas supply city-regions. It does however operate
to Bristol Airport, the furthest west city it serves (to/from Aberdeen, Leeds
Bradford, Wick and Stornoway) and it has experimented with internal
services in France between similarly sized small cities there.
The weakness of Eastern Airways in respect of Plymouth’s requirements is
that it does not operate at any London airport or at Manchester. It does
operate at Birmingham but mid-long haul services there to which a
Plymouth flight might connect are still limited in comparison to the other
two cities’ airports. It does not (yet) operate any UK-European flights other
than from Scotland. Extension of services to and from Bristol might present
an opportunity – Eastern Airways does operate staged flights between
multiple cities – but the routes at Bristol, while appropriate to that market,
might not be to Plymouth.
Eastern Airways currently operates 29 aircraft: 17 Jetstream 41s (it is
believed to be the largest operator of this type in the world); two Embraer
135s; three Embraer 145s; and two Saab 2000s.
Potential for Plymouth operations: Limited potential
easyJet
easyJet is the UK’s largest airline by passengers carried and the second
largest ‘low cost carrier’ in Europe with almost 60 million passengers in
2012. It is undergoing a metamorphosis, increasingly taking on the role of a
business airline and replacing British Airways as the airline of choice for
short and medium haul routes in the business community at many UK
airports.
As such, and unlike Ryanair, it tends to serve primary airports with large
immediate catchment areas and a significant economic-commercial base. It
operates out of 18 cities in the UK, including Bristol (27 regular and 17
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seasonal routes). This makes Bristol – which was one of its first UK bases one of its largest as well. It also operates a single route at Bournemouth
Airport, and recently announced it would commence routes connecting
Newquay Airport with Liverpool and Southend airports in summer 2013.
Table 7.1: Flybe Group PLC Fleet Summary: as at
18 January 2013
Source: OAG
Aircraft
Total:
ATR 42-500
ATR 72-500
Bombardier/de
Havilland Dash 8-400
Bombardier/de
Havilland DHC-6 Twin
Otter
Embraer 170
Embraer 175
Embraer 195
Saab 340
Saab 340
These routes appear to be designed to service a leisure market from the
London area and Essex and the Northwest to the West Country but also
serve the purpose of offering West Country business travelers a quicker
access to and from those regions, which are not easily accessible by road or
rail.
In
Service
100
3
12
43
In
Storage
0
0
0
0
On
Order
27
0
0
0
2
0
0
easyJet is present in all the London area airports except Heathrow and
London City and at major primary airports such as Manchester and
Edinburgh. easyJet is not so obsessive about driving a bargain on airline
costs at airports as is Ryanair, but remains a tough negotiator.
2
8
14
2
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
27
0
0
0
It cannot operate a service at Plymouth at present because of the runway
restriction but can operate economically at Newquay (2744 metres).
Potential for Plymouth operations: Never
Flybe
Flybe is headquartered at Exeter Airport. Its plan is to return to profit by
2013/2014, but it has issued four separate profit warnings in the past 18
months. Flybe Group reported an operating loss of GB£1.0 million, a loss
before tax of GB£1.3 million and a loss after tax also of GB£1.3 million in
the six months ended 30 September 2012 (covering the high season for UK
airlines).
Flybe Group anticipated its underlying loss for the full year 2012/2013
would be at the lower end of its previous expectations and revenue growth
would be relatively muted. Costs, including fuel, were estimated to increase
by about 2.5%, in line with expectations. But the actual result was worse
than anticipated. Revenues actually fell by 0.2% to GB£614.3 million,
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despite a sterling performance from Flybe Finland (GB£167.2 million,
+163%). Although operating costs actually fell, the operating loss grew from
-GB£4.9 million in the previous comparable period, to –GB£34.3 million and
the net loss was GB£40.7 million compared to a loss of GB£6.2 million in the
p.c.p.
The airline had already announced the closure of its Gatwick base, and a
GB£20 million sale of 25 slots to easyJet, on the basis it has reportedly
become simply too expensive to operate there. Flybe now hopes to make
annual savings of GB£50 million by 2014/15 after slashing more than 20% of
its workforce and cutting pilot pay. It will concentrate on four major hubs:
Southampton, Manchester, Birmingham and the Channel Islands. Orders
for 16 Embraer aircraft are deferred. The airline blamed the double
taxation burden, i.e. passengers on most domestic flights pay the
Government to fly in both directions.
Because of the difficult operating conditions in the UK domestic market,
where Flybe has been most active, it is understood that it will henceforth
focus instead on developing its international network. Flybe’s domestic
business, which in 2012 was contributing 75% of Flybe’s passengers, should
ideally make up no more than 25% of the airline’s overall traffic within five
years.
Flybe is thus an ‘in-transition’ airline which, at the same time, is fighting for
survival. Should it fail, there are few other airliners that could fill the gap at
Exeter. easyJet, which is negotiating over Flybe’s slots at Gatwick, is unlikely
to expand there, with its commitments at Bristol and new services at
Newquay.
Despite its financial predicament it is Europe’s largest regional airline and
predominately operates within the UK (not London) and Ireland and also
mainland Europe, in the ratio 63% domestic, 37% international. Because of
the stagnant UK economy and the punitive passenger taxes – especially for
domestic operations, and with a large order for aircraft in place, Flybe has
been developing third party operations, commencing with those on behalf
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of Finnair, as Flybe Nordic. These third party operations are likely to
increase and Flybe has previously indicated that it will begin to shrink UK
domestic operations in favour of international ones, possibly on behalf of
other carriers. Consequently, it is more likely to shrink its operational bases
in the UK rather than increase them.
Flybe offers 12 regular and 12 seasonal routes at Exeter, including domestic
and European cities that would be appropriate to Plymouth, such as
Amsterdam, Paris, Dublin, Manchester, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Belfast.
Flybe’s fleet comprises 100 aircraft as per table 7.1, some of which (such as
the ATR-42) could nonetheless be suitable for the runway length at the
former Plymouth City Airport.
Potential for Plymouth operations: Negligible potential
Virgin Atlantic
Virgin Atlantic is best known as an operator of medium and long haul
services from Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester and Glasgow airports but the
Virgin aviation group comprises airlines in Australasia and the US and did at
one time include a Brussels-based low cost airline and an African regional
carrier. Virgin Atlantic was unable to continue to compete as an isolated
standalone carrier and recently Singapore Airlines sold its 49% stake to
Delta Air Lines. This will fundamentally alter the nature of Virgin Atlantic,
which is now also likely to join the SkyTeam alliance.
In tandem with this, Virgin is also entering the domestic UK market, with
routes connecting Heathrow Airport with Manchester, Edinburgh and
Aberdeen. These routes will inevitably target feeder traffic to the long haul
routes at Heathrow. There is no indication that Virgin will consider any
other UK domestic routes that are not built around large city-regions with
high traffic volumes (e.g. Greater Manchester), or smaller ones that are
tourist destinations (e.g. Edinburgh) or that are globally significant in one or
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more industrial/commercial sectors (e.g. Aberdeen, oil, gas, carbon capture,
and wave generated power)
Virgin Atlantic will use large jet aircraft leased from Aer Lingus. There is no
indication at all it will, now or ever, use small aircraft that would be
appropriate to Plymouth Airport.
Jet2.com
Jet2.com is a low cost airline headquartered at Leeds Bradford Airport and
with bases at Manchester, Blackpool, Belfast International, Edinburgh,
Glasgow, Nottingham East Midlands and Newcastle. It operates B737-400,
B737-800, B757-200 and B767-200 equipment. None of these are
appropriate to Plymouth at present. Apart from regular European and nearAsian scheduled services (it operates no UK domestic flights) it also
operates series charter flights including Christmas special services to New
York from Leeds and Newcastle.
Blackpool (runway 1869 metres) is the nearest equivalent airport to
Plymouth in terms of the catchment area population. Jet2.com has three
regular and seven seasonal routes there, mainly to Spanish or other leisure
city destinations. Jet2.com continued to support Blackpool Airport after
Ryanair quit that airport. It could conceivably consider Plymouth operations
as a Southwest England base but remains hampered by the infrastructure
imposition.
Monarch Airlines
Monarch Airlines is a London Luton Airport-based operator of short,
medium and long haul scheduled and charter services as a hybrid carrier,
offering low fares with the perception of a higher comfort level than its
rivals. Traditionally it has operated out of what might be described as
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traditional ‘red brick’ primary and sub-primary level airports such as London
Luton and Gatwick, Manchester, Birmingham and East Midlands. It will
open a sixth base at Leeds Bradford Airport in March 2013. It has no West
Country base. Because of the type of airport it typically operates to and
from, all of which are in heavily built up parts of England, it is more likely it
would choose Bristol as a base in that region.
