AFRICAN UNION

Study Guide
2015
28 – 31 May
AFRICAN UNION
Chair:Joshua Adama
CO-Chair: Fria Abdelkarim
http://pimun.epanu.org/
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION OF THE DIAS .............................................................................................. 1
HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) ........................................................................... 3
AGENDA 1 .................................................................................................................................... 5
Crisis Prevention, Crisis Management and the Post-Crisis Programmes: Three Steps for a
Stable Continent. ............................................................................................................................ 5
I.
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 5
II.
Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 6
III.
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 9
AGENDA 2 .................................................................................................................................. 11
ADDRESSING THE THREAT OF BOKO HARAM AND SIMILAR GROUPS, AND
FINDING WAYS TO EFFECTIVELY COUNTERACT THEM. ........................................ 11
I.
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 11
II. Discussion.......................................................................................................................... 12
III.
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 15
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 16
INTRODUCTION OF THE DIAS
CHAIR
Distinguished Delegates,
I’m Adama Joshua Ugbede, a post graduate student from the prestigious Obafemi Awolowo
University, Ile-Ife, Osun State Nigeria concentrating in Real Estate Investment and Finance. It is
my pleasure to welcome you as the Chairman, African Union Committee to the 4th session of the
Paris International Model United Nations.
I have an unflinching passion for civic leadership, economic development, international relations
and diplomacy. I enjoy talking, reading and travelling. My exposure in the MUNs has not being
exceptionally long, but I have made unique strides, which empowers me to offer unique
contributions in making the 4th session of the Paris International Model United Nations, a great
success.
The topics before the Committee revolve around evolving trends that will have an enormous
impact on the planet as it relates to our collective future. It is my earnest hope that the coherence
of our ideas (as we share them), and the resourcefulness of our commitments (as we make
necessary sacrifices), in the preparations and subsequently, the deliberations at PIMUN 2015,
consolidates on the impact past generations have made; in ensuring the world attains the status of
“a better place for Man to live in”, as we consciously and deliberately delve into the prospects of
setting the path for the Sustainable Developmental Goals.
I can’t wait to see you guys come May in Paris for an amazingly memorable conference.
Best Regards
Joshua
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Co-CHAIR
Hello,
I am Abdelkarim Friaa from Tunisia; I am currently in my second year in Master program:
Terrorism, Organized crime and Security at the University of Belgrade, Republic of Serbia. This
Master program is conceived with the idea to provide graduate university students, including
reporters and journalists, private enterprises as well as CSOs necessary preparation for professional
dealing with European and international policies, good government and strategic management in
domain of security, especially in prevention and combating terrorism and organized crime. I am
participating in Program of scholarship “The world in Serbia” that invited international students
from the movement non-aligned countries. I am sure that working with PIMUN 2015 will create
a meeting space for international participants that care about the World around them. I strongly
believe this is an enriching experience.
Best Reagdrs
2
HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN UNION (AU)
Africa has a long history and it is the unique product of the social and cultural attitudes of Africans.
The advent of the AU is described as an event of great magnitude in the institutional evolution of
the continent. Today, the African Union (AU) is an entity that continues to work for integration in
the continent to enable it play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multi-faceted
social, economic, and political challenges. The historical foundations of the African Union
originated in the Union of African States, a short lasting union of three (3) West African States1.
In subsequent attempts to unite Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established
on May 25, 1963; it remained the collective voice for the continent until 2002. On July 9, 2002, in
Durban, South Africa, the African Union was launched by its first president, Thabo Mbeki.
The African Union was formed in hopes of further improving the objectives to secure Africa’s
democracy, human rights, sustainable economy, and bringing an end to the intra-conflict that has
plagued the continent. The Assembly of the African Union, the chief decision-making body within
the AU, consists of the Heads of State or Government of Member States. While the Assembly is
gradually devolving some of its decision-making to the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African
Union is also composed of a number of official bodies that have an important say in critical issues.
