the warsaw pact and the inter-alliance behaviour

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the warsaw pact and the inter-alliance behaviour
Chapter V
THE WARSAW PACT AND THE INTER-ALLIANCE BEHAVIOUR
v'
201
A study
of
the
genesis
of
the
Warsaw Pact ·must
necessarily encompass also its functional
patterns.
Broadly
aspects, the one,
the
members
relations
of
and
speaking,
within
the
in
the
Pact,
the
these
and
behavioural
patterns
have
alliance-relation ship
and
the
crucial
ether,
issues
in
two
among
East-West
arising
out
of
them.
Inter-alliance relationship really
revolves
the policies of the dominant member of the Pact,
as
well
as
concerning
On
its
performance-record
other
the .other
members
hand,
now
take
up
the
and
into
inter-alliance
USSR
issues
collectively.
response-patterns
behaviour have also to be taken
the
on. important
individually
their
around
to
account.
Soviet
We
relationship
shall
in
this
chapter, while the other aspects, mentioned above, will be
focussed in the following chapter.
We
shall
begin
here
towards the Pact mainly in
relationship within the
by
the
Warsaw
analysing
context
of
An
Pact.
the performance-record of the Soviet Union
Europe and Warsaw Pact
will
however,
the
clarify
at
outset
here is only focussed on the
entire
gambit
of
Soviet
follow
relations
Pact
with
policy
inter-alliance
examination
of
vis-a-vis
East
We
may,
thereafter.
that
Warsaw
Soviet
our
and
discussion
not
Eastern
on
the
Europe.
Since the Warsaw Pact was established after Stalin's death,
the
policies
of
the
have to be focussed.
successor
Soviet
leadership
also
202
Soviet Policy Under Khruschev
After Stalin, the Soviet leadership
Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe.
an authority on Warsaw Pact says,
reassessed
the
Malcolm Mackintosh,
"However,
Stalin's successors may ·have been they
authoritarian
could
not
fail
to
realise in 1953 when Stalin died, that Eastern and Central
Europe
were
wasting
politically,
assets
paradise." 1
little
Stalin
economically,
more
had
than
a
followed
secret
an
awe inspiring personal rule whereas his
a
different
tasks
was
system
the
politically.
of
revival
.control.
of
the
policeman's
autocratic
successors
One
region
It may even be argued
militarily,
of
allies
to
and
transmsi t
organise
directives
East
European
major
economically
that
to
wanted
their
the
the
and
Warsaw
was conceived as an organisation through which
continue
and
they
East
support
Pact
could
European
for
Soviet
policies.
Besides,
Stalin's
policy
security of the Soviet Union
obsolete.
towards
had
become
a.nd
wasteful
and
After his death the defence policy and require-
ments had to be redefined in the light of
and post-war improvements in means of
nuclear
deli very,
and speed of movement for the ground forces.
1. Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Evolution of the
in Adelphi Paper 58 (London), 1969.
2. Ibid.
defence
2
weapons
transport
As
Warsaw
far
as
Pact"
203
the
European
new
Soviet
European
theatre
of
military
forces
to
operations
doctrine
play
a
was
concerned
required. Soviet·
part
in
the
and
defence
the
East
of
the ·
Soviet Union's open western frontier by manning the buffer
zone between the frontier and the west.
Ideologically,
Lenin's
concept
c.ommunism
of
by example replaced Stalin's concept of war as a
spreading Soviet type revolution.
a
relaxation
of
Soviet
control
In
general,
over
Eastern
means
of
there
was
Eur:ope
Stalin's radical "shock brigade" idea was given up leading
to
popular
front
cooperation
between
socialists and the communists both
the colonial countries.
people
to
communism
participate
by
means
communism alone
will
in
the· non-communist
the
capitalist
and
Khruschev said, "You cannot drive
with
of
a
war;
give
club
when
them
a
.or
drive
people
truly
them
realise
happy
li:~e
to
that
they
will come running of their own freewill ....3
After Stalin, during the Khruschev pe.riod, peaceful
coexistence replaced
the atomic poliny was
the
fatal
outlined
inevitability
by
of
"the biggest
the smallest number of roubles invested."
It
is
war
and
bang
for
in
this
atmosphere that the Warsaw Pact was constructed.
3. As quoted in Michael P. Gehlen, The Politics of Coexistence- Soviet Methods and Motives (Bloomington, 1967),
p.65.
204
However,
Khruschev
also
ideological
displayed
ambiguities and this contributed to revolts in
Hungary.
Poland
In 1958 when he realised that his hopes to bring
the Yugoslavs back
into
"socialist
camp"
would
not
his
conservative
criticism of
Khruschev's
Party
Stalin
all
over
beginning
liberal
views
Congress
the
XXI
( 1959)
Eastern
with
of
indeed
Europe.
His
administrative
and
leading
economics
he
Congress
instabi1ity·
1957 in the Soviet Union
the
at
ideological
destabilisa tion
reformism
XXI
to
like
were elicited, was more or less echoed in
1961. 4
in
enh~nced
economic
in
proposal
to
introduce
encountered unsurmountable
which
Liberman
other
communist
supranational
resistance
of
Evsei
countr1es (e.g. the New Economic System in the GDR).
crude
a
resumed
changes
debate
come
After
true he condemned the new Yugoslav constitution.
more
and
from
the
His
planning
Romanians
and .others.
Khruschev
commonwealth"
differ
on
Leninist
the
introduced
conceding
road
principles
to
that
the
national
socialism
were
concept
as
preserved.
of
"socialist
conditions
long
The
as
could
essential
Soviet
Union
never accepted the concept of multiple centres of authority
as ideology and doctrine and asserted the right
to
deter-
mine which policies were correct a.nd which were revisionist. 5
4. Zbgniew K. Brzezinzki, ~T~h~e~S~o~v~i~e~t~B~l~o~c~~U~n~1~·~t~y~a~n~d~C~o~n~­
flict (Cambridge, 1967), pp.137-38.
5. Ibid.
9.05
It was this
that
socialist camp,
sealed
or
Yugoslavia's
expressed
exclusion
differently
its
from
the
choice
for
bloc
the
independence.
To
Soviet
support
Union
military
and
Council of
the
attempted
Polish
freedom)
and
Janos
inviting
rejected
any
allow
(except
Kadar
"Goulash Communism."
the
of
of
the
Hungary
like
to
action
and
plan
far in the military sphere.
Europe
divisions-Soviet
anything
less
was
than
the
on
quietly
of
with
with-
Romania
devJlopmen t
foreign
did
not
policy.
go
quite
Soviet ground forces deployed
never
military
the
keep
carry
integrated
Changes under Khruschev however,
and
intellectual
Gheorgh:iu -Dej
for
of
However,
to
Albania left the bloc
Khruschev's
Eastern
Pact
Gomulka
some,
network
(CMEA).
through CMEA and asserted independence in
in
the
Warsaw
Assistance
did
October
unity
strengthen
in
Economic
flexi bi 1 i ty
gains of
out
to
economic 'ties
Mutual
Khruschev' s
necessary
reduced
circles
Nor
this.
to
never
did
less
than
could
they
26
accept
accept
that
the improved calibre of indigenous Eastern European forces
might
justify
requirements.
a
reduction
in
their
own
theatre
Moreover, they continued to assume
war time the other Pact would be subordinated
to
force
that
in
directed
Soviet Command. 6
6. See J.F. Brown, Relations Between the Soviet Union and
its. East European Allies: A Survey (Santa Monica,1975).
206
However,
suffered a terrible setback by
the
and Poland in the fall of 1956,
could
be
interpreted
repressive legacy.
lion
by
the
as
rebellions
even
delayed
though
army
in
fact
in
Hungary
these· events
reactions
The crushing of . the
Soviet
liberalisation
so-called
Khruschev's
to
Stalin's
Hungarian
not
only
rebel-
tarnished
the image of a socialist military alliance based on common
goals but also left room for friction and
disagreement
as
to how far a treaty ostensibly meant to counter NATO might
be stretched to cover Soviet
policing
actions
in
Eastern
Europe. 7
Following these events, Khruschev had to
fences within
and
a "Unity" meeting
around
of
the
East
He
Warsaw Pact.
European
mend
communist
some
convened
leaders
in
Budapest in January 1957, promoted a series of discussions·
with East European delegations in Moscow and concluded new
bilateral
Warsaw
agreements
Pact
allies
between
that
the
included
Soviet
Union
"economic
and
the
concessions
as well as status of forces
agreements
aimed
at
blunting
East European resentment of
the
military
presence
Soviet
in the area. " 8
Khruschev may have hoped
of
agreements
such
joint
in
the
that
military
cultivation
sphere
would
7. See, Ibid.
8. John Michael Monti as,
"Communist Rule
in
Eastern
Europe, Foreign Affairs (New York) January 1965, p.331.
207
accomplish what the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
( CMEA) had
Marshal
not.
plan
in
The
1949
CMFA
was
and
set: up
was
His
counter
reactivated
disruptive events of the fall of ""1956
the bloc closer together.
to
had
accent
after
failed
on
to
the
draw
cbser economic
and military integration apparently was meant to
political image of Soviet bloc
the
solidarity
and
convey
to
a
promote
greater cohesion within the Warsaw Pact.
It was all being
done in the face of "Polycentric"
that
trends
increasingly manifest in Eastern Europe by the
ties.
had
become
early
six-
Evidently Khruschev saw in the Warsaw Pact a poten-
tially useful organisational
instrument
through
which
to
offset such tendencies and to help maintain discipline and
political unity within
the
never have intended to
foster
Soviet
bloc.
more
independence in Eastern Europe.
than
However,
9
a
European
the composition of several of which
he
features
the
of
characterised
Warsaw
Pact
stress,
strain
tradi tiona!
9. Ibid., p.333.
began
semblance
of
did
to
and
alliances
assume
to
change,
bargaining
and .even
to
much
leaderships,
helped
leverage in their relations with the Soviet
result,
may
he
create a situation in which Eastern
developed some degree of autonomy
Khruschev
Union.
some
bargaining
throughout
As
of
that
a
the
have
history.
