Law and Economics - Department of Economics

Law and Economics - Department of Economics

Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
http://www.econ.jku.at/schneider
Recht und Ökonomie
(Law and Economics)
LVA-Nr.: 239.203
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(9) Competition Policy and Law
[Wettbewerbspolitik & -recht]
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Content (1-2)
(1) Introduction
• General Questions
• Competition Policy: Goals
• Competition Law: Advantages
• Economic Impact
• Relevance Nowadays
(2) International Competition Policy: WTO
(3) Competition Law
• Economics
• What is Prohibited?
• Abuse of Dominance
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Content (2-2)
(4) International Competition Standards
• European Union (legislation & examples)
• USA (legislation)
• China (legislation & examples)
(5) Conclusions Competition Policy & Law
(6) Appendix: Regulation Resources
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1. Introduction
1.1. General Questions
General questions regarding competition policy & law:
(1) Why do we have:
− competition law
[“Wettbewerbsrecht”] ;
− competition policy
and
[“Wettbewerbspolitik”]
?
(2) What is “abuse of dominance”?
[“Missbrauch
einer
marktbeherrschenden
Stellung
/
einer
Marktbeherrschung”]
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1. Introduction
1.2. Competition Policy: Goals
What could be goals of competition policy?
(1) Making markets work better.
(2) Aspire to [“Streben nach”] efficiency.
(3) Aspire to fairness.
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1. Introduction
1.3. Competition Law: Advantages
Competition law applies broadly
less distorting.
Competition law reduces scope for corruption.
Problem of international cartels
[“Kartelle”]
countries
without competition law affected more.
Competition law provides a focus for:
− Pro-competition measures [“wettbewerbsfördernde Maßnahmen”] .
− Privatization [“Privatisierung”] .
− Regulated sectors.
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1. Introduction
1.4. Economic Impact
Which economic aspects / areas are affected by
Examples:
competition policy & law?
− International trade.
− Intellectual
property
rights
(abbreviated
“IPRs”)
[“geistige Eigentumsrechte”] .
− Regulation (e.g. of partly regulated companies).
− Public procurement [“öffentliches Vergabe- / Beschaffungswesen”].
− Concessions [“Konzessionen”] .
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1. Introduction
1.5. Relevance Nowadays
Nowadays relevant for competition law:
− Cartels & mergers.
− Dominance abuse.
− Vertical
agreements
/
restraints
[“vertikale
Vereinbarungen
/
Beschränkungen”] :
• Agreements between firms at different level of the production or
distribution chain; relating to the conditions under which the parties
may purchase, sell or resell certain goods / services.
Nowadays relevant for competition policy:
− Advocacy [“Interessensvertretung”] .
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2. International Competition Policy: WTO
The
World
Trade
Organization
[“Welthandelsorganisation”]
(abbreviated “WTO”) is a international organization
dealing with the rules of trade between nations.
Basic facts about WTO (http://www.wto.org):
− Headquarter in Geneva, Switzerland.
− Established on January 1st , 1995.
− Created by “Uruguay Round” negotiations (1986-94).
− Membership: 162 countries (since 30 November 2015).
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2. Internat. Competition Policy: WTO (cont.)
Main functions of WTO:
− Administering WTO trade agreements (for goods,
services and intellectual property).
− Forum for trade negotiations.
− Monitoring national trade policies.
− Handling trade disputes.
• EU vs. USA:
Subsidies
[“Subventionen”]
for aircraft construction companies (
for agriculture,
Airbus vs. Boeing).
• EU vs. China: Subsidies for steel, solar panels, …
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2. Internat. Competition Policy: WTO (cont.)
Important basic WTO-agreements:
− Goods:
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”)
[“Allgemeines Zoll- und Handelsabkommen”]
− Services: General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”)
[“Allgemeines Abkommen über den Handel mit Dienstleistungen”]
− Intellectual property rights: Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPs”)
[“Übereinkommen über handelsbezogene
Aspekte der Rechte am geistigen Eigentum”]
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2. Internat. Competition Policy: WTO (cont.)
Latest major round of negotiations: “Doha Round”, launched by
WTO trade ministers in Doha (Qatar) in 11/2001.
