Bestandsaufnahme und Empfehlungen - Schleswig

Transcription

Bund/Länder-Messprogramm für die Meeresumwelt von Nord- und Ostsee
Munitionsbelastung
der deutschen Meeresgewässer
– Bestandsaufnahme und Empfehlungen
(Stand 2011)
Claus Böttcher, Tobias Knobloch, Niels-Peter Rühl,
Jens Sternheim, Uwe Wichert, Joachim Wöhler
10.4.2.5 G. Carton & A. Jagusiewicz - Historic Disposal of Munitions in
U.S. and European Coastal Waters, How Historic Information
Can be Used in Characterizing and Managing Risk
Dieser Anhang des Ergebnisberichts erscheint an dieser Stelle mit freundlicher
Genehmigung des Marine Technology Society Journal.
www.munition-im-meer.de
PAPER
Historic Disposal of Munitions in U.S.
and European Coastal Waters, How Historic
Information Can be Used in Characterizing
and Managing Risk
AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Geoffrey Carton
CALIBRE Systems, Inc.
Sea disposal of wastes from industry and government was accepted internationally as a safe and efficient practice until the 1970s. Options available for addressing excess, obsolete, and unserviceable munitions prior to the 1970s were
limited to salvage, destruction by open detonation or open burning, or burial on
land or at sea. Sea disposal of conventional and chemical munitions and other
waste material was considered appropriate until the enactment of the Convention
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter in
1972 and its 1996 Protocol prohibiting sea disposal of chemical and biological
agents. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention contains a similar ban. Seadisposed munitions pose two types of risk. These are acute—injury or death caused
by either detonation or direct exposure to chemical agents—and chronic—adverse
health impacts resulting from prolonged exposure to munition constituents. The
type and configuration of sea-disposed munitions, disposal location, water
body properties (e.g., depth, current), and its usage (e.g., commercial fishing,
recreation, pipeline construction) are factors in determining the relative risk
posed by munitions. The collection, analysis, and sharing of historical information allow more efficient investigation and management of risks from sea-disposed
munitions.
Andrzej Jagusiewicz
Chief Inspector of Environmental
Protection, Poland
1. Introduction
S
ea disposal of munitions was an
internationally accepted practice used
from at least the late 1800s through
the 1970s. Historic sea disposal of
munitions is an emotionally charged
subject of global concern because disposals have occurred in most oceans
and major seas. Sea disposal of
chemical munitions or bulk containers of chemical agents1 (referred to as
chemical warfare material (CWM))2
affects as many as 40 countries,
and many others are affected by sea
disposal of conventional munitions.
Expanding use of marine resources
1
A chemical compound that produces lethal or
other damaging effects on human beings and is
intended for use in military operations through
its physiological effects.
2
Items generally configured as a munition containing a chemical compound that is intended
to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate a person.
CWM does not include riot control devices; defoliants and herbicides; industrial chemicals not
configured as a munition; smoke and other obscuration producing items; flame and incendiary producing items; or media contaminated
with low concentrations of chemical agents
where no chemical agent hazards exist.
16
drives a need to better understand and
manage risks to human health and the
environment posed by the munitions
and released munitions constituents3.
This paper’s premise is that the aggressive investigation, collection,
analysis, and sharing of historical information increase the efficient and
effective assessment of risks and their
management.
3
Munition constituents are materials originating
from military munitions, including explosive and
non-explosive materials, and emission, degradation, or breakdown products of such munitions.
Marine Technology Society Journal
2. Terminology
A common understanding of the
terminology relating to munitions
and sea disposal is important. The
United States has codified several
terms used in dealing with munitions.
The three most important are provided
below. In the context of this paper,
“munitions” is used, rather than “military munitions,” to include the munitions of all countries.
■ “Military munitions means all ammunition products and components produced for or used by the
armed forces … including bulk
explosives, and chemical warfare
agents … and devices and components thereof.” 4
■ Unexploded ordnance (UXO) are
“military munitions that … have
been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for action; … constitute a hazard … and remain
unexploded by malfunction, design, or any other cause.”5
■
Discarded military munitions
(DMM) “are military munitions
that have been abandoned without
proper disposal or removed from
storage … for the purpose of
disposal.”6
There is an important distinction
between DMM and UXO. DMM
have not experienced the firing sequence normally required to arm
their fuzes. Many are not complete,
lacking components required for
them to function. UXO have been
through the firing sequence required
to arm their fuzes. Although both
present potential explosive hazards,
DMM in general have a significantly
lower probability of detonating than
UXO. Although this paper focuses
on DMM, it is important to recognize
that testing and training ranges that
may encumber water and areas where
combat activities occurred are likely
to contain UXO.
3. Risk
Evaluation and management of risk
can only be addressed through sound
historical research and scientific evaluation. Sea-disposed munitions pose
four principal types of risks to human
health and the environment:
■ health impacts from direct physical
contact;
4
10 U.S.C 101(e)(4)(A) through (C)
10 U.S.C 101(e)(5)(A) through (C)
6
10 U.S.C. 2710(e)(2)
5
impact to marine organisms and the
environment near the disposal site;
■ consumption of contaminated seafood; and
■ explosions either spontaneous or
during handling, which can threaten
life and spread contaminants from
disposal sites (Helsinki Commission
(HELCOM), 1994; MEDEA,
1997; Beddington and Kinloch,
2005).
Direct contact with munitions or
munition constituents may occur in
a number of ways. The effects can
be either acute or chronic, depending
on proximity to and the effects of
a detonation, constituent toxicity,
quantity released, route, and levels
of exposure. The most common
method of direct exposure is the inadvertent recovery of munitions in commercial fishing equipment. The
increase in pipeline construction in
areas with munitions present carries
the potential for encounters and recoveries. These are a concern in the
Baltic Sea where conventional and
chemical munitions were disposed in
relatively shallow water. Munitions
and munition constituents wash
ashore on the German coast on nearly
a daily basis because of the large quantities of conventional ammunition disposed in the nearby waters. Potentially
hazardous activities include dredging
and beach replenishment, underwater
mineral exploitation, and offshore construction. Recreational SCUBA divers
have the potential to contact munitions to a depth of about 40 m.
