FlightCom_March 2015

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March 2015
Edition 78
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Ed's note...
E
THOPIAN Airlines is the
poster-boy for what can be
achieved by airlines in Africa.
And for those who insist on
private ownership of airlines,
Ethiopian remains resolutely
state owned.
Ethiopian has taken full advantage of its
geographical position as a hub for north Africa
by pushing ahead with its aggressive network
and fleet expansion in 2015. COPA reports
that Ethiopian has already become the largest
airline in Africa based on fleet size and could
overtake South African Airways (SAA) in 2015
as the largest based on passengers carried.
Ethiopian has doubled in size since the
beginning of the decade while most other
major African carriers have grown only slightly
or not at all.
Ethiopian Airlines carried 6 million
passengers in the 2014 financial year, making
it one of only four airlines in Africa with over 5
million annual passengers. It is also one of only
four airline groups with a fleet of more than 50
aircraft. Passenger traffic reached 6 million in
2014 fuelled by 15% growth.
Notably the other three African airlines
that have at least 5 million annual passengers
have recorded virtually zero growth over the
past six years.
SAA carried about 7.1 million passengers
in 2014, maintaining its position as market
leader in Africa based on passengers carried.
But SAA traffic is below its 2008 levels, when
it carried 7.4 million passengers. (SAA traffic
shrunk in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 but grew
slightly in 2013 and 2014.)
EgyptAir also carried an estimated 7
million passengers in 2014. The airline’s traffic
level reached a pre-Egyptian crisis high of
7.3 million in 2010. Back in 2008 EgyptAir
transported 6.8 million passengers. Royal
Air Maroc (RAM) carried about 6 million
passengers in 2014, roughly matching the
Moroccan flag carrier’s figures from 2008 and
2011. (RAM traffic shrunk in 2012 and 2013 as
it restructured but grew again in 2014.)
As EgyptAir and SAA are both restructuring
in 2015, their traffic levels will probably drop
below 7 million. RAM is again expanding
but not as ambitiously as Ethiopian. As a
result Ethiopian could soon become the only
African airline with 7 or more million annual
passengers – if not in 2015, then almost
certainly in 2016.
This is a remarkable achievement given that
SAA carried three times as many passengers as
Ethiopian in 2008. EgyptAir and RAM were
also more than double the size of Ethiopian
in 2008.
But perhaps the best comparison is
between Ethiopian and its closest rival, Kenya
Airways. COPA reports that Kenya Airways
was slightly larger than Ethiopian in 2008,
when it carried 2.8 million passengers. Kenya
Airways transported 3.7 million passengers in
2014. Its average annual growth rate has been
only about 5% since 2008. This makes the
almost 300 percent growth of Ethiopian all the
more impressive.
Guy Leitch
Editor
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70
Address
301 Bryanston
Drive, Bryanston,
2021
P O Box 71052
Bryanston, 2021
South Africa
Tel
+27 (0)11 463 1573
Fax
+27 (0)11 463 1812
"
!
!!!
!!
!
Airports
ZAMBIA’S MFUWE
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mfuwe International Airport is Zambia’s smallest and most remote
international airport. It serves the Eastern Province’s Luangwa Game
Park, a well-known wildlife sanctuary.
D
ESPITE its name, Mfuwe
International Airport does
not have international
scheduled flights, but is
serviced by the major
domestic player, Proflight
Zambia, which uses British Aerospace
19-seater J32 and 29-seater J41 Jetstreams.
Proflight has signed interline agreements
with Emirates Airlines, Ethiopian Airlines,
Kenyan Airways and Precision Air for flights
to Mfuwe International Airport and other local
destinations. In May 2014, Proflight’s interline
agreements were extended to low-cost
operator, fastjet, originating from Tanzania.
The new interline agreement with fastjet will
offer seamless air travel on the two airlines’
destinations in Zambia and Tanzania.
Commenting on the interline agreement
in the Proflight Zambia in-flight magazine,
Nkwazi, managing director, Tony Irwin,
said: “With the fastjet interline,
it will
give passengers originating in Tanzania
the opportunity to connect to any Proflight
Proflight operates a 29-seater British Aerospace
J41 Jetstream into Mfuwe International Airport.
destination and will give Proflight passengers
originating in Zambia the opportunity
to connect to any of fastjet’s Tanzanian
destinations.”
