Towards an Improved Understanding of Stakeholder

Transcription

Working Paper Proceedings
Engineering Project Organization Conference
Devil’s Thumb Ranch, Colorado
July 9-11, 2013
Towards An Improved Understanding Of Stakeholder
Dynamics During The Project Front-End: The Case Of
Nuclear Waste Repository Projects
Kirsi Aaltonen, Aalto University, Finland
Jaakko Kujala, University of Oulu, Finland
Laura Havela, University of Oulu, Finland
Proceedings Editors
Patricia Carrillo, Loughborough University and Paul Chinowsky, University of Colorado
© Copyright belongs to the authors. All rights reserved. Please contact authors for citation details.
Proceedings – EPOC 2013 Conference
TOWARDS AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF STAKEHOLDER
DYNAMICS DURING THE PROJECT FRONT-END: THE CASE OF NUCLEAR
WASTE REPOSITORY PROJECTS
Kirsi Aaltonen,1 Jaakko Kujala2 and Laura Havela3
ABSTRACT
The importance of project stakeholder management and dynamics is emphasized in
nuclear power field where stakeholders’ negative attitude towards a project can severely
endanger the achievement of project’s objectives. The aim of this paper is to enrich our
understanding of stakeholder dynamics during the project’s front-end stage – a research area
which clearly merits from further empirical research. The study focuses on the examination of
stakeholder dynamics of two pioneering nuclear repository projects, Onkalo in Finland and
Yucca Mountain in USA during the project front-end stage. In order to systematically analyze
changes in stakeholders’ importance and position, a salience-position matrix is developed in the
study. This framework is believed to be of practical use for project managers when analyzing the
needs and concerns of different stakeholders during the early feasibility and conceptual design
stages of projects. Furthermore, the results of the study are valuable for project stakeholder
research, since prior stakeholder literature has rarely conceptualized stakeholder dynamics and
the elements of stakeholder dynamism in a systematic manner.
KEYWORDS: project stakeholder management, stakeholder dynamics, project front-end,
salience-position matrix
INTRODUCTION
The management of project stakeholders is widely acknowledged as an essential part of
project management and as a factor contributing to project success (Cleland, 1986; Olander and
Landin, 2005). Despite the acknowledged importance of stakeholder management, project
management research still lacks both theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence of various
project stakeholder related phenomena (Achterkamp and Vos, 2008; Yang et al, 2009). Until
today, project stakeholder research has primarily focused on the conceptual development of
stakeholder management tools and frameworks in order to better manage stakeholders. However,
the majority of the stakeholder management research, tools and frameworks provide only a static
perspective of the project and are focused primarily on the project execution stage. Clearly less
attention has been devoted to understanding stakeholder dynamics, i.e. changes in stakeholders’
attributes and positions towards the project, both empirically and theoretically during the early
project front-end stage (Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010; Olander and Landin, 2005).
The importance of stakeholder management and dynamics is emphasized especially in
nuclear power field where stakeholders’ negative attitude towards a project can severely obstruct
project progress and cause cost overruns and exceeded time schedules. This study focuses on the
examination of stakeholder dynamic of two pioneering nuclear repository projects, Onkalo in
1
Postdoctoral Researcher, Aalto University, Finland, [email protected].
Professor, University of Oulu, Finland, [email protected].
3
Researcher, University of Oulu, Finland, [email protected].
2
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Finland and Yucca Mountain in USA during the project front-end stage. Such projects can be
described to be the most ambitious construction projects in the history of mankind – the goal is
to isolate nuclear waste at least for 100 000 years. The technology used in final disposal is
mature and technically proven, but gaining the diverse stakeholders support and managing
stakeholder dynamics is a challenge during the project’s early stages.
The aim of this paper is to enrich our understanding of stakeholder dynamics during the
project’s front-end stage. This is done by analyzing the changes in stakeholders’ salience
attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency) (Mitchell et al, 1997) and in their position
(supportive/non-supportive) towards the project. In addition, we are interested in the potential
reasons and explanations for the identified changes. We decided purposefully to focus on the
project’s front-end stage (considered to cover all the activities from the project’s idea generation
to the more detailed planning phase), because it is a stage, when stakeholders’ positions are
shaped and the stakeholders’ potential to influence the project management’s decision-making is
highest (Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010). Furthermore, the current understanding of project front-end
stakeholder dynamics can be considered to be at its infancy. Hence, on the practical side, the
paper increases our understanding of how project management can actually influence and
manage stakeholder dynamics.
We start our analysis with a literature review on project stakeholder management and
stakeholder dynamics. Based on the conceptual analysis of the elements of stakeholder
dynamics, an analytical framework, stakeholder salience-position matrix, is developed. In the
empirical part, we first provide a short briefing of nuclear waste management in general and later
analyze the two nuclear repository projects as well as their stakeholder dynamics by using the
developed framework. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for research and
managers and provide suggestions for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Project Stakeholder Thinking
The notion of stakeholders was originally introduced to the mainstream general
management discussion by Freeman (1984). Two years later, Cleland (1986) brought stakeholder
thinking into the project management paradigm. Ever since, the role of stakeholder management
as a central project management process has strengthened, and today even the concept of project
management is defined through stakeholders as “the process of adapting the specifications, plans,
and approaches to the different concerns and expectations of the various stakeholders” (PMI,
2008). Stakeholders have their own objectives, interests and expectations which may conflict and
cause challenges to the project management (Artto and Kujala, 2008). Stakeholder theory is then
to enable managers to understand stakeholders and strategically manage them by engendering
and maintaining their support (Aaltonen et al, 2008).
After Cleland’s (1986) work, various definitions and categorization attempts of
stakeholders have been presented in the existing project management literature ranging from
broad to narrow views. Broad definitions (El-Gohary et al, 2006; Fraser and Zhu, 2008; Kolltveit
and Gronhaug, 2004; PMI, 2008; Turner, 1999; Ward and Chapman, 2008) accentuate the fact
that project stakeholders can affect or are affected by the project. In turn, definitions that adopt a
narrower view highlight the nature of the interest or stake that a particular stakeholder has with
regard to the project(Cleland, 1986; Cleland, 1998; Chinyio and Akintoye, 2008; McElroy and
Mills, 2003; Olander, 2007). Many of the definitions follow the notions in the stakeholder
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management literature, but are applied to the project context. Table 1 in Appendix 1 summarizes
the found existing definitions for stakeholders in the field of project management.
In addition to diverse definitions, project management scholars have also categorized
stakeholders in a variety of ways. Most prominent in the literature are categorizations based on
stakeholders’ involvement in the project and the nature of their relationship with the project, the
nature of stakeholders’ claim and position towards the project, the stakeholders’ role in the
project, and the degree to which stakeholders’ behavior can be anticipated. Internal stakeholders
are “the stakeholders who are formally members of the project coalition and hence usually
support the project” (Winch, 2004). External stakeholders are not formal members of the project
coalition, but may affect or be affected by the project. Such groups are often referred to as nonbusiness stakeholders or secondary stakeholders (Cova and Salle, 2005). In addition, stakeholder
categorizations in project management literature include the division of stakeholders according
to their functional role in a project, such as client, contractor, customers, sponsors, local
community members, NGOs, media, lobbying organizations, and government agencies (Cova et
al, 2002).
