by ICR

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by ICR
Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00003999
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IBRD-80000)
ON A
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$32 MILLION
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA
FOR AN
ENHANCING MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE PRODUCTIVITY PROJECT
March 1, 2017
Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice
Central America Country Management Unit
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective January 31, 2017)
Q 1 = US$0.14
US$1 = Q 7.38
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BDS
CEM
CENAME
ESMF
GDP
ICR
IPP
IT
M&E
MFI
MINECO
MSME
PAD
PDER
PDO
PIU
REM
SME
TA
USAID
Business Development Services
Country Economic Memorandum
National Metrology Center
Environmental and Social Management Framework
Gross Domestic Product
Implementation Completion and Results Report
Indigenous Peoples Plan
Information Technology
Monitoring and Evaluation
Microfinance Institution
Ministry of Economy
Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise
Project Appraisal Document
Rural Economic Development Program (Programa Desarrollo Económico
desde lo Rura)
Project Development Objective
Project Implementation Unit
Registry for Non-Profit Microfinance Institutions
Small and Medium Enterprise
Technical Assistance
United States Agency for International Development
Vice President:
Country Director:
Senior Global Practice Director:
Global Practice Director:
Practice Manager:
Project Team Leader:
ICR Team Leader:
Jorge Familiar
J. Humberto Lopez
Anabel Gonzales
Cecile Fruman
Marialisa Motta
Cristian Quijada
Raha Shahidsaless
Guatemala
Enhancing Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Productivity Project
Contents
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... i
B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................... i
C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................ i
D. Sector and Theme Codes............................................................................................ ii
E. Bank Staff .................................................................................................................. ii
F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... ii
H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................ xi
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes................................................... 4
3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 11
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 17
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 18
6. Lessons Learned ............................................................................................................ 19
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ............... 22
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 23
Annex 2. Outputs by Component ...................................................................................... 24
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 31
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 32
Annex 5. Evolution of Results Framework ....................................................................... 34
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 36
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 37
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 38
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 39
A. Basic Information
Country:
Guatemala
Project Name:
GT Enhancing MSME
Productivity Project
Project ID:
P112011
L/C/TF Number(s):
IBRD-80000
ICR Date:
12/08/2016
ICR Type:
Core ICR
Lending Instrument:
SIL
Borrower:
REPUBLIC OF
GUATEMALA
Original Total
Commitment:
US$32.00 million
Disbursed Amount:
US$4.61 million
Revised Amount:
US$7.00 million
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy (MINECO)
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: None
B. Key Dates
Process
Date
Process
Original Date
Revised/Actual
Date(s)
12/21/2012
12/18/2012
Concept Review:
04/05/2010
Effectiveness:
Appraisal:
11/30/2010
Restructuring(s):
Approval:
03/03/2011
Mid-term Review:
05/11/2015
04/08/2015
Closing:
12/31/2017
06/30/2016
07/11/2014
02/03/2016
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes:
Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:
High
Bank Performance:
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:
Unsatisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank
Ratings
Borrower
Quality at Entry:
Unsatisfactory
Government:
Implementing
Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory
Agency/Agencies:
Moderately
Overall Bank
Overall Borrower
Unsatisfactory
Performance:
Performance:
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
QAG Assessments (if
Indicators
Performance
any)
i
Ratings
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Rating
Potential Problem Project at
No
any time (Yes/No):
Quality at Entry
(QEA):
Problem Project at any time
Yes
(Yes/No):
Quality of Supervision
None
(QSA):
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status:
None
Unsatisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original
Actual
Public administration - Industry and trade
24
24
SME finance
7
7
Other industry, trade and services
59
59
Agricultural markets, commercialization and agri-business
10
10
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support
75
75
Regulation and competition policy
25
25
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
E. Bank Staff
Positions
At ICR
At Approval
Vice President:
Jorge Familiar
Pamela Cox
Country Director:
J. Humberto Lopez
Carlos Felipe Jaramillo
Practice Manager/Manager: Marialisa Motta
Lily Chu
Project Team Leader:
Cristian Quijada Torres
Michael Goldberg
ICR Team Leader:
Raha Shahidsaless
ICR Primary Author:
Raha Shahidsaless
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives
The objective of the project is to stimulate the growth of MSMEs in Selected Value Chains.
Revised Project Development Objective (as approved by original approving authority)
There were no changes to the original PDO throughout the life of the project.
ii
(a) PDO Indicator(s)1
Indicator
Baseline
Value
Original Target
Values (from
Approval
Documents)
Formally
Actual Value Achieved at
Revised Target Completion or Target
Values
Years
DROPPED First
Value increase per unit in respective value chains (US$)
PDO Indicator
(R1)
Value (Quantitative
0
TBD
—
—
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
15-Jun-2011
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replaced with a PDO indicator to
Comments (Incl. %
reflect the more reliably measurable concept of increase in revenue rather than
of achievement)
increase in value added.
DROPPED Second
Number of MSMEs participating in value chain working groups
PDO Indicator
(R1)
Value (Quantitative
0
TBD
—
—
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
15-Jun-2011
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replaced with a PDO indicator to
Comments (Incl. %
include a broader range of MSMEs that have received support through project
of achievement)
activities (including BDS).
ADDED Indicator
Number of MSMEs that have received support from at least one activity of support
(R1) REVISED
from the project
Indicator (R2)
Value (Quantitative
0
TBD
400
451
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
30-Apr-2016
27-Jun-2016
EXCEEDED. Target value exceeded by 13% at completion. Added during first
restructuring in July 2014. New PDO indicator to include a broader range of
Comments (Incl. % MSMEs that have received support through project activities (including BDS).
of achievement)
Revised indicator during second restructuring in 2016. Target value identified and
target date revised.
ADDED Indicator
(R1) DROPPED Increase in revenue of MSMEs in value chains selected for project support (%)
Indicator (R2)
Value (Quantitative
0
20
—
—
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Added during first restructuring in July 2014. New PDO indicator to reflect the
Comments (Incl. % more reliably measurable concept of increase in revenue rather than increase in
of achievement)
value added.
1
R1 refers to first restructuring and R2 refers to second restructuring.
iii
Indicator
Original Target
Formally
Actual Value Achieved at
Values (from
Revised Target Completion or Target
Approval
Values
Years
Documents)
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not
implement most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the
Results Matrix to reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the
reduced scope.
Baseline
Value
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)2
Indicator
Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
REVISED
Indicator (R1) Number of calibration and testing services provided to MSMEs
DROPPED (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
230
450
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
31-Dec-2017
31-Dec-2017
—
Revised during first restructuring in July 2014. Target value modified and name of
indicator ‘number of calibration services provided to MSMEs’ revised. The new name
Comments
more precisely reflects the services provided—both calibration and testing services.
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project was unable to
implement most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results
Matrix to reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
REVISED
Number of normalization, certification, accreditation, and metrology verification
Indicator (R1)
services provided to MSMEs
DROPPED (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
15
475
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
31-Dec-2017
31-Dec-2017
—
Revised during first restructuring in July 2014. Target values modified and original
indicator name ‘number of accreditations provided to MSMEs’ revised. Revisions
conducted to more precisely state all services being provided, including metrology
Comments
verification services.
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement
most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to
reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
Number of hits on online platform providing information on international standards and
DROPPED
Indicator (R1) listing certified companies
2
R1 refers to first restructuring and R2 refers to second restructuring.
iv
Indicator
Value
(Quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
0
90,000
—
—
11-Jul-2014
31-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replacement of two intermediate
indicators measuring number of website hits for the Business Development Services
(BDS) database with an indicator capturing the number of BDS providers registered in
the new database.
DROPPED
Number of hits on online directory of business development service providers
Indicator (R1)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
118,000
—
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
31-Dec-2017
—
—
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replacement of two intermediate
indicators measuring number of website hits for the BDS database with an indicator
capturing the number of BDS providers registered in the new database.
Number of workers trained in the tourism value chain by programs supported by the
DROPPED
Indicator (R1) project
Value
(Quantitative or
TBD
TBD
—
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replacement of intermediate indicators
Comments
related to employment in the tourism industry, number of hits to tourism e-platforms,
(Incl. % of
and number of tourists using project-supported tourism packages with an indicator
achievement)
having stronger attribution that captures the percentage of firms in selected tourism
value chains receiving support.
DROPPED
Number of hits in the project-supported e-tourism platforms
Indicator (R1)
Value
(Quantitative or
TBD
TBD
—
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replacement of intermediate indicators
Comments
related to employment creation in the tourism industry, number of hits to tourism e(Incl. % of
platforms, and number of tourists using project-supported tourism packages with an
achievement)
indicator having stronger attribution that captures the percentage of firms in selected
value chains receiving support.
DROPPED
Number of tourists using project-supported tourism packages
Indicator (R1)
Value
(Quantitative or
TBD
TBD
—
—
Qualitative)
v
Indicator
Date achieved
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
DROPPED
Indicator (R1)
Value
(Quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
DROPPED
Indicator (R1)
Value
(Quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
DROPPED
Indicator (R1)
Value
(Quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Original Target
Actual Value
Values (from
Formally Revised
Achieved at
Baseline Value
approval
Target Values
Completion or
documents)
Target Years
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replacement of intermediate indicators
related to employment creation in the tourism industry, number of hits to tourism eplatforms, and number of tourists using project-supported tourism packages with an
indicator having stronger attribution that captures the percentage of firms in selected
value chains receiving support.
Number of companies in value chain compliant with relevant SPS standards
TBD
TBD
—
—
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014.
Narrowing of price gap between U.S. import price of respective produce compared to
other Latin American countries
TBD
TBD
—
—
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Elimination of indicator showing
narrowing of the price gap between U.S. import price of respective produce compared
to other Latin American countries due to attribution difficulties.
Number of producers participating in project-supported training and outreach programs
TBD
TBD
—
—
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Dropped during first restructuring in July 2014. Replacement of indicator capturing
number of producers participating in project-supported training and outreach programs
with an indicator that captures the percentage of firms in selected agricultural value
chains receiving support.
ADDED
Indicator (R1)
Percentage of project beneficiaries that implement clean production improvements
DROPPED
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
18
—
—
Qualitative)
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
Date achieved
—
—
vi
Indicator
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Original Target
Actual Value
Values (from
Formally Revised
Achieved at
Baseline Value
approval
Target Values
Completion or
documents)
Target Years
Added during first restructuring in July 2014. Introduction of a new indicator to track
implementation of clean production practices among MSMEs benefiting from program
resources.
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement
most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to
reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Indicator (R1)
Volume of Bank Support: Enabling Environment - SME (US$)
DROPPED
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
815,000
—
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Added during first restructuring in July 2014. Retrofitting of Component 1 of the
project to include two core indicators as advised by OPCS for MSME projects (Volume
of Bank Funding: Institutional Development–MSME, and Volume of Bank Funding:
Comments
Enabling Environment–MSME).
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement
most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to
reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Indicator (R1)
Volume of Bank Support: Institutional Development–SME (US$)
DROPPED
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
645,000
—
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Added during first restructuring in July 2014. Retrofitting of Component 1 of the
project to include two core indicators as advised by OPCS for MSME projects (Volume
of Bank Funding: Institutional Development–MSME, and Volume of Bank Funding:
Comments
Enabling Environment–MSME).
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement
most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to
reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Indicator (R1) Number of BDS providers validated, categorized and registered in the new BDS online
database
DROPPED
Indicator (R2)
vii
Indicator
Value
(Quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
0
300
—
—
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Added during first restructuring in July 2014. New indicator to replace two intermediate
indicators measuring number of website hits for the BDS database.
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement
most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to
reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Indicator (R1)
Number of MSMEs that receive business development services provided by BDS Units
REVISED
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
94
185
370
396
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
30-Apr-2016
27-Jun-2016
EXCEEDED. Target value exceeded by 7% at completion. Added during first
restructuring in July 2014. Introduction of a new indicator ‘number of municipalities
where MSMEs can receive BDS provided by the MSME directorate’ to capture
Comments
geographic outreach (in terms of number of municipalities covered) by services
(Incl. % of
provided by the MSME directorate.
achievement)
Revised during second restructuring in 2016. Changed the indicator to ‘number of
MSMEs that receive business development services provided by BDS Units.’ Adjusted
target value and completion date.
ADDED
Indicator (R1)
Number of Microfinance Institutions registered in the new Microfinance Registry
DROPPED
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
80
—
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Added during first restructuring in July 2014.
Comments
(Incl. % of
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement
achievement)
most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to
reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Indicator (R1) Percentage of MSMEs receiving services from project activities relative to the total
number of firms in selected value chains–agribusiness
DROPPED
Indicator (R2)
viii
Indicator
Value
(Quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
0
30
—
—
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Added during first restructuring in July 2014. New indicator replacing indicator
capturing number of producers participating in project-supported training and outreach
programs to capture a broader range of beneficiary firms (including non-producers).
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement
most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to
reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Indicator (R1) Percentage of MSMEs receiving services from Project activities relative to the total
number of firms in selected value chains-tourism
DROPPED
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
20
—
—
Qualitative)
Date achieved
11-Jul-2014
29-Dec-2017
—
—
Added during first restructuring in July 2014. New indicator with stronger attribution
captures the percentage of firms in selected value chains receiving support, replacing
intermediate indicators related to employment in the tourism industry, number of hits to
Comments
tourism e-platforms, and number of tourists using project-supported tourism packages.
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Dropped during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project was unable to
implement most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results
Matrix better reflect the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
MINECO Personnel Trained
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
175
—
188
Qualitative)
Date achieved
01-Jan-2014
30-Apr-2016
—
27-Jun-2016
EXCEEDED. Target value exceeded by 7% at completion. Added indicator during
Comments
second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement most of its
(Incl. % of
planned activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to reflect better
achievement)
the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Training in Good Manufacturing and Business Practices
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
28
—
28
Qualitative)
Date achieved
01-Jan-2014
30-Apr-2016
—
27-Jun-2016
ix
Indicator
Comments
(Incl. % of
achievement)
Original Target
Actual Value
Values (from
Formally Revised
Achieved at
Baseline Value
approval
Target Values
Completion or
documents)
Target Years
ACHIEVED. Added during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could
not implement most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the
Results Matrix to reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced
scope. Target met at completion.
ADDED
Value Chain Strategic Plans
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
6
—
6
Qualitative)
Date achieved
01-Jan-2014
30-Apr-2016
—
27-Jun-2016
ACHIEVED. Added during second restructuring in 2016. Because the project could
Comments
not implement most of its planned activities and closed early, the team updated the
(Incl. % of
Results Matrix to reflect better the outcomes that were achievable within the reduced
achievement)
scope. Target met at completion.
ADDED
Competitiveness Sub-Project Proposals
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
12
—
17
Qualitative)
Date achieved
01-Jan-2014
30-Apr-2016
—
27-Jun-2016
EXCEEDED. Target value exceeded by 42% at completion. Added during second
Comments
restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement most of its planned
(Incl. % of
activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to reflect better the
achievement)
outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
ADDED
Formalization of MSMEs
Indicator (R2)
Value
(Quantitative or
0
30
—
27
Qualitative)
Date achieved
01-Jan-2014
30-Apr-2016
—
27-Jun-2016
PARTIALLY ACHIEVED. Target partially achieved (90%). Added during second
Comments
restructuring in 2016. Because the project could not implement most of its planned
(Incl. % of
activities and closed early, the team updated the Results Matrix to reflect better the
achievement)
outcomes that were achievable within the reduced scope.
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No.
Date ISR
Archived
1
2
07/09/2011
01/15/2012
DO
IP
Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
x
Actual
Disbursements (US$,
millions)
0.00
0.00
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
06/13/2012
02/13/2013
10/21/2013
05/07/2014
11/25/2014
06/30/2015
12/28/2015
06/30/2016
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
0.00
0.00
1.40
1.40
1.40
2.33
4.48
4.53
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring
Date(s)
07/11/2014
02/03/2016
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
DO
MU
U
IP
MU
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in US$,
millions
1.40
U
4.48
xi
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made
A Level 2 restructuring at the
request of the Government of
Guatemala. The restructuring
amended the Legal Agreement
to: (1) modify the definition of
beneficiaries to better reflect the
targeted audience of the project
interventions, (2) broaden the
objective of the technical
assistance (TA) and training
provided to beneficiaries, (3)
amend the definition of Steering
Committee to clarify domains of
responsibility for committee
members, and (4) alter the World
Bank’s role in the selection
process of value chains to benefit
from Component 2.
Also, the results framework was
revised to make adjustments to
indicators to capture project
outcomes better and more
reliably.
This Level 2 restructuring sought
a partial cancellation of loan
proceeds in the amount of US$25
million and a change in the
closing date from December
2017 to June 30, 2016, as agreed
with the government. Also, the
project’s sub-components, their
cost, the results framework, the
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
DO
IP
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in US$,
millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made
disbursement estimates, the
implementation schedule, and the
economic and technical appraisal
summaries were adjusted to
reflect the cancellation and the
early closing date.
I.
Disbursement Profile
xii
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1.
At appraisal, Guatemala had a stable macroeconomic environment. The country had
weathered the global financial and economic crisis comparatively well, with positive real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth from 2008 to 2010. Owing to prudent fiscal management, the
public debt to GDP ratio remained at 24 percent of GDP, and inflation dropped to 3–5 percent
annually (2009–2010). However, poverty stayed comparatively high in Guatemala, especially
among the indigenous population in rural areas. In 2008, about 47 percent of the population lived
in poverty, and 16 percent in extreme poverty. Guatemala ranked 116 of 169 countries on the
Human Development Index.
2.
Despite this favorable macroeconomic environment, the changed global environment
reduced the access of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to affordable financial
services and increased instability in their markets. MSMEs employed about 75 percent of the
active population. At project appraisal in 2008, tourism and agribusiness accounted for 11 and 34
percent of foreign exchange earnings, respectively. Agriculture alone accounted for 12 percent of
GDP. These two sectors were large providers of employment in rural and indigenous areas of the
country.
3.
Rationale for World Bank involvement. Because MSMEs play critical roles in the
labor market, analytical studies have highlighted the need to enhance their productivity,
facilitate their access to financing, and link them to new markets and technologies. The World
Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) of 2010, for example, focused on barriers to the
growth of SMEs and analyzed bottlenecks using a value chain approach. As barriers, the CEM
highlighted (a) the need to promote a culture of innovation and quality, (b) the poor availability
and slow uptake of the national quality system, (c) the lack of adequate education, (d) low levels
of technology transfer and few productive relationships between the private sector and academia,
and (e) most importantly, a lack of integration of MSMEs into production, processing, and
marketing networks. Further analytical work included cluster work carried out by the Guatemalan
Exporters Association (Asociación Guatemala de Exportadores) and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). The studies indicated that support for MSME growth would
strengthen their participation in regional and global markets and generate healthy, positive
economy-wide benefits. These benefits would, in turn, reduce poverty in the country, because
MSMEs were the core providers of employment to rural poor.
4.
Support for MSME growth was part of the government’s economic growth strategy
led by the MINECO and was a priority area of the Country Partnership Strategy. 3
MINECO’s national policy for MSME development, under implementation at the time of appraisal,
focused, among other things, on developing economic clusters. Furthermore, the productivity
enhancement pillar of the World Bank’s strategy focused on supporting MSME development.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (As Approved)
5.
The PDO was to stimulate the growth of MSMEs in selected value chains.
World Bank Group’s Country Partnership Strategy (Report Nº 44772-GT), discussed by the Board of Executive
Directors on September 23, 2008.
3
1
6.
The PDO was to be measured by:
(a) Value increase in value per unit of outputs produced in the respective value chains
(+20 percent)
(b) Number of MSMEs participating in value chain working groups (TBD)
1.3 Revised PDO (As Approved by Original Approving Authority) and Key Indicators, and
Reasons/Justification
7.
The PDO of the project remained unchanged.
8.
The main performance indicators and the intermediate outcome indicators were
adjusted twice during project implementation:

The first restructuring modified the two primary performance indicators. As shown in
Annex 5, the restructuring changed the wording of the first indicator to clarify that a
‘value increase’ would be measured by an increase in revenue of MSMEs in the
selected value chains. The restructuring dropped the second performance indicator,
replacing it with a broader indicator: Number of MSMEs that have received support
from at least one activity implemented by the project.

The intermediate outcome indicators were also fine-tuned or revised (see Annex 5),
and baseline and target indicators determined where possible. Establishing baseline
and target indicators was necessary because the Results Framework of the PAD did
not provide any baseline and target indicators and some of the indicators were not
sufficiently clear (see indicators on quality services). Furthermore, the intermediate
results framework for Component 2 was revamped to bring it in line with actual
outputs and to add support for clean production improvements.

Triggered by the early closing of the project and the resulting cancellation of about 80
percent of project funds, the second project restructuring, in 2016, adjusted the results
framework. This second restructuring dropped the first main performance indicator
because it was no longer feasible to measure an increase in revenue in the value chains
during the project’s lifespan. Furthermore, it adjusted the intermediate outcome
indicators to reflect the reduced scope of project activities.
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
9.
The project’s target beneficiaries were MSMEs in the selected value chains. Project
implementation broadened this focus to all MSMEs that received support under the project.
1.5 Original Components (As Approved)
10.
The project consisted of three components:
(i) Component 1: Improving and Promoting Business Development Services (estimated
US$9.7 million). Component 1 was closely linked with Component 2 to reap synergies.
The component aimed to strengthen MINECO’s capacity to lead and coordinate the
development efforts of public and private sectors to support MSMEs based on national
policies. The focus was on improving BDS and quality services and conducting pilots to
increase MSMEs’ access to BDS and financial services. Component 1 included four
subcomponents:
2
a.
Subcomponent 1.1: Improving and Promoting Quality Services Relevant to
MSMEs’ Needs
b. Subcomponent 1.2: Strengthening BDS Provided by MINECO
c. Subcomponent 1.3: Supporting Pilots for the Development and Implementation of
New Products
d. Subcomponent 1.4: Strengthening MINECO’s Vice Ministry for MSMEs
(ii) Component 2: Creating Productive Value Chains (estimated US$19 million). The
component provided support for increased competitiveness of MSMEs through (a) TA
and training to beneficiaries to facilitate the design of subproject proposals and (b) subgrants to beneficiaries in the selected value chains for carrying out subprojects.
(iii)Component 3: Project Management and Monitoring (estimated US$2.52 million).
Under this component, the project included funds for TA, equipment, training, and
operational costs of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), as well as for carrying out the
financial audits of the project.
1.6 Revised Components
11.
The restructuring in 2016 changed the cost and scope of all three components to
reflect the early closing of the project and the cancellation of about 80 percent of the project
funds (Table 1). The cost of Component 1 fell from US$9.7 million to US$2.58 million. As a
result, many activities under Component 1 were cancelled. The cancelled activities included those
under subcomponents 1.1 (quality system) and 1.2 (BDS). The cost of Component 2 dropped from
US$19 million to US$2.95 million because, realistically, the project could only fund one or two
subprojects for each of the selected value chain Action Plans before closing. The cost of
Component 3 declined from US$2.52 million to US$1.39 million also to reflect the shorter
duration of the project due to, among other things, lower planned operational costs of the PIU.
Table 1. Revision of Costs by Component
Component
Estimated Costs
(PAD, March
2011 - US$,
millions)
%
Revised Cost
(January 2016 US$, millions)
%
Costs at closing
(July 2016 -US$,
millions)
%
Component 1: Improving and
Promoting Business
Development Services
9.70
30
2.58
37
2.18
47.29
Component 2: Creating
Productive Value Chains
19.00
60
2.95
43
1.16
25.16
Component 3: Project
Management and Monitoring
2.52
8
1.39
20
1.19
25.82
Unallocated
0.70
2
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
Front-end Fee
0.08
0
0.08
0
0.08
1.73
TOTAL
32.00
100
6.92
100
4.61
100.00
3
1.7 Other Significant Changes
12.
The project was restructured twice. The first restructuring (Level 2) in July 2014
amended the Legal Agreement in four ways. (1) It modified the definition of beneficiaries to reflect
the targeted audience of the project interventions better. (2) It broadened the objective of the TA
and training provided to beneficiaries. (3) It replaced the Steering Committee with an Advisory
Committee and clarified the responsibilities of members of the Advisory Committee. Finally, (4)
it modified the World Bank’s role in the selection process of value chains to benefit from
Component 2.
13.
The second restructuring (Level 2) in 2016 included cancelling US$25 million in loan
proceeds and changing the project closing date from December 2017 to June 30, 2016. The
early closure of the project was due to problems associated with design and readiness, which made
implementation challenging; procurement and disbursement-related issues, which persisted and
had caused delays in disbursements; and challenges that presented themselves during
implementation, which slowed down disbursements. These are expanded further in the following
sections of the report. The second restructuring also adjusted the project’s sub-components and
costs, the results framework, the disbursement estimates, the implementation schedule, and the
economic and technical appraisal summaries to reflect the cancellation and early closing date.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
14.
While the overall project objective was backed up by strong analytical work,
including the CEM mentioned earlier, the preparation of the project was hastened to benefit
from the outgoing government’s commitment to pass the project through the Congress, prior
to the September 2011 elections. Consequently, the team postponed to project implementation
many important design issues that would have required longer than 11 months to prepare. Also, at
the time of the appraisal of this project, the World Bank did not have much experience providing
support to value chains through lending operations beyond matching grant schemes. This project
was a pioneer. Due to a combination of a rushed preparation and lack of experience with
comprehensive support for value chains through lending operations, project preparation closed
without having completed critical analytical work. For example, project preparation did not define
the methodology for selecting value chains and did not fully assess potential value chains. Instead,
defining the methodology and analyzing and selecting value chains remained for project
implementation. Developing the methodology and selecting the value chains during
implementation delayed disbursement under Component 2. The project did not select the six value
chains it would support until early 2015. Special interests and lobbying groups advocating for
particular value chains—together with the unstable and opaque political environment associated
with corruption scandals (see section 2.2) —exacerbated the delay.
15. Selecting value chains during implementation left many aspects of project design
undefined. In particular, defining baselines, targets, and the M&E framework depended upon the
prior completion of critical steps under Component 2 (see section 2.3). Component 2 required
implementing a sequence of activities, which included identifying the methodology to select value
chains, using the methodology to choose the value chains to be supported, preparing Action Plans
and subproject implementation plans for the selected value chains, and implementing the
4
subprojects. Because the value chains were not selected during project preparation, finalizing the
design of the project (the M&E framework, the financial and economic analysis model, and so on)
depended upon first selecting the value chains, delaying implementation.
16.
Inadequate implementation arrangements at preparation also delayed
implementation. The project design envisaged establishing a Steering Committee—led by the
Vice Minister of MSME in MINECO—that would make decisions about the project, including the
selection of value chains. It was the borrower’s responsibility to create the Steering Committee.
The Steering Committee would comprise representatives of academic institutions and civil society,
as well as specialized technicians. However, Guatemalan law prohibited individuals who were not
government staff from decision-making. The Steering Committee was not a government entity,
and the law prohibited MINECO from sharing or delegating decision-making to a non-state entity.
Consequently, establishing the Steering Committee had to wait until the 2014 restructuring had
amended the Legal Agreement. Moreover, the restricting transformed the Steering Committee into
an Advisory Committee, whose primary responsibility was to make recommendations rather than
decisions. As a result, the final decision-making authority remained with MINECO. Also, due to
internal decisions within MINECO, the PIU never carried out its role in budget execution. Instead,
the PIU could only complete the initial contracting paperwork and submit it to the Vice Minister
for approval through a multi-layered process that caused significant implementation delays.
17.
Appraisal assessed the overall risk of the project as High. While the project
adequately identified many of the risks, the proposed mitigation measures were not effective
in practice. The rating was adequate, and most of the identified risks materialized during project
implementation, including the stakeholder and institutional risks. The proposed mitigation
measures were not effective in addressing the materialized risks. For example, the PAD
acknowledged that the client’s commitment might change because elections were approaching in
September 2011. The World Bank held discussions with the members of congress and relevant
ministers to emphasize the importance of the project and the expected impact of value chain
activities by relying on the CEM and its focus on SMEs and value chains. However, it took a long
time to build the political buy-in and momentum after the change in Government, and the sectors
that were expected to be supported needed to be slightly modified (for example, tourism was no
longer included) for either due to shifts in Government priorities, requests for changes to project
approach and design or due to influences by the private sector elites.
18.
Moreover, implementation risks, in particular, those associated with procurement
and financial management, turned out to be far more complex than envisioned (see section
2.4). The lack of an adequate Operations Manual at project effectiveness to address the bottlenecks
in fiduciary arrangements exacerbated these implementation risks.
2.2 Implementation
19.
Project implementation suffered several setbacks, delaying the project start date and
causing an impasse in project execution. The 22-month lag between loan approval and the
effectiveness of the project delayed the start of project implementation because there were no
provisions in place to advance project implementation before congressional approval (such as
through a project preparation advance facility or retroactive financing).
20.
Political economy and local regulations proved to be significant bottlenecks. Project
implementation spanned three administrations that had different priorities related to rural
development and support for value chains. Also, project implementation spanned three separate
5
Vice Ministers of Economy, as chairs of the Advisory Committee for the implementation of
Component 2. With each shift in government or Vice Minister, the process of familiarizing the
new staff with the project and the identification of new champions caused a significant delay in
implementation. The political and institutional crisis of 2015 exacerbated the challenges related to
implementing this project. For example, bidding on contracts went slowly and took a long time,
because, due to corruption scandals and fear of being associated with them, the private sector was
afraid to enter into transactions with the government.
21.
The project also faced several implementation challenges, especially due to
procurement issues and weak implementation capacity that hindered execution. The
implementation agency ignored many procurement-related recommendations from the World
Bank throughout the project cycle. Shortcomings in both the procurement processes and contract
administration procedures followed by the implementing agency limited the timely achievement
of critical outputs. Although the implementing agency received substantial support from the World
Bank, it was not able to implement the project activities effectively.
22.
The PIU’s lack of understanding of what the project was and what it aimed to do
compared to the PDER project, and lack of internal World Bank coordination to provide
clarification on the status and future of the two projects, hampered implementation. To
ensure smooth implementation, the team chose an experienced PIU to implement this project.
However, the PIU was also responsible for executing another World Bank project, the Rural
Economic Development Program (Programa Desarrollo Económico desde lo Rura, PDER) in
parallel and was focused on completing activities under that project. Once the PDER closed (in
late 2014), and the attention of the PIU staff turned towards this project, the staff of the PIU faced
a challenge in understanding the particular features of the new project (including the fact that the
project was designed to finance subprojects that the PAD had not defined). At the request of the
government and the PIU, the World Bank considered restructuring the project to align it with the
PDER. The PIU was already familiar with the PDER and, therefore, could have more quickly
implemented a similar project. However, aligning this project with the PDER would have required
a Level 1 restructuring and Congressional approval. In the fragmented political context of
Guatemala, approval could have taken another 22 months. At the same time, the World Bank
could have done more to support a smoother transition and coordination between the two Projects,
and to settle the discussions on whether this project was to be a PDER 2.0 or a distinct Project as
it was designed. While these discussions were ongoing, different sectors of the World Bank were
communicating at times contradictory messages to the Government on the status and fate of this
Project. It is likely that a clearer communication with the Government could have avoided
confusion and helped more effectively in Project implementation.
23.
Options for improving Project performance were considered. During the Mid Term
Review of April 2015, a comprehensive restructuring was proposed but never materialized because
the Ministry of Economy, in the end, decided that they did not want to cancel any funds. This
restructuring was to cancel US$15 million, revise the scope of Components and activities, realign
the results framework, and simplify the fiduciary arrangements to ensure a more agile
implementation. The restructuring was also to support one of the Government’s priorities related
to financing activities aimed at improving the economic and social well-being of communities that
6
were affected by the construction of the Chixoy dam4. The Government also requested the World
Bank to finance feasibility studies for another dam, which would have triggered additional
safeguards. However, this restructuring never happened. Instead, the Government and the World
Bank decided to close the project early, and to cancel US$25 million of Project funds.
24.
The peripheral requests distracted Project implementation, and impacted key
decisions about the fate of the Project. Although there is some benefit in flexibility and
responsiveness of the team within a project, there should be awareness that issues outside the
agreed scope of the project reduce focus on implementing the Project’s core activities. During the
implementation of the Project, a peripheral request was received from the Government to assess
whether some of the Project’s resources could be utilized to support the Chixoy communities.
Given the strategic importance of Chixoy for the government and the World Bank’s willingness
to provide support to this community, the government and the World Bank agreed that the Project
-- that was already experiencing implementation challenges – should not be closed at the mid-term
review, as it was the only instrument that the World Bank had, at the time, to possibly, provide
such support. In addition, the government requested feasibility studies for irrigation projects,
which had pre-feasibility studies completed under the PDER Project. As a social safeguards
specialist from the World Bank was able to conduct a field visit to the proposed site of the projects,
critical issues were identified, which led to the team’s decision not to proceed with the support to
feasibility studies. The proposed projects, though irrigation focused, were essentially dam projects.
While these additional requirements were manageable and critical, carrying out this work would
have required a restructuring and processing through the lengthy national Congress approval. In
the end, given that the restructuring proposed in the mid-term review did not go through, support
to Chixoy was not provided under the Project. The decision to close the Project was made by the
government and the World Bank shortly thereafter (July, 2015).
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
26.
M&E design. The design of the M&E framework remained deficient throughout the
project and is assessed as Highly Unsatisfactory. Only the first of the two PDO indicators
measured the achievement of the objective. However, its wording (‘increase in value added’)
lacked specificity and measurability. The second PDO indicator (defined as the number of firms
‘participating in value chain working groups’) was better suited as an intermediate indicator
because it failed to capture the much higher development objective of stimulating the growth of
MSMEs. Moreover, the PDO and the associated indicators did not adequately measure activities
under Component 1.
27.
The M&E framework was redefined twice during project implementation (see section
1.3), but deficiencies in the design remained. The restructurings introduced baseline and target
indicators for the intermediate outcome indicators and reformulated them to make them more
specific and attributable to project support. However, the first restructuring, did not introduce a
4
After four decades, the Government agreed on both an individual and collective reparations plan for 33
communities displaced by the construction of the Chixoy dam.
7
target for the second PDO-level indicator, weakening the indicator’s link to the PDO.5 The revision
of the M&E framework under the second restructuring eliminated the only true outcome indicator
and changed the indicators into output measurements. While this was understandable given the
reduced scope of activities due to early closing and the limited time to capture the impact of the
activities, the redefined results framework was no longer relevant to measuring progress toward
the PDO.
28.
M&E implementation and utilization. Design issues hampered implementation of the
M&E framework, which is rated overall as Moderately Unsatisfactory. Because of the delay
in project implementation, reporting on intermediate outcome indicators in the M&E framework
only started after the first restructuring. Moreover, only the last Implementation Status and Results
report in June 2016 captured data for the second PDO indicator. Delays in selecting the value
chains and problems obtaining regular, reliable data on the revenue of the participating MSMEs
were the main causes of the lack of reporting on the first PDO indicator. However, the project
could have established a target for the second PDO indicator early on and measured progress
toward its achievement. The early closing of the project prevented a planned final evaluation to
measure its effects.
29.
Efforts to capture the potential impact of individual activities and bridge problems in
