Betriebliche Informationssysteme –

Transcription

Strategy
Strategy
An Information Systems (IS) Framework
Betriebliche
Informationssysteme –
Strategie, Anwendungen,
Integrationstechnologien, Management
Vorlesung im Rahmen der
Allgemeinen Wirtschaftsinformatik (AWI)
Hauptstudium
WS03/04
Prof. Dr. Detlef Schoder
Betriebliche Informationssysteme WS 03/04
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Strategy
2
Strategy
IS
Information systems perform three vital roles in business firms.
They support:
¾ Business processes and operations
¾ Business decision making
¾ Strategic competitive advantage
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4
Strategy
Strategy
Information Systems (IS)
References (must read)
1. Strategy
Ward, J.; Peppard, J. (2002): Strategic Planning for Information
Systems, 3rd ed., Wiley Series in Information Systems, John
Wiley&Sons, Chapter 1
1.1.
The Evolving Role of Information Systems and Technology in
Organizations: A Strategic Perspective
1.2.
Implications for Management and Strategic Planning
1.3.
Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage with IT/IS
1.4.
Strategy Tools and Techniques
1.5.
Cases
Clarke, Roger (1994): The Path of Development of
Strategic Information Systems Theory,
Online:
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/SOS/StratISTh.html
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Strategy
1.1. The Evolving Role of Information Systems and
Technology in Organizations: A Strategic Perspective
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Strategy
Information Technology (IT) – Definition
Information Technology (IT)
¾ IT refers specifically to technology, essentially hardware, software and
telecommunications networks. It is thus both tangible (e.g. with servers,
PCs, routers and network cables) and intangible (e.g. with software of all
types). IT facilitates the acquisition, processing, storing, delivery and
sharing of information and other digital content.
¾ EU uses ICT as term (Information and Communication Technologies)
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Strategy
Informations Systems (IS) – Definition
Contemporary Approaches to IS
Informations Systems (IS)
¾ IS: the means by which people and
organizations, utilizing technology,
gather, process, store, use and
disseminate information. It is thus
concerned with the purposeful
utilization of information
technology.
¾ The domain of study of IS involves
the study of theories and practices
related to the social and
technological phenomena, which
determine the development, use
and effects of information systems
in organizations and society.
Strategy
Technical
Approaches
ORGANIZATIONS
Computer
Science
TECHNOLOGY
Management
Science
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
Operations
Research
IS
Psychology
Sociology
Economics
MANAGEMENT
Behavioral
Approaches
Source: The UK Academy of Information
Systems (UKAIS)
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Strategy
Application - Definition
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Strategy
Early Views and Models of IS/IT in Organizations
Application
¾ An application refers to the use of IT to address a
business activity or process. There are essentially two
types of application:
• general uses of IT hardware and software to carry
out particular tasks such as word processing,
electronic mail or preparing presentation materials;
• uses of technology to perform specific business
activities or processes such as general accounting,
production scheduling or order processing.
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12
Strategy
Typical planning, control and operational systems
Anthony 1965
The Widening Scope of Information Systems
1950-1960
1960-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
1990-2000
Data
Processing
Management
Reporting
Decision
Support
Strategic &
End User
Electronic
Commerce
Electronic
Electronic
Data
Data
Processing
Processing
- -TPS
TPS
Early
Early
Management
Management
Information
Information
Systems
Systems
Decision
Decision
Support
Support
Systems
Systems
- -Ad
Adhoc
hoc
Reports
Reports
End
EndUser
User
Computing
Computing
Exec
ExecInfo
InfoSys
Sys
Expert
ExpertSystems
Systems
SIS
SIS
Strategy
Electronic
Electronic
Business
Business&&
Commerce
Commerce
-Internetworked
-Internetworked
E-Business
E-Business&&
Commerce
Commerce
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p. 9
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Strategy
Transition between computer and information
management: relationships and emphases
Strategy
From the data processing (DP) era (1960s) towards the
management information systems (MIS) era (1970s onwards)
Traditional, mainly operational and control, systems were
essentially of two types:
¾ Monitoring — transaction handling and control;
¾ Exception — triggered reporting and/or action.
• Although these provide management with information, they are
primarily focused on the processing of data.
At about the same time, ‘office automation’ systems provided
new means of processing and communicating information.These
advancements permitted two new functions to be added to the
repertoire of IS/IT:
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p. 12;
partly derived from EDP Analyser—‘How
the management job is changing’, June
1984, Vol. 22, No. 6
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¾ Enquiry —flexible access to data and information initiated by user
¾ Request analysis — decision support, with flexible processing of data
and information.
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Strategy
Summary and Lessons from DP and MIS eras
DP lessons
Towards the third era
Unfortunately, two factors served to confuse the progress in evolutionary terms that
even the best-managed companies were achieving:
Need to understand the process of developing complete information systems,
not just the programs to process data.
1. How was the large new investment required in hardware and
software—many hundreds of workstations, networking costs and
multiple licences for software packages—to be justified?
More thorough requirements and data analysis to improve systems linkages
and a more engineered approach to designing system components.
¾ The rationale for investment had reverted, in many cases, from ‘business pull’ to ‘technology
push’.
¾ Should the role of the IT unit be extended or should such systems be the responsibility of
users?
¾ Were the new office systems an extension to a department level of personal computing or an integral part
of the organization’s information processing ability and resources?
¾ How did the management of personal computing and office systems relate?
As the new ‘strategic’ potential of IS/IT began to be appreciated in the mid-1980s, most
organizations were still wrestling with the problems of managing concurrent DP and
MIS applications based on rapidly evolving technology.
More appropriate justification of investments by assessing the economics of
efficiency gains and converting these to a return on investment.
Less creative, more structured approaches to programming, testing and
documentation to reduce the problems of future amendments.
2. How should the new applications and supporting technology be
managed and, even more critically, who should be responsible?
Strategy
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Extended project management that recognized the need for coordination of
both user and DP functions and the particular need to establish user
management in a decisive role in the systems development—the user had to
live with the consequences.
The need for planning the interrelated set of systems required by the
organization. Better planning produced overall improvements in systems
relevance and productivity.
Strategy
Summary and Lessons from DP and MIS eras
MIS lessons
Databases require large restructuring projects and heavy user involvement in
data definition—data integration had been weak based on the project by
project DP approach.
The IS resource needs to move from a production to a service orientation to
enable users to obtain their own information from the data resource—the
information centre concept.
Need for organizational policies, not just DP methodologies.
Personal computers and office systems enable better MIS to be developed,
provided that users and IS specialists both focus on the information needs
rather than the technology.
Strategy
The Strategic Information Systems Era
Justification of IS investments is not entirely a matter of return on
investment/financial analysis.
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During the late 1970s, a number of organizations had began to
use IS/IT in ways that fundamentally changed how their
business was conducted, changing the balance of power in
their industry with respect to competitors, customers and/or
suppliers.
The use of IS/IT was thus directly influencing their competitive
position and had become a new weapon to improve their
competitiveness, implying a new relationship between IS/ IT
investment and strategic development.
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Strategy
Trends in the evolution of business IS/IT
The three-era model
Strategy
Trends in the evolution of business IS/IT
The three-era model
(1/2)
(2/2)
The prime objective of using IS/IT in the eras differs:
¾ data processing to improve operational efficiency by automating
information-based processes;
¾ management information systems to increase management
effectiveness by satisfying their information requirements for decision
making;
¾ strategic information systems to improve competitiveness by changing
the nature or conduct of business (i.e. IS/IT investments can be a source
of competitive advantage).
Source:
Ward/Peppard, 3rd
ed., p. 24; adapted
from R.D.
Galliers and E.
Somogyi, ‘From data
processing to
strategic information
systems:
A historical
perspective’, in R.D.
Galliers and E.
Somogyi, eds,
Towards Strategic
Information Systems,
Abacus Press, 1987
The objectives of DP and MIS are, strictly speaking, a subset of
the SIS objective—to improve competitiveness.
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Strategy
Strategic Uses of IS/IT: Classification, and Management
Implications, Factors for Success
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Strategy
Classification of Strategic Systems 1/4 (Ward/Peppard)
The four main types of strategic system appear to be, those that
1. share information via technology-based systems with customers/
consumers and/or suppliers and change the nature of the relationship;
2. produce more effective integration of the use of information in the
organization’s value-adding processes;
3. enable the organization to develop, produce, market and deliver new or
enhanced products or services based on information;
4. provide executive management with information to support the
development and implementation of strategy (in particular, where relevant
external and internal information are integrated in analysis).
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Strategy
Classification of Strategic Systems 2/4 (Notowidigdo)

