Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars

Equality Matters:
Negotiating an End to
Civil Wars
Journal of Conflict Resolution
00(0) 1-28
ª The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0022002711431798
http://jcr.sagepub.com
Cecilia Albin1 and Daniel Druckman2
Abstract
This article explores relationships between procedural justice (PJ) in the negotiation
process, distributive justice (DJ) in the terms of negotiated agreements, and their
durability in cases of civil war. Adherence to PJ principles was found to correlate
strongly with agreements based specifically on the DJ principle of equality. Agreements
were also found to be more durable when based on equality, but not when based on
other DJ principles. The equality principle accounted for the relationship between PJ
and durability irrespective of differences between the parties in power. Further
examination suggested that two types of equality in particular—equal treatment and
equal shares—were associated with forward-looking agreements and high durability.
The findings suggest that durability is served by including equality in the terms of agreements, and that PJ helps (but does not guarantee) achieving such agreements.
Keywords
civil war, distributive justice, durable peace, equality, peace negotiations, procedural
justice
Is it important for negotiators to be just, if they are to conclude an agreement that
will be implemented and durable? Specifically, does procedural justice (PJ) in the
negotiation process enhance the prospects for a durable agreement? How does PJ
1
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
2
Corresponding Author:
Cecilia Albin, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Box 514, Uppsala S-751
20, Sweden
Email: [email protected]
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
relate to distributive justice (DJ) in the outcome, and which type of justice contributes the most to durability? These questions are addressed in this study.
The conditions and requirements for durable peace are growing concerns within
peace and conflict research. These concerns partly reflect the recognized serious
problems with the implementation of negotiated agreements, and with preventing
violations and relapses into violence. Today more wars are stopped by negotiated
settlements than by military victory, but a large part of those settlements relapse into
renewed violence—43 percent of them within five years, in one estimate (Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue 2007). Nearly one-third of sixty-nine peace agreements concluded in the period from 1989 to 2000 resulted, within five years of signing, in civil
war recurring, according to another study (Jarstad and Sundberg 2007). In many
cases—such as Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, and Israel–Palestine—the costs in human
lives of peace agreements falling apart have been enormous. Several factors have
been put forward to explain why some agreements fail while others endure. The
importance of justice, however, remains little explored and poorly understood.
Yet, justice issues often play a central role as sources of civil wars, and are therefore important to address if peace is to be restored and endure. These issues may concern the division of political power, territory, and other resources; procedures for
democratization including the holding of elections; and the establishment of human
rights commissions, amnesty and compensatory justice for war crimes. Earlier
research has demonstrated that justice principles and related concepts influence
the dynamics of international negotiation and the content of agreements (e.g.,
Albin 2001; Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005; Druckman and Lyons 2005;
Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler 2008). However, work to date has not examined
whether or ways in which PJ affects their durability, or how PJ relates to DJ.
This article contributes to filling that gap.
PJ refers to the justice of the process from which agreements result. It concerns how the negotiations are conducted, and how the parties relate to each
other and are treated in the process, including modes of representation and decision making. DJ refers to the justice of the allocation of benefits and burdens in
the terms of agreements (outcomes). Recent work has shown that DJ contributes
to the durability of peace agreements negotiated in the 1990s (Druckman and
Albin 2011). Specifically, the DJ principle of equality was found to play a key
role: significantly more durable agreements occurred when equality played a
central role in those agreements. Equality was also shown to mediate the relationship between the conflict environment and durability: equality reduced the
negative impact of intense conflicts on durability. This article extends the analysis of peace agreements to include principles of procedural justice. We examine a set of hypotheses about the impact of PJ principles on the terms of
negotiated agreements and their durability, and explore the role played by PJ
in the relationship between equality and durability. Given the positive impact
of the equality principle on durability, we explore how and why it was applied
in different peace agreements. Finally, we ask how the equality principle
Albin and Druckman
3
contributes to the durability of agreements, and suggest relationships between
type of equality, the outcome and durability.
Distributive Justice and the Durability of Peace Agreements
Recent research on agreements negotiated to end civil wars in the 1990s indicates that
DJ enhances durability over a five-year period (Druckman and Albin 2011). Specifically, basing peace agreements on DJ principles reduces the negative impact on their
durability of difficult conflict environments, as defined by Downs and Stedman
(2002): including many DJ principles in an agreement reduces the negative effects
of such environments, while including few or no DJ principles heightens the impact
of a difficult conflict context. Justice also appears to enhance the positive effects of
a ‘‘peace friendly’’ environment. Of the four DJ principles covered in the study—
equality, proportionality, compensatory justice, and need—the equality principle was
found to account primarily for these relationships.
As noted above, equality was found to mediate the relationship between the conflict environment and durability: difficult conflict environments had less negative
impacts on durability when the equality principle was central to the agreements. Further, the centrality of equality correlated with forward-looking (FL) versus backwardlooking (BL) outcomes (see Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). The more central was the
equality principle, the more FL the outcome. FL agreements also correlated with durability. However, the relationship between FL/BL and durability was mediated by
equality: FL agreements were more durable when the equality principle was central
in those agreements. In this study, we build on these findings by first examining the
role of PJ in the relationship between process, outcome, and durability.
How does Procedural Justice Affect the Terms and
Durability of Agreements?
Whether PJ by itself enhances the durability of agreements has not been examined
previously in a civil war context. But extensive research from other fields, particularly social psychology and management studies, offers support for the argument that
PJ contributes to the durability of agreements and effectiveness generally (e.g., in an
organization). While the exact meaning varies somewhat across studies, a core component of PJ is that those affected can participate and have a voice in or influence the
negotiation or decision-making process (Thibaut and Walker 1975). Another component is treating those affected with respect and giving adequate explanations for decisions taken (Bies and Moag 1986). Leventhal’s (1980) six criteria of fair procedures
include consistency in procedures across persons and over time, bias suppression or
impartiality, accuracy, correctability (reversibility of decisions taken in error), representation of parties affected by the decisions, and ethicality.
A number of mechanisms have been found to explain the favorable effects of PJ
on the acceptance of the outcome and its durability. Adherence to PJ in the
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negotiation or decision-making process promotes (1) positive attitudes such as trust
and confidence in those deciding on the outcome, (2) cooperative behavior,
(3) opportunities for parties to participate, (4) integrative (problem solving) rather
than distributive (competitive) bargaining, and (5) a reduction in conflict
(Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler 2008; Tyler and Caine 1981). Each of these factors
increases satisfaction with and acceptance of the outcome as legitimate, thereby
enhancing compliance with it (e.g., Thibaut and Walker 1975; Gibson 1989). Compliance occurs even when the outcome favors one party more than another (Lind and
Tyler 1988). Aside from the content or principles in an agreement itself, acting in
procedurally just ways enhances acceptance of and adherence to it. Unfair procedures have the opposite effects and, thus, impact negatively on outcomes.
The research reviewed earlier suggests a first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The more central PJ principles are in the negotiation process, the
more durable the agreement will be.