208
Soviet Policy Under Brezhnev
The Brezhnev and Kosygin period
did
not
bring
any
substantial change in policy towards Eastern Europe.
growing
Sirio-Soviet
Eastern
Europe.
conflict
China's
had
its
cultivation
Albania proved irritating for Moscow.
challenge in the 1960s came
got wary of
relaxation
In
from
also
in
of· Romania
However,
and
the
Czechoslovakia.
main
Moscow
Alendander Dubcek' s liberalising efforts, the
of
censorship,
Communist Party.
policies
impact
The
the
the
Finally,
Soviet
Union
the
being
democratisation
intolrant
invaded
post-Khruschev
era
the
the
of
of
the
the
Czech
in
1968.
country
following
changes
were marked about in the inter-alliance behaviour.
( 1)
Soviet
nuclear
(as
repudiation
opposed
to
the main line of thinking.
mine
the
of
However,
by
towards
the
Soviet
weapons
improving
the
offensive
to
did
in
conventional
commitment
forces
this
threat of it in Europe had increased.
nied
preference
conventional)
importance of nuclear
which the possibilities for
Khruschev' s
a
marked
not
under-
scenario
warefare
This
for
was
or
the
accompa-
programmes
capabilities
in
geared
of
Pact
ground forces. 10
10. Dr. Richard E. Darilek, "Organisation versus Alliance:
The Warsaw Pact in Retrospect and Prospect," Parameters,
(Carlisle Barracks, Pa., USA), June 1978, p.71.
209
(2)
and
Modernization of indigenous Eastern European forces
numerical
especi~lly
increases
in
strength
within
the
area
following the Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968 and the subsequent retention of .five
extra
Soviet
divisions there.
( 3)
Renew~d
emphasis upon earlier
Soviet
calls
for
an
all European security conference and general disarmament 11
( 4)
Acceptance
of
a
1972
Quadripartite
Agreement
on
Berlin.
(5)
Agreement to participate in the
Force Reduction
(MBFR)
lowering the levels
of
talks
forces
in
Mutul and Balanced
Vienna
and
confronting
to
each
discuss
other
in
Central Europe.
( 6)
Realisation of
negotiations
on
signature of
the
the
s~curi
CSCE
ty
opening.
and
in
1973
cooperation
Final
Act
at
the
of
in
East-West
Europe
Helinski
and
Summit
in 1975.
(7)
trade,
Repeated
credits,
overtures
loans
and
to
the
other
West .for
forms
of
additional
increased
but relative economic interchange.
The changes which occured in the internal relationship were mainly focussed on the following.
( i)
Reemphasis
objective
11. Ibid.
in
on
pro-Soviet
intra-alliance
cohesion
relations
as
the
primary
particularly
in
210
connection
with
and
as
a
result
of
the
Czech
crisis
of 1968 and effective demonstration of the Pact's continuing ability to limit deviationism.
( ii)
and
Attempts
political
Warsaw Pact.
to
restore
orthodoxy
the
semblance
both
These included
12
within
steady
of
ideological
and
beyond
pressures
on
the
Romania
as well as an other European Communist Parties to recognise
the hegemony of the Soviet
national
communism;
postponed
Congress
Union
convocation
of
further elaboration of
European
the
irt
the
in
rahks
of
inter-
of
an
often
1976
Communist
Pact's
Parties;
political
and
consultative
mechanisms for coordination of views on matters of foreign
policy. 13
(iii)
Employment of Soviet economic reources to reinforce
dependence
and
maintain
compliance
with
the
boarder
objectives of the Soviet Union.
Thus
we
find
that
the
post-Khruschev
emphasised on orthodoxy in internal
relationships
in the external relationship it emphasised on
forces and East-West dialogue.
cohesion· was a response to
1968.
to
the
Moreover, the Soviet
"one
variant
Emphasis on
crisis
like
leadership
nuclear
war
leadership
whereas
conventional
orthodaxy
Czechoslovakia
was
concept"
12. Ibid., p.74.
13. The Times (London) 15 September 1965.
also
of
and
in
reacting
Khruschev.
211
Thus if
the
post-Khruschev
leadership
was
interested
in
improving East-West relations in both political and economic
spheres
as
well
as
in
the
sphere
of
disarmament
it also increased conventional force postur·es in
European theatre.
crisis of
1968
However, it
had
great
is
bearings
tiona! forces so as to maintain
faces
of
increasing
a
Western
fact
in
an
overdetermining
Khruschev's
time,ideological
In
place,
this
they
guidance
monolithism
orthodoxy became the corner stones of a policy
alliance
cohesion.
of the Romanian
Moscow
wavering and
further defineation
Consul ta ti ve
grievances.
further
was
of
Committee
the
in
its
functions
of
order
to
in
the
though
not
during
political
of
particularly
declared
Czech
did
as
and
East
conven-
cohesion
pressures.
policy
the
increasing
alliance
nuclear weapons acquired a prominent
carry
that
the
further
conscious
intention
the
for
Political
cpordina te
alliance
This however, went hand in hand with 1nducing
economic
dyrendence
into
alliance
relationship
no part of an attempt to increase Pact cohesion.
Thus
cohesion
objective in the
of
1968,
the
reasserted
post-Khruschev
Soviet
led
itself
era.
invasion
as
The
of
a
Prague
central
Spring
Czechoslovakia
the following summer, and the Brezhnev Doctrine spawned by
these
events
Khruschev' s
Pact.
confirmed
emphasis on
one
anticipated
increasing
viability
outcome
of
within
the
Khruschev's successors could blame the Czech crisis
212
on
existing
policies
largely
attributable
with same manner as Khruschev had
the Hungarian uprising to
the
been
legacy
to
able
of
Khruschev
to
attribute
Stalin.
after 1968 as Khruschev had after 1956 but in
Moving
a
different
direction, the Brezhnev leadership fashioned new military,
political
at
and
economic
preventing
further
greater
compliance
Union.
The
Warsaw
Pact
policies
had
rebellion
with
qualities
seemed
the
of
to
a
of
it
in
the
early
against
genuine
be
simple
extent
air
l 1' t y. 15
of
the
Western
1960s
as
an
Pact
ground
forces
been
steadily
Soviet
which
way
from
aimed
promoting
began
to
the
fade.
percep-
unsophisticated
easily maintained
forces
and
improving
to
some
in
qua-
According to the annual report of the US Secretary
of Defense to Congress for fiscal
have
and
acquiring
weapons. 14
have
Pact
alliance
assemblage armed .with masses of rugged,
but
the
objectives
The pact has come a long
tions
wi thir.
considerably
expanded
the
and rna terised rifle divisions
year
structure
(of
which
Eastern Europe) "most notably in the
Group of Soviet
Forces
front
the
allies.
about
1000
NATO
men
have
Germany
been
It
1979,
20
(GSFG)
reads,
added
to
the
Soviets
of
their
there
are
divisions
tank
31
of
that directly
"Since
each
of
the
the
in
the
con-
1960s,
tank
14. rhomas W.
Wolfe,
The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw
Pact (Santa Manica, 1965), pp.12-13.
15. Pravda (Mocow), 23 February 1963.
213
divisions and approximately 2500 to each of
rifle
divisions.
At
least
self-propelled artillery,
in
the
GSFG,
new ·anti-tank
the
motorised
modern
guided
tanks,
missiles,
armoured personnel carriers, attack helecopters (including
the heavily armed MI-24
HIND
and
MI-8
HIP),
and
organic
air defenses have been provided in quantity. 16
By 1980s the Warsaw pact was characterised
extensive
reliance
ever
before
on
non-Soviet forces to deal with the
tional
war
expected
in
the
Europe.
bear
In
the
the
brunt
the
of
USSR. 17
By
initial
the
80s
objectives
reinforcement
in
it
on
was
the
any
advance
possible
from
a
Soviets
prior
in
reinforcefrom the
achieve
Europe
Sov·iet
Union.
the Warsaw Pact presented much of a
united
front
regional negotiating forums as the Conference
Mutual
and
NATO.
The
while
NATO
Balanced
Pact
has
has
Force
its
France
as
the
Reductions
troublesome
well
as
on
its
without
the
and Cooperation in Europe ( CSCE) and
were
against
Europe
to
of
conven-
fighting
Eastern
ground
of
the
the West and to acquire for that purpose
ments of teir forces deployed in
more
capabilities
out:break
60s
by
Thus
in
such
Security
Vienna
talks
(MBFR)
as
renegade,
Greece.
on
does
Romania,
Expanded
' Annual Report,Fis16. Harold Brown, Department of Defense
cal Year 1979 (Washington, 1978), p.75.
17. Ibid.
214
mechanisms and procedures for consultation and
now
available . to
Pact
However,
members.
advice
are
unlike
.
the
numerous institutions within NATO where views are exchanged
on an equal basis, "advice" in the WTO tends
to
originate
with the Soviets and to flow in one direction to the other
member states.
The Political Consultative Meetings (PCC)
In order to understand the inter-alliance relationship in the Warsaw Pact, better, here
summary
of
the
meetings
of
the
we
provide
the
period
The Political Consul ta ti ve Committee
under study.
seminal
organisation
of
the
WTO,
brief
Consul ta ti ve
Political
Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact held during
most
a
is
the
therefore
any
analysis of the WTO must highlight the performance
of
PCC.
several
These can be seen
from
an
analysis
of
of
PCC
the
the
meetings of the PCC.
The
Declaration
1956
meeting
European
Security
the
adopted
a
International
.
18
Problems to halt arms race and prevent atomic war.
This
meeting was
of
Prague
move Moscow's campaign to formalise
Germany. 19
The Committee accepted East
another
the division of
German
and
participation
in
the
Joint
Command
and
gave
18. V.A.Matsulenko, Bastion Mira (Moscow, 1978), p.19; see
also, Warsaw Pact 1945-75, Documents and Materials
(Moscow, 1975).
19~
Pravda, 29 January 1956.
,'
y
..... _//
215
the GDR equal status with the
other
states
German
by
allowing
to serve as one of
the
the
East
East
European
Minister
of
member
Defense
Deputy-Commanders-in-Chief
of
the
United Arms Forces.
