The Supposed Roman Manpower Shortage of the Later Second

Transcription

The Supposed Roman Manpower Shortage of the Later Second Century B.C.
Author(s): J. W. Rich
Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 32, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1983), pp. 287-331
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435854
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THE SUPPOSED ROMAN MANPOWER SHORTAGE OF THE LATER
SECOND CENTURY B.C.
I. Introduction
In early Rome, as in other archaic states, only those who could afford to
equip themselves could serve in the army. In due course, pay for military
service was introduced and arms came to be supplied by the state.' But Roman
conservatism ensured that the link between property ownership and military
service was maintained, even when Rome acquired extensive military commitments overseas. Until the end of the second century service in the legions was,
except in grave emergencies, restricted to freeborn citizens possessing a certain
property qualification, who were known as assidui. Marius was the first
commander to enrol men into the legions without regard for the property
qualification.
"I am very grateful to Professor P. A. Brunt, Mr. M. H. Crawford and the members of
Professor H. B. Mattingly's seminar at Leeds for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All
dates are B. C. unless otherwise stated. I refer to the following modern works in an abbreviated
fashion: A. E. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (1967), Cato the Censor (1978); A. H. Bernstein, Tiberius
SempronisusGracchus, Tradition and Apostasy (1978); P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower 225 B.C. A.D. 14 (1971), Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (1971); M. H. Crawford, Roman
Republican Coinage (1974) (= RRC), The Roman Republic (1978) (= RR); Les "Divaluations"a
Rome: epoque republicaine et imperiale (Rome, 13-15 novembre 1975) (1978); D. C. Earl, Tiberius
Gracchus, A Study in Politics (1963); E. Gabba, Esercito e societd nella tarda repubblica romana
(1973) (English translation: Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies (1976)); W. V. Harris, War
and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C. (1979); M. K. Hopkins, Conquerorsand Slaves
(1978); P. Marchetti, Histoire economique et monitaire de la deuxieme guerre punique (1978); T.
Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrec/b&(1887-8); C. Nicolet, Le mitier du citoyen dans la Rome
ripublicaine (1976) (English translation: The Worldof the Citizen in Republican Rome (1980)); J.C. Richard, Les Origines de la Plebe Romaine (1978); H.-C. Schneider, Das Problem der
Veteranenversorgungin der spateren romischen Republik (1977); Y. Shochat, Recruitment and the
Programme of Tiberius Gracchus (1980); R.E. Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army
(1958); D. Stockton, The Gracchi(1979); R. Thomsen, King Servius Tullius(I980); A. J. Toynbee,
Hannibal's Legacy (1965).
l There may be substance in the traditional association of the introduction of pay with the start
of the war with Veii (Livy IV.59.11; Diod. XIV.16.5): see C. Gatti, Acme 23 (1970), 131-5;
Crawford in L'Italie priromaine et la Rome ripublicaine (Melanges offerts a Jacques Heurgon)
(1976), I. 197-207, especially 204-5. Polybius tells us (VI. 39.15) that deductions from pay were
made x6v TLVOg 0tXoij 7tQo(6E-qft6)OL, i. e. for replacement arms. I infer from Plb. VI.21.6-7 that
in his day soldiers were supplied with arms free of charge when they enrolled: so Gabba, ES23-4;
Brunt, IM 405; Nicolet, Mitier 156. For the view that soldiers still had to provide their own
equipment see Toynbee 11.514-5; Marchetti 244, 247-8. The members of the first class presumably
had to pay for the loricae which they alone wore (Plb. VI.23.15).
288
J. W. RICH
It is commonly supposed that by the later second century the Romans'
insistenceon retainingthe propertyqualificationcreateda gravemanpower
problem.2This view may be summarizedas follows. In the course of the
century many peasantproprietorsgave up their holdings; most of this land
was taken over by large landholdersand worked by slave labour. The
dispossessedpeasantsno longersatisfiedthe propertyrequirement,and so the
numberof assiduidropped.The drop was so steep that the remainingassidui
could not meet the demandsof the levy without considerablehardship,and
men came to fearfor Rome'ssecurity.Variousattemptswere madeto resolve
the problem: the property qualification,already reduced during the HannibalicWar,was at some point reducedagain,and at leastpartof the purpose
of the agrarianschemesof Laeliusand the Gracchiwas to increasethe number
of assidui.But these expedientswere of no avail. The only solution was to
abandonthe propertyqualification,but for long no one was preparedto takea
step so repugnantto Roman sentiments.At last Mariusmadethe breakand
later commandersfollowed his example.
This doctrinerequiresus to supposethatthe Romanswere so unyieldingin
their devotion to the principlethat only men of propertyshould servein the
armythat they allowedan entirelyartificialmanpowercrisisto develop.If the
Romansdid behavein this way, they displayeda rigiditywhich was not only
foolish but uncharacteristic:althoughthey were a conservativepeople, their
conservatismwas generallytemperedby pragmatism.It would be wrong to
asserta priorithatthe Romanscannothaveactedin this way, but we oughtnot
to acceptthat they did so without good evidence.In this paperI shallexamine
the various argumentson which the doctrineoutlinedabove rests. I hope to
show that the casefor it is veryweakandthatour evidencecanbe satisfactorily
accountedfor without supposingthat a shortageof assiduidevelopedin the
later second century.3
II. The Burdenof the Levy and the Number of Assidui
This section is devoted to two topics on which some preliminarywords of
clarificationare necessary:the natureof the burdenwhichthe levy imposedon
the assidui,and the size of the class of assidui.
2 See especially Gabba, Athenaeum 27 (1949), 173-309 and 29 (1951), 171-8 = ES 1-56 =
RRAA 1-24, 171-282; Smith 1-10; Earl 30-40; Astin, Scipio 161-174, 196-7; Brunt, IM 75-7,
402-8 and SCRR 11-19; Schneider 17-28, 65-101; Crawford, RR 99-108; Stockton 8-9, 31-5.
The rejection of the doctrine that there was a shortage of assidui is one of the main
contentions of Shochat, but in other respects his views differ widely from those which I put
forward in this paper. Scepticism about the supposed shortage of assidui has also been expressed
by J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal'sWar(1978),245.
The SupposedRomanManpowerShortageof the LaterSecondCenturyB.C.
289
We are very poorly informed about how the levy was conducted.4 Polybius
tells us that when a levy was held all eligible citizens were required to present
themselves at Rome for selection, but there are grave difficulties in supposing
that the procedure he describes was in force in his own day.5 Although there is
no evidence for their involvement before the first century, it may be that
already by the time of the Hannibalic War local authorities were responsible
for the conduct of the levy over much of the ager Romanus.6 Conquisitores
may sometimes have been despatched by the central government to seek out
recruits, although before the first century this practice is attested only at two
critical moments in the Hannibalic War.' However, it seems to me likely that
the principle still held good that, when a levy was held, those eligible should
present themselves for selection, even if many did not have to go to Rome.
When a sudden crisis occurred, the usual procedures of the levy could be
dispensed with and a tumultus declared. Men normally exempt might then be
enlisted, and the commander would enlist men as expeditiously as possible,
both at Rome and on the way to the trouble spot.8
Unless they enjoyed exemption (vacatio), assidui were liable for military
service during the period in which they were iuniores, that is, between their
seventeenth and forty-sixth birthdays; in exceptional circumstances boys
under 17 and men of 46 and over might be enlisted.9 Infantrymen might be
called on to serve up to sixteen campaigns (stipendia), or twenty in
emergencies; equites were liable only for ten.10 In early days legions were
normally discharged after a single campaigning season, so that a man might be
enlisted many times but each individual period of service did not last more
than a few months. From the time of the Punic Wars periods of continuous
service lasting several years became common. In the second century legionaries
enlisted for wars fought overseas in an area where Rome did not regularly
maintain an army normally served for the duration, and legionaries serving in a
province which was permanently garrisoned (as were the two Spains and after
4 In general on the workings of the levy see J. Marquardt, Romische Staatsverwaltung2
II.380-9; W. Liebenam, RE V.591-615; Brunt, IM625-634; Nicolet, Metier 128-140.
5 Plb. VI. 19-2 1, with the criticisms of Brunt, IM 625-7.
6 Brunt, loc cit. holds that only those living near the city still had go to Rome; he is followed by
H. Galsterer, Herrschaft und Verwaltung im republikanischen Italien (1976), 105-6. Polybius is
defended by E. Rawson, RBSR 39 (1971), 15 and F. Gschnitzer, Hermes 109 (1981), 69-71: they
hold that all except those who lived in colon*ae and municipia still had to go to Rome.
7 Livy XXIII. 32.19; XXV 5.5-9.
8 Cf. RE V. 603-4; Brunt, IM 629-630.
The lower age limit: Tubero ap. Gell. X.28.1 (= fr. 4P.); Livy XXII. 57.9, XXV.5.8,
XXVII.11.15; Plut. CG 5. The upper age limit: Plb. VI.19.2; Cic. Sen. 60; Varro ap. Censorin.
XIV.3; Livy XLIII.14.6; Dion. Hal. IV.16.3; cf. Livy XL.26.7, XLII.31.4, 33.4. On vacationes see
Mommsen, Str. III.241-4.
10 Plb. VI.19.2. The figure of sixteen campaigns depends on an emendation: see Walbank ad
loc.
19
290
J. W.
RICH
146 Macedonia) were discharged only when the senate and their commander
thought fit. There is some evidence that a man was deemed to be entitled to
discharge after six years' continuous service."1Men who had undergone a long
period of continuous service were not exempt from being enlisted again. We
have no means of telling how much service assidui were on averagecalled upon
to perform throughout their lives.'2
Those who fell below the property qualification were known as proletarii or
capite censi.3 Like freedmen, they were normally liable only for service in the
fleet and were enrolled in the legions only in emergencies.14We do not know
how often such enrolments took place. We are told that opificum quoque
vulgus et sellularii, minime militiae idoneum genus were enlisted in 329 and
freedmen in 296, but these notices may not be historical.'5 There is
unimpeachable evidence that proletarii were enrolled as troops at the beginning
of the Pyrrhic War."6In the First Punic War the proleta ni were no doubt fully
employed in manning the fleets.
In the immediate aftermath of Cannae an army had to be amassed as quickly
as possible from the manpower available in the immediate environs of Rome;
the dictator M. lunius Pera enlisted as volunteers both slaves (who came to be
l Livy XL. 36. 10; App. Iber. 78. Not all were so fortunate, but I doubt whether we can safely
infer from Lucilius 509-10 M (of whose context we know nothing) that there were cases of men
serving in Spain for continuous periods three times as long.
12 On length of service see Smith 6-7; Toynbee II. 72-80; Astin, Scipio 169-170; Brunt, IM
399-401; Harris 44-5.
13 The capite censi were those whose property was so low that the censors did not record it but
registered them by their caput alone. On the etymology of assiduus and proletarius see G.
Wesenberg, RE XXIII. 631-2; Richard 367-371. (The attempt of A. Pagliaro, Helikon 7 (1967),
395-401, to deny the derivation of proletartus from proles is unconvincing). I have followed the
usual view that the capite censi were not a sub-class of the proletarii (as stated by Gell.
XVI.10.I 1-14) but identical with them (so Festus 253L; Cic. Rep. II.40 seems to me ambiguous on
this point). There is no ancient authority for the statement of Nicolet, Metier 109 that the capite
censi were those who declared only their own person and the proletarii those who had children to
declare.
14 Plb. VI.19.3; Gell. XVI.10.1 1-14. For the novelty of Marius' enrolment see the sources cited
below n. 176. On military service by the proletarii before Marius see Gabba, ESI I ; Brunt, IM 395,
402; Shochat 27-31.
15 Livy VIII.20.4, X.21.4.
16 Oros. IV.1.3; Aug. Civ. Dei I11.17. Orosius implies that the enrolment took place at the
time of the first campaign against Tarentum in 281, but it cannot have been necessary then. It is
usually supposed that the proletarii were enrolled as a garrison for the city of Rome when Pyrrhus
landed in spring 280. Two obscure fragments are commonly associated with this incident: Ennius
Ann. 183-5V; Cassius Hemina 21P tunc Marcus praeco primum proletanios armavit. On this
interpretation of the corrupt Hemina fragment Marcus is emended to MarCiusand praeco to either
praetor or procos.; the Marcius is identified as Q. Marcius Philippus (cos. 281) (see MRR I. 191-2).
If this interpretation is correct, we should accept Hemina's authoriy that this was the first (but not
the last) emergency enlistment of proletarii, rejecting the passages cited in n. 15 as unhistorical.
291
known as volones)and men held in prison for debt."7As the HannibalicWar
draggedon, Rome's reservesof legionarymanpowercameunderstrain.Livy
recordsa numberof measurestakenin responseto this shortage,18
but we hear
of only one instance of the enlistment of non-assidui: the recall to the
standardsin 207 of the voloneswho had disbandedthemselveson the deathof
theircommanderin 212.'9Theremay havebeen a few enrolmentsof freedmen
andproletariinot mentionedby our sources,but we should, I think,conclude
that, apartfrom the men recruiteddirectlyafterCannae,the legionaryforces
fielded in this war were almostentirelycomposedof assidui.20
Why more use
was not made of non-assiduimust remaina matterfor conjecture.2'
We never hear of non-assiduibeing enlisted in the legions between the
HannibalicWar and Marius' break with tradition.22Some may have been
enrolled when a tumultuary levy was held. Livy records declarationsof
tumultusin 198, 193, 181 and 178; the first was occasionedby a slave-risingat
Setia,the other three by setbacksin northernItaly.23We cannot tell whether
any tumultuarylevies were held in the period from 167 for which we lack
Livy, but there cannot have been much occasionfor them now that northern
Italy (exceptfor the Alpine valleys)had been pacified.24It may be thatlevying
17 Livy XXII.57.11, XXIII.14.3-4;
App. Hann. 27; Zon. IX.2; Val. Max. V1I.6.1; Oros.
IV.16.8-9; Fest. 511L; Macr. 1.11.30-1. The volones are discussed by N. Rouland, Les esclaves
ronains en temps de guerre (1977), 45-58. Boys under seventeen were also enlisted on this
occasion (Livy XXII.57.9).
18 In 214 the censors are said to have penalized those who had not served: XXIV. 18.7-9. In
212 the senate decided that boys under 17 should be enlisted and two boards of trumviriwere sent
around the country districts to seek out those who had roborissatis adferenda arma: XXV. 5. 5-9.
In 207 the exemption normally granted to the inhabitants of coloniae maritimae was set aside:
XXVII.38.3-5.
"9 Livy XXV.20.4, 22.3-4; XXVII.38.8,10; XXVIII.10.11,46.13.
20 The freedmen enlisted in 217 (Livy XXII.11.8) may have served only in the fleet (so Brunt,
IM 395 n.6). On naval service by proletarii in the Second Punic War see Brunt, IM65-6, 421-2,
668-9.
21 It is also curious that our sources make no explicit mention of ingenuous proletarii; the
tiumviri of 212 were ordered to inspect omnem copiam ingenuorum. In my view the solution to
both puzzles may be that at this period most ingenui and almost all the ingenui living outside the
city of Rome ranked as assidui. It is usually thought that the property qualification was reduced at
some time during the war; on this see below section V.
22 The words expedito pauperem plebeium atqueproletarium have survived from Cato's speech
De tribunis militum (ORF3 fr. 152). It is uncertain whether this should be taken as an exhortation
to enlist proletarii;
if so, it may not have been meant seriously.
See now Astin, Cato 118 n. 46.
XXXII.26.10-12; XXXIV.56. 11-13; XL.26. 6-7, 28.10; XLI.5.4. The tumultuary levy of
201 (XXXI. 2.5-6) seems to have been conducted in the Cisalpina itself (though see Briscoe ad
23
loc.).
24 Such a levy may have been held by Q. Metellus Macedonicus and Cn. Servilius Caepio when
as privati cum imperio they crushed a slave revolt at Minturnae and Sinuessa in 134 or 133 (Oros.
V.9.4.; Obseq. 27, 27b; see E. Badian, ANRWI.1.684-5).
19*
J. W.
292
RICH
officersenrolledsome proletariiwithout officialsanctioneitheras volunteers
or as conscripts,25but in view of the outcry raisedby Marius'actionthis is
unlikely to have been common. So in this period as before the legions were
composed almost exclusivelyof assidui.