Given their positive effects on attitudes and behaviors described above, PJ principles
in the process can also be expected to lead to more FL, rather than BL, outcomes
(Kapstein 2008; Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler 2008). Case study and comparative
research show that FL outcomes are also more durable (Zartman and Kremenyuk
2005; Albin and Druckman 2010). Additionally, the more the principle of fair representation is adhered to in the process, the more durable the agreement (Hayner
2007; Konovsky 2000). These findings suggest a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The more central PJ principles are in the negotiation process, the
more FL the agreement will be.
The preceding discussion concentrates on the independent effects of PJ on outcomes
and on durability. The next question is, How then does PJ relate to DJ? Experimental
studies have addressed the relative importance of these forms of justice. Van den
Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke (1997) found that information about PJ influences fairness
judgments of the outcome more than DJ, whenever information about justice of procedure is initially available. Moreover, an outcome that favors one party more than
another increases the importance of PJ while an outcome that favors all parties can
help compensate for little PJ in the process (see Konovsky 2000). However, PJ and
DJ have also shown to be strongly correlated across various contexts (Hauenstein,
McGonigle, and Flinder 2001), and there is support for the directional proposition
that more PJ in the process leads to more DJ in the outcome (Niehoff and Moorman
1993; Brockner and Siegel 1996; To¨rnblom and Vermunt 2007). Although justice of
procedure cannot guarantee an outcome based on DJ principles, it is reasonable to
conclude that PJ may enhance the opportunities for an outcome based on DJ. The
more central PJ is in the process, the more likely that DJ principles will be represented in the terms of the agreement. Further, PJ helps create a ‘‘level playing field’’
for all parties, and this element of equality or equalizing in the negotiation process
Albin and Druckman
5
may enhance the opportunities for an outcome based specifically on the equality
principle. These findings suggest two hypotheses about relationships between PJ
in the process and DJ in the outcome:
Hypothesis 3: The more central PJ is in the negotiation process, the more DJ content in the agreement (the more central they will be to the core terms of the
agreement or the greater the number of DJ principles).
Hypothesis 4: PJ in the negotiation process enhances the prospects of an agreement based on the equality principle.
These hypotheses posit relationships between the two forms of justice. Extending the
period beyond the agreements leads to another hypothesis that links process to outcomes and durability. The first hypothesis, presented earlier, describes a relationship
between PJ and durability. Our previous findings showed statistically significant
relationships between DJ and durability. This relationship was accounted for largely
by the principle of equality. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that equality in the outcome mediates the relationship between PJ in the process and the durability of the
agreement. This relationship is stated as a fifth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between PJ and durability is mediated by equality
outcomes.
Another important variable highlighted in previous research is the difficulty of the
conflict environment. As we noted previously, earlier studies show strong relationships between difficulty and durability: Agreements are less durable in high conflict
environments. However, it has also been shown that the equality principle mediated
the relationship between difficulty and durability (Albin and Druckman 2010).
When the equality principle was central in the agreement, the negative effects of
intense conflicts on durability were reduced. The correlation between difficulty and
durability was reduced when equality was taken into account. Not known however
is the role of process in the relationship among these variables. It appears reasonable to suggest that PJ principles are less central in difficult conflicts. This can be
stated as a sixth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: PJ principles are less central in negotiation processes intended to
resolve difficult conflicts.
Taken together, this set of hypotheses suggests a path from the difficulty of the conflict to the durability of agreements. Types of processes and outcomes mediate that
relationship as summarized by a seventh hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: The relationship between conflict difficulty and durability is
mediated by the negotiation process and outcome along the following path:
difficulty Ò PJ in the process Ò equality outcome Ò durability of the agreement:
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
The hypotheses presented previously do not take account of power differences between the parties. Of course such differences exist, often favoring the
government, and could be thought to influence the terms and durability of negotiated agreements. Numerous studies pertaining to negotiations, conducted in a
variety of issue areas and contexts, have examined the influence of power (see
Zartman 2002; Zartman and Rubin 2002). The predominant conclusion is that
large power differences between parties produce outcomes favoring the more
powerful side, while rough power symmetry leads to more balanced outcomes.
This resonates well with arguments made in the political philosophy literature as
well, that sharp power asymmetries are likely to exclude any serious role for
justice. Rough symmetry, by contrast, creates a need and motivation to act more
justly and search for a balanced solution which can secure voluntary acceptance
(Barry 1995; Albin 2001). It follows from these observations that asymmetrical
settlements are unlikely to include equality provisions while symmetrical ones
may well do so, as summarized in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8: Large (small) differences in power between parties reduce
(increase) the chances of including equality provisions in the agreement.
In the context of civil wars, the balance of power between rebels and the
government has been shown to influence the negotiation process and outcomes.
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) showed that strong rebels are less
likely to achieve a negotiated settlement relative to other outcomes such as
reduced activity or fighting. Conflicts involving strong rebels may produce stalemates where the rebels obtain their goals without a formal agreement or a
decisive military victory. Thus, rebel power is instrumental in shortening military conflict and increases the changes of attaining their goals but not increasing
the chances of concluding with military settlements. This finding is similar to
that obtained in experiments where it has been shown that the most difficult
negotiations are those between near equals: the negotiating process consists of
attempts by both parties to jockey for increased relative power, resulting often
in impasses (Vitz and Kite 1970; Hornstein 1965). These findings suggest that
when rebels are more powerful than governments or are at parity with them,
negotiated settlements are less likely to occur. Settlements that do occur are also
less likely to include equality provisions as summarized by the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9: Increased rebel power reduces the chances of including equality
provisions in the agreement.
Implications can be drawn as well for the durability of negotiated agreements.
Equality provisions serve to alter the balance of power between rebels and the government. These provisions enable rebels to claim equal treatment or equal shares of
benefits. Thus, equality mediates the relationship between power asymmetry and
durability as summarized by a final hypothesis:
Albin and Druckman
7
Hypothesis 10: The relationship between power asymmetry and durability is
mediated by the centrality of the equality principle in the agreement along the
following path:
power differences between parties Ò equality principle Ò durablity of agreement:
This set of hypotheses is evaluated by the analyses of peace negotiations and agreements to follow. We turn next to a discussion of the data set, coding procedures, and
methods of analysis.
A Data Set of Peace Agreements
This study consists of an analysis of fifteen cases of civil war, in which negotiations
in the 1980s and 1990s led to the conclusion of peace agreements. The cases are
Angola I (Bicesse Agreement), Angola II (Lusaka Agreement), Bosnia (Dayton
Accords), Cambodia (Paris Accords), El Salvador (Chapultepec Agreement), Guatemala (Guatemala City Agreement), Lebanon (Ta’if Agreement), Liberia (Abuja
Agreement), Mozambique (Rome General Peace Accords), Namibia (Geneva
Agreement), Nicaragua (Esquipulas II/Arias Peace Plan), Sierra Leone (Abidjan
Peace Accord), Somalia (Addis Ababa Agreement), Sri Lanka (Indo-Sri Lankan
Accord), and Zimbabwe (Lancaster House Agreement).
