Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans

Transcription

Rocznik
Instytutu Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej
Rok 12 (2014)
Zeszyt 3
Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe
Volume 12 (2014), Issue 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Western Balkans
Macedonia’s Difficult Path
to the European Union
Uneven and Combined Development
of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans
Is Kosovo a Precedent? Legal and International Dilemmas
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
of the Kosovo Republic
Bosnian Visions of Europe
Rocznik
Instytutu Europy
Rok 12 (2014)
Zeszyt 3
Yearbook
of the Institute of East-Central Europe
Volume 12 (2014)
Issue 3
Rada Naukowa
„Rocznika Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”
Natalia Yakovenko (Kijów), Adolf Juzwenko (Wrocław), Jūratė Kiaupienė (Wilno),
Andreas Lawaty (Lüneburg), Alexei Miller (Moskwa), Antony Polonsky (Boston),
Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Warszawa), Henryk Samsonowicz (Warszawa),
Aleksander Smolar (Warszawa), Oleksiy Tolochko (Kijów),
Piotr S. Wandycz (New Haven), Jerzy Wyrozumski (Kraków)
Komitet Redakcyjny
„Rocznika Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”
Mirosław Filipowicz (przewodniczący),
Andrzej Gil, Jerzy Kłoczowski, Hubert Łaszkiewicz, Tomasz Stępniewski, Agata Stolarz,
Paweł Jarosz (sekretarz redakcji), Anna Paprocka (sekretarz wydawnictwa)
Rocznik
Instytutu Europy
Rok 12 (2014)
Zeszyt 3
Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe
Volume 12 (2014), Issue 3
and the Western Balkans
EDITED BY
Jakub Olchowski
Tomasz Stępniewski
Bartosz Bojarczyk
Alina Sobol
Lublin 2014
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of the Institute of East-Central Europe
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Table of contents
PAPERS
Mladen Karadzoski, Artur Adamczyk
Macedonia’s Difficult Path to the European Union9
Tomasz Stępniewski, Tomasz Olejarz
Is Kosovo a Precedent? Legal and International Dilemmas
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Kosovo Republic27
Abit Hoxha, Donika Emini
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Kosovar Perspective:
An Agenda for International Cooperation37
Bartosz Bojarczyk
Radical Islamism – A Threat to Bosniak Identity
and Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina53
Ewa Dominikowska
Bosnia and Herzegovina – Unquiet region – Implication
for Neighbouring Countries73
Magdalena Rekść
Bosnian Visions of Europe93
Jan Muś
of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans107
Anna Masłoń-Oracz
Recommendations for Development of Cluster Policy
in Croatia in the Light of Smart Specialization in Poland129
About the Authors145
Papers
Macedonia’s Difficult Path
to the European Union
Abstract: After becoming independent, the Republic of Macedonia consistently strived towards obtaining its membership in the European Union.
The consecutive Macedonian governments implemented reforms aimed at
meeting the Copenhagen criteria, which were appreciated by the EU. In 2005,
FYROM was granted the status of a candidate country. Unfortunately, due to
the unresolved dispute with Greece concerning the country’s name and the
strained relations with Bulgaria, the starting date of the accession negotiations has not been set yet, even despite positive recommendations issued
by the European Commission. Macedonian politicians are no longer standing
the test of time and are beginning to abandon European standards.
Keywords: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the European Union, accession negotiations, foreign policy of Greece, foreign policy of Bulgaria
Introduction
After becoming independent in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia started the process of political, economic and social transformation. The
reforms consistently implemented by the government were to bring
Macedonia closer to Western European standards and gradually include it in the processes of European integration. Memberships in the
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have
been pointed out by all of the country’s political parties as the primary strategic goals. As a result, Macedonia has become the leader of
pro-Western transformations among all the Balkan countries of the
former Yugoslavia.1 Successive Macedonian governments conducted
1
Of course, the first constituent of the former Yugoslavia to join the European Union was Slovenia, in 2004, but Slovene politicians do not classify their country as a Balkan state.
10
reforms suggested by the EU and, as a result, in 2005, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was granted the status of a candidate
country. Unfortunately, the so far unsolved dispute with Greece concerning the country’s name as well as political problems surfacing in
the relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria have effectively stopped
Macedonia’s march towards the European Union.
1.
The evolution of the relations
between Macedonia and the European Union
The relations between Macedonia and the European Communities
started already in the age when the world was divided into two blocs,
when trade agreements were signed between the EEC and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s.2 After
Yugoslavia disintegrated and Macedonia declared independence, the
Macedonian government attempted to re-establish relations with
Western European structures. Despite the fact that the Communities
recognised Macedonia’s sovereignty and in 1992 allowed it to appoint
a representative in Brussels, full diplomatic relations between the EU
and Macedonia were established only in 1995.3 This delay was caused
by the dispute between Macedonia and Greece over the name and
national symbols of the new country, and the government in Skopje
was only able to proceed with establishing its international relations
in 1995, after the signing of the Interim Accord between Macedonia
and Greece, which stipulated that the young country could apply for
membership in international organisations under the name ‘Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM).4 Consequently, in December 1995, the European Union decided to establish full relations
2 Sporazum o Stabilizaciji i Pridruzivanje, Vlada Republike Srbije, Kancelarija za Pridruzivanje Evropskoj Uniji, Beograd 2005, available at: www.seio.gov.rs, last accessed on: 9 September 2014,
p. 1-5.
3 Македонија во ЕУ-трето дополнето и изменето издание, Секретаријат за европски
прашања, Скопје: септември 2006 година/Skopje: September 2006, available at: http://www.
morm.gov.mk, last accessed on: 3 September 2014, p. 10-11.
4 Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the FYROM, United Nations, New York, 13 September 1995, available at: http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/fyrom/interim_accord_1995.pdf, last
accessed on: 8 September 2014.
Roczni k I nstytutu Eu ro p y Ś ro d ko wo -W s c h o d n iej • Ro k 1 2 (2 01 4) • Zes z y t 3
Macedonia’s Difficult Path to the European Union
with Macedonia and agreed to the opening of a FYROM diplomatic
mission in Brussels.5 Following that, the relations between Macedonia
and the EU gradually developed. In 1996, they started negotiations on
trade and transport cooperation, which culminated in the signing of
an agreement that entered into force two years later.
In 1999, the European Commission presented a new project addressed to the Western Balkan states (Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia), called the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The main objective that the European Commission tried to achieve was stabilisation of the political
and economic situation in the Balkans and encouraging the countries
covered by the project to further develop the relations among themselves in order to establish a strong regional structure. The project was
meant as a litmus paper, testing the ability of the Western Balkans to
engage in integration on their path to the European Union.6 The EU
Member States were concerned that further conflicts could break out
in the Balkans, especially with regard to the issue of Kosovo. Therefore, they forced the Balkan states to form coalitions among themselves
and encouraged them to cooperate with each other, emphasising it as
the best way to further their chances for EU membership. The main
instruments of the project were bilateral Stabilisation and Association Agreements, concluded between the EU and the Balkan countries. When this opportunity appeared, the Macedonian government
immediately started negotiating this agreement with the European
Commission.7 A huge incentive for the countries of the West Balkans
to participate in the project announced by the EC was provided by
the declaration of the European Council at the summit in Santa Maria
da Feira in 2000 that all the countries subject to the Stabilisation and
Association Process were potential candidates for EU membership.8
5 The European Commission opened its representation in Skopje in 1998; after: Македонија во
ЕУ-трето дополнето и изменето издани, op. cit., p. 11.
6 O. Anastasakis, V. Bijcic-Dzelilović, Balkan Regional Cooperation and European Integration, The
Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, London 2002, p. 5-14.
7 Национална стратегија за интеграција на Република Македонија во Европската Унија,
Влада на Република Македонија, Генерален секретаријат, Сектор за европска интеграција:
Скопје, септември 2004 година, стр. 34/Skopje, September 2004, p. 34.
8 Conclusions of The Presidency, European Council, Santa Maria Da Feira 19 And 20 June 2000, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm, last accessed on: 20 September
2014.
Ro c z nik Ins tytutu Europy Środkowo-W schodniej • Rok 12 (2014 ) • Zeszy t 3
11
12
FYROM’s determination to join the EU was proven by the fact that it
was the first country to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union (already in 2001).9
Despite internal problems suffered by Macedonia in 2001, caused
by an armed conflict with insurgents from the Albanian minority, the
government in Skopje managed to convince the European Union of its
democratic intentions. The signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended the internal political crisis, showed that Macedonia was indeed a democratic and tolerant country that respected the
rights of national minorities. In the following years, 2003-2005, in order to safeguard the still fragile peace in Macedonia, the European Union executed the EU Police Mission Proxima. The mission’s main task
was to support the Macedonian Ministry of internal Affairs in maintaining the legal order and reforming the national police force.10 The
calming of the internal situation and the implementation of further
reforms recommended by the European Commission induced the
FYROM government to apply for full membership in the European
Union, which it did at the 2004 summit of the European Council in
Dublin.11 In response, in November 2005, the European Commission
issued an opinion that FYROM deserved the status of a candidate
country, which was officially confirmed by a decision of the European
Council in Brussels a month later.12
The decision of granting FYROM the status of a candidate country was a form of reward given to Macedonians for their immense effort in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and for their achievements
resulting from the implementation of the legal solutions laid down in
the Ohrid Agreement. It is worth noting that even Greece, with which
Macedonia was still conducting negotiations on the country’s name,
did not block this decision. There is no doubt that this was a political
9 Македонија во ЕУ-трето дополнето и изменето издани, op. cit., p. 12.
10 www.europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r18013.htm, last accessed on: 10 August 2014.
11 Analytical Report for the Opinion on the Application from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
for EU Membership, Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 9 November 2005, SEC
(2005) 1425, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/
package/sec_1425_final_analytical_report_mk_en.pdf, last accessed on: 10 August 2014.
12 F. Nelli Feroci, The Future of Enlargement: Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries of the Western Balkans, in: F. M. Bindi and I. Angelescu (ed.), A Frontier of Europe: A Transatlantic Problem?,
Brooking Institution Press, Washington D.C.–Rome, p. 27.
reward given to the government in Skopje for the quick and peaceful
solution of the Albanian problem, which threatened to spread in the
region, and thus indirectly threatened security and stability in Greece.
Pleased with obtaining the candidate country status, the government in Skopje consistently implemented further pro-democratic reforms towards obtaining a full membership in the EU – with some
success, particularly in combating corruption and organised crime,
as well as introducing the principles of the freedom of the press.13
Once again, the European Union appreciated Macedonia’s efforts in
2009, when it decided to abolish the visa requirement for Macedonian citizens in the first phase of visa liberalisation for the Western Balkans.14 As Macedonia made significant progress and largely fulfilled
the primary priorities of the accession partnership, in the same year
the European Commission issued a recommendation on the opening
of accession negotiations with FYROM.15 The government in Skopje was hoping that after the Commission’s recommendation, the EU
heads of state and government would soon set the date for launching
the accession negotiations. Unfortunately, Greece took advantage of
its right to veto this decision in the European Council and forced the
arrangement that before the starting date of accession negotiations
was specified, Macedonia first had to reach an agreement with Greece
regarding the name of the young country.
Although in consecutive annual reports on FYROM’s state of preparations for EU membership the European Commission maintains that
the country is ready to start negotiations, the starting date has not
been set so far.16 Greece, opposing the commencement of negotiations
13 T. Żornaczuk, Macedonia: od bałkańskiego prymusa do chorej demokracji, “Biuletyn PISM”, Polski
Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2014, no. 64, p. 2.
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1244/2009 of 30 November 2009 amending Regulation (EC)
No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement,
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009R1244, last ac�cessed on: 2 September 2014.
15 D. Morolov, The Euro-Atlantic aspiration of the Republic of Macedonia, “International Journal of
Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR)”, vol. 13, 2014, no. 1, p. 271.
16 Commission Staff Working Document The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2013 Progress
Report and Accompanying the Document Communication From The Commission To The European
Parliament And The Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, European Commission COM(2013) 700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013.
13
14
due to the unsolved dispute over the name, was joined by Bulgaria,
which accuses Skopje of conducting an anti-Bulgarian campaign and
of falsifying history. In line with the EU’s decision-making procedures,
the European Council decisions on commencing negotiations and on
Macedonia’s possible accession have to be unanimous, which means
that as long as FYROM does not normalise its relations with Greece
and Bulgaria, the accession process is up in the air.
2.
Greece’s policy towards the FYROM
and the Greek veto in the European Union
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic
of Macedonia on 19 December 1991 came as a surprise to Greek politicians. Initially, the government in Athens perceived it as a threat to
Greece’s territorial integrity, as during the formation of the new state
some people had called for incorporating the territories inhabited by
Macedonians in neighbouring countries. As Macedonian politicians
mainly strived for international recognition, which would stabilise
the country’s situation in the international arena, they quickly backed
out from the aspirations to establish a United Macedonia. The newly
formed parliament in Skopje passed a declaration on relinquishing all
claims to territories held by the neighbouring countries and on having
all international disputes settled by peaceful means.17
This, however, did not dissipate all the concerns of Greek politicians and the relations between the two countries remained strained.
The Macedonian issue essentially comes down to a dispute over the
name and the national symbols of the new country. Greeks negate
this name claiming that the new country may not be called Republic of Macedonia because Macedonia is connected with the historical
and national heritage of Greece, a region which was part of the ancient Hellas. Despite the Macedonian’s reassurances of their peaceful
intentions, Greeks perceived the adoption of this name as a pretext
for potential territorial claims to territories held by the Republic of
17 S. Pięta, Polityka Grecji wobec kwestii macedońskiej w latach 1991-1995, in: M. Waloński (ed.), Wybrane
problemy współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych, Wrocław 2008, p. 159 ff.
Greece. Another element of the dispute was Macedonia’s flag depicting the Sun of Vergina – the symbol of Alexander the Great, connected
with Hellenic history and not with the Slavic peoples that inhabit the
new country. Yet another controversial issue was the provision in the
Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia that the state would look
after the rights of all Macedonians, including those living in neighbouring countries (this concerned primarily inhabitants of Greece and
Bulgaria). According to Athens, this provision interfered with its internal affairs and infringed on its sovereignty. In fact, Greece negates
the existence of a separate Macedonian nation and believes that they
are just Slavic immigrants.
Following explicit signals from European countries that any constitutional provisions resembling nationalist discourse would hamper the process of recognising the new country and admitting it into
the international community, Macedonia altered its flag and removed
the controversial passages from the constitution. What still remained,
however, was the issue of the name, under which the new country was
to be recognised in the international arena. As a result of negotiations
conducted since 1992, Athens and Skopje agreed to adopt the technical name ‘former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM),
under which Macedonia was to be admitted to the UN on 7 April
1993.18 The adoption of this technical name, under which Macedonia
was able to apply for membership in international organisations, was
only a temporary solution and did not mean that the relations with
Greece were normalised.
In February 1994, Greece broke off talks with FYROM on negotiating the final name and introduced a trade embargo against it.19 The
tensions between Athens and Skopje forced the US diplomacy and
the European countries to take mitigating actions. Cyrus Vance’s mediations ended in a limited success, which allowed the two countries
18 P. Sioussiouras, The Process of Recognition of the Newly Independent States of Former Yugoslavia by
The European Community: The Case of Former Socialist Republic of Macedonia, “Journal of Political
and Military Sociology”, 2004, no. 1, p. 12.
19 The European Commission referred the decision of the Greek government on introducing the
embargo against FYROM to the European Court of Justice, but it rejected the claim stating that
this was a political issue and not a legal one. Even before that, however, the Greek prime minister announced that his government would pursue its policy towards Macedonia regardless of
the Court’s verdict.
15
16
to re-establish relations and trade exchange between them. In 1995,
they signed an agreement, but the problem of the name remained unsolved. As a result of the turn in Greece’s policy, upon Greece’s motion, FYROM was admitted to the Council of Europe and the OSCE.20
From the second half of the 1990s, the relations between Greece
and Macedonia were considerably improving. Greece became Macedonia’s primary trade partner and the largest foreign investor. Macedonian politicians were also becoming aware that their path to the
family of European democracies led through Greece. Macedonia has
a very bad geopolitical and demographic situation. With the Albanian
minority constituting almost 23 per cent of the population and being
still unsatisfied with its status, with borders with Albania and Kosovo,
FYROM is permanently in the state of potential threat.21 This state of
insecurity was further highlighted by the 2001 Albanian insurgency in
Macedonia. Concerned that the conflict might escalate to neighbouring countries, the EU and US diplomacy quickly intervened and the
conflict ended in the conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement.22 In order
to ensure its security, FYROM applied for membership in the NATO
and the EU in 2004. The decision of admitting Macedonia to these organisations, however, depends largely on the government in Athens, as
it has a veto right on the enlargement of both structures. Greek politicians try to take advantage of the situation and use the membership
in the organisations as leverage to force Macedonia to solve the dispute over its name. After Macedonia obtained the status of candidate
country for EU accession, the process of integration with the Western
European structures was frozen – primarily due to the Greek veto.
In April 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Greece blocked
the invitation to the organisation and threatened that it would do the
same with Macedonia’s integration with the EU, if the country fails to
solve the problem of its name.23 In response, Macedonia filed a com-
20 Ch. Tsardanidis, S. Stavridis, The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal, “European Integration”, 2005, no. 2, p. 229.
21 R. Panagiotou, FYROM’s Transition: on the Road to Europe, “Journal of Southern Europe and the
Balkans”, 2008, no. 1, p. 50-51.
22 M. Szpala, Macedonia, in: Bałkany Zachodnie a integracja europejska. Perspektywy i implikacje,
Warszawa 2008, p. 56-57.
23 A. Adamczyk, Kwestia macedońska w bałkańskiej polityce Grecji, “Rocznik Instytutu Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej”, 2009, no. 7, p. 51-67.
plaint against Greece with the International Court of Justice claiming
that Greece was violating the agreement of 1995 by blocking FYROM’s
accession to international organisations. In 2009, when the European
Commission issued a recommendation to open accession negotiations between the EU and FYROM, Greece was the only country to
block the decision on setting the starting date for these negotiations.
In 2011, the ICJ ruled that Greece had had no right to block FYROM’s membership in the NATO.24 This ruling, however, had no effect
on Greece’s policy towards Macedonia. Consecutive Greek governments stand by the position that before Macedonia can resume its
path to the EU, it first needs to solve the issue of its name. Even though
every year the European Commission reconfirms its opinion that FYROM is ready to start the accession negotiations, Greece consistently
blocks the decision on setting the date for the commencement of these
negotiations in the EU. At the summit of the European Council in December 2012, the heads of state and government unanimously decided
that the commencement of FYROM’s accession process depended on
the implementation of the right reforms, consolidation and respect
for good neighbourly values and on the resolution of the name issue
in negotiations held under the auspices of the UN.25
The difficult task to mediate in these negotiations fell to Matthew
Nimetz, who made a number of attempts to propose different versions of the country’s possible name.26 In late 2012 and early 2013,
there were proposals to name it the Upper Republic of Macedonia,
Northern Republic of Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Macedonia, or Vardar Republic of Macedonia.27 None of these, however, was
accepted by Greece and some were also rejected by Bulgaria. Greek
politicians – hostages to the internal political situation, which they
24 International Court of Justice website: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16841.pdf, last ac�cessed on: 12 September 2014.
25 FYROM Name Issue, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.mfa.
gr/en/fyrom-name-issue, last accessed on: 10 August 2014.
26 Nimetz Starts New Push for Macedonia ‘Name’ Deal, “Balkan Insight", 8 January 2013, available at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-visits-athens-skopje-for-fresh-name-talks, last
accessed on: 10 August 2014.
27 Nowa propozycja nazwy dla Macedonii, EuroActiv, 17 April 2013, available at: http://www.eura�ctiv.pl/rozszerzenie/artykul/nowa-propozycja-nazwy-dla-macedonii-004616, last accessed on:
10 August 2014.
17
18
themselves have caused trying to overdo each other in patriotism –
do not want to accept any name which contains the word Macedonia.28
The relations between the two countries became even more strained
in 2010, when the Macedonian government launched the project
Skopje 2014 of restructuring the downtown of the capital to emphasise its historical ties to the ancient Macedon. Next to classicist buildings bearing hallmarks of ancient Greek architecture, huge statues to
Alexander III of Macedon, Philip II of Macedon and Olympias were
erected. The Macedonian project offended the Greeks’ patriotic feelings and provoked the government in Athens to take further international actions against Macedonia. The enlargement policy was not one
of the priorities of the Greek Presidency in the Council of the European Union. This way, at the next summit in June 2014, the problem
of setting the starting date for accession negotiations with FYROM
did not arise. Well aware that its recommendation would once again
be rejected, the European Commission did no longer even try to issue it. Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and
European Neighbourhood Policy, attempted on several occasions to
persuade Greece to soften their position so that FYROM would be
able to commence their accession negotiations, and so that only the
final outcome would depend on the resolution of the name problem,
but Greece remained adamant.29
It would seem that the relations between Greece and Macedonia and, consequently, between the EU and Macedonia have reached
a stalemate. Greece is waiting for the government in Skopje to come
up with an initiative. In Macedonia, in turn, the dispute with Greece
is excellent political fuel for the FYROM’s ruling party which enjoys
ever greater political support due to its uncompromising stance. As
a result, there is little hope for a solution to this problem and for resuming integration between Macedonia and the European Union.
28 P. Koktsidis, FYROM’s EU Accession Hopes: A Delicate Balance, “ELIAMEP Briefing Notes”, 2013,
no. 6, p. 2.
29 Bulgaria and Greece Block Macedonia’s EU Talks, “Balkan Insight”, 12 December 2012, available at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-joins-greece-in-blocking-macedonia-s-eubid, last accessed on: 10 August 2014.
3.
The Bulgarian veto
against FYROM’s accession to the EU
The relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria are best described as
changeable. Initially, after Macedonia’s declaration of independence,
they were friendly. In 1992, Bulgaria was the first country to recognise
Macedonia as a sovereign state30 and, what is even more important,
it also recognised the name Republic of Macedonia, which caused
a brief crisis in the relations between Bulgaria and Greece. Bulgaria
supported Macedonia’s pro-Western efforts and its ambitions to join
the NATO and the EU. The government in Sofia was deeply interested
in stabilising the political situation of their western neighbour, well
aware that with a considerable Albanian minority Macedonia could
be a source of ethnic conflicts in the entire region.
Even though the two governments issued official declarations that
they would maintain friendly relations, numerous problems arose and
hampered the relations between Skopje and Sofia. Even today Bulgarian linguists abide by the thesis that there is no separate Macedonian language and that it is just a dialect of Bulgarian, while Bulgarian
rightist politicians and historians claim that there is also no separate
Macedonian nation and that the country is in fact inhabited by ethnic
Bulgarians.31 Some Macedonian politicians, in turn, criticise the Bulgarian government for not recognising the Macedonian minority living in Bulgaria. Furthermore, the disputes between the two countries
concern some historical events, which the two countries interpret as
their own national heritage.32 In 1999, in order to eliminate the problems causing disputes between them, the two countries signed a Joint
Declaration, in which they committed to supporting the development
of cooperation between Macedonia and Bulgaria. The main objective
behind the declaration was to bring the two societies closer through
promotion of the development of transportation and communication
as well as joint participation in regional projects. Moreover, the two
30 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/macedonian-spat-marks-end-greek-presiden��cy-303277, last accessed on: 8 September 2014.
31Ibidem.
32 In the Middle Ages, the present territory of the Republic of Macedonia was held by the Bulgarian Empire and was subsequently conquered by the Ottoman Empire. As an autonomous entity,
Macedonia was distinguished only after World War II, as a part of Yugoslavia.
19
20
countries promised to abstain from taking any hostile actions against
each other: ‘Both parties shall undertake effective measures to prevent
ill-intentioned propaganda of the respective institutions and agencies
and shall not allow activities of private individuals aimed at instigating
violence, hatred or other such actions which might harm the relations
between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia’.33
Even though the declaration was very general and left many issues unaddressed, it contributed to the improvement of the relations
between the two countries. Taking into account the bad relations between Macedonia and Greece, the government in Skopje was aware
that Bulgaria was their main partner in the region – a partner who
was advanced on the path to Western European structures and who
could support Macedonia in the international arena. Good relations
between the two countries lasted until the NATO summit in Bucharest of 2008, when FYROM’s candidacy was rejected after Greece’s
veto. Furthermore, the spokesperson for the Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs declared that bearing in mind the historical and geographic determinants, Sofia would not support the government in Skopje
unconditionally. It seems that the Bulgarian government decided to
take advantage of Macedonia’s difficult situation to pursue its own
interests. Following that, the Macedonian media presented opinions
that by supporting Athens, Bulgaria was interfering with the dispute
between Macedonia and Greece, and there were suggestions of there
being a Greek–Bulgarian conspiracy against Skopje. These speculations were denied by the prime minister of Bulgaria, but this did not
prevent the relations between the two countries from deteriorating.34
It should be stressed that the rejection of FYROM as a candidate for
a NATO member in 2008 was a landmark event for Macedonians,
whose bitterness and resentment fuelled a surge of nationalistic attitudes. In 2010, the Bulgarian government presented to Macedonia
a proposal of an agreement on good neighbourly and friendly relations.
The proposal concerned cooperation in the fields of economy, infrastructure, energy, and combating organised crime. A special scientific
33 Macedonia and Bulgaria: So Close, Yet So Distant, “Policy Brief”, Macedonian Centre for European
Training, February 2012, p. 8, available at: http://mcet.org.mk/ckfinder/files/Bulgarija_Macedonia_So-Close_Yet_So-Distant_MCET_-ENG.pdf, last accessed on: 21 September 2014.
34 Ibidem, p. 4.
committee would also be established to solve the problems with the
interpretation of history by the two societies. In response, the Macedonian government proposed that Bulgaria should sign the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which would
force the government in Sofia to recognise the Macedonian minority living in Bulgaria.35 Nationalist rhetoric was becoming an increasingly prominent element of statements made by politicians from both
countries. The culminating point of the relations between Macedonia
and Bulgaria was 2012, when Bulgaria took an official position in the
dispute between Greece and Macedonia concerning the name of the
latter. The government in Sofia announced that they would not agree
to the name North Macedonia proposed by the mediator, as they believed this could mean that Macedonia would make territorial claims
to the Bulgarian region of Pirin Macedonia. Bulgarian politicians announced that they would be blocking any progress in the talks between
Macedonia and the European Union until such a time when all problems between Bulgaria and Macedonia are solved. In the same year,
the European Commission once again presented its positive opinion
on commencing accession negotiations between FYROM and the EU.
The government in Sofia criticised the Commission’s opinion, claiming
that it did not reflect reality. In the opinion of the Bulgarian government, there was an anti-Bulgarian campaign in Macedonia, conducting
business was made difficult for Bulgarian companies and individuals
of Bulgarian origins were persecuted.36 Bulgaria was the second country, after Greece, which did not consent to launching accession negotiations at the summit of the European Council in December 2012.
