AAAE Basics of Airport Law Workshop and 2014 Legal Update Atlanta, GA

Transcription

AAAE Basics of Airport Law Workshop
and 2014 Legal Update
Atlanta, GA
Mary Kate Whalen
TSA Deputy Chief Counsel for General Law
October 21, 2014
OVERVIEW
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Agency Mission, Responsibilities and Structure
TSA Authorities
Risk-Based Security
Recent Updates
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Mission and Responsibilities
• Mission: To protect the Nation’s transportation systems to
ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.
• TSA’s responsibilities encompass the U.S. transportation
system.
• Strategic Approach: Employ a risk-based approach to
security; implement layers of security; deploy a flexible,
well-trained workforce; establish consistent and
complementary security standards; and work closely with
stakeholders.
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Agency Structure
• TSA was established by the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71 (Nov. 19, 2001).
• TSA is a component of the Department of Homeland Security.
• Approximately 60,000 employees nationwide, including
50,000 full-time and part-time Transportation Security Officers
(TSOs).
• Located at approximately 450 airports nationwide.
• Effectively and efficiently screen approximately 1.8 million
people per day.
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Agency Structure –
Office of Chief Counsel
• Francine J. Kerner, Chief Counsel
• 220+ attorneys at TSA HQS and field offices
• Comprised of 6 divisions:
o General Law
o Litigation
o Procurement
o Enforcement
o Regulations & Security Standards
o Field Operations
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TSA AUTHORITIES
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),
Pub. L. No. 107-71 (Nov. 19, 2001)

TSA Responsibility. Overseeing security in any mode of
transportation that was regulated by DOT. 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)

TSA Liaison Role. Serving as a liaison for transportation
security to law enforcement, intelligence and stakeholder
communities, helping to coordinate the flow of information.
49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)
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TSA AUTHORITIES
Screening. TSA handles day to day screening in airports.
49 U.S.C. §§ 114(e), 44901
Background Checks. TSA requires background checks
for personnel with access to secure areas of the airport.
49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(12)
Secured Area and Perimeter Access. TSA has authority
to improve secured area access control and airport
perimeter access security. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(g)–(h)
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TSA Authorities
• Intelligence Information. TSA has authority to “receive, assess,
and distribute intelligence information related to transportation
security.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1).
• Threat Assessments. TSA has authority to “assess threats to
transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2).
• Coordinate Countermeasures Against Terrorism. TSA also has
authority to make plans and coordinate countermeasures with
appropriate departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the
United States Government. 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(4).
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TSA Authorities
• National Emergency. TSA has authority, during a national
emergency, to coordinate domestic transportation, coordinate
and oversee transportation-related responsibilities of other
Federal agencies, coordinate and provide notice to other
Federal agencies and appropriate State and local governments
about threats to transportation, and carry out other duties, and
exercise other powers, relating to transportation as prescribed
by the Secretary. 49 U.S.C. § 114(g)(1).
• Other Duties and Powers. TSA has authority “to carry out
such other duties, and exercise such other powers, relating to
transportation security as the Assistant Secretary considers
appropriate, to the extent authorized by law.” 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(f)(15).
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TSA’s Regulatory Authorities
• Rulemaking. TSA has broad rulemaking authority governing all
modes of transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 114(l); 40113; 44903.
• Security Programs. TSA’s regulations require certain regulated
entities, such as airports, aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and
indirect air carriers, to adopt and implement TSA-approved Security
Programs in order to operate within the United States.
o TSA standard and model security programs may be adopted and
tailored to specific operational needs.
o These programs are enforceable.
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AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM
Security Program Content at 49 C.F.R. § 1542.103 includes
requirements for airports to:
Describe sterile, SIDA, and secured areas
Describe measures to perform access control or to control
movement within secured area
Develop procedures for personnel IDs, criminal history checks
for persons with unescorted access
Approval by TSA. The Airport Security Program (ASP) and any
amendments to it must be approved by TSA. 49 C.F.R. §
1542.105.
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AIRPORT OPERATORS
Obligation Prior/Post 9/11. Ensure safety at airport through shared
responsibility.
Airport Security Program. Airport operators are required to maintain an air
transportation security program and must provide “a law enforcement
presence and capability” that “is adequate to ensure the safety of passengers.”
49 U.S.C. § 44903(c)
Law Enforcement Personnel. Uniformed law enforcement personnel must be
provided “in the number and manner adequate to support each system for
screening persons and accessible property.” 49 C.F.R. § 1542.215(a)(2).
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SECURITY DIRECTIVES/REGULATIONS
Standard for Issuing Security Directives (SDs). “When TSA
determines that additional security measures are necessary to
respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil
aviation, TSA issues a Security Directive setting forth mandatory
measures.” 49 C.F.R. § 1542.303(a) (airport operators).
SDs. SDs are mandatory and supersede Security Program
provisions, and have the force and effect of a regulation.
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TSA Regulatory Authorities
• Security Directives. TSA issues Security Directives to Security Programs,
in response to a threat assessment or a specific threat against civil aviation,
that set forth mandatory measures that must be implemented. 49 C.F.R. §
1542.303 (airports), 1544.305 (aircraft operators), 1548.19 (indirect air
carriers), and 1549.109 (certified cargo screening facilities).
• Emergency Amendments. TSA issues Emergency Amendments to
Security Programs, in response to an emergency requiring immediate
action with respect to safety in air transportation or air commerce that
make a procedure in a program contrary to the public interest, that set
forth mandatory measures that must be implemented. 49 C.F.R. §
1542.105(d) (airports), 1544.105(d) (aircraft operators), 1546.105(d)
(foreign air carriers), and 1548.7(e) (indirect air carriers).
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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION (SSI)
Security Programs, Security Directives, and Emergency Amendments are nonpublic documents and are considered SSI pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 1520.
SSI is information obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities,
including research and development, the disclosure of which TSA has
determined would:
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy
reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information
be detrimental to the security of transportation
Covered persons. Authorized to have access to SSI. 49 C.F.R. § 1520.
Airport and aircraft operators
Indirect air carriers (IACs)
Duty to protect. Covered persons have a duty to protect SSI.
Requests for SSI. TSA works closely with airports to protect SSI when there
are 3rd party requests for information.
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SSI HANDLING
Proper Handling of SSI (49 C.F.R. § 1520.9) – Covered persons must:

Take reasonable steps to safeguard SSI. Store in a secure container or
locked room.

Disclose only to covered persons with a need to know. Covered persons
must disclose, or otherwise provide access to, SSI only to covered persons
who have a need to know, unless otherwise authorized in writing.
Requests for SSI. Refer to TSA or applicable agency in DOT or DHS.
Marking and Disposal of SSI. Must be done in accordance with regulations.
49 C.F.R. § 1520.13, 1520.19
Dealing with Unmarked SSI. Mark and inform sender it must be marked.
Unauthorized Disclosure of SSI. Report to TSA or applicable agency.
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AIR CARGO SCREENING UNDER 9/11 ACT
9/11 Commission Act § 1602. Codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g).
Screening Requirement. Screen 100% of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft not later than August 3, 2010.
Checked Baggage Equivalent. Screening must be commensurate with level
of security for screening of checked baggage.
Standard Met. TSA believes that industry has met the mandate for cargo
uplifted domestically and international inbound cargo, although inspections
have sometimes uncovered compliance issues.
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AIR CARGO – CERTIFIED CARGO SCREENING
FACILITIES
Certified Cargo Screening Facility (CCSP) Requirements
Each CCSF must apply for and implement a TSA-approved
security program, and screen cargo according to TSA standards.
A CCSF must initiate chain of custody measures to protect cargo
from the time it is screened until it is loaded on passenger aircraft.
A CCSF’s key individuals must successfully undergo Security
Threat Assessments (STAs).
Changes to Security Programs. To implement the mandate, TSA has
also made changes to security programs for aircraft operators, foreign
air carriers and indirect air carriers.
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REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT
Civil Penalties. TSA has authority under 49 U.S.C. §§ 46301 and 114 to
assess civil monetary penalties of up to $11,000 per violation, per day
(exception: maximum penalty is up to $27,500 per violation, per day for air
carriers; up to $10,000 per violation, per day for surface entities).
Potential Enforcement Actions. Enforcement action may involve on-the-spot
counseling, warning notice or letter of correction, civil penalty assessment, or
security program withdrawal.
Notification to Alleged Violators. TSA notifies alleged violators of the
allegation and gives an opportunity for response. Violators may then appeal to
an ALJ and subsequently to the TSA Decision Maker and then to the Federal
Courts of Appeals.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (LEOS)
LEO Presence Required. TSA “shall order the deployment of law
enforcement personnel authorized to carry firearms at each airport
security screening location to ensure passenger safety and national
security.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(h)
Power and Authority. TSA Administrator may designate any employee a
LEO to carry a firearm, make arrests and execute search warrants.
49 U.S.C. § 114(p)
Deputation. TSA may deputize state or local LEOs to carry out any
Federal airport security duty. 49 U.S.C. § 44922
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LEO REIMBURSEMENT

