Options Paper for Marine Licensing in Victoria

Transcription

Options Paper for Marine Licensing
in Victoria
For Marine Safety Regulations 2011
This publication is copyright. No part may be reproduced by any process
except in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
© State of Victoria 2011
Authorised by the Victorian Government,
121 Exhibition St, Melbourne Victoria 3000
If you would like to receive this publication in an accessible format, such as large print
or audio please telephone Public Affairs Branch, Department of Transport on (03) 9655 6000.
www.transport.vic.gov.au
Contents
Introduction
5
Chapter 1. Marine licensing in Victoria
and the outcomes of current
licensing arrangements
9
1.1
Background
9
1.1.1
Purpose of marine licensing
9
1.1.2
Current Victorian marine
licensing scheme
9
Licensing under the Marine Safety
Act 2010
9
1.1.3
Chapter 2. The Basic Marine Licence
37
2.1
Background
37
2.1.1
National Guidelines
37
2.1.2
Current marine license and PWC
endorsement testing
37
2.1.3
The Marine Safety Act 2010
38
2.2
What could a best practice
assessment model look like?
40
2.2.1
Practical on-water testing
40
2.2.2
Logged experience
40
2.2.3
Practical training
41
2.2.4
Knowledge testing
41
2.3
Items which the basic license
needs to address
41
2.3.1
Reduce incidents caused by
human factors
41
Increase competencies of recreational
vessel masters
41
2.3.3
Enable targeted interventions
42
2.4
Evidence indicating that outcomes
from general boating point to issues
with the general boating license.
42
1.1.4
Progression of competence
10
1.2
Applicants and vessel numbers
10
1.2.1
Changes in applicant profiles
10
1.2.2
Number of registered vessels
11
1.3
Human factors as main causal
factors for incidents, accidents
and death
12
1.4
Data
12
1.4.1
Victorian exposure, injury and
death data
12
Victorian vessel and person
exposure information
13
1.4.3
Incident types 15
2.5
Options for licence testing reform
43
1.4.4
Incident causes
16
2.5.1
1.4.5
Fatalities
17
Option 1 – Theory test only –
status quo
44
2.5.2
Option 2 – Improved knowledge
test split-score model
45
1.4.2
1.4.6
Injuries
20
1.4.7
Insurance company data
26
1.4.8
Conclusions from the data
27
1.4.9
Risk-based assessment of hazards
27
1.5
Means to deliver licensing
28
1.5.1
What should a licence test?
28
1.5.2
National Competencies
28
1.5.3
Training and Assessment Methods
28
1.6
Conclusion
33
1.7
Relative exposure to risk, a
comparison between marine and
road fatality rates
33
1.7.1
Comparison of vessel/vehicle
fatality rates.
33
1.8
Summary
34
2.3.2
Contents
1
2.5.3
2.5.4
2.5.5
46
Option 4 – Theory test and mandatory
on-water assessment
47
Option 5 – Mandatory on-water
training course with practical and
theory assessments
48
2.6
Options Summary
49
2.7
Restricted licences and learners
51
2.8
Cost-benefit assessment of options
52
2.9
Summary of general marine
licence options
53
Recommendation
54
2.10
2
Option 3 - Theory test and either
supervised practical experience
documented through a log book
or a practical training course
3.7.7
Option 3 - Improved PWC information
via DVD or similar mechanism with
improved knowledge test based on this
information and a practical assessment 70
3.7.8
Summary of options
70
3.7.9
Cost Benefit Analysis
72
3.7.10
Case for PWC endorsement
improvements
74
3.7.11
Recommendation
74
3.8
Offshore operations endorsement
75
3.8.1
Nature and extent of problem
75
3.8.2
Indicators of recreational vessel risk
in Victorian coastal waters
77
3.8.3
Injury Data
81
3.8.4
Objectives of regulation
81
3.8.5
Bow tie exercises and analysis
81
3.8.6
Summary
84
3.8.7
Options
84
3.8.8
Recommendation
84
3.8.9
Available practical courses with
offshore components
85
3.9
High speed vessel endorsement
85
3.9.1
85
3.9.2
Injury and fatality trends citing speed
as a contributing factor
85
3.9.3
Stakeholder comment
87
3.9.4
Elements identified as requirements
for a high speed endorsement
87
Possible elements for inclusion in
an endorsement
88
Chapter 3. Licence Endorsements
57
3.1
Background
57
3.2
Risk assessment
57
3.3
Regulatory control of risk
57
3.4
Determining whether an
endorsement is the preferred option
58
3.5
Suggested Endorsements
58
3.5.1
Personal Water Craft operation
58
3.5.2
Offshore operations
58
3.5.3
High speed vessels
58
3.5.4
Towed water sports
58
3.5.5
Vessels carrying more than
12 passengers
59
3.6
Endorsement assessment
59
3.6.2
Cost benefit assessments
59
3.7
Personal Water Craft (PWC)
Endorsement
3.9.6
88
60
3.9.7
Summary
88
3.7.1
60
3.9.8
Options
89
3.7.2
National and international comparisons 60
3.9.9
Recommendation
89
3.7.3
PWC incidents, fatality and injury trends 61
3.10
Towing Endorsement
90
3.7.4
Options
69
3.10.1
90
3.7.5
Option 1 - Base case
69
3.10.2
3.7.6
Option 2 - Improved PWC information with
improved knowledge test based
on this information
69
Current Regulations –
State by State
90
3.10.3
Towed water sport incidents, fatality
and injury trends
91
3.9.5
Options Paper for Marine Licensing in Victoria – For Marine Safety Regulations 2011
3.10.4
3.10.5
3.10.6
Causes/mechanisms of injury and
potential risk/contributory factors
to injury
93
Contributory factors to injury:
self reported 95
The number and duration of hospital
admissions for towed sports 96
Appendix 1: Stakeholder feedback
on the current licensing
framework
115
Appendix 2: Recreational Boat
Operator Licensing
Schemes within Australia
119
Appendix 3: Analysis of the current
Victorian licensing scheme
129
3.10.7
MUARC survey
101
3.10.8
Exposure
101
3.10.9
101
Appendix 4: Bow tie analysis
133
3.10.10 Options
101
Appendix 5: Offshore requirements 155
3.10.11 Risk assessment
103
3.10.12 Cost Benefit Analysis
103
Appendix 6: Cost benefit analysis
and the identification of
feasible solutions 159
Present value of benefits
168
Present value of costs
169
Benefit Cost Ratios
170
Modifications to the basic BCR results
172
177
183
3.10.13 Summary of towed water sport options 105
3.10.14 Case for towed water sport
endorsement improvements
105
3.10.15 Arguments against a separate licence
endorsement for towing activities
106
3.10.16 Recommendation
106
Endorsement for operators of
vessels capable of carrying more
than 12 passengers
107
Appendix 7: Relative exposure to risk,
a comparison between
marine and road incidents
3.11.1
107
Glossary
3.11.2
Experience from other jurisdictions
109
3.11.3
Incident data in relation to large
vessels with high number
of passengers
109
Victorian recreational vessels over
8 metres 109
3.11.5
Stakeholder comment
110
3.11.6
Commercial qualifications for these
types of vessels
110
3.11.7
110
3.11.8
Identified knowledge and skill
requirements
110
Summary
112
3.11
3.11.4
3.11.9
3.11.10 Options
112
113
Contents
3
4
Introduction
Background
Purpose of this paper
The Department of Transport (DOT) has been
conducting a review of Victoria’s transport policy and
legislation since 2004. The review has covered all
transport modes, and broadly seeks to establish an
integrated and sustainable transport system. As a
result of the review, new legislation reflecting current
regulatory best practices is being adopted for each
transport mode.
This paper outlines how marine licensing is currently
managed in Victoria, and how it could be improved.
It aims to promote discussion and debate, to provide
valuable information to the DOT in developing a
licensing scheme which is directly focussed on
improving safety outcomes.
As part of this process, DOT has conducted a
comprehensive examination and analysis of the
legislation governing the marine industry in Victoria.
The review led to the development and passage by
Parliament of a new Marine Safety Act 2010 (the Act),
to come into effect before July 2012.
In regard to licensing, the review identified the need
to examine the effectiveness of marine licensing as
part of the overall marine safety regulatory framework.
Feedback obtained during consultation suggested
that the current means of obtaining a recreational
boat operator licence may not meet the objective of
ensuring licensed operators are competent to drive
boats safely.
This paper presents a range of options for
development of a licensing scheme. No decision on
which option, if any, to adopt has yet been made. This
is because DOT is keen to receive feedback from
people directly involved in the marine sector before
proposing any changes to the licensing scheme,
including any proposed decision about the timing of
such changes.
DOT will carefully consider the feedback, together
with the analysis presented in this paper, to determine
if any change to the present licensing scheme is
warranted. The objective is to strengthen the licensing
scheme so that it improves the safety of recreational
boating and meets the expectations of Government,
the marine industry and the boating community.
In addition, the review identified that certain marine
activities or particular vessel types were of themselves
hazardous and that the licensing scheme could be
an effective means of improving safety outcomes for
those activities or vessel types.
Introduction
5
Structure of this paper
The paper is divided into 4 parts:
ff Part One contains background information on
licensing, and data on incidents, injuries and
fatalities. It also sets out analysis based on risk
assessments carried out during the course of
several stakeholder and public workshops.
ff Part Two outlines the case for a change to the
basic marine licence and discusses various
licence delivery options. For those options
considered most feasible, a cost benefit
analysis has been conducted.
ff Part Three discusses the five activities and/
or vessel types where endorsements have
been suggested as ways to improve safety
outcomes. Evidence to support each of
the suggested endorsements is listed and
analysed, together with alternatives for how the
endorsement could be obtained in practice.
ff Part Four contains appendices with the
information used to support or amplify the
core parts of the paper.
Have your say
Feedback is sought on the contents of this paper.
Submissions are required to be made in writing and
can be emailed to:
ff [email protected]
or posted to:
Marine Safety Regulations
Department of Transport
GPO Box 2797
Melbourne VIC 3001
Australia
Please note that all submissions will be treated as public information
unless you request otherwise.
Submissions will be published on the Department of Transport website
unless you clearly indicate that you would like all or part of your
submission not to be published.
Any content considered to be defamatory, vilifying or otherwise
inappropriate will not be published.
You should be aware that all submissions are subject to the Freedom of
Information Act 1982.
Personal information may be used to contact you regarding your
submission and/or the outcomes of the consultation. Please clearly state
in your submission if you do not wish for this to occur.
6
7
8
Chapter 1. Marine licensing in Victoria and the
outcomes of current licensing arrangements
1.1
Background
1.1.1
Purpose of marine licensing
Marine licensing seeks to ensure that people in
charge or command of recreational vessels have
a minimum required level of knowledge, skill and
experience to support the safe operation of the vessel
and an adequate awareness of the risks involved.
1.1.2
Current Victorian marine
licensing scheme
Licensing in Victoria was introduced by the Marine
(Amendment) Act 2000, which established the
following licenses and endorsements for powered
recreational vessels:
ff General operator licence (section 116)
ff Restricted operator licence (12-15 years of age
inclusive) (section 117)
ff Personal watercraft (PWC) endorsement
(section 118)
Applicants are required to undertake and satisfactorily
complete a knowledge test. Those requiring the
PWC endorsement must sit a further knowledge test.
Applicants have the option of doing this in one of
two ways:
ff pass a multiple choice test paper administered
by VicRoads, or
ff attend an authorised training course and
pass an equivalent multiple choice test,
administered by a registered training provider.
1.1.3
Licensing under the Marine Safety
Act 2010
Under the Marine Safety Act 2010, the purposes of
licensing are specifically listed. They include seeking
to ensure that people who are in command or in
charge of a vessel are:
ff competent; and
ff aware of safe operating procedures and
relevant marine safety laws.
The figure below shows this existing framework.
Un-powered vessel operators are not required hold a
licence or endorsement.
Figure 1 - Current recreational vessel
licensing scheme
Marine Act 1988
Section 10A
Recreational Boat
Operator Licence
(including Restricted
Licences)
PWC Endorsement
Chapter 1. Marine licensing in Victoria and the outcomes of current licensing arrangements 9
Competence
There are numerous interpretations of ‘competent’.
For example:
• The Australian Qualification Training Framework
(AQTF) definition of competency used in the
Vocational Education Training (VET) context is “the
consistent application of knowledge and skill to the
standard of performance required in the workplace.
It embodies the ability to transfer and apply skills
and knowledge to new situations and environments”.
• The Macquarie Dictionary definition of competent
is “properly qualified; capable; fitting, suitable, or
sufficient for the purpose; adequate”.
1.1.4
Progression of competence
The diagram below illustrates that four stages of
competence are generally recognised. This model is
based on both the competency of the person and the
person’s knowledge of their level of competency.
Figure 2 - Conscious competence learning model
1. Unconscious
Incompetence
The person is not aware
of the existence or
relevance of the skill area
3. Unconscious
Competence
The skill becomes so
practised that it enters
the unconscious parts of
the brain – it becomes
‘second nature’
2. Conscious
Incompetence
The person becomes
aware of the existence
and relevance of the
skill and their deficiency
in this area
4. Conscious
Competence
The person will need
to concentrate and
think in order to
perform the skill
The Victorian knowledge test currently focuses on
having knowledge suitable for the purpose of being
able to demonstrate the competence to safely
operate a recreational vessel. This most closely aligns
with the second stage in the model of competence,
‘conscious incompetence’. The skill and experience
elements essential to progress to the next stage of
‘conscious competence’ are not provided for within
the current Victorian testing regime.
10
In contrast, the Western Australian ‘Skippers Ticket’
assessment requires a person to ‘demonstrate’
a set of tasks which are clearly described in the
assessment reading material as being essential to
safely operate a vessel. This allows the applicant
to prepare for the assessment with a clear
understanding of the specifics and the standards they
must achieve. This assessment method aligns to the
third stage, ‘conscious competence’. This approach is
consistent with the approach used for issuing licences
for the operation of motor vehicles.
Most licensing schemes in Australia test for operating
competencies somewhere between these two levels.
The competency of operators in Victoria could
be improved by increasing the level of testing
to raise operator standards to the level of
‘conscious competence’.
1.2
Applicants and
vessel numbers
1.2.1
Changes in applicant profiles
When marine licensing commenced in Victoria, the
majority of people attending courses and VicRoads
tests for licences were recreational vessel operators
with many years of experience and knowledge.
They had little trouble passing the required test.
More recently, there has been a marked change in the
mix of people wanting to gain a recreational boating
licence. There is now a much higher percentage of
inexperienced, less knowledgeable and less skilled
people wanting to operate recreational vessels and
PWCs. Additionally, with the growth in recreational
pleasure boating, the number of family groups
attending the courses has shown a marked increase.
This change increases the likelihood of less skilled
new masters operating recreational vessels on
Victorian waters.
Recreational vessels and user groups
A recreational vessel is a vessel that is used, or
intended to be used, for a recreation or sport, and
not for hire or reward. Common types of recreational
vessels are powered boats, PWC (otherwise referred to
as jet skis or power skis), yachts, kayaks and canoes.
1.2.2
Number of registered vessels
It is estimated that there are an additional 35,000 to
40,000 un-powered recreational vessels which are not
required to be registered. These include un-powered
yachts, kayaks, canoes, row boats, sail boats,
sailboards and other types of wind powered vessels.
These are not covered by any licensing scheme.
There are approximately 170,000 registered
recreational vessels in Victoria. On average,
compounding year to year, the number of registered
recreational vessels has grown around 2.5%
per annum.
The development of the Marine Safety Act 2010
included the production of a discussion paper on
options for the Act including licensing options1.
One option was whether there was support , and any
reason, for, the introduction of licensing for nonpowered vessels. The results of this consultation did
not support the expansion of licensing to include
operators of these vessel types, and this matter will
not be pursued by Government.
The fastest growing category is PWCs. These now
number approximately 14,000, compared with 4,665
in 2003.
The vast majority of registered vessels are relatively
small in size, being less than 4.8 metres in length.
Most cabin cruisers (62%), trailer sailers (91%)
and most half cabin cruisers (68%) are between
4.8 metres and 8 metres in length, while 51% of
yachts are between 8 metres and 12 metres in
length. By contrast, 73% of open vessels are less
than 4.8 metres in length. Indeed, more than 50% of
the registered fleet are open type vessels less than
4.8 metres in length.
Note: number of registered vessels
The number of registered vessels within Victoria varies both as an
increase over time and cyclically over annual periods; therefore there is
no definitive number of registered vessels. Unless specified elsewhere the
value used in this paper is 170,000.
The main types of recreational vessels, according to
an analysis of registration data on 21 March 2011,
are listed in the table below. Percentages of vessel
types used throughout this paper (excepting the
specific discussion on exposure) use the values in
this table.
The passenger carrying capacity of vessels less
than 4.8 metres is (at maximum) five persons.
For vessels less than 3 metres, the maximum number
of persons safely accommodated is two. Vessels of
8 metres in length can be expected to accommodate
approximately twelve persons, but this depends on
the type of vessel and its attributes. Vessels over
8 metres in length can be expected to accommodate
more than twelve persons, but again, this depends on
the type of vessel and its attributes.
1
Improving Marine Safety in Victoria. Review of the Marine Act 1988.
Department of Transport (Vic), July 2009
Table 1 – Victorian registration data as at 21 March 2011
Vessel type
0-4.8m
4.8-8m
8-12m
Greater
than 12m
Total
Percentage
of Total
Cabin Cruiser
223
3375
1657
487
5742
3%
Canoe
49
5
0
0
54
0%
Half Cabin
8238
18235
246
77
26796
16%
Houseboat
6
40
61
551
658
0%
Hovercraft
725
50
1
1
777
0%
Open
86562
31514
214
159
118449
69%
PWC
13874
128
2
5
14009
8%
120
2135
98
3
2356
1%
1
0
1
0%
Trailer Sailer
Windsurfer
0
Yacht
103
810
1340
342
2595
2%
Total
109900
56292
3620
1625
171437
100%
1.3
Human factors as
main causal factors for
incidents, accidents
and death
Causal factors for marine safety incidents can be
grouped according to whether they are human,
environmental or material. While there is some
peripheral scope to address environmental or
material factors with training as part of licensing,
the main focus of a licensing regime is to reduce the
numbers and severity of incidents caused by human
factors, such as lack of knowledge or skills and
inconsiderate behaviour.
1.4
Data
1.4.1
Victorian exposure, injury and
death data
The key data sets currently available in Victoria to
assess the exposure to, frequency and causes of,
marine incidents are as follows:
ff Exposure to recreational boating data
collected by the Monash University Accident
Research Centre (MUARC).
ff Marine Incident Database (MID) which records
incidents reported by the Marine Incident
Reporting System (MIR system) managed
by Transport Safety Victoria. This includes all
incidents reported by the Water Police and
Search and Rescue organisations.
Knowledge and skills can be addressed through
education and training but behavioural problems,
such as misuse of alcohol and drugs and deliberately
taking risks that can endanger lives or cause
injury, are less likely to be affected by respond to
education or training and are better addressed by
other measures.
ff National Coroners Information System (NCIS)
which records details of coroner reports of
boating related fatalities.
ff Hospital emergency department data
recorded on the Victorian Emergency
Minimum Dataset (VEMD).
Examples of human factors include:
ff Operator inattention or improper lookout,
which can cause a collision with another
vessel, object or person in the water.
ff Overloading of a vessel which increases
the chance of flooding or capsize leading to
drowning or hypothermia.
ff Improper anchoring which can result in
capsizing the vessel leading to drowning.
ff Rules infraction which is likely to result
in endangering the vessel, safety of the
passengers and other property.
ff Not wearing a PFD which can result
in drowning.
ff Inability to prevent or manage fire on board
thus putting the passengers and property
at risk.
ff Inconsiderate behaviour and deliberate risk
taking which can cause injures, fatalities, and
endanger property as well as bystanders.
ff Hospital Admissions data recorded on the
Victorian Admitted Episodes Dataset (VAED).
ff Insurance company incident data.
In recent years, the MUARC has produced an annual
report for Marine Safety Victoria analysing these
data sets. The most recent annual report covers the
2008/09 financial year2. MUARC has also written a
5 year report covering injuries and incidents for the
years 2003/04 to 2007/083.These reports analyse all
the above datasets and provide insight into the nature
of incidents, their probable causes and the types of
injuries caused over a longer period.
The Department of Transport commissioned MUARC
to update the hospital treated injury information
contained in the 5 year report to encompass the most
recently available data from 2009/9 and 2009/104.
The following tables and discussions are drawn from
the data contained within these reports.
ff Alcohol or drug use which reduces the ability
to operate the vessel in a safe and proper
manner, endangering passengers and other
vessels, and which increases the chance of
taking risks.
12
2
Monash University Accident Research Centre Marine Safety in Victoria July 2008 to June 2009. Published by Marine Safety Victoria 2010
3
Ashby K and Cassell E (2009). Marine Safety in Victoria - 5 years report
2003/4 – 2007/8. Report to Marine Safety Victoria
4
Kerr, E, Ashby K and Cassell E (2011). Marine Safety in Victoria
Hospital-Treated Recreational Boating Injury 2008/9 to 2009/10. Report to
Department of Transport, Victoria
1.4.2
Victorian vessel and person
exposure information
MUARC recently drafted an unreleased report on the
exposure of Victorian Boaters to risks associated with
recreational boating5. The following information and
tables summarise the type of craft used in recreational
use and their frequency of use. The categories of
vessels mentioned are similar to those used in the
Victorian recreational vessel register.
Note: number of registered vessels
Note that the number of registered vessels used in the exposure report
by MUARC is 151,519, which is smaller than the number used in this
discussion paper of 170,000. For the analysis of data relating to the
exposure report, 151,519 continue to be used. When used in conjunction
with other data the proportionate values from the report is maintained with
the 170,000 used in the calculations.
1.4.2.1
Estimated exposure for all registered
recreational vessels in the year ended
30 September 2009
In the 12 months ended 30 September 2009,
there were an estimated 151,519 registered powered
recreational vessels in Victoria. The distribution
of vessels covered by returned surveys (termed
‘surveyed vessels’) was very similar to their
distribution on the VicRoads Vessel Register for
all vessel types except PWCs, which were underrepresented, and trailer sailers, which were
over-represented.
Open boats made up the largest group of registered
vessels (70.7%), followed by half cabin cruisers
(16.0%), PWC (6.3%) and full cabin cruisers (3.6%).
The remainder (3.4%) comprised trailer sailers (1.5%),
yachts (1.5%) and hovercraft (0.4%).
Registered powered recreational vessels in Victoria
took an estimated 913,002 trips and an estimated
2.21 million person-trips in the 12 months ended
30 September 2009, an average of 6.0 trips and
14.6 person trips per vessel. In total, vessels spent
5.68 million hours and 14.26 million person-hours
on the water over the 12 months, an average of
37.5 hours and 91.4 person-hours per registered
vessel. (Person trips and person hours are defined in
the glossary).
5
1.4.2.2
Exposure by vessel type
Open boats, the most popular registered vessel,
accounted for most of the trips (62.2%, n=568,128)
and person-trips (61.8%, n=1.37m) taken by powered
recreational vessels in the 12 months. However they
contributed only around half of total vessel hours
(50.4%, 2.86m) and person hours (48.9%, 6.98m)
spent on water. This discrepancy is largely explained
by the lower average number of persons on board
and time spent on the water per trip by open boats
compared with full cabin cruisers, which accounted
for a disproportionately high amount of the total
number of hours and person-hours spent on water by
all vessels in the 12 months.
Half-cabin cruisers, the second most popular
registered vessels (16.0%), accounted for the second
highest proportion of all trips (20.3%, n=185,371) and
person-trips (18.5%, n=408,280) taken, and all hours
(19.5%, 1.11m) and person-hours (17.4%,2.48m)
spent on water. Their proportion of exposure on each
measure was around expectations, based on their
representation on the recreational vessel register.
PWC comprised 6.3% of registered vessels and
accounted for 5.0% of vessel trips (n=46,018), 3.7%
of person-trips (n=82,844), 4.0% of on-water hours
(n=225,910) and 3.0% of person on water hours
(422,817).
Full cabin cruisers comprised 3.6% of registered
vessels, yet accounted for 5.9% of trips (n=53,684),
8.3% of person-trips (n=182,756) and, notably, 13.2%
of all vessel on-water hours (n=747,051) and 17.9%
of all vessel on-water person-hours (n=2.55m).
Trailer sailers and yachts comprised only small
proportions (1.5% each) of registered vessels and
accounted for around 3% of trips and 3-4% of
person-trips taken by all vessels over the 12 months.
However, they accounted for 6.9% (n=390,629)
and 6.0% (n=339,213) of all vessels’ on-water
hours respectively and 7.3% (n=1.047m) and 5.4%
(n=768,093) of all person on-water hours respectively.
Powered Recreational Boating Exposure to Risk Survey October 2008 to
September 2009. MUARC June 2010
Table 2 – Summary of vessel exposure by type of craft
Number of
registered
vessels
(%)
Number of
boat trips
Number of
vessel on
watewr hours
(%)
Number of onwater person
hours (%)
(%)
Number of
person trips
taken
(%)
Open Boat
107,121
(70.7)
568,128
(62.2)
1,366,617
(61.8)
2,857,890
(50.4)
6,978,713
(48.9)
Half Cabin
24,271
(16.0)
185,371
(20.3)
408,280
(18.5)
1,105,499
(19.5)
2,477,201
(17.4)
PWC
9,499
(6.3)
46,018
(5.0)
82,844
(3.7)
225,910
(4.0)
422,817
(3.0)
Full Cabin Cruiser
5,450
(3.6)
53,684
(5.9)
182,756
(8.3)
747,051
(13.2)
2,548,123
(17.9)
Trailer Sailor
2,309
(1.5)
27,295
(3.0)
72,052
(3.3)
390,629
(6.9)
1,046,549
(7.3)
Yacht
2,297
(1.5)
30,304
(3.3)
92,994
(4.2)
339,213
(6.0)
768,093
(5.4)
Hovercraft
572
(0.4)
2,203
(0.2)
4,549
(0.2)
8,612
(0.2)
17,367
(0.1)
151,519
913,002
2,210,092
5,674,805
14,258,862
Total
1.4.2.3
Exposure by geographical area
The table below estimates where vessels operate in
Victoria. This data records the points of departure of
vessels and indicates that 55% of trips are on inland
waters, 35% are on the enclosed waters such as Port
Philip, Westernport and Corner Inlet and 10% of trips
occur offshore into Bass Strait.
Table 3 - Table of vessel exposure by area of
operational use
Area of recreational
vessel use
Percentage of trips
Inland waters (rivers, lakes
and up stream of ports)
55%
Enclosed waters (bays
and estuaries)
35%
Offshore (Bass Strait)
10%
100%
1.4.2.4
Exposure by activity
ff Fishing was the most popular boating activity
in Victoria to the year ended 30 September
2009, accounting for most of the trips (69.6%,
n=635,452), person trips (60.9%, n=1.35m),
vessel hours (66.1%, n=3.75m) and person
hours (57.4%, n=8.19m) spent on water in the
12 months.
14
ff Pleasure cruising was the second most
popular activity in the 12 months, accounting
for 16.2% (n=147,789) of all trips and 16.8%
(n=370,917) of person trips taken, and 21.6%
(n=1.23m) of all hours and 21.4% (n=3.05m)
of all person hours spent on water in the
12 months.
ff Towed water sports ranked third in terms
of popularity accounting for 8.9% of vessel
trips (n=81,650), yet 15.7% (n=347,080) of
person trips, and 6.5% of on water hours
(n=368,651) and 11.6% of person on water
hours (n=1.65m).
1.4.2.5
Note re NMSC Exposure data
The National Marine Safety Committee (NMSC)
released its own exposure data report in August
2010 after conducting a similar study involving 2000
recreational boaters Australia-wide completing trip
diaries for boating activities conducted between 1
October 2008 and 30 March 2010. The study found
that boaters most commonly used their craft for
between 3 and 5 hours (43% of trips) followed by 0-2
hours (16% of trips). If we assume an average national
trip length of 4 hours this is significantly less than the
average from the Victorian report of 5.9 hours.
The NMSC report also stated that the greatest users
of recreational boats were from NSW, followed by
Victoria, with Queensland third.
1.4.3
Incident types
Injuries and fatalities can result from vessel incidents.
Vessel incidents are required to be reported to the
Victorian Police. Incident statistics are collected by
Transport Safety Victoria and recorded on the Marine
Incident Record (MIR) Database. Incident reports are
compiled whenever an incident occurs to which there
has been a response by the Victorian Police (generally
the Water Police) or a search and rescue organisation
or when an incident is reported by a vessel operator,
waterway or port manager or other source.
The following table illustrates the types of serious
incidents which are recorded. The data is for the
years 2007/8 and 2008/9. Groundings, capsizings
and collisions are the major types of serious
incidents experienced.
Table 4 - Serious incidents recorded 2007/8 - 2008/9
Serious Incident Type
2007/8
2008/9
N
%
N
%
60
36
58
35
Capsizing
29
18
43
26
Collision with
22
13
23
14
(14)
(8)
(10)
6
−− submerged object
(4)
(2)
(2)
1
−− fixed object
(3)
(2)
(5)
3
−− floating object
(1)
(1)
(6)
(4)
Grounding
−− another vessel
Swamping/sinking
14
8
10
6
Flooding
10
6
10
6
Person overboard
7
4
7
4
Loss or presumed loss of vessel
5
3
4
2
Fire
13
8
4
2
Close quarters
–
–
2
1
Explosion
2
1
2
1
Structural failure
1
1
1
1
Loss of stability
–
–
1
1
Onboard incident
2
1
–
–
165
100
165
99
TOTAL
1.4.4
Incident causes
The following table is a summary of tables 12 and 13 of the MUARC 5 year report and tables 8 and 14 of
the MUARC 2008/9 report. It splits contributing or causal factors into three broad groups: human factors,
environmental factors and material factors.
Table 5 - Contributory factors to incidents - all incidents recorded on MIR system during the six years
from 2003/4 to 2008/9
Incident Severity
Serious Incidents
(1338 factors for 841 incidents)
Factor Type
Response Only Incidents
(5608 factors for 4563 incidents)
N
%
N
%
816
61%
1873
33%
Lack of
maintenance
29
2%
894
16%
Lack of fuel
9
1%
344
6%
317
24%
198
4%
Inexperience
162
12%
223
4%
Navigational error
100
7%
57
1%
Insecure Mooring
29
2%
24
0%
Failure to keep
proper lookout
53
4%
14
0%
Fatigue
14
1%
13
0%
Alcohol and drugs
19
1%
6
0%
Excessive Speed
28
2%
3
0%
Overloading
4
0%
2
0%
Other human
Factors
52
4%
95
2%
Environmental
296
22%
270
5%
Material
226
17%
3464
62%
Human
Error in judgement
From the data, it can be seen that, of the serious
recreational vessel incidents where contributing
factors were recorded, human factors made the
greatest contribution at 61%. Most common were
errors of judgement (24%), inexperience (12%),
navigational errors (7%) and failure to keep a
proper lookout (4%).
A similar analysis for non-serious or response-only
incidents (also referred to as disablements) shows
us that material factors replace human factors,
making up 62% of contributing factors. Human factors
contributed 33% of factors, with lack of maintenance
(16%) and lack of fuel (6%) being seen as human
factor reasons why disablements occur.
Unfortunately the dataset does not record in any
further detail exactly what each of these human
factors represent. It is therefore not possible to ‘drill
down’ further into these factors to gain greater insight
into the incidents.
16
1.4.5
Fatalities
1.4.5.1
Fatalities trends
The Marine Act Review in 2009 found that the marine sector in Victoria generally operates safely. Importantly,
there has been a reduction in the number of marine related deaths over the previous decade. For recreational
boating, over the past 10 years there has been an average of 6.9 deaths a year in Victoria. In the last 5 years,
despite continued growth in vessel registrations and licensed operators, this number has dropped to 4.8 deaths
a year on average.
Graph 3 - Recreational boating fatalities in Victoria for 1989-90 to 2009-10
18
16
14
12
10
8
9
4
2
Fatalities
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2004/05
2003/04
2002/03
2001/02
2000/01
1999/00
1998/99
1997/98
1996/97
1995/96
1994/95
1993/94
1992/93
1991/92
1990/91
1989/90
0
Linear (fatalities)
y = 0.413x + 13.352
R2 = 0.4331
Graph 4 - Change in 5 year averages for recreational boating fatalities in Victoria
12
Average fatalities per year
10
8
6
4
2
0
1990/95
1996/00
2001/05
2006/10
However, there has been an upward trend in the
numbers of incidents and injuries in the recreational
sector. In particular, hospital-treated injuries
associated with recreational boating have doubled
over the period from 2003-04 to 2009-10.
1.4.5.2
A detailed analysis of the causal factors of
recreational boating fatalities based on Victorian
Coroner’s reports into boating-related fatalities
from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2008 was carried out.
The following factors were identified as having
contributed to fatalities:
Causal factors
The Review found that a key factor in worsening
injury rates is increased waterway congestion due to
sustained growth in shipping, commercial traffic and
recreational boating activities, further exacerbated by
shrinkage of inland waters due to drought. Low water
levels expose navigation hazards that were previously
hidden. This is reflected in the increasing incidence
of collisions between vessels and objects as well as
rising numbers of ‘near misses’.
Table 6 - Incident causal factors derived from Victorian Coroner’s reports
18
Causal Factor identified by
Coroner’s reports in at least one
coronial finding
Discussion
Possible causal factor type
Failure to insert a bung prior to
commencing trip which lead to
swamping and capsizing;
Could result from operator
distraction, inattention or lack of
knowledge of vessel.
Inexperience, Inattention
Going out in bad weather/dangerous
sea conditions;
Could result from operator not
understanding weather forecast
implications, not understanding limits
of weather and sea conditions on the
vessels and whether the vessel was
‘fit for purpose’ for the conditions.
Inexperience, Error of Judgement
Vessel not fit for purpose leading to
swamping by waves;
Could have resulted from
misunderstanding of vessel’s
fitness for the conditions or not
understanding the buoyancy
characteristics of the vessel and
believing the vessels would float
when swamped.
Engine failure leading to vessel
ending up broadside to waves;
Could be due to lack of maintenance
of engines and/or ancillary systems
such as fuel or electrical systems.
Could be due to operator not
knowing the danger of being
broadside to waves and not
understanding how to manage this
event safely.
Lack of Maintenance,
Error of Judgement
Overloading vessel and incorrectly
seating people on vessel;
Could be due to lack of
understanding of stability, trim and
the relatively large effect that the
mass and movement of a single
person can have on these issues in a
small vessel.
Error of Judgement, Overloading
Insufficient local knowledge;
Inexperience
Insufficient skills to cross a bar;
Inexperience
Causal Factor identified by
Coroner’s reports in at least one
coronial finding
Discussion
Leaving vessel and attempting to
swim to shore;
Could be due to a lack of
understanding that staying with a
vessel is generally safer than leaving
it as it is easier to spot by searchers
and provides one with a raft of last
resort (Club Med)
Error of Judgement, Inexperience
Failure to wear PFD, wearing
inappropriate PFD, wearing
improperly fitted PFD;
Could be due to a lack
understanding of the life saving
properties of a correctly fitted PFD
and the length of time some PFD
types require to be correctly donned.
Error of Judgement
Deciding to carry out/ continue a
voyage in a leaking vessel;
understanding that water in boat
leads to lowered freeboard, reduced
stability and increased susceptibility
to swamping,
Vessel had starting problems prior
to departure,
understanding that this indicates a
problem which needs to be resolved
prior to taking a voyage in a vessel.
Operating at night at speed, too
close to bank
Could be due to overconfidence, not
understanding different risk profile
when operating at night
Error of Judgement, Inexperience,
Complacency
Poor visibility from helm
Inattention
Vessel unsuitable for conditions
Inattention, Lack of knowledge
Improperly fitted lifejacket,
Error of Judgement,
Lack of emergency planning
Inexperience, Inattention,
Lack of knowledge
1.4.5.3
Vessel disablements
A key indicator of the increasing risk of further
fatalities is vessel disablements, which increased
from 586 in 2003–04 to approximately 1000 in
2009–10. The most common causes were machinery,
electrical equipment and related human failures,
such as inadequate maintenance, lack of fuel and
errors of judgment. It is the combination of vessel
disablements, changing weather conditions, off shore
operations and inadequate safety equipment (radio,
PFDs etc) that has proved fatal in the past. It is clear
that Victoria needs to remain focused on trying to
address the causes of vessel disablements, as well
as developing means to mitigate the consequences
of those disablements (e.g. through safety equipment
and improved search and rescue capabilities).
1.4.5.4
Coroner’s recommendation
Following each inquest, the Coroner makes
recommendations for marine safety improvements.
Within the above time period, there has only
been one case where the Coroner has explicitly
recommended that the boating licensing scheme be
improved. This case involved a drowning in August
2003, where the deceased operator had obtained a
recreational boat licence 3 days before the incident.
He then bought a 4.4m half cabin vessel and went
fishing with another person while anchored 100m off
the end of a breakwater. Bad weather and a failure
to put in bungs caused the boat to take on water
and sink.
As a result, the Coroner, in addition to the then
existing written licensing examination, recommended
that all applicants for a recreational boat licence be
required to undertake a practical examination and
exhibit reasonable proficiency in the operation of a
boat before being issued with a licence.
1.4.5.5
Personal flotation devices
1.4.6
The majority of fatal incidents involve a person
drowning and the vast majority of coronial
recommendations relate to mandating the wear of
personal flotation devices (PFDs), generally or a
specific type of PFD i.e. PFD Type 1.
Partially as a result of these recommendations,
PFD wearing has been mandatory in Victoria since
2005 for persons onboard vessels smaller or equal to
4.8 meters in length. In addition, persons on vessels
greater than 4.8 metres at times of heightened risk
are required to wear a PFD. Times of heightened
risk include operating at night, alone, crossing a bar,
during a storm or during a severe weather warning.
Injuries
In addition to fatality data derived from coronial
investigations, MUARC draws on hospital admissions
and emergency department presentations to provide
information on injuries.
In relation to general boating injuries, emergency
department case notes indicated that the major cause
of injuries was a lack of appropriate skills when in
control of a recreational vessel.
Licensing is used to reinforce the wearing of PFDs by
testing an applicant’s knowledge of the rules for the
carriage, use and stowage of PFDs.
Table 7 - Hospital-treated recreational boating-related injury by age and selected watercraft activities over
7 years 2003/4 – 2009/10
Activity
Towed sport
(n=2,716)
Motor boating/
boating unspecified
(n=1,777)
PWC riding
(n=647)
Fishing from a boat
(n=140)
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
0-14
279
10.3
188
10.6
29
4.5
4
2.9
15-29
1,419
52.2
409
23.0
309
47.8
26
18.6
30-44
761
28.0
492
27.7
206
31.8
39
27.9
45-59
247
9.1
443
24.9
89
13.8
31
22.1
60+
10
0.4
245
13.8
14
2.2
40
28.6
Total
2716
Age of injured person
20
1777
647
140
Figure 5 - Hospital treated boating injuries by age and activity
Distribution of hospital treated boating injuries by age and activity
1600
1400
Number of incidents
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0-14
15-29
30-44
45-59
60+
Age range
1.4.6.1
0-14
15-29
30-44
45-59
60+
Towed sport
279
1,419
761
247
10
Motor boating/boating unspecified
188
409
492
443
245
PWC riding
29
309
206
89
14
Fishing from a boat
4
26
39
31
40
Implications of injury data for licensing
Licensing is aimed at new entrants to the boating
community, regardless of age. The injury data
indicates that there may be merit in better tailoring
licensing to the specific issues within different age
groups, such as the introduction of specific measures
for towed sports.
It may also indicate a need to introduce skills based
training and assessment for licensing as well as
maintaining the existing knowledge based test.
The table and graph highlight the fact that injuries
resulting from some activities are age specific. It is
apparent that adults between 15 and 44 engaged
in towed sports form a significant proportion of all
injuries recorded – greater than 41%. One weakness
of the data is that it does not differentiate between
injuries to the person towing or the person being
towed. This means that the best intervention may not
be related to licensing but rather one which is aimed
at the skier or wake-boarder.
Injuries sustained in general motor boating make up
34% of recorded injuries. General licensing targets
basic boating skills and licence improvement may be
warranted to reduce motor boating injuries.
1.4.6.2
PWC riders
PWC riding results in 12% of injuries. This is lower
than for general motor boating and towed water
sports. PWC registrations make up 6.3% of the total
vessels registered but, as previously discussed,
PWC activities represent 5.0% of vessel trips, 3.7%
of person trips, 4.0% of on-water hours and 3.0% of
persons on water hours. The number of injuries is
therefore disproportionate when compared to the time
that PWC operators use their vessels on water.
The young adult incident rate reflects not only a
lack of skills but also reflects behavioural attitudes.
This age group is over-represented in incident
statistics on the road and shows patterns of risk
taking behaviour not evident in other age groups.
As previously indicated, licensing will have little
impact on incidents caused by poor behavioural or
cultural attitudes. This is supported by feedback from
the water police who attest to ongoing problems with
some sectors of the boating community, particularly
PWC riders.
As discussed above, PWC riders include many young
adults and this group is also likely to have the highest
participation rate in towed sport activities. Alternatives
to licensing are used to address this sector, including
targeted education campaigns and compliance
measures, such as ‘hoon boating’ laws.
1.4.6.3
Fishing
1.4.6.4
Fishing is a high volume activity with the exposure
report determining that 69.6% of trips are fishing
trips. Injuries from fishing make up less than 3% of all
injuries. This means that licensing reform would be
expected to make little difference to reducing injuries
within the fishing community.
Age
Injury trends are similar across the motor boating,
PWC and fishing sectors, with a decline in injuries
as age increases. This probably reflects fewer
people engaging in boating as they get older but
may also reflect that older people have greater
boating experience, more highly developed skills
and a lower propensity to take risks. However,
motor boating remains a higher risk activity for older
stakeholders. These operators generally will have
had a licence since their introduction in 2002 and
improved licensing requirements could be expected
to have little or no impact. This may indicate a need to
improve educational programs directed at people in
this age group.
Table 8 - Hospital-treated recreational boating-related injury by gender and selected watercraft activities over
7 years 2003/4 – 2009/10
Characteristic
Towed sport
(n=2,716)
N
Motor boating/
boating unspecified
(n=1,777)
%
N
%
PWC riding
(n=647)
Fishing from a boat
(n=140)
N
%
N
%
Gender
2,064
76.0
1,271
71.5
513
79.3
121
86.4
Female
647
23.8
504
28.4
134
20.7
19
13.6
Missing
5
0.2
2
0.1
—
—
—
—
Male
1.4.6.5
Male and female injuries
As may be expected, the majority of injuries are sustained by males (76% overall). Admission rates were
higher for males than females in all age groups over the 7 years. The highest rates for boating – related injury
admissions were observed in males aged 25-29 years, 20-24 years and 35-39 years (11.8, 11.5 and 11.3
admissions per 100,000 male populations, respectively).
Males are at a higher absolute risk of serious injury in boating-related recreational activities than females.
This may be due to gender differences, but is more likely to be due to males boating more often than females,
as available participation data indicates that male exposure to boating activities is much higher than females.
Table 9 - Hospital-treated recreational boating-related injury by injury type and selected watercraft activities
over 7 years 2003/4 – 2009/10
Characteristic
Towed sport
(n=2,716)
Motor boating/
boating unspecified
(n=1,777)
PWC riding
(n=647)
Fishing from a boat
(n=140)
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
1,114
41.0
482
27.1
135
20.9
11
7.9
Hit/struck/crush
711
26.2
499
28.1
127
19.6
28
20.0
Transport/craft
accident
85
3.1
143
8.0
156
24.1
15
10.7
Injury Type
Fall
22
Cutting/piercing
47
1.7
148
8.3
9
1.4
25
17.9
Near drowning
33
1.2
49
2.8
22
3.4
4
2.9
Fire/burn/
explosion
8
0.3
53
3.0
2
0.3
—
—
Other specified
551
20.3
331
18.6
148
22.9
47
33.6
Unspecified
167
6.1
72
4.1
48
7.4
10
7.1
Figure 6 - Hospital treated boating injuries by cause and injury
Distribution of injury types activity
1200
Number of injuries
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Fall
Hit/struck/crush
Transport/craft
accident
Cutting/piercing
Near drowning
Type of injury
Fall
Transport/
craft
accident
Cutting/
piercing
Near
drowning+
1,114
711
85
47
33
Motor boating/boating unspecified
482
499
143
148
49
PWC riding
135
127
156
9
22
Fishing from a boat
11
28
15
25
4
Towed sport
1.4.6.6
Hit/struck/
crush
Towed water sports and motor boating
Towed water sports (51%) and motor boating (34%)
are the major causes of injuries.
