UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings

Transcription

UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism
Standards for Buildings
“The Changes”
Impacting the
Structural Engineering Community
John Lynch, P.E.
NAVFAC ATLANTIC
Virginia Structural Engineers Council – March 2014
DISCLAIMER
•The opinions expressed herein are those of the
author(s), and are not necessarily representative of
those of the Na
Naval
al Facilities Engineering Command,
Command
the Department of Defense (DOD); or, the United
States Army, Navy, or Air Force.
2
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum AT Standards
for Buildings
1999)
2002)
2003)
2007)
2012)
2013)
3
Interim Department of Defense
Antiterrorism/Force Protection
Construction Standards issued 16
December 1999 by Under Secretary of
Defense A&T Memorandum (FOUO).
Standards updated and converted to UFC
4-010-01 and issued by Under Secretary
of Defense AT&L Memorandum on 20
September 2002.
Standards updated 8 October 2003.
2003
Standards updated with change 1 dated
22 January 2007.
Standards Revised 9 February 2012.
Major changes include:
• Chapter 1 and 2 content expanded
• New definitions in Appendix A
• Conventional Construction Standoff
Distance
• Window/Glazing Requirements
Standards updated with change 1 dated 1
October 2013 – Major change to
requirements for leased facilities.
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum AT Standards for
Buildings 2012 Revision,
Revision Change 1,
1 1 OCT 2013
REASON FOR CHANGES
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reduce misunderstandings
Add
Address
situations
it ti
nott previously
i
l addressed
dd
d
Improve consistency of interpretation
Reduce redundancy or inconsistency w/other UFCs
Eliminate standards and recommendations that were unnecessary
Incorporate information based on new studies, research, new or revised national standards
WHAT WE ADDED
•
•

4
Applicability text for : DOD purchase of existing building, visitor center/museums, visitor control centers
Added exemption text for: Low Occupancy buildings, Town Centers, Enhance use leases, Temporary & Relocatable Buildings,
C
Construction
t
ti Admin
Ad i structures,
t
t
all
ll transitional
t
iti
l structures
t
t
Added requirement for Design Submittals

Removed all requirements for leased buildings and required all DoD leased buildings off DoD installations to comply with
standards established by the Department of Homeland Security’s Interagency Security Committee in The Risk Management
Process for Federal Facilities.

Added warnings throughout the document that for some wall types the conventional construction standoff distances will require
window and door construction that is significantly heavier and more expensive than windows and doors designed at the
conventional construction standoff distances in previous versions of these standards.

Added exemption for parking structures.

Added definitions to glossary.

Added notes to Tables 2-3 and B-2.

Updated window and door design provisions of Standards 10 and 12.

Added loading docks to Standards 13 and 17.

Added requirements for application of Standards 16 and 18 for heating, ventilating, and air conditioning replacement and upgrade
projects.
Buildings 2012 Revision,
Revision Change 1,
1 1 OCT 2013
IMPACT
•More consistent application of the provisions of the document due to more detailed
guidance.
•Non-compliance with the standards should be reduced because some perceived “loop
holes” were eliminated through clarifying language and because the commonly
misunderstood provisions that were leading to non-compliance have been clarified.
•Reduced
R d
d conflict
fli t between
b t
security
it and
d antiterrorism
tit
i
personnell and
d design
d i
teams
t
due
d
to clarifications.
•By establishing design submittal requirements there should be better and more
consistent compliance with the standards.
standards
•Due to the changes in conventional construction standoff distances there should be a
general reduction in building setbacks from parking and roadways that should reduce
DoD land use.
•Reduced costs of window systems and of supporting structural elements due to
changes in Standard 10 on windows and skylights.
•Reduced costs for transitional structures because of expanding exemption to all
standards as long as expected occupancy will be less than 5 years.
5
Buildings 2012 Revision – Chapter 1
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
(A SAMPLING OF THE CHANGES)
• Authorities – What drives the standards
• Master Plans – “roadmaps” for UFC 4-010-01
• G
Generall Building
B ildi R
Requirements
i
t (UFC 1
1-200-01)
200 01) – AT iis “core
“
criteria
it i ”
for project development
• Roadway Improvement Projects Under “Applicability”
• DoD Purchase Of Existing Buildings
• Leased Buildings
• Visitor Centers And Museums
• Visitor Control Centers At ECF/ACP
6
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum AT Standards for Buildings –
2012 Revision DESIGN SUBMITTALS (NEW) (1-11)
• Design submittals for DoD projects requiring compliance with these standards
will include the following elements as a minimum:
 Narratives of how each applicable standard is met.
 Applicable explosive weights and levels of protection.
 Standoff distances provided.
 Blast resistant window system and supporting structure calculations or test
results. (Glazing/Frame/Connections/Structural Supporting Elements)
 Building element structural analysis or design calculations wall or roof
construction is not included in Table 2-3 or if it is included in Table 2-3 and
the standoff distances are less than the applicable conventional
construction standoff distances
 Progressive collapse calculations (where applicable)
• Additional submittals may be required to show compliance with specific
standards
Note that any references to explosive weights other than referring to
them as Explosive Weights I, II, and III in narratives or calculations will
result in INFORMATION SENSITIVITY issues – documents being FOUO
7
Buildings Building Occupancy
• Four Basic Occupancy Categories of Facilities:
 Low Occupancy
 Inhabited Structures
 Primary Gathering Structures
 Troop Billeting Structures
ROUTINELY
OCCUPIED
 For the purposes of
these standards, an
established or
predictable pattern of
activity within a
building that terrorists
could recognize and
exploit.
(Definitions are Appendix A)
8
Buildings 2012 Revision
CHAPTER 2 – PHILOSOPHY, DESIGN STRATEGIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
(SAMPLING OF CHANGES)
• Controlled Perimeters and Access Control
• Vehicle Barriers
• Building Occupancy Levels
• Controlled Perimeter
• Laminated Glass and Polycarbonate
• Parking and Roadways
• Exterior Conventional Doors
• Emergency,
Emergency Command,
Command and Operational
Support Vehicles and Mobile Tactical
Platforms
• Exterior Stairwells and Covered or
Enclosed Walkways
• Applicable Explosive Weight
• Standoff Distances (Table 2-3 Conv Constr Parameters)
 Conventional Construction Standoff Distance
 Minimum Standoff Distance
 Standoff to ECF/ACP
• Town Centers
• Transitional and Temporary
Buildings, Structures, and Spaces,
Construction Administration
Structures, and Relocatable
Buildings
 Unobstructed Space
 Distance
 Concealment
9
Buildings – 2012 Revision
THE CHANGES THE WILL HAVE THE GREATEST IMPACT ON YOU –
THE STRUCTURAL ENGINEER
10
Buildings – 2012 Revision
MAJOR CHANGES REGARDING STANDOFF DISTANCE AND WINDOWS
• Changed approach to conventional construction standoff distance to be based on specific
materials to resolve conservatism in previous numbers and because people were not
taking advantage of existing allowances – NO MORE ONE SIZE FITS ALL
• Reduced minimum standoff distance to the distances at which buildings would be within
the realm of hardened structures based on the two applicable explosive weights in this
UFC associated with vehicle borne and placed explosives
• Made major changes to Standard 10 on windows and skylights. Most changes were in
applying the static design method of ASTM F 2248, although the standard was also
completely rewritten for clarity
 Eliminated windows and doors from any consideration of conventional construction
standoff distance
 Eliminated minimum window and skylight construction requirements except for
buildings that are exempt from parking and roadway standoff distances provisions
of Standard 1 and for windows and skylights in existing buildings that are being
p
as p
part of window and skylight
y g replacement
p
p
projects
j
replaced
11
DoD Minimum AT Standards for Buildings
Standard 1 – Standoff Distances
Standard 1. Standoff Distances (B-1.1)
(B 1.1)
•
•
•
•
•
From Controlled Perimeter
g and Roadways
y
From Parking
Trash Containers
Applicable to all inhabited buildings
Provides flexibility with existing inhabited buildings
 Access control to parking areas
 Eliminate parking on roadways within required standoff
• Provides flexibility for:




12
Parking for Family Housing
Parking of Emergency and Operation Support Vehicles
Parking of Vehicles Undergoing Maintenance
Parking and Roadway Projects
Standard 1 – Standoff Distances
Standard 1. Standoff Distances (B-1.1) (cont’d)
• Conventional Construction Standoff Distance (Based on Building Material for Wall
and Roof – Tables 2-3, B-1,& B-2)
• Minimum Standoff Distance
• Distances
Di t
B
Between
t
C
Conventional
ti
l and
d Mi
Minimum
i
Standoff
St d ff Distances
Di t
• Inhabited Buildings Partially Exempt from Standard 1
• Controlled Perimeter Standoff Distance
g and Roadways
y Standoff Distances
• Parking
 New Buildings
 Existing Buildings w/Controlled Parking/Driving Lanes/Existing Roadways/High
Occupancy Family Housing/Alternate Solutions
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
13
Adjacent Underground Parking
Parking of Emergency/Command/Operations Support Vehicle
Parking of Vehicle Undergoing Maintenance
Parking of Mobile Ground Tactical Platforms
P ki
Parking
for
f Handicapped
H di
d Personnel
P
l
Parking and Roadway Projects
Standoff to Entry Control Facilities/Access Control Points
Adjacent Existing Buildings
Standoff Distances – Changes
USACE Protective Design Center
Technical Report (PDC TR-10-01)
Conventional Construction Standoff Distances Of The Low
And Very Low Level Of Protection IAW UFC 4-010-01
• Prepared/Published during the development of new
conventional construction standoff distances (CCSD)
based on the structural analysis of standard building
components used for DoD inhabited and primary
gathering facilities – this over the last 5 YEARS
• Installations that knowingly did not have the CCSD
recogni ed the extra
recognized
e tra cost applied to each project
project.
• Often times the design team would relocate the facility
and reduce the CCSD during the planning or design
phase, not recognizing the ATFP cost impacts of this
decision
• Those costs then become an unfunded project
requirement having significant cost impacts to building
projects
• Installations unable to meet the CCSD
CCSD’s
s required an
analysis to review the standoff distance requirements for
their building components
AVAILABLE AT THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
PROTECTIVE DESIGN CENTER WEBSITE
14
• Therefore revising CCSD’s will provide project
design cost savings
USACE Protective Design Center
Technical Report ((PDC TR-06-08))
Single Degree of Freedom Structural Response Limits for
Antiterrorism Design
• Structural engineers needed guidance for the design of
buildings required to resist the air blast associated with
terrorist explosive threats.
 Where the CCSD were not available
 Where higher levels of protection were required
and/or more severe threats need to be considered
• The prevalent method used in DoD to design structures to
resist the air blast loading from terrorist explosive threats is
the single degree of freedom (SDOF) process
 UFC 3
3-340-01
340 01 - Design and Analysis
Anal sis of Hardened
Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects (FOUO)
 UFC 3-340-02 - Structures to Resist the Effects of
Accidental Explosions
• SDOF Design Process – SBEDS/SBEDS
SBEDS/SBEDS--W
15
• USACE Protective Design Center (PDC)
• Technical Report (PDC TR-06-08)
• Single Degree of Freedom Structural Response Limits for Antiterrorism Design
• SDOF Design Process – SBEDS/SBEDS-W
• When using the SDOF methodology for design of a structural component the following
steps are followed
 A trial member (typically the member required to resist conventional loads) is
selected and the equivalent SDOF system determined
 Air blast load is calculated based on charge weight, distance between the charge and
the member being
g considered (standoff
(
distance),
) and the orientation of the member
with respect to the charge
 Maximum dynamic deflection of the SDOF system is calculated and used to calculate
the maximum support rotation (θ) and the ductility ratio (μ) , the RESPONSE
 Calculated θ and/or μ are then compared to established RESPONSE LIMITS to
determine the level of protection the member would provide
 If an acceptable level of protection is provided, the design of the member is finalized
( h
(shear
capacity
it verified,
ifi d connections
ti
designed,
d i
d etc.),
t ) if not,
t another
th member
b is
i
selected and the process is restarted
16
Component Descriptions
PDC
C TR-06-08: Response Limits
17
Building LOP vs. Component Response
Hazardous
(B3 – B4)
Blowout
( > B4)
Blowout
( > B4)
Heavy
(B2 – B3)
Hazardous
(B3 – B4)
Hazardous
(B3 – B4)
Moderate
(B1 – B2)
Heavy
(B2 – B3)
Heavy
(B2 – B3)
Superficial
( < B1)
Moderate
(B1 – B2)
Moderate
(B1 – B2)
Superficial
( < B1)
Superficial
( < B1)
Superficial
( < B1)
PDC
C TR-06-08: Response Limits
18
Damage Thresholds
Charge Weight
vs. Standoff chart
19
Response Limits - Ductility Ratio
• Ductility: is the maximum
displacement ( Xm ) divided
by the elastic limit
displacement ( Xe )
Xm

Xe
20
Response Limits - Element Support Rotation
L
Blast Load (psi)
 Support Rotation
V
Xm
V = Support Shear
Support Rotation is the angle of the deflected shape as
measured at the point of support
1  2 X m 
  tan 

 L 
21
Member Response Limits
Charge Weight
vs. Standoff chart
22
Standoff Distances – Understanding It
•Blast loads vary with cube root of distance to the
explosion
•Baseline: “Conventional” construction
•Glass and frames control hazards
Impulse i = area under the curve
23
23
Pressure & Impulse Comparisons
W = 1000 # TNT
R = 100 ft
Pso = 9.56 psi
Iso = 80.9 psi-msec
W = 220 # TNT
R =60.4 ft
Pso = 9.56 psi
Iso = 48.9 psi-msec
24
•Testing
Testing has shown that peak pressure and
pressure related effects are a function of the
separation distance of the explosive from the
structure, R, divided by the cube root of the
charge weight, W.
•This function is called the scaled distance, a
term commonly used by design engineers when
designing structures to resist the forces of
explosive blast. Scaled distance is expressed as:
Scaled Distance = R/W 1/3
25
25
Scaled Value
Hopkinson or cube-root scaling eliminates the need to plot
every combination of charge weight and range
range.
Scaled Value = Actual Value
W 1/3
for example:
p
Scaled range ( Z ) for 1000-lbs TNT at 300-ft
Z = 300 / 1000 1/3 = 300 / 10 = 30 ft / lbs 1/3
26
Distance for Peak Pressure from a Hemispherical TNT Explosion (feet)
27
27
Vehicle Bomb Loads on Buildings
28
28
Vehicle Bomb Loads on Buildings
29
Building Elements Respond
•Walls
Walls move, a little, or a lot
•Progressive Collapse
•Beams
B
and
dC
Columns
l
b
bend
d or break
b
k
•Roofs uplift and compress
•Windows crack and fly
•Doors
Doors bend and fly
30
Masonryy Wall Response
p
31
METAL/STEEL STUD TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION
32
METAL/STEEL STUD MODIFICATIONS
33
METAL/STEEL STUD MODIFICATIONS
34
Conventional (Type 5) Construction
BEFORE
35
Conventional (Type 5) Construction
BEFORE
36
Very Low Level of Protection Conventional (Type 5) Construction
Conventional Construction Standoff
37
Very Low Level of Protection Conventional (Type 5) Construction
38
Low Level of Protection Conventional (Type 5) Construction
Conventional Construction Standoff
39
Blast Effects
•Blast effects all sides of a building
g
Blast side
40
Non-blast side
Applicable Explosive Weight (2-4.7)
• Applicable Explosive Weights
The applicable explosive weights to be used in
g g buildings
g required
q
to comply
p y with these
designing
standards are commonly established based on
potential bomb locations.
– Explosive Weight I - The larger explosive weight
typically required to be applied at controlled perimeters
or in parking areas and on roadways where there are no
controlled perimeters.
– Explosive Weight II - The smaller explosive weight
typically applied in parking areas and on roadways
within controlled perimeters, in trash containers, and
around buildings outside unobstructed spaces
spaces.
41
Applicable Explosive Weight (2-4.7)
• Buildings Beyond 200 Feet of Controlled Perimeter
The effects of an explosive of the size of explosive
g I placed
p
at the controlled perimeter
p
will be less
weight
than those of an explosive of the size of explosive
weight II located near the buildings. In those cases,
only
l explosive
l i weight
i ht II is
i used
d in
i the
th design
d i off the
th
WINDOWS AND DOORS.
• Buildings Within 200 Feet of Controlled Perimeter
Both explosive weights I and II need to be
investigated at their actual standoff distances to
determine which controls the WINDOW AND DOOR
g
designs.
42
Conventional Construction Parameters
• The building components which the Conventional Construction Standoff
Di
Distances
(CCSD
(CCSDs)) iin T
Tables
bl B-1
B 1 and
dB
B-2
2 are b
based
d upon are tabulated
b l d in
i Table
T bl 2-3
23

They do not address roofs (except those indicated in Table 2-3) or framing systems
because those were found not to control any of the standoff distance analyses at the
conventional construction standoff distances.
distances
• The wall and roof types in Table 2-3 are those that were analyzed to establish the
conventional construction standoff distances in Tables B-1 and B-2.

Those distances may be used as long as the construction for the applicable walls fits
within the ranges of properties in Table 2-3.

Any construction outside those ranges will have to be analyzed.
• Roofs may be assumed not to control the designs of buildings for which any of the
conventional construction standoff distances are provided

As long as they fall within the ranges of properties for the concrete and metal roofs in
Table 2-3.