Monarch has a fleet of 30 aircraft, comprising Airbus
A300/A320/A321/A330 and B757 models. None are appropriate to
Plymouth Airport at this time.
Suckling Airways
Suckling Airways, established in 1984, is an ACMI (lease) and charter carrier
based in Cambridge. The carrier operates from its operating main base at
Cambridge Airport and from its secondary hubs at Dundee Airport and
Norwich Airport. Suckling Airways is, since 2011, owned by Loganair and
operates select Loganair services with a fleet of turboprop equipment
(seven Dornier 328s) and has now taken on charter work for Flybe, CityJet
and Scandinavian airlines.
Suckling Airways, which began as a husband and wife team, was an
innovative carrier in its early days, operating on what was a grass strip at
Ipswich Airport and successfully challenging established carriers like KLM on
the route Manchester-Ipswich-Amsterdam. It would be an ideal airline to
operate selected routes at Plymouth if it returned to scheduled operations
in its own right, or to operate on behalf of other carriers, but there is little
indication of either eventuality at this time.
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Loganair
Suckling Airways’ parent, Loganair, is a Scottish airline operating scheduled
services in Scotland and to neighbouring countries such as Ireland. The
airline’s hub is at Glasgow Airport, and its main destinations are Edinburgh,
Inverness, Dundee and the Scottish Highlands and Islands. It operates under
a Flybe franchise and has previously operated routes to selected English
cities such as Manchester and Birmingham but no longer does so.
Loganair has considerable experience of operating air routes in areas that
are more isolated than the English West Country. It also has a fleet that is
ideal for Plymouth operations: 34-seat Saab 340s; 19-seat De Havilland
DHC-6 Twin Otters and two eight-seat Britten-Norman Islanders. However,
it is a Scottish airline, under Scottish ownership and its tag line is ‘Scotland’s
Airline.’ It is unlikely to be persuaded easily to commence air services at
Plymouth.
Citywing/Manx2.com
Citywing, formally known as Manx2, is a regional airline based in Ballasalla,
Isle of Man. The airline markets and sells seats on scheduled services
between its base Isle of Mann Airport to points across the UK, but all flights
are operated by three partner airlines; Van Air Europe, FLM Aviation and
Links Air using Dornier Do 228, Bae Jetstream 31 and Let L-410 Turbolet
aircraft (all of which may be appropriate to operations at Plymouth Airport).
Manx 2 became well known and representative of the concept of a ‘virtual
airline’ following a fatal accident at Cork Airport in February 2011 involving
an aircraft it was using to fly an international service from Belfast.
Citywing is now selling flights and services from several airports in the UK
with bases in Belfast, Blackpool, and Cardiff as well as the Isle of Man.
Citywing does not operate the flights itself and the routes are flown by EU
registered airlines Van Air Europe and Links Air. It is understood it also plans
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Table 7.2: Thomas Cook Airlines Fleet Summary as at
18 January 2013
Source: OAG
Aircraft
Total:
Airbus A320-210
Airbus A321-210
Airbus A330-240
Boeing 757-200
Boeing 757-300
Boeing 767-300ER
In
Service
30
5
4
3
13
2
3
In
Storage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
On
Order
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
to commence services from Gloucestershire Airport (Cheltenham) to Jersey
and the Isle of Man, possibly Belfast.
This kind of operation would lend itself well to Plymouth Airport, as a
‘virtual airline’ is able better to respond to changing demand scenarios than
is a regular scheduled airline. It might be able to operate, for example,
charter air taxi services to London. However, it would arrive with the
unfortunate heightened level of media scrutiny following the Cork incident.
Potential for Plymouth operations: Potential
7.1.3
Charter airlines
Thomas Cook
Thomas Cook Airlines is a British charter airline with its main bases at
Manchester and London Gatwick airports. The airline also operates services
from nine other bases in the United Kingdom. It merged in 2008 with
MyTravel Airways, and today operates short- and long-haul services to
destinations in the Mediterranean, East Asia and the Caribbean.
The Thomas Cook airline fleet is detailed in table 7.2. None of these types
is presently appropriate to Plymouth Airport due to the runway length and
strip width.
Short haul charter traffic in general has been and is in decline in the UK
where low cost scheduled airlines are in competition; which is at most
airports. In that sense operations at Plymouth Airport, if the infrastructure
was suitable, might be attractive on certain key leisure routes (for example
Spain, Portugal).
However, and despite the fact there is anecdotal evidence that British
leisure travellers are reassessing favourably the value of the European
inclusive package tour, the future for Thomas Cook, which has announced
two consecutive annual losses, would appear to be of continuing
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consolidation back to its two primary bases and potentially a further
merger.
Thomas Cook Airlines has existing operations at Bristol, Exeter, Cardiff and
Bournemouth airports. The Exeter operation comprises only three seasonal
routes.
Thomson Airways
A subsidiary of international travel company TUI Travel, Thomson Airways
was formed out of the 2007 merger of First Choice Airways and
Thomsonfly. Headquartered at London Luton Airport, Thomson Airways is
one of the largest carriers in the UK, with aircraft based at 21 airports,
although, as with Thomas Cook, London Gatwick and Manchester airports
represent the largest bases. Thomson Airways offers both scheduled and
charter service to destinations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, the
Caribbean and Africa, operating many services on behalf of UK tour
operators such as parent TUI Travel, Portland, Skytours and Crystal.
Thomson Airways has a fleet of 49 aircraft, comprising B737s, A321s, B757s
and B767s, none of which are presently appropriate to Plymouth Airport.
Otherwise it would be an attractive partner for the airport as it is prepared
to operate widely throughout the UK. However, it has existing operations
already at Bristol, Exeter, Cardiff and Bournemouth airports.
JetXtra.com
JetXtra.com is a 2013 start-up airline based at Humberside Airport and
which intends, in the first instance, to offer services to Alicante and Palma
in summer 2013. It is owned by an established UK tour operator,
Independent Worldchoice Holidays and that company’s operations are
focused on Northwest England. The type of aircraft to be deployed is not
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known but will likely be jet aircraft that are not presently appropriate to
Plymouth Airport.
7.1.4
Non-UK airlines
Ryanair
Ryanair is thought of as a UK airline but though its largest airport by far is
London Stansted, it is Irish-registered. Ryanair is Europe’s biggest low cost
carrier, and now operates over 300 aircraft, all of the same model, the
B787-800, which is not presently appropriate to operations at Plymouth
Airport. After a two-year period of abstinence, Ryanair has recently
indicated that it is negotiating an order for a further 200 aircraft, which
indicates continuing expansion. If it is unable to gain access to place such
as Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation that expansion must take
place at airports in Western Europe that are already well served by routes.
It is for that reason that the carrier continuously seeks out new airports to
operate from. On the other hand the prevailing philosophy is to focus
increasingly on primary airports where it is better prospects of ‘yield’
(revenue per seat) from business passengers. Ryanair is an airline of
contradictions.
Ryanair’s modus operandi at small regional airports is to demand very low
or even zero operating charges, supported by paid-for marketing from the
airport operator. The rationale is that its services are guaranteed to bring
additional tourists to a city or region in addition to outward travel
opportunities. This rationale has proved to be very attractive to the
municipal owners of airports more than it has to private sector owners. It is
also more prone than any other airline, anywhere, to enter and exit
markets at very short notice.
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The airline is currently represented at 14 cities in the UK, 11 of which are
bases. Ryanair operates from Bournemouth and Bristol, but not Exeter or
Cardiff airports. It has slightly consolidated this network, for example
exiting Newquay, Durham Tees Valley and Blackpool airports. Despite its
market power it is unlikely that Ryanair would choose to operate ‘head-tohead’ against Flybe at Exeter but weighed against that is the fact that it quit
Newquay Airport in 2006 and has shown no inclination to return.
Irrespective of the fact that the B737-800 is inappropriate to Plymouth
Airport, the most important issue for many airport operators has become
one of whether encouraging Ryanair services is economically justifiable.
Unless large amounts of retail and food and drink expenditure can be
elicited from passengers (some airports have been able to do this), no
money will be made out of such services, except perhaps by the local
community.
Aer Arann (Aer Lingus Regional)
Aer Arann Regional is a privately owned airline based at Dublin. The carrier
operates scheduled services from Ireland and the Isle of Man to
destinations in Ireland, the UK and France and is Ireland's third largest
airline behind Ryanair and Aer Lingus. It has bases at Galway, Waterford,
and the Isle of Man, and operates from Cork, Dublin and Shannon under the
Aer Lingus Regional brand, following the signing of a franchise agreement in
January 2010 and with a fleet of 12 dedicated aircraft. The total fleet
comprises 15 aircraft including 12 ATR-42 and -72 versions and three
Britten-Norman Islanders that operate exclusively for a sister company Aer
Arann Islands in Ireland.