Such bodies like the Executive Council; Peace & Security Council; Economic, Social and Cultural
Council (ECOSOC); Specialized Technical Committees; and Human Rights Institutions, all play
a prominent role addressing pressing challenges. Currently, three documents structure the work of
the AU: the Vision of the African Union and the Mission of the African Union Commission, the
2004-2007 Strategic Framework of the African Union Commission, and the Action Plans of the
various Departments of the Commission. Included are for instance twenty three (23) Priority
Programs, divided into six “Action Areas” where the continent will need to coordinate and
integrate to address health, political, economic and ecological issues. They include: (1)Shared
Vision (2)Peace, Governance and Human Security (3)Economic Integration (4)Integration
Infrastructure (5)Social Development, and (6)Culture.
In other policy areas, the African Union also faces tremendous organizational and financial
barriers, coupled with additional challenges of endemic poverty and civil conflict among many of
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its Member States, but the continent has continuously proven that it has what it takes in terms of
human and material resources to surmount these challenges. It took many years for the similar
regional institutions in Europe, Asia, and Latin America to establish themselves, and the AU must
establish ingenuity to keep moving forward, at the same time ensuring that it enjoys the support of
its respective member states. It is imperative that Member States of the AU continue building on
these measures to achieve their vision of a unified continent, with periods of peace and prosperity.
4
AGENDA 1
Crisis Prevention, Crisis Management and the Post-Crisis Programmes: Three Steps for a
Stable Continent.
I.
Introduction
This topic is an issue that raises crucial concerns. It is an effort to guide in the process of acquiring
possible answers that would arise from lessons learnt from a crisis-torn continent. While we look
forward to resolving these fundamental questions in plenary, it is noteworthy to begin by
establishing the fact that there is a recurring decimal in the life of man, namely, conflict. These
rustic trends does not just describe events which occur in a particular geography, rather, it bears
testimony to the actual nature and character of man and his overall existence. Hence, it is right to
say, crisis is a human condition and that crisis will always occur. But then, the management of
crisis is crucial because it is the application of man's rational ability, to salvaging his society from
the Hobbesian analogy; that in the state of nature "life is brutish, short and nasty1". We ought not
to live in the state of nature, hence the need to manage the destructive influence of the "state of
Nature"1. Avoidable bloody conflicts are as old as human and seem to be interpreted (in certain
quarters) that there are the traditions that have evolved with man. It is expected that while man
has succeeded (and is succeeding) in the handling of tools which fosters his better living, there
should be a corresponding increase in his understanding of the world and the interpretation of it.
Hence, a better handling of disagreements which leads to conflicts. While we ponder over the
science of crisis management and raise questions sons transfer them, it is imperative that we also
raise the question, as to, what the common denominator of African Crisis is and how avoidable
these conflicts (which threatens the human and resources of Africa) are. Hence, what is the
common integer of African crisis?
5
II.
Discussion
Northern African countries are struggling to contain the fallout of the Arab Spring, which left
behind a dangerous combination of weak governments and available weapons for armed groups to
advantage. In Libya terrorism is on the rise and national forces are battling with power-seeking
militias who have been causing chaos since Muammar Qaddafi ouster in 2011, and the peace is
increasingly fragile with dire economic consequences. Libya appears to be the prospective theater
of the next African Civil war.