data availability were incomplete. For Component 1, a feasibility assessment for the mobile
laboratory identified different routes and uptake scenarios for implementation and calculated the
expected costs and revenue generated under each scenario. This assessment established the
approach and a baseline against which to measure results. The value chain diagnostics and Action
Plans included preliminary calculations of investment needs and potential returns of investment,
against which the team could have measured results. However, the early closing of the project
prevented measurement of the de facto impact of these activities. The PIU also tried to assess the
impact of the business development pilots (web page design, formalization) on the supported
businesses but faced challenges in collecting information on growth from the participating MSMEs.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
30.
Safeguards Compliance. The project was given a B category and triggered six social
and environmental safeguards. The safeguards triggered included Environmental Assessment
(OP/BP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Pest Management (OP 4.09), Physical Cultural
Resources (OP/BP 4.11), Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP
4.12). Project appraisal included an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF).
The ESMF provided a framework for sound management of environmental and social risks.
Social Safeguards
31.
At project closing, compliance with social safeguards was satisfactory. Because
indigenous peoples live in the areas of project intervention, an Indigenous Peoples Planning
Framework (IPPF) was prepared in November 2010. The IPPF was to guide the preparation of
individual Indigenous Peoples Plans (IPPs) for the selected value chains. The IPPF outlined the
5
Following the first restructuring, the indicator measured participation of any MSME in Project activities, which
was broader than the stated PDO of ‘growth of MSMEs in selected value chains’. This disconnect is more
attributable to an unfortunate wording of the Project objective, which did not adequately cover work to be provided
under Component 1 (see section 2.1).
8
country context, possible impacts, and risks for indigenous peoples, and recommendations to
ensure that subprojects incorporate indigenous peoples’ needs and concerns. To identify and
mitigate potential adverse effects and proactively support measures to enhance inclusion of
indigenous peoples and women within each value chain subproject, the Operations Manual
mandated carrying out social assessments and preparing IPPs. A social specialist was hired in the
PIU to coordinate the completion of the social assessment and consultations for IPPs for two value
chains (export vegetables and potatoes). The social assessment included stakeholder mapping of
each value chain, socialization workshops with the value chain committees to communicate the
importance of the activities, and carrying out surveys and consultations with indigenous producers
and women participating in each of the value chains. These assessments served both to socialize
the potential benefits of the project and to highlight issues faced by women and indigenous people
that the IPPs could address. The project would have supported specific actions designed in the IPP,
had implementation moved forward. As with the other project investment activities, cancellation
of support to the value chains for which the IPPs had been prepared prevented implementation of
the IPPs.
32.
During the social assessment of the export vegetable value chain, concerns about child
labor arose, given that children were assisting their families in post-harvest activities. During
the social assessment, it was observed that children were assisting their families in post-harvest
activities. The family unit of labor, where production activities are carried out by the entire family
and produce sold to intermediaries is a very common practice among indigenous communities in
rural Guatemala and other rural areas of Latin America. This observation was documented by the
client and communicated to the World Bank. As a result, the World Bank decided that no
disbursements were to be made under Component 2 until the extent of the issue was known and
mitigation measures in place. Given that the implementation support to subprojects (investment
projects for each value chain) had not yet been rolled out, a strategy to mitigate this potential risk
was developed, including (i) adding a clause in the grant sub-agreements which committed
beneficiaries to not utilizing the labor of any child under 18 years of age, in accordance with
national law; (ii) including the issue of child labor in a social management module to be in included
in training that was to be offered to the value chains before Project closing; (iii) including explicit
screening criteria to identify and assess child labor issues in the social assessment for each value
chain. In cases where it was determined there was violation of children’s fundamental rights to
security, recreation, or education, those parts of the value chain would be excluded from
participating in the Project; and (iv) encouraging the client to collaborate with relevant national
agencies to increase awareness and actions to promote the rights of children. The issue was first
brought to the attention of the World Bank in early April, 2015, and guidance as to how to manage
this risk was given in July, 2015, and recorded in the ISR of July, 2015. In November, 2015, a
request to use funds for value chain training was submitted to the Bank, which in response provided
recommendations to project team about how to operationalize the earlier guidance (by including
training on child labor issues for value chains), therefore, resume disbursements under component
2 in November, 2015.
33.
Although the project did not anticipate funding any projects that could lead to
voluntary or involuntary resettlement, the World Bank prepared a Resettlement Policy
Framework in November 2010. The framework included a checklist and screening criteria for
determining whether involuntary resettlement was occurring and whether a subproject could be
approved. The project did not carry out any involuntary land acquisition, and therefore did not
prepare any Resettlement Action Plans.
9
Environmental Safeguards
34.
At project closing, compliance with environmental safeguards was rated Satisfactory.
The project had completed—on time and satisfactorily—all environmental management tasks
required by national regulations and World Bank policies. The ESMF identified no environmental
issues initially. As project implementation got under way, updates and revisions to the ESMF
outlined the responsibilities of major participants, including the value chain working groups, the
environmental specialist contracted by MINECO, and the Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources. MINECO obtained environmental licenses for two of the value chain subprojects that
managed to initiate activities before project closing. The project also focused on environmental
management to increase the quality of products and enhance the competitiveness of MSMEs. To
facilitate environmental management within the value chains, the PIU planned to continue the
work initiated under the PDER to create product-specific environmental guides, in collaboration
with the value chain committees. Persistent delays in defining the value chain activities and slow
procurement processes affected the drafting of the environmental guides, and the attempt to
contract a firm to draft the guides faced procurement challenges. Ultimately, the PIU prepared two
product-specific Environmental Management Plans, for the potato and bean value chains.
35.
Fiduciary compliance. Fiduciary performance was weak despite the technical support and
intense supervision by the World Bank.
Procurement
36.
Overall procurement arrangements were Moderately Unsatisfactory, largely because
of the misinterpretation regarding the World Bank Procurement and Consultant Guidelines
prevailing for this operation, as stated in the Legal Agreement. MINECO repeatedly requested
documents that were not applicable or differed from those agreed with the World Bank.
Additionally, the legal and administrative requirements in the national law caused delays and
contributed to process inefficiencies. During several missions, the World Bank discussed with the
borrower its lack of knowledge and improper application of the World Bank’s guidelines. However,
the borrower continued certain practices that hindered contract administration, impeded the
participation of potential bidders, and delayed the delivery of goods and the products. For example,
for the selection of subprojects, MINECO insisted on using direct selection to shorten the time
frames. However, the World Bank determined that this was neither cost-effective nor transparent.
In other cases, when the work touched on the jurisdiction of several Ministries, the contract
required the approval of more than one Vice Minister to approve each contract. Every
disagreement on procurement methods or misunderstanding of the WB procedures would add to
the delays in procurement and project implementation. There were some concerns throughout
project implementation that the implementing agency was not following the guidelines the World
Bank team recommended and were instead relying on internal process within MINECO, which
sometimes required more than 20 steps.
Financial Management
37.
At project closing, financial management was rated Moderately Satisfactory. This
rating was mainly due to cumbersome internal procedures and processes in MINECO, as well as
some delays in the submissions of statements of expenses. MINECO complied with the timely
submission of financial reports and audited financial statements. An assessment of financial
administration in February 2016 found that project records were up to date and that the PIU had
complied with the reporting requirements. The reports contained the required information and were
10
acceptable. However, internal processes and administrative requirements within MINECO were
complicated and lengthy. Additionally, there were delays in the submission of withdrawal
applications, which could have presented a challenge to the liquidity available to attend to project
needs.
38.
MINECO established a PIU without the authority to directly execute the budget,
which caused delays and affected execution. MINECO was responsible for approval of the
budget. Its approval processes were inefficient and sometimes discretionary, affecting contracting
and payment procedures. MINECO required the PIU to break down all contracts—regardless of
the duration of their associated activities—into one-year phases, with separate contracts for each
year. This procedure delayed the project, created budgeting challenges, and required signing
multiple contracts with the same firms, with each contract subject to the lengthy approval processes.
A fiduciary management guide prepared during project implementation was to serve as a guide for
the implementing agency’s implementation of the value chain subprojects. It included guidelines
on reporting, monitoring, and evaluation of subproject investments by the implementing agency.
These restrictive processes further constrained the implementation of activities under the
subprojects. The World Bank team explored the possibility of providing TA to review budget
management procedures, but the client did not pursue this. Moreover, implementation risks, in
particular, those associated with procurement, turned out to be far more troublesome than initially
envisioned. For example, the PIU was not a real budget execution unit. The Operations Manual
prepared at the beginning of the project assumed that the PIU was a budget execution unit and did
not cover the processes under MINECO’s control. Lacking the power to execute the project budget
forced the PIU to follow the timelines MINECO set. Though the PIU could complete the initial
contracting paperwork, the Vice Ministry of MINECO had to approve all processes through a long,
multistep process that was hard to predict. The Operations Manual updated in 2014 clarified some
of these steps. However, the World Bank Project implementing team learned of many of the
procedures and steps only while procuring the contracts.
39.
The MINECO contracting processes were bureaucratic. When the work touched on
the jurisdiction of different Ministries, each contract required the approval of more than one
Vice Minister. Such multiple approvals resulted in delays in contracting and made the
arrangements for disbursements complicated and cumbersome. Especially following the first
restructuring in 2014, when time to implement the subcomponents was limited, these complicated
processes limited what the project could accomplish in the remaining period of the project. While
the PAD broadly identified the procurement risks, the World Bank project implementation team
only learned about the risks mentioned here during implementation. As a result, project preparation
had not recommended effective mitigation measures for addressing them early on in the project.
These challenges were critical contributing factors to project implementation delays that the
project preparation phase could have better mitigated. A completed Operations Manual was not in
place at effectiveness, and the implementation team had to help the PIU prepare one. The combined
team completed the manual only in 2014, contributing to these implementation risks and
challenges.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
40.
No follow-up operations have been contemplated for this project.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
11
41.
The PDO remains relevant. Communities and rural areas in the country remain poor, and,
although there have been disagreements about the means, tackling poverty through supporting the
private sector remains a priority for the government, as evidenced by the government’s 2030 vision.
Similarly, the PDO aligns with the Country Partnership Framework FY17–206 in which enhancing
the enabling environment and increasing access to finance for MSMEs is a priority.
42.
The design and implementation are both rated modest. While the PDO remains relevant,
the project design and the PDO indicators are inconsistent—the PDO indicators do not measure
the achievements the project envisioned. The project design was flexible, allowing for adjustments
during implementation. Nevertheless, in Guatemala, defining the methodology for selecting value
chains and selecting the value chains as part of project design would have yielded better results.
Also, the challenging implementation arrangements—in particular, as they relate to the PIU and
multi-layered approval processes and procedures—the role of implementation in the project’s
limited achievement is modest. The poor design and implementation of this project are in part
responsible for the limited achievement.
43.
Furthermore, it should also be mentioned that a number of activities supported under
component 1 were not fully linked to value chain and MSME development, so including them
was not the most effective approach to reaching the Project development objective. This is
most evident in the area of access to finance, where for example the creation of a MFI registry can
be a good tool for enhancing financial soundness and regulatory compliance of financial entities,
but the link towards increasing MFI’s outreach to the target beneficiaries is weak.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
Rating: Negligible
44.
The progress toward achieving the PDO is rated negligible. It was not possible to
measure the project’s contribution to stimulating the growth of MSMEs in selected value chains
(the PDO objective) at project closing because the supported reforms are either incomplete or have
just completed implementation. Therefore, no impact data on the growth of the supported MSMEs
is yet available. Some the supported reforms, however, have the potential to increase the growth
of MSMEs. Annex 2 provides a detailed description of the project support under each component.
45.
The evaluation follows progress made towards the achievement of each intermediate
result. To overcome the weaknesses in the results framework and the lack of data on achievements
toward the initial PDO indicators, the assessments focus on the intermediate results indicators. No
disbursement-weighted split rating was applied because the second restructuring, which
significantly changed the results framework, only took place after most disbursements (US$4.48
million of US$4.61 million).
Intermediate Result 1: Improving and Promoting Business Development Services (Modest)
46.
Component 1 aimed at enhancing MINECO’s capacity to lead and coordinate the
development efforts of the public and private sectors in support of MSMEs and through this,
strengthen the national business environment in which MSMEs operate. As discussed in the
6
Report No. 103738-GT discussed by the Board of Executive Directors on November 17, 2016.
12
following paragraphs, the project made limited progress toward enhancing MINECO’s capacity.
We, therefore, rate the outcome modest. No PDO indicator was included to measure the results of
the support under Component 1. The assessment, therefore, focuses on the achievement of each
subcomponent as measured by the available intermediate outcome indicators related to Component
1.
47.
Improving and promoting quality services relevant to MSME needs (not achieved).
The funded mobile laboratory is operational. The Minister of Economy publicly announced it in
July 2016. However, it has not yet deployed, because CENAME had to shift the trained staff into
verification of the legal compliance with calibration standards of gas stations upon request from
the Consumer Protection Agency (DIACO) and the Ministry of Energy. The new management of
CENAME, which took over in August 2016, is also assessing whether the mobile laboratory can
offer additional services.7 Pending availability of staff and some fine-tuning, CENAME aims to
provide services with the mobile laboratory from mid-2017 onwards. Until then, CENAME’s
services will remain limited to Guatemala City. The staff capacity building of staff and the outreach
events have not yet translated into an increase in calibration services provided by CENAME. As
Table 2 shows, the number of services for mass and temperature calibrations decreased since 2014.
CENAME provides the services to 53 companies from different sectors, most of them located in
Guatemala City. The reduction in calibration services was in part due to frequent turnover of staff
in CENAME, but also due to a shift toward more accreditation and legal metrology services. Data
on the calibration and accreditation services does not include the size of the entity, precluding the
assessment of outreach to MSMEs. However, because the mobile laboratory was to be the primary
vehicle to reach out to MSMEs, this subcomponent of component 1 has not met the intermediate
outcome indicators on quality services to MSMEs.
Table 2. Evolution of Calibration and Accreditation Services in CENAME
Mass
Temperature
Volume
Accreditation
2012
671
532
—
21
2013
680
611
—
26
2014
518
376
—
30
2015
472
292
25*
34
Note: * at the end of October 2016.
48.
Strengthening BDS (not achieved). The project only financed the development of a
platform on which qualified business service providers can register. The web page went live in
mid-November 2016. At the time of the ICR mission, none of the 204 identified BDS providers
had yet registered on the platform (target 300). The project has, therefore, not yet met the
intermediate outcome indicator. Absent funds for outreach campaigns, the promotion of the
platform will hinge on dissemination by the regional offices of MINECO and search engines like
Google. Limited dissemination will reduce the visibility and impact of the platform. However,
stakeholders who have visited the platform confirmed that the availability of such a database of
7
The laboratory is fitted to undertake calibration services of instruments and carry out phyto-sanitary assessments
Additional services could include “force”, “dimensions”, “pressure” and “viscosity”, which CENAME now also
offers.
13
BDS providers would fill a significant information gap and facilitate uptake of these services.
49.
Supporting pilots for the development and implementation of new products (partially
achieved). Most of the reforms supported under this component aimed at promoting the sound
growth of microfinance institutions in the country, with only an indirect link to MSME growth.
Due to the state of the reforms and their indirect links to MSME growth, the impact will take a few
years to materialize:
50.