Proflight does not have interline
agreements with the international airlines from
South Africa, namely South African Airways
and Airlink. However, it has timed its flights
in such a way that travellers have seamless
progressions to and from Mfuwe International
Airport.
I recently flew to Mfuwe in a Proflight
19-seater British Aerospace J32 Jetstream and
noticed the high level of activity of small
private and charter aircraft. Mfuwe is ideal for
light planes, which accommodate passengers
when traffic levels are low and are great for
tourists, who are treated to aerial views of the
animals in the game reserves and the luxuriant
scenery of the Luangwa River.
Mfuwe International Airport was
constructed in the mid-1970s, mainly to
serve South Luangwa Game Park. It was
conferred with the status of international
airport in 1995. The three other airports with
international status in Zambia are Kenneth
Kaunda International Airport (formerly
Lusaka International Airport), Harry Mwaanga
Nkumbula International Airport (formerly
Livingstone International Airport) and
Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe Airport (Ndola
International Airport).
Like the other three international airports,
Mfuwe is managed by the Zambia Airports
Corporation Limited (ZACL), a state-run
corporation mandated to collect landing fees,
be responsible for the collection of taxes
from major airports and provide navigational
services, provision of infrastructure and fire
and rescue services.
Since being established in the mid-1970s,
the game reserve has attracted tourists from all
over the world. It is located on a trade route
that the Portuguese established between Tete in
Mozambique and Lake Mweru on the border
with the Democratic Republic of Congo in
the 1800s.
In spite of its small size, Mfuwe
International Airport has a Titan 4x4 E-One
fire (foam) tender that can handle bigger
aircraft such the DC-8, and locally owned
Air Mafuta provides Jet A1 fuel and Avgas to
schedules and charter planes. This is supplied
from cargo containers on the apron.
Banking services, including ATMs, are
provided by the Zambia National Commercial
Bank and Barclays inside the small terminal
building. Luggage is conveyed manually into
and out of the terminal. Since the airport is
serviced by light planes, it is not a very big
task for Zambia Airports Corporation Limited
(ZACL) staff to deal with luggage on trolleys.
Mfuwe International Airport in Zambia
was constructed in the mid-1970s, mainly
to serve South Luangwa Game Park.
Mfuwe is ideal for light planes. They
accommodate passengers when traffic
levels are low and are great for tourists
wanting to see Luangwa from above.
Flights from Mfuwe provide great
views of the Luangwa River.
FUTURE EXPANSIONS
Six years ago, the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) carried out an
audit on Zambian aviation regulations and
raised safety concerns. Aircraft originating
from Zambia were banned from landing in the
European Union following the audit.
The Zambian government has since sought
US$900 million from co-operating partners
to upgrade the country’s four international
airports, including Mfuwe. Out of the US$900
million, the government, through the ZACL,
has reserved US$139 million for airport
upgrades at Mfuwe.
Those upgrades will include a new
terminal, a hotel and 85 housing units on the
eastern side of the airport. Airport development
and investment in real estate have been
combined due to the seasonality of animal
viewing in the South Luangwa Game Park.
When the grass is tall during the rainy season
from April to December, there are few aircraft
that fly to Mfuwe International Airport because
animals are obscured by the tall grass. This
reduces revenue in terms of landing fees and
airport charges, hence the mixed investment
strategy.
Other future airport developments will
include the extension of the 2,200 m x 30 m
asphalt-surfaced runway by another 1,000 m.
Mfuwe, like other international airports, will
also have an aeronautical message handling
system, information management system, new
communication radios and automated weather
stations.
Future developments at Mfuwe Airport are
justified owing to the ever increasing number
of passengers. The highest annual growth was
13.1% in 2012 when the number of passengers
increased to 23,587 from 20,848 in 2011.
Mfuwe’s smallest growth rate in terms of
passengers was 0.3% in 2011. In that year, the
number of passengers increased marginally by
71 passengers to 20,848 from the 2010 figure
of 20,777.