LEO Presence Required. ATSA requires airport operators to provide law enforcement
presence but allows state, local or private LEOS (unlike screening which must be
federal). 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c)

LEO Reimbursement Program
Discretionary program which ensures a highly visible on-site LEO presence to
support passenger screening checkpoint operations to detect, deter, and mitigate
threats.
Financial support for LEOs provided under LEO Reimbursement Program.
Currently 323 participants in the Program. Total funding in FY13 was $44,971,975.

Agreements. TSA enters into agreements with airport operators pursuant to its authority.
Agreements allow participating airports to request partial reimbursement from TSA for
LEO support, up to an annual allocation of hours and a maximum hourly rate.
49 U.S.C. §§ 114(m), 106(l)
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VISIBLE INTERMODAL PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE (VIPR) (6 U.S.C. 1112)
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VIPR teams work with local security and law enforcement officials to augment
existing security resources; provide a deterrent presence and detection
capabilities; and introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt potential
terrorist planning or operational activities.
TSA’s VIPR teams provide a full range of law enforcement and security
capability; the exact makeup of VIPR teams is determined jointly with local
authorities and can include FAMS, TSOs, BDOs, TSA certified explosive
detection canine teams, security and explosive screening technology,
radiological/nuclear detection, and local law enforcement officers.
TSA VIPR teams can be deployed at random locations and times in cooperation
with local authorities to deter and defeat terrorist activity; or teams may be
deployed to provide additional law enforcement or security presence at
transportation venues during specific alert periods or in support of special
events.
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SECURE FLIGHT
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. Congress
requires the government to assume watch-list matching function from air
carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2).

Watch-list. Pre-flight comparisons of airline passenger information and nontraveling individuals seeking authorization to enter the sterile area of a U.S. airport.
Secure Flight Final Rule. Published October 28, 2008. 73 Fed. Reg. 64,017
(codified at 49 C.F.R. Parts 1540, 1544, and 1560).

Effective on December 29, 2008
Fully implemented for all covered aircraft operators in November 2010
Redress. DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) is available for
passengers who feel they have been improperly delayed or prohibited from
boarding an aircraft.
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SCREENING OVERVIEW
Screening Operations. 49 U.S.C. § 114(e).

Person
Walk Through Metal Detector
Advanced Imaging Technology
Resolution Procedures (including Pat-Downs and Explosive Trace
Detection)
Random Screening

Property
X-ray
Liquid Container Screening
Explosive Trace Detection
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SCREENING – TRAVEL DOCUMENT CHECKERS
Travel Document Checkers (TDCs). TSA assumed the TDC
function from airline contractors. 49 U.S.C. § 114(e), (f).
See also 9/11 Commission Act § 1611 (requiring specialized
training for TSOs to develop specialized security skills,
including among other things, document examination).
Gilmore v. Gonzalez, 425 F. 3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006).
Requirement for travelers to present identification does not
violate First or Fourth Amendment.
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SCREENING – BEHAVIOR DETECTION

Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT). Technique using behavior
observation and analysis to identify potentially high risk individuals. SPOT is conducted
by certified TSA Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs). Passengers meeting a defined
threshold may be referred for selectee screening and/or LEO referral.

