Hurricane Katrina: Dimensions of a Major Disaster

Hurricane Katrina:
Dimensions of a Major Disaster
Papers prepared for EMSE 334:
Environmental Hazards Management
Fall 2005
Dr. Paul Bourget, Professor
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Preface
Hurricane Katrina, the costliest disaster in US history, struck the Gulf Coast during the
same week that the Fall 2005 Environmental Hazards Management (EMSE 334) class
commenced. It decided that it would be best to focus the major class exercises on this one major
event. A disaster of this magnitude has many dimensions, and the rich physical and cultural
character of the Gulf Coast region adds to the richness of this unique "hazardscape".
Our knowledge of the effects that the combined Hurricanes of Katrina and Rita have on
the Gulf Coast is still unfolding. Since the papers contained in this report were written in the
weeks immediately following those two events their findings are necessarily incomplete.
Subsequent reporting and analyses will answer many of the questions posed herein. Much of
what is written, however, has broader implications that may very well prove useful in the longer
term.
Students were allowed to choose from a list of candidate topics and, working as teams,
decided to address the following issues:
•
Governance: Evaluate the various stakeholders in the region and what roles they played
before, during and after the event. Are roles and responsibilities within the US clearly
defined to allow for disaster resilience? What improvements should be made to delineate
lines of authority in conjunction with broader stakeholder involvement?
•
The Implementation of the National Response Plan: Hurricane Katrina marked the first
real test of the NRP. What are the shortcomings of this "all-hazards" approach? Evaluate
how well it performed and how it might be improved given the Katrina experience.
Discuss inter-organizational procedures in action vice the NRP.
•
Evacuation Procedures: Discuss the various evacuation measures that were imposed
during the incident and their outcomes. Discuss how the evacuation procedures could
have been improved.
•
Mass Fatalities: Evaluate policies that guide the management of mass casualties, and
evaluate how well the responsible authorities performed.
•
Identify and Address Vulnerable Populations: Describe the population that was
particularly exposed to this event. To what extent were the special needs addressed
during the various stages of the disaster? How could the most obvious cases of social
vulnerability been managed more effectively?
•
Public Health and Medical Response: Explore the various health issues that arose from
the event and how they were or were not managed during the various stages of the
disaster. Recommend improvements to the overall health care and medical delivery
system.
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•
Environmental Impacts: Evaluate the secondary environmental hazards that stemmed
from the event. What measures should be imposed to ameliorate future environmental
impacts?
•
The Louisiana Coastal Area: Summarize the history and goals of the LCA project.
Discuss reaction to the project, how it is to be funded, and upon implementation how it
may or may not have minimized the losses from Hurricane Katrina.
•
Urban Flood Protection Measures: Evaluate the various measures that were in place
prior to Katrina. Who is responsible for their construction, maintenance and operations?
What were the barriers that precluded our having a more effective regional and urban
flood protection system?
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Governmental Responsibilities
Shandi Stracke, Matt Briston and Kashif Javaid
In an attempt to provide some sort of analysis on what the government roles are in a
disaster we have created a general comparison between what the responsibilities are as outlined
in the current local, state and national emergency plans and what the actual responses were
before, during and after Hurricane Katrina. In addition to the “what shoulda happened”
comparison we will look at the differences between how Florida responded to Hurricane Wilma
as opposed to how Louisiana responded to Hurricane Katrina.
In light of the fact that response and recovery efforts are still underway and the fact that
these efforts are in the process of being investigated, the information provided in this report is
what was available and/or what was directly experienced through on-the-job exposure as
emergency managers. That being said, a report such as this will not be comprehensive for some
time, if ever, nor will it be bias-free. When and if possible any and all information presented in
this paper will be updated based on new findings and outcomes of investigating committees or
hearings.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines Governance as the
act, process, or power of governing; government: “Regaining a sense of the state is thus an
absolute priority, not only for an effective policy against . . . terrorism, but also for governance
itself” (Moorhead Kennedy).
Governance in the Thesaurus is classified to be the continuous exercise of authority over
a political unit: administration, control, direction, government, rule. A system by which a
political unit is controlled: government, regime, rule. (From answers.com)
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, we see governance as an action-oriented task that
requires key figures to maintain authority and control any foreseeable road blocks, therefore we
have Governance = Prevention + Response. The key government officials responsible for
prevention and response to a state level emergency are:
•
•
•
Local Officials
Governors
Federal Government (Department of Homeland Security, FEMA)
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The stakeholders listed above play vital roles in order to prevent and respond to a state
level emergency. The roles and responsibilities of these stakeholders and how they were
executed during Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma will be discussed.
Two key elements in hurricane planning and management at the Local and State level are
early warning systems and timely evacuation. These elements when developed and implemented
will reduce the risks and get people out of the harms' way. Florida is a state frequently hit by
hurricanes, allowing ample opportunity for government officials to test their plans. The State of
Florida after learning from past hurricanes has improved on sending a clear message to the
public: evacuate in time and minimize power outages at critical facilities such as hospitals. In the
wake of Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Floyd, the State of Florida focused on improving their
evacuation practices.
Louisiana, on the other hand, has large parts of the state that are at or below sea level, as
well as being located in flood plains, making them particularly vulnerable to many disaster
scenarios. Louisiana has accepted or been complacent with this risk and has allowed citizens to
live in these vulnerable areas. The state paid scant attention to prevention. Levees are the only
preventive measure in place. Due to more pressing economic concerns, the State has not
maintained or strengthened the levees as necessary.
As a result of the Hurricane Pam exercises in 2004 and 2005, involving State emergency
managers, FEMA federal and regional officials assessed how the levees might perform during a
Category 4 hurricane, and certain recommendations were made based on this scenario. The
primary recommendation was to strengthen the levees and that required money. Part of which
had to come from the Federal government and the rest from the State. With the present efforts of
the Federal government to secure the homeland and to combat terrorists world-wide, this
hurricane study was not given ample attention. FEMA recently was rolled into the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the funding mechanisms that would have allowed them to
strengthen the levees were not allocated (Hurricane Pam, 2005).
So what plans do Florida and Louisiana have in place in case of an emergency or
disaster? It is important to look at these two states in order to shed light on the recent events of
the 2005 Hurricane Season. By looking at the responsibilities outlined in the Local, State and
Federal plans and comparing that with what actually happened, the lessons learned can begin to
take shape and plans can be updated accordingly.
The Florida Hurricane Evacuation Plan
What Should Happen on a Local Level in Florida
“Just as all politics are local, so are all disasters,” said Governor Jeb Bush of Florida
before the House Committee on Homeland Security (Bush, 2005). “The Most effective response
is one that starts at the local level and grows with the support of surrounding communities, the
state and the federal government,” Bush also added (Bush). Governor Bush’s statements hold
true when examining the role of local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) in the state of
Florida.
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Preparation for a hurricane begins with each resident in Florida. Before each hurricane
season, residents are urged by their local EOC’s to stock up on emergency supplies such as food,
water and clothing. A complete list of recommended emergency supplies is available on each
county’s EOC website. Residents are also advised to stock up on enough emergency supplies to
last 3-7 days (FL EM Website, 2005).
Every county in Florida has an established EOC, however, only those counties that have
the possibility of being affected by storm surge issue maps that indicate which areas are at risk
from the surge. As illustrated in the map below for the city of Tampa, located in Hillsborough
County, Florida, areas near the coast and inland waterways are at most risk from experiencing
storm surge. Each area is coded by color and zone ranging from “A – E”. When a hurricane is
forecasted to make landfall, the Hillsborough County EOC will advise residents to evacuate
based on which zone they reside in. For example, if a category 1 storm was expected to hit the
Tampa Bay region, those living in evacuation zone A, or in the purple sections in the map, would
be put under mandatory evacuation orders. Whereas if a Category 5 storm was forecasted,
everyone up to and including zone E would be put under a mandatory evacuation order.
Evacuation map of
downtown Tampa
illustrating evacuation zones
A through E.
Evacuation Map and legend
courtesy of Hillsborough
County EOC
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Miami-Dade County, Florida, has a map similar to that of Hillsborough County;
however, their evacuation zones only range from “A-C”. It should be noted that the Florida State
EOC maintains similar evacuation maps for at-risk counties that remain constant in terms of
evacuation zones based on the category of hurricane. Also, despite each EOC’s best efforts to
evacuate residents, and although evacuations may be called “mandatory”, it is not required that
residents evacuate, rather it is “highly recommended” that they do so.
Miami-Dade
County
Evacuation Map
– Courtesy of the
Miami-Dade
EOC
What Should Happen on the State Level in Florida
In December of 2003 the State of Florida released a hazard mitigation plan that was
aimed at ensuring the safety of residents and businesses through mitigation practices. While this
plan was focused on natural, technological and human hazards, hurricane mitigation was an
important topic. The Florida State Government placed hurricane mitigation into six categories;
preventative measures, property protection, emergency services measures, structural projects,
natural resource protection and public information (Statewide Hazard Assessment).
Preventative Measures: This portion of Florida’s mitigation plan includes community
planning, zoning and building code enforcement. An example of a local community
incorporating mitigation into its community is Jacksonville. The city’s Preservation Program
acquires land for conservation purposes. The program allowed for the acquisition of Castaway
Island, an area that would be affected even by a minor hurricane. The acquisition of this land
prohibits developments from forming and thus eliminates the possibility of any damage
occurring to structures, and ultimately saves residents hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Hurricane straps are another example of a preventative measure that can be taken to make a
structure sturdier when exposed to hurricane force winds. While it is possible for one to install
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hurricane straps on their own, it is highly recommended that a contractor be used to mount the
straps to ensure proper installation.
Property Protection: Property protection involves removing people from areas most at
risk of being repeatedly affected by natural disasters, such as flooding. This also includes
moving business and property from areas that, in terms of disaster planning, should not have
been built in the first place.
Emergency Services Measures: This aspect relates to action taken during and
immediately after a disaster to minimize its impact. This includes emergency response, critical
facilities protection and communications, especially amongst first responders. Local fire, police
and EMS are typically the first on the scene immediately after a hurricane and therefore must be
trained to meet the demands presented by a major land-falling hurricane.
Structural Projects: Structural projects include such activities as building levees to help
control flooding, modifying channels to divert flood waters to open spaces and storm water
management facilities. Since local governments have the most knowledge of their geography
and risks to their areas, they will typically identify what structural projects will be needed to
protect citizens in their jurisdiction.
Natural Resource Protection: The most visible mitigation procedures taken in regards to
natural resource protection in Florida are jetties. These manmade structures help to prevent
beach erosion, both during storms and during calm weather. The expected price for the
construction of jetties would average out to be just a fraction of the cost to rebuild a beach and
all of its natural habitats that exist there if destroyed.
Public Information Programs: Public Information Programs inform property owners of
hazards and ways to protect their property from such hazards. Public information activities
usually include flood maps and data, library resources, outreach programs, real estate disclosure
information and environmental education programs. Each county in Florida has an EOC office
here citizens can obtain more information on potential risks to and ways to protect their selves
and property when a disaster occurs.
Florida’s geography puts nearly every resident in the state at risk of experiencing some
type of hurricane hazard. Because of this, the state of Florida has implemented a regional
evacuation process, which includes five separate stages (FL Evacuation Procedure, 2001). These
stages include preparedness, stand-by, decision, evacuation and re-entry. This process is
constantly in effect, but typically does not move from the “preparedness” stage until a hurricane
threatens the state.
The preparedness stage was created to allow local and state EOC’s to prepare for the
inevitable. Training and exercises in evacuation procedure are performed to ensure that all
programs run smoothly when a tropical storm or hurricane threatens to make landfall.
The stand-by stage is when the state EOC is put on alert and begins communicating with
both the National Hurricane Center and county EOCs to discuss probabilities of landfall and
evacuation coordination issues. Local and state emergency information lines are established in
the area predicted to be affected and emergency operation centers are put on stand-by for
resource mobilization. Any outstanding issues such as high tourism period, holidays, road
construction, etc… are also identified and communicated to the State EOC.
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During the decision phase, a state of emergency would be declared by the governor, the
decision to reverse traffic into a “contra flow” plan is considered and made if necessary and then
the State EOC would mobilize all necessary resources to counties that will not be affected by the
storm. State and local EOCs will coordinate the release of pre-event/pre-evacuation emergency
public information to local media outlets for disseminating the information.
When the evacuation stage is initiated, it is here that EOC officials make the
determination if the evacuation can be completed before it becomes too dangerous to evacuate.
Residents who are unable to evacuate in time will be advised to seek refuges-of-last-resort. In a
case where the evacuation cannot be completed fully, the state EOC will mobilize and coordinate
the delivery of state assistance to those evacuees who are instructed to seek refuges-of-lastresort.
After the storm has passed, the re-entry stage would be put into effect. During the initial
implementation of this stage, county officials would make damage assessments and make a
determination regarding lifting the evacuation order. The decision to lift the evacuation order
would be made by local jurisdictions and traffic control is directed by local law enforcement.
The county officials would coordinate with state officials to prepare a re-entry traffic
management plan.
As is mentioned in the decision phase, the Florida Governor has the option to initiate
“contra flow” on designated highways. The concept of the “contra flow” plan is to allow more
residents to evacuate faster by reversing traffic on highways. Southbound lanes become
northbound lanes, which gives evacuees another 2-3 lanes of highway to escape. The “contra
flow” plan is only used at the governor’s discretion. The idea to reverse traffic lanes was
developed in 1994 after Hurricane Andrew devastated the south Florida region.
During Hurricane Ivan in 2004, Florida road crews and traffic enforcement put over
3,000 traffic cones and signs in “stand-by” mode in case the governor gave the order for “contra
flow”. Although “contra flow” was never ordered, it was a good exercise for the road crews
involved. In fact, through all four of the land-falling hurricanes in 2004, the reverse traffic flow
code was never given.
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The green line
indicates which roads
on Florida’s Turnpike
system would be put
into “contra flow”.
Image courtesy of FLA
DOT
What Should Happen on a National Level in Florida
As Governor Bush pointed out, preparation for a hurricane should begin on a local level
and work its way up to the federal level. In terms of how the government should assist, FEMA
should step in when local and state operations become overwhelmed and can no longer
accommodate the needs of the affected area (Bush). Debris removal, temporary housing and
emergency supplies are among the more expensive necessities required by areas affected by a
hurricane and are typically areas where FEMA will assist. FEMA also aids in mobilizing and
positioning emergency equipment and rescue personnel, providing food and water, aiding with
low interest loans, providing financial support to private citizens affected by the storm and
restoring damaged services and systems.
What Actually Happened on the Local Level During Hurricane Wilma
Mandatory evacuations were issued for several locations in south Florida. More
specifically, all residents of the Florida Keys were asked to evacuate, however it is estimated that
only 10% of the total population of the Keys actually left the islands. Evacuation numbers were
also low in Monroe County (USA Today, 10/05). “We are very discouraged about the low
number of people evacuated,” said Irene Toner, emergency management director for Monroe
County. Toner went on to say that, “We had law enforcement encouraging people to leave, but
unfortunately we cannot make them go (USA Today 10/05).” Residents in Collier County who
were asked to evacuate, did a much better job of heeding that order as an estimated 70% of
residents evacuated. As expected, local EOCs coordinated efforts with the American Red Cross
and got several shelters up and running. Of the 160,000 south Florida residents who were under
mandatory evacuation orders only 7,000 actually used those shelters.
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After Wilma made landfall, local EOCs and emergency crews were quickly overwhelmed
by the amount of damage that was caused by Hurricane Wilma. Local officials called upon state
and national officials to assist them with recovery efforts.
What Actually Happened on the State Level During Hurricane Wilma
Florida Department of Transportation officials estimated that only 10% of the residents
who live in the keys heeded the warning to evacuate (Simmons, 2005). In Collier county,
residents took the storm more seriously as 70% of those living in the mandatory evacuation area
decided to leave (Simmons). On the East Coast, residents who lived in mobile homes and lowlying areas were ordered to evacuate. In south-Florida as a whole, 160,000 residents were told to
evacuate and about 7,000 of those told to do so actually went to shelters (Simmons).
In terms of recovery, state operations were criticized for their timeliness to deliver goods.
Although more than 400 trucks filled with ice and water also were waiting in Homestead and
Jacksonville, many residents had to wait several days to receive those basic necessities.
Governor Bush answered back to those who complained about the slow delivery of goods,
"People had ample time to prepare, and it isn't that hard to get 72 hours worth of food and water,
to do the simple things we ask people to do (Kleindienst, Nolin and Wallman, 2005) However,
Florida State Director of Emergency Management Craig Fugate admitted that state efforts could
have run a lot more smoothly. "We pushed as much as we could in a rapidly moving
environment. No excuses. We're working hard to make it better,” Fugate said (Kleindienst, Nolin
and Wallman). In his testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Bush admitted
that Florida learned its lesson last year to get ice, water and food in to those who need it
immediately after the winds die down (Bush). But those efforts clearly were no match for the
wrath of hurricane Wilma as Bush stated, “This is a chaotic process. We did not perform where
we want to be” (Kleindienst, Nolin and Wallman).
In terms of “contra flow”, it was implemented on all of the bridges connecting the barrier
Islands in and around Fort Myers (Cooper, 2005), however, it was not implemented on any of the
major Florida Highways.
What Actually Happened on the National Level During Hurricane Wilma
When comparing FEMA’s response to both Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma, FEMA did a
much better job responding to Wilma’s devastation. A key in any disaster situation, such as a
hurricane, is communication. With this in mind, FEMA provided 300 satellite phones to agency
workers in south Florida to ensure a strong communications link during and after the storm
(Gaouette, 2005). In addition to the satellite phones, FEMA also provided the following to South
Florida in preparation for Wilma’s arrival (HQ-05-342, 2005):
•
•
•
•
50 truckloads of ice, 50 truckloads of water, 5 truckloads of meals are en-route to preposition to Homestead Air Force Base to be staged by Friday afternoon.
100 truckloads of ice, 100 truckloads of water, 25 truckloads of meals are en-route to preposition to Jacksonville Naval Air Station to be staged by Friday afternoon.
2 Urban Search and Rescue Task Force and 1 Incident Support Team have been deployed
to arrive in Orlando, Fla., by 12 noon on Friday.
2 additional Urban Search and Rescue teams are staging at their home bases in Florida.
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•
•
6 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams are deployed to pre-stage in Orlando by Friday
afternoon.
6 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams are on alert at their home bases.
FEMA credits its response to Wilma to their permanent presence in Florida. A
spokesperson for FEMA also said that residents in Florida are much more familiar with
hurricanes which aided in the evacuation and recovery process (Cooper). Pleasant Mann, a
FEMA program specialist also added that, “"We knew that it [Wilma] would be more of what
we're used to dealing with than what we had with Katrina (Cooper).”
Characteristics of Hurricane Evacuation that Florida has improved upon:
• Advanced warning that a hurricane is approaching
• Understanding of the level, velocity, and locality of the storm
• Awareness of high risk locations
• Large regional evacuation area
• High potential for damage to the road infrastructure
These are key characteristics to successfully administer hurricane evacuation. With 36
hours or more warning time, most evacuation can ideally occur prior to the storm’s arrival. It is
also possible to prepare and evacuate communities in stages based on their proximity to the
approaching storm, allowing for more efficient use of transportation resources. In order to
prevent loss of life during and after a hurricane, evacuation is the best risk reduction measure.
Policies and detailed plans should be developed for risk reduction measures such as evacuation.
The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan:
What Should Happen at the Local Level in Louisiana
According to the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Plan the local jurisdictions are
responsible for planning and making prior arrangements for evacuations, shelters, and first
response by police, fire and medical personnel. Flood-protection via levees are the primary
responsibility of local levee boards. Local emergency management organizations shall function
from designated EOCs.
To highlight a specific local jurisdiction in Louisiana, and one that could arguably be the
most prominent one of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, what were the responsibilities as outlined
in the New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan? The plan is based on the
principle that City government bears the initial responsibility for disaster response and relief. It
also indicates that “the City Code provide for emergency continuity of City government in the
event of any emergency or disaster.” In addition, each City agency is responsible for
accomplishing the functions for which it is meant to perform as well as ensure that essential
personnel report to work prior to, during and following an emergency or disaster. In activating
the EOC each city agency is responsible for “designating an EOC representative and alternate(s)
who must be prepared to respond to any emergency or disaster.” It is states that these
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representatives would ideally be trained, experienced and have the authority to direct the actions
of the responders from that agency.
The mayor, as outlined in this plan, “shall utilize all available resources of the City
government, as reasonably necessary to manage emergency operations”. The Mayor is also in
charge of Emergency Operations for the City of New Orleans. He must prepare for and execute
“rescue, care and treatment of persons victimized or threatened by disaster and provide a setting
conducive to the rapid and orderly restoration and rehabilitation of persons and property affected
by a disaster.”
In the Hurricane Annex of the plan it states that “the safe evacuation of threatened
populations when endangered by a major catastrophic event is one of the principle reasons for
developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.” It goes on to state that “thorough
identification of at-risk populations, transportation and sheltering resources, evacuation routes
and potential bottlenecks and choke points.” The Annex specifies that approximately 100,000
citizens in New Orleans do not have means of personal transportation, and identifies eight
schools approved as hurricane evacuation shelters and only states that “last resort refuges and
super shelters are described in specific SOP’s covering their application.”
What Should Happen at the State Level in Louisiana
The State has also established an emergency plan as mentioned earlier. The State of
Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan outlines the responsibilities of the state in the event of an
emergency or disaster.
When local resources are overtaxed, the state is responsible for stepping in to provide
assistance with logistical and manpower. State assistance should supplement local efforts and
federal assistance will supplement State and local efforts when it is clearly demonstrated that an
emergency or disaster is beyond local and state capabilities. One of the State’s main resources is
the National Guard, which is under the control of the governor.
The governor is responsible for coordinating delivery of all emergency services, public,
quasi-volunteer and private during an emergency or disaster. The governor has delegated the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Director the authority to
implement this plan and to direct State-level emergency operations through the regularly
constituted government structure.
The State’s responsibility also necessitates the development of an all-hazard plan, with
functional annexes and detailed procedures, supported by parish and local emergency plans. The
State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan indicates that “planning efforts are made as
general as possible to insure flexibility to combat the impact of all types of hazards”.
What Should Happen at the National Level
As previously discussed, the Federal responsibilities are outlined in the National
Response Plan (NRP) as “the final stop when disasters outstrip state and local resources.” When
called upon, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the Department of
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Homeland Security takes the lead in coordinating the response to provide supplies, help with
cleanup, and provide aid to those whose homes are destroyed. The Federal government can also
enlist the Department of Defense for troops, air and sealift help.
What Actually Happened on the Local Level: Hurricane Katrina:
Actions taken by the City of New Orleans and Mayor Ray Nagin in the specific areas of
responsibility outlined previously show that on August 27, 2005 Nagin warned citizens not to be
complacent. He advised people to board up their homes, fill their gas tanks and gather their
medications. At this point, the Mayor suggested that people evacuate the city (USA Today,
2005) SS.
The city identified and designated the Superdome, convention center and other sites as
temporary shelters, however transportation was not available for those without cars. The Mayor
had used the Superdome twice prior to Hurricane Katrina as a shelter of last resort. The first
time, during Hurricane Georges it turned out to be a disaster and the second time, During
Hurricane Ivan it proved to be better organized. Unfortunately, its use during Hurricane Katrina
fared not so well once again.
On August 28, 2005 Mayor Nagin made evacuation of the city mandatory; still no means
of transportation was made available to those estimated 100,000 people with out cars, even
though several hundred school buses were at the City’s disposal.
Due to the destruction of the City and the devastation to the utilities the city had to
relocate the EOC to a local hotel. The City also had to request emergency management support
to run the EOC due to the lack of government personnel available. Two of the management
teams sent to New Orleans reported that the city personnel who did arrive to work did not know
what the National Incident Command System was nor did they know how to set up an EOC. The
room originally chosen for the EOC was no bigger than a typical classroom. In addition to these
shortcomings, the Mayor, who was supposed to be in charge of the emergency operations, was
rarely seen in the EOC (Anonymous, 2005).
State Response to Katrina:
When informed of the imminent threat of Katrina, Governor Kathleen Blanco warned
citizens to evacuate and the State Transportation Department and police managed traffic flow
north. On August 26, 2005 as the storm approached, Governor Blanco declared a state of
emergency in order to initiate the pre-positioning of Federal commodities at Federal Operations
Staging Areas (FOSA’s).
At the time of the storm approximately 65% of Louisiana’s National Guard troops were
available the rest had been depleted by deployments to Iraq, anemic recruiting and other reasons,
leaving only 3,780 to provide assistance in the State. The National Guard is an entity well known
to be an integral part of a state government. They are well trained and prepared to deal with
natural disasters by activating plans (such as NIMS) and by assigning personnel and resources to
numerous tasks defined within the mission’s scope. They understand not only how to manage the
task (disaster) but also are trained to effectively communicate and raise matters to appropriate
levels.
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Their mission as it reads on the National Guard’s web site states that “The Army National
Guard’s state mission is perhaps the most visible and well know. Nearly everyone has seen or
heard of Guards units responding to battle fires or helping communities deal with floods,
tornados, hurricanes, snowstorms or other emergency situations. In times of civil unrest, the
citizens of a state can rest assured that the Guard will be ready to respond, if needed.”
(Army.Mil)
Depending on the nature of the duty, the governor of a given state or the President of the
United States has control and authority over the National Guard units. When the units are not
under federal control, they fall under their respective state’s government command structure. The
President serves as commander-in-chief for units mobilized for federal active duty. Guards are
considered active-duty under the command of the state governor during a community based duty
such as a flood response aid and rescue civilians. When activated abroad to support a federal
mission, the Guards are under the control of the President of the United States.
“At the state level, the governors reserve the ability under the constitution to call up
members of the Army National Guard in times of domestic emergency.” (Army Mil)
During Hurricane Katrina 7,000 Guardsmen from Louisiana and Mississippi were
deployed in Iraq. Half of them are members of Louisiana’s 256th Mechanized Infantry Brigade
(Healy, 2005). Also deployed in Iraq were the high-water vehicles and other gear that could have
contributed in responding to the flooding in New Orleans.
On August 28, 2005 the governor asked the President for help, saying the crisis was
“beyond the capabilities of the state and affected local governments.” After this letter was
received and help was offered to the Governor from the President, Governor Blanco was
indecisive whether to turn over law enforcement authority to the federal government as well as
place all State Guard troops under federal control.
Federal Response to Katrina:
With warnings of a Category 4 hurricane approaching the region, FEMA pre-positioned
small teams at appropriate staging areas. These teams consisted of 50 medical assistance teams
and 25 search-and-rescue task forces. In addition to those teams, eight Navy ships headed to the
Gulf of Mexico, though they would take days for them to arrive. The Army Corps of Engineers,
expecting rising water from the storm would top the levees, evacuated their personnel ahead of
time.
Once Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency FEMA Logistics pre-positioned
commodities such as ice, water and Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) at the closest FOSAs.
Approximately 1,700 trucks moved supplies into the region. Unfortunately, as the disaster
response was underway actual numbers of commodities and services did not match up with what
was being reported. This issue of conflicting numbers continues to be a hindrance.
On September 26, 2005, President Bush urged Congress to consider amending the Posse
Comitatus Act in order for the U.S. forces to take control without delay in the aftermath of a
disaster. The Posse Comitatus Act is a federal ruling that limits the ability of the government to
use arm forces to respond to domestic events such as floods. Red tape and bureaucracy, not
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specific government officials, were to blame for the delay in getting emergency aid to stranded
residents of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico told
a breakfast crowd at a Democratic Party fundraiser in Socorro. He said that “Our system is so
bureaucratic that it’s difficult to get things done.”
Governor Richardson gave permission to deploy New Mexico National Guard members
on Tuesday, but because of red tape and bureaucracy, “they just left Friday ... They stood around
waiting for three days.” – Gov. Richardson. (Bowley,2005)
Lessons learned
Now begins the questions and the inquiries. Members of Congress such as Sen. Hillary
Rodham Clinton of New York questioned whether folding FEMA into the Department of
Homeland Security had weakened its disaster-relief role amid a heightened emphasis on fighting
terrorism (USA Today). “They’ve taken emergency management away from the emergency
managers,” complained Morrie Goodman, who was FEMA’s chief spokesman during the Clinton
administration. “These operations are being run by people who are amateurs at what they are
doing.” (Elliston, 2005)
Some are suggesting that the Federal government take a larger role in disaster response,
however as stated by Governor Perry from Texas, “If, from the President on down, we recognize
the federal response was not adequate during Katrina, does that inspire confidence that a greater
federal role is the solution?” (Perry, 2005).
When Hurricane Katrina made land fall in Louisiana, the state and local governments did
not follow a standardized approach outlined in the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) and therefore each oversight made the next issue
worse to manage and thus both the Mayor and the Governor were overwhelmed. Certain
elements such as Louisiana’s telecommunication infrastructure, back up generators and power
supplies to hospitals were old, untested and lacked upgrades. Due to no diversity, telephone lines
went out of service as soon as only one part of the region was flooded. The Mayor and Governor
found themselves isolated and were not able to communicate. On Wednesday morning, Senator
Landrieu was standing outside the chaotic Superdome and asked to borrow a FEMA official’s
phone to call her office in Washington. “It didn’t work,” she told Newsweek (3).
Hospitals lost power, generators and back up power supplies did not work effectively.
Police and Fire Fighters were soon exhausted and started dismantling and many were reported to
be absent without leave. FEMA had not fully taken over and engaging armed forces required a
declaration from the president overriding all other authority. Stakeholders starting with the
elected officials of the City of New Orleans, failed to foresee and react in time. (Thomas, 2005)
Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco was aware that she needed help but due to lack of
constant communication and competency in dealing with disasters, did not know what to ask for.
Once the 17th Street Canal levee had been breached and the city was overwhelmed it was
FEMA's responsibility to step in. The ability of FEMA to respond to a natural disaster of this
magnitude had not been tested under the Bush Administration. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11
attacks, FEMA lost its Cabinet-level status and was folded into the much larger Department of
17
Homeland Security. In the years following the September 11 attacks it has suffered budget cuts,
the elimination or reduction of key programs and an exodus of experienced staffers.
Since Florida appears to have had a better grasp on hurricane response than Louisiana, it
is a question as to who should be responsible for initiating and managing federal programs such
as NIMS ICS. The comparison between Florida and Louisiana suggests that they are not. To
ensure that officials responsible for these duties are qualified and adequate a possible solution
would be to test, or certify potential appointees. A study conducted by Princeton University’s
Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs to determine which managers are
successful at achieving results, by using scores from the Bush administration’s Program
Assessment Rating Tool. The core finding of this study is that the politically appointed bureau
chiefs receive lower management grades as compared to the bureau chiefs drawn from the civil
service (Lewis).
The PART ranks managers in 4 categories:
1. Program Purpose & Design
2. Strategic Planning
3. Program Management
4. Results
According to David Lewis of Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, “FEMA
has an appointee – laden management structure that by almost any account has a large number of
appointees for its size.” Lewis’s study also shows that there are 10 to 33 percent appointed
executives in agencies managed by political appointees. On the other hand offices run by career
officials, only 3 percent are political appointees. The study recommends reducing the number of
appointees in order to improve the management of federal programs. (Lewis). This gives food for
thought and approaches making changes from the top level down, maybe even from the
Secretary of Homeland Security down.
While not all these problems will be solved in a month, a year or even more, they do need
to be recognized and taken seriously. We cannot forget what went wrong if we expect to make it
better next time. By focusing on those who will ultimately make the decision you create a new
culture of preparedness and planning to ensure the training, resources and personnel are in place
to manage any emergency or disaster.
References
1. Governor Jeb Bush. (October 19, 2005) Testimony Before the House Committee on
Homeland Security. Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and
Responsibilities of Local, State and Federal Agencies.
http://www.floridadisaster.org/documents/testimony_10-19-2005.pdf
2. Florida Division of Emergency Management Website. Citizen Emergency Information
http://www.floridadisaster.org/supplykit.htm
18
3. Florida Statewide Hazard and Risk Assessment Summary p242-244
http://www.floridadisaster.org/eoc/haz_mit/State%20Plan%20Revised%2008%2027%20
04.pdf
4. State of Florida Regional Evacuation Procedures. (June 1, 2000).
http://www.floridadisaster.org/dem/DOCUMENTS/EvacSOP/regional_evac.pdf
5. USA Today, Section: News, Pg. 09a 31-Oct-2005
6. American Red Cross Website. (October 24,2005) Wilma Hits as Category 3 Storm.
http://www.redcross.org/article/0,1072,0_272_4791,00.html
7. Simmons, L. (October, 24, 2005). The Waiting is Over. St. Petersburg Times
online, pg. 1.A.
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/915950451.html?MAC=abad85a5ba0186922490d03
186498586&did=915950451&FMT=FT&FMTS=FT&date=Oct+24%2C+2005&author=
ABHI+RAGHUNATHAN&pub=St.+Petersburg+Times&printformat=&desc=THE+WA
ITING+IS+OVER+%2F%2F+Speeding+toward+South+Florida
8. Kleindienst, L., Nolin, R., Wallman, B. (October 27, 2005) Florida Sun-Sentinel online
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/southflorida/sflwilma0,1180061.story?page=2&coll=sfla-home-headlines
9. Gaouette, N. (October 25, 2005) An Orderly Storm Response This Time. Los Angeles
Times
10. HQ-05-342 (October 20, 205) Homeland Security Urges Preparedness and Continues
Preparations As Hurricane Wilma Strengthens FEMA Website
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19864
11. Anderson Cooper. (October 21, 2005) CNN Broadcast Transcript
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0510/21/acd.01.html
12. Governor Rick Perry of Texas (October 19, 2005) Testimony Before the House
Committee on Homeland Security. Federalizing Emergency Response.
13. Bowley, D. (September 7, 2005) Richardson Blames Bureaucracy. El Defensor Chieftain.
http://dchieftain.com/news/54194-09-07-05.html
14. Army National Guard Website. http://www.arng.army.mil
15. Lewis, D. Political Appointments, Beaurue Chiefs, Federal Management Performance.
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/research/papers/09_05_dl.pdf
16. Thomas, E. (September 19, 2005). How Bush Blew It. Newsweek.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9287434/
17. Gosselin, P. and Miller, A. (September 5, 2005). Why FEMA Was Missing in Action.
Los Angeles Times http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-nafema5sep05,0,2650635,full.story?coll=la-home-headlines
18. Elliston, J. (September 7, 2005) The Disaster That Shouldn’t Have Been. The
Independent Weekly.
19. Healy, G. (October 9, 2005). Domestic militarization disaster in making. The Daily
News, Jackson, North Carolina,
http://www.jdnews.com/SiteProcessor.cfm?Template=/GlobalTemplates/Details.cfm&St
oryID=35652&Section=Opinion
20. Hurricane Pam Documentation. (August 2004—November 2005).
21. The Response and Responsibilities in a Disaster. (November, 11, 2005) USA Today.
22. State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan. (April 2005)
23. City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. (2004)
24. National Response Plan
25. Personal Experience
19
20
The Implementation of the National Response Plan
David Talbot, Jeffrey Goldberg and Thomas Lyons Carr, III
The terrorist attacks of September 11th gave the United States a wake-up call. They
forced the nation to realize that terrorism poses a very real threat, even within the country’s
borders. They also brought attention to the fact that the Federal government was not sufficiently
prepared to respond to modern large-scale disasters. While the response to the attacks was truly
impressive, there was a noticeable lack of coordination between the Federal agencies involved in
the response. Because of this, the United States government launched a large-scale initiative after
the attacks to better prepare the country to respond to disasters. A major component of this effort
was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which involved a major
restructuring of numerous Federal agencies. This reorganization was a major undertaking, the
likes of which the nation had not seen since the creation of the Department of Defense (DOD) in
the late 1940’s. The second major component of this effort was the complete overhaul of the
nation’s emergency response plans. The ad-hoc collection of plans and guidance which the
nation was using before September 11th was analyzed, consolidated, and augmented into what
has become known as the National Preparedness System (NPS). This is a comprehensive,
nationwide system designed to streamline and optimize the national response to “incidents of
national significance,” a term coined by the National Response Plan.
One main element of the National Preparedness System is the National Response Plan
(NRP). The NRP is an extremely significant document, in that it clearly defines the roles and
interagency responsibilities for the management of all disasters as deemed by DHS to be
incidents of national significance. The NRP is more than just a compilation of existing Federal
documents; it was augmented with additional coordination, response elements, and clarification
of existing authorities and terminology. It is based on many of the best practices that have come
about as a result of previous Federal responses.
Less than nine months after the official release of the National Response Plan in
December of 2004, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita made landfall in the gulf coast. The Federal
response to these events presents the nation with its first opportunity to gauge the true
effectiveness of the government’s recent planning and organizational initiatives during an actual
response and not a simulation. Now that the response to these events has transitioned into a
recovery phase and the initial commotion of the disaster has finally settled down, we can step
back and make an objective analysis as to how recent Federal planning has actually played out
during the response. In particular, it was the National Response Plan as well as the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) that were the parts of the NPS implemented during the
response.
21
The development of the National Response Plan was a very costly and time-consuming
effort, and it is important to ask what was really achieved by the plan. If the plan was
implemented as intended, what did American citizens gain during this response that they would
have if the government had relied on previous plans and structures? Based on the initial
implementation of the plan during Katrina, how might the Federal government be looking to
modify and further improve upon the system that has been developed? After looking at some of
the key issues that have arisen during this initial implementation of the NRP, we will discuss
some of the current speculation regarding how The Department of Homeland Security may
revise the plan in the future.
At the time of this writing, ten weeks after Katrina’s landfall in Louisiana, few official
sources on the topic of The National Response Plan’s implementation have been made publicly
available. For this reason, most of this paper was written based on interviews with Federal
employees who were involved in the response. Some of these people that were interviewed
include Marge DeBrot, (ESF #3 Lead at FEMA Headquarters, and one of the primary writers of
the NRP), Jeffrey Gafkjen (US Coast Guard liaison to U.S. Northern Command, and another
primary writer of the NRP), Bruce Heide (US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) representative
in the Interagency Incident Management Group), Meegan Nagy (Lead ESF #3 representative in
the Joint Field Office in Louisiana), Lenny Kotkiewicz (One of the initiators of the Infrastructure
Support Integration Center), Bill Irwin (who was the primary coordinator of the USACE
response at the headquarters level in Washington, D.C.), and an unnamed, high ranking official
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Headquarters. As FEMA
representatives are currently under Federal subpoena, this interviewee requested that his name be
omitted from the report. These sources provide a unique perspective as to how the Federal
responses to Katrina and Rita were conducted in the field and in Washington, D.C.
BACKGROUND
The National Preparedness System and the National Response Plan
As mentioned above, one of the major results of the terrorist attacks of 2001 was that the
Federal response that ensued made the nation realize that even with its existing plans and
regulations, the Federal emergency response system was disjointed. There were over 100
different agencies that had some role in Federal disaster response, and despite efforts to the
contrary, there was insufficient coordination between the Federal agencies involved.
Components of the intricate Federal plan were scattered throughout a number of documents, and
because of this, it was difficult for Federal responders to get a clear picture of how responses
should be conducted. For states it was also difficult to follow the plan. There were minimal
standards to specify which response capabilities state governments needed to maintain within
their state, and there was minimal guidance as to how states were to interact with Federal
responders at the scene of a disaster (Talbot 2005c).
In seeking to address these weaknesses that were highlighted on September 11, the
government decided to overhaul the nation’s response system. This initiative was carried out
through authority given in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which was later expanded with
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 7, and 8. The Federal government began a major
effort to consolidate, systematize, and improve the existing plans, and it developed what became
known as the National Preparedness System (NPS). Two now well-known components of the
NPS are the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System
22
(NIMS), which were written based on guidance in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5.
The other five core initiatives of the NPS are the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the
National Preparedness Goal, Capabilities Based Planning Tools, Homeland Security Grant
Program Guidance, and National Preparedness Guidance. However, these later initiatives were
either still in draft form or were so new at the time that Katrina made landfall that they had
minimal effect on the response. Overall, when the National Preparedness System is finalized, it
will be a very comprehensive set of documents, which will provide a unified system for Federal
emergency response. However, one of the major criticisms of the NPS is that it is
overwhelmingly unbalanced, putting far too much emphasis on terrorism-related incidents and
not enough on natural disasters. For example, only two of the 15 planning scenarios that were
developed in the NPS involve natural disasters; and even these two combine the effects of a
natural disaster with some other terrorist-related activity (United States House of Representatives
2005).
The National Response Plan is a 400-page document, written under the direction of the
Department of Homeland Security, and one of the initial components of the National
Preparedness System. Although undertaken by DHS, the writing of the National Response Plan
involved extensive efforts and collaboration of almost every branch of the United States
government. The National Response Plan is the one document that defines how the Federal
government should respond to any “incident of national significance.” According to the plan, an
incident of national significance is any “actual or potential high impact event that requires a
coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of Federal, State, Local, tribal,
and/or private sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis
for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities” (United States Department of
Homeland Security. 2004 67). Based on this definition, the NRP is applicable to a broad range of
situations, including but not limited to natural disasters and terrorist-related incidents. After
many revisions, the plan was signed by fully 28 agencies and four non-profit organizations,
indicating the remarkable interagency coordination that went into its creation. As of December
2004 The National Response Plan is publicly available and downloadable from the DHS website
(United States Department of Homeland Security. 2004).
Like the Federal Response Plan (FRP) that came before it, the National Response Plan
organizes the Federal response around a series of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each
ESF is made up of primary, coordinating, and supporting Federal agencies, which play various
roles within that ESF during a response. In addition to Federal agencies, the American Red Cross
also has a dedicated role in one Emergency Support Function: ESF #6 (United States Federal
Emergency Management Agency. 2003).
In developing the National Response Plan, the writers included all the concepts that had
previously been in the Federal Response Plan, because the responders were already familiar with
it. In addition to the concepts from the FRP, the creation of the NRP brought together a number
of different plans that were in existence, as well as the best practices gathered from previous
responses. It clarified key concepts and realigned some of the roles in the response. Knowing
that all of the concepts of the FRP are in the NRP, many people have questioned the necessity of
the new plan. However, there are a number of differences, some subtle, and some more distinct.
A number of these differences became evident in the Federal response to Katrina and Rita.
Initial Test of the National Response Plan
23
At a cost of nearly 15 million dollars, TOPOFF 3 was a full scale response exercise that
took place on April 4-8, 2005 and to date is claimed to be the “most comprehensive terrorism
response exercise ever conducted in the United States” (United States Department of Homeland
Security. 2005b). The term TOPOFF stands for Top Officials, and this exercise had responders
and representatives from more than 275 Federal, State, Local, tribal, private sector, non
government agencies (United States Department of Homeland Security. 2005a). Participants
from the United Kingdom, and Canada came to participate in the exercise. The estimated 10,000
participants set out to “test the full range of existing procedures for domestic incident
management of a “weapons of mass destruction” terrorist event and to improve [the response]”
(United States Department of Homeland Security. 2005b). This exercise was the only full
functional test of the National Response Plan that occurred before the plan was implemented
during Hurricane Katrina.
The first major objective of the exercise was to test the overall ability to respond to and
manage a multi-jurisdictional event involving “weapons of mass destruction.” The second major
objective was to test information sharing across the various levels of government in the United
States, the private sector, as well as representatives from Canada and the United Kingdom.
According to an interview posted on the DHS website referencing the TOPOFF 3 exercise, an
unnamed senior DHS Official made the following statement. “Yesterday we had the horrific
subway bombings happen in London, we pulsed our folks in London for information about the
actual dynamics of that attack and were able to get that information within a very short amount
of time back here at DHS headquarters.” It was because of the intelligence-sharing network that
the government took one of the lessons learned and used it in a real life application. As was
found to be successful through TOPOFF 3, it is useful to have tested processes by which to
communicate sensitive information from one agency to another (United States Department of
Homeland Security. 2005c).
The third major objective was to test the public communications strategies, protocols, and
processes. According to the DHS Official, they “coordinated public affairs messaging across all
levels of government, every one in sync, everyone on the same message explaining ground
truth…to minimize the panic and [negative] public perception” (United States Department of
Homeland Security. 2005c). This seems to be a consistent area of difficulty in a large-scale
response. Despite whatever training Federal officials may have gained regarding media relations
during the TOPOFF exercise, all of our sources agreed that media relations during the Katrina
response were sorely lacking, which was greatly detrimental to the public perception of the
Federal response to the event.
Hurricane Katrina
After passing over Florida as a Category 1 storm, Hurricane Katrina entered into the Gulf
of Mexico; gaining strength and eventually making landfall in Louisiana between Grand Isle and
the mouth of the Mississippi River. At about 7AM on Monday, August 29th, the now Category 4
Katrina pounded areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Estimates say that economic and
physical damages from this storm could exceed 200 billion dollars, making it the costliest
disaster in history. In addition to the staggering dollar figures, there have been over one thousand
deaths confirmed and nearly 1.3 million households affected by this storm (Kuepper 2005).
It was anticipated even before the hurricane made landfall that the damage to New
Orleans and the surrounding areas would be catastrophic. As a result, The White House
24
“authorized the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, to
coordinate all disaster relief efforts which have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and
suffering caused by the emergency on the local population, and to provide appropriate assistance
for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives,
protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe.”
(United States, the White House, 2005b). The State of Emergency began on August 26, 2005 and
has been the means by which countless resources and personnel have been deployed under the
direction of the National Response Plan.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NRP
Overview
The response to Hurricane Katrina demanded an unprecedented response from local,
state, and Federal officials. Despite media claims to the contrary, the overwhelming majority of
the response (from the Federal perspective) went almost exactly as planned. The Federal system,
for example, cannot be blamed for the poor execution of New Orleans’ evacuation or the
problems with the coordination of resources that the Federal government poured into the region,
both of which were Louisiana’s responsibilities. Most of the Emergency Support Functions
responded in essentially the same fashion as they had done in previous disasters. The Red Cross,
for example, set up emergency shelters for the victims, and in addition to repairing the damaged
levees and pumping the water from the city of New Orleans, the US Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) supported FEMA by removing debris, installing emergency generators, and installing
tarps over damaged roofs among other means of emergency assistance. The entire response and
particularly the quantities of relief supplies that were brought into the region are unprecedented.