Of the towed water sports injuries, half (724) resulted
from falls. It is probable that the majority of these falls
involved the person being towed falling from their
equipment resulting in high impact injuries. It is also
likely that the majority of hit/struck/crush injuries were
also sustained by the towed person.
As many of these injuries would have been sustained
due to decisions made by the towed person rather
than resulting from decisions made by the vessel
operator, it is difficult to correlate the injuries to
decisions made by the operator. Unless further data
becomes available that provides more detail on
who has suffered the injuries and the circumstances
of each incident, it is difficult to make a case that
changing the licensing requirements would reduce
towed water sport injuries. It may be better dealt with
by education programs.
1.4.6.7
Types of injuries
Falls and hit/struck/crush injuries from motor boating
probably reflect ‘on vessel’ incidents. While the
incidence is high (22% of the total), it is likely that
many of these are relatively minor, even though they
result in hospital treatment.
It is noted that in 26% of cases, injuries are either
‘other specified’ or ‘unspecified’. This makes it difficult
to understand their impact. It is difficult to draw any
conclusions as to their cause, but it is likely that at
least some percentage of them would relate to a lack
of operator skill.
The number of hit/struck/crush injuries represents
between 18% and 28% of injuries in all categories.
This may be indicative of injuries sustained by limbs
being crushed between vessels and other vessels
or objects. Strikes and hits could be from vessels or
equipment. These injuries could be to any persons
on the vessel, not particularly the vessel operator.
This suggests that a lack of general boating safety
awareness is an important factor. As such, licensing
may not necessarily reduce these injuries.
Table 10 - Hospital-treated recreational boating-related injury by nature of injury and selected watercraft
activities over 7 years 2003/4 – 2009/10
Characteristic
Towed sport
(n=2,716)
Motor boating/
boating unspecified
(n=1,777)
PWC riding
(n=647)
Fishing from a boat
(n=140)
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
Fracture
504
18.6
333
18.7
185
28.6
33
23.6
Dislocation/
sprain/ strain
763
28.1
329
18.5
99
15.3
12
8.6
Open wound
439
16.2
443
24.9
104
16.1
27
19.3
Nature of injury
Intracranial
77
2.8
29
1.6
22
3.4
3
2.1
Injury to
muscle/ tendon
357
13.1
116
6.5
37
5.7
5
3.6
Superficial injury
176
6.5
164
9.2
55
8.5
8
5.7
Other
316
11.6
309
17.4
123
19.0
47
33.6
Unspecified
84
3.1
54
3.0
22
3.4
5
3.6
Characteristic
Towed sport
(n=2,716)
Motor boating/
boating unspecified
(n=1,777)
PWC riding
(n=647)
%
Fishing from a boat
(n=140)
N
%
N
%
N
N
%
Lower extremity
901
33.2
590
33.2
204
31.5
29
20.7
Upper extremity
612
22.5
501
28.2
102
15.8
40
28.6
Head/face/neck
741
27.3
265
14.9
154
23.8
19
13.6
Trunk
311
11.5
220
12.4
147
22.7
25
17.9
Multiple body
sites
37
1.4
41
2.3
15
2.3
—
—
Other/
unspecified
114
4.2
160
9.0
25
3.9
27
19.3
Body Region
Types of injuries range from the serious, such
as fractures and intracranial injuries, through to
soft tissue injuries ,cuts and other injuries of a
superficial nature.
24
Injuries are sustained to all parts of the body.
Notably, 75% of head injuries are associated directly
with the high speed activities of PWC operation and
towed water sports. Leg injuries are represented
across all activities and make up just under one third
of all injuries.
Table 11 – R
ecreational (powered) boating related injury admissions by length of hospital stay and watercraft
activity in Victoria over 7 year period 2003/4-2009/10
Watercraft/
Activity
Length of stay (days)
<2 days
2-7 days
8-30 days
31+ days
Total
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
456
49
191
40
49
38
5
29
701
45
Motor boating
181
19
116
24
23
18
3
18
323
21
PWC riding
156
17
93
19
36
28
7
41
292
19
Other specified /
fishing from boat
137
15
81
17
20
16
2
12
240
15
Total
930
Water skiing/
wakeboarding/
inflatable
481
128
17
1556
Percentages rounded off to nearest .5 or whole number.
The MUARC report states that “Length of stay in
hospital can be used as a proxy measure of injury
severity”. The report indicates that 60% of admitted
cases had a length of hospital stay of less than
2 days, 31% stayed 2-7 days, 8% stayed 8-30 days
and 1% stayed more than 30 days.
A higher proportion of PWC riders and fisher people
experienced a length of stay of 8 days or more.
However, 61% of patients that stayed in hospital for
8 days or more were towed water sports participants
and PWC riders. This may be due to severe impact
injuries caused by the relatively high speeds of
vessel operation.
1.4.6.8
Which human factors may not be
appropriately managed by licensing?
As discussed above, licensing is most effective in
being able to influence safety outcomes where the
injury or death has occurred as a result of human
factors. However, it is recognised that licensing is
unlikely to address all human factor issues.
For example, inexperience can only be addressed
by more time spent operating vessels in varying
conditions. This could be partially overcome by a
licence scheme which required experience to be
logged as a prerequisite to obtaining a licence.
However, in order to ensure operator competency,
a large amount of logged experience would
be required.
This model would be difficult to implement as the
requirement for logged experience in order to achieve
competency would be substantial. An example
of a scheme which uses logged experience as a
determination of competency is the commercial
vessel operator licensing scheme within the National
Standard for Commercial Vessels. The lowest
level commercial vessel certificate of competency
(coxswain) requires one year of ‘seatime’ to be
logged. While there is no suggestion that the same
amount of logged experience would be required
for recreational vessel operators, it is difficult to
determine how much experience a novice operator
would require. However, logged experience combined
with an assessment of practical skills may help
address the issue of inexperience.
Similarly, navigation errors may result from noncompliance with the rules of the sea and this may be
partially addressed by a licensing scheme by testing
knowledge of these rules. Navigation errors are also
caused by the operator being unable to confirm their
position using navigational charts or aids. In the latter
case, a specialised navigation course may achieve
competent navigators, but a basic licensing scheme
will not.
It should be noted that many incidents – particularly
those resulting in fatalities – are caused by a number
of contributing factors and it is not always easy to
isolate them or establish the major contributory cause.
1.4.7
Insurance company data
Boats and other vessels are expensive assets that,
when used, have the potential to cause significant
public liabilities. Accordingly, owners and operators
of these vessels have incentive to consider the
benefits of insurance, and a large proportion decide
to manage this risk through the purchase of an
insurance or public liability policy or policies.
Data made available to DOT indicates that
approximately 55-60% of the powered recreational
vessel fleet in Victoria is not insured. Surprisingly,
the propensity to take out a policy is not biased
toward the more valuable end of the market. It would
seem that there are quite a large number of very
valuable boats that are not insured.
The main value of insurance data is that it provides
some insight into the level of property damage
sustained as a result of incidents and this is
information is not available through any other source.
The data also provides a more complete picture of
the number of incidents that are occurring. However,
confidentiality requirements have meant that DOT’s
access to more detailed information on causal factors
of incidents has been limited.
DOT has extrapolated the following information from
insurance data:
ff There are 300 stolen boats per year across
Victoria that are not recovered.
ff The value of stolen boats lost and not
recovered per year in Victoria = $7m.
ff The number of collisions between vessels
per year = approximately 700.
ff The number of collisions with submerged
objects per year = approximately 1000.
ff The number of collisions with berths, wharves
and jetties per year = approximately 350.
ff There are approximately 50 fires and
explosions per year resulting in property
damage of approximately $9000 on average.
ff There are 50-55 vessel capsizes per year.
ff There are 90 significant injuries to persons per
year (i.e. injury severe enough to result in a
public liability insurance claim).
The data is based on actual insurance claims made
after an event. This offers a different perspective on
incidents than that shown by the Marine Incident
Database (MID) which records incident information
collected as a result of responses to marine incidents
by emergency or rescue services. A comparison of
the respective data illustrates this.
ff Value of Victorian recreational vessel fleet
= $7 billion.
ff Average value of recreational vessel
= $42,000.
Incident type
Reported to MID
Reported to insurance
companies
2007/8
2008/9
Collision between vessels
14
10
700
Collisions with submerged objects
4
2
1000
Collisions with berths, wharves and jetties
3
5
350
Fires and explosions
15
6
50
Vessel capsizes
29
43
50-55
As can be seen, the insurance data captures numbers of incidents many times greater than those recorded on
the MID. This is probably reflective of the relative importance owners place on recovering incident costs relative
to reporting to the Authority.
26
1.4.8
Conclusions from the data
From the above discussion, we can make the
following observations;
ff General licensing may contribute to an overall
reduction in the incidence of fatalities and
injuries which currently occur as a result of
general motor boating activity, including
fishing from a boat. These are considered
boating activities of ‘average risk’ as they do
not involve any specifically identified high
risk components.
ff General licensing is unlikely to be a suitable
mechanism to achieve improved safety
outcomes for all vessel activities. However,
particular endorsements could prove useful as
a mechanism that can be specifically targeted
to situations of higher risk of injury or death.
ff General licensing may be useful to improve
safety outcomes in respect of towed water
sports may if it can be shown that the human
factors causing incidents are under the control
of the master of the vessel.
ff Opportunity exists to impose specific licensing
requirements on PWC masters. It is likely that
the level of PWC injuries will be reduced by
specific intervention. The current licensing
scheme requires a PWC endorsement
but further investigation is warranted to
determine if the endorsement requirements
can be strengthened in a way that leads to
an improvement in PWC competency and
therefore safety outcomes for this activity.
1.4.9
Risk-based assessment
of hazards
The incident analysis with accompanying injury and
fatality data has enabled us to build a picture of the
outcomes achieved by the current range of regulatory
interventions. These interventions include registration,
licensing, safety equipment and boating rules
and requirements.
However, this analysis has weaknesses. It is an
historical analysis and does not take into account the
current and potential hazards of the present boating
environment. In essence, using the incident analysis
alone may mean that future safety initiatives are driven
by the past, not by the future.
To enable a more detailed examination a risk-based
approach has been undertaken to uncover human
factors relating to licensing from a ‘green-fields’
perspective. This can act as verification of the human
factors uncovered by the past data, as well as
potentially uncovering additional factors which may
need to be addressed in a general licensing scheme.
1.4.9.1
Method of risk-based assessment
It is possible to take action to avoid a known hazard
or to mitigate the extent of injury or fatalities which
may result from such a hazard. The effectiveness of
these actions can be assessed through a simplified
‘bow tie’ assessment model. The bow ties were
initially developed within DOT and then expanded and
verified through discussion at an industry workshop
. The types of actions which can be shown to be
effectiveness in improving safety outcomes were
categorised as either ‘defences’ or ‘mitigations’
which were:
ff approaches to the type of factor the action
represents (human, material, environmental
etc); and
ff the preferred approach to their
management i.e.
–– is the defence one which uses equipment
to manage it?
–– is it an engineering control?
–– is it something which general licensing can
be used to control?
‘Bow ties’ were developed for events such as
a collision, a fire or explosion, a capsize and a
disablement. The resulting bow ties are in Appendix 4.
Following from the bow tie analysis, those actions
where licensing was seen as a useful mechanism to
improve safety outcomes were grouped and collated
based on the National Competencies. Each identified
element of the action was then assessed to determine
how best it could be addressed: either by better
information, by being included as part of the basic
marine license process or by requiring an additional
endorsement to an existing licence.
Each element was also examined from the
perspective of whether it could be assessed, and if
so, how, eg:
ff not assessed (provision of information only;
ff requiring a knowledge test;
ff requiring practical training; or
ff by a practical-based test.
Appendix 4 contains the complete table of actions
and their constituent elements as developed by DOT
and refined during the workshop.
The information obtained by the bow-tie models
enabled us to examine whether there are any hazards
additional to those produced by the data and which
should be considered.
The results of the data in section 1 indicates the
outcomes from the current licensing scheme.
Combining this information helps to build a picture
of a licence and endorsement scheme which can
reasonably be expected to improve safety outcomes.
1.5
Means to deliver
licensing
1.5.1
What should a licence test?
The fundamental question in determining the
elements of a general licensing scheme is – what
should licensing test?
1.5.2
National Competencies
A document defining the minimum core competencies
for the operation of mechanically powered vessels
was developed by the National Marine Safety
Committee (NMSC). The National Competencies were
developed from the nationally agreed Principles for
common standards for recreational boat licensing.
Principle 5 requires that candidates for a boat
operator licence should be able to ‘demonstrate’
a wide range of knowledge and boat-handling
requirements.
Having regard to those principles, the National
Competencies comprise three individual
competency units:
To become a competent operator of a recreational
powered vessel, an inexperienced person will follow
a similar learning pathway which involve moving
through three distinct stages of development.
These are the acquisition of the required knowledge,
development of skill in applying that knowledge, and
finally the demonstration of competence against the
required standards. The table below shows the type
of testing applicable to each of the three stages of
development.
Table 12 - Stages to obtain competence with means
to achieve competency
Stage 1
Knowledge (acquisition)
Theory Training
Self-paced Learning
Stage 2
Skill (development)
Practical Training
Logbook
Stage 3
Assessment (demonstration)
Knowledge Test
Practical on-water assessment
ff Unit 1 - Trip preparation and planning
1.5.3.2
ff Unit 2 - Safe Operation
Information Materials
ff Unit 3 - Responding to emergencies
and incidents
Currently, Transport Safety Victoria (TSV) issues the
Recreational Vessel Safety Handbook. This contains
the information which a person is tested on when
applying for a Recreational Boating Operator licence.
However, it is recognised that the Handbook is limited
in its capacity to influence safety outcomes in all
areas of boating activity. This is because, while it
contains information on legislation and the on-water
equivalent to the ‘rules of the road’, it contains little in
terms of practical boating information.
It was expected that, over time, the regulators of
recreational boat operators in each state would
introduce these common minimum competencies into
their recreational boat licensing schemes.
Since 2000 all states, including Victoria, have
adopted licensing schemes which are aligned to
the units contained in the National Competencies.
These competencies should be retained as the basis
of any revised or improved general licensing scheme.
1.5.3
Training and Assessment
Methods
1.5.3.1
Training and assessment
methods used in licensing models
throughout Australia
Information
A valuable output of the risk assessment referred
to in Appendix 4 was a list of information which
boaters consider necessary for the safe operation of
recreational vessels. The majority of this information
is not contained in the current material and there is
a clear need to develop a more comprehensive and
up-to-date handbook.
All jurisdictions that issue licences as a pre-requisite
for operating a recreational boat require applicants to
complete a test before a licence can be issued.
28
1.5.3.3
Knowledge
1.5.3.5
Assessment
Theory Training
Knowledge or theory testing
Theory training is the delivery of information to
students within the limitations of a classroom
environment. A theory training session could
incorporate the presentation of information,
discussion, scenarios, diagrams and displays.
Knowledge testing involves a written test paper
that aims to assess the applicant’s knowledge of,
typically, collision rules, boat preparation, emergency
situations and compliance with applicable regulations.
All recreational boat operators should have a sound
understanding of the rules, regulations and safe
boating procedures. Accordingly, there is an element
of knowledge based testing in all options under
consideration.
Self-paced Learning
A self-paced learning method for basic marine
licensing in Victoria could require the development
of a learning resource or workbook similar to that
available in Queensland and Western Australia.
The new handbook could be developed by TSV and
supplied to all new applicants, in hard copy and
on-line. This would be more comprehensive than the
Victorian Recreational Boating Handbook and contain
activities and questions for the learner to complete as
they work through the modules.
1.5.3.4
Skill/Experience
Practical Training
Practical training normally incorporates theory training
with an on-water practical training component.
This could be a mandated training course delivered
via a common curriculum. Typically, a practical training
course would last between half a day and a day and
be carried out by a registered training organisation.
Logbook
A logbook method would require a person to log
a prescribed number of voyages, with each trip
supervised by an adult who holds an unrestricted
licence. A logbook would be an alternative to a
mandated practical training model, designed to
provide a person with a minimum level of experience.
Logbooks could also mandate certain tasks
which would need to be carried out and signed off
on completion.
Practical on-water assessment
The applicant must demonstrate the ability to
complete an established set of tasks to the standard
required by TSV. A practical assessment would be
modelled on the national competencies.
On-water assessment may be conducted as part of
an approved practical training course or as a stand
alone competency assessment.
See Appendix 5 for a summary of the training and
assessment methods used in licensing schemes
across Australian Jurisdictions.
1.5.3.6
Key features of recreational boat
operator licensing schemes
within Australia
Appendix 2 contains full discussion and analysis of
the licensing schemes currently in place within each
Australian jurisdiction.
Australian jurisdictions that require a licence to
operate a recreational vessel all have a theory-based
test as part of their assessment models.
Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia and
Tasmania have all adopted models which address
knowledge and skills and/or experience. They have
adopted different methods of delivery, ranging from
logbook models to competency-based assessments.
South Australia and Victoria have adopted models
which rely mainly on knowledge based tests to
achieve competency. The Northern Territory and the
ACT do not have registration or licensing schemes for
recreational boating.
The table below sets out the licence requirements for vessels by type in each jurisdiction
Table 13 - Triggers for determining which vessels require a licence to operate
Victoria
If the vessel is powered regardless of engine size/capacity
South Australia
If the vessel is powered regardless of engine size/capacity
Tasmania
If powered more than 4hp
Queensland
If powered more than 4.5kw
Western Australia
If powered more than 4.5kw
New South Wales
If operating at speed of 10 knots or more
Australian Capital Territory
None
Northern Territory
None
The following table summarises the various schemes operating within Australia.
Table 14 - Testing and other options required to assure competency in order to acquire a licence
Jurisdiction
Knowledge Requirement
Practical Requirement
Victoria
Answer correctly a minimum of 26 out of
30 questions to pass.
None
South Australia
50 questions and must answer all of the
8 compulsory questions correctly and at
least 32 of the remaining.
Special permit for 12 to 15 year olds must
do a practical on-water assessment.
New South Wales
40 questions of which the first 15 must all
be answered correctly.
Complete a practical boat course, or
Complete a Boating Licence Practical
Logbook in the company of an
experienced skipper.
Tasmania
8 compulsory questions that MUST be
answered correctly and get at least 75% of
the remaining questions correct to pass.
Complete a Boat Safe practical tuition
course, or 20 hours experience logged in a
registered power boat.
Queensland
Must complete Boat Safe Course
Must complete Boat Safe Course including
on-water assessment
Western Australia
30 questions and must answer at least 25
correctly to pass.
Must get 100% in set practical assessment
It is noteworthy that Victoria is the only Australia
jurisdiction to have a recreational boat licensing
scheme with no requirement for practical skills training
or assessment and/or on-water supervised boat
operating experience. SA has similar arrangements
for unrestricted licenses but does require a practical
assessment of younger boat operators.
The purpose of each Australian State’s licensing
scheme is to ensure operators meet the
competencies outlined in the Guidelines for
Recreational Boat Operator Competencies. However,
how a scheme addresses those competencies and
ensures that they are met is currently left for each
jurisdiction to determine
contains 11 elements and the applicant is allowed
two attempts at each element. Competency in
all elements is required for a pass. Based on the
outcomes of the assessment, it appears that the
Victorian scheme does not deliver an outcome
consistent with the Western Australian model, as only
1 Victorian out of 49 tested was able to successfully
complete the competency assessment.
All jurisdictions incorporate mutual recognition of
interstate licences and other commercial qualifications
in their licensing schemes and some have recognition
of prior knowledge arrangements in place.
Most jurisdictions also have medical information
disclosure requirements and eyesight testing.
Appendix 3 contains a discussion of work carried
out to assess the outcomes of Victoria’s licensing
scheme. It includes practical testing of candidates
who had previously successfully completed the
Victorian knowledge test. These people were required
to complete an assessment based on Western
Australia’s Practical Assessment. The assessment
30
1.5.3.7
Summary of licensing in Australia and
the Victorian Model
All the licensing schemes are aimed at ensuring
that recreational boat operators attain a level of
competency as outlined in the NMSC guidelines.
As there has been no objective assessment of
the various license schemes, it is not possible
to say whether each individual scheme meets
this requirement.
It is probable that such a broad range of different
schemes aimed at achieving the same ends will not
achieve the same level of competency. For example,
a knowledge based theory test is unlikely to lead
to the same level of competency as an on-water
practical assessment by a qualified assessor.
To achieve a satisfactory level of competency, it
appears clear that there needs to be some practical
experience and/or training.
Rather than addressing the relative outcomes of each
scheme, it may be preferable to determine whether
the minimum level of competency each jurisdiction
adopts meets the aim of the national competencies.
It is understood that the only comparison of models
carried out to date is the MUARC assessment of
the Victorian model against a simulation of the WA
Recreational Skippers ticket test.
This comparison illustrates that the Victorian model
achieves outcomes which fall well short of the level
of competency achieved by successful completion of
the WA test.
If the practical assessment of competency achieved
by the WA model is a reasonable assessment of
the national minimum competencies then, from the
evidence available, the Victorian model fails to deliver
competent operators.
1.5.3.8
Comparison of schemes
The following diagram shows conceptually how
effective various schemes may be in assuring
regulators that persons are competent.
The figure indicates that there are competency
assurance gaps for persons who do not pass a
formal on-board assessment. This suggests that
a knowledge test will certainly achieve a level of
competence, but only in areas where gaining
that knowledge is all that is needed to achieve
competency in that subject.
For example, if understanding the rules regarding
the minimum distance required between vessels is
the required competency, a knowledge of the laws
which govern these requirements may be seen to
be sufficient to assure that the required competency
level is met. This may be achieved via the successful
completion of a knowledge test on the subject.
Other skills cannot be tested in a knowledge test,
but could be demonstrated as part of a practical test.
For example, it may be that being able to apply a
safe distance rule is the true measure of the level of
competency required.
Figure 7 - relative levels of competency assured by differing testing and assessment processes
LEVEL OF COMPETENCY
COMPETENCY GAP
KNOWLEDGE
SKILLS and/or EXPEREINCE
COMPETENT
knowledge
test
32
knowledge
test plus
practical test
for 12-15 y/o
knowledge
test plus
either
practical
training or
logged
experience
practical
training with
knowledge
and practical
assessments
knowledge
test plus
practical
assessment
1.6
Conclusion
1.7
A higher standard of testing, such as practical
training or assessing, in relation to the following
competencies, could reduce the number of marine
incidents in Victoria in the following ways:
Some training/
assessment options
Expected outcome
Person overboard and
retrieval procedures
Reduce the risk of
drowning and improve the
chances of retrieving a
person in the water
Boat launching/
docking and slow speed
manoeuvres training
Minimise collision risks
and hand/finger/limb
injuries at jetties and
“ramp rage”
Basic fuel and battery
checks training
Reduce the risk of
capsizing due to going
broadside after losing
power
Setting and retrieving
anchor training
Minimise hand and finger
injuries
Training in towing people
at moderate to high
speeds
Reduce the likelihood of
injury from towed water
sport activities
Training in operating
high speed watercraft,
particularly PWCs, and
the dangers involved
in operating in close
proximity to others
Reduce the incidence of
high speed collisions
Relative exposure to
risk, a comparison
between marine and
road fatality rates
An estimation of the relative safety of recreational
boaters compared to persons travelling in cars on
in Victoria. Appendix 8 contains a set of calculations
based upon data from the MUARC exposure
data report, VicRoads and the Australian Bureau
of Statistics.
Two approaches were used to estimate relative fatality
rates on an annual basis. The measures used were
based (a) on the exposure hours of a vessel or a car
per fatality, and (b) on the distance the car or vessel
travelled per fatality.
1.7.1
Comparison of vessel/vehicle
fatality rates.
Based on exposure hours
3.9
Based 0n 2007 km travelled
6.3
Each of the methods used in the estimation produces
results of the same magnitude.
Whilst the actual values are subject to conjecture due
to the assumptions, regardless of which methodology
is used, there appears to be a greater likelihood
of incidents resulting in a fatality when boating
compared to when driving.
By comparing these outcomes, we have a measure
which attempts to objectively consider boating
outcomes. The conclusion that boating is ‘riskier’
than driving in itself provides impetus to improve
boating safety. A large amount of resources
are currently directed at reducing fatalities and
improving road safety and this conclusion suggests
that greater resources need to be directed at
measures – including licensing – aimed at improving
boating safety.
1.8
Summary
While overall marine activity in Victoria is generally
safe, there is data to suggest the need for
improvement. Fatalities are trending lower which
is a positive sign, although there are indications,
based on available exposure data, that fatality
rates are nonetheless 4-6 times higher than those
in vehicles on the roads. Additionally, the number
of reported incidents and hospital admissions are
rising. Injuries are highest in towed water sports,
general boating and PWC operations, even though
towed water sports and PWC activities are carried
out by a relatively small number of participants.
This indicates that they contribute disproportionately
to the total number of injuries and accordingly,
further investigation is required into whether licensing
can play a targeted role in reducing injuries in
these sectors.
Victoria’s licensing scheme is designed to improve
the skills and knowledge of boat operators or
masters within the National Competency framework.
This framework is used by all Australian jurisdictions
as the basis for their boating licensing schemes.
Jurisdictions have differing means of assessing
licensing applicants as detailed in Appendix 2.
While there has been little formal assessment of the
merits of the various schemes, anecdotally Victoria’s
scheme is currently one of the least successful at
producing masters and operators who are competent
in safe vessel operations.
The causes of boating incidents can be split into
three basic groups, environmental factors, material
factors and human factors. Licensing schemes are
primarily aimed at reducing the human factors which
lead to incidents. The challenge is to produce a cost
effective scheme of licences and endorsements
which successfully targets these factors where
there is evidence to suggest that a genuine safety
problem exists.
Victoria’s scheme will continue to include a basic
licence test for the master of powered recreational
vessels which need to be endorsed for PWC
operations. The questions to be addressed are
whether the current form of assessment for the basic
licence and PWC endorsement need to be changed
and whether there are additional vessel types or
vessel activities which warrant more attention through
the introduction of endorsements or other licensing
scheme improvements.
34
36
2.1
Background
2.1.1
National Guidelines
The national guidelines were “designed to be capable
of being taught, learned or demonstrated by one or a
combination of the following methods”:
The minimum standards of competence for
recreational boat operation are documented in the
national Guidelines for Recreational Boat Operator
Competencies, which form the basis for all licence
regimes within Australia.6
The national guidelines seek to ensure that people in
charge of or in command of registered recreational
vessels are competent masters. The framework
was developed in response to fatalities and injuries
resulting from recreational boating activities. The
premise behind the framework is that competent
operators make better decisions and respond more
appropriately in operational settings.
6
ff Classroom instruction; or
ff Practical instruction or demonstration; or
ff Distance learning.
In relation to the assessment processes, the national
guidelines note that:
“Given the aim of the operator licence is to increase
marine safety through ensuring minimum levels
in the awareness and skills of boat users, then an
educationally based operator licence containing both
theory and hands-on practical experience is the most
effective method.”
Guidelines For Recreational Boat Operator Competencies Edition 1 –
November 2000; National Marine Safety Committee
2.1.2
Current marine license and PWC endorsement testing
As described in part 1.1.2, the current Victorian marine licensing scheme is as follows:
Figure 8 - Generic licensing model for general operator licences and restricted operator licences. A similar
model exists for the current PWC endorsement
General or Restricted
Marine Licence
- General 16 y.o. or above
- Restricted 12 to 15 y.o. (less
than 10 knots unsupervised,
between 10 and 20 knots
during daylight and
accompanied by general
licence holder over 16 y.o.,
no towing)
Theory based training course
- approved by TSV
- includes knowledge test
or
Self-paced learning
Knowledge Test
Red border indicates
mandatory component
of model
Chapter 2. The Basic Marine Licences
37
The only mandatory component is the knowledge
test. How an applicant obtains the knowledge prior
to taking the test is up to the individual. TSV provides
a handbook, updated regularly, which contains the
information required to pass the test7. Alternatively a
network of training providers registered with Transport
Safety Victoria provides training for and administers
the test.
At the time licensing was introduced into Victoria,
the training and assessment methods adopted were
consistent with the standard applied in other States
where recreational boat operator licensing had been
introduced. However, since that time, other States
have implemented changes and have adopted
licensing models that integrate practical competencybased training and testing requirements which licence
applicants must pass.
7
2.1.3
The Marine Safety Act 2010 is expected to come
into force in late 2011. Part 3.2 of the Act provides
the requirement for mandatory licensing of masters
of recreational vessels on all prescribed waters in
Victoria. The Act allows for non licensed persons to
operate a vessel provided that they are under the
direct supervision of an operator.
The Act sets out:
ff the purpose of licensing
ff licensing offences
ff licensing provisions; and
ff exemptions.
Victorian Recreational Boating Safety Handbook
Figure 9 - Licensing model under the Marine Safety Act 2010
Marine Safety Act 2010
Chapter 3 Part 3.2
Marine Regulations 2011
Sample Range of Possible Endorsement
Marine Licence
PWC Endorsement
High Speed
Endorsement
Towed Sports
Endorsement
Offshore Operations
Endorsement
Vessels Carrying More
Than 12 Passengers
Endorsement
Endorsements may be combined or put
into an expanded RBOL
The above figure outlines the proposed framework under the Act. The PWC endorsement framework present
in the Marine Safety Act 2010 has been removed. The Marine Safety Regulations will provide for endorsements,
including the PWC endorsement.
The nature of endorsements is the subject of further discussion in this paper but it is envisaged that the PWC
endorsement scheme will continue.
A hierarchy of monetary penalties for failing to obtain an appropriate marine licence or endorsement is also set
out in the Act.
38
The Act will be administered by TSV, with the Safety
Director empowered to grant licences.
The purposes of licensing masters of recreational
vessels are stated in the Act as being (amongst other
things) to:
ff ensure that people who are in charge of or in
command of registered recreational vessels
are competent masters; and
ff ensure that those masters are aware of safe
operating practices and relevant marine
safety laws.
In granting a basic marine licence, the Safety Director
may require the applicant to pass any test of a
prescribed type about the operation of recreational
vessels or undergo any training about the operation of
recreational vessels that the Safety Director considers
appropriate, or both.
Differences between the Marine Act 1988 (as
amended in 2000) and the Marine Safety Act 2010
with regard to the licensing scheme are summarised
in the following table:
Table 15 – Comparison of Marine Act 1988 and Marine Safety Act 2011 licensing frameworks
What is the license called
Marine Act 1988
General operator licence
Marine licence
or
Restricted operator licence
Who is required to hold
a license?
Recreational vessel operator.
Restricted recreational vessel
operator (person between 12 and
16 years of age inclusive)
Master of a recreational vessel.
Master is the person in command
or in charge of the vessel.
Restricted recreational vessel
Master (person between 12 and 16
years of age inclusive)
Who is required to hold
an endorsement?
Persons operating a PWC
Act is silent but sets up a
framework for a range of
endorsements to be required by
the regulations
Do all operators require
a license?
Yes
No. Framework is put in place for
persons to operate vessels without
holding a licence providing there
is a Master present who is an
adult and is able to supervise the
vessel’s operation.
Does Act set up
testing framework?
No but Act requires the applicant
to “pass any test .. or undergo
any training … that the Director
considers is appropriate”.
No. But sets up a framework
for the regulations to set any
testing requirements for a license
or endorsement.
39
2.2
What could a best
practice assessment
model look like?
A best practice assessment model for recreational
boating should aim to objectively assess applicants
as meeting the nationally agreed minimum
competencies. Ideally, its method of delivery should
aim to maximise retention of these competencies
over time.
A suggested best practice assessment model which
ensures that all licence applicants are competent
operators would involve:
ff passing a theory-based test on the person’s
knowledge of the rules and regulations
ff completing a reasonable amount of
supervised practical experience through
either a logbook or a practical training course
(experience), and
ff passing a practical skills based on-water
assessment (skill).
The Australian jurisdiction which most closely
resembles this model is Queensland. Its six hour
Boatsafe course includes knowledge-based training
and practical assessment as well as an on-water
assessment. Other jurisdictions include a knowledge
based test and aspects of an experience and/or
skill test.
Internationally, Singapore has a model similar to
Queensland in its Powered Pleasure Craft Driving
Licence. The course is completed over four days and
involves 15 hours of knowledge based training over
the first three days and an 8 hour practical lesson on
the fourth day.
The licensing options presented in this paper
will include variations on the Queensland model.
Ultimately, the recommended option will be
determined by which options provides the best
safety outcome (maximises benefit) with the
fewest regulatory interventions (measured by
minimising costs).
The extent to which a model is supported by cost/
benefit analysis is consider later in this paper.
2.2.1
Practical on-water testing
A practical skills-based on-water assessment is
arguably the most objective method of assessing
boating competency. This is because it requires
applicants to demonstrate the skills needed to safety
operate a boat in a formal testing environment.
40
The Western Australia Recreational Skipper’s
Ticket (RST) is arguably the most objective form
of this model operating in Australia. The test for an
RST requires applicants to successfully complete
11 tasks to a minimum standard during a 45 minute
on-water assessment. The average fee for sitting
the assessment is $100. Many RST assessors also
offer a full day training course, concluding with an
assessment, for applicants with no prior boating
experience. This costs about $250.
A key benefit of the RST is the flexibility that it
offers applicants in obtaining the practical boating
experience required to demonstrate competence.
Western Australia allows unlicensed operation
of recreational vessels by people, provided they
are supervised by a holder of a RST. This enables
prospective licence applicants to obtain the
experience needed to pass the RST assessment
under the supervision of friends or family members
and at a relatively low cost i.e. fuel and time.
Applicants do not need to pass a specific training
course or demonstrate logbook experience but need
to pass the knowledge test and practical components
of the RST test outlined above. This minimises
regulatory pre-requisites and allows those who have
boating experience the opportunity to be assessed
without the need for the safety regulator to mandate
any training or logged boating time.
The Queensland Boatsafe course is a mixture of
both practical on-water assessment and training,
which can be completed during one 6-hour session.
The on-water component assesses the applicant
against a number of tasks, both individually and as
part of a training group.
South Australia also has a short practical test to
allow people aged between 12 and 15 years of age
(special permit operators) to operate a vessel, subject
to conditions, or to act as an observer in towed water
sports. In addition to passing a multiple choice theorybased test, Special Permit applicants must pass a
20 minute on-water practical skills test which involves
demonstrating boat manoeuvring skills, navigation
skills, knowledge and use of safety equipment and
knowledge of the collision regulations. An adult,
defined here to mean a person who is 16 years or
older does not need to do a practical test.
2.2.2
Logged experience
New South Wales gives applicants the option of
completing a log-book during at least 3 separate
boating trips under the supervision of a licensed
operator and following the structure of the national
competencies. In addition to the 3 trips, the supplied
logbook requires the applicant to complete
specific tasks.
This requirement to provide evidence of experience
was introduced on 1 July 2009 following a number
of recreational boating fatalities on Sydney Harbour.
A review of this practical requirement is planned
in 2012.
NSW chose a logged experience model instead of an
on-water assessment model after forming a view that
requiring applicants to demonstrate competencies
would require practical testing and it was believed that
the cost and inconvenience incurred by applicants
would not be justified having regard to the expected
safety benefits. The logbook model was instead
seen as ensuring that licence applicants at least
understood the competencies that are required for
safe operation.
Consultation was undertaken before the introduction
of log books and indicated resistance to practical
testing from the boating sector. No cost benefit
analysis was undertaken prior to the introduction of
the logbook/ practical training model.
The main weakness of a logged experience model
is the lack of an objective measure of an applicant’s
skills against a minimum standard of competence.
A further weakness is that it is difficult to detect
fraudulently completed logbooks. It is understood that
this is the prime reason behind the move in Tasmania
to phase out its logbook option from March 2011 in
favour of practical training.
2.2.3
All elements would need to be supported by the
provision of basic information. This could take
the form an expanded recreational boating safety
handbook, or, preferably a document similar to the
National Powerboating Workbook 8. This workbook
is used across Australia and includes in depth
discussion on most issues concering safe operation
of recreational boats and can be adapted to suit local
requirements, such as PFD wearing and state rules
for speed and distances.
The tables in Appendix 4 also indicate which items are
covered by the current licence test, which could be
covered by an improved test, which items could be
included as part of a logbook system, and those in a
competency based test or competency based training
or practical test or training.
As can be seen there are a large number of elements
which should be included within a licensing scheme.
The only practical way to cover all of these is by
providing information. However, information alone is
not a good method of ensuring competency. On top
of this a scheme needs to be developed covering
subsets of these elements which could be tested or
assessed in some manner. This model is the basis for
the proposed licensing options.
Several specific factors which a licensing scheme
needs to address are listed below:
2.3.1
Practical training
ff ‘Human factors’ is a term for human
performance or ‘how well a person does a
piece of work or activity’.
New South Wales and Tasmania both had practical
boating courses with no formal practical assessment.
Tasmania is phasing out its current log-book option
leaving the practical boating course as the only option
available to licence applicants. These courses run
from 3-4 hours and include both theory and on-water
practical training.
2.2.4
ff Human factors account for 61% of causal
factors in serious marine incidents and 33% of
causal factors in response only incidents.
ff Licensing is the major intervention within
the Marine Safety Act scheme which is
aimed at mitigating human factors as the
cause of incidents. Licensing can directly
focus on reducing the incidence of human
factors which lead to fatality, serious injury
and vessel incidents, by providing a testing
system whereby a person can gain enough
knowledge and skills to perform the activity
of operating a recreational vessel with
reasonable competency.
Knowledge testing
Victoria and South Australia currently use only
knowledge tests. In practice, such tests concentrate
predominantly on testing knowledge of laws and
specific parts of the collision regulations. They do
cover some operational and emergency aspects
and are therefore limited in their capacity to test
practical matters.
2.3
Items which the
basic license needs
to address
Reduce incidents caused by
human factors
2.3.2
Increase competencies of
recreational vessel masters
ff Competencies can be improved by a mix of
knowledge based testing and assessment,
training and/or experience, and practical
testing and assessment.
Appendix 4 details the elements which can be
managed by the basic license test. It also identifies
which elements can be delivered by which option.
8
National Powerboating Workbook, Edition 4
41
2.3.3
Enable targeted interventions
ff The approach which involves general licence
testing for all recreational vessel masters
and targeted endorsements for specific
vessel types and/or activities provides safety
regulators with a cost-effective method to
target risks associated with specific vessel
types and/or activities.
2.4
Evidence indicating
that outcomes from
general boating point to
issues with the general
boating license.
General boating activity encompasses fishing from
a vessel including travelling to and from fishing
grounds, casual use, cruising and non specific
sporting activities. It does not include PWC activities.
The following points are derived from the data and
information contained within Part 1 of this paper.
ff The main focus of licence training is to reduce
the numbers and severity of incidents caused
by human factors such as lack of knowledge
or skills and inconsiderate behaviour. . It has
only incidental effect on the reduction of the
severity of incidents caused by material or
environmental factors.
ff Of the serious recreational vessel incidents
where contributing factors were recorded
human factors made the greatest contribution
at 61%. Most common factors were errors
of judgement (24%), inexperience (12%),
navigational errors (7%) and failure to keep a
proper lookout (4%).
ff For non-serious or response-only incidents
human factors contributed 33% of factors with
lack of maintenance (16%) and lack of fuel
(6%) being seen as human factor reasons why
vessel disablements occur.
ff General boating is the largest grouping
of boating activity. Table 16 shows the
contribution the various components of
general boating (all vessel types excepting
PWCs) contribute to recreational activity.
ff Nowadays there is much higher percentage of
inexperienced, less knowledgeable and less
skilled people wanting to operate recreational
vessels. This is illustrated by increasing
recreational boating and with this growth, the
number of family groups attending licence
courses is increasing.
Table 16 - Vessel exposure by vessel type
Number of
registered
vessels (%)
Number of boat
trips (%)
Number of
person trips
taken (%)
Number of
vessel on water
hours (%)
Number of
on-water person
hours
Open Boat
107,121
(70.7)
568,128
(62.2)
1,366,617
(61.8)
2,857,890
(50.4)
6,978,713
(48.9)
Half Cabin
24,271
(16.0)
185,371
(20.3)
408,280
(18.5)
1,105,499
(19.5)
2,477,201
(17.4)
PWC
9,499
46,018
(5.0)
82,844
(6.3)
(3.7)
225,910
(4.0)
422,817
(3.0)
Full Cabin
Cruiser
5,450
(3.6)
53,684
(5.9)
182,756
(8.3)
747,051
(13.2)
2,548,123
(17.9)
Trailer Sailor
2,309
(1.5)
27,295
(3.0)
72,052
(3.3)
390,629
(6.9)
1,046,549
(7.3)
Yacht
2,297
(1.5)
30,304
(3.3)
92,994
(4.2)
339,213
(6.0)
768,093
(5.4)
Hovercraft
572
(0.4)
2,203
(0.2)
4,549
(0.2)
8,612
(0.2)
17,367
(0.1)
151,519
913,002
2,210,092
5,674,805
14,258,862
Total
42
ff General boating comprises all types of vessel
type activities with exception of PWCs which,
as they have a separate endorsement, are not
treated as part of general boating’. The table
above indicates that this cover 93.7% of
vessels, 95% of vessel trips, 96.3% of person
trips , 96% of vessel on water hours and 97%
of on water hours.
ff For recreational boating overall over the
past 10 years there has been an average
of 6.9 deaths a year in Victoria. In the last
5 years (despite continued growth in vessel
registrations and licensed operators), this
number has dropped to 4.8 deaths a year on
average. All deaths with the exception of a
single PWC fatality occurred during ‘general
boating’ vessel usage.
ff Licensing has an unprovable effect on fatality
reduction. The majority of fatal incidents result
in a person drowning and the vast majority of
coronial recommendations relate to mandating
the wear of personal flotation devices (PFDs),
generally or a specific type of PFD i.e. PFD
Type 1. Licence information and knowledge
testing reinforces the requirements covering
PFDs and may have an indirect impact upon
reducing the numbers of drownings.
ff Other fatality rates resulting from collisions,
fires and explosions may have also been
reduced by licensing in a similar manner.
ff 87.75 % of vessel injuries over the period
2003/4 – 2009/10 occurred during general
boating. With general boating comprising
95% of vessel trips at first glance this indicates
that general boating performs equably on the
basis that injury rates and vessel trip values
are similar. However based on activity, 51.4%
of injuries occur as a result of towed water
sports which account for only 8.9% of vessel
trips. Thus a more accurate picture would
be that 36.3% of injuries occur in 85.1% of
vessel trips.
ff The average annual cost of injuries has been
estimated by Acil Tasman in Appendix 6 to be
approximately $38 million and general boating
is responsible for 36.3% of these costing
$13.8million
ff Thus whilst a relatively low percentage of
injuries occur from general boating licensing
could contribute to reducing their estimated
$13.8million cost.
ff Injury trends are similar across the motor
boating, PWC and fishing sectors with a
decline in injuries as the age of operators
increases. This probably reflects fewer people
engaging in boating as they get older but
may reflect that older people have greater
boating experience, more highly developed
skills and a lower propensity to take risks.