These cases were used in previous analyses by Downs and Stedman (2002)
and by Druckman and Albin (2011). As discussed by the latter, two changes
were made to the original data set. One decision consisted of dropping the
Rwanda case. Based in part on Paris’s (2004) account of the Arusha Accords
signed in 1993, the agreement was deemed to be coerced. The Accords were
signed by a Hutu president under considerable pressure from opposition groups,
expatriate Tutsis, and international donors such as the World Bank. The Rwandan president had little choice but to acquiesce to these pressures. Yet, the
acquiescence was in name only and served the short-term goal of sustaining the
funding. It ignited serious conflict within the country, particularly a rift between
the president and members of his own regime who were strongly against the
Accords. The president was isolated on this issue and the conflict spread widely
across the country culminating in a vicious civil war. The justice principles
reflected in the agreement were false. They were meaningless in deed. This history led to the decision to drop the case.
The other decision consisted of changing the Downs-Stedman implementation
score for El Salvador from three (success) to two (partial success). The Chapultepec
peace agreement of 1992 was successful because the rebel Farbundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) became a participating party in the political system. Other
features of the agreement however were not sustained (Paris 2004). The economic
and social reforms stipulated in the agreement did not transform the society. The
sources of conflict—poverty, lack of political representation, and crime—remained.
The conditions that fueled the conflict were unchanged and, in fact, led to further
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
deterioration following the agreement. Thus, we judged this agreement to be a partial success.
Questions have been raised about three other cases in the data set: Guatemala,
Lebanon, and Bosnia. With regard to Guatemala, Stanley and Holiday (2002)
claimed that the commitments made by the government to the rebels were in hindsight broad and vague. Zahar (2002) points out that the Lebanon agreement was
probably a coerced settlement, resulting from Syrian influence and guaranteed by
Syrian management of its implementation. Cousens (2002) emphasizes the coercive
feature of the Bosnian agreement. More importantly, she notes that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has taken the primary responsibility for its implementation. Indeed, it may well be that the civil war would erupt again if NATO
forces were removed. These observations question the significance (authenticity)
of the equality provisions in these three agreements and, more broadly, the strength
of the relationship found between equality and durability. For this reason, we performed analyses without these three cases. No change in the strength of the correlations among the variables would attest to the robustness of the hypothesized
relationships. Results with and without these cases are reported below in the section
on results.
The Downs and Stedman (2002) study examined the relationships among three
variables: the difficulty of the conflict environment, willingness of external actors
to intervene, and implementation success. The Druckman and Albin (2011) study
added two variables to the data set: DJ principles in the agreements and FL/BL outcomes. For coding DJ, including the presence of the equality principle, and FL/BL
outcomes, the peace agreements themselves and any directly related documents were
used as source materials. These two variables are included in this study, in which the key
addition (and contribution) is the assessment of the significance of PJ principles in the
negotiation process of each case. For this purpose, much effort was devoted to searching
for and assembling the best available documentation on the negotiation processes preceding each peace agreement. That documentation consisted mostly of published
books, chapters, articles, and reports, and was deemed to be sufficient for coding PJ
in all cases. Nonetheless, some negotiation processes turned out to be very well documented and relatively easily coded, for example, those on El Salvador, Mozambique,
and Cambodia. In other cases, detailed information on what happened inside the negotiating room in all key phases was less plentiful, as with Angola I and Sierra Leone.
Coding the Documents
The variables coded for this study include PJ, DJ, the equality principle, FL/BL,
power, and durability. Another variable, the difficulty of the conflict environment,
was also included in some of the analyses. In this section, we discuss each variable
and describe the coding procedures.
PJ in the negotiation process was defined in terms of four core principles: transparency (openness and accessibility, especially regarding decision making), fair
Albin and Druckman
9
representation (full or even-handed representation of all parties/interests), fair treatment and fair play (opportunities for all parties to participate in and influence the
process according to agreed rules), and voluntary agreement (freedom from
heavy-handed imposition; see further discussion in Albin [2008]). A coding system
was developed to assess the presence, nature, and importance of PJ in the negotiation
processes leading up to each of the fifteen agreements. Definitions and key indicators were provided as a guide for coding decisions based on the available documentation (see Supplemental Table 1 at http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental for the
complete PJ coding guide). Coders were asked to judge whether any of the principles
was clearly (beyond reasonable doubt) present in the process, even if not stated by
name or as a justice issue. The judgments were structured by a set of questions presented as a coding form. The questions included the following: What procedural
matters came up in this negotiation process? How important were these procedural
matters (major or not major), and how satisfied were parties with the way in which
they were handled or resolved (satisfied, partially satisfied, or not satisfied)? Which
PJ principle/principles, if any, were raised or used in connection with each procedural matter, and was this done explicitly or implicitly? In each instance when a
PJ principle came up or was used in the negotiation process, was the principle strictly
applied (a model/‘‘exact’’ application of the principle), or did some aspect of the
principle influence the process more loosely (not a strict application)?
Another question asked the coder to assess the influence of each PJ principle used,
with a score of 1.5 (highly significant—at the heart of the process), 1.0 (important—
influenced some main aspects of the process), or 0.5 (marginal—influenced only lesser aspects of the process). These scores were then aggregated across the four
principles to form a total justice index. The aggregated scores range from zero to six.
A per principle index was also calculated by dividing the total justice score by the
number of principles used (zero to four), with scores ranging from 0 to 1.5. These
scores thus measure PJ by the average strength (importance) of the role played by each
PJ principle in the negotiation process.
Following trial runs to refine the codes, a research assistant coded PJ in the entire
set of cases. Another research assistant, working independently, coded a random
sample of ten cases for reliability. For this purpose the cases were divided into two
groups—one with the very well or well-documented cases (eight cases), and one
with the reasonably well or less well documented cases (seven cases)—and five
cases from each group were included in the reliability coding. The average difference between the coders on total justice was 1.1 (SD ¼ .72) on a scale ranging from
zero to six. The largest differences were for the cases of Bosnia and El Salvador (a
difference of two points on the scale). The average difference between coders on per
principle justice was .3 (SD ¼ .17); none of the differences was larger than .5. The
larger variability (SDs) on the total justice codes led to the decision to use the per
principle index in the analyses discussed later.
Another five cases were coded, also for reliability, by a group of students in the
College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra. The
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ANU judgments were compared to those made by the first research assistant. The
average difference between the ANU coders and the two research assistants on total
justice was 1.1 (SD ¼ .94). The average difference on per principle justice was .18
(SD ¼ .16). These results are very similar to those obtained with the larger set of
cases. Per principle justice codes are considerably less variable than the total justice
codes. This finding further bolsters our confidence in the decision to use the per principle index in the analyses to follow.