For example, according to USACE, there were approximately 5000 truckloads of both ice and
water that were brought into the region. Each truck holds 18,000 liters of bottled drinking water.
To put this into perspective, it means that the total amount of water delivered is equivalent to the
amount of water that flows over Niagara Falls over a five and a half minute period.
According to all of the sources interviewed, the overall Federal response to Katrina and
Rita was not significantly different under the National Response Plan than it would have been if
we were still using the Federal Response Plan. None of the people interviewed could readily
identify elements of this response that were the direct result of changes in the response plan.
There are a number of reasons people said this. First of all, the very nature of this event obscured
from view which aspects of the response were new because of the NRP and which simply came
about as people tried to solve the new problems that came up during the complex response. As
Leonard Kotkiewicz from USACE explained, we never encountered an event like Hurricane
Katrina throughout the implementation period of the Federal Response Plan. Even Hurricane
Andrew can be viewed as a small event when comparing the impacted populations and economic
losses from Hurricane Katrina. The enormity of the event forced Federal responders from
different agencies to forge new relationships and communications with one another, just to get
their work done (Talbot 2005d). From her viewpoint in the National Response Coordination
Center (NRCC) at FEMA Headquarters, Marge DeBrot commented several times about the way
she had never seen as much communication between the different ESFs in previous disasters as
she had during this event. Consequently, it cannot be claimed that these new interagency
relationships that developed during Katrina are due to the NRP (Talbot and Goldberg 2005b).
25
Furthermore, as Marge DeBrot put it, “Why would it have been different?” All of the
elements of response that had previously been in the Federal Response Plan were incorporated
into the new National Response Plan, so many of the Federal responders already had experience
carrying out their role in a response. Especially in this type of event, a natural disaster and not a
terrorist attack, for example, the NRP simply changed very little about the way Federal
responders would have conducted their missions (Talbot and Goldberg 2005b).
A final reason people may not have noticed many changes with the response due to the
NRP was that a number of the specific changes laid out in it simply were not implemented
during the response. Despite the new training initiatives and requirements, the plan is too new to
have been fully implemented by all of the supporting agencies. The plan is in many respects only
an overarching document, which outlines the overall elements in the response. What many
people overlook is that all of the supporting agencies outlined in the NRP develop task-specific
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that may include substantive changes from their previous
SOPs, but these changes can be attributed only indirectly to the NRP. For example, Standard
Operating Procedures are still under development for each of the Emergency Support Functions,
and for things like the Joint Field Office (JFO). However, according to Jeff Gafkjen (one of the
three primary writers of the NRP), Katrina unfortunately hit while many of these Standard
Operating Procedures were still in draft form. Because of this, some of the specific changes that
we should have seen as a result of the NRP were not properly implemented. For example,
Gafkjen visited the JFO in Louisiana during the response. He commented that the Joint Field
Office looked to him to be more like the “Disaster Field Office” that was described in the old
FRP than what they had envisioned the JFO to look like when they wrote the NRP. The JFO was
being run with “more emphasis on the individual Emergency Support Functions and not as much
emphasis on ICS (Incident Command System)” as was the intent of the NRP. Had the JFOspecific SOPs been complete and available to responders before the Katrina made landfall, then
maybe they would have set up the Joint Field Office in a way that was more aligned with the
NRP. It will take some time before Federal responders can fully internalize many of the smaller
changes that were made in the plan (Talbot and Goldberg 2005a).
All of these points aside, the question still remains, what positive things did we see as a
result of the NRP, that we would not have seen if we were only using the FRP? Though the
overwhelming majority of the response was not affected by the changes in the NRP, there are
several aspects of the response that are indeed new. These elements that had a direct impact on
the response are the primary focus of the remainder of this paper.
Interagency Incident Management Group
One of the lesser-known organizational elements in the National Response Plan is the
Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG). The IIMG is comprised of senior officials
from each of the government agencies involved in the response, and meets together in
Washington, DC to discuss the overarching issues of the response. The concept of the
Interagency Incident Management Group was based on a similar structure that existed under the
Federal Response Plan, called the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). However, the
CDRG was almost completely unimplemented. Since all of the senior officials typically involved
in responses knew each other anyway, they found it more convenient to call each other on the
telephone when they needed to coordinate their actions, rather than to convene as an official
group. The Interagency Incident Management Group, however, puts far more emphasis on
26
interagency planning than the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group had, and is expected to
meet much more frequently than the earlier CDRG. The Department of Homeland Security now
mandates each of the agencies involved in the response to staff the IIMG with high-level
representatives during a major Federal response. During the Katrina and Rita responses, the
Interagency Incident Management Group was convened a full three days before Katrina made
landfall and convened daily for 12 hours a day for the first five weeks during the initial response
(Landay, Young, and McCaffrey 2005). The group also met three times a week for several weeks
thereafter.
According to Bruce Heide, who represented the US Army Corps of Engineers in this
group, there are a number of reasons that the IIMG was significant to the response. First of all,
the IIMG reported directly to the Secretary of DHS, Michael Chertoff, so the group was his
single point of contact to reach any of the Federal agencies involved in the response. There were
a number of times when the President urgently needed information from the Federal agencies
involved in the response, and Chertoff received that information through the IIMG. For this
reason alone, it is unlikely that we will see this group disappear from Federal responses. It was
very convenient for the Secretary of DHS and the President to have all of the major Federal
responders readily accessible in one group, and it is unlikely he would want to lose such an asset
(Talbot 2005b).
The main function of the IIMG was to analyze the broad, strategic, long-term effects of
the disaster. The broad issues they discussed could often be missed by the Emergency Support
Functions, which by necessity were focused on a much more narrow aspect of the overall
response. In sharp contrast to the way government representatives were arranged in other levels
of the response, representatives in the IIMG were not broken up by ESFs, but answered
independently for the capabilities of the organization they represented (Talbot 2005b).
In a recent interview with Mr. Heide, he recalled a number of the issues the IIMG spent
time on during the Katrina disaster. One issue they discussed was the potential for disease
outbreaks. As a result of interactions within this group, they were able to coordinate Air Force
assets to spray insecticides over the impacted areas.
International aid contributions for pumps, generators, and other commodities flowed
through the IIMG to the various agencies that could use them. In reality, the main issue at stake
was whether or not the United States would accept the foreign aid, and the President had
stipulated that he wanted to do so. However, the responding agencies were so absorbed with their
existing work that they simply did not want to deal with contributions such as pumps from
Germany or supplies from Mexico. For this reason, without the involvement of the IIMG, these
offers for international donations would have probably been largely ignored by the responders.
(Talbot 2005b).
Another issue that was directed to the IIMG involved a critical liquid hydrogen plant in
the region affected by Hurricane Katrina. Without the intervention of the IIMG, responders
would have almost definitely not spent time on this one private facility, because it meant pulling
resources away from their core tasks like reopening hospitals or schools. However, the hydrogen
plant was one of only three in the entire country, and the hydrogen it produces is critical to
governmental research laboratories and fuel for space shuttles, so even though people on the
ground could not see the immediate importance of this one facility, it was highly important on a
27
national level. Through the intervention of the IIMG, Federal resources were redirected to bring
this facility back into operation early in the response (Talbot 2005b).
As a final example, it was at the level of the IIMG that the Environmental Protection
Agency representatives approached the US Army Corps of Engineers about the contaminated
water that was being pumped out of New Orleans into Lake Pontchartrain. Because of IIMG’s
intervention a solution was devised that would reduce the contamination going to the lake. By
installing aerators onto the pumps, the level of dissolved gasses pumped into the lake was
exponentially reduced (Talbot 2005b).
While it is likely that the Corps would have eventually installed the aerators in the pumps
on their own, the intervention of the IIMG brought this about much faster. There are many
thoughtful people producing great ideas during a disaster, but if there is no system to implement
these ideas, they may fall to the wayside. During the disaster, people are so busy with what they
are already doing, that they cannot take on new things unless someone above them sets it as a
priority. This is what the IIMG brought to the response (Talbot 2005b).
Infrastructure Support Integration Center
Another example of the coordination structures that resulted from the National Response
Plan was the Infrastructure Support Integration Center (ISIC). Under the NRP, Emergency
Support Function #3 (Public Works and Engineering) was given new responsibility for
coordinating infrastructure-related issues in the impacted area. During the response to Katrina,
the US Army Corps of Engineers, as one of the lead agencies for ESF #3 took the initiative to
create the ISIC as a new organizational structure. The ISIC supported communications between
the various agencies that had roles in infrastructure during the response, such as the Department
of Energy, Federal Highways, and the Environmental Protection Agency (which governs
infrastructure such as sewers and water plants). The ISIC was first established in Washington,
DC but soon moved into the field to be more effective in the response (Talbot 2005d).
One example of the kind of issues that this group worked on during the hurricanes
involved Route 23, in Louisiana. This road is of great national importance because it leads
directly to an important natural gas terminal on the Gulf Coast. However, the levees protecting
the route failed during the storm and it was impassable due to flooding. There were also reports
of 100-foot long boats lying across the road, which had been moved there by the force of the
storm. The task to reopen the highway was more complicated than just fixing the breached levy.
Engineers were first required to work with other agencies because they could not repair the levee
until a pipeline running through the levee was repaired. The pipeline was privately owned by the
Shell Oil Company and the Office of Pipeline Safety under the Department of Transportation
worked with them to get this asset functional again. The ISIC coordinated this interagency effort
to clear Route 23, at the field level. First, the Coast Guard had to remove the vessels and the
Department of Transportation had to fix the pipeline. After this the US Army Corps of Engineers
would be able to repair the levy and lastly the water could be pumped out and the route could be
reopened. This is an example of a complex problem involving many players and ultimately
resulted in a timely successful operation (Talbot 2005d).
The question may be raised on whether or not this same effort would have been
accomplished under the FRP, without the proactive interaction of the ISIC. The answer is
presumably yes, it would have probably eventually been cleared, but it would have undoubtedly
been a much more cumbersome process. It can be easy for responders to become narrowly
28
focused in their own specific piece of the response that they begin to overlook the needs of other
agencies that are involved. It is through the proactive intervention from interagency groups like
the ISIC that complex and diverse needs can be addressed (Talbot 2005d).
Security Officer
Emergency Support Function #5 is “responsible for supporting overall activities of the
Federal government for domestic incident management. Under ESF #5 are the core management
and administrative functions in support of the National Response Coordination Center, the
Regional Response Coordination Center, and the Joint Field Office operations”(United States
Department of Homeland Security. 2004 ESF #5-1). One of the areas that proved to be a success
is the addition of a safety officer under ESF #5 in support of the heath and safety of the
emergency responders.
This concept and role of the “safety officer” is not a new to the field of disaster
management. The role is responsible for monitoring, assessing and overseeing all health and
safety aspects. The safety officer must take immediate intervention of activities to prevent the
loss of life and prevention of injuries of responders. If the role is not filled, then the senior
member retains that role’s duties and responsibilities (Bigley and Roberts 2001; National Fire
Protection Association. 2004; United States Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2003).
As part of adapting the FRP to the NRP a minor but very significant change occurred to
the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex. Delegation of responsibilities were transferred
from Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (United States Department of Homeland Security. 2004; United States
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2003).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) implemented tried and tested
practices and procedures from the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan and the National Response Team (The National Response Team. 2003; United States.
1999). One of the new things the OSHA safety officer did in the field was that he mandated
safety briefings for all of the Federal disaster workers in the JFO. A number of interviewees
noted that the changes to ESF #5 “Emergency Management” and the pre-deployment safety
briefings at the staging areas were very successful.
Catastrophic Incident Annex
The “Catastrophic Incident Annex” is a component of the NRP that was not a part of
previous plans. According to the National Response Plan, this 6-page annex “establishes the
context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive
national response to a catastrophic incident” (United States Department of Homeland Security.
2004 NRP-CIA). In a proactive Federal response, the Federal government can move its resources
into an affected state before the state officially requests them. Once the resources are positioned
at Federal staging areas, the state still has the right to reject them. This means that the Federal
government would not want to enact this part of the plan unless it was absolutely sure the state
was going to take the resources.
Understandably, this annex was an item of particular public interest during the response
to Katrina. Clearly, the complete flooding of a major US city, combined with the destruction of
29
the surrounding region is certainly a catastrophic event, so many people have asked why this
annex was not implemented. Retired Admiral James Loy, former Department of Homeland
Security Deputy Secretary was quoted as saying that “lives could have been saved had the
catastrophic annex been implemented” (Strohm 2005).
However, the annex itself gives few details about what the Federal government should do
during such an incident. Instead, it refers to a separate document that is not publicly available
called the Catastrophic Incident Supplement (different from the annex), which goes into much
more detail on how and in what order the Federal government should push its resources into the
affected region. According to Jeffery Gafkjen, this document was still only in draft when Katrina
hit. When The White House Press Secretary was questioned about the use of the supplement, he
declined to answer. According to Gafkjen, there would have been no right answer for the
secretary. Had the supplement been available, it is likely it would have helped in the response,
but unfortunately the document was not completed (Talbot and Goldberg 2005a).
An alternate perspective on this issue comes from Leonard Kotkiewicz, who is the Team
Leader of the Readiness Branch (Emergency Management) of the US Army Corps of Engineers.
As he put it, the NRP gave us the beginnings of catastrophe planning. The annex was not
explicitly implemented, but knowledge of it came to play, and it influenced things at the
planning level. In an unquantifiable way, some people feel as though we really were a little better
off for having the Catastrophic Incident Annex in the NRP. Academics in emergency
management have spent a great deal of time focusing on the differences between “catastrophic”
disasters such as Katrina and more minor disasters that impact smaller populations (Talbot
2005d). Even events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11th would not be considered to be
truly catastrophic in the way that Katrina was (Quarantelli 2005). The very fact that this type of
academic research officially made its way into the NRP served to bring attention to the fact that
the response to Katrina could not simply be a larger version of their response to a commonplace
disaster. Due to the sheer magnitude of the damage, Federal responders knew they were
completely justified in thinking innovatively and seeking new communications and innovative
solutions to issues that came up during the response (Talbot 2005d).
New Emergency Support Functions
The NRP includes three Emergency Support Functions that were not in previous Federal
plans: ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and
Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). According to the sources interviewed, ESF #13 and
#14 were very successful additions to the Federal response, while ESF #15 did not respond as
well as it may have.
Emergency Support Function #13 (Public Safety and Security Annex)
Of the new ESFs added to the NRP, ESF #13 was by far one of the greatest success
stories (Talbot and Goldberg 2005a). ESF #13, responsible for Public Safety and Security,
“provides a mechanism for coordinating and providing Federal-to-Federal support or Federal
support to State and Local authorities to include non-investigative / non-criminal law
enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities and resources during potential or actual
Incidents of National Significance (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2004, ESF
#13-1). This ESF serves as a method by which to incorporate security resources to support
incident operations. During Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans Police Department was
30
overwhelmed due to a number of factors. The flooded streets made it difficult for them to
respond to calls for assistance. Many police left their posts because they too were affected by the
disaster, and had to care for their families. Under ESF #13, representatives from nearly all
branches of Federal Law Enforcement augmented remaining police and security forces to
provide additional law enforcement support for the affected areas.
While the news agencies reported a lack of security for the safety of the people at the
New Orleans Superdome there were also successful “Incident Management Activities” that the
public might not have seen. For example, emergency trucks of fuel, water, or other commodities
were in danger of being hijacked in the area, and ESF #13 provided security to these assets.
According to Marge DeBrot, armed police officers from ESF #13 were sent to escort fuel trucks,
before they would enter the region. This success that was not publicized because of poor media
relations from most areas of the Federal government (Talbot and Goldberg 2005b).
Marge DeBrot summarized her perspective on the new ESF, “I don’t think they really
understood the Stafford Act. They had a few faults during the response, for example, they self
activated, and they may have procured some things improperly, but considering that this was
their first time out, they did an overall wonderful job” (Talbot and Goldberg 2005b).
Emergency Support Function #14 (Long-Term Public Safety and Security Annex)
Emergency Support Function #14, Long-Term Public Safety, is “a framework for Federal
Government support to State, regional, Local, and tribal governments, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and the private sector designed to enable community recovery from the
long-term consequences of an Incident of National Significance. This support consists of
available programs and resources of Federal departments and agencies to enable community
recovery, especially long-term community recovery, and to reduce or eliminate risk from future
incidents, where feasible.” (United States Department of Homeland Security. 2004 ESF #14-1)
This ESF was incorporated into the National Response Plan to act for the public as
something of a one-stop-shop for the recovery resources that the Federal government has to
offer. The intention of ESF 14 is to enter in during the recovery phase and help affected people
bring their lives back to normal. Hopefully, the ESF will help to reduce some of the confusing
bureaucracy involved in obtaining Federal aid, so the affected communities don’t find it so
frustrating to get the aid the government has set aside for them. Under the National Response
Plan, there are 17 different agencies operating under ESF #14. Together, these agencies hold the
authority and financial backing to provide almost any kind of aid that could be anticipated after a
disaster. ESF 14 helps to coordinate their resources, so that the available aid can be distributed
fairly over the affected region.
Marge DeBrot commented that even though this ESF wasn’t as visible as some of the
others, it was really quite active behind the scenes. (Talbot and Goldberg 2005b). Megan Nagy,
from the JFO, also spoke of this new ESF, saying that even though you might not be able to see
the impact of this ESF yet, people would probably look back on it after a year’s time and list it as
one of the major successes of this response (Talbot 2005e).
Emergency Support Function #15 (External Affairs Annex)
31
Emergency Support Function #15 is the ESF that “all Federal, State, Local, and tribal
incident management systems are supposed to use when passing on critical communication to the
public. The purpose of ESF #15 is to “provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to
affected audiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the Local populace.” It
is supposed to provide support needed to implement the specific media-related guidance
described in the NRP’s Public Affairs Support Annex. (United States Department of Homeland
Security. 2004 ESF #15-1).
One of the biggest shortcomings in this response, from the point of view of Federal
responders, was the enormous void that was left in the government’s relations with the media.
The media is paid to report a developing story, not to give an unbiased, measured report on the
overall situation over a multi-state region. If the Federal responders do not actively work with the
media, build strong relationships, and help them give accurate reports of the response, it is only
natural that the media will give an unbalanced, slanted description of the events in the field.
According to the people we interviewed, that is exactly what happened in this response.
In an interview with a high-ranking FEMA official in Washington (who requested that his name
be omitted from this report, due to Congressional subpoena), the person spoke about the media
reports in the region. “One thing that amazes me was how much harder Mississippi got hit than
Louisiana. Entire communities were wiped out but the press has not covered it.” He summarized
the problem as follows. “FEMA did not do a good job communicating with the press. They did
not set the story up front; Bad media relations led the American people to perceive that FEMA
did a bad job” (Goldberg 2005). Despite everything the Federal government was doing in the
region, the response was portrayed very poorly by the press. When ESF #15 was specifically
tasked with media interactions, one has to wonder what they were actually doing during this
response. Certainly, the ESF is necessary to the NRP, but there is a lot of room for improvement
in the future.
Principal Federal Official
The Principal Federal Official (PFO) is a new position under the National Response Plan.
Originally, this position was established under the NRP to be the eyes and ears of the Secretary
of DHS at the site of the disaster. The designated PFO was to report any problems with
interagency coordination to the Secretary of DHS, who would in turn be ultimately responsible
for resolving tribulations. According to the NRP, “The PFO does not direct or replace the
incident command structure established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive authority
over the [Federal Coordinating Officer]…or other Federal and State officials” (United States
Department of Homeland Security. 2004 33). The NRP lays out the plan for one Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) in every State, who is appointed by the President. Even though one
of the responsibilities of the FCO is to support the Principal Federal Official, the National
Response Plan makes it is clear that it is the FCO who is responsible for coordinating the Federal
response in that state (United States Department of Homeland Security. 2004 34). Under the
National Response Plan, the Principal Federal Official has no official authority to direct the
response, and the actual role that the Principal Federal Official would play during a response was
somewhat unclear before our response to Katrina.
It is interesting how the role of the Principal Federal Official played out during the
response to Hurricane Katrina and Rita. Secretary of The Department of Homeland Security,
Michael Chertoff, named Michael Brown (who was then the director of FEMA) as the PFO
32
shortly after Katrina made landfall. The Federal response received a great deal of scrutiny from
the press, and Brown was blamed for many of the shortfalls that were seen. He was called back
from the field and resigned from his position in FEMA soon afterwards. Yet despite the wellpublicized shortfalls in the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina, even many critics would agree
that Brown carried out his role as Principal Federal Official as outlined by the NRP. Leonard
Kotkiewicz, a Team Leader for Emergency Management at USACE, when reflecting on Brown’s
role in the response, commented, “Maybe [Brown] could have been more effective, but he was
definitely following the script” (Talbot 2005d).
The replacement to Michael Brown was Vice Admiral Thad W. Allan of the US Coast
Guard. Allan brought additional substance and meaning to the role. Although he had never been
given legal authority to do so, he began to task the various Emergency Support Functions to
carry out specific roles. The FCOs in the affected states became irritated as Admiral Allan
assumed much of their authority to lead the response, and his directions began to cause
considerable confusion among the Emergency Support Functions as well. For example, coauthor
David Talbot listened as one of the field leaders in Louisiana voiced his frustration and
confusion during a Corps of Engineers teleconference, saying that he simply did not know
whether or not he should be taking orders from the Principal Federal Official. Marge DeBrot,
one of the original writers of the National Response Plan, was present at the conference as well,
and began to reply that under the NRP, the Principal Field Officer did not have the authority to
task Emergency Support Functions. However, Ed Hecker, the Senior Executive overseeing the
Army Corps of Engineers response, interrupted and told her that the doctrine on the Principal
Federal Official, as explained in the NRP, was being “rewritten” as they spoke.
While no official US Army Corps of Engineers doctrine resulted from that particular
conversation, it was at about this time in the response that it became generally understood among
Federal responding agencies that the strong leadership Admiral Allan was providing was exactly
what the response needed, even though at the time he had no legal authority to do what he was
doing. Soon after these problems started coming up, the Department of Homeland Security came
up with a creative solution. Not only would Allen be the Principal Federal Official, but he would
also be the “Federal Coordinating Officer of the multi-State region” that had been affected by
Katrina, which included Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama (Talbot 2005d).
With the impending landfall of Hurricane Rita, Admiral Hereth, from the Coast Guard,
was assigned as PFO for the Hurricane Rita response in Texas. When Rita made landfall, the
Governor of Louisiana said that the state would be able to officially combine the Rita and
Katrina response efforts into one, rather than differentiating between which damage came from
Katrina and which came from Rita. Even though Rita had caused significant damage in
Louisiana, Hereth was not the PFO over the response in Louisiana. Admiral Allen remained in
charge of operations from both storms in Louisiana. In comparison to Admiral Allan’s approach,
Admiral Hereth took a more reserved stance on his role in the Federal response, and never
attempted to exercise the same level of authority that Admiral Allan assumed less than a month
earlier (Talbot 2005d). His approach corresponded much more closely to what was envisioned by
the writers of the NRP. While the authority that Allan accused during the response did not come
directly from the National Response Plan, the NRP provided the basis for the multi-state
leadership that he provided. This multi-state coordination and leadership is something gained
from the NRP that it is unlike those of previous plans.
33
Another success of the creation of The Department of Homeland Security was the high
involvement of the Coast Guard as part of the Federal response. As part of DHS, the door was
opened to bring in Admirals Allan and Hereth into the leadership roles. From this, the Coast
guard quickly became a remarkable and visible success story for the Katrina response. The
various news agencies showed constant footage of Coast Guard rescue operations, including
dramatic footage of survivors being rescued from their rooftops (Talbot 2005a).
SPECULATION ON FURTHER CHANGES TO THE NATION’S RESPONSE SYSTEM
Expansion of Legal Authority
One of the guiding principals given to the original writers of the National Response Plan
was that they were not allowed to expand upon any of the governmental authorities already in
existence. They knew that the Principal Federal Official would have some authority through his
relationship with the Secretary of DHS, but they were not able to give this position any specific
new authorities. With the upcoming reviews of the national response, however, the reviewers
will no longer be confined to the existing legal authorities. Instead, they may go to Congress with
recommendations for legal changes they could make that would improve the nation’s response
capabilities. Because of this, there are now endless possibilities as to how they may improve the
Federal response system. It will be interesting to see whether the role of the Principal Federal
Official will be officially redefined when the NRP is reviewed and amended, because this change
would involve changes to Federal Laws. All of the people interviewed during the writing of this
paper believed that the role of the PFO will be expanded, and will become more like the role that
Admiral Allan assumed during the response to Katrina, and that the Federal law will be modified
to allow for these changes (Talbot 2005c).
Another example of the possible legal expansion that might occur involves the funding
streams for The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and other Federal Law Enforcement
agencies. Currently these organizations have the authority to direct other law enforcement
agencies to respond to security threats, but they do not have the authority to fund them. While
this particular issue did not come up in the response to the hurricanes, it has been an issue for
many years, and may be addressed in the upcoming review (Talbot 2005c). The FBI and other
Federal Law Enforcement agencies need the authority to delegate funds to others in the same
way that FEMA can use finances from the Disaster Relief Funds, as allowed by the Stafford Act.
Completion of Catastrophic Plan
The completion of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement will be an important issue in the
near future. After experiencing the devastating effects of Katrina, many people have realized the
importance of such a plan, and it will be a high priority to complete it. The government would
almost certainly implement such a plan in the case of an earthquake along the New Madrid fault
line, for example, which is predicted to cause extreme damage to Memphis, Tennessee, or St
Louis, Missouri (Talbot and Goldberg 2005b).
Further Expansion of the Military Role
On August 15, 2005 President Bush addressed the nation from New Orleans, Louisiana.
In this nationally televised address, the President spoke about the Federal response that was well
34
underway. One of the areas that the President spoke about was the possibility of further
expansion of the United States Armed Forces roles in domestic “Incident of National
Significance.” President Bush stated that “the system, at every level of government, was not
well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days.” He then went on to say that, “It is
now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for
the armed forces -- the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical
operations on a moment's notice.” (United States, the White House, 2005a). The question has to
be asked if the office of the President of the United States will seek to decrease Federal agencies
roles during domestic disasters, and replace them with a military presence. This would be a very
significant change in the response, because even though the military is currently written in the
NRP as a support agency for most of the ESFs, they typically enter a response only as the option
of last resort.
As it presently stands, state governments and first responders are told not to rely on
Federal assets for the first few days of the incident. Federal assets might be vast in nature but
take time to arrive to the affected areas. During the response to Katrina for example, the U.S.
Comfort, a floating Navy Hospital Ship, took over one week to start heading to the area (United
States Department of Navy, 2005). Upon arrival, the ship was able to make a positive difference
by treating both rescue workers and locals. The President has sparked debate in the response
community. If the Department of Defense is given additional responsibility in a response, it will
have to be ready to respond much faster.
The Future Role of FEMA
Almost all of our sources spoke about the role of FEMA during the response, and about
how they expected that role to change in the future. However, they all had somewhat different
reasoning behind this. From Bill Irwin’s perspective in the US Army Corps of Engineers
Headquarters, the NRP now lists FEMA in important roles for several Emergency Support
Functions, including ESF #3 for which the Corps is responsible. However, from his perspective,
FEMA was added to the ESF in name only, and might just as well have been taken out
completely. Megan Nagy, from the Louisiana Joint Field Office, agreed (Talbot 2005e).
Important requests for Emergency Support Functions #3 support would come into the JFO, and
the paperwork would get lost in FEMA’s infrastructure section before it was finally passed to the
Corps for action (Talbot 2005e). Marge Debrot, sitting in the NRCC (FEMA Headquarters),
agreed that other response organizations, such as the American Red Cross, had had a similar
reaction to FEMA’s increased role in their ESF. However, she added, it was probably largely
personality driven, and specific to Louisiana. If we had called the Joint Field Office in Florida or
Texas, she said, we may have heard a completely different story, and the addition of FEMA
might have been very positive in those areas. At the same time, she agreed that the role of FEMA
was going to change. DeBrot spoke about a rumor that the National Response Coordination
Center, (where all of the Emergency Support Functions meet in Washington,) which is currently
located in FEMA Headquarters, might be moved to the Coast Guard Headquarters. In her
opinion, FEMA is either going to get bigger and regain some of the status it held during the
1990s, or it will be further diminished, but there would be no way for it to stay the way it is right
now.
35
CONCLUSION
In his statement before the House Committee on Governmental Reform (15 September
05), Dr. James Carafano said that “Only a national system- capable of mustering the whole
nation- can respond to catastrophic disasters”, and in this response, we saw just that (Carafano
2005). Responders from all over the Federal Government, filled with determination and
organized by the meditated planning of documents such as the NRP, came together to try to heal
the wounds left by a catastrophic disaster.
The Federal response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was immense, and for the most part,
a well coordinated effort. These responses were the first ever to implement the newly developed
National Response Plan. Clearly, though, the response did not rest on this one document. Even
though the National Response Plan is new, the Federal government has been responding to
disasters for hundreds of years. Despite all of the planning that went into the NRP, the primary
reasons the Federal responders knew what to do is that they already had experience responding
to hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and countless other disasters when they followed guidance
from the FRP, and this had been built upon experience and practices that had been developed
during previous years.
Most of the NRP was similar to the FRP, and this helped its successful implementation
during the Katrina and Rita responses. Some new components of the NRP were neglected simply
because they were relatively unknown and unpracticed, and had not yet been integrated into all
of the necessary SOPs and trainings. At the same time, we can look to ESF #13 and #14, the
IIMG, and the PFO, as examples of successful response elements that were based on concepts
that were new to the National Response Plan. New communications were established, and
structures like the ISIC (which were not specifically outlined in the NRP, but were newly
allowed by it) were formed to address the issues at hand.
President Bush has made a number of statements reassuring the American People that we
will further improve the nation’s response plans. (United States The White House. 2005a).
Further improvements to the nation’s plans, as well as improved implementation of the existing
plans, will allow the nation to respond better in the future.
36
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38
Hurricane Katrina Evacuation:
An Analysis of the Evacuation of Southeast Louisiana
Bryan Taylor, Aaron Morningstar, Ron Molway
ABSTRACT
On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the U.S. Gulf Coast with disastrous
results. There are essential emergency management lessons to be learned from the evacuation
conducted, specifically in Southeast Louisiana, in preparation for and response to Katrina. The
intent of this paper is to examine the various measures that were taken at different levels of
government in order to identify those that functioned well or required improvement. Each broad
level of government - Federal, State, and local - will be evaluated individually so that
corroborated evidence supports an unbiased analysis. This paper will also identify some of the
obstacles and social issues that government officials faced in developing and implementing an
effective evacuation plan for southeast Louisiana and will review the specific evacuation plans
that were in place before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast. It will then provide a critical look at
what evacuation measures were actually imposed before, during, and briefly after landfall in
Louisiana and provide recommendations to enhance future mitigation, preparedness, and
response.
Introduction
On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the U.S. Gulf Coast with
disastrous results. Although the Associated Press reported that most of those at risk had
evacuated from New Orleans prior to the hurricane's landfall, the combined death toll eventually
topped out at nearly a thousand in Louisiana, and damage estimates are expected to far exceed
$100 billion dollars.1 Katrina was not only a devastating demonstration of the fierce power of
nature, but was an eye-opener to the immense importance of effective mitigation, preparedness
and response in the face of catastrophic environmental hazards. Integral to these concepts is a
well-thought out evacuation plan executed competently and judiciously with contributions from
all levels of government. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it appeared that federal, state,
and local officials were pointing to each other to shoulder the responsibility for failures in the
response. Political posturing to transfer blame in the wake of a tragedy that is exacerbated by
emergency management missteps may seem to be standard political rhetoric. But there are
essential lessons that must be pulled from this political mire to ensure an effective response to
39
the next disaster. As with other aspects of the Hurricane Katrina response facing critical review
in the public forum, responsibility for the evacuation measures and their shortfalls appears to be
shared throughout all levels of government. The intent of this paper is not to lay blame on any
level. Rather, the purpose is to examine the various measures that were taken at different levels
of government in order to identify those that functioned well or required improvement. In this
vein, each broad level of government - Federal, State, and local - will be evaluated individually
so that corroborated evidence may support an unbiased analysis. This paper will also identify
some of the obstacles and social issues that government officials faced in developing and
implementing an effective evacuation plan for southeast Louisiana and review the specific
evacuation plans that were in place before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast. While this review
focuses on the preemptive evacuation primarily rather than the rescue of those stranded after the
event, some evacuee sheltering issues will be addressed. Finally, this document will then
provide a critical look at what evacuation measures were actually imposed before, during, and
briefly after landfall in Louisiana and provide recommendations to enhance future mitigation,
preparedness, and response.
Barriers to Effective Evacuation in Louisiana
The state of Louisiana faced significant obstacles to effective development and execution
of an emergency evacuation plan. Such barriers derive from environmental, socioeconomic and
physical factors; all must be addressed in the planning, implementation, and execution of an
emergency management strategy.
First, Louisiana is located in an environmental hazard-prone area. A cursory look at
the numerous concerns listed in the
Louisiana State Emergency
Operations plan provides an idea of
the robust environmental hazard
landscape of the region. Developing
an emergency operations plan that
Figure 1. Hazards Identified in the LA State EOP (2)
40
addresses all these hazards is a challenging endeavor. Motivating people to evacuate in the face
of such a robust, high-frequency problem set is equally difficult. Consider the shear frequency of
hurricanes, in particular, affecting the southeast Louisiana region and the associated evacuation
measures as shown in Figure 2. Of note, in the case of Hurricane Flossy, many residents
remembered the vast devastation caused by the Hurricane of 1947. As a result, most apparently
heeded evacuation orders and the loss of life was relatively small. Shortly later, when Audrey
approached the Gulf coast, many residents, perceiving Flossy as a minimal impact event, likely
underestimated the storm and over 500 people were killed. Though not confirmed, it is likely
that a similar misconception developed as a result of Hurricane Ivan’s less-than-expected impact
on New Orleans just one year before Katrina hit, contributing to avoidable loss of life. It is
foreseeable that a percentage of the population will have an inherent false sense of security.
Many have endured previous hurricanes with varying levels of success and may be skeptical of
the warnings because they occur so often. There will always be some who choose not to heed
evacuation notices, whether they are voluntary, recommended, or mandatory.2 A 2001
preparedness guide published by NOAA in concert with other federal agencies, identified
inaccurate perceptions of risk and increased frequency of hurricanes in the previous three
decades as contributors to problems in hurricane hazard management. The guide stated that
“false impression of a major hurricane’s damage potential…can lead to complacency and
delayed actions resulting in injuries and loss of lives”.3
Second, and perhaps most discussed in the recent public forum, is the significant
disparity in economic status that exists in Louisiana, particularly in the New Orleans area.
According to the US Census Bureau the city of New Orleans has approximately 484,000
residents of which approximately 130,000 live under the poverty line, an estimated 27% in
comparison to the national rate of 12%. Most of these citizens did not have the knowledge or
resources to access emergency preparedness and evacuation information offered online. If they
did have the capability of accessing the Internet and other sources of information, it would likely
have made little difference as they still lacked the funds to purchase and maintain transportation.
It is estimated that more than 49,000 households in New Orleans alone did not have
private means of transportation. Most of those who do not own cars rely on the mass transport
system for any necessary travel, a resource that if not properly allocated may or may not be
available in time of emergency. Failure to effectively educate the poorer public on the dangers of
hurricanes and importance of timely evacuation, coupled with a lack of vehicles to execute that
evacuation, set the scene for significant emergency management difficulties in the event of a
large scale emergency in the Southeast Louisiana area. 4,5
39
Figure 2. Louisiana Major Hurricane History
Hurricane
Date
Evacuation Measures
Killed
Damages
(Million)
Flossy
Sept. 24, 1956
Residents evacuated to shelters (1947
hurricane on their minds)
15
$22
Audrey
June 27, 1957
Mandatory Evacuation Ordered
526
$120
Carla
Sept.10-12, 1961
Estimated one-half million residents of low coastal
areas and islands off Texas and Louisiana
evacuated.
6
$25
Hilda
Oct. 2-3, 1964
Complete evacuation of the entire Louisiana coast
39
$53
Betsy
Sept. 9-10, 1965
N/A
81
$1,400
Camille
Aug. 17-18, 1969
81,000 out of 150,000 ordered to evacuate
did so
9
Andrew
Aug. 26, 1992
1.5 million people evacuated
7
$1,000
Georges
Sept. 27, 1998
“Large Scale” evacuation, Superdome used for
first time as shelter (14,000)
2
N/A
July 1997
Grand Isle (60 mi. south of New
Orleans) long lines on Highway 1 as
1,500 evacuate. Evacuations ordered
2
Minor
damage
Sept 14, 2004
Mandatory evacuations in 7 parishes,
voluntary evacuations in 6 others. More
than one-third of the population of
Greater New Orleans voluntarily
evacuated congestion on local
N/A
Minimal
damage.
Danny II
Ivan
(Multiple Sources including: Roth, D. Louisiana Hurricane History: Late 20th Century. National Weather Service
Lake Charles, LA. (http://www.srh.noaa.gov/lch/research/lalate20hur.htm), Schmid, R. Major storms nothing new in New Orleans,
USAToday.com, Posted Sept. 2 2005, Associated Press. ( http://www.usatoday.com/weather/news/2005-09-02-NewOrleans-stormhistory_x.htm?POE=WEAISVA)
The Local Plan for Evacuation
The local emergency management establishment in the city of New Orleans and
surrounding parishes relied on two primary documents for guidance in the event of mass
evacuation, both of which were meant to dovetail with the State plan. The first document, the
New Orleans Evacuation Plan, calls for public transportation to be used during the
40
Recommended and Mandatory Phase of the evacuation. However, the “Precautionary Phase”
applies to the following:
“…people who are most vulnerable to a hurricane and the effects of both water and
wind. It is directed at offshore workers, persons on coastal islands or in wetlands,
persons aboard boats, and those living in mobile homes and recreational vehicles” 6
However, the Precautionary Phase does not include individuals without cars as “most
vulnerable”. This could be viewed as a pre-existing and inherent failure of the plan. One could
rationally justify evacuating those without vehicles at this stage would: a) maximize evacuation
capabilities by utilizing the most time available between phase initiation and storm fall, and b)
facilitate mobility of mass transportation vehicles. 7
Mass transportation of victims is an essential consideration for evacuation planning. In both
the state and local emergency preparedness plans called for utilizing New Orleans Regional
Transit Authority (NORTA) and school buses during the Recommended and Mandatory Phases
of the evacuation plan. The second applicable document, the City of New Orleans
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, states that: "The City of New Orleans will
utilize all available resources to quickly and safely evacuate threatened areas," and
"Transportation will be provided to those persons requiring public transportation from the area”.
Specifically, the plan lists potential resources. The plan relied on most people driving their own
vehicles out of the risk area without necessary plans and devoted resources to evacuate that large
population without cars. Although primarily a local responsibility, the Louisiana Emergency
Operations Plan (Supplement 1A) states:
" The primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles.
School and municipal buses, government-owned vehicles and vehicles
provided by volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation
for individuals who lack transportation and require assistance in
evacuating." 8
Additionally, the State plan declares that individual Parishes and private health care
facilities are expected to:
"Conduct and control local evacuation in parishes located in the risk area and
manage reception and shelter operations in parishes located in the host area" in Part
1 Section D. The state evacuation plan also assigns the responsibility of evacuation of
the sick and those needing assistance to the owners of the facilities with the
language: "Hospitals, nursing homes, group homes, etc. will have pre-determined
evacuation and/or refuge plans if evacuation becomes necessary. 7,8
41
What Actually Happened: The Local Perspective
On August 24, Tropical Depression 12 strengthened to Tropical Storm Katrina. On
August 25 and 26, Hurricane Katrina hit Florida briefly weakening and then gaining momentum
towards the Gulf coast. On August 27, a hurricane warning was issued for the Louisiana gulf
coast including New Orleans. All accounts indicate Mayor Nagin had been sufficiently informed
that the impeding hurricane was a severe threat to the people of New Orleans. On August 27, 36
hours prior to Katrina’s landfall, Max Mayfield director of the National Hurricane Center in
Florida phoned Mayor Nagin at home. Mayfield firmly advised Nagin to order the mandatory
evacuation. However Mayor Nagin waited twelve hours to declare the mandatory evacuation.
New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin held a news conference on the morning of August 28th,
shortly after Katrina was upgraded to a Category 5 storm, in his address he stated that Katrina
was, "a storm that most of us have long feared," At that time Nagin ordered the first ever
mandatory evacuation of the city. 9
On August 28, as Hurricane Katrina developed into a Category 5 storm but well before
landfall, Mayor Nagin established several "refuges of last resort" for citizens who were unable to
leave, including the massive Louisiana Superdome which received the most media coverage
during the early days of the event. The New Orleans Times - Picayune reported that the
Louisiana National Guard delivered three truckloads of water and seven truckloads of MRE's to
the Superdome, enough to supply 15,000 people for three days, according to Col. Jay Mayeaux,
Deputy Director of the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Emergency Preparedness. 9
When Katrina came ashore on August 29th approximately 9,000 people along with 550
National Guard troops took shelter at the Superdome. As the massive force of Katrina passed
over New Orleans two large holes were ripped in the Superdome’s roof .10 On August 31, it was
announced that evacuees would be moved to the Astrodome in Houston, Texas. According to
statements released by the Louisiana National Guard on Thursday, September 1, as many as
30,000 to 60,000 people had gathered at the Superdome for evacuation. As the storm took its toll
the Superdome faced increasingly difficult circumstances. Air conditioning, electricity, and
running water all failed, making for very unsanitary and uncomfortable conditions. Raymond
Cooper a CNN reporter who was at the Superdome reported individuals fighting, brandishing
weapons, corpses lying in the open and women being raped. 10 By September 6, the Superdome
was completely evacuated. Officials say that the flood damage, debris, human waste and bodily
fluids in the Superdome is a "potential biohazard," and that it is too early to tell what the final
fate of the structure will be, although demolition has been cited as a possible outcome. 11
Unfortunately, the buses at the city’s disposal were only used to transport individuals to
the Superdome, which was deemed the “refuge of last resort”. Much of the city flooded due to
the storm. The New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (NORTA) Administration building
appeared to have been engulfed with ten feet of water post-Katrina. At the Canal Street facility
146 city buses were visible outdoors in the flood. Another 22 buses were damaged at the Desire
Parkway facility. The buses will most likely have to be scrapped or completely rebuilt due to the
extensive water damage. Greyhound ended bus service out of the city late on August 27, citing
safety concerns, and Amtrak, which runs on tracks that go through the city's levees, ended
service to and from New Orleans on August 28. It was not until Saturday morning, September 3,
42
that Amtrak trains began evacuating residents out of New Orleans. Amtrak returned twice more
on Saturday to evacuate more people to Dallas and other nearby metropolitan areas.12,13,14
To further add to the confusion and dismay of what occurred before and after Katrina it is
unclear if Mayor Nagin had knowledge of the school buses in his area. The Orleans Parish
School Board is governed separately so, technically, the Mayor’s office for New Orleans has no
jurisdiction over the public school. According to the Mayors office they would not have had
knowledge of the OPSB bus yards or have the ability to contact drivers if needed. FEMA usually
coordinates between jurisdictions for use of equipment if requested to do so by local
governments, however it is unclear whether the Mayors office made these requests. Controversy
continues over whether or not the New Orleans Mayor failed to follow hurricane plan. 15
Communication problems emerged as another signifiant obstacle to effective evacuation.
The lack of a “practiced communication network” between New Orleans, the surrounding
Parishes, the State of Louisiana, and the Federal Government is a monumental factor in the
botched evacuation. By all media accounts it appears that little communication occured between
the involved parties. In a radio news interview with Mayor Nagin on September 2, 2005 he was
asked if he knew what the state and federal governments were doing: his response; “…I have no
idea what they're doing…... if they are not doing everything in their power to save people, they
are going to pay the price. Because every day that we delay, people are dying and they're dying
by the hundreds, I'm willing to bet you”. 16 Governor Blanco lashed out at Mayor Nagin in a
public statement blaming him for not utilizing the now destroyed school buses in a timely
manner. Blanco cited the federal state of emergency that President Bush declared two days
before Hurricane Katrina struck. 17 Governor Blanco also questioned the Mayor in regards to
what emergency plan was followed. Blanco: “There were however alternative emergency plans,
including ones held by state Homeland Security offices, and it is unclear which one was being
operated to” 15
Failure for government officials to communicate amongst themselves caused significant
difficulties, but another and possibly greater communication malfunction was the relationship
between the government and its citizenry. The City of New Orleans' website offers CERT
training and has tips on how one should prepare for an emergency, but no information that
showed the city engaged in a door-to-door grass roots campaign to prepare those citizens who
lacked the capability to access this information.18
The State Plan for Evacuation
The procedures for the progressive evacuation of the Louisiana population, as
delineated in the Louisiana State Evacuation Plan (Supplement 1A), breaks the event into three
phases as previously discussed: Precautionary/Voluntary, Recommended, and Mandatory
evacuation. At each of these three steps, required actions are specified for the state, risk area
parishes, and host area parishes. The primary actions delineated for state officials in the face of a
potential evacuation are summarized in Figure 3. The plan states that when a precautionary or
voluntary evacuation notice is issued, the focus should be on persons in high-risk coastal areas,
43
but no specific traffic, transportation, or sheltering procedures are delineated. When a
recommended evacuation notice is issued, local and state authorities are directed to evacuate
high-risk persons and facilitate transportation only if necessary. Finally, when a mandatory
evacuation order is issued, evacuation routes should be converted to one-way traffic flow and
last resort sheltering made accessible as the storm approaches.8
Figure 3. Requirements of the LA State Evacuation Plan (8)
The Governor’s Role. In general terms, the Governor has the overall responsibility of
emergency management in the state. It is under the governor’s purview to declare a State of
Emergency and to make further declarations as required. Additionally, the governor is in charge
of authorizing and directing state personnel and resources as well as non-risk parish authorities to
illicit assistance to the evacuation and shelter effort. Finally, it falls within the state executive’s
right and responsibility to request federal government assistance when required. Other state
organizations including the Department of Transportation and Development provide specific
vital functions to fulfill the state role in the evacuation process.2,8
Other State Organizations. The Louisiana State Department of Transportation and
Development is responsible for the development, maintenance and repair of hurricane evacuation
routes and their associated highways and bridges and to ensure that they can support a largescale evacuation. The department is also tasked with assessing the structural integrity of public
facilities. It is this department that is specifically tasked to coordinate with state and local
authorities to oversee the evacuation. The Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS) is
tasked with overseeing the opening of shelters, to include last resort locations like the New
Orleans Superdome, for evacuees. Louisiana State Police are, as expected, charged with keeping
order and facilitating traffic flow from risk areas. The Department of Health and Hospitals
44
(DHH) is expected to coordinate the evacuation and sheltering of evacuees with special needs.