Other roof construction will have to be analyzed.
Change 1 of October 2013 added “Roof
Roof
Construction” type in Table B-2 CCSDs
43
Levels of Protections – New and Existing
(Table 2-1)
Table 2-1 Levels of Protection – New and Existing Buildings
Level of
Protection
Potential Building Damage/Performance 2
Potential Door and Glazing Hazards3,4
Potential Injury
Below AT
standards1
Severe damage. Progressive collapse
Doors and windows will fail catastrophically and Majority of personnel in collapse region
likely. Space in and around damaged area result in lethal hazards. (High hazard rating)
suffer fatalities. Potential fatalities in areas
will be unusable.
outside of collapsed area likely.
Very Low
Heavy damage - Onset of structural
collapse, but progressive collapse is
unlikely. Space in and around damaged
area will be unusable.
* Glazing will fracture, come out of the frame, and
is likely to be propelled into the building, with
potential to cause serious injuries. (Low hazard
rating)
* Doors will be severely deformed but will not
become a flying debris hazard. (Category IV)
Majority of personnel in damaged area suffer
serious injuries with a potential for fatalities.
Personnel in areas outside damaged area will
experience minor to moderate injuries.
Low
Moderate damage – Building damage will * Glazing will fracture, potentially come out of the
not be economically repairable.
frame, but at reduced velocity, does not present a
Progressive collapse will not occur. Space significant injury hazard. (Very low hazard rating)
in and around damaged area will be
* Doors will experience non-catastrophic failure,
unusable.
but will have permanent deformation and will be
inoperable (Category III)
inoperable.
Majority of personnel in damaged area suffer
minor to moderate injuries with the potential
for a few serious injuries, but fatalities are
unlikely. Personnel in areas outside damaged
areas will potentially experience minor to
moderate injuries
injuries.
Medium5
Minor damage – Building damage will be
economically repairable.
Space in and around damaged area can be
used and will be fully functional after
cleanup
p and repairs.
p
* Glazing will fracture, remain in the frame and
results in a minimal hazard consisting of glass
dust and slivers. (Minimal hazard rating)
* Doors will be operable but will have permanent
deformation. ((Category
g y II))
Personnel in damaged area potentially suffer
minor to moderate injuries, but fatalities are
unlikely. Personnel in areas outside
damaged areas will potentially experience
superficial
p
injuries.
j
High5
Minimal damage.
No permanent deformations. The facility
will be immediately operable.
* Glazing will not break.(No hazard rating)
* Doors will remain intact and show no
permanent deformation. (Category I)
Only superficial injuries are likely.
1. This is not a level of protection and should never be a design goal. It only defines a realm of more severe structural response, and may provide useful information in some
cases.
2. For damage / performance descriptions for primary, secondary, and non-structural members, refer to PDC Technical Report 06-08.
3. Glazing hazard levels are from ASTM F 2912.
4. Door damage level categories are from ASTM F 2247 and F2927
5. Beyond minimum standards.
44
Levels of Protections – New and Existing
PDC TR-10-01:
TR 10 01: CCSDs
LLOP and VLLOP
45
1 Other types of construction other than that shown in
1.
this table may be permissible subject to validation by
the designer of record.
2. See PDC Technical Report 10-01 for details on the
analysis assumptions and material properties.
3 \1\ Steel studs are assumed to be connected top and
3.
bottom for load bearing walls. For non-load bearing
walls steel studs are assumed to have a slip-track
connection at the top /1/.
4. Unreinforced masonry must have adequate lateral
support at the top and bottom
bottom.
5. Weight supported by the wall that moves through the
same deflection as the wall, not including self-weight
of the component.
6. \1\ For walls or roofs built using metal panels and
girts; use the greater of the standoffs for the metal
panel and the girt /1/.
7. \1\ Reinforcing steel is 60,000 psi (414 MPa) tensile
strength./1/
8. \1\ Concrete Masonry Units (excluding European
block)) are medium weight
g (120
(
pcf
p / 1922 kg/m
g 3) /1/
9. \1\ Shear will need to be checked when using higher
than minimum material strengths. /1/
S-S = Simple - Simple Supports
F-S = Fixed - Simple Supports
46
47
48
Table 2-3 Conventional Construction Parameters
Analysis Assumptions(2,9)
Analysis Assumptions(2,9)
Wall or Roof
Type
Sections
Span
8 – 10 ft
Wood Studs
2x4 & 2x6 in
Wall
or– Roof
Brick Veneer
(50x100 & Sections
(2.4 - 3 m)
Type 50x150
mm)
Reinforced
≥ 6 in
Reinforced
Concrete(7)
(≥ 150 mm)
≥ 6 in
12 – 20 ft
(≥ 150 mm)
(3.7- 6 m)
6 – 12 in
6 – 128 – in
12 ft
U
Unreinforced
i f
Unreinforced
U
i(4,8)fd (150d– 300 mm)
– 3.7 m)
(150 (2.4
– 300
Masonry
Masonry(4,8)
Reinforced
Masonry(7,8)
(200 - 300 mm)
Reinforced
(7 8)
Masonry(7,8)
European
Block3
mm)
10 – 14 ft
8 – 12 in
14 ft (4.3m)
(200 - 300
6 – 8 in
10 – 12 ft
mm)
(150 – 200 mm)
(3 – 3.7 m)
Reinforceme
nt Ratio
S-S,, One
way flexure
10 p
psf
≥ 0.0015
3,000
,
psi
p
16 - 24 in
S-S
44 psf
N/A
Span
(215
Spacing
12 – 20 ft
N/A
kg/m2)
(3.7- 6 m)
N/A
S-S, One
way flexure
8N/A– 12 ft S-S,
One
way flexure
(2.4 – 3.7 m)
N/A
(3 – 4.3 m)
8 – 12
12 ft in
(3.7m)
Supported
Weight4
Reinforcement
Ratio
THERE ARE MORE WALL AND ROOF TYPES
Concrete (7)
875 psi
Support
(6 MPa)
Condition
Supported
Weight4
(400 – 600 mm)
S-S, One
way flexure
10 – 14 ft
10 psf
(49 kg/m2)
N/A
10 psf
(49 kg/m2)
10 psf
(49 kg/m2)
N/A
(3 – 4.3 m)
N/A
S-S, Brittle
Flexure
12 ft (3.7m)
10 psf
(49 kg/m2)
Static
Material
Strength
Static
Material
Strength
Spacing
Support
Condition
≥ 0.0015
(21 MPa)
10 psf
(49 kg/m2)
1,500 psi
(10 MPa)
(10 MPa)
10 psf
(49 kg/m2)
1,800 psi
(12 MPa)
14 ft (4.3m)
49
0
1,500 psi
S-S, One
way flexure
fl
0
(21 MPa)
3,000 psi
S-S, 1,500
One
0
psi
way flexure
(10 MPa)
0.0005 0.0030
(49 kg/m2)
0.0005 0 0030
0.0030
1,500 psi
(10 MPa)
Table B-1 Standoff Distances for New and Existing Buildings
Standoff Distances
Conventional
C
ti
l Construction
C
t
ti
Standoff Distance
Building
Category
to:
Parking and Distance
Billeting
Controlled
Billeting and High
or
Occupancy
Roadways Perimeterand
High
Family
y Housing
g
Parking
and
Occupancy
within a
Roadways
a
Primary Gathering
Controlled without
Family
Controlled
Building
Perimeter
Perimeter
Housing
Inhabited Building
Primary
Gathering
Building
Primary
Billeting and
Parking and
Roadways within High Occupancy
Family Housing
a Controlled
Perimeter
Applicable
Level of
Protection
Load Bearing
Walls (1)
Non-Load
Bearing
Walls (1)
Minimum
Standoff
Distance (2)
Applicable
Explosive
Weight (3)
Low
A
C
20 ft
I
Low
E
G
A
C
20 ft
I
(6 m)
Very Low
Low
Low
B
D
E
EG
20 ft
(6 m)
13 ft
I
G
II
(34m)
Low
E
G
13 ft
Inhabited
Very
Low F
Inhabited
Very Low
Building
Building
FH
(4 m)
Gathering
Building
13 ft
13 ft
II
(4 m)
II
H
II
(4 m)
THERE IS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING TRASH CONTAINERS THAT HAS NOT
BEEN INCLUDED FOR THIS PRESENTATION
1. See Table B-2 for standoff distances.
2. For new construction, standoff distances less than those in this column are not allowed for new
buildings regardless of analysis or hardening. For existing buildings that are constructed /
retrofitted to provide the required level of protection, standoffs less than those in this column are
allowed, but discouraged.
3. See UFC 4
4-010-02,
010 02, for the specific explosive weights (pounds / kg of TNT) associated with
designations I and II. UFC 4-010-02 is For Official Use Only (FOUO).
NO MORE ONE SIZE FITS ALL
50
II
((4 m))
(6 m)
Low
13 ft
13 ft
(4 m)
II
Table B-2 Conventional Construction Standoff Distances
Column Letter
Wall Type
Wood Studs – Brick
Veneer
A
105 ft
(32 m)
B
C
D
E
APPLICABLE
EXPLOSIVE
LOADWT I (4)
NON-LOAD
BEARING
NON-LOADBEARING
LOAD BEARING
Reinforced Concrete
BEARING
PG‐BIL
INHAB
PG‐BIL
PG‐BIL
INHAB
66 ft
66 ft
26 ft
Reinforced
(20 m)
Concrete
(3)
Unreinforced Masonry
262 ft
F
G
H
Without
Controlled
Perimeter
Within 23
Controlled
Perimeter
105 ft
79 ft
66 ft
36 ft
36 ft
ft
16 ft
(5) Applicable Explosive Weight II (5)