In March 2012, Aer Arann confirmed it would no longer exist in its own
entity from 10 April 2012. All its services transferred to Aer Lingus Regional,
streamlining services to a single brand. The Principal now, therefore, is Aer
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Lingus, which may yet be purchased by Ryanair, which would probably
leave Aer Arran to start all over again as Ryanair’s business model does not
inlude regional routes flown by small turboprop aircraft. Otherwise, Aer
Lingus currently operates to Bristol (as Aer Lingus Regional from Cork and
Dublin) and Cardiff (as Aer Lingus Regional from Dublin) airports but has no
other services in the West Country.
The ‘Celtic Connection’ between Ireland and the English West Country,
historical trading links and the potential for niche tourism development
such as golfing holidays indicates there may be an opportunity for Aer
Lingus Regional to build additional services but much depends on whether
or not it remains an independent entity.
Air France subsidiaries
Air France has five subsidiaries (Brit Air, CityJet, Arlinair, Regional and
Transavia.com), which may be merged under a common brand, HOP, in
2013. Air France is attempting to create new identities for its mainline
operation and the regional subsidiaries.
Of these, the ones that have fleets appropriate to Plymouth Airport are
Arlinair (ATR-42 and -72; 24 in all); and CityJet, which has 15 Fokker 50s
acquired through Air France’s takeover of VLM. Brit Air’s historic fleet
included a wide range of turboprop aircraft but it has now focused on 40
Canadair Regional Jets. Regional operates exclusively Embraer equipment
(48), including four of the smaller E-135 version. Transavia’s fleet is
exclusively B737-800.
Arlinair does operate internationally, on behalf of Air France. Routes have
included Bristol, but that service will be withdrawn in March 2013, to be
replaced by a Regional service that will be operated as an Air France
mainline flight.
122
The nature of Brit Air, which began in the Brittany region, has changed and
while it still serves secondary airports in the north and west of France its
operations are now focused on flying on behalf of Air France from Paris and
Lyon. CityJet is focused almost entirely on routes at London City Airport.
Despite the proximity of France and, again, an extension of the ‘Celtic
Connection’ between the Southwest England region and some parts of
northern France, in addition to ferry services from Plymouth to Normandy,
it would appear there is little prospect momentarily of air services and that
the gateway points for the region will continue to be Bristol and Paris. If the
mainline Bristol-Paris service is successful that could encourage Arlinair to
consider other Paris flights from additional West Country airports.
Minoan Air
Minoan Air is a start-up scheduled carrier which is already established as an
ACMI (lease) carrier in other parts of Europe. It is cited here as an example
of the type of ambitious start-up with a business plan that varies somewhat
from the norm, and which would be attractive to a working Plymouth
Airport.
Minoan Air is a Greek carrier founded in September 2011. It operates
services throughout Europe utilising Fokker F50 equipment. Unlike many
start-ups it is headed by experienced staff, including the former Advisor to
the President of Olympic Airways.
Minoan Air’s recent expansion included the attempted establishment of a
hub at London Oxford (Kidlington) Airport, from where it planned to
operate services to Munich, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Dublin and
Edinburgh from January 2013, under a two-month route expansion plan.
The frequency and departure time for each route was to be tailored to the
requirement of the business passenger for each specific route. The airline
intended to employ a mixed distribution model embracing both online and
123
travel agent sales and aims to offer ‘premium service’ with no additional
charges. More routes were under examination but in January 2013 the
carrier deferred the launch date.
However, just five months after the Cretian operator started running flights
between Oxford, Edinburgh and Dublin, it announced that it would stop its
routes from Oxfordshire in August 2013. Despite a gradual increase in load
factors, these remained below 30% in the first four months of operation on
both routes and the routes ultimately ceased.
Minoan Air became the fourth airline to have tried and failed at London
Oxford over the past few years. Flybaboo, now part of Darwin Airline,
operated a winter-season, Saturday-only service to Geneva over W09/10,
which did not return the following year. Varsity Express flew for one week
on 11 flights, carrying just 46 passengers to Edinburgh in March 2010, with
the UK regional airline Linksair, which operated the route for the virtual
airline, withdrawing its support for the venture fronted by entrepreneur
Martin Halstead. Most recently, the airport was served from the Isle of
Man from May 2012 up until January 2013 by Manx2.com (now operating
as CityWing). As reported by anna.aero, ‘clearly there is a network
development opportunity at London Oxford, but the right mix of aircraft,
airline and route is yet to be found to make it a sustainable operation’.
Oxford has some similarities to Plymouth in terms of regional population
size and catchment area. It has a more diverse economic base because of its
academic role and the consequent attraction of information technology and
science-based businesses. More pertinently, the Oxford airport serves a
wealthy population base to the west of London of people who work in the
capital and who might find local air services by both business and leisure to
be preferable to those at London Heathrow.
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7.1.5
The Orien Advisors Report
Aviation experts Orien Advisors Ltd were independently appointed by PCC
to assess the market for operators of small aircraft capable of operating out
of the airport without a public subsidy.
They identified and investigated 12 potential airlines and 17 potential
airport operators. They concluded that there were insufficient profitable
routes, that it was highly unlikely that an operator would consider investing
without some form of underwriting from the Council and ‘there is no
evidence of a commercially viable future for PCA that can be put in place in
the short term or without some form of capital or revenue subsidy to enable
longer term options to be explored…and even these options must be
recognised as presenting high implementation risks’.
This conclusion by the Council’s own advisors concurs with the conclusions
of this report and that of Berkeley Hanover who also concluded within their
study that the actual use of the airport by local companies was very small,
that the closure would not have a significant impact on future investment
decisions and that ‘given the range of alternatives for London, European
international and UK regional connectivity, the loss of the alreadydiminished PCA services is not expected to reduce Plymouth business overall
competitiveness’.
C17: In order for Plymouth to have sustainable air links, it must first attract one or more airlines to establish a base
and to create the foundations for a critical mass of operations. There is little in the analysis above (and summarised in
table 7.3 overleaf) nor in that by Plymouth City Council’s own advisors that suggests that any UK or non-UK airline
would be interested in operating from PLH.. Only the identification of an airline as a ‘potential’ operator at Plymouth
indicates a 50:50 chance even of selected route operation, let alone that airline designating Plymouth as a ‘base’ or
‘focus city’.
In our estimation there is only one ‘potential’ candidate out of 18 airlines analysed, and that is a virtual airline.
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Table 7.3: Airline Potential Summary
Airline
BA City Flyer
bmi regional
Eastern Airways
easyJet
Assessment of
likelihood to fly
to/from Plymouth
Low potential
Limited potential
Limited potential
Never
Rationale for
Rationale against
Secondary airport route operated by small regional aircraft
under evaluation
Some small aircraft. Extension of Bristol service to Plymouth?
Some small aircraft
None
Focused on ex- London international operations
Flybe
Negligible potential
Some small aircraft
Virgin Atlantic
Jet2.com
Monarch
Airlines
Suckling Airways
Never
None
No Southwest England base
Only with extended runway, otherwise none
Limited potential
Regional services at Bristol
Operates mainly in the eastern part of the UK
Aircraft size; Prefers primary airports; Big regional Bristol base;
Newquay routes.
Exeter base. Reduction of UK domestic routes; Re-focus on
foreign third party operations; financial position.
Wrong aircraft size; focus on primary cities/regions/airports
Wrong aircraft size. Focus on northern England and Scotland.
Focus on primary cities/regions/airports. Wrong aircraft size.
Thomas Cook
Appropriate aircraft but only if returning to scheduled
operations on thin routes
Appropriate aircraft; experience of working in ‘isolated’
communities
Appropriate aircraft size; flexible modus operandi; expanding
operations in England; Can operate schedules services or air
taxi type services on thin domestic or international routes
Likes to be present in as many regions as possible.
Thomson
Airways
JetXtra.com
Ryanair
Likes to be present in as many regions as possible.
Never
Start-up airline open to attractive offers
No longer operating at Newquay.
Aer
Arran/Lingus
Regional
Air France
subsidiaries
Minoan Air
Limited potential
Celtic connection; Some appropriate aircraft.
Wrong aircraft size; Large base at Bristol, small base at Exeter;
Consolidation of charter segment.
Wrong aircraft size; Large base at Bristol, small base at Exeter;
Consolidation of charter segment.