Bulgaria decided to take advantage of Macedonia’s difficult situation
and demanded that the government in Skopje meet three conditions:
first, that they sign the agreement on good neighbourly practice; second, that they create suitable conditions for the development of cooperation and establish working groups for improving relations in
35 Ibidem, p. 2.
36 Bułgaria nadal przeciwna negocjacjom UE z Macedonią o akcesji, EuroActiv, 6 December 2012,
available at: http://www.euractiv.pl/rozszerzenie/wywiad/bugaria-nadal-przeciwna-negocjac�jom-ue-z-macedoni-o-akcesji-004269, last accessed on: 21 September 2014.
21
22
key areas; and third, that a special council be formed to deal with the
organisation of annual intergovernmental meetings.37
Concerned that his country might be facing further international
isolation, the Macedonian prime minister accepted Bulgaria’s conditions.38 But even despite this declaration, the relations between the
two countries kept deteriorating in 2013. The escalation of tensions
was caused by repressions against Macedonians of Bulgarian origin
in the town of Strumica and appropriation by Macedonia of Bulgaria’s
historical heroes and their achievements. But the greatest consternation among Bulgarians was caused by the screening of the movie
‘Third Half ’, which accused Bulgarians of collaboration with the Nazis and aiding them in committing the Holocaust against Jews during
World War II.39 Nationalist rhetoric surged in the speeches delivered
by politicians from both countries. It seems that at a certain point it
got out of control and was used mainly for the purpose of internal political games preceding the parliamentary elections in both countries.
At the moment, Bulgaria’s position remains unchanged. The government in Sofia still demands that Macedonia sign the agreement on
good neighbourly practice and that it cease all attempts to falsify history and any other actions contributing to the worsening of the relations between the two countries.40
Conclusion
Macedonia’s road to the European Union seems particularly bumpy.
Despite the implemented reforms and the determination of consecutive governments to obtain a membership in Western European struc-
37 Bulgaria’s Brussels Blockade Leaves Macedonia Bitter, “Balkan Insight”, 14 December 2012, available
at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-s-brussels-blockade-leaves-macedoniabitter, last accessed on: 21 September 2014.
38 Macedonia Accepts Bulgaria’s Terms for Support, “Balkan Insight”, 5 December 2012, available at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-accepts-bulgarian-terms-for-support, last
accessed on: 21 September 2014.
39 Bulgaria’s Relations with Macedonia: Reset Or Reverse?, The Sofia Globe, available at: http://sofia�globe.com/2013/01/10/bulgarias-relations-with-macedonia-reset-or-reverse/, last accessed on:
12 September 2014.
40 Bulgaria Continues Sting Conditions for Macedonia’s EU, NATO Accession, Focus News Agency,
23 July 2014, available at: http://www.focus-fen.net/news, last accessed on: 12 September 2014.
tures, the country still has no tangible prospects for accession. The
unresolved dispute between Greece and Macedonia concerning the
name of the country and the strained relations between Skopje and
Sofia keep preventing Macedonia from participating in the processes
of European integration. The Macedonian society is already tired and
feels humiliated by the long wait for the EU’s decision on commencing accession negotiations. On the other hand, Macedonia’s leading
political party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO –
DPMNE), does not exhibit any inclination towards reconciliation with
the neighbours. On the contrary, it tries to gain political support by
taking advantage of the Macedonians’ patriotic feelings by promoting a sense of threat to their national identity.41 The lack of tangible
prospects for joining the EU causes increasing tensions among Macedonia’s citizens and leads to a surge of nationalist sentiments. The
Albanian minority protests against the government’s policy, which
has a rather liberal attitude to the country’s name. Politicians do not
stand the test of time and forget about implementing pro-democratic
reforms. Macedonia is more and more often criticised for lowering
democratic standards, infringing on the freedom of the media, corruption and nepotism. Macedonia’s path to the EU is now blocked not
only by the unresolved dispute with Greece and Bulgaria, but also by
failing to observe European values.
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25
Is Kosovo a Precedent?
Legal and International Dilemmas
of the Unilateral Declaration
of Independence of the Kosovo Republic
Abstract: On 17th February 2008, the parliamentary body of the temporary authorities of Kosovo adopted a Declaration of Independence and proclaimed
that Kosovo should be recognized as an “independent and sovereign country”. At present, 106 countries recognize Kosovo as an independent country
(as for 2nd July, 2014). The political dilemmas of the countries of the international community, including the requirement of a legal assessment of the
consequences of the unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Kosovo
Republic, referred, in fact, to the need to take a stance towards the meaning of
and the mutual relations between the basic rules and principles and the institutions of modern international law (ius inter gentes), in particular the problem
of setting a precedent in terms of intrastate and international law, respecting
the rules of the territorial integrity of states, and issues such as the autonomy
of nations, the institution of territorial secession and the recognition of states
by other states.
Keywords: Kosovo, Western Balkans, international law, independence, precedent.
1.
The problem of precedent as exemplified
by Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence
On 17th February 2008, the parliamentary body of the temporary authorities of Kosovo adopted a Declaration of Independence and proclaimed that Kosovo should be recognized as “an independent and
sovereign country”1. The case above resulted in an actual polarization
of the standpoints of other countries as to its legal validity. As a result,
1
More in: P. Hilpold (ed.), Kosovo and International Law, The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010,
Leiden 2012.
28
Kosovo was only recognized as a state body by a particular, though
divided and pluralized, group of countries – so far 106 countries have
declared this kind of affirmation (as for 2nd July, 2014). What is significant, there is no consensus in this matter among the EU member
states or the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN
(the Russian Federation and the Republic of China).
Russia, a long-time and proven ally of Serbia, is the main opponent of the existence of an independent Kosovo2. As a member of the
Security Council of the UN it effectively blocks the accession of the
new country to that organization. This approach is enhanced, on the
one hand, by the rivalry between Russia and the USA, and, on the
other hand, by Russia’s fear of the “precedent” as encouraging local
separatism in the post-soviet countries. The latter reason, apart from
solidarity with Serbia, is the premise of the attitude of such countries
as Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia, Greece or Romania which also refused to
accept the independence of Kosovo3.
The political dilemmas of the countries, including the requirement
of a legal assessment of the consequences of a unilateral Declaration
of Independence of the Kosovo Republic, in fact, referred to the necessity of taking stance towards the meaning of and relations between
the basic rules and principles as well as the institutions of modern international law (ius inter gentes), in particular the problem of setting
a precedent in terms of intrastate and international law, respecting
the rules of the territorial integrity of states, the autonomy of nations,
the institution of territorial secession of states, and the recognition of
states by other states.
The main dilemma, which seemed to have the greatest influence on
the reactions of other countries, was the belief and the question if the
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo and its subsequent recognition would be some kind of a precedent which could result in similar
reactions in spe. In other words, there was a fear that the Declaration
of Independence of Kosovo would inspire and provide a legal basis
for analogue attempts at political emancipation of the national mi-
2 More in: K. Pawłowski, Kosowo: konflikt i interwencja, Lublin 2008, chapter 2 and 3.
3 Cf. P. Pacuła, Kosowo: problemy teraźniejszości, wyzwania przyszłości, „Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”,
nr 22, II – 2012, p. 118.
Is Kosovo a Precedent? Legal and International Dilemmas...
norities within other countries. Whereas the anxious opponents of
the recognition of Kosovo persist in pressing the charge of a violation
of the principles of international law which should safeguard, first of
all, the territorial integrity of the existing countries, those who accept
the foundation of Kosovo claim that the act of separation of the province from Serbia is unique in international practice and does not set
a precedent for the future4.
Therefore, it seems that in order to assess the legitimacy of the dilemmas rationally, it has to be stated that the problem of a precedent
is described and analyzed differently in international legal doctrine
and practice and in the theory of international relations. Political scientists usually use the term “precedent” with reference to finite past
events which are politically convincing and usable in terms of daily
political and diplomatic practice. In contrast, lawyers, show a more
principled and stricter understanding of that term and use it when
a past event confirms the legitimacy of its application in current and
analogue cases. From a practical, technical point of view, it should be
stressed that in international law, unlike in intrastate law, a precedent
is not binding. For example, a previous decision by the International
Court of Justice in the case between A and B does not define a legal
rule and, in consequence, the practice of its use later in a similar situation occurring between countries C and D.
However, in defiance of this stipulation, in international legal practice attempts are often made to create and use a coherent catalogue of
rules possible to use in similar or analogical situations. The questions
is whether Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence and the acceptance
of its consequences in international practice by means of diplomatic recognition signifies that both international lawyers and political
decision-makers have decided to follow that example and as a result
use it as a legal principle for other analogical cases, or, if that practice
is, in fact, incorrect and should rather be perceived as an actual violation of international law.
4 Cf. P. Daranowski, Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa – usankcjonowanie precedensu, [in:] Księga
pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Białocerkiewicza, T. Jasudowicz, M. Balcerzak (ed.), Toruń
2009, p. 1-2.
29
30
It seems that in this particular case, i.e. the international status of
the Kosovo Republic, the answer should comprise an analysis of the
content of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which is
binding on this matter, as well as an interpretation of the rules and
provisions of international law and of the theory of international relations concerning the problems of sovereignty and secession5.
2.
The case of Kosovo and the implications
of the UN Resolution 1244
It remains significant that the direct parties to the conflict, that is the
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo, are now seeking a legal
justification to their political standpoints as to the status of Kosovo in
the UN Resolution 1244 from June 10, 1999. What is more, the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo emphasizes expressis verbis the
will to act according to the rules of international law and the resolutions of the Security Council (including the Resolution 1244) and at
the same time, a contrario, Serbian political authorities are contesting
the legality of the declaration, quoting its incongruity with the Resolution 1244 as one of the reasons. In a way it confirms the importance
and a special political and legal character of the Resolution 1244 and
its practical significance to Kosovo6. In practice, the acceptance of the
resolution meant that the intervention of NATO countries in Serbia
and Montenegro in 1999 determined the “entanglement” of further operations in Kosovo with some UN mechanisms and subjecting them
to the order established by the Charter of the United Nations and the
international community accepted and adopted that solution.
Most importantly, an analysis of the content of the UN Resolution
1244 shows that it established an international protectorate in Kosovo
supervised by the UN (United Nations Interim Administration Mission
5 Cf. Ch. Borgen, Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict Resolution, Wilson Center/Global Europe Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/350-kosovo-precedent-secession-self-determination-and-conflict-resolution
6 Cf. R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej deklaracji niepodległości Kosowa, [in:] Prawo Międzynarodowe i Wspólnotowe wobec wyzwań współczesnego świata, E. Dynia
(ed.), Rzeszów 2009, p. 115-116.
in Kosovo – UNMIK). In the prologue, the resolution confirmed the
duty to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and appealed for real autonomy and self-governance in Kosovo. In its matter, however, the resolution asserted that
“actions aimed at establishing real autonomy and self-governance” in
Kosovo will be taken “the definitive decision pending” with full respect
to the Rambouillet agreement. The Rambouiliet agreement which was
de facto an attempt at normalizing the conflict between Serbia and
Kosovo with the support of the international community and outlined
a construction of the province’s autonomy which was very demanding
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia7. The content of the resolution
also stipulated that formally Yugoslavia would have sovereignty over
Kosovo while, in fact, it granted the power to the Kosovo Force and
a UN-appointed administrator8.
Nowadays, when referring to the specific character and the interpretation of the content of the UN Resolution 1244 and the consequences it entailed, governments of states such as the Republic of
Serbia or the Russian Federation quote the provisions of the preamble: “reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”
and claim that de facto et de iure the Resolution 1244 does not allow
the secession of Kosovo in any scope or form, and even less so without
a formal agreement of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, the
European Union in its official stance emphasizes that the Resolution
1244 is not an obstacle to Kosovo’s independence, sovereignty and political subjectivity and that the document does not determine the ultimate status of the province. In fact, it should be assumed that from
a formal point of view the resolution neither promotes nor in any way
prevents a future secession of Kosovo. What is more, the content of
paragraph 1 of the resolution states that a future political solution as to
the status of the province should be based on the principles included
in the relevant annexes, which, as far as their content is concerned,
remain “silent” in this matter. They only confirm that until a defini-
7 More in: P. Daranowski, Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa – usankcjonowanie..., p. 13.
8 Cf. E. Dynia, Uznanie Kosowa w świetle prawa międzynarodowego, [in:] Prawo Międzynarodowe
i Wspólnotowe wobec wyzwań współczesnego świata, E. Dynia (ed.), Rzeszów 2009, p. 21.
31
32
tive solution is worked out, Kosovo should have a wide autonomy and
self-governance while preserving a permanent territorial integrity of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As for the territorial integrity of
Serbia, the relevant declarations are limited to the introductory part
of the preamble and do not occur in the operational part of the document. In other words, in its technical part the UN Resolution 1244 is
also “silent,” which has led to a number of interpretative speculations
as to the legality and validity of the acknowledgement of the Republic
of Kosovo as a full-fledged state entity9.
3.
The principle of sovereignty and the problem
of the “precedent” of Kosovo
As Roman Kwiecień notices, the lack of reference to the principle of
sovereignty in the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is significant. Presumably, it was an intentional act. In fact, the legal justification of the secession of Kosovo on the strength of the principle of the
autonomy of nations seems nowadays to be a risky measure which
is doomed to failure. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, the process of establishing Kosovo was not an inner process and as such it
was not a self-constitution, but was incited by international involvement, especially that of the UN (Resolution 1244). The involvement
was so significant that the constitution adopted by the Parliament of
Kosovo is, in fact, a granted constitution, as the legal system which it
introduced in Kosovo had been stipulated in the so-called Ahtisaari
Plan10 (Annex 1, Art.1.3). Secondly, because of the lack of the home
9 Cf. Ch. Borgen, Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict Resolution...
10 On the strength of a decision of the UN, its Special Envoy, Martii Ahtisaari, was obliged to prepare a comprehensive proposal of solving the status of Kosovo as a basis for further international negotiations. His proposal was submitted (respectively on 26 Jan and 02 Feb 2007) to the
parties of the so-called Contact Group. Russia excluded the possibility of accepting it without
a Serbian agreement. The Serbian parliament rejected the project. On March 26th, 2007, the
UN submitted the final version of the project, stating the final status of Kosovo, to the Security
Council with the recommendation of accepting it and a Report of the Special Envoy. The plan
stipulated an extensive self-governance of Kosovo including the right to enter into treaty relations and apply for the membership of international organizations as well as the right to decide
its state symbols, such as the flag, the currency and the army. Although the plan did not use the
term “independence,” its author formed his opinion saying that “the only credible option is the
state’s (the Republic of Serbia’s) agreement to a secession of part of its
territory. It is worth noticing, that the authors of the Declaration of
Independence of Kosovo were conscious of the legal controversy of
the act admitting in the preambule that the case of “Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not
a precedent for any other situations”11.
In the subject of the so-called Ahtisaari Plan, it should be noticed
that the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo emphasizes the respect for the principle of integrity of the existing countries. It declares
that “Kosovo will maintain its international borders as determined in
Annex VIII to the Ahtisaari Plan and will fully respect the autonomy
and territorial integrity of all its neighbours”. In Annex VIII, we can
read that “3.2 The territory of Kosovo shall be defined by the frontiers
of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo within the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as these frontiers stood on 31 December 1988 (…)”12.
The Ahtisaari Plan stipulated that Kosovo would obtain the status of an entity recognized by international law13, controlled by the
EU and NATO, yet it did not contain any reference to Kosovo’s independence. It was only supported by the authorities of Kosovo, most
EU countries and the USA, while Serbia and Russia were against it.
The subsequent negotiations between Serbia and the contemporary
authorities of Kosovo, in cooperation with the representatives of the
EU, the Russian Federation and the USA, were not successful. On
17th February 2008, the National Assembly of Kosovo proclaimed the
unilateral Declaration of Independence14. The act, nota bene of a very
controversial nature, initiated the real process of the secession of Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia.
11
12
13
14
independence of Kosovo, initially under the supervision of the international community (…)”
because “Kosovo is a unique case requiring unique solutions. It does not set a precedent in relation to other unsolved conflicts”. Cf. R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej deklaracji..., p. 117.
R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej.., p. 12.
P. Daranowski, Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa…, p. 12.
E. Dynia, Uznanie Kosowa w świetle prawa międzynarodowego..., p. 20.
Kosovo Declaration of Independence, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,100,45 [access:
01.08. 2010].
33
34
4.
The consequences of the recognition of Kosovo
and its absence in international legal practice
The problem of the recognition of the new subject aroused controversy
in the international community. The Serbian government did not agree
to the independence and secession of a part of Serbia considering it
a breach of international law. Acting upon the initiative of that country, on October 8, 2008, the General Assembly of the UN made the
decision of examining the international legacy of the unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo. Voting 10 to 4 the International
Court of Justice in the Hague ruled that the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo15 proclaimed in February 2008 violated neither international law nor the Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the UN.
More importantly, as stated in the opinion of the International Court
of Justice, the interpretation only concerns Kosovo and takes into account the particular historical and political conditions of the process
and as such should not be used as a precedent in international law.
In spite of the above, the international community is still divided
over the question of the legitimacy of the Declaration of Independence and the recognition Kosovo by other countries. The split illustrates not only the division of the community into countries which
recognize Kosovo and those which do not, but also the outcome of
the vote on the resolution of the UN from 2008, concerning the motion for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on
the compatibility of the declaration with international law (77 countries were for, 6 against, 74 abstained from voting or voted against the
adoption of the resolution)16.
We can try to estimate the influence of the recognition of Kosovo
as a country by most subjects of international communities for international law. It seems that over the lack of common recognition,
particularly by all the members of the Security Council of the UN the
recognition does not result erga omnes but only inter partes. That
means that Kosovo is a country in relation to the countries which recognize it. It is not a country for those which do not17.
15 E. Dynia, Uznanie Kosowa w świetle prawa międzynarodowego..., p. 21.
16 R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej deklaracji..., p. 118.
17 Ibidem, p. 119.
What is more, it should be stated that for the international law the
case of Kosovo is dangerous for essential reasons. It undermines an
relativizes its stability and predictability and in this way proves its susceptibility to change, either revolutionary or evolutionary. Describing
Kosovo as a case sui generis we accept that the international law is not
sufficient or inadequate in this matter and seek solutions outside the
law. The risk is not reduced by the reservations voiced by some countries as well as the very Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, claiming that the case should not be considered as a precedent. Moreover,
this kind of statement is counterproductive as it implies the awareness of the resolving entities of the incongruity of the legal status of
Kosovo with the international law. Secondly, it should be noted that
the recognition of Kosovo by a numerous group of countries has had,
despite the controversy of the act and due to its incompatibility with
the principle of territorial integrity of a country, at least two measurable international consequences, i.e., a reduction of the Serbian territory and the establishment of a new state – the Republic of Kosovo18.
Bibliography
Borgen Ch., Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict
Resolution, Wilson Center/Global Europe Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/350-kosovo-precedent-secession-self-determination-and-conflict-resolution
Daranowski P., Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa – usankcjonowanie precedensu,
[in:] Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Białocerkiewicza, T. Jasudowicz, M. Balcerzak (ed.), Toruń 2009, p. 1-2
Hilpold P. (ed.), Kosovo and International Law, The ICJ Advisory Opinion of
22 July 2010, Leiden 2012
Kosovo Declaration of Independence, http://www.assembly-kosova.
org/?cid=2,100,45 [access: 01.08. 2010]
Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Białocerkiewicza, T. Jasudowicz, M. Balcerzak (ed.), Toruń 2009
Kwiecień R., Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej deklaracji
niepodległości Kosowa, [in:] Prawo Międzynarodowe i Wspólnotowe wobec
wyzwań współczesnego świata, E. Dynia (ed.), Rzeszów 2009, p. 115-116
18 Ibidem, p. 120; K. Pawłowski, Kosowo…, p. 210.
35
36
Pacuła P., Kosowo: problemy teraźniejszości, wyzwania przyszłości,
„Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, nr 22, II – 2012, p. 118
Pawłowski K., Kosowo: konflikt i interwencja, Lublin 2008, chapter 2 and 3
Prawo Międzynarodowe i Wspólnotowe wobec wyzwań współczesnego
świata, E. Dynia (ed.), Rzeszów 2009
in Kosovar Perspective:
An Agenda for International Cooperation
Abstract: Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) shared a similar fate in
former Yugoslav conflicts and international development on the subject of
nation building, international intervention and international relations. The
two countries now are making an incremental progress towards the EU integration. However, challenges remain in many aspects, including the regional
cooperation. This paper aims to look at the Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina relations in last decade or so with the objective to conduct an analysis
of the current developments in the region. This paper looks at the political,
economic and security cooperation as an amalgamation of inter-dependent
relations in the post-Yugoslav context, with all the ethno-political challenges
and geo-political burdens.
Keywords: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Yugoslav conflicts, the
EU.
1.
Historical Overview
1.1. Former Yugoslavia
The relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are linked
historically since the Ottoman Empire until the collapse of Yugoslavia.
However, the history of the Balkans is riddled with historic resources allowing for symbolic distinctions to be manipulated for political
goals1. This is particularly evident within former Yugoslavia, where
ethnic, religious, and nationalist divisions have lasting consequences
on international relations. Yet, relations since independence of both
states have been non-existent due to a lack of unanimity in the central
1
Barth F., Boundaries and connections. Signifying identities: Anthropological perspectives on boundaries and contested values, 17-36.
38
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Bosnia has refrained from
formal recognition, largely due to the position of its own Serb population on the issue”. As the Serbs comprise around 37% of the population
of the country. Even though “Bosniaks share a similar independence
trajectory and a common stance against Serbs–as well as having some
religious and cultural similarities to Kosovo”2, constructed ethnic divisions within Bosnia have had consequences on international relations. For instance, on the 21st February 2008, the Republika Srpska
refuses to recognize Kosovo; this stance has been continued until the
present day3, resulting in the lack of formal recognition of Kosovo by
Bosnia and Herzegovina due to ethno-politics.
1.2. Diasporas (Kosovars in Bosnia and Bosniaks in Kosovo)
Ethno-politics have consequences also in Kosovo; for instance, the political structure secures non-Serb minorities with ten seats in the Kosovo Assembly, three of which are for Bosniaks, enables community
elites to manipulate “political activity within the community in order
to prevent the emergence of electoral competitors”. While, for Bosniaks (diaspora & non-diaspora) in Kosovo, have struggled to stay politically unified, and tend to support larger Albanian parties. This may
be a result of the 1974 Yugoslav Federation constitution which titled
all Slavic Muslims as “nationality Muslim” or “Bosniak”4. Therefore,
this may be an indication that those classified as “Bosniaks” are not
self-prescribed, or the fact that the classification of “national” Muslim
may also contribute to their integration into other Albanian parties.
1.3. Relations during the Kosovo war
The course of wars in Former Yugoslavia brought up a very important
question “How did such an obvious artificial construct as Yugoslavia
came into its existence and survived for such a long time?” By the end
2
Stroschein, S. (2013). Discourse in Bosnia and Macedonia on the Independence of Kosovo: When
and What is a Precedent? Europe-Asia Studies, 65:5, 874-888.
3 Republika Srpska Slams Kosovo Recognition “Pressure”: Balkan Insight. 2014. RepublikaSrpska
Slams Kosovo Recognition “Pressure”: Balkan Insight. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dodik-opposes-bosnia-s-recognition-of-kosovo. [Accessed 09 July 2014].
4 Cocozzeli, F. (2008). Small Minorities in a Divided Polity: Turks, Bosniaks, Muslim Slavs and Roms,
Ashkalis, Egyptians in Post-Conflict Kosovo. Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 7:2-3, 287-306.
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Kosovar Perspective: An Agenda for International Cooperation
of the 20th century, Yugoslavia was a truly multi-national state; The
Bosniak and Albanian communities comprised 18.6% respectively 8%
of the total Yugoslav population by 19885. (See table 1.)
Table 1. Kosovo and Bosnian population within Yugoslavia6
Population in Percentage
Year
1953
1979
1988
Kosovo
4.8%
6.9%
8%
16.7%
18.6%
18.8%
The course of wars and the rise of nationalism and economic issues
within Yugoslavia profoundly influenced the stability of the federation. The internal movements within BiH and later on Kosovo7 raised
violence to a total new level and agitated the public opinion in Yugoslavia. These movements triggered a chain of bloody wars that lasted
for years bringing the Yugoslav federation towards an end. Needless
to say, the conflicts brought unity, especially between Bosniaks and
Kosovo Albanians, having to share a similar experience of war, displacement and later on international intervention.
The political elite in BiH having to deal with coordination and problems originated by the Dayton Peace signed in December 19958 were
reluctant to show support for Kosovo explicitly. Nevertheless, by the
end of April, around 600, 000 residents of Kosovo had become refugees; roughly 400,000 were displaced internally within the territory of
Kosovo. 375,000 Kosovars moved south to the neighbouring Albania,
and 150,000 had moved to Macedonia. Others moved to Montenegro
5 Lampe, J. R. (1996). Yugoslavia as history: twice there was a country. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni��versity Press, 336-337.
6 Leätina D. (1992). Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, anti-Consequences, Boulder, CO: Westview Press (180-181).
7 For the purpose of this paper the case of Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro and FYROM will not be
elaborated.
8 Peace agreement reached on November 21, 1995, by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, ending the war in Bosnia and outlining a General Framework of the Bosnian Federation and
its political system.
39
40
and BiH. According to UNHCR, approximately 10,000 of the Kosovo
refugees have moved to BiH since January 19889.
2.
Economic Cooperation
Kosovo and BiH are undergoing a long-lasting transition from
the socialist to liberal open market economy. The trajectory of Kosovo
and BiH economic development is shifting from the system in which
the establishment of state ownership and control was the main objective of economic policy, to the liberalization of the economy, free
market, self-management and decentralization10. The economies of
Kosovo and BiH have shown a relatively low development since the
90s, and the challenging struggles for better, sustainable economy are
continuing in the post-war years.
Needless to say, despite its weak economy, Kosovo has showed enthusiasm for trade liberalization. Along with internal economic development, Kosovo has been struggling to establish commercial and trade
relations with other countries in the region and worldwide. A small
emerging economy such as the one of Kosovo does not have a balance
of exports and imports – meaning that the quantity of imported good
is larger than the goods exported in other partner countries.
2.1. CEFTA and Free Trade between Kosovo and BiH
The CEFTA is a free trade agreement which progressively form an
integrated area of regional trade and cooperation. The new CEFTA
– also the so called – CEFTA 2006 was signed by its all parties in
2007, to only enter into force in the second part of 200811. CEFTA
represents a trade agreement between non-EU countries in Central
and South-Eastern Europe. Comprised of fifteen member states, the
signatory countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
9 Krieger, H. (2001). The Kosovo conflict and international law: an analytical documentation, 19741999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 66-68.
10 Simon, György, An Economic History of Socialist Yugoslavia (2014). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2094334 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2094334
11 Introduced by the European Union, CEFTA was firstly established in 1991, and it only became effective in 1993 having only Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary as member states.
Slovenia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo,
BiH, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia.Basically, through this treaty
the member states agree on mutual reduction of customs in their territory. Furthermore, it envisages the elimination of state monopolies
by stimulating competition, and harmonizing the legal framework
and regulations12.
