Analisa - Balai Litbang Agama Semarang

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ISSN : 2502 – 5465 / e-ISSN: 244 – 3859
Accredited by LIPI Number: 543/AU1/P2MI-LIPI/06/2013
Analisa
Journal of Social Science and Religion
Volume 01 No. 01 June 2016
Analisa is a peer-reviewed journal published by Office of Religious Research and Development Ministry
of Religious Affairs Semarang Indonesia. It specializes in these three aspects; religious life, religious
education, religious text and heritage. Analisa aims to provide information on social and religious issues
through publication of research based articles and critical analysis articles. Analisa has been published
twice a year in Indonesian since 1996 and started from 2016 Analisa is fully published in English as a
preparation to be an international journal. Since 2015, Analisa has become Crossref member, therefore
all articles published by Analisa will have unique DOI number.
Advisory Editorial
Koeswinarno
Religious Research and Development, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Semarang, Indonesia
Editor in Chief
Sulaiman
International Editorial Board
Florian Pohl, Emory University, United State of America
Alberto Gomes, La Trobe University, Melbourne Australia
Nico J. Kaptein, Leiden University, Leiden the Netherlands
David Martin Jones, University of Queensland, Brisbane Australia
Patrick Jory, University of Queensland, Brisbane Australia
Dwi Purwoko, The Indonesian Institute of Science, Jakarta Indonesia
Heidy Sri Ahimsa, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta Indonesia
Irwan Abdullah, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta Indonesia
Iwan Junaidi, Semarang State University, Semarang Indonesia
Komarudin Hidayat, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta
Bani Sudardi, Surakarta State University, Surakarta Indonesia
Muslich Shabir, Walisongo State University, Semarang Indonesia
Sutrisno, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta Indonesia
Zamroni, Yogyakarta State University, Yogyakarta Indonesia
Editors
A.M Wibowo
Samidi
Zakiyah
Siti Muawanah
Umi Mozayanah
Umi Masfiah
Assistant to Editor
Muhammad Purbaya
Mustolehudin
Musyafak
Arda Arief Ridhaffa
Mailing Address
jl Untungsurapati Kav 70 bambankerep Ngaliyan
semarang
Central Java, Indonesia
Email : [email protected]
Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion Volume 01 No 01 June 2016
INTRODUCTION FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARDS
The advancement of information and technology in this era has encouraged the editorial boards
of Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion to change some aspects of the journal for the better.
The first changing is the name of the journal since 2015, from “Analisa Jurnal Pengkajian Masalah Sosial
Keagamaan” to be “Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion”. As a consequnce, there is alteration
on the ISSN 1410-4350 to be 2502-5465. Furthermore, at this time, it is a must that a journal is published
electronically, as it is stated in the rule issued by PDII LIPI (the Indonesian Institute of Science). Tehrefore,
in 2015, Analisa started the electronic journal with E-ISSN 24443-3853, while the printed edition has been
published since 1996 and continued until now. Along with the changing of the name, Analisa began the
publication in English started vol.1.no.1 2016 as part of the preparation for being an international journal.
There are various articles submitted to Analisa in the beginning of 2016. These include Islamic
fundamentalism, terrorism, culture, Islam and Islamic education in Turkey. An article written by Tauseef
Ahmad Parray talking about Islamism is placed as the opening of this volume. He argues that the incidence
of 9/11 2011 in World Trade Center USA became a turning point for Western country to stereotype Islam
as terrorist. Furthermore, after that tragedy Islam is perceived as fundamentalist religion, extremist,
conservative Islam, radicalisms, and other negative stereotypes. In this article, he suggests that it is
necessary to evaluate the Western perspectives on Islam in which they labeled Islam as extremists.
The next article is entitled “The Chronicle of Terrorism and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia” written
by Zakiyah. This paper provides data and deep analysis on the series of bombing and terror happened in
Indonesia from 2001 to 2012. After the fall of President Soeharto in 1998, there were a series of bombing
and terror in some part of the country which caused hundreds casualties and great number of property
damages. This year was also a time for some extremists coming back to Indonesia after a long period of
exile abroad. These extremist figures then began their activities in Indonesia and they also disseminated
the radical ideology, establishing network, recruiting new members and preparing for terror and violent
action. Some of the terrorists and suspected of the bombing actions were indicated having connection
with the Islamic radical group which means that there is an Islamic militancy in Indonesia
The radical ideology was also spread at prominent university in Yogyakarta Indonesia. This
theme is discussed by Arifudin Ismail. He mentions that this ideology is not only spread by jihadists but
also by some activists in certain campuses. For instance, there are some discussions and discussion groups
existed in Gadjah Mada University, Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University, Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah
University, and Indonesia Islam University. In such activity, there is an indication that there is discussion
on “the radical ideology”. He focused his study on the exclusive students movement in Gadjah Mada
University especially related to how the religious doctrine (Islam) disseminated and perceived by students.
Besides the discussion of the Islamism, terrorism and radical movement as the phenomena
happened in Indonesia and in the world, this volume also offers other insights of Indonesia. Betty Mauli
Rosa Bustamn explores the Minangkabau tradition. She describes in her article how the local people
(Minangkabau) adopted Islamic values into their tradition from generation to the next generation. In
this paper, it can be seen that Islam and local culture are living in harmony. In addition, Asep N Musadad
talks about the assimilation and acculturation process between local traditions of Sundanese community
with Islam. He describes that the harmony between them can be seen on the literature; there is a cultural
change as a picture of how Islam and local tradition met and assimilated. Besides, in the folklore as he
mentions that some incantations used by shaman (panayangan) contain some symbols of Islam
Besides being practiced in the local tradition as mentioned earlier, Islam in Indonesia is
i
transformed and disseminated through electronic media such as television; this can be read at the next
article. Siti Solihati wrote a paper about how Islamic symbols are used by a soap opera broadcasted in a
national television. In this article, she found that there are some ideologies embedded in such program
namely; (1) ideology of materialistic-capitalist, (2) ideology of patriarchy, and (3) violent domination.
Napsiah and her colleagues wrote an article about how the people living in surrounding
the Merapi Mountain cope with the disaster especially when the eruption occurred and its aftermath.
Community living in Pangukrejo village near the mountain helps each other dealing with their disaster
related problems. They are hand in hand in re-building their villages without looking at their religious
background. All people participate in those activities since they feel that Merapi is their home and their
source of convenience and safety, therefore this honorable symbol should be preserved at all cost. They
argue that the eruption is the destiny from God, thus it is undeniable fact. At that time, they were at
the bottom level condition, so that to wake up from that situation they need to help each other (gotong
royong).
The last article in this volume is about the transformation of Islamic education at Imam Hatip
School in Turkey. This paper is written by Mahfud Junaidi. He describes that the curriculum in this school
aims to transfer the traditional norms based on the Islamic values. It is expected that by implementing
Islam, this will contribute to the development of society and nation-state in Turkey.
Please enjoy reading articles in this volume.
ii
Semarang, May 2016
Editorial boards
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion would like to thank you to all international editorial
boards for their support and their willingness to review articles for this volume. Analisa would also
like to thank you to all authors who have submitted their articles to Analisa, so that this volume is
successfully published.
Analisa do hope that we would continue our cooperation for the next editions.
Semarang, May 2016
Editor in Chief
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TABLE OF CONTENT
ISSN : 1410 - 4350/ e-ISSN: 2443 - 3859
Accredited by LIPI Number: 543/AU1/P2MI-LIPI/06/2013
Analisa
Volume 01 No 01 June 2016
Pages 1 - 138
Introduction from the Editorial Boards :: i
Acknowledgments :: iii
Table of Content :: v
RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON “ISLAMISM” DISCOURSE: AN EVALUATION AND
ASSESMENT
Tauseef Ahmad Parray :: 1-18
THE CHRONICLE OF TERRORISM AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN INDONESIA
Zakiyah :: 19-40
NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT ON CAMPUS: A ROLE OF CAMPUS’ MOSQUES IN RAISING
EXCLUSIVITY
(A Case at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta)
Arifuddin Ismail :: 41-58
THE SOCIETY OF MINANGKABAU IN TULIS SUTAN SATI’S SENGSARA MEMBAWA
NIKMAT: BETWEEN LOCAL TRADITIONS AND ISLAMIC TEACHINGS
Betty Mauli Rosa Bustam :: 59-74
TRACING THE “CULTURAL CHANGES” IN SUNDANESE LOCAL INCANTATIONS
Asep Nahrul Musadad :: 75-90
THE USES OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS TO REPRESENT ISLAM
(A Study on Religious Soap Opera “Bukan Islam KTP”)
Siti Sholihati, Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra, Heru Nugroho :: 91-104
VALUE RATIONALITY OF PEOPLE LIVING ON THE SLOPE OF MERAPI IN YOGYAKARTA
Napsiah, Budhi Gunawan, Oekan Soekotjo Abdoellah, dan Munandar Sulaeman :: 105-120
IMAM HATIP SCHOOL (IMAM HATIP LISESI): Islamic School in Contemporary
Secular Turkey
Mahfud Junaedi:: 121-138
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vi
Analisa Journal of Social Science
and Religion
Vol 01onNo.01
June 2016
Recent
Scholarship
“Islamism”
Discourse: An Evaluation and Assesment
Tauseef Ahmad Parray
Website Journal : http://blasemarang.kemenag.go.id/journal/index.php/analisa
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18784/analisa.v1i1.263
RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON “ISLAMISM”
DISCOURSE: AN EVALUATION AND ASSESMENT
TAUSEEF AHMAD PARRAY
Assistant Professor (Contractual),
Department of Islamic Studies,
Islamic University of Science and
Technology, Awantipora Kashmir India
Email: [email protected]
Paper received: 25 January 2016
Paper revised: 27 February - 1 March 2016
Paper approved: 16 May 2016
Abstract
The events of 9/11 era had a number of dramatic results for ‘Islam’ and the Muslim
world; and one such result was a surplus of endeavors through various mediums
to conceptualize, hypothesize, and posit an ostensible ‘divide’ between ‘Islam’ (as a
religion, ideology, and political system) and Western culture and society. In post9/11 era, Islam was frequently used as a ‘violent’ and ‘terrorist’ religion and, on
the other, there has been a prodigious demand for information about Islam, and
things related to Islam. It gave a momentum, in the years to come, to an issue
(among a multiple of issues and discourses) referred as “Islamism”—a term/ label,
in many senses, used collectively but commonly for “Islamic fundamentalism”,
“Islamic extremism”, “Islamic conservatism”, “radicalism”, “political Islam”, etc.
This paper, in this backdrop, presents an assessment of the recent scholarship on
“Islamism” as a discourse. It highlights and presents a detailed evaluation and
estimation, with some critical and comparative notes, on some important works
dealing with various aspects and facets of Islamism (radicalism and political
Islam), and puts forward some insights on the future prospects of ‘Islamism’ as
a discourse.
Key Words: Islamism, Islamists, Political Islam, Radicalism/Radical Islam,
Islamic Fundamentalism
INTRODUCTION
It is a well-known fact that after the events of
9/11, a number of dramatic changes took place in the
political landscape. At the same time, these events
had a melodramatic effect for ‘Islam’ (as a religion,
ideology, and political system), for Muslims
(especially living in the non-Muslim countries),
and for the Muslim world. One of these outcomes
was a number of academic attempts to advance an
ostensible ‘divide’ between ‘Islam’ and Western
culture and society. In post-9/11 era, Islam was
repeatedly labeled, designated, and branded as a
‘violent’ and ‘terrorist’ religion and there has been
a prodigious demand for information about Islam,
and things related to Islam, which, in turn, gave an
impetus, in the coming years, to an issue (among
a multiple of issues and discourses) referred as
‘Islamism’—a term/ label, in many senses, used
collectively, commonly, and interchangeably for
‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘Islamic extremism’,
‘Islamic conservatism’, ‘radicalism’, ‘political
Islam’, and other related terms and labels.
This paper provides answer, through a
literature assessment, to the development and
advancement, expansion and extension, of
Islamism as a discourse; looks into its various
dimensions, and focuses on its future prospects
as well being theoretical and theoretic in nature
and analytical and comparative in methodology,
this paper focuses on some important works
which discuss various dimensions of Islamism. It
presents a critical assessment and evaluation, with
some comparative notes, on these works, which
deal with various aspects and facets of Islamism,
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Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion Volume 01 No. 01 June 2016
pages 1-18
and puts forward some insights on the future
prospects on this critical discourse. The framework
of the paper is as follows: in the introductory
section, it throws light on the definitions and
descriptions of ‘Islamism’ as a term as well as on
the alternative use of terms like ‘Islamism’ and
‘Political Islam’, and ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’.
It is followed by a detailed assessment and
evaluation, critically, of three important works on
‘Islamism’, viz: Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar’s
Radical Islam and International Security:
Challenges and Responses (2008); Roxanne L.
Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman’s Princeton
Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts
from al-Banna to Bin Laden (2009); and Anders
Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion,
Radicalization, and Resistance (2012). This
evaluation is followed by a brief overview on the
‘Moderate Islamism’, with an explicit concentration
on Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senza’s Political
Islam in the Age of Democratization (2013). In the
conclusion, the focus is on the future of Islamism:
wherein it is argued that ‘Islamism’ is not only a
complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, but is
a varyingly contested discourse, and one of the
most significant, complex, and political ideologies
of the 21st century. It concludes that the more
this discourse is discussed and debated, the more
complex and intricate it becomes to determine
precision and position of this discourse.
Defining ‘Islamism’
Defining “Islamism”, a disparately debated and
diversely deliberated discourse, is distressed and
fraught with difficulty and intricacy. Frequently
invoked with caution and caveats, vigilance
and warning, Islamism, for instance, as defined
by Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim
Zaman(2009: 4)refers to the “contemporary
movements that attempt to return to the
scriptural foundations of the Muslim community,
excavating and interpreting them for application
to the present-day social and political world”.
A20th and 21stcentury phenomenon, Islamism
refers, in Roxanne Euben’s terminology (Euben,
in Bowering, 2015: 55),to those Muslim groups
and thinkers of last and present century “that seek
2
to recuperate the scriptural foundations of the
Islamic community, excavating and reinterpreting
them for application to the contemporary social
and political world”.In Political Islam in the Age
of Democratization, Kamran Bokhari and Farid
Senzai (2013: 19) define Islamism as an “early
twentieth-century construct, a specific Muslim
religio-political response to an otherwise secular
modernity”; and a “specific ideology adhered to by
a distinct collection of non-state actors seeking the
geographical revival of Islam in the post-imperial
age”.
Moreover, it is defined, by Sheri Berman(2003:
257); as “the belief that Islam should guide social
and political as well as personal life” or “the building
of an Islamic state” (Roy, 2006: 2) or “the brand
of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that
claims to recreate a true Islamic society, not simply
by imposing shari’ah, but by establishing first an
Islamic state through political action” (Ibid.: 58);as
“a religious ideology that insists on the application
of shari‘ah law [or Islamic revealed law] by the
state” (Benjamin and Simon, 2002:448-9); and
even as an “anti-modernist ideology of reform in
Muslim countries” (Ernest, 2004: 68); or simply,
as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by
individuals, groups and organizations that pursue
political objectives”, providing, in various means,
“political responses for today’s societal challenges
by imagining a future, the foundations for which
rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts
borrowed from Islamic tradition” (Guilain
Denoeux, 2002: 61).“Islamism” is regarded, by
Michael Laskier (2008: 115), “a virus that affects
Islam and is a destabilizing phenomenon”.
Islamism, now-a-days, in simpler terms, describes
a political or social movement, organization, or
person that believes Islam or God’s will applies to
all areas of life.
Using ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’
synonymously
and
extensively—throughout
his The Future of Political Islam—Graham
Fuller(2003)is of the opinion that Islamism
is not an ideology, but “a religious-culturalpolitical framework for engagement on issues
that most concern politically engaged Muslims”
Recent Scholarship on “Islamism” Discourse: An Evaluation and Assesment
(Fuller,2003: 193; Italics in original). In his view,
“an Islamist is one who believes that Islam as
a body of faith has something important to say
about how politics and society should be ordered
in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks
to implement this idea in some fashion” (Ibid.: xi;
Italics in original). He is of the opinion that “Islam
itself, of course, is not a political ideology but a
religion. Yet Islamism is different: while it has
some aspects of political ideology, this ideology
takes various forms. Islamism is a broad term
embracing a body of quite variegated and even
contradictory political, social, psychological, and
economic—even class—functions. It is represented
by differing types of movements that draw general
inspiration from Islam”(Ibid.: 14).
Islamism encompasses and comprises a broad
spectrum, not necessarily coherent or consistent
across movements, and is not at all ‘monolithic’;
Islamism is really “a variety of political
movements, principles, and philosophies that
draw general inspiration from Islam but produce
different agendas and programs at different times,
often quite contradictory”(Fuller, 2003: 45).
Similarly, in Bassam Tibi’s terminology Islamism
is “a concept of order in the global phenomenon
of religious fundamentalism, aimed at remaking
the world” based on God’s Sovereignty (Tibi, in
Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 14). A “political ideology”,
it is an outcome of the current form of political
Islam—a process which leads to the “Shariatization
and jihadization of faith pronounced as a return
to tradition”( Tibi, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 12).
Although, the ideology of Islamism is different than
the religion of Islam, but it is the Islamism which
forms “the ideological foundation of political Islam,
an aspect of the overall phenomenon of religious
fundamentalism” .In a summary fashion, for Tibi,
it can be stated that “Islamism is not a delinquency,
but stands as a political phenomenon within
Islam as a social reality”. But, at the same time,
he cautions that “Islamism is an Islamic variety of
religious fundamentalism. Its emergence relates
to a structural phenomenon in world politics and
is not simply terrorism”(Tibi, in Frisch and Inbar,
2008: 12, 30).
Although the interchangeable use of terms
like political Islam, Islamism, and Islamic
fundamentalism is seen in most of the writings
on the subject, but Islamism’s description as
“fundamentalism” is still the most commonly
used English term that refers to “religiopolitical movements, Muslims or otherwise”,
although coined back in 1920s “Islamism” and
“Islamic fundamentalism” are mostly used
interchangeably(Euben and Zaman; 2009: 4, fn.
2),and are defined by Mahmud A. Faksh (1997:
xv), Islamism refers to “Islamic movements or
groups that want to use Islam as a political force
to mobilize the public, gain control, and reform
society and state in accordance with their doctrinal
religious agenda.” Not only this, but Islamism
is equated with “terrorism” as well. Especially
in the post-9/11 era, “Islamism” has been more
closely identified with “terrorism” so much so that
the two “terms and the phenomena they name
are often depicted as synonymous”(Euben and
Zaman, 2009: 3). Thus, Islamism as a discourse
is not a “monolithic” but diverse; it is a “modern
phenomenon”, and an “instrument of political
mobilization” and change (Bokhari and Senzai,
2013: 20-22). And given that Islamism continues
to evolve according to the circumstances and
events, it would be incorrect to think of Islamism
“as a fixed ideology to be accepted or rejected as a
whole” (Fuller, 2003: xi).
Are ‘Political Islam’, ‘Islamism’,
‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ Same?
and
Regarding the interchangeable use of terms
like political Islam, Islamism, and Islamic
fundamentalism, Bassam Tibi is of the opinion
that this use is highly “debated”, because
Fundamentalism is an analytical term and the
rejection of it is misleading. … Scholars who
use the term “Islamism” as an alternative to
fundamentalism are unknowingly contributing to
the stereotyping of Islam by implicitly restricting
the general phenomenon of the politicization
of religion to it. In contrast …“Islamism” is an
element of the phenomenon of political religion
known as a variety of religious fundamentalism.
This phenomenon is not limited to Islam; it is
also present in other religions. However, jihadism
3
pages 1-18
as the military dimension of this phenomenon is
specific to Islamism as an interpretation of Islam.
This compels the inquiry of Islamism to be included
in the field of security studies (Tibi, in Frisch and
Inbar, 2008: 24).
Similarly, Bokhari and Senzai (2013: 19) are
of the opinion that ‘Political Islam’ refers to all
political manifestations of Islam from the Prophet
to present; ‘Islamism’, an ideology, refers to a
20thcentury response to the Western secular nationstate based international system. Furthermore,
what also becomes clear, in the terminology of
Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn(2012), is that
Islamism is a “multidimensional paradox”, and is,
at the end, both “identity and ideology”, because,
“Islamism is both an identity and ideology, it is
simultaneously process and objective, tactic and
strategy, reality and ideal. It is a totalizing ambition
grounded in the diffusion between the public and
private spheres, between the present and the
transcendent. At the same time, the multitude of
local contexts, out of which Islamism has emerged,
have forced each individual group and movement
to socially construct its own distinct emphases,
its own focus and priorities, its own level of sociopolitical grounded-ness or abstraction.” But at the
same time, they highlight the cautiousness that the
“modalities by which that new reality is sought,
however, are diverse and divided”(Ibid. : 205-6).
“Islamism and Islamist denote”,in the
terminology of Peter R. Demant (2006: xxii,
xxv)“the radical religious movement of ‘political
Islam’”, and although “Islamic fundamentalism”
is its popular synonym, “Islamism is no unified
movement, and differs from country to country and
from one period to the next”(Italics in original).
For Demant, Islamism, “a politicized, antiWestern, and anti-modern reading” of Islam, is at
is at once “an ideology and a social movement”—
and it takes Islam “from religion to ideology”
(Ibid.: 89, 177,180).As an ideology, Islamism
is, for Demant, a “reaction against modernity
produced by modernity, during modern times,
using modern means, and irreversibly partaking
of modernity”(Ibid.: 181;Italics in original).
In “Contemporary Islamism: Trajectory of
a Master Frame”, Matthew Cleary and Rebecca
4
Glazier(2007: 2-3), are of the opinion that in the
last quarter of the twentieth century, “Islamism
emerged as a potent ideological force that
has challenged—and continues to challenge—
nationalist elites for power; one that has left
academics struggling to explain why, in an era
characterized by ever-increasing secularism, such
an ideology has attracted the support of so many
Muslims”.
Thus, “Islamism” has been defined differently
and debated variedly, and, hence has been burdened
and laden with difficulty. There are various ways,
in which scholars try to address this. There have
been many books on this issue and its multifold aspects. Mention may be made of these few
important works: A. Musallam, From Secularism
to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations
of the Islamic Radicalism (2005);Peter R.
Demant, Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of
the Muslim World (Praeger Publishers, 2006);
John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, Islam
in Transition: Muslim Perspectives(2007);
John Calvert, Islamism: A Documentary and
Reference Guide(2008); Hillel Frisch and Efraim
Inbar, Radical Islam and International Security:
Challenges and Responses (2008); Roxanne L.
Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton
Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts
from al-Banna to Bin Laden (2009); and Anders
Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion,
Radicalization, and Resistance (2012).And the
list continues, with more aspects and dimensions
being debated and deliberated, highlighted and
stressed, explored and studied. An assessment and
evaluation of some important works on Islamism
(especially of Frisch and Inbar, 2008; Euben and
Zaman, 2009; and Strindberg and Wärn, 2012)is
provided below.
John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito’s Islam
in Transition: Muslim Perspectives (2007) is a
collection of original writings by seminal thinkers
of the modern Muslim world from Sayyid Qutb,
al-Afghani, to Hamas and Khomeini. This book
presents a wide range of viewpoints from a crosssection of Muslim intellectuals and religious
leaders—from secular to devout, traditionalist to
reformist, and moderate to extremist. It addresses
crucial and critical key issues including Islam
and nationalism, socialism, the secular state,
economics, modernization, democracy, women,
jihad, violence, terrorism, suicide bombing,
globalization,
and
civilizational
dialogue.
John Calvert’s Islamism: A Documentary and
Reference Guide (2008)consists of an organized
forty-one (41) excerpted documents in nine
chapters, by subjects such as: “Islamist Movements
and Thinkers”; “Islamism, Democracy, and the
Limits of Freedom”; “Women and Family in
Islamist Discourses”; “Global Jihad”, etc. Aiming
to enhance and increase understanding of the
Islamist phenomenon, the documents in this work,
written by Islamists themselves, shed light on the
origins, goals, and practices of Islamic-focused
groups and movements throughout the Muslim
world. Each document is identified and analyzed
as to its significance, but very precisely and briefly.
Frisch and Inbar’s Radical Islam and
International Security:Challenges and
Responses (2008)1
Highlighting the intellectual and policy debate
on the nature of the radical Islam phenomenon and
how to respond to it, the goal of Frisch and Inbar’s
work is “to clarify the radical Islam phenomenon
and to discuss ways to combat the challenge”
(Frisch and Inbar; 2008: 7).
Radical Islam, no doubt, poses a political
challenge in the modern world which is like that of
no other radical religious movement. Ideologically,
it is perceived by Western policy makers as
threatening the liberal-democratic ideology by
which most states in the West abide and which
most other states rhetorically espouse. In this
framework, Radical Islam and International
Security—a compendium of a dozen of articles,
divided into three parts and preceded by 7-pages
‘Introduction’ by the Editors—serves as a welcome
addition to the intellectual and policy debate on
the nature of the radical Islam phenomenon and
how to respond to it. It is obvious that meeting any
1. My detailed review on this book was published in History
Studies—International Journal of History, 3(1): 2011, pp. 301-7.
challenge requires much more than writing articles
and books, but it is also true that intellectual clarity
is unquestionably a prerequisite for effective
strategic action. To “clarify the radical Islam
phenomenon and to discuss ways to combat the
challenge” is the “modest” goal of this collection
(Frisch and Inbar; 2008: 7).
The first part (consisting of chapters 1-3)
seeks to understand the Islamic challenge in broad
comparative and historical terms; the second part
(chapters 4-8) deals with specific regional case
studies, seeking to identify contrasting patterns
of uniformity and variation inradical Islam across
a wide swath of terrain; while the third part
(chapters 9-12) is policy-oriented, suggesting
possible responses to the Islamic challenge. Here
only those chapters are highlighted which discuss
radical Islam or Islamism directly.
In the first chapter, “Religious Extremism
or Religionization of Politics? The Ideological
Foundations of Political Islam” (pp. 11-37),
Bassam Tibi argues that radical Islam has little
to do with traditional Islamic precepts, and since
the “Arab defeat in Six Day War” there has been a
“religionization of politics along with a politicization
of Islam” (Tibi, inFrisch and Inbar, 2008: 11).
An emerging irregular war waged in the name of
Islam in the context of a religio-culturalization
is the major feature of the Islamist challenge,
and the conflict over the “Holy Land” of Israel/
Palestine is its major arena. Tibi rebukes European
cultural and political elites for not recognizing the
magnitude of the danger posed by the Islamists
and their conviction and sincerity which will
hardly be swayed by strategies of “engagement.”
Similarly, Tibi rejects Samuel Huntington’s “clash
of civilizations,” not because a clash does not exist
but because the Islamism these extremists espouse
is an invention of tradition, not Islam itself. Rather
than this clash of civilizations, he believes there is
a clash between Islamists and proponents of free
and democratic societies (Frisch and Inbar; 2008:
29). Refuting the idea of “multiple modernities”,
Tibi concludes that “Islamism is not another
modernity; it alienates Muslims from the rest of
5
pages 1-18
humanity in a modern world” (Frisch and Inbar;
2008: 31).
For Tibi, Islamism is a concept of order in the
global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism;
a “political ideology”, which is an outcome of the
current form of political Islam. For him, the ideology
of Islamism is different than the religion of Islam,
but it is the Islamism which forms the ideological
foundation of political Islam. He is of the opinion
that the goal of the Islamists is not the restoration
of the Caliphate as some self-proclaimed experts
contend; rather, the establishment of an “Islamic
Order” (nizam Islami) is the top priority of
political Islam. In the twenty-first century this has
become a competition between Pax Islamica and
Pax Americana (Frisch and Inbar; 2008: 16).
Concurring with Tibi’s prognosis that views
Islam in evolutionary rather than essential terms,
Ze’ev Maghen in chapter 2, ‘Islam from flexibility
to ferocity’ (pp. 38-43), asks why in the minds of
most Westerners and some Easterners, is Islam
“associated today with fury, fierceness, fanaticism
and intransigence”? Perceived to be a “harsh and
uncompromising faith” now, for most periods of
Islam’s 1400-year history and across the length
and breadth of “the Abode of Islam,” the Shari‘ah
(Islamic law) was in fact rarely enforced, and
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was almost a paragon
of flexibility to the point of championing canonical
laxity (Maghen, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 38).
His answer paradoxically lies in the tremendous
influence of Western thought on the Islamic world
rather than in its rejection, as argued by Bernard
Lewis and others. Maghen’s reading of recently
written fundamentalist tracts and treatises provides
evidence that this new Western way of looking at
things had begun to penetrate the consciousness of
the educated classes in Middle Eastern countries
by the end of the first half of the twentieth century.
The Islamists were no exception. This is when
a fascinating and monstrous hybrid began to
grow. Suddenly, the blurry lines and rounded
edges characterizing Islamic law and life were
unacceptable. “Islam, they frowned, is no laughing
matter!” Maghen concludes with a fervent wish to
see the “Religious corner-cutting, legal laxity and a
6
‘laid-back’ outlook” on life formerly characterizing
Islam renewed or “what pristine Islam was all
about” (Ibid.: 42).
In Chapter 3, “An economic perspective on
radical Islam” (pp. 44-69) Arye Hillman warns
that the world-view of the Islamists is inimical to
economic development and, inasmuch as they have
political influence, reduces the chances of such
integration. A focus on economic consequences
of radical Islam introduces two explanatory
concepts: supreme values and rent-seeking
behavior (Hillman, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 45).
Hillman shows that the greater the influence of the
Islamist value-system and ideology, the poorer the
economic performance of that society is.
This is followed by Part II, beginning by chapter
4, “The rise of jihadi trends in Saudi Arabia: the
post Iraq–Kuwait war phase” (pp. 73-92) by Joseph
Kostiner, who credits the Saudi Arabian elite for
embarking on a policy of reconciliation between the
different religious groups. In Chapter 5, “Islamic
radicalism and terrorism in the European Union:
the Maghrebi factor” (pp. 93-120) Michael Laskier
looks specifically at the involvement of Islamists
from the Maghreb (North Africa) and presents six
recommendations to “curb these developments”
(Laskier, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 115-17).
Combating ideas with ideas is the solution is the
theory, Jonathan S. Paris proposes in Chapter 6,
“Explaining the causes of radical Islam in Europe”
(pp. 121-133). This chapter examines identity
issues among Muslims in the Europe and the new
sense of global solidarity shared by European
Muslims with other Muslims throughout world.
Patrick James and Yasemin Akbaba in chapter 7,
“The evolution of Iranian interventionism: support
for radical Islam in Turkey, 1982–2003” (pp. 134152) employ the tools of International Relations
(IR) theory to study radical Islam in Turkey,
particularly as it was influenced by the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The study focuses on the “Iranian
support for radical Islam in Turkey following the
transition from the 1979 Revolution through
2003” (James and Akbaba, in Frisch and Inbar,
2008: 134).The state–proxy nexus takes on much
greater importance in Rushda Siddiqui’s analysis
of the Islamic dimension of Pakistan’s foreign
policy, where support for proxy insurgents is a
means to balance against a vastly more powerful
neighbor, in chapter 8, “The Islamic dimension of
Pakistan’s foreign policy” (pp. 153-168).According
to Siddiqui, Pakistan has been one of the first
states in contemporary history to employ nonstate proxies to safeguard its interests in the region
and in the international arena. But, today, the
country is considered both a “state sponsor” and a
“passive sponsor” of terrorism (Siddiqui, in Frisch
and Inbar, 2008: 153).
This is followed by part III, which focuses
on the responding to the Islamist challenge, but
is beyond the scope of this paper here. In sum,
presenting different kinds of ideas in its three
parts, Radical Islam and International Security—
begins with the term “Radical Islam” and ends with
the term “radicalization”—serves as a welcome
addition to the intellectual and policy debate on
the nature of the radical Islam phenomenon and
how to respond to it.
Euben and Zaman’s Princeton Readings in
Islamist Thought (2009)2
A selection of 18 texts both from individual
Islamic Intellectuals and from Islamic Sunni
groups, Hamas and the Taliban, it is a wide-ranging
anthology of key ideas and prominent thinkers—
from the early twentieth century “Islamist”
thinkers/ intellectuals to the present (some
even living)—who have formed and fashioned,
shaped and designed “Islamism” over the past
century. It brings together a broad spectrum of
“Islamist” voices on a variety and multiplicity of
issues—ranging from the relationship between
2. My three critical reviews and review-articles on this work have
been published. For details, see, Tauseef Ahmad Parray, “A
Critical Analysis of Euben and Zaman’s ‘Princeton Readings
in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to
Bin Laden’ (Princeton, 2009)”, Encompassing Crescent
(Online Magazine, New York: http://encompassingcrescent.
com), October 13, 2012; Idem., “Princeton Readings in
Islamist Thought (2009): A Brief Critical and Comparative
Analysis”, Islam and Muslim Societies: A Social Science
Journal, 6(1): 2013, pp. 110-22; Idem., “Islamists, Islamist
Thought, and Islamism”, Turkey Agenda, July 08, 2015 (http://
www.turkeyagenda.com/islamists-islamist-thought-andislamism-2594.html)
Islam, Jihad, and violence to Islam, politics/ state
and democracy, to gender and women’s rights/
position.
In this anthology, the editors—Roxanne
L. Euben (Professor of Political Science at
Wellesley College) and Muhammad Qasim Zaman
(Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Religion
at Princeton University)—take “Islamism” to refer
to the contemporary movements that attempt to
return to the scriptural foundations of the Muslim
community, excavating and interpreting them for
application to the present-day social and political
world(Euben and Zaman; 2009: 4).Consisting
of 19 chapters and divided into 5 parts (I-V),this
anthology also includes 46-page introduction (by
the editors) and biographical introductions and
notes preceding each “text”. These selected texts
cover the topics on a variety and multiplicity of
positions, ranging from the relationship between
Islam and politics/ state, to Jihad and violence,
and from Islam and democracy to gender, and
women’s rights/position. Thus, this selection
brings into sharp relief the ‘commonalities’
in Islamist arguments about politics, gender,
violence, Jihad, democracy, and much more.
Organized and arranged thematically and
subject-wise, and not in chronological order,
the “Islamists”—both activists and intellectuals,
incorporating those trained as “Ulema” as well
as “new religious intellectuals”—included in this
selection are: Hasan al-Banna (1903-49), Sayyid
Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903-79), Sayyid Abu’l
Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi (1914-99), and Sayyid Qutb
(1903-66) under Part I: Islamism: An Emergent
Worldview; Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (190289), Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1934-80), Hasan
al-Turabi (b. 1932), and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.
1926) are covered in Part II: Remaking the Islamic
State; Part III: Islamism and Gender includes
figures like Murtaza Mutahhari (1920-79), Zaynab
al-Ghazali (1917-2005), and Nadia Yassine (b.
1958); Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-82),
‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman (b. 1938), and Muhammad
Husayn Fadlallah (1935-2010) are covered under
Part IV: Violence, Action, and Jihad; while as
Usama bin Laden (1957-2011), and Muhammad
7
pages 1-18
‘Ata al-Sayyid (1968-2001) are discussed under
Part V: Globalizing Jihad. In addition, “Hamas”
and “The Taliban”, which were established in 1987
and 1994 respectively, are also included in part IV.
Below is presented an overview of each section/
part of this anthology.
Islamism as an “Emergent Worldview”
Each “text” is preceded by an “introduction”
of the author, ranging from 5-11 pages each
(5-6 pages in the majority cases), representing
and portraying—as becomes apparent from the
same—each writer (‘alim/intellectual/thinker) as
“Islamist” to fit as per the subject/text that follows.
For example, in Part I, “Islamism: An Emergent
Worldview”, the four intellectuals and religious
scholars discussed are portrayed as ‘Islamists’ in
these ways: (a) Hasan al-Banna is described as
the “father of contemporary Islamism, and with
good reason” (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 49); (b)
Mawlana Mawdudi is presented as one of the
“prolific Islamist writers” who is “responsible” for
Islamism in Indian subcontinent, but also as one
who has “influenced”, more than anybody else in
the 20th century especially, the “political vocabulary
of Sunni Islam” (Ibid.: 79); (c) Malwana Abul
Hasan Ali Nadwi is presented as “an influential
contributor to the Islamist discourses from 1950s”,
whose thinking, in thee editors’ view, “blurs the
boundaries between Islamists and ‘ulama” (Ibid.:
107); and (d) Sayyid Qutb is depicted as “one of
the most influential architects of contemporary
Islamist political thought” (Ibid.:129).
In the post-9/11 era, Qutb—whose ideology
constitutes ‘the fundamentals of radical Islamism’—
has been labeled and branded, for instance, as
“one of the most influential Islamists of the 20th
century” (Shepard,2013);one of the “great thinkers
of political Islam” (Akbaezadeh, 2012);“Founder
of radical Islamic political ideology”; (Moussalli,
2012); “The ideological founding father of
the salafi jihadi trend in Islamism” (MiltonEdwards, 2012);“an ideologue whose writings
are a manifesto” and a strategy, a platform and a
policy, “for revolutionary Islamists” (Musallam,
2005); “the foremost thinker of political Islam and
8
continues to be the most influential ideological
precursor of contemporary Islamism” (Tibi, 2008);
“The Philosopher of Islamic Terror” (Berman,
2003) and “godfather of Muslim extremist
movements around the globe” (Esposito, 2002),
“the father of modern fundamentalism” (Irwin,
2001), and the list of such labels and descriptions
continues.
Islamists and their Role in “Remaking the
Islamic State”
Part II, “Remaking the Islamic State”,
includes the writings of: Ayatollah Khomeini, who
is illustrated as one who “epitomizes Islamism”,
on second place after Osama bin Laden, “more
vividly for Western observers” (Euben and Zaman,
2009: 155); Baqir al-Sadr, whose legacy extends
well beyond the “intricacies of Shi’i politics in
contemporary Iraq”, (Ibid.: 185) as the “most
prominent symbols of Shi’i resistance to Saddam
Hossein regime” (Ibid.: 181); Hasan al-Turabi is
presented as the “influential Sudanese Islamist”
(Ibid.: 207); while as Yusuf al-Qaradawi is regarded
as the “most prominent scholar and preacher in
Sunni Islam” of 21stcentury (Ibid.: 224), who is also
an important figure who represents a new brand in
Islamism—the “moderate Islamism” (Ibid.: 303).
In this part, the selections are taken from
Khomeini’s “Islamic Government” on Islam and
Revolution; al-Sadr’s “The General Framework of
the Islamic Economy” focuses on the principles of
multifaceted ownership, economic freedom, and of
social justice; Turabi’s selection is taken from his
“The Islamic State” which discusses the “universal
characteristics of an Islamic state” derived from the
“teachings of Qur’an as embodied in the political
practice of the prophet Muhammad [pbuh] and
constitute an eternal model that Muslims are
bound to adopt as a perfect standard for all times”
(Ibid.: 213); and followed by Qaradawi’s detailed
answer to a answer on the relationship between
“Islam and Democracy”: the crux of the question
is: Is it true that Islam is opposed to democracy and
that democracy is a form of unbelief or something
reprehensible?
Islamists and Islamism vis-a-vis“Gender”
Issues
“Islamism and Gender” is the theme of Part
IIIof this anthology, including the writings of
Iranian Murtazza Mutahhari, Egyptian Zayanb
al-Ghazali, and Moroccan Nadia Yassine.
Mutahhari is presented an “Islamist” in the
sense that he is “widely organized as one of the
most important intellectuals” associated with
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Ibid.: 249); alGhazali is characterized as the “unsung mother”
of contemporary Islamist movements, whose
life and works have received “less scholarly and
popular attention”, a “pioneering” da’iya (female
preacher) “dedicated to bringing Muslims to Islam
through education, exhortation, and example”
(Ibid.: 275);while as Nadia Yassine—the “unofficial
spokeswoman for the most popular Islamist
group in Morocco”, Jama‘at al-‘Adl wa’l Ihsan
(the Justice and Spiritual Association, or JSA) as
well as the official leader of JSA’s women division
(Ibid., p.302) who has arguably joined, along with
al-Qaradawi, to the brand of “moderate Islamism”,
exemplifies all the “promise, pragmatism, and
complexity [that] the label [moderate Islamism]
suggests” (Ibid.: 302). Playing a “crucial role” in
bringing “the JSA’s blend of Islamism, Sufism,
and nonviolent populism to a new generation of
Moroccans”, she at once “articulates and embodies
the uneasy union of Islamism and feminism,
challenging a host of assumptions about each
along the way” (Ibid.).
In this Part, the chapters illuminate Islamist
gender norms by revealing the character and
content of Islamist concerns about the place and
purity of Muslim women, for “gender is frequently
an implicit preoccupation among Islamists”
(Ibid.: 40). Consisting of three chapters, this
part discusses “The Human Status of Woman
in the Qur’an” by Mutahhari—a full-fledged and
detailed answer to the crucial, critical, debated,
and debatable questions: what kind of entity
does Islam envisage woman? Does it consider her
the equal of man in terms of dignity and respect
accorded to her, or is she thought of as belonging
to an inferior species? (Ibid.: 254). It is followed by
al-Ghazalli’s two “texts”: one is “excerpts from the
1981 interview”, entitled “An Islamist Activist”,
and second is “From Days of my Life, chapter
2”—chapter 2 of her memoir, Ayam min Hayati
(Cairo, 1978)—which reveals her connections with
the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, Nadia Yaasine’s
“Modernity, Muslim Women, and Politics in
the Mediterranean” puts fort JSA’s and Yaasin’e
stand on gender issues: (a) Justice and Spiritual
Association (JSA), contrary to conventional
stereotypes, advocates both “nonviolence and the
sine qua non participation of women as the best
means of reproducing the model of social justice
promoted by the original Islam” (Ibid.: 314); and
(by way of conclusion regarding the Scarf) (b)
The Islamic Scarf, “a significant symbol of the
transformation of a movement”, is a testimony of
faith, as well as expresses threefold break: “When
a woman wears the Islamic scarf, she reclaims her
spirituality, reconquers the public sphere (because
the Islamic scarf is a projection of the private
sphere within that public space), and finally makes
a political declaration of dissidence against the
established order, be it national or international”
(Ibid.: 316-7).
Islamists and their Writings on Violence,
Jihad, and ‘Globalizing Jihad’
Part IV, “Violence, Action, and Jihad” consists
of the writings, Charter, and Interviews of ‘Abd
al-Salam Faraj, ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, ‘Hamas’,
Fadlallah, and ‘The Taliban’ respectively; and
Part V, “Globalizing Jihad”, consists of the fatwa
of bin Laden (or his declaration of war against
America) and Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sayyid’s “Final
Instructions”. The main argument put forward
in these two sections is that “Jihad is arguably
Islamists’ most consistently explicit concern”
(Ibid.: 40). Here, both individuals as well as groups
are presented as “Jihadists”.
Faraj has been described as “twenty-seven
year old electrical engineer from Cairo”, who was
executed six months later, along with four other
members of Jama’at al-Jihad, for the murder of
Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat, on October
6, 1981 (Ibid.: 321); ‘Abd al-Rahman, a blind
9
pages 1-18
Egyptian Shaykh, who was the “charismatic
maestro” responsible for the “urban war” or of
1993 bombings in USA (p.344); ‘Hamas’—the
abbreviated name of Harakat al- Muqawama
al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement),
established in 1987, meaning in Arabic “fervor”
or “zeal”—has been described as a “terrorist
organization and a network of social welfare, an
Islamic liberation theology” (Ibid.: 356); while as
Fadlallah is described as “one of Lebanon’s best
known Islamists and its most influential religious
scholars” (Ibid.: 387) and ‘The Taliban’—who
emerged in 1996 in Afghanistan’s scene—reveal,
both before and after 9/11, “a very different facet
of Islamism” than those represented by other
Muslim activists, groups, intellectuals, including
those presented here in this volume (Ibid.: 414).
On the same lines, bin Laden is described not
only as the “most famous Islamist of the twentyfirst century” but as the “primary founder and
financer of al-Qa‘ida”, who is, for some, “a warriorpriest”, and to others a “terrorist” who has twisted
Islam for “discriminate violence” (Ibid.: 425),
while as ‘Ata al-Sayyid is described as “one of the
five hijackers on American Airlines flight 11, the
airplane that tore into the North Tower of World
Trade Centre”—what is commonly known as the
9/11(Ibid.: 460). Collectively, these two parts put
forth the argument that Jihad is arguably Islamists’
most consistently explicit concern. For example, in
Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sayyid’s “Final Instructions”,
as the editors’ note, the language is “often brutally
crass or simple-mindedly therapeutic”—in the
light of observations of various scholars—and is
“unyieldingly rigid” in its “conceptual framework”
(Ibid.: 463-4). Nevertheless, this document also
“provides a window”, as the editors’ note (in
“Biographical Introduction of ‘Ata al-Sayyid),
“onto a worldview in which Islam is not simply
a repository for reflexive rage or rhetorical
camouflage for what are essentially socio economic
grievances, but rather a particular lens on religion,
history, geopolitics, and power” (Ibid.: 464).
Aimed and targeted, predominantly, to
enhance and increase understanding of the
Islamist phenomenon, the documents in this work,
10
written by Islamists themselves, shed light on the
origins, goals, and practices of Islamic-focused
groups and movements throughout the Muslim
world. Each document is identified and analyzed
as to its significance, but very precisely and briefly.
But what makes Euben and Zaman’s anthology
most distinctive, unique, and characteristic,
in comparison to other anthologies/ works on
“Islamism” on a similar pattern (for example,
Donohue and Esposito, 2007; Calvert, 2008)is
its “unique” feature of providing the reader with
“biographical introductions” or “biographical
notes” by the editor’s. These introductions
precede each selection, showing their expertise
and understanding of these intellectuals and the
subjects dealt. Doing more than just introducing
these ‘Islamist’ authors, they explore the
background, networks, and issue that link each
writer with broad patterns of Islamist political
thought. It is this unique and additional feature
that distinguishes and differentiates Euben and
Zaman’s work and makes it a ‘better guide’, a must
read for everyone interested in contemporary
Islamist through in particular and in listening
to the new and old voices, although “Islamist”
and “conservative”. The 46-pages “Introduction”
(Euben and Zaman, 2009: 1-46)and the significant,
comprehensive and well-informed introductions to
each chapter are worthy of, and call for, a cautious
reading and understanding, for this anthology
situates the selected intellectuals, or by that way
“Islamists” and their thought within the distinctive
Islamic intellectual tradition in all its complexity.
Thus, although a good and rich anthology of
Islamist readings, there are some shortcomings
in this anthology as well. For example, the editors
provide, in the “biographical introductions” of the
author’s, some highlights about the “texts”, that
follow, as well (e.g., as in chapters 8, 10, 15, and 19)
but do not do so for majority of them. One more
important point that needs to be highlighted is that
some of the “Islamists” included here have been
included and labeled as “liberal” by others: case in
point is Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who is also included
in Charles Kurzman’s anthology, Liberal Islam
(1998) under the section “Freedom of Thought”.
No doubt, Qaradawi is regarded/ labeled as the
“moderate Islamist”, but the overall impression of
the book is that all are (hard-line) ‘Islamists’, by
that way “Jihadists”. Same is the case with Nadwi,
for no other work has introduced him as a hardline/conservative “Islamist” so far.
Furthermore, while discussing Qutb (who
is regarded as the main source of “radicalism”,
“Jihadism”, and main inspiration behind alQaeda and other “terrorist” or ”militant” groups),
at the same time, the editors’ argument that he
“echoes of a mystic’s [although he was not a Sufi]
direct encounter with the fountainhead of truth
and knowledge are hard to miss in Qutb’s writings,
especially in his commentary of the Qur’an[Fi Zilal
al-Qur’an/ In the Shade of the Qur’an]” (Euben
and Zaman, 2009: 24); and, for this remark, they
quote the following opening lines of his Preface
of Qutb’s commentary: “Life in the shade of
the Qur’an is a blessing … unknown to anyone
who hasn’t tasted it” (Ibid.: 24; Italics by the
editors). Such contradictory statements add to the
complexity.
Finally, it seems confusing and perplexing
to see essays and excerpts on “women’s rights”,
“status of women” etc.—i.e., “gender” issues—
under “Islamism” label. All the scholars/ writers—
whether early modernists or present-day (living)
intellectuals, both male and female—who discuss
issues/ themes related to women, especially
regarding their “status”, “role”, “rights”, etc. are
labeled and termed as “feminist” scholars, and
as such this discourse is termed as “Feminism”—
whether in East or in the West—with added
prefixes like “Islamic”, “Western” etc. So here too,
one may possibly say, the editors create confusions
in readers’ minds.
Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn’s
Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and
Resistance (2012)3
Strindberg and Wärn’s work on ‘Islamism’ is
primarily and principally focused on an arduous
attempt to understand where, how, and why
Islamism emerges within the wider framework of
Islamic discourse, and what accounts for the often
vastly different political agendas, tactical choices
and strategic objectives of individual Islamist
groups (Strindberg and Wärn, 2012: 7).The
primary objective is to shed light on the nature
of Islamism, by examining, in its nine chapters
(including the Introduction and Conclusion, as
well), the complex interplay of diversity and unity,
and at the same time, re-examining critically the
received view within Western scholarship. It thus
attempts to answer a core set of questions (among
others):What is relationship of Islamist groups to
the specific sociopolitical contexts from which they
emerge? What factors determine groups’ tactical
and strategic choices? Is Islamism particularly
prone to militancy and, if so, why? Drawing on the
theoretical and methodological insights produced
within various fields—spanning from sociology
and psychology, to anthropology and political,
along with various case studies (of various global
Islamic movements)—the book under review takes
an interdisciplinary approach in answering these
questions.
Spanning over nine (9) chapters, from
Introduction to Conclusion, the book makes
discussion on Islamism from diverse point of
views, viz: Definitions and representations: the
legacy of Orientalism; ‘The Fanonian Impulse’:
Islamism as identity and ideology; Roots and
branches: From the Muslim Brotherhood to
Hamas; Islamists without borders: al-Qa’ida and
its affiliates; Hezbollah: Islamism as obligation
to resistance and governance; Bitter harvest:
Algerian Islamism; Western Europe: Islamism
as Mirror Image; and in the Conclusion, it draws
attention to Islamism and a fragmented quest for
dignity. In these chapters, the book makes the
reader understand through various current and
3. My previously published Reviews and articles on this book
include: Tauseef Ahmad Parray, Review on Anders Strindberg
and Mats Wärn’s Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and
Resistance (Polity Press, 2012), The Muslim World Book
Review, 34:2, 2014, pp. 60-2; Dr Tauseef Ahmad Parray,
“Understanding Islamism and Radicalism”, Kashmir Reader,
27 December 2014,p.7 (URL: http://www.kashmirreader.com/
understanding-islamism-and-radicalism/); Idem., “Islamism:
Emergence, Establishment, and Expansion”, Turkey Agenda,
23 May, 2015, (URL: http://www.turkeyagenda.com/islamismemergence-establishment-and-expansion-2460.html)
11
pages 1-18
emerging events to know, not only, what Islam and
Islamism are, but even the many ways in which its
local manifestations differ from and relate to each
other.
In this volume—by way of answering such
questions like what makes a movement Islamist?—
Strindberg and Wärn claim that “almost all of the
groups and movements examined in these case
studies [from Hamas and Hezbollah to Muslim
Brotherhood and al-Qa’ida] are to some degree
militant” (Ibid.: 7). For them, there are two main
reasons for this selection: first, these “major militant
groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qa’ida have
come to define Western imaginings of Islamism,
especially in the wake of 9/11 and the ‘global war
on terror’”; and secondly, because of their “iconic
status, calling attention to the complex social
dynamics, political nuances and widely divergent
aspirations” have, in fact, “implications for the
study of Islamism more generally” (Ibid.).This,
then, provides, argues the book, a powerful case
for an effort “to critically rethink our assumptions
and models for the study of Islamism in general; to
acknowledge the intellectual harm caused by neoOrientalist scholarship, and the disservice it does
to the communities it purports to study and to the
government officials and policy makers who rely
on its findings” (Ibid.).
Without any doubt, Islamist discourse
“appear[s] universal, but its interpretations, uses,
and implications are numerous” (Ibid.: 7), and
thus, the contemporary Islamism has its genesis
in a “purposive move” to address, to tackle, and
to deal with an “existential threat” (Ibid.: 68).
Making discussions, so to say, on Hamas and
Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qai’da,
and on Algerian Islamism and on Islamism as
“mirror image” in Western Europe, the book
challenges the persistent, constant and powerful
and dominant myth/allegory that “Islamism is a
monolith; a monolith, moreover, that is somehow
detached from the various sociopolitical and
historical contexts that surround it” (Ibid.:186).
Although, Islamism has emerged, in the
past century or so, as one of many political and
intellectual currents born in the centrifuge of
12
modernity as a means of dealing with its challenges,
in succeeding centuries—as the chapters of this
volume demonstrate—different Islamist groups
and movements have taken very “different paths
in their particular struggles, translating the faith
dimension in the different and often conflicting
ways, in part depending on whether they have
come to emphasize the process of liberation or its
objectives -resistance or statehood” (Ibid.: 188).
Moreover, the book also makes it emphatically clear
that the Islamist struggle must also be understood
as a “third wordlist struggle for independence
against foreign intrusion and domination, past
and present” (Ibid.: 191); and thus, the authors,
among others, conclude:
The effect of differentiated local contexts and
challenges is that groups and movements
labeled ‘Islamist’ have formulated disparate and
sometimes flatly contradictory understandings of
Islamist ideology and strategy. Islamist movements
and thinkers articulate and advocate an array
of shifting ideas and tendencies; some inclusive
and accommodating of those not like themselves;
others implacably hostile and absolutist to everyone
outside a narrowly conceived ingroup. Some,
like Hamas, have chosen a territorially bounded
national path while others, like the jihadists of alQa’ida, have developed a transnational narrative
and methodology in order to promote their
struggle(Ibid.: 194).
Furthermore, what also becomes clear is
that as Islamist narratives and aspirations went
from clashing with colonialism to confrontation
with neo-colonialism, it also moved to challenge
local post-colonial elites in a struggle for power
framed by the turbulence of de-colonization and
state building (Ibid.: 195). Finally, Islamism is a
“multidimensional paradox”, and is, at the end,
both “identity and ideology”: “it is simultaneously
process and objective, tactic and strategy,
reality and ideal” and is a “totalizing ambition
grounded in the diffusion between the public
and private spheres, between the present and the
transcendent” (Ibid.: 205). At the same time, the
multitude of local contexts out of which Islamism
has emerged have forced each individual group and
movement to “socially construct its own distinct
emphases, its own focus and priorities, its own
level of sociopolitical groundedness or abstraction”
(Ibid.); and thus the “modalities by which that new
reality is sought, however, are diverse and divided”
(Ibid.: 206).
One can, and of course one should, differ and
disagree with many viewpoints and arguments
made by Strindberg and Wärn in the different
parts of the volume. But, on the whole, it is a
welcome addition to this most interesting and
diversely debated theme/topic, and one of the most
significant political ideologies of the 21st century.
Making discussions on various facets and aspects
of Islamism and providing original and insightful
analysis on the emergence and nature, formation
and causes of Islamism, it is an interesting
read in knowing and exploring, critically and
conventionally, Islamism in 21st century.
“Moderate Islamism” or Moderation in
Islamism?