The demands made on the assiduiduring the Hannibalic War were
enormous. In 218-216 citizen losses are unlikely to have been much below
50,000.26 If Livy's legion lists areauthentic,20 or more legionswere in service
every year from 214 to 206, with a peak of perhaps 25 in 212. Although I am
sceptical about a good deal of Livy's information on this subject, I think it
unlikely that the totals he implies should be much reduced.27Calculations of
the number of men serving can only be conjectural, for many of the legions
must have been seriously under strength. Brunt estimates that there were never
less than 60,000 legionaries in service between 215 and 207, with a peak of
80,000 in 212.28 These figures are likely to be of roughly the right order of
magnitude, and may even err on the side of caution.
The number of legions and legionaries in service in the years 200-168 have
been calculated by Afzelius and Brunt on the basis of Livy's evidence.29
Although some points of doubt subsist, the margin of error is not likely to be
great. On Brunt's figures the average number of legions in the field in these
years was 8.7. If we assume that the legions were kept up to a nominal strength
of 5,500, the average number of legionaries was 47,850. In thirteen years ten or
more legions were in service. During the war with Antiochus Rome fielded
12-13 legions: her effort then was of the same scale as in the Hannibalic War.
From 167 we lack Livy, but Brunt has calculated the number of legions in
service on the basis of our fragmentary evidence and reasoned conjecture.30
Although there were no doubt some years in which more legions were fielded
than appear in his figures, these do in my view show that the demands of the
legionary levy, although still high, were not as great in this period as in
Cf. Crawford, RR 107; Hopkins 30-1 n.40.
Brunt, IM 419-420. Brunt assumes that only four legions fought at Cannae, but Polybius'
figure of eight legions could be right; see now Lazenby, op. cit. n.3, 75-6.
27 For reconstructions of the number and distribution of legions during the Second Punic War
based on Livy's information see G. De Sanctis, Storia deiRomaniIII.2 (1916), 631-7; Toynbee II.
647-651. A new analysis is offered by Marchetti 13-94. The criticisms of Livy's information about
legions made by M. Gelzer, Kleine Schr2ften (1964), III. 220-255 are in my judgment not
satisfactorily answered by Brunt, IM 644660. However, the attempt of F. Gschnitzer, Hermes
109 (1981), 59-85 to revive Kahrstedt's view that Rome's legionary forces were much smaller than
Livy implies does not convince me.
25
26
28
1M417-420.
A. Afzelius, Die romische Kriegsmacht wahrend der Auseinandersetzung mit den hellenistischen Grossmachten (1944), 34-61; Brunt, IM 422-6 (reckoning only two legions in Spain from
178 instead of Afzelius' four).
30 IM 404, 426-434 (with table on pp. 432-3). Earl 30-1 and A.N. Sherwin-White, JRS 67
(1977), 73 n.75a exaggerate Rome's legionary commitments.
29
293
200-168, let alone the Hannibalic War. It is unlikely that as many as ten legions
were fielded except for two brief periods, 148-6 and 105-1, and possibly the
year 135. The average number of legions in the intervening period according to
Brunt's table is 6.4 - at full strength, 35,200 men. A particular problem is
presented by Cisalpine Gaul. We have positive evidence for the presence of
armies there in only nine of the years between 166 and 105, but no doubt
armies served there in other years as well. Brunt arbitrarily allows for two
legions there in every year down to 135 and for none thereafter except when
consular governors are recorded, but he considers it not unlikely that two
legions served there in most years after 135. This is possible, but, since the area
had been completely pacified (except for the Alpine valleys), it seems to me
much more likely that from well before 135 military activity there was only
occasional. Thus in some years before 135 Brunt's total of legions may actually
be too high.
The fact (if such it is) that the demands made on the assidui were in general
rather lower after 168 than in the earlier years of the century has implications
of some importance for the present enquiry. Some decline in the number of
assidui may have taken place in the course of the second century without the
burden of legionary service becoming greater than it had been in the early
years of the century; the burden would only be greater if the decline in the
number of assidui was steeper than the decline in the number serving in the
legions.
Unfortunately our sources give us no indication of how many assidui there
were. Some scholars hold that the census figures represent assidui.31If they are
right, there cannot have been a shortage of assidui in the later second century:
although the figures recorded for that period show a decline from the peak
reached in 164/3, they are still higher than any earlier figures.32However, I
cannot accept this view of the census figures. The following argument seems to
me decisive. Livy and his epitomator have a standard formula for presenting
the figures: censa sunt (Romanorum) capita tot. It is natural to conclude that
this formula was used by the censors themselves when they published the
figure at the close of the lustrum. There is no doubt that non-assiduiwere censi,
registered by the censors, as the term capite censi attests. It is perverse to
suppose that the words censa sunt were used in the formula in some special
3' This view was originally propounded by E. Herzog, Commentationes Philologae in
Honorem T. Mommseni(1877), 124-142. Modern writers who have adopted it include Gabba, ES
17-21, 521-535; Earl 35-7; G. Pieri, L'Histoire du cens jusqu'a la fin de la republique romaine
(1968), 177-182; J. Molthagen, Historia 22 (1973), 439-445; Schneider 79-80 n.96, 89-90, 150-6;
Shochat 9-45.
32 Cf. P. Fraccaro, Opuscula 11 (1957), 54 n.1; Brunt, IM 23. Gabba fails to appreciate the
contradiction between his view of the census figures and his belief in a second-century shortage of
assidui: cf. ES 22-3. The census figures are conveniently tabulated by Toynbee 1.438-440 and
Brunt, IM 13-14.
294
J. W.
RICH
sense under which such personswere excluded."Most probably,the figures
representadult male citizens.'4
Two authors writing about ServiusTullius'centuriateorganizationmake
statementsabout the proportion of proletarii:Cicero says that there were
more men in the single centuryof proletariithan in almostthe whole of the
first class, Dionysius thattheproletariioutnumberedall five classes."5
Whether
there was any historicalperiod for which eitherof these statementswas valid
we can only guess.
Bruntholds that in 214 there were about 100,000citizensqualifiedby age,
birthandpropertyfor militaryservice,andthatthe numberwas thenincreased
by a reductionin the propertyqualification.'6This view is based on Livy's
statement(XXIV.18.7-9) that in 214 the censorsfound that only some 2,000
iuniores(excludingthose who could pleadillnessor vacatioiusta militiae)had
not servedquadriennio,takenwith Brunt'sown calculationthat by the end of
215 the number who had "ever served" in the legions was about 108,000.37
However, it is difficultto believethat therewas a totalmobilizationof assidui,
let alone that the governmentallowedmattersto go so far beforeloweringthe
We must, I think, supposethatthe 2,000 men singled
propertyqualification.'8
out for punishmentin 214 were by no meansthe only qualifiedmen who had
not servedsince218. Perhapsthe 2,000 werenot thosewho hadnot served,but
those who had not presentedthemselvesat the levy. There may be deeper
distortionin Livy: the 2,000 are sent to Sicilyad Cannensisexeritus reliquias
and, as Brunthimself admits,Livy's accountof that force cannotbe accepted
in
fu1139;
there seems to be some overlap between the censorial punishments
recordedby Livy at XXIV.18.2-9 and XXVII.11.12-15.
Two very differentsuggestionshave been made about the numbersof the
assiduiin the second centuryto illustratethe supposedshortage.Astin takesa
cautiousview. He thinksthat the numberof proletariiandfreedmenmayhave
stood at about 80,000 in 164 and eitherremainedstationaryor showed some
Shochat 12-17 has not succeeded in rebutting this argument.
" So e. g. K. J. Beloch, Die Bevolkerung der griechisch-romischen Welt (1886), 312-9;
Toynbee 1. 438-479; Brunt, IM 15-25. Another possibility which in my view deserves more
attention than it has so far received is that the figures represent only those adult male citizens who
were sui iuris (cf. F. C. Bourne, CW45 (1952), 129-134, 180-2).
35 Cic. Rep. II. 40; D.H. IV. 18.2, VII.59.6.
36 IM 64-6, 77, 405. Cf. Harris 44-5.
37 This figure rests on the unexplained assumption that the censors' investigation preceded the
levy of 214 (the figure of 105,000 given at IM 64 is a misprint). However, even if those enrolled in
214 are included in the figure of those who had "ever served," Brunt is surely right that the gap
between this figure and the number of iuniores implied by the census figures cannot be bridged
(contra Shochat 23-5).
38 Cf. Hopkins, JRS 62 (1972), 192-3.
33
39
IM 652, 654-5.
295
increasethereafter;the decline in the census figuresregisteredafterthat date
thus fell entirelyon the assidui,whose numbersfell by 8 percent or more.40He
seemsto envisagethatthe totalof assiduiremainedwell over200,000.It is hard
to supposethat therecan have been a seriousshortageof qualifiedmenfor the
levy if the numberof assiduiwas as high as this in the later second century.
Indeed, the burdenof the levy would probablyhave been lighterthan in the
earlierpartof the century,when the citizen body was smallerand the number
of men servinghigher.
At the other extreme,Bruntsupposesthatthe numberof assiduiof military
age may havefallenas low as 75,000 by the latersecond century.41It is worth
bringingout the implicationsof this suggestion.On Brunt'sown reckoningthe
numberof proletariimustin thatcasehavebeenat leastthreetimesas large.42As
we haveseen, the averagenumberof men servingin the legionswas then about
35,000. On the simplifyingassumptionsthatthe assiduiconstituteda stationary
populationwith anexpectationof lifeatbirthof 25 andthatallassiduienteredthe
legionsatthe ageof seventeenandservedcontinuously,a body of 75,000assidui
would have had to serve about 11.5 years each to maintainan army of this
size.43 In practicethe averagelifetimeservicewould have been much higher:
not all will haveenrolledat seventeen,and few servedcontinuouslyfor such a
long period; death, disease and the accidentsof recruitingwill have ensured
that many assiduiservedless thanthe average.It follows thatlargenumbersof
assiduiwould have servedfor the full sixteenyearsfor which they were liable
or longer. If the numberof assiduidid drop to somethinglike 75,000, the
Romangovernment'sconductwas very remarkable.To maintainthe principle
that militaryserviceshould be confinedto men of property,they imposed a
crushingburdenof militaryserviceon whatwas at most a quarterof the citizen
body - and that the most well-to-do - while the rest went scotfree.In the rest
of this paper I consider whether there is good reason to suppose that an
artificialmanpowershortagedid develop on anythinglike this scale.
40
Scipio 337.
IM 77, 405; cf. Harris 44 n.5.
42
On the size of the citizen body in the second century see Brunt, IM 68-83. The ratio of
iuniores to seniores is estimated at 3:1 by A. Afzelius, Die romische Eroberung Italiens (340-264 v.
Chr.) (1942), 100; cf. Brunt, IM 53 n.2. On the U.N. Model Life Table for expectation of life at
birth of 25, adult males over 45 constitute 26.5 per cent of all adult males.
43 This calculation is modelled on those of Hopkins 34-5, using the model life tables published
in United Nations, Population Studies No. 25, Methods for Population Projection by Sex and Age
(1956). On Roman expectation of life see also Hopkins, Population Studies 20 (1966), 245-264;
D. Engels, CP 75 (1980), 116-8.
41
296
J. W. RICH
III. AgrarianChange
Agrarian change provides the starting point for the theory that a serious
shortage of assiduideveloped in the later second century: large numbers of
peasants, it is held, lost their holdings and with them their
status as
assid'i.
That the second century saw important changes in the pattern of Italian
agriculture can hardly be doubted. In outline the characterof these changes has
long been familiar. Rome's foreign wars led to an influx of wealth for which
agriculture was the most attractive investment and made available large
numbers of slaves. As a result there took place a great expansion of agricultural
enterprises whose permanent work force was composed of slaves. These were
of two main types, according to region: medium-sized plantations, of the kind
for which Cato wrote his handbook, and transhumantpasturage. At first there
was probably plenty of land available for those seeking to invest as a result of
the disruptions of the Hannibalic War and the confiscations of territory from
ex-rebels, but as the century progressed the peasantry (citizen and allied) must
have come under increasing pressure from rich men eager to expand their
holdings. Long terms of military service overseas helped to undermine the
ability of peasant families to resist these pressures, and many succumbed.
Recent research has done much to refine this picture, and several writers
have properly stressed the danger of exaggerating the deracination of the
peasantry44. The sweeping generalizations of Appian and Plutarch and the
preoccupations of the agronomists sometimes led older writers to give less
than due weight to both general considerations and scattered literary
indications which show that, although the peasantry may have been in decline,
small farmers (both freehold and tenant) never ceased to play a significant part
in Italian agriculture. Field surveys have now provided further evidence of the
survival of the peasantry. The surveys conducted by the British School of
44 Modern discussions of agrarianchange in second century Italy include Toynbee II.286-312;
Astin, Scipio 161-5 and Cato 240-266; M. W. Frederiksen, Dial Arch. 4/5 (1970/1), 330-357;
Brunt, IM 269-284, 345-375; V. A. Sirago, L'agricultra italiana nel II sec. a.l. (1971); E. Gabba,
Ktema 2 (1977), 269-284 (reprinted with modifications in E. Gabba and M. Pasquinucci, Strutture
agrarie e allevamento transumante nell' Italia romana (III-I sec. a.c.) (1979), 13-54); Bernstein
77-97; Hopkins 1-25, 48-64; F. de Martino, Storia economica di Roma antica (1979) 1.59-123;
D. W. Rathbone, JRS 71 (1981), 10-23; A. Giardina and A. Schiavone (ed.), Societa romana e
produzione schiavistica. I. L'Italia: insediamenti e forne economiche (1981). On the survival of
smallholders see especially Frederiksen and Rathbone, and P. D. A. Garnsey, cited below nn.
53-4. Earl 23-30 goes too far in denying that there was in any sense an "agrariancrisis". Rathbone
argues interestingly that the expansion of large estates may have taken place without much
expropriation of smallholders, but his view that casualties in war brought about a continual decline
in the number of smallholders in the third and second centuries is based on an exaggeratedestimate
of the military demands made on the Latin colony Cosa (pp. 18-9) and takes no account of the
Roman census figures. In general on the peasantry in ancient Italy see J. M. Frayn, Subsistence
Farming in Roman Italy (1979).
297
Rome in Southern Etruria have revealed a high density of rural settlement in
both the Republican and early imperial periods with small farms forming a
high proportion of all farm sites.45 A similar pattern of settlement has been
detected by surveys of the territory of Cosa and of the Biferno valley on the
borders of Samnium, although in parts of these territories larger 'villas' came to
predominate.46
The uprooting of the Italian peasantry was a long drawn out process which
continued long after the second century and was never completed. In the
Gracchan period there will have been few, if any, districts of Italy from which
subsistence farmers had altogether disappeared and many in which they
continued to flourish. However, it would be excessively sceptical to doubt that
by the time of the Gracchi a good many peasants had given up their holdings.
Any drop in the numbers of smallholders which had taken place in the first
three decades of the second century was probably more than compensated for
by the large-scale colonial and viritane assignations made in that period, but
thereafter there were few, if any, land assignations.47 Thus by the later second
4
The survey reports were published in PBSR 26 (1958), 63-134; 30 (1962), 116-207; 31
(1963), 100-158; 33 (1965), 70-112; 36 (1968). T. W. Potter, The Changing Landscape of South
Etruria (1979) provides a synthesis of the results; he discusses rural settlement in the classical
period at pp. 120-137. See also D. B. Nagle, Athenaeum 57 (1979), 411-441. The lack of a firm
chronology for black glaze ware prevents the analysis of changes within the Republican period.
Much of the black glaze from Southern Etruria is of types normally dated to the third century;
Potter, op. cit. 95-6 explains this in terms of regional conservatism, but M. H. Crawford,
Athenaeum 58 (1980), 497 thinks that it may be evidence of depopulation in the second and first
centuries. For some other possible evidence for the decline of the peasantry near Rome see
Crawford, JRS 71 (1981), 158.
46 The Wesleyan University survey of the ager Cosanus is reported by S. L. Dyson, Journal of
Field Archaeology 5 (1978), 251-268, concluding that settlement patterns were very similar to
those observed in South Etruria. A new survey is under way under the direction of Professor A.
Carandini; his conclusions for the Valle d'Oro district are set out in A. Carandini and S. Settis,
Schiavi e Padroni nell' Etruria Romana. La Villa di Settefinestre dallo Scavo alla Mostra (1979),
32-41 and pannelli 5-7. Carandini holds that by the first century smallholdings were completely
ousted from the Valle d'Oro by rich villas, but for criticisms of this view see Rathbone, art. cit.
n.44, 20-1. Some of the villas, like that excavated at Settefinestre, date to the first century, but
others date from the mid-second century if not earlier (Rathbone, loc. cit.). The Biferno survey is
reported by G. Barker, J. Lloyd and D. Webley, PBSR 33 (1978), 33-51. They show that
smallholdings survived in the vicinity of Larino, but in the lower valley had been replaced by
larger units by the later first century. For preliminary reports of surveys in the Albegna and Liri
valleys, where only small farmsteads have been detected, see G. Barker and R. Hodges (ed.),
Archaeology and Italian Society (B.A.R. Int. 102, 1981), 269-275 (S. L. Dyson) and 275-287
(E. M. Wightman).