From 2000 until 2013, Kosovo products have been exported mainly on the regional countries, whereas the economic embargo set by
the authorities in BiH and Serbia had a remarkable implication in this
manner. Since the declaration of independence by Kosovo institutions,
both Serbia and BiH have introduced the economic sanctions towards
Kosovo. Not having recognized the independence of Kosovo and the
new customs stamps, Serbia and BiH seized both import and transit
of Kosovo products in and through their territories thus by hampering
Kosovar economic development13. As a reaction towards the Serbian
and BiH authorities, Kosovo introduced trade reciprocity, meaning
that an embargo on imports of Serbian products and set a 10% tariff
on goods produced in BiH14.
Figure 1. Kosovo Foreign Trade with BiH (Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics)
12 Handjiski, B. (2010). Enhancing regional trade integration in Southeast Europe. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 56-57.
13 GAP Insitute (2011). Kosovo in CEFTA: In or Out? GAP Institute. Retrieved August 13, 2014, from
http://www.institutigap.org/documents/72590_CEFTAEng.pdf
14 Halili, P. (2011). Kosovo on the offensive: Trade reciprocity and rule of law. Washington Times Communities. Retrieved August 7, 2014, from http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighbor�hood/europeanization-monitor/2011/aug/2/kosovo-offensive-trade-reciprocity-and-rule-law/
41
42
Despite the contract signed and the decision to become part of
CEFTA and the agreement for a free trade economy within Balkan
states, the trade reciprocity between Kosovo and BiH breached the
main points of the CEFTA treaty. As seen in the figure above, precisely
after signing the CFETA agreement, BiH introduced the economic embargo thus by decreasing the percentage of imports from Kosovo from
3.0% in 2008 to 0.7% in 2009. This trend continues to decrease, while
the products of BiH, still remain in Kosovo market by roughly 3.0%.
Economic sanctions as a practice are quite well-known in international relations, a practice than in the 20th century has been used widely15. Despite the fact that the economic sanctions are widely used, the
traditional scholars believe that this tool is unsuccessful in achieving
the policy objectives16. Although, Robert Pope argues that economic
sanctions are rather human and definitely have smaller impact than
the use of military force17. Yet, in the case of Kosovo and BiH, the economic reciprocity has a great impact, and by default illegal, since it
does breach the CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement).
One of the most debatable issues is that the CEFTA treaty does
not possess any provision on how to act in cases when one member
state or groups of states applies economic embargo towards another
CEFTA member. However, Article 43 of the CEFTA treaty on Arbitration, clearly states that:
Disputes between the Parties, arising after this Agreement enters into
force between the Parties concerned and relating to the interpretation or
application of rights and obligations under it, which have not been settled through direct consultations in the Joint Committee within 90 calendar days from the date of the receipt of the request for consultations,
may be referred to arbitration by any Party to the dispute by means of
a written notification addressed to the other Party to the dispute18.
15 Tsugui, E. (2011). Regionalization and European Integration in the Framework of Central European Free Trade Agreement. Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS), 2, 1-8.
16 Delevis, M. (1998). The International Journal of Peace Studies. Economic Sanctions as a Foreign
Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia. Retrieved September 7, 2014, from http://www.gmu.edu/
programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/Delvic.htm
17 Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, 22(2), 90.
18Central European Free Trade Agreement (2006) Consolidated Version of the Central European
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006). Retrieved August 8, 2014, fromhttp://www.stabilitypact.
org/trade/ANN1CEFTA%202006%20Final%20Text.pdf
Nevertheless, in the case of Kosovo and BiH, the dispute is still ongoing, after almost four years by seriously harming the main concept
of the CEFTA as such the free trade concept.
As showed in the stats below, in 2013, Kosovo main foreign trade
partners in exports are Albania with 14.9%, Macedonia 8.9%, 5.9%
Montenegro, Serbia by 4.9%, while the largest partners of Kosovo imports from Balkan countries are Serbia with11.7%, Macedonia with
7.6%, and 4.5% Albania19.
3.
Security Cooperation
Developing and maintaining regional security cooperation in
the Western Balkan region continues to remain of the most crucial
interests of the European Union and Western Balkan countries. Indeed, security is a vital factor for establishing political stability, peace,
security and economic prosperity in the region.
Having in front challenges such as organized crime, international
terrorism, corruption and border management the Western Balkan
countries assisted by the EU, has had established many regional security initiatives. Despite the fact that cooperation in the field security
does represent one of the main elements of stabilization in the region,
it also requires partnership and cooperation between the countries
which were active in the chain of conflicts occurring in 1990’s or still
is in ongoing political disputes20. Hence, lack of recognition of Kosovo independence21 and statehood from BiH has created a status-quo
thus lack of bilateral relations among these countries.
19 Kosovo Agency of Statistics: Kosovo Foreign Trade – 2013 Stats. Kosovo Agency of Statistics.
Retrieved August 13, 2014, from http://ask.rks-gov.net/publikimet/doc_view/1127-statistikat-etregtisaeuml-saeuml-jashtme-2013?tmpl=component&format=raw
20 Djugumanov, I., Lazić, B., &Tasev, J. (2012). The Balkans and the Future of Euro-Atlantic Integration. Atlantic Council, 2(2), 1-12.
21 Full text: Kosovo declaration. (2008, February 17). BBC News. Retrieved September 8, 2014, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm
43
44
4.
Police
Police cooperation between BiH and Kosovo is constantly being
hampered by the political implications and lack of statehood recognition by BiH. Lacking formal and bilateral agreements between Kosovo
and BiH, the cooperation between the two states has been done by using other channels such as informal communication and cooperation
through regional initiatives in the field of security22.
So far, Kosovo has been communicating with BiH informally
through ILECU (International Law Enforcement Coordination Unit)23.
This platform of communication did boost cooperation between Kosovo and BiH, and it does connect Kosovo to the international platforms such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL24.
Needless to say, the development of the regional cooperation in the
Balkans under the coordination of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) which represents one of the main initiatives carrying more
than 40 regional cooperation mechanisms, has begun to show its first
successes by engaging Kosovo in regional level projects. Police cooperation in the Balkans has been also seen as a tool to overcome the
challenges of the past while facilitating the campaign against organized crime and other security threatens25.
4.1. Organized crime, Trafficking and Drugs
There is lack of cooperation between Kosovo and BiH in the bilateral
level, however, there has been some communication set up by law enforcement agencies led by several EU and Balkan countries. Collaboration in several operations has led to the dismantling one of the largest
and powerful drug network in the Balkans which used to network and
supplies drugs to the EU countries26. Moreover, the cooperation be-
22 Emini, D. (2014). Kosovo’s Membership and Participation in Regional Security Initiatives. Kosovar
Center for Security Studies (KCSS), 1(1), 1-32.
23 ILECU is an EU regional project aiming to establish national coordination units and enforce cooperation in the Western Balkan state.
24 Elshani, Veton. Interview by Donika Emini.Personal interview. Kosovo Police – ILECU, June 26,
2014.
25 Paszkiewicz, J. (2013). Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences, Regional Cooperation In Western Balkans : A View From Inside The European Union, The Premises And Obstacles
(149-160).
26 Karadaku, L. (2013, November 4). Police co-operation breaks major drug-trafficking network.
(SETimes.com). Retrieved September 25, 2014, from http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/
tween police and prosecutors Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Italy after an operation of
four years with the arrests of seven suspects in Albania and Italy on
charges of drug trafficking and other related crimes.
5.
Military
Military cooperation does represent one of the most challenging sphere in which Kosovo and BiH have not managed to establish
cooperation. The logic of linking the security institutions with the
statehood of Kosovo has made BiH authorities reluctant to establish
any type of relations with Kosovo. Thus, different from the police sector, the defence sector still remains challenging.
5.1. Defence, Training and Peacekeeping
Lacking bilateral relations Kosovo and BiH have not yet established
cooperation in the defence sector, henceforth the newly established
Kosovo Security Force (KSF) did not benefit from joint trainings with
BiH or other regional states.
So far Kosovo has not been able to participate in the Peace Support
Operations Training Center (PSOTC), an organization created for the
support of Armed Forces of BiH which of course has a regional component and partnership with NATO. Kosovo authorities have been
constantly showing ambitions to join this organization, but failed to
establish any type of relations, even non formal27.
Nevertheless, the Western Balkans region is being threatened from
terrorism, organized crime, cross-border criminal activities, corruption, such cases need to be dealt regionally and cooperation in the field
of security, including the intelligence sharing and other joint effort
are very much needed in order to fight against powerful global forces.
xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/11/04/feature-01
27 Emini, D. (2014). Kosovo’s Membership and Representation in Regional Security Initiative. Kosovar Center for Security Studies. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from http://www.qkss.org/reposi�tory/docs/Kosovo
45
46
6.
Transnational Justice and Victims of war
The chain of conflict in the Balkan Region for almost a decade
has had a huge impact on the former Yugoslav countries and their political and economic systems. Besides, this had devastated the social
fabric leaving thousands of people traumatized, still missing, killed and
disabled. Social devastation and wars and atrocities in this regional,
especially towards Muslims in BIH and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
reinforced and deepened social fragmentation in post-war society.
Many scholars have raised the question how do the post-war societies and countries manage to come to cope with a history of war
and violence, oppression and human rights violations? The concept
of transitional justice evolved from the field of international human
rights movements initially aiming to the judicial process aiming to address human rights violations committed by the dictatorial regimes28.
Nowadays, the concept of transitional justice has expanded and plays
a crucial role in international law and the process of democratisation,
as well as state and nation building in post-conflict countries. The concept does not include the judicial process only; it also includes truth
commissions aiming to keep track of the “damages”, and reparation
to the victims29. This process is usually led by international organizations/donors and foreign experts for the countries and societies in
transition most likely post-war or authoritarian countries. Generally
this process is done by reforming the state institutions focusing on
the security and justice sectors and by proceeding cases towards war
criminals by national and international courts. In the case of Kosovo
and BiH, the process of the above mentioned reforms are being initiated and implemented by international institutions, the concerns
about capacities and impartiality led to the creation of a mixed judicial
system staffed by both international and national judges and prosecutors, especially in the high profile cases of war crimes30. Nevertheless,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
28 Fischer, M. (2010). Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice. Berghof Foundation. Retrieved August 9, 2014, from http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publica�tions/fischer
29 Riffler, V. (2010). International Journal of Rule of Law, Transitional Justice and Human Rights, Transitional Justice And Human Rights, Vol. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1736605 p. 13
30 Zupan, N. (2007). Facing the Past and Transitional Justice in Countries of Former Yugoslavia. Berlin, 332.
deals with the cases of high profile war criminals, and so far this tribunal has four rather big cases ongoing31.
The number of victims in both Kosovo and BiH is rather difficult to
be estimated due to an ongoing process of finding the missing people.
However, the approximate death toll as registered so far shows that
in Kosovo around 16.00032 people died, while in BiH the number of
war victims is rather larger by registering around 104.000 victims33.
Table 2. Missing Persons during the Yugoslav wars: Cases of Kosovo and BiH34
Unaccounted/Missing Persons in the former Yugoslavia
Persons that went missing during the Yugoslav Wars
Bosnia-Herzegovina
30,000
Kosovo
4,400
Persons still missing or unaccounted for today
Bosnia-Herzegovina
10,000
Kosovo
1,900
6.1. Reparations
Reparations refer to the programs and initiatives sponsored by the
state aiming to contribute repairing – moral and material – of the
past abuse experienced by the victims35. Until now, no governmentsponsored reparation programmes for direct/ indirect victims of war
have been initiated in Kosovo or BiH.
31 The case of Ratko Mladic, Vojislav Seselj, Goran Hadzic, he cases are listed on the website of the
Tribunal: available at: http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4
32 Human Rights Watch. (2000). The Crisis in Kosovo. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.
Retrieved September 21, 2014, from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm
33 Zwierzchowski, J., & Tabeau, E. (2010). The Global Costs of Conflict.ICTY. Retrieved August 21,
2014, from http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_under�count_conf_paper_1
34 Der Auweraert, P. V. (2013). Reparations for Wartime Victims in the Former Yugoslavia: In Search
of the Way Forward. IOM. Retrieved August 22, 2014, from https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/
iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/Reparations-for-Wartime-Victimes-in-the-Former-Yugoslavia-InSearch-of-the-Way-Forward.pdf
35 What is Transitional Justice? (2008, August 20). UN. Retrieved September 10, 2014, from http://
www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/do
47
48
While, the government of BiH has filed a lawsuit against Former
Yugoslavia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violating
the Convention on Genocide in 1993, the government of Kosovo has
created a ministerial working group in 2012 to develop a strategy for
dealing with the past36.
6.2. Lustration
The concept of lustration refers to the measures taken by the state
against all persons associated and linked to the former state authorities which functioned during the period of repression. So far, Kosovo
and BiH have not drafted the Law on Lustration, although the international institutions in both countries have introduced the screening
and vetting process as part of a larger institutional reform37. It is only
Serbia that passed this law in 2003, however due to the high political
consequences this law did not manage to open the secret files, and no
case has been preceded so far38.
Conclusion
To boost cooperation and relations BiH needs to lift its sanctions
against Kosovo declared after the Independence of Kosovo. Not having recognized the independence of Kosovo and the new customs
stamps, Serbia and BiH seized both import and transit of Kosovo
products in and through their territories thus by hampering Kosovar
economic development.
BiH and Kosovo needs to increase Police cooperation in the technical level and policy level. Lacking formal and bilateral agreements
between Kosovo and BiH, the cooperation between the two states re-
36 Zupan, N. (2007). Facing the Past and Transitional Justice in Countries of Former Yugoslavia. Berlin, 332.
37 Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav Countries. (2007). Report for 2006. Retrieved September 15,
2014, from http://wcjp.unicri.it/proceedings/docs/DOCUMENTA-HLC-RCS_Trans%20justice%20
in%20ex%20Yu%
38 Dvořáková, V., & Milardović, A. (2007). Lustration and Consolidation of Democracy and the Rule
of Law in Central and Eastern Europe. Series of Political Science Research Centre Forum Book 5. Retrieved August 9, 2014, from http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_12839-1522-19-30.pdf?090702164702
mains informal and not effective in fighting organized crime and other
security challenges in the region.
BiH and Kosovo needs to start cooperation in the field of defence
sector to address necessary joint efforts for NATO integration and
regional defence challenges.
BiH and Kosovo need to cooperate closely in the field of transitional
justice and exchange experiences in dealing with the past. Issues such
as reparation, missing persons, and lustration can be accelerating issues in cooperation between the two countries.
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Lampe J. R., (1996), Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_1
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Bartosz Bojarczyk
Radical Islamism – A threat to Bosniak Identity and Security
of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Abstract: The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that broke out in the eve
of post-Cold War era has brought to the international agenda the issue of Bosniak identity, rights and future political and state representation. The security
of Bosniak identity, built up on religious and cultural aspects, was confronted in military terms with nationalistic ethnic approach of Serbs and Croats.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the roots, history and evolution of Bosniak
identity as challenged by radical Islamic ideology that emerged with the conflict. The role of radical Islamism in shaping the security of post-conflict Bosnia
will also be described. Foreign assistance or help from various Muslim states,
non-governmental organizations as well as from radical Islamic militant
groups put the question of the Bosniak islamization and radicalization into
discourse. The security and structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina was also
challenged by radical Islamic ideologies and their militant representations. After the September 11th the Islamic terrorism was a target of international war
and that has changed Bosnia and Herzegovina in a great manner.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, identity, security, Islamic, radicalism
Introduction
The dissolution of the Soviet Union that started somewhere in the late
1980-ies but formally occurred in the 1992 has brought fundamental
changes to European security system. New developments were transforming the map of Europe not only in political sense but what’s more
important in the geopolitical one. Formation of new independent states
from Baltic states to Central Asia, reintegration of the Germany (or
rather incorporation of DDR into Federal Republic), division of Czechoslovakia into two independent states effected the nations of Yugoslavia, which also wanted to implement the idea of self-determination
and create its own “national” states. The processes of democratization
of political systems and liberalization of economies has been characterizing most of post – Soviet bloc states but in the Balkans the ghost
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Bartosz Bojarczyk
of violent ethnic conflict was challenging the multinational structure
of Yugoslavia. That structure designed and preserved by Tito was already falling down through the 1980-ies but the end of the Cold War
speed up processes of disintegration and finally let to outbreak of three
year long, bloody and very turbulent civil war on the territory of former Yugoslavia.
Between the 1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina have proclaimed independence and Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia still with Kosovo, Montenegro) was
created. The initiatives of peaceful and democratic changes were being destroyed by each side of conflict and military option was most
likely chosen for reconstruction of regional affairs. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the weakest organism due to the internal division between
the three ethnic groups (Bosniaks1, Serbs and Croats), three religions
(Islam, Orthodox and Catholic) and the ambitions of newly established Serbia and Croatia to divide the Bosnia and Herzegovina and
incorporate its territories into their states. The Muslim side of the conflict had no backing in regional actors and had to defend itself with
the help of anyone who would like to provide it. Naturally, they turned
to the Muslim states of the Middle East, as well as to the other nonstate Muslim actors for help. The turnout was quite significant and
the stream of money, weapons and other help was heading to Sarajevo
from the Muslim states, nongovernmental organizations and terrorist
groups. As a result of that cooperation the challenge of radical Islamism emerged in the Bosnia and Herzegovina mostly due to the direct
and military involvement of many radical or terrorist organizations
whose interests were not always parallel with the ones of Bosniak society and Bosnian state.
In many sources the question of Bosnian islamization and its role
in international terrorist network was stated. The aim of this paper
is to analyze the roots and evolution of the Bosniak identity and its
adaptation to radical Islamic concepts promoted by international jihadist and Muslim states during and after the conflict. As well as to un-
1
In this paper the term Bosniacs will refer to the Muslim populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
where Bosnians would mean the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Radical Islamism – A threat to Bosniak Identity and Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina
derstand the role of radical Islamic ideologies and theirs supporters
in shaping and challenging the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1.
Bosniak Islamic identity and history
Muslim history of Bosnia is mainly connected with the Ottomans
who established its presence over her territories also by spreading Islam. Migration from other Ottoman regions and conversion of locals
into Islam brought the Muslim community into aliveness. It built up
its identity in the mixture of Turkish influence and accommodation
to Balkan ethnic and religious diversity. Long-term administration
of those territories by the Turks allowed the community to fit into
regional affairs and secure its dominant position over other Balkans’
communities in all aspects. After the Congress of Berlin the Bosnia
and Herzegovina went under the Austro-Hungarian rule. They untouched the Muslim rights on that territory, mainly on the economic
level. That was the reason that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina
supported the Central Powers in the World War I2. The legal system
of Muslim advantages has secured their rights for long period but was
also a reason of great conflict with the Serbs and Croats.
Bosnia as a peripheral region quickly became a victim of international conflicts through XIX and XX centuries. Ottoman Empire was
falling down since the mid XIX century and loosing Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of early syndromes of final collapse that emerged
as a result of World War I. The nation-state’s building processes that
shaped Europe those days have omitted Bosniaks3. Turks were not able
to support Muslim community and they alone were unable to break
through other Balkans nationalisms. In given period, Bosniaks were
rather the subjects of regional and international arrangements and
preserve identity mostly because of religious and linguistic differences
as well as previous economic dominance.
2 J. Elsässer, Jak dżihad przybył do Europy. Wojownicy Boga i Tajne Służby na Bałkanach, Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA 2007, p. 29-30.
3 S. L. Burg, P. S. Shop, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, M. E. Sharpe 2000, p. 18.
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Until the second half of the XX century, described group was perceived mostly as a religious minority/community, not as a distinguished ethnic category. That was main the main reason why their
rights of self-determination were not recognized by regional states
and international system. In addition, between the great wars the geopolitics of the Balkans were shaped on the grave of Ottomans and
the possibility to recognize the interests of “Turks” in Bosnia and Herzegovina was unlikely to happen. Nevertheless, most of the Bosniaks
(Muslims) supported the idea of Yugoslavian state when they were
placed among the Serbs and Croats. The idea of unite multinational
state was giving the chance for gaining at least some autonomy especially in the religious and educational aspects. For most of those times
Bosnia and Herzegovina was under the Belgrade’s administration, but
growing conflict between Serbs and Croats placed them again of both
sides4. Nevertheless, before the World War II the Muslims of Bosnia
and Herzegovina enjoyed some degree of autonomy and were able
to build up their political representation, namely Yugoslav Muslim
Organization (YMO).
The World War II brought to the Balkans an outbreak of ethnical/
religious war between the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats who supported different sides of the conflict. On 10 August 1941 the YMO recognized the German satellite “state” – the Independent State of Croatia
and its members took some high positions in government of that entity. In 1943, the Muslim volunteers from Bosnia and Herzegovina has
formed SS Division “Handschar”, which became infamous of the ethnic
cleansing committed in Central-Eastern Bosnia5. However, formally
the Muslims supported the Nazi Germany and the Croatian satellite
state, the regular people were present in all of fighting formations.
The activities of the Bosniaks were not different than others in the region, even concerning the genocides or other war crimes. The complicated and bloody war in the Balkans during the WWII was just
a prelude to the conflict that blew up during the 1990s.
After the war, the victorious side became the communists with
the leader Josip Tito, who established Federal People’s Republic of Yu-
4 Ibidem, p. 35-37.
5 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 28, 35.
goslavia in 1946. The Yugoslavia was built up on the idea of communism, which in this case promote multicultural diversity and protection
of each minority. Although the Serbs were somehow favoured, the system was working and the conflicts have been silenced for some decades.
Under the communist rule, the Bosniaks were adapting to new realities
and system that secured their rights on basic level. In the 1963, J. Tito
change the name of the state into Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, amended constitution that established authoritarian system of his
rule, granted some self-governance rights to the federal republics, but
what’s more important in this case, recognized the Muslims of Yugoslavia as a nation with equal status the other participating nations6.
It was a milestone in building up the Bosniak identity, which not only
facilitated the presence in the legal system but also was a main source
of nation building processes. Even the next amendment of constitution
from 1974, which limited the powers of the federal republics, hasn’t
stopped the wheel of Bosniak political identity building processes.
Like it was already described, the Bosniaks identity before the second part of the XX century was build up rather on religious and cultural
aspects and the political awareness is a quite new concept. The ideas
of sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina were appearing in the thoughts
of Young Turks, however it was the Islamic Religious Community that
was following the caliphate order, trying to preserve the Islam religion
on these territories, and secure the interests and rights of Muslim people7. It was just in 1939, when the Young Muslims started to operate
in the Bosnia and Herzegovina. They brought idea of pan-Islamism and
were trying to shape the Muslim/Bosniak identity in political terms.
Recognition in national/ethnic category under socialistic rule, gave
Muslim leaders great opportunity to build up coherence of Bosniaks.
The openness of the system allowed the Young Muslims to reorganize and to conduct some activities. Alija Izetbegovic and many others
continued to promote the ideas of pan-Islamism and Muslim political
identity. In 1970 he wrote famous Islamic Declaration. In many terms
it’s a very fundamentalist document that promote establishment of Is-
6 S. L. Burg, P. S. Shop, op. cit., p. 41.
7 The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, History, http://www.rijaset.ba/english/index.php/modules-menu/history, [20.10.2014].
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lamic entity/state among the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and postulate reestablishment of united Islamic state based on
the conception of Umma (conception of religious and political unity
of all Muslims). Some postulates of Izetbegovic Declaration, as it was
stated by J. Elsässer, are potentially dangerous to the civil society concept and more important to the basic democratic values8. However,
the document itself looks more like general manifesto rather than coherent concept, nonetheless it brought the idea of radical Islamism
into the modern European security system9. It need to be underline
that the Islamic Declaration was alike other manifestos that were written all along the Muslim world. The 1970s were the times of Islamism’s
awaking due to the practical failure of secular pan-Arabism and arise
of many political Islamism concepts.
After the J. Tito’s death in 1980, the fragile multinational system
of Yugoslavia was already in a deep crisis. The national tendencies were
breaking the system from inside, where main cluster of it seemed to be
the cold war realities. On the turn of the 1970-ies and 1980-ies, Young
Muslims were able to extend their activities, establish strong links with
the Muslim organizations and promote the idea of sovereign Bosnia. With the help of foreign donations, mostly from the Arab world,
many mosques and Islamic schools were built up or reopened10. For
those reasons the leaders of that organization, with the Izetbegovic at
the head of it, became accused of anti-systemic activities, tried to create national, independent Bosnia. They were judged and sentenced
for long prison but after a few years (3-5) all of them became free men
again. Those days were the times when fundaments of Bosniak political identity and ideas of coherent state were shaped in the minds
of future Bosniak political elite members. In the late 1980-ies some
kind of agreement between the Young Muslims and the Islamic Community was made, since those two organizations were backing an idea
of Bosnia’s autonomy, self-governance and possible achievement of formal independence. The year of 1990 was crucial for Bosniak history
8 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 39-41.
9 For Text of Islamic Declaration look: A. Izetbegovic, Islamic Declaration. A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim People, Sarajevo 1990, http://life-info.de/inh1./texte/Islamic%20Declaration_1990%20Izetbegovic.pdf [15.09.2014].
10 W. Dietl, K. Hirschman, R. Tophoven, Terroryzm, Wydawnicto Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2009, p. 170.
because its main political representation and military forces were organized. On 26th May 1990 the Party of Democratic Action (Stranke
Demokratske Akcije – SDA) was established, with the leadership of Alija Izetbegovic. It was not only the first political party organized on collapse of Yugoslavian state (among other republics) but it was the first
such an entity which was established to secure and promote the interests of the Muslim population of the Bosnia and Herzegovina11
(the Bosniaks). During the same year the military Bosniak formation
was organized – the Patriotic League, which in 1992 was incorporated by Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniaks
were aware of the possibility of armed conflict so they wanted to be
prepared in some way to defend their interests also on military level.
2.
Defending Bosnia and Herzegovina –
role of radical Islamism
The founders of the Muslim entity of Bosnia in Herzegovina, mainly A. Izetbegovic and the other leaders of the SDA represented very
Islamic, or even fundamentalist, approach to the idea of future Bosnia and Herzegovina state’s structure and model. Many scholars have
been accusing them of desire to build up the truly Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina or to establish a safe base for radical Islamists’
operations in Europe12. Indisputably, they grew up from the mixture
of pan-Islamism and newly born Bosniak political identity. They had
to operate in geographically isolation from the main area of Muslim
polity, so most of contacts have been established through informal
nets of cooperation – with today terrorist organizations, those days
openly accepted as Islamic fighters. Rapid and turbulent process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration surprised not only the concern nations but
mainly international community. Clear signs of upcoming catastrophe
were turned back on the wave of positive climax in changing Europe.
The Bosniaks were left alone in the growing military conflict. Croatia
11 Offical website of SDA – http://sda.ba/home/o-name/licna-karta-stranke/, [15.09.2014].
12 Look into: Ch. Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and
the West, Praeger Security International 2007, p. 3-22; J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 46-55.
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was quickly backed by some European states, with the Germany on
the top. Serbia naturally was granted some help from Moscow and
only the Bosniak side was left without formal protection and backing
in upcoming military struggle. The fall down of Yugoslavia state started the decomposition of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Republic. With
the creation of independent Croatia (1991), Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1992 (reminiscence of the former Yugoslavia with the dominant
Serb position) and proclamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence on 6th March 1992 political and military conflict erupted
on this territories. The Bosniaks had to compete with the Croatia and
Serbs who wanted to divide the Bosnia and Herzegovina territories and
incorporate them into their national states. The Republika Srpska and
the Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Herzeg-Bosnia) were
formed on the territories of former federal republic and the Bosniak
(Muslim) interests were omitted in division plans of bigger nations13.
