Pension Reform and Financial Markets: Encouraging Households Savings for Retirement Anita Tuladhar
Transcription
Pension Reform and Financial Markets: Encouraging Households Savings for Retirement Anita Tuladhar
Pension Reform and Financial Markets: Encouraging Households Savings for Retirement Anita Tuladhar International Monetary Fund June 2007 Conference on International Forum on Pension Reform: Exploring the Link to Labor and Financial Market Reforms The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. Background Rapidly ageing populations Unsustainable pension system and public finances in the long run Introduction of funded pensions system with mandatory private individual account and voluntary supplemental accounts, including in the region. – – – – – – 1998 (Hungary, Kazakhstan); 1999 (Poland); 2001 (Latvia); 2002 (Croatia, Estonia, Bulgaria); 2003 (Russia); 2005 (Macedonia, Slovakia); Shifting of responsibility for old-age income to households (by working more or higher financial savings) Question: How to encourage household financial savings for retirement? Outline of this presentation: Examination of household financial savings – Factors affecting pension fund savings – – in particular, pension savings in some emerging and mature markets Descriptive analysis using cross country data Empirical analysis using more detailed pension fund data from Latin America. Policy implications for pension fund regulations Household balance sheets: Share of financial assets in total wealth varies considerably. 120 Composition of Household Wealth in Household Balance Sheets, 2000 100 80 60 40 20 0 Average - MM Average - EM USA Canada Financial assets Denmark Netherlands UK Japan Portugal Source: Davies, Sandstrom, Shorrocks and Wolff (2006) Italy Australia Germany France New Zealand Spain South Africa Taiwan Singapore Czech Republic Poland Non-financial assets Household balance sheets: Share of liquid assets in financial assets significantly larger in emerging markets. 120 Composition of Financial Assets in Balance Sheets, 2000 100 80 60 40 20 0 Shares and equities Source: Davies, Sandstrom, Shorrocks and Wolff (2006) Other (including pensions) Average - MM Average - EM USA Netherlands Switzerland Denmark UK Austria Australia Italy Canada France Germany New Zealand Spain Greece Portugal Japan Belgium South Africa Estonia Lithuania Taiwan Hungary Singapore Slovenia Latvia Poland Czech Republic Korea Turkey Slovakia Romania Croatia Bulgaria Liquid assets Household balance sheets (contd.) The low share of pension fund savings also observed in the OECD. 1.2 Select OECD Countries: Composition of Household Financial Assets (In percent) 1 Others Equities 0.8 Loans 0.6 Securities except shares Insurance reserves (incl pensions) Currency and deposits 0.4 0.2 0 CZE Source: OECD. POL HUN SVN JAP FIN NOR AUS Factors Affecting Pension Fund Assets: A Cross-Country Comparison Turkey Lithuania Luxembourg China Slovak Republic Russia Dominican Republic Pakistan Latvia Costa Rica Korea Slovenia Bulgaria Italy Croatia Estonia Germany Kazakhstan Czech Republic Belgium Argentina Austria Thailand India France Norway Mexico Hungary Poland El Salvador Spain (6) Bolivia New Zealand Peru Uruguary Portugal Sweden Colombia Japan HongKong Kenya Denmark South Africa Non-OECD Canada Ireland Malaysia Australia Singapore Chile Finland United Kingdom Total OECD United States Switzerland Iceland Netherlands Pension Fund Assets to GDP, 2005 0 Source: OECD. 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Pension fund assets in non-OECD countries remains relatively low. Ukraine Indonesia Lithuania China Russia Dominican Republic Pakistan Latvia Costa Rica Slovenia Bulgaria Croatia Estonia Kazakhstan Argentina Thailand India El Salvador Bolivia Peru Uruguay Colombia Hongkong Kenya South Africa Malaysia Singapore Chile Pension Fund Assets in Selected Non-OECD Countries, 2005 (In percent of GDP) Weighted Average: 37 percent 0 Source: OECD. 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Theoretical foundations on determinants of household savings Macroeconomic conditions Income Wealth Real Interest Rates Inflation Unemployment Financial Market Development Investment Opportunities Liquidity constraints Preferences Household savings 1. Level 2. Composition Alternative Income Sources Public pensions (features and financing) Public transfers Household size Demographics Dependency ratio Per Capital Income: Pension fund savings are positively correlated with income levels. 