internal systems that have direct benefit for the company;

external systems that have direct benefits for the company’s
customers.
Strategy
Classification of Strategic Systems 3/4 (Venkatraman)
Venkatraman described three types of ‘revolutionary’ uses of IT, which require
considerable transformation in terms of what the organization does or how it
does it:
1. business process redesign—using IS/IT to realign business activities and
their relationships to achieve performance breakthroughs;
2. business network redesign—changing the way information is used by the
organization and its trading partners, thereby changing how the industry
overall carries out the value-adding processes;
3. business scope redefinition—extending the market or product set, based
on information or changing the role of the organization inthe industry.
1.-3. called revolutionary levels within Scott Morton‘s framework
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Strategy
Classification of Strategic Systems 4/4 (Scott Morton)
Strategy
Scott Morton's Five Levels of IT-Induced Reconfiguration
Scott Morton proposes five levels of complexity at which reconfiguration can be
applied.
High
evolutionary levels
¾ localised exploitation within individual business functions. The primary
objectives addressed are local efficiency and effectiveness;
¾ internal integration between different systems and applications,
generally involving not just automation, but also rationalisation, and using
a common IT platform. Efficiency and effectiveness are enhanced by
coordination and cooperation within the enterprise.
Plus
Business Scope Redefinition
Revolutionary
Levels
(Transformate)
Business Network Redesign
Business Process Redesign
Internal Integration
Evolutionary
Levels
(Automate & Informate)
Localised Exploitation
Low
revolutionary levels (3 levels as introduced before)
Low
High
Range of potential benefits
(Scott Morton 1991)
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Strategy
Summarizing:
The changing role of IS/IT
Strategy
1.2 Implications for Management and Strategic Planning
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd
ed., p. 34
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30
Strategy
The relationship between the business, SIS, MIS and DP
Strategy
The relationship between business, IS, and IT strategies
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd
ed., p. 39
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Source: Ward/Peppard,
3rd ed., p. 41
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Strategy
Applications portfolio
Strategy
Applications portfolio, explained
Strategic applications that are critical to future business success. They
create or support change in how the organization conducts its business, with
the aim of providing competitive advantage. Note that whether the technology
used is ‘leading edge’ does not indicate that the application is strategic—
assessment must be based on business contribution.
Key operational applications that sustain the existing business operations,
helping to avoid any disadvantage. It can be argued that, in many industries,
substantial numbers of applications (e.g. EPOS [electronic point of sale], ATMs
[automated teller machines] and ERP) have become so pervasive that they
have become ‘mandatory’ for survival in the industry.
Support applications which improve business efficiency and management
effectiveness but, in themselves, do not sustain the business or provide any
competitive advantage.
High potential innovative applications which may create opportunities to
gain a future advantage, but are as yet unproven.
3rd ed., p. 41
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Strategy
What is an IS/IT Strategy?
(1/2)
¾ an IS component and an IT component.
¾ The IS strategy defines the organization’s requirement or ‘demand’ for
information and systems to support the overall strategy of the business. It
is firmly grounded in the business, taking into consideration both the
competitive impact and alignment requirements of IS/IT. Essentially, it
defines and prioritizes the investments required to achieve the ‘ideal’
applications portfolio, the nature of the benefits expected and the
changes required to deliver those benefits, within the constraints of
resources and systems interdependencies.
Strategy
What is an IS/IT Strategy?
Essentially, an IS/IT strategy is composed of two parts:
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(2/2)
¾ The IT strategy is concerned with outlining the vision of how the
organization’s demand for information and systems will be supported by
technology—essentially, it is concerned with ‘IT supply’. It addresses the
provision of IT capabilities and resources (including hardware, software
and telecommunications) and services such as IT operations, systems
development and user support.
In short:
¾
IS demand refers to the IS strategy
¾ Similarly, IT supply refers to IT strategy
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Strategy
Why Have an IS/IT Strategy?
Or: Consequences of not having an IS/IT Strategy
(1/2)
Systems investments are made that do not support business
objectives.
Systems are not integrated. This can also lead to duplication of
effort and data leading to inaccuracy and no coherent
information resource.
Strategy
Why Have an IS/IT Strategy?
Or: Consequences of not having a IS/IT Strategy
(2/2)
Misunderstanding between users and IT specialists leading to
conflict and dissatisfaction.
Technology strategy is incoherent and constrains options.
Inadequate infrastructure investments made.
All projects evaluated on financial basis only.
No means of setting priorities for IS projects/resources and
constantly changing plans leading to lower productivity, etc.
Problems caused by IS/IT investments can become a source of
conflict between parts of the organization.
No mechanisms for deciding optimum resource levels or the best
means of supplying systems.
Localized justification of investments can produce benefits that
are actually counterproductive in the overall business context.
Poor management information; it is either not available,
inconsistent, inaccurate or too slow.
Systems, on average, have a shorter than expected business life
and require, overall, considerably greater IS/IT spending to