All of these organizations are directed to operate under the lead of the Louisiana Office of
Emergency Preparedness (LOEP). The LOEP is also responsible for coordinating between state
and local efforts, as well as coordinating requests for aid from other states and the federal
government.2,8
What Actually Happened: The State Perspective
There has been no lack of criticism levied on state officials in Louisiana following the
evacuation measures taken before, during and after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. A review of
how the event actually played out sheds light on the validity of these criticisms. Governor
Blanco declared a state of emergency for Louisiana on August 26.17 At that time, the National
Hurricane center forecasted landfall 18 miles from New Orleans. The Louisiana Office of
Emergency Preparedness had previously assessed that it would take 72 - 82 hours to evacuate the
approximate 1.2 million people in the greater New Orleans area.19
On August 27, Governor Blanco requested that the President declare a state of emergency
for Louisiana claiming that appropriate actions had to been taken at the state level:
In response to the situation I have taken appropriate action under State law
and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 26, 2005 in
accordance with Section 501 (a) of the Stafford Act. A State of Emergency has been
issued for the State in order to support the evacuations of the coastal areas in
accordance with our State Evacuation Plan and the remainder of the state to support
the State Special Needs and Sheltering Plan. 17
Also on August 27, Mayor Ray Nagin announced a voluntary evacuation and on August 27,
Blanco joined the Mayor in announcing a mandatory evacuation just 20 hours before Katrina’s
landfall. Katrina struck at 6:10 AM on 29 August and at 3:00 pm the New Orleans Homeland
Security Director was quoted saying that “everybody who had a way or wanted to get out …was
able to.” Governor Blanco ordered the Superdome evacuated on August 31 and refused the
President’s offer for a federal takeover of the evacuation efforts on September 2.20,21
The Governor’s Role. Media reports have documented a significant amount of criticism
of Governor Blanco’s supervision and execution of the state role in the Katrina Evacuation. Four
primary points of view have pervaded throughout this ruthless and politically soaked debate.
The overriding criticism is that the governor failed to properly execute the plan that state
officials developed and she signed, specifically failing to order mandatory evacuations of at-risk
parishes well before Katrina hit. Although experts had predicted it would take a minimum of 48
hours to evacuate New Orleans, there was no mandatory evacuation order issued by the state or
local officials until August 28th, only 20 hours before Katrina came ashore. The governor has
joined local officials as targets of criticism for failing to exercise necessary powers to manage
transportation resources in a timely fashion. It was not until September 1 that the governor
announced her authorization for the use of public school buses for the transportation of
45
evacuees.17 Second, in accordance with reported orders from the governor, food, water, and other
necessary supplies were denied in order to encourage victims remaining in New Orleans after the
initial evacuations to leave the Superdome facility. Third, in the resulting chaos and apparent
disorder that occurred in the New Orleans streets, Governor Blanco apparently delayed
activation of the Louisiana National Guard; this could have conceivably stopped the violence and
looting that had been reported, as well as facilitated a smoother evacuation. Lastly, Blanco has
been criticized for engaging in partisan politics that hampered the overall effort, including her
refusal to allow for the federal takeover of the evacuation and response efforts in the wake of
Katrina. 22
Other State Organizations. Other State Organizations. The Louisiana Office of
Emergency Preparedness (LOEP), Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD),
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH), Department of Social Services (DSS), and State
Police were entrusted with specific functions in the EOP, as previously discussed. These
agencies have been criticized by observers who claim that there is “no evidence that any of these
State agencies assisted the mayor in evacuating the city.”23 Rhetoric aside, the LOEP was clearly
tasked with overall coordination and direct support to the Governor, and therefore can be
associated with the leadership failures identified within the governor’s role as well as some of
the shortfalls in the effectiveness of other state agencies. DHH and DSS, though not directly
involved in the preliminary evacuation procedures, must share responsibility with local
authorities for problems relating to sheltering evacuees. A general observation is that these
departments failed to adequately estimate the requirement for resources in the event of a
catastrophic event, even with the incorporation of federal aid. There seems to be little evidence
that DSS coordinated effectively with New Orleans officials to ensure adequate last-resort
facilities were available. As a result, the Louisiana Superdome experienced an influx of people
well beyond its capacity, causing many of the problems identified in the local effort section
above. 23 The department failed to ensure this “last resort” facility was used in its designated
role. And although much of the responsibility for individual cases lies at lower levels, apparent
inadequacies in the DHH effort appear to have contributed to the poor accommodation of special
needs evacuees. Granted, many elderly and disabled chose not to evacuate deeming the danger
greater if they moved. However, the compelling anecdotal information regarding special needs
casualties leads to the questioning of the DHH coordination. 5
On a positive note, the DOTD and State police were able to execute a relatively effective
vehicular evacuation. On August 27, State police announced that while U.S. 90, I-10, and I-49
are primary evacuation routes, secondary roadways should be utilized whenever possible.
Traffic flow was monitored and contraflow procedures were enacted only in the New Orleans
area. While there were significant delays on highways and isolated issues inherent to any largescale mass movement of people, the personal vehicle evacuation for Katrina was deemed
generally adequate. Although the major highways in New Orleans were cleared out by Sunday
evening, heavy traffic continued throughout the night. People were able to exit Louisiana by
vehicle at a rate of 18,000 people an hour. It is certainly arguable that time and capability
existed to evacuate more people via this route rather than transitioning to the shelter of last
resort.24,25
46
The Federal Plan for Evacuation Support
The National Response Plan (NRP), finalized and signed in December 2004, fully
mobilizes the resources of the Federal government to support response and recovery efforts of
state and local authorities—particularly in the event of a catastrophic incident like Hurricane
Katrina. The NRP brings all of the Federal government’s response and recovery resources under
a single effort, led by the Department of Homeland Security. This is designed to streamline the
process of coordinating immediate Federal support to the States, cities, and counties that need
federal assistance when State resources and capabilities are overwhelmed. The NRP also
describes the requirement for State Governors to request Federal assistance under a Presidential
declaration. State Governors are responsible for public safety within the boundaries of their State
and, as such, are charged with the responsibility of the coordination of resources to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all-hazards emergencies.26 It is critically important that
each State maintain this capability in order that Federal resources may be effectively marshaled
and addressed to regions or areas that have been truly overwhelmed, such as the case may be as
the result of a catastrophic disaster event spread across multiple jurisdictions, States’
boundaries’, or international borders. Planning and deployment of Federal assistance is provided
as depicted in Figure 4 below. 26
In order to accurately describe the role of the Federal government in coordinating
complex issues of large-scale evacuation, such as the one that occurred prior to and after landfall
of this hurricane, it is important to review the sequence of events, pursuant to public law and
resultant legal authority, that precedes Federal assistance as shown in Figure 4. Additionally,
Authority for Federal officials to intervene without State’s approval may be largely
misunderstood. U.S. State Governors have the authority, under certain emergency conditions, to
command policing measures; to enact, change, or rescind standing orders and regulations; and to
request Federal assistance when State capabilities appear inadequate, have been exceeded, or are
logistically and operationally ineffective.
Further, the Governors are vested with the authority to implement State-level mutual aid
agreements, to lead command and control functions, and to act as Commander in Chief of State
military forces (National Guard) and authorized State militias, as defined in Title 32, Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR). Likewise, local Mayors and city or county managers, appointed by
constituency vote as jurisdictional Chief Executive Officers, are responsible for the public safety
and welfare of the people within their jurisdiction and for coordination of local resources needed
to perform activities in preparation for prevention, preparedness, response and recovery from all
hazards incidents. 26
47
NRP implemented here, in the
crisis/disaster response cycle
Figure 4. The
Crisis/Disaster Response
Cycle
The basic premise of the national plan is that all emergencies are local events; and, thus
managed as such –until or unless local capacity to do so is overwhelmed. Local police, fire,
public health and emergency managers are trained, equipped, and funded to provide the local
response –with a significant portion of that funding originating from Federal budget-lines. 27
Although designed with management of terrorism events in mind, basic command and control
before, during and after local emergencies, such as a hurricane, are first managed locally, via the
basic National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command structure as depicted in
Figure 5. 26
Figure 5. NIMS
Structure.
48
Federal EOCs are well aware of hurricane threats and can predict and track a hurricane to a
potential point of impact. Therefore, State and local authorities will obtain hurricane threat data
from the National Weather Service. This data, also available to the general public in near-real
time, may also become useful to local authorities as a reference that may be cited when
advocating or recommending voluntary evacuation prior to 72 hours preceding land-fall: the
minimum time required by local and State plans, in this case, to enact a mandatory evacuation.
State- and local-level EOCs are able to directly link with DHS through the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC), which is manned 24/7 from Herndon, Virginia and from several
satellite locations. The HSOC maintains daily situational awareness to identify and monitor
threats, such as a large hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. The HSOC also monitors emergency
bulletins and warnings from the National Weather Service and provides coordination activities
with multiple agencies, including National, State and local Emergency Alert Systems (EAS). 26
What Actually Happened: The Federal Perspective.
On Saturday, August 27, President Bush declared a State of Emergency in Louisiana,
allowing FEMA officials to coordinate with authorities in Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and
Alabama. At that time, Governor Blanco issued only a voluntary evacuation order, despite
having received a call from the President, urging her to make it a mandatory one. Mike Brown,
Under Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security for Emergency Response and
Preparedness, received the order from President Bush to prepare for Katrina disaster relief at this
time.28 On Sunday, August 28, evacuations were finally ordered for New Orleans by State and
local officials. FEMA moved supplies from centers in Atlanta and Denton, Texas, to areas closer
in. On Monday, August 29, Katrina made landfall and on Wednesday, August 31, 10,000
National Guard troops deploy to the Gulf Coast, bringing the number of troops to more than
28,000, which marked the largest military response to a natural disaster in United States history.
On Thursday, September 1, disorder began to break out in New Orleans and FEMA director
Brown said that the agency was unaware of 15,000 people seeking shelter in the convention
center, a figure that conflicts with other accounts but clearly demonstrates breakdowns in
communication. 30
The evacuation that preceded Hurricane Katrina was an emergency evolution and as
such, a local event. Local and State plans, though flawed, were not completely followed as
previously shown. Evacuation from the Superdome, and from other areas of New Orleans where
people failed to evacuate prior to the storm, quickly turned from a local emergency to a national
disaster. It was then that the Federal response, with regard to evacuation, was most evident.
Under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, the Federal Government and FEMA
are not allowed to interfere with local operations unless they are authorized by state and local
leaders. 26 Blanco did not authorize this until September 1, 2005. 28 According to a Washington
Post report on Sunday, September 4: “Shortly before midnight Friday, the Bush administration
sent Blanco a proposed legal memorandum asking her to request a federal takeover of the
evacuation of New Orleans, a source within the state's emergency operations center said
Saturday.” The President’s offer to have the Federal government aid in the evacuation was
49
rejected. Not only were lines of responsibility clear and known in advance, so too were the tasks
that would need to be addressed after Katrina left. 29
The Federal response was further complicated by the fact that only 75% of the residents
of New Orleans had evacuated before the hurricane. Approximately 300,000 residents remained,
a large portion of which were from the city's public housing projects. 30 Federal officials, early
on, recommended an evacuation of New Orleans. Regardless, U.S. Navy ships were directed to
that area and USAF aircraft were sent to nearby airports -well before the Governor gave
permission to do anything 30 Critics of the Federal response must recognize that State and local
government did not ask for help when they clearly required it, so the Federal government began
to prepare for that inevitability as early as possible. 30 It is also important to note that the Federal
government, though powerful and possessing abundant resources, is an extremely large,
cumbersome, and unwieldy machine. Rapid mobilization of Federal resources within the
boundaries of the United States requires careful attention to laws that may be of little
consequence with regard to similar operations carried-out overseas. That has to be expected and
it must be considered in State and local disaster preparedness plans.
The New Orleans Evacuation Plan makes clear that decisions involving a proper and
orderly evacuation lie with the governor, mayor and local authorities. Nowhere is the president
or federal government even mentioned:
The authority to order the evacuation of residents threatened by an approaching
hurricane is conferred to the Governor by Louisiana Statute. The Governor is
granted the power to direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population
from a stricken or threatened area within the State, if he deems this action necessary
for the preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response or recovery. The
same power to order an evacuation conferred upon the Governor is also delegated to
each political subdivision of the State by Executive Order. This authority empowers
the chief elected official of New Orleans, the Mayor of New Orleans, to order the
evacuation of the parish residents threatened by an approaching hurricane. 2
Consequently, while other actions in the federal response may have proven to be late or
inadequate, it appears that, in terms of the evacuation, the federal government did nearly all
that it was authorized to do.
Recommendations
Our evaluation of the evacuation measures enacted at all levels during the response to
Hurricane Katrina highlights many opportunities for improvement. The following
recommendations are offered to Federal, Louisiana, New Orleans, and all emergency managers
for the planning and implementation of appropriate evacuation measures should another
catastrophic event such as Katrina threaten the Southeastern Louisiana region.
50
Planning Recommendations. First, it is essential that Federal, State, and Local emergency
management authorities conduct a coordinated evaluation of evacuation procedures enacted for
Katrina. The initial question is when this review should occur. Senator Jon Kyl, chairman of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, is one among many
who are pushing for hearings on the adequacy of evacuation plans.14 While it is tempting to
initiate such a review as soon as possible, it is our recommendation that, due to the significant
amount of conflicting reporting and scant documentation currently available, such a review be
delayed 6-12 months. While it is necessary to document observations in a timely fashion to
promote accurate recollection, the inherent bias and general uncertainty surrounding the
Hurricane Katrina response will make it difficult to accurately assess what actually happened and
why.
Second, in assessing the validity of evacuation strategies in place before Katrina, planners
must reevaluate the assumptions upon which those strategies were developed. Like all thorough
plans, the Louisiana State Evacuation Plan was developed based on some basic assumptions.
The first assumption was that the announcement of a voluntary, or precautionary, evacuation
would come well before landfall. The second assumption was that much of those in high-risk
areas would evacuate when the “recommended” call was made. Finally, the planners assumed
that most would evacuate once the mandatory evacuation order was issued. None of these
assumptions proved realistic in the wake of Katrina and must be reassessed. Another overriding
problem with the Louisiana State Evacuation Plan was its dependence on nebulous designations
of Precautionary, Recommended and Mandatory evacuations. At no point during the Katrina
evacuation process were these phases announced in an orderly way by one competent authority.
Future plans should include more distinct evacuation procedures as well as provide direction
regarding who should be making those determinations and on what basis.2,8
Third, an integral part of the planning process is accurate collection and realistic
utilization of population and cultural data. Emergency planners must focus more on population
characteristics such as poverty, infirmity, distrust, lack of transportation and lack of information.
As Americans, we have historically relied on our own initiative rather than assuming that our
elected officials will take care of us. An exception to this rule may be found in areas of extreme,
abject poverty, however. The chaos in New Orleans may have been largely exacerbated by the
social symptoms of poverty, and the consequences that a “welfare state” existence can create.
Realization of the complexities within communities like New Orleans is also important. It has
been repeatedly argued that New Orleans "did not plan for people who did not have lots of
money, do not own cars, the poor, sick, elderly."4 In fact there was a plan but it was grossly
inadequate. New Orleans suffered from a string of problems, some of which could not have been
foreseen and others with roots dating back decades, including a lack of money allocation in
accordance with population risk assessments. There is evidence to suggest that some of their
funding may not have been properly or efficiently utilized, and that local plans were not
followed. Regardless, this population information should be updated and used to reevaluate how
those without means will be evacuated and what resources will be required to do so.
Implementation Recommendations. One of the overarching observations of the Katrina
evacuation was a general lack of competent, proactive leadership. Certainly, it is the purview of
voters in a democratic society to elect officials who are most qualified to carry out the positions
51
for which they run. Depending on the political climate, competence in emergency management
may not be the highest priority in the collective public mind. It is therefore incumbent upon
elected officials, especially those without experience dealing with disasters, and those who elect
them to ensure personnel with appropriate qualifications are placed in positions of leadership
within the emergency management apparatus. This is especially important in a hazard prone area
like the area surrounding New Orleans. To accomplish this, disaster management must be
brought to the forefront of politics, regardless of the chronological proximity to a disastrous
event. This will take diligence on the part of the electorate as well as media and public officials.
Additionally, a regular system of checks and balances is required to ensure that all relevant
parties at all levels are up-to-date on the various policies and procedures that reflect the
characteristics of the current population and hazard landscape.
Significant attention has been given to the role of communications in this and previous
disasters. It is apparent that the technologies are available to emergency planners to support
effective communications, including interoperability, between all relevant entities and levels of
government. The key to actually making these systems function effectively is to drill with them
in all possible conditions. More frequent and realistic exercises are recommended to test
communications plans, and evacuation plans in general, to identify potential breakdowns and
develop means to overcome them. Incorporated in this process should be simulations like those
previously initiated at the federal level. In 2004, FEMA hired IEM Inc. of Baton Rouge to
conduct the eight-day, fictional Category 5 hurricane simulation (Pam) in New Orleans. The
simulation included a helicopter evacuation of the Superdome, a prediction of 15 feet of standing
water in parts of the city, and the coordinated evacuation of one million residents. Katrina looked
very similar to the “Pam” simulation. An important part of the contract was to design a plan to
resolve problems, such as evacuating sick and injured people, and housing thousands of stranded
residents. This portion of the project unfortunately never occurred due to a lack of funding.31
As mentioned in the planning recommendations, an essential piece of the evacuation
puzzle lies in addressing the plight of the resource-limited portion of the population. To most
effectively facilitate the evacuation of the poor, more must be done to educate people on the real
threat that exists due to hurricanes and other hazards. People failing to heed warnings presented
the greatest loss of life as a result of Hurricane Camille. Most of the 256 fatalities that occurred
in that event were people who did not evacuate despite the warnings.19 It is likely that future
details will show that a large portion of the Katrina casualties occurred for the same reason. It is
in this vein that dedicated school programs communicating this threat and the appropriate
actions, including safe evacuation, are recommended for all grades, especially in high-risk areas
like New Orleans. Additionally, since many of the economically disadvantaged rely on social
services for income and support, it is recommended that education of environmental hazards and
evacuation measures be incorporated into the application for such aid.
Execution Recommendations. Even with appropriate planning and implementation
corrections, effective evacuation is not possible without a successful execution of the plan. It is
certainly arguable that at least somewhat comprehensive plans were in place for Southeast
Louisiana, but officials failed to put those plans in effect in a competent, timely fashion,
especially at the state and local level. Divergences from the plan in an emergency are not just
possible, they are inevitable. But the following recommendations are standards of common
52
sense that must be mandated whenever an evacuation plan is enacted. First, the order of
evacuation must be distinct and timely. Forecast and evacuation models are readily available to
support the somewhat difficult call for evacuation. As previously discussed, this order must be
specific in its scope and issued from the most credible authority available. The requirement for
timeliness also extends to the integration of federal, state and local resources.
Proper resource identification and protection of required transportation resources is also
essential. The hundreds of buses that were flooded despite specific identification in State and
local evacuation plans is a prime example of this. It is recommended that thorough, realistic
evaluation of required transportation resources be conducted well before an emergency is
looming, but is also continually adjusted for the circumstances of the threat when it becomes
imminent. In other words, move what you expect to need to high ground and be proactive if that
ground is threatened.
Lastly, the decision of when to utilize the Superdome and to what extent was problematic
for the initial evacuation and follow-on actions. Last resort shelters should be used exactly for
that—last resort. The evacuation routes out of Louisiana remained available well beyond the
time that thousands were being moved to the Superdome. It is recommended that, to the greatest
extent possible, out-of-area evacuation be used as long as possible until it is deemed unsafe in
comparison to last resort means.
Conclusion
Despite significant research, many details of the Hurricane Katrina preparation and
response are yet to be available. Many of the specifics are still unfolding. However, the
recommendations herein reflect common standards that will likely be applicable regardless of
future revelations. In this document, emergency management issues have been identified at all
levels of government. The general conclusion is that, in the focused realm of preemptive
evacuation, the primary responsibilities and criticisms fall to the state and local levels. While
evacuation plans existed, the execution and devotion of resources appeared lacking. Much of
this can be attributed to leadership deficiencies. Regardless of who the responsible authorities
are, this is a national issue requiring devotion of resources from all levels to ensure effective
evacuation planning and execution for future disasters. If New Orleans is rebuilt, it will
inevitably be with acceptance of a less-than-average physical resilience of communities in the
area. For this reason, it is essential that the rebuilding process incorporate evacuation capacity
into transportation and population planning. However, as demonstrated by previous
catastrophes, the greatest opportunity for benefit and potential for failure with regards to
evacuation, as well as other aspects of emergency management, relates to the level of attention
given to the lessons learned from this event.
53
References
1. Associated Press. In Louisiana, Katrina's final toll put at 964, Oct 4, 2005. Available
at www.boston.com/news/nation/articles.
2. LA State Emergency Operations Plan. Previously available at
http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov.
3. Hurricanes...Unleashing Nature’s Fury, A Preparedness Guide, U.S. Department Of
Commerce, National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration, National
Weather Service. Revised August 2001. Available at
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/hurr.pdf
4. Featherstone, L. Race to the Bottom, Slow Katrina evacuation fits pattern of injustice
during crises, 08 Sep 2005
(http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2005/09/08/featherstone-katrina/).
5. Fussel, E. Leaving New Orleans: Social Stratification, Networks, and Hurricane
Evacuation. Posted: September 26, 2005. Available at
6. Evacuation Route Map and Estimated Drive Times.
http://www.nola.com/hurricane/?/weather/data/ssfstuff/evacuationguide.html
7. Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Components/Interactives/News/US/Katri
na/docs/Southeast_Louisiana_Catastrophic_Hurricane_Functional_Plan.pdf#se
arch='IEM%20inc%20%20New%20Orleans'
8. Louisiana State Evacuation Plan, Supplement 1A. Previously available at
http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov.
9. Chronology of errors: how a disaster spread, By Keith O'Brien and Bryan Bender,
Globe Correspondent and Globe Staff | September 11, 2005.
http://www.boston.com/news/weather/articles/2005/09/11/chronology_of_error
s_how_a_disaster_spread/?page=1
10. Relief workers confront 'urban warfare'Violence disrupts evacuation, rescue efforts in
New Orleans Thursday, September 1, 2005; Posted: 11:36 p.m. EDT (03:36
GMT) www.cnn.com
11.
“Future of the Superdome Remains Uncertain” Melinda Deslatte AP
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=1106009&CMP=OTCRSSFeeds0312
12. New Orleans Regional Transit Authority. Available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Orleans_Regional_Transit_Authority.
54
13. Hurricane Katrina Timeline. The Brooking Institution. Available at
http://www.brook.edu/.
14. Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 2005, No 3b (September 10, 2005 – 11am
PST)Posted Blackboard for EMSE 334.
15. Controversy over whether New Orleans Mayor failed to follow hurricane plan.
Available at
http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Controversy_over_whether_New_Orleans_Mayor
_failed_to_follow_hurricane_plan
16. Mayor to feds: 'Get off your asses'. Transcript of radio interview with New Orleans'
Nagin. CNN.com, Sept 2, 2005. Available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/nagin.transcript/
17. The State of Louisiana Website (www.gov.state.la.us). Press releases:
Governor Blanco Declares State Of Emergency, Aug 26, 2005
Governor Blanco asks President to Declare an Emergency for the State of
Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina, Aug 27, 2005
Governor Blanco Announces Executive Order, Aug 28, 2005
Governor Blanco's Announcement on Hurricane Evacuation, Aug 28, 2005
18. Office of Emergency Preparedness http://www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=46
19. Pielke, Simonpietri, and Oxelson. Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille: Lessons
Learned, Lessons Lost, Hurricane Camille Project Report, 12 July 1999.
Available at
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/about_us/meet_us/roger_pielke/camille/repor
t.html.
20. Katrina,Timeline, Wikipedia. Available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Hurricane_Katrina
21. The Brookings OInstitue Timeline
22. NBC's Lisa Myers Reports on Governor Blanco's Katrina Mistakes, Posted by Brad
Wilmouth on October 9, 2005 - 00:04.
23. Perryman, W. Katrina Disaster - Enough Blame To Go Around, September 10, 2005.
Available at www.wayneperryman.com/wp/. Louisiana State Police News
Releases: Troop I Special Operations Center Activated, August 27 2005; Troop
D Monitoring Storm Traffic, August 27 2005. Available at
www.dps.state.la.us.
55
25. Associated Press, New Orleans flees as Katrina approaches Gulf Coast. Posted
8/28/2005 8:02 AM. Available at
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/stormcenter/2005-08-28-katrina-gulf_x.htm
26. National Response Plan (NRP), December, 2004. Available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml
27. Brookings Institute. Hurricane Katrina: Where do we go from here? 8 Sept 2005.
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20050908.htm
28. Hurricane Katrina: The federal Response. Available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168573,00.html
29. Many evacuated, but thousands still waiting. 4 Sep 2005. Available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090301680_2.html
30. Clark, Lee. Worse Case Katrina. 2 Sep 2005. Available at
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Clarke/
31. Hurricane GlobalSecurity.org. Available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hurricane-pam.htm
32. Ruddy, C. Don't Blame Bush for Katrina, NewsMax.com, Sept. 5, 2005. Available at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/9/4/151327.shtml.
33. Hebert, P.J., J.D. Jarrell, and B.M. Mayfield, 1997: The Deadliest, Costliest and Most
Intense United States Hurricanes of This Century (and Other Frequently
Requested Hurricane Facts), NOAA, Technical Memorandum NWS TPC 1, 30
pp.
34. Jarrell, J.D., B.M. Mayfield, E.N. Rappaport, and C.W. Landsea, 2001: The
Deadliest, Costliest and Most Intense United States Hurricanes from 1900 to
2000 (and Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts), NOAA, Technical
Memorandum NWS TPC 3, 30 pp.
35.
Indepth: Hurricane Katrina.Hurricane Katrina timeline CBC News Online Updated
September 4, 2005
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/katrina/katrina_timeline.html
36. NPR.com “Evacuees Were Turned Away at Gretna, La”
37. gallerywatch.com “Texas nearing capacity with evacuees”
38. City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
www.neworleans.gov
56
39. Hebert, P.J., J.D. Jarrell, and B.M. Mayfield, 1997: The Deadliest, Costliest and Most
Intense United States Hurricanes of This Century (and Other Frequently
Requested Hurricane Facts), NOAA, Technical Memorandum NWS TPC 1, 30
pp.
40. Jarrell, J.D., B.M. Mayfield, E.N. Rappaport, and C.W. Landsea, 2001: The
Deadliest, Costliest and Most Intense United States Hurricanes from 1900 to
2000 (and Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts), NOAA, Technical
Memorandum NWS TPC 3, 30 pp.
41. Simpson, R.H., 1974: The hurricane disaster potential scale. Weatherwise, Vol. 27,
169-186.
42. Rulon, M. and Scott, K. H. Evacuation plan failed to consider those without
transportation, Gannett News Service, 5 Sep 2005. Available at
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43. Wolshon, Urbina, and Levitan. National Review of Hurricane Evacuation Plans and
Policies, LSU Hurricane Center, 2001.
57
58
Katrina: A Mass Fatality Disaster
John Delaney and Sergio de Cosmo
Mass fatality: general considerations
In light of Hurricane Katrina, which struck the Gulf Coast of the United States on August
29, 2005, and other recent disasters that caused mass fatalities around the world, it becomes
obvious that natural and man-made disasters may cause mass casualties that take on national and
sometimes international dimensions.
A disaster is a sudden occurrence that exceeds the resources available in a community to
effectively deal with it. A disaster, natural or man-made, becomes a “mass fatality incident”
when there are more human bodies to be recovered and examined than can be handled by the
usual local resources (1) (1a) (1b). Whatever the cause of the disaster, there will certainly be an
ensuing need to identify victims and an expectation that this will be done in each and every case.
Victim identification is one of the enormous challenges that a nation faces in the
aftermath of mass disaster events. Identification and proper disposal of a dead body is not only a
legal, societal need, but also a basic human right of the surviving family members. A timely
reunification of missing persons with their loved ones can greatly reduce emotional stress and
grief. The proper disposal of a dead body adheres to a variety of sacred religious principles and
traditions that cut across cultures and religions, confirming that respect for the dead is a universal
value.
Failure to identify bodies can also have material consequences on family members who
are unable to access family assets and receive property that is in the name of the missing person,
until a death certificate is issued. This issue can have severe economical consequences and
jeopardize the recovery process of an entire community.
Two major elements can be identified as the principal causes in adopting improper
practices in managing mass fatality events. The first element is the common belief that bodies
exposed to the environment in the aftermath of a natural disaster are the cause of epidemics. This
belief is deeply rooted in the human psyche, regardless the culture or religion, and often leads
authorities to adopt misguided procedures, such as changing the priority of their actions and
resources that should always be first, to rescue and treat survivors, second, to repair and maintain
basic services, and third, to manage the dead bodies. The relationship between bodies and
epidemics has never been scientifically demonstrated or reported (2) and studies prove that the
risk to the general public is negligible, even in areas where diseases are endemic (3). The body
could be the carrier of the etiologic agent, but not the cause of the epidemic, which is in general
59
due to poor sanitation measures, or because the water sources are compromised, or is a
consequence of the interruption of public health services or proper control of vectors (4).
The second element relates to the management aspect of a mass fatality incident response.
The management of dead bodies is a complex process which involves a series of activities and
stakeholders that need to be coordinated and managed. The lack of a mass fatality plan, or poor
knowledge and practice of an existing plan, causes delays, mistakes and inefficiencies with the
misuse of resources or duplicated efforts slowing down the entire identification process or even
compromising it.
Mass fatality: the process
Immediately after large-scale disasters, several activities related to the management of
victims takes place. As shown in Figure 1, these activities, which are functionally located under
Operations in the Incident Command/Management System, can be divided into three broad
phases: 1. search and recovery of bodies and human remains; 2. disaster victim identification; 3.
disposal of bodies and assistance for family members (2).
Management
phases of management of dead bodies
Operations
Planning
Logistic
Police
Firefighters
Emergency Mdical Personnel
DMORT/Contractors
Volunteers
Incident Site
Site Operation
Branch
Search and
Recovery
Morgue
Mortuary Service
Branch
Identification
See Table 1
Family Assistance
Branch
Assistance for
family memebers
State/Local Health Dept.
American Red Cross
Figure 1: Management of dead bodies – organizational chart
60
Finance
First responders arriving on the scene should verify the type of accident. They should
evaluate the size of the incident, and estimate the number of injuries and fatalities in order to
request proper assistance. After identifying potential hazards, such as structural collapse or
chemical/ biological hazards, first responders should provide medical assistance and establish an
initial security perimeter.
Once the search and rescue phase is completed, the initial response changes focus,
switching from safety and medical assistance to the injured to search and recovery of human
remains. The team that performs this task may be different from the first responders, depending
on the size and type of the mass fatality incident. For example, during the response to the Federal
Building bombing in Oklahoma City, the search and recovery of body victims was performed by
SR team, assisted by DMORT. Similarly, in air disasters, like United Flight 93, SR and
DMORT perform this task. In Louisiana, the body retrieval was conducted by specific body
recovery teams, which did not include either DMORT or SR teams.
These responders, being the first of many links in the management of dead bodies,
perform a critical task for the success of the entire identification process. The execution of a
speedy search and quick removal of the remains to a mass fatality morgue, while certainly
ensuring that the dead are no longer exposed to the public view, may result in a longer
identification time, loss of valuable information and a lack of complete report (6). For these
reasons, the search and recovery personnel must be trained to operate according to standardized
procedures.
In this stage of the process, the responders should identify and select the remains, process
the scene (document the location of remains, personal effects and evidence; establish and
maintain a chain of custody) and conduct the systematic removal of remains, personal effects and
evidence. (5)
Disaster victim identification is the term given to procedures used to positively identify
the deceased victims of a casualty event (7). The identification of victims, which is performed at
the morgue, comprises four major steps: collecting post-mortem (PM) data, collecting antemortem (AM) data, reconciliation and identification, and the release of the body to the family
members. (8)
For these purposes, the center is organized into several different stations. The inprocessing area establishes chain-of-custody documents and starts the tracking of the remains
(9). In particular, as shown in Figure 2, once the body victim arrives at the temporary morgue
and the logging procedures have been fulfilled, it is photographed and, “ if available, full-body
radiology may be done to locate any object or personal effects that may be commingled with the
remains. In the personal effect station, clothing and jewelry are collected, documented and
stored. Fingerprints are taken. Medical radiology may be conducted as directed. The pathology
section performs an autopsy to confirm the manner of death and samples may be taken for
laboratory tests and DNA if so directed by protocol. The dental section processes ante-mortem
61
and post-mortem evidence and forward findings to the identification center chief. The physical
anthropology examination provides information regarding age, sex, racial origin and skeleton
abnormalities that might aid in the identification”. (9)
There are several forensic experts involved in this phase and the composition of the
investigation team is determined by many factors such as type of disaster, logistics, availability,
etc. A general list of forensic scientists involved in the DVI process is shown in Table 1.
Recovery Logged
into Temp Morgue
and documentation
Photography
Full body radiology
Pathology
Cause and manner
of death
Medical Radiology
Fingerprints
Medical labs
DNA samples
Dental
Physical
Anthropology
Return to Family
Embalming
Reconciliation
Board
(9) Adapted from: Role of the Dental Team in mass fatality incidents
Figure 2: The identification process
Depending on the type of incident and condition of the body parts, some tests may not be
performed. For example, a body left in warm water for a week loses its skin and with it any
fingerprints or other distinct marks, making the fingerprints analysis not performable.
All the data collected in this phase will be used to populate a post-mortem database.
Simultaneously, family victims are interviewed by experienced investigative or support
specialists and asked to provide contact information for family doctors, dentists, and others who
could provide medical records and other documents, including blood, mouth swabs and other
specimens to develop a DNA profile (11).
Once the AM and PM data have been gathered, the records are compared, usually
through the help of specific software computer programs, in order to identify or exclude possible
matches. The positive matches are reviewed by the medical examiner chief that has been
62
assigned to the case and final deposition of the case is signed off. Once all the information is
recorded, the mortuary science section prepares the remains for the return to the family members.
The family assistance center is necessary to facilitate the exchange of information and to
address the families’ needs and provide crisis and grief counseling. This assistance should be
guaranteed not only to the families that are at the disaster site, but also for those families who
have decided to remain at home. Funeral directors and mental health professionals are available
to assist the families and gather the information (ante-mortem data) needed for the identification
process.
Medicine/Health
Science
Other Professionals
Care
Forensic pathology
Clinical forensic
medicine
Forensic odontology
Medical epidemiology
Anthropology/osteology
Molecular biology (DNA)
Fingerprints experts
Crime scene examiners
Radiography
Entomology
Police
Photographers
Interviewers
Mortuary technicians
Logistics & administration
Liaison
(10) Adapted from: STEPHEN CORDNER AND HELEN MCKELVIE
Table 1: Forensic scientists in the DVI process
The Federal Response Plan
The Federal support in a mass fatalities incident is outlined in the National Response
Plan. Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 – Public Health and Medical Services - provides
the mechanism for coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State, local, and tribal resources
in response to public health and medical care needs (to include veterinary and/or animal health
issues when appropriate) for potential or actual Incidents of National Significance and/or during
a developing potential health and medical situation. ESF #8 is coordinated by the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) principally through the Assistant Secretary
for Public Health Emergency Preparedness (ASPHEP). ESF #8 resources can also be activated
through the Robert T. Stafford Act or the Public Health Service Act.
The scope of ESF #8 provides supplemental assistance to State, local, and tribal
governments in identifying and meeting the public health and medical needs of victims of an
Incident of National Significance. This support is categorized in the following core functional
63
areas: assessment of public health/medical needs, public health surveillance, medical care
personnel, and medical equipment and supplies (NRP 8-1).
Victim Identification/Mortuary Services is a functional area of ESF #8. “Upon
notification of activation for a potential or actual Incident of National Significance by the NRCC,
HHS consults with the appropriate ESF #8 organizations to determine the need for assistance”
(NRP 8-4). “HHS may request DHS and DOD to assist in providing victim identification and
mortuary services, establishing temporary morgue facilities; performing victim identification by
fingerprint, forensic dental, and/or forensic pathology/anthropology methods; and processing,
preparation, and disposition of remains” (NRP 8-6).
HHS is the primary coordinating Federal agency in a mass fatalities incident. HHS will
call upon other Federal agencies to assist in some manner. For example, the Department of
Defense's responsibility is to “provide assistance in managing human remains, including victim
identification and mortuary affairs” (NRP 8-9). DHS is responsible for the activation and
deployment of NDMS assets, supplies and personnel “in a phased regional approach and
coordinated the provision of hospital care and outpatient services, veterinary services, and
mortuary services through NDMS” (NRP 8-10) Additionally, the Department of Justice is tasked
with assisting in victim identification, as coordinated through the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Arguably, the biggest player in the Federal response to a Mass Fatalities incident is the
National Disaster Medical System NDMS). “NDMS is a section within the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response Division, Operations
Branch and is responsible for supporting Federal agencies in the management and coordination
of the Federal medical response to major emergencies and Federally declared disasters including:
natural disasters, technological disasters, major transportation accidents, and acts of terrorism
including Weapons of Mass Destruction events” (NDMS website 11-1-05).
NDMS manages and coordinates the response of a number of different medical teams
depending on the emergency. In a mass fatalities incident, the NRP assigns the NDMS section
under ESF #8 to provide victim identification and mortuary services. These responsibilities
include: temporary morgue facilities, victim identification, forensic dental pathology, forensic
anthropology methods, processing, preparation, disposition of remains.
In order to accomplish this mission, Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams
(DMORT) are developed. DMORTs are composed of private citizens, each with a particular
field of expertise, that are activated in the event of a disaster. DMORT members are required to
maintain appropriate certifications and licensure within their discipline. When members are
activated, licensure and certification is recognized by all States and the team members are
compensated for their duty time by the Federal government as a temporary Federal employee.
During an emergency response, DMORTs work under the guidance of local authorities by
providing technical assistance and personnel to recover, identify and process deceased victims.
Teams are composed of funeral directors, medical examiners, coroners, pathologists, forensic
anthropologists, medical records technicians and transcribers; finger print specialists, forensic
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odontologists, dental assistants, x-ray technicians, mental health specialists, computer
professionals, administrative support staff, and security and investigative personnel.
FEMA Response Division, in support of the DMORT program, maintains two Disaster
Portable Morgue Units (DPMUs). Both DPMUs are staged at FEMA Logistics Centers, one in
Rockville, MD and the other in San Jose, CA. The DPMU is a repository of equipment and
supplies for deployment to a disaster site. It contains a complete morgue with designated
workstations for each processing element and prepackaged equipment and supplies (NDMS
website 11-1-05).
Within NDMS there is a specialized DMORT within a specialty that focuses on the
decontamination of fatalities in a Weapons of Mass Destruction incident. The mission of the
DMORT-WMD “is to support the Department of Homeland Security and local jurisdictions. The
team deploys to work in a hazardous materials environment to provide decontamination of
fatalities for a WMD event or any other incident where the remains may be contaminated. The
team is prepared to provide limited forensic services and to continue the chain of custody and
documents personal effects” (Manual of Operations p.3)
Although this is a specialized DMORT team, according to its Manual of Operations, it
may be activated to any site, incident or event (Manual of Operations p.6) As such, in reviewing
the team’s operational procedures provides insight as to how the other DMORTs operate. “The
DMORT-WMD consists of 50 personnel as a standard deployable force, although, more or less
personnel may be used dependent upon the incident type and size. It is designed to respond by
ground or air and is self-sufficient except for the need for local authorities to provide water for
decontamination, emergency transportation for members, and local ground transportation of
personnel. The team is maintained in a readiness state to deploy within 4 hours of notification, 24
hours a day, 7days a week ”(Manual of Operations p.4).
The initial request for a DMORT will come through the local coroners or medical
examiners offices after a determination is made that they or the resources that are available to
them are not sufficient to adequately handle the number of dead.
On September 11, 2001, United Flight 93 crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.
There was a total of 44 passengers on board; six were crew members and four were terrorists.
The local coroner knew his limitations and resources and sought assistance. DMORT III, from
the mid-Atlantic region responded with approximately 50 members. “United 93 triage station
was the intake site of the morgue. It was staffed by pathologists, an anthropologist, a dentist and
an FBI agent who was available for consultation. The team sorted potentially identifiable
remains from unidentifiable ones and numbered the remains starting with Number One. The
coroner assigned case numbers after identification was complete. The DMORT response used for
the first time a DNA team, which had received training a few months before the crash. The
DMORT used a contract disaster portable morgue unit supplied by the private firm Kenyon
International Emergency Services. DMORT work was augmented by local supplies and
equipment, borrowed scientific equipment and Kenyon staff. DMORT members copied all
records and provided the originals to the coroner and copies to the FBI. DMORT volunteers
continued to assist the coroner in additional recovery and examination after regular DMORT
65
deployment ended (two week deployments are typical). Numbered specimens needed reassociation after DNA analysis was complete. DMORT volunteers assisted the coroner in this
process, worked out some problems with re-association databases, and verified all identification
information.
The final figures, from the DMORT perspective, on United Flight 93 are as follows:
•
12 deceased were identified during DMORT deployment through dental and
fingerprints.
•
All 40 passengers and crew were identified using DNA.
•
Four terrorist remains were isolated but not identified.
•
DMORT processed 1,087 bags containing 1,319 total samples.
•
DMORT triaged 501 pounds.
•
592 DNA samples were taken.
•
101 family/direct reference samples were collected.
•
No remains were released during DMORT deployment.
•
Families were given choice on remains release. (www.semp.us 10-28-05)
The Louisiana Response Plan
In the State of Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan, Appendix 3 discusses Mass
Fatalities Incident Response. It “provides for proper coordination of mass fatalities incident
response activities, and establishes means and methods for the sensitive, respectful, orderly care
and handling of human remains in multi-death disaster situations” (ESF 8-7). A trained and
qualified mass fatalities task force was formed in the State of Louisiana in 1992 when the State’s
“Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LHLS/EP) recognized the need for
a statewide resource to assist local governments, specifically, when a disaster results in the loss
of lives which local governments are unable to accommodate. The intent of the Task Force is to
assist local authorities by providing specialists in the area of handling human remains” (MOU 813). “The team is comprised of individuals trained and educated in recovery, identification and
returning the dead to their families for proper disposition. In the event of a mass fatalities
incident, these individuals will provide support to state and local government. This assumes the
Louisiana Mass Fatalities Task force will be available to aid the parish coroner in the necessary
acts of recovery, evacuation, identification, sanitation, preservation or embalming (as
authorized), notification of next of kin, counseling, and facilitating the release of identified
human remains to next of kin or their representative”(ESF8-7).
The concept of operations states that mass fatalities incident response should only occur
after all survivors are moved to safety thus, it “is separate from and secondary to search and
rescue operations. The primary concerns of mass fatalities incident response are recovery,
identification of human remains and assistance to affected families. Ultimate responsibility for
collection, identification, storage and dispatch of deceased victims lies with the parish coroner as
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set forth by law in the State of Louisiana. The Louisiana Mass Fatalities Task Force will assist at
the request of the coroner, and as coordinated through the local Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness. The Task Force shall send a team to the site to assess the situation and
determine resource needs” (ESF8-7-8).
The Task Force is a State resource that will be activated “in time of disaster as
determined by the Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (LOHSEP)” (ESF8-9). A request for the Task Force should be initiated through
this office. LOHSEP is responsible for “conducting training and exercises in mass fatalities
incident response. The responsibilities for the parish coroner and the Louisiana Mass Fatalities
Task force include:
a. Recovery and evacuation of remains
b. Body identification
c. Disposition of human remains
d. Preservation or embalming
e. Notification of next of kin
f. Grief Counseling
g. Family assistance
h. Documentation of each victim
i. Preparation and filing of death certificates
j. Resource listing
k. Safeguarding of personal effects
l. Identification of morgue site
m. Establishing staging area
n. Determination of cause and manner of death” (ESF8-9)
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Louisiana Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness and the Louisiana Mass Fatalities Task Force was signed
in 2004. The agreement is effective for three years.
Figure 3 shows the Mass Fatalities Organizational Chart from the State of Louisiana
Emergency Operations Plan.
The Local Response Plan
By law in Louisiana, each parish shall have a coroner. “Except for the parish of Orleans,
he shall be elected at the gubernatorial election, shall serve for a term of four years” (Louisiana
Code RS33:1551). The law also states the coroner shall be a physician licensed by the State
Board of Medical Examiners and also a resident of the parish.
Revised Statute (RS) 33:1563 of the Louisiana Law outlines the responsibilities of the
coroner to hold autopsies and investigations, etc. It is from this statute that ultimate responsibility
for the collection, identification, storage and dispatch of human remains lies with the coroner in a
mass fatalities incident.
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Commander
LHLS/EP
LOHSEP
Liaison/Planner
Administrative
Officer
Procurement
Officer
Operations Officer
Operations
Center
Security
Officer
Safety
Officer
CISD
Funeral
Director
Family Assistance
Center
Search
Support
andAgencies
Recovery
ARC
Salvation Army, etc.