47 G. Tibiletti, Athenaeum 28 (1950), 232-9 argued that
assignations may have continued in the
period 167-134 on much the same scale as before, but, although our sources are certainly defective,
foundations on a significant scale would probably have left some record and it is hard to see why
Ti. Gracchus sought to obtain land for allotment by such controversial means, if land assignations
had been continuing steadily in the previous decades. Cf. Toynbee II. 208-210, 658-9; E. T.
298
J. W.
RICH
century there will have been a significantdrop in the number of peasant
smallholders.How greatthe drop was we cannottell, althoughwe know that
enough peasantshad been ousted to arousethe concernof contemporaries.
It has been generallysupposedthat all those citizenpeasantswho lost land
ceasedto rankas assidui.In my view, theremayhavebeenmanywho retained
that status.
As Brunthas argued,the valueof the propertyqualificationwas verylow.48
Our only figure for the price of land is Columella's 1,000 sestertiifor a
iugerum.49 At that rate the figures for the property qualificationgiven by
Polybius and Cicero would be equivalent to 1.6 or 0.6 iugera respectively.50
Now Columella'sfigure may well have been somewhatexaggeratedfor his
own day,51and land valueshigherthen than in the second centuryB.C.; but
there is no reasonto suppose that land values rose sharplyafter the second
centuryB.C., and in any case not justlandbut almostall a man'spropertywas
takeninto accountin fixinghis censusrating.Bruntis surelyrightto conclude
that assiduiwere requiredto own no more than a house and gardenat the
most.
Manyformerpeasantproprietorsremainedin the country:it was thesemen
Someof them may
who constitutedthe bulk of Ti. Gracchus'ruralsupport.52
have been able to get the tenancy of a smallholding,but most must have
subsistedin the main by casuallabour. Considerableuse was madeof hired
free labour on slave-runestates.53But such work was largelyseasonal.Few
families can have got all their living from this source alone. Most probably
eked out their earningswith the produce of a small patch of land. Some of
these plots will have been leased, but some may have been owned, either
retainedfrom the formerpropertyor boughtwith money obtainedby the sale
of the holding.A good manyformersmallholdersmayhaveowned a house,in
Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic (l969), 112-5. Veil. I.15.3 assigns the colony of
Auximum to 157, but for the possibility that the correct date may be 128 see Salmon, loc. cit. and
Athenaeum 41 (1963), 5-13.
48 Brunt, JRS 52 (1962), 74; IM 405-6; SCRR 14. Cf. Schneider 13-16. The calculations of
Shochat 20, 67-8 are based on the erroneous assumption that income was taken into account in the
census assessment.
49
Colum. RR III.3.8.
50 Reckoned at the pre-tariffing rate of 10 asses to the denarius. On the figures for the property
qualification see below Section V.
51 Cf. R. P. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire (1974), 49-51.
52
Brunt, JRS 1962, 69-72; Astin, Scipio 345-6; Bernstein 86-97; Stockton 18-21.
53 Cato Agr. 1.3.; 4; 5.4; 144ff; Varro RR 1.17.2-3. See Brunt, JRS, 1962, 72; K. D. White,
Roman Farming (1970), 347-350; P. D. A. Garnsey (ed.), Non-Slave Labourin the Greco-Roman
World(1980), 41-3 (Garnsey), 65-72 (J. Skydsgaard); Rathbone, art. cit. n.44. Rathbone holds that
except near Rome most of the seasonal agricultural labour was provided by peasant smallholders;
in his view, few peasants had been expropriated and 'the villa systems and peasant smallholdings
were complementary modes of agricultural production' (p. 15).
299
some cases acquired by purchase, but perhaps more often the ancestral home.
Peasants who lived in the towns and went out to their fields by day, as many
may have done, could have lost their land without losing their homes.' Thus
many of those dispossessed peasants who remained in the country may have
owned enough property to satisfy the modest requirement for an assiduus.
We cannot be sure that those who were no longer qualified by property
invariably ceased to rank as assidui. Censors may have been reluctant to accept
the claim of former assidui that their property had fallen below the minimum,
especially if they were still resident in the country. Probably only a few of
those who drifted to Rome had enough property to qualify as assidui, but it is
possible that others retained that status along with their membership of the
rural tribes.55
I do not doubt that a decline took place in the number of assidui as a result
of the agrarian changes. However, our evidence about these changes does not
help us to determine the extent of the decline: we do not know how many
peasants lost their lands or how many of those who did ceased to rank as
assidui. What we know about the agrarianchanges is compatible with the view
that the number of assidui fell a long way below the level obtaining in the early
second century, so that, although the demand for legionaries was now less
great, the burden of the levy on the assidui was greater. It is, however, no less
compatible with much less pessimistic estimates of the fortunes of the assidui.
It is likely that there was some increase in the number of assiduiin the first part
of the second century as the citizen body as a whole expanded, and it may be
that, although the number later declined, it remained above the level of the
early years of the century. Even if it dropped below that level, it may not have
fallen so far that the reduced demands of the levy constituted a significantly
greater burden on the remaining assidui.
IV. Contemporary Anxieties about Manpower
Those who hold that there came to be a serious shortage of assidui suppose
that this gravely concerned many contemporaries and that C. Laelius and Ti.
Gracchus hoped to relieve the shortage by agrarianlegislation. It was, on this
For the view that many peasants lived in the towns see e. g. White, op. cit. 345; Brunt, IM
345. The first serious investigation of where peasants lived is by P. D. A. Garnsey, PCPS 205
(1979), 1-25, arguing that most peasants lived in the countryside. Garnsey may be right: he argues
convincingly that the origins of the 'agro-towns' of present day southern Italy are mediaeval; the
field surveys mentioned above provide evidence for dispersed settlement; and there are a number
of colonies where it is clear that there was space for only a minority of the settlers within the walls.
However, even Garnsey admits (pp. 10, 15) that some peasants whose holdings were near a town
are likely to have lived there.
5' For such persons remaining in the rural tribes see H. M. Last, AJP58 (1937), 468-472; E. S.
Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (1972), 142, 201, 258 n. 374.
300
J. W.
RICH
view, one of the principal aims of Gracchus' law to restore the status of assidui
to men who had been reduced to proletaii by granting them allotments.
There are a number of difficulties in this view. It may be doubted whether
men would have been eager to receive allotments which would make them
liable to what had become, on this view, a crushing burden of conscription.56
We do not know to what extent, if at all, the law converted proletarii into
assidui: it is not certain that the allotments counted towards a man's census
rating,57and, if the argument advanced in the previous section is correct, many
of the beneficiaries may never have ceased to rank as assidui.
The most serious difficulty, to my mind, is that the hypothesis is in conflict
with our evidence. Appian and Plutarch tell us a good deal about contemporary anxieties about manpower, but they say nothing of a decline in the
number of assiduicaused by men ceasing to satisfy the property qualification.
They speak rather of a decline in the numbers of the free population caused by
a failure to rear children. In this section I examine this discrepancy.
It is a notorious difficulty of Appian's account of the agrariancrisis that he
sometimes implies that it was only Italian allies who lost their lands and
aroused Gracchus' concern.58To that extent Appian was (for whatever reason)
certainly mistaken: it is a matter of dispute whether the solicitude of Gracchus
and his contemporaries extended to the allies as well as the citizens, but it
cannot have been confined to the allies.59Apart from this problem, there are no
serious inconsistencies in the accounts which Appian and Plutarch give of the
manpower problem. The peasantry, they tell us, were impoverished by the loss
of their lands, and so were unable to rear children. The resulting decline in the
free population was all the more alarming because the number of slaves on the
land was increasing; these were, Appian says, at best militarily useless and
might actually be a threat. Gracchus undertook to set this state of affairs to
56 Cf. H. H. Scullard, JRS 54 (1964), 199, and J. E. A. Crake, Phoenix 20 (1964), 174, not
adequately answered by Badian, ANRWI.1.718.
5' The allotments remained public land; they were made ager privatus by the agrarianlaw of
111, and line 8 of that law is taken by some writers to show that it was only then that they were
counted for their holders' census assessment. For this view see P. Fraccaro, Opuscula 1I (1957)
87-8; F. C. Bourne, CW45 (1952) 181; Shochat 42, 87. Arguments against it are presented by
Brunt, IM 78; Bernstein 128-131.
'8 There can be no doubt that by 'ITakXL6TCELAppian was referring to Italian allies, not to
citizen country-dwellers: cf. P. J. Cuff, Historia 16 (1967), 177-188.
59 Shochat 20-2, 77-85 attempts to save Appian's credit: Gracchus in his view planned to shift
the burden of recruitment from the citizens to the allies, and so 'whereas in his speeches Tiberius
suggested distributing land to Roman citizens in the name of justice, with the object of improving
their economic situation, he justified the division of land to the allies by claiming that this would
increase their share of military service" (p. 84). Both Shochat's interpretation of Appian and his
account of Gracchus' motives seem to me quite untenable. We need not consider here the vexed
question whether the allies were entitled to receive allotments under the law: for ingenious recent
contributions to the debate see Bernstein 137-157 and J. S. Richardson, JRS 70 (1980), 1-11.
301
rights; according to Plutarch, Laelius had attempted to do the same earlier but
had desisted when opposed by the powerful. Appian tells us that the purpose
of Gracchus' measure was to procure eiicivb6Qac.Gracchus' plan on his view
was evidently to restore prosperity to those who had been impoverished by
giving them land and so to enable them to rear children once again.60
Some writers have claimed to discern references to the property qualification and the problems to which it is supposed to have given rise in Appian's
words. These claims are in my view unconvincing.
Brunt correctly points out that the words EvcavQLtaand ouavb?ctaused by
Appian are ambiguous: they may refer to the quality as well as the quantity of
manpower.61 It may well be that Appian meant to convey not only that there
was a shortage of qualified men, but that those who were left were of poor
physique. It does not seem to me that in the context in which Appian uses
them these terms could reasonably be taken to refer to a shortage of citizens
possessing the property qualification.
A reference to the distinction between assidui and proletarii has been
detected in the following passage from Appian's account of the speech which
Gracchus made at the assembly at which the vote was to be taken on his law:
EL
.. .tXCLOV
8L-'TL.
Tta xoLvC( XOLV 6tav4Etu1atL
XaiL CiL yvrOLWTEQog
&E'L
XQaL
xCiLToL;
'0F,QovTo;g 6 3tOkiLTTg
)(Q@OLWTEQO 6 0tQQliaTYL(T1atoXEC[LOU
But the opening words of the next
6TriIooLoLLE?oVVOUcEQ0o
O XOLVwVO6.62
sentence
(ovUX 0g noXi
8E Trv
OUYXQLOLV
g 66botov
tnitvEyxdv)
suggest
that
the contrast in all these comparative phrases is the same, namely that between
citizens and slaves.63 &nokE4ou recalls Appian's earlier insistence on the
uselessness of slaves for military purposes.64Any citizen could be said to be a
XOLVwVo5in the respublica.
Both Appian and Plutarch in fact imply that those who had lost their land
were still liable for military service.65 On the view for which I have argued in
the previous section, there may have been many of whom this was true.
60 App. BC I.7.30; 9,35; 10.40; 11.43. 45-6, 27.122, 124; Plut. TG8.3. The decline of the free
population: App. 7.30 Toi,; 6' 'ITctkL6TC(;
UL,yftrl; xCti voCvb6ta xEaxeXLaVtTave
TQuxo0vou;
JtEVL TE xCdi o(poQ(aL;
xai TLTEcL?;a, 9.35 rQlxxog... oERv0o? oViOoE tEQi TOV) 'ITC(XXOu
yEvovU . .(.f1ELQOkEtVOV ... xCT'oXyoV EL &ITOQiaVxai 6kLyaCtV6QLCV,
10.40 oi 6' au 7ErVv1rET
&-VTW16VQ0VT0
7I,itoiQoq?tiv,
(t
F-VZOQt0(Lg
TIeQLqE(eoaL,
?5
7MViaV
tUXa<T'V
Plut. oi 7TEmvTE- ...
xCai 63T' avm'g
-yovCCLV, ovU 5UV&V6EVo
tg
lLEXoUV ITE7[Ci6oUv &VaTQOcPll GxrrE TCXii
T1V 'IakCiav &tnaGav6IyaV6QiaV tXekEU&wV CidO&G1hL. Gracchus' aim of ectv8Qv'a: App.
11.43, 45. On Laelius' proposal see Astin, Scipio 307-310.
61 IM 77, 189; cf. Earl 39, L. Gallo ASNP 3.10 (1980), 1240-3, 1259.
62 App. 11.44.
Badian, ANRW 1. 1.686 n. 50; Nicolet, Rome et la conquete du monde
mediterraneen 264-27 avant J-C. 1. Les structures de l'Italie romaine (1977), 127; Stockton 32.
63 So Gabba ad loc. ("il confronto e per Iiberio fra il cittadino e lo schiavo"); Bernstein 146.
64 App. 7,29; 9.36.
65
App. 7.30 (cited above n. 60); Plut. Oc Cit.oL 7tEtvTljEg outTcZTaLQ eaTeiLCTL TE7QO&Vp.0vg
If Gracchus really said that those who fought for Italy were homeless vagrants
naXQELXOV
ciCUToi3g.
302
J. W. RICH
Suchotherevidenceas we havefor contemporaryanxietiesaboutmanpower
also impliesthatit was aboutthe numbersof the freepopulationthatmenwere
concerned.
ScipioAemilianus,censorin 142/1, protestedagainstthe use of adoptionto
MetellusMacedonicus,censor in 131/0,
retainthe privilegesof parenthood.66
urgedthatall citizensshouldmarryliberorumcreandorumcausa.67Althoughit
was, of course, not novel for the guardiansof Romanmoresto show concern
for the propagationof the race,68these incidentsmay plausiblybe taken as
evidencethat at the time men were concernedabout citizen numbers.
Appian tells us that, when Scipio Aemilianus was appointed to the
commandagainstNumantiain 134, he did not hold a levy, becauseRomewas
fightingmany warsat the time and therewere plentyof menin Spain;instead,
he took out a force of 4,000 volunteersraisedfromforeignkingsandcitiesand
his Roman clients and friends.69Accordingto Plutarch,the senateprohibited
the many men who wished to accompanyScipio from going on the grounds
that Italy would be deserted (6g
FiQ>oU
tij
'ITaXLag;cooivrI5).7? If
Plutarch'sstory is historical(which is by no meansbeyond doubt), we must
supposethat the senaterefusedto allow Scipioto hold a levy.7"The numberof
men involved may have been large: Scipio may have proposed that most,
perhapsall, of the troops in NearerSpainshouldbe replaced,in whichcasethe
number of Roman and allied troops to be levied might be of the order of
20,000 or more.72 Even so, the senate's decision was probably the product
(Plut. 9.5), this must be either rhetorical exaggeration or another instance of the common
complaint that soldiers returned home to find their farms expropriated, on which see Brunt, IM
642-3.
66
Gell. V. 19,15-16. See Astin, Scipio 322-4; T. P. Wiseman, JRS 59 (1969), 61.
67 Livy Per. LIX; Suet. Aug. 89; Gell. 1.6; cf. Lucilius 678-686M. The attempt of Shochat 50-2
to show that Metellus was moved simply by moral considerations and was not concerned for
citizen numbers is unconvincing. On p. 52 he interprets Metellus' words (cited by Gellius) saluti
perpetuae potius quam brevi voluptati consulendum est to mean that "the individual should act
with moderation, taking thought for his long-term good." This overlooks the reason Metellus
gives: quoniam ita natura tradidit, ut nec cum illis satis commode nec sine illis ullo modo vivipossit.
68 Cf. D. Daube, Proc. Class. Ass. 74 (1977), 10-25.
69 App. Iber. 84.
70
Plut. Mor. 201A = Apophth. Sc. Min. 15.
