ORANGE ROUGHY (ORH 1) – FINAL ADVICE Executive Summary

Transcription

ORANGE ROUGHY (ORH 1) – FINAL ADVICE
Figure 1. Orange roughy Quota Management
Areas (QMAs).
Figure 2. The four sub-areas (labelled A-D) in
ORH 1, and the Mercury-Colville ‘box’.
C
B
Mercury-Colville box
A
D
Executive Summary
1
Information on ORH 1 to underpin an assessment of stock status and long-term yield
is not available. There is neither an evaluation of stock size in relation to the biomass
that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY), nor an indication of the
likely trend in stock size under the current Total Allowable Catch (TAC).
2
Taking account of the uncertainty in the best available information, MFish proposes
that you set the TAC under section 13(2)(a) to maintain the stock at or above a level
that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, having regard to the interdependence
of stocks. However, given the level of uncertainty in respect of the information on the
current stock biomass, it is also open to you to set the TAC under section 13(2)(b) to
restore the stock at or above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield.
3
MFish proposes three options to manage the orange roughy fishery in ORH 1. All
options include a variety of management and sustainability measures that existed
under the Adaptive Management Programme (AMP). Industry has agreed to continue
to implement the measures, which include: sub-area limits, feature limits, biological
sampling, observer coverage, and regular reporting. Their adoption results in a
structured fishing plan to manage risks of localised depletion or sustainability risks to
localised stocks that might exist.
4
Option 1 (status quo) retains the existing TAC, Total Allowable Commercial Catch
(TACC), sub-area and feature limits. Option 1 places more weight on short-term
utilisation and the existing management approach (catch spreading, etc.) as the means
to manage risk. Although retaining the current TAC is not likely to pose a high risk to
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the stock in the short term, the longer term sustainability risks are unknown. A TAC
is set to move the stock to BMSY over time; a higher TAC increases the risk that the
stock will not move to or be maintained at BMSY. Option 1 proposes a TAC for which
there is little short-term sustainability risk from catching 1,400 tonnes of roughy this
year; this is different from a sustainable catch over the long term, moving the stock
towards BMSY.
5
Due to the biological characteristics of orange roughy, the nature of the ORH 1
fishery (relatively small aggregations widely dispersed over a large fishing area), and
the sort of information that is being collected on the fishery, evidence of unsustainable
harvesting (at both the stock level and for individual aggregations) will likely only be
available following a major decline in stock size.
6
Accordingly, Option 2 adopts a more cautious approach than Option 1 by reducing the
TAC by approximately 20% to 1,208 tonnes, and the TACC to 1,150 tonnes. Suboptions 2a and 2b provide different voluntary catch limits by sub-area 2 to effect the
TACC reduction. 2a imposes a reduction of approximately 20% to each sub-area,
whereas 2b only reduces sub-area C where the limit has never been caught.
7
Option 2 (and 2a in particular), places greater weight on the uncertainty of the current
information regarding stock status, and the biological characteristics of the species. In
the absence of an assessment of stock status relative to the sustainability of current
catches and the current TAC, Option 2 seeks to reduce risk to the long-term
sustainability of the stock. Given the biological characteristics of this species, the
approach under Option 2 recognises the risk that isolated features within ORH 1 are
particularly susceptible to over-fishing. A TAC reduction is appropriate under
13(2)(a) if you are satisfied that maintaining the biomass at or above BMSY, and
avoiding a risk that the biomass may decline below that target stock level, is best
achieved by a lower fishing mortality.
8
Option 3 places the greatest weight of any of the options on the uncertainty of the
information, takes the most cautious approach in favour of sustainability, and imposes
the greatest short-term economic loss. MFish considers this option is open to you if
you are satisfied that the stock is likely to be below BMSY, and s 13(2)(b) is the
appropriate basis for setting the TAC. Option 3 would reduce the TAC by 38% to 914
tonnes, and the TACC to 870 tonnes. MFish recommends under Option 3 that you
request sub-area limits of 150 t for sub-area A, 380 t for sub-Area B, 190 t for subArea C, and 150 t for sub-Area D, which are calculated by applying a 25% reduction
to the average catch by sub-area over the past five years.
Problem Definition
9
2
Estimating BMSY has not been possible for ORH 1, and there is no way to determine if
the current level of fishing is sustainable in the long term at the stock level, or would
result in overexploitation of localised areas. In setting the appropriate TAC with
respect to BMSY under s 13(2), MFish considers you will be required to consider what
level of sustainability risk is acceptable given the high level of uncertainty.
‘Sub-areas’ are non-statutory regions within ORH 1, labelled from A to D. Figure 2 shows the four sub-areas.
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Management Options
10
MFish proposed three management options in the IPP, and these have remained
unchanged in the FAP. Option 2 has two pathways to reach the proposed TACC,
presented as Option 2a and 2b. Both options 2a and 2b are the same statutory
decision – the difference relates to how you request MFish to approach discussions
with quota owners to effect the TAC and TACC decision. You may choose other
options (alternative TAC levels and sustainability measures) that you consider will
best meet your obligations under the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act).
11
As the AMP for ORH 1 has completed its full term review, MFish proposes that the
catch spreading, sub-QMA limits, 3 monitoring and reporting measures formerly
managed under the AMP continue as part of a management and monitoring plan. This
would be implemented through industry agreement with all major quota holders. SubQMA limits and catch-spreading are voluntary, and are not part of your TAC and
TACC decisions.
12
MFish proposes that the agreement and administration of the package of management
measures be formalised under a fisheries plan in place by 1 October 2008.
Summary of Options
13
The options available for consideration are unchanged from the IPP:
a)
Option 1:
AGREE to retain the existing TAC of 1,470 tonnes and TACC of 1,400 tonnes.
Provide an allowance of zero for non-commercial use and an allowance of 70 tonnes
for other sources of fishing related mortality;
AND
REQUEST that industry adhere to the sub-area and feature limits listed in the Option
1 column in Table 1, and request that industry continue to submit comprehensive
catch reports by feature and sub-area.
OR
b)
Option 2:
AGREE to decrease the TAC to 1,208 tonnes and the TACC to 1,150 tonnes.
Provide an allowance of zero for non-commercial use and an allowance of 58 tonnes
for other sources of fishing related mortality;
AND
REQUEST that industry adhere to the sub-area and feature limits listed in the
Option 2A column in Table 1, and request that industry continue to submit
comprehensive catch reports by feature and sub-area.
3
Sub-QMA limits includes sub-areas A through D, the Mercury-Colville Box, and ‘features’ within the subareas. Features are smaller zones within sub-areas, centred around an identified underwater feature such as a
seamount.
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OR
REQUEST that industry adhere to the sub-area and feature limits listed in the
Option 2B column in Table 1, and request that industry continue to submit
comprehensive catch reports by feature and sub-area.
OR
c)
Option 3
AGREE to decrease the TAC to 914 tonnes and the TACC to 870 tonnes. Provide an
allowance of zero for non-commercial use and an allowance of 44 tonnes for other
sources of fishing related mortality.
AND
REQUEST that industry adhere to the sub-area and feature limits listed in the Option
3 column in Table 1, and request that industry continue to submit comprehensive
catch reports by feature and sub-area.
Table 1
Option 1
(status quo)
Option 2
A
TAC
Allowance for other sources of fishing-related
mortality
Option 3
B
1,470 tonnes
1,208 tonnes
1,208 tonnes
914 tonnes
70 tonnes
58 tonnes
58 tonnes
44 tonnes
Allowance for customary Mäori interests
0
0
0
0
Allowance for recreational fishery interests
0
0
0
0
TACC
Requested sub-area A limit
1,400 tonnes
1,150 tonnes
1,150 tonnes
870 tonnes
200 tonnes
175 tonnes
200 tonnes
150 tonnes
Requested feature limit in sub-area A
Requested sub-area B limit
100 tonnes annual feature limit
500 tonnes
Requested feature limit in sub-area B
Requested sub-area C limit
500 tonnes
380 tonnes
500 tonnes
Requested feature limit in sub-area C
Requested sub-area D limit
400 tonnes
400 tonnes
250 tonnes
190 tonnes
200 tonnes
175 tonnes
200 tonnes
Requested feature limit in sub-area D
Requested Mercury-Colville ‘box’ limit
30 tonnes bycatch-only limit
150 tonnes
Consultation
14
Consultation on the IPP was undertaken with such persons or organisations
representative of those classes of persons having an interest in the stock or the effects
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of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned, including Maori,
environmental, commercial, and recreational interests.
15
Submissions on the IPP were received from:
•
Anton’s Group, representing Anton’s Seafoods Ltd., Anton’s Trawling Company
Ltd., Esperance Fishing Company Ltd., and Orneagan Developments Ltd.
(Anton’s)
•
Environment and Conservation Organisation of NZ Inc. (ECO)
•
The ORH 1 Exploratory Fishing Company Ltd. (EFC)
•
New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council (RFC)
•
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc. (RF&B)
•
Te Ohu Kai Moana (TOKM)
•
The New Zealand Seafood Industry Council Ltd. (SeaFIC)
•
WWF – New Zealand (WWF)
Cost-Benefit Analysis
16
In the New Zealand Fishing Industry Association Inc v Minister of Fisheries
(CA82/97, 22/7/97) case (known as the ‘Snapper 1’ case), the Court of Appeal wrote
“the Minister would be wise to undertake a careful cost/benefit analysis of a
reasonable range of options available to him in moving the fishery towards MSY”.
Appendix 4 provides a tabular summary of the costs and benefits of each option; the
detail of each is provided in the body of the FAP.
17
As a simple summary list, the costs and benefits cannot be summed, or the costs
netted out against the benefits to derive the superior option. In general, there are
unquantified sustainability risks and benefits of the options, with more known (and to
some degree quantifiable) utilisation costs and benefits.
Previous ORH 1 Management Advice
18
ORH 1 was reviewed one year ago, during the October 2006 sustainability round.
Your decision to reduce the TAC and TACC for ORH 1 was challenged, and you
elected to withdraw from proceedings. Accordingly, the TAC and TACC remained
unchanged.
19
When making your decision, you must consider all relevant information, and
disregard any irrelevant considerations. MFish considers the concerns expressed by
some stakeholders over recent ORH 1 advice and management decisions, court
challenges and possible amendments to s 10 of the Act to be irrelevant to your current
sustainability measures decisions. You must review this advice on its own merits
without reference to previous advice.
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20
However, some of the documentation relating to last year’s ORH 1 decisions provide
relevant information for this year’s decision. Such information has been incorporated
into this FAP where appropriate. Sources have been footnoted.
Past misreporting
21
Previous ORH 1 advice discussed the issue of misreporting in the ORH 1 fishery.
Due to the reliance on catch and effort trends as the tool by which the effect of the
TAC can be monitored, and feature reporting as a means to manage catch spreading,
misreporting of catch and effort between features and sub-areas undermines the value
of monitoring and management.
22
There have been prosecutions regarding misreporting between features and sub-areas
within ORH 1 under the AMP. The prosecutions focused on approximately
180 tonnes of misreported catch. Once the offenders were convicted and sentencing
concluded, the relevant forms were re-submitted and analysed for the full term AMP
review.
23
Misreporting concerns in ORH 1 are not relevant to decisions on TAC setting under s
13 of the Act. All available steps have been taken to correct and complete the input
data in order to improve the credibility of the subsequent analyses. MFish is satisfied
that the information considered by the AMP Working Group (AMP WG) is the best
available, and is the most credible basis on which to assess and manage ORH 1. This
FAP presents the best information currently available, and incorporates all relevant
information from stakeholder submissions.
Rationale for Management Options
24
The Plenary report for ORH 1, completed following the full term review of the ORH 1
AMP in May 2007, is attached as Appendix 1; species characteristics of orange
roughy are discussed in Appendix 2; the history of the fishery and the management of
ORH 1 under the AMP are discussed in Appendix 3.
25
There is no formal stock assessment for ORH 1 to provide estimates of the maximum
sustainable yield or current stock size relative to BMSY. Information from the
commercial fishery drives the assessment of stock status by the AMP WG.
Results of the full-term AMP review
26
The objectives of the 2001-2006 AMP were to determine stock size, geographical
extent, and long term sustainable yield of the ORH 1 fish stock. The AMP spread
catch between sub-areas, directed exploratory fishing, and provided scientific
observer coverage of around 25-37% of trawl tows. 4 Observers collected information
on target species’ length frequency and sex ratio, and on bycatch. The AMP was able
only to obtain information regarding geographical distribution.
27
The previous WG report, as presented in the Plenary document, stated that “the
current stock size is probably above that which will support the maximum sustainable
yield”. That statement dates to 2001 when the AMP was initiated; following an
4
The observer coverage target in the AMP was 50% of trawl tows.
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assessment of the five years of data collected since then, the WG has revised this view
to: “it is not known if recent catch levels or current TACCs are sustainable in the long
term”. The WG was unable to determine the sustainability of catches, because ORH 1
“probably includes a number of constituent stocks”, and “it is not possible to estimate
BMSY for any of the individual stocks, let along aggregate up to an estimate for ORH 1
as a whole.”
28
Moreover, “a better understanding is not possible in the near future. BMSY is difficult
to estimate in situations involving an unknown number of constituent stocks.” The
WG concluded that “no other information can currently be extracted from the existing
data that will provide insight into the status of the ORH 1 stocks”. A 2001 assessment
of yield for the Mercury-Colville ‘box’ serves as the basis for the proposed orange
roughy bycatch limit for that area.
29
The report continues: “The amount of fishing in some areas appears to be low, but
without any indication of current abundance, there is no way to determine if this level
of fishing is in fact sustainable or if current feature limits will avoid overexploitation
of localised areas.”
30
Unstandardised catch per unit effort (CPUE) of tonnes/tow is the major monitoring
tool for ORH1. The fishery has generally operated above the threshold of 2.0 tonnes
per tow, although there is considerable variation between sub-areas, and between
years in the same sub-area (e.g. in 2006, CPUE was 0.97 t/tow in Area A, and 3.18
t/tow in area C; within Area A, CPUE was 3.96 t/tow in 2005, and 0.97 t/tow the
following year).
31
The AMP WG agreed that CPUE does not seem to be a measure of abundance or a
biomass index. For ORH 1, monitoring CPUE is not likely to provide a signal of
stock decline. CPUE has been used in ORH 1 as a management tool: the AMP spread
effort in an attempt to reduce fishing pressure on any one sub-area or feature (and
Area D in particular).
32
ORH 1 is a large area, with roughy spread across a number of areas and features.
Much of the area has not been explored, and there may be other orange roughy
populations in the unexplored parts of ORH 1. MFish is investigating the viability
and utility of a characterisation study to inform future estimates of roughy on known
but unfished features in ORH 1. By analogy with other areas, the likely total stock
size of orange roughy from known features in ORH 1 could be approximated. While
this may be informative, it would still not lead to any conclusive finding about the
sustainability of current harvesting, or the relationship of the stock to BMSY. Within
ORH 1, there are six Seamount Closures and one BPA which are or soon will be
closed to bottom trawling, which may include features that are likely to host roughy
populations.
33
Estimates of stock status and long-term sustainable yield are not expected to be
available in the near future. MFish considers that this is a stock where information is
inadequate and highly uncertain.
34
Obviously a meaningful stock assessment would be desirable to assess stock status
and BMSY, and to determine long-term sustainable yields. However, given the best
available information, MFish considers that it is not possible to assess BMSY for ORH
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1. Nevertheless, s 13 requires the Minister to set or vary the TAC with reference to
where the stock is in relation to BMSY. The best available information is presented in
this FAP on ORH 1, and will provide the Minister with a rational basis for his
decision.
35
All of the above information was presented in the IPP. No submission provided
additional information or alternative interpretations.
Assessment of Management Options
TAC
36
You must set a TAC under s 13 that maintains the stock at or above, or moves it
towards or above, a biomass level that can produce the MSY. The available
information for ORH 1 is uncertain and inadequate, and therefore you should be
cautious when making your decision, both in relation to its possible effect on
sustainability and its possible effect on utilisation. Options 2 and 3 adopt a
progressively more cautious approach in favour of sustainability, while still providing
for utilisation.
37
Under s 13, you may set a TAC that maintains the stock (13(2)(a)), rebuilds the stock
(13(2)(b)), or moves the stock from a position where it is above MSY (13(2)(c)), to a
biomass level at or above that which can produce the MSY. Given the level of
uncertainty of the information on stock status, it is not clear which of (a), (b), or (c)
should be applied. MFish proposes that you set the TAC for ORH 1 under section
13(2)(a) to maintain the stock at or above a level that can produce MSY, having
regard to the interdependence of stocks. That does not mean that adjustments to catch
limits cannot be made, provided those adjustments are considered by you to maintain
the stock at or above a biomass that can produce MSY.
38
However, given the uncertainty in the best available information regarding stock size
for ORH 1 and combined with a more cautious assessment of that information, you
may also consider that ORH 1 is more likely to be at a level below BMSY. If so, then s
13(2)(b) may also be an appropriate basis to set the TAC, in which case Option 3 is
likely to be the most suitable option.
39
No submission provided a view on the appropriate section of the Act under which to
set a TAC.
40
Options 2 and 3 propose varying the TAC. MFish is of the view that you can have
regard to the relevant social, cultural and economic factors for all options (an
approach supported by SeaFIC 5). To enable a proper comparison between the three
options, the FAP provides information on social, cultural and economic factors so that
you may determine their relevance.
TACC and Allowances
41
5
The TAC must be apportioned between the relevant sectors and interests set out under
the provisions of s 20 and 21 of the Act. Section 21 prescribes that you shall make
SeaFIC submission to the IPP, dated 27 July 2007, at paragraphs 23-27.
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allowances for Maori customary non-commercial interests, recreational fishing
interests, and for any other sources of fishing-related mortality, before setting the
TACC. In determining the TACC and these allowances, the Minster should consider
how the allowances will enable people to provide for their social, economic and
cultural wellbeing (as provided for in the purpose of the Act).
42
There is no known recreational or Mäori customary fishery for ORH 1. MFish
proposes that you set allowances of 0 tonnes for recreational and Mäori customary
fishing – consistent with the status quo that has existed since orange roughy became a
QMS species in 1986. MFish proposes that the current allowance for other sources of
fishing-related mortality be retained at 5% of the TACC, and is combined with the
TACC to make up the TAC.
43
No submission provided alternative information or viewpoints.
Recommended management measures
44
Each option includes a variety of management and sustainability measures that existed
under the AMP by industry agreement. Their adoption would result in a structured
management and monitoring plan to manage risks of localised depletion or
sustainability risks to localised stocks that might exist. Where the options differ is on
the TAC, TACC, and catch limits by sub-area.
45
While the overall ORH 1 TAC and TACC are important, a management and
monitoring plan to spread effort (with good compliance and reporting) most directly
influences the sustainability of the stock or stock complexes, and is therefore critical
to managing risk. As sub-area and feature limits (and reporting on them) cannot be
imposed without agreement, industry co-operation is required. Given the influence of
sub-QMA management on sustainability, the IPP recommended that the general
management approach for ORH 1 continue, including sub-area limits, feature limits,
biological sampling, observer coverage, and regular reporting.
46
The IPP recommended that most elements of the management and monitoring plan
continue to be implemented by industry agreement for the 2007/08 fishing year.
These elements are described in the ORH 1 AMP Management & Monitoring Plan
(M&MP) and Memorandum of Understanding for the Management of the ORH 1
Fishery between the ORH 1 Exploratory Fishing Company (EFC) Ltd & Owners of
ORH 1 Quota (MOU). MFish further recommended that these arrangements be
formalised (in their current or modified form) in a fisheries plan approved under s
11A of the Act by 1 October 2008, and that the Management & Monitoring Plan be
updated and agreed to by quota holders by 1 October 2007.
47
EFC, representing over 90% of quota owners, has agreed to this approach. The
M&MP and the MOU will be updated, and submitted for approval and execution by
quota owners controlling at least 90% of ORH 1 before 15 September 2007. TOKM
will work with EFC on this approach, and will ensure that the measures become
conditions for ACE transfers.
48
The EFC has also undertaken to develop and implement a fisheries plan by October
2008. SeaFIC submitted that it is “willing to provide support in the development of
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any fisheries plan for ORH 1” 6; TOKM suggests that “priority should be given to
MFish collaboratively developing a fisheries plan for ORH 1 with quota owners”. 7
49
The table below presents a summary of the recommended management measures. A
full description is found at Appendix 5.
Catch limits for each
sub-area (A, B, C and
D), and limits for each
of the features
Sub-area limits as proposed in each option. Feature limits
per sub-area: A = 100 t, B = 150 t, C = 150 t, D = 75 t,
Mercury Colville Box = 30 t.
Mercury-Colville Box
Maintain a 30 t bycatch-only limit (no orange roughy
targeting in this area).
Monitoring and
reporting
As per the M&MP/MOU with regards to notification,
reporting and ACE sales (see Appendix 5 for details).
Directed exploratory
fishing programme
Suspend for 2007. To be considered by working group to
establish value of continuing following an analysis of
results to date. If useful information is likely to be
generated, the working group can properly structure the
fishing programme in time for the winter 2008 fishery.
Observer coverage
MFish recommends 100% observer coverage for June and
July in sub-area A, C and D, for October in sub-area B.
Outside these months, the standard observer coverage of
approximately 10 to 15% is recommended.
Biological sampling
Standard sampling according to accepted protocols.
50
An analyst in the MFish Deepwater Team will be responsible for monitoring the ORH
1 fishery, and any deviance from the agreed management system will be followed up
with EFC, as will any discrepancies that may be detected between reported data,
statutory forms, and fishery-independent data (such as VMS).
51
MFish advises that fine scale management and reporting is the preferred approach for
this fishery, but that its success depends on all relevant groups working together.
52
MFish notes that the key parties support the development of a fisheries plan approved
under s 11A of the Act. EFC has submitted that it may be appropriate to integrate the
management of ORH 1 under the general orange roughy fishery plan being developed
with the Deepwater Group Limited (subject to approval by shareholders from both
companies). MFish would welcome this approach, with its improved likelihood of
consistent management approaches for orange roughy stocks, and will fully evaluate
this option with the relevant stakeholders.
53
Several submissions discussed whether the fisheries plan should be structured around
s 13 or s 14 (s 14 establishes a TAC that meets the Purpose of the Act, rather than in
relation to BMSY, as required by s 13). MFish agrees with SeaFIC that such issues are
6
7
SeaFIC submission to the IPP, dated 27 July 2007, at paragraph 55.
TOKM submission to the IPP, at paragraph 28.
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matters for discussion of a fisheries plan; as such they are not relevant to this FAP, but
these views will usefully inform future work on the management of orange roughy.
Option 1 - Retain the 1 470 tonne TAC and 1 400 tonne TACC
54
Option 1 retains the current TAC of 1,470 tonnes, the TACC of 1,400 tonnes, and
sub-area limits of 200 t for sub-area A, 500 t for sub-Area B, 500 t for sub-Area C,
and 200 t for sub-Area D. This option also proposes the continuation of the feature
limits by sub-area and other recommended management measures described above
and in Appendix 5.
55
At the start of the AMP, scientific advice was that the stock was likely to have been
above the BMSY level. The latest scientific advice has confirmed that it is now
unknown whether or not the ORH 1 stock is at, above, or below BMSY. MFish
considers that continuing the current TAC could enable ORH 1 to be managed at, or
above, BMSY. However, there is increased risk that the TAC under this option will not
achieve this target level over the long-term.
56
The ORH 1 TACC has not been fully caught since it was set at 1,400 tonnes (70 to
92% caught, mean of 82%). 8 This is not entirely unexpected in a fishery managed by
spreading effort into unfished areas; Area C for example, with a limit of 500 t has
never been more than 75% caught. Area B now represents the largest ORH 1 fishery
(since the decline of Mercury-Colville in Area D), with a relatively stable target catch
of about 450 t, close to the 500 t area limit.
Option 2 - Reduce the TAC to 1 208 tonnes and the TACC to 1 150 tonnes
57
Option 2 adopts a more cautious approach to ensuring sustainability than Option 1 by
reducing the TAC to 1,208 tonnes, the TACC to 1,150 tonnes. This option adopts a
correspondingly less cautious approach to providing for utilisation that does Option 1.
This option also proposes the continuation of the feature limits by sub-area and other
recommended management measures described above and in Appendix 5.
58
Two sub-options are presented with regards to requested sub-area limits. In Option
2a, an approximately 20% reduction across all sub-areas is requested, resulting in subarea limits to 175 t for sub-area A, 400 t for sub-area B, 400 t for sub-area C, and 175
t for sub-area D. 9 In Option 2b, the entire reduction in TACC is taken from sub-area
C, resulting in sub-area limits of 200 t for sub-area A, 500 t for sub-area B, 250 t for
sub-area C, and 200 t for sub-area D.
59
The proposed reduction to the TAC of 20% under Option 2, in particular if effected
through Option 2a, may provide greater certainty over the longer term that ORH 1
will be managed at or above BMSY, in light of the uncertainties in the best available
information and uncertain stock information. It is, however, not possible to ascertain
8
As of 27 August 2007, catch for the 2006/07 fishing year is approximately 1,020 tonnes. Over the past ten
years, very little orange roughy has been harvested in September. Accordingly, it is unlikely that more than
1,100 tonnes (or 79% of the TACC) will be taken in 2006/07.
9
Calculations of catch by sub-area for tows targeting ORH are taken from Table 1 from AMP WG 2007/30,
Report to SeaFIC on the orange roughy Adaptive Management Programme in ORH 1 by Owen Anderson, dated
April 2007. Table 1 from this report was reproduced to show all catch of ORH irrespective of target in personal
communication to MFish on 7 June 2007. These sources are used throughout the FAP.
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with any certainty the actual or likely effect of the proposed TAC on the biomass and
sustainability of ORH1, and is best characterised as a risk mitigation approach. The
cost to utilisation must be weighed against this mitigation in risks to sustainability.
60
Option 2, and Option 2a in particular, places greater weight on the level of uncertainty
generally, and the risk that a sustainability problem might not be detected in advance
of substantial stock depletion (due largely to the biological nature of the stock, and the
use of CPUE analysis as the primary assessment tool). Since stock status is not
known, Option 2, and Option 2a in particular, provides greater certainty to the
decision maker that sustainability is ensured over the longer term. This greater level
of certainty must be balanced with the greater costs for industry of this option.
61
Option 2a would result in an appreciable reduction in fishing mortality, as each subarea limit is reduced. Since the current limit for sub-area A and B is close to the
current catch for those areas, catch would be reduced in A and B. The limit for subarea C would still be greater than any catch recorded, allowing for some expansion in
catch in this area (within the limits of the reduced TACC). The limit for sub-area D
would be modestly above the long term average catch for this sub-area, but is lower
than the most recent year’s catch.
62
Option 2b would effect the reduction in the TACC only by reducing the limit in subarea C. 250 t is just over the 5-year average catch (average is 233.3 tonnes) for this
sub-area, although in 2005/06, catch was estimated at 375 tonnes, a 30% increase over
the next-highest catch from that sub-area. As of 28 August 2007, catch in sub-area C
is 315 tonnes for 2006/07. 10 Although Option 2b removes the ‘headroom’ (the
difference between actual and allowable catch), this calculation is done based on the
average catch. MFish notes that in the recent two years, catch has well exceeded the
average, so a 250 t limit would reduce catch in sub-area C.
63
In the absence of an assessment of stock size or status or sustainable yield, and
therefore no assessment that the current TAC is sustainable, this approach adopts a
more cautious catch limit with respect to risk to sustainability. The cautious approach
under Option 2 recognises the specific biological characteristics of this species and the
isolated features within ORH 1 that are particularly susceptible to over-fishing.
Option 3 - Reduce the TAC to 914 tonnes and the TACC to 870 tonnes
64
Option 3 adopts the most cautious approach, by reducing the TAC to 914 tonnes, and
the TACC to 870 tonnes, and requesting sub-area limits of 150 t for sub-area A, 380 t
for sub-area B, 190 t for sub-area C, and 150 t for sub-area D. This option also
proposes the continuation of the feature limits by sub-area and other recommended
management measures described above and in Appendix 5.
65
You may select Option 3 while setting the TAC under s 13(2)(a), if you consider the
reduction necessary to maintain the stock at or above a biomass that can produce
MSY. However, MFish considers a reduction of this magnitude may be more suited
to a determination that setting the TAC under s 13(2)(b) is more appropriate, and that
10
Given the historical pattern of fishing, with only 200 kg recorded as caught in sub-area C in September, this is
likely to be close to the total catch for sub-area C for 2006/07.
58 of 397
the risk that ORH 1 is below BMSY is sufficiently great that a reduction is required to
rebuild the stock.
66
The TACC under Option 3 is a 38% reduction over the current catch limit. It would
be effected by reducing each sub-area limit by 25% from the five-year average
landings by sub-area. Option 3 removes all ‘headroom’ from all sub-areas.
67
Option 3 would result in the greatest reduction in fishing mortality across ORH 1. In
one respect, Option 3 provides the greatest certainty that over the longer term ORH 1
will be managed at or above BMSY, in light of the uncertainties in the best available
information and uncertain stock information.
68
Option 3 places the greatest weight on the level of uncertainty generally, and adopts
the most cautious catch limit. Option 3 adopts a TAC that will likely provide for
management at or above BMSY at the ORH 1 stock level, although there remains risk
that parts of the stock will be over-exploited.
Discussion of TAC options
69
Industry has agreed to a structured fishing approach, including the setting of sub-area
and feature limits, as well as the range of measures described in Appendix 5.
Views from Stakeholders
70
Quota owners have pointed out that there is no evidence that the ORH 1 fishery is
under stress, through, for example, declining catch rates. 11 EFC has stated that “the
fishery is not sending any signals to the fishers that there needs to be a reduction in
the level of catch.” 12 EFC submits that there are no reports from skippers that catches
or ORH 1 are getting scarcer, or additional effort is required to maintain catches.
Instead, “catches are being spread and new concentrations of ORH 1 are being found
on a regular basis”. 13
71
Paul Starr, an independent scientist contracted to SeaFIC, stated that “analysis shows
that the catch rates in [the sub-areas other than D] are above the 2.0 t/tow threshold
specified in the AMP, indicating that the Fishstock is most likely in reasonable health
and not affected by strong sustainability concerns.” 14 Therefore, according to EFC,
“retaining the current TAC/TACC will not pose a risk to the stock in the long term”. 15
72
EFC has submitted that “the fishery is largely undeveloped and conservatively
managed and that the fishery has the potential to sustainably produce levels of catch
11
Submission to the Primary Production Committee on the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill on behalf of the
Anton’s Group of Companies. Submission dated 16 April 2007. See also EFC submission to the Review of
Sustainability Measures and Other Management Controls for the 2007/08 Fishing Year, dated 31 July 2007.