Motor boating remains a higher risk activity
for older stakeholders. However these
operators generally will have had a licence
since their introduction in 2002 and improved
licensing requirements will have little or no
impact. This may indicate a need to improve
educational programs directed at people in
these age groups.
ff General licensing is unlikely to be a
suitable tool to cover all vessel activities but
particular endorsements could provide a
targeted response.
ff It is arguable that the current Victorian
licensing arrangements produce less
competent boaters than the current interstate
models. Appendix 3 contains a discussion
of work which was carried out assessing the
outcomes of Victoria’s licensing scheme.
It included practical testing of candidates
who had previously successfully completed
the Victorian knowledge test. These people
were required to complete an assessment
based on the Western Australia Practical
Assessment. The assessment contains
11 elements and the applicant is allowed two
attempts at each element. Competency in
all elements is required to pass. Based on
the outcomes of the assessment it appears
that the Victorian scheme does not deliver
an outcome consistent with the Western
Australian model as only 1 Victorian out of
49 tested was able to successfully complete
the competency assessment.
2.5
Options for licence
testing reform
A number of options for the reform of boat operator
licensing have been developed.
Note on the ‘base case’
The ‘base case’ referred to in this section is the scheme which will operate
upon the implementation of the Marine Safety Act 2010 and the Marine
Safety Regulations 2011.
43
2.5.1
Option 1 – Theory test only – status quo
Figure 10 - Licensing Option 1
Marine Licence
during daylight and
no towing)
- approved by TSV
or
Self-paced learning
Knowledge Test
mandatory component
of model
Licensing Requirements
ff Pass a knowledge test set by the Director TSV
Retain the existing theory based testing model. The
test would continue to be delivered either by VicRoads
or through a course carried out by a registered
training organisation (RTO).
Because these tests would not vary significantly
from those currently in place, there is no change
to the overall costs compared with the current
testing process.
It is a low cost option imposing the smallest regulatory
burden on the individual.
However,. this model does not assure that people
who obtain a licence are competent to safely operate
recreational vessels. It manages to test knowledge
of collision regulations and basic safety rules
but does not test practical skills in operational or
emergency situations.
44
Strengths
• No additional cost impacts to the community,
training providers or regulator.
• Is successful at effectively assessing knowledge of
collision regulations and basic safety rules
Weaknesses
• No improvement in the delivery options therefore no
effect on safety outcomes.
• Because there is no practical component this model
may be considered to compromise the mutual
recognition between jurisdictions.
• Is limited when assessing the national operational or
emergency response competency units.
2.5.2
Option 2 – Improved knowledge test split-score model
Figure 11 - L
icensing Option 2
Marine Licence
during daylight and
no towing)
- approved by TSV
or
Self-paced learning
Split-score Knowledge Test
Must get 100% correct on
mandated questions
mandatory component
of model
Retain the knowledge based test but require the
applicant to answer specific questions relating to
operational and emergency situations.
The test could be administered by approved training
providers at the conclusion of an approved course as
currently run or by VicRoads.
Strengths
This could be achieved by changing the test to a
split-score model where the test is separated into two
sections – section one containing critical questions
which the applicant must get 100% correct and
section two comprising general knowledge questions
at least 70% correct.
• Will be more successful at effectively assessing
knowledge of collision regulations and items of a
legislative nature
Mandating that the applicant must get key questions
correct provides an assurance that new licence
applicants have consistent knowledge in essential
areas related to boating safety.
Weaknesses
• Use of skilfully designed questions may improve the
ability for knowledge testing to assess operational or
emergency response competency units
• Additional cost impacts of a minor nature eg:
−− modification of government IT systems
−− more time required to administer tests increasing
costs for training providers and the regulator.
• Cost increases likely to be passed on to applicants
• Because there is no practical component this model
may be considered to compromise the mutual
recognition between jurisdictions.
• Slightly more successful in assessing emergency
response competency units.
45
2.5.3
Option 3 - Theory test and either supervised practical experience documented
through a log book or a practical training course
Complete TSV approved trainig course
- General course (4hrs)
- Certificate of completion issued
1. Theory Training or
Self-paced learning
or
Study Recreational Boat Safety Handbook or
Workbook produced by TSV
and
2. Practical Boating
Experience (demonstrated by
flexible options)
- combined theory and on-water component
delivered over 1 day
or
then
3. General knowledge
boating test
Complete a minimum number of boating hours,
under the supervision of a fully licenced operator
- Activities and hours to be recorded and certified
in a TSV developed Recreational Boating Logbook
Complete a general knowledge test developed by TSV
- as part of practical training course, or
- by attending VicRoads
mandatory component
of model
ff Pass the knowledge test set by TSV, and
ff Demonstrate experience via a logbook
or training.
This option involves retaining the existing theorybased test and adding a requirement to demonstrate
on-water training experience and is similar to current
requirements for a New South Wales General
Boat Licence.
Experience may be demonstrated by attending a
TSV approved practical training course with on-water
component or by completing a minimum number
of hours and tasks in a TSV developed logbook.
The logbook option will require access to recreational
vessel and the supervision of a fully licensed
operator who must certify each trip and task in the
applicant’s logbook.
46
The course and logbook would be supported
by a Workbook to be developed by Transport
Safety Victoria and based on the National
Powerboat Workbook used in Queensland for the
BoatSafe course.
Indications from an initial stakeholder survey are
that there is an existing capacity to deliver practical
training and/or assessment.
TSV may incur higher costs of providing resources to
conduct monitoring and auditing activities to ensure
course providers are delivering services in compliance
with TSV standards.
Strengths
Weaknesses
• Improved operator capability through
mandatory experience.
• Increased investment of time and cost to applicant.
• It provides applicants with a degree of flexibility
in that there are alternate means of obtaining the
required level of competency.
• It facilitates harmonisation of licensing requirements
between the states of Victoria and NSW. This is
important as the majority of water users on the
River Murray which is managed by NSW come from
Victoria. Adoption of similar licensing requirements
should lead to easier and consistant enforcement.
• Logbook method relies on the honesty of the licence
holder who certifies the document.
• The licence holder providing the applicant with
practical experience is not a qualified trainer and
may pass on bad habits and/or attitudes.
• A disadvantage of adopting this option is that its
effectiveness over the current knowledge based
tests cannot be easily measured as there would be
no testing process under this option.
• Given the relatively infrequent exposure to boating
in the Victorian population relative to other modes of
travel, maximising knowledge and skill retention is
a key consideration in determining the best option.
A requirement to log a minimum number of hours
of supervised vessel operation may provide a
suitable alternative to a training course in achieving
this objective.
2.5.4
Option 4 – Theory test and mandatory on-water assessment
- General course (4hrs)
- Certificate of completion issued
or
Study Recreational Boat Safety Handbook or
Workbook produced by TSV
1. Theory Training or
Self-paced learning
or
Other pathway – not specified
and
2. Practical Boating
Experience (demonstrated by
flexible options)
then
3. General knowledge
boating test
4. Practical Assessment
Complete TSV approved practical trainig course
- modelled on National Competencies
or
Other pathway – not specified
Complete a general knowledge test developed by TSV
- as part of practical training course, or
- by attending VicRoads
Mandated practical on-water assessment
- by TVS approved assessor
- estimated 1 hr on-water
Red boarder indicates
mandatory component
of model
47
Strengths
Requirements to be met for issue of licence:
• The system provides opportunities for persons to
build skills over time under supervision.
• It is an objective assessment of skills; and
ff Complete a practical assessment.
Retain the existing theory test and add a practical
on-water assessment based on the WA Skippers
Ticket model which allows a person to be assessed
regardless of how skill and knowledge is gained.
It is estimated that the practical testing would take
approximately 1 hour to complete and be similar to
the WA Skippers Ticket model.
The option would be supported by a Workbook
to be developed by Transport Safety Victoria and
based on the National Powerboat workbook used in
Queensland for the BoatSafe course. This could be
used by as part of an approved course or as a selfpaced learning method.
Applicants may complete an approved training course
but there would be no mandated requirement to
do so.
• It allows applicants the flexibility to determine
how they attain these skills – either through
training courses or supervised vessel operation
or experience.
• Potentially lower cost impacts to applicants.
• This option has the benefit of allowing applicants
with prior boating experience to go straight to an
assessment and not incur the cost of attending
training courses.
Weaknesses
• Costs
• A disadvantage is that it may not maximise
knowledge and skills retention to the same extent
as a log book option, which requires the person to
log a certain amount of on water hours under direct
supervision of an adult licence holder (if the persons
compliant and ignores possibility of falsification).
The regulator may also incur higher costs of providing
resources to conduct monitoring and auditing
activities to ensure course providers are delivering
services in compliance with TSV standards.
2.5.5
Option 5 – Mandatory on-water training course with practical and theory
assessments
Marine Licence
during daylight and
no towing)
Complete TSV approved practical trainig course
Mandated knowledge test
and
mandatory component
of model
48
Mandated practical on-water assessment
Requirements to be met for issue of licence:
ff Complete a practical training course endorsed
by TSV.
This option involves retaining the existing knowledgebased test and adding a requirement to complete a
practical on-water training course which includes a
practical assessment of skills.
The practical on-water training and testing would
be supported by a Workbook to be developed by
Transport Safety Victoria and based on the National
Powerboat workbook used in Queensland for the
BoatSafe course. Duration of course is estimated to
take approximately 6 hours to complete.
The regulator may also incur higher costs of providing
resources to conduct monitoring and auditing
activities to ensure course providers are delivering
services in compliance with TSV standards.
Strengths
• A benefit of this option are that it covers all three
parts of a general definition of competency – skills,
experience and knowledge – with an emphasis on
skills and knowledge.
• Ensures that all new licence holders have a common
level of knowledge and skill.
Weaknesses
• Increased investment of time and cost to applicant.
• Does not provide flexible pathways for learning
and experience.
Indications from an initial stakeholder survey are
that there is an existing capacity to deliver practical
training and/or assessment. Due to the higher set-up
costs of on-water training the cost to the community
are estimated to be in the order $150 per person per
one day course inclusive of assessment.
2.6
Options Summary
The table below summarises the above options.
Table 17 - s
ummary of testing and assessment modes between the options
Option
1
2
3
4
5
Theory Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical Test
Practical Assessment as part of mandated training
Y
Mandated Training
Option
Mandated Experience Recording (Logbook)
Option
Y
49
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Theory
training, or
Self-paced
learning
Theory
training, or
Self-paced
learning
Theory
training, or
Self-paced
learning
Theory
training, or
Self-paced
learning
Mandated
Theory
Training
Practical
Training,
or Experience
Mandated
Practical
Training
Combined Course
Option 1
Mandated
Practical
Training, or (a)
Mandated
Logbook
ASSESSMENT
SKILL
KNOWLEDGE
Figure 15 - Comparison of requirements for each option
Mandated (b)
Knowledge
Test
Mandated (b)
Knowledge
Test
Change to
split-score
test wit
compulsory
questions that
must be
answered
correctly
Mandated (b)
Knowledge
Test
Mandated (b)
Knowledge
Test
&
Mandated
Practical on
water
assessment (a)
Note: The items in red are mandated by legislation.
50
Mandated (b)
Knowledge
Test
&
Mandated
Practical on
water
assessment (a)
Figure 16 -Comparison of options indicating level of regulatory intervention
Option 1
MANDATED REQUIREMENTS
• Current Vic model
• Maintains the
status-quo
• No impact in time
and money
• No improvement
in copetency level
od vessel masters
Knowledge
Test
Option 2
• Minimum impact
to business
process
• Improved
knowledge
outcomes in
critical areas of
boating safety
Split-score
Knowledge
Test
Option 3
Option 4
• Aligns to NWS and
TAS models
• IAim to ensure
competency
through
mandatory
practical on-water
experience
• Logbook option is
open to abuse
• Application of skill
not assessed
• Increased costs
for practical
training
• Provides flexible
options for
attaining
exerience
• Most closely
aligned to WA
models which is
considered to
meet the intended
outcomes of the
NMSC Guidelines
• Only concered
with the outcome
•Provides flexibility
in how the
applicant acquires
knowledge &
skills
• Increased costs
for training where
applicants do not
have access to
vessels
Mandated
Practical, or
Mandated
Logbook
&
Mandated
Knowledge
Test
Mandated
Knowledge
Test
&
Mandated
on- water
Practical
Assessment
Option 5
• Minimum impact
to business
process
• Improved
knowledge
outcomes in
critical areas of
boating safety
Mandated
Knowledge
Test
&
Mandated
on- water
Practical
Assessment
INCREASED INTERVENTION
2.7
Restricted licences
and learners
Currently, restricted marine licence holders (aged
between 12 and 15) are subject to conditions which
prohibit towing and operating the vessel at more
than 20 knots. When operating the vessel at between
10 and 20 knots there must be a holder of a marine
licence who is at least 16 years old in the vessel and
it cannot be operated before sunrise or after sunset.
Restricted licences automatically convert to full
licences at the age of 16.
It is anticipated that restricted licences will be retained
with the above limitations despite the revised system
under the Marine Safety Act 2010 allowing unlicensed
people to operate vessels under supervision. This is
because young people may still wish to operate
vessels independently of supervisors and the
retention of the scheme will allow this to continue.
It is anticipated that demand will be lower for
these qualifications.
51
2.8
Cost-benefit assessment
of options
In order to objectively examine the options a cost
benefit assessment has been carried out. Appendix 5
contains full details of the cost – benefit methodology
and includes the calculations which lead to the values
presented here.
The options were assessed by calculating benefit –
cost ratios (BCRs).
Benefits were estimated in terms of the value of
reduced injuries, fatalities and property damage which
could be attributed to the general licence test.
Costs were estimated based on the costs of
implementing the various possible licensing regimes.
Forward projections of the benefits were calculated
based upon two models:
ff The average values of the past data being
used to estimate future values
ff The trend values of the past data being used
to estimate future values.
The actual BCR value is hard to determine as it
will depend whether trend based future values or
average based future values will dominate the future
benefits. In order to resolve this BCR ranges for each
delivery option assessed are used. It is assumed that
the realised BCR value would lie somewhere within
this range which is bounded by the average and
trend values.
Therefore the net present values of these two sets
of benefit estimations were used along with the
net present value of the estimated future costs to
determine benefit-cost ration (BCR) values.
Table 18 - summary of BCR results for general boat licensing options.
52
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical
test
Training
Training
and test
percentage reduction
in recreational boating
incidents
6.41%
9.00%
25.30%
22.62%
23.73%
38.85%
BCR values based on
trend values
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.7
0.4
0.5
BCR values based on
trend values
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.6
0.3
0.4
Table 18 - summary of BCR results for general
boat licensing options. above shows the estimated
reduction in injuries that differing delivery options
would deliver. As expected the interventions of a
higher level than a knowledge test are likely to achieve
the greatest benefits in reducing injuries, fatalities and
property damage.
The table also shows the BCR values which have
been estimated for each option and which are also
shown in Figure 17 - BCR ranges for general marine
licence options below. The ranges show that all BCR
values are under 1. This indicates in all cases that the
benefit of the changes is outweighed by the increase
in costs.
These indicate a benefit of between 20%
and 40%, significantly greater than those of
enhancing information and/or enhancing the basic
knowledge test.
These results mean that none of the options proposed
for licensing reform produces benefits on a purely
economic basis.
Figure 17 - BCR ranges for general marine licence options
Range of BCR values between values based on long term trends and
values based on long term averages for general boat licence
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Enhanced
Information
2.9
Enhanced
Knowledge
Logbook
Practical Test
Summary of general
marine licence options
Licensing is aimed at improving the competency
of recreational vessel masters and operators and
thereby reducing the human contribution to incidents.
There is evidence that the current marine licensing
regime could be improved and a number of options
for licence improvements are suggested. However,
the evidence used to make a case for licensing
improvements is tempered by the economic analysis
which shows that none of the options suggested are
economically justifiable.
2.9.5.1
Case for basic marine licence
improvements
ff Analysis shows that incidents resulting from
general boating could be decreased by
as much as 39% with a resulting decrease
in injuries.
ff Licensing is the only major regulatory tool
which directly influences the competency of
vessel masters and operators. Stakeholder
anecdotal evidence as well as independent
assessment of the Victorian licensing scheme
point to the Victorian licensing scheme being
less effective than other Australian schemes at
producing competent masters and operators.
Training
Training
and test
ff Navigation and other rules (e.g. speed limits)
are designed to provide a level of protection
against the risk of many marine events. It
is critically important to improve the level of
compliance with marine safety laws in the
future to address the rising occurrence of
collisions and associated incidents. Licensing
interventions assist in this by increasing
awareness and understanding of marine
safety laws. However, there is a need to ensure
that improved knowledge testing results in
an improved safety culture, not merely short
term memorisation of laws which happens
at present.
ff Following each inquest the Coroner makes
recommendations for marine safety
improvements. There has been a single case
where the coroner has explicitly recommended
that licensing be improved. This case involved
a drowning where the deceased operator had
obtained a recreational boat licence 3 days
before the incident.
ff As a result the Coroner, recommended
that all applicants, in addition to sitting the
existing written examination for a recreational
boat licence be required to undertake a
practical examination and exhibit reasonable
proficiency in the operation of a boat before
being issued with a licence.
ff The Victoria testing scheme is primarily aimed
at testing for the applicant’s knowledge of
regulatory requirements rather than assessing
their ability to manage operational or
emergency response issues.
53
ff An estimation of the relative safety of
recreational boaters compared to persons
travelling in cars in Victoria has been carried
out. Two approaches were used to estimate
relative fatality rates on an annual basis.
The measures used were based (a) on the
exposure hours of a vessel or a car per fatality,
and (b) on the distance the car or vessel
travelled per fatality.
Table 19 - Comparison of vessel and vehicle
fatality rates
3.9
6.3
Each of the methods used in the estimation
produces results of the same magnitude.
These results reflect outcomes under the
present licensing scheme and improving the
licensing scheme is likely to bring boating
safety more in line with road safety.
ff Nowadays there is a much higher percentage
of inexperienced, less knowledgeable and less
skilled people wanting to operate recreational
vessels. This is illustrated by the number of
family groups attending licence courses which
is increasing.
ff Marine licensing is aimed at reducing
human factor caused incidents. Of the
serious recreational vessel incidents where
contributing factors were recorded human
factors made the greatest contribution at 61%.
For non-serious or response-only incidents
human factors contributed 33% of factors. An
improved licensing scheme will address many
of these human factors reducing the number
of human factor caused incidents.
ff Injury trends are similar across the motor
boating, PWC and fishing sectors with a
decline in injuries as age increases. This
probably reflects fewer people engaging in
boating as they get older but may reflect that
older people have greater boating experience,
more highly developed skills and a lower
propensity to take risks.
ff However, motor boating remains a higher
risk activity for older stakeholders. These
operators generally will have had a licence
since their introduction in 2002 and improved
licensing requirements will have little or no
impact. This may indicate a need to improve
educational programs directed at people in
these age groups.
54
ff The Victorian knowledge test, albeit recently
improved, is unable to assure that applicants
are competent to successfully ‘drive’ a vessel.
The assessment discussed in Appendix 3
where 49 Victorian operators were tested using
the Western Australian practical test, and only
one successfully showed the required
competence, strongly indicates a competency
– particularly a lack of skills - problem with
the current Victorian scheme. Changing
the licensing test to a model incorporating
a practical assessment will improve the
competency of Victorian boaters and improve
the confidence other jurisdictions have in the
Victorian licensing scheme.
2.9.5.2
Case against basic marine licence
improvements
ff The economic analysis carried out
estimated that the costs for each of the
options considered outweigh the estimated
benefits for the options considered. One
of the regulatory tenants within Victoria is
that benefits should outweigh costs for any
regulatory change.
2.10 Recommendation
There is sufficient evidence to show an improvement
in the licensing scheme is desirable to address
the knowledge and skills needed for new
entrant operators.
Cost benefit analysis shows that costs outweigh
benefits on all the licensing delivery options discussed
which indicates that retention of the present scheme
may be the only available option.
However, the cost benefit rate is not the only factor to
take into account when discussing a safety scheme
such as recreational boat licensing. Evidence relating
to incidents and injuries which could be reduced by
increasing vessel operator competency provides a
strong argument in favour of licence change.
Comparing the fatality rates of vehicles and vessels
has demonstrated a greater risk in operating vessels
compared with operating road vehicles. We require
new entrant vehicle drivers to successfully complete
written and practical assessments and demonstrate
levels of experience prior to issuing a permission to
drive on Victorian roads.
As discussed, the Victorian licence scheme when
objectively assessed did not produce competent
operators compared with those from another
licensing scheme.
The recommended option is to improve operator
competency and provide a significant increase
in the safety of boating activities. This is the
option which requires the new applicant to pass
an improved knowledge test and successfully
demonstrate skills and competency by completing a
practical assessment.
This option has a negative benefit cost ratio in the
range of 0.6 – 0.7.
The option is seen as the best way to improve
competency albeit at a cost, to meet the intent of the
national Guidelines for Recreational Boat Operator
Competencies, ensure consistency with other
Australian jurisdictions and improve confidence in the
Victorian licensing scheme.
55
56
3.1
Background
The framework set up under the Marine Safety Act
2010 gives the regulator the flexibility to require a
specific licence endorsement where a vessel class or
activity requires a higher skill set than that required for
standard recreational vessel operations.
In addition to the current PWC endorsement, the
Marine Safety Review discussed the possibility of
endorsements in relation to:
ff high speed operations
ff offshore operations
ff carrying more than 12 passengers; and
ff towed water sports.
In order to obtain an endorsement a distinct skill set
needs to be identified and a competency standard
developed. The National Competency Guidelines
envisaged that the minimum set of competencies
would not address all knowledge requirements nor all
potential situations and conditions.
The method of assessing any identified skill set will
need to be determined by vessel and activity type,
based on the frequency and exposure risk levels.
Assessment methods may range from knowledgebased testing to practical on-water competencybased testing. This part of the report deals with and
analyses the issues, costs and benefits associated
with introducing future endorsements for recreational
boating activities.
3.2
Risk assessment
The risks associated with all vessel operations
were examined using risk registers and bow tie
assessments, the results of which are summarised in
Appendix 4.
Risk example – offshore fatalities
In considering the risks associated with offshore
operations, the risk workshops held with TSV
identified both the causes of vessel failure and human
errors contributing to a person entering the water
unexpectedly.
All fatalities offshore occur due to people drowning.
Therefore the risk assessment looked particularly at
mitigating the causes and results of persons ending
up in the water. This developed into means to (a) avoid
ending up in the water and (b) reduce the amount of
time in the water.
Interlinked with (a) is that in the majority of instances
when people have drowned, the reason they have
entered the water is because their vessel capsized.
3.3
Regulatory control
of risk
Nine types of possible regulatory control to reduce
risk were identified:
1. Equipment
2. Information
3. Knowledge based assessment
4. Training based assessment
5. Competency based assessment
6. Continual Training requirements
7. Ban activity
8. Government infrastructure
9. Legislated intervention
57
Controls types 2, 3, 4 and 5 represent controls which
are aimed at improving skills and knowledge of
masters that could form the basis for an endorsement
or other license based intervention.
3.4
Determining whether
an endorsement is the
preferred option
Five activities or vessel types were considered as
potentially requiring an endorsement. To determine
whether an endorsement is warranted we need to
answer the following questions.
ff Is there enough evidence from the available
data, detailed in part one of this document,
that an endorsement is required?
ff Does the risk profile developed from the bow
tie and risk assessments suggest that an
endorsement is required?
ff What should the endorsement cover?
ff Would an endorsement add value above that
of a basic licence test?
ff Would the costs of developing an
endorsement or specific intervention outweigh
the benefits?
ff If an endorsement is not considered
practicable could improved safety information
be included in TSV’s licence material?
The bow tie assessments in Appendix 4 suggest
the elements which should be included within the
endorsement curriculum.
3.5
Suggested
Endorsements
The following are the five possible endorsements
identified during the marine safety review and policy
development process.
3.5.1
Personal Water Craft operation
Currently the only endorsement in the Victorian
licensing scheme is for PWC operation. There is
general support to maintain this endorsement. The
draft Marine Safety Regulations 2011 regulate this
endorsement and maintain the current knowledge test
to acquire it.
58
There is stakeholder support for the premise that
the endorsement test is too easy. It is available
at a minimum cost and the test can be taken at
the same time as the basic license test. Many
stakeholders have commented that people do not
have to demonstrate practical experience or practical
knowledge of safe PWC practice and that the
assessment should test the practical competency of
the applicant.
3.5.2
Offshore operations
The impetus for this endorsement came from
suggestions at a number of public meetings.
Stakeholders stated that if there were proven
deficiencies in offshore operator skills or that serious
incidents were occurring due to operator issues,
an endorsement to the basic operator license may
address this in preference to managing safety by
putting limitations on the area of vessel operation.
3.5.3
High speed vessels
For the purposes of this endorsement proposal high
speed has been defined as greater speeds than 40
knots. High speed represents a high risk and if an
incident occursthere is greater likelihood of serious
injury occurring to participants and those nearby at
the time. Stakeholders agreed that an endorsement
for operators of vessels capable of travelling at high
speed should be examined.
It is noted that a majority of vessels travelling at these
speeds are PWC’s whose operators are already
required to hold a PWC endorsement. A separate
high speed endorsement would not be required for
PWC use but would be required as an additional
endorsement should a holder of a PWC endorsement
operate a conventional high speed vessel.
3.5.4
Towed water sports
Due to the number of serious injuries caused
to persons engaged in towed water sports it is
considered that a licence endorsement for vessel
operators may provide a means to reduce the risks
associated with these sports. As licensing is aimed
at improving the ability of the boat operator, one key
issue is to identify which actions are within the control
of the operator and which are within the control of the
towed person(s).
3.5.5
Vessels carrying more than
12 passengers
When developing the bow ties the following
assumptions were made:
Masters of vessels carrying a high passenger
numbers may require different or additional skills
to those of vessels with carrying fewer persons.
Vessels with large numbers of passengers potentially
face increased consequences if they capsize or are
involved in collisions due to the need to manage
the safety of a large number of persons. The master
requires not only vessel management competencies
but also personnel safety management knowledge.
ff That the suggested defences and mitigations
are fully effective.
Should the risks indicate an endorsement is required
an appropriate knowledge and/or training requirement
may provide operators with the necessary skills.
ff That exposure to this latent risk is lower than
ordinary day to day activities as recreational
boating is a discretionary activity.
Note on Restricted licence holders
Currently restricted licence holders are permitted to operate a PWC
unsupervised, provided they do not exceed 10 knots. Many exceed this
speed limit. A restricted operator may operate at speeds up to 20 knots
if accompanied by a licence holder aged at least 16 years.
It is proposed that restricted operators may be permitted to operate any
vessel requiring an endorsement provided they are at all times supervised
by an adult operator (18 years or over) who can assume responsibility
for the vessel and who is situated on the vessel at all times while it is
in operation.
An alternative is not to permit restricted operators to drive any vessel
where an endorsement is required. This may be too draconian given the
lack of evidence that this group causes major problems. It would reduce
the opportunity to teach restricted licence holders safe operations when
carrying out high risk activities which attract endorsements.
3.6
Endorsement
assessment
In examining the suggested endorsements the
following process has been used where appropriate.
3.6.1.1
Examination of data
Historical data on incidents, fatalities and injuries has
been examined to see if sufficient evidence exists for
an endorsement.
3.6.1.2
Risk assessment and Bow tie
modelling
The bow tie models in Appendix 4 were developed
by the Department of Transport and verified at an
industry workshop. From these a list of elements was
developed which form the basis of the syllabus for
each endorsement. These are included within the
relevant sections.
ff That an effective enforcement strategy is
in place.
ff That society accepts that the level of latent
risk for recreational boating activities is higher
than for ordinary day-to-day activities and that
fatalities may be a consequence of the activity.
The bow ties illustrate the mitigations and defences
in context. Those factors which are ‘human’ in nature
where knowledge and skills are required are listed in
the accompanying table which orders them according
to the National Competency framework.
3.6.1.3
Aggregation of defences and
mitigations
Defences are things put in place to prevent an event
from occurring. Mitigations are things put in place
to reduce the severity of the outcome of an event
if it occurs. There a number of interventions within
the regulatory system that provide defences and
mitigations. These include:
ff Licensing and endorsements
ff Safety equipment
ff Safety infrastructure such as radio
communicationsnetworks and search and
rescue capability
ff Education and training; and
ff Information.
The actual outcomes of an event will depend upon
not only the effectiveness of each defence and/or
mitigation, but the aggregation of all defences and
mitigations. Should one fail hopefully another will
remove the threat. Fatalities and serious injuries occur
when all defences and mitigations fail. In this model,
we are assuming that an endorsement will not be the
sole defence or provide the sole mitigation.
3.6.2
Cost benefit assessments
A model for cost benefit analysis was developed,
detailed in Appendix 4. Where it is determined that an
endorsement may be required this is used to estimate
the costs and benefits associated with each option
which has been developed for the endorsement
assessment.
59
3.7
Personal Water Craft
(PWC) Endorsement
3.7.1
3.7.1.1
Background
PWCs or jet skis are the fastest growing form of
watercraft with registrations in Victoria increasing
four or five fold during the past decade to more than
14,000 vessels currently.
There is some evidence that many Victorian PWC
operators do not abide by the current regulations
and / or are not able to operate their craft in a safe
manner. Some of the current regulations reported as
being ignored by a number of PWC riders include:
ff distance off i.e. both other riders and vessels,
as well as the waters edge;
ff speed restrictions;
ff noise pollution;
3.7.1.2
The current mitigations against the risks associated
with operating PWCs contained in Victoria’s Marine
laws include:
ff Licence applicants must pass an additional
15 question multiple-choice test to obtain a
licence endorsement to allow operation of a
PWC. These questions are drawn from a bank
of 19 questions based on a 4-page section
of the Victorian Recreational Boating Safety
Handbook and cover topics such as:
ff Towing rules
ff Navigation lights
ff Collision regulations
ff Maintaining steering control
ff Distance off rules.
ff Zoning and speed limits
3.7.1.3
ff towing and overloading.
The conclusions reached by a series of marine safety
reports in relation to PWC related injuries suggest that
injury numbers and severity could be reduced by:
ff improving the skills and safety knowledge of
PWC operators,
ff increased compliance with safety
requirements, including speed limits,
ff better protective equipment, and
ff improved safety design of craft.
Targeted licensing by the use of an endorsement for
PWC masters is used as way to improve the situation.
The current PWC endorsement requires the
successful completion of a knowledge test which is
completed at the same time as a general operator’s
boat licence test. It should be noted that whilst many
complaints against PWC operators reflect poor
behaviour and or deliberate non-compliance with
current regulations, licensing is not the solution to
these issues. Recent legislative changes resulting
in the Hoon Boating laws, coupled with increased
enforcement of regulations, are directly aimed at
reducing these behaviours to an acceptable level.
60
Current mitigations
Safety equipment requirements
Towing of water skiers, wake
boarders etc.
PWCs are able to tow, providing the towing operation
meets the towing requirements specified in the
marine regulations.
The potential use of a towing endorsement is
discussed else where and would apply to the master
and operators of PWCs undertaking towing should
such an endorsement be required by the regulations.
3.7.2
National and international
comparisons
3.7.2.1
Other jurisdictions
Within Australia, where the requirement for a license
exists for recreational boat operators to hold a boat
operator licence, jurisdictions usually require the
operator of a PWC to be licensed or have their licence
endorsed. This is achieved through successfully
passing a test. The table below summarises
requirements for each Australian jurisdiction.
Table 20 - PWC licensing requirements within Australia
Jurisdiction
Intervention
Victoria
Knowledge test.
Queensland
Queensland has the most comprehensive test for PWC operators, unit 7 of the
Queensland Boatsafe scheme.
This involves a 2 to 3 hour training course which includes practical onwater assessments.
Applicants must also successfully complete the 6-hour Boatsafe course for general
recreational vessels.
Tasmania
Completion of a PWC training course
Western Australia
Considering a PWC practical test
NSW
In addition to the basic boating licence the applicant has to complete an additional
knowledge test to obtain a PWC endorsed recreational boating licence
South Australia
Allows persons holding a general boat licence to operate PWCs but does not allow
the operation of PWCs by special permit holders i.e. 12 to 15 year olds.
3.7.2.2
Harmonisation issues
Due to the different PWC licensing arrangements
between Victoria and bordering States some
issues have arisen which highlight a lack of
harmonised arrangements.
South Australia has noted an inconsistency where
Victorian restricted licence holders with a PWC
endorsement have been allowed to operate on South
Australian waters under the mutual licence recognition
arrangements when South Australian residents of the
same age are prohibited from operating.
NSW has publicly stated that as a result of issues
on the River Murray harmonisation of Victorian
requirements with their own would be beneficial as
this would increase operator competencies via a
common information package.
3.7.3
PWC incidents, fatality and
injury trends
3.7.3.1
Serious incidents within Victoria
In Victoria during the 6 years from 2003/4 and
2009/10 there were 40 PWC incidents that resulted in
serious injury.
The incidents included:
ff Eleven incidents were high speed collisions
between PWCs
ff Two incidents occurred as a result of people
coming off their PWC after getting caught in
the wash of other vessels
ff Two of the injuries were caused by explosions.
From these we have identified the following
contributing factors:
ff Error of judgement was a factor in 13 of the
26 incidents.
ff Excessive speed was a factor in 12 of the
26 incidents.
ff Inexperience was a factor in 12 of the
26 incidents.
ff Failure to keep a proper lookout was a factor in
7 of the 26 incidents.
Given the nature of these craft and the way they are
operated it is suspected that speed would be a factor
in most of the incidents. Of the serious PWC incidents
where MUARC have included narratives of incidents,
speed was a major factor.
3.7.3.2
Serious PWC incident case studies
The following illustrate some typical PWC incidents
which have occurred. These incidents are sourced
from a number of Australasian jurisdictions and
illustrate how incidents have much in common
regardless of where they occur.
ff Two incidents occurred as a result of a
collision with a boat and a PWC
collision with a tree
PWC grounding
61
Case study 1
Case study 3
On June 13, 2009, in Auckland Harbour New Zealand
there was an incident involving a PWC in a race
colliding with an observing New Zealand Coast Guard
rescue vessel. Due to a procedural failure the NZCG
vessel was unaware there was a race being staged
and proceeded through the course heading to a
predestined training area. The briefing before the
race made participants aware that the course was
not closed.
On the 21st. December 2010 an incident on the Swan
River near Perth, Western Australia, saw one PWC
collide into another, severing a leg from the second
PWC rider. The cause, although not stated, was
likely to be from lack of attention to the vessels in
the vicinity.
The look out on the NZCG vessel detected the PWC
approaching at high speed from the port side and
noted the PWC was on a collision course. The master
of the NZCG vessel expected the PWC to give way as
it was supposed to do under the collision regulations.
With the PWC at a distance of around 150 metres he
sounded a number of short blasts from the NZCG
vessel’s horn to warn the PWC rider of their presence
believing that his vessel, being the stand on vessel,
could maintain her course and speed as required
under the International Maritime Collision Regulations
and that the PWC rider would give way as she was
supposed to.
The PWC rider did not give way and the NZCG vessel
subsequently collided with the PWC while making a
last moment hard turn to starboard. The PWC rider
suffered a fractured ankle and several fractured ribs
as a result.
In 2007 near Bribie Island, in Pumicestone Passage
along the coast of Queensland, a PWC carrying a
9 year old girl and a 10 year old boy as passengers
hit a navigation pole causing both the children to be
thrown off the PWC. The 9 year old girl was killed and
the 10 year old boy suffered serious injury. The driver
of the PWC was unlicensed.
Case study 5
In 2007 in Queensland a hired PWC collided with
the anchor chain of a moored vessel and the
operator died. It was concluded that the operator
‘did not possess the necessary skills to successfully
navigate past a moored vessel’. One of the coroner’s
recommendations was that all persons who use a
PWC in Queensland be licensed
Case study 6
During investigation the PWC rider stated she had not
seen the NZCG vessel and that raised the question
over whether she had kept a proper look out as
required under the International Maritime Collision
Regulations. The rider of the PWC also stated that ‘in
a straight line, you’re obviously concentrating pretty
hard on what you’re doing’. The rider was wearing a
helmet which restricted lateral vision unless the head
was turned left or right.
In Victoria two PWCs were travelling in the same
direction on Lake Nagambie, one following close
behind the other. The lead PWC deliberately turned to
throw up water onto the following PWC. It is alleged
the forward motion of the lead PWC was either
stopped or slowed and the PWC at the rear came
through the water and hit the back of the lead PWC.
The operator of the lead PWC had fallen off the PWC
just prior to the collision and was struck by the other
PWC, he sustained serious spinal injuries and was
transferred to Northern Hospital.
Case study 2
Case study 7
In 2007 a PWC struck a swimmer at a popular beach
in New Zealand and the swimmer suffered a fractured
right scapula along with 3 broken ribs.
In Victoria a PWC with 3 persons on board executed
a long turn to starboard (speed unknown). A second
PWC, that was travelling much faster, struck the first
PWC on the starboard aft quarter, hitting the rear two
occupants of the first PWC. All persons were thrown
into the water. The operator of the second PWC
checked that there were no life threatening injuries
and rode away. The first PWC returned to shore,
the Surf Life Saving Patrol provided first aid and the
ambulance was called.
The skipper (master) pleaded guilty to not keeping
a proper lookout and admitted his sun glasses had
some sea spray on them as well as some sun strike.
He further admitted to periodically looking around
to see where a companion, also riding a PWC,
was located.
He also convicted of not operating at a speed that
would have allowed him to take action to avoid a
collision, as he was near or in a speed restricted zone
and within 50 metres of a person in the water.
62
Case study 4
Table 21 - PWC incident causal factors
Causal Factor identified
Expectation that other vessel would give way according
to rules of the road
Error of Judgement on other vessel
Expectation that sound signal would alert other vessel
operator to danger
Delay in taking avoiding action when operator of other
vessel failed to give way
Restricted vision due to helmet
Error of Judgement, Failure to keep a proper lookout
Not keeping a proper lookout
Failure to keep a proper lookout
Equipment (sunglasses) causing vision impairment
Error of Judgement,
PWCs operating in close proximity
Error of Judgement
Young persons operating PWC
Error of Judgement,
Inexperienced operator operating PWC
Typical features of these PWC incidents are that they
occur at high speed and involve collisions. Typical
causal factors are errors of judgement, lack of proper
lookout and inexperience.
3.7.3.3
Fatalities
Of the 48 recreational boat fatalities recorded over
the past 8 years only one PWC related fatality has
been recorded in Victoria. The fatality occurred in
April 2004 and involved a 29 year old unlicensed
and inexperienced male operator. Whilst operating
the PWC in a swell outside a sheltered cove about
300m off Port Fairy Lighthouse the deceased rode at
speed into a large crashing wave resulting in a heavy
crash. The deceased was rendered unconscious –
probably from his head impacting the PWC - and
drowned. The coroner’s report noted that the PFD
type 3 worn at the time did not place the deceased in
a safe floating position and recommended a review
of the PDF wearing requirements for PWC operation,
particularly in open waters.
Holding a license may have reduced the risk as the
material supporting the issue of an RBOL includes
discussion on operating vessels in breaking
waves. A practical PWC endorsement including
operating a PWC may further reduce the risk in
similar circumstances.
In addition in 2001, there was a PWC fatality on the
Goulburn River. The following extract from a joint MSV
Coroners report demonstrates the incident resulted
from the operator having insufficient knowledge
and skill9.
This fatality resulted from drowning which was not
intrinsically linked to the use of the PWC.
The Coroner made the point that the deceased did
not have a Recreational Boat Operator Licence,
nor did he have the PWC endorsement.
9
“Recreational Vessel Fatalities in Victoria 1999–2002” A joint initiative
of the State Coroner’s Office, the Department of Human Services and
Marine Safety Victoria. Compiled by Lyndal Bugeja, Injury Prevention
Research Officer, September 2003.
63
Goulburn river incident
There was one incident involving a PWC. The deceased
was going for a ride up the Goulburn River when he
collided with another vessel (a ski boat). The deceased
suffered a head injury and was unconscious when he
was thrown into the water. The deceased was wearing
a PFD at the time of the incident and alcohol had not
been consumed.
An investigation by the water police concluded that
the incident was a result of human error, primarily
inexperience and excessive speed. The investigating
police member noted the following in part:
• Contrary to the practices of good seamanship,
the operator of the PWC [deceased] did fail to
maintain sufficient throttle, thereby reducing his
vessel’s ability to manoeuvre and avoid collision
with vessel;
• Contrary to the practices of good seamanship, the
operator of the PWC [deceased] did fail to make
proper allowances for his inexperience on these
high performance craft in that he failed to maintain
minimum vessel separation;
• Contrary to the provisions of the Marine Act,
Schedule 1, Rule 7, Section (a), International
Collision Regulations, the operator [deceased] did
fail to use all means appropriate to the prevailing
circumstances and conditions to determine if
risk of collision exists before executing a turning
manoeuvre. (If there is any doubt, such risk shall be
deemed to exist);
Both cases suggest that increased competency
resulting from more vigorous licence testing could
have reduced the likelihood of the incident becoming
a fatality.
3.7.3.4
PWC Injuries
The following figure is derived from the MUARC
reports into Marine Safety in Victoria, and shows
in absolute terms how the number of injuries
sustained by those involved in PWC operations has
changed over the financial years 2003/4 to 2009/10.
For comparison it also includes the total recreational
boating injuries and the percentage of the total which
is PWC related. Conclusions reached are:
ff There is an upward trend in all vessel injury
numbers.
ff There is an upward trend in PWC injury
numbers.
ff There is a small upward trend in the
percentage of injuries which PWC injuries
make up compared to the total.
The above factors indicate that not only are PWC
injuries increasing but they form an increasing
proportion of the total. Both trends illustrate that
current interventions may not be as effective as they
need to be.
• Contrary to the provisions of Notice No. 1, under
Section 15(2) of the Marine Act 1988, the operator
of PWC [deceased] did fail to operate his vessel at
a speed not exceeding 5 knots within 50 metres of
another vessel.
64
Figure 18 - Summary of PWC injury numbers compared with all injuries numbers sustained by recreational
boaters 2003/4 - 2009/10
14.00%
1200
12.00%
1000
10.00%
800
8.00%
600
6.00%
400
4.00%
200
2.00%
0
0.00%
2003/4
2004/5
2005/6
2003/4
2006/7
2004/5
2007/8
2005/6
2008/9
2009/10
2006/7
2007/8
2008/9
2009/10
PWC injuries
51
71
93
80
118
118
117
Rec. boat injuries
535
725
947
902
899
995
1097
9.00%
9.70%
9.80%
8.80%
13.10%
11.80%
10.60%
% of PWC injuries to rec.
boat injuries
PWC activities cause injuries resulting in hospital
admissions and presentations. The following points
come from the MUARC marine safety reports and
exposure report.
ff PWCs represented 8.1% of registered vessels
in 2008/9.
ff From the exposure report PWCs represented
5.% of vessel trips, 3.7% of person trips, 4%
of on water vessel hours and 3. % of on water
person hours.
ff In the five year period between 2003/4 and
2007/8 PWC injuries represented an average
of 17% of all boating hospital admissions.
ff PWC related injuries accounted for 13% of
recreational boating hospital-treated injuries in
2007/08. In total there were 118 PWC related
injuries which resulted in 59 admissions and
59 ED presentations. Most of these injuries
occurred as a result of ‘onboard incidents’ and
falls, although it is noted that there appears to
be a lack of commonality between the cause
descriptors used to record the hospital and
ED outcomes.
ff 26 PWC incidents resulted in serious injury in
Victoria over the period 2003/4 to 2007/8.
ff Injuries in PWC riding have been trending
upwards over the last 6 years.
ff Most of the injured were males and almost
80% were aged between 15 and 34 years.
65
The MUARC reports list the major causes of injury
from PWCs in Victoria over a seven year period as:
ff Falls from the PWC (33%)
ff Being struck by/colliding with an object (in
most cases their own PWC or another PWC)
(30. %).
The percentage of PWCs to overall boat registrations
is between 6% and 7%. When related to the numbers
of injuries caused by PWC activities this clearly
reflects a disproportionate representation of PWC
operators being injured.