The PCC meeting in
May
1958
reduce Eastern European armies by
to the 300, 000 cut in Soviet
in
Moscow
119000
forces
decided
men
already
in
to
2, 596, 000
Soviet
men. 20
troops.
It
Of
this
endorsed
total
the
in
since
1955
had
been
2, 140,000
Soviet
addition
indica ted
January brought the total announced reductions
to
version
of
the
Polish-Rapacki Plan for an atom fre zone in Central Europe
and the East German proposal for confederation between the
two Germanies.
It also gave
approval
to
the
forthcoming
force withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Romania
in July 1958) and of one division from
Hungary.
declared
solved
with
that
certain
(unspecified).
NATO
included
arms race.
a
organisa tiona!
It
non-aggression
ending
any
type
It also proposed
(completed
It
problems
had
also
resolved
to
pact.
The
proposal
of
to
nuclear
make
test
Europe
also
been
disucss
and
free
also
naval
of
any
nuclear arms.
The PCC meeting in April 1959 did little
upheld Soviet policy on Germany and on relations
United States.
20. Ibid.
more
with
than
the
2i'6
The PCC meeting in February 1960 in Moscow
sed
the
contemporary
to
give
up
nuclear
test
that European states will follow suit.
The PCC meeting in May 1961
further strengthening
the
bloc for defense and peace.
The
June
1962
PCC
armed
total
situation,
international
disarmament, a peace pact with Germany,
proposal
discus-
one
with
sided
an
Soviet
intention
21
discussed
forces
the
of
the
again
put
idea
of
socialist
22
meeting
forth
a
proposal to solve the German problem. 23
The January 1965 PCC meeting was concerned with the
implications of the NATO Multilateral Force and
ing of decision making on nuclear matters within
the
sharNATO.
Romania's talk of enthusiasm for the ~oviet interpretation
of the Pact's role was also disucssed in the meeting. This
meeting also expressed grave concern about
the
increasing
arms buildup by the NATO nations. 24
The PCC meeting in July 1968 in Bucharest
issued
a
Declaration of Peace and Security in Europe which emphasised on the necessity of having peaceful relation
European States.
21. Ibid.
22.Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
25
with
the
217
In
this
between the
And
it
is
meeting
foreign
there
were
ministers
understood
that
by
the
procedures
Soviet
on
the
Union,
use'
had
absence
nuclear
countries.
asked
domination
the
of
disagreements
of 'the member
Romania
meeting to air her views on the
Pact
serious
of
of
weapons
for
the
the
Warsaw
consultation
and
contributions to the upkeep of Soviet troops
financial
stationed
in
member's territories abroad etc.
It is also
P richlik
the
believed
Chief
of
that
the
later
Political
on
General
Commission
Czechoslovak army had also voiced grievances on
polisa tion
Union.
of
all
top
posts
in
the
He had urged that the PCC
working
body
which
should
WTO
should
not
by
be
entirely
Vaclav
of
the
the
a
the
mono-
Soviet
systematic
dependent
on
being occasionally convoked. 26
The PCC in its Sofia meeting on 6 and 7
took
note
of
the
aggressive
of the USA in Vietnam and
ions of the
grave
American
concern
about
the
tion of further bodies
objective
common defence.
26. Ibid.
unanimously
imperialists.
international peace.
more
and
They
to
disucssion
effect
also
condemned
American
all
the
act-
expressed
policy
the
conditions
important
1968
policy
the
also
considered
create
of
adventurist
They
of
March
on
consti tufor
problems
the
of
218
In
the
in March 2969,
Budapest
a
call
PCC
was
meeting
given
for
of
a
the
WTO
General
Conference to disucss· security and
cooperation.
condemned
European
the
actions
of
some
further mili tarise Europe and
security.
thereby
was
also
countries
endanger
the
European
It
to
peace
The meeting declared that on.e of the
conditions of European security
held
main
and
pre-
inviolability
of
the existing frontiers on the Oder and Neisse and also the
frontiers between the GDR and the FRG and
the
recognation
. ex1s
. t ence. 27
o f th e1r
The Moscow PCC meeting of the WTO held on 20 August
1970
disucssed
pointed out
the
that
existing
the
signing
international
of
the
situation
treaty
between
and
the
USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany on 12 August 1970
was
a
major
stop
towards
relaxation
normalisation of situation in Europe.
its call for a
General
European
It
of
tension
also
reiterated
on
Conf~rence
and
Peace
and
Security.
The Berlin PCC meeting
of
December
1970
supported
the· peace policy of GDR for lasting peace in Europe.
This
also supported the Czech stand not to accept and recognise
the Munich Pact of 1938.
It
also
disucssed
the
problems
of Indo-China and Middle East. 28
27. Ibid., see also A.C.Bakhov, Organisation of the Warsaw
Pact, (Moscow, 1971).
28. Ibid., see also Bakhov, n.27.
The
Prague
PCC
issued
Cooperation
condemning
China.
in
the
meeting
a
on
25
and
Declaration
Europe. 29
of
This
continuation
Peace,
also
of
The communique issued
26 · January
US
at
1972,
Security
issued
a
end
of
and
statement
aggression
the
in
in
the
Indomeeting
declared that they were fully determined to work for peace
and security in Europe.
They also reiterated the call for
All-European
on
proposals
Conference
are
contained
of 1966, in the Budapest
statement
of
importance
1970.
of
note
of
address
1969
aiso
of
Republics
positive
Declaration
and
took
These
the
note
and
Berlin
of
coopertion
the
between
France.
significanoo of
Power agreement on 3 September 1971 on
to West Berlin.
Security.
Bucharest
of
meeting
Socialist
the
and
the
principles
the Union of Soviet
also took
in
The
the
Peace
the
questions
It
Four
relating
It stressed on involability of frontiers,
renunciation of the use of force and peaceful coexistence,
good
neighbourly
among
states,
and
mutually
disarmament
and
relations
beneficial
support
for
the
United
Nations.
The Committee
of
Defence
Ministers
met
in
Berlin
1972 and disucssed the political
situation
and
arms
race
in Europe.
The Defence
Moscow
and
29. Ibid.
Ministers
discussed
of
the
WTO
met
about · implementing
in
the
1975
in
previous
220
decisions and the strengthen their armed forces to improve
military
technology
and
strive
for
peaceful
coexistence
among states. 30
On 26 May 1977, foreign ministers of the WTO states
discussed about the current problems of peace and security
specifically
emphasised
on
the
peace
from
the
PCC
prospects
of
the
the
WTO
Helsinki agreement.
As
it
appears
definitely quite vaci ferously
peace
and
security
in
internal functioning
declared
Europe.
and
meetings,
the
its
intentions
However,
management
so
of
bloc
as
alliance
overdominated
Soviet
Union
partners.
Probably
much
to
the
it
was
resentment
In crucial decision
making
complained of their exclusion.
Soviet Union much to
European
the
countries.
It
Soviet union as
a
the
security
safety
and
big
one
brother
of
did
treat
these
the
the
by
the
alliance
partners
the
neglect
thing
did
and it is another to say that in
attitudes it
of
collective
often
It served the interests of
disdainful
is
true
the
affairs
are concerned it failed to function
system.
a
far
of
of
to
say
always
try
the
East
that
the
to
ensure
East 'European
countries
its
brotherly
so
countries
called
as
no
more
than
strategic variables in its quest for security.
30. See Rudolph Waller, Warsaw Pact Reserve Systems (Munich,
1978), p.113.
31. See Mackintosh, n.1, p.6.
221
As has been
irregularly.
was
body
it
the
gradually.
supposed
but
in
to
be
later on
When
the
most
became
while
as
issues
of
concerned,
issues
pertaining
of
far
bloc
decade
aff1,1irs
of
PCC
were
its
it
was
crucial
an
met
very
was
peace
to
hardly
decision
of
and
the
existence,
PCC
alliance
meet-
security
By
for
furnctional
internal
disucssed.
making
body
the
consistently
European
structured,
umbrella
A review
that
so
shov.s
the
it
just
decisions already arrived at.
ings
outset
In fact, this only, shows had its importance
undermined
it was
said
were
management
the
partners
second
started
voicing concern about their non-involvement in the management of the Pact.
On
important
complaint
politation of top posts by the Soviets.
centred
on
absence
of
consultative
virtual non-functioning of
Such
led
consistent
ultimately
the
friction
to
souring
partners. Other issues
PCC
of
that
the
Other
a
out
relations,
exaccrba ted
mono--
grievances
procedures
in
arising
was
and
regular
of
the
manner.
grievances
among
alliance
friction
related
to financial contribution and absence of proper modalities
towards the use of nuclear weapons.
Having a brief idea
of
the
issues
with
PCC of the WTO have been concerned, we move on
some
important
events
which
took
place
1979 and how the WTO responded to it.
which
to
during
the
analyse
1955
and
I·.,.
il./
222
At
this
stage
let
us
now
pattern of the Soviet Union.
came
up
before · the
WTO
examine
the
behaviour-
On some crucial
concerning
its
issues
other
that
members
individually or collectively.
The Polish October, 1956
Khruschev' s speech at
the
infused some kind of liberal
grievances
on
28
by
CPSU
industrial
June,·
Congress
into Eastern Europe.
ambi~nce
In Poznan (Poland), a protest
economic
Twentieth
1956
workers
turned
ever
violent.
32
Indeed the protest was also partly the result of conflicts
between the reformers and the
conservatives
known. as
Natolin faction.
Whereas the reformers justified
Natolin
blamed
faction
the
provocateurs" and
the
argument.
Soviet
defence
When
minister
uprising
Soviet
Union
Premier
Marshal
on
the
"imperialist
rehashed
Nikolai
Zhukhov
it,
the
the
Na tolin
Bulganin
~isited
and
Poland
they
severely criticised the Poznan uprising.