Reliabilities between independent coders were calculated as well for the other
indices. Coding agreement on the DJ variable was strong, with no case exceeding
one step on a scale ranging from 0 to 8; the correlation between the coder’s judgments was .87. The variable FL/BL outcomes was coded on a five-step scale ranging from past (1) to future-oriented (5) agreement, with various mixes of past and
future orientations in between. Two independent coders applied this index to a random selection of outcomes from eight cases. Coding was blind to DJ principles in
the agreements or to PJ principles in the process. None of the comparisons differed
by more than one step on the scale; the correlation between the coders’ judgments
was .65.
Two power symmetry indices were calculated, based on measures constructed by
Cunningham et al. (2009). These are ‘‘summary ordinal measures of the military
strength of rebels relative to the government by rating the relative power of rebels
to government on a dyadic basis’’ (Cunningham et al. 2009, 581). These measures
are part of the supplementary information about nonstate actors involved in intrastate conflicts. They extend the Uppsala/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed
Conflict Data. We developed two versions of their index. One version (power I)
is nondirectional: the balance of power between rebel groups and the government
on a three-step scale—power equality, some inequality, and large inequality. The other
version (power II) is directional: rebel strength relative to government strength on
a five-step scale—rebels are much weaker, weaker, parity, stronger, much stronger.
The indices were calculated for each of the dyads in the cases in the data set used
in this study. The dyadic data were chosen at the period closest to the date of settlement. Factions within the rebel camps were combined to form one party (e.g., two
rebel groups for Zimbabwe, four for Sri Lanka, three for Lebanon).
The durability index used in these analyses was taken from the Downs and
Stedman (2002) study. However, the authors performed a quality-control analysis.
All the agreements were evaluated independently on the Downs-Stedman threestep scale: failure, partial success, and successful implementation. One-step discrepancies occurred in only two cases. These scores were adjusted for in the analyses.
Methods of Analysis
The analyses build on the earlier results that evaluated hypotheses on the relationship between DJ and durability. They consist of both statistical and focused comparison methods.
Albin and Druckman
11
Table 1. Cases by Variables
Case
DJ
DJ
Power Power
I7
II8
FL/BL9
PJ1 Total2 per3 Equality4 Durability5 Difficulty6
Angola I
Angola II
Bosnia
Cambodia
El Salvador
Guatemala
Lebanon
Liberia
Mozambique
Namibia
Nicaragua
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Zimbabwe
0.83
0.50
0.75
1.06
1.08
0.90
0.63
0.80
1.10
0.81
0.83
0.50
0.75
0.50
0.80
2.75
0
3.50
1.50
2.50
0
3.00
1.25
4.50
4.25
3.50
2.00
3.50
3.00
3.75
2.75
0
1.75
.67
.83
1.08
1.00
1.00
1.10
2.13
1.17
1.00
1.17
1.50
0.94
1.33
0
1.67
1.33
1.33
2.00
1.67
.67
2.00
2.00
1.33
0
1.00
1.00
2.00
1
1
2
2
2
3
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
1
3
4
4
6
5
1
0
5
6
3
0
1
6
5
6
4
2.5
2
2
2
2
2
2
2.5
1
2
2
2
1
2.5
2
1.5
2
2
2
2
2
4
4.5
3
2
2
2
3
1.5
2
4
3
3
3
5
4
4
3
5
4
4
3
2
3
5
Note: BL ¼ backward looking; DJ ¼ distributive justice; FL ¼ forward-looking; PJ ¼ procedural justice.
Statistical Analyses
Focusing in this study on PJ, we performed a series of statistical analyses that
evaluated the ten hypotheses presented above. The ratio of cases (15) to variables (6) assured sufficient degrees of freedom to perform statistical tests. The
complete data set is presented in Table 1. First, we performed correlations and
factor analyses among the set of variables. Two sets of correlations were computed. One matrix was generated with the fifteen cases. Another was generated
from a smaller data set of twelve cases, excluding Guatemala, Lebanon, and Bosnia
(see the discussion in the preceding section on the data set). Similar correlations
from the two analyses would attest to the robustness of the relationships among the
variables: the relationships hold with a smaller data set. Weaker correlations with
the smaller data set would reduce support for the hypothesized relationships. The
correlations address the bivariate relationships posited by the hypotheses: PJ and
durability (Hypothesis 1); PJ and FL/BL (Hypothesis 2); PJ and DJ (Hypothesis
3), PJ and equality (Hypothesis 4), PJ and conflict difficulty (Hypothesis 6), and
power and equality (Hypotheses 8 and 9). Second, partial correlations were computed. These analyses remove variation contributed by a third variable, for example,
the correlation between PJ and durability controlling for DJ or the equality principle. This type of control bolsters confidence in the bivariate correlation, providing a
stronger test of the hypotheses.
A third statistical analysis consisted of performing regressions. These analyses
provide path coefficients that can be used in mediation analyses that address
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Hypotheses 5, 7, and 10. They address the question of whether DJ or equality
outcomes mediate the relationship between the process (PJ) and durability as stated
in Hypothesis 5. They also evaluate the path that extends from difficulty to durability
through process and outcome, as stated in Hypothesis 7, or from power to durability
through equality (Hypothesis 10). These effects are assessed by Sobel’s (1982) test.
The calculations use coefficients and standard errors from two regressions: A regression with PJ (independent variable) predicting DJ or equality (mediator) and another
with PJ (independent variable) and DJ or equality (mediator) predicting durability
(dependent variable). The test statistic (Sobel’s z) and associated probability levels
show the impact of the mediating variable (DJ) on the direct relationship between PJ
and durability. (See MacKinnon et al. [2002] for discussions of strengths and weaknesses of this statistical test.)
Focused Comparison
Another analysis consisted of a focused comparison of four new cases. Designed to
address sampling issues, this analysis evaluated the hypothesized relationships
between PJ and durability (Hypothesis 1), equality and durability, and the interaction
between these variables (Hypothesis 5). The data set consists of peace agreements
that were negotiated mostly in the early 1990s. A question is how far results from
this sample extend to other, more recent cases. One approach is to perform the statistical analyses on a larger data set. An advantage is that it provides a more robust
sample for statistical evaluation. A challenge is to decide on how many and which
cases to choose for inclusion. Too few cases are unlikely to alter the statistical results
obtained with the original data set. (Note in this regard discussions of the file drawer
problem in meta-analyses, see Druckman [1994].) Another approach is to select
cases based on values for the independent variables. An advantage is that this
approach adheres to the logic of causal inference in the context of experimental
design (George and Bennett 2005). Challenges are to locate the relevant cases (an
issue of internal validity) and the relatively small number of cases (a challenge for
external validity). Given the external/internal validity trade-offs of these approaches,
we decided to pursue the focused comparison. The selected cases occurred in the
early 2000s, allowing for examination of recent cases without jeopardizing the
five-year period needed to evaluate durability.