The project has developed the registry for non-profit microfinance institutions (REM)
as stipulated by the recently passed MFI law. However, launching the registry requires
prior approval of the regulations for the microfinance law. Because the new regulatory
framework will make it mandatory to register and regularly share financial and
outreach information, it is likely that the project will meet and surpass the expected
intermediate outcome indicator of 80 registered entities in the medium term.

The project made progress toward automating the administration of the MSME
development trust fund. The project helped develop an information technology (IT)
platform to facilitate uploading data and reports of microfinance institutions that
receive funds for on-lending to MSMEs. In parallel, the FIRST trust fund 8 and
MixMarket 9 supported the government in assessing the second-tier lending
procedures and criteria, but this is not yet formally regulated. The registry launched
in November 2016, allowing participating MFIs to upload the required data online
through the platform. Using the platform will become mandatory once the regulation
for the platform is developed. Lack of funds has delayed latter because the project
could not finance it. The FIRST trust fund is exploring options to support this work.
Once implemented, the platform will facilitate and rationalize selection of
participating MFIs and supervision of the Q 500 million (US$66 million) of funds
available for disbursements. Furthermore, it will likely reduce costs for compliance
for MFIs in the medium term.

The project-supported feasibility study helped initiate the work on a Credit Guarantee
Facility, while the FIRST trust fund supported the set-up and specifications of the
Guarantee Facility. The MSME Credit Guarantee Fund is now operational and in the
process of signing contracts with three financial institutions for a total guarantee
amount of US$20 million (out of the earmarked US$30 million).