In Egypt the Arab Spring has also left a legacy of extremism. A handful of Islamist groups have
announced themselves in the Sinai since President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011. But the
scope of attacks increased after Egypt’s military booted out the country’s subsequent president,
the Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Morsi, in 2014. Analysts fear that more disaffected
supporters of the now-banned Brotherhood may be pushed into terrorist ranks. Meanwhile, Tunisia
is struggling to contain its own terrorist factions.2
Armed fighters are taking advantage of instability and porous borders to perpetrate mayhem
throughout the Sahel region. In 2014 the French Government intervene in Mali to stem a civil war
being waged by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), together with other terrorist and
separatist units. That restored reasonable peace to the country, but the peace has not yet been
sustained throughout the region. Other groups have spun out of AQIM, including the militia that
claimed responsibility for seizing in an international gas facility in Algeria in 2014. Those groups
have led grim credence to Qaddafi’s prophecy that if he was toppled, North Africa would descend
into holy warfare. “Bin Laden’s people would come to impose ransoms by land and sea,” he said
as his rule became increasingly precarious. 2
As this wave of violent conflicts ravages Africa, conventional and unconventional peace processes
seem to have been defied; or rather, have been defied by the problems they seek to resolve. But
while it is common in some continents that the effective networking of traditional and hybrid
peacemaking efforts have largely solve conflicts of this sort, it seems surprisingly different in
Africa.
6
Crises Prevention
Crises Prevention is a set of measures applied to prevent crises. It means to avert; to foil. These
measures could be negotiation, lobbying, mediation and dialogue. But the negotiate what? What
is the object of negotiation, lobbying, mediation and dialogue?
Is the object mediation et al of economic character, political or social; it the character that
determines what how successful a measure would be? For instance a problem of economic
character requires some form of review of the distribution of resources and a sense ethics to
resolve. The merits of crisis prevention are manifold, but in summary, they prevent the loss of life
and property and sustenance of the peace.
Crisis Management
When strategies are designed so as to help with significant negative event (whether sudden or
remote) it could described as crises management. Management actually entails successful
handling. Crisis is actually an actuality; the actualization of certain potentialities which occur as a
result of an unpredictable event or as a foreseeable/an unforeseeable consequence.
The field of crisis management is generally considered to have originated with Johnson &
Johnson's handling of a situation in 1982, when cyanide-laced Tylenol killed seven people in the
Chicago area. The company immediately recalled all Tylenol capsules in the country and offered
free product in tamper-proof packaging. As a result of the company's swift and effective response,
the effect to shareholders was minimized and the brand recovered and flourished. Hence, crisis
management is a measure taken to prevent further damage.3
Post-Crisis Programmes
There is crisis in Darfur; the two-year-old violence continues. The over 100,000 people who have
lost their lives, and the over 2.5 million who have lost their homes since the war began in 2003, is
the consequence. Sudanese, regional and international peace processes have stalled, and the big
question is WHY? Why must they not restart with parallel initiatives so as to that take into better
account all of Darfur’s communities and armed groups; the victims and the villains?
7
The election in Burundi brings us to a moment of truth; the ever-decreasing likelihood of a free
and fair presidential election is in growing conflict with a popular desire for change in Burundi.
To safeguard the Arusha Principles, agreed upon in 2000, to end Burundi’s civil war, President
Nkurunziza and opposition leader must lead others to return to the path of democracy and dialogue,
so as to secure both the injured peoples and communities, as well as the armed personnel.
The security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau gives us an opportunity that ought not to be missed.
A legitimate civilian government, economic improvement and an army that has lost credibility are
an opportunity for Guinea-Bissau to put things right. Regional and international partners meeting
in Brussels of 25th March should make frantic commitment to finance security sector reforms so
as to help it move beyond its history of military coups and the likes.
In Nigeria, a trend has been defeated; an African incumbent concedes defeat to an opposition even
before the electoral umpire officially announces poll results. That President Goodluck Jonathan
phones the presidential flag bearer of the opposition, Muhammadu Buhari, to congratulate him on
his electoral victory, is an action that is not only novel in African politics but a panacea to
forestalling most of the threat to life, property and the peace that has characterized the African
continent, especially intensities eras.
The Prospects for a National Dialogue in Sudan stares us all in the face; President Bashir’s promise
of national dialogue seems to be failing because it is handled in hands of poor political will,
factional maneuvering, and looming elections. Although the threat of economic and political crisis
has subsided, renewed commitment to substantive, structured, broad-based dialogue is lacking.