Paragraph 6.5.
12
Submission from the ORH 1 Exploratory Fishing Company Limited, dated 31 July, Re: Review of
Sustainability Measures and Other Management Controls for the 2006/2007 Fishing Year (1 October Stocks).
13
EFC submission to the Review of Sustainability Measures and Other Management Controls for the 2007/08
Fishing Year, dated 31 July 2007, paragraph 6.6.
14
Affidavit of Paul Joseph Starr in support of application for interim relief. Filed in the High Court of New
Zealand, 22 September 2006. Paragraph 14.
15
EFC submission to the IPP, dated 31 July 2007. Paragraph 5.2.
59 of 397
above the current TACC”. 16 Anton’s has characterised this fishery as “steady with
potential for expansion” 17 and SeaFIC submits that there may be considerable
developmental potential within this fishery. 18 The basis for SeaFIC’s assessment is
that less than 0.2% of the fishable area was trawled between 2000 and 2006. 19
73
With their submission, Anton’s included a CD-ROM showing digital photos of
codends filled with orange roughy, and acoustic data from the sounder from FV
Seamount Explorer. The screen shots show (unidentified) fish aggregations along the
bottom at depths of 800-1100 metres, and are provided to present “an informative
visual outline of the fishery”. 20 The CD-ROM has been provided for your
information.
74
Anton’s believes “there is nothing to suggest that the current catch rates cannot be
maintained”. 21 Moreover, if there “were any indications that the current TACC was
unsustainable then the ORH 1 EFC, as the relevant stakeholder organisation, would
support a reduction in the TACC”. 22
75
SeaFIC has pointed out in a recent communication that a sensible approach to
gathering information, such as on stock status, “is to actually do something [i.e. fish at
a particular level] and then carefully monitor the effects of that activity and adjust
management approaches in response to the information gathered.” 23 By developing a
‘survey-like’ approach to management, rotating effort between areas over a multi-year
cycle, may allow for catch rates to “be interpreted as relative indices at least of local
abundance to guide management”. 24 This would, in effect, be looking for the ‘signal’
that the EFC has not yet seen. This is ‘adaptive management’, and is based on (and a
further developed form of) the approach taken to manage ORH 1 for much of the past
decade.
76
Given the willingness to develop a fisheries plan, and no sustainability concern for
this year, SeaFIC and TOKM submit that the current TAC should be maintained for a
further year. According to SeaFIC, this “would provide [a] stronger basis for
developing an enduring long term strategy for the sustainable management of ORH 1
than the imposition of a TAC reduction that could disrupt the fishery and cause
significant economic impacts in the interim.” 25
16
EFC submission to the IPP, dated 31 July 2007, paragraph 2.5.
Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill on behalf
of the Anton’s Group of Companies. Submission dated 16 April 2007. Paragraph 64, p.13. Repeated in the
18
SeaFIC submission on the IPP, 27 July 2007, at paragraph 62.
19
20
EFC submission to the IPP, dated 31 July 2007, paragraph 4.1 to 4.5.
21
Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill on
behalf of the Anton’s Group of Companies. Submission dated 16 April 2007. Paragraph 64, p.13.
22
EFC submission to the IPP, dated 31 July 2007, paragraph 6.5. See also the Submission to the Primary
Production Select Committee on the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill on behalf of the Anton’s Group of
Companies. Submission dated 16 April 2007. Paragraph 63, p.13: if there was “any evidence of stress then the
Submitters, as the majority quota holder, would be prepared to accept any cuts which need to be made in the
long term interest of the fishery and their quota holdings”.
23
The New Zealand Seafood Industry Council Ltd Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on
the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill. Submission dated 13 April 2007.
24
25
17
60 of 397
77
RFC submit that fisheries should be healthy and well-managed, and support option 3,
to reduce the TACC to 870 tonnes.
78
ECO, RF&B, and WWF support a TAC of less than 500 tonnes, which is lower than
the options considered in the IPP. The submitters support a TAC reduction as a
precautionary measure, given the uncertainty regarding stock status, the vulnerability
of orange roughy to overfishing, and environmental impact of fishing practices. The
ENGO view is that the absence of information should require lower catch limits,
although there is no particular rationale for the preference for a 500 t TAC (except
that it is lower than the most conservative option in the IPP, and therefore more
cautious in favour of sustainability).
79
Therefore there is agreement between MFish and the WG, quota owners, and vessel
operators that there is no evidence of an immediate sustainability risk. The RFC and
ENGO submissions did not present an alternative view on this point. However, there
is a divergence of views between submitters when recommending what management
action be taken in such circumstances.
80
To summarise the view from industry (SeaFIC, Anton’s, EFC, TOKM):
81
•
the TAC and TACC should remain unchanged, at least in the short term;
•
the focus should be on the development of a well-designed structured fishing
programme to ensure the careful development and management of the fishery;
•
a fishery plan, incorporating this approach should be the management vehicle in
the future; and
•
the current limit is appropriate given the development of a structured fisheries plan
in the near future, and the potential presence of orange roughy in unexplored
regions of ORH 1.
To summarise the view from the ENGOs (RF&B, ECO, WWF):
•
the TAC and TACC should drop significantly, to a precautionary limit of less than
500 tonnes;
•
this reduced limit is appropriate given the biological characteristics of the species,
the impact of trawling on the seabed, and the lack of information on stock status.
MFish Analysis and Comment
82
Due to the biological characteristics of orange roughy, the nature of the ORH 1
fishery (widely dispersed over a large area fishing relatively smaller aggregations),
and the sort of information that has been collected on a fishery of those
characteristics, evidence of unsustainable harvesting levels and stock decline will
likely only be available following a major stock decline. MFish agrees with SeaFIC
that a fine-scale management approach provides the best opportunity to detect and
respond to a sustainability risk. However, MFish considers that this does not mean
that the risk will be detected, but rather there is a greater likelihood than would be the
case with management at the QMA level.
61 of 397
83
Therefore, the updated information currently available on the stock at this fine-scale
level could be considered annually, and each year the risk to the stock for that year
could legitimately be judged low, until the stock was overexploited with dismal
prospects for recovery. Alternatively (and also plausibly, given the level of
uncertainty), the annual short-term risk could equally continue indefinitely with no
long-term overexploitation.
84
The history of orange roughy management in New Zealand has several examples of
high early catch rates, followed by a sharp decline in CPUE, and evidence of serial
depletion. Because of the aggregating behaviour of orange roughy, it is easy to
overestimate the unfished biomass. Given these characteristics, and the low long-term
sustainable yields, the BMSY target has been exceeded in many orange roughy
fisheries. 26
85
There is no discernable CPUE trend in ORH 1. It is possible that catch rates (t/tow)
could remain high, and certainly above the threshold of 2.0 t/tow, until the stock
becomes severely depleted.
The link between any CPUE level and stock
sustainability is at best weak and likely undetectable.
86
The use of CPUE, despite its shortcomings, has been employed because of the size of
the stock – an investment into better information has not been deemed affordable
given the likely return. 27 More costly research, such as acoustic surveys, may allow
more accurate monitoring, although it is also possible that a substantial investment
would not lead to any improved information or reduced uncertainty.
87
As SeaFIC has argued in a general context in a submission to the Primary Production
Committee, the extent of precautionary measures must be commensurate with the
potential risks. 28 As put by the Deepwater Group Limited, there “must be a
reasonable balance between the stringency of precautionary measures (with their
associated financial or opportunity costs) and the seriousness and irreversibility of the
potential threat”. 29 Although not made with reference to ORH 1 specifically, MFish
agrees with the comments, and their application to ORH 1. Information is provided in
this FAP both on the potential threat to sustainability of ORH 1, and on the likely
effect on fishers. You should examine the information on both sustainability and
financial impacts in this particular case, and decide upon the weight given them.
88
MFish agrees with SeaFIC that the “acceptability of uncertainty diminishes as the
severity of potential negative effects increases”. 30 Due to the high degree of
uncertainty, in deciding between the options you should therefore form a view as to
the possible severity of the possible ORH 1 depletion in determining if the level of
26
Source: Annal, Clark, Clement and Cornelius, Management of New Zealand orange roughy fisheries – a deep
learning curve, in Deep Sea 2003: Conference on the Governance and Management of Deep-sea Fisheries.
FAO 3/1. 2005.
27
An acoustic survey would likely cost millions of dollars, exceeding the value of the fishery. MFish and the
EFC both consider this cost to be prohibitive, and not warranted by the prospective catch.
28
The New Zeland Seafood Industry Council Ltd Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on
the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill. Submission dated 13 April 2007. Paragraph 72, p.18.
29
Deepwater Group Ltd Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on the Fisheries Act 1996
Amendment Bill. Submission dated 13 April 2007. Paragraph 11, page 2.
30
The New Zeland Seafood Industry Council Ltd Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on
the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill. Submission dated 13 April 2007. Paragraph 72, p.18.
62 of 397
uncertainty is acceptable. The greater the consequences of stock depletion, the more
certain you should be that the effect of your decisions will avoid this outcome.
Way and rate of moving to BMSY
89
Section 13(2)(a), maintaining a stock at or above BMSY, does not require a
consideration of the way and rate a stock moves to the target. However, given the
level of uncertainty on stock size, MFish has advised (at paragraphs 37-38) a more
cautious assessment of that information s 13(2)(b) may also be an appropriate basis to
set the TAC to rebuild the stock. This section discusses additional considerations if
you choose to act under s 13(2)(b).
90
If you determine that a rebuild is needed and a reduction is required to rebuild the
stock is appropriate, you must decide on the way and the rate to rebuild the stock.
MFish has provided you with two possible TAC levels (1150 t and 870 t). There is no
statutory guidance on what an appropriate ‘way and rate’ might be in any given case –
it is a matter for you to determine having regard to such social, cultural, and economic
factors you consider relevant. The social, cultural and economic factors that MFish
views as relevant to a consideration of way and rate are set out in detail in paragraphs
107 to 121.
91
In the case of ORH 1, given the uncertainty information on stock size and distribution,
it is not possible to determine any meaningful periods of rebuild or candidate way and
rate assessments for your consideration. With such uncertainty over current stock
status, it is equally not possible to measure the ‘rate’ of movement towards a target
level. However, if you determine that a stock rebuild is appropriate under the
circumstances, MFish considers that a smaller TAC reduction would likely provide
for a slower rebuild (stock increase) than that which otherwise would occur under
Option 3. You may consider a slower rebuild to be appropriate given the social,
cultural and economic factors discussed at paragraphs 107 to 121.
92
Similarly, you may consider a series of staged TAC cuts as a different ‘way’ of
rebuilding ORH 1 to the target level, which would also provide for a slower rebuild
than that which otherwise would occur under a single larger TAC reduction. Such a
staged reduction may allow fishers to mitigate some of the adverse economic, social
and cultural impacts of a large TAC reduction. For example, in light of the significant
effect that Option 3 is likely to have on short term utilisation by commercial ORH 1
fishers, it is open to you to make a smaller TAC reduction than that proposed by
Option 3 (such as the reduction proposed by Option 2) with a view to making (in
principle) a further reduction for the 1 October 2008/09 fishing year. In other words,
you may select any series of staged TAC reductions (including reductions less than
those proposed by option 2 and 3) to reach the ultimate target level. MFish considers
that if you are rebuilding the stock, any TAC and TACC between those of Option 1
and 3 are reasonable. MFish could provide you with further advice on this approach
should you wish to make a decision on this basis.
93
That said, you must be aware that any future decision (as part of a staged reduction,
such as for the October 2008/09 fishing year) on the TAC would be a fresh decision,
based on the best information available at that time. MFish advises that it is unlikely
that there will be any better information at that time in relation to the stock with
respect to BMSY, or improved way and rate assessments for ORH 1.
63 of 397
94
EFC has submitted that any catch limit reduction would have substantial adverse
economic impacts. If this is the case, then several of the economic (and ancillary
social) consequences might occur irrespective of a staged reduction designed to
mitigate these effects.
95
MFish acknowledges that, having considered such economic, social and cultural
factors as those outlined in paragraphs 107 to 121), it is also open to you to prefer the
level of TAC reduction proposed by Option 3 in order to provide what may be a faster
period of rebuild for ORH 1. This, in effect, would be to choose that the way and rate
of rebuilding the stock should be through a one-time TAC and TACC reduction. As
noted previously, MFish considers that Option 3 would provide greater certainty that
over the longer term ORH 1 will be managed at or above BMSY, in light of the
uncertainties in the best available information.
Statutory Considerations
96
When setting sustainability measures, and when making decisions under the authority
of the Act, you are required to consider a series of principles and factors.
Interdependence of stocks: section 13(2)(a) and (b)
97
This section should be read in conjunction with the fish bycatch section (paragraph
129).
98
Available information about the interdependence of stocks is inadequate to provide
guidance on the appropriate level for a TAC. At times there has been significant ORH
1 bycatch to targeted fishing for other deepwater species (such as cardinal fish and
alfonsino), and this could have contributed to overcatch of sub-area and feature limits.
99
Between 2001−02 and 2005−06, the estimated catch of targeted orange roughy ranged
from 872 to 1183 tonnes. Over the same years, the estimated bycatch of orange
roughy taken when fishing for cardinal fish ranged between 11 and 122 tonnes per
year, and the bycatch of orange roughy taken when fishing for alfonsino ranged from
an estimated 1 to 102 tonnes per year. In general, the trend in ORH 1 has been a
steady decrease in the volumes of orange roughy taken as bycatch; in 2005/06, less
than 2% of the orange roughy catch was taken as a bycatch. Almost all bycatch
orange roughy last year came from sub-area D as a bycatch in the target cardinal fish
fishery.
100
However, as the TACCs for several deepwater stocks are under-caught, catch in these
stocks could increase (and therefore ORH 1 bycatch). For example, the TACCs for
CDL 1, BYX 1, RIB 1, and RBY 1 have been greatly under-caught during the last five
years. 31
101
On balance, MFish advises that bycatch is not a significant consideration in setting a
TAC for ORH 1.
102
As noted above, you may determine that the risk that ORH1 is below BMSY is
significant, given the uncertainty in the best available information and applying a
31
Except BYX1 in 2004/05, in which catch equalled the TACC.
64 of 397
cautious approach to sustainability. If so, then s 13(2)(b) is the appropriate basis to
set the TAC. Under this subsection, as well as having regard to the interdependence
of stocks in considering the way and rate the ORH 1 should be moved towards BMSY,
you must also consider the period of time appropriate for doing so, having regard to
the biological characteristics of ORH 1 and any environmental conditions affecting
ORH 1:
a)
Biological characteristics: orange roughy are late maturing and very longlived, which are biological characteristics that render them slow to recover
from overfishing. Accordingly, the rate of rebuild would be long, in the order
of generations. Orange roughy form aggregations both to spawn and outside
the spawning period over identifiable features, making them susceptible to
overfishing and localised depletion.
b)
Environmental conditions:
MFish is not aware of any specific
environmental conditions affecting the ORH1 stock. However, environmental
factors may have influenced the distribution of orange roughy, contributing to
the rapid decline in abundance in the Mercury-Colville Box in the late 1990s.
Purpose of the Act: section 8
103
The options presented provide for different levels of utilisation through the setting of
catch limits and allowances. The sustainability risk may be greater under Option 1;
Options 2 and 3 are a more cautious approach, since a lower catch, in the absence of
information, has a higher probability of being sustainable over the long term.
104
You must weigh up providing for the utilisation of orange roughy with ensuring the
sustainability of orange roughy – however, ensuring sustainability is the ultimate
objective. In this particular case, the decision is confounded by unquantified
sustainability risks and benefits of TAC levels, and utilisation risks being more easily
quantified. You must be satisfied that your decision will ensure sustainability while
providing for utilisation. This does not require the selection of Option 2 or 3; given
the uncertainty of information, you must exercise your judgement, and may determine
that Option 1 satisfies your obligation with respect to sustainability. With respect to
ORH 1, given the uncertainty of the information and the biological characteristics of
the species, MFish considers that all options are reasonable and consistent with the
Purpose of the Act.
105
The ENGO submissions support a TAC and TACC reduction greater than that of
Option 3. In MFish’s view, in the absence of evidence of immediate sustainability
risk, MFish has judged that the under Option 3 represents the outer boundary of what
is reasonable. That said, given the available information, there is room for broad
interpretation of whether the drastic catch reductions suggested by ENGOs (which
assume a high degree of caution in favour of a reduced sustainability risk) could
arguably meet the Purpose of the Act. Therefore, you are entitled to adopt a different
view than that of MFish.
106
While you must consider both providing for utilisation and ensuring sustainability in
your decision, you are entitled to determine that the protection of orange roughy from
over-exploitation warrants more weight being given to the sustainability element over
the utilisation element of the Purpose of the Act. You are also entitled to determine
that the combined effect of his tolerance for sustainability risk with the socio65 of 397
economic factors mean that a TAC reduction does not best meet the purpose of the
Act.
Social, cultural and economic wellbeing and factors: section 8, section
13(3) and 13(4)
107
Retaining the current TAC and TACC would enable greater utilisation benefits, at
least in the short term. It also provides a greater number of CPUE data points, which
is cost-effective data gathering. Reducing the TAC and TACC under Option 2 would
constrain utilisation, and Option 2a in particular would considerably reduce revenues
from the fishery. Option 3 imposes the greatest constraint on utilisation.
Economic wellbeing and factors
108
The ORH 1 catch is New Zealand’s second largest after ORH 3B, taking about 8% of
the total orange roughy landings. ORH 1 fishing is conducted throughout the year,
although large catches are taken in the June - July spawning season, and October in
sub-area B. Three companies hold 90% of ORH 1 quota; the remainder is settlement
quota held by 38 different Maori interests.
109
Since 2001/02, between 4 and 7 vessels (from 3 to 7 companies) have recorded ORH
1 catch in excess of 5 tonnes each year. 12 vessels have recorded catch in excess of 5
tonnes at least once over the five-year period. The vessels in the fleet range between
25 and 44 metres, with an average length of approximately 33 metres. The ORH 1
fleet is composed primarily of domestic fresher vessels (no freezing capacity) with
only minor participation by foreign charter vessels.
110
The ORH 1 fishery is a significant contributor to the $84.1 million export value
(2006) of orange roughy. Of the various export states, 87% by value (or 64% by
weight) of orange roughy is either chilled or frozen fillets. It is not possible to
determine the percentage of ORH 1 that is exported as fillets (as opposed to a lessprocessed state), but if it is significant, then there would be substantial shore-based
value-added for the ORH 1 catch.
111
The direct economic effects of each option are estimated in the following table:
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
1,400
1,150
870
$4.19
$3.44
$2.60
Export value (millions) 33
$6.34
$5.21
$3.94
Reduction over status quo
0
18%
38%
TACC (tonnes)
Gross landed value (millions)
32
32
Gross landed value estimated by multiplying the port price ($2.99/kg for 2007/08) by the TACC.
Export value was estimated by multiplying the export price by the TACC. In 2006, 4,601 tonnes of orange
roughy fillets (fresh and frozen) were sold for $72.93 million. The standard conversion factor for fillets is 3.5,
so 4,601 tonnes of fillets is estimated to equal 16,103 tonnes of orange roughy (greenweight). Therefore, in
fillet form, the average price is $4.53 per greenweight kilogram.
33
66 of 397
112
This table assumes that the full TACC is caught. Over the past five years, the TACC
has been 70 to 92% caught. Therefore the table overestimates both the economic
value of Option 1, and the per cent reduction over the status quo. If the average of
actual catches by sub-area over five years is used, then Option 2b imposes no landed
value or export value reductions (as the option reduces the TACC only by eliminating
the headroom – or the unused portion of the catch limit – in sub-area C). 34 MFish
notes that catches from the two most recent fishing years (2005/06 and 2006/07) from
sub-area C are both above the five-year average, and therefore a lower limit as
proposed by Option 2b would result in catch reductions in sub-area C.
113
Information on the economic consequences of the catch limit reductions last year was
produced in response to the IPP of June 2006, during court proceedings following the
Minister’s decision in September 2006, and in submissions to the 2007 IPP. This
provides guidance to the Minister on the possible economic consequences of the
options. Last year’s proposed TACC was 800 t (moderately more severe than Option
3 this year); Option 2, with a TACC of 1,150 t is in between the current limit and that
proposed last year. Comments received with regard to an 800 t TACC likely
represent the outer boundary of possible economic impacts of the current set of
options. Fishers have proffered the following views and information on the economic
effects of the TAC reductions:
a)
Anton’s, representing 66.3% of ORH 1 quota, argued that the proposed
reductions would be “extremely detrimental.” The immediate impact would
be a loss in gross revenue of between $0.75 and $1.6 million. The EFC
submission puts the total loss across all quota holders at $1.3 to $2.7 million.
This estimate is based on an assumption that 1,400 tonnes would otherwise be
caught; since the TACC has been consistently undercaught, this slightly
overestimates the revenue loss that would result from either Option 2 or 3.
The calculated revenue loss was based on a sale price of USD $4.50/lb, and an
exchange rate of $0.66. MFish estimates that the price for orange roughy
fillets has softened, and the current exchange rate is about $0.70. EFC submits
that the greenweight port price has dropped to $2.50/kg for 2007. The
consequence of these changes (i.e. how it affects an economic loss calculation)
depends on the nature of the sales arrangements made with US buyers.
b)
With regards to last year’s proposed TACC reduction, Anton’s submitted that
they would have to tie up a vessel and lay off staff”. 35 Anton’s confirmed in
34
Option 2b effects the TACC reduction by reducing the sub-area catch limit for sub-area C from its current
level of 500 tonnes down to 250 tonnes. All other sub-area limits remain unchanged. The following table
shows the actual catch from sub-area C:
As the table illustrates, there is no landed value or export value loss for the
Year
Landings
average Area C. For 2002, 2003 and in particular 2006 and 2007, when the catch
2001/02
280.6
was higher than the average, a sub-area limit of 250 tonnes would impose some
2002/03
285.7
economic loss.
2003/04
142.4
2004/05
190.6
2006/06
375.3
2006/07
315*
* As at 28 August 2007. There has historically be very little catch in sub-Area C in
September, so 315 t is likely to be close to the 2006/07 total
35
Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill on behalf
67 of 397
this year’s submission that the vessel would be uneconomic under a reduced
TACC, and that there would be additional indirect losses arising from “selling
or decommissioning surplus vessels, plant capacity, and resultant
redundancies.” 36
114
c)
Anton’s submitted that, with respect to its vessels, the holding costs of laying
up the vessel would be in the region of $300,000 per annum, 37 and that the
world market for the 43 metre trawler Seamount Explorer is such that it would
be difficult to sell outright.
d)
Anton’s submitted that the international reputation of New Zealand fisheries
management system would be damaged by a TAC and TACC reduction.
e)
In an affidavit, the Managing Director of Anton’s stated that a cut in ORH 1 to
800 t would have “an impact on personnel in the processing sector but the
level of disruption is difficult to assess” but that it would be significant as one
third of Anton’s processed product is orange roughy. 38
f)
Anton’s submitted that an 800 t TACC “could well have a detrimental impact
on the bank’s assessments of the Anton’s group and on the bank’s view of the
fishing industry in general. Our initial assessment is that the cuts are of such a
magnitude that they are likely to put us in breach of at least two of our banking
covenants.” 39 The submission on the 2007 IPP did not comment on this
position.
In 2000/01, between the two AMP programmes, the TACC was set at 800 tonnes. For
that year, Anton’s advised that one of its two vessels was deployed to fish orange
roughy outside New Zealand’s 200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 40 The costs
of outside-EEZ fishing are high (due to fuel costs for transit), making it economically
less attractive than fishing closer to port. If Option 2 or 3 is selected, it is not apparent
that fishing vessels could fish economically outside the EEZ. In addition, you have
also recently announced that effective 30 September 2006:
a)
Bottom trawling in the high seas of the South Pacific must not exceed current
levels and must not expand into any new areas of the high seas
b)
Current bottom trawling activities may continue only if they can satisfy an
independently peer-reviewed process that they will not cause significant
adverse effects to vulnerable marine ecosystems such as seamounts,
hydrothermal vents, cold water corals and sponge fields.
The effect of this announcement is uncertain, but it at least raises the possibility that
high seas bottom trawling options for displaced ORH 1 companies may be reduced.
of the Anton’s Group of Companies. Submission dated 16 April 2007. Paragraph 66, p.13
36
37
Affidavit of Milan Stephen John Barbarich in support of application for interim relief, filed in the High Court
of New Zealand, 22 September 2006, para 75, p 19.
38
of New Zealand, 22 September 2006, para 74, p 18.
39
of New Zealand, 22 September 2006, para 78, p 19-20.
40
of New Zealand, 13 October 2006, para 20, p 6.
68 of 397
115
Sanford Limited, the other major quota holder, did not provide comment on the
current ORH 1 IPP. Sanford did provide a submission opposing the TAC and TACC
reduction last year, but it did not include an assessment of economic consequences.
116
In general, many of the costs in deepwater fisheries are more or less fixed – vessels,
shore-based facilities, overhead, etc. – and these are not easily or quickly scaled back
to respond to catch decreases. Although a lower TACC will reduce or eliminate some
variable costs – such as fuel, some labour, etc. – the general effect is that the decrease
in revenue (from fewer fish) usually well exceeds the decrease in costs. Irrespective
of the overall amounts, this means reduced profitability.
117
Based on available information, MFish’s assessment is that that the possible TACC
reductions would impose significant economic hardship on the majority quota owner.
118
ECO submits that economic considerations should not be focused on losses to
industry, but should include considerations of the annual loss in natural capital that
could be mitigated by a reduction in catch. MFish is unable to quantify such indirect
costs and believes these issues are better considered as part of the Minister’s
obligations to set a TAC and TACC at a sustainable level.
Social wellbeing and factors
119
Catch reductions can have social implications when employment opportunities for
catching and processing staff are reduced. The information MFish has on the impact
on employment that might arise from Options 2 and 3 is discussed under Economic
Factors.
120
There is no known recreational or customary fishing for orange roughy, and no
allowance has been provided to non-commercial extractive users. There is a broad
social benefit to New Zealand from the supply of orange roughy to the domestic
market, and there is a general public benefit from the maintenance of orange roughy
populations. Both of these issues are adequately addressed by maintaining a
sustainable fishery.
Cultural wellbeing and factors
121
MFish is not aware of any cultural factors relevant to these TAC or TACC decisions,
and no such factors have been raised by submitters.
International obligations and the Treaty of Waitangi (section 5)
122
Decision-makers are required to act in a manner consistent with New Zealand’s
international obligations relating to fishing, including the Law of the Sea and the Fish
Stocks agreement as well as regional fishery management agreements. Decisionmakers must also act in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Treaty of
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. MFish considers that the proposed
options are consistent with both New Zealand’s international obligations relating to
fishing and the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992.
69 of 397
Environmental principles (section 9) and Effects on the aquatic
environment: section 11(1)(a)
123
You must take into account any effects of fishing on any stock and the aquatic
environment. You must also take into account the following principles:
a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that
ensures their long-term viability;
b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained;
c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be
protected.
124
ENGO submissions consider that environmental considerations have not been
adequately reflected, and that a precautionary and ecosystem approach is required.
125
The specific nature and extent of effects of ORH 1 fishing on any stock and the
environment generally are not known. While some bycatch of non-harvested species
is known, information is inadequate to determine the impact that fishing for ORH 1
might be having. Bycatch of corals has been raised as an issue in orange roughy
fisheries in New Zealand and this is addressed in the area closures within ORH 1
discussed below. No specific concerns have been raised at this time on issues which
would affect setting the TAC for ORH 1.
126
No habitats of particular significance for fisheries management that should be
protected are currently known.
Marine mammals
127
The available observer information indicates that incidental captures of marine
mammals do not occur in the ORH 1 target fishery. Therefore, the proposed options
are likely to have no adverse implications for marine mammals.
Seabirds
128
Although trawl fisheries for orange roughy are known to interact with seabirds, the
available observer information indicates that incidental captures of seabirds are
infrequent in the ORH 1 target fishery (three birds captured over ten years ago, all
landed on deck and released unharmed). Therefore, the proposed options are likely to
have no adverse implications for seabirds.
Fish bycatch
129
ECO submits that there is poor reporting of bycatch species which are not of
commercial interest. ECO raises deepwater sharks as an area of particular concern.
130
Orange roughy is one of several deepwater species that share similar ecological
habitats in the area of ORH 1. In the past, there has been significant ORH 1 bycatch
in alfonsino (BYX) target tows (100 tonnes in 2001/02); in the four most recent years,
this catch has dropped to an average of 4 tonnes per year. There has also been
substantial ORH 1 bycatch in the black cardinal fish (CDL) fishery (average of 82
tonnes over the past 5 years), in particular in sub-area D. For ORH 1 target tows,
70 of 397
CDL, rattails (RAT), and sharks and dogfish not otherwise specified (OSD) are the
most common bycatch. 41
131
Given the low level of bycatch of other species in ORH 1 target tows, and the low
level of ORH 1 bycatch in tows not targeting either ORH 1 or cardinal fish, the
proposed options are likely to have no adverse impacts on fish bycatch.
Benthic impacts and coral bycatch
132
While trawling can adversely affect fragile benthic invertebrate communities, the
commercial bycatch of benthic invertebrates is seldom recorded or examined.
Research has revealed marked differences in the bottom fauna of fished and unfished
seamounts off New Zealand and Tasmania, and those differences have been ascribed
to the impact of bottom trawling. 42,43 Researchers have reported anecdotal evidence
of bycatch of coral species in developing orange roughy fisheries in New Zealand.
133
Submissions from ENGOs point to concerns regarding the impacts of trawling on the
benthos in the new areas fished under the AMP. The submitters cite international
literature in support of evidence that trawling has adverse effects on the benthos and
the potential to reduce biodiversity. They submit that there is no proposal to mitigate
the adverse effects of fishing in the new areas.
134
MFish notes that the feature and sub-area catch limits proposed under all options
constrain trawling effort and serve to mitigate adverse effects of fishing at the feature
and sub-area spatial scales. At a broader scale, the effect of catch spreading may be to
shift effort into new areas, potentially increasing the extent of benthic impacts at the
QMA level. The proposed observer coverage provides for the collection of data that
could better inform the consideration of any effects of fishing.
