LIN1180 Semantics Lecture 5 Albert Gatt

Transcription

LIN1180 Semantics
Lecture 5
Albert Gatt
Theories of concepts I: Necessary and
sufficient conditions
 We considered the pros and cons of the classical theory of
concepts:
 Necessary and sufficient conditions
 MAN = [human, adult, male,...]
 No fuzziness: Some entity x is either an instance of concept C or
not
Semantics -- LIN 1180
Theories of concepts II: The causal theory
(Putnam, Kripke)
 Causal theory states that proper names identify individuals because of
some initial event in which the connection is set up
 Others “receive” the name and use it, even if they don’t know what
caused the association
 Some argue that nouns that denote natural kinds work the same way.
E.g. GOLD
 Someone must have discovered it and called it gold
 An expert would know exactly what it takes for a substance to qualify as
gold
 We don’t need to know, we simply use the term because of the original
“christening”
Some characteristics of these theories
 Both theories have little to say about fuzziness.
 They can’t really handle asymmetry:
 If x and y are both instances of a concept, then they are equally
good instances
Theories of concepts III: prototypes
 Extensively studied by psychologist Eleanor Rosch in the
1970’s.
 Central argument is that concepts have internal structure,
with some members being “better” than others.
 Example: BIRD:
 central/typical members (sparrow)
 have features typically associated with the concept (flies, has wings, has
feathers…)
 peripheral members (ostrich, penguin)
 There is a gradient from centre to periphery
Prototype example
Evidence I: Goodness of exemplar
 Experimental subjects are shown pictures of different things
of the same category (e.g. VEGETABLE)
 Asked to rate each one in terms of how good an example of the
category they are.
 E.g. carrot, turnip, cabbage, beetroot, lemon
 Subjects tend to be quite homogeneous in agreeing on what
typical and not-so-typical members are.
 (As long as they come from the same cultural group)
Evidence II: Prototype effects
 Order of mention: Under time pressure, when asked to list members of
a category, subjects tend to list the prototypical members first.
 Acquisition: prototypical members tend to be acquired first.
 Learning: kids learn new words faster if taught the meaning with
reference to the prototype.
 Reaction time: People judge statements of the form X is aY if X is typical
of Y than if it isn’t.
 Similarity ratings: Less representative examples are more similar to
more representative examples of a concept, than vice versa
 Mexico is more similar to the US than the US is to Mexico
 An ostrich is more similar to a sparrow than a sparrow is to an ostrich
Evidence III
 Generalisation:
 We tend to generalise easily from typical/representative to non-
typical examples.
 If a disease affects robins (typical), it could well affect ducks (atypical)
 But not so much the other way round
 If a disease affects ducks (atypical), we find it less likely for it to affect robins
 Family resemblances:
 Remember Wittgenstein on the concept of GAME?
 Rosch’s experiments show that people often categorise objects in
terms of similarity to some typical member of a category.
 FOOTBALL is a typical/salient instance of SPORT
 HANDBALL is less typical, but has some similarities to FOOTBALL
Consequences of prototypes
 Views concepts as having fuzzy boundaries
 some things might qualify as CHAIR, but they might not be
typical
 some things qualify as RED, but others are between RED and
PURPLE
In the remainder of this lecture
 We ask:
 What is the relationship between culture, language and thought?
 We contrast two theoretical stances:
 universalism
 relativity
Questions to think about
 Are languages simply vehicles for a common, universal
vocabulary of concepts, or do different languages embody
different worldviews?
 Can you think of words or expressions in your native
language that would be untranslatable into another language?
Part 1
Universalism vs. relativism
What’s the relationship between concepts,
language and thought?
 Strong Universalist view:
 The way we think is completely independent of language.
 Therefore, thought and concepts are largely independent of linguistic differences.
 Strong relativist view:
 Relativism: Language reflects the culture in which it is spoken.
 Cultural differences result in linguistic differences.
 Determinism: Language determines our way of thinking.
 Linguistic differences, reflecting cultural differences, result in differences in ways of thinking
and conceptualising the world.
A potted history of relativism (I)
 Herder (18th Century philosopher)
 “The human spirit thinks with words”
 “Talking is thinking aloud”
 Language and thought are one and the same; different languages