In such realities, the Bosniaks realized that they need to prepare
themselves for war on two frontlines. It’s why we are not surprised that
they used religious aspect (the core of their identity) of the conflict
to internationalize it and gain support from any sources. The Muslims
cried for help, lacking almost everything were in position to accept
the help from anyone. As it will be describe later, the help came from
Muslim states but also from militant Islamic groups14. Complacence
and cruelty of Bosnian war resulted in involvement of all important
intelligence services, where the interests of ethnic groups were mixed
with the ones of informal groups, regional states and international
actors. The international Islamic militant groups’ presence and involvement of the Middle East States (mainly Saudi Arabia, Iran and
Turkey) gave enough help for survival but it was actually the USA
who secured the position of Bosniaks and the integrity of the Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
13 S. L. Burg, P. S. Shop, op. cit., p. 64-69.
14 J. S. Landay, J. Battersby, Bosnia War Shakes Mulim Word, Christian Science Monitor, 9.05.1995,
http://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0809/0913.html, [02.10.2014], p. 1.
3.
International Islamic Militant groups’ involvement
The war in Bosnia attracted many of the Mujahedeen, who answered the call of the Izetbegovic and the SDA from 1992. They were
coming in numbers to fight the war in Bosnia on behalf of the Muslim community15. After the declared victory in Afghanistan, the Mujahedeens were taking part in new emerged conflicts on the Caucasus
and the Central Asia, Somalia, Algeria and many other places. Bosnia seemed for them as a good place to conduct international jihad
and defend Muslims. According to radical jihadist ideology, Serbs
and other enemies have occupied Muslim territories and it was natural right for Islamists to defend them16. The Muslim volunteers that
were coming into fight were mostly previous fighters of Afghanistan
and the Caucasus but the conflict also attracted new wave of Islamist
who turned into it because of pro-Bosniak propaganda in the Muslim states’ media17. No one may argue that the international Islamic
militant groups, nowadays labelled terrorist, played an important role
in defending Bosniak security, but its role was partly limited coming
from internal demands and external pressure. Due to the later terrorist
activities of the Al-Qaeda, the links between Bin Laden and the heads
of the war-time Bosniak leaders are well described in literature.
In 1987, in Vienna the new charity foundation was established –
the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). The head of the foundation was Sudanese Faith al-Hasan and one of the board members was
close friend of A. Izetbegovic from Young Muslims – Hasan Cengic.
After the 9/11 it was proven that TRWA was a company that directly linked Osama bin Laden with the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims.
The international militants Islamists/terrorists backed the Bosniaks
with the financial help, mostly spent on arms purchases and sending the fighters into frontlines. Thousands of millions of dollars were
transfers through the TWRA (0.5-2.5 bln USD) and many of fighters
were trafficked into the conflict area (2500-6000). Besides, bin Lad-
15 P. L. Williams, AL-KAIDA. Międzynarodowy terroryzm, zorganizowana przestępczość i nadciągająca
apokalipsa, Zysk i S-ka Wydawnictwo, Poznań 2007, p. 82-83.
16 W. Dietl, K. Hirschman, R. Tophoven, op. cit., p. 172.
17 Ch. Hedges, Muslims from Afar Joining “Holy War” in Bosnia, The New York Times, 05.12.1992,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/muslims-from-afar-joining-holy-war-in-bosnia.html,
[17.09.2014].
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en connections the other terrorist groups from Hezbollah to Islamic
Jihad were very active in the Bosnian war. In 1991, Chief of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad and current leader of Al-Qaeda – Ayman al-Zawahiri,
opened in Sofia Mujahideen Coordination Bureau. Its main role was
to transfer the fighter into the conflict18. Close connection of Izetbegovic with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and different Islamic groups
made Bosnia in some way safe haven for Islamic militants in Europe
who started to operate from there into other part of the Balkans (Kosovo, Macedonia) as well as other part of Europe19. As it was proven,
Bosnia after the conflict was used by terrorist to prepare the operations, laundry the money or train fighter but predicted or even described radicalization of social affairs has never occurred in the big
manner. The link between the Bosniak leaders and terrorist organizations is more than clear. However, they fight to secure the Bosniaks
and needed much more than the given international Islamic militant
groups were able to provide.
State’s assistance
The war in Bosnia brought attention all around the Muslim world.
The pictures of atrocities were shown publicly what turned popular
support for the Bosniaks, but only few of the states acted in serious
manner. Most of the relief that was going through the legal channels
from the Muslim states to Bosniaks had humanitarian or civil use
character, due to the UN arms embargo placed on all sides of conflict
(1991/1992). Bosniaks could not count as Croats and Serbs on direct
deliveries from neighbour Croatia or New Yugoslavia; it’s why the matter of arms delivers to Sarajevo was so crucial and only possible with
the support of friendly states. Between 1992 and 1993 the main, but
very limited arms deliveries to Bosniaks came from Sudan, Iran, and
Turkey20. The outbreak of war between the Muslims and Croats closed
the Zagreb connection and Sarajevo was left with no other option than
relying on terrorist network.
18 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 59-77; P. L. Williams, op. cit., p. 173.
19 Ch. Deliso, op. cit., p. 5-8.
20 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 113.
After the end of bilateral military conflict and reestablishment
of Bosnian Croats and Muslims Federation in 1994, the process of mass
arms transfers to the Bosniaks was organized in secret and very fragile coalition led by the USA. According to report “Intelligence and
the war in Bosnia, 1992-1995” prepared by Professor Cees Wiebes deliveries where made through Croatia who cut 20-50% for themselves
and organized the transport via controlled territories. The operation
was organized by various US agencies, Iran and Turkey (with financial
backup from Saudi Arabia) together with various radical Islamic militant groups (Afghan Mujahedeens and Hezbollah members). It was
proven that Iran Air was delivering weapons do several Croatian airports but there were also reports of US direct involvement in those
lifts, especially since 199521. It is widely believed that the US agencies
helped some radical Islamists group in their activities in Bosnia who
later became their fighting enemies in the war against terrorism22.
The US recognition of Bosniak rights and some kind of protection
of their interest on the international level, with efficient military help,
was crucial for securing lives of the Muslim Bosniaks but also for establishment of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. It looks like tactical
alliance with radical Islamist militants in Bosnia, very quickly turned
to be wrong path in US policies. In the times pre-9/11, the USA was
not recognizing radical Islamic militant groups as a serious challenge
to international security or underestimated their potency. Nevertheless, as it was described in details in last decade, US intelligence agencies were rather blind on Islamic extremism or didn’t want to recognize
growing threat. Most probably, in old-Afghanistan times model, they
used them as the proxies in realization of particular international interests especially on the Balkans and Caucasus. After 9/11 former allies
became primary enemies when radical Islamic militant ideology became stated as the one of the biggest threats to international security.
The war in Bosnia created some strange alliances based on support given to the fighting sides. The Croats were supported in the military sense by Germany and some other Western European countries.
21 After R. J. Aldrich, America used Islamists to Arm the Bosnian Muslins, The Guardian, 22.04.2002,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/warcrimes.comment, [02.10.2014].
22Ibidem.
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Bosniak Serbs were supported by Russia but also the secret services
of Greece, Ukraine and Israel were arming them23. The Bosniaks were
supported by described Muslim states but it was the USA who made
significant change in building the military potency of the Bosniaks.
There were also some arms deliveries to Sarajevo made from Germany and through Austria but we should rooted them in a strange
cooperation of the European states and informal terrorist nets, made
on the supervision of the USA24.
Besides, the fact that almost all of Muslim states supported the Bosniak case and even were trying to organize humanitarian help, it were
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey who made significant difference. Turkey was quite reluctant to the idea of supporting radical Islamist but
was not able to stand aside of the conflict; it’s why her role was growing bigger with the internationalization of the conflict and involvement of the USA. It mostly served logistic and financial roles rather
then coordinating the nations. Turkey during the 1990-ies was preoccupied with domestic issues (political and economic ones) and its
role was limited due to internal limitations. Saudi Arabia became one
of the main supporters of the Bosniak cause. In 1993, the Saudi High
Commission for Aid to Bosnia was created. Since the wartimes, the financial help that was channelled through different foundations, legal
institutions and others is counted for about 560 million of dollars25.
Members of Saudi Royal family, as well as other wealth individuals,
were supporting military struggle of the Bosnian Muslims in the name
of Islamic brotherhood and help for oppressed. It was a part of realized by Saudi Arabia role – supporter and defender off all Muslims
as a result of growing international ambitions. Unfortunately, as it was
proven later, some of that money was send through terrorist financial
net and was spent on spreading the radical Islamic ideologies/models (like Wahhabism) among the Bosniak people. And it will be described later it didn’t change Bosniak society but rather established
some radical entities with it. It looked like Islamic Republic of Iran was
one of the main donors and organizer of illegal trafficking into Bosnia.
23Ibidem.
25 Saudi Arabia ends an almost decade-old $560 million aid program to Bosnia, Al Arabiya News,
22.12.2011, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/22/183927.html, [03.10.2014].
Iran during the 1990-ies was still in some way driven by radicals who
supported the spread of revolutionary ideologies across the world.
Bosniaks perfectly fitted into Iranian categories; it’s why Tehran was
so active in this area. Since 1991, Iran organized the smuggling of weapons to Bosnia through Sudan an later on has entered the strange alliance with USA. Both states were providing their military assistance
between 1994 and 1995 to the Bosnian Muslims, in the same time
they were engaged in the deep political conflict in the Middle East.
Iran openly supported the Bosniaks and was cooperating with various states and even with radical Salafists terrorist organizations. Of
course, its capabilities were quite limited (longstanding war with Iraq
and international isolation) but Tehran was able to place in Bosnia and
Herzegovina very strong intelligence net based on multidimensional
penetration (from weapons to education). The influence of Iranian intelligence agency in the Bosnian security apparatus became so strong
and obvious till 1997 that it became main aim of Western (US and EU)
counteractions26. One more time the war in Bosnia proved that some
tactical and very particular in aims alliances may occurred between
antagonists if the short time interest serves both sides.
In summary, it can be said that the war in Bosnia of 1992-1995 has
brought into the Bosniak entity and society some radical elements
of Islamic radicalism. The need of assistance in the military struggle
left Bosniak leaders with no other option but to accept help from any
sources. The radical Islamic militant groups have helped to defend
the Bosniak interests but in the same time they entered the Balkans
in huge manner.
4.
Building Bosnia and Herzegovina –
role of radical Islamism
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence was established by direct intervention of international powers. From the very beginning its existence and internal structure was questioned by the Bosnians, regional
states and other actors of international system. The radical Islamism
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and its followers, as well as an intelligence services of some rough states
like Iran were shaping realities in post-Was Bosnia. We may distinguish
two periods in analyzing the role of radical Islam in Bosnia after 1995.
First phase after the peace treaty and 9/11 2001 when international
radical Islamic militant groups were free to operate on the Bosnia and
Herzegovina territory, enjoying the support from legal Bosniak and
Bosnian institutions. Iran and Saudi Arabia had a lot of influence over
the Bosniak decision-makers and security forces. The ideas of radical
Islamism (i.e. wahhabism) were promoted with the help of the state.
Many legal and illegal groups were operating on that territory. The activity of international jihadist militias in Chechnya, Kosovo and Europe were organized and coordinated also through the Bosniak cells.
The situation during those days created among some scholars (Ch.
Deliso, J. Elsässer, J. R. Schindler, S, Shay) and for sure within the global
community the fear: of Bosniak radicalization (in religious terms), unpredictable grow in power of radical Islamic groups and of even creation of fundamentalist caliphate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The main reason for cementing presence of radical Islamic ideologies in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995 was that some of the militants Islamists, who fought the war, didn’t leave the country. Like
it was already stated, there is no agreed and proven number of Islamic fighters who came from abroad to fight the Bosnian war. From
few hundreds up to 6500 is a number we may find in the different
sources. The size of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was no less
then 140 000 troops, so the Mujahedeen played more qualitative then
quantitative roles in the military effort of Bosniaks. On the beginning,
they formed “al-Mujaheed Battalion” and with the increase in numbers they dominated the whole 3rd Corps of the 7th Brigade. Fighting
jihad rather conducting military operations, they became infamous
for the cruelty and ethnic cleansings. They were also very efficient on
the military level. Determination and skills of Mujahedeen made them
be perceived by enemies as tough fighters. On the easy from the frontline they were forcing locals to accept and follow strict religious model,
what created a lot of tensions27. The foreigners were mostly followers
27 Ibidem, p. 72-76, 83-94; G. Kepel, Święta woja. Ekspansja i upadek fundamentalizmu muzułmańskiego,
Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2003, p. 251-258.
of radical Islamic ideology and tried to persuade (also by force) the local population into strict code of behaviour and religion. They came
to Bosnia for achieving two goals: fighting the enemies of Islam and
secure the Muslim community but also to organize an Islamic fundamentalist state (or at least try to do so). Their military role was widely accepted by most Bosniak and international powers but the desire
to radicalize the social relations and create fundamentalist state were
not supported by majority of Bosniaks and international community.
Under the Dayton Treaty all foreign forces and fighters supposed
to leave the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina till 16th January 1996.
Most of them left Bosnia in 1996 heading in organized way to Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. But the group of several hundred Mujahedeens
stayed in Bosnia. They were granted citizenship or even married Bosniak women. Because of their presence, the net of radical Islamic terrorist activities was able to operate and coordinate their operations
in South-Europe. The mobilization and success of UCK in conflict
over Kosovo was also possible of Islamist net in the Bosnia28. In our
opinion, naturalization of Mujahedeens served two purposes. They
supposed to secure the Islamic character of Bosniaks and the Bosnian
state from within – supporting Islamic leader like A. Izetbegovic, and
promoting radical models of Islam. What’s more important, they were
active in organizing and conducting terrorist activities in the region
or world widely in the financial aspect. In this aspect, the Bosniak
episode in the international Islamic terrorists’ evolution was a huge
step forward because let them entered the European system on almost
legal bases. It has been already proved that the Bosnian territory or
the Bosnian citizens were used/ involved in planning, and sometimes
conducting most of the terrorist attacks in those days.
After the war, states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey were
continuing building up their roles in new realities of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina. New state needed multilevel assistance from economic to security matters and the help from the European powers was
much less then expected. The main donor was a Saudi Arabia who
was sending billions of dollars into Bosnia. As it was already described, some part of that many was transferred through terrorist fi-
28 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 130-138, 161-170.
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Bartosz Bojarczyk
nancial nets but part was spent on cultural and economic projects.
With the Saudi money the promotion of Wahhabi version of Islam
was continued, which was anathema to most Bosnian Muslims, who
followed more tolerant, Ottoman version. Saudi sponsored groups
(also “former” Mujahedeens) were provoking the conflicts with Serbs
and Croats and were forcing for radicalization of social life. In 1995 by
Saudi money the Active Islamic Youth was created, which was supposed to spread the Islamic values, code and behaviour among young
Muslims29. The main problem for radicals was the fact the Bosniaks
hadn't radicalized in the social or political manner. The sponsored
groups functioned in the small groups (enclaves) that were not able
to change the Bosnian society but presented great threat international
security due to its involvement in terrorist activities30. Saudi money
was mostly spent on reestablishment of religious infrastructure. Most
of the mosques, schools and other institutions governed by the Islamic
Community of the Bosnia and Herzegovina were built, rebuilt and are
partly financed by the Persian Gulf monarchies.
During the war times and after, Iran was trying to obtain influence
among the Bosniaks and within the Bosnian state. Arm deliveries, trafficking of fighters, humanitarian aid and some financial assistance grew
its position a lot. Most probably, Iranian leaders were using the Bosniak
case as a proxy in increasing its international position and get access
to European territories. It was never proven, but there were rumours
that Iranian secret services organized several assassinations and attacks
in Western Europe from the territory of Bosnia. As it was described,
Iranian penetration of Bosnian security apparatus and growing influence over its polity resulted in harsh US actions aimed at Tehran net.
After 9/11 we may notice the gradual decrease of Iranian influences.
Iranians were not able to successfully export its ideas and ideologies
due to the ethnical and sectarian differences. They were able to penetrate the system and get some influence over the Bosnia but with
the help of international powers Tehran’s role seems to be limited.
29 B. Whitmore, Saudi “charity” troubles Bosniacs, „Bosnia Report” New Series No: 29-31, June-November 2002, http://bosnia.org.uk, [14.09.2014].
30 T. Bachora, Bośnia i Hercegowina państwem upadłym? Kwestia ekstremizmu muzułmańskiego,
[in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski Protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie
środkowoeuropejskiej, PISM, Warszawa 2008, p. 134.
Turkey was playing in most modest way in its approach to Bosnia
and Herzegovina. During the war time it restrained from direct military involvement (played secondary role) but was constantly calling
for international intervention. Ankara backed US interference, NATO
intervention and Dayton Peace Agreement Since than, was taking
part in the following UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and together
with the USA trained armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina31. After
the war, Turkey became mediating between the Bosnians and Serbs and
Croats, promoting regional cooperation through South East Europe
Cooperation Process. Due to the change in Turkish foreign expectation with the won of AKP with the leaders Erdogan and Davutoglu
in 2002, Ankara has increased its presence in the Balkans32. Turkey
plays a positive assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina in post conflict
times. It engaged not only politically but mostly on the economic level.
In 1995 both states have signed Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation what finally let to Free Trade Agreement of 2002. The volume of bilateral trade in 2012 was about 360 mln USD and Turkey
was ranked 9th in direct investments list to Bosnia and Herzegovina33.
Turkey does not pose the threat to Bosniak identity but rather might
serve as a model of society structure and governance. To some extend
Bosniaks looked up to Turkish example, and increase in relations may
strengthen that tendencies.
After the 9/11 terrorist Islamic net that was operating on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina became one of the main targets
in the war on terrorism announced by the USA and quickly picked up
by main international powers. That subject is well described in the already cited books and documents that we will just focus on presenting main outcomes of international inquiries. There was evidence
presented that linked leaders of SDA to the international Islamic terrorism. Bosnia served as some kind of operational base for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations during the 1990-ies. The unique
31 S. Sayari, Turkish Foreign Policy In the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism, „Journal of International Affairs”, Fall 2000, 54, no. 1, p. 177-178.
32 Ł. Reszczyński, Geopolityczna emancypacja Turcji i jej wpływ na Bałkany Zachodnie, „Biuletyn
Opinie”, Nr 25/2010, p. 6-7.
33 Relations Between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic
of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa,
[17.10.2014].
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Bartosz Bojarczyk
system of financial-charity institution was discovered, where Bosnian
NGO-s played an very important role (TWRA, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundations, Benevolence International Foundation, Global Relief
Foundations and hundreds more) not only as collectors but mainly
as laundering chains. Many of terrorist plots and attacks were organized in Bosnia or with the participation of its citizens. Through last
decade in Bosnia and Herzegovina many efforts were made to break
the Islamist net mainly under the supervision of EU institutions but
also in the cooperation with the UN and USA34. In last years there were
no data about significant activity of terrorists in Bosnia and Herzegovina that may serve as some proof that main sources of radical Islamic terrorism were successfully destroyed there. Of course, Bosnia
is still challenged by those organizations but their power is too weak
to destabilize the structure of the state or pose serious international
threat. The main reason that international institutions and the Bosnian
state got rid off most of terrorist and Islamic radicals is that they lacked
the popular support among the Bosniaks and Bosnian society. The radical ideologies like Wahhabism were rejected by most of the people
who stuck to their more tolerant version of Islam. The same happen
to the idea of fundamentalist Islamic state that was overwhelmed by
mass support for democratic values and standards35.
Conclusions
The Bosniak identity shaped by Islam, Ottoman culture and the Balkan realities is different from other models of Muslim communities.
The geographical isolation from main centres of Muslim culture and
polity, together with small population made it very vulnerable in the security terms. The collapse of Yugoslavia endangered the physical and
political existence of the Bosniaks. Lack of wider international protection of Bosniak security and interest made them turned into illegal,
terrorist and other sources for help. The emergence of radical Islamic
34 The war on terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina was described in details by J. Elsässer, Ch. Deliso.
35 G. Kippel, op. cit., p. 255-258; Ch. Deliso, op. cit., p. 54-58.
ideologies, together with foreign Islamists who came to Bosnia and
Herzegovina to fight jihad, stated a recognized threat to Bosniak identity and to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Muslims
states, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, were able to get some
influence over the Bosnia and Herzegovina also by spreading different
Islamic models, ideologies and Islamic concepts. During the 1990-ies
Bosnia and Herzegovina became an operational base for radical Islamic militant groups, with the Al-Qaeda as a one of most important
challenger. After the 9/11 the international counterterrorism focused
on the Balkans and was quite successful in crushing main cells of international terrorist network. The radical Islamism that was brought
to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war time, was mainly rejected by most of the Bosniaks. The fundamentalist Islamic concepts are
rather strange to most of the Bosniaks; it’s why radical elements have
created so little support. However, Islamic terrorist network still operates on the Bosnian territory and some of the citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina follow jihadist movement.
Bibliography
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Bachora T., Bośnia i Hercegowina państwem upadłym? Kwestia ekstremizmu
muzułmańskiego, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski Protektorat?
Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, PISM, Warszawa 2008
Burg S. L., Shop P. S., The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention, M. E. Sharpe 2000
Deliso Ch., The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West, Praeger Security International 2007
Dietl W., Hirschman K., Tophoven R., Terroryzm, Wydawnicto Naukowe
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Elsässer J., Jak dżihad przybył do Europy. Wojownicy Boga i Tajne Służby na
Bałkanach, Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA 2007
Hedges Ch., Muslims from Afar Joining “Holy War” in Bosnia, The New York
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Sayari S., Turkish Foreign Policy In the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges
of Multi-Regionalism, „Journal of International Affairs”, Fall 2000, 54,
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Poznań 2007
Ewa Dominikowska
– Unquiet Region – Implication
for Neighbouring Countries
Abstract: The article is devoted to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and its impact on the European security. Particular emphasis has been placed
on the recent history of the state, including the Balkan wars taking place
in the end of twenty century, as well as on the resulting from it complex internal situation, without any doubts influencing the perception of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as not fully democratic state, struggling with many problems
of political, social, as well as religious and ethnic nature. Not without consequence for this situation is the attitude of neighboring countries – Serbia and
Croatia. Policy pursued by the governments of these countries has a huge
influence on the actions taken by the national minorities living in the regions
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has an impact on the internal situation
of the country. All these activities contribute to internal stability and external
position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Keywords: stability, multiethnicity, European security, conflict, disintegration
Introduction
The twentieth century has elapsed on the Balkan Peninsula under
the sign of bloody conflicts. It was a continuation of ongoing (since
the second half of the nineteenth century) struggle of the Balkan nations for freedom and independence, which in the next century took
the form of domestic fighting during the Balkan and both World Wars.
The next 50 years were influenced by Josip Broz “Tito” and seeking
of economic and political “third way”. Even though there existed one
and independent state of southern Slavs, the internal situation in Yugoslavia was far from ideal. Reluctance and ethnic conflicts between
the various components of the federation to a lesser or greater extent
manifested throughout the existence of the state. Josip Broz “Tito” tried
to balance the claims (especially territorial and economic) of the individual republics and ethnic groups. However, not only Serbs evinced
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Ewa Dominikowska
a desire to achieve greater power, the Croatian side was also not satisfied with the status quo. Josip Broz “Tito” was well aware of existing
the Serb – Croatian animosity (especially mutual territorial claims),
because from the beginning he tried to neutralise it. First important
step was the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) as one
of the constitutional republics of Yugoslavia1. Such a solution, which
was to bring back not only on maps, but mainly to the internal political and ethnic discourse, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was to become
the guarantor of abandoning all attempts to change the internal borders and the balance of power in the federation. From that moment
republic is functioning not only as a buffer, but above all once again
became a kind of “safety valve” for all inarticulate conflict and mutual
resentment among the Yugoslavia’s nations.
The first post-war years were in these area extremely difficult, on
one hand, both Serbs and Croats claimed their right to the lands inhabited by them in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other
hand, the communist authorities try to incorporate the idea of Yugoslavism in the attempt to displace the consciousness of the inhabitants
of these regions, their faith and sense of separateness from neighbouring ethnic groups2. In the census, however, very few Muslims declared
their ethnicity (the biggest part of them underlined anything or chose
the answer “unspecified”). The situation changed in the 60s, when
for the first time name Muslim was used to identify a specific ethnic
group, which were Slavic Muslims living in Bosnia and Herzegovina3.
Although certain reluctance from the part of some communist activists was seen, the term “Muslim”, in the ethnic meaning, entered permanently into use. Among the Muslims themselves also there was no
agreement as to whether this name is to be more political and ethnic,
or should be based on religion identity. Initially, the first view prevailed, supported by secular Muslims, members of the Communist
Party, who actively worked to isolate the Muslim ethnos. The second
direction came to the fore later, becoming the basis for modern Mus-
1 N. Malcolm, Bosnia: a short history, Papermac, London 2002, p. 196-197.
2 N. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 194-198.
3 Ibidem, p. 198.
Bosnia and Herzegovina – Unquiet Region – Implication for Neighbouring Countries
lim nationalism, supported by later president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović4.
After the death of Josip Broz “Tito”, Yugoslavia slipped into a growing economic and political crisis. Lack of strong leader made the form
of federation increasingly difficult to maintain. Although the Communists of Yugoslavia – SKJ (Savez komunista Jugoslavije – SkJ) tried
to keep the state’s unity, its decay was only a matter of time. Mutual resentment and grievances erupted in the early 90s, initially in the form
of a civil war, which, after the declaration of independence by Croatia
and Slovenia (and recognition of their independence, first by Germany
and Vatican, then by other countries) took on the nature of interstate
war. Fights intensified, however, only after the declaration of independence by Bosnia and Herzegovina (this took place in October 15,
1991, after the vote by Croatian and Muslim members of parliament
in favour of declaration of independence)5. Officially republic was declared March 1, 1992, but the road to true independence was very difficult and bloody6.
Ethnical situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most complex. Extremely bloody civil war very quickly engulfed the entire republic – Bosnian Serbs fought with Bosnian Croats and Muslims, there has
also been a short Croat-Muslim conflict (May 1993 – February 1994).
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was so serious that not only did
they threaten to destabilize the Balkan Peninsula, but also threaten
the security of the region or even the entire continent. Great influence
on the further development of the situation had the actions taken by
neighbors – Serbia and Croatia, as well as by Germany, the United
States and Islamic countries (including Saudi Arabia, Turkey)7. Soon
it turned out that all mediation and negotiation is not enough to calm
the conflict, which was sneaking out of control. International community, fearing of spilling the fighting on still unstable Central Europe,
has decided to extend the mandate of the military peacekeeping mis4 Ibidem, p. 200.
5 M. Kuczyński, Bałkańska pożoga: wojny i konflikty na Bałkanach w latach 1981-1999, Biuro Prasy
i Informacji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 1999, p. 54.