During the
late
two factions centred
on
summer,
the
the
struggle
question
statement as a party member.
of
between
Gomulka' s
The reformers led
Ochab wanted to make Gomulka the Party Secretary
the other faction was opposed.
not improve, Khruschev,
to
reinEdward
which
Meanwhile, when things did
Molatov,
32. Pravda, 17 October, 1956.
by
the
Mikoyan,
Kaganovich
and
223
high ranking Soviet generals
on 19 October. 33
arrived
Khruschev on
seeing
ated and is supposed to have said,
country
and
Americans
they
and
are
trying
troops stationed in Poland
Gomulka
at· Warsaw
got
irri t-
"We shed blood for this
to
sell
Zionists". 34
the
uninvited
it
out
to
Simultaneously,
under
post.-war
the
Soviet
agreements
and
the Warsaw Treaty began to move towards the Polish capital
at a time when there
was
no
declared
state
requiring the use of Soviet troops. 35
The
of
emergency
Polish
had discussions with the Russians and it was
leaders
described
as
"party like and friendly". 36
faced
According to
Adam
the
of
prospect
would have
lasted
million Poles.
Poland was
such
event
European
Polish
1
another
long
Adam
Ulam,
and
Bromke
on the verge of a
would
have
countries.
defence
on
strongly
also
resisted
says
bloodbath 1
Moreover,
impact
Marshal
conveyed
that
•
to
Khruschev
wa r 37
Russo-Polish
disastrous
minister
19 October,
by
at
which
the
the
Moreover,
on
other
Rokossovsky,
Khruschev
that
25
time
any
East
the
the
33. Pravda, 19 October, 1956.
34. Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Polish Revolution
of 1956 (London, 1957), p.84; see also Adam B. Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence (New York, 1968).
35. New York Times, 28 October, 1956.
36. Pravda, 21 October, 1965.
37. See. Ulam, n.34, pp.51-94.
224
Polish troops under his
above
reasons
command
dissuaded
were
Khruschev.
not
to
reliable.
go
for
The
military
action.
After Gomulka's election .as the First Party Secretary on 21 October by the Central Committee and the ousting
of Rokossovsky from the Polish
Khrushchev
Moscow
in
said
a
that
telephonic
the
message
Soviet
return to their bases in
Politburo,
troops
Silesia
on
to
on
and
October,
23
Gomulka
manoeuvre
East
the
Polish
crisis
the
their· intervention,
WTO as
a
multilateral
situation.
East
The
alliance
Soviet
Europeans
that
neither
action
they
to
did
should
Two
Moscow.
Soviets
take into confidence their Warsaw Pact partners
taking
would
Germany.
weeks later Rokossovsky resigned and returned to
During
from
did
in
not
under-
they
activised
the
take
stock
the
make
not
it
of
clear
take
to
the
ideological
liberalism too far.
The
activated
October
of the
Political
to
was
discuss
mainly
Polish
the
the
workers.
led to such emergency
misconstrued
Consultative
as
Polish
result
The
action.
ideological
crisis.
of
The
heresay
cohesion.
Soviet
preserve
was
to
workers
and
The
not
Polish
grievances
of
the
issue
uprising
as
fact
alliance
was
The
economic
misperception
trend affecting alliance
effort
Committee
a
was
dangerous
is
entire
integration
225 .
by whatever means
rated
ill
possible.
feelings
among
The
the
incident
part·ners.
however
Even
gene-
when
one
looks at from the cold war perspective the Soviet response
appears a little exaggerated that· too without
any
organi-
the
Soviet
sational sanction.
The Hungarian Uprising, 1956
The
economic
concessions
uprising.
'New
to
crisis
Pol ish
Before that
Course'
industry
which
and
Hungary
autonomy
the
and
produced
Soviet ·Union
called
improving
Hungarian leaders.
in
for
the
the
Hungarian
had ·suggested
de-emphasising
living
conditions
In this Soviet leaders
a
heavy
to
the
appointed
Imre
Nagy as the Prime Minister to carry out the task.
Matyas
Rokosi
Rokosi
did
was
not
however,
the
First
like
it
and
Nagy
with
Secretary
expelled
his
In the
mean
workers,
time,
the
Nagy
reformist
constituency among party
tuals.
of
Nagy
in
define
one's
own
socialist
November
zeal
had
students
in
his
avoidance of membership in any power
to
Party.
created
and
works
bloc and
1955.
a
intelleccalled
the
development.
for
freedom
He
was
condemned by the Soviet Union as 'Nationalistic' and antiSoviet.
After the
visit
of
Anastas
Mikoyan
Rokosi resigned in favour of Erno Gero.
not satisfy
the
students
and
workers
Nagy was reinstated as a party member.
to
Budapest
However, this did
(striking)
through
When the Hungarian
226.
police could not control the
Soviet
Nagi
troops
was
Mikoyan
Nagy.
were
Gero
as
Budapest 38
was
Soviet
the First Secretary.
and
Union
by
24
the
decided
replaced
The Soviet
in
on
After
Premier.
retired
crowd
Ultimately,
called.
reinstated
to
swelling
Budapest,
October,
visit
of
to
bring
in
Janos
kadar
as
Declara tion 39
Government
on th~ Principles of Development and further Strengthening
of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and
other
of
the
was
Countries
Hungarian
"ready
with
of
Socialist
other
to
communists'.
review
socialist
stationing
of
referred
its
relations
in
'serious
It
countries"
troops
to
declared
of
and
their
mutual
also
countries
'by agreement among all its members of
here
was
giving
to the Warsaw Treaty. 40
a
different
In
that
it
security·
question
be
done
and
only
fact,
the
interpretation
It is important to note here that
the WTO PCC meeting which ·took place only in
in its communique did
to
the· WTO'
with the consent of the receiving country.
Soviet Union
the
mistakes
not
outline
any
January
proposal
withdrawal of Soviet troops would be done on the
1956
that
basis
the
of
38. Pravda, 28 October 1956.
See also Paul E. Zinner,
Revolution in Hungary (New York, 1962); Paul Kuskemeti
The Unexpected Revolution (Stanford, California, 1961)
39. Pravda, 31 October 1956.
40. Pravda, 4 November 1956.
/
227
'
collective
agreement. 41
Article
V o'f
Pact
Warsaw
the
states that only when a member-country.attacked by another
Th~refore,
country it calls for military aid.
action was unjustified for
many
East
the
European
The argument that the Warsaw Pact .was
a
Soviet
countries.
mere
'collective
self-defence agreement' fell to pieces.
Nagy however, blamed the Soviet Union for violating
the
Warsaw
the
WTO
Pact.
allies
The
Soviet
undertaking
the
Union
did
not
intervention.
consult
The
WTO
did not act on the issue.
The 1 November, 1956 decision
of
Nagy
to
from the WTO did provoke Moscow but
his
up
communist
coalition
did
enrage
supremacy
the
Soviets
intervention took place
Na~y
42
in
to
the
a
great
decision
extent
to
give
government
and
on 4 November, 1956
was replaced by Janos Kadar.
withdraw
a
second
after
which
Nagy was executed
by
a
Soviet firing squad on 16 June, 1958.
During
the
Hungarian
crisis
also,
the
Consultative Committee did not discuss the issue.
Political
It
was
41. It is important to note here that the four bilateral
treaties signed between the Soviet Union, GDR, Poland,
Romania and Hungary regula ted the number of Soviet
troops, their location arid consent of the receiving
country for troop manoeuvre.
The first such treaty
was signed with Poland on 18 December,
1956,
then
witil GDR, on 12 March, 1957, Romania, on 15 April
1957 and Hungary, on 27 May, 1957.
42. Pravda, 5 November, 1956.
228
unilateral
Soviet
Union
was
most
were
subsidiary
Preserving
was
the
and
decision.
the
to
decision
to
alliance
protecting
of
charter
national
socialism
the
its
concerned
cohesion.
even
it
obligation
What
Pater
own
in
the
Soviet
Other
things
sovereignties.
an
erring
Hungary's
Familia s.
course
away
state
from
the
WTO
posed serious challenge to the very basis of the organisation and could have
Moscow used the
led
to
alliance
ideological
barrier
disintegration.
So
to
to
bring
Hungary
the socialist track.
The Albanian Crisis, 1961
Khruschev's
prompted
a
section
de-Stalinisation
programme
of
party
the
Albanian
Enver Hoxha with Soviet support.
to
force
Hoxha
to
give
up
China.
By 1960 there were
against
each
other.
Albania's
barrages
Mostly
question like the nature
of
In 1960
it
1960 Conference
of
were
for
condemned
the
anti-Soviet
to
interfere
in
Albania's
tried
ties
polemics
with
directed
an
ideological
the
possibility
In the 1960 FCC meeting
however,
Communist
turn attacked Khruschev and
of
1956
overthrow
close
imperialism,
there was no public accusation;
to
Khruschev
centred
of war, nature of Stalinism etcft 3
in
in
Parties,
policies
Marshal
internal
43. See William E.Griffith, Albania
Rift (Cambridge, Mass. , 1963).
the
the
and
M'alinonsky
affairs.
and
the
November
Albanians
Hoxha
of
in
trying
Whereas
Sino-Soviet
229
Khruschev and
Suslov
tuating personality
Soviet
leaders'
publicly
cult,
right
condemned
Hoxha
to
went
Hoxha
on
interfere
of
perpe-
questioning
the
in
the
internal
affairs of Albania.
Virtual
consultation
exclusion
of
followed.
response to the
Albania
There
Albanian
from
was
public
no
declarations.
attend the WTO defence ministers meeting
Albanian troops did not take part
In
the
22nd
CPSU
attacked Hoxha for his
na tiona! ism
and
Congress
personality
called
for
meeting
of
June
was
excluded
1962.
45
the meeting was illegal.
Treaty
Soviet
Albania
did
not
in '1961
and
the
the
WTO
in
1961
cult,
punishment
leadership for Stalinist crimes.
Albania
in
Warsaw
manoeuvres.
Khruschev
revisionism
the
-=>f
and
Albanian
44
attending
from
Albania
protested
The Soviet Union
the
PCC
saying
that
kept
attacking
Albania at a series of European Communist Party Congresses
in 1962
and
1963.
However,
Albania
was
never
formally
expelled from the WTO and the Soviet Albanian relationship
remained
frozen
till
1968,
when
Albania
protesting against the Soviet invasion
Here again in dealing with Albania,
take into confidence the WTO allies.
44. Pravda, 18 and 21 October, 1961.
45. Pravda, 2 February, 1962.
of
Soviet
left
the
WTO
Czechoslovakia.