redevelop more frequently than should be necessary.
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Strategy
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Strategy
Environments of IS/IT strategy, INTERNAL perspective
Framework by SULLIVAN
(1/3)
The Context for IS/IT Strategy
simple matrix to explain how the IS/IT strategic environment is
being affected by forces outside the control of any individual
organization. He describes two axes within which an organization
Two perpectives
¾ internal perspective
• focusing on the role of IS/IT in the organization
¾ external perspective
• exploring the overall dynamics of IS/IT
can consider the implications of these forces:
¾ Infusion:
the degree to which an organization becomes dependent on IS/IT to carry
out its core operations and manage the business;
¾ Diffusion:
the degree to which IT has become dispersed throughout the organization
and decisions concerning its use are devolved.
→ By plotting high and low degrees of infusion and diffusion,
four essentially different environments are established.
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Strategy
Framework by SULLIVAN
(2/3)
Strategy
Framework by SULLIVAN, explained
(3/3)
Low diffusion/low infusion—
Conflict:
While moving towards „complex“
situations (with their more
decentralized control) a more
centralized approach for IS/IT
planning and management makes
sense.
¾ highly-centralized control of IT resources, and IS is not critical to the business. This, Sullivan
describes as a ‘traditional’ environment typical of companies using IT solely to improve
efficiency on a system-by-system basis.
Low diffusion/high infusion—
¾ highly-centralized control, and IS is critical to business operations and control. The business
could be seriously disadvantaged if systems fail. Therefore, high-quality systems are needed
with, normally, a high degree of integration. The systems have become part of the
‘backbone’ of the organization, in Sullivan’s terms.
High diffusion/low infusion—
¾ largely-decentralized control, giving business managers the ability to satisfy their local
priorities. Any integration of systems occurs due to user–user cooperation (a ‘federation’ of
interests), not by overall business or IT design. The management approach is essentially
‘opportunistic’, driven by short-term priorities that may create business advantage in some
areas.
High diffusion/high infusion—
¾ largely-decentralized control but the business depends on the systems for success, both in
avoiding disadvantage and in achieving its overall business objectives. Sullivan describes this
as a ‘complex’ environment that is difficult to manage. Too much central control to avoid
poor investments will limit innovation, hence new strategic opportunities may be missed; too
little control and the core systems may disintegrate.
3rd ed., p. 49
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Strategy
Environments of IS/IT strategy, EXTERNAL perspective
The duality of IT
(2/3)
42
Strategy
The duality of IT
(1/3)
The duality of technology:
¾ it not only supports the strategy of an organization
(arrow a—strategic alignment) but can also
¾ define the business, as strategic moves may not be possible without
technology (arrow b—competitive impact).
For example, organizations such as
¾ ebay, eSteel and Covisint
all deploy business models that are fundamentally defined by technology.
Technology also facilitates new ways of organizing new process
innovations and can enable the creation of innovative ‘network-based
businesses’.
3rd ed., p. 51
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44
Strategy
The duality of IT
(3/3)
Strategy
1.3.
Creating and Sustaining
Competitive Advantage with IT/IS
However, an organization does not exist in isolation (unless it
occupies a monopoly position), but has competitors and is part of
a wider industry system and business environment.
¾ Competitors’ moves, including new entrants, affect the dynamics of an
industry and, consequently, the organization itself and its strategies
(arrow c);
¾ at the same time, strategic plays made by the organization effect
competitor moves (arrow d).
¾ Technological innovations can have disruptive effects on an industry
(arrow e), rewriting the rules of competition and even challenging
traditional notions of industry structure.
45
Strategy
Strategy
How do we define and achieve competitive advantage?
Two Major Schools of Thought
Competitive advantage means:
The strategic “positioning” school of strategy
¾ “Being able to earn a ROI (return on investment) that is persistently
above the average for a given industry.”
(not just a temporary advantage or high ROI)
¾ Associated with Michael Porter
¾ Select the right “position” in an “attractive” industry
Crowston & Treacy, “Assessing the Impact of IT on Enterprise Level Performance”
1986.
How do firms achieve competitive advantage?
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The Resource Based View of the Firm (RBVF)
¾ Originated with economist Edith Penrose; developed by strategy
professors Jay Barney; Dierickx & Cool
¾ Recently popularized by Hamel & Prahalad, Competing for Time (1990) but
re-named “core competencies”
¾ Develop and exploit your unique capabilities
48
Strategy
Strategy
Porter’s “Five Forces Model”
(as applied to discount retail industry)
Why is Michael Porter important?
First strategy writer to analyze why information and IT can be
critical to competitive advantage
¾ Competitive Strategy, 1980
¾ Competitive Advantage, 1985
What contributions is Porter best known for?
¾ Five forces model
• What makes an industry “attractive” to compete in?
¾ 2 x 2 matrix of core strategies
• What are possible strategies for achieving advantage?
¾ The value chain
• How can we analyze the core activities that firms perform?
49
Strategy
Strategy
Strategic Implications of
Five Forces Analysis
What are possible strategies that may lead to
competitive advantage?
(1/2)
A given industry is unattractive when:
Competitive Strategies (Porter, 1985)
¾
¾
¾
¾
Rivalry is strong
Barriers to entry are low
Competition from substitutes is strong
Suppliers and customers have strong bargaining power (relative to you)
A given industry is ideal when:
¾
¾
¾
¾
Rivalry is moderate
Barriers to entry are high
Good substitutes don’t exist
