Ryan International School Model United Nations 2015

 Ryan International School
Model United Nations
2015
Background Guide
General Assembly IV - SPECPOL
Agenda: Question of the Right to Self Determination with special emphasis
on Crimea, Eritrea and Chechnya.
RISMUN 2015
0 LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD Hello delegates, We welcome you to the Ryan International School Model United Nations 2015, where we come across well researched and intellectually sharp delegates representing their respective countries with full zest. This background guide is designed to be the beginning of your research process, and by no means should your research restrict to this. The agenda for the council is open headed which requires focused research in certain key aspects which have been listed in this guide. The delegates should research thoroughly and explore the different aspects associated with the agenda. Your understanding of the topics through research will be the key to a successful debate that would influence the Resolution writing process. Please do note that the agenda is not only revolved around the aspects of these three case studies, however encompasses certain other important issues as well and these case studies are a guide for you to understand better the situation we have to deal with to arrive at a moral end result. Delegates are free to discuss as well any other case study that might affect the discussion and the outcome during the discussion of this particular agendum. At this simulated conference too, delegates, a highly co-­‐ordinate and cohesive approach is expected of you as representatives of the member nations. It is required that you streamline your thoughts towards greater good, much beyond individualistic demands. We look forward to a constructive and productive debate Regards, Shubhankar Gupta Udbhav GVS Hiten Chowdhry Snigdha Baweja RISMUN 2015
1 Introduction to the Committee The General Assembly Fourth Committee (Fourth Committee) is one of the six Main Committees of the United Nations General Assembly. Also called the Special Political and Decolonization Committee, it deals with a wide range of issues including Palestinian refugees and human rights, peacekeeping, public information, outer space, mine action, atomic radiation, University for Peace, and topics related to decolonization. Unlike the other committees of the General Assembly, the Fourth Committee, in its actual form, is rather young. Indeed, it was only in 1993 that the Special Political Committee was merged with the Fourth Committee in General Assembly resolution 47/233 of 17 August 1993. The aim of this resolution was to revitalize the work of the General Assembly and it resulted in the creation of the Fourth Committee as we know it today. Mandate The United Nations (UN) General Assembly is one of the five principal organs laid out in the Charter of the United Nations (1945). Its mandate is laid out in Chapter IV of the Charter, with Article 10 stating that the body: “May discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.” One of the most important characteristics of the General Assembly is its universal nature and ability to discuss any issue within the UN system. This is core to the mandate of the General Assembly, and illustrated by the diversity and range of topics discussed within its Main Committees. The mandate for General Assembly Fourth Committee on a topical level is determined by the allocation of agenda items in line with the focus of the committee on “special, political and decolonization” issues. Governance, Structure, and Membership The General Assembly is comprised of all 193 Member States of the UN, as outlined in Article 9 of the Charter. Each Member State has one vote, regardless of its population or geography. Additionally, non-­‐
Member States, nongovernmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations have received invitations to participate as observers in the sessions and work of the General Assembly. Decisions on important matters require a two-­‐thirds majority of those present and voting; these questions include those on peace and security, admission of new members, and budgetary matters. Though each Member State is granted one vote, there has been a special effort in recent sessions to achieve consensus on issues rather than going through a formal vote. The work of the General Assembly is distributed to its six committees, each examining different topics that affect the international community. The First Committee examines topics pertaining to international security and peace; the Second Committee examines economic and financial topics; the Third Committee examines social, cultural, and humanitarian affairs; the Fourth Committee examines special political questions and decolonization, the Fifth Committee handles administrative and budgetary issues of the United Nations; and the Sixth Committee examines legal questions in the General Assembly. In addition to the six Main Committees of the General Assembly, a number of Boards, Commissions, Committees, Councils, and Working Groups work to support the advancement of the General Assembly’s mandate. RISMUN 2015
2 Functions and Powers The General Assembly assumes the role as the main deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the UN. It provides a forum for multilateral discussions on a range of issues outlined in the Charter, specifically within Articles 10 – 22 which detail the functions and powers of the body as follows: • The General Assembly is tasked with initiating studies and making recommendations to promote international cooperation in the political field, encouraging the development of international law, promoting the implementation of cultural, social, and human rights, and promoting fundamental freedoms free from discrimination (Article 13). • The General Assembly “receives and considers reports” issued by “the other principal organs established under the Charter as well as reports issued by its own subsidiary bodies” (Article 15). The General Assembly Plenary receives recommendations from the six Main Committees. Once the recommendations are sent to the Plenary Committee, the Plenary then votes on whether to adopt the resolutions as presented. Any decisions reached by the Assembly are non-­‐binding in international law; however, their decisions have enacted actions that have affected millions of people around the world. • The General Assembly additionally “approves the budget of the UN and decides on the scales of assessment, i.e., each Member State’s share of the budget” (Article 17). • Should the Security Council fail to address a breach of international peace and security due to deadlocks between permanent members, the Assembly can consider the matter immediately, laid out in Article 11, but further codified with the adoption of General Assembly resolution 377(V) (1950) entitled “Uniting for Peace.” RISMUN 2015