Fourth Amendment and Civil Liberties Concerns are Addressed

Behavioral indicators not based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion.

Referrals are neutral, incremental means of identifying candidates for
additional screening or law enforcement resolution.

BDOs receive statutorily mandated specialized training (49 U.S.C. § 114
note) and anti-discrimination training. Zero tolerance for unlawful profiling.
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RISK-BASED SECURITY (RBS) STRATEGY
Problem. The current one-size-fits-all system is unsustainable.
Solution. TSA is continuing to evolve into a risk-based, intelligencedriven approach to further strengthen transportation security.
Risk-Based Security Premises
The majority of airline passengers are low risk.
By having passengers voluntarily provide more information about
themselves, TSA can better segment the population in terms of risk.
Increase security by focusing on unknowns; expedite known and
trusted travelers.
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RISK-BASED SCREENING
Pre-Screening Data. More attention to pre-screening data has the potential to
create efficiencies in the system and improve passengers’ travel experiences.
How it Works. Prescreening involves the use of information, Secure Flight
Passenger Data and travel itinerary (already received under Secure Flight
regulations), or frequent flyer information submitted by airports, to make
decisions before the passenger receives a boarding pass, to determine what
level of physical screening the passenger will receive upon arrival at the
checkpoint. Change is part of TSA’s ongoing efforts to identify appropriate
screening for travelers, including those who present a lower security risk.
Primary Result. Identification of passengers who are eligible for expedited
screening at participating airport security checkpoints.
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RISK-BASED SECURITY PROGRAMS
Passengers 12 Years of Age and Under
Passengers 75 Years of Age and Over
Expanded Behavior Detection and Managed Inclusion
TSA Pre✓®
Known Crewmember
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TSA Pre✓®
TSA Pre✓®. A risk-based passenger prescreening initiative that allows
eligible participants to receive expedited screening at participating airports.
Enables TSA to focus resources on passengers more likely to pose a threat to
civil aviation, while improving the passenger’s travel experience.
Benefits. May leave on your shoes, light outerwear/jacket, and belt and keep
laptop and 3-1-1 liquids in carry-on bag.
TSA will always incorporate random and unpredictable security measures
throughout the airport and no individual will be guaranteed TSA Pre✓™
screening.
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KNOWN TRAVELERS