Union
did
not
.'
230
,''
The
Albanian
leadership
too
crisis
much
did
not
bother
it
was
also
though
the
an
Soviet
irritant.
Apart from ideological barrages no severe action was taken
against
it
for deviationism.
position allowed it to get
Moscow's
ideological
Its
away
not
with
too
significant
non-compliance
The
prescriptions.
Soviet
with
Union
did not consider its errant behaviour as any way dangerous
to
alliance
from
the
integration
PCC
meetings
and
or
from
hardly caused any consternation
cohesion.
the
in
Its
WTO
the
joint
Soviet
absence
exercises
leadership
circles.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
The Soviet explanation of the Cuban
states
that
the
victory
of
revel u tion
the imperialist
circles
to
it.
"United
States
It states:
export
and most unbridled, reactionary policy.
plea
to
usurp
a
special
right
to
in
counter
pol icy
Cuba threatens America, or any other
missile
Cuba
revolution
Cuba
to
is
declared· that
country
act
provoked
vis-a-vis
To
crisis
was
against
on
Cuba
this
is
monstrous. 46
Thus a large
launched
about
scale
100,000
milita-ry
invasion
of
men,
warships
with
183
Cuba
was
85,000
naval personnel were bent on attacking Cuba. backed by NATO
46.
Khruschev, "Report to the Supreme Soviet," 12 December, 1969 quoted in H .H.anak,
Soviet Foreign Policy,
Since the Death of Stalin (London, 1972), p.125.
•"-·
r;/
231
forces.
In 'the face
of
it,
Cuba
requested
help defend itself and Khruschev agreed.
Soviet IRBMs were taken
than
protecting
During this
Cuba·
period
to
Cuba
from
the
both
the
Khruschev
Thus a
with , no
other
imperialist
Soviet
score
and
to
of
intention
quarantine.
WTO
forces
were
•
alerted.
Khruschev wrote later, "The main thing was that the
installation
of
our
missiles
in
restrain the United States from
tion
against
Castro 1 s
Cuba
would,
I
precipl ta ti ve
government ....
thought
mili tarisa-
In
addition
to
protecting Cuba our missiles would have equalised what the
West
likes
to
call
the
1
balance
Americans had surrounded our
of
country
power 1
with
•
•
•
The
•
military
and threatened us with nuclear weapons and now
they
bases
would
learn just what feels like to have enemy missiles pointing
at you". 47
The
have
Western
invaded
Khruschev
did
logic
Cuba· if
goes
it
recognise
that
would
that
have
he
island with strategic missiles. 48
hand, reported that since the
American
invasion
of
Cuba
Americans
been
could
could
necessary
not
defend
and
the
Khrtischev, on the other
desired
was
the
goal
achieved
by
of
preventing
the
American
47. Ibid.
48. See, Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: !
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1969).
Memoir
of
the
//
232
promise not to invade, there was no question
of
capitula-
ting before the imperialists show of strength and
defended the withdrawal of
therefore
this
did
not
the
missiles
undermine
from
thus
Cuba.
position
th~
he
And
of
the
USSR or the socialist bloc.
Kennedy in his interview with Izvestia
4
December
1961
had
categorically
stated,
(Moscow)
,;It
would
helpful if NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a
on
be
~itment
to live in peace with each other. " 49
The Soviet Union
In
fact
this
proposal
of
was
a
in
did
line
welcome
with
non-aggression
the
Pact
this
in
Geneva
the
in
Eighteeen
March
He
1962.
statement.
repeated
the
considerably
V.A. Zorin
Nation
oft
between
the Warsaw Pact states which would
the European situation.
Kennedy's
of
the
said,
NATO
"The
and
normalise
USSR
Disarmament
Soviet
repeated
Conference
in
conclusion
of
a non-aggression treaty between the NATO countries and the
Warsaw
fact
Treaty
that
aggressive
improving
whole
the
states
state
would
members
designs.
the
world."
It
situation
The
of
would
not
Soviet
be
only
Union
an
the
expression
two
contribute
in
Europe
then
had
following things :
49.
blocs
Izvestia (Moscow), 4 December 1961.
to
but
of
the
have
no
greatly
in
the
proposed
the
(/
233
1.
De-nuclearised zones around the world.
2.
Non-aggression treaties and agreements.
3.
Prohibition of war propaganda.
The Cuban missile crisis was indeed a test case for
the
socialist
bloc.
It
displayed
the
strength
tenacity of bloc to face the western threat
tely.
Though Cuba was not
a
member
quite
of ·the
and
resolu-
Warsaw
Pact,
the Soviet Union expanded all possible help when the Cuban
revel ution
was
at
its
most
action was exemplary.
that
was
it
could
busy
in
made
a
also
engage
increasing
real
hour,
Khruschev' s
Soviet Union showed it to the world
nuclear warheads into
bloc
peril ious
in
forces
Poseidon
show
brinkmanship.
of
in
Europe
submarines,
strength
and
When
NATO
and
inducting
the
socialist
extended
its
solidarity to another socialist country.
The Berlin Crisis, 1961
The German question had remained
prelude
to
German
unification
unsettled.
Otto
Gretewohl
As
of
a
GDR
proposed:
( 1)
( 2)
Outlawing
the
distribution
atomic bombs
and
an
on
agreement
weapons
outlawing
and
on
Ge,rman
atomic
Withdrawal of the German states
Warsaw Pact, abel i tion
of
manufacture
terri tory
war
from
ment on the number of troops which each
maintain.
and
propaganda.
NATO
conscription
of
and
and
side
the
agreewould
234
( 3)
Joint or separate
requests
to
the
gradually withdraw their forces
four
powers
to
whole
of
liquidation
.
of
from
the
Germany in the near future. 50
The Soviet Union also
foreign' bases,
withdrawal
proposed
of
the
foreign
.
troops
from
count.ries and conclusion of a treaty between NATO
Warsaw Pact members binding
them
along with an
disarmament,
agreement
on
not
to
and
resort
all
other
the
to
force
these
aimed
July
1961,
at promoting European Collective Security.
However,
situations
deteriorated.
In
30,000 citizens of the GDR fled to the 'West
the
Ulbricht
regime.
countries
published
crisis.
It
made
efforts
any
said,
On
a
August,
statement
"The
to
12
Western
normalise
the
relating
powers
the
C0ntre
of
subversive
activities
shocked
Warsaw
Treaty
to
the
Berlin
from
having
far
situation
Berlin, on the contrary continue to use it
a
which
in
West.
intensively
against
the. German
Democratic Republic and all other countries of
the
list commonwealth.
In
world,
so
and
many
espionage
no
other
part
subversion
of
the
centres
as
of
sociaare
foreign
states to be found as in the West Berlin and nowhere else
can they act with such impunity.
These
sion centres are
agents
smuggling
their
numerous
into
Democratic Republic for all kinds of subversion,
the
subverGerman
recruiting
50. Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Ann Arbor),
no.32, 18 September, 1957, pp.18-19.
vol~9,
235
spies and inviting hostile
provoke
and
Republic.
elements
in
disturbances
51
And thus the
Berlin
to
organise
the
German
Wall
went
sabotage
Democratic
up
in
August
1961.
In
1959,
the
1960,
discussed;
proposals
to
1961,
the
the
West.
in
the
German
Warsaw Pact
question
countries
European
encouraging
East
of
of
consultation
general
busy
fleeing
the
direct
a
activities in
meetings
socialist
for
conclude
however,
PCC
Germany
thousands
was
had
trea·ty.
The
kinds
ultimately
of · East
Germans
had
no
alternative
other
than
the
erecting
was
subversive
resulted
towards
socialist countries kept up their solidarity
end,
WTO
West
of
which
In the
their
NATO . and
The Berlin crisis is also one example in
and faced the challenge.
in
thoroughly
repeated
between
all
held
the
cohesion
socialist
the
the
which
and
in
Berlin
bloc
wall
which stood as the emblem of cold war till 1990.
The Czechoslovak Crisis, 1968
On
20
August,
1968
with
stand up in the defense of the
half
a
million
20, 000
East
10,000
Bulgarian
Soviet
German
a
solemn
gains
troops,
troops,
troops 5 2
1
20, 000
marched
of
commitment
socialism
50,000
Polish
Hungarian
into
51. "Statement by the Warsaw Treaty
13 August,1~61 in Pravda, 15 Augu~t,
52. See Robin Alison Remington, ed. ,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1969)' p.358.
to
about
1
troops,
troops
and
Czechoslovakia.
States,
Member
1961.
Winter
in
"
Prague
\.:-
236
Pravda in Moscow justified it as 'Defense of
the
Highest
that
International
'the
defnese
of
Duty".
53
socialism
It
in
Socialism
was
considered
Czechoslovakia
not only the internal affair of that country's
also
a
problem
of
defending
political
objective
the
is
is
people
positions
of
but
world
. 1'~sm. 54
soc~a
The
of
the
entire
operation
was to install a pro-Soviet regime and arrest the renegade
leaders.
Indeed like Imre Nagy,
arrested
and
Alexander
taken
Dubcek,
to
Legnica
Smrkovsky,
four
in
Czech
leaders
they
Poland
Kriegel,
were
Spacek.
were
Alois
Indra was asked to head a new government in Prague.
The Czechs simply
the
Poles
had
done
failed
under
to
deter
Gomulka
and
the
Soviets
as
the . Yugoslavs
had done under Tito.
Unlike
the
other
crises,
the
Czech
is, the Prague Spring had some intellectual air
The "Gottwald Memorandum", the "Two
Manifesto",
to
Lieutenant
re~ormulate
the
General
Czech
military
self-immolation of Jan Palach
and
the
massive
popular
Vaclav
a
young
54. Izvestia, 25 August, 1968.
Thousand
doctrine
that
about
Prchlik' s
it.
Words
attempt
and
university .student
demonstrations
53. Pravda, 22 August, 1968.
one
in
Prague
had
237
indeed made
the
Prague
Spring 5 5
somewhat
romantic
which
soon turned ugly and pathetic.
The
page
ten
memorandum 56
Gottwald
Voj tech Meriel, rector of the
Gottwald . Academy, and
called for a nationalist military strategy
vakia,
talked
of
the
written
possibility
for
others
Czechoslo-
neutrality
of
by
and
an extente. in Central Europe without ideological bearings.