Wrong aircraft size; northern England focus
Wrong aircraft size; No evidence of continuing interest in West
Country market beyond Bristol/Bournemouth; Demands often
unacceptable terms on charges.
Aer Lingus service to Bristol
Limited potential
Celtic connection; Some appropriate aircraft.
Strong Bristol route (Paris)
Limited potential
Start-up regional carrier; appropriate aircraft; looking for more
opportunities to deploy its model in the UK
Had to succeed at Oxford first but routes failed with low uplift
(albeit gradually increasing).
Loganair
Limited potential
CityWing
Potential
Current focus on Scotland and Eastern England and preference
for lease work
Focus on operations in Scotland
Virtual airline
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7.1.6
Route development - London
The most critical route to the success of Plymouth Airport would be to
London, partly because of the need to be connected to the capital and the
government, financial and entrepreneurial bases there, but also because of
the opportunities to make air transfers there to European business cities
and others on other continents including the emerging markets, BRIC, N11
and CIVETS countries (and vice versa).
Currently there are no air services to any London airport from either Bristol
or Exeter airports. Albeit the Newquay airport to Gatwick route ceased in
May 2013, this has subsequently been reinstated with Flybe now providing
a three times daily service to Gatwick providing air services access to
London within the sub-region.
(It could be argued that Manchester would offer an alternative
international/intercontinental gateway if services from Plymouth were
sufficiently frequent, but that would likely require up to four round trips a
day, which would not be appropriate to O&D demand).
The current rail journey time for the high speed service (three times daily
each way) is 3 hours and seven minutes between Plymouth and London
Paddington station (source: PCC), which will eventually form a gateway to
the Crossrail service through to the City of London and Canary Wharf via
Stratford. Thus the City of London could be accessible in 3.5 hours. These
trains are timed specifically for directional rush-hour travel in each
direction. Otherwise, there are slower trains to a total of 16 daily services
each way on weekdays.
There are no plans to improve the rail line between London and the
Southwest of England. There is no ‘HS2’ planned here.
Nevertheless, to a neutral observer, the rail picture is not as bad as is
reported. The journey time of the high-speed trains is about one hour
127
longer than the comparable length journey between Manchester and
London, though there is far greater frequency (every 20 minutes
throughout the day) on that route. The problem comes with travel between
Plymouth and London or v.v. that is outside the timetable of the high-speed
trains, for example travel to London in the evening in advance of an early
morning meeting or to catch an early flight from a London airport.
The selection of an airport in London is highly dependent on the constraints
at that airport. The Air Southwest service, and others before it (e.g.
Brymon, BA), operated into Gatwick Airport. Central London (Victoria
Station) is accessible from there by frequent fast trains (but which double
as commuter trains) in a total journey time that would be at the very least
the equivalent of a rail journey from Plymouth. Since the change of
ownership of Gatwick Airport it is being developed as a ‘point to point’ O&D
airport and potential connections to onward intercontinental flights are
diminishing.
On the other hand, Gatwick is easyJet’s largest base with over 100 cities in
Europe and beyond now served. Gatwick is slot constrained in peak periods
but not during the majority of the day, despite its single runway.
Heathrow Airport, unless and until a third runway is constructed, offers far
and away the best connecting flights but is too capacity and slot restrained
to accept any small commuter style airline except at enormous and
unjustifiable cost to that operator.
The value of slots is dependent on many factors, including their position
within the daily schedule. They have traded at GB£3-4 million at
unattractive times for flight operation, but when airlines were moving
under new open skies agreements from Gatwick Airport to Heathrow
several years ago they went to GB£12 million for the more attractively
timed ones, and there are uncorroborated reports of GB£15 million.
There is also the question of who is going to sell them. Since slots were
traded following the takeover of bmi by IAG there is no carrier remaining at
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Heathrow with a large minority share of slots (bmi had 12%) that it might
wish to dispose of. That situation is unlikely to change in the immediate
future.
One possible method of obtaining a slot at Heathrow that does occasionally
occur is by what is known as ‘slot-sitting.’ Both British Airways and Virgin
Atlantic are known to have more slots than they need at times and to be
prepared to pay airlines to take them for a specified period of time in order
to protect their interests from watchdogs in the European Commission who
have devised new slot-use rules.30
Stansted Airport is 35 miles beyond London to the northeast, which is a
psychological barrier for air passengers on relatively short air routes from
the west who then have to retrace their steps. Furthermore, it has poor rail
transport connections that can take up to an hour to complete their short
journey to or from Liverpool Street station, and the alternative change to
the Northern Line at Tottenham Hale is an equally slow method of
accessing the city centre. Moreover, Stansted is geared up towards low cost
operations, being dominated by Ryanair and easyJet and not conducive to
the needs of commuter carriers. Some of these specifics may change as a
result of the purchase of Stansted Airport by Manchester Airports Group.
A similar set of circumstances applies at London Luton airport, 30 miles to
the north of London, and where surface (rail) connections are equally poor
despite improvements in the last ten years.
A market research exercise was undertaken in 2003 on behalf of Liverpool
Airport to assess demand for the air route Liverpool-London and to identify
the most appropriate London airport. Air services between the two cities
had been provided, inter alia, by British Airways, British Midland and
easyJet over a period of three decades but none had proved to be
30
The reputable source of this information declines to be identified in this
document
129
sustainable. London Heathrow was, unsurprisingly, the first choice, but
London City was a close second.
On this basis the airline VLM was approached and, despite it already having
a frequent schedule to Manchester (11 times daily) and there being services
between Manchester and four London airports in all, it commenced
services from London City to Liverpool that eventually increased to seven
times daily. Subsequently the route came under pressure from Virgin rail
services after the West Coast rail line refurbishment was completed (with a
20-minute London-Liverpool service, like Manchester), the number of daily
frequencies was reduced and the service was ultimately cancelled
altogether when VLM was sold to Air France. London City Airport offers
rapid access to the City of London and Canary Wharf (and, critically, vice
versa, which would enable the investment community to gain access to
Plymouth) and to/from the West End, also to a growing number of onward
flights within Europe operated by British Airways CityFlyer.
A route to London Southend Airport would not match the aspirations of
Plymouth-area travellers who wished to access London (for the same
reasons as Stansted or Luton) or to make connections (routes are growing
but they still number only 11).
Lastly, up until early 2012 there had been some consideration that the
runway at RAF Northolt in west London might form an alternative to the
conundrum of providing additional capacity at Heathrow, and thus offer a
London runway into which smaller regional air services could gain a peak
hour slot.
Whilst it is noted that Berkeley Hanover Consultants represented this as a
potential ‘upside risk’ for a future PLH within their report to PCC in August
2011, since that time the Government has commissioned and received
studies by two independent consultants that have concluded that RAF
Northolt would not provide an alternative to a third runway at Heathrow
and would also be complicated by significant air space constraints due to
130
C18: In conclusion, the southwest is already served by
good direct rail services to London and air services
have proven to be a poor competitor to rail services in
the southwest; neither Bristol nor Exeter airports offer
a direct London air service but Newquay does.
Previous withdrawals of direct air services to London
at PLH have certainly impacted the airport’s traffic
figures historically. However, experience of operating
these services also showed only a limited take-up at
the beginning and the end of each week, with poor
uplifts in between.
Reinvigorating a direct air service to London will be
difficult given the lack of capacity at the more
attractive airports, and costly given the value placed
on slots at peak times. Future plans for increased
capacity at the London airports will provide better
opportunities, but these will not bear fruit in the
market for many years, or even decades.
the proximity to Heathrow (ironically the main driver for consideration of
this aerodrome in the first instance).
Given the density of population surrounding the aerodrome, there would
also be considerable opposition to any increases in air traffic (which is
restricted to 3,500 flights per year).
Presently the Davies Commission, formed by the Government in 2012 to
find a solution for increased runway capacity in the southeast, is
considering all credible options and the proposal for using RAF Northolt is
thought to be one of those. However, it is in our view unlikely to be one of
the final options to be considered as it does not provide the whole solution
and it will only exacerbate the west London air space issue (RAF Northolt
has not been included within the Davies Commission Interim Report of
December 2013 as one of the options to be considered further). Therefore
once the preferred solution is forthcoming, we consider that the future of
the RAF Northolt site will be to either remain as an aerodrome with
constrained activities, or there will be a gradual erosion of tenants should
the Ministry of Defence seek to sell-off the lands for development.
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7.1.7
Air Taxi Services
Air taxi services could potentially operate on a loose scheduled/on demand
basis between Plymouth and any number of smaller London region airports
including London City and Biggin Hill. Such a service was operated for
several years at Sheffield City Airport prior to the airport closing.
In general terms, air taxis are air charter passenger or cargo aircraft which
operate on an on-demand basis or to a loose, unpublished timetable.