90,000 Per Capita GDP vs. Pension Assets 80,000 70,000 in USD 60,000 50,000 Full Sample 40,000 30,000 20,000 Non-OECD 10,000 Non-OECD 0 0 20 Source: OECD ; and IMF WEO. 40 60 80 In percent of GDP 100 120 140 Demographics: An older population or a faster pace of ageing Is not related to significantly higher pension fund savings 70 Old Age Dependency Ratio vs. Pension Fund Assets, 2005 60 50 Full Sample In times 40 30 20 Non-OECD 10 Non-OECD 0 0 20 40 60 80 In percent of GDP Source: OECD; and United Nations. 100 120 140 Alternative income sources: Public pension policy affects incentives to save in pension funds. 16 Public Pensions Expenditure vs. Pension Fund Assets 14 12 In percent of GDP 10 8 Full Sample 6 4 2 Non-OECD 0 0 20 Source: OECD. 40 60 80 In percent of GDP 100 120 140 Alternative income sources: Generosity of public pensions likely reduces incentives to save in pension funds. 140 Net Replacement Rate vs. Pension Fund Assets 120 In percent 100 Full Sample 80 Non-OECD 60 40 20 Non-OECD 0 0 20 Sources: IMF staff; and OECD. 40 60 80 In percent of GDP 100 120 140 Pension Reforms: The maturity of the mandatory funded system is a significant determinant of the size of pension fund savings. Turkey Lithuania Luxembourg China Slovak Republic (1) Russia Dominican Republic Pakistan Latvia Costa Rica Korea Slovenia Bulgaria Italy Croatia Estonia Germany Kazakhstan Czech Republic Belgium Argentina Austria Thailand India France (1) (3) Norway Mexico Hungary Poland El Salvador Spain (6) Bolivia New Zealand Peru Uruguary Portugal Sweden (7) Colombia Japan (5) HongKong Kenya Denmark South Africa Non-OECD Canada (1) Ireland (4) Malaysia Australia Singapore Chile Finland (2) United Kingdom (1) Total OECD United States (10) Switzerland (1) (8) Iceland Netherlands (1) Pension Assets, 2005 (In percent of GDP) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Financial market development: Pension fund savings shows a strong positive relation with financial market development. Direction of causality? 300 Market Capitalization vs. Pension Fund Assets 250 Full Sample In percent of GDP 200 150 Non-OECD 100 50 Non-OECD 0 0 20 40 60 80 In percent of GDP Source: Bloomberg; and OECD. 100 120 140 Financial market development: Pension fund savings are inversely related to financial market volatility. Market stability or preference for safer assets? 180 Equity Market Volatility vs. Pension Fund Assets 160 Non-OECD 140 Std. dev (In percent) 120 100 80 60 Non-OECD 40 Full Sample 20 0 0 20 40 60 80 In percent of GDP Source: Bllomberg; and OECD. 100 120 140 Financial market development: Pension fund savings are inversely related to risk adjusted returns in the equity market. Investment limitations or lack of deep liquid markets? 2.5 Risk Adjusted Return vs. Pension Fund Assets 2.0 1.5 1.0 Full Sample 0.5 Non-OECD Non-OECD 0.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Empirical analysis Question: What factors enhance participation and pensions savings? Equations: 1. Change in pension fund participation = f (fund performance, years since reform, change in income, change in unemployment rate) 2. Change in pension fund assets per participant = f (fund performance, change contribution rate, change in income, rates of return on alternative investments) Data: – – – Pension fund data: FIAP on Latin American countries Macroeconomic data: WEO Financial Market data: IFS, World Development Indicators, Bloomberg Unbalanced Panel Data with 8 countries Results: Equation 1 Fixed Effects Estimation Dependent Variable: D(Number of Participants) Explanatory Variables: Constant 0.06 Lagged Dependent Variable -0.36 Annual Rate of Return 0.002 Lag Annual Rate of Return Dummy (Reform Years) D(Unemployment Rate) Income Per Capita D(Income Per Capita) Annual Rate of Return*D(Income Per Capita) R-Squared F-Stat Sample (adjusted) Included observations after adjustments Cross-sections included Total pool (unbalanced) observations 0.16 1.02 0.06 -0.36 0.002 0.000 0.15 0.78 0.05 -0.44 0.001 0.04 -0.48 0.002 0.42 -0.48 0.002 0.32 -0.46 0.002 0.02 -0.45 0.003 0.10 0.09 -0.23 0.08 -0.19 -0.05 