Since World War II (WWII), there
have been few reported incidents of
direct exposure encounters with seadisposed munitions in U.S. waters;
however, hundreds have occurred in
European waters. There were at least
448 incidents between 1985 and
2007 where fishermen in Danish
■
waters recovered CWMs in their nets
(HELCOM at www.helcom.fi/
environment2/hazsubs/en_GB/
chemu/). Most encounters occurred
during commercial fishing with some
resulting in injury and fatalities. Most
reported injuries are from direct
contact with chemical munitions or
chemi cal agent (e. g., solidified
mustard) entangled in nets, explosives, and white phosphorous (WP);
the latter washed ashore on beaches.
Although several of the injuries that
resulted from direct exposure to
mustard were serious, reports on sea
disposal of chemical agent in the
Baltic Sea conclude that chemical
agents pose little or no environmental
threat because of their degradation,
which varies from rapid to gradual, in
seawater (MEDEA, 1997; Theobald,
2002; Hart, 2008). This degradation
in conjunction with the risks associated with recovery is the basis for
the general consensus for leaving the
munitions in place.
The potential for food chain impacts depends on the quantities of
sea-disposed munitions, the physical
and chemical characteristics of their
munition constituents, and the rate
of release of the munition constituents
to the environment. Many munition
constituents undergo chemical and biological reactions in the environment,
degrading to less toxic compounds,
and very few appear to bioconcentrate.
Thus, food chain contamination does
not appear to constitute a significant
risk (HELCOM, 1994; Fisheries Research Service, 1996). Certain CWM
is arsenic based and there is limited information on the behavior and potential impacts of the residual arsenic in
the marine environment.
There have also been a number of
injurious and fatal accidents involving
conventional munitions (Beddington
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17
and Kinloch, 2005). Incidents are
likely to continue as use of the oceans
expands into progressively deeper
waters.
Detonations may be spontaneous
or as a result of disturbance. Spontaneous explosions are a possibility particularly when dealing with some of the
less stable compounds, such as picric
acid, used in World War I (WWI)
munitions. A review of seismic data
collected near the Beaufort’s Dyke disposal area off of the coast of the United
Kingdom between 1992 and 2004
identified 47 underwater explosions,
measuring 1.5 or greater on the
Richter scale. These explosions included 13 deliberate demolitions with
some or all of the remaining being
spontaneous explosions (Beddington
and Kinloch, 2005; British Geological
Survey, 2005). Explosive hazards are
instantaneous and can be catastrophic
under some circumstances. However,
the overall risk of spontaneous detonations is low because of the hydroscopic
nature of explosives and the moisture
present, which reduces their sensitivity
and strength of a detonation (Hart,
2008). Detonation effects are generally
localized.
Although some information on the
types and quantities of munitions and
other materials sea disposed at many
locations is available, the completeness
and accuracy of this information are
unknown. Some verification of the
historical information may be necessary to refine the evaluation of relative
risk. The risk evaluation process must
judge the quantity and quality of available data. Given the difficulty of
obtaining new data, the technical approach must rely heavily on mining
and analyzing existing or historical information (MEDEA, 1997). Factors
to be considered and data to be collected include:
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potential for human or ecological
receptors to be exposed to the munition constituents;
■
disposal information—types of
munitions, quantities, locations,
and length of exposure to the
environment;
■ condition of the munitions (e.g.,
heavily corroded) and spatial distribution on the seafloor;
■ characteristics of disposal site (e.g.,
current, depth, temperature, geology, and ecology);
■ properties of the munition constituents—mobility, toxicity, and environmental fate;
■ rate and duration of munition constituents released to the environment; and
■ current impacts, if any, to human
health and the environment.
Even incomplete historical information is useful in determining approximate locations of sea-disposal
sites, the munition types and quantities
present, and their distribution on the
seafloor. Once historical information is
collected, much of the remaining data
can be gleaned from scientific literature
and other documentation. The relative
risk posed by a specific site can then be
determined and risk management can
begin.
■
4. Reason for Disposal
and Available Options
The armed forces have always had
excess, obsolete, or unserviceable
munitions that required disposal. The
reasons are primarily a function of mission and include, but are not limited
to, an inventory that exceeds requirements, munitions designed for use
with weapon systems that became obsolete, munitions that have deteriorated and are unsafe for use or storage,
the resources associated with transport
from theater of operations, and the
capture of enemy munitions. The
two most significant periods of disposal occurred following the World
Wars when large stores of munitions,
including captured munitions, required
disposal because combat operations
ended. Munitions, including CWM,
were forward deployed, and at the
end of hostilities, much was disposed
because of deteriorated casings, required maintenance, and serviceability
assessments.
Although chemical warfare was
limited in WWII, several countries, including Germany, Japan, the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, and the United
States, maintained large stockpiles of
CWM. By the end of WWII, large
amounts of CWM and related military
chemicals were amassed (Stock, 1996;
Lohs and Stock, 1997). Much of this
material was sea disposed at the end
of hostilities.
From at least the early 1900s
through the 1970s, many nations considered sea disposal a routine part of
inventory management. Although it
is likely that specific policies or guidelines (as described below) governed the
disposals, documentation of the specific events may be sparse. Records
available today lack the detail needed
to document all aspects of disposal operations, leaving a disparity, with some
disposal sites well documented, while
others are not (Brankowitz, 1987;
ACDA, 1993).
Munitions are inherently dangerous, and their safe destruction has always presented a challenge. Until
recently, munition design criteria focused on operational requirements,
without consideration of demilitarization. Although other alternatives
(burial on land, disposal by detonation,
or burning) were considered and often
practiced, sea disposal provided a safe
and efficient method for disposing of
large stocks of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable munitions (Gorodnitsky
and Filin, 2002; Zanders, 2002). Sea
disposal was thought to be the best
method for dealing with chemical
agents because they would dissipate
at sea (Chepesiuk, 1997).
Disposals in U.S. coastal waters occurred as early as the late 1800s and
continued through 1970. The Secretary of the Navy prohibited the practice in 1971. Although the early U.S.
procedures were quite general, betterdefined and more stringent procedures
evolved over time in an effort to reduce
the possibility of damage to fisheries,
or recovery or accidental contact by
the public. Historical records make it
clear that U.S. sea-disposal operations
followed specific instruction from
higher headquarters.
5. Applicable Conventions,
Treaties, and Policy
Treaty law, rather than customary
international law, governs the marine
environment. Customary international law obligates nations to cooperate on the high seas, which are an open
area for the use of all (Heintze, 1997).