3 INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA The right of nations to self-­‐determination, or with less words, self-­‐determination is the idea that nations have the right to choose their sovereignty (who or what rules them) and international political status without other countries telling them. Most of the world used to be ruled by empires (really big countries with more than one ethnic group, usually with one group having a lot of power over the others), and many of the countries that the empires ruled were considered colonies of the empire, but after The first World War (1914-­‐1919), and especially the second World War (1929-­‐1945), most of these empires collapsed (fell apart) and local populations (people living in the "colonies" native to the area) began to want independence and their country to be ruled by them, not someone very far away who they thought was mistreating them. Lots of nationalist movements arose in these countries, usually in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, because people usually considered themselves as a separate group than the one who ruled them (for example, Arabs, not British, when the British Empire had ruled a lot of Arabia). The principle of self-­‐determination of peoples has been subject to a conceptual evolution which began in post-­‐Second World War era and accelerated in 1960’s due to the decolonization process. This evolution pertains to the transformation of self-­‐determination which was firstly conceived as a political principal to a peremptory legal norm, i.e. jus cogens. Manifestations under the Aegis of the United Nations 1. Incorporation into the Charter of the United Nations The principle of self-­‐determination was invoked on many occasions during World War II. It was also proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter (1941) (Declaration of Principles of 14 August 1941), in which President Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill of the United Kingdom declared, inter alia, that they desired to see ‘no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’ (Principle 2 Atlantic Charter), that they respected ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’ (Principle 3 Atlantic Charter) and that they wished to see ‘sovereign rights and self-­‐
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them’ (Principle 3 Atlantic Charter). The provisions of the Atlantic Charter were restated in the Declaration by United Nations (United Nations (UN)) signed on 1 January 1942, in the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and in other important instruments of the time. 2. Development through UN Practice RISMUN 2015
4 The first significant contribution made by the UN in developing the concept of self-­‐
determination was the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UNGA Res 1514 [XV] [14 December 1960]). According to this resolution, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly without dissenting votes, all peoples have the right to self-­‐determination. The administrative powers were called upon to take immediate steps to transfer without reservation all powers to the peoples in the trust and non-­‐self-­‐governing territories or all other territories which had not yet attained independence, ‘in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire’ (Declaration on the Granting of Independence para. 5). The Declaration on the Granting of Independence represents the political and—in some observers’ view—the legal basis for the decolonization policy of the UN for the implementation of which special institutions and procedures were created using plebiscites and elections as modes to determine the will of the peoples. In UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 the UNGA also elaborated a list of principles which were to guide members in deciding whether or not particular territories qualified as territories to which Chapter XI UN Charter applied. Status, Scope, and Content in Contemporary International Law Both the UN and the majority of authors maintain that the principle of self-­‐determination is part of modern international law. There are indeed good reasons for recognizing its legal character, as after its mere inclusion in the UN Charter the principle has been confirmed, developed, and given more tangible form by consistent State practice and was embodied among ‘the basic principles of international law’ in the Friendly Relations Declaration. The point at issue seems to be to what extent the principle operates as a legal right in contemporary international law and what other—more indirect—legal consequences may be attributed to it. Self-­‐Determination as a Binding Rule of International Law Instances may inform the principle of self-­‐determination with a legal dimension. Right to Self-­‐Determination: Instances •
(i) The principle of self-­‐determination is binding upon the parties, whether they have adopted it as the basis or as a criterion for the settlement of a particular issue or dispute. In the peace treaties after World War I, and in the cases of Kashmir(after 1948), the Saar Territory(1955), and Algeria’s struggle for independence, the principle of self-­‐