This indeed had irritated
the
Soviets
to
such
an entente
that Marshal Iakubovski i, the Chief of the WTO
forces
was
immediately sent to Czechoslovakia to extract an assurance
of loyalty.
of
the
Lt. General Vaclav
Gottowald
military
Memorandum
doctrine
criticized the
of
Soviet
Prchlik
called
territorial
monopoly
of
with
for
a
the
Romania
defense.
all
top
backdrop
type
also
He
posts
of
the
WTO and called for democratising the WTO bodies.
Ludvik Vaculik, in the
"Two
festo"57 in June 1968 condemned
were
trying
to
interfere
in
the
the
.
.
Thousands
foreign
internal
Words
Mani-
forces
which
affairs
of
Czechoslovakia.
Here
it
is
Brezhnev doctrine.
appropriate
to
discuss
first
the
Then we shall analyse the Czech crisis
in the perspective of the Brezhnev doctrine.
55. A letter from Alexander Sol tzheni tsyn to the Soviet
Writer's Union was read in the Czech Writers Congress
around June 1967. This had also irritated the Soviets
greatly.
56. Czechoslovak Press Survey (New York),2272, 18 November
1969
57. See
Remingto~,
n.52, p.20.
238
The Brezhnev Doctrine
The sovereignty
could
not
be
of
individual ·socialist
counterposed
to
the
interests
socialism and the world revolutionary movement,
S. Kovalev
in
concept of
of the
his
famous
'limited
Brezhnev
Pravda
article
sovereignty'
Doctrine.
He
countries that have their own
which
each
country.
measures
to
radically
And
perfect
when
in a country.
a
no
one
danger
to
socialism
so
said
advocated
the
state
specific
But
World socialism as a
58
world
a
basis
" .•. indi vi.dual
interferes
socialism.
of
formed
defined
ries and develops with regard for the
of
and
continued,
well
countries
bounda-
attributes
with
concrete
matters
change
itself
arises
system
is
social
the
common achievement of the working people of all countries,
it is indivisible and its defense is
the
common
all communists and all pr6gressive people On
and
foremost
of
the
working
people
of
cause
earth,
the
of
first
socialist
countries". 59
Brezhnev in his Warsaw speech d·rawing
theme
said,
Union
has
"It
really
sovereignty
But
it
natural
is
and
well
laws
of
is
common
done
a
autonomy
known
knowledge
good
of
the
comrades
socialist
to
that
Kovalev' s
the
Soviet
strengthen
socialist
there
construction,
58. Pravda, 26 September, 1968.
59. Ibid.
deal
that
on
the
countries ...
are
deviation
common
form
.
t.. ·'
~
239
which
And
could
lead
to
deviation
from
socialism
as
such.
external and internal forces hostile to socialism
wh~n
try to turn the development of
socialist
country
in the direction of restoration of the
capitalist
system,
when a threat
socialism
country
-
a
arises
threat
common wealth
as
to
the
to
a
given
cause
the
whole
a
of
security
-
this
of
is
no
problem for that country's people -but
a
the
in
that
socialist
longer
common
merely
a
problem
-
the concern of all socialist countries". 60
And
so
it
was
the
concern
of
the
Soviet
led
Warsaw Pact forces to restore socialism in Czechoslovakia.
The October
and
Czechoslovakia
in Czechoslovakia.
contained
a
1968
Treaty
between
legitimised
Soviet
Unlike the
provision
that
the
treaty
troop
subject to mutual agreement, there
Soviet
troops
with
Union
remaining
which
Hung~ry
movements . would
was
no
such
be
provision
in this treaty.
It is interesting to note that in the WTO Political
Consultative
17
March,
hardly
a
Committee
1969,
meeting
invasion, nor
Dubcek
in
the
meeting
served
sense
the B rezhnev
held
as
Chairman. 61
that
doctrine
neither
nor
border clash were mentioned and talked
Union chose to ignore
these
issues
60. Pravda, 13 November, 1968.
61. Pravda, 18 March, 1969.
Budapest
in
in
the
about.
the
It
the
on
was
Czech
Sino-Soviet
The
Pact
Soviet
meeting.
240
This was indeed quite in contrast with the Dresden meeting
of
the
Warsaw
Pact
leaders
on
23
March,
Czechoslovakia was censured and was
there would not be any
One
tion".
has
economically
to
note
hardpressed,
thus
economic reforms
here
violation
on
the
asked
of
Yugoslav
to
in
which
assure
"socialist
that
it
1968
that
construe-
Czechoslovakia
VAry
was
sincerely wanted
pattern
which
combined
a socialist market. economy with Western technological aid.
This also
gave
was
ample
the
reason
cause
to
of
the
internal
WTO
concern the Czech developments.
party · struggle
leaders
On
11
to
July,
view
1968
and
with
Pravda
for the first time linked Czechoslovakia with the "Counter
62
After a spate of
revolutionary elements in Hungary".
·
visits
by
Alexy
Kosygin,
Marshal
Grechko, ·Marshal
Iakubovskii and after the Bratsilava meeting on
3
1968, it was believed that the crisis had passed
Ivan
August,
over
but
seventeen days after the inevitable happened.
As
has
been
pointed
out
in
the
preceding
pages,
Pravda justified the invasion on the grounds of situations
of
of
on
disarray,
vacillation
reactionary,
world
and
uncertainty
anti-socialist
imperialism
for
forces
support". 63
forcibly to Moscow but was spared the
When the invasion was
62. Pravda, 11 July 1968.
63. Pravda, 22 August, 1968.
condemned
the
"existence
which ·
Dubcek
relied
was
taken
nagy.
fate
of
Imre
by
the
Romanians,
241
Yugoslavs, Albanians, Chinese, French,
Italian and Spanish
Communist Parties, Pravda wrote, "Does this not
sh.ow. ·that
some of our friends abroad obviously misled by imperialist
propaganda
the
have
failed
prevailing
their
to
situation
disagreement
with
understand
and
are
essence
of
of
expressing
hastily
the . actions
countries which are fulfilling the
the
the
socialist
commitments
undertaken
by them in Bratsilava". 64
Whereas
positively
even
its
with
and
Hungary,
commented
refused
to
on
censure
1964 declaration
the
its
Federal
military
of
East
the
Bulgaria
action,
Romania
Soviet
keeping
independence,
of
On the other
of
its
Germany
activity with
cooperation
Germany,
Czechoslovakia
Republic
diplomatic
USA and France.
Poland,
hand
the
from
socialist
justification
There
ourside ....
for
admitting
arined forces in the
internal
in
any
affairs
is a member of the Warsaw Pact.
The
problems
the
each
belong
country,
exclusively
and
cause of socialism".
to
interference
.January
Arabs,
1967
China,
Ceausescu wrote,
countries
been and is directed against the danger of
aggression
view
rapproachment
in
Israel,
in
an
of
the
a
exist
use
of
Party and
cannot
of
country
solving
but
has
imperialist
cannot
way
"The
any
the
which
domestic
people of
harm
the
65
64. Pravda, 23 August 1968.
65. Scinteia (Bucharest), 15 August, 1968, in FBIS, DR, EE
20 August, 1968, p.113.
242
As we came across our analysis, the
was
unwarranted
so
far
as
The
the WTO were concerned.
in its PCC.
acted
The
on
treaty
crisis
Even after the crisis,
in the WTO PCC.
ment.
the
The
WTO
Romanian
failed
Soviet
to
Czech
provisions
was
it
never
was
as
instructions.
a
discussed
quite
collective
Pol ish,
East
doctrine provided the
it an aberration?
invasion.
ideological
but
German
and
was
The
rational ·for
We shall take this up
after
vehe-
body
Bulgarian forces did participate but hardly there
collective d~cision prior to the
of
discussed
not
criticism .was
act
invasion
any
Brezhnev
it.
Was
discussing
the Romanian crisis.
Romania - The Rebel Within
Romania
has
been
indeed
the Enfant
Terrfble
for
fifties
the
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
If
Romanian
Soviet
in
late
Communist
Union
sixties
the
it
for
had
Soviet party.
Party
its
grown
The
forties
and
(RCP)
survival
itself
Hungarian
early
wa~
and
growth
from
and
dependent
the
crisis
lessons
to maintain independent stand vis-a-vis the
GhearghiU
followed
Dej
the
the
Romanian
Stalinist
foot
leader
steps.
control over the party, fostered
the
parenting
Polish
gave the Romanian l·eadership necessary
by
on
in
He
early
of
as
1956
to
how
Union.
virtually
exercised
anti-Russian
the
of
Soviet
this
the
tight
nationalist
.. ,
,..,
"\,"·.
',
(./
243
feelings
and
attempted
started
to
faster
maintain
economic
distance
development
from
WTO
as
and
much
as
possible.
After
the
believed
that
withdraw
troops
greater
and
Ghecrghiu-Dej
from
popular
countries.
Hungarian
south
after
the
crisis
persuaded
legitimacy
Thus
Polish
Khruschev
eastern
Europe
to
regimes
the
withdrawal
it
of
to
is
to
provide
in
these
Soviet
troops
from Romania in 1958, Dej developed a ''territorial defense
system" between 1958 and
sending
officers
thereby
stopped
officers
of
the
to
1964.
Soviet
the military
Romanian
did not allow the conduct
.
t err1•t ory. 67
Roman1an
forces
for
territory.
Political
the
Soviet
WTO
In
Romania
indoctrination
WTO
By
joint
exercises
Dej
by
1964
Political
and
thus
Romania
the
links
and
the
token
Romanian
Romanian
severed
Administration
in
only
the
and
Soviet
exercises
outsid~
abolished
stopped
academies 66
miliatry
military.
of
Administration
Main
1960
After 1964 Romania sent
joint
1964
By
in
Main
with
place
established a network of party committees. 68
In 1964, the
Romanian
Central Committee
virtually
issued a declaration of independence from the Soviet Union
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
See also,
Pages from History of the Romanian
Army (Bucharest, 1975).