Figure 19 - Trend in hospital-treated recreational boating injury by watercraft/activity, Victoria: VAED and
VEMD 2003/4 – 2009/10 (n=6,076)
600
500
400
Towed water sports
Motorboating/boating unspecified
PWC riding
Sailing
Wind/Kite surfing
Fishing from a boat
Paddle craft
300
200
100
0
2003/4
2004/5
2005/6
2006/7
The figure above summarises the past 7 years of
injury data for all recreational vessels and illustrates
the changes in injuries for a number of activities
including PWCs. The other major activities which are
carried out and cause injury are towed water sports
(which account for 9% of vessel trips but 50% of
injuries) and general boating (86% of vessel trips and
34% of injuries). It indicates that the number of PWC
injuries is plateauing but that they are still at a level
of concern and improvement should be sought to
reduce these numbers.
3.7.3.5
Age and experience of injured parties
One pointer to whether licensing is an appropriate
mechanism for managing incident and injury
reduction is whether incidents are due to
inexperienced and/or immature operators.
Incident records do not record experience levels
of operators. However hospital records do include
the age of the person treated which in the majority
of cases is probably the operator and can be used
as a loose proxy for experience. The table below
summarises the number of injuries in relation to the
age group of the injured party.
66
2007/8
2008/9
2009/10
Table 22 - Number of injuries compared to age
of operator
Age of injured party
PWC riding (n=647)
N
%
0-14
29
4.5
15-29
309
47.8
30-44
206
31.8
45-59
89
13.8
60+
14
2.2
Total
647
85.1% of injuries are to persons under 44 and 52.3%
to persons under 29. This is an expected result, as
PWCs attract young fit operators and young families
They are a relatively inexpensive form of recreational
boating which is attractive as an entry level vessel.
The high percentage of young people being injured
may indicate that an improved endorsement will help
reduce incidents and injury. The endorsement will be
taken by persons starting out in PWC operations and
will directly target the inexperienced.
3.7.3.6
Injury types
The cause of injuries is recorded as part of the data
set. The table below summarises this information for
PWC riding incidents.
Table 23 - H
ospital-treated recreational PWC-related
injury by nature of injury over 7 years
2003/4 – 2009/10
Injury cause
PWC riding (n=647)
Fractures, dislocations and soft tissue injuries make
up 49% of injuries.
The MUARC follow up study interviewed 7 PWC
operators who had sustained injuries and the 7 PWC
riders reported 8 injuries with one rider identifying
2 separate injuries from the same incident.
The 6 riders that suffered single injuries sustained
the following:
ff a bump to the neck that caused temporary
paralysis;
N
%
Fall
135
20.9
Hit/struck/crush
127
19.6
Transport/craft accident
156
24.1
Cutting/piercing
9
1.4
ff concussion;
Near drowning
22
3.4
ff compound finger fractures; and
Fire/burn/explosion
2
0.3
ff facial bruising.
Other specified
148
22.9
Unspecified
48
7.4
ff fractured coccyx;
ff dislocated shoulder;
The seventh suffered multiple injuries including
concussion and facial cuts/bruising.
Falls and being hit/struck/crushed are high on the list
of injury causes. PWC incidents often occur at high
speed and it is likely that the severity of the impact
leading to the injury will result in these injuries being
relatively serious.
These single injury types indicate the severity of
many injuries, the significants of which may be easily
overlooked if are only examining the high level injuries.
The types of injury recorded are listed below.
The table below derived from that table in Appendix 6
summarises the number of major injuries (hospital
admissions) and minor issues (emergency
department presentations) from PWC activities over
the period from 2003/4 to 2008/9. It compares the
PWC outcomes with all vessel outcomes and shows
that 16% of major injuries, 8% of minor injuries and
10% of all injuries over the six years resulted from
PWC incidents,
Table 24 - Hospital-treated recreational PWC related injury by injury type over 7 years
2003/4 – 2009/10
Injury type
PWC riding (n=647)
N
%
Fracture
185
28.6
Dislocation/sprain/ strain
99
15.3
Open wound
104
16.1
Intracranial
22
3.4
Injury to muscle/ tendon
37
5.7
Superficial injury
55
8.5
Other
123
19.0
Unspecified
22
3.4
3.7.3.7
Cost of admissions
Given that PWC registrations are approximately
6.3% of the total and PWC activity is 5% of all vessel
trips., PWC activities are over represented in the
injury statistics.
Appendix 6 discusses how the injury costs were
derived for the purposes of this report. These
values are:
ff The average cost of a hospital stay up to
7 days is $5000
ff The average cost of hospital stays > 7 days
is $147,600
67
Table 25 - PWC related injury admissions period 2003/4-2008/9
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
Annual
average
Major injuries ($147,600 per incident)
PWC
PWC major
injury Costs
Total incidents
Total Costs ($m)
22
34
39
29
59
46
38
$ 3,247,200
$5,018,400
$ 5,756,400
$ 4,280,400
$8,708,400
$6,789,600
$5,608,800
156
211
244
223
298
284
236
$23.03
$31.14
$36.01
$32.92
$43.98
$41.92
$34.83
30
36
56
54
59
71
51
$ 150,000
$ 180,000
$ 280,000
$ 270,000
$ 295,000
$ 355,000
$ 255,000
Minor injuries ($5,000 per incident)
PWC
PWC minor
injury Costs
Total incidents
Total Costs ($m)
379
514
703
679
810
711
633
$1.90
$2.57
$3.52
$3.40
$4.05
$3.56
$3.17
The cost of major injuries (hospital admissions) from
PWC incidents/accidents for the years 2003/4 and
2008/9 is estimated at $33,800,000 an average of
$5,608,800 per annum.
The cost of minor injuries (hospital emergency
department presentations) from PWC incidents/
accidents for the years 2003/4 and 2008/9 is
estimated as $1,530,000, an average of $255,000
per annum.
3.7.3.8
Summary of fatalities and injuries
PWC incidents tend to occur at high speed with
severe impacts. Fortunately the number of PWC
fatalities has remained low with only a single fatality
over the past few years. However there has been an
upward trend in PWC injuries and injury rates since
licensing was introduced in 2002/3 and this remains
a concern.
PWC activity will always be a higher risk activity
when compared to general boating due to the high
speed operation of these vessels. While PWC activity
may seem unimportant compared to other boating
activities due to the lower number of participants, the
relatively high rate of injury, the numbers of injuries,
the types of injuries and costs to society demonstrate
that PWC incidents are a major cause of concern and
cost effective actions are required to reduce injury
rates and costs.
3.7.3.9
Is there a distinct skill set required to
safely operate a PWC?
ff The following unique characteristics of PWCs
and their operation suggest that a distinct
skill set beyond that required for standard
recreational boat operations is required for
operation The speed at which a PWC can be
operated (up to 120kph – approx 65 knots)
considerably reduces the time in which an
assessment of a risk of collision can be made
and evasive action can be taken.
68
ff Operating vessels at such speeds leads
to ‘tunnel vision’ and an inability to see
crossing hazards
ff There is a loss of steerage when power is
taken off while operating a PWC. This causes
problems as the natural reaction when an
operator encounters a problem is to take the
power off and then attempt to turn to avoid
the incident. Doing this on a PWC will instead
result in the PWC going straight on, as some
power is required to turn a PWC.
ff The relatively small size of PWCs makes them
more susceptible than standard recreational
vessels to the effects of wash from other
vessels operating nearby.
ff PWCs do not offer the same level of protection
from collision impact as standard recreational
vessels. The occupant(s) are directly exposed
to crushing and being ejected from the PWC.
3.7.3.10 PWC operations from a risk
perspective
A risk assessment of vessel and PWC operations
was carried out to look at the problems of operations
from a risk perspective rather than merely looking
at past evidence in the form of incident, fatality and
injury data.
Appendix 4 details the bow tie analysis carried out
to look at recreational vessel operations from a risk
perspective. It includes a table which summarises
outcomes from external workshops as well as from
analysis carried out by the Department of Transport.
Conclusions drawn from the above are:
ff That the current PWC interventions do
not adequately ensure that operators are
competency trained. A basic marine licence
test addresses issues such as rules of the
road and legal requirements but it does not
address the particular operational issues
associated with PWCs.
ff That these issues generally relate to National
Competency 2 – Safe Operations.
ff That operational issues need to be adequately
covered by the licensing scheme.
ff That options for addressing these operational
issues are to:
–– Provide improved, targeted information to
PWC Masters
–– Require applicants to undertake a
knowledge test. This test should expand
the scope of the the current PWC
knowledge test.
–– Require applicants to undertake practical
training.
3.7.4
The following options have been developed for testing
for a PWC endorsement.
Note
In considering the options, a decision was made not to include a log
book or a training only option. These were discarded as it was felt that an
assessment or testing should be mandatory as part of the requirements.
A logbook or training option were not considered to achieve a result
consistent with the objective of demonstrating skills.
3.7.5
The base case assumes that there is a continuation of
the current PWC endorsement requirement from the
date that the Marine Safety Act 2010 comes into force.
An applicant is issued with a PWC endorsement
provided he or she:
ff Holds a marine licence; and
ff Successfully completes a knowledge test
on material contained within the Victorian
Recreational Vessel Safety hand book.
The knowledge test may be undertaken either at
VicRoads or at a Registered Training Organisation
which has a Service Level Agreement with Transport
Safety Victoria to provide knowledge testing.
The test consists of 15 multiple choice questions, of
which at least 13 must be answered correctly.
Questions are derived from information on state rules
and the regulations governing PWC use.
PWC endorsements have been required for
Victorian recreational boat operators since 2002.
This option would maintain the current model which
is a knowledge test based on boating information
contained in the current recreational boat operators
hand book.
If the current system is maintained, current safety
outcomes would be expected to be maintained with
increasing injuries and the occasional fatality, in the
absence of other types of intervention.
3.7.6
–– Require applicants to demonstrate a
level of experience through a logbook or
3.7.3.11 Base case – current PWC
endorsement
Options
Option 2 - Improved PWC
information with improved
knowledge test based on
this information
The risk analysis and resulting matrix in the
previous table provided a list of elements for PWC
endorsement. This matrix includes a list of improved
information which needs to be provided by the Safety
Director and a list of items which an improved test
should give.
These are:
ff Impact of boat use on others and
the environment*
ff Handling a vessel at speed and turning
at speed
ff ‘Defensive Operation Skills’ - understanding
operational hazards and how to reduce the
likelihood of them becoming a risk, including
operating at night*
ff Skills for taking evasive action while towing
skiers, wake boarders etc.
ff Understand risks of high speed operation*
ff Understanding the physics of
towing someone*
ff Education about appropriate speed
for conditions*
ff Collision avoidance techniques to be applied
when required in accordance with relevant
legislation, recognised regulations and rules
ff Importance of having spatial awareness*
69
ff Understand loss of steerage occurs when
power is taken off PWC*
ff Understand that PWCs are more susceptible
to the effects of wash from other vessels
ff Understand that PWCs do not offer the same
structural protection from collision impacts as
other vessels
The items marked with * can be tested through
improved information being available.
As an alternative to developing new material
for Victoria, the NSW package which includes
2 DVD’s containing PWC specific information could
be adopted.
3.7.7
Option 3 - Improved PWC
information via DVD or similar
mechanism with improved
knowledge test based
on this information and a
practical assessment
Option 3 would expand Option 2 to include a
The assessment would include:
ff Handling a vessel at speed and turning
at speed.
3.7.8
Summary of options
Option 1 represents Victoria PWC endorsement as
of 31st. June 2011 and under current legislation.
The outcomes associated with this intervention are
improved information for PWC operators.
Option 2 enhances 1 by improving delivered
information along with improved knowledge testing
would deliver more competent operators. The
broadened scope of knowledge testing aims to
address the human factors which contribute to
collisions and drowning.
An improved knowledge test would benefit PWC
operators understanding of boating rules and PWC
operations, but it would not, of itself embrace the
operating skills of PWC masters.
Option 3 is a combination of option 2 with a practical
assessment in addition to the improved knowledge
test. A practical assessment would give the new
operator the opportunity to demonstrate practical
skills and also discover any areas they are not
competent in. This would ensure the new operator
is aware of areas in which they need to improve
their skills.
The outcome from option 3 would be more skilled
and more knowledgeable operators, creating a safer
environment to operate in for everyone.
ff Skills for taking evasive action while towing
skiers, wake boarders etc.*
ff Understanding the risks of high
speed operation.
ff Understanding the physics of
towing someone.*
ff Importance of having spatial awareness.
ff Understand loss of steerage occurs when
power is taken off PWC.
ff Understand that PWCs are more susceptible
to the effects of wash from other vessels.
*Note that should a towing endorsement be prescribed that these issues
would be dealt with within a towing endorsement.
The Queensland PWC practical assessment
model could be used as the basis for a Victorian
70
Human Factors
Incident types
Syllabus of Test
OPTION 1
OPTION 2
OPTION 3
• Knowledge only
gained from
recreational hand
book and no skills
gained.
• Improved
information
resulting in extra
knowledge
gained on top
of information
in recreational
boating book.
• Improved
information
resulting in extra
knowledge
gained on top
of information
in recreational
boating book.
• Improved
knowledge
assessed by
knowledge test.
• Improved
knowledge
assessed by
knowledge test.
• Skills
demonstration
from DVD
or similar
mechanism.
• Skills
demonstration
from DVD
or similar
mechanism.
• Knowledge
assessed by
knowledge test.
• Skills tested
by practical
assessment.
Collision avoidance
techniques are
applied when
required in
accordance with
relevant legislation,
recognised
regulations and rules.
Collision, capsize,
• Yes
• Yes
• Demonstrate
ability to
manoeuvre a
PWC smoothly
while operating at
various speeds.
• Demonstrated
ability to
adequately
determine a speed
of 5 knots.
−− Demonstrated
ability to
adequately
determine a
distance of
50m.
−− Demonstrate a
proper lookout.
Training is given on
handling a vessel at
speed and turning at
speed
• Yes
Understanding
risks of high speed
operation
• Yes
Education about
appropriate speed
for conditions
• Partially
• Yes
Importance of spatial
awareness
• Partially
• Yes
• Yes
• Yes
Understanding loss
of steerage occurs
when power is taken
off
Collision, capsize
• Yes
71
Human Factors
Incident types
Skills for taking
evasive action while
towing a skier,
wakeboard etc.
Collision with fixed
object or other
vessel/skier
OPTION 2
OPTION 3
• Yes
• Yes
PWC’s do not offer
the same structural
protection from
collision impacts
• Yes
• Yes
Understanding
physics of towing
someone
• Yes
• Yes
• Yes
• Yes
• Yes
• Yes
PWC more
susceptible to the
effects of wash from
other vessels
OPTION 1
Capsize
“Defensive
operation skills”
– understanding
operational hazards
and how to reduce
the likelihood of them
becoming a risk (also
to include operation
at night
3.7.9
Cost Benefit Analysis
presented here.
cost ratios (BCRs).
based upon two models
trend values.
Therefore the net present values of these two sets
of benefit estimations were used along with the
net present value of the estimated future costs to
determine benefit-cost ration (BCR) values.
72
Table 26 - Summary of BCR results for PWC licensing endorsement options
PWC endorsement
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
4.01%
Logbook
Practical test
9.14%
24.91%
PWC endorsement
Trend based
1.89
1.56
PWC endorsement
Average based
1.0
0.9
The first line of Table 26 above shows the estimated
reduction in injuries that differing delivery options
could deliver. As expected the reduction in injuries by
completing a practical test is expected to be higher
than for an enhanced knowledge test and improved
information alone.
Training
Training and
test
shown in Figure 20 below. The ranges show that
the range of estimated BCR values range from .9 to
1.89. This indicates that it is highly probable that an
intervention will have greater benefit than the costs to
deliver the benefit.
These results mean that these results support
improved licensing reforms for PWC operators on a
purely economic basis.
Figure 20 - BCR ranges for investigated PWC options
Range of BCR values between values based on long term trends
and values based on long term averages for PWC operation
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Enhanced
Knowledge
The above values were further weighted based upon
any changes to the base licence method. It was felt
that an improved basic licensing regime (should one
be implemented) would have the effect of reducing
the effectiveness of an improved PWC endorsement.
The table below illustrates this with some examples
of how the range of BCR values could be assumed
to change with differing improved basic licence
delivery options.
Practical Test
This table illustrates that any changes to basic
licence would make any PWC endorsement changes
more marginal. Thus should changes to a basic
licence scheme materialise then their effect on any
changes to the PWC endorsement will need to be
further examined.
73
Table 27 - PWC endorsement BCRs weighted for overlap due to licence method
Weight due to base licence method
No change
0%
Enhanced
knowledge
test 5%
Training or
logbook 10%
Practical
Assessment
15%
Training plus
Assessment
20%
1.89 - 1
1.80 - .95
1.70-.9
1.61- .85
1.51 - .80
1.56 - .90
1.48 - .86
1.40 - .81
1.33 - .77
1.25 - .70
PWC endorsement
Range of knowledge test BCRs –
trend to average ‘trend’ model
Range of Practical test BCRs –
3.7.10
Case for PWC endorsement
improvements
A PWC endorsement is aimed at improving the
competency of PWC masters and operators and
thereby reducing the human contribution to incidents.
There is evidence that the current PWC licensing and
endorsement regime could be improved. Current
outcomes indicate that whilst PWCs make up a small
percentage of the total number of registered vessels
they are involved in a disproportionate number of
incidents and injuries.
The evidence which is used to make a case for PWC
endorsement improvements is supported by the
economic analysis which shows that some of the
options suggested are economically justifiable.
The following points summarise the case for an
improved PWC endorsement
ff That the current PWC interventions do
not adequately ensure that operators are
competently trained. A basic marine licence
test addresses issues such as rules of the
road and legal requirements but it does not
address the particular operational issues
associated with PWCs.
covered by the licensing scheme
ff PWCs represented 8.1% of registered vessels
in 2008/9.
ff PWC operations represented 5.0% of vessel
trips, 3.7% of person trips, 4.0% of on water
vessel hours and 3.0% of on water person
hours. .
ff PWC operations are responsible for 16% of
major injuries, 8% of minor injuries and 10%
of all injuries over the six year the period from
2003/4 to 2008/9
ff Injuries in PWC riding have been trending
74
80% were aged between 15 and 34 years.
ff The cost of major injuries (hospital
admissions) from PWC incidents/accidents
for the years 2003/4 and 2008/9 is estimated
at $33,800,000 an average of $5,608,800
per annum.
ff The cost of minor injuries (hospital emergency
department presentations) from PWC
incidents/accidents for the years 2003/4 and
2008/9 is estimated $ 1,530,000, an average
of $255,000 per annum.
ff It is estimated that the number of injuries
could be reduced by approximately 9% saving
$527,742 should an enhanced knowledge test
be introduced.
ff It is estimated that the number of injuries could
be reduced by approximately 25% saving
$1,700.502 should a practical PWC operator
assessment test be introduced.
ff Benefit cost ratios (BCRs) for improving the
knowledge test are positive ranging between
1.0 and 1.89.
ff Benefit cost ratios (BCRs) for improving
implementing a practical PWC operator
assessment test are positive ranging between
0.9 and 1.56.
3.7.11
Recommendation
Given the increasing trend in PWC related incidents
and the move by a number of Australian jurisdictions
towards practical testing for PWC operators, the
introduction of a specific PWC knowledge test and
practical test modelled on Unit 7 of the Queensland
Boatsafe course to obtain a PWC endorsement in
Victoria is recommended.
Adoption of the proposal that restricted operators
may be permitted to operate at any speed, provided
they are at all times supervised by an adult operator
(18 years or over) who will assume responsibility
for the vessel as master and who is situated on
the vessel at all times while it is in operation is
also recommended.
3.8
Offshore operations
endorsement
3.8.1
These characteristics mean that support systems
for offshore boaters such as safety infrastructure
and communication points/facilities are important
in ensuring that offshore operations can be carried
out safely.
3.8.1.1
Background
3.8.1.3
The Victorian fleet which engages in offshore
operation ranges from modern vessels designed and
operated with offshore conditions in mind to vessels
of many types and ages which may not be suitable for
operating in other than optimum offshore conditions.
Offshore vessel operations are defined as vessels
operating greater than 2 nautical miles offshore. This
aligns with the definition contained in the Victorian
Recreational Boat Safety Handbook when specifying
safety equipment.
The majority of offshore activities undertaken are
either fishing from vessels or vessels transiting along
the coast. The amount of offshore activity has been
reasonably constant although there has been an
increase in activity due to tuna fishing off the western
Victorian coast. This occurs seasonally from March
until May and recent years have seen large numbers
of vessels operating up to 50nm from shore.
3.8.1.2
Characteristics of offshore operation
Victorian offshore waters are dominated by Bass Strait
which stretches for approximately 240 km from east
to west and is about 50 metres deep. The Victorian
coastline consists of many cliffs to the west of Port
Phillip and lower lying rocky shores and beaches to
the east.
Because of its limited depth, Bass Strait is notoriously
rough. Treacherous winds and seas have caused
many ships to founder on the numerous semisubmerged rocks and reefs within the Strait.
Characteristics of Victorian coastal waters include:
The infrastructure that is in place to
support vessels in trouble
Recreational vessels operating offshore are required
to have safety equipment onboard including marine
radios and Electronic Position Indicating Radio
Beacons (EPIRBs).
The following components make up the safety
support infrastructure for vessels offshore:
ff EPIRB monitoring is carried out by the
Australian Marine Safety Authority (AMSA)
in Canberra.
ff Search and Rescue services are provided by
helicopter and fixed wing aircraft, coastguard
and water police vessels.
ff Radio communication infrastructure, such as
shore stations, is provided. At present they are
limited as they do not meet national marine
distress emergency management system
standards. In recent years the Australian
Volunteer Coast Guard Association (AVCGA)
has implemented a state wide marine radio
monitoring system. However this system
does not monitor emergency frequencies on
VHF 24/7. Increased investment is required
to achieve a system which monitors VHF
emergency services on a 24/7 basis.
3.8.1.4
Exposure to offshore operations
To estimate the number of vessels operating offshore
data from the MUARC vessel exposure report was
used. The following 10departure point information has
been collated to estimate offshore trip numbers.
ff The average annual water temperature in
Bass Strait ranges between 14 to 16 degrees
Celsius. Estimates of survival times based on
immersion in water at 15 degrees vary from
just under 2 hours to 5 hours
ff Vessels may operate to distances offshore
exceeding 100 nautical miles at the east and
west extremities of the State.
ff There are a limited number of safe vessel
access points.
ff There are a limited number of safe havens to
shelter in.
10 MURAC Powered Recreational Boating Exposure to Risk Survey:
October 2008 to Septeber 2003.
75
Figure 21 - E xposure of vessels operating offshore
Departure Point
Total
Trips of
surveyed
fleet per
annum
% of total
Assuming all trips were offshore
Portland
77
1.7
Eden
29
0.7
Venus Bay
13
0.3
Port Fairy
9
0.2
Robertson Beach
7
0.2
Assuming 50% of trips were offshore
Anderson Inlet
12
0.25
Port Albert
19
0.45
Corner Inlet
24
0.55
Assuming 25% of trips were offshore
Other
256
5.25
Total
446
9.6
Based on the MUARC exposure report analysis that
there were 5,833,482 exposure hours for Victorian
recreational vessels per annum with average voyage
duration of 5.9 hours, this translates into annual offshore
exposure rates of 560,000 hours and 95,000 trips.
3.8.1.5
Non licensing interventions
within Australia
In Victoria there is currently no requirement for any
special knowledge or skills in offshore operations
to be demonstrated as part of the marine licence
scheme. No other Australian jurisdiction intervenes in
offshore operations by imposing an endorsement on
the operator’s licence.
Queensland encourages operators to contact the
local marine volunteer rescue group and lists all the
contact details in their Recreational Boating and
Fishing guide.
Victoria and Tasmania encourage the operator to
advise someone of their trip plans and TSV used to
provide a fridge magnet where the operator could
record proposed trip plans and vessel details.
All vessels going offshore are required to have a
marine radio on board which may be either a VHF
radio or a 27MHz radio. There are no operator
requirements for a 27 MHz radio operator. VHF
radios are part of the national framework for marine
emergency distress communications requirements.
VHF radio operators must be competent to operate
a VHF marine radio. The Australian Communications
and Media Authority (ACMA) require that a master
must hold a Marine Radio Operator’s Certificate of
Competency (MROCP/MROVCP) if the vessel is
equipped with a HF or VHF marine radio.
3.8.1.6
Incidents in coastal waters
Incident reports have been analysed to determine
the numbers and types of incidents reported
occurring offshore.
A large number of incidents occur where vessels
are disabled due to lack of fuel or an engine
or electrical failure. It is easy to dismiss vessel
disablements as being of little importance. However
while disablements may not be life-threatening
in themselves, a disabled vessel at sea can very
quickly become a vessel in danger of serious harm.
Capsizing and swamping happen very easily when
a vessel is unable to manoeuvre or keep its bow to
the sea. These circumstances often result in vessels
taking on water or in vessels ending up broadside to
the waves, broaching and subsequently capsizing.
An endorsement suggested in the discussion paper
was for licence holders who operate vessels greater
than 2Nm offshore in Bass Strait to undergo specific
training and/or assessment. In particular, it was
suggested that licence holders be required to pass
a competency-based test in the fields of navigation,
radio communications and meteorology.
A smaller number of incidents are reported as more
serious either resulting in greater interventions to
save vessel or property or in extreme circumstances
requiring search or rescue resources to be activated.
The Western Australian maritime agency restricts
vessels under 3.75 metres from operating more than
5 nautical miles offshore. In addition, as a part of the
practical assessment for their Skippers Ticket the
operator must simulate notifying the local sea rescue
organisation on departure and return.
Victoria does have some interventions which
help to manage the risks of offshore operation.
These include:
South Australia and NSW encourage the operators to
advise the local volunteer rescue organisation of all
trip plans.
3.8.1.7
Defences and mitigations in
Victoria include;
ff Basic licence for vessel masters.
ff Marine education programs,
including seminars.
ff Information including national and state wide
campaign materials.
ff Search and Rescue organisations such as the
Water Police and Australian Volunteer Coast
Guard vessels and AMSA aircraft.
76
ff A (non Marine Distress Emergency Monitoring
System compliant) VHF radio network,
administered by the Australian Volunteer Coast
Guard 24/7.
ff Safety equipment.
3.8.1.8
Current safety equipment mitigations
in Victoria
Victoria currently regulates minimum safety equipment
to be carried onboard mechanically powered vessels
operating more than 2 nautical miles off the coast
of Victoria.
All such vessels on Victorian waters are required
to carry:
ff one PFD of a prescribed type per person;
ff fire extinguisher(s) dependant on the length of
the vessel and the amount of fuel carried;
ff waterproof buoyant torch;
ff bailer and/or bilge pump;
ff bucket with lanyard;
ff Two hand held orange smoke signals;
ff Two hand held red distress flares;
ff an anchor and chain or line or both.
Based on vessel length there are also requirements
to carry:
ff oars or paddles for vessels under 4.8m;
ff One lifebuoy if the vessel is more than 8m in
length, or two if more than 12m;
ff One dinghy or life raft if vessel is more than
12m in length.
Additionally, all vessels that are operated in waters
more than 2 nautical miles offshore have the following
equipment requirements:
ff Compass;
ff Marine radio – 27MHz, HF or VHF marine radio
transceiver;
ff Red star parachute distress rocket; and
ff Approved emergency position-indicating radio
beacon (EPIRB).
3.8.1.9
Alternative safety equipment
As part of the risk assessments a number of practical
alternative mitigations were identified and. Mandating
the following items warrants further consideration:
ff GPS equipped 406 EPRIB’s to more
accurately locate people in distress and,
therefore, reduce rescue times;
ff A second water removal system, (ie.
an electric bilge pump backed up by a
hand pump);
ff A sea anchor which can be used to mitigate
the chances of a vessel becoming broadside
when it has lost power;
ff Equipment to assist in man overboard
retrievals eg ladder, safety scoop or
Jacob’s cradle;
ff A life raft (for vessels smaller than 12 metres);
ff A radar reflector to enable ships and radar
equipped vessels to more easily identify
recreational craft. While collisions are not
a major source of incidents offshore there
have been examples of ships running down
smaller vessels;
ff A suitable tool kit and appropriate spare parts;
ff A secondary source of power either by
duplicate power supplies or through a back up
power pack.
Some of these options are further explored in the
Regulatory Impact Statement for the Marine Safety
Regulations 2011.
3.8.2
Indicators of recreational vessel
risk in Victorian coastal waters
The following discussion is the result of analysis of
the known data relating to the level of risk involved
in the operation of recreational vessels in Victorian
coastal waters. Data was obtained from the Marine
Safety System (MSS) database. Unfortunately there is
a lack of more specific data of individual incidents is
available for detailed analysis.
3.8.2.1
Fatal Incidents
Throughout Victorian waters, the trend has been a
reduction in fatality rates and increase in injury rates.
Of eighteen reported incidents over the last 10 years
that resulted in fatalities, only two incidents occurred
more than two nautical miles offshore.
Both offshore and inshore fatalities occurred primarily
due to drowning. In the majority of cases PFDs were
carried but not worn.
Some incidents occurred on or close to bars where
vessels capsized. Many other fatalities resulted from
vessels which have capsized. This type of incident is
not exclusively attributable to offshore operators as
many of these vessels would have remained inshore
after crossing the bar. Bar crossings do remain
a source of danger and TSV put out educational
material aimed specifically at crossing bars safely.
The chart below summarises the offshore and inshore
fatal incident data. The trend of fatality numbers over
time coincides with the overall Victorian downward
trend in fatality rates.
77
Figure 22 - Graph of inshore and offshore fatality data
4.5
4.5
4
4
3.5
3.5
3
3
2.5
2.5
2
2
1.5
1.5
1
1
0.5
0.5
0
0
2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
Fatal Incident (Offshore)
2004-2005
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008
2008-2009 2009-20010
Total
Fatal Incident (Offshore)
3.8.2.2
Incident Data
The data set here was obtained from TSV in 2010 and
contains data for all waters off the coast of Victoria,
both inshore and offshore.
The following tables summarise the information for the
past 10 years.
78
Note that whilst accurate fatality data is available
going back to 2001/2 incident data was only reliably
researched from 2004/5.
It must also be noted that the data from 2005/6
indicates higher levels than recorded in the initial
discussion paper. This is primarily a function of
improved data capturing by the authority.
Figure 23 - Table of reported incidents of recreational vessels on both inshore (< 2 Nm from coast) and
offshore Coastal Waters. Years from July 1 2001 – June 6 2010
Recreational Inshore
(within 2Nm of shore)
20012002
20022003
20032004
20042005
20052006
20062007
20072008
20082009
20092010
Total
1
4
4
13
7
8
37
Cabin Cruiser
Canoe
Half Cabin
1
1
1
3
3
14
15
Houseboat
24
27
Kayak
1
1
2
3
16
2
3
Kite
3
1
1
5
2
1
1
2
12
24
26
23
113
2
5
1
5
19
1
1
1
1
Trailer Sailer
1
Windsurfer
1
1
3
1
2
2
1
Yacht/Catamaran (off
the beach)
1
1
3
2
Yacht (Keel Boat)
1
2
4
3
1
3
7
2
7
1
6
3
4
Undefined
Undefined
11
7
34
4
4
8
21
7
5
18
15
48
48
76
73
76
366
20012002
20022003
20032004
20042005
20052006
20062007
20072008
20082009
20092010
Total
1
4
3
3
3
15
9
5
10
4
37
Cabin Cruiser
1
Half Cabin
1
Kayak
8
1
1
Open
1
4
4
3
Windsurfer
9
9
1
1
1
1
1
7
8
8
15
Undefined
1
3
3
26
30
1
1
Yacht/Catamaran
(off the beach)
Yacht (Keel Boat)
9
2
Raft
Rowing Boat
106
1
1
Open
Recreational Offshore
(> 2NM off shore)
19
1
20
19
38
5
46
3
3
24
134
From the table above the following can be concluded:
ff 73% of incidents occurred within 2nm of the shore (inshore).
ff 75% of inshore and 61% of offshore incidents occurred in motorised craft without sails.
ff Sailing yachts with keels have a high incident rate (34% offshore and 9% inshore). The offshore incidence
is interesting. Many yachts traverse Bass Strait on interstate voyages without having any direct link
with Victoria. Victoria does not have a VHF radio network along its coastal strip in the manner required
by protocols set up by the National Marine Safety Committee. Many of these vessels rely on VHF
communications for routine and emergency calls and may have been unable to communicate successfully.
ff 8% of offshore and 2% of inshore incidents involved un-powered vessels. These vessels are not
registered, nor are their operator’s licensed. Their primary safety mitigation is to carry safety equipment
including the carrying of, and in some cases wearing, PFDs.
ff It is possible, but not provable, that many of these vessels could have been involved in incidents which
may have been preventable had adequate emergency communications been available.
79
Powered Recreational Vessel Offshore Incidents
Number of incidents
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
0
2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010
Cabin Cruiser
Half Cabin
Open
Cabin cruisers make up a smaller proportion of the
incidents as they are less involved in offshore fishing
activities and less likely to engage in cruising unless
in ideal conditions.
The above table shows that half cabin vessels
followed by open vessels make up the majority
of vessels involved in incidents. These vessels
are used offshore for fishing operations. Vessels
of an open or partially open construction may be
particularly vulnerable to certain incident types such
as swamping. Cabin cruisers and yachts with cabins
tend to be intrinsically safer as they are larger than
open vessels and half cabin vessels. Their size, along
with enclosed nature, makes them better protected
from the effects of wind and weather.
Table 28 - Types of offshore incidents from July 1 2005 to June 6 2010 including recreational and
commercial incidents
Coastal Offshore (all)
20012002
Capsizing
20022003
1
Close Quarters
Collision
20032004
20042005
20052006
1
1
1
1
1
24
19
24
39
1
3
1
4
21
127
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
Other Personal Injury
1
2
1
4
1
3
1
Sinking
3
1
Swamping
2
1
1
7
2
1
2
5
4
2
1
1
3
15
1
1
Person in Trouble
Total
4
1
1
Loss or presumed loss
of vessel
80
20092010
1
Grounding
Structural failure
20082009
1
1
Flooding
Onboard incident
20072008
1
Disablement of Vessel
Fire
20062007
33
22
29
43
27
171
The table above contains a list of the types of offshore
incidents and contains both commercial (37) and
recreational (134) vessel incidents. We are unable to
separate the two vessel types from the data but make
the following conclusions:
ff Vessel disablements make up 74% of
offshore incidents.
ff Disablements are primarily incidents
categorised by engine failure due to fuel
or starting problems. The mechanisms to
address these are a better understanding of
basic vessel maintenance through education
or training and better information. The rate
of disablements has plateaued and possibly
declined in the past few years. TSV has placed
a greater emphasis on vessel maintenance in
its education campaigns over the past three
years and this may be paying off.
ff Less than 3% of offshore vessel incidents were
capsizes which tend to result in people in the
water and which can lead to fatalities.
ff 2% of offshore incidents led to the loss or
the potential loss of vessels by sinking, fire,
flooding or swamping. These incidents all
have the potential for persons to end up in
the water.
3.8.3
Injury Data
There is no specific injury data relating to offshore
operations available for analysis.
3.8.4
The objective of licensing regulations is to improve
safety by increasing the competencies of new entry
masters and masters of vessels that operate more
than two nautical miles offshore.
Regulation provides a means by which operators
can develop the skills to become competent
masters through knowledge based and skills based
assessments.
The objective of regulations is aimed at an outcome
which further reduces incident, injury and fatality rates.
3.8.5
Bow tie exercises and analysis
At the stakeholder workshops a bow tie exercise
was conducted (see Appendix 4). The cause and
mitigations were explored for a recreational vessel
where the crew were in the water due to incidents
such as swamping and capsizing.
Participants named human factors as the main
causes that need to be addressed.
The table below demonstrates the current knowledge
requirements in the recreational boat licence hand
book and test. Also identified are the items that
could be included in an improved knowledge test
and items that could be taught and/or assessed
in a competency based assessment. The National
Competency relating to emergency management and
response was identified as the competency most in
need of attention.
81
Figure 24 - Table of elements identified as requirements for an offshore endorsement
Information
Current
Knowledge
Test
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Weather, conditions,
vessel and personnel
are checked for
suitability for planned
trip
Y
Y
Y
Basic Meteorological
knowledge
Y
Y (in part)
Y
1.3.3
Adequate provisions,
including fuel, for the
trip are carried
Y
Y
1.4.3
Education on vessel
stability including
effect of heeling
moments such as
wind/passengers/
lifting loads over side
Y
Y
2.1.10
"Defensive
Operation Skills"
- understanding
operational hazards
and how to reduce
to include operating
at night)
Y
Y
2.2.6
Determine the
current location of
the vessel
Y
Y
3.1.7
Know when to stay
with your boat
Y
Y
Y
3.1.8
Know how to use
radio in emergency
Y
Y
Y
3.3.1
On board personnel
are informed of
actions required
to deal with the
emergency
Y
3.3.2
Procedures are
implemented to
combat emergency
and protect persons
on board
Y
3.3.3
Position is identified,
recorded and
communicated
Y
Y
Y
Y
Use of GPS
(emergency
situations)
Y
Y
Y
Y
1.3.1
Practical
training/
Experience
Competency
based
assessment
(Y for
offshore)
Y
Y(offshore)
Y (offshore)
Y (offshore)
Radio
Y
Y
Y
First-aid training
(separate course)
82
Training
course plus
assessment
First Aid
Information
Current
Knowledge
Test
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
3.3.6
Preparation for
abandoning the boat
is undertaken, if
required
Y
3.5.1
Vessel being
swamped and
capsized
Y
3.5.2
Bar Crossing
Y
3.5.5
Using a lifebuoy
Y
Y
Y
4.1.1
Bar Crossing Training
Y
Y
Y
The table indicates the following potential mitigation
for offshore hazards:
ff Provide a broader range of information to
the offshore boater, better preparing them to
manage the hazards of offshore operations.
ff Improve the current knowledge test to better
assess the ability of the operator to manage a
wider range of offshore hazards.
ff Require the operator to carry out
practical training or log experience of
offshore operations.
ff Require an operator to have his or her
competency formally assessed in a number
of areas encompassing offshore operations,
predominantly in emergency management.
3.8.5.1
Causal factors
Based on the bow ties, the risk assessment
workshops produced the following list of possible
causal factors for vessel failure and capsizing:
ff Hull failure due to hitting an object;
ff Crossing bars;
ff Vessel underpowered for conditions;
ff Mechanical failure due to running out of
fuel, electrics being swamped, lack of
maintenance;
ff Bilge pump not operating;
ff Scuppers blocked;
ff Bungs not in; and
ff Overloading/inadequate freeboard.
Competency
based
assessment
Training
course plus
assessment
Y
Y
Y
Also based on the bow ties, the risk assessment
workshops produced, the following list of human error
causal factors:
ff lack of knowledge about sea conditions;
ff lack of knowledge about weather conditions;
ff lack of knowledge about navigation;
ff inability to calculate fuel requirements;
ff lack of knowledge about boat stability;
ff Not using equipment (eg wearing PFDs, not
setting off EPIRBs);
ff lack of man overboard retrieval skills; and
ff lack of sea survival skills.
The following skills are suggested which could
address the human factors of safe operation offshore.
ff Vessel and equipment maintenance
training – ability to identify and fix simple
engineering problems.
ff Meteorological knowledge – ability to
identify forthcoming changes in the
weather conditions.
ff Person overboard training, including retrieval
and positions to adopt to minimise heat loss.
ff Training in how to cross ocean bars in differing
tidal and sea conditions.
ff GPS training to ensure operators are able to
use GPS accurately and effectively.
ff Coastal Navigation training including using
compasses and charts and estimating vessel
position from compass bearings.
ff Make marine VHF radio mandatory and
maintain the current requirement for a Marine
Radio Operators Certificate of Proficiency.
83
3.8.6
Summary
ff Offshore operations can result in vessels
being disabled. Fatalities tend to occur when
people end up in the water from a vessel
sinking, capsizing or being swamped.
ff Five percent of offshore incidents (sinkings,
capsizing, swampings etc.) result in people
entering the water with only a few hours before
hypothermia sets in and death a likely result.
Therefore, to prevent loss of life, safety training
of masters and operators, safety equipment
on the vessel and the safety infrastructure
onshore all become extremely important
components of the overall safety system .
ff Safety equipment on the vessels is important
in alerting authorities to an incident.
This may be by radio, EPIRB and/or light and
sound signals.
ff Communications and search and rescue
infrastructure play important roles in saving
lives. While Victorian water – borne and
air – borne search and rescue assets may
be adequate, the radio communications
infrastructure in Victoria currently fails to meet
national requirements for an emergency
response communication system.
ff The vessel master has a greater responsibility
as they are the focus for the provision of
immediate emergency response. There is
often nobody else.
ff From the bow-tie analysis a list of skills which
could be improved has been developed which
could be incorporated in an endorsement.
ff However the low number of offshore incidents,
fatalities and injuries provide insufficient
justification for a specific endorsement for
offshore operations at this time.
ff This does not mean that action should
not be taken. At the very least improved
information could be developed addressing
the identified skills and the basic licence
test could be improved to better address
offshore operational issues, in particular the
role of a master in an offshore emergency,
the importance of and means to know your
position and the use of communications and
position indicating safety equipment.
3.8.7
3.8.7.1
The recreational boating safety handbook contains
little specific information regarding offshore
operation and emergency preparedness. The current
knowledge based licence test does not specifically
address offshore issues.
The outcome of this option would be at best to
maintain the current levels of incidents.
In recent years there has been a change in the risk
profile as less experienced operators travel offshore,
particularly to take advantage of fishing opportunities.
This increases the risk of more incidents, injuries
and fatalities.
3.8.7.2
Option 2 - Improved information
without requiring an endorsement.
In order to improve the decision making ability of
those who do go offshore the information provided
at the time of a person completing their basic license
could be improved. This would be a relatively low cost
approach to introducing applicants to the hazards of
offshore boating and providing masters with materials
which would help them prepare their vessels and
improve their understanding of any particular hazards
posed by operating offshore.
The material would be made available to operators of
all vessels.
This information could be in the form of a workbook
similar to the National Powerboating Workbook and
material could also be made available in the form a
DVD or similar illustrating practical solutions to the
problems of offshore operations.
The outcome of this option is aimed at raising
the master’s awareness to the risks that can
be associated with the operations of a vessel
offshore. The aim would be at worst to stabilize
incidents, injuries and fatalities at current levels
despite the increasing use of offshore waters for
recreational activities.
3.8.8
Recommendation
With insufficient incidents, fatalities and injuries to
justify introducing an endorsement, the most effective
means of managing the potential and real dangers
of offshore vessel operation at present appears
to be through improving available information on
offshore operations and including questions on these
operations in the basic licence knowledge test.
Options
The following options are offered for consideration.
84
–– TDM MF 1107B Survive at sea in the event
of a vessel abandonment.
A staged approach to offshore interventions is
recommended.
ff TSV to improve information on offshore
boating and make publications like the
National Power boating Workbook or similar
material, including a DVD, which would
demonstrate the conditions likely to be
prevalent offshore and how to handle them,
available to all license holders. Operators
should be encouraged to attend any courses
that are publicly available.
The course also includes a practical wet drill involving
deployment and use of a life raft, flares detonation in
a controlled environment and theory sessions and is
from the TDM Marine package.
3.9
High speed vessel
endorsement
ff TSV offer information sessions on aspects of
boating safety including aspects of offshore
operations and these could be expanded to
cover areas not currently covered.
3.9.1
ff The boating sector should be encouraged
to offer courses on offshore operations and
TSV should publicise and publicly support
operators to attend these courses.
ff Should incident, fatality and/or injury rates
indicate a worsening of outcomes then the
introduction of an endorsement with a test
containing questions specific to offshore
operations should be mandated. A practical
assessment would be difficult to facilitate but
could be addressed by using a simulator.
This information should be part of the information
given out supporting the basic licence scheme
and could be specifically tested as part of the
basic licence.