The formalization of 27 producer groups, as part of a pilot, enabling them to access
international markets. The producer groups are in ten departments of Guatemala and
have 244 members of mostly indigenous background. Thirty-five MSMEs received
support for the design of a web page. However, concrete data was not available to
show an impact of these activities on producer groups or MSMEs. In the meantime,
lack of funding for these types of activities has led to the discontinuation of both pilots.
Strengthening MINECO’s Vice Ministry for MSMEs (partly achieved). The
The Trust Fund “Developing Diversified and Responsible Financing for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises in
Guatemala” was launched in 2015, and support the implementation of recommendations made as part of the
Financial Sector Assessment Program in 2014.
9
MixMarket is a data platform, that provides data, as well as graphic and analytical tools to assess the soundness
and outreach of 2000 microfinance oriented institutions in over 100 countries worldwide.
8
14
subcomponent helped reorient MINECO toward a results management and to improve the quality
of its processes and services. Some 188 employees received training or participated in study tours,
surpassing the intermediate indicator of 175. Based on unstructured feedback received from about
ten employees of MINECO during the ICR preparation, the capacity building had a positive impact
and helped lay the groundwork for a significant culture change in MINECO. Managers also
confirmed that MINECO is now better able to monitor its work program and has started tracking
results. The interviewed staff confirmed that they benefitted from the training for improving
project management, collaborating between units, and setting up work plans.
51.
To enhance regional service provision, the project financed equipment, audiovisual
facilities, and vehicles, helping showcase MINECO’S services in trade fairs and regional centers.
To date, 395 MSMEs benefitted from BDS from MINECO, almost reaching the target of 396. 10
However, MINECO’s regional offices remain understaffed, with only one employee in most
regional offices. To address this issue, MINECO is now reorganizing. The regional offices will
focus on disseminating information and facilitating business linkages, while the 11 Small Business
Development Centers, operated by nongovernmental organizations and other stakeholders, will
provide direct business support services.
Intermediate Result 2: Creating Productive Value Chains (Negligible)
52.
Component 2 aimed at directly helping MSMEs in selected value chains improve
competitiveness, foster innovation, increase quality, and, through support for implementing Action
Plans, boost productivity and facilitate integration into national and international markets. The
achievement under this Component is negligible because it implemented very few action plans.
53.
The project supported the development of Action Plans in six value chains, achieving
the intermediate outcome indicator. The Action Plans laid out a road map identifying capacity
building activities and investments to enhance the quality and output of the respective value chains.
The six plans involved 205 producer associations, indirectly benefiting over 30,000 members (see
Table 3). Stakeholders from the public and private sectors confirmed that the approach has helped
create a shared vision in the value chain and link the various actors along the value chain. Of the
six value chain committees established under the project, the ICR confirmed that the potato value
chain community is still operational after project closing still operates and conducts regular
meetings. While some of the stakeholders also reported that at least two other value chain
committees are still active, it was not possible to confirm this because MINECO no longer has any
contact with the value chains. (The cancellation of the project funds created some tension between
MINECO and the value chains.)
Table 3. Number of Producer Organizations to Benefit Under the Value Chain Action Plans
Value Chain
Geographical Location
Number of Involved
Producer Organizations
Number of Members
Vegetables for export
Sacatepéquez,
Chimaltenango
26
n.a.
Potatoes
Huehuetenango,
Quetzaltenango, San
Marcos
52
5,915
10
The ICR mission did not receive data to assess the increase in outreach by municipality, as stipulated in the initial
formulation of the intermediate outcome indicator.
15
Value Chain
Geographical Location
Number of Involved
Producer Organizations
Number of Members
Beans (pulses)
Chiquimula, Jalapa,
Jutiapa
25
9,601
Cocoa
Alta Verapaz, Isabal,
Petén, Quiche
19 producer organizations
and 13 pre-cooperatives
3,912
Cardamom
Alta Verapaz
52
Over 10,000
Papaya
Petén
18
2,168
205
31,596
Total
Source: Value chain Action Plans.
54.
Support for the implementation of the Action Plans was limited to the potato value
chain, and the project procured and implemented few investments in the potato value chain.
To date, 335 members of eight potato producer organizations received training in good practices
in agriculture and manufacturing, and another 217 members from four seed producer organizations
attended five training modules on seed production. Three producers of the potato value chain, and
the federation of producers (ASUCUCH 11 ), reported that the training helped them understand
quality requirements and implement organic farming techniques. However, they would have
appreciated further technical support and ongoing guidance to facilitate the implementation of the
changes. The project also financed equipment to improve the sanitary standards of production,
benefiting 28 producer organizations with 1,029 members. Based on the feedback received from
the value chains, the equipment is now widely utilized.
55.
Overall, the training and investments have helped producers improve the quality of
production. The beneficiaries emphasized that they are now washing potatoes, which will help
increase the quality of produce. Some participating farmers have also switched to using certified
seeds, and a few fields were certified. The ICR mission also learned about efforts from various
stakeholders to continue some of the activities related to value chains and to link producers to
funding sources (both donations and credit) for implementation of investments suggested in the
Action Plans.
3.3 Efficiency
56.
The ICR does not attempt to quantify the benefits of the small part of the Project that
was implemented. Nevertheless, the cost-efficiency of implementation is considered modest.
Benefits that are expected to accrue to the project from the sub-components of the project that were
implemented are discussed below.
57.
Overall, the cost-efficiency of implementation was modest. On the one hand, the slow
implementation of the value chain work hampered efficiency, so synergies between components 1
and 2 could not materialize. For example, the training on good business practices in the value
chains—which was to increase awareness among farmers of the need to adhere to quality standards
and raise demand for quality services via the mobile laboratory—should have benefitted the work
in the area of quality standards. The same holds for linking members of the value chain to BDS
via the BDS platform and for facilitating their access to finance through participating financial
institutions. On the other hand, the slow project start, the implementation delays (see section 2.2),
11
Asociación de Organizaciones de los Cuchumatánes
16
and the early project close limited achievements in the project areas. These limitations hampered
implementation of the Action Plans in five of the six supported value chains that did not receive
project funds.
58.
Finally, some activities funded under component 1 did not relate directly to value chain
and MSME development, so including them was an inefficient approach to reaching the project
development objective. Such an independent activity is most evident in the area of access to
finance, where for example the creation of an MFI registry can be a useful tool for enhancing
financial soundness and regulatory compliance of financial entities, but the link toward increasing
MFI’s outreach to the target beneficiaries is weak.
59.
Overall, regarding cost-effectiveness, the bundling of some of the purchases led to a
reduction of prices and the ability to procure higher-quality products that are not typically available
in the local markets. For example, the purchase of spray pumps and plastic containers led to cost
savings of 20–30%.
60.
The project also would likely have had a positive return, had it been implemented all the
way through. Based on 2015 calculations, for example, the expected rate of return of the
investments and capacity building in the potato value chain was around 17%, with 4 years needed
to regain the invested funds. The remaining project support went to a number of small capacity
building activities, for which a return on investment calculation is not feasible.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome
Rating: Unsatisfactory
61.
The overall outcome rating is unsatisfactory. While the relevance of objectives remains
high, there were serious shortcomings in the design, implementation, and efficacy of the project.
The design and implementation rating is modest; the progress towards achieving the PDO is
negligible; and while it is not possible to quantify the efficiency of the project, cost-efficiency of
implementation is modest.
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
62.
Not available. However, most of the value chain activities focused on producer
organizations whose members had a significant share of indigenous populations.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
63.
The project supported a number of activities that have a potential to enhance the
institutional capacity of MINECO over time. However, these activities have not yet achieved
concrete results, which will depend on the availability of financing and human resources. The
support for developing the value chains is unlikely to lead to lasting institutional structures. The
course on ‘Good Practices in Agriculture and Manufacturing’ has not become a standardized
training tool, although all the value chain diagnostics identified substantial capacity building needs
in this area. This is mainly because the association in charge of training does not have enough
funds to continue rolling out the training. The culture of paying for training services is still
undeveloped.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: High
17
64.
The overall risk to project Development Outcome is rated High. For results to
materialize from the activities supported by the project, MINECO’s follow up is required on many
fronts. For example, while there are strong indications that MINECO will use the mobile
laboratory to provide critical BDS outside Guatemala City, fundamental issues remain related to
staffing and financing. Also, approving the regulations for the microfinance law will be essential
for ensuring that the registry for microfinance institutions is operational. Although MINECO is
committed to completing all the outstanding steps, changes in priorities, lack of ownership and
financing, high staff turnover, lack of capacity, and fragmented decision-making may prevent the
results from materializing. The implementation and funding of Action Plans will depend on the
availability of financing, both donor and credit. The potatoes value chain will likely sustain the
good practices in agriculture and manufacturing due to their positive impacts on beneficiaries.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Unsatisfactory
65.
The World Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry is unsatisfactory. The
serious shortcomings in the project that preparation did not address determined the ICR rating.
Although the World Bank was piloting a new approach to value chain support, and few lessons
existed at the time of preparation, a more defined project design would have ensured a smoother
implementation. In addition, a number of the main analytical pieces that would have contributed
to the better design of the project slipped to implementation. The analysis of the value chains and
the design of the methodology for selecting value chains were critical for timely implementation.
Moreover, the link between the PDO and Component 1 was not clear. Finally, lack of
implementation, readiness, including an Operations Manual that did not capture and address the
fiduciary arrangements of the project, an inadequate M&E framework, and the absence of an
economic and financial analysis, contribute to the Unsatisfactory rating.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
66.
The World Bank’s quality of supervision is rated moderately satisfactory. Supervision
missions were timely and focused on identifying and resolving bottlenecks to implementation. To
ensure hands-on support, one team member was located in the Country Office. A comprehensive
Mid Term Review was carried out in April 2015. The World Bank and MINECO reached an in
principle agreement on a substantial restructuring and an Action Plan intended to remove identified
bottlenecks to successful Project implementation. However, the restructuring resulting from the
mid-term review did not proceed, and the project was closed early. Procurement and financial
management were also supervised well, though fiduciary challenges remained throughout
implementation. On the other hand, there were some issues related to supervision as well: the
selection of the value chains to support under the Project was completed only in the first quarter
of 2015 largely, due to the cumbersome selection methodology that was incorporated in the design.
The shortcomings in methodology were not addressed under the first restructuring, or at any time
during Project implementation. Moreover, the project went through three TTLs during a two-anda-half year period of implementation. With every change, the relationship between the TTL and
the client had to be established, and the TTL needed to become fully proficient in the Project
18
design. With the arrival of the fourth and final TTL, who led the Project for two years, there was
consistency in decision-making that expedited the process of implementation.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
67.
Overall World Bank performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory given that the
quality at entry was unsatisfactory and the quality of supervision was moderately
satisfactory.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
68.
Government performance is rated unsatisfactory. The ICR rating reflects the political
economy and institutional constraints that made the implementation of this project difficult,
including delays due to the need to develop an understanding of the objectives of the project with
every incoming government or change in Vice Ministers of Economy. The government displayed
its commitment to the project during the mid-term review and as evidenced by Aides Memoire,
However, in light of the institutional and implementation issues that the project faced, more central
effort would have been desirable. Delays due to limited implementation capacity remained a
significant challenge throughout the project.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
69.
The Performance of the PIU is unsatisfactory. The implementing agency’s performance