Although a growing environmental
awareness led to the inclusion of provisions that addressed marine pollution
in the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, these provisions proved inadequate to stop marine pollution
(Zanders, 2002). This Convention focused on freedom of the high seas and
permitted states to dispose of wastes
(Heintze, 1997). Sea disposal of munitions, including CWM, continued
as an accepted practice in the United
States until it was discontinued in 1970.
Increasing environmental awareness in the 1960s resulted in a gradual
decline in the number of sea-disposal
operations conducted throughout the
world (Missiaen and Henriet, 2002).
In May 1969, the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD) halted a planned
Operation Cut Holes and Sink Em
(CHASE 7 ) deep water disposal of
more than 25,000 tons of CWM.
This action was in response to concerns about the potential dangers associated with the transport of CWM and
the possible impact on the ocean environment (Baine and Simmons, 2005).
Congress and the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) reviewed the need
for the operation (Congress, 1969;
NAS, 1969). The NAS concluded
that there were no viable alternatives
for some of the planned disposals but
advised avoiding future sea disposal
of CWM because the environmental
effects were unknown (NAS, 1969).
The United States ceased sea disposal
of CWM after a final operation in
August 1970 and ceased disposal of
conventional munitions after September 1970 (RDECOM, 2001). In 1971,
the DoD placed a moratorium on deep
water disposal of munitions, with the
exception of emergencies where munitions placed a vessel or its crew at risk.
In the 1970s, concerns over sea
disposal of CWM and conventional
munitions in the United States and
Europe led to several regional laws
and conventions. In 1972, Congress
passed the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA, Public Law 92-532) that
prohibited U.S. disposal of munitions
and many other materials at sea unless
authorized by a permit. No permits
have been issued by the DoD for the
7
The name of the operation is somewhat of a
misnomer since the ships were scuttled through
the opening of valves rather than by cutting
holes in the hull. CWM was disposed in four
of the vessels between 1967 and 1970.
sea disposal of munitions since the
MPRSA was enacted (EPA, personnel
communication). Most other nations
terminated sea disposal at about the
same time (Heintze, 1997; Zanders,
2002; Baine and Simmons, 2005).
About the time that the United
States adopted the MPRSA, European
nations established several regional
conventions to address marine pollution, including preventing sea disposal.
The first was the 1972 Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft
(Oslo Convention). The 1974 Convention for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution from Land-Based Sources
(Paris Convention) merged with the
Oslo Convention in 1992 to become
the Oslo-Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the Northeast Atlantic (OSPAR
Convention).
The wider international community also raised concerns about the
potential impacts of sea disposal of
military materials. The Convention
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (London Convention) opened
for signature in 1972 and was enacted
in 1975 (Baine and Simmons, 2005).
The London conference concluded
with the directive, “States [Nations]
shall take all possible steps to prevent
pollution of the seas by substances
that are liable to create hazards to
human health, to harm living resources
and marine life, to damage amenities
or to interfere with other legitimate
uses of the sea” (Stub, 1995).
The London Convention prohibits
the deliberate disposal of certain harmful wastes, including CWM, outside
the internal waters of the nations that
are parties to the convention. Today,
the London Convention and its 1996
Protocol remain the basic international
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19
framework for controlling sea disposal
of chemical and biological agents.
In 1974, the first Convention for
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic was signed (Helsinki
Convention). In 1992, all the countries bordering on the Baltic Sea and
the European Economic Community
formed a new Helsinki Convention
that was enacted in January 2000.
The HELCOM consists of nine member nations and the European Community. The OSPAR Commission is
composed of 15 contracting nations
and the European Union. HELCOM
and OSPAR provide continuing forums for Europeans to collect and
exchange information on marine pollution, including sea-disposed munitions, affecting the parties in the
convention. HELCOM established
an ad hoc Working Group on Dumped
Chemical Munitions that compiled available information and developed findings and recommendations
in 1995. The recommendations included identification of five areas
where no anchoring or fishing with
bottom contact gear was advised, and
the continued study of the disposalrelated issues (HELCOM, 1995).
International steps toward a convention banning chemical weapons in
the 1980s culminated with the United
Nations-sponsored “Chemical Weapons Convention” (CWC) in 1993.
The CWC, which became effective
in 1997, prohibits the development,
production, stockpiling, and use of
CWM for military purposes and calls
for the destruction of present stocks
(Missiaen and Henriet, 2002; Baine
and Simmons, 2005). The CWC
clearly excluded CWM that was sea
disposed prior to 1985 (Chepesiuk,
1997). Furthermore, the CWC exempts such CWM from declarations
and follow-up obligations—the Verifi-
20
cation Annex—as long as the items
remain where disposed. The CWC provides no incentives to recover CWMs
that were sea-disposed prior to 1985
(Stock, 1996; Missiaen and Henriet,
2002; Zanders, 2002). One author concluded that the CWC’s explicit exclusion
of sea-disposed CWM was recognition that the risks and costs associated
with recovery would be prohibitive
(ACDA, 1993). There is no consensus
whether sea-disposed CWM should be
handled as an environmental issue or
as an arms control and disarmament issue (Hart, 2008). Although the CWC
does not address CWM sea disposed before 1985, several European countries
believe that the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which assists in the implementation of the CWC,
could serve as a forum for voluntary
co-operation in addressing the issue of
sea-disposed CWM, and Lithuania has
put forth an initiative to this effect.
The June 2009 European Commission communiqué, The Marine Strategy
for the Baltic Region, includes a pilot
project to assess the risk posed by seadisposed CWM, which will be led by
Poland. This could include characterization, assessment, and recovery.
6. Historic Context
of Munitions Disposals
Under provisions of the River and
Harbor Act of 1899, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers had the authority
to permit or restrict disposal of materials that could interfere with navigation
or wash ashore. In 1918, the House
and Senate approved the Army appropriation and included a section entitled, “Protection of Life and Property
in Waters Endangered by certain Military Operations.” Essentially, this section authorized the Secretary of War
to prescribe regulations governing the
military use of U.S. navigable waters.