Suppliers and customers are in a weak bargaining position (relative to
you)
¾ Cost leadership
¾ Differentiation
¾ Focus
Competitive Advantage
Competitive Scope
or
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50
Lower Cost
Broad
Target
Narrow
Target
Differentiation
Cost
Leadership
Differentiation
Cost
Focus
Differentiation
Focus
52
Strategy
What are possible strategies that may lead to
competitive advantage?
(2/2)
How Can You Deploy IT to Create a Competitive
Advantage?
Additional competitive strategies
Identify novel uses of IT that are consistent with and support
your strategy
¾ growth
• increasing market share, acquiring more customers or selling more
products.
¾ improved internal efficiency
¾ alliances
• working with business partners to create synergy & provide
opportunities for growth
¾ innovation
• developing new products and services
¾ customer relationship management
• customer-oriented approaches
¾ time
• competing on the basis of time
Strategy
These novel uses of IT may:
¾ Reinforce your cost leadership position
¾ Allow you to provide product/service differentiation to your customers (or
suppliers)
Strive to “lock-in” your customers (or buyers) through such
innovative uses of IT
¾ What factors can enhance customer “lock-in”?
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Strategy
54
Strategy
Is Such a Competitive Advantage Really “Sustainable”?
What happens to innovative IT solutions?
¾ ..
¾ ..
Which is better: “first-mover advantage” or “second-mover
advantage”?
Example: Mass
Customized
Jeans may lead
to lock-in.
Does customer “lock-in” really work?
¾ Why or when?
¾ ..
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56
Strategy
Strategy
… But Remember, We Said There Are Two Major Schools of
Thought
What Do RBVF Strategists Say?
1. The strategic “positioning” school of strategy
Innovative IT solutions are copied or imitated
¾ Associated with Michael Porter
¾ Select the right “position” in an “attractive” industry
¾ Most IT applications are imitable
¾ Some exceptions exist when IT can’t be imitated
Unless the capabilities to create the innovative IT solution are
unique and immobile, then second-movers may:
2. The Resource Based View of the Firm (RBVF)
¾ Originated with economist Edith Penrose; developed by strategy
professors Jay Barney; Dietricx & Cool
¾ Popularized by Hamel & Prahalad, Competing for Time (1990) but
re-named “core competencies”
¾ Develop and exploit your unique capabilities
¾ copy your great ideas more cheaply
¾ learn from your mistakes
Customer “lock-in” does not really work
¾ Customers are too smart and will avoid becoming over-committed to you
¾ ..
57
Strategy
Resource Based View of the Firm and Sustainable
Competitive Advantage
All three criteria must be present for a firm to have a sustainable
competitive advantage
1. It adds positive value to the firm
If only two of the criteria are present (1 and 2), then a firm has
a temporary competitive advantage
rather than a liability – e.g., outmoded factories or employees
Dorothy Leonard-Barton, “Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities”
¾ if the resource is not immobile
¾ what is an example of such a resource?
2. Not all firms possess it to the same extent
•
it is “heterogeneously distributed across firms”
If only one of the criteria is present (1), then a firm only has
competitive parity
3. It cannot be easily imitated, acquired, or stolen
•
•
it is immobile or at least “imperfectly mobile ”
this means that other firms are at a cost disadvantage if they try to
acquire, imitate, or internally develop the same resource
Strategy
When is Competitive Advantage Sustainable or Temporary?
A resource (asset) is valuable to the firm when:
•
•
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¾ if the resource is equally distributed across firms
¾ if the resource is not immobile
¾ what is an example of such a resource?
60
Strategy
Which of these are sources of sustained competitive
advantage for a firm? Why?
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
Strategy
Achieving a Competitive Advantage
Customer lock-in
Access to financial capital
Proprietary technology (patents, copyrights, etc.)
Technical IT skills (e.g., software developers)
Managerial IT skills
• (e.g., IT managers, business unit managers, the ability to collaborate
in order to identify and deploy effective IT)
Strategy
IT Role
Improving
Business
Process
reduce costs
of doing
business
(1/2)
Promote
Business
Innovation
create new
products or
services
Locking in
Customers
and Suppliers
•improve quality
•link business to
customers and
suppliers
Why do the authors argue that many of these resources can’t
create sustainable advantage?
» IT and Sustained Competitive Advantage: A Resource Based Analysis,”
MIS Quarterly 1995
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Outcome
Enhance
Efficiency
Create New
Business
Opportunities
Maintain Valuable
Customers and
Relationships
Strategy
Achieving a Competitive Advantage
Strategy
IT Role
Outcome
Raise
Barriers
to Entry
Increase
amount of
investment or
complexity of IT
needed to
compete
Increase
Market Share
(2/2)
Build a
Strategic IT
Platform
Leverage
investment in IS
resources from
operational
uses to
strategic uses
Create New
Business
Opportunities
Strategy
A brief critique
Build a
Strategic
Information Base
Use IT to provide
information to
support firm’s
competitive
strategy
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(1/3)
A particularly surprising weakness of the existing literature is its
inapplicability to organisations which are not subject to
powerful market-based competitive forces, such as notfor-profit enterprises, public sector agencies, and
associations which are intentionally monopolistic, including
industry and professional associations. This is so marked that
some definitions of the term 'strategic IS' are restricted to
systems that "confer a unique, sustainable, or otherwise
significant advantage" (Ciborra 1991).
Enhance
Organizational
Collaboration
Source: Clarke, R. (1994)
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64
Strategy
A brief critique
(2/3)
Strategy
A brief critique
It is contended that, even in corporations operating in free-market economies,
organisational strategy should not be analysed exclusively in competitive terms. Other
possible bases include:

