(appellate jurisdiction) civil appeal no: w-01(im)-367
Transcription
(appellate jurisdiction) civil appeal no: w-01(im)-367
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-01(IM)-367-09/2014 BETWEEN TEH GUAT HONG (NRIC NO. 790323-01-5610) … APPELLANT AND PERBADANAN TABUNG PENDIDIKAN TINGGI NASIONAL … RESPONDENT [In the matter of judicial review application no: 25-98-05/2014 In the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur] Between PERBADANAN TABUNG PENDIDIKAN TINGGI NASIONAL … PLAINTIFF And TEH GUAT HONG (NRIC NO. 790323-01-5610) … DEFENDANT CORAM: Hamid Sultan Bin Abu Backer, JCA Varghese a/l George Varughese, JCA Prasad Sandosham Abraham, JCA Decision Date: 12th March 2015 1 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Prasad Sandosham Abraham, JCA) [1] The appellant appeals against the decision of learned High Court judge who refused leave of the appellant to proceed with the judicial review application based on the preliminary objection of the respondent, on the grounds that the subject matter of the judicial review being sought is non-justiciable. The learned High Court judge has not provided the grounds for the said decision. We heard the appeal on 11-12-2014 and reserved judgment. [2] It is important to note that the respondent had not filed any affidavit in reply and the submission by the Senior Federal Counsel on behalf of the respondent ought to have been rejected by the High Court in limine. Brief Facts germane to this appeal [3] The appellant, now a graduate with first class honours in LLB from University of London, having pursued that degree at ATC College. To pursue the degree, the appellant was offered an education loan of RM47,875.00 by the respondent which was disbursed pursuant to a circular known as PTPTN Bilangan 1 Tahun 2002 (2002 Circular). Subsequently, the respondent had informed the appellant that her 2 results entitled her full exemption from repayment of the education loan pursuant to circular, known as Pekeliling PTPTN Bilangan 2 Tahun 2003 (2003 Circular). [4] The 2003 Circular in essence says that students with first class honours shall be exempted from the repayment of the loan. However it applies to Institusi Pendidikan Tinggi Swasta (IPTS) students, and it is limited to those who pursue courses that have obtained Certificate of Accreditation from the National Board of Accreditation (LAN). The appellant falls in the category of IPTS students. The appellant applied for exemption but was rejected. Subsequently, the respondent had informed the Public Complaints Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Department that the appellant’s application could not be processed because a certificate from LAN was not produced and if the certificate was produced the respondent will have no obstacle to consider the application. [5] The appellant obtained the LAN certificate from ATC and forwarded it to the respondent. Again the respondent rejected on the ground that the LAN accreditation was from year 27-02-2006 till 26-022011 and degree obtained earlier did not have the LAN certificate. The appellant appealed against that decision and the respondent informed 3 the appellant that the appeal will further be submitted to “Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Kutipan Balik Pembiayaan Pendidikan (MJKBPP)” for consideration. Finally the respondent dismissed the appeal. [6] The appellant says in the 2005 Circular that the respondent recognizes that the absence of LAN certificate does not mean the courses provided by the private colleges are not approved by LAN and the loan application can still be made so long as they are made before 1st July 2006. In the instant case, the LAN certificate was issued to ATC on 27-02-2006 and has met with the deadline set in the 2005 Circular. [7] The appellant’s complaint is that the 2003 Circular does not state when the accreditation must be obtained and it was wrong for the respondent to interpret it to include the words ‘during the time the appellant was undergoing her studies’. The appellant says, the interpretation is inconsistent with public policy, the 2002 Circular and Surat Pekeliling PTPTN Bilangan 1 Tahun 2005 (2005) circulars and in consequence the decision is irrational and unreasonable. In addition, the appellant says that there was a legitimate expectation that the respondent would not renege on its previous policy and that the appellant would be given an opportunity to be heard before the decision was made. 4 [8] The learned Federal Counsel for the respondent says, (i) the relationship between the appellant arises out of a contract; (ii) 2003 Circular has no legislative effect and is administrative in nature. The circular was not issued based on Akta Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional 1997; (iii) the policy made by the respondent in its administration is not justiciable; (iv) there is non-disclosure of material facts and evidence. Findings of Courts [9] This is an appeal in respect of an application for leave for judicial review. It was not necessary to go into the merits of the case at the leave stage because the threshold to establish whether leave should be granted is very low. I refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Jerry Wa Dusing & Anor V. Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [2014] 9 CLJ 321 in particular to the judgment of Her Ladyship, Justice Tengku Maimun JCA found at page 336 at para 22 and I quote: “Finally, we take note that this appeal is in respect of an application for leave for judicial review where the threshold is very low. There is no necessity to go into the merits of the case at the leave stage. The test is to see whether the appellants had an arguable case and that the application is not 5 frivolous (see Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 927). We find that the appellant had passed the threshold, for leave to be granted.” (Emphasis added) The test was to see whether the appellants had an arguable case and that the application was not frivolous. [10] The test whether the appellant had an arguable case and that the application is not frivolous has been laid down in Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 927, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) stated: “…the High Court should not go into the merits of the case at the leave stage. Its role is only to see if the application for leave is frivolous. If, for example, the applicant is a busybody, or the application is made out of time or against a person or body that is immunised from being impleaded in legal proceedings then the High Court would be justified in refusing leave in limine. So too will the court be entitled to refuse leave if it is a case where the subject matter of the review is one which by settled law (either written law or the common law) is nonjusticiable, e.g., proceedings in Parliament (see Art. 63 of the Federal Constitution).” (Emphasis added) 6 [11] The respondent, had raised preliminary objections on the grounds that the subject matter being sought for judicial review is non-justiciable. The said Federal Counsel for the respondent submitted in summary that the appellant intended to challenge the policy made by the Respondent in its administration, which is not justiciable for judicial intervention. The Appellant in her application seeks this Court intervention to declare that the narrow interpretation of ‘Pekeliling PTPTN Bil. 2 Tahun 2003’ as not being fair and to move this Court to interpret and to include the appellant within the scope of the ‘Pekeliling’. The requirement and condition imposed in the ‘Pekeliling’ is within the policy making process of the Respondent to determine its applicability. The related prayers in this application are not justiciable for judicial review because it involves a challenge against policy consideration in which for this matter, it is totally within the best knowledge of the respondent to determine. [12] The stand taken for the appellant is that: (1) The issue of justiciability can be decided at the leave stage purely to pass the threshold for leave. (2) The decision is justiciable and amenable for Judicial Review. 7 [13] The appellant submitted that the decision is justiciable and amenable for judicial review because it contains sufficient elements of public law for the following reasons: a) the 2003 Circular (under which the Decision was made) has legislative effect and is a subsidiary legislation; b) the 2003 Circular (under which the Decision was made) is an administrative quasi-legislation; c) the Decision was made by a public body having public consequences that infringes upon the rights of the Applicant. [14] The issue that need to be determined in the instant appeal is whether the executive’s discretion, whether by statute or prerogative is amenable to judicial review. [15] In my view, the 2003 Circular is made pursuant to s.19 and/or s.20 of the PTPTN Act which authorised both the Minister and Perbadanan to enact the said Circular. In Laguna Be Bay Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Subang Jaya [2014] 7 MLJ 545 the Applicant was challenging a decision made pursuant to a circular issued by the 8 Selangor State Secretary relating to the construction of billboards. Judicial review was allowed and it was held that: “s.9 of the Local Government Act 1976 (“LGA “) empowers the state authority to give directions to local authorities. The circular was a direction under s.9 of the LGA.” The provision in s.9 of the LGA is similar to s.19 of the PTPTN Act. The court in Laguna Be Bay recognises that a circular is an instrument enacted and permitted under statute and has legislative effect. As such, the decision made pursuant to the circular was capable of judicially review or is an issue to be canvassed on the full hearing of judicial review. Hence, I agree that the Respondent’s source of power in making the Decision derives ultimately from the PTPTN Act because the 2003 Circular was enacted under the PTPTN Act. [16] The 2003 Circular can be characterised as an administration quasi legislation which are subject to judicial review. The 2003 Circular is a public document and is intended to be made known to the public. This can be seen where the same was published on the Respondent’s website. The 2003 Circular was also intended to bind the students who 9 had an education loan from the Respondent and the Respondent itself. If the 2003 Circular was not intended to bind the public, the Respondent would not have made the Decision, however wrong, by referring or relying to the 2003 Circular. When an instrument has ‘force of law’, it is regarded as a subsidiary legislation and is binding on the parties. [17] The respondent also put in argument that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent was contractual in nature and therefore is regulated by private law. Reference is made to the Federal Court’s decision in Ahmad Jefri bin Mohd Jahri @ Md Johari v. Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Others [2010] 5 CLJ 865; [2010] 3 MLJ 145, where it was held that even though the relationship between the appellant and respondent is contractual in nature, the Federal Court found that the appellant’s claim was based solely on public law. The Federal Court held and I quote:“Thus, the decision to dismiss the appellant was made under a statutory law by a body who acted within the scope of such statutory power. Though the decision involves the dismissal of an employee by an employer, much like a master dismissing his servant, which is a private law matter, the fact that there are statutory conditions and restrictions imposed by the Regulations on the conduct and dismissal of the appellant underpins the public law element in this case... Here, a special statutory provision bearing directly upon the rights of a public authority to 10 dismiss the appellant. This injects the element of public law necessary in this context to attract the remedies of administrative law making this case amenable for judicial review.” [18] Thus, the decision by the respondent was made under a statutory law by a body who acted within the scope of such statutory power. 