6 E. Bujwid-Kurek, Państwa pojugosłowiańskie. Szkice politologiczne, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Krakowskiego, Kraków 2008, p. 136.
7 More information on this subject: A. Parzymies, Muzułmanie w Europie, Wydawnictwo Akademickie
DIALOG, Warszawa 2005.
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Ewa Dominikowska
sion stationed in Croatia – United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), which task was to monitor fulfilling of peace agreements,
as well as protection of convoys with help. It was also decided to create a safety zone around Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Zepa, Srebrenica and
Goražde and introduced a ban on flights over the territory of BosniaHerzegovina8.
Unfortunately, situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not improve. The whole world was watching ethnic cleansing and war crimes.
Images from blockaded Sarajevo or columns of refugees, escorted by
international troops, trying to reach the designated safety zones, have
been shown by all TV stations and newspapers. Drama unfolding on
the continent was the largest since World War II and Europe was unable to prevent it. In the early stages of the conflict, most Western
countries thought that Yugoslavia must enter the path of transformation and slowly begin democratization and implementation of market
reforms. However, they did not support the independence aspirations
of the individual nations. The threat of disintegration of Yugoslavia
and the outbreak of a possible war in this peripheral, from the bipolar division of the world point of view, region was not treated seriously enough by leading European politicians, absorbed on the one
hand on amalgamation of the two German states and, on the other
hand, on the slow disintegration of the Soviet Union9. Unfortunately,
this attitude has brought disastrous consequences in the form of war.
It turned out that continent uniting after nearly 50 years is completely unprepared for the new political challenges, and more importantly
Europeans themselves are not able to ensure peace and security in its
territory. The role of main negotiator and the donor during the conflict
in the Balkans took over the United States, which together with Russia became the main political force in the region. Also important was
the fact that the “new issues” in the field of security required the use
of such military measures that Europe did not have, concentrating
mainly on the economic and social development.
8 M. Bjarnason, The War and War-Games in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The main
events, disagreements and arguments, resulting in a “de facto” divided country, http://www.nato.
int/acad/fellow/99-01/bjarnason.pdf [15.08.2014], p. 63.
9 B. Koszel, Konflikt na Bałkanach (1991-1999) a bezpieczeństwo europejskie, „Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego”, vol. 16, Poznań 2000, p. 3-4.
1.
Dayton Agreement
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely destructive to all parties of the conflict. This circumstance, however, did not
transform into any actions aiming parties even for a ceasefire, not
to mention a long-term peace. Numerous attempts of the international community to impose a peace plans did not bring the expected results10. The breakthrough came after 3.5 years of heavy fighting,
which so weakened all parties that further continuation of war, on
such scale as before, was impossible. At the negotiating table alongside representatives of the so-called contact group11 and international
organizations sat people who had undoubtedly contributed to the outbreak of the conflict.
Since the middle of 1995 first serious signs that could suggest
the possibility of taking the peace negotiations by the warring parties
could be observed. After a series of reconnaissance meetings it has
been decided that from the beginning of October an effective ceasefire will be established, and more importantly – a deadline for peace
talks had been set. Negotiations that took place since November 2,
1995 at the Dayton airbase (USA), finally were completed on November 21, initialing of The General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ending a bloody war12. The official signing of the document by the representatives of the warring parties:
Slobodan Milošević – President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
called “New Yugoslavia”13, Franjo Tuđman – President of Croatia and
Alija Izetbegović – President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, took place
in December 14, 1995 in Paris14.
Dayton Agreement with 11 annexes and 102 maps15 became the basis
for the functioning of an independent, multiethnic Bosnia and Her-
10 More information on this subject: M. Tanty, Bałkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne, Książka i Wiedza,
Warszawa 2003, p. 354.
11 Contact Group – a group consisting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France,
Germany and Russia, established to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Source: B. Koszel, op. cit., p. 30.
12 W. Walkiewicz, Jugosławia. Byt wspólny i rozpad, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 2000, p. 275.
13 New Yugoslavia – state that proclaimed its independence on April 27, 1992; consisting of Serbia
and Montenegro; it survived until 2003, when was transformed into Serbia and Montenegro.
14 M. Tanty, op. cit., p. 355.
15 W. Walkiewicz, Jugosławia: państwa sukcesyjne, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 2009, p. 275.
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Ewa Dominikowska
zegovina16. This document is extremely complicated – on one hand
it was to serve to maintain the territorial unity of the state, on the other hand it had to meet the expectations of all its signatories, to solve
the conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been defined as a republic
with the structure of federation, consisting of the Federation of Muslim and Croats (51% of the area), divided into 10 cantons, and Republika Srpska (49% of the territory)17. Sarajevo, located in the Federation
of Muslim and Croats, was decided to be a capital city. Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs and Croats have been recognized as equivalent constitutional nations. The most important annex to the Agreement is Annex
4, which is imposed by the international community, Constitution
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It established that both components – administrative units (called entitet) will share president (in accordance
with Article V of the Constitution – the Presidency is a collegial body
composed of representatives of all three constitutional nations), central government, bicameral parliament, the Constitutional Court and
the Central Bank (Article III of the Constitution). At the central level
will be conducted foreign policy, customs, trade and monetary therefore in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be applied the common currency
– Convertible Mark (BAM)18. The Constitution and other Annexes
were extremely accurate guidance of the complex electoral systems
based on ethnic parity, which were to be used for elections of “common” central government. Other institutions and areas of the country were in the hands of local authorities at the level of entitets. Both
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Muslim and Croats have had
its own president, government and parliament. More importantly, the
state components could lead their own separate foreign policy (establish bilateral relations with special rules), domestic policy (separate
police, justice) and have its own army (Article III of the Constitution)19.
16 The text of General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is available on
the website of the UN High Representative and EU Special Envoy to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 [12.08.2014].
17 W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia z Bośni i Hercegowiny, [in:] J. Stańczyk, B. Stefańczak (eds.), Wojna czy
pokój? Perspektywy byłej Jugosławii, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 1999, p. 29-30.
18 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14.12.1995, is available on the website of the UN High Representative and EU Special Envoy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/?content_
id=372 [12.08.2014].
19Ibidem.
It seems that the division of powers in 1995 was an attempt to meet
the conditions set by all fighting parties, but over time it became one
of the main problems related to the functioning internally divided state.
From the European point of view key provisions from the Dayton
Agreement was the creation of the Office of the High Representative
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR). The mandate of the OHR is an Annex 10 to the Dayton Agreement. Actions taken by the Office together
with the method of appointing the person of the High Representative
is supervised by the Peace Implementation Council, which consists
of representatives of 55 countries and international organizations, who
are interested in the restoration and maintenance of peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina20. In time, when it turned out that the European vision
of multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been entirely shared by its
inhabitants, as well as the authorities of that State, mandate has been
enriched with new powers and responsibilities21. New competences
delegated to the OHR are an important point of dispute between international community and the inhabitants and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who believe that in this way they are deprived
of the influence on their own country, therefore further democratization of the country is not possible. Instead of planned decentralization and stimulation of local structures for cooperation, “imposed” by
the international community “administrator” in the form of the OHR
decides on major issues concerning the state. This raises a justify concern that such attitude of the Europeans would discourage people
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take any initiatives, thereby contributing
to the continued functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a protectorate of the European Union (EU)22. This situation remains a major
challenge for the EU diplomacy, since the existence of reliant and unstable quasi-state is destabilizing the situation in the whole region,
and thus, poses a real threat to the security of the entire continent.
20 W. Stanisławski, M. Szpala, Bośniacki Chaos. Źródła kryzysu politycznego we współczesnej Bośni
i Hercegowinie, „Prace OSW”, vol. 31, Warszawa, październik 2009, p. 22, available on official website of Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_31.pdf
[13.08.2014].
21 More on new prerogatives on the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
official website, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519 [14.08.2014].
22Ibidem.
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Ewa Dominikowska
The most important attempt to stabilize the situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and accordingly on a significant part of the Balkan Peninsula, was deployment of 60,000 troops from 27 countries23. Under
the UN Security Council Resolution no 1031 the NATO Implementation Forces (IFOR), that took part in the operation “Joint Endeavour”, has been established24. The mandate of IFOR was provided for
12 months and was attached to the Dayton Agreement as Annex 1.
Seeing that the situation in the Balkans is stabilizing, but not at expect by international community pace, NATO defense ministers, at
a meeting held in September 1996 in Bergen (Norway), said that not
all objectives faced by IFOR have been achieved – the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was still unstable and required further monitoring.
Confirmation of these concerns was the result of the first parliamentary elections monitored by international observers and election commissions. In both parts of the Federation definitely won nationalistic
parties – each of the three ethnic groups voted for the representatives
of their communities, which clearly indicated the failure of current
international politics25. Furthermore, the lack of progress in attempts
to create the Bosnian nation consisting of three constitutional nations
was visible. This indicated that although hostilities ceased, the situation is still tense. In order to avoid any possible problems arising from
the reduction in the number or even the withdrawal of international peacekeeping forces, it was decided to appoint another mission.
UN Resolution no 1088 of December 12, 1996, giving permission for
the implementation of the military aspects of the Peace Agreement,
the Stabilization Forces (SFOR)26. These forces have become the legal successor to IFOR units, acting as its predecessors, on the basis
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and signed an agreement regarding
the use of force (Rules of Engagement). The mandate of SFOR, initially also – as in the case of IFOR – provided for 12 months, lasted until
2004. The stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not go so fast,
23 B. Koszel, op. cit., p. 35.
24 A. Ciupiński, J. Pawłowski, Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt wewnętrzny, Wydział Wydawniczy Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2001, p. 69.
25 L. Hladký, Dwanaście lat po Dayton – rzeczywistość i iluzje, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski
protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw
Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 28-29.
26 J. Pawłowski, A. Ciupiński, op. cit., p. 71.
as international community was expecting, but it was noticeable,
that’s why the number of SFOR soldiers gradually decreased to reach
the level of 12,000 in 200227.
Military mission was not the only international mission established
by the Dayton Agreement. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was created by the United Nations International Police
Task Force, whose main task was to “monitor, observe and supervise
of the introduction of law and justice system, providing all necessary
help to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the organization and management of local police personnel”28.
Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has stabilized enough that a dominant role in further promotion of peace and security in the region took
civilian missions, of course, still supported by the presence of the military units, but much less numerous than it has been so far. Since December 2, 2004, the European Union Forces (EUFOR) in the mission
Althea took over most of the SFOR duties29. The main goal of the establishment of EUFOR was to maintain the status quo achieved through
“deterrence” military presence, control of airspace over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enable government and nongovernmental organizations to implement activities aimed at peace
maintenance.
The visible presence of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina has also
a political and economic nature. One of the main objectives of the EU
is a long-term stabilization of the entire region, and the best motivation for the Balkan countries is the prospect of integration. The EU
hopes that the example of a successful transition of countries from
Central Europe, crowned with membership in the EU, will be sufficient incentive for the elite of Bosnia-Herzegovina for putting their
efforts to break the political impasse, and thus, allow for the necessary reforms and modernize existing institutions, which do not always
meet the democratic standards30. The first clear result of European in27 The Stabilization Force, http://www.nato.int/SFOR/docu/d981116a.htm [14.08.2014].
28 The United Nations, www.un.org. [15.08.2014].
29 I. Pikner, Zaangażowanie sił wojskowych UE w Bośni i Hercegowinie, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut
Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 100.
30 J. Solana, From Dayton implementation to European integration, „NATO Review”, vol. Winter 2004,
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/art2.html [15.08.2014].
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Ewa Dominikowska
volvement is the signing in 2008, after long and difficult negotiations,
the Plan for the Stabilization and Association Process of Bosnia and
Herzegovina with the EU31.
2.
Ethno-religious mosaic and stabilization
of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
– implications for neighbouring countries
Extremely complicated history of the lands incorporated in Bosnia and
Herzegovina has made the ethnic and religious situation in this young
country one of the most complex on the continent. Over the centuries, various pieces of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina were part
of the various states, which has been reflected in their ethno-religious
composition. Herzegovina, adjacent to Dalmatia, was partly under
the influence of the catholic Kingdom of Croatia, forming the Habsburg
state. In Bosnia, the situation was slightly more complex – bordered
on north by the Kingdom of Croatia, in the south was surrounded by
the Orthodox Serbs. Due to the large amount of conversion to Islam
in the Ottoman era, Bosnia has become one of the main settlement
areas of the Turkish population and other Slavic Muslims. The situation is additionally complicated by the fact that after almost five centuries of Ottoman rule in 1878 occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was taken over by the Austria-Hungary, in 1908 the Habsburg Empire
incorporated these lands. In 1918 they became part of the Kraljevina
Srba, Hrvata and Slovenaca. Throughout all this time ethnic structure
of these lands was changing, as a result leading to more frequent conflicts between different groups, escalation of which could be observed
during the World War II. Ethno-religious issues have been somewhat
muted only in the era of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
when officially has been confirmed the existence of Muslims, who are
Slavs of Islamic religion, inhabiting mainly the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina32. All this helped to create in this part of Yugoslavia unprec-
31 W. Stanisławski, M. Szpala, op. cit., p. 55.
32 M. Waldenberg, Rozbicie Jugosławii; od separacji Słowenii do wojny kosowskiej, Wydawnictwo
SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2003, p. 155.
edented in Europe ethno-religious mosaic, which mainly consisted of:
Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and numerous minorities
(Jews, Gypsies, and Turks)33.
Slow destabilization of the Federation in the late 80s and 90s
of the twentieth century has shown, that the coexistence of the southern Slavs of different faiths and ethnic characteristics in one country is not enough to balance the differences, on the contrary, it led
to the outbreak of mutual resentment on an unprecedented, in last
50 years, scale. The biggest drama took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which turned out to be a miniature version of Yugoslavia, with
all its problems34. Initially, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not going to leave
the Federation, but when information that the presidents of Serbia
and Croatia talks on the division of the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina, possibly leaving a small Bosnian state, appeared the situation
has changed. This led to proclamation of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina35.
Since the announcement of independence Republic began to fight
for every piece of land, which was to be incorporated into the new
state. It soon became clear that the war took the ethno-religious nature, and the main way of fighting became resettlement, expulsion and
ethnic cleansing36. Any attempt of international mediation and proposals for peace plans did not bring results. Finally, under the Dayton
Agreement independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was maintained,
but it became a federal state. This document provided great freedom
of operation of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Muslim and
Croats (now the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The most
important, from the point of view of territorial unity and stability
of the region, proved to be a part with the possibility of creating by
entitets, on special rules, bilateral relations with third countries (Arti-
33 More detailed information about ethnic mosaic in: D. Majstorović, V. Turjačanin, Youth Ethnic
and National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Social Science Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan,
London 2013.
34Ibidem, p. 148.
35 E. Bujwid-Kurek, op. cit., p. 136.
36 M. Waldenberg, op. cit., p. 168.
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Ewa Dominikowska
cle III of the Constitution), which was mainly applied to contacts with
Croatia and Yugoslavia (currently only Serbia)37.
From the very beginning, coexistence of three nations in one country proved to be extremely difficult. Distinguishing of two entitets,
based largely on ethnicity, wasn’t enough. Serbs, mostly living in Republika Srpska and Croats, constituting the majority of the cantons
forming part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were interested in the largest decentralization of the state, hoping for the implementation of the irredentist aspirations of joining areas inhabited
by them to the neighboring countries – Croatia and the New Yugoslavia (now only Serbia). On the contrary Muslims were interested in,
as soon as possible, centralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hoping
to strengthen the unity of the state and ensure themselves a dominant
role in it38. This difference of opinion was the basis of the political crisis, which de facto has continued to this day. It has become clear that
the European vision of creation in Bosnia-Herzegovina stable multiethnic state is incredibly difficult to be put into practice. On one
hand, thanks to the large, although smaller than originally expected,
financial support granted by the EU and USA, Bosnia and Herzegovina is rebuilding infrastructure (most of the roads, bridges, railways)
and internal security (free movement of persons, goods, reducing
the number of international forces); on the other hand, it seems that
the peaceful existence of all three nations in this extremely complicated state organism is rather unrealistic39. The reluctance of ethnic
hatred is so strong that without outside help the existence of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the shape given to it in the Dayton Agreement
is still a question mark40.
However, not only internal disputes threaten the maintenance
of the unity of the new state. The significant destabilizing factors
of such fragile peace were the activities taken by closest neighbors
37 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14.12.1995, is available on the website of the UN High Representative and EU Special Envoy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/?content_
id=372 [12.08.2014]
38 L. Hladký, op. cit., p. 18-19.
40 More on internal factors of state-building in: J. Dobbins, Overcoming obstacles to peace: local
factors in nation-building, RAND, Santa Monica 2013, p. 93-124.
– Croatia and Yugoslavia (now Serbia). The governments of these
countries wanted to have the greatest impact on strengthening the position of the representatives of their minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, hoping that this temporary state in the absence of common
identity and historical memory quickly cease to exist in the shape
given to it by the West41. On one hand, the regime of Milošević, on
the other Tuđmana meant that both Serbia and Croatia were not willing to comply to sign peace agreements. Willingness of incorporation
of the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina inhabited by Serbs and Croats
to neighboring countries manifested itself mainly in supporting nationalistic party and groups, which were fighting for the rights of their
ethnic groups, even for the right to secede. Zagreb and Belgrade also
were looking for military and economic dependence of Croats and
Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina42. This situation constituted a real
threat to the internal security of the country, while increasing the risk
of the outbreak of another war, outcome of which would affect and
change the balance of power in the Balkans.
This situation has changed after 2000, after the death of Tuđman
Croatia entered the path of democratic reforms. The prospect of membership in the European Union and NATO has appeared, which forced
Zagreb to revise its current policy with respect to the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian minority living there.
First of all, Zagreb has accepted the territorial independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its “interfering” in the internal affairs of that
State limited mainly to the observance of the rights of national minorities. But it cannot be said that the government in Zagreb broke
completely with the policy of interference, since it supported administrative reforms that aimed to create in Bosnia-Herzegovina a third
Croatian entity43. In addition, the strongest Croatian party in Bosnia
and Herzegovina is the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – HDZ BiH (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne
41 W. Satnisławski, Źródła kryzysu politycznego w Bośni i Hercegowinie, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.),
Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 36-37.
43 The Croatian authorities supported the idea of changing the territorial division of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In place of the existing two entitets had formed three territorial
units, each subordinate to one of the constitutional ethnic groups.
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Ewa Dominikowska
i Hercegovine), which is a sister party of the Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica). Both parties bring out
ideas that promote ethnic issues, which further affects the destabilization of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina44.
In the case of Serbia, after the overthrow in 2000 of Milosević’s
government, also can be observed a shift in policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not as visible as in Croatia. The new centralright government formed by the Democratic Party of Serbia – DDS
(Демократска странка Србије/Demokratska stranka Srbije) under the leadership of a new president Vojilslav Koštunica, though did
not support efforts to create a “Greater Serbia”, but was not willing
to abandon the influence on its minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Did not cease to militarily and economically support of Republika Srpska, therefore supporting the separatist sentiments among its people
and weakening the influence of the central government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in that area. The situation has vast change in 2008, when
after the parliamentary elections came to power pro-Western Democratic Party – DS (Демократска странка/Demokratska Strank)
supported by president Boris Tadić. The new government focused
on improving relations with the EU, what definitely require a change
in relations with neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia continued
to support its minority, but avoid direct solidarity with separatist slogans45. A major threat to the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina proved
announcement of independence by Kosovo in February 2008. Violent
reaction of Serbia, which did not agree on disconnection of its southern autonomous region, also led to increased tensions in neighboring
Bosnia and Herzegovina46. In Republika Srpska appear voices that since
Kosovo has detached and received a partial international recognition,
why Republika Srpska can’t leave the Federation and join Serbia. This
situation alarmed the international community, especially the European states, as they did not present common positions in relation to Ko44 Programs and activities of parties available on the official website Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne I Hercegovine, http://www.hdzbih.org/ [15.08.2014].
46 V. Stojarová, Problem bośniacki a szerzej rozumiane bezpieczeństwo. Strony i reprezentacja interesów w Bośni i Hercegowinie, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych,
sovo. However, they all agreed that this precedent will adversely affect
the fragile stability in the Balkans. After a few months the situation
calmed down and Serbia launched a diplomatic offensive to “recover”
in Kosovo. Danger of the disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
influencing the security of the entire region, thereby receded but not
disappeared completely47.
Conclusions
Twenty years after the end of warfare, it appears that Bosnia and
Herzegovina is still struggling with problems which prevent it from
complete independent and free functioning. Europe sees many failures in the fiasco of creation of one Bosnian nation. No shared tradition, religion and common ground strongly contributed to radicalize
the ideas of individual ethnic groups leading to the fact that BosniaHerzegovina has become a center for all sorts of groups, even of extremist nature. These views, which are shared by many authors writing
about the Balkans, including particularly the Muslim population,
in which small groups already in the 70s tended to oscillate in the direction of radical fractions of Islam48. This problem has again gained
relevance with the beginning of the war on terror, when it turned out
that some of the people associated with terrorist organizations also
participated in fighting during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina49.
Europe was concerned with information seeming to confirm that not
only during the war to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina rushed
47 B. Górka-Winter, Unia Europejska a Bośnia i Hercegowina – w kierunku nowego modelu partnerstwa, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie
środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 169.
48 A. Koseski, Bałkańskie konflikty etniczne na przełomie XX i XXI stulecia, [in:] W. Konarski, A. Koseski
(eds.), Bałkany: etnokulturowe podłoże konfliktów, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Humanistycznej
im. A. Gieysztora, Pułtusk 2006, p. 109.
49 Emerge and mechanisms of action of organizations and persons linked to terrorist activities are
described in detail in: J. Elsässer, Jak dżihad przybył do Europy. Wojownicy Boga i tajne służby na
Bałkanach, Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza, Warszawa 2007.
87
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Ewa Dominikowska
a large number of Mujahedeen50 fighting previously in Afghanistan,
great amount of which has stayed in the Balkans51.
Consequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the state which is still
not fully democratic is exposed to the influence of extremist ideologies
of all types (equally Islamic radicalism as well as Serbian and Croatian),
that fall on fertile ground which are the ordinary citizens of BosniaHerzegovina, dissatisfied with the lack of improvement in their living
conditions52. All these factors mean that the EU still considers Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a potential source of threats to peace in Europe.
This is reflected in the adopted in 2003 the EU Security Strategy (ESS),
in which experts have emphasis that main threat to the European security in international terrorism and the associated proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (seen as the greatest threat to human security
dimension global). It also emphasized regional conflicts, which, by
the escalation could lead to the disintegration of the state, and hence
to global conflict. As a result of incompetent governments and poverty of local communities, this can lead to destabilize the situation
in the region and even continent. As the last risk factor is pointed organized crime, which also cannot be handled by state authorities (police and army). Unfortunately all above mentioned threats are present
in Bosnia and Herzegovina53.
With this in mind, Europe should be interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible entering the path of reforms, not only
political and economic but also social, enabling the state to function
freely without assistance and international supervision. Following
this requirement, the EU has undertaken a number of actions aimed
at the inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the “European community of nations” by many aid programs (ECHO, PHARE/CARDS or
50 Mujahedeen (from Arabic muǧāhid meaning fighter for a just cause) – a member of the religious
– liberation and social-liberation movement in Muslim countries. Often leads an armed struggle
against the unaccepted government. Source: A. Markowski, R. Pawelec, Słownik wyrazów obcych
i trudnych, Wydawnictwo Wilga, Warszawa 2001, p. 593.
51 A. Parzymies, op. cit., p. 158.
52 R. Báchora, Bośnia i Hercegowina państwem upadłym? Kwestia ekstremizmu muzułmańskiego,
[in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie
środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 138-140.
53 Bezpieczna Europa w lepszym świecie – Europejska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa, Urząd Publikacji Unii
Europejskiej, Belgia, 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568PLC.pdf [17.08.2014].
OBNOVA) as well as the presence of military and political missions.
Above all, it supports (within the Stabilization and Association Process) Bosnia and Herzegovina in their efforts to join the EU. It seems,
however, that for the situation in the country to stabilize, there are
needed clear steps aimed to determine the final shape of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (the answer to the question whether the state should be
more centralized and unified or decentralized, which may not necessarily lead to a transformation of the federation into confederation?).
It is also important to accelerate reforms of the security, both internal and external, sector allowing for effective fighting against fundamentalism, separatism, organized crime and arms trafficking. In this
place it should be underlined that without support and cooperation
of neighboring countries – mainly Serbia and Croatia as well as the EU
maintaining, a stable and independent country of Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to be only an international experiment without chances
for happy ending.
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Stojarová V., Problem bośniacki a szerzej rozumiane bezpieczeństwo. Strony i reprezentacja interesów w Bośni i Hercegowinie, [in:] Gniazdowski M. (ed.), Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie
środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008
Tanty M., Bałkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 2003
The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina official
website, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_
id=38519 [14.08.2014]
The Stabilization Force, http://www.nato.int/SFOR/docu/d981116a.htm
[14.08.2014]
The text of General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 [12.08.2014]
The United Nations, www.un.org [15.08.2014]
Waldenberg M., Rozbicie Jugosławii; od separacji Słowenii do wojny kosow
skiej, Wydawnictwo SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2003
Walkiewicz W., Jugosławia. Byt wspólny i rozpad, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 2000
Walkiewicz W., Jugosławia: państwa sukcesyjne, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 2009
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Abstract: The aim of this work is to present the Bosnian visions of Europe
as well as its expectations concerning the membership in the European Union which seems to be an important issue as almost half of the Bosnian society is Islamic. Bosniak people believe their religion, or rather its non-orthodox
version, will be accepted easier by the West. They see themselves as mediators between two civilisations able to show other Muslims that their faith does
not stand in contradiction to European values. The citizens of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina are in great majority in favour of accessing the EU. They treat this
possibility as a chance to raise the level of life; to strengthen the social guarantees; to curb corruption and to improve the judiciary system. Those collective
hopes come together with a grudge towards Europe for being passive during
the war but also for lack of power of the international administration.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Identity, Europe, European Union
The vision of Europe seen by the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina is indeed a very important issue concerning the aspirations of this
country to join the European Union. First of all, it has to be noticed
that in the collective ideas Europe is identified with the European
Union which should not come as a surprise since the fundamental
feature of collective imagination is to simplify the reality. That is one
of the reasons why in numerous discourses, not only in the Balkan
ones, terms: Europe and EU are used interchangeably. During the process of accessing the European Union also Poles spoke about joining
the Europe, although from the geographical point of view, the border
of the old continent lies several thousand kilometres from the Vistula
River. A similar kind of Europhilia among Slovenians was analysed by
Mitja Velikonja who quoted a broad spectrum of statements dealing
with the topic of coming back to Europe.1
1
M. Velikonja, Evroza. Kritika novog evrocentrizma, Biblioteka XX Vek, Beograd 2007, p. 36-42.
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Besides, the European Union itself propagates such associations,
many examples of which can be easily pointed to. One of them is the official portal of the European Union which is called Europe.2 Serbian
scholar, Tanja Petrović talks about the metaphors of home (in some
cases a stronghold), family and road functioning in the Western discourse.3 From the perspective of the countries applying for accession
to the EU, the last metaphor, suggesting that the membership has
to come after an arduous process of adjusting to the EU standards,
seems to be the most important one. However, in the case of Bosnia
and Herzegovina this route appears to be much more complicated and
bumpy because of the almost bizarre character of the country. And
it is trivial to say that the Dayton Agreement created a weak country
unable to perform its functions.4
While this paper is being written the results of the first census (2013)
from the times of the Breakup of Yugoslavia remain unknown, thus we
are forced to base on the unofficial estimates according to which 48%
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s inhabitants are Bosniaks, 37% – Serbs and
14% – Croats. This shows that almost half of the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s inhabitants are Muslim and in such a context the attitude towards
the European integration takes on new meaning, thus the specificity
of Bosniak autoidentification has to receive as much attention as the issue of how Europe is seen in Bosnia. Regarding the limit of this text’s
length, the author of this work is forced to restrain herself from writing about this one nation only.