short-term survival (which is essentially concerned with being around long enough to
be able to compete at all);

medium-term survival (which is concerned with the establishment or re-establishment
of a platform or infrastructure on which recovery from current difficulties can be
based);

service ("our clients need it");

the marketing imperative ("our customers want it");

the regulatory imperative ("if we don't do it, we'll be precluded from participating by
some powerful legal or political authority");

corporate infrastructure (which is concerned with investing in an environment which
will support future adaptability, and the conception and implementation of as yet
unspecified - and probably unspecifiable - future strategic advantage); and

the national strategic imperative ("the government has determined that it is essential
to the nation's competitiveness"). This is apparent as an important factor in such
countries as Japan and Singapore, and is the subject of Porter (1989).
(3/3)
A further common feature of most papers to date is the implicit
assumption that business needs drive IT and information
strategy. There is evidence, however, that, in some
organisations, IT strategic planning is driving corporate planning,
and that IT can actively assist in the creation of business
opportunities, rather than just support them (Oesterle 1991).
(see also slides in this deck: The duality of IT)
Source: Clarke, R. (1994)
65
Strategy
A Strategic Framework
3rd ed., p.71
66
Strategy
1.4 Strategy Tools and Techniques
Ward, J.; Peppard, J. (2003): Strategic Planning for Information
Systems, 3rd ed., Wiley Series in Information Systems, John
Wiley&Sons, Chapter 2
Good overview:
Clarke, Roger (1994): The Path of Development of
Strategic Information Systems Theory,
Online:
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/SOS/StratISTh.html
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68
Methods for deriving Strategy
inputs to the strategic
planning approach
Strategy
Strategic IS/IT Planning Process –
Inputs & Outputs
External business
environment
I
N
P
U
T
S
Current
applications
portfolio
Internal IS / IT
environment
Internal business
environment
External IS / IT
environment
Strategic
IS / IT
planning
process
O
U
T
P
U
T
S
IS management
strategy
Planning, approaches,
tools & techniques
Business
IS strategy
Applications
portfolio
IT strategy
References to
Chapters in
Ward/Peppard
Models &
matrices
3rd ed., p.250
Adapted from: Ward et al Figure 3.8
69
Strategy
Strategy
Industry and product life cycles —
information and systems focus
Methods and Frameworks
70
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p.71; derived
from an analysis in J.M. Higgins, Strategy
Formulation, Implementation and Control,
Dryden Press, New York, 1985, pp. 130–135
Portfolio and Planning Matrices based on life-cycle approach
(BCG)
Value chain (Porter 1980, 1985)
Information intensity matrix (Porter and Millar 1985)
Earl’s procedure for generating competitive strategies (Earl 1987,
based on Porter and Wiseman)
Customer resource lifecycle model (Ives and Learmonth 1984)
…
71
72
Strategy
Product portfolio (Boston Consulting Group Matrix)
Strategy
Policy/ Portfolio Matrices
3rd ed., p.89
73
3rd ed., p.91
Strategy
74
Strategy
Value Chain and IS, examples (specific to Airline industry)
Identifies uses of IT for each element of the value chain
Value Chain and IS, examples (generic)
Source: Porter 2001
75
76
Strategy
The airline industry: how IS/IT has affected competitive
forces
(1/2)
Strategy
The airline industry: how IS/IT has affected competitive
forces
(2/2)
77
Strategy
Strategy
Earl’s Procedure for Generating Competitive Strategies
(based on Porter and Wiseman) Earl (1987)
Information intensity matrix (Porter and Millar 1985)
78
79
80
Strategy
Customer Resource Life Cycle Framework (Ives and
Learmouth, 1984)
Strategic option generator — sample questions

1. Suppliers—Can we use IS/IT to:
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾

T he C ustomer's R esource Life C ycle M odel
Gain leverage over our suppliers (improving our bargaining power or reducing theirs)?
Reduce buying costs?
Be a better customer and obtain a better service?
Identify alternative sources of supply?
Improve the quality of products/services purchased?
2. Customers—Can we use IS/IT to:
¾
¾
¾
¾

Strategy
Increase our customers’ switching costs (to alternative suppliers)?
Increase our customers’ knowledge of our products/services?
Improve support/service to customers and their needs?
Identify new potential customers?
3. Rivals/Competitors—Can we use IS/IT to:
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
Raise the entry cost of potential competitors?
Differentiate (or create new) products/services?
Reduce our costs/Increase competitors’ costs?
Alter the channels of distribution?
Identify/Establish a new market niche?
Form joint ventures to enter new markets?
E xte nd e d M od el
D e scription
1. Set Requirem ents
How m uch of the resource is required?
2. Specify
What are the resources' attributes?
3. Select Source
Where will we buy it from ?
4. Order
Order a quantity from the supplier.
5. Authorize
Authorize m onies to be spent.
6. Acquire
Take possession of the resource.
7. Test and Accept
Ensure it m eets specifications.
8. Integrate
Add to existing inventory.
9. M onitor
Control access and use of the resource
10. Upgrade
Upgrade resource if conditions change
11. M aintain
Repair resource if necessary.
12. Transfer or Dispose
M ove, return, or dispose of the inventory
as necessary.
13. Account For and Pay For
M onitor where and how m uch m oney is
spent on the resource.
Fro m: Ive s, B. and Learmonth, G. "The Information Sy ste m a s a Co mpetitive Weapon",
Co mmunications of the ACM , Dece mber 1984, page 25.
81
Strategy
Strategy
1.5. Cases in Strategic Information Systems
Success Factors in Strategic Information Systems
Success Factors in Strategic Information Systems
External, not internal, focus
Cases
Adding value, not cost reduction
¾ ECONOMOST, McKesson Drugs
¾ SABRE, American Airlines
¾ MAC vs. GEORGE
82
Sharing the benefits
Understanding customers
Business-driven innovation, not technology-driven
Incremental development
¾ Vgl. Ward/ Peppard, 2002, 3rd ed., pp. 28
Merrill Lynch, American Hospital Supply, Otis Elevators, Schneider
National, Inc., Amazon.com, Bootsphoto.com, Leather Xchange.com,
Ryanair, ATC Bologna, …
Using the information gained
See cases!
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84
Strategy
Strategy
Fallstudie 1: ECONOMOST - das automatisierte
Bestellsystem von McKesson Drugs
(1/3)
1.5. Cases Strategic Information Systems
Fallstudie 1: ECONOMOST - das automatisierte Bestellsystem von McKesson
Drugs
¾ Literatur: Clemons/Row, 1988; Clemons, 1991; Segars/Grover, 1993; Kettinger et
al., 1994