71 Plutarch's account is defective in at least one respect, namely the implication that Scipio was
not allowed to take volunteers. There is a close parallel to this episode in the story that Scipio's
grandfather, the first Africanus, was only permitted a volunteer force in 205 (Livy
XXVIII.45.13-46.1 ; App. Lib. 7; Plut. Fab. 26.2; Zon.IX.11). That story may be a fiction based
on the episode of 134 (so e. g. Brunt, IM 655-6). However, it may be historical (so e. g. Gelzer,
Kleine Schniften(1964), 111.245-7); if so, it is possible that Scipio elected to take only volunteers in
134 in conscious emulation of his grandfather (for such emulation in his career see Astin, Scipio
20-2, 46). Scipio might well have preferred to avoid the odium of holding yet another levy for the
hated Spanish wars (see below section VI).
72 The morale of the troops in the province was low (references in Astin, Scipio 136 n. 3). No
reinforcements are recorded after those of 140 (App. Iber. 78), so that, on the principle that a man
303
chiefly of political jealousy and the claim that Italy would be left deserted
hardly more than a pretext.'3Such a pretextwould, however, probablynot
have been used if it was not felt to have some plausibility.It has sometimes
been adduced as evidence that declining numbers of assiduihad led to a
shortageof recruits.74But I doubt whether it can mean that, althoughthere
would still be plenty of free men, Italy would be empty of assidui.The point
must ratherbe that Italy would be empty of free men.5 Grossly exaggerated
though this was, the claim reflectedand exploitedcontemporaryfearsabout
the numbersof the free population.
The impoverishmentof a substantialproportionof the peasantrycould have
led to a decline in the numbersof the free population.There may have been
some reductionin the frequencyof marriage,and it is likely that manypeople
Whethersucha declinedid in facttakeplacewe
sought to limit theirfamilies.76
do not know. The census figuresgive us evidencefor adultmalecitizens,but
pose grave problems of interpretation.77They show a gradual decline,
sometimeschecked,from a peakof 337,022in 164/3 to a low point of 317,933
in 136/5. In 131/0 the numberregisteredrose slightly to 318,823. Only two
more figures are recorded for the second century. They are suspiciously
similar:394,736 in 125/4 and 394,336 in 115/4. The decreasebetween 164/3
and 136/5 may be the resulteitherof a declinein the citizenpopulationor of an
increasein the numberof those who werefailingto register.If we accepteither
of the figurespreservedfor 125/4 and 115/4 as authentic,the explanationof the
earlierdecreasein termsof non-registrationis almostcertainlycorrect.Evenif
both figures are corrupt and the true figures showed a continuingdecline,
increasingnon-registrationmight still be at least part of the cause.
If a decline did take place in the numbersof the free population,it cannot
have been on the scale which the dramaticstatementsof our sourcessuggest.
The lowest recordedcensusfigurefor this period,thatof 136/5, was only 6 per
cent lower thanthat for 164/3 andwas higherthanany recordedbeforethat.It
has been inferredfrom this that our sources must have misrepresentedthe
was entitled to discharge after six years' continuous service (above n.1 1), most, if not all, may have
served their term.
73 Cf. Astin, Scipio 184. According to Plutarch the senate begrudged Scipio money as well as
men. The excuse for this must have been the poverty of the treasury; this too was an argument of
doubtful validity (cf. Crawford, RRC635-6). One may compare Cicero's allegations against Piso:
cum exhauriebas aerarium, cum orbabas Italiam iuventute (Pis. 57).
74 E. g. Astin, Scipio 171; Brunt, IM407 n.2; Badian, ANRW 1.1. 685 n.48.
75 This was certainly what later writers meant when they complained of solitudo Italiae: cf.
Brunt, IM 128, 345ff.
76 On the relationship between poverty and family limitation in Roman Italy see Brunt, IM
76-7, 136-154; J.K. Evans, CQ 31 (1981), 435-8; W.V. Harris, CQ 32 (1982), 114-6.
77 Lucidly discussed by Brunt, IM77-83. Against the view that the figures represent assidui see
above section 11.
304
J. W.
RICH
natureof contemporaryfearsaboutmanpower.The decline(realor supposed)
in the nativestock may havebeenthe subjectof some concern,but it cannot,it
is argued, have given rise to the acute anxiety attested by the sources or
prompted Laelius and Ti. Gracchusto bring forwardcontroversialagrarian
proposals;the conclusionis drawnthat for the chief causeof alarmwe must
look elsewhere- to the assidui.78In my view this rejectionof our evidenceis
unwarranted.
The declinein the censusfiguresfrom 164/3 and in particularthe low figure
recordedin the last censusbeforeGracchus'tribunate,thatof 136/5(a dropof
9,509 from the previouscensus),may well haveseemeddisquietingenoughto
contemporaries,and they may have thought that the true picturewas worse
still. Manumissionswere probably frequentin this period; men may have
concludedthat the numberof ingenuiwas decliningfasterthanthe figuresfor
all adult male citizens recordedby the censors.'9A decline in child-rearing
could have only a delayed impact on figures for all adult males, and other
figures which may have been available- for example,the total of iuniores may have shown a sharperdecline.Suchinformationas could be obtainedfor
the Italianallies may have suggestedthat their numberswere decliningfaster
thanthose of the citizens." Concernfor the nativestock may, in any case,not
have startedfrom the census returns.These figuresmay have done no more
than lend colour to alreadyexisting fears, based on subjectiveimpressions
about the countryside,the complaintsof the dispossessedand the conviction
that peasantswho had lost their lands could not but be reluctantto bear
children. It would have been naturalfor those who felt such fears to give
expressionto them in highly colouredlanguage:thus Gracchusin his speeches
may have painted a picture of the depopulationof Italy not unlike that of
Appianand Plutarch.
The Romangoverningclasswas only too proneto exaggeratedfearsfor the
state'ssecurity:thus the war againstCarthage,in which Gracchushad begun
his militaryservice,had been undertakenin the groundlessbeliefthat, as long
as Carthagestood on its existingsite, Rome could not be safe.81However, it
78 For this line of argument see especially Brunt, IM 75-7.
7 Scipio's famous outburst in 131 (references in Astin, Scipio 265-6) attests contemporary
awareness of the increase in freedman numbers. An increase in non-registration, if it did take place,
is less likely to have been apparent at the time.
80 Brunt, IM 84-90, 97-9, concludes from an analysis of the census figure for 70/69 that the
rate of increase from 225 was much lower for those who had been allies than for those who had
been citizens before the Social War.
81 Harris 163-254 demonstrates that fears for their own security played a smaller part in
bringing about the Romans' wars of conquest than has often been supposed, but he overstates his
case, notably on the origins of the Third Punic War (pp. 234-240). On that question Astin, Scipio
270-281 remains the best discussion (though he represents the Romans' fears as more reasonable
than they were). The arguments of Cic. Leg. Agr. II.87-95 presumably did not seem as absurd to
his audience as they do to us.
305
would perhapsnot have been so unreasonablefor men to fearthat, if nothing
was done to check the declinein the nativestock andthe risein slavenumbers,
Rome's security would be imperilled.No one knew how many slavesthere
were in Italy. The SlaveWarin Sicily vividly illustratedthe danger.It was a
slave revolton a scalewithout precedentin the Greco-Romanworld, andwas
crushedwith considerabledifficulty; Sicily was declareda consularprovince
each year from 134 to 132. Minoroutbreaksoccurredin Italy too. Men might
well trembleat whatwould happenif revolton the Sicilianscalewereto spread
to Italy.82
I conclude that we may accept the evidence of our sources. Men were
gravelyconcernedabout the decline of the nativestock, citizen and perhaps
also allied, and the increasein the numberof slaves.LaeliusandTi. Gracchus
brought forward their agrarianproposals in the hope of checking these
developments. Under Gracchus' law and probably also Laelius' proposal
peasantswould be settledon landnow workedby slaves;slavenumberswould
thus be reduced, and the settlers, protected under Gracchus'law from the
encroachmentsof the rich by the stipulationthat their lots could not be
alienated,would, it was hoped,prosperandonce againbe ableto rearchildren.
It might still be maintainedthat, in additionto theirconcernfor the native
stock, Ti. Gracchus,Laelius and their contemporarieswere also concerned
about an artificialmanpowershortagebroughton by the maintenanceof the
propertyqualification.But the sourcesprovideno supportfor sucha view, and
those who hold it must accountfor their silence.
V. The PropertyQualificationsof the CensusClasses
It is now usually supposed that the property qualificationfor military
servicewas reducedtwice, once in the HannibalicWar and once duringthe
second century.These reductions,if they were made,must attesta shortageof
qualified men.83 However, no ancient writer refers to a change in the
qualification.The supposed reductionsare merely a modern hypothesis to
account for some of the differentfigures for the qualificationgiven by our
82
&
T
Cf. Badian, ANR WI.1.684-5. The point was made by Gracchus himself: App. BCI.9.36 br'
(
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bvtJXEtEvag
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(p, T6 EvayXog
4 6oiotxI
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&83EOTCV7tcfoS
Vito f?EfQWtOVTWOV
yEVO6LEVOV,bTJJAvOv X)&XELVwvnZo3
yEw?yiag, xaLt TOV tn' ai'VToi; 'PwRa(wv noiXegoovo1 6XL8ov oii& ItQaXuv,dXX' 'Eg TE
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83 Shochat 49-50 holds that the qualification was reduced at some time between 133 and 123,
although there was no shortage of assidui, because men were reluctant to be recruited. But, if there
was no shortage, it is hard to see why reducing the qualification should have been seen as a way to
resolve the problem of reluctance to serve. There is no reason to suppose that the attitude to the
levy of those made liable for it by this reduction would be significantly different from that of those
already liable.
20
306
J. W.
RICH
sources.The sourcesalso reportdifferentfiguresfor the qualificationfor the
first propertyclass; these too are commonlytaken to representthe ratingsin
force at differentperiods. In this section I assess these explanationsfor the
discrepanciesin our sources.84
The accounts which Livy and Dionysius give of the centuriatesystem
ascribedto ServiusTullius agreein all except a few particulars.5Dionysius'
sourcespresumablygavethe propertyratingsin asses,like Livy: Dionysiushas
converted them into minae, making the equation of the denariuswith the
drachmawhich was standardby his day and reckoningat the pre-retariffing
rateof ten assesto the denarius.86
His figuresagreewith those givenby Livy
for the first four propertyclasses,namely 100,000,75,000, 50,000and25,000
asses.Livy gives the ratingof the fifth class as 11,000asses,whereasDionysius
gives it as 121/2minae,i. e. 12,500 asses.
We have no other evidencefor the ratingsof the second, third and fourth
classes.
Polybius in his accountof the Romanarmytells us thatonly thosewho had
propertyto the valueof 400 drachmaeor morewereliablefor militaryservice,
and that only those ratedover 10,000drachmaewore a lonrca.87
Sincethe lonrca
was restrictedto the first classin the Serviansystemas describedby Livy and
Dionysius, the secondfigureis generallytakento be the firstclasscensus.It is
usually supposed that Polybius was reckoningwith the Attic-Alexandrian
drachmaand so equatedthe drachmawith the denarius,and that his figures
relate to the period before the retariffingof the denarius.In that case, the
figurescorrespondto 4,000 and 100,000assesrespectively,and Polybiusis in
agreementwith Livy and Dionysius on the first class, althoughnot on the
fifth88.It is a difficulty of this view that it requiresus to treat Polybius'
apparentlypreciseequationat 11.15.6of 1/2 as with 1/4 obol as an approximation. Some writers, starting from this equation, suppose that Polybius'
8' Discussions of the problems of the property qualifications include: Mommsen, Str. III. 230,
237-8, 248-251; Kubler, RE III. 1521-3; G.W. Botsford, The Roman Assemblies (1909), 84-91;
A. Rosenberg, Untersuchungen zur romischen Zenturienverfassung (1911), 33, 40-3; H. Mattingly, JRS 27 (1937), 99-107; Gabba, ES 3-30; F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on
Polybius I (1957), 176, 698, 706; Toynbee I. 512-5; Brunt, IM 402-5; R. Thomsen in Classica et
Mediaevalia FranciscoBlatt Dedicata (1973), 194-208 (hereafter CMB) and Actes du 8eme congres
internationalde numismatique, 1973 (1976), 377-381 (hereafter Actes); Crawford, RRC621-631;
Nicolet in Devaluations 248-269 (with discussion at 270-2); Marchetti 154-6, 168-198, 262-272.
8 Livy 1.43; D.H. IV.16-18.
86 For the equation of the denarius with the drachma see F. Hultsch, RE V. 1628-9.
Presumably Dionysius reckoned at ten asses to the denarius because he knew that this was the
original ratio. Dionysius' use of this ratio does not constitute evidence that these ratings were in
fact introduced when the as was on the sextantal standard, as is asserted by e. g. Gabba, ES 3 n.2;
Thomsen, CMB 205-6, Actes 377, KST 151; Nicolet, Devaluations 244, 247.
87
VI.19.3, 23.15.
88 For this view see especially Walbank and Thomsen, cited above n.84.
307
drachmawas the equivalent of 12 or 121/2 asses,giving figures for the census
classes of 4,800 or 5,000 and 120,000 or 125,000 asses respectively.89 But it
seems unlikely that Polybius could have expected his readers to understand
without any explicit indication that he was using a weight standard other than
the Attic-Alexandrian.90
Yet another figure for the fifth class appears in Cicero, Gellius and Nonius,
according to whom the proletarii were those whose property was worth no
more than 1,500 asses.91Cicero's statement occurs in a passage of the De
Republica which purports to describe the centuriate system instituted by
Servius Tullius, but, whereas Livy and Dionysius assign 80 centuries to the
first class, he gives it only 70; in this respect his account reflects the centuriate
organization as it was in 129 (the dramatic date of the dialogue) and in his own
day.92Gellius goes on to distinguish the capite censifrom the proletariias those
whose property was worth no more than 375 asses. It is commonly thought
that a mistake has somehow arisen here, and that the capite censi and proletarni
were in fact identical.93
A variant tradition on the first class census is preserved in three sources.
According to Pliny, it was 120,000 asses in Servius Tullius' day. Gellius tells us
that the rating was 125,000 asses and that those who possessed it were called
classici and the rest infra classem. Festus says that the term infra classem
denoted those who had less than 120,000 asses.94 As is generally agreed, the
89
Mattingly, art.cit. n.84, held that Polybius, using the Aeginetan standard, reckoned the
drachma as equivalent to 11/4 denarii. Marchetti 168-198 and in Devaluations 196-200, 211-6
holds that Polybius, using the Rhodian standard, reckoned the drachma at 3/4 denarius and
calculated at the post-retariffing rate of 16 asses to the denarius.
90 Yet another solution is proposed by A. Giovannini, Mus. Helv. 35 (1978), 258-263, who
supposes that Polybius made the following equations: I drachma = I denarius; I obol = 2
(retariffed) asses; 8 obols = 1 denarius. But Polybius cannot have reckoned (or expected his
readers to reckon) with a drachma of other than six obols, as Giovannini's theory requires him to
do (notably at VI.39.12).
91 Cic. Rep. II.40; Gell. XVI. 10.10; Nonius 228 L.
92
In the "reformed" centuriate organization there were two centuries in the first class for each
of the 35 tribes. This arrangement must be subsequent to the creation of the last two tribes in 241;
it is implied by various passages in Livy's account of the Second Punic War (XXIV.7.12;
XXVI.22.2-5; XXVII.6.3), but some writers reject this evidence and date the "reform" to 179 on
the basis of Livy XL.51.9 (notably Nicolet, RHDFE4 39(1961), 341-358). For bibliography on the
problems of the "reform" see R. Develin, Athenaeum 56 (1978), 346-377 (whose solution does not
convince me).
93 See above n.13.
9' Pliny NH XXXIII.43 maximus census CXX assium fuit illo rege, et ideo haec prima classis
(there is no warrant for deriving this statement from Timaeus, contra Crawford, Devaluations
271-2). Festus IOOL 'infra classem' significantur, qui minore summa quam centum et viginti
milium aeris censi sunt. Gell. VI. 13 'classic' dicebantur non omnes, qui in quinque classibus erant,
sedprimae tantum classis homines, qui centum et viginti quinque milia aeris ampliusve censi erant.
'infra classem' autem appellabantur secundae classis ceterarumque omnium classium, qui minore
20-
308
J. W. RICH
discrepancybetween Gellius' figure and that of Pliny and Festus is almost
certainlythe productof a scribalslip. Probablyit is Gelliuswhose figureis in
error.
In the samepassageGelliusgoes on to statethatthe termsclassicusandinfra
classemwere used in Cato's speech in favour of the lex Voconia.This law,
passed in 169, preventedmen owning property above a certainvalue from
institutingwomen as their heirs. We may reasonablyinferfrom Cato as cited
by Gellius that the limit fixed by the law was identicalwith the first class
census.95Gaius'figurefor the Voconianlimit is 100,000asses,the sameas that
given by Livy, Dionysius and Polybius for the first class census.96However,
Dio, reportingexemptionsto the Voconianlaw grantedby Augustusin A.D.
