ga1.disec – muntr 2014
Transcription
ga1.disec – muntr 2014
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL Honourable participants, It is a tremendous pleasure to welcome you all to the tenth annual session of Model United Nations Turkey (MUNTR) 2014 Conference. I am Hüseyin Kağan İmamoğlu and I have the distinct honour of serving as the Secretary-General of MUNTR, a conference that has, for the past decade, successfully presented its participants a unique simulation experience that strives to achieve academic discussions of the highest quality. Bearing in mind the perfect example that has been set for MUNTR by its previous sessions, the Secretariat has been working relentlessly in order to create an academic setting deserving of the successful tradition we are now leading as well as satisfying its participants with regards to all academic-wise matters. A substantial amount of effort has been put into this very guide, and I would like to assure all of you that this document contains all the necessary knowledge required in order to participate in the discussions. Before addressing the academic content of this document, I have to thank all members of the Secretariat, and Ms. Arzum Koca in particular. Without her dedication and efforts, the setting we have been pursuing so as to attain academic excellence would be incomplete. As the Under-Secretary-General responsible for the General Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and International Security, her devotion and contribution to the Conference has been indispensable. The General Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and International Security, will be focusing on two highly important issues, that currently occupy the international agenda: Promoting Effective Verification and Compliance Measures for Arms Control and Disarmament and Strengthening Proactive Cyber Defense and Enhancing International Information Security. Within this context, the delegates of DISEC, are highly encouraged to thoroughly read this very study guide prepared for them. Considering that DISEC, a General Assembly Committee, will be a rather large committee in which its participants can experience the art of lobbying, utilization and combination of this guide with the policies of Member States present in the sessions will be of key importance with regards to achieving a Conference that incorporates a simulation experience which will gratify academic expectations. In case you require any further information or instruction as to the academic-wise content of the Conference and DISEC in especial, you may always contact your Committee Directors; responsible Under-Secretary-General, Ms. Arzum Koca; or me via [email protected]. Reiterating my sincere belief and confidence that MUNTR 2014 will be a Conference in which not only the academic trend we have generated over the past decade, but also you will excel; I welcome you once more. Kind regards, Hüseyin Kağan İmamoğlu Secretary-General LETTER FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL Dear participants, My name is Arzum Koca and I am a junior at Ankara University School of Law. In this conference I serve as the Under-Secretary-General responsible for the Disarmament and International Security Committee and the Scheidemann Cabinet and it is my pleasure to welcome you. Along with our Secretary General we chose the topics related to verification and compliance for our first agenda item, and cyber crime related topics for our second agenda item. When you try to disarm the world there are many discussions about how to regulate that disarmament but regardless of the measures it always comes to the necessity of ensuring the verification of those measures. Before moving to further implementations regarding disarmament the world needs to ensure the compliance first. This is the reason behind our first choice. While the first agenda item is the substructure of further solutions the second one addresses the needs of digital era. Knowing the impotence of both topics I wish you fruitful debates. Although they are very essential I am well aware that MUN activities do not only consist of academics. Therefore it is my sincere wish for you to get to know other participants, make long lasting friendships, enjoy all the social events and make many good memories. Should you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me via [email protected] or your committee directors. Regards, Arzum KOCA Under-Secretary-General General Assembly First Committee and 1919 Germany: Cabinet Scheidemann GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST DISEC works in close cooperation with COMMITTEE: DISARMAMENT two AND INTERNATIONAL Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the bodies, namely Geneva based UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) SECURITY (DISEC) which was established by the UN Special Assembly Session on Disarmament in 1978.vi While deliberative, the Commission deals with a smaller policymaking and representative organ of number of items than the First Committee the United Nations (UN) which was and in greater detail; CD focuses on established in 1945.i The GA comprises of negotiation of treaties.vii Although CD sets all 193 Members of the UN with equal its own agenda, it is funded by the UN and United Nations (UNGA) is General the chief meaning each reports to the General Assembly. viii Also Member State in the Assembly has one reporting to the General Assembly, it is vote.iii decided by GA’s decision that as of 2000, representation principle, ii the UNDC would normally comprise two Being the First Committee of the GA, substantive items per year from the whole Disarmament and International Security range of disarmament issues, including one Committee on nuclear disarmament.ix (DISEC) deals with disarmament, threats to peace and tries to find solutions to the challenges in the The Concept of International Security international security regime.iv and Disarmament The First Committee considers all According to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the disarmament and international security UN Charter, matters within the scope of the UN Charter international such “the peace maintenance and of security and principles of disarmament”, is an important objective of maintenance of the UN for strengthening international international peace and security, principles security. x From the term "disarmament" governing disarmament and the regulation various measures related to the regulation, of armaments; promotion of cooperative limitation, reduction and elimination of arrangements and measures aimed at armaments, armed forces and military strengthening stability through lower levels expenditures; limitations or prohibitions on of armaments.v the as cooperation the in general the development, testing, production, emplacement, deployment, proliferation and transfer or use of arms can be understood. xi One crucial point about of the peaceful settlement of disputes with disarmament measures is that, it should be implementation of progressively more balanced: No state should gain a military effective measures for peace-keeping.xvi advantage as a result, or have its security diminished.xii AGENDA ITEM A: The term “international security” can be PROMOTING EFFECTIVE defined as “a state of international VERIFICATION AND relations COMPLIANCE MEASURES FOR in which implementation respect for of there sovereign the rights is full equality, inherent in sovereignty, non-use of force or the threat of force, the inviolability of frontiers, the ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT A. INTRODUCTION territorial integrity of States, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, equality of rights and the right of peoples to determine their own destiny; cooperation among States and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under Bearing in mind the utmost importance of disarmament the maintenance of international peace and security, it is vital to know that the States are acting in accordance with the related regulations. In other words it should be ensured that disarmament agreements are being complied with and the method for that is verification. international law.”xiii in xvii Although specific techniques of verification will change Disarmament and effective international based on the nature of each particular security disarmament measure, the disarmament process. preservation xiv is a complex It incorporates the halting of the will still require efficient verification.xviii arms race, reduction and elimination of arms while having effective verification measures. On the other hand, it would be better to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence, for the maintenance of undiminished security for all States and enhancing security throughout the process.xv Also it includes the involvement "Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed." (General Assembly resolution Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) can be defined as “weapon[s] with the capacity to inflict death and destruction on such a massive scale and so indiscriminately that its very presence in the hands of a hostile power can be considered a grievous threat.” xxii WMDs have the potential to kill thousands of people in a single attack. xxiii Moreover S-10/2, their effects may persist in the environment and human bodies. xxiv They are nuclear, paragraph 31) At the following parts of this Agenda Item, specific verification measures for different types of disarmament mechanisms, general obstacles of effective verification systems and compliance methods will be inspected in details. The root cause of the diversity in disarmament measures comes from the difference of the armaments which are the subjects of disarmament. a. Weapons of Mass Destruction xix Each armament has its own appropriate method. xx I. Classification of Arms Arms can be classified by many factors such as user, target or function. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs divides the arms in two main categories as, weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, each with its sub-distinctions.xxi biological, or chemical weapons; xxv moreover, there are certain differences in their use, effects, legal status and strategic importance.xxvi 1. Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons work by releasing a huge amount of energy through fusion or fission.xxvii Although nuclear weapons have been used in war only twicexxviii – by the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 – the threat of their usage, whether intentional or accidental, by States or by terrorists, remains as long as such weapons continue to exist.xxix The United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Israel are the nine States that are believed to be the only States in possession of nuclear nuclear weapon States in a multilateral weapons.xxx treaty Apart from the safeguarded nuclear stocks, which has the goal of disarmament.xxxvi there are also concerns that other related Another important treaty concerning the nuclear nuclear materials are not secured non-proliferation is the sufficiently and are vulnerable to theft.xxxi Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Related to the protection of these nuclear (CTBT) which bans the nuclear weapon and radioactive materials, the International tests. xxxvii Verification of whether or not Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains the parties are fulfilling their obligations is an Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) on ensured by the Preparatory Commission incidents of illicit trafficking and other for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty unauthorized occurred Organization (CTBTO) which maintains a intentionally or unintentionally, with or monitoring network of 337 facilities without crossing international borders, as globally.xxxviii activities that well as unsuccessful or thwarted acts.xxxii CD has also started working on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear negotiations of a verifiable treaty banning Weapons (NPT) which aims to achieve the production of fissile materials for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear nuclear weapons, but there are still energy, to prevent further spread of nuclear significant hurdles to overcome, including weapons nuclear whether and how it can be verified that disarmament can be considered a landmark States are meeting their obligations under international treaty. xxxiii A total of 190 such a treaty.xxxix and to pursue parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US), then DPRK announced its withdrawal and that left the Treaty with 189 parties.xxxiv While more States have acceded to NPT than to other disarmament agreements, in 1995, the duration of the NPT was extended indefinitely. xxxv Also another important characteristic of the NPT is that it is the only binding commitment made by the There are also regional efforts towards global nuclear non-proliferation. Four Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are in force: in Latin America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Central Asia. xl A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone can be specified as “a region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test or possess nuclear weapons.” xli Each Nuclear Weapon Free Zone establishing treaty has Nazi concentration camps and in Asia).xlviii a protocol for the five nuclear-weapon Development, manufacture and stockpiling States to sign and ratify. xlii According to of chemical weapons intensified in the these Cold War period.xlix legally binding protocols, the nuclear-weapon States respect the status of the zones and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty States Parties.xliii The danger of the chemical weapons led governments to adopt Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and requires 2. Chemical Weapons Modern use of chemical weapons began with World War I, when both sides to the conflict used poisonous gas to inflict agonizing suffering and eventually caused almost 1.3 million casualties.xliv States Parties to destroy all stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years with a possible extension of up to five years (which was 2012). l Inspections system of CWC and the guarantee of the safe destruction of these weapons are carried As a result of public outrage, the Geneva out by the Organization for the Prohibition Protocol which prohibits the use of of chemical weapons in warfare was signed in indicated in the CWC.li Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as 1925.xlv Although it was a beneficial step, the Protocol did not prohibit the 3. Biological Weapons development, production or stockpiling of Rapid advancements in the life sciences chemical weapons. xlvi Another problem of and the globalization of biotechnology the Protocol was the fact that many States make the deliberate use of biological that ratified the Protocol reserved the right agents as weapons to cause disease to use prohibited weapons against States outbreaks, a growing concern.lii Apart from that were not party to the Protocol or in the above mentioned Geneva Protocol cases where chemical weapons were used which contained the same weaknesses for against them.xlvii both chemical and biological weapons, liii In the inter-war period, two signatories of the Geneva Protocol used chemical weapons (by Italy in northern Africa and by Japan in China) and unfortunately the violations continued in World War II (in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC or BWC as mentioned in some documents) which bans the development, production, kilograms of conventional weapons to stockpiling and acquisition of biological megaton nuclear warheads.lx and toxin weapons and requires the destruction of such weapons or delivery means was signed in 1972. liv With total 170 States-Parties and 13 signatories, there are still 19 States which have neither signed nor ratified the Convention. lv Although some steps have been taken, the BTWC has no formal monitoring and verification mechanism and lacks any measures for investigating States suspected of non-compliance.lvi Although proliferation of missiles is a universal subject, reaching to a consensus on how to regulate missiles has proven to be an extremely complicated case. lxi Discussions in the UN did not result in concrete policy recommendations; furthermore, there are no multilateral treaties that deal with missiles and their proliferation. difficulty in lxii the One reason of the non-proliferation of missiles is that they can be seen as a The Sixth Review Conference of the legitimate component of a State’s self- BTWC defence.lxiii (held in Geneva in 2006) established the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) which does not have the mandate to monitor compliance or carry out inspections, but to assist States-Parties with the implementation of the Convention and to serve clearinghouse. as an information lvii Rockets and missiles are a very diverse class of weapons that can be defined as “self propelled vehicles without a guidance system” which means once they are fired they cannot be redirected. missiles are the Control Regime Missile (MTCR) Technology and the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (also called the Hague Code of Conduct or HCOC).lxiv While the former seeks to coordinate 4. Missiles and Other Delivery Systems lviii The two basic instruments regulating the lix Generally being categorized by launch platform and sub-categorized by range and by target; their potential payloads range from a few export controls of missiles and missile technology, HCOC, aims to build confidence among its parties through prelaunch notifications and other transparency measures.lxv b. Conventional Arms “While nuclear weapons threaten us with mass destruction, on a cumulative basis conventional weapons wreak tremendous death and destruction every day in conflicts across the globe. It is, therefore, and relatively easy to produce. lxx Also vital to encourage responsible conduct in small arms are highly portable thus can be conventional weapons transfers. We must smuggled also explore ways to lessen the pressure on borders. States to engage in conventional weaponry usages, remain widely available and are build-ups, little regulated.lxxii while safeguarding the legitimate right to self-defense of all Member States.” - BAN lxxi relatively easily across Moreover, they have wider 1. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) KI-MOON, United Nations Secretary-General, the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 2007 A universally accepted definition of a 'small arm' or of a 'light weapon' does not exist, but it can be said that, on the Conventional weapons include various proposal of the UN Panel of Governmental weapons; that are more easily defined by Expert in 1997,lxxiii the main characteristics what they are not (nuclear, chemical and of them is being portable.lxxiv Examples to biological weapons, which are called such weapons can be given as follows: for “unconventional”) than what they are. lxvi small arms; revolvers and self-loading Conventional weapons are the devices pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, capable or sub-machine guns and light machine guns; injuring mainly (though not exclusively) for light weapons; heavy machine guns, through explosives, kinetic energy or hand-held of incendiaries. killing, lxvii incapacitating Some examples of conventional weapons can be listed as, armoured combat vehicles, helicopters and aircraft, warships, small arms and light weapons, landmines, cluster munitions, ammunition and artillery. lxviii Although they receive less attention than weapons of mass destruction due to having less dramatic results and being limited in scope, they are the most common type of armament globally; lxix in addition, historically they are used more commonly in conflicts as they are widely available under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers.lxxv According to the Small Arms Survey (an independent research project which serves as the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence and as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists), lxxvi more than 1,200 companies in at least 90 countries are involved in some aspect of small arms and light weapons production. lxxvii In addition, illicit trade of such weapons has a With the effects of Landmine Convention great value.lxxviii in 1997 and the awareness raised by civil Having one of the least transparent trades of all weapon systems,lxxix small arms and light weapons regulated; lxxx are not efficiently moreover, due to this lack, it is comparatively easy for small arms to slip from the legal market to the illicit market.lxxxi The Small Arms Survey noted in 2001, that “more is known about the number of nuclear warheads, stocks of chemical weapons and transfers of major conventional weapons than about small society groups which were integral to the Convention’s development and entry into force in the following years, there has been progress in more than 75 countries. lxxxv However, in every region there are still countries affected by landmines or unexploded ordnance to some degree such as Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chechnya, Colombia, Iraq, Nepal and Sri Lanka.lxxxvi 3. Cluster Munitions lxxxii arms”. A cluster munition (or cluster bomb) is “a container that holds a number of sub- 2. Landmines Although the original purpose of landmines was to protect antitank mines (to stop them from being removed by enemy soldiers), borders, camps and other strategic locations and to restrict the movement of enemy troops; now they are mainly deployed as offensive weapons, often in internal conflicts and against civilians.lxxxiii munitions, ranging from a few to several hundred.” lxxxvii Handicap International (an independent international aid organization working in situations of poverty and exclusion, conflict and disaster) lxxxviii has recorded that there are more than 11,000 cluster munitions casualties worldwide; moreover 98 percent of them are civilian. lxxxix It is known that there are thirty-four countries producing cluster sub- Since the development of systems related munitions and at least 73 countries are to the delivery of mines (such as from air), known to stockpile them.xc they have been used in greater numbers; marking and mapping became nearly II. Overview of the Agenda Item impossible which resulted with unmarked The importance of arms control and fields and thousands of mine-related deaths disarmament and injuries.lxxxiv maintenance of international peace and agreements security is indescribable. for xci the While an efficient and comprehensive treaty covers explanations and normative approaches.xcvi the needs of that area, that treaty will not These mean anything if it is not complied with.xcii exclusive; moreover, several points have Therefore in an era in which means of common characteristics. xcvii Nonetheless, destruction the these four broad approaches differ from technological developments, agreements’ each other in important respects and offer a quality share equal importance with their useful way to organize the studies on impacts on life. xciii For that reason it is compliance crucial to be sure that the agreements are agreements.xcviii improves parallel to complied with, and to be sure of the compliance; it is crucial to promote effective verification systems. perspectives are not with a. Enhancing mutually international Compliance with Agreements Seeing that compliance with agreements B. UNDERSTANDING should be promoted and strengthened, the VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE fundamental mechanisms to achieve that Before examining the reasons of non- goal can be listed as objective verification, compliance of disarmament treaties or the incentives and penalties, as well as verification measures of such treaties domestic verification and compliance should be (especially penal legislation). xcix Looking inspected deeply. through areas of international law, it can be implementation provisions said that “[t]here are many possible types I. Compliance of treaty provisions to consider, including: “Compliance” means the fulfilment by the individual accountability; measures to contracting parties of their obligations accommodate under an agreement and any amendments actors; to the agreement.xciv Until recently, far less mechanisms attention to agreements); methods of arbitration and understanding why governments actually adjudication; means to protect ‘whistle- comply with such agreements, given that blowers’; retaliation rights (such as they can be costly in the short term and are retaliation in kind); methods of imposing has been devoted not likely to be centrally enforced. xcv There financial and binding obligate dispute (especially penalties; non-state settlement in liability trade for are four wide approaches to that matter, compensation; confiscation of materials namely: rational (as in the laws of contraband); court domestic regime based challenges initiated by civil society actors realist functionalism, theory, (to apply pressure and provide exposure); and strengthened links to domestic enforcement mechanisms. As mentioned above, one of the most powerful means of promoting treaty compliance is to harness the target state’s own law enforcement mechanisms.”c Before setting up the compliance mechanisms, the competent body of an agreement could, where authorized to do so, regularly review the implementation of obligations under the agreement and examine specific difficulties of compliance b. Negotiations for Compliance thus consider measures aimed at improving it.ciii While regular reviews assist States in Mechanisms Negotiation process of agreements is vital for States to determine whether they would be able to comply with its provisions and for assessing their domestic capabilities for implementing c. Compliance Mechanisms the agreement under negotiation. preventing possible non-compliance, they are best placed to choose the approaches that are useful and appropriate for enhancing compliance with them.civ While the amount of incentive measure usage (referred to as “carrots” at Table 1) may change the characteristic of compliance In order not to have compliance problems, mechanisms, root causes of different States should not only participate in the approaches lies in the reasons of treaty process of the determination of provisions violations.cv but also contribute to the process of deciding the compliance mechanisms such as funding of verification methods or noncompliance penalties.ci Furthermore, it would be beneficial to agree upon a mechanism for amendment and for treaty review conferences where complaints can be voiced and constructive measures adopted so that parties may deal with possible dissatisfactions, which might lead to non-compliance.cii misbehaviour of Parties. cvii Leading to a Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of cooperative atmosphere, facilitative measures must assist States by creating the Compliance Approachescvi capacity to comply with their international 1. Facilitative Approach commitments This approach is based on the idea that confidence in the treaty regime as a most treaty violations result from a lack of whole.cviii The management doctrine is an awareness, application of the general principle of capacity, resources and and strengthening concerns raised within a given Party peaceful settlement regarding the implementation of provisions principle of of the treaty and emphasizes preventive measures to protect not from wilful of caution disputes, as it the clearly rather than attempting to compensate or both the management and the enforcement punish for harm after it has occurred. cix approaches, not as alternatives but rather Moreover, greater as a list of possible responses to different participation in and implementation of the types of non-compliance.cxv The following treaty regime.cx table it may encourage outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the above approaches. 2. Enforcement Approach Positive measures may not always be enough to bring a State that may lack the political will to cooperate into compliance; due to that reason, enforcement measures cxvi Once the States have chosen the approach, they should start developing the compliance mechanism in accordance with the following points: can be applied as a second plan once the Clarity: To assist in the evaluation and management mechanisms have failed.cxi It ascertainment of compliance and prevent is clear that, once again, States are willing possible differences in interpretations, the to protect their sovereignty rather than obligations exposing themselves to counter measures agreements should be stated clearly;cxvii taken by the international community; moreover they are often reluctant, for political reasons, to take legal action against each other or even to authorize other Parties to do so. cxii Enforcement measures have been criticized for being bilateral, confrontational and strongly backward-looking, addressing problems only after they arise. cxiii However, despite the criticisms, it is true that the threat of stricter enforcement mechanisms and sanctions has played a proven preventive cxiv role. of parties to multilateral Reporting, monitoring and verification: Most common compliance mechanisms of multilateral agreements can include provisions for reporting, monitoring and verification of the information obtained on compliance which can also help promotion of compliance by, inter alia, potentially increasing public awareness. collection and reporting cxviii Data requirements should not be too onerous and should be in accordance with those of other related agreements. cxix They can include the following requirements: Bearing in mind that the two approaches to non-compliance with international treaties are not mutually exclusive; an ideal noncompliance system combines elements of o Reporting: Parties may be required to make reports on compliance or on noncompliance regularly by using appropriate formats that are simple and brief to ensure consistency, efficiency compliance at an early stage, determine the and convenience;cxx causes of non-compliance, and to prepare o Monitoring: Monitoring involves the collection of data and, parallel to the provisions of an agreement they can be used to assess compliance with an agreement, to identify compliance problems and to indicate solutions;cxxi suitable responses including, addressing and/or correcting compliance the without state delay. of cxxv nonThese responses may include both facilitative and stronger measures thus can be adjusted to meet changeable necessities of cases of non-compliance.cxxvi o Verification: Ascertaining whether a party is in compliance and, in the event of d. Problem of Interpretation non-compliance, the degree, type and Sometimes it turns out that there are frequency of non-compliance by differing interpretations of the treaty verification of data technical language especially when an agreement is information is very important. cxxii While officially written in more than one implementing verification measures, the language.cxxvii Many, but by no means all, principal source might be national reports compliance issues have been due to and, technical verification can involve differing interpretations independent sources for corroborating changes in national data and information.cxxiii developments. cxxviii Even at the stage of and Just as compliance mechanisms, States can also consider the inclusion of noncompliance provisions with a view to assisting parties having compliance problems by addressing individual cases of non-compliance and taking into account the importance of tailoring compliance of technology, language, or new information gathering in accordance with the purposes of monitoring and compliance, the problem of what it means, arises. There are many levels of difficulties beyond data; interpretation furthermore involves their judgments regarding intentions.cxxix provisions to the agreement’s specific Since compliance is essentially a legal obligations. cxxiv While determining on a issue, there is a need for precision in how non-compliance mechanism, it should be information and its interpretation are kept in view that those mechanisms could presented, “in particular, loose use of be used by the parties to provide a way to undefined terms such as “program” and identify especially “capability” is not helpful.cxxx If possible situations of non- a country is said to have the “capability” Capacity-based to do something, the inference is frequently (intentional non-compliance) results from a that it is in violation of some obligation, State’s wilful decision to violate the law which may be quite misleading. cxxxi For which is based on the State’s calculation of example, to say that a country has the its interests, costs and benefits, particular capability biological to, among other things, the primary rules, weapons sounds quite dire until one participants, and facts involved at any one recognizes that this would be true of any moment.cxxxvi to manufacture country with a developed pharmaceutical cxxxii industry.” terminology To and overcome the interpretation-related problems, in recent years, the relevant international organizations, such as the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) have been quite careful in their language.cxxxiii non-compliance However, often non-compliance is rooted in numerous second order conditions and inadequacies in how the international community creates, internalizes, and manages the rules such as substantive and procedural flaws in the creation of legal norms that impinge on the rules’ fairness and legitimacy. cxxxvii There could also be deficiencies in norm internationalization, in the transnational legal process as mentioned in the section above. A third form of non-compliance can also e. Causes of Non Compliance be based on the international system’s On the surface, non-compliance is simply a structural inability to maintain and enforce function of the wrongdoer’s ability and international law will, which can be summarized as, the international institutions. wrongdoing State’s incapacity to comply operational gaps can provide opportunities with the law and its desire to comply.cxxxiv for non-compliance in ways as by reducing Incapacity can be based on several factors the risk that non-compliant acts will be such as ambiguity in the rules themselves; punished and by altering a State’s cost- limitations on the State’s ability to take benefit calculus.cxxxix actions necessary to obey the rule, for example financial or technological deficiencies; or, more simply, a mistake or a lack of intention to disobey.cxxxv and to cxxxviii control Such f. Determining the Existence of Non- information for compliance which is from Compliance all sources, not just what may be seen in Since the first principle of international relations is that, agreements have to be complied with (pacta sunt servanda); cxl violations should be identified promptly, and appropriate responses should be taken. cxli The questions of who actually carries out these tasks, who should decide whether non-compliance has occurred and, if so, how serious it is has proven to be more difficult than many would have expected.cxlii the field at a particular place and time. cl Moreover, it helps to make the work of the inspection team confrontational. in the field less cli g. Consequences of Non-Compliance “Once non-compliance is suspected, there is usually a process of graduated exposure: consultation with the suspected party; formal recommendations from an expert group or governing body; possible demands for inspections; demands for In principle, each State-Party has an remedial action with a stipulated deadline; obligation to make compliance decisions increased public exposure; referral to the for itself; however, in practice, the ability UN Security Council; condemnation in of States-Parties to evaluate relevant national and international fora; and information varies widely.cxliii collective measures or other arrangements The major multilateral agreements are not entirely consistent in their compliance approach and are more difficult to understand: cxliv Some have a governing body, cxlv some have verification regimes and organizations to carry them out, cxlvi some have only review conferences, cxlvii and some lack even that mechanism.cxlviii to address non-compliance.”clii In most of the treaties signed since 1967, the above mentioned measures are implemented in outline only. Among the collective actions suggested by the respective treaty administering organisations are sanctions which can only be in the form of recommendations to States-Parties unlike the decisions of the Security Council, and Moreover, when agreements are inspected cannot involve the use of military force, the inspection teams do not have the but could still be quite powerful if responsibility to make actual compliance undertaken voluntarily and collectively.cliii judgments: they may identify an “ambiguity” but not a “violation”.cxlix This fact is in accordance with the necessary damages the terms of verifiability, the II. Verification As defined in the introduction section of this document the main goal of treaty verification is to determine and, hence, to credibility of the verification mechanisms that are established and the possibility of international controversy.clix promote the compliance of parties. The One other difficulty is the high temptation issue of verification is more than a to avoid details in favour of getting an technical issue and quite separate not only early agreement, leaving those aspects to from the legal question of whether an the bodies with the clx mission of observed activity constitutes a treaty implementing the treaty. violation but also from the political too much detail can also be efficient since question of what to do about a violation implementation process almost always once it has been detected.cliv Another result throws up unexpected problems that can be of efficient verification mechanism is that difficult to precluded. clxi when there are no immediate suspicions of treaty violations neutral verification can help to raise confidence.clv be in attempting to establish legal and organizational barriers to the imposition of politics, verification does not operate in a void agreement. clvi Approximately all the time there is a tension between achieving consensus on a treaty and achieving an agreement on the optimal verification and that the options difficulties in are the be said