But there are other works too, which reveal
and divulge on other faces—which are moderate—
of “Islamism”. One such recent attempt is Political
Islam in the Age of Democratization(2013) by
Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai.4 It offers a
comprehensive view of the complex nature of
contemporary political Islam and its relationship
to democracy, by focusing on the process of
democratization vis-à-vis political Islam or
Islamism. Using ‘democratization’ as a theoretical
framework, the book examines and analyses the
landscape in which Islamism is evolving (Bokhari
and Senzai; 2013: 11), and is designed to contribute
to the scholarly debate on political Islam. It thus
provides a compelling and insightful analysis of
Islamism and the role that religion is likely to play
in any future Muslim democracy.
so in the years and decades ahead as the region
transitions through this democratization process.
Islamists of varying shades, for Bokari and Senzai,
become major players as authoritarian states
break down and autocratic leaders lose their grip
on power. Their widespread support may wax and
wane, but it is not likely to disappear. At the same
time, they make it clear that ‘Political Islam’ refers
to “all political manifestations of Islam” from
the Prophet to present; while as ‘Islamism’, an
ideology, refers to a 20th century “response to the
Western secular nation-state-based international
system” (Ibid.: 19).
Presenting the Islamism and Islamists,
present in various countries, as case studies
(chapters 4-10) Bokahri and Senzai mention and
discuss them with various labels. For example,
the Muslim Brotherhood (of Egypt, Jordan,
Syria, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia),
the world’s first Islamist group is presented as
“Participatory Islamists” (chapter 4); Salafis/
Salafism of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states as
“Conditionalist Islamists” (chapter 5); Al-Qaeda,
Taliban (of Afghanistan and Pakistan) and their
transnational and national Jihadismas “Rejector
Islamists” (chapters 6 & 7); Iran as “Participatory
Shia Islamists” (chapter 8); Iraqi Shia Islamists
and Hezbolllah as “Arab “Shia Islamism” (chapter
9); and Turkey’s AK Party as a case study for “PostIslamism” (chapter 10). Some of the central and
challenging arguments, Bokahri and Senzai, put
forward in this book regarding Islamism and postIslamism, are:
•
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)—in its
different periods like 1990s, post- 9/11 and
post-Arab Spring—represents the most
significant example of ‘democrats within
Islamism’ (Ibid.: 74)—a phrase borrowed from
the title of Azam Tamimi’s book on Rachid
Ghanouchi (2001).
•
Salafism, a religious trend as opposed to a
coherent political ideology, for much of its
history has been a non-Islamist force that
still suffers from a chronic poverty of political
thought (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013: 99).
Bokahri and Senzai divide Islamists into various
categories, like “Participatory”, “Conditionalist”,
“Rejectors” Islamists, and conclude that they
have played a central role and will continue to do
4. My reviews and write-ups on this book include: Dr Tauseef
Ahmad Parray, “Political Islam vis-à-vis Democratization”,
Turkey Agenda, August 19, 2015 (URL: www.turkeyagenda.
com/political-islam-vis-a-vis-democratization-2742.html);
Idem., “Political Islam, Islamists, and Democratization”,
Kashmir Reader, August 21, 2015, p.7
13
pages 1-18
•
•
•
No doubt Islamic Republic of Iran represents
the unique case of an Islamist state actor, but
Iranian Islamism is not a monolithic, as there
is a great deal of diversity among the Iranian’
attitudes toward democracy (Ibid.: 147-8).
Hezbollah, Hizb al-Dawah, and other similar
movements had no ideological aversion to
democracy (which was due to geo-political
considerations and not religious and
ideological ideals, thus setting them apart
from their Sunni counterparts, who are either
conditionalists or rejectors (Ibid.: 167).
AK Party of Turkey, a prime example of a
post-Islamist group making the journey out
of Islamism (Ibid.: 173), best exemplifies
the “post-Islamism” (Ibid.:182). However,
the term “post-Islamism” should rather be
understood in a sense that through the AK
Party Islamism had achieved political power.
In the Conclusion, (Ibid.: 185-95) Bokhari
and Senzai focus on the “Prospects for Muslim
Democracies” vis-à-vis Political Islam/Islamism
(Ibid.: 185). Examining the democratization and
Islamism throughout the Muslim world, through
the complex geopolitics of political Islam, the book
highlights the political Islam’s future trajectory in
the post-modern world as well as the theoretical
framework of “Muslim democracies” which is
likely to emerge in coming decades. They thus
conclude, predict, and envisage that
•
Islamists have played a central role and will
continue to do so in the years and decades
ahead as the region transitions through this
democratization process (Ibid.: 185).Islamists
of varying shades become major players
as authoritarian states break down and
autocratic leaders lose their grip on power.
Their widespread support may wax and wane,
but it is not likely to disappear (Ibid.).
•
Religion will likely play an important role
in Muslim politics as this democratization
process unfolds (Ibid.); and will play a role in
any type of Muslim democracy that emerges
from the interplay between participator and
14
conditionalist Islamism and democratization
(Ibid.: 194).
•
The outcome of Islamist democratization will
likely lead to Muslim democracies, as opposed
to Muslim democracy(Ibid.: 186; Italics in
original), because—throughout the Muslim
world, from Egypt to Iran, Turkey to Pakistan—
the majority of Islamists are participatory in
regard to democracy (Ibid.: 189)
•
Islamists will remain an integral part of
democratization and strive to capitalize on the
popular sentiment to integrate Islam into the
political arena (Ibid.: 195).
But, in comparison to making this
discourse to be made clear, comprehensionable, and understandable, all this has resulted
in creating more confusions, perplexities, and
misunderstandings: and the main reason, for
this worry and aggravation, is that the Muslims
intelligentsia and the Islamic movements who
have been branded and categorized under in this
‘label’, have either been prefixed with such labels
as “hard core”, “radical” or “moderate” Islamists/
Islamism—or, in Graham Fuller’s (2003: xix)
terminology, has been characterized by the
division of ‘radical/fundamentalist’ Islamism
versus ‘modernist’ or ‘liberal’ Islamism.
Conclusion: On the Future of Islamism
The above assessment shows that much has
been written on ‘Islamism’ as a complex and
multi-faceted phenomenon, as an interesting and
diversely debated discourse, and as one of the
most significant, but complex, political ideologies
of the 21stcentury.But, at the same time, these
works reveal that the more this discourse is
discussed and debated—from varied viewpoints
and perspectives—the more complex and intricate
it becomes to conclude what this discourse
actually/exactly is. Also, keeping in view its varied
definitions and descriptions, as well as its multiple
aspects and facets of Islamism, what becomes
obvious is that this discourse will continue to be
debated and discussed with more zeal and fervor
in the coming years as well.
In such a situation, what we find hard,
difficult, and challenging, is to answer and predict
the future prospects of Islamism. To answer this
crucial question, it is worthy to quote the Graham
Fuller’s insights and from the analysis and
conclusions of Cleary and Glazier. Fuller is of the
opinion that “Islamism is not the only vehicle for
reform and change by any means, but it will be the
dominant one, especially in closed societies”, but
what is true is that “Islamism in some of its current
guises will certainly run its course and recede in
popularity and importance over time—indeed,
that process is already observable in a few more
fringe or extremist movements. But Islamism as
a phenomenon will never fully disappear, because
its message in one sense is timeless for Muslims:
that Islam has something important to say about
the political and social order. Political Islam will
thus evolve and change, divide and unite, wax or
wane in its popularity, but it will not disappear”
(Fuller, 2003: 14)Similarly, on envisaging of the
future of Islamism or political Islam and the role
of jihadism in it, Cleary and Glazier (2007: 17)
conclude that “it is still unknown” and is “unclear”
because “the future of Islamism could lie down
either path”. What is clear, in their opinion, is
that “a lot will depend upon how the movement is
framed, who it reaches out to, and who will identify
with this new cause”.
To conclude, it is difficult at this critical-cumcrucial juncture to argue that whether ‘Islamism’
is only a ‘Political Discourse’, an ‘Ideology’, or
summarily a ‘Multidimensional Paradox’ (Parray,
2015b)or in other words, it is precarious to predict
the future prospects of Islamism: only time will
reveal what consequences this discourse (in its all
representations) discloses? Where it will lead us
to? And in what form/ model will it materialize?
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pages 1-18
18
Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion
The Chronicle
Vol 01 No.01
of Terrorism
June 2016
and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia
Zakiyah
THE CHRONICLE OF TERRORISM
AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN INDONESIA
ZAKIYAH
A researcher for the Office of Religious
Research and Development
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Semarang
Indonesia
Address : Jl. Untung Suropati Kav 69-70
Bambankerep, Ngaliyan, Semarang
Indonesia
Phone : 024-7601327 Fax. 024-7611386
[email protected]
Paper received: 12 February 2016
Paper revised: 27 February – 1 March
2016
Abstract
This paper examines the chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia and the relationship
between terrorism and Islamic militancy in this nation. This research focused
on bombing cases from 2001 to 2012 Data was gathered through documentary
research including primary and secondary resources. This research shows that
after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, there were bomb attacks on various
targets and militant extremists were able to return to Indonesia after long period
of exile abroad. They started again their activities including disseminating their
radical ideology, building networks and recruiting new members in Indonesia, as
well as preparing for militant actions. The perpetrators of these terror attacks were
mostly associated with the Islamic radical groups like Jemaah Islamiah and Majlis
Mujahidin Indonesia. These two militant groups had a close relationship with Darul
Islam, an organization founded during the colonial era that aimed to establish an
Islamic state and to apply Syariah as a state law. In addition, both groups became a
political window for al-Qaeda in Indonesia.
Key words: terrorism, Islam, Jihad, militancy, radicalism
INTRODUCTION
After the fall of president Soeharto in 1998,
there was a sea change in Indonesian politics.
The state altered from a centralized authoritarian
regime to a decentralized democracy and the
government has become more accountable to the
people (Ricklefs, 2012: 261). From 1998-2008
Indonesia experienced a democratic transition
marked with uncertainty and the rise of violent
conflicts (Effendy, 2003: 200; Hasan, 2006:
13). During the Asian financial crisis Indonesia
experienced economic collapse and chaos in
some parts of the country. In Jakarta, in May,
1998 Chinese-Indonesians became the target of
violence and shopping malls were set on fire in
the Glodok area of the city (Feillard and Madinier,
2011: 86). In the following years, there were social
uprisings and communal conflicts in several
provinces such as central Kalimantan, Moluccas,
West Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and Eastern
Nusa Tenggara (Hasan, 2006: 13; Varsney &
Tadjoeddin & Panggabean, 2008: 377-379).
The year 1998/1999 was also a time for
the birth of militias groups and radical groups
prepared to recourse to violence in Indonesia.
In August 1998 the Front Pembela Islam (FPI/
Islamic Defender Front) was created (Sukma,
2003: 344-345; Feillard and Madinier, 2011:
90). In 2000, Laskar Jihad (Holy war force)
achieved growing momentum and got popular
acknowledgement after they held a big gathering
attended by approximately ten thousand
participants in Senayan the main stadium in
Jakarta. At this gathering, the leader of Laskar
Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib, mentioned the need
for armed jihad (Hasan, 2006: 17).
19
pages 19-40
The regime change also made it possible for
religious extremists to return to their homeland
after a long period of exile abroad. Among those
the more politically prominent were Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar (Mietzner, 2009:
281). Both of them fled to Malaysia in the 1980s
and claimed to be the ideological successor of the
founders of Darul Islam (DI, abode of Islam), an
organization promoting the notion of Indonesia as
an Islamic state (Abuza, 2003, 126; Mietzner, 2009:
281). They returned to Solo, Central Java to run the
pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki and began teaching
Islam as well as organizing a new group (Vaughn
et all, 2008: 10). In 2000, Ba’asyir formed Majlis
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesia Mujahidin
council); this organization aimed to implement
Islamic law and to promote the Islamic state as
well as forming the political front for Jemaah
Islamiah (JI). The organization is recognized as
the hardliner group with its paramilitary wing
named Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (Hasan,
2006: 18). When the sectarian conflict arose in
Ambon, Maluku, in 1999 and in Poso Sulawesi in
2000, the organization seized a chance to recruit
and train members and send them to those conflict
zones (Vaughn et all, 2008: 10).
The political transition from the new order
to the reformation era was also marked with the
rise of national and transnational terrorism. There
were numerous bombings occurring throughout
the country including night club, hotel, churches,
mosques, shopping center, and other public areas.
From 1997 to 2002 there were ninety bombings that
injured more than three hundred people and 214
people were killed (Pusponegoro, 2004: 100). On
October 12, 2002, the bomb explosion happened at
Paddy’s bar and Sari night club in Bali killing 202
people, 82 of them were Australian (Ramakrishna
and Seng Tan, 2003: 1). Subsequently, on August
5, 2003, there was a car bombing at a hotel
owned by the American, JW.Marriot hotel chain
in Jakarta. This incident killed 11 people and
150 people injured (Ramakrishna and Seng Tan,
2003: 1; Pusponegoro, 2004: 100). The terror
attack continued throughout the decade with
several bombs detonated at various places. For
20
instance, the bombing of the Australian embassy
in 2004, the second bombing in Bali occurred at
a bar and a restaurant in 2005. In 2009, another
bomb exploded at the JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton
hotels in Jakarta. In 2011, a bomb blast occurred
at a mosque in Cirebon West Java and at a church
in Solo Central Java (Kompas, 2010: 1; Vivanews,
2011), and the recent bomb exploded in Thamrin
Street Jakarta in 2016.
These bombing attacks were linked to militant
Islamic group such as Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia
and Jemaah Islamiyah (Barton, 2004: 78-79;
Singh, 2010: 47; Jones, 2005: 3; Sukma, 2003:
341; Fealy, 2005: 25). It was reported that JI
was responsible for several bombing including a
bomb at the Philippine ambassador’s residence
in 2004, the first and the second bombing in Bali
in 2002 and 2005, the bombing at the Australian
embassy in 2004, and a series of bombing attacks
at hundred churches across Indonesia during
Christmas Eve in 2000 (Crouch, 2005: 44; Singh,
2003: 37; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 18). In
addition, JI was also associated with earlier terror
attacks, for example bombing at Istiqlal mosque in
1999, at two churches and at the Atrium mall in
Jakarta in 2001 (Singh, 2003: 37). Furthermore,
JI and its militias groups, Laskar Jundullah and
Laskar Mujahidin, were also involved in fighting
against Christians in the Maluku and Poso conflict
(Chrouch, 2005: 40).
The incident of those terror attacks and the
involvement of people affiliated with the Islamic
radical groups in such actions are evidences that
Indonesia faced a serious internal challenge from
terrorists and Islamic militancy. Although, several
terrorists including the emir of JI, Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir, were arrested by Indonesian police and
some received the death penalty, the underground
terrorists’ movement seems to be exist in some
part of Indonesia (Kompas, 2010: 1; Vivanews,
2011; the economist, 2010). For instance, Nasir
Abas, a former leader of JI who is now helping
Indonesian police, mentions that the death of
the leader of JI, Nordin M.Top in 2009 has not
stopped terrorism in Indonesia. This is because
one person killed does not mean the ending of the
The Chronicle of Terrorism and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia
Zakiyah
extremist ideology. This ideology still remains in
the heart and mind of the followers which is much
more dangerous (Straits times, 2009).
In more recent time, Indonesian radical have
been recruited to fight for the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS). In August
2014, the Indonesian police arrested two people
in Depok West Java as suspected supporters of
ISIS (Liputan6, 2014). Even, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,
from his jail, had encouraged his followers to
support ISIS, his messages had been delivered
to Mochammad Achwan, the leader of Jamaah
Ansharut Tauhid (the organization of which
Ba’asyir was as the former leader) (BBC Indonesia,
2014). Therefore, this paper has objectives to
answer these two questions namely; how did
terrorism evolve in Indonesia and what is the
relationship between terrorism and radical Islamic
militancy in Indonesia?
Literature Review
There has been much research on terrorism
and Islamic militancy in Indonesia over the last
decade. After the Bali bombing 1 in October
2002, many analysts and scholars studied this
issue. Besides, these events became an important
turning point for Indonesia to take part against
extremism like issuing some regulations and
counter terror law (Sebastian, 2003: 363-365).
Thus Sebastian argues (2003) that although there
were terrorism and many bombings before 2002,
the Indonesian government seemed to be reluctant
to take serious action against JI as the “suspected”
group supporting terrorism (Sebastian, 2003:
358). In addition, before the Bali bombing the
Indonesian government also failed to take action
against radical groups like Laskar Jihad and Front
Pembela Islam/FPI (Front of Islamic Defender)
which engaged in violence and breached the law
(Smith, 2005: 110). From a similar perspective,
Sahni (2003) argues that the Indonesian
leadership tends to hide the fact that there was
terrorism in their homeland, and they hesitated to
deal seriously with this threat (Sahni, 2002: 4).
After the Bali attack, there were growing
concerns on the issue of terrorism and Islamic
militancy in Indonesia. This incident demonstrated
that the threat from “the radical Islamic group”
was real. In addition, there was also the possibility
of international terrorist elements involvement in
this case that were connected in a network with
al-Qaeda, as Sukma argues (Sukma, 2003: 350353). Batley similarly argues that some of the
detainees in the bombing cases were members of
JI. In February 2003, three among the 19 arrested
people for the Bali bombing were alleged to be JI’s
members (Batley, 2003: 21). Furthermore, this
attack and the following bombing blast in August
2003 at JW.Mariot hotel in Jakarta are seen by
some commentators viewing Southeast Asia
particularly Indonesia as a “terrorists heaven”, as
Desker argues (Desker, 2003: vii). In April, June
and July 2003, there were 41 JI suspects arrested
in relation with the bomb at JW.Mariot hotel in
Jakarta (Batley, 2003: 20). In this context, some
commentators argue that due to these arrests of
those bombing suspects and the existence of the
organization of JI, it demonstrated how radical
Islamism had an International dimension in
Indonesia (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 125).
Besides, there was evidence that some important
members of JI had developed relationships
with other radical Islamic movements in other
countries. Even, many members of JI were trained
in Pakistan (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 128).
Break Batley (2003) particularly addresses the
relationship between JI and other transnational
radical groups (Batley, 2003). He wrote a book
entitled “The Complexities of Dealing with
Radical Islam in Southeast Asia, a Case Study of
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)”. In this book, he argues
that JI had evolved a “branch” or cell structure
across Southeast Asia including cell in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore and Thailand.
In each country, the cells have a special board
which is responsible for their operations in each
area. JI had also developed a regional network
and trained their member at their pesantren
(Islamic boarding school) and mosques. They use
Islamic sentiment and ideology to convert and to
radicalize new members and to build their regional
network (Batley, 2003: 11-17). In addition, they
21
pages 19-40
to utilize halaqah or small study group to teach
and spread their jihadist ideology (Batley, 2003:
11-17). Imam Samudra, the organizer of the Bali
bombing, promoted several halaqah in pesantren
and state Islamic senior high schools which
are headed by the supporter of Negara Islam
Indonesia (NII). They met and played videos
showing the violence by Christians against Muslim
in Moluccas and Poso. From these meetings, some
of the participants were invited to the next stage
of intensive training called daurah in which they
are trained to be involved in the terrorist operation
(Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 120). Moreover,
Batley shows that JI developed close relationship
with other hardliner groups in Southeast Asia
such as Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), the Malaysian Mujahidin group (KMM),
Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jihad and
Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia (Batley, 2003: 1920). JI, Singh argued, has linkages with the Arakan
Rohingya National organization in Myanmar, and
Gerakan Mujahidin Pattani Islam in Thailand
(Singh, 2003: 24).
The detailed character of the network of JI in
Southeast Asia was also explored in the work done
by Zachary Abuza (2003). He describes that every
cell of JI in each country has functions to support
the work of JI either with funding, recruiting
new members, or providing logistic (Abuza,
2003: 128-140). For instance, the Malaysian
cell is responsible for establishing commercial
companies which is connected with al-Qaeda and
has the capacity to buy weapons and to gathers the
material to make bombs. The Philippine cell by
contrast is responsible for the main logistics like
purchasing explosive bombs, arsenals, and other
facilities. The Singapore cell is in charge of the
planning of actions and the attacks. Meanwhile,
the Indonesian cell is the coordinating center of JI
operation (Abuza, 2003: 128-140).
The existence of JI and other radical Islamic
groups in Indonesia is not moreover a new
phenomenon. As Vaughn and Sydney Jones show,
historically, JI is closely related to the Darul Islam
movement that emerged in 1948 in West Java
and sought to establish shariah law in Indonesia
22
(Vaughn et.all, 2008: 10; Jones, 2005: 5). Two of
the important figures of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’syir and
Abdullah Sungkar are the ideological successors
of Darul Islam’s founder (Vaughn et.all, 2008:
10). In 1992 Abdullah Sungkar stepped out from
Darul Islam and then he formally established JI
on January, 1, 1993 (Vaughn et.all, 2008: 10).
Fealy (2005) argues that between 1993 to 2000,
JI focused on establishing the organization and
its network by recruiting new members, training,
generating fund, preaching to and teaching the
wider society (Fealy, 2005: 25). The first bomb
explosion associated with JI was in May 2000
at a church in Medan North Sumatra. Then on
Christmas Eve in the same year, there were more
than 30 bombings at several churches across
Indonesia (Fealy, 2005: 25). It was followed by
other bombing actions in the next years culminating
at nightclub bomb in Bali (Fealy, 2005: 25).
After the death of Abdullah Sungkar in 1999,
Jamhari and Jahroni argue that Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir became the emir of JI and established an
organization named Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia
(MMI) in 2000 (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 48).
This organization aimed to build an Islamic state
in Indonesia and it is claimed that most of the
members coming from many regions are originally
member of Darul Islam who want to revive the
Islamic state ideal (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004:
49). Feillard and Madinier claimed that Majlis
Mujahidin Indonesia provided a political window
for JI to be heard (Feillard and Madinier, 2011:
134). Subsequently in 2008, Ba’asyir founded
a new organization named Jamaah Ansharut
Tauhid (JAT) after he left MMI. In 2010, JAT
was suspected of providing funds for a JI training
camp in Aceh (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 130134). The position of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir toward
terrorist operation was questioned for many years
whether he was directly involved in operation or
merely called for radical reform of the state. He
was prosecuted in relation to terrorist attacks after
2002 but he often evaded sentencing or revived
short sentences. Only in 2011 was he sentenced
to 15 years imprisonment due to proof of his
involvement in several terrorists attacks (BBC, 27
February 2012).
Zakiyah
The literature on JI from 2000 demonstrated
the involvement of people associated with the
radical Islamic groups in the terrorist attacks
and showed an evolving relationship between
terrorism and Islamic militancy as previously
discussed. However, most of those studies focused
on JI and its transnational network. Besides,
they focused on the cases of Bali Bombing and
other bombing occurring from 2000 to 2005.
Therefore, this research exercise differs from the
earlier researches, whist drawing upon it because
it addresses terrorism and Islamic militancy in
Indonesia from 2001 to 2012. This study fills the
gap, provides some insight through the chronicle
of the cases during that period, and shows why the
terrorist engaged in those actions.
Theoretical Framework
This research chronicles the evolution of
new terrorism and its relationship with Islamic
militancy in Indonesia. To examine those aspects,
various frameworks are applied. The first thing
that arises in addressing the phenomenon relates
to the definition and scope of terrorism. Although
there is no fixed definition of this word, terrorism
in this research is defined as terror, intimidation,
attack, and violent actions against other peoples
conducted by non-state actors (Aly, 2011, 4-5).
In this study, it focuses only on a series of attacks
especially bombing cases undertaken by non-state
actors in several part of Indonesia between 2001
and 2012. These years were a period when many
bombing attacks happened in this country as
previously discussed and caused serious casualties
(Pusponegoro, 2004: 100; Ramakrishna and Seng
Tan, 2003: 1; Kompas, 2010: 1; Vivanews, 2011).
To know how those people are associated with
the Islamic radical groups, it is necessary to look
at the background of the terrorists. As previously
discussed, some of the detainees related to the
terrorism are member or former member of certain
Islamic groups like Jemaah Islamiyah. From this
point, it can be assumed that there is a link between
those people with the Islamic radical group.
Therefore, this study briefly analyzes the structure
and thinking of certain Islamic groups which are
considered as the “radical” group such as Jemaah
Islamiyah, Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia and Darul
Islam to establish the relationship between their
religious understanding and their recourse to
violent action (Crouch, 2005: 43-45). Then, this
research seeks to place these groups in the broader
context of Indonesian Islam, as the Islamic radical
groups are minorities living in a society generally
recognized as moderate in its Islamic approach to
politics (Hughes, 2010: 76).
To examine these phenomena, the ideology of
Islamism is examined. Barton (2004) mentions
that to understand the Islamic movement and
political parties, it is necessary to look at the
ideology and belief system of the organization
(Barton, 2004: 28). In relation to this, “Islamism”
is one of the ideological frames through which to
understand this movement. Islamism, unlike the
moderate views of Nahdlatul Ulama, considers
Islam profoundly linked to religious and political
purification. It means that Islam is not only
the belief system but also political ideology; in
other word, they will endorse Islamic law and
promote an Islamic state (Barton, 2004: 29-30).
Furthermore, the main ambition of the Islamists
is remaking the world. Regarding this matter, Tibi
(2012) argues that “Islamism is not about violence
but as the order of the world” (Tibi, 2012: 15). In
this sense, Islamism serves as the central ideology
of the political challenges. The reformed political
order is based on the concept of Dawla Islamiyya
(Islamic state), and Hukumiyyat Allah (God’s
rule) (Tibi, 2012: 15).
In this context, a further aspect that needs to
be looked at is the motivation of the terrorists. This
is an important step to understand the world-view
of the radical Islamist groups. In order to know
the terrorists motives, there are several elements
that should be looked at namely; firstly, how the
terrorists create their enemy. Generally, their
ideology and belief system will influence them
when constructing their enemy (Drummond,
2002: 56). For instance, a study done by Pavlova
(2003) mentions that the radical Islamists consider
that the modern society does not follow the
Islamic order and secularism and capitalism have
23
pages 19-40
returned the world to the period of ignorance or
Jahiliyya (the time before Islam and Muhammad’s
reception of the message). Hence, modern states
with their ruling elites are categorized as breaking
the God’s law and deviating from the path of Islam.
Therefore, the radical Islamists will see those not
following the path as their enemy (Pavlova, 2003:
32). To reinforce this Manichean division of the
world, terrorists give their enemy certain labels
like kuffar (infidel) and they seek fatwas (religious
instructions) to justify their actions (Pavlova,
2003: 32; Drummond, 2002: 56). Religion, in
this case, is used as the basis of their deed and
as the reason to gather people’s support, then
it is used to achieve their aim in establishing the
Islamic state and a new world order (Aly, 2011:3940). Secondly, as a result the terrorists argue
that violence is justified and they perceive killing
the enemy not as murder but part of their moral
obligation (Drummond, 2002: 60-61). In some
cases, Islamic radical groups see this as part of the
jihad to implement syariah law and to reach their
goals (Khan, 2006: 172-187). In the case of the Bali
blast, Smith (2005) argues that the main purpose
of their action is to create an Islamic state in the
region and to demonstrate a form of solidarity
toward al-Qaida (Smith, 2005).
RESEARCH METHOD
This study follows a process tracing case study
approach. It is a case study of terrorism and Islamic
militancy in Indonesia from 2001 to 2012 or it
could be described as evaluating Islamism from
the reformation era onward. As such, a qualitative
approach is used in this research. According to
George and Bennet (2005) a case study focuses on
the depth of data and identifying setting of the case
which can be applied to make inferences (George
and Bennet 2005, 31-32). In relation to this idea,
this research refers to the argument proposed by
Bailey (1994) who said that a case study can be
interpretive. It means that it not only describes the
data but also interprets it (Bailey, 1994 in Mcnabb,
2004: 359). To do this, there are several steps as
follows; (a) identifying and selecting the case as the
24
focus of the study; here I selected “terrorism and
Islamic militancy in Indonesia” as the case for the
study, (b) classifying the data based on the issues
namely; the chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia,
the actor and their motives, the terrorist groups
and their networks, (c) analyzing and interpreting
the data.
Data was collected using documentary
research. This method is used to gather data on
the chronicle of emerging terrorism and Islamic
militancy in Indonesia. This comprises primary
and secondary data. The primary data includes
testimony of the terrorists published in the mass
media, books written by some actors involved
in terror actions, and records of interviews with
the people involved in terror attacks that are
published in Western and South East Asian as well
as Indonesian media. Meanwhile, the secondary
data consists of government documents, law, news
from the media, and scholarly papers on this topic
either books or journal articles.
The Origin of Terrorism and Islamic
Militancy in Indonesia
The chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia dates
back to the colonial history of this country. Before
the independence of Indonesia, Muslim societies
were involved in fighting against the Dutch and
Japanese colonization. At that time, when the
country did not exist and consisted of a thousand
islands composed of various languages, traditions
and cultures, Islam played an important role as
the unity among them (Effendy, 2003: 15). Islam
is also used to mobilize people to participate in the
battles against colonialism. For instance, Islam
became catalyst of the war of Padri against Dutch
colonial in Minangkabau West Sumatra from
the 1920s to 1938, although the main purpose of
this revolt is actually to gain an economic control
over coffee trading (Feillard and Madinier, 2011:
9). Another example is the Java war from 1925 to
1930, the leader of this revolt, Prince Diponegoro,
used Islam to mobilize people with an Islamic
teaching background to fight against the infidels
(the Dutch) (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 9).
The Dutch policy, at that time, tried to restrict
Zakiyah
Islam as the main focus of the independent
movement. They tried to marginalize the role of
religious leaders by working with the traditional
abangan aristocracy or priyayi in Java. Priyayi
were the elites who had power to control and to
manage people. These aristocrats were selected by
the Dutch as the senior administrator who were
always superior to the religious leaders (Abuza,
2003: 61). Meanwhile, during this period many
Islamic groups emerged as prominent in the
nationalist movement (Abuza, 2003: 61; Effendy,
2003: 16). For example, Sarikat Islam (Islamic
association) was the first political organization
led by H.O.S Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim and
Abdoel Moeis. This organization was formed
from the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic trading
association) founded by H Samanhoedi in 1911 in
Solo (Effendy, 2003: 16-17; Feillard and Madinier,
2011: 13).
The main purpose of Sarikat Islam was to
achieve an independent Indonesia. However, the
Islamic nationalist organization suffered from the
introduction and growing influence of Marxism. In
1917, the ideology of Marxism started to influence
Sarekat Islam and undermined and caused
the decline of this group. The two prominent
supporters of Marxist ideology are Semaun and
Darsono, the leaders of Sarekat Islam branch in
Semarang. This situation resulted in two factions
in the organization; the Islamic and the Marxist
who fought over defining the movement and
agenda. In 1921 during the Surabaya congress,
the Marxist faction was expelled from the
organization, but this could not stop internal
disputes and fragmentation (Effendy, 2003: 16-17;
Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 13). Lastly, from 1930
onward, Sarekat Islam along with other activists
and intellectuals such as Syahrir and Mohammad
Hatta who had education background from the
Netherland, created a nationalist movement
against the colonialists (Effendy, 2003: 16-17).
Afterwards, In 1912 Muhammadiyah was
created by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta. This
organization represented the moderate Muslim
and reformists which has developed good
networks with mosques, educational institutions
and charity organizations (Ricklefs, 2012: 19;
Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 11-12). Then, in 1926,
the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was formed. This
organization showed a traditional response to the
modernist Islamic organization and a challenge
to the authority of the traditional Islamic scholars
(kyai). These two organizations focused mainly
on non-political matters such as education, social,
economy and health issues (Abuza, 2003: 61;
Ricklefs, 2012: 19). NU became a political party
after separating from Masyumi. NU participated in
the 1955 election (Ricklefs, 2012: 83-84). In 1973
the New Order government issued a regulation on
political parties that required nine existing parties
to merge into two parties; (a) Partai Perjuangan
Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democracy party)
for those national and Christian based parties,
and (b) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP,
Development Unity party) for parties with Islam as
the religion followed by majority of the constituents
including NU (Effendy, 2003: 49).
It should be noted in the evolution of
Indonesian political Islam that from 1941 to
1945, Japan came and occupied the East Indies
(pre-Indonesian country). Japanese policy was
different from the Dutch; they started to use Islam
to gain sympathy and to fight against Westerner
influence. They built an office for religious affairs
in charge of dealing with the Islamic problems
at the local level (Abuza, 2003: 63; Effendy,
2003: 27). The Japanese attempted to merge
all Muslim organizations into one entity. In this
case, the Masyumi became a single organization
representing all those organizations and the sole
Islamic political party. Moreover, the Masyumi
became a leading actor in fighting against Dutch
and in pursuing independence after 1945 (Abuza,
2003: 62).
In the period from 1940s to 1950s, the idea of
Islam and the state was spreading throughout the
country (Abuza, 2003: 62; Mietzner, 2009: 74).
There were heated debates between nationalists
and Islamists about whether Islam should be
included in the Jakarta charter or not, and
whether the newborn country should use Syariah
as the basis of state law or not (Barton, 2004: 68).
25
pages 19-40
For instance, Mohammad Natsir, the leader of
Masyumi, promoted daulah Islamiyah (Islamic
state) for Indonesia. On the other hand, Soekarno,
the nationalist leader, preferred a secular state
(Azra, 2003: 49).
One day after the declaration of the Indonesian
independence, on August 18,1945, Wahid Hasyim
(the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama) and other Islamic
scholars such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman
Singodimedjo, and Teuku Mohammad Hassan
made a compromise and dropped the sentence “in
accordance with the Islamic doctrine and tauhid”
in the first of the Pancasila (five principles of
Indonesia). They changed it to “belief in God is
one” (Barton, 2004: 68). They also approved to
remove some Islamic elements from the state law
including; Islam as the official religion of the nation,
Islam as a requirement for Indonesian president,
and all Muslims have to practice Islamic law
(Effendy, 2003: 32). Post colonial Indonesia was
not, therefore, an Islamic state although Indonesia
is a nation with the largest Muslim population in
the world (Azra, 2008: 52). However, the debate
regarding the relationship between Islam and the
state had not ended. Some people were upset with
the decision of the nationalist leadership. One of
them was Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo,
a former member of Masyumi (Azra, 2008: 49;
Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 11). He was
disappointed in the state political ideology and the
strategy toward the Dutch in preventing them from
coming back to re-colonize the nation (Effendy,
2003: 35; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 17).
On November15, 1946, Indonesian government
signed a Linggarjati agreement with the Dutch.
This agreement mentioned that the Indonesian
government approved to work under the United
State of Indonesia, and both Indonesia and the
Dutch agreed to withdraw their armies and made
clear boundary for both of them. Consequently,
the Siliwangi (troops) division had to leave West
Java and move to Central Java. Kartosuwirjo,
as the deputy defense minister, rejected this
idea because it disadvantaged Indonesia (Singh,
2003: 7). Then, in 1948 Kartosuwiryo declared
the creation of Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII,
26
Islamic army of Indonesia). In early 1949, there
was a clash between Darul Islam (DI, the abode
of Islam) and the new state’s troops. It was
happened when the Siliwangi troops rallied to
West Java after Yogyakarta was attacked by the
Dutch on December 1948 (Mietzner, 2009: 87). In
July 1949, Kartosuwirjo declared a Negara Islam
Indonesia (NII, Islamic state of Indonesia) with its
headquarters in West Java (Conboy, 2004: 138;
Singh, 2003: 6-8). The exact date of the birth of DI
was debatable, but it was generally said that it was
on August 7, 1949, along with the declaration of
NII (Fealy, 2005: 16-17).
DI spread to other parts of the country and
continued to fight against the Dutch and to
challenge the Indonesian nationalist government.
The fight was to last for many years (from 1949
to 1965) across the country including South
Kalimantam, West Java, Central Java, Aceh
and South Sulawesi (Fealy, 2005: 17). In 1962,
Kartosuwirjo received the death penalty and the
activities of DI were repressed by the military.
However, the ideology and the spirit of establishing
an Islamic state have never ended (Conboy, 2004:
138-139; Fealy, 2005: 20-21; Mietzer, 2009: 8687; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 11). The first
reappearance of DI was Komando Jihad (holy
war command). It was a militia group founded by
Dodo Mohammad Darda, the son of Kartosuwirjo
(Conboy, 2004: 140). Consequently today, DI was
recognized as the embryo of the current Islamic
militancy and radicalization in Indonesia (Conboy,
2004: 138-139; Fealy, 2005: 20-21; Mietzer, 2009:
86-87; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 11). DI
actively recruited new members through many
ways, not only using traditional based support
like pesantren but also enlisting members at the
universities and at senior high schools. From these
places, they built networks and cells for activities.
Besides, they held series of discussions at mosques
(Fealy, 2007: 70).
The characteristic of DI ideology can be seen
from its leader perspectives on several aspects
related to their own struggle (Fealy, 2005: 20).
Kartosuwirjo used Islamic terms in delivering his
thought such as (a) jihad or perang suci (holy war)
Zakiyah
to explain their action, (b) mujahid to describe
people involved in the holy war. These people’s
action were called as jihad fi sabillilah (holy war
for the sake of God), (c) the enemy was described
as kafir (infidel) or communists who should be
killed due to the religious reasons (Fealy, 2005:
21). DI leaders also distinguished between the
Islamic state (darul Islam) and non-Islamic state
(dar al-harbi) as their enemy. In this case, the
Indonesian republic was considered as the enemy
for it was not based on the Islamic law. Moreover,
the true Muslim had to follow the Darul Islam
(NII), whereas other Muslim who did not follow
this could be considered as an apostle. This notion
was also used as the reason to attack other Muslim
outside the DI (Fealy, 2005: 21; Fealy, 2004: 111112). Terrorism and Islamic militancy in the
reformation era
After the first Bali bombing on 12 October
2002, there has been much attention to the
terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia.
Many scholars mentioned that Indonesia has
become a target of terrorists and a source of jihadis
from the Islamic militant groups (Ramakkrishna
and Seng Tan, 2003: 1-2; Thayer, 2005a: 53;
Ankersen, 2007: 1). Furthermore, this radical
revival of Islamic militancy is also called as the
“new terrorism” since the targets are civilians,
Indonesians and foreigners (mostly Australian and
several Americans, Canadians and Europeans). It
is different from the old terrorism focusing their
targets on the property related to politics or state
assets (Thayer, 2005a: 53).
The attacks on two prominent nightclubs
frequently visited by western tourists to the peaceful
Bali island demonstrated that a serious terrorists’
threat in Indonesia. Moreover, there is also a threat
of Islamic militancy; this can be seen from the
confession of the perpetrators of the bombing who
are associated with JI (Ramakkrishna and Seng
Tan, 2003: 1). Among the 30 people arrested by
the Indonesian police, there are several prominent
actors related to Bali bombing namely Amrozi, Ali
Imron, Imam Samudra (the leader), and Abdul
Rauf; They are members of JI (Harsawaskita and
Laksmana, 2007: 72-73). Besides, these people
received their education from the pesantren alMukmin, al-Islam, or Lukmanul Hakim, the
Islamic education institution affiliated with
Ba’asyir (Batley, 2003: 11). Furthermore, Faiz bin
Abu Bakar Bafana, another suspected person who
was arrested and jailed in Singapore, confessed
during his interrogation that Imam Samudra had
participated in the previous bombing attack in
Jakarta. (Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 2007: 7273). He also mentioned that JI was responsible for
the Christmas Eve attacks in 2000 at various cities
in Indonesia and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was involved
in the discussion about terror preparation held in
Solo Central Java (Harsawaskita and Laksmana,
2007: 72). The arrests of those people depicted
that JI in Indonesia had links with other radical
Muslim groups. Indeed, it was predicted that
terrorism in Indonesia was interrelated with those
militant groups (Singh Daljit, 2003: 205).
The Bali incident was occurred just one year
after the 9/11 2001 tragedy, the attack on the
World Trade Center, in New York the United States
of America, so that this received international
attention. The focus was on a new type of the
terrorism and how the Islamic extremists have
relations with international groups (Kingsbury,
2005: 1; Thayer, 2005a: 54). Regarding this issue,
there is a significant debate over whether Islamic
militant groups in Indonesia have relationships
with transnational terrorists like al-Qaeda and
other groups or not. One of the reports released
by the Brussels-based International Crisis group
(ICG) in August 2002 mentioned that there was no
evidence about the relationship between al-Qaeda
and Islamic radical group in Indonesia (Barton,
2005: 76-77). This report focused on the Pesantren
Al Mukmin, Ngruki located in Solo Central Java
which was led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir; he was also
the founder of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)
(Barton, 2005: 77).
Another source described that there is a
connection between al-Qaeda and the militant
groups in Indonesia. Time magazine, as quoted
by Barton (2004), states that Omar al-Faruq, a
27
pages 19-40
Kuwaiti, was involved in a camp established by
Indonesian Islamist militants in Borneo. Al Faruq
had received training for three years at a camp
associated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Besides,
he had close relationship with camp leaders, alMughira al Gazairi and Abu Zubaidah who both
were close to Osama bin Laden. Al-Faruq married
an Indonesian through Agus Diwkarna (Barton,
2004: 16-17). Besides, it was mentioned that AlFaruq was the senior operative of al-Qaeda in
Indonesia (Williams M.G, 2003: 88).
The Indonesian intelligence agency also
disclosed that four members of MMI including alFaruk and Dwikarna were involved in the camp.
In March 2002, Dwikarna was arrested at Manila
port by the Philippine police. A month later, in
April 2002 Zubaidah was caught in Pakistan
(Barton, 2004: 17; Sukma, 2003: 351). Later
on, during the judiciary session 26 March 2002,
Mohammad Ikhsan also known as Idris, a witness
and a suspected of Bali Bomb 1, said that Osama
bin Laden gave US $ 30,000 to Mukhlas (Suhendi,
2012). Mukhlas also known as Ali Ghufron,
another detainee of Bali bomb 1, was reported as
the coordinator of the Bali bombing (Bately, 2003:
7). Before Idris’ confession, Ali Imron mentioned
about that money too during the tribunal at the state
court in Jakarta (Suhendi, 2012; Susanto, 2012).
This is an evidence that the Islamic extremists in
Indonesia have links to al-Qaeda (Suhendi, 2012;
Susanto, 2012; Thayer, 2005).
The network between local extremists and the
international group is a symbiotic relationship.
Vaughn et.al (2008) mentions that they share a
training camp in some countries including the
Philippines (in Mindanao), Afghanistan and
Pakistan. In addition, al-Qaeda offered financial
aid and technical expertise for operational matters
to JI (Voughn.et.all, 2008: 11; Thayer, 2005:
55). Furthermore, JI is believed to represent alQaeda in Southeast Asia. Moreover, after the
Singaporean government took action on the JI
cell in Singapore, the JI leadership was moved to
Indonesia (Gunaratna, 2003: 141).
The link between al-Qaeda with the local
28
extremists in Indonesia was shown at the guise of
Laskar Jihad as well (Chalk, 2002: 115). Laskar
Jihad was a militia group; the wing of the Forum
Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Waljamaah (Sunni
communication forum). It was founded on 30
January 2000 as a response to the communal
conflict in Moluccas in which they saw this conflict
as the intentional assassination toward Muslim
community (Chalk, 2002: 115; Jamhari and
Jahroni, 2004: 88-89). Therefore, they send their
fighters to Moluccas to help their fellow Muslims
fight the Christian “Kafir’ (Chalk, 2002: 115;
Hefner, 2008: 36).
The leader of Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar
Thalib, called involvement in that battlefield as
jihad. To justify this action, he sought a fatwa from
Muslim authorities in the Middle East, al-Abbad
of Medina said that going to the conflict zone in
Moluccas was lawful since it was to defend their
fellow Muslims from attacks. Similarly, An-Najm
of Mecca mentioned that jihad in Moluccas was
mandatory for Muslims to help their brothers. He
described three types of helping based on their
abilities; either with their body, their wealth or
their mind (Hasan, 2006: 116-117; Jamhari and
Jahroni, 2004: 100-102).
Meanwhile, Ja’far Umar Thalib, a son of
Abdullah bin Amir bin Abi Thalib from Yemen,
had experiences of involvement in the war zone.
He was engaged in the Afghan war against Soviet
Union in 1987. He was firstly trained in Peshawar
camp and then became the leader of volunteer
troops in Syria. In the Afghan war, he joined the
group named the Hisb-iIslami under the leader of
Gulbudin Hekmatyar. Afterwards, he joined the
group Jami’at-iIslami directed by Abdul Rasul
Sayyaf (Hasan, 2006: 71). After his arrest and
subsequent release in 2002, however, Ja’far Umar
Thalib disbanded Laskar Jihad (Hefner, 2008: 37
Hasan, 2006: 210).
Before the Bali tragedy, Indonesia experienced
several bombing attacks. For instance, in 2000
there were several bomb explosions at churches
in different cities during Christmas Eve (Crouch,
2005: 44). Regarding this case, it was reported
Zakiyah
that Omar Faruq confessed as the mastermind of
this action (Barton, 2004: 14). In addition, Umar
Patek, the suspected of the Bali Bomb 1, was also
reported responsible for attacks at six churches
in Jakarta (Natalia, 2012). In the same year,
there were other bomb blasts at the Philippine
embassy that caused the death of two people and
at Malaysian embassy, as well as a bomb at Jakarta
stock exchange building that killed 10 people
(Saifullah, 2009). One year later, there were four
incidents namely, a bomb at Santa Ana church and
HKBP church; caused five people died, a bomb at
Plaza Atrium Jakarta, a bomb at KFC restaurant in
Makasar, and a bomb at the front of the Australian
international school (Saifullah, 2009).
After the Bali attack, the threat of terror
continued. In 2003, there were three bomb
attacks: at the Soekarno-Hatta International
airport; at the police headquarters in Jakarta;
a suicide bomb attack at JW Marriot hotel in
Jakarta; (Singh, 2003: 28; Saefullah, 2009;
Jones, 2010: 120). Then, On September 9, 2004,
a bomb was detonated at the Australian embassy
in Jakarta. In total the bombings took 18 lives, all
Indonesian (Saefullah, 2009). In 2005 another
bomb exploded at a bar and a restaurant in Bali at
Kuta and Jimbaran Bay which is responsible for 31
deaths.(Bali post, 2005). Besides, there were other
bomb attacks in other places during this year; in
Tentena, Ambon and at a market in Palu Sulawesi
(Saefullah, 2009).
This data demonstrates that after the fall
of Soeharto, also known as the reformation era
terrorism had emerged in Indonesia. From 2001 to
2005, there were bomb blasts each year that caused
hundreds of deaths and injured (Bali post, 2005;
Saefullah, 2009; Jones, 2010: 120; Harsawaskita
and Laksmana, 2007: 72-73). The perpetrators in
each case were arrested and sentenced, but this
did not put a stop to the violence. This suggests
that the terrorists are not ended just because the
main actors of terrorism JI were jailed or killed
(Kompas, 2011). In addition, as a consequence of
the greater political openness, Islamic militancy
and radical groups resurfaced during these years
(Ricklefs, 2012: 409-410; Mietzner, 2009: 281).
The militant groups were MMI, Lakar Jihad, JI,
Komando Jihad, and FPI (Jamhari and Jahroni,
20-28). (Vaughn, 2008: 15; Singh, 2003: 27-28;
Barton, 2004: 17-19).
MMI was officially declared as an organization
on August 7, 2000 in Yogyakarta. It was a
response to Muslim political repression during
the old and new order era (Jamhari and Jahroni,
2004: 48-49). The main aim of this organization
is to build an Islamic state for the reason that the
essence of Islam is both a religion and a state (din
wa daulah) (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 49).
Moreover, the creation of MMI is intended to serve
as the political wing of JI (Feillard and Madinier,
2011: 124). In addition, it is understood that most
of the MMI constituents are former members of
Darul Islam (DI). Among those people involved in
MMI are Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Jones, 2005: 5) who
created this organization along with Irfan Awwas,
Surya hardi and Mursalin Dahlan (Singh, 2003:
38). At that time, Ba’asyir thought that during the
reformation era there were opportunities for them
to establish an Islamic state since there was much
more political tolerance (Signh, 2003: 38).
Following the death of Sungkar, Ba’asyir
became the main ideological pillar of their
movement. (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 5657). In 1971, they had founded a Pesantren alMukmin also known as Pesantren Ngruki in
Solo Central Java (Barton, 2004: 49). In the later
period, this pesantren formed the basis of what
the International Crisis Group called the “ngruki
network” (Wildan, 2013: 191; Singh, 2003: 39).
Ba’asyir and Sungkar had long opposed the
government policy and promoted an Islamic
state. In 1977, Sungkar and Ba’asyir created a
group named Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah;
this was also known as another form of DI (Singh,
2003: 18). A year later, Ba’asyir and Sungkar
were arrested by Indonesian government due to
subversion indictment. They were alleged that they
tried to destroy Pancasila, the ideology of the state
and attempted to promote an Islamic state (Jones,
2005: 5). Another source mentions that they were
29
pages 19-40
accused because of their participation in Komando
Jihad, an Islamic militia (Singh, 2003: 18). In
court, Sungkar confessed that he established a
community (jemaah) as a way to fight against
communism (Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2003:
19). Both of them were sentenced to nine years in
jail, but later the sentence was decreased to three
years on demand.
In 1985, Ba’asyir and Sungkar fled to Malaysia
where they built an Islamic school in Johor as
the training based camp and created additional
networks (Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2003: 19;
Jones, 2005:5; Mietzner, 2009: 90). Malaysia
became a safe haven for Ba’asyir and Sungkar. This
network helped them when recruiting volunteers
for participating in the war against Soviet Union
in Afghanistan (Barton, 2003: 31). In addition,
Ba’asyir and Sungkar actively recruited people
from other countries including Malaysia and
Singapore to participate in the military training in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Thayer, 2005: 69).
During their stay in Malaysia, Sungkar
formed JI in 1993 (Fealy, 2005: 25). Meanwhile,
Ba’asyir was known as the spiritual leader of this
JI (Smith, 2005: 113). Sungkar claimed that this
group was different from DI (Thayer, 2005: 69).
However, to say that this group totally different
from DI in reality was quite difficult. This is
because historically both DI and JI members were
interrelated. These two groups also share some
of the basic principles such as promoting Islamic
state, the differentiation between darul harbi and
darul Islam, the distinction between true Muslim
and infidel (Jones, 2005: 25-26). The main goal
of JI is to build the Islamic state and Islamic
community throughout Southeast Asia (Fealy,
2005: 25; Jones, 2010: 199). In the 1990s, Sungkar
met with several leaders of al-Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden at the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. He also pledged allegiance to Osama bin
Laden during that meeting (Abuza, 2003: 127).
From 1993 to 2000, JI focused their activities
on developing the network, recruiting members,
educating members, enhancing the members’ skill
and capability (Abuza, 2003: 129; Fealy, 2005:
30
112). To create external links, Ba’asyir and Sungkar
delegated Hambali and Jibril as their deputy.
During this period, JI was not involved in terror
action or attacks (Singh, 2003: 40-41; Abuza,
2003: 128-129). In this stage, Hambali made
linkage successfully with Islamic movements in
Southeast Asian countries such as KMM, MILF,
Abu Sayaf and other groups. He also established a
business company selling palm oil to Afghanistan.
This business was intended to make money for
financing logistics and material for their actions
(Singh, 2003: 41).
During the political transition in 1998, there
was an opportunity for some “extremists” to
return to Indonesia. In 1999, Ba’asyir and Sungkar
returned to Solo Central Java. They came back
to Pesantren Ngruki and continued teaching
(Thayer, 2005: 69; Abuza, 2003: 141). Sungkar
died in late 1999. This death caused friction within
JI, it was reported that younger militants were
not satisfied with Ba’asyir as the new leader. They
argued that Ba’asyir was considered too weak
and was easily influenced (Thayer, 2005: 70). In
2000, Ba’asyir founded MMI as an umbrella for
Muslim community to promote syariah (Islamic
law) for Indonesia and to build daulah Islamiyah
(Islamic state). To reach this goal, MMI conducted
legitimate activities such as teaching, publication,
public sermons, campaign, seminar, and rallies
(Fealy, 2004: 113-114).
On the other hand, the more militant
members of JI started to play a more “extreme”
role, Hambali, Imam Samudra, and Muchlas also
known as Ali Ghufron actively created a plan for
violent actions (Thayer, 2005: 70). For instance,
Hambali activated the Malaysian cell to attack
Western properties; however al-Qaeda did not
follow his instruction (Thayer, 2005: 70). Hambali
also planned the “Singaporean attack” in 1999 and
initiated other attacks including Christmas Eve
bombing in 2000, attack at the Philippine embassy
in Jakarta in 2000, Bali bombing 1 in 2002, and
bombing at the JW. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in
2003 (Singh, 2003: 41).
After the second Bali attack in 2005, there
Zakiyah
was no further major incident related to terrorism
until 2009. During this period, the Indonesian
police had arrested many important terrorists and
attempted to dismantle JI link (SuaraMerdeka,
2005; Jones, 2010: 172). For instance, in 2005
detachment 88 (special group of Indonesian
police) searched for terrorist’s house successfully
in Malang East Java and killed Azhari Husein, the
Bali bomb maker (SuaraMerdeka, 2005; Jones,
2010: 172). In 2007, other important figures of
JI were arrested namely, Abu Dujana (the leader
of JI militia) and Zarkasih (the new leader of
JI). In addition, several suspected people of the
Bali attack had been arrested in 2005 including
Hambali, Faiz Bafana, Abu Jibril and Abu Rusdan
(Jones, 2010: 172).
On 17 July 2009, bombing was renewed
with two attacks in Mega Kuningan Jakarta. One
suicide bomb attack was at JW Marriot hotel, and
another suicide attack was at Ritz Carlton hotel.
These explosions killed seven people (BBC, 2013;
Siradz, 2009). One year later, on 15 April 2010
Muhammad Syarif exploded himself during the
Jum’at praying at a mosque in the police complex
in Cirebon West Java. On September 2011 another
suicide bombing occurred at Bethel Injili Church
in Solo Central Java (Bbc, 2013).
There are different opinions regarding
whether the new attacks were affiliated with JI.
One report issued by police office mentioned
that the suicide bombers at Mega Kuningan were
invited by Ibrohim who was part of the West cell
of JI (Jakarta and Bogor) under Saifudin Zuhri as
the leader (Republika, 2009). Ibrohim worked as a
florist for both hotels; he masterminded the terror
action with Saifudin Zuhri and Noordin M Top, the
masterminds of bombings in 2003, 2004 and 2005
(Republika, 2009; Liputan6, 2009). However, Al
Chaidar, a terrorism expert, said that the actors of
the Mega Kuningan terror were not JI, since the
name of JI was not used anymore. Nevertheless,
he mentioned that they were associated with
Pesantren Ngruki due to the fact that Nur Said,
one of the suspected actors, was an alumnus of the
Pesantren (Okezone, 2009).
The bombing in Cirebon in 2010 was
reported as the work of the underground group
Tauhid Wal Jihad. This group was established by
Aman Abdurahman in 2003 (Beritasatu, 2011).
Detachment 88 mentions that from the collected
evidence, Syarif (the suicide bomber) might learn
to make bomb from Sigit Qardhawi, the leader
of Hisbah team and the leader of Laskar in Solo.
Sigit was involved in the bomb attack at the police
office and a church in Solo in 2010. The ideology
of Tauhid wa Jihad had some similarities with JI
as they use violence to achieve the Islamic state. In
addition, people in this group studied “Bergabung
dengan khalifah suhada” translated by the Arafah
group which was part of JI (Beritasatu, 2009). In
addition, Indonesian intelligent argues that people
in this group received training from Sogiri and
Rois (suspects of the Australian embassy attack).
These two were students of Azhari (the chief JI
bomb maker) (Beritasatu, 2009). Although, the
recent bombs are undertaken by a new generation
of radicals, Ansyad Mbai, the chief of BNPT (Badan
Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, the National
board for counter terrorism) considered that they
have links to JI. This can be seen from their modus
operandi that was similar with the past cases (Bbc,
2012).