This Act specifically stated that the regulations issued would not unreasonably interfere with or restrict the food
fishing industry (40 Stat. 982; 33
USC3, July 9, 1918). The 1899 Act,
hazards to fishermen, and likely protests by the Conservation Commission were cited in prohibiting a private
company from disposing munitions
in the Chesapeake Bay in 1928. Disposal was recommended in a minimum of 30 m of water, 65 km from
shore (Pettis, 1928). As early as
1917, coordination of disposals with
port authorities was required prior to
disposal. The earliest documents that
researchers have found about U.S. policy and guidelines for the disposal of
munitions date to the end of WWI.
The American Expeditionary Forces
(AEF) in France preferred detonation
and, if other options were not available, burial (presumably on land)
(American Expeditionary Forces,
1917, 1919; Chemical Warfare Service, 1918). A 1920 War Office document identified use as intended or
burial (again, presumably on land) as
the methods for CWM disposal, and
prohibited disposal in water (War
Office, 1920). Precautions described
in a 1919 New York Times article indicated that early concerns about the
potential impacts of CWM disposal
were considered in selecting seadisposal sites (New York Times, 1919).
“There did remain, however, tons
and tons of methyl [lewisite].
What was to be done with it,
now that there was no longer
any active occasion for exterminating Germans? Cleveland did
not want the deadly stuff dumped
into Lake Erie, and there seemed
no practicable method of neutralizing its deadliness chemically….
The ocean was selected as its
catch-basin. Difficulties were
met in transporting the stuff
from Cleveland to the ocean.
Handling such quantities was
perilous. So it was put into big
iron containers … the containers
were stowed gently in a ship and
taken fifty miles to sea, where they
were lowered over the side into
water three miles deep. Rust will
eat pinholes into those containers,
and there will be a minute and
gradual intermixture of water
with the fatal contents. In such
circumstances … a slow chemical
reaction which produces two nontoxic compounds. Experts do not
believe even that fish will perish
from the presence on the ocean
bed of this vast quantity of poison.
When the salt water of the Atlantic embraced the last of those iron
tanks, finis was written to a chapter in American war effort which,
until now, has been a secret scrupulously guarded.”
A July 1919 memorandum to the
Chemical Warfare Services (CWS) indicated that the lack of commercial
uses for mustard agent and the possible
danger of keeping large quantities on
hand made it necessary to develop a disposal policy. The only satisfactory method identified, sea disposal, began soon
thereafter (Edgewood Arsenal, 1919).
Some munitions in transit (e.g.,
from Europe to Canada and the United
States) at the end of WWI and WWII
were disposed at sea. Munitions sea disposed by the United States included
both conventional and chemical munitions. Documentation is sparse, and in
some cases, it is unclear on which side
of the Atlantic the disposals occurred.
A 1933 memorandum refers to a
policy requiring munitions to be dis-
posed of in a minimum of 55 m of
water. This was believed to be of sufficient depth to “safeguard against adversely affecting fishing conditions.”
One letter indicated that munitions
had been found in water between 22
and 29 m in depth, and that an investigation of a specific incident found
that munitions had been disposed of
in 44 m of water (Fourth Naval District, 1933). Although a policy that
was intended to protect the public
was in place, it is clear from the records
that it was not always followed. Possible reasons include navigational errors,
weather conditions, concern for safety
of the vessel, and simple expediency.
During the intra-war period between
1919 and 1941, the U.S. military performed research and development, and
continued to manufacture and maintain
chemical munitions and bulk chemical
agents as well as conventional munitions. U.S. military guidance in effect
during 1931 and reissued in the latter
part of 1941, allowed the disposal of
munitions at sea. Consultation with
port authorities was required, and the
materials were to be removed from packaging prior to disposal to ensure that
they sank where disposed (Office of
Chief of Ordnance, 1931, 1941).
During WWII, the manufacturing,
transportation, and storage of munitions dramatically increased, as did
the need to dispose of unserviceable
munitions, including leaking chemical
munitions. War Department guidance
in effect during and immediately after WWII stated that the “safest and
easiest way to destroy unusable ammunition is to dump it at sea” (War
Department, 1944). Documentation
supports the contention that, within
the various theaters of action, sea disposal was a preferred method of disposal of munitions (ACDA, 1993;
Chepesiuk, 1997; RDECOM, 2001).
After WWII, Allied nations faced
the daunting task of disposing of extensive stocks of excess, obsolete, or
unserviceable munitions and CWM
as quickly and safely as possible. The
1945 Potsdam Agreement decreed
that Germany should be demilitarized,
with its war materiel distributed to the
Allied powers or destroyed (ACDA,
1993; Stock, 1996). A 1946 Headquarters Allied Sea Command order
to theater commanders “authorized
disposal of hazardous ammunition
by dumping at sea or demolition”
(ACDA, 1993; Laurin, 1997). The
Allies established the Continental
Committee on Dumping to coordinate these disposal operations (Fokin
and Babievsky, 1996) and decided
that each occupation authority would
be responsible for disposing of munitions in its occupied zone (ACDA,
1993; Fokin and Babievsky, 1996).
In 1945, the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, and the United States established the Allied Control Commission
to address the discovery, dismantling,
and disposal of German chemical
weapon stocks. The Allies were faced
with disposing of approximately
300,000 tons of munitions filled with
mustard, phosgene, organoarsenic
agents, and nerve agents from the German arsenal (Fokin and Babievsky,
1996; Stock, 1996).
The Allied Control Commission’s
Standing Committee on War Material
recommended in November 1945 that
the only practical method for disposal
of CWM was at sea (Fokin and
Babievsky, 1996; Laurin, 1997). The
Allies disposed of as much as 85% of
the German stockpile in the Baltic
and North Seas (Stock, 1996).
The United States disposed of
120,000 tons of the German chemical
munitions by scrapping, burning, detonation, burial on land, and scuttling
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21
at sea. The Western Allies preferred to
dispose of CWM and weapons by
loading them on damaged or unfinished ships and scuttling the ships in
deep water (Loucks and Elliott,
1949; ACDA, 1993; Laurin, 1997).
Between 1945 and 1947, the United
States sea disposed portions of its
CWM stockpile in the European and
Pacific Theaters, although some
CWM was returned to the United
States (War Department, 1944;
Pease, 1945; RDECOM, 2001).
Some excess munitions being returned
from the European theater were sea
disposed off the U.S. Atlantic coastline
at the end of WWII.
Between 750,000 and 1,500,000
tons of munitions, nearly exclusively
conventional, were disposed of
along the German North Sea coast
(Liebezeit, 2002). Approximately
90,000 tons of conventional munitions
from the Netherlands were disposed
in the Baltic Sea (Van Ham, 2002).