‘Bali Package’ [“Bali-Paket”] in 12/2013:
− Trade
agreement
resulting
from
‘Ninth
WTO
Ministerial
Conference’ in Bali (Indonesia).
− Selection of issues from broader ‘Doha Round’ negotiations.
− First major agreement among WTO members since WTO was
found in 1995!
− 08/2014: Refusal by India due to subsidization of staple foods.
− 11/2014: Subsidization agreement India – USA.
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3. Competition Law
3.1. Economics
Basically, competition law
is composed of economic
concepts, adjusted to be administrable for:
− Markets and market power [“Marktmacht”] .
− Substantial & durable market power.
− Barriers to entry [“Marktzutrittsschranken”] & barriers to expansion
[“Marktexpansionsschranken”] .
− Coordination & collusion [“Kollusion, Absprachen”] .
− Principal-Agent-problems (hidden action, hidden knowledge).
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3. Competition Law
3.2. What is Prohibited?
Competition law prohibits:
(1) The deliberate exploitation of a dominant market
position by a firm.
(2) Generally
any
agreement,
arrangement
or
understanding between firms that has the effect of
substantially lessening or limiting access to market.
• Prohibition applies not only to written agreements but also
to oral and informal agreements.
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3. Competition Law
3.3. Abuse of Dominance
Abuse of dominance
Stellung
/
einer
["Missbrauch einer marktbeherrschenden
Marktbeherrschung"]
by
companies
questions arise:
− Is the firm dominant?
− Is the conduct (of the firm) an abuse?
− Is there a remedy [“Abhilfe(-Maßnahme), Lösung, Rechtsmittel”] ?
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3.3. Abuse of Dominance (cont.)
Figure 1: Supply & Demand with Market Power
Price
S2
Supply
Less supply (S1
Price rises (p1
S2)
p2)
Quantity declines
(q1
S1
p2
q2)
Excess profit &
deadweight loss
p1
Demand
q2
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Quantity
q1
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4. International Competition Standards
Examples for international competition standards (details
next sub-chapters):
(1) European Union (EU): Articles 101 & 102 TFEU.
(2) USA: US Sherman Act (plus supplements).
(3) China: Anti-Monopoly Law.
Of course, there are more standards.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.1. EU-Antitrust Legislation
EU-antitrust legislation
[“EU-Kartellrecht”]
in force:
− Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’)
[“Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (AEUV)”].
− Rules on competition laid down in:
o Article 101 TFEU (former Art. 81 TEC), and
o article 102 TFEU (former Art. 82 TEC).
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4.1. European Union
4.1.1. EU-Antitrust Legislation (cont.)
Article 101 TFEU
[“AEUV”]
(former Article 81 TEC):
“Mit dem Binnenmarkt unvereinbar und verboten sind alle
Vereinbarungen
zwischen
Unternehmensvereinigungen
Unternehmen,
und
Beschlüsse
aufeinander
von
abge-stimmte
Verhaltensweisen, welche den Handel zwischen Mitgliedstaaten zu
beeinträchtigen
geeignet
sind
und
eine
Verhinderung,
Einschränkung oder Verfälschung des Wettbewerbs innerhalb des
Binnenmarkts bezwecken oder bewirken, insbesondere: … “
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4.1. European Union
4.1.1. EU-Antitrust Legislation (cont.)
Ausnahmeregelung Art. 101, Abs. 3, AEUV: Nur gültig, wenn zwei
positive & zwei negative Voraussetzungen kumulativ erfüllt sind:
• Die Vereinbarung trägt zur Verbesserung der Produktion bzw. des
Vertriebs oder zur Förderung des technischen oder wirtschaftlichen
Fortschritts bei, d.h., sie führt zu Effizienzgewinnen.
• Die Beschränkungen sind unerlässlich, um diese Ziele, d. h. die
Effizienzgewinne, zu erreichen.
• Verbraucher müssen in angemessener Weise an den erwachsenden
Vorteilen beteiligt werden, … . Es genügt folglich nicht, wenn nur den
Parteien der Vereinbarung Effizienzgewinne entstehen.
• Die Vereinbarung eröffnet den Parteien nicht die Möglichkeit, für einen
wesentlichen Teil d. betroffenen Produkte den Wettb. auszuschalten.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.1. EU-Antitrust Legislation (cont.)