0.08 -0.21 -0.04 0.09 -0.23 0.26 1.67 0.31 1.93 0.33 1.88 0.002 0.04 0.004 0.33 1.49 0.33 1.68 1984 2005 1984 2005 1984 2005 1984 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 59 56 59 59 59 59 59 Results: Equation II Fixed Effects Estimation Dependent Variable: D(Pension Funds Per Participant) Explanatory Variables: Constant Lagged Dependent Variable Annual Rate of Return Lag Annual Rate of Return D(Income Per Capita) Fund Contribution Rate (Net of Fees) Stock Market Return Government Bond Rate R-Squared F-Stat Sample (adjusted) Included observations after adjustments Cross-sections included Total pool (unbalanced) observations 0.07 0.04 0.014 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.004 0.10 -0.19 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.38 0.36 0.36 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.47 4.97 0.58 6.18 0.47 2.25 0.54 5.67 0.82 13.5 0.54 3.97 1984 2005 1984 2005 2000 2005 1984 2005 1996 20051993 2005 22 22 6 22 10 13 7 7 7 7 5 7 54 51 33 54 33 45 Key Factors and Challenges to Pension Fund Savings Structural factors limit pension fund coverage – – Pension savings on a voluntary basis low reflecting – – – high unemployment rate low income levels still generous public pension system level of financial sector development that limits investment opportunities or low financial awareness thereof, or myopia Improved performance on pension funds encourage savings Other variables: savings incentives, other income sources, demographic factors Policy Implications Enhancing coverage of pension income: – – creates a need for non-contributory social safety net for retirees (minimum public pensions or the zero pillar) make pension fund savings mandatory or require automatic enroll enrollment as default option to improve participation – In CEC’s generally, participation to funded pensions is designed as a carve-out of existing public pension contribution which is mandatory for younger workers. (~20 yrs for SVK, EST, MKD, HUN, ~30 yrs POL and LVA, ~40 yrs CRA, BLG, all for KZK) awareness/financial literacy Policy Implications Regulations for improving fund performance/net riskadjusted returns: – Investment in an optimum portfolio: – – regulations on asset allocation. For eg - shift from quantitative investment limits to prudent person rule or loosen tight regulations taking into consideration the development of local securities markets regulations on guarantees: For eg – minimum guaranteed return relative to industry Tax incentives on voluntary pension savings Minimizing fees and costs: regulations on fees, industry structure Pension portfolios mostly in government bonds, reflecting both regulatory restrictions and lack of investment opportunities 60 Portfolio Allocation in Select Latin American Pension Funds, 1999-2006 50 40 30 20 10 0 Government Debt Financial Institutions Non-financial Institutions Equities Jun-99 Mutual Funds Dec-06 Foreign Investments Others Pension portfolios are shifting from bank deposits towards capital markets and international investments Shift in Portfolio Composition of Pension Funds, 1999-2006 NonGovernment Financial financial Mutual Debt Institutions Institutions Equities Funds (In percent of total funds) Argentina 9.3 -15.6 -0.7 -4.6 5.1 Bolivia 8.8 -22.9 9.3 0.1 0.2 Chile -24.2 -4.9 4.3 4.3 0.9 El Salvador 10.5 -16.3 5.8 0.0 0.0 México -24.2 4.7 8.0 1.8 0.0 Perú 12.5 -30.1 -6.2 4.9 1.7 Uruguay -4.1 3.4 1.1 0.1 0.0 Foreign Investments Others 9.5 2.7 19.6 0.0 9.6 8.5 0.0 -2.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 -0.7 Investment limits: Need to enable diversification, and also allow life-cycle investing Investment Limits Equity Foreign Investment United Kingdom PPR 1/ PPR United States PPR PPR Germany 30 20 Japan 30 30 Canada No limit 30 Italy PPR 20 Argentina Chile Mexico Peru Colombia El Salvador 50 39 15 35 30 n.a. 20 30 20 10.5 20 7 Slovakia n.a. 50 Hungary 50 30 Latvia n.a. 30 Macedonia 30 20 Croatia 30 15 Kazakhstan 30 10 Poland 40 5 Bulgaria 5 5 Sources: Poirson (2007), Chlon Dominczak (2003), Rutkowski (2006) 1/ Prudent Person Rule (PPR) Policy Implications Gradual easing of investment limits, especially on foreign investments – Public debt management: – – facilitates diversification gains especially in lack of domestic investments, limits foreign exchange