135
ECO and RF&B submit that the seamount and Benthic Protection Area (BPA)
closures in ORH 1 do not meet the Fisheries Act of 1996 obligation to avoid, remedy,
or mitigate the impacts of fishing. ECO submits the Seamount Strategy is incomplete
and more seamounts should be closed to fishing. In addition, ECO believes the BPA
closures are unrepresentative of known seamount diversity in the ORH 1 area and a
further scientific assessment of the BPA proposals is required.
136
SeaFIC considers the existing seamount and regulatory closures in ORH 1 reflect a
precautionary approach to benthic protection. SeaFIC and TOKM note that 3.95% of
the currently fishable area 44 within ORH 1 is closed through seamount and BPA
closures, and an additional 3.23% of fishable area is closed to vessels longer than 46
m. In comparison, 0.17% of the fishable area was actually trawled from 2000-2006. 45
41
CDL, RAT and OSD each appear as having been taken in volumes greater than 7 tonnes in any one year from
all tows targeting ORH 1. A variety of other species have been reported in volumes less than 7 tonnes.
42
Anderson, O.F. and Clark, M.R. 2003 Analysis of bycatch in the fishery for orange roughy, Hoplostethus
atlanticus, on the South Tasman Rise. Marine and Freshwater Research, 2003, 54: 643-652.
43
Clark, M.R. and O’Driscoll, R. 2003 Deepwater fisheries and aspects of their impact on seamount habitat in
New Zealand. J. Northw. Atl. Fish. Sci., Vol.31: 441-458.
44
The area within the depth contours of 600 m to 1,200 m.
45
Calculation based on plotted trawl paths from 2000 to 2006, assuming a 10 m width.
71 of 397
137
MFish notes that nineteen seamounts of varying size and depth within New Zealand
waters have been closed to trawling, and six of these are within ORH 1. In addition,
the Norfolk Deep BPA is within ORH 1. There was virtually no fishing in the BPA or
any of the six seamounts closed through seamount closures. MFish therefore
considers that more than 51,600 km2 in six different areas of ORH 1 is or will soon be
closed to bottom trawling, and has for all intents and purposes never been trawled.
MFish also accepts that a very small percentage of the depth range in ORH 1 typically
inhabited by orange roughy has ever been targeted by orange roughy trawls.
138
These closures, and the limited extent of trawling in ORH 1, should therefore protect
faunas in a variety of habitats from the effects of fishing. In ORH 1, MFish considers
that the combined effect of the seamount closures and BPAs avoids, remedies, or
mitigates the impacts of fishing on seamounts generally – a position categorically
rejected by ECO or RFB. Research in this area is ongoing, and various policy
initiatives such as the Marine Protected Area Policy and the Benthic Impact Strategy,
will continue to review benthic impacts.
Information principles: section 10
139
MFish considers that the information used to support these proposals (catch data, the
opinion of the stock assessment working group for deepwater fisheries and MFish
scientists, the known biological characteristics of orange roughy, and socio-economic
information provided by stakeholders) is the best available information for ORH 1
stock (s 10(a)). MFish is not aware of any other information related to the status of
the stock that could be made available without unreasonable cost, effort, or time.
140
The FAP advises on how uncertainty might be considered, and how caution might be
exercised (s 10(b) and (c)). In progressing the advice process, no postponement is
being made as a result of absent or uncertain information (s 10(d)).
Existing controls that apply to the stock: section 11(1)(b)
141
Before varying the TAC for ORH 1, you must take into account any existing controls
that apply to the stock. For ORH 1, the measures that apply currently are a TAC,
TACC and an allowance for incidental fishing-related mortality. No other controls
under the Act apply specifically to ORH 1. The effect of the seamount closures and
the BPA is discussed at paragraph 133.
Natural variability of the stock: section 11(1)(c)
142
Before varying the TAC for ORH 1, you must take into account the natural variability
of the stock. Best available information is that orange roughy are not highly variable,
and therefore the natural variability of orange roughy is not a concern in setting the
ORH 1 TAC.
Resource Management Act 1991: section 11(2)(a)
143
Before varying the TAC for ORH 1, you must have regard to any provisions of any
policy statement or plan under the Resource Management Act 1991 that apply to the
coastal marine area and you consider to be relevant. MFish is not aware of any
72 of 397
relevant policy statements or (proposed) regional plans, under the Resource
Management Act 1991 relevant to ORH 1.
Conservation Act 1987: section 11(2)(b)
144
Before varying the TAC for ORH 1, you must have regard to any provisions or any
management strategy or plan under the Conservation Act 1987 that apply to the
coastal marine area and you consider to be relevant. MFish is not aware of any
relevant management strategies or plans under the Conservation Act 1987 for ORH 1.
Hauraki Marine Park Act 2000: section 11(2)(c)
145
Before varying the TAC for ORH 1, you must have regard to ss 7 and 8 of the
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 that apply to the coastal marine area and you
consider relevant. Although the ORH 1 quota management area encompasses the
waters of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park, the distribution of orange roughy and the
fishery for it do not intersect with the Park boundaries. Therefore MFish considers
there are no relevant concerns regarding sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine
Park Act 2000 in considering the ORH 1 TAC.
Conservation services, fisheries services and fisheries plans: 11(2A)
146
Before varying the TAC for ORH 1, you must take into account any conservation or
fisheries services, any relevant fisheries plans approved under the Act, and any
decisions not to require conservation or fisheries services. MFish does not consider
that existing or proposed conservation or fisheries services materially affect the
proposed TAC options. There is no approved fisheries plan for ORH 1.
Setting or varying the TACC: section 20 and 21
147
As noted above, there is no known recreational or Mäori customary fishery for ORH
1. MFish proposes that you set allowances of 0 tonnes for recreational and Mäori
customary fishing under this option – consistent with the status quo that has existed
since orange roughy became a QMS species in 1986. MFish proposes that the current
allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality be retained at 5% of the
TACC, and is combined with the TACC to make up the TAC.
148
Section 21(4) requires that any mätaitai reserve or closure/restriction under s 186A to
facilitate customary fishing be taken into account. There is one mätaitai reserve, three
taiapure and two s 186A closure in ORH 1, 46 but none intersect with the ORH 1
fishery. No area has been closed or fishing method restricted (that affects the fishery
within ORH 1) under the customary fishing provisions of the Act.
149
Section 21(5) also requires that any regulations to prohibit fishing made under s 311
be taken into account when setting allowances for recreational interests. No
restrictions under s 311 have been placed on fishing in any area within ORH 1.
46
Raukokore Mataitai, Kawhia Aotea Taiapure, Maketu Taiapure, Waikare Inlet Taiapure, Ohiwa Harbour
Temporary Closure, Mt Maunganui Temporary Closure (Green-lipped Mussels).
73 of 397
APPENDIX 1 – 2007 ORH 1 PLENARY REPORT
ORANGE ROUGHY NORTHERN NORTH ISLAND (ORH 1)
1.
FISHERY SUMMARY
(a)
Commercial fisheries
This region extends northwards from west of Wellington around to Cape Runaway. Prior to 1993–94 there
was no established fishery, and reported landings were generally small (Table 1). A new fishery developed
in winter 1994, when aggregations were fished on two hill complexes in the western Bay of Plenty. In 1996
catches were also taken off the west coast of Northland.
A TACC of 190 t was set from 1989–90. Prior to that there had been a 10 t TAC and various levels of
exploratory quota. From 1995–96, ORH 1 became subject to a five year adaptive management programme,
and the TACC was increased to 1190 t. A catch limit of 1000 t was applied to an area in the western Bay of
Plenty (Mercury-Colville ‘box’), with the former 190 t TACC applicable to the remainder of ORH 1. In
1994 and 1995, research fishing was also carried out under Special Permit (not included in the TACC). For
the period June 1996-June 1997, a Special Permit was approved for exploratory fishing. This allowed an
additional 800 t (not included in the TACC) to be taken in designated areas, although catches were limited
from individual features (hills and seamounts etc).
Table 1: Reported landings (t) and TACs (t) from 1982–83 to 2005–06. – no TAC. The reported landings do not include catches
taken under an exploratory special permit of 699 t in 1998–99 and 704 t in 1999–00.
Reported landings
Fishing year
West coast North–east coast
1982–83*
< 0.1
1983–84*
0.1
1984–85*
< 0.1
1985–86*
<1
1986–87*
0
1987–88†
0
1988–89†
0
1989–90†
37
1990–91†
0
1991–92†
+
1992–93†
+
1993–94†
0
1994–95†
0
1995–96†
55
1996–97†
+
1997–98†
+
1998–99†
+
1999–00†
+
2000–01†
+
2001–02†
+
2002–03†
+
2003–04†
+
2004–05†
+
2005–06†
+
* FSU data.
† QMS data.
+ Unknown distribution of catch.
0
0
96
2
< 0.1
0
19
49
200
+
+
189
244
910
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Total
TAC
< 0.1
0.1
96
2
< 0.1
0
19
86
200
112
49
189
244
965
1021
511
845
771
858
1294
1123
986
1 151
1 207
–
–
–
–
10
10
10
190
190
190
190
190
190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
800
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Reported catches have varied considerably between years, and the location of the catch in the late
1980s/early 1990s is uncertain, as some may have been taken from outside the EEZ, as well as misreported
from other areas. Research fishing carried out under Special Permit in 1994 and 1995 resulted in catches of
45.2 t and 200.7 t, respectively (not included in Table 1).
Based on an evaluation of the results of an Adaptive Management Programme (AMP) for the MercuryColville box initiated in 1995, the AMP was concluded and the TACC was reduced to 800 t for the 2000–01
fishing year. Catch limits of 200 t were established in each of four areas in ORH 1, with an individual
seamount feature limit of 100 t. From 1 October 2001, ORH 1 was reintroduced into the AMP with different
design parameters for five years, and the TACC was increased from 800 to 1400 t.
In recent years the fishery has also developed off the west coast and sizeable catches have been taken off the
Tauroa Knoll and West Norfolk Ridge. The current management of the fishery is described in section 4
(Analysis of adaptive management programme) with a 2007 review of the performance of the AMP.
2005-06 Fishery (Anderson 2007)
The pattern of catch and effort in 2005–06 was different to 2004–05 in several areas. While most fishing
again took place within the main recognised fishing regions, the distribution of catches amongst and within
these regions was quite different. Effort and catches in the Northland fishery were greater than in 2004–05
with several large catches in the southwest of this area. The several good catches reported from North
Colville in 2004–05 were not repeated in 2005–06, with almost no effort or catch in this fishery. Catch sizes
were also much smaller in Manukau in 2005–06, although they were from approximately the same positions.
Elsewhere, in the West Norfolk Ridge and Bay of Plenty fisheries, the pattern of fishing between the two
years was much the same. The focus of catch and effort in the West Norfolk Ridge continues to be in the
northwest, close to the limits of the EEZ.
Following the exploratory development of the fishing grounds through the mid–late 1990s, large annual
catches have been reported regularly from Tauroa Knoll, the West Norfolk Ridge, and the north Colville
Ridge. Catches on Tauroa Knoll increased from a relatively low level in 2004–05 to be similar in 2005–06 to
the level of the three years prior to 2004–05. Catches and catch rates in the West Norfolk Ridge fishery
peaked at about 350 t in 2001–02, and since then have remained steady at a level of 150–250 t. The catch in
2005–06 in this fishery was similar to recent years, but with relatively low effort and a high overall catch
rate. Despite double the effort of any previous year, catches were down in the Manukau fishery, and the
catch rate fell below 1 t per tow for the first time. Newly developed grounds in the Northland fishery
provided a boost to the catches and catch rate in this fishery, the catch of 332 t being more than three times
that of any previous year, and the catch rate almost double the previous high of 1.5 t/tow recorded in 1997–
98. Effort was relatively low in the North Colville, Mercury-Colville, and Aldermen fisheries, with only 30
orange roughy target tows in total for these areas. Catches in the White Is. fishery have fluctuated over time
and the 74 t caught in 2005–06 is slightly below the median level of the nine years of this fishery, although
the 3.7 t/tow catch rate is the highest recorded.
The catch limit for the Mercury–Colville Box was reduced to 30 t in 2000–01, and although catches and
effort increased in 2001–02, well beyond this catch limit, catches have been closer to this limit since 2002–
03. Only in 2003–04 was this 30 t limit not exceeded. Within the Mercury-Colville Box, on Colville Knoll,
only about 9 t were caught from 25 tows in 2005–06 (the 13 ORH target tows caught only 50 kg, the
remainder being caught as bycatch from cardinalfish fishing). Catch rates were better on Mercury Knoll,
where 29 t were caught from 18 tows.
(b)
Recreational fisheries
There is no known non–commercial fishery for orange roughy in this area.
(c)
Maori customary fisheries
No Maori customary fishing for orange roughy is known in this area.
Page 75 of 397
(d)
Illegal catch
No quantitative information is available on the level of illegal catch in this area.
(e)
Other sources of mortality
There may be some overrun of reported catch because of fish loss with trawl gear damage and ripped nets. In
other orange roughy fisheries, a level of 5% has been estimated.
2.
STOCKS AND AREAS
Orange roughy are distributed throughout the area. Spawning is known from hills in the western Bay of
Plenty. Stock status/affinities within the QMA are unknown. The Mercury-Colville grounds in the Bay of
Plenty are about 120 n.miles from fishing grounds at East Cape (ORH 2A North), and spawning occurs at a
similar time. Hence, it is likely that these are separate stocks. The Mercury and Colville Knolls in the Bay of
Plenty are about 25 miles apart and may form a single stock. Stock affinities with other fishing hills in the
southern and central Bay of Plenty are unknown. The Tauroa Knoll and outer Colville Ridge seamounts are
distant from other commercial grounds, and these fish may also represent separate stocks.
3.
STOCK ASSESSMENT
An assessment for the Mercury-Colville box was carried out in 2001 and is repeated here. A deterministic
stock reduction technique (after Francis 1990) was used to estimate virgin biomass (B0) and current biomass
(Bcurr) for the Mercury-Colville orange roughy stock. The model was fitted to the biomass indices using
maximum likelihood and assuming normal errors. In common with other orange roughy assessments, the
maximum exploitation rate was set at 0.67. The model treats sexes separately, and assumes a Beverton-Holt
stock-recruit relationship. Confidence intervals of the biomass estimates were derived from bootstrap
analysis (Cordue & Francis 1994).
(a)
Estimates of fishery parameters and abundance
A series of trawl surveys of the Mercury-Colville box to estimate relative abundance were agreed under an
Adaptive Management Programme. The first survey was carried out in June 1995 with a second survey in
winter 1998 (Table 2). The biomass index of the latter survey was much lower than 1995, and it was
uncertain whether the 1998 results were directly comparable to the 1995 results because of warmer water
temperatures. They were not incorporated in the decision rule for the adaptive management programme. A
third survey was carried out in June 2000, with the results suggesting that the abundance of orange roughy in
the box had decreased considerably and was at low levels. However, these estimates are uncertain because of
the suggestion that environmental factors may have influenced the distribution of orange roughy. The
abundance indices from trawl survey and commercial catch-effort data used in the assessment are given in
Table 2. The trawl survey indices had c.v.’s of 0.27, 0.39 and 0.29 for 1995, 1998, and 2000 respectively.
Table 2:
Year
Trawl survey
CPUE
Catch (t)
Biomass indices and reported catch used in estimation of B0. Values in square brackets are included for
completeness; they are not used in the assessment.
1993–4
–
8.3
230
1994–95
76 200
9.1
440
1995–96
–
5.4
915
1996–97
–
4.2
895
1997–98
[2 500]
[0.5]
295
1998–99
–
1.5
140
1999–00
3 800
(2.0)
250
The CPUE series is mean catch per tow (sum of catches divided by number of tows, target ORH) from
Mercury Knoll in the month of June. This is the only month when adequate data exist from the fishery to
compare over time. A c.v. of 0.30 was assigned to the CPUE data.
Catch history information is derived from TCEPR records, scaled to the reported total catch for ORH 1.
Figures differ slightly from unscaled data summarised by Clark (1999), but this would make little difference
to the assessment. Overrun of reported catch (e.g., burst bags, inappropriate conversion factors) was
assumed to be zero, as even if there was some, it is likely that it was similar between years. The catch in
Page 76 of 397
1999–00 was assumed to be 250 t.
Assessments were carried out for three alternative sets of biomass indices (Table 3).
Table 3:
Three alternative sets of biomass indices used in the stock assessment.
Alternative
1
2
3
Trawl survey indices
1995, 2000
1995, 2000
1995, 2000
CPUE indices
All except 1998
None
All except 1998
and 2000
Biological parameters used are those for the Chatham Rise stock, except for specific Bay of Plenty values
for the maturity and recruitment ogives (Annala et al., 2000).
(b)
Biomass estimates
The estimated virgin biomass (B0) is very similar for all three alternative assessments (Table 4). With
alternative 1 the estimated B0 is 3200 t, with a current biomass of 15% B0. For both alternatives 2 and 3, the
estimated B0 is 3000 t, which is Bmin, the minimum stock size which enables the catch history to be taken
given a maximum exploitation rate of 0.67.
Table 4:
Biomass
B0 (t)
BMSY (t)
Bcurrent (t)
Bcurrent (%B0)
Bbeg (t)
Biomass estimates (with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses) for stock assessments with the three
alternatives of Table 3. B0 is virgin biomass; BMSY is interpreted as BMAY, which is 30%B0; Bcurrent is mid-season
1999–00; and Bbeg is the biomass at the beginning of the 2000–01 fishing year. Estimates are rounded to the
nearest 100 t (for B0), 10 t (for other biomasses), or 1%.
3200
960
490
15
480
Alternative 1
(3000, 3600)
(900, 1080)
(290, 890)
(10, 25)
(270, 900)
3000
900
290
10
270
Alternative 2
(3000, 3500)
(900, 1050)
(290, 790)
(10, 23)
(270, 800)
3000
900
290
10
270
Alternative 3
(3000, 3300)
(900, 990)
(290, 590)
(10, 18)
(270, 590)
The model fits the CPUE data reasonably well but estimates a smaller decline than is implied by the two
trawl survey indices.
(c)
Estimates of Yield
Yield estimates were determined using the simulation method described by Francis (1992) and the relative
estimates of MCY, ECAY and MAY, as given by Annala et al. (2000).
Yield estimates are all much lower than recent catches (Table 5). Estimates of current yields (MCYcurrent and
CAY) lie between 16 t and 35 t; long-term yields (MCYlong-term and MAY) lie between 44 t and 67 t.
Table 5:
Yield
MCYcurrent
MCYlong-term
CAY
MAY
Yield estimates (t) for stock assessments with the three alternatives of Table 3.
Alternative 1
35
(22,53)
47
(44,53)
29
(16,54)
67
(58,70)
Alternative 2
22
(22,51)
44
(44,51)
16
(16,48)
58
(58,68)
Alternative 3
22
(22,44)
44
(44,49)
16
(16,36)
58
(58,64)
CSP for this stock is just under 100 t for any B0 between 3000 t and 3600 t.
4.
ANALYSIS OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME
The ORH 1 TACC was increased from 800 to 1400 t in October 2001/02 under the Adaptive Management Programme. The objectives of this AMP
were to determine stock size, geographical extent, and long-term sustainable yield of the ORH 1 stock. This is a complex AMP, with ORH 1 divided
into four sub-areas (see Figure 1), each with total catch and “feature” catch limits (a “feature” was defined as being within a 10 nm radius of the
shallowest point).
Page 77 of 397
ORH 1 Subarea
Area B
Area C
Area D
Proposed Catch Limit
200 t
Feature Limit
(t/fishing year)
100 t
500 t
500 t
200 t
150 t
150 t
75 t
Feature limits also serve as limits to the total catch in any area due to the limited number of available productive features. The Mercury-Colville
“Box” (located within Area D) has been given a specific limit of 30 t per year to allow for the bycatch of orange roughy when fishing for black
cardinalfish. The catch of orange roughy in the Mercury-Colville “Box” is included in the overall limit for Area D.
Figure 1.
Four sub-management areas for the ORH 1 AMP (labelled A-D). Dotted lines enclose the exploratory fishing areas
defined in the special permit issued on 6 July 1998. Solid lines enclose seamount closures and the Mercury-Colville
Ohena ‘box’ (labelled at their top). Trawls (dots) where orange roughy were reported as the target species and caught
during 1997–98 and 1998–99 are shown. Note that the lines separating Areas A and D from Areas B and C are incorrectly
drawn at 36° S latitude rather than 35°30’ S latitude.
Review of ORH 1 AMP in 2007
In 2007 the AMP FAWG reviewed the performance of the AMP after the full 5-year term.
Fishery Characterisation
• In most years, the total catch has been less than the TACC.
• The area splits into A, B, C and D only occurred in 2001.
• Main fishery is in area B; the fishery in area A only began in 2002.
• Two main goals of the AMP:
o Reduce fishing in area D, in particular the Mercury-Colville “box”.
o Look for new fishing areas, distributing effort across the QMA, with feature limits to
reduce the possibility of localised overfishing
Page 78 of 397
Table 6: Estimated target catches by sub-area , reported landings and TACC for ORH 1.
1997–98
1998–99
1999–00
2000–01
2001–02
2002–03
2003–04
2004–05
A
0.5
5
1
9
123
197
223
277
B
6
575
645
166
441
508
422
390
Sub-area target catch (t)
C
D
0
491
165
725
165
598
99
165
266
227
238
72
117
110
173
174
Total target
catch(t)
497
1470
1408
439
1056
1015
872
1014
Reported TACC
landings (t)
(t)
511
1190
1543
1190
1476
1190
858
800
1294
1400
1123 `1400
986
1400
1151
1400
CPUE Analysis
• Unstandardised CPUE is in kg/tow. The short time series, the nature of the fishery (fishing aggregations
spread over a wide area in different seasons) and the impact of catch limits on features and sub-areas
prevent any useful relative abundance indices from being developed at this point for ORH 1.
• Where features are less than 10 nm apart, catch is apportioned according to the distance to the feature.
Industry in-season reporting is based on the feature closest to the start of the tow.
• Possible problems with the area A observations in 2005-06, as there seem to be more reported tows than
expected given the number of vessels operating in the area.
Observer Programme
• 50% observer coverage prior to 1 October 2006 (a high level relative to that for other deepwater stocks,
with a large number of samples taken relative to the size of the fishery). From 1 October 2006, 100%
coverage was requested by the Minister, but this has not been fully achieved, as some ORH 1 is taken as
bycatch on trips that do not predominantly target ORH.
• The size frequency data show high levels of stock variability between fisheries on features or feature
groups. Size variation does not seem to be linked to exploitation rate.
Environmental Effects
• Observer data from 2000 to 2003 indicated that incidental captures of seabirds did not occur in the ORH
1 target fishery (Baird 2005). Marine mammal interactions are also not .a problem.
• Only 3 non-fish bycatch records have been reported from observed trips (in 1994 and 1995). All were
shearwaters that landed on deck and were released alive. It was verified that observers were briefed in
the same way as for other MFish trips including recording non-fish bycatch i.e. seabirds and marine
mammals. Note that this does not include benthic organisms.
• The overall impact of bottom trawling on seamounts in ORH1 is not known. A number of seamounts
have been closed to fishing and the Norfolk Deep BPA is included in the industry accord relating to
benthic protection areas within New Zealand's EEZ.
Sub-area D Directed Adaptive Exploratory Fishing Programme
• The purpose of this exercise was to establish whether fish populations shift between features in different
years in sub-area D.
• Based on the results from the exploratory fishing from 2002 to 2005 it is evident that catches from all
features contained a high proportion of ripe or ripe running females and that synchronised spawning occurs
on a range of hills during winter.
• In 2006 the AMP Working Group recommended some changes to the design of the exploratory survey;
however, this was not achieved during the 2006 survey.
The abbreviated checklist questions for full- and mid-term reviews are:
1. Is stock abundance adequately monitored?
The working group concluded that CPUE does not seem to be a proportional measure of abundance
for this stock. However, CPUE is used in ORH 1 as a management tool. When CPUE drops on a
feature, fishers are meant to move to another feature.
Page 79 of 397
2. Is logbook coverage sufficient?
As there are MFish observers on these vessels, fishers are not required to complete detailed
logbooks for the AMP. This is the highest level of monitoring of any ORH fishery in New Zealand.
3. Are additional analyses of current data necessary?
No. The Working Group concluded that no other information can currently be extracted from the
existing data that will provide insight into the status of the ORH 1 stocks. However, a potential
problem with the 2005-06 catch records from Area A still needs to be checked.
4. Based on the biomass index, is current harvest sustainable?
Unknown. The purpose of the AMP was to spread effort in an attempt to reduce fishing pressure on
any one sub-area or feature (and Area D in particular). ORH 1 is a large area, with orange roughy
aggregations spread across a number of areas and features. The amount of fishing in some areas
appears to be low, but without any indication of current abundance, there is no way to determine if
this level of fishing is in fact sustainable, or if current feature limits will avoid overexploitation of
localised areas.
5. Where is stock, based on weight of evidence, in relation to Bmsy?
Unknown. In 2001, when the AMP was initiated, the Working Group stated that the stock was
likely above BMSY; while the information collected since that time has not improved the
understanding about the status of the stock, the intent of the AMP design for ORH1 was to spread
effort to reduce the likelihood of the biomass declining below BMSY.
ORH 1 is unlikely to be a single biological stock, and probably includes a number of constituent
stocks. The Working Group concluded that it is not possible to estimate BMSY for any of the
individual stocks, let alone aggregate up to an estimate for ORH 1 as a whole. Moreover, a better
understanding is not possible in the near future. BMSY is difficult to estimate in situations involving
an unknown number of constituent stocks.
6. Are the effects of fishing adequately monitored?
Yes, there is good observer coverage. The Working Group noted that one consequence of
deliberately spreading effort was to increase the possible benthic impact.
7. Are rates of non-fish bycatch acceptable?
Yes.
8. Should the AMP be reviewed by the plenary?
This AMP does not need to be reviewed by the Plenary.
5.
STATUS OF THE STOCKS
From 1 October 2001, the TACC for ORH 1 was increased to 1400 t within the AMP, with sub-area and
feature limits. In most years the total catch has been less than the TACC. However, it is not known if recent
catch levels or current TACCs are sustainable in the long term. Except for the small area of the MercuryColville box no assessment of stock status is currently available.
An assessment of the Mercury-Colville box in 2001 indicated that biomass had been reduced to 10-15% B0
(compared to an assumed BMSY of 30% B0). As the stock was considered to be well below BMSY, a catch limit
of 30 t was set for the box. The assessment indicated that a catch level of about 100 t would probably
maintain the stock at the 2000 stock size (assuming deterministic recruitment) and catch levels from 16 to 35
t (consistent with CAY or MCY strategies) might allow the stock to rebuild slowly.
In other areas of ORH 1 the status of the constituent stocks is unknown. The amount of fishing in some areas
appears to be low, but without any indication of current abundance, there is no way to determine if this level
of fishing is in fact sustainable or if current feature limits will avoid overexploitation of localised areas.
Page 80 of 397
6.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
Anderson, O.F. (2007). Descriptive analysis of catch and effort data from New Zealand orange roughy fisheries in ORH
1 to the end of the 2005–06 fishing year.. Deepwater-WG-07/39. 11p
Anderson, O.F.; Dunn, M.R. (2006). Descriptive analysis of catch and effort data from New Zealand orange roughy
fisheries in ORH 1, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, and 7B to the end of the 2003–04 fishing year. New Zealand Fisheries
Assessment Report 2006/20. 59p
Annala, J.H.; Sullivan, K.J.; O’Brien, C.J. (2000). Report from the Fishery Assessment Plenary, May 2000: stock
assessments and yield estimates. (unpublished report held in NIWA library, Wellington.)
Baird, S.J. (2005a). Incidental capture of seabird species in commercial fisheries in New Zealand waters, 2002–03. New
Zealand Fisheries Assessment Report 2005/2. 50 p.
Clark, M.R. (2001). A description of the orange roughy fishery in northern North Island waters (ORH 1) for 1997–98 to
1999–2000: an update of commercial catch and effort information. New Zealand Fisheries Assessment Report
2001/76. 23 p.
Clark, M.R.; Tracey, D.M. (1988). Assessment of the west coast South Island and northern North Island orange roughy
fisheries. N.Z. Fisheries Assessment Research Document 88/20. 11 p.
Clark, M.R.; King, K.J. (1989). Deepwater fish resources off the North Island, New Zealand: results of a trawl survey,
May 1985 to June 1986. N.Z. Fisheries Technical Report No. 11. 56 p.
Clark, M.R.; Field, K.D. (1998). Distribution, abundance and biology of orange roughy in the western Bay of Plenty:
results of a trawl survey, June 1995 (SMT9501). NIWA Technical Report 14. 29 p.
Cordue, P.L.; Francis, R.I.C.C. (1994). Accuracy and choice in risk estimation for fisheries assessment. Canadian
journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 51: 817–829.
Francis, R.I.C.C. (1990). A maximum likelihood stock reduction method. N.Z. Fisheries Assessment Research
Document 90/4. 8 p.
Francis, R.I.C.C. (1992). Recommendations concerning the calculation of maximum constant yield (MCY) and current
annual yield (CAY). N.Z. Fisheries Assessment Research Document 92/8. 27 p.
SeaFIC (2006). 2006 Report to the Adaptive Management Programme Fishery Assessment Working Group:Full Term
Review of the ORH1 Adaptive Assessment Programme. AMP-WG-06Starr, P.; Clark, M.R.; Francis, R.I.C.C. (1996). ORH 1: blueprint for controlled development of an orange roughy
fishery? Seafood New Zealand 4(2): 29–31.
Page 81 of 397
APPENDIX 2 – ORANGE ROUGHY CHARACTERISTICS
150
151
The unique characteristics of orange roughy give rise to fisheries management
considerations that differ from many other species. Key biological features and issues for
consideration by fisheries managers, especially with regard to managing new fisheries for
orange roughy, were summarised by Annala et al. (2005): 47
•
Because of their low productivity, sustainable yields from orange roughy fisheries are
estimated to be low, at an annual rate of 1 to 2 percent of the virgin biomass (B0), and 4
to 6 percent of the biomass that will produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY);
•
The aggregating behaviour of orange roughy, particularly on undersea hill features and
during spawning seasons, makes it easy to overestimate the unfished biomass;
•
The major scientific challenges have been to obtain reliable estimates of orange roughy
life history parameters and stock size in order to estimate the yields appropriate to move
the stocks from B0 to BMSY;
•
It is difficult to accurately specify a time stream of future catches and catch limits that
will result in an orderly fishing-down phase to achieve target biomass. In New Zealand,
these stock assessment difficulties have resulted in stocks falling below BMSY in 7 of the
9 orange roughy fisheries for which quantitative stock assessments have been
conducted, and the subsequent need to rebuild stocks back to BMSY;
•
Initial high catch rates lasted only a few years in most fisheries, to be followed by sharp
declines, and the serial depletion of hill features has been observed;
•
The challenge is to use information on possible stock size and our knowledge about the
low productivity of the species to devise an orderly fish-down strategy that satisfies both
the desire for high initial catch levels and the need to ensure that the target biomass level
is not exceeded.