Whether Sudan will escape the cycle of war and humanitarian crisis is a question the United
Nations, the African Union and the people of Sudan can answer. The conflicts in Sudan and South
Sudan are increasingly merged because a halting drift toward a Uganda-Sudan proxy war on the
Sudan-South Sudan border is requiring better coordination by regional organizations and needing
more engagement by influential external powers, notably China and the United States. A UNimposed arms embargo, improved border monitoring, and a UN panel of experts mandated to study
the funding of South Sudan’s war is what is critically needed.
8
In Burkina Faso, we have a case of nine months duration to complete the democratic change the
country requires. Three months after Blaise Compaore’s ouster, Burkina Faso’s transition is
moving forward, but in an uncertain context. The provisional government, with the help of its
international partners, ought to initiate urgent reforms and ensure the October 2015 elections
allows for peaceful democratic change. 4
Congo is poised to ending a status quo as a new consensus and strategy is urgently in need to tackle
the numerous, brutal armed groups in its eastern region and to save the February 2013 Peace,
Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) in the Great Lakes region. Until this sees the light
of day, the future of a peaceful Congo is in sincere doubt.
Guinea has another emergency in its hand; namely, organizing elections. As she approaches the
second presidential election in its history the circumstances are difficult. But then, it is expedient
that the government convenes a serious dialogue with the opposition, so as to forestall the risks of
electoral violence and the exacerbation of ethnic divisions.
III.
CONCLUSION
The fate of Africa lies in how best her people manage her crisis (most of which begins from her
kitchen), how they create partnerships to rebuild the walls of the wastelands and how deeply
entrenched a prevailing philosophy of never seeing solutions (to her problems) in fighting.
Until Africans see everything wrong in fighting, Africa may never stand.
9
10
AGENDA 2
ADDRESSING THE THREAT OF BOKO HARAM AND SIMILAR GROUPS, AND
FINDING WAYS TO EFFECTIVELY COUNTERACT THEM.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Critical, at this moment, is the question of whether the Boko Haram insurgency is actually
interminable is a “HOW” or “WHY”. Another question arises; what hope is left for a continent
plagued with a network of insurgency.
Africa is evidently arising as an undisputed frontier for extremism as the Boko Haram in Nigeria
and al-Shabab in Somalia now rank among the most dangerous insurgent groups in the world.
Boko Haram is the world’s deadliest insurgency by having the largest fatality of approximately 24
people per assault (versus 2 in Iraq).
1
This fatality has spilled-over into neighboring Chad,
Cameroon and Niger Republic. Al-Shabab, on the other hand, has wrecked great havoc within and
without the Somalian borders, with Kenya bearing the hardest brunt for being a neighbor; the
bloody massacre of Christian students of Garissa University College and the siege on Westgate
Mall in Nairobi are few of a series of attacks the group has carried out on Kenya. A question again
arises; how did Africa get to this stage, and how can she harness this impending treat and
effectively counter it?
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II.
DISCUSSION
On the African continent, we are experiencing a Cold War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which
spilling over to Somalia, is causing acute suffering on both the most and less vulnerable (where
Eritrea is supporting the jihadist group, al Shabaab, in its fight against the Ethiopian-backed
government in Mogadishu); in Sudan and South Sudan, insurgencies have been fuelled in each
other’s kitchen, with both parties laying claims to objects and issues which can be resolved without
bloodshed if, and only if, the fears of vested interests are shelved; the Sudanese Janjaweed militias
have fought in eastern Chad and in the Central African Republic claiming thousands of lives, and
disrupting the Peace efforts; in Uganda, The Lord’s Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony has
disturbed the Museveni-led state efforts to protect life and property, and has wreaked substantive
havoc in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan; in
Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect has seriously bloodied thousands of civilians and seem to have
defied national Military (but for the recent military offense against it); in Congo, a Civil War
wages and even disturbs Rwanda and Uganda on the broader-sides, claiming human life as if life
has become of mundane and animalistic nature, impeding socio-economic activities in the
process.2 After two decades of apparent stability, Africa is beginning to shed its reputation as the
war-torn continent.