As the war in the Pacific Theater
was fought island to island, munitions storage and supply areas were
spread out over vast distances. In
some cases, munitions stored at
these areas were abandoned as the
war progressed. Recovery of these
munitions presented additional logistical (e.g., transportation, storage)
and security concerns. In some
cases, sea disposal was used. Captured
stocks of Japanese munitions also required disposal.
6.1. Baltic Sea
Following WWII, an estimated
360,000 to 385,000 metric tons of
munitions, including about 40,000
metric tons of chemical munitions,
are believed to have been disposed of
in the Baltic Sea. It is estimated that
these chemical munitions contained
some 13,000 metric tons of chemical
22
agents. Areas with large quantities
of disposed munitions include the
Skagerrak Straits and the Bornholm
Basin. The quantities present; the progressive corrosion of the munitions
and leakage of the fill materials; the
shallow depth of the Baltic Sea (55 m
average) and slow rate of water exchange within the basin; and its
heavy use for recreation, commercial
fishing, and commerce have led to
a significant concern by bordering
countries about potential impacts.
Nord Stream AG plans to construct
a 1,300-km gas pipeline through the
Baltic Sea from Vyborg in the Russian
Federation to Greifswald in Germany
in 2010-2011 (Figure 1). It is estimated that as much as 100,000 metric
tons of munitions lie along the route
and approximately 390 million m3 of
sediment will be disturbed. Concern
over the possible release of munition
constituents during or as a result of
construction and the possibility of a
detonation rupturing the pipeline has
arisen. Studies undertake to address
these, and other concerns have resulted
in a modification of the proposed route
(Hart, 2008).
The completeness and accuracy of
an inventory of CWM along the proposed pipeline route are in question,
and there is significant concern about
the level of knowledge of the behavior
of CWM in the marine environment.
There is a broad agreement that given
the magnitude of the proposed project,
any seabed activities undertaken near
the sea-disposed CWM should be subject to a full assessment of the potential
risk prior to the approval by national
authorities.
6.1.1. Skagerrak Straits
168,000 metric tons of munitions
were sea disposed of in water depths
of 600 to 700 m in the Skagerrak Strait
between the southern coast of Norway
and the southern coast of Sweden and
the Jutland Peninsula of Denmark.
These munitions were disposed in
26 hulks scuttled in the Skagerrak,
southeast of Arendal, Norway
(OSPAR, 2005). Paetzel (2002) stated
that as many as 38 warships and container ships were sunk in the Skagerrak
between 1945 and 1947. The ships
are estimated to contain as much as
50,000 metric tons of mustard agent
and unknown quantities of Tabun
and phosgene.
6.1.2. Bornholm Basin
40,000 metric tons of CWM was disposed of off Bornholm, primarily
within a circle with a 5.5-km radius.
The munitions are scattered along
the transport routes and over a considerably larger area. Initial disposals
included munitions still in their packaging, which drifted prior to sinking.
These munitions have also been dispersed through fishing activities. In
addition, several sunken vessels with
munitions on board have been observed within the Bornholm area.
These vessels are draped with fishing
nets, and munitions fragment were
observed around one of the vessels
(HELCOM, 1994; Paka and Spiridonov,
2002).
6.2. Paardenmarkt Site
Large quantities of munitions remained in Belgium following WWI,
and many accidents resulted from
their collection and storage. The situation became intolerable in 1919, and
a decision was made to dispose of
approximately 35,000 metric tons of
munitions on a shallow sandbank
known as “Paardenmarkt.” Approximately one third of the disposed muni-
Fall 2009
Volume 43, Number 4
23
Munition areas in the Baltic Sea and proposed Nord Stream Pipeline Route, courtesy of Nord Stream LLC.
FIGURE 1
tions are believed to be CWM. The
Paardenmarkt site is 1 to 2 km off
the Belgium’s Knokke Beach Resort,
a similar distance from the port of
Zeebruggee, covers 3 km 2 , and lies
in waters that are from 1.5 to 5.5 m
in depth. The site was discovered in
1971 during harbor maintenance, and
a no anchorage or fishing zone was established. No accidents have been reported here (Missiaen et al., 2002a, b).
A 2001 study focused on the geophysical, geochemical, sedimentdynamics, biological, engineering,
and ecological aspects of the site. The
study concluded that it could take
hundreds of years for all of the munitions to corrode completely; in-situ
measurements and monitoring are
necessary. Although it is unlikely that
munitions would be moved by currents or tides, the possibility of mustard agent lumps reaching the shore
cannot be ruled out. The final conclusion was that recovery of the disposed
munitions would be a costly and highly
risky operation, could result in the release of toxic compounds into the environment, and could threaten nearby
resorts. The best option appears to be
to leave the disposal site untouched
and carry out regular monitoring unless
an acute risk is found (Zanders, 1997;
Missiaen et al., 2002a, b; OSPAR,
2004).
6.3. Beaufort’s Dyke
Beaufort’s Dyke, a 200- to 300-m
deep trench between Scotland and
Northern Ireland, has been used for
munitions disposal since the 1920s.
The trench is more than 50 km in
length and is approximately 3.5 km
wide at its broadest point. It is estimated
that over 1 million metric tons of munitions were disposed of here to include cartridges, hand grenades, land
mines, shells, bombs, bomb casings,
24
and depth charges. Related materials
included boxes, and crates or racks
containing munitions. During the
1990s, thousands of WP munitions,
believed to have been dislodged during
installation of a pipeline, washed
ashore on the Scottish and Irish coasts.
Once dislodged, these munitions,
which are positively buoyant, floated
to the surface where they were carried
ashore by wind and current. They
present a risk of burns should they be
handled (Fisheries Research Service,
1996; OSPAR, 2005), as reports of
beachgoers in Europe being burned
from collecting WP testify.
6.4. United States
In the post-WWII time period,
large quantities of conventional munitions and CWM were sea disposed.
These large operations were conducted
openly and in coordination with many
branches of government (i.e., port authorities, state health departments,
U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and U.S. Surgeon
General). Two of the more significant sea-disposal operations were as
follows.