3.8.9
Available practical courses with
offshore components
The following commercially available courses
would improve the skills of offshore operators. It
is suggested that TSV publicise the awareness of
these courses and encourage vessel masters to
attend them.
ff Yachting Australia has a Safety and Sea
Survival Course which is modelled on the
International Sailing Federation (ISAF) model
training course for offshore personal survival.
The course is a two-day (at least 16 hours)
intensive course and costs approximately
$345. The course includes a practical wet drill
involving deployment and use of a life raft,
flare detonation in a controlled environment
and theory sessions.
ff The Elements of Shipboard Safety - Personal
Survival Techniques module of the commercial
coxswain course taking 2 days could be
adopted. This covers:
–– TDM MF 5507A Fight and extinguish fires
on board a coastal vessel;
–– TDM MF 5407A Observe safety and
emergency procedures; and
One of the potential endorsements suggested in
the Marine Safety in Victoria discussion paper is for
operators of vessels that are capable of speeds in
excess of 40 knots (about 75 kph). It was suggested
that this endorsement should require the master to
possess knowledge and skills in operating safely at
speed. This endorsement would apply to vessels
such as PWCs and powerboats.
3.9.1.1
Current mitigations in Victoria
There are currently no specific mitigations in Victoria’s
marine legislation against the risks associated with
operating at high speed. Like any other powered
vessel, a high speed vessel master will be required to
obtain a marine licence before being able to operate a
vessel on Victorian waters.
While there are questions in the licence test on safe
speeds and speed limits there is nothing in particular
aimed at safe operation of vessels at high speed.
3.9.1.2
Other jurisdictions
No Australian jurisdiction has a licence or
endorsement requirement that is specifically directed
at high speed operation.
3.9.2
Injury and fatality trends citing
speed as a contributing factor
3.9.2.1
Incident types
Vessel speed is not a problem in itself. In the right
conditions vessels operate at speeds of 40 knots or
more without incident. Incidents occur during racing;
however these events are carried out within safety
frameworks managed by clubs, waterway managers,
associations and individuals. They are organised events
and outside the general recreational boating sphere.
The only identified high speed fatality in Victoria
occurred when a person was killed whilst engaged
in high speed drag boat racing being conducted by
the Victorian Drag Boat Club under the sanction of
the Australian Power Boat Association. The incident
was likely caused by the vessel’s propeller striking a
submerged object, the vessel losing stability and the
pilot being catapulted from the cockpit.
85
It was identified during risk workshops held with MSV
that collisions are the type of high speed related
incident which lead to the greatest impact.
The MUARC report summarising 5 years of
commercial and recreational incidents in Victoria
recorded in the Marine Incident Report (MIR) system
tabulates the following information with regard to
collisions by recreational vessels.
Figure 25 - Table showing incident types, number
of incidents and represented % of
total incidents
Incident Type
N
% of total
incidents
(N = 676)
Collisions (all)
52
8
• with another vessel
30
4
• submerged object
6
1
• fixed object
6
1
• floating object
2
<1
• not specified
8
1
This report states that collisions make up only 8% of
all incidents. It does not indicate how many collisions
were the result of high speed.
3.9.2.2
The impact of high speed incidents
including collisions
Incident and hospital injury reports have been
analysed to determine the extent that excessive speed
has been a factor in causing injuries.
The MUARC report ‘Marine Safety in Victoria 2003/04
- 2007/08’ covers a five year period and reports
incidents that are recorded on the marine incident
database and those reported through hospital
admissions and emergency departments.
During this five year period, 991 serious recreation
incidents were reported. Over half of the serious
incidents resulted in personal and/or property
damage. Contributory factors were reported for 75%
(506) of serious incidents. Of these, only 20 (2%)
reported excessive speed being a contributory factor
in causing the incident. By comparison ‘error of
judgement’ and ‘inexperience’ collectively accounted
for about 36% of contributory factors reported.
Response only incidents cover disablement of a
vessel and ‘person in trouble’. There were 3,636
response only incidents in the 5 year period.
Contributory factors were reported for 81% (2,929) of
incidents. A total of 4,191 contributory factors were
reported and only 2 for excessive speed. The most
common factors causing response only incidents
were machinery or equipment failures or lack of
maintenance and fuel, which frequently resulted
in disablements.
86
There were a total of 3,984 hospital treated
recreational boating injury cases in the five years.
These comprised 1,128 admissions and 2,856
emergency department presentations. The high level
reported hospital data does not record whether any
of the injuries were caused as a result of speed. Most
incidents occur as a result of falls, striking another
object or collisions. It is probable that a number of
these would have resulted from excessive speed and
that a number of injuries are more severe due to the
impact at a high speed However, this is not apparent
from the data.
The 2008/09 report on Marine Safety in Victoria
reports in more detail on hospital treated injuries
than the 5 year report, providing a short narrative
description in a small number of cases. This
highlights, for example, that for water ski injuries
speed was a contributing factor where these resulted
in hospital admissions. This information was only
provided in a small number of cases and a number
of these occurred on the Murray River (which is
not administered by MSV) and / or took place in
organised water ski racing events.
In relation to water skiing racing events it is assumed
that experienced operators were involved who knew
and understood the risks of the activity they were
engaged in. This is not the level where entry level
licensing can effectively be used to reduce the rate of
severity of injuries.
The evidence does not show that there are a
large number of incidents citing speed as a major
contributory factor. However incidents that happen at
high speed are likely to be of high impact and result in
trauma type injuries.
3.9.2.3
Specific high speed activities
At first glance towed water sport activities appear to
occur at high speed. However with the exception of
waterski racing, towed water sports occur at speed
below 40 knots and in many case below 30 knots.
PWCs provide a relatively cheap means of entry level
boating and all can operate at speeds in excess
of 40 knots. A PWC endorsement exists and it is
intended that this endorsement continue. High speed
operational issues associated with these craft are
discussed as part of that endorsement.
A large number of vessels involved in general
motor boating (cruising and fishing) are capable of
operating at greater than 40 knots. Most cruising
is carried out at speeds below this. Fishing vessels
transiting to and from fishing grounds may travel
at high speeds, although these high speed transits
probably account for a third or less of the time these
vessels operate.
3.9.2.4
Other jurisdictions
Queensland report one death may be contributable to
speed but do not have specific statistics focused on
speed. Likewise the NSW figures are vague on speed
related incidents which are often reported as a lack of
judgement.
3.9.3
Stakeholder comment
The general response from stakeholders in the
Marine Act Review consultation process was that
they supported an increased array of licence
endorsements focussed on improving knowledge and
skills of boating operators. However, a high speed
operation was not specifically discussed.
Comments were made during the consultation that
high speed activity, particularly in relation to PWCs,
made boating unpleasant for other water users and
potentially created dangerous on-water situations.
The police reported a range of incidents with PWC
operators involving high speed activity. However, their
view was that the primary causes were behavioural,
rather than lack of knowledge or skill of the operator.
TSV supports measures to reduce speed, particularly
for night operating. In normal circumstances a person
operating at high speed usually lacks awareness of
their surroundings as they are focussed on ensuring
that their vessel is travelling in the right direction and
avoiding any problems in front. This reduces side on
perception and creates risk situations if a vessel were
to suddenly move in from the side.
At night this concern is clearly much greater as the
operator may be oblivious to hazards in the water as
well as other vessels. TSV indicated that imposing
a strict limit on night speed to about 10 knots would
greatly reduce the potential for accidents to occur.
As this issue does not relate to licensing it is not
further discussed in this paper.
3.9.4
Elements identified as
requirements for a high
speed endorsement
Should a high speed endorsement be justified
the following elements could form the basis of the
endorsement. These elements were extracted from
the bow tie assessment summarised in Appendix 4.
Figure 26 - Table indicating the elements identified for inclusion in a high speed endorsement
Information
Current
Knowledge
Test
Improved
Knowledge
Test
are checked for
trip
Y
Y
Y
Education about
implications of fitting
larger outboard
engines
Y
2.1.5
Impact of boat
use on others and
the environment
is considered
(nuisance?)
Y
2.1.7
speed
Y
2.1.10
"Defensive
Operation Skills"
- understanding
operational hazards
and how to reduce
at night)
Y
1.3.1
Practical
training/
Experience
Y
Y
Competency
based
assessment
Training
course plus
assessment
Y
Y
87
Information
Current
Knowledge
Test
2.1.12
Understand risks of
high speed operation
Y
2.2.11
Education about
appropriate speed
for conditions
Y
Y
2.2.2
Collision avoidance
techniques are
applied when
required in
accordance with
recognised
regulations and rules
Y
Y
2.2.15
Importance of having
spatial awareness
Y
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Practical
training/
Experience
Y
Y
Competency
based
assessment
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
First-aid training
(separate course)
Y
First Aid
The majority of elements form part of National
Competency 2 which addresses managing the
vessel’s operation.
If a practical training course for a master’s licence
is adopted, the risks associated with high speed
operation could be specifically addressed.
3.9.5
3.9.6
Possible elements for inclusion in
an endorsement
The following elements, identified from the table
above, could make up a high speed endorsement:
ff Understanding the effect weather conditions
have on high speed operation;
ff Retrieval of an injured person from the water;
ff First Aid ;
ff Speed and turning manoeuvres;
ff Speed/distance perception;
The objective of regulation is to improve safety by
improving the competencies of new entry masters
and operators of vessels that operate at more than
40 knots, to reduce the risks associated with high
speed operation particularly new entrants to boating.
Regulation provides the means for operators to
develop competency through knowledge and skill
based assessments. Specifically, regulation requiring
a licence endorsement for high speed vessel masters
is aimed at reducing high speed incidents resulting in
fatalities and injuries from high speed impacts.
ff Scanning ahead for objects;
3.9.7
ff Leaving more room between vessels and
structures;
With insufficient incidents, fatalities and injuries to
justify introducing an endorsement, the most effective
means of managing the potential and real dangers
of high speed vessel operation at present appears
to be through improving available information on
offshore operations and including questions on these
operations in the basic licence knowledge test.
ff Stopping safely;
ff Environmental considerations;
ff Understanding vessel reaction to controls;
ff Operational hazards and risks associated with
high speed operation.
The elements above could be incorporated into
improved information made available to vessel
operators as part of the basic licence. They could also
be incorporated into a revised general licence test.
The general knowledge tests could include questions
and study material relating to operating speeds and
the risk consequences.
88
Training
course plus
assessment
Summary
ff High speed incidents are usually high impact
collisions between a vessel and other objects
including boats, snags, jetties, bridges,
wharfs, riverbanks etc. High speed collisions
can lead to serious injuries.
ff However, collisions account for less than 8%
of incidents and the number of incidents which
have been recorded as directly linked with
high speed as a causal factor is 2%.
ff With such low numbers there is insufficient
justification for a specific endorsement to be
developed solely for high speed operations.
The basic licence test could include questions which
improve applicants understanding/knowledge of the
dangers of high speed operations
ff Given that many high speed incidents
and injuries result from behavioural issues
rather than a lack of knowledge or skill an
endorsement aimed at addressing knowledge
and skills would have minimal impact on
reducing the problem.
The following elements should be contained in the
material for masters operating vessels at high speed:
ff Never the less improved information could be
developed covering the hazards associated
with high speed operations, reinforcing the
rules of the road and developing greater
understanding of the smaller timeframes
available to make decisions.
ff The basic licence test could include questions
which improve applicants understanding/
knowledge of the dangers of high
speed operations.
3.9.8
Options
3.9.8.1
The recreational boating safety handbook mentions
speed restrictions in designated areas but contains no
targeted information regarding high speed operation.
Although there were 52 incidents reported involving
vessels colliding, for example, with other vessels
and objects in the water, over the 5 years detailed in
the MUARC report, the causal factors have not been
necessarily attributed to high speed.
There is very little data recorded which specifically
identifies fatalities and injuries resulting from high
speed operations.
ff Information on high speed operation including
vessel turning and manoeuvring at high speed
and stopping safely.
ff The importance of maintaining a proper
lookout and the smaller timeframes available
for reacting to an incident.
ff The importance of ensuring the master is
not distracted
ff The importance of not being impaired by
fatigue, drug and alcohol.
ff Spatial awareness
In recent years there have been continual increases in
the power of engines available for recreational boats
resulting in increasing numbers of vessels capable
of high speed operation at speeds greater then 40
knots. This increases the risk of increased numbers of
incidents, injuries and fatalities. These issues should
continue to be monitored along with developing
intelligence to identify incidents, fatalities and injuries
which could be attributed to high speed operation
in order to obtain ongoing evidence of the hazards
posed by high speed operations.
This option is aimed at raising the master’s awareness
of the risks associated with the operation of a vessel
at speeds greater than 40 knots. The aim would
be to reduce current levels of incidents resulting in
collisions and their subsequent outcomes.
The outcome of this option would be to maintain
the status quo using the knowledge in the current
handbook and, at best, to maintain the current levels
of incidents.
3.9.9
3.9.8.2
The most effective means of managing the potential
and real dangers of high speed vessel operation
appears to be through improving available information
on high speed vessel operations, both for new
entrants as part of the basic licence scheme as well
as for current licence holders. .
Option 2 - Improved information
without requiring an endorsement
There is no specific knowledge or skills information in
the current Recreational Vessel Safety Handbook for
masters who operate vessels at greater speeds than
40 knots.
The information available to applicants for the basic
license test on high speed vessel operations could
be improved. This could be in the form of a workbook
similar to the National Powerboating Workbook or in
the form a DVD illustrating practical solutions to the
problems of high speed operations.
Recommendation
There is insufficient evidence to support introducing a
specific high speed vessel operations endorsement
for masters of recreational vessels.
This information would be part of the basic licence
scheme and elements of it could be specifically tested
as part of the basic licence.
It is recommended that Option 2 above be implemented.
The material should be made available to operators of
all vessels. Support should be provided to encourage
operators to work through the information.
89
3.10 Towing Endorsement
3.10.1
3.10.1.1 Background
Towed water sports, primarily undertaken on inland
and enclosed waterways, are a popular pastime for
recreational boaters. Towed water sports include
water skiing, wake boarding, towing buoyant
apparatus such as inflatable doughnuts (and other
objects without any substantial directional control),
and any other activity where a person or persons are
pulled by a vessel.
The following locations are popular for towed
water sports:
ff Port Phillip
ff Lake Mulwala
ff Hazelwood Pondage
ff Lake Nagambie
ff Gippsland Lakes
ff Eildon Weir
ff Murray River
ff Mallacoota Lakes
Stakeholder consultations suggested that an
endorsement aimed at increasing the competency of
operators of vessels engaged in towed water sports
should be considered. This endorsement should
require the applicant to possess knowledge and skills
relating to towing and operating safely at speed.
The endorsement would apply to the operators of all
towing vessels, including operators of jet skis and
powerboats.
When incidents occur, the party injured is usually the
person being towed. It is difficult for the statistics to
determine whether the boat operator or the person
being towed is responsible.
Note
For the purposes of this discussion ‘tow-in surfing’ is not considered
a towed water sport as it takes place exclusively within a surfing
environment using PWCs. Any issues, requiring specific intervention, will
be addressed as part of changes to subordinate legislation.
3.10.2 Current Regulations –
State by State
3.10.2.1 Transport Safety Victoria (TSV)
TSV is responsible for the licensing of boat masters
and operators. TSV is aware that towed water
sports are a relatively high risk activity that results
in a disproportionate number of injuries. TSV has
undertaken specific work over recent years to address
the increasing number of incidents and serious
injuries arising from towed sports.
90
TSV’s Victorian Recreational Boating Safety
Handbook covers hand signals and the basic rules for
operators with regard to observers and TSV ’s website
includes information specifically on safety.
There is a requirement which limits to 3 the number
of people who can be towed at any one time.
Also towing is only permitted during daylight hours,
between one hour before sunrise and one hour
after sunset.
Under current legislation operators with a restricted
licence i.e. under 16 years, are unable to tow.
Changes to the marine regulations will allow people of
any age to operate a vessel whilst towing as long as
they are under the direct supervision of a master who
holds any relevant licences and endorsements and is
over the age of 18.
TSV does not set standards either for the formal
training of persons operating a vessel which is towing,
or for the person acting in the role of the observer.
There is no requirement for an observer to have
any knowledge of the marine environment or safe
operation of vessels.
Under the new Marine Safety Act 2010 the master
has a duty of care, referred to in the Safety Duties
Relating to Recreational Vessel Operations, to ensure
the vessel is operated safely. This extends to ensuring
the observer is able to carry out his/her role correctly
and safely.
There are no requirements for the registration, training
or licensing of towees, nor is there any future intention
in this regard.
3.10.2.2 Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ)
MSQ lists basic waterskiing rules on their website
and provides a brochure covering the basics of
waterskiing safety. The Boat Safe licensing course
and the Recreational Boating and Fishing Guide
include suggestions for signals which may to be
used by skiers and operators, although these are
not mandatory.
Under the Queensland licensing scheme, boat
operators are 16 years and over and will have
undertaken an accredited Boat Safe course to obtain
their licence.
3.10.2.3 NSW Maritime
NSW Maritime has more prescriptive regulations
regarding towing, but does not require formal training
of towers or observers. Towing is also restricted to
daylight hours and one hour before and after
sunrise/sunset.
ff must have a minimum crew of two, the master
(driver) and an observer (this also applies to
PWCs when towing)
NSW are currently reviewing feedback from their
discussion paper on the future of operations on the
River Murray. This may lead to some changes in
regulating towed water sports – particularly ‘slow
tow’ sports which cause environmental rather than
safety impacts.
ff must have a capacity sticker
3.10.2.4 Marine Safety Western Australia
ff must carry appropriate safety equipment
Marine Safety Western Australia requires a skipper
of a boat which is towing to be at least 17 and the
observer can be no younger than 14 years. Only the
skipper needs to hold a licence.
The vessel:
ff must have current registration
ff Cannot be remotely controlled.
The Driver:
ff has to be at least 16
ff must hold a general licence if the vessel will be
operated at 10 knots or more, or PWC Licence
when operating a PWC at any speed
ff is responsible for the safety of the boat
and towed people and for maintaining the
minimum distances off applicable to the boat
and the skier(s).
The Observer:
ff must be 16 years of age or older, or the holder
of a Young Adult Licence
ff must not suffer hearing, sight, or other
disabilities which could affect the performance
of observation duties
ff has the prime responsibility of observing
the towed people and reporting all matters
affecting them to the master
ff tells the driver about other vessels
approaching from behind
ff should be familiar with the standard
hand signals.
ff In a ski boat the observer faces backwards to
watch the person being towed whilst the driver
faces forward to maintain lookout.
The Towed Person
ff No more than 3 skiers can be towed at once
ff Must maintain the minimum distances off, and
when returning to shore must do so safely
Towing Prohibited
ff Towing is prohibited between sunset
and sunrise.
NSW Maritime also has a brochure (What to know
before you tow) and a sticker covering waterskiing
hand signals.
3.10.2.5 Transport South Australia
Transport SA requires operators of a vessel to be
16 years of age. Twelve to fifteen year olds can
be issued a special boat operator’s permit after
completing a practical test. This permit does not
allow them to tow a skier, though part of the test
requirement is that they recognise and understand
the hand signals to be used by the observer. Special
boat operator permit holders can act as an observer,
provided the vessel operator is over 18 years of age.
Transport SA also has prescribed blood alcohol limits
for both the observer and the skier.
3.10.2.6 Marine and Safety Tasmania (MAST)
MAST has minimal skiing and towing information in
their Safe Boating Handbook.
The vessel operator must hold a full license.
Provisional licenses are available for those between
12 and 17 years of age. Provisional licences restrict
the holder from towing a skier and restrict the holder
from towing an aquaplaner at greater than 10kn.
Observers must be at least 10 years of age. MAST
has no formal training mechanism for observers.
3.10.3
Towed water sport incidents,
fatality and injury trends
3.10.3.1 Serious incidents within Victoria
MUARC data for the years 2005/6 – 2007/8 reveals
only 3% of recreational vessel serious incidents
involved water skiing or related activities and this
percentage fell to 1% in 2008/09.
However the large number of towed sport injuries
recorded by the VEMD hospital data suggests a
severe under reporting of serious incidents resulting
from towed water sports.
3.10.3.2 Fatalities
Of the 48 recreational boat fatalities recorded over
the past 8 years there have been no recorded towed
water sport fatalities in Victoria.
91
However there have been fatalities on the River
Murray due to water sports activities. The river falls
under the jurisdiction of NSW but a majority of the
users are from Victoria. The following extract from
the NSW maritime discussion paper, Review of
Boating Safety on the River Murray, highlight some of
the issues.
‘The NSW Ports and Waterways Minister the Hon. Paul
Mcleay MP tasked NSW Maritime to conduct a review of
boating safety after an unusually high number of serious
boating incidents in the three months from December
2009 to February 2010.
On Christmas eve 2009 a swimmer died from injuries
after being run over by a ski boat at Casey’s Bend;
on Christmas day a man drowned after a small punt
capsized 200 metres from the shore of Lake Hume; on
24 January 2010 a water skier died after hitting a log at
Moama; and on 13 February 2010 a water skier fell and
died while competing in the Southern 80 Ski Races.
Other serious incidents over this period included a man
receiving severe lacerations and a broken leg after being
hit by a boat propeller, a personal watercraft (PWC or
jet ski) crash, and a skiing incident where a skier was
knocked unconscious.’
Following the consultation program the following
recommendations were made which referred or
implied means to reduce the incidents of injuries and
fatalities from water sports.
ff 40 knot speed limit for the Murray River (official
races and race training would be conducted
under an aquatic licence)
ff Speed limits during peak usage periods
ff More 4 knot zones declared during high
use seasons
ff No swimming zones within 100 metres of any
boat ramp
ff Passive activity zones
ff More off-river ski parks
ff No wash zones
ff Limit tow rope lengths for ski tubes
ff Maximum ski rope length < 18.5 metres
ff Anti-hoon legislation with vessel
confiscation powers
ff Demerit points system for boat licences to
apply in both states
ff Education campaign on the dangers of high
speed tow “whipping” manoeuvres
ff Improved signage on both banks of the River
Attention is drawn to the recommendation suggesting
improving Victorian licensing requirements. This
supports any outcomes from this discussion paper
which improves the Victorian licensing scheme.
An additional theme from the River Murray safety
discussions was the need for Victoria and NSW to
greater harmonize their requirements in order to
improve Victorian boater understanding of NSW
requirements and vise versa.
3.10.3.3 Injuries arising from incidents
in Victoria
There are a disproportionate number of injuries arising
from towing incidents.
In Victoria, during the 7 years from 2003/4 and
2009/10, there were 2716 towed water sports injuries
from incidents resulting in hospital emergency
department presentations and admissions.
The following examples of towed sports injuries are
drawn from the MUARC report which follow up on
injuries sustained in recreational boating.
Injury examples by activity included the following
(note that all the injuries were sustained by the person
being towed):
Waterskiing:
ff Fell off water skis and a boat went over the top
of water skier
ff Fell and broke back
ff Fell, landing heavily on shoulder
ff Fell while water skiing at high speed (150kph)
ff Collision with submerged tree
ff Hit a tree. Large piece of tree in right lower leg
and laceration
ff Collided with a pontoon in the river
ff Plastic handle from water ski boat hit left eye at
a high speed
ff Injury to ankle and foot – caught in tow rope
ff Partial amputation of right thumb from water
ski rope
Wakeboarding
ff More stringent boat licence requirements
in Victoria
ff Fell from wakeboard, injured ankle
ff Increase boater education in Victoria
ff Fall from wakeboard, injured knee
ff Fell from wakeboard and dislocated shoulder
ff Hit in the throat by wakeboard, fractured larynx
ff Hit on the back of the head by a wakeboard
92
ff Wakeboard struck right thigh
Hit/struck/crushed:
ff Wakeboarding in bare feet, struck object and
lacerated foot
ff Hit in the face with steel whilst waterskiing;
ff Wakeboarding, struck post, injured lip
and head
Knee boarding
ff Knee boarding, lost control and fell off the
ski ring
Towed inflatable (tube, biscuit etc.)
ff Being towed in a biscuit behind a jet ski at
approximately 50kph. Thrown from biscuit
into log
ff On a ski biscuit on Murray River, became
airborne and hit a tree stump in the water
ff Laceration to the thigh from the rope attached
to the tube
ff Dislocated left shoulder in fall from ski donut
ff Riding a biscuit behind a boat, rope wrapped
around and injured right upper arm
ff Climbing into a biscuit, slipped when trying to
get on
The following examples illustrate the type if injury
experienced;
Trips/slips/falls
ff Fell off water skis as the skis hit a bump, fell
face first into the water;
ff hit on the head by waterski;
ff hit an aluminium pole whilst waterskiing;
ff knee boarding, slammed into bank
wooden wall;
ff on a ski biscuit, collided with another person’s
foot; hit on the head with a kneeboard going
20km/hr; hit to head by another person’s knee.
Cutting/piercing:
ff Rope of water ski cut hand;
ff cut from reeds in the water.
3.10.4
Causes/mechanisms of injury and
potential risk/contributory factors
to injury
3.10.4.1 Towed water sports injuries
The following figure is derived from the MUARC data
and shows in absolute terms how the number of
injuries sustained by those involved in towed water
sport operations has trended upwards during the
financial years 2003/4 to 2009/10. For comparison
it also includes the total recreational boating injuries
and the percentage of total injuries which are towed
water sport.
The data shows:
ff An upward trend in all vessel injury numbers
ff fell off water skis and got caught in a rope, left
arm was pulled;
ff An upward trend in watersport injury numbers.
ff overbalanced on water skis; fell into buoy
whilst waterskiing;
ff Water sport injuries compared to total injuries
has remained in the range at between 40%
and 50%.
ff fell from wakeboard and struck riverbank with
both feet;
ff came off wakeboard at 40km/hr, hit side of
head on water; fell off kneeboard, kneeboard
hit him in the face;
Not only are water sport injuries increasing but they
form an increasing part of the total injury numbers.
Both trends illustrate that current interventions may
not be as effective as they should be.
ff fell off biscuit while being pulled along
by speedboat.
93
Figure 27 - Summary of towed watersport injury numbers compared with all injuries numbers sustained by
recreational boaters 2003/4 - 2009/10
1200
60%
1000
50%
800
40%
600
30%
400
20%
200
10%
0
0
2003/4
2004/5
Towed water sport injuries
2006/7
2005/6
2007/8
2008/9
2009/10
% of towed water sport injuries to total injuries
Rec. boat injuries
3.10.4.2 Injury causes and mechanisms
ff getting tangled in the tow rope 13% (n=16);
One hundred and twenty three people participated
in the MUARC follow up injury study. The statistics
and table below summarise the results of that study.
Almost one third of injuries (29%, n=36) to towees
resulted from falls into the water, mostly due to impact
with the water at speed.
ff colliding with a log or tree in the water
7% (n=9);
Other common injury causes were:
ff struck by the board, ski or towline handle
18% (n=22);
ff colliding with or being struck by other
recreational boaters 5% (n=6);
ff wakeboard bindings non-release 4%
(n=5); and
ff landing hard on a kneeboard or inflatable after
being bounced in the air 4% (n=5)
ff over-exerted or over-stretched while skiing or
performing a wakeboarding trick 13% (n=16);
94
Figure 28 - Causes and mechanisms of injury in towed water sport (n=123)
Activity
N
Mechanism
Suggested
responsible person
N
Waterskiing
48
Fall into water
Tow-ee
13
Entangled in tow rope, handle, ski
Tow-ee
11
Over-exerted (e.g torn hamstring)
Tow-ee
8
Tow-er/Tow-ee
6
Hit by ski
Tow-er
6
Struck by rope/handle
Tow-er
3
Collided with log in water
Wakeboarding
39
Cut foot on bolt in boat
Tow-er
1
Fall into water (failed trick, over-exerted)
Tow-ee
12
Over-exerted (attempting trick)
Tow-ee
8
Struck by own board
Tow-ee
7
Bindings did not release
Tow-ee
5
Struck by/tangled in trick handle
Tow-ee
2
Tow-er
2
Tow-er/Tow-ee
1
Observer thrown against boat windscreen
Tow-er
1
In water, struck by boat
Tow-er
1
Struck by (board, handle)
Tow-ee
5
Landed awkward after being bounced in air
Tow-ee
3
Boat caught fire
Collided with others on inflatable
Kneeboarding
15
Fall into water
Collided with log/tree in water
2
Tow-ee
2
1
Fall into water
Tow-ee
9
Collided with another person on inflatable
Tow-ee
4
Entangled in tow rope
Tow-ee
2
Landed awkward after being bounced in air
Tow-ee
2
Struck by boat while in water
Tow-er
1
Struck by wakeboard
Tow-ee
1
Observer thrown against side of boat
Tow-er
1
Tow-er/Tow-ee
1
Collided with bank
21
2
Tow-er/Tow-ee
Entangled (rope, ramp)
Inflatable riding
Tow-ee
Tow-er/Tow-ee
Collided with log in water
From the table above the majority of incidents in
towed water sport are caused by the towee and the
operator, in many cases, may have little control over
the actions of the towee. Those incidents foe which
the operator is responsible could be reduced by skills
and knowledge improvement possibly through an
endorsement or increased education/information.
3.10.5
Contributory factors to injury:
self reported
Participants were asked to identify the factors that
they thought contributed to their injury occurrence.
They were prompted by the interviewer to consider
three categories of factors: human factors, boat/
equipment related factors and environmental factors.
Figure 11 summarises the factors reported by towed
water sports participants.
95
Figure 29 - Contributory factors to injury: self reported by towed water sports study participants
(n=123 responses)
Activity
Number of
responses
Human factors
111
74.0%
Boat/ equipment
related factors
16
11.0%
Environmental
factors
17.0%
3.10.6
24
Factor
N
Inexperience
26
Carelessness/distraction/lack of concentration Misjudgement
17
Risk taking
13
Problem with technique inc. gathering too much rope
13
Bad luck
10
Driver carelessness/inexperience
9
Poor preparation/lack of preparedness
6
Fatigue
5
Overconfidence
4
Alcohol
3
Speed
2
Race area not clearly marked by organisers
2
Bindings did not release/ bindings too loose (cheap/old)
7
Speed
3
Age of ski rope (too old)/elasticity in rope
2
New motor, misjudged use
1
Fuel filler spilt fuel in engine bay
1
Wakeboard was “too big”
1
Bolt sticking up from floor of boat
1
Traffic conflict: wash/wake from other boats (all on Murray River)
10
Log/tree in the water
8
Choppy/rough conditions
4
Strong current
2
The number and duration
of hospital admissions for
towed sports
Waterskiing and wakeboarding accounted for 33%
of all Victorian hospital admissions for recreational
boating related injuries in 2005/06. Hospital stays
ranged from 0 to 30 days. Of the 123 participants
surveyed in MUARC’s follow up study nine
participants reported multiple injuries from the same
incident11. Strains, sprains and ligament tears account
for most of the injuries (38%). The data indicates most
frequently injured area of the body is the head (11%).
Excerpt from Marine Safety in Victoria 2006-2007, p.53
‘As in all previous years towed water sports account for
most recreational boating injury hospital admissions and
ED presentations (372/947, 39%). Although the number
of admitted towed water sports cases decreased by 13%
(from 93 to 81 cases), ED presentations increased by
20% (from 242 to 291 case).
Case numbers for the individual towed sports cannot be
disaggregated in admissions data, but analysis of ED
data show that water skiing probably accounts for around
60% of towed water sports cases and wakeboarding
20%. Among towed water sports cases the lower
extremity (knee) and head/face/neck were the most
frequently injured body sites. Fractures, dislocations,
sprains and strains and open wounds were the most
common injuries. There were more lower limb fractures
and fewer sprain/strains in 2005/6 compared with
2004/5. Falls were the major cause of injury. Struck by/
collision with objects (mostly the ski/board or submerged
objects), entanglements with the towrope, and overexertion also caused many injuries.
11 “Follow up study of hospital treated recreational boating injury” (Ashby,
Cassell, Congiu)
96
These results are generally consistent with those found
in a study of the characteristics of water skiing and
wakeboarding injuries treated in emergency departments
in the United States between 2001 and 2003 (Hostetler
et al., 2005). The injury pattern and causes indicate
that preventive measures could include: promotion of
pre-season physical conditioning; provision of skills and
safety training for skiers/wake boarders, boat operators
and observers (spotters); promotion of the use of a
quick-release tow line device; safety improvements
to equipment design; wearing of wet suits and PFD;
and regular and routine risk assessment of designated
towed sports areas by waterway authorities and event/
competition organisers.’
Towed water sports activities cause injuries
resulting in hospital admissions and presentations.
The following points come from the MUARC marine
safety reports and exposure report.
ff Towed water sports ranked third in terms of
popularity accounting for 8.9% of vessel trips,
15.7% of person trips, 6.5% of on water hours
and 11.6% of person on water hours.
ff Twelve waterskiing incidents resulted in
serious injury in Victoria during the period
2005/6 to 2007/8.
ff Except for a small decrease in 2008/9 injuries
due to towed water sports have been trending
ff 76 % of the injured were males and over 80%
were aged between 15 and 44 years.
The MUARC report lists the major causes of injury
from towed water sports in Victoria over a seven year
period as:
ff Falls (41.0%)
ff Hit/struck or crush by/colliding with an object
(26%).
When relating these injury rate to the exposure data
relating to the activity rates of towed water sports
operations the numbers of injuries caused clearly
reflects a disproportionate representation of injuries to
those engaged in towed water sports.
Figure 30 - Trend in hospital-treated recreational boating injury by watercraft/activity, Victoria: VAED and
VEMD 2003/4 – 2009/10 (n=6,076)
600
500
400
Towed water sports
Motorboating/boating unspecified
PWC riding
Sailing
Wind/Kite surfing
Fishing from a boat
Paddle craft
300
200
100
0
2003/4
2004/5
2005/6
2006/7
The figure above summarises the past 7 years of
injury data for all recreational vessels and illustrates
the changes in injuries for a number of activities
including towed water sports. The other major
activities which are carried out and cause injury
are PWCs and general boating. It indicates that the
number of towed water sport injuries continues to
increase and without further regulatory intervention
there may be difficulty in reducing these numbers.
2007/8
2008/9
2009/10
3.10.6.1 Age and experience of injured parties
One pointer to whether licensing is an appropriate
mechanism for managing activities is whether
incidents are due to inexperienced and/or immature
operators. Records do not record experience levels
of operators. However hospital records do include
the age of the person treated which in the majority
of cases is probably the operator and can be used
as a loose proxy for experience. The table below
summarises the number of injuries in relations to the
age group of the injured party from 2003/4 – 2009/10.
97
Table 29 - Number of injuries compared to age
of operator
Age of injured party
Towed sport (n=2,716)
N
%
279
10.3
15-29
1,419
52.2
30-44
761
28.0
45-59
247
9.1
60+
10
0.4
0-14
Total
Falls and being hit/struck/crushed are high on the list
of injury causes. Towed sport incidents rarely occur at
high vessel speed but it is likely that the severity of the
impact leading to the injury will result in these injuries
being relatively serious. The types of injury recorded
are listed below.
Table 31 - Hospital-treated towed sport - related
injury by injury type over 7 years
2003/4 – 2009/10
Injury type
Fracture
3.10.6.2 Injury types
The cause of injuries is recorded as part of the data
set. The table below summarises this information for
towed sports incidents in the years 2003/4 – 2009/10.
Table 30 - Hospital-treated towed sport-related injury
by nature of injury over 5 years
2003/4 – 2009/10
N
%
1,114
41.0
Hit/struck/crush
711
26.2
Transport/craft accident
85
3.1
Cutting/piercing
47
1.7
Near drowning
33
1.2
Fire/burn/explosion
8
0.3
Other specified
551
20.3
Unspecified
167
6.1
Fall
N
%
504
18.6
2716
Ninty percent of injuries are to persons under 44 and
sixty two percent to persons under 29. This is an
expected result, water sports attract to fit persons and
young families.
Injury cause
Dislocation/sprain/ strain
763
28.1
Open wound
439
16.2
Intracranial
77
2.8
Injury to muscle/ tendon
357
13.1
Superficial injury
176
6.5
Other
316
11.6
Unspecified
84
3.1
3.10.6.3 Cost of admissions
The table below derived from that table in Appendix 6
summarises the number of major injuries (hospital
admissions) and minor issues (emergency
department presentations) from towed water sport
activities over the period from 2003/4 to 2008/9.
It compares the towed water sport outcomes
with all vessel outcomes and shows that 40% of
major injuries, 43% of minor injuries and 42% of all
injuries over the six years resulted from towed water
sport incidents.
Given that towed water sport registrations are
approximately 6.3% of the total and towed water sport
activity is 5% of all vessel trips. PWC activities are over
represented in the injury statistics.
Appendix 6 discusses how the injury costs were
derived for the purposes of this report. These
values are:
ff The average cost of a hospital stay up to 7
days is $5000
ff The average cost of hospital stays > 7 days is
$147,600
98
Table 32 - Towed water sport related injury admissions period 2003/4-2008/9
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
Annual
average
Towed water sport
73
93
81
91
121
109
95
Towed water sport
major injury Costs
$ 10,774,800
$ 13,726,800
$ 11,955,600
$ 13,431,600
$ 17,859,600
$ 16,088,400
$ 14,022,000
156
211
244
223
298
284
236
Total Costs ($m)
Total incidents
$23.03
$31.14
$36.01
$32.92
$43.98
$41.92
$34.83
Towed water sport
190
242
288
299
292
313
270
Towed water sport
minor injury Costs
$ 950,000
$ 1,210,000
$ 1,440,000
$ 1,495,000
Total incidents
Total Costs ($m)
$ 1,460,000 $ 1,565,000 $ 1,350,000
379
514
703
679
810
711
633
$1.90
$2.57
$3.52
$3.40
$4.05
$3.56
$3.17
The cost of major injuries (hospital admissions) from
towed water sport incidents/accidents for the years
2003/4 and 2008/9 is estimated at $83,836,800, an
average of $14,022,000 per annum.
The cost of minor injuries (hospital emergency
department presentations) from towed water sport
incidents/accidents for the years 2003/4 and 2008/9
is estimated at $8,120,000, an average of $1,350,000
per annum.
3.10.6.4 Summary of fatalities and injuries
Towed sport activities have a higher human risk
factor for the towee than the operator of the vessel,
due to the nature of the activity. While most injuries
occur from over confidence or risk taking etc, some
can be attributed to the vessel operator, through
carelessness or inexperience, as well as through
inattention by the observer.
ff The operator is relying on the ability of the
observer to pass on instructions between the
towee and the operator. Incorrect information
from the observer can put both the towee and
the vessel at risk.
ff There can be distraction on the part of a
new and inexperienced operator as there
is a compulsion to look around and not
concentrate on the hazards ahead.
The table below demonstrates the current knowledge
requirements in the present recreational boat licence
hand book and test. Also identified, from the bow-ties,
are the factors that could be included in an improved
knowledge test and factors that could be the subject
of training and/or assessment in a competency
based test.
3.10.6.5 Is there a distinct skill set required to
safely operate a vessel during towed
water sport?
The following unique characteristics of towed water
sport activities suggest that a distinct skill set above
that required for standard recreational boat operations
is required dealing specifically with these issues
of difference.
ff There are a number of people with specific
responsibilities for the safety of the activity e.g.
boat operator, observer and towee.
ff While the speed at which a vessel tows
may not be extreme, the towee can reach
a considerably higher speed when cutting
across the wake.
99
Table 33 - Elements suggested for the options
Information
Current
Knowledge
Test
Improved
Knowledge
Test
are checked for
trip
Y
Y
Y
Education about
implications of fitting
larger outboard
engines
Y
2.1.4
Performance of the
boat and personnel
is monitored at all
times
Y
2.1.5
Impact of boat
use on others and
the environment
is considered
(nuisance?)
Y
2.1.7
speed
Y
2.1.10
"Defensive
Operation Skills"
- understanding
operational hazards
and how to reduce
at night)
Y
2.1.11
Skills for taking
evasive action
while towing skier,
wakeboarder etc.
Y
2.1.12
Understand risks of
high speed operation
Y
2.1.13
Understanding
physics of towing
someone
Y
2.2.11
Education about
appropriate speed
for conditions
Y
Y
2.2.2
Collision avoidance
techniques are
applied when
required in
accordance with
recognised
Y
Y
1.3.1
100
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
Competency
based
assessment
Training
course plus
assessment
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Current
Knowledge
Test
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
2.2.9
Having a separate
observer role while
towing
Y
2.2.15
Importance of having
spatial awareness
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
Competency
based
assessment
Training
course plus
assessment
Y
Y
Y
First-aid training
(separate course)
3.10.7
MUARC survey
The MUARC survey on Marine Safety in Victoria
reports in detail on hospital treated injuries covering
various years.
Causes and outcomes of injuries suffered from
water ski activity, resulting in emergency department
presentations, was similar to those for people that
were admitted to hospital e.g. incidents were caused
mainly by falls, lower body (knee, leg) was the most
common area injured (followed by face and neck)
and the age and gender profile of those injured was
very similar.
MUARC concludes its analysis by stating that injury
in this activity is not well researched. The measures
they suggest to reduce injuries apply to boat
operators, skiers and observers. These include higher
levels of fitness, better equipment and equipment
design, and the provision of skills and safety training
for participants.
Though almost every jurisdiction has regulations
regarding towed sports, there has been minimal effort
to engage towed sport communities. Although access
to clubs and associations is readily available, access
to the weekend recreational skier is made difficult,
due to the absence of any endorsement requirements
or mandatory formal training requirements
for participants.
According to the Follow up study of hospital treated
recreational boating injury (Ashby, Cassell, Congiu,
2004-2006) water skiers and wake boarders were
more likely to have taken lessons than knee boarders
and inflatable tube riders. However, of the 43 towed
sport participants who had taken lessons, 23 reported
that instruction was provided by family members or
friends, 17 were trained by certificated instructors and
only 3 were trained by ski club members.
3.10.8
Exposure
From the MUARC report, towed water sports ranked
third in terms of popularity of boating activities,
accounting for 8.9% of vessel trips (n=81,650), 15.7%
(n=347,080) of person trips, 6.5% of on water hours
(n=368,651) and 11.6% of person on water hours
(n=1.65m).
First Aid
3.10.9
The objective of regulation is to improve safety
by improving the competencies of masters and
operators of vessels that engage in towing activities.
The intent is to provide an environment that would
prevent incidents caused by human factors.
Regulation establishes the conditions which operators
can develop the skills to become competent masters
through establishing knowledge based and skills
assessment requirements.
3.10.10 Options
3.10.10.1 Option 1 - Base case
TSV is responsible for the licensing of boat operators.
There are no regulatory requirements for registration/
training or licensing of skiers.
The Victorian Recreational Boating Safety Handbook
covers hand signals and the basic rules for operators
with observers. TSV has minimal information about
towed sports for participants on its website.
Only general licence operators are able to tow. TSV
has specified that the minimum age for an observer
must be 12 years and that a maximum of 3 people
can be towed at any time. Towing is only permitted
during daylight hours, between one hour before
sunrise and one hour after sunset. ,.
TSV does not set standards for the formal training
of people operating a vessel which is towing, or for
an observer. An observer is not required to have
any knowledge of the marine environment or safe
operation of vessels.
Maintaining the status quo would preserve
this situation.
3.10.10.2 Option 2 - Improved information –
without requiring an endorsement.
This option would provide information about towing
operations in the TSV boat operation hand book.
TSV would also make a DVD or similar material
specifically available to all people wishing to operate a
vessel towing.
101
The DVD or similar material could demonstrate towedsport injury prevention and strategies, including:
ff Preparatory exercises for the persons to
be towed
ff Technique tips for both the master and the
tow-ee
ff Checking the condition and suitability of the
equipment to be used
ff On-water hazard identification
ff Observer responsibilities and understanding
of hand signals
ff The dangers associated with retrieving the
tow-ee
ff Wearing the correct PFD type
ff Local knowledge and site risk assessments
ff The human consequences of not managing
the risks
This option is aimed at raising the master’s awareness
and knowledge to the risks that can be associated
with towing for both the operator and the people
being towed.