Indonesian
Motives
Islam
and
the
Terrorists’
Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim
population in the world has many variants of
Islam. Clifford Geertz classically divided Muslims
in Java into tree types namely (a) Abangan, the
nominal Muslim peasantry living in a rural areas,
this group is also characterized as syncretism
between Islam and Hinduism as well as Animism
or the old Javanese traditions. (b) Priyayi, the
aristocratic class and also syncretism in tendency
and, (c) Santri, the strict Muslim practicing Islam
or the conservative and traditional Islam (Du Bois,
1961: 603; Benda, 1962: 404-405; Azra, 2003:
39). Meanwhile, in the recent era the distinction of
these Muslim are not referred to the occupation or
place of living, but more the religious orientation
and their political affiliation (Du Bois, 1961: 603).
31
pages 19-40
Moreover, Geertz also describes that majority
Muslims in Indonesia are generally nominal
Muslims or abangan (Azra, 2003: 39-40). In
this sense, Indonesian Islam was recognized as
different from the Middle Eastern Islam or less
Arabized (Azra, 2003: 40).
Islamic based organizations that have various
ideologies existed in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah
and NU are the two biggest Muslim organizations
and are considered a moderate groups (Ricklefs,
2012: 408). Besides, there are many other
organizations such as Persis and Al-Irsyad
which concern on social aspect and providing
education (Abdullah, 2013: 75-76). Meanwhile,
other scholars mention that the santri group had
influenced the life of community. This can be
seen from the transformation of the society who
tends to be more orthodox. For instance, more
Indonesians now travel to Mecca for pilgrimage,
and distribute alms giving and donation to the
needy. Institutions for collecting and distributing
alms were created like Dompet Dhuafa Republika,
along with the establishment of Islamic banks
and Islamic insurance (Azra, 2003: 40-43). Smith
further argues that the orthodoxy in the practice
of Islam in Indonesia reflected “Arabisation” and
the opposition to the idea of democracy as well as
“Neo-Salafi”(Smith, 2005b: 100).
The dynamic of Islam in Indonesia is also
influenced by global factors. For instance, the
Middle East continued to influence Indonesian
perspectives like the idea of pan-Islamism and
Wahabism (Azra, 2003: 43-44). In the past,
Wahabism influenced the Padri’s movement
in West Sumatra in which they tried to impose
the literal understanding of Islam, but they were
not successful. This group used some terms like
jihad and dar-alharbi in order to fight against
colonialism (Azra, 2003: 44). The Wahabist’
ideology influenced on the contemporary radical
groups too (Batley, 2003: 4). In quoting the
Qur’an and Hadith, JI preferred to use the raw
understanding of Islam and choose the most
suitable parts for their actions such as the verses
on jihad and Islamic law (Batley, 2003: 4).
32
The contemporary radical Islamic groups like
JI and MMI have objectives to build an Islamic state
that is generally different from the mainstream
Islam in Indonesia (Azra, 2003: 51). Also, there are
many other factors which influenced those militant
groups such as political marginalization and the
hatred toward the West (Feillard and Madinier,
2011: 271). The JI interpretation of certain Islamic
texts had given them legitimacy to fight against
their “enemy”. One of them is “jihad”, this term
can be traced back in the JI’s commands and
objectives. It is stated at the JI’s charter that Jihad
mussalah (military struggle) is the final stage of
JI’s planning. This Jihad is a way to prepare an
Islamic state, and to build the Islamic caliphate
accordingly (global Islamic governance) (Pavlova,
2007: 82).
The declaration of Jihad against their enemy
including the West legitimated radical groups
to use violence (Dolnik, 2007: 108). This can be
perceived from their attacks from 2000 to 2012
(Pusponegoro, 2004: 100; Crouch, 2005: 44;
Singh, 2003: 37; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005:
18; Kompas, 2010: 1; Vivanews, 2011). The attitude
of militant groups toward jihad differentiated
them from the majority Islam. Mainstream Islam
usually emphasizes their interpretation of jihad as
a non-violent action and only favored jihad when
under attack (Fealy, 2007: 66).
Some terrorist attacks in Indonesia used
suicide bombings as the strategy for their jihad. It
was started at the Bali bomb 1 on 12 October 2002;
a man detonated himself at Paddy’ Bars cafe and
another bomber exploded a van loaded with 1000
kg of bombs outside the bar (Dolnik, 2007: 110).
Suicide bombing continued in the following
years: in 2003, Amir Latin Sani exploded himself
at J.W Marriot hotel in Jakarta; on 1 October 2005,
the explosion in Jimbaran food court in Bali was
undertaken by suicide bombers named Muhammad
Salik Firdaus, Misno, and Ayib Hidayat; on July
2009, Dani Dwi Permana was the suicide bomber
at J.W Marriot hotel in Mega Kuningan Jakarta;
Nana Ikhwan Permana exploded himself at Ritz
Carlton hotel in Megakuningan Jakarta; on 15
Zakiyah
April 2010, Muhammad Syarif exploded himself at
a mosque near police office in Cirebon West Java;
on 29 September 2010, Abu Ali exploded himself
near a police officer in Bekasi; on 25 September
2011, Ahmad Yosepa Hayat was the suicide bomber
of Bethel church in Solo Central Java; on 3 June
2013, an un-identified bomber exploded himself in
front of the police station in Poso South Sulawesi
(Bbc, 2013; Chim and Si Yew and Song, 2007: 2;
Widjaya, 2007).
The act of suicide bombing in Indonesia is
called “pengantin” (bride). This term reflected
their doctrine that those martyrs will receive a
reward “meeting fairy” in heaven. Abu Wildan, a
friend of Noordin M Top, described that a suicide
bomber dies as syahid (a martyr) (Kristanti,
2009). These “will-be brides” (calon pengantin)
were recruited by Nordin M top and his followers.
Nordin’s network had recruited young people
and trained them for being a martyr/syahid. For
instance, Saifudin Jaelani also known as Saifudin
Zuhri recruited Dani Permana and Nana Ikhwan
Permana. Saifudin Zuhri claimed himself to be
an ustad (an Islamic teacher), he brainwashed
those “will-be brides” with the doctrine of jihad
(Widjaya, 2011; Kusaeni, 2009).
The doctrine of suicide bombing was related
to the idea of “martyrdom” or self-sacrifice.
Martyrdom was accepted as a way to promote the
sect. Martyrdom was different from “suicide” as
this martyrdom was self-sacrificing for the name
of God, and the logic behind the action was for
jihad (Cook, 2005: 142-143). However, besides the
religious belief, the strategy of suicide bombing by
radical groups was cheap. For example, the bomb
explosion in Bali II only cost $ 700 (Dolnik, 2007:
110). This type of attack results in many casualties
(Dolnik, 2007: 110-118).
The targets of bombing blasts in Indonesia
are various from night clubs, to embassies and
religious places. It can be said that every target
has its meaning and purposes. The attack at the
night club in Bali is a symbol of fighting against the
West (Hafidz, 2003: 396). During the Bali trial,
the key offenders mentioned that they committed
their terror attack for jihad against the US and its
allies as well as fighting against the negative moral
effects brought in by Westerners (Hafidz, 2003:
396). One of the offenders described that the Bali
bomb target was initially the US, but most of the
victims were Australian. This reflected al-Qaeda
warning to Australia for its involvement in East
Timor (Smith, 2005: 112). Similarly the attacks at
JW.Marriot and Ritz Carlton, two hotels with many
foreign visitors, were also a symbol of elites and
Western investment (Saefullah, 2009; Widjaya,
2011; Smith, 2005: 112).
JI and its network declared the US and nonMuslims as their enemy or their targets (Kompas,
2011:1). The hatred against the US was spread by
media outlets. (Batley, 2003: 8). The Bali bomb
was a revenge attack for the killing of Muslims
in many parts of the world such as Afghanistan,
Sudan, Palestine, Bosnia, Kashmir and Iraq
(Fealy, 2005: 29). Imam Samudra, the perpetrator
of the Bali attack, said that “there was genocide
toward Muslim communities in the Philippine and
Poso, Ambon as well as other places, therefore as a
Muslim I have to repay them; blood paid by blood,
life paid by life” (Fealy, 2005: 29). Furthermore,
the bomb attack at the Philippine embassy was
intended to show solidarity with separatist groups
in Southern Philippines. Meanwhile, bombings
at several churches were aimed to symbolize the
dispute between Muslim and Christian and also as
revenge for violence in Ambon and Poso (Smith,
2005: 112).
The post 2010 targets were different from
the earlier cases for mosques and police stations
became targets such as bombing in Cirebon in
2010 and Poso in 2013 (Bbc, 2013; Chim and Si
Yew and Song, 2007: 2; Wijaya, 2007). From the
testimony by Bayu Setiono, the bomber in Solo
Central Java, it can be understood that the police
station represented non Islamic government that
also must to be fought. Here is his testimony:
“Dan
rencana
kami
buat
pecah
Solo
atau amaliyah Solo. Target-target
kami
adalah
a parat
toghut, aparat polisi
itu
direncanakan
sudah
bertahun-tahun.
33
pages 19-40
Sekitar tahun 2007-2008 hingga sekarang. Dan
salah satu itu pula alumni Filipina atau Moro, yang
namanya Farhan dari Jakarta. Dia di Filipina dua
tahun. Di sana dia sekolah militer dan pulang ke
Indonesia tahun 2012. Disitu dia sudah membawa
senjata api, 200 amunisi dan granat.Di situlah
kami membuat pecah Solo. Dan membuat aparataparat togut ketakutan. Insya Allah tegaknya
syariah Islam. Dan khilafah Islamiyah. Dan kami
juga terdiri dari. Sekitar enam orang. Salah satunya
donatur kami, dan lima yang lain adalah alumni AlMukmin Ngruki Sukoharjo lulusan 2010. Kecuali
saya.” (Sindonews, 2012).
“and our plan was to break Solo and amaliyah Solo.
Our targets were toghut governance (government
that does not follow the God’s instruction), we have
planned this police office as the target for many
years, around 2007 to 2008 until now. One of the
alumni from the Philippine or Moro named Farhan
originated from Jakarta. He was in the Philippine
for two years. He studied military and came back
to Indonesia in 2012. In that place, he collected
weapons, 200 ammunitions, and grenades. In
that area, we broke Solo, and make toghut officers
afraid. God willing for the sake of syariah Islam
and khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic state). We were six
people. One of them was the donator; five of them
were alumni of Ngruki Sukoharjo 2010 except me”.
The terrorist network is also changing as well
as the shifts of targets. Dolnik (2007) mentions
that there were many new factions in JI that
emerged related to suicide bombing. The attack
on the JW Marriot hotel 2009 might come from
a new faction named Laskar khos (special force)
led by former leader of JI mantiqi III. The bomber
for Bali case came from the Thoifah Muqatilah
(combat unit) (Dolnik, 2007: 111-112; Jones and
Solahudin, 2014: 140). In the later period, the
extremists were engaged in low-tech assaults
(Jones and Solahudin, 2014: 140). For instance
the suicide bombing near police station in Poso
in 2013 was intended to create more casualties.
Yet, it only killed the suicide bomber (Jones and
Solahudin, 2014: 140-141; Bbc, 2013).
CONCLUSION
The chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia dated
from the colonial past of this country. It started
with the revivalist movement during the colonial
era; Masyumi, NII and TII all contributed elements
34
to the forming of DI in the post-colonial era. The
struggles of Kartosuwirjo, the leader of NII and
TII against the Dutch and against the idea of an
Indonesian secular state were the main spirit of
the DI. Besides, the main aim of this organization
was to establish an Islamic state and to implement
Syariah law, the ostensible aim of contemporary
jihadis. This organization was, in other words, the
embryo of the contemporary of Islamic radical
groups such as MMI and JI due to the similarity
of their ideology and their members, family and
kinship interconnections.
From many reports, the terrorists in the
majority of bomb attacks across Indonesia
are associated with JI. Primary and secondary
evidence show that the perpetrators confessed that
they were members of JI. The targets of terrorist
were various including bars, churches, mosques,
hotels, embassies and police offices. Each of these
targets had its meaning such as a symbol of the
West, symbol of the “toghut” state, and symbol of
the capitalist. The doctrine of jihad becomes the
ideological support to engage in the terror action.
This can be seen from the involvement of martyrs
in suicide bombings as they were ready to die for
the sake of religion.
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40
Analisa Journal of Social Science
New Religious
and Religion
Movement
Vol 01
onNo.01
Campus:
June
A 2016
Role of Campus’ Mosques in Raising Exclusivity
Arifuddin Ismail
NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT ON CAMPUS: A ROLE OF
CAMPUS’ MOSQUES IN RAISING EXCLUSIVITY
(A Case at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta)
ARIFUDDIN ISMAIL
Office of Religious Research and
Development Ministry
of Religious Affairs Makassar
Jl.A.P.Pettarani No.72 Makassar,
Indonesia
Phone : 0411-452952 Fax. 452952.
[email protected]
Paper received: 13 Oktober 2015
Paper revised: 27 February - 1 March
2016
ABSTRACT
The Islamic model that happened and developed within the campus as the place used for this
study, is the results of the implementation of religious movement. This model is known through
a qualitative method with interviews and direct observation to some religious activities
organized by students, in both the formal and informal settings. In the process of religious
movement itself, there is a tension between those who tend to be an exclusive group with the
one who is moderate (non-exclusive) in various forms of activities, particularly in scientific
research forum. Student religious movement became a phenomena indicating a desire to learn
or analyze religious beliefs with the more acceptable scientific reasoning. This choice is a form
of expression to the lack of or inability in meeting the needs of religious knowledge provided by
the university. Ironically, this choice of students was understood by some religious groups with
different ideology. Each pattern known through activities and religious movements even it did
not appear overtly or show its identity. Will this phenomena allowed or the campus will take
an anticipatory action in order to develop new policies as an effort to meet the needs of students
religious knowledge?Everything should goes back to the university.
Keywords: religious movements, campus mosque, campus propaganda activist, exclusive
INTRODUCTION
The shifting and strengthening phenomenas
of religious movement taking place within the
campus are very interesting to study for several
reasons. First, the phenomena of the rise of Islam
in the campus becomes more visible in comparison with other religious movements occurred in
Indonesia, including in Yogyakarta. This revival
is characterized by the revolutionary change of
student lifestyle. Most of the female students involved in religious activities on campus wear the
hijab (headscarf with big size) as the Islamic outfit.
Similarly, the Islamic atribute (Arab and Pakistan)
reflected on dress pants “cingkrang” (end of the
lower limit above the ankle) are used by the male
Muslim students.
Second, the rise of Islam among the students
started from campus is not only on a “non-
religious” one such as the University of Gadjah
Mada (Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM), but at the
same time it also appears on the Islamic campus
such as the State Islamic University. It is an antithesis toward an expression that the spread of
Islam is only on “non-religious” campus. Islamic
Campuses such as the State Islamic University,
Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah University and the
Islamic University of Indonesia become the place
of the Islamic movements. Third, the organized
Islamic activities are not temporary, but included
within the student activities program, including
the Lecture of Akidah and Islamic faith on campus.
Fourth, their activity has produced new ideas that
their practice is an effort to apply Islamic concepts
about certain issues which have not been done
before, such as the idea of khilafah (Jamas in
Afadlal et.al, 2005).
41
pages 41-58
Another important factor of the strengthening
of Islamic students on campus is that it has been
supported by various religious facilities. Currently,
almost all campuses already have a mosque or at
least musholla. Therefore, with the establishment
of mosque and small prayer house on campus such
as religious activities exist and are increasing, as
well as the mosques’ activists become bigger in
numbers.
The strengthening of religious activities in
several campuses through the Lembaga Dakwah
Kampus-LDK (campus preaching institution)
is very positive and should be supported by all
parties since these activities have affected the
religious consciousness of students in off-campus.
Furthermore, in terms of the coverage of its
spreading experienced substantial progress. If
at the beginning of the reformation, they only
encompass urban and campus-based, currently
mosques in the city areas have been controlled
by them in which they bring the atmosphere of
the more Islamic devotion, as well as relying on
the power of preaching, organization and other
activities (Zada, 2007). Through a variety of
activities in the mosques, they call themselves
“youth of the mosque” and this is very positive.
However, there are signs that the attraction
characterizing the strength of the movement, on
the one hand shows the tendency that leads to
what is known as a “religious exclusivism” even
“Islamic radicalism,” a term which is still a subject
to debate. Yet, it is enough to convince academics
as embryonic religious ideas which are less tolerant
and open; on the other hand there are religious
movements which are quite open, more tolerant,
democratic and liberal.
The exclusivism nuance of students according
to Muhibbullah (2006) is a necessity as the
implication of the social process that has been going
through. Interaction of the mosque activists on
campus is relatively intensive through a variety of
activities. Therefore, any activity carried out almost
always lasted until the internalization process, is
rare in the activities of the Mosque’s congregation
in general. This internalization process is what
42
allows the establishment of character or revolution
personality that exclusive and radical.
Muhibbullah’s statement got justification
from the obtained preliminary data which is the
rejection of assistance from the non-Muslims
on the grounds that receiving such assistance
is “illegal” (haram) because it comes from the
pagans. The similar refusal happens when giving
assistance to the afflicted non-Muslims; they
prioritize the fellow Muslims only or their specific
group because the unbelievers, for them, are “their
enemy.”
The phenomena of Islamic exclusivism like
this is certainly worrying. Given campus mosques
are assets of the nation and the people, they should
be able to produce individuals who are intelligent,
creative, tolerant, courageous to live but do not fear
death, love the people and the nation; but in fact
it tend to produce individuals who are rigid, stiff,
glorifies death, intolerant, divisive and potentially
community and nation. Therefore, it is time to
pay attention to the construction of mosques and
campuses (Sasmono, 2006).
Thus, the attention on campus does not only
lead to the development of the intellectual capacity
of students, but also on how to create conditions
that are far from groups interests which could
potentially reduce the independence of the campus
as a neutral academic institution. Based on this, a
study of the strengthening phenomena of the new
Islamic movement on the Public Higher Education
campus in particular Gadjah Mada University
(UGM) in Yogyakarta draw studied deeper.
The fundamental problem of this research is
“how Islamic Movement Campuscould intensify
and become an alternative of students on public
higher education university of Yogyakarta.” From
this issue, there are three research questions,
as follows: 1) how the reality of Islamic religious
education at the University of Gadjahmada as
Public Higher Education in Yogyakarta? 2) What
kind of model that was developed in the Islamic
campus? 3) how are the dynamics of the Islamist
movement took place on campus?
In general, this study aims to describe
New Religious Movement on Campus: A Role of Campus’ Mosques in Raising Exclusivity
Arifuddin Ismail
Islamists campus that intensified and become an
alternative option in the Public Higher Education in
Yogyakarta. In particular, we want to know about:
1) the system of Islamic education at the University
of Gadjah mada as public college; 2) Islamic model
in college that became the object of study; 3) the
dynamics of the movement which took place in the
campus and the anxiety underlying the movement.
comprehensive review of several groups called
“Radical Islam” in Indonesia. This book gives the
impression which quite clearly related groups
of radical Islam in Indonesia such as the Islamic
Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI),
Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin, MM),
Laskar Jihad (LJ), and Indonesian Committee for
Solidarity of Islamic World (KISDI).
The results of this study are expected to
provide a valuable contribution to the Universities,
especially those related to religious activities
and religious education system in college. The
intensified phenomena of Islamic movements in
campus is more or less influenced by the weakness
of religious institutions in the College itself. The
results of this study can be the foundation for
evaluating the performance of religious institutions
in Higher Education. The study is also beneficial
to the development of science, especially as data
enrichment for academics and other researchers,
as well as the possibility of further research.
Other studies also have relevance to the
discussion on the research conducted by Zuly Qodir
(2011), The radicalization of Islam in Surakarta,
Central Java: A Case Study of Islamic Mosque
Campus UMS, UNS, IAIN, and Pondok Pesantren
Ngruki, which highlighted the dynamics of Islam
during the campuses’ mosques. In that study, it
was confirmed that the campuses’ mosques, not
just secular campuses, but religious (Islam) ones
understand the radical tendencies are very strong.
This can be seen from the efforts of certain parties
to dominate the mosques by entering new model
of Islamic studies as well as look at the sermon
takes place every Friday. However, this study did
not arrive at a model of how Islam developed and
held on campus (the Mosque) is.
LITERATURE STUDY
Previous Writings
So far, efforts to systematically mapping
the phenomena associated with the presence of
new religious movements are much studied by
experts from various disciplines. Among them
is an article by Haidar Nasir (2007) entitled:
Manifestasi Gerakan Tarbiyah; Bagaimana
Sikap Muhammadiyah? (2007: v). The Tarbiyah
Movement at first (around 1970 and 1980) was a
propaganda movement in the campus of ITB, IPB,
UI, UGM, and others. Later, it became a movement
and they called themselves Gerakan Tarbiyah,
Tarbiyah Movement. Finally, in 1998, when
there was a new round of reform among activists
founded the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan-PK)
which turned out to be the Prosperous Justice Party
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) in 2004. Though
it discusses the problems of propaganda/dakwah
movement in the campuses’ mosques, it emphasis
on the historical perspective of the phenomena of
Tarbiyah movement.
M. Zaki Mubarok (2008) provides a fairly
Another study of radical Islam also was done
by M. Imdadun Rahmat (2005) entitled “New
Islamic Currents: Revivalism Transmission of
Middle East Islam to Indonesia.” In his study,
he noted that the campuses’ mosques are very
strategic places for mission activists to spread their
ideologies. Campus movement activist such as
Gerakan Tarbiyah, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, and
the Salafi movement had used campuses’ mosques
as media of propaganda in transmitting Islamic
revivalist ideology imported from the Middle East.
The study of differences in propensity
between students of Natural Science Faculty
and Social Science Faculty in responding to the
idea of fundamentalism is also shown by Erham
Budi Wiranto (2010) in his article titled “Islamic
Fundamentalism among Student of Natural
Sciences and Social Sciences Faculties of Gadjah
Mada University.” This study reveals that students
at the Faculty of Social Sciences have stronger
tendency against the idea of fundamentalism.
43
pages 41-58
Students from the Faculty of Social Sciences have
an open and sustain understanding because they
have been in contact with social theories such
as cultural understanding, multiculturalism,
pluralism, etc., so they are more capable in doing
further research on phenomena and problems
that occur, including socio-religious phenomena.
On the other hand, students of the Faculty of
Natural Sciences are often caught in the way of
positivism thinking that is more likely to look at
the question as the “black-and-white.” The idea
of fundamentalism is easy to flourish because the
students have relatively low understanding on the
social theories. They have lack of knowledge and
ability to counter this kind of idea. Besides, it is
due to the network of institutions of the campus
propaganda forum (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus)
which strongly facilitate and socialize the idea of
fundamentalism.
Research and thoughts about variants in
religious student movements were also carried
out by Arifuddin Ismail and colleagues (2011)
with the title: Varian Pemikiran dan Gerakaan
Keagamaan Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi di
Jatim, Jateng, dan DIY (Variants of Thoughts
and Religious Movement of Student in Higher
Education University in East Java, Central Java
and Yogyakarta). The study has found three trends
of thought and movement among students, which
are the radical, liberal and moderate. All three
forms of thinking is growing among students
with a wide range of factors that influence such
religious understanding, motivations, patterns
of interaction and communication patterns of
movement.
Some of its library study have a lot in common,
especially on the study of radical Islamic groups
on the Islamic state, with the use of terrorism as
well as the political approach in analyzing the
phenomena of conflict or unrest in Indonesia and
the emergence of curent movement. To uncover the
phenomena of the emergence of new trends which
is the strengthening of the Islamic Movement
Campusthat tend to be systematically exclusive in
campuses’ mosques, it requires a relatively new
research focus on these issues.
44
A Theoretical Reference
The presence of several “new religious
movements” which are generally different from
the established religious movement such as
Muhammadiyah and Nahdltul Ulama had given
the new color of the dynamics of the Islamic
movement in this country. These new religious
movements have many names associated to it such
as Islamic fundamentalists, radical Islam, militant
Islam, exclusive Islam, and even the most extreme
groups are labeled as a “terrorists” embryo. Despite
the various names, it have common characteristics
such as equally dogmatic, the claim of truth, a
rigid interpretation of the sacred texts (textual),
the radicalization of views, their attitudes and
actions in the communities allowing them to
easily label other group who have different views
and understanding to them as unbelievers; that
later give birth to a type of a collective movements
(social movements). New religious movements
also appear and thrive in universities because it is
not an area that stands alone and isolated from the
large society.
Studies on the Islamic movement in
universities, referred to the theory of “social
movements”. In general, a social movement has
a broad definition because of its various scope.
According to Giddens (1993), a social movement
is a collective effort to pursue a common interest;
or movement to achieve common goals through
collective action (collective action) outside the
scope of the institutions established.
Meanwhile, Tarrow (1998) positioned social
movements as political resistance that occurs
when ordinary people that unite with a more
influential group of people, join forces to fight the
elite, authority, and other opposed group. Action
underlying political resistance is a contentious
collective action. Collective action can take many
forms, short or sustained, institutionalized or
quickly dispersed, dull or dramatic. Collective
action has the sense of resistance when the
action is done by people who have less access to
institutions to submit new claims or claims that
could not be accepted by the authorities or other
opposed parties (Putra, 2006: 2).
Arifuddin Ismail
Rhys H. Williams defined social movement as:
“Social Movements are socially shared activities
and beliefs directed toward the demand for change
in some aspect of the social order. To the narrow:
a social Movement is a formally organized group
that acts consciously and with some continuity
to promote or resist change through collective
action” (Marty and Appleby, 1994: 786).
Based on the view, the social movement is
an organized movement by the ideals and goals
of “to do” or “to reject” the changes consciously,
continuously and collectively towards certain
aspects in the existing social order, including the
movement associated with religious.
‘Religious movement’ is an idea which
seeks to interpret religious ideas to become a
transformative power for developing a better new
social structure and order; by partaking, being
open and being emancipative (Rahardjo, 1999:
12). It is an ambition upholding the dignity and
the self-regard of humanity. Religious movements
in the frame of transformative paradigm are the
most humane way to change human history. The
religious movement defined here is any individual
or business group that’s been organized to show
new patterns of different religious or a new
interpretation of an existing religion (established).
For further development of the theory of
social movements, New Social Movements
(NSM) was born to complement the old social
movements. This term refers to the phenomena
of social movements which have developed since
the mid-1960s (Suharko, 2006). NSM is a recent
development of the concept of social movements
present to correct principles, strategy, action or
ideological choices used by social movements
in the past. New social movement is a collective
action of the community as it struggles to meet the
needs of a new paradigm, a model of alternative
culture, and a new awareness of the betterment of
sustainable future (Qadir, 2009).
Situmorang (2007) in his book “Social
Movements” offers new patterns of social
movements (New Social Movement). The
emergence of social movements is characterized
by the diverse social movements’ performers
such as students, professionals, women, and
workers and farmers who defend human rights,
democracy, environment, and injustice. New social
movements emerged, not because of the pressures,
but, a broader political and socio-economic plan,
resulting in social movement which can take
advantage of that. This view is further clarified by
Zuly Qodir (2009), Social Movement in Islam: The
Manifesto of the Believer, that a group of a small
scale religious movement (Muslim) can influence a
bigger religious movement in achieving its greater
political objectives.
New social movement is the dynamic of the
social movement itself. Nonetheless, principally,
both the old social movement and the new one have
the same goal, namely the desire for transformation
as what is aspired. Social movements have the
characteristics of the actors, pilgrims/the people,
activity, ideology, and networks. In addition, the
social movements demonstrated the so-called
collective consciousness and then bring what
is called collective behavior arising from the
collective consciousness (Donattela, 1992: 23;
Tarrow, 1993: 26). In times, the emergence of new
social movements can be considered to filling the
empty spaces which go unnoticed by the agendas
of the old social movements. The study of the new
religious movements within the campus of UGM
uses the above theoretical formulas, because it is
considered to be closer to the existing conditions.
RESEARCH METHODS
This is a case research involving descriptive
qualitative method, and was conducted at the
University of Gadjah Mada (UGM). This campus
has been used as the location based on the
following considerations. First, UGM is one of the
leading universities in Indonesia with the number
of Muslim students more than 80% of the number
of active students. Second, the campus is not based
on Islam as well as not directly patronized Islamic
education as campus under the auspices of the
Ministry of Religious Affairs. Third, there is various
dynamics of religious movements on campus.
Fourth, there is an aspect of Islamic Religious
45
pages 41-58
Education, which involves senior students as
mentors, without selection and control, as the
finding of Arifuddin Ismail (2011); Fifth, religious
activities on campus are rampant and intensive.
The data collected include: 1) the reality of
Islamic religious education at the University
of Gadjah Mada as Public Higher Education in
Yogyakarta; 2) Islamic model developed on campus,
including a variety of forms of religious activity,
and the tendency of the movement as implication
of religious understanding; 3) the dynamics of
the campus Islamist movement, related to the
emergence of students creativity involved in this
movement to adding and deepening their religious
knowledge.
Data collection methods used in this study
includes observation, in-depth interviews, and
field notes as well as documentation study.
Observations were carried out on the variety of
student activities at both campus and mosque.
Various student involvements on campus
were recorded through their activities such as
Ramadan and Islamic studies, especially after
noon prayers (shalat dhuhur). In observation, the
researchers did not do it alone, but were helped
by two assistants of students. This was done to
facilitate introduction and communication of the
observation area. It was not done on a daily basis,
but adjusted for events or activities undertaken by
students known through announcements on the
bulletin board on campus.
The in-depth interviews were conducted with
several informants, such as the management,
professors and students. Selection of the informants
is based on their faculty. This determination is
also based on the assumption that the Islamic
movement happens in two different disciplines.
Interviews were also conducted with students who
are active in Salahuddin campus mosque and the
graduate school (At Taqwa) and Takmir mosque
as the compared informants.
This study is a qualitative research using
words and sentences compared to figures.
Accordingly, the proces and analysis of data has
been done through three lines of activity which
46
occurred simultaneously. The lines are data
reduction, data presentation and conclusion.
Data reduction is defined as the selection process,
focusing on the simplification of abstraction, and
the transformation of raw data that comes from
the notes written on the field. Data reduction is
a process to sharpen, classify, direct, remove and
organize data in such a way that it can be concluded
or verified.
In the meantime, the process of preparing the
data is to plan and incorporate the information in
a cohesive structured form and easier to read. The
conclusion is the process for registering regularity,
patterns, explanations, possible configurations,
the flow of cause and effect, and propositions. The
process is interactive, which are interconnected
and cohesive.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
The Reality of Religious Study on Campus
Courses on religion at the University of
Gadjah Mada (UGM) is inserted into the Personal
Development subjects or courses (Matakuliah
Pengembangan Kepribadian, MPK). There are 42
lecturers on the courses coming from UGM and
UIN, aided by several assistants. The learning
is divided into two; the first, religious course
that has been taught using standard material, as
published by the Ministry of Religion (Islamic
disciplines). Second, the contextual Islamic
material is coordinated and given to each faculty
with the adjustment of the specific disciplines of
the faculty.1
Religious courses for students, especially for
the freshmen, are required as their educational
background are not religious. It is assumed
that they do not have religious background. It is
intended to assist them in providing enrichment of
religious knowledge. Religious courses formally are
only 2 credits. Apparently, the university realizes it
so they provide assistanship for Islamic program
1. Interview with Arqom Koeswanjono (Pembantu Dekan I
of Philosophy Faculty of UGM) at the Philosophy Faculty,
September, 2012.
Arifuddin Ismail
(Asistensi Agama Islam).2 AAI program itself
is a complementary program to help introduce
Islam to students despite new policies, including
direction to read the Quran. A student of UGM
said that with only 2 credits of religious studies, it
is impossible to provide a sufficient understanding.
Furthermore, he said:
The class we have received is only 1 hour per
week, plus assistance every week for 2-3 hours.
This is not enough, so to work around this, I follow
khalaqah, at the Mosque near my boarding house,
visit forums and university studies, and learn
religious by myself.3
Apart from the religious education program
formally enacted at the university, there are
also other extra activities, such as prayer and
religious gathering dedicated to the entire
academic community within the university under
the coordination of “Dzikir and Do’a Assembly”
(Majelis Dzikir dan Do’a). The event is raised by
lecturers who are responsible for things related
to religious programs at UGM. In all business
units are always activities respectively, including
religious programs. For example, there are prayer
and dzikir performed by Dharma Wanita Faculty
and other units.
In addition, there is the Student Activity
Unit (Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa, UKM) which
has a lot of student activities. In this unit, there
are specific areas and one of them is ROHIS
(Islamic Spirituality program). ROHIS directly
handles activities related to Islam since there are
specific areas on Islamic spirituality. ROHIS at the
university level is also formed in ROHIS- faculty
level. This ROHIS in each faculty makes a number
of Islamic ritual programs, such as coordinating
the implementation of the prayer (Dhuhr) and
Friday prayers in their respective faculties. In the
Graduate School, for example, ROHIS is taken
2. This program has started since 1987 and was approved by the
university through the SK Rektor N0. 214/P/SK/HT/2004.
This decision letter is a form of legalization to the assistance
or mentoring of Islamic religious education on UGM that has
been done up to this day.
3. Interview with HF (22), Student of Engineering Faculty of
UGM, October 6, 2012.
over by the officer in charge of organizing Kultum
(seven minutes sermon) every Dhuhr and preacher
(khatib) at Friday prayers.
The other side, Shaladuddin Foundation also
has a major role in filling the lack of religious
knowledge in the university environment.4 The
foundation is responsible for coordinating the
activities of Islamic spirituality in UGM, as the
Ramadhan committee in Campus (RIC) (see
Tempo Magazine, May 13, 1989). In 1997, the
Rector Prof. Dr. Koesnadi Hardjasumantri,
SH., setted the Jamaah Salahuddin (JS) as
Islamic Chaplaincy Unit under the coordination
of Vice Rector (Pembantu Rektor, Purek) III
(now the Vice Rector of Alumni and Business
Development). Since then, JS officially is entitled
to occupy a space in the UGM Student Center. In
its journey, JS has a significant role in the fight for
the establishment of the mosque in the university
campus. Nevertheless, activities in JS are not only
about Islam, but also to discuss discourses of the
social-political situation, the world of the student
movement, and moral issues in society.
In carrying out its mandate as UGM students’
forum in deepening knowledge and understanding
Islam, Jamaat Salahuddin (JS) focuses all
activities on the campus mosque where they plan
and implement programs and activities which
are consistent with the objective of JS. These
activities are planned in its long-term and there
is also a temporary activity in accordance with the
needs and the development of the programs. As
the forum being in charge of the daily programs,
the Shalahuddin Foundation appointed a daily
manager for all program activities to run well.
In relation to the development of people, the
Foundation has scheduled the programs for talks
by inviting speakers from all level. Beside study,
discussion or prayer groups are not coordinated
by the JS, but by another student group (Ismail,
2012).
4. Aside from JS, UGM also have other spirituality units
of other religions, such as the Buddhist Students Family,
Hindu Students Family Dharma, Catholic Chaplaincy Unit
(Campus Mass) as well as the Christian Spirituality Unit (Unit
Kerohanian Kristen).
47
pages 41-58
Religious activities and the nuance of Islam
are very much felt on the campus. Various
activities such as Islamic studies, discussions, a
big gathering for Islamic sermon (tabligh akbar)
and the like can easily be found at the university.
The latest program created by the campus activist
propaganda movement is memorizing the Qur’an
in the name of “Gadjah Mada memorizing the
Quran” (Gadjah Mada Menghafal Qur’an, GMMQ).
It was on Friday, October 19, 2012 at 4pm in the
Multimedia Room of Faculty of Law, student
activity units LDK Jama’ah Shalahuddin of UGM
launched Semi Autonomous Body (BSO) named
GMMQ. The semi-autonomous organization has
a special program to accommodate students who
want to become those who memorize the Quran.
Mosque: Contention between Public and
Private Space
A mosque on campus is an important asset
for the development of Islamic study in general.
However, the mosque is also sometimes used as
an arena of contestation intended to show the
influence of each group which involves ‘worship’
as its slogan (jargon). In the practice of shalat
sunnah tarawih for example, the UGM’s mosque
chooses eleven rakaats, including tarawih and
witir prayers. It seems that the choice seems to
be based more on prophetic practice than follow
the companions of the prophet who practiced 23
rakaats in tarawih and witir prayers. Related to
tarawih prayers, the Sunni campus mosque refers
to the Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, narrated
by Aisha (the wife of the Prophet), “Mohammed
never” pray (Sunnah) in the month of Ramadan
and the others more than eleven raka’at.”5 It is
widely practiced by Muhammadiyah. The Muslim
Indonesia analysts in particular, then label that
performing 11 rakaats of tarawih is considered as
Muhammadiyah followers, while choosing the 23
rakaats is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) followers.
In connection with the politics, the mosque
of UGM is a phenomena because it was in the
5. Hadith transmitted by Aisyah r.a., in “Bulughul Maram”
(translation) Muh. Syarif Sukandi. Bandung: al-Ma’arif, 1978,
p. 141.
48
old campus and it has the faculty of Social and
Political Sciences. However, the campus mosque
activists tend to be allergic to politics, though in
fact they are political. They are actually involved in
practical politics as a staunch supporter of HizbutTahrir Indonesia (HTI) or the Prosperous Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), especially
those who are affiliated with the Union Action
of Indonesian Muslim Students (Kesatuan Aksi
Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI).6 They
argue that “Political indeed a good thing, but for
the benefit of mankind”.
The head of campus mosque caretakers
(takmirs) emphasized that the mosque was
not competent to respond to this. The political
question is out of the responsibilities and duties of
the mosque. The mosque has nothing to deal with
politics, it should take care of the issue of worship
instead. This is consistent with the function of
the mosque which is to spiritually communicate
with God (munajah). Politics is not a matter of
religion and the mosque only deals with building
faith of the people. By saying this, it is claimed that
between Islam and politics are separable. This is
where the contradiction of the managers mosque
UGM was beginning looks obvious.
The mosque of UGM is not so much engaged in
economic problems, but social actions for helping
poor people at Eid (idul fitri), Ramadan, the
distribution of rice, the distribution of sacrificial
meat, and clean water. According to one of the
mosques caretakers, the assistance is provided
not only when there is a religious event, but also
a social one.
On the issue of culture, it seems that The head
of campus mosque caretakers (takmirs) did not
give his response to cope with. According to him,
any activity should be in line with the Qur’an and
the Hadith. In connection with any culture that
is not associated with ritual worship is not the
6. KAMMI is one of the organizations that respond the state
(1998) condition due to a crisis of multi-dimensional that trying
to create the madani society. The organization is confined to
Muslim students only and has aspires to make Islam more
down to earth.
Arifuddin Ismail
authority of the mosque. In this case, the mosque
is only dealing with religious activities. Yet, when
asked about Islam and Javanese, he firmly said
that there is Muslim Javanese (Muslim Kejawen),
and it is not a problem because, for him, it is the
result of acculturation.
This shows that, first, the mosque is used
by certain groups as a space to promote the
development of an ideology, though it only involves
the members of the group. Second, various religious
(Islamic) activities increasingly spread on campus
which in one side can be regarded as the sign of
the dynamics of campus Islamic movement. Yet,
in another side, it indicates the increasingly lack of
control of the student activities which leads to the
formation of an exclusive group.
In this mosque, every Friday is filled by a
variety of topics addressed in the speech leading
to ‘invite’ people to return to the Qur’an. Instead,
there was a preacher who does not hesitate to
say that the institutions which promote religious
pluralism are the agents of colonialists (the West)
who are now trying to reaching the campus. This
shows that, the purification of Islamic movement
on campus, especially on the non-religious campus
has been intensified which indirectly also provides
spaces for a certain group to develop and voice up
their ideology in the spirit of freedom of expression
on campus.
Halaqah:
Internalization
Understanding Islam
Forum
of
The other place used by students beside mosque
is the yard or the campus area. The yard with the
cool weather was used as a place for discussion. At
any given time (specifically afternoon), there can
be found a few small groups (halaqah) consisting
of three people who are guided by a mentor (the
instructor). In the courtyard of the Graduate
School, for example, some groups can be found
on a daily basis. They sat down to talk with a
small circle of same-sex, while for other types also
form a circle not far from the cycle of the other
group. According to one of them, they use a yard
as a discussion place due to the difficulty to find
another place on campus. Then, this beautiful
campus provides an environment of tranquility in
the discussion. The other reason is that the use of
the place is free of charge. Also, it is easy to reach
friends or members of the study group itself.7
Themes of the study within this small groups
are faith, morals, worship, mu’amalah while
themes on philosophy and mysticism are barely
discussed. The study also focuses on the Qur’an and
the Hadits by which it internalizes understanding.
Beyond that, they regard it as an act violating
the rules. SH said that research done for all this
time is always aimed at establishing an Islamic
personality based on understanding derived from
al-Qur’an and the Hadis of the Prophet. He said
further that everything should be in reference to
the two sources of Islam.8 Meanwhile, the methods
applied in discussion are question and answer,
tutorial and lecture.
The intensive discussions involve students by
expressing their concern about the lack of Islamic
knowledge acquired over the years. With their
non-religious background, they take the time
to seriously participate in various studies. They
are even eager to set up a short time to continue
participating in religious activities such as a book
review, bazaar, charity, and social activities. At
the end of the discussion, the theme for next
discussion is determined. Themes of discussion
are very various, ranging from how to live in an
Islamic way. Furthermore, the themes being faced
by Muslims in recent issues, such as the issue
of pluralism, equality, justice, leadership of the
countr, are discussed.
This forum (halaqah) can also be viewed in
three ways. First, as a means to internalize the
process of its members. In general, members of
the halaqah come from non-religious background.
7. Interview with TF (23 years old, student of Engineering
Faculty), August 12, 2012 in the yard of postgraduate school
of UGM.
8. Interview with SH (24 year old) at UGM, October 2012. In
fact, some people think that life (religion) is the holy book of
life that what does not directly relate to the scriptures is not
a religion. It is obvious when talking about science, the socalled science is only found in the scriptures. Thus, the social
sciences, such as sociology, anthropology, and as they are not
religious domain (Sobary, 2006: 23).
49
pages 41-58
Second, it is a forum to examine the solidarity
of Islamic group in a micro scale. The Muslim
students consciously or not, are actually in the
middle of the ideological debate, especially with
the presence of the forum in the name of particular
religion. Third, it is a forum against any “nonIslamic group” or “secular Islam.” Thus, there are
two trends here, on the one hand there is a desire to
learn about Islam, and the other, is to implement
Islamic values. The forum as such in some corner
of the campus is easy to find. It usually has small
groups were attended by several people.9
Nonetheless, there are two contradictory
things by looking at the routine activities such
as the establishment of the study group forum.
First it indicates a strong desire among them
to understand Islam better. Yet, they are not
supported by the adequate space and facilities.
As the result, they have to find ways and means of
self-learning system outside the campus. Second,
it pictures that there can be a system in which the
perpetrators transform the religious beliefs into a
consciousness. The system evidently shows that
religious practices are seen as a system which
should be distinguished from the non-religious
practice (Mashad, 2000: 126). This spirit was
also born of their concern for the condition of the
Muslims who have the moral decay of the social
consequences of the influence of other ideologies
(secular, etc.) and should be returned to the
original path (Islam).
The rise of limited review forums like is also
due to the lack of allocation of Islamic studies at
the faculty. Although this has been recognized by
the university to include curriculum design and
teaching on religious courses under the umbrella
Subject Personality Development (MPK). The
time allocation for the courses is very limited, only
9. HF (22) said that the members of the group usually consist of 5
to 7 people come from multi background. According to him, he
joined one of the study group (JS and Muslim Forum ISIPOL)
because the invitation of his friend. The members of the group
come from MIPA Faculty, Tecnique, etc. In its study forum,
HF share opinion regarding contemprary issues. Even, he also
make friendship with other student from different background,
but very careful if there is any political issue.
50
2 hours within a week. This means the students,
with their non-religious background, feel so.
Consequently, they try to find another way to fill
the gap.
Differentiation
Movement
of
Campus
Islamic
There are differences in the Islamic movement
occuring in every faculty at non-religious
campuses. The difference is caused by the type
of each faculty, especially in response to various
developments and the emerging face of the Islamic
world. At the faculty of social sciences, for example,
Islamists campus leads more on a consolidation
in forming Islamic identity to strengthen the
identity. Meanwhile, at the faculty of natural
sciences (science) precisely occurs the opposite.
They reinforced how knowledge is internalized in
Islamic life which should be started from us.
At certain faculties such as Mathematics and
Science, Pharmacy, Engineering, for example,
there are students who always use identities
characterizing a particular group by using Arabic
term which directly shows their self-existence
being different with other groups. From this view,
the notion emerged that those students at the
faculty of natural sciences are more ‘Islamic’ than
others from the social sciences. Shidqi Ahmad as
quoted by Erham Nudi Wiranto (2010) pointed
out that there are many akhwat-akhwat (Muslim
sisters) who studied at the Faculty of Mathematics
and Natural Sciences, Pharmacy, Engineering,
and at some other natural science faculty. This
indicates that the intensity of the Islamists among
students of natural sciences is more intensive and
nuanced than the Islamic movement at the faculty
of social sciences-humanities.
On the information boards in corners of the
faculties like in the Faculty of Medicine UGM
found the announcement of talks and seminars
on Islam. In fact, a similar announcement can also
be found at the other campuses’ mosques beside
UGM, such as UNY and UII, which also shows that
the distribution of announcement of UGM study
group can also be easily accessed in other places
because communication networks and group
publications are well linked.
Arifuddin Ismail
Speakers in the talks are typically graduates
from Saudi Arabia and Yaman who has a network
of alumni in Indonesia. The theme was very
popular around the current religious phenomena
which tends to affect daily lives and praxis. It is
also free of charge where everyone are invited to
join the event, although the invitation is strictly
limited to Muslims.10 From here we can see that
the management of the activities of the study
group was very neat for it does not only spread
its purpose to understand Islam, but also how
they should attract interest and sympathy of other
students to join the group.
The different view happens in the graduate
school. The presence of the CRCS provides
regular discussions of different colors with a wide
range of discussions. In regular discussions every
Wednesday, for example, issues and themes of
discussion no longer revolves around the study of
basic Islam. At the CRCS, religions are not only
studied and understood as a doctrine, but as an
object of scientific research (academic) so that
religion can be viewed from various perspectives
(multi-disciplinary). At this point, the study of
religion (Islam) in the CRCS with different religious
studies conducted in the campus mosque, halaqah
and faculties.
At the regular discussions, CRCS responds to
a variety of religious issues from the perspective
of science. Religion, again, is seen as an object
of scientific study, which involves a variety of
perspectives to criticize for. Religious has been
reviewed academically resulting understanding
which is not only doctrinal, but more comprehensive
even to the very technical as how religion is
understood and practiced by the transvestites and
others. It is certainly, on the one hand, provides a
new perspective on religion. But, on the other hand,
it brings out controvercy, especially for people who
think that it is excessive. As an academic study,
10.This shows that in every activities done by one of the study
groups very much prioritize the Islamic group. It also reflects
that the tendency of the exclusive movement is clearly visible,
even though it is only supported by one indicator which is the
restriction of participants or audience that only Muslims.
religion can surely be investigated and studied
with “value-free”, so an understanding of the
religious person can experience transformation
from doctrine to academic.
The Typologies of the Campus Islamic
Movement
Starting from a mosque, the Islamic movement,
especially at the UGM has spread to the other
faculties. The spread of Islamic movements within
the campus can not be separated from the history
of the early establishment of the mosque itself. The
mosque in early Islam became the center of the
dynamics of the Muslims.
However, the campus mosque was “controlled’
by certain groups that make the spirit of struggle
was different from other mosques in general.
The UGM’s mosque as described in another
part of this discussion, has been a birthplace
of Campus Propaganda Institute (Lembaga
Dakwah Kampus, LDK), which coordinates all
activities of the propaganda. From this, we can
see how a propaganda journey on campus does
tend to be “closed.” In line with the condition,
the mosque Nurul Huda UNS (State University
of Solo) centralizes a mission which favors neofundamentalime (al-Makassary, et al, 2010: 261).
This is due to fact that all the dynamics of the
mosque has been regulated and controlled. There
are three types of activities here: First is the regular
(daily) activities such as praying five times. Second
is the incidental activities such as Ramadan.
And third is the long-term nature of such studies
on a regular basis, usually called ‘canteen’ and
jurisprudence for women. It is commonly called
‘Kafenita ‘. The Friday sermon and its preachers are
scheduled as part of the programmed activities. It
is as described earlier in this section, in accordance
with the mission of establishing the mosque as a
center of Islamic studies, not of any other interest.
The above description shows that the spread
of Islam on campus tends to be exclusively enjoyed
and followed by certain circles or groups. This
trend is also not free from criticism of people
within the campus. As happened at the university,
for example, the university is considerably failed in
51
pages 41-58
controlling the Islamic movement on campus. It is
also seen in some cases as in the case of rejection
of Irshad Mandji in a discussion. In fact, the
campus is an autonomous institution at which the
rights to freedom of expression and thought can
be freely made. So, there is a tendency in which
the presence of the Islamic propaganda institute
(lembaga dakwah) centralized in mosque also
affects the dynamics of Islam on campus and even
influences the independence of academic freedom
of the university, as we look upon the case of Irshad
Mandji.
Understanding and Islamic Model:
1. Response to the Contemporary Issues
The Islamic model understood and developed
on campus is a model of Islam as a whole (kaffah)
which does not only touch the aspect of worship,
but all aspects of life, including social, cultural,
economic, political, and so on. As for the response
to the social, economic, political and cultural
problems responses that given by the Islamic
campus is positive and constructive. The way to
respond varies by dialogue on the raised issues,
through media owned by the Islamic institutions
on campus, or through other propaganda
programs (Syiar). The activists of campus mosque
understand Islam as kaffah in its literal meaning.
This, for them, implies that things associated with
the political, economic, cultural, and life should
be Islamic which means in accordance with the
scripture. If not, there is no need to be done and
followed.11 The Islamists of UGM understand Islam
as a complete and final religion and everything
must be based on the holy book Quran, not from
another source.
Thus, it is a simple fact about the understanding
of Islam and its practice. Although not directly say
that it is necessary to discuss political, economic,
cultural and other issues, but the campus Mosque
has a serious concern in those matters. Moreover,
the activist of the campus Mosque consists of
activists and KAMMI and Hizbuttahrir. Therefore,
it is actually very reasonable if the campus Mosque
11. Interview with R (24) at UNY Mosque, October 8, 2012.
52
can be seen as a center of education to discuss
issues of social, economic, political, cultural and
contemporary issues that developed within the
community. The presence of this kind of student
organization represents the spirit of “a new
Islamic” that reflects “totality” and “sincerity”,
both in its goal and in terms of social and political
behavior. They really have a desire to reflet the
portrait of an ideal young Muslim generation, as a
pious generation, who uphold Islamic morality in
all aspects of life (kaffah).
The Islamic Movement on campus seriously
addresses secularism, pluralism, and liberalism.
The activists publicly acknowledge that there are
disagreements about secularism, pluralism, and
liberalism. In response to these problems, they
understand the poblems as part of the ‘guests’
action’ who do not believe in the teachings of
Islam of kaffah. The “guests” try to find excuses
in order to get a place. In fact, the teachings
of Islam are perfectly clear and there is no any
shortfall, but some Muslims do not even believe
it. This is a war of ideas between people with
Muslims and Muslims versus people who do not
like Islam. For this reason, the Islamic movement
on campus seriously responded by launching the
counter thinking with those who carry the issues
of pluralism, liberalism and secularism. Three of
these issues, according to them, are big problems
and even bigger if not handled soon and carelessly.
Muslims will be scattered as what they confessed.
Therefore, he said, Muslims should be careful
with the campaign of pluralism, liberalism and
secularism for it is very dangerous to the integrity
of Islam as a whole.
The presence of prayer group and religious
forum as shown on campus of the non-religious
university, as described above, at least has
stressed three significant points. First, it has
emerged and raised a high awareness about the
importance of Islamic studies which is sustainable
and institutionalized within a university. The
lack of Islamic knowledge could be fulfilled by
these kinds of activities. Second, there has been a
strengthening of understanding on the importance
of solidity and solidarity among the people on
Arifuddin Ismail
campus. It particularly responds to development
and dynamics of the community which continue
to progress very rapidly. Third, there is a
systematic effort built intentionally to obliterate
stigmatization of non-religion campus as often
regarded as a platform to fertilize secular thoughts
which give more space for human reason than the
involvement of religion.
The existence of the research/study forum
(halaqah) at the non-religious university, on one
hand shows the high sensitivity to the importance
of enhancing the knowledge and discourse on
issues of Islam which are less sufficient than in
the religious universities. On the other hand, the
presence of these forums also indicates a ‘struggle’
and even a fight between one group against the
others. Prayer forums at university and faculty
indicate a tendency toward how to understand and
how to apply Islam in a simple manner, but what
is shown by other groups such as JS takes a slightly
different path.
The emergence of groups proposing the
Islamic Shari’a, in Haedar Nashir (2006), carries
the ideology of Islam as a result of ‘negligence’ to
accommodate the country’s interests. The country
is considered in favor of the secular ideology
and ignores Islam. These groups represent
Islam literally, formalistic, and doctrinaire.
More interestingly, in the midst of the writhing
movements appear CRCS which comes to give
a new color in the dynamics of religious studies
at UGM. It tries to voice up a priority to respect
others for the sake of humanity.
2. Resistant to the View of the Modernists
Rejecting the modernists view in this case is
defined as a view of the anti-everything perceived
as West. West here is translated as the United
States, Israel and their allies, especially European
countries. West in the eyes of the Islamist activists
is the main rival to blame for the destruction of
Muslim countries such as Palestine, Iraq, and
Afghanifstan in which it is considered as Western
design to destroy the power of the Islamic radical
Islamic forces. This is due to an understanding
that they are the only one that able to compete
with Western hegemony.
The modernity understood as something that
comes from the West is rejected by radical groups
in the Muslim world. This is because modernity
is considered a form of Westernization. Bassam
Tibi (1994: 10-11) claims that the world of Islam
in facing Westernization, has took the culturedefensive attitude. This culture is viewed by
Arnold Hottinger, a German journalist, as an
attitude by which that almost all the “literalist”
Muslim in modern times hold tight. It seems that
fundamentalism is something created. It was
created from their hatred to the West.
Activists of Islamic mission criticize the United
States of America as “a grey state” because on one
hand they fight for the values of human rights,
but on the other they deny human rights. They
say that discrimination against women in hijab
and men with beards in the West is an example of
the denial of the human rights. The siding of the
West to Israel has increasingly made the activists
have more hatred towards the West. The activist
thought that the land of Palestine officially belongs
to the Palestinian people. It is therefore, for them,
Israel’s annexation of Palestinian land was illegal.
The view above shows that Muslims around
the world are required to remain solid and united
against Western hegemony as any damage that
befell Muslims in the entire world is caused by
the greed of the West. In the view of the campus
propaganda activists, the West systematically
attempts to break the mentality of the Muslims so
that they can deviate from the teachings of their
religion. According to them, one of the efforts is
issued by promoting the views of liberalism and
pluralism.
Resentment against modernity (the West) by
the activists has intensified by the fact that they
make the magazine entitled “Voice of Islam” which
contains themes on anti-Western and is sold freely
in the campus. The Magazine is of the magazines
concerned in the dissemination of anti-Western.