Search and Recovery
Morgue Operations
Identification Center
Figure 3: State of Louisiana Mass Fatalities Organizational Chart
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According to the Mass Fatalities Response Plan for the Office of the Coroner Parish of
East Baton Rouge, “the primary concerns of mass fatalities response are: recovery, identification
of human remains, and determination of cause and manner of death and aid to distressed
families. The recovery operations are divided into four phases. The phases are equally important
and are conducted concurrently:
•
•
•
•
Phase 1: Initial evaluation of scene/determination of equipment needs,
Phase 2: Morgue establishment and operations,
Phase 3: Family assistance/ critical stress debriefing, and
Phase 4: Body recovery (U-2-1).
The plan details all phases of the event and the requirements for each phase. It must be noted that
there is no mention of the Louisiana Mass Fatalities Task Force within the plan, other than a
contact number.
The Mass Fatalities Annex for Caddo and Bossier Parish are similar in scope and
function to the East Baton Rouge plan, however, the Louisiana Mass Fatalities Task Force is
identified as a resource that will be available to the parish. It outlines the role of the task force in
relation to a mass fatalities incident within the parish.
The Event
The Katrina timeline, prepared by CBS News, helps pinpoint critical elements that help to
interpret the response to the mass fatality events in the States of Mississippi and Louisiana. The
analysis of the timeline allows for the formulation of several considerations.
In Mississippi and Louisiana the body-recovery phase began at very different times. In
Mississippi the body retrieval started “as soon as the wind dropped below 60 miles per hour”
(Gary T. Hargrove, coroner of Harrison County. ‘Weeks later, most storm victims lie unnamed’.
NYT, 09/05/05). Six days following Katrina landfall, Mississippi reported 144 dead; Louisiana
had no official death report. By September 12, fourteen days after the impact, Mississippi had
collected 161 bodies were collected in the FEMA morgue and 46 were identified and returned to
the family members. In Louisiana, that same day, Kenyon Worldwide Emergency Services was
contracted by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospital (DHH) to retrieve bodies.
Kenyon would have first recovered the bodies whose location had been provided by SR teams,
mobilizing up to 150 recovery specialists. In Mississippi the bodies were probably recovered by
the SR teams and law enforcement. There is no evidence regarding the use of recovery
specialists or volunteers.
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Katrina Timeline
8/29/05
(O)
8/30/05
(+1)
• Katrina – Cat 4, 145 mph – makes landfall near Buras, La at 6:10 am
• Firtst levee breaks in New Orleans - Floods ~ 20% of of the city
• President Bush makes emergency disaster declaration for La and MS
• Second levee breaks in New Orleans - Floods ~ 80% of of the city
• FEMA activates the NRP. FEMA stops volunteer and firefighters in New
Orleans due to the insicurity of the city
• Mississippi: more than 100 deaths are reported
• Louisiana: no report on death
• Water level stop rising in New Orleans
• FEMA deploys 39 medical teams and 1700 trailer trucks
8/31/05
• Mississippi: same as the 30th of August
(+2)
• Louisiana: New Orleans Major Nagin estimates “Minimum hundreds of
deaths. Most likely thousands”
from: NYT; CBS News: Hurricane Katrina timeline; NOAA; D kosopedia
• Military increases National Guard deployment to 30,000
• Violence spread
• FEMA water rescue operation suspended because of gunfire
9/1/05
(+3)
• Mississippi: 126 people are reported dead
• Louisiana: ?
9/2/05
• More Natinal Guardsmen arrive; 6,500 arrive New Orleans, 20,000 by day’end
in La and MS
(+4)
9/3/05
(+5)
• 40,000 National Guard in the Gulf Coast
• New Orleans police report 200 officers of 1,500 total have walked off the job.
2 committed suicide
from: NYT; CBS News: Hurricane Katrina timeline; NOAA; D kosopedia
70
• Governor Blanco declares State of Public Health Emergency
• Missisipi: the death toll is 144
9/4/05
(+6)
• Louisiana: Governor Blanco says the Louisiana death toll will likely be in the
thousands
• One major gap in one of the broken levee is closed. Still reparing another gap
• 500 New Orleans officers are unaccounted for. Reinforcements arrive from
around the U.S.
9/5/05
(+7)
• Mississippi: Well over 100 death have been confirmed, with many more
unaccounted for
• La – New Orleans: Major Nagin says the N.O. body count may have reached
10,000. The official toll is 59. Local officials believe that thousands remain in
the area
• The Army Corps says that 60% of New Orleans is still flooded
9/8/05
(+10)
• Missisipi has recorded 201 deaths
• Louisiana: 83 death
from: NYT; CBS News: Hurricane Katrina timeline; NOAA; D kosopedia
• New Orleans is still 50% floded
• Mississipi: 214 confirmed deaths. 46 of 161 bodies in the FEMA morgue have
been already identified
9/12/05
(+14)
• Louisiana: 197 confirmed deaths. Only few bodies (?) that were in hospitals or
nursing home and therefore had bracelets with the name printed on, have been
identified.
Kenyon Worldwide Emergency Services is contracted by the Department of
Health and Hospital (DHH) of Louisiana to retrieve bodies.
Kenyon will recover first the bodies whose location has been provided by SR
Teams
The contract
•
•
•
•
Kenyon will recovery the dead and transport to temporary collection
point
Kenyon will provide up to 150 recovery specialists plus coordinating
staff to conduct these poerations
Kenion will provide all supporting equipment
Cost: $ 639,015.48 per month (the contract cannot be extende
beyond November 15, 2005)
from: NYT 09/12/05; CBC News 09/12/05: Hurricane Katrina timeline; Kenyon International Inc.
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• The US Army Corps has dried up New Orleans
• Missisipi: 219 confirmed dead. 70 bodies identified and names released
9/21/05
(+23)
• Louisiana: 736 confirmed dead. Only few (?) have been identified and
returned to their families.
FEMA officials, state health officials and local coroners have all declined to
say how many bodies have been identified
The body recovery process in New Orleans (by Cataldy, La Emergency
Response Medical Director – from CNN)
“There is a primary search. When they have the sospect or suggestion that
there could be something in the area, they perform a secondary search. They
do not want going kicking down doors…”
from: NYT 09/21/05; CNN video: ‘ Body recovery a grim task’ 9/21/05
10/04/05
• Missisipi: the death toll is 221.
196 have been identified and released
• Louisiana: the death toll is 972.
61 have been identified and released
(+36)
• Missisipi: the death toll is 228 ?
11/02/05
• Louisiana: the death toll is 1067 ?
(+65)
Most of the recovered bodies - 874 as of Monday - have been taken to a
morgue in St. Gabriel operated by the federal government
Bodies identified and released: 57%
Bodies identified, awating autopsy: 3%
Unidentified: 40%
Source: Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
from: NYT 10/05/05; Chicago Tribune, 11/02/05; The Times-Picayune, 11/02/05
72
Louisiana started the recovery-body phase fourteen days after ‘D-Day’ and the only
victims identified up to that point were those who died in hospitals or nursing homes and had
bracelets with their names printed on them. However, in many of these cases, the attorney
general opened investigations to determine the cause of death, forced to perform autopsies on
these victims and therefore postponed the return to the family.
The delay in the activation of the body-recovery phase worsened the condition of the
human remains, already critical due to the heat and warm water that accelerated the
decomposition process. Bodies in an advanced decomposition state require more sophisticated
identification methods, like DNA, which take longer to perform. Moreover, this delay caused
dramatic situations that caused concern in the U.S. and abroad. “In the downtown business
district, […] Union Street, […] there is a corpse […] Its knees rise in rigor mortis […] Six
National Guardsmen walked up to it on Tuesday [Sept. 6] afternoon […] One soldier took a
snapshot like some visiting conventioneer and they walked away […] What is remarkable is that
on a downtown street in a major American city, a corpse can decompose for days, like carrion,
and that is acceptable. Welcome to New Orleans in the post-apocalypse.” (‘Macabre Reminder:
The corpse on Union Street’. NYT, September 8, 2005).
The differences between Mississippi and Louisiana in managing the mass fatality process
include not only the recovery phase but the victim identification phase as well. The parish
medical examiners/coroners are ultimately responsible for establishing the identity of the missing
person and issuing the death certificate. To establish the identity the coroner may use one or
more identification methods, classified as presumptive (visual, personal effects, tattoos, physical
characteristics) and confirmatory (DNA, dental, fingerprints) (5). It is the coroner who operates
in the affected jurisdiction that decides which types of methodology to apply. In Mississippi and
Louisiana the standards adopted by the coroners were different. In Mississippi tattoos, personal
effects and physical characteristics were sufficient to establish identification; Louisiana, on the
contrary, accepted only confirmatory methods as a valid proof of identity (The Ney York Times
10/05/05). The decision to utilize DNA, dental and fingerprints only, dramatically increased the
time required to identify a victim, also for the problems encountered in collecting ante-mortem
data. In fact, “the storm destroyed dental and medical records and the wide dispersal of family
members who could provide DNA samples, photographs or basic information”. (‘Identifying
hurricane dead poses unusually daunting challenges’. The Ney York Times, 09/12/05)
The NYT on October 4th reported that “about 370 of the bodies at the temporary morgue
set up by FEMA [Saint Gabriel, east New Orleans] have been “presumptively” identified but
await confirmation by one of those [DNA, fingerprints and dental] three methods.” Therefore,
with 972 confirmed deaths in Louisiana, only 62 were officially identified and released, while in
Mississippi, of the 221 dead, 196 were identified and returned to their family members. Still on
November the 2nd, sixty-five days after Katrina struck Louisiana, 40% of the missing persons
remained unidentified (source: Louisiana DHH. From: ‘Alligator? Infection? Gunshot?’
Chicago Tribune, 11/02/05).
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The length of the identification process undoubtedly had a negative impact on the
families of the victims. According to a testimony of a missing person “the worst part is the
images they [family victims] cannot blot out […] A brother’s body left in a bathtub by the road
in hopes that it would not be overlooked […] If only they could have their loved one’s body,
they say, the imagined film loops might stop” (‘With information on bodies hard to come by,
relatives of victims wait in anguish’. The Ney York Times, 09/21/05). While “State officials
[Louisiana], still in crisis mode [10/04/05], say compiling and releasing data about the dead is
simply not a priority.” (‘Weeks after, most storms victims lie unnamed’. NYT, 10/05/05).
Overall response assessment and analysis
The CRS Report from Congress dated September 21, 2005 reports: “Hurricane Katrina
struck the Gulf Coast in late August 2005, causing catastrophic wind damage and flooding in
several states, and a massive dislocation of victims across the country. The storm is one of the
worst natural disasters in the nation’s history. Early estimates are that hundreds of people were
killed and about one million displaced.” (23) These numbers will undoubtedly change as
Congress continues to evaluate the overall response to Hurricane Katrina. Regardless of the final
numbers, the fact remains that many aspects of the mass fatality response could be improved
upon. The following elements played an important role in the mass fatality response to Hurricane
Katrina; these elements need to be addressed at all levels of government, as further information
becomes available.
Federal Plans:
The overriding goal of the federal government in a mass fatality incident is to provide
assistance to the state and local governments in areas where the resources available are
inadequate to effectively mitigate, handle or resolve the situation. The plan to provide mass
fatality support is outlined in the National Response Plan under ESF #8 – Public Health and
Medical Services Annex. This annex is general in nature and scope and falls short in addressing
several important issues related to mass fatalities that impacted the Hurricane Katrina response.
The Department of Health and Human Services is the primary agency and ESF
Coordinator for ESF #8. There are fifteen federal support agencies that are listed as being
responsible for some aspect of the federal public health or medical response. The functions of
each agency are listed in bullet form and are very general and vague in scope. In addition, many
of the responsibilities and functions assigned to each agency are duplicated or not well defined
between the agencies. Although this may be purposeful, to allow for flexibility, it can lead to
confusion in a response. Unless the specifics of such functions and the implementation process is
well defined there is certain to be problems from the onset of the federal response.
The NRP does not mention “mass fatality” anywhere within the document. However,
victim identification/mortuary services are listed as an “action” under the concept of operations.
It states: “HHS may request DHS and DOD to assist in providing victim identification and
mortuary services; establishing temporary morgue facilities; performing victim identification by
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fingerprint, forensic dental, and/or forensic pathology/anthropology methods; and processing,
preparation, and disposition of remains” (NRP 8-6).
This is a general statement that briefly discusses major functions of a mass fatality
response. It suggests that two separate federal departments (two of the largest) share
responsibility for assisting HHS in this endeavor. The question then becomes, who is responsible
and for what, when assistance is requested by HHS? Have DHS and DOD discussed and
developed plans and procedures and delineated responsibility to avoid duplication of effort or
resource? The specifics of the NRP need to be established in the various federal agency response
plans. These plans must then be thoroughly vetted and shared between the agencies and
departments with functional responsibility in a mass fatality incident.
Perhaps the most significant oversight in the ESF #8 with regard to Hurricane Katrina is
the assignment of responsibility or establishing a coordinating agency responsible for body
recovery in a mass fatality incident. Ultimate responsibility fell on the local coroner’s office,
however, because of the magnitude and scope of the incident, Federal oversight should have
been assigned to coordinate and direct such operations.
State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan:
In the State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Appendix 3 (Mass Fatalities
Incident Response), describes and defines the roles and procedures in mitigation, preparedness,
response to and recovery from mass fatalities incident. The State of Louisiana recognized their
vulnerability to “hurricanes, tornados, floods, hazardous materials incidents, mass transportation
accidents and acts of terrorism” (ESF8-7). In addition to the plan, and included within the State
had established a Mass Fatalities Task Force. The Task Force was setup similar to a DMORT
with consistent responsibilities – “to provide support to the state and local governments” (ESF-87). A memorandum of understanding between the state and the task force is included within the
plan. The fact that Louisiana had a Mass Fatalities Incident Response plan and a pre-established
Mass Fatalities Task Force, with a current MOU, is an indication that the State had a thorough
Emergency Response Plan for a mass fatalities incident.
The plan primarily focuses on the functions and concepts of operation of the Mass
Fatalities Task Force, however, there has been nothing found in the research conducted for this
paper that the team was ever activated or deployed. In fact, upon calling the Louisiana EOC on
several occasions, no one was familiar with the team. If this is, in fact, true, it would mean that
the entire Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan would be completely ineffective and thus the
probable root of all the mass fatalities issues in the Hurricane Katrina response. The State’s plan
called for the Mass Fatalities Task Force to assist in all areas of a mass fatalities incident but if
the team never deployed, failure was certain.
The plan does not address the issue of a mass fatalities incident that encompasses several
localities. If the Mass Fatalities Task Force were operational, how would it respond?
Furthermore, the plan does not address how the request for assistance from multiple coroners
would be prioritized.
75
Lastly, the State plan does not address any aspect of federal support in a mass fatality
incident. The plan should outline what resources are available to the State, how to request those
assets and the time and requirements necessary to get those assets into the State.
Local Mass Fatality Plans:
In reviewing two local Mass Fatality Response Plans, covering the parishes of East Baton
Rouge, Caddo, Bossier and the cities of Shreveport and Bossier, it was evident that the local
coroner had a thorough understanding of his/her responsibility in a mass fatalities incident. Both
plans clearly state that the local coroner has ultimate responsibility for all related issues in a mass
fatalities incident. Additionally, both plans identified the phases of the event and clearly outlined
the coroner office's role in each phase.
The biggest surprise within the local plans was the lack of reference to the Louisiana
Mass Fatality Task Force. In fact, the East Baton Rouge plan only listed the team contact number
in the resource list. For a state resource that was expected to be utilized extensively in a mass
fatalities incident not to be mentioned within a local mass fatality plan is an indication of the lack
of trust and/or understanding between locals and the state.
It is difficult to determine the resources and capabilities of the local coroner’s offices but
suffice it to say, the plans focused on a single, centralized mass fatalities event, such as a bus
accident or an event similar to Oklahoma City. Although each plan recognizes that floods and
hurricanes are potential mass fatalities incidents, they do not address the issues surrounding a
mass fatality incident that is de-centralized and covers a large area.
The local plans also state that a “response is separate from and secondary to search and
rescue operations. Mass fatality response activities should occur only after all survivors of the
incident are moved to safety” (Caddo-Bossier EOP pg.2). It is difficult to determine if this was
strictly adhered to in Hurricane Katrina for each of these localities. The current evidence
indicates that it may be a factor in the delay of body recovery. For a centralized, mass fatality
event, this is a common sense, reasonable approach, as the goal in any emergency is to save as
many lives as possible. But with Hurricane Katrina the impact of the dead bodies in public view,
along with the projected number of dead, necessitated a response that was coordinated with the
search and rescue operations.
Area of Impact:
All of the Federal, State and local “mass fatality “ plans recognize that hurricanes, or
other natural hazards can result in mass fatality incidents, however, the focus of such plans
centered on a mass fatality incident that was centralized or confined to a certain geographical
area. The assumption being, the dead would be confined to a relatively small area. This was the
76
case in previous mass fatality incidents: the Oklahoma City bombing and all three incidents on
September 11, 2001.
Hurricane Katrina affected South Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida
panhandle and a large portion of eastern North America. The federal disaster declaration covered
90,000 square miles of the United States. As of this writing, the confirmed deaths from the
affected States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and Mississippi totaled 1,302. The
majority of the deaths occurred in Louisiana (1,056) and Mississippi (228). There were 12
parishes in Louisiana that had over 5 related deaths with the largest numbers occurring in East
Baton Rouge (72), Jefferson (30), Orleans (700), St. Bernard (123) and Tangipahoa (26). In
Mississippi there were six counties that had over 5 related deaths with the largest numbers
occurring in Harrison (91), Hancock (51) and Pearl River (17).
Hurricane Katrina impacted an extremely large area and created a mass fatalities incident
that immediately overwhelmed the local, State and Federal resources in a multitude of
jurisdictions. Knowing that a hurricane could produce such a mass fatalities incident, why
weren’t all levels of government better prepared for such an event?
Simply, there has been no natural disaster in the United States in recent memory that has
resulted in such large numbers of deaths. The United States has been spared the huge loss of life
from natural disasters; an occurrence that is seen more frequently in less developed countries.
The crisis and emergency management community within the US as a whole has also focused on
a terrorism type of response since September 11, 2001. This was considered to be the greatest
threat in terms of producing a significant loss of life.
Body Recovery – Not a Priority
The Louisiana State and local mass fatality plans clearly state that mass fatalities
response should occur after all survivors have been moved to safety. Again, this is an indication
that the mass fatality plans focus on a single, centralized event. This is a common sense approach
when dealing with a “typical” mass fatalities incident, whereby, the ultimate goal is to save lives.
All available resources should focus on saving as many people as possible. This concept is easy
to grasp when a mass fatalities incident is centralized. However, with Hurricane Katrina a
quicker response may have been warranted in dealing with the mass fatalities. The impacts of the
dead bodies in public view and the total effects on the citizens and family members have yet to
be determined. But it goes without saying, that the quicker the body recovery can be performed,
the less overall impact it has.
Search and Rescue Operations
Hurricane Katrina posed a number of challenges to the first responders, severely
impacting the overall rescue operation process and consequently the recovery and management
of dead bodies. Urban Search and Rescue Teams and everyday citizens attended first to rescue
missions for the living then transitioned to recovery missions for those who did not survive, but
this transition was delayed for several reasons.
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A principal reason for the inadequate response was the enormous regional destruction of
communication and transportation infrastructure caused by Katrina. The areas affected by the
hurricane experienced shortages of essential services, including electricity, potable water, food,
and fuel; damage to health-care and public health systems; and disrupted communications. From
the Congress Report (23): “The logistical hurdles posed by Hurricane Katrina have been
formidable. Communications were knocked out in hard-hit areas, which compromised the
process of assessing and prioritizing needs. Physical access was blocked in some areas, and civil
disorder was a problem in some others. Each kept responders from delivering aid. In some cases,
victims were isolated without water and medicines, and hospitals that had not been evacuated
were unable to sustain operations.”
Together with the extent of the damages to airports/airbases, highways, and other
infrastructures, poor planning and execution and a lack of coordination between the several local,
State and federal agencies involved in the response could have contributed in slowing down the
relief asset’s approach. This issue is still under investigation: “Congress and others will review
the response to Hurricane Katrina with an eye toward assessing how well the NRP worked as an
instrument for coordinated national response, and how well various agencies at the federal, state
and local levels carried out their missions under the plan” (25). A question that comes to mind is
whether the agencies and authorities that have been overwhelmed are indeed capable of making
the incident assessments and informed resource requests necessary to obtain federal assistance. A
CRS reports that (24) “The issue that has attracted the most attention in post-Katrina discussions
has been the speed of rescue and relief operations. As noted, NORTHCOM began its alert and
coordination procedures significantly before Katrina’s landfall and the subsequent levee
breaches. It is not yet clear exactly when DHS/FEMA first requested DOD assistance or what
was specifically requested. From press releases and reports to date, it appears that DOD made its
own assessments of what resources would be useful and began moving towards deployment prior
to or shortly after Katrina’s landfall. However, it was not until after the presidential declaration
of a federal emergency on August 30, and the declaration of an Incident of National Significance
on August 31, that many deployments began. […] Another factor that affected deployments is
simply that most relief assets must be kept out of the storm’s path until it passes to avoid their
own destruction. It is possible, however, that an earlier and phased deployment could have
brought assets closer to the affected region in a more timely fashion.”
The victim identification process
When the response effort shifted from the search and rescue phase to the search and
recovery of remains, other issues arose that complicated the victim identification process and
increased the time to perform the identification and finally the return of the body to its family
members.
An element that contributed to the delay in the identification effort was the condition of
the bodies that spent days or weeks in the heat or warm water. Many of the victims were in an
advanced decomposition state when they reached the morgue. “Coroners have said that even the
bodies of people they knew personally were unrecognizable by the time they were collected.”
(14). Therefore, in order to identify the bodies the medical examiner had to use advanced
78
identification methods, like DNA dental recognition and radiography, which may require more
time to be performed.
Moreover, forensic scientists had to face an additional challenge in the collection of antemortem data. Katrina, in fact, destroyed or contaminated many of the ante-mortem data, such us
medical records, dental records, photographs, fingerprints and DNA. The dispersal of family
members, who could have provided some of this data, further complicated the problem. As
reported by the New York Times “some of the problem existed well before the storm plowed
ashore. Louisiana and Mississippi are among the states with the lowest percentage of residents
going to the dentist, making it harder for officials to use that extremely reliable form of
identification”. (14)
Finally, Hurricane Rita, which made landfall along the Gulf Coast in late September
2005, causing a temporary displacement of the staff involved in the disaster victim identification
process, further increased the length of the process.
Conclusion
As reported by the New York Times, “Only 40 percent of the 883 bodies at the central
morgue in St. Gabriel, La., [had] been released to families, and many victims – out of an
estimated total of 1,050 in Louisiana and 230 in Mississippi – remain nameless or unclaimed”
(NYT 11/14/05) (26). This statistic is an indication that the overall mass fatality response in
Hurricane Katrina was ineffective. The mass fatality plans, on all levels of government, were
insufficient to deal with a natural disaster that encompassed a large geographical area. Search
and recovery responsibilities were not clearly defined prior to the incident, which in turn affected
the victim identification procedures and standards. The entire mass fatality response was doomed
long before the hurricane hit because many of these issues had not been thoroughly addressed
previously.
The fact is, the true number of deaths as a result of Hurricane Katrina may never be
known. “Unlike previous mass casualty events, such as the September 11 terrorist attacks or the
1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, Katrina’s victims were spread out over
hundreds of miles and died from a variety of causes. Most of the confusion lies with how to
classify evacuees who died – many of them – elderly – and what constitutes an indirect death.”
(15) Defining who died as a consequence of the hurricane and, therefore, establishing the exact
number of the victims is not an exercise for statistical purpose only, but it affects federal funding
for funerals and recovery efforts.
79
References:
1. National Association Of Medical Examiner: Mass Fatality Plan (Accessed at
http://www.dmort.org/FilesforDownload/NAMEMFIplan.pdf)
1 a. CRS Report for Congress – The Library Congress. September 21, 2005. Order Code
RL33096. Page 11, note 30.
1 b. Mass Fatality Response Plan. Office of the Coroner. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Annex U,
Appendix 2 (available at: http://www.brgov.com/dept/oep/plan/annexu/Appendix2.pdf)
2. PAHO: Management of dead bodies in disaster situations. Washington, DC. 2004 (available
at: http://www.paho.org/English/DD/PED/ManejoCadaveres.htm)
3. Morgan O. Infectious disease risks from dead bodies following natural disasters. Rev. Panam
Salud Publica. 2004; 15 (5): 307–12 (Accessed at
http://publications.paho.org/english/dead_bodies.pdf)
4. Claude de Ville de Goyet: “Epidemics caused by dead bodies: a disaster myth that does not
want to die” Rev Panam Salud Publica/Pan Am J Public Health 15(5), 2004 (Accessed at
http://publications.paho.org/english/editorial_dead_bodies.pdf)
5. Mass Fatality Incident: A Guide for Human Forensic Identification – US Dept. Of Justice.
June 2005 (accessible at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij)
6. Mass fatality and casualty incidents. A field guide. Robert J. Jensen. CRC Press 1999.
7. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Accessed at:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page
&cid=1007029390554)
8. Disaster Victim Identification – Guide. Interpol (accessible at:
http://www.interpol.int/Public/DisasterVictim/Guide/Default.asp)
9. Role of the Dental Team in mass fatality incidents. Richard H. Fixott et al. Dental Clinics of
North America. Volume 45 – Number 2 – April 2001
10. Developing standards in international forensic work to identify missing persons. Stephen
Cordner and Helen McKelvie (IRRC December 2002 Vol. 84 No 848)
11. Ante-mortem and post-mortem process backgrounder. Kenyon Emergency Services. 2005
12. ‘Weeks later, most storm victims lie unnamed’. The New York Times, 09/05/05
80
13. ‘Macabre Reminder: The corpse on Union Street’. By Dan Barry, The New York Times,
September 8, 2005
14. ‘Identifying hurricane dead poses unusually daunting challenges’. By Shaila Dewan, The
New York Times, 09/12/05
15. ‘Alligator? Infection? Gunshot?’ By Maurice Possley and John Mccormi, Chicago Tribune,
11/02/05
16. ‘With information on bodies hard to come by, relatives of victims wait in anguish’. By Shaila
Dewan, The New York Times, 09/21/05
17. Weeks after, most storms victims lie unnamed’. By Shaila Dewan, The New York Times,
10/05/05
18. CBC News In-depth: Hurricane Katrina timeline. (accessible at:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/katrina/katrina_timeline.html)
19. Kenyon International Emergency Services, Inc. Statement of work for Louisiana Dept. of
Health and Hospitals, Dated 12 September 2005
20. O’Neill, Ann - CNN.com - September 9, 2005-“Identifyin victims a grueling task”
21. CNN – Video – September 21, 2005: ‘ Body recovery a grim task’
22. NPR – Audio – September 28, 2005: ‘New Orleans begins probe into Katrina deaths’
23. Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response. CRS Report from Congress.
September 21, 2005. Order Code RL33096
24. Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response. CRS Report from Congress. September 19,
2005. Order Code RL33095
25. Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response. Summary. September 21,
2005. Open CRS – Congressional Research Report for People (accessed at:
http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL33096/)
26. ‘At storm victim’s funeral, a celebration of a life and of a city’. By Deborah Sontag, The
New York Times, 11/14/05
27. ‘Caddo-Bossier Emergency Operations Plan.’ Caddo-Bossier Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness. November 3, 2003.
28. Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team – Weapons of Mass Destruction, Manual of
Operations, Oct 19, 2004.
81
29. ‘Emergency Operations Plan.’ State of Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness. April 2005.
30. Louisiana State Law. RS 33:1563. (accessed at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/lss_doc/lss/house/RS/33/Doc%2089333.html) 10-28-05
31. ‘Mass Fatality Response Plan.’ Office of the Coroner Parish of East Baton Rouge. January
2001.
32. ‘National Response Plan.’ Department of Homeland Security. December 2004.
33. National Disaster Medical System (Accessed at http://www.ndms.dhhs.gov) 11/01/05
34. ‘The Role of DMORTs in Mass-Fatality Management in US Civilian Domestic Disasters.’
Suburban Emergency Management Project. (Accessed at http://www.semp.us) 10-28-05
35. Vernon, August ‘Mass Fatality Response for Fire/EMS.’ (Accessed at
http://cms.firehouse.com/content/article/printer.jsp?id=44687) 10-28-05
82
Hurricane Katrina: Identifying and Addressing Vulnerable Populations
Jeremy Burcher, Danielle Kaplan and John Norton
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina raced into the Gulf Coast and the city of New
Orleans as a Category 4 storm and altered the region forever. The catastrophic effects of Katrina
included a federal disaster area spanning over 90,000 square miles and the distribution of goods
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to over 700,000 households equaling
approximately 1.5 million residents. Projected Katrina costs range from $100-$200 billion
dollars. Further, the population affected by flooding was initially estimated at 583,000
individuals with 70,000 elderly residents and 124,000 children, of which 57,300 lived in a singlefamily residence. Approximately 1,076 lives have been lost to Katrina in Louisiana alone.1
As predicted by studies and exercises, the powerful storm caused the levees holding the
waters of Lake Pontchartrain out of the city to fail, and water poured into New Orleans. The
nation and world watched as thousands of New Orleans residents were rescued from the flooded
city over the next days. The storm and its aftermath led to a major debate in this country about
who had been impacted by the disaster, as well as the planning and response for the hurricane.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the debate dispassionately and provide a basis for
understanding the issues. Specifically, we were tasked with the following:
•
•
•
Describe the population that was particularly exposed to this event.
To what extent were the special needs addressed during the various stages of the
disaster?
How could the most obvious cases of social vulnerability been managed more
effectively?
Hurricane Katrina cut a wide swath when it struck the Gulf Coast, leaving behind death
and destruction in several states, affecting millions of people, and creating what President Bush
described as “a disaster area that is larger than the size of Great Britain.”2 However, it is New
Orleans that has generated most of the heated debate and garnered most of the public attention.
1
Johnson, Kevin and Willing, Richard “La. toll rises as evacuees find dead in return to homes,” USA Today,
November 14, 2005
2
President George W. Bush addressing the nation, September 3, 2005
83
In this paper, we will focus specifically on New Orleans and its surroundings to address this
topic.
First, we will examine the definition of vulnerability and how it applies to the population
of New Orleans. Second, we will analyze the response and preparedness planning with respect
to the vulnerable population, as well as the execution of those plans. And lastly, we will make
recommendations for improvements for the future.
The concept of vulnerability
The word vulnerable, meaning susceptibility to injury, illness, or harm, is an old one, and
is generally applied to individuals or locations. The term “vulnerable population,” applied to
groups, is a relatively recent concept, arising in the aftermath of World War II. It was a human
rights response to the atrocities of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. The United Nations was
formed as a result of that war, and its charter intended to prevent recurrence of those atrocities.
This concept has expanded beyond the area of human rights and human action to human health
and natural disasters.
The human rights view of vulnerability, as promoted by the United Nations (UN), does
not have a static definition. It can depend on who is describing a vulnerable population, on
events, or on the context of the discussion. The UN stated in its Millennium Declaration, in a
section titled “Protecting the Vulnerable:”
We will spare no effort to ensure that children and all civilian populations that
suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, genocide, armed
conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies are given every assistance and
protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible.3
The UN, in answer to the question “How does the UN defend vulnerable groups in
society?” responds, “The UN is an advocate for society's most vulnerable groups – minorities,
migrant workers, refugees, indigenous people and children in especially difficult
circumstances….”4
Also in response to the atrocities of World War II, the public health community has
adopted a concept of “vulnerable populations.” In the United States (US), this is enacted in law
for protection of vulnerable populations in medical research. In the US Code of Federal
Regulations, the vulnerable include “children, prisoners, pregnant women, and persons who are
handicapped, mentally disabled, economically disadvantaged, or educationally disadvantaged.”5
3
UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, September 8, 2000
United Nations Image & Reality website <http://www.un.org/geninfo/ir/ch4/ch4.htm>
5
US CFR Title 45, Part 46.111(a)(3)
4
84
The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) convened a
conference in July of 2005 on the topic of defining vulnerable populations. In their call for
papers for the conference, the IUSSP noted:
[T]he expression "vulnerable population" has become increasingly commonplace
to designate very different groups. Popularly, the term refers to people under the
threat of such natural disasters as hurricanes, earthquakes, and flooding.
Demographically, the term refers to populations defined by specific social or
economic characteristics - unwanted children, lonely mothers, widows, the
elderly, the poor, and various racial and ethnic groups - that suffer greater risks of
morbidity and mortality than wealthier and more privileged populations.
Populations experiencing significant pressures on marriage and fertility are also
demographically vulnerable. The lack of common definitions can lead to
considerable confusion.6
In At Risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability, and disasters, the authors define
vulnerability as:
[T]he characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate,
cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. It involves a
combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone's life and
livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society.7
Sometimes the terms "vulnerable" or "special needs" populations are used to characterize
groups whose needs are not fully addressed by traditional service providers. The organization
PrepareNow.org has the mission “to ensure that the needs and concerns of vulnerable people are
addressed in emergency preparedness and response.”8 PrepareNow.org uses as its definition of
vulnerable populations:
[P]eople who feel they cannot comfortably or safely access and use the standard
resources offered in disaster preparedness, relief and recovery. They include but
are not limited to those who are physically or mentally disabled (blind, Deaf,
hard-of-hearing, cognitive disorders, mobility limitations), limited or non-English
speaking, geographically or culturally isolated, medically or chemically
dependent, homeless, frail/elderly and children.9
Despite the differences in these definitions, there are some commonalities. The dominant
theme in all of them is that a vulnerable population is one for which extra care, special measures,
or additional attention is required, above and beyond the needs of the population at large. There
is also the idea that a vulnerable population will be harmed more – they “suffer
disproportionately.”
6
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, IUSSP Web Site <http://www.iussp.org/Activities/scchis2/his2-call05.php>
7
Blaikie P., et al., At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerabilities, and Disasters. p. 9
8
PrepareNow.org, PrepareNow.org Web Site, <http://www.preparenow.org/purpose.html>
9
PrepareNow.org, PrepareNow.org Web Site, <http://www.preparenow.org/pop.html>
85
A Working Definition of Vulnerability in New Orleans
In order to analyze vulnerability during the Katrina event in New Orleans, and to make
meaningful recommendations for improvement, we must develop a working definition of the
vulnerable population in order to avoid “considerable confusion.” A definition based on
casualties will at this point be difficult to establish. The identification of the dead in New
Orleans is not yet complete, and injury statistics are not yet available. Economic loss is not
likely to be a good indicator, either. Like casualty information, the economic loss information is
not yet complete. But intuitively, while the loss of a $500,000 house is greater than the loss of a
$50,000 house, the impact of the loss to the owners of the house with less economic value may
be greater.
Given the various definitions of vulnerability discussed previously, a good working
definition will have multiple categories. The first category that we will be discussing is that of
“geographic vulnerability.” The geography of New Orleans makes the entire city vulnerable to
some extent, as it sits below the level of the surrounding waters. The lowest lying areas are the
most at risk, and the people who live in those areas are the most vulnerable.
The second category is “mobility vulnerability.” The immediate mitigation for the
approaching storm was evacuation – those with limited or no mobility, either due to age or
medical conditions, or lack of transportation, require extra care and assistance in order to be able
to escape, or lessen, the consequences of a hurricane.
The third category, and the largest, is “economic vulnerability,” or more directly,
poverty. The poor are often identified among “vulnerable populations,” and for good reasons.
Those living in poverty are least likely to be able to prepare for disaster, least able to cope with
it, and least able to recover. A person with a credit card, savings, and insurance is much more
likely to be able to evacuate, find shelter, and rebuild a lost home than one without those
resources.
Geographic Vulnerability
A History of Vulnerability
New Orleans was built on the Mississippi River delta as a trade port by the French in
1718. The area was prone to annual floods, therefore, much of the initial building was made on
the highest ground available. In New Orleans, the highest ground is the natural levee that forms
the bank of the river. However, a natural levee is not protection from all flooding of a river,
since the levee is itself formed by the deposition of material when the river overflows its banks.
10
The French colonists began the process of augmenting the natural levees as early as
1727 , and the process of building and maintaining levees to protect the city of New Orleans has
11
10
11
Lewis, Peirce F. New Orleans: The Making of an Urban Landscape, p. 39
Colten, Craig E. An Unnatural Metropolis, p. 19
86
been essentially continuous from the founding until today. The levees protect the city by
keeping the water out of the low-lying areas. However, they do not solve the problem of the
city’s low elevation. In the absence or failure of a levee, the lowest areas will be those most
affected.
During the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, the City of New Orleans was threatened
with failure of the levees. In order to avoid the inevitable devastation that would follow, city
businessmen and the governor of Louisiana decided to breach the levees intentionally.12 The
levees were dynamited by the US Army Corps of Engineers13, and the flood waters of the
Mississippi poured out and inundated St. Bernard and Plaquemines parishes. The city escaped
the flood in 1927 with this action, but it wasn’t the last of the devastation for St. Bernard’s and
Plaquemines.
In 1965, Hurricane Betsy struck the Louisiana coast. Once again, the low-lying parishes
near New Orleans were flooded causing homes and livelihoods to be destroyed. But the city
itself was also flooded, with the water depth reaching 12 feet in the Lower Ninth Ward.14
Eighty-one people were killed, and over $2.4B ($12B inflation adjusted) in damages were
inflicted.15
In more recent years, Louisiana has proven to be a state vulnerable to the hazards of
flooding and tropical storms. It ranks near the top in monetary losses due to flooding (Figure 1)
in data from 1975-1998. It also ranks near the top in deaths by tropical storms (Figure 2).
Geography and Hurricane Katrina
An elevation map of modern New Orleans (Figure 3) reveals those areas that are most
vulnerable to flooding. Louisiana State University is undertaking a project to map deaths by
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. The data are incomplete and imprecise, but among the
preliminary results of this project reported, as reported in the Washington Post:
The city's two worst-hit neighborhoods, the data show, were the Lower Ninth
Ward, the predominantly black, working-class community east of the French
Quarter, and Gentilly, a fast-gentrifying area where homeownership rates among
middle-class blacks had been rising before the storm. Each neighborhood
accounted for 31 to 75 deaths, according to the mapping data, which assigned a
range of deaths for each region of the city, rather than an exact figure.
More surprising were the high death figures in upscale neighborhoods once
considered less vulnerable to flooding deaths because residents had the means to
escape, particularly along Lake Pontchartrain in Lakeview, a predominantly white
12
Barry, John M. Rising Tide, p. 248
ibid., p. 257
14
Shallat, Todd. “In the Wake of Hurricane Betsy.” Transforming New Orleans and Its Environs. Ed. Craig E
Colten, p. 124
15
ibid., p. 126
13
87
neighborhood where 21 to 30 bodies were recovered on streets where homes
routinely sell for $1 million.16
Figure 1. Trends in losses from flooding, 1975-1998: damages (in 1999 dollars).17
Figure 2. Trends in hurricane and tropical storm events and losses, 1975-1998: deaths and injuries18
16
Connolly, Ceci, and Roig-Franzia, Manuel, “Grim Map Details Toll In 9th Ward and Beyond.” Washington Post,
October 23, 2005
17
Cutter, Susan L. ed., American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of Hazards and Disasters, p. 120
18
Cutter, Susan L. ed., American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of Hazards and Disasters, p. 136
88
Figure 3. New Orleans Elevation by neighborhood. (annotated)19
Considering geography as a measure of vulnerability, it should not be surprising that
Lakeview had a high number of casualties. The Lakeview neighborhood has a lower overall
elevation than either Gentilly or the Lower Ninth Ward.
Mobility Vulnerability
On August 28, 2005, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issued an emergency order for the
mandatory evacuation of the city. In the emergency order, the mayor cited the “anticipated high
lake and marsh tides due to the tidal surge, combined with the possibility of intense
thunderstorms, hurricane force winds, and widespread severe flooding.”20
Among those who may have impaired mobility are those who are hospitalized. They
may be too ill to move on their own, or may need specialized equipment and support in order to
do so. Additionally, they have no control over whether they are evacuated or not. Regardless of
19
“Elevation Map,” Greater New Orleans Community Data Center
<http://www.gnocdc.org/mapping/docs/Neighborhood.pdf>
20
“PROMULGATION OF EMERGENCY ORDERS,” City of New Orleans
<http://www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=1&tabid=43>
89
the ability to evacuate, those hospitalized in New Orleans were exempt from the mandatory
evacuation for Katrina.
The State of Louisiana, in its Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), provided for Special
Needs persons who were defined:
[A]s being medically dependent. They may have physical or mental conditions
that limit their mobility and ability to function on their own. They cannot evacuate
from a risk area that is threatened by an emergency or disaster by themselves,
cannot provide or arrange for their own transportation, and cannot arrange for
their own sheltering.21
The groups covered by this definition are the nursing home population and home health
care population. This places these persons in the population with mobility vulnerability.
The death toll information for Katrina – still incomplete and imprecise – shows that they
were particularly vulnerable. In Louisiana, an estimated 215 deaths occurred in hospitals and
nursing homes, amounting to one-fifth of those killed in the entire state.22 These people were not
evacuated, but evacuation itself can be life threatening to this population without sufficient
preparation and care. Three nursing home residents who were evacuated to Baton Rouge by bus
died of apparent dehydration.23
A third group of persons who are “mobility vulnerable” are those who do not have access
to personal transportation. Often people who live in cities do not own a car for various reasons
such as lack of parking, congestion, or inability to afford one. Census data shows that a
significant number of people in New Orleans did not have access to a vehicle. In 1990, data for
the New Orleans Metropolitan Statitistical Area, the city and its surrounding suburbs, had 18.2
per cent of households with no vehicle – ranking 4th in the United States.24 Using 2000 Census
Data, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center compiled statistics by Census tract in
the city itself, and arrived at 27.3% of households with no vehicle. They also produced a map
showing the distribution of these households throughout the city, as seen in Figure 4. The City
of New Orleans recognized this large number of persons without access to a vehicle as a
vulnerable population. In July of 2005, several city officials participated in the production of a
DVD about evacuation to be distributed in New Orleans, particularly to those without their own
transportation.25
21
“State Of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1C, Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan,” Annex X,
p. 5
22
Davis, Robert, and Johnson, Kevin, “La. looks into 215 Katrina deaths,” USA Today, October 16, 2005
23
Nossiter, Adam. “Monstrous Hurricane Heads for New Orleans,” Associated Press, August 29, 2005
24
Bureau of the Census, “Statistical Brief: Housing in Metropolitan Areas -Motor Vehicles Available,” August
1995 <http://www.census.gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb95_23.pdf>
25
Nolan, Bruce. “In storm, N.O. wants no one left behind,” The Times-Picayune, July 24, 2005
90
Figure 4. Households without vehicles26
Economic Vulnerability
As of 2000, New Orleans was the 44th largest metropolitan area and the 31st largest city in
the country with a population of approximately 1.3 million residents. As with many large cities,
there have been significant issues of race and poverty. Since 1970, the population of the City of
New Orleans has slowly declined while the population of the metropolitan area spiked and then
remained relatively steady since 1980, as seen in Figure 5. Between the years of 1970 and 2000,
109,000 or 19 percent of the residents have left New Orleans with an additional 22,400 since
2000. Racial distribution in New Orleans has become increasingly uneven as two thirds of the
African-American population lived in the city but the city contained only 36 percent of the
region’s population.27 Peirce Lewis documented the growing disparities in New Orleans: The
Making of an Urban Landscape: “while New Orleans has always had one of highest proportions
of black population of all big American cities, it has - until recently - been one of the least
segregated geographically.”28
26
“Households w/o access to a vehicle,” Greater New Orleans Community Data Center,
<http://www.gnocdc.org/maps/PDFs/vehicle_access.pdf>
27
Brookings Institution, New Orleans After the Storm: Lessons from the Past, a Plan for the Future, p. 4
28
Lewis, Peirce F. New Orleans: The Making of an Urban Landscape, p. 52
91
Two trends that have exacerbated economic vulnerability and the impact of Hurricane
Katrina are a low wage economy and increased segregation with resultant concentrations of
poverty. These trends in New Orleans have been accelerated by government policies and
actions.
Figure 5. New Orleans Population Information29
After Katrina exited New Orleans, the devastation revealed shocking levels of poverty in
African-American neighborhoods throughout the town. In spite of pre-storm evacuations,
thousands of houses in urban areas such as B.W. Cooper, the Lower Ninth Ward, the Seventh
Ward, and Gert Town consisting of more than 20,000 mostly poor African-Americans who were
flooded while the French-Quarter and downtown stayed dry. Talk throughout the United States
began to develop concerning poverty and the needs of the poor. There are many reasons people
are poor including bad luck, illness, lack of education or job skills, not being able to support a
family or children, or criminal actions, to name a few. Whatever the specific causes of poverty
in New Orleans may be, poverty includes a person’s culture and is propagated through a number
of habits, behaviors, and characteristics that are examined below.
29
Brookings Institution, New Orleans After the Storm: Lessons from the Past, a Plan for the Future, p. 5
92
Figure 6. Locality by Race and Poverty Level30
Employment and Income
Poverty and low employment are highly concentrated among the African-American
population in New Orleans. Since the year 2000, New Orleans employment has only increased
by one percent, and annual pay only increased by seven percent, which was extremely lower than
the national growth of 16 percent in the nation. Further, the income in a representative AfricanAmerican household consists of one-half of a representative white household and the poverty
rate for public housing was a whopping 74 percent. In neighborhoods like the lower Ninth
Ward, for example, the average annual household income was approximately $17,000-$22,000.
Additionally, “only one in 12 adults held a college degree, four in five children were raised in
single-parent families, and four in 10 working age adults (many of them disabled) were not
connected to the labor force.”31 Katrina’s flood zone contaminated 12,000 businesses,
representing 41 percent of the entire area and accounting for 200,000 residents.
Of the 43 percent of residents that did own a home in New Orleans, as seen in Figure 7,
fifty-nine percent in the lower Ninth Ward and approximately 228,000 units were affected by
flooding. Specifically, this included 120,000 units that were owned and 108,000 units that were
rented. The neighborhoods hit the hardest included Jefferson and Orleans, accounting for 90
percent of the housing units in the flood zone and 88 percent (63,000) of the elderly people. The
30
31
Brookings Institution, New Orleans After the Storm: Lessons from the Past, a Plan for the Future, p. 8
Berube, Alan and Katz, Bruce “Katrina’s Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America,” p. 3
93
flood zone also hit eighty-four percent of St. Bernard’s residents but fortunately this only
represented less than 10 percent of the entire flooded population.