9, statesthe limit as 25,000 drachmae,whichmustmean100,000sestertii, anda
figureof 100,000sestertiifor the limit is also impliedby Pseudo-Asconius.9'
Thus we have to reckonwith three conflictingtraditionson the first class
census and the limit underthe Voconianlaw: 100,000asses(Livy, Dionysius,
Polybius, Gaius), 120,000 (or 125,000) asses (Pliny, Festus, Gellius), and
100,000 sestertii (Dio, Pseudo-Asconius). For the fifth class our sources
preserve four figures: 1,500 asses (Cicero, Gellius, Nonius), 4,000 asses
(Polybius), 11,000 asses (Livy) and 12,500 asses (Dionysius).
We do not know when the Roman citizen body was first divided into
property classes with assessments in asses. Probably this development took
place after the regal period but well before the first Roman coinage, the as
being merely a pound of bronze.98 As most writers have recognized, the first
census ratings must have been much lower than the ratings attributed to
Servius Tullius by Livy and Dionysius. The evidence of Polybius and Gaius
shows that there was a period when the figure given by Livy and Dionysius for
the first class was in force. It is usually supposed that the same is true for their
figures for the intermediate classes and for one of their figures for the fifth
class; on this view, whatever be thought of the rest of the account of the
Servian system reproduced by Livy and Dionysius, the assessments were
anachronisms introduced from a much later period. It has traditionally been
thought that these ratings were introduced when the as was on the sextantal
summa aens, quod supra dixi, censebantur. hoc eo strictim notavi, quoniam in M. Catonis oratione,
qua Voconiam legem suasit, quaeri solet, quid sit 'classicus',quid 'infra classem'. On the original
significance of the distinction between classici and infra classem see most recently Richard 360ff
and Thomsen, KST 167ff.
95 Contra Nicolet, Devaluations 262 n.25. Gellius' words do not, however, warrant the
conclusion that he found the figure he gives for the census rating in Cato: cf. Thomsen, CMB 207,
Actes 378-9.
' Gaius II.274.
97 Dio LVI.10.2 (omitting the word drachmae in accordance with his usual practice); Ps.-Asc.
247 St.
98 Cf. G. Pieri, op cit. n.31, 48-50; Crawford, art. cit n.l.; Richard 386ff.
309
standard.9Of the two figures for the fifth class, most writersaccept Livy's
11,000 asses as historical and dismiss Dionysius' 12,500 asses as a fiction,
obtainedby halvingthe figure for the fourth class.'1'
It is commonlysupposedthat the first classcensuswas at some point raised
from 100,000to 120,000(or 125,000)asses;Crawfordhas recentlyarguedthat
120,000asseswas the earlierrating.The view thatthe figureof 100,000sestertii
representsyet anotherchange in the census goes back to Boeckh and is still
current;other explanationshave also been canvassed.101
Older writerscommonlyheld that the qualificationfor militaryservicewas
at some point reduced from I 1,000 to 4,000 asses, but attempted to account for
the figure of 1,500 assesby denying that the property qualificationwas the
Solutions
same for the fifth classand for liabilityfor the levy and tributum.'02
along these lines are in clearconflictwith the sourcesand must be rejected.'03
In an influentialarticle,first publishedin 1949, Gabbaarguedthat the fifth
class ratingwas reducedtwice, with the resultthat the legions were gradually
"proletarianized."Almost all subsequentwritershave acceptedthis view.'04
Gabba ascribedthe first reduction,from 11,000 to the Polybianfigure of
4,000 assesto the HannibalicWar,and this remainsthe dominantview. Gabba
argued for the date 214; this has also been advocatedby Brunt, but for
9 This view is based partly on an invalid inference from Dionysius' use of the ratio of ten asses
to the denarius (see above n. 86), partly on the (in my judgment correct) belief that the ratings
would be implausibly high if expressed in libral asses.
'00 Some writers (e. g. Nicolet) leave open the possibility that it is Livy's figures rather than
Dionysius' which should be rejected. Toynbee I.512-4 regarded both as historical; in his view the
qualification was reduced from 12,500 to 11,000 asses in the later fifth century. Nicolet supposes
that the common source from which Livy's and Dionysius' accounts of the Servian system derive
was a work of the early second century (see especially art. cit. n. 92; Quad. Accad. Naz. Linc. 221
(1976), 111-148); Gabba thinks that it may belong to the Sullan period (Athenaeum 39 (1961),
98-121; Quad Accad. Naz. Linc. 1976, 149-150). Thomsen, KST 153-6, holds that the common
source may be Piso and that he derived all of his account, except for the attribution of the
arrangements to Servius Tullius and the information about military equipment, from a document
in the censorial archives which set out the arrangements in force in the period between the
introduction of the sextantal as (212/11) and the reform of the centuriate organization, which he
dates (following Nicolet) to 179 (cf. above n.92).
0O1For the view that the census was twice raised see A. Boeckh, Metrologische Untersuchungen
,uber Gewichte, Muinzfuisseund Masse des Altertums (1838), 427ff., and among recent writers
Thomsen, CMB 206-8, Actes 3 78-81, Devaluations 2 70; Nicolet, art. cit. n. 84; Marchetti 262-272.
For Crawford's views see RRC 621-5, 631; Devaluations 271-2. Some older writers (cited by
Steinwenter, RE XII. 2419-20) attempted to explain the discrepancy on the limit fixed by the lex
Voconia in terms of the supposed equation between the libral as and the sestertius; against this
equation see Crawford, RRC 622.
102 E. g. Mommsen, Botsford, Rosenberg, as cited in n.84.
103 The sources give no hint of any such distinctions, and Gell. XVI.10.1 0-l1 is explicit that the
proletarn,
who owned not more than 1,500 asses, were not normally liable for military service. See
Fraccaro, Opuscula 11 (1957), 152 n.1 1; Gabba, ES 6-8.
104 Scepticism
has been expressed by Lazenby,
loc. ct. n.3.
310
J.W.RIcH
differentreasons.'05Some writersdate this reductionin the earlierpartof the
second century.'6
The terminusante quemfor the secondreduction,from4,000to 1,500asses,
is taken to be 129, the dramatic date of the De Republica. Gabba held that it
was introduced in 129 or shortly before, since he took the increase in the
census figures between 131/0 and 125/4 to reflect the reduction in the
qualification; this argument is invalid if, as I have argued above, the census
figures represent not assidui but all adult male citizens.'07 It is generally
supposed that the reduction must have taken place after Polybius wrote Book
VI, probably about 150.108 Brunt thinks that Polybius' figure may have been
out of date at the time he wrote, one of a number of anachronisms which he
suspects in Polybius' account of the Roman army; in his view, the reduction
may have taken place as early as 171.1'9
Two recent advances in our understanding of the numismatic history of the
Roman Republic have important implications for these questions: the
establishment of a firm chronology for the devaluation of the bronze coinage,
and Crawford's demonstration that the sestertiusreplaced the as as the unit of
reckoning about 141.
It is now clear that the earlier part of the Second Punic War saw a
progressive and drastic devaluation of the bronze coinage. Crawford's account
is as follows." 0 At the outbreak of the war the as was still being coined on the
'libral' standard, in fact of ten ounces."' The standard was reduced to six
ounces (semilibral) in 217, but continued to fall in the following years. Stability
was simultaneously restored to both the silver and the bronze coinages in 211
105 Gabba's arguments for this date (ES 12-13) lack cogency. The shortage of rowers which
made it necessary to call on slaves in 214 (Livy XXIV.11. 7-9) could have been the result of factors
other than the enrolling in the legions of men who formerly served in the fleet. There is a good deal
of evidence for light-armed troops in the legions before 211 (see Walbank on Plb. VI.21.7); Livy's
claim (XXVI. 4.4-10) that velites were introduced in 211 may be based merely on a story (of
doubtful value) that in skirmishes at Capua cavalrymen carried velites into battle. On Brunt's
argument see above section II.
106 Nicolet, Devaluations 257, 259 (either during the Second Punic War or in 179); Marchetti
154-6, 262-272 (suggested date 169). See also Crawford, RR 101.
107 See above section II. Gabba's dating for the reduction is accepted by those more recent
writers who take the census figures to represent assidui, cited above n.31.
108 Cf. C.O. Brink and F.W. Walbank, CQ 4 (1954), 97-122; C. Nicolet in Polybe (Fondation
Hardt, Entretiens XX, 1974), 209-265.
'09 IM 604, 625. Rejected by Crawford, RRC 625; Harris 49. For their view that the reduction
took place between ca. 150 and ca. 141 see below.
110 RRC28-35, 43, 595-6, 615-6, 625-8. Crawford marginally revises the account offered by
Thomsen, Early Roman Coinage (1957-1961). For Thomsen's present views (in general agreement
with Crawford) see Devaluations 9-22.
" This weight standard had been in force since the fourth substantive bronze issue (RRC no.
21, dated by Crawford to 269-266).
311
or possibly 212: the denarius was introduced (tariffed at ten asses) and the as
was issued on a weight standard of two ounces (sextantal). It seems unlikely
that this account will be significantly modified by further research."2 Thus by
211 the purchasing power of the as had fallen to about one-fifth of what it had
been at the start of the war.'13
Crawford and Nicolet have recently argued that the qualifications for the
classes remained unchanged in these years in spite of the progressive
devaluation of the as; Nicolet holds that it was the "Servian" ratings of Livy
and Dionysius which were in force."4 This is difficult to accept. Ratings
ranging from 11,000 (or 12,500) to 100,000 "libral" asses are much too high to
be plausible; a reduction in the real value of the census rates to one-fifth of the
earlier level would have had profound social and political consequences which
would surely have been unacceptable to the ruling oligarchy."5 We can
certainly exclude the possibility that the fifth class census stood at the
"Servian" figure (11,000 or 12,500 asses) before the Second Punic War and was
reduced to the Polybian figure of 4,000 asses during the war: this would have
meant a reduction in real value to about seven per cent of the pre-war level!
It seems much more likely that higher ratings were introduced to take
account of the devaluation. Possibly there were two upward revisions of the
ratings, for the censuses of 214 and 209 respectively. The rating of the fifth
class (and perhaps others too) may have been fixed rather below the equivalent
in real terms of the pre-war figure in view of the losses in the war and the
continuing high demand for legionary manpower.
Those who adhere to the traditional view that the "Servian" ratings were
introduced after the as had become sextantal must now accept 211 as the
earliest possible date for their introduction. On this view too it seems most
112
Marchetti believes that the denarius and the sextantal as were introduced in 214 and that the
as was reduced to the uncial standard and retariffed at sixteen to the denarius in 211: RBN 117
(1971), 81-114; Numismatique antique. Problemes et methodes (1975) 75ff.; Devaluations 23-29,
195-209; Hist. icon. et monet. 174-197, 281-352. I am not competent to assess his arguments;
numismatists seem unconvinced (cf. Thomsen, cited n.110). His attempt to reconcile his date for
the uncial standard with his view that the "Servian" ratings were sextantal and remained in force
until 169 is very strained, and his claim that the denarii with the symbol XVI need not be
connected with the retariffing is implausible.
113 Nicolet, Devaluations 258 n.16, 271, is surely wrong to suggest that the devaluation may
not have been fully reflected in prices.
114 Crawford, RRC 627; Nicolet, Devaluations 257-9.
115So Thomsen, Devaluations 270; Nicolet himself expresses misgivings (ib. 271). Both
Crawford and Nicolet seek support in the consular edict of 214 fixing contributions of slaves
according to property (Livy XXIV.11.7-9). But there is no reason to think that the scale
prescribed bore any relation to the ratings of the property classes. The property assessments made
at the census of 220 were used because none had been made since. The phrase aut cuipostea tanta
res esset facta may mean that account was taken of the subsequent devaluation (cf. Marchetti
299-301).
312
J. W. RICH
unlikely that the fifth class census was reducedto the Polybianfigureduring
the Second Punic War. The reductionwould come when the worst of the
manpowerdifficultieswereover, althougha suitablecontextmightbe foundin
207.116 Much more serious, the life of the "Servian"figurefor the first class
census would have been very short. Why should any ancient author have
attributedto ServiusTulliusa rating which was in fact in force for so brief a
period ?117
Thus in the light of what we now know aboutthe numismatichistoryof the
HannibalicWar,it can, in my view, no longerbe maintainedthatthe fifthclass
censuswas reducedfrom the "Servian"to the Polybianfigureduringthe war.
It remainspossibleto supposethatthe "Servian"ratingswereintroducedafter
the as becamesextantaland the fifth class ratingwas reducedto the Polybian
figure at some time in the first half of the secondcentury.However,one may
wonder whether Polybius would in that case have recordedthe new figure
without mentioningthe change.He claimedto be describingthe Romanarmy
as it was in the HannibalicWar,and in some respectshis accountmay reflect
the practiceof even earlierperiods.'18
Crawfordhas shown conclusivelythat the sestertiuswas adoptedby the
Roman state as the official unit of reckoningin place of the as in or shortly
before 141. His suggestion that the retariffingof the denariusat 16 asses
occurredat the same time and as part of the same reformis attractive.119
What happenedto state assessments,which had been previouslyexpressed
in asses,when the sestertiusbecamethe official unit of reckoning?Crawford
holds that for administrativeand politicalconveniencethese assessmentswere
converted into the same number of sestertiiso that their real value was
quadrupled.He also thinksthatto createmoreassiduithe fifth classcensuswas
reduced from 4,000 to 1,500 asses between about 150 and 141. These two
propositions are surely incompatible.If, as Crawfordsupposes, the rating
became 1,500 sestertiiin 141, it was thereby raised substantiallyabove the
Polybian figure. If the Roman governmentwas preparedto quadruplethe
value of the qualification for military service in 141, no concern can have been
felt in that period about the numberof assidui.
116
For the emergency measures relating to manpower taken then in response to Hasdrubal's
approach see above nn. 18-19.
117 Gabba's original account was vulnerable to this objection: on his view the denarius system
was introduced ca. 218, the "Servian" ratings were introduced after that and the fifth class census
was reduced to the Polybian figure in 214.
118 Cf. Brunt, IM 627. Polybius remarks on a change of practice at VI.20.9.
119 RRC 621-5. Cf. Devaluations 21-2n.63 (Thomsen), 149 n.Il (Crawford). H. Zehnacker in
Les devaluations a Rome: epoque romaine et imperiale 2 (Gdansk, 19-21 octobre 1978) (1980),
31-49 argues convincingly from references in Cato Agr. (dismissed as interpolations by Crawford,
RRC 621 n.2) that private use of the sestertius as a unit of reckoning was established before its
adoption by the state.
313
Crawford'stheory about stateassessmentsshouldin my view be rejected.120
So drastican increasein the census valuesseems in principleunlikely.It may
be that the first class census and the limit underthe lex Voconialaterstood at
100,000sesterti4but this could havebeen broughtabouttot by conversionin
141 but by a laterincrease.In any case,this is not the only possibleexplanation
of the evidence.As Nicolet has pointed out, the passageof Pseudo-Asconius
which mentions the figure of 100,000 sestertii is confused, and the writer may
well have converted100,000assesinto sestertiiin error."2'It is not impossible
that a similarmistakelies behind Dio's statementon the Voconianlimit. The
qualificationfor locupletioresliberti laid down in the lex Papia need not be
identical with the first class census.'22The other evidence assembled by
Crawfordfor assessmentsbeing expressedin the same numberof assesand
sestertiican carry no weight.'23It seems to me most likely that, when the
sestertiuswas adoptedas the unit of reckoning,assessmentsformerlyexpressed
in asses were converted into a quarter that number of sestertii so that there
should be no changein their realvalue.'24
Although Crawford'stheory about state assessmentsis unacceptable,his
demonstrationthat the sestertiuswas adoptedas the unit of reckoningabout
141 holds good and must be takeninto accountby those who wish to explain
the traditionsof a fifth class census of 1,500 assesand a first class census of
120,000assesby supposingthat the ratingswere changedat some point in the
second century.