Having no place for a broaden description of the historic past:
the pre-Osmanian times; the dependence on Turkey resulting in orientalization of the country; the Hapsburg epoch when the western
tradition started to be more widely recognized the author of this work
will limit herself to use the communistic Yugoslavia as the point of reference for the present times. Under the rules of Josip Broz Tito Bosnia underwent a rapid transformation as the backward, agricultural
2 http://europa.eu/index_pl.htm [2.08.2014].
3 T. Petrović, Yuropa. Jugoslovensko nasleđe i politike budućnosti u postjugoslovenskim društvima,
Fabrika knjiga, Beograd 2012, p. 38-52.
4 M. Babić, Węzeł gordyjski: piętnaście lat daytonowskiej Bośni i Hercegowiny, [in:] P. Chmielewski, S. L. Szczesio (ed.), Bośnia i Hercegowina 15 lat po Dayton. Przeszłość – teraźniejszość – perspektywy, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2011, p. 271-273.
territory was to be modernized by developing the industry, mainly
the defence industry.5 And although, as it is nowadays often underlined, such politics did not bring any of the expected results, as Bosnia
was left far behind Croatia and Slovenia, the investments also the foreign ones (e.g. Volkswagen) resulting in the transformations of people's awareness, are an indisputable fact. One has to remember about
the westernisation of SFRY indicating the inflow of the Western trends
and lifestyle. Radina Vučetić in a book devoted to Americanisation
of the Yugoslavian culture, notices that although the level of existence
in Yugoslavia could not be seen as equal with the one from the United
States, the process itself revealed that there actually is a different way
of living and triggered the willing of its achievement.6 To this fact, one
should also add the labour-related migration to Western countries,
mostly to Germany and Austria, which also meant transferring many
ideas. Returning home for their holiday, Gastarbeiters brought with
themselves not only souvenirs but also their own observations and experiences that they shared with others. Yugoslavian passport allowed
its owner to travel freely around Europe and opened many doors not
only to visit members of the family but also for tourist or shopping
purposes (e.g. to Trieste).
Also in the times of the communist Yugoslavia the city of Sarajevo had been constantly developing and finally became the symbol
of multiculturalism. A milestone event in the collective consciousness
of the inhabitants of Sarajevo was the Olympic Games from 1984 called
by Vojislav Perica “Yugoslavia’s Swan Song.” The authorities tried to put
much effort in adding propaganda value to the whole event to use
it as a representation of the successes of the Yugoslavian version of socialism and as a symbol of the effectiveness of brotherhood and unity
politics. It was also underlined in the interior discourse that entrusting SFRY with this kind of event is a proof of its recognition in its activities for building the stability in the international relationships.7
5 N. Anđelić, Bosna i Hercegovina. Između Tita i rata, Samizdat B92, Beograd 2005, p. 51-52.
6 R. Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslovenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka, Službeni glasnik, Beograd 2012, p. 409.
7 V. Perica, Balkanski Idoli, Religija i nacionalizam u jugoslovenskim državama, Vol. 1, Biblioteka XX
Vek, Beograd 2006, p. 218-222.
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All of this made the inhabitants of Bosnia feel as Europeans; perhaps
they even regretted that they did not belong to the “true” West. An
American Journalist, Barbara Demick in her documentary form the besieged Sarajevo writes: “Everybody was anxious to explain that they
hadn’t always lived like barbarians. Usually within minutes of meeting us, they pulled out their fading snapshots of holidays spent skiing in Switzerland or sunning on the Mediterranean. They showed
off the fashionable clothes they once wore – usually imported from
Italy. Saraievians were sophisticated travellers and many had worked
abroad.”8
It can be said that the European identity survived the war and is still
present, especially in the discourse of Bosniak elite. For example, philosopher Muhamed Filipović underlines that the term South-Eastern
Europe has not only got geographical connotations as it symbolises
the ancient roots of the entire continent.9 Abdulgafar Velić adds that
because in the ancient and medieval times South-East was the centre
of contemporary civilisation it was there were, among many others,
the cultural, philosophical political and educational currents were
born.10
Besides, such theses are propagated not only in Bosnia. Božidar
Jezernik underlines that in antiquity the term Europe meant exclusively the territory which nowadays is called the Balkans.11 In 1994,
thus when the war raged in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and
when Balkans became the synonym of bestiality and brutality, which
was the theme of Maria Todorova’s writings, a famous Serbian historicist, constantly living abroad, creating in the trends of Annales
School – Trajan Stojanović published a book titled Balkan Worlds:
The First and Last Europe. According to one of the theses that can be
found in this book the first Europe lies in the South (thus Greece and
Balkans), the new Europe on the other hand is the West part of the Old
Continent. As Stojanović notices, Balkans were excluded from both
8 B. Demick, W oblężeniu. Życie pod ostrzałem na sarajewskiej ulicy, Czarne, Wołowiec 2014, p. 24-25.
9 M. Filipović, Deset predavanja o ideji Europe, Pravni centar Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, Sarajevo
2000, p. 46-47.
10 A. Velić, Bošnjaci i Evropa, Bošnjacko razumijevanje Evrope i zapadnoevropske kulture u periodu austrougarske uprave nad Bosnom i Hercegovinom 1878-1918, Dobra knjiga, Sarajevo 2013, p. 25-26.
11 B. Jezernik, Dzika Europa. Bałkany w oczach zachodnich podróżników, Universitas, Kraków 2007, p. X.
visions of Europe and the purpose of his book is to prove that the Balkan territory is the indispensable part of the first Europe.12 Following
Stojanović’s thought, who also in other cases pointed that Balkans are
one of the prime parts of Europe,13 it is natural to start wondering why
while talking about the necessity of accessing Bosnia and Herzegovina and also other Balkan countries to the EU, the strategic and political aspects are often mentioned, but the ideological aspect is left
aside. Somehow Greek Europeanism had never been undermined.
It seemed unquestionable (at least until the break out of the crisis
when the mechanisms of Greek economy were exposed) whereas
Balkans are still treated as a worse part of Europe. Possible, an average inhabitant of the West would be more than surprised to hear that
those “continental outskirts” are actually the cradle of Europe. Such
a picture of Balkans, which is propagated by their elite, is something
that collective imagination of Europeans cannot grasp. For example,
German chancellor, Angela Merkel, during a meeting with Serbian
prime minister Aleksandar Vučić while discussing the perspectives
of the Western part of Balkans concerning the EU, stated that European history cannot be separated from the Balkan history, which one
of numerous proofs are the circumstances in which the First World
War started.14 It is hard not to get an impression that for the Westerners Balkans remain in the margin which presence is marked only
during the subsequent explosions of the powder keg.
It seems that the catchphrase: Balkans – The First and the Last Europe can be interpreted in one more way by connecting it with the process of integration with the EU. Being the cradle of the European
civilisation, Balkans will join the European Union as the last bridgehead
of the old continent. As a result, the last of the borders will disappear.
Writers: Miljenko Jergović and Marko Vidojković in a 2010 documentary Dugo putovanje kroz istoriju, historiju i povijest (The Long
Road Through Balkan History) state that the ghetto begins just behind the Slovenian border. Following this idea it can be said that after
the Croatia’s accession to the EU the ghetto shrank a bit. Nevertheless,
12 T. Stojanović, Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe, M.E. Sharpe, New York 1994, p. 2-3.
13 Vide ex.: T. Stojanović, Balkanska civilizacija, Geopoetika, Beograd 1995, p. 13-14.
14 Merkel: Zapadni Balkan čeka dug put do EU-a, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/merkel-zapadnibalkan-ceka-dug-put-do-eu [3.08.2014].
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further reductions are possible. Much is being said about Serbia’s and
Montenegro’s accession; Albany received the status of the official candidate. Bosnian situation is exceptionally hard due to the lack of understanding between entities. It is enough to mention that because
of this lack of internal compromise the association agreement with
the EU has not been reached so far.15 Serbs and Croats can count on
Belgrade and Zagreb.16 The EU’s Croatian passports guarantee full
freedom in Europe. Serbian passports, on the other hand, guarantee
the possibility to travel without visa to the Schengen Area. For now,
Bosniaks remain closed in the ghetto.
Not only do the Bosniak elite underline that the European integration is a necessity and that their motherland is the cradle of the old continent, but they go in their suggestions ever further by trying to secure
for their country a special mission. It has to be noticed that the need
to play the main role in a historical mission is felt not only by the nation but also by every collectivity. However, as Maria Dąbrowska‑Partyka notices, the borderline situation helps such attitudes to arise
since the division of the world to a familiar and foreign space results
in the willingness to undertake a civilisation and spiritual mission.17
While there is no doubt in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s transitory character it would be wise to spare a moment and discuss what kind of task
Bosniaks want to undertake.
First of all, Bosniaks see themselves as the bridge between Europe
and the Muslim world. It is often underlined that the so called autochton, European version of Islam, which Bosniaks believe in, will be more
acceptable for the Western societies and that it will not awake deep
collective fear as Islam of Arabs do, whose appearance and clothes
are quite distinctive. By becoming familiar witch such “gentle” version of Islam, Europeans will get accustomed and stop or at least significantly limit the ritualization of the negative stereotypes. This on
15 C. Kowanda, Kto następny do Unii, „Polityka”, 16.04.2014, http://www.polityka.pl/
tygodnikpolityka/1577213,2,kto-nastepny-do-unii.read [3.08.2014].
16 E. Sarajlić, Razmatranje režima državljanstva u postdejtonskoj Bosni i Hercegovini, [in:] Dž. Šo, I. Štiks
(ed.), Državljani i državljanstvo posle Jugoslavije, Clio, Beograd 2012, p. 156-157.
17 M. Dąbrowska-Partyka, Literatura pogranicza, pogranicza literatury, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2004, p. 10.
the other hand would prepare the mental ground for the Turkey’s accession to the EU.
It is also said that about 15 million Muslims live in the European
Union without any common identity. Such views correspond with
the suggestions, sprouting in the West, that not only is there an urgent
need to create the European civil religion but also that for Muslims,
which number rises, there should also be a place in the European home.
Xavier Bougarel adds that in Europe one can speak of many Islams,
as a universal, European version of this religion has not been founded so far.18 The way of making Muslims “fellow countrymen” and not
“strangers” could be achieved through developing such a form of Islam
that would be suitable for the European realities.19 These kinds of ideas
were eagerly picked up by the Bosniak elite who saw in them the historical chance to engage a cultural-civilisation dialogue.20 It is often
underlined that Bosniaks will become European patriots21 setting an
example for other Muslim societies.
Secondly, according to Bosniak elite, Bosnia can be a model
of a peacefully coexisting society for contemporary Europe, which
is struggling with the challenges of the inflow of the culturally alien
immigrants. Such slogans can be seen as a surprise in the outer world,
in which there has been appearing a big number of publications, not
only scientific ones, dealing with the mad conflicts of neighbours
turning against each other. The entire world would probably be more
eager to learn from Bosnia how not to repeat its mistakes rather than
copy the Balkan solutions. Nevertheless, Bosniak internal discourse
is abundant in statements about the exceptional tolerance, which
could be witnessed on their territory in the times when the religious
minorities were subjected to repression in Europe. Thus one can easily come across M. Filipović’s statement that convinces that being
18 X. Bougarel, Bosnian Islam as “European islam”: Limits and Shifts of a Concept, [in:] A. Al-Azmeh, E. Fokas (ed.), Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2007, p. 121.
19 A. Karić, Položaj muslimana u Evropskoj Uniji. Velika Britanija, Njemačka i Švedska, Dobra knjiga,
Sarajevo 2012, p. 180.
20 S. Abedpour, O definiranju evropskog identiteta Bošnjaka, „Bošnjačka pismohrana”, no. 3435/2012, p. 61.
21 E. Rathfelder, Raskrsnica Sarajevo. Bosna i Hercegovina deset godina poslije Daytona: muslimani,
pravoslavci, katolici i jevreji grade zajedničku državu, Bosanska Riječ, Tuzla 2007, p. 135.
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the only province of the West Roman Empire, isolated from the outer
world, Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to preserve the contemporary system of values based on multiculturalism and respect towards
foreigners. Meanwhile, Europe accepted Christianity as the only possible paradigm. Thus, as the philosopher concludes, Bosnia remains
as a memory after the first Europe. It appears to be the picture of paradise lost. To some extent it still can be seen as the living past of Europe.22 It seems that such views are in fact a consequence of a popular
in the Islam world thesis claiming that Islam is actually the most tolerant of all monotheistic religions. The proof of that is supposed to be
found in the centuries-old presence of Jewish and Christian minorities in the Muslim world.23
So far this work was mainly devoted to the attitude of Bosniak
elite towards Europe, but it would be also wise to discuss the views
of the society which, apparently, does not declare itself being explicitly
European. The European identity is declared by 1/3 of the respondents, however, depending on the poll, 70-90% of respondents believe
that Bosnia and Herzegovina should join the European Union. Such
pro-EU attitude can be observed among all three Bosnian nations, but
it is a bit less strong among Serbs and Croats than among Bosniaks.24
However, public knowledge about the EU is still limited.25 On the other hand, analysts underline the fact that Bosnia does little to adapt
to the requirements posed by Brussels and that together with Kosovo, which still is not recognized by many countries, occupies the end
part of the queue to the EU gates.26
The disappointment with Europe, which will be discussed later
in this text, does not transfer to the negative attitude towards EU
as the inhabitants of Bosnia see in Brussels the only chance to improve
the economic situation, ensure social guarantees and last but not least
22 M. Filipović, op. cit., p. 65.
23 D. Moïsi, Geopolityka emocji, PWN, Warszawa 2012, p. 122.
24 Vide ex.: Vijeće ministara: Čak 85 posto građana BiH podržava ulazak u EU, http://www.avaz.ba/
vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/vijece-ministara-cak-85-posto-gradjana-bih-podrzava-ulazak-u-eu
[5.08.2014].
25 Građani u BiH znaju malo o procesu evropskih integracija, http://cps.ba/gradani-u-bih-znaju-maloo-procesu-evropskih-integracija/ [6.08.204].
26 Praštalo: Građani BiH nepovratno izgubili još jednu godinu života, http://www.visokoin.com/prast�alo-gradani-bih-nepovratno-izgubili-jos-jednu-godinu-zivota/ [6.08.2014].
to force Sarajevo to accept the broadly defined Union standards.27
What is more, as it has been pointed out by many, the accession will
be connected with the necessity of normalization of the state apparatus and replacing the labyrinth of ethnic parity with more efficient solutions. One of the journalists in the neighbourhood Croatia said that
the Union “forces us to have courts in which nobody inquires whether
you are a Croat, Serb, Romani or Hungarian. Courts are blind to origin but they act quicker, they are more efficient and more just. Union
forces us to have equal possibility in being employed and also to have
economy in which it is possible to get a job.”28 Bosnia has similar expectations. One can risk a supposition that they are even bigger while
taking into consideration the post-dayton paralyses of the country.
Analysts, however, point to yet another aspect of membership
in the EU that is the chance to build a common all-Bosnian European
identity over the ethnic divisions. And although it appears to be a utopian vision, numerous scholars remind that the identity is not something that was given once and for all and that it was in Bosnia where
the Yugoslavian identification caught on the strongest in all the SFRY.
Džemal Sokolović believes that “on the Balkan peninsula everybody
was changing their religious and ethic identities.”29 Thus it is possible
to foresee that in the future more permutations may occur. The disappointment of Bosnian state can paradoxically strengthen the process of identifying with Europe. Danijela Majstorović and Vladimir
Turjačanin prove that in their country Serbs and Croats identify more
willingly with entities and with Europe than with Bosnia and Herzegovina.30
It is worth to notice that the attitude towards West and thus towards Europe will vary in the case of people declaring themselves
as Bosniaks and Muslims. Here, it has to be mentioned that the decision of the Second Bosniak Congress from 1993 to adopt a new name
27 D. Bajraktarević, Bosna i Hercegovina i proces evropskih integracija, [in:] D. Banović, S. Gavrić (ed.),
Država, polityka i društvo u Bosni i Hercegovini. Analiza postdejtonskog političkog sistema, IKD University Press – Magistrat izdanja, Sarajevo 2011, p. 540-541.
28 As cited in A. Puszczewicz, Proces integracji Chorwacji z Unią Europejską, Grado, Toruń 2013, p. 242.
29 Dž. Sokolović, Nacija protiv naroda. Bosna je samo jedan slučaj, Biblioteka XX Vek, Beograd
2006, p. 126.
30 D. Majstorović, V. Turjačanin, Youth Ethnic and National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Social
Science Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2013, p. 161.
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for the nation – Bosniaks, did not put an end to arguments and disputes. Many opinions are heard, especially from the units supported
form the external pan-Islamic environments, to consider the earlier
name – Muslims, more accurately, because of its inclusive character.
Islamic missioners often express their conviction that cooperation
of all Balkan Allah’s followers in necessary. Pan-Muslim circles say
that nationalism became the real enemy of Islam followers as it has
forced men to choose between loyalty towards the religious community and towards the national state.31 This in the Balkan conditions
often happens to be a hard choice. Moreover, until now non-Slavic
Islamic minorities such as Albanians and Romani people live in Bosnia. The result of this is the fact that some choose to define themselves
as Muslims and not as Bosniaks. Sarajevian sociologist Dino Abazović
underlines that Bosniaks present their pro-Western attitudes more often than Muslims.32 However, the Muslim identity is declared by relatively small number of people and they are often placed in statistics
under the “other” category.
There is no doubt that the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina bears
a grudge to the international society, European Union included, as they
were left all alone while the war was treated as a marginal conflict.
The biggest disappointment is probably felt by Bosniaks among whom
one can come across views stating that the Western world turned
a blind eye towards ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and also
towards Srebrenica while recognizing Muslim people as worse, not
worthy of any sacrifices.33 Such views appear to suggest that the West
treats Bosniaks in the way it was described by Edward Said in Orientalism.34 Rasim Muratović notices that Europe’s involvement in Bosnia
was a moral fiasco since instead of effective actions to stop the genocide, disputes about the end of history, the triumph of the West were
31 A. al-Ahsan, Ummet ili nacija. Kriza identiteta u savremenom muslimanskom društvu, Libris, Sarajevo 2004, p. 45.
32 D. Abazović, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani na početku novog milenija: sociološki pogledi,
[in:] H. Kamberović (ed.), Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka, Institut za istoriju, Sarajewo 2009, p. 232.
33 E. Rathfelder, op. cit., p. 119.
34 E. W. Said, Orientalizm, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2005, p. 82.
more occupying. The war nightmare was used as an attempt to verify
the hypothesis of the unity of the post-cold-war-world.35
Meanwhile, Europe, which allowed for the Bosnian tragedy and
which attempts to manage the country resulted in more defeats than
successes, wants now to make demands as its idea of playing a historical mission assumes passing the experience to others.36 As Croatian
political scientist Boris Buden, notices, the West has full control over
the Mid-European transformations. By creating some kind of ideal,
the West defines the direction towards which young democracies
should be going, de facto interfering in the internal policy of the postcommunistic countries.37 That kind of bitterness seems natural, as no
one likes being subjected to demands and receiving in return only
vague promises of membership in an undefined time. There was a time
when also in Poland complains arouse about Europe daring to impose
conditions on Warsaw when some time ago in Yalta it allowed Poland
to stay in the Soviet block. A certain illogicality is striking here; as it was
mentioned, Bosnians see in the EU a chance to sort out the country
affairs, create the social guarantees, curb corruption, etc. Thus why
does the society that expects the introduction of European norms at
the same time oppose them being imposed by Brussels? The answer
to this question seems simple since the collective ideas, hopes and
fears are not internally cohesive. They are led rather by the wishful
thinking that by rationale.
Europe keeps disappointing Bosnia as the control over country
lead by international administration is far from being effective which
is aptly captured in Nenad Veličković’s book Sahib: Impressions from
Depression. What is more, the society seeing the consent of the foreign
officials for the ubiquitous mess and corruption does not understand
their indifference. In a poor society troubled with high unemployment
rate it is difficult to understand that for years armies of foreigners receive high salaries for actions that are supposed to lead to normalize
the reality but actually bring no spectacular effects.
35 R. Muratović, Holokaust nad Jevrejima i genocid nad Bošnjacima, Institut za istraživanje zločina
protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo 2011, p. 140.
36 M. F. Gawrycki, A. Szeptycki, Podporządkowanie – niedorozwój – wyobcowanie. Postkolonializm
a stosunki międzynarodowe, PWN, Warszawa 2011, p. 110.
37 B. Buden, Zona prelaska. O kraju postkomunizma, Fabrika knjiga, Beograd 2012, p. 90.
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Here, it has to be mentioned that in the Bosniak society it is possible to differentiate between two opposing each other attitudes towards
religion. The European version of Islam, about which elites speak,
can be juxtaposed with deep religiousness brought during the war by
Wahhabis. The strict version of religion, although very much conspicuous is still a margin but the West cannot forget that Muslim countries invest a lot of capital in Bosnia. Mosque-by schools where free
after class lessons are conducted are very popular.38 The EU should
thus deeply consider the possibility of redefining its politics as so far
tightly wrapped women are humorously called ninja and the majority
of Bosniak people desire the European style of living. At the same time
negative emotions can be easily channelled in the opposite direction
the signals of which are the ideas of basing Bosnia on Muslim instead
on EU countries.39 It is worth to remember that Turkey or Saudi Arabia for lending a helping hand do not make any demands concerning
the respect of human rights or corruption and, as it has been already
noticed, such demands made by Brussels awake bitterness in Bosniaks.
The already mentioned Dino Abazović underlines that although
Bosniaks see their future in the European Union, they tend to believe
that the West does not understand Islam, that it does not have sufficient knowledge about Bosniaks, that it considers their nation as delayed in terms of civilisation and that it prefers other Bosnian nations
(Serbs and Croats).40 Nevertheless, the membership in the European
Union is treated as a chance to improve the broadly defined quality
of life and as a possibility to escape from the Daytonian labyrinth.41
But Bosnian political elite show not enough engagement in reforming the country. One can only suppose that cleaning the Bosnian mess
is not suitable for the elite. However this issue goes beyond the topic
of this text.
38 M. Kowalik, Boszniackie projekcje Europy, [in:] P. Chmielewski, S. L. Szczesio (ed.), Bałkany Zachodnie między przeszłością a przyszłością, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2013, p. 539.
39Ibidem.
40 D. Abazović, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani između sekularizacije i desekularizacije, Synopsis,
Zagreb – Sarajevo 2012, p. 163-164.
41 E. Islamović, Europska nelagoda i bosanski labirint, „Bošnjačka pismohrana”, no. 34-35/2012, p. 85.
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Jan Muś
of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans
Abstract: This article proposes an approach to ethnopolitics in the Balkans
based on the law of uneven and combined development. It assumes a significant role of economy (and control over economy) in social and political
development of a society across the ages. Subsequently, the ethnopolitics of
the Balkans should be perceived through the prism of historic development
of the political solutions to arising economic questions. In effect, we recognize several models of cultural division of labour. These models provide varying levels of economic (in)dependence of minorities from state-authorities.
Our claims, however, are based on the conviction that these institutions and
models are focused mostly on meeting demands of the minorities’ leaders,
not necessarily of the minorities themselves. Consequently, political and economic interests took precedence over human rights and democratic values.
Keywords: ethnopolitics, ethnicity, combined and uneven development, Balkans, ethnic minorities
Introduction
Contemporary research approaches to ethnicity and ethnic groups
tend to perceive them through the prisms of either political and institutional frameworks1, widely understood protection or abuses of hu-
1
J. Erin, A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia, International Studies Quarterly 48:729-754 or, by the same author, Ethnic Bargaining:
The Paradox of Minority Empowerment, Cornell University Press, 2007 ; T. Kuran Private Truths and
Public Lies, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1996; J. C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday
Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale University Press 1985; J. Zielinski Translating Social
Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of the New Democracies, World Politics 54:184-211,
2002. Important are the works of Arend Lijphart devoted to plural societies: Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy 15 (2): 96-109, 2004; Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms & Performance in Thirty-six Countries, Second Edition, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2012.
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man (and minority) rights2, or cultural and anthropological issues3.
This article seeks to address the question of inter-ethnic political relations through the prism of combined and uneven development law.
The idea of combined and uneven development assumes that social
development is directly linked to control over production process.
In other words, economic development is a key determinant of social
relations. Some social groups develop quicker than others, depending
on geopolitical conditions and historical circumstances. History witnesses various paths and speeds of development and progress of different segments of society, economy, culture and politics around the
globe. The development remains uneven. A combination of domestic
and international interactions between various social groups, branches
of economy, as well as cultural and intellectual exchange lead to further changes in human development. Therefore, this development
can be described as combined. The main assumption of this work is
that the process of inter-ethnic relations has been shaped by uneven
economic development, providing particular groups with distinctive
position in the cultural division of labour.
So far, the historical materialistic approach to social-sciences has
ignored the question of inter-ethnic relations. Later on, based on the
modernist approach to the concept of nation and nationalism, it as2 R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press 1992; S. Smooha, Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in
Israel, Ethnic and Racial Studies 13: 389-413, 1990; S. Castles, H. Booth, T. Wallace, Here for Good:
Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities, London, England, Pluto Press 1984; A. Adeno Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 615 (1991-1992);
works of Will Kymlicka: Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1995; Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2001; and Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State, Ethics &
International Affairs, Volume 20.3 Fall 2006.
3 R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, New
York: Cambridge University Press 1996; E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983. E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality,
New York: Cambridge University Press 1992; A. Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism, New York: Oxford University Press 2004; Ch. Tilly, The Formation of National States in
Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975; of the same author: Coercion, Capital,
and European States: AD 990-1990, New York: Basil Blackwell Press 1990; A. D. Smith, Ethnic Origins
of Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986; and published 3 years earlier in 1983; Theories
of Nationalism, New York: Holmes and Meier, B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1983, and more recent Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the
Anti-Colonial Imagination, 2005.
Uneven and Combined Development of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans
sumed a state-centred, top-bottom orientation. In this sense, we endeavour to create a new perspective within the modernist branch. In
other words, we will highlight the economic origins of ethnopolitics.
We claim that control over production processes and economic development requires a respective representation in the political system.