Article 102 TFEU
[“AEUV”]
(former Article 82 TEC):
“Mit dem Binnenmarkt unvereinbar und verboten ist die
missbräuchliche Ausnutzung einer beherrschenden Stellung auf
dem Binnenmarkt oder auf einem wesentlichen Teil desselben
durch ein oder mehrere Unternehmen, soweit dies dazu führen
kann, den Handel zwischen Mitgliedstaaten zu beeinträchtigen.
Dieser Missbrauch kann insbesondere in Folgendem bestehen …
“
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4.1. European Union
4.1.2. Market Power / Dominance
The assessment of whether a firm is in a dominant
position – and of the degree of market power it holds –
is a first step in the application of Article 102 TFEU.
According to the case-law
holding
a
dominant
[“Fallrecht; Rechtsspechung”]
position
confers
a
,
special
responsibility on the firm concerned, the scope of which
must
be
considered
in
the
light
of
the
specific circumstances of each case.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.2. Market Power / Dominance (cont.)
Dominance
[“Marktbeherrschung”]
is a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an firm, which enables it to prevent
effective competition being maintained on a relevant
market
[“relevanter Markt”]
, by affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors and customers.
A firm which is capable of profitably increasing prices
above the competitive level for a significant period of
time does not face sufficiently effective competitive
constraints
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can generally be regarded as dominant.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.2. Market Power / Dominance (cont.)
Assessment of dominance will take into account the
competitive structure
[“Wettbewerbsstruktur”]
of a market
Indicators for dominance:
− Market position of dominant firm & its competitors.
− Expansion or entry by rivals.
− Countervailing
power
[“Nachfragemacht”]
of
buyers
(constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the firm's
customers).
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4.1. European Union
4.1.3. Market Shares
Market
shares
[“Marktanteile”]
provide
a
useful
first
indication of the market structure and of the relative
importance of the various firms active on the market.
Market shares are interpreted in the light of the relevant
market conditions, and in particular of the dynamics of
the market and of the extent to which products are
differentiated.
The trend / development of market shares over time may
also be taken into account in volatile or bidding markets
[“Ausschreibungs-, Bietermärkte”] .
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4.1. European Union
4.1.3. Market Shares (cont.)
Market shares in relevant market:
Unlikely
dominant
0%
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Dominant
40%
50–70%
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4.1. European Union
4.1.4. Barriers to Entry & Expansion
Barriers to entry or expansion
various forms, e.g.:
− Legal tariff barriers [“Zollschranken”] : Tariffs or quotas.
− Advantages specifically enjoyed by dominant firm:
• Economies of scale & scope [“Größen- & Verbundvorteile”] ;
• privileged access to essential inputs or natural resources,
important technologies; or
• an established distribution and sales network.
− Network effects
[“Netzwerkeffekte”]
faced by customers in
switching to a new supplier.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.4. Barriers to Entry & Expansion (cont.)
− The dominant firm's own conduct may also create
barriers to entry
• Previous
[“Marktzutrittsschranken”]
significant
investments
, e.g.:
which
entrants
or
competitors would have to match.
• Long-term contracts concluded with its customers that have
appreciable foreclosing effects.
Persistently high market shares may be indicative of the
existence of barriers to entry and expansion.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.5. Abuse of Dominant Position
Abuse of a dominant position
specific forms, e.g.:
− Exclusive dealing: Exclusive purchasing, conditional rebates.
− Tying and bundling: Customers that purchase one product (the
tying product) are required also to purchase another product
from the dominant firm (the tied product).
− Predation: Deliberately incurring losses or foregoing profits in
the short term to foreclose one or more of actual / potential
competitors.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.6. Summary: Dominance & Market
Dominance [“Marktbeherrschung”] is not defined in Treaty (“TFEU”),
but defined in case-law [“Fallrecht; Rechtsspechung”] .
Dominance must be in reference to a market.
Market share is the most important indicator but not determinative.
Market definition – objectively & spatially [“sachlich & räumlich”] –
is essential.
Dominance means substantial market power over a time period:
If one can profitably maintain prices above the competitive level for
a significant period of time
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generally dominant.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.7. Cartel Policy
Definition of cartel
[“Kartell”]
by European Commission:
− A cartel is a group of similar, independent companies which join
together to fix prices, to limit production or to share markets or
customers between them.