A 2 2 design consisted of high and low PJ in the negotiation processes, and high
and low equality in the agreements. Decisions were made by a person blind to the
hypotheses. The four cases fit into the cells as follows: the 2002 Sun City agreement
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (high PJ, high equality), the 2000 Arusha
peace agreement in Burundi (low PJ, high equality), the 2005 Helsinki agreement in
Aceh (high PJ, low equality), and the 2002 Luanda Memorandum of Understanding
reached in Angola (low PJ, low equality). The dependent variable was durability
over a five-year period.
The rationale for the decisions can be summarized briefly for each case.
Albin and Druckman
13
Sun City Agreement (2002)
Procedural justice. The peace process adhered to most of the PJ principles. By
including the warring parties, the political opposition, and representatives of civil
society, it was possible to address issues that extended beyond a cease fire (fair representation). All parties were encouraged to influence the process and advocate for
positions in government on a nondiscriminatory basis (fair treatment and fair play).
However, an element of coercion was present when each of the major parties threatened to sign separate agreements with the government, indicating that the agreement
may not have been entirely voluntary.
Equality. Equality was central to the agreement in several ways. A power sharing
agreement based on equal shares was indicated by rotating major offices among the
parties and by jurisdiction over an equal number of ministries as well as in the
transitional national assembly and senate. Equal treatment was reflected in a plan
to integrate all parties into the national army and police forces.
Arusha Peace Agreement (2000)
Procedural justice. Few PJ principles surfaced during the Arusha process in Burundi.
Two key Hutu groups (The National Council for Defense of Democracy/Forces for the
Defense of Democracy [CNDD-FDD] and National Forces of Liberation [FNL]) were
excluded from the negotiation, violating the principle of fair representation. A coerced
process aggravated by strict timelines reduced opportunities for influencing decisions,
demonstrating a lack of fair play. Further, many sections of the agreement were forced
on the parties, violating the principle of voluntary agreement.
Equality. The agreement embodied several notions of equality. These included
equal treatment—‘‘all Burundi citizens are to be treated equally, without discrimination, and provided equal opportunities’’—equal measures with regard to the distribution of Hutus and Tutsis in the security forces, and equal shares with regard
to demobilization and alternation of the presidency between the groups.
Helsinki Agreement (2005)
Procedural justice. Compared to Burundi, the Aceh peace process demonstrates the
opposite pattern of adherence to PJ principles but few equality provisions in the
agreement. All parties were represented at the table. The process was open and transparent, allowing all parties to take initiatives, float ideas, and work together toward
crafting an acceptable document without coercion.
Equality. The agreement favored Aceh over other Indonesian jurisdictions. This
favoritism covered the categories of authority over its territory, legislative processes,
political status (Aceh-based political parties), revenue shares from hydrocarbon
deposits and natural resources, and security arrangements with regard to integration
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
of Aceh-based Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) forces and those from the Indonesian
government.
Luanda Agreement (2002)
Procedural justice. The Angola peace process violated several PJ principles. A lack
of equal representation was evident when the Angolan government rejected all major
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) wings, including
both overseas and political factions, and relevant civil society groups. Without recognition, these groups were compelled to sign an agreement that failed to represent
their interests. The Angolan government dominated the process by making most of
the proposals, many of which surfaced in the agreement.
Equality. The imposed agreement contained few equality provisions. The rebel
group, UNITA, was not treated on an equal basis with the Angolan Armed Forces
(FAA) on integration of forces, demobilization, or political power sharing. The proportions of representation between UNITA and the FAA favored the former in
nearly all categories following the cease fire. The only example of equality was
on amnesty provisions, which applied equally to UNITA and the FAA.
The judgments for the four cases are represented in the following matrix:
Procedural Justice (Process)
Adhere to Principles
Violate Principles
Central
Sun City 2002
Success
Arusha 2000
Partial success
Marginal
Helsinki 2005
Partial success
Luanda 2002
Failure
Equality (Outcome)
The durability judgments were made by a peace studies scholar who was blind
to the independent variables and the hypotheses. She was provided with articles
documenting the post agreement period for each case, and then asked to judge
durability over a five-year period. The judgment took the form, first, of a
descriptive narrative and, second, as an assigned score for each case on the following five-step scale:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Perfect durability/implementation.
Highly durable/implemented.
Good/moderate durability/implementation.
Some elements of durability/implementation.
Poor durability/implementation (or nonexistent in the case of abrogation).
The results of these judgments in relation to the hypotheses are presented in the
next section.
Albin and Druckman
15
Results
Two correlation matrices were generated, one with fifteen cases, another with twelve
cases (excluding Guatemala, Lebanon, and Bosnia). The correlations were very similar.
The average discrepancy was .04 with a range from 0 to .22. The significance level
changes from significant (.61) to nonsignificant (.49) only for the relationship between
FL/BL and equality. The largest change of .22, considered to be an outlier, was between
DJ total and equality with the significance level dropping from .01 to .05. These results
indicate that the three questionable cases made virtually no difference. The relationships among the variables are robust. Thus, the evaluation of the ten hypotheses to
follow is performed with the full data set of fifteen cases (see Supplemental Table 2
at http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental for the complete correlation matrix).
Hypothesis 1: The more central PJ principles are in the negotiation process, the
more durable the agreement will be.
A moderately strong correlation of .58 (p < .02) between PJ per principle and durability suggests that adherence to PJ principles contributes to the durability of the
peace agreements.
Hypothesis 2: The more central PJ principles are in the negotiation process, the
more FL the agreement will be.
A correlation of .53 (p < .04) between PJ per principle and FL/BL outcomes
indicates that the more PJ in the process, the more likely that outcomes will be FL.
Hypothesis 3: The more central PJ is in the negotiation process, the more DJ
content in the agreement (the more central they will be to the core terms of the
agreement or the greater the number of DJ principles).
Correlations between PJ in the process and two measures of DJ in the outcome are
nonsignificant: PJ per principle and DJ total (.33); PJ per principle and DJ per principle (.06). Further, factor analysis results show that the DJ and PJ measures load on
different factors. The correlation between PJ per principle and number of DJ principles attains borderline significance (.49, p < .07). Thus, this hypothesis receives only
modest support on one of the three measures of DJ.
Hypothesis 4: PJ in the negotiation process enhances the prospects of an agreement based on the equality principle.
A correlation of .60 (p < .02) between PJ per principle and the equality principle in
the agreements suggests support for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between PJ and durability is mediated by equality
outcomes.
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M
Principle of Equality
IV
DV
Procedural Justice
Principles
Durability of
Agreement
Figure 1. Indirect effect of procedural justice (PJ) on durability
A significant Sobel’s z of 1.96 (p < .05) indicates that equality outcomes mediate
the relationship between PJ per principle and durability. This relationship is
shown in Figure 1. When equality is controlled (by partial correlation), the relationship between PJ and durability changes from .58 to .24. Thus, this hypothesis
is supported.