Stakeholder Salience
Stakeholder theory provides a solid standing point for identifying, classifying and
categorizing stakeholders and understanding their behavior in order to better manage them
(Aaltonen et al, 2008). However, as all stakeholder needs and concerns cannot be fulfilled, the
project management needs to balance between different stakeholders’ diverse claims in their
decision-making process in a manner that the purpose of the project would not be compromised
(Olander, 2007).
A widely known stakeholder salience framework, proposed by Mitchell, Agle and Wood
(1997), explains the process of managerial decision making with regard stakeholders. Mitchell et
al. (1997) classify stakeholders according to the power, legitimacy and urgency of their claims.
Stakeholder salience framework suggests that these three attributes can be used to determine how
much and which type of attention stakeholders receive from management. The stakeholder
salience framework suggests that the more attributes a stakeholder possesses, the more salient it
is to the firm – salience refers to the degree to which managers give priority to competing
stakeholder claims. By combining these three attributes, a typology of stakeholders can be
formed and their importance to management and its decision making evaluated.
The salience framework proposes that the more powerful the stakeholders are, the more
salient their requests are in the eyes of the management. In the salience framework, stakeholder
power is defined as ‘‘a relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get
another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done. The bases of
power are seen to be mainly in the type of resource used to exercise power giving material or
financial resources, symbolic resources and force and violence. Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that
the more legitimate the stakeholders’ claims are, the more likely they are to receive positive
responses from firms. Mitchell et al. (1997) use the definition on legitimacy as ‘‘a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” Finally, the urgency
of the stakeholders’ request is seen as the third attribute that increases the salience of the
stakeholder. Urgency is defined as ‘‘the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate
attention.” It is based on two attributes (1) time sensitivity – the degree to which managerial
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delay in attending to the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder – and (2)
criticality – the importance of the claim to the stakeholder (Mitchell et al, 1997).
Stakeholders’ Position Towards The Project
In addition to the analysis of stakeholders’ attributes, project stakeholders can also be
divided into different classes based on their position, stake and interests towards the project.
Winch (2004) proposes a classification based on those who promote the project and those who
oppose it (Winch, 2004). McElroy and Mills (2003) present a more fine-grained model with five
different levels of stakeholder position towards the project: active opposition, passive opposition,
noncomittal, passive support and active support. These positions towards the project ultimately
determine the impact of each stakeholder on the project’s decision making. Mathur et al. (2008)
distinguish between those scholars that view stakeholders as claimants and those who view them
as influencers. Olander (2007), however, postulates that this distinction is problematic because it
implies that the media would not be classed as a stakeholder despite having the potential ability
to significantly affect a project’s activities and performance. Much of the existing research seems
to classify external stakeholders, such as local citizens, community groups and environmentalists
to those stakeholder groups who oppose the project and that need to be convinced of the project’s
worth. In turn, internal stakeholder behavior is typically considered as supportive towards the
project (Winch, 2004).
Stakeholder Influence Strategies
Stakeholders’ attributes and, hence, salience do not remain steady-state during the
project, but have a dynamic nature (Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010). Stakeholders’ influence
strategies are important means for them to strategically shape their position and to increase the
likelihood that their claim will be taken into account in the project management’s decision
making (Frooman, 1999; Aaltonen et al, 2008). The concept of stakeholder influence strategy is
often used interchangeably with such concepts as ‘influence tactic’ (Hendry, 2005) and
‘activities’ (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). Frooman (1999) discusses influence strategies as
the “means” stakeholders use to try to get what they want, and proposes that the nature of the
resource relationship between the stakeholder and the firm determines the type of influence
strategy that will be used by each stakeholder. Project stakeholders can shape their salience by
using different strategies which include the direct withholding strategy, indirect withholding
strategy, coalition building strategy, resource building strategy, conflict escalation strategy,
creditability building strategy, communication strategy and direct action strategy (Aaltonen et al.,
2008). Power is closely related to resources. In order to provide the project with the resources,
stakeholders can claim something in return, which gives them power over projects. Stakeholders
that use the direct withholding strategy control critical resources in terms of project’s success and
can therefore increase their power by conditionally restricting access to these resources. In
addition, stakeholders may be in a position to influence resources provided by another
stakeholder. In these instances, they can use the indirect withholding strategy to manipulate the
flow of resources and increase the salience of their claims (Aaltonen et al, 2008). Stakeholders
may use different strategies to influence the legitimacy of their claims. One important strategy
for this is the coalition building strategy. This can directly increase stakeholder legitimacy,
particularly if they are able to form a coalition with a more legitimate partner. Stakeholders often
do not pursue their objectives alone, but in cooperation with other partners and stakeholders to
increase the salience of their claims. The resource building strategy can be used by stakeholders
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to increase the possession of critical resources on a project. Furthermore in many projects, there
are also actors who use the project to further other, non-project related goals. In these situations,
the project becomes an arena for actors with a political agenda to promote other, non-project
related issues. This is called the conflict escalation strategy. (Aaltonen et al 2008). Finally,
stakeholders can increase their legitimacy through the credibility building strategy, for example,
recruiting a well-known and legitimate member into the stakeholder group. Project stakeholders
may use communication or direct action strategies to increase the urgency of their claims. This
can happen by using the different communication channels and media cleverly (Aaltonen et al,
2008).
Stakeholder Management Strategies
Stakeholder management strategies are means enacted by project management to shape
the attributes or positions of stakeholders and, hence, contribute to the stakeholder dynamics
during the project early stage. Prior research on a focal project’s stakeholder management
activities can be roughly divided into two discourses that both adopt a rather static perspective on
a project’s behaviors. First, extant research has focused on demonstrating and articulating the
managerial importance of stakeholder management and examining the role and value of
stakeholder management process (e.g. Bourne and Walker, 2005; Cleland, 1986; Cleland, 1998;
Olander and Landin, 2005). Second, the majority of the research on managerial behavior with
regard to project stakeholders has adopted a practice-oriented view and focused on the
conceptual development of different managerial frameworks, tools and processes to identify,
categorize and manage project stakeholders. For example, there are tools to classify stakeholders
through matrices such as the power/interest in the project matrix (Johnson and Scholes, 1999),
tools to map whether stakeholders are promoting or opposing the project (Winch, 2002), and
tools to categorize, visualize, and identify different stakeholder attributes such as Stakeholder
Circle (Bourne and Walker, 2005).