Applicable
(32 m)
(24Explosive
m)
(20 m) Weight
(11 m) I
(11 m)
(7 m)
(5 m)
66 ft
INHAB
PG‐BIL
20 ft
66 ft
(20 m)
(8 m)
262m)
ft
(20
125 m)
ft
(20
26 ft
APPLICABLE
EXPLOSIVE
WT II (5)
LOAD
NON-LOAD
BEARING
BEARING
NO MORE ONE SIZE
LOAD BEARING
NON-LOAD BEARING
FITS ALL
PG‐BIL
INHAB
16 ft
16 ft
13 ft
INHAB
13 ft
(5 m)
(4 m)
(4 m)
13 ft
13 ft
33 ft
(8
m)
80
(6 ftm)
80
(5ftm)
26
(5 ftm)
16 ftm)
(4
(4 m)
(80 m)
(80 m)
(38)
(8 m)
(5 m)
Unreinforced86 ft
R i f
Reinforced
dM
Masonry
Masonry(4) (26 m)
262
86 ftft
262
30 ft ft
125
20 ft ft
33ft ft
30
80ft ft
30
80ft ft
13
26ft ft
13
16 ft
(26 m)
(80
m)
(9 m)
(80
m)
(6(38)
m)
(9 m)m)
(10
(9
m) m)
(24
(4 m)m)
(24
(4
(8m)m)
(5 m)
164 ft
59 ft
30 ft
European Block
1.
164 ft
39 ft
(24 m)
16 ft
INHAB
PG‐BIL
(5 m)
(24 m)
16 ft
PG‐BIL
INHAB
(6 m)
(10 m)
20 ft
INHAB
PG‐BIL
39 ft
23 ft
16 ft
(50
(18
(9
(12
(1230
m)ft
(730
m) ft
(5
86 m)
ft
86m)ft
30m)ft
20m)ft
13m)ft
Reinforced (50 m)
Refer to Table
2-3 for details on the analysis
y
assumptions
p
and material p
properties
p
for these wall types.\1\
yp
Note that window and door construction will need to be
Masonry
m)) are less(26
m)) for Explosive
(6 m)
) I and(9
(9 for
m)Explosive
)
(4 m)II.)
heavier and more expensive when standoff(26
distances
thanm)
82) feet (25 (9
meters)
Weight
33 m)
feet) (10 meters)
Weight
Where wall types include multiple cladding systems such as brick half way up the wall and EIFS above that, use the greater of the two applicable standoff
distances /1/
2.
Metal panels and girts are not considered primary structural members. \1\ Where they are used in the same wall, use the applicable standoff that is the greatest
of the two components /1/.
3.
Non-load bearing steel studs are assumed to have slip-track connections. Closer distances may be obtained through non-standard detailing and analysis.
4
4.
Only used for analysis of existing structures.
structures Not allowed for new construction.
construction
5.
\1\ Note that standoff distances less than 43 feet (13 meters) for Explosive Weight I and 23 feet (7 meters) for Explosive Weight II will require dynamic analysis
for windows because lesser distances are outside the range of ASTM F2248 /1/.
6.
\1\ Note that all of the construction included in this table must also be checked for loading conditions specified by other applicable structural criteria/1/.
51
13 ft
(4 m))
Standoff Distances – BE AWARE!!
WARNING
• 1
1-1.5
1 5 MASTER PLANS: “Buildings
Buildings sited at the minimum standoff distances in Appendix B that are designed to provide
the structural performance required to meet these standards will require construction that is significantly heavier and
more expensive than conventional construction; therefore, the minimum standoff distances should not be used as a
common master planning strategy unless the resulting cost increases are taken into account.”…Also “Also note that
the conventional construction standoff distances in Table B-2 are the standoff distances at which walls of various
constructions can provide the required structural performance
performance. For some wall types the conventional construction
standoff distances will require window and door construction that is significantly heavier and more expensive than
windows and doors designed at the conventional construction standoff distances in previous versions of these
standards. Planners will have to analyze tradeoffs between standoff distance and the associated wall, window, and
door construction to determine what standoff distances may be most economical. Refer to UFC 2-100-01 for additional
guidance on standoff distance considerations for master planning.
planning “
• 2-2.2 MASTER PLANNING: “Note that costs increase significantly as standoff distance is reduced. Even providing the
conventional construction standoff distances in accordance with Appendix B may result in significantly increased
window and supporting structure costs. There are also allowances in Appendix B for minimum standoff distances.
Buildings sited at the minimum standoff distance that are designed to provide the structural performance required to
meet these standards will require construction that is significantly heavier and more expensive than conventional
construction; therefore, the minimum standoff distances should not be used as a common master planning strategy
unless the resulting cost increases are taken into account.”
• 2-4.8.1 CCSD: Note that Tables B-1 and B-2 do not address windows. For some wall types in those tables the
conventional construction standoff distances will require window and door construction that is significantly heavier
and more expensive than windows and doors designed at the conventional construction standoff distances in previous
versions of these standards. Tradeoffs between standoff distance and the associated wall, window, and door
construction will have to be analyzed to determine what standoff distances are most economical. Those tradeoffs will
generally need to be analyzed when standoff distances are less than 82 feet (25 meters) for Explosive Weight I and 33
feet (10 meters) for Explosive Weight II
52
Standoff Distances – BE AWARE!!
WARNING
• B-1 SITE PLANNING: “The following standards detail standoff distances, referred to as
“conventional construction standoff distances,” that when achieved will allow for buildings
to be built with minimal additional construction costs for blast protection. Note, however,
that standoff distances for building walls may require more heavily constructed windows
and doors, which may result in significant building cost increases.”
• B-1.1.1 CCSD: “Conventional construction standoff distances do not apply to windows and
doors. Windows and doors must be designed in accordance with Standards 10 and 12 to
provide the applicable levels of protection.
protection For some wall types the conventional
construction standoff distances will require window and door construction that is
significantly heavier and more expensive than windows and doors designed at the
conventional construction standoff distances in previous versions of these standards /1/.
Planners and designers will have to analyze tradeoffs between wall standoff and window
and door construction. Those tradeoffs will generally need to be analyzed when standoff
distances are less than 82 feet (25 meters) for Explosive Weight I and 33 feet (10 meters) for
Explosive Weight II. There are tools in UFC 4-020-01 that can assist in evaluating those
tradeoffs ”
tradeoffs.
• B-1.1.2 MINIMUM STANDOFF DISTANCE: “Note that achieving the minimum standoff
distance generally requires a significant degree of building component hardening; therefore,
where only
y the minimum standoff distance is p
provided there must be analysis
y
results that
show it can be achieved while still providing the required level of protection.”
53
Standoff Distances – MASTER PLANNING
Master Planning Standoff Distances (1)
Construction
Type
Without a Controlled Perimeter
Applicable Explosive Weight I(2)
Within a Controlled Perimeter
Applicable Explosive Weight II(2)
PG-BIL(3)
INHABITED (3)
PG-BIL(3)
INHABITED(3)
Light
C
Construction
t
ti
Wood/Metal Stud
190FT/58M
175FT/53M
82FT/25M
82FT/25M
Light
Construction
w/Brick Veneer
Wood/Metal Stud
105FT/32M
105FT/32M
36FT/11M
36FT/11M
148FT/45M
108FT/33M
56FT/17M
39FT/12M
66FT/20M
66FT/20M
33FT/10M
33FT/10M
82FT/25M
82FT/25M
33FT/10M
33FT/10M
PEB
y
Heavy
Construction
Girt and Metal
Panel
Reinforced
Concrete
Reinforced
Masonry
1.
FOR MASTER PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY – NOT FOR PROJECT DEVELOPMENT/PROJECT SPECIFIC DESIGN For project specific planning and design see UFC 4010-01: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings and UFC 4-020-01: Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual.
2
2.
See UFC 4-010-02,
4-010-02 DoD Minimum Standoff Distance for Buildings,
Buildings for the specific explosive weights (pounds / kg of TNT) associated with explosive weights I and II.
II
UFC 4-010-02 is For Official Use Only (FOUO).
3.
PG –Primary Gathering Building; BIL – Billeting; INHABITED – Inhabited Building
The standoffs in the above table are based on the standoff distances from UFC 4-010-01 and from consideration of