One of its articles of the latest issue, the edition 144
of June 5-19, 2012, is entitled Save the Children
from the Dangerous of Sepilis, ‘Selamatkan Anak
Dari Bahaya Sepilis.’
53
pages 41-58
Campus propaganda activists argue that
Muslims do not need to extoll western civilization
because today they were on the verge of collapse.
They state Muslims should remain optimistic
although the stigma is still often addressed to
Islam, such as Islamic terrorists, Islam oppressing
women. It is, for them, considered to be a process
and trial from God to achieve success. In their
opinion, a person who is successful in the process
will always face many trials and forgings.
3. Self-Closing to the Interpretation of
Relogious Text
Reinterpretation of the text is one of the
issues discussed by many Muslims up to this
day. Muslim intellectuals are pushing the
importance of reinterpretation of religious
texts as a form of response to their critical
stagnation on Islamic theology in responding the
challenges of contemporary world, such as Islam
fundamentalism, discrimination against women,
and the increasing of intolerance in society.
The groups that emphasize the urgency of
reinterpretating the text of Quran are, for them,
considered as liberals. They are liberal because
they “dare” to reinterpret religious texts that have
been final in the hands of the previous righteous
people (salafushshalih). Nevertheless, some
intellectuals are often rejected by the so-called
liberal because of the negative connotation of the
term (Safi, 2003: 17).
One of the efforts often made by them to
denote liberal intellectuals is by showing a passage
written by the liberal intellectuals. For instance
they state that the liberal intellectuals always
lead to the importance of reinterpreting the
verses related to gender issues, especially with
regard to women. They will say for example that,
Nazaruddin Umar (2009) who is labelled by them
as a liberal intellectual said in his work: “That
negative image of women in the Islamic world and
the Middle East in general is that women seem to
be the second human, can not be separated with
the understanding of religious texts, including to
the Quran and hadith. We’re so confident that God
is just ... and infinitely wise.”
54
However, the activists refused the view that
Islam is a doctrine legalizing oppression for
women. They said that Islam is a religion which
upholds the dignity of women. They pointed out
that in the eyes of God, men and women have the
same degree. The campus propaganda activists
also experience a very large concern over the
spread of interpretation based on lust, because
it has deviated from the interpretation that has
been set by salafhushshalih. According to them,
Islam is a very fair teaching. The fairness of Islam,
according to them, does not mean that each party
has to get something similar, but it means that
each party should get something in proportion
to their responsibilities to which it aspires. They
added that Muslims should not follow a gender
perspective echoed by the West. Today it is even
more terrible, as some Western countries legalize
the same-sex marriage which in their views denies
human nature.
Still, according them, interpretation of the
Qur’an for this group is an activity that should not
be done. Whatever written in the text is what should
be well done and well practiced. Interpreting the
text means not only denying the truth, but also
giving other meaning to it. Thus, what is in the text
literally is the final one.
4. Closing the Room for Dialogue
Being closed for dialogue in this regard is
meant to do the purification of Islam. Purification
in this case is defined as an understanding that
everything has to be purified based upon the Qur’an
and the practices of the Prophet Muhammad. To
perform the purification, the activists implement
the teachings of the consolidation of power by
strengthening their pilgrims, textual interpretation
of the text, and following the way of dressing which
is considered prophetic, like wearing jungkring,
baju koko, having beard, etc.
One of the sticking characteristics of
radical groups in religiosity is that they consider
themselves as the most correct and authentic one
in understanding religion. They departed from the
hadith of the Prophet that one day Muslims would
Arifuddin Ismail
split into many groups i.e., 73 groups, and only one
of them will survive. The survivors are their group
as they claim. The hadith is understood textually
without taking any proper theoretical approach
of interpretation or hermeneutics. For them, the
argument has been very clear and unnecessary to
interpret. Therefore, they do not open any space for
dialogue with the other groups; group of sorcery
and the need to be straightened out.
To counter these views promoted by the
liberals, the campus propaganda activist do many
attempts such as making group discussions and
holding seminars. In fact, the discussions and
seminars drive them to exclusivity for having
another dialogue as evidenced by their refusal
to attending our invitation for seminars and
discussions with the liberal Muslim thinker, Ulil
Abshar Abdallah.
This previous view shows that the
strengthening of consolidation in the congregation
is very urgent to be done for they believe that
the liberals backed up by the great power, the
West. One of the hot issues attracting public
attention lately is the launching of a movie entitled
“Innocence of Muslims.” The majority of Muslims
have considered that the movie insults the Prophet
Muhammad. This then sparked protests from
almost all Muslims throughout the world. In an
attempt to protest against the release of the movie,
the propaganda campus activists who are under
the Jamaah Shalahuddin attempted to protest
by inviting the Embassy of the United States of
America to attend their discussions. But until now,
the embassy has not given any response to the
invitation.
In essence, they will continue to be the
forefront of the fight against parties that want to
destroy Islam. They want to understand how Islam
is practiced without departing from the essence
and by who promoted the values of morality and
humanity. Similarly, the passion to return to the
legal / law is a form of longing of success as in the
early days of Islam until the various activities are
performed to support these ideals.
CONCLUSION
The Islamic Movement Campus widely
emerged stresses that there are efforts made by
various groups to keep putting, even polarizing
the fikr (dimension of ratio) and zikr (dimensions
of conscience) on campus. Various forums and
worship groups, like liqa’, halaqah, so on and so
forth are no longer considered as a new phenomena,
but a social fact which also contributes to the
emergence of various forms of response to the
problem of humanity. It also indicates a tendency
for introducing new religious models on campus
that has very minimal space for the development
of Islamic studies. The growth and expansion of
the study groups also give an overview that there
is the strengthening of the Islamic movement on
campuses which are often labeled as seculars.
The intensity of religious studies at nonreligious campuses can also be understood as
a new form of creativity of students to cover up
their lack of knowledge and understanding of the
religion (Islam), as well as the lack of religious
knowledge programmed by universities. The
presence of various agencies, boards, or Islamic
study groups on campus also has an impact on
the dynamics of the campus that always changes.
On campuses’ mosques, at certain times such as
Ramadan, they are very active in holding many
programs. Sermons and lectures on the campuses’
mosque are typically common to support their
activities. The sermons and lectures usually stress
on purification, authenticity, and back to devout
Muslims (Islam Kaffah). Meanwhile, at the same
time students also continue to have meetings on
Islamic studies at the campus area which indicates
the existence of their movement in the midst of
the debate and discussion on scientific approaches
rather thanreligious ones.
A brief description above shows several
things. First, the form of Islam taking place on
campus is more pronely directed to do a ‘counter’
to the scientific development which are considered
to have more distance from religion itself. It
can be seen from the tendency of strengthening
intensive studies, lectures, and religious activities
55
pages 41-58
on campus. The form of Islamization on campus is
how to strengthen the activists’ programs through
various groups and religious activities which do
not involve other groups and close dialogues.
The development of religious (Islamic) activities,
on one hand, can be seen as a model of activities
which provides a space for students to reduce
their shortage of knowledge. On the other, it
raises understanding and attitude of exclusivity
on campus which tend to deny the existence of
others. Indeed, if campuses play roles in control
such activities, the campuses can be set free from
development and dissemination of the exclusivity.
able to demonstrate their Islamic identity. Also,
it is a form of criticism to the system of religious
(Islamic) course which allocates very less time on
a non-religious campus. It is therefore important
to reform the system of the religious course which
is more proportional and does not collide with the
religious courses on religious campuses. Thus, in
the future, it is expected that the system will be
able to accommodate the interests of particular
students, and also will be able to answer the
students’ curiosity on Islamic studies.
Second, the question of humanity which
becomes the main concern to the Islamic movement
on campus is how to strengthen the capacity of
individuals and groups to form a community
in dealing with various issues considered as
contradictory to Islam. Injustice, democracy,
liberalization, and global issues are not the focus
of the available study. However, the early stage is
how to provide sufficient understanding as to what
is outlined in the scriptures without adding or
deleting anything of it. Political, social, economic,
and cultural problems have been ‘neglected’ since
the focus on the religious (Islamic) response is
also aimed to change the value system of the nonreligious to be religious.
Afadhal, M. 2005. Gerakan Islam Kampus.
Jakarta: Lakspedam NU.
Third, the development of Islamic movement
is the one which leads to the formation of attitudes
(character) and understanding aimed to be the
castle of Islam through various Islamic studies
intensively promoted. However, this development
is likely to be an exclusive one which makes the
study is only done and provided by a specific group.
This also produces understanding stirring to claims
that non-Muslims’ discourses (political, social,
economic, and cultural) have failed to address the
issues so that the only Muslims are considered to
be the most capable of providing solutions to the
various problems faced by mankind in the present
and in the future.
Nevertheless, the presence of various forms
of Islamic movement on campus is a form of
students’ creativity. They, to some extent, are
56
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58
AnalisaThe
Journal
Society
of Social
of Minangkabau
Science and
in Tulis
Religion
Sutan
VolSati’s
01 No.01
Sengsara
June Membawa
2016
Nikmat: Between Local Traditions and Islamic Teachings
Betty Mauli Rosa Bustam
THE SOCIETY OF MINANGKABAU IN TULIS
SUTAN SATI’S SENGSARA MEMBAWA NIKMAT: BETWEEN
LOCAL TRADITIONS AND ISLAMIC TEACHINGS
BETTY MAULI ROSA BUSTAM
Gadjah Mada University
Jl. Teknika Utara, Pogung, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia
Phone : 0274-564239 Fax. 0274-547681
[email protected]
Paper received : 7 January 2016
Paper revised : 27 February - 1 March 2016
Paper approved : 16 May 2016
ABSTRACT
The culture of Minangkabau is different from the ones generally existing in Indonesia,
particularly compared to the Javanese culture. Therefore, the culture of Minangkabau
is often considered as a contradictory or antithesis of the Javanese culture, often
represented as the overall culture of Indonesia. Minangkabau culture peculiarity lays
in its matrilineal which influences lineage and inheritance. The contradictory matter
refers to the society of Minangkabau that is the largest Islamic followers in Indonesia,
yet their ancestral traditions are not completely in line with the Islamic teachings,
some even are contradictory. It is a common knowledge that a literary work is not
born from an ‘empty culture’ meaning that a literary work must be influenced by its
author. Even some of literary experts believe that a society described in a novel is the
real society where the author lives. It is similar to the novel of Sengsara Membawa
Nikmat of Sutan Sati, which is the object of this study. The novel describes the society
of Minangkabau in the early 20th century, at the end of 1920s to be exact.This research
shows how the efforts of Minangkabau people in adopting the Islamic teachings
completely and how Islam adapts to the Minangkabau hereditary traditions. Some
of the traditions may exist in accordance with the Islamic teachings, but some do not.
Even to gather all headman of the ethnic group to decide a case is not in line with
Islam, whether following pure traditions or Islam as it should be.
Key words: Minangkabau’s Society, Minangkabau Traditions, Islamic Teachings,
Sengsara Membawa Nikmat Novel, 1920s.
INTRODUCTION
The Minangkabau society has a peculiar and
different culture from other societies’ cultures in
Indonesia. The Minangkabau culture is one of
the two big prominent and influential cultures,
not only in Indonesia but also in the whole
archipelago. This big culture is equal, democratic
and synthetic which becomes the antithesis of
another big culture namely the Javanese culture
that is feudal and syncretic. The Minangkabau
culture is different from most cultures existing in
the world. It embraces matrilineal system which is
clearly visible in the matters of marriage, lineage
and inheritance.
In the beginning, the culture of Minangkabau
was influenced by animism and the cultures of
Hinduism and Buddhism. Since the arrival of
Islamic the reformists at the end of the 18th century
from Middle East, the customs and cultures of
Minangkabau which were contradictory with
Islamic Laws had begun to be removed. These
reformists pioneered by Haji Piobang, Haji
Miskin, dan Haji Sumanik, urged ‘Kaum Adat’
(Indigenous Society) to change the view of ancient
Minang culture. Eventually, the cultures of cock
fighting, buffalo fighting, gambling, drinking tuak
(palm wine) were forbidden in cultural ceremonies
of Minang people. The kaum is a social unit of
individuals descended from a common ancestor,
and possesses a communal social responsibility
for the actions of its members (Golden, 2012:
156). Abdullah (1972) added, kaum members live
together in a neighborhood (it is called kampuang),
which share rights to the land, and they bear social
59
pages 59-74
obligations to one another, both ceremonial and
mundane. Individuals have rights and obligations
at each level of social organisation.
Minangkabau as a region with strong local
traditions, must be considered in the matter
of its people’s acceptance to Islamic teachings,
because as it is stated previously that since the
first time of Islam’s arrival in Minang region it has
brought significant changes. In its development,
Minangkabau has Islamic traditions reflecting its
local culture as part of the archipelago. Islam arrives
in Minangkabau and is accepted with open arms
without setting apart the local traditions existing
since ancient time and without changing the dalil
qath’i of two Islamic sources (the Holy Qur’an
and Sunnah). Therefore, Islam in Minangkabau
is practiced side by side with the local traditions.
It is observable not only in the daily life of its
people but also in the Indonesian literary works
written by Indonesian authors, in particular the
Minangkabau authors who surpass other regional
authors in the quantity of works in colonial era (
the era of Balai Pustaka and Pujangga Baru).
One of the Minangkabau authors who writes
a novel about the Minangkabau Islamic society
is Tulis Sutan Sati. His novel entitled ‘Sengsara
Membawa Nikmat’ was written in 1929, and has
become one of the renowned novels in Indonesian
literature from Balai Pustaka generation. This
novel tells about the life of a young man named
Midun born in one of the villages in Minangkabau
and then he ventures to Java Island as a tramp. He
is a polite, good, religious, martial arts expert, and
humble person. Because of his good characteristics,
Midun is loved by the villagers. However, these
good characteristics of Midun make another young
man named Kacak envious and spiteful. Kacak is
the nephew of the Head of the Village respected by
all villagers. His envy comes from the thought that
a son of a poor farmer like Midun is not worthy of
being loved by many people. The dispute between
these two young men becomes the turning point of
all incidents experienced by Midun and the story
of this novel.
The novel of Sengsara Membawa Nikmat
shows the description of Minangkabau society in
60
the late of 1920s. In the novel it is described clearly
the unity of people’s local traditions, Islamic
teachings practice, and the in between discrepancy,
for example how come the relationship between
a nephew and his uncle who is a head of village
affects his position in society. It is quite possible
because in Minangkabau custom, the uncle from
the mother’s side must be responsible for all his
nephews surpassing his responsibility to his
own children. This is due to the fact that his own
children become the responsibility of their mamak
(uncle) from his wife’s side. This kinship pattern
comes from the matrilineal lineage, exceeding the
kinship of sibling relationship between a father
and his children. Basically, this pattern is not in
line with the Islamic teachings that only recognize
kinship pattern based on the lineage of the father
(patrilineal). However, the Minangkabau society
does not feel burdened in practicing Islamic
shari’a although they still practice the tradition
which is contradictory to the Islamic teachings.
The tradition of this kinship is discussed further in
the next part of this paper.
This article discusses the problem about how
the image of Minangkabau society, as one of the
largest Muslim communities in Indonesia, in
the practices of ancient traditions of which are
inconsistent with the Islamic teachings, illustrated
in a classic literary work written by Minangkabau’s
author. To response that problem, this article uses
the research’s theory of Sociology of Literature.
Basic assumption about this theory is that the
literary work is a miniature of the author’s
social community. Therefore, by looking at the
relationship between literature and writer’s society,
could be known the real picture of Minangkabau’s
society in terms of traditions and implementing
Islamic teachings.
This article is a library research including a
variety of written texts related to the theme as an
object and data of research. Many texts used in
this study are classic texts because the object of
research is a classic literary work. Another reason
is the lack of recent posts available on this research
The Society of Minangkabau in Tulis Sutan Sati’s Sengsara Membawa Nikmat: Between Local Traditions and Islamic Teachings
theme.
THE RISE OF ISLAM IN MINANGKABAU
Islam is a universal religion known for its unity
between the constant and elastic characteristics.
The constant characteristic of Islam relates to basic
transcendent matters such as in acknowledging
the Oneness of God and the forms of worship
rituals. Meanwhile, the elastic characteristic
of Islam refers to the acceptable condition of
various changes as long as without disturbing the
fundamental values. Both of these characteristics
certainly have something in common with social
phenomena in society. In revealed texts, the Holy
Qur’an and Hadiths, there are only ten percent
of constant and unchangeable (dalil qath’i), the
other ninety percent are universal (dalil juz’i).
Therefore, this second characteristic contacts
directly with the social phenomena in society. The
overlapping between the constant characteristic
of Islam and societal traditions of a region brings
out adaptive Islam which possibly accepts the
existence of various changes in the operational
scope as long as they stick to qath’i revelation
texts. This adaptive characteristic makes Islam
suitable for dynamic social conditions in society.
As the reflection of dynamic social phenomena,
Islam faces social problems bringing out new rules
now and then. This contradictory condition may
be anticipated with its understandable teachings
in multidimensional scope and be accordingly
implemented. Thus ratio is an important part of
Islam to realize great Islamic values in social life of
a society (Yasid, 2014 : 2-5).
The same condition happens to Islam in
Southeast Asia, in Indonesia in particular. Islam
coming to Indonesia experiences localization
process caused by the strong influences of local
culture and tradition. Consequently, it can be
stated that it is Islam adapting to the existing
culture results to the existence of Islam with the
pattern of local culture of Indonesia. Indonesia
consists of spacious regions and has many ethnic
groups, languages, traditions and cultures which
are different from one to another. This makes
the local-patterned Islam absorbs the traditions
and cultures from each of Indonesian regions
where it comes to. Having said that, it implies the
Islamic tradition of a certain region may differ
from the one of another region in Indonesia,
for instance the Javanese-pattern Islam in Java
Island and Minangkabau-pattern Islam in West
Sumatera. The Javanese-pattern Islam holds the
traditions of syncretic society1. Meanwhile, the
Minangkabau-pattern Islam follows the traditions
of Minangkabau ethnic group known for having
strict and different culture custom from Islamic
teachings, e.g. Law of lineage and inheritance
allocation.
Islam arrived in the Archipelago through
various channels and one of them was trade
network. Islam arrived in West Sumatera for the
first time in 1400s. At that time, the teachings of
Hinduism and Buddhism developed tremendously,
while Islam came quietly and gradually. The first
Islamic kingdom in the Archipelago was Peurelak
kingdom located in Aceh. In the 16th century, one
of the Portuguese noblemen saw many mosques
in Sumatera. According to Abu Bakar Atjeh (1977:
35-37), Islam developed not only in Sumatera but
also in Java, based on many ancient inscriptions
and artifacts discovered in these regions.
Islam started to develop significantly in West
Sumatera, in Minangkabau region to be exact,
when the ulama who learned Islam intensively in
Mecca returned. These ulama named themselves
as reformists or revivalists. In the 18th century, the
unexpected competition between the traditionalist
and reformists turned into a civil war. The
traditionalists were usually called as Red Society
and the reformists, pioneered by three Hajj as
stated previously, were called as White Society.
The traditionalists often called ‘Indigenous/
Custom Society’ concerned with matrilineality
lineage. This lineage was contradictory to the
reformists. The reformists destroyed many idols
and killed traditionalists people whom they
considered misguided from the teachings brought
from Mecca.
The overwhelmed traditionalists received
helps from the Dutch Colonialists who aimed to
61
pages 59-74
destroy the order in Minangkabau, both custom
and Islam. The war was occurred from the 18th
century to 19th centuries known as Padri War.
This Padri war involved three parties, namely the
Indigenous/custom party, the reformists’ party
and the Dutch Colonialists party. The colonialists
tried to put their ideology, resulting to the war
between the custom society and reformists. At the
end, both the custom society and reformists tried
to find uniformity in difference. The reformists
tried to equalize their ways of thingking in
understanding Islam with the matrilineal custom
system existing in Minangkabau. The one who
was meritorious enough in mediating dialogue
between the reformists and custom society was
Tuanku Imam Bonjol (Hadler, 2010: 42-45).
The social dynamics in Minangkabau region
in the 19th century was a process of finding the
meeting point between the reformists brought
by the three Hajj following neo-wahhabism
and the custom society with their local culture
of matrilineality. Matrilineality was a must in
Minangkabau custom. Even though it tried to
blend with Islamic conception, yet this dispute
ended with existence of Tuanku Imam Bonjol. He
was the one who compromised the dependency
between the reformists and Minangkabau custom,
i.e., matrilineality.
The local traditions of Minangkabau remains
well-preserved up to this day, even though Islam
comes with new cultures which some of them
are contradictory to those local traditions. The
Minangkabau society wants to keep holding on the
local traditions along with practicing the Islamic
teachings. This explains that the Minangkabau
society can accept the Islamic teachings without
removing their ancestral traditions.
NOVEL’S SOCIETY IN THE LITERARY
SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT
The form and content of the novel derive
more closely from social phenomena. Novels
often seem bound up with particular moments
in the history of society. The novelist analyses
the ‘data’ of social life, interprets them, and tries
to determine their essential features in order to
62
transmit them in writing. The novelist must be
absolutely considered as being an artist: his work
is the expression of a reality which already has in
his mind a form and a meaning, and he expresses
it by means of techniques, some of which he has
inherited from his predecessors and some of
which he has worked out himself from phenomena
he has actually observed. It is through its formal
character, and through the techniques used to
create that formal character, that a work of art
exposes reality (Zeraffa, 1973 : 35-38).
On this view, novel is a direct reflection
of various facets of social structure, family
relationships, class conflict, etc. Novel finds
itself in conflict with the conventional, with the
accepted norms and values of its socio-economicpolitical environment and actively struggles with
them. The result is literature which is significant
beyond its own time, and helps man towards a
greater understanding of his social world. As such,
this literature can be seen as a structural unity
(Laurenson and Swingewood, 1972 : 170).
Novel as a literary work should at one and
the same time describe what is happening to us,
extract its meaning, and signpost the direction to
which we are going. The novel has ceased to exist
when the writer does not place his characters in a
specific milieu, explain them ‘in social terms’ or
provide them with a clearly defined future. The
proper way to treat a character in a novel is for him
first to be conditioned by society.
Implicit in the text of the novel are the
propositions that man never lives by himself, and,
above all, that he has a past, a present, and a future.
The novel is the first art to represent man explicitly
as defined historically and socially. In myth, man
is a social being but his story is only developed by
obscure means, by the intervention of gods, heroes
or magical events. With the novel, society enters
history and history enters into society (Zeraffa :
39)
ADAT BASANDI SYARA’
The present relationship between Islam and
adat (Minangkabau traditions) is described in the
saying “tradition founded upon Islamic law, Islamic
law founded upon tradition” (Adat basandi syara’,
syara’ basandi adat) or in another saying, “Islamic
law founded upon the Quran (Adat basandi syara’,
syara’ basandi Kitabullah). However, whether
this expression is actually practiced in the life of
Minangkabau society, especially at the end of the
1920s decade, Peletz (1981 : 15) described adat as
‘a unitary, all-embracing concept encompassing
an expansive set of institutions governing the
conduct of all personal, kin, and local affairs’.
He also wrote, it includes ‘the reciprocally based
relationships between humans and the natural
and supernatural realms’. The pervasive and solid
reality of the power of adat is captured in the wellknown saying which claims that the livings are
anchored and guided in their lives by adat. In the
same way, the deads are surrounded and held firm
by the packed earth of their graves.
The concept of adat is of crucial importance
in Minangkabau life, past and present. It is a
term mostly translated as ‘customary law’, the
traditional rules of conduct, belief, and social
organization. It is what is right and proper; it is
what is essentially Minangkabau (Golden, 2012:
157). The Minangkabau world, with Islam and
traditional adat side by side, was a harmonious
one. Traditional Minangkabau society embraces
two traditions, the one a masculine adat which
recognizes the power of Muslim law and the
jurisdiction of the patrilineal royal family over
the entire society; the other a feminine adat
which identifies only matrilineal custom and local
communities (Golden, 2012 : 159).
Kahn (1980: 9,153) asserts that in fact the
Minangkabau practiced something of a dual
descent system during the centuries of royal rule. It
is that royal power was patrilineal, while the rules
for inheriting both land and other forms of wealth
followed the matrilineal adat. He points out that
rules in a place for choosing between instances
where each tradition is to be applied. Inheritance of
property, for example, sometimes follows Muslim
law, and other times (most notably when ancestral
land is at issue) is inherited through the matriline.
The novel Sengsara Membawa Nikmat
describes several traditions of Minangkabau
society which have been practiced since ancient
time, and have developed with the existence of
Islam in this region. One of them is kenduri,
which in the Great Dictionary of the Indonesian
Language (p.734) means a feast to celebrate an
event, ask blessing and so on. At least there are
two types of kenduri known by the Minangkabau
society, as mentioned in the novel, namely kenduri
dua belas and kenduri besar for three and seven
days of the death of family members.
“Begini! Maun! Waktu berdua belas di masjid
tempo hari, bukankah engkau duduk dekat saya?”
“Benar.”
“Nah, adakah engkau melihat bagaimana
pemandangan Kacak kepada saya?”
“Tidak.”
“Masa kenduri itu kita duduk pada deretan yang
di tengah. Kacak pada deret yang kedua.
“So Maun! When we had (Kenduri) dua belas at
the mosque the other day, were not you sitting next
to me?”
“Then, did you see how Kacak looked at me?”
“No.”
“During the Kenduri we were sitting in the middle
row. Kacak was in the second…”(Sati, 1991 : 10)2
Kenduri dua belas mentioned here is a feast
held on the 12th of Rabi’ I (Rabi’ Al-Awwal), this
date is the birthdate of Prophet Muhammad SAW.
This feast is meant to celebrate this birthdate. A
feast as such is also known as Kenduri Maulud.
“Pada hari itu juga Pak Midun dikuburkan dengan
selamatnya. Tujuh hari lamanya orang mengaji
dan makan minum di rumah famili Pak Midun.
Waktu meniga hari dan menujuh hari diadakan
kenduri besar, mendoakan supaya arwah Pak
Midun dilapangkan Allah di dalam kubur. Tidak
sedikit uang habis untuk penyelamatkan si mati
itu. Oleh famili Pak Midun, tak kayu jenjang
dikeping, yang tidak ada, diadakan. Dua tumpak
sawah tergadai untuk memenuhi keperluan itu.
Ibu Juriah dalam tujuh hari itu bekerja keras di
rumah iparnya. Tidak sedikit jua ia menghentikan
tangan, karena jamu tidak berkeputusan dan
selalu makan minum. Setelah sudah menujuh
hari, barulah ibu Juriah dan anaknya pulang.”
“On that day, Midun’s father was buried grandly.
For seven days people prayed and had a feast at the
family’s house of Midun’s father. On the third and
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pages 59-74
seventh day, the Kenduri besar was held to pray for
the spirit of Midun’s father to be forgiven by Allah in
the afterlife. Much money was spent for celebrating
the deceased. By the Midun’s father’s family,
everything was prepared without exception. Two
rice fields were mortagaged for the celebration. For
seven days Juriah’s mother worked very hard at
her in-laws’ house. She barely rested to serve and
prepare for the feast. After the seventh day, she and
her daughter went home. (p. 162)
The kenduri besar is almost similar to the
tradition of selamatan tiga, tujuh, and empatpuluh
harian in the Javanese tradition. However, there
is an important difference in the kenduri besar
of Minangkabau tradition. In the case of a death
of a father, it is the family of his ethnic group that
holds the kenduri to celebrate his death not his
wife and children, that is (mamak) uncle and his
nephews and nieces. The wife and children do not
have the right to decide anything in relation to the
kenduri since their present is simply to help. As
described in the quote above, during the kenduri
celebration, the wife of the deceased will stay in
her in-laws’ house and help her in-laws preparing
anything needed. At least she must stay for seven
days before going back to her own house. Because
this kenduri is held by the ethnic group (clan), the
ethnic group will try to celebrate it as good and
glorious as they can to keep their dignity in front
of the other ethnic groups. By this, they will not be
thought lightly.
The Minangkabau society has a tradition of
helping each others especially in heavy works
such as harvesting rice field, building a house,
building a mosque and other activities involving
many people. This novel tells a situation when a
family wants to harvest their field. This harvesting
activity eventually ends up as a kenduri, working
together, having fun, and celebrating a feast.
“Pada suatu malam Pak Midun berkata kepada
anaknya, “Midun! beritahukanlah kepada
kawan-kawanmu, bahwa hari Ahad yang akan
datang ini kita akan mengirik padi di sawah.
Begitu pula kepada Pendekar Sutan dengan
murid-muridnya. Orang lain yang engkau rasa
patut dipanggil, panggillah! Sekali ini biarlah
kita memotong kambing untuk penjamu orang
yang datang mengirik ke sawah kita. Saya rasa
takkan berapa bedanya menyembelih kambing
64
dengan membeli daging di pasar.”
“One night, Midun’s father talked to his son,
“Midun! Tell your friends that on the next Sunday
we will thresh rice in the field. As well to Pendekar
Sutan and his pupils. Other people you think
worthy, call them! For this one time, let’s have
lamb to serve those who come for threshing to our
field. I feel no difference whether to butcher a lamb
or buy meat at the market.” (p. 33)
The Minangkabau people are famous for their
dedication to education, as well the widespread
diaspora of their men outside their hometown
for a living (merantau). Minangkabau people
are quite prominent in the field of trading, as
professional and as an intellectual person. They are
the respected heirs of ancient traditions of Malay
and Srivijaya Empires who are fond of trading and
living dynamically. The Minangkabau tramp is a
term for Minang people living outside the Province
of West Sumatera, Indonesia. Tramping (or some
people called ‘out migration’) is an interaction
process of Minangkabau people with the outside
world, and also an experience and adventure. The
tramp tradition usually comes from the families of
traders, crafters and religious learners. According
to Golden (2012, p. 162), the Minangkabau system
of matrilineality was instrumental in facilitating
the changes in migration. Men were not tied to the
village in the same way women were. The position
of men in a matrilineal system are more free, but
less secure. They make tramping (often translated
merantau) an appealing option, both for economic
and personal reasons.
In the novel, it is also told that how Midun
wants to work outside his village. Yet, unlike the
major reason for tramping, Midun’s leaving is
to avoid spiteful attitude of Kacak (the head of
village’s nephew) which makes him jailed. The
Midun’s family is not a trader, crafter or religious
leaner, but a farmer family whose job is to work on
land or farm.
“Tentu saja kalau ia pulang Kacak tidak
bersenang hati, dan mencari ikhtiar supaya
ia binasa juga. Midun berkata dengan lemah
lembut sambil memohon permintaan, katanya,
“Jika ada kemurahan Engku kepada saya, harap
Engku mengizinkan saya tinggal di sini. Saya
tidak hendak pulang, biarlah saya mencari
penghidupan di kota ini saja. Dan kalau tak
ada keberatan kepada Engku, saya bermaksud
hendak keluar sekarang.”
“Tidak boleh, karena orang hukuman yang sudah
bebas mesti pulang kembali ke kampungnya.”
“Atas rahim dan belas kasihan Engku kepada
saya, sudi apalah kiranya Engku mengabulkan
permintaan saya itu. Saya takut pulang, karena
saya dimusuhi orang berpangkat di negeri saya.
Yang menghukum saya kemari pun, sebab orang
itulah. Oleh sebab itu, saya berniat hendak tinggal
di Padang ini saja mencari pekerjaan.”
Karena Midun meminta dengan sungguhsungguh dan dengan suara lemah lembut, maka
timbul juga kasihan sipir kepadanya. Ia pun
berkata, katanya, “Sebetulnya hal ini tidak boleh.
Tetapi sebab engkau sangat meminta, biarlah
saya kabulkan…”
“Of course when he came home Kacak was
unhappy and tried to get him killed. Midun said
gently while asking, he said “should Engku (an
honorable Mister) feel generous to me, hopefully
Engku allows me to stay here. I do not want to go
home, let me have a life in this town. And if Engku
does not mind, I want to go out.”
“No, because whoever is free from his sentence
must go back to his own village.”
“For Engku’s generosity to me, should Engku grant
my wish. I am scared of going home because I am
opposed by a powerful person in my home town.
He was the one who sentenced me. Therefore, I
wish to stay in Padang, looking for a job.” Since
Midun asked earnestly and with gentle voice, the
warden felt sorry for him. He then said “Actually,
it is not allowed. But since you asked tenaciously, I
then grant it…” (p. 115-116).
As a Minang who is used to tramping
tradition, the character of Midun is also described
as a nomadic living from one town to another.
The majority of Minangkabau tramps choose Java
Island as their destination, because Java Island has
a Betawi City which is the administrative capital as
well as trading center at that time.
“Dengan tidak kurang suatu apa, kedua mereka
pun sampailah ke Tanjung Priok, di pelabuhan
kota Betawi. Midun dan Halimah turun dari
kapal, lalu terus ke stasiun. Karena hari masih
pagi dan kebetulan ada kereta api ke Bogor, maka
Halimah pun membeli karcis, terus ke negerinya.”
“Safely, both of them arrived in Tanjung Priok, a
port of Betawi City. Midun and Halimah came
down from the ship and then continued to the
rail station. Since the day was still early and
coincidentally there was a train to Bogor, thus
Halimah bought tickets, go to her town.” (p. 144).
The tramping tradition to look for experiences
and fulfill basic needs of life is reflected as well in
this novel. The characteristics of Minangkabau
people who are dynamic and adaptable to new
environments along with having strong will to
learn something new are also intensively reflected.
The followings are the quotations described in the
novel regarding the made-up mind of a Minang
tramp doing various professions to look for a
better life.
“Setelah sampai di stasiun Betawi, Midun pergilah
bersama Syeikh Abdullah al-Hadramut, ke
rumahnya di Kampung Pekojan. Maka tinggallah
Midun bersama-sama, dengan dia di rumahnya.
Ada sebulan lamanya Midun berjalan hilir mudik
saja menurutkan Arab itu berniaga. Dengan hal
demikian, ia telah mengetahui jalan-jalan di kota
Betawi. Bahasa negeri itu pun sudah mahir pula
kepadanya. Begitu pula tentang hal berniaga, ia
sudah agak paham.”
“After arriving at Betawi station, Midun went
together with Shaikh Abdullah al-Hadramaut to his
house in Pekojan village. Thus Midun stayed with
him at his house. For a month, Midun followed that
Arabian and learnt to trade. Therefore he had been
familiar with the streets around the Betawi City.
He also spoke local language fluently. As well with
trading, he quite understood.” (p. 151).
“Selama Midun dalam penjara itu, ada seorang
hukuman bekas orang yang bersekolah juga,
yang mengajarkan menulis dan membaca dan
menceritakan berbagai-bagai ilmu pengetahuan,
sehingga
banyaklah
tokok
tambahnya
pengetahuan Midun selama dalam penjara itu.
Orang itu Mas Sumarto namanya. Ketika ia
akan meninggalkan bui itu, maka ditemuinyalah
orang itu. Sesudah mengucapkan terima kasih
atas nasihat-nasihat dan kesudian Mas Sumarto
mengajarnya menulis dan membaca selama
dalam bui, Midun memberi selamat tinggal
kepada gurunya itu.”
“During Midun was jailed, there was an inmate,
an educated one, who taught writing and reading
and told him knowledge, so that Midun learned
many things when he was jailed. That person
was Mas Sumarto. When he got out, he met him.
After saying his gratitude for the advices and Mas
Sumarto’s willingness to teach him how to write
and read in the jail, Midun said his good bye to his
teacher.” (p. 171).
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pages 59-74
““Tabik,
Midun,
ada
baik?”
kata
Hoofdcommissaris.
“Baik juga, Tuan,” ujar.Midun dengan sopannya.
“Kemarin kamu katakan, kamu tidak bekerja.
Mau kamu bekerja di sini?”
“Kalau Tuan mau menerima saya, dengan segala
suka hati saya terima.”
“Baiklah. Sekarang boleh Midun mulai bekerja.”
Setelah Hoofdcommissaris bercakap beberapa
lamanya di telepon, Midun dibawa ke dalam
sebuah kamar besar. Di situ dilihatnya amat
banyak orang bekerja. Maka Midun pun
mulailah bekerja sebagai juru tulis di kantor
Hoofdcommissaris.
Dengan rajin dan sungguh Midun bekerja di
kantor itu. Di dalam dua bulan saja, sudah
kelihatan kecakapannya bekerja. Ia selalu hatihati dan hemat dalam pekerjaannya. Tidak lama
Midun disuruh mengambil pekerjaan mata-mata.
Sebabnya ialah karena masa itu amat banyak
penggelapan candu.
Di dalam pekerjaan itu pun Midun sangat
pandai. Tidak sedikit ia dapat menangkap candu
gelap. Pandai benar ia menjelmakan diri akan
mengintip orang membawa candu gelap itu.”
“Greetings Midun,
Hoofdcommissaris
how
are
you?”
said
“Yes, Sir!” told Midun
“Yesterday you said you had no job. Do you want
to work here?”
“If you are willing to accept me, I will gladly accept
it.”
“Fine. You may work here.”
After Hoofdcommissaris talked for quite sometimes
on the phone, Midun was taken to a spacious room.
There, he saw many people working. Then Midun
started to work as a clerk at the Hoofdcommissaris’s
office.”
Midun worked diligently and earnestly at that office.
In two months, he already seemed competent. In
no time, Midun was asked to be a spy, because at
that time many people smuggled opium.
Midun was very competent with that job. He
captured many opium smugglers. He was quite
clever disguising himself to identify the opium
smugglers.” (p. 175).
Besides, the Minangkabau society has different
traditions from other ethnic groups’ traditions
in Indonesia, i.e. Tambo. The Tambo recounts
the beginnings of Minangkabau history, the time
before memory, in which the rules of adat were
66
given and the royal family was established (Golden,
2012: 157). Taufik Abdullah (1972: 184) explained
that Tambo provides both ‘mystical sanction to the
existing order’ and ‘categories for the perception of
reality’. It is not only a recounting of the history of
the Minangkabau world, but also a template with
which events in modern times may be interpreted.
Tambo is one of the important Minangkabau
cultural inheritances. It is a story delivered orally
by a kaba (like a tourbadour in Europe travelling
to show his expertise in storytelling across the
country) told by an announcer in a local customary
ceremony. At least there are two types of Tambo,
namely Tambo Alam telling about the history of
ancestors and Mingkabau kingdom buildings, and
Tambo Adat telling about custom or system and
the rules of Minangkabau government in the past
(Navis, 1985: 45). This tradition strongly practiced
in the Mingkabau society is also reflected in the
novel. The Tambo described in the novel is Tambo
Alam, the following is the quotation:
“Konon kabarnya, menurut cerita orang: pada
zaman dahulu kala orang Jawa datang ke
Minangkabau akan menyerang negeri itu. Melihat
kedatangan orang Jawa yang sangat banyak
itu, orang Minangkabau khawatir, takut akan
kalah perang. Oleh sebab itu, dicarinya akal akan
menghindarkan bahaya itu. Maka dikirimnya
seorang utusan oleh raja Minangkabau kepada
panglima perang orang Jawa itu membawa
kabar, mengatakan: bahwa jika berperang tentu
akan mengorbankan jiwa manusia saja. Oleh
karena itu, dimintanya berperang itu dihabisi
dengan jalan mengadu kerbau saja. Manakala
kerbau orang Minangkabau kalah, negeri itu akan
diserahkan kepada orang Jawa. Tetapi kalau
menang, segala kapal-kapal dengan muatannya
harus diserahkan kepada orang Minangkabau.
Permintaan itu dikabulkan oleh orang Jawa
dengan segala suka hati. Maka dicarinya
seekor kerbau yang amat besar. Tetapi orang
Minangkabau mencari seekor anak kerbau yang
sudah tiga hari tidak diberinya menyusu. Pada
moncong anak kerbau itu diberinya berminang
yang amat tajam. Setelah datang hari yang
ditentukan hadirlah rakyat kedua kerajaan itu.
Ketika orang Jawa melihat anak kerbau orang
Minangkabau, mereka tertawa dengan riangnya.
Pasti kepada mereka itu, bahwa ia akan menang.
Tetapi setelah kedua kerbau itu dilepaskan ke
tengah gelanggang, anak kerbau itu pun berlarilari kepada kerbau besar orang Jawa itu, hendak
menyusu... sehingga perut kerbau itu tembus oleh
minang yang lekat di moncongnya. Kerbau orang
Jawa itu mati, maka menanglah kerbau orang
Minangkabau itu. Demikianlah ceritanya. Benar
tidaknya cerita itu, wallahu alam.”
“Reputedly, a long time ago the Javanese people
came to Minangkabau to attack this land. Seeing
so many Javanese people came, the Minangkabau
people were worried, afraid of losing the war.
Therefore, many means were sought to avoid
that danger. Thus, a messenger was sent by the
King of Minangkabau to the War Commander of
the Javanese people to bring news, stating that
war only brought death. Therefore, he was asked
to end the war with buffalo fighting. Should
the the buffalo of the Minangkabau people lost,
the Kingdom would be surrendered to the the
Javanese people. However, should they won, all
ships along with their loads should be handed
down to Minangkabau people. That request was
granted by the Javenese people gladly. Then a
very big buffalo was sought. Yet the Minangkabau
people sought a calf that was not breastfed for
three days. On the snout of the calf, they put a very
sharp minang (a small pointed object like horn).
On the appointed day, the people of both kingdoms
came. When the Javanese people saw the calf of
the Minangkabau people, they laughed loudly.
They confidently thought of winning. But after the
two buffaloes were released to the arena, the calf
ran towards the big buffalo of the Javanese people
for breastfeeding,…in which the buffallo’s stomach
got stabbed by the Minang on the calf’s snout. The
buffalo of the Javanese people died, thus the calf of
the Minangkabau people won. That was the story.
Whether the story was true or not, wallahu alam
(only God knows). (p. 69).
Tambo Alam told in the novel was also
described by Koentjaraningrat (1975), Vreeland
et.al (1977), and Golden (2012). But, Golden added,
this story is told more for its charm than out of a
sure sense of truth, the buffalo’s horns can be seen
in the unique sweeping roof points of traditional
architecture and the hornlike projections of
women’s ceremonial headdress. A more prosaic
explanation is that Minangkabau is derived from
pinang kabu which means ‘an original home’.
(Golden, 2012: 154) According to Esten (1993:
32), Tambo is one of the traditional Minangkabau
literatures (kaba) delivered by singing. This
storytelling by singing (also called bakaba) was
accompanied by special music.
In addition to Tambo, this novel describes
as well the construction of classical traditional
Minangkabau house barely existed at the time.
This house construction is called balairung sari.
“Midun dan Maun sampai di pintu gerbang itu.
Dengan heran mereka melihat keindahannya.
Agak ke sebelah dalam sedikit ada sebuah
rumah yang amat kukuh, bangun rumah itu
tak ubah dengan balairung sari buatan orang
Minangkabau zaman dahulu. Sungguh tertarik
hati melihat bangun rumah itu. Atapnya dari
ijuk, berdinding papan berukir. Di tengah-tengah
balai itu ada sebuah pintu masuk yang amat
besar. Jika orang hendak melihat pasar malam,
harus melalui pintu balai itu. Di atas pintu agak
sebelah atas, ada kepala kerbau yang bertanduk.
Kepala kerbau itu ialah menjadi suatu tanda
kebesaran orang Minangkabau.”
“Midun and Maun arrived at the gate. Curiously
they saw its beauty. Not far inside, there was a
sturdy house, the house construction was similar
to the balairung sari of Minangkabau people in old
times. It amazed many those who saw it, the roof
was made from ijuk (natural fibre of palm tree),
and the wall was made from carved wooden board.
In the middle of balai (hall) there was a giant
entrance. Should people wanted to see the night
market, they must go through this entrance. On
the right side of the entrance, there was a horned
buffalo head. This buffalo head was the insignia of
Minangkabau people. (p. 69).
Although there are many traditions of
Minangkabau society which are not contradictory
to Islamic teachings, yet there are some traditions
that are strongly contradictory. However, there are
some people who support the traditions and some
support the Islamic teachings leading to horrible
dispute. The description of the dispute in applying
the traditions in society is also shown in the novel.
This novel is not only documenting but also
criticizing people’s faith in those traditions. One of
them is the sacred stone tradition of Pagaruyung
kingdom which today is known as batu angkekangkek.
““Batu apa ini, Mamak? Bagaimanakah, maka
kita dapat menentukan nasib kelak dengan batu
ini?”
“Batu ini ialah batu keramat, pusaka dari Raja
Pagaruyung yang telah berabad-abad lamanya,”
jawab orang itu. “Jika orang muda dapat
67
pages 59-74
mengangkat batu ini sampai ke atas kepala,
tandanya orang muda akan berbahagia kelak.
Tetapi bila tidak dapat, boleh saya pastikan,
bahwa nasib orang muda tidak baik akhir
kelaknya. Dan barang siapa yang tidak percaya
akan perkataan saya, tentu ia dikutuki batu
keramat ini.”
Midun dan Maun amat takjub mendengar
perkataan orang itu. Karena ia seorang alim pula,
bersalahan sungguh pendapat orang ini dengan
ilmu pengetahuannya. Pikirnya, “Ini tentu suatu
tipu untuk pengisi kantung saja. Mengapakah
hal yang semacam ini kalau dibiarkan saja
oleh pemerintah? Bukankah hal ini bersalahan
dengan ilmu pengetahuan dan agama? Orang
ini barangkali tidak beragama, karena batu
disangkanya dapat menentukan buruk baik
untung orang.”
“What kind of stone is this Mamak (uncle)? How
come this stone decide our destinies?”
“This stone is a sacred stone, an heirloom of the
King of Pagaruyung from centuries ago,” answered
that man. “If you, young man, can lift this stone
over the head, it means that you will have a happy
life. But if you cannot, I guarantee that your destiny
will be miserable. And whoever has no faith in my
words, certainly he will be cursed by this sacred
stone.”
Midun and Maun were very amazed listening
to what the man said. Since he was a religious
person, he had sinned for abusing his knowledge.
He thought, “This was certainly a fraud for his
money. Why was this kind of thing allowed by
the government? was this not abuse of knowledge
and religion? This person was probably irreligious
because he thought a stone may decide one’s
destiny whether it was good or bad luck.” (p. 72).
The most prominent tradition of Minangkabau
society is its kinship pattern. In the novel, the main
story is the relationship between an uncle and
his nephew and family clan that is Tanjung clan.
This novel describes the practice of this kinship in
society.
“…Juriah said to her mamak (uncle), she said,
‘Mamak! Why did Sutan Manindih say, it was such
a shame father was sick here?”
“Apparently you do not understand yet, said Datuk
Paduka Raja (His majesty the King-clan customary
title), listen to what I say! Your father, according
to the custom, was “abu di atas tunggul” (ash on
a stump) at our house. It means that it would fly,
should it blown away by the wind. Your father was
part of the kinship of our clan. Thus he was a family
because of the marriage of your mother and father.
68
Should we dislike him or otherwise he might leave
anytime. Therefore your father stayed temporarily
at this house. We could make him go or he might
leave if he wanted to. Thus, Sutan Manindih said it
was such a shame that his mamak was sick at this
temporarily house.”
“But was it not my father sick at his own children’s
house? It was we who treated him when he was sick.
It was another matter should we were strangers,
therefore it was common of what he said.”
“In this matter, you, Juriah, was not mentioned,”
said Datuk Paduka Raja who was shocked by his
niece’s question.”Your question was quite difficult.
According to the custom “adat bersendi syara’,
syara’ bersendi adat” (custom founded on syara’,
syara’ founded on custom), this meant that our
syara’ and custom relied to each other or in line.
Should based on syara’ it was the children that
must be prioritized but based on custom it was
the nephews and nieces. Thus, this was quite
contradictory.” (p. 161).
The biggest impact of this kinship pattern
is inheritance matter. The dispute as described
above is getting worse regarding the inheritance
allocation between clan relationship and sibling
relationship.
“Sehari sesudah menujuh hari, Sutan Menindih
dan beberapa orang saudaranya datang ke
rumah Ibu Juriah. Setelah sudah makan minum,
dan setelah dianjurkannya dengan perkataan
yang panjang lebar, Sutan Menindih berkata,
“Ibu, saya harap Ibu jangan gusar dan jangan
pula berkecil hati. Kedatangan kami kemari
ini, ialah menurut sepanjang adat, yaitu akan
mengambil harta peninggalan mamak kami.”
“Benar, Sutan,” ujar ibu Juriah, “tetapi apalah
peninggalan mamak Sutan. Uang tak ada, hanya
pakaiannyalah yang ada.”
“Ah, rupanya Ibu bersembunyi di balik lalang
sehelai. Yang terang saja hak kami, sawah dan
huma. Bukankah itu mamak saya yang membeli
dan peninggalan beliau?”
Mendengar perkataan itu ibu Juriah sangat
terkejut… Maka ibu Juriah berkata pula, katanya,
“Itu jangan Sutan sebut-sebut, sebab pencaharian
kami berdua. Berdikit-dikit kami menyimpan
uang; setelah agak banyak kami belikan tanah
untuk kami usahakan. Pendeknya, yang Sutan
sebutkan itu usaha kami berdua, yang sudah kami
untukkan bagi anak kami. Pak Midun sendiri
sudah mengatakan waktu ia hidup, bahwa segala
pencahariannya diuntukkannya kepada anakanaknya.”
“A day after the seventh day, Sutan Manindih and
some of his siblings came to Juriah’s mother house.
After having drinks and food and after talking for
quite long, Sutan Manindih said, “Ma’am, I hope
you will not be worried and hopeless. Our coming
here is according to the custom that was to take our
mamak’s (uncle) inheritance.”
“You were right Sutan,” said Juriah’s mother, “but
what Mamak Sutan (Sutan’s uncle) left, there was
no money, only clothes.”
“Ah, apparently you were not very thoughtful. What
become our rights were the rice field and huma
(private-owned lands). Were they not bought by
and the inheritances of our Mamak?”
“Hearing this conversation, Juriah’s mother was
quite shocked,…Then Juriah’s mother also said,
she said, “dit not you mention them, because they
were belong to both of us. We saved money for
quite some times, after it was enough, we bought
lands to be worked on. Shortly, what Sutan said,
was both of our work, which we decided to be left
for our children. Midun’s father himself already
told it when he was alive, that all of his inheritances
were for his children. (p. 163).
Minangkabau social structure, as written in the
novel, is guided by adat law, which sets forth the
rules of matriliny regarding village organization,
group membership, residence, and inheritance of
property. In the case of most matrilineal systems,
a man is differently responsible for his children,
who are not a part of mamak-kemenakan (uncleniece/nephew) network. The mamak, generally
the oldest male member of the suku, is the head
of the family and is responsible for the welfare
of his sisters’ children. He represents the family
in suku affairs (Abdullah, 1972, p. 196). Mamak
has to be consulted in all kinds of actions; before
a house is built or a wedding is arranged; before
any important financial transaction, etcetera. As
the saying, ‘pai tampek batanyo, pulang tampek
babarito’ (on going he must be asked, on returning
he must be informed) (De Jong, 1980: 118).
Despite the fact that they are not members of
the same clan, fathers have a close and important
relationship with their children. Abdullah (1972, p.
196) writes that although mamak is responsible for
the material welfare of his niece/nephew, it is the
father who is expected to see to the spiritual growth
of his children and mamak to his sisters’ children,
is expected to fulfill both sets of responsibilities.
Frey (1986, p. 84) suggests that the distinction
between a man’s roles as father versus as mamak
is perhaps best expressed by the adage that he
‘holds his children in his lap, but guides his nieces
and nephews with his right hand.’
The
ownership
and
inheritance
of
Minangkabau property is governed by adat. There
are two types of property governed by different
rules. Harto Pencarian (also called Tanah Pusako
Rendah, Taruko), acquired goods, are inherited by
either sons or daughters, and the mandate are more
flexible. Harto Pusako (also called Tanah Pusako
Tinggi), ancestral property, however has much
more stringent rules, it is always the possession
of women, passed from mother to daughter
and never sold. Such ownership contributes to
women’s socio-economic autonomy. It is through
their wives that most men have access to land, by
farming it and eating what they have grown. Still,
some men will receive gifts of some proportion
of the land’s yields from their sisters or nieces, in
recognition of their special bound (Golden, 2012:
166; Thalib, 1985: 5; De Jong, 1980: 87-88).
While sometimes prescribing conflictual
actions, there are many fundamental ways in
which adat and Islam resemble and reinforce
one another. Both traditions place great stock in
the ideal of mufakat, consensual agreement. Both
possess value reciprocity and social obligations,
and stress compassion and loyalty (Golden, 2012,
p.160). In the novel, it is described how to find a
solution of the dispute through deliberation among
the penghulu suku. The deliberation among the
penghulu suku is commonly conducted when a
penghulu suku finds a certain problem among his
clan relating to other clans. It is as proposed by
Dobbin (1974: 322), ‘It was the penghulu suku who
had the most authority and influence in a nagari
and it was this penghulu who settled disputes
arising in the nagari, either by himself within his
own suku or within the rapat penghulu (council)
if his decision was disputed or more than one suku
involved.’
“Datuk Paduka Raja lalu menerangkan duduknya
pusaka yang ditinggalkan Pak Midun. Bagaimana
penghidupan Pak Midun laki istri sejak mulai
69
pages 59-74
kawin diceritakannya dengan panjang lebar.
Kemudian diterangkannya pula pendakwaan
orang Tanjung hendak merebut pusaka itu. Setelah
berkata pula, katanya, “Penghulu seadat, Tuanku
(‘alim) sekitab. Datuk sendiri sudah maklum,
bahwa di Alam Minangkabau ini pusaka turun
kepada kemenakan. Bukannya dia, melainkan
Datuk sendiri rupanya yang mendakwa, padahal
Datuk sudah mengetahui. Sungguh heran, saya
kurang mengerti dalam hal ini. Orang Tanjung
itu sekali-kali tidak merebut, melainkan mereka
berhak mengambil pusaka kaumnya yang telah
meninggal.”
“Benar kata Datuk itu,” ujar Datuk Paduka Raja.
“Tetapi lupakah Datuk akan kata adat: Harta
pembawaan pulang, harta tepatan tinggal, harta
suarang (pencaharian) dibagi? Dan sebuah lagi
menurut kata adat: adat bersendi syara’ dan
syara’ bersendi adat?”
“Datuk Paduka Raja then explained the
inheritances matter left by Midun’s father. How the
life of a man and woman since they married was
told for quite long. Then it was also explained the
intention of Tanjung people who wanted to take
the inheritances.
“After saying such thing, one said, “Penghulu
seadat, Tuanku (‘alim) sekitab (Leader of the
clan, the wise one) Datuk yourself already
understoodthat in this Minangkabau land, the
inheritances were inherited to the nephews and
nieces. It was neither him or Datuk yourself
determine, and Datuk knows it. Curiously, I did
not quite understand of this matter. The Tanjung
people did not forcefully take but they took for
what to be their rights of their deceased family.”
“It was true of what this Datuk said,” said Datuk
Paduka Raja. “But do you forget of what custom says:
Harta pembawaan pulang, harta tepatan tinggal,
harta suarang (pencaharian) (inheritances of
the deceased, house, and inheritances resulted
from work during the deceased was alive) must be
divided? And there is another thing according to the
custom: adat bersendi syara’ dan syara’ bersendi
adat? ” (custom founded on syara’, syara’ founded
on custom) (p. 168).
The colonial government systematized nagari
administration by creating three new ‘native’
administrators: the Laras, the Nagarihoofd or
Panghulu Kapalo and the Panghulu Suku Rodi.
The first two heads of specific territorial units, the
first of the district and the second of the village.
Their main tasks are to conduct all government
directives which affect their territories, to
70
police their districts, to ensure law enforcement
and order, and to oversee both coffee and rice
cultivation (Kahn, 1980: 167).