Aaltonen and Sivonen (2009) have identified and described five different types of
response strategies i.e. stakeholder management strategies that project management may enact as
a response to stakeholder pressures. The identified response strategies are adaptation strategy,
compromising strategy, avoidance strategy, dismissal strategy and influence strategy. The
adaptation strategy refers to a strategy by which project management adapts to demands
presented by stakeholders. The compromising strategy refers to a strategy in which project
management makes concessions and compromises over its own objectives because of claims
presented by stakeholders. Hence, project management aims to meet some of the requirements
presented by stakeholders and, in this way, accommodates some of the pressures. The avoidance
strategy refers to a strategy by which project management loosens its attachments to stakeholder
related claims and tries to guard or shield the project from the claims. Project management that
employs the dismissal strategy ignores demands and pressures posed by stakeholders. In this
case, project management considers that it is not necessary to take into account stakeholders’
claims for the sake of the efficient execution of operations. In turn, the intended effect of the
influence strategy is to neutralize the stakeholders’ opposition and to proactively shape their
demands. This strategy involves active and innovative information sharing, opening the project
to stakeholders, multi-stakeholder dialogues and building active and nonadversarial, long-term
relationships with stakeholders.
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Towards Understanding Project Stakeholder Dynamics: An Analytical Framework
Based on the literature review, we suggest that project stakeholder dynamics can be
analyzed through examining the changes in stakeholders’ salience attributes (power, legitimacy,
urgency) and in stakeholders’ stance towards the project. We also suggest that stakeholder
salience attributes and stakeholders’ stance towards the project are properties of stakeholders that
may change through stakeholder influence strategies (stakeholders shape their attributes and
stance by themselves) or through stakeholder management strategies (project management
attempts to shape stakeholders’ attributes or stance). Figure 1 illustrates the degree of
salience/position towards the project –matrix (further referred to as salience/position –matrix).
Salience/position –matrix is an analytical framework that is developed for the purposes of this
study in order to examine project stakeholder dynamics in the empirical cases.
Stakeholder management
strategies
High
degree
of salience
Stakeholder influence
strategies
Stakeholder
management
strategies
Stakeholder
influence
strategies
Low
degree
of salience
Supportive
Non-supportive
Figure 1. Salience/position –matrix
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Strategy
Since the purpose of the study is to improve our understanding of stakeholder dynamics
during the project front-end and prior research within this area is limited, a case study was
selected as a research strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989). The case study was conducted as a multiplecase design and two polar multi-stakeholder case projects were chosen for detailed analysis:
Onkalo is a successful nuclear repository project in Finland and Yucca Mountain a debated
nuclear repository project in USA. We selected these two unique multi-stakeholder cases due to
their different early stage stakeholder dynamics and outcomes with regard to stakeholders.
According to Yin (1994) a multiple case study enables to explore differences within and between
cases and it is considered to be more robust and reliable compared to a single-case design which
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is criticized for its uniqueness. In addition, we believed that the nuclear waste management
context would provide us with interesting insights with regard to managing stakeholders.
According to World Nuclear Association (2009) repository projects are being planned in several
countries. Gaining the stakeholder support and maintaining it has been the main challenge in the
piloting repository projects.
Research Data
The empirical data consists of publicly available electronic information on the two
pioneering nuclear repository projects. Hundreds of Onkalo project related articles were
published in leading Finnish financial periodicals and newspapers whilst information concerning
Yucca Mountain was primarily collected from US financial periodicals and newspapers (articles
during years 2005-2013). Furthermore, independent information concerning nuclear waste
decommissioning and nuclear waste field was provided in the Internet sites of International
Atomic Energy Agency), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and World
Nuclear Association. In addition, an extensive study on scientific articles concerning both cases
was also done in order to obtain rich case analyses and perspectives on the cases. The specific
details concerning the used data for both cases are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Case data
Case Onkalo
Case Yucca Mountain

The coverage of electrical articles published in the
Finnish leading periodicals and newspapers about
Onkalo between years 1995 and 2013 (these periodicals
and newspapers include: Kauppalehti4, Taloussanomat5,
Tekniikka ja Talous 6and Helsingin Sanomat7).

The coverage of electrical articles published in
the periodicals and newspapers about Yucca
Mountain in USA and in Finland between years
1987 and 2013 (these periodicals and
newspapers include: Time Magazine, New York
Times, Las Vegas Sun and Helsingin Sanomat)

Public information provided in the Internet sites of the
key actors: Posiva (www.posiva.fi), Eurajoki
(www.eurajoki.fi), STUK (www.stuk.fi), Fennovoima
(www.fennovoima.fi) and The Ministry of Employment
and the Economy the former Ministry of Trade and
Industry (http://www.vn.fi/ministeriot/tem/en.jsp)

Public information provided in the Internet sites
of the key actors: US Department of Energy
(www.energy.gov), Nuclear regulatory
commission (www.nrc.gov), Environmental
Protection Agency (www.epa.gov) and Nuclear
Energy Institute (www.nei.org)

Broadcasted TV documents and films (Michael Madsen
Into Eternity 2010) and news broadcasts

Broadcasted TV documents and news broadcasts
(CNN)

Posiva’s own leaflet
(http://www.posiva.fi/tietopankki/posiva_tutkii/)between
years 2000 and 2013

The Eureka County Yucca Mountain
Information Office online
(www.yuccamountain.org)
4
Kauppalehti is a leading and oldest business newspaper in Finland focusing on marketing and economics.
Taloussanomat is a commerce-oriented on-line newspaper in Finland.
6
Tekniikka ja Talous is economics and technology-oriented newspaper.
7
Helsingin Sanomat is the largest subscription newspaper in Finland.
5
7
Interviews with key persons involved in the two case projects will be conducted during the next
round of the data collection (summer 2013). The interviews will also be used to validate the
stakeholder analyses presented in the paper.
Data Analysis
During the first stage of the analysis, researchers familiarized themselves with the case
materials and formed a comprehensive understanding of the series of key project events during
the front end of both of the cases. At this stage also event databases covering the key events,
their timing, important stakeholders involved in these events and the implications of the events in
both cases were created. In addition, stakeholder databases including key stakeholders, their
goals and position towards the project, salience (power, legitimacy and urgency) and their
influence and management strategies were formed. After this, detailed case descriptions covering
the key events of both cases were written. In the actual empirical analysis of the data, our focus
was on mapping the key stakeholders (stakeholder maps) and the changes in their degree of
salience and position as well as the reasons for these changes. For the positioning of the
stakeholders and the changes in in their salience and position we utilized the developed
analytical framework: stakeholder salience/position –matrix. Finally, we were able to analyze the
stakeholder dynamics of both of the cases and seek explanations for the found dynamics. In the
analysis of the changes particular focus is put on the stakeholders’ influence behavior and project
management’s stakeholder management behavior. In addition, we attempted to theorize on the
potential reasons and explanations for the found different outcomes of the two project cases and
the role of stakeholder dynamics in these outcomes.
Case Background Information
Nuclear waste management
Nuclear power generation, as well as other applications of nuclear fission or nuclear
technology, create nuclear waste. This waste is hazardous and can stay radioactive depending on
the waste type thousands of years. Therefore, nuclear waste needs to be managed safely to
protect human health and the environment. However, the nuclear waste field is still in its infancy
as the nuclear waste is being stored in temporary storages (Pickard, 2010). The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has taken a leading role in order to achieve an international
consensus and recommended deep geological repository as a solution (World Nuclear
Association, 2011). Repository projects can be described as extremely demanding because they
require taking into account not only a long list of technical factors but also economical, political
and social factors (Won Han, 1997).