3.10.10.3 Option 3 - An endorsement
containing improved information
with an improved knowledge test,
based on this information.
operations in the hand book and make a DVD or
similar material available to all wishing to operate
a vessel towing. TSV could design an appropriate
DVD with support material. Make the material readily
available to operators of all vessels. Support and
encourage operators to work through the information
and attend any courses contained in the literature
prior to taking the mandated test.
DVD, any similar mechanism and material for masters
operating at high speed:
be towed
ff Technique tips for both the master and
the towed
ff Avoidance of shallow waters and fixed objects
of hand signals
towed person(s) back on board
102
the risks
The outcome of this option is aimed at not only raising
the master’s awareness to the risks and skills that can
be associated with towing but by also demonstrating
via a test, retention and understanding of the
knowledge gained.
3.10.10.4 Option 4 – An endorsement
containing improved information
with an improved knowledge test and
a practical assessment.
operations in the hand book and make a DVD or
similar material available to all wishing to operate
a vessel towing. TSV could design an appropriate
DVD with support material. Make the material readily
available to operators of all vessels. Support and
encourage operators to work through the information
and attend any courses or training contained in
the literature prior to taking the mandated test and
DVD, any similar mechanism and material for masters
operating at high speed:
be towed
ff Technique tips for both the master and
the towed
ff Avoidance of shallow waters and fixed objects
of hand signals
towed back on board
the risks
The skills to be tested in a practical assessment are:
ff High speed operation including turning and
manoeuvres while towing
ff Collision avoidance techniques while towing
ff Stopping safely to protect the person
being towed
ff Retrieval procedures and taking a person on
board from the water
ff Demonstration of equipment checking and
fault finding
ff Towing etiquette
This option aims to raise the master’s awareness of
the risks and knowledge and develop the necessary
skills to operate safely while towing.
A knowledge test and a practical assessment,
including demonstrating knowledge of towing, are
integral to this option.
The assessment would ascertain whether the master
could demonstrate they had the skills necessary to
safely manage a vessel whilst towing.
3.10.11 Risk assessment
In considering an endorsement for this activity it
is relevant that the majority of injuries relate to the
person being towed.
The master can avoid hazards and keep the person
being towed in safe water but they have limited
control over any activities the person being towed
may decide to execute, such as jumping the wake or
performing a trick.
While the master can develop the skills necessary to
manage the vessel and to some extent the person
being towed, the skills and knowledge of the person
being towed are less easily managed by the master.
3.10.12 Cost Benefit Analysis
presented here.
cost ratios (BCRs).
based upon two models
trend values.
Education and training the tow-ee has not been made
an option in this paper.
Table 34- Summary of BCR results for towed water sport endorsement options
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
4.01%
8.37%
27.14%
Towed water sports
endorsement
Trend based
5.73
4.60
Towed water sports
endorsement
Average based
2.3
1.8
Towed water sports
endorsement % drop
in negative outcomes
Logbook
Practical test
Training
Training and
test
103
Table 34 above shows the estimated reduction in
injuries that differing delivery options could deliver.
As expected the reduction in injuries by completing
a practical test is expected to be higher than for an
enhanced knowledge test and improved information
alone.
shown in Figure 31 below. The ranges show that the
range of estimated BCR values range from 1.8 to
5.73. This indicates that it is highly probable that an
intervention will have greater benefit than the costs to
deliver the benefit.
These results mean that these results support
improved licensing reforms for PWC operators on a
purely economic basis.
Figure 31 - BCR ranges for investigated towed water sport options
Range of BCR values between values based on long term trends and
values based on long term averages for towed water sport operations
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Enhanced
Knowledge
The above values were further weighted based upon
any changes to the base licence method. It was felt
that an improved basic licensing regime (should one
be implemented) would have the effect of reducing
the effectiveness of an improved towed water sport
endorsement. The table below illustrates this with
some examples of how the range of towed water
sport values could be assumed to change with
differing improved basic licence delivery options.
This table illustrates that any changes to basic licence
would make any towed water sport endorsement
changes more marginal. Thus should changes to a
basic licence scheme materialise then their effect on
any changes to the towed water sport endorsement
will need to be further examined.
Practical Test
It is the master/operator that requires the licence and
thus the master/operator who acquires increased
competency through any changes to the licensing
regime. The endorsement is not aimed at the towee
and will not effect his or her decisions.
In order to account for this Table 35 includes
weightings for the BCRs to account for the relative
level of incidents resulting from the towee’s decisions
as opposed to the master/operator’s decisions.
In the table a value of 100% assumes that all water
sport incidents are attributable to operator failures,
50% assumes that 50% are attributable to operator
failures and 50% are attributable to decisions by the
towed person.
The effectiveness of any towed water sport
endorsement will be further reduced as a significant
proportion of injuries in the towed water sports
sector are due to decisions made by the towee.
In comparison to other boating activities, a larger
proportion of injuries are not ‘susceptible’ to being
prevented by the master/operator, no matter how
skilled they are.
104
Table 35 - T
owed water sport endorsement BCRs weighted for overlap due to licence method and the
percentage of efficiency of the endorsement based on assumed percentage of incidents
attributable to the operator.
Range of knowledge
test BCRs – BCR
trend to BCR average
Range of Practical
Assessment BCRs
– BCR trend to BCR
average
Towed
water sports
endorsement
proportion of
cost ‘susceptible’
to licensing
No
change
0%
Enhanced
knowledge
test
5%
Training or
logbook
10%
Practical
Assessment
15%
Training plus
Assessment
20%
100%
5.73 – 2.3
5.44 – 2.19
5.16 – 2.07
4.87 – 1.96
4.58 – 1.84
90%
5.16 - 2.07
4.90 - 1.97
4.64 – 1.86
4.38 – 1.76
4.13 – 1.66
80%
4.58 - 3.68
4.35 – 3.50
4.13 – 3.31
3.90 – 3.13
3.67 – 2.94
50%
2.87 – 1.15
2.72 – 1.09
2.58 – 1.04
2.44 – 0.98
2.29 – 0.92
100%
4.6 – 1.8
4.37 – 1.71
4.14 – 1.62
3.91 – 1.53
3.68 – 1.44
90%
4.14 – 1.62
3.93 – 1.54
3.73 – 1.46
3.52 – 1.38
3.31 – 1.30
80%
3.68 – 1.44
3.50 – 1.37
3.31 – 1.30
3.13 – 1.22
2.94 – 1.15
50%
2.30 - 0.90
2.19 - 0.86
2.07 - 0.81
1.96 - 0.77
1.84 - 0.72
The table of ranges above illustrates the impact of
both an improved basic licence and the assumptions
of differing level of responsibility for incidents between
the tower and the towee.
The table indicates that except where the towee takes
a large part of the responsibility (over 50%) there is
economic benefit based upon BCRs in implementing
a towed water sport endorsement.
3.10.13 Summary of towed water
sport options
There is evidence that the current licensing and
endorsement regime could be improved to better
manage towed water sports. A towed water sport
endorsement would be aimed at improving the
competency of masters and operators of vessel
engaged in towed water sports and thereby reducing
the human contribution to incidents.
Current outcomes indicate that whilst towed water
sports make up a small percentage of the total
recreational vessel activities they are involved in a
disproportionate number of incidents and injuries
The evidence which is used to make a case for a
towed water sports endorsement is supported by
the economic analysis which shows that the options
suggested are economically justifiable.
3.10.14 Case for towed water sport
endorsement improvements
The following points summarise the case for a towed
water sport endorsement:
ff That the current interventions (whether
licensing or not) do not adequately ensure that
operators are competently trained. A basic
marine licence test addresses issues such as
rules of the road and legal requirements but
it does not address the particular operational
issues associated with towed water sports.
ff Lack of situational control of the person being
towed requires the boat operator to take
significant responsibility for the safety of all
parties involved and also possess high level
boat handling skills.
ff Given the high speeds, interaction with other
vessels and the towing of multiple persons,
it is important that masters have a complete
understanding of safe boat handling,
particularly in high risk situations.
covered by the licensing scheme
ff A high level of injuries, hospital admissions
and emergency department presentations
from towing activities indicates a significant
need to improve the skills and knowledge of
boat operators engaged in towing.
105
ff Towed water sport activities represented 8.9%
of vessel activities. Operations represented
8.9% of vessel trips, 15.7% of person trips,
21.6% of on water vessel hours and 21.4% of
on water person hours.
ff 40% of major injuries, 43% of minor injuries
and 42% of all injuries over the six PWC over
the period from 2003/4 to 2008/9
ff Injuries from towed water sports have been
trending upwards over the last 6 years.
62% were aged between 15 and 34 years and
80% under 40 years.
ff The cost of major injuries (hospital
admissions) from towed water sport incidents/
accidents for the years 2003/4 and 2008/9
is estimated at $83,836,800, an average of
$14,022,000 per annum.
ff The cost of minor injuries (hospital emergency
department presentations) from towed water
sport incidents/accidents for the years 2003/4
and 2008/9 is estimated at $8,120,000, an
average of $1,350,000 per annum.
be reduced by approximately 8.7% saving
$1,337,364 should an enhanced knowledge
test be introduced.
be reduced by approximately 27% saving
$4,150,440 should a practical PWC operator
assessment test be introduced.
ff Un weighted benefit cost ratios (BCRs) for
testing via a knowledge test are positive
ranging between 2.3 and 5.73. BCRs weighted
for improved basic licences and allocating up
to 50% of the responsibility of incidents to the
towee remain strongly positive.
ff Benefit cost ratios (BCRs) for testing via a
practical test are positive ranging between
1.8 and 4.6. BCRs weighted for improved
basic licences and allocating up to 50% of the
responsibility of incidents to the towee remain
strongly positive.
3.10.15 Arguments against a separate
licence endorsement for
towing activities
The following comments have been considered when
looking at whether an endorsement would deliver an
outcome of less incidents and injuries:
ff The majority of injuries are incurred by
skiers are sprains & strains, many of which
can occur as a result of inadequate skiing
expertise or lack of fitness and conditioning.
There is no evidence to support that enhanced
boat handling skills would prevent many of
these injuries.
ff Given the range of factors that can cause
towing incidents there are no obvious tests
that would satisfy compliance with the
endorsement that could not be delivered
through general licence knowledge and
practical testing.
ff Raises questions of training for observers, and
consideration of whether an observer should
have greater expertise and maturity e.g. raise
the age/qualifications of observers to 16 and/
or for them to be full licence holders.
Whilst a knowledge test using a model similar to the
current PWC endorsement could be implemented
reasonably easily it would yield modest returns in
terms of injury reduction.
It is recommended that new operators would be
required to successfully complete a practical
assessment to demonstrate the skills required to be a
master for towed water sport.
However, such a test could pose significant practical
difficulties. There are a number of physical difficulties
with implementing such a test should a towee be
required. Alternative methods may need to be
developed which simulate a towee before a practical
assessment becomes a viable option.
Should a practical assessment be too difficult to
implement then a knowledge test based endorsement
should be introduced.
Whichever method is adopted, TSV should add more
information in the supplied licensing materials relating
to the operation and dangers of towing and these
could be tested as part of the basic licence test.
Therefore Option 4 is recommended. An improved
hand book is made available to all new operators
prior to the general masters licence test. Upon
successfully obtaining a basic licence, a practical
towing assessment would provide the means for the
new operator to demonstrate the skills required to be
a master for towed water sport. Upon completion of
this test an endorsement would be awarded.
106
However the difficulties with this approach are
acknowledged. It is recommended that a towed
water sports knowledge test based endorsement
be introduced.
3.11 Endorsement for
operators of vessels
capable of carrying
more than 12
passengers
3.11.1
3.11.1.1 Background
Vessels that carry large numbers of passengers face
additional risks due to the hazards associated with
managing people in emergencies. To address these
risks improved preparedness is necessary.
For commercial vessel, crew training, processes
and procedures are required to ensure that in an
emergency passengers may be evacuated safely and
that they have a basic understanding of the use of
lifesaving equipment e.g. lifejackets.
In the recreational sector there is little or no
information available which identifies any knowledge
or skills that are specifically aimed at managing the
operations of larger vessels or the management of
people onboard them in the event of an emergency.
More specifically there is no licence endorsement,
nor any other mandated requirement, for operators
or masters of recreational vessels that are capable of
carrying large numbers of passengers.
The Department of Transport discussion paper into
Marine Safety in Victoria in 2009 raised the concept
of an endorsement for operators of vessels that
are capable of carrying 12 or more passengers.
Twelve passengers was chosen as this parallels the
experience in the commercial sector where vessels
carrying more than 12 passengers must meet
more stringent requirements than those carrying
12 passengers or fewer.
The table below supplies a reference to the
size of vessels which have the capacity to carry
12 or more passengers. It comes from the draft
Marine Regulations 2011 and is a tabular version
of the formula for maximum vessel capacity in
the regulations.
Figure 32 - Table showing the maximum number of people vessels of 7m and larger are permitted to carry
Column 1
Length
Column 2
Breadth of
less than
2.5 metres
Column 3
Breadth of
2.5 metres
or more but
less than
3 metres
Column 4
Breadth of
3 metres or
more but
less than
3.5 metres
Column 5
Breadth of
3.5 metres
or more but
less than
4 metres
Column 6
Breadth of
4 metres or
more but
less than
4.5 metres
Column 7
Breadth of
4.5 metres
or more but
less than
5 metres
Column 8
Breadth of
5 metres
or more
6 metres or
more but
less than
7 metres
6
7
7
8
9
9
10
7 metres or
more but
less than
8 metres
7
8
9
9
10
11
11
7 metres or
more but
less than
8 metres
8
9
10
11
12
12
13
8 metres or
more but
less than
9 metres
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
9 metres or
more but
less than
10 metres
10
11
12
14
15
15
16
107
Column 1
Length
Column 2
Breadth of
less than
2.5 metres
Column 3
Breadth of
2.5 metres
or more but
less than
3 metres
Column 4
Breadth of
3 metres or
more but
less than
3.5 metres
Column 5
Breadth of
3.5 metres
or more but
less than
4 metres
Column 6
Breadth of
4 metres or
more but
less than
4.5 metres
Column 7
Breadth of
4.5 metres
or more but
less than
5 metres
10 metres
or more but
less than
11 metres
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
11 metres
or more but
less than
12 metres
12
14
15
16
18
19
20
12 metres
or more but
less than
13 metres
13
15
16
18
19
20
21
13 metres
or more but
less than
14 metres
14
16
18
19
21
22
23
14 metres
or more but
less than
15 metres
15
17
19
21
22
23
25
15 metres
or more
16
18
20
22
23
24
26
An endorsement for masters of vessels with maximum
capacities of 13 or more persons (master plus 12
passengers) would apply to vessels of 8m in length
that have a beam of more than 4m or more. An
endorsement could apply to masters of vessels in
this length range. Approximately 4% of the Victorian
fleet are in this length range. The endorsement if
appropriate could apply to new operators of vessels
of this size.
3.11.1.2 The Victorian Recreational Safe
Boating Handbook
Boating requirements, applicable to all vessels, such
as trip planning and emergency procedures are
included in the recreational boating handbook. There
are no specific references to vessels with the capacity
to carry 12 or more passengers.
One issue requiring resolution would be whether the
endorsement should apply to masters of vessels
capable of carrying 12 or more passengers or only
to masters of vessels actually carrying more than
12 passengers.
108
Column 8
Breadth of
5 metres
or more
3.11.2
Experience from other
jurisdictions
No Australian jurisdiction has any specific
endorsement, special education or special training
requirement imposed on persons operating larger
recreational vessels or on vessels with larger numbers
of passengers.
3.11.3
Incident data in relation to
large vessels with high number
of passengers
ff Rules on lifesaving equipment be
‘rigidly enforced’.
ff A public education campaign be held to
increase awareness of safety aspects.
There were no recommendations regarding improved
licensing or skills of persons who operate vessels with
large numbers of passengers.
3.11.3.2 Collision between the ferry Pam
Burridge and the motor cruiser
Merinda in March 2007
There is no specific incident data that identifies
whether recreational vessels capable of, or carrying,
more than 12 passengers have been involved in
boating incidents in Victoria.
Late in the evening of 28 March 2007, the ferry Pam
Burridge and the motor cruiser Merinda collided in
Sydney Harbour. Of the twelve people aboard the
Merinda, four died.
Standard incident data fields do not record the
number of passengers on the vessel at the time of
the incident. However, should there have been any
fatalities, serious injuries or specific incidents where
large numbers were a contributing factor the numbers
would be mentioned.
The coroner concluded that the incident was a result
of a combination of human and systemic factors.
He found that the Merinda was travelling without
navigation lights on which led to her not being
seen by the ferry. The coroner made numerous
recommendations, but none which specifically dealt
with issues of managing large numbers of passengers
in emergency situations.
However in New South Wales there have been fatal
incidents with vessels involving 12 or more persons
on vessels.
Details of three incidents are set out below:
3.11.3.1 Capsize of N’Gluka in 1990
The 12 metre motor vessel N’gluka was carrying 49
people when the accident occurred in waters off Port
Stephens. In January 1990, the boat veered out of
control while on a pleasure trip then capsized when
brought to an abrupt halt. Five children drowned in
the submerged cabin of the boat.
The NSW Coroner’s report stated “the safe number
of people to have on this vessel was about 20”, and
“I am satisfied this accident occurred because the
vessel was grossly overloaded.”
The Coroner made a series of recommendations to
the Maritime Services Board which included:
ff That limits be imposed on the number of
people allowed on recreational vessels.
ff Where a boat has more than one set of
controls, the driver ensures that the controls
not in use cannot be operated.
Recommendations concerned with improving
recreational vessel licensing requirements; were
aimed at improving the basic licensing test for all
boaters, including requirements for practical testing
and operating at night time.
3.11.3.3 Collision between a 23 ft runabout and
a fishing vessel in May 2008,
Fourteen people were on an allegedly stolen vessel,
which was legally permitted to carry only 8, when
it collided at night with a fishing vessel on Sydney
Harbour. 5 people were killed. A formal enquiry had
not sat at the time this paper was prepared and the
cause has yet to be established.
3.11.3.4 Coroner’s recommendations
In none of the incidents outlined above were there
any recommendations from the coroner that people
management was an issue. This could be reflective
of the lack of insight in this area, the investigations
tended to be looking at the causes rather than
the effectiveness of the mitigations after the event
occurred.
ff That escape hatches open from the inside
and outside.
3.11.4
ff That boat manufacturers be required to fix
a plate near each steering area on the boat,
indicating its maximum loading and any other
special restrictions. (note: The Australian
Builders Plate requires this information to be
mounted in a plate on new vessels and has
been mandatory in Victorai since 2009).
Registration data on vessels was analysed to
ascertain how many vessels are registered in Victoria
capable of carrying 12 or more passengers Current
registrations are taken as being 170,000 vessels. It
was assumed that those boats that are 8 metres or
longer would be suitable for taking 12 passengers
or more.
Victorian recreational vessels
over 8 metres
109
The overall number of registered vessels that are
8 metres or longer is 2.75% of total vessels. There are
4,680 vessels in this length range. Of these vessels
approximately two-thirds were motor vessels and onethird yachts.
Anecdotally Victoria is experiencing an increase in the
number of vessels of this size. Recent developments
such as in Docklands, have increased berthing space
for larger vessels and additional marinas are being
planned and built throughout Victoria. While these
vessels could carry large numbers of passengers,
there is no evidence that this actually occurs to any
significant extent. In fact very few recreational vessels
with the capacity to carry more than 12 passengers
are being operated to that capacity.
Therefore while it is important for vessel operators to
be able to manage emergency situations involving
large numbers of people, these situations are
very uncommon.
3.11.5
Stakeholder comment
Stakeholder comment during the Marine Review
consultation process supported a range of licence
endorsements for high risk vessels and for operating
in high risk areas. However there was no support for
an endorsement operators of recreational vessels
capable of carrying 12 or more passengers.
3.11.6
Commercial qualifications for
these types of vessels
To operate an equivalent large commercial vessel
that would be capable of carrying or be permitted to
carry 12 or more passengers an operator would, at
minimum, require a coxswain’s certificate.
The requirements for completion of a coxswain’s
certificate are 360 days (1,800 hours) of sea time
and a further 2 to 3 weeks of course attendance,
which covers topics such as basic seamanship,
navigation, boat handling, mechanical engineering
and COLREGS. While it is not suggested that a
recreational operators should be required to acquire
this level of skills and knowledge, it does demonstrate
the wide gap between recreational and commercial
qualifications and potentially the need for recreational
boat operator qualifications to be raised.
3.11.7
The objective of regulations for this endorsement is to
improve safety by ensuring the master has the skills
and knowledge to protect, as best as possible, the
well-being and safety of passengers on the vessel
under their control and in an emergency situation.
3.11.8
Identified knowledge and skill
requirements
From the bow tie analysis in Appendix 4 and the
discussions held with stakeholders a number
of elements which could be used to develop an
endorsement were identified. The table below
identifies which elements provide the knowledge
requirements in the current test and the specific
information that would be beneficial for an improved
knowledge test. It also highlights the skills that could
be subject to practical training and/or tested in a
competency based skills assessment.
110
Figure 33 - Table of elements identified for knowledge and skill requirements for operating a vessel carrying
12 or more passengers.
Information
Current
Knowledge
Test
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Practical
training/
Experience
Designate vessel
muster stations
Y
Y
Have evacuation plan
Y
Y
2.1.10
"Defensive
Operation Skills"
- understanding
operational hazards
and how to reduce
at night)
Y
Y
Y
2.2.2
Collision avoidance
techniques are
applied when
required in
accordance with
recognised
Y
Y
Y
3.1.6
Launching and
entering liferaft/
dinghy
Y
3.3.1
On board personnel
are informed of
actions required
to deal with the
emergency
Y
3.3.2
Procedures are
implemented to
combat emergency
and protect persons
on board
Y
Competency
based
assessment
Y
Training
course plus
assessment
Y
Y
Y
Y
First-aid training
(separate course)
First Aid
3.3.6
Preparation for
abandoning the boat
is undertaken, if
required
Y
3.5.1
Vessel being
swamped and
capsized
Y
3.5.3
Use of vessel muster
stations
Y
3.5.4
Use of headcounts to
manage numbers of
passengers
Y
3.5.5
Using a lifebuoy
4.1.1
Bar Crossing Training
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
111
The majority of elements come together under the
national competency which addresses emergency
management and this competency would form the
core of any requirements.
3.11.9
Summary
The questions are whether masters of vessels with
high passenger numbers require additional skills and
knowledge compared to those of vessels with fewer
persons and, if so, is there sufficient evidence in
terms of incidents, fatalities and injuries to support the
introduction of an endorsement.
Vessels with large numbers of passengers impose
different hazards compared to smaller vessels as
person management has increased importance,
particularly in emergency situations.
There have been no incidents in Victoria involving
recreational vessels with large numbers of
passengers and there is no other recorded
evidence from Victoria to suggest there is a problem
with recreational vessels that can carry 12 or
more passengers.
However incidents from other jurisdictions illustrate
that when incidents do happen to these vessels they
can result in multiple fatalities.
Larger recreational vessels make up a small
percentage of registered vessels although numbers
are increasing possibly pointing towards an increased
likelihood of a significant incident.
Interventions that have been considered include:
ff Alerting masters to hazards by providing
information aimed at improving a master’s
knowledge of the different hazards associated
with operating with a large number of
passengers and providing material to help
him or her develop suitable processes
and procedures to manage passengers in
emergency and unexpected situations.
ff Mandate a knowledge test aimed at testing
some of the information provided above
leading to an endorsement.
ff Mandate practical training to assist a master to
develop procedures and processes including
passenger briefings on safety equipment and
what to do in an emergency. The training could
include ‘in the water’ training on emergency
and survival techniques enabling the master
to experience the reality of an emergency in a
controlled environment. Successful applicants
would receive an endorsement.
Due to the lack of hard evidence of a real problem
allied to the expected costs of formal testing or
training neither a test nor a mandated training course
is supported.
Should future evidence point to a definite increase
in the risk profile then the introduction of some form
of endorsement tied to a knowledge test or practical
training with or without an assessment for masters
of vessels that fall into this category should be
further investigated.
3.11.10 Options
3.11.10.1 Option 1 - Base case
In Victoria there is no record of incidents, fatalities or
injuries suggesting adverse outcomes from the status
quo. There are no indicators that there is a problem
requiring significant intervention to mitigate.
However the growing number of vessels capable
of carrying larger numbers of people may be a risk
indicator highlighting an increase in risk without the
level of risk it being of concern.
3.11.10.2 Option 2 - Improved information.
The expected increase in the size of the fleet
brings with it an increase in congested waterways,
particularly in rivers and near marinas which could
bring about incidents due to a lack of skills and
therefore some improved knowledge of the hazards
and risks larger vessels face could be introduced.
Larger recreational vessels currently make up a small
percentage of registered vessels although numbers
are increasing pointing towards an increased
likelihood of a significant incident
Improved information could be provided as part of
the recreational licensing materials, possible in the
form of a workbook which a master can work through
with ideas for processes and procedures which could
be adapted to suit particular vessels. Some form of
audio-visual presentation such as a DVD or similar
material could also be made available.
Masters of large vessels could also be encouraged
to attend existing safety courses such as those
described below as a way to improve skills.
The following elements should be contained in
the information.
ff The risk management of a vessel carrying
more than 12 passengers which may be
significantly larger than the majority of
ff Passenger management in emergency
and non emergency situations including
safety briefings.
ff The concepts of evacuation drills and
muster stations.
ff Processes for contacting and communicating
in an emergency.
ff Pre-trip briefings
112
ff Fatigue, drug and alcohol management
ff Deployment of safety equipment including and
entering a liferaft.
ff Vessel loading and stability and the influence
of people on this.
ff The importance of maintaining a
proper lookout.
The option is aimed at raising the master’s awareness
to the risks associated with the carriage of 12 or
more passengers by the use of improved access
to knowledge of these risks and advice on how to
manage them.
3.11.10.3 Currently available practical courses
which may address some of the
operational issues with larger vessels.
The following courses are currently available and
cover many of the elements discussed above.
Yachting Australia has developed Safety and Sea
Survival Course which is modelled on the International
Sailing Federation (ISAF) model training course for
offshore personal survival. The course is a twoday (at least 16 hours) intensive course and costs
approximately $345. The course includes a practical
wet drill involving deployment and use of a life raft,
flare detonation in a controlled environment and
theory sessions.
The commercial vessel Coxswain course includes
a subject called ‘The Elements of Shipboard Safety
- Personal Survival Techniques’. This module takes
approximately 2 days and is available via Victoria’s
registered training organisations (RTOs).
The course covers:
ff TDM MF 5507A Fight and extinguish fires on
board a coastal vessel
ff TDM MF 5407A Observe safety and
emergency procedures
ff TDM MF 1107B Survive at sea in the event of a
vessel abandonment
The course also includes a practical wet drill involving
deployment and use of a life raft, flares detonation in
a controlled environment and theory sessions and is
from the TDM Marine package.
The recommendation is to introduce Option 2 and
provide improved information to vessel masters on
the hazards of operating vessels carrying greater
than 12 passengers along with template processes
and procedures which could be adapted for
specific vessels.
113
114
Appendix 1: Stakeholder feedback on the current
licensing framework
General response from
consultation process
In 2009 a comprehensive discussion paper was
issued as part of the review of the Marine Safety Act
1988. This paper was supported by an extensive
consultation process which included over 25
meetings held across the state addressing over
800 participants.
Stakeholders (recreational boat users, industry
associations and the enforcement agencies) were
invited to respond to a number of questions regarding
existing recreational boat licences and possible
options for improvement.
Ninety-five written submissions commented on
whether skills based testing should be introduced
for recreational boat operators. Over 62% of those
responding to a question on whether skill based
license testing should be introduced, supported
the proposal.
At all meetings stakeholders commented that the
current licensing arrangements were ‘too easy’
and that many existing license holders were not
competent to safely operate vessels despite passing
the knowledge test.
Particular concerns from stakeholders were:
ff boat handling,
ff launching and landing a vessel,
ff trip preparation.
ff understanding weather and sea
conditions, and
ff safety equipment i.e. ensuring the correct
equipment was carried and that it was in
operating condition.
Stakeholders against practical testing did not favour
it for reasons of cost and it being an imposition, in
particular a belief that it may prove a deterrent to
people taking up boating.
These stakeholders believed that boater skills would
be enhanced by experience.
Nevertheless, both groups, those for and against
practical testing, supported higher levels of
supervision for young and new boaters.
The table below summarising particular licensing
issues arising out of the consultation.
The general view was that the current licensing
system only provides an operator with a limited
understanding of boat operating rules and that it
does not enable operators to identify risky or difficult
situations or provide the knowledge and expertise to
deal with those situations.
Appendix 1: Stakeholder Feedback on the current licensing framework
115
Table 36 - Stakeholder summary
Recreational licences: general issues
Summary of issues
Stakeholder feedback
At present, applicants for licences are only required to
pass a knowledge-based test involving a small number
of multiple choice questions. An additional knowledgebased assessment must be completed for a licence
holder to be endorsed as an operator of a PWC.
There is a widespread view that the current licensing
regime is too lax and that it is too easy to get a licence.
Applicants are not required to demonstrate boating skills
or to have any practical experience prior to obtaining a
licence. Nor, for example, does the applicant have to
demonstrate practical experience in operating a PWC, to
obtain a PWC endorsement.
The prevailing view is that people can pass the test
without having sufficient knowledge of boating rules and
safety issues.
A substantial percentage (40%) of recreational vessel
incidents and injuries are caused through human factors
such as inexperience, navigational error and errors
of judgment.
Available safety data suggests there is a case for
increasing the level of skills and knowledge of operators
before they receive their recreational boat operator
licence (RBOL).
−− Majority support for skill based testing (62% of
155 respondents).
−− Majority support for an increased endorsement
system (63% of 115 respondents).
−− While there is broad support for the above
options, key stakeholders raised important
practical considerations.
−− There is a wide range of views on what skills based
testing actually entails - e.g. some respondents
support on-water testing while some believe a
simulator test would be appropriate.
−− Peak bodies including the Boating Industry
Association of Victoria, the Recreational Fishing and
Trailer Boat Owners Advocacy and Support Group
and the Australian National Sportfishing Association
do not support on-water testing.
Victoria Police
Boating Industry Association (BIA)
Victoria Police
The BIA did not support the introduction of practical
licence testing as on-water testing would represent
an additional entry barrier for Victorians considering
boating as a recreational pursuit.
In 2010, members of the Victorian Water Police were
surveyed on boat operator licensing.
They cited the following as being major issues.
ff A lack of skills,
ff Lack of knowledge of boating rules and basic
safety requirements,
ff a lack of experience, and
ff a poor attitude to rules and requirements.
The first two of these issues can be linked to
the current licensing process which comprises
a knowledge based test only. The water police
responses indicate that the current testing regime
does not deliver competent operators.
Furthermore, in areas where the knowledge based
test is strongest (rules and requirements) the water
police responses indicate that this knowledge is not
retained.
The survey responses showed that 70% and 80%
of water police members (of those responding?)
supported proposals for practical boating training
and/or practical assessment of operators forming part
of the license test.
116
There is broad support for improving the
licensing system:
These concerns should be put in perspective by
comparing the cost of a typical boating safety course
(hundreds of dollars) with the price of an entry level
new vessel ($20-30,000 for a PWC or low spec vessel
for example). This indicates that the cost of entry
is relatively small compared to the capital cost of
modestly priced new vessel (about 1% of the cost).
The BIA did support the possibility of a knowledge
based endorsement for towed water sports.
Feedback from ‘Big Ships –
Small boats’ project
A stakeholder workshop was held to discuss issues
relating to the interaction of commercial vessels and
recreational vessels on Port Phillip.
Stakeholders, including port operators, commercial
vessel operators, and port pilots, agreed that there
is a need for better education and skills amongst
recreational vessel operators.
Stakeholders observed that operators of recreational
vessels demonstrated poor understanding and
application of collision regulations and boat handling
skills, putting themselves and others at risk.
Transport Safety Victoria’s Summer Safety
Education Officers 2009-2010
From 26 December 2009 Marine Safety Victoria (MSV
- now Transport Safety Victoria (TSV)), instigated a
Summer Safety Officer program to educate vessel
operators in safety issues, including carrying the
mandated safety equipment. The program covered
most of the Victorian coast and some inland lakes
and rivers.
Feedback obtained, based on face-to-face
interactions with a total of 1837 boaters across
Victoria, highlighted a poor understanding among
recreational boat licence holders of the following
critical aspects of boating:
ff Many boaters do not know what ‘Heightened
Risk’ is and the requirements for wearing a
PFD Type 1. The Marine Regulations require
that a PFD is to be worn on certain recreational
vessels during time of heightened risk.
ff Boaters lack understanding of the
requirements for wearing of PFDs.
In particular:
–– the requirement for PFDs to comply with
specific standards, and
–– special requirements for inspection and
servicing of inflatable PFDs.
ff Boaters lack of understanding about the type
and configuration of vessel lights. Light colour,
location, and configuration are used to identify
vessel type and operation at night and during
times of poor visibility. A vessel displaying
incorrect lighting or an operator unable to
interpret the lights on another vessel may
increase the risk of a collision.
ff Lack of understanding of different types of
marine radio and requirements for use.
ff Lack of understanding of the merits of using
a radio compared to a mobile phone. On the
water a mobile phone signal is not as powerful
and there can be black spots where the
mobile network is not available.
ff Operators using VHF radios without being
licensed. VHF is used for commercial shipping
and search and rescue organisations.
Unlicensed recreational vessel operators
using this network may interfere with important
commercial or rescue broadcasts.
Appendix 1: Stakeholder Feedback on the current licensing framework
117
118
Appendix 2: Recreational Boat Operator Licensing
Schemes within Australia
A key document defining the minimum core
competencies for the operation of mechanically
powered vessels was developed by the National
Marine Safety Committee (NMSC). The National
Competencies were developed from the nationally
agreed Principles for common standards for
recreational boat licensing. Principle 5 requires that
candidates for a boat operator licence should be able
to “demonstrate” a wide range of knowledge and boat
handling requirements.
The National Competencies comprise three individual
competency units:
ff Unit 1 - Trip preparation and planning;
ff Unit 2 - Safe Operation; and
ff Unit 3 - Responding to emergencies
and incidents.
It was expected that, over time, the regulators of
recreational boat operators in each state would
introduce these common minimum competencies into
their recreational boat licensing schemes. Since 2000,
most Authorities have adopted licensing schemes
which are aligned to the units contained in the
National Competencies.
Australian jurisdictions in which a licence is required
to operate a recreational vessel all have a theorybased test as part of their testing models.
Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia and
Tasmania have all adopted models which address
knowledge and practical skills and/or experience.
They have different methods of delivery ranging
from logbook experience models to competencybased assessments.
South Australia and Victoria rely solely on knowledge
based testing (other than for under 16 year olds in SA
who have to complete a practical test). The Northern
Territory and the ACT do not have registration or
licensing schemes for recreational boating.
Based on the outcomes of the Victorian report into
the Victorian licensing system, the Victorian licence
scheme does not deliver a competency outcome
to the standard of the Western Australian model.
A sample of boat operators evaluated and reported
on in a study by MUARC found that only one Victorian
out of forty-nine was able to successfully complete
the competency assessment based on the WA
RST model.
All jurisdictions incorporate mutual recognition of
interstate recreational boat licences [and other
commercial qualifications] in their licensing regimes
[and some have recognition of prior knowledge
arrangements in place.]
Most jurisdictions also have medical information
disclosure requirements and eyesight testing.
Set out below are the pathways to obtaining a
recreational boat licence in five other Australian
jurisdictions – New South Wales, Western Australia,
Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania.
Appendix 2: Recreational Boat Operator Licensing Schemes within Australia
119
Figure 34 - Model of NSW licensing scheme
New South Wales
New South Wales – Recreational Boat Licence
Boating safety
Course
- DVD or
online (1hr)
- Extra PWC
DVD or
online (20min)
PLUS
Practical boating
experience
- 3 logged trips
with supervisor
OR practical
boating course
THEN
Regulation of recreational boating in NSW is managed
by NSW Maritime a state government authority
headed by a Chief Executive who is responsible and
accountable to the Minister for Ports and Waterways.
The relevant legislation is the Marine Safety Act 1998
and the Marine Safety (General) Regulations 2009.
An operator requires a boat licence to operate a
powered recreational vessel at speeds of 10 knots
or more.
The two main licence types in NSW are the General
Boat licence and the PWC licence. These two licence
types are further categorised into adult and young
adult licences. Young adult licences are available
for 12 to under 16 year olds and adult licences
for people aged 16 years or over. A PWC licence
applicant must also comply with the general licence
test requirements.
NSW requires all initial licence applicants to complete
a three-step process to obtain a boat licence.
The first step is the completion of the General Licence
Boating Safety Course which involves applicants
watching a 60 minute presentation delivered via
DVD presentation or online. This covers a variety of
regulatory and safety requirements. A person applying
for a PWC licence must complete an additional
PWC Licence Boating Safety Course which requires
watching an 18 minute presentation covering PWC
specific regulatory and safety information. There is no
assessment at this step.
The second step requires both General and PWC
applicants to provide evidence of practical boating
experience. This can be done by either:
ff completing a competency log (log-book
option); or
ff completing a practical boating course.
General knowledge
boating test
(Theory Assesment)
- 40 multiple
choice questions
extra 15 for PWC
Recreation Boat
Licence (General
or PWC)
- Young adult 12 to
15 y.o.
- Adult 16 y.o.
and above
- motorised boat
over 10 knots
The log book option requires applicants to complete
a minimum of 3 trips under the supervision of an
experienced skipper who has held a licence for at
least 3 consecutive years. During each trip a set
of activities and discussions must be completed
and noted in a log-book. The log-book activities
and discussions are modelled on the national
competencies. The log-book is supplied free of
charge by NSW Maritime and requires both the
skipper and the trainee to sign-off each activity or
discussion in the log-book once completed. The
log-book must be presented to NSW Maritime prior to
sitting the third stage of licensing.
The practical boating course must be undertaken with
a recognised training provider. Boating courses are
modelled on the national competencies. No minimum
time is set for this course and the average cost
is $150.
The third step requires General and PWC licence
applicants to pass the General Licence Knowledge
Test. The test is a 40 question theory-based multiple
choice test of which the first 15 are compulsory
questions which must be answered correctly. PWC
applicants must also pass the 15 question PWC
Licence Knowledge Test of which a minimum of
12 questions must be answered correctly. Both
tests are based on the content of NSW Maritime’s
Boating Handbook and are similar to the Victorian
knowledge test.
Snapshot
There were approximately 220,000 registered
recreational vessels in NSW at 30 June 2009. 3.6% of
these are PWC registrations.
There were approximately 480,000 recreational
licence holders in NSW at 30 June 2009. 8.1% are
PWC licences.
NSW recorded 11 fatalities and 66 serious injuries in
recreational vessels in the 2008/09 year.
120
Figure 35 - Model of WA licensing scheme
Western Australia
Western Australia – Recreational Skippers Ticket (RST)
Theory
Assesment
- 30 multiple
choice questions
PLUS
Practical skills
and knowledge
assessment
- approx. 1hour
on water
- assessed on
11 tasks
Regulation of recreational boating in Western Australia
is managed by the Marine Safety Business Unit of
the Department of Transport. The relevant legislation
is the Western Australia Marine Act 1982 and the
Navigable Waters Regulations 1958 (Part VI – Private
Pleasure Boats).
A Recreational Skipper’s Ticket (RST) is required to
operate a motor boat which is powered be a motor
greater than 4.5 kilowatts.
A person must be 14 years or older to obtain a RST.
However, RST holders who are under the age of 16
i.e. 14 and 15 year olds are restricted to driving during
daylight hours and cannot travel faster than 8 knots.
Unlicensed operation by a person aged between 10
and less than 14 years is permitted where there is
direct supervision by a holder of a RST who is at least
18 years of age.
All applicants are required to complete a two stage
assessment process to obtain a RST.
Applicants must first pass a theory-based assessment
comprising 30 multiple choice questions – 24 must
be answered correctly (modelled on the national
competencies); and
Second, pass a competency-based practical onwater assessment of approximately 1 hour duration,
covering 11 tasks of competency.
Some tasks are to be completed over the duration
of the test, such as obeying the relevant rules and
regulations. Other tasks are more specific, such as
safely departing a berth, performing a controlled
stop at 5 knots and safely retrieving a simulated
man overboard.
Recreation
Skippers Ticket
- 14 y.o. or above
- drive motor boat
greater than 6ph
- under 16 y.o. can
only drive during
daylight and under
8 knots
The on-water assessment guidelines are highly
prescriptive as to how the standard is to be met,
the number of attempts permitted for each task,
defining minor and major breaches and providing
feedback at the end of the assessment. Applicants
who are considered to be ‘not yet competent’ at
the end of the assessment can attempt further
assessments as many times as it takes to achieve a
‘competent’ result. Further assessments will cover all
11 units and require the payment of the whole fee.
The Western Australian model does not specify what
training or experience is required prior to sitting a test.
It is merely a test of the competencies of the applicant
at the time of the test.
The RST was introduced in April 2008 as the first form
of recreational boat licensing in Western Australia.
The Department of Planning and Infrastructure
authorises assessors to undertake all aspects of the
theory and practical RST assessment. The assessors
charge market rates for the testing. The Department
does not receive any revenue from the program and
has estimated costs of about $350,000 per annum to
administer the RST accreditation and audit regime.
The average cost of the two assessments –
theory and practical – is $99 for experienced
applicants. Most assessors also provide training for
inexperienced boaters for an additional $150
i.e. total $250.
.
121
Figure 36 - Model of Queensland licensing scheme
Queensland
Queensland – Recreational Marine Driver Licence
BoatSafe practical course with theory and
practical assessment
- Successfully complete 6 units of competency
through group and individual on-water exercises
- 6 hours, 4 students
- Extra Unit 7 for PWC operation (2-3 hours)
Regulation of recreational boating in Queensland
is managed by the Maritime Safety Queensland
Division of the Department of Transport and Main
Roads. The relevant legislation Transport Operations
(Marine Safety) Act 2004 and Part 4 of the Transport
Operations (Marine Safety) Regulation 2004 –
Licences to operate ships.
A Recreational Marine Driver Licence is required to
operate a boat which is powered by a motor greater
than 4.5 Kw in Queensland. An additional PWC
licence is required to operate a PWC.
A person must be 16 years or older to obtain a
licence. There is no restricted licence in Queensland
for younger operators, however, unlicensed operators
may drive a boat provided a licensed driver is
onboard supervising and is able to take immediate
control of the boat. Unlicensed operators are
prohibited from towing.
Queensland was the first Australian jurisdiction to
introduce a comprehensive competency based
training and assessment regime for the operation
of recreational vessels via the Boatsafe training
course. The course was modelled on the National
competencies and introduced in 2006.
The Boatsafe course involves completing the
following 6 units of competency:
ff Prepare a recreational vessel for operation;
ff Apply international and state regulations
relevant to the operation of a
recreational vessel;
ff Assess weather conditions and forecasts;
ff Operate mechanical and electrical appliances
of a recreational vessel;
ff Manoeuvre a recreational vessel; and
Recreation Marine
Driver Licence
- boat with motor
over 6hp
-16 y.o.
Applicants wishing to operate PWCs must
complete an additional seventh unit - ’operating a
personal watercraft’.
The Boatsafe Competency Standard (October 2009}
provides the most recent version of the standard
applicants must meet. Applicants must possess the
skills and knowledge detailed in the standard and
must demonstrate competence in performing the
tasks outlined at the prescribed level of performance.
These matters are assessed through theory based
learning and practical exercises, after which a
“successfully completed” or “not yet successfully
completed” result is given to applicants.
The Queensland government has approved 28
training providers to conduct Boatsafe courses.
The training providers are required to run each
course over a minimum duration of 6 hours and for
a maximum group of four students. Shorter courses
can be run where the students complete the Boatsafe
workbook prior to taking the course. Larger groups
can be taken if the provider allocates more time
and equipment.