that there is one aspiration that No matter how efficient negotiators might system from if negotiation process of verification, it can a. Negotiating Verification compliance Apart resolve Not getting into should be adopted.clvii It is often seen that a powerful conception of verification is traded off for some other, unrelated aspect of the envisaged treaty.clviii While States tend not to like intrusive verification measures that cause them effort and expense, this negotiators should have, that is building flexibility efficiently into their verification system so that it can adapt itself to future needs and challenges.clxii Flexibility should be built very carefully and creatively since States will oppose too much flexibility because they want to be sure about what they are signing up to.clxiii b. Organization of Verification Much has been learned about the requirements of organizational structures for effective verification and compliance, especially when a comprehensive system is envisaged. clxiv Moreover, there is now a standard model for a conference of States- Parties, a governing body and a technical blinded instrumentation which can only secretariat, including where necessary a inspect a limited area.clxxii standing clxv inspectorate. However, international verification organizations still, rarely adopt best management practicesclxvi and tend to use allegedly tried and true mechanisms, often simply because they are readily available while assuming that running a verification organization is a unique organizational challenge that has no similar elsewhere.clxvii c. Technology and technology can be specialized deeply that it must be researched and developed by verification bodies themselves. clxxiii That eventually will be a heavy burden on verification organizations, Techniques of techniques and technologies can be used in verification systems, the with universities, less commercially-driven the mutually beneficial exchange of technology, methodologies between Although the latest and most appropriate despite possible existence of creative partnerships organizations, Verification multilateral Another difficulty is that verification international verification organizations and national research and monitoring agencies.clxxiv the The fact that many developing countries question of to which extent is often face obstacles when reporting on their own controversial. clxviii To begin with, there is compliance with international treaties and always a trade-off between effectiveness adopting and cost since States-Parties will naturally measures constitutes a proof that national want to keep the costs of verification as technical and technological incapacity for low as possible, while still giving the self-monitoring verification system a requisite degree of treaty commitments is also a major credibility.clxix issue.clxxv Although bodies of professional Sometimes it is seen that the States are worried for the technology to be too capable and want to restrict it, clxx other times the type of verification technology being applied needs to be restricted in order to prevent proliferation-relevant information being disseminated to the verifiers; clxxi hence, the use of so called on-site national and implementation for inspectors, implementing comprehensive protocols, procedures and technologies for on-site inspections and useful amount of experience and monitoring to the use of supplement remote on-site inspections exist, difficulties continue in contributing technical personnel to international verification efforts and the education process of them.clxxvi d. Funding of the Verification cultivating Mechanisms Although no one expects verification systems to have endless currency, it also cannot be expected to be done on the cheap lest it discredit the whole verification enterprise. clxxvii Today, almost all of the multilateral verification organizations are experiencing funding challenges, clxxviii especially when compared to spending on defence, spending on verification seems like a burden and a necessary security bargain. other clxxix bodies can take caution against these by Verification regimes need funding possibilities, such as foundations and commercial spin-offs.clxxx stakeholders elsewhere, together with civil society and among nongovernmental organizations. clxxxiii Support for multilateral verification organizations can be raised by participating in States Parties’ annual and review meetings, organizing ‘side events’, undertaking research into the challenges faced by verification regimes.clxxxiv f. Related International Organizations 1. Verification Research, Training and Information Centre Established in 1986, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre e. Building the International Verification Community (VERTIC) is an independent, non-profit, charitable organization which supports the Multilateral organizations need to do better development, at promoting a positive reception of the verification of international agreements as contribution they make to international well as initiatives in related areas.clxxxv The peace and security or whatever their aforementioned objective may be so that they can sustain through various ways such as research, the analysis, necessary political support and implementation support assistance, is and provided training and information. clxxxvi relevance. clxxxi An example can be given dissemination of from the disarmament area: when pressed Development and to sign Additional Protocols to their monitoring, reviews, reporting, verification nuclear some and compliance measures on national governments, have actually requested a implementation mechanisms are the main quid focuses of VERTIC’s work.clxxxvii safeguards pro quo agreements, like technical and/or economic benefits when the primary benefit derives from the improvement of their national security. clxxxii Verification application of Asking for international the elimination, supervision, of under Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a specific range it also called for measures to ensure that the acquisition Figure 1: Logo of VERTICclxxxviii and production of prohibited items were VERTIC holds an observer status at the IAEA General Conference and not resumed.cxci has consultative (roster) status with the UN’s “The Commission's mandate [was] the Economic and Social Council. Moreover following: to carry out immediate on-site itself or its staff are members of the inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical Academic Council on the United Nations and missile capabilities; to take possession System (ACUNS), BioWeapons for destruction, removal or rendering Prevention Project (BWPP), Chemical harmless of all chemical and biological Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC), weapons and all stocks of agents and all European and related sub-systems and components and Development Association (ESARDA), EU all research, development, support and Non-Proliferation Consortium, manufacturing facilities; to supervise the International Action Network on Small destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic Arms (IANSA), International Institute for missiles with a range greater than 150 km Strategic International and related major parts, and repair and Relations and Security Network (ISN) , production facilities; and to monitor and Landmine Action and several others.clxxxix verify Safeguards Studies Research (IISS), Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to use, develop, construct 2. United Nations Special Commission Existing from 1990-1999 the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was a UN inspection team created to inspect Iraq’s production of weapons of or acquire any of the items specified above.”cxcii 3. UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission mass destruction and remove or destroy The weapons and to implement the non-nuclear Verification and Inspection Commission provisions of the resolution 687 and to (UNMOVIC) was created through the assist the International Atomic Energy adoption of Security Council resolution cxc 1284 in December 1999. cxciii UNMOVIC Agency (IAEA) in nuclear areas . United Nations Monitoring, replaced the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) with the mandate to verify Iraq's compliance with its obligation regarding the weapons of mass destruction and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification to ascertain that Iraq did not reacquire the same weapons prohibited by the Security Council.cxciv Unlike its predecessor the UN employees were working as the staff. cxcv “UN inspectors that tasked with verifying and monitoring Iraq’s disarmament had not been able to visit Iraq since a U.S. led coalition invaded the country in 2003. The international organizations are accordingly various: States-parties need to ensure the integrity and technical competence of international implementation, compliance verification, organizations. cc and Although some of these organizations have been underfunded and are unable to provide the high-level training and equipment that is necessary for their success, they must be capable of excluding unwarranted intelligence infiltration and of protecting restricted and proprietary information.cci United States and United Kingdom assured While States-Parties should accept their the responsibility council disarmed.” cxcvi that Iraq had been “Although its inspectors to contribute to the verification process and to make their own were withdrawn from Iraq, UNMOVIC national continued to operate with respect to those organizations parts of its mandate it could implement States-Parties to have greater access to outside of Iraq and maintained a degree of relevant compliance information and help preparedness them in analyzing and understanding such Iraq.” cxcvii to resume work in On 29 June 2007, the Security Council adopted resolution 1762 and interalia, decided to terminate immediately the mandate of UNMOVIC under the relevant should international assist interested information.ccii When necessary, international organizations should move expeditiously to resolution.cxcviii decisions, reach compliance decisions, to ameliorate instances of non-compliance, 4. Strengthening International Organizations appropriate Since it is very difficult to generalize the compliance recommendations and to refer intractable cases to the problems, to cxcix strengthening higher authorities, which themselves must then deal with the issue.cciii The international organizations of implementation and compliance have a key role in keeping agreements, especially the respect their treaty commitments because cciv they want to be respectable members of the arms control agreements, effective. However, the ability of these organizations international community. to identify and fix compliance problems accelerating needs to be improved.ccv integration C. COMPLIANCE CONTROL AND OF ARMS DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS pace makes ccix of Since the international all States more dependent upon one another, the cost for a State to be seen as an unreliable treaty partner could be very high. ccx Another reason is that while devotion to and Arms control and disarmament treaty compliance obligations are respected for reasons. First, specific rewards, such as a facilitated the rules they lay down are accepted by, transfer for example in the cases of BWTC, CWC assistance, and NPT, a vast number of States-Parties with a treaty is likely to be discouraged by that share the view that such weapons are the risk of economic or other pressures, destructive; possibly outlawed. ccvi they want them to be By sticking to agreements, States help progressively build up a world order that will give them the assurance of other States to be bound by restrains while demanding the same restrains for themselves. ccvii Second reason of treaty compliance of global arms control and disarmament treaties is that during their negotiation process, many specific national concerns are taken into account; moreover concessions are made equally. ccviii Third reason comes from the respect to the law, since just as citizens, for the most part, States comply with the law not out of fear of penalty or other consequences for violations but because they accept the requirement of law and want to be seen as law-abiding. Governments habitually of with treaties technology conversely, sanctions, may and bring technical non-compliance brought by the international community or individual States.ccxi Nevertheless, non-compliance with treaty obligations under arms control agreements, might meet only oral condemnation, especially if the wrongdoing party is a State that has influence on the international relations area or is invulnerable for some other reason.ccxii “Yet, just as national laws are rarely discarded because of violations, treaties are also rarely abandoned because of a few violations.”ccxiii I. Determining non-Compliance with investigate and eliminate Iraq’s weapons Arms of mass destruction.ccxviii Control and Disarmament Treaties To Changing from agreement to agreement, discuss the implementation and between individual States and the Security compliance issues of the major agreements Council that were negotiated bilaterally such as implementing SALT, START, the Anti-Ballistic Missile conferences. ccxix This way, the judgments Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the of individual States are made into a Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, the collective judgment at the level of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, conference of States-Parties, executive commissions which carry on their work in council, board of governors, or other secret bodies and can discuss classified information have been established. ccxiv stand that agreement. ccxx executive bodies are councils, and specified review by the Above mentioned bodies Basically, in these fora, other parties to the can take actions themselves or, in some agreements make the judgments about the cases, refer the matter to the United compliance.ccxv As seen in the example of Nations.ccxxi the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, which implements START, results of these commissions' work to improve the viability and effectiveness of the agreements are sometimes made public.ccxvi In the case of the CWC, the Executive Council has the power to consider “concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance.” ccxxii “Conference [of States Parties] shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, UN Security Council is at the top of the including pyramid with the authority to take actions conclusions, to the attention of the [UN] against threats to international peace and General Assembly and the [UN] Security security, especially when non-compliance Council.”ccxxiii of multilateral agreements is the case.ccxvii Since charters of the organizations created by the UN tend to be focused, and their lines of authority clear, they have a special character such as, the UN Special Commission and UNMOVIC which were created by the Security Council to In relevant information and the CTBT, the Conference of States Parties and Executive Council are given alike powers and responsibilities, with the reference to the UN and not making a difference between the General Assembly and the Security Council.ccxxiv Resorting to the UN is not mentioned in were created by the States-Parties and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe possess special expertise on the subject Treaty.ccxxv matter involved.ccxxix In International the case of NPT and IAEA, the NPT is organizations should be more subtle in that the IAEA does not have careful about proving a State is in non- jurisdiction over all provisions of the treaty compliance. They may not have all the but does have jurisdiction over safeguards, relevant which has been a key point of the though they may know enough to say that disagreements with regards to Iran and a State is in non-compliance, they still moreover, even For example, even should be careful about certifying it. ccxxx though the bodies did not take action in the “This is [a well-known] arms control end, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2003 dilemma about not being able to prove a reported North Korean “non-compliance negative because it may be that the and the Agency’s inability to verify non- relevant sites were not inspected or not diversion of nuclear material subject to inspected at the right time or the right safeguards” to the Security Council and people were not interviewed and so on—a the General Assembly.ccxxvii valid principle that, if taken to extremes, North Korea. ccxxvi information, Decisions of these organizations differ from the decisions of the Security Council since they are not binding on the StatesParties. ccxxviii However, they are exclusively capable of making compliance judgments, both based on the terms of the agreements themselves and because they will assure that compliance issues will never be resolved.”ccxxxi II. Compliance Provisions Table 2: Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties: Major Prohibitions and Compliance Provisionsccxxxii D. VERIFICATION OF ARMS the arms control lexicon, while “monitoring” is the gathering of data relevant to an obligation in a treaty, “verification” includes a judgment, made at the political level, as to whether a party is complying with this obligation. ccxxxiii In popular usage, however, “verification” covers both functions. ccxxxiv A monitoring and verification regime’s purpose is both to prevent violations from being committed and to detect violations that do occur. ccxxxv Measures for consultation and clarification viability and and for improving effectiveness of the the agreement should be included in such a regime, as well as measures for the resolution of disputes. ccxxxvi Incentives for compliance and sanctions for monitoring mechanism non- compliance can be provided by above mentioned enforcement mechanisms. Since non-compliance can be made, provisions in arms control have many functions. They promote compliance by rendering the risks and costs of evasion unacceptably high, thereby international confidence building ccxxxvii by reassuring participating States that their interests are being protected. ccxli Furthermore, a verification mechanism makes it easier for a party that is unjustly accused of violating a treaty to prove its ccxlii innocence. Member States By certificating that fulfilling their are obligations, and by confirming that the prohibited activities have not taken place, verification generates trust in arms control and disarmament initiatives.ccxliii VERIFICATION REGIMES these organizations and better use should deterring possible violators; ccxl they play a role in have implementation, verification, and a reliable and stable view of the role of a proliferation agreement. ccxxxix Verification E. PROBLEMS WITH compliance organizations, there should be is prerequisite for any arms control or non- most of the major arms control agreements be made of their capabilities. that provides data on which the judgment of CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT In reliable Confidence in verifying a numerical limit on a weapon system depends on the number of weapons permitted; ccxliv moreover, it is generally difficult to