Project Onkalo in Finland
In Finland Posiva Oy is an expert organization responsible for the final disposal of spent
nuclear fuel of its owners. Posiva was established in 1995 and it is owned by the two biggest
players in the Finnish nuclear power field Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) (60%) and Fortum
Power & Heat Oy (40%). (Posiva, 2011). In the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act the first step
towards a new nuclear facility or final repository or power station is the so-called Decision in
Principle (DiP). This means that the government has to consider whether the construction project
is in line with the overall good of society. In particular, the government pays attention to the
need for the facility, the suitability of the proposed site and its environmental impact. Moreover,
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the policy also includes legislation to ensure public participation, and a local right of veto on the
siting process. (SDC, 2006). After a flexible site selection process Eurajoki was nominated as a
hosting municipality. The project is on schedule as the site was selected in 2001 and the
construction license application was submitted in 2012. The operation license application is to be
submitted in 2018 and the final disposal is planned to begin in 2020. (Posiva 2012). The main
events of Onkalo project are presented on the timeline in Figure 2.
The construction license
Eurajoki changes its attitude
towards siting
Systematic siting
process starts
Posiva submitted a DIP
application for Eurajoki to
the Government
Flexible preliminary
investigations
final disposal
begins
The municipal council of
Eurajoki votes 20-7
The operation
license application
The Government gives a
positive DIP
Posiva is
established
The Parliament ratifies the
DIP 159-3
The work begins
Vuojoki group
Olkiluoto vision
1980
1985 1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Time
Figure 2. Main events of Onkalo project
In the USA, the Department of Energy (DOE) is obligated to provide a permanent storage
solution for spent nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) from 1982 was
designed to require a fair, technically sound and comprehensive selection process for a
permanent disposal site. However, in order to save money and time of the program, NWPA was
amended to focus the site characterization studies solely on Yucca Mountain in Nevada in 1987
(Widder and Calloway 2010). After all, Yucca Mountain was already located within a former
nuclear test site and was rated number one based on all technical factors (Inhofe 2006; Widder
and Calloway, 2010). This decision got a lot of criticism and problems started to arise as
Nevadans felt it is unfair for their state to have to store all nuclear waste when there are no
nuclear power plants in Nevada (Rodney and Hippel, 2009). Under the Act, congress set a
deadline of 1998 for DOE to begin moving used nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants.
However, DOE missed the date and failed to remove any spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites.
The delay became expensive for nuclear facilities as they had to build additional storages
(Widder and Calloway, 2010). Practically, during the whole time Yucca Mountain project has
been interfered by the politicians. At the moment the project is frozen and other options are
being considered. However, there is a pressure to find a solution quickly, as the country is the
world's largest producer of nuclear power and according to the California law no new reactors
can be built until a national nuclear waste repository has been established (Rogers, 2009; Carter
9
et al, 2010). Obama administration stands behind nuclear power (Miller, 2010; Favole and Tracy,
2011). The main Yucca Mountain project events are presented on the timeline in Figure 3.
The Blue Ribbon
commission
The Yucca Mountain
Development Act
Reid is elected
Senate Majority Leader
The Nuclear
Waste Policy Act
Presidential
elections
License application is
submitted to the NRC
NWPA amendment
“Screw Nevada Act”
Obama is elected
President
DOE misses DL for
removal of nuclear waste
from reactor sites
Yucca Mountain is doomed
“not suitable”
The secretary Chu withdraws
the license application
1980 1985
1990
1995 2000
2005
2008
2010
2012
Time
Figure 3. Main events of Yucca Mountain project
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this empirical analysis stakeholder analyses of both cases are presented. The
stakeholder maps (Figures 4-9) present the changes in stakeholders’ positions and relationships
with respect to the project and to other stakeholders. Detailed stakeholder related information is
supplied in Tables 2 and 3 (Appendix 2). In the tables the stakeholders are described according
to their goals, positions with regard to the project, salience attributes and strategies.
Project Onkalo
Posiva, who was a salient actor with regard to repository projects in Finland, initiated the
preparations of the Onkalo by launching the environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 1997.
The strategy of Posiva was to have a flexible siting approach and keep all the possible siting
options open as long as possible. Therefore, EIA was conducted in every four sitein Eurajoki,
Loviisa, Äänekoski and Kuhmo. In addition to its original purpose, Posiva also used EIA as a
means to get an understanding of the prevailing atmospheres in the municipalities (Raittila et al,
2002). Furthermore, at this stage, Posiva enacted proactive stakeholder engagement strategies by
promoting the benefits of the project towards the municipalities as well as inducing competition
among them. They were active in organizing group meetings and public briefings as well as
discussion sessions near the local residents. Communication was regular, leaflets were published
and own employees’ voices were used to personalize the communication. However, from early
on, particularly, Kuhmo and Ääneskoski municipalities had a lot of civil activity and the
10
atmosphere was rather negative towards the potential project despite Posiva’s engagement
attempts. The approach of the municipalities was non-co-operative and both Kuhmo and
Äänekoski residents organized channels for their opposition by establishing non-governmental
organizations that were registered to promote the criticality of their claims for Posiva and for the
surrounding society. The establishment of these protest organizations increased clearly the
salience of Kuhmo and Äänekoski with regard to the project e.g. through their increased urgency
of the claim and resources. These organizations also received power through municipal elections,
in which their primary theme was to oppose the planned project. In addition, address writing
campaigns were induced and requirements for referendum presented. As a consequence, Posiva
warned Äänekoski municipality for its passivity (Raittila et al, 2002). Loviisa and Eurajoki
municipalities in turn are both nuclear power municipalities and were more favorable towards
the facility even though also within them the views of the project were diverse. Within Loviisa
particularly the local residents had a nonsupportive stance towards the project and as a result a
non-governmental organization was formed to impact the decision makers and to start collecting
petition signatures. In Eurajoki, no non-governmental organizations to oppose the project were
founded. However, even though the municipality saw the project as highly significant for its
economy, it decided to play “hard to get” during the initial stages of the project preparation. Still,
the attitude of the municipality towards co-operation with Posiva was positive right from the
start.
In January 1998, Eurajoki, Teollisuuden Voima and Posiva formed Vuojoki workgroup
whose main task was to negotiate the compensations for Eurajoki municipality. Posiva’s aim was
to safeguard the development of nuclear waste management and Eurajoki was interested in
safeguarding its tax revenue (Kojo et al, 2010). The co-operation between Eurajoki and Posiva
further developed, as the local council of Eurajoki accepted the so-called “Onkalo vision” where
the municipality took a positive position towards the siting and additional nuclear power. The
Onkalo vision was signed in May 1999 after Eurajoki got its required change in real estate tax
and about 7 million Euros compensation of hosting the repository. (Kojo et al 2010, Posiva
investigates 2007). Figure 4 presents the Onkalo project’s stakeholder map in 1999.