Occasionally they are manifested as members clubs, such as one that
existed at Farnborough Airport in the early 2000s. They are popular in
North America, where they are subject to regulation. In the UK, while an
operator will require an air operator’s certificate, it may not be subject to
the same degree of regulation on commercial aspects of operation such as
pricing and ticketing; hence these operations might be appropriate to
Plymouth Airport in order to test the market for scheduled services. There
are similarities between business jet operators and air taxi operators but
business jet services are typically marketed at economically high-value
corporate, sporting and financially independent clients while the air taxi
translates the modus operandi of road vehicle taxi services into an aviation
environment.
The European Business Aviation Association numbers 89 members in the air
taxi category, of which eight are in the UK.
Locally, the company Capital Aviation is based at Exeter Airport and offers a
number of commercial air charter services including air taxi. The company
has a fleet of turboprop aircraft, including the Beech 200 Super King Air
carrying up to nine passengers. These aircraft are mainly used on a private
hire/charter basis. Capital Aviation also provides emergency medical
transport and cargo/mail services.
The potential downside to air taxi operations at Plymouth might be the
propensity for crosswinds due to only a single runway being available in all
132
wind conditions. Heavy crosswinds which might otherwise de-stabilise a
small aircraft could potentially disrupt services. However, it should be
noted that NQY, BRS and EXT airports similarly have only a single licensed
runway each. The runways at both BRS and EXT are better orientated than
that at PLH in terms of the prevailing winds, but the runway at NQY is at a
very similar orientation to that at PLH. Therefore, whilst air taxi operators
will necessarily take the potential for crosswind disruption into account, if
they are considering offering services within the Southwest region there
may be a preference towards EXT over PLH.
As the market matures, a large number of aircraft types are being used for
air taxi services, but it is noted that in other countries there is an uptake for
air taxi services using Very Light Jets (VLJ). One of the leading aircraft types
in this field is the Eclipse 500 and 550 jets which would require a take off
and landing distance of approximately 730m which could be
accommodated by the existing runway length at PLH, with suitable
resurfacing to ensure both friction under high speed, elimination of foreign
object debris (FOD) and also suitability for higher tyre pressures (see
earlier).
C19: In conclusion, while PLH could attract air taxi services, its single
runway is not ideally aligned for lighter aircraft. Furthermore, the air
taxi sector is a niche market that has suffered a significant downturn
during recent years due to the economic conditions and appears to be
quite susceptible to such external factors. It should be noted that air
taxi ticket prices likely result in this remaining a premium form of
travel for businesses and those with high disposable income, rather
than a basis for any form of mass transit for the benefit of the
Plymouth population.
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7.1.8
Commercial Helicopter Operations
Commercial helicopter operations might also be considered for Plymouth
Airport. These are popular at a high number of airport locations in the UK,
including some mentioned in this report such as Norwich, Blackpool and
Humberside; also Aberdeen. They are notably to be found at airports that
support offshore extraction or power supply industries, which is
appropriate to all those named above, and where fixed wing operations are
inappropriate. They operate at St Mary’s airport in the Isles of Scilly (from
Tresco, Cornwall), which hosts around 115,000 passengers per annum, and
where they are in competition with Skybus, which operates fixed wing
services from Newquay and Exeter.
However, this is an unusual set of circumstances. Helicopter operating
economics cannot usually compete with those of fixed wing aircraft. Some
police forces now deploy fixed wing aircraft for routine non-emergency
surveillance rather than helicopters. The few attempts to utilise helicopters
on commercial passenger routes in the UK have been unsuccessful,
including the 1985 Holyhead-Dublin five times daily service, which
connected to rail services at Holyhead and which was expected to carry
35,000 passengers in its first year. The service lasted two months before it
collapsed amidst a cash flow crisis.
C20: Commercial helicopter passenger services are not popular with
passengers, they inflict high noise levels on local residents under flight
paths and have almost always proven unsuccessful when not
underpinned by specific industry or social needs, such as offshore
access or public service obligation.
134
7.1.9
Business Aviation Operations
The principal characteristic of business aviation is the ability to fly at short
notice, to a bespoke schedule and itinerary, and to airports that may not be
served by commercial scheduled flights. This flexibility is a key feature of
Business Aviation and makes it less a luxury than a high value business tool.
Other advantages of using business aviation include:





more productive use of time whilst in the air;
shorter journey times to destination;
less congested airports;
privacy;
security.
As the pressure on commercial airports became greater and the time it took
to process passengers through check-in and security increased, these
advantages were making bespoke business aviation more and more
attractive through the middle of the last decade.
However, research company Wingx Advance has published its latest figures
in January 2013 providing data on the business aviation market within
Europe31. This data indicates that European business aviation flight activity
in December 2012 fell by 7% year-on-year to little more than 39,600
departures, marking the lowest single month of business aviation take-offs
across the continent since 2005 (refer to figure 7.2).
The data also shows a year-on-year decline in departures for 11 of the 12
months of 2012, while activity for the full year was down 3.8% compared
with 2011, to less than 625,000 take-offs. Furthermore, demand for
midsize, light jet and turboprop aircraft, especially on short-haul routes of
up to 1.5 hours, continued to show a “big year-on-year decline”.
31
Business Aviation Monitor – Year 2012 Review; Wingx Advance; December 2012
135
The success of business aviation is intimately linked to local and national
economic performance and the market would naturally grow during better
economic conditions. However, it is not clear that there is sufficient
business demand within the Plymouth area for such services, and whilst a
nominal level of smaller business aircraft activity might become achievable
from the airport, this may not be to a level that would sustain a fixed body
operation (FBO) of sufficient quality and with sufficient services to attract
customers away from either Newquay or Exeter airports which also offer
these services.
Figure 7.2: European Business Aviation Flight Activity
2007 – 2012
Source: Wingx Advance
136
The runway length at PLH would constrain any business aviation activities
to certain types of aircraft. There does however remain a good range of
smaller business aviation aircraft that would be able to use the single
runway at PLH, should the demand be realised.
C21: Given the decline in the business aviation market, the nearby
competing airports and the uncertainty over local demand for such
services, it is considered that business aviation at PLH could not easily
be cultivated to a sustainable level in the short to medium term
unless a compelling offer could be made to the business aviation
community in terms of incentives, services and operating
environment that would attract such (declining) traffic away from
other nearby airports. Should those nearby airports become capacity
constrained then business aviation opportunities might spill over
towards PLH. However, this is not the case, as both Exeter and
Newquay airports have significant spare capacity.
137
7.1.10 Cargo/Airfreight Operations
In this document, reference has been made to several UK regional airports
that either have been able to build an airfreight business, or which covet
one. They include Durham Tees Valley, Glasgow Prestwick, Manston,
Humberside and Coventry airports.
In early February 2013 reports emanating from IATA and ACI indicated that
while passenger traffic is expected to dip in 2013 in many world regions,
cargo volume is anticipated to grow slightly. Hence the prospect of adding
airfreight services to any airport’s portfolio is appealing.
However, there are frequently one or more specific reasons why airports
are able to attract and retain cargo flights including 24-hour operations
(particularly for airmail as opposed to airfreight) and central locations close
to the motorway network. One of the most successful UK airports in this
category is East Midlands Airport, which is located close to the geographical
centre of England, to the motorway and trunk road network (M1, M42,
A14), supports 24-hour operations and is as a consequence well served by a
cluster of logistical and freight handling companies, notably UPS and DHL.
Glasgow Prestwick became established as a base for freight for Scotland
when it was served by wide body aircraft such as the B747, operated by
airlines such as British Airways and Northwest Orient. Once the
infrastructure was in place (using redundant military buildings) it stayed in
place.
Durham Tees Valley airport has sought to convince KLM of the viability of a
cargo route from and to Amsterdam based on the remnants of the once
extensive petrochemical, oil and heavy engineering industries in the area.
Manston Kent airport, which has a very long runway, has created a niche in
handling large/heavy loads and intercontinental charity aid flights, as well
as incoming trade from Egypt and Kenya (perishable goods, which are
handled by a cluster of national supermarket distribution centres in the
Southeast). Cambridge Airport has similarly found a smaller niche with
equine traffic related to the nearby Newmarket horse racing centre.
138
Figure 7.3: UK Population Density
Source: Office for National Statistics
Humberside Airport has a small cargo business that is focused on Grimsby’s
reputation as the Frozen Food capital of the UK, while Coventry Airport
established a reputation for handling cargo such as live animal imports and
exports in addition to a large airmail (Royal Mail) centre. Once again, all
these airports have access to road infrastructure that is either directly part
of the national motorway/trunk road network or is connected quickly to it.