Therefore, depending on the relatively large size of non-majoritarian
groups, their economic development and (favourable) international
circumstances, the political system of a particular country was likely
to change if another institutional set up provided more beneficial (for
the minority groups) division of labour. On the other hand, a dominating ethnic group will want to preserve its privileged position by
a respective set of institutions. In both cases an idea of separate ethnic/national identity will be a primary tool of mobilisation. Intellectual and ideological developments (i.e. liberalism, nation state, self
determination of peoples, etc.) provided explanation for such an evolution, while international and domestic circumstances (i.e. shifts of
international alliances, armed conflicts, invasions, changes of rulers
in the capital city, economic crisis, etc.) generated favourable momentum when changes could be applied or prevented.
In the first part of the text the major historical events leading to
establishment of national states and capitalism have been shown. The
specificity of inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans through the prism
of combined and uneven development will be highlighted in the second part.
1.
Combined development of the Great Revolutions4
1.1. Concentration of capital
At the end of 18th century two revolutions took place in the Western
Europe. They shook the entire world and opened a path to the creation
of national states and politicization of ethnicity. The first of them had
an industrial character and was possible thanks to a conjunction of
specific international circumstances and socio-economic institutions
4 See: E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848, New York: Vintage Books 1996.
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Jan Muś
of the country, where it all began – the Great Britain. Industrialization,
which followed, led to the creation of a whole new international system
divided between developed centres and underdeveloped peripheries.
Although this sort of international division of labour had existed since
the beginning of human societies, the industrial revolution contributed to it new dynamics that forced markets to accelerate trade, buy
and sell more and quicker – processes that privilege economic development and concentration of capital. While the first group (centres)
was at the time (i.e. 18th and 19th century) composed of the western
powers (the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Germany,
and to a much lesser degree also Russia, Italy, Belgium and non-European Japan), the second covered the rest of the world with a net of
colognes and more or less dependent states and state-like territories,
which are called by some contemporary scholars as peripheries, and
the third world by others. In effect, the globe has been dominated by
those who produce, create and sell, and subsequently develop quicker,
gaining economic advantage over subordinated economies of natural
resources, cheap labour and political dependency.
1.2. Capital and coercion
Economic changes happened to be followed by a set of rapid developments later named as the French Revolution. These events led to the
creation of a new political pattern that resulted in the establishment
of nation states representing the capital, which arose during and after
the industrial revolution. Balance between those accumulating capital
and those accumulating coercion has been achieved5. These political
and institutional evolutions, initially of the western European states,
resulted in the establishment of some new political forms that revolutionized political scenes and enable relatively wider groups of society,
namely those accumulating capital, participation in state governance.
The pillars for modern nation-state have been created.
5 Ch. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, Blackwell, Cambridge
1992 za: A. Gałganek, Historia Stosunków Międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój.
Tom I. Idee, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 2013, p. 462.
1.3. Nation-states
Creation of the states functioning in 19th century required some particular and far-reaching changes concerning the vast majority of the
population; namely, the creation of a nation. For this goal a cultural
standardization had to be introduced via public education and imposition of a single common language. These two features were necessary to organize administration and to manage working class growing
in the industrialized towns. This led to establishment of an ideological (one nation – one state principle), cultural (homogeneous public
education, dominant state religion), and linguistic (single official state
language) framework with which the state’s population should correspond6. The maintenance of political stability and economic development, combined with redistribution of public goods, has been the
main goal of ethnopolitics.
A homogeneous society was required and subsequently designed
for 1. economic development of the industrial states, and 2. relatively
stable state politics in the new institutional set-up. It has not been done
according to the French model, where a person is linked with the state
by ties of citizenship and social agreement, nor by multicultural Swiss
model, where ethno-confessional divisions are ignored. Centuries of
authoritarian Ottoman rules and geographic proximity led to adoption of the German model, where a citizen is linked with the state by
ethnic ties, which and creates most culturally homogeneous society
of the three possible options7.
2.
1st phase of ethnopolitics – nationalization
2.1. Fall of the empire and rise of the nations
While the western world was undergoing fundamental social, political and economic changes, the East was left far behind. The 19th century was characterized by the final stage of the Ottoman Empire’s
6 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca New York 2006.
7 We shall leave aside the question “what would happened” with the Balkans if the French or Swiss
models prevailed – surely history of Balkan states would take very different course.
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Jan Muś
fall8. The Sublime Porte finds itself on the very periphery of the ongoing developments. The centre of the world that had already moved
to the western world, along with corrupted administrative system of
the Empire, demoralized armed forces as well as impoverished peasantry and lack of industry separated Ottoman lands from the rapidly
developing countries and, in effect, led it to dissolution at the beginning of the 19th century. All attempts of reforms were either abolished,
incomplete or came too late to safe the country which used to encompass lands stretching over three continents and populated by three
religious denominations9.
The transitions that were imported from, or imposed by, the West
have found not only a weak state structure and semi-feudal economy
but also a very specific social system that stratified population along
religious lines. That was a consequence of the Ottoman idea of society,
where state elites were Muslims and particular confessional groups
were governed by their respective leaders. Common cultural or linguistic denominators had rather secondary meaning. Unlike general acceptance for multi-confessional idea of nations in other parts of
Europe (Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Germans,
French)10, the religious differences served in the Balkans as primary
indication of nationality. Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs or Bulgarians became
separated by religion rather than united by common (south Slavic)
language and culture or heritage.
2.2. New men, new states, old problems
National awakening and the creation of the nation states began in
Greece and in Serbia, mostly because of the influence of Western ideas
of the time and favourable international and domestic circumstances.
Bulgarians and Albanians began much later, i.e. in the second half of
the 19th century, mostly due to geographical conditions. Romanians
on the other hand suffered from a sharp social stratification11. The
8 In 1811 the Empire lost Egypt, in 1812 Bessarabia, 1817 Serbia, 1828 Greece, 1829 Abkhazia and
Megrelia, 1856 Moldova and Wallachia, 1878 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Kars and
Ardahan, 1912 Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Albania and Macedonia.
9 Muslims, Christians (Orthodox, Catholic, and others) and Jews.
10 … even if under the banner of a single or dominating religion.
11 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, Hurst&Company, London 2000, p. 222.
development of the national ideas concerning a particular group was
therefore uneven and led to a situation in which some states began
the race earlier than the others. And yet, by influencing each other,
especially at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, that development
was combined by ideas, experiences, external influence and domestic
socio-economic and political circumstances.
Establishment of the nation-state did not have, however, the dimension of national struggle for liberation from the Turkish/Ottoman/Muslim rule. It was rather an expression of resistance to an old,
feudal system of redistribution of goods and financial assets that left
a vast majority of the population out of its already scarce benefits. The
homines novi or new men, as Traian Stoianovich refers to them, were
composed of almost all religious, and most probably also all ethnic,
groups of the Ottoman empire. Local lords, military officers, merchants, chiefs of brigands, lower clergy, teachers and civil servants and
all those who were either deprived of political power and economic
privileges or whose high status was never legitimized by the Porte were
ambitious, energetic people with a lot of ideas about how to improve
their situation12. The enlightenment ideas of liberalization and of creation of a nation-state were the most influential among them. Self-determination of people was a logical consequence of the liberal path.
3.
2nd phase of ethnopolitics – legitimization,
assimilation, expulsion
The western ideas were difficult to implement in the Balkan realities.
Most of the newly created or recreated states suffered the same dysfunctionality, such was the view of the statesmen on multi-ethnicity
at the time. The creation of nation-states required also some further
corrections in the spheres of political system, economic development
and the idea of nationality.
12 T. Stoianovich, Social Foundations of the Balkan Politics, [in:] Ch. And B. Jelavich (eds.), The Balkans
in Transition. Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century,
Archon Books 1974, p. 297-345.
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Jan Muś
The main difference between the West and the East was the lack of
strong economies in the latter. In effect, rapid industrialization of the
capitalist centres led to economic subordination of the peripheries.
The newly established states lacked strong and developed class of merchants, bankers, industrialists, etc., which would be able to compete in
international trade and constitute a solid political and economic base
for the states elites. In effect, economy has been linked to the state
authorities by personal ties. The state has been the most important
economic actor13. This, in turn, strengthened not only Balkan rulers
(in Serbia and Montenegro14) or led to permanent disorder (Greece)
but also pushed for the introduction of authoritarian regimes. Such
a form of government did not encourage building of multi-confessional, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic nor multi-national states.
Secondly, independently from their rather poor deliberative-parliamentarian experience, international circumstances forced the newlyborn states to territorial expansion. Nation states in the Balkans were
liable to the Western economic influence and, consequently, their domestic development has been often hampered by foreign interest15.
Instead, these poor countries developed by expanding and overtaking lands of the falling Ottoman Empire. This had two consequences:
they needed to compete with each other, and they had to absorb large
areas inhabited by populations whose national identity, which would
attach a population to the state, was still to be moulded.
Thirdly, as already mentioned above, a strong cultural influence
from Germany and central Europe led to the establishment of ethnic
ties with the state rather than citizenship-based relations or a concept a multi-ethnic society. This in turn resulted in the implementation of a one state – one nation principle. Non-state related identities
threatened young political structures. There was simply no space for
double loyalty.
13 A trend that is well visible today among the ruling elites.
14 Ruling Belgarde Pashalik Obrenović family quickly became one of most riches in Europe.
15 See: L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, Hurst&Company, London 2000, subjects devoted to
economic development, or B. McGowan, Era of Ayans, 1699-1812 and D. Quataert, Era of Reforms,
1812-1914, [in:] H. Inalcik and D. Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman
Empire 1300-1914.
Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian and, to a limited degree, Croatian nationalisms have been fuelled by the necessity to control possibly large
territories, which would eventually overlap with the ethnic map of the
region. These concerned, first of all, Macedonia, Southern Serbia, Kosovo, Thrace, Aegean, Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts as well as Bosnia
and Herzegovina. For this goal, ethnopolitics were employed. Along
military and diplomatic campaigns, they encompassed three principal strategies: legitimization of one’s rights to the land in question;
assimilation of local population, and the expulsion of this part of the
population that, for various reasons, would not or could not be assimilated. As a result, various contradictory ideas were employed and
often implemented. This was particularly true of Kosovo, Macedonia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are exactly these lands which, to
this day, have constituted a major stability challenge to the region and
the international community.
Why Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia? The geopolitical position of theses states made them attractive targets. Inhabited
by ethnically/religiously mixed population made claims of particular
states legitimized (Serbian, Montenegrin and Croatian towards Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian and Albanian towards
Macedonia; Serbian, Montenegrin and Albanian towards Kosovo and
Sandjak). Various economic reasons made these targets valuable, either for expected increase of population, access to natural resources,
fertile lands or to important trade routes, and often a combination of
these. The historically justified claims remained however well rooted
in the society and ethnopolitics became permanent feature of political discourse in the Balkans.
How the great powers referred to ethnopolitics? Underestimating
capabilities of the small Balkan states they allowed for articulation of
the territorial and ethnic claims, intervening however when the lands
carved up threaten the balance of power in the region. These happened
in 1878 after the treaty of San Stefano, in 1885 after unification of the
two Bulgarian provinces, and after each of the following conflicts
in the region (including both Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 and the
Serb-Bulgarian conflict of 1886). This in turn result in situation, where
ambitions of particular Balkan states (Serbia and Bulgaria) (and capabilities) were not fulfilled, while (Montenegro and Greece) the appetite
of others arose, and still others (Croats and Albanians) matured imRo c z nik Ins tytutu Europy Środkowo-W schodniej • Rok 12 (2014 ) • Zeszy t 3
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Jan Muś
patiently, while observing claims and expansions of their neighbours.
The leaders of the Balkan nations realized that they would need solid
arguments for convincing both public opinion of necessity of further
casualties and the great powers of their rights to the lands in question.
3.1. Legitimization
All the Balkan states implemented various forms of legitimization
of particular claims, vast majority of which were backed with ethnic
and/or historical arguments. The nation would claim ether historical
rights to particular land and/or would provide ethnically based arguments. For example, references to the medieval or ancient statehoods
or other legacies have constituted the basis for further claims of Serbs,
Greeks, and Bulgarians towards Macedonia. Other arguments, such as
ethnic ties, concerned Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example. Interestingly, while Serbian leaders invoked historical legacy to claim Kosovo,
Albanians referred to the ethnic factor. None of the sides mentioned
natural resources, in which these lands are rich, and a railway connecting the city with the strategically important harbour in Thessaloniki.
These claims quickly came into conflict with each other. The Macedonian Question, but also the claims over Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, Dobruja, Epirus and many other smaller regions, became
a subject of fiery discussions between historians, politicians and journalists (not necessarily in this order), thus creating public image of
national character of a given territory. However, since the claims were
balancing each other out, i.e. each part of the conflict possessed some
historically justified rights to the disputed lands, states and their leaders required another tool – assimilation.
3.2. Assimilation
Assimilation forbids a non-majoritarian, and therefore non-assimilated, (ethnic) group any participation in state governance and in the
redistribution of public assets. In effect, such a group (or groups) is
considerably disadvantaged in cultural division of labour and forced
either to adopt the majoritarian culture, language, values, etc, or to remain in an unprivileged position. Assimilation of the population was
a process that lasted, with some short breaks, from the second half of
the 19th century until the middle of the 20th century. It concerned not
only the disputed lands, and hence disputed population, but also those
lands that indisputably belonged to a given state but were inhabited by
a population whose ethnic identity did not necessarily matched that
preferred by the state. In other words, the state authorities strove to
convince a particular population of their national identity. At the time,
this was executed through a combination of educational and religious
policy, as well as terror spread by militias. In result, in peripheries (for
example Macedonia or Bosnia) where more national centres (for example Bulgaria and Greece) were involved, local population changed
its identity, often according to the circumstances and situation “on the
ground”16. Therefore, the results of a public poll conducted by various
states reflected very different ideas of the national identity of a given
population. These differences have been presented in the table below:
Nationality/Source and
year of poll
Serbian 1889
Bulgarian 1900
Greek 1904
Turks
231.400
499.204
603.017
Bulgarians
57.600
1.181.336
332.162
Serbs
2.048.320
700
Bd
Greek
201.140
228.702
652.795
Albanians
165.620
128.711
Bd
Aromanians/Vlachs
69.665
80.767
25.101
Gypsies
28.730
54.557
8.911
Jews
64.645
67.840
53.147
Source: M. Dymarski, Konflikty narodowe na Bałkanach w okresie kształtowania się państw narodowych w XIX i na początku XX
wieku, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2010, p. 202.
In practice, assimilation often meant the creation of a new, common identity, since the members of the dominant ethnic group would
not identify themselves with the new idea, although they usually accepted it rather quickly. A most vivid example was an attempt to create
a common Yugoslav identity, after a failure of cooperation of various
national fractions within one, common state organism. That concept
was based on the Serbian political and cultural heritage, leaving other
16 See: M. Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, Granta Books, London 1999 and M. Mazower, The Balkans. A short History, The Modern Library, New York 2001.
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nations of the Kingdom the role of petitioners. Imposition of certain
cultural norms was more or less the case in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece,
Romania and in Turkey during the inter bellum period and in some
cases also during the Cold War and thereafter. In general, we can claim
that today’s result of those policies is a clear confusion and identity
problem in the contested areas. The process of ethnic and national
identification has not reached its end in the Balkans.
3.3. Expulsion
Combining ethnic and state borders was, as Gellner put it, a “sociological necessity”. There was a certain level of assimilation rate that
could be achieved. The rest of the population, especially in towns and
inhabiting rural areas with fertile lands, was threatened to be expelled
peacefully or by force. Ottoman authorities, and at the beginning of the
19th century also the rulers of the young Balkan states, did not need to
impose a cultural homogeneity upon rural societies, which were governed by different principles. The second half of the century, however,
brought prospects of industrialization and a necessity to strengthen
and organize the state structure, which required impersonal, contextfree communication and a high degree of cultural standardization17.
Multi-ethnic society, especially when the minorities’ kin states were
dangerously close, was not a preferable solution. Both the Balkan wars
and the World Wars, as well as the after-war settlements, involved, formally or not, expulsion or exchange of populations. Mostly members
of such ethnic groups that could hardly be assimilated due to cultural
differences were subject of these arrangements.
Greece and Turkey exchanged populations in 1920s and similar
arrangements were followed by Greek and Bulgarian governments.
Albanians were prosecuted in Serbian state and Serbs in the Albanian-controlled Kosovo. In both cases, a massive change in the landowing structure could be noted. Trade, and therefore also markets,
have been turned upside-down, and very often new state elites were
the benefiting group. There were however exceptions: Bosnian Muslims and Macedonian Slavs in Yugoslavia were permitted to stay on
17 E. Gellner, op. cit.
the condition of recognition of a new national model, within which
they could actually fit in.
4.
3rd phase of ethnopolitics – empowerment
The events and the casualties of the Second World War disillusioned the elites of a rapid, and often drastic, solutions of the minorities issue. Neither the Albanians nor the Serbs succeeded in the
creation of a purely ethnic Kosovo. Croatian Pavelić’s regime, despite
its cruelty and devilish methods, did not get rid of Serbs in the Croatian heartland. Also Bosnia had remained ethnically mixed rather
than divided. Most of the borderlands dividing the Balkan states still
contained a significant share of minorities. The new world order has
been based on the ideas of protection of human rights and promotion
of democracy, as opposed to the past era of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that governed most of the world before 194518. That required addressing the question of ethnic minorities by enabling them
to participate in state governance.
Secondly, new institutional models adopted in the region were
driven by the necessity to stabilize inter-ethnic relations for the sake
of the state’s stability and security. This was especially important after
an internal split between the Balkan states. Bulgaria remained within
the Eastern block, Greece joined NATO, Tito chose the third path of
“non-aligned movement” and Albania fell in Enver Hodxa psychosis
of autarky. Preserving peace within one’s state became the priority,
since any destabilization of the system led to consequences all too
well known from Hitler’s claims toward Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Austria, as well as more recent ones from East Germany in 1953 or
from Hungary three years later. Unrests, which could quickly lead to
rebellions, would be immediately used by other states and domestic
opposition to discredit the ruling elites. In result, the Balkan authorities adopted several various solutions, sometimes complimentary to18 Real character of people’s democratic regimes in central and eastern Europe was clearly authoritarian. Nevertheless the idea was based on right of self-determination of peoples and basic
democratic principles. This was well visible in the constitutional arrangements of these states.
Arrangements that became dead letters.
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wards each other. These arrangements enabled various ethnic groups
to participate in a redistribution of the public financial assets. Ethnicity and multi-cultural character of the society provided a pattern along
which a certain part of the public funds was to be allocated. Ethnicity
has become a valuable asset for minorities themselves.
5.
4th Phase – Further Divisions
The fall of Eastern Bloc and general victory in the Cold War
of the liberal democracies of the West shifted a large share of public attention to the protection of human rights, and especially to the
minorities. Developments and human casualties related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the USSR drew media and so also political
attention. It also brought back the question of minorities’ rights – the
issue almost forgotten after 1945 and Hitler’s claims. Since 1945 those
minorities gained political experience and ambitions. Until the beginning of 1990s, the members of minorities enjoyed their rights either
as individual members of a particular group or as all other citizens of
the given state. The fall of the Eastern Bloc and the related conflicts,
surprisingly often of ethnic character or background, led to the adoption of a convention on minorities rights that provided certain political rights and freedoms to whole groups, rather than individuals.
Politicization of ethnicity received a new dynamic that resulted in
(re)creation and/or adoption of a number of tools and solutions, such
as federalism or power-sharing mechanisms, territorial autonomy, cultural autonomy and national minority councils, or specific central-,
state-level institutions, quotas system for parliamentary elections and
specific party politics. Each of them constituted a different model of relocation of financial assets and eventually of cultural division of labour.
5.1. Federalism and power-sharing mechanisms
Various forms of federalism and power-sharing19 mechanisms have
been introduced in the communist Yugoslavia and in the post-Yugo-
19 Power sharing regime is a wider concept putting emphasis on participation in state governance,
while federalism has territorial character, where power and sovereignty are divided between
slav republics. Those forms are applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo and Macedonia today. Federalism means shared sovereignty,
limitation of the state-power by empowering federal units in stategovernance and economic and fiscal autonomy. In case of the Balkan
states which were federalised – Bosnia and Herzegovina and former
Yugoslavia, significant decentralisation has been applied. In practice,
this meant not only that the federal units enjoyed wide autonomy, but
also that certain decisions on the state level could not be taken without their consent. Federalisation, if overlapping with ethnic division
of the country, provides in effect not only the widest possible degree
of self-government of respective minorities, but also the ability to influence, create and direct the state policy.
Except for Bosnia and Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia, powersharing mechanisms have been applied in Kosovo and in Macedonia.
They seek the inclusion of the representatives of major segments of
a divided society into the state governance and providing them with
tools of inter-segmental or inter-ethnic cooperation, but without the
provision of shared sovereignty and divided territory. There are two
main approaches to the question of mechanisms and institutions
which can be used. The first of them, developed by Arend Lijphart,
and known as a type of consociational democracy includes: building
a grand coalition by including all major groups in the ruling coalition,
proportional representation of these groups in state institutions, inclusion of all major groups in the government, veto rights and a high
degree of autonomy. Another one, advocated by Donald Horowitz,
has centripetal character and five features: dispersion of power, devolution of power, fostering cooperation, promoting cross-cutting
cleavages and reducing disparities20. Both of them aim at preserving
political stability in plural societies.
Both federalism and the power-sharing system have been applied
in states where non-majoritarian groups constitute a significant part
of the society. Federal units usually enjoy various degrees of fiscal and
various entities. Territorial and social division (and institutional solutions) can overlap, just as in
the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20 F. Bieber, Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, [in:] Power
Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – Office Macedonia, Skopje 2008, p. 10-13.
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Jan Muś
economic independence from the state centre – in such cases economic and coercive powers overlap. Power-sharing regimes guarantee
participation in decision making processes regarding economic development, the direction of investments and public funds and managing
state enterprises. What happens if the ethnic composition of a society is less balanced, when a non-majoritarian community is concentrated in a specific part of the country but its political ambitions do
not reach the capital city?
5.2. Territorial autonomy
Territorial autonomy has been applied in several cases. Most prominent are Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia and today’s Voivodina
and Istria. Though, a federal division of the state has to be recognized
also as a form of autonomy. This form of solution of inter-ethnic problems requires high and historically legitimized concentration of a distinguishable group on a given territory, constituting at the same time
rather an exception on the ethnic map of the country. Autonomy is
also available to communities that do not represent secessionist aims.
This was sealed after Kosovo secession in 1990s and 2000s. Therefore,
Albanians of Macedonia enjoy a high level of decentralisation, while
stopping short from gaining autonomy that would unite the Albanian
municipalities in the north-western corner of Macedonia.
Autonomy provides group leaders with a high level of economic
and political independence from the state authorities, for example by
granting grants conditionally or unconditionally, or by allowing the
collection of particular taxes. In such a case, however, the impact of
the autonomy’s leaders upon the state authorities is not guaranteed
by any institutional solutions. Therefore, they are more vulnerable to
influence from the capital than in the case of power-sharing or federal
models of state-governance.
5.3. Cultural autonomy and national minority councils
Minorities that are spread around vast territory and still do not constitute the majority in a particular region cannot expect territorial autonomy. Instead, another form of self-government has been adopted.
Cultural autonomy, a concept developed by Austrian Marxist at the
turn of the 19th and the 20th century accepts multi-confessional or multi-ethnic character of particular society. Instead of carving out signifiRoczni k I nstytutu Eu ro p y Ś ro d ko wo -W s c h o d n iej • Ro k 1 2 (2 01 4) • Zes z y t 3
cant parts of the state’s territory, which in such cases would create more
minorities, it provides dispersed minorities with a high level of selfgovernment in limited areas that remain crucial for the preservation
of the group’s identity – culture, language, religion, education, etc21.
The state provides institutions representing particular minorities
with financial means, enabling them to maintain respective institutions.
These are known as National Minority Councils, or NMCs. Croatia and
Serbia, where NMCs exit, adopted solutions that provide the councils with competences in areas of culture and the use of the minorities’
languages, making them, however, financially dependant on the state.
This type of minorities empowerment enables the authorities to create
a dense network of financial dependencies that rely upon the good will
of the state, yet it tends to satisfy a relatively large group of local leaders.
5.4. State-level institutions
Albania and Croatia adopted yet another solution22, i.e. central-level institutions representing minorities directly in the government. At a first
glance, such a solution provides the minorities’ representatives with
a tool enabling them to react immediately, or at least quicker than in
case of local authorities, at the level of the highest decisive bodies in
a particular country, influencing legislative processes, whistle-blowing
in cases of misuse or discriminatory behaviour of the public organs.
The state-perspective purpose of this solution, however, is to bring
the minorities’ leaders closer to the state-elites, while separating them
from the minorities. Lucrative and prestigious positions, life in the
capital city, close to the power source, must influence the perspective of any provincial leader. Lack of any work-related effects of these
institutions confirms this statement.
5.5. Quotas system for parliamentary elections
There is a whole range of various forms of political parties and electoral
systems adopted in the Balkans, and except for Greece, minorities are
21 On the cultural autonomy see: E. Nimni (ed.), National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary
Critics, Routledge, Oxon New York 2005.
22 Author’s own article (together with Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska), Divide et impera principle. Minority Oriented State Policy in the Balkans, New Balkan Politics peer-reviewed journal, no.
13/2013.
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Jan Muś
represented in each one of them. Sometimes, due to their ethnicity
which is different from the main-stream parties (Croatia), and sometimes, thanks to their actual strength (Bulgaria), minorities can play
an important role in party politics23.
The introduction of parliamentarian systems across the Balkans
resulted in a gradual introduction of quotas for minorities that either
would not be able to pass the electoral threshold or require a stronger
representation in the parliament. Minorities’ quotas were introduced
in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. This usually means
that regardless of election results and the participation of minorities
in it, representatives of particular communities will have their seat
in the parliamentarian assemblies. In effect, however, they are more
likely to have an impact on the state policy and access to lucrative
contacts and positions.
Conclusions
The process of politicisation of ethnicity began already at the turn of the
18th and the 19th century and it evolved across the following centuries
and decades. It provided ethnie with a certain political values. Values
that were supposed to enable at first majority and later also minority
groups their participation in state governance and thus provide an acceptable cultural division of labour. Contemporary Ethnopolitics of the
Balkan peninsula involve various forms which place representatives of
minorities in high-rank and/or well-paid positions where they became
involved in the division of public funds and assets. Larger, territorially concentrated groups tend to claim autonomy, power-sharing or
federalisation of the country which provide them with economic and
fiscal independence from the state authorities and/or include the ability to govern the state themselves. Smaller minorities, often dispersed
across the country or squeezed within an area of a few municipalities,
23 On party politics see for example: V. Stojarova and P. Emerson, Party Politics in the Western Balkans, Routledge, Oxon New York 2010; Political Parties and Minority Participation, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, Skopje 2008; B. Reilly, and P. Nordlund (eds.), Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies:
Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development, United Nations University Press, Tokyo
2008.
too small for an economically independent region, can expect other
forms of solution that would meet their expectations as a minority.
The cultural autonomy is provided by the state. The state controls it
and it is financially dependant from the state. In order to satisfy international standards and domestic public opinion, sometimes the state
creates state-level bodies representing minorities in the capital-city,
directly in the government and other highest political institutions.
