Seminarthemen SS 2014 - Ruhr

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Seminarthemen SS 2014 - Ruhr
Nina Ismael, Annika Sauer, Jörg Schimmelpfennig
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
SS 14
Seminar Intermediate Microeconomics
A:
Spieltheorie und Anwendungen
nicht-zitierfähige Grundlagenliteratur:
Dixit, Avinash K. and Susan Skeath (1999), Games of Strategy, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.
Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, New
York.
A1)
Das Tausendfüßlerspiel - Kritik an der Rückwärtsinduktion
Rosenthal, Robert W. (1981), Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store
Paradox, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 92-100.
A2)
Das Chainstore-Paradox
Selten, Reinhard (1978), The Chain-Store Paradox, Theory and Decision, vol. 9, no. 2, pp.127-159.
A3)
Predatory Pricing - ein sinnvolles Konzept?
Ordover, Janusz A. und Robert D. Willig (1981), An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and
Product Innovation, Yale Law Journal, vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 8-53.
A4)
Zur (Un-)glaubwürdigkeit der Limit Pricing - Strategie
Bain, Joe S. (1971), Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing
Industries, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Sylos-Labini, Paolo (1962), Oligopoly and Technical Progress, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
A5)
Tit for Tat
Rapoport, Aanatol und Albert M. Chammah (1970), Prisoner`s Dilemma – A Study of Conflict and
Cooperation, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Axelrod, Robert M. (1987), Die Evolution der Kooperation, Oldenbourg, München.
B:
Industrieökonomik und Anwendungen
nicht-zitierfähige Grundlagenliteratur:
Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, New
York.
Carlton, Dennis W. und Jeffrey M. Perloff (2005), Modern Industrial Organization, Pearson AddisonWesley, Boston.
B1)
Theorie der bestreitbaren Märkte – Sinn oder Unsinn?
Baumol, William J. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, New York.
B2)
Asymmetrische Informationen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Die Effizienzlohntheorie
Yellen, James L. (1984), Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, American Economic Review, vol.
74, no. 2, pp. 200-205.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1987), The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price,
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 25, no.1, pp. 1-48.
B3)
Asymmetrische Informationen und Qualitätsunsicherheit: Das „Lemon“ - Problem
Akerlof, George A. (1970), The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
Quarterly Journal of of Economics, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 488-500.
B4)
Monopole dauerhafter Güter: Würdigung und Kritik
Coase, Ronald H. (1972), Durable Goods Monopolist, Journal of Law and Economics, vol.15, no.1,
pp. 143- 150.
B5)
Entstehung und Stabilität von Kartellen
Stigler, George J. (1964), A Theory of Oligopoly, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 4461.
Levenstein, Margaret C. und Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), What Determines Cartel Success?, Journal of
Economic Literature, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 43-95.