■
In December 1948, Operation
Geranium, so-named because of
the geranium-like odor of lewisite,
was conducted. The U.S. Army
loaded 3,153 metric tons net chemical agent weight (NCAW) of
lewisite aboard a hulk, S.S. Joshua
Alexander, and it was scuttled (i.e.,
intentionally sunk) in the Atlantic
Ocean (ACDA, 1993).
■ The DoD sea disposed of thousands of tons of conventional munitions and CWM during separate
disposal operations that composed
Operation CHASE. Operation
CHASE involved the consolidation
of munitions and bulk materials in
vessels that were scuttled between
1964 and 1970. Of the 19 vessels,
8 were sunk off the Pacific coast and
11 off the Atlantic coast. Of the
15 vessels loaded with explosives,
12 detonated during sinking
(five intentionally). Four vessels
(CHASE 8, 10, 11, and 12) were
loaded with CWM and were scuttled in deepwater off the Atlantic
coast (ACDA, 1993).
The recovery of an unfired 75-mm
mustard filled projectile from a clamshell driveway at a residence in
Delaware in 2004 led to a review
that revealed that hundreds of conventional munitions were recovered
from driveways in several Mid-Atlantic
States. These munitions originated
from clam dredging areas off the
Mid-Atlantic coast, primarily New
Jersey. The stakeholders cooperated
to implement procedures to preclude
additional munitions from being distributed to the public domain, and
hundreds of munitions were recovered
from existing driveways paved with
clamshells. Since the investigation,
10 additional 75-mm mustard projectiles and over 100 conventional munitions have been interdicted and
brought under DoD control.
7. Characteristics of
Disposed Munitions
All manner of military munitions
and related chemicals have been disposed of at sea. An estimated net
weight of 27,000 metric tons of
chemical agent was disposed of in
U.S. and nearby coastal waters (DoD,
2008). The relative amounts are
shown in Figure 2. Research on sea
disposal of conventional munitions in
U.S. coastal waters is still in its early
stages, but the known gross weight
disposed already significantly exceeds
that of disposed CWM. Common
FIGURE 2
Relative quantities of CWC schedule chemicals disposed in U.S. coastal waters. A total of approximately 27,000 metric tons was disposed between 1919 and 1970 (DoD, 2008).
conventional munition explosive fillers
include TNT, Composition B, Explosive D, and amatol.
Generally, the definition of CWM
is restricted to only those chemicals
listed in the CWC. Chemical munitions, designed for maximum dispersal
of their chemical agent fill, are normally
thinner skinned than conventional munitions. The fills for conventional munitions include high explosive, smokes,
pyrotechnics, and incendiaries. Most
munitions are composed of metal parts.
U.S. records often identify specific
munition types and quantities that
were sea disposed. When the specific
munitions are known, the design
drawings provide information on the
items shape and dimensions, as well
as information that can be used to
estimate the quantity of the materials
used in the finished product. This information is useful when evaluating
the potential effects on the environment as well as the effects of the environment on the munitions (i.e.,
corrosion). It is also helpful during
the selection of equipment (e.g.,
SONAR, video) and a chemical analytical suite when characterizing a site.
When analyzing the potential for
release of munition constituents
caused by corrosive processes attacking
the casing walls and assuming the
materials are the same, it is important to note that thicker walled munitions (e.g., projectiles) are estimated
to take five to perhaps ten times longer to corrode to the point of release
than thinner-walled munitions (e.g.,
bombs, rockets) (Epstein, et al., 1973;
MEDEA, 1997).
It is hypothesized that chemical
agent releases in the Baltic Sea are almost entirely caused by the leakage
from thin-skinned chemical bombs
(MEDEA, 1997). The observation
that recoveries of complete bombs in
the Baltic Sea have become infrequent
and that the thin bombshells, when recovered, are corroded through supports this hypothesis (HELCOM,
2002, 2005). Adverse impacts on the
health of individual organisms and
population reductions were observed
in some Baltic Sea unique species at
CWM disposal sites (Barsiene et al.,
2008).
disposal (Figure 3), and consolidation
in and then scuttling of hulks (Figure 4) (RDECOM, 2001). HELCOM
indicates that over-the-side disposal
from moving vessels may have dispersed munitions over a large area
with a variable density (HELCOM,
1994). Individual disposal events
ranged from a few items to thousands
of tons of munitions. The disposal
method significantly affects the distribution of sea-disposed munitions and
other material on the seafloor. The
fall of munitions or containers through
the water column and movement of
the vessel causes dispersion, making
bounding of over-the-side disposals difficult. The United States used
over-the-side disposal and scuttling interchangeably until 1964 (RDECOM,
2001). As a rule, the U.S. military removed munitions from their packaging prior to disposal to ensure that
they sank. From 1964 through the
last event in 1970, the United States
FIGURE 3
Photographs of loose disposal of munitions.
8. Disposal Methods
Sea-disposal operations were conducted using one of two methods—
over-the-side (also known as “loose”)
Fall 2009
Volume 43, Number 4
25
FIGURE 4
Photographs of munitions packed into the
hold of a ship prior to scuttling.
the disposed munitions may be on or
may have penetrated beneath the
surface.
9. Disposal Sites
used consolidation and scuttling for sea
disposal. Scuttling reduces the probability of disposal outside of the planned
site, and housing the munitions in
the hulk minimizes their spread
(HELCOM, 1994). Scuttling in hulks
normally resulted in a single, large, and
easy to locate target on the bottom.
An estimate of the depth of penetration into coarse compact sediments
was developed for palletized munitions
of various sizes, including 1-ton containers. Calculations concluded that
the palletized munitions would penetrate from 0.1 to 4 m into the sediment
(MEDEA, 1997). Most, if not all munitions, disposed over-the-side were
not palletized and were likely to penetrate deeper into sediments. Complete
coverage by sediment would likely reduce the rate of corrosion because of
oxygen deficient conditions. Depending on disposal method, bottom type,
munition type, and local conditions,
26
The need to protect people and resources from the potential impacts of
sea-disposed munitions has been understood since the earliest disposals.
The hazardous nature of munitions
and their fill was recognized at the
time of disposal, as was the ultimate
failure of containers. Near the end of
WWII, efforts were made to standardize and restrict disposal to specific areas
of the ocean to minimize the potential
for interference with human activities
and impacts on resources. Minimum
distance from shore and water depth
for disposals was defined. The policies
and regulations in force at the time of
the specific sea-disposal operations
provide ancillary information concerning locations of sea-disposal sites.