Those who hold that the fifth classwas reducedfromthe Polybianfigureto
1,500 asses must suppose that it stayed at that ratingfor only a short period:
unlessPolybius'figurewas obsoletewhen he wrote, the reductioncannothave
takenplace beforeabout 150; about141,the ratingwould havebeenconverted
into perhaps 375 sestertii. This hypothesis seems to me unattractive: it is hard
to see why a figure which was in force for perhapsless than a decadein the
120 So Nicolet, Devaluations260-4 and Thomsen, ib.
270; not in my view effectively rebutted
by Crawford, ib. 271-2,
121 Nicolet, Devaluations 263, showing that the writer has
misunderstood Cicero's neque
census erat. The source from which he took his information on the lex Voconiamay have stated the
limit simply as centum milia without specifying the unit of reckoning (as Pseudo-Asconius himself
did the second time he mentioned the figure).
122
Gaius III.42; Just. Inst. 111.7.2.
123 There was no need in 141 to convert the
penalty of 25 asses for iniuria specified in XII Tab.
8.4, since it was no longer effective law; 25 sestertii in Paulus, Coll. Mos. Rom. II.5.5 can only be a
jurist's error. I do not understand the relevance of Crawford's speculations on the "basic daily
wage" since on his view it was only state assessments, not state payments, which were converted to
the same number of sestertii. It is natural that nominal assessments should be fixed at I x the unit of
currency.
124 Zehnacker, art. cit. n.1 19, holds that for reasons of conservatism the census ratings
continued to be expressed in asses. This seems unlikely in view of the use of the sestertius for the
equestrian census, on which see the remarks of Nicolet, Devaluations 264-7.
314
J. W. RICH
middle of the second centuryand was alreadyobsolete by 129, the dramatic
date of the De Republica,should have been ascribedby Cicero to Servius
Tulliusor should have been the ratingcited by Gellius and Nonius.
Gaius' statementon the limit fixed by the lex Voconia,takenwith Gellius'
citationof Cato'sspeechon the law, permitsus, in my view, to concludewith
reasonableconfidencethat, when the law was passed in 169, the first class
census was 100,000asses.It seems to me perverseto maintainthat, in spite of
the Gelliuspassage,the Voconianlimit may not havebeenthe sameas the first
class census,125or that Gaius' figure may not be the limit specified in the
originallaw.'26Those who supposethat the firstclasscensuswas 120,000asses
at some time in the second century must, I think, choose between two
hypotheses. They may suppose that the census was raisedfrom 100,000to
120,000assesat some point afterthe passingof the lex Voconiain 169,127and
convertedinto perhaps30,000 sestertiiabout 141. Holders of this view who
cannotacceptthat Polybius'figurewas no longerin forcewhen he wrote must
date the introduction of the 120,000 asses rating after about 150; this
hypothesisis vulnerableto the objectionthat the life of the ratingwould have
been very short.The alternativeis to supposethatthe censuswas reducedfrom
120,000to 100,000assesbefore 169 and convertedinto perhaps25,000sestertii
about 141. On this view, Polybius failed to remarkthat the ratehad recently
been changed.
The main way in which recent writershave attemptedto accountfor the
variousfiguresgiven by our sourcesfor the census ratesof the first andfifth
classes is to suppose that the figures representrates which were in force at
differentperiods. I have arguedthat the fifth class census cannot have been
reducedfrom the figureof Livy or Dionysius to that of Polybius duringthe
HannibalicWarand that some of the hypothesesaccordingto which the rates
of these two classeswere changedduringthe secondcenturyareless attractive
than has been supposed.It remainspossible that some of the discrepanciesin
our sources may have arisen in this way. Another hypothesis of this type
which might perhapsbe worth consideringis that the fifth class censuswas
1,500 asses at the time of the "libral"as and was increasedto the Polybian
figureduringthe HannibalicWarto take accountof the devaluationof the as.
There are other ways in which the discrepanciesmay have come about.
Error,eitherby ancientauthorsor by scribes,may accountfor some of them.
125
See above n.95.
So Marchetti 268 n.50 (absurd) and Crawford, RRC631. Crawford supposes that both the
census and the Voconian limit were reduced from 120,000 to 100,000 asses between 169-8 and ca.
150, but it seems unlikely that Gaius would have cited a figure which was not that of the original
law and was in force for so brief a period. The 30,000 sestertii of Livy XLV.15.2 need bear no
relation to the first class census.
127 So Thomsen, cited n.101.
126
315
It has long been recognizedthat the disagreementbetweenthe 120,000assesof
Festus and Pliny and the 125,000assesof Gellius is probablythe productof
scribal error. As I have suggested above, misunderstandingby Dio and
Pseudo-Asconius may have been responsible for their figure of 100,000
sestertii.It may be that the figure which the common source of Livy and
Dionysius gave for the fifth classwas 12,500assesand that Livy's 11,000asses
is a scribalerror.Misunderstandings
or scribalerrorsmay lie behindsome of
the other figures- possibly even Polybius' figurefor the fifth class.
The antiquarianor annalistfrom whom the accountsof the Serviansystem
in Livy and Dionysius deriveassignedto the first class a ratingwhich was in
force in a later historicalperiod (which may or may not have been the time
when he himselfwrote). We cannottake it for grantedthathe did the samefor
his figuresfor the otherclasses:it is worth notingthat,if his figurefor the fifth
classwas 12,500asses,all four figuresaresuspiciouslyneatfractionsof the first
class rating.
Our three sourceswhich speakof a first classcensusof 120,000or 125,000
assesare all concernedwith early Rome: Pliny says that this was the ratingin
the time of ServiusTullius,while Gelliusand Festusmentionit in conncetion
with the archaic distinction between classici and infra classem. They may well
deriveultimatelyfrom a commonsource,perhapsan antiquarianwho gavean
account of the Serviansystem significantlydifferentfrom that of Livy and
Dionysius. We have no warrantfor assumingthat the figurefor the first class
census given by this tradition was, like that of Livy and Dionysius, a
retrojectionof a ratingactuallyin force in a later period. That is a possible
explanation,but others are no less likely: the figure could have been the
productof antiquarianspeculationor sheer invention.
Cicero attributedthe figureof 1,500assesfor the fifth classcensusto Servius
Tullius,while the other sourceswho mentionthis rating,Gelliusand Nonius,
give no indicationof when it was in force. It may well be that this figuretoo
derivesfrom an antiquarianwriterand was neveractuallyin force.'28
On the first class census it seems to me not unreasonableto hazard a
hypothesis.The most economicalsolutionis to supposethatthe variantfigures
are the productof erroror invention,and that the censuswas fixed at 100,000
assesin or soon after211, when the as becamesextantal,and remainedat that
rate until 141, when it was convertedinto probably25,000 sestertii.On the
remainingclasses my conclusion is negative.For the intermediateclasseswe
haveonly the doubtfulevidenceof Livy andDionysius,while for the fifth class
the discrepanciesof our evidenceseem to me intractable.In my view, the only
128 It is true that the figure given for the number of centuries in the first class in Cicero's
account is one which was in force in later times, but it does not follow that this was the case also
for his figure for the fifth class census.
316
J. W. RICH
prudentcourse is to acceptthat speculationabout the historyof these census
ratingsis fruitlessand to admitour ignorance.
The view that the propertyqualificationfor militaryservicewas progressively reducedderivesmuchof its plausibilityfromthe factthatit fits well with
receiveddoctrineon Romanmanpower:manpowerresourceswere evidently
understrainin the HannibalicWarandon the usualview a shortageof assidui
developedduringthe secondcentury.It would thus smackof circularityto use
the supposed second century reduction in the property qualificationas
evidencefor the shortageof assidui.I have arguedin this sectionthatthereare
no good groundsfor advancingeitherthis or any other hypothesisaboutthe
level of the property qualification.If that is correct, the evidence of the
propertyqualificationcan provideno supportfor the doctrinethattherewas a
shortageof assidulin the later second century.
VI. The Levy beforeMarius
If the Romangovernmentwas facedby a seriousshortageof recruitsin the
later second century, one might expect that it would have avoided all
unnecessarymilitarycommitments.But the Romansundertooka numberof
wars in this period in areaswhere armieswere not normallystationed,and
some at least of these wars could readilyhave been avoided.129
A varietyof evidencerelatingto the levy has been taken as supportingthe
view that a shortageof assiduidevelopedin this period.In this sectionI seekto
show that these claimsare without substance.
(i) Popularattitudesto the levy. It is often saidthat men becamelesswilling
to serve in the legions in the courseof the secondcenturyand thatone of the
reasons for this was that, as the numberof assiduideclined,the burdenon
those who remainedbecameheavier.In fact, it is by no meansclearthat men
becamegenerallyless willing to serve.130
Livy's silence shows that there was no seriousmanifestationof unwillingness to be conscriptedfrom men normallyliable to serve in the first thirty
years of the century.Disputes over the levy took placein 193 and 191, but in
both cases they concernedparticulargroupswith a claimfor exemption."3'
129
130
Cf. Harris 245-9.
On popular attitudes to the levy in the second century see especially Smith 5-8; L. R.
Taylor, JRS 52 (1962), 20-2, 26; Toynbee II.92-100; Astin, Scpio 167-172; Brunt, IM 396-402,
404-5; Harris 46-50; Shochat 55-60. Harris effectively questions the assumption of earlier writers
that throughout the century most conscripts served reluctantly; he supposes that in the earlierpart
of the century citizens were generally willing to serve, but that by the middle of the century their
willingness was becoming much more selective. Shochat supposes that citizens did become
generally unwilling to serve, although there was no shortage of qualified men; he exaggerates the
weakness of the senate's response. I discuss the special problem of the recall of veterans below
(sub-section (iii)).
131 Livy XXXIV. 56-9, XXXVI. 3.4-6; see Harris 48 n.2.
317
Service in the war against Perseus seemed attractive when it began in 171:
men remembered the gains that had been made by those who fought against
Philip and Antiochus.'32 By 169 no progress had been made in the war. The
consuls reported that they were having difficulty in completing the levy
because men were not answering to their names, but two praetors claimed that
the consuls were seeking to avoid unpopularity by not enlisting those who
were reluctant to serve; the levy was transferred to the praetors who
completed it successfully after the promulgation of a censorial edict.'33
In 149 there was general eagerness to enlist for the war against Carthage in
the expectation of easy victory and rich booty.'34 By contrast, the protracted,
hard and unrewarding wars fought in Spain from 154 to 133 evoked much
discontent.'35 The first instance occurred in 151. Polybius tells us that, because
of unattractive reports of the recent fighting, "a sort of extraordinary panic
overtook the young men, such as the older men said had never happened
before," and they sought to evade service both as officers and in the ranks. The
tribunes disputed with the consuls over exemptions and took the unprecedented step of throwing the consuls into prison. At least one concession was
made: the ballot was used for the first time in the levy, evidently to decide
which of the recruits should serve in the Spanish legions and which should
enjoy brief and safe service in Italy.'36Two obscure episodes in 140 may reflect
resentment at the Spanish levy: Ap. Claudius Pulcher obtained a decree of the
senate that there should not be more than one levy in the year and a tribune
sought unsuccessfully to impede the departure of the consul Q. Servilius
Caepio for Further Spain.'37 Further incidents occurred at the levy of 138,
when troops were presumably being raised for the consul D. lunius Brutus to
take to Further Spain. The new recruits were taught an exemplary lesson: one
or more deserters from the Spanish army were flogged and sold into slavery
before their eyes.'38 Once again the tribunes pressed claims for exemption and
threw the consuls into prison.139It is true that some Romans went to Spain
132
133
134
Livy XLII. 32.6.
Livy XLIII. 14.2-6,15.1.
App. Lib. 75.
135 On the character of the fighting see especially Plb. XXXV.1, 4.2. Lack of booty: App. Iber.
54; Pliny NH. XXXIII. 141; but see Brunt, IM 396 n.2.
136
Plb. XXXV.4; App. Iber. 49; Livy Per. XLVIII; Oros. IV.21.1; Val. Max. 111.2.6.Polybius'
claim that it was Scipio Aemilianus' offer to serve which brought men to their senses evidently
exaggerates the effect of his gesture. Livy seems to have combined Polybius' account with that of
an annalist. The episode is well discussed by Astin, Sczpio42-6.
137 Livy Oxy. Per. LIV. This account of Claudius' action depends on the restoration of the
word delectus; its significance is discussed by Astin, Scipio 144. The suggestion of Harris 49 n.5
that the levy Claudius prevented may have been for Sicily, not Spain, requires too early a date for
the outbreak of the Sicilian slave revolt.
138 Livy Per. LV; Ps.-Frontin. Strat. IV.1.20.
139 Cic. Leg. III.20; Livy Per. and Oxy. Per. LV.
318
J. W. RICH
with Scipio as volunteersin 134, but these were all clients or friendsof the
commander.140
We hear of no resistanceto the levy in the remainingyears of the second
centuryafterthe wars in Spainended.
It is clearthat in the secondcenturythe attitudeof the assiduitowardsa levy
varied considerablyaccordingto the characterof the war for which it was
being held. It may be that the mid-century wars in Spain provoked
unprecedentedresistanceto the levy simply becausenone of Rome's earlier
wars overseashad seemedso unattractive.
If it were true that the assiduibecamegenerallyless willing to serve in the
legions in the course of the century,it would not necessarilyfollow that the
reason was a decline in their number.Many differentfactorscould help to
bring about such a change.
Plutarchis the only ancientauthorto assertthattherewas a declinein men's
willingness to serve. He links the developmentto the dispossessionof the
peasantry,but says nothing of a drop in the numberof assidui;accordingto
him it was the dispossessedpeasantrywho no longerreadilycameforwardfor
service."4'If the argumentadvancedin section III aboveis correct,Plutarch's
explanationis not to be dismissedout of hand:many of the dispossessedmay
Still have ranked as assidui.It would not be surprisingif those whom
conscriptionhad helped to ruin lost their relishfor fightingRome'swars. It
could also be that familieswho were mainly dependenton wage labourfor
their subsistencecould less readilysparea manfor prolongedmilitaryservice
than those who lived off the produceof their own smallholding.'42
(ii) C. Gracchus'lexmilitaris.One of C. Gracchus'lawswas concernedwith
Plutarchtellsus of two of
amelioratingthe conditionsof servicein the army.143
its provisions:clothingwas to be suppliedfreeof charge,andno one was to be
conscriptedbelow the age of seventeen.Others may be conjectured:some
other deductions from pay may have been stopped, and the number of
stipendiamen were liable to servewas probablyreduced."'
140 Appian, cited above n.69. According to Plutarch, many men wished to go, but he is wrong
to say that the senate prohibited men from going as volunteers (above, nn. 70-1).
141
TG 8.3, cited above n.65.
142 On the underutilization of manpower on peasant holdings see Hopkins 24-5; Crawford,
RR 102-3; Rathbone, JRS 1981, 15, 19, 22. On the comparative attractions of work as a
mercennarius and military service see the judicious remarks of Brunt, IM 411-412.
141 Plut. CG 5.1; Diod. XXXIV/XXXV. 25.1. Plutarch's clear implication that Gracchus
passed just one law on military matters is to be preferred to Diodorus' vague reference to v6LO L
(contra G. Bloch and J. Carcopino, Histoire romaine II (1935), 245; Gabba, ES 15-16).
144 Gracchus may have retained the charge for replacement weapons and armour (for which see
above n.1) to ensure proper care of arms. If he did remove it, it was later restored, as were
deductions for clothing: Tac. Ann. I.17.6; G. R. Watson, The RornanSoldier(1969), 103-4. On the
legitima stipendia see below sub-section (iii).
319
The prohibition on the conscription of those under seventeen merely
reassertedthe existing state of the law.145It is commonly said that Gracchus
must have included this provision because there had been recent cases of
personsbelow the minimumage being conscripted,andthatthis is evidenceof
a shortageof qualifiedrecruits,since, as Astin puts it, "armiesdo not enlist
This is not plausible.Personsnot normally
boys when they can find men".146
liable to serve could be conscriptedby a decree of the senate, but it seems
unlikelythat the senatewould have sought to alleviatea shortageof assiduiby
authorizingthe conscriptionof assiduiunderthe age of seventeen.Sucha step
would simply have made the plight of the unfortunateassidui yet more
wretched;the naturalway to achieve a marginalalleviationof a shortageof
assiduiwould have been to reduce the propertyqualification.Commanders
who conscriptedmen not liableto servewithout the senate'sauthorityranthe
risk of an appealto the tribunes;147 they would in any case be more likely to
choose adultproletarii,who on this hypothesiswere numerous,than assidui
underseventeen.
It would be in keepingwith Romanlegislativepracticeif Gracchus'military
law did not merely prescribechanges from existing procedureand reassert
rulesby which Gracchusset specialstore, but gavea comprehensivestatement
of whatwas henceforthto be the law on the conditionsof militaryservice.148In
that case many of its provisionswould simply be tralaticianreenactmentsof
the existing state of the law (which had presumablyrested up till now on
custom rather than statute). I suggest that, while the other known or
conjecturedprovisions of Gracchus'law were changes, the prohibitionon
conscriptionunderseventeenwas tralatician.'49
(iii) The laws reducingthe 'legitimastipendia.'Plutarchtells us that Ti.