have It is a requirement of verification that each confidence in agreements that involve State to have a consistent and objective small numbers of weapons. mean of monitoring the military activities example a complete ban of a missile of the other. ccxxxviii Because of this, an system would be easier to verify than an effective verification regime including a agreement that allows 100 such missiles on ccxlv For each side since it would be difficult to for non-compliance, and to incorporate detect whether they had 100 or 130. ccxlvi many other compliance initiatives from the Because primitive provision of the 1925 Geneva of agreements that reason that arms-control completely forbid a Protocol to the complex mechanisms of the cclii CWC. are much easier to monitor and verify for international community will have many compliance than the agreements which are opportunities to make treaties more robust allowing small numbers of weapons.ccxlvii with the inclusion of evolving compliance Regarding the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements, problem of the cruise missiles (small pilotless drones several meters long) is a special case.ccxlviii The main complicating factor of them is that the same type of cruise missile can carry either a nuclear warhead or a conventional one. ccxlix Hence separating cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads from those carrying conventional warheads In the 21st weapon system, a practice or an activity century, the mechanisms and international law will be more strictly monitored, enforced and obeyed.ccliii If nations are to carry out deep reductions in their weaponry and move towards their stated goal of ‘general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control’ and towards the eventual international peace and security, then even more progressive instruments will be needed to be devised.ccliv is an extremely difficult task. ccl Due to While devising those instruments it should above mentioned reasons it is likely that be any verifiable treaty dealing with cruise verification and monitoring of small arms missiles must cover the total number of control are bound to differ substantially cruise from the ones used in other arms control missiles allowed, distinguishing between conventional warheads solutions should be sought. without nuclear and kept in mind that methods of and and disarmament fields. cclv Even a new further innovative and creative approach may be ccli F. CONCLUSION needed or a variety of different approaches may have to be combined in order to monitor and verify various different Compliance mechanisms in disarmament aspects of the implementation of small accords become more sophisticated in the arms th control initiatives. cclvi “These 20 century. Great strides have been made approaches will lean to increase verification capabilities, to list monitoring than verification, the rewards for compliance and penalties intrusive nature of verification regimes are more towards as the likely to be resisted by States that are keen Ways to determine the non-compliance to preserve their national sovereignty, keep with issues related to national security under agreements; wraps, and protect the commercial interests of their arms industries.”cclvii arms control and disarmament Methods of increasing the funding of verification mechanisms; The efforts on attaining such an order are mostly through establishing transparency, confidence-building among the actors, establishing an evolving attitude towards Ways to build an international verification community by strengthening the related international organizations; the utility of weapons and growing Measures for overcoming verification of experience with verifiable interim steps arms control and disarmament agreements towards that limit the cruise missiles; the disarmament. long lasting goal of cclviii Methods to ensure the verification of G. POINTS THAT A RESOLUTION arms control and disarmament agreements SHOULD COVER regarding WMDs with paying importance In light of the issues explained in the previous sections, the General Assembly to different types of weapons and the treaties that regulate them; First Committee is expected to pass a Methods to ensure the verification of comprehensive arms control and disarmament agreements resolution that should cover these points: regarding SALWs; Measures of determining best approaches Measures to guarantee that the States are for arms control and disarmament treaties complying with the arms control and compliance mechanisms; disarmament treaties regarding WMDs; Methods to overcome terminology and Measures to guarantee that the States are interpretation related problems regarding complying with the arms control and the compliance of treaties; disarmament agreements regarding SALW. Ways to determine who will decide the existence of a non-compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements; AGENDA ITEM B: telecommunications context of technology international in the security STRENGTHENING PROACTIVE “nowadays usually called cyber-security” CYBER DEFENCE AND which has been introduced by the Russian ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL Federation INFORMATION SECURITY September 14, 2011, Russian and Chinese since governments, A. INTRODUCTION fiction, the debate among policy-makers internationally on what norms shall guide swing. cclix with cclxiii Tajikistan On and Uzbekistan, proposed an International Since cyber-warfare is no longer science behaviour in 1998.” cyber-space is in full Code of Conduct for Information Security, a week later, Russia published a concept for a Convention on International Information Security. The emerging perception of In the early 2010, a group of governmental what constitutes national interest will experts (GGE) and diplomats from the inform and be informed by the discussions U.S., Russia, and China, mutually stated on how to use the new technological that potential threats in the sphere of possibilities for warfare. cclx information security are among the most Related discussions take place in the United Nations in the form of two different streams: the politico-military focusing on cyber-warfare stream and an economic stream focusing on cybercrime. cclxi Examining both streams, it is evident that norms governing cyberspace are slowly emerging with the involvement serious challenges of the twenty-first century in their report for the UN. First group of experts and diplomats in 2004, had failed before to even find the smallest common denominator which forced the Secretary-General to conclude that due to the complexity of the issues no consensus was reached.cclxiv of many UN bodies related to the issue.cclxii Since these technologies have numerous “While cyber-security was making front economic and social benefits, Information page headlines in 2010 with Stuxnet and Wiki Leaks, at the United Nations: the U.S. reversed its long-time policy position and for the first time co-sponsored a draft resolution on information and and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have reinvented the international security environment. cclxv However, it is not arguable that ICTs can also be used contradictory to international peace and security; they produce an evident increase in disruptive activities since they are used cyber-conflicts also results in difficulties in for crimes. Moreover, the destructive use formulating of ICTs by parties who have broad problems of the counter strategies include impunity systems is easily concealed, thus the speed required to cope with such finding a specific perpetrator can prove to attacks, an inadequate terminology or be difficult if not impossible. cclxvi Those counter strategies. Other lexicon, an outdated Internet structural facts construct an environment that aids the design, use of ICTs for increasingly complex collateral abuses. Because the agreements, recognition of technologies international community is crucial to involved, and the need for equilibrium reduce risk and enhance security, Member between Internet privacy and control.cclxviii cooperation of States have repeatedly stated the need for cooperative action against threats resulting from the malicious use of ICTs. "Further progress in cooperation at the international level will require actions to promote a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative ICT environment. Cooperative measures that could enhance stability and security include norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour by States, voluntary measures to increase transparency, confidence and trust among States and capacity-building measures. States must lead in these efforts, but effective Cooperation would benefit from the appropriate participation of the private sector and civil society."cclxvii problematic assessment of damage, verification of I. Cyber Definitions and Other Relevant Terms Computer and electronic based technology refers to the term cyber as a prefix. cclxix Cyber-space is a prepared domain framed by the use of electronics to exploit information via consistent systems and their related infrastructure. cclxx Therefore cyber-space is a unique hybrid regime of physical and virtual properties, hardware and software, which are all computer networks including the Internet as well as other networks both separate from and not linked to the Internet.cclxxi a. Internet The Internet is the biggest network in The challenges of addressing cyber- cyber-space,cclxxii and it was planned to be warfare and cyber-security arise from the open, modest, and neutral.cclxxiii Alternative fact that both are relatively new issues, opinions can be found in some states such therefore, many countries are unprepared. as China or Saudi-Arabia. The virtual and anonymous nature of Internet's structural design is dependent on cclxxiv The choice, not natural law.cclxxv Moreover, the safeguards, guidelines, risk management national laws, technological developments area that in the approaches, enables the practices, assurance and technologies that sense preferences of different cultures are environment and organization and user's the reasons of the bordered Internet that assets.”cclxxxii While cyber-security can be emerged through national changes of the divided Internet‘s architecture.cclxxvi espionage, crime, cyber war, and cyber Although it can be said that the national legislation does create borders legally and sometimes through specific technical features,cclxxvii the Internet’s original intent ignores those national borders, and it remains borderless unless specific interventions are taken by the governments to alter this state of nature.cclxxviii affecting another country from one place, without that user ever having left his/her own country.cclxxix Such action that exploits in international both national jurisdictions benevolent or malevolent. can cclxxx and be While handling cyber-security, when the latter is the case, need for international cooperation is obvious.cclxxxi cclxxxiii major cyber categories: the possibility for the subsistence of a threat can go back to three sources, (1) Flaws in the design of the Internet;cclxxxiv (2) Flaws in the hardware and software;cclxxxv systems online.cclxxxvi c. Cyber Power Cyber-power is “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events.” cclxxxvii It can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace. Another usage of cyberspace is that it can use cyber instruments to produce preferred outcomes in other d. International Communication Cyber-security has been defined by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to indicate the “collection of tools, security four the domains outside cyberspace.cclxxxviii b. Cyber Security policies, protect (3) The move to put more and more critical Actions can be taken in one country while loopholes into to best can terrorism, used training, implementation of certain policies, and in a Yet, the Internet remains borderless. be actions, concepts, security Technology International Communication Technology refers to “technologies that provide access to information through telecommunications.” cclxxxix Focus points of ICTs communication are primarily technologies the including rapidly than conventional communication technology or the Internet.ccxciii e. International Cooperation the Internet, wireless networks, cell phones, Because of the Internet's transnational and other communication mediums.ccxc nature, governments have recognized the Digital ICT is the creation of the meeting of modern telecommunication technology and digital data processing technology.ccxci The telecommunication technology used by convergent technologies can be listed as the internet; the devices themselves that are computers which evolve rapidly such need for international cooperation. ccxciv International cooperation is defined in the form of regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”ccxcv as, PC, notebook, mobile phone, smart It is common for the UN bodies to be used phone, pad, and the like. The speed at as a mediator through Member-States’ which negotiations.ccxcvi digital technology has highly developed in the past is without a guide.ccxcii Moreover, it can be said that the convergent ICT is spreading much more Table 3: Global ICT developments, 20012013ccxcvii This is another reason behind the division of UN's security. activities ccxcviii regarding cyber- Although the division is incomplete, the Telecommunication International Union (ITU) categorizes the UN organization's work on cyber-security as follows: 2. Negotiations on economic issues.cccv The politico-military branch of the UN is mainly concerned about how the information technologies can potentially be used for contradicts destructive purposes with objectives the that of maintaining international stability and (1) Combating cyber-crime: ITU and security and even has a negative effect on the United Nations Office on Drugs and the security of States.cccvi On the other side, Crime (UNODC);ccxcix the economic branch is about the illicit (2) Building capacity: ITU, The United Nations Institute Research (UNIDIR), misuse of information technologies.cccvii for Disarmament Cyber-warfare and cyber-crime are other and The alternative terms for these two branches, United cccviii Nations Interregional Crime and Justice respectively. Research Institute (UNICRI);ccc described as "the unauthorized penetration (3) Child Online Protection: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UNICRI, UNODC.ccci Cyber-warfare is by, on behalf of, or in support of, a government into another nation's computer or network, or any other activity affecting a computer system, in which the purpose is to add, alter, or falsify data, or cause the disruption of or damage to a computer, or Generally, the ITU and UNODC are network device, or the objects a computer considered the leading UN bodies in cyber- system controls."cccix security and cyber-crime.cccii II. Relevant Bodies f. Cyber-Security and the United Nations Union The norm emergence process of the UN, on the cyber-security can be divided into two main branches of negotiations:ccciii 1. Negotiations a. International Telecommunication focusing military issues,ccciv on politico- International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the leading and specialized agency of the United Nations which handles the ICTs. cccx "As the global focal point for governments and the private sector, ITU's role in helping the world communicate organizational platform used by Member spans States; but also an autonomous norm [three] core communication, sectors: radio- standardization and development." cccxi ITU is established with the purposes of allocating global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, developing entrepreneur.cccxvi b. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research United Nations networks and technologies, and striving to Disarmament Research improve voluntarily the technical standards access to that ICTs ensure for the underserved communities worldwide.cccxii Being the only treaty organization under the umbrella of the UN which works on cyber issues, ITU is the principle United Nations organization that has the responsibility for practical aspects of The founded and Institute (UNIDIR), for a autonomous institute within the framework of the UN, conducts research on disarmament and security to assist the international community. cccxvii As an impartial actor, UNIDIR creates ideas and promotes action on disarmament and security.cccxviii cyber-security. cccxiii ITU joined the UN Statute of the UNIDIR, explains its system as a Specialized Agency under functions in Article 2 as follows: Article 57 of the Charter which established "The work of the Institute shall aim at: that "the various specialized agencies, intergovernmental (a) Providing the international community agreements and having wide international with more diversified and complete data on responsibilities, as defined in their basic problems relating to international security, instruments, in economic, social, cultural, the armaments race and disarmament in educational, health, and related fields, all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, shall be brought into relationship with the so as to facilitate progress, through United Nations."cccxiv negotiations, towards greater security for established by all States and towards the economic and ITU occupies a significant role in setting social development of all peoples; technical standards with special focus areas like “smart grid infrastructure.”cccxv (b) Promoting informed participation by Looking from an international relations all theory point of view, ITU’s role in the UN (c) Assisting ongoing negotiations on activities related to the cyber security is disarmament and continuing efforts to very important because it is not only an ensure greater international security at a States in disarmament efforts; progressively lower level of armaments, UNICRI particularly nuclear armaments, by means intergovernmental, governmental and non- of objective and factual studies and governmental organizations on creating analyses; and implementing enhanced policies on (d) Carrying out more in-depth, forward- crime prevention and criminal justice.cccxxiii looking UNICRI declares their goals as: and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations."cccxix bureaucracies to become involved in cccxx Moreover, UNIDIR dedicated the third issue of its publication Disarmament Forum to the issue of "Information mandated to aid advancing the understanding of crimerelated problems; fostering impartial and competent UNIDIR was one of the first UN cyber-security. is & Communication Technologies and International Security." and many more.cccxxi criminal justice systems; supporting the respect of international instruments and other standards established by the international community; facilitating international law enforcement cooperation and judicial assistance.cccxxiv Since UNICRI mostly aims to endorse c. United Nations Interregional Crime every nation's self-reliance and the development of institutional capabilities, it and Justice Research Institute provides a one-stop capacity offering highUnited Nations Interregional Crime and level knowledge in crime prevention and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) is a criminal justice problems. UN