is rated Unsatisfactory due to shortcomings, including (a) inadequate attention to the project until
late in the life of the project and (b) the deficiencies in carrying out procurement and contracting
activities (some of it being due to the complex institutional arrangements that slowed down
decision-making). Although there was some improvement in implementation after the 2014
restructuring, procurement and other institutional shortcomings, as discussed in this ICR,
prevented timely delivery of outputs and completion of activities according to the implementation
plan.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
70.
The Borrower performance is rated Unsatisfactory given that both the government
performance and the implementing agency performance was unsatisfactory.
6. Lessons Learned
71.
In addition to the political turmoil that engulfed Guatemala during the life of the
project and distracted from implementation, the essential reasons this project closed early
are:
a. Problems associated with design and readiness, which made implementation
challenging;
b. Key implementation challenges, in particular, procurement- and disbursement-
19
related issues, which persisted and had caused delays in disbursements; and
c. Other challenges that arose during implementation that contributed to further delays
in disbursement.
Lessons learned associated with each will be discussed below.
6.A. Design and Readiness Issues:
72.
Sequential project designs—like that used in this project—can significantly delay
activities and disbursements if the project faces obstacles in one phase. Component 1
encompassed a series of activities that could have taken place in parallel. Therefore, the slow
progress in one would not necessarily slow down disbursements in other aspects of the component.
However, Component 2 involved a sequence of activities. If the process faced hurdles in one step,
the whole component could not disburse. Given that Component 2 was the largest part in U.S.
dollars and since the project did not finalize the process for selecting value chains until
approximately a year before the closing of the project, this sequential project design contributed
significantly to delays in the implementation of activities, disbursements, and achieving objectives.
In a country like Guatemala, value chain work could focus on targeted interventions (such as
linking local producers to markets). If a lending operation envisions comprehensive value chain
work, substantial preparation would be required to ensure that the project is ready for
implementation. This preliminary work would mean that TA or other means should fund
identifying the supported value chains, the Action Plans, and the eligible subprojects. In that case,
the lending operation can support the implementation of subprojects. Doing so would reduce
delays in disbursement. This preparatory work would, of course, require sufficient budget.
73.
While leaving some flexibility in project design is good, projects should have a defined
design and set of M&E indicators, a sound economic and financial analysis, and an adequate
Operations Manual before presentation to the Board. Postponing definition of core activities
(in this case, developing the methodology for selecting value chains and identifying the value
chains to be supported and the investments needed to support them) to project implementation has
follow-on effects. For example, it entails that the associated M&E indicators, financial economic
analysis, and Operations Manual also cannot be defined in the project preparation phase.
74.
Establishing an adequate institutional framework during project preparation is
critical. The PIU within MINECO was responsible for executing the project activities. However,
because the PIU had no real budget execution powers, it could not implement the project
effectively. Also, the staff of executing units, particularly those for complex projects, should feel
ownership of projects they are implementing, fully understand them, and be willing to execute
them before the commencement of implementation activities. In this project, the PIU staff were
dedicated to their work on the PDER, and only after the closing of PDER did the PIU staff pay the
needed attention to the present project.
75.
When designing a project, World Bank teams should review the country portfolio and
identify possible synergies with other projects to avoid duplication and streamline of
implementation. There were some overlaps in the topics and areas covered by the PDER and the
MSME project. Consequently, there may have been some value in building on the existing project
and expanding upon the lessons learned and the existing relationships and institutional
infrastructure. This approach might have mitigated the challenge to project implementation caused
by the multiple demands on the PIU staff, as well as internal World Bank issues that resulted in
20
sending mixed signals to the Government of Guatemala from two different practice groups of the
World Bank.
76.
Detailed social assessment and safeguards analysis early on in project design can
produce critical information for the implementation of project activities. The project could
have benefitted from an evaluation of the implementation context. Such an evaluation would
include, for example, (a) assessing the participation of women, children, indigenous peoples, and
vulnerable populations in rural activities; (b) documenting potential risks and impacts related to
supporting particular sectors (for example, agribusiness), and (c) identifying more inclusive
indicators and fundamental social issues. This type of detailed assessment could have identified
the issues regarding the family unit of labor in agricultural practices, for example. This kind of
evaluation could also affect project design by flagging issues that are important in a particular
context—for instance, the issue of food security was also of concern in regions implementing
agribusiness projects and the design of the activities could have considered it in detail.
77.
Projects should be designed with the aim to transcend political parties and remain a
priority regardless of the government in power, and after each election, the incoming
government should be sensitized and informed about the project very early on (even before
the new administration takes office officially, and immediately after elections). Support to
value chains could be politically sensitive, even if there is robust analytical work to support
particular interventions. Different administrations may favor some sectors over others. Detangling
the lines of interest and going beyond lobby groups to support value chains in a satisfactory manner
requires a stable and transparent political environment and strong public (and private) sector
champions. The different administrations that were in power over the life of this project disagreed
about how Guatemala should develop and support rural areas (one supported MSMEs in rural areas,
and the other supported assistance to large firms with a trickle-down effect on the rest of the
economy). Also, given that election cycle is every four years and the average project life cycle is
six years, it is inevitable for projects to span across governments and elections. If a project has to
be negotiated and approved by an outgoing government, it is critical to ensure that, as soon as
elections have taken place, the project team has engaged the incoming administration and
sensitized it to the project. The team needs to identify champions for the project early, ideally,
even before the government has taken office. The Country Management Unit of the World Bank
would be a critical partner in this regard.
6.B. Implementation Challenges: Procurement and disbursement
78.
Detailed discussions regarding the prevalence of the World Bank Procurement
Guidelines before implementation and a thorough understanding of the processes on both
the client side and the World Bank side are necessary to streamline the procurement
processes. Procurement was one of the areas that presented the greatest challenges in this project.
Confusion regarding the use of policies underscores the need for a detailed Operations Manual that
should be prepared and agreed upon between the government and the World Bank in the early
stages of the project. The PIU relied on a mixture of procurement policies, some that complied
with the national law and others that followed World Bank guidelines. Some of these policies
conflicted with each other, whereas others were duplicates. The risk of having two sets of policies
that could potentially conflict with one another, causing confusion and delays in the project, would
have been mitigated by agreeing with the World Bank on an Operational Manual where roles,
responsibilities, and flow of processes were clearly defined. The current World Bank procurement
framework and strategy, which will apply to future projects, addresses these risks by analyzing all
21
possible constraints before implementation. The project procurement strategy will identify at an
early stage all known factors, both enablers and limitations, which may impact either the delivery
of the project or the procurement approach. The team should thoroughly plan all technical aspects
of subprojects before implementation.
6.C. Other Challenges that Arose During Implementation:
79.
When key risk issues arise during implementation, it is important for the World Bank
to react with agility. As it relates to child labor, the issue was first brought to the attention of the
World Bank in early April, 2015, general recommendations were included in the ISR of July, 2015.
Final guidance that would allow the project team to operationalize the decisions and, therefore,
start disbursements again under component 2, was made in November, 2015. From June until the
issue was resolved in November, 2015, the project implementation team did not make any
disbursements under Component 2, which contributed to some of the delays in disbursement.
80.
Focusing on peripheral projects or proposals during implementation can distract the
team from essential project objectives and delay implementation. The assessment of the
potential work on productive activities in Chixoy was a valuable and important effort that could
have added greater dimension to the project. At the same time, an attempt to incorporate activities
related to Chixoy also diverted some efforts from the other project activities. Support to Chixoy
did not end up materializing, given that the mid-term restructuring proposed, which would have
provided support to this community, did not materialize. Similarly, the consideration of the
client’s request to produce feasibility studies for irrigation projects required efforts that were
outside the original scope of implementation. Attention to these peripheral projects meant that the
World Bank and the client could not fully focus on implementing the core activities of the project.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(A) Borrower/Implementing Agencies
81.
The borrower and implementing agencies confirmed their overall agreement with the ICR.
(b) Cofinanciers
Not applicable.
(C) Other Partners and Stakeholders
Not applicable.
22
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$, millions equivalent)
(b) Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
Unallocated
Designated account
Front end fee
Total Project Cost
Appraisal Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (USD
millions)
9.7
19
2.52
0.70
0
0.08
32
2.108
1.147
1.167
0
0.103
0.08
4.605
Percentage of
Appraisal
21.73
6.03
46.30
0
100
(b) Financing
Source of Funds
Borrower
IBRD
Total
Actual/Latest
Percentage of
Estimate
Estimate
Cofinancing
Appraisal
(USD millions) (USD millions)
Type of
-
Appraisal
$32
$32
23
$4.605
$4.605
14.5
14.5
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Component 1: Improving and Promoting Business Development Services
Subcomponent 1.1: Improving and Promoting Quality Services
1.
The project supported a number of activities to (a) enhance the human capacity in
CENAME, (b) create the necessary infrastructure to provide quality services, and (c) promote
quality services in the country:
A. Enhance Human Capacity in CENAME
2.
The project financed capacity building for the staff of CENAME to help them study and
understand the available equipment. Furthermore, the project-funded capacity building for staff to
operate the mobile laboratory and a field visit to Argentina to study the functioning of a mobile
laboratory and build consensus on the needed equipment and technical specifications of the mobile
laboratory.
B. Create the Necessary Infrastructure to Provide Quality Services
3.
To help CENAME provide services outside Guatemala City, the project financed (a)
feasibility studies for the mobile laboratory, (b) the elaboration of routes for the cost-efficient
rollout of the lab, and (c) the purchase of a panel truck and equipment. Furthermore, the project
paid for some electrical equipment (hardware and software) for CENAME and financed a preinvestment study and building permit for a new CENAME annex.
C. Promote Quality Services in the Country
4.
To disseminate information on why quality control is important and assess demand for
mobile labs, the project supported several workshops. Dissemination included support for the
annual national quality fair, which attracts around 400 stakeholders and 15 other outreach
activities. Furthermore, study carried out with project support assessed demand for calibration and
assay services in individual departments of Guatemala.
Subcomponent 1.2: Strengthening Business Development Services
5.
To provide a better overview of available BDS, the project supported the design and
creation of a platform for the Registry of Suppliers of Business Development Services.
Furthermore, the project carried out a first categorization and assessment of needs training and TA
for the Suppliers of Business Development Services.
Subcomponent 1.3: Supporting Pilots for the Development and Implementation of New
Products
6.
To facilitate access to financing, the project supported various reforms to create more
transparency about microfinance institutions operating in the country and facilitate their access to
funding for on-lending purposes. The supported reforms included (a) designing a platform to
automate second-tier funds of the MSME financing trust fund managed by MINECO, (b)
24
designing a registry for non-profit microfinance institutions, (c) purchasing hardware and software
for the two aforementioned platforms, and (d) financing a validation workshop with national
stakeholders on design of Registry of Microfinance Entities (REM). Finally, the project supported
the design of a credit guarantee fund that MINECO would manage and financed a three-day study
tour for three staff members to Peru, to study the credit guarantee scheme FOGAPI. The FIRST
trust fund financed the development of the Operational Manual and regulations.
7.
The BDS Unit of the MINECO also piloted support for the legalization of 27 MSME
producer group, and supported the design, creation, and implementation of 35 websites for
MSMEs.
Subcomponent 1.4: Strengthening Capacity in the MINECO Vice Ministry for Micro, Small,
and Medium Enterprise Development
8.
The project funded a substantial amount of training for the staff of MINECO to enhance
the delivery of quality services by the Vice Ministry and its regional offices.