Orange roughy are widely distributed within New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and
elsewhere, with a number of genetically distinct stocks. There are likely to be several
distinct biological stocks within the area of ORH 1.
47
Annala, J., M. Clark, G. Clement, and J. Cornelius 2005. Management of New Zealand orange roughy fisheries – a
deep learning curve. In FAO Fisheries Proceedings No. 3/1, Deep Sea 2003: Conference on the Governance and
Management of Deep-sea Fisheries. (Ed. R. Shotton). FAO, Rome.
Page 82 of 397
APPENDIX 3: DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE ORH 1 FISHERY
152
The development of the ORH 1 fishery lagged considerably behind that of other New
Zealand orange roughy fisheries. ORH 1 was introduced into the quota management system
(QMS) in 1986 under a TACC of 10 tonnes, when effort in this area was very low. The
TACC was increased to 190 tonnes from 1989−90. Initial orange roughy catches in ORH 1
came from the Bay of Plenty in the mid-1980s. It was not until the mid 1990s that relatively
large quantities of orange roughy were found to aggregate around the Mercury-Colville
seamount features in the centre of the Bay of Plenty.
153
A trawl survey in the winter of 1995 estimated the biomass in the Mercury-Colville area at
78 000 tonnes. In response, a five-year AMP was initiated for ORH 1 as from the 1995−96
year. The AMP framework allows the TAC for low knowledge stocks to be set higher than
would otherwise be the case, as long as, on the balance of probabilities, the TAC would
move the stock towards the BMSY level over the duration of the AMP.
154
The AMP framework relies on the collection of more information from the fishery than
otherwise available, in order to assess and manage risks associated with the increased TAC.
The TACC for ORH 1 was set at 1 190 tonnes under an AMP, with a catch limit of 1 000
tonnes applying to the Mercury-Colville ‘box’ area, and the previous TACC of 190 tonnes
applying to the remainder of the ORH 1 QMA. In addition, research and exploratory
fishing was undertaken under special permits between 1994 and 1997, which allowed up to
800 tonnes catch each fishing year in designated areas of ORH 1 and with feature limits
applied.
155
The Mercury-Colville knoll fishery persisted near the 1 000 tonne level for two years, after
which catches declined. Additional survey work was carried out in the area of the MercuryColville knoll in 1998 and 2000; the results indicated a much lower estimate of between 2
500 and 3 800 tonnes. The fishing pressure could not have been sufficient to result in this
decline, and it was proposed that the decline could be a result of oceanographic conditions
or movement of orange roughy between areas. Based on the available information, the
AMP was concluded and the TACC was reduced to 800 tonnes for 2000−01. For that year,
the Minister requested industry to implement a structured fishing plan with catch limits of
200 tonnes for each of four sub-areas within ORH 1, and individual feature limits of 100
tonnes to ensure the TAC was sustainable.
156
A second ORH 1 AMP was implemented on 1 October 2001, with the objective of
determining stock size, geographical extent, and long term sustainable yield, of the various
features and sub-areas of the ORH 1 quota management area (QMA). In order to facilitate
the objectives of the AMP and encourage fishing over a wide area, the TACC for ORH 1
was increased from 800 to 1 400 tonnes for five years under the AMP framework (as
described in the Revised Framework for the Adaptive Management Program 48).
157
Criteria for approval of AMPs under the revised framework and stakeholder undertakings of
particular relevance are that:
48
The Revised Framework for the Adaptive Management Program dated March 2004 is available on request from
MFish.
Page 83 of 397
•
Increased TACs can be agreed where there is reasonable probability that current
biomass exceeds the BMSY level and that the TAC is likely to move the stock
towards, or keep it at or above, that level over the five years of the AMP;
•
The increased TAC is not for an indefinite period and efforts have to be made to
improve the understanding of stock status and yield;
•
There is scope to consider ongoing management of a stock at the conclusion of the
AMP in the absence of an assessment of stock status and estimation of yield, but
such ongoing management would require that stakeholders continue to collect the
same level of information (under a longer-term plan) as under the AMP in order to
justify retaining the increased TAC – however, this would require that there would
be ongoing monitoring of changes in stock status and agreement that the TAC is
sustainable;
•
There is an ‘onus on industry to either fulfil their commitments or face a reversal of
the TACC increase’; and
•
Stakeholders accept the responsibility to work cooperatively to meet the AMP
criteria, ‘otherwise the Minister of Fisheries will reduce the TACC to a level that he
determines will ensure sustainability with no information’.
158
Controls and monitoring measures aimed at ensuring sustainability and encouraging
exploration included voluntary catch limits by sub-area and undersea ‘feature’, as well as
decision rules relating to progressive reductions of catch limits that would be triggered by
reductions in CPUE. A critical element of the AMP was the use of CPUE to monitor
relative abundance, both for increasing information on abundance (and distribution)
generally, and for managing sustainability risks or risks of localised depletion.
159
Monitoring requirements of the AMP included a high level of scientific observer coverage
to collect biological information on ORH as well as the weight and number of all species of
fish and invertebrates caught. The AMP also undertakes to complete annual ‘directed
exploratory fishing surveys’ in the Bay of Plenty to determine the extent of spawning
grounds in the area.
160
In agreeing to the current AMP proposal, the Minister specifically requested that industry
develop and implement a compliance and monitoring plan that would be in place before
fishing began for the 2001-02 fishing year. The ORH 1 Exploratory Fishing Company
subsequently produced the ‘Management and Monitoring Plan’ 49 that set out quota owners’
undertakings in the conduct of the AMP. The company also produced a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) to bind industry participants to the ‘rules’ under the AMP.
161
Both the AMP WG and the Minister have raised concerns about the operation of the AMP
on more than one occasion. Concerns focused on industry governance where agreed subarea and feature catch limits have been exceeded, and the desired scientific observer
coverage levels in 2001−02 and 2002−03 were not achieved. Those matters were of
concern because exceeding the agreed sub-area and feature limits increased concerns over
unknown sustainability risks, given the uncertainty of information underpinning those
management measures. In addition, failing to achieve the desired level of scientific
49
The Management and Monitoring Plan and MoU were prepared by the ORH 1 Exploratory Fishing Company, and
are available on request from MFish.
Page 84 of 397
observer coverage could reduce the value of biological data collected about orange roughy
and about any adverse effects of fishing under the AMP.
162
As a result of his concerns at the time, the Minister directed MFish to review the AMP at
the end of the 2003−04 fishing year. The Minister noted that he would withdraw the AMP
if additional measures were not undertaken by industry to address governance problems and
affirm their commitment to adhere to sub-area and feature limits. The Minister required the
development and acceptance by stakeholders of an industry MoU designed to address
governance problems.
163
In March 2004, industry signed the MoU commitment. Since then some sub-area and
feature limits have continued to be exceeded. Monthly reporting has generally been
reliable, although some reports have been delayed.
Page 85 of 397
APPENDIX 4 – SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
Option 1
Costs
Benefits
• Greater risk that fishing exploitation leads
to stock biomass below BMSY in the future
• Ongoing utilisation at current level:
landed value of approximately $4.2
million, or approximately $6.3 million
export value, if TACC fully caught
• Possible depletion of individual features
• Continued management under an industrydriven structured fishing plan, although
efficacy of this plan not fully tested
• In the case of over-exploitation, forgone
future utilisation
• Continued collection of data
Option 2
Costs
Benefits
•
If TACC was fully caught, potential
immediate landed value loss of
approximately $750,000, or
approximately $1.13 million export
value. Losses are not as great if average
catches over past five years are used.
• Lower overall exploitation rate across the
stock, which means increased certainty
over the long-term sustainability, and
long-term sustainable utilisation, of ORH
1 compared to Option 1.
•
Possibly the Anton’s Group will no
longer be commercially viable.
• Possible reduced environmental impact
should effort be reduced
•
Unknown number of vessel and shorebased staff layoffs.
•
Continued management under an
industry-driven structured fishing plan,
although efficacy of this plan not fully
tested.
•
Possible costs incurred to lay up or sell a
vessel.
•
Utilisation: landed value of
approximately $3.4 million, or
approximately $5.2 million export value,
if TACC fully caught.
•
Unknown ability to manage an industryled fishing plan at a reduced TACC.
•
If the catch in sub-area C matches the
average of the past five years, then
Option 2b results in no loss in landed
value or export value. Note that catch in
2005/06 and 2006/07 were well above the
five-year average.
•
Possibly less biological information
Page 86 of 397
collected.
Option 3
Costs
Benefits
•
Immediate gross revenue loss greater
than Option 2. If TACC was fully
caught, potential immediate landed value
loss of approximately $1.6 million, or
approximately $2.4 million export value.
Losses are not as great if average catches
over past five years are used.
• Lowest overall exploitation rate across
the stock, which means the greatest
certainty of the three options of the longterm sustainability, and long-term
sustainable utilisation, of ORH 1.
•
Possibly the Anton’s Group will no
longer be commercially viable.
• Possible reduced environmental impact
should effort be reduced
•
Unknown number of vessel and shorebased staff layoffs.
•
•
Possible costs incurred to lay up or sell a
vessel.
•
Least certainty over the effectiveness of
an industry-led fishing plan.
•
Possibly less biological information
collected.
Utilisation: landed value of
approximately $2.6 million, or
approximately $3.94 million export
value, if TACC fully caught.
Page 87 of 397
APPENDIX 5 – RECOMMENDED MANAGEMENT
MEASURES
164
A summary of the recommended management measures is provided in the body of the FAP.
Sub-area and feature limits
165
A catch limit should continue to exist for each sub-area (A, B, C and D), and each of the
features. Feature limits per sub-area should be: A = 100 t, B = 150 t, C = 150 t, D = 75 t,
Mercury Colville Box = 30 t.
Mercury-Colville Box
166
The Mercury-Colville Box has had a 30 tonnes ORH 1 catch limit in place to allow the
catch of orange roughy as bycatch to cardinal fish target fishing. However, in some years
this limit has been greatly exceeded by combined target and bycatch take of orange roughy
(including as part of the directed exploratory fishing programme).
167
An assessment for the Mercury-Colville ‘box’ in 2001 assessed the stock to be below BMSY,
and that a catch of around 100 tonnes would probably maintain the then-current stock size,
while catches between 16 tonnes and 35 tonnes would be consistent with MCY or CAY
strategies and could allow the stock to rebuild slowly. Exceeding the 30 t limit in the
amounts recorded over the past few years is not likely to be reducing the stock size,
although it may also be preventing rebuilding.
168
MFish’s advice continues to be that a 30 t bycatch-only limit (no orange roughy targeting in
this area) be maintained. MFish expects that industry make all reasonable attempts to
ensure that the limit is not exceeded, whether as a result of targeted fishing for cardinal fish
or any other species.
Monitoring and reporting
169
The M&MP/MOU contained several monitoring and reporting elements, each of which is
repeated:
a)
Fishers will notify the EFC of their intention to fish a sub-area or areas at least 12
hours prior to the each voyage. EFC will provide an update on the current catch
level by sub-area and feature, prior to the vessel departing. A full list of such
notifications should be furnished to MFish monthly, for auditing against TCEPR and
VMS data.
b)
Vessels will report date, time, feature, position, target species, estimated catch and
actual catch at the completion of every tow to EFC. At the conclusion of each
voyage, vessels will confirm to EFC the actual catch taken by feature and sub-area.
EFC will notify ORH 1 ACE holders at least monthly of catch by sub-area and
feature, and will immediately notify all operators when sub-area or feature limits are
close to being reached, or have been reached. EFC will notify MFish monthly of
catch by sub-area and feature, for auditing against TCEPR and VMS data.
Page 88 of 397
c)
Quota owners agree not to sell ORH 1 ACE to any non-shareholder who lands
ORH1 who has not agreed to fish according to these terms.
d)
EFC will provide an Annual Report to MFish on the ORH 1 fishery.
Directed Exploratory Fishing Programme
170
The exploratory fishing programme was designed to determine if fish populations shift
between features in different years in sub-area D. If this was indeed the case, spawning
aggregations would be found on different features from one year to the next.
171
EFC undertook a directed exploratory fishing programme in the Bay of Plenty with a
suitable vessel and a scientist on-board to manage the programme, between late June and
early August (dates varied by year). Generally speaking, tows were conducted on several
features in the Bay of Plenty, with biological sampling done and CPUE analysis conducted.
172
Evidence to date (from an analysis of four years) is that catch from all features contained
spawning fish, and that synchronised spawning occurred on a range of hills during winter.
The working group recommended changes to the 2006 programme design, and the survey
was completed; however, data from 2006 have not yet been analysed.
173
MFish is not convinced of the value of the exploratory fishing programme. MFish wrote to
EFC in June 2007 to advise that the winter 2007 programme was not required. MFish
recommends that the working group reconsider this programme by March 2008, once the
analysis of all data has been completed, to determine if useful information is likely to be
generated. If the programme is useful, the working group can properly structure the fishing
programme in time for the winter 2008 fishery.
Observer coverage
174
The MOU agreed to 50% observer coverage on all targeted tows. MFish sought to
implement 100% observer coverage on all ORH 1 fishing trips for 2007/08. For the
2007/08 fishing year, MFish intends to recommend 100% observer coverage for June and
July in sub-area A, C and D, and 100% observer coverage for October in sub-area B.
Outside these months, and where ORH 1 is likely to be caught only in small quantities, the
standard observer coverage of approximately 10 to 15% is intended to apply.
175
The proposed scientific observer coverage is aimed at improving voluntary compliance with
sub-area and feature limits, providing verification of fishing activity, and providing
opportunities to maximise the collection of biological data relevant to the management of
the fishery. This will ensure the greatest reliability of the available monitoring tools for the
fishery.
176
Decisions concerning the level of observer coverage are made by the Chief Executive under
s 224 of the Act. As such, any level of intended observer coverage is not a condition of any
TAC or TACC decision by the Minister. MFish will advise the Minister of the Chief
Executive’s intention to implement, subject to this consultation, a level of observer coverage
described above for ORH 1.
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Biological sampling
177
Sampling of catch will be carried out by MFish observers to the accepted sampling
protocols.
Page 90 of 397
Page 91 of 397
ORANGE ROUGHY (ORH 3B) – FINAL ADVICE
Figure 1: Quota Management Area (QMA) for orange roughy (ORH 3B) stocks
Northwe st Rise
East Rise
Arrow
45°
South Rise
Fiordland
Puyse gur
Southland
Priceles s
Snares
Macquarie
50°
Bounty
Pukaki
Auckland
Antipodes
Sub-Antarctic
EEZ
1000 m
55°S
165°E
170°
175°
180°
175°
Executive Summary
1
ORH 3B is a large and spatially complex fishery, comprised of several biological stocks. A
range of sub-QMA catch limits are managed under a voluntary agreement by the Deepwater
Group (DWG) which represents 97.95% of the ORH 3B quota owners. Monthly reports on
catch by sub-stock and sub-area 50 are provided to MFish.
2
Although information at the stock level is uncertain, on balance MFish considers that the
ORH 3B stock is likely to be below BMSY and that it is appropriate to manage this stock
under section 13(2)(b) of the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act). MFish considers that the
management measures in place for the Northwest Chatham Rise, Arrow Plateau, Puysegur
and the Sub-Antarctic sub-stocks are appropriate. Options considered in the paper address
management measures for the South and East Chatham Rise.
3
No new stock assessment information is available this year. A proposed South Chatham
Rise assessment was not carried out as new analyses in 2007 suggested that the East and
50
See paragraphs 9 -10 for definitions of geographic terms.
Page 92 of 397
South Chatham Rise do not constitute separate sub-stocks. The reasons for rejecting the
South Chatham Rise assessment raise concerns over the stock assessment boundaries on the
East and South Chatham Rise. Separate stock assessments for sub-area components within
the East Chatham Rise were accepted, with some reservations, by the Plenary in 2006.
While the East Chatham Rise assessments stand as the best available information on the
status of the East Chatham Rise fishery, there are reasons to consider that catch limits for
the East Chatham Rise sub-stock are not sustainable.
4
Prior to the 2006-07 fishing year, industry proposed a staged reduction of the catch limits on
the East and South Chatham Rise of 1,000 t per year for three years. You ultimately
supported this reduction in combination with a reduction in the catch limit on the Northwest
Chatham Rise, and reduced the ORH 3B TAC accordingly. As part of your decision,
industry was requested to limit the catch taken from the Andes Complex and the Northeast
Hills in response to your concerns of localised depletion. Industry expressed the view that
managing to these sub-area limits was not possible, nor was it warranted on the basis that
fish moved freely between features on the East and South Chatham Rise. Accordingly,
industry has not managed to the sub-area component limits for the Andes and the Northeast
Hills, although the sub-stock catch spreading arrangements (Northwest Chatham Rise, East
Chatham Rise, South Chatham Rise, Spawning Box, and Sub-Antarctic) have been
respected.
5
MFish considers that, although uncertain, there remain sustainability concerns for the South
and East Chatham Rise sub-stocks. Submitters share this view and support a decrease in the
catch limit on the South and East Chatham Rise. Industry has confirmed its support for a
further 1,000 t reduction to the TAC for the 2007-08 fishing year, to be effected by a
reduction in catch levels on the South and East Chatham Rise.
6
MFish proposes under Options 2 and 3 to retain the existing South Chatham Rise boundary
and to simplify the management arrangements within the East Chatham Rise. These
simplified arrangements retain measures to spread catch to ensure that effort is not
concentrated on any of the recognised feature complexes within the East Chatham Rise.
Effectively they provide for the East Chatham Rise catch limit to be spread between the
spawning box, the Northeast Rise (incorporating the Northeast Hills) and the Southeast Rise
(incorporating the Andes Complex).
7
Under Option 2, a 1,000 t reduction in the TAC would be effected by reducing the South
and East Chatham Rise catch limits, spread between the South Chatham Rise and the three
East Chatham Rise areas. Option 3 proposes a reduction of 2,000 t incorporating the same
catch split arrangements.
8
Industry has confirmed that, although it does not agree with the rationale provided by MFish
for the sub-area component catch spreading arrangements, it will abide by all catch
spreading arrangements at the sub-stock and sub-area component scales under Option 2 if
this is the option that you choose to implement. However they remain opposed to Option 3
and it is unclear whether industry would abide by the catch spreading arrangements under
this option.
Page 93 of 397
Terminology used to describe spatial portioning in ORH 3B
9
ORH 3B is a large and spatially complex fishery, comprised of several biological stocks of
orange roughy, although there is debate over the boundaries between these biological
stocks. To avoid confusion between biological stocks and the stock defined at the QMA
level, biological, or geographically distinct, orange roughy populations will be referred to
here as sub-stocks 51. Where it is necessary to consider areas within the sub-stock
boundaries they will be referred to generically as sub-area components 52. For example
ORH 3B is a stock, the East Chatham Rise is a sub-stock and the Andes Complex is a subarea component. MFish and DWG have agreed to this terminology.
10
Sub-stock and sub-area component boundaries are defined in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3
respectively. The sub-stock boundaries are shown in Figures 1 and 2 and Figures 3 and 5
show the existing and proposed sub-area component boundaries respectively.
Summary of Options
Initial Proposal
11
51
52
The IPP proposed the following options:
ORH 3B
Sub-stocks and sub-area components
Northwest Chatham Rise
Option 1 - status
quo
750 t
East and South Chatham Rise
East Chatham Rise
Spawning Box (Jun-Aug)
NE Hills
Andes Complex
Spawning box (outside Jun- Aug) + Eastern Flats
South Chatham Rise
Puysegur
Arrow Plateau
Sub-Antarctic
Feature limit
Research survey allowance
TACC
Other sources of fishing related mortality
TAC
8,650 t
(Maximum) 7,250 t
4,000 t
200 t
700 t
2,350 t
(Maximum) 2,000 t
0t
0t
1,850 t
500 t
250 t
11,500 t
575 t
12,075 t
DWG has previously referred to these sub-stock boundaries as ‘designated sub-areas’.
This is consistent with DWG terminology for these areas
Page 94 of 397
ORH 3B
Sub-stocks and sub-area
components
Option 2
East Chatham Rise
Spawning Box (Jun-Aug)
Northeast Rise
Southeast Rise
South Chatham Rise
Puysegur
Arrow Plateau
Sub-Antarctic
Feature limit
Research survey allowance
TACC
Other sources of fishing
related mortality
TAC
Option 3
750 t
750 t
7,650 t
(Maximum) 6,500 t
3,200 t
1,650 t
1,650 t
(Maximum) 1,750 t
0t
0t
1,850 t
500 t
250 t
10,500 t
6,650 t
(Maximum) 5,500 t
3,200 t
1,150 t
1,150 t
(Maximum) 1,750 t
0t
0t
1,850 t
500 t
250 t
9,500 t
525 t
475 t
11,025 t
9,975 t
Final Proposal
12
The options provided for your consideration are:
a)
Option 2:
AGREE to reduce the ORH 3B TAC from 12,075 tonnes to 11,025 tonnes
and the TACC from 11,500 tonnes to 10,500 tonnes;
AND
Request industry to alter the voluntary catch split arrangements as detailed in
the table above;
OR
b)
Option 3:
AGREE to reduce the ORH 3B TAC from 12,075 tonnes to 9,975 tonnes
and the TACC from 11,500 to 9,500 tonnes;
AND
Request industry to alter the voluntary catch split arrangements as detailed in
the table above;
Additional measures common to all options are to:
Request industry to spread catch between individual features within the
broader sub-area component catch limits;
Page 95 of 397
AND
Request that, as far as possible, fishers targeting orange roughy on features in
ORH 3B follow known trawl tracks;
AND
Request industry to confirm the voluntary agreement on the new catch limits
within ORH 3B; and
i)
acknowledge the objectives and operational implementation of the
Deepwater Fisheries Management Agreement prior to the 1 October
2007 fishing year;
ii)
continue to submit annual updates and specific DWG annual
agreements that pertain to the ORH 3B fishery to MFish;
iii)
continue to submit monthly monitoring reports pertaining to catch
levels by both sub-stock and sub-area component to MFish;
iv)
continue to notify MFish when catch reaches 80% of the sub-stock
and sub-area component limits, and also notify MFish when any limit
has been reached;
v)
request that DWG continue to work with MFish Science group to
develop and present a stock assessment research programme for the
Sub-Antarctic;
vi)
request that DWG continue to work with MFish Science and
Operations Groups to develop alternative management options, with
associated research requirements, for the Chatham Rise stocks.
Consultation
13
Your decision whether or not to adjust the TAC for ORH 3B is a decision under section
13(2)-(4) of the Act and therefore the consultation requirements of section 12 apply.
Further, in respect of your decision whether or not to adjust the TACC for ORH3B, the
consultation requirements set out in section 21(2) apply.
14
Consultation on the IPP was undertaken with such persons or organisations representative of
those classes of persons having an interest in the stock or the effects of fishing on the
aquatic environment in the area concerned, including Mäori, environmental, commercial,
and recreational interests. Additional consultation was undertaken with industry with
regards to voluntary arrangements proposed under each option.
Submissions Received
15
Submissions regarding this proposal were received from:
•
Deepwater Group Ltd. (DWG)
•
Environment and Conservation Organisations of NZ Inc. (ECO)
Page 96 of 397
•
New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council (NZRFC)
•
New Zealand Seafood Industry Council Ltd. (SeaFIC)
•
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc (Forest & Bird)
•
Sanford Ltd. (Sanford)
•
Te Ohu Kaimoana (TOKM)
•
World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF)
16
While little new information was provided through the submission process, clear positions
were established as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the proposed options. The views
expressed by submitters fall into two broad categories – that taken by industry and that by
the environmental non-government organisations (ENGOs). NZRFC did not express
support for any particular option but considered that management decisions should be made
with a view to ensure an effective rebuild of orange roughy stocks within 10 years.
17
Specific TAC and catch spreading arrangements proposed by submitters are summarised in
the table below.
Industry
Sub-stocks and sub-area
component
18
Environmental NGOs
DWG, Sanford,
SeaFIC and TOKM
WWF
F&B
ECO
750 t
450 t
410 t
410 t
East Chatham Rise
Spawning Box
Northeast Rise
Southeast Rise
South Chatham Rise
7,650 t
------
4,400 t
3,000 t (max)
2,200 t
150 t
650 t
1,400 t (max)
Under 4,400 t
3,000 t (max)
3,000 t
170 t
650 t (Andes)
Under 1,400 t
Under 4,400 t
3,000 t (max)
3,000 t
170 t
650 t (Andes)
Under 1,400 t
Puysegur
0t
0t
0t
0t
Arrow Plateau
0t
0t
0t
0t
Sub-Antarctic
Feature limit
1,850 t
500 t
1,300 t
100 t
1,300 t
100 – 150 t
1,300 t
None specified
TACC
TAC
10,500
11,025
6,150 t
6,457.5 t
6,110 t
6,415 t
6,110 t
6,415 t
Submissions from industry were received from Sanford (which owns 34.7% of ORH 3B
quota), DWG (representing 97.95% of the quota owners in ORH 3B), SeaFIC and TOKM.
All four submissions indicated partial support for Option 2 by favouring a reduction in the
TACC of 1,000 tonnes to be implemented by a reduction in catch on the East and South
Chatham Rise. Industry submitters also agree with the catch spreading arrangements under
this option at the sub-stock level, recognising the Northwest Chatham Rise, the East and
South Chatham Rise combined, and the Sub-Antarctic as containing biologically distinct
orange roughy fisheries. TOKM submit that it will include conditions in its ACE round to
encourage compliance with these conditions where it is required, and will recommend that
the Asset Holding Companies that have received ORH 3B settlement quota also include
these conditions in their ACE sales agreements.
Page 97 of 397
19
All four industry groups express their opposition to catch limits at the sub-area component
scale on the East and South Chatham Rise. This position is primarily based on industry’s
perception that the orange roughy on the East and South Chatham Rise constitute a single
sub-stock and management by sub-area components within these sub-stocks only serves to
increase management complexities and cost, with no sustainability benefit. DWG, SeaFIC
and TOKM argue that spatial partitioning of the East and South Chatham Rise has arisen
from boundaries established for stock assessment purposes, and that these boundaries are no
more than assessment conveniences that have little, or no, real-world management utility.
In support of this position, DWG notes that a proposed assessment of the South Chatham
Rise in 2007 was abandoned on the basis that there was no valid biological reason for
treating orange roughy on the South Chatham Rise as distinct from those on the East
Chatham Rise.
20
SeaFIC supports the approach taken in Options 2 and 3 in the IPP to attempt to simplify
catch spreading at the sub-area component level and considers that such approaches have a
better chance of success than the unworkable status quo. The DWG, Sanford and TOKM
submissions were silent on whether industry would conform to the catch spreading
arrangements on the East and South Chatham Rise provided under these options.
21
Subsequent discussions between MFish and DWG have resulted in an agreement that
industry, although it does not agree with the rationale provided by MFish for the sub-area
component catch spreading arrangements, will nonetheless abide by all catch spreading
arrangements should you choose the 1,000 t TACC reduction under Option 2. Industry
makes it clear that they support Option 2 as an interim option to be superseded by
management arrangements developed through the fisheries plan process. Industry remain
opposed to a 2,000 t reduction under Option 3 and it is not clear whether industry would
abide by the catch spreading arrangements at this lower TAC.
22
In contrast to industry, ENGOs considered that all options provided in the IPP were
unsatisfactory. All ENGOs supported a significantly greater reduction in the TAC than any
of the options proposed in the IPP. While the figures presented in these three submissions
were largely in agreement, only ECO provided discussion justifying the catch limits
presented other than a general preference for a more precautionary approach expressed by
all three ENGOs. The ECO submission referred extensively to the Plenary report, adopting
a position generally consistent with the most precautionary interpretation of sustainable
catch levels presented in that document. Their position is consistent with that taken in 2006
which is appropriate as no new stock assessment information is presented in the 2007
Plenary report.
23
More generally, the ENGOs all submitted on the need to consider the environmental effects
of orange roughy fisheries, particularly in regard to benthic impacts (ECO, Forest & Bird,
and WWF) but also in regard to seabirds and marine mammals (WWF); and deepwater
sharks and other non-target fish species (Forest & Bird). In relation to benthic impacts all
ENGOs contend that neither the BPA proposal nor the seamount closures mitigate the
current impact of trawl fisheries.
24
Analysis of the best available information is included in the body of this paper and positions
taken in submissions, and in subsequent discussions, on the appropriate interpretation of this
information is included for your consideration where appropriate.
Page 98 of 397
Background information
25
Genetic data has demonstrated that there are two distinct main sub-stocks within ORH 3B –
the Chatham Rise and Puysegur - and that these sub-stocks are distinct from adjacent areas.
Genetic data also suggests that there are multiple sub-stocks within the Chatham Rise
although no clear boundaries have been determined. The boundaries most recently used for
assessing the Chatham Rise sub-stocks divide it into three areas: the Northwest, the East and
the South Chatham Rise. The Arrow Plateau is an area located to the east of the Chatham
Rise fisheries and the remaining southern portion of ORH 3B is referred to as the SubAntarctic (figure 1).
26
The most recent stock assessments in 2006 were undertaken on further subdivisions of the
East Chatham Rise (the Spawning Box, the Northeast Hills and the Andes). Although these
assessments were progressed through the Deepwater Fisheries Assessment Working Group
(Deepwater FAWG) and the 2006 Plenary, there is ongoing debate about the utility of these
finer scale divisions, and industry is opposed to their use.
27
While acknowledging this debate, MFish considers that there is evidence of localised
depletion across the various East Chatham Rise features and, given the potential effect on
the stock as a whole, this provides some basis for management intervention at a scale below
the sub-stock level.
28
Orange roughy spawn in dense aggregations and also form aggregations outside the
spawning period, presumably for feeding. This renders orange roughy susceptible to
overfishing and localised depletion. Localised depletion may indicate a sustainability
concern at the sub-stock level as it suggests that feature complexes across the Chatham Rise
may be serially depleted by fishing pressure.
Experience with orange roughy to date
suggests that the biomass found on such features may be reduced to levels that will no
longer support a localised fishery and that recovery from such levels is uncertain. Further
cause for concern over localised depletion on the East Chatham Rise is evidence of
spawning fish on the Northeast Hills. This may indicate a separate biological population on
these features and that fishing them, particularly over the spawning season, may result in the
depletion of such populations.