The village unit is inhabited by a number of
clans (suku) and administered by the clan heads
(penghulu). To be regarded as a true negeri, a
village must possess a balai or council-hall for the
assembly of the penghulus, and also a mosque,
pathways, a cock-pit and a bathing-place. Each
nagari was inhabited by six or more suku, made up
of a number of sebuah perut (a womb) or extended
families. At the end of each family branch within
a suku stood a penghulu kecil, and at the head of
each suku a penghulu suku, thus giving the average
nagari about sixty penghulus (Dobbin,1974: 322).
The novel tells that although a certain problem
in a clan relating to other clans is decided through
the deliberation among the penghulu suku. Yet, the
result of this deliberation may not reflect justice,
particularly relating to supporting the Islamic
teachings and overcoming the custom.
“Maka
kerapatan
itu
pun
ramailah
membicarakan bagaimana duduk pusaka itu
dan ke mana jatuhnya… Melihat kepada keadaan
rapat itu, nyata ada berudang di balik batu yang
datangnya dari seseorang yang berkuasa di
kampung itu… Kesudahannya maka diputuskan
bahwa pusaka itu dijatuhkan kepada kemenakan
Pak Midun… Sungguhpun rapat adat di negeri
itu sudah memutuskan demikian, tetapi Datuk
Paduka Raja belum lagi bersenang hati. Maka
ia pun membawa perkara itu kepada Hakim
Pemerintah. Dimintanya kepada Tuanku Laras,
supaya perkara itu dibawa ke Bukittinggi, baik
pihak anak, baik pun kemenakan sama-sama
memakai pokrol. Beberapa hari perkara itu
ditimbang di Landraad, kesudahannya menang
juga di kemenakan… Ibu Juriah dengan anakanaknya terpaksa memindahkan rumahnya ke
tanah kaumnya sendiri.”
“Then the deliberation was getting crowded, talking
about the inheritances and to who they were going
to be inherited… Judging from the condition of
the deliberation, clearly there was ulterior motive
from someone powerful in the village….afterwards
it was determined that the inheritances were to be
inherited to Midun’s father’s nephews and nieces….
Even though the rapat adat (custom deliberation)
had decided as so, but Datuk Paduka Raja (His
majesty the King) was not happy yet. He then took
this matter to the government judge. For several
days that matter was discussed in Landraad, the
verdict was the same, favored to the nephews and
nieces…. Juriah’s mother along with her children
were forced to move their house to the land of their
own clan.” (p. 169).
The alignment to custom over syara’ in the
deliberation of the penghulu is a common thing,
as proposed by Dobbin (1980), ‘In the rapat
penghulu decisions are normally determined
by adat or custom. The office of penghulu is
confined to a particular line within the suku and
hereditary within a penghulu’s maternal family,
passing either to his sister’s son or his mother’s
brother’. Furthermore, the penghulus’ alignments
to the adat are fully supported by the government,
especially the Dutch government that still has
great power at the end the 1920s. This is in line
with Kahn’s inscription (Dobbin, 1980: 161-162).
‘It is not therefore surprising that a Muslim
movement known as the Padri began agitating
against adat authorities and the royal lineage. The
Padri movement took the form of a struggle against
the corruption of Islamic beliefs and practices by
local customs or adat. Nor is it surprising that
the Dutch chose to intervene on the side of the
adat authorities as an excuse to move into the
Minangkabau highlands’.
This novel describes the anxiety of the author,
Tulis Sutan Sati, related to custom rules applied
in Minangkabau, especially on inheritance and
relationship between the child and father. Through
the figure of Datuk Paduka Raja, the author
attempts to sue the practice of inheritance that his
thought is not in line with the hereditary law in
Islam. That anxiety is illustrated in the following
dialogue:
“Mamak! Apakah sebabnya Sutan Menindih tadi
mengatakan ‘memberi malu kalau ayah sakit di
sini?”
“Kau rupanya belum mengerti,” ujar Datuk
Paduka Raja, “dengarlah saya terangkan! Adapun
ayahmu itu, menurut kata adat, ‘abu di atas
tunggul’ di rumah kita. Artinya, bila ditiup angin
ia terbang. Ayahmu adalah orang semenda bagi
kaum kita. Jadi ia famili karena perkawinan ibu
dan ayahmu. Jikalau kita tidak suka kepadanya
atau kebalikannya, boleh pergi sembarang
waktu. Oleh sebab itu, ayahmu adalah sebagai
orang menumpang di rumah ini. Boleh diusir dan
dia pun boleh pergi bilamana ia suka. Karena
itu tentu Sutan Menindih mengatakan ‘memberi
malu’, mamaknya suka di rumah penumpangan.”
“Tetapi bukankah ayah sakit di rumah
anak
kandung
beliau?
Kamilah
yang
menyelenggarakan beliau dalam sakit. Lain
perkara kalau kami orang lain, sudah patut ia
berkata begitu.”
“Dalam hal ini Juriah tidak disebut-sebut,” ujar
Datuk Paduka Raja yang agak tersentak oleh
pertanyaan kemenakannya.
“Pertanyaanmu itu memang sulit. Menurut kata
adat, ‘adat bersendi syara’, syara’ bersendi adat.’
Artinya, syara’ dan adat kita sandar menyandar
atau sejalan. Jika menurut syara’, anaklah yang
diutamakan, tetapi menurut adat, ‘kemenakan’.
Jadi hal itu nyatalah sudah berlawanan. Oleh
sebab itu, saya sendiri ragu-ragu, entah mana
yang benar kedua perkataan itu. Perasaan
saya itu sudah saya perbincangkan dengan
beberapa penghulu di sini. Banyak mereka
yang mengatakan, bahwa anak dengan bapak,
menurut adat, tak ada pertaliannya. Sebab orang
semenda itu adalah sebagai orang diselang dari
suatu kaum kepada kaum yang lain. Sebab itu
kemenakan pulang kepada mamaknya, tidak
kepada bapaknya. Tetapi menurut pikiran saya
tidaklah demikian. Pada hemat saya, anak itu
pulang kepada bapaknya. Artinya bapaknyalah
yang harus menyelenggarakan anaknya. Begitu
pula si anak wajib membela bapak bilamana
perlu. Anak itulah yang lebih dekat kepada bapak
daripada kemenakan.
Manakala sudah demikian, sudah sesuai dengan
kata adat: adat bersendi syara’ dan syara’
bersendi adat. Banyak lagi hal lain yang bersalahsalahan orang memakainya. Mereka melakukan
adat itu banyak sesat, agaknya karena salah
pengertian jua. Bahkan saya sendiri pun banyak
yang kurang paham, sebab kurang selidik.”
“Mamak! What the reason Sutan Manindih said ‘it
was ashamed if my father was sick here?”
“You apparently did not understand yet,” said
Datuk Paduka Raja, “Hear I explained to you! Your
father, according to the customary words, ‘ashes on
the stump’ in our home. It meant, when the wind
blown he flew. Your father was semenda (a person
related by marriage) to us. So he became family by
marriage of your mother and him. If we did not like
him or otherwise, he can leave any time. Therefore,
your father was staying person in this house. Could
be expelled and was allowed to go wherever he
likes. Because of that Sutan Manindih surely said
‘ashamed’, his uncle (mamak) preferred at the ride
71
pages 59-74
home.”
“But, was not my father sick at his biological
children house? It was we who held him when he
was sick. It another case if we were others, it was
worth it to say so.”
“In this case you (Juriah) were not mentioned,”
said Datuk Paduka Raja somewhat struck by his
niece’s question.”
Your question was difficult. According to the
custom word, ‘custom founded on syara’, syara’
founded on custom’, it meant syara’ and our
custom was leaning away. If according to syara’,
the children who come first, but according to
custom, ‘nephew/niece’. So it was obvious already
the opposite. Therefore, my own hesitation, which
was true whether the two words.
I feel that I have talked to some penghulus here. A
lot of them said that the children with their father,
according to custom, no affinities. For this person
who related by marriage was punctuated of a kaum
to another kaum. Therefore, nephew came to his
mamak, not to his father. But, according to my
mind was not so. In my opinion, the child came to
his father. This meant his father that should hold
him. Similarly, the child should defend his father
when necessary. Child that was closer to father
than a nephew. When it was in line with customary
words: ‘custom founded on syara’, syara’ founded
on custom’. Lots of thing, people was wrong when
used it. They did custom with many misguided,
presumably because of misunderstanding. Even
I myself was much less understood, for less
searchingly.” (p. 161-162)
CONCLUSION
the elders of the ethnic group or the authorized
parties to find its solutions.
Although the society described in the novel is
the Minangkabau society in the early 20th century,
yet with the universal literary characteristic and
the Minangkabau people capabilities in preserving
the traditions, this major description still can be
seen in today’s Minangkabau society. Though, this
research still limits its scope to the years when the
novel published, because the society which became
the inspiration to the author is the society in the
end of 1920s.
REFERENCES
Abdullah, Taufik. 1972. “Modernization in the
Minangkabau World”. In Claire Holt (ed.)
Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press. pp. 179-245
Amir, M. S. 1997. Adat Minangkabau: Pola dan
Tujuan Hidup Orang Minang. Jakarta: Citra
Harta Prima
Atjeh, Aboebakar. 1977. Aliran Syi’ah di Nusantara.
Jakarta: Islamic Research Institute
Benda-Beckman, Franz von. 1979. Property in
Social Continuity: Continuity and Change
in the Maintenance of Property Relationship
Through Time in Minangkabau, West
Sumatera. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
The Minangkabau traditions are not easy
to preserve. Especially, it is about the traditions
which are contradictory to the Islamic teachings,
the religion followed by the majority of population.
Nonetheless, the efforts to preserve these ancestral
traditions are still performed, even though
sometimes they lead to a dispute among its people
due to the tendency for prioritizing religion
compared to custom and tradition.
De Jong, P. E. De Josselin. 1980. Minangkabau
and Negri Sembilan: Socio-Political Structure
in Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
The novel of Sengsara Membawa Nikmat
describes comprehensively the implementation of
traditions and the Islamic teachings side by side in
the Minangkabau society. Some traditions in line
with the Islamic teachings remain to be developed;
meanwhile some of them which are contradictory
to the Islamic teachings are set to be discussed by
Golden, Holly Peters. 2012. Culture Sketches:
Case Studies in Anthropology. 6th Edition.
University of Michigan
72
Dobbin, Christine. 1974. “Islamic Revivalism in
Minangkabau at the Turn of the Nineteenth
Century” in Modern Asian Studies Journal.
pp. 319-356
Esten, Mursal. 1993. Minangkabau Tradisi dan
Perubahan. Padang: Penerbit Angkasa Raya
Graves, Elizabeth E. 2007. Asal Usul Elite
Minangkabau Modern. Jakarta: Yayasan
Obor Indonesia
Haddler, Jeffrey. 2010. Sengketa Tiada Putus.
Matriarkat, Reformisme Agama, dan
Kolonialisme di Minangkabau. Jakarta:
Freedom Institute
Kahn, Joel. S. 1980. Minangkabau Social
Formations: Indonesian Peasant and
The World Economy. London: Cambridge
University Press
Laurenson, Diana and Alan Swingewood. 1972.
The Sociology of Literature. London: Collier
MacMillan Publisher
Naim, Mochtar. 2013. Merantau Sepanjang
Masa. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu
Navis, Ali Akbar. 1985. Alam Takambang Jadi
Guru. Jakarta: PT. Grafiti Press
Peletz, Michael Gates. 1981. Social History and
Evolution of the Inter-Relationship Adat
and Islam in Rembau, Negeri Sembilan.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies
Sati, Tulis Sutan. 1991. Sengsara Membawa
Nikmat. Jakarta: Balai pustaka
Thalib, Sajuti. 1985. Hubungan Tanah Adat
Dengan Hukum Agraria Di Minangkabau.
Jakarta: Bina Aksara
Tim Penyusun Kamus Pusat Bahasa. 2008. Kamus
Bahasa Indonesia. Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa
Departemen Pendidikan Nasional
Yasid, Abu. 2014. Islam Moderat. Surabaya:
Penerbit Erlangga
Zeraffa, Michel. 1973. “The Novel as Literary Form
and as Social Institution” in Elizabeth and
Tom Burns (ed.) Sociology of Literature and
Drama. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd.
73
pages 59-74
74
Analisa Journal of Social Science andTracing
ReligionThe
Vol“Cultural
01 No.01Changes”
June 2016
in Sundanese Local Incantations
Asep Nahrul Musadad
TRACING THE “CULTURAL CHANGES”
IN SUNDANESE LOCAL INCANTATIONS
ASEP NAHRUL MUSADAD
State Islamic University (UIN)
Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta
Jl. Marsda Adisucipto Yogyakarta 55281
Indonesia
Email : [email protected]
Paper received: 13 Oktober 2015
Abstract
One of the key terms employed in exploring the story of Islamization in the
archipelago is the acculturation between Islamic spectrum and local genius,
through which the fine grain of Islamization flows. This paper aims to discuss
this acculturation with special reference to the “cultural change” mechanism that
reflected in Sundanese local incantations. To some extents, it has reflected the
indigenous articulation of Islamic spectrum. In the tradition of Sundanese oralliterature, particularly those are widely used by “pananyaan” (local shaman),
there are several magical spells that creatively assimilate with the Islamic
symbols. Using the ethnographic method and Haviland’s notion of the stages of
“cultural change”, it provides a preliminary exploration on how they adopted
as supplement or even transformed into local incantations and how the cultural
change, in turn, synthetically happens. The research shows the various form of
incantations; from hybrid incantations to pure Arabic “amalan”. They reflected
the presence of three kinds of mechanism as follows: (1) “the innovation” that
reflected in several mixture incantations, (2) “the diffusion” as represented by
several incantations which indicated to have their origin from outside region, and
(3) “the cultural loss” which represented by incantations in the Arabic formulas.
This kind of assimilation has shown the reception of Sundanese people which also
established by local determinations. In one sense, it also reflected – in Ricklefs
term – the “mystic synthesis” which regarded as the one of the “major gate” for
Islamization of the archipelago.
Keywords: Sundanese Local Incantation, Pananyaan, Cultural Change, Reception.
INTRODUCTION
The Sundanese Islam – and Indonesian
Islam in general – is a story of an array of creative
hybrid, in which Islamic spectrum and local
genius interact each other. One of the earliest
Islamic legacies in the archipelago is mystical
insight as well as magical powers. The transition
from mystical Hindu-Buddhism to mystical Islam
was presumably eased by conceptual continuities
(Ricklefs, 2007: 3). Mystical Islamic teachers,
perhaps claiming supernatural powers, seem a
more plausible agent of conversion in Javanese
court circles, which had long been familiar with
the mystical speculations of Hinduism and
Buddhism (Ricklefs, 2001: 6). Islam would first
gain adherents from the pasisir (northern littoral).
However, started from the reign of Sultan Agung
(1613-1646 AD.) of Mataram-Islam, the first major
reconciliation took place and the intensification
of Islam in Java land began to arise. This is what
Ricklefs refers as “the mystic synthesis” (Ricklefs,
2007: 3).
One of the major characteristics of that
synthesis is the “acceptance” of an array of local
75
pages 75-90
spiritual forces (Ricklefs, 2007: 6). From the
opposite view, the articulation efforts of Islamic
account is also represented within the indigenous
local customs. For that reason, the Islamization of
archipelago was widely regarded as a fine grain and
the peaceful one. In Sundanese context, the living
culture of “pananyaan” (local shaman) has shown
the presence of an acculturation of Islam and local
culture, which in turn also recorded the story of
Sundanese culture with its primordial nature from
past periods until now.
Sundanese people – especially in Priangan
region – consider pananyaan (literary means
“who is asked or the place/someone to ask) as
someone who has ability to reveal the world of
unseen and give advices on all problems brought
to him. The ultimate meaning of pananyaan
today encompasses the significance of shaman,
traditional healer, spiritual practitioner, astrologer,
and – in turn – Islamic priest (ahli hikmah).
The reconciliatory moments between Islamic
expressions and Sundanese account were reflected
in their incantations or magical spells (mantra),
especially that of pananyaan, which is believed
to have the significant influences. It is proven by
plenty of spell’s compositions which creatively
combine the Quranic verses and Sundanese
language. In this case, Qur’anic verses and Islamic
expressions were adopted as a supplement and
even transformed into local incantations. This
indigenous articulation of that Islamic holy text
has represented such a picture of local aesthetic
reception in the occult term. Indeed, the living
phenomenon of pananyaan and their magical
spells have also reflected a continuation of what
had been going on before pre-Islamic Sundanese
culture.
This paper aims to provide a preliminary
exploration of some aspects of the acculturation
between Islamic spectrum and Sundanese local
customs. It focuses on the traces of “cultural change”
that reflected in Sundanese local incantations; in
which the Qur’anic text and Islamic expressions
were adopted as supplement and even totally
transformed into an incantation. It would like to
describe the living-culture of pananyaan, through
76
their incantation, as the medium through which
Sundanese people adapt to changes and solve the
problems of existence.
Research Question and Previous Studies
Up to present day, the existence of pananyaan
in Sundanese culture remains the important one.
Some of rural Sundanese indigenously regard
the extrasensory experiences as the sacred and
otherworldly forces that have vital roles for their
life. In this case, the existence of that old local
shaman is the continuation of what had been going
on before pre-Islamic times. The local “hybrid
incantations” is one of the representative features
of the acculturation of both, Islamic spectrum and
local genius. Therefore, the question that becomes
the main focus here is “how Islamic spectrum and
local genius interact each other, as represented in
various Sundanese local incantations?”.
Many researchers have conducted studies on
the local incantations in the archipelago. Heru
Saputra in his book which previously originated
from his Magisterial Thesis in Gajah Mada State
University, Memuja Mantera: Sabuk Mangir
dan Jaran Goyang Masyarakat Suku Using
Banyuwangi (Saputra, 2007), has provided a deep
anthropological explanation about two famous
(Banyuwangi) incantations, Sabuk Mangir and
Jaran Goyang. Both are well-known as spells for
gaining people’s affection (pengasihan) which are
used not only by a shaman or sorcerer, but also
casted by ordinary Using people, those who don’t
possessed certain magical expertise. He concluded
that using the incantations, in spite of their role as
the living oral-literature, has indigenously become
the feature of daily life practices.
Sundanese incantation in particular, has also
become the interesting field to be explored. There
are several representative studies in this field.
Asep Yusuf Hudayat in his study entitled Tinjauan
Fungsional Mantera Sunda (Hudayat, 2010), has
provided the anthropological examination on the
realm of the user or the caster of the incantations.
It principally discusses the functional relation
between the incantations and its casters, with
the case study of ritual practices held by the rural
Tracing The “Cultural Changes” in Sundanese Local Incantations
Asep Nahrul Musadad
Sundanese in rice farming procession, starting
from the first planting race in irrigated rice fields
(sawah) until the harvest season, the magical
environment, and the external determination.
It also deals with the textual analysis of the
incantations, in which the surrounding context
provided the main determination through the
metaphorical ways.
Elis Suryani’s investigation of Sundanese
Incantations (Mantra Sunda), entitled Eksistensi
dan Fungsi Mantera Dalam Kehidupan
Masyarakat Sunda (Suryani, 2001), also tends to
explain the function of incantations in Sundanese
society. The existence of incantation (mantera)
can be seen both in positive and negative sense
in the mind of Sundanese society. Accordingly,
she maintains two classification of Sundanese
incantations based on the purpose of the user
into “white” and “black” incantation. The study
entitled Mantera Guna-Guna Dalam Kehidupan
Masyarakat Sunda, wrote by the same author has
provide the elaboration on the Sundanese “black
incantation” (Suryani, 2003).
Yusep’s study entitled Pelestarian Tradisi
“Jampe” Pada Masyarakat Kampung Naga
Tasikmalaya (Yusep, 2014), has preceded the
study of incantations in Tasikmalaya context, with
special reference to “Kampung Naga”, one of the
traditional villages that still maintains the original
local customs and mostly refuses modern stuffs. It
focuses on the preservation of jampe or local spell
for traditioal healing. Functionally, it concluded
three kinds of jampe: sasalad (spell for physical/
medical illness), kabadi (spell for magical illness)
and pamake (spell for various activities).
The study of Sundanese incantations seems to
be dominated by pure linguistic and anthropological
concerns in Sundanese local context. Therefore,
the intersection between Islamic elements and
Sundanese local genius remains neglected and
needs more exploration in a lot of terms.
Scope and Method of Research
The scope of this research is limited to the
incantations in Sundanese-Priangan culture.
The classification of Sundanese culture can be
hypothetically divided into four major clusters: (1)
Sunda Buhun (Sunda Wiwitan, Kanekes) people,
who still exclusively hold the Sundanese primordial
way of life in South Banten and Sukabumi. (2)
Sunda Priangan or Parahyangan culture which
has been influenced by Javanese-Mataram Sultan
Agung culture, including the region of Bandung,
Cianjur, Sumedang, Garut, Tasikmalaya and
Ciamis. (3) Sunda Pakaleran which has spread
over Karawang and Subang. (4) The culture of
Pakidulan [the southernmost part throughout
Sunda region] (Sumardjo, 2003: 301-302).
The research also limited to the incantations
which are collected in Kawalu village in Kota
Tasikmalaya, a city in southeastern part of West
Java, Indonesia. It was previously a part of
Tasikmalaya regency (kabupaten Tasikmalaya).
The history of Tasikmalaya goes back to
Galunggung as one of the spiritual centre of
Sundanese Kingdom before Pajajaran era with
Queen Batari Hyang (12th century) as the sacred
figure. After the intensification of Islam in Sunda
region, the center was moved to Pamijahan with
Syekh Abdul Muhyi (17th century) as the sacred
saint. Afterwards, the Islamic centre spread out
over the pesantren (Yahya, 2013: 8).
In spite of accepting modernity, the people of
Tasikmalaya still don’t fully discard the occult belief.
The belief on the Supernatural beings remains the
nucleus of their believe system across generation.
They believe in such invisible matters and ask the
pananyaan to solve the various problems such
as healing the ilness, seeking a job, rediscovering
the lost items, gaining rank and power in the
bussiness, familiy welfare, etc. Accordingly, there
are various occult knowledge which are usually
possesed by a pananyaan including; paririmbon
(horoscope), implengan (prophecy), kinasihan
(spells to win affection), singlar (spells to expel
the evil creatures), jampe (spells for healing),
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pages 75-90
jangjawokan (spells for various activities), amalan
(special Islamic prayers), and many others.
Kawalu village, particularly, is regarded as one
of the most “occult” places in Tasikmalaya. In this
case, Tasikmalaya people also recognise several
places as being “the most occult”, comparing to
other places, such as Kawalu, Pancatengah, villages
located nearby mount Galunggung (Singaparna,
Cigalontang, Cihanjuang, etc.), and villages in
southernmost part of Tasikmalaya (urang kidul),
such as Pamijahan, Karangnunggal, Cikalong, etc.
The majority of occult knowledge was believed
originated from mount Galunggung and Sancang
forest (leuweung Sancang) in Garut district as
two major magical sources, and from numerous
pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding school)
in Tasikmalaya as the Islamic origins. It is also
important to highlight that almost all villages
in Tasikmalaya have their own local shaman or
pananyaan.
This research uses an ethnographic method.
According to James Spradley, ethnography is the
work of describing culture. The central aim of
ethnography is to understand another way of life
from the native point of view (Spradley, 1980:
3). Participant-observation and depth-interview
are methods used to collect the incantations or
magical spells and all the material related to the
purpose of this research.
To analyze the data (incantations, magical
spells), the researcher uses several theories. First
and foremost, John Haviland’s theory of “cultural
change” would be applied to construct the stages
of acculturation as reflected in selected pattern
of incantations. According to Haviland, there are
three mechanisms of change; innovation, diffusion,
and cultural loss (Haviland, 2008: 347-352). To
trace the native’s ability to grasp another culture
(Islamic account; Qur’anic verses), the reception
theory would also be applied. On the other hand,
Hans Robert Jauss, insists that the audience of
literature doesn’t merely play a passive or formal
role. Indeed, the historical life of a literary work
is unthinkable without the active participation
of its addresses. Literature is “dialogic”, it exists
78
only in the form of a dialogue between text and
reader (Habib, 2005: 721). In the context of
cultural transformation, aesthetic reception also
has a major role. According to Milton L. Grahm,
the aesthetic has a preconditioning effect on
latter judgement. The appreciation of aesthetic is
a creative act, similar to the act of creation itself
(Grahm, 1969).
Levi Strauss’ notion about structural analysis
on myth would also relevant to explain the inner
relation between the incantations and Sundanese
culture as a whole. Strauss states that mechanism
of human mind is the major accentuation in
explaining the myth. In this case, he emphasizes
the “unconscious nature of collective phenomena”.
In this case, he juxtaposes language in the one hand
and myth in the other hand (Ahimsa-Putra, 2013:
75). He also maintains that structural linguistics
shift from the study of conscious linguistic
phenomena to the study of their unconscious
infrastructure (Strauss, 1963: 33).
General Context: The Intensification of
Islam and Cultural (Mystical) Challenge in
West Java
In the early 15th century, Syekh Hasanuddin,
also well-known as Syekh Quro from Campa
(Vietnam) was reported to be the first Islamic
propagator who has established a pesantren-like
institution in Karawang, northern littoral of West
Java. It has paved the way for Islam to penetrate the
core of the Hindu Pajajaran Kingdom. At the same
period, Syekh Datuk Kahfi also established the
similar institution in Pasambangan, Amparan-Jati,
which has provided a way for the establishment of
an Islamic kingdom (kraton). In return, pesantren
gained full recognition, legitimation and political
support from the kraton (Muhaimin, 1995: 205206). Hence, this attempt was also continued by
Sunan Gunung Jati who established a pesantren in
Dukuh Sembung. In the late 15th century, Cirebon
has become the center of disseminating Islam in
West Java, under the leadership of Sunan Gunung
Jati as the religious and political leader.
The intensification of Islam in Sunda region
begun after the fall of Sunda Kingdom in 1579.
Asep Nahrul Musadad
The Sultanates of Cirebon, Banten, and Mataram
played the key roles in this process of Islamization.
Between 17th and 18th century, the influence of
Javanese culture also flows into Sundanese region
along with the massive Islamization. Therefore,
Sundanese literary forms, like dangding or
guguritan and wawacan, is highly influenced by
Javanese culture (Rohmana, 2012: 9). The first
stage came from Demak and the second was from
Mataram-Islam (Yahya, 2013: 10). From Northern
littoral, the Islamic propagators continued to
penetrate the “back country” of West Java. In
this case, Syekh Abdul Muhyi in Pamijahan,
South Tasikmalaya, is one of the most important
supporter who penetrated the Southern part of
Priangan in late 17th and early 18th century AD.
(Christomy, 2008).
Particularly, the history of Tasikmalaya goes
back to mount Galunggung as one of the spiritual
centre of Sundanese Kingdom before Pajajaran
era with Queen Batari Hyang (12th century) as the
sacred figure. After the intensification of Islam in
Sunda region, the center was moved to Pamijahan
with ‘Abdul Muhyi (1640-1715 M.) as the sacred
saint. Afterwards, the Islamic centre spread out
over the pesantrens. (Yahya, 2013: 8).
In this stage, the case seems to be different
from Syattariyah sufi order (tarekat) legacy
that can be found in Abdul Muhyi’s connection.
The Syattariyah connection is one of the early
major sufi orders (tarikat) in the archipelago.
Although there is no reliable information about its
origin, the Syattariyyah adherents have claimed
‘Abdullah al-Syattar as the founder of tarikat. In
the archipelago, most of the genealogical order
are originated from ‘Abdurrauf al-Sinkili (d. 17..),
one of ‘Abdul Muhyi’s teacher. He was regarded
as one of the major Syattariyah propagator in the
archipelago. In the case of Tasikmalaya, ‘Abdul
Muhyi’s Syattariyah order also connected to alSinkili as his teacher (Arifin, 2015).
In another case, the Southernmost part of
West Java, particularly Tasikmalaya, is widely
regarded by most – until recent times – as the
“occult zone”. Tasikmalaya people recognize this
part as the culture of pakidulan, in which the
mystical life and believe are naturally high. They
also demographically regard the Southernmost
part as the place where local shaman (dukun,
tukang teluh) concentrated. Accordingly, similar
to Ricklef’s argument on the “mystic synthesis”
in the Islamization of Java, the negotiation,
reconciliation, and acceptance of an array of local
spiritual forces and the indigenous articulation
effort of Islamic account in the Islamization of
Tasikmalaya can also be traced.
In this case, with Cirebon and Banten, – which
was established with the support from Demak
– and lately Mataram, as three major agents of
Islamization, the identity of Sundanese-Priangan
mystical culture, especially Tasikmalaya, has
already dealt with Javanese Islamic account, which
is the product of such “mystic synthesis”. Thus, it
can probably be explained that the intensification
of Islam in West Java was “politically” and
“culturally” continuation of the of Sultan Agung’s
legacy of the “mystic synthesis” in penetrating
Islam from the North littoral of Central Java
(Demak) which represented the “putihan zone” to
the “back country” of Java-land which is regarded
as the “abangan zone”. The following section deals
primary with the traces of that synthesis through
local incantations.
Sundanese Puisi-Mantra: The Poetry of
Power
Native Sundanese in Kawalu, – before the
advent of the “paradigm shift” – consider some
words in Sundanese language to be powerful and
have the significant influences. Thit shift means
a lately paradigm in which the occult beliefs,
especially regarding the use of local “incantation”,
were henceforth generally left behind. It is not my
intention here to discuss how this shift occured;
which determined by complex reasons. Although
it is too difficult to demarcate them, based on
my field informations, in the case of Kawalu, for
example, the years 50’s until 70’s as the last
period of the occult belief, due to the advent of
so-called “modern stuff”, such as electricity and
modern medicine in that village. Nowdays, with
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pages 75-90
kampung adat and certain people (elderly people,
pananyaan (shaman), paraji (local midwife),
etc.) as the exception, local incantation is not used
anymore in daily life.
The identification of a speaker is also
important. The words, uttered by those who
possess a higher social and spiritual position (like
elder people, dukun, pandita, lately pananyaan
and ahli hikmah, etc.) are believed to be more
powerful. The identification reflected what
Michael Johnstone refers as “low magic” and “high
magic”. The former, is also called “natural magic”.
It was widely practiced in the Middle Age, and still
in some parts of the world. It combines the arts of
withcraft, spellcraft, hexcraft, which utilizes herbs,
amulets, and other simple objects along with
incantations to bring about the desired results.
The latter is performed to bring about union with
the divine. The power of nature, conceived as
being either angelic or satanic, is controlled by
spirits, using words and the names of sacred gods
(Johnstone, 2006: 27).
These special words had originally become a
“living oral-literature” (sastra lisan) of Sundanese
people and generally expressed in poetical form.
Confirming Pattrick Dunn, every culture in the
world has poetry, even cultures of those who do
not have writings, and they regard their poetry as
sacred and magical thing. Poetry is designed to
produce a magical effect called – in English – the
“incantation” (Dunn, 2008: 47).
In case of Kawalu, various local incantations
are well-remembered by some elder people, and
certain incantations are still used today. In the
time of youth, Nini Itoh (64) was regularly casted
the following spell (jangjawokan) before taking a
bath while patting the water repeatedly:
jaya aing jaya cai,
jaya cai jaya aing
(my glorious is water’s glorious,
water’s glorious is my glorious)
She got the spells from her grandfather, Aki
Sarjuki (born in the late 19th century and died
around 60’s). She believed that the spell was casted
to reach the longevity and welfare of life like the
80
water, one of major elements in life, that will exist
throughout the time. She also has a collection of
incantations that is still in use until today, namely
the jajampean or spells for healing. One of the
popular examples is a spell for a passive baby who
is late to learn to walk. While massaging the baby’s
knee, she casts this spell repeatedly:
turuluk lutung
tuur monyet
(be fast like lutung,1
with the knee of monkey)
Aki Saripudin (77), also an elder in Kawalu,
states that using incantation was common in his
youth among rural people in the sidelines of their
activity, and he did it long time ago. Along with
the stronger influence of Islam and the advent
of “modern” tools such as the electricity, these
incantations were slowly replaced by pure Islamic
expressions and some prayers, such as bismillah,
syahadat, shalawat, ayat kursy, and others. Now
days, he uses these Islamic prayers while doing
various activities. He states that the absence of pure
Islamic prayers in the past is due to the ignorance
of most people at that time. Unlike recent days,
someone having Arabic and Islamic knowledge
was very limited at that time.
In addition to the pure Islamic prayers, the socalled domestic Islamic prayers can also be found.
To expel the Satan and other evil creatures, Aki
Amir (1935-2013) used to cast the following spell
called Kulhu Geni when entering such “haunted”
places:
Bismillahirohmanirohim in the name of Allah
kul huwalohu ahad
say He is Allah, the One
kun payakun
“be” – and it is
masa Alloh
as God has willed
kodiron abadan abada who has power, forever, forever
These incantations, which have previously
become the oral literature, are what today called as
“puisi-mantra” in the study of Sundanese modern
literature. According to Yus Rusyana, an expert of
1. Black long-tailed monkey
Asep Nahrul Musadad
Sundanese modern literature, there are at least six
types of puisi-mantera in Sundanese literature
(Rusyana, 2009: 109):
1. Asihan (spell for gaining people’s affection)
2. Jangjawokan (spell casted in various daily activities)
3. Ajian (spell for invoking supernatural powers)
4. Singlar (spell to expel the evil)
5. Rajah (spell casted when starting to build a house
and the others)
6. Jampe (spell for healing)
Due to its nature as the living hereditary and
the difficulty – if not impossible – to confirm the
first composer, the authorship of puisi-mantra,
it is rather regarded as collective living literature
across generations. The spells are not spoken in
vain, but specifically used in magical behavior to
bring about the desired results with supernatural
forces. They are casted with the aim of mastering
and using the magical powers for certain purpose.
In addition to above-mentioned types of puisimantra, there are also spells that used to harm or
destroy other people, such as the spells of tukang
teluh/witches (Rusyana, 2009: 109). Along with
the dawn of academic purpose of Sundanese
literature, the so-called “written puisi-mantra” has
been collected by several researchers in specialized
books and then become the subject for the lesson
of Sundanese modern literature. However, my
intention here is to provide the “living puisimantra” which is still used by certain people,
particularly by the pananyaan.
In anthropological view, however, language is
not simply a matter of combining sounds according
to certain rules to come up with meaningful
utterances. It is important to remember that
languages are spoken by people who are members
of distinct societies (Haviland, 2008: 100). The
most important symbolic aspect of culture is
language-using words to represent objects and
ideas. Through language, Sundanese people, for
example, are able to transmit culture from one
generation to next generation for its “continuity”
and “change”.
It is important to note that all
above-
mentioned puisi-mantera – and the following
incantations in this paper – are used the “new
Sundanese” language that are largely influenced
by Javanese Mataram. They imposed its influence
in Priangan area since 17th century AD. Before that
one, the so-called “old Sundanese” (Sunda Buhun/
Kuna), in both of language and script had existed
as a distinct language in West Java (Moriyama,
1996: 153).
The following incantation is the Sundanese preIslamic magical spell which used “old Sundanese
language” (Sunda Kuna). it is usually casted in the
ritual of cleansing the soil/area (Gunawan, 2010:
159):
Ong paksa ma Guru pun
Ong, the owner of will is Guru, forgive
Pasaduan kami di na li(ng)ga Si Jaja,
we beg permission to Lingga si Jaja
li(ng)ga si Jantri
Lingga si Jantri
Bawa tamah Batara Kala put away the darkness
of Batara Kala
Tinggalkeun sarining lemah
to leave the essence of soil
Apan gawe sang pandita
by the labor of Pandita
Accordingly, it can probably be described that
the vast majority of Sundanese incantation, not
to mention all of them, after the intensification
of Islam through three major political agents
(Cirebon, Banten, Mataram), uses the “new
Sundanese” language which is widely applied in
the post-17th century AD.
From “Hybrid” Incantation to Pure ArabicAmalan
According to Federspiel, Islamic mystical
practice is an important expression of religion
among Southeast Asian Muslims during early
stage. Traditional shamans were in place when
Islam arrrived and the new religion did not
essentially change their roles. Regarding “power”
as residing in religious objects and language,
the traditional shamans converged with Islam
in a fragmentary way, even as they had been
merged with Buddhism and Hinduism in their
time. Accordingly, some shamans attempted to
81
pages 75-90
incorporate Islamic knowledge, symbols, and
prayers as part of their practice. However, it was
a specialized extraction without regard to the core
meaning of the religion itself and concentrated on
the use of religious terms and expressions in an
attempt to draw power from their use (Federspiel,
2007: 68-70).
Accordingly, when describing the earliest
attitude of Javanese to the initiation of the newly
established Islam, Ricklefs offers three kind of
appreciations; (a) for some Javanese, a new faith
may have been a means of gaining another source
of supranatural power, (b) for some, it was the
key for salvation., (c) for others, it was anathema
(Ricklefs, 2006: 2). In the first case, the tradition
of casting incantations is the main tradition.
Malinowski argues that the most important
element in magic is the spell. It is part of the magic
which is occult, handed over in magical filiation,
known only to the practitioner (Malinowski, 1948:
4).
However, Islam unwittingly gave these preIslamic local practitioners some new material.
Arabic expressions, particularly the key Islamic
ones, such as “the confession” (syahadah), “the
remembrance” (dzikr), the “opener” (bismillah) to
the Qur an, and the “magnificent” (takbir), have
replaced some incantations; sometimes replacing
but more often supplementing the Sanskrit
expressions (Federspiel, 2007: 65). In many ways,
this stage of “combining” Islamic expression with
the local incantation has representatively recorded
the development of assimilation of both elements.
Regarding the mystic as a culture, there is a
“change” in the construction, from one period to
another one. In this section, the preliminary sketch
on the stages of depelovement would be explored
through the linguistic-anthropological analysis
in various pattern of the “hybrid” Sundanese
incantations. Several “hybrid” incantations
were gathered during my fieldwork from
several pananyaan and elder people in Kawalu
village, Tasikmalaya. In regard to the language
composition, the way of mixing the spells can be
82
divided into several “creative” ways:
1. Pure Arabic incantation (amalan/wirid)
2. Pure Sundanese language with Islamic content
(theme)
3. Mixture of Sundanese language and Arabic
Islamic expression
4. Mixture of Sundanese language and special
Qur’anic verses
5. Sundanized Qur’anic verses
First and foremost, such basic assumption
can be employed with fully consideration to the
“lingustic composition” as the ultimate measure.
That the transformation of the incantations
(from pure Sundanese, Sundano-Arabic, to
pure Arabic) is juxtaposed with the “cultural
change” of Sundanese mystical tradition. This
led us to assume that; the more Qur’anic verses
transformed, the more syncretic stage took place,
and local custom hence regarded as superior to
the so-called Islamic mysticism, and neither is the
exact opposite, nor the “pure” Arabic incantation
(amalan) has shown the superiority of so-called
Islamic mysticism. In Haviland’s chronological
sense of “culture change”, mechanism, innovation
and diffusion stages are reflected in that “hybrid”
incantations, and the cultural loss is marked up by
the domination of “pure” Arabic incantation.
Although it has such linguistic plausibility,
this way of chronological thinking, however,
has a blind spot for several reasons. The first
and foremost, due to the absence of the “dating”
of incantation’s composing for the first time,
constructing the chronological stages based on
mere “linguistic composition” without regarding
to the historical symbol in the content, is unfairly
leading to the state of disarray. Besides, as it will
be mentioned later, replacing incantations with
Arabic expression or Qur’anic verses, is not always
equivalent to replacing the full account of local
mystic tradition itself.
The following section deals with the
examining several pattern of incantations and
historical contents. Using Haviland’s idea of
three mechanism of “cultural change”, selected
Asep Nahrul Musadad
incantations will be divided under three kinds
of mechanisms; an innovation stage, a difusion
stage, and a cultural loss stage. It is important
to note that this categorization is built on “the
ways” or “mechanism” in which mystic synthesis
takes part either as representation of the linguistic
composition or the historical information.
1. The Innovation Stage
According to William Haviland, the ultimate
source of all cultural change is innovation; any
new idea, method, or device that gains widespread
acceptence in a society. Primary innovation is the
creation, invention, or discovery of completely
new idea, method or device. Secondary invention
is a deliberate application or modification of an
existing idea, method or device (Haviland, 2008:
348).
This way of innovation is seemingly reflected
in several mixture incantations, in which Islamic
expression and Qur’anic verses are adopted as
supplement without regard to the core meaning
of the religious account. The following is a
“Sundanese-Qur’anic malevolent incantation”
used by several Sundanese local shaman and
pananyaan, to harm other people:
Spell to Taking Over People, Either to
Harm or Something Else
Bismilahirohmanirohim
in the name of Allah
Munirun .. illuminating …
Basirun .. Nadirun ..
giving good news … warning people
Hadarol maot, pakola lahum mutu
in fear of death, God said to them: Die!
Dina arah-arah opat jihat
on the four directions
Malaikat Jibril, Mikail, Isropil, Ijro’il
angel Jibril, Mikail, Israfil and Izrail
Robi Gusti, Abdi Gusti
o my Lord,
Nyanggakeun si ....
i hand over (name of targeted person)
La ilaha Illaloh
there is no God but Allah
In addition to the so-called “white magic”
that widely practiced by pananyaan, it is true
that there are Sundanese people practicing the socalled black art by weaving malicious spells which
then widely known as the “black magic”. There are
also spells used to harm other people, such as the
spells of tukang teluh or sihir (witches, withcraft).
In this case, it can probably be described that local
shaman, which had long been familiar with the
mystical speculations of Hinduism and Buddhism,
perhaps adopting Islamic expression, pieces of
Qur’anic verses and several Islamic teaching to
gain such new supranatural power in their “black”
incantation.
In above magical spell, the special pieces of
Qur’anic verses are used as supplement for the
“black” incantation. Moreover, the Islamic portion
seems to dominate all the spells composition;
It contains Islamic expression (bismillah and
lailahaillalloh) and teaching of the several angel
names. Three separated words; munir, basir,
nadir, is seemingly reflected Q.S. al-Ahzab: 4546. The next section was clearly referred to QS.
al-Baqarah: 243. The chosen pieces, however,
is the “cruel” phrase; in fear of death, God said
to them: Die! This has obviously indicated the
consciousness of the suitability of the meaning,
although with the absence of historical sense of the
verses and religious motives.
In this sense, the local shaman’s reception of
the verses can be explained. They choose these
Islamic expression and Qur’anic verses in the light
of local occult tradition without regarding to the
“white” and “black” purposes. In the context of
the intersection between pananyaan’s magical
spells and Islamic account, there is such unique
interpretation concerning “the malevolent spells”
and “the black magic”. According to Ki Ade Atis,
a pananyaan in Kawalu village, the nature of all
of magical knowledge has actually a neutral status.
Due to the absence of clear standard between
“white” and “black” spells, the measurement is
eventually back to the intention (pamaksadan) of
the spell caster.
In this case, the emergence of the “black”
Quranic incantations can be explained. There are
83
pages 75-90
some Islamic expressions and Quranic verses that
used as supplements for the “malevolent” spell
to harm people. To the contrary, there are also
several witchcraft practices which actually have a
good purpose. Accordingly, this kind of “paradox”
incantation has reflected the early stages which
Federspiel refers as “the incorporating” Islamic
knowledge, symbols, and prayers as part of local
shaman’s practice in specialized extraction without
regarding to the core meaning of the religion itself
(Federspiel, 2007: 68-70).
2. The Difusion Stage
The spread of certain ideas, customs, or
practices, from one culture to another is known
as difusion (Haviland, 2008: 350). The spreading
of certain incantations in several different regions
has also become a part of cultural difusion in the
web of mystic-synthesis in West Java. In the case
of Kawalu village, there are several incantations
coming from outside region. The following is a
Cirebonese-origin incantation which is also used
by several pananyaan in Tasikmalaya region;
Spell for Long Trip
Indit abdi jeung Kanjeng Nabi Ibrohim
i am going with prophet Ibrahim
Leumpang abdi
i am walking ... jeung Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad
with prophet Muhammad
Dipayungan abdi ku Gusti Alloh
i am sheltered by Allah Dudu pujiningsun
it is not my commendation
pujine Kanjeng Sinuhun Yahu
it is for his eminence ...
Nu ngadeg di Gunung Jati
who dwelled in Gunung Jati
Anggala cahyaning hurip as the light of the prosperity
La ilaha illalloh ... There is no God but Allah
The composition of the spell consists of the
compound expressions of Sundanese, Javanese
language and Arabic expression. It is started
84
by one of the the most common expressions in
the Islamic tradition, namely the opener of the
Qur’an (basmalah) and closed by the statement of
tauhid (oneness of God). Apart from this Islamic
confession, the spell has also asserted another
symbol concerning the “totemic figure” which in
turn indicated the difusion of the incantation in
Tasikmalaya. This is what Malinowski refers as the
“mythological allusion”; the reference to ancestor
and culture heroes from whom the magic has been
recieved (Malinowski, 1948: 155). The phrase “nu
ngadeg di Gunung Jati” (who dwelled in Gunung
Jati) seems to make a reference to Sunan Gunung
Jati, one of the Nine Saints in Java land (Wali
Songo) who spread Islam in West Java. Thus, it
can probably be described that this incantation
was composed by Sunan Gunung Jati’s followers
, and hence it gained widespread usage during the
intensification of Islam in West Java.
Another shared incantation in all over Java
land is the aji-kulhu which also reflects such
intersection between Q.S. al-Ikhlas and local occult
tradition. The word kulhu is from the first verse of
Q.S. al-Ikhlas and simply become the name of the
surah (Mustapa, 1998: 186). Sundanese people
– and Javanese in general – have a very simple
way to give a name of something. Most of them
are based on the similar sound according to the
hearing, such as ketuk, because it is herad as tuk.
Likewise, goong, according to the sound of these
instruments, bedug, kendang angklung, lesung,
etc. all based on their sound. Accordingly, the first
word of Q.S. al-Ikhlas simply became the name of
the surah.
There are at least 7 kinds of aji kulhu; kulhu
geni, kulhu komara geni, kulhu nangtung, kulhu
absor, kulhu derga-agung, kulhu buntet and
kulhu sung-sang. Most of aji kulhu use Javanese or
Cirebonese language, except kulhu geni (Qur’anic
pieces) and kulhu nangtung & kulhu absor
(Sundanese). The most famous one among them
is kulhu geni that is believed to have an influence
fo rexpelling Satan and other evil creatures. The
spell goes as follows:
Asep Nahrul Musadad
Aji Kulhu Geni
Bismillahirohmanirohim
kul huwalohu ahad
say He is Allah, the One
kun payakun
“be” – and it is
masya Alloh
as God has willed
kodiron abadan abada
who has power, forever, forever
The spell maker choses some piece of Quranic
verses to be arranged as a magical spell. The
spell consists of Quranic pieces and some Islamic
expressions. It is started with basmalah, the spell
is continued with two Qur’anic pieces. Firstly,
kulhuwallohu ahad, the first chapter of QS. alIkhlas which is the major Qur’anic verse to the
establishment of Islamic monotheism (tauhid).
Secondly, kun payakun (the last pieces of several
suras; al-Baqarah: 117, Ali ‘Imran: 47, 59, alNahl: 40, especially QS. Yasin: 82 and the others)
that is famously recognized as the “creative”
word of God when He wants to create something.
In a sense, there is no direct meaning-relation
between the spell and the “expelling” the evil.
This incantations, however, has gained popularity
among spiritual practitioners all over Java land
and hence it becomes the most representative
sample for the stages of difusion of incantations.
The “Cultural Loss”?
Most often people look at a cultural change
as the accumulation of innovation. Frequently,
however, the acceptance of a new innovation
results in cultural loss – the abandonment of the
existing practice or trait (Haviland, 2008: 352). In
Sundanese mysticism context, the emergence of
the lately established Islamic term ahli hikmah has
played a major role in shaping and determining
the direction of Islamic mysticism.
Ahli hikmah – as understood by Tasikmalaya
people – has been identical to those who expert
in Islamic occultism, which is different from that
of ajengan or Sundanese Islamic propagator
in many ways. The ancient usage of the Arabic
“hikmah” which refers to “wisdom”, lent itself to
the evolution of its meaning; science, philosophy,
and the others (Goichon, 1986: 3,377). However,
people of Kawalu simply conceive this word in the
occult term as “Islamic supernatural knowledge”.
This sense of meaning most likely has its
legacy from some Arabic “occult” books which
are studied in pesantren. it should be mentioned,
particularly, al-Buny’s Manba’ Ushul al-Hikmah
(al-Buny, 1999)2 from 13th century AD – one of
the major hikmah books for advanced student in
many pesantren in Tasikmalaya, in addition to
Syams al-Ma’arif, Khazinat al-Asrar, al-Aufaq,
Taj al-Muluk, etc. – as one of the determinations
responsible for shaping such meaning for hikmah.
According to Mustapa’s late 19th century
reports concerning on Sundanese local customs,
the double roles of religious propagator and
supranatural practitioner that possesed by
an ajengan have gained more popularity in
Sundanese-Priangan society (Mustapa, 1998: 215).
In this stage, the so-called Arabic occultism began
to flow into Sundanese speaking area and grasped
by Sundanese Muslim. Some of those Arabic occult
sciences are domesticated. Mustapa mentions the
“aji saepi” (saepi angin, saepi banyu, saepi geni)
as one of the high-level domestificated Islamic
supernatural sciences at that time. However, most
of them are transmitted and practiced in their
Arabic formulas. Some people call them amalan or
aurod. The most popular example is “hijib” (hijib
nawawi, hijib sadili, hijib akbar, etc.), and “hirz”
(hirzul yamani, etc.) which are considered as wellknown Islamic supernatural powers possessed by
ajengan or ahli hikmah and they are from Muslim
saints (para wali). For quite lower degrees, there
are also a lot of amalan for various purposes, such
as ayat tujuh (seven verses of the Qur’an) and ayat
lima belas (fifteen verses of the Qur’an).
This in turn leads one to except that the stage
2. The title itself is reflecting the framework of occultism; The
Source of Hikmah; major four treatises on ‘ilm al-hikmah
concerning the science of the secret of letters (al-‘ulum alharfiyyah), telesmology (al-wifqiyyah), special prayers (alda’awat), and the others
85
pages 75-90
of “cultural loss” in Haviland terms as mentioned
earlier, has come to the scene. Although it is
plausible with fully regarding to the “lingustic”
matter; the Arabic usage has replaced local
language, however, the receptionary practices
is not represent the complete “loss” of culture in
practical dimension. Thus, replacing the “word”,
for instance, does not always mean to replace the
grand narration on which someone based their
activities, as represented in previous section.
Neverthless, Hodgson’s notion on the term
“Islamicate” is highly relevant in this elucidation.
It refers not directly to the religion, Islam, itself,
but to the social and cultural complex that is
historically associated with Islam and Muslims,
both among Muslims themselves and even among
non-Muslims (Hodgson, 1974: 1,59).
In the case of Kawalu, for instance, A Anwar
(43), a pananyaan who represents the most
“puritanical” character among ahli hikmah or
pananyaan, has generally abandoned all previous
shamanic practices, such invoking ancestral spirit
and using local incantation. The practices have
generally become Islamic. He leads a majelis dzikir
held at home and uses the special Islamic prayers
for the purpose of his practices in overcoming
various problems brought to him. Nevertheless, he
still defends the local identity, beside water (cai) as
the main device, some kind of local herbs are still
used for healing some diseases and the “exorcism”
practices.
Contesting Language, Power, and Culture
Malinowski mentions that the foundation of
magical belief and practice is not taken from the air,
but is due to a number of experience actually lived
through, in which man recieves the “revelation” of
his power to attain the desired end (Malinowski,
1948: 62). Accordingly, the magical power, either
high magic, as possesed by a pananyaan/shaman
or low magic which contained in various local
Sundanese incantation (puisi-mantera) casted by
rural farmer for instance, is actually determined
by experiences and series of practical activities, in
which they engaged.
The spell caster believes in natural relation
86
between word and world. The wedding of both has
ultimately brought something into being. Linguists
such as J.L. Austin, classified the “verbal act”
like those above-magical spells as performative
utterances which is a part of doing something
(Hale and Wright, 1998: 64). It is a phrase that
doing something and making some changes of
the world at the moment of its being said. It is not
a report of an event, but the event itself (Patrick
Dunn, 2008: 48-49). The search for how magical
spells work is still enigmatic. Malinowski states
that all obsessive desires in magical purposes
are based on the universal psycho-physiological
mechanism (Malinowski, 1948: 62). According
to Leidgh Mudge, the influence of subconscious
forces stimulated by suggestion is the main force
for all occultists and those who believe in them
(Mudge,1920: 291-292). According to Levi Strauss,
there are at least, three complementary conditions
in the efficacy of shamanic practices: (1) the belief
of shaman in their practices and techniques to
have a significant influence, (2) the belief of a
patients to the magical power of a shaman, and (3)
the collective beliefs and hopes of a community as
a gravity field (Strauss, 2006: 97,73).
Performative utterances are therefore said to
have “illocutionary force”, simply means that the
power of the words is not in its interpretation or its
being brought by another person, but in the words
themselves (Patrick Dunn, 2008: 49). For that
reason, many pananyaan in Sundanese speaking
area, are not posssesed a proper knowledge of
Arabic phonology (makharijul huruf). According
to proper Arabic pattern, most of pananyaan’s
Arabic speeches might be totally wrong. But the
case seems to be different, due to the arbitrary
aspect of word. In the context of the meeting of
diverse cultures, it is a collection of sounds upon
which all people agree referring to certain object
or idea. In magical spells, pananyaan make a link
between words and idea. This obviously affirms
that the relation between words and power is
always shaped by such local determinations.
In this sense, the reception role finds its
momentum. Based on Ki Ade’s explanation, called
Asep Nahrul Musadad
“the subconscious forces stimulated by suggestion”
– in Mudge’s term – is equivalently comparable to
the faith (kayakinan) or the attitude of expectancy.
It is true that the spell’s composition is ultimately
very important in making the efficacy, but above
all, he states that all of magical spells, whether it
is Arabic (amalan), Sundanese, Javanese, or even
Sanskrit incantation, mainly depend on the faith
(kayakinan) and the qualified power possessed by
the casters. He states that sometimes, the result
of amalan or Arabic spells is not better than the
efficacy of local incantations due to the unqualified
caster. The so-called “Sundanese-Qur’anic malevolent
spell, ” for instance, is representatively a “hybrid”
incantation composed by local practitioner in
syincretic way. Thus, it is fairly clear that such
incantations are ultimately shaped by local
determination engaged in both spell of composer
and caster. The usage of Qur’anic verses for “black”
purposes is a part of the shamanic reception
regarding that verses, without paying attention to
the religious motives.
In the light of Strauss notion of myth and
language, all of the incantations represent the
inner linguistic-structure that are equivalent to
the grand narration of Sundanese culture in its
intersection with the Islamic spectrums. This
kind of inner structure can be found through the
structural analysis of the composition, as follows
(case of Sundano-Arabic malevolent spell):
No
Structural
Composition
Phrase
1
The Opening
Munirun, Basyirun, Pakolalahum
Mutu
2
The Suggestion
Dina arah-arah opat jihat,
Malaikat Jibril, Mikail, Isropil,
Ijro’il
Robbi Gusti Abi Gusti
3
Purpose
Nyanggakeun si .....
4
The Closing
La ilaha Illallah
Since the language is juxtaposed with the
culture as a matter of human mind, the structural
composition of that incantation indicates the same
pattern as the indigenous Sundanese incantation.