Figure 7. Key Indicators of Entrenched Poverty
The lack of industry competition and labor force in New Orleans actually resulted in
increased prices for low-income houses. This is because conditions in poverty stricken areas
such as New Orleans leads to the devaluation of assets and therefore, hinders residents from
accumulating appreciation on their homes. 32 In turn, poor residents have a more difficult time
becoming wealthy and pay more for basic utilities than individuals living in middle-income
areas.
Although approximately 10,000 residents in New Orleans' poor areas earned income tax
credit for the year 2003, almost half of the families received $10,000 or less, signaling
employment was only part-time or unstable. Low labor participation in poor regions inhibits the
production of the informal networks needed to get and keep a job. Individuals that do not work
potentially do not invest the time in education or training necessary for achievement.
Additionally, some business owners fail to hire individuals from poor areas based on certain
characteristics.33
32
Fellowes, Matthew, and Katz, Bruce, “The Price is Wrong: Getting the Market Right for Working Families in
Philadelphia” (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2005).
33
Wilson, William Julius, The Truly Disadvantaged: The New World of the Urban Poor
94
Concentrated Poverty
Poverty is defined on the basis of a family’s income relative to a fixed poverty line
reflecting the cost of basic necessities. Further, an extreme poverty neighborhood is defined
where at least 40 percent of its residents have incomes below the federal poverty threshold.
Before Katrina hit, New Orleans had 47 extreme poverty communities, representing one out of
every four neighborhoods within the city and including approximately 100,000 residents.34
When you are poor, you are debilitated in many ways; it lowers your quality of life and limits the
type of opportunities you can get. Statistics show that poor people often live near other poor
people in neighborhoods with high poverty rates and this is specifically difficult for those who
are affected by both race and income. Approximately 50,000 New Orleans residents lived in
neighborhoods where the poverty rate exceeded 40 percent. The city was known for exhibiting
traits such as a segregated population, lack of two-earner families, low levels of education, and
barriers to labor. New Orleans ranks second out of the nation’s 50 largest cities based on the
degree to which poor families (and in this case African-Americans) were clustered in
exceptionally poor neighborhoods as shown in Figure 8.
Education
In the Ninth Ward, for example, families were extricated from quality education, housing,
and employment opportunities. In the year 2000, the percentage of adults 25 or older with a
college degree was a mere 8.5 percent as seen in Figure 9. High poverty neighborhoods endured
added educational constraints, such as the need for special systems to cope with disorder, social
welfare, or a high rate of mobility, decreasing the stability in the classroom and school. As a
result, only two-thirds of African-Americans held a high school degree vs. 89 percent of white
residents.35 Additionally, it is difficult for high poverty neighborhoods to attract the best staff
including the most competent teachers or educational assistance for students. This leads to lower
standardized test scores, lower grades, a high drop out rate, and a greater risk of failure.36
Race
Statistics show that more than 30 percent of poor blacks live in areas of severe social and
economic distress and race is correlated with the rate of poverty as shown in Figure 10. The
district’s racial geography ensured the areas that were affected the most were non-white as 58
percent of the quarters accounted for blacks and other minority residents. The flooded area in
New Orleans contained 80% of the city’s minority population vice 54% of its white population.
Additionally, in 2000, blacks consisted of 67% of the city’s total population with 84% of its
population below the poverty line.37 This meant that African-Americans were five times more
likely to live in concentrated poverty than whites or 43 vs. 11 percent. An additional reason
34
Berube, Alan and Katz, Bruce “Katrina’s Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America,” p. 3
Brookings Institution, New Orleans After the Storm: Lessons from the Past, a Plan for the Future, p. 8
36
Century Foundation Task Force on the Common School, Divided We Fail: Coming Together Through Public
School Choice
37
Berube, Alan and Katz, Bruce “Katrina’s Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America,” p. 10
35
95
black people suffered the most destruction was because a majority of the residents lived in the
low-lying flood prone sections like the Ninth Ward. Geographer Craig Colten observed “with
Figure 8. Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods and Percentage of Poor People Living in those Neighborhoods, by
Race/Ethnicity, 50 Largest Cities in the U.S., 200038
38
Berube, Alan and Katz, Bruce “Katrina’s Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America,” p. 10
96
Figure 9. New Orleans Extremely Poor Neighborhoods Exhibited High Degrees of Social and Economic
Disadvantage39
greater means and power, the white population occupied the better-drained sections of the city,
while blacks typically inhabited the swampy ‘rear’ sections.”40
One of the most noticeable characteristics between blacks and whites in New Orleans
consisted of the quarters they lived in. During 1980-2000, division of the races grew and by the
year 2000, a black resident lived in the same locality where 82 percent of fellow persons were
black.41 In 2000, 50,000 or 38 percent out of 131,000 New Orleanians were concentrated in
“high-poverty zones” and 43 percent were African-American.
These circumstances further exacerbated the community and contribute to poor physical
and mental health of its residents. Studies have shown that areas of extreme poverty experience
higher rates of illness including depression, asthma, diabetes, and heart problems.42 Health care
in New Orleans is substandard compared to that of wealthy areas and this characteristic
continues to affect the entire area.
39
Berube, Alan and Katz, Bruce “Katrina’s Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America,” p. 4
Colten, Craig E. An Unnatural Metropolis, p. 77
41
Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, segregation data from New Orleans city,
<http://mumford.albany.edu/census/WholePop/CitySegdata/2255000City.htm>
42
Deborah Cohen and others, “Neighborhood Physical Conditions and Health.” Journal of American Public Health
93 (3) (2003): 467–71; Ana Diez-Roux and others, “Neighborhoods of Residence and Incidence of Coronary Heart
Disease.” New England Journal of Medicine 345 (2) (2001): 99–106.
40
97
Figure 10. Neighborhoods That Are Predominantly White Tend To Have Lower Poverty Rates43
Combined Vulnerabilities
Based on our research and working definition, individuals may be considered vulnerable
in any single category, or in multiple categories. In addition, the impacts of these vulnerabilities
can overlap. Along with poverty and class segregation, geography aided in the Katrina disaster
that hit New Orleans. The development patterns across the neighborhoods clearly influenced
which regions and neighborhoods were affected the most. For example, low-lying areas in the
“shallow bowl” next to the levee and lake by the Ninth Ward caused neighborhoods such as
B.W. Cooper and the Seventh Ward to be affected by water the most. Additionally, the
marshlands and all areas near Lake Pontchartrain were inundated with flooding.
The flooded area depicted in Figure 11 is nearly the entire city, with just a few areas of
high ground untouched. In Figure 12, neighborhood poverty data is added to the image. While
almost the entire city is flooded, an increased proportion of neighborhoods with high poverty are
in the flooded area than in the dry area.
43
Brookings Institution, New Orleans After the Storm: Lessons from the Past, a Plan for the Future, p. 7
98
Figure 11. Flooded Area of New Orleans44
44
Image prepared with Google Earth™. Damage Assessment overlay prepared with data from National Geo-spatial
Intelligence Agency, represents maximum extent of flooding.
<http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/showflat.php/Cat/0/Number/99819/an/0/page/0#99819>
99
Figure 12. Poverty and Flooding45
When Katrina struck, a majority of the poor population was lacking in requirements necessary to
aid in evacuation such as transportation. A total of two hundred thousand individuals throughout
the region lacked a car or access to a car during the time they were able to leave. In the center of
New Orleans, only one in five individuals had access to a car versus one in ten elsewhere
throughout the region.46 Figure 13 shows the distribution of households without access to a
vehicle on a map of the flooded area. Areas with higher concentrations of those without access
to vehicles are more likely to be in the flooded zone.
45
Image prepared with Google Earth™. Neighborhood poverty data from Greater New Orleans Community Data
Center <http://www.gnocdc.org/mapping/docs/Poverty.pdf> is added as an overlay to the damage assessment
information.
46
Brookings Institution, New Orleans After the Storm: Lessons from the Past, a Plan for the Future, p. 19
100
Figure 13. Vehicle Access and Flooding47
47
Image prepared with Google Earth™. Vehicle access data from Greater New Orleans Community Data Center
<http://www.gnocdc.org/maps/PDFs/vehicle_access.pdf> is added as an overlay to the damage assessment
information.
101
Figure 14. Vehicle Access, Poverty, and Flooding48
In Figure 14, the data for vehicle access, poverty, and flooding are combined. The areas
that represent significant overlap of the three vulnerabilities are highlighted in the image.
Planning for the Vulnerable
Generally, the hurricane emergency plans at the state and local levels are for evacuation
and sheltering. Extra measures are only specified for those with mobility vulnerability – persons
who cannot evacuate. Federal plans describe coordination assistance levels and organizations,
for “all-hazards” response. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) does not get into a level of detail
48
Image prepared with Google Earth™. Vehicle access, neighborhood poverty, and damage assessment overlays
activated.
102
that would include identification of vulnerable populations. None of the plans include the other
vulnerabilities that we have identified and analyzed in this paper: geographic and economic.
Perhaps the greatest divide between state and local plans came with the Sheltering plans
devised by the State of Louisiana and the Sheltering plans devised by the City of New Orleans.
The state plan covers the evacuation of special needs persons, but does not define the term
‘special needs’ adequately. In the City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan, special needs persons are defined as people who “are able to provide their own basic
care…and are not acutely ill.”49 Each patient in the special needs shelter will be required to
administer his or her own medication and must bring a five-day amount of dietary rations. The
shelters were not designed to have all medications available, and the New Orleans plan
specifically states that “admission into the Shelter is NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS A
GUARANTEE OF SAFETY.”50
In the Louisiana State Emergency Operations plan, the Department of Social Services
(DSS) in the State of Louisiana assessed the need for public sheltering, “initiate the opening,
staffing and supplying of shelters in cooperation with local, parish and state government
agencies, private industry and volunteer organizations and individuals.”51 At the same time,
Louisiana State University’s Health Science Center had authority to set up special needs shelters
as well. This dual tasking may have led to the lack of professional medical care for the special
needs populations, as well as confusion as to where families with special needs members were to
send their relatives.
In the New Orleans Special Needs shelter plan, specific direction was given to special
needs persons to wait until a telephone number was issued to the public. This response was an
insufficient means to get vital information to a population with medical problems.52 Planning
needed to be prepared ahead of the disaster, rather than relying on the special needs patients to
seek help when they are in danger. Having proactive plans is essential to a successful disaster
plan, and the authorities in New Orleans and Louisiana were ill-prepared to handle such a
significant natural disaster. Furthermore, there is little information as to whether any of the state
or local plans were exercised on a regular basis. The State EOP provides language stating that
‘Command and Control will be exercised,’ yet no after action reports, lessons learned, or media
reports were available as proof that the Special Needs plans were exercised at any level of
government.
Implementation of Plans
The plans to evacuate these special needs persons, as well as healthy non car owners
failed miserably. The overall evacuation plan of the masses of car owners worked, with quite a
few hitches, but none to the deadly extent that the lack of evacuation means for vulnerable
citizens failed. “City officials had 550 municipal buses and hundreds of additional school buses
49
City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Special Needs Shelter Plan,p. 2
City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Special Needs Shelter Plan,p. 1
51
State of Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan April
2005
52
City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan- Special Needs Shelter Plan, p. 2
50
103
at their disposal, but made no plans to use them to get people out of New Orleans before the
storm.”53 Some buses were used to pick people up from twelve, undesignated pickup spots where
crowds gathered, and were taken to the New Orleans Convention Center, and Louisiana
Superdome. Each of these facilities were known as ‘shelters of last resort’. In order for an area to
be properly evacuated, resources must be cited ahead of time, and plans and procedures must be
drawn up and exercised. The public school systems in New Orleans could have played an
integral role in evacuating nearly the entire vulnerable population. While some individuals would
choose to stay in their homes despite being given a free ride out of town, there should have been
a better public relations campaign to alert each citizen of their safety options prior to the storm.
How Planning and Implementation Failed the Vulnerable
A major fallacy in the local planning and response to Hurricane Katrina was the use of
the Louisiana Superdome and the New Orleans Convention Center as shelters for residents.
While the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Plan listed the Superdome as a possible
sheltering venue, past experience has shown that it serves at best as a poor option for evacuees.
Moreover, Louisiana Mayor Ray Nagin did not give the word to open the Superdome as a shelter
until Saturday afternoon, giving the National Guard little time to prepare and stock the facility
with the needed resources for sheltering. As it stood, the Superdome had Meals Ready-To-Eat
(MRE’s) for 15,000 people for seven days. However, at its height, the Superdome housed
30,000 evacuated residents, which was twice the amount it was able to hold.
There were numerous courses of action the federal government took in the years prior to
Hurricane Katrina that led to an increased vulnerable population. One such course of action has
been the development of the Interstate Highway Act. This act led to the expansion of the suburbs
around New Orleans, and left many inner-city residents with no job opportunities. As soon as the
highways were opened, those with the means to afford the more expensive suburban life left, as
many jobs were moving to the suburbs as well. Not only did this sprawl of interstate highways
cause jobs to leave the inner city, it caused major damage to coastal waterways, as much of the
natural habitat was destroyed to make way for the spreading highway system.
Another course of action the federal government took that led to an increase of poverty in
the south was its public housing ventures beginning in the 1930’s. Federal money given to the
Housing Authority of New Orleans took a culturally diverse area and built a large housing project,
intended to provide residents with cheaper housing. However the cultural diversity was lost and
the project became a predominately African-American project. Continually, more and more
projects were built around the initial project, which eventually led to the massively impoverished
projects that existed in 2005.
The Federal presence in New Orleans over the previous 25 years had given residents and
politicians a false sense of security. With the Army Corps of Engineers constantly reengineering
the levees in and around New Orleans, one would assume that progressive work was being done to
the system. This coupled with a lack of hurricanes with the magnitude of Katrina hitting the New
Orleans metropolitan area led to a sense of complacency on the local, state, and federal levels.
53
Houston Chronicle- City had evacuation plan but strayed from strategy- Olsen, Lise
104
Recommendations
To reduce vulnerability in New Orleans, a multitude of areas need to be addressed at the
state, regional, and local levels. More specifically, three distinct actions need to be taken to
improve the region of New Orleans. First, to free New Orleans residents of concentrated
poverty, desirable neighborhoods need to be created. Neighborhoods should focus on connecting
and immersing the population and removing isolation. In addition, policies, grants, and housing
vouchers can be employed to assist with public housing. For example, by approving the bill to
give the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers more money, we will be able to implement new
measures to protect the Gulf Coast. Second, New Orleans needs to develop a district of
sustainable development through planning where to rebuild and instituting city design
improvements such as improved transit capabilities and bringing in tourism. One way to achieve
this is through the relocation of buildings, schools, and housing districts away from the
marshlands. Third, create an environment of economic opportunity by improving infrastructure
and cleaning up the city as a whole. A plan should be devised to increase employment
opportunities and the ability to receive better jobs by connecting the workers to those jobs and
making it a part of their lives.
In addition, evacuation plans need to provide means for every citizen of a city, county,
parish, or town to escape the impending harm of a natural, or manmade disaster. The likelihood
of evacuating an entire city, or region for that matter is extremely difficult. First responders
should first account for and remove handicapped residents living at home, in nursing homes and
in hospitals. Evacuating special needs citizens first ensures that their needs are addressed and
attended to before the disaster engulfs the local responders, electricity and communications
sources are lost, and chaos ensues on the roads exiting the locale.
The mobility vulnerable population does not consist only of the special needs citizens,
but also includes those residents of cities who do not have access to or the means to purchase
their own vehicle. After ensuring that the special needs populations evacuations are in process,
the next step in the process should include entering into the poverty stricken inner city to
continue evacuation. It must be assumed that many residents in these areas may not have access
to basic means of communication such as television or Internet access, and therefore will not be
aware of the evacuation process. As an example, trucks with speakers or police cars with public
address systems could be driven street to street, repeating evacuation instructions. Concurrently,
transportation must be staged in areas within close proximity of vulnerable populations. In New
Orleans, hundreds of buses were staged in parking lots, and never moved towards the most
vulnerable, low-lying areas.
In order to adequately attain this ideal evacuation function, plans must be developed,
exercised, kept up to date and manned. Not only must the evacuation plan be staffed, the
evacuation sites must be prepared to handle the sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of
residents. Agreements should be reached with surrounding counties and states for opening
shelters in schools, hotels and other large gathering areas. These agreements should also be
reached with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to ensure that the schools and hotels
105
will be reimbursed for opening their doors to vulnerable populations. A person’s economic status
in life should never bar them from obtaining a means of evacuation out of a hazardous area, or a
night in a reasonably comfortable shelter. If prior planning is done for these amenities, stress and
arguments should occur very rarely during the actual event.
Major consideration needs to be given to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
As it appears now, residents are being rewarded for living in hazardous areas. There must be a
cap placed on how much money, or how many times a household can be reimbursed for major
flood damage. Intuitively, this process makes sense. Implementing such a process poses a major
problem that must be tackled by numerous parties. One cannot say that if a household is
damaged a certain number of times, that it must be evacuated and condemned, because that
residence could have had minor damage on any or all of those occasions. Each situation must be
approached subjectively, yet with a defined criterion to support the action. Many of the
households affected by Hurricane Katrina should have been eradicated previously, thus lessening
the extent of vulnerable people living within their walls.
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) could have been an extreme asset to
the populations in and around New Orleans during the response to Hurricane Katrina. Had CERT
teams been formed with certain vulnerable areas in mind, the death totals may have possibly
been less in New Orleans. At the very least, the CERT teams could have prolonged the life of
some residents by coming to their aid, assessing their injuries, and giving them important life
safety information. Yet CERT teams are typically left open to anyone in the public interested in
saving their own families lives. In the future, cities can learn from the debacle in New Orleans
plan to make better use of their CERT training and positioning in case of a disaster.
A natural disaster should not be used as a basis to tackle social and economic problems
that continue to plague the urban neighborhoods of New Orleans. The government has a myriad
of tools and policies that can be developed and implemented to dissolve poverty, racial
segregation and social isolation, and create a prosperous integrated living environment. Benefits
employed to New Orleans will not only assist the city but also broaden the reduction of poverty
throughout the country.
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110
Hurricane Katrina:
Review and Analysis of the Public Health and Medical Response
Joanie Rainey, Krista Scardina and Rebecca Updike
Disclaimer: This paper focuses on medical and public health issues within the State of
Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The response analysis was from
August 29, 2005 to September 30, 2005. This paper should be considered a “snap
shot” in time as the health issues and effects of Katrina are still ongoing. With the
strike of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005, any data obtained after that date
cannot be applied to the impact of Katrina alone. In addition, the Katrina response has
become a highly criticized event and therefore, there is a heightened level of
information sensitivity and availability. The analysis and recommendations in the
following paper are based on identified references and the personal opinion of the
authors. In no way does this paper represent the opinions of the organizations or
agencies in which the authors are associated.
Louisiana faces a variety of natural hazards which pose a significant threat to its citizens.
They include, but are not limited to, hurricanes, severe storms, tornadoes, floods, dam failures,
freezes, winter storms, earthquakes, subsidence, erosion, drought, water shortages, and wildfires.
On August 29, 2005, a Category 4 Hurricane named Katrina hit the south central coast of
Louisiana, severely impacting the healthcare infrastructure and creating a large number of public
health and medical concerns. The state’s public health and medical preparedness planning and
response capabilities were immediately put to the test. Unfortunately, Louisiana’s response was
lacking in the particular areas of healthcare facility evacuations, adequate personnel staffing,
surge capacity, proper use of emergency operation plans and interoperable communications.
State resources were quickly overwhelmed and the public health and medical infrastructure was
severely weakened. As a result, it was realized early in the incident that federal resources would
be required to manage the public health and medical crisis.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight and discuss the details of the inadequacy of
Louisiana’s public health and medical response to Hurricane Katrina. Further analysis and
discussion will be provided on the response role of the federal government and its impact on the
medical and public health infrastructure. Finally, recommendations will be identified for both
the state of Louisiana and the federal government to better enable successful public health and
medical operations before, during, and after a catastrophic event in the future.
111
Background
Storm History
On Tuesday, August 23rd, 2005, the National Hurricane Center announced that a large
low pressure system over the southeastern Bahamas had become a tropical depression. The next
day this tropical depression was upgraded to Tropical Storm Katrina, making it the twelfth
tropical storm of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season. Katrina became a Category 1 hurricane the
following day making landfall just north of Miami, Florida, then moving into the Gulf Coast
gaining strength and picking up momentum (Wikipedia, 2005).
Experts continued to track Katrina’s projected path towards Louisiana. Three days
before the storm made landfall, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a state of
emergency and requested federal assistance. On August 27th, after reviewing the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) analysis of Louisiana’s Request for Aid, President
George Bush issued a federal emergency disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (FEMA news, 27 Aug
2005).
By Sunday, August 28th, Katrina was upgraded to a Category 5 hurricane, with wind
speeds in excess of 175 mph and gusts over 215 mph. The following morning, at 6:10 AM, the
storm made landfall in the Central Gulf Coast region near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana as a
Category 4 hurricane with sustained wind speeds of at least 145 mph. At approximately 9:00
AM, the eye of the storm grazed the City of New Orleans. The storm surge and winds caused
breaches in the levee systems that protected New Orleans (a basin city) from Lake Pontchartrain.
The waters from Lake Pontchartrain resulted in the flooding of 80% of the city. Katrina, still
not satisfied, continued to forge a path of destruction moving back out into the Gulf before
making landfall once again near the Louisiana-Mississippi border as a Category 3 hurricane with
wind speeds of 125 mph. Most of the Mississippi coastline was ravaged by record storm surges
and high winds. Finally, losing speed and strength inland near Jacksonville, Mississippi, Katrina
was downgraded to a tropical depression near Clarksville, Tennessee. On August 31st, the last
effects of Katrina were seen in the eastern Great Lakes region (Wikipedia, 2005).
Louisiana State Health Care System
In 2002, the United Health Foundation State Health Rankings rated Louisiana as the
unhealthiest state in America, 50th on the list. According to the Louisiana Health Report Card
(LHRC), Louisiana’s health status was rated 23.9% below the national average. Several parishes
have a significant number of disabled persons attributing to the state’s unhealthy status (LHRC,
2003). Furthermore, as reported by the National Organization on Disability in their Report on
Special Needs Assessment for Katrina Evacuees (SNAKE), 23.2% of New Orleans’ residents are
disabled compared to the 19.3% national average (SNAKE, 2005).
112
Louisiana’s healthcare system is crippled by the lack of healthcare delivery within the
state. Although healthcare was the number one employer in Louisiana, there is a significant
shortage of primary care providers such as physician assistants, nurse practitioners, certified
nurse midwives, registered nurses, dentists, psychologists and social workers. As of January
2003, primary care shortages existed in almost all parishes (LHRC, 2003).
Health Care Access
•
There are approximately 209 hospitals in Louisiana including two medical schools and
research institutions at Tulane University and Louisiana State University (LSU) Hospitals
(Hamilton, 2005). Additionally, there are 125 acute care facilities (Hurricane Pam,
2004).
•
Louisiana has forty-four rural hospitals with no more than a sixty bed capacity located in
municipalities with a population not less than 13,000 and in parishes where the
population is not less than 32,000. These facilities are not considered to be long-term
care facilities.
•
The state has twenty-five community health centers that are supported through a federal
grant program. These clinics provide primary and preventative health care to the
medically underserved population. A multi-disciplinary team of doctors, nurses,
counselors, psychiatrists, and substance abuse professionals provide a wide range of
services to this large population.
•
Forty-nine Rural Health Clinics (RHCs) operate in the state, offering routine diagnostic
services and dispensing medications. RHCs are located in non-urbanized areas and in
healthcare professional shortage areas with one physician during hours of operation.
•
There are nine state-run developmental centers providing residential services and care for
persons with mental retardation.
•
Louisiana has thirty-three community mental health centers, thirty-three outreach sites,
seven acute treatment units and four long-term mental health hospitals.
•
Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) Office for Addictive Disorders
has ten adult and two adolescent inpatient clinics, eleven detoxification clinics, sixteen
half-way houses, and three residential facilities. (LHRC, 2003)
•
Eight of the sixty-four parishes within Louisiana do not have a hospital.
Impact on Infrastructure
Between September 6, 2005 and September 15, 2005, the following statistics were made
available in reference to the impact Hurricane Katrina had on Louisiana’s healthcare
113
infrastructure: fourteen health centers in Louisiana lacked access to generators; ten of the
State’s health centers had been destroyed and another eight remained closed, but were expected
to reopen; among the forty-two HIV/AIDS clinics in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama,
twenty-nine were open, nine were unresponsive and three remained closed or destroyed; the
service delivery sites in New Orleans appeared to be the hardest hit. As of October 6th, eight
Louisiana health centers in New Orleans remained listed as destroyed, and five other remained
closed. Among the six maternal and child health sites in Louisiana, only half were open (HRSA
Administrator’s Emergency Response Center, 26 Sept 2005). At the time the paper was written,
additional information pertaining to the damages and current status of healthcare facilities after
Katrina passed over south central Louisiana had not been published or made public.
National Plan
Over the past decade, in response to a series of disasters and terrorist attacks, Congress
and the administration created new authorities, structures and plans to assure that government at
all levels could appropriately respond. Local and state governments are to be the first responders
in a disaster. When their resources are overwhelmed, federal assistance can be provided under
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Through executive
orders, the President has delegated to FEMA, within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), responsibility for administering the major provisions of the Stafford Act. In December
2004, the National Response Plan (NRP) was approved and replaced the previous Federal
Response Plan and places the DHS in charge of coordinating the overall federal response (Lister,
21 Sept 2005).
The NRP is a single, comprehensive framework that provides the structure and the
mechanism for the coordination of Federal support for domestic incident management. The NRP
assists in prevention of terrorist attacks in the US, reduces the vulnerability to all natural and
manmade hazards, and minimizes the damage and assists in the recovery from all types of
incidents on US soil. The NRP divides the government’s emergency operations into fifteen
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that consist of a grouping of government and certain
private-sector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide planning, support,
resources, program implementation, and emergency services. This functional approach serves as
the coordination mechanism to provide assistance to State, local, and tribal governments or to
Federal departments and agencies. Each ESF is composed of primary and support agencies that
are identified in the NRP based on resources, capabilities within that functional area, and the
components that can best address the requirements of the incident. ESF activities and
involvement can vary throughout an incident from high visibility, high intensity activities in the
early response, to program implementation and management recovery, to a stage of declining
requirements and deactivation as ESFs or their components complete their assignments (NRP,
Dec 2004).
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the designated coordinator for
ESF-8: Public Health and Medical Services. ESF-8 is categorized in the following core
functional areas: assessment of public health/medical needs; public health surveillance; medical
care personnel; medical equipment and supplies; patient evacuation; safety and security of
114
human drugs; blood supply and blood products; food and agriculture safety and security; worker
health/safety; all-hazard public health and medical consultation; behavioral health care; vector
control; potable water/wastewater and solid waste disposal; victim identification/mortuary
services; and protection of animal health.
ESF-8 coordinates with the appropriate State, local and tribal medical and public health
officials and organizations to determine current medical and public health assistance
requirements (NRP, Dec 2004). ESF-8 consists of personnel and assets within HHS, as well as
personnel and assets from many Support Agencies, with the DHS, the Department of Defense
(DOD), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) playing the largest roles. HHS resources
include the Secretary’s Emergency Response Teams (SERTs), the Commissioned Corps of the
Public Health Service (PHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and many other Operating
Divisions within HHS. Assets utilized from Support Agencies include the Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams (DMATs) and the Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMATs) within
DHS, VA personnel, the American Red Cross, and the Medical Reserve Corps.
In the absence of an emergency, most states have the ability to respond to public health
events, and most can declare public health emergencies to expand their powers further when
needed. The federal role is largely assistive in nature. This model does not change in
emergencies, though there are statutory provisions for some specific expansions of federal public
health authority in emergencies. Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act provides broad
authority for the Secretary of HHS to declare a public health emergency at the federal level. This
allows the Secretary to waive certain requirements for provider participation in serving
individuals enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program,
to make grants available to provide awards for expenses and allows the Secretary to enter into
contracts and to conduct and support investigations into the cause, treatment or prevention of
disease. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt declared public
health emergencies in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi on August 31, 2005, two
days after the storm made landfall. Before Hurricane Katrina, the only prior recent incident in
which a federal public health emergency had been declared was September 11, 2001 (Lister, 21
Sep 2005).
State Plans
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
EMAC is the first national disaster relief compact since the Civil Defense Compact of
1950. Congress ratified EMAC in 1996, which became Public Law 104-321. As a
congressionally ratified organization administered by the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA), EMAC is an interstate mutual aid agreement that allows states to assist
one another in responding to natural and man-made disasters. EMAC is neither a federal agency
nor part of the federal government. It is an agreement among 49 states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, to provide assistance across state lines when a disaster occurs
115
(www.emacweb.org). Through EMAC, a disaster impacted state can request and receive
assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues upfront:
liability and reimbursement.
As defined in the EMAC Articles all member states have the following responsibilities:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Be familiar with possible joint member situations
Be familiar with other states’ emergency plans
Develop an emergency plan/procedures for managing and providing assistance
Assist in warnings
Protect and ensure uninterrupted delivery of services, medicine, water, food, energy and
fuel, search and rescue, and critical lifeline equipment, services and resources
Inventory and set procedures for interstate loan and delivery of human and material
resources, including National Guard troops outside the requesting state; and procedures
for reimbursement or forgiveness and
Provide for temporary suspension of statutes or ordinances that restrict implementation
EMAC can be used for any capability one member state has that can be shared with
another member state. As long as there is a governor-declared state of emergency, EMAC can be
called into action and used.
During an emergency, NEMA staff work with EMAC member states to ensure
information passes through the EMAC system to coordinate relief efforts. The EMAC process
follows a nine step critical process which begins when:
1. The Governor of a member state / requesting state declares a state of emergency.
2. An authorized representative (AR) from the affected state who can legally initiate a
request for assistance alerts EMAC National Coordinating Group (NCG) - the nationwide
EMAC point of contact during normal day-to-day, nonevent periods. The NCG
coordinates with the AR and Designated Contact (DC) of the EMAC member states when
an emergency is anticipated or occurs.
3. The affected state requests A-Team deployment: an A-Team consists of two persons who
are knowledgeable about and prepared to implement EMAC procedures in the requesting
member state. The A-Team is the primary point-of-contact for requesting and acquiring
assistance provided under EMAC.
4. The A-Team deploys to the requesting state’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to
facilitate EMAC requests and assistance between member states. The A-Team assists the
requesting state with requests for assistance, tracks the location and status of the
assistance accepted and deployed to the requesting state’s location(s), and assists the
deployed personnel as needed and required while they are deployed.
5. A-Team helps the requesting state determine the cost and availability of resources.
6. The requesting state completes an official request for assistance form (REQ-A). When
the REQ-A form is duly executed by the AR of both the requesting and assisting state(s),
the REQ-A becomes a legally binding agreement between the requesting and assisting
state.
116
7. The requested resources are sent to the affected state.
8. The responding state requests reimbursement, under EMAC affected states are
responsible for reimbursement and personnel sent are protected under workers
compensation and liability.
9. The responding state is reimbursed.
(www.emacweb.org)
Louisiana State Emergency Operations Plan
During an emergency or disaster, the State will take immediate and appropriate actions to
determine, direct, mobilize, and coordinate resource needs. The State Government will suspend
or cancel normal operations and redirect resources to save lives, relieve human suffering, sustain
survivors, protect property, and repair essential facilities. The state has designed, built, equipped
and staffed an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) from which all emergency activities will be
managed. Furthermore, the state requires that all parish governments have EOCs from which the
parishes can manage emergency operations at the parish level and communicate with the state
EOC to ensure close cooperation in emergencies and disasters.
The State is primarily responsible for natural and technological emergency
preparedness, but has a shared responsibility with the Federal government for national
security preparedness. The State’s responsibility necessitates the development of an allhazards plan, with functional annexes and detailed procedures, supported by parish and local
emergency plans. Planning efforts are made as general as possible to assure flexibility to combat
the impact of all types of hazards.
Emergencies or disasters could, individually or in combination, cause a grave emergency
condition in any area of the State. Emergencies can vary in scope and intensity, from a small
local incident with minimal damage to a multi-parish disaster with extensive devastation and loss
of life. The initial actions of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery
operations are conducted by the local government. Local authorities will have to exhaust their
resources prior to using mutual aid agreements with volunteer groups, the private sector and/or
neighboring parishes. State assistance will supplement local efforts and federal assistance will
supplement state and local efforts when it is clearly demonstrated that it is beyond local and state
capability to cope with the emergency/disaster. The governor of Louisiana has the ultimate
responsibility for direction and control over state activities related to emergencies and disasters.
Upon delegation of authority by the governor, the director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) acts on behalf of the governor in
implementing the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), and direct State level emergency
operations through the regularly constituted governmental structure (EOP, April 2005).
Each State department or agency remains under the general control of its respective
Secretary, Director, or designated emergency representative. The emergency representative is
empowered to make decisions, and expend resources (personnel, materials, supplies, equipment,
117
facilities and funds) in providing operational and technical support to State and Local
governments during an emergency or disaster. Local governments are responsible for operating
under all applicable laws, executive orders, proclamations, rules, regulations, and ordinances for
emergency management within their respective jurisdiction. Local emergency management
organizations function from designated EOCs and are subject to the direction and control of the
executive heads of government, in coordination with the Governor and the LOHSEP Director
(EOP, April 2005). When the State EOC is activated, the operations staff and state agencies
ensure the necessary personnel and resources are available. Those agency representatives either
bring or have pre-positioned plans, procedures, resource inventories, supplies, and notification
lists needed to facilitate emergency/disaster operations.
ESF-8 Public Health and Medical Services – Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH)
and Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center (LSUHSC)
ESF-8 on the state level has two Primary Responsible agencies. The DHH is responsible
for public health, sanitation, medical and health assistance to Special Needs shelter operations,
and mental health and crisis counseling. The LSUHSC is responsible for providing hospital care
and shelter support for nursing home and home health patients with acute care requirements, as
well as casualties of emergencies and disasters. LSUHSC has the lead role in coordinating
hospital planning and actions with private hospitals and other facilities.
It is the responsibility of the Secretary of DHH and the Chief Executive Officer of
LSUHSC to designate ESF-8 coordinators to organize and administer the ESF. The ESF-8
coordinators develop plans, procedures, arrangements and agreements to identify, acquire and
mobilize public health and medical resources for emergencies and disasters. Additionally, ESF-8
coordinators develop and maintain information and liaison with public health and medical
resources in local, parish, state government, federal government, private industry and volunteer
organizations that could furnish assistance in an emergency or disaster.
As an emergency develops, the ESF-8 emergency coordinators activate and mobilize
their respective personnel, facility and material resources. The ESF-8 LSUHSC coordinator
ensures the state hospitals and facilities under LSU control are ready to deal with the situation
and that arrangements have been made to work with private hospitals and facilities to meet the
medical needs of the situation. The ESF-8 Public Health Coordinator has the disaster area
surveyed as soon as possible to determine whether the disaster has created any public health
problems or threats. The Coordinator then directs the appropriate resources to the area to
remove, solve problems, and suppress any threats to health and sanitation. The ESF-8 Public
Health Coordinator assess the public health impact of utility damages and outages and
recommends the allocation of generators, potable water and other resources to areas that are in
need. The Coordinator compiles lists of particular health, medical and sanitation facilities that
are in need of priority utility restoration and forward that information to the appropriate utility
providers.
Public Health and Medical Services activities continue as long as necessary after the
conclusion of the emergency or disaster. The ESF-8 coordinators continue to gather information
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passing it along to the appropriate proponent to ensure the restoration of health, medical and
sanitation facilities are brought back to an acceptable level as soon as possible. The Support
Agencies for Public Health and Medical Services are responsible for developing and maintaining
plans, procedures and asset inventories to support the Primary Coordinators. ESF-8 Support
Agencies include, but are not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The Louisiana National Guard
The Department of Agriculture and Forestry
The Department of Corrections
The Department of Environmental Quality
Board of Regents
The Department of Transportation and Development
Volunteer Organizations
If state resources are inadequate to perform the tasks assigned, the ESF-8 coordinators
will report the situation and the needs to the Local Louisiana Office of Homeland Security
Emergency Preparedness (LLOHSEP), which will seek additional resources from EMAC and
from the federal government pursuant to a Presidential Disaster Declaration.
Medical Consultation
Laboratory Facilities
Medial – Field Hospitals
Medical – Emergency Procurement
Technical Assistance – Food Quality
Water Quality Control & Waste
Treatment
Communications Equipment
Transportation – Air
Transportation – Land
Louisiana National Guard
Medical – Personnel, Supplies, &
Equipment
Agency support to the Louisiana
Department of Health and
Hospitals, and the Louisiana State
University Health Sciences
Center
Medical – Facilities
ESF 8 – Public Health and Medical Services Responsibility Chart:
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Department of Agriculture & Forestry
Department of Corrections
X
X
X
X
Board of Regents
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Department of Transportation and
Development
X
X
X
Department of Environmental Quality
Volunteer Organizations *
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source: Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Emergency Operations Plan
Every agency providing emergency Public Health and Medical services support will maintain
records of the operations, including cost records that can be used after the emergency to obtain
119
reimbursement from state or federal sources (EOP, April 2005). To include private relief
organizations (i.e. American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Mennonite Disaster Service, etc.);
private industry; professional associations and participants in mutual aid agreements, etc.
Special Needs Shelter Plans
The mandatory evacuation order issued by the city of New Orleans excluded hospitals,
nursing homes, group homes, and their patients, thus placing the responsibility for evacuation of
those needing assistance on the owners of these facilities. However, they are required to have
pre-determined evacuation and/or refuge plans if evacuation becomes necessary, any request for
assistance is to be routed through the requesting facilities’ Parish EOC. Additionally, all
facilities must have approved Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plans as mandated by the
State of Louisiana, DHH. Given the nature of their business, hospitals are generally able to
continue operations in the face of power outages because they employ generators to maintain
critical life-support functions in an emergency. For this and other reasons, hospitals are
generally better equipped to ride out an incident than many other types of facilities. It is difficult
to evacuate hospital or nursing home patients, as their special needs may require special transport
and host facilities.
The Special Needs (SN) population is defined as being medically dependent. They may
have physical or mental conditions that limit their mobility and ability to function on their own.
They cannot evacuate from a risk area that is threatened by an emergency or disaster by
themselves, cannot provide or arrange for their own transportation, and cannot arrange for their
own sheltering. Although Parish governments have overall responsibility for SN shelters in their
jurisdictions, the State Regional SN Concept provides SN support depending on the
circumstances. The Department of Social Services (DSS), the DHH, the LSUHSC hospital
system, with other state agencies, volunteer organizations, and other public and private entities,
may be called upon to support the Parish and Regional SN Concept as required.
Each Parish is required to have at least one SN shelter operated and controlled in
accordance with the Parish Emergency Operations Plan. The shelter cannot be a general
population shelter, but operated only for those SN persons who cannot go elsewhere. The Parish
SN shelters are to be supported by the State if State assistance is requested and coordinated.
Moreover, if he Parish capacity or resources are exhausted, arrangements must be made with the
Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness to expand and support Parish operations. The State
may initiate regional SN shelters if other approaches are not adequate.
In an emergency, Parish and State government authorities call for the evacuation of
SN patients well before calling for mandatory evacuation of the general population. SN facilities
and agencies are required to evaluate all their patients and assign them to categories in
accordance with the instructions in the Louisiana Model Nursing Home or Home Health
Emergency Plan (LSOP, July 2000). SN persons whose health could seriously deteriorate in a
shelter will be classified as Category I Hospital Admit or Category I Hospital Shelter patients.
People who can survive in SN Shelters without serious deterioration of their condition will be
classified as Category II patients.
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Physical Health Impact
The National public health response to Hurricane Katrina following the storm included
hundreds of public health professionals deployed to the affected areas. Vigilant disease,
environmental, injury and mental health surveillance is ongoing. During the time period ranging
from 29 August – 30 September, a myriad of health risks and concerns were reported (Update on
CDC’s Response, Sept 2005):
•
Communicable disease: Aside from the lack of water, food, shelter, and sanitation
facilities, there was concern that the prolonged flooding might lead to an outbreak of
health problems for those who remained in the hurricane affected areas. In addition to
dehydration and food poisoning, there was potential for communicable disease outbreaks
of diarrhea and respiratory illnesses, all related to the growing contamination of food and
drinking water supplies.
•
E.Coli was detected ten times above unsafe levels in the waters that flooded the affected
area.
•
Vibrio species illnesses: A total of 34 cases were reported to CDC; 33 known to be
related to Hurricane Katrina; six deaths resulted from these illnesses.
•
Upper respiratory infections (URI): A report of a mild viral URI among some DOD
personnel housed in a gymnasium was reported by CDC; however they did not have
occupational exposures to mold or other agents. CDC epidemiologists attempted to
determine if these illnesses represented an increase above normal levels in the population.
•
Mosquito control: Of the 264 mosquito pools collected all were negative for West Nile
Virus; spraying for mosquitoes is ongoing.
•
Injuries: Among unintentional injuries, falls and puncture wounds were most prevalent;
bites and stings were also numerous.
•
Mental health resilience is ongoing for persons experiencing stress from displacement.
•
Other reportable concerns, illnesses, and infectious agents included: Pertussis, varicella,
rubella, hepatitis, tuberculosis, mold, cholera, and carbon monoxide poisoning.
•
Death toll: As of November 4, 2005, the total number of deaths attributed to Hurricane
Katrina reached a staggering 1,070 deaths.
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Louisiana State Response Management
Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana, the State EOC was operational and
able to handle all health related requests for assistance and resources. Requests were managed
through the ESF-8 public health and medical services desk. A member of the Emergency
Medical Response Team - Advanced Element (ERT-A), acting as an ESF-8 federal liaison, was
deployed to Louisiana prior to landfall to assist in manning the ESF-8 desk along side the state’s
representative. Although information regarding the effectiveness of the communication between
the state and federal representative was limited and in many cases unavailable, people who were
in the affected area during the crisis were able to provide first hand accounts of the response in
the days following the hurricane. One criticism is the poor utilization of resources that were
deployed and then staged for long periods of time and unused. Critics question if Louisiana
officials knew what resources were available, or if they knew what resources to ask for to handle
such a large scale health crisis.
When Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a state of emergency for Louisiana
on August 26th, this enabled the activation of the EMAC. Thousands of doctors, nurses,
emergency medical technicians, dentists, ambulances and medivac helicopters were deployed.
However, due to the enormity of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation, federal officials attempted to
lift some of the burden from the states by federalizing the medical resource deployment and
medical management response (EMAC Release, 12 Sept 2005).
Officials at all levels expected the hurricane to produce thousands of causalities. As a
result, Louisiana created temporary hospital facilities in Baton Rouge to handle surge capacity.
Within hours of Katrina’s landfall, the Pete Maravich Center was transformed into an 800 bed
temporary emergency room. Within two days a second temporary hospital was established in a
K-Mart. Many of the supplies for the facilities were brought in from local hospitals, private
businesses and donations. There was an initial lack of medical professionals, however DMATs
from other states were requested and worked in the temporary hospitals. According to Dr. Bill
Cassidy, who worked at the Pete Maravich Center, “the temporary makeshift hospitals that were
opened were the result of several years of intense planning by state health officials and the local
and regional health care system.” Initially, the facilities were set up properly, but there was no
way to get the patients to the facilities (Online News Hour, 8 Sept 2005).
The DHH opened up a number of SN shelters for those persons who required medical
support services and had no other place to go and receive care. A total of five SN shelters were
opened in Louisiana prior to Katrina making landfall. Initial staffing of the shelters included
employees of DHH and the DSS. Due to limited staffing, many shelters requested that a care
taker accompany each patient to assist with ongoing support (Emergency News, 28 Aug 2005).
Other SN populations were also addressed by DHH. For example, the Louisiana State
Office for Addictive Disorders published flyers with phone numbers both in-state and out-ofstate for those who struggle with addiction helping them find 12-step meetings, treatment and
recovery support services, methadone maintenance and other support services (Office of Public
Health Hurricane and Emergency Resources, 2005).
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The Louisiana Office of Public Health (OPH) played a vital role in the aftermath of
Katrina. Officials quickly realized that Louisiana was in the mist of a public health crisis.
Drinking water was unavailable; massive power outages lasted for days; thousands were exposed
to extreme high heat and humidity, contaminated flood water, and mold growth, coupled by the
lack of bathroom amenities and over crowded shelter facilities. Without basic services such as
electricity to supply phones, television and radios, getting public health information to people
was a challenge. Word of mouth, going door to door and posting flyers was the only way to
educate victims of Katrina in affected areas. For those who were available to evacuate
Louisiana, information was available through the OPH website.
The first issue addressed by the state OPH was to evacuate people still in their homes
after the storm. Next, people had to be informed of hazards in the disaster area. The
publications posted on the OPH website and distributed among shelters and people still in their
homes included the following: Safety Tips for Returning to Your Homes; Keeping Food and
Water Safe after Katrina; Mold: What You Need To Know About Your Health and Your Home;
Indoor Mold and Mildew after Katrina. Each publication listed specific precautions and steps to
take as well as awareness information. In addition, Frank Welch, Medical Director of the DHH
Immunization Programs produced the publication Vaccine Recommendation in Response to
Hurricane Katrina. DHH posted vaccine recommendations for shelter adults and children,
shelter workers, healthcare providers, rescue and recovery workers, and for residents returning to
the flood damaged area. For example, DHH recommended that people living in crowded
shelters be vaccinated against Hepatitis A; Influenza; Chickenpox; Measles, Mumps, Rubella
(MMR); and Tetanus/diphtheria.