entity that was established in 1967 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) following Resolution 1086 in order to support countries in their efforts of preventing crime and assisting criminal justice while supporting governments and the international community to tackle with the criminal threats to peace, development and stability.cccxxii UNICRI Statute states in Article 2 that " [i]n the pursuit of its objectives, the Institute shall carry out its activities in close collaboration and co-ordination with institutes and other bodies within and outside especially the United with the Nations system, United Nations regional institutes on the prevention of crime." cccxxv Consequently, UNICRI sets its activities and priorities in accordance with the United Nations Commission on General to conclude that due to the Crime Criminal complexity of the issues involved, no also it maintains close consensus was reached on the preparation Justice; Prevention cccxxvi and working relations with various UN bodies and agencies, especially with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).cccxxvii of a final report.cccxxx The Group consisted of governmental experts from 15 States: Belarus, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, the Republic of d. Group of Governmental Experts There have been a total of six groups of governmental experts on cyber related issues so far. “The first GGE in 2004 created by the General Assembly's First Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.cccxxxi Committee with the second one publishing The main obstacle on the way of consensus its report in 2010 [and the third one was the question of whether or not publishing its report in 2013]. In 2004, international law sufficiently regulated the ECOSOC set up an intergovernmental security aspects of international relations expert group on identity-related crime in cases of hostile use of ICTs for politico- which has evolved into the core group of military purposes. However, the work of experts. The ITU set up a high level expert the GGE was not completely useless. On group that developed the cyber-security the contrary, it successfully increased the agenda in 2007 and the United Nations amount of the relevant efforts on the Congress international agenda.cccxxxii on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice established an openended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime in 2010.”cccxxviii 2. Second Group of Governmental Experts (2010) This time, the GGE did come to a 1. First Group of Governmental Experts (2004) consensus stating that existing and potential threats in the area of information The first Group of Governmental Experts security are important challenges of the (GGE) was launched in 2004, in order to twenty-first century. present a report in 2005; however, at the perpetrators end, they were not able to reach a common terrorists; position. cccxxix This forced the Secretary- national infrastructures, and governments cccxxxiv are cccxxxiii While their identified as individuals, businesses, are identified victims. cccxxxv as their potential B. THE POLITICO-MILITARY As States are found to STREAM: CYBER-WARFARE expand cyber warfare capabilities, the threat is considered to be large enough to pose a risk to national and international peace and security. cccxxxvi “They acknowledge the attribution problem and the dual-use character of the cyber-space, which corresponds with the idea that the Internet is neutral and the way it is put to use is dependent on the intent of its users (unanticipated consequences aside).” cccxxxvii Existing means to combat the criminal use of information technology and to create a global culture of cybersecurity is mentioned. 3. Third Group cccxxxviii Cyber-warfare is at the centre of discussions in the General Assembly’s First Committee on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of security. cccxli These discussions have specific moments such as the presentation of the first draft resolution on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of security in the First Committee in 1998, and each year since then, by the Russian government. cccxlii Expansion is wanted for the international law regimes that aim at of Governmental the prevention of the use of information technologies for purposes incompatible Experts (2013) The need for better focusing on the discussions on international peace and with missions of ensuring international stability and security.cccxliii security got even more noticeable with the In accordance with the political blocs, lessons learned from the first and second discussions have two sides; some are GGE. cccxxxix outcomes Results of the reports and of the whereas others wish the same laws that discussions in the First Committee greater apply to the use of kinetic weapons to weight the apply to state behaviour in cyberspace international community and allow them to while trying to step up international add a substantive layer to the work done in cooperation and other forums. their actions legitimacy cccxl give calling for a cyber arms control treaty, among Third GGE will be examined in the following chapters of this Agenda Item. agencies. among law enforcement cccxliv I. Phase 1: 1998-2004 First steps towards cyber norms are made in this phase. The 1998 draft resolution was adopted and it built on the prior work The first resolution on this item, 53/70, on the “role of science and technology in was adopted by the General Assembly; yet, the context of security, disarmament and the push for an international treaty was met other related fields” (A/53/576, 18 Nov with suspicion by some states which cccxlv “The key elements of the believed that such a treaty could be used to resolution for an international computer limit the freedom of information under the security treaty are: mentions the military guise potential telecommunications security.cccl 1998). of information and communication technology for the first time as well as an expression of concern about the use of such technology of increasing information and II. Phase 2: 2005-2008 In 2005, an important alteration occurred inconsistent with the objectives of maintain in international resolution introduced by Russia was stability and security the First Committee. The draft to adopted and went to a recorded vote for the prevent cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism first time in its history. cccli The U.S. was (US position) invites Member States to the only state that voted against the inform the Secretary-General notably on resolution on October 28. ccclii During this their views regarding definitions and the period, cyber-warfare made attained public development of international principles attention for the first time in 2007 because (operative paragraphs of the Distributed Denial of Server (DDoS) (Russian position) mentions need regarding next steps).”cccxlvi (which will be explained in the following Comparing to the 2010 version of the draft resolution, it can be seen that here are two main changes: cccxlvii parts of this Agenda Item) attack against Estonia and during the Georgian- Russian war in 2008. cccliii However, even the description of these events is controversial (1) Oversight of the reference and attempt and dependent on the still ongoing norm to come up with definitions which would emergence and classification of such have debatably been a first step towards a incidents. cyber arms control agreement; cccxlviii (2) Substitution of the reference to international principles with references to international measures.cccxlix concepts and possible cccliv It is still controversial whether DDoS was a cyber-attack or merely a form of protest that should be protected under the freedom of expression. ccclv On the other hand, the effects of Stuxnet were perceived more like sabotage than a traditional attack.ccclvi The difference in this classification suggests that outcome of the event is another decisive factor.ccclvii To sum up, the debates are as much about norms as on how to classify the events in the first place.ccclviii strategies and technologies, policies and best practices; 4. Identification of measures to support capacity-building less developed countries; and 5. III. Phase 3: 2009-To-Date in Finding possibilities to elaborate common terms and definitions relevant to In October 2009, draft resolutions in the United First Committee once again started to be resolution 64/25/78"ccclxi adopted without an opposition, just as the pre-2005 period. ccclix Later in Geneva, the UN agreed to discuss cyber-warfare and cyber-security with representatives of the UN in the First Committee.ccclx Nations General Assembly Estonia and Israel joined the new group established in 2009.ccclxii Since Estonia was the first country to go through a massive DDoS attack, and Israel was considered to be of the potential states designing Stuxnet, Later in the same year, the second GGE this presented its report. The group made the importance.ccclxiii following five recommendations to the states: change had a significant Also during this same period when the major WikiLeaks release and Stuxnet took "1. Further dialogue among States to place, the U.S., decided to co-sponsor the discuss norms pertaining to State use of Russian draft resolution in the DISEC.ccclxiv ICTs, to reduce collective risk and protect Resolution 65/41 included a paragraph critical requesting national and international infrastructures; measures to address the implications of State use of ICTs, including exchanges of national views on the use of ICTs in conflict; national to report at the 68th session in 2013. This GGE and its report will be explained deeply in the following sections of this Agenda Item.ccclxv C. 3. Information exchanges on national legislation, Secretary-General establish a new GGE in 2012 to submit a 2. Confidence-building, stability, and risk reduction the ICT security THE ECONOMIC STREAM: CYBER-CRIME There are many bodies of the UN that deal with the economic stream of the issue. United Nations structure of governance on of a global culture of cyber-security. ccclxx crime is even more complex than the The second resolution on a global culture typical UN system since the General of cyber-security negotiated in 2004 and Assembly, has been dealing with the issue adopted by the GA is extended to contain as well as The United Nations Economic the protection of critical information and Social Council (ECOSOC) with its infrastructures which take their roots from smaller membership of only 54 out of the the 2003 meeting of the G8 Ministers of 193 UN Member States.ccclxvi In addition to Justice and Interior. ccclxxi The resolution ECOSOC, two functional commissions now contains the link between countries’ meeting annually also focus on crime, critical namely: the Commission on Narcotic critical information infrastructures.ccclxxii Drugs and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. ccclxvii Lastly, an independent UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice takes place every five years as well as the aforementioned bodies to make recommendations to the Commission on Crime Justice. Prevention and Criminal ccclxviii infrastructures and countries’ After the shift in the U.S. policy in 2010, the third resolution, Resolution 64/211, was adopted. ccclxxiii An important part of the document is the second part of its title: Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures. ccclxxiv The document includes an annex that outlines a voluntary D. THE SECOND COMMITTEE OF self-assessment instrument for national THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY - "A efforts to protect critical information GLOBAL infrastructures with a detailed road map for CULTURE OF CYBER- Member-States. ccclxxv Being sponsored by SECURTIY" The three resolutions of the General Assembly's Second Committee on “a global culture of cyber-security" link the the U.S. along with 39 other countries, the key challenges added to the original draft are: and “ (i) First, references to civil society and economic referencing the resolutions of business were taken out of the original both the First and Third Committee.ccclxix draft of the resolution text itself. The two streams: politico-military After introducing a draft resolution in 2002, the Second Committee entitled the creation section mentioning freedom of expression and the free flow of information, ideas and knowledge was also deleted as well as the suggestion to submit relevant information in Tunis, Tunisia in 2005. ccclxxviii Today, by a set deadline, by the sixty-fifth session. annual WSIS Forums are an essential part (ii) Second, the final text emphasizes the importance of the mandate of the Internet Governance Forum and reiterating that all Governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international Internet governance relating to the larger Internet governance debate. It of the follow-up on the World Summit on the Information Society.ccclxxix They have a set of targets, recommendations and commitments to build a comprehensive, people-centric and development-oriented Information Society.ccclxxx also The review process which was initiated in highlights that each country will determine 2013 with the purpose of assessing the its own critical information. progress and lessons learned by all (iii) Third, the resolution highlights the importance of international informationsharing and collaboration, so as to effectively confront the increasingly transnational nature of such threats‖ and encourages Member States to share best practices for dissemination.”ccclxxvi E. WORLD SUMMIT ON stakeholders private -including sector, community, civil Internet and society, technical Governments- in advancing targets set by the WSIS in areas such as Internet infrastructure, ICT and education, or building confidence and security in the use of ICTs had two main outcomes that are being prepared:ccclxxxi THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1) A statement on the WSIS implementation,ccclxxxii The UN General Assembly Resolution 56/183 endorsed the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in two phases. (2) A Vision statement on forwardlooking challenges.ccclxxxiii WSIS aimed to achieve "a common vision, The format and aims of the meeting may desire and commitment to build a people- be further developed by the discussions of centric, the UNGA at end of March 2014 on the inclusive and developmentwhere future of the WSIS. ccclxxxiv Furthermore, everyone can create, access, utilize and 2015 is 10th anniversary of the World share information."ccclxxvii Summit oriented Information Society The first phase of the WSIS took place in Geneva in 2003 and the second phase was on (WSIS).ccclxxxv the Information Society F. GLOBAL CYBER SECURITY AGENDA(GCA) sought to develop advice on how criminal The Secretary-General of the ITU, Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré, launched the Global Cyber-Security Agenda (GCA) on 17 May 2007. It was a framework to establish international “Work Area one, 'Legal measures', internationally compatible manner. Work Area two, 'Technical and procedural measures', focused on key endorse the efforts for cyber-security and measures for addressing vulnerabilities in increase confidence and security in the software products, including accreditation information society. The GCA aimed to schemes, protocols and standards. collaboration that dealt with through legislation in an would encourage cooperation activities committed over ICTs could be amongst all relevant parties in confidence building in the use of ICTs.ccclxxxvi Work Area structures”, three, “Organizational considered generic frameworks and response strategies for the The High-Level Experts Group (HLEG), prevention, detection, response to and assisted the GCA with advices on the crisis complex cyber- including the protection of countries’ The HLEG is “a group of critical information infrastructure systems. security. issues ccclxxxvii surrounding specialists in cyber-security, comprising more than one hundred experts from a broad range of backgrounds in policymaking, government, academia and the private sector.” ccclxxxviii HLEG will be examined in the following pages of this document. I. Five pillars of the ITU Global Cyber Security Agenda management of cyber-attacks, Work Area four, “Capacity building”, sought to elaborate strategies for capacitybuilding mechanisms to raise awareness, transfer know-how and boost cyber security on the national policy agenda. Work Area five, “International cooperation” sought to develop a strategy for international cooperation, dialogue and coordination in dealing with cyber- The ITU Global Cyber Security Agenda threats.”cccxc seeks to build on existing national and regional initiatives to avoid repetition of work and encourage collaboration amongst G. HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP (HLEG) ON CYBER SECURITY all relevant partners. ccclxxxix The GCA is Consisting of successful specialists in the built upon five key Work Areas (pillars): subject, an expert panel was appointed to advise the ITU Secretary-General on the -to provide guidance on possible long-term complex issues surrounding cyber-security. strategies and emerging trends in cyber- ITU security.”cccxciii Secretary-General appoints the members of the High-Level Experts Group (HLEG), with “due consideration to both geographical expertise, diversity to ensure representation.” cccxci and range of multi-stakeholder Having more than one hundred world-renowned specialists in cyber security, representing expertise from across a broad range of backgrounds including the administrations of ITU Member States, industry, regional and international organizations, research and academic institutions, the key purpose of the HLEG was to advise the ITU Secretary-General on the complex issues surrounding formulate cyber security proposals on and to long-term For their advices to be efficient, HLEG Members acted in their personal capacity and at their own expense, therefore their advice can be considered as objective and impartial. cccxciv organization Members are elected Member-States from the main five world security and other information technology firms) and other regional and international organizations, academic and research institutions to ensure a representative balance in the membership.cccxcv CONDUCT The being service providers, software developers, five Areas. by regions; industry (manufacturers, operators, H. INTERNATIONAL Work this nominated as a broad cross-selection from strategies to promote cyber security in the key of FOR CODE OF INFORMATION responsibilities of the HLEG were:cccxcii SECURITY “-to further develop GCA by proposing “On September 12, 2011, the permanent refinements to its main goals; representatives -to analyze current developments in cybersecurity, including both threats and stateof-the-art solutions, anticipate emerging and future challenges, identify strategic options, and formulate proposals to the ITU Secretary-General; -to meet the goals of GCA; of China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations submitted a letter jointly to the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, asking him to International Code of distribute the Conduct for Information Security drafted by their countries as a formal document of the 