reflect different ways of thinking
 Humboldt (19th Century)
 “Each language contains a characteristic worldview”
 So languages do display different perspectives on the world.
A potted history of relativism (II)
 Edward Sapir viewed language as part of culture, shaping us and our world
views and thoughts:
 The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent
unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group . . . . We see and
hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language
habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir
1929)
 Sapir’s student Benjamin Lee Whorf took this further:
 “We cut nature up, organise it into concepts … because we are party to an
agreement … that holds through our speech community and is codified in
… our language” (Whorf, 1956)
Whorf’s relativism
 The Linguistic Relativity hypothesis suggests that language,
culture and thought are closely interlinked.
 This is largely reflected in the semantic structure of language.
 Whorf paid particular attention to how differences in
grammar give rise to different ways of thinking.
Time: an example from Whorf
 Whorf compared the conception of time in English and Hopi
(American Indian).
 English conceptualises recurrent phases like ordinary objects.
E.g.:
 we speak of 10 days as we do of 10 men
 Hopi has no equivalent of 10 days [sic].
 English: They stayed 10 days.
 Hopi: They stayed until the 11th day.
 English objectifies time in terms of units; Hopi conceptualises time in
terms of a stretch.
Time in English
 In English, time is a formless “substance” which is divided
into phases, periods etc.
 use of nouns for stretches of time (seasons etc): this summer; it is a hot
summer
 “time” is a substance, “contained” in these phases
 spatial metaphors for time: long, short, quick, slow…
 Whorf suggested that this leads to an objectifying tendency in
the way we think of abstractions like “time”.
Time in Hopi
 Hopi does not use nouns for phases. Most expressions are adverbials.
 emphasis on the relation between earlier and later and while
 The Hopi word for morning would be translated as while morning-phase is occurring.
 less tendency to use spatial metaphors
 more tendency to view time as a factor influencing things as they age or
change
 less tendency to identify events as single, individual occurrences
 Whorf suggested that this leads to more emphasis on the “subjective”
passing of time.
A potted history of universalism (I)
 Plato wondered how people knew so much when their contact with the
world was so brief and limited
 There must be something common to all humans.
 To Plato, all knowledge is universal and innate.
 The same view was adopted by Descartes in the 18th Century.
 This is the core of Chomsky’s definition of Plato’s problem.
 Since the 1950s, Chomsky has promoted the view that much of our
linguistic knowledge is innate and universal.
A potted history of universalism (II)
 Philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor has defended the universalist
view
 Language of thought hypothesis (Fodor, 1975):
 thought is independent of natural language
 it has its own “metalanguage”, which is universal, a kind of “mentalese”, which is innate
 therefore, the same structures of thought and meaning underlie all languages
 More recently, Fodor (1998) has argued that all concepts must be innate.
 Do you think the concept AEROPLANE or PTERANADON is something you’re born
with?
Why does this matter?
 It seems obvious that languages differ in the concepts they
encode as words.
 Equally “obvious” is the idea that a people will have developed
words that are most useful in their environment.
 At the same time, people in different cultures seem to have a
lot in common, biologically and psychologically.
 We would expect all languages to have words for food, drink, air,
person…
More recent positions
 Semanticists have tried to identify “core semantic universals” across languages:
 Basic vocabularies
 Universal principles of organisation
 …
 The less extreme view is that there is a lot which is shared, a “core vocabulary of
concepts”. There is also a lot which is not shared, because it depends on culture and
environment.
 But what is not shared can be defined in terms of the core vocabulary.
 This is the position advocated by Anna Wierzbicka, who has tried to identify cross-
linguistic differences in word-meaning, but insists that they can all be explicated using a
core, universal conceptual vocabulary.
What concepts should we look at?
 Researchers have investigated the relationship between
language and culture by focussing on core concepts
 basic perceptual categories (e.g. colour and shape)
 abstract mathematical concepts (e.g. number, quantifiers)
Part 2
Contemporary research: Studies of colour terms
The logic behind it