It is likely that sea-disposal sites annotated on navigational charts were used
for disposal of a variety of materials
(e.g., munitions, radioactive wastes,
industrial waste).
For a number of reasons (e.g., level
of detail in the logbooks, limited documentation for disposal operations),
only the general location of the actual
disposal may be known. Additionally,
navigational aids available at the time
and other factors (e.g., weather conditions) may have caused some disposals,
in part or whole, outside the intended
disposal sites. Documentation such as
charts for most sea-disposal sites indicates that they cover tens of square
kilometers of the seafloor, without
consideration of the high potential
for navigational and documentation
errors at the time of disposal (Table 1).
U.S. disposal sites are as close as
2 km from shore and vary from 10 to
5,100 m in depth. U.S. regulations
and policies on sea disposal of munitions changed over the period that sea
disposal was allowed, rapidly evolving
during WWII and becoming more
stringent with each revision. In an
April 24, 1945 memorandum, the
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) instructed all Navy and
Coast Guard commands to establish
and record the locations of disposals
of all “explosives, ammunition, and
chemical munitions.” The CNO also
required that sea-disposal sites be located outside regular shipping lanes,
fishing grounds, submarine operating
areas, and well away from marine
cables. The sites used were reported
to the Government Hydrographic Office, which, in turn, was to use the information to post a Notice to Mariners
and indicate them on nautical charts
(CNO, 1945).
■
Disposal sites designated at the
end of WWII are about 343 km2
and appear on current National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) charts.
■
Only two CWM sea-disposal
operations, one in 1919 and the
other in 1944, are known to have
occurred at depths of less than
90 m (DoD, 2008).
Although little information has
been collected on the majority of
sea-disposal sites, several sites have
been investigated multiple times.
Most of the CHASE ships sank
straight down and landed on their
keels (Donnelly, 1990).
The general scientific opinion
concerning Operation CHASE was
that sea-disposed chemical agents
would undergo hydrolysis8 and dilu8
Hydrolysis is a chemical reaction in which a
compound is broken down by the addition of
a water molecule.
Fall 2009
Volume 43, Number 4
27
200
Over 400
160
Over 70
240
100
440
160
Over 400
20
NA
NY-01 (Area A)
NC-04 (Area B-1)
NC-03 (Baker)
USS Elinor
NJ-02 (Unnamed 1)
NJ-X01
NJ-01 (Unnamed 2)
VA-01 (Unnamed 3)
FL-02 (Unnamed 4)
PR-01
Unknown
2
NA
HI-06 (Ordnance Reef)
HI-X01 (Oahu Unknown)
Under 2
80
NA
LA-X01 (Braithwaite)
AL-X01 (Mobile)
Unknown
Gulf of Mexico
Over 10
HI-05 (Oahu Unnamed)
20
HI-01 (Oahu Area 1)
20
20
AK-03 (Attu)
HI-02 (Oahu Area 2)
190
CA-10 (West Coast)
Pacific
190
MD-01 (Area 1)
Atlantic
Sites
Estimated
Distance from
Shore (km)
NA
460
20
NA
10
430
Over 460
1,460
1,800
4,100
NA
900
4,800
1,100
3,300
Over 30
2,100
Over 100
1,800
1,800
2,000
1,800
Estimated
Minimum
Depth (m)
NA
NA
NA
NA
10
NA
340
340
340
4,800
NA
340
4,300
340
340
NA
340
Over 3,400
340
270
340
340
Estimated
Size
(km square)
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Scuttle/loose
Loose
Loose
Scuttle/?
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Loose
Scuttle
Loose
Disposal
Method
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Artillery
Projectiles/
Mortars
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Aerial
Bombs
Summary information on U.S. sea-disposal locations. A map showing site locations can be found in DoD 2008.
TABLE 1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Bulk
Container
X
X
X
Munition
Components
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CWM
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Conventional
X
X
Radiological
tion. In combination with the density
of the chemical agent involved, which
prevented it from rising to the surface,
this supported the conclusion that
CHASE disposals presented only
a minimal threat to human health;
however, an assessment of long termeffects required further investigation
(Donnelly, 1990).
Between 1969 and 1975, the DoD
performed investigations of several
CHASE sites. CHASE 8, 11, 12, and
21 were scuttled at a depth of about
2,100 m. In addition to CWM,
approximately 680 metric tons of conventional explosives and other miscellaneous materials were also disposed.
Investigations located the intact hulks
of CHASE 8, 10, and 11 and the debris field from 21. The sites (CHASE
8 and 11 in 1969, CHASE 12 in 1969
and 1972) were extensively photographed, water and sediment samples
were collected and analyzed, and a biological survey was conducted. Chemical analysis did not find any evidence
of contamination, and photographs
showed an apparently healthy ecosystem. Water current data indicate little
possibility of the material reaching the
surface (Wilkniss, 1973).
The CHASE 10 site is approximately 470 km east of Florida and at
a depth of approximately 4,900 m. It
was located, sampled, and photographed each year from 1971 through
1975. Chemical analysis found no evidence of contamination, and photographs showed an apparently healthy
ecosystem. The site was originally selected because the stable density structure of the vertical water column
resulted in a deep, isolated basin
where mixing of the bottom waters
with overlying upper water masses
is comparatively slow and sluggish
and would prevent any signi ficant spread of the CWM before hy-
28
drolysis was complete (Linnenbom,
1997).
10. Assessing and
Managing Risk
Risk management is the process of
analyzing the level of potential risk associated with a munitions disposal site
and developing a strategy to mitigate
potential impacts. Some management
strategies (e.g., public education) require relatively little in the way of resources, while others (e.g., recovery
and disposal) can be resource intensive. Successful risk management requires resource intensive efforts to be
prioritized to address the highest risk
and be as effective as possible. In the
case of munitions sea-disposal sites,
modeling of potential environmental
impacts is a tool that can help determine the relative risk posed at each
site and prioritize sites for further investigation or response actions.
The design of any response action
(e.g., investigation, survey, monitoring,
and removal) must be based on an analysis of site-specific conditions and evaluation of risk posed to human health
and the environment. Worldwide, the
majority of responses focus on determining the site conditions, identifying
the site, and implementing a public
safety education program. A significant
concern is that handling could result in
a detonation or, in the case of CWM,
the catastrophic failure of an item and
release of its contents.