Government
Posiva
High
degree
of salience
Low
degree
of salience
Kuhmo and
Äänekoski
municipality
Loviisa
municipality
Kuhmo and
Äänekoski
residents
Loviisa
residents
EEurajoki
municipality
Parlament
Eurajoki
residents
STUK
Public
Greenpeace
Researchers
Non-supportive
Supportive
Figure 4. Onkalo stakeholder map 1999
11
Because of the Onkalo vision, Posiva submitted a decision in principle application only
for Eurajoki to the government. As a result, all the opposing groups in the other municipalities
ended their opposing activities (Raittila et al, 2002). For the decision in principle the government
requested statements from the municipality of Eurajoki and from the Radiation and Nuclear
Safety Authority STUK. STUK submitted a preliminary safety appraisal of Eurajoki to the
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) in January 2000. In this appraisal STUK concluded that
the prerequisites for a DiP from the standpoint of nuclear and radiation safety were met. (Posiva
investigates, 2009). The municipal council of Eurajoki approved Onkalo as the site for the
repository in January 2000. Earlier the local council had decided that referendum will not be
needed as the facility does not cause disagreements (Raittila et al, 2002). After having received
these statements, government saw no obstacles to a positive DiP. Despite Greenpeace was
campaigning against additional nuclear power ‘the fifth mistake’ and nuclear waste
decommissioning, government made a positive DIP in December 2000. The proposal was further
discussed in parliament which ratified the government’s positive DiP in May 2001. The
unanimity of parliament can be explained by the Finnish decision making procedure (Raittila et
al, 2002). After the environment and economy committees had taken a positive stands there was
not much that singular members could do and moreover, they did not want to bring up their
opposing views anymore. An interesting point related to the DIP procedure, however, was, that
no alterative options and sites were presented. Figure 5 presents the Onkalo stakeholder map in
2001.
Government
High
degree
of salience
EEurajoki
municipality
Parlament
Eurajoki
residents
Low
degree
of salience
Posiva
STUK
Greenpeace
Kuhmo and
Äänekoski
municipality
Kuhmo and
Äänekoski
residents
Public
Loviisa
municipality
Researchers
Loviisa
residents
Non-supportive
Supportive
After submitting the construction license application in 2012 Posiva has continued testing
and simulating the final disposal. In addition, Posiva is also required to provide further
clarification concerning the copper canisters used in the final disposal (Helsingin Sanomat 2012).
Posiva needs to maintain the positive atmosphere not only at local level but at national level too.
The fact that there is no support from other nuclear power nations, as they are still at the starting
point with their repository projects, does not make the task any easier. Furthermore, a new
12
stakeholder organization has appeared. The new nuclear company Fennovoima got its license for
a nuclear power in 2010 and is planning to build a nuclear power plant in Pyhäjoki. Next
Fennovoima needs to make a clearance concerning the nuclear waste management. Fennovoima
has publicly announced that it would be interested in co-operation with Posiva. Posiva, however,
has declared that the company will only take care of the spent nuclear fuel produced by its
owners which has ended up in a complicated situation between Fennovoima and Posiva. Figure 6
presents the Onkalo stakeholder map in 2009.
Government
High
degree
of salience
EEurajoki
municipality
Parlament
Eurajoki
residents
Low
degree
of salience
Posiva
STUK
Greenpeace
Public
Fennovoima
Non-supportive
Researchers
Supportive
Project Yucca Mountain
In the Nuclear waste policy act 1982 congress authorized different federal agencies to
perform different functions related to Yucca Mountain. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
sets standards to protect human health and safety. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is
responsible for implementing EPA's standards and determining if the Yucca Mountain facility
can be safe enough to contain nuclear waste. The Department of Energy owns, constructs,
applies for licenses and will operate the facility. Generators and owners of spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste in turn are required to pay the costs of the disposal. In 1987’s
amendment, known as "Screw Nevada Act" (Fialka, 2009), congress narrowed the site search to
Yucca Mountain violating provisions of the original legislation which mandated that several
locations would be studied to find the most suitable site. The majority of Nevadans have been
against the project for the whole time (Interrante, 2011). Later it has been speculated that
congress chose Nevada because Nevada had a small population and limited political influence
compared to the other two finalists, Texas or Washington, which had larger and more influential
congressional delegations (Teller 2011; Niskakangas 2011). Figure 7 presents Yucca Mountain
stakeholder map in 1987.
13
High
degree
of salience
Congress
State of
Nevada
EPA
NRC
DOE
Low
degree
of salience
Nuclear
facilities
Public
Non-supportive
States with
nuclear
waste
Supportive
Figure 7. Yucca Mountain stakeholder map 1987
As Yucca Mountain was deemed scientifically and technically sound and the public
hearings did not bring out any major obstacles, the Secretary of Energy of the time recommended
the site to President Bush who approved the recommendation. The Nevada governor was object
to Yucca Mountain and used his veto which, however, was overturned by the simple majority in
both houses of congress. In 2002, the President Bush signed the approval into law as the Yucca
Mountain Development Act (YMDA) (Inhofe, 2006). As a reply the State of Nevada filed
multiple lawsuits against the federal government during 2001-2002. Most of the Nevada's claims
were, however, dismissed except the concerns over the EPA’s safety standards. As a result, the
coverage period was extended from 10000 years to 1 million years in the future (Inhofe, 2006).
What is more, in 2000 Las Vegas made it illegal to ship high-level radioactive waste through the
city. DOE in turn, filed a suit against Nevada over water rights at Yucca Mountain, as Nevada
had denied water to Yucca Mountain in 2003 on the grounds that the area is not in the public
interest. (Yucca Mountain Information Office Yuccamountain.org, 2010). Figure 8 presents
Yucca Mountain stakeholder map in 2002.
14
Congress
High
degree
of salience
State of
Nevada
Nevada
governor
President
Bush
EPA
DOE
NRC
Low
degree
of salience
Nuclear
facilities
Public
Non-supportive
States with
nuclear
waste
Supportive
One of the greatest objectors of the Yucca Mountain has been Nevada senator Reid
(Reid, 2011). In 2006 congressional elections he was elected as a senate majority leader which
gave him the position to greatly affect the future of the project (The Energy Library, 2009).
Furthermore, in the 2008 presidential election campaign Barack Obama promised to abandon
Yucca Mountain project - in the same manner as his democrat counter-candidate Hillary Clinton
who had long sided with Nevada in its opposition to a repository at Yucca Mountain (Carter
2010; Teller 2011). As Obama was elected the president in 2010 his new administration,
including the new secretary of energy, Chu, started to suspend the project. Without any scientific
justification, Yucca Mountain was doomed simply as "not a workable option" (Carter et al,
2010). As the expenditures for repository development were subject to annual congressional
appropriations, president Obama started defunding the Yucca Mountain project in 2010. To
formalize the abandonment, secretary Chu withdrew the Yucca Mountain license application. In
order to resolve the waste problem secretary Chu announced a panel for experts, called The Blue
Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC), to analyze other options for nuclear
waste disposal (Widder and Calloway, 2010). Later it has been speculated that Obama and Reid
had a deal where Reid helped Obama to get his agenda including the healthcare bill through the
senate, while Obama in turn removed the funding for Yucca Mountain (Carter et al, 2010).