Fallstudie 1: ECONOMOST - das automatisierte Bestellsystem von McKesson Drugs
Literatur: Clemons/Row, 1988; Clemons, 1991; Segars/Grover, 1993; Kettinger et al., 1994
Im Jahr 1975 führte der amerikanische Pharma-Großhändler McKesson Drugs das elektronische Bestellsystem ECONOMOST landesweit ein, nachdem das System bereits
einige Jahre in Teilen Kaliforniens eingesetzt wurde. McKesson ist ein Großhändler, der vor allem kleine Apotheken beliefert. Mit ECONOMOST wird das Bestellwesen für
diesen Kundenkreis wesentlich vereinfacht. McKesson stellt dem Abnehmer einen Strichcode-Leser oder ein tragbares Datenerfassungsgerät zur Verfügung, mit dem bei
einem Rundgang durch das Lager die Bestellnummern der benötigten Artikel erfasst werden. Die Bestelldaten werden über Telefonleitung an McKesson übertragen. In der
Regel werden die Bestellungen am nächsten Tag geliefert. Bei der Zusammenstellung der Lieferung wird die Anordnung des Lagers des Kunden berücksichtigt, so dass der
Kunde die Waren der Reihe nach aus der Transportverpackung entnehmen und im Lager einordnen kann. Preisschilder und Codes für den Strichcodeleser werden von
McKesson ebenfalls mitgeliefert, außerdem erhält der Kunde auf Wunsch ausführliche Auswertungen über die einzelnen Artikel.
Das System bietet somit für die Kunden wesentliche Vorteile: die Kosten des Bestellwesens und der Lagerverwaltung deutlich reduziert, McKesson gewährt für über
ECONOMOST bestellte Artikel erhebliche Rabatte und der Kunde erhält Management-Informationen, über die Einzelhändler dieser Größe sonst nicht verfügen.
Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American Airlines
Die elektronische Form der Bestellungen bietet auch für McKesson selbst erhebliche Vorteile. Das Personal für die Aufnahme telefonischer Bestellungen wurde von 700 auf 15
reduziert. Die Abwicklung im Lager kann wesentlich schneller erfolgen, da die Bestellungen intern nach dem Aufbau des Lagers sortiert werden. Im Zeitraum 1975-1985 stieg
die Produktivität des im Lager eingesetzten Personals auf das Fünffache. Da die erforderlichen Lieferungen im System erfasst sind, kann die Transportplanung optimiert
werden, was die Transportkosten wesentlich verringert hat. Insgesamt konnte McKesson im Zeitraum von 1975 bis 1987 seinen Umsatz um 424% erhöhen, während die
Kosten nur um 86% stiegen.
¾ Literatur: Copeland/McKenney, 1988; Hopper, 1990
Bereits Mitte der 80er-Jahre war erkennbar, dass die Einführung des Systems auch wesentliche Auswirkungen auf den gesamten Markt hatte. Zum Zeitpunkt der Einführung
des Systems befanden sich die kleinen unabhängigen Apotheken in intensivem Wettbewerb mit großen Ketten. Die großen Ketten hatten gegenüber den kleinen Apotheken
erhebliche Kostenvorteile. Zum Teil bezogen die Ketten ihre Waren unter Umgehung der Großhändler direkt von den Produzenten, aber auch gegenüber den Großhändlern
erzielten sie auf Grund ihrer Marktmacht günstigere Preise. Darüber hinaus hatten die großen Ketten auch Effizienzvorteile durch die zentralisierte Abwicklung und
qualifiziertes Management.
Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in Philadelphia
Diese Vorteile konnten die kleinen Apotheken durch die Nutzung von ECONOMOST weitgehend kompensieren. Die kleinen Apotheken verloren zwar weiter Marktanteile, aber
weitaus weniger, als dies Mitte der 70er-Jahre prognostiziert wurde. Für McKesson (und die anderen Pharma-Großhändler) blieb damit ein wichtiger Kundenkreis erhalten.
Darüber hinaus erwies sich die elektronische Bestellung beim Großhändler auch für die großen Ketten als attraktiv, so dass der Anteil an Waren, die direkt beim Produzenten
gekauft wurden, insgesamt zurückging.
¾ Literatur: Clemons, 1990
Die Struktur des Großhandels hat sich in den Jahren nach der Einführung von ECONOMOST jedoch drastisch verändert. Die Zahl der Großhändler sank in zehn Jahren auf die
Hälfte, der Marktanteil der fünf größten Händler stieg in der gleichen Zeit von 40 auf 65%. Gleichzeitig sank die durchschnittliche Handelsspanne um fast ein Drittel, von
12,2% auf 8,5%.
Dementsprechend ergaben sich in der Struktur der Branche deutliche Unterschiede. Wiesen die drei führenden Unternehmen 1976 noch sehr unterschiedliche strategische
Positionen bezüglich ihrer finanziellen Struktur, der Effizienz ihrer Distribution und ihrer Marketingaktivitäten auf, waren die strategischen Positionen Mitte der 80er-Jahre sehr
ähnlich. Alle führenden Unternehmen wiesen hohe Effizienz in der Produktion und einen beträchtlichen Anteil an Fremdfinanzierung auf.
Vgl. Ward/ Peppard, 2002, 3rd ed., pp. 28
¾ Merrill Lynch, American Hospital Supply, Otis Elevators, Schneider National, Inc.,
Amazon.com, Bootsphoto.com, Leather Xchange.com, Ryanair, ATC Bologna, …
McKesson selbst hat aus der Entwicklung von ECONOMOST jedoch keine nachhaltigen Wettbewerbsvorteile gegenüber seinen unmittelbaren Konkurrenten gezogen. Der
Marktanteil stieg zwar von 20% auf 27%, diese Erhöhung ist aber auf den Aufkauf eines früheren Konkurrenten zurückzuführen, die 27% entsprechen weitgehend der
Summe der früheren Marktanteile der beiden Unternehmen. Dies ist nicht zuletzt darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Konkurrenten auf die Einführung von ECONOMOST bald mit
der Entwicklung ähnlicher Systeme antworteten. Die Umstellung zwischen den einzelnen Systemen, wenn eine Apotheke von einem Großhändler zu einem anderen wechselt,
kann in einem Tag durchgeführt werden. Die meisten Großhändler bieten für den Wechsel zu ihrem System Unterstützungen und übernehmen auch die anfallenden Kosten.
Quelle: Vetschera 2000
85
Strategy
(2/3)
Strategy
(3/3)
Vorteile Kunden
¾ Kostenreduktion der
Lagerverwaltung
¾ Rabatte
¾ Zusätzliche Management-Information
86
87
Vorteile McKesson
¾ Bestelldaten elektronisch verfügbar
¾ geringerer Personalaufwand bei der
Bestellannahme
¾ Optimierung interner Abläufe
¾ Optimierung Transportwesen
88
Strategy
Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American
Airlines
(1/2)