Zeroing into Nigeria; it has a history of Islamist sects within its borders. Not all have been violent
movements, some existing peacefully in parallel with the state. And not all of Nigeria’s violent
sects are Islamist; one such is the Ombatse cult, which clashed with security forces in Nasarawa
state in May 2013. Until Boko Haram’s transition to extreme violence, perhaps the most virulent
of the radical Islamic movements was the Maitatsine uprising in the 1980s or the Yan Shi’a
movement in the 1990s. But all of these movements could be described as international in some
respect: their members or ideologies all crossed beyond Nigeria’s northern borders, or they
referred to global models of Islamism in Iran or Saudi Arabia.3
Now defined as an international terrorist organization, Boko Haram is no different in this regard.
There is a lot of speculation about the sect and its links with foreign jihadists. But it is its splinter
group, Ansaru that exhibited much more potential to become Al-Qaeda’s Nigerian affiliate. Unlike
al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram has no known connections to Nigeria’s diaspora. This northeastern violent extremist sect has fused itself to external ideological influences and the tools of
12
global communication but, while benefiting from porous borders, it has remained focused on
Nigerian targets and has echoes of other African uprisings that grew out of social grievances. It
mutated into a fanatically violent terrorist movement with shades of cultist and criminal
motivations over a period of years of mishandled responses by government and security forces. A
peculiarity of Boko Haram in Nigeria is not its criminality but the sectarian nature of its agenda,
which is distinct from the dynamics of resource-driven localized violent conflicts between
different ethnic groups in Plateau state, or the ethnic claims of insurgent groups such as the O’odua
People’s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and
the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). Based in
Nigeria’s semi-arid north-east, Boko Haram does not have access to the economic leverage of oil
to pressure the government. It adopted the iconography and some of the tactics of foreign jihadist
movements, in particular suicide attacks, which had never before been seen in Nigeria. But while
this and the extreme nature of its violence, including against children, is of such significant
international concern that more countries are becoming engaged in the security response to the
crisis, Boko Haram’s ideology and tactics do not prove sustained international operational
connections and coordination. International interests were much more threatened by MEND in
Nigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta.3
The Boko Haram Insurgency is one of the many groups that have soaked African soil with the
blood of her people. Officially called Jama'atuAhlis Sunna Lidda'AwatiWal-Jihad, it is based in
northeast Nigeria, and also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. The group is led
by Abubakar Shekau and has an estimated membership of between 7,000 and 10,000 people. The
group initially had links to al-Qaeda, but in 2014 it expressed support for the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant before pledging formal allegiance to it in March 2015.4
After its founding in 2002, Boko Haram's increasing radicalization led to a violent uprising in July
2009 in which its leader, Mohammed Yusuf was executed. Its unexpected resurgence, following a
mass prison break in September 2010, was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks,
initially against soft targets, and progressing in 2011 to include suicide bombings of police
buildings and the United Nations office in Abuja. It is characterised by its kidnapping (notably that
of over 250 schoolgirls from the Chibok community in Borno state in April 2014), anti-women,
anti-Christian, anti-education and terrorist stance and has drawn an unprecedented level of
13
international concern. The Nigerian government had established a state of emergency at the
beginning of 2012 and a major part of 2013 in the affected areas in its efforts to counter the
insurgency, but the region is still marked with an increase in both security force and militant
attacks.
The Nigerian military proved ineffective in countering the insurgency, hampered by an entrenched
culture of official corruption, only until recent times, in the countdown to the 2015 polls. Since
mid-2014, the insurgents have been in control of swathes of territory in and around their home
state of Borno, estimated at 50,000 square kilometres (20,000 sq mi) in January 2015, but have not
captured the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, where the group was originally based.4 What is
paramount is how this militia will be effectively countered.