− Instead of competing with each other, cartel members rely on
each others' agreed course of action, which reduces their
incentives to provide new / better products and services at
competitive prices.
− As
a
consequence,
their
clients
(consumers
or
other
businesses) end up paying more for less quality.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.7. Cartel Policy (cont.)
Cartels are illegal, so:
− they are generally highly secretive,
− and evidence of their existence is not easy to find.
‘Leniency policy‘
[“Kronzeugenregelung”]
by EU:
− The first company which provides sufficient evidence of a
(illegal) cartel – to allow the Commission to pursue the case –
can receive full immunity from fines;
subsequent firms can receive reductions of up to 50% on the
fine that would otherwise be imposed.
− Encourages firms to hand over inside evidence of cartels.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.7. Cartel Policy (cont.)
Firms – found by the European Commission to have
participated in a (illegal) cartel – can settle their case by
acknowledging their involvement in the (illegal) cartel
and getting a smaller fine in return.
Settlements reduce the administrative costs of cartel
decisions, including court costs, and help the EUCommission deal more quickly with cartel cases.
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Table 1: Fines for breaking EU Competition Law
Source: European Commission, Fines for breaking EU Competition Law, Factsheet.
Basic fine
Percentage of value of relevant sales (0-30%)
x
Duration (years or periods less than one year)
+
15-25% of value of relevant sales: additional deterrence for cartels
Increased by
Aggravating factors:
e.g. ring leader, repeat offender or obstructing investigation
Decreased by
Mitigating factors:
e.g. limited role or conduct encouraged by legislation
Subject to
overall cap
10% of turnover (per infringement)
Possibly
further
decreased by
Leniency [“Kronzeugenregelung”]:
100% for first applicant, up to 50% for next,
20-30% for third and up to 20% for others
Settlement: 10%
Inability to pay: reduction
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4.1. European Union
4.1.8. Cartel Policy: Examples
Example 1/5: Cartel ‘Schienenfreunde’
− ‘Deutsche Bahn’ (German Railway) operates largest rail network
in Europe; buys rails & points for about € 300 million annually.
− Goal of cartel: illegal price agreements on railway tracks in
Germany. Compliance with agreed quotas was monitored;
projects allocated & selling prices fixed.
− Duration of cartel:
(At least) 1999 - March 2011 (revealed by
anonymous criminal charges [“Strafanzeigen”] ).
− Estimated damage for 'Deutsche Bahn': About € 550 million.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.8. Cartel Policy: Examples (cont.)
Example 1/5: Cartel ‘Schienenfreunde’ (cont.)
− Key witness was (a subsidiary of) ‘Voestalpine Stahl’.
− Cartel-fines by German ‘Bundeskartellamt’:
• Year 2012:
Total € 124.5 million
thereof € 103m against
‘ThyssenKrupp’; € 13m ‘Vossloh’; € 8.5m ‘Voestalpine’.
• Year 2013: € 10m against ‘Moravia Steel Deutschland GmbH’.
− Plus
compensation
payments
by
cartel
members
to
‘Deutsche Bahn’ (e.g. more than € 150 million by ThyssenKrupp;
more than € 50 million by ‘Voestalpine’).
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4.1. European Union
4.1.8. Cartel Policy: Examples (cont.)
Ex. 2/5: Cartel of lift & escalator
[“Lift & Rolltreppen”]
producers:
− Duration of cartel: 1995-2004.
− Members of cartel:
17 subsidiaries of 5 companies (4 of 5
sentenced companies with (local) market shares of 80 to 100%).
− Total fine by European Commission: € 992.3 million.
• Biggest fine for ‘ThyssenKrupp’: € 479.6m; included a surcharge of
50% (!) for repeat offenders (due to a stainless steel cartel in 1998).
• Further fines:
‘Otis’ € 224.93m; ‘Schindler’ € 143.75m; ‘Kone’ €
142.12m; ‘Mitsubishi’ € 1.84m.
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4.1. European Union
4.1.8. Cartel Policy: Examples (cont.)
Ex. 3/5: Cartel of laundry detergent
[“Waschmittel”]
producers:
− Duration of cartel: 01/2002 – 03/2005.