Known Traveler Definition. Individuals who have undergone a Security Threat
Assessment (STA) that TSA has determined provides adequate assurances of passenger
risk. When making a travel reservation, Known Travelers who submit their KTN are
eligible for expedited screening on flights originating from airports with TSA Pre✓®
lanes.
Known Traveler Population. Includes individuals who have voluntarily provided
information to government trusted traveler programs, such as U.S. Customs and Border
Protection’s Global Entry, NEXUS and Sentri programs. Currently also includes eligible
members of the U.S. Armed Forces, federal judges, members of Congress, and Medal of
Honor recipients.
TSA Pre✓® Application Program. In November, TSA kicked off its own trusted traveler
program. The TSA Pre✓® Application Program allows travelers to apply directly to be
eligible to participate in TSA Pre✓® . Process includes an online application and
submission of valid identification and fingerprints at an enrollment center. Application fee
is $85 with eligibility good for 5 years.
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MANAGED INCLUSION
Definition. Managed Inclusion, part of TSA Pre✓®, is the use of canines and
behavior detection to conduct real-time threat assessment to improve security,
efficiency, and passenger experience.
Process. Passengers routed into expedited screening lanes using Passenger
Screening Canine teams to screen passengers and their belongings for
explosives while BDOs assess passengers for suspicious behaviors.
Deployment. Managed Inclusion in operation at over 132 airports, increasing
utilization of TSA Pre✓® lanes.
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SCREENING: HOW COURTS VIEW THESE
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
Fourth Amendment. All TSA screening falls under the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment.
Administrative Searches. The U.S. Supreme has instructed that the
suspicionless screenings conducted at airport security checkpoints fall under
the administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement.
Legal Standard. Airport searches do not need to be based on reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997)
NTEU v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989)
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SCREENING CASES: BASIC SCREENING
AUTHORITY
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007)(en banc).
Election to attempt entry into secure area triggers screening.
United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3rd Cir. 2006).
Passengers must complete screening.
United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2005).
Random screening upheld.
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Updates - LAX
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In March 2014, TSA issued a report outlining steps for improvement of security at
airport checkpoints following the November 1, 2014 shooting of 3 TSOs and 1
traveler, resulting in the death of TSO Gerardo Hernandez.
These actions include: (1) mandating active shooter training and exercises for
TSA employees and requiring bi-annual evacuation drills; (2) acquiring additional
duress alarms to close existing gaps; (3) ensuring that all airports have explicit
maximum response times; and (4) continuing to have an increased VIPR team
presence at airports.
TSA also issued recommended standards to airports for law enforcement presence
at checkpoints and ticket counters during peak travel times and further
recommended bi-annual active shooter training and exercises.
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SCREENING CASES
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Corbett v. TSA, No. 12-15893 (11th Cir. 9/19/14). Neither AIT
nor TSA’s pat-down procedures violate the Fourth Amendment.
The court held that both search methods represented reasonable
efforts to address the continuing threat to aviation.
Governmental interest in preventing terrorism outweighs the
degree of intrusion on passengers’ privacy from either scanners
or TSA pat-down procedures at security checkpoints.
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SCREENING CASES
Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013). Passenger arrested for stripping
to his undergarments when requested to proceed through AIT. Brought claims
against three TSA screeners in their individual capacities, alleging, in part, that
the request for law enforcement assistance was retaliatory. The court found a
prima facie First Amendment violation because TSA screeners requested
police assistance when confronted with a “peaceful protest.”
George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (3d Cir. 2013). Passenger carrying ArabicEnglish flashcards for words like bomb, explosion, terrorist was referred to
airport police and ultimately detained for four hours pending questioning.
Brought claims against three TSA screeners (and airport police) alleging, in
part, that the request for law enforcement assistance was retaliatory. Rejecting
Tobey, the court held that a request for police assistance by TSA personnel
could not alone be the predicate for a retaliation claim under the First
Amendment.
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SCREENING CASES

Hannibal v. Sanchez, et al., No. 13-CV-640, 2014 WL 3845172 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014).
Passenger arrested for making a joke about explosives after TSA employee told him he
could not carry jars of peanut butter and jelly through security. Brought suit against TSA
screeners and airport police officers alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations.
Court ruled that there was arguable probable cause under the circumstances to arrest for a
violation of N.Y. criminal code (although not the provision initially identified by the
officers themselves), and that the screener was not responsible for the arrest by simply
requesting assistance.

Shimomura v. Carlson, et al., No. 13-CV-000462-RBJ-MJW, 2014 WL 585343 (D. Colo.
Feb. 14, 2014). Passenger arrested after complaining about screening procedures and
allegedly running his carry-on into a TSO in the presence of an airport police officer.
Brought suit against TSOs and police officer, claiming his arrest violated First and Fourth
Amendments. The court found arguable probable cause for his arrest (but noted that if
the officer had not witnessed the incident, the retaliatory arrest claim might have survived
given the very minor nature of the incident).
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SCREENING CASES: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
(CON’T)

Pellegrino, et al. v. United States, et al., No. 09-CV-5505 (E.D. Pa. 2014). Passenger
arrested for assaulting two TSOs with her luggage at the end of a contentious private
screening. Brought suit against TSA screeners (only) for malicious prosecution in
violation of First and Fourth Amendment. Court ruled there was probable cause for her
arrest on all but two charges based on the TSOs’ statements at the checkpoint, and that
the screeners had not sought the other charges (and so were not responsible for her
prosecution on them).