However, the fight over Yucca Mountain is not over. The licensing board at the NRC
stated in 2010 that the withdrawal is illegal because it supersedes the DOE’s authority under the
NWPA of 1982. The licensing board stated "unless congress directs otherwise, DOE may not
single-handedly derail the legislatively mandated decision-making process" (Carter et al 2010).
At the moment (2013) congress still appears divided on waste issue and the legislation stays
quiet on Yucca Mountain. Moreover, the 2012 Presidential elections did not change the situation.
In January 2013 DOE issued new strategy for the management and disposal of used nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste based on the recommendations made by the BRC. The new
strategy is based on a consent-based siting process, a reformed funding approach and the
establishment of a new organization with greater autonomy to implement the program. The
strategy contains a pilot interim storage facility, a larger full-scale interim storage facility and a
geologic repository. The geologic repository should be operating by 2048. (Department of
Energy 2013). Figure 9 presents Yucca Mountain stakeholder map in 2012.
15
State of
Nevada
High
degree
of salience
President
Obama
NRC
Nevada
Chairman
Senator
Secretary
Reed
of
Nevada
Energy
governor
Congress
NRC
DOE
EPA
Low
degree
of salience
Nuclear
facilities
Public
Non-supportive
States with
nuclear
waste
Supportive
EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION
In the two cases stakeholders’ stances and salience were by no means static during the
front-end phase of the projects. Case Onkalo and Case Yucca Mountain demonstrate different
types of stakeholder dynamics due to both stakeholder management strategies and stakeholders’
influence strategies that have had significant implications to the progress of the projects. Based
on the within case analyses, we mapped the changes in stakeholders’ salience attributes and
positions in both cases to the salience-position matrix.
In Case Onkalo, the opposing municipalities were able to increase their salience through
using stakeholder influence strategies such as forming non-governmental organizations to oppose
the repository projects – a strategy that highlighted the urgency of their claim and increased their
power. In turn, the owner of the project, Posiva, was also able to enact stakeholder management
strategies that were effective in terms of modifying the position of Eurajoki municipality and its
residents to being more supportive towards the project. Furthermore, Posiva was sensitive
enough towards the opponent signals from the other municipalities and decided to proceed with
Eurajoki site alone. This decision to engage with Eurajoki and dismiss the other municipalities
directly decreased the level of salience of other municipalities. At the end of the front-end stage,
the majority of the salient Onkalo project stakeholders were positive towards the project. In other
words, through effective stakeholder management strategies, Onkalo project’s project
management was able to induce favorable stakeholder movement towards supportive-salient
quarter and to move non-supportive stakeholders to non-salient quarter. Posiva was able to
proceed with the project as it had salient and supportive stakeholders Eurajoki municipality,
STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Finland), government and parliament behind it.
Figure 10 summarizes the major changes in the stakeholders’ salience and positions, as well as
reasons for them during the front-end stage.
16
High
degree
of salience
Low
degree
of salience
2. Municipalities
and residents of
Äänekoski,
Kuhmo, Loviisa
Stakeholder
management
strategies
Stakeholder
influence
strategies
1.Municipalities
and residents of
Äänekoski,
Kuhmo, Loviisa
3.Municipalities
and residents of
Äänekoski,
Kuhmo, Loviisa
1. Eurajoki
municipality
and
residents
Fennovoima
2. Eurajoki
municipality
and
residents
Stakeholder
management
strategies
Emergent
player
Supportive
Non-supportive
Figure 10. Onkalo stakeholder salience-position matrix (changes in stakeholder positions and
salience)
In comparison, Case Yucca Mountain featured more dramatic changes in the positions of
salient stakeholders due to the effective stakeholder influence strategies that stakeholders
employed. In this case, stakeholders’ movement was out of project management’s control and
mostly towards non-supportive–salient quarter. In Yucca Mountain project, the location of the
site was fixed at quite an early stage of the project despite the opposing opinions and movements
of salient stakeholders such as the State of Nevada. Consequently, in this case the project owner
DOE as well as the nuclear facilities and the states with nuclear waste that highly supported the
project lacked the adequate salience to begin with. Furthermore, they were not able to engage
opposing salient stakeholders’ effectively which exposed the project to political scheming and
was unfavorable considering its length. As the controversial project prolonged, the number of
opposing stakeholders increased and the opponent stakeholders gained enough salience to
terminate the project through their employment of influence strategies. Figure 11 summarizes the
major changes in the stakeholders’ salience and positions, as well as reasons for them during the
front-end stage.
17
High
degree
of salience
Low
degree
of salience
President,
NRC
Chairman,
Secretary of
Emergy
2.State of
Nevada and
governor
Stakeholder
influence
strategies
President,
NRC
Chairman,
Secretary of
Emergy
Stakeholder
influence
strategies
1.State of
Nevada and
governor
2.Public
1.Public
Stakeholder
influence
strategies
Non-supportive
Supportive
Figure 11. Yucca Mountain stakeholder salience-position matrix (changes in stakeholder
positions and salience)
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the study are valuable for project stakeholder research, since prior
stakeholder literature has rarely conceptualized stakeholder dynamics and the elements of
stakeholder dynamism in a systematic manner (Yang et al, 2009). The value of the paper is also
in increasing our understanding of the dynamics of the project front-end stage that has just
recently gained more attention from researchers. Specifically, the empirical findings of
stakeholder dynamics bring up important lessons for project managers on the proactive
management of stakeholder dynamics. First of all, it is important for project management to
evaluate the stance and position of the stakeholders and the potential changes within them. The
empirical analyses highlight the importance of building a project stakeholder coalition in which
the majority of stakeholders are supporters with a high degree of salience. For example, in case
Onkalo, the project management was able to strengthen the salience of such stakeholders who
supported the project and in turn able to decrease the salience of opponent stakeholders through
stakeholder management strategies. Unfortunately, in case Yucca Mountain there was a number
of local stakeholders who were opponents and whom the management did not actively pay
attention to in order to change their stance or decrease their salience. This finally led into a
situation where the stakeholder dynamics became uncontrollable and the opponent stakeholders
were able to increase their salience significantly by employing stakeholder influence strategies.
Hence, it is also important for the management to carefully evaluate the capability of different
stakeholders to shape their salience attributes through stakeholder influence strategies. Case
Yucca Mountain also reminds that central project decision-makers need to be primarily
18
interested in the success and effectiveness of the project. This ensures that the project will not be
altered to political scheming and that central decision-makers will not easily change their stance
towards the project. It would be best to try to seek for solutions where stakeholders and decisionmakers would be as permanent as possible during the project. For example, in Finland the
investment funds are allocated for a company, whose only objective is to take care of nuclear
repository projects.
Furthermore, the developed salience-position framework for mapping stakeholders and
their dynamics is believed to be of practical use for project managers when analyzing the needs
and concerns of different stakeholders during the early feasibility and conceptual design stages
of projects. The existing stakeholder frameworks do not often take into account whether the
stakeholders are supporters or non-supporters and what are the potential reasons that may lead to
changes in stakeholder positions. Therefore, we suggest that the developed salience-position
matrix offers a more realistic picture for the purposes of stakeholder analysis and management
than the widely applied power-interest matrix (Johnson and Scholes, 1999; Olander and Landin,
2005) which does not take into account the nature of stakeholders’ interest towards the project –
a key dimension to be included in stakeholder analysis and strategy formulation.