2003 Circular gives rights to individuals to obtain waiver and imposes obligations on the public authority to grant the waiver. [19] As stated in the case of Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors at the leave stage, merits of the case shouldn’t be considered and the test to grant leave would be whether the case is arguable and it is not frivolous. In the instant appeal, the decision by the respondent was made by a body exercising its public function on a public law matter and thus amenable for judicial review. On the facts, it was right to conclude that there was an arguable case. The learned judge was wrong in refusing to exercise his discretion in granting leave. [20] In George John v. Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319, his Lordship Lim Beng Choon J, with whom I agree described in crisp language the approach the court should take at the leave stage where he said: 11 “At the outset, it is very significant to take note that the application in the instant proceeding is not one for an order of certiorari but rather for leave to apply for such an order. On principle and authority, I am of the view that at this stage of the proceeding, the court is required only to inquire whether the matter to be decided by the court is not in fact frivolous and vexatious in the sense that it is a trivial complaint of an administrative error by a busybody with a misguided sentiment and misconception of the law. Another requirement at this stage of the proceeding which a court has to consider is that the applicant must produce sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case that a public officer or authority that made the decision had acted unlawfully or that he or it had in its exercise of the administrative discretion acted ultra vires the power given to him or it under the relevant statute. If the court is satisfied that the applicant has complied with these two requirements, leave would usually be granted irrespective of whether the applicant has suffered no greater injury than thousands of the King's subjects.” (Emphasis added) [21] I find that this threshold has been met by the appellant. Whilst we are unanimous in allowing the appeal, I take the view the appeal should be confined to the sole issue of whether leave for judicial review should have been granted or not. As I adopt that stand, I am therefore constrained to encapsulate my views in a separate grounds of judgment. 12 [22] As a matter of observation, I note that there is a growing trend to deal with applications for leave for judicial review on an inter parte basis although the rules, be it the 1980 Rules of High Court and the Rules of Court 2012 provide that such an application shall be made ex parte, although the cause papers are to be served on the Attorney General. It is perhaps opportune to remind ourselves of the dictum of His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr. (as he then was) in the case of Tuan Haji Sarip v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442 the decision of the Supreme Court, at p 449 of the judgment, where His Lordship quoted with approval the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Rukshanda Begum [1990] COD 107, as to the approach to be taken for leave for judicial review and I quote: “(i) The judge should grant leave if it is clear that there is a point for further investigation on a full inter partes basis with all such evidence as is necessary on the facts and all such argument as is necessary on the law. (ii) If the judge is satisfied that there is no arguable case he should dismiss the application for leave to move for judicial review. (iii) If on considering the papers, the judge comes to the conclusion that he really does not know whether there is or is not an arguable case, the right course is for the judge to invite the putative respondent to attend and make representations as 13 to whether or not leave should be granted. That inter partes leave hearing should not be anywhere near so extensive as a full substantive judicial review hearing. The test to be applied by the judge at that inter partes leave hearing should be analogous to the approach adopted in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal against an arbitrator’s award, ... namely: if, taking account of a brief argument on either side, the judge is satisfied that there is a case fit for further consideration, then he should grant leave.” It would follow therefore that an application for leave as a norm should be dealt with on an ex parte basis, save and except for the exceptions set out in that portion of the judgment referred to aforesaid and where the circumstances of the case require the presence of the respondent. However that should be an exception rather than the norm. [23] For reasons stated above, I take the view the appeal must be allowed with no order as to costs. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Leave for judicial review is granted and the application for judicial review is to be heard on its merits. I hereby so order. 14 Dated: 12th Mac 2015 Signed [DR. PRASAD SANDOSHAM ABRAHAM] Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya For Appellant: Irwin Lo Chi Vui Messrs. Lo Chambers Advocates & Solicitors 13A-6, Menara 1 Mont Kiara No. 1, Jalan Kiara Mont Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur. For Respondent: Khairul Fazly bin Kamarudin Senior Federal Counsel Attorney General’s Chambers Civil Division, Level 3, Block C3 Complex C Federal Government Centre of Administration 62512 Putrajaya. 15 Cases Referred To: 1. Laguna Be Bay Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Subang Jaya [2014] 7 MLJ 545 (referred) 2. Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 927 (referred) 3. George John v. Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319 (referred) 4. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Rukshanda Begum [1990] COD 107 (referred) 5. Tuan Haji Sarip v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442 (referred) 6. Jerry Wa Dusing & Anor V. Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [2014] 9 CLJ 321 (referred) Legislation Referred To: 1. PTPTN Bilangan 1 Tahun 2002 2. Pekeliling PTPTN Bil. 2 Tahun 2003 3. Surat Pekeliling PTPTN Bilangan 1 Tahun 2005 4. Akta Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional 1997 16