economical window construction. For most buildings, these standoffs will enable designers to provide cost effective
solutions that meet the levels of protection required by UFC 4-010-01. Standoff distances of less than those shown in
above table are possible, but they may require significantly more expensive windows.
(See UFC 2-100-01 Installation Master Planning for additional information on ’Antiterrorism and Master Planning)
54
Standoff Distances – Help is on the way
Charts are being developed to help determine the
standoff distance for building components for different
levels of protection and threat severity levels.
55
Standoff Distances – Wall Construction
Find the chart for
the correct level
of protection
Find the
corresponding
charge weight
Find the first available wall to
the left of the intersection.
Find the corresponding
available
For thisstandoff
standoff and
distance
charge
weight the only
wall that works is 18”
Moderately Reinforced
150 m
Concrete.
56
Conventional Construction Example
?
?
57
What is the conventional
construction standoff
di t
distance
from
f
the
th
controlled perimeter
fence and the
installation parking
perimeter for
within the p
a single story Primary
Gathering building
constructed
t
t d with
ith walls
ll
of load bearing
reinforced concrete.
concrete
From Table B-1
B1
find:
• Distance to
potential threat
location
58
• Select proper
Building Category
and Level of
Protection
59
• Find Conventional
Construction
Standoff Distance
designation for
load bearing walls
• “A” designation for
the perimeter and
an “E” designation
for parking
60
Table B-2 Conventional Construction Standoff Distances
Column Letter
WITHOUT A CONTROLLED PERIMETER
APPLICABLE EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT I
LOAD BEARING
WALLS
WITHIN A CONTROLLED PERIMETER
APPLICABLE EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT II
NON-LOAD BEARING
WALLS
LOAD BEARING
WALLS
NON-LOAD BEARING
WALLS
Wall Type
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
PG-BIL
INHAB
PG-BIL
INHAB
PG-BIL
INHAB
PG-BIL
INHAB
Wood Studs –
Brick Veneer
105 ft
105 ft
79 ft
66 ft
36 ft
36 ft
23 ft
16 ft
(32 m)
(32 m)
(24 m)
(20 m)
(11 m)
(11 m)
(7 m)
(5 m)
207 ft
207 ft
164 ft
141 ft
85 ft
85 ft
66 ft
56 ft
(63 m)
(63 m)
(50 m)
(43 m)
(26 m)
(26 m)
(20 m)
(17 m)
(2)
75 ft (2)
Wood Studs –
EIFS
Metal Studs –
Brick Veneer
(2)
75 ft
43 ft
(57 m)
(23 m)
(13 m)
(25 m)
(23 m)
361 ft(2)
151 ft
85 ft
167 ft(2)
151 ft(2)
(110 m)
(46 m)
(26 m)
(51 m)
(46 m)
151 ft
108 ft
n/a(1)
n/a(1)
56 ft
39 ft
(46 m)
(33 m)
(17 m)
(12 m)
115 ft
59 ft
n/a(1)
n/a(1)
23 ft
16 ft
(35 m)
(18 m)
(7 m)
(5 m)
26 ft
20 ft
16 ft
16 ft
13 ft
13 ft
(20 m)
(8 m)
(6 m)
(5 m)
(5 m)
(4 m)
(4 m)
262 ft
262 ft
125 ft
33 ft
80 ft
80 ft
26 ft
16 ft
((80 m))
((80 m))
((38))
((10 m))
((24 m))
((24 m))
((8 m))
((5 m))
86 ft
86 ft
30 ft
20 ft
30 ft
30 ft
13 ft
13 ft
(26 m)
(26 m)
(9 m)
(6 m)
(9 m)
(9 m)
(4 m)
(4 m)
164 ft
164 ft
59 ft
30 ft
39 ft
39 ft
23 ft
16 ft
(50 m)
(50 m)
(18 m)
(9 m)
(12 m)
(12 m)
(7 m)
(5 m)
187 ft
108 ft
(57 m)
(33 m)
(63 m)
361 ft
207 ft
420 ft(2)
(110 m)
(63 m)
(128 m)
Metal Panels
n/a(1)
n/a(1)
Girts
n/a(1)
n/a(1)
Reinforced
Concrete
66 ft
66 ft
(20 m)
Metal Studs –
EIFS
Unreinforced
Masonry(3)
Reinforced
Masonry
European Block
207 ft
186 ft
(2)
82 ft
•P
Proceed
d to
t Table
T bl
B-2 to find
i t
intersection
ti
off wall
ll
type and letter
d i
designation:
ti
•T
To Determine
D t
i the
th
required standoff
distances
distances.
1. Metal panels and girts are not considered primary structural members.
2. Non-load bearing steel studs are assumed to have slip-track connections. Closer distances may be obtained through nonstandard detailing and analysis.
3. Only used for analysis of existing structures. Not allowed for new construction.
61
66 ft
16 ft
•This wall type can be
used at these
distances without a
specific blast analysis
to provide a low level
of protection
•Windows and doors
need to be designed
(Remember the ‘warning’ from the
previous slides)
62
Conventional Construction
Roof Types in Design Charts
Open Web Steel
Joist and Steel
Deck
Reinforced
Concrete
63
Grap
phics ffrom FE
EMA 42
27
Building
g and Site Cost Considerations
64
Standard 2 – UNOBSTRUCTED SPACE
• It is assumed that aggressors will not attempt to place explosive devices in areas
near buildings where those explosive devices could be visually detected by
building occupants observing the area around the building.
• Ensure there are unobstructed spaces in which there are no obstructions or
building features that might allow for concealment from observation of explosive
devices 6 inches (150 mm ) or greater in height or width around buildings and
underneath building overhangs or breezeways.
• This does not preclude the placement of site furnishings or plantings around
buildings. It only requires conditions such that any explosive devices placed in
the unobstructed spaces would be observable by building occupants either from
within the buildings or as they walk into or around it.
• Where buildings required to meet these standards are located within controlled
perimeters, the unobstructed space will extend out to the applicable conventional
construction standoff distance for parking and roadways but not less than the
minimum standoff distance
• To mitigate the introduction of hand delivered explosives into the controlled
parking areas those areas will have some means to control pedestrian access as
well as vehicular access, such as fencing or walls at a minimum of 6 feet (2
meters) high.
65
OK
OK
10 m
Landscaping should not provide concealment
Change
For trees or shrubs ensure that no foliage extends lower than 3
feet ((1 meter)) above the g
grounds to improve
p
observation of
objects underneath them.
66
66
UFC 4-010-01,
Standard 2 – Unobstructed Space
Landscaping within Unobstructed Space
67
NAVFAC-SE
Planning Engineers
CommunityCouncil
- Nov. 2013
UNCLASSIFED
Virginia Structural
– March
2014
Equipment Enclosures
• Avoid opportunities for
concealment
OK*
CCSD
• Screening material < 6 inches
(150 mm )
• Secure surfaces that can be
opened
• Top enclosure not required if
vertical surfaces transparent
and at least 7 feet tall
OK*
OK*
• * Trash container standoff
distances also apply
S
Secured
d
68
•
Fuel tanks OK in unobstructed space
 If it does not provide concealment of device
 Standoff distance based on fire code NFPA 30, not explosive effects.
•
N parking
No
ki exceptt
 Emergency, command & op support vehicles
 Ground tactical platforms.
platforms
•
Adjacent Existing Buildings
 Maintain unobstructed space between existing buildings and new projects
located nearby.
 Modify any features that provide opportunity to conceal EW II devices.
•
Adjacent Uncontrolled Public Space
 Consider EW II may be located in this area
 Design accordingly
69
69
Site Concepts
70
Site Concepts – PPV - Norfolk
71
What We Do Want!
AT and Physical Security features should be attractive
and
d unapparent.
450,000 SF Admin
Facility.
Facility
Water element was
q
for biorequired
retention pond. Used
for vehicle barrier.
Wall (vehicle barrier)
was built using loose
stack local stone
Vehicle barriers not
required for DoD
Mi i
Minimum
Standards
St d d
72
What We Do Want!
73
What We Do Want!- Enhanced Use Lease
Moanalua Shopping
Center, Honolulu,
Hawaii
74
Site Concepts
(
(Not
Required
q
by
y DoD Minimum Standards))
Water element was intended to act as a bio-retention pond. Water from adjacent
parking lot and building roof pass through sand filters to a pond. Indigenous
plants require little maintenance. Fish and frogs should keep the mosquito
population under control. Air bubblers will be used.
Protect the Anacostia River and the Chesapeake Bay.
75
What We Don’t Want!
76
What We Do Want!
77
Standard 6 - Progressive Collapse Avoidance
Standard 6. Progressive Collapse Avoidance
• Required for new inhabited building with 3 or more stories
– Penthouse structures and floors below grade (i.e., single and multiple level
basements) will be considered a story if there is any space that is designed for
human occupancy and that is equipped with means of egress as well as light
and ventilation facilities that meet the local building code requirements.