The ethno-religious culture of Nigeria has caused her a variety of blessings and curses. She is
caught in a series of ethno-religious conflicts with corresponding devastating human and material
losses, since its amalgamation. Nevertheless, the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 is one of its
kind; no insurgency and militancy has hit Nigeria this hard. It is a practical reinforcement by
Islamic conservative elements in imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular
Nigerian state. Nigeria is religiously sensitivity and this character has provided fertile ground for
the breeding of the Boko Haram sect. Hence, the ethno-religious cause.
Since its disturbance began, it has been established that the sect’s blossoming is also said to have
been aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian, vis-a-vis the introduction of party
politics and politics of anxiety, the associated desperation of politicians for political power, and
the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on
mutiny, but either did nothing to impede it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These
internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the globe made a highly
volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising.5 Hence, the
political-economy cause.
The movement remains mysterious, with little evidence to substantiate different allegations about
its true agenda. According to the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) to President
Goodluck Jonathan, ‘the sect is ideologically linked to Al Qaeda’ and ‘it rejects peaceful
coexistence with Christians’.6
14
The facets related to gender, religion and politics are all correct, but they paint an incomplete
picture and on their own limit the understanding of a group that has mostly killed Muslims and
young men. This incomplete focus also detracts from a contextual understanding of how the
movement developed and became increasingly criminalized over a period of years during which
civilians have also been killed by security forces. 7
Hence, the task before the Nigerian Government and her people, the United Nations, the African
Union and other regional organizations, and local and international Civil Society Organisations, is
to devise a means of addressing the political-economy and the ethno-religious constriction of this
over 150 million-people West African State. This is the root of the problem; not just in Nigeria,
but across Africa.
III.
CONCLUSION
The need to effectively counteract Boko Haram’s violent advance is dire, and the Nigerian
democratic transition 2015 is key to this. Since it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between
ideologically or grievance-driven Boko Haram attacks, the transition will give us a lead.
Ethno-religiously, Nigeria stands on a crossroad, and her choice of which path to take, as a people,
determines her future. But then the mystery of the actual motivation of Boko Haram leaves the
country in suspense of when all these bloodshed and loss of property will end. Such is to be
unravelled to help devise an effective counteraction.
Although the April 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok girls is still pending, renewed focus and
significant international attention on Nigeria and Boko Haram should intensify, and Nigerians
must find a lasting solution to her political, ethno-religious and economic differences so as to
uproot the Boko Haram threat, and its likes.
Hence the aching question; is the Boko Haram insurgency (and its African likes) actually
interminable. If “YES”, HOW? If “NO”, WHY?
15
REFERENCES
Introduction to committee
1. African Unification Front, Brief Overview of the History of the African Union: Towards
African National Sovereignty, 2002.
2. National Model United Nations,African Union Committee Background Guide 2008.
Agenda 1
1. Thomas Hobbes; The Leviathan.
2. Africa's Deadly Insurgencies Ranking high on the Wrong Measures; The Economist, Jul
28th 2014.
3. http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/crisis-management.
4. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/222-burkina-fasonine-months-to-complete-the-transition.aspx
Agenda 2
1. Africa's Deadly Insurgencies Ranking high on the Wrong Measures; The Economist, Jul
28th 2014.
2. http://ojifo-raphael.blogspot.com/2014/06/violence-in-africa-and-nigerian_4.html
3. Research Paper Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos Africa Programme; September 2014
Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis.
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram
5. Anyadike, Nkechi O; Boko Haram and National Security Challenges in Nigeria; Causes
and Solutions-Journal of Economics and Sustainable DevelopmentVol.4, No.5, 2013
6. Office of the Security Adviser, Abuja, 2014.
7. Loimeier, Roman (1997), Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria.
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