In the past half a decade, it was only
in 2009 that the number of passengers at
Mfuwe International dropped below 20,000.
The airport recorded an average above 2,000
passengers per month in 2013 when the
number of travellers shot to 24,880. Those
2013 numbers were boosted by the UN World
Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) General
Assembly that Zambia jointly co-hosted with
Zimbabwe from August 24 to 29.
Mfuwe may be Zambia’s smallest and
most remote international airport, but the
wildlife sanctuary will continue to attract
visitors from all over the world for years to
come. Þ
Airline Ops
MIKE GOUGH
Further
Evidence
The aviation sector is unique. Where else can one use a highly publicised
event to illustrate a point, and then the industry obligingly serves up yet
another dramatic accident to continue the discussion on aircrew fallibility?
T
WO serious
accidents in
less than two
months – both
seemingly
triggered
by
failures
that were simply not handled
at all appropriately by their
respective crewmembers.
Let’s consider the latest
accident – the ATR72 crash in
Taipei. Thanks to widespread
use of cameras and recording
equipment in our technologydriven lives, we have ample
this aircraft. For all intents and
purposes, it appeared to be in
an irrecoverable state from the
moment it appeared between
the buildings to when it struck
the highway bridge.
What should the crew
have been focusing on – the
management of the threat
or error that produced this
scenario, or the management of
the undesired aircraft state that
resulted from the threat/error
event?
With
the
limited
information released to date,
a full and detailed analysis of
all the causal events will have
to wait. However, the facts
that have been released so far
make for an absolutely classic
study-case of Threat and Error
Management (TEM) followed
by an Undesired Aircraft State
(UAS).
To
recap,
TEM
is an evolution of the
acknowledgement that human
factors are a major source
of incidents and accidents.
Prior to 1985, just about all
crew training focused almost
exclusively on the technical
aspects of operating the aircraft
@ ?
watershed in crew training,
and had a less than luke-warm
reception by most airlines
and crews. Pilots considered
themselves to be tough and
were not meant to allow
emotions and self-analysis into
the cockpit. Of course emotions
and personalities have always
been present and it was a case
of getting them channelled in a
safe direction.
About 15 years later, after
The ill-fated ATR72-600 was operated by a carrier
that has IATA membership, so this tragedy will
become a feature of the database to assist training.
deck, engine starting, takeoff performance calculations,
rejected take-offs and so-on
?
regime.
In the late ‘80s, the basics of
human factors emerged in the
G
(Crew Resource Management),
*, !
placed all responsibility on
the crew. In its day, it was a
a few evolutions of CRM, the
obvious became apparent –
pilots are not the only ones in
,
?
As we all know, we now
have Human Factors to consider,
of which CRM and TEM are
components. Evidence Based
Training (EBT) is our present
frontier to master, which
encapsulates all these concepts
and produces training scenarios
based on real-life events that
' displayed by the operator or
crew.
As mentioned in last
month’s column, there are 95
IATA airlines that contribute
to the constantly growing
STEADES database of events
that are available to member
airlines as points from which to
develop training scenarios.
The ill-fated ATR72-600
was operated by a carrier that
has IATA membership, and
thus this tragedy will become
a permanent feature of the
database, available to create
suitable training interventions.
As an aside, I love the use of
these terms which actually
convey a fairly simple notion,
but sound oh-so important.
#
?
K
To start from what may or
may not be the beginning of
this chain of events that resulted
in the aircraft ending upsidedown in a river, let’s consider
what is known, and how our
growing knowledge of TEM
and EBT can work with us as
crew and instructors.
This much we know:
•
This operator has had
two fatal accidents in
the past year, both with
the newly-delivered
ATR72-600s. This is
a ‘glass’ cockpit, latest iteration of the popular ATR series.
The crew transitioned to this latest version through one
simulator session. This is from a personal source who
operates as a Type Rating Instructor (TRI) in the region.
•
The accident aircraft was less than a year old, but for some
reason required major maintenance on both engines only
days prior to the accident.
•
2
?
+!