A diploma in ‘Development of Managerial Skills and Competencies’ was created for
personnel in the central offices and the regional headquarters of BDS. Thirty-nine
people received diplomas in administrative management after participating in 158
hours of training. The training included a broad range of components, like effective
communication, negotiation skills, conflict resolution, and time management.

Personnel in the Vice Ministry of Economy received training in ‘The Seven Habits of
Highly Effective People’, with 112 people participating in the course. The course
spanned 10 weeks and covered 28 hours of teaching material.

Eighteen people also received IT training to enhance IT project management.

Finally, seven people received training for high impact presentations.
9.
To enhance regional service provision, the project funded study tours, capacity building,
and office upgrades.

The offices of the regional MINECO headquarters received new furnishings,
equipment, and audiovisual facilities. Some regional offices also received
motorcycles to facilitate outreach to remote areas.

To develop Small Business Development Centers similar to the ones operating in the
United States, the project financed a three-day study tour for nine stakeholders and
MINECO staff to Texas, United States.
Component 2: Creating Productive Value Chains
A. Project-Funded Technical Assistance to Facilitate and Guide the Selection of Value Chains
and the Elaboration of Action Plans
25
10.
In 2013, the Advisory Committee was created with the Vice Minister for MSME
Development as chair and representatives from academic institutions, civil society, and the public
and private sectors. Furthermore, with project support, a process started to identify productive
value chains for the initial technical evaluation phase. The Advisory Board identified ten value
chains for a quantitative evaluation:
(a) Avocado
(b) Sesame
(c) Cocoa
(d) Cardamom
(e) Beans
(f) Milk
(g) Mango
(h) Potato seeds
(i)
Papaya
(j)
Vegetables
11.
In 2014, the project funded the analysis of the ten selected value chains based on four
criteria for evaluation:
(a) The dynamic of demand and competitiveness
(b) The assessment of potential impact
(c) Preconditions for success/assessment of risks
(d) Geographic factors
12.
Written reports detailed the results of the evaluation. The reports included information on
the size of the value chain, locations, share of formal and informal MSMEs in each sector, and
emerging weaknesses and challenges. Based on these reports, the Advisory Committee, in early
2015, selected six value chains and recommended them for further project support to MINECO.
13.
In 2015, the project supported a detailed strategic planning exercise and the development
of subprojects that each of the six selected value chains would execute. The planning exercise
involved a broad consultation process with stakeholders along the value chain (suppliers,
producers, and buyers). A Value Chain Committee of 12–32 members for each of the value chains
led the planning exercise. An action plan for each value chain consolidated the findings. The
findings comprised (a) a qualitative evaluation, (b) a situation analysis and development of a
strategic vision for the chain, (c) a baseline, (d) an action plan per se, and (e) subprojects for the
26
involved producer organizations. For the potato value chain, the action plan involved, for example,
stakeholders from Quetzaltenango, Huehuetenanco, and San Marcos, areas that together account
for 77 percent of the national potato production and 85 percent of the productive units. It included
detailed assessments of 19 potato producer organizations to identify weaknesses and strengths in
their production techniques and infrastructure (storage and so on). This approach was new in
Guatemala, where cluster work had mostly focused on individual locations and producers but had
not involved stakeholders throughout the value chain.
Table 2.1. Number of Producer Organizations to Benefit Under the Value Chain Action Plans
Value Chain
Number of Involved
Producer Organizations
26
Geographical Location
Vegetables for export Sacatepéquez, Chimaltenango
Huehuetenango,
Potatoes
Quetzaltenango, San Marcos
Beans (pulses)
Chiquimula, Jalapa, Jutiapa
Alta Verapaz, Isabal, Petén,
Cocoa
Quiche
Cardamom
Alta Verapaz
Papaya
Petén
Total
Source: Value chain Action Plans.
Number of Members
n.a.
52
5.915
25
19 producer organizations
and 13 pre-cooperatives
52
18
205
9.601
3.912
Over 10.000
2.168
31.596
B., Project Support for Technical Assistance and Investment Funding to Implement Value
Chain Action Plans
14.
In light of the termination of the project, support for the implementation of the Action Plans
was limited to the potato value chain. The support aimed at enhancing the use of certified seeds
and improving adherence to sanitary standards and requirements. Other measures sought to
increase quality and safety of the potato production and improve market access.
Provision of Training
15.
In the first half of 2016, the project contracted BDS provider ASOCUCH for the
Huehuetenango region and FUNDASISTEMAS for the San Marcos-Quetzaltenango region. The
training program for all the beneficiary organizations included environmental and social
safeguards training, as well as good practices in agriculture and manufacturing. The latter focused
on quality standards and organic farming techniques.
Three hundred and fifty-five members of eight producer organizations in the potato value
chain received training on good agricultural and manufacturing practices. Seventy members were
female (20 percent). Two hundred seventeen potato seed growers received training on potato seed
production.
16.
27
Table 2.2. Project-Funded Training Provided to Members of the Potato Value Chain
Course
Number
Duration
of
(Hours)
Courses
General Potato Value Chain Training (delivered by ASOCUCH)
Module 1: ‘Basis concepts of good agricultural
3
10
practices’
Module 2: ‘Sources of food contamination and value
3
10
chain concept training’
Module 3: ‘Clean production plot’
3
10
Module 4: ‘Good practices in potato growing (Part I)’
3
10
Module 5: ‘Good practices in potato growing (Part
3
10
II)’
Module 6: ‘Good practices in potato growing (Part
3
10
III)’
Module 7: ‘Basic concepts of good manufacturing’
3
10
Module 8: ‘Hygiene and standards for cleanliness in
3
10
storage/collection centers’
Potato Seed Value Chain Training (delivered by ASOCUCH)
Module 1: ‘Technical concepts of potato seed
3
9
production’
Module 2: ‘Legal framework for potato seed
3
9
production’
Module 3: ‘Good practices in growing seeds’
3
6
Module 4: ‘Good practices in processing seeds’
3
6
Module 5: ‘Principles in agricultural management’
3
9
Number of
Participating
RPO
Number of
Participant
s
8
289
8
289
8
8
291
293
8
334
8
334
8
289
8
289
4
217
4
211
4
4
4
172
171
217
Financing of Subprojects
17.
The project directly benefitted the 1,209 members of the producer organizations. The
estimated rate of return on the invested project funds was over 20 percent, with the recuperation
time of the invested funds below four years, but the calculations also included also investments
into upgrades of the storage facilities. The latter were no longer feasible to finance in the remaining
time frame of the project.
Table 2.3. Investments Financed in Potato Value Chain
SubProject Title
Production of potato seed
and implementation of good
manufacturing practices in
potato management
Region
Supported
Huehuetenango,
San Marcos,
Quetzaltenango
Beneficiary
RPO
28
28
Beneficiary
Members of
RPO
Investment Support
Received
1,209
5,046 plastic containers, 35
stainless steel tables, 287
plastic pallets, 411 spray
pumps for chemicals, 1
potato washing equipment,
296 aprons,
296 nets, 21 signposts, 17
scales, 21 medical chests
and cleaning kits,
Table 2.4. List of the 28 Beneficiary Organizations that Received Investment Support in the Potato Value
Chain
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Name of MSME
Geographical Location
Potato Seed Producing Value Chain
Cooperativa Agrícola Integral Joya Hermosa de las Tres
Aldea Climentoro, Aguacatán,
Cruces, R. L. (Joya Hermosa de las Tres Cruces Unified
Huehuetenango
Agricultural Cooperative)
Asociación de Comunidades Rurales para el Desarrollo
Aldea La Capellanía, Chiantla,
Integral (Rural Communities Association for Integrated
Huehuetenango
Development)
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Unión Todosantera
Cantón El Calvario, Todos Santos
(Unión Todosantera Association for Integrated
Cuchumatán, Huehuetenango
Development)
Cooperativa Integral Agrícola Paquixeña Cuchumateca,
Aldea Paquix, Chiantla,
R.L. (Paquixeña Unified Agricultural Cooperative)
Huehuetenango
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral La Pradera (La Pradera Caserío El Plan Calapté, Ixchiguán,
Association for Integrated Development)
San Marcos
Asociación de Desarrollo Social Ixchiguanense (Ixchiguán Cantón San Cristóbal, Ixchiguán,
Association for Social Development)
San Marcos
Asociación Integral Papicultores Ostuncalco (Ostuncalco
Caserío Los Alonzo, San Juan
Unified Association of Potato Growers)
Ostuncalco, Quetzaltenango
Asociación Agricultores Esquipulas-Boxoncán (Esquipulas- Aldea Boxoncán, Tajumulco, San
Boxoncán Farmers Association)
Marcos
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral La Comarca (La
Aldea Laguna Chica, San José
Comarca Association for Integrated Development)
Ojetenam, San Marcos
General Potato Value Chain
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Piedra de Fuego (Piedra Aldea Piedra de Fuego,
de Fuego Association for Integrated Development)
Comitancillo, San Marcos
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Flor San José la
Ciénaga (Flor San José La Ciénaga Association for
San Juan Ixcoy, Huehuetenango
Integrated Development)
Asociación de Agricultores y Artesanos La Nueva Jerusalén Aldea Chicoy, Todos Santos
(La Nueva Jerusalén Association of Farmers and Artisans) Cuchumatánes, Huehuetenango
Cooperativa Integral de Ahorro y Crédito El Altiplano
Aldea Chemal, Todos Santos,
Mam, R. L. (El Altiplano Mam Unified Savings and Loan
Chuchumatánes, Huehuetenango
Cooperative)
Asociación de Silvicultores Chancol (Chancol Association Aldea Siete Pinos, Chiantla,
of Foresters)
Huehuetenango
Cooperativa Integral de Ahorro y Crédito Flor Milpense, R.
San Juan Ixcoy, Huehuetenango
L. (Flor Milpense Unified Savings and Loan Cooperative)
Cooperativa Integral Agrícola Flor Guadalupana
Aldea Bacu, San Juan Ixcoy,
Bacuense, R. L. (Flor Guadalupana Bacuense Unified