market volatility Longer term instruments, inflation hedge, establishing liquid benchmark instruments, ensuring pension funds don’t become captive markets for government financing that provides cheap financing. Measures to strengthen capital market development – – Privatization, increasing available investment instruments, corporate governance regulations to improve supply Liquidity of these instruments also important Minimum Return Guarantees (MRG): Significantly affects asset allocation and leads to herding behavior Relative to the Pension Industry – Relative to a benchmark – Hungary No guarantees – Kazakhstan, Poland, Croatia, Slovakia Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Macedonia If MRG invoked, requires paying up from reserves, guarantee funds, etc. Regulations on Guarantees: Flexibility in parameters of Minimum Return Guarantees, including setting of benchmark and portfolio choice Minimum Guaranteed Return in Select Countries Assessmet Period 12 months Frequency of Full Disclosure Evaluation of Portfolios Monthly Colombia Minimum Return = (A+B)/2 A = 70 percent of ARS B = 70 percent of Return on Synthetic Portfolio 70 percent of Return on Bogota stock exchange index 70 percent of return of S&P 500 36 months Quarterly After 30 days Chile Risky Funds = Min (50 Percent of ARS, ARS-4 percent) Conservative Funds = Min (50 Percent of ARS, ARS-2 percent) 36 months Monthly After 10 days Uruguay Min( 2 percent real, ARS-2 percent) 12 months Monthly 36 months Bi-annually Country Benchmark and Returns Argentina Min( 70 percent of ARS, ARS-2 percent) 1/ Poland Min( 50 percent of ARS, ARS-4 percent) Source: IMF/World Bank (2007). 1/ ARS = Weighted Average Return of the System Yearly Other considerations: Tax incentives for voluntary savings not very effective for lower income and liquidity constrained individuals. No evidence of an increase in overall savings while mixed evidence of impact on composition of savings Effectiveness of tax incentives depend on the substitutability of different savings alternatives. Nonsubstitutability could arise from the motivation for – – (i) precautionary savings if liquidity constrained (ii) bequest to heirs Strong distributional effects with benefits accruing to older and richer individuals who face higher marginal tax rates. Fiscal costs Industry structure: trending towards consolidation requiring a balance between competition in returns and scale economies to keep costs low 30 Number of Pension Fund Administrators 25 20 15 10 5 0 1993 1994 1995 1996 ARGENTINA EL SALVADOR URUGUAY 1997 BOLIVIA MÉXICO BULGARIA 1998 1999 2000 COLOMBIA PANAMÁ Kazakhstan 2001 2002 COSTA RICA PERÚ Poland 2003 2004 CHILE Dominican Rep. 2005 Minimizing fees and costs are important to ensure high net returns High fixed costs has more distributional impact on lowincome savers. Centralization of basic services with scale economies such as account management, collections. This is already the case in most CECs. Minimizing costs from regulatory burden (for reserves, reporting, etc) and initial marketing costs. Regulatory ceilings for fees on contributions/assets which decline over time as asset size grows. Balance the costs with high concentration in the industry. Financial Awareness Financial education and awareness particularly if given choice of portfolio Greater need if low-income savers Dynamic default portfolio for passive investors Public information including availability of simulation models to analyze potential net replacement rates at retirement Easy access to account information Transparency and Accountability of pension funds – Publication of investment results and financial statements Conclusions Share of pension savings in household balance sheets are relatively small but growing rapidly. Factors affecting pension fund savings – – – Pension reform, mandatory savings, fund performance, Macro/Structural factors Financial sector development Policy implications for pension fund regulations – – – – Enhancing coverage through mandatory forms of savings, default rules and other social safety nets Enhancing net risk-adjusted returns through increasing flexibility for diversification gains, Reducing costs by harnessing economies of scale and minimizing other burdens Investor protection through information and education