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
Recommendations for Development
of Cluster Policy in Croatia in the Light
of Smart Specialization in Poland
Abstract: Special interest is paid to the economic performance of regional
clusters in the Polish economy. The main research questions are: what characterizes the regional clusters in Poland and what are the main tendencies
in cluster development? The purpose of this research is to analyse the importance of clusters and their influence on employment growth. The analysis
is based on the theoretical framework of the cluster development and experiences in some old and new EU Member States. The research shows that clusters in EU 27 and Poland differ in many dimensions: the point at which they
arise, the type of products and services they offer, their stage of development,
and the business environment that surrounds them.
Keywords: clusters, smart specialisation, European Union Economic Strategies
Introduction
Before Poland accessed the European Union, the concepts of supporting clusters and cluster policy had not been fully developed yet.
In this respect, Poland was still behind other East-Central Europe
countries1. Meanwhile, the concept of cluster was gaining more supporters in different Member States. A particular interest towards this
issue appeared after the publication of M. Porter’s The Competitive
Advantage of Nations2. According to M. Porter, “A cluster is a geographical proximate group of interconnected companies and asso-
1 For instance, in relation to Hungary or Slovenia.
2 M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, London 1990.
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
ciated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and
externalities in particular: enterprises, research institutions, business
institutions and public authorities”3.
1.
Clusters’ characteristics
Apart from this well-known definition by M. Porter, other resources provide more descriptions of a cluster, which indicates huge
dynamism in the field of the creation of industrial circles. In their
analysis, C.Brasisli and R.Fanfani4, enumerate the following characteristics of the term:
• tight socio-economic correlation between companies and family relationships, which develop jointly in the process of adaptation to the new surroundings;
• geographical concentration of companies of special production;
• concentration of small and medium enterprises around companies specializing in one stage of the production process;
• cooperation as a part of network of enterprises.
Because clusters are a global phenomenon of localized production and innovation systems, they are not limited only to the highlydeveloped countries. The operations of cluster schemes are recorded
in many regions of the world, including the developing countries. That
is why clusters do not occur solely in the sectors of high technologies
as they are also identified in processing industry, services and even
in traditional sectors. Clusters’ individual structures are characterized by various levels of innovation and advancement of technology
and by different perspectives and development strategies. The synergetic effect of industrial clusters is mainly identified by absorption
of know-how, personnel changes and increase of productivity within
the structure of a cluster. These processes have their source in concentration and attraction of resources and new companies, openness
to the innovation and possibility of its diffusion.
3Ibidem.
4 C. Brasili, R. Fanfani, Agri-food Districts: Theory and Evidence, 10th Congress of EAAE, Zaragoza
(Spain) 28-31 August 2002, p. 61-80.
Recommendations for Development of Cluster Policy in Croatia...
Reference literature presents a dominant view indicating that innovative clusters are characterized by huge effectiveness of absorption
of knowledge within the range of the cluster. This results from the fact
that the knowledge developed in a given cluster is forwarded faster
and more efficiently within the scope of its structure and slower outside of it. The advantage of localization and specialization supports
the increase and establishment of new enterprisers when urbanization
advantages guarantee cluster’s ability to adapt and to survive5.The foregoing perception of the complexity of the notion of cluster implies that
cluster policy, understood as a policy stimulating clusters’ development, focuses mainly on stimulation of economic development and
innovation, where clusters are identified as factors encouraging foreign
investors and constitute a lifeblood of export increase. At the national level, the development of clusters can speed up the process of internationalization of the economy, as well as of the growth of export,
investments and GDP. Analogously, at the regional level, clusters can
contribute to the education of professional human resources, development of resourcefulness in a particular area and the formation
of new entities on the local market. By these operations, clusters provide new work places and stimulate the growth of effectiveness of enterprises from the MSP sector. Simultaneously, clusters make regions
more attractive for foreign entrepreneurs willing to commence direct
investments6.
The policy based on clusters makes use of similar tools and has similar impact on problematic fields in the same way as economic, innovative and scientific policies do7. In the broader view, a cluster-based
policy (CBP) covers various tools and policies implemented in a coordinated way by authorities of different ranks, supporting development of particular centres (clusters)8 on the regional level. The main
objective of CBP is to increase the level of competitiveness of the eco-
5
R. Boschma, Franco Angeli (ed.), Constructing Regional Advantage and Smart Specialisation: Comparison of Two European Policy Concepts, “Scienze Regionali”, vol. 2014(1), p. 51-68.
6 C. Pilarska, Klastry, Doświadczenia Polski i Innych Krajów Unii Europejskiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, Kraków 2013, p. 45.
7 Rola Klastrów w Budowaniu Gospodarki Opartej na Wiedzy, Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką
Rynkową, Gdańsk, Szczecin, 2011, p. 9.
8 Kierunki i Założenia Polityki Klastrowej w Polsce do 2020 Roku, Polska Agencja Rozwoju
Przedsiębiorczości 2012, p. 16.
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
nomic system of a particular country. In order to do this, one shall
take into account country’s specific conditioning on which depends
the way in which these objectives are accomplished. For this reason,
there are two models of CBP9.
1.1. Models of cluster-based policy
In the narrower point of view, the cluster policy chooses diversified
objectives, makes use of different tools and finds various solutions.
For these reasons one can indicate two models of the said policy10.
The first model consists of a support of clusters coordinators providing information, networking, promotion on the foreign markets and
bringing profits to the members of the particular cluster. What is more,
the coordination consists of stimulating cooperation between entities
of the clusters pursuant to the triple helix concept developed by H. Etzkowitz and L. Levdesdorff11. This strategy establishes an interaction
between universities, industry and authorities. The triple helix concept
focuses particularly on the role of universities in the knowledge-based
economy as well as on mutual merge of different institutions from
three spheres including industry, competent authorities and science.
The second model supports cluster’s internal operations (irrespectively of co-financing of the cluster coordinator) within the scope
of common research, development projects, usage of common R+D
infrastructure or co-financed educational programs. The network
of cluster’s interconnections includes, apart from companies, any other institutions or organizations such as scientific units, research and
development units and private organizations.
This model brings innovative potential and synergy of actions
as the numerous interconnections between cluster’s entities proceed
by the same path of development12.
The policy of supporting clusters does not generate profits resulting solely from effectiveness of cluster’s entities but it primarily puts
9 Polityka Wspierania Klastrów. Najlepsze Praktyki dla Polski, Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką
Rynkową, Gdańsk, 2004, p. 17.
10 Trend Chart Report, European Commission, 2003.
11 H. Etzkowitz, L. Leydesdorff, The Triple Helix as a Model for Innovation Studies, “Scene and Public
Policy”, 1988, no. 25(3), p. 195-203.
12 A. Rodrígez-Pose, R. Ceescenzi, Research and Development, Spillovers, Innovation Systems, and
the Genesis of Regional Growth in Europe, “Regional studies”, vol. 42, 2008, p. 51-67.
emphasis on the positive influence of external environment, i.e. a region in which a particular cluster operates.
Developed cluster policy for particular regions accomplishes
the following objectives:
• stimulation of the development of existing clusters
• testing of potential of existing clusters
• development of business environment, expansion of entrepreneurs
• strengthening of confidence13.
2.
Clusters and Smart Specialisation
The above mentioned cluster policy is connected with the concept of Smart Specialization (SS)14 which constitutes a framework for
regional policy for innovation powered by economic growth. Many
of the fundamental assumptions of Smart Specialization are not identified as new ideas – they are part of a wider discussion concerning innovation, industrial policy and economic development of a particular
region in a given time. SS is the most essential element for obtaining
factual effectiveness of research and innovative investment. The European Commission’s draft resolution on cohesion policy for the years
of 2014-2020 assumes that the development of SS15 strategy for a particular country or region shall constitute grounds for obtaining funds
from European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in the years 20142020 on the basis of supporting SS investments16.
From the analysis conducted by the European Commission
in 2006 it is clear that the biggest success is reached by regions of re-
13 The Role of Cluster in Smart Specialisation Strategies, European Commission, 2013, p. 30-40.
14 Smart Specialisation is connected with identification of unique characteristics and assets of every country and region. It emphasizes the regional competition advantage and concentrates on
resources and local partners aiming to realize their achievement-oriented vision of future. Ibidem, p. 12.
15 For more information, see: The draft regulation of European Parliament and European Council
establishes common provisions concerning European Regional Development Fund, European
Social Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, European Maritime and Fisheries Fund included in the common strategic frameworks and establishes general
provisions concerning European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, Cohesion
Fund and revokes the regulation (WE) nr 1083/2006.
16 Przewodnik Strategii Badań i Innowacyjności Na Rzecz Inteligentnej Specjalizacji (S3), Komisja Europejska, 2013, p. 12.
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lated variety. This concept refers to the regions which have diversified specializations and common competences, for instance, specialist
knowledge and technologies. Therefore, this variety constitutes a base
for innovation which is a result of interaction between particular regions17.
According to Dominique Forey, this phenomenon creates favourable conditions for:
• the creation of new domains which have their basis in already
existing technologies
• transformation of already existing sectors
• diversification of local economy18.
The concept of SS establishes the adjustments of the strategies
of regional development to the level of development of clusters. This
phase of clusters’ development depends on clusters’ position in their
life cycle. The SS strategy particularly focuses on an emerging cluster.
It is essential for emerging clusters to identify a new sector or a new
domain in which they will specialize. That is why one should support
entrepreneurs who by establishing new contact networks support
the exchange of experience, technology and good practices. Table 1 illustrates the so called entrepreneurial discovery being one of the stages
of smart specializations.
Tab. 1: Enabling Entrepreneurial Discovery for emerging clusters
Emerging cluster
Specific challenges for emerging clusters
Framework
High
Capital
Low
Knowledge
Medium
•
•
•
•
•
Acceptance of risk
Risk Management
Project, not institution
Exploration of market opportunities
Crossing geographical and industrial boundaries
Source: drawn up on the basis of The role of cluster in smart specialization strategies, European Commission 2013, p. 30-40.
17 J. Del Castillo, B. Barroeta, J. Paton, Converting Smart Specialisation into a Regional Strategy, “Infyde”, Working Paper, vol. 2, 2014, no. 1, p. 3.
18 D. Foray, P. A. David, B. Hall, Smart Specialisation: the Concept in Potocnik’s, “Expert Group Knowledge for Growth Report”, 2009, p. 34.
Tab. 2: Adjusting cluster policies to the stage of Cluster Development. Enabling Entrepreneurial
Discovery for emerging clusters. [original table]
Source: The role of cluster in smart specialization strategies, European Commission 2013, p. 33.
Both concepts of clusters and Smart Specialisation are similar, but
they put stress on different aspects. Although Clusters are very important elements of developing Sustainable Regional Development Strategy, they should not be identified with Smart Specialization. Smart
Specialization is a broader concept aiming at transformation of local
economy. Clusters may come closer to Smart Specialization only when
they are stimulating development of a new sector and new knowledge.
However, one should remember that the position of a cluster depends
on its phase of life cycle.
Summarizing, one can state that clusters constitute the most important element of the implementation of SS strategy. However, one
should bear in mind that the full potential of clusters will be applied
under the following conditions:
Smart specialization integrates policy based on clusters. SS transforms whole regional economy and contributes to the development
of technology and communication between particular sectors.
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
Developed programs of regional support contribute to the local
environment (in this case, the emerging clusters will fulfil the conditions of good practice)19.
Tab 2. Similarities and differences between smart specialisation and clusters
Smart Specialisation
Clusters
Similarities
Productivity and innovation are critical for sustained growth
Multiple factors influence productivity and innovation
Importance of proximity and local spillovers and a critical role of locational context
Differences
Exploring emerging market opportunities
Critical mass
Facilitating knowledge about spillovers between
sectors and knowledge domains
The source of knowledge: shared infrastructure and
common experience
Entrepreneurs derive their knowledge from each
Exploit related variety between knowledge domains
other and other entities of local economic community
Derive structural social and economic changes
Enhancing performance of a set of linked companies
Source: The role of cluster of smart specialisation strategies, European Commission 2013, p. 9-17.
3.
Development of cluster policy in Poland and
the synthesis of cluster – conclusions for Croatia.
In reference to The Cluster Initiative Green Book the attempt to elaborate cluster policy in the countries undergoing economic transformation is burdened by the following problems:
• Limited confidence of the entrepreneurs to the government
initiatives
• Lack of experience in cooperation
• Lack of sufficient knowledge about clusters
• Barriers connected with development of resourcefulness20.
19 D. Foray, P. A. David, B. Hall, Smart Specialisation – The Concept, Knowledge, “Economists Policy
Brief”, 2009, no. 9 and Smart Specialisation Platform “Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies
for Smart Specialisation (RIS 3)”, 2012 on: http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/home [March 2012].
20 Polityka Wspierania Klastrów. Najlepsze Praktyki dla Polski, op. cit.
Basic barriers restraining the development of cluster policy in Poland before accession to EU were mainly identified with: lack of cooperation between entrepreneurs, institutions and organizations, lack
of confidence to business partners, cultural barriers, lack of confidence
to potential cluster’s entities, no willingness to cooperate. The abovementioned constraints resulted from underdevelopment of business
cooperation. It is worth stressing that also underdevelopment of transportation, telecommunication and information technology infrastructure put many constraints on establishing clusters in particular
regions21. When Poland became a member of the European Union, its
activity on the international market became more dynamic. Therefore,
Poland joined different organizations and also acquired access to external funds which in natural way stimulated the creation of clusters.
3.1. Clusters’ support policy in Poland
The analysis entitled Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 201022 carried
out in 2009 on a group of 47 Polish clusters, created between 19972009, indicates that only one cluster of this group was created before
2000. Most of the examined clusters were created between 2007 and
2008. 13 of the analyzed initiatives were created until 2007.
Graph 1: Examined years of clusters creation
Source: Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2010, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2010, p. 27.
21 C. Pilarska, op. cit., p. 74-79.
22 Raport “Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2010”, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości,
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
In the financial perspective for the years 2004-2006, the Ministry
of Economy together with the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development and self-government authorities undertook promotion activities aiming at popularization of knowledge about clusters. Through
a system of trainings and workshops clusters were presented as innovative concept leading to the growth of competitiveness of enterprises
united within cluster’s structure23.
The support of the cluster policy in Poland is associated with sectorial operational program Improvement of the Competitiveness of Enterprises for the years 2004-2006, action 1.1.2. Strengthening of Institutions
Supporting Operations of Enterprises and Networks of Institutions
Supporting Operations of Enterprises and Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources Development 2004-2006, action 2.3 Development of Human Resources for Modern Economy, schema b: Promotion
of Systematic Solutions for Adaptive Potential and Knowledge-based
Economy. In the scope of action 2.2, the Polish Agency for Enterprise
Development accomplished a program entitled Training Program for
Promotion of Clusters. Its main objective was the presentation of opportunities of cooperation in the form of clusters for enterprisers
as well as for territorial self-governing bodies24.
In 2007, the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development realized
pilotage program entitled Strengthening Cluster Development in scope
of which one could obtain funds for cluster initiatives from Integrated
Regional Operational Program (IROP), action 2.6. Regional Innovation Strategies and Transfer of Knowledge.
In the financial perspective for the years 2007-2013, the strategy
of cluster policy is partially framed in the strategic document entitled
Directions of Expanding Innovativeness of Economy 2007-2013 which
indicates national and regional operational programs as instruments
for strengthening and developing clusters. The Operational Program
Innovative Economy, action 5.1. Strengthening of Supra-Regional Cooperation Links, which was one of the most important programs for
strengthening development of clusters at the national level for the fi23 W. Duczmal, W. Potwora (eds.), Klastry i Inicjatywy Klastrowe w Województwie Opolskim, Wyższa
Szkoła Zarządzania i Administracji w Opolu, Opole 2010, p. 31.
24 Kierunki i polityka rozwoju klastrów w Polsce, Ministerstwo Gospodarki Departament Rozwoju
Gospodarki, Warszawa 2009, p. 18.
nancial perspective 2007-2013, aimed to increase competitiveness
of companies by strengthening links between companies, research
and development units.
Additionally, within the scope of IROP one could obtain support for
the initiatives strengthening operations of clusters in a given region:
• support for technology parks and business incubators
• support for business institutions aiming at development of innovations
• elaboration of alternative forms of external financing of development of resourcefulness
• elaboration of alternative forms of external financing for the purpose of development of resourcefulness
• support for promulgation and popularization of knowledge related to intellectual property.
3.2. Detailed analysis of existing clusters in Poland
Among other actions realized by PAED one can enumerate an operational program entitled Development of Eastern Poland dealing with
promotion of cooperation.
Within the scope of 16 operational programs at the regional levels, there are several actions supporting the creation and development
of cluster initiative.
Separate actions were performed for the following voivodeships
(pursuant to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics level
2) Mazowieckie, Lubuskie, Śląskie, Opolskie, Pomorskie, Podlaskie,
Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Warmińsko-mazurskie, Lubuskie, Małopolskie and Świętokrzyskie. Whereas in the remaining
voivodeships, there was a possibility to obtain support for the cluster
initiatives within the scope of activities executing more than one projects. Most of the project funds are dedicated to development of innovation and technology, stimulation of resourcefulness and promotional
activity. Additionally, most subsidiaries were granted for investments,
development of clusters and personnel trainings. Implemented programs concerned primarily cooperation between companies and R+D
units and transfer of technology. Some of the said programs were
dedicated directly towards entrepreneurs, granting them funds for
personnel training. In each voivodeship one could find programs
granting funds for development of local and regional business links.
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
In regional operational programs, there was also possibility of co-financing transfer of new technologies, development of technological
parks and scientific units25.
Operational programs in Łódzkie, Mazowieckie, Opolskie, Podlaskie, Świętokrzyskie and Warmińsko-mazurskie Voivodeships focused
mainly on the creation and expansion of clusters. An improvement
in the cooperation between clusters and R+D units was noticeable
in Kujawsko-pomorskie, Mazowieckie and Śląskie Voivodeships. Activities putting into effect new technologies were included in the operational programs for Lubuskie and Podlaskie Voivodeships. Promotion
of cluster initiatives as well as technology parks and business incubators was included in the activities of Mazowieckie and Podlaskie
Voivodeships26.
The examined clusters operate in various lines of business, but
most of them are connected with technological information, aviation
and construction sectors. The fewest clusters operate in transportation, automotive and medical sectors.
More than half of the examined clusters were created from
the so called grass-root initiatives. This means that, they were created intrinsically from the cooperation of companies. 17% of the examined clusters were created from top-down initiative, and 30% of them
represent mixed initiative, i.e. they were created from the cooperation
of companies, non-profit organizations and the public sector.
An association is the most popular organizational and legal form
of clusters – 16 from 35 of the examined clusters operate on the basis of this legal form (4,5 of examined clusters operate as spółka z.o.o.
(limited liability company)). Only one cluster operates as a foundation, whereas 6 operate on the basis of other deeds27.
25 Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową „Wykorzystanie Koncepcji Klastrów dla kształtowania
polityki innowacyjnej i technologicznej państwa. Rekomendacje dla polityki stymulowania rozwoju klastrów w Polsce”, 2009, http://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/wyniki/documents/2_030.pdf
26 UniaEuropejska.org „Klastry”, 2001, http://www.uniaeuropejska.org/klaster-czyli-w-grupie-raniej
27 J. Hałub-Iwan (ed.), Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2012, Warszawa 2012, p. 25.
Graph 2: Clusters’ organizational and legal forms
Source: Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2010, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2010, p. 24-26.
According to the data by the European Cluster Observatory of 2014,
Poland has about 264 clusters. Most of them were established after
2006 when Poland joined the EU, obtaining access to funds from financial programs realized in years 2007-2013. Most of the existing clusters
are associated with information technology, aviation, eco-energetics,
hotel industry, tourism services as well as with construction, printing,
wood and furniture industry sectors. After the accession of Poland
to the UE, common programs funds became the main source of financing of cluster initiatives. Through their operations, benchmarked
clusters obtained 65.5 million zlotys, from which 32.2 million was received from an operational program Innovative Economy28.
By 2012, 212 cluster initiatives appeared in Poland. 26 of them are
identified in Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 18 in Warmińsko-mazurskie
Voivodeship and 17 in Śląskie Voivodeship. The dominant business line connected with cluster initiative is ICT, represented by
28 clusters, including 6 cluster initiatives in Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 5 in Małopolskie Voivodeship and 4 in Śląskie Voivodeship.
28 M. Dzierżanowski (ed.), Kierunki i założenia polityki klastrowej w Polsce do 2020 roku, Polska Agencja
Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2012, p. 17.
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
The tourist sector includes 27 initiatives, 4 of which are located in Lubuskie Voivodeship. Food industry locates initiatives on the territory
of 12 Voivodeships, 3 of which operate in Lubuskie, Łódzkie, Podlaskie
and Warmińsko-mazurskie Voivodeships. Łódzkie Voivodeship dominates in the textile and clothing industry, with 5 cluster initiatives operating there. In Warmińsko-mazurskie Voivodeship, wood industry
is the dominant branch; one can enumerate about 4 initiatives of this
type. Mazurskie Voivodeship has 4 initiatives from automotive sector29 operating there.
3.3. Development of clusters in Croatia and other European countries.
Majority of clusters in Croatia function in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, having more than 500 employees (40% of the total),
these clusters are mainly financed by membership (68%), and they are
mainly producing for Croatian market (72%). The development of regional clusters in Croatia commenced after 2005. The innovative activity of European clusters is relatively concentrated in a few areas
in Europe (West Germany and most regions of Austria, the north and
east of France, the south-eastern part of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and in some Scandinavian countries, mostly in Sweden)30.
Conclusions
To summarise, one can state that a part of clusters’ initiatives in particular regions has been created, and is being created, thanks to the accessibility to funds designated for development of clusters – at the regional
and at national level. Unfortunately, this procedure causes some kind
of inflation of cluster initiatives31, some which do not influence the re29 Klastry w Polsce, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2012, p. 8-9.
30 A. Obadićthe, Analysis Of Regional Cluster Development In Europe And Croatia, 2009, p. 17.
31 On the basis of benchmarking research carried out in 2012 on a group of 35 clusters with attributed phase of their development, 80% of them were described as emerging clusters. The youngest
clusters, created in years 2010-2011 and older clusters, created in years 2006-2007, were identified
in incubation phase. However, one of the youngest clusters, created in 2011, has been defined
as an emerging cluster. These data indicate that the number of years is not the sole factor determining cluster’s development. Without appropriate activity, clusters which function on the market for several years do not advance to the next stage of development. However, clusters which
take opportunities arising from cooperation can advance to the next phase in a short time.
gional level and by the same they do no speed up the development
processes. The foregoing analysis of the types of clusters’ business
lines indicates that Polish policy aiming at stimulating the development of clusters, in relation to the growth of their competitive position, shall take into account the specificity and smart specialization
of a given region.
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of EAAE, Zaragoza (Spain) 28-31 August 2002, p. 61-80
Duczmal W., Potwora W. (eds.), Klastry i inicjatywy klastrowe w województwie
opolskim, Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Administracji w Opolu, Opole
2010
Dzierżanowski M. (ed.), Kierunki i założenia polityki klastrowej w Polsce do
2020, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2012
Etzkowitz H., Leydesdorff L., The Triple Helix As a Model for Innovation
Studies, “Science and Public Policy”, 1998, no. 25(3)
Foray D., David P. A., Hall B., Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies
for Smart Specialisation (RIS 3), Smart Specialisation Platform, http://
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Foray D., David P. A., Hall B., Smart Specialisation – The Concept, Knowledge,
“Economists Policy Brief ”, June 2009, no. 9
Hołub-Iwan J. (ed.), Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2012, Warszawa 2012
Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową „Wykorzystanie Koncepcji Klastrów dla kształtowania polityki innowacyjnej i technologicznej państwa.
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nad Gospodarką Rynkową, Gdańsk 2004
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Anna Masłoń-Oracz
Przewodnik Strategii Badań i Innowacji na rzecz inteligentnej specjalizacji
(RIS 3), Komisja Europejska, 2013
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About the Authors
Artur Adamczyk – Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Centre for Europe, University
of Warsaw
Bartosz Bojarczyk – Ph.D., University of Maria Curie-Sklodowska in Lublin
Ewa Dominikowska – Ph.D. student, University of Warsaw
Donika Emini – a fellow of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS Foundation) at the
Kosovan Center for Security Studies in Prishtina, Kosovo
Abit Hoxha – doctoral researcher at the Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU)
in the INFOCORE project in January 2014
Mladen Kardzoski – Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of
“St. Kliment Ohridski” – Bitola. Author disagrees with the reference FYROM used in part of the text
Anna Masłoń-Oracz – Ph.D. student at Warsaw School of Economics, a political scientist, economist, the CEO of Maroney Group, Vice-Chairperson
of Polish European Community Study Association, a member of the International Women Forum
146
About the Authors
Jan Muś – Ph.D., LLM, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Affairs, Catholic University of Lublin
Tomasz Olejarz – Vice-Director and a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science and Regional Policy at the East European State Higher School in Przemyśl (PWSW); Ph.D. candidate at the Political Science Faculty at Maria
Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin
Magdalena Rekść – Ph.D., University of Lodz
Tomasz Stępniewski – Doctor Habilitatus, Associate Professor at the Institute
of Political Sciences and International Affairs, The John Paul II Catholic
University of Lublin and an associate fellow at the Institute of East-Central Europe in Lublin
Rocznik
Instytutu Europy
Rok 12 (2014)
Zeszyt 3
Is Kosovo a precedent? Legal and international dilemmas of the unilateral Declaration of Independence
of the Kosovo Republic.
On 17th February 2008, the parliamentary body of the temporary authorities of Kosovo adopted a Declaration
of Independence and proclaimed that Kosovo should be recognized as an “independent and sovereign country”.
At present, 106 countries recognize Kosovo as an independent country (as for 2nd July, 2014). The political dilemmas
of the countries of the international community, including the requirement of a legal assessment of the consequences of the unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Kosovo Republic, referred, in fact, to the need to take
a stance towards the meaning of and the mutual relations between the basic rules and principles and the institutions
of modern international law (ius inter gentes).
Macedonia’s road to the European Union seems particularly bumpy. Despite the implemented reforms and the
determination of consecutive governments to obtain a membership in Western European structures, the country
still has no tangible prospects for accession. The unresolved dispute between Greece and Macedonia concerning the
name of the country and the strained relations between Skopje and Sofia keep preventing Macedonia from participating in the processes of European integration. The Macedonian society is already tired and feels humiliated by
the long wait for the EU’s decision on commencing accession negotiations. On the other hand, Macedonia’s leading
political party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO – DPMNE), does not exhibit any inclination towards reconciliation with the neighbours. On the
contrary, it tries to gain political support by taking advantage of the Macedonians’ patriotic feelings by promoting
a sense of threat to their national identity.
Jan Muś
Contemporary research approaches to ethnicity and ethnic groups tend to perceive them through the prisms of either political and institutional frameworks, widely understood protection or abuses of human (and minority) rights,
or cultural and anthropological issues. This article seeks to address the question of inter-ethnic political relations
through the prism of combined and uneven development law. The idea of combined and uneven development assumes that social development is directly linked to control over production process. In other words, economic development is a key determinant of social relations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans

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