%-
+
,
He was called back from leave as the airline had no First
A'
*
Preliminary FDR (Flight Data Recorder) data has been placed
in the public domain, which, in broad terms, indicates the following:
•
After a normal take-off, the number 2 (left hand) engine
‘rolled back’ to idle power, causing the propeller to Autofeather, which means it placed itself in the least-drag
! 2
exactly as per design. This engine runs at idle until impact.
•
The number 1 engine has its power lever (throttle, in simple
terms) retarded by 10 degrees initially, then all the way
back, triggering its own fuel shut-off valve. This counters
the automatic up-trim of the engine, which is an increase
in power to counter the self-detected loss of power from
the left.
•
$*9?!%
crew attempt to re-start it. This, I can only imagine, is the
result of what must be that completely frantic realisation
that they had shut down the wrong engine.
The gut-wrenching feeling of impending doom that must have
•
prevailed in those last few seconds can only have added to the
procedural confusion as they desperately tried to rectify their fatal
mistake.
There, but for the grace of God, go I.
Can we remember the two main ‘groups’ of threats from our
Threat and Error Management training? The guys I asked at
yesterday’s simulator session also battled … Overt and Latent.
Overt being those mountains around Blantyre or that huge
thunderstorm painting on the radar. Latent being that incorrectly
!
2
Control – just as general examples.
So these guys started off with a couple of Latent Threats. The
5 all done correctly? Maybe not, considering number 2 went to uncommanded idle.
?,
A
which had to cut his leave short to go back to work to help out the
/
A
+!,
their lack of planning on crew strengths. This will, possibly, make
,+
'
*+
even read.
A third one, which sits squarely with the company, was the very
short transition training onto the new instrumentation of the -600. I
have visions of the Kegworth 737 accident when the crew shut down
the wrong engine due to lack of familiarity with new instruments.
Were these threats briefed on? Unlikely. Latent threats, are by
',
!
,'),
hindsight on this one. The point is, they existed and it appears that
they manifested themselves in the accident sequence.
Airline Ops
MIKE GOUGH
The overt threats were probably those
that we brief on daily – busy airport
operations, weather, distractions and soon. As we do it regularly, we tend to pay
a certain amount of ‘lip-service’ to the
process. On the other hand, we cannot
reel off every conceivable potential issue
as we would never get off the ground. It is
*
who can come up with the most potential
problems.
this step, it is impossible to mitigate the
effects of any crew-committed mistake.
This accident is an extreme example of
what goes wrong with an un-trapped error.
Did the crew realise their mistake? Yes,
I believe so, as the incorrectly shut down
engine was in the process of re-lighting.
Why was the most basic of all engine
failure procedures incorrectly carried out?
+,%
?
deck had something to do with that, plus
80% of all routine flights show
crew errors of one sort or another.
So those were some of the threats.
Were they adequately managed? I don’t
think so. What of the errors? Probably a
few happened as a matter of course, as the
STEADES database indicates that 80% of
?
sort or another. A scary statistic indeed, but
a clear indication that we have to be able to
manage errors.
This can only happen if the errors are
@ referred to as ‘trapping’ the error. Without
TransAsia crew did one
simulator session to transition
onto the new glass cockpit
in the ATR72-600, possibly
compounding the threats.
the dynamic of two Commanders trying
to work together in an absolute pressurecooker environment of an aircraft that
,?,
When we have all the details and the
! ' *
laid bare for our dissection, and ultimately
incorporated into our training programmes
through EBT. Similarly, so will the demise
of the AirAsia A320 of two months ago
@ for public consumption. I would venture
that their tardiness in this regard could be
considered a latent threat in itself, from an
organisational perspective.
In terms of this A320 accident, what
can go so wrong with a FAC (Flight
Augmentation Computer) reset that causes
the aircraft to auger into the sea? That’s all
the information we seem to have at present,
and it leaves more questions than answers
right now.
I have done a FAC reset in anger, and
seem to still be around to tell the tale. It does,
however, make me consider the overhead
panel where that reset switch is with a
5
I can see a scenario being developed in
the future for the simulator with some of
those events incorporated – until we get the
info, however, it will remain a latent threat.
/ , ! pieces of the puzzle into the TEM and EBT
+ *
%
mystifying the new methodology.
It will be most interesting to see if we
**
reduced un-trapped errors as a result of such
a shift in training. Þ