It is rare that the major cargo operators employ small, regional aircraft
outside of the US (where Fedex has over 200 small Cessna 210 aircraft in its
fleet). The operators DHL, TNT, UPS and FedEx, for example, use a wide
range of jet aircraft with no suitability for Plymouth (various Boeing and
Airbus types from the B737 to the B747, A300 and MD-11), but do have a
small number of types such as the ATR-42 and BAe-146 that might be
employed at Plymouth, for example in a feeder role to and from their main
bases at airports such as East Midlands and Liege in Belgium.
Moreover, there is at least one new small ‘air van’ aircraft that is under
development in order potentially to fill a void specifically as a freight feeder
vehicle at small regional airports. While these aircraft are designed to
replace types such as the Cessna in the US a role might be found for them in
Europe in appropriate circumstances although these are still very much in
development.
Because of Plymouth’s relatively isolated position however, there are few
obvious pull factors to serve the airport with freight services that support a
wider region. Plymouth Airport is located 40 miles from the nearest
motorway and distribution regionally is centred on Bristol at the M4/M5
junction and to a lesser degree along the M3 through Berkshire and
Hampshire. Population density does not necessarily decrease to the west of
Bristol (see figure 7.3) but that population is more widespread with few
alternative easily identifiable distribution locations to the west of Bristol.
For example, in the supermarket sector, both Wal-Mart and Sainsbury’s
have their regional distribution centres close to Bristol, while Tesco’s is at
Chepstow.
139
Given the relative isolation of Plymouth from the motorway network, it is
considered that there could only be a demand for a small level of airfreight
activity serving the Plymouth locality carried as belly-hold cargo on
scheduled air passenger routes, but due to the aircraft sizes that would fly
those routes the scope for this could be very limited. The DHC-6 Twin Otter
flights operated by Metropolitan Airways in the 1980s, which made
multiple stops on linear routes throughout the UK, had a dual
passenger/freight and also mail role, often with un-booked seats allocated
for such purpose at short notice. The difficulty is that there is no such
business model employed in England presently, so one would have to be
engineered specifically for this purpose.
It is noted32 that until 2003, Plymouth City Airport was handling up to 68
tonnes of freight, after which no freight has been recorded. A similar peak
figure was handled in 2007 by Exeter Airport, after which the tonnage has
dropped away significantly also. For airmail, 39 tonnes was handled by
Plymouth City Airport in 2001 after which no airmail is recorded. Exeter
however has maintained very high levels of airmail tonnages, handling
5,550 tonnes in 2011 which is in fact larger than that handled at Bristol
Airport after the collapse in airmail figures at BRS in 2011. Exeter’s growth
in the airmail sector has come about due to the airport being one of Royal
Mail’s principal feeder hubs which operates two Boeing 737 aircraft each
night into and out of the airport. Growth in airmail at Exeter Airport since
2008 is also partly attributed to new European Union legislation which
came into force at that time, limiting the speed of all vehicles over 7.5
tonnes to 56 mph and tighter restrictions on the hours that drivers can
work. This prompted Royal Mail to increase the amount of post that it
transported by air.
The Royal Mail air network consists of 5 main airport hubs – Belfast, Bristol,
East Midlands, Edinburgh and Stansted – and 13 feeder hubs – Aberdeen,
Benbeccula (Hebrides), Bournemouth, Exeter, Guernsey, Inverness, Isle of
32
CAA Published Statistics
140
C22: Given that the Royal Mail already has an
established feeder hub in Devon at Exeter Airport,
the major integrators such as FedEx, UPS and DHL
operate aircraft too large for the runway at PLH, and
the fact that historically PLH has not been an airport
that has been open to night flights (and the noise
consequences to local residents), the potential for
growth in airfreight and airmail at PLH would be
extremely limited. This is further evidenced by the
lack of recorded interest for such services at PLH.
Man, Jersey, Kinloss, Kirkwall, Sumburgh (Shetland), Newcastle, and
Stornoway.
In January 2001, Royal Mail withdrew its five times weekly postal flights
after moving mail transfers to road freight. It is understood that the effect
of this withdrawal on PLH was to reduce annual contribution by £100,00033.
The historical experience at PLH has been that air freight operations had
only been minimal and discontinued more than a decade ago. It is
understood that no further interest for freight operations has since been
recorded.
7.1.11 General Aviation
Any new operator of PLH may naturally seek to attract private general
aviation (GA) aircraft within an initial start-up phase. Recent changes in
CAA guidance mean that there is increased scope for attracting GA aircraft
owners to an unlicensed airfield. Licensing an aerodrome was, until
recently, necessary if flying training was carried out. However, with effect
from April 2010 the CAA changed the rules on this and it is now possible to
conduct flying training at unlicensed airfields. The commercial carriage of
passengers by ‘air taxi’ style operations would generally also be conditional
on the airfield being licensed, except in circumstances where aircraft of less
than 2.7 tonnes maximum take-off weight are used during daylight hours
and in good weather. Licensing an aerodrome would not necessarily be
required for corporate aircraft (i.e. aircraft owned by a company and
operated for business purposes). Air taxis and business aviation are
discussed earlier in this section.
However, it is considered that the location of PLH would in fact prohibit any
contemplation of operating the airport unlicensed, even temporarily. Rule
5 of the Rules of the Air Regulations (RoAR) 2007, amongst other
requirements, prohibits flights below 1,000 ft over 'congested' areas except
33
Sutton Harbour Holdings plc
141
when aircraft are taking off or landing in accordance with normal aviation
practice. However, it is an important safety consideration that climb out,
approach and circuit paths at unlicensed aerodromes do not overfly builtup areas. These Congested Areas are legally defined in Article 255 of the
ANO 2009 as ‘in relation to a city, town, or settlement, any area which is
substantially used for residential, industrial, commercial or recreational
purposes;...’.
Therefore, the re-establishment of any flying at PLH would require the
aerodrome to operate under a licence granted by the CAA.
Definitions
General Aviation (GA) can be defined as all civil aviation activity other than
that carried out by the commercial air transport sector. It is the largest
aviation sector in the UK and includes:






Flights for business purposes, either using corporately owned
aircraft or by the ad hoc hiring of an aircraft for business purposes.
Flights for leisure and recreational purposes;
Flying training for new pilots; there are over 100 flying schools and
clubs operating in Britain;
Emergency services operations by aircraft and helicopters offering
improved reaction and mobility for police and ambulance services
as well as for civil search and rescue operations;
Agricultural aviation;
Aerial survey work, including traffic monitoring;
142
GA Market Size
A study by the CAA34 estimated that there are some 27,000 commercial
aircraft on the UK register, of which only 4% are commercial airliners and of
which around 9,000 are General Aviation fixed-wing aircraft (excluding
microlights). The total number of pilots licensed to fly powered aircraft in
the UK is 47,000 and of these 19,000 have professional licenses, and 28,000
have private licenses, of which 3,400 have the more basic national license.
The GA market has however experienced some turbulence in recent years.
The CAA study revealed that some parts of the sector have experienced
strong growth in recent years, particularly helicopter flying and microlight
flying. However, the same report highlighted that the more traditional
fixed-wing flying has not seen similar growth which is of significance given
that the report predates the more recent economic decline. In fact, whilst
the number of registered aircraft (single-engined) has remained relatively
constant, the number of flying hours has reduced in recent years. One
reason for this is suggested to be a growing preference to seek training in
better weather conditions outside of the UK and this is reflected in the
decline in aero club movements at the majority of such aerodromes in
recent years. However, notwithstanding the decline in flying school and
fixed-wing movements, there does continue to be an increase in private
flight movements in recent years overall.
PLH is understood to be situated within ‘Class G’ airspace, which means
that it is relatively unhindered by aircraft activity from major airports. Class
G airspace is uncontrolled airspace in which pilots operate to visual flight
rules (VFR) in accordance with the privileges of their license, e.g. clear of
cloud and in sight of the surface. PLH also retains its fuel farm which is a
key asset that private aircraft owners seek out when choosing an airfield to
either fly into or base their aircraft at.
However, a major consideration will the ability to take off and land without
34
Strategic Review of General Aviation in the UK, CAA, July 2006
143
undue wind shear or crosswinds. As mentioned elsewhere in this report,
the single runway alignment is not beneficial to attracting owners of light
aircraft, nor flying schools, as the single runway is poorly aligned in relation
to prevailing wind direction. For larger aircraft this is less problematic, but
for fixed wing light GA traffic this could be a general deterrent to pilots if a
better choice exists.
Other Devon and Cornwall GA Providers
A review of available GA airfields in Devon highlights a lack of such facilities.