Focused Comparison
The results of the durability judgments made for each case over a five-period are
shown in the following matrix:
Central
Procedural Justice (Process)
Adhere to Principles
Violate Principles
Sun City 2002
Arusha 2000
Good/moderate durability
Good/moderate durability
Equality (Outcome)
Marginal
Helsinki 2005
Good/moderate durability
Luanda 2002
Some elements of durability
These judgments were made on the basis of detailed narratives that described the
implementation period in each case. Parts of the Sun City agreement were implemented: a balanced transitional government was installed, security improved, rebel
forces were integrated in the army, elections with high voter turnout occurred, and
the constitutional referendum was adopted. However, parallel negative developments offset the achievements, leading to the judgment of moderate durability.
Implementation of the Arusha agreement was mixed. Success with regard to the
distribution of political power and reform of the army was offset by breaches
Albin and Druckman
IV 1
Conflict
Environment
17
IV 2
Procedural
Justice Principles
Mediator
DV
Principle of
Equality
Durability of
Agreement
Figure 2. Mediated effects of the equality principle
with regard to demobilization and reconciliation, leading to the judgment of good/
moderate durability. Similarly a mixed judgment is rendered with regard to the
Helsinki accord. Both parties to the agreement have remained committed to it and
elections were held in 2006. But there have been violations as well: the GAM movement was not dissolved, disarmament faced challenges, and promises of employment and social reintegration did not materialize. The Luanda agreement was less
mixed. Although disarmament and demobilization had been largely achieved, failure
to institute democratic reforms (including the postponement of elections) and the
lack of a process of national reconciliation (including a role for UNITA) render this
case marginal in terms of implementation. In many respects, the accord was poorly
implemented.
Thus, three of the four cases support this interaction hypothesis (hypothesis 5).
This result is discussed further in the next section.
Hypothesis 6: PJ principles are less central in negotiation processes intended to
resolve difficult conflicts.
A correlation of .48 (p < .07) indicates a modest and only borderline significant
relationship between PJ per principle and difficulty of the conflict environment.
Thus, the hypothesis receives support in terms of direction—less adherence to PJ
in more difficult conflicts—but not in terms of strength of the relationship between
these variables.
Hypothesis 7: The relationship between conflict difficulty and durability is
mediated by the negotiation process and outcome along the following path:
difficulty Ò PJ in the process Ò equality outcome Ò durability of the agreement:
The obtained path is shown in Figure 2. Mediation tests indicate that equality
mediates the relationship between difficulty and durability (Sobel’s z ¼ 1. 71, p <
.09) as well as between PJ and durability (Sobel’s z ¼ 1.96, p < .05) as shown earlier
in conjunction with Hypothesis 5. However, PJ per principle does not mediate the
relationship between difficulty and durability (Sobel’s z ¼ 1.20, p < .23). Nor does
PJ mediate the relationship between difficulty and equality outcomes or between
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
difficulty and FL/BL outcomes (neither Sobel’s z approaches significance). Further,
the equality–durability correlation of .76 is only slightly reduced (to .64) when PJ is
controlled. Thus, the hypothesized path receives partial support. The link in the
chain from difficulty to PJ is broken. Equality mediates two separate relationships,
between difficulty and durability and between PJ and durability. It is the only
mediating variable in the path, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Hypothesis 8: Large (small) differences in power between parties reduce
(increase) the chances of including equality provisions in the agreement.
This hypothesis is evaluated with the nondirectional index, the balance of power
between rebel and government forces. This index did not correlate significantly with
equality (r ¼ .21). The partial correlation between equality and durability, controlling for nondirectional power produced about the same relationship (.76 without
control, .75 with the control for nondirectional power). Thus, Hypothesis 8 is not
supported.
Hypothesis 9: Increased rebel power reduces the chances of including equality
provisions in the agreement.
This hypothesis is evaluated with the directional index, rebel strength relative
to government strength. This index did not correlate significantly with equality
(r ¼.03). The partial correlation between equality and durability, controlling for
directional power produced virtually the same relationship (.76 without control,
.77 with control for directional power). Thus, Hypothesis 9 is not supported.
Hypothesis 10: The relationship between power asymmetry and durability is
mediated by the centrality of the equality principle in the agreement along the
following path:
power difference between parties Ò equality principle Ò durability of agreement:
A mediation analysis was used to evaluate this hypothesized path. Neither the
nondirectional or directional indices of power resulted in significant Sobel z’s
(p < .45 and .82), respectively. Thus, the hypothesized path is not supported. Additional mediation analyses showed that PJ did not mediate the relationship between
power and durability. Nor did power mediate the relationship between conflict difficulty and durability. Further, factor analysis results show that the power indices are
independent of most of the other variables: these two indices load on different factors than all but the DJ measures (see Supplemental Table 3 at http://jcr.sagepub
.com/supplemental for the coefficients and z scores for each of three mediation
models).
We now turn to a discussion of these results with particular attention paid to the
importance of equality principles in sustaining peace agreements through time.
Albin and Druckman
19
Discussion
A key issue addressed in this article is the role of PJ principles in the durability
of peace agreements. Correlational analyses showed that PJ is associated with durability (Hypothesis 1), FL outcomes (Hypothesis 2), and equality—but not other DJ
principles—in the outcomes (Hypotheses 3 and 4). These findings are qualified by the
statistical mediation analyses. They show that the impact of PJ on durability (and on
FL/BL outcomes) is mediated by a particular DJ principle, equality (Hypothesis 5):
when equality is (not) central to the terms of agreement, durability is (not) influenced
by adherence to PJ principles in the process. The results also show that PJ is not influenced by the difficulty of the environment surrounding the peace negotiations
(Hypothesis 6). Nor does PJ mediate the effects of the environment on durability (see
Hypothesis 7). This stands in contrast to earlier findings on distributive justice (Albin
and Druckman 2010; Druckman and Albin, 2011): the equality principle was shown to
mediate the relationship between difficulty and durability. Taken together, the findings from both studies indicate that equality mediates two separate relationships—
between difficulty and durability and between PJ and durability (see Figure 2). The
robustness analyses demonstrated that three questionable cases (Guatemala, Lebanon,
and Bosnia) had no significant impact on the statistical results and that the observed
relationships among variables are virtually the same whether or not these cases are
included in the data set. Specifically, equality provisions were once more confirmed
as an important factor that contributes to the durability of peace agreements.
One implication of these results is that PJ in the negotiation process has some
(limited) influence on the durability of agreements. Its impact depends to a significant degree on equality in the outcomes. Yet, adherence to PJ apparently helps pave
the way for equality in the outcome: this is indicated by the significant correlation
between adherence to PJ principles and equality. Thus, the role played by PJ in producing equality outcomes suggests an indirect effect of PJ on durability: equality
often emerges from adherence to PJ in the process. But it is the emergence of equality principle—not PJ—that is key to durable agreements. High-equality outcomes
produce durable agreements even when adherence to PJ is relatively low. Examples
of cases in our data set include Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Guatemala. Equality seems
to be essential, even if not sufficient, to produce durable outcomes.