In particular in the context of nuclear industry projects, it is highly important to evaluate
and understand the positions of the stakeholders towards the project, as well as the potential
changes within these positions in order to evaluate the viability of projects. Finally, the empirical
findings illustrate how both the project management’s effective stakeholder management
strategies as well as stakeholders’ own influence strategies may explain stakeholder dynamics.
This is a perspective that has been rarely addressed in prior literature.
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22
APPENDIX 1:
Table 1. Project stakeholder definitions (chronological order)
Authors
Project stakeholder definition
Cleland (1986)
“Individuals and institutions that share a stake or an interest in the project.”
Cleland (1998)
“People or groups that have, or believe they have, legitimate claims against the substantive
aspects of the project. A stake is an interest or share or claim in a project; it can range from
informal interest in the undertaking, at one extreme, to a legal claim or ownership at the other
extreme.”
Turner (1999)
“All the people or groups whose lives or environment is affected by the project but who
receive no direct benefit from it. These can include families, people made redundant and local
community actors.”
McElroy and Mills
(2003)
“Person or group of people who have a vested interest in the success of a project and the
environment within which the project operates.”
Newcombe (2003)
“Groups or individuals who have a stake in, or expectation of, the project’s performance and
include clients, project managers, designers, subcontractors, suppliers, funding bodies, users
and the community at large.”
Boddy and Paton (2004)
“Stakeholders are individuals, groups or institutions with an interest in the project, and who
can affect the outcome.”
Kolltveit and Gronhaug
(2004)
“Individuals and/or organizations that are involved in or may be affected by the project
activities, e.g. the project client, project sponsor, project manager and the employees involved
in the project.”
Cova and Salle (2005)
“Project marketing thinks of stakeholders from the standpoint of “markets as networks”, i.e.
stressing the relationship between stakeholders rather than the players themselves.”
Bourne and Walker
(2005)
“Individuals or groups who have an interest or some aspect of rights or ownership in the
project, and can contribute to, or be impacted by, the outcomes of the project.”
Bryde and Robinson
(2005)
‘‘People or organizations who have a vested interest in the environment, performance and/or
outcome of the project.”
Boonstra (2006)
“Any person or group who can affect or is affected by the change [brought by the project]. “
El-Gohary et al. (2006)
“Individuals and organizations that are either affected by or affect the development of the
project.”
Olander (2007)
“A person or group of people who has a vested interest in the success of a project and the
environment within which the project operates. Vested interest is defined as having
possession of one or more of the stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy or urgency
(adapted from Mitchell et al, 1997).”
IFC (2007)
“Persons or groups who are directly or indirectly affected by a project, as well as those who
may have interests in a project and/or the ability to influence its outcome, either positively or
negatively.”
Fraser and Zhu (2008)
“Individuals and groups affected by their actions and behaviors”
Chinyio and Akintoye
(2008)
“Individuals or groups with an interest in and influence on an organization (adapted from
Thompson, 2002).”
PMI (2008)
“Individuals and organizations that are actively involved in the project or whose interests may
be affected as a result of project execution or project completion.”
Walker et al. (2008)
“Individuals or groups who have an interest or some aspect of rights or ownership in the
project, and can contribute to, or be impacted by, either the work or the outcomes of the
project.”
Ward and Chapman
(2008)
“Various parties who may affect the form, progress and outcomes of a project.”
23
APPENDIX 2: Classification and description of stakeholders
Table 2. Onkalo stakeholder identification.
STAKEHOLDER
Posiva
GOAL
Bury the nuclear
waste and
maintain the
positive
atmosphere in the
future.
POSITION
TOWARDS
THE PROJECT
SALIENCE
DESCRIPTION
Supportive
- Posiva gained
power by
marketizing the
repository and
inducing
competition between
the municipalities
- Crucial nature of
the project and time
sensitivity to realize
the project in
schedule induced
urgency
- Cooperation with
the authorities
increased legitimacy
24
INLUENCE
/STAKEHOLDER
MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY
- Flexible approach
on siting
- Keep options open
as long as possible
- Offer repository
project as a ready
package ‘take it or
leave it’ (milestones,
timetable,
technology)
-Promote the
benefits of the project
- Induce competition
- Act locally
- Open local offices
- Organize small
group meetings,
public briefings and
discussion
- Cluster decision
makers and local
residents using
different
communication
tactics on them
- Pursue to
cooperation and
comply with
compensations
- Publish own leaflet
‘Posiva investigates’
- Use employees’
voices
- Organize excursion
to nuclear power
plants
- Conduct EIA in all
four municipalities
- Found EIA
organization
including a EIA
contact person
- Ask for clear
positions before DiP
application and warn
Loviisa for its
passivity
- Earlier 1994 TVO
(predecessor of
Posiva) had put the
pressure on Eurajoki
by approaching the
neighbor
municipality Rauma
Eurajoki
Eurajoki residents
Loviisa
-Improve the
municipality’s
economy and
remain as an
independent
municipality.
-Gain
international
recognition as an
“nuclear power
center”
-As a
compensation
plan repair
historical Vuojoki
mansion
Supportive
- Initially Eurajoki
possessed power due
to the veto right to
its host
- Crucial and time
sensitive claims
since it needed the
project and did not
want to lose it to
other municipalities
- The fact of being
the most convenient
option for Posiva
increased the
urgency of its claims
- Play ‘hard to get’
first and later close
coperation
- Turn down
suggestions of a
referendum
- One person made an
appeal considering
the land rent
negotiations between
Posiva and Eurajoki
- About ten persons
appealed against
Eurajoki’s positive
dictum
- 11 persons
expressed their views
in EIA by writing
(Raittila et al 2002)
Benefit from the
positive side
effects given
work
opportunities,
better services
and increased real
estate value
Majority
supportive
towards the
project
- The potential
referendum vested
residents with power
- No nongovernmental
organizations were
formed which
excluded their
urgency attribute
As a potential
compensation
plan create
Loviisa Energy
Center
Nonsupportive/
Supportive:
divided views
- Vested with power
as it possessed veto
right to the potential
host of the facility
- Bystander
- Non-governmental
organization (Proloviisa and Loviisaliike) were
registered to
promote the
criticality of their
claims which
induced urgency.