Question: If a language can’t distinguish a colour, will its
speakers fail to perceive it?

Reasoning:
1. assume all humans have the same basic physiological capacity to
perceive things
2. suppose language L1 has no word for RED
3. suppose speakers of L1 fail to perceive red
4. then, if speakers of L1 cannot perceive RED, it must be because their
language has a causal influence on their perception
Berlin and Kay (1969)
 Classic cross-linguistic study of colour terms.
 B & K compared several languages from unrelated families
 The question: is there a universal underlying pattern beneath
colour terms cross-linguistically?
 B&K’s answer: yes there is!
Basic colour terms
 B&K focused on basic terms, i.e. terms which:
 are monolexemic (e.g. black is ok; reddish-brown is not)
 are not hyponyms of other terms (e.g. red is basic, but scarlet is a
hyponym of red)
 are widely applicable (e.g. yellow, but not blonde)
 are not extensions of something manifesting the colour (e.g. gold and
faun are excluded)
Some cross-linguistic examples
 Dani (New Guinea): only two terms, one meaning broadly
light, the other dark
 Pomo (Ca, USA): three terms
 Tamil (India): 6 terms
 Lebanese Arabic, English: 10/11 terms
So what?
 B&K argued that the differences hide a fixed universal
pattern.
 a universal division of the colour spectrum into discrete categories
 Main claim:
 there are a few basic categories of colour terms
 categories are ordered in a hierarchy
 if a language has one category, it will also have categories lower down
 this is an implicational universal
The Berlin and Kay hierarchy
Dani (New Guinea): only black or white
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
white/black
Pomo (Hokan): black/white + red
red
Ibibio (Niger-Congo): black/ white + red
green/yellow
+ green
blue
Tzeltal (Mayan)
Tamil (Dravidian, India)
brown
purple/pink/orange/grey
English, etc.
B&K’s claims
 If a language has a system at a certain level, that system includes the systems
below it.
 e.g. Pomo has red, therefore it has black and white
 The hierarchy reflects a historical developmental process:
 English must have gone through the black/white, red, etc stages before
reaching its current state
 Implication:
 all speakers of all languages are capable of perceiving all colours (contra the
strong relativist claim)
 languages will develop more complex systems over time
Empirical validation
 Eleanor Rosch tested the B&K theory on speakers of Dani compared to
English speakers:
 Dani only has the black/white system
 Q: can they still perceive other colours and distinguish them?
 If so, then language does not determine our perception, at least for colour
 Result:
 in spite of linguistic differences, Dani and English speakers showed the same
pattern of errors in colour perception
 Rosch concluded that colour concepts are universal, but some languages have
lexicalised fewer of these
More recent challenges
 Sampson (2005) noted serious methodological flaws in the Berlin and Kay
study
 e.g. the data was collected from texts, by students with no knowledge of the
languages
 some of the results have since been questioned
 Davidoff (2001):
 new psychological studies on Berinmo speakers (New Guinea)
 these people divide the colour spectrum differently from English speakers
 division is according to their linguistic system
 e.g. their notion of blue includes some shades of purple and green, which
English speakers distinguish and have different words for, whereas Berinmo
don’t seem to.
Summary: the colour term debate
 The original claims by Berlin and Kay seemed reasonable,
but:
 the studies may have suffered from methodological flaws
 the jury is still out on whether colour perception is universal
and independent on language
Part 3
Contemporary research: Numerical cognition
The number sense

Rationale:
1.
Suppose language L2 only distinguishes quantities in a very
basic way

e.g. “one” vs. “many”
2.
Then, we can ask whether speakers of L2 are capable of
abstract quantitative reasoning like other speakers.
3.
If not, then there must be an influence of language over
mathematical cognition.
Peter Gordon’s work
 Gordon (2004):
 investigated these questions among the Piraha tribe in the
Amazon
 Piraha distinguishes “one”, “two” and “many”.
 No terms for “twenty”, “thirty-three”
 No recursive devices for forming complex numbers (“one
hundred and one” etc)
Some observations on Piraha
 The three words for “one”, “two” and “many” are used as
prototypes:
 hói (“one”): typically for one objects, but often also used for “a
few”
 hoí (“two”): typically for 2 objects, but also for “a relatively
small quantity greater than hói”
 aibaagi (“many”): for any number of objects which are “a lot”
Experimental task (example)
 7 participants in a matching task
 Experimenter sits opposite participant
 places a linear array of objects on a table
 participant has to match the array with his own objects
 (a kind of substitute for counting)
Matching task: results
 If the array consisted of between 1 and 3 objects, participants
were reasonably accurate.
 With greater numbers, performance became increasingly
inaccurate.
 Tendency became more pronounced with more complicated
versions of the task.
Gordon’s conclusions
 “The results of these studies show that the Piraha’s
impoverished counting system limits their ability to
enumerate exact quantities when set sizes exceed two or
three items.” (2004, p. 498)
Some reflections on Gordon (2004)
 Gordon’s study was restricted to a small set of individuals.
 Not very controlled environment.
 It has sparked off a considerable debate about:
 whether “all languages are equal”
 whether language has a “conditioning” effect on thought: Can
we not think things which we cannot name?
Some reflections on Gordon (2004)
 Gordon’s work goes beyond words:
 languages like English have simple number words (one, two…)
 but also grammatical systems which allow these words to be
combined (one hundred and one….)
 If Gordon’s observations are correct, then grammar may have
a role to play in thinking:
 grammar may be a way of combining simple concepts into complex
ones.
Next lecture
 We have now taken a tour of some of the theories and
debates surrounding concepts and representation.
 We begin a more in-depth investigation of:
 definitions of a word
 word meaning
 word senses

LIN1180 Semantics Lecture 5 Albert Gatt

Transcription

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