Federal Response Management
Katrina was much too large of a disaster for the OPH to handle alone. The PHS, the
CDC, and other federal agencies worked with state and local officials to address the numerous
public health problems. The most immediate response from HHS was the activation of several
EOCs at HHS headquarters in Washington DC and at a number of other HHS agencies. The
EOCs are staffed 24 hours a day and are electronically connected. The DHS Operations Center
is also connected to HHS’s EOC to receive inputs from all other Cabinet departments. In
addition, a FEMA Joint Field Office (JFO) was activated in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. As
required in the NRP, any request for federal assistance is forwarded up through the local EOC to
the state EOC and passed on to the ESF-8 federal liaison as an Action Request Form (ARF). The
ARF is then forwarded through the HHS chain of command, and if deemed appropriate, a
Mission Assignment (MA) is established that identifies both the cost of the request and
designates who will support it. Throughout September, the public health missions continued in
the affected region, including school assessments, food and restaurant assessments, public health
essential services and hospital recovery planning. Besides providing direct assistance, HHS also
began working with the state partners on planning for short and long-term recovery. The
response efforts by the multiple agencies and partners of HHS will be discussed below.
As CDC’s EOC was activated, it served as the single point of contact for state
123
health departments, CDC grantees and other interested parties to request assistance and provide
new or updated information about public health concerns. CDC also launched a website to
provide public health information in the aftermath of the hurricane that provided educational
literature containing various fact sheets for healthcare professionals, response and cleanup
workers, evacuation staff, school officials, state grantees and the general public. As of
September 16, 2005, the CDC had more than 150 staff in the affected states, including the
following specialties: medicine, epidemiology, sanitation, and environmental health and disease
surveillance. Often times, the CDC is asked to conduct vector surveillance and rapid needs
assessments as well as environmental assessments for both hospitals and communities for both
state and local governments to aid them in assessing their needs and providing emergency
managers with reliable information regarding public health threats (Lister, 21 Sep 2005).
Another unique asset that is managed by CDC is the SNS, which was deployed to the
states affected by the hurricane. Soon after the hurricane made landfall, twenty-seven pallets of
requested medical supplies from the SNS were shipped to Louisiana alone. This cache of
pharmaceuticals contained thousands of doses of vaccines for tetanus/diphtheria, hepatitis A and
B, insulin, pain medications, ventilator kits, basic first aid materials such as bandages and pads,
ice packs, blankets and patient clothing, suture kits, sterile gloves, stethoscopes, blood pressure
measuring kits, portable oxygen tanks and other needed medical supplies. Additionally,
hundreds of thousands of doses of antibiotics and maintenance mediations for diabetes, heart
disease, anxiety and other conditions were also shipped as part of the SNS pharmaceutical push
package (DHHS Press Releases, 2005).
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the FDA stepped up its role, using numerous
recommendations regarding the handling of drugs, biologics and medical devices that may have
been destroyed or damaged due to floodwaters or loss of refrigeration. The FDA has also
provided information to the affected states regarding food safety. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) took several actions to streamline access to healthcare for displaced
victims and their providers. Many evacuees who were transported or self evacuated across state
lines either lost or failed to take documentation which could be used to verity their program
eligibility. HHS Secretary, using his authority under the Social Security Act (SSA), waived
certain program requirements in order to assist those who needed medical care (Lister, 21 Sep
2005).
On September 9, 2005, Secretary Leavitt announced that the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) would advance approximately $2.3 million in FY 2005 funds
to establish twenty-six new health centers in the affected area. Providers who normally provided
medical services under the liability protection of federal employment were issued a notice by
HRSA which informed them that the protection would continue. HRSA also administers a grant
program that supports state and local hospital preparedness for public health emergencies in
order to help states coordinate hospital surge capacity, personnel and medical supplies in an
emergency (DHHS Press Releases, 2005). This program was used a resource to assist the
affected states after the storm.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) set up phone-based medical consultation service
for providers treating victims or evacuees and mobilized bed capacity within its facilities. The
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Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) has its main focus on
providing resources to aid in the recovery process by establishing a toll-free hotline for people in
crisis. Additionally, SAMHSA is providing funding to address victims’ mental health needs
though the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program, Emergency Response Grants and
supplemental appropriations. SAMHSA has also provided abuse/methadone treatment expertise
to the state of Louisiana (Lister, 21 Sep 2005).
The Commissioned Corps of the PHS, one of the seven uniformed services which is
headed by the Surgeon General, is comprised of many healthcare professionals, including nurses,
mental health providers, pharmacists, doctors, engineers, scientists and dentists, who are
expected to maintain skills and deploy to support emergency response efforts. As of September
24, 2005, the PHS deployed more than 1,100 of its officers to the Gulf Coast region to provide
medical and clinical services, augment staff in hospitals, vaccinate patients, assist with the
deployment and distribution of the SNS, and hold various leadership positions (DHHS Press
Releases, 2005).
In accordance with the Homeland Security Act, The National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS) was transferred from HHS to DHS. NDMS consists of response teams that can rapidly
deploy and set up field operations that are self sustaining for 72 hours until additional federal
support arrives. NDMS can be requested by the Secretary of HHS pursuant to ESF-8. As of
September 9, 2005, NDMS had already deployed more than 87 teams in response to the
hurricane (Lister, 21 Sep 2005). The NDMS is the operating structure for the DMATs, the
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORTs), and the VMATs, all key
components to the ESF-8 response.
The DMAT is a team of physicians, nurses and other medical professionals who can
provide care. FEMA reported that it deployed all of the nation’s more than 50 DMATs in the
initial response phase. As of September 3, 2005, the total number of patients treated by DMATs
in Region VI was over 10,000. The DMORT is composed of medical examiners, coroners,
pathologists, forensic dentists, radiologists, mental health counselors, and funeral directors.
Their role is to assist in handling the bodies of the dead, victim identification and investigating
the cause of death. A DMORT site was set up in Gabriel, Louisiana that contained four teams
and one portably morgue. On September 30, 2005, there were approximately 17 DMORTs
deployed to the Gulf Region (FEMA National Situation Report, 30 Sep 2005). The VMAT is
composed of veterinarians and technicians who provide animal rescues, health assessments and
other services. All four VMAT teams were deployed to the Gulf Coast, providing care for
displaced animals and support for destroyed veterinary practices (Lister, 21 Sep 2005).
During a disaster, the DOD also assists the Secretary of HHS with many ESF-8
responsibilities, including patient evacuation, specialized laboratory testing, hospital beds,
additional personnel and medical supplies as requested. The DOD provided 789 beds which
were made available in field hospitals setup inside New Orleans Airport, the 14th Combat
Support Hospital (CSH) and aboard the USS Bataan, USS Iwo Jima, USS Tortuga and USS
Shreveport. Meanwhile, twenty Navy ships were also available to provide medical support,
transportation and humanitarian relief. The USNS Comfort arrived in the port of New Orleans
by September 30th to provide additional surge capacity (Lister, 21 Sep 2005).
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The VA, another important partner in the ESF-8 response, assists HHS in coordinating
available hospitals beds, additional personnel and supplies and provided technical assistance.
The VA facility in New Orleans was evacuated after the city was flooded. The VA activated 17
of its NDMS Federal Coordinating Centers to coordinate the relocation of evacuated veterans
and civilian patients who were evacuated from permanent and temporary hospitals in the affected
area (Lister, 21 Sep 2005).
For the first time since their existence, the HHS Federal Medical Stations (FMS) became
operational. These FMS facilities serve as 250 – 500 bed medical shelters which include cots,
sheets, fully operational pharmacies, and other medical supplies (Young, 24 Sep 2005). By
September 30th, more than 2,000 beds were deployed to Region VI on standby (which includes
TX post Rita). In partnership with the state, the first FMS opened on August 30th at the LSU
campus in Baton Rouge. Shortly after becoming operational, the facility screened 300 patients
and admitted 45 for in-patient care. Up to ten additional FMSs were used throughout the Gulf
Region (DHHS Press Releases, 2005). The purpose of the FMS is to provide basic health care
and support for bed surge and as shelters for SN patients that are not sick enough to receive full
hospital care but who cannot function by themselves at home. Pharmaceuticals for the facilities
were obtained through the SNS, the State Boards of Pharmacy, the Navy, donations through
pharmaceutical companies and chain and independent pharmacies (Young, 24 Sep 2005).
Although all of the DMAT teams were deployed and support was augmented by the PHS,
there were continuous reports of overwhelmed field hospitals and triage centers, which resulted
in calls from hospitals requesting additional medical personnel. Because the federal government
was limited in its capacity to supply additional medical professionals at this stage, the next step
was to ask for volunteers. The Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (ESAR-VHP), which is directed by HRSA, was developed following September
11, 2001. This system is designed to assist state and local authorities in verifying the status of
volunteer healthcare workers. This system is strictly meant to be a state asset and is managed at
the state level, with different credentialing and licensing requirements in each state.
Unfortunately, the program was not utilized during Hurricane Katrina, with reports that the
program was not ready (Lister, 21 Sep 2005). On September 3, 2005, HHS initiated a call to
healthcare professionals to volunteer their services through a website that was managed by PHS
officers. In response to this plea for assistance, over 33,000 volunteers had registered, 3,500 had
been credentialed and roughly 100 were deployed to the affected region (DHHS Press Releases,
2005). These volunteer health professionals (VHPs) become federalized employees (for the
purpose of liability and compensation) and deployed to the areas where assistance was requested
and needed (Hurricane Katrina Response, 15 Sep 2005). The VHPs were required to be licensed
in at least one US jurisdiction and the federal agency responsible for deployment held the burden
of verifying their credentials. Because of the program’s success and future potential, HHS is
considering this program to be a permanent resource that can be utilized in response to a
catastrophic event (Lister, 21 Sep 2005).
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Analysis of State Response
The National Strategy for Homeland Security has a specific initiative to prepare
healthcare providers for catastrophic events, specifically terrorist attacks. A Government
Accounting Office (GAO) report in 2003 reported that many states were not adequately prepared
to respond to such an event. It was further stated that no state was fully prepared to respond to a
major public health threat (Rabkin, 28 Sept 2005). With a national focus on terrorism, the
Louisiana DHH response to Katrina was hampered by the lack of focus on All-Hazards
preparedness work. There has been an overemphasis on terrorism emergency preparedness and
planning in the state of Louisiana in recent years. In 2002, the Louisiana DHH was awarded a
$1.9 million grant from HRSA for statewide bioterrorism planning. The specific grant was
continued in 2003 and 2004 with an additional $7.7 million each year (HRSA Emergency
Response Center, 2005).
The 2004 Hurricane Pam exercise in Louisiana was used to identify gaps and shortfalls in
the state’s emergency preparedness to catastrophic hurricanes and to adjust state plans in an
effort to provide a better response. Following Hurricane Pam’s 2004 exercise, the final draft of
the functional plan section entitled - Temporary Medical and Appendices - was originally due in
April of 2005, well before the hurricane season was to begin. The state failed to meet its
suspense and the final plan did not become available until September 3, 2005, after Katrina made
landfall. Hurricane Pam’s assumptions/predictions were almost identical to what happened after
Katrina. For example, those going into shelters did not bring their medications with them; after
the levee systems were breached large quantities of pollutants and hazardous waste contaminated
flooded areas; many hospitals were damaged and could not maintain vital life-support functions
for prolonged periods without power. Additionally, medical professionals were evacuated, or
self evacuated, thus decreasing the number in-state after the hurricane to address the medical
needs of those who were not and/or could not evacuate.
The impact of primary care provider shortages was severely felt in the aftermath of
Katrina. Chronic medical provider shortages were made worse when up to 5,944 active patient
care physicians were evacuated prior to or displaced after Katrina. This was the single largest
displacement of doctors in US history (Medical News Today, 27 Sept 2005). The number of
providers in Louisiana prior to assistance from outside states could not match the numbers of
people requiring medical care. The damages to the healthcare infrastructure and the relocation of
healthcare professionals to other states/areas may lead to continued, if not worsened healthcare
workforce shortages in the future for Louisiana.
The state performed some of its functions as laid out in the State EOP and Hurricane
Pam draft such as, opening SN shelters and coordinating with hospitals outside the affected areas
for the evacuation of patients in the affected areas within one to seven days of the event.
However, hospitals that lost generator power needed immediate evacuation of critical patients
(up to 300 people in some hospitals). Personal accounts from doctors and nurses indicated that
most hospitals had supplies and generator power to last from three to five days, but the effects of
Katrina lasted much longer than that. Generators were located in the basements and failed due to
flooding. Likewise, there were no redundant systems to maintain power in hospitals still holding
critical patients reliant on IV pumps, dialysis, or ventilators. Most hospitals were scrambling to
127
get critical patients out while other patients continued to pour in. Doctors and nurses worked for
many hours hand ventilating patients while simultaneously trying to figure out how to transfer
them. Many of the areas that were flooded required boats to evacuate critical patients to dry
areas and to helipads that were not under water (MSNBC, 31 Aug 2005).
Health facilities are managed by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals;
therefore, the State Emergency Manager has no authority over them in the time of an emergency.
Evacuation is up to each individual organization. Hospitals are generally considered buildings
that can withstand severe storms and many did, but were overcome by flooding when the levees
were breached. Because hospitals are considered “able to withstand storms” they were not
mandated to respond or comply with mandatory evacuations issued by the Governor. In the case
of New Orleans, this proved to be a horrible mandate. The levees were expected to fail and
flooding was almost guaranteed for this reason, and the hospitals should have been required to
comply with the mandatory evacuation order.
On a positive note, some hospitals that were not overcome by flooding and were able to
maintain generator power became shelters for hundreds. Dr. Stephen Geraci MD, Chief of Staff
at the VAMC Jackson stated “our hospital set up a “hotel” that covered security, food, and
sleeping accommodations, long distance phone and internet/email facilities, clothing and even
bus trips to the shopping malls….we were able to accept and care for over 200 non-patients
evacuees over the course of the disaster.” (Geraci, 2005). This was an excellent use of available
resources to aid needy citizens.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina it had been recognized that most hospitals today are too small,
understaffed and cash strapped to instantly handle large numbers of patients, Dr. Jimmy Guidry
stated, “hospitals today are unable to surge.” The ability to open temporary facilities in Baton
Rouge was a great asset. There were many areas of Louisiana that were not prepared to do this.
In addition, transportation of patients to temporary facilities seemed to have been another
shortfall. Dr. Chris Trevino, an emergency room physician tasked with transforming to the Pete
Maravich Center into a temporary emergency room stated that, “I think many people died
because of our inability to get access, to get them access, and to get transportation access to
them.” (Online NewsHour, 8 Sept 2005)
The inability to access a patient’s medical record was also a huge problem during the
Katrina catastrophe. Most patients’ records were paper-file based, thus primary care offices and
many hospitals lost a majority if not all of their patient’s medical records, including birth
certificates. Almost all of the victims and patients were sent for treatment to numerous health
care facilities both temporary and permanent along the south central US without access to
important medical records, making it more difficult if not impossible to treat patients suffering
from long-term conditions. In addition, transferred patients were separated from family and
loved ones. There was no pre-established tracking system for patients who were transferred.
Families went for days with no idea where their loved ones were sent or how to find them
(Lister, 21 Sept 2005).
Many victims who evacuated to shelters did so without their daily medications. Those
who did take their prescriptions with them found that the incredible heat and humidity in the
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shelters caused them to fuse together, rendering them unusable. With no medical records,
providing prescriptions for people was almost impossible. Additionally, hospitals were shutting
down and clinics, grocery stores, and chain pharmacies were either destroyed or closed leaving
almost no access to routine medications.
One of the most debilitating problems in any disaster is failure in communication and
communication systems. Communication systems were completely knocked out including
satellite, cell phones, and email after Katrina. Hospitals, nursing homes, home healthcare
agencies and public health agencies went without communication systems for four days,
sometimes longer. The use of personal runners in many instances was the only way to send and
receive messages and this was a very slow and difficult process. Delays in communication and
the failure to have adequate back up systems resulted in increased causalities, injuries, and
illness.
Another communication failure occurred at the state level. The Louisiana State
Evacuation Plan assigns responsibility of evacuation of sick and those needing assistance to the
owners of the health facilities including nursing homes and home healthcare agencies. All
healthcare facilities are required annually to maintain an approved Multi-Hazard EOP as
mandated by the state, DHH (LSOP, 2000). It is also mandated that prior to emergencies like
Katrina, the state is to contact each facility to ensure they have the ability and the means to
evacuate their patients as well as provide resources to assist them when necessary. Tragically,
one nursing home in New Orleans was not evacuated, resulting in the death of thirty-four elderly
patients. One can only infer that the state had a plan and failed to execute it.
This analysis shows that there are many areas that need to be addressed and improved
regarding Louisiana’s readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic events. In many areas, the
state was only partially prepared to deal with a medical and public health disaster. It is true that
with a Hurricane of Katrina’s size almost all local resources will be wiped out and the state
resources handicapped. However, it is the state’s responsibility to ensure they are capable of an
adequate response to support and aid its citizens in their time of need before and after a disaster.
Analysis of the Federal Response
Soon after Hurricane Katrina made impact, there were concerns that federal readiness had
been severely affected by the fact that there had been an overemphasis on planning for terrorist
attacks and not enough on natural disasters. The most immediate logistical issues that the federal
response faced in terms of ESF-8 were physical access to healthcare facilities, civil disorder,
protection of healthcare providers, communication systems knocked out, and many hospitals that
failed to evacuate patients prior to Katrina (Rabkin, 21 Sep 2005).
The federal and state governments lack a coordinated grant review process to ensure that
funds were used for communications projects that not only complemented one another, but were
interoperable as well. In April 2004, the GAO testified that the Wireless Public Safety
Interoperable Communications Program (SAFECOM) had made very limited progress in
achieving communications interoperability among all entities at all levels of government and had
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not achieved the level of collaboration necessary (Rabkin, 21 Sep 2005). It was apparent in the
response to Katrina that hospitals and the healthcare system lacked the ability to adequately
communicate to each other to identify immediate needs.
The transfer of NDMS to DHS and FEMA continues to be a response issue. NDMS
leadership reported that the lack of administrative support from FEMA and the needs and
challenges of medical missions are not fully understood by FEMA. In July 2005, DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff announced his proposal to reorganize and split the existing Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate into two separate directorates. In October 2005, DHS
Secretary appointed a chief medical officer within the preparedness directorate who would serve
as the principal advisor on medical preparedness. NDMS remained under the response
directorate, therefore not being able to benefit from the appointment of the medical officer.
FEMA works under the basic planning assumption that state and local governments are solely
responsible for responding to a disaster in the first 72 hours of the event. However, DMATs
historically function to arrive immediately and provide support for 72 hours prior to the arrival of
other federal assets. It has become apparent that FEMA cannot support such a rapid deployment
capability (Lister, 21 Sep 2005).
Healthcare facilities are licensed and regulated by state and local authorities. However,
there is a federal role for oversight of their disaster preparedness and response capabilities
through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) among others. Through these
organizations, facilities are required to have evacuation plans, drills, and comprehensive disaster
plans (Lister, 21 Sep 2005). Evacuation of healthcare facilities must be addressed and
coordinated between all levels of government.
The ESAR-VHP program was not ready for the hurricane response. However, pilot
programs have begun in several states and were funded $8 million in FY05 and an additional $8
million requested in FY06. This tool is a state asset. Even with HHS’s initiative for VHPs, there
continues to be a number of legal concerns to assure the VHPs are protected from liability in the
requesting state. Issues with credentialing and license verification also remain a challenge for
mutual aid agreements (Hurricane Katrina Response, 15 Sep 2005).
Use of the FMSs for the first time seemed to be a success, but also served as an
opportunity to improve upon the station’s response and setup. The FMS is a hospital packed up
in a box that once it arrives, would need to be built. The FMS requires a hardened structure in
which to build the facility. Most of the FMSs used during Hurricane Katrina were built on a
military base. One of the downfalls it faced was that officers sent to staff the FMS were not
trained in how to build this type of hospital; therefore, resulting in a huge learning curve which
must be addressed through future drills and training exercises. Another pitfall with the FMS
setup is that they were placed too far away from the Gulf Region. For this reason, victims did
not want to travel such long distances from their homes in order to receive medical care.
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Recommendations and Conclusions
This analysis is a narrowed look at the Katrina disaster, limited to a one month response
window. Issues discussed within this time frame have fostered the following recommendations.
In the short study period there were many areas, both federal and state, that have been identified
that will require future planning and preparedness if the outcome is to ensure a more successful
operation and response in future disasters.
•
The Louisiana DHH must do a capability assessment not only looking at what they can
do, but figure out what they should be able to do and work towards accomplishing this
prior to the next disaster.
•
The National Incident Management System that is endorsed by the President under
Homeland Security Presidential Preparedness Directive – 5 (HLSPPD-5), must be fully
integrated into the state’s All-Hazards management system. Louisiana must begin AllHazards planning, taking great care to avoid narrow planning and preparedness efforts
that are engineered towards one type of incident - like bioterrorism.
•
All of the sixty-four Parishes in Louisiana must have an EOP that addresses surge
capacity, the ability to create and staff temporary hospitals until federal assistance arrives
on the scene and to identify what resources are available.
•
Since local emergency managers are responsible for coordinating disaster responses, the
development of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between local emergency
managers and hospitals would allow the emergency manager the ability in emergency
situations to mandate certain aspects of response, such as patient evacuations
(Congressional Quarterly, 20 Oct 2005).
•
Federal agencies such as OSHA and JCAHO, should conduct annual audits of healthcare
facilities to assure not only that EOPs exist, but that they are fully exercised and updated.
•
The need for medical facilities, nursing homes, and home health agencies to frequently
train and drill emergency operation plans including evacuation plans cannot be
overemphasized. As seen in Louisiana it does no good to have a plan on paper if it
cannot be fully executed or relied upon when needed.
•
The Louisiana DHH should try to establish emergency contacts with pharmaceutical and
medical supply distributors to deliver medications and equipment in disaster situations as
local stock will be limited or wiped out completely. This will allow victims to manage
independently in a general shelter population, thus reducing stresses on an already over
burdened system.
•
The state of Louisiana should contract with out-of-state transportation systems (i.e.,
private ambulances and charter bus companies) to move victims to temporary medical
facilities or shelters.
131
•
On a national level, the need to adopt and fund the purchase of health information
technologies such as universal e-records system for medical facilities is crucial. In
addition, the state must also adopt and facilitate off-site business continuity operation
plans that allow for the creation of a redundant system that protects vital patient
information needed in times of an emergency.
•
On a state and national level, the need to adopt a patient transfer tagging and tracking
system can prove to be invaluable during a crisis. For example, a national based wrist
band bar coding system that allows a facility to scan a patient as they leave one facility
and arrive at another.
•
It is vital the DHH assures that whoever is seated at the State EOC EFS-8 desk is trained
to fulfill the position. The person must be able to ask requesting facilities the right
questions to assure they are requesting not only the appropriate resources but enough of
them. In addition, this person must understand how to then request the resources from
their federal counterpart.
•
Regular communication systems like phones and internet are bound to fail in large scale
disasters. Back up systems like HAM radios should be stocked for use or contracting for
Cell on Wheels (COW) equipment to be delivered immediately after a disaster. Federal
grant money that is awarded to the states should be specific in the types of
communication that is purchased. The federal government should mandate the type of
equipment that is purchased to ensure the interoperability with other communications
equipment is optimized. Grant money should also be used to train individuals on the use
of such equipment.
•
Medical professional shortages following a disaster are likely to be worsened
immediately following a disaster. In Louisiana’s particular case, the state should begin
workforce recruiting and state incentive programs to attract medical professionals back to
the affected areas as they re-develop. Incentives may include subsidizing moving costs,
offering attractive benefit packages and/or signing bonuses.
•
The current organization and leadership of NDMS greatly hinders its ability to respond.
HHS should work to overcome the problems faced when working with NDMS by
improving coordination with DHS with respect to the NDMS. These two agencies should
meet to discuss the communication hurdles that adversely impact information sharing.
HHS needs to identify the resources and personnel utilized within NDMS and determine
whether they will share this asset with DHS or create one if its own to fulfill its mission.
•
The ESAR-VHP and HHS VHP program should continue to evolve and improve upon
their database systems to assure healthcare volunteers are adequately credentialed and up
to date in their practice. The legal issues with VHPs should be addressed at all levels.
These systems should be used during national disaster situations to maximize the number
of healthcare professionals that can be used.
132
•
The FMSs that were used were an overall success. However, it will be very important to
institutionalize and memorialize the process so that it can be used and improved upon in
future events. Individuals who are the first to arrive on site to build the hospitals should
be adequately trained. In addition, because a hardened structure is needed to build this
type of hospital, it is recommended that sites where the facilities can be used are predetermined. Sites chosen should also be in the closest proximity to the disaster site as
possible to assure they will be fully used and to their maximum potential.
The above are points of consideration for improvement to be made in preparing and
responding to catastrophic events for the state of Louisiana and can be applied in most states in
the Nation. It is recognized that there are significant limitations to some of the recommendations
made. Funding, technology, man power, inter-agency relationships, and neo-politics all must be
recognized and addressed prior to consideration and implementation of any of the above
recommendations. There have been no official reports as to whether or not state and federal
ESF-8 response management was a success or failure. It is the conclusion of this paper,
however, that many changes are needed to improve the preparedness and response applications
of ESF-8 Public Health and Medical Services.
References
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Dentzer, Susan. Katrina’s Public Health Risks. Online NewHour. September 12, 2005.
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136
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA
Kia N. Braxton, Jessie Brown, and Claudette Fetterman
Hurricane Katrina cut a wide swath of destruction across the Gulf Coast region,
particularly in New Orleans, Louisiana. The storm affected some 90,000 square miles in the
region, leaving much of New Orleans under water. Historically, hurricanes and floods are a
common heritage for citizens and residents; however, despite increasing vulnerability, the
government of New Orleans continued to build complex levees and water pumping systems and
encouraged expanded residential and commercial development. Over the years, New Orleans’
natural barriers to hurricanes and floods had degraded and its levees and flood systems had set
the stage for a natural catastrophe.
Today, Hurricane Katrina poses an enormous challenge to New Orleans’ and the Gulf
Coast region’s environmental recovery. Excessive flooding caused health hazards to thousands
of residents, destruction of hundreds of homes and businesses, land pollution and debris removal
issues, contamination of drinking water and vegetation, submersion of critical infrastructures,
and wildlife, terrestrial, and marine displacement. In essence, Hurricane Katrina posed important
lessons about the management of essential environmental resources.
This paper discusses New Orleans’ environmental history, highlighting its planning and
policy failure and increasing hazards over the years. Additionally, it details Hurricane Katrina’s
catastrophic impact to the area’s water, land, air, and biological resources. Logical analysis and
recommendations as a basis for a comprehensive solution to rebuilding New Orleans and its
region are also provided. Critically, the area’s environmental condition plays a vital role in the
prevention and recovery from future natural disasters. Incorporating environmental protection
and management strategies is a must towards a sustainable and disaster resilient New Orleans.
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Background
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA: ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
New Orleans is a major port and the
largest city in the State of Louisiana. During the
2000 U.S. Census, the city had a population of
484,674, totaling 1,337,726 inhabitants for the
Greater New Orleans. Much of the city is
located below sea level between the Mississippi
River and Lake Pontchartrain [CDC/EPA,
2005]. Historically, hurricanes and floods are a
common heritage for Louisiana residents.
Today, billions of dollars worth of levees, sea
walls, pumping systems, and hurricane tracking
systems have been established in the
surrounding communities of New Orleans and
across Louisiana.
During the 1800s, the French colonial
administrators required land claimants to establish ownership by building levees along bayous,
streams and rivers [Dean and Revkin, 2005]. Unfortunately, levee construction during that early
period of flood control was of poor quality. They were narrow, low, vulnerable to destruction by
large floods, and generally ineffective at controlling the river. As a result, the substandard
workmanship combined with severe flooding in the early 19th century and the growth of New
Orleans and surrounding communities compelled the U.S. Congress to act [Penland, 2005]. The
Swamp Land Act of 1849 authorized Louisiana to create a system of levee districts where each
district received donated federal land that it could sell and utilize its proceeds to finance levee
construction and land reclamation [USGS, 1998].
The American Civil War and severe floods in 1862, 1865, and 1867, undid much of the
work done under the Swamp Land Act. In the decades following the Civil War, the white
businesses and political leaders of New Orleans and Louisiana begged the U.S. Federal
Government to take the lead in sealing the city off from the waters that surrounded and all too
often inundated it. Thus, in 1879, Congress created the Mississippi River Commission, under the
leadership of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to assume the role of controlling the
river [Penland, 2005]. Immediately thereafter, since cotton and sugar plantations needed to be
revived and the region’s largest port safeguarded [Morris, 2005], A. Baldwin Wood, an engineer
and inventor, was hired by the New Orleans Sewage & Water Board in 1899 to improve the
flood-prone city's drainage. Subsequently, Wood invented "flapgates" and other hydraulic
devices, most notably efficient low maintenance high volume pumps, including The Wood Screw
Pump (1913) and The Wood Trash Pump (1915). Wood spearheaded the reclamation from
swamp and the efforts to make developable much of the land now occupied by the City of New
Orleans [ASME, 1975].
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However, the pumping of groundwater from underneath the city has resulted in
subsidence, which is a downward motion of the earth’s surface that greatly increases the flood
risk should the levees be breached or precipitation be in excess of pumping capacity.
Consequently, the Mississippi River Commission established new standards and methods for
levee construction and it operated under those guidelines for nearly half a century. The record
flood of 1927, on the other hand, forced a drastic reconsideration of the Commission’s leveesonly policy of river control. That year’s flood inundated 26,000 square miles of land, killed
hundreds of residents, and displaced hundreds of thousands more. Thereafter, existing levees
were rebuilt, extended, and reinforced with revetments. But the Commission also tried new
approaches, such as building floodways to divert water from the river and digging cutoffs to
speed the passage of floodwaters. Over time across Louisiana, coastal land loss continued to
worsen. Flood control had set the stage for disaster [Penland, 2005].
New Orleans and other communities are protected by two kinds of levees: one defends
against the Mississippi’s annual floods; the other protects against deadly hurricane storm surges
Initially, no one viewed coastal land loss as a problem as severe as flooding. The first official
recognition that beach erosion in Louisiana needed higher-level attention came from the USACE
report on Grand Isle, the state’s only developed barrier island. Subsequently in 1970, Louisiana
received more bad news, noting that the state had lost interior coastal lands at a rate of almost six
square miles a year between the 1890s and 1930s. Furthermore, the rate had accelerated to more
than sixteen square miles a year by the 1950s. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) found
that between 1955 and 1978, Louisiana lost more than thirty-five square miles a year. Such
conditions put human settlements at great risk from encroaching water [Penland, 2005]. In the
mid-20th century, when oil and gas fields were developed in the Gulf of Mexico, people added
petrochemical refineries and factories to the river mix, convenient to both drillers and shippers.
To protect it all, New Orleans and the Government of Louisiana built a more complicated system
of levees, dams, spillways, and other installations. “New Orleans is surprising evidence of what
men will endure, when cheered by the hopes of an ever-flowing tide of dollars and cents,” said
Ari Kelman, an environmental historian at the University of California. Eventually, more and
more people have realized what a terrible bargain the region made when it embraced
environmental degradation in exchange for economic gains. Its islands are the region's first line
of defense against hurricane waves and storm surges. Marshes, which can normally absorb
storm water, are its second. However, starved of sediment, New Orleans and Louisiana have
shrunk significantly in recent decades. “Grassland turns into open water, ponds turn into lakes,”
said Dr. Abby Sallenger, a scientist with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) who studied
Louisiana landscape for years. Without the fine sediment that nourishes marshes and the coarser
sediment that feeds eroding barrier islands, “the entire delta region is sinking,” he said. In effect,
it is suffering a rise in sea level of about a centimeter, about a third of an inch a year, which is 10
times the average rate globally [Dean and Revkin, 2005].
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Source: Natural history magazine. 2005. http://www.naturalhistorymag.com/0205/0205_feature2.html
By the early 1980s, despite the signs of impending disaster, Federal and state agencies
were still reluctant to attempt any kind of restoration. As a result, the local government and its
environmental entities acted first. In 1984, the frustrated government of coastal Terrebonne
Parish, some forty miles southwest of New Orleans, appropriated $1 million for the first barrierisland restoration project in Louisiana, at Isles Dernières, under the direction of Robert S. Jones,
the parish engineer and a leader in barrier-island restoration. Then in 1989, the Louisiana
Legislature established the Louisiana Wetlands Conservation Authority and Congress
subsequently passed the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act of 1990
(CWPPRA). By that time, the combined funding of various state and federal coastal restoration
programs in Louisiana had reached more than $50 million a year [Penland, 2005].
One of CWPPRA’s first restorations was the Caernarvon Freshwater Diversion Project,
which began operation in 1991. The project benefited existing commercial fisheries by
enhancing marsh conditions, thereby improving the fish and wildlife resources of the area. The
total average annual benefits include $8,706,000 for fish and wildlife and $449,000 for
recreation, totaling $9,155,000 [LaCoast, 1998]. Since its inception, the Caernarvon project
became a model that has afforded valuable practical experience with restoration techniques. So
from 1991 until 1998, more than forty-five projects began under the auspices of the CWPPRA
[Penland, 2005].
Consequently, the State of Louisiana and its Federal partners approved a coastal
restoration plan in 1998 entitled Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana. This
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presented strategies jointly developed by federal, state, and local interests to address Louisiana's
massive coastal land loss problem. For the first time, solutions were proposed to address
fundamental ecosystem needs. By implementing the plan’s regional ecosystem strategies, it is
envisioned that a sustainable ecosystem will be restored in coastal Louisiana, in large part by
utilizing the same natural forces that initially built the landscape [Coast 2050, 2005]. However,
the project never won federal funding and has not moved beyond the planning stage [AAAS,
2005, p. 1657].
To most of the world, New Orleans had been the "Big Easy", the cradle of the blues, the
home of Cajun cooking, and a symbol of laidback style. Nevertheless, to environmental experts,
the city had been a disaster just waiting to happen. "We have always used New Orleans as the
perfect example of the unsustainable city. It is a hopeless case," Klaus Jacob, senior research
scientist at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at New York's Columbia University, told
reporters.
The city started (to be built) in the French Quarter, on high ground,
which is the logical place to be when you build a village. But what
happened is that as settlement progressed, people didn't want to be
periodically flooded. So a complicated system of levees (dams)
was erected, with pumps and so on, and this allowed the city to
develop. But at the same time, the delta subsided because of
natural action and the city got lower as the water around it builds
up [Ingham, 2005].
Like coastal Bangladesh, where typhoons killed 100,000 and 300,000 villagers,
respectively, in two horrific storms in 1970 and 1991, the New Orleans area lies in a low, flat
coastal area. Unlike Bangladesh, New Orleans has hurricane levees that create a bowl with the
bottom dipping lower than the bottom of Lake Pontchartrain. Though providing protection from
weaker storms, the levees also would trap any water that gets inside—by breach, overtopping or
torrential downpour—in a catastrophic storm [McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2002].
Today, wetland loss in coastal Louisiana has reached catastrophic proportions, with
current losses of 25-35 square miles per year. Since the magnitude of the problem was identified
in the 1970s, we have gained much insight into the processes that lead to wetland creation and
destruction. The disappearance of Louisiana’s wetlands threatens the enormous productivity of
its coastal ecosystems, the economic viability of its industries, and the safety of its residents.
The wetlands support various functions and values, including commercial fisheries; harvesting of
furbearers and alligators; recreational fishing and hunting; ecotourism; critical migratory
butterfly, songbird and waterfowl habitat; endangered and threatened species habitat; water
quality improvement; navigation and waterborne commerce; flood control; buffering protection
from storms; and the perpetuation of a unique culture that has developed in this beautiful and
bountiful area of the country [Coast 2050, 2005]. Now, Louisiana, particularly New Orleans’
coast resembles a bowl placed in a sink full of water. Push it down, or just tip it slightly, and
water rushes in.
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HURRICANE KATRINA AND ITS AFTERMATH
Hurricane Katrina was the eleventh named
North Atlantic Hurricanes
tropical storm, fourth hurricane, third major
Rank Hurricane Year Cost (In 2005 dollars)
hurricane, and first Category 5 hurricane of the
2005 Atlantic hurricane season. It first made
1
2005 Est. $200 billion
Katrina
landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north of
Andrew
1992 $45 billion
Miami, Florida on August 25, 2005, then again on 2
August 29 along the Central Gulf Coast near New 3
Fifi
1974 $20 billion
Orleans, Louisiana, as a Category 4 storm. Katrina
4
Hugo
1989 $15-16 billion
resulted in breaches of the levee system that
protected New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain,
5
Charley
2004 $15 billion
and most of the city was subsequently flooded by
the lake's waters as deep as 25 feet. This and other major damage to the coastal regions of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama made Katrina the most destructive and costliest natural
disaster in the history of the U.S. [Hopper, 2005].
In Louisiana, the hurricane's eye made landfall at 6:10am Central Daylight Time (CDT)
on Monday, August 29. After 11:00 am CDT, several sections of the levee system in New
Orleans collapsed. Mandatory evacuation of New Orleans had been ordered by Mayor Ray
Nagin before the hurricane struck, on August 28. The order was repeated on August 31. By
early September, people were being forcibly evacuated, mostly by bus to neighboring states.
As director of Louisiana State University's Center for Public Health Impacts of
Hurricanes, Van Heerden has since 2002 led a multidisciplinary team looking at what would
happen if a major hurricane directly hit New Orleans. The center has studied everything from
how the city would flood to how many people might ignore evacuation orders or be unable to
flee—almost 1 in 4, they had estimated. "The sad part is that we called this 100%," says Van
Heerden. Causing the largest natural disaster in U.S. history, Katrina slammed into the Gulf
Coast on 29 August with its eye hitting about 55 km east of the city. Although the storm initially
brought more destruction to other areas along the Mississippi and Louisiana coast, several levees
protecting New Orleans failed the following the day, and the city, about 80% of which is below
sea level, filled with water. The floods may have killed thousands, stranded many more, and
triggered a massive relief and evacuation effort.
Numerous studies had warned of this catastrophic scenario, and as it played out, many
scientists watched with anger and frustration. "It's easy to do studies. Sometimes it's hard to act
upon them," says Rick Leuttich of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, who has helped
model how a hurricane could flood New Orleans. "We've had plenty of knowledge to know this
was a disaster waiting to happen [AAAS, 2005, p. 1656].”
Federal disaster declarations blanketed 90,000 square miles of the U.S., an area almost as
large as the United Kingdom. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified a suite of environmental health issues
and supporting infrastructure to address. This includes drinking water, wastewater, solid
waste/debris, sediments/soil contamination (toxic chemicals), power, natural gas, housing,
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unwatering/flood water, occupational safety and health/public security, vector/rodent/animal
control, road conditions, underground storage tanks (e.g. gasoline), and food safety. Security
and personal safety concerns also existed among those residents who were unable or unwilling to
heed the evacuation order and who were housed at the Superdome and New Orleans Convention
Center. A significant portion of the housing stock of New Orleans was at least partially
submerged in water, compounding the problems listed above [CDC/EPA, 2005]. Experts say the
city could face long-term problems from contaminated sediment left behind once the floodwaters
are pumped away [Hawthorne, 2005].
In essence, Hurricane Katrina carried important lessons about management or
mismanagement of essential health and environmental safeguards. Hurricanes are a fact on the
Gulf Coast, and, invariably, some turn deadly. A century of poor planning and industrial abuse
has stripped away much of the Gulf Coast’s natural protection against storms and flooding. More
than 1 million acres of coastal wetlands in Louisiana have been drained, lost to development, or
starved of the Mississippi River sediments they need to survive. Fixing these problems will
make the Gulf Coast communities safer and more secure and reduce the long-term cost of coping
with the disaster. Indeed, lessons from Hurricane Katrina will pay dividends in other regions
subject to extreme weather disasters as well [Olson, September 2005].
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
FLOODWATER IMPACTS
During a hurricane, the greatest cause for loss of life is typically the storm surge, which is
described as “water that is pushed toward the shore by the force of the winds swirling around the
storm” [National Hurricane Center]. A storm surge effectively combines with the normal tide to
create a storm tide, which can increase the mean water level 15 feet or more. Hurricane Katrina
caused a nearly 30-foot storm surge that ultimately overran and/or breached New Orleans’ levee
system leaving approximately 80% of the city under water [CDC/EPA, 2005]. The force of the
floodwater devastated everything in its path, at times ripping homes and businesses from their
foundations; imploding structural walls and causing roof collapses; toppling power lines and
vegetation; and submerging the city infrastructure (e.g., industrial facilities, water/wastewater
treatment facilities, and similar facilities).
With such excessive flooding, unwatering of the city was a critical first step to allow
debris clearing, habitability and environmental assessments, and repair of basic services
[CDC/EPA, 2005]. Delayed unwatering only compounded the secondary impacts of Hurricane
Katrina’s floodwaters. These secondary impacts included mold, contamination from oil and
toxic chemicals, vector hazards, ecological impacts to wildlife and marine systems, and the
potential for waterborne illnesses and disease.
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Mold Issues
Mold posed a significant environmental health concern for all structures flooded during
Hurricane Katrina since molds grow in moist, damp environments. Mold spores, which cannot
be seen without magnification, waft through indoor and outdoor air continually. When mold
spores land on damp or wet spots indoors, they may begin growing, subsequently producing
allergens and irritants [EPA, 2001]. Individuals who are sensitive to mold may experience
allergic reactions, asthma attacks, opportunistic infections, and other immunologic effects from
touching or inhaling mold or mold spores [EPA, 2001]. These allergic reactions may include
sneezing, runny nose, itchy eyes, headaches, and skin irritation.
Molds can also produce toxic substances, or mycotoxins, that have been linked to severe
human health effects, including nausea, acute or chronic liver damage, immune system
suppression, or cancer [EPA, 2001]. However, more research and information on mycotoxins is
needed to develop a comprehensive picture of human health effects to mycotixin exposure.
Mold also damages, or weakens, whatever it grows on. As such, the potential for weakened and
structurally-unsound walls, floors, and ceilings, was an additional public health concern for
individuals returning to mold-infested homes and businesses.
Clearly, individuals returning to homes and businesses flooded by Hurricane Katrina
must take extreme care in initiating mold remediation and cleanup. The key to limiting an
individual’s exposure to mold is wearing personal protective equipment (PPE), including an N95 respirator (which reduces exposure to airborne mold), long gloves (made from natural rubber,
neoprene, nitrile, polyurethane, or PVC), and goggles that do not have ventilation holes [EPA,
#402-K-02-003]. However, according to a Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
delegation that toured New Orleans and surrounding areas, many returning residents, first
responders, and recovery contractors did not understand the risks and were not using PPE to limit
their exposure [Olson, October 2005]. This might suggest that long-term medical surveillance
of the effects of mold exposure is warranted.
Multiple Sources of Contamination
Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge and resulting floodwaters also inundated municipal and
industrial facilities, including water and wastewater treatment systems, Superfund National
Priority List (NPL) sites, petrochemical plants, gas stations, and similar facilities. As such,
Federal authorities cautioned first responders, returning residents, and recovery workers about
the potential hazards associated with elevated levels of contamination from raw sewage/fecal
matter, oil and toxic chemicals, and other hazardous substances in floodwaters.
Oil and Toxic Chemicals
Hurricane Katrina caused over 575 petroleum and hazardous chemical spills from aboveground tanks, of which 11 significant spills released approximately 7 million gallons of oil into
the environment [Olson, October 2005]. Oil could be seen on the surface of the floodwaters, but
also had the potential to sink to the bottom of the floodwaters and be deposited as sludge or
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sediment. There were also many instances of underground storage tanks at gas stations and
similar facilities that were damaged and leaking fuel or other toxic substances. Further, hundreds
of thousands of ruined automobiles, boats, barges, and other vehicles containing gasoline, oil,
and toxic fluids submerged in floodwaters in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Consequently,
EPA and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) began an aggressive
floodwater sampling effort to evaluate the extent of contamination from oil and chemical
hazards.
According to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson, over 630 floodwater samples were
collected (as of October 20, 2005) and analyzed for over 100 priority pollutants, including
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), total metals,
pesticides, herbicides, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) [Johnson, 2005]. Sampling values
for these priority pollutants were compared to EPA’s Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs), a
legal limit for each contaminant, or to health guidance values calculated by the Agency for Toxic
Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR)/CDC.
Numerous priority pollutants, including lead, arsenic, barium, thallium, chromium,
benzene, selenium, and cadmium, were commonly detected in floodwaters at levels that
exceeded MCLs. Other chemicals, such as hexavalent chromium, manganese, p-cresol, toluene,
phenol, 2, 4-D (an herbicide), nickel, aluminum, copper, vanadium, zinc, and benzidine were
detected and compared to ATSDR/CDC health guidance values; these chemicals were
subsequently determined not to be immediately hazardous to human health [EPA Summary of
Water Testing, 2005]. While EPA and ATSDR/CDC strongly encouraged individuals to limit
contact with floodwaters unless wearing the appropriate PPE, they concluded that chemicals
exceeding MCLs or CDC/ATSDR health guidance values did not pose a human health threat
unless inadvertent ingestion occurred [EPA Summary of Water Testing, 2005]. However,
according to NRDC findings, individuals became ill after contact with the floodwaters and
developed rashes and blisters and/or infected sores that did not respond to antibiotics [Olson,
October 2005].
Further, Hurricane Katrina’s floodwaters impacted 54 NPL sites in the Gulf Coast
Region. According to Administrator Johnson, EPA completed visual inspections of these sites
and initiated floodwater sampling efforts at 10 sites in Louisiana, three in Mississippi, six in
Alabama, and 12 in Texas [Johnson, 2005]. Of the 10 NPL sites in Louisiana, Agriculture Street
Landfill is the only one located in New Orleans [EPA Superfund Issues, 2005]. This facility
once served as a municipal disposal area, and was contaminated with lead, arsenic, and
carcinogenic polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (cPAHs) [EPA, #LAD981056997, 2005]. The
facility underwent environmental remediation and was partially redeveloped for residential
purposes.