66th session the General Assembly and called upon countries to further discuss the document within the framework of the In recent years, information and network United Nations so as to reach consensus security started to draw attention from the on the international norms and rules international community thus it is required standardizing the behaviour of countries to concerning information and cyberspace at standardize information and cyberspace an early date.” cccxcvi Code Information Security of Conduct for for maintaining information and network security which cover the political, military, economic, social, aspects. cultural, cccxcvii international rules technical and other It is understood from the submitted by China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is the first relatively comprehensive and systematic document in the world proposing the international rules on information and network security and more certainly it will not be the only one.cdi principles that countries shall not use such I. POTENTIAL THREATS FROM information CYBER-SPACE and to behaviour. cd It can be said that the draft Various basic principles raised by the International formulate telecommunication technologies as the network to conduct hostile behaviours and acts of aggression or to threaten international peace and security and stress that countries have the rights and obligations to protect their information and cyberspace as well as key information and network infrastructure from threats, interference and sabotage In modern society, communication through internet is the primary method for private and professional endeavours.cdii Therefore, cyber-threat is omnipresent in the communication systems, the computerbased critical infrastructure and also in the military technologies.cdiii attacks.cccxcviii “They advocate establishing Considering the political and military a multilateral, transparent and democratic spheres, the oft-cited computer worm international ‘Stuxnet’ of June 2010 is "the most Internet governance mechanism, fully respecting the rights and outstanding freedom of information and cyberspace modern cyber-attack with a political with the premise of observing laws, background. helping developing countries develop the demonstrates the role of cyber-space as a information and network technologies and central sphere for political, diplomatic and cooperating military disputes and confrontations of the crimes.”cccxcix on fighting cyber individual The incident 'Stuxnet' of a episode 21st century." cdiv Because of the difficulty of finding the responsible behind a cyber- “Extortion. The attackers seek to cause attack, national governments can easily key online business services to become conceal unavailable at critical times and expect entities. their attacks behind private cdv payment for an attack to cease. Espionage. The attackers seek to cause I. Distributed Denial-of-Service Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks pose an immense threat to the Internet, and many defence mechanisms have been proposed to overcome the problem.cdvi Since it is a dynamic process and attackers constantly modify their tools key business services to become unavailable or unresponsive while reaping an award on another front. The DDoS attack itself is used as a method of disguising the real purpose of the attack or distracting the victim’s attention. to bypass these security systems in return Protesting. The attackers seek attention researchers modify their approaches to to the particular cause or public issue they handle new attacks. cdvii The DDoS field is are pursuing and work to force a rapidly becoming more and more complex. particular change in policy or behaviour. While this hinders an understanding of the Attack participants are provided with DDoS incident the variety of known target and coordination details from a attacks creates the impression that the central “authority”. problem is enormous, and hard to explore and address, existing defence systems deploy various strategies to tackle the problem. cdviii Understanding their similarities and differences, and assessing their effectiveness and cost, it is difficult to compare them to each other.cdix Nuisance. The attackers launch attacks against a broad spectrum of targets “because they can”. The objectives vary greatly between targets but the DDoS attacks are typically short- lived, often reactionary to a perceived slight, or designed Although for many organizations situated to gain some temporary advantage over named individuals.”cdxi at the receiving end of a coordinated DDoS attack, the objectives of the attackers may II. WikiLeaks not necessarily be self-evident,cdx from an Since the leak of the Pentagon Papers forty instigator’s perspective, some of the most years ago WikiLeaks’ 2010–2011 release common DDoS objectives are: of multiple large caches of classified documents stolen from the U.S. government constitutes the most radical disclosure of classified information.cdxvii It form of unauthorized disclosure.cdxii is assumed that the state knows or at least “Publishing improves transparency, and this transparency creates a better society for all people. Better scrutiny leads to reduced corruption and stronger can confidently predict disclosure’s ill effects when the laws and regulations that govern classification are the subject.cdxviii Constitutional executive-privilege and democracies in all society’s institutions, state-secret doctrines rest on the parallel including government, corporations and presumption that the threat of disclosure other organizations. A healthy, vibrant and will affect the executive’s ability to protect inquisitive journalistic media plays a vital the nation and perform his delegated duties. role in achieving these goals.” cdxiii For that reason, the sequential narrative, in which information disclosure impairs the III. Declaration of WikiLeaks state’s operations and endangers the nation, “Asserting that it is “part of that media” forms a core tenet of the transparency that ideal’s spreads transparency, WikiLeaks contends that its publication of authentic limitations. cdxix Therefore information transforms must be controlled. documents leaked from governments and powerful private entities will expose IV. Stuxnet Computer Worm “otherwise unaccountable and secretive Since the invention of the first computer- institutions” that engage in unethical acts, assisted industrial control system (ICS) “good device, technical and national security government and a healthy society,” “alter communities expressed concerns about the course of history in the present, and . . . software and hardware vulnerabilities and lead us to a better future.”” cdxiv It is potential security risks associated with believed these and thereby that help since establish the information devices. cdxx Penetration of a cdxv computer system for purposes of degrading Therefore when information disclosure its capabilities, manipulating data, or using leads to a more engaged public, more the device to launch cyber attacks on other democratic politics, and a more efficient systems is generally included in such state, it forms a core tenet of the ideal concerns.cdxxi transforms, it must be disclosed. transparency.cdxvi In September 2010, media stated that a A similar description plays the same role new form of cyber attack appeared to about concerns regarding the unauthorized target Iran, although the actual target, if any, is unknown.cdxxii What was known is J. REPORT OF THE THIRD GROUP that through the use of thumb drives in OF computers that were not connected to the (2013) Internet, a malicious software program known as Stuxnet infected computer systems that were used to control the functioning of a nuclear power plant moreover once inside the system, Stuxnet had the ability to degrade or destroy the software on which it operated. cdxxiii GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS Agreement of UN group of governmental experts on cyber-security on a substantial consensus report represents a significant success for the maintenance of international peace and stability in this crucial area.cdxxviii Moreover the Stuxnet worm appears to be “By acknowledging the full applicability of the first malicious software (malware) international law to state behavior in designed specifically to attack a particular cyberspace, type of ICS: one that controls nuclear transparency plants, whether for power or uranium measures, enrichment. cdxxiv Although early reports by extending and traditional confidence-building and by recommending international cooperation and capacity focused on the impact on facilities in Iran, building it was later discovered that the program communications had spread throughout multiple countries infrastructure more secure around the worldwide.cdxxv world, the report lays a solid foundation To date, numerous countries including Iran, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Germany, China, and the United States are identified to make information technology and (ICT) for states to address the mutual risks that arise from rapidly increasing cyberthreats.”cdxxix to be affected by the Stuxnet worm to It is disturbing that each day, more- varying degrees of disturbance in their sophisticated cyber tools allow states to cdxxvi “A lack of attack the control systems of critical publicly available information on the infrastructure.cdxxx Furthermore these tools, damage caused by Stuxnet in these coupled with a widespread uncertainty countries makes it difficult to determine the about the rules that would govern state malware’s potency.”cdxxvii behaviour in cyberspace, have raised the technology systems. risk of cyber-conflict between states. cdxxxi It was, therefore, of crucial importance that the UN find common grounds to address these challenges by affirming and clarifying the application of international law to state behaviour in cyberspace and by recommending confidence-building measures.cdxxxii a substantial report, namely “On the Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” to carry out a mandate from the UN General Assembly to examine possible cooperative measures in addressing the existing and potential threats regarding the use of ICTs. cdxxxiii This mandate was more specific than other expert emphasized “According to a recent study by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, more than 40 states have now developed some military cyber-capabilities, 12 of them for On June 7th, the group of experts agreed on recent I. Difficulties groups, the need as to it clearly elaborate confidence-building measures and norms, offensive cyber-warfare.”cdxxxvii According to the report there are several factors that make the situation in cyberspace particularly difficult to control. For example many of the tools in cyberspace can be used for both legitimate and malicious purposes.cdxxxviii Attributions to specific perpetrators continue to be difficult, increasing the risk of “false flag” attacks which can be defined as attacks by a state, group, or individual under an assumed identity.cdxxxix rules or principles of responsible behaviour Another difficulty which is emphasized in of States.cdxxxiv the experts’ group report is the issue of Four categories are covered within the group’s report for enhancing international cyber-security: cooperation, international law, confidence-building measures, and improvements in states’ capacities for building robust ICT infrastructures. cdxxxv When examined together, the report presents specific measures to promote the peaceful use of cyberspace in the interest of preventing international conflicts.cdxxxvi collateral damage. For example by spreading malware into computer networks or digital control systems that were not the primary target of the original attack; global connectivity, vulnerable technologies, and anonymity facilitate the spread of disruptive cyber-activities that may cause considerable collateral damage. cdxl These damages can be particularly through socalled ICT enabled industrial control systems such as those used in nuclear power plants infrastructure.cdxli and other critical cdxlviii “To address these new risks, the report the arms control implications. calls on Member States to agree on an particular, the group called upon states to array of international actions in the four promote a peaceful ICT environment, categories to promote a peaceful, secure, which was a referral to the Outer Space open ICT Treaty. cdxlix In its approach to cyberspace also issues, the experts group applied a similar recognizes the importance of participation concept to one they used in the information of and cooperation with the private sector weapons: and civil society in these efforts.cdxliii specific prohibitions but positing the and environment.” cooperative cdxlii The group refraining from In imposing general objective of peaceful state use of II. Building Transparency and Trust cyberspace.cdl The issue of dealing with the possibility of states acquiring cyber weapons and pursuing their development is a highly "The report recommends the following confidence-building measures: controversial issue, yet the group managed Exchanging views and information on to take a realistic approach on the national policies, best practices, decision- matter. cdxliv In their draft code of conduct making processes, and national on the usage of ICTs by states, China and organizations and structures with regard Russia suggested explicit prohibitions of to cyber[-]security. As an example, the “information the United States in 2012 and Germany in cdxlv 2013 exchanged so-called white papers on weapons” and proliferation of their technologies. However, in deliberations, the experts' Chinese and group Russian representatives accepted that the dual nature of these technologies is decided upon a more pragmatic approach.cdxlvi Thus, the group decided on starting out with a traditional approach, which was taking confidence-building measures before attempting to agree on prohibitions that are cyber [-] defense with Russia. Creating bilateral or multilateral consultative frameworks for confidencebuilding measures, for example, within the Arab League, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Organization Regional for Forum, Security and the Co- operation in Europe (OSCE), and the basically unverifiable.cdxlvii Organization of American States. These The Group’s 2013 report repeatedly referred to terms used in other treaties on frameworks could include workshops and exercises on how to prevent and manage private sector will cooperate to elaborate disruptive cyber [-] security incidents. the objectives, conditions, requirements Enhancing the sharing of information and crisis communication among states on cyber[-]security incidents at three levels: between national [Computer Emergency Readiness Teams] CERTs bilaterally and within already existing multilateral CERT communities to exchange technical information about malware or other and frameworks on a global scale.cdliii As a result, some global ICT corporations are already engaged in this issue. Nevertheless, the exact roles of states and private companies and the method on cooperation among them in the issue of cyber-security needs to be clearly defined and developed by governments stakeholders. and private sector cdliv malicious indicators; through previously existing or newly created channels for Furthermore, in their report, the experts crisis management and early warning to highlighted the necessity for international receive, collect, analyze, and share such capacity building in order to assist states in information to help mitigate vulnerabilities their efforts to tackle the digital divide and and risks; and through channels for to improve the security of vital ICT dialogue at political and policy levels. infrastructure.cdlv The report also called on Increasing states, "working with the private sector and cooperation to address incidents that affect critical infrastructure systems, particularly those that rely on UN specialized agencies, to provide technical or other assistance in building capacities in ICT security."cdlvi ICT-enabled industrial control systems. To conclude, Member States must take the Enhancing mechanisms enforcement cooperation for to law reduce incidents that could be misunderstood as hostile state actions and that affect international security."cdli necessary measures to reach the objectives of this framework with state practices in accordance with the general principles to create a cyberspace that is “peaceful, secure, open and cooperative” which is the The group expressed the necessity of primary goal articulated in the experts governments to take the lead in developing group report.cdlvii and implementing those measures and it is K. CONCLUSION also highlighted that the private sector and civil society have an important role to The emergence of Stuxnet becomes the play.cdlii In the future, governments and the starting point of a new era for cyber- attacks.cdlviii Although the damage it caused regional legal frameworks; was appeared to be limited to the Iranian secure nuclear program, the vulnerabilities it applications; revealed were enormous.cdlix “By the time national it was discovered, Stuxnet had wormed its structures to deal with cyber incidents;cdlxv way into computer networks around the lack of information security professionals world, including, by some estimates, nearly and skills within governments;cdlxvi lack of half of those running electric utilities.”cdlx basic awareness among users; lack of Apart from the potential damage, even the international cooperation between industry sole existence of Stuxnet is troublesome experts, law enforcements, regulators, enough since it is an example of the academia and international organizations capacities of future cyber attacks. to address a global challenge.cdlxvii Cyber-attacks on vital infrastructure are L. Points that a Resolution Should becoming widespread; moreover, cyber- Cover security professionals report that the computer infrastructure has become more vulnerable even in just the past year. cdlxi And yet, while the threat of cyber-attacks has rapidly grown, the response has not kept the pace. While it is evident that this software cdlxiv and cdlxiii and lack ICT-based of global lack of appropriate organizational In the light of the issues explained in the previous sections, the General Assembly First Committee is expected to pass a comprehensive resolution that should cover these points: global threat may only be effectively met Mechanisms to increase international by a global solution by the international capacity building in order to assist states community working together to design a new law for cyber-attacks, international community has thus far largely failed to Ways to overcome the challenges outlined in the 2013 GGE report such as: update the legal framework for responding o lack of adequate and interoperable to cyber-attacks. cdlxii Although efforts of national or regional legal frameworks States and organizations especially the work of the UN and the recent GGE report shows that the international community o lack of secure software and ICT-based applications gives utmost importance to the agenda, o lack of appropriate national and global there are many challenges such as a lack of organizational structures to deal with adequate and interoperable national or cyber incidents o lack of professionals information and skills security within governments o lack of basic awareness among users Ways to be protected from Stuxnet and similar cyber threats Measures to strengthen the international organizations regarding cyber-security Measures to be taken in order to promote Measures transparency and trust transforms while respecting freedom Ways to prevent occurrence of collateral damages to control information BIBLIOGRAPHY i United Nations. 