- Register as nongovernmental
organizations
- Impact the decision
makers
- Start to collect
petition signatures
- Vested with power
- Non-cooperative
attitude
- Negative stand
towards the project
Loviisa residents
Mixed goals:
impact the
decision makers
both preventing
Loviisa getting
the project and
having it
Kuhmo
As a potential
compensation
plan improve
roads and build
an airport
Majority
nonsupportive;
local
businessmen
supportive
Nonsupportive
25
Kuhmo residents
Äänekoski
Äänekoski residents
Government
Parliament
Majority wanted
prevent Kuhmo
from hosting the
facility
Prevent
Äänekoski from
hosting the
facility
Prevent
Äänekoski from
hosting the
facility
Develop
independent
information about
nuclear power
Support the
realization of the
project according
to the nuclear
waste policy
Support the
realization of the
project according
to the nuclear
waste policy
Majority
nonsupportive;
local
businessmen
supportive
Nonsupportive
- Non-governmental
organizations
(Romuvaara-liike,
Yrittäjät ja
Mahdollisuuksia
Kuhmo) were
registered to
promote the
criticality of their
claims which
induced urgency
- Later they gained
power through
municipal elections.
- Address writing
campaigns
- 68 people expressed
their views in EIA by
writing (Raittila et al
2002)
- Register as nongovernmental
organizations
- Impact the decision
makers
- Use an direct
impact through
municipal elections
- Vested with power
- Non-cooperative
attitude
Nonsupportive
- Non-governmental
organization
(Kivetty-liike) was
registered to
promote the urgency
and criticality of its
claims
- Later they gained
power through
municipal elections.
Supportive
- Power according to
the DiP
- Legitimacy
warranted by the
status
- Urgency induced
by the criticality and
time sensitivity of its
claims
Excluding a
couple of MEPs
the overall
attitude was
supportive
- Power set by the
DiP
- Legitimacy
warranted by the
duty
- Urgency by the
criticality and time
sensitivity of its
claims
26
- Register as a nongovernmental
organization
- Have a direct
impact through
municipal elections,
green party got 4
members (Raittila et
al 2002)
- Require for
referendum
- Participation to
Posiva’s occasions
was exceptionally
low
- Favorable attitude
towards the deep
underground disposal
throughout the
project
- Convince public of
the safety of the
project
- Not to interrupt the
local decision making
- Reserved in media
before Parliament
handling in 2000
- Keep voters
satisfied
- Act as a link
between Posiva and
the authorities
- Advocate the
residents by visiting
the municipalities
- Act passively in
media
- Communicate
inside the research
community instead of
coming public
STUK
Ensure the safety
of the project
Supportive
- The role as an
independent agency
whose word is
trusted and respected
gave power and
legitimacy.
Researchers
Improve the
realization and
make
observations
Supportive
- Independent
opinion leaders,
possess legitimacy.
Nonsupportive
- Vested with
urgency as they are
already organized
groups and have
critical claims
towards the whole
industry
- Publish papers and
articles
- Organize campaigns
- Insist further studies
Supportive
- EIA hearings gave
public legitimacy
and the possibility to
get their voice heard.
- Not to intervene
with the project
- Express their voices
in TV news and
newspapers.
Greenpeace and The
Finnish Association for
Nature Conservation
Public
Question the final
disposal and
destabilize
Posiva’s action
Non-uniform goal
27
Table 3. Yucca Mountain stakeholder identification
STAKEHOLDER
GOAL
Realize the waste
burying project:
owns, constructs,
applies for licenses,
and will operate the
facility
DOE
Chu Secretary of
Energy (2009-)
Cancel Yucca
Mountain and
search for other
options
POSITION
TOWARDS
THE PROJECT
-A
Cabinet-level
department
of
the
United
States
government
-Legitimacy warranted
as
authorized
by
Congress
Supportive
-Legitimacy along the
duty
-Assigned by president
Obama Critical and
time sensitive claims
induced urgency.
Nonsupportive
- An agency of the
federal government of
the United States
- Legitimacy warranted
as authorized by
Congress
EPA
Ensure the safety of
the project by
setting the public
health and safety
standards
Supportive
NRC
Implement EPA's
standards and
license Yucca
Mountain as it fills
the requirement
Supportive:
despite the
different position
of the chairman
NRC
Chairman Jaczko
(2009-)
Congress
President
(2000-2008)
Bush
Cancel Yucca
Mountain
Nonsupportive
Keep Yucca
Mountain alive
Supportive
To conduct the
process as far as
possible
before
resigning
Supportive
SALIENCE
DESCRIPTION
-Legitimacy warranted
as authorized by
Congress
- In alliance with Reid
- Legitimacy along the
duty
- Critical and time
sensitive claims
induced urgency
- All legislative powers
are vested in Congress.
Has the power and
legitimacy to do
changes to the NWPA
and to President’s
budget proposals
- Long-term supporter
of Yucca Mountain
- Critical and time
sensitive claims
induced urgency.
-Possessed power in the
site designation and
budgeting processes
duty
28
INLUENCE
/STAKEHOLDER
MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY
- Act according the
NWPA and the best
interest of the nation
- Simply to state that
Yucca Mountain is 'not
a workable option’
- Appeal to the best
interest of the nation in
order to search for
alternative options
- Use the best available
scientific approaches
and issue a standard
that will protect public
health for a million
years
- Act according the
NWPA
- Challenge his own
authority as a chairman
and play shady politics
- Stick to the original
plan and respect
NWPA
- Speed up the whole
process
- Critical and time
sensitive claims
induced urgency.
The
Senate
Majority
Leader
Reid (2007-)
President
(2008-)
Obama
Nevada governor
Cancel
Yucca
Mountain and
boost his political
career
Cancel Yucca
Mountain by
staying loyal to his
voters
Cancel Yucca
Mountain and
boost his political
career
Nonsupportive
- Possess power to set
the budget proposals
and sig the final budget
duty
- Objects the project
due to personal affairs:
critical and time
sensitive claims
induced urgency
Nonsupportive
Nonsupportive
- Use his position as a
means to spread Yucca
Mountain objection
- Create alliances
-Eliminate funding
- Use his role as an
opinion leader
- Spread the alliance
- Possessed power and
used veto but was
overridden by the
Congress
duty
- Maintain Yucca
Mountain opposition
among Nevadans
- Has critical and time
sensitive claims which
induced urgency:
people feel it is unfair
for their state to host a
nuclear repository when
there are no nuclear
power plants in the
state
- Prolong the project
- Protest with lawsuits,
letter-writing
campaigns and public
demonstrations
- Refuse to issue
environmental permits
and deny water
- Las Vegas passed a
law making it illegal to
haul nuclear waste
through the city
Nevada
Cancel
Mountain
Nuclear facilities
Get Yucca
Mountain in
operation as soon as
possible
Supportive
States with nuclear
waste from nuclear
weapons production
Get Yucca
Mountain in
operation as soon as
possible
Supportive
- Critical and time
sensitive claims
induced urgency
- Filed lawsuits
Stop the fee
collection as there is
no clear plan for
Nonsupportive/
Supportive:
Not in my
- Time sensitive claims
induced urgency
- Presented claims
Public
Yucca
- As Senate Majority
Leader he leads the
Senate which gave him
power and legitimacy
- The main objector of
the project: critical and
time sensitive claims
induced urgency
Nonsupportive
- Critical and time
sensitive claims
induced urgency: extra
storage capacity
becomes expensive
29
- Want to get rid of the
waste but not on the
expense of additional
nuclear power
- File lawsuits
decommissioning
backyard attitude
30

Towards an Improved Understanding of Stakeholder

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