Each has a suggestion, power allusion, and purpose.
In this case, the difference of the linguistic surface
does not always mean the difference in the inner
structure. In the level of unconscious linguistic,
all local Sundanese spell and hybrid incantations
(Sundano-Arabic), are actually the same. They
have the same structural pattern and functionally
used for the same purposes.
The structure below is the composition of old
Sundanese incantations:
No
Structural
Composition
Phrase
1
The Opening
Ong paksa ma Guru pun
2
The Intention and
Suggestion
Pasaduan kami di na li(ng)ga
Si Jaja li(ng)ga si Jantri
3
Purpose
4
The Closing
Bawa tamah Batara Kala
Tinggalkeun sarining lemah
Apan gawe sang pandita
It can be concluded that pure Sundanese
incantations (old Sundanese and new Sundanese)
and the hybrid one (Sundano-Arabic) have the
same structural pattern. The case seems to be
different from the pure Arabic amalan. There
is at least, a shift in linguistic pattern into more
complex forms. The following Arabic phrases are
the representatives of several basic form of Arabic
‘amalan:
1. Fifteen Verses of The Qur’an
Ayat Lima Belas (fifteen verses of the Qur’an)
is one of the most famous ‘amalan that consist of
special fifteen verses of the Qur’an. Each verse has
several merits and functions. The fifteen verses are
the pieces of the following surah:
a) Ali Imran:1-2 and 18 (gaining forgiveness from
God)
b) Al-Anàm: 95 (realizing what is required)
c) Ar-Ra`d: 31 (gaining respect)
d) Yasin: 82 (self-defense)
e) Al-Fatihah: 2 (realizing what is required)
f) Qaf: 15 (poison antidote)
87
pages 75-90
g) Al-Hadid: 4 dan 25 (poison antidote)
h) At-Taghabun: 13 (avoiding the danger)
i) Ath-Thalaq: 3 (avoiding the danger and
forgiveness from God)
j) Al-Jinn: 28 (realizing what is required)
k) Al-Muzzammil: 9 (overcoming anger)
l) An-Naba: 38 (realizing what is required)
m) Abasa: 18-19 (overcoming the robber, criminal)
n) At-Takwir: 20 (weakening the dispotic ruler)
0) Al-Buruj: 20-22 (opening the locked)
2. Islamic Prayer for The Sick
can be found in Arabic occult sciences, does not
mean to completely replace the grand narration
of local mystic tradition. Thus, the incantations
of ayat lima belas, for instance, have been widely
used for various purposes among Sundanese
people which in many ways are “out” of its original
Arabic purposes; as a magic whereby a person is
made to fall in love (pelet), spell for the power of
invulnerability (kabedasan), spell for opening the
locked door, and others. In this sense we have to
place such local Islamic tradition in cosmopolite
term; that is a certain and distinct part of tradition
in the web of Islamic world as a whole.
CONCLUSION
“Oh Allah! The Sustainer of Mankind! Remove
the illness, cure the disease. You are the One Who
cures. There is no cure except Your cure. Grant us a
cure that leaves no illness. (Recommended to touch
the area of pain with the right hand while reciting
this supplication”
3. ‘Amalan For Getting the Wealth and
Property
These three basic
forms have also reflected
three kinds of pure Arabic ‘amalan, according to
their source and material: (1) Qur’anic verses, (2)
Prophetic prayer, and (3) ‘amalan composed
by certain Islamic ascetics. I this case, the
incantations or the spells are apparently replaced
by these kind of texts and also regarded as certain
part of a prayer (al-du’a), which is one of the
Islamic teaching. To some extents, not only the
language, words and linguistic structure have
developed, the essential doctrine has also changed,
from incantations (mantra) to the prayer (dua’a/
amalan). In this spot, the religious demarcation of
heretical claims took place.
The usage of “pure” Arabic incantation which
88
The preliminary exploration on these
incantations has representatively shown the
presence of such “Islamicate” culture in Sundanesespeaking area; that is the social and cultural
complex historically associated with Islam and the
Sundanese muslims. In spite of the nature of their
religious spirituality, The belief on supernatural
being remains the important one and becomes
one of the primordial natures. The existence of
pananyaan remains significant in their life.
The creative “hybrid” incantations has also
reflected such a fine grain in the acculturation of
Islamic account and Sundanese local customs. In
turn, it has become one of the keywords employed
in providing the peaceful way in the Islamization
of archipelago. Through the brief investigation on
various incantations, three mechanism of cultural
changes can be traced, from innovation, diffusion
and the the challenge of “cultural loss” stage in
the intersection between Islamic teaching and
Sundanese local genius.
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90
Analisa Journal of
The
Social
UsesScience
of Religious
and Religion
SymbolsVol
to 01
Represent
No.01 June
Islam
2016
Siti Sholihati1, Heddy Shri Ahimsa Putra2, Heru Nugroho3
Website Journal: http://blasemarang.kemenag.go.id/journal/index.php/analisa
THE USES OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS
TO REPRESENT ISLAM
SITI SHOLIHATI1, HEDDY SHRI AHIMSA PUTRA2, HERU NUGROHO3
Walisongo State Islamic University
[email protected]
1
Jln. Sosio Humaniora, Yogyakarta
[email protected]
2
3
Jl. Teknika Utara,Yogyakarta
Paper received: 30 November 2015
Paper revised: 27 February – 1 March 2016
Abstract
This study is entitled “The Uses of Religious Simbols to Represent Islam (A Study on
Religious Soap Opera ‘Bukan Islam KTP’)”. The background of the research is based
on the facts of the arbitrary use of symbols in representing Islam which are shown
on Indonesian televisions. The pattern of the use of religious symbols, either verbal
or non-verbal, symbols are generally explicit, but when they are examined using
appropriate methods, they actually contains some implicit meanings. The purpose
of this study was to discover how Islam is represented on television religious soap
opera using religious symbols and to find out the dominant ideology behind the
representation techniques. To analyze the soap operas which consisted of twenty
episodes, the researcher used a semiotic approach of John Fiske on television
codes. The results of this study are: (1) the use of verbal symbols to represent Islam
potentially creates multiple interpretations when they are spoken by different
characters, (2) some religious terminologies are often used by antagonist players
to express anger and disappointment, (3) the soap opera is dominated by verbal
violence used by both protagonist and antagonist players, while antagonist player
use violence both in verbal and non-verbal forms. The findings about ideology
embedded in the soap opera are: (1) capitalist-materialistic ideology, (2) ideology
of patriarchy, and (3) violence domination.
Keywords: representation, religious symbols, ideology
A. INTRODUCTION
1. The background of the study
The
development
of
communication
technology has inevitably caused a new demand
for every elements of society to make an adaptation
to the rapid movement of media culture. As a part
of social system, Islam especially feels the needs of
appropriate media as potential tools to transfer
Islamic values to the wider audiences. Amids the
variety of modern media, so far, television has
become the reasonable choice, it seems to be the
most popular and the most widely accepted among
the people compared to other types of media.
The way television uses religious symbols to
represent Islam has been carried out in various
media nature that, to some extent, causes the
religious teaching to be subtly mixed up with
media culture. As there is a mixture between
media and religious symbols, therefore, it could
be understandable that the content of religious
portrayal on television may raise multiple
interpretations among the people. Before
portraying religious programs, television usually
takes a religious consultant as its reference
concerning the on-going issues. In this case,
religious consultant referred by the television has
a certain pattern in interpreting the teaching, so
that it makes the multi-process of interpretation
becomes more complex matter. There are at least
three steps of interpretation occur in religious
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pages 91-104
programs on television. First, the interpretation
by the messengers toward the normative religious
symbols is potentially faceted as their beliefs.
Second, the result of this interpretation is
transformed to the media practices in such a way
which also may result another faceted knowledge.
Third, based on messengers’ legitimation on
the matter, television uses all the mean of art,
aesthetics, and the market demands to create
another form of Islamic symbols which has been
naturalised in the media culture.
The diversity in the use of religious symbols in
representing Islam can at least be seen on religious
television shows in the forms of entertainment,
for example on religious soap operas. In general,
representation of Islam by using religious symbols
in religous soap operas can be identified from the
way in which the religious attributes are used, the
sacred texts are exploited, the dialogue are spelled
out, and in a problem is solved at the end of the
whole narration. The uses of religious symbols in
representing Islam in such a way, to some extent,
could lead to the simplification of the substance
of religious values so that it would be easier for
the audience to understand religious teachings.
The uses of religious symbols either on television
soap operas or movies could not be separated
from the media construction of religious teaching
to represent in such a way so that it becomes an
easy consuming program. By doing so, the idea
of Islamic teaching could be more easily accepted
by the audience from various levels of religious
knowledge.
The use of religious symbols in such a simple
way to represent Islam seems to be inevitable as
naturally television has its own way to convey a
message to its viewers. Based on the contents,
Indonesian private televisions have actually given
a relatively large portion in portraying Islam. This
can be seen especially on television shows during
the month of Ramadan as well as on some special
events concerning Islamic holy days. Regarding
the claim that some television programs have
tended to discredit Islam which bring about multi
interpretation at any rate, it is important to note
here that it could be one of the side effects of the
92
work system existing in media institutions. The
multi interpretation about television contents
can be understood as a way of working system in
the media that generally has a complex process.
According to van Dijk (1985: 18) the media
performance is shaped by several factors such as
the interests of the owners, the interest of market,
and the pressures from an outsider faced by media
organizations. Meanwhile Irianto (2005: 520)
suggests that television does actually like to play
around in the realm of representation of reality in
depicting Islam, so that the viewers have a picture
of Islam in an artificial form. Religious phenomena
which are artificially displayed in the media can be
seen on some religious programs represented by
television during the month of Ramadan using
religious symbols that creates an artificial reality
about Islam.
In fact, television is only one form of media
existed in Indonesia, but for some Indonesian
Moslem community television has become
not only an important source of information
but also become source of entertainment. The
media, therefore, take the advantage of people’s
dependence on it to sell products in the form of
information package. By doing so, television has
established its strategic position as an agent of
distributing cultural issues among the society. As
an agent of distributing cultural issues, television
strives to include as many elements of culture as
possible into the audience needs, including about
religion in cultural perspective. Television seizes
opportunities of people’s need for information
as well as entertainment by presenting popular
programs to attract as many viewers as possible
so that it can convince more advertisers to get into
bussiness (Burton, 2008: 96). In this case, the
cultural aspects of society embedded on television
programs has only served as an object of media
commodity using the principles of demand and
supply. Popularity concept complements the claim
that television is a form of popular culture, which
is according to Storey, has appeared in the early
20s (Storey, 2007: 11).
Accordingly, the event portrayed on television
show can be seen as an attempt to narrate and
The Uses of Religious Symbols to Represent Islam (A Study on Religious Soap Opera “Bukan Islam KTP”)
visualize ideas through a program on the screen
using construction techniques in such a way, in
order to give the impression of the real for the sake
of its viewer interest. Recently the programs offered
in Indonesian private television have showed the
notion toward resemblance to each other. When
a certain station has succeeded in portraying a
particular theme, then it is immediately followed
by other stations in presenting a program with
similar theme. Religious-themed soap opera tends
to follow this trend as well, beginning with Rahasia
Ilahi in TPI (now MNCTV) in early 2004, which
is soon followed by other stations using slightly
similar materials.
In these religious-themed soap operas the
image about Islam is, more or less, determined
by the way the media use the religious symbols.
The use of religious symbols to represent the
image of Islam can also be seen in religious soap
opera “Bukan Islam KTP” SCTV. The efforts of the
medium to represent the reality of Islam in this
soap opera becomes an interesting object to study,
especially because these symbols are presented in
a comedian format. Based on previous experience
in observing the fact of how religious symbols are
used to represent Islam on television religiousthemed soap opera, the writer feels an urge to
conduct a close study to the main theme on the
representation of Islam using religious symbols on
soap opera entitled “Bukan Islam KTP” in SCTV.
2. Research Questions
When Islam is conveyed through television
as a mean of mass communication in the form of
an entertainment program, the use of symbols to
represent Islam is potential to cause a different
image about it. Through this study, the writer
is trying to take a close look on how television
represents the image of Islam in the religious
soap opera, the uses of religious symbols, and the
ideology hidden behind it. In order to get a clear
picture on media reality about Islam as well as how
this reality is represented on television, the writer
proposes the main questions as followed:
a. How is Islamic teaching represented on
television using religious symbols?
b. What are the ideologies behind the uses of
religious symbols in representing Islam?
3. Literature Review
Some researches on television content
concerning the uses of religious symbol are hardly
found. In this part, the author classified previous
research into three categories. First, there is a
research which corresponds with study objection
on television content using semiotic approach done
in 2013 by Feralina. In her research, Feralina tried
to find out the meaning of non-verbal symbol used
in cigarette advertising using semiotic approach
of Peirce. She defined non-verbal symbols into
three areas: facial expression, gestural move,
and postural appearance (Feralina, 2013: 359).
The finding of her research was that every nonverbal symbol used in the advertising portrayed
on television has actually conveyed certain
meaning in various ways. Second, a research
that corresponds to the focus of the study on
representation, it was carried out by Yohana (2013)
who studied film representation about polygamy.
The aim of Yohana’s study was to find out how
the film represents the practice of polygamy. She
employed discourse analysis by Sara Mills. Yohana
did not specifically make a clear definition about
the terminology of representation. Using Mills
approach on discourse analysis Yohana found out
that the way film represented polygamy was based
on women’s perspective. (Yohana, 2013: 53)
Third, the study about religious content on
television using religious symbols has been done
by Syahputra (2011). According to him television
has been relatively powerful in creating certain
image about religious phenomena. The images
about religion are represented through religious
fictions using symbolic codes, either verbal or
non-verbal. Studying soap opera “Rahasia Ilahi”,
Syahputra (2011: 298) found out that the reality
about Islam has been intrinsically co modified by
television. Through this co modification, there is
a significant change where information values on
a message are constructed become marketable
symbol systems.
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pages 91-104
This previous researches relating to symbolic
paradigm showed that television uses certain
religious symbols as a manifestation of political
representation to create an image about certain
religion. The difference of these previous studies
from the recent lays on the treatment towards
religious symbol itself. In this study, the author
focused on not only how religious symbols are
used to represent Islam, but also the attempt to
close look closely at the meaning of each symbol
by studying its literal meaning.
4. Theoretical Framework
The word symbol is sometimes percieved in
some different ways in accordance with the context
in which it is used. In Collin Cobuild dictionary,
symbol is defined as: (1) “a shape or design that
used to represent something such as an idea”,
(2) “something that seems to represent society or
aspects of life, because it is very typical of it “(Collins
Cobuild, 1987: 1482). While in the dictionary
of Sociology (Jary and Jary, 1991: 645) symbol
is defined as: (1) a sign, in which the connection
between the meaning and the sign is conventional
rather than natural”, (2) an indirect representation
of an underlying meaning, syndrome, etc, as in
religious symbolism and ritual”. Because of the
relationship between meaning and sign of a more
conventional nature, therefore, a symbol not
always contains universal meaning, but it depends
on the communities where the symbol is used.
According to Morris, the terminology of the
symbol was often used to mean everything from
signs that are very simple to use to describe a
complicated picture of a story often used for
philosophical arguments (http://www.fiu.edu/~
Morriss). Furthermore, Morris explains: “a symbol
is any sign which also inherent connection to that
greater thing or image to which it points”. In this
case the term symbol is also used in graphic design,
the myth, the events, even so a picture of people
and places. In explaining the definition of symbol,
Morris uses Fontana’s argument which states that
“symbols are more than just cultural artefacts in
their correct contexts as they still speak powerfully
to us, simultaneously addressing our intellect,
94
emotions, and spirit”. Although the symbol is not
solely regarded as a cultural artefact, it can be used
to convey a message of culture (Liliweri, 2009:
180). Liliweri argues that symbol is “a sign to
mean something” which could provide more than
one meaning (for example: the ring is a symbol of
marriage).
It is obvious that actually human life can not
be separated from the world of symbols, and that
all aspects of human life consists of not only the
production but also the consumption of symbols.
Discussing about symbol, it is worth to notice the
thesis made by Cassirer that is “man is animal
symbolicum” (quoted in Verene, 1979). In this
study, the word “symbol” is defined as everything
related to the product such as the form of images,
speech, writing, attitude, and people behavior, as
representation of all aspects of human life. The
definition of symbol used in this study refers to
the terminology used by Turner (1983: 19), that is
“objects, activities, relationships, events, gestures,
and spatial units” which empirically has been used
as instruments to observe the ritual community of
Ndembu that were filled by symbolic events.
A symbol can also be used to distinguish the
type of human activities, for example, whether
the activity is considered as being natural or
supernatural, as well as whether a symbol is
profane or the sacred one. According to Beattie
(1966: 202), all symbols can be considered as a
kind of language used by the people to express
about something, and to express human behavior
that are considered to have important social
values. Symbols are also used as a means of human
expression in explaining their behavior that could
mean either they ‘want something’ or ‘prevent and
reject anything’.
Beattie (1964: 224-229) explains that the
meaning of symbol can be classified into three,
namely personal meanings, cultural meaning, and
universal meaning. Personal and cultural meaning
of symbol are based on different experiences of
the people, the way of their feeling, and their
perception of certain symbols, while universal
meaning of symbol based on human characters
who have a common sense as well as a shared
perception about certain things. For example, the
symbol of human expression which is associated
with ghosts and human soul may vary due to
different spiritual experiences of each individual.
Cassirer emphasized that basically people do not
have the ability to understand the whole world in
a coherent way, but rather human understanding
of the world is fragmented into the area of thought
as well their cutural domain. Therefore, people’s
understanding about the world is carried out by
marking every area of thought in a particular way
so that they form activities and some object of
lives into certain symbols. Cassirer’s conception
of symbolic forms of human life is divided into
aesthetic and scientific forms (in Verene, 1979:
28). At the beginning, the movement of human
consciousness emerges from their expression of
anxiety in line with the aesthetic concerns of their
religious myth, which arises from philosophical
and scientific awareness.
Based on previous dicussion about symbol,
the term ‘religious symbol’ in this study means all
attributes, phenomena, and signs which are used
to notify the presence as well as the characteristics
of a religion, including the system of values and
belief systems. Beattie (1964) proposes that in
religious practice, religious symbols are often faced
with social and cultural practice so that the form
of religious practices may vary in accordance with
it. This also stated by Broos (1987) that religion
and religious symbol is supposed to be the oldest
symbol created by human kind.
Symbol in Islam is defined in permanent forms
that it is less likely to be changed in accordance with
the perspective of symbols interpreters (Ridwan,
2004: 132). Islamic symbol has been changed in
such various way, that to some extend has caused
the shift of meaning from the original teachings.
The changes of meaning becomes apparently clear
and more diverse as a result of media encounters in
the case that religiuos symbols are mixed up with
popular culture of media products. Irianto (2005:
520) argues that the depiction of Islam in the
media (especially on television) is not essentially a
relfection of true Islamic teaching, rather, it is no
more than a form of image about Islam.
Religious life is not only manifested in the
form of symbols and attributes, but also in the form
of religious attitudes and behavior. Therefore, to
describe Islam in its context, rigorous studies
on religious symbol need to be established. In
this study, Islamic symbol is divided into two
categories: (1) the normative symbol including the
verses of Quran and the hadith, and (2) cultural
symbols in the form of religious attitudes and
behavior as well as the attributes used by Muslims.
When a religious symbol is represented in
the media, it gives a chance to anyone to do the
interpretation. This interpretation may vary from
one person to another, as a result of differences of
their belief system. In addition, the interpretation
of religious symbols is also influenced by the
process of its production so as to make the circuit
of symbol interpretation more complex.
Regarding the description of the complexity
of symbol production in the media, David Morley
(2007: 284) explains that there are at least three
things worth to consider:
1. Production of the message is a problematic
work, as the events can be encoded in different
ways by message producer, so it could produce
different meanings
2. The message made by the media is an open text
which more lilkely to be interpreted differently
by the recipients
3. The process of decoding is problematic
because the message can be interpreted in
different ways by different people
According to Bungin (2001: 5) basically
people are creative actors. Human creativity is
manifested by a variety of capabilities in creating
social construction of reality that exists where the
truth of it is relatively obvious to find. While social
reality is shaped by the convention or common
sense on the local community, and it depends on
the time and place of the social reality imposed.
In order to dissect the social reality through social
construction process, it is important to note the
thesis proposes by Jacobson (in Fiske, 1987: 47).
Jacobson argued that a message (text) will only be
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pages 91-104
meaningful if it is viewed from three aspects:
(a) Context (in terms of what, when, and where it
is used). It means that a message could have
different meaning if it is used in different
social contexts
(b) Contact (the relationship between the sender
and the recipient). It means that a message
can be interpreted differently depending on
the intensity of the relationship between the
sender and the recipient
(c) Code (symbol used). It means that the message
or sign language (icons, symbols) either verbal
or non-verbal also affects the meaning of a
message.
The example of religious symbols that have
undergone a process of social construction is as
such presented in religious television soap opera.
Terminology “soap opera” is generally understood
as a short term of electronic serial cinema shown
on television. Indonesian television soap opera
is basically a duplication of the soap opera that
has been aired on foreign television. Soap opera
is a continuation of the electronic cinema that
means a copyright work of art and culture made by
cinematographic proffessionals which is recorded
on video tape through electronic processes and
aired through television stations (Endah, 2008,
Arimbi, 2009: 202). The term ‘religious soap
opera’ in this study is, therefore, means electronic
cinema products which is televised using religious
symbols, either it explicitely mentioned in the form
of the program or it is manifested in its content.
It is obvious, therefore, that a critical study in
order to understand how religious symbols are used
to represent Islam on television entertainment
need to be conducted. Burton proposes some ideas
about how a message is culturally constructed so
as to form a new reality (2007: 37) by using several
key concepts such as by looking at the ideology, the
concept of co-modification, the representations
and the modes. In understanding the reality of
religious teachings it is important to take a close
look at the object especially by observing the
structure of an icon, a symbol, and a sign system.
On the other hand, religious realities presented in
96
front of television audience can be regarded as a
‘constructed reality’ or pseudo-reality because it
has undergone a few modifications in the name of
aesthetic and the market reasons.
The main story of religious-themed soap
opera is generally made with the concept of
easy consuming so that the embodied religious
messages can be accepted easily by the viewer,
without having to use complex thought. Easy
consuming concept in representing religious
teachings by using religious symbols (Islam) in the
form of entertainment program, to some extent
has resulted this program becomes an enjoyable
viewing.
D. Method
Object of Study
The data of this research is the television serial
of religious soap opera entitled “Bukan Islam KTP”
which consisted of twenty episodes. This soap
opera is portrayed daily at 18:30 on SCTV channel,
started on November 18, 2011. This soap opera
is a unique viewing because it is presented using
comedy format so that religious messages are
conveyed in a way that looks ridiculous and funny.
Besides the comedic aspect, another interesting
thing in this soap opera is the contradiction
between the content of the message about Islamic
teachings and its narration which is dominated
by scenes of verbal violence. The scenes of verbal
violence are apparently not only demonstrated
by antagonist players but also by the protagonists
who are supposed to deliver the main ideas of
Islamic teaching.
This research was qualitative, using the
constructionist paradigm. According to Pawito
(2008: 48) the type of qualitative research is
rooted in the tradition of philosophical thought
which aims to understand human behavior. In
studying film, then the so-called human behavior
here is applied to the way human speak, the
sentence pronounced, as well as how to dress and
how to use accessories. This approach is applied
to the study film content as well as to interpret on
how the message was delivered. The study was
started from understanding the meaning and the
way of constructing it, then finding the dominant
ideology embodied in the content.
It is important to make a limitation to the
area of the study in order to keep the research on
the track. This study focused on the uses of these
religious symbols, either in the form of verbal
or non-verbal, to represent the image of Islam.
Some religious symbols used in this soap opera
including the quotation of Quranic verses of and
its translation, some Islamic terminologies which
are defined as verbal symbols. While clothing used
by the players, accessories, and worship utensils
such as rosarrio and praying carpet are defined as
non-verbal symbols.
Data Collecting
This study used recorded soap opera as
the primary data, therefore the process of data
collecting was based on the type of the data.
a. Documentation. Documentation technique
was used to get the data straight away from
television when the program was aired. To
make easier for the research process, the
recorded soap opera were transferred into
compact disk as a raw data. Documentation
technique was practiced through writing up
every dialogue used as an access of verbal
symbols. The script was collected and used as
raw data for analysing verbal symbols.
b. Observation. Observation technique was
used in form of close watching for the
recorded soap opera. During this process, the
researcher noted carefully every gesture, facial
expression, clothing, camera shoot, and the
setting. Through this process, the researcher
collected all information that were needed for
non-verbal symbols.
Data Analysis
In order to find the appropriate answer to
the research questions stated earlier, this study
employed semiotic approach to find out the
meaning of the text. As a media text, soap opera
that presents Islamic teachings using religious
symbols is assumed as an open text, so that it can
be interpreted differently by different researchers.
In order to keep the consistence of the study,
so that it would not out of the methodological
framework, the researcher used semiotic approach
adopted from John Fiske on television codes. Fiske
(1987: 13) explains that to assess the meaning
of the television text, it is important to underpin
television and its program as a potential meaning
instead of its aspects of commodities.
An effort to see how television represents
Islam using religious symbols, therefore, should
be equipped with a tool of analysis includes the
analysis of political representation, such as a camera
and lighting technique as well casting techniques.
This type of analysis is meant to show not only how
religious symbols are used in representing Islamic
teaching, but also to discover the ideology behind
the use of symbols. In this regard, this study
requires semiotics for cinematography that could
explain about inter-textual study in the film show
(soap operas). Television codes initiated by John
Fiske (1987) explains that the ideology contained
in an actual movie could be known of how to use
the symbol, players selection, the tone of voice, as
well as camera techniques used.
Television code is a rule-governed system
of signs which shared among the member of
community and is used to distribute the meaning
among members of the community. Fiske (1987:
4) argues that “codes are links between producers,
texts, and audiences, and are the agents of intertextuality through which texts interrelate in
a network of a meaning that constitutes our
cultural world”. The concept of the structure of the
television code begins from social realism which,
according to Fiske (1987: 23), should be presented
by the television in the form of a narrative of the
events that are personal, where the event must
contain a social problem and there must be the
solutions. Besides, the narrative also must show an
easily recognizable figure and use a natural setting
and the present time.
Fiske explained that an event or a reality
presented on television has before undergone a
social code and has become a common sense. The
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codes are then formed as dominant meanings
and are distributed to the audience. The structure
of Fiske’s television code consists of three levels:
(1) reality which shows player performance,
which are technically presented in the form of (2)
representation which is arranged coherently to
be accepted socially or representational codes, in
the form of (3) ideology or ideological codes. The
structure of television code can be explained in the
following chart:
Betawi people. The people live in poverty and
bad behavior. The people do bad things for living
such as becoming thieves, pick pockets, burglars,
gamblers, and drug users. People always live in
some kinds of conflicts between them. Therefore
this supposed to be soap opera is dominated with
violence scene. The conflict happens in every
level, such as internal conflict within families and
external conflict between the rich and the poor.
Every conflict can be solved by a man whose
profession is as a religious book seller, and often
Figure 1:
preach the people about how to be good Moslems.
Level 1
Reality This man has a unique character because often
Appearence, dress, make-up, behavior, speech,
mocks and underscores people while speaking
gesture, expression, sound
about religion.
(these are encoded electronically by technical codes such
as those of :)
In the poor village, lives a very wealthy man
(antagonist) who has gone pilgrim for 7 times with
a beautiful wife (protagonist). The husband is a bad
Level 2 Representation
mannered, mean, snobbish, arrogant, egoist, and
Camera, lighting, editing, music,
non-religious person. On the other hand, the wife
sound
is very nice, good mannered, helpful, and religious.
(which transmit the conventional representational codes,
which shape the representations of: narrative, conflict,
The man is a trouble maker and always out looking
actions, character, dialogue, setting, casting)
for trouble with everyone, and this is contradictory
with his wife. Using religion as a legitimation, he
Level 3
Ideology treats his wife as a slave. He speaks in high tone
and rude sentence to everyone he meets. This
Individualism, patriarchy, race, class, materialism,
capitalism
man treated the poor people in the way he likes.
On the contrary, those people always ready to do
(which are organized into coherence and social acceptability
by the ideological codes )
whatever he said. It seems that those poor people
Source: Fiske (1987: 4)
are economically dependent on him. He has halfbother who lives in poverty who becomes his
E. The Findings and Discussion
routine enemy.
Soap opera entitled “Bukan Islam KTP” is a
religious program which tries to bring forward the
aspect of religio-comedy as a dominant narration.
Some normative aspects in Islamic teaching are
represented in an easy form as well as a light absurd
dialogue. The techniques of representation Islamic
teaching using arbitray religious symbols which
rise to multiple interpretations. Representation
techniques used in this soap opera is manifested in
the use of religious symbols, either in the form of
verbal symbols or non-verbal symbols.
The main story of “Bukan Islam KTP”
The main theme of this soap opera is multiple
conflicts among poor society in small part of
98
Among this society, there is a 10 years old boy
who is looked after by his poor grandfather. This
boy has an obsession of becoming a preacher, and
he tries to preach every time he meets people who
have the wrong doing. He acts like a professional
preacher on stage, and always uses rude words in
reminding other people without considering their
ages.
There is a book seller who promotes the book
by walking around the village. He is actually a very
rich man from the town who pretends to be a book
seller in order to be able to help the poor people
and to do the preaching. He appears where ever
there is conflict, and he always gives his tidings
with a rude words. This makes people cornered
and feel under pressure, but the people who are
narrated as uneducated seem to be dependent on
his religious knowledge.
Apparently, this soap opera makes a clear cut
about the character of people, that is good people
and bad people. There are three main ideas which
can be concluded from this film narration; they are
(1) rich people have the power to control the poor
in every way they would like to, (2) well educated
people have the power to control the uneducated
in every way they would like, and (3) man can
use religious teaching as an excuse to dominate
women.
The uses of religious symbols
Looking at the types of religious symbols used
by the players, there are two phenomena that could
be explained here:
a) The types of non-verbal symbols are apparently
represented by all categories of players, either
the protagonist or antagonist characters. Nonverbal symbols in the form of dress such as
head cap and koko, for example, can be worn
by men of both antagonist and protagonist
character as the type of clothing is culturally
worn by Betawi people. While muslim’s dress
for women such as long dress and veil our
apprently worn by muslim.
b) The types of verbal symbols in the form of
verses of the Koran are used by the protagonist
characters. In each scene, the majority of the
verses are delivered using the original language
(Arabic) and partly delivered by citing its
translation, while religious terminologies
are used by both antagonist and protagonist
characters.
After studying closely about religious soap
opera package containing twenty episodes, the
author find out four domains in the use of religious
symbols, both verbal and non-verbal symbols, to
represent Islamic teaching. The same symbols can
create different meaning when they are used by
different people, in different ways and different
objectives..
1. Representation using verbal symbols
a. One of verbal symbols used in this soap opera
is religious terminologi. In using religious
terminology, there are some terms used
differently between players based on their
character, for example:
1) The sentence assalamu alaikum, which has
meaning as a greeting and good wishes given
to the other, in this soap opera is sometimes
pronounced with a high tone, rough voice,
and unfriendly facial expression. The other
difference is the matter of word completion
in which sometimes it is used in incomplete
sentences. According to Daud (2014: 427)
the function of the word salam in Islam
is not merely as a wish of safety for other
people but can be used as social function
to eliminate the hatred and build love
feeling between moslems. By the way of
representing this religious terminology and
the functional use of these symbols, then the
greeting sentence is constructed as a cultural
symbol in which its functions is no more
as a wish prayer for the safety of the other
person, but as a sentence for opening and
closing a conversation.
2) The sentence astaghfirullah al-adzim
has terminological meaning “I ask for
forgiveness to God the supreme”. In this
soap opera the word is used in a different
context by different players, in accordance
with the character they are supposed to
perfom. This sentence is represented in
three kinds of facial expressions, that are (1)
an expression of regret, (2) an expression
of dissappointment, and (3) an expression
of harassment. Expression of regret is
represented by protagonist characters,
whereas expression to show the anger and
the abuse are represented by the antagonist
character.
3) The religious terminology in the form of
phrase Allahu Akbar which means Allah is
the Greatest, is used not only in different
contexts by different characters but also
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pages 91-104
for different objectives. The differences in
using this word can be seen in the cast of
characters who use it, the way how they use
this word includes the tone of voice and
facial expressions, the purpose of the use,
and the setting of the uses. The protagonist
characters exclaim the word Allahu akbar
with facial expressions that indicate a
sense of admiration, as well as using soft
tone of voice. While antagonist character
pronounces this word with loud tone of
voice, facial expression that indicates anger
(upset), and follows it with rude words
addressed to other people.
4) The sentence laa haula wa laa quwwata
illa billah which terminologically means ‘no
power and no strength except it only belongs
to Allah’ is supposed to be the expression
of a submission as well as resignation of
human toward their creator. This sentence
is used in different way, by different people
in different contexts and different objectives.
Antagonist character used this sentence
in an effort to release the pressure from
the strength of another human being with
a loud tone of voice and cranky face, while
protagonist characters used this sentence as
a submission to the power of God with a soft
tone of voice and a soft facial expression.
b. The verbal symbols in the form of verses of the
Qur’an are sometimes used out of context as
well out of content. In one occasion, the verse
is arbitraryly used by a 10 years old boy when
he passed through the place where four older
men are gambling. The boy quoted the verse in
such a way so it looks like he was at the stage
of public speech. This representation could
be interpreted that some one could quote any
verse and address it to other people without
considering whether it is done in a proper place
and in a proper way of expression. In addition,
the meaning of the quoted verse is sometimes
used to refer to something on surface and
physical that could mean a different thing, and
therefore shows something banal. For instance
the context of the word adzab in one of the verse
100
which is supposed to mean as the “punishment”
from God for the people who have done some
evil doing, is simply presented on this soap
opera by exemplify a scene to show a kind of
“shame” experienced by a family who have been
fighting in front of other neighbors.
Furthermore, the verses are pronounced in
an awkward voice as well as facial expression,
which shows that the characters who used them
are eventually lack of fluency and do not seem
to understand the meaning of the verses. In
other words, religious symbol in form of the
verses of the Koran seems to be used as merely
an accessory on this soap opera in order to give
an image that this soap opera would be looked
by its audiences as a real religious program.
2. Representation using non-verbal symbols
In using non-verbal symbols, the emergence
of multiple interpretations of meaning as a result
of technical representation is manifested in two
areas related to the clothing and accessories worn
by the players, including the make-up for women
players.
a. The use of the symbol of fashion (the kind of
dressing) and the make-up by the (female)
players in this soap opera shows the way of
presenting the reality of Muslim fashion as a
differentiator of social identity. Nice and fancy
dress is used by the rich female players as their
daily clothing which is worn in all places and
almost all the time, like when they are cooking
in the kitchen, washing the dishes, and going
to Islamic events. The embeded meaning that
could arise in the use of the religious symbols
of this dress is that a beautiful and rich woman
should wear nice and beautiful clothes to
enhance the beauty and to show off their wealth.
While the poor women are depicted by using a
simple of clothes and a simple (almost without)
make-up, with a simple model. Therefore, by
simply looking at the clothing, it will be easy for
other people to differentiate between the poor
and the rich women.
b. The description of the use of religious symbols
in the form of fashion and accessories worn by
male characters is manifested in the form of
turban worn by Muslim men who are described
as have already performed the pilgrimage (the
hajji). The narrative tries to urge the audience
that only the hajji is allowed to wear the turban.
As the common sense in social live proves that
only the rich could be possibly become the hajji,
therefore, this way of using religious symbol
led to the meaning that the turban is a type of
accessories which serve as a symbol of social
identity among male Muslim, whether or not
they have the title of hajji and whether they are
rich or poor. The way of representing people
clothing in this soap opera seems to correspond
with Barnard (2011) who argues that actually
the clothing can be used to identify social status
of the people. In these endeavors, the figure of
Hajji is described as an arrogant rich man, so
turban (scarf) has become one of the signs of
wealth as well. While religious accessories in the
form of beads carried by one of the player are
not used in accordance with its basic function
as calculators for a Muslim to do wirid, but
only indicated as a complementary fashion
accessories. On this soap opera eventually the
actor who brings the accessories has never been
described of how to use these tools. Such way of
depictions can also be seen in the use of symbols
in the form of turban that has been constructed
as a cultural symbol and social status symbol.
3. Representation in Comedy Format in
Religious Program
The religious soap opera entitled “Bukan
Islam KTP” that conveys some important religious
messages can be categorized as a religio-comedy
show. Comedy element is visible in several aspects
such as the selection of the player which is visually
evident in their physical appearance and facial
expression, the use of the contents (material for
conversation) of funny and silly dialogue, as well
as the behavior of the players in each scene which
looks like being in a stage of stand-up comedy.
There are some examples of scene that show
indications of how this soap opera seems to make
fun of religious symbol. One of the scenes shows an
element of comedy represented on this soap opera
is depicted though the symbol which is performed
by a player in a funny and ridiculous way, as if he
is joking instead of praying. By using the symbol
in such a way, the symbol creator tries to create
an image that prayer can be performed by playing
around. Accordingly, prayer means an expression
of people needs towards their God and that people
are willing to ask for help and the mercy from God.
When people do the prayer it means they ask for
blessing, therefore, as suggested by Abdurrahman
(2014: 5) that prayer is about submission to God
and should be done in sincere way. Nonetheless,
the scene of prayer on this soap opera tries to tell
another side of prayer, that the people who pray
could also make fun on their God.
Meanwhile, messages containing about
religion (Islam) is generally delivered with a
patronizing tone by using sharp sentences, where
a messenger was in a position to be more educated
and more competent about religion than his
interlocutor. It seems unavoidable that the main
concept in comedy film, is making fun of the others.
Hayward (2006: 91) argues that there always be
a sense of domination in comedy film where the
weaker is being sacrificed as the victim, while the
stronger always dominates the stage. Moreover, if
it looked from its content, a comedy film usually
close to violence which is known as an aggressive
humour.
4. Representation of Violence
The violence aspect (especially verbal
violence) that became the main point in the soap
opera has become one of many consequences to
the selection of comedy format, as stated earlier.
It has been common that Indonesian television
programs gererally dominated by violence,
without considering who the audience are. In so
far, the stage of comedy is identical to the stage of
violence with the main purpose to create pleasure
by the way of bullying others both in physical and
verbal. In the name of cinematographic art, it may
be understandable if the violence is represented
through antagonist characters to give the effect of
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pages 91-104
stronger impression in characterising. Ironically
in this soap opera, the violent behavior is not only
represented by antagonist character but also by
protagonist characters who are supposed to play
their roles as the messengers of islamic teaching.
group is economically dependent. Rich people
are represented in a certain way using certain
symbols such as fine and looks expensive
clothings, good housing, well mannered, well
educated, fine tone of voice (for the protagonist
character), and fine make-up for women
character. On the contrary, the poor people
are represented using certain symbols such
as: ordinary (almost poor) clothings, rough
housing, rude tone of voice, uneducated,
shameless, greedy, plain and rough (almost
without) make-up for women characters.
The dominant aspects of violent behavior
in religious soap opera done by both antagonist
and protagonist characters could create negative
image not only about Islam but also of how its
teaching is delivered. Through the uses of violent
symbols, Islam is constructed the media as no
more of the religion of peace. This representation
is itself contradictory with the concept of nonviolence communication in which the nature of
communication is supposed to be a tool to build
understanding with other people and not to hurt
the others (Liliweri, 2011: 987).
The following is the depiction of violent
behavior in representing Islam using two groups
of characters: (1) For the purpose of delivering
islamic teaching the protagonist players use
verbal violence as well as verbal abuse, and (2)
antagonist players perform both verbal and nonverbal violence. The verbal violence is used one
after another with religious terminologies by both
antagonist and protagonist characters.
5. Ideology
By using the structure of Fiske’s television
codes in looking at the contents of messages (that
is the television reality) and the representation
techniques, it can be known the dominant
ideologies embeded in religio-comedy program
“Bukan Islam KTP” in SCTV. These dominant
ideologies embeded in this soap opera are:
a. Through the whole episodes observed, it seems
clear that this religious soap opera tries to make
dominant of the rich in some ways. The rich
people are represented to be undefeatable in
their relationships with the poor. Therefore it
can be said that the produser tries to devote
this product to the materialistic capitalist
ideology. Rich group is represented to have the
power to win public devotion as they are able
to control and regulate the poor in the way
they like by using their wealth, while the poor
102
Figure 2:
b. Another aspect which can be used as a tool to
find out the ideology of this soap opera is to
take a close look at the way it represents the
relationships between men and women. In
a patriarchal type of society, men have every
mean to be dominant in nature, while women
have every mean to be in submission toward
them (Walby: 1990). The dominant idea in
representing the relationships between man
and woman is that by using religious doctrines
as an excuse, man (husband) tends to dominate
his wife and demands for her total submission.
In this case, Islamic teaching has been used as
a mask for man to take control over his wife.
In observing this, there are two interesting
facts found in this representation: (1) the
relationships established within the rich family
follows a man dominated culture, and (2) the
relationships within the poor family is much
more egalitarian.
Using Fiske’s structure, it can be found that
there is a patriarchy ideology embodied in
this representation. This can be seen from
the representation of the way men dominate
women’s lives. Male was described as being
superior in the name of religion to gain
compliance and obedience of women.
Figure3:
researchers exploiting better methods.
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INTERNET
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http://www.fiu.edu/~morriss.
Value
Rationality
of People
Living
on The Slope of Merapi in Yogyakarta
Analisa Journal of Social Science and
Religion
Vol 01
No.01 June
2016
Napsiah, Budhi Gunawan, Oekan Soekotjo Abdoellah, and Munandar Sulaeman
VALUE RATIONALITY OF PEOPLE LIVING ON THE
SLOPE OF MERAPI IN YOGYAKARTA
1
2
2
NAPSIAH , BUDHI GUNAWAN , OEKAN SOEKOTJO ABDOELLAH
3
AND MUNANDAR SULAEMAN
1
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social
Sciences and Humanities, State Islamic
University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga
Yogyakarta. Indonesia
Phone: 0274-519571
Email:[email protected]
2
Graduate Program, Faculty of Social and
Political Sciences, Padjadjaran University
Bandung. Indonesia
Phone: 022-2510275
3
Sociology and Counseling Laboratory,
Faculty of Animal Husbandry, Padjadjaran
University. Bandung. Indonesia
Phone: 022-7798241
ABSTRACT
This study aims to describe rationality of the people who live in the eruptionprone areas of Mount Merapi and who refuse to be relocated. A qualitative
research method with interpretative phenomenological analysis is used in this
research. Informants are selected by snowball sampling technique. The location
of research is in Pangukrejo village which is a village in the southern slopes of
Merapi. The results show that people think Merapi as a place of origin where they
obtain senses of comfort and safety. Merapi is also a place where they acquire
and preserve community value system. Merapi is a symbol of their dignity that
must be maintained. In this relation, eruption is interpreted as destiny, eruption
is interpreted as destiny of God that can not be circumvented. At that time, their
living conditions were on the bottom and could be overcome by means of mutual
cooperation to return to normal condition. The value rationality motivate them to
resettle in their homes after the great eruption of Merapi.
Keywords: rasionality value, people’s action, Merapi disaster, resattlement.
Paper received: 10 September 2015
Paper approved : 16 May 2016
INTRODUCTION
Disaster management, especially settlement,
is an important thing which requires attention
(Bookshire et al., 1985). It is because people who
live in disaster-prone areas have a high degree
of vulnerability (Ozdemir, 2000). Therefore, an
effort to relocate people living in disaster-prone
areas is a primary effort taken by the government.
However, in practice, such relocation effort is
often not responded well by a group of people.
According to Triyoga (2010: 158), Singarimbun
(1980), Dove (2008), Dynes (1993) and Lane
(2003), this is due to the difference of rationality
between government and local residents. The
rationality of governments perceives that disaster,
using scientific perspective on disaster, is a
danger so that all people living in disaster-prone
areas should be relocated. Meanwhile, using the
objectivity perspective, people perceive disaster as
something dangerous, but an attempt to leave their
residence after the disaster is not something they
have to do. Such difference in rationality exists,
according to Kholiq and Arum (2011), is caused
by the fact that the government does not take the
value system of people who live in disaster-prone
areas into consideration. According to Nygren
(1999) the value system of the local population
is often regarded as traditional so that it is not
considered in the disaster management. In line
with that views, Carter (1991:27) suggests that the
difference of rationality results in the exclusion
of local residents in the disaster management
ranging from pre-disaster phase, when the
disaster is happening, to the rehabilitation phase.
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pages 105-120
The difference of rationality significantly affects
the disaster management so that it requires an
understanding of the rationality of people living in
disaster-prone areas.
In regard to the efforts to understand the
rationality of people, various studies on disaster
phenomenon, particularly volcanic disaster, which
prioritized the perspective of the people have been
conducted by experts, among others are Chester
et al. (1999), Dibben and Chester (1999), who
investigated public perception of the eruption of
Mount Etna in Italy.
The experts’ research focused not only on the
people living around the volcanoes in Italy, but
also people living in other mountains, for example,
in Costa Rica, where Sheet (1999) investigated the
perception of Indian communities in the vicinity
of Mount Arenal. In Hawai, Gregg et al. (2004)
investigated the perceptions of people in the vicinity
of Mount Mauna Loa and Mount Hualalai. In East
Africa, Morin and Lavigne (2009) investigated
the perception of people who live in the vicinity
of Mount Karthala, Comoro Islands. Njome et al.
(2010) focused on the perception of people of the
eruption of Mount Cameron in Central Africa.
The studies on the volcanic disasters at the
international level above focused on the people’s
perception of the disaster. These studies revealed
that people living in disaster-prone areas of
the volcano followed the instructions from the
government to leave their homes during the
disaster. However, after the disaster ended they
returned to their native places because they thought
that the eruption of volcanoes existing close to
them would be of a long duration to reoccur, so
there was no reason to leave their native places
forever.
In the context of volcanic disaster in Indonesia,
particularly related to the disaster phenomenon
of Mount Merapi in Java, various studies have
been conducted. Some of them used sociological
perspective and focused on the conflict and
solidarity, such as the studies of Pramono (2012)
and Herianto (2012). These studies investigated
the conflict that arose as a consequence of the 2010
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eruption of Merapi. Pramono (2012) investigated
the relocation conflicts in Central Java, while
Herianto and Wicaksono (2012) investigated
performance by people in Cangkringan,
Yogyakarta. Different from those two studies,
Amiruddin and Widyanto (2010) focused on
solidarity and disaster tourism business.
Investigating the disaster phenomenon of
Merapi by using sociological perspective, previous
studies generally focused their attention on the
issues of conflict and the issues of social capital.
All of the research on disaster phenomenon
associated with the eruption of Mount Merapi did
not specifically examine the issue of the rationality
of the people behind the return of people living in
a place declared dangerous by the government.
Such research is important in order that the
rationality of people living on the slopes of active
volcanoes will be considered important by the
government in disaster management, especially
in terms of resettlement, and also to avoid the
unilateral decision made by the government
(Ahimsa: 2012, Indiyanto: 2012). According to
Tyler (2006), a minimum number of studies that
focus on the rationality of people will result in
incomprehensive understanding in studying the
phenomenon of volcanic disaster. Therefore, it
is necessary to conduct a research that focuses on
the understanding the people about the disaster,
which eventually combines the rationality of
the government and the rationality of people
(Tyler, 2006) as a consideration in the disaster
management, especially the issue of settlement for
people in disaster-prone areas.
After the 2010 eruption of Mount Merapi, the
regional government of Yogyakarta attempted
to relocate people who live in the disaster prone
area III to the places provided. However, a group
of people refused the relocation and rebuilt their
house in their place of origin. Accordingly, this
study is aimed at identifying the value rationality
of people who returned to their native places on
the slopes of Merapi, which were categorized as
the Disaster Prone Area III by the government
after the huge eruption of Merapi which according
to the Research and Technology Development
Value Rationality of People Living on The Slope of Merapi in Yogyakarta
Agency for Vulcanology (BPPTK) the eruption
that occurred in 2010 was more powerful than the
eruption of Merapi in 1872 (Kompas, 9 November
2010).
The theoretical framework used in this study
refers to the rationality of social action proposed
by Weber. According to Weber (1978) rationality
of social action is action taken to achieve the goal.
Thus, the rationality of social action is subjective.
Rational or irrational action is very dependent
on who is doing and understand. Further Weber
(1978) differenciated the rationality of social
actions into the instrumental and value rationality.
Both rationality are interrelated. Because the value
rationality is an abstract thing and could not be
proved objectively, such as proving the success
of the action of instrumental rationality, then
value rationality is used as a means to achieve
instrumental rationality.
The value rationality proposed by Weber in the
form of values that bind people to perform actions
based on the capacity of rational self-possessed.
Kalberg (1980) confirmed the Weber’s opinion
that the actions of a person through profit or loss
are taken into account, so when someone makes a
decision then the decision is a rational choice.
Rational choice is an action taken because they
are bound by social value in the form of cultural
values inherent in society (Susetiawan, 2000). In
line with these opinions, Schmuck (2000) states
that local values espoused by someone serve as
guidelines for its action.
Based on the theoretical description above, a
proposition built in this study is the shared values
of citizens into a subjective rationality to return to
the village, despite it was decided into the Disaster
Prone Region III of Merapi.
RESEARCH METHODS
The qualitative research methods using
interpretative phenomenological analysis was
conducted to identify the rationality of people who
resettled in their native places categorized into the
disaster-prone areas of Merapi. Informants were
taken purposively (purposeful random sampling)
by selecting people who were considered knowing,
being involved, and having information related
to the research topic and problems (Patton, 1990
quoted Barker dan Gentry, 2006: 322-333).
Therefore, the informants in this study were
those who knew the required information related
to this study. The informants were divided into
three categories, namely: first, the parties who
had a close relationship with the community so
that they had information about the disaster.
The informants who were included in this group
were: Head of the Disaster Management Agency of
Yogyakarta Special Region Province, Head of the
Disaster Management Agency of Sleman Regency,
Head and Secretary of Cangkringan Subdistrict
of Sleman Regency, Head of Umbulharjo Village,
Secretary of Umbulharjo Village, Head of
Pangukrejo Hamlet. Second, informal figures such
as prominent religious leaders, youth leaders,
village elders. Third, the parties who were involved
in the process of post-disaster economic activities.
The informants included in this group were
merchants/owners of stall/store, cottage owners,
tourist guides, tourist transport services and other
residents.
Based on the three groups of informants, the
informants were selected using snowball sampling
(Groenewald, 2004), by first visiting the Head of
the Disaster Management Agency of Yogyakarta
Special Region Province to find out information
related to the state of location used as the research
site. Other relevant informants were obtained
from the interviews in order to obtain the required
data in this research.
Data was also gathered through participant
and non-participant observation. The participant
observation was conducted in order to explore
data that could not be disclosed during the
interview. In addition, a variety of secondary data
were also collected from the office of the Disaster
Management Agency of Yogyakarta Special
Region Province and Sleman Regency, various
reports of Cangkringan Subdistrict and reports of
Umbulharjo Village.
The qualitative data were analyzed using
a model developed by Huberman and Miles
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pages 105-120
(1994:428-444), known as the interaction. This
model starts from data collection, data reduction,
presentation of analyzed data, and conclusion. The
research was conducted at Pangukrejo Hamlet,
one of the hamlets in which people refused to
be relocated although their settlement area was
categorized the Disaster Prone Area III after the
2010 eruption of Merapi.
RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Pangukrejo Community, Land, and Merapi
Environment
Pangukrejo people belong to Javanese ethnic
group who live at Pangukrejo Hamlet located on
the southern slope at a distance of 6 km from the
peak of Mount Merapi. They have inhabited this
hamlet for generations.
Religion serves as a guide in their life.
Therefore, religion is an important thing for them
(agama mergene aji). Pangukrejo people practice
Islamic teaching faithfully, either individually or
in groups. Religious gathering is held every month
which is not only limited to the mosque existing in
their neighborhood, but also in resident’s houses
which is scheduled alternately. They are mostly
affiliated with Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)
They grow in environment of Javanese
tradition that respect ancestors. One of the
forms of respecting ancestors is upholding and
maintaining ancestral property bequeathed to
them. Land is inheritance or gift from parents
which is commonly accepted by Pangukrejo
people. The estate is given to heirs who still belong
to one lineage. Therefore, the ownership of land
in Merapi nowadays has changed. The changes in
land ownership provide evidence that inheritance
and change of generations have taken place.
Living in the mountainous village, they still
prioritize togetherness in many ways. It can be
seen from life attitude that they always work
together in any activities. Social activities are
performed weekly and monthly in the form of
mutual cooperation activities. They jointly clean
up the environment in their own houses and in the
hamlet where they live.
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Monthly meeting is conucted regularly by
the residents in the form of RT (Neighborhood
Association) meeting and RW (Community
Association) meeting. Moreover, the formal
meeting also include meeting of local associations
such as Dairy Cattle Association, Cottage
Association, and Sand Association. Such meeting
strengthen their togetherness.
As mountain people, they utilize the mountain
resources as a source of livelihood. Prior to the
2010 eruption of Merapi, the livestock was the
leading sector. The availability of grass and cool
air was used to keep dairy cattle. Their expertise
in dairy farm had created a fixed cow’s milk
marketing network. The production of cow’s milk
was collected by local cooperation and then sold to
PT. Sari Husada in Yogyakarta. As a result, their
area earned the epithet of “white gold mine”.
However, after the 2010 eruption of Merapi it
seems that the livestock sector has not been a
leading sector due to the inadequate availability of
grasses and cow pens.
After the eruption of Merapi, people take
advantage of the disaster condition as a source of
livelihood. They create disaster tourist destination
by making the disaster-affected areas, destroyed
homes and sand-buried villages to be disaster
tourist destination. This way makes them survive
in their villages after the eruption of Merapi.
In addition, they rely on sand mining sector
after the eruption of Merapi. The availability of
abundant sand scattered into Kuning River, Opak
River, Gendol River and lands encourage them to
own truck to transport sand and sell them directly
to consumers. As a result, they have access to
markets and also determine the price of sand in
the market.
Carpentry sector is also a reliable sector
because after the 2010 eruption of Merapi their
neighborhood suffered extensive damage. Houses
and public facilities were destroyed and in need
of renovation in order to be functioned again.
Accordingly, carpentry sector is a sector that also
provides a source of livelihood for those who work
in the carpentry sector.
Living on the slopes of Mount Merapi, which is
very active, they form an agglomerated settlement
patterns. They built house next to one another
without being separated by fences. All houses are
built facing south, east and west. No houses are built
facing north directly to Mount Merapi. According
to Javanese philosophy, building a house facing
Mount Merapi means opposing Mount Merapi. It
gives bad impact for the residents of the house such
as long illness. In addition to the philosophical
meaning, it is a strong reason for the Pangukrejo
people not to build houses facing Mount Merapi
that it is difficult for them to get to the main roads
when the status of Merapi is increasing. Therefore,
they decide to build houses facing south and east
which connect to the main roads.
also officially changes its ownership to the heirs.
The Heirs who receive such land are entitled
to give the land to their descendants. Thus, the
ownership of lands in Merapi has changed from
one generation to the next.
Living on the slope of Merapi, they have a set of
value concerning the interaction with Merapi. They
have knowledge of Mount Merapi as gugon tuwoh
that contains prohibitions and suggestions related
to Merapi. Not cutting down trees, not entering
prohibited areas, not grazing in prohibited places
and not moving sacred objects are forms of respect
for Merapi.