Strategy
Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American
Airlines
(2/2)
Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American Airlines
Literatur: Copeland/McKenney, 1988; Hopper, 1990
American Airlines war einer der Pioniere des Einsatzes von Informationstechnik im Luftverkehr. Bis in die 50er-Jahre wurde die Platzreservierung für Flüge
weitgehend manuell in den Abflughäfen vorgenommen. 1958 schloss American Airlines einen Vertrag mit IBM über die Entwicklung eines
computergestützten Reservierungssystems ab, das ab 1961 schrittweise realisiert wurde. Das System "Sabre" bestand aus einem Zentralrechner und
Terminals in den Verkaufsbüros von Amarican Airlines, die über Telefonleitungen mit dem Zentralrechner verbunden waren. Damit wurde es zum ersten Mal
möglich, sämtliche Daten eines Passagiers zentral zu verwalten und gleichzeitig das Platzangebot in einem Flugzeug laufend zu kontrollieren. Die
Entwicklung des ersten Systems war mit großen technischen Problemen verbunden und gelang nur unter großem finanziellen Aufwand sowohl für American
Airlines als auch für IBM. Mitte der 60er-Jahre war die technische Entwicklung weiter fortgeschritten und IBM bot ähnliche Systeme "schlüsselfertig" auch
anderen Fluggesellschaften an, da das gestiegene Aufkommen an Flugpassagieren anders gar nicht mehr bewältigt werden konnte. Die Systeme waren
jedoch auf die einzelnen Gesellschaften beschränkt und wurden von diesen nur intern in ihren eigenen Verkaufsbüros genutzt.
Anfang der 70er-Jahre gab es einige Versuche, ein gemeinsames System für alle Fluggesellschaften zu entwickeln, das auch den Reisebüros zur Verfügung
stehen sollte. Es kam jedoch zu keiner Einigung zwischen den Fluggesellschaften. Ende 1975 kündigte United Airlines an, sich nicht an den gemeinsamen
Projekten zu beteiligen, sondern ihr eigenes Buchungssystem Apollo im Laufe des Jahres 1976 auch für Reisebüros zu öffnen. Darauf hin bot American
Airlines bereits Anfang 1976 ihr System Sabre ebenfalls den Reisebüros an. Die Nachfrage der Reisebüros überstieg die Erwartungen drastisch. Ursprünglich
wurde geschätzt, dass die ersten 200 Terminals in Reisebüros in zwei Jahren installiert sein würden und einen Umsatz von 3 Millionen Dollar erbringen
würden; tatsächlich wurden die ersten 200 Terminals in 11 Monaten installiert und erbrachten einen Umsatz von 20 Millionen Dollars.
Trotz dieser anfänglichen Erfolge sah sich American Airlines mit Sabre gegen Ende der 70er-Jahre erheblicher Konkurrenz durch United Airlines ausgesetzt.
United Airlines hatte zwar später damit begonnen, das Buchungssystem auch Reisebüros zur Verfügung zu stellen, hatte jedoch ein größeres Streckennetz,
so dass die Reisebüros das System von United Airlines bevorzugten. American Airlines begann daraufhin, das System auch für andere Fluggesellschaften zu
öffnen und deren Flüge ebenfalls über Sabre anzuzeigen und zu verkaufen. Zunächst wurden nur Fluggesellschaften berücksichtigt, deren Streckennetz das
von American Airlines ergänzte und die Tarife, die von diesen Fluggesellschaften für die Mitbenutzung von Sabre verlangt wurden, richteten sich nach dem
strategischen Interesse von American Airlines. Durch Gerichtsbeschluss wurden die Fluggesellschaften Anfang der 80er-Jahre jedoch gezwungen, ihre
Buchungssysteme auch konkurrierenden Gesellschaften zu öffnen und von allen Gesellschaften einheitliche Tarife zu verlangen. Außerdem wurde die
Bevorzugung der eigenen Gesellschaft, etwa in der Reihenfolge der angezeigten Flüge, verboten.
Die erzwungene einheitliche Tarifgestaltung der Buchungssysteme führte jedoch zu einem drastischen Anstieg der Einnahmen aus den Buchungsgebühren.
Vor der Vereinheitlichung wurden Buchungen für Gesellschaften, deren Streckennetz das von American Airlines ergänzte, weitgehend gratis abgewickelt;
1980 erzielte American irlines mit Sabre lediglich Einnahmen von ca. 7 Millionen $. Auf Grund der gesetzlichen Vorschriften wurde dann eine einheitliche
Buchungsgebühr von 1,75$ je Buchung verlangt, der Gewinn aus dem Betrieb von Sabre betrug 1985 bereits ca. 140 Millionen $.
Ab der zweiten Hälfte der 80er-Jahre wurde das System auch auf Leihwagen und Hotels ausgeweitet. 1996 wurde Sabre von American Airlines als
eigenständiges Unternehmen ausgegliedert, an dem American Airlines aber noch einen Anteil von über 80% hielt. Ende 1999 erfolgte die endgültige
Trennung von American Airlines. 1998 wickelte Sabre ca. 410 Millionen Buchungen ab und erzielte einen Gewinn von ca. 230 Millionen US $. 75% des
Umsatzes wurden mit Unternehmen außerhalb der American-Airlines Gruppe erzielt (1997: 70%).
89
Strategy
Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in
Philadelphia
(1/2)