– At changes
g in building
g elevation from a one or two story
y section to a section with
three or more stories, the appropriate progressive collapse design requirements
from Section 2-2 shall be applied to the section with three or more stories.
Special attention shall be given to potential deleterious effects associated with
th attachment
the
tt h
t off the
th short
h t building
b ildi section
ti tto th
the b
building
ildi section
ti with
ith th
three or
more stories.
• Required for Existing inhabited buildings when triggered
• Required
R
i d to
t follow
f ll
design
d i guidance
id
in
i UFC 4-023-03,
4 023 03 Design
D i off
Buildings to Resist Progressive Collapse.
• Provisions apply regardless of standoff distance or ability to
resist blast effects
78
Normal Dead and Live Load
“Normal” Deflection
79
Uplift
p Load
Deflection Due to Uplift
p
80
Reaction if Structure is Damaged
“Normal” Deflection
81
82
Determination of Design Requirements
Occupancy (Risk) Categories (Table 2-1 UFC 4-023-03)
Note: Occupancy Category has been changed to Risk Category in
UFC 3-301-01 to match terminology in IBC 2012
As defined by UFC 4-010-01 Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings
Occupancy Category II is the minimum occupancy category for these buildings, as their population or function may
require designation as Occupancy Category III, IV, or V.
\2\ C Section 1604.5.1 Multiple occupancies of the International Building Code (IBC) is applicable for determination of the
Occupancy Category including the provisions for structurally separated structures. /2/
A
B
83
83
Determination of Design Requirements
Occupancy Categories and Design Requirements
(Table 2
2-1
1 UFC 4-023-03)
4 023 03)
Occupancy
Category
Design Requirement
I
No specific requirements
II
Option 1: Tie Forces for the entire structure and Enhanced
Local Resistance for the corner and penultimate columns or
walls at the first story.
story
OR
Option 2: Alternate Path for specified column and wall removal
locations.
III
Alternate Path for specified column and wall removal locations;
Enhanced Local Resistance for all perimeter first story columns
or walls.
IV
Tie Forces; Alternate Path for specified column and wall
removal locations; Enhanced Local Resistance for all perimeter
first and second story columns or walls.
Note: Occupancy Category has been changed to Risk Category in
UFC 3-301-01 to match terminology in IBC 2012
84
84
Design Requirement - Tie Force Method
•Tie Forces
–Building is mechanically tied together,
enhancing continuity, and aiding development
of alternate load paths
Note catenary action of
perimeter beam over
p
failed column
85
85
Design Requirement - Alternate Path Method
•Alternate
Alternate Path
–Requires structure to be capable of spanning
over a missing structural element (column or
load-bearing wall)
Plastic Hinge, Typ.
Note enhanced beam-column connections in
steel
t l framing
f
i
86
86
U
Uncontrolled
t ll d Public
P bli Access
A
• UFC 4-023-03 requires interior columns and/or walls to be evaluated for
progressive collapse where there is underground parking or other
uncontrolled public access.
• Access control at controlled perimeters will not normally be considered
to establish sufficient positive access controls for buildings within those
perimeters to be considered to have controlled public access.
• Positive access control will be considered to include (but not be limited
to) electronic access control on all exterior doors
doors.
• Where visitor processing makes locking visitor entrances during
building operating hours impractical, providing personnel to control
visitor access can be considered positive control at those entrances
entrances.
• Controlled public access to individual buildings or groups of buildings
should be coordinated with local physical security policies and
procedures
procedures.
87
• Progressive collapse UFC requires positive access
control to building to avoid analysis of interior walls
and columns
• Positive building access control includes
 Electronic access control
 Personnel to control visitors
 Other systems
y
defined locally
y
• Controlled perimeter is NOT considered positive
building
g access control
88
DoD Minimum AT Standards for Building
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights
WINDOW HAZARDS
89
WINDOW HAZARDS
90
Historically cause
up to
t 85% off iinjuries
j i
in blast events
91
Extent of Glass Hazard
Case Study – Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building
10 BUILDINGS - COLLAPSED
25 BUILDINGS - SERIOUSLY DAMAGED
312 BUILDINGS - “FACIAL” DAMAGE
92
Extent of Glass Hazard
Case Study
Oklahoma City
Murrah Federal Building
93
Standard 10. Windows and Skylights
• Gl
Glazing
i and
d frames
f
mustt work
k as an integrated
i t
t d system
t
to
t provide
id
effective hazard mitigation – glass/frame/bite/anchorage/structural
support.
• Provisions
P
i i
apply
l all
ll standoff
t d ff distances
di t
even if conventional
ti
l wall
ll
construction standoff distances are met or exceeded.
• Minimum requirements
 Use laminated glass or polycarbonate
• Minimum of two 3mm (1/8 inch) annealed panes bonded together with 0.75mm
(0.030 inch) polyvinyl-butyral (PVB) interlayer for buildings exempt from
standoff and those having window/skylight replacement projects
 Window frames shall be aluminum or steel. Other materials must be
verified through testing.
 Connection design of frame to building structural support system
 Supporting Structural Elements
• ALL glazing systems must be designed for specific design basis
threat at the achievable standoff and provide required level of
protection.
94
Standard 10. Windows and Skylights
• Existing Building Triggers/Requirements
 Triggers
 Major Investment/Conversion of Use/Building Addition
 Window/Glazing replacement projects
 Requirements
 Replacement of existing windows that are triggered must
meet same requirements
q
as new buildings
g –
glass/frame/anchorage/structural support.
 For Window/Glazing replacement projects there is a need to
consider:
 Historical Significance/Look
 Standoff – may require the elimination of existing parking
 Structural Supporting Elements – may require interior demo to
evaluate/strengthen existing construction
95
Civil Engineering Magazine: October 2012
96
PUNCHED WINDOW
97
RIBBON WINDOWS
CURTAIN WALL
WINDOWS
STOREFRONT WINDOWS
98
TYPICAL WINDOW MAKE-UPS
Glazing
Frame
Depth
Structural or
gasket
material
e
Gasket
Material
Frame
Bite or
Rebate
Setting Block
Frame of
Aluminu
m or
Steel
Connection
SINGLE PANE
99
DOUBLE PANE INSULATED
GLASS UNIT (IGU)
•No more minimum window makeup
•ALL windows must be designed for blast
loads at achievable standoff distance and
provide required level of protection
•Allows
All
for
f design
d i
by
b
 ASTM F2248 design approach – “static
equivalent”
i l t”
 Dynamic Analysis
 Testing – ASTM F1642 w/Hazard Rating IAW
ASTM F2912
•Performance
P f
Requirements
R
i
t as defined
d fi d in
i Table
T bl 2-1
21
100
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights - References
•USACE PDC TR-10-02, Blast Resistant Design
g
Methodology for Window Systems Designed Statically
and Dynamically.
•ASTM Standard F 2248, Standard Practice for Specifying
an Equivalent 3-Second Duration Design Loading for Blast
Resistant Glazing Fabricated with Laminated Glass
•ASTM Standard E 1300, Standard Practice for Determining
Load Resistance of Glass in Buildings
•ASTM Standard F 1642, Standard Test Method for Glazing
g Systems
y
Subject
j
to Air Blast Loadings
g
and Glazing
•ASTM F2912, Standard Specification for Glazing and
Glazing Systems Subject to Airblast Loading
101
•Dynamic
Dynamic Analysis
 Guidance in PDC TR 10-02
 Use response limits for aluminum or steel
window frame members from PDC TR 10-02
 Use response limits for structural elements
supporting window from PDC TR 06-08
 SBEDS-W
102
•Testing
Testing
 In accordance with ASTM F 1642
 Test will include entire system including
Glazing
Frame
Connections to structural support
 Loading for test must be pressures and
impulses from applicable explosive weights at
the actual standoff distances.
 Hazard
H
d rating
ti iin accordance
d
with
ith ASTM F2912
103
•ASTM
ASTM F 2248 Design Approach