29
Although the Act requires TAC decisions to be made at the QMA stock level, management
of sub-stocks and sub-area components within these sub-stocks has historically relied on
agreements with industry to manage them independently. A key component of the
management options put in place for the 2006-07 fishing year were a suite of voluntary
catch spreading arrangements and DWG’s commitment to collect catch data by sub-stock
and sub-area component, and to submit regular reports to MFish.
Your 2006 decision
30
The 2006 Plenary reported on new stock assessments for the Northwest and East Chatham
Rise sub-stocks. As a result of this assessment the catch limits for the Northwest Chatham
Rise were judged to be unsustainable and you reduced the catch limit.
31
All parties expressed concern over the status of the sub-stocks on the East and South
Chatham Rise. DWG, representing 97.95% of ORH 3B quota owners, suggested a staged
reduction in catch levels on the East and South Chatham Rise over three years and you
ultimately agreed to adopt the industry offer for the first year of that process. In your
Page 99 of 397
decision letter for the current fishing year you reserved comment on the proposed reductions
for 2007-08 until you were able to consider the results of the proposed 2007 stock
assessment for the South Chatham Rise.
32
You also agreed with an industry proposal to close the Arrow Plateau. The Puysegur
fishery remained closed and the catch limit for Sub-Antarctic was increased to 1,850 tonnes.
A 250 tonne allowance for industry research surveys was retained.
33
In response to sustainability concerns for sub-area components within the East Chatham
Rise - specifically the Northeast Hills and the Andes complex – you decreased the TAC for
ORH 3B on the understanding that industry would effect this reduction through voluntary
arrangements to decrease the catch limit on the South and East Chatham Rise. Voluntary
sub-area component limits in the East Chatham Rise were also requested.
34
As a part of your decision, you requested DWG to manage the spreading of commercial
catch between the designated sub-stocks and sub-area components of ORH 3B. Industry,
through DWG, agreed to implement the catch spreading arrangements at the sub-stock level
and for sub-area components in the Sub-Antarctic.
35
During the decision-making process DWG wrote to you to express the industry view that
the sub-area component limits on the East Chatham Rise were not justified or warranted.
The essence of the industry position was that the sub-area components within this part of the
Chatham Rise formed components of the same population and fish movement between these
areas would render the proposed sub-area component limits ineffective as sustainability
measures. DWG also submitted that the timing of the decision made it difficult to
implement the sub-area component limits. By that time most of the ACE trading
arrangements for the 2006-07 fishing year had already been concluded, and quota owners
were therefore unable to impose conditions on this ACE.
36
In reply you reaffirmed concern over the localised depletion on the East Chatham Rise if the
sub-area component limits were not respected – specifically you requested again that the
spawning box limit of 4,000 t during the spawning season and the 700 t limit for the Andes
be observed for the 2006-07 fishing year.
Efficacy of existing catch spreading arrangements
37
Catch in the current fishing year to date as reported by DWG and confirmed by MFish
demonstrates that no sub–stock catch limit has been exceeded. While there were some
instances of non-reporting in the first quarter, these problems appear to have been rectified.
The reporting framework at the sub-stock level appears to be working well and the DWG
reports are providing full information.
38
DWG has also provided MFish with catch data by sub-area component in the Sub-Antarctic
and on the East Chatham Rise. DWG agreed to inform MFish when catch for any sub-area
component within the Sub-Antarctic reached 80% of the agreed limit. Reports to DWG
have indicated that catch reached 95% of the 500 t feature limit for Priceless early in the
fishing year. This feature was subsequently closed by industry agreement on 4 December
2006, although subsequent analysis determined that the feature limit was undercaught at the
time of closure. This discrepancy was primarily due to significant catch from a new area to
the south of the recognised Priceless box.
Page 100 of 397
39
A definition of this new feature area has not as yet been confirmed. Companies are
sensitive about giving away information about the localities of their 'hotspots', which result
from considerable exploratory fishing/searching activities and come at a significant cost. In
order to provide some measure of protection to company-specific information, and at the
same time exercise control over catches as prescribed for feature limits in the Deepwater
Agreement, DWG has gained agreement by industry to close an area described by a circle
with a radius of 20 nautical miles as a temporary measure (see Appendix 4 for details
provided by DWG). DWG requested that companies refrain from fishing for orange roughy
in this area from 30 March 2007 when the catch had reached 506 t. DWG has yet to reach
consensus on how to address this confidentiality issue and communication with quota
owners in this regard is on-going. Until such time as agreement is reached the area shown
in Appendix 4 will constitute a feature in terms of the Sub-Antarctic feature limit. Note that
this new area covers much of the Priceless Box.
40
Preliminary analysis suggests that two of the sub-area component limits on the East
Chatham Rise that you requested (the Andes and the Northeast Hills) have been
significantly over-caught. Although accurate figures are not yet available, the reported
catch appears to be close to twice the limits you requested on the Andes and approximately
three times that on the North-east Hills. These areas were closed on 15 June and 2 June
2007 respectively and key industry members have agreed to refrain from fishing these areas
for the remainder of the fishing year. While complete figures for the spawning box for the
June to August period are not yet available it appears that this sub-area component limit will
be undercaught to compensate for the over-catch on the Andes and the Northeast Hills and
thereby ensure that the sub-stock limits are not exceeded.
41
There are a number of factors that may have contributed to industry exceeding the sub-area
component limits on the East Chatham Rise. The correspondence between you, DWG, and
MFish regarding the catch-splitting arrangements on the East Chatham Rise, subsequent to
your decision in 2006, meant that the issue remained unresolved at the start of the fishing
year. This provided little time for DWG to put in place arrangements with operators for
management at the sub-area component scale.
42
This correspondence also made it clear that industry did not support the proposed sub-area
component management arrangements. As a consequence, at least some operators have
simply chosen not to abide by them. A contributing factor may also have been concern that
reporting arrangements had insufficient resolution to accurately allocate tows to features.
Rationale for Management Action
Status of the ORH 3B stock
43
The most recent stock assessment information is presented in the 2006 Plenary and is
repeated in the 2007 Plenary. No new stock assessment information is available subsequent
to your decision in 2006. A proposal to produce an updated stock assessment for the South
Chatham Rise using updated catch and effort data was considered by the Deepwater FAWG
in 2007. However concerns were raised as to whether the East and South Chatham Rise
constitute separate sub-stocks as both geography and catch data suggest that the South
Chatham Rise may be continuous with the East Chatham Rise. Doubts were also raised
over the current stock assessment models due to their poor fit to catch and effort data, and
Page 101 of 397
survey data. Ultimately this assessment did not proceed as it was decided to revisit stock
structure issues before proceeding further
44
The Plenary report includes the status of the various sub-stocks and sub-area components
for which stock assessments have been undertaken and no discussion is included on the
status of the ORH 3B stock as a whole. Although stock assessment information is not
available for all areas of the QMA, the main areas of the fishery are covered.
45
Although SeaFIC ultimately supports a TAC reduction, it contends in its submission that in
principle, if the available catches from the many stock assessments are added up, there is
probably no need for an aggregate TACC reduction at all. MFish does not agree with the
latter part of this statement, as discussed below.
46
A cursory examination of the status of the various components of the ORH 3B stock, as
reported in the 2007 Plenary, shows that the Northwest Chatham Rise, Northeast Hills and
Puysegur are considered to be below BMSY, the Andes and the South Chatham Rise are near
BMSY, and the Spawning Box and Northeast Flats are above BMSY. Although the Plenary
report notes that there is considerable uncertainty associated with all of these assessments,
MFish considers that the state of the Spawning Box and Northeast Flats should be treated
with particular caution.
47
The credibility of this assessment was questioned during the 2006 Deepwater FAWG
meetings and subsequently by stock assessment scientists at both NIWA and MFish. The
concerns raised relate not only to the 2006 assessment, but also to the previous East
Chatham Rise stock assessments in 2001 and 2005. In all three cases the estimates of
current biomass were considered by many to be overly optimistic, and such was the concern
after the 2005 assessment that three major workshop reviews were undertaken. The 2006
assessment instigated numerous refinements based on the recommendations of the three
review panels but resulted in little change from the 2005 assessment. Of primary concern
was the fact that a virtually identical rebuild was seen in the model regardless of whether the
observations from the fishery (i.e. acoustic survey data and CPUE indices) were included or
not. From this result it became apparent that the rebuild was largely driven by productivity
assumptions rather than actual data. This conclusion is included in the 2006 and 2007
Plenary reports. Subsequent to the 2006 Deepwater FAWG discussions, the MFish Chief
Scientist has published a paper (initially drafted in late 2006) claiming that the 2006 East
Chatham Rise stock assessment is an example of a failed stock assessment.
48
Tacit support for concerns over the state of the East Chatham Rise sub-stock may also be
drawn from submissions. All submissions received supported a reduction in the TACC, and
that this reduction should be implemented by a reduction in catch limits on the East and
South Chatham Rise. Sanford considers that this reduction is necessary to ensure the
sustainability of the ORH 3B fishery
49
ORH 3B, both in terms of the fishery and the biomass of the stock, is dominated by the East
Chatham Rise (i.e. the Spawning Box and the Northeast Flats stock assessment area).
Consequently the status of the ORH 3B stock as a whole, by and large reflects the status of
this portion of the stock. MFish considers that the stock assessment information presented
in the Plenary, and in particular that for the Spawning Box and Northeast Flats, should be
tempered by the significant uncertainty inherent in this information, and by anecdotal
information suggesting widespread concern over the state of the South and East Chatham
Rise sub-stock.
Page 102 of 397
50
Further increasing the uncertainty of conclusions drawn from simply aggregating the results
of individual stock assessments is the complex geographic nature of the various sub-stocks
that make up the ORH 3B stock, particularly on the East and South Chatham Rise. As
noted above, the proposed South Chatham Rise stock assessment did not proceed due to
suggestions that it may be continuous with the East Chatham Rise sub-stock. There is also
ongoing debate in the Deepwater FAWG over the East Chatham Rise stock assessment
boundaries which are effectively derived on a fishery basis, rather than delineating separate
orange roughy populations. SeaFIC allude to these concerns in their submission where they
state that concerns over the structure of existing assessments provide pause for thought.
51
MFish considers that a cautious approach to the stock assessment information is warranted
and that it is reasonable to conclude that, on balance, the ORH 3B stock is likely to be
below BMSY.
Catch spreading arrangements
52
Examination of the catch information for the 2006-07 fishing year to date clearly
demonstrates that, while the catch spreading arrangements at the sub-stock level are
operating effectively, those at the sub-area component scale on the South and East Chatham
Rise are not being respected by industry. MFish considers that it is necessary to revisit the
management approach for the orange roughy fisheries on the South and East Chatham Rise.
53
A research project in 2007-08 will look at the stock structure and distribution across the
Chatham Rise and may provide a basis for the consideration of sub-stock boundaries in the
future.
Fisheries plans
54
In light of uncertainty about the status of the orange roughy sub-stocks across ORH 3B, and
concerns over the location of sub-QMA stock assessment and management boundaries, a
new approach is required to derive management solutions for ORH 3B. Industry has
recognised the need to decrease orange roughy catch and will participate in the fisheries
plan process to develop and implement the range of measures that will be required.
55
Over the coming year MFish is investing considerable resources in the development of
fisheries plans across a number of fisheries including ORH 3B. A fisheries plan for orange
roughy is proposed for implementation prior to the start of the 2008-09 fishing year. This
plan will build on collaborative work already underway between MFish and DWG. A
successful conclusion will rely on willingness by all parties to engage meaningfully in the
process and to ultimately respect management actions included in the completed fisheries
plan.
56
MFish considers that the development of an orange roughy fisheries plan is a high priority
to provide a durable, long-term management approach to New Zealand’s orange roughy
fisheries. A suite of new management measures will flow from this process, which is likely
to include, but not be limited to, consideration of a potential reduction in the TAC,
realignment of management boundaries, fleet consolidation and better vessel co-ordination.
Page 103 of 397
The 2007-08 DWG proposal
TAC
57
Industry has reconfirmed its support of a TAC reduction of 1,000 t for the 2007-08 fishing
year and to review the need for any further change during 2008. This proposal is the second
step in the staged reduction that was initiated in 2006-07.
Catch spreading arrangements
58
In their submissions, industry agreed to effect the 1,000 t TAC reduction by reducing catch
limits on the South and East Chatham Rise. While industry remains fundamentally opposed
to management measures imposed at a scale below the sub-stock level, they agree that the
sub-area component approach proposed under Option 2 is an improvement over the finescale management arrangements that you requested for 2006-07 but were not agreed to by
quota owners. Industry, through DWG, has provided an assurance that they will abide by
the proposed arrangements under Option 2 at both the sub-stock and sub-area component
scales for the 2007-08 fishing year if this is the option that you choose to implement.
59
Industry wishes to make clear however that it considers this to be an interim arrangement
pending fisheries plan development. It also does not want the agreement to abide by these
arrangements for the 2007-08 fishing year to be interpreted as support for catch spreading at
the sub-area component level.
60
Industry does not support Option 3 and it is unclear whether it would abide by the catch
spreading arrangements at a lower TAC under Option 3.
Considerations at the stock (QMA) level
Total allowable catch
Section 13 (2)
61
The ORH 3B stock is managed under section 13 of the Act which requires that you set a
TAC that moves the stock to or above, or maintains the stock at or above, a biomass level
that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY). An assessment of the status of the
entire ORH 3B stock relative to BMSY 53 is not available. While information to underpin an
assessment of the overall status and long-term yield of the ORH 3B stock is not available,
on balance MFish considers it likely that the ORH 3B stock is below BMSY.
62
Given the concerns regarding catch levels and stock status, MFish recommends that you
consider the TAC for ORH 3B pursuant to section 13(2)(b) of the Act. Section 13(2)(b) is
appropriate in cases where the stock biomass is likely to be below BMSY and requires a TAC
that restores a stock biomass towards (at or above) a level that can produce the maximum
sustainable yield, having regard to the interdependence of stocks, biological characteristics
and environmental conditions. Consequently MFish considers that maintaining the status
53
For orange roughy stocks, BMSY is interpreted as the mean biomass under a CAY policy, which is estimated to be
30% Bo.
Page 104 of 397
quo under IPP Option 1 is not appropriate and we do not recommend this option to you.
MFish acknowledges that estimates of unfished biomass, current absolute biomass, or the
biomass that will produce MSY are unavailable for the entire ORH 3B stock and, as such,
there is no certainty whether or not the proposed TACs under Options 2 and 3 will restore
the stock to a size that will support MSY.
63
MFish does not consider that adopting the most precautionary interpretation of the Plenary
data, as advocated by the ENGOs is appropriate in all cases. Rather, the various
interpretations provided in the Plenary must be assessed on their merits. Ultimately it is
your decision as to the appropriate weightings to give the various components of the best
available information, and to determine what risk to the sustainability of the stock is
appropriate in providing for the utilisation of the ORH 3B stock.
Section 13 (3)
64
Section 13 (3) requires that, in considering the way and the rate that the stock may be
moved towards a level that can produce MSY under s 13(2)(b), you shall have regard to
such social, cultural and economic factors as you consider relevant.
Economic factors
65
The ORH 3B catch is New Zealand’s largest orange roughy fishery and also the largest such
fishery in the world. ORH 3B fishing is conducted throughout the year, although large
catches are taken in the June - July spawning season. Two companies hold 70%, and a
further four companies hold 20%, of ORH 3B quota; the remainder is settlement quota held
by 38 different Mäori interests.
66
Since 2001/02, between 15 and 27 vessels have completed in excess of 50 tows and have
fished in two or more fishing years, targeting orange roughy in ORH 3B.
67
The proposed reduction in the TAC of 1,000 t under Option 2 has been supported by
industry. A conservative estimate of the landed value of 1,000 t of orange roughy derived
from the 2006-07 port price in ORH 3B equates to a value of $3.67 million 54. Since the
majority of orange roughy is exported a better estimation of value may be derived from
export earnings. On the basis of export value (all product states) 1,000 t of orange roughy is
worth approximately $4.53 million 55.
68
The economic cost of the TAC reduction under Option 2, while significant, has been
accepted by the owners of 97.5% of the ORH 3B quota. The proposed sub-area component
catch spreading arrangements provide greater flexibility for industry to manage their fishing
operations than those under the status quo. This is likely to have an economic benefit for
operators although MFish is not in a position to quantify this effect and no information on
this point was provided through the consultation process.
69
Option 3 proposes a reduction in the TAC of 2,000 t which equates to a value of $7.34
million based on port price and $9.06 million based on export value. MFish notes that the
54
Estimated by multiplying the port price ($3.67/kg for 2006-07) by 1,000 t.
Export value was estimated by multiplying the export price by 1,000 t. In 2006, 4,601 tonnes of orange roughy fillets
(fresh and frozen) were sold for $72.93 million. The standard conversion factor for fillets is 3.5, so 4,601 tonnes of
fillets is estimated to equal 16,103 tonnes of orange roughy (greenweight). Therefore, in fillet form, the average price
is $4.53 per greenweight kilogram.
55
Page 105 of 397
staged reduction in the TAC proposed by DWG in 2006 included a further reduction of
1,000 t for the 2008-09 fishing year. Option 3 essentially accelerates the staged reduction
initially proposed by industry. Their proposal of annual 1,000 t cuts was to provide a ’soft
landing’ by allowing operators a period of time over which to rationalise their operations at
progressively lower TAC levels rather than to inflict a single large TAC reduction. A
further 1,000 t reduction in 2008 has not been confirmed by industry. Rather, they have
agreed to re-evaluate the need for further reductions to the ORH 3B TACC prior to October
2008.
70
Given that industry have previously contemplated a TAC reduction to the level proposed
under Option 3, MFish considers that the economic consequences of a staged TAC
reduction to the level proposed under Option 3 over two years instead of three must at least
have been considered by industry. However, a TAC reduction to this level for the 2007-08
fishing year, as proposed under Option 3, may have adverse economic and management
implications for operators in the short term, and these could be significant. Industry does
not support this option.
71
ENGOs support a reduction of the TAC of between 5,350 and 5,390 t which equates to a
value of $19.63 million to $19.78 million based on port price and $24.24 million to $24.42
million based on export value. Such a reduction would have significant adverse economic
and management implications for operators.
Social factors
72
Catch reductions can have social implications when employment opportunities for catching
and processing staff are reduced. The information MFish has on the impact on employment
that might arise from Options 2 and 3 is discussed under Economic Factors.
73
There is no known recreational or customary fishing for orange roughy, and no allowance
has been provided to non-commercial extractive users. There is a broad social benefit to
New Zealand from the supply of orange roughy to the domestic market, and there is a
general public benefit from the maintenance of orange roughy populations. MFish
considers that both of these issues are adequately addressed by maintaining a sustainable
fishery.
Cultural factors
74
MFish is not aware of any cultural factors relevant to these TAC or TACC decisions, and no
such factors have been raised by submitters.
TACC and Allowances
75
The TAC must be apportioned between the relevant sectors and interests set out under the
provisions of s 20 and s 21 of the Act. In varying the TACC, section 21 prescribes that you
shall make allowances for Mäori customary non-commercial interests, recreational fishing
interests, and for any other sources of fishing-related mortality. In determining these
allowances, you should consider how the allowances will enable people to provide for their
social, economic and cultural wellbeing (as provided for in the purpose of the Act).
76
There are no known Mäori customary or recreational fisheries for orange roughy due to the
geographic location of orange roughy fishing grounds, and the depth at which they live.
Page 106 of 397
MFish proposes that you set allowances of zero tonnes for recreational and Mäori
customary fishing under all options. This is consistent with the status quo and the approach
that has been adopted since orange roughy became a QMS species in 1986.
77
Other sources of fishing related mortality has been previously set at 5% of the TACC to
account for lost fish, discards, discrepancies in tray weights and conversion factors. There
is no information to support a change to this figure at this time.
Sub-QMA catch spreading arrangements
78
Proposed sub-stock and sub-area component catch limits for the 2007-08 fishing year are
discussed below. MFish recommends that catch limits and reporting requirements continue
to be managed by DWG as the reporting framework has worked well in the fishing year to
date. Under all options MFish will monitor DWG reports against data provided by
FishServe and will monitor operators’ fishing patterns to evaluate voluntary catch limits.
MFish will ensure that, through joint MFish-DWG communications, operators are fully
informed as to the progress of catch taken against sub-stock and sub-area component limits.
Considerations at the sub-stock level
Sub-stock boundaries
79
While there is some debate over the location of stock assessment and management
boundaries within ORH 3B, particularly between the East and South Chatham Rise, there is
no consensus position on what changes are necessary at this time. A desktop study on the
stock structure and spatial partitioning of Chatham Rise orange roughy sub-stocks generally
is currently being undertaken (Research Project ORH2007/05) and will provide a better
basis for determining where stock boundaries should lie. The location and need for
boundaries will be informed by the results of this research project and will be considered as
part of the development of a fisheries plan for ORH 3B. No changes to the recognised substock boundaries are proposed at this time.
80
The existing sub-stock boundaries are shown in figure 2 and are defined in Appendix 2.
Page 107 of 397
Figure 2 Sub-stock boundaries within the ORH 3B QMA.
Sub-stock catch limits
81
The catch limit for the Northwest Chatham Rise was decreased in response to sustainability
concerns identified in the 2006 stock assessment and no new information is available. In
their recent submission, ECO have repeated the argument made in their 2006 submission in
support of a catch reduction to, or below, the CAY estimate for 2007 of 410 tonnes.
82
The ECO position was considered in making your 2006 decision on the appropriate catch
limit for the Northwest Chatham Rise. MFish considers that the 2006 decision was
appropriate and in the absence of new stock assessment information, does not consider that
you should vary the current management arrangements for this sub-stock at this time.
83
All options retain the existing catch limit for the Northwest Chatham Rise.
84
MFish notes that the Deepwater FAWG raised concerns over both the stock assessment
model and the stock assessment boundaries this year and there is considerable uncertainty as
to when new stock assessment information will be available. Nonetheless MFish remains
concerned that the current catch levels on the East and South Chatham Rise may not be
sustainable. Reasons for concern over the state of the East Chatham Rise sub-stock,
include;
•
A decrease in the CPUE;
•
Reductions in the spatial extent of commercially viable aggregations;
•
Reductions in the spatial extent of main spawning plume on the East Chatham Rise;
•
Reductions in biomass estimates of the East Chatham Rise spawning plume; and
•
Reductions in biomass estimates derived from wide-area surveys.
85
Both ENGOs and the industry share these concerns as demonstrated by their proposals to
reduce catch levels by 4,250 t and 1,000 t respectively. MFish recommends that the catch
limit on the East and South Chatham Rise be reduced for the 2007-08 fishing year.
86
As noted, there is debate over the separation of the East and South Chatham Rise sub-stocks
and MFish considers that discussion on the appropriateness or otherwise of an East / South
Chatham Rise split for stock assessment and/or management purposes should be informed
by the results of the research being undertaken in the coming fishing year and is then better
progressed through the fisheries plan process.
87
In the interim, MFish proposes that the existing structure of the East / South Chatham Rise
catch split be retained – that is, retain a catch limit for the combined South and East
Chatham Rise with maximum catch limits for each area. This approach ensures that catch is
spread between feature complexes and provides industry a degree of flexibility about where
their catch is taken. The South Chatham Rise catch is largely taken off the Chiefs – a
complex of hills at the eastern end of the South Chatham Rise – and MFish considers there
Page 108 of 397
is a sustainability risk should no limit be set for the South Chatham Rise. All options retain
the East/South split pending the outcome of a more detailed and informed analysis.
88
The original industry proposal of a 1,000 t reduction in the catch limit for the East and
South Chatham Rise did not address how this should be apportioned between the two areas.
In the IPP, MFish stated that it considers it appropriate to retain the existing catch split
proportions to effect the industry proposal. Catch spreading arrangements under Option 2
were derived on that basis and include a reduction in the maximum catch from the South
Chatham Rise to 1,750 t. This is above the projected South Chatham Rise catch for 200607. Industry has subsequently agreed to abide by this catch split should you agree to
implement Option 2.
89
Option 3 proposes a further reduction to the catch limit on the East Chatham Rise but
includes a maximum 1,750 t catch limit for the South Chatham Rise.
90
ECO’s proposed reduction of 4,250 t is based on the 2006 stock assessment information at
the sub-area component level and is discussed below.
Arrow Plateau
91
The Arrow Plateau has been closed to bottom trawling under the BPA initiative and the
catch limit for this portion of the stock will remain at zero. This position is supported by all
submitters.
92
All options retain a zero tonne catch limit for the Arrow Plateau.
Puysegur
93
The fishery has been voluntarily closed since 1997-98 and this closure is supported by all
submitters.
94
All options retain a zero tonne catch limit for Puysegur.
Sub-Antarctic
95
The catch limit for the Sub-Antarctic was increased in 2006 to 1,850 t on the basis of the
2006 stock assessment and no new information is available at the sub-stock scale. Industry
support retention of the existing catch level. ECO considers that there is no evidence that
the Sub-Antarctic fishery is sustainable. Rather ECO considers that declines in the Priceless
CPUE, significant catch reductions in the East Pukaki fishery, and an absence of large
spawning aggregations in this area of the ORH 3B QMA support a reduction in catch limit
to below 1,300 t.
96
MFish considers that your 2006 decisions remain appropriate. In the absence of new stock
assessment information, MFish does not propose varying the current management
arrangements at this time. ECO’s concerns over CPUE indices at spatial scales below that
of the sub-stock level are discussed below.
97
All options retain a catch limit of 1,850 t for the Sub-Antarctic.
Considerations at the sub-area component level
Catch spreading by sub-area component
Sub-Antarctic feature limits
Page 109 of 397
98
Both Priceless and a new southern box were closed for the remainder of the 2006-07 fishing
year once the catch limit of 500 t was reached, and industry supports retention of this limit
for 2007-08. ECO supports a reduction in feature limit closer to that provided in ORH 1 of
100-150 t.
99
The areas to which feature limits apply in the Sub-Antarctic orange roughy sub-stock are
significantly bigger than those in ORH1. Feature limits in ORH 1 are set at a standard size
and apply to 314 nm2 areas. In contrast Sub-Antarctic features enclose feature complexes
and the size of these complexes varies. For example the Priceless Box is 625 nm2 and the
new Southern area shown in Appendix 4 is 1,256 nm2. Both of these areas were closed
during the 2006-07 fishing year once the 500 t limit was reached. MFish considers that
your 2006 decisions remain appropriate and that the voluntary catch spreading and reporting
arrangements are working well. In the absence of new stock assessment information, MFish
does not propose varying the current management arrangements at this time.
100
MFish will continue to monitor DWG reports against data provided by FishServe and to
monitor operators’ fishing patterns to evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary catch limits in
2007-08. MFish will also ensure that, through joint MFish-DWG communications,
operators are fully informed as to the progress of catch taken against the Sub-Antarctic
feature limits.
East Chatham Rise
101 MFish acknowledges that the orange roughy taken from the various sub-area components
across the East Chatham Rise may comprise the same population although there remains
significant uncertainty regarding this contention. Nonetheless MFish remains concerned
that fishing pressure at the level seen in 2006-07 on the Andes Complex and the North-east
Hills may constitute a sustainability risk to the East Chatham Rise sub-stock.
102
Until we have a better understanding of the spatial structure of the orange roughy stocks on
the East and South Chatham Rise we will not be in a position to determine the implications
of localised depletion of the various features and feature complexes on which a significant
component of the ORH 3B fishery is based. Consequently MFish considers that it is
appropriate to continue to spread catches across the South and East Chatham Rise until a
more informed catch spreading framework can be established.
103
In your 2006 decision, you requested that the industry abide by sub-area component catch
limits. This decision reflected your concern about localised depletion largely based on the
stock assessment information for the East Chatham Rise sub-area components. The East
Chatham Rise sub-area components for which you requested catch limits in your 2006
decision are shown in figure 3 and are defined in Appendix 3.
Page 110 of 397
Figure 3 Existing sub-area component boundaries within the East Chatham Rise.
104
Concerns about the use of the sub-area component boundaries used in these assessments
have been raised by industry. The industry view that the sub-area component boundaries
have little management utility, coupled with the reliance on voluntary catch spreading
arrangements, has contributed to the sub-area component catch limits for the current fishing
year being largely ineffective.
105
In light of concerns over the efficacy of these sub-area component boundaries for stock
management purposes, and information suggesting that the East and South Chatham Rise
may comprise a single stock, MFish does not recommend persevering with this approach for
the 2007-08 fishing year.
106
Options 2 and 3 provide an alternative management arrangement that incorporates a
simplified catch spreading framework. These options are intended to effectively spread
catch across the East and South Chatham Rise, reducing the risk of localised depletion and
therefore the sustainability risk at the broader sub-stock level.
107
MFish considers that the proposed sub-area component boundaries and limits are a
reasonable trade-off between the need for industry flexibility, and the potential
sustainability risk associated with possible localised depletion. To an extent the proposed
boundaries respect existing fishing practices and therefore codify current arrangements, as
shown in the figure below.
Page 111 of 397
Figure 4 Fishing effort by proposed sub-area components from 1 October 2006 – 28 May 2007.
108
109
Under both options the East Chatham Rise would be divided into three sub-area
components, based on spatial and temporal considerations, with maximum catch levels
requested for each of the following divisions;
i)
the Spawning Box (in June – August);
ii)
the Northeast Rise (including the Spawning Box outside June - August, the
Northeast Flats and the Northeast Hills); and
iii)
the Southeast Rise (incorporating the Andes Complex and the larger Andes
Box)
The location of these sub-area component boundaries is shown in figure 4 and they are
defined in Appendix 4. They largely conform to the 2006 East Chatham Rise stock
assessment boundaries.
Page 112 of 397
Figure 5 Proposed sub-area component boundaries within the East Chatham Rise.
110
Although the sub-area components under this approach are larger than those under the
status quo, if respected by industry they will provide greater protection against localised
depletion on the Northeast Hills and the Andes Complex than the current ineffective subarea component arrangements.
111
Industry opposition to catch spreading at this scale stems from their views that any
sustainability risk associated with localised depletion on the Northeast Hills and the Andes
Complex is unclear and localised depletion is better considered as an economics issue (i.e.
adversely effecting catch rates) rather than a sustainability concern. They further contend
that management becomes more difficult and more costly at a finer scale. While MFish
accepts that there is uncertainty in quantifying the impact of localised depletion on
sustainability at a broader scale, and that management at finer scales is increasingly difficult
and costly, we nonetheless consider that there is a sustainability risk if catch spreading at the
sub-area component scale is not adhered to.