Apart from prescribing course duration and class
sizes and a requirement that classes be structured
around the competencies in the standard, there is
no prescribed curriculum for the Boatsafe training.
To date, providers have determined their own lesson
plans and assessment tools.
During recent Departmental consultations Maritime
Safety Queensland has indicated that they are
reviewing the course requirements following reports
that some training providers were not achieving an
appropriate balance between time spent on the water
and time spent in theory-based learning. Maritime
Safety Queensland is in the process of conducting
activity based time-trials to help define the specific
on-water components of the Boatsafe course.
ff Apply safety management processes on a
recreational vessel.
122
This may lead to the development of a more
prescriptive Boatsafe course which mandates a
minimum time for on-water activities. Consideration
is also being given to mandating specific theorybased questions in the skills and knowledge testing
components of the course.
The average costs per person for the training courses
are $140 each for the Boat licence or PWC courses
and $240 for a combined Boat and PWC course.
Snapshot
There were approximately 233,200 registered
recreational vessels in Queensland as at 30 June
2009. There has been an average annual growth of
4.5% since 2001.
There were approximately 662,000 recreational
licence holders in Queensland as at 30 June 2009.
There has been an average annual growth of 5%
since 2005.
Queensland recorded 11 fatalities (seven incidents)
and 18 serious injuries (defined as requiring overnight
hospital admission) in recreational vessels in the
2008/09 year.
Figure 37 - Model of SA licensing scheme
South Australia
South Australia – Boat Operator Licence
Operator Theory Test
- 50 multiple choice questions
- 8 compulsory, 22 on boating rules,
20 on boating safety
Boat Operator Licence
- Recreational vessel
fitted with an engine
includes PWC
-16 y.o. or above
Permit Theory Test
- specific theory
questions including
observer
requirments
Special permit to operate
a recreational vehicle
- 12 to 15 y.o.
- take sole charge of
vessel during daylight
hours if under 4m length
and capable of max speed
10 knots
- longer and faster boats
can be operated under
direct supervision of 18
y.o. licenced operator
- No towing skiers
- No PWC operator
- Can act as observer
PLUS
Practical Test
- complete within
6 months of
theory test
- supply own boat
- Approx 20 min
on-water
- demonstrate boat
manoeuvering
skills, navigation,
safety, equipmnet,
Colregs
Regulation of recreational boating in South Australia
is managed by the Department for Transport, Energy
and Infrastructure. The relevant legislation is the
Harbours and Navigation Act 1993 and the Harbours
and Navigation Regulations 2009.
A Boat Operator Licence is required to operate
a vessel which is fitted with an engine including
PWCs even if the engine is not being used. Licence
applicants must be 16 years or older.
A 50-question multiple choice theory-based test must
be passed to obtain a Boat Operator Licence.
A Special Permit to operate a recreational vessel is
available to a person aged 12 to 15 years old and
allows the person to take sole charge of a vessel
during daylight hours if the vessel is less than 4m in
length and capable of a maximum speed of 10 knots.
Operation of any other recreational vessel (other than
PWCs) is permitted under the direct supervision of a
person who holds a Boat Operator Licence. Towing
and PWC operation is prohibited for permit holders,
however, they are permitted to act as an observer in
water-skiing activities.
Special Permit applicants must pass a multiple choice
theory-based test and a 20 minute on-water practical
skills test. The practical on-water test involves
demonstrating boat manoeuvring skills, navigation
skills, knowledge and use of safety equipment and
knowledge of the collision regulations.
South Australia also has an active school boating
education program to teach secondary school
children about boating safety.
123
Figure 38 - Model of Tasmanian licensing scheme
Tasmania
– Motor Boat Licence
Practical Tuition
Course
- 4-5 hours
- on-water training
- $150
OR
PLUS
Log-Book
- 20 hours sea time
Phasing out in 2011
Motor Boat
Licence
PLUS
Theory Exam
- 30 min multiple
choice – 8
compulsory and
75% of rest correct
PWC Practical
Course
- $120
PLUS
Regulation of recreational boating in Tasmania is
managed by Marine and Safety Tasmania (MAST)
which is a statutory authority with a board appointed
by the Minister for Infrastructure. The relevant
legislation is the Marine and Safety Authority Act
1997 which is administered by the Department of
Infrastructure, Energy and Resources.
A Motor Boat Licence is required to operate a vessel
with an engine over 4 hp. Licence applicants must be
17 years or older.
A provisional licence is available for a person
aged 12 to 16 years old and allows the person to
operate a vessel under supervision during daylight
hours, subject to travelling under 20 knots and a
towing prohibition.
Prior to 2008, Motor Boat Licence – including provisional
licence - applicants were required to pass a 30-minute
multiple choice theory based test. An additional
requirement to either complete a practical tuition course
or undertake 20 hours logged on-water experience was
introduced in 2008. The logged on-water experience
option will be phased out in March 2011.
The practical tuition course does not include an
assessment component but does involve practical onwater training activities over a period of 4 to 5 hours.
Motor Boat Licence
- Motor boat with engine
over 4ph
- General licence from
17 y.o. or above
- Provisional licence for
12 to 16 y.o. (must be
supervised, under
20 knots, daylight only,
towing restrictions)
PWC Theory Exam
- 30 min multiple
choice – 8
compulsory and
75% of rest correct
Northern Territory
Regulation of recreational boating in the Northern
Territory (NT) is managed by the Marine Safety Branch
of the Department of Lands and Planning via the
Marine (Pleasure Craft) Regulations. These regulations
cover matters such as the collision regulations,
speed limits, equipment requirements and minimum
safety standards for recreational vessels. There are
no alcohol restrictions on operators of recreational
vessels in the NT.
The regulatory regime does not require the
registration of vessels or licensing of operators. The
key reasons for not introducing licensing have been
the low population (approx 220,000) and the unique
recreational fishing destination that NT represents to
all Australians. There are also the inherent difficulties
associated with enforcement over the large coastline
and inland waterway systems in NT. Darwin Harbour is
about 3 times the size of Sydney Harbour.
There is an estimated 25,000 recreational vessels in
the NT. There are indications that recreational vessel
registration and licensing may be introduced in the
next 12-24 months.
There is minimal incident data available. No fatalities
were recorded in the last financial year.
An endorsement is required to operate a PWC. This
endorsement is obtained by completing a PWC
practical course.
124
Motor Boat Licence
with PWC
Endorsement
Summary of licensing in Australia and the
Victorian model
All the Australian licensing schemes are aimed at
assuring recreational boat operators attain a level of
competency as outlined in the NMSC guidelines. As
there has been no objective evaluation of the various
license schemes it is not possible to say whether
individual schemes meet this requirement.
It is probable that such a broad range of different
schemes aimed at achieving the same ends cannot
hope to achieve an identical level of competency.
For example, a knowledge based theory test is
unlikely to assure the same level of competency
as an on water practical assessment by a qualified
tester. The issue is whether the minimum level of
competency each jurisdiction adopts meets the aim
of the national competencies.
The only comparison of the licensing models
carried out to the knowledge of DOT is the MUARC
assessment of the Victorian model against a
simulation of the WA Recreational Skippers ticket test.
This comparison illustrates that the Victorian model
achieves outcomes which fall well short of the level
of competency achieved by successful completion of
the WA test.
If the practical assessment of competency achieved
by the WA model is a reasonable assessment of
the national minimum competencies then, from the
evidence available, the Victorian model fails to deliver
competent operators.
Overseas Jurisdictions
New Zealand
New Zealand does not require a person to hold
a licence to operate a recreational boat or the
registration of vessels.
New Zealand most recently reviewed the issue
of recreational boat licensing in 2007 as part of
a review of its Pleasure Boat Safety Strategy. An
option to introduce mandatory licences for operators
of power boats was considered as part of the
review. The option was dismissed, on the basis that
interventions such as the use and carriage of PFDs
and education and public awareness campaigns
would provide the greatest potential safety benefits
relative to cost.
The review recommended that the introduction of
mandatory licences be reconsidered if the voluntary
education and public awareness campaigns fail to
meet agreed safety targets within 5 years i.e. by 2012.
The conclusions of this review were drawn from a
detailed analysis of 123 boating fatalities between
2000 and October 2006. The methodology of the
analysis involved identifying the prime contributing
factors for each fatality. A list of possible safety
interventions for each contributing factor was
compiled and given an effectiveness rating from
0 to 10. A rating of 10 was assigned when it was
considered that a safety intervention, such as PFD
or communications, would definitely have prevented
the fatality, whereas a zero rating indicated that the
intervention would not have been effective at all. It
was noted that in many fatalities, any one of several
measures could have prevented loss of life.
Canada
Recreational boaters in Canada are required to hold
a Pleasure Craft Operator Card. The card is, in effect,
a licence to operate which never expires and is not
subject to suspension. The card can be obtained by
either completing an online or classroom test.
Between 1991 and 2006 there were 2765 boating
fatalities of which 63% or 1738 were fatalities
from powerboats.
In 2006 there were 108 fatalities of which 66 (61%)
were from power boating.
Death rate per 100,000 pop/year was 0.45 in 2006,
0.27 for power boating.
United Kingdom
Many jurisdictions including the United Kingdom
and the USA do not require mandatory licensing of
recreational vessel operators.
In the United Kingdom boating has traditionally been
carried out by people who ‘grow up’ in a boating
environment. Legislation is light with few mandated
requirements, although new vessels have been
required to comply with the European Directive
for recreational vessels which requires vessels to
be designed and built to standards. Within this
framework, vessels are designed and built for use
within a stratified set of water types. Details of the
waters a vessel is suitable for are fully transparent
making choosing a suitable vessel easier.
Peter Chennel reinforces this in a recent paper. He
states… ”Unlike many nations with highly developed
recreational boating environments there is no
statutory obligation for any boat owner or user of
any craft to have undergone any formal training; nor
indeed is there a requirement for craft to be subject of
any form of registration process, and even insurance
is an option, though one that is self- regulating, as
most marinas and launch sites demand evidence
of insurance.”
125
The UK relies on ‘back-ending’ safety, as described
by Peter Chennel “The UK is a signatory both to
SOLAS and the newer UNCLOS, but it relies on a
voluntary educational process and peer pressure
from other sea users for the voluntary adoption of safe
practices. At the other end of the use [of ]spectrum,
that is once things have gone wrong and a search
and rescue operation is needed, then the UK is very
well-placed indeed. The MCA have a network of
Maritime Rescue Coordination centres (MRCCs), a
highly efficient and very effective communications
network, backed up by land-based rescue units and
access to strategically placed helicopters and deep
water tugs.”
United States of America
In the United States licensing is a state issue and only
Alabama has licensing requirements. There are many
civil liberties issues which make successful legislative
interventions very difficult.
In 2009 there were 4730 incidents involving 736
deaths (65% in powerboats), 3358 injuries and
approximately $36 million dollars damage to property
as a result of boating accidents.
There were 12.751,541 boats registered by the states
in 2009.
PWC Operation in the US
The USA has no licence requirements for the
operation of PWC’s but imposes an age limit in most
states and mandates the wearing of PFD’s.
There are some restrictions applied to speed, towing,
operating times and wake jumping.
126
Some states require an adult to be on board when a
minor is operating the PWC.
PWC operators in the US show a similar profile
Victoria. There are more males than females involved
in PWC operations and operators are predominately
young adults,.
Over the five years 2005 – 2009 shows that males
were involved in 74% of PWC incidents and females
were involved in 26%. Which is consistent with the
relative ratio of male operators to female operators
of 3:1.
Incidents data shoes that involved operators, both
male and female, averaged fewer than 100 hours
PWC operating experience.
Of a total of 3274 PWC incidents recorded in the five
year period to 2009 , 2795 (85% of the total) were
identified as being caused by human factors. 8%
were caused by environmental factors and 2% by
material factors .
This contrasts with the Victorian experience where
61% of serious incident causal factors and 33% of
response only incident causal factors were attributed
to human factors.
The USCG report that 22% of vessels involved in
incidents were PWCs. With the 1,036,874 PWCs out
of a recreational fleet 12,721,541 vessels representing
8.1% PWCs are disproportionally represented.
The US has averaged approximately 40 fatalities per
annum from PWC incidents which reflects a rate of
approximately 4.5 fatalities per 100,000 PWCs.
127
128
Appendix 3: Analysis of the current Victorian
licensing scheme
It is self evident that where a person has not operated
a vessel previously, a multiple-choice theory-based
test or classroom based training will not provide
the practical skills to ensure a person is capable of
operating a vessel, even to a minimum standard.
This view was confirmed in a study conducted in
2008 12 which evaluated the Victorian recreational boat
operator licensing scheme.
The study carried out by Monash University evaluated
people sitting the knowledge based theory test by
giving them the test with no prior preparation. The
results from these tests were then compared with
people sitting the test who had read the recreational
boating safety handbook and also against a different
group sitting the test after completing the knowledge
based training course.
The study further examined 49 people who had
passed the Victorian knowledge only test by putting
them through a simulation of the Western Australia
practical or ‘Skippers Ticket’ assessment. In addition,
the study contained results of a behavioural
attitudes survey.
Competency assessment
Forty-nine holders of Victorian licences undertook
a practical test assessed by Yachting Victoria
assessors. The test was an adaptation of the
practical component of the Western Australian
skipper’s ticket model, which in turn is based on the
Yachting Australia National Recreational Powerboat
Operator competencies.
Of the 49 people who completed, 36 had gained their
Victorian licence by completing an approved course
and 13 by passing the licence at a VicRoads office.
Only one of the 49 completed all 11 tasks
successfully. Eight successfully completed 6-10 of the
tasks. The other 30 (61%) failed more than half of the
11 tasks.
To pass the test in WA all tasks have to be
completed successfully.
From the above study it is likely that the current
Victorian licensing scheme fails to provide applicants
with the knowledge and competencies required to
safely operate a vessel.
Knowledge transfer
The study comparing the results of licence applicants
sitting the theory test before and after studying the
Victorian Recreational Boating Safety Handbook
found that there was only a 5% knowledge gain
between pre- and post- study of the handbook.
The study comparing results of those sitting the
test after the knowledge based training course
demonstrated a knowledge gain of 19%.
Since the study was completed TSV have updated
the questions in the theory test in order to include
more safety related questions and to make the test
more rigorous.
12 MUARC report
Appendix 3: Analysis of the current Victorian licensing scheme
129
Has the current Victorian licensing scheme
improved the behavioural attitudes of
boat operators?
The third part of the evaluation of the Victorian
recreational boat operator licensing scheme involved
consideration of the effect of the current licensing
scheme on safety attitudes and behaviours of newly
licensed vessel operators. A telephone survey
asked questions relating to PFD wearing, alcohol
consumption, licence testing and hoon laws both
pre- and post- licensing. The most significant positive
change in attitude and behaviour was found to be in
the areas of PFD wearing and alcohol consumption.
A similar phone survey conducted in Western
Australia in 2008 found that Recreational Skippers
Ticket holders more often reported logging on,
checking EPIRB and anchor and line and to regularly
servicing their boat’s engine than people who had
not completed their Recreational Skipper’s Ticket.
This reflects the different emphasis between the two
licensing schemes.
There appears to be some evidence that the
licensing scheme has changed behavioural attitudes.
However not all changes in the improvement of
safety outcomes may be attributable to licensing
initiatives. For example, the increased awareness of
PFD wearing which may have reduced the number
of fatalities from drowning may be attributed to
licensing and/or to the mandated wearing of PFDs
implemented in 2005.
130
Appendix 3: Analysis of the current Victorian licensing scheme
131
132
Process
The bow ties analysis created defences from hazards
and mitigations of outcomes. These defences and
mitigations have been grouped and called elements.
Elements which came from the bow tie analysis
and which were labelled as ‘operator influence’
were added to the elements listed in the National
Competencies. Each element was further categorised
according to whether it should form part of the basic
licence or be part of an endorsement. Elements were
also examined to determine how they could best be
used to deliver the required competency.
Understanding the bow ties
The diagram below illustrates the parts of a bow tie.
Bow ties centre around an event which is what we are
trying to either (a) prevent from occurring or (b) if it
occurs prevent from resulting in an adverse outcome.
To the left are potential hazards or threats which could
cause the event.
Each hazard has a number of defences put in place
to prevent the event from taking place. These are
illustrated on the bow tie by being placed in the line
between the hazard and the event.
Defences can be of a number of types. These include
vessel master training and vessel design features.
Should the event take place despite the defences
then outcomes can occur. Where these are adverse
outcomes we need to prevent them occurring.
In order to prevent an outcome mitigations are put in
place. Typical mitigations include safety equipment
or a communications net. These are illustrated on the
bow tie by being placed in the line between the event
and the outcome.
For the purposes of licensing we are interested in
determining which defences and mitigations (together
called elements) are those which are the responsibility
of the vessel master and as such can be addressed
via a licensing or licence endorsement scheme.
Figure 39 - Bow tie nomenclature
Hazard of
Threat
Defence
Mitigation
Mitigation
Mitigation
Outcome or
Consequence
Outcome or
Consequence
EVENT
Hazard of
Threat
Defence
133
For the purposes of licensing we are interested
in determining which defences and mitigations
(sometimes grouped together for our discussion
as ‘elements’) are those which fall within the
responsibility of the vessel master and as such
could be addressed via a licensing or licence
endorsement scheme.
Bow tie process
The bow ties were drafted within the Department and
then workshopped with stakeholders to test their
validity. The final bow ties are included below.
Bow ties were developed for the following events
ff Recreational vessel crew in water due to
swamping, sinking, flooding capsize.
ff Recreational vessel disablement.
ff Recreational vessel collides with another
vessel or object.
ff Recreational vessel engine explosion.
Defences and mitigations are grouped according to
the means of their delivery.
ff Operator influence - elements which could be
part of a licence regime.
ff Rules / legislation – elements which are set by
legislation.
ff Information / education – elements addressed
by education and/or information campaigns.
ff Safety Equipment – elements addressed by
the carriage and use of safety equipment.
ff Engineering controls – elements addressed by
engineering solutions such as vessel design
solutions.
ff Other – elements not readily categorised.
134
135
Vessel takes a
big wave
onto deck
Broaching on
a bar
Bailer or Bilge
Pump
Boat suitable
for conditions
Training/
experience on
effect of wind on
stability
Foam
Buoyancy
Experience at
crossing bars
Training/
experience on
appropriate need
for turning
Boat is flooded
due to hull
breach
Capsizing due
to large heeling
moment
Education
regarding Rigid
Inflatable Boat
collar maintenance
Sea anchor
Maintenance
Vessel
becomes
disabled
Multiple buoyant
compartments
providing
redundancy
Vessel design
Understanding of
effect of positioning
of heavy load
on stability
Capsizing due
to high centre
of gravity
Boat suitable
for conditions
Education on
appropriate boat
size and power
Understaning
of effect of lifting
a heavy load over
the side on tability
Education
on dangers of
broaching
Meteorological
knowledge
Education on
vessel stability
Operator
miscalculates
fuel
Event
Understanding
of effect of person
movement
on stability
Maintenance
Training
Government
accredited
boat inspection
scheme
Bar crossing
training
Industry based
boat inspection
scheme
Boat is
adequately
maintained
Boat suitable
for conditions
Australia
Builders Plate
contains loading
information
Vessel designed
with adequate
buoyancy for
anticipated load
Adequate
scupper/freeing
ports
Vessel has foam
buoyancy to
keep to afloat
KEY
Put
bungs in
Understanding
sea conditions
Education on
appropriate
vessel loading
Capsizing due
to inadequate
freeboard
Training for
emergency
Tick box
pre start
check list
Bailer or
Bilge Pump
Use of sea
anchor to
maintain
heading
Boat is flooded
due to failure to
put bungs in
Figure 40 - Bow tie for crew in water due to swamping, sinking, flooding, capsize
Outcome we
are trying
to prevent
Recreational
vessel crew in
water due
to swamping,
sinking, flooding,
capize
Hazard we
are trying
to prevent
Persons must
not don or inflate
PDF whilst in
cabin
Inherent
buoyancy in the
vessel
Operator has
emergency
plan
Boat has facility
for person to self
recovery back
to boat
Carry torch
for distress
signalling
Operator
influence
Operator has
emergency
plan
Use muster
stations and
headcourts
Vessel lost
Operator
keeps boat tidy
Ensure
passengers are
free from
sinking vessel
Boat has facility
for person to self
recover back
into boat
Person
supported by
lifebuoy
Boat has facility
for person to hang
on if boat
upside down
Person wears
lifejacket
Boat has facility
for person to hang
on if boat
upside down
Person
supported by
lifebuoy
Person has
radio training
(MROPC)
Person wears
lifejacket
Person launches
and enters
dinghy/liferaft
Person/vessel
had registered
406 EPIRB
Know help
position
Engineering
control
Passenger dies
due to drowning
by entrapment
Enough suitable
PDFs carried for
each person
Person dies
with boat
Enough suitable
PDFs carried for
each person
Person stays
with boat
Person dies
from hypothermia
due to lenghty
immersion
Safety
Equipment
Have radio
and use prior to
entering water
Information/
Education
Carry rockets
and flares
Rules/
Legislation
Defence and Mitigations
Passenger
dies due to
drowning
Person operating
alone dies due to
drowning
Other
136
Electrical fault
prevents tarting
Know how
to choose a
suitable boat
Boat not fit
for purpose
Wear PFD
Meteorological
knowledge
Cleaning and
maintenance
schedule
General boat
cleanliness
Use/Deploy
anchor
Rough
weather boat
handling
knowledge
Personal
injury due to
exposure
Carry EPIRB
Carry and
know how to
use GPS
Use/Deploy
Sea anchor
Equipment and
knowledge to
jury rig (sailing)
vessel
Have
emergency plan
to follow when
disabled
Carry mobile
phone
Carry
emergency
aural signalling
devices
Know where
you are
Tell someone
before you go
and estimated
time of return
Carry First Aid Kit,
sunscreen, protective
and warm clothing,
drinking water
Travel in a
group of vessels
Rules/
Legislation
Have
redundancy in
battery system
Operator
influence
Educate
operators on
troubleshooting
basics
Outcome we
are trying
to prevent
Carry oars to
get you home
Hazard we
are trying
to prevent
Regular
maintenance
Start up
procedure
Rig failure
(sailing vessel)
Recreational
vessel disabled
Event
Carry First Aid Kit,
sunscreen, protective
and warm clothing,
drinking water
Fire fighting
equipment
Start up
procedure
Fire on board
KEY
Need to
understand
maintian vessel
integrity and stability
Regular
maintenance
of systems by
qualified person
Mechanical
failure
Maintain/
monitor battery
Tick box
pre start
check list
Maintain/
service fuel
filters regularly
Carry spare
battery or
battery pack
Replace old
fuel at start of
season
Tick box
pre start
check list
Fuel is
contaminated
Operator
miscalculates
fuel
Maintain
electrical
system
Insuficient fuel
capacity
Tick box
pre start
check list
Insuficient fuel
Figure 41 - Bow tie for disabled recreational vessel
Use Oars
Safe Return
Wear PFD
Carry radios
(HF and/or VHF
and/or 27MHz)
Carry Flares/
Rockets/Visual
signal
Carry spares
and toolkit
Information/
Education
Incident
escalates to a
serious incidnet
Person is
ejected and dies
from drowning
Hold redio
licence
(MROPC)
Register 406
RPIRB
Other
Assistance is
unable to be
contacted
Engineering
control
Vessel is unable
to be restarted
and vessel towed
to shore
Safety
Equipment
137
Operator
unable to
control vessel
Failure to obey
waterway rules
Operator makes a slip
or lapse (distraction,
complacancy,
unable to control)
Knowledge
of impact of
girting whilst
towing
Education on
appropriate
behaviour
Have separate
observer rolw
while towing
Understand
differences between
low and high speed
operaton
Understand
differences between
vessels (power
plants, size etc.)
Practical skills
acquisition
Drug and
alcohol
penalties
Vessel designed
for maximum
situational
awareness
Awareness
of tides and
currents
Charting and
navigational
skills
Lack of local
knowledge
Understand
physics
of towing
someone
Awareness of
own vessel’s
deficiencies/
blind spots
Operating
under
supervision
Dayshapes or
lights displayed
on vessels
Local
waterway rules
Understanding
changes in local
situations
Understaning
of risks of high
speed operation
Deadman
switch
Operator’s situational
awareness
compromised by
vessel design
Restricted
licences
Navigation
lights displayed
Operator does
not recognise
vessel
Select a
appropriate
vessel for
activity
Waterski lanes
Signage of
zones
Congestion
Operator high
speed tunnel
vision
Proximity
Sensor
technology/
collision alarms
Speed
restrictions for
day and night
Education
Campaign on
importance of
remaining alert
Maintenance
training
Maintenance
undertaken
by qualified
persons
Current
knowledge test
50 metre rule
Vessels in close
proximity
New penalties
for ColRegs
Skills for
taking evasive
action whilst
towing
Event
‘Defensive’
operation skills
Signage of
zones
Other vessel
uses horn or
sound signals
Radio call
to alert other
vessel of
collision path
ColRegs
Mechanical
failure
Understand
vessels
limitations
KEY
Education about
appropriate
speed for
conditions
Spatial
awareness
Operator
does not take
sufficient
evasive action
Operator
failing to keep a
proper lookout
Penalties
under hoon
legislation
Master
controlling people
on board
Restrict
passenger
numbers/activities
on board
Figure [x] - Bow tie for collisions
Outcome we
are trying
to prevent
Rec Vessel collides
with another vessel
or object
Hazard we
are trying
to prevent
Emergency
procedures
Wearing
helmet (PWC)
Airbags
Seatbelts
Airbags
Operator
influence
Drills
Person
impacts other
person
Vessels need
to be evacuated
Console
designed to
crumple
Wearing a
harness
Wearing
helmet (PWC)
Engineering
control
Person strikes
part of vessel
and suffers
injury
Wearing a PFD
Safety
Equipment
Crumple zones
Information/
Education
Wearing a PFD
Guard rails
on vessel
Seatbelts
Rules/
Legislation
Person ejected
from vessel and
drowns
Person suffers
serious injury
Other
138
Ensure portable
fuel tanks meet
Australian or
Internationalstandard
Intrinsically
safe electrical
system
Fuel system
has leaks
Ignition
sources present
Replace
components as
required
Install bilge
blowers
No smoking
No smoking
Maintain
system
adequately
Fuel vapour in
bilge
Remove unnecessary
electrical items from
spaces where vapour
can collect
Refuellingat a
designated point
Figure 42 - Figure - Bow tie for engine explosion
Safety signage
at point
Be aware of
effect of sun
on expansion
of fuel
Maintain Fuel
Pump
Ensure hoses
meet standards
and are regularly
replaced
Public notice
warning on
days > 40˚C
Swap for
diesel engine
Petrol as fuel
Use marine
carburettors
Use passive
ventilation
systems
Install vapour
detectors linked
to audio and visual
helm alarms
Install vapour
detectors with
engine interlock
preventing startup
Ensure fuel
systems
are built to
standards
Isolate and vent
spaces where
fuel vapour
can collect
Swap for
diesel engine
Event
Inspect system
regularly
Ethanol as fuel
or fuel mix
KEY
Outcome we
are trying
to prevent
Recreational
vessel engine
explosion
Hazard we
are trying
to prevent
Restart
vessels away
from other
vessels
No bystanders
nearby when
restarting after
refuelling
Damage to
infrastructure
No bystanders
nearby when
refuelling
Design of
designated
refuelling
points
Isolate
refuelling point
infrastructure
Firefightingprecautions
andequipment
atdesignated
refuellingponts
Carry fire
extinguisher
Person in
ejected and dies
from drowning
Person
seriously or
fatally injured
due to fire
Other vessels
wait to refuel
away from
refuelling point
Use non
flammable
materials on
vessels
Person in
ejected and dies
from impact
No passengers
on board when
restarting after
refuelling
Install fixed
fire suppression
suystems
Engineering
control
Injury to
bystanders
Severe
damage nearby
vessels
Rehearse fire
emergency
procedures/
drills
Safety
Equipment
Sever blast
injury or death
Information/
Education
No passengers
on board when
restarting after
refuelling
Rules/
Legislation
Isolate
refuelling point
infrastructure
Install fixed
fire suppression
suystems
No passengers
on board when
restarting after
refuelling
Person on
board wear a
PFD
Carry fire
extinguisher
Design vessels
to vent ‘safety’
in an explosion
Operator
influence
Severe vessel
damage or loss
Other
Understanding the element tables
From the bow tie analysis a list of defences and mitigations were developed which have been grouped into
categories. Elements which were considered to be those resulting from human factor issues and which could
be addressed by licensing were selected and are listed in Table 37 below.
The following describes the makeup of Table 37.
Column
Description
1-3 – National Competency Framework categorisation
1
Categorises the element within the national competency framework. i.e starting with
a
1 ; Unit 1 – trip preparation and planning;
2 ; Unit 2 – Safe Operation: and
3 : Unit 3 – Responding to emergencies and incidents
1.1; 1.2; etc are the category headings within the national competency framework.
Note if ‘Other’ appears this is an item which does not directly fit within the framework.
2
A code listing the element within the framework for ease of reference
3
Element description
Columns 4-9 – Whether element should be addressed as part of the basic licence or one of the considered
endorsements
4
Element should be addressed as part of the basic licence
5
Element should be addressed as part of any PWC endorsement
6
Element should be addressed as part of any High Speed endorsement
7
Element should be addressed as part of any Offshore Operations endorsement
8
Element should be addressed as part of any Towed Water Sport endorsement
9
Element should be addressed as part of any Vessels Carrying more than 12
Passengers endorsement
Columns 10-15 – Suggested delivery options, the appropriate method(s) which could be used to ensure the
master has the competency.
10
Information – provide information on the element for applicants
11
Current Knowledge Test – tested under the current knowledge test
12
Improved Knowledge Test - Tested as part of an improved knowledge test
13
Practical training/ Experience – Recorded in a log book or taught as part of an
untested training course.
14
Competency based assessment – tested as part of a practical assessment of
competency-
15
Training course plus assessment – tested as part of a training course
139
Elements
1.1 Maintain the boat
140
1.1.1
Y
Understand
impact of old fuel
in vessel
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Keeping a
cleaning and
maintenance
schedule
>12
pass.
Y
Towed
WS
Y
Y
Remove
unnecessary
electrical items
from spaces
where vapour can
collect
Offshore
Endorsement
Understanding
of managing
pollution on the
boat
Y
Fuel system
maintained
High
Speed
Y
Y
Spare battery
carried
PWC
Be aware of
consequences of
leaving a vessel in
the sun
Y
Y
Battery maintained
Y
Fuel filters
maintained
Electrical system
maintained
Y
Boat is
maintained/
serviced on a
regular basis and
safety equipment
maintained
Basic
licence
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Competency
Training
based
course plus
assessment assessment
141
Elements
1.1 Maintain the boat
1.2 Maintain mooring
1.3 Plan trip
Safety equipment
is serviceable,
accessible, its
location identified
and securely and
appropriately
stowed
Mooring
and berthing
apparatus is
maintained/
serviced
and berthing
apparatus
serviced on a
regular basis
Mooring
apparatus is
appropriate to
the vessel and
location
Weather,
conditions, vessel
and personnel
are checked for
suitability for
planned trip
1.1.3
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.3.1
Understand
danger of 40+
degree days on
vessel
Basic
Meteorological
knowledge
Safety equipment
complies with
relevant legislation
1.1.2
Good refuelling
practice
Y
Towed
WS
>12
pass.
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
Y
High
Speed
Y
PWC
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
(Y for offshore)
Y?
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
Elements
1.3 Plan trip
142
Trip activity plan
takes into account
area and type
of operation
and emergency
contact
Adequate
provisions,
including fuel, for
the trip are carried
Trip details are
communicated
to an appropriate
person
Check is made
to ensure the
number of
passengers does
not exceed boat
design limitations
and/or legislative
requirements
Check is made to
ensure equipment,
stores and
personal items
are securely
stowed and do not
adversely affect
the boat's stability
Appropriate
person is informed
of safe return from
the activity
Check vessel
not overloaded
(equipment/cargo/
people) prior
to trip
1.3.2
1.3.3
1.3.4
1.3.5
1.3.6
1.3.7
1.3.8
Towed
WS
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
High
Speed
Y
PWC
Y
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Y
Y
(Y for offshore)
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
(Y for offshore)
Y?
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
143
Elements
1.3 Plan trip
1.4 Vessel Knowledge and Information
Y
Towed
WS
>12
pass.
Understanding
of legislated
heightened risk
- and that there
may be other
Heightened Risk
circumstances.
Education about
appropriate boat
size and power
- boat 'fit for
purpose'
Education about
implications
of fitting larger
outboard engines
Education on
vessel stability
including effect of
heeling moments
such as wind/
passengers/ lifting
loads over side
Understanding of
collar degradation
and maintenance
on RHIBs
Understand
Vessel limitations
under certain
water conditions
(manoeuvring etc)
1.4.1
1.4.2
1.4.3
1.4.4
1.4.5
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Have evacuation
plan
Y
High
Speed
Y
Y
Y
PWC
Designate vessel
muster stations
Master
understands
possible
emergency
scenarios and is
prepared to deal
with them - safety
management
plan [vessel risk
assessment]
1.3.10
1.3.9
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
Elements
1.5 Other
2.1 Manoeuvre and handle boat
144
Understand
different systems
in rec boats
( propulsion,
fuel, steering,
cooling, electrical,
berthing, trailer)
Calculate tide
heights
Understand state
regs (registration,
equipment etc)
A pre-start check
is undertaken
Motor is prepared
and started
Boat is
manoeuvred
safely according
to conditions and
in accordance
with water traffic
regulations
Performance
of the boat and
personnel is
monitored at all
times
Impact of boat
use on others and
the environment
is considered
(nuisance?)
Safety equipment
is used, stowed
and if required
, worn in
accordance
with legislation
and recognised
regulations and
rules
1.5.1
1.5.2.
1.5.3
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.1.5
2.1.6
Y
Towed
WS
>12
pass.
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
Y
High
Speed
Y
Y
PWC
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
145
Elements
Training is given
on handling a
vessel at speed
and turning at
speed
Understand
correct start-up
procedure (in
general or after
refuelling)
Understand
different operating
techniques
depending on
current weather
conditions
"Defensive
Operation Skills"
- understanding
operational
hazards and how
to reduce the
likelihood of them
becoming a risk
(also to include
operating at night)
Skills for taking
evasive action
while towing skier,
wakeboarder etc.
Understand risks
of high speed
operation
Understanding
physics of towing
someone
2.1.7
2.1.8
2.1.9
2.1.10
2.1.11
2.1.12
2.1.13
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Y (surf
towing)
Y
Y
PWC
Y
Y
Y
High
Speed
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Towed
WS
Y
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
Elements
2.2 Navigate safely
146
Understand
the difference
between low
speed and
high speed
operations and
the differences for
each in different
sized vessels
(i.e. small v
large, outboard
v inboard, twin v
single)
Education about
appropriate speed
for conditions
Knowledge of
vessels towing
hazards/Girting
Aids to small
craft navigation
are identified
(infrastructure)
Collision
avoidance
techniques are
applied when
required in
accordance
with relevant
legislation,
recognised
regulations and
rules
Operation of the
boat is carried
out at all times
in accordance
with relevant
legislation,
recognised
regulations and
rules
2.1.14
2.2.15
2.2.16
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
Y
Y
Towed
WS
Y
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
Y
Y
High
Speed
Y
Y
Y
PWC
Y
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Competency
Training
based
course plus
147
Elements
2.2 Navigate safely
Navigational aids
and landmarks are
used to determine
and monitor boat
position
Hazards and
conditions are
taken into account
in navigating the
boat
Determine the
current location of
the vessel
50 m rule (state
rules)
ColRegs (lights,
shapes and rules
of the road)
Having a separate
observer role while
towing
Education on
zones
Understand
hazards due to
changes in local
conditions eg.
Snags, water
depths, other
submerged
hazards
Navigation Lights
Displayed
helm position
and awareness
of own vessel's
deficiencies/blind
spots
Importance of
having spatial
awareness
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6
2.2.7
2.2.8
2.2.9
2.2.10
2.2.12
2.2.13
2.2.14
2.2.15
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
PWC
Y
High
Speed
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
Y
Towed
WS
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y(offshore)
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y (offshore)
Y
Y
Y
Y (offshore)
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
Elements
2.3 Anchor the boat
2.4 Operate Safely
2.5 Other
148
No passengers
on board when
restarting after
refuelling
Understand life
jacket wearing
rules
No bystanders
near while
restarting
Understand
reasons for No
smoking on vessel
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.4
2.5.1
Understand loss
of steerage occurs
when power is
taken off PWC
Anchor is retrieved
and securely
stowed
2.3.4
2.5.3
Anchor is lowered,
set and monitored
according
to prevailing
conditions
2.3.3
Launching a
retrieving a boat at
a boat ramp
Type of anchor
used is suitable
for location
2.3.2
2.5.2
Anchorage site
is selected in
accordance
with prevailing
and forecast
conditions and in
accordance with
legislation
2.3.1
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
PWC
High
Speed
Offshore
Endorsement
Towed
WS
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
149
Elements
2.5 Other
3.1 Use safety equipment
Complete a figure
of eight and S turn
Make an
emergency stop
(controlled stop at
5 knots)
Return to the
beach
Dock at a Jetty
Nature, type,
location,
accessibility and
serviceability of
safety equipment
is known and
understood by
all personnel on
board
Briefing of
personnel is
conducted before
departure
2.5.13
2.5.14
2.5.15
2.5.16
3.1.1
3.1.2
Driving a boat on
the plane
2.5.10
Cross a wash
Using a transit
to steer a steady
course
2.5.9
Make a U-turn
Skills in using a
line and some
basic knots
2.5.7
2.5.11
PWCs do not
offer the same
structural
protection from
collision impacts
2.5.5
2.5.12
PWC more
susceptible to the
effects of wash
from other vessels
2.5.4
Towed
WS
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
High
Speed
Y
Y
Y
PWC
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
Elements
3.1 Use safety equipment
3.2 Raise alarms
150
Safety equipment
is used in
a manner
appropriate to
the emergency or
incident
Safety equipment
is used for the
purpose for which
it was designed
Launching and
entering liferaft/
dinghy
Know when to stay
with your boat
Know how to
use radio in
emergency
Lifejackets not be
inflated in cabins
Nature of
emergency is
identified
Alarm is
communicated
to on-board
personnel
Recognised
distress signals
are used to
indicate need of
assistance
Radio Call made
to alert another
vessel of collision
path
Use horns and
sound signals to
alert of potential
collision
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.6
3.1.7
3.1.8
3.1.9
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2.5
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Towed
WS
Y
>12
pass.
Information
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
High
Speed
Y
PWC
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Radio
Y
Radio
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
151
Elements
3.3 Deal with on-board emergency
Position is
identified,
recorded and
communicated
3.3.3
Preparation for
abandoning
the boat is
undertaken, if
required
Cessation of
emergency is
communicated
to appropriate
personnel
Understand
need to maintain
vessel stability in
the event of an
emergency such
as a disablement
3.3.6
3.3.7
3.3.8
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
First-aid training
(separate course)
Communication
with rescuers is
maintained
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
High
Speed
Y
PWC
Y
Injured persons
are provided with
assistance
3.3.5
3.3.4
Procedures are
implemented
to combat
emergency and
protect persons
on board
3.3.2
Use of GPS
(emergency
situations)
On board
personnel are
informed of
actions required
to deal with the
emergency
3.3.1
Basic
licence
Y
Towed
WS
Y
Y
Y
Y
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
First Aid
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
Elements
3.3 Deal with on-board
emergency
3.4 Assist others in distress
152
Understand how
to undertake basic
repairs on vessel
[shear pins and
pump impellors?]
Maintenance
training for
operators in
the event of a
mechanical failure
Development of
boat emergency
checklist
Distress signals
from others are
recognised
Nature of
assistance
required is
identified
Capability to
safely assist or
relay emergency is
determined taking
into account
own safety and
physical proximity
to the emergency
incident
Appropriate
response to the
emergency is
prepared for and
implemented
Cessation of
emergency
incident is
communicated
to appropriate
personnel
3.3.9
3.3.10
3.3.11
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.4.3
3.4.4
3.4.5
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
>12
pass.
Y
Towed
WS
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Y
High
Speed
Y
PWC
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Basic
licence
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Competency
Training
based
course plus
153
Elements
3.5 Specific Emergency Training
3.6 Other
Vessel being
swamped and
capsized
Bar Crossing
Use of vessel
muster stations
Use of
headcounts to
manage numbers
of passengers
Using a lifebuoy
Positions
to minimise
hypothermia
Fire
Vessel
Troubleshooting
Basics for
operators
Disablement
Broaching
Person overboard
training (retrieval)
Accepting a tow
Bar Crossing
Training
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3
3.5.4
3.5.5
3.5.6
3.5.7
3.5.8
3.5.9
3.5.10
3.1.1
3.1.2
3,1,3,
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Basic
licence
PWC
High
Speed
Y
Y
Y
Y
Offshore
Endorsement
Towed
WS
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
>12
pass.
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Information
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Current
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Improved
Knowledge
Test
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Practical
training/
Experience
How to Deliver
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Competency
Training
based
course plus
154
Appendix 5: Offshore requirements
Safety equipment
requirements, in other
jurisdictions, for offshore
operations
All Australian jurisdictions have mandatory safety
equipment requirements which are based on the
National Standard for Recreational Boat Safety
Equipment. These requirements are scaled for
operating in smooth, inshore and offshore waters.
Due to this standard, the minimum equipment
specified within each jurisdiction is similar for offshore
vessels in all states. However there are still some
differences between states and the table below
lists items which are in excess of the Victorian list
of equipment.
The table below has been generalised as each state
has slightly differing requirements based on distance
offshore and vessel length.
In addition, WA and SA have requirements which limit
some vessels from travelling too far offshore.
155
Table 37 - Additional safety equipment required by each jurisdiction above minimum national requirements
Australian jurisdictions
NT
Additional offshore equipment (varies on vessel length)
−− one litre of fresh drinking water for each person on board in a leak-proof container;
−− one “V” distress sheet; ;
−− one chart of the area of operation.
−− one lifebuoy fitted with buoyant line.
WA
Limits for small vessels
Vessels under 3.75 metres in length (including personal watercraft) may not go further to
sea than five nautical miles from the mainland.
NSW
Additional offshore equipment
−− Fire bucket (if no bailing bucket carried suitable for fire fighting)
−− Map/chart of area (paper not electronic)
−− Sound signal (air horn/whistle/bell)
−− V sheet (orange)
−− Water (suitable for drinking)
SA
Limits for small vessels
Personal Water Craft (PWC) may not be operated in unprotected waters, i.e. beyond two
nautical miles offshore, without the approval of the CEO.
−− one V distress sheet.
−− a map or chart of the waters in which the vessel will operate.
−− one life-buoy with line
−− four litres of fresh water
−− the boat must be fitted with a liquid damped magnetic or a gyroscopically
controlled compass. Note: This requirement is not satisfied by GPS, satellite
navigation systems or similar electronic devices, nor by a handheld compass
TAS
−− Radar reflector
−− First Aid Kit
−− Water
QLD
−− V sheet
−− Chart appropriate to area of operations or other directional finding or
positioning equipment
−− Drinking water
Overseas jurisdictions
UK
Radar reflectors
Discussion of changes to the Victorian equipment requirements (if any) may be found in the Regulatory Impact
Statement for the Marine Safety Regulations 2011.
156
157
158
Appendix 6: Cost benefit analysis and the identification
of feasible solutions
Victorians sustain significant costs each year due to
marine safety incidents caused by human factors. In
future it is likely that this cost will continue. Evidence
suggests that incidents and injuries will continue to
trend upwards, in particular for those participating in
towed water sports. For the purposes of this analysis
we have assumed that the future cost of incidents
caused by human factors will be at least equal to the
historic average and may continue in line with recent
trends.