104
Glazing
Frames
Glazing frame bite
Connections
Structural Supporting Elements
Guidance in PDC TR 10-02
10 02
Results in a conservative
design
• UFC 4-010-01 provides baseline minimum levels of
protection with which all DoD inhabited buildings
must comply as long as they meet specific “triggers
• Those levels of protection can be achieved using
conventional construction if certain minimum
standoff
t d ff distances
di t
are provided
id d
• In all cases the analysis of window systems and
their supporting structural elements is required
• Structural engineers need guidance for the design of
window systems and their supporting structural
elements to resist the air blast associated with
terrorist explosive threats, whether it may be for the
minimum requirements or where higher levels of
protection are required and/or where more severe
threats need to be considered
105
• The two prevalent methods used in DoD to design
window
i d
systems
t
and
d th
their
i supporting
ti structural
t t l
elements to resist the air blast loading from terrorist
explosive threats are a static and a dynamic
approach. The preferred DoD method is the
d
dynamic
i method
th d as it provides
id more a more
optimized system
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights – Design Approach
106
Supporting
pp
g
Structural
Static Design
Supporting
Structural
Dynamic
Design
Glazing Static
Design
Glazing
g
Dynamic
Design
Level of
Protection
Levell off
L
Protection
Levell off
L
Protection
Level off
Protection
•Very Low
•Low
•Any Level of
Protection
•Very Low
•Low
•Medium
•Any Level of
Protection
Threat
Threat
Threat
Threat
•Charge Weight
I or II
•Any Threat
•Bounded by
ASTM F 2248
•Any Threat
Standoff
Distance
Standoff
Distance
Standoff
Distance
Standoff
Distance
•At or Beyond
Wall
Conventional
Construction
Standoff
Distance
•Any
An Standoff
•Bounded
Bo nded by
b
ASTM F 2248
•Any
An Standoff
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights - LOP
Level of Protection
Potential Glazing Hazards
Below AT standards
Doors and windows fail catastrophically and result in lethal hazards.
(High hazard rating)
Very Low
Glazing will fracture,
fracture come out of the frame
frame, and is likely to be
propelled into the building, with the potential to cause serious injuries.
(Low hazard rating) Doors will be severely deformed but will not
become a flying debris hazard. (Category IV)
Low
Glazing will fracture, potentially come out of the frame, but at a
reduce velocity, does not present a significant injury hazard. (Very low
hazard rating) Doors will experience non-catastrophic failure, but will
ha e permanent deformation and will
have
ill be inoperable.
inoperable (Category
(Categor III)
Medium
Glazing will fracture, remain in the frame and result in a minimal
hazard consisting of glass dust and slivers. (Minimal hazard rating)
D
Doors
will
ill be
b operable
bl but
b have
h
permanent deformation.
d f
i (Category
(C
II)
High
Glazing will not fracture. (No hazard rating) Doors will remain intact
and show no permanent deformation. (Category I)
Ref: UFC 4-010-01, Table 2-1
107
y g
– HAZARD LEVELS
 Very Low
Level of
Protection –
Inhabited
Buildings
Low Lev
vel of
Protecttion
 Low Level of
Protection –
Primary
Gathering
Buildings and
Billeting
Low Level of
Protection
Very Low Level of Protection
ASTM F1642 – STANDARD TEST METHOD FOR GLAZING AND GLAZING
SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO AIRBLAST LOADINGS
108
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights – ASTM Example
Problem Statement: Statically design the glazing, framing, bite, and connection
requirements
i
t for
f a 64” ttall
ll b
by 38” wide
id IG window
i d
for
f 88 lbs
lb att 100’.
100’
Solution: First determine the equivalent 3 second duration load from ASTM F
2248 09 NEXT SLIDE.
2248-09,
SLIDE It is found to equal 60.2
60 2 psf.
psf
Use ASTM E 1300 to determine a window with a load resistance greater than the
equivalent 3-second
3 second load
load, starting with a 1/4
1/4” laminated window with a minimum
of 0.030” PVB interlayer inner pane and a 1/4” monolithic outer pane. The
process for IG windows supported on four sides is described in section 6.11 of
ASTM E 1300. The NFL for each lite is found using the charts in Appendix A. Lite
1 will be the monolithic pane while Lite 2 is the laminated pane. NFL1 is found to
be 51.2 psf using FIG. A1.6 and NFL2 is found to be 55.4 psf using FIG. A1.28.
Non-factored load determinations are shown graphically in the next few slides.
109
ASTM F2248 – Equivalent 3-Second Duration Design Loading
110
ASTM E 1300 – Load Resistance of Glass
Non-factored loads
Lines of constant aspect ratio
111
ASTM E 1300 Table 2
112
ASTM E 1300 Table 5
113
GLAZING LOAD RESISTANCE
The GTF for each lite is determined from Table 2 in ASMT E 1300 and GTF1 and GTF2 were
both found to be 0.9. The LS for each lite is determined from Table 5 in ASMT E 1300 and LS1
and LS2 were both found to be 2.0 since both lites are the same thickness.
Now the LR for each lite can be computed by multiplying NFL, GTF, and LS all together.
Multiplying the values, LR1 was found to be 92.2 psf and LR2 to be 99.72 psf. The system
load resistance is equal to the lower of the values,
values hence the LR for this design is 92
92.16
16 psf
which is larger than the 3 second load of 60.2 psf so the glazing is acceptable.
114
FRAMING DESIGN
Next the framing is designed using twice the LR found above, which is equal to 184.3 psf. This load is then
divided into a long span and short span line load which yields 17.1 lbs/in and 12.2 lbs/in respectively. The
deflection limits of L/60 for the long and short span are found to be 1.1” and 0.63” respectively. Using a
simple beam deflection equation for an aluminum frame with a modulus of elasticity of 10,000,000 psi, the
minimum required moment of inertia can be determined.
determined By providing a frame with a moment of inertia of at
4
least 0.334 in in the long direction and 0.053 in4 in the short direction, the deflection will be less than L/60
for each, and thus be acceptable.
64”
64
64”
19”
26”
19”
38”
38”
115
BITE REQUIREMENTS: Using ASTM F 2248-09 to determine the bite requirement the
minimum depth is found to be 3/8”
3/8 with a maximum of 1/2”
1/2 . Since the window is an IG,
IG the
structural silicon only needs to be applied to the interior, laminated, lite.
CONNECTION LOADING: The connection load determined from ASTM F 2248-09 is twice the
LR since the peak blast pressure is larger than one half the LR. This load can be transferred
into a single force yielding 3,113 lbs which must be resisted by the connections. For this
example a self drilling screw was chosen with an ultimate shear capacity of 2,016 lbs. Based
on the simple calculations only 2 connectors are required, but to provide proper support for
the window 4 connectors are used, 1 at each corner fastened into the jam through the vertical
frame member.
116
Supporting Structural
Element Issues
•Surrounding
S
di
wall
ll
must be able to take
th load
the
l d from
f
the
th
anchors that fasten
th window
the
i d
frame
f
to
t
the wall.
117
“Type 5” Window Framing
118
MASONRY SUPPORTING STRUCTURAL ELEMENT, STATIC DESIGN
Problem Statement: Statically design the supporting structural elements of an 8 inch thick, 10’ high CMU
wall with reinforcement of #4 bars at 32 inches. The window that the supporting structural elements will
support is 64” high by 36” wide. Assume that conventional construction standoff distances are available.
Solution: The first step is to determine the moment and shear capacities of the typical wall section. By
using the equation below to determine the ultimate moment, it is determined that it is 1,451 in-lbs per inch.
Likewise the shear capacity can be found by using the equations below
below, which yields a shear capacity of
4,545 lb per foot .
119
Assume that the Mu/Vudv ratio is 1.0. An was found to be 46 in2 per foot, based on an 8” CMU block with
reinforcing at 32 inches.
The next step is to determine the tributary area factor using Equation 1 from UFC 4-010-01
4 010 01 which is shown
below.
The window spacing is calculated by adding together half the reinforcing spacing, half the window width,
and the distance from the reinforcing bar to the edge of the rough opening and multiplying the sum by the
height. The calculation looks like;
The wall area is 32 inches multiplied by the height. The tributary area factor can be calculated yielding a
factor of 1.22.
120
By applying this factor to the moment and shear capacities, the supporting structural elements must have a
moment and shear capacity of 1,770 in-lbs
in lbs per inch 12.8 lbs per inch respectively.
Try reducing the rebar spacing to 16 inches check the moment capacity using the same equations as above.
Next, check the shear strength of the wall using the reduced rebar spacing.
Since the moment and shear capacities are both greater than the required, reduce the spacing to 16 inches.
121
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights – Dynamic Design
•Dynamic design of window systems can provide more optimized
designs in comparison to those designed using the static
approach.
•Using
Using the dynamic approach,
approach a components response can be
more realistically and accurately modeled than the static
approach using simplified assumptions.
•The dynamic approach takes into account the actual blast load,