112
Options considered under this approach for voluntary catch spreading by sub-area
component within the East and South Chatham Rise catch limit are summarised in the
following table and discussed further below.
ORH 3B
Sub-Area components
East Chatham Rise
Spawning Box(Jun-Aug)
Northeast Rise
Southeast Rise
South Chatham Rise
Voluntary catch
limits under Option
2
Voluntary catch
limits under Option
3
7,650 t
(Maximum) 6,500 t
3,200 t
1,650 t
1,650 t
(Maximum) 1,750 t
6,650 t
(Maximum) 5,500 t
3,200 t
1,150 t
1,150 t
(Maximum) 1,750 t
Sub-area catch limits under Option 2
113
Under Option 2 the method used to derive the catch limit for the Spawning Box is consistent
with that used to derive the South Chatham Rise catch limit i.e. the existing catch limit has
been reduced proportionately across the South and East Chatham Rise.
114
The current limits for the Northeast Rise and the Southeast Rise, which were derived from
the 2005 stock assessments, provide some guidance on appropriate catch levels for these
areas, although, as discussed, there are some concerns with this information. Past fishing
practices may also provide some guidance. In the absence of better information, MFish
proposes that the East Chatham Rise catch outside the spawning box is split equally
between the Northeast Rise and the Southeast Rise. This approximates both the current
catch split as effected by industry, and your 2006 decision at a coarser scale than was
requested at that time.
115
The removal of the existing fine scale sub-area component limits may increase the risk of
localised depletion, particularly on the Northeast Hills and the Andes Complex. As a part of
this approach, industry would be requested to spread catch between individual features
within the broader sub-area component catch limits but MFish does not propose to
Page 113 of 397
recommend specific feature limits at this time. Feature limits have failed for the current
fishing year and there is no information to suggest that industry would respect arrangements
requested at this scale for the 2007-08 fishing year. Industry have agreed to abide by all
catch spreading arrangements under Option 2. The agreement by industry to spread catch
across the various East Chatham Rise features, and their proposal to rationalise the ORH 3B
fleet, provide some measure of confidence that the risk of localised deletion and sub-stock
sustainability will be mitigated until this issue can be more satisfactorily addressed through
the fisheries plan process.
Sub-area catch limits under Option 3
116
As noted, the removal of the fine-scale sub-area component management arrangements you
requested in 2006-07 under Option 2 may increase the fishing pressure on the Andes
Complex and the Northeast Hills. This may increase localised depletion on these feature
complexes and may increase the sustainability risk at the sub-stock scale. Option 3 is
available if you consider this risk to be unacceptable.
117
Option 3 places greater weight on the possible risk of localised depletion if the information
that suggests there is a single East Chatham Rise, or East and South Chatham Rise, substock is wrong, or that that there is in fact greater site fidelity within the East Chatham Rise
sub-area components than is currently recognised.
118
Under Option 3 the catch limit for the East Chatham Rise has been reduced by a further
1,000 t, effected by reducing the sub-area component catch limits for the Northeast and
Southeast Rise by a further 500 t each. MFish considers that these reductions, when
compared to Option 2, will decrease the risk of localised depletion on the feature complexes
if industry adhered to them, and will move the sub-area component limits closer to the
current limits for the Andes and the Northeast Hills. Although the sub-area component
limits would remain higher than the existing levels, they also encompass significantly more
area.
119
These limits, although more restrictive than those under Option 2, provide greater flexibility
to industry than the existing sub-area component limits and are therefore more likely to be
respected. Industry has not confirmed whether it will abide by these limits and there
remains a risk that industry will consider arrangements under this option too restrictive. If
they are not adhered to, these limits may compromise the success of the voluntary
arrangements across the fishery and, ultimately, the sustainability of the fishery.
120
Existing sub-area component boundaries are defined in Appendix 3 and sub-area
components proposed for the East Chatham Rise under Options 2 and 3 are defined in
Appendix 4.
Fleet management
121
The owners of the majority of ORH 3B quota have advised that they are currently
conferring on commercial details to reorganise their ORH 3B harvest plans. This
reorganisation will reduce the number of vessels operating in ORH 3B and increase the coordination of the deployment of the fleet. Their motivations in instigating this approach are
to maximise catch rates, and therefore the economic returns from these fisheries; to reduce
fishing pressure on the grounds, and hence the environmental footprint; and to enhance the
collection of scientific information to inform future management decisions.
Page 114 of 397
122
MFish support this co-ordinated approach to fishing ORH 3B. Aggregations of orange
roughy are dispersed by trawling and fewer vessels means larger and denser aggregations of
fish should be available to fishers. A reduction in the size of the fleet would enable more
efficient fishing plans with vessels better able to expend effort in the most efficient manner,
both spatially and temporally. It could also lead to significant benefits to the sustainability
of the fishery, and reduce the environmental impacts of fishing.
Other options
123
It is open to you to implement other options. If you consider that the risk of localised
depletion producing sustainability concerns is unacceptable and that voluntary arrangements
are not satisfactory you may in future seek to sub-divide the QMA under section 25 to allow
the use of statutory tools to be used at a finer spatial scale than is currently available to you.
Alternatively you could close specific areas under section 11 of the Act through regulation
or gazette notice.
124
Given the information currently available, MFish does not propose either of these options at
this time. Although there may be two or more orange roughy stocks on the Chatham Rise it
is unclear where a boundary between distinct stocks could be drawn. Closing individual
features is also not currently proposed as there is concern that this would only serve to focus
pressure elsewhere. Any increase in pressure on the spawning plume would be of particular
concern.
125
If you wish to pursue the other options discussed above (i.e. to address concerns over
localised depletion), or TAC and TACC options outside the range proposed in the IPP,
MFish considers further consultation would be required with stakeholders before a decision
on such measures could be taken. As a consequence, such measures could not be
implemented prior to the commencement of the 1 October 2007/8 fishing year.
Environmental considerations relevant to setting the TAC
126
Under section 11(1)(a) of the Act, in varying the TAC, you must take into account any
effects of fishing on any stock and the aquatic environment. Moreover, the purpose of the
Act in section 8 provides that “ensuring sustainability” includes avoiding, remedying, or
mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment.
127
MFish is in the process of developing environmental standards - including a seabird
standard and a benthic impact standard - to ensure that statutory obligations to avoid remedy
or mitigate the adverse effects of fishing are met. These standards will ultimately be used to
inform fisheries plan development.
128
Key environmental issues in relation to considering the TAC for the ORH 3B fishery,
including environmental issues raised in submissions are discussed below in relation to the
options presented. The environmental impacts discussed are, to an extent, proportional to
effort in this fishery. Industry initiatives to reduce the number of vessels engaged in the
fishery, and reduce effort expended will have a significant benefit in reducing the
environmental footprint of this fishery. Any reduction in the TAC will have the same
positive effect.
Page 115 of 397
Finfish Bycatch
129
Forest & Bird expressed concern at the impact of orange roughy fishing on non-target fish
species. While a number of deepwater species that share similar habitat to orange roughy
are taken in the ORH 3B fishery (including the QMS species oreo, ribaldo, rubyfish and
gemfish) targeted orange roughy fishing historically captures over 90% orange roughy. No
increase in the orange roughy TAC is contemplated and consequently there should be no
increase in finfish bycatch under any option.
Shark Bycatch
130
Forest & Bird has also expressed concern at the impact of orange roughy fishing on highly
vulnerable deepwater sharks. MFish notes that deepwater sharks account for less than 1%
of the bycatch in orange roughy fisheries. Issues in relation to the impact of fishing on
sharks generally are addressed in a specific national plan of action for sharks which is in
preparation by MFish.
Marine Mammals
131
The WWF submission touched on the impact on marine mammals. As no increase in the
orange roughy TAC is contemplated, MFish consider that there should be no increase in
marine mammal interactions under any of the proposed options.
Seabirds
132
Trawl fisheries for orange roughy are known to interact with seabirds and concern over this
impact was raised by WWF. Fishing-related mortalities of seabird species are known to
occur in ORH 3B, although it is difficult to quantify the overall impact as knowledge of the
population characteristics of seabird species is typically limited. It is known however that
the Chatham Rise and Sub-Antarctic regions are areas of vulnerable and threatened sea bird
species such as the Chatham Island Albatross (International Union for the Conservation of
Nature, (IUCN) status: critically endangered), Black Browed and Northern Albatross (IUCN
status: endangered), the Shy Albatross and Northern Giant Petrel (IUCN status: near
Threatened).
133
As no increase in the orange roughy TAC is contemplated, MFish consider that there should
be no increase in seabird interactions under any of the proposed options.
134
All ENGO submissions discussed the need to consider the benthic impacts of orange roughy
fisheries. Bottom trawling can affect fragile benthic invertebrate communities but adverse
effects in terms of area disturbed may be reduced if vessels repeatedly trawl along the same
towlines in a fishery. Under all options industry is requested to follow known trawl tracks.
135
Under all options the TAC will be decreased, which is likely to reduce the fishing effort
expended in ORH 3B. In addition, the fleet rationalisation being implemented by the
industry is likely to further reduce the number of tows undertaken in the future.
136
Two other initiatives are in place to address benthic impacts. In 2001 the then Minister of
Fisheries initiated a trawl closure covering a selection of 19 seamounts of varying size and
depth within New Zealand (10 of which are within ORH 3B). In addition a further twelve
areas have recently been closed to bottom trawling under the BPA proposal within ORH 3B,
Page 116 of 397
totalling close to 350,000 square kilometres. While ENGOs contend that neither the BPA
proposal nor the seamount closures are sufficient to mitigate the current impact of trawl
fisheries MFish considers that these closures make a significant contribution to the
protection of a wide range of habitat types found in New Zealand’s EEZ.
Additional management issues
Compliance implications
137
Key offences that may occur in ORH 3B include misreporting of QMA, species and
weights, fishing in closed areas and bycatch targeting. MFish considers that the proposed
management options should not significantly increase the incentive to offend.
138
Industry’s adherence to voluntary catch spreading arrangements is currently monitored
through monthly reports compiled and sent to MFish by DWG. The monthly reports pertain
to catch levels by both sub-stock and sub-area component. Industry, through DWG, notifies
MFish when catch reaches 80% of the sub-stock and sub-area component limits, and also
notifies MFish when any limit has been reached. Existing reporting arrangements have
been working well and are retained under all the proposed options.
Sub-Antarctic stock assessment
139
Included in your decision last year, was a request that DWG work with MFish Science to
develop and present a stock assessment research programme for the Sub-Antarctic. As part
of this initiative, an industry vessel completed a survey of the Priceless feature over the
spawning period. This survey included acoustics and biological sampling aimed at
determining if spawning was taking place on this feature complex. Results will be
presented to the Deepwater FAWG with further survey work planned for the 2007-08
fishing year.
Page 117 of 397
APPENDIX 1
140
When setting or varying the TAC and TACC under the Act, you are required to consider a
series of principles and factors:
a)
b)
Section 13(2) MFish recommends that you consider varying the TAC pursuant to s
13(2)(b) to enable ORH3B to be restored to a level at or above BMSY. An assessment
of the current status of the entire ORH 3B stock or stock complex relative to BMSY is
not available and no new stock assessment information is available this year. After
considering the available stock assessment information, and taking into account the
significant uncertainty associated with the stock assessment for the Spawning Box
and Northeast flats area in conjunction with widespread anecdotal information that
suggests concern over the status of the South and East Chatham Rise sub-stock,
MFish considers that, on balance, the ORH 3B stock is likely to be below BMSY.
MFish also considers that the proposed TACs (along with the proposed catch limits
on the South and East Chatham Rise) should restore the stock to a biomass that can
produce MSY. The specific considerations set out in s 13(2)(b) include having
regard to the interdependence of stocks, the biological characteristics of the stock
and any environmental conditions affecting the stock. As such, in considering the
proposed TAC options and corresponding proposed periods of rebuild, you must
take into account:
i)
The interdependence of stocks for ORH 3B (as required by s 13(2)(b)(i)).
There is no information to suggest the interdependence of stocks should
affect the level of the TACs and sub-area component catch limits set for
ORH 3B at this time. The fishery is relatively clean, and bycatch proportions
are low given that the fishery primarily targets aggregations of orange
roughy.
ii)
Environmental factors affecting ORH3B (as required under s 13(2)(b)(ii)).
However, no specific environmental conditions affecting the ORH 3B stock
have been identified.
iii)
The biological characteristics of ORH3B (as required under s 13(2)(b)(ii)). It
is known that orange roughy are very long-lived and late maturing, which are
biological characteristics that render them slow to recover from overfishing.
Section 13(3) requires that you, in considering the way and rate at which a stock is
moved towards BMSY, have regard to such social, cultural, and economic factors as
he considers being relevant when determining the way and rate at which to move the
stock biomass toward or above the BMSY level.
Economic considerations have been discussed in the body of the paper in paragraphs
69-75.
Industry proposes a consolidation of the fleet deployed in the ORH 3B fishery. Such
a consolidation is likely to significantly reduce the number of personnel involved in
this fishery and will have a greater social impact than any of the proposed TAC
reductions.
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MFish is not aware of any recreational or customary Mäori interest in the fishery and
no other cultural factors that MFish consider are relevant to your determination
under section 13(3).
c)
Sections 5(a) and (b) require the Act to be interpreted consistently with New
Zealand’s international obligations with respect to fishing and with the provisions of
the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. Provisions of
general international instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Fish Stocks Agreement have been implemented
through the provisions of the Fisheries Act 1996 and given effect here. MFish
considers that the options are consistent with both New Zealand’s international
obligations relating to fishing and the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries
Claims) Settlement Act 1992.
d)
Section 8 of the Act describes the purpose of the Act as being to provide for the
utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability, and defines the
meanings of utilisation and sustainability. The management options presented seek
to achieve the purpose of the Act. The proposals allow for variable levels of
utilisation through the setting of catch limits. The proposals ensure sustainability
under the respective catch limits via different fine-scale management and monitoring
measures that address risk as appropriate to the different levels of catch, and take
into account the respective costs of management versus the utilisation benefits.
e)
Sections 9(a) and (b) require you to take into account that associated or dependent
species (those that are not harvested) be maintained at or above a level that ensures
their long-term viability, and that the biological diversity of the aquatic environment
should be maintained. The specific nature and extent of effects of fishing on any
particular sub-stock in ORH 3B and the environment are generally understood to be
localised and specific to aggregations of orange roughy at 850-1,200 metre depths.
While some bycatch of non-harvested species is known, the impact that fishing for
ORH 3B has on the long term viability and biological diversity of the aquatic
environment is of greater concern in regions of steep sloping and highly diverse
topographic features. Some features within ORH 3B have been set aside from all
trawling, including ten seamounts and the Arrow Plateau, to mitigate the benthic
effects of fishing.
The main prey species for orange roughy include mesopelagic and benthopelagic
prawns, fish and squid, with other organisms such as mysids, amphipods and
euphausiids occasionally being important. MFish has considered the effects on
associated and dependent species and biodiversity that would affect the setting of the
TAC and determined the impact is addressed under the catch spreading
arrangements.
f)
Section 9(c) requires you to take into account the principle that habitat of particular
importance for fisheries management should be protected.
While trawling can adversely affect fragile benthic invertebrate communities, the
commercial bycatch of benthic invertebrates is seldom recorded or examined.
Research has revealed marked differences in the bottom fauna of fished and unfished
seamounts off New Zealand and Tasmania, and those differences have been ascribed
to the impact of bottom trawling. Researchers have reported anecdotal evidence of
bycatch of coral species in developing orange roughy fisheries in New Zealand.
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Nineteen seamounts of varying size and depth within New Zealand waters have been
closed to trawling, and ten of these are within ORH 3B. In addition, 12 BPAs are
within ORH 3B. These closures should therefore protect faunas in a variety of
habitats from the effects of fishing. The material discussion in paragraphs 139-141
in the body of the paper is also relevant to your consideration of this principle.
g)
Section 10 of the Act sets out the information principles, which require that
decisions be based on the best available information, taking into account any
uncertainty in that information, and applying caution when information is uncertain,
unreliable, or inadequate. In accordance with s 10, the absence of information
should not be used as a reason to postpone, or fail to take, any measure to achieve
the purpose of the Act, including providing for utilisation at levels considered to be
sustainable. The status of the entire ORH 3B stock complex relative to BMSY is
uncertain, and concerns raised at the 2007 Deepwater FAWG meetings in relation to
the stock assessment model and the stock assessment boundaries serve to increase
this uncertainty. In the body of the paper, MFish has also endeavoured to set out the
relevant uncertainty in, and inadequacy of, that information so that the appropriate
caution can be applied in assessing the proposed management options. On balance
MFish considers that the options provided are derived from the best available
information and cover an appropriate range of caution in response to the uncertainty
in that information.
h)
Section 11(1)(a): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must take into account
any effects of fishing on any stock and the aquatic environment. No information
about any effects of fishing on any stock or on the aquatic environment additional to
that discussed elsewhere in the paper (refer to discussion at paragraphs 131-141 is
considered relevant to the consideration of sustainability measures for ORH 3B at
this time.
i)
Section 11(1)(b): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must take into account
of any existing controls under the Act that apply to the stock or area concerned. For
ORH 3B, the measures that apply currently are a TAC, TACC and an allowance for
incidental fishing-related mortality. No other controls under the Act apply
specifically to ORH 3B. Specific seamount closures are located within ORH 3B.
j)
Section 11(1)(c): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must take into account
the natural variability of the stock. Orange roughy year-to-year biomass is not
known to be highly variable, and therefore the natural variability of orange roughy is
not a concern in setting the TAC for ORH 3B.
k)
Sections 11(2)(a) and (b): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must have
regard to any provisions of any regional policy or plan under the Resource
Management Act 1991 and any management strategy or plan under the Conservation
Act 1997 that apply to the coastal marine area and you consider relevant. MFish is
not aware of any such provisions that should be taken into account for ORH 3B.
l)
Section 11(2)(c): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must have regard to
sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 that apply to the coastal
marine area and you consider relevant.. The distribution of orange roughy in the
ORH 3B QMA does not intersect with the Park boundaries.
m)
Section 11(2A)(b): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must take account of
any relevant and approved fisheries plans. A fisheries plan incorporating ORH 3B is
Page 120 of 397
proposed for development in 2007-08. However, at present, no such plan has been
finalised or approved by you.
n)
Sections 11(2A)(a) and (c): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must take
into account any conservation or fisheries service, or any decision not to require such
services. MFish does not consider that existing or proposed services materially
affect the proposals for the ORH 3B stock. No decision has been made to require or
not require a service in this fishery at this time.
o)
Section 20 and 21 specify a number of matters that must be taken into account when
setting or varying a TACC. Section 21 requires you to allow for non-commercial
Mäori and recreational fishing interests, and other sources of fishing-related
mortality when setting or varying the TACC. The nature of the ORH 3B fishery and
the interests of recreational and customary fishers have been considered in proposing
the TACCs. These interests are discussed further at paragraphs 79-81 in the body of
the paper.
p)
Section 21(4) also requires that any mätaitai reserve or closure/restriction under s
186A to facilitate customary fishing be taken into account. There is one mätaitai
reserve in ORH 3B generally (Te Whaka a Te Wera Maitaitai – located in Patterson
Inlet, Stewart Island), but this does not intersect with the ORH 3B fishery. No area
has been closed or fishing method restricted (that affects the fishery within ORH 3B)
under the customary fishing provisions of the Act.
q)
Section 21(5) also requires that any regulations to prohibit fishing made under s 311
be taken into account when setting allowances for recreational interests. No
restrictions under s 311 have been placed on fishing in any area within ORH 3B.
Page 121 of 397
APPENDIX 2.
Definition of ORH 3B sub-stock boundaries
Note: All positions are given in degrees, minutes and decimal minutes format.
Figures in brackets are decimal degrees with western longitudes given as a progression of
eastern longitude (for example 179º W is given as 181).
The area within the box defined by the points:
42º10.0’ S, 174 º42’ E
42º10.0’ S, 178 º00’ W
44º00.0’ S, 178 º00’ W
44º00.0’ S, Coastline
43º44.3’ S, 173 º07.5’ E
43º08’ S, 173 º57’ E
(-42.166667, 174.700000)
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
(-44.000000, coastline )
(-43.738333, 173.125000)
(-43.133333, 173.950000)
South Chatham Rise
The area defined by the points:
44º00’ S, 171 º55.8’ E
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 170 º15.6’ E
(-44.000000, 171.930000)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 170.260000)
Note that for the area defined above, points 1 and 4 are linked by the coastline. For reporting
purposes the following rectangular box that overlaps with the South Island may be used:
44º00’ S, 170 º15’ E
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 170 º15.6’ E
(-44.000000, 170. 256977)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 170. 260000)
East Chatham Rise
The area within the box defined by the points below:
42º10’ S, 178 º00’ W
42º10’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 178 º00’ W
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-42.166667, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
Arrow Plateau
The area within the box defined by the points:
42º10’ S, 173 º40’ W
42º10’ S, 171º00.07’W
(-42.166667, 186.333333)
(-42.166667, 188.998833)
Page 122 of 397
46º00’ S, 171º46.68’W
46º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
(-46.000000, 188.222000)
(-46.000000, 186.333333)
Note that for the area defined above, points 2 and 3 are linked by the boundary of the EEZ.
Puysegur
The area within the rectangular box defined by the points:
46º00’ S, 165 º00’ E
46º00’ S, 166 º30’ E
47º30’ S, 166 º30’ E
47º30’ S, 165 º00’ E
(-46.000000, 165.000000)
(-46.000000, 166.500000)
(-47.500000, 166.500000)
(-47.500000, 165.000000)
Sub-Antarctic
The remaining area within ORH 3B. Specifically the area (excluding Puysegur) within the EEZ
and below 46º00’ S on the East Coast and 44º15.6’ S on the West Coast.
Page 123 of 397
APPENDIX 3.
Definition of the East Chatham Rise sub-area component
boundaries under Options 2 and 3
Note: All positions are given in degrees, minutes and decimal minutes format.
Figures in brackets are decimal degrees with western longitudes given as a progression of
eastern longitude (for example 179º W is given as 181).
Spawning Box
42º10’ S, 178 º00’ W
42º10’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 178 º00’ W
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-42.166667, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
Northeast Rise
42º10’ S, 178 º00’ W
42º10’ S, 173 º40’ W
44º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
44º00’ S, 178 º00’ W
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-42.166667, 186.333333)
(-44.000000, 186.333333)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
Southeast Rise
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
Page 124 of 397
APPENDIX 4.
Sub-Antarctic features
Page 125 of 397
Priceless
48º05.5’ S, 174 º42’ E
48º05.5’ S, 175 º13’ E
48º26.5’ S, 175 º13’ E
48º26.5’ S, 174 º42’ E
(-48.091667, 174.700000)
(-48.091667, 175.216667)
(-48.441667, 175.216667)
(-48.441667, 174.700000)
Temporary Closure
The circle wit a radius of 20 nm, centred on the point:
48o.30’ S, 175 o.00 ’E
(-48.500000, 175.000000)
Page 126 of 397
Page 127 of 397
ORH 7B – FINAL ADVICE
Figure 1: Quota Management Area (QMA) for ORH 7B
Executive Summary
1
The TAC and landings in the ORH 7B fishery reached a peak in the late 1980s and early
1990s and have subsequently declined to the point where the TAC is now less than 7% of its
highest level. The current TAC of 110 tonnes is the maximum constant yield (MCY) level
estimated in 2001 (110 t mean, with a range of 80 t to 180 t).
2
By the late 1990s the stock was believed to be well below BMSY and the 2004 stock
assessment indicated that the stock was at 17% B0. Despite the large reduction in annual
removals from the stock since 2001-02 recent catch rates have not increased over the last 5
years.
3
Since the TAC was reduced to its current level, it has not been fully caught in four of the
five years. Catch rates have also decreased with their mean values now less than 10% of
those at the start of the fishery. A new stock assessment was attempted in 2007 but was
rejected on the basis that it was insensitive to the recent CPUE data and predicted a rebuild
that was not supported by any observations in the fishery. The 2007 Plenary report
concludes that no estimate of current biomass is available, although it is likely that the
biomass of the stock is below that which can support the maximum sustainable yield
(BMSY). The Plenary further states that it is not known if catches at the level of the current
TAC will allow the stock to move towards a size that will support the maximum sustainable
yield (MSY).
4
Analysis of catch and effort data shows a spatial and temporal dispersion of effort, a large
increase in tow duration over the last five years and a decrease in both catch per tow and
catch per hour over the course of the fishery, although catch per tow and catch per hour
Page 128 of 397
have been relatively stable over the past five years. It appears that fishers are finding it
increasingly difficult to locate significant aggregations of orange roughy, suggesting
concerns over the state of the ORH 7B stock.
5
Industry argues that there are reasons other than those presented by the Ministry of Fisheries
(MFish) in the IPP to explain the CPUE observations and the under-catch of the TAC in
recent years. DWG has also presented catch and effort data from the current fishing year to
demonstrate its contention that CPUE in this orange roughy fishery is more an artefact of
fishing behaviour than an indicator of underlying stock size, and that the TAC has been
fully caught this year. While it appears that industry was able to catch the TAC in 2006-07
and to increase catch rates through changes in the way the fishery was prosecuted, MFish
does not consider that the information provided by industry is sufficient to fully satisfy
concerns over the state of the ORH 7B stock.
6
Three management approaches are presented to address the current situation in ORH 7B –
retain the existing TACC (IPP Option 2), reduce the TACC moderately below the level of
current catch (Option 3) or effectively close the fishery (Option 4). If you consider that the
current TAC is not enabling the stock to rebuild in an appropriate way and rate then you
should decrease it. Given the already low TAC, reducing the TAC further to an
intermediate level as proposed under Option 3 may not provide a meaningful or reasonable
management response. To effectively close the fishery you must consider that no level of
commercial take will allow the stock to rebuild at an acceptable rate. Under this option no
fishery dependent data would be collected and there would be little prospect of the TAC
being increased in the short to medium term. Administrative requirements necessitate that a
one tonne TAC is provided if the fishery is effectively closed.
7
Under Options 2 and 3, MFish proposes to require all operators in the fishery to report on
Trawl Catch Effort Processing Return (TCEPR) forms to improve the spatial and temporal
resolution of the CPUE data. Industry has also proposed development of a directed fishing
programme to enhance the utility of CPUE information in providing an index of abundance.
While this approach shows some promise generally, its utility in regard to ORH 7B is
questionable. Industry considers this approach could be implemented under Options 2 or 3
for the 2007-08 fishing year, and you may wish to request further development and
implementation of this proposal.
8
MFish also considers it is appropriate to set an allowance for other sources of fishing related
mortality in line with other orange roughy fisheries in New Zealand (Options 2 and 3).
Under Option 2 the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) remains the same and,
although increased, the TAC better reflects the existing total fishing related mortality
(commercial extractions and incidental mortality) in this fishery.
Page 129 of 397
Summary of Options
Initial Proposal
9
The IPP proposed the following options:
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
110 tonnes
115.5 tonnes
52.5 tonnes
1 tonne
Allowance for other
sources of fishing-related
mortality
0 tonnes
5.5 tonnes
2.5 tonnes
0 tonnes
Allowance for customary
Mäori interests
0 tonnes
0 tonnes
0 tonnes
0 tonnes
Allowance for recreational
fishery interests
0 tonnes
0 tonnes
0 tonnes
0 tonnes
110 tonnes
110 tonnes
50 tonnes
1 tonne
Status quo
TAC
TACC
a) Option one: status quo (no action).
b) Option two: Maintain the existing TACC and provide an allowance for other sources of
fishing-related mortality.
c) Option three: Reduce the TACC to 50 tonnes and provide an allowance for other
sources of fishing-related mortality.
d) Option four: Reduce the TACC to 1 tonne and effectively close the fishery.
Final Proposal
10
While all options proposed in the IPP remain open to you, MFish recommends either
Options 2, 3 or 4.
11
The options recommended for consideration are:
a)
Option 2 with additional conditions:
AGREE to retain the ORH 7B TACC at 110 tonnes;
AND
Provide an allowance for other sources of fishing related mortality of 5.5 tonnes (5%
of the TACC);
AND
Page 130 of 397
Increase the TAC to 115.5 tonnes to incorporate the allowance for other sources of
fishing related mortality;
AND
Note if you choose this option the Chief Executive intends to exercise his powers to
require all vessels fishing targeting orange roughy in ORH 7B to report on TCEPR
forms;
OR
b)
Option 3 with additional conditions:
AGREE to reduce the ORH 7B TACC to 50 tonnes;
AND
Provide an allowance for other sources of fishing related mortality of 2.5 tonnes (5%
of the TACC);
AND
Reduce the TAC to 52.5 tonnes to incorporate the allowance for other sources of
fishing related mortality;
AND
Note if you choose this option the Chief Executive intends to exercise his powers to
require all vessels fishing targeting orange roughy in ORH 7B to report on TCEPR
forms;
OR
c)
Option 4:
AGREE to effectively close the fishery and reduce the TAC and TACC to 1
tonne.
Consultation
12
Your decision whether or not to adjust the TAC for ORH 7B is a decision under section
13(2)-(4) of the Act and therefore the consultation requirements of section 12 apply.
Further, in respect of your decision whether or not to adjust the TACC for ORH 7B, the
consultation requirements set out in section 21(2) apply.
13
Consultation on the IPP was undertaken with such persons or organisations representative of
those classes of persons having an interest in the stock or the effects of fishing on the
aquatic environment in the area concerned, including Maori, environmental, commercial,
and recreational interests.
Page 131 of 397
Submissions Received
14
Submissions regarding this proposal were received from:
•
Deepwater Group Ltd. (DWG)
•
Environment and Conservation Organisations of NZ Inc. (ECO)
•
New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council (NZRFC)
•
New Zealand Seafood Industry Council Ltd. (SeaFIC)
•
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc (Forest & Bird)
•
Sanford Ltd. (Sanford)
•
Talley’s Fisheries Ltd. (Talley’s)
•
Te Ohu Kaimoana (TOKM)
•
World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF)
21
Additional information containing catch and effort data from the 2006-07 fishing year and a
proposal for a directed fishing plan, were provided by DWG. These are included in
Appendices 2 and 3 respectively.
22
The views expressed by submitters fall into two broad categories – that taken by industry
and that by the environmental NGOs (ENGOs). NZRFC did not express support for any
particular option but considered that management decisions should be made with a view to
ensure an effective rebuild of orange roughy stocks within 10 years.