determination was chosen as a basis for negotiation, and in the Agreement on Ending War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (1973)the parties expressly recognized the South Vietnamese people’s right to self-­‐determination. RISMUN 2015
5 •
(ii) Self-­‐determination—as a result of the practice of the UN under Chapters XI to XIII UN Charter—clearly emerged as the legal foundation of the law of decolonization. As expressly affirmed by the ICJ both in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion)(1971) para. 52 and in Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (1975)paras 54–59, it became applicable to non-­‐self-­‐governing territories, trust territories and mandates, notwithstanding the differences and the qualifications of the respective constituent instruments (South West Africa/Namibia [Advisory Opinions and Judgments]; Western Sahara [Advisory Opinion]). As such, it includes the right of the population of a territory freely to determine its future political status. Furthermore, the Friendly Relations Declaration recognized that the territory of a colony or other non-­‐self-­‐governing territory has, under the UN Charter, reached a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it. It is generally concluded that, as a consequence of this qualification, the use of force to prevent the exercise of self-­‐determination of a colonial people has become unlawful, as has the assistance of third parties to the metropolitan powers in their effort to frustrate self-­‐
determination. Right to Self-­‐Determination: Legal Issues The above-­‐mentioned instances make it obvious that any legal approach to self-­‐determination must address a number of issues. Firstly, it must identify the holder of the right to self-­‐
determination. It must answer the question: Who is entitled to the right of self-­‐determination? Who is ‘the people?’ Finding an answer to this question is obviously not an easy task, especially when bearing in mind the troubles that this sort of question causes in other domains of collective rights, such as with the definitions of the ‘minority’, the ‘indigenous population’, or the ‘nation’ (see also Indigenous Peoples; Minorities, International Protection). Unsurprisingly, no definition of the term ‘people’ has been generally agreed upon so far. As with other collective rights, the lack of definition does not by itself mean that it is always unclear in concrete instances whether one or more peoples exist. Even though highly antagonistic claims of competing groups regularly clash when self-­‐determination is at stake, the claim of a particular group to constitute a people often goes unchallenged. In particular, in the process of decolonization the uti possidetis principle—and more simply fait accompli—made certain distinctions possible: the UN and States could distinguish between peoples along the borders of former colonies or protectorates. The ICJ followed suit in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion in stating that ‘[t]he right of that population to self-­‐determination constitutes therefore a basic assumption of the questions put to the Court’ (para. 70). In a similar way, the ICJ in the East Timor (Portugal v Australia) case took note of the fact that both parties to the dispute agreed that the people of East Timor had the right to self-­‐determination (at paras 31 and 37) and thereby underscored that the population of East Timor is a people. RISMUN 2015
6 Self-­‐Determination and the Interpretation and Development of International Law The considerable problems with the right to self-­‐determination are, of course, not by themselves an argument against the legal dimension of self-­‐determination. But they show that legal and extra-­‐legal aspects are probably more strongly intermingled in self-­‐determination than with other rights and principles. In light of this, one seems well advised to look beyond the mere status issue of self-­‐determination. Whether self-­‐determination is to be understood as a right or not does not seem to be the decisive issue. The broader dimension of self-­‐
determination seems relatively more important. To understand self-­‐determination as a principle that is flexible, that underlies the whole international order, and that informs, shapes, and contributes to the development of international law, seems a more promising approach. Only in this way can self-­‐determination develop its full potential CASE STUDIES RUSSO-­‐CHECHNYAN CONFLICT The current Russo-­‐Chechen conflict illustrates the persistent tension between the principles of national self-­‐determination and territorial integrity. Russia and Chechnya remain engaged in a centuries-­‐old struggle with no foreseeable end. Many Chechens assert that they are continuing the struggle to break free of Russian oppression which began over two centuries ago. In contrast, Russians argue that they have the right to protect and preserve their country’s territorial integrity. In an effort to gain support from foreign observers, Russia has portrayed its struggle in Chechnya as part of the fight against international terrorism. Reaching an acceptable political solution would require compromises regarding the fundamental principles as well as the security and economic interests at stake. PROSPECTS OF CHECHNYAN INDEPENDENCE AND RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS The current methods of attempting to resolve the conflict (military combat and terrorism) have to date proven to be unsuccessful for both the parties to the conflict. The failure to achieve a military solution underscores the need to examine the complex set of requirements and issues that stand as an impediment to reaching a political solution acceptable to both Chechens and Russians. RISMUN 2015