Our research concluded that the following alternative facilities are
available:
 Eggesford Airfield – unlicensed single grass strip oriented 11/29;
 Belle Vue, near Bideford – unlicensed single grass strip oriented into
prevailing wind;
 Exeter International Airport – licensed regional airport;
Other nearby airfields in Cornwall include:
 Bodmin Airfield – licensed aerodrome with two grass runways, 13/31 and
03/21;
 Truro Aerodrome – unlicensed aerodrome with single grass runway
14/32;
 Newquay Airport – licensed regional airport
Noise Associated with GA Operations
One key drawback associated with GA operations is the fact that it is widely
carried out at weekends due to its recreational nature. This weekend
activity often causes unacceptable levels of noise nuisance to local
residents and it is understood that PLH is no exception. It is for this reason
that GA activities are often better placed at more remote / rural airfields
out of the way of dense areas of population.
144
In September 2009 the PCC Department of Development issued changes to
the planning controls at PLH relating to flying training35. This planning
decision notice identified three changes to the planning controls at the
airport namely:
C23: Our conclusion with regard to GA and its
potential for growth at PLH is that whilst there is
dearth of GA facilities in the Plymouth area and the
former airport itself has fuel storage and an allweather runway, other airfields do exist.
Furthermore, the non-preferred alignment of the
single runway at PLH, the stringent controls on
weekend flight training coupled with the general
demise in the sector means that developing any
significant scale in the GA market would prove to be
difficult.
1. No flying training of any sort shall take place between the hours of
20:00 on one day and 09:00 the following day, on any days of the
week;
2. No flying training which includes “circuits” shall take place at any
time on Sundays (but training flights not including circuits are
allowed between 09:00 and 20:00 on Sundays);
3. Not to permit the Airport Premises to be used for training purposes
by helicopters (other than for familiarisation purposes) and other
vertical take-off and landing aircraft
These revised planning controls appear to place a heavy restriction on the
nature of any growth in GA traffic at PLH with training being a principal
attractant of GA traffic and circuits being an important facet of pilot
training. The restrictions also include the growth area of helicopter traffic.
It is accepted that these new planning controls do not in themselves serve
to stifle the opportunity for GA traffic growth, but they will certainly hinder
attempts to attract flying clubs/schools.
35
PCC Planning Decision Notice dated 18 September 2009 in relation to Application
No: 09/00822/FUL
145
08 Conclusions
146
147
8 Conclusions
In concluding this report, reference should also be made to the Executive
Summary. The conclusions of this report are as follows:
o
Reviewing the available evidence base, it would seem highly
unlikely that a commercial scheduled service operator would base
itself at the Former Airport Site again. Independent viability reports
commissioned within the past two years have endorsed this
position.
o
The historical evidence shows that Brymon, then BA, Air Wales, Air
Southwest and latterly Eastern Airways have all failed to achieve a
sustainable operation due to the very many constraints of the
facility.
o
Other operations have either failed to start at all or have been short
lived. Aviation operations are inherently risky and few operators are
likely to pursue a marginal operation with a history of failure at
their own financial risk.
o
The existing site cannot accommodate the size of runway to meet
the requirements of the fleets of most potential operators without
considerable capital investment and compulsory purchase of lands
adjacent to the former airport boundary.
o
Sutton Harbour Holdings plc has not identified a realistic
opportunity for commercial scheduled operations to a variety of UK
and near continental destinations without substantial start-up
funding, annual gap funding and major capital investment.
148
o
Income from general aviation in itself would not be commercially
capable of supporting an operational facility such as PLH and there
a number of alternative available facilities that exist within the
southwest sub-region ;
o
The very low levels of income that have been developed
historically, given that FOST, the NHS and Plymouth Flying School
have now relocated to new facilities, would not sustain the basic
operational cost and the stringent licensing requirements
necessarily imposed by CAA.
o
Any future investment would also need to be balanced against the
significant environmental implications of developing a larger airport
located within a densely populated urban area and also the
licensing, risk management and insurance constraints.
o
It is conceivable that an airport in the vicinity of Plymouth could
succeed, but this would only be on the assumption that facilities at
Exeter and Newquay were closed to secure a sufficient flying
population. This is presently not a realistic proposition. It was
pursued as an opportunity for the southwest region by SHH but was
met with considerable opposition.
o
It is clear that SHH has found itself in an unenviable position in
trying to turn Plymouth City Airport into a commercially viable and
sustainable proposition. To ensure sustainability of Plymouth City
Airport, SHH had two major challenges; firstly to increase levels of
business and secondly to reduce costs. The latter was reasonably
straight forward and immediately post acquisition a number of
outsourced functions were brought in house and general savings
were achieved. Sustaining levels of business was far more difficult
149
however and the airport struggled against a continual erosion of its
revenue base, physical constraints and consequent loss of routes
and airlines.
150
09 Glossary of Common Terms
151
152
9
Glossary of Common Terms
Accelerate – Stop Distance Available (ASDA)
The distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome at which the aircraft can
commence its take-off run to the nearest point in the direction of take-off at which the
aircraft cannot roll over the surface of the aerodrome and be brought to rest in an
emergency without the risk of accident.
Aerodrome
A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment)
intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure or surface movement
of aircraft.
Aerodrome Elevation
The elevation of the highest point of the landing area. This is the highest point of that part of
the runway used for both landing and take-off. See also 'Landing Area'.
Aerodrome Reference Point
The aerodrome reference point is the geographical location of the aerodrome and the centre
of its traffic zone where an ATZ is established.
Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ)
The airspace specified in Article 258 of the ANO 2009 as being airspace in the vicinity of an
aerodrome notified for the purposes of Rule 38 of the Rules of the Air Regulations.
Aeronautical Beacon An aeronautical ground light visible continuously or intermittently to
designate a particular point on the surface of the earth.
Aeronautical Ground Light
Any light specifically provided as an aid to air navigation other than a light displayed on an
aircraft including lights specifically provided at an aerodrome as an aid to the movement and
control of aircraft and of those vehicles which operate on the movement area.
Aircraft A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft, deriving its lift in flight chiefly from
aerodynamic reactions on surfaces which remain fixed under given conditions of flight.
153
Aircraft Reference Field Length
The minimum field length required for take-off at maximum take-off weight, calculated at
MSL, in standard atmosphere conditions and still air, and with zero runway slope. The
precise distance will be given in the Flight Manual or equivalent data-sheets from the
manufacturer.
Aircraft
Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of air other than
by the reactions of air against the earth’s surface.
Aircraft Stand
A designated area on an aerodrome intended to be used for parking an aircraft.
Air Navigation Order (ANO)
The Air Navigation Order 2009 ("the ANO") is a substantial piece of secondary legislation by
which aviation safety standards are implemented and air navigation is regulated. The ANO is
wide-ranging, covering aircraft (airworthiness, operation and certification), air crew,
passengers, cargo, air traffic services and aerodromes. Certain articles extend to the flying of
kites and model aircraft.
Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP)
Air navigation service providers are either government departments, state-owned
companies, or privatised organisations providing Air Traffic Control Services.
Air Traffic Control (ATC)
Aircraft are safely separated in the sky as they fly and at the airports where they land and
take off again – Air Traffic Control is the process by which this is safely achieved. In Europe,
air traffic control is done by the air traffic control centres (ACCs) located in each country,
which guide aircraft to and from airports. Commercial airports are usually situated within
Aerodrome Traffic Zones ATZ) within which airport-based ATC controllers provide regulatory
oversight of the local airspace.
Apron
A defined area on a land aerodrome provided for the stationing of aircraft for the
embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, the loading and unloading of cargo, fuelling,
and for parking.
154
Balanced Field
A runway for which the Accelerate Stop Distance Available is equal to the Take-off Distance
Available is considered to have a balanced field length.
Cleared and Graded Area (CGA)
That part of the Runway Strip cleared of all obstacles except for minor specified items and
graded, intended to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft running off the runway.
Clearway
An area at the end of the take-off run available and under the control of the aerodrome
licence holder, selected or prepared as a suitable area over which an aircraft may make a
portion of its initial climb to a specified height.
Critical Area
An area of defined dimensions extending about the ground antennae of a precision
instrument approach equipment within which the presence of vehicles or aircraft will cause
unacceptable disturbance of the guidance signals.
Declared Distances
The distances declared by the aerodrome authority for the purpose of application of the
requirement of the Air Navigation (General) Regulations in respect of aircraft flying for the
purpose of public transport.
Instrument Runway
A runway intended for the operation of aircraft using non-visual aids providing at least
directional guidance in azimuth adequate for a straight-in approach.