23
ENGOs submit that the biological characteristics of orange roughy, and the history of
orange roughy fisheries, demonstrate that it is particularly vulnerable to overfishing and that
a precautionary approach should be implemented for these fisheries. All ENGOs consider
that the TAC should be reduced to 1 tonne (Option 4) and Forest & Bird and ECO support
ensuring that all trawlers fishing in the ORH 7B QMA report on TCEPR forms.
24
Industry submissions (DWG, SeaFIC, Talley’s and TOKM) all agree that the existing TAC
is sustainable. While acknowledging that the information presented in the IPP is accurate,
they consider that the analysis suggesting concern at the state of the fishery was flawed.
Both DWG and Talley’s provided additional information in support of an alternative
interpretation of the information presented in the IPP. An analysis of the industry assertions
and the information they provide are examined below.
25
More generally, the ENGOs all submitted on the need to consider the environmental effects
of orange roughy fisheries, particularly in regard to benthic impacts (ECO, Forest & Bird
and WWF) but also in regard to seabirds and marine mammals (WWF); and deepwater
sharks and other non-target fish species (Forest & Bird). In relation to benthic impacts all
ENGOs contend that neither the BPAs, nor the seamount closures, mitigate the current
impact of trawl fisheries.
Page 132 of 397
26
Analysis of the best available information, including that provided in submissions, is
included in the body of this paper. The positions of industry and ENGOs on the appropriate
interpretation of this information are included for your consideration.
Background
27
Quota Management Area (QMA) ORH 7B covers an area off the west coast of the South
Island from near Westport to south of Jackson Head (Figure 1). Orange roughy occur
throughout the QMA and are thought to constitute a single stock. It is likely that the stock
is distinct from the Challenger and Puysegur fisheries to the north and south respectively.
28
The fishery developed from May 1985, with a rapid increase in the following year when
aggregations of spawning orange roughy were targeted. The vast majority of orange roughy
taken in ORH 7B has been targeted and this remains the case with targeted orange roughy
fishing accounting for in excess of 98% of the in the 2003-04 to 2005-06 fishing years.
29
Reported landings reached a maximum of 1,763 tonnes in 1985-86 (Table 1). Catches in
1992–93 to 1994–95 were well below the TAC of 1,708 t. The TAC was subsequently
reduced to 430 t for the 1995–96 fishing year, but was only reached for the 1995–96 and
1996–97 fishing years. Following a new stock assessment undertaken in 2001, the TAC was
further reduced in the 2001–02 fishing year to 110 t to reflect the best estimate of current
yield under an MCY strategy (110 t with 95% confidence limits of 80 – 180 t). The TAC
has remained at this level.
30
Over the course of the fishery there has also been a reduction in the average size of vessels
prosecuting the fishery and it is now dominated by small (approximately 25 m) inshore
vessels. Fourteen vessels have recorded orange roughy catch from ORH 7B between 200304 and 2005-06, although five vessels, all from different companies, dominate the catch.
Following the reduction of the TAC to 110 t in 2001-02 there was a drop in the number of
vessel days and tows. In recent years catch rates (both catch per tow and catch per hour)
have remained low, with their mean values in the 2003-04 to 2005-06 fishing years less than
10% of their values at the start of the fishery. Although only available from vessels
reporting on TCEPR forms, which form a small component of the ORH 7B fleet in recent
years, it also appears that the average distance towed had increased to more than twice that
in the late 1990s by 2005-06.
31
Historically most effort and catch in the ORH 7B fishery has been concentrated in the
winter spawning period (June and July) with a much smaller, secondary peak in catch and
effort in September and October. Since 1997–98, however, catch has tended to be more
evenly spread throughout the year.
32
The geographical distribution of effort has also changed over the course of the fishery. In
the early years of the fishery, effort was concentrated in a very small area in the Cook
Canyon which returned high catch rates. Effort became more dispersed in 1992–93 and
relatively high catches were taken in the Moeraki Canyon to the south in 1992–93 and
1993–94. Fishers have subsequently ranged widely across the QMA. Catch rates have
decreased as the fishery dispersed, and have been low throughout ORH 7B from 1997-98 to
2005-06, with very few catches over 5 t.
Table 1. Reported landings (t) of orange roughy and TACs (t) for ORH 7B from 1983–84 to 2005–06.
Page 133 of 397
Fishing year
Reported landings
1983–84*
2
1984–85*
282
1985–86*
1 763
1986–87*
1 446
1987–88†
1 413
1988–89†
1 750
1989–90†
1 711
1990–91†
1 683
1991–92†
1 604
1992–93†
1 139
1993–94†
701
1994–95†
290
1995–96†
446
425
1996−97†
330
1997−98†
405
1998−99†
1999–00†
284
2000–01†
161
2001–02†
95
2002–03†
90
2003–04†
119
2004–05†
106
2005-06†
77
2006-07‡
124
* FSU data † QMS data ‡ Preliminary analysis by DWG
TAC
–
–
1 558
1 558
1 558
1 708
1 708
1 708
1 708
1 708
1 708
1 708
430
430
430
430
430
430
110
110
110
110
110
110
Stock assessment
33
The most recent stock assessment was carried out in 2004. Biomass was estimated to be
17% B0 (95% confidence interval 14-23%) when CPUE was assumed to be directly
proportional to abundance. For orange roughy BMSY is considered to be 30% B0.
34
The standardised CPUE data series was updated in 2007 to include data derived from the
fishing years up to and including 2005-06. A plot of the standardised CPUE indices 56 are
shown in figure 2.
56
The change in fleet composition to smaller vessels has also resulted in a change in the way catch is reported with
Catch Effort Landing Returns (CELR) dominant in recent years and Trawl Catch Effort Processing Returns (TCEPR)
more prevalent in the earlier part of the fishery. The period when both form types were in operation has been used to
scale the CPUE index to allow a meaningful comparison across years
Page 134 of 397
2.5
x
CPUE index
2.0
x
1.5
x
1.0
x x
0.5
x
x
x
x
x
x x
0.0
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Fishing year
Figure 2:
The CPUE indices based on: (i) TCEPR data (solid line and crosses) covering 1985–6 to
1996–97, and (ii) CELR data (triangles and dashed line) covering 1990–91 to 2005–06. The
CELR index has been scaled so that it has the same mean value as the TCEPR index in the
years that they overlap.
35
An updated stock assessment was attempted in 2007 with the addition of catch data up to
2005-06, and the new standardised CPUE indices. The draft assessment returned a similar
result to that from the 2004 assessment and showed a slow rebuild over the last five years.
The Deepwater Fisheries Assessment Working Group (Deepwater FAWG) considered that
this rebuild was driven by the model’s recruitment assumptions and was not supported by
the CPUE data, which instead showed a stable trend. On the basis that the model was
insensitive to the recent CPUE data, and predicted a rebuild that was not supported by any
observations in the fishery, the assessment was rejected by the Deepwater FAWG.
36
The TCEPR series is based on catch per tow and the CELR series used daily catch. As the
average tow length in recent years is significantly longer than that in the early years of the
fishery, the indices may underestimate a decline in catch rate at a finer temporal scale such
as catch per hour.
Rationale for management Options
37
The 2007 Plenary report concludes that no estimate of current biomass is available, although
it is likely that the biomass of the stock is below that which can support the maximum
sustainable yield (BMSY) as catch rates have not increased over the last 5 years despite a
large reduction in the annual removals from the stock, and the last assessment indicated that
the stock was at 17% B0. The Plenary further states that it is not known if catches at the
level of the current TAC will allow the stock to move towards a size that will support MSY.
38
The rejection of the stock assessment this year places greater emphasis on the CPUE data
series in deriving an appropriate management response. There are well documented
problems with using CPUE indices to track abundance in aggregating species such as
Page 135 of 397
orange roughy (i.e. fishers targeting aggregations are able to retain high catch rates even if
the overall spatial extent of the aggregations decrease as the stock declines). However, it
may have more utility in this fishery in recent times if, as industry contend (see for example
the Talley’s submission), the majority of effort is now expended on the flats rather than the
denser aggregations found in the canyons, and fishers no longer concentrate their effort in
the peak spawning months of June and July. The CPUE indices, in conjunction with the
under-catch of the TAC in recent years, suggest that there are grounds for concern over the
state of the ORH 7B stock. This information was analysed in the IPP and prompted several
submissions from industry.
39
While industry acknowledged that the information presented in the IPP is an accurate
reflection of the fishery-dependent data, it takes issue with the conclusions drawn as to the
state of the ORH 7B fishery. Talley’s and DWG provide additional information in support
of an alternative analysis of the data, and DWG have provided a preliminary descriptive
analysis of catch data from the current fishing year. Specific issues they raise, in
conjunction with additional information provided in support of their analysis, are discussed
below.
CPUE analysis up to 2005-06
40
The CPUE information shows that there has been a dispersion of effort across the QMA and
throughout the fishing year, suggesting that it may be increasingly difficult for fishers to
locate significant aggregations of orange roughy. The increase in trawl duration (although,
as noted by DWG, only available from the small number of vessels reporting on TCEPR
data) and the decrease in catch per tow and catch per hour further support this position.
Although the TAC was reduced to 100 t in 2001 to rebuild the stock, the standardised CPUE
indices up to 2005-06 do not indicate that the predicted rebuild occurred and rather show a
stable trend.
41
Talley’s provided additional information in support of their view that there have been
significant changes in the way the fishery is prosecuted in recent years. It estimates that,
while approximately 90% of ORH 7B was taken from aggregations in the earlier years of
the fishery, 90% is now taken from flat areas where there are fewer fish. In the IPP, MFish
interpreted this change from targeting aggregations as an indication that such aggregations
may no longer exist, or exist in a diminished capacity.
42
While Talley’s accept that the ‘aggregations’ of fish have reduced, both Talley’s and DWG
offer an alternative scenario to at least partially explain the change in where orange roughy
in ORH 7B are targeted.
i)
Talley’s submits that, subsequent to the major TAC reductions, there was an exodus
of experienced orange roughy skippers from the fishery. Most of the current
skippers prefer long tows on flat grounds rather than venturing into canyons where
orange roughy aggregate, but where considerably more skill is required to fish
successfully;
ii)
The exodus of fishers from ORH 7B has also left a small number of vessels (3-5)
active in the fishery. Industry contends that this has resulted in fewer “eyes” on the
grounds meaning that the fish are less easily located and particularly so given the
focus of the fishery in recent years on flat grounds where very large areas need to be
traversed to locate the fish;
Page 136 of 397
iii)
DWG contends that fish on these flat grounds are typically found hard on the bottom
and are therefore seldom evident on echo-sounders, adding to the difficulty in
locating them;
iv)
DWG also contends that the fishery is now prosecuted mainly by owner operators
who are dependent on purchase of ACE. This is expensive and often only made
available after the peak fishing season (i.e. after the spawn in June-July). This
provides another barrier to fishers venturing into the canyon areas to fish the
spawning aggregations.
43
As a result of these points, industry contends that tows are longer and catch rates are lower.
Consequently industry contends that it is not valid to compare the resultant CPUE series
with the earlier series in this fishery
44
MFish accepts that there has been a significant change in the way ORH 7B has been
prosecuted since the TAC was significantly reduced in the mid 1990s, and this is most
clearly seen subsequent to the 1997-98 fishing year. Prior to this date an average of 83% of
the catch was taken during the June-July spawning period but in subsequent years this has
averaged 52%, supporting the industry contention that the targeting of aggregations has
decreased.
45
There is also some evidence to support the view that fishers are fishing more after the peak
June-July period. On average only 6% of the annual catch was taken in August and
September up to 1997-98 but in the subsequent period this figure increased to 20%. It
remains unclear however why ACE would be withheld until late in the fishing year given
that the ORH 7B fishery is virtually all targeted and consequently ACE is not required to
balance bycatch.
46
In terms of the experience of skippers prosecuting the fishery, some insight is possible by
analysing vessel participation. Of the five vessels that have caught the bulk of the TAC
over the five years up to 2005-06, one has been involved in the fishery since the 1989/90
fishing year, one since 1990/91, two since 1998/99, and the most recent arrival began
fishing in ORH 7B in 2000/01. Two of these vessels can therefore be considered to have
been involved in ORH 7B in at least the latter years of the fisheries peak while the
remaining vessels have clearly arrived subsequent to the sharp decline in catches and catch
limits. It remains unclear whether the skippers have changed on the two vessels that have
been involved for a considerable time in the fishery, although records indicate that this is
likely.
47
MFish agrees with the industry contention that changes in the fishery means that the raw
CPUE data from the early years in the fishery cannot be directly compared with that in later
years. For that reason the Deepwater Fisheries Assessment Working Group (Deepwater
FAWG) has split the CPUE indices into two series based on the dominant type of data
collected (i.e. based on form type). The transition period has been used to scale the two
time series to enable comparison between them. It is also important to note that
considerable effort has been made to ‘standardise’ the CPUE data - that is to compensate for
changes in vessels, season and area fished etc. over the course of the fishery to maximise the
utility of the time series in indexing changes in stock abundance over time. While it is not
possible to fully compensate for all the subtleties of variation in the way the fishery has
been prosecuted over the years, comparison of standardised CPUE data over the course of
the fishery is an important component of the best available information.
Page 137 of 397
2006-07 catch and effort data
48
While industry submissions endeavoured to explain the observed CPUE data up to and
including the 2005-06 fishing year, DWG also made a late submission that included catch
data from the 2006-07 fishing year (Appendix 2.).
49
DWG concludes from this data that in the most recent fishing year;
•
Mean daily catch rate reached a 10-year high
•
Mean tow duration declined to the 1995-96 level
•
Over 80% of the effort and 90% of the catch was taken during June and July
50
It appears from a preliminary analysis that the figures presented by DWG are an accurate
reflection of the data and that the changes in unstandardised catch and effort data are real 57.
The data presented suggest that, at least for the current fishing year, increased catch rates are
possible. However caution is warranted as MFish only received this information on 28
August 2007 and has not had an opportunity to fully analyse it. MFish also note that the
data available has not been verified 58 and that a fully verified data set for the 2006-07
fishing year is unlikely to be available until February 2008.
51
The data represent a significant change in the way the fishery was prosecuted in 2006-07.
Of the three vessels, one is new to the fishery and is larger and more powerful than the
vessels that have dominated the fishery over recent years. The greatest change however is in
the percentage of catch taken during June and July when orange roughy aggregate to spawn.
According to the DWG figures, 110 t was taken over this period in 2006-07 compared to an
average of 49 tonnes between 2001-02 and 2005-06. MFish considers that the catch and
effort data presented from 2006-07 cannot be compared to the standardized CPUE time
series depicted in figure 2 because of the change in the way the fishery operated this year.
Given how much the fishery has changed, MFish consider it unlikely that a standardised
analysis will improve this situation.
52
The DWG contention that these figures indicate greater abundance of orange roughy on
traditional towlines cannot be verified. MFish considers that the time at which a particular
towline is fished may determine how much fish is taken from it. Consequently both
temporal and spatial aspects would need to be considered when evaluating if a towline
fished in 2006-07 was comparable to one fished in previous years.
Under-catch of the TACC
53
The IPP noted that the TAC, although only 110 t, has been undercaught in four of the five
years since it was reduced to this level, and in the 2005-06 fishing year the TAC was
undercaught by 30%. Industry argues that there are good reasons for the TAC undercatch,
which are not linked to a sustainability concern for the fishery.
57
As of 3 September 2007, records show that estimated catch of ORH was in excess of 95 t in ORH 7B and that the
vessels noted by DWG as taking most of the catch did indeed dominate the fishery. MFish cannot at this time confirm
catch of the remaining 27 t that DWG indicates has been taken this year as this information has yet to be entered into
the fisheries information system.
58
Accurate reporting is a statutory requirement. The verification alluded to here is the normal checks undertaken by
FishServe to correct data entry errors, issues with illegible or incomplete forms etc.
Page 138 of 397
i)
Talley’s submits that some ACE fishers choose to retain percentages of their ACE as
‘under fishing entitlement’ and that this further distorts the relationship between
catch levels and stock status.
ii)
Industry considers that a 10% under or over catch is to be expected and note that,
apart from the 2005-06 year, catch has been generally within this expected range –
ACE has been 90% caught on average.
iii)
Industry has also provided specific information relating to the 2005/06 fishing year.
Industry submits that the weather in ORH 7B during June and July of 2006 was
particularly bad and vessels lost out on the opportunity to fish during the spawning
period when catch rates are highest. Consequently the ACE for that year was
undercaught.
iv)
Industry considers that the primary reason for the under-catch over the last five years
has been the very small ACE parcel sizes. As an example it cites the current fishing
year where there are 43 quota owners, 38 of whom own less than two tonnes, 36
hold less than one tonne and 29 own less than 200 kg. Industry submits that these
parcels are not economical to fish and, in many cases, are too small to justify the
costs of ACE trading.
Talley’s and DWG also contend that the timing of the hoki season may have an
impact on how much of the available ACE is fished in ORH 7B. Orange roughy
form a small proportion of both the catch and effort of the vessels operating in ORH
7B. All of these vessels form part of the west coast hoki fleet and once this fishery
commences vessels concentrate their effort on the hoki ground.
54
v)
Industry also contends that high fuel cost in recent years has made it increasingly
uneconomical to search for fish, reducing the amount of effort and therefore catch by
some operators.
vi)
The DWG analysis of catch in 2006-07 suggests that the available ACE has been
fully caught, and that 90% of this was taken in the June to July period.
MFish acknowledges that fishers do not have to fully fish their ACE entitlement with a
maximum of 10% of a fishers ACE being able to be carried forward to the next fishing year.
Fishers may also choose to leave ACE in excess of this 10%, unfished if they so choose,
although if it was economically viable to fish the ACE, MFish would anticipate that most
fishers would choose to do so. Further analysis, taking into account the ACE carried
forward each year, shows that total ACE available for fishing in any one year (i.e. ACE
derived from the TAC + that carried forward from the previous fishing year – that carried
forward into the next fishing year) was fully fished in 2003-04 and 2004-05 but under
caught in the remaining years since the TAC was reduced to the present level. In 2005-06
the total ACE available for fishing was undercaught by 25%.
Table 2: Reported landings (t) of orange roughy, TACs (t) and ACE available for ORH 7B from 2001–02
to 2005–06.
Fishing year
Reported landings
TAC
ACE available for
fishing
2001–02
2002–03
2003–04
2004–05
2005-06
2006-07*
95
90
119
106
77
124
110
110
110
110
110
110
104
106
119
107
103
121
Page 139 of 397
Percentage of ACE undercaught (-ve) or over-caught
(+ve)
- 9%
- 15%
0
-1%
- 25 %
2%
* Based on preliminary analysis provided by DWG
55
It appears from the DWG analysis that the ACE available has been fully fished in the
current fishing year and this may suggest that the result in 2005-06 was an anomaly.
However, given that the vast majority (90%) of this catch occurred late in the fishing year
there appears to have been a change in fishing pattern meaning that it may not be
appropriate to compare the latest figures directly against the time series shown in table 2. It
is possible that a change in the way this fishery was prosecuted in 2006-07 may have been
influenced by a desire by industry to demonstrate that concerns over the state of the fishery
are unfounded. Similarly the possibility that you may reduce the TAC or effectively close
the fishery, signalled through the release of the IPP, may have encouraged fishers to fully
catch the TAC in the current fishing year as, if the TAC is reduced, no unfished ACE could
be carried over into 2007-08. These results do suggest, however, that it remains possible to
fully catch the TAC within ORH 7B.
56
On average 49 tonnes has been taken in June and July over the period 2001-02 to 2005-06.
Not surprisingly, in the years when the TAC has been undercaught (2001-02, 2002-03 and
2005-06), the amount of catch taken in June and July has also decreased. However, of these
years, the catch taken in June and July in 2005-06 was the highest and was only slightly
below the average over the 5 year period. This suggests that bad weather in June and July
in 2005-06 does not explain the under-catch in that year.
57
The preliminary results from DWG for 2006-07 suggest that 90% of the total catch, or
approximately 110 tonnes, has been taken between June and July in the fishing year to date.
This represents a significant change in the way the fishery is prosecuted.
58
The quota ownership in ORH 7B has been fairly stable in recent years with four key quota
owners owning approximately 88% of total quota shares over the last five fishing years,
with their individual quota holding ranging from 14 to 28%. TOKM owned an additional
10% until immediately prior to the start of the 2005-06 when it began to allocate ORH 7B
quota to iwi. In September 2005 approximately 1.3% of ORH 7B quota was allocated to 6
iwi and a further 1.2% was allocated to 11 iwi in March 2006. A further 2.6% was allocated
to 17 iwi organisations prior to the start of the current fishing year.
59
MFish considers that the allocation of ORH 7B quota to iwi has had little effect on the ACE
available to fishers. There is an active ACE market in ORH 7B with in excess of 125 ACE
trades taking place during the 2005-06 fishing year. There appears to be little barrier to
ACE trades in terms of the size of the ACE parcel traded with approximately 100 trades
being less than 1 tonne and half of these being less than 100kg.
60
Even if these small iwi holdings were not traded they would have little effect on the ACE
available to fishers. Effectively 2.5% of the total quota was allocated in small lots to iwi
that may have affected the ACE availability to fishers during that fishing year. If it is
assumed that none of the ACE derived from this quota was available to fishers, the ACE
available to fishers would have decreased from 103 t to 100 t for the 2005-06 fishing year,
and would still be undercaught by 23%. Even if the ACE derived from the further 2.6% of
quota allocated to iwi late in the 2005-06 fishing year was not available to fishers in that
year the effective under-catch would decrease to 21% - still a significant amount.
61
Fuel costs have undoubtedly increased in recent years and this has certainly had an impact
on the profitability of fishing. However, industry also confirms that fishers are choosing to
Page 140 of 397
fish on the flats where long and presumably costly tows are required. If significant
aggregations of orange roughy exist it would seem that rising fuel costs provide an incentive
for skippers to target these fish.
Other sources of fisheries related mortality
62
ORH 7B is the only orange roughy fishery of any size that does not have an allowance for
other sources of fishing related mortality and MFish considers that it is appropriate to
consider setting such an allowance.
63
The 2006 Plenary noted that reported catch overruns are likely to occur in ORH 7B because
of fish loss from torn nets, and discarding of small or damaged fish. There is no estimate of
the size of the overrun, but it means that actual fishing related mortality is greater than
reported catch. The Plenary report further states, however, that although overruns have not
been added in the catch history for stock assessment purposes, this will have no affect as
long as future overruns are similar to those in the past.
64
The nature of the fishing effort in ORH 7B has changed over time. On average tows are
now longer and towing speeds are higher which may increase incidental mortality relating
to fishing.
Total allowable catch
65
Although no stock assessment for ORH 7B was confirmed through the 2007 working group
process, the 2007 Plenary report constitutes the best available information on the status of
the stock. That report states that, despite uncertainty, the biomass of ORH 7B is considered
likely to be below BMSY. On that basis MFish considers that the TAC should be set under s
13 (2)(b) - that is the TAC should be set such that it enables the level of the stock to be
altered –
i)
In a way and at a rate that will result in the stock being restored to or above a
level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, having regard to the
interdependence of stocks; and
ii)
Within a period appropriate to the stock, having regard to the biological
characteristics of the stock and any environmental conditions affecting the
stock.
66
The key consideration in determining appropriate management action in this fishery is
whether the existing TAC is appropriate – that is, whether it is allowing the stock to rebuild
and if it is, whether the rate of rebuild is appropriate to the stock. The Plenary report
provides no guidance on this point. In considering the appropriate way and rate of rebuild
you must have regard to social, cultural and economic factors that you consider relevant.
When considering a large TAC cut or effective closure of a fishery you must seriously
consider both the costs and benefits of doing so.
67
MFish considers that there are two broad approaches open to you– retain or reduce the
current catch limits. If you consider that the existing TAC is not allowing the stock to
rebuild within an appropriate timeframe you should reduce the TAC.
Page 141 of 397
Section 13 (2)
Stock assessment data
68
There is no new stock assessment on which to base a determination as to whether the
existing TAC will enable the stock to rebuild. An updated stock assessment was attempted
in 2007 with the addition of catch data up to 2005-06, and the new standardised CPUE
indices. The draft assessment returned a similar result to that from the 2004 assessment and
showed a slow rebuild over the last five years. The Deepwater FAWG considered that this
rebuild was driven by the model’s recruitment assumptions and was not supported by the
CPUE data, which instead showed no increase. On the basis that the model was insensitive
to the recent CPUE data, and predicted a rebuild that was not supported by any observations
in the fishery, the assessment was rejected by the Working Group.
69
The most recent completed stock assessment was carried out in 2004 and is reported in the
Plenary. Biomass was estimated to be 17% B0 (95% confidence interval 14-23%) when
CPUE was assumed to be directly proportional to abundance. For orange roughy BMSY is
considered to be 30% B0.
70
The existing TAC was derived under an MCY strategy based on the 2001 stock assessment
and DWG consider that this constitutes the best available information and, consequently, the
TAC should remain at this level. MFish disagrees with this position. Additional sources of
information, and possible interpretations of this information are discussed below.
71
In 2001, the stock assessment model predicted a rebuild subsequent to the reduction of the
TAC to the present level. The predicted rebuild was not seen in the CPUE data in either
2004 or 2007.
72
Standardised CPUE indices are available up to and including the 2005-06 fishing year.
While MFish acknowledges that there are problems with using CPUE data as a basis for
making management decisions for orange roughy, they may have more utility in ORH 7B
where, as noted by industry, the fishery is no longer primarily focussed on dense spawning
aggregations. The CPUE data suggest a sustainability concern for the stock if the existing
TAC is retained. This position is supported by the spatial and temporal changes that have
occurred in the fishery in recent years suggesting that fishers may be finding it increasingly
difficult to catch the TAC.
73
Industry has argued that there are other reasons for these signals and that catch rates from
the fishery do not provide a reliable index of abundance. Industry support alternative
interpretations of the catch and effort data and have a different view of the appropriate
management response. While it appears that catches from the 2006-07 fishing year to date
provide some support for the industry view, on balance MFish considers that industry
arguments do not fully explain the CPUE trend, and the observed under-catch of the
available ACE up to 2005-06. MFish also considers that the way the fishery was prosecuted
in 2006-07 was different from the previous five years. The unstandardised data presented
by DWG is therefore not directly comparable to the standardised CPUE series shown in
figure 2.
74
While the Plenary concludes that the current stock size is most likely below BMSY, it is not
known if catches at the level of the current TACC will allow the stock to move towards a
size that will support the maximum sustainable yield or if so, how long it will take. If you
Page 142 of 397
consider that the risk is unacceptable that the existing TAC is not moving the stock towards
BMSY, or is not moving the stock towards BMSY at an appropriate rate (having regard to
relevant social, cultural and economic factors), then you must reduce the TAC. Given the
uncertainty in information on the status of the stock, and more generally in relation to the
biological characteristics of orange roughy, reducing the TAC would represent a cautious
approach to managing ORH 7B in favour of long term sustainability.
75
Options 3 and 4 are available to you if consider it necessary to reduce the TACC. Given the
already low TAC, MFish considers that setting the TAC at the intermediate level below the
current TAC, as proposed under Option 3, may not provide a meaningful or reasonable
management response. MFish notes that no support for this option was provided by
submitters, although fishers may prefer this option over closing the fishery.
76
Administration requirements in regard to the maintenance of quota shares dictate that a
fishery managed under the QMS should not be completely closed to commercial fishing.
Thus Option 4 retains a one tonne TAC.
77
Closing a fishery (Option 4) is not an option that should be undertaken lightly. For this
option to be chosen, you must consider that no level of commercial take will allow the stock
to rebuild at an acceptable rate.
78
Existing information on the status of the stock is based on fishery-dependent data and the
value of the fishery is such that the collection of fishery-independent data are unlikely to be
economically viable. Closure of the fishery would mean that no information would be
collected and there would be little prospect of the fishery reopening in the short to medium
term. Additional measures to collect better fishery-dependent information through the use
of TCEPR forms are included as a requirement under Option 2 and 3 and are provided for
your consideration later in the paper.
Section 13 (3)
79
Section 13 (3) requires that, in considering the way and the rate that the stock may be
moved towards a level that can produce MSY under s 13 (2)(b), the Minister shall have
regard to such social, cultural and economic factors as he or she considers relevant.
80
Social, cultural and economic aspects of the fishery are discussed in the following sections.
MFish requested that industry provide additional information on social, cultural and
economic factors relevant to this decision through their submissions. No additional
information was forthcoming.
Economic factors
Value of the fishery
81
A conservative estimate of the landed value of the fishery may be determined from the port
price of orange roughy landed from ORH 7B. The port price for 2005-06 and 2006-07 was
$3.35 which equates to a value of $368,500 if the TACC was fully caught 59. Since the
majority of orange roughy is exported a better estimation of value may be derived from
export earnings. On the basis of export value (all product states) 110 t of orange roughy is
worth approximately $498,300 60.
59
60
Estimated by multiplying the port price ($3.35/kg for 2005-06) by 110 t.
Export value was estimated by multiplying the export price by 110 t. In 2006, 4,601 tonnes of orange roughy fillets
Page 143 of 397
82
Under option 3 the TACC would be reduced by 60 t. Based on port price this is worth
$201,000 and on the basis of export value it is worth approximately $271,800.
Vessels in the fishery
83
Over the last three completed fishing years there have been 5 vessels that have taken in
excess of 98% of the orange roughy from ORH 7B with the total catch fairly evenly spread
between them. All are small vessels with an average registered length of approximately
25m. Three of the vessels are based in Nelson, one in Greymouth and one in Wellington
with the proportion of their annual effort expended in the statistical areas that comprise the
ORH 7B QMA varying substantially between vessels. Two vessels spend over 50% of the
year within these statistical areas, with the vessel based in Greymouth spending 99% of its
time there.
84
Orange roughy taken from ORH 7B is virtually all targeted (98-99% over the period 200304 to 2005-06) with the remaining 1-2% taken primarily in the targeted hoki and hake
fisheries. For each of the vessels which dominate the ORH 7B fishery, including that based
in Greymouth, orange roughy from ORH 7B represents less than 3% of their annual catch
by greenweight over the last three fishing years. Hoki contributes a significant component
of the total catch for all of these vessels (between 25-53% greenweight) with the remainder
of their catch dominated by red cod, black and smooth oreo, barracouta, squid and orange
roughy from other QMAs, although the contribution of each of these species to their total
catch varies by vessel. As a consequence, your decision on Hoki will also affect these
vessels.
Social factors
85
The vessels operating in the ORH 7B fishery in recent years employ a small number of crew
(typically 5-6 each) and the majority operate across a number of QMAs. Only one vessel is
located locally and, while this vessel operates almost exclusively in the statistical areas
which comprise the ORH 7B QMA, orange roughy provides only a small proportion of its
total catch.