7 1. PROSPECTS OF CHECHNYAN INDEPENDENCE Russia and Chechnya, each with its own definition of the present conflict, remain engaged in a battle that shows little hope of any near-­‐term resolution. Both sides continue to seek resolution and/or retribution through the use of violence, and both sides have to date failed to 40 achieve their objectives. The obstacles to obtaining a political solution to the conflict are numerous and unlikely to be surmounted in the foreseeable future. CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO MEET BY THE CHECHNYANS The first of many conditions required for Chechnya to gain independence is significant support from foreign governments for its movement towards independence from Russian rule. Although gaining such support is not completely impossible, the recent use of terrorism as a form of resistance by some groups within Chechnya has undermined most of the possibilities for support from foreign governments. The second condition required for Chechnya to gain independence is an erosion (or collapse) of prevailing foreign perceptions of the legitimacy of Russian rule. The ability of the Chechens to sway the perceptions of foreign governments and cast doubt on the legitimacy of continued Russian domination of Chechnya has been crippled by the terrorist acts of some groups purporting to be fighting for Chechnya’s independence. By committing acts of terrorism and allowing the region to become an enclave of lawlessness, these groups are helping to solidify among foreign governments support for the Russian government’s position that it has the right to protect the country’s territorial integrity. Another obstacle preventing Chechnya from making an effective and winning case for independence is the inability of its leadership to maintain control of the Chechen population and territory. To gain control over the population, Chechen leaders need to possess political cohesion and to develop the Chechen nation’s military power. In the absence of cohesive political and military establishments, the leaders in Chechnya have little chance of gaining support from foreign governments for Chechen independence. 2. Territorial Integrity vs. Self-­‐determination Beyond the previously mentioned conditions, resolution of the Russo-­‐Chechen conflict will require foreign governments to decide which principle is supreme: territorial integrity or the right to self-­‐determination. The circumstances of particular cases have historically determined how and when each principle is applicable. In the Russo-­‐Chechen conflict Russia maintains that it is protecting its territorial integrity while Chechnya’s position is that it is continuing a centuries-­‐old fight for national self-­‐determination. RISMUN 2015
8 Russia argues that it has the right to preserve and protect its territorial integrity. This argument, like Chechnya’s argument for self-­‐determination, is well founded in state practice. In international history there have been cases in which the right to self-­‐determination and the right to territorial integrity have both been recognized and precedence has been given to territorial integrity. In deciding what position to take regarding the dispute between Chechnya and Russia, foreign governments need to determine which of the two conflicting principles holds supremacy over the other. In doing so, they will be deciding whether the Russian Federation’s representation of the conflict holds more international legitimacy than the representation by the Chechens. B. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS In an effort to gain international support for their military actions in Chechnya, Russian leaders have argued that they are combating international terrorism and protecting the country’s territorial integrity. In a broader context these goals translate to protecting Russian national interests. Russian national interests as they relate to the situation in Chechnya include security of and within the Russian Federation’s borders. Russian national interests also involve economic considerations related to Chechnya’s geo-­‐strategic location. 1. Security Russia’s security concerns with regard to Chechnya involve promoting peace and stability in the region and preventing it from becoming an enclave for Islamic fundamentalism. The establishment of peace and stability in Chechnya and the rest of the north Caucasus is a goal far off in the future. However, a more achievable near-­‐term goal is to contain the lawlessness and terrorism which have engulfed Chechnya and spread into Russia. 2. Geo-­‐Strategic Location of Chechnya and Economic Concerns Continued instability in Chechnya could have disastrous affects on Russian economic interests in the region. First, continued conflict and instability in Chechnya prevent the influx of foreign investment needed to develop and maintain the infrastructure required to exploit the natural resources of the region. Conflict in a given region repels investors because of the high risk of losing their investments due to corruption and lawlessness. Resolving the conflict in Chechnya is a complex task that will require a large amount of effort and cooperation from Chechnya, Russia, and foreign governments. The conditions required for Chechen independence are numerous and complex. The only certain conclusion at this point in the conflict is that the current approach of using force to solve the dispute is not working for either Russia or Chechnya. RISMUN 2015
9 Crimea The right of self-­‐determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter and international human rights treaties, enables a people to determine for themselves their political, economic, social and cultural status. It has been applied in recent years in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor and South Sudan. It is certainly arguable that the people in the Crimea have a distinct identity and territory, created over centuries and fostered by decisions of the USSR, Russia and Ukraine. This includes its status as an autonomous region within the state of Ukraine and by specific agreements about it between Russia and Ukraine. It is not unlawful for it to have a referendum and declare itself independent (or that it wishes to merge with Russia), as this was allowed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the declaration of independence by Kosovo. However, such a declaration of independence or merging is not effective in international