The results obtained from the focused comparison bolster the argument for generality. Three of the four cases selected support the hypotheses. Although not achieving the expected level of strong durability, the Sun City agreement can be
understood in the context of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). The moderate durability attained is remarkable given the high level of intensity of that conflict over a long period. On the positive side, the agreement ended the
fighting, combatants from both sides were integrated into the army, elections were
held eventually, and a power sharing arrangement was implemented. On the negative side, integration of the army was uneven, voting during the elections was problematic, executive power remained concentrated, and little has been done to resolve
20
Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
the conflict in the East. Yet, despite not resolving the sources of conflict, the Sun
City agreement has restored stability and moved the country toward democracy after
thirty-two years of misrule. It seems plausible that the centrality of PJ in the process
and equality in the outcome, among other factors, contributed to these
accomplishments.
These results raise at least three important questions: How is equality reflected
concretely in agreements to end civil war? What are the implications of this for outcomes and durability? Why is equality so important for maintaining peace agreements? Answers to these questions have practical implications for policy,
including the design of negotiation processes and agreements. They are also intriguing given that many, if not most, agreements to end civil war were negotiated
in an apparent situation of considerable power inequalities between parties—a context commonly thought to impede evenhanded bargaining and outcomes, and indeed
any successful negotiation at all. We turn now to addressing these questions.
What does Equality Mean in Peace Agreements?
The presence and importance (centrality) of equality and three other principles of
distributive justice—proportionality, need, and compensatory justice—were
assessed in each of the study’s fifteen peace agreements. This was done on a twostep scale ranging from 0 (not present) to 2.0 (highly significant; i.e., the principle
is at the very heart of the agreement and its core provisions). A score of 1.5 means
that the principle is very important in the agreement, a score of 1.0 that it is important (i.e., included in some of its main terms), and a score of 0.5 that it is present but
only marginally important.
As summarized in Table 1, nearly all the agreements, namely fourteen, include
the equality principle. In all but one of these, the importance of equality in the agreement is rated 1.0 (three agreements) or higher (ten agreements). Six agreements have
very high equality content: those on Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Guatemala,
Lebanon, and Bosnia.
How then was the equality principle expressed and applied concretely in the
agreements? All agreements were analyzed in terms of the forms taken by the application of equality; that is, what exactly was to be treated equally and how? Particularly detailed analyses were done of the six ‘‘high equality’’ cases listed earlier.
Generally, across all fifteen cases, equality provisions concerned two major issues.
The first is the implementation of the peace agreement and the transition to postwar
society. Here, equality frequently emerges as a tool to ensure proper management of
a transitional (preelection) period. It is reflected in time-bound provisions for ceasefires and demilitarization: parties are to carry out responsibilities and/or implement
measures based on equality, reciprocity, and mutuality. The second is the nature of
the new society to emerge after the implementation period. Here, equality is a more
permanent feature and generally scores high. It is seen as essential, notably in the
creation of unity among formerly warring parties in several cases (e.g., Guatemala,
Albin and Druckman
21
Mozambique, and Namibia). Unity is to be achieved through important provisions
for equality in rights, opportunities and treatment for all groups or citizens in a variety of areas including political life, human rights, and job recruitment. Equality in
this sense also provides guarantees (and with this incentives) for each party or group
in terms of rights and influence in the new postwar society.
Three main types or categories of equality emerged from and turned out to
capture well the equality provisions across the agreements. The first is equal measures, which is BL and often concerned with military strength and disarmament/
demilitarization. The second is equal treatment, which is FL and aimed to secure
nondiscriminatory treatment and equal opportunities for all groups or peoples
concerned on a long-term basis. In this sense it is procedural and does not provide
actual allocations. The third is equal shares which is also FL—either on a transitional or time-bound basis (e.g., shared decision-making powers until elections
have taken place) or permanently (e.g., shared powers between former belligerents in a new political system). This type of equality often concerns the sharing
of political powers.
The presence and centrality (very important, important, or marginal) of these different types of equality were then recorded systematically in the six ‘‘high equality’’
agreements. Equal measures was found to be central in one case only (Dayton
Agreement—Bosnia), and marginal in the other five agreements. Equal treatment
and equal shares were each found to be very central or central in four agreements,
and marginal in the other two. Striking is the fact that all cases include equal treatment in the sense of equal rights and opportunities for all (formerly warring) parties
and/or all citizens, whether in a central or marginal role. Equal shares, identified in
all but one agreement, involves shared responsibilities between parties in securing
the implementation of the agreement and during a transitional period, and shared
political powers on a longer-term basis. (See Albin and Druckman [2010] for further
discussion of these types of equality in several peace agreements; see also Supplemental Table 4 at http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental for a summary of the types
of equality found in each of the six cases.)
Type of Equality, Outcome, and Durability
A final step in this study was to investigate possible relationships between type of
equality (equal shares, equal treatment, and equal measures), the outcome (FL or
BL) and implementation or durability in the agreements on Zimbabwe, Namibia,
Mozambique, Guatemala, Lebanon, and Bosnia. Outcome and implementation
scores for all agreements are found in Table 1. Agreements in which equal treatment
and/or equal shares are central turned out to be associated with highly FL outcomes
(rated 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5) and high durability (rated the highest on a scale
from 1 to 3 in all but one case), while equal measures was associated with a more BL
outcome (rated 3) and poorer durability (rated 2). Equal treatment specifically was
central or very central in all the agreements with the highest durability score (3) and
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
marginal in both the agreements with less durability (2). Equal treatment and equal
shares were both central or very central in two of the cases (Mozambique and Zimbabwe), and this was associated with the two highest FL scores (5) and high durability (3).
Why Does Equality Contribute to Durability?
In this section, we suggest reasons for the relationship between equality and durability, with an eye on topics for further research. We investigated one possible factor, to
which research and conventional wisdom attach much significance: the balance of
power between parties. As already discussed, research on negotiation and justice
associates power asymmetries with ‘‘poor’’ outcomes, including one-sided agreements devoid of justice considerations. By contrast, the absence of sharp power
inequalities creates the necessity and motivation to act more justly and search for
a balanced outcome. Thus, we hypothesized that one factor determining whether and
how far parties created outcomes based on equality was the power balance—specifically, that small or no power asymmetries would be associated with equality agreements and that sharp power asymmetries would reduce the chances of reaching such
agreements. However, based on measures of military strength of rebels relative to
the government, the results of our analyses showed no effects of symmetry or asymmetry: power in this sense did not explain why or how equality contributes to the
durability of agreements.
How then may the impact of equality on durability be explained? A search
through various research literatures suggests another possible answer, not measured
or tested in this study: trust. Inequalities between parties breed distrust, which in turn
is associated with uncooperative behavior, including corruption (Uslander 2008).