Gracchusannounceda numberof legislativeproposalswhen he was seeking
reelection,one of which was for the reductionof the periodof militaryservice,
145
146
Above, n.9.
Astin, Scipio 172; cf. Smith 8 and Brunt, IM405. Shochat 54 holds that youths had been
recruited because there was a shortage of qualified men who were willing to serve; this seems most
unlikely.
147 Cf. the incidents reported in Livy XXVIII.38.3-5; XXXIV.56.9-11; XXXVI.3.4-6. For the
senate authorizing the conscription of men not normally liable for the levy see Livy XXV.5.6-8;
XL.26.7; XLII.31.4, 33.4.Brunt, IM405-6, is right that such men could be conscripted without
legislation (thus in 212 the senate authorized the conscription of boys under seventeen, but it was
deemed necessary to pass a law ". . . uis perinde stipendia procederent, ac si septem decem
annorum aut maiores milites facti essent": Livy XXV.5.6-8), but he overlooks the role of the
senate.
148 The repetundae laws provide a good illustration of this legislative method. See especially
Cic. Rab. Post. 9.
149 The two provisions which Plutarch records may have been selected more or less at random
from a more comprehensive account by Plutarch or an intermediary.
320
J. W.
RICH
but whether Gracchusactually made these proposals is much disputed."50
Ciceroin the Pro Corneliomentioneda senatusconsultum
of 109callingfor the
abrogationof quae legesremmilitaremimpedirent;Asconius,commentingon
the passage,says that the consul M. Iunius Silanuscarriedthe abrogationof
severalrecent laws quibusmilitiaestipendia
It is thusclearthat
minuebantur."5'
between 133 and 109 two or more laws were passed,presumablyby popularis
tribunes,reducingthe numberof yearsfor which citizenswere liableto serve;
one of these may have been C. Gracchus'lex militaris.The occasionfor the
repeal of these laws was probably, as Asconius seems to imply, the
reappearanceof the Cimbri,againstwhom Silanuswas sent; the new effortin
the war againstJugurthamay have been anotherfactor.'52
It is usuallysaid that the laws reducingthe legitimastipendiawerepassedin
responseto the growing distastefor militaryserviceand repealedbecauseit
would otherwisehave been difficultto find enough qualifiedrecruitsfor the
force to be raised in 109, which probably numberedabout 10,000.153
This
interpretationis in my view mistaken.
What was in questionwas the total periodof servicewhich a manmightbe
calledupon to performduringhis lifetime;beforethe reductions,this hadbeen
sixteen years.'54 Very few men in the second century can have served
continuouslyfor periodsas long as this.The menwho would benefitfromthis
legislation would be veterans,who would either be protected from recall
altogetheror, if recalled,entitledto an earlierdischarge.
The recallof veteranshad been a causeof contentioneversincelong periods
of service became common.'55Commandersnaturally tended to prefer
experiencedsoldiersto tiros. No doubt some veteranswerehappyto returnto
the standards,and, as we haveseen,thereweresomewarsin whichservicewas
especiallyattractive.156
However, recallcould be bitterlyresented.In 200 the
senateruledthat only volunteerscould be takenfrom Scipio'sveteransfor the
war againstPhilip,but 2,000 men mutiniedin 199,claimingthatthey hadbeen
'5 Plut. TG. 16.1; cf. Dio fr. 83.7. For a recent defence of the authenticity of these proposals
see Bernstein, TSG 215-219; see also Shochat 85-6.
151 Asc. 68 C.
152
Metellus' preparations against Jugurtha: Sall. BJ 43.3-4. We do not know whether
deductions for clothing were restored now or later (see above n.144).
153
E. g. Gabba, ES 33; Smith 9; Brunt, IM407; Harris 46, 50. Shochat 65 holds that the laws
were repealed because of "the reluctance of the populace to join the army and the desire to raise
the standard of the soldiers."
'54 Above n.10.
55 On this question see especially Smith 5-7; Astin, Scipio 169-170.
" Those who protested in 171 (Livy XLII.32.6ff) were complaining not at being recalled but
at the loss of their rank. Some enthusiastic soldiers may have achieved records almost as impressive
as that with which Livy credits Sp. Ligustinus (XLII.34). I cannot share the confidence in the
details of Ligustinus' story evinced by G. Perotti, CISA II (1974), 83-96.
321
As might be expected,
enrolledagainsttheir will despitethe senate'sruling.157
reluctanceto reenlistwas particularlyevidentat the time of the Spanishwarsof
the mid-century,servicein which was so much disliked.Q. FabiusMaximus
Aemilianustook out an armyof rawrecruitsto FurtherSpainin orderto spare
the veteransof recentwars, and the armywhich was sent to Q. Pompeiusin
Nearer Spain in 140 was similarly composed.158Astin has plausibly suggested
that the exemptions which were being claimed by tribunes in 151 and 138 were
for veterans who had already served long periods.'59
The laws reducing the legitima stipendia were passed, in my view, because in
the Gracchan age tribunes were ready to address themselves to the longstanding problem of the recall of veterans, to which the recent Spanish wars had
given a new prominence. The laws would have had the effect of making it more
difficult for commanders to stiffen new levies with seasoned troops. It was
surely for this reason that the senate recommended their abrogation.t60
(iv) The ratio of allied to Roman troops. Brunt has argued that towards the
end of the second century the Roman government increased the proportion of
troops supplied by the Italian allies to compensate for the decline in the
number of citizen assidUi.161
Polybius tells us that the allies supplied the same number of foot as the
citizens, but three times as many cavalry; he implies that these ratios were in
force both in the Hannibalic War and in his own day.'62This generalization is
not borne out by the detailed evidence supplied by Livy. The ratio varied from
period to period, and within the same period between different armies and
different years. The allied cavalry was normally much less numerous than
157 Livy XXXI.8.6, 14.2; XXXII.3.2-7. 3,000 Scipionic veterans were enrolled as volunteers by
Flamininus in 198 (Livy XXXII.9.1; Plut. Fl. 3.1) and 5,000 (including allies) by L. Scipio in 190
(Livy XXXVII.4.3; Brunt, IM 395 n.1, is wrong to link this passage with XXXVII.2.3).
158 App. Iber. 65, 78.
"9 Astin, Scipio 170. Our optimate sources present them in a less favourable light: Plb.
XXXV.4.6 with Walbank's note; Livy Per. XLVIII (pro amicis suis).
160 We may compare the senate's decree of 171 empowering the consul who obtained the
province Macedonia to enrol veterans (Livy XLII.31.4, 32.6, 34.4). How the assembly's agreement
was secured in 109 we can only guess. Perhaps men were persuaded that the national interest
required the abrogation; possibly veterans were poorly represented at the meeting (dominated by
city-dwellers ?).
161 IM404, 684-6; cf. Crawford, RR 101, 129-130. Gabba had already suggested (ES 33, 70-1)
that there was a tendency in the later second century to spare citizen manpower at the expense of
the allies, but, as Brunt remarks (IM 686 n.1), "the texts he cites show only that allied contingents
remained an indispensable part of the Roman army." Shochat 89-93 accepts that the proportion of
allies was increased; in his view this was a response to the reluctance of Roman citizens to serve. It
cannot be shown that (at any rate after the end of the Spanish Wars in 133) there was such marked
and general unwillingness to serve among the citizens as he supposes, and it seems to me unlikely
that the senate would have condoned such reluctance in this or the other ways which he suggests.
162
Plb. I11.107.12, VI.26.7., 30.2.
21
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J. W.
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Polybius says. At the start of the Hannibalic War it was probably normal for
the allies to furnish significantly more infantry than the citizens, but, when
many allies revolted in the course of the war, the proportion of allied foot must
have declined, perhaps to something approaching parity.'63From 200 to c. 179
the ratio of allied to citizen foot ranged between 3:2 and 2 :1; there is some
evidence to suggest that in the 190's especially high demands were made on
allies who had been disloyal. In the 170's the proportion of allied foot dropped
nearly to parity.'" After 168, when Livy fails us, we do not have enough
evidence to tell whether Rome kept her demands as moderate as in the 170's.165
Velleius says that the allies were justified in taking up arms in 91 to get the
citizenship, since in every year and in every war the allies furnished twice as
many foot and horse as the citizens.166It would have been natural for the
Italians to exaggerate their services as passions became inflamed, but Brunt
argues that such evidence as there is for the last years of the second century
suggests that by then Velleius' claim may not have been wide of the mark.'67
Orosius (doubtless following Livy) tells us that in 110 A. Postumius was in
command of an army of 40,000 in Numidia.168 Postumius is unlikely to have
had more than two legions, i. e. 11,000 foot and horse. Brunt supposes that the
regular allied contingents were twice as numerous and that the balance was
supplied by allies not serving ex formula togatorum.'69 There are other
possibilities: the number of allies not in the formula might be greater, or
Orosius' figure erroneous.
Valerius Antias said that at Arausio in 105 the Romans lost 80,000 soldiers
and 40,000 campfollowers and only ten men survived to tell the tale.'70
Diodorus gives the more moderate figure of 60,000 for the Roman losses.'7'
There were probably four legions in the Roman force. Brunt takes Diodorus'
figure to imply an allied contingent about twice as large as the citizen. But
Brunt, IM 677-681; cf. V. Ilari, Gli Italici nelle strutture militari romane (1974), 154-9.
Afzelius, op. cit. n.29, 62-79; Brunt, IM681-4; cf. lhari,op. cit. 158-166. I suspect (cf. n.27
above) that there may be more inaccuracies in Livy's information than these writers allow, but not
so much as to cast doubt on the overall trends implied by his figures.
165 Brunt, IM684, infers from Paus. VII.16.1 and App. Ill. 10 that a ratio near parity obtained
in the armies fielded in Achaea in 146 and in Illyricum in 135.
'66 Vell. II.15.2.
167 Loc. cit. n.16. Brunt also suggests that Appian's statement (Hann. 8) that in the Hannibalic
War the allies had to furnish twice as many men as the citizens is an anachronistic application of
the later ratio to the Hannibalic War. Ilari, op. cit. 166-171, holds that the proportion of allies
remained slightly above parity from 179 to 91.
168 Oros. V.15.6.
169 Postumius' force included Ligurians and Thracians: Sall. BJ38.6.
170 Livy Per. LXVII; Oros. V.16.3-4.
171
Diod. XXXVI.1, presumably following Posidonius. Diodorus' use of the words btiXExTot
and Xoy&be&in this passage is puzzling; he certainly cannot intend a distinction between citizens
and allies, as the Loeb editor, F. R. Walton, supposes.
163
'64
323
Diodorus may have included allies not in the formula and he too may have
exaggerated the Roman losses.172
Diodorus says that the force which L. Lucullustook againstthe Sicilian
This should presumably
slaves in 103 included14,000Romansand Italians.'73
be reckonedas a legion of 5,500 and 8,500 allies, a ratio of 17:11.
Sulla said that Catulushad 20,300 men and Marius32,000 at the battleof
Vercellae.'74It is hard to resist the conclusion that the ratio of allies exformula
togatorum to citizens in this force must have been well below 2:1. Brunt's
suggestion that exclusively allied troops had been detached to garrison the
towns of northern Italy looks like special pleading, and he overlooks the
possibility that the figures may have included allies not in the formula.
The case for the view that at the end of the second century the ratio of allied
to Roman troops was normally 2:1 does not seem to be strong. Even if it were
correct, it would not follow that the proportion of allies had been raised to
compensate for a decline in the number of citizen assidui. As we have seen, the
proportion had been not far short of 2 :1 in the first two decades of the century.
We do not know why the proportion dropped nearly to parity in the 170's or
how long it remained so low.
VII. Mariusand the Levy
It used to be widely held that Marius transformed the Roman legions from a
force raised by conscription from men of property into one composed of
volunteer professionals, most of whom were penniless. A number of more
recent writers notably Gabba, Smith and Brunt, have pointed out various
defects in this thesis: the property qualification was so low that many of those
who served before Marius must have been very poor; there was no sudden
change in the length of service; conscription continued to be extensively used,
and assidui still served. However, although these writers seek to minimize the
significance of Marius' enrolment of capite censi they still suppose that Marius
brought about a lasting change. Marius' action, in their view, was a response to
the shortage of assidui; later commanders followed his example and the
artificial crisis of manpower which had been brought about by the maintenance of the property qualification was thus resolved.'75
In this section I assess this interpretation of Marius' enrolment of capite
censi I shall argue, first, that Marius' action can be accounted for without
supposing that there was a shortage of assidui, and, secondly, that it was an
172
173
174
On the unreliability of the casualty figures given even by good sources see Brunt, IM694-7.
Diod. XXXVI.8.1.
Plut. Mar.25.4.
175
Gabba, ES30-56; Smith 9-10; 27ff; Brunt, IM406-413. For a more traditional view of the
significance of Marius' action and references to earlier literature see J. Harmand, L'armeeet le
soldat a Rome de 107 a 50 avant notreere (1967), 11-20.
21*
324
J. W.
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isolatedincidentand that it was laterand in quite differentcircumstancesthat
the propertyqualificationfor militaryserviceceasedto be observed.
Sallustputs Marius'enrolmentof capitecensiin his first consulshipin 107
before his departurefor the war against Jugurtha.Plutarch, Florus and
Exuperantiusagree,but a varianttraditiondatingthe episodeto the Cimbric
Scholars
Waroccurs in Pseudo-Quintilianand Gellius notes both versions.176
have surely been rightto preferSallust'sdating;the CimbricWarversionwas
perhapsthe invention of a pro-Marianwriter seeking to representMarius'
action as a necessaryexpedientin a time of nationalcrisis.177
for the legions
The senatehad empoweredMariusto raisea supplementum
alreadyin Numidia.'78Disregardingthe customaryproceduresof the levy,
Mariusassembleda forceentirelyfromvolunteers;he did not debarthosewho
lackedthe propertyqualificationand the majorityof those he took in fact did
not possess it. 79 The breachof conventioninvolved in enlistingunqualified
men evoked much disapproval,but, since none of them had been enrolled
againsttheirwill, no sanctionscould be taken.Mariustook morementhanthe
senate had decreed,'80but even so the numbersinvolved were not large. At
most, the numberdecreedmay have been about 3,000, the numberenlisted
about 5,000.181
Sallustrecordstwo explanationsfor Marius'enrolmentof capitecensi.One
is favourableto Marius:he acted in this way becauseof a "shortageof good
men" (inopiabonorum).The other is unfavourable:recruitsof this type most
suited the purpose of a man seeking potentia.'82 The second explanation
appealedmore to Sallust'sown preconceptions,as the space he devotedto it
176 Sall. BJ86.2-4; Plut. Mar. 9.1; Val. Max. 11.3.1; Ps.-Quint. Decd. 111.5; Gell. XVI.10.14;
Flor. I.36.13; Exup. 2; Lyd. de mag. 1.48.
177
Gabba, ES 31-2.
178
Sall. BJ 84.3, quoted below.
179
Sall. BJ 86.2 ipse interea milites seribere, non more maiorum neque ex classibus, sed uti
cuiusque lubido erat, capite censos plerosque. Volunteer armies had been raised by Scipio
Aemilianus in 134 and perhaps by Scipio Africanus in 205, but they had not been authorized to
hold a dilectus (above section IV and n.71). For the enrolment of men lacking the property
qualification as a breach of convention see also the other sources cited in n.176. Plutarch may be
although
right that it broke not just convention but the law (3aMx T6v v6Otov xai ThV aouvr?Lav):
the property qualification had no doubt rested on custom rather than statute up to C. Gracchus'
day, it was probably reasserted in his lex militans, if the view of that law for which I argued above
(section VI (ii)) is correct. On Brunt's view that Marius was entitled to enlist unqualified men by
virtue of his discretionary imperium see above n.147. I do not understand why R. Mariano, Labeo
26 (1980), 354-364, supposes that the senate authorized Marius' action.
180
Sall. BJ 86.4 cum aliquanto maiore numero quam decretum erat.
181 Cf. Brunt, IM 430.
182
Sall. BJ 86.3 idfactum alii inopia bonorum, alii per ambitonem consulis memorabant, quod
ab eo genere celebratus auctusque erat, et homini potentiam quaerenti egentissumus quisque
opportunissumus,cui neque sua cara, quippe quae nulla sunt, et omnia cum pretio honesta videntur.