law by itself. There are two key factors that are relevant: the actions of the state within whose borders the people live; and the responses of the international community. In relation to the first factor, if that state is oppressing the people, discriminating against them, violating their human rights and not allowing them freely to be involved in the politics and internal affairs of the state (i.e. to exercise their internal self-­‐determination), as was probably the situation in Kosovo, then international law allows them a range of possible actions, including independence and merging with another state. If the people are able freely to participate in governance and are not being oppressed as a group, then these actions of secession are not lawful. The second factor of the responses of the international community can be significant in terms of the recognition (or not) of the entity as a state. Indeed, Russia has not recognised Kosovo as a state. The situation in Ukraine is such that the new government is just starting to be in a position to govern. It is trying to restore law and order. It has taken no major military or other oppressive actions against the people of Crimea (or in other areas of Ukraine). There are at this time no clear actions by it that would be sufficient to justify under international law any independence or merger with another state by the people of Crimea. Thus there can be no international legal effect of any independence or merger declaration that might arise from a referendum. The right of self-­‐determination does not of itself give rise to a legal right for a state to intervene in the territory of another state, whether directly or through private actors. Where a people are being oppressed and force is being used against them by their own state, it is possible for them to seek and obtain military assistance of a defensive kind from another state. This is preferably through a resolution of the UN, as collective action by a number of states or as part of a self-­‐
RISMUN 2015
10 defence agreement. However, a unilateral military action where there is no such oppression or force is unlawful. If Russia, and all other states, are to comply with international law then they must first allow the new Ukrainian government (whether or not they are seen as the legitimate government) to resolve the situation in Crimea and ensure that the people of Crimea are allowed internal self-­‐
determination. Only if that does not occur then can other possibilities, such as secession and merging with Russia, be possible lawful responses. In any event, that decision is one for all the people of Crimea, and not just for those who are of Russian nationality or heritage (or there only for military purposes), and should not be subject to military or other pressure by any other state. After all, if international peace and security is to be maintained, it must be according to international law, otherwise we begin ‘sliding into chaos’. Eritrea The conflict in question is one of the many in the African continent. It takes place in the horn of Africa. This conflict is particularly significant owing to its historical nature. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia-­‐ though the former submitted as a colony while the latter maintained its independence-­‐ had Italy’s interference in their sovereignty in one way or another; and the subsequent Europe’s and U.S.’s interest in the region. This would be very significant to trace the ongoing claim by Ethiopia that in fact Eritrea is part of its territory. International interest in this context will be referring to the decision of the Big Four (U.S., Britain, Soviet Union, and France), but in reality, U.S. and Britain were the prominent players. U.S. and Britain lobbied against Eritrea’s independence with utter determination. The Big Four’s decision, and endorsed by the United General Assembly Resolution 390 A (V) in 1950, has since seen many attempts by Eritrea to invoke the right of self-­‐ determination of peoples fruitless. There’s no legal means through which to pursue its cause -­‐ only through the taking up of arms and waging a war whose only impetus lies in the determination of the peoples. Self-­‐determination in terms of independence is actually a right for nations. The General Assembly Resolution, 2105 (XX) adopted in 1965, in particular Para. 10 affirms this view: …recognizes legitimacy of the struggle waged by peoples under colonial dominion to exercise their right to self-­‐determination and independence and invites all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial territories. RISMUN 2015
11 It is usually common for any states threatened by a common enemy to team up to maximize their efforts aiming at defeating the enemy. During such times allies tend to be so united that a family-­‐like relationship is evident -­‐ as if one nation were fighting against an external intruder. Such was the case between Eritrea and Ethiopia allied against the colonialist, Italy. At the time Eritrea did not see the possibility of Ethiopia becoming a colonialist itself. It is clear that Ethiopia had dishonoured the U.N. resolution that sought to protect its rule in Eritrea. According to Ethiopia, it was not enough to just have Eritrea as a federation. The only acceptable deal to Ethiopia sought to have Eritrea "completely united with our motherland". In pursuant of this objective, Ethiopia violated Eritreans' rights. In 1967, for example, even the right to speak their language was undermined. Amharic, the language of Ethiopians, officially replaced Eritrean languages of Tigrigna and Arabic. Ethiopian constitution superseded Eritrean's. After the federation, the Ethiopian government punished those believed to be harbouring "bandits from the hills" opposed to its rule. Villages of people suspected of holding such positions were burned down and their families killed. Eritrea has constantly been fighting for the right to self determination but has not been able to attain it. Its principle motive still remains gaining independence from Ethiopia. RISMUN 2015
12