− Eight European countries concerned.
− Fines of about € 315 million against ‘Procter & Gamble’ (e.g.
‘Ariel’) & ‘Unilever’ (e.g. ‘Coral’); both firms received reductions
due to confession.
− ‘Henkel’ (e.g. ‘Persil’) was key witness
[“Kronzeuge”]
(
no fine).
− Starting point of cartel was an European initiative for eco-friendly
laundry
detergent,
which
was
organized
by
their
trade
association …
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4.1. European Union
4.1.8. Cartel Policy: Examples (cont.)
Ex. 4/5: Cartel of cathode ray tube (CRT)
− Duration of cartel:
1996-2006;
[“Bildröhre”]
producer:
in total two (sub-)cartels:
one cartel for TVs, the other for computer monitors.
− Members of cartels: ‘Samsung SDI’, ‘Philips’, ‘LG Electronics’,
‘Technicolor’, ‘Panasonic’, ‘Toshiba’ and ‘Chunghwa’.
− Total fine by European commission: € 1.47 billion.
− Key witness was ‘Chunghwa’.
− Agreements of participants took place at co-called “green
meetings” (manager played golf afterwards) …
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4.1. European Union
4.1.8. Cartel Policy: Examples (cont.)
Ex. 5/5: Cartels in the interest rate derivatives industry:
− Cartel in Euro interest rate derivatives (EIRD) & cartels in
Yen interest rate derivatives (YIRD).
− Cartels-duration: EIRD = 09/2005 - 05/2008; YIRD = 2007 - 2010.
− Members of cartels: Eight international financial institutions.
− Total fine by European commission: € 1.7125 billion.
− Key witness was ‘Barclays’ (avoided a € 690 million fine!).
Participation
(in months)
Leniencyreduction (in %)
Fine
(in million €)
Barclays
32
100
0
Deutsche Bank
32
30
465.861
Société Générale
26
5
445.884
Royal Bank of Scotland
8
50
131.004
Participants
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4.2. USA
4.2.1. Antitrust Laws
Three core federal antitrust laws in USA:
(1) Sherman Act (issued 1890):
First antitrust-law at
federal level.
(2) Federal Trade Commission Act (issued 1914).
(3) Clayton Act (iss. 1914): Extension to Sherman Act.
There are more laws, e.g.:
− Robinson-Patman-Act (iss. 1936; extension to Sherman Act).
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4.2. USA
4.2.1. Antitrust Laws (cont.)
US Sherman Act Section 2: [Sinngemäße Übersetzung!]
„Nach dem Gesetz werden Verträge oder Vereinbarungen in Form
von Trusts oder unter einer anderen Bezeichnung, deren Zweck
ist, den Handel oder den Verkehr zwischen den einzelnen
Bundesstaaten oder auch fremden Staaten zu beschränken, für
ungültig erklärt. …
Bundesgerichte und Staatsanwälte werden angewiesen, von Amts
wegen gegen derartige Vereinigungen vorzugehen.“
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4.2. USA
4.2.1. Antitrust Laws (cont.)
Enforcement of US-antitrust laws generally takes place
on three different channels:
− Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice;
− Federal Trade Commission; or
− civil legal proceedings
[“Zivilprozesse”]
.
• E.g. by action for damages [“Schadenersatzklagen”] .
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4.2. USA
4.2.1. Antitrust Laws (cont.)
The antitrust laws proscribe unlawful mergers and
business practices in general terms, leaving courts to
decide (!) which ones are illegal based on the facts of
each case.
Hence
US
competition
law
[“Gewohnheitsrecht, nicht kodifiziertes Recht”]
is
a
common
law
system
law = court decisions.
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4.2. USA
4.2.2. Monopoly Power
By law, ‘monopolization’
[“Monopolisierung”]
with ‘abuse of dominance’
is NOT equated
Reasons:
− Monopolization requires more market power than
dominance requires.
− The conduct focus is on exclusion of (potential)
rivals.
− Exploitation of a market is per se not illegal.
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4.2. USA
4.2.2. Monopoly Power (cont.)
Market share is a starting point for determining if there
is monopoly power
[“Monopolmacht”]
:
− Market share of >70% almost always supports
inference that monopoly power exists; but this
conclusion is occasionally rebuttable.