If sea-disposed munitions pose a
significant hazard, then appropriate
risk mitigation methods must be identified and implemented. Risk mitigation methods range from education
(e.g., marking on nautical charts) and
monitoring, to containment or removal
and destruction. An important aspect
of hazard analysis and risk mitigation
is establishing the location and boundaries of the munitions disposal sites. In
shallow European waters where the potential of encounters is high, it is likely
that the policy will be to “recover and
destroy” CWM, particularly at sites
driven by high value projects such as
the construction of the Nord Stream
pipeline.
Along the German coast, members
of the public are injured nearly every
year by WP from incendiary devices
(Koch, et al., 2008). Between the end
of WWII and 1996, there were five incidents where 126 people were burned
by mustard agent, which contaminated beaches in Poland. Most of
these occurred in the 1960s and
1970 (Witkiewicz and Szarski, 1997).
Although it is clear that the general
public can be affected by sea-disposed
munitions, the greatest risk from seadisposed munitions occurs through
inadvertent recovery of munitions or
contaminated media during commercial maritime activities. “The consensus of scientific opinion is that
munitions on the seabed present no
risk to human health or the marine
environment if they are left undisturbed. Recovery of dumped munitions is a costly and highly risky
operation that could result in the release of large amounts of toxic compounds into the environment – and
may even result in the loss of life.”
(OSPAR, 2004). Although localized
effects are possible, a general consensus is that sea-disposed munitions do
not appear to pose a widespread threat
to marine ecosystems (HELCOM,
1994, Theobald, 2002). That said,
further studies of potential impacts are not only prudent, but also
necessary.
Effective communication, cooperation, and information sharing is key to
educating the public and addressing
the sea-disposal issue based on a rational evaluation of risk rather than
on an emotional response. An important aspect is providing information
in a form that is accessible to the public.
Open communication is also important
in view of expressed skepticism about
the military’s commitment to addressing this issue.
Over the past 50 years, there have
been a significant number of incidents
involving sea-disposed CWM in the
Baltic Sea, North Sea, Adriatic Sea,
and Sea of Japan. The majority of
these incidents involved the recovery
of and, in some cases, exposure to mustard by fishing crews (Kurata, 1980;
Missiaen and Henriet, 2002). International experience has shown that public education concerning the locations
of munitions and CWM disposal sites
and procedures to be followed has
reduced the number of incidents
(ACOPS, 2003; Plunkett, 2003). Between 1972 when information regarding the sea-disposal sites was released
to the public and 1980, the Japanese
had no injuries from sea-disposed
CWM. This compares with several
deaths and dozens of injuries reported
from contact with sea-disposed chemical agents in the period from WWII to
1972 (Kurata, 1980; Plunkett, 2003).
Public concerns about munitions
sea-disposal sites will continue to
grow until more certainty about the
risks presented can be provided. It is
important that the public be kept informed of the work being planned
and the results of any completed studies (Paetzel, 2002). Care must be taken
in performing the historical research,
developing site inventories, estimating
quantities and types of munitions,
identifying munition constituents,
and making a determination of relative
risk of each site. The sharing of information on disposal of munitions and
education of maritime workers is also
an important part of risk management.
11. Conclusion
The oceans were once considered a
safe and reasonable alternative for efficiently disposing of large stocks of munitions, but the question is whether
these historic sea disposals are now a
significant threat to human health
and the environment. It is not possible
to identify and remediate all munitions
in aquatic environments, and accidental recoveries will continue. Thus, any
risk management strategy must include education of the potentially effected population.
Several European countries have
prepared guidelines for maritime
industries on how munitions inadvertently encountered should be
handled. Nautical charts are marked
with warnings to prevent individuals
from inadvertently contacting or recovering munitions. Some countries,
such as Denmark and Sweden, instruct
fishing vessels to carry specialized first
aid and protective equipment for dealing with recovered CWM when fishing at sea-disposal sites (HELCOM,
1994; 1995; OSPAR, 2004). Since
1995, HELCOM has developed a number of publications (www.helcom.fi)
that address the hazards associated with
sea-disposed munitions and actively
tracks incidents and recoveries in the
Baltic region.
In a similar effort to educate the
pu blic, t he DoD de s igne d a n d
launched a UXO Safety Education Program web site that provides educators
and safety specialists with a packaged
toolbox of educational materials for
use in classrooms and public forums.
The DoD “Maritime Industry: 3Rs Explosives Safety Guide” informs maritime works of the hazards associated
with munitions and the steps to be
taken if encountered. It is available on
the DoD UXO Safety web site (www.
denix.osd.mil/uxosafety). The DoD is
in contact with NOAA to ensure that
all known disposal sites are included
on nautical charts.
The implementation of an effective
education program for potentially affected communities (e.g., emergency
responders, commercial maritime
industries, and targeted-recreational
activities such as SCUBA diving)
would mitigate such risks. Affected
communities should be informed and
periodically reminded how to deal
safely with encountered munitions.
The DoD has notified federal and
state regulators, the commercial fishing industry, and trade organizations
about CWM inadvertently recovered
during commercial clamming operations off the Mid-Atlantic States, and
identified actions to be taken in the
event of an encounter. Commercial
entities should also educate their workers. This helps ensure the safety of their
operations and avoids worker’s compensation claims, potential regulatory fines, and consumer tort actions.
The coordination of efforts for outreach and education has proven to
be helpful (Baine and Simmons,
2005).
It has been over 90 years since
WWI and about 65 years since
WWII and Europe still faces the legacy
munitions from those wars both on
land and at sea. The risks posed by
the sea-disposed munitions should be
fully assessed so that appropriate risk
management can be implemented.
This may include the recovery and destruction of sea-disposed munitions
where the risk is high.
It is possible to determine the relative risk posed by sea-disposal sites to
human health and the environment
Fall 2009
Volume 43, Number 4
29
using available historical information
and an understanding of the fate and
transport of munition constituents in
the marine environment. The potential impacts to human health and environmental and national economies
from legacy sea-disposed munitions
clearly call for voluntary international
cooperation and information exchange. The exchange will minimize
duplication of effort and foster development of best practices for risk management that clearly begin with
targeted education efforts. This paper
is one small step in this direction.
Beddington, J., Kinloch, A. 2005. Munitions
Dumped at Sea: A Literature Review. Imperial
College London Consultants.
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