The size of land received by each heir is highly
dependent on the size of the land area of the original
owner. It is certain that people who have a large
area of land have a relationship with those who
firstly came at Pangukrejo Hamlet. The pioneers
of the hamlet had a vast area of land because at
that time the land belonged to no one. Although
the land had been divided to the heirs, it seems
that the size of land turn out to be different with
people who came later. Thus, the estate is evidence
that they are the descendants of the pioneers of the
hamlet.
In addition, they also have ilmu titen to
recognize the symptoms of the eruption of Mount
Merapi, such as animals coming out from the
forests of Mount Merapi, earthworms coming out
from the ground, the leaves withering around the
forest of Mount Merapi, very hot weather even at
night.
Such signs of eruption serve as a local
mitigation effort so they can minimize the impact
of the eruption of Merapi. Therefore, whatever the
condition is in Merapi, they will feel comfortable
living in the vicinity of Merapi although Merapi
erupts frequently.
Land in Merapi as Symbol of Self-Esteem
Although lands in Merapi are owned by
individuals, the origin of the lands is acquired
from the inheritance for generations. Handover
to the heirs is done by showing the location and
boundaries of the land to heirs entitled to receive.
The handover of estate is witnessed by relatives.
After the handover process is completed, the land
The change of land ownership continues to
exist as the change of generations. However, there
is no change in the system of the division of the
estate. The adopted system refers to the teachings
of Islam that a female child gets half of a male
child. In practice, it is not rigid as in religious
system. Sometimes a male child receives much
smaller inheritance because the male child hands
over his inheritance to the female child. Thus, the
female child receives more land for more than the
male child.
The land handover system is very diverse.
There are those giving land to the heirs when
their children get married, or long before they get
married. There are also those who have daughters
have prepared the land for them although they are
still under the responsibility of the owner of the
land.
The division of estate to the descendants is
intended that the descendants of Pangukrejo
people will live in their hamlet even after getting
married. For them, if there is one who marries
someone who is not a resident of Pangukrejo
Hamlet, they are required to live at Pangukrejo
Hamlet, especially for daughters. Therefore, it
can be said that there is only a small number of
Pangukrejo people who live outside the hamlet.
Even if they live outside, one day they will return
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by reason of being bound to the estate inherited
from their parents at Merapi.
They were born and raised in Javanese culture
at Merapi. They also form a residence that later
became their settlements for generations. In
the meantime, a relationship is also established
between them and the environment of Merapi.
Thus, they have adaptability in order to live
in harmony with Mount Merapi. They have
knowledge to keep Merapi because Mount Merapi
is the source of their livelihood. In addition, they
have local knowledge of the dynamics of Mount
Merapi which can be used as a local mitigation
effort. All of that are the value systems of the
mountain people agreed for generations and do
not change although generations have changed.
Furthermore, the agglomerated settlement
pattern and the houses next to one another without
fence facilitate people to meet each other under any
circumstances, either in happiness or sadness. It
can be seen when they are disaster victims, caring
attitude among them get stronger by helping each
other among fellow residents.
Accordingly, strong social control over their
neighbors is a way to obtain security guarantee. A
sense of caring among each other unites them to
have a sense of belonging. This can be seen when
they leave their houses for everyday activities or
for a long time. They never hesitate to leave their
houses and cattle all day even within weeks if
they have some errands to do outside the hamlet.
They entrust their house and cattle to the nearest
neighbor with full trust. Meanwhile, the residents
who are entrusted have the responsibility do tasks
as the house owners such feeding cattle and even
keeping the house. Such responsible attitude
strengthens trust and brotherhood among fellow
residents.
They can also obtain security guarantee not
only around the neighborhood, but also in their
workplace. It can be seen from the results of
materials excavated by sand miners. They are
not afraid to lose the results of the excavation
materials placed in the mining arena, without
strong evidence to show that the sand is theirs.
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In fact, sand miners are not only them, but also
many other miners are around the mining arena.
Although leaving for days, they never lost their
sand excavation results.
The security guarantee felt by Pangukrejo
people is not just limited to guarantee of nonmaterial, but also material. This can be seen in
security and safety guarantee for those working as
handymen. Although there is no security and safety
insurance, they can obtain such guarantee flexibly.
They get help from neighbors and house owners in
the form of safety funds if they are injured on the
job.
Silaturrahim culture is done through
meeting of local associations such as groups of
religious gathering, social gathering, RT and RW
meetingsand business association meeting which
serve as a medium for knowing the condition of
each residen and even resolving life problems
satisfactorily. In such meeting, they express their
problems being faced in various situations, so that
it is not uncommon that a life problem of a resident
becomes a shared responsibility. Therefore, these
problems can often be solved because residents
help providing a solution, either advice or real
assistance.
Furthermore, for Pangukrejo people the land
at Merapi is also a means of power for its owner.
The decisions to function the land into productive
facilities, either for local businesses such as
building cottage or keeping cattle or also used as
a means to access capital in financial institutions
become the power of the land owners.
Furthermore, the land at Merapi is used as a
means to identify the lineage. This also implies that
the land is an evidence to show their social status.
This is closely related with their predecessors of the
tenure which can be traced until their offspring
today. For those who have large area of land it is
certain that they are descended from ancestors
who settled in the environment of Merapi.
At Merapi, people develop skills like mining
sand, building houses, and raising cattle. As a
result, they become cattle farmers, builders and
sand miners which then become their source of
livelihood. They do not specially acquire such
skills, but from experience of seeing and following
their family members or relatives who are in their
houses.
There are various life comfort values attached
to the land at Merapi, so that the land at Merapi
is sedumuk bathuk senyari bumi which implies
that an inch of land is a self-esteem that must
be maintained in any conditions. Accordingly,
various measures are taken to preserve the land of
heritage, albeit using local actions.
Local Action as a Form of Resistance to
Relocation Program
When Mount Merapi erupted in 2010,
Hamlet Pangukrejo suffered severe damage and
were later declared as the Disaster Prone Area
III which must be emptied. Its inhabitants were
encouraged to move to another place through the
relocation program. In regard to the relocation
plan, Pangukrejo people openly rejected the
relocation offered by the government. However,
they silently returned and survived in Pangukrejo
by working hard to repair the entire public
facilities and their houses so as to be livable. In
addition, they also worked hard to make economic
efforts by opening up business opportunities in
sand mining, carpentry, cottage, cattle farming
and tourism business. As a result, in 2011 overall
houses of Pangukrejo people had been rebuilt and
livable. The economic activities gradually have
also become their source of livelihood.
The attitude of resistance to the relocation
plan shown by Pangukrejo people was not simply
expressed in a silent manner as mentioned above.
They responded to the government’s insistence in
another way. They took action by placing billboards
at the side of road leading to their village as a form
of resistance to the relocation plan offered by the
government to them.
Approximately after two months, the
billboards were removed because the government
did not return to offer the relocation program.
Such calm attitude of the government made people
panic because one read a daily newspaper that
contained their settlement. From the news, the
Governor of Yogyakarta threatened that if they did
not leave their place, the governments would force
them by flattening their settlement using heavy
equipment. The news spread immediately and all
Pangukrejo people knew about it.
However, the news from the daily newspaper
apparently was not yet done by the government
because the residents received the registration form
of relocation from the head of RT. The government
gave relocation the registration form through the
hamlet head which was then forwarded to every
RT. RT then gave to the residents to fill in their
willingness to join the relocation.
Pangukrejo people still did not respond
to efforts of picking up the ball made by the
government. For them, maintaining their hamlet is
much more important than following the relocation
although various facilities were provided by the
government, including compensation for land and
freedom of citizens to manage their previous land
before it was officially declared by the government
closed to people because it was converted into as
a protected forest.
Submission Attitude Toward Merapi
Disaster
Pangukrejo people believe that life is arranged
by God. Accordingly, they believe that everything
happenned at Mount Merapi has been arranged by
God, including the time of the eruption, the size of
the eruption, any losses that will be experienced,
and who will be the victims. All have been arranged
by God.
Such belief in fate forms a submission
attitude towards the eruption of Mount Merapi,
including the impacts they receive. This condition
is analogous to the rotation of the wheel of life
(Javanese: cakra mangilingan), sometimes we
are down, sometimes we are up. They accept of
(Javanese: nerima) what is going on, although in
this case it does not mean they are silent and do
nothing. They try to regain their living conditions
as prior to the 2010 eruption of Merapi. They
accept living conditions by working hard and
motivating themselves to immediately rise from
the deterioration of life due to the eruption of
Merapi (nerima ing pandum).
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In line with the awareness that life is always
rotating like a wheel, they always aware and alert
(eling lan waspodo) in acting and also ajo dumeh
and ajo aji mumpung. The moral message becomes
more meaningful when they have to start living from
the bottom again. A prudent attitude to maintain
balance of relationships with fellow human beings
and God becomes absolutely necessary to be done
to emerge from the deterioration of life as a result
of the eruption.
People’s Theological Expression in Merapi
Disaster.
The sincerity (Java: accept) and gratitude
concepts are a form of expressions to indicate the
level of submission to God. Although it is difficult
to describe the level of expression of sincere
because it is very abstract, one of the expressions
can be detected in the way they respond to events
that happened to them by not regretting or being
sad towards changes in their lives that occur
quickly, either before, at the moment of and after
the eruption of Merapi.
In the days before the disaster, they followed
the government’s instructions to evacuate to places
considered safe by the government. At the same
time they were separated from their economic
or social activities. Meanwhile, in the event of a
disaster they relied on external parties. After the
disaster, they faced major and sudden changes
due to the eruption impact that caused the loss
of houses and jobs which used to be the source
of their livelihood. Such condition is the most
difficult living condition for them.
The changes in life due to the eruption of
Merapi are returned to God. They assume that
there is nothing to do but surrender themselves
by letting the lost property go. Accordingly, they
do not waste positive energy to rise after the
eruption. In addition to the sincere expression to
indicate submission, Pangukrejo people express
their submission by gratitude during the eruption
of Mount Merapi. In this case the gratitude is
expressed because they survive from the disaster.
There are no family members or neighbors who
died or suffered physical disability as a result of
112
the eruption of Merapi. They are grateful to be
able to deal with the conditions after the eruption
in healthy condition and no family members died
as a result of the eruption of Merapi.
Emphasizing the role of God in the eruption
of Merapi, they perceive disaster as a form of
trial from God on them. Accordingly, they think
that what is experienced today as the disaster
victims does not always happen, one day the life
like before the eruption definitely will return in an
unpredictable time.
The perception of disaster as a form of trial
gives impact on everyday behavior in various
activities. They do not feel inferior because they
do not have any property and have to start their
life from the beginning. They also earnestly work,
develop the spirit of cooperation and the spirit of
helping to share with other people.
Religious Action
Pangukrejo people had taken the submission
attitude when the disaster occurs because the
eruption is the destiny of God. Accordingly, people
realized they could not avoid such event because
the power of God has arranged the eruption.
The awareness has long been established so that
they rely on the power of God when the eruption
occurred.
The submission attitude to the disaster
expressed in sincerity and gratitude are
strengthened with religious activities in their
residence. Through religious gathering they
perform religious activities carried out once a week
on Friday at 08:00 pm until finished. The religious
gathering is followed Pangukrejo people. It is held
regularly once a week at Al-Mujahidin Mosque.
It is led by a local figure who is a former head of
RW. It opened with the reciting Al-Quran of Yasin
chapter and doing the prayer together. The activity
is then continued with a religious lecture. It is
delivered by a cleric coming from Al-Qodir Islamic
Boarding School, one of the schools located near
Pangukrejo Hamlet. The presence of a cleric at the
mosque is a form of assistance from the school to
give religious reinforcement for people, the victims
of the disaster.
Mental reinforcement for disaster victims
is important to anticipate that they will not sink
into prolonged sadness which will eventually
lead to psychological disorders. In addition, the
presence of cleric is to anticipate the attempt of
Christianization to Pangukrejo people, because
this area is a destination of assistance from
various parties who have various interests which
are not only limited to humanitarian, but also
other interests.
Religious activities in the form of religious
gatherings are conducted monthly. In practice
the religious gathering involved Kinahrejo
people. This is because Kinahrejo people are
also involved in the tourism economic activities.
Establishing not only limited to the business
relation, Pangukrejo people deem it necessary
involving Kinahrejo people in religious activities.
In addition, Pangukrejo people also wish that the
relationship (silaturahim) between people of the
two hamlets is well maintained although they have
been separated because Kinahrejo people join the
relocation.
Pangukrejo people do not have a special
method to remind members to attend the event.
They spread the information orally (Javanese:
gethok tular), so do Kinahrejo people. They remind
each other orally. The religious gathering is held
monthly on every Tuesday at 08:00 pm. There
are more members of monthly religious gathering
because it involves not only Pangukrejo people but
also Kinahrejo people. Therefore, Al-Mujahidin
mosque is used because of its larger space.
The religious gathering activity is not much
different from the weekly religious gathering.
However, the monthly religious gathering is not
opened by reading Yasin Chapter, but reading
Al-Fatihah. Then, it is continued with religious
lecture. The religious lecture also takes different
topics from that are given on a weekly religious
gathering. In addition, monthly religious gathering
is conducted in dialogue. The residents are given
opportunity to ask questions about the problems
they encounter. This session receives many
responses because people ask many questions
related to what they experience and what should
be done in accordance with the Islamic teachings.
The religious activities are conducted to
strengthen them who are victims of the disaster
in order to rise from the deterioration. The cleric
teaches them to work teach is them to work hard
and not to despair easily. The concept of religious
teachings can be manifested into the work ethic of
Pangukrejo people. From the religious value the
residents are motivated to work hard to get a good
new source of livelihood or to manage a business
that has been previously occupied. They do not
despair and do not give up too quickly and do not
depend on outside parties in the long term. Thus,
working is the key to get out of the problems they
encounter.
Solidarity of Pangukrejo People
When the residents returned to Pangukrejo
Hamlet after the eruption, the condition of hamlet
was filled with Merapi’s materials such as sand and
stone. Likewise, Kuning River located just west of
their settlement which was originally used as a
source of clean water after the eruption, is covered
with the sand and rocks materials, the trees around
the river also had been burned. Coinciding with
the rainy season in November, heavy rainfall can
drain the sand at Pangukrejo hamlet. Gradually,
paved main roads, land and frame of houses began
to appear. However, it seems that the rainfall has
not fully reduced sand thickness at Pangukrejo
Hamlet because there are still sand and rocks and
uprooted large trees that are scattered.
In such condition, people start to work together
to resolve the problems they face one by one. They
worked together (Javanese: gugur gunung) to
clean up the remaining sand, rocks, uprooted trees
and debris from buildings. Activities of mutual
cooperation were helped by a team of volunteers.
One of the teams of volunteers was from Bantul.
The presence of a voluntary team from Bantul is
interesting because a number of Merapi people
were sent to Bantul to help the people affected
by the 2006 earthquake. It seems that the
cooperation and mutual help existing among the
victims have been established well. When Merapi
113
pages 105-120
people suffered from the disaster, Bantul people
provided help for Merapi people to clean up Merapi
materials from Pangukrejo Hamlet.
distributes the assistance helped by other residents.
The entire assistance is reported to the residents
through the RW meeting which is held monthly.
In addition, they also worked together rebuild
people’s houses. Such mutual cooperation has
made people’s houses rebuilt quickly although it
still rudimentary. The mutual cooperation is also
conducted to provide water. Although they get
clean water assistance, it seems that they are not
satisfied with the condition. They utilized water
pipe they received and worked together to install
the water pipe directly to spring water. The work is
done together by the residents until the water can
be distributed at the household level.
The assistance is used as working capital, and
it is useful to accelerate the restructuring of their
lives after the eruption. There is still some relief
that has not been used until now by the residents
such as skills to make livestock feed concentrates.
This type of assistance cannot yet be used
because of unfavorable condition and situation
to maximize the assistance because they still lack
the dairy farmers. In addition, those who return
to be livestock farmers can easily obtain fodder in
the cooperation that facilitate them. Nevertheless,
this skill assistance will not be in vain because the
skills to make fodder can be practiced when the
condition is favorable.
Water pipe installation work directly to the
spring water of Mount Merapi is not something
new for them because they have ever done it. Such
experience is reused when they installed water pipe
to the spring water and distributed it to houses.
Since the water pipe was installed, Pangukrejo no
longer relied on clean water assistance. Water for
household needs have been fulfilled; even they also
supplied water to public facilities in the arena of
Merapi Exploration Tour.
The arrangement of Pangukrejo Hamlet is
done together by Pangukrejo people. They think
that everything can be solved together and the
hard work becomes light by means of mutual
cooperation. They also think that the mutual
cooperation does not require enormous cost. In
addition, the activities of mutual cooperation
reunite fellow residents who have separated
because of living in the refuge camp for months.
The assistance from external parties as a form
of concern for the victims of the disaster are still
accepted after they returned at the hamlet. Such
assistance includes not only consumables, but also
long-term assistance, such as cattle farming, skill
training to make livestock feed concentrates, and
economic empowerment and religious assistance.
The material or non-material assistance are
managed in groups.
The assistance from the external parties is
received through “one-door” system which is
accepted by the head of Pangukrejo Hamlet.
In practice, the head of Hamlet receives and
114
Value Rationality Behind the Resistance to
Relocation
Pangukrejo people rejction on the relocation
offered by the government is not without reason.
They believe that the rejection is one of their
rational actions. Weber mentions (1978: 22 ) that
rational action is action taken to achieve the goal
and highly subjective which it depends on who
is doing. Furthermore, according to Karberg,
person’s action is based on the rational choice
and the capacity of themself. In other words, the
rational action is taking into account the gains and
losses of its action.
The action of Pangukrejo people to keep
living in the Merapi area is related to some of
the values that they believe or feel. Merapi is
their birthplace. They acquire a sense of comfort
and obtain security guarantee, mainly because
they still have and feel attached to the land. They
grow and develop with the value system of the
mountain people that make them different from
others. Whatever the environmental conditions at
Merapi is, the land they have should be retained.
According to Winangun (2004: 74), local actions
are used to retain the land because for resident it
is not only a source of livelihood but also a source
of comfort of life. In line with Winangun’s view,
Weber (1978: 24) also states that one perform an
action to achieve the goal of the comforts of life.
Although, according to Weber, such comfort is
abstract and relative because it depends on who
performs and interprets such action.
For Pangukrejo people, land at Merapi is a
source for enjoyment of life, because they are born
and grow up to be citizens in the mountainous
region. Moreover, the life values of the mountain
people was formed long time ago. In addition,
the land becomes heritage from generation to
generation, so that his estate becomes evidence
to determine the family tree. Thus for the citizens,
the land at Merapi is a symbol of self-esteem is it
are known as sedumuk bathuk senyari bumi. This
concept means that every piece of land has worth
and meaning that stored in the minds of citizens
Pangukrejo. This is clearly revealed through their
daily language. This concept is often expressed by
the citizens of Java in particular to demonstrate the
importance of land for farmers. But for Pangukrejo
people, this new concept initially first used to
justify the rejection of the government’s efforts
that would move them from their homeland.
Therefore, whatever the condition of the land must
be maintained.
Pangukrejo people using local actions such
as cultural silence, is to improve conditions in the
township independently and put up banners in
the street to show the attitude of rejection of the
relocation program. Local actions is also done by
Samin tribe who refuses relocation because in their
area there will be built cement factory. According
to Said (2012:225-262) local actions done by
Samin tribe is through dialogue and cultural
performances, namely building a house without
using cement and other materials produced by
the plant. Local actions are a form of rejection of
citizens to refuse relocation, because for them to
leave the township is not the thing to do, although
they will receive compensation.
Just like the local action which done by Samin
tribe, Pangukrejo people also perform local actions
to show the attitude that they are not willing
to leave their village. Although the eruption of
Merapi destroyed their houses and the source
of life, Pangukrejo people consider the disaster
as God’s destiny which cannot be avoided. The
condition is like hitting the bottom because life
always analogous to a rotating wheel (Javanese:
cakra manggilingan). They accept it sincerely,
but that does not mean they are passive, they try to
work hard and let God determine the results.
The concept of sincerity and nerima ing
pandum, according to Imron and Hidayat (2012
: 207-228), is the value existing in the public
mind that comes from the religious values which
is referred as theological construction and cultural
values inherited from ancestors. It which is called
cultural construction. Both theological and cultural
construction are used to explain how Pangukrejo
people interpret disaster. This value serves as a
spirit to rise from the disaster that befell them.
This is consistent with the views of Koening
(2006) and Chester et al. (1999 : 189-207) that
religious actions taken by disaster victims aim
to give power to rise from the deterioration due
to the disaster. The view of Chester et al., (1999:
189:207) is specifically based on the experience
of Italian people when Mount Etna and Mount
Vesuvius erupted. After the eruption, the survivors
experienced prolonged trauma. Embracing
Catholicism, people came to the church with the
expectation to find peace and to rise from the
deterioration caused by the disaster.
The same thing occurred in the lower class in
Bangladesh who lived in flood-prone areas. The
research of Schumck (2000: 85-96) concluded
that the victims of flood in Bangladesh sought to
strengthen themselves through religious activities
to face the floods that occur every year therefore
they could immediately rise to reorganize their
lives. The same thing was stated by Dave (2008:
329-337), when Merapi erupted in 1994, Turgo
people considered that eruption of Merapi was not
a thing to be feared, so they remained living in his
village. Religion became an amplifier factor for
them to survive in between eruptions. In addition,
their culture did not ask to leave their homeland,
despite eruption of Merapi was frequently
occurred.
The action of
Pangukrejo people
relying
115
pages 105-120
on the religious value in facing of the disaster
condition become relevant when Merapi erupted.
When human cannot escape from the disaster,
people rely on the power of God.
Such beliefs then makes religious followers
feel protected so that they will feel comfortable in
performing a variety of activities to reorganize their
life. In this context, religion is a coping mechanism
for disaster victims to survive the adverse effects
of the disaster that they eventually revive (Ghozali,
2008: 103-131).
Revival of people from Merapi eruption can be
seen from the actions that they start their business.
As it was the case in Bantul people who become
victims of Earthquake in 2006, according to Imron
dan Hidayat (2012 : 215), Bantul people formed
groups to conduct social activities at a mosque
that palxs as a place of assembly. Moreover, in
some mosques there is a business related to the
procurement of leather as a raw material of puppet
craft. Those prompted the emergence of other
business activities.
Moreover, according to Imron dan Hidayat
(2012 : 215), the mosque also became a citizen
deliberation plate to improve their living
environment after the disaster. Even the mosque
also became a social gathering place where they
performed routine activities by citizens who
became victims. Thus, the function of the mosque
was not only for performing acts of religious per se,
but rather to do out social and economic activities.
The spirit, theological construction and
cultural construction are manifested in the form of
mutual cooperation to help both in material and
non-material aspects. According to Pangukrejo
resident, helping each other through mutual
cooperation is done by rebuilding the houses of
residents. In addition, they also work together to
repair public facilities. They do it as they are in
the same boat in facing living conditions after
the eruption of Merapi. The mutual cooperation
activity, according to Budiani et al. (2014 : 106-113)
is important element in the disaster management
because it indicates togetherness of disaster
victims.
116
Referring to the opinion of Durkheim,
togetherness of disaster victims was manifestation
of organic solidarity. Organic solidarity is grown
in rural communities with every members known
each other. As such, they work together to resolve
their problems due to the Merapi eruption.
The mutual cooperation is evidence that the
solidarity of residents has strengthened as a result
of the disasters. This is similar to what has been
expressed by Abdullah (2009) that the solidarity
of victims of disaster has its ups and downs. There
are times when solidarity weaken because one
puts more emphasis on personal interest to get
rid of the disaster. However, there are times when
solidarity strengthen because people mutually
help each other.
It seems that the strengthening of solidarity
also occurred in Japanese society when the Kobe
disaster occurred. According to Harwich (1979)
when a disaster occurs, the rich provides assistance
to the poor. Similarly, it happened to the people
of Bantul when the 2006 earthquake happened.
According to Surjono (2007: 35 ), Bantul residents
provided mutual assistance among fellow victims,
so that by strengthening the solidarity Bantul
people could quickly repair their neighborhoods.
For residents who are the victims of Merapi
disaster, it seems that the strengthening of
solidarity is not only solidarity that comes from
within or in the term Durkheim 1965 (quoted
Turner & Beeghley, 1981:334 ) is a mechanical
solidarity, but also organic solidarity. According to
Durkheim, the organic solidarity is the solidarity
that comes from outside the community. The form
of solidarity is the development of mechanical
solidarity. Organic solidarity grows in society
that is more professional in the division of labor.
Nevertheless, the solidarity actually requires the
existence of entanglement among the part of the
community with other parts. Thus, although its
members do not know each other, but there is an
intensified relationship between citizens.
The organic solidarity expressed by Durkheim
above seems to occur also in the victims of Merapi.
They did not know the donor before, because
the aid was from outside their communities.
Nevertheless, Merapi disaster victims received
assistance from various parties, as a form of
sympathy from outsiders to the Merapi victims.
The assistance received by the Pangukrejo
people from the university as the emergency
response could be manifested by actions involving
students to help people resolve their problems. In
addition, the assistance in the form of strengthening
religious and economic were well received by
residents. The assistance from the universities was
utilized by residents to re-organize their life in the
village.
While the aid given by the donors to
the citizens, including in the form of a team
of volunteer labor was not just limited to the
emergency response phase but also periods of
improvement. They received help to repair the
environmental conditions and they obtain the
temporary shelter.
Pangukrejo people also received assistance
in the form of health care. Residents obtained
health insurance since the evacuation. Residents
received medical assistance from some agencies.
Thus, disaster victims received various assistance
from outside parties as a form of manifestation of
solidarity mechanical reinforcement.
The assistance received is a proof that the
people of Merapi have a strong level of solidarity
and it becomes stronger when a disaster occurred.
Therefore, the reason that they did not leave the
village becomes a normal thing, though the eruption
of Mount Merapi damaged their environment. It is
because they have a strong solidarity value to stay
on the slopes of Mount Merapi.
CONCLUSION
The disaster management efforts planned by
the government in the event of the devastating
eruption of Mount Merapi in 2010, especially in
terms of resettlement, meet with resistance from
certain groups of people who have lived in the
area around Mount Merapi. The reason behind
such resistance is related to the rationality of
residents which is different from the rationality
of government. For the resident by using their
subjective perspective, disaster is something
dangerous, but an attempt to leave their place
categorized by the government as a disasterprone area is not something they have to do. This
research concludes that Pangukrejo people have
an attachment to Merapi because it is a place of
origin, where they gain a sense of comfort and
safety. In addition, Merapi region is a place to gain
and to perpetuate a system of values, therefore
Merapi has become a symbol of self-esteem that
must be maintained. Accordingly, the eruption is
interpreted as the destiny of God that cannot be
avoided. At such times, the living condition hit the
bottom and is back to normal by means of mutual
cooperation. Such value rationality motivates
people to return to their hamlet although a huge
eruption has just occurred.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank the Pangukrejo people
who provided information about what they
experienced during the eruption of Mount Merapi
that occurred in 2010. I would also like to thank
Mr. Budhi Gunawan, MA., Ph.D., Prof. Oekan S
Abdoellah, Ph.D., and Prof. Munandar Sulaeman,
MS. which provided guidance in this paper. My
gratitude also goes to The Institute of Management
Education Fund which had funded this research.
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120
Hatip
(Imam
Hatip
Lisensi):
Islamic School in Contemporary Secular Turkey
Analisa Journal of Social Imam
Science
andSchool
Religion
Vol 01
No.01
June 2016
Mahfud Junaedi
Website Journal: http://blasemarang.kemenag.go.id/journal/index.php/analisa
IMAM HATIP SCHOOL (IMAM HATIP LISESI):
Islamic School in Contemporary Secular Turkey
MAHFUD JUNAEDI
Walisongo State Islamic University
Address Jl. Prof.Dr. Hamka (Kampus II)
Ngalian Semarang, Indonesia
Phone 024-7601295 Fax 024-7615387
[email protected]
Paper received: 12 November 2015
Paper revised: 26 February – 1 March 2016
ABSTRACT
Imam Hatip schools have been a crucial and controversial Islamic education in
a contemporary secular Turkey. The majority of Imam Hatip School students
come from families who live and conduct their relations in accordance with
Islamic norms and principles. Many conservative, religious-minded parents in
rural and small town (in central and eastern Turkey) send their children after
primary school to an Imam Hatip High school because this is the only school type
in which the children can study Islamic subjects besides the general curriculum
and the teachers are believed to impart traditional moral values. Many of those
parents would, however, wish their children to pursue modern careers and find
more prestigious and better-paid jobs than that of a modest preacher. Today Imam
Hatip schools do not only produce Imams (leaders of prayer) and hatips (deliver
khutba at every Friday sermon), but also design to cultivate religious sensibilities
(dini hassasiyetler) in their students. The schools aim to heighten their student’s
awareness of faith and promote the notion that religion should play a substantial
role in the life of individuals and society. The most important is that Imam Hatip
schools play an important role in Turkey’s pious community and make the country
more Islamic.
Keywords: Turkey, Imam Hatip School, religion, education, secular.
A. INTRODUCTION
Islam is the main religion of the Turkish
people, where 99.8% of the country’s population is
nominally Muslims. Most Muslims in Turkey are
Hanafite Sunnis, forming about 72%, and Alevis of
the Syiah denomination, forming about 25% of the
Muslim population. There is also a Twelver Syiah
community, which forms about 3% of the Muslim
population. However, Turkey is more recognized
as secular than Islamic country. The secularization
of Turkish society started during the last years of
Ottoman Empire, and it was the most prominent
and controversial feature of Kemal Pasha
Atatturk’s reforms. Under his leadership, the
caliphate—the supreme politico-religious office of
Islam and the symbol of the sultan’s claim to world
leadership of all Muslims—was abolished. The
secular power reduced and eventually eliminated
the religious authorities and functionaries. The
religious foundations were nationalized, and
religious education was restricted and for a time
prohibited. The influential and popular mystical
orders of the dervish brotherhoods (Tariqa) were
also suppressed (“Islam in Turkey”, n.d.).
The Turkish government had more freedom
to pursue policies attacking Islamic institutions.
Under the guise of “cleansing Islam of political
interference”, the educational system was
completely overhauled. Islamic education was
banned in favor of secular, non-dogmatic schools.
Other aspects of religious infrastructure were also
torn down. Religious endowments were seized and
put under government control. Sufi lodges were
forcefully shut down. All judges of Islamic law in
121
pages 121-138
the country were immediately fired, as all Shari’ah
courts were closed (“How Atatturk”, n.d.).
In addition, Atatürk’s attacks on Islam were not
limited to the government, however, everyday life
of the Turks was also dictated by Atatürk’s secular
ideas: (1) Traditional Islamic forms of headdress
such as turbans and the fez were outlawed in favor
of Western-style hats, (2) The hijab for women
was ridiculed as a “ridiculous object” and banned
in public buildings, (3) The calendar was officially
changed, from the traditional Islamic calendar,
based on the hijrah -Prophet Muhammad’s flight
to Madinah- to the Gregorian calendar, based on
the birth of Jesus Christ, (4) In 1932, the azan -the
Muslim call to prayer- was outlawed in Arabic.
Instead, it was rewritten using Turkish words and
forced upon the country’s thousands of mosques,
and (5) Friday was no longer considered part of
the weekend. Instead, Turkey was forced to follow
European norms of Saturday and Sunday being
days off from work (“How Attaturk”, n.d.). After
all of these changes, Attaturk deleted the clause
in the constitution which declared Islam as the
official state religion. Islam had been replaced with
Atatürk’s secular ideologies.
The most important, but at the same
vulnerable, is secularism in general and secularism
in education which is still disputable. Some
scholars think that the secularization process is not
completed in Turkey. A country cannot really be
called secular when it pays every month the salary
of 60,000 imams and dictates the content of their
weekly sermon at Friday prayers, sometimes down
to the last word. On one side, there are educated
people who accepted secular agenda, and on the
other side, there are uneducated people who live
in villages and are believers (Giuli Alasania, Nani
Gelovani, 2011, p. 39).
Fazlur Rahman (1982, p.92) explained that
perhaps the most spectacular development in
Islamic education in contemporary Islamic world
has occurred in Turkey, where after a quarter of
a century’s officially total ban, it resurrected itself
through sheer public pressure. At last, with the
introduction of democracy, i.e., a multiparty system
122
in 1946, the Republican Party (Atatturk’s party)
saw that the opposition party (the Democratic
Party) might successfully do campaign on the issue
of freedom of religious education. The Republican
leader decided to undercut the opposition and
established the Imam Hatip Schools to train imam
and khatib, and Faculty of Theology (Ilahiyat
Fakultesi) whithin Ankara University. The faculty
was established as a scientific body and would be a
torch of light like other scientific institutions.
Religion and education (Islamic education
or Schooling Islam) in secular Turkey are an
interesting issue due to an uneasy relationship
of the state and religion. In this research, I try to
explore this uneasy relationship of secular Turkish
state with religion by investigating how religion
has been dealt within the field of education. It is
also interesting and important because it has had
the largest period of independent existence among
Muslim countries in recent history. This research
focused on Imam Hatip School (Turkish: Imam
Hatip Lisesi) as a transformative institution of
Islamic education in contemporary secular Turkey,
with two research questions: 1) Why do Imam
Hatip Schools still exist in contemporary secular
Turkey? and 2) How do the transformation of
Imam Hatip Schools in contemporary secular
Turkey ?
B. METHOD OF RESEARCH
This research is a qualitative study with a
historical approach centering on Turkey as the
setting of the study. This study reads historical
moments synchronically and diachronically.
Synchronic reading of the historical events is
meant to look at the historical moment within a
particular time associated with many variables,
for example, when looking at the development of
religious education in a given context, it needs to
be associated with other aspects such as political,
social, cultural, and religious aspects. Meanwhile,
diachronic reading of history is meant to look at
certain historical events as a continuation of the
previous events that will continue in the next
period. Turkey is chosen in this study because it is
a unique secular state which is different from other
Imam Hatip School (Imam Hatip Lisensi): Islamic School in Contemporary Secular Turkey
Mahfud Junaedi
secular states in Europe and has a population the
majority of which embrace Islam by the percentage
of around 99 percent.
This research is related to phenomena or
activities of human being in Islamic education.
Therefore, the researcher uses observation
to collect data and strengthen their validity.
Observation is made indirectly (nonparticipant)
on the implementation of Islamic education
conducted by Imam Hatip Schools. In addition,
the researcher needs to take some advantages of
the interview method. Interviews were conducted
on people involved in Islamic education in Turkey,
namely Imam Hatip School, as well as those who
have adequate information and understanding
about the issue of Islamic education in Turkey
(Mehmet Toprak, Sulaiman, and Syeifi Kenan).
This research uses a historical perspective, so the
documentation is used to collect data from works
or references related to the Islamic education
(Imam Hatip schools) in Turkey.
After the data are collected completely,
they are then carried out to the data analysis.
Descriptive data are analyzed qualitatively with
an emphasis on primary sources supported by the
results of interviews with key informants and field
observations. The data are interpreted to find a
new meaning of development and implementation
of Islamic education (Imam Hatip Schools) in
contemporary secular Turkey.
C. RESEARCH FINDINGS
1. Islam in Contemporary Turkey
Gibb (1978, p. 69) explained that “Islam is not
only a body of religious doctrine but also a way of
life with a long tradition behind it, extends to the
whole range of Islamic doctrines and institutions,
ethics, and rituals and also to the Islamic past”.
Therefore, Islam in Turkey can be understood as
Muslims civilization including of politic, social,
economy, cultural, and education.
The people of Turkey are Muslims even though
in 1928 Islam as the religion of the state was deleted
from the constitution. This fact is well known
enough though this deeply significant fact has
been less widely appreciated. An understanding of
the modern Turks as Muslims has been little bit
late to be cultivated, either by western students
or by Islamic peoples. The people of Turkey are
not only Muslims, but also, for many centuries,
have been of all Muslims (W. C. Smith, 1957, p.
165). Whereas Islam had formed the identity of
Muslims within Ottoman Empire, secularism was
seen as molding the new Turkish nation and its
citizens. The interaction between secularism and
Islam plays an important role in normative and
ethnic conflict, culture and politics, remembrance
and representation of the past, and the formation
of new social movement in Turkey (Yavus, 2014,
p. 7).
In contemporary Turkey, Directorate of
Religious Affairs, known as Diyanet, is the
government body representing and directing all of
Sunni Islam in Turkey. Created in 1924, a year after
the Republic of Turkey was formed, the Diyanet is
enshrined in 136 of the Turkish Constitution. The
Diyanet is huge and powerful. Operating under the
Prime Minister, it employs about 100,000 (from
muftis to imams in mosques). All Sunni clergies
are salaried as civil servant of Diyanet. (The Myth
of Turkish Secularism, 2013). In addition, the state
is one of the main producers of religious discourse
in Turkey, providing free areas of development
for mosques to be built, paying the expenses of
water and electricity, and educating and paying
preachers. Moreover, the state shapes the religious
discourse through standardized Friday sermons,
fatwas, religious publications, and to the state
media, and non-Muslim are legally restricted in
their religious freedoms. This attitude of the state
towards religion, especially towards Islam, can be
understood only in a historical framework (Bekim
Agai, 2007, p. 150)
Until the present day, the Diyanet writes all
the sermons for its clergy, but reportedly now it
sometimes allows them to write their own though
their contents are controlled. The Diyanet also
controls all mosques (80,000). In the educational
sector, it is responsible for 4,322 Quranic courses
throughout the country and provides the series
of publications dealing with educational matters.
123
pages 121-138
The Diyanet assumes the task of including Islam
in the project of national homogenization as well
as exercising state control over private forms of
Islamic activities (Bekim Agai, 2007, p. 150). The
nation of laicism had changed. Turkish laicism
means the control of religious expression through
the state. By controlling religious tasks, the state
hoped to depoliticize religion and integrate it into
its civilizing project.
The new constitution of 1982 consequently
strengthened the role of Islam in Turkey.
National historiography was revised, and Islam
was presented as an outstanding national trait of
the Turks, as well as being a source of social and
moral stability. The curriculum of state schools
was adapted to religious demand, obligatory
religious courses were introduced, and the theory
of evolution was banned from schoolbooks. Even
today, there are varied levels of state involvement
in the religious sphere (Bekim Agai, 2007, p. 150).
Would the U.S., or any Western country, be termed
“secular” if it funded a huge Christian government
agency that employed all Christian clergy and
controlled their sermons? Obviously not.
In both theory and practice, the Turk’s version
of Islam Today is different from other Muslim
people. It is, we believe, of major significance
in itself if we shall presently try carefully to
understand. Also, its very differentiation from
the others is significant, and this too needs
clarification. It is, of course, related to the fact that
the historical context is different, both present and
past. Quite a part from religious interpretation,
the Turks stand out from among other Muslims
both for their current activity and development,
their revolutionary prosecution of modern life,
and for their past role in Islamic history, especially
in recent centuries. As with other Muslims,
their understanding of Islamic history and their
participation in it have been markedly distinctive
(W. C. Smith, 1957, p. 166).
Islam in Turkey is distinguished by
considerable diversity, both in ideational content
and in institutional forms. In political expression
and organization, Islam is not restricted to one
124
part and it is even more socially and culturally
developed than it is politically. Turkish Islam is
distinguished by a high degree of institutional
differentiation from secular counterparts in
separate trade unions, business associations,
foundation, education, and media activities. Some
cultural and intellectual Muslims milieus display
a high level of vitality and innovation, compared
to the stereotypical products of much of political
Islam.
A survey entitled “Religious Life in Turkey” was
conducted by the Presidency of Religious Affairs or
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı on religion and religious
habits in Turkey. For Diyanet’s survey, 21,632
people were interviewed across the country which
has a population over 76 million, and 50.9 percent
of them were women. The majority of them, at 77.5
percent, followed the Hanafi madhhab or school of
law interpreting religious rules while 11.1 percent
were Shafii and 0.1 percent followed the Hanbali
School. One percent responded that they followed
the Ja’fari sect of Shia Islam and 6.3 percent
described themselves as followers of none of these
sects while 2.4 were not aware of his or her sect.
(“Turkish Muslims are more Pious as They Age”,
2014).
When asked whether they believe in God, 98.7
percent of participants responded that they believe
God’s existence and oneness, and 0.8 percent only
replied either that they doubted his existence but
still believed, or were doubtful of his existence
and did not believe in God at all. Moreover, a
majority of participants said that they accepted
all revelations in Quran as accurate and valid for
people of all ages while only 1 percent expressed
doubt, and less than half of interviewees said they
were able to read Islam’s holy book Quran in its
original (Arabic), while others said they could
not. Over 95 percent of the participants believe in
the existence of angels, satan, and jinns. A large
majority of the interviewees expressed their faith
in the day of resurrection and judgment and only
0.9 did not believe in resurrection and being held
accountable for their sins and good (“Turkeys
Muslims more Pious as They Age”, 2014).
Mahfud Junaedi
The survey shows that more than half of those
performing prayers five times a day live in rural
areas while 39.4 percent live in cities. Women
perform daily prayers more than men and there
is a correlation between the age and frequency
of performing prayers. People observe obligatory
prayers more as they age according to the survey.
Turkey’s Muslims above 65 are most likely to
perform daily prayers regularly while only 26.2
percent of Muslims between the ages of 18 and
24 regularly perform obligatory prayers. Another
interesting finding in the survey is that the higher
the level of education of Muslim individuals have,
the more they are inclined to skip daily prayers.
The frequency of performing daily prayers is the
highest among illiterate Muslims. The highest
rate of attendance to prayers is for Friday prayers,
a prayer that needs to be performed with a
congregation and is obligatory exclusively for men.
Over 57 percent of interviewees said they always
attend Friday prayers and only 7.2 percent said they
had never attended the Friday prayers (“Turkeys
Muslims more Pious as They Age”, 2014).
The survey also examined Muslim’s observance
of fasting and giving zakat, a type of almsgiving
obligatory for all Muslims considered wealthy
enough. Over 83 percent perform fasting as long as
they are healthy while 2.5 percent said they never
fast. The rate of women was higher among those
regularly fasting. Those giving zakat annually are
in majority while only 1.1 percent said they did not
give zakat although they could afford to.
On the matter of performing a religious
pilgrimage, a pillar of Islam compulsory for every
able-bodied follower who can afford it, only 6.6
percent of interviewees performed the pilgrimage
to Mecca and Medina known as Hajj. A large
number of interviewees plan to perform it as soon
as they can afford while a very small percent said
they preferred to help the poor instead of spending
money on a pilgrimage. A considerable majority of
interviewees said they recite prayers at any time of
day without any reason while more than half recite
prayers to show their gratitude to God. The rest of
interviewees recite prayers only when they face a
problem, an ordeal (“Turkeys Muslims more Pious
as They Age”, 2014).
Based on the survey, more than 71 percent
of women interviewed said they covered their
head while going out though they were not asked
whether they regularly wear a headscarf or other
forms of covering and 27.2 percent said they did
not cover. Wearing headscarves or other items to
cover the head is more common in rural parts of
Turkey according to the survey. The main reason
women cited for wearing a headscarf was that they
believed it is an obligation of Islam. This reason
was followed by family’s pressure, adherence
to customs and societal pressure respectively
(“Turkeys Muslims more Pious as They Age”,
2014).
It can be concluded that the religiosity of
Turkish Muslim is good enough. Therefore, it is
understandable that “more than anything else into
modernist Turkey, convinced me that Islam has
a very deep root in the hearts of the real Turkish
people, nor can, indeed, be divorced from their
mind” (Javad Saeed, p. 165). A country cannot
really be called secular when it pays, every month,
the salaries of Imams and dictates the contents of
their weekly sermons at Friday prayers. Islam is
the most controversial issue to divide the Turkish
republic since 1923. On one side, there were
educated people who accepted secular agenda, and
on the other side, there were uneducated people
who lived in villages and were believers (Giuli
Alasania, Nani Gelovani, 2011, p. 39)
The facts show us that Islam is still alive in
Turkey, and even they claimed that 99 percent of
Turkish citizens are Muslims. In addition, although
the state recently still embraces a secular ideology,
the religious life of people is similar to other people
in Islamic countries, either in worshiping or in
practicing other Islamic cultures.
In Turkey, the state shapes Islam on different
levels. Today one key actor is the directorate for
Religious Affairs or Diyanet. With about 100,000
employees, from Muftis to imams in the mosques,
all state paid, it controls the religious service in
70,000 mosques and shapes the religious discourse
throgh standardized Friday sermon, fatwas,
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pages 121-138
religious publications, and access to the state
media. In the educational sector it is responsible
for 4,322 Quranic courses throughout the country
and provides a series of publications dealing with
educational matters. The Directorate assumes the
task of including Islam in the project of national
homogenization as well as exercising state control
over private forms of Islamic activities. According
to the constitution, it is the Directorate’s duty to
ensure national unity. The creation of a Sunnistate Islam is the paradoxical consequence of
Turkish laicism (Bekim Agai, 2007, pp. 153-4).
Such an approach had to ensure that all Turkish
pupils learned the one and only “enlightened
state-version of Islam” whilst undermining
Islamic influence outside of state control and the
potential creation of alternatives forms of Islamic
belongings.
Though Turkey is often potrayed as very
secular and laicist, different Islamic groups
found ways to transmit their forms of Islamic
knowledge in Turkey. The Islamic brotherhoods
were outlawed, but some continued to operate
in hidden forms. Some underground medresses
were maintained, while Qur’anic courses were
held in private. The most important development
during the repressive period of the early Republic,
however, was the formation of new forms of
religious communitis, the cemaats. These groups
attempted to maintain and transmit their Islamic
ideas under the state’s repressive policies. Cemaat
can be defined as the combination of a specific
discourse with certain forms of social relations.
Unlike the sufi brotherhood, the cemaat has no
formal act to bestow membership. The cemaats
were critical of the state’s religious education and
developed their own forms of Islamic teaching
(Bekim Agai, 2007, pp. 153-4).
We
have seen how strongly and
comprehensively the state involved in religious
teaching, and how it causes traditional patterns
of classical Islamic education disappear. The
followers of Said Nursi, Nurcu movement,
(Fethullah Gullen group) are a specific result of
these developments which have made Turkey a
unique case in Islamic world.
126
The political scientist Hakan Yafuz, as cited
by Ozgur, argues that “Turkish Islam” is different
from the Arab and Persian Islam because of
its production of cultural norms and modes of
thought as related to religion, faith, personal life,
ritual practices, and religious holidays, covering
a whole spectrum from social mores to personal
ones and the interpretations of Islamic principles.
Since they are contextualized in a setting where
“Turkish Islam” is the norm, it is conceivable
that the communities around Imam Hatip
schools advocate a more “liberal” form of Islam
(Ozgur, 2012, pp. 189-190). Religion, either as an
expression of individual piety or as an institutional
organization, could not be suppressed or ignored.
2. Social and Political Background
Turkey is a country located in Europe, Asia, and
Midle East. Ninety nine percent of the population
of Turkey is Muslim. Turkey is the only country in
which Islam is the major religious community, but
is constitutionally secular guaranteeing complete
freedom of worship to non-Muslim. In addition,
the present conservative government, has Islamic
origins, is engaged in reform, with the goal of
Turkey joining of European Union (EU) (Mustafa
Cinoglu, 2006, pp.676-687).
Turkey is a parliamentary democracy with
multi-party system. Major parties are defined as
political parties that recieved 10 % of the votes in
the latest general election (July, 22, 2012) and/
or represented in parliament. Minor parties are
defined as political parties that have fulfilled the
requirements of the Supreme Election Committee
((Yuksek Secim Kurulu (YSK) in Turkish). Parties
represented in Parliament now are: (1) Adalet
ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development
Party), (2) Cumhuriyat Halk Partisi (Republican
Party), (3) Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist
Party), (4) Halklan Demokratik Partisi (People’s
Democratic Party), and (5) Bans ve Democrasi
Partisi (“List of Political”, n.d.).
Social mobility has increased since the
emergence in the 1950s of a multi-party
participative nature of policy and greater economic
development. The neglected villagers who clung to
Mahfud Junaedi
their traditional ways as a result of one-party city
center modernization have come to participate
in the educational system at a greater rate than
ever before. The changed policy in the agricultural
sector has also helped the peasants to be more
mobile and economically strong.
Although democratic Turkey
is
over
whelmingly Muslim, for almost eight decades
its legal and political system have shown a
deep seated fear of Islam as political force. The
government monitors and regulates how Islam is
preached and practiced. In recent years, One of
many restrictions on religion, on December 1981,
the Prime Ministry issued a list of regulations
which required all personal and students in
institutions of higher education to wear “clothing
which is compatible with Atatturk’s revolution
and principles” not cover they heads while in
the institution. Many people saw the decision
as a reflection of the nation’s partisan politics.
The Republican people’s party called the verdict
a “triumph of justice,” while the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi),
a group with roots in Islam, defended the scarves as
a matter of individual rights. Consequently, many
families sent their children abroad for university
education. The Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan,
said that he had two daughters and they were
going to university in the United States because
of the head scarf problem. On February 9, 2008,
Turkey’s parliament approved a constitutional
amendment that lifted the ban on Islamic
headscarves in universities. Prior to this date, the
public ban on headscarves officially extended to
students on university campus throughout Turkey.
Nevertheless, some faculty permitted students to
wear head coverings in class. On June 5, 2008,
Turkey’s constitutional Court annulled the
parliament’s proposed amendment intended to lift
the headscarf ban, ruling that removing the ban
would run counter to official secularism. The last
debates were solved in such a way: students can
have headscarves but not their teachers. (http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
muslim/portraits/turkey.html).
In politics, it is important to recognize that
although the Justice and Development Party
(Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/AKP), the
ruling party now, can be regarded as a Muslim
government, it controls power within a secular
state. Since the late 1990s, scholars have been
examining the practices of secular states and
challenging some of the established categories
used to understand and asses secularism. There
has been a widespread definition that secularism
is the separation of religion from the policy and
practices of the state. Recent scholars, however,
finds this definition too narrow and argues that
secularism seeks not so much to banish religion
from the public domain, but to reshape the form
it takes, the subjectivities it endorses, and the
epistemological claims it can make (Ozgur, 2012,
p.5-6.). This broader definition better captures the
ways in which religion and state interact in Turkey.
The AKP’s politics and discourse are
characterized by conservative democracy, which
claims to combine the traditional lifestyle inspired
by Islam with the Western liberal values that
are based on the free market and globalization.
The AKP’s orientation, which is based on the
contradictory attitudes of Islam and the West, is
quite different from traditional Islamic discourse.
After the political victory of the AKP, the debates
about the relationship between Islam and functions
of Imam Hatip schools significantly increased.
These schools, after the 1970s, became the sources
of the grassroots of Islamist parties (Interview
with Mehmet Toprak, September 25, 2014). There
is ample evidence that, though they might not be
attempting to turn Turkey into an Islamic state,
members of the AKP are prepared and interested
in evolving the country into a state that is more
sympathetic to religiously conservative Turks.
Secularization in Turkey is a product of the
interaction and influence of many diverse factors,
such as pro-French policy is redundant of the
sultans, intensive and massive campaigns of
people who love to imitate the West and Westerneducated elite to take over institutions and
127
pages 121-138
Western values. Coupled with diplomatic pressure
continuously from European countries since the
beginning of the nineteenth century. And the most
important among the causes of the change is the
military defeats and insults suffered by soldiers
of Osmaniyah in the eighteenth century and the
nineteenth, the increase of Western countries in
the fields of politics and economics and a sharp
decline of empire Osmaniah (Al Attas, 1988, p. 9).
Turkish secularism is based on the radical
Jacobin laicism that aimed to transform society
through the power of the state and eliminate
religion from the public sphere. The Jacobin faith
“in primacy of politics and in ability of politics
to reconstitute society” guided Mustafa Kemal
and his associates (Yavus, 2014). The aim of the
project was to modernize Turkey, give it a Western
outlook, and make it compatible with modern,
Western civilization, regardless of the difficulties
this might cause for the populace (Bekim Agai,
2007, p.151).
Although Turkey was secularized at the
official level, religion remained a strong force
at the popular level. After 1950, some political
leaders tried to benefit from popular attachment
to religion by espousing support for programs and
policies that appealed to the religiously inclined.
Such efforts were opposed by most of the state
elite, who believed that secularism was an essential
principle of Kemalist ideology. This disinclination
to appreciate religious values and beliefs gradually
led to a polarization of society. The polarization
became especially evident in the 1980s as a new
generation of educated but religiously motivated
local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance
of the secularized political elite. These new leaders
have been assertively proud of Turkey’s Islamic
heritage and generally have been successful at
adapting familiar religious idioms to describe
dissatisfaction with various government policies.
By their own example of piety, prayer, and
political activism, they have helped to spark a
revival of Islamic observance in Turkey. By 1994
slogans promising that a return to Islam would
cure economic ills and solve the problems of
128
bureaucratic inefficiencies had enough general
appeal to enable avowed religious candidates to
win mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara,
the country’s two largest cities (“Islam in Turkey”,
n.d.).
Turkey’s “laïcité” does not call for a strict
separation of religion and the state, but describes
the state’s stance as one of “active neutrality.”
Turkey’s actions in relation to religion are carefully
analyzed and evaluated through the Presidency of
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). The
duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are “to
execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship,
and ethics of Islam, to enlighten the public about
their religion, and to administer the sacred
worshipping places” (“Secularism in Turkey”, n.d.).
Religion is mentioned on the identity documents
and there is an administration called “Presidency
of Religious Affairs” or Diyanet which exploits
Islam to legitimize sometimes State and manages
77,500 mosques. This state agency, established
by Atatturk (1924), finances only Sunni Muslim
worship (“Islam in Turkey”, n.d.).
This fact indicates that secularization does
not necessarily mean that religion loses its
ability to influence political behavior. Among
the many factors which affect political responses
toward modernization, religion is undoubtedly
an important one. Gibb says that we must not
think of all Westernizers as secular minded and
antireligious, even if it is true that a great number
of the educated neglect the observances of religion
(H.A.R Gibb, 1978, p. 51). In contemporary
Turkey, the separation of Islam from the polity or
secularism is not complete success. It is recognized
the significance of Islam’s role in Turkish history
and it is an essential part of the individual’s life of
Turkish.
So far, Turkey is still a secular country. It may
be the way to maintain Ataturk Reforms or to
have similarities among countries in the European
Union, but Islamic movements find a conducive
position. The model of secularism in Turkey is
different from that in Europe. Turkey recently
led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the third term as
Mahfud Junaedi
the Prime Minister since 2003 (“Recep Tayyip
Erdogan”, n.d.), gives attention to Islam. Erdogan
was a graduate of Imam Hatip School, and he is
a Muslim and religious person. Therefore, he has
a mission to support Islamic movements through
many ways including policy of National Education
System, especially related to Islamic schools.
However, he is still careful to implement such a
policy in order to run smoothly. He performs an
integrated ideology of secular and Islam.
This analysis demonstrates how the fortunes
of Imam Hatip schools have risen and fallen
with the shifting fortunes of the Islamic political
movement. Since the early 1920s, Imam Hatip
schools have been at the center of a conflict between
the secularist and Islamist forces in Turkey and
have been debated within the larger context of
social and political issues. Imam Hatip schools
are unique institutions in the religious education
experience of secular Turkey.
3. The Development of Imam Hatip Schools
Each historical period has the education
relevant to it. As a mirror, education reflects all
social changes. No essential changes are possible
without deep changes in education. Traditional
education, transmitted through generations, was
spread for a long time in the early Turkish history.