− Market share of <50%
monopoly
[“Monopol”]
one finds almost never a
.
But: Other evidence is very important.
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4.2. USA
4.2.2. Monopoly Power (cont.)
Other evidence that is relevant:
− showing that a firm with high market share is not a
monopoly, or
− showing that a firm with relatively low market share is
a monopoly, or
− where market share data is absent:
• Barriers to entry [“Marktzutrittsschranken”]
• Barriers to rivals' expansion
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most important.
also important.
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4.2. USA
4.2.2. Monopoly Power (cont.)
• Technological superiority resulting in cost advantage.
• Economies of scale and scope [“Größen- & Verbundvorteile”] .
• Ability for price discrimination [“Preisdiskriminierung”] .
• The relative size of competitors.
• Competitors' performance.
• Pricing trends & practices.
• Homogeneity [“Gleichwertigkeit”] of products.
• Stability of market share over time.
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4. International Competition Standards
4.3. China: AML
China:
Current Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) is in force
since 1st August 2008.
AML is based on:
− merger control;
− prohibited monopoly agreements;
− abuse of a dominant market position.
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4. International Competition Standards
4.3. China: AML (cont.)
Enforcement of AML by three government bodies:
− ‘Ministry of Commerce’ (MOFCOM)
responsible
for merger provisions;
− ‘State Administration of Industry and Commerce’
(SAIC)
responsible for non-price related actions;
and
− ‘National Development and Reform Commission’
(NDRC)
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responsible for pricing arrangements.
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4. International Competition Standards
4.3. China: AML (cont.)
Examples for execution of AML:
− Japanese automotive suppliers (08/2014):
• Total fine of EUR 151 million against 10 Japanese suppliers.
• Reason: Price fixing on car spare parts (2000-2011).
• One of the biggest fine against a group of companies since
AML came into force (in 2008).
• Two further firms were key witnesses (
no fine).
− Chrysler China (09/2014):
• Fine of about € 4 million against ‘Chrysler’ (subsidiary of Fiat).
• Reason: Minimum prices for car spare parts & services.
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4. International Competition Standards
4.3. China: AML (cont.)
− Audi China (09/2014):
• NRDC-fine of EUR 31.4 million against ‘Audi’ sales subsidiary
of joint-venture “FAW-Volkswagen” in China.
• Reason: Minimum prices for car spare parts & services.
− Daimler Benz China (04/2015):
• Fine of about EUR 53 million against ‘Daimler Benz’.
• Reason: Price-fixing agreements [“Preisabsprachen”] for cars &
spare parts [“Ersatzteile”] .
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4. International Competition Standards
4.3. China: AML (cont.)
− Qualcomm (smartphone chip maker; 02/2015):
• NRDC-fine of USD 975 million (largest in history).
• Plus reduction of royalty on patents
for phones sold in China
[“Patent- / Lizenzgebühr”]
fee will be based on 65 % of the
selling price of phones (instead of on 100%).
• Reason: Supposedly abused dominant position by forcing
Chinese OEMs/ODMs into unpaid cross-licensing & charged
them too high rates on FRAND-patents (‘Fair, Reasonable and
Non-Discriminatory’ / “fair, vernünftig und diskriminierungsfrei” ).
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4. International Competition Standards
4.3. China: AML (cont.)
Further AML-investigations against:
− Microsoft (software);
− Symantech;
− pharma industry;
− cement manufacturers;
− car manufacturers and car seller;
− …
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5. Conclusions Competition Policy & Law
Final conclusions:
(1) Policy measures without competition law help create
a competitive environment.
(2) But there will be gaps which competition law can fill.
(3) Effective competition policy requires the existence
and the usage of competition law.
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6. Appendix: Regulation Resources
General information regarding EU-regulation of companies:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/index_de.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html
General information regarding regulation of companies in USA:
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/antitrust_laws.shtm
‘Antitrust Law Developments’ (by American Bar Association).
Example
regarding
“Lebensmittelbranche
illegal
fasst
Flut
price
an
agreements
Kartellstrafen
aus“;
(Austria):
URL
Article
article
=
http://derstandard.at/1388649912432/Lebensmittelbranche-fasst-Flut-anKartellstrafen-aus (DerStandard-Online, 02.01.2014).
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