244
which said,
blocs,
as
declare
"We stand
a
the
transi tiona!
ourselves
between the
Atlantic
for
in
measure
favour
critical of
of
Organisation.
Soviet
of the na tiona!
a
this
in
Parties
Interference
Parties
went
in
as
the
far
domestic
as
the
military
direction,
and
the
both
in
affairs
the
removal
of
and
North
was
domestic
we
pact
the
statement
(1919-43) and Cominiform (1947-53). phases.
II
all
non-aggression
The
interference
Communist
in
of
Organisation, 69
Warsaw Treaty
Treaty
abolition
quite
affairs
Comintern
In
continued,
the
Communist
replacement
of
leading party cadres and even of entire Central Committees
as
far
as
the
imposing
suppression
of
parties....
There does
party
and
a
from
distinguished
"Son"
without
leading
not
and
party,
or
"subordinate" parties ....
of
leaders,
cadres
cannot
of
exist
"superior"
various
a
'Parent'
parties
No party is allowed to
the heads of the party leaders of
one
the
country
and
go
or
over
another
and even less to launch appeals for the removal or change,
The
of the leadership of a party".
rejected economic integration
Council
and
"The
for
Mutual
Khruschevian
state
plan
Economic
mechanism
Assistance
"supranational
is
one
and
declaration
strongly
contained
(CMEA)
planning'~. 70
indivisible;
in
framework
It
no
the
said,
parts
or
sections can be separated from it in order to be transferred outside
the
state.
The
management
69. See William F.Griffith, Sino-Soviet
bridge, Mass., 1964), p.280.
70. Ibid.
of
the
national
Relations
(Carob-
245
economy as a
whole
is
not
possible
if
the
questions
managing some branches or enterprises are taken
the competence of the party and government of
tive
country
and
transferred
to
away
the
from
respec-
bodies". 71
extrasta te
However, this does not mean. that Romanian-Soviet
economic relations continued to strain only
of
by
and
CMEA
1964.
On
the other hand it had already started by 1953? 2
During the Hungarian crisis· if the
had participated with the Soviet one,
Romanian
later
provided medical and economic assistance
on
to
his election speech of 2 February, 1957 while
friendship
with
the
Soviet
friendship
with
China
and
Union,
other
In the 1957 Moscow meeting of
Romanian
delegation
abstained
he
a Romanian delegation consisting
Stoica,
defense
minister
affairs visited China.
and
of
the
Prime
In
Dej
pledged
of
the
receptions,
In March 1958,
Minister
minister
The Sino-Romanian
Hungary.
Parties,
dinners,
memorials and other cultural programmes. 74
also
countries. 73
Communist
from
they
also · talked
socialist
the
troops
of
joint
in this occasion called for abolition of blocs. 75
Chi vu
foreign
statement
Romania
71. Ibid.
72. See John Michael Montias,
Economic Development in
Communist Romania (Cambridge,
Mass.,
1967),
p.187.
See also Marshal D. Shulman, "The Communist States and
Western
Integration,"
International Organization
(Cambridge, Mass.), vol.17, no.3, Summer 1963.
73. Pravda, 3 February, 1957.
74. Pravda, 7 November, 1957.
75. See Stephen Fischer-Galati, The New Romania (Cambridge
Mass., 1967), pp.70-71.
246
also praised
Chinese
troop
withdrawal
from
And these got a low-key coverage in Pravda.
North
The
Political Consultative Committee (PCC) ·meeting
Korea.
1958
decided
WTO
on
the troop withdrawal from Romania.
Before the PCC meeting the first of the Warsaw Pact
Partie~
Communist
had
decided
on
further
integration
within the CMEA framework which obviously had
annoyed
Romanians.
Khruschev' s
statement
They were also annoyed because
that
"question
of
borders
of
between
the
socialist
countries will be a pointless one". 76
The Sixteenth CMEA Council Plenum in December 1961,
which
recommended
the
principles
of
the
International
Socialist Division of Labour, was indeed quite acrimonious
The Poles, the Hungarians, the
time
was
not
yet
ripe
for
Romanians
such
The June 1962
statement
of
that
transitions,
Fadayev, the CMEA Secretary kept assuaging
that the CMEA was not assuming
argued
their
supranational
Khruschev on
though
anxi ties
authority. 77 ·
"Vi tal questions
of Development of World Socialist System"
further
ted the Romanians.
'Khruschev wrote,
socialist
system is now at
stage
a
when
it
"The
is
no
the
longer
irritaworld
possible
correctly to chart its development by merely adding up the
national
economies.
The
task
76. Pravda, 27 March, 1959.
77. Pravda, 17 December, 1961.
is
to ... ·advance
towards
247-
that single world wide organism ... and calls
.... on the scale of the entire commonwealth".
The polemics between the
Soviet
leaders
October,
continued
1964.
attempted ·to
criticising
The
recast
the
till
the
and
leadership
Romania
by ·its
cultural growth and deve·lopment as a
for Romania.
there
Hence on the arrival
followed
declared,
of
the
Warsaw
"Complete
unity
imperialist
complete
unity
of
which
and
on
fall
of
on
impeding
on
specialised
the
was
the
16
leadership
insistence
of
new
Thus
by
the
agri-
activity
leadership
the
attended by
1965
Romania
solidarity · in
the
face
Moreover,
there
was
threat". 80
views
and
relationship
understanding. 79
mutual
.WTO PCC meeting in
leaders
Kosygin
Soviet-Romanian
planning
78
Khruschev' s
Brezhnev
Khruschevian
industrialisation of
Romanian
for
all
questions
discussed
in
Warsaw. 81
However, Romanians
meeting
of
anniversary
Communist
not
Parties.
celebration
including. Marshal
did
of
Grechko
WTO,
attend
1965
during
the
the
Soviet
leadership
further
78. Ibid.
79. See Pravda, 18 and 28 October, 1964.
81. Pravda, 6 February 1965.
March
Thus,
displayed
80. Pravda, 22 January, 1965.
the
tenth
conciliatory
248
gestures
leading
to
the
visit
of
delegation to Moscow since 1961.
82
a
top
level
This took place on the
background of the death of Gheorghiu Dej.
Soviets
started
emphasising
of the WTO.
It is
in
a
which
called
statement
WTO"
to
face
sions. 83
the
Then
this
in
Congress Brezhnev
talked
the
in
In
Warsaw
May
Pact"
1966
of
that
the
1966
of
aspect
Brezhnev
at
the
the
the
the
the
aggres-
23rd
CPSU
mechanism
socialist
Ceauasescu
issued
perfecting
imperialist
"improving
defense
Nikolai
military
"further
March
of
In the meantime
the
context
intrigues
again
on
for
Romanian
of
system.
leader
84
during
the 45th anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP)
called for abolition of mili.tary blocs and
military
and the withdrawal of foreign troops
countries.
dictates
referred to "the
on Romania with respect to
away
from
Romania
"Nevertheless,
and
of
Vienna"
Transylvania
merged
foreign
from
with
domination
which
was
not
He
imposed
which was
sliced
He
Hungary.
did
bases
said,
succeed
in
smothering the people's desir~ for freedom and in changing
its strong wish for unity". 85
The
July
1966
Bucharest
meeting
of
the
WTO
which lasted for twelve days was quite acrimonious.
82. Pravda, 11 September 1965.
83. Pravda, 16 September 1965.
84. Pravda, 29 March, 1966.
85. New York Times 14 May, 1966.
PCC
After
-I
249.
mutual bickering between
the
Soviet
leadership
Brezhnev,
warned
. t eres t s b y na t.1ona"1.1sm an d
1n
Soviets refrained
from
deteriorated
Soviet
Union
did
the
not
to
and
on
of
1
perfecting
West
the
European
the
April
though
Communist
stren~thening
the WTO. 88
Romania.
Like
a
of
meeting
Parties,
wise
WTO
Commander-in-Chief
Brezhnev
Marshal
defense
WTO
forces)
in
in
called
attended
(after
1967
the
appropri-
I. I. Iakubovski'i
ministers
1967
Conference
again.
•
leadership
not
However, it was not
when
of
Vary'
the
WTO 1
in
.Romanian
Karlovy
1967
the
Germany
directly; it only said that conditions were
87
ate.
In
socialist
However,
relationship
attack
Ceasescu,
endanger
86
. .
c h auv1n1sm.
harping
Romanian -recognition
further
not
Kosygin
for
by
called
being
the
of
_the
Romanian
defense minister Ion Ionita did not participate.
However,
relations
again
improved
by
the
summer
and Romania took part in the joint exercises for the first
time in three years. 89
As
has
been
pointed
out
in
the preceding
Romania did not censure Czechoslovakia nor did
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in
86. Pravda, 17 and 25 June, 1966.
87. Pravda, 8 February 1967.
88. Pravda, 25 April, 1967.
89. Scienteia (Bucharest), 26 July, 1967.
1968.
pages,
it support
However,
250
by 196'8 the Romanians
torial
and
defense
strongly
comprising
system
members
700,000
con sol ida ted
of
the
Patriotic
Romanian Defense Law of 1972 91
the
"War
of
the
Entire
of
their
terri-
520,000:
troops
Guards.
constituted
People"
a
The
charter
It
concept.
90
for
seeks
to
expunge the legal basis for collaboration between Romanian
citizens and occupation force.
note
that
since
1960
the
It
i.s
Romanian
also
important
defense· spending
to
has
.
d. . 92
s t ea d 1. 1 y 1ncrease
As it is clear from the foregoing
has
hardly
toed
independence
concerned,
Soviet
so
the
Soviet
far
as
caused
policy
line.
foreign
Its
Its
pol icy
considerable
makers.
analysis
Romania
assertion
operations
con sterna tio:r~.
distantiation
of
were
among
from . the
WTO
functioning and sticking to its national military doctrJne
of territorial defense posed great challenges to the WTO's
block solidarity and
unity.
The
Romanian
behaviour
has
led the Soviet Union often to think of it as an unreliable
ally.
Its errant behaviour so far
as
Albania,
China
and
the West were concerned, kept worrying not only the Soviet
Union but also its other WTO partners.
Czechoslovakia,
90. Patriotic
forces.