Although contaminated soils in the residential areas were excavated and replaced, the
contaminated soils in the undeveloped, vegetative areas were capped in-place. This presented a
concern in terms of the floodwaters causing a potential release or disturbance of soil
contaminants. As of September 25, 2005, initial sampling efforts at the Agriculture Street
Landfill detected lead at levels below that which precipitated environmental remediation in the
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first place; however, further testing is required to evaluate the extent of re-contamination at this
site [EPA Superfund Issues, 2005].
Contaminated Sediment
Hurricane Katrina’s receding floodwaters deposited thick layers of sediment, which EPA
and LDEQ have defined as including “historical sediment from nearby water bodies, soil from
yards, road and construction debris, and other material” [EPA/LDEQ, 2005]. This sediment
posed a very similar threat in terms of contamination from biological pathogens, as well as oil
and toxic chemicals. As such, EPA and LDEQ broadened the scope of their sampling efforts to
include an analysis of sediment. According to Administrator Johnson, over 423 sediment
samples were collected (as of October 20, 2005) and analyzed for the same priority pollutants
evaluated in floodwater samples [Johnson, 2005].
Sampling results indicated that the sediment contained elevated levels of biological
pathogens, SVOCs, arsenic, and lead (other contaminants were detected at levels not likely to
result in adverse health effects). Some of the SVOCs that were detected (e.g., diesel and fuel
oils) posed a risk for dermal irritation of exposed skin; breathing fuel vapors posed a risk of
nausea, eye irritation, increased blood pressure, headache, and light-headedness [EPA Summary
of Sediment Testing, 2005]. These findings presented two additional concerns: 1) no standards
exist for determining human health risk from biological pathogens in sediment or soil, and 2)
once the sediment began to dry, air sampling would be required to determine any resulting
inhalation risks from breathing sediment dust [EPA/LDEQ, 2005]. Ultimately, EPA concluded
that direct, frequent contact with sediments containing fuel oils and biological pathogens at the
levels detected in the samples may cause adverse health effects and, as such, should be avoided.
Biological Pathogens
Environmental sampling efforts were also focused on addressing public health concerns
stemming from fecal contamination in floodwaters and the potential for contamination of
drinking water systems. Ingestion of floodwaters containing bacteria can cause illness (e.g.,
vomiting, diarrhea, stomach-ache, fever), and exposure of bacteria-laden floodwaters to open
wounds, cuts, and abrasions can also lead to illness. As such, EPA and LDEQ initiated
biological pathogen studies of floodwaters and sediment to analyze for coliforms (bacteria that
live in the intestines of warm-blooded animals), fecal coliforms (a type of coliform associated
with human and animal waste), and Escherichia coli (E. coli) (a type of fecal coliform) [EPA
Fecal Coliform and E. coli, 2005].
While coliforms do not generally pose a danger to humans, they are an indicator of
disease-causing bacteria, such as those that cause typhoid, dysentery, hepatitis A, and cholera
[EPA Fecal Coliform and E. coli, 2005]. Sampling results of Hurricane Katrina floodwaters and
associated sediment indicated levels of E. coli that greatly exceed EPA’s recommended levels of
contact. To address this environmental public health concern, EPA and public health officials
initiated an educational campaign warning against the dangers of exposure to bacteria-laden
floodwaters. The campaign addressed steps to take following contact with floodwaters (e.g.,
washing exposed skin with disinfecting soap) and procedures for handling drinking water and
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food (e.g., boil water or chemical treatment alerts) [HSRC, 2005]. Although certainly a critical
step in protecting human health, the boil water alerts do little to address the potential chemical
contamination that could be present in drinking water sources.
Floodwaters also contaminated private water wells, adding to an already increasing array
of public health challenges. Since many individuals in the impacted region relied upon private
water wells, returning residents had to purify the wells of any fecal contamination through a
lengthy process involving pumping the well for several hours, disinfecting with chlorine bleach
for a minimum of 24 hours, followed by opening the faucets to allow the water to run until the
chlorine smell dissipated. All private well owners were advised to have a laboratory or local
public health office sample and test their well water before consuming it.
Vector Hazards
A secondary effect of hurricane-related flooding is the increase in vector, or insect,
hazards. Standing floodwaters serve as breeding grounds for disease-carrying insects, including
mosquitoes that can spread West Nile Virus. In anticipation of increased hatching of mosquito
and fly larvae, the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (LDHH), in coordination with
EPA and other Federal agencies, developed preventive measures for controlling mosquitoes.
This plan included aerial application of pesticides routinely used by local mosquito control
districts [LDHH, 2005].
According to experts at the Louisiana State University (LSU) Agriculture Center
(AgCenter), fire ants also posed a significant health hazard following the extreme flooding from
Hurricane Katrina. Floodwaters forced fire ant colonies from their underground nests and into
floating masses of ants; as the floodwaters receded, the ant masses clung to any dry structure that
would support it, including debris piles, furniture, etc. [LSU AgCenter, 2005]. For returning
residents and recovery workers, avoiding fire ants and their bites was a critical mandate. The
best tips for avoiding fire ants during recovery operations included: wearing PPE; dusting
shovels and cleanup tools with talcum or baby powder (to prevent the ants from being able to
climb up the handles); and using aerosol spray products containing pyrethrins or pyrethrum
derivatives [LSU AgCenter, 2005].
Ecological Impacts
Hurricane Katrina caused a significant impact to the ecological environment. According
to preliminary reports, Hurricane Katrina’s winds and waters accelerated the destruction of the
region’s natural buffer by eradicating entire barrier islands and destroying vast swaths of
wetlands. These natural buffers are the “first line of defense” against catastrophic storm surges
[Benfield et al, 2005]. The storm surge and associated floodwaters also stirred up and carried
polluted saltwater into sensitive, ecologically important waters and marshes that serve as
nurseries for many rare birds, fish, shrimp, and other wildlife [Olson, October 2005]
Coastal marshes in the Mississippi River delta and the Parishes south of New Orleans
were hard hit by winds, surge, and saltwater. Several plant species were impacted, including
Spartina (which was extensively uprooted) and Phragmites (which was laid over and “burned”
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by saltwater from the storm surge) [FWS, 2005]. Additional spatial analyses are needed to
quantify the acreage of those wetlands that were deluged and converted to open water. Coastal,
forested wetlands in the eastern Lake Pontchartrain Basin to the Pearl River were defoliated, and
standing trees sustained heavy damage due to the 150+ mph winds.
Further, sixteen coastal national wildlife refuges (NWR) covering nearly 365,000 acres in
the Gulf Coast region were temporarily closed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Many of
these NWR areas have public use programs (e.g., hunting and fishing) that will not likely reopen
until damage assessments are completed and safety hazards are remediated. The 23,000-acre
Bayou Sauvage NWR, located within the city limits of New Orleans, remains closed (as of this
report writing).
To address these ecological impacts, EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) are lead federal agencies coordinating an ongoing interagency
assessment of the environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina in coastal waters throughout the
affected Gulf Coast region. The assessment will characterize the magnitude and extent of coastal
contamination, ecological effects, and health risks resulting from Hurricane Katrina.
IMPACT TO LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN
Since unwatering of the city was a critical first step to allow debris clearing, habitability
and environmental assessments, and repair of basic services, efforts initiated by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE) resulted in the pumping of sewage-laden, contaminated
floodwaters into Lake Pontchartrain. The floodwaters were untreated and were believed to pose
significant implications regarding the long-term sustainability of the lake. As such, EPA, LDEQ,
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) collected water samples from the lake, as well as
tissue samples from aquatic life (e.g., fish, shrimp, crabs) to evaluate the lake’s recovery from
the contaminated floodwater. Initial results from the water sampling effort indicated that
bacteria could be of concern, but as more floodwaters were pumped back into the lake, the
number of bacteria began to decline. The volume of lake water effectively diluted the
floodwaters [LDEQ, 2005].
Toxicity tests of aquatic life, which involved exposing aquatic life to various
concentrations of floodwaters for 48 hours, indicated that the test animals were able to survive in
100% pumped-out floodwater [LDEQ, 2005]. These tests indicated that aquatic life in Lake
Pontchartrain is unlikely to encounter issues that would hinder their survival. However, a longterm evaluation of potential damage and impacts on humans and habitat should not be
overlooked.
LAND IMPACTS
Land in the Gulf area has been greatly affected by Hurricane Katrina, as seen by the loss
of wetlands, contamination of the soil/sediment, and damage to wildlife refuges (discussed
above). In addition, the debris/solid waste left in the wake of Katrina has the potential to cause
even greater damage to the land and environment. Inland forests were affected by strong winds,
which downed trees and scattered debris. This is significant due to the large, forested areas in
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the Gulf states, which are major lumber producers. These environmental issues will undoubtedly
have effects on humans and the wildlife that inhabited the area.
Debris/Solid Waste
According to a USACE debris model, Katrina generated an estimated 22 million tons of
debris [LDEQ Response, 2005]. This exceeds debris from any hurricane and the 1.5 million tons
of debris from the 9/11 attacks [Olson, October 2005]. Much of this debris has been soaked with
oil or other toxic chemicals and intermixed with plastics, which will become toxic if burned
[Olson, October 2005]. The LDEQ plans on removing all White Goods (refrigerators, stoves,
washer-dryers, etc.) from each home for recycling, removing all thermostats because they
contain Mercury, and removing all smoke detectors because they contain small amounts of
radioactive materials [LDEQ Response, 2005]. The EPA and LDEQ estimate one million
pounds of household hazardous waste (pesticides, bleach, solvents, etc.) has been collected in
Louisiana so far (by October 31). These items may cause long-term damage to the environment
if they are disposed along with other ordinary garbage [EPA Press Release, 2005]. Other debris
that needs to be managed include vegetative debris (yard waste, trees, limbs, etc), abandoned
vehicles, abandoned boats, liquefied petroleum gas tanks, and asbestos debris [LDEQ, November
2005].
Hypoxic zones in the Gulf
An environmental phenomenon occurs off the coast of Louisiana every summer, covering
over 7,000 square miles of the Gulf of Mexico at times [NCAT, 2005]. The Gulf of Mexico
"Dead Zone", or hypoxic zone, is an area of oxygen-depleted waters that cannot sustain most
marine life. This hypoxic zone is caused by excessive amounts of nitrogen pollution delivered to
the Gulf by the Mississippi River [NCAT, 2005]. There is concern that when debris from
Katrina is washed out to the Gulf of Mexico, it will rot and may cause an increase in these
hypoxic zones. This will make the area even more uninhabitable.
Forested Lands
The USDA Forest Service [2005] estimated 19 billion board feet of timber damaged on
over 5 million acres in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. That is an estimated $5 billion loss
in potential revenue to the Forest Service [Sheikh, 2005]. The environmental effects could very
easily outweigh the economic loss. Damage to these forested lands causes the displacement of
many types of wildlife from their habitats. The loss of forest cover has the possibility of
changing the whole ecology of the area. Another problem is the damaged and dead trees may
become hazardous fuels for wildfires. For example, it is estimated the debris available for
fueling wildfires is 20-30 times higher than normal in southern Mississippi [Baker, 2005].
Insect Issues
Fallen timber promotes insect infestations such as the southern pine beetle and black
turpentine beetle. They thrive on downed trees and then harm the living trees [Sheikh, 2005].
The mass attack process is initiated by adult females, which bore into the tree and release
149
pheromones that in combination with volatiles from the damaged tree attract large numbers of
beetles. If a sufficient number respond they overwhelm the defenses (the resin system) of the
host tree, and then attack is switched to adjacent trees [Payne 1980].
Another insect problem is Formosan subterranean termites, Coptotermes formosanus,
which were introduced into the greater New Orleans area after World War II. The New Orleans
area has one of the largest most destructive termite infestations, which is facilitated by the neartropical climate. Landfills are an ideal environment for these termites [LDEQ, Nov.2005]. On
October 3, 2005, the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry issued a quarantine on
wood debris to “prevent the spread of Formosan termites and infestation of areas, homes and
structures that are not currently infested, or which are to be built or reconstructed” [LDAF,
2005].
Invasive Species
Forested lands exposed to increased levels of sunlight caused by fallen trees and
defoliation are susceptible to invasive non-native species. The Chinese tallow tree and
cogongrass are examples prevalent in these areas [Sheikh, 2005]. Cogongrass is an aggressive,
rhizomatous, perennial grass that is distributed throughout the tropical and subtropical regions of
the world [MacDonald et al., 2002]. The Chinese tallow tree grows and spreads rapidly, is
difficult to kill, and tends to take over large areas by out-competing native plants [University of
Florida and IFS, 2005]. Winds may also spread the prevalence of invasive species.
Effects on Humans/Wildlife
The impact Katrina had on wildlife is still in the initial assessment phase. According to
FWS (2005), initial damage to wildlife/fisheries facilities exceeds $94 million. Severe storms
claim individual animals and destroy food and shelter they need. In addition, non-native (and
dangerous) animals may escape captivity. Habitat destruction may prevent migratory birds from
using the area. This will be especially critical in the spring when they cross the entire Gulf,
using the barrier island chain to rest before continuing their northward flight [USGS, 2005].
Katrina will cause many types of wildlife to find new areas to nest, forage, etc. if the coastal area
is not restored.
Humans have also been affected by the destruction/contamination of land. Debris is
more dangerous due to its recent contact with the floodwaters of Katrina. The people who go
back to New Orleans will be surrounded by contaminated soil/land which have unknown and
possible long-term effects.
AIR IMPACTS
Release of air toxics and other air pollutants may occur as a result of the damage from
Katrina and cleanup/restoration activities [EPA Air Quality Data, 2005]. These could have
serious health effects on humans if inhaled. In addition, the smell of petroleum vapors, the
stench of putrefying organic matter/sludge, and the unmistakable odor of mold are prevalent
150
[Olson, October 2005]. There is an overpowering smell throughout the area due to Katrina.
Another major factor is dust, which may be toxic, swirls with wind or disturbance.
Sources of Contamination
The main sources of air pollution in the New Orleans area include: spills of volatile
chemicals, start-up releases or leaks from industrial plants, dust from building demolition and
debris transport, contaminated sediment that may be re-suspended as dust, and smoke from open
burning fires [EPA Air Quality Data, 2005].
Testing Air Quality
The EPA does several types of air quality monitoring, they include real time data, air
screening data and time delayed data collection. Samples are evaluated against standards and
guidelines to protect the public health.
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
Real Time Data: The Real-time data method provides ozone and particle pollution
levels that can be translated into Air Quality Index values [EPA Air Quality Data,
2005]. They use fixed site continuous PM2.5 monitors, which monitors fine particle
levels, and portable monitors to measure fine and coarse particles [EPA Air Quality
Data, 2005].
Air Screening Data: This method provides initial assessment of air quality. The EPA
has a remote-sensing aircraft called ASPECT (Airborne Spectral Imagery of
Environmental Contaminants Technology) to protect water and air quality. The data
produced by ASPECT is non-validated and is used for screening purposes only. The
EPA also has two real-time air monitoring mobile laboratories known as TAGA
(Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer) buses. The samples were analyzed for volatile
pollutants such as benzene, toluene, and xylene. The third method of real time air
quality data is an instrument (MIE DataRAM nephlometer), which measures
particulate matter, provides immediate results, and is portable [EPA Air Quality Data,
2005].
Time Delayed Data: This method requires analysis in a laboratory, which may take
one day to one week, depending on the pollutant [EPA Air Quality Data, 2005].
On October 9, air sampling at several sites in and around New Orleans began on metals
(e.g., lead and arsenic), VOCs (e.g., benzene), polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAH's; carcinogens
associated with burning activities), and particulate matter, are among some of the pollutants
being monitored on a daily basis. Air monitoring will continue throughout burning and
destruction removal associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita [EPA Air Quality Data, 2005].
Preliminary results, as of November 3, from all monitoring samples taken, are well below the
human health levels of concern [EPA Air Quality Data, 2005]. A low level of air pollutants is
expected in this preliminary stage because the pollutants may still be bound to sediment.
There has been some concern about the current air quality testing. The EPA has been
criticized for comparing data to the acute NIEHS safety level, which is a level considered safe
for short-term exposure (24 hours). The EPA data on its website is higher than the NIEHS
151
intermediate level, which is equivalent to a two week exposure. They are possibly giving a false
sense of security to the public. Also, no air or other sampling has been publicly reported for
most areas around spills or chemical spills outside New Orleans [Olson, October 2005].
Effects on Humans
Respiratory problems, including asthma, are being reported from people exposed to
fumes in contaminated areas [Olson, October 2005]. Inhaling smoke from burning debris could
also have serious effects. A large number of people along the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts
are developing a condition that some have dubbed "Katrina cough" [Gold and Simmons, 2005].
Patients appear to be allergic to the filth they are exposed to, such as dust and mold. Those
allergies make them more susceptible to respiratory illness, including bacterial bronchitis and
sinusitis [Gold and Simmons, 2005].
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to ameliorate the extreme environmental consequences of Hurricane Katrina,
Federal, state, and local officials must be careful to analyze the reasons why the hurricane
wreaked such havoc in the first place. In essence, while we may never be able to prevent the
occurrence of hurricanes, we can certainly evaluate policies, procedures, and resources, and
establish solutions that address each concern. Initiating steps to address these primary causes of
environmental devastation will have an automatic secondary impact on the consequences of such
devastation (e.g., reducing the occurrence of catastrophic flooding should result in a decrease in
flooded homes and businesses with mold issues).
PRIMARY CAUSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION
In many respects, the primary causes of the environmental devastation from Hurricane
Katrina can be boiled down to two key factors: catastrophic flooding and contamination from oil
and toxic chemicals.
Catastrophic Flooding
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region experienced catastrophic flooding, the likes of
which had not been previously experienced, due to the lack of natural buffers along the coastline
and the poor design of the city’s levee system.
ƒ
Natural Buffers: Although studies have shown that just one square mile of wetlands
can absorb a foot of storm surge, land management policies mandating channeling
along the Mississippi River and nearby waterways have prevented wetlands from
replenishing. Further, extensive development has disrupted the ecosystem and led to
152
a systematic destruction of wetlands along the coast. Consequently, since the 1930s,
nearly 2,000 square miles of the Louisiana Delta have eroded away, leaving coastal
communities and critical infrastructure (e.g., oil and gas lines) increasingly
susceptible to storm surge and flooding [Benfield et al, 2005]. Ultimately, this
degradation of coastal wetlands and barrier islands, if left unchecked, could become
an environmental security issue, as these natural resources provide habitat for various
foul and aquatic life.
Recommendation: Planners and developers must integrate rebuilding efforts and longterm wetlands protection and restoration efforts. Over time, a concerted focus on
stemming the tide of wetlands loss will enable coastal wetlands and barrier islands to
replenish and serve as the first line of defense against future hurricanes. Federal,
state, and local partners must immediately move to fund and implement the Coast
2050 comprehensive plan, which addresses developing regional ecosystem strategies
to restore a sustainable ecosystem in coastal Louisiana.
ƒ
Levee System: A secondary, but also critical, component of addressing catastrophic
flooding in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region is a focus on building a more
robust levee system. According to preliminary findings, significant flooding in New
Orleans occurred because of flaws in the conception, design, construction and
maintenance of the region's flood-control system. Analyses indicate that the levees
failed because they were designed in the late 1980s and 1990s in weak soil conditions
and without the proper safety margins, in addition to the fact that some of the floodcontrol system architecture dates back nearly 100 years ago [Vartabedian, 2005].
Further, maintenance practices for evaluating the integrity of the levees were lax.
Recommendation: USACE, working with state and local planners and developers,
must complete a comprehensive analysis of the New Orleans’ levee system to
determine why the levees either failed or were overrun. Following the
comprehensive evaluation of the levee system in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
USACE and its government partners should collaborate on rebuilding the city’s flood
control system in a manner that does not impede wetlands restoration efforts. The
redesign of the flood control system should be done using a sophisticated design
approach, such as “probabilistic design analysis,” which tries to estimate the
probability of failure over time [Vartabedian, 2005]. Such an approach would
ensure that the margin of safety for the flood control system would be significantly
higher than pre-Katrina conditions.
Oil and Toxic Chemicals
Hurricane Katrina’s floodwaters played a significant role in damaging and/or destroying
oil/petrochemical and other industrial facilities, leading to major releases of oil and toxic
chemicals into the environment. The damage to these facilities may be directly related to poor
compliance with environmental regulations.
153
ƒ
Compliance Issues: Federal environmental regulations, including the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), have requirements
for proper storage of petroleum products in aboveground storage containers. CWA
requires facilities to prepare Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC)
Plans to ensure that containment and other countermeasures are in place that would
prevent oil spills that could reach navigable waters. RCRA requires facilities that
manage, store, and dispose of hazardous waste to have emergency plans that prevent
waste from escaping into the environment following an accident or foreseeable event
like a hurricane.
Recommendation: Federal and state environmental officials must complete a
comprehensive analysis of facilities that experienced significant losses of hazardous
materials due to Hurricane Katrina. These facilities should be evaluated for their
compliance with SPCC requirements and RCRA to determine if non-compliance,
whether intentional or accidental, lead to the high number of petroleum and toxic
chemical releases. The evaluation should also determine 1) if any steps were taken
pre-event that would have better enabled the facilities to withstand Hurricane
Katrina’s floodwaters, and 2) if these facilities were indeed built so close to the
coastline that they would be vulnerable to hurricane flooding even with the best
containment and countermeasure plan.
These recommendations are not mutually exclusive, rather they form the basis for a
comprehensive solution to rebuilding the impacted region in a matter that would preclude the
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region from experiencing environmental devastation on such a
large scale in the future.
SECONDARY CAUSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION
Hurricane Katrina’s impacts on land and air have resulted in secondary causes of
environmental devastation. They include contamination from debris and decreased air quality.
Contamination from Debris
Katrina left an enormous amount of debris behind which was made up of construction
materials, damaged buildings, sediments, green waste, and personal property. Hurricane debris
obstructs roads and disables electrical power and communication systems over wide areas [EPA
Planning for Disaster Debris, 2005]. This debris was also soaked in floodwaters, which
contained oil/toxic chemicals. Ordinary household materials, under these disaster conditions,
may become hazardous. The long-term effects of contact with the debris are uncertain.
Recommendation: To ameliorate the effects of contamination from debris, a long–
term debris management plan needs to be implemented. This should include a
detailed strategy for debris collection, temporary storage and staging areas, recycling,
disposal, hazardous waste identification and handling, administration, and
dissemination of information to the public [EPA Planning for Disaster Debris, 2005].
Implementing a plan for recycling disaster debris is much easier if a community
154
already has a recycling program in place [EPA Planning for Disaster Debris, 2005]. A
community’s solid waste management plan should be updated. It is important that the
solid waste management plan reflect current practices and policies, especially those
that apply in disaster situations [EPA Planning for Disaster Debris, 2005]. A
communication strategy should be prepared ahead of time. Government officials will
need to tell the community when, where, and how trash collection will resume, as
well as provide special instructions for reporting and sorting disaster debris [EPA
Planning for Disaster Debris, 2005]. It is important to pre-select debris staging sites
that will be used for temporary storage and processing of debris. Selection of the
sites should be based on planned activities, such as staging, collection, storage,
sorting, recycling, landfilling, and burning of debris [EPA Planning for Disaster
Debris, 2005]. Finally, hazardous materials must be segregated from nonhazardous
disaster debris; otherwise your community might be forced to dispose of the
combined waste as hazardous waste [EPA Planning for Disaster Debris, 2005].
Decreased Air Quality
It is uncertain what will happen to the air quality in New Orleans in the coming months.
Contaminated sediment will be dried out/moved, which could send pollutants into the air. There
may also be serious respiratory health effects on people who return to New Orleans.
Recommendation: Burning of debris must be done in accordance with all local, state
and federal emergency orders. The public must be educated on how to protect
themselves from airborne pollutants. There needs to be adequate air quality
monitoring, not only in testing frequency, but in an expanded method to insure
absolute readiness. There needs to be implementation of section 112 of the Clean Air
Act of 1990 regarding Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants [EPA Clean Air Act,
2005]. Under this law, the EPA sets limits on how much of a pollutant can be
anywhere in the U.S.
Conclusion
Hurricanes generate forces that cause catastrophic damages to the environmental
resources of a region. Following Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf Coast Region, particularly New
Orleans, experienced a unique environmental disaster exacerbated by its long history of poor
planning. The subsequent environmental devastation will cause long-term economic, biological,
social, and political issues for generations to come.
Hurricane Katrina caused considerable alterations to Gulf Coast ecosystems and their
biological resources. The hurricane tore through several areas of shallow-shelf estuarine waters
including extensive oyster reefs, large marine and estuarine submerged aquatic vegetation beds,
and wetlands. Hurricane Katrina also affected inland forests and wildlife refuges by downing
trees and scattering debris. Further, the hurricane storm surge led to levee breaches in New
Orleans and flooding throughout the city. The return flow of contaminated floodwaters back into
Lake Pontchartrain has the potential to affect the lake and associated ecosystems.
155
According to several sources, surveys of the damage to the environment are just
beginning and quantitative evaluations of the losses to biological resources caused by Hurricane
Katrina and flooding have yet to be reported. There are regional estimates of wetland loss, and
estimates of impacts on fisheries, forests, and aquatic areas. Consequently, community and
political support have increased as a result of this disaster. Investment in mitigation plans,
emergency management techniques, and government and organizations interoperability are being
analyzed.
Several questions remain regarding the short- and long-term environmental impacts of
Hurricane Katrina Katrina in the Gulf Coast region. It is imperative that New Orleans and
Federal and state stakeholders consider these questions in developing a strategy to facilitate the
recovery process. These questions include:
ƒ
What is the extent of coastal wetland loss in the region, is this loss permanent or
temporary, and how will this loss alter the buffering capacity of coastal wetlands
against future hurricanes?
ƒ
What has been the impact of Katrina on endangered and threatened species
populations and their habitat?
ƒ
What are the long-term ecological and economic consequences for coastal fisheries
and can the fisheries be restored?
ƒ
How much is wildfire risk increased by the dead and damaged trees?
ƒ
How much time can elapse before this risk and the threat of insect or disease
infestation become severe?
ƒ
Will coastal and inland ecosystems be more susceptible to invasive species?
ƒ
Will toxic substances released through flooding leach into the groundwater? Where
and how such leaching may occur, and how long will it take to remediate water
supplies?
ƒ
Will there be bioaccumulation of toxic substances through the food chain? How long
will it take for substances to accumulate in aquatic and terrestrial wildlife?
The available body of knowledge regarding Hurricane Katrina recovery suggests that
there were primary and secondary causes of the tremendous environmental devastation. The
primary causes of environmental devastation were catastrophic flooding and oil/toxic chemical
hazards, whereas the secondary causes of the devastation were contamination from debris and
decreased air quality. To ameliorate the effects of the primary and secondary causes of
devastation, New Orleans officials, as well as state and Federal stakeholders, should focus on
five Ps – Proper Planning to Prevent Poor Performance – to prevent a repeat of this level of
156
devastation following future hurricane events. The focus of these planning efforts should
include:
ƒ
Rebuilding/restoring natural barriers since natural barriers serve as an effective
buffer against storm surge
ƒ
Redesigning more sophisticated flood control measures in a manner that does not
impede wetlands and barrier islands restoration and to to ensure significantly higher
safety margins
ƒ
Enforcing compliance with environmental regulations (e.g., SPCC, RCRA, Clean Air
Act) to prevent the release of hazardous materials into the environment
ƒ
Developing long-term debris management plans to address debris collection and
staging, recycling, and disposal
Other restorative actions should be considered, including: increasing oyster habitat and
supplementing oyster populations; clearing forest debris and salvaging fallen timber to lower the
chance of forest fires; rehabilitating wildlife refuges and reserves to increase wildlife populations
and recreational options; and creating new sanctuaries for migrating birds and turtles to replace
lost areas. Recently proposed legislation includes provisions that would fund the mitigation of
the environmental impacts caused by Hurricane Katrina. Several proposed programs that would
benefit the biological resources altered by Hurricane Katrina are being considered in various
bills. Some ideas include grant programs for coastal states to fund, for example, the conservation,
protection, management, and restoration of coastal wetlands.
Finally, lessons were learned and various recommendations have been provided
throughout this paper that merit vital considerations in order to protect and maintain safety in
local communities. In due time, although the impacts of Hurricane Katrina have been
devastating, there is an opportunity for Federal, state, and local officials to facilitate a successful
recovery while implementing policies and procedures to prepare for future hurricane events.
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extent, and their value to waterfowl and other wildlife. A century of exploitation. USGS
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http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/1998/uswetlan/century.htm.
Vartabedian, Ralph and Stephen Braun. (2005). System failure seen in levees. LA Times.
Retrieved October 22, 2005 from http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-nalevees22oct22,0,7024222.story?coll=la-home-nation.
161
162
The Recovery of Louisiana’s Wetlands and Its Impact on Hurricanes
John Harris and Matthew Hewett
Introduction
In the 20th century, hurricanes, other natural events, and human encroachment and
manipulation of the Mississippi River have destroyed 1000 years of the natural geomorphic
process that built the Mississippi River Delta. Since we began building levees in the late 17th
century, mankind has attempted to alter the course of the Mississippi river to meet his needs.54
Attempts have been made over the years to protect the growing populace from, primarily, the
threat of flooding from the Mississippi River. The wetlands along the Louisiana coast that
provide a barrier through the “sponge effect” are catastrophically being destroyed. Scientists
have known for decades of this destruction and attempted at times in vein, to raise the
communities' awareness of the cycle of destruction. This alarm of concern should be obvious to
those on the Louisiana’s coast because “on average, since 1871, a tropical storm or hurricane
affects Louisiana every 1.2 years. 55
Following Hurricane Katrina, the nation is looking for answers as to how so much
devastation occurred in one of the nations most vital economic regions? In 2002, the Louisiana
Coastal Area Plan was put forth as a blue print to restore Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. Now the
basic question is: Will that plan mitigate the effects of another perfect hurricane?
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands
Over the last 7000 years, seven deltaic cycles have been identified that have built
Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. These wetlands contain an “extraordinary diversity of habitats that
range from natural levees and beach bridges to expanses of forested swamps and freshwater,
intermediate, brackish, and saline marshes.”56 There are two wetland-dominated ecosystems, the
Deltaic Plain which ranges from the eastern border of Louisiana to the freshwater bayou, and the
Chenier Plane that ranges from Louisiana’s western border to Vermillion Bay. It is these
ecosystems and natural barriers that have been compromised over the years by the encroachment
54
http://www.pubs.asce.org/ceonline/ceonline03/0603feat.html, JUNE 2003, CIVIL ENGINEERING MAGAZINE
THE CREEPING STORM
55
“Louisiana Coastal Area, Ecosystem Restoration Study”, US Army Corp of Engineers, November 2004,
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/factsheet.asp
56
“Louisiana Coastal Area, Ecosystem Restoration Study”, US Army Corp of Engineers, November 2004,
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/factsheet.asp
163
of humanity, civil engineering works, and coastal storms including hurricanes. Not only is the
Louisiana coast important from an environmental aspect, “economic prosperity depends on
stable natural resources, which can only be sustained through healthy, functioning ecosystems.”57
It is important to understand the geographic and economic makeup of the coastal area in order to
describe the relevance of the wetlands in hurricane mitigation.
Geographic Understanding of the Louisiana Coastal Wetlands
The deposits of silt from the Mississippi River have created over 3 million acres of
coastal wetlands. The coastal region of Mississippi is a thriving economic area with significant
investment in industry, tourism, ecology, and transportation. According to the US Census, over
2 million people, or over 50% of the state’s population live in coastal parishes.58 Development
has not only brought people and industry closer to the hurricane vulnerable lowlands and shores,
but has promoted a sense of false security in populations located close to flood prevention
projects such as levees. The populace of the coastal area depends heavily on the wetlands for its
livelihood and as the wetlands diminish, so increases the populace’s exposure to storm surge
from tropical storms and hurricanes.
Definition of Wetlands and Wetland Loss
The term “wetland” refers to areas saturated with water adequate to support the growth of
aquatic fauna. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.59 In the
case of the Louisiana coast, much of the wetlands were produced by sediment deposition from
the frequently flooding Mississippi River. “On a geological time scale, sediment deposited by
the Mississippi River compensated for the relative rise in sea level and new land was constructed
because of abundant sediment supply.”60 Because of stream control due to human activities, the
natural flooding of the Mississippi has been controlled which, in turn, has reduced the amount of
sediment and nutrients necessary to maintain and protect the wetlands from natural seawater
encroachment. Human induced pollution, infestations of herbivores, and heavy traffic have also
contributed to the wetlands decline. “According to the Louisiana Department of Resources,
coastal system erosion began in the 1890s and peaked during the 1950s and 1960s. In the last
fifty years, land loss rates have exceeded between 25 and 35 square miles per year. This loss
represents 80% of the coastal wetland loss in the entire continental United States.”61 It was
estimated in 2000 that 6,600 acres per year would be lost over the next 50 years resulting in a
lost of 10 percent of Louisiana’s remaining coastal wetlands.62 The massive loss of these coastal
57
“The Need for a Systematic Approach to Coastal Restoration “ , NOAA Coastal Services Center,
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/coastal/overview/overview.htm, April 6, 20
58
“Louisiana Coastal Facts”, Updated Wednesday, July 13, 2005, http://www.dnr.state.la.us/crm/coastalfacts.asp
59
Definition of Wetlands, US Army Corps of Engineers,
http://agen521.www.ecn.purdue.edu/AGEN521/epadir/wetlands/us_army_corps.html
60
“An Overview of Coastal Land Loss: With Emphasis on the Southeastern United States”, USGS Coastal &
Marine Geology Program, Last modified: Thu 29 Apr 2004, http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2003/of03-337/wetland.html
61
“Coast 2050: Towards a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana”, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Baton
Rouge, La. 1998;
62
“Louisiana Coastal Area, Ecosystem Restoration Study”, US Army Corp of Engineers, November 2004,
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/factsheet.asp
164
wetlands due to natural processes such as subsidence and storms combined with human actions
at large and small scales has pushed the system to the verge of collapse.”63
Louisiana Coastal Economics
Notwithstanding the vulnerability of the Louisiana coastline to the threats of hurricanes,
the economic investment in this vulnerable area continues unabated. Nussbaum estimates that
about one-fourth of the nation's oil and natural-gas production is located in the Louisiana Coastal
area, as is one-third of its seafood catch. In addition, it is home to the nation's largest port
complex, moving 16 percent of its cargo.64 The table below illustrates what is at stake in
protecting the Louisiana coast from the effects of hurricanes.
•
•
•
•
•
$30 billion per year in petroleum products
$7.4 billion per year in natural gas (21% of the nations supply)
400 million tons per year of waterborne commerce
$2.8 billion per year in commercial fishing
$1.6 billion per year in recreational fishing65
Apart from the immediate costs indicated above, the relief and recovery cost must be
considered as well. Relief costs include any assistance provided by NGOs or government
entities to support the effected people. The damaging effects of hurricanes to humans and human
property on the Louisiana coast are amplified by the loss of wetlands and the increased
development in the close proximity of man-made levees. Recovery costs include the loss of
taxable property and tax revenue as well as the cost to rebuild infrastructure damaged by the
storms. According to a study created in preparation for the Hurricane Pam simulation in 2004,
“assuming a real estate value of $400/acre and a similar value in terms of protection the coastal
wetlands represent for coastal communities from major tropical storms, means that the annual
loss to Louisiana and the nation exceeds $150 million every year (van Heerden, 1994). In fact,
since the 1950's this loss in total amounts to an excess of $7.6 billion.”66
Wetlands, it has been proven, can protect these vital economic resources through what is
known as the “sponge effect” where for every 4 miles of wetlands, the storm surge is reduced by
one foot.67 This does not mean that the full flooding force of the hurricane is abated as wave
height and wave velocity also vary greatly depending on the strength of a given hurricane. It
does mean that flooding will be lessened or nonexistent in areas as a direct result of the lack of
the buffering effects of this particular geography.
63
“Coast 2050: Towards a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana”, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Baton
Rouge, La. 1998;
64
“New Orleans' growing danger”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 8, 2005, Paul Nussbaum
65
“Disappearing Delta Overview”, PBS, Science Now, Sept. 9, 2005,
http://www.pbs.org/now/science/neworleans.html
66
“COASTAL LAND LOSS: HURRICANES AND NEW ORLEANS”, Hurricane Pam Exercise, July 2004,
Center for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes LSU Hurricane Center, Louisiana State University, Ivor
L. van Heerden,
67
“New Orleans' growing danger”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 8, 2005, Paul Nussbaum
165
Current Efforts to Curtail Wetland Loss
The criticality of wetlands to the vitality of the Louisiana coast and the nation, while, at
times at odds with development and the creation of navigable waterways in the Mississippi delta
has not been completely forgotten. Recognizing the importance of wetlands as a buffer
following hurricane Betsy in 196568, the creation of the Coastal Wetland Planning, Protection
and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) took place. Over the last 40 years, there have been at least 467
projects initiated to restore and protect the wetlands. Projects have included Freshwater
Diversion, Sediment Diversion, Dedicated Dredging, Salinity Control, Structure Modification,
Hydrologic Modification, Land Acquisition, and Barrier-shoreline Restoration.69 Sediment
diversion uses pumps and pipelines to replace open water with solid ground. Preventing further
development on these newly created land masses should be carefully considered as, if not
planned effectively, their creation could lead to more development in the very areas they were
trying to protect. Despite current and past efforts to curtail the loss of the wetlands, only 28% of
the loss is being addressed according to a Corps project manager for the Louisiana Coastal Area
(LCA) Study. 70
Timeline of the Civil Engineering Works on the Mississippi River Coastal Area
Pre 1900’s
French pioneers founded New Orleans in 1718 and one of their early engineering projects
was building a 3-foot-high, mile-long earthen levee to protect New Orleans from the Mississippi
River during flooding. The following highlights some of the major events and the efforts taken
to control the Mississippi River during the 20th Century:
•
•
•
•
•
•
1727: a colonial governor declared that New Orleans was nearly flood-proof.
1837: the Army Corps of Engineers began work on the excavation of a navigation
channel around the Des Moines rapids.
Mid 1800’s: levee boards were established and charged with the responsibility for floodfighting. Their authority included the power to collect taxes and draft slaves.
1879: Congress created the Mississippi River Commission and assigned the Army Corps
to control the Commission.
1880: the Army Corps of Engineers constructed several dams to maintain channel depth.
The Mississippi River had significant floods in 1884, 1890, 1891, 1897, 1898, 1912, and
1913.
68
“The Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment Hearing on Louisiana Coastal Area – Addressing
Decades of Coastal Erosion”, July 15, 2004, http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/07-15-04/07-1504memo.html
69
“Louisiana Coastal Authority Comprehensive Coast-wide Ecosystem Restoration Study” PowerPoint presentation,
US Army Corps of Engineers / Louisiana Department of Natural Resources,
http://www.lca.gov/products/pres/orig/lca_may03.ppt#477,25,Phase III Develop and Evaluate Measures
70
“New Orleans' growing danger”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 8, 2005, Paul Nussbaum
166
1900’s – August 2005
In 1917, the Army Corps of Engineers facilitated the final implementation of a levee’s
only policy to control the Mississippi River and prevent future flooding; the river flooded again
in 1922. In 1927, the Army Corps of Engineers having constructed levees stretching from Cairo,
Illinois to New Orleans publicly declared that the levee system along the Mississippi would
prevent future floods. Again, in 1927, the Great Mississippi Flood occurred killing 250 - 1,000
people and caused damages in excess of $347,000,000. Following the 1927 flood, Congress
established the 1928 Flood Act, expanded the Army Corps of Engineers' authority and began
implementation building higher levees, reservoirs, and spillways.
1928 Flood Act
It is argued that the 1928 Flood Act was the impetus which has caused the significant
deterioration of the coastal areas marshes. It is theorized that because of the extensive levee’s
policy and subsequent engineering projects focused on flood prevention, the Mississippi River
no longer erodes its banks carrying silt to the delta, and thus is no longer naturally builds the
coastal marshes through the deltaic process. Due to the dysfunction of the deltaic process, New
Orleans began to sink and continues to sink.
1950’s Protection Plan for New Orleans
In the 1950’s Congress directed the Corps to devise flood protection and navigation plans
for New Orleans. This included the Lake Pontchartrain project and digging the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet, a shortcut from the Gulf of Mexico to the Port of New Orleans. Critics in St.
Bernard Parish denounced the Gulf Outlet declaring it would direct a storm surge directly at the
city. In 1956, the Gulf Outlet Project was approved by Congress, and in 1965, the Lake
Pontchartrain’s project was approved.
Hurricane Betsy
In 1965, Hurricane Betsy, a Category 4 storm, struck New Orleans killing in excess of 70
people and caused damages exceeding $1 billion. In 1965, Congress passed the Flood Control
Act of 1965 authorizing the first federal hurricane protection for the New Orleans area.
“Congress ordered the Corps to recommend a project to protect New Orleans that would provide
the most economic benefits, regardless of who received them. In addition, the distribution of
those benefits would not be considered nor the value of the wetlands or the projects that could
destroy them.”71 The Corps, using data from 42 previous hurricanes, which topped out at
Category 3, concluded that to build protective measures to withstand storms greater than
Category 3 were cost prohibitive. The Corps settled on a 200-year protection plan from storms.
The plan incorporated building levees and two huge flood gates designed to keep storm surges
out of lake. The economic rationale was that by reclaiming wetlands at the city’s outskirts and
extending the levees beyond New Orleans, to “hasten urbanization and industrialization of
71
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
167
valuable marsh and swampland.”72 In addition, the development of low-lying wetlands was
promoted.
In the 1970’s, Louisiana congressman, Robert Livingston Jr. questioned a Corps colonel
for protecting swamps instead of people. He proclaimed, “Perhaps I am being a bit too
complex,” “It would seem to me that in the hurricane protection to the people and properties is
the paramount importance, the portion you would want to complete first would be those levees
surrounding inhabited areas rather than those around uninhabited areas.” “Would that not be a
priority, sir?’73
1970’s
In the 1970’s Coastal planning efforts began in earnest. During this time, coastal scientist
Sherwood Gagliano first warned that the coast was disappearing and that wetland losses would
intensify storm surges. He declared in speeches, “We’re creating deathtraps.”
In 1977, the Corps abandoned building flood gates because of a law suit and chose
instead to build taller levees. In addition, a federal judge orders the Corps to produce a new
environmental impact statement for the proposed hurricane protection plan. In 1982, the New
Orleans Levee District urged the Corps to “lower its design standards to provide more realistic
hurricane protection. They stated that they could not afford its share of the protection from a 200
year storm, suggesting that a 100 year projections would be fine.74 The Levee Board also
opposed a Corps plan for smaller floodgates at the mouths of three drainage canals stretching
from Lake Pontchartrain into New Orleans, saying they would be too expensive to maintain.
Congress therefore directed the Corps to build taller floodwalls along the canals to keep the
water out. Two of those floodwalls collapsed during Hurricane Katrina.75
1990 Coastal Wetland Planning, Projections and Restoration Act
In 1990 the Coastal Wetland Planning, Projections and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) and
the Breaux Act were passed, providing up to $50 million a year for coastal restoration projects.
However, the wetlands were still eroding much faster than they could be rebuilt.
In 1995 Rep. W.J. Tauzin (R-La) sponsored measures that allowed landowners to dredge
and fill wetlands on their properties. “A Clinton appointee, Michael Davis overseeing the Corps,
told Tauzin that the ragged marshes along the shore helped protect the coast from hurricanes, but
Tauzin lectured him about the administrations misplaced sympathy for wetlands.”76
72
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
73
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
74
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
75
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
76
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
168
After extensive studies and construction of a number of coastal restoration projects under
the CWPPRA, in 1997, the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana was formed which lead to the
COAST 2050 Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana report (COAST 2050). The COAST
2050 proposed ecosystem restoration strategies that would result in efforts larger in scale than
any that had been implemented previously.
As a result of all the efforts addressing New Orleans vulnerability and the potential
calamity of political and engineering errors, Weatherwise magazine dubbed New Orleans, “The
Death Valley of the Gulf Coast.” Ed Steinberg wrote in his 2000 book, “Acts of God”, would
“turn New Orleans into a huge lake 20 feet deep.” Articles in Scientific American and the New
Orleans Times-Picayune forecasted the potential devastation if a category 4 or 5 hurricane struck
New Orleans.77
Louisiana Coastal Area Plan
The Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) Plan was developed as the result of the maturation of
multiple coastal restoration projects and studies dating back to the 1990 passage of the Coastal
Wetland Planning, Projections and Restoration Act (CWPPRA). To understand the LCA Plan in
its current form, it is important to understand some of the basic building blocks and most notably
the Coast 2050 Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana Report (COAST 2050) published in
1998. The COAST 2050 formed the basis for the broader-scale LCA Plan.
COAST 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana
In 1997, the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana formed in an effort to bring together
all previous efforts, initiatives from private citizens, local governments, Sate and Federal
agency’s and the scientific community to unit and work together to formulate a plan for the next
50 years. Their unity was formed in an effort to “sustain a coastal ecosystem that supports and
protects the environment, economy, and culture of Southern Louisiana, and that contributes
greatly to the economy and well-being of the nation.”78 The plan was based on the following
objectives:
1) To sustain a coastal ecosystem with the essential functions and values of the natural
ecosystem.
2) To restore the ecosystem to the highest practicable acreage of productive and diverse
wetlands
3) To accomplish this restoration through an integrated program that has multiple use
benefits; benefits not solely for wetlands, but for all the communities and resources of
the coast.”
77
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
78
“Coast 2050: Towards a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana”, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Baton
Rouge, La. 1998;
169
Thus, the COAST 2050 (Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana) plan was developed.
The strategies set forth in the plan constitute the “world’s most ambitious program of
ecosystem restoration. The plan was to encompass monitoring the ecosystem, spatially and
temporally linked coast wide data for attributes such as water levels, currents, salinities and
suspended sediments, to aid in planning and fully assesses the rate of progress toward the goal of
a sustainable coast.” 79
COAST 2050 Plan
The plan identifies four essential building blocks for successful restoration:
1. Commitment: Commitment by the public the public to support a large-scale restoration
project. This will include the State of Louisiana to show its legislative and fiscal
commitment to ecosystem sustainability.