Huehuetenango
Agricultural Cooperative)
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Comunitario Tejutlense
(Tejutla Association for Integrated Community
Tejutla, San Marcos
Development)
Caserío Buena Vista. Aldea
Asociación de Campesinos Forestales Buena Vista (Buena
Chichim, Todos Santos
Vista Association of Farmers and Foresters)
Cuchumatánes, Huehuetenango
Asociación de Autogestión Turística (Touristic SelfTodos Santos Cuchumatánes,
management Association)
Huehuetenango
Asociación Civil, no Lucrativa de Desarrollo Integral del
Altiplano Tutuapense (Non-profit Civil Association for
Concepción Tutuapa, San Marcos
Integrated Development of the Tutuapa Highlands)
29
Members
65
50
50
50
40
30
30
20
20
52
50
40
40
40
40
60
50
40
37
30
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Name of MSME
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Nimal Tnam (Nimal
Tnam Association for Integrated Development)
Cooperativa Integral Agrícola Tuichanenses, R. L.
(Tuichán Integrated Agricultural Cooperative)
Asociación de Desarrollo del Occidente de Guatemala
(Western Guatemala Development Association)
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Comunidades
Ojetecas (Association for the Integrated Development of
Ojeteca Communities)
Asociación Vida, Padres y Amigos de Personas
Discapacitadas de Tejutla (Tejutla Life Association of
Parents and Friends of the Disabled)
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Medianos
Agricultores de Guatemala (Association for the Integrated
Development of Medium-size Farmers in Guatemala)
Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Sinaí, Palestina de los
Altos (Sinaí-Palestina de los Altos Integrated Development
Association)
Asociación de Agricultores para el Desarrollo Concepción
Chiquirichapa (Concepción Chiquirichapa Association of
Farmers for Development)
Total Beneficiaries
30
Geographical Location
Concepción Tutuapa, San Marcos
Aldea Tuichán, Ixchiguán, San
Marcos
Cantón Tojchoc Grande, Aldea El
Rosario, Tacaná, San Marcos
Members
35
60
50
San José Ojetenam, San Marcos
40
jutla, San Marcos
50
Tacaná, San Marcos
30
Concepción Chiquirichapa,
Quetzaltenango
50
Palestina de los Altos,
Quetzaltenango
60
1,209
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
(including assumptions in the analysis)
Not applicable.
31
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team Members
Names
Lending
Cristian Quijada Torres
Monica Lehnhoff
Lourdes Consuelo Linares Loza
Carlos Fernando Paredes
Solorzano
Daniel Ortiz del Salto
Title
Unit
Responsibility/Specialty
Senior Private Sector Specialist
Procurement Specialist
Senior Financial Management
Specialist
GTC04 Team Leader
GGO04 Procurement Specialist
Financial Management
GGO02
Specialist
Senior Operations Officer
LCCGT Team Member
Operations Officer
Senior Social Development
Dianna M. Pizarro
Specialist
Jaime Andres Uribe Frias
Economist
Jimena Garrote
Senior Counsel
Luz Berania Diaz Rios
Senior Agribusiness Specialist
Tuuli Johanna Bernardini
Environmental Specialist
Michael Goldberg
Lead Operations Officer
Rekha Reddy
Senior Financial Sector Economist
Thomas Edward Haven
Senior Private Sector Specialist
Tomas Socias
Procurement Specialist
Senior Financial Management
Antonio Leonardo Blasca
Specialist
Abdelaziz Lagnaoui
Lead Environment Specialist
Andres Mac Gaul
Senior Procurement Specialist
Benjamin Schapiro
Safeguards Specialist
Johannes Werner Christia Schuster Consultant
Senior Social Development
Kristyna Bishop
Specialist
Kwang Wook Kim
Consultant
Oliver James Rogers
Safeguards Specialist
Senior Financial Management
Patricia De la Fuente Hoyes
Specialist
Pilar Elisa Gonzales Rodrigues
Senior Counsel
Sandra Monica Tambucho Perez
Senior Finance Officer
Sunita Varada
Special Assistant
Valeri Hickey
Practice Manager
Supervision/ICR
Raha Shahidsaless
Senior Private Sector Specialist
Ilka Funke
Consultant
Zahra Alleyne
Consultant
Julie Barbet Gros
Private Sector Analyst
GTC04
Team Member
GSU04
Safeguards Specialist
GTCIE
LEGOP
GFA04
GEN04
GFMSO
GFM04
GTC03
GGODR
Team Member
Counsel
Team Member
Environmental Specialist
Team Leader
Team Leader
Team Leader
Procurement Specialist
Financial Management
GGO22
Specialist
GEN06 Team Member
GGOGI Team Member
LCSDE Safeguards Specialist
LCSPE Safeguards Specialist
GSU01
Team Member
CASSB Team Member
LCSPF Safeguards Specialist
GGO22 Team Member
LEGLE
WFALA
GGEVP
GEN03
Team Member
Team Member
Team Member
Safeguards Specialist
GTC04
GTC04
GTC04
GTC04
TTL/Co-Author
Author of
Contributor
Contributor
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle
Lending
FY09
No. of Staff Weeks
US$, Thousands (Including
Travel and Consultant
Costs)
2.03
11.25
32
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle
Lending
FY10
FY11
Total:
Supervision/ICR
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
Total:
No. of Staff Weeks
US$, Thousands (Including
Travel and Consultant
Costs)
15.30
38.93
56.26
56.23
57.12
124.6
0.30
17.29
15.41
39.00
77.98
26.00
4.48
180.46
0.00
23.16
18.24
22.65
104.49
23.01
14.60
206.15
33
Annex 5. Evolution of Results Framework
PAD
First Restructuring July 2014)
Second Restructuring
(February 2016)
Key Performance Indicators
Value increase per unit in
respective value chains (US$)
Modified: Increase in revenue of
MSMEs in value chains selected for
project support
Number of MSMEs participating
in value chain working groups
Dropped
Added: Number of MSMEs that
have received support from at least
one activity implemented by the
project
Dropped
Number of MSMEs that have
received support from at least
one activity implemented by
the project
Intermediate Outcome Indicators
Component 1
Number of calibration services
provided to MSMEs
Number of accreditations
provided to MSMEs
Number of hits on online
platform providing information
on international standards and
listing certified companies
Number of hits on online
directory of BDS providers
Modified: Number of calibration
and testing services provided to
MSMEs
Modified: Number of
normalization, certification,
accreditation, and metrology
verification services provided to
MSMEs
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Modified: Number of BDS
providers validated categorized and
registered with the new BDS online
database
Added: Number of MFIs registered
in the new MFI registry
Added: Number of municipalities in
which MSMEs can receive BDS
provided by the MSME directorate
Added: Volume of World Bank
Support: Institutional Development–
SME
Added: Volume of World Bank
Support: Enabling Environment
SME
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Added: MINECO personnel
trained (number of staff)
Added: Number of MSMEs
that receive BDS provided by
the BDS Unit
Component 2
Number of workers trained in
the tourism value chain by
programs supported by the
project
Modified: Percentage of MSMEs
receiving services from project
activities relative to total number of
firms in selected value chain tourism
34
Dropped
PAD
First Restructuring July 2014)
Added: Percentage of MSMEs
receiving services from project
activities relative to total number of
firms in selected value chain agribusiness
Number of hits in the projectsupported e-tourism platforms
Number of tourists using
project-supported tourism
packages
Number of companies in value
chain compliant with relevant
SPS standards
Narrowing of price gap between
U.S. import prices of respective
produce compared to other Latin
American countries
Number of producers
participating in projectsupported training and outreach
programs
Second Restructuring
(February 2016)
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Dropped
Added: Training in Good
Manufacturing and Business
Practices (number of
beneficiary MSMEs)
Added: Percentage of project
beneficiaries that implement clean
production improvements
Dropped
Added: Value Chain Strategic
Plans (Number of plans
elaborated)
Added: Competitiveness
SubProject Proposals (Number
of subprojects developed
under the project)
35
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
Not applicable.
36
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and Comments on Draft ICR
AVISO DE CONFIDENCIALIDAD
La información contenida en este correo electrónico es considerada privilegiada y confidencial, y debe ser utilizada única y exclusivame
destinatario. Si usted no es el destinatario, empleado o el encargado de llevar este correo al destinatario, por este medio se le notifica q
publicación, revelación, copia, distribución o cualquier acción que se tome o realice en relación con el contenido del presente correo, es
estrictamente prohibida. Si recibe este correo por error, por favor repórtelo a [email protected] con el objeto de arreglar la devo
correo, documentos e información.
De: Ada Azucena Ramírez Villatoro
Enviado el: jueves, 19 de enero de 2017 06:54 p.m.
Para: Rosa María Ortega de Ramazzini; Luis Javier Ortíz Jerez
CC: Juan Jose Véliz Olivet; David Estuardo González Furlán
Asunto: RE: Reenv: Urgente: Banco Mundial: Informe de Clausura ICR - Proyecto Fortalecimiento de la
Productividad de la Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa
Estimada Rosa María:
En atención a las instrucciones recibidas, me permito remitir los comentarios al documento
recibido:
En sentido, se indica que la calificación de la gestión del Banco es moderadamente
insatisfactorio y la del prestatario es insatisfactorio.
En comentarios específicos, al documento se incluye lo referente a que el cierre anticipado y
desobligación de recursos del préstamo fue un acción consensuada entre ambas partes, en virtud
que en el documento se incluye la solicitud del Gobierno únicamente. Asimismo, se indica que
debe revisarse lo indicado referente a que el Gobierno solicitó que la ejecución del préstamo se
detuviera hasta que estuviera cerrado el préstamo PDER.
Es importante indicar que los comentarios se encuentran incluidos en el documento adjunto.
Atte.
Azucena Ramírez
37
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
Not applicable.
38
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents
World Bank, Country Economic Memorandum, 2010,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/docsearch/report/4195
World Bank, Guatemala Country Partnership Strategy, 2009–2012,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/893701468250878107/Guatemala-Countrypartnership-strategy
World Bank, Project to support the Rural Economic Development Program (PDER),
http://projects.worldbank.org/P094321/project-support-rural-economic-developmentprogram?lang=en
39

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