90
Strategy
Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in
Philadelphia
(2/2)
Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in Philadelphia
Literatur: Clemons, 1990
1976 begann die Girard Bank in Philadelphia mit dem Aufbau ihres Netzwerkes von Geldausgabeautomaten unter dem Namen
"GEORGE". Girard war zu diesem Zeitpunkt die drittgrößte Bank in Philadelphia und war insbesondere im Privatkundenbereich
sehr stark vertreten. Der Aufbau eines Netzwerkes von Geldausgabeautomaten in Verbindung mit der bestehenden großen Zahl
von Filialen sollte diese Position weiter stärken und wurde auch intensiv beworben.
Die Philadelphia National Bank war zu dieser Zeit die zweitgrößte Bank in Philadelphia. Ihre Stärken lagen vor allem im Bereich der
Geschäftskunden, verglichen mit Girard hatte diese Bank ein weitaus kleineres Netz von Filialen. Der Aufbau und die aggresive
Vermarktung von GEORGE wurde von Philadelphia National Bank als ernste Bedrohung angesehen, da befürchtet wurde, dass sich
ein größerer Verlust von Privatkunden an die Girard Bank langfristig auch negativ auf das Geschäft mit den Firmenkunden
auswirken würde. Auf Grund der geringen Zahl von Filialen und des insgesamt geringen Privatkundengeschäfts sah die
Philadelphia National Bank jedoch keine Möglichkeit, alleine ein konkurrenzfähiges Netzwerk an Geldausgabeautomaten
aufzubauen.
Das Management von Philadelphia National beschloss daher, ein Netzwerk in Kooperation mit anderen Banken aufzubauen. Dabei
wurden zunächst zwei Strategien betrachtet:

1. Der Aufbau des Netzwerks in Form eines gemeinsamen Tochterunternehmens oder eines Konsortiums, bei dem das Netzwerk
im gemeinsamen Eigentum der beteiligten Banken steht
2. Der Aufbau eines Netzwerkes in alleinigem Eigentum von Philadelphia National und das Angebot an andere Banken, das
Netzwerk als Dienstleistung gegen Entgelt mit zu benutzen.

Auf Grund der erwarteten Schwierigkeiten beim Aufbau eines Konsortiums wurde der zweiten Strategie der Vorzug gegeben.
Philadelphia National Bank begann, ein eigenes Netzwerk aufzubauen und intensiv an andere Banken zu vermarkten. Bereits bei
Beginn des Netzwerkbetriebes 1979 nahmen 13 Banken teil. Das Netzwerk expandierte rasch und 1988 wurde das CashStreamNetzwerk der Mellon Bank, die zuvor Girard und damit das GEORGE-Netzwerk aufgekauft hatte, ebenfalls übernommen. MAC
erlangte damit eine Monopolstellung im Großraum von Philadelphia.
Inzwischen ist MAC mit 32.000 Automaten das größte Netzwerk von Geldausgabeautomaten der USA und ein Teil eines
eigenständigen Unternehmens, das im gemeinsamen Eigentum mehrerer Banken steht.
91
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Strategy
Erkenntnisse aus den Fallstudien

Strategy
Information Systems (IS)
Alle drei Fallstudien zeigen, dass Informationssysteme die Wettbewerbssituation in
einer Branche nachhaltig verändern können und somit strategische Bedeutung haben.
Die strategische Bedeutung der Informationssysteme für die einzelnen Unternehmen
ist aber sehr unterschiedlich. Economost hat zu keinen nachhaltigen
Wettbewerbsvorteilen für McKesson geführt, ein EDV-gestütztes Bestellsystem ist für
alle Unternehmen dieser Branche zu einer Notwendigkeit geworden. Allerdings hätte
sich die Situation der Branche insgesamt durch den Wegfall einer wichtigen
Kundengruppe möglicherweise ohne Einführung derartiger Systeme erheblich
verschlechtert. Sabre hat zu erheblichen Wettbewerbsvorteilen für American Airlines
geführt, diese waren allerdings so groß, dass die strategische Nutzung des Systems
durch die Wettbewerbsbehörden beschränkt wurde. MAC stellte selbst eine Reaktion
auf ein angekündigtes System eines Mitbewerbers dar und war als solche sehr
erfolgreich.
MAC ist damit auch das Einzige der drei Systeme, bei dem die strategische Bedeutung
von Anfang an klar war. Sowohl Economost als auch Sabre wurden anfänglich wohl
eher als Möglichkeiten zur Kostensenkung und Effizienzsteigerung operativer Abläufe
gesehen. Die strategischen Auswirkungen dieser Systeme wurden erst später erkannt.
1. Strategy
1.1.
The Evolving Role of Information Systems and Technology in
Organizations: A Strategic Perspective
1.2.
Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage with IT/IS
1.3.
Strategic Information Systems
1.4.
Strategy Tools and Techniques
1.5.
Cases
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94

Betriebliche Informationssysteme –

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