2013. 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[online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/SS8.pdf (accessed: 19 December 2013) xi Ibid. xii Ibid. xiii Ibid. xiv Ibid. xv Ibid. xvi Ibid. xvii Ibid. xviii Ibid. xix United Nations. 2013. FIRST COMMITTEE APPROVES SERIES OF DRAFTS ON WHICH DIVERSE POSITIONS CONVERGE BEFORE TACKLING RAFT OF MORE CONTENTIOUS TEXTS NEXT WEEK. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gadis3468.doc.htm (accessed: 19 December 2013) xx James Lee. 2013. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. [online] Available at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/8713-e.htm (accessed: 20 December 2013) xx United Nations. 2013. Disarmament in the News. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/ (accessed: 20 December 2013) xxi United Nations. 2014. UNODA. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/ (accessed: 2 January 2014) xxii Encyclopædia Britannica. 2014. Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). [online] Available at: http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/917314/weapon-of-mass-destruction-WMD (accessed: 2 January 2014) xxiii Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. 2006. WEAPONS OF TERROR. [online] Available at: http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf (accessed: 3 January 2014) xxiv Ibid. xxv Encyclopædia Britannica. 2014. Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). [online] Available at: http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/917314/weapon-of-mass-destruction-WMD (accessed: 2 January 2014) xxvi Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. 2006. WEAPONS OF TERROR. [online] Available at: http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf (accessed: 3 January 2014) xxvii Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. 2014. Weapons Basics. [online] Available at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/weapons-basics.htm (accessed 3 January 2014) xxviii Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 2014. The effects of nuclear weapons. [online] Available at: http://www.cnduk.org/campaigns/global-abolition/effects-of-nuclear-weapons (accessed 3 January 2014) xxix Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xxx Kym Ganczak. 2014. Non-proliferation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. [online] Available at: http://al.odu.edu/mun/SCNon-proliferationandtheDPRK_20131003104418_470121.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xxxi Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xxxii Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xxxiii Ibid. xxxiv Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xxxv Ibid. xxxvi Ibid. xxxvii Ibid. xxxviii Ibid. xxxix Ibid. xl Daryl G. Kimball. 2012. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz (Accessed 4 January 2014) xli Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xlii Ibid. xliii Ibid. xliv Ibid. xlv Ibid. xlvi Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xlvii Ibid. xlviii Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) xlix Ibid. l Ibid. li Ibid. lii Ibid. liii Ibid. liv Ibid. lv Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC). [online] Available at: http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/convention-prohibition-development-production-and-stockpilingbacteriological-biological-and-toxin-weapons-btwc/ (accessed 4 January 2014) lvi Ibid. lvii Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) lviii Ibid. lix Jürgen SCHEFFRAN. 2007. Missiles in conflict: the issue of missiles in all its complexity. [online] Available at: http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/EINIRAS/47131/ichaptersection_singledocument/9a9d3bab-f4da44f9-9d23-8955babc5d75/en/3_Missiles+in+conflict.pdf (accessed 4 January 2014) lx Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) lxi Aaron Karp. June 2005. Going Ballistic? Reversing Missile Proliferation. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Karp (accessed 4 January 2014) lxii CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES. 2001. Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects. [online] Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op7/op7.pdf (accessed 4 January 2014) lxiii James Clay Moltz. 2000. The Impact of National Missile Defense on Nonproliferation Regimes. [online] Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/73moltz.pdf (accessed 4 January 2014) lxiv THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES. 2013. Ballistic Missiles & Outer Space: Transparency & Confidence Building. [online] Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/eu%20conference/sections/eu-conference-2013-ca57/special-sessions3818/special-session-2-7e33 (Accessed 4 January 2014) lxv Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) lxvi Control Arms. 2009. SCOPE: types of equipment to be covered by an Arm Trade Treaty. [online] Available at: http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Scope-Types-of-Weapons.English.pdf (accessed 5 January 2014) lxvii Ibid. lxviii Ibid. lxix Wade Boese. 2007. The Accomplishments of Conventional Arms Control. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2497 (accessed 5 January 20014) lxx Ibid. lxxi Kate Joseph and Taina Susiluoto. 2002. A role for verification and monitoring in small arms control? [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2002/VY02_Joseph-Susiluoto.pdf (accessed 5 January 2014) lxxii Control Arms. 2009. SCOPE: types of equipment to be covered by an Arm Trade Treaty. [online] Available at: http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Scope-Types-of-Weapons.English.pdf (accessed 5 January 2014) lxxiii Small Arms Survey. Definitions of Small Arms and Light Weapons. [online] Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html (accessed 5 January) lxxiv Small Arms Survey. About the Small Arms Survey. [online] Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/mission.html (accessed 5 January) lxxv Small Arms Survey. Definitions of Small Arms and Light Weapons. [online] Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html (accessed 5 January) lxxvi Small Arms Survey. About the Small Arms Survey. [online] Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/mission.html (accessed 5 January) lxxvii SMALL ARMS WORKING GROUP. 2006. Consequences of the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons. [online] Available at: http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/sawg/2006factsheets/SAWG_Small_Arms_Fact_Sheets_2006.pd f (accessed 6 January) lxxviii SMALL ARMS WORKING GROUP. 2006. Consequences of the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons. [online] Available at: http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/sawg/2006factsheets/SAWG_Small_Arms_Fact_Sheets_2006.pd f (accessed 6 January) lxxix Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) lxxx Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council Small Arms Firing Range Team. 2003. Characterization and Remediation of Soils at Closed Small Arms Firing Ranges. [online] Available at: http://www.itrcweb.org/Guidance/GetDocument?documentID=93 (accessed 6 January 2014) lxxxi Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) lxxxii Small Arms Survey. 2001. Half a Billion and Still Counting ... Global Firearms Stockpiles. [online] Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2001/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2001Chapter-02-EN.pdf (accessed 6 January 2014) lxxxiii Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) lxxxiv Ibid. lxxxv Ibid. lxxxvi Ibid. lxxxvii Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014) lxxxviii Handicap International. 2014. About Handicap International. [online] Available at: http://www.handicapinternational.org.uk/about_us (accessed 6 January 2014) lxxxix : Dr. Brian Rappert and Richard Moyes. 2006. A case for the prohibition of cluster munitions. [online] Available at: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/failuretoprotect-lma.pdf (accessed 7 January 2014) xc United Nations. 2013. THE WORLD IS OVER-ARMED AND PEACE IS UNDERFUNDED. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/visitors/shared/documents/pdfs/FS_Disarmament_March2013.pdf (accessed 6 January 2014) xci United Nations. 1999. General Assembly Official Records Fifty-fourth session First Committee 9th Meeting. [online] Available at: https://disarmamentlibrary.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/2ec8768d20dcd0f585257631005152cd/c06a54fc9ac1884b8525764b0062c99 2/$FILE/a-c1-54-pv9.pdf (accessed 7 January 2014) xcii ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. 2014. ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/newspublications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ (accessed 7 January) xciii Riel Miller, Wolfgang Michalski and Barrie Stevens OECD Secretariat, Advisory Unit to the SecretaryGeneral. THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF 21st CENTURY TECHNOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES. [online] Available at: http://www.oecd.org/futures/35391210.pdf (accessed 7 January) xciv United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January) xcv Beth A. Simmons. 1998. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at: http://scholar.harvard.edu/bsimmons/files/Simmons1998.pdf (accessed 8 January) xcvi Ibid. xcvii Ibid. xcviii Ibid. xcix David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse. 2003. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Reconciliation-After-Violent-Conflict-A-HandbookFull-English-PDF.pdf (accessed 8 January) c A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January) ci Ibid. cii A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2001. Verification Yearbook. [online] Available at: http://candispeace.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Compliance_VERTIC-YrBk2000_Dorn&Scott.pdf (accessed 8 January 2014) ciii UNEP Division of Environmental Law and Conventions. 2010. Auditing the Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs): A Primer for Auditors. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/audingmeas.pdf (accessed 8 January 2014) civ Liles Parker. 2014. Regulatory Compliance / Compliance Plan Development and Implementation. [online] Available at: http://www.lilesparker.com/areas-of-practice/regulatory-compliance/ (accessed 8 January) cv A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2001. Verification Yearbook. [online] Available at: http://candispeace.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Compliance_VERTIC-YrBk2000_Dorn&Scott.pdf (accessed 8 January 2014) cvi Ibid. cvii United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Division of Environmental Law and Conventions. 2009. Issues of compliance: Considerations for the international regime an access and benefit sharing. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/portals/119/COMPLIANCEandABS.pdf (accessed 8 January) cviii Ibid. cix Ibid. cx United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January) cxi United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Division of Environmental Law and Conventions. 2009. Issues of compliance: Considerations for the international regime an access and benefit sharing. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/portals/119/COMPLIANCEandABS.pdf (accessed 8 January) cxii Ibid. cxiii Ibid. cxiv Ibid. cxv Ibid. cxvi Ibid. cxvii United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January) cxviii Ibid. cxix Ibid. cxx United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Division of Environmental Law and Conventions. 2009. Issues of compliance: Considerations for the international regime an access and benefit sharing. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/portals/119/COMPLIANCEandABS.pdf (accessed 8 January) cxxi United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January) cxxii Ibid. cxxiii Ibid. cxxiv BRUCH, CARL and MREMA, ELIZABETH. UNEP GUIDELINES AND MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at: http://www.inece.org/conference/7/vol1/MremaBruch.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014) cxxv Maas Goote & René Lefeber. 2004. COMPLIANCE BUILDING UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE. [online] Available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/014/j2323e.pdf (accessed 9 January) cxxvi COMMISSION ON GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE. 2002. PROCEDURES TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND GRICULTURE. [online] Available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/014/y7168e.pdf (accessed 9 January) cxxvii Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 (accessed 9 January 2014) cxxviii Ibid. cxxix Ibid. cxxx Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Ifft (accessed 9 January 2014) cxxxi Ibid. cxxxii Ibid. cxxxiii Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 (accessed 9 January 2014) cxxxiv Jacob Katz Cogan. Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law. [online] Available at: http://www.yale-university.org/yjil/PDF/Cogan.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014) cxxxv Ibid. cxxxvi Ibid. cxxxvii Ibid. cxxxviii Ibid. cxxxix Ibid. cxl Barker, J. 2014. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. [online] Available at: http://www.eolss.net/eolsssamplechapters/c14/e1-44-01/e1-44-01-txt-02.aspx [Accessed: 13 Feb 2014]. cxli Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Ifft (accessed 9 January 2014) cxlii Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 (accessed 9 January 2014) cxliii Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Ifft (accessed 9 January 2014) cxliv Ibid. cxlv Un.org. 2014. UNODA - Disarmament Related Treaties. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/treaty/treaties.shtml [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. cxlvi Ibid. cxlvii Ibid. cxlviii Global-challenges.org. 2014. Global Issues of the Twenty-First Century: United Nations Challenges. [online] Available at: http://www.global-challenges.org/37biological-weapons.html [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. cxlix Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. cl Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. cli Ibid. clii A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2001. Verification Yearbook. [online] Available at: http://candispeace.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Compliance_VERTIC-YrBk2000_Dorn&Scott.pdf (accessed 8 January 2014) cliii Ibid. cliv Ibid. clv Ibid. clvi Ibid. clvii Ibid. clviii Vertic.org. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/Findlay_Geneva%20speech.doc [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clix Ibid. clx Opcw.org. 2014. History of the Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/news-publications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxi Ibid. clxii Ibid. clxiii Vertic.org. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/Findlay_Geneva%20speech.doc [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxiv Ibid. clxv Opcw.org. 2014. History of the Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/news-publications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxvi Mofa.go.jp. 2014. Roles of the United Nations and Other International Organizations, and Japan's Cooperation. [online] Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1990/1990-2-4.htm [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxvii Opcw.org. 2014. History of the Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/news-publications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxviii Vertic. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/No19.pdf [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxix Ibid. clxx Vertic. 2014. Yearbook [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2003/VY03_Introduction.pdf [Accessed: 11 January2014]. clxxi Ibid. clxxii Ibid. clxxiii Research.microsoft.com. 2014. [online] Available at: http://research.microsoft.com/enus/um/people/leonardo/vstte.ps [Accessed: 14 January 2014]. clxxiv Ibid. clxxv Ibid. clxxvi Ibid. clxxvii Vertic. 2014. Yearbook [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2003/VY03_Introduction.pdf [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxxviii European Commission. 2014. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/finance/international/transparency/docs/mrv_cc_finance_master_en.pdf [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxxix Vertic. 2014. Yearbook [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2003/VY03_Introduction.pdf [Accessed:11 January 2014]. clxxx Ibid. clxxxi Ibid. clxxxii Ibid. clxxxiii Nuclearfiles.org. 2014. Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: Issues: Arms Control and Disarmament: Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/armscontrol-disarmament/verification/index.htm [Accessed: 14 January 2014]. clxxxiv Ibid. clxxxv Vertic.org. 2014. VERTIC: Building trust through verification - About VERTIC. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/pages/homepage/about/about-vertic.php [Accessed: 11 January 2014]. clxxxvi Ibid. clxxxvii Ibid. clxxxviii Ibid. clxxxix Ibid. cxc Council on Foreign Relations. 2014. UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM): Mandate. [online] Available at: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/un-special-commission-iraq-unscom-mandate/p19033 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cxci Un.org. 2014. basicfacts.html. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/General/basicfacts.html [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cxcii Un.org. 2014. UNSCOM MANDATE. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscom.htm#MANDATE [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cxciii Ibid. cxciv Unmovic.org. 2014. UNMOVIC - United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. [online] Available at: http://www.unmovic.org/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cxcv Ibid. cxcvi Ibid. cxcvii Ibid. cxcviii Ibid. cxcix Beyondintractability.org. 2014. Monitoring of Agreements | Beyond Intractability. [online] Available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/monitoring-agreements [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cc Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cci Ibid. ccii Ibid. cciii A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January) cciv Ibid. ccv Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccvi A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January) ccvii Ibid. ccviii Ibid. ccix Ibid. ccx Ibid. ccxi Ibid. ccxii Ibid. ccxiii Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxiv Ibid. Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxvi Armscontrol.org. 2014. State Department Arms Control Compliance Report Underscores Value of New START | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/newstartcompliancereport [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxvii Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxviii Armscontrol.org. 2014. State Department Arms Control Compliance Report Underscores Value of New START | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/newstartcompliancereport [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxix Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxx Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxi Ibid. ccxxii Opcw.org. 2014. Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/chemicalweapons-convention/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxiii Opcw.org. 2014. About the Convention. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/about-the-convention/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxiv Ctbto.org. 2014. The Treaty: CTBTO Preparatory Commission. [online] Available at: http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxv Ibid. ccxxvi Un.org. 2014. NPT Treaty. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxvii Iaea.org. 2014. News Center : IAEA and DPRK. [online] Available at: http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxviii Ibid. ccxxix Ibid. ccxxx Ibid. ccxxxi Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxxii A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January) ccxxxiii Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxxiv Ibid. ccxxxv Ibid. ccxxxvi Ibid. ccxxxvii A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January) ccxxxviii Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxxxix Ibid. ccxl Ibid. ccxli A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January) ccxlii Ibid. ccxliii Ibid. ccxliv Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxlv Ibid. ccxlvi Ibid. ccxv ccxlvii Ibid. Un.org. 2014. NPT Treaty. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxlix Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccl Fas.org. 2014. Cruise Missiles. [online] Available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/cm/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccli Ibid. cclii A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January) ccliii Ibid. ccliv Ibid. cclv Vertic. 2014. Yearbook. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2002/VY02_Joseph-Susiluoto.pdf [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cclvi Ibid. cclvii Ibid. cclviii Ibid. cclix Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cclx Ibid. cclxi Ibid. cclxii Ibid. cclxiii UN General Assembly A/RES/53/70 cclxiv United Nations. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS_33.pdf [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cclxv Ibid. cclxvi Ibid. cclxvii Ibid. cclxviii Oapen.org. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.oapen.org/download?type=document&docid=391032 [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cclxix References-definitions.blurtit.com. 2014. What Does Cyber Mean? - Blurtit. [online] Available at: http://references-definitions.blurtit.com/34981/what-does-cyber-mean- [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cclxx Ibid. cclxxi Ibid. cclxxii Ibid. cclxxiii Schreier. On Cyber Warfare. [online] Available at: https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCgQFjAA&url= http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dcaf.ch%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F67316%2F1025687%2Ffile%2FOnCyberwarfare -Schreier.pdf&ei=rMXqUs6GEoKThgew3YHoAQ&usg=AFQjCNHSti4VD11zqhHbyC36ASV0RLJ8g&bvm=bv.60444564,d.ZG4 [Accessed: 10 February 2014] cclxxiv Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cclxxv Ibid. cclxxvi Oecd.org. 2014. Internet economy - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. [online] Available at: http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonald ata.htm [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cclxxvii Ibid. cclxxviii Wipo.int. 2014. Understanding Copyright and Related Rights. [online] Available at: http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.html [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cclxxix Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cclxxx Ibid. cclxxxi Ibid. cclxxxii Ibid. cclxxxiii Ibid. ccxlviii cclxxxiv Ibid. Ibid. cclxxxvi Ibid. cclxxxvii Ibid. cclxxxviii Ibid. cclxxxix Techterms.com. 2014. ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) Definition. [online] Available at: http://www.techterms.com/definition/ict [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxc Ibid. ccxci Ibid. ccxcii Fleming Euan. 2014. [online] Available at: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/114353/2/Fleming_Euan_553.pdf [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxciii Ibid. ccxciv Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] ccxcv Ibid. ccxcvi Wto.org. 2014. WTO | Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study. [online] Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case27_e.htm [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccxcvii Ibid. ccxcviii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] ccxcix Ibid. ccc Ibid. ccci Ibid. cccii Epublications.bond.edu.au. 2014. [online] Available at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=eassc_publications [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. ccciii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] ccciv Ibid. cccv Ibid. cccvi Mark Sedra. THE FUTURE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM. [online] Available at: http://www.coffey.com/Uploads/Documents/The%20Future%20of%20SSR_20110504145753.pdf [Accessed 11 February 2014] cccvii Ibid. cccviii Epublications.bond.edu.au. 2014. [online] Available at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=eassc_publications [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cccix Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccx Ibid. cccxi Un.cv. 2014. Agencies of the UN: ITU. [online] Available at: http://www.un.cv/agency-itu.php [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cccxii Ibid. cccxiii Ibid. cccxiv Un.org. 2014. Charter of the United Nations. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxv Un.cv. 2014. Agencies of the UN: ITU. [online] Available at: http://www.un.cv/agency-itu.php [Accessed: 18 January 2014]. cccxvi Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxvii Editors, I. 2014. UNIDIR Books and Reports. [online] Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=47329 [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxviii Ibid. cccxix Unidir.org. 2014. UNIDIR : Statute. [online] Available at: http://www.unidir.org/en/about/theinstitute/statute [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxx Unidir.org. 2014. UNIDIR : The Institute. [online] Available at: http://www.unidir.org/about/the-institute [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxxi Ibid. cccxxii Ibid. cclxxxv cccxxiii Unicri.it. 2014. Mission and Statute. [online] Available at: http://www.unicri.it/institute/about_unicri/mission_statute/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxxiv Ibid. cccxxv Unidir.org. 2014. UNIDIR : Statute. [online] Available at: http://www.unidir.org/en/about/theinstitute/statute [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxxvi Unicri.it. 2014. Mission and Statute. [online] Available at: http://www.unicri.it/institute/about_unicri/mission_statute/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxxvii Ibid. cccxxviii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxxix Ibid. cccxxx Unicri.it. 2014. Mission and Statute. [online] Available at: http://www.unicri.it/institute/about_unicri/mission_statute/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cccxxxi Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxxxii Ibid. cccxxxiii United Nations. 2012. Developments in the Field of information and telecommunication in the context of international security. [online] Available at: http://www.ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/EnekenGGE-2012-Brief.pdf [Accessed: 10 February 2014] cccxxxiv Ibid. cccxxxv Ibid. cccxxxvi Ibid. cccxxxvii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxxxviii Ibid. cccxxxix Ibid. cccxl Ibid. cccxli Ibid. cccxlii United Nations. 2012. Developments in the Field of information and telecommunication in the context of international security. [online] Available at: http://www.ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/EnekenGGE-2012-Brief.pdf [Accessed: 10 February 2014 cccxliii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxliv Ibid. cccxlv United Nations. 2012. Developments in the Field of information and telecommunication in the context of international security. [online] Available at: http://www.ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/EnekenGGE-2012-Brief.pdf [Accessed: 10 February 2014] cccxlvi Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxlvii Law Reform Commission. 2010. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION. [online] Available at: http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/r98ADR.pdf [Accessed: 11 February] cccxlviii Ibid. cccxlix Ibid. cccl Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccli Ibid. ccclii Un.org. 2014. General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine Non-Member Observer State Status in United Nations. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [Accessed: 10 February 2014]. cccliii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccliv Ibid. ccclv Ibid. ccclvi Ibid. ccclvii Law Reform Commission. 2010. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION. [online] Available at: http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/r98ADR.pdf [Accessed: 11 February] ccclviii Un.org. 2014. General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine Non-Member Observer State Status in United Nations. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [Accessed: 10 February 2014]. ccclix Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] ccclx Ibid. ccclxi Ibid. ccclxii Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. Estonia and Israel. [online] Available at: http://www.vm.ee/?q=node/64 [Accessed: 10 February 2014]. ccclxiii Ibid. ccclxiv Ibid. ccclxv Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] ccclxvi Archive.unu.edu. 2014. United Nations in Twenty-First Century. [online] Available at: http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/un21-report.html [Accessed: 10 February 2014]. ccclxvii Ibid. ccclxviii Ibid. ccclxix UN General Assembly A/RES/57/239; A/RES/58/199; A/RES/64/211 ccclxx Wikileaks.org. 2014. Cable: 09USUNNEWYORK1161_a. [online] Available at: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USUNNEWYORK1161_a.html [Accessed: 10 February 2014]. ccclxxi Ibid. ccclxxii Ibid. ccclxxiii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] ccclxxiv U.S. Homeland Security. 2007. National Preparedness Guidelines. [online] Available at: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf [Accessed: 20 January 2014] ccclxxv Ibid. ccclxxvi Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] ccclxxvii Internetsociety.org. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) | Internet Society. [online] Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/wsis [Accessed: 20 January 2014]. ccclxxviii Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at: http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014]. ccclxxix Internetsociety.org. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) | Internet Society. [online] Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/wsis [Accessed: 20 January 2014]. ccclxxx Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at: http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014]. ccclxxxi Ibid. ccclxxxii Ibid. ccclxxxiii Ibid. ccclxxxiv Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at: http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014]. ccclxxxv Internetsociety.org. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) | Internet Society. [online] Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/wsis [Accessed: 20 January 2014]. ccclxxxvi Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at: http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014]. ccclxxxvii Ibid. ccclxxxviii Ibid. ccclxxxix Ibid. cccxc Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxci Ibid. cccxcii Itu.int. 2014. ITU - Global Cybersecurity Agenda. [online] Available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/hleg/ [Accessed: 19 January 2014]. cccxciii Ibid. cccxciv Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxcv Itu.int. 2014. ITU - Global Cybersecurity Agenda. [online] Available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/hleg/ [Accessed: 19 January 2014]. cccxcvi Fmprc.gov.cn. 2014. China, Russia and Other Countries Submit the Document of International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t858978.htm [Accessed: 19 January 2014]. cccxcvii Ibid. cccxcviii Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014] cccxcix Fmprc.gov.cn. 2014. China, Russia and Other Countries Submit the Document of International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations. [online] Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t858978.htm [Accessed: 19 January 2014]. cd Ibid. cdi Armscontrol.org. 2014. China and Russia Submit Cyber Proposal | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/China_and_Russia_Submit_Cyber_Proposal [Accessed: 22 January 2014]. cdii Issuu. 2014. Atlantic Voices Vol.2 no.5. [online] Available at: http://issuu.com/atlantic_treaty_association/docs/vol._2__no._5__may_2012_ [Accessed: 23 january 2014]. cdiii Armscontrol.org. 2014. China and Russia Submit Cyber Proposal | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/China_and_Russia_Submit_Cyber_Proposal [Accessed: 22 January 2014]. cdiv Issuu. 2014. Atlantic Voices Vol.2 no.5. [online] Available at: http://issuu.com/atlantic_treaty_association/docs/vol._2__no._5__may_2012_ [Accessed: 23 january 2014]. cdv Ibid. cdvi Ibid. cdvii Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at: https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed: 24 January 2014] cdviii Ibid. cdix Wikileaks.org. 2014. About. [online] Available at: http://wikileaks.org/About.html [Accessed: 24 January 2014]. cdx Ibid. cdxi Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at: https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed: 24 January 2014] cdxii Wikileaks.org. 2014. About. [online] Available at: http://wikileaks.org/About.html [Accessed: 24 January 2014]. cdxiii Ibid. cdxiv Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at: https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed: 24 January 2014] cdxv Law.cornell.edu. 2014. Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | LII / Legal Information Institute. [online] Available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26 [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cdxvi Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at: https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed: 24 January 2014] cdxvii Law.cornell.edu. 2014. Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | LII / Legal Information Institute. [online] Available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26 [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cdxviii Ibid. cdxix Ibid. cdxx Ibid. cdxxi Ibid. cdxxii Ibid. cdxxiii Ibid. cdxxiv Ibid. cdxxv NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2014. United Nations First Committee | NTI. [online] Available at: http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/un-first-committee/ [Accessed: 27 January 2014]. cdxxvi Ibid. cdxxvii Law.cornell.edu. 2014. Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | LII / Legal Information Institute. [online] Available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26 [Accessed: 25 January 2014]. cdxxviii NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2014. United Nations First Committee | NTI. [online] Available at: http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/un-first-committee/ [Accessed: 27 January 2014]. cdxxix Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014]. cdxxx Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014]. cdxxxi Ibid. cdxxxii Ibid. cdxxxiii Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014]. cdxxxiv Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014]. cdxxxv Ibid. cdxxxvi Ibid. cdxxxvii Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014]. cdxxxviii Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014]. cdxxxix Ibid. cdxl Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014]. cdxli Ibid. cdxlii Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014]. cdxliii Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014]. cdxliv Ibid. cdxlv Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014]. cdxlvi Un.org. 2014. First Committee Wraps Up Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space,Opens Discussion on Conventional Weapons, Hearing Introduction of Six DraftTexts. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gadis3394.doc.htm [Accessed: 1 February 2014]. cdxlvii Ibid. cdxlviii Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014]. cdxlix Un.org. 2014. First Committee Wraps Up Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space,Opens Discussion on Conventional Weapons, Hearing Introduction of Six DraftTexts. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gadis3394.doc.htm [Accessed: 1 February 2014]. cdl Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014]. cdli Ibid. cdlii Sustainabledevelopment.un.org. 2014. Future We Want - Outcome document .:. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. [online] Available at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html [Accessed: 2 February 2014]. cdliii Ibid. cdliv Ibid. cdlv Un.org. 2014. First Committee Wraps Up Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space,Opens Discussion on Conventional Weapons, Hearing Introduction of Six DraftTexts. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gadis3394.doc.htm [Accessed: 1 February 2014]. cdlvi Ibid. cdlvii Ibid. cdlviii Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703340904575284964215965730.html. [Accessed 4 February 2014] cdlix Ibid. cdlx Ibid. cdlxi Mark Clayton, Security Lags Cyberattack Threats in Critical Industries, Report Finds, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (April 20, 2011) (citing a global survey of 200 computer security professionals working in critical infrastructure industries, “In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks”). cdlxii Mark Clayton, Security Lags Cyberattack Threats in Critical Industries, Report Finds, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (April 20, 2011) (citing a global survey of 200 computer security professionals working in critical infrastructure industries, “In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks”). cdlxiii Datuk Mohd Noor Amin. 2013. Security of Telecommunications Networks. [online] Available at: http://www.tk.gov.tr/etkinlikler/uluslararasi_etkinlikler/dosyalar/securityoftelecommunicationsnetworks.pdf [Accessed: 31 January 2014] cdlxiv Ibid. cdlxv Ibid. cdlxvi Ibid. cdlxvii Ibid.