Intermediate holding position
A designated position intended for traffic control at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles shall
stop and hold until further cleared to proceed, when so instructed by the aerodrome control
tower.
Landing Area
That part of a movement area intended for the landing and take-off of aircraft.
Landing Distance Available (LDA)
The distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome above which the aircraft can
commence its landing, having regard to the obstructions in its approach path, to the nearest
155
point in the direction of landing at which the surface of the aerodrome is incapable of
bearing the weight of the aircraft under normal operating conditions or at which there is an
obstacle capable of affecting the safety of the aircraft.
Manoeuvring Area
That part of an aerodrome provided for the take-off and landing of aircraft and for the
movement of aircraft on the surface, excluding the apron and any part of the aerodrome
provided for the maintenance of aircraft.
Movement Area
That part of an aerodrome intended for the surface movement of aircraft including the
manoeuvring area, aprons and any part of the aerodrome provided for the maintenance of
aircraft.
Non-Instrument Runway
A runway intended for the operation of aircraft using visual approach procedures.
Non-precision approach runway
An instrument runway served by visual aids and a non-visual aid providing at least
directional guidance adequate for a straight-in approach.
Obstacle
All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are
located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft or that extend above a
defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight, or that stand outside those defined
surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation.
Obstacle Free Zone
A volume of airspace extending upwards and outwards from an inner portion of the Runway
Strip to specified upper limits which is kept clear of all obstructions except for minor
specified items required for air navigation purposes, of low mass and frangibly mounted.
PLH
All licensed and many unlicensed aerodromes in the world are assigned a unique three-letter
code. The Code assigned to the former Plymouth City Airport was PLH.
156
Precision Instrument Approach Runway
An instrument runway intended for the operation of aircraft using precision instrument
approach aids that meet the Facility Performance requirements defined in ICAO Annex 10
appropriate to the Category of Operations. These runways are divided into three categories
as follows:

Category I (Cat I) operation: A precision instrument approach and landing with a
decision height not lower than 200 ft and with either a visibility not less than 800 m, or
a runway visual range not less than 550 m.

Category II (Cat II) operation: A precision instrument approach and landing with a
decision height lower than 200 ft but not lower than 100 ft, and a runway visual range
not less than 300 m.

Category IIIA (Cat IIIA) operation: A precision instrument approach and landing with
either a decision height lower than 100 ft, or with no decision height and a runway
visual range not less than 175 m.

Category IIIB (Cat IIIB) operation: A precision instrument approach and landing with
either a decision height lower than 50 ft, or with no decision height and a runway visual
range less than 175 m but not less than 50 m.

Category IIIC (Cat IIIC) operation: A precision instrument approach and landing with no
decision height and no runway visual range limitations.

Lower than Standard Category I Operation: A Category I Instrument Approach and
Landing Operation using a Category I decision height, with an RVR lower than would
normally be associated with the applicable decision height.

Other than Standard Category II Operation: A Category II Instrument Approach and
Landing Operation to a runway where some or all of the elements of the ICAO Annex 14
Precision Approach Category II lighting system are not available.
Runway
A defined rectangular area, on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and take-off run
of aircraft along its length.
157
Runway End Safety Area (RESA)
An area symmetrical about the extended runway centreline and adjacent to the end of the
strip primarily intended to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft undershooting or
overrunning the runway.
Runway Holding Position
A designated position intended to protect a runway, an obstacle limitation surface, or an
ILS/MLS critical/sensitive area at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles shall stop and hold,
unless otherwise authorized by the aerodrome control tower.
Runway Incursion
Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or
person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.
Runway Strip
An area of specified dimensions enclosing a runway intended to reduce the risk of damage
to an aircraft running off the runway and to protect aircraft flying over it when taking-off or
landing.
Runway Threshold
The beginning of that portion of the runway usable for landing.
Runway Visual Range (RVR)
The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centreline of a runway can see the
runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centreline.
Safety Management System (SMS)
A safety management system (SMS) is an organised approach to managing safety including
the necessary organisational structure, accountabilities, policies and procedures.
Shoulder
An area adjacent to the edge of a paved surface so prepared as to provide a transition
between the pavement and the adjacent surface for aircraft running off the pavement.
158
Stopway
A defined rectangular area beyond the end of the TORA, suitably prepared and designated as
an area in which an aircraft can be safely brought to a stop in the event of an abandoned
take-off.
Take-off Distance Available (TODA)
Either the distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome at which the aircraft can
commence its take-off run to the nearest obstacle in the direction of take-off projecting
above the surface of the aerodrome and capable of affecting the safety of the aircraft, or
one and one half times the take-off run available, whichever is the less.
Take-off Run Available (TORA)
The distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome at which the aircraft can
commence its take-off run to the nearest point in the direction of take-off at which the
surface of the aerodrome is incapable of bearing the weight of the aircraft under normal
operating conditions.
Taxiway
A defined path on a land aerodrome established for the taxying of aircraft and intended to
provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another, including:
a) Aircraft stand taxilane. A portion of an apron designated as a taxi route intended to
provide access to aircraft stands only.
b) Apron taxiway. A portion of a taxiway system located on an apron and intended to
provide a through taxi route across the apron.
c) Rapid exit taxiway. A taxiway connected to a runway at an acute angle and designed to
allow landing aircraft to turn off at higher speeds than are achieved on other exit taxiways
thereby minimising runway occupancy times.
Taxiway Strip
An area of specified dimension enclosing a taxiway and intended to protect aircraft
operating on the taxiway and to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft running off the
taxiway.
Taxiway Holding Position
A designated position at which taxying aircraft and vehicles may be required to hold in order
to provide adequate clearance from a runway or another taxiway.
159
Runway Taxi Holding Position:
A Taxi Holding Position intended to protect a runway.
Intermediate Taxi Holding Position:
A Taxi Holding Position intended to protect a priority route.
Taxiway Intersection
A junction of two or more taxiways.
Threshold
The beginning of that portion of the runway available for landing.
160
10 Principal CAA Documents
161
162
10 Principal CAA Documents
The principal CAA documents outlining mandatory requirements in connection with the safe
operation of a licensed aerodrome are listed below:
CAP 168 Licensing of Aerodromes – this is the guidance document for aerodrome operators
and gives details of the minimum requirements for licensed aerodromes.
CAP 393 Air Navigation: the Order and the Regulations – Articles 208 and 211 of the Air
Navigation Order 2009 give details of the licensing process.
CAP 232 Aerodrome Survey Information – all licensed aerodromes will need to be surveyed
to an appropriate standard. CAP 232 details the survey requirements to be met for each
appropriate type of aerial activity.
CAP 637 Visual Aids Handbook is a compendium of visual aids intended for the guidance of
pilots and personnel engaged in the handling of aircraft.
CAP 642 Airside Safety Management – may assist in developing airside procedures. This
gives comprehensive information and guidance on the essential elements for creating a safe
ground handling environment for aircraft and individuals.
CAP 683 The Assessment of Runway Surface Friction Characteristics – the objective of this
document is to offer guidance on the procedures for undertaking runway surface friction
assessments and to define the criteria by which friction values should be assessed, on
applicable runways under specified conditions.
CAP 699 Standards for the Competence of Rescue and Firefighting Service Personnel
Employed at UK Licensed Aerodromes – describes a model for competence that is aligned to
ICAO standards and enables the UK to define its requirements in the form of an acceptable
means of compliance.
CAP 700 Operational Safety Competences – gives guidance on the competences appropriate
to various operational tasks.
CAP 726 Guidance for Developing and Auditing a Formal Safety Management
System and CAP 728 The Management of Safety – provide guidance to industry on how to
develop and adopt a system for managing safety.
163
CAP 738 Safeguarding of Aerodromes – it is recommended by the Government that all
licensed aerodromes have in place procedures, in conjunction with the relevant Local
Planning Authorities, for safeguarding their aerodromes. This document gives guidance on
safeguarding.
CAP 748 Aircraft Fuelling and Fuel Installation Management – if it is intended to store and
dispense fuel at the aerodrome, the applicant must be aware of the requirements of this
document and also the relevant parts of the Air Navigation Order.
CAP 772 Birdstrike Risk Management for Aerodromes - this document provides guidance to
assist aerodrome operators in establishing and maintaining an effective Bird Control
Management Plan (BCMP).
CAP 791 Changes to Aerodrome Infrastructure - This document provides guidance on the
procedures to be used to notify the CAA of developments on an aerodrome and other
changes to the physical characteristics of an aerodrome. Additionally, it includes guidance to
help ensure that changes comply with licensing criteria and are managed safely.
164

Independent Aviation Study

Transcription

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