325
betrays, but it is certainly wrong: it was twenty years later and with Sulla's
examplebeforehim that Mariussoughtto dominatethe stateby forceof arms.
Some of the other sources offer another explanation:Mariusenrolled men
from the humblestclasses becausehe himself was a "new man."'83It seems
most likely that this was a laterhistorian'sfancy.184
Most modern historiansexplain Marius'action in terms of the supposed
shortageof assidui.Althoughthe force which Mariusneededwas so small,he
would, it is supposed,have had difficultyin findingenoughassidui,or at any
rateenough assiduiwho were willing to serve.To avoid losing popularityby
conscriptingmen againsttheir will, he took unqualifiedvolunteers.'85
At first sight Sallustprovidesimpressivesupportfor this view, since one of
the two explanationswhich he cites is that therewas a shortageof good men,
which must mean, in this context,qualifiedmen.'86But the credentialsof this
explanationmay be no betterthanthose of the otherexplanationwhich Sallust
cites: both show evidentbias,andmay well be laterinventions.'87
It is unlikely
that Mariusor his sympathizersattributedhis action at the time to inopia
bonorum,for Mariuswould hardlyhave concededthat his recruitswere not
boni.
The view that Mariusdisregardedthe property qualificationin order to
avoid unpopularityimplies that there was a great differencein the attitudes
towards service under Marius held by those who possessed the property
qualificationand those who did not. A passageearlierin Sallust'snarrative
suggests that this was not the case: (senatus)supplementumetiam laetus
decreverat,quia nequeplebi militiavolentiputabaturet Mariusaut belli usum
183
So Valerius Maximus and Florus, cited above n.176, probably following Livy.
M. Sordi, Athenaeum 50 (1972), 379-385, holds that the explanation derives from Marius
himself. Against this suggestion see Gabba, Athenaeum 51 (1973), 135-6.
18 See especially Gabba, ES 33ff; Brunt, IM 407.
186 Both explanations presuppose the doctrine that only property owners could make
trustworthy soldiers. The doctrine (which also appears in the accounts of Plutarch, Valerius
Maximus, Gellius and Exuperantius) ignored the fact that the property qualification was very low.
Pseudo-Quintilian represents Marius as rejecting the doctrine: cum scires non ex censu esse
virtutem, praeterita facultatium contemplatione vires animosque tantum spectasti; cf. the use of
bonus in Marius' speech, Sall. BJ 85.5, 48.9. On the usage of bonus in Sallust see U. Paananen,
Sallust's Politico-Social Terminology (1972), 59-64. The rejection of this interpretation of inopia
bonorum by Shochat 62-3 is perverse: Sallust clearly implies that the capite censi enrolled by
Marius were not boni.
187 Sallust's memorabant can hardly be pressed as evidence that the explanations were current
at the time: Gabba, ES 33-4, 41-3 and Brunt, IM406-7 hold that the view that Marius enrolled the
capite censi as a means to potentia cannot be contemporary, but their arguments are not
conclusive: the doctrine that the loyalty of men without property could not be depended on could
have been current in second century Rome, and in 107 Marius' opponents may well have alleged and perhaps believed - that he aspired to excessive power. It is possible that the explanation in
terms of inopia bonorum derives from the tradition in which Marius' action was attributed to the
Cimbric War.
184
326
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aut studiavolgi amissurus.Sed ea resfrustrasperata;tanta lubidocumMario
eundi plerosque invaserat. sese quisque praeda locupletem fore victorem
domum rediturumalia huiuscemodianimis trahebant, et eos non paulrm
orationesua Mariusarrexerat.'88
The senate,accordingto Sallust,thoughtthat
there was generalreluctanceto serve, but in fact Mariushad arousedgeneral
enthusiasm.Other considerationssupport what Sallustsays here about the
popularattitude.189It is improbablethat therewere manyproletarii who were
eager to become legionaries irrespective of the character of the service for
which they were enlisting.'90 The belief that Marius would bring men easy
victory and rich booty could have led to general eagerness to enlist such as is
attested at the outset of the Third Macedonian and Third Punic Wars.19'
If there was no shortage of assidui and widespread eagerness to serve under
Marius, Marius could have held a traditional dilectus without loss of
popularity, simply by avoiding enlisting anyone who was reluctant to serve.
Why then did Marius break with convention? The answer, in my view, is that
Marius acted as he did not to avoid loss of popularity but to make himself yet
more popular than ever. All the men he took were not just willing but eager to
serve. If he had respected tradition, many of them would have been
disappointed. Marius broke with tradition to gratify their wish. In doing so he
incurred the senate's disapproval, but that mattered little to the declared enemy
of the nobility.
Sallust's words imply that there were some assidui in Marius' force,'92 and
there may have been more than he and the other sources were prepared to
admit. But no doubt the majority did not have the property qualification. This
is not surprising: the less a man had to lose, the more tempting was the
prospect of easy enrichment. Many of them may have been drawn from the
urban plebs.'93
Thus Marius' enrolment of capite censi may be satisfactorily accounted for
without supposing that there was a shortage of assidui. I turn now to the
question of what happened to the property qualification for military service
after 107.
188
Sall. BJ84.3-4.
189 The miscalculation which Sallust attributes to the senate suggests that legionary service was
generally unpopular, but Sallust is hardly a reliable witness on the senate. His language there and at
BJ85.3 may reflect first century dislike of the levy (on which see the evidence collected by Brunt,
IM635-8, especially Cic. Att. IX.19.1).
'90 Cf. Brunt, IM410-3.
191 See above section VI (i). As Brunt observes (IM407 n.3), the hopes of booty were fulfilled.
192 According to BJ 86.2, the force comprised capite censosplerosque.
193
Contra Gabba, ES 38-9, 56-7; other views are reported by J. Harmand, op. cit. n.175, 16.
The veterans of the Cimbric War were countryfolk according to App. BC I. 29.132 but this does
not entitle us to infer the same of the men enrolled in 107. According to Sall. BJ 73.6, Marius'
consular campaign aroused the enthusiasm of opifices agrestesque omnes, i. e. the urban and the
rural poor.
327
None of our sources suggest that Marius' successors followed his example.
Gellius and Exuperantius state that he was the first to enrol capite censi; this
implies that others did so later, but they give no indication when this took
place.194
It seems unlikely that many proletarii were enlisted as volunteers in the
years after 107. Few commanders in that period would have been as ready as
Marius to brave the senate's disapproval or could have offered attractions
comparable to those which had made men flock to serve under him.
Marius' acceptance of unqualified men as volunteers cannot have affected
the exemption which such men traditionally enjoyed from conscription except
in emergencies. It would be most implausible to suppose that the senate was
led by Marius' action, of which it strongly disapproved, to take the view that
the conscription of proletariiwould now be proper in normal times. As before,
commanders who attempted to conscript proletarii without the senate's
support would run the risk of an appeal to the tribunes.'95
Rome had more men in service in 105-101, the years of the Cimbric threat,
than at anytime since the Third Punic War.'" Four legions were annihilated at
Arausio. The emergency measures taken after that disaster included requiring
all iuniores to take an oath to remain in Italy.197 Further demands were made
on Rome's manpowerwhen the Sicilianslavesrose again in revolt.'98 It could
well be that in these years the senate deemed that the situation was so grave as
to require the recruitment of proletarii. However, the assidui had met even
greater challenges in the past, and in my view may have been numerous enough
to man the armies which Rome fielded now. We do not know whether Marius
raised troops on a large scale in 104.'" If he did, we cannot be sure that he
appealed once again to the proletaii. The situation was very different: he
might indeed have promised that the victors would gain not just booty but
land, but no one this time will have thought that victory would be easy.
194
Gell. XVI.10.14; Exup. 2. Gellius' statement is based on his distinction between proletarii
and capite censi (on which see above n.13); he supposes that only proletanii had been included in
the earlier emergency enlistments (ib. 13). Gellius himself is not altogether clear on the point (cf.
ib. 11), and, even if the distinction were historical, it seems unlikely that officers raising troops in
an emergency would have taken account of it.
195 Cf. above n.147.
196 Brunt, IM 430-3.
197
Gran. Lic. 14F. (The numeral XXXV should surely be emended to XXXXVI).
198 A Roman force was not sent out until 103 (Diod. XXXVI.8.1). In 104 the governor, P.
Licinius Nerva, made do with such forces as could be raised locally (Diod. XXXVI.3-4; cf.1
&6tOQ()V O6vto)v E'L; ajtocToXiv O?QaTlwTWV koyacbwv).
199 Cf. Brunt, IM 430-1. Marius took over the two legions raised by P. Rutilius Rufus (Ps.Frontin. Strat. IV.2.2), and no doubt strengthened them with African veterans or new recruits.
Brunt may be right, despite Plut. Mar. 24.2, that he raised two further legions for his army in Gaul.
328
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I conclude that no significant enrolments of proletarii, either as volunteers or
conscripts, took place between Marius' enrolment of 107 and the Social War,
except perhaps in 105-103 to face the Northern barbarians or the Sicilian
slaves. Marius' action remained an isolated incident.200
The armies which were fielded by the two sides in the Social War constituted
the greatest mobilization of Italian manpower which had yet occurred,
exceeding even what had been achieved in the Hannibalic War.20'The Roman
government drew on every available resource to meet the crisis. Freedmen
were enlisted for coastal defence.202Freeborn proletarii must also have been
called upon. We hear of one army composed mainly of men from the city of
Rome :203 these must have been largely proletarii. The armies which fought in
the civil war of 83-2 were hardly less numerous,204and were naturally raised
by procedures very different from the traditional dilectus. The levying officers
of this war will hardly have been concerned with the property qualification.
Once again we hear of troops being drawn from the city of Rome.205
The manpower demands of the civil wars of 49 to 30 were on the same
scale,206 and there can be no doubt that proletarii were called on again.207A
levy was held in the city of Rome in 43.208 However, in the period between the
two bouts of civil war far fewer men were in service. In the years 70-50 Italy
supplied no more troops than in the quieter years of the second century.209
Our sources give no indication as to whether proletarii were recruited in these
years, either as volunteers or as conscripts, but in my judgement it is likely that
the property qualification was not now enforced.
200 I agree with Brunt
(SCRR 99) that Saturninus' agrarianschemes were not a consequence of
Marius' enrolment of proletarni. The majority of Marius' African veterans were assidui (if the
supplementum decreed to Marius was 3,000, there were 8,000 citizens serving there in 107). In my
view, most, if not all, of the veterans of the Cimbric Wars may have been assidui. In view of the
low level of the property qualification there is no need for surprise that land allotments were
attractive to assidui.
201
Brunt, IM 435-440, estimates that some 300,000 men were under arms in 90-89.
202
App. BC I.49.212; Livy Per. LXXIV; Macr. 1.11.32.
203 Dio fr. 100.
204 Brunt, I
441-5.
205 App. BC 1.82.373.
206
Brunt, IM 473-512.
I cannot, however, accept Brunt's view (IM 409) that this is what Appian meant when he
explained the disloyalty of the legions in 41 by the fact that ou1 Tot; 3TatTQOL; 'EHoLV tX xCatakrtyov
ovv'yovTo (BC V. 17.68). Appian's words would be a very roundabout way of referring to the
socio-economic composition of the troops. Brunt is right that Appian cannot mean that the legions
were composed of volunteers, since compulsion had in fact been extensively applied. I take
Appian's point to be that the troops had been raised by irregularprocedures, very different from
those which would have been employed in normal times.
208 Cic. Phil. X.21; Fam. XI.8.2. The Pompeians held a levy circa urbem in 49: Caes. BC I.
14.4.
209
Brunt, IM 446-472, with summary at 446-7.
207
329
In the late Republic levies were usually held only in particular districts;
levies throughout Italy were required only in emergencies. Commanders
raised their armies mainly through the agency of the authorities of the colonies
and municzpia.210 An important role was also played by conquisitoressent out
by commanders to seek out recruits.21'We cannot be sure how far the practice
of this period differed from that of the second century, since there is so much
uncertainty about how the levy was conducted in the second century.212
However, it seems to me likely that there had been a very substantial change in
practice, that what had remained essentially a levying system in which those
eligible were required to present themselves for selection had been transformed
into one in which recruits were sought out, and that along with the other
changes the property qualification had ceased to be observed.
If this is correct, the Social War should be identified as the turning point.
The levying procedures of the second century continued, in my view, to be
observed down to the outbreak of that war; no departures from normal
practice occurred in the years leading up to its outbreak except for the isolated
incident of 107 and perhaps some emergency measures in 105-103. The levying
system was transformed by the demands of the great wars of the years 90-82.
Many of the new expedients adopted in those years persisted and became
established practice in the post-Sullan period; the abandonment of the
property qualification was one of these.
That Sulla's successors should not have reverted to the traditional procedures of the dilectus need not surprise us. The seventies were troubled years.
Those Italian communities which had hitherto sent allied contingents now
contributed to the legions. A comprehensive list of iuniores can hardly have
been available to the Roman authorities before the census of 70/69.213 The
failure to complete the census thereafter would have made it impossible to
keep the list up to date.
The abandonment of the property qualification may not have greatly
changed the social composition of the legions. I argued in section III that a
high proportion of those impoverished peasants who stayed in the country in
the second century may still have had enough property to qualify as assidui. In
my view this may have been true in the first century too. The uprooting of the
peasantry had continued, perhaps at an increasing rate. But the capacity of the
countryside to support the dispossessed was no greater in this century than in
the last. The drift to the city of Rome gathered momentum.214 Brunt has shown
Brunt, JRS 1962, 74, 85-63, IM 631.
Cic. Prov. Cons. 5; Mil. 67; Att. VIII.21.1.
212
See above section II
213 For the tabulae iuniorum, which must have played an important part in the traditional
dilectus, see Livy XXIV.18.7. On the census of 86/5 see Brunt, IM 91-3.
214 See Brunt, IM 376ff; Hopkins 57-8, 96-8.
210
211
J. W.
330
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that the armiesof the late Republicwere raisedmainlyin the country;levies
Although, as I
were held in the city only rarely, at times of great need.2"5
believe,the levying officersof the late Republicregardedthemselvesas under
no obligationto take accountof a man'sproperty,most of those whom they
enlisted may still have possessedthe meagreamountof propertyrequiredto
qualifyas an assiduus.
VIII. Conclusion
As I arguedat the beginningof this paper,it is in principleunlikelythatthe
Roman governmentin the second century set such store by maintainingthe
property qualificationfor military service that they allowed a grave, but
entirely artificial, manpower crisis to develop. The doctrine that such a
shortageof assiduidid occur rests on an accumulationof argumentsbasedon
variouskindsof evidence.I hope to haveshown thatat everypoint the casefor
the doctrine is weak and alternative,often preferable,interpretationsof the
evidence are available.I conclude that we should abandonthe belief that a
serious shortageof assiduidevelopedin the course of the second century.
The number of assidui probably rose in the first decadesof the second
century,as the citizen body as a whole expanded;thereafterthe changesin the
pattern of agriculturemust have caused the numberto decline. We cannot,
however,determinehow steep the declinewas. It is possiblethat the number
did not fallbelow the levelof the earlyyearsof the century.If it did, it maynot
havefallenso far that, althoughthe demandfor legionarieswas now less great,
the burdenof the levy on the remainingassiduiwas significantlygreater.
There is no good reason to reject the evidence of our sources that the
concern about manpower which was one of the motives for the agrarian
schemesof LaeliusandTi. Gracchuswas directednot to the numberof assidui,
but to the decline (real or supposed)in the numbersof the free population
(citizen and perhapsalso allied).
The view that the propertyqualificationfor militaryservicewas progressively reduced in order to create more assiduiis only one of a numberof
hypotheseswhich might be put forwardto accountfor the variantfiguresfor
the qualificationin our sourcesandis open to a numberof objections.It is best
to admit that we do not know how these discrepanciesshould be accounted
for.
None of what our sourcestell us about the levy in the latersecond century
constitutes good evidence for the supposed shortage of qualified recruits.
Marius, in my view, enrolled capite censi not becausehe would have lost
popularityif he had confinedhimselfto assidui,but in orderto earnstill more
215
Above, n.210.
331
popularityby enrollinga force composed entirelyof men who were eagerto
serve, many of whom would have been disappointedif he had respected
tradition. It is unlikely that succeeding commanders followed Marius'
example;his action is best seen as an isolatedincidentwhich had no effect on
subsequent levying practice. It was probably in the turbulentyears of the
eighties that the property qualificationfor military service ceased to be
observed.
Universityof Nottingham
J. W. Rich

The Supposed Roman Manpower Shortage of the Later Second

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