Given that Victorians will continue to sustain costs
from these incidents, in this Appendix we discuss the
possibility that this cost can be reduced. In particular,
we consider the possibility that the cost of future
incidents can be reduced by increasing the skills and
knowledge of Victorian boaters by altering applicable
licensing requirements. The benefit of interventions to
prevent incidents is that they will reduce the cost of
similar incidents in future.
Increasing the skill and knowledge of Victorian
boaters could be achieved either by requiring all
boaters to undergo re-training or by focussing on the
least experienced, i.e. new boaters. Concentrating
on new boaters can be achieved by changing the
requirements for licensing so that new boaters
must show a higher degree of proficiency before
commencing “unrestricted” boating.
The alternatives under consideration for improving
the competency of recreational vessel masters and
operators include :
ff Improved information regarding the risks (for
all boaters)
ff Increase the stringency of the knowledge tests
before new boaters can obtain their licence.
ff In addition to the knowledge test, introduce
a requirement to obtain practical experience
before a licence is issued through either a
logbook requirement or a mandatory training
requirement
ff In addition to the knowledge test, introduce a
practical (skills) test.
ff In addition to the knowledge test and the
practical test introduce a compulsory training
course
These options could be applied to all boaters
through the general boating licence. Additionally, or
alternatively, they could be applied only to higher skill
activities, using licence endorsements.
Appendix 6: Cost benefit analysis and the identification of feasible solutions
159
Improve the available information
regarding the risks of boating activities
The first and probably simplest option to improve
vessel operational competencies is to provide
improved information, with a more comprehensive
information book covering both general boaters
and the more specific areas identified for possible
endorsements. Where an endorsement has been
identified as a possibility, such as for PWC drivers and
masters engaged in towing activities, this improved
information would outline the risks involved in the
activity, identify required abilities for vessel operation
and .provide self assessment tools.
The information could be supplied as a workbook. It
is important that it cover all areas identified as part
of the national competencies as well as any specific
areas identified from this paper.
The major downside of this approach is that there
is no means of ensuring that the applicant has
read the booklet and absorbed and understood the
information. Because there is no test, there is no
guarantee that this approach will result in a significant
increase in the ability of a person to operate a vessel,
a PWC or improve the ability to tow people.
Enhanced knowledge test for
boating activities
To overcome deficiencies in the existing knowledge
test, a more stringent test for applicants may
be introduced. Applicants under this test,
would be requested to demonstrate broader
boating knowledge.
The knowledge test would cover a wider range
of subject areas than the current test and aim to
assess applicants ability to react to operational
and emergency issues. The test could include
compulsory questions i.e. those the applicant must
answer correctly to gain a licence. It is estimated that
the enhanced knowledge test would cost a similar
amount to administer as the existing test. VicRoads
would continue to administer the test, and training
providers would continue to provide a short course
teaching option as currently.
Enhanced knowledge test for boating
activities with a logbook experience
requirement
This could be achieved by a new entrant completing
a log of experience. A logbook would require the
completion of a specific number of “hours on the
sea”, in a similar way to an L-plate driver completing
a set number of driving hours prior to sitting for a
driving licence. For boating, the learner would drive
a vessel under supervision of an experienced vessel
operator, who holds a full licence. It may also require
the applicant to demonstrate a number of boating
tasks under supervision. . After completion of the
required hours with the experienced vessel operator,
the learner would submit the completed logbook
toTSV, as evidence that this test requirement has been
fulfilled. Then following successful completion of the
enhanced knowledge test, the applicant would qualify
for a boat operator licence.
The advantage of a log book approach is that the
learner would not only be required to demonstrate
competence in practical situations, but in a learning
environment. This method of learning would be likely
to impart essential boating knowledge quicker and
more efficiently than other teaching methods.
The disadvantages of a log book are that, the
applicant must have access to a boat, and access
to a licenced person who has the time to teach the
applicant. It is considered likely that any log book
scheme would be eroded by a significant percentage
of log books being incorrectly filled in either by
accident or on purpose.
activities with a training requirement
As an alternative to the logbook requirement,
mandatory practical training could be an option for
learners without access to a vessel and qualified
master.
Training would be conducted by a TSV registered
training provider who would teach a curriculum
developed in conjunction with TSV. The learner would
learn to drive a vessel under the supervision of an
experienced vessel operator. After completion of
the training, the learner would recieve a certificate of
completion, as an equivalent to a completed logbook.
Following satisfactory completion of the knowledge
test the applicant would qualify for a boat operator
licence.
To tackle particular issues such as errors of
judgement and inexperience, a hands on practical
component could be introduced to the licence testing
requirements, to compliment the knowledge test.
160
activities with a practical test
This licensing approach requires the learner to
complete the knowledge test and also pass a
practical test. TSV would not specify or mandate
how the learner obtains the necessary ability to pass
the practical test. This provides the applicant with
flexibility in obtaining the knowledge and skills they
require.
This option overcomes any necessity to have
someone available with a boating licence who can
teach the practical component. The issue with this
approach, compared to mandating a logbook or
requiring training, is the lack of measured experience.
However it does directly test the competency of the
applicant to successfully complete the tasks which
are tested.
This option would require new entrants, with no
boating experience, to assure their competency prior
to taking the test.
activities with a mandatory training
element and a practical test
This licensing approach requires the learner to
satisfactorily complete the enhanced knowledge test
and a mandatory practical course, which includes
a practical test. This option also overcomes the
necessity for the learner to have ready access to
a boat owner who can teach the practical skills as
part of a logbook option. It partially overcomes the
problem of the lack of witnessed sea-time, which
may reduce the ability of an applicant to judge risky
situations, given the low probability of such situations
to occur during the practical test.
Assessment of benefits of options
The benefit of measures designed to reduce human
error component in marine incidents is the cost of
incidents prevented. In this section we summarise the
approach taken to estimating this benefit.
Estimating the benefit of the measures involves first
estimating the number of incidents that could be
expected if there were no changes to the current
regulations. This is then combined with an estimate
of the economic loss sustained through each incident
to provide an estimate of the total cost if the current
regulations are not altered.
Any regulatory intervention is unlikely to reduce all
boating incidents and therefore those incidents
to zero. Regardless of the knowledge and skill of
Victorian boaters some marine incidents would still be
caused by human factors each year. This is taken into
account by assigning an efficacy rate to the different
licensing options and adjusting the total benefit by
this rate.
Loss sustained in individual incidents
This section describes the methodology for assessing
losses to Victorians due to marine incidents that are
attributable to human contributions.
First, panel data on different types of marine
incidents was identified by MUARC. These incidents
were derived from marine incident reports, hospital
emergency department presentations, hospital
admissions and fatalities, for the years 2003 to 2009.
As not all incidents are caused by (or contributed to
by) human factors, it was necessary to estimate the
number of marine incidents attributable to human
contributions by type of boating activity. The available
data enabled incidents to be distinguished by severity
(fatality, serious or less serious injury etc) and by
boating sector (general boating, PWC operation,
and towed water sports). The data also summarised
the contributing factors that were reported for all
incidents, although it did not enable a breakdown of
contributing factors by incident severity or boating
sector.
To estimate the contribution of contributing factors
it was assumed that the pattern (distribution) of
contributing factors was the same for all types
of serious incident. In other words, the pattern of
contributing factors was assumed to be the same for
incidents in the general boating sector as for incidents
when operating PWCs as for incidents to towed water
sports.
The data below is based on this assumption and
shows the (reported) number of serious incidents
in each boating sector categorised by contributing
factors according to the common distribution.
Note that 41% of incidents were caused by non
human factors. While these were not included as
incidents that would benefit from improved licensing
arrangements, it is likely that would be a positive
benefit.
This is the maximum potential benefit the measures
could achieve should there no longer be any
incidents.
161
Table 38 - Number of serious recreational marine incidents – by boating activity and contributing factors
2003/04 to 2008/09
Contributing factor
Proportion
Towing
PWC
General boating
Other
Lack of maintenance
2%
9
2
6
4
Lack of fuel
1%
3
1
2
1
Error of judgment
24%
89
22
64
38
Inexperience
11%
42
10
30
18
Navigational error
7%
24
6
17
10
Insecure mooring
2%
8
2
6
4
Failure to keep proper lookout
3%
12
3
9
5
Fatigue
1%
4
1
3
2
Alcohol and drugs
1%
5
1
4
2
Excessive speed
2%
6
2
5
3
Overloading
0%
1
0
1
0
Other human factors
4%
14
3
10
6
Total Human factors
59%
216
53
157
92
Total Material and
Environmental factors
41%
149
36
108
63
100%
365
89
265
155
TOTALS
Note: there are frequently several contributing factors recorded per incident
Data source: MUARC 2009, MUARC 2010, ACIL Tasman estimates
Incidents cause Victorians to sustain losses in up to
4 ways:
ff Fatalities –a person(s) may be killed in
the incident
Table 38 distinguishes incidents between their severity 1 in terms of fatalities, major injuries and minor
injuries.
Data in the table comes from the following sources.
ff Marine Incident Database (MID) which records
incidents reported by the Marine Incident
Reporting System (MIR system) managed by
Transport Safety Victoria. This includes all
incidents reported by the Water Police and
Search and Rescue assets,
ff Injury – a person(s) may sustain injuries
ff Property loss – the value of property damaged
in the incident
ff Rescue – a rescue may be required and costs
incurred
ff National Coroners Information System (NCIS)
records details of coroner reports of boating
related fatalities,
Of course not all of these cost types are sustained in
every incident.
ff Hospital emergency department data
recorded on the Victorian Emergency
Minimum Dataset (VEMD), and the
ff Hospital Admissions dataset on the Victorian
Admitted Episodes Dataset (VAED).
It should be noted that the presentation of frequency
data for hospital admissions and ED presentations
underestimates the incidents and injuries due to
under reporting on the admissions dataset and lack of
detailed information in the case narratives on the ED
presentations dataset. Likewise, the Marine Incident
Database generally only records incidents reported
by search and rescue organisations and the Victorian
Police and under-represents the totality of incidents.
1
162
Minor injuries are defined as injuries that require ED-presentation, while
major injuries required admission to hospital.
Table 39 - Marine incidents 2003/04 to 2008/09 – by boating activity and severity
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
Annual
average
Fatalities ($3.93 million per incident)
Towing
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PWC
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
General boating
7
6
0
3
7
4
5
Other
3
1
3
0
0
0
1
Total incidents
11
7
3
3
7
4
6
$43.23
$27.72
$11.79
$11.79
$27.51
$15.72
$23.62
121
109
95
Total Costs ($m)
Towing
73
93
81
91
PWC
22
34
39
29
59
46
38
General boating
39
51
59
51
65
59
54
Other
Total incidents
Total Costs ($m)
22
34
66
51
53
70
49
156
211
244
223
298
284
236
$23.03
$31.14
$36.01
$32.92
$43.98
$41.92
$34.83
242
288
299
292
313
270
Towing
190
PWC
30
36
56
54
59
71
51
General boating
106
175
274
251
189
242
206
Other
53
62
84
75
270
85
105
Total incidents
Total Costs ($m)
379
514
703
679
810
711
633
$1.90
$2.57
$3.52
$3.40
$4.05
$3.56
$3.17
Response only ($10,824)*
Total incidents
118
167
276
362
413
538
n/a
Total cost ($m)
$1.28
$1.81
$2.99
$3.92
$4.47
$5.82
n/a
* The data is not sufficient to allow response only incidents to be distinguished between the different types of boating.
Data source: incident statistics: MUARC 2009,
MUARC 2010, for cost data refer SECTION BELOW.
ff The value of a minor injury was estimated to
be $5,000
Table 39 shows the average cost incurred in an
incident for each level of severity. These costs were
calculated using the following values:
ff The average cost of responding to a marine
incident was estimated at $10,824 based
on information supplied by the Australian
Volunteer Coast Guard.
ff The cost of a fatality was calculated using
the value of statistical life as suggested by
the Office of Best Practice Regulation and
the Victorian Competition and Efficiency
Commission for these purposes
ff The value of a major injury was estimated
using the same values as DoT used in its
earlier marine discussion paper (2009), which
were $339,000 for major injuries involving
extended stays in hospital and $20,000 for
lesser incidents. These costs were weighted
using exposure data which showed that 60%
of injuries are in the less serious category
163
Projected frequency
of relevant incidents –
assumptions and methodology
The data in Table 39 above shows the number of
incidents by type and severity that have occurred
in recent years. An analysis of the data shows that
some categories exhibit upward or downward trends,
while others have been relatively flat over time. One
challenge is to determine the appropriate trend or
average line to use as a basis for future estimation of
benefits.
Trend estimates
Trend estimates have been used in the analysis to
calculate future benefits due to the introduction of a
recreational boating licence. The problem with using
values based upon trend estimates is the limited data
available DOT has only 7 years of data available on
which to base trend estimates whereas the minimum
requirement would be 10 years.
Furthermore, the data recording method changed
during these 7 years. Consequently, an increasing
trend may well due to better data recording methods
rather than a real increase in the number of incidents.
Note: Trend estimates for fatalities (not shown) indicate that within a
number of years fatalities will be zero and eventually negative. This is an
illogical outcome and average values in lieu used for fatality rates.
Figure 43 - Average projection of (un-weighted) costs to society due to current levels of recreational
boating incidents
$140,000,000
$120,000,000
$100,000,000
$80,000,000
$60,000,000
$40,000,000
$20,000,000
$-
Towing
PWC
In some cases, though, the trend appears conclusive,
in particular, the number of injuries in the towed water
sports sector appears to be growing strongly.
In the analysis, the results are presented on the
assumption that the trends will continue and also on
the assumption that the number of incidents in future
will be the average number from the past.
164
General Boating
Average estimates
To overcome the uncertainty that arises with the use of
trends, the average is used to provide an estimate for
the cost savings for the next 20 years. In this scenario,
we estimated the average yearly number of incidents
and extrapolated these to forecast the future benefits.
However, this is, also not a 100 per cent correct
estimate of the future outcomes, and represents
merely an approximation of the benefits.
Figure 44 - A
verage projection of (un-weighted) costs to society due to current levels of recreational
boating incidents
$70,000,000
$60,000,000
$50,000,000
$40,000,000
$30,000,000
$20,000,000
$10,000,000
$-
Towing
PWC
General Boating
In the absence of better knowledge and data, using
both forecast methods in combination provides an
upper and lower bound approximation of the benefits,
or costs saved. The cost estimate value is assumed
to be somewhere in between.
This issue was modelled as follows.
First, the various options under consideration for
the general boating licence were evaluated in a
cumulative fashion. Some requirements would be
additional to others. This is illustrated in Figure 45.
Efficacy – the impact that different
approaches to licensing would have on
safety outcomes
To estimate the benefits of a more stringent licensing
regime, it is necessary to estimate the number of
incidents that would be avoided. This requires further
assumptions about the effectiveness of each of the
licensing options.
Figure 45 - Licensing options ‘roadmap’
1+2+
Logbook
Enhanced Information
= Option 1
Enhanced Knowledge Test
= Option 2
= Option 3
1+2+
1+2+
Mandatory Training
Practical
Assessment
= Option 5
= Option 4
1+2+5+
Mandatory Training
plus Practical
Assessment
= Option 6
165
The outcome of each licensing option was assessed
against each of the human factors individually
by a panel of DoT staff with external consultants
assisting. In this process, each licensing approach
was assigned a score between 0 and 2 regarding its
efficacy in preventing incidents caused by each of the
contributing factors.
As an element was added to the licensing approach
it was assumed that the outcome could improve
or remain the same, but could not deteriorate. For
example, the knowledge test was assigned a score
of 1 for most human factors according to the panel’s
judgement. A separate set of scores were assigned
to the logbook option and the sum of the scores
assigned to each option and each contributing factor
were carried through to the modelling.
The cumulative scores assigned to each option for
the general boating licence are shown in Table 40.
Note that, while the scores are added together as
requirements are added to the licensing option, the
options themselves are not strictly additive, as shown
in Table 40 above, for example the practical test
option does not involve the logbook. Therefore, the
scores do not necessarily increase from left to right
across the table.
Table 40 - Cumulative licensing efficacy scores by boating sector and contributing factor
General boating
166
PWC
Towed water sports
Option
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
Lack of maintenance
1
1
3
2
2
3
1
1
3
2
2
3
1
1
3
2
2
3
Lack of fuel
1
1
3
2
2
3
1
1
3
2
2
3
1
1
3
2
2
3
Error of judgement
1
1
3
3
3
5
1
1
3
3
3
5
1
1
3
3
3
5
Inexperience
0
0
2
1
1
2
0
0
2
1
1
2
0
0
2
1
1
2
Navigational error
0
1
2
2
3
5
0
1
2
2
3
5
0
1
2
2
3
5
Insecure mooring
1
1
2
2
2
4
1
1
2
2
2
3
1
1
2
2
2
4
Failure to keep
proper lookout
0
1
2
2
2
3
0
1
2
2
2
3
0
1
2
2
3
5
Fatigue
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
Alcohol and drugs
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Excessive speed
1
2
3
3
3
4
1
2
3
3
3
4
1
2
3
3
3
4
Overloading
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
1
1
2
1
2
3
Other human factors
1
2
3
3
3
4
1
2
3
3
3
4
1
2
3
3
3
4
Table 41 - Licensing percentage of incidents prevented at overall efficacy score of 50%
General boating
Option
1
2
3
4
5
PWC
6
1
2
3
4
Towed water sports
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
Lack of
maintenance
10% 10% 30% 20% 20% 30%
6%
6%
19% 13% 13% 19%
6%
6%
19% 13% 13% 19%
Lack of fuel
10% 10% 30% 20% 20% 30%
6%
6%
19% 13% 13% 19%
6%
6%
19% 13% 13% 19%
Error of
judgement
10% 10% 30% 30% 30% 50%
6%
6%
19% 19% 19% 32%
6%
6%
19% 19% 19% 32%
Inexperience
0%
0%
20% 10% 10% 20%
0%
0%
13%
13%
0%
0%
13%
Navigational
error
0%
10% 20% 20% 30% 50%
0%
6%
13% 13% 19% 32%
0%
6%
13% 13% 19% 32%
Insecure
mooring
10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 40%
6%
6%
13% 13% 13% 19%
6%
6%
13% 13% 13% 25%
Failure to
keep proper
lookout
0%
10% 20% 20% 20% 30%
0%
6%
13% 13% 13% 19%
0%
6%
13% 13% 19% 32%
Fatigue
10% 10% 20% 10% 10% 10%
6%
6%
13%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
13%
6%
6%
6%
Alcohol and
drugs
10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
Excessive
speed
10% 20% 30% 30% 30% 40%
6%
13% 19% 19% 19% 25%
6%
13% 19% 19% 19% 25%
Overloading
10% 10% 20% 10% 10% 10%
6%
6%
13% 19%
6%
6%
Other human
factors
10% 20% 30% 30% 30% 40%
6%
13% 19% 19% 19% 25%
6%
13% 19% 19% 19% 25%
The cumulative scores were normalised and
converted to percentages such that the highest of the
scores assigned to the general boating licence was
100 per cent. For PWC and towed water sports the
normalisation was done differently to take account of
the specialist nature of this type of boating and of the
possible endorsements discussed below.
These percentages were then multiplied by an
overall efficacy score to generate an estimate of
the efficacy of each licensing option in preventing
incidents caused by each of the human factors. The
percentages are shown in Table 41 above, using an
overall efficacy score of 50 per cent.
These percentages were applied to the projected
number of incidents to estimate the (gross) benefit of
each licensing option.
Endorsements
The comments above concern options for the
general boating licence. DoT has also considered the
possibility of introducing endorsements for specialist
boating activities, such as PWC riding and towed
water sports.
13%
6%
6%
6%
13%
6%
6%
6%
13%
13% 19%
Similarly to the analysis of the general boating licence,
each endorsement option was assigned a score,
between zero and two, to reflect the impact it would
have on reducing incidents caused by the various
human factors. The same 6 options were considered
for endorsements as for the general boating licence.
However, the scores assigned to the information only
option were zero on the assumption that the impact of
the information campaign was captured entirely in the
general licensing stage.
The scores assigned to the endorsement options
were cumulative in that:
ff A more stringent requirement for obtaining
an endorsement could not be less effective
than a less stringent option (i.e. the same
requirement applied to the general boating
licence) and
ff The impact of an endorsement option was
additional to the impact of the general boating
options
The approach taken to estimating the efficacy of these
endorsements was similar to the general licence, with
two key differences.
167
Therefore, the scores assigned to the endorsement
options were added to the scores assigned to the
licence options. In doing this, though, the panel felt
that another issue needed to be taken into account.
It seems likely that obtaining a general boating
licence will provide licensees with some of the skills
necessary to participate in more specialised activities
such as PWC riding and towing, but not all of them.
In addition, as the general boating licence becomes
more stringent in its requirements, it is likely that the
increases would be in areas less relevant to these
specialised activities. Therefore, the more stringent
general licensing scores were weighted down as
they were carried through to the endorsements in the
modelling. This was the first key difference between
the modelling of licences and endorsements.
The second key difference was in the way the scores
were normalised. It is necessary to normalise the
scores so that none exceeds 100 per cent, to prevent
the model from reaching illogical outcomes such as
preventing more than 100 per cent of incidents from
happening. For the general boating sector this was
simply a matter of dividing all scores by the largest
score and then applying the overall efficacy score. In
the case of the PWC and towing sectors, scores were
normalised by the highest score from the combination
of licensing and endorsement scores.
Through this process a set of percentages were
produced that estimate the impact that different
combinations of licensing and endorsement options
would have on incidents caused by human factors. A
sample of these percentages are shown in Table 42.
Table 42 - Percentage reduction in recreational boating incidents by licence type – general boating
and endorsements
Gross
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical test
Training
Training and
test
General boating
licence
6.41%
9.00%
25.30%
22.62%
23.73%
38.85%
PWC
endorsement
4.01%
9.14%
24.91%
Towed
water sports
endorsement
4.01%
8.37%
27.14%
Data source: ACIL Tasman
As expected higher level interventions would be expected to have the greatest impact in reducing incidents.
Present value of benefits
The objective is to analyse whether or not any of the boating licensing options may provide more benefits than
costs,. This is represented by a Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) >1. For the analysis of the benefits, it is not only
necessary to analyse the past benefits, but also to estimate future potential benefits which are represented in
the Net Present Value (NPV). Aggregating over the entire population of recreational boating licence holder in
Victoria, the present value of benefits from an improved licensing system for any one of the five licence options
for each boating type shown in Table 43 and 44.
Table 43 - Present value benefits (average)
168
Gross
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical test
Training
Training and
test
General boating
$13,134,602
$18,427,610
$51,802,332
$46,329,479
$48,594,714
$79,548,810
PWC
endorsement
$1,452,512
$4,455,771
Towed
water sports
endorsement
$4,369,125
$13,030,827
Table 44 - Present value benefits (trend)
Gross
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical test
Training
Training and
test
General boating
licence
$7,506,082
$10,530,898
$29,603,681
$26,476,089
$27,770,611
$45,460,070
PWC
endorsement
$2,645,621
$8,115,788
Towed
water sports
endorsement
$10,939,635
$32,627,243
Present value of costs
The cost of the licensing regime depends on two things:
ff The cost to the licence applicant of reduced leisure time, due to time spend studying for a test, sitting a
test, and taking part in practical experience requirements, such as logbook or practical training.
ff The cost to the licence applicant of the licence fee, and the costs of training and testing facilities
associated with the licence tests.
A summary of these costs is represented in Table 45. below. They are based on estimated (student) time to
complete the various requirements and administration time (both costed at average weekly earnings) and the
estimated cost of course fees.
Table 45 - Cost of training methods
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical test
Mandatory
training and
practical test
General licence
$80
$105
$815
$248
$643
Towing endorsement
$40
$53
$448
$195
$538
PWC endorsement
$40
$53
$448
$195
$538
Data source: DoT estimates
Note: Costs include estimates of the time taken to complete tasks by the applicant plus apportioning cost of $35 per hour as well as the costs to be paid
to course providers and the administration costs of the regulator.
For the analysis of the costs, it is not only necessary to analyse the costs that occurred in the past, but also
to estimate future potential costs which are represented in the Net Present Value (NPV). Aggregating over the
entire population of recreational boating licence holders in Victoria, the present value of costs from an improved
licensing system for any one of the five licence options for each boating type is estimated to be as shown in
Error! Reference source not found..
169
Table 46 - present value cost (average)
Gross
Enhanced
information
Knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical test
Training
Training and
test
General boating
$28,834,678
$37,845,515
$293,753,280
$89,207,284
$180,216,736
$231,578,506
PWC
endorsement
$1,400,603
$5,202,241
Towed
water sports
endorsement
$1,908,437
$7,088,482
Benefit Cost Ratios
Should a range have values wholly below a BCR of
1 then it is highly likely that the costs outweigh the
benefits and that on a benefit-cost basis the option
should not be pursued.
In order to assist in decision making Benefit- Cost
Ratios (BCRs) are determined.
As previously discussed modelling BCR values has
complications due to estimating future costs and
benefits. One could use either future values of costs
and benefits based upon trends of past data or future
values of costs and benefits based upon ongoing
averages of past data.
For the purposes of this paper both trend and
averaging data have been modelled. It is likely that
the true BCR will be between the two values obtained.
I.e. the average and trend based values provide end
points for a range of BCR values and the true BCR
value would lie somewhere within this range.
Should a range have values some above a BCR of
1 and some below a BCR of 1 then it is likely that
there is some benefit and that there may be a case to
further examine these options.
The tables below list the benefit – cost ratios for the
trend projected values and the average projected
values of costs and benefits.
Table 47 - Estimated benefit cost ratios (BCRs) for approaches to licensing based on trend projection of
costs to society due to current levels of recreational boating incidents – unweighted, unadjusted for
injuries to skier
Item
Number
Licence /
Endorsement
Delivery Options
Enhanced
information
knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical
test
Training
Training and
test
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.7
0.4
0.5
General boating
licence
1
PWC
endorsement
2
1.89
1.56
Towed
water sports
endorsement
3
5.73
4.60
Data source: ACIL Tasman modeling
170
Table 48 - E
stimated benefit cost ratios (BCRs) for approaches to licensing based on average projection of
costs to society due to current levels of recreational boating incidents – unweighted, unadjusted for
injuries to skier
Item
Number
Licence /
Endorsement
Delivery Options
Enhanced
information
knowledge
test
enhancement
Logbook
Practical
test
Training
Training and
test
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.6
0.3
0.4
General boating
licence
1
PWC
endorsement
2
1.0
0.9
Towed
water sports
endorsement
3
2.3
1.8
The first row of results in each table shows the ratios
as estimated for the general boating licence.
The diagram below plots the average and trend
based BCRs values. Figure 46 illustrates that trend
based BCR values are generally higher than average
based BCR values which is consistent with the
increasing numbers of injuries over the past few
years.
The lower rows of the table show estimated BCRs for
PWC and towed water sport endorsements. These
ratios reflect an assumption that a knowledge test or
practical test for an endorsement would be completed
after the corresponding test for a general licence
was completed, but that it would not be as costly
as the general licence test. The endorsement test is
envisaged to be a more specific test tailored to the
particular requirements of the PWC and/ or towed
water sports sectors. Therefore, as shown in the table
above, its efficacy is estimated to be higher.
Figure 46 – Graphical representation of average and trend based BCR vales
7
BCR value between values based on long term trends and values based on long term averages
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
Enhanced
Information
1
2
3
Enhanced Knowledge
Average based BCR
1
Logbook
1
2
Practical Test
3
1
1
Training
Training
and test
Trend based BCR
171
Figure 47 - Ranges of BCR for each investigated option
7
BCR value range plots for each option
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
Enhanced
Information
1
2
3
Enhanced Knowledge
1
Logbook
Figure 47 illustrates the range of BCR values
estimated for each option investigated.
Numbers 1-3 on the x axis refer to the following.
Item 1 - Enhancing the general licence
The analysis does not indicate that there is an
economic benefit in altering the pre-requisites for
the current marine licence. None of the analyzed
changes result in any BAR greater than 1. e.g. the
costs to implement any changes more than offset any
benefits which could be obtained.
Item 2 – PWC endorsement.
With a range of BCRs between 2.3 and 5.73 the
analysis indicates the use of an enhanced knowledge
test is likely to provide net benefits.
analysis indicates the use of a practical test is likely to
provide net benefits.
Item 3 – Towed water sports endorsement.
With a range of BCRs between 1 and 1.89 the
analysis indicates the use of an enhanced knowledge
test is likely to provide net benefits.
analysis indicates the use of a practical test is likely to
provide net benefits.
1
2
Practical Test
3
1
1
Training
Training
and test
Modifications to the basic BCR results
There are two issues that need further consideration.
Firstly, the benefit that can be achieved from an
endorsement is likely to vary depending on the
method applied to the base licence.
Secondly, injuries in the towed water sports category
may be less ‘susceptible’ to avoidance through
licensing than injuries in other sectors. This is due to
the level of control the operator has over incidents.
An endorsement for the master and/or operator will
not address decisions made by other parties such as
water skiers and other towed parties.
Varying endorsement BCRs based upon base
licence delivery method
As the method applied to acquiring the general
licence becomes more stringent it is reasonable
to expect that licencees will have a higher level
of knowledge of some of the elements which an
endorsement would also cover. For example, a person
who has completed a 20 hour logbook would have
more experience in boating than someone who has
only completed a paper test and is likely to be a better
PWC operator because of it. Given the higher level of
base knowledge, the additional knowledge acquired
when obtaining a secondary endorsement may be
reduced. To account for this it may be appropriate
to weight the ratios calculated for the endorsements
appropriately.
Suggested weightings and the weighted BCRs for
PWC and towed water sport operations are provided
in Tables 49 and 50.
172
Table 49 - PWC endorsement BCRs weighted for overlap due to licence method
No change
0%
Enhanced
knowledge
test 5%
Training or
logbook 10%
Practical
Assessment
15%
Training plus
Assessment
20%
1.89 - 1
1.80 - .95
1.70-.9
1.61- .85
1.51 - .80
1.56 - .90
1.48 - .86
1.40 - .81
1.33 - .77
1.25 - .70
PWC endorsement
Range of knowledge test BCRs –
Range of Practical test BCRs –
From the table it can be seen that should the basic
licence improve the knowledge of PWC there is
expected to be less benefit gained from the additional
endorsement. All the ranges dip below BCR values of
1 although the majority of values remain above 1.
In comparison to other boating activities, a larger
proportion of injuries are not ‘susceptible’ to being
prevented by the master/operator, no matter how
skilled they are.
This needs to be taken into account should the
requirements to achieve a basic licence alter from
current practice and the PWC endorsement be
altered.
It is the master/operator that requires the licence and
thus the master/operator who acquires increased
competency through any changes to the licensing
regime. The endorsement is not aimed at the towee
and will not effect his or her decisions.
Towed water sport BCRs weighted for
percentage of adverse outcomes resulting
from towed person’s decisions.
To account for this Table 15 includes weightings for
the BCRs to account for the relative level of incidents
resulting from the towee’s decisions as opposed to
the master/operator’s decisions.
The reduction in effectiveness of a towed water sport
endorsement due to an improved basic licence is
similar for PWC endorsements as discussed above.
However, the effectiveness of any towed water sport
endorsement will be further reduced as a significant
proportion of injuries in the towed water sports sector
are due to decisions made by the tow-ee.
In the table a value of 100% assumes that all water
sport incidents are attributable to operator failures,
50% assumes that 50% are attributable to operator
failures and 50% are attributable to decisions by the
towed person
173
Table 50 - Water Sports endorsement BCRs weighted for overlap due to licence method and the percentage
of efficiency of the endorsement based on assumed percentage of incidents attributable to
the operator.
PWC
endorsement
proportion
of cost
‘susceptible’
to licensing
No change
0%
Enhanced
knowledge
test 5%
Training or
logbook 10%
Practical
Assessment
15%
Training plus
Assessment
20%
Range of
knowledge test
BCRs – trend to
average ‘trend’
model
100%
5.73 – 2.3
5.44 – 2.19
5.16 – 2.07
4.87 – 1.96
4.58 – 1.84
90%
5.16 - 2.07
4.90 - 1.97
4.64 – 1.86
4.38 – 1.76
4.13 – 1.66
80%
4.58 - 3.68
4.35 – 3.50
4.13 – 3.31
3.90 – 3.13
3.67 – 2.94
50%
2.87 – 1.15
2.72 – 1.09
2.58 – 1.04
2.44 – 0.98
2.29 – 0.92
Range of Practical
test BCRs – trend
to average ‘trend’
model
100%
4.6 – 1.8
4.37 – 1.71
4.14 – 1.62
3.91 – 1.53
3.68 – 1.44
90%
4.14 – 1.62
3.93 – 1.54
3.73 – 1.46
3.52 – 1.38
3.31 – 1.30
80%
3.68 – 1.44
3.50 – 1.37
3.31 – 1.30
3.13 – 1.22
2.94 – 1.15
50%
2.30 - 0.90
2.19 - 0.86
2.07 - 0.81
1.96 - 0.77
1.84 - 0.72
Conclusions from Table 50
The majority of BCR ranges from this sensitivity
analysis estimate ranges of BCR values greater than
1. This indicates that regardless of changes to the
basic licence test a towed water sport endorsement
delivered either via a knowledge test or via a practical
test would have benefits greater than the costs.
The table indicates that when injuries result from
decisions made by the towee 50% of the time the
BCR ranges straddle a BCR of 1. This indicates that
any intervention is becoming marginal in terms of the
benefits it achieves.
174
175
176
Appendix 7: Relative exposure to risk, a comparison
between marine and road incidents
The exposure to risk report from MUARC discussed
above provides data on marine fatality rates which
allows us to compare fatality risk in boating to that
involved in different transport modes within Victoria.
The report is based on a ‘participation and exposure’
data study of recreational vessel usage in Victoria
and allows us the possibility to make some broad
assumptions about the relative risk marine and road
users face.
Calculation of vessel exposure/fatality
rate.
From the MUARC exposure report, an average total
number of on water hours per surveyed vessel per
annum can be calculated at 38.6 (see Table 15).
Comparison of vessel fatality rates and
vehicle fatality rates based on hours of
exposure
The following is a broad comparison of fatality rates
based on information from the MUARC analysis of
marine activity in the year 2008-2009, road travel data
for 2007 from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)
as well as ABS information on road fatality rates for
the years 2007-2010.
Table 51 - Determination of average hours used by recreational vessel per year
Quarter
Number of
surveyed vessels
Total hours used
per quarter
Average hours
used per quarter
per surveyed
vessel
Oct qtr. 2008
722
7297
10.1
Jan qtr. 2009
719
11370
15.8
Apr qtr. 2009
779
6845
8.8
Jul qtr. 2009
762
2930
Average hours per surveyed vessel per annum
3.8
38.6
This figure of 38.6 hours per vessel per annum can be used to extrapolate the average number of vessel
exposure hours per fatality using the average number of registered vessels and an indicative figure for annual
marine fatalities (see Table 16). The calculations show us that a fatality occurs per average 949,000 vessel
exposure hours.
Appendix 7: Relative exposure to risk, a comparison between marine and road incidents
177
Table 52 - Calculation of total vessel exposure hours
per fatality
Average number of registered
vessels across the year from
the exposure report
170,000*
Total exposure hours for fleet
170,000 x 38.6 =
6,545,000
Long term trend in recreational
boating fatalities (average over
ten year period from 2000/01
– 2009/10)
Average number of vessel
exposure hours per fatality
6.9
949,000
Average distance travelled
(km)
48
Average number of exposure
hours per car
315
Number of registered vehicles
in Victoria (ABS Release
12/11/2009)
4,000,000
Total exposure hours for
vehicle fleet
Number of fatalities (ten year
average to 2010)
Motor Vehicle statistics
Average number of vehicle
Data on average travel speeds for motor vehicles
in Victoria is unavailable and our calculations thus
rely on a few assumptions. The ABS survey data
indicates 75% of the distance travelled in motor
vehicles was within urban areas and the other 25%
was in rural areas. We presume an average travelling
speed of 70km/h in rural areas and one of 40km/h
in urban areas. By weighting these two averages,
we arrive at an estimation of 48km/h for road travel
across the state. This represents approximately 315
hours of travel (or exposure) per registered vehicle
in Victoria per annum. Multiplying this by a rounded
figure for the number of registered vehicles in Victoria
(4,000,000), we arrive at an estimate for the total
exposure hours for the entire Victorian vehicle fleet of
1,260,000,000.
We take the ten year average Victorian annual road
toll (341 - TAC) and divide the above total exposure
hours by this to arrive at the estimate of 3,695,000
exposure hours per road fatality (see Table 17).
15,100
Assumed average speed
(km/h)
*Note: As discussed earlier figure used is 170,000 whereas exposure
report used 151,519.
Motor vehicle use statistics provide a useful
comparison to the hours of boating exposure per
fatality rate. The most recent ABS survey of motor
vehicle use in Australia (Survey of Motor Vehicle
Use, 9208.0) covers the 12 month period ending
31 October 2007. It reports the average kilometres
travelled in vehicles in Victoria per passenger vehicle
as being 15,100 over the 12 month survey period.
178
Table 53 - Calculation of total vehicle exposure hours
per fatality
1,260,000,000
341
3,695,000
Comparison of vessel and vehicle statistics based on
exposure hours
Table 54 - Table comparing vessel and vehicle
exposure rates and ratio of fatality rates
Average number of vessel
949,000
Average number of vehicle
3,695,000
Ratio of vessel fatality rates to
road vehicle fatality rates
3.89
Based on hours of exposure a recreational vessel is
approximately 3.89 times more likely to be involved in
a fatality than a vehicle.
The conclusion is not a strict comparison of like
activity rate for like activity rate, given:
ff the number of vehicles included fatalities
on motorcycles, in trucks and on any road
vehicle, and
ff the vessel statistics relate only to
However even if (based on that method of analysis)
20% of vehicle statistics were based on non car
incidents, there is still a large difference in vessel and
vehicle fatality rates and the conclusion remains valid.
Comparison of vessel fatality rates and
vehicle fatality rates based on distance
travelled
The assumptions per vessel type are:
ff Fishing - assume 1/2 travel at 30 knots, 1/2
anchored
An alternative methodology to ascertaining the relative
risk of fatality between vessels and vehicles is to use
a measure based upon distance travelled.
ff Yachting - assume 10 knots
ff Cruising - assume mix of vessels motor boats
averaging 30 knots
The Survey of Motor Vehicle Use 2007 from the ABS
reported road fatalities per million vehicle kilometres
as 0.0057 for Victoria. In order to validate the above
conclusion a similar estimate for vessels can be
calculated based on how far the recreational fleet
would have travelled and then be compared to this.
ff PWC - assume 35 knots
ff Towed water sports - assume mix of water
sports activities at speeds averaging 25 knots
ff Racing - assume mostly yachts at 10 knots
ff Other - assume 15 knots
Average speed of vessels
This would result in a weighted average speed of
15.61 knots, or 29 kilometres per hour (Table 23).
The MUARC exposure report provides data for
total on-water hours per vessel type for the year
comprising October 2008 – September 09. While
not a financial year it does contain a years worth
of data and is the only data available for vessel
exposure rates. This can be used, along with a list of
assumptions for average travel speed, as the basis
for an estimate of average vessel speed for the whole
Victorian recreational boating fleet.
Table 55 - Table showing the average speed of vessels from vessel on water hours.
Activity
Number of vessel
on - water hours
% of total
Estimated average
speed
Weighted average
contributions
Fishing
18400
65%
15
9.75
Yachts
4634
16%
10
1.60
Motor Boats
1123
4%
30
1.18
PWC’s
686
2%
35
0.70
Towed Water Sports
1688
6%
25
1.50
Racing
361
1%
10
0.13
Other
1540
5%
15
0.75
28432
Weighted average speed (Knots)
15.61
Using the above figure of 29km/h, an estimate of the total kilometres covered by the Victorian recreational
boating fleet can be calculated (189,800,000km). This can be used to arrive at a boat deaths per million
kilometres figure to be compared with that of the roads (0.0057). This shows the fatality risk for recreational
boating to be over six times that for passenger vehicles. Table 21 shows this and the resilience of a large risk
differential when varying the average fleet speed.
179
Fatal crash comparison - vessels/vehicles (2007)
Table 56 – Comparison of fatal crashes between vessels and vehicles in 2007
Average boating
Speed
Knots
Comparisons vessel
death rate/vehicle
death rate (0.0057)
Km/h
Total Km (6,545,000
* km/h)
Vessel Deaths(6.9)/
million km
5
9.26
54,000,000
0.115
20.1
10
18.52
108,000,000
0.057
10.1
15
27.78
15.61
29
20
37.04
25
46.3
162,000,000
0.038
6.7
0.036
6.3
216,000,000
0.029
5.0
270,000,000
0.023
4.0
189,800,000
Comparison of vessel/vehicle fatality rates.
Table 57 – Comparison of vessel and vehicle
fatality rates
3.9
6.3
Each of the methods used in the estimation produces
a similar result. Whilst the actual values are subject
to conjecture due to the assumptions, regardless of
which methodology is used there appears to be a
greater likelihood of incidents resulting in a fatality
when boating compared to when driving.
The conclusion illustrates that, of itself, the boating
fatality rate provides impetus to improve boating
safety.
180
SMVU (fatalities)
181
182
Glossary
ABS
Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACMA
Australian Communications and Media Authority
ACT
Australian Capital Territory
AVCGA
Australian Volunteer Coast Guard Association
BARD
(US Coast Guard’s) Boating Accident Report Database
BIA
Boating Industry Association
CEO
Chief Executive Officer
ColRegs
International Collision Regulations
DVD
Digital Video Disc
Endorsement
Permission to master a vessel in a prescribed activity
Environmental factors
Causal factors from environmental actions
EPIRB
Electronic Position Indicating Radio Beacon
GPS
Global Positioning System
HF
High Frequency
Hours
Vessel movement by time
HP
Horse power
Human factors
Causal factors from human actions
Kw
Kilowatt
Marine licence
Permission to be a master of a vessel
MAST
Marine and Safety Tasmania
Master
A person having command or charge of a vessel
Material factors
Causal factors from the variability of materials strength and desdign
MHz
Megahertz
MROCP
Marine Radio Operators Certificate of Proficiency
MROVCP
Marine Radio Operators VHF Certificate of Proficiency
MSQ
Marine Safety Queensland
Glossary
183
184
MSS
Marine safety system
MUARC
Monash University Accident Research Centre
Nm
Nautical mile
NMSC
National Marine Safety Committee
NSW
New South Wales
NT
Northern Territory
Operator
A person controlling the movement of a vessel
Permission
A marine licence or endorsement of a marine licence
Person hours
Vessel movement by time and number of people on board
Person trips
Vessel movements by number of people on board
PFD
Personal Floatation Device
PWC
RandL
VicRoads data base
RBOL
Recreational Boat Operators Licence
Restricted marine licence
A permission to master a vessel with conditions of operations
RST
Recreational Skippers Ticket (Western Australia)
RTO
Registered Training Organisation
SA
South Australia
The Act
Towee
Person engaged in water sports and being towed
Tower
Person operating a vessel engaged in towed water sports
Trips
Vessel movements
TSV
Transport Safety Victoria – Victoria’s marine regulator
TSV
Transport Safety Victoria
VHF
Very High Frequency
Vicpol
Victoria Police
VicRoads
Victorian licence and registration authority
Acknowledgements
We acknowledge the support of the following during
the preparation of this paper.
ff Honourable Deborah Hersman,
Chairman, National Transportation Safety
Board, USA.
ff Bill Gossard, National Transportation Safety
Board, USA.
ff Jeff Hoedt, United States Coast Guard.
ff Susan Tomczuk, United States Coast Guard.
ff Peter Chennel, Royal National Lifeboat
Institute, UK.
ff Delegates to the Department of Transport
workshops during the Marine Safety
Legislation Review
ff Lee-Anne Bowles
ff Monash University Accident Research Centre
ff Transport Safety Victoria
ff New Zealand Safety Authority
ff Australian Volunteer Coast Guard
Association Inc.
Glossary
185
DOT5861/11
www.transport.vic.gov.au

Options Paper for Marine Licensing in Victoria

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