dynamic material properties, and the allowable dynamic
response of the component.
component
•Unlike the static approach, the dynamic analysis is not limited to
only
y laminated g
glass glazing.
g
g Most g
glazing
g types
yp can be
modeled using a dynamic approach.
122
DOUBLE PANE WINDOW, DYNAMIC DESIGN – SBEDS-W & SBEDS
Problem Statement: Dynamically design the glazing, framing,
bite and connection requirements for a 64”
bite,
64 tall by 38
38” wide IG
window for 88 lbs at 100’ for a very low level of protection.
Solution: First the glazing is designed using SBEDS-W. Input
the proper window height, width and distance from floor in the
input boxes. The window height can be assumed to be 24
inches. The input can be seen in
123
Input For
Glazing
System
Make-up
124
Input For Blast
Load Selection
And Hazard
Level/LOP
125
Results
Summary
Glazing
126
•The next step is to design
the window frame for the
blast load.
•One way that this can be
done is by using SBEDS-W
mullion module and using
the area tributary to the
window frame and designing
to the applicable level of
protection based on
response limits.
•Start with a given aluminum
frame as shown in
127
I = 2.291 in4
S = 1.145 in3
w = 1.17 lb/ft2
tw= 0.1875 in
d = 4 in
A = 1 in2
6063-T6 Al
E = 10,000,000 psi
Fy = 25,000 psi
Fu = 30,000 psi
• The mullion module should be opened in
SBEDS W and all proper input entered into
SBEDS-W
the worksheet.
• The span should be taken as the long
dimension of the frame in feet and the span
p
should be half of the short span of the
frame, also in feet.
• The mullion section properties can be
entered as a user defined section as shown
in to the right.
• After the section properties are input, the
mullion material can be defined also.
• The blast parameter inputs are the same as
in the window module of SBEDS-W as
shown above.
• The support weight should be the weight of
the glass. In this case 1/4” glass is 3 psf
and 0.030”PVB is 0.17 psf resulting in a
6.17 psf support weight since there are two
lites
128
• Once all the proper input has been entered,
the problem can be run.
run
• The lower right corner of the spreadsheet
(as shown to the right) has a results
summary
y which displays
p y the calculated
response.
• Aluminum response limits for a very low
level of protection are a ductility of 10 and
a rotational limit of 10 degrees.
degrees By using
these response limits, this section is
acceptable.
• Additionally
y the connection load can be
determined from this analysis also. Using
the peak reactions as the required
connection load insures that the frame will
be sufficiently
y anchored.
• For this example, the connection must
have a minimum capacity of 2,273 lbs as
displayed as the maximum Vu for
connection
ti as seen in
i the
th figure
fi
on the
th
right
129
MASONRY SUPPORTING STRUCTURAL ELEMENT, DYNAMIC DESIGN USING SBEDS
Problem Statement: Dynamically design the supporting structural elements of an 8 inch thick CMU wall
with reinforcement of #4 bars at 32 inches which spans 10 feet. The threat is 88 lbs of TNT at 100 feet.
The window that the supporting structural elements will support is 64” high by 38” wide. Assume a 15
psf façade.
Solution: Using SBEDS, the supporting structural elements can be designed. Most of the input values
are straight forward, while there are a few that could be confusing at how they were derived. Bw is the
effective width resisting the blast. In the case of a supporting structural element, it is half the distance to
the next reinforcement divided by the total tributary width
width, essentially the solid strip that exists
exists. For this
example the Bw factor is shown below.
130
SBEDS INPUT
CALCULATED PROPERTIES
131
•The results box displays
the majority of the output
that is needed.
•Assuming
Assuming a LLOP and the
masonry wall being a
primary member, the wall
has a limiting response of 2
degrees rotation per PDC
TR 06-08.
•Since the response is less
than the limits, the design is
acceptable.
•Additionally the shear is
acceptable.
132
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights – Testing
ASTM F1642 --“Standard
Standard Test Methodology for
Glazing and Glazing Systems Subject to Air
blast Loading”
g
ASTM F2912 H
Hazard
dR
Ratings
ti
•Provided standardized test
•No Break
methodology and
procedures for rating
•No
N H
Hazard
d
glazing subject to air blast
•Minimal Hazard
•Allows testing
g of glazing
g
g
•Very
V
Low
L
Hazard
H
d
with or without framing
system
•Low Hazard
•Method
M th d to
t test
t t and
d rate
t
•High Hazard
glazing, glazing with
framing, and retrofits
133
ASTM F2912 -“Standard Specification for
g and Glazing
g Systems
y
Subject
j
to
Glazing
Airblast Loading”
Standard 10 - Windows and Skylights – Testing
Shocktube
Open Arena Test
Shocktube with Witness Area
134
Desired Performance
Video Courtesy of Arpal
135
•Note Glazing Performs
Acceptably, Glazing Remains
In Frame
•Limited
Limited Glass Fragments into
Interior
•Frame Remains Attached to
W ll
Wall
Polycarbonate is
another
alternative
136
Retrofit Alternatives
137
Window Glazing
150 m
138
Collaborative Effort
•An
An effective site planning effort must be coordinated
with the entire design team to develop a cost effective
UFC compliant solution.
–Explosive charge weight at an installation can be
increased by the commanding officer.
–Standoff
St d ff Di
Distance
t
and
dU
Unobstructed
b t
t d Space
S
vary with
ith
exterior wall materials and structural system.
–Controlled
Controlled Parking and Access Road access control
measures must be approved by Installation Security.
–Building Occupancy can now also be defined by Life
Safety.
139
Take Awayy
1. More Consistent Application
pp
2. Non-Compliance should be reduced
3. Reduce conflict between security professionals and
design team
4. The Criteria requires input during project development
stage.
stage
5. Changes in conventional construction standoff
provide a general
g
reduction in
distances should p
building setback
6. Reduced costs of window systems and supporting
structural
t
t
l elements
l
t due
d to
t STD 10 changes.
h
Regarding 5. and 6. above – will require a careful balance
during BOTH planning and design phases.
phases
140
Resources
Unified Facilities Criteria Program:
http://www wbdg org/references/pa dod php
http://www.wbdg.org/references/pa_dod.php
Antiterrorism and Security Engineering Seminars:
http://www.wbdg.org/references/pa_dod_at_seminar.php
USACE – Army Corps –Protective
Protective Design Center:
https://pdc.usace.army.mil/
141
Thanks!
NAVFAC Atlantic:
John Lynch, P.E.
[email protected]
(757) 322-4207
142
G
GRAPHIC
C DISPLAY
S
O
OF TRIBUTARY WIDTH VALUES
S
143
Level of Protection
Mullion
Material
Hi h
High
M di
Medium
L
Low
V
Very
Low
L
μmax
θmax
μmax
θmax
μmax
θmax
μmax
θmax
Aluminum
1
-
5
3°
7
6°
10
10°
Steel
1
-
-
3°
-
6°
-
10°
Mullion/Frame Response Limits
144
Sitework Standards – Controlled Perimeter
New Construction – EW I
CCSDI
CCSDI
Parking
P
Controlled Perimeter
C
Note: CCSD = Conventional Construction Standoff Distance from Table B 1
Distance from Table B‐1
Low Occupancy
Portion of
Building
Inhabited
Buildings
Primary Gathering
Buildings or
Billeting
Low Occupancy
L
O
Building
I
Roadways
Parking
145
145
Sitework Standards - Controlled Perimeter
New Construction – EW II
Standoff - Parking and Roadways
Note: CCSD = Conventional Construction Standoff Distance from Table B 1
Distance from Table B‐1
CCSDII
Parking
P
Controlled P
Perimeter
Exp II
Low
Occupancy
Portion of
Building
Inhabited
Buildings
CCSDII
Primary Gathering
Buildings or Billeting
Low Occupancy
Building
I
Roadways
Parking
Unobstructed Space
146
146
Sitework Standards – No Controlled Perimeter
New Construction – EW I
Standoff - Parking and Roadways
Roadways
CC
CSDI
CC
CSDI
Parking
g
I
Note: CCSD = Conventional ff
Construction Standoff Distance from Table B‐1
Low
Occupancy
Portion of
Building
Low
Occupancy
Building
Inhabited
Buildings
Primary Gathering
147
147
CCSDII
Sitework Standards - Controlled Perimeter
Existing Construction – EW II
MSD
Existing
Building
(inhabited
CCSDII
)
MSD
MSD
M
CCSD
DII
Parking
Exp
p II
Controlled Parking
CCSD = Conventional Construction Standoff Distance from Table B‐2
148
MSD
Existing
Building
(primary
gathering)
Exp II
Roadways
CCSDII
No Parking
MSD = Minimum Construction Standoff Distance from Table B‐1
148
Sitework Standards – No Controlled Perimeter
Existing Construction – EW I
CCSDI
MSD
Existing
Building
(inhabited)
MSD
CCSDI
CCSDI
MSD
MSD
Parking
Existing
Building
(primary
gathering)
th i )
CCSDI
Exp I
Roadways
Exp I
Controlled Parking No Parking
149
149
Standard 2 – Unobstructed Space – ALL LOP
With Controlled Perimeter
Note: CCSD =
Conventional
Construction Standoff
Distance from Table B-2
Exp II
Parkin
ng
CCSDII
Low
Occupancy
Portion of
Building
Inhabited
Buildings
CCSDII
Primary Gathering
Unobstructed Space
6” (150mm high)
Low Occupancy
Building
Roadways
Parking
150
Controlled Perimeter
Standard 2 – Unobstructed Space – ALL LOP
Without Controlled Perimeter
Roadways
y
Exp I
CCSDII
CCSDI
C
CCSDI
C
Parking
Low
O
Occupanc
y Building
Inhabited
Buildings
CCSDII
Unobstructed
Space
151
Note: CCSD =
Conventional
Construction Standoff
Distance from Table B-2
Primary Gathering
Low
p
Occupanc
y Portion
of Building
Progressive Collapse and Blast Resistance Upgrade
Edward Zorinsky
Building
Omaha, Nebraska
152

UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings

Transcription

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