Corbett v. TSA, et al., 568 F. App’x 690 (11th Cir. 2014). Passenger who opted-out of
all offered forms of screening brought suit against TSA, a TSO, and airport police
department alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations. Court ruled that TSA’s
additional screening of his carry-on baggage (including a stack of IDs and credit cards
and a book), and request for police assistance was constitutional given his refusal to
submit to the screening procedures offered, and that a check for warrants and other
information by airport police was permissible.
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SUPREME COURT UPDATE

Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. (Jan. 27, 2014). Former AWAC pilot
and Federal Flight Deck Officer brought defamation suit regarding the circumstances of
his termination, alleging that the airline’s report to TSA that they were concerned about
his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm after telling him he would be fired
(but putting him on a plane home anyway) was recklessly false. The Supreme Court
overturned state court rulings that AWAC was not entitled to immunity under 6 U.S.C. §
44941, which protects reports of security concerns to TSA that are “materially true.”

Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean, No. 13-894. On November 4, 2014, the
Court will hear argument as to whether a former Federal Air Marshal is entitled to
whistleblower protection under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) in connection with his public
disclosure of matters that were ultimately deemed to constitute Sensitive Security
Information (which is protected from disclosure under 49 U.S.C. § 114(r) and 49 C.F.R.
Part 1520).
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BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT -EXIT LANES
Exit Lanes. Allow passengers to exit the sterile areas. Unauthorized persons
are not permitted entry into the sterile area while authorized persons may be
permitted to enter the sterile area (varies by airport). Must prevent and detect
an item being thrown, rolled, glided, or placed into the transition zone from the
public area to the exit lane. TSA conducts access control at approximately one
third of airports, with the other airports controlled by the airport operator or
aircraft operator.
TSA’s Interpretation of the Meaning of § 603 of the Budget Act. TSA
interprets the phrase “monitoring passenger exit points from the sterile area of
airports at which TSA provided such monitoring as of December 1, 2013” as
applying only to those actual sterile area exit lanes that were in existence on
December 1, 2013, and staffed by TSA at the 155 airports at which TSA was
providing monitoring services on that date.
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BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT -EXIT LANES
TSA’s Interpretation of the Meaning of § 603 of the Budget Act. In cases
where airport remodeling or reconfiguration of an exit lane is such that the
location essentially remains the same, exit lane access control responsibilities
will be staffed in the same manner it was staffed on December 1, 2013. If
remodeling, reconfiguration, or construction significantly changes the
location of existing exit lanes, requiring additional staffing and resources,
TSA is not obligated to monitor those exit lanes.
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BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT -FEES
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Title 49 U.S.C. § 44940, authorizes TSA to impose a fee to defray the
government's costs for providing U.S. civil aviation security services.
Sept 11 Passenger Security Fee. 49 U.S.C. § 44940(c) authorized TSA to impose
a passenger security fee of no more than $2.50 per enplanement (the September
11th Security Fee), as long as the total fee per one-way trip did not exceed $5.
Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee. To the extent the revenue collected from the
passenger fee did not defray all of the relevant costs, TSA was authorized to
impose a second fee on air carriers and foreign air carriers in air transportation.
TSA collected an estimated $420 million annually as ASIF offsetting fees.
Section 601 of the BBA eliminated ASIF effective October 1, 2014.
• 79 Fed. Reg. 56663 (Sep. 23, 2014)
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BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT -FEES
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The Budget Act amended 49 U.S.C. 44940 “Security Service Fee” as follows:
o (c) Limitation on fee.--Fees imposed under subsection (a)(1) may not exceed
$2.50 shall be $5.60 per enplanement one-way trip in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation that originates at an airport in the United States,
except that the total amount of such fees may not exceed $5.00 per one-way
trip.
TSA published an interim final rule 79 Fed. Reg. 35462 (June 21, 2014):
o
o
o
Imposes the fee based on one-way trips, rather than enplanements; and
Removes the regulatory round trip cap of 4 enplanements (which had been based on
the previous statute’s provisions which gave TSA the ability to impose less than $2.50
per enplanement. ).
TSA modified the definition of “stopover” to include a 12-hour break in travel for noncontinental U.S. air transportation (previously, a 4-hour hour break in travel).
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QUESTIONS?
Contact information:
[email protected]