2. Knowledge: The State and Federal Government partners must support programs to
increase the knowledge base, predictive tools, and make the technological advances
necessary.
3. Process: Planning and implementation process that has extensive public involvement and
effective incorporation of public values. The process must integrate the restoration
program into the entire fabric of coastal activities.
4. Resources: Large increases in resources directed at the coastal restoration. Without such
funding, the coast will be lost.
Success of the COAST 2050 Plan will be measured by the “quantity, diversity, and
quality of wetland acreage, and the resulting benefits from various services to Louisiana and the
nation.” “The benefits include protection against storms and floods, production of fisheries and
wildlife resources, protection of water supply and wastewater assimilation capacity, and support
to GIS-based information regarding the current status of our coastal systems, especially the
bathymetry of water bodies and topography of marshes and swamps, and the current ever
changing, land-water configuration of our coast, and GIS-based information regarding
infrastructure so that landscape restoration planners can readily determine the location of oil and
gas pipelines, roads, levees etc.”80 It is important to note that benefits would be “protection
against storms and floods”, however, there is no mention of hurricanes or to the degree to which
the protection would exist.
79
“Coast 2050: Towards a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana”, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Baton
Rouge, La. 1998;
80
“Coast 2050: Towards a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana”, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Baton
Rouge, La. 1998;
170
COAST 2050 Restoration Strategies
COAST 2050 was published in 1998 and included 77 “restoration strategies” spanning
over 50 years. The strategies would be distributed along the entire length of the Louisiana’s
coastal area. Many of the strategies were construction projects and it was anticipated that as a
result of the strategies, if fully implemented, would protect or restore almost 450,000 acres of the
wetlands.81 COAST 2050 was projected to cost $14 billion and the financial responsibility was
identified as follows:
Project
Construction Features
Dredged Material for Use
Studies
Land Easements
Maintenance & Repair
COAST 2050: Cost Responsibility
Federal Responsibility
65%
75%
50%
zero
zero
State Responsibility
35%
25%
50%
100%
100%
“To date, the U.S. Congress has not considered legislation authorizing the COAST 2050
Plan.” Therefore, the Corps and the state of Louisiana developed a set of ten proposals and
completed a revised draft in 2003. The cost for implementation was $4.3 billion to $14.7
billion.83 However, that plan was never published. “Instead, the Bush Administration through
the Office of Management and Budget directed the Corps to come up with a less costly
proposal.”84
82
LCA Plan-Today
“Early in fiscal year 2002, it was recognized that it would be more efficient to develop a
comprehensive coastal restoration effort that could be submitted to Congress as a blue print for
future restoration efforts.”85 The LCA Plan was “created to develop a systematic approach
involving larger projects, working in concert with smaller projects to restore natural geomorphic
structures and processes of the Louisiana Coastal Area. The plan maximizes the use of
restoration strategies that reintroduce historic flows of river water, nutrients, and sediment to
coastal wetlands, and that maintain the structural integrity of the coastal ecosystem.”86
81
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystems Study, Final Report. New Orleans,
November, 2004.
82
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22276” Updated September 26, 2005.
Jeffery Zinn.
83
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22276” Updated September 26, 2005.
Jeffery Zinn.
84
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22276” Updated September 26, 2005.
Jeffery Zinn; http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/
85
Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystems Study, Final Report. New Orleans, November, 2004.
86
Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystems Study, Final Report. New Orleans, November, 2004.
171
The Plan consists of two major feasibility studies to develop the restoration strategies:
1. “The Comprehensive Coast-wide Ecosystem Restoration Study which will develop
projects from regional strategies across the coast and prepare a programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement.
2. Barataria Basin Study which will develop projects for marsh creation and barrier
shoreline restoration to feasibility level, and develop a basin-wide hydrologic and
hydrodynamic model.”87
The goal of the LCA Plan is to “reverse the current trend in degradation of the coastal
ecosystem.” It emphasizes “the use of the restoration strategies that: reintroduce historical flows
of river water, nutrients, and sediment to coastal wetlands; restore coastal hydrology to minimize
saltwater intrusion; and maintain the structural integrity of the coastal ecosystem.” 88 It is hoped
that execution of the LCA Plan “would make significant progress towards achieving and
sustaining a coastal ecosystem that can support and protect the environment, economy, and
culture of southern Louisiana and contribute to the economy and well being of the Nation.”89
The anticipated benefits taken into consideration when developing the plan were
navigation, hurricane protection, flood control, land transportation works, agricultural lands, and
oil and gas production and distribution facilities. It is important to understand that the “The
LCA Plan presents significant capacity for the preventions of future wetland loss with a smaller
component of wetland building capacity.”90
LCA Funding 2005
The current plan as considered by the 109th U.S. Congress under provisions S.728 and
H.R.2864 would authorize “numerous activities to slow the rate of coastal wetlands loss in
Louisiana over the next decade.”91 These two bills if approved would provide:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
$1.1 billion for five “near-term feature” projects
Monitoring program performance
Demonstration projects ($25 million per project)
Exploring options to use dredged material to create wetlands
Continued planning for ten additional projects to be authorized at a future date
87
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22276” Updated September 26, 2005.
Jeffery Zinn; http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/
88
“Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Study, November 2004, Final Volume 1, LCA Study – Main
Report.”
89
“Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Study, November 2004, Final Volume 1, LCA Study – Main
Report.”
90
“Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Study, November 2004, Final Volume 1, LCA Study – Main
Report.”
91
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22276” Updated September 26, 2005.
Jeffery Zinn; http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/
172
6) Additional funding to study six less well defined programs termed “large-scale, long term
coastal restoration concepts.”92
The House of Representatives passed their version on July 25, 2005 authorizing $1.218 billion.
“The Senate’s version does not specify an amount, but does state “substantially in accordance
with” the report from the Corps”93
The Measures of Success for the LCA Plan include the short term goal of “implementing
a large number of strategic restoration projects and operated efficiently”.94 The long term goals
are maintained as the benefits highlighted above in the COAST 2050 report.
Politics and Money
Wherever the Army Corps of Engineers are, there have been politics and money. Since
the 1800’s when the Army Corps of Engineers began dredging the Mississippi River, dollars
have been allocated to fund such projects. As the projects grew in scale and cost, so has the
political inertia to secure the federal funding for larger and grander projects. “Louisiana’s
politicians have been the undisputed champions of the Corps funding game; the second-place
state, California has eight times as many people.” Retired Gen. Elvin R. Heiberg recalled that
when he commanded the Corps district in New Orleans, House Armed Services Chairman F.
Edward Hebert (D-La) promised him he would always get whatever resources he needed. “He
kept his word.” In 1976, investigators reviewing the Lake Pontchartrain project noted that the
district never lacked money: “To the contrary, the Corps has not been able to use all monies
allocated.”95
Politically attractive projects were the thrust behind the political coalitions and energy.
Navigation was the focus and not flood control. The J. Bennett Johnston Waterway was a $2
billion project to subdue the Red River between Mississippi and Shreveport, Louisiana. Five
presidential administrations opposed it, but Johnston pushed it through Congress and in its
current state, it has been an economic “flop”, attracting only a tiny fraction of the barge traffic
that Johnston claim would support such an investment.96
92
“Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Study, November 2004, Final Volume 1, LCA Study – Main
Report.”
93
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22276” Updated September 26, 2005.
Jeffery Zinn; http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/
94
“Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Study, November 2004, Final Volume 1, LCA Study – Main
Report.”
95
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
96
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
173
MRGO
One of the most controversial projects was the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. The Corps
concluded in 2004, that the project was still economically justified. The Bush Administration
felt their study ignored environmental considerations and ordered the Corps to reevaluate it
taking into consideration the environmental impact. The Louisiana State University Hurricane
Center stated that the canal and the funnel it forms near the Industrial Canal may have amplified
Katrina’s storm surge as much as 40 percent.97
Louisiana receives more Corps funding than any other state.98 As the Corps has waged
an unrelenting effort to protect New Orleans from the Mississippi River, the wetlands that helped
protect the city from the sea have been catastrophically neglected.
Even with said warning and projected catastrophic consequences, politics and money
have been Louisiana’s addictive poison rather than sound policy management. Examples of this
are disagreements between the Bush Administration proposing a $22.4 million funding for the
Lake Pontchartrain project and Congress approving $42.5 million. Meanwhile, the Louisiana
delegation tucked a provision into an emergency funding bill for Iraq that ordered the Corps to
restructure its cost-benefit analysis over the Corps conclusions that the cost of a New Iberia port
deepening project was not cost feasible.99 This simply illustrates the lack of commitment and
focus on the national, state and local levels. Until the Administration, Congress, Louisiana’s
political leaders and communities come together on the identification of the problem and
establish a well defined set of goals, solutions, and methods to pay for the wetlands
reconstruction, politics and money will continue to be a poison rather than a solution.
Katrina
Storm Surge and the Wetlands
Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana coast on August 29, 2005 at the town of Burras.100
When Katrina hit Burras, it was rated as a Category 4 storm, yet it maintained a storm surge
generally found in Category 5 storms. 101 This is an important point as the majority of land
above sea level in the Mississippi delta is located next to the levees guiding the Mississippi River
97
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
98
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
99
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
100
“Katrina Intensifies Into a Powerful Hurricane, Strikes Northern Gulf Coast”, NASA.gov, Editor: Lynn Jenner
NASA Official: Brian Dunbar, Last Updated: August 30, 2005,
http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/lookingatearth/katrina_trmm_0828_0829.html
101
“Storm surge the fatal blow for New Orleans”, CNN.com, Peggy Mihelich, September 7, 2005,
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/01/orleans.levees/
174
to the Gulf of Mexico (Figure 1).102 In the last decade, the Corps could not guarantee that the
current protection of New Orleans could withstand a Category 3 storm because “continuing land
loss and settlement of land in the project area may have impacted the ability of the project to
withstand the design storm.”103
From the coastal side, there was a significant barrier system buffering component that
provided a degree of protection for the shore and metropolitan areas, as illustrated in Figure 2.
An essential component in protecting the coastal areas was the condition “sponge effect.”104 The
sponge effect properties show that for every 4 miles of wetlands, a storm surge is reduced by 1
foot. The problem lies in the fact that when a hurricane such as Katrina with a storm surge above
Category 3 level strikes, the wave surge overwhelms the barrier system rendering the surge
effect ”ineffective in even partially mitigating the inshore surge and wave field”.105 Despite the
presence of wetlands, waterways such as the MRGO and other large bodies of water such as
Lake Pontchartrain, all were subject to the forces of high winds pushing water and storm surge
affecting the large metropolis of New Orleans, some 40 miles inland. The lake, which normally
is 1 foot above sea level, peaked at 8.6 feet above sea level106.
Effect of Katrina on the Wetlands
Preliminary evidence suggests that Katrina inflicted severe damage on the wetlands of the
Louisiana coast and, in particular, the Mississippi River Delta area. This is not surprising, given
evidence by Stone from the LSU Coastal Studies Institute. Stone has done studies using data
from instrumentation distributed throughout the Louisiana Coast known as the Wave-CurrentSurge-Information-System (WAVCIS). He has shown, empirically, that the destructive impact of
hurricane storm surges is not lessened by wetlands in the presence of anything beyond a
Category 3 storm. Post Katrina opinion is leaning toward the same conclusion: “though robust
marshes may dampen the effects of minor storms, for a storm like Katrina "our unanimous
feeling was no, it would not have made any difference," said one member, Joseph Kelley, a
coastal scientist at the University of Maine.”107 Considering the fact that category 4 and 5 storms
do hit the Louisiana coast, does the cost-benefit ratio warrant a significant investment to restore
the wetlands?
102
“The Scourge of Surge”, Hurricane Center - US Army Corps of Engineers, NOAA, no date listed,
http://www.nola.com/hurricane/images/scourgeofsurge.pdf#search=%27Storm%20Surge%20AND%20Louisiana%
27s%20Coastal%20Wetlands%27
103
“The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By Michael Grunwald and Susan
B. Glasser.
104
“The Scourge of Surge”, Hurricane Center - US Army Corps of Engineers, NOAA, no date listed,
http://www.nola.com/hurricane/images/scourgeofsurge.pdf#search=%27Storm%20Surge%20AND%20Louisiana%
27s%20Coastal%20Wetlands%27
105
“Coastal Land Loss and Wave-Surge Predictions During Hurricanes in Coastal Louisiana: Implications for the
Oil and Gas Industry”, LSU Coastal Studies Institute, Dr. Greg W. Stone, Feb. 14, 2003, p. 12,
http://camille.csi.lsu.edu/cml2/archivedreports/dnr%20hurricane%20project_final.pdf
106
“Storm surge the fatal blow for New Orleans”, CNN.com, Peggy Mihelich, September 7, 2005,
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/01/orleans.levees/
107
“Hard Choices Seen in Efforts to Help Louisiana Wetlands”, Cornelia Dean, November 10, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/10/national/nationalspecial/10marsh.html
175
Figure 1 – Showing the extent of the wetlands and the leveeing of the Mississippi
176
Figure 2 – Distance from the beginning of the wetlands to the outskirts of New Orleans
177
Conclusion
The Louisiana coast is one of the most unique, diverse and complex ecological areas in
the world. It is because of these characteristics, that it is also one of the most valuable economic
centers in our nation as illustrated by its contribution in petroleum, shipping, and its fishing
industry. Historically, the region and nation have focused on controlling the Mississippi River’s
navigation capabilities and flood control, and the extraction of petroleum from the region. This
was done at the sacrifice of the wetlands. It has only been over the last several decades that
scientists, the business community, and the political leaders have come together to understand
the historical devastation which has occurred to the wetlands and region. With that said, there is
still a lack of focus and continuity among the vested parties on how to address the damage that
has occurred and how best to prevent future damage.
The wetlands play a critical role as a barrier to protect Louisiana’s coast from storms
through the sponge effect. In Category 3 storms or lower, wetlands diminish storm surge, wave
height and wave energy providing a barrier of immeasurable value. With the loss of more than
600,000 acres of wetlands over the last century, New Orleans continued sinking, the rise in sea
level, poor infrastructure maintenance (maintaining the levees), and a large human population
along the coast, it should have been easy to identify the region’s vulnerability.
The LCA Plan which incorporates COAST 2050 is a vital step towards unifying the
region and the vested parties towards a common goal as noted above. However, it is important
to note that the Plan’s goal is not to rebuild the wetlands, but to merely slow down the
devastation of the wetlands. Scientists are not sure what, if any, conglomerate affects might be
from the past projects and the “near-term feature” projects. The Plan as it is today may, in fact,
have only a localized effect on areas under restoration.
As a result of Hurricane Katrina, there is a focus to understand what impact the LCA Plan
would have, if it was fully implemented prior to the storm? Our research shows that the LCA
Plan is not designed to stop hurricanes. Storm mitigation is a minor benefit of the plan, not a
goal. The five “near term” projects under the LCA plan do not have provisions included to
buildup or maintain the levees around New Orleans. Our conclusion is that the LCA Plan would
not have stopped New Orleans from flooding. At best, through the sponge effect, damage along
the coast might have been minimized depending on the condition of the wetlands.
With the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina and the public outcry and focus on the
region, we suggest that the LCA Plan incorporate the acknowledgement that there is an inherent
risk associated with development in and around natural disaster prone areas. With this
recognition, the Plan should include the issue of human migration towards the disaster prone
areas and take steps to ensure that any success of the program not be compromised by human
encroachment.
178
References
1. “The Slow Drowning of New Orleans”, The Washington Post, October 9, 2005, By
Michael Grunwald and Susan B. Glasser.
2. Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana; http://www.crcl.org/
3. US Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem
Restoration Project; http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/
4. “Louisiana Coastal Wetlands: A Resource At Risk” U.S. Geological Survey Marine and
Coastal Geology Program; http://marine.usgs.gov/factsheets/LAwetlands/lawetlands.html
5. The Louisiana Coastal Long-Term Goals;
http://www.lca.gov/products/pres/orig/lca_public_mtg_aug03.ppt#744,2,The LCA LongTerm Goals
6. American Society of Civil Engineers;
http://www.asce.org/pressroom/news/grwk/event_release.cfm?uid=2688, April 1, 2005
7. http://hurricane.lsu.edu/_in_the_news/phillyinquirer100804.htm, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Oct. 4, 2004
8. http://www.americaswetland.com/article.cfm?id=280&cateid=3&pageid=3&cid=18,
America’s Wetland, article discussing funding and details of restoration
9. http://www.factcheck.org/article344.html, Factcheck.org, Sept. 2, 2005, “Is Bush to
Blame for New Orleans Flooding?”,
10. George Haddow, adjunct professor, GWU, Institute for Disaster and Crisis Management,
conversation Oct. 24, 2005
11. John Pine, professor, LSU Department of Geography and Anthropology, conversation
Oct. 25, 2005
12. Hillary Stockdon, Oceanographer, USGS Center for Coastal and Watershed Studies,
conversation Oct. 25, 2005
13. Gregory Stone, professor, LSU Coastal Studies Institute and Earth Scan Laboratory
14. “Coastal Land Loss and Wave-Surge Predictions During Hurricanes in Coastal
Louisiana: Implications for the Oil and Gas Industry”, LSU Coastal Studies Institute, Dr.
Greg W. Stone, Feb. 14, 2003,
http://camille.csi.lsu.edu/cml2/archivedreports/dnr%20hurricane%20project_final.pdf
15. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22276”
Updated September 26, 2005. Jeffery Zinn; http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/
16. “Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Study”, November 2004, Final Volume
1, LCA Study – Main Report, http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/lca/factsheet.asp
17. “Coast 2050: Towards a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana”, Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources, Baton Rouge, La. 1998; http://www.coast2050.gov/
18. “Holding Back the Sea”, Harper Collins Publishers Inc. Copyright 2001, by Christopher
Hallowell
19. American Society of Civil Engineering,
http://www.asce.org/pressroom/news/grwk/event_release.cfm?uid=2688
20. Coast 2050, One Voice, One Mission; http://www.coast2050.gov/
21. “Disappearing Delta Overview”, PBS, Science Now, Sept. 9, 2005,
http://www.pbs.org/now/science/neworleans.html
22. http://www.americaswetland.com/article.cfm?id=314&cateid=3&pageid=3&cid=18
179
180
Urban Flood Protection System of New Orleans
Patrick Lynch, Grant Schneemann and Bassit Solomon
From the beginning, New Orleans has been a city wed to both river and ocean; an almost
natural dock for the transshipment of goods. All cities' destinies are largely determined by
geography and geology, but New Orleans more so than most. It would, in fact, be impossible to
understand New Orleans’ urban flood protective measures without some knowledge of its unique
geography and location.
Geography of New Orleans
Pierce Lewis, a noted New Orleans historian, describes it as the "inevitable city on an
impossible site." His reasons for saying so were as obvious to early explorers as to modern
geographers and geologists. Looking at a map of North America, the continents interior is
drained by a single river system--the Mississippi. From the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico,
from the Rockies to the Appalachians, the Mississippi with its vast network of tributaries,
particularly the Ohio and Missouri Rivers, provides a natural waterway system for moving
people and goods across the mid-continent of North America and down the Mississippi to its
outlet on the Gulf.i
The Mississippi's present riverbed at New Orleans is approximately 1,000 years old.
When the river retreated to its present course, it left behind a series of small bayous. These were
called Metairie, St. John, and Gentilly Bayous by the early French explorers. Though Metairie
and Gentilly Bayous have long since silted up and disappeared, the natural levee along the old
river's bed remained, creating a causeway through the murky swamp known as the Metairie
Ridge and the Gentilly Ridge. Indians, and later Europeans, used these ridges as a portage
through the swamp. Today, the Metairie Ridge and Gentilly Ridge can still be located on a street
map of the modern city and are labeled as "Metairie Road" and "Gentilly Boulevard," see Figure
1.ii
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Figure 1 - Elevation Map of New Orleans2
Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Maurepas were created approximately 5000 years ago, at
the end of the last Ice Age. As the sea level rose, the Gulf of Mexico overflowed into this bowl
of swampy land. Today, Lake Maurepas empties into Lake Pontchartrain through Pass Manchac,
which in turn empties into the Gulf through a narrow and shallow channel called the Rigolets
(Rig-a-lees). Lake Pontchartrain's surface is normally about 2 feet above sea level. Like the river,
it is normally kept out of the city by a natural levee that has been built up around its banks.
The streets, homes, and businesses of the city occupy the land between the lake and the
river. The river is about 11 feet above the sea level and the lake is about 2 feet above sea level.
The land immediately bordering the banks of both the river and the lake are naturally only mere
feet above the water's surface. From there, it sinks almost imperceptibly to a depth of about 10
feet below sea level in some places (Figure 2). This means that the city lies below its
surrounding waters like a bowl.
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Figure 2 - Cross Section Map of New Orleans2
In the latter part of the 19th century, and into the 20th, New Orleanians began a concerted
project to drain the Isle of Orleans of its shallow swamp. All of the high land along the river's
bank had long since been claimed and developed, but of course more was needed. In order to
reclaim the swamp, a series of canals and pumping stations were built. The pumping stations
were able to drain hundreds of square miles of swampland, pumping the excess water into Lake
Pontchartrain to the north of the city and into the swamps and bayous to the south, thus leaving
behind a dry, yet still spongy prairie upon which the city could sprawl. No canals are needed to
drain the land close to the river's banks, since the river has built up this land to an elevation of
about 11 feet above sea level. As water flows down, the canals drain into the Lake and bayous
surrounding the city instead of into the River itself. The few canals that do empty into the River
are connected to it in order to allow barge traffic to pass through them.2
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in New Orleans
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (ACOE) involvement in New Orleans dates back to
1803, when an Army engineer was sent to the newly acquired city to study its defenses. The
Corps' early work in the area was of a military nature, but soon expanded to include navigation
and flood control.3
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been involved in the control of the Mississippi
River and in particular the lower Mississippi River, in the New Orleans area, for the last 202
years. The flood control in the New Orleans area of the lower Mississippi is in complete control
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The New Orleans District covers the entire southern half
of the state of Louisiana. There are over 2,800 miles of water way that the Corps of EngineersNew Orleans District is in charge of maintaining.iii
Mississippi River and Tributaries Project
The Lower Mississippi River flood in 1927 was one of the worst floods to occur, and the
reason for much of the laws and regulations in place for the control of the Mississippi River
today. The flood covered an area of over 26,000 square miles, and took the lives of over 500
people. Over 700,000 people were forced to evacuate their homes and hope for the best. At the
time of the flood, the only man made structures controlling the flow of the Mississippi River
were levees. When the flood came, the water pressure created cracks in thirteen of the "main
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Mississippi River levees." This instance proved that no matter how strong a levee, there needs to
be more safe guards in place to control the Mississippi River. From the floods of 1927 came the
Mississippi River and Tributaries (MR&T) Project. This was the first "comprehensive flood
control and navigation act" the United States adopted.iv
Most of the New Orleans District's flood control work falls under the Mississippi River
and Tributaries Project, a flood control plan consisting of four elements:3
1. Levees - to contain flood waters;
2. Floodways - that provide an outlet for excess flood water;
3. Channel improvement and stabilization - to improve a river's flood carrying capacity; and
4. Tributary improvement - This includes reservoirs, pumping stations and control structures.
Hurricane Betsy
Hurricane Betsy was a fast moving storm (22 mph forward speed) that made landfall at
Grand Isle, LA on September 10, 1965. Grand Isle experienced 160 mph gusts and a 4.8 m (15.7
ft) storm surge that flooded the entire island. Winds gusted to 125 mph in New Orleans with a
9.8 ft storm surge that caused the worst flooding in decades to the city. Loss of life from Betsy
was a total of 81 persons, with 58 in the state of Louisiana. Damage in Southeast Louisiana
totaled $1.4 billion.
As a result, Congress decided to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to upgrade the
flood control system that now includes more than 520 miles of levees, 270 floodgates, 92
pumping stations, and thousands of miles of drainage canals. Also, the New Orleans Levee
Board decided to raise the existing levee to a height of 12 ft in response to the flooding caused
by Betsy — a project the Corps of Engineers is still attempting to complete today. Of course,
this level of protection was based on the science of storm prediction, as it existed in the 1960s.v
Back then, experts worried that even a less severe storm could flood the city. In the 40
years since the design criteria were established for New Orleans’s hurricane protection levees,
southeastern Louisiana’s coastline has been subsiding—settling in on top of itself—even as the
natural height of the sea rises. A century ago any hurricane heading toward New Orleans would
have had to traverse a 50 mi (80 km) buffer of marshland. Today that marsh area is only half as
broad and the hurricane would be striking a city that itself sinks lower every day.vi
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina was the first Category 5 hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane
season. It first made landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north of Miami, Florida on August
25, 2005, then again on August 29, 2005 along the Central Gulf Coast near Buras-Triumph,
Louisiana as a Category 4 storm, see Figure 3. Its storm surge soon breached the levee system
that protected New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River. Most of the city
was subsequently flooded, mainly by water from the lake. This and other major damage to the
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coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama made Katrina the most destructive and
costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States.vii
Figure 3 - Satellite Photo of Hurricane Katrina (Photo by NOAA)
Failure of the Flood Control System
In approximately 15 hours on August 29, three massive concrete floodwalls in separate
parts of the city fractured and burst under the weight of surging waters from Hurricane Katrina.
The breaks on the walls lining 17th street, London Avenue canals, and along the industrial canal
were the ones that gave way. Normally, the 17th street and London Avenue canals carry runoff
pumped out of the city into the lake.viii
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Figure 4 - Before & After Picture of the 17th Street Canal10
Figure 5 - Before & After Picture of the London Avenue Canal10
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Figure 6 - Picture of the Industrial Canal10
Potential Causes of the Levees’ Failures
There are still investigations currently underway to determine why the levees failed as
they did. Experts believe that Hurricane Katrina was no stronger than a Category 3 storm when
it passed nearby New Orleans, and Congress had directed the Army Corps of Engineers to
protect the city from just such a storm. Preliminary findings, based on physical evidence, ACOE
documents, and hydrodynamic models run through a Louisiana State University supercomputer
suggest that the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, known locally as MRGO or “Mr. Go” helped to
contribute to the demise of the levees.8
MRGO was a 76 mile-long, 36 foot deep canal created as a navigation shortcut to the
Port of New Orleans built in 1965 by the ACOE. The preliminary analysis conducted so far
showed that the outlet’s “funnel” intensified the initial surge by 20%, raising the wall of water
about 3 feet. But it also increased the velocity of the surge, which potentially contributed to the
scouring that undermined the levees and floodwalls along the outlet and Industrial Canal.
In the case of the 17th Street and London Avenue canals, investigators saw truck-size
chunks of earthen levees that were heaved 35 feet from where they were supposed to be. They
believe the floodwalls themselves were the problem in these two areas. The reason is the natural
soft soil made up of river silts and swampy peat became saturated and began to shift under the
weight of relatively modest surges from the lake. These levees did not overtop, but they failed
anyway. Also, ACOE engineering manuals caution that flood walls should not exceed 7 feet
because they can lose stability as waters rise. However, some of the New Orleans canal walls
rose as high as 11 feet above the dirt-berms, in which they were anchored.8, ix
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Recommendations
With the obvious result of New Orleans flooding, there are a host of possible conclusions
and recommendation to make. First, we believe a very thorough investigation from various
parties understanding the failures of the current flood protection system has to be understood so
sound recommendations of how to protect the city in the future can be made.
Secondly, with the Mississippi River flood that occurred in 1927, it was known then that
the levee type flood protection system has its limits in what it can do. As it applies to New
Orleans, we believe a more modern type of flood protection system needs to be implemented that
will last as long as the city is there. This will include restoration of the marsh lands to help
prevent future hurricane storm surges, more modern water surge protection like those used in the
Netherlands (i.e. for MRGO in New Orleans), and other flood protection that will lessen the need
to always increase the height of the levee walls as the means to protect the city.
Finally, the ACOE has a tremendous role in being the “responsible party” in charge of
flood control for New Orleans. With having direct involvement for protecting the city from
flooding as long as the ACOE has, the question we have is whether New Orleans is getting the
adequate attention it deserves. Big organizations like the ACOE run into a lot of budgetary,
political, or technological issues that can interrupt projects from being completed. It is our
recommendation that the ACOEs New Orleans District have a decentralized management
structure so they can get the resources they need without their projects being assimilated into
others that the ACOE might be faced with.
Key Factors That Contributed to Ineffective Regional And Urban Flood Protection System
for the New Orleans Area
There were both natural and man-made factors that interplayed to produce the devastating
failure of the regional and urban flood protection system for the New Orleans area at the time of
Hurricane Katrina. In a sense, Hurricane Katrina became a “perfect storm” that succeeded in
exploiting a combination of weakest links in the New Orleans flood control plan to produce the
ruinous consequences suffered by the city and its inhabitants. No one factor can be blamed.
Instead, the interaction of several conditions that had developed over time contributed to a
complacent attitude and a system that is best described as reactionary, inadequate and unable to
meet the needs of the area in which it had been deployed. Reactionary in the sense that
regardless of warnings and past history the flood controls system was constantly in need of repair
and upgrade to keep up with the demands of the city.
Certainly the natural topography of the New Orleans region with the city below the level
of surrounding bodies of water and lying in the path of potentially powerful Gulf storms provides
a highly challenging environment for flood control. But further contributing to the problem was
the failure to recognize the protective effects of surrounding wetlands that were destroyed by the
deployment of flood control structures and commercial canals and waterways. Purely human
factors played a part as well in producing a less than satisfactory system to control and manage
flooding in the region. Overall funding shortfalls forced engineers to compromise upgrades to a
flood control and levee system constantly in need of review. Finally the inevitable bureaucratic
188
wrangling between competing agencies and the politicization of the flood control system resulted
in delay and, at times, inaction that plagued the development and construction of an adequate
flood protection system. Each of these factors will be discussed in an effort to demonstrate why
flood protection systems developed for the New Orleans area have been ineffective.
Geographic Layout and Consistent History of Flooding
Flooding is not new to New Orleans. Since the French explorer Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne
Sieur de Bienville selected the site for New Orleans in 1717, the city has endured the floods from
the Mississippi River and the tidal surges from the Gulf of Mexico.x In the short history of New
Orleans, the city has experienced significant flooding in 75 of the past 288 years. (Flood data
has been tracked since 1717.) From 1717-1927 a flood was experienced every 5.8 years. When
you examine more recent history, data shows that between the years 1801-1927 a flood occurred,
on average, every 2.6 years. Since 1927 there have been 16 major flood events in the region.xi
The potential for flooding stems not only from the Mississippi River but also from tidal
surges that accompany Gulf storms, and is often caused by less dramatically by precipitation.
Over the last four centuries -, 172 hurricanes have struck the Louisiana Coast, 38 have threatened
New Orleans by sending the waters of Lake Ponchartrain over the flood protection system.xii
Taking a four-century long view, the instances of hurricanes or floods affecting New Orleans
occur quite frequently – every 1.8 years. This data illustrates the fact that flooding and flood
control have been a constant source of concern for those living in South East Louisiana and the
Mississippi River Delta since the area has been inhabited.
Besides the storm potential, flood potential exists in the possibility of a levee failure.
Lake Pontchartrain covers an area of approximately 640 square miles.xiii New Orleans has 350
miles of levees that protect the city from surrounding lakes, the Mississippi River and the
Mississippi Gulf River Outlet. A two-foot rise of water and a levee failure would create an
immense flood problem, which could easily overcome the capacity of the pump systems.
As discussed earlier in this paper, the geographic layout of the region presents one of the
most significant obstacles to establishing effective flood control in the area. The region has
been and will continue to be a prime area for flooding when you consider the fact that at least 45
percent of the metropolitan area is at or below sea level.xiv The bowl shape of the terrain, the
location of the city relative to the elevated waters of Lake Ponchratrain, the fact that the
Mississippi Gulf River Outlet is contained only by a levee, plus its overall proximity to the Gulf
of Mexico all make New Orleans an area with a high potential for flooding. In addition to these
topographic and geographic factors, New Orleans receives an enormous amount of rainfall with
accumulations of 60-70 inches annually, enough to earn its place as one of the wettest cities in
the United States. xv The flood danger is heightened by the fact that there is little high ground
available as a refuge from storm surges and the potential flooding of the Mississippi.xvi
Historically there have been several factors in the current levee system design that
compromised the effectiveness of the flood control system. Most significantly, pre-Katrina
engineering estimates forecast that the current levee system was likely too low to contain the
storm surge from a Category 3 or stronger storm.xvii Even before construction of the levee
project began in the 1960’s it became apparent that due to updated Weather Bureau data on
hurricane severity the three main levees would need to be raised to protect against storm surges
189
from Lake Ponchartrain.xviii The need to raise the levees has been an ongoing issue that has been
discussed throughout the lifecycle of the project. As recently as May 2005, the Army Corps of
Engineers noted to officials in Washington the fact that several of the levees had settled and
needed to be raised.xix A second problem stems from the design of the levees themselves in that
they were designed to handle short term storm events, but were inadequate to accomplishing
longer term water retension.19 Engineering critics have suggested that the current levees were
designed for a fast moving Category 3 storm, xx therefore a slower moving or greater intensity
storm would easily render the levees and floodwalls inadequate. In the case of Katrina, the storm
surge was so significant that it pressured the levees and floodwalls for a time longer than they
were designed to withstand causing their integrity to give way. Thus, the pressures created by
the metropolitan growth of the city made it difficult to utilize land area for levee reinforcement
while simultaneously increasing the amount of low lying area that required protection.
Man vs. Nature Part I: Historically Ineffective Flood Protection Methods Contribute to the
Modern Problem
From the beginning of settlement in the New Orleans area, man has tried to control the
waters of the Mississippi River. The earliest Europeans in the area began to use levees to control
the Mississippi River’s flow, and by doing so subjected themselves to periodic long term
flooding when these levees would fail.xxi The earliest levees were crude structures made with
earthen walls designed to redirect and keep out water.
Historically, the flood control system of the New Orleans area has sought to accomplish
two main objectives: excluding water through a system of levees and removing the water through
an enhanced drainage system. Although over the years the levee systems have changed,
becoming stronger and higher, the basic principles of levee design have remained the same.
Drainage systems have changed from the earthen drainage ditches used in the 1750’s to the
sophisticated pumping stations of today. Yet even with technological advancements, the mission
has remained consistent and focused on removing water from the area. In some ways attacking
the problem by simply providing higher levees and higher capacity pumping stations creates a
spiral that may be setting itself up for failure. If the levee is built higher and it fails, even more
water is visited on the city. If there are sophisticated pumping stations that are being relied on to
remove this increased flood, as opposed to gravitational drainage, a power failure can compound
the disaster.
While the flood protection barriers and drainage systems have been implemented to keep
water away from populated areas, there is evidence that historical flood protection systems
designed to protect New Orleans from flooding actually contributed to the creation of an
environment that is more conducive to flooding. This conclusion is supported by Craig Colton’s
book Unnatural Metropolis. Colton details New Orleans’s undesirable location. He also
observes that from its early settlement, New Orleans and other communities along the
Mississippi River needed protection from the unpredictable surges in water levels that often
occurred, yet, in an effort to protect themselves, these early settlers actually ended up eradicating
protective wetlands which contributed to additional flooding in modern times.
Early levee systems systematically deprived the Louisiana marshes and swamps of the
sediments considered vital to keeping that environment near equilibrium.xxii Wetlands help to
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slow floodwaters and also function as sponges to absorb runoff, thereby providing a tremendous
capacity to act as natural flood control agents.xxiii Historically and in modern times, levee
systems in the New Orleans area, combined with the dredging and channeling of existing
wetlands for commercial marine purposes have contributed to an overall ecological system that
is plagued by continuous erosion. Extensive wetlands loss over the past several decades has
hindered New Orleans’s ability to disperse the water brought by heavy rains, by flow
fluctuations of the Mississippi River, as well as potential storm surges, which often accompany
tropical storms and hurricanes.
Another historical perspective that illustrates the long-term struggle between man and
nature in the New Orleans area comes from noted scholar Donald Davis. Davis describes the
period of 1750-1927, “as the crevasse period in Louisiana’s fluvial history.”xxiv The majority of
flooding during this time period can be attributed to breaks in the faulty levees systems that
controlled the Mississippi River. During this time “the average crevasse splay (failure of a levee
and flooding) encompassed an area of 650 square miles, the largest involved 2,160 while the
smallest was about square 212 miles”.xxv
Man vs. Nature Part II: Urbanization of the New Orleans Region Places Additional Strain
on Flood Protections Systems
As New Orleans grew and the flood plains of the Mississippi River became more
urbanized, demand for dependable flood protections systems increased even as the consequences
of urbanization increased the risks associated with flooding.xxvi Due to the population growth
and the rapid economic development that followed, the New Orleans metropolitan area in 2005
had more people, infrastructure and assets exposed to storm threats.xxvii This modern expansion
led to the need for more space for development, which led to great efforts by the city and the
Army Corps of Engineers to remove additional water from the Isle of Orleans in order to,
literally, pave the way for more development. This increased pace of urbanization fueled the
expansion of flood protection systems that had already demonstrated their inability to
dependably control flooding in the New Orleans area.
Today, the flood protection system of New Orleans consists of pumps and canals to
remove water trapped in the low lying parts of the city, combined with a system of levees and
floodwalls to protect the city from rising water levels.xxviii Even with all of the technology
upgrades and repair projects that have been completed since 1965, the potential for flooding
remains just as significant a risk as before modern systems were implemented. Whether the risk
can be attributed to rising sea levels, degradation of the surrounding wetlands, or faulty design of
the entire levee/ pump/ canal system, it is clear that flooding will continue to be a costly problem
for the area. While there has not been a significant increase in the natural occurrence of flood
related conditions in Southern Louisiana, the fact that urban New Orleans has expanded into
areas that pose an extremely high risk for flooding has greatly increased the potential impact of
any flooding that actually occurs.
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Man vs. Nature Part III: Flood Protection Issues Compete For Attention Among Crowded
Political Agendas
The third aspect of the “man vs. nature” component is the attitude towards flooding that
has been prevalent in the New Orleans area. An attitude of complacency is the product of
perhaps an “it won’t happen here” mind set combined with an unjustified faith that high tech
solutions have minimized the potential damage that flooding can cause to the area. While all do
not share the attitude, it has affected decision making that has allowed the increased development
of the New Orleans metropolitan area without commensurate increases in the reliability of flood
protection systems.
There is a pervasive perception in modern life that technology can overcome all and
make the world a safer place. While the marvelous effects of technology have improved the
quality of life in many areas of society, the reality is that as confident and knowledgeable as we
are as a people, there are forces of nature we cannot control. A neighborhood leveled by a
tornado or a freeway collapsed by an earthquake may stimulate more stringent building codes,
but there remains the possibility of an even more powerful storm or a more violent upheaval.
And recently the world has been shocked by South East Asian tsunami disaster as to which the
only solution is not prevention, but an improved warning system.
One example where nature decidedly prevailed over man’s efforts at protection was the
Galveston, Texas Hurricane of 1906. With the establishment of the U.S Weather Bureau and its
numerous tracking stations, one newspaper editorialist in 1900 called weather prediction "a
complete science“.xxix Man thought he had contained the power of storms by countering with
the power to predict their existence. Yet, the nature of storms within the Gulf of Mexico was
misunderstood. In the early 1900’s, the chief meteorologist for the Galveston region, Issac Cline,
had assumed it to be "an absurd delusion,” that any hurricane posed a serious danger to the
burgeoning city. This false sense of security was shattered when the 1906 Hurricane decimated
the area killing thousands. Cline had thought that the unique shape of the Gulf and the gentle
slope of the seashore would protect Galveston from major damage due to a storm. Others had
relied on Cline’s research only to be proven terribly wrong by nature.
Many parallels can be seen in the mentalities of Galveston residents prior to 1906, and
New Orleans residents prior to the major storms in modern history. Blind faith in technology is
the most apparent. In both communities residents believed that science and technology had
exhibited a killing blow to nature’s power over man, by building better roads and stronger
bridges, and developing advanced warning systems which eliminated Mother Nature’s lethal
element of surprise.xxx Instead, the detriment of these potentially life saving innovations was that
they created a false sense of security that led residents to believe that even if shore and suburban
areas were exposed to the waves surging in the gulf, they would still be protected.xxxi
Even public officials exuded confidence in the systems. “We have spent hundreds of
millions of dollars to protect ourselves from water” said Louisiana Governor John McKeithen in
1965, bolstering the confidence of New Orleans’s residents on the eve of Hurricane Betsy. “We
have cut the Mississippi in so many places so water can get faster and quicker to the Gulf. We
have built levees up and down the Mississippi… We feel like we are now almost completely
protected,” he boasted.xxxii
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In 1965, New Orleans had the most sophisticated levee and spillway system known to
man and Americans had a towering faith in solutions afforded by monumental construction and
urbanization.xxxiii Many thought this was enough. Since the levees had not burst since 1927
(though they had come close to collapse in 1973 and 1997) residents in the area during the years
proceeding Hurricane Katrina continued to feel safe.xxxiv Public confidence in the system was
further entrenched when Hurricanes Betsy, Flossy, Carla, and Hilda spared New Orleans not
delivering direct blows to the city.
Instead, Katrina would prove this was a false sense of security. While the system
appeared to be capable, New Orleans was actually flirting with disaster and even though the
general public was not aware of the potential for disaster, the experts were. It is common
knowledge that the Army Corps of Engineers had recognized that the levee and pumping stations
were vulnerable to storms greater than a Category 3 hurricane. The potential damage a powerful
hurricane could impart on New Orleans and the area’s critical transportation, energy and
petrochemical facilities was well understood.xxxv
While many experts were adamant about the threat and potential for disaster, the public’s
false sense of security affected decisions to under-fund numerous levee projects. Thus, major
inadequacies in the flood protection for New Orleans resulted from lack of funding. Since the
public and many city officials believed a storm the magnitude of Katrina had a low probability of
occurring, funding dollars were directed elsewhere. Recent history had seemed to demonstrate
that existing levels of protection were adequate and the probability of a devastating storm was
extremely small.xxxvi This false assumption would prove to be costly in 2005. The false security
can be carried over to the future, already there are concerns about rebuilding and to what extent it
should take place, by using higher levees and floodwalls we may be providing another chance for
catastrophic failure.xxxvii
Consistent Lack of Funding Hinders Efforts to Improve the Flood Protection System
Federal Government funding was particularly crucial to the success of flood protection
measures in the New Orleans area. The SELA program, one of the more recent projects to create
reliable drainage systems in Southeast Louisiana, was 75% federally funded.xxxviii The
Atchafalaya Basin Flood Way System, at a total cost of $232 million, relied on $202 million of
federal funds.xxxix With so much of the funding supported by the federal government, state and
local entities grew complacent and dependent on national dollars to fund their regional flood
protection systems.
Yet when the federal budget was cut in recent years, flood control projects, and
ultimately the residents of the New Orleans area, suffered. In 2001, New Orleans asked for $500
million for flood control, Congress approved only $250 million and state and local governments
could not compensate for the deficit.xl The Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity Project has also been
affected by budget cuts. Although the federal government had met 87% of funding
requirements, the Army Corps of Engineers stated that even with the FY2005 funding, funds
were still insufficient to support new construction projects.xli Funding shortfalls are so extensive
that resources are still not being allocated for the desperately needed upgrades to the existing
systems highlighted by the devastation from Hurricane Katrina. Funding shortfalls in FY2005
193
and FY2006 will leave the Army Corps of Engineers unable to repair pump stations vulnerable
to storm surges or raise levees that have settled in the wake of Katrina.xlii
Considering the high probability and the frequency in which flooding occurs in the New
Orleans area, it is easy to understand why an effective flood protection system is needed to
ensure the area’s continued survival and prosperity. To date, an effective system has not been
found. The events of Hurricane Katrina will either work to unite the area in an effort to
overcome flood protection woes through innovation in technology, attitude and funding methods
or the New Orleans area will reemerge only to face certain disaster once again.
In an effort to understand ways in which the residents of New Orleans can better protect
themselves in the future, consideration should be given to storm protection projects that have
been completed in other countries, such as the Netherlands and England.
Flood Protection Comparison: the Netherlands and England
In 1953, the Netherlands experienced a major winter storm that was one of their worst on
record. The resulting flood killed an estimated 2000 people and contributed directly to 70,000
evacuations by others. The Dutch knew that they were particularly vulnerable and feared what
effects future events of that magnitude might have on the major cities of Rotterdam and
Amsterdam, both of which lie below sea level. In response to the 1953 storm, the Dutch devised
a rather futuristic system - the Deltaworks - that would protect them against another disaster
event. The Dutch Government erected a complex of floodgates that close when the weather
turns violent but remain open at other times so the saltwater can flow and the ecosystems can
keep their natural balance. In addition to the surge barriers and flood gates that comprise the
Deltaworks, the Dutch-built dikes are 40 feet above sea level, making them the highest
worldwide. In addition to the towering dikes,
In addition to building vast flood protection systems, the Dutch have taken protection
measures to another level by designing their homes to be ‘flood friendly’, which basically means
that many homes in Holland are built to withstand the wrath of significant floods and storms.
These “flood homes” are built on sponge like synthetic wood that help absorb the floodwaters.
The 1953 storm also pounded Britain. Along the Thames, flooding killed more than 300
people, ruined farmland and frightened Londoners, whose central city narrowly escaped disaster.
The British responded with a plan to better regulate tidal surges sweeping up the Thames from
the North Sea. Engineers designed an attractive barrier meant to minimize interference with the
river's natural flow. It went into service in 1982 at Woolwich, about 10 miles east of central
London. Normally, its semicircular gates lie flush to the riverbed in concrete supporting sills,
creating no obstacle to river traffic. When the need arises, the gates pivot up, rising as high as a
five-story building to block rising waters. The authorities have raised the Thames barrier more
than 80 times. The English built an additional movable barrier as a form of protection after the
1953 floods. It consists of 10 flood gates with housing that rise above water, the gates
themselves are set within the riverbed so the water flow is ongoing, but its architectural
advancement is evident in the fact that when a storm occurs the gates are raised, acting as a steel
wall across the river around 60 feet high.
194
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-glacial_rebound
195
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xxii
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xxv
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xxvi
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xxxiii
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xxxv
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198