Traditions were preserved and developed in the
theocratic Ottoman Empire, where Sultan was
Caliph and civic and spiritual powers.
The Westernization and secularization
processes among Turks started much earlier than
Republic and Atatturk’s time, it was as early as
in the late medieval Ottoman state. First of all
the process was revealed in education which was
crucial for economic and social changes. The
secularization of education was set up on agenda;
however the longstanding traditions of religious
education were still very strong and viable (Giuli
Alasania, Nani Gelovani, 2011).
According to the law issued on 3 March, 1924,
479 medresses were closed, and also religious
courses were deleted from the curricula of the
public schools. Such a situation lasted until 1949.
Education and curriculum contents in medresses
did not go through important changes for centuries
except some minor modifications, and thus,
medresses in general remain solidly traditional
institutions, which end up loosing their connection
with the modern period and its realities, and the
needs of the society when entering the 19th century
( Seyfi Kenan, 2009,p. 521).
Additionally, the medresses established by old
Turks are degenerated ruins, unable to be reformed
in the light of modern academic mentality (Bekim
Agai, 2007, p. 150). Syefi Kenan (2009) said that
each school or any kind of educational organization
emerges and survives based on satisfying certain
needs and expectations of its own society.
However, when they fail to meet those needs and
demands, society will start searching for new
models of schooling and education. This is what
happened in the late of 19th century. There was no
course for the teaching of religion available in the
public school system for fourteen years between
1935 and 1948. Religious education moved to the
private realm for a while, and the young generation
received their religious education in informal
settings, mostly from their parents at home,
sometimes from imams, old medresses graduates,
or scholars at mosques. There was also a plethora
of religious books written by the prominent experts
of religion in the period to teach Islam to the young
generation as part of the activities of informal
religious education during these silent years (Seyfi
Kenan, 2009, p.532).
Moreover, it is important to note that
the fourth article of the Law of Unification of
Education required to open, at the same time
Imam Hatip mekteps in 29 centers as secondary
schools, and reestablish a Theological Faculty
in Darul Funun in Istanbul. The new Republic
offered a new modern of religious education at
both secondary and higher level replacing the
medreses education, but this attempt could not
succeed well in the following years. The number
of Imam Hatip schools decreased gradually, and
by 1927, there were only two schools surviving,
one in Istanbul and the other in Kutahya, due to
a lack of students. Nonetheless, informal religious
education continued under the supervision of
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pages 121-138
the Presidency of Religious Affairs, for instance,
in limited number of Quranic Schools (Darrul
kurra) to preserve the tradition of recitation and
memorization of the Quran. This Quranic schools
(Kuran kursu) still exist today in certain numbers
for religious education under the supervision of
the same Presidency, admitting students only
after they have completed the eighth grade in
compulsory primary schools (Seyfi Kenan, 2009,
pp.530-531).
The first phase of Imam Hatip schools was
brief and ill fated. Early Imam Hatip schools
bore several elements that resembled medreses.
The schools attracted students and teachers from
shuttered medreses and taught from a curriculum
that combined secular and Islamic subjects.
During the 1923-1924 academic year, Imam Hatip
schools enrolled 2,258 students and employed
approximately 300 teachers. By the 1926-1927
academic year, the number of Imam Hatip school
students had decreased to 278, and the number
of teachers had decreased to 10. The schools
were closed in the 1929-1930 academic year. The
government closed Imam Hatip schools because
the ministers themselves -not the students- had
lost interest in them (Ozgur, 2012, p.35).
The government in power, which was
Atatturk’s Republican People’s Party, decided to go
ahead with a new announcement in September 1,
1947 amid diverse public opinions, and to initiate
a formal religious education program again after
a long period of official silence to train teachers
of religion, qualified imams and hatips under the
supervision of the Ministry of National Education.
Intellectuals and politicians from diverse
political and ideological backgrounds debated in
those years whether religious education violates
the principles of secularism that should provide
religious education if the state does not have it
since Islam does not have a mosque bureaucracy
or hierarchy like a church in the West, and how this
education can be provided (Ozgur, 2012, p.533).
Besides, intellectuals and politicians were also
concerned about the fact that if the state does not
provide religious instruction, then people would
130
get immersed in superstition and wrong beliefs,
and fanaticism might spread all over the country.
Ihsan Olgun, a representative in his speech in
1948 in the National Assembly, affirmed that most
of the imams and hatips/preachers in the period
were unqualified or poorly educated in religious
matters (Ozgur, 2012, p.533).
In 1949, in a relatively weak response to
grassroots demands, the government announced
the opening of Imam Hatip courses (Imam Hatip
Kurslari) in ten cities. The ten month program
included topics such as Qur’an, Hadits, and
Islamic History. Lessons were fifty minutes long
and ran from nine o’clock in the morning till 12:50
in the afternoon. Their enrollment was limited,
they graduated only fifty students after their first
year. It is unlikely that the courses were perceived
as a serious effort to satisfy the need for more
religious functionaries ((Iren Ozgur, 2012). On
13, October, 1951 the government decided to open
new religious schools. The first schools known
as Imam Hatip schools (Imam Hatip Liseleri)
started to function in Ankara, Adana, Istanbul,
Isparta, Konya, and Kayseri in 1951-52. The total
number of students at these schools was 876. Later
the number of students at these schools increased
parallel with the increasing number of schools
(Alasania, Gelovani, 2011).
The historical analysis of the Imam Hatip
schools in their reinstated form could be divided
into four periods. They are (1) 1951 – 1973, a period
of nascence and growth, (2) 1973 – 1997, a period
of transformation and progress, (3) 1997 – 2002,
a period of weakening and decline, and (4) 2002
to the present, a period of resurgence and renewal
The period from 1951 to 1973 witnessed
the steady expansion of the Imam Hatip School
system as different government made concession
to Islamic sentiment in the country. The number
of Imam Hatip schools increased from 7 to 72 and
the number of students from 876 to 36,378. The
increasing in the number of Imam Hatipp schools
brought forth the opening of higher Islamic
Institutes (Yuksek Islam Enstituler) in the late
Mahfud Junaedi
of 1950s. Between 1951 and 1973, Imam Hatip
school students came predominantly from similar
socio-economic background. The majority came
from poor and lower-middle-class families who
were either villagers or recent migrants to cities.
Some stayed with relatives, while others stayed
at dormitories or the courtyards of mosques
The period between 1973 and 1997 was one
of growth and progress for the Imam Hatip
schools. During this time, successive governments
undertook initiatives to transform Imam Hatip
schools from vocational schools into more
mainstream educational institution. For the first
time, the schools began to cater to both male and
female students who wanted to pursue university
degrees in nonreligious fields. In these two decades,
the number of Imam Hatip schools and students
increased significantly. The growth of Imam Hatip
schools during this period reflected advancement
in Islamist politics, (Alasania, Gelovani, 2011).
During the 1974-75 school year, the number of
students attending to the Imam Hatip high schools
grew to 48,895. This number subsequently grew to
200,300 by 1980-81. In addition, females gained
the right of entry to Imam Hatip high schools
in 1976. The proliferation of Imam Hatip high
schools is often cited as the effect of the National
Salvation Party’s membership of a number of
coalitions with Nationalist Front governments. In
October 1972, the Islamists were allowed to form
National Salvation Party (1972-1981). The party’s
goals were compulsory secondary education,
including religion in curricula, and restoration
of the caliphate. Their voters were lower-middle
class. The party was against of the common
market and exhorted for closer relations with
Muslim countries. They believed that the Ottoman
Empire was destroyed by Westernization process
and alienation from Islam. Regardless of their
anti-secular agenda after the elections in 1973,
during the 70s Islamic parties were frequently in
coalition with secularists. As the result, Islamists
were promoted to the high positions and number
of mosques, or Imam Hatip schools, courses of
Qur’an or related personnel increased (Alasania,
Gelovani, 2011).
Two decisions of education and training have
a positive effect on the future of the Imam Hatip
schools. One decision (number 394, August 25,
1974) introduced Qur’an, Arabic Language, and
religion courses into the Junior High school
curriculum. The other decision (number 632,
November 28, 1975) recognized the Imam Hatip
school’s equivalency to regular high school
(Imam Hatip school diplomas) since then having
read “Senior High and Imam Hatip schools”.
Consequently, Imam Hatip school graduates
became eligible for admission to national
universities. Since 1975, the Imam Hatip school
graduates have successfully entered diverse
majors in the national universities: Theology,
Education, Economics, Public Administration,
Engineering, Medicine, Law and Political Sciences
(Alasania, Gelovani, 2011, pp. 35-50). In 1989,
according to the University Exam Centre statistics,
22% of Imam Hatip Schools applicants were
admitted to universities. In the 1980s and 1990s,
Anatolian Imam Hatip schools placed many of
their graduates into prestigious professional
faculties in leading Turkish universities. During
this decade, approximately 80 percent of the
graduations from Kertal and Kadikoy Anatolian
Imam Hatip schools in Istambul and Tevfix Ileri
Anatolian Imam Hatip school in Ankara received
high score in the university entrance exams and
enrolled in a wide range faculties. Moreover, the
success of these Imam Hatip schools graduates
is accountable for the enhancement in the appeal
and standing of Imam Hatip schools in the eyes of
many religiously conservative Turks. Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, the schools had influx of
new students. In the 1982-1983 academic year,
there were 374 Imam Hatip schools enrolling 219,
931 student’s. In 1996-1997 academic year there
were 601 Imam Hatip schools enrolling 511,502
students. (Ozgur, 2012, p.50). The period from
1997 to 2002 was weakening and decline of Imam
Hatip schools because of the escalating tensions
between the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP). Also, it
was due to the secularist forces in society leading to
the 1997 political crisis. Since their rise to power,
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pages 121-138
members of Refah Partisi had encouraged several
Islamic practices that had especially provoked the
military, such as interest free banking, veiling in
state institutions, and public prayers. As a direct
result of the crisis, the number of Imam Hatip
school students decreased from 511,502 to 77,392
between 1997 and 2002 (Ozgur, 2012, pp. 52-53).
Research indicates that between the years of
1993 and 2000, prospective students registered
at Imam Hatip high schools primarily to receive
religious tutoring alongside a more general
education (“Imam Hatip School”, n.d.). In addition,
research shows enrolment at Imam Hatip high
schools was based solely on the student’s decision.
The third proposed factor in the rise in popularity
of Imam Hatip schools is the admission of female
students in 1976. By 1998, almost 100,000 females
attended Imam Hatip high schools, making
up almost half of all students. This statistic is
particularly revealed because women are not
eligible to become either priests or ministers
(“Imam Hatip School”, n.d.). By 1995, 13,826
females compared to 29,103 males had graduated
from Imam Hatip schools (Alasania, Gelovani,
2011, p.43).
However, the introduction of eight years of
compulsory education in 1997 has seen a sudden
decline in the popularity of Imam Hatip schools.
In 1999, the reclassification of Imam Hatip schools
as “vocational schools” meant that, although more
options had been made available to graduates,
attaining places at prestigious university courses
became more difficult. By requiring that all eight
compulsory years of schooling be spent under the
same primary-school roof, middle schools were
abolished. Children could not enter vocational
schools (one of them is the Imam Hatip school)
until the ninth grade (rather than the sixth, as
before) (Andrew Finkel, 2012), and 2002 to the
present, a period of resurgence and renewal of
Imam Hatip schools. In this period Imam Hatip
schools have been regaining the status, enrollment
levels, and overall capabilities of previous decade.
Although they leg behind the figures of the late
1990s, the enrollment figures have risen from
71,100 to 235,000 in 2011 (Ozgur, 2012, p.63).
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Following the reforms of March 2012, which
extended compulsory education to 12 years and
allowed for Imam Hatip schools to be opened and
“middle school” level (second term of four years)
experts, warned that the possible increase in the
number of Imam-Hatip schools was not in line
with people’s expectations, and described it as
a “top-down” process. Critics noted that the new
education system seemed to be a revenge being
taken for Imam-Hatip schools which were shut
down after 1997.
Like so many state institutions in Turkey,
Imam Hatip schools (Imam Hatip liselerli) were
initially established to further the top-down secular
goals of the early republic, but have undergone a
gradual redefinition ever since. They were opened
in 1924, with the specific purpose of monopolizing
religious education in the training prayer leaders
(imam) and preachers (hatips). Today the Imam
Hatip curriculum is around 40 percent religious,
and 60 percent secular, that allowed Imam Hatip
schools to begin functioning as general high
schools, not simply as schools for the training
of religious functionaries. The expansion of the
Imam Hatip schools was accelerated after the
1980 military coup, which was led by generals who
believed that ignorance about religion had made
Turkish youth susceptible to radical groups of left
and right. A “Turkish Islamic synthesis” was thus
promoted by military authorities, which aim to
utilize Islam as a socially unifying force (“Islamic
Schools in”, n.d.).
Imam Hatip schools (Imam Hatip liselerli)
has developed and increased fivefold in the past
11 years, with the ruling party of Turkey, the AKP,
showing that they want to get rid of secular system.
The number of Imam Hatip schools located across
the Turkey has risen from 450 to 708 in the 11
years that the AKP has been in power. It was being
planned that in the education year of 2013-2014, by
creating 100 new Imam Hatip schools, this figure
will reach 808 (“AKP Replaces High Schools”,
n.d.). Kenan Cayir (2012), an assistant professor
of Sociology at Istanbul’s Bilgi University, says the
schools can have a positive impact so that religion
and modernity can be together. In addition, a survey
Mahfud Junaedi
conducted by the Turkey İmam-Hatip Alumni
Foundation (TİMAV), titled “Perception of İmamHatip High Schools and İmam-Hatip Students in
Turkey,” was conducted between April 24 and May
18, 2012 with 2,689 people in 26 provinces. Most of
the respondents were not Imam-Hatip graduates.
The survey shows a majority of the respondents
hold a positive perception of Imam Hatip students
and graduates (http://www.todayzaman.com/
columnist/joost-lagendijk,)
In the following time, the progress happened
in policies on Imam Hatip schools were that:
(1) the curriculum were not only contain Islamic
teachings but also general knowledge, and (2) the
graduates were allowed to take further study at any
discipline of knowledge at any universities. This
policy was welcomed by most Muslim community
in Turkey and made Imam Hatip school developed
very rapidly. Every city and town had an Imam
Hatip school which had more students than its
capacity. The students of these schools not only
become Imams for the mosques, but also enter the
various faculties of universities.
However, an objection to the free choice
of Imam Hatip graduates came from TÜSIAD
(Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s
Association). According to their research
conducted in 1988, approximately 32% of
graduates of Imam Hatip schools picked faculties
of law as their first choice in university entrance
exams, proving more popular than religious
based alternatives. The report concluded that due
to fundamental differences in their upbringing,
Imam Hatip graduates were rendered unsuitable
for public office. Politicians tended not to agree
with TÜSIAD’s position. For example, the then
Minister of National Education, Avni Akyol,
criticized the report in terms of human rights,
claiming such proposals undermined the principle
of equal opportunity in education (“Imam Hatip
School”, n.d.).
4. The Transformation of Imam Hatip
Schools
A broad definition of “education” must
be adopted when assessing how and by what
means students learn and grow intellectually and
spiritually in an Imam Hatip school’s environment.
Monica Ringer, as Iren Ozgur cited, defines
education as the body of texts, ideas, and concepts
transmitted in the educational system and argues
that education “forms people’s intellectual and
cultural perspectives, their values systems, and
their world views” (Ozgur, 2012, p.66). The courses
at Imam Hatip school consists of vocational,
cultural and scientific classes. While the ratio of
professional or religious course is 40%, the ratio
of cultural and scientific courses is 60%. This 60%
ratio is composed of the same courses that are
found on the curriculum of general high schools.
Thus, the 40% religious or vocational courses are
additional courses. Therefore education at Imam
Hatip schools is an amalgam of two elements:
formal curriculum and experience (Observation
in Uskudar Imam Hatip schools, September, 25,
2014).
Formal curriculum denotes the subjects
which teachers intentionally plan and teach
to their students in organized and structured
ways. Besides, it refers to what students learn
or are exposed to in classrooms, assemblies, and
planned school activities (Ozgur, 2012, p. 66). An
Imam Hatip school education takes four years
to complete, during which students take classes
from a curriculum comprised of secular (beseri) or
cultural and scientific course and religious (dini)
or vocational courses. Secular courses, commonly
known as “cultural and scientific classes,” include
: History, The History of the Republic, National
security, Geography, Mathemathics, Physics, and
Turkish Language, Foreign Languages (English,
French, Germany), Geometry, Trigonometry,
Geology, Astronomy and Space Science, Chemistry,
Biology, Computer, Science and Technology,
Physical Education, Music, Art and Literature.
Although the majority of cultural and scientific
courses are compulsory, some of them are optional.
However, Imam Hatip school students have less
exposure to the secular curriculum than students
of general high schools. For example, during his/
her third year, a general high school student takes
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pages 121-138
six hours of history per week, while an Imam Hatip
school student takes only two hours (Interview
with Mehmet Toprak, September, 22, 2014)
Courses on religion, commonly known as
“vocational classes”, enable students to familiarize
themselves with teachings and principles of Islam.
The vocational classes include Qur’an, Arabic,
Quranic Exegesis (Tefsir), Islamic Jurisprudence
(Fikih), The Life of Muhammad, the History of
Religions, Religious Rethoric and Islamic Theology
(Kelam). The state-directed curriculum is designed
to emphasize historical rather than contemporary
forms of Islam and transmit information and
learning that adheres to the secular values of the
republic. However, the curriculum still allows
teachers latitude to teach topics in a manner of
their choice (Interview with Mehmet Toprak,
September, 22, 2014).
There are eleven classes in the vocational
(religion classes) curricula of Imam Hatip schools.
A first year Imam Hatip school student takes
twenty hours of vocational classes per week, a
second year student takes ten, and third and fourth
year students takes sixteen. Of these eleven classes,
Arabic and Qur’an classes form of backbone. These
two classes are the only classes that are required
every semester, in each of the four years. Imam
Hatip schools are the only schools that offer Arabic
as a foreign language in their curricula. In the
Arabic class I attended, a teacher introduced new
grammar rules and demonstrated how they were
applied in sentences. The students would then write
then write these sentences in their notebooks and
memorize them (Observation in Uskudar Imam
Hatip School, September 25, 2014). Arabic class
is designed to help students read and understand
the Qur’an. The Arabic teacher told me that the
class was meant to cultivate the idea that learning
Arabic was an essential part of embracing Islam
and becoming a religiously conscious individual.
He said that the class was designed to strengthen
the students’ ties with religion rather than having
them engage with Arab culture.
The second element of Imam Hatip curricula is
134
“experience” as hidden curriculum. “Experience”
refers to what students learn by simply being in
school. The experience side of education includes
everything that students learn and internalize
informally or passively through their interactions
with peers, teachers, and the powerful aesthetic
and normative environment that surrounds them
(Ozgur, 2012, p.67). Compared to the formal
curriculum, the hidden curriculum is not written,
does not have explicit objectives, and varies
considerably from one school to another. The
hidden curriculum is the most powerful influence
in the classroom and the school generally. Alan
Skelton defines the hidden curriculum as a set of
implicit messages relating to knowledge, values,
norms of behavior and attitudes that learners
experience in and through educational process
(Ozgur, 2012).
There are non-curricular (hidden) elements
that, by adhering to Islamic customs and rituals,
contribute to the formation of an Imam Hatip school
experience. These elements refine and reinforce the
religious consciousness that the schools, through
their vocational curricula, seek to engender in
the students. The first of these elements has to do
with the schools’ social aesthetics. Social scientists
study aesthetics choices to understand the cultural
traditions, practices, and behaviors of societies.
The social aesthetics concern the character itself
and pervade the entire range of human culture.
At Imam Hatip schools, social aesthetics can refer
to the design of buildings and grounds as well as
the use of space nd clothing (Ozgur, 2012). Imam
Hatip schools bear distinctive features that set
them apart from other general high schools. A
significant number of the Imam Hatip schools, like
Uskudar, Kartal, and Umraniye Imam Hatip, have
mosques in their courtyards. Others, like Esatpasa
and Sariyer Imam Hatip, have mosque in their
immediate vicinity. In addition, the more common
practice is to build Imam Hatip schools next to
existing mosque. Despite the common existence of
mosques either nearby or on their campuses, most
Imam Hatip schools also accommodate prayer
rooms within their main buildings. There are two
prayers rooms (mescit) in the schools, catering to
Mahfud Junaedi
each gender separately.
It is arguable that mosques and prayer rooms
(mescit) allow Imam Hatip school students to pray
within a congregation and in so doing inculcate
the importance of performing namaz alongside
other believers. Most of the Imam Hatip school
graduates I met said that they attended prayers at
mosques.
Today Imam Hatip schools do not only
produce Imams (leaders of prayer) and hatips
(deliver khutba at every Friday sermon), but also
Imam Hatip schools designed to cultivate religious
sensibilities (dini hassasiyetler) in their students.
The schools aim to heighten their students’
awareness of faith and promote the notion that
religion should play a substantial role in the life of
individuals and society (Interview with Mehmet
Toprak, September, 22, 2014).
Religious sensibilities can refer to a range of
attitudes, values and practices that have Islamic
underpinnings. It is a concept used both in speech
and writing to indicate a level of religiosity that
affects not only one’s personal and spiritual
outlook on life, but also his/her behaviors and
actions toward others in society. Religious
sensibilities include, but are not limited to,
elements of faith and worship. To say that a person
has religious sensibilities broadly means that
he/she is religiously conscious. On the other hand,
an individual’s sensibility is always comprised of
many discrete facets (Ozgur, 2012).
The schools integrate religious elements
into their curricula through either elective
religion courses or daily religious rituals. Turkish
secularists often allege that Imam Hatip schools
create ideologized and politically radicalized
graduates and that the schools act as the primary
gents in promoting religious sensibilities. There
is, however, a difference between assuming that
religious schools will graduate students who
are more religious in their personal lives and
more religiously conscious in their politics, and
understanding who that religious schools promote
these results. A closer examination reveals that
that while the schools endeavor to teach their
students to observe, uphold, and advocate Islamic
norms and practices, they do not overtly promote
political opposition or religious revivalism (Ozgur,
2012).
On the political socialization of Imam Hatip
school students, an informant told me “Don’t
be afraid of people who know religion. Be afraid
of people who don’t, for it is they who become
radical Islamists”. (Interview with Mehmet
Toprak, September 22, 2014). The schools do
not promote radical Islamism, and inculcation
of religious sensibilities can put the schools in a
position to raise generation that can challenge the
Turkish state’s historically secular ideology. It is
highly likely that the communities, that is external
influences and variables around Imam Hatip
schools in Turkey, are more moderate. Turks
have a particular interpretation of and approach
to Islam that is more “liberal” compared to their
counterparts in other Muslim countries, like
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
The Imam Hatip schools have expanded
so much that they are producing many more
graduates than ever found, such as mosque
personnel. In fact, many if not most of their
graduates have no intention whatsoever to just
become prayer leaders or preachers. The schools
have turned into something different from what
their founders intended: schools of preference
and a channel of upward social mobility for the
children of an important, conservative segment
of the population. Many conservative, religiousminded parents in rural and small town (in central
and eastern Turkey), sent their children after
primary school to an Imam Hatip high school. This
is the only school type where they would study
Islamic subjects besides the general curriculum,
and where the teachers were believed to impart
traditional moral values, much like many parents
in Europe would prefer a Christian over a neutral
school. Many of those parents would, however,
wish their children to pursue modern careers and
find more prestigious and better paid jobs than
that of a modest preacher (Interview with Seyfi
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pages 121-138
Kennan, September 15, 2014)
It should be noted that students who enroll
in Imam Hatip schools, most of which are in
the countryside, do not do so necessarily with
intention of pursuing a religious career. Most of
these schools are like ordinary schools where one
gets the education to follow whatever profession
one may wish to pursue later on. In many cases,
these are the only schools available to parents in
the countryside, so they send their children there.
Of course, many parents also prefer to send their
children to Imam Hatip schools because these
schools offer instruction in the religion of Islam
besides giving a basic education. It should also be
noted that the buildings of Imam Hatip schools are
constructed by local community effort, and only
after their construction does the government hire
teachers. This shows the real basis of the strength
of Turkish Islam (Interview with Mehmet Toprak,
September 25, 2014).
Today, only 15 percent of the school’s graduates
become religious functionaries, and the majority
of Imam Hatip school graduates enter business,
the practice of law, and politics, and many of
them fill midle and high level posts in national
and local government. The growing tendency of
Imam Hatip school graduates to pursue careers
outside of the religious realm have put the schools
at the nexus of debates over Islamism, secularism
and modernity in Turkey. The country’s secular
learning and religiously conservative communities
posses chlassing perspectives about the schools’
role in politics and society (Ozgur, 2012). But the
most important is that Imam Hatip schools play
an important role in Turkey’s pious community
and making the country more Islamic.
The fact that the president of Republic of
Turkey and many leading figures of the AKP, the
ruling party, are Imam Hatip school graduates
is of profound significance because it reinforces
the perception that they are good Muslims and
highlights the schools as successful models for
Islamic education. Scholars and journalists have
named Imam Hatip schools as potential building
blocks for an international network of “moderate”
136
Islamic educational instructions. They have noted
how the schools equip students for entry into a
wide range of professions in international markets
and regional politics.
Ziauddin Sardar, a contemporary Muslim
scholar, argued that the establishment of Imam
Hatip schools, where Islamic studies are combined
with modern scientific thought, and the emergence
of a contemporary school of young intellectuals,
who are concerned with issues of justice and
equity, science and values (the epistemological
basis of Muslim civilization and ecological and
environmental problems) is an indication that in
the next decade Turkey will become intellectually
the most exciting country in the Muslim world.
(http://www.salam.co.uk/knowledge/inquiry3.
php).
The transformation of Imam Hatip schools,
from only vocational school to general and
vocational high school is powerful influenced by
the ruling politics party. Currently, AKP (Adalet
ve Kalkinma Partisi) or Justice and Development
Party is the ruling party in Turkey with Recep
Tayib Erdogan as the president of Turkey at
present. He was a student of Imam Hatip school,
called as Imam Hatipli. AKP and Erdogan had
good policy for the advancement of Imam Hatip
schools. The experience of what can be described
as an intriguing and dynamic relationship between
politics and religious education since the birth of
Republic achieved major progress, despite its up
and down, during the last 80 years.
D. CONCLUSION
The development of Imam Hatip schools is
very powerful and influenced by the development
of social and political condition of Turkey.
Therefore, the existence Imam Hatip schools is
determined by and very depending on the ruling
party in Turkey, the Justice and Development
Party (AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi).
State of Turkey (Ministry of National
Education) grants permission for operation of
Imam Hatip Schools (Turkish: Imam Hatip
Lisesi), appoints their teachers, and designs their
Mahfud Junaedi
curricula. Imam Hatip Schools are Islamic Schools
that provide the most prominent exception to the
rule of secular education in Turkey. The courses
at Imam Hatip schools consist of vocational,
cultural and scientific classes. While the ratio of
professional or religious course is 40%, the ratio
of cultural and scientific courses is 60%. This 60%
ratio is composed of the same courses that are
found on the curriculum of general high schools.
Thus, the 40% religious or vocational courses are
additional courses. Therefore, education at Imam
Hatip schools is an amalgam of two elements:
formal curriculum and hidden curriculum
(experience). The hidden curriculum is the most
powerful influence in the classroom and the school
generally. The hidden curriculum as a set of implicit
messages relating to knowledge, values, norms of
behavior and attitudes that learners experience in
and through educational process.
The majority of Imam Hatip School students
come from families who live and conduct their
relations in accordance with Islamic norms and
principles. Many conservative, religious-minded
parents in rural and small town (in central and
eastern Turkey) sent their children after primary
school to an Imam Hatip High school, because this
is the only school type where they would study
Islamic subjects besides the general curriculum
and where the teachers were believed to impart
traditional moral values. Many of those parents
would, however, wish their children to pursue
modern careers and find more prestigious and
better paid jobs than that of a modest preacher.
Today Imam Hatip schools do not only
produce Imams (leader of prayer) and hatips
(deliver khutba at Friday sermon), but also design
to cultivate religious sensibilities in their students.
The schools aim to heighten their students
awareness of faith and promote the notion that
religion should play a substantial role in the life
of individuals and society. The most important is
that Imam Hatip schools play an important role
in Turkey’s pious community and making the
country more Islamic.
In the following time, the progress happened in
policies on Imam Hatip schools: (1) the curriculum
were not only contain Islamic teachings but also
general knowledge, and (2) the graduates were
allowed to take further study at any discipline of
knowledge at any universities. This policy was
welcome by most Muslim conmunity in Turkey
and made Imam Hatip Schools developed very
rapidly. Every city and town had an Imam Hatip
school that had more students than its capacity.
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140
Indeks/ Index
INDEKS
ISSN : 1410 - 4350/ e-ISSN: 2443 - 3859
Terakreditasi LIPI Nomor: 543/AU1/P2MI-LIPI/06/2013
Analisa
‘urf 1, 58, 66, 67, 68, 82
A
Abdul Hamid Abulung 296
Abdullah Gymnastiar vii, viii, 174
Adam Hawa 82
Adaptasi ii, x, xi, 237, 241, 250, 253, 9
Adat istiadat 82
Ahlaq 82
Ahmadiyah 5, 82
Aji Qamara Hakim 82
Akademis 82
Akidah 14, 82
Akidah Akhlak 82
Al Muzammil 82
Al Qaeda 82
Al Qur’an 82
al-Durr al-Nafīs 299, 300, 302
al-Ghazālī 296, 299
Allah iii
al-Qusyairī 299
Analisis evaluative 82
Anthony Giddens 215
Arab 260, 288, 301, 310, 311, 312, 14
Aspek input xiv, 82
Aspek konteks 82
Aspek produk 82
Aspek proses 82
B
Bacaan keagamaan 82
Bersimbiosis 250
Bhiku Khantidaro 4, 82
Bid’ah 61, 68, 82
BIN 82
Bina Seni Bahasa Indonesia 82
Bisri Mustofa 310, 312
Bom Bali 82
BSE 82
Budaya Bugis x, 82
budaya dan pendidikan xii
budaya politik 162
Budha 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 19, 20, 25, 30, 33, 82, 176,
179, 188, 194, 200, 240, 244
Budi pekerti 82, 205, 310, 311, 312
Budiono 3, 6, 8, 10, 82
Buku PAI 82
C
CRCS UGM 82, 224
D
dakwah Islam 204, 207
David Harvey 216
Demak 82, 163, 165, 237
Demokrasi 13, 41, 81, 82, 161, 162, 164, 165, 172,
198, 248, 251, 267
Desa Sarirejo 189, 195, 196, 197
Dialog agama 31, 82
Dian Nafi 35, 40, 82
doktrin salafi 299
DUPAK 179
E
Ekonomi 181, 225, 227, 237, 238, 253, 261, 306
Ekonomis 82
Eksklusif 82
Elit agama 82
Etika 208, 232, 252
Etnis Dayak 82
F
Faktor hukum 196
fenomenologis 274
FGD viii, 15, 16, 18, 19, 82, 176, 179, 180, 181,
182, 214
Fikih 82
Filologi 318
Fiqih 82
318-1
FKUB viii, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 82, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193,
194, 195
Focus Group Discussion viii, 176
Formalina 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26, 82
Forum Lingkar Pena 82
Forum Umat Islam Bersatu Sarirejo Pati 196
Framing vi, xi, 82
Fullday School 82
Fungsi informatif dan edukatif 175
Fungsi konsultatif 175
G
Gambus 82
Gate keepers 82
GBI Diaspora Sejahtera viii, 29, 35, 36, 39, 40,
82
Gender 70, 71, 79, 80, 81, 82
gerakan dakwah 241, 270
gerakan ekonomi xii, 270
gerakan Islam ii, xii, 242, 244, 249, 270, 271,
272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 279, 9
gerakan pendidikan 270
Gerakan purifikasi 275
gerakan sosial 241, 242, 264, 270, 271
Gereja ix, 8, 12, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40,
82, 183, 189, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198
Gereja Injil Tanah Jawa (GITJ) 189, 195
Gereja Isa Almasih 196
GKJ Joyodiningratan 34, 39, 40, 82
Golkar 163, 164, 165, 166
Gorontalo v, ix, x, 9, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,
64, 66, 67, 68, 82
Grebeg 244
Gresik v, viii, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 82, 84, 230
GUII 82
Gus Dur 3, 82, 173, 258
H
H Ahmad Fauzan 37, 82
Hablumminallah 82
Hablumminannas 83
Hadis xiii, 71, 80, 83, 263
Halfday 83
Harmonious social 83
Harmony society 83
Hindu 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 19, 20, 23, 25, 30, 33, 49,
54, 83, 176, 177, 188, 189, 194, 200, 240,
244, 259, 275, 292, 299
318-2
HMI 256, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266
Hukum Islam ix, 13, 63, 65, 66, 68, 77, 80, 83
Hukum normative 83
Humaniora xiii, 83, 252, 295
I
Ideologis 83
Ideology negative 83
Idul Adha 34, 39, 83
Idul Fitri 34, 51, 83
Ikhlas Beramal 183
Ilmu social 83
IMM 256
indigenous 200, 205
Indonesia iii, 15, 29
Information 83
Intan saying 83
Integrasi social 83
Interaksi sosial 217
Interfaith logic 221
Internal Control Questionaire
Ishlah 8, 83
Islam ii,v, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 2, 3, 4, 5,
7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 25, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 44, 45, 48,
49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83,
84, 85, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 171,
172, 176, 177, 178, 180, 184, 188, 189, 191,
193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200, 204, 205, 206,
207, 208, 212, 221, 225, 228, 232, 237, 240,
241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249,
250, 251, 252, 253, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260,
261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 269, 270,
271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279,
280, 282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292,
295, 296, 298, 302, 303, 306, 307, 311, 312,
318, 9, 10, 13
Islam fundamental 288
Islam inklusif 3, 83
Islam radikal 29
Islam tradisional ii, viii, xi, 15, 19, 22, 83, 250
Islamic Circle of North America 83
Islamic Studies xii, 270, 272, 273, 274, 279
Islamic teaching xii, 83
Isolation 83
Israiliyat 73, 83
J
Indeks/ Index
Jagalah kebersihan 83
jama’ah thoriqoh 291
Jamaah Islamiyah 83
Jaringan social 83
Jaringan tokoh viii, 83
Jawa Tengah i, vii, viii, x, 161, 163, 164, 165, 172,
187, 189, 243, 252, 298, 9, 10
Jenazah 83
Jepara vi, xiii, xiv, 83, 85, 164, 165
Jihad 13, 83
JW Marriot 83
K
kajian kitab kuning 206
Kalimantan Tengah ii, xiii, 295, 296, 298, 299,
300, 307, 10
Kalimantan Timur ii, xii, 83
Kamala Suta 6, 83
KAMMI xi, 256, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266
Kampong Solor 83
Karakter anak ii
Karuna 83
Kasunanan 240, 243, 244, 250
Katolik 2, 4, 10, 30, 33, 83, 164, 166, 167, 176,
178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 189, 221, 225, 244,
259, 260
KBK 83
Kearifan local 83
Kebersamaan 9, 83, 220
Keharmonisan 83
Kejawen 240, 248
Kejujuran 83, 316
Kelompok Kerja Madrasah xiv, 83
Kementerian Agama vii, viii, x, xiii, 173, 174,
176, 181, 182, 183, 185, 188, 190, 191, 194,
195, 198, 202, 207, 224, 257, 307
Kepala Keluarga 33, 83
Kepemimpinan peremupuan 83
Kerukunan i, vii, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 27, 31, 33,
41, 83, 252
Kesetaraan 71, 81, 83
KH Ahmad Dahlan 276, 278
KH Haderanie HN vi, 295, 10
Khonghucu 19, 83, 176, 188, 244, 259
Ki Hajar Dewantara 83
Kolaborasi 83
Komnas PA 83
Kompas 252, 280, 309, 318, 10, 13
Kompas vi, xi, 83
Kompetensi dasar 83
Kompetensi personal 83
komunikasi i, viii, x, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 185,
193, 195, 198, 224, 229, 234, 236, 237, 241,
279, 283, 284, 285, 290
Konflik 13, 27, 30, 41, 55, 56, 83, 252, 257, 259,
267, 299
konstruksi Islam 287
Kontekstualisasi 212, 237
Kota Malang i, vii, 1, 2, 7, 83
Kota Tegal 83
KPU 163, 164, 172
Kristen viii, ix, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20,
23, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 43,
83, 166, 167, 176, 178, 179, 188, 189, 193,
194, 197, 212, 219, 221, 244, 256, 258, 259,
260, 276, 280
Kristianitas 11, 83
KTSP 83
KUA 176, 189, 298
Kulliyah Muballighin 298
Kupang ix, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 83
Kurikulum 2013 vi, xiv, 83
Kusumo Rahardjo 3, 83
Kutai 83
L
Lagu tingkilan 83
Laskar Pelangi 278, 280
LDK xi, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266
Lembaga Amil Zakat 228, 230, 237
Lembaga Dakwah Kampus xi, 83, 261
Lesson learn 83
Library research 83
lintas agama 84, 221, 222, 283
lintas etnis 283
Lirik xii, 84
Lirik Jepen Muslim 84
LKiS 13, 80, 84, 253, 267
Lomba keagamaan 84
M
Mabbulosipeppa 84
Madrasah Tsanawiyah xiv, 84
Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran (MTA) 240, 242, 246,
249
Majelis Taklim 177, 178, 184
Manado viii, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 184, 185
Mangkunegaran 240, 243, 250
Mario Teguh vii, viii, 174
Masjid Al Hikmah 40, 84
318-3
masjid Bani Darussalam 189, 190, 191
Masjid Sami’na 30, 35, 36, 38, 84
Matakin 84
Maulid 19, 84, 262
Media massa 84, 171
Mediasi 31, 84
Meta 84
Metode kualitatif 84
Metodekualitatif 84
Minority group 84
Mitologi 84
MMI 244, 288
Modal social 84
money politics 169, 170, 171
Moral vi, ix, xiii, xiv, 84, 199, 205, 206, 208,
309, 312, 318, 9
Motivasi xii, 84
motivator vii, viii, 174
Mpennorialei 84
MTA 240, 242, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 288
MTA Gresik 84
Muhammad ii, vi, xi, xii, 5, 13, 18, 23, 24, 27, 36,
53, 54, 68, 69, 72, 77, 80, 81, 82, 84, 242,
253, 255, 261, 263, 264, 265, 271, 296, 298,
300, 306, 307, 311, 312, 318, 9, 10
Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari 296, 307
Muhammadiyah ii, vi, xii, 3, 22, 23, 68, 84, 240,
242, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 252, 264,
269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277,
278, 279, 280, 288, 9
Muhammadiyah Studies vi, xii, 269, 270,
271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277, 278, 279,
280, 9
MUI x, 20, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 84,
204, 259
Multicultural approach 84
Multikulturalisme 41, 55, 84, 198, 252
Museum Tenggarong 84
Musik modern 84
Muslim Indonesia xi, xii, 84
Mutual communication 84
Mutual trust 9, 84
N
Nafs 80, 84
Nafsun wahidah 84
Nahdlatul Ulama 248, 250, 298
Nakamura 270, 274, 275, 276, 280
Natal 5, 34, 35, 36, 84
Ndoro Purbo ii, vi, xii, xiii, 282, 285, 286, 287,
318-4
288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 10
Negara xii, 175, 179, 183, 185, 200, 263, 264,
267, 279, 280, 298
Negosiasi 38, 84
Neo Sufisme ii
Newcomers 50, 84
Nilai agama 168
Nilai agama 84
Nilai-nilai karakter 84
Non Fiksi 84
Norma social 84
Novel 278
Novel 68, 84
NU xii, xiii, 3, 5, 7, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 84, 190,
191, 220, 224, 244, 246, 247, 263, 270, 272,
273, 276, 279, 282, 285, 288, 289, 290, 291,
292, 298, 299
Nugraha 3, 84
O
orang sakti xiii, 287, 288, 292
Orde Baru iii, 15, 29, 84, 163, 164, 185, 248, 276
Organisasi Pengelola Zakat 228
OSN 84
P
PAI 82, 84, 245, 246
Pakem 245, 251
PAN 163, 164, 165
Panca Yadnya 8, 84
Pancasila 27, 50, 84, 163, 194, 196, 258, 266
Partai Damai Sejahtera 163
Partai Demokrat 163, 164, 165
partai Islam 163, 165, 251
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)
Partai Politik NU 299
Pati v, viii, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195,
196, 197, 10
PBM 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 84, 188, 191, 197, 198
PBM 2006 84
PBNU 84
PDIP 163, 164, 165, 167
Pdt Chris Yehuda 36, 84
Peduli sosial 84
Pedupaan 84
Pegawai Negeri Sipil 84
pekerja seks komersial 202
Pemandu moral 84
pembinaan masyarakat viii
Indeks/ Index
pemilihan umum 162, 165
Pendidikan Agama Islam xiii, xiv, 84
Pendidikan karakter 84
Penyuluh agama 9, 84, 178
Penyuluh agama Buddha 178
Penyuluh KB 173, 184
Penyuluh Kehutanan 183, 184
Penyuluh Kesehatan 183, 184
Perang 84
perilaku pemilih i, vii, 161, 163, 10
periode 1912-1950 xii, 273
Persaudaraan sejati 84
Pesantren v, ix, 27, 40, 41, 84, 192, 199, 200,
202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 244, 318,
9
Pesantren Darut Taubah ix, 199, 202, 203,
204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 9
Peserta didik 84
Piagam Madinah 5, 13, 84
PKI 30, 49, 84, 244, 248
PKNU 163, 164, 165
PKS 163, 164, 165, 166, 262, 267, 288
Pluralisme v, vii, 2, 3, 4, 13, 27, 41, 55, 84, 198,
267
Pluralitas 16, 84, 194
Plurality 52, 84
PMII, 256, 261, 266
Pola komunikasi 23, 84
Politik 168, 171, 172, 208, 248, 251, 252, 253,
267, 280, 283, 299
popular culture xii, 273, 277
PPP 163, 164, 165
prostituere 201
Psikologi 84, 186, 208
Psikoreligius 249
Purifikasi agama 256
Puritan xi, 245, 248, 249, 251, 252, 280
Purwokerto 68, 84
R
Raden Bekel Prawiro Poerbo 286
Radikalisme 84, 252, 257
Ratu Balqis 79, 84
regulasi formal i, viii, 187, 197
Rekayasa social 85
relasi ii, xi, 189, 190, 192, 194, 215, 217, 240,
241, 242, 247, 251, 286
Relasi gender 85
Religion i, iii, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv,
13, 53, 55, 57, 85
Religious devation 85
Religious integration 85
Rencana Pelaksanaan Pembelajaran 85
Republika vi, xi, 10, 85
Resepsi xi, 85
resistensi i, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 292
Responsibility xiv
Retnowat 85
Revival 249, 307
rezim iii, 15, 29
Ritz Calton 85
Rohis vi, xi, 9, 85
Romo Felix Suyatno 3, 85
RPP xiii, xiv, 85
Rumah ibadah 85
Rumah tangga 85
S
Salafy 242, 249, 252
SARA ix, 11, 30, 43, 44, 52, 85, 217
Saritem v, ix, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206,
207, 208, 209, 9
Sastra 85, 261, 318
SDIT Salsabila 85
Sejarah Kebudayaan Islam 85
Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu xii, xiii, 85
Semarang iii, 15, 29
serangan fajar 170
Shalawat 85
Sibaliperi 85
Simbol agama 85
Sinkretis 252
Sipakalebbi 85
Sistem pendidikan nasional 85
SKH Kedaulatan Rakyat 282, 293
Slametan 85
SMA Labschool Jakarta Timur xi, xii, 85
SMA N 1 Jepara 85
SMA N Kudus 85
SMAN 48 Jakarta Timur xi, 85
Social change 46, 85
Social contract 85
Social demand 85
Social integration 44, 47, 50, 85
Social interaction 85
Social relations 85
sosial-politik xii, 272, 273
Sosiologi ix, 26, 27, 55, 56, 63, 68, 85, 172, 185,
208, 225, 252, 297
Sosiologis 85, 191, 195, 197
318-5
Spiritual Bribery 85
Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono X 282
strategi viii, x, xi, 163, 182, 205, 207, 213, 242,
243, 250, 251, 283, 285
Sulaiman i, ii, v, vi, viii, xiii, 187, 304, 10
Surakarta v, viii, ix, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 68, 85
Surat kiriman dari Allah 85
Syariah 13, 57, 85
Syariat Islam 85
Syi’ah 5, 76, 85
System religi 85
T
Tafsir 71, 72, 79, 80, 81, 85
Tahlilan 68, 85
Takjil 85
Talqin mayit 85
Tata karma 85
Tayopo 85
Teologis 85
terorisme iii, 15, 29
Terorisme xi, 85
Tionghoa 30, 35, 85
Tokoh Katolik 85
Toleransi 2, 33, 85
Tradisi Hileyiya ix, 60, 63, 85
Transformasi pendidikan 85
Trihitakarana 6, 85
Tugu Lilin 85
318-6
U
Ulama Bugis x, 69, 72, 85
Unkhair xi, xii, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262,
263, 264, 265, 266, 267
urban sufism 15
Utlilitarianism 85
V
Village ix, 9, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54, 55, 85
W
Wahabi 240, 262
Wahdah Islamiyah xi, 256, 261
waliyyullah xiii, 287, 288, 292
Walubi 85
Wawasan Hanif 85
Wisata religi 85
Workshop 85
Y
Yogyakarta vi, xii, xiii, 171, 172, 186, 202, 208,
212, 224, 225, 238, 252, 253, 266, 267, 276,
279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 286, 287, 288, 289,
290, 291, 292, 293, 306, 318, 10, 13
Z
ziarah kubur 263, 282, 290, 291, 292
Indeks/ Index
INDEKS PENULIS
ISSN : 1410 - 4350/ e-ISSN: 2443 - 3859
Analisa
D
Darwis, Rizal, “Tradition of Hileyiya: The Interaction Between Religion and Traditions in Gorontalo in
Sociology of Islamic Law Perspective”, 22 (01) : 57 - 68
H
Haryanto, Joko Tri, “Relasi, Transformasi dan Adaptasi Pendukung Tradisi Jawa terhadap Puritanisme
Islam di Surakarta Jawa Tengah”, 22 (02) : 239 - 253
Hasim, Moh, “Ajaran Moral Syi’ir Ngudi Susilo dalam Membangun Karakter Anak”, 22 (02) : 309 - 319
Humaedi, M. Alie, “Penanganan bencana berbasis perspektif hubungan antaragama dan kearifan local”,
22 (02) : 213 - 226
J
Jinan, Mutohharun, “Muhammadiyah Studies : Transformasi kajian tentang gerakan Islam di
Indonesia”, 22 (02) : 269 – 280
K
Kustini dan Koeswinarno, “Penyuluh agama : menuju kinerja professional”, 22 (02) : 173 - 186
L
Ludji, Irene dan Lauterboom, Mariska, “Learning From The Socio-Religious Integration In Solor Village Indonesia”, 22 (01) : 43 - 56
M
Mustafa, Muhammad Sadli, “Religious Values In Song Lyrics Tingkilan”, 22 (01) : 109 - 120
N
Nuriyanto, Lilam Kadarin, “Social Integration Management Of Places Of Worship For Islam And
Christian In Surakarta”, 22 (01) : 29 - 41
Nur, Mahmudah, “The Reception Of Islamic Religious Activists (Rohis) On Religious Reading Materials
In Sman 48 East Jakarta And Sma Labschool East Jakarta”, 22 (01) : 97 - 108
O
Oetomo, Setyo Boedi, “Gate Keeper Role in Building Network of Interreligious Figures Based Local
Wisdom In Gresik”, 22 (01) : 15 - 27
S
Saepuddin, Juju, “Pesantren Darut Taubah dan Pekerja Seks Komersial Saritem Kota Bandung”, 22
(02) : 201 - 211
318-7
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Yustiani S, “Inculcation Nation Character Values Through Islamic Religious Education Subject In Public
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318-8
Pedoman Penulisan Naskah/ Writing Guide
AUTHOR GUIDELINES
ISSN : 1410 - 4350/ e-ISSN: 2443 - 3859
Analisa
GENERAL GUIDELINE
1. The article has not been published in other
journals or other places
2. The article should be written in English
(United State of America English) with a
formal style and structure. This is because
it is a fully peer-reviewed academic journal,
so that an oral and informal language
would not be accepted
3. The article should be written in word
document (MS word), 1,5 space, 12pt
Times New Roman, and margin 4-4 (leftright) and 3-3 (above-bottom), 30 – 35
pages of A4 paper
4. The article is an original work of the
author/s
5. The author/s have responsibility to check
thoroughly the accuracy of citation,
grammar, table and figures before
submission
6. The author/s have responsibility to revise
their article after receiving a review from
the editorial boards.
7. The author/s should register at the
e-journal of Analisa before submitting
their paper and fill the form completely.
8. The article should be submitted via online
9. The articles will be reviewed by editorial
boards
STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE
1. Title
2. Author’s name, email address, author’s
affiliation address
3. Abstract (250 words maximum, it consists
of background of the study, research
method, finding of the research)
4. Key words ( 3-5 words/phrases)
5. Introduction (it consists of background
statement, research questions, theoretical
framework, literature review)
6. Hypothesis (optional)
7. Methodology of the research (it consist
of data collecting method, data analysis,
time and place of the research if the article
based on the field research).
8. Research findings and discussion
9. Conclusion
10. Acknowledgement (optional)
11. Reference
12. Index (optional)
WRITING SYSTEM
1. Title
a. Title should be clear, short and concise
that depicts the main concern of the
article
b. Title should contain the main variable
of the research
c. Title should be typed in bold and
capital letter
2. Name of the author/s
a. The author/s name should be typed
below the title of the article without
academic title
b. The author/s address (affiliation
address) should be typed below the
name of the author/s
318-9
c. The author/s email address should be typed
below the author/s address
d. If the author is more than one writer, it
should be used a connecting word “and” not
a symbol “&”
3. Abstract and key words
a. Abstract is the summary of article that
consists of background of the study, data
collecting method, data analysis method,
research findings.
product
2010
2011
2012
2013
Rice
1.500 Ton
1.800 Ton
1.950 Ton
2.100 Ton
Corn
950 Ton
1.100 Ton
1.250 Ton
1.750 Ton
Sweet
potato
350 Ton
460 Ton
575 Ton
780 Ton
Source: Balai Pertanian Jateng, 2013.
5. How to present picture, graph, photo,
and diagram
a. Picture, graph, figure, photo and diagram
should be placed at the center
b. Abstract should be written in one paragraph,
single space and in italic
b. Number and title should be typed above the
picture, graph, figure, photo and diagram.
c. Abstract should be no more than 250 words
c. Number and the word of the picture, graph,
figure, photo and diagram should be typed in
bold, 12pt Font Times New Roman and at the
center, while title of them should be typed in
normal (not bold).
d. The word “abstract” should be typed in bold,
capital letter and italic
e. Key words should consist of 3-5 words or
phrases.
f. Key words should be typed in italic
4. How to present table
d. Number of the picture, graph, figure, photo
and diagram should use an Arabic word (1, 2,
3 and so forth).
a. Title of the table should be typed above the
table and align text to the left, 12pt font Times
New Roman
e. Source of the picture, graph, figure, photo
and diagram should be typed below the table,
align text to the left, 10pt font Time New
Roman.
b. The word “table” and “number of the table”
should be typed in bold, while title of the
table should not be typed in bold (normal).
f. Picture, graph, figure, photo, and diagram
should not be in colorful type (should be in
white and black, or gray).
c. Numbering for the title of table should use an
Arabic word (1, 2, 3, and so forth)
d. Table should be appeared align text to the
left.
e. To write the content of the table, it might use
8-11pt font Time New Roman or 8-11pt Arial,
1.0 space.
f. Source of the table should be typed below the
table, align text to the left, 10pt font Time
New Roman.
g. Example:
Table 4. Number of Rice, Corn and Sweet
potato Production
318-10
Example:
Figure 1
Indonesian employment in agriculture compared
to others sectors (% of the total employment)
60
50
Agriculture
40
Industry
30
Services
20
10
0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Source: World Development Indicator, 2005
Pedoman Penulisan Naskah/ Writing Guide
6. Research finding
This part consists of the research findings,
including description of the collected data,
analysis of the data, and interpretation of the data
using the relevant theory
7. Referencing system
Analisa uses in note system for the referencing
system, format (last name of the author/s, year of
publication: page number). For example (Shihab,
1997: 459).
8. Referencing system
Analisa uses this format for reference system:
a. Book
Last name of author/s, first name of the
author/s. year of publication. Title of the book.
Place of publication: name of the publisher.
Example:
Aly, Anne. 2011. Terrorism and global
security, historical and contemporary
perspectives. South Yara Australia:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Effendy, Bahtiar. 2003. Islam and the state
in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of
Southeas Asian Studies.
b. Chapter of the book
Last name of the author/s, first name of the
author/s. “Title of the chapter”. In title of the
book. Editor name, place of publication: name of
publisher.
Example:
Dolnik, Adam. 2007. “Suicide terrorism
and Southeast Asia.” In A handbook of
terrorism and insurgency in Southeast
Asia. Tan, Andrew.T.H (ed). Cheltenham,
UK and Northamtom, USA: Edward
Elgar.
c. Journal article
Last name of the author/s, first name of
the author/s. Year of publication. “Title of the
article”. Name of the journal. Volume. (Number):
Page number.
Example:
Du Bois, Cora. 1961. “The Religion of
Java by Clifford Geertz.” American
Anthropologist, New Series. 63. (3):
602-604
Sirry, Mun’im. 2013. “Fatwas and their
controversy: The case of the Council of
Indonesian Ulama.” Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies, 44(1): 100-117.
d. News paper
author/s. Year of publication. “Title of the article”.
Name of the newspaper. Date of publication.
Example:
Eryanto, Hadi. 2010. “Menyiapkan Jihad di
Aceh.” Kompas. 18 March 2010.
e. Internet
author/s. Year of publication. “Title of the article
or writing”. Date of access. Web address
Example:
Suhendi, Adi. 2012. “Dana Osama bin Laden
dipakai untuk bom Bali 1” (Osama
bin Laden’s fund was used for Bali
Bomb 1). Accessed August, 20, 2014
from:
http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2012/03/26/14001755/Dana.
Osama.bin.Laden.Dipakai.untuk.Bom.
Bali.I
f. Unpublished thesis/dissertation
author/s. Year of publication. Title of the thesis/
dissertation. Name of the university.
Example:
Muhtada, D. 2005. Zakat and Peasant
Empowerment: Case Study on Zakat
Organizations in Yogyakarta. Yogyakarta:
318-11
Unpublished Master thesis for graduate
school of social work at State Islamic
University Sunan Kalijaga.
g. Article/paper
presented
at
seminar/
conference
author/s. Year of publication. “Title of the paper.”
Article presented at seminar/conference, host
of the seminar, place of the seminar, date of the
seminar.
Example:
Anwar, K. 2007. “Mengungkap Sisi Akidah
dalam Naskah Syair Kiyamat.” Paper
318-12
presented at a seminar on text of religions,
hosted by Office of Religious Research
and Development Ministry of Religious
Affairs Republic Indonesia. Jakarta, 30
November 2007-03 December 2007.
9. Transliteration system
Transliteration Arab-Latin system refers to
SKB Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry
of Education and Culture Republic of Indonesia
Number 158 year 1987 and 0543/b/u/1987
Indeks/ Index
318-13

Analisa - Balai Litbang Agama Semarang

Transcription

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