Cultural factors
86
There is no known Customary Maori interest in the fishery and no other cultural factors that
MFish considers are relevant to the Ministers determination under section 13(3).
87
Overall, MFish recognises that ORH 7B is a small fishery, and although orange roughy are
a high value fish, the low TAC effectively limits the returns available from the fishery. On
balance MFish considers that no community or individual relies significantly on the ORH
7B fishery for their economic, social and/or cultural wellbeing.
TACC and Allowances
88
There are no known Maori customary or recreational fisheries for orange roughy and no
catch entitlement is currently provided, or proposed, for Maori customary or recreational
interests.
(fresh and frozen) were sold for $72.93 million. The standard conversion factor for fillets is 3.5, so 4,601 tonnes of
fillets is estimated to equal 16,103 tonnes of orange roughy (greenweight). Therefore, in fillet form, the average price
is $4.53 per greenweight kilogram.
Page 144 of 397
89
No allowance is currently provided for other sources of fishing related mortality. MFish has
typically recommended a 5% allowance for other sources of fishing related mortality in
trawl fisheries generally and this figure has been used in a number of other orange roughy
fisheries. ORH 7B is the only orange roughy fishery with significant catch for which no
such allowance has been provided.
90
The Plenary has stated that catch overruns will not have an impact on estimates of the status
of the stock as long as future overruns remain similar to those in the past. Increases in
average tow length and towing speeds may cause an increase in incidental fishing related
mortality although this may be offset by smaller catches per tow minimising the chance of
lost catch.
91
MFish considers that it is appropriate to provide an allocation for other sources of fishing
related mortality for the ORH 7B stock to better reflect the impact of fishing and to provide
a basis for taking into account any changes in fishing related incidental mortality in the
future. MFish proposes that, consistent with other trawl fisheries, the allowance be set at
5% of the TACC at this time. If the TACC of 110 t is retained, this equates to an allowance
of 5.5 tonnes (Option 2) and if the TACC is reduced to 50 t this equates to an allowance of
2.5 tonnes (Option 3). If the fishery is effectively closed, a zero tonne allocation will be
required (Option 4).
92
Option 2 is intended to better reflect the current level of fishing related mortality (from both
fish landed and other sources of fishing related mortality) in the ORH 7B fishery. Under
this option MFish proposes to add the allowance to the existing TACC, increasing the TAC
to 115.5 tonnes.
Additional considerations
Future stock assessments
93
Stock assessments in ORH 7B rely on CPUE indices and closure of the fishery under
Option 4 would mean that no such data would be available in future. Once closed, the cost
of collecting stock assessment information to support the possible reopening of the fishery
would appear to outweigh the economic value that may be derived from it.
94
If closed, it is unlikely that the ORH 7B fishery would re-open in the short to medium term.
Reporting requirements
95
The stock assessment for 2007 was rejected by the Working Group and there appears to be
no clear solutions to the problems associated with the models’ recruitment assumptions and
its insensitivity to the recent CPUE data. Consequently MFish does not consider that it will
be possible to undertake a new stock assessment for ORH 7B in the short to medium term.
CPUE indices derived from vessel catch and effort reports will therefore be relied on to
monitor the status of the stock.
96
CELR forms provide daily records by statistical area or general location and include number
of trawls, total trawl duration and estimated catch on a daily basis. TCEPR forms provide
greater spatial and temporal resolution of catch and effort information by recording tow-bytow information including location, time, trawl length and estimated catch.
Page 145 of 397
97
Regulations require that all vessels over 28m in length use TCEPR forms but the smaller
vessels which dominate the ORH 7B fishery, unless advised otherwise, must use CELR
forms.
98
If you choose Option 2 or 3, MFish will ensure that fishers targeting orange roughy in ORH
7B use TCEPR forms regardless of the size of the vessel. The additional spatial and
temporal resolution provided by TCEPR forms would enhance the utility of CPUE data for
stock assessment and management purposes.
99
Decisions concerning the manner and form in which records are to be kept or provided may
be specified by the Chief Executive. As such, specific reporting requirements are not a
condition of any TAC decision that you make. Unless the fishery is effectively closed, the
Chief Executive will require all vessels targeting orange roughy within ORH 7B to report on
TCEPR forms.
Directed fishing
100
Discussions at the 2007 Deepwater FAWG meetings identified a broad level of unease with the
stock assessments for a number of orange roughy stocks. A key concern was that standardised
CPUE series using currently available information may not be directly related to fish
abundance, although this data has more utility in ORH 7B compared to other fisheries as it is
less focussed on aggregations.
101
In its submission on the 2007 IPP, SeaFIC raise the possibility of orange roughy fishing
following a ‘survey-like’ mode. Under this proposal, a vessel’s fishing plan would be designed
to maximise the value of the CPUE data – that is, the vessel would fish to a plan that broadly
specified where, when and how it fished. SeaFIC consider that reliably interpretable catch
rate data could be achieved by commitment to a clear catching plan. It also suggests that,
given that fishing is carried out by very few vessels, establishment of a standardised fishing
plan might be contemplated.
102
While ECO supports closing the fishery for several years, it also suggests that, during this
period of closure, a management and research regime be established to effectively monitor
the fishery.
103
A directed fishing approach in ORH 7B was also supported by DWG, and the quota owners in
this fishery, including Talley’s, have instructed DWG to co-operate with MFish in
constructing and implementing a co-ordinated harvest strategy for the fishery over the next
3-5 years with the following objectives:
i) To ensure viable ACE parcels are made available to vessels at the start of the
season
ii) A co-ordinated operational approach is implemented to optimise catches and
increase catch rates
iii) To obtain additional and improved information from the fishery through:
-Reporting using TCEPR forms (i.e. as opposed to CELR forms), to improve
the spatial and temporal resolution of the catch and effort information and to
enhance the value of the CPUE time series for management application;
Page 146 of 397
-Collecting biological information from the catches for input into the stock
assessment process.
iv) To develop a consistent set of fishery data over the next 5 years which can then
be used as a basis to inform the management of this stock.
104
It appears that points i) and ii) above may, at least partially, have been implemented by
industry in the current fishing year.
105
Subsequent to its submission, DWG has assessed the feasibility of such a plan, and the
initial output is included in Appendix 2. MFish considers this approach is worthy of further
discussion for orange roughy stocks generally. However, MFish has reservations over its
utility for informing management decisions in a fishery such as ORH 7B. Of primary
concern is that the low TAC, and small number of vessels, limits the number of data points
(i.e. individual tows) that can be collected making the utility of any subsequent analysis
questionable.
106
Industry have indicated that if, dependent on your decision, there remains an operational
ORH 7B fishery, they are prepared to continue to develop a directed fishing approach and
consider that it could be put in place for the 2007-08 fishing year. It is open to you to
request that such an approach be adopted. Given the concerns noted above, MFish do not
consider that this initiative can be considered to mitigate risks to the sustainability of the
fishery.
107
In making your decision you must first decide on an appropriate TAC, allowances and
TACC for the ORH 7B fishery. If the TACC is greater than one tonne, then you may decide
whether or not to request that MFish work with industry to develop a directed fishing plan.
Environmental considerations
108
MFish is in the process of developing environmental standards - including a seabird
standard and a benthic impact standard - to ensure that statutory obligations to avoid remedy
or mitigate the adverse effects of fishing are met. These standards will ultimately be used to
inform fisheries plan development.
109
Key environmental issues in relation to the ORH 7B fishery are discussed below. In general
the environmental impacts discussed are, to an extent, proportional to effort in this fishery.
Effort in terms of vessel days has significantly decreased over the course of the fishery as
catch limits have decreased. The trend of reducing vessel days has been partially offset in
recent years as tow duration has increased.
110
Specific environmental issues raised in submissions include;
Finfish Bycatch
Forest & Bird expressed concern at the impact of orange roughy fishing on non-target fish
species. While a number of deepwater species that share similar habitat to orange roughy
are taken in the ORH 7B target fishery, the management proposals do not include an
increase in the orange roughy TAC. Consequently there should be no increase in finfish
bycatch under any of the proposed options. There should be a decrease if the TAC is
reduced, and finfish bycatch will be eliminated if the fishery is effectively closed.
Page 147 of 397
Shark Bycatch
Forest & Bird has also expressed concern at the impact of orange roughy fishing on highly
vulnerable deepwater sharks. While deepwater sharks are taken, they account for less than
1% of the bycatch in orange roughy fisheries. Issues in relation to the impact of fishing on
sharks generally are addressed in a specific national plan of action for sharks which is in
preparation by MFish.
Marine Mammals
The WWF submission touched on the impact on marine mammals. As no increase in the
TAC is contemplated, MFish considers that there should be no increase in marine mammal
interactions under any of the proposed options, and there should be a decrease if the TAC is
reduced. All marine mammal interactions will cease if the fishery is effectively closed.
Seabirds
Trawl fisheries for orange roughy are known to interact with seabirds and concern over this
impact was raised by WWF. Fishing-related mortalities of seabird species are known to
occur, although it is difficult to quantify the overall impact as knowledge of the population
characteristics of seabird species is typically limited. As no increase in the TAC is
contemplated, MFish considers that there should be no increase in seabird interactions under
any of the proposed options, there should be a decrease if the TAC is reduced, and seabird
interactions will be eliminated if the fishery is effectively closed.
All ENGO submissions discussed the need to consider the benthic impacts of orange roughy
fisheries. Bottom trawling can affect fragile benthic invertebrate communities and two
initiatives are in place to address benthic impacts nationally. In 2001 the Minister initiated a
trawl closure covering a selection of 19 seamounts of varying size and depth within New
Zealand although none are within ORH 7B. In addition, further areas will be closed to
bottom trawling under the BPA proposal, including an area (Challenger South) which
partially overlaps the north-western extent of the ORH 7B QMA. While ENGOs contend
that neither the BPA proposal nor the seamount closures are sufficient to mitigate the
current impact of trawl fisheries MFish considers that these closures make a significant
contribution to the protection of a wide range of habitat types found in New Zealand’s EEZ.
MFish notes that the area over which the ORH 7B fishery is distributed has increased over
the life of the fishery although the catch limits have decreased significantly. On balance,
MFish considers that the management proposals should have no additional benthic impact
as no increase in orange roughy catch entitlements is proposed. Benthic impacts caused by
this fishery will reduce if the TAC is lowered, and will be eliminated altogether if ORH 7B
is closed.
Future management
111
A fisheries plan for orange roughy is proposed for implementation for the 2008-09 fishing
year. If, dependent on your decision, there remains an operational ORH 7B fishery, the
fisheries plan may include some or all of the following provisions for ORH 7B;
•
Further fleet rationalisation
•
Long-term approach to research requirements
•
Specified CPUE triggers for TAC adjustment
Page 148 of 397
112
Statutory considerations in relation to sections 13(2) and 13(3) are central to your decision
in relation to ORH 7B and the implications of these sections on the options proposed in this
paper have been discussed at length above.
113
Additional legal obligations, and how they are applicable to your decision are included in
Appendix 1.
Page 149 of 397
APPENDIX 1
114
In forming this management proposal, the following statutory considerations have been
taken into account:
a)
Sections 5(a) and (b) require the Act to be interpreted consistently with New
Zealand’s international obligations with respect to fishing and with the provisions of
the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. Provisions of
general international instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Fish Stocks Agreement have been implemented
through the provisions of the Fisheries Act 1996 and given effect to here. MFish
considers that issues relating to international obligations and the Settlement Act are
adequately addressed in the management options proposed.
b)
Section 8 of the Act describes the purpose of the Act as being to provide for the
utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability, and defines the
meanings of utilisation and sustainability. The management options presented seek
to achieve the purpose of the Act. Under Option 4 no utilisation is provided for.
This option is available if you determine that cessation of utilisation is required to
ensure the rebuild of the ORH 7B stock to a sustainable level and at an appropriate
rate.
c)
Sections 9(a) and (b) require you to take into account that associated or dependent
species (those that are not harvested) be maintained at or above a level that ensures
their long-term viability, and that the biological diversity of the aquatic environment
should be maintained.
Seabirds and marine mammals have been discussed in the body of the paper. Some
concern has also been raised regarding highly vulnerable deepwater sharks, but
sharks account for less than 1% of the bycatch in orange roughy fisheries. A specific
national plan of action for deepwater sharks is in preparation by MFish.
d)
Section 9(c) requires that habitat of particular importance for fisheries management
should be protected. Our knowledge of the distribution of such habitats is
fragmentary however some habitats that are understood to be important nationally
are protected from trawling under the seamount closures and the BPA initiative. No
seamount closures are included in ORH 7B. Of the BPAs, approximately 12,000
square kilometres of the Challenger South closure are included in ORH 7B.
e)
Section 10 of the Act sets out the information principles, which require that
decisions be based on the best available information, taking into account any
uncertainty in that information, and applying caution when information is uncertain,
unreliable, or inadequate. In accordance with s 10, the absence of information
should not be used as a reason to postpone, or fail to take, any measure to achieve
the purpose of the Act, including providing for utilisation at levels considered to be
sustainable. MFish considers that the information used to support the management
proposals are the best available information on the status of the ORH 7B stock.
There remains significant uncertainty in regard to what level of catch will allow the
stock to rebuild, and at what rate. MFish considers that the range of options
Page 150 of 397
presented will allow the decision maker to exercise his discretion with regard to
determining the appropriate degree of caution to apply in setting sustainability
measures.
f)
Section 11(1)(b) requires any existing controls under the Act to be taken into
account. For ORH 7B, the only measure that applies currently is a TACC.
g)
Section 11(1)(c) requires you to take into account the natural variability of the stock
when setting or varying any sustainability measure. Orange roughy year-to-year
biomass is not known to be highly variable.
h)
Sections 11(2)(a) and (b) require you to have regard to any provisions in any policy
statement or plan under the Resource Management Act 1991, or any management
strategy or plan under the Conservation Act 1987, that are relevant to the setting of
any sustainability measure for the ORH 7B stock. MFish is not aware of any such
provisions that should be taken into account for ORH 7B.
i)
Section 11(2)(c) requires you to have regard to ss 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf
Marine Park Act 2000. This provision is not relevant to ORH 7B as it does not
apply to this QMA.
j)
Section 11(2A)(b) requires you to take into account any relevant fisheries plan
approved under the Act. There is no fisheries plan in operation that applies to ORH
7B.
k)
Sections 11(2A)(a) and (c) require that before setting or varying any sustainability
measure, you must take into account any conservation or fisheries service, or any
decision not to require such services. MFish does not consider that existing or
proposed services materially affect the proposals for the ORH 7B stock. No decision
has been made to require or not require a service in this fishery at this time.
l)
Section 21 requires you to allow for non-commercial Maori and recreational fishing
interests, and other sources of fishing-related mortality when setting or varying the
TACC. There are no known customary or recreational interests in ORH 7B and
other sources of fishing-related mortality have been considered in the paper. Section
21 also requires that any mätaitai reserve or closure/restriction under s 186A to
facilitate customary fishing be taken into account. There are no mätaitai reserves
and s 186A measures that intersect with the ORH 7B fishery. No area has been
closed or fishing method restricted (that affects the fishery within ORH 7B) under
the customary fishing provisions of the Act. Section 21 also requires that any
regulations to prohibit fishing made under s 311 be taken into account when setting
allowances for recreational interests. This consideration is not relevant with regard
to ORH 7B as there is no recreational fishery for ORH 7B.
Page 151 of 397
APPENDIX 2
ORH7B Fishery
2006-07 Catch & Effort data
The Ministry’s IPP for ORH7B includes options to either cut the existing TAC by 50% or to close
the fishery altogether, on the basis that:
• There is a lack of evidence from the fishery to support the stock rebuild projected by the
2004 stock assessment
• It is unknown whether the current TACC is sustainable
• The TACC has been under-caught in four of the last five years
• Average tow duration and tow length have increased in recent years
In DWG’s submission in response to the IPP several reasons were given for the recent lack of
performance in this fishery, most of which were linked to factors other than stock abundance (e.g.
exodus of experienced skippers; small ACE parcels; dispersed nature of the fish; few ‘eyes’ on the
grounds; high fuel costs; reduced incentive to target roughy once the hoki season starts).
Feedback received by DWG in late July was that the ORH7B fishery had performed well during
2006-07. The overall catch of 123.829 t (FishServe data) amounted to an over-catch of 2% (a total
of 121.466 t of ACE was available to the fishery).
The object of this paper is to illustrate is that CPUE in this orange roughy fishery is more an
artefact of fishing behaviour than an indicator of underlying stock abundance. A preliminary update
of the unstandardised catch and effort data from the fishery has been prepared for this purpose.
Methods
•
•
•
•
Catch and effort data for 2006-07 were obtained from three vessels that caught 96.4% of the
total catch in the ORH7B fishery (Table 1)
Two of these (Cook Canyon and Galatea II) have been involved in this fishery for several
years. The third vessel (Ocean Pioneer) has not previously fished here although carried the
same skipper that fished here on Resolution II in recent years.
Non-targeted ORH catches were included in the analysis (i.e. 520 kg catch, 18 hrs effort, 6
tows).
The most recent data points were plotted alongside those of the historical unstandardised
catch and effort series (McKenzie, DWWG 07/22) to illustrate the marked changes in the
fishery during 2006-07.
Note:
Due to minor differences in methodologies this analysis of 2006-07 catch and effort data may not
be directly comparable with the most recent time-series of unstandardised CPUE for the fishery
(McKenzie, DWWG 07/22). However, while we recommend that the McKenzie analysis be
updated with the 2006-07 data we are of the view that the changes are real.
Table 1: Catch and effort data for the vessels Cook Canyon, Galatea (CELR data) and Ocean Pioneer
Page 152 of 397
(TCEPR data) during 2006-07.
ORH7B Targeted & Non-Targeted Fishing 2006-07
Fishing
Year
2006-07
2006-07
2006-07
No.
vessel
days
Vessel
Cook Canyon
Galatea
Ocean Pioneer
25
14
4
43
No.
tows
79
45
15
139
Total
recorded
landed
catch (t)
59.627
38.633
21.756
120.016
Mean
Mean daily Mean daily
Mean tow
Mean tow
tow
catch rate catch rate
duration
speed (kt)
length
(t/tow)
(t/hr)
(hr)
(nm)
0.755
0.859
1.450
0.863
0.411
0.305
0.778
0.400
2.8
1.84
2.82
1.86
2.16
5.2
These new data for 2006-07suggest the following:
• The mean daily catch rate reached a 10-year high (Fig. 1)
• Mean tow duration declined to the 1995-96 level (Fig. 2)
• Over 80% of the effort and over 90% of the catch was taken during the spawn (June-July),
typical of the fishery pre 1996-97 (Figs 3 & 4)
ORH7B Mean Daily Catch Rate (t/tow)
Tonnes/tow
5
4
3
2
1
20
06
-0
7*
*
20
03
-0
4
20
00
-0
1
19
97
-9
8
19
94
-9
5
19
91
-9
2
19
88
-8
9
19
85
-8
6
0
Fishing Year
Figure 1. Mean daily catch rate (t/tow) ** 2006-07 data point not directly comparable.
Page 153 of 397
ORH7B Mean Tow Duration (hours)
5
Hours
4
3
2
1
20
06
-0
7*
*
20
03
-0
4
20
00
-0
1
19
97
-9
8
19
94
-9
5
19
91
-9
2
19
88
-8
9
19
85
-8
6
0
Fishing Year
Figure 2. Mean tow duration (hrs). ** 2006-07 data point not directly comparable.
ORH7B % Effort During Spawn (June+July)
% Effort (tows)
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
20
06
-0
7*
*
20
03
-0
4
20
00
-0
1
19
97
-9
8
19
94
-9
5
19
91
-9
2
19
88
-8
9
19
85
-8
6
0%
Fishing Year
Figure 3. Fishing effort (% of tows) during the spawning season (June-July).
not directly comparable.
Page 154 of 397
** 2006-07 data point
ORH7B % Estimated Catch During Spawn (June+July)
% Catch (t)
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
20
06
-0
7*
*
20
03
-0
4
20
00
-0
1
19
97
-9
8
19
94
-9
5
19
91
-9
2
19
88
-8
9
19
85
-8
6
0%
Fishing Year
Figure 4. The proportion of the catch taken during the spawning season (June-July). ** 2006-07 data point
not directly comparable.
Several factors contributed to the improved fishery parameters in 2006-07:
• Greater abundances of roughy on traditional towlines
• Favourable fishing/weather conditions during the spawn
• A concerted effort by vessel owners to purchase all available ACE
• Availability of the ACE prior to the spawn
• Concentrated fishing effort during the spawn (i.e. June and July)
The perception from MFish that tow duration and tow length have increased in recent years is also
somewhat misleading. These data in McKenzie’s paper were derived only from TCEPRs and are
representative of a very small component of the fishery (i.e. a total of 7 tows out of 393 in 2004-05
and only 3 tows out of 257 in 2005-06), and there is no rationale given as to why this small subset
would provide a useful basis for catch rate or stock analysis and is hardly worthy of consideration.
The view of the skippers and companies in the ORH7B fishery is that stock abundance has
improved in recent years, but that several factors have mitigated against consistent annual
performance:
• A small TACC fragmented into many small ACE parcels
• The difficulty in securing the ACE prior to the spawn
• Most skippers in this fishery focus on hoki and inshore species and lack the skills required
for targeted roughy fishing
• While the best roughy catch rates occur in June and July, vessels are redeployed to catch
hoki once this season starts, usually in early July
• Most roughy fishing in ORH7B occurs on flat ground and along traditional towlines. The
fish here are generally hard on the bottom and marks are seldom evident on echo-sounders
(i.e. this fishery doesn’t target marks as is the practice in other roughy fisheries)
• The small TACC translates to only three vessels in the fishery and very few ‘eyes’ on the
grounds. As a result, locating the fish is problematic, generally involves long tows and is
expensive to prosecute (i.e. it is financially a high risk fishery)
Page 155 of 397
In summary, many factors affect the performance of the ORH7B fishery and, as a result, the CPUE
index cannot be used as a reliable indicator of the underlying stock abundance. The analysis of the
2006-07 CPUE data presented in this paper illustrates how the conclusion reached in the 2007
DWFAWG Report, that “Recent catch-per-unit-effort data show no increase over the last 5 years
despite a large reduction in annual removals from the stock.” may not be correct. Catch rates by
themselves, in orange roughy fisheries, do not provide a reliable index of abundance.
It is the opinion of DWG that the available information does not provide the basis to take
management action to reduce the current TACC (which has been set at the MCY level) at this time.
Alternatively, DWG has proposed measures, through the implementation of a fishery plan, to
maximise the value of the data acquired from the fishery towards obtaining useful information on
which to base management decisions. We submit this is a logical and responsible route to follow.
N:\_PROJECTS\2006-07\4000 ORANGE ROUGHY & OREO\4051 DW STOCK ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT\DEEPWATER MANAGEMENT\FOR 2007-08\ORH7B FISHERY
UPDATE 280807.DOC
Page 156 of 397
APPENDIX 3
Directed fishing proposal
Project:
Assessment of the ORH 7B Fishery
Project Code:
Not assigned
Start Date:
1 October 2007
Completion Date:
ongoing
Vessel Use:
Commercial vessels as required
Overall Objectives:
To assess the status of the ORH 7B Fishstock.
Specific Objectives:
1.
Obtain a full understanding of the ORH 7B fishery by monitoring catches, catch rates and
biological information from this fishery at the finest practicable level of spatial resolution.
2.
Monitor the relative biomass of this fishstock using trawl survey methodology, based on a
“hybrid” survey design, which makes best use of commercial fishing capacity.
Rationale:
Previous research and the stock assessment
1.
The ORH 7B Fishstock was assessed at 17% B0 in 2004, with the CPUE β fixed at 1.0, and at
45% B0 with β estimated. This assessment predicted the stock would rebuild from 2000, but
this prediction has not been supported from observations in the fishery. An update of this
assessment in 2007, based on commercial CPUE, was not accepted by the Deepwater Fishery
Assessment Working Group (DWFAWG).
2.
The reasons the stock assessment models estimate the stock is rebuilding under the current
TACC is that approximately 16,000 t of orange roughy have been removed from this fishery
over the past 24 years, a level of catch which indicates that the unfished biomass would have
been on the order of 20,000 t. An orange roughy stock of this size should be able to sustain
annual catches in the order of 110 t, even with the low productivity attributed to orange
roughy and especially since recruitment would still be derived from the unfished biomass,
under the current ageing assumptions.
3.
The 2007 CPUE analysis is problematic because of a substantial shift in the fishery away
from areas which showed high initial catch rates and a shift in the fleet from larger vessels
capable of fishing in more extreme situations to a smaller coastal fleet staffed by less
experienced skippers. The CPUE analysis presented to the DWFAWG indicates that there is
practically no overlap between the vessels presently fishing with those fishing in earlier years
(McKenzie 2007).
Page 157 of 397
Research and management proposal
4.
In order to ensure sustainable management of this fishery, it is important that we collect
adequate information from the fishery. The current TACC was set at the MCY level
estimated in the 2001 and 2004 stock assessments. This level of catch was believed at the
time to have been conservatively set and should enable the stock to rebuild, given the model
assumptions and reasonable levels of recruitment. It is important that we now collect more
consistent and robust information from this fishery to establish whether current catches are
sustainable and are allowing the stock to rebuild.
5.
On behalf of the ORH 7B quota owners, The Deepwater Group Limited (DWG) has proposed
to the Ministry of Fisheries that participants in the ORH 7B the fishery would be willing to
collect useful scientific information to inform future management decisions. This document
presents the objectives, scope and general structure of a research plan. A more complete
description of this research plan will be developed between industry and MFish over time.
Explanation of the objectives
6.
The present ORH 7B TACC and catch are a fraction of their previous size. The small size of
the current fishery compared to the relatively large size of the unfished biomass reduces
options for both management and research. In particular, the research options are limited to
monitoring catches from the current fishery and the possible mounting of a small-scale
“hybrid” trawl survey. Reducing the current TACC during the period of the data collection
would be counter-productive because this would even further diminish the capacity to collect
information. However, both research options are potentially feasible and both should provide
information to inform future management decisions.
7.
Very little monitoring effort has been expended in this fishery, particularly during the early
stages of the fishery. The biological composition of the catch was not followed and there are
considerable uncertainties with respect to the quality of the CPUE analysis. Part of the reason
that the current CPUE analysis lacks credibility is that there have been significant changes in
the fishery which reduce the power of the CPUE analysis to track changes in abundance
because other factors might also cause shifts in catch rates. These factors include a shift
away from larger to smaller vessels, changes in skippers (with the concomitant loss of
knowledge of the fishing grounds and their orange roughy fishing skills), and changes in the
areas fished. With the lower TACC, many of the parcels of ACE have been reduced to levels
that are below the practical level for trading, resulting in many parcels remaining unfished.
The 2007 stock assessment attempted to deal with some of these issues by separating the
analysis into two series: one representing the earlier fishery based on larger vessels and using
the more detailed catch/effort data available on the MFish TCEPR forms. The second series,
representing the current fleet, began in the mid 1990s and uses CPUE data derived from the
less detailed CELR forms. However, this approach did not materially change the analysis and
the updated ORH 7B assessment was not accepted by the DWFAWG.
8.
Fishery-independent information is almost always preferred to fishery-derived information
because it is less susceptible to economic and social factors which undoubtedly have a
profound influence on the catch rates. Biological information is required from the fishery so
that the composition of the fish being removed can be monitored.
9.
This research proposal consists of the following initiatives:
a.
Report all catch on TCEPR forms. This will allow for a more consistent time series of
comparable catch data, including the provision of tow by tow locations;
Page 158 of 397
b.
Institute a biological catch sampling programme. It is proposed that be modelled on the
programme implemented by the DWG for the exploratory fishing areas in ORH3B.
The data collected by this programme have been evaluated and used by the DWFAWG
in recent assessments for both orange roughy and oreo. In outline, this programme
involves randomly selecting one tow per day and then randomly sampling about 100
orange roughy from this tow, as long as the tow satisfies the minimum catch
requirement. Otherwise the subsequent tow is sampled. Because this fishery is small
(currently only three vessels are operating), all vessels will need to subscribe to this
design in order to obtain an adequate sample. There is also an opportunity to minimise
the disruption on board these small vessels, as the catch is landed fresh which means
that all that is required from the vessel operator is to sequester the catch into bins for
on-shore measurements. As well, implementing this procedure means that there is an
opportunity to collect otoliths which may additionally improve the monitoring capacity
of the programme;
c.
This is one of the few orange roughy fisheries that may be fished on flat ground and not
targeted at aggregations. Therefore, it is possible that a trawl survey approach may
provide usable information for this stock. The objective of collecting this information
would be to establish an index of abundance that could track changes in stock
abundance over future years, given the expectation from the 2001 and 2004 assessments
that the stock is increasing in size under current catch levels. However, such a survey is
unlikely provide a better understanding of the stock status relative to the unfished
biomass.
i.
Trawl surveys tend to be expensive and thus are usually confined to large, wellestablished fisheries. However, there is a need to apply this technology to smaller
and/or less valuable fisheries because of the unreliability of fishery-derived data
for tracking biomass levels. Applying survey methodology while engaged in
commercial fishing is a possible way to obtain the benefits of surveys without
incurring the high cost of using a dedicated research vessel. This methodology
involves asking commercial vessels to perform tows at pre-selected locations in a
prescribed manner and then cataloguing the catch from the tow. This
methodology sacrifices some of the rigour of a dedicated research vessel,
including consistent vessels and gear, experienced scientific personnel and
detailed examination of the catch. However, the gains made may be considerable,
including lowered costs, potentially better representation of the population over
time (by covering a wider time period), and the availability of experienced fishing
skippers.
ii.
Designing such a programme is not trivial and requires a detailed examination of
the available catch and effort data to determine the potential extent of the survey,
both in space and in time. However, the ORH 7B fishery does not commence
until just prior to the spawning season (see Figure 3 in the attached document
[McKenzie 2007], showing that the fishery was mainly a June and July fishery
even at its very beginning), which provides the opportunity for the DWG and
MFish to develop a detailed design, obtain support from fishers and to consult
with the DWFAWG on the design and to implement it prior to the 2008 fishing
season.
Reference:
McKenzie, A. (2007) Descriptive and standardised CPUE analyses for the west coast South Island
orange roughy fishery (ORH 7B) up to 2005–06. DWWG Document No. 2007/022. 24 p.
Page 159 of 397
Page 160 of 397

ORANGE ROUGHY (ORH 1) – FINAL ADVICE Executive Summary

Transcription

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