However, if rules (constraints) involving fair procedures are followed or enforced,
this will help generate trust even when parties are unequal. The trust acquired in turn
promotes cooperative behavior, such as a willingness to enter into and implement
¨ berg, and Svensson 2009; Oskarsson, Svensson, and
agreements (e.g., Oskarsson, O
¨
Oberg 2009). This study suggests that PJ is one factor which encourages negotiators
to select equality as a basis for agreements. Moreover, PJ is likely to have a positive
effect on trust. Negotiations to end civil war take place between, in several respects,
unequal parties with a great deal of mutual distrust from the past. To the extent that
parties develop and retain trust in a procedurally just process—a way of creating
more equality or a ‘‘level playing field’’ in the process—it facilitates agreements that
feature equality as well as implementation and durability. However, even when distrust remains, equality might be a favored outcome: It guarantees or safeguards certain rights or shares for each party. The peace agreement ending fifteen years of civil
war in Mozambique suggests, despite being preceded by a process high in PJ, a spirit
of distrust remaining between the parties. Numerous equality guarantees for the transitional period may have bolstered the parties’ confidence in future arrangements.
Albin and Druckman
23
Additional suggestions as to why negotiators often prefer to base agreements on
equality are found in the literature. Social–psychological research points to the
nature of the parties’ relationship, goals, and culture as influencing the choice of
justice principle (e.g., Sampson 1975). For example, when longer-term good relations and/or solidarity are valued this favors using equality, and certain cultures are
more ‘‘egalitarian.’’ In other literatures, two related factors stand out. The first is
that the equality principle has strong intrinsic appeal and legitimizing power, as it
converges with popular ideas about the meaning of justice and impartiality (e.g.,
Montada 2003). Using some other basis often requires additional time, information, and justification (Schelling 1960), as if equality was the salient choice unless
proven to be unsuitable. This widespread acceptability favors implementation and
durability. The second factor is that the equality principle tends to be relatively
uncomplicated and unambiguous in application as in concept (Barry 1965). These
are valuable advantages in complex negotiations (Albin 2001). Simplicity and
explicitness also favor implementation and durability.
What may explain the finding of positive impacts of equal treatment and equal
shares on durability? The reviewed cases suggest several possible explanations, all
of which require further investigation. Equal treatment and equal shares are likely to
address and help resolve at least some of the root causes of earlier conflict. Both
types serve to diminish inequalities (political, economic, and other) that typically
exist between parties to civil war, and often reflect a goal to create new relationships and a new political order. The Guatemalan peace agreement is a case in point,
which directly targeted structural inequalities as a cause of the war (Jonas 2000).
Equal treatment seeks to establish equal rights and opportunities for formerly warring groups and/or all citizens, as part of a larger project to help unite war-torn
societies. ‘‘Unity through equality’’ in this sense was an explicit goal in cases such
as Mozambique, Namibia, and Guatemala and should favor durability. Transitional provisions for equal shares pave the way for equal shares on a permanent
or longer-term basis, which in turn secures for each party some control and influence. Equal measures as defined here, by contrast, seems more BL and focused on
the symptoms of (earlier) conflict.
Conclusion
This study began by asking whether PJ in the negotiation process matters for the durability of the outcome, and how it relates to DJ in the terms of agreements. The
results obtained from our analyses of cases of civil war are clear. Negotiators who
respect PJ principles are more likely to produce agreements based on equality, and
such agreements are more durable. In our study, this was particularly the case when
equality entailed FL provisions for equal treatment and equal shares. When the
equality provisions concerned BL provisions for equal measures, the agreements
turned out to become less durable or no more durable than agreements based on
other (or no) justice principles. These results contribute to existing knowledge about
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
the conditions and requirements for durable peace, and the durability of peace agreements in particular, and suggest advice for practitioners. They also shed light on
scholarly debates in other fields, reviewed earlier, about how PJ relates to DJ and
affects cooperation or compliance of various kinds.
Much remains to be examined in this new domain. Analyses of additional and
recent cases of civil war would be valuable. Greater understanding of the reasons
behind the impact of equality, including further exploration of those suggested
above, would enrich theorizing about the role of justice as well as assist in designing
durable agreements. The impact of justice (equality) beyond a five-year period could
well be studied, to assess whether it holds in the longer term when memories of the
signing of an agreement and of the process which produced it have started to fade. So
could the interaction of justice with other factors already known to influence negotiation and the durability of agreements significantly. Finally, of considerable interest is exploring the extent to which these results generalize to other domains. Does
negotiating in procedurally just ways, and basing agreements on equality, enhance
implementation and durability in current multilateral processes over the climate,
trade, and weapons disarmament? These are examples of issue areas in which matters of justice, both procedural and distributive, are explicit and controversial and at
the forefront of the negotiations themselves. Yet, the impact of the way processes in
these domains influence durability has not been examined and is an important part of
the agenda for further research.
Acknowledgments
Special thanks go to Kristian Gleditsch for assistance with power indexes and data, Ariel
Young and Marcus Nilsson for valuable research assistance, Judith Vorrath, Valerie Rosoux,
and Will Reno for their contributions to the focused comparison analysis, and two anonymous
referees for helpful comments. Financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is gratefully acknowledged.
Authors’ Note
A coding guide, full correlation matrix, mediation analysis results, and a table on types of
equality by case are available at http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental. The order of authorship
is alphabetical and implies equal contributions. Druckman is also at the Public Memory
Research Centre, University of Southern Queensland, Australia.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: Financial support was provided by the Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (grant ref. no. QZA 1072135).
Albin and Druckman
25
Notes
1. Procedural justice (PJ) scores are the per principle average scores for the various cases
(i.e., total PJ scores divided by the number of PJ principles present in each case),
ranging from 0 to 1.5.
2. Total distributive justice (DJ) scores are the sum of codes across four principles, each
scored on a two-point scale.
3. Per principle DJ scores are total DJ divided by each of the DJ principles present in each case.
4. Equality is a DJ principle scored on a scale ranging from zero (not present in the agreement) to two (highly significant in the agreement).
5. The durability scores are the outcomes from Downs and Stedman (2002), coded on a scale
from 1 (failure/failed implementation) through 2 (partial success) to 3 (success). The score
for El Salvador was adjusted from three to two in this study.
6. The difficulty index is from Downs and Stedman (2002). It is a measure of the difficulty of
the conflict environment and ranges from 0 (low difficulty) to 8 (high difficulty).
7. Power I measures the balance of power between rebel group(s) and the government in
terms of troop strength. It is a three-step scale from 1 (rough power equality) through 2
(some power inequality) to 3 (much power inequality). In cases with more than one rebel
group, the average of the separate scores is recorded.
8. Power II measures rebel power relative to the government in troop strength on a five-step
scale: 1 (much weaker), 2 (weaker), 3 (parity), 4 (stronger), and 5 (much stronger). In cases
with more than one rebel group, the average of the separate scores is recorded.
9. The ‘‘forward-looking’’ (FL) and/or ‘‘backward-looking’’ (BL) content in agreements is
assessed on a scale from 1 (entirely backward-looking) to 5 (entirely forward-looking).
A score of three indicates a roughly balanced mix of FL and BL features.
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