Romania
Guards
in
played
its
Romania
Unlike Hungary and
cards
constitute
vis-a-vis
the
Paramilitary
91. Sceinteia, 24 December, 1972.
92. Alex Alexiev, Party-Military Relations in East Europe:
The Case of Romania (Los Angels, 1979), pp.25-26.
'' )
\
'
'/
.251
Soviet Union quite
skilfully,
from
allow any thing like a repeat
or the Prague
the WTO' s
spring.
mi 1 i tary
Its
of
the
beginning
the. Hungarian
"nationalist
framework
often
not
to
situation
deviation"
threatened
to
from
create
deep fissures in the Warsaw Pact.
Now
we
move
on.
to
a
general
analysis
of
the
issues discussed above.
The analysis of different crises thus show that the
Soviet
Union
multilateral
preserve
means
has
alliance,
collective
used
alliance
possible.
undertook
not
but
the
used
solidarity
The
alliance
it
Pact
as
an
operationalised
during
the
bilateral
Issues
talks
of
crucial
with
the
Kremlin.
activities of the bloc countries
substance
and
remain
primarily
in a ·Byzantine style". 93
mine the efforts of the
tries together
to
This,
Soviet
preserve
is
are
not
stability
and
rather
says,
porblems
are
tackled
in
multilateral
of
ceremonial
Union
a
the
. The
however,
as
in
are
devoid
to
whatever
Sohul tz
political
significance
by
crises
Eberhard
important
true
instrument
not
"In sum one can maintain that as a rule it
decided.
a.
cqhesion
decisions.
multilateral scene that
as
and
WTO was
system
unilateral
Warsaw
does
the
during
political
performances
not
under-
bloc
coun-
the
first
93. Eberhard Schultz, "New Developments in Intrabloc Relations in Historical Perspective," ·in Karen Dawisha and
Philip Hanson, eds., Soviet East European Dilemmas:
Coercion, Competition and Consent (London, 1981),p.48.
252
decade
of
the
Pact's
Given
existence.
situation during the 1956, the pace at which
control
was
remarkable.
( 1) · to
assert
firmly
The
the
Soviet
aim
pre-eminent·
rejection
of
chaotic
they
managed
was
two
position
Soviet Union among the socialist states,
blockwise
the
(2)
revisionism.
fold
of
to
the
effect
Except
for
a
some
•
temporary
resistance
Union
no
had
on
real
1957.
Communist
part
difficulty
accepted which resulted
Ruling
the
in
Parties"
of
-in
the
Gomulka
making
statement
issued
in
the
its 'position
of
the
Moscow
in
This document identified the USSR as the
the
mightiest member
out
revisionism
as
of
a
the
socialist
greater
danger
Soviet
camp
to
"Twelve
November
first
and
the
and
singled
communist
movement rather than Stalinist dogma.
Moscow
was
indeed
extremely
cautious
with the Federal Republic of Germany
did permit Prague and Warsaw
which
Konard
resulted
·~Adenauer
proclamation
not
in
just
also the
the
the
to Moscow
of
the
in
acceptance
countries
of
of
second
diploma tic
had
Indeed Moscow has pursued
East Germany
94. Ibid.
in
the
Chancellor
post-war
of
the
the
German
one
FRG
the
forbade
state
but
with
the
relations
major
it
FRG,
after
which
recognised
two
era,
to
1955
DQctrine"
a
which
signals
September
"Hall stein
establishment
East European
of
dealing
However,
(FRG).
to . send
visit
in
the
goals
connected
GDR.
94
towards
to
its
253
policy
toward
other to its
poli tik).
The
predominant
ably. 95
policy
toward
GDR 1 s
role
although
With
the
its
the
in
western
(Westo-
Soviet· blocpoli tic
remains
of
FRG 1 s
East things changed dramatically.
( 1)
Sanction
Soviet
the
alliance
significance has
emergence
and
(Blokpolitik)
Europe
Eastern
grown
overtures
remarkto
the
Europe
and
It seemed to:
hegemony
over
Eastern
and thereby satisfy Kremlin.
(2)
Eventually to settle the territorial
Poland
and
Czechoslovakia
thus
disputes
making
them
with
less
dependent on the Soviet Union.
(3)
To recognise the GDR as a separate state.
( 4)
To
eliminate
the
Berlin
question
as
a
stumbling
bloc to practical politics.
( 5)
To
clear
It was
the
the
to Brezhnev too
way
last
for
East.- West
cooperation. 96
consideration which
much.
He
started
had
thinking
in ·terms
American, Japanese and West German investments
and procure Western and
Japanese
Soviet economy.
This
the
between
first
March 1969.
rift
had
technology
irritated ·Walter
GDR
and
Political Consul ta ti ve
Moscow
Committee
appealed
in
to
of
Siberia
modernise
Ulbricht
and
surfaced
in
meeting
in
95. Angela E. Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward German Democratic Republic" in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy
..!...!!. Eastern Europe (New Haven, 1984), p.34.
·
96. Schultz, n.93, p.55.
/!_.,
"--?
I
254
Budapest
where
the
USSR
revived
its
proposal
European Security Conference and where the
notable
for
its
April 1969,
the
in
Comintern,
mild
language
the
fifteenth
both
Mikhail
Suslov
and
a
communique
was
Again
in
toward· Bonn.
anniversary
for
celebration
Boris
of
Ponomarev
disparaged the Stalinist understanding of social democracy
as
the
main
enemy
of
communism.
It
is
significant
to note that in the same meeting Ulbricht had defended the
Stalinist thesis.
that
detente
West
German
The USSR was also thinking at that time
would
benefit
Treaty
was
the
GDR.
signed
in
Thus
August
of the Ulbricht Doctrine - the opposite of
doctrine.
Union
However,
completely
this
does
reconciled
not
with
mean
the
all the fears of German revanchism.
the
ambivalent
Mikhail
policy
continued.
the
Bakunin
Voltaire said of
God,
Russian
that
if
the
1970
the
Hallestein
that
the
and
dismissed
Quite
the
contrary,
anarchist,·
were
"I
no
so
strategic
considerations
written
say,
as
Germans
we
successfully
unites the Slavs as a rooted hatred of Germans".
and
Soviet
FRG
should have to invent them, since nothing
Military
inspi te
Rightly. had
there
Soviet
97
have
been
upper most in the Soviet thinking than political or economic.
have
Certain amount of
always
vulnerable
97.
been
to
there
military
Ibid. , p. 33.
obsession
since,
pressure
with
security
"Russia
has
ever
since
concerns
always
felt
its. people
,(
..l-\,/
255
tried to set up
the northern
natural
a
na tiona!
parts
of
defences,
overrun by
the
the
Tartars
and
state
Russians
Mongols
found
from
to
entrust
their
to
survival
own military effort. 98
In the
Swedes,
of
form
fulfil their long cherished goals.
role
of a lJuffer
zone
is
fostered
Soviet
Turks
and
in
military
post-Second
a security mechanism
by
French
exclusively
zone
the
territory
east,
amass
of
Lacking
mass.
the
the Soviets thus created a buffer
in
plains
their
experience
Russian a deep sense of the need
vast
land
Poles,
This
Germans from the west.
the
Eurasian
from the south and attacked by
and
in
power
to
World
the
their
War
era
institutionalising
the
Warsaw
Mackintosh
political
Pact
says,
and
to
"The
military
thinking is on the whole a fairly straight forward one••. 99
The military-strategic considerations have
a ted
over
politico-economic
strategic sphere as
has
been
Moscow has always retained an
And this is reflected in the
Warsaw Pact.
no
The
military
one.s.
analysed
Defence.
in
in
predomin-
the
military
chapter
three,
extremely dominant position.
military
functioning
headquarter
operational ·capability, no
peacetime.
And
thus
These are provided by
logistic
the
of
the
branch
Soviet
of
the
P'act
has
during
Ministry
of
During war time, the military haadquarter of the
98. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Military Considerations in Soviet
East European Relations," in Dawisha and Hanson, eds.,
n.93, p.133.
99. Ibid., p.136.
256
Pact, whatever little role it has, will
the
Soviet
Ministry
of
that
the
ra tely resembles a joint
stock
a major shareholder,
this
One
of
in
the
100 '
Defence.
Richard E. Darilek think
most
be
taken
Some
Warsaw
analysis
Pact
corporation
case
more
by
like
accu-
controlled
by
Union". 101
the Soviet
significant
over
achievements
of
the Warsaw Pact has been the building up the East European
forces in a massive way and enriched by
Soviet
equipments
like T-72, BMP Combat Vehicle, MIG-25s and other aircrafts
new
artillery
defense
pieces,
launchers,
rocket
weapons.
Moreover
SS-21 in the GDR
territory,
with
a
the
new
deployment
generation
nuclear missiles was located in Eastern
the value of the area to Soviet
remarkable
1964
and
stability
1982
further
both as a political
· turn
of
the
and
helped· preserve
to
the
military
European
air
of
of
Europe
strategic
Brezhnev
added
mobile
the
theatre
underlying
planning.
leadership
growth
of
organisation.
between
the
Pact
This
and
security
The
in
detente
which went into a blind alleyafter the Soviet intervention
of Afghanistan in
the
prospering
of
1979.
It
detente,
is
during
also
grew
this
period
East-West
with
trade
significantly.
East-WEst detente which had
taken . an
after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and had
100. Ibid., p.139.
101. Darilek·, n.lO, p.75.
upward
flowered
swing
into
257
the Helinski Conference in 1975.
However it
nosedi ved
in
1979 after the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan.
It was
indeed
except
a
steady
period
for
the
Soviet
Union
1968,
the intervening events like the Czech crisis of
Romanian rebellion which spanned from. 1958
onwards
the
perpe-
tually, the Solidarity movement in Poland in. the eighties.
However, if these
could
manage
constituted
them
the
"fault
successfully.
And
lines"
the
the
Warsaw
WTO
pact
continued to exist as militarily strong as its counterpart
the
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organisation,
the
though
Soviet menolithic dominance continued.
Poland indeed was a sad case for the
In
1974,
Moscow
had
recognised
Poland
Soviet
as
one
Union.
of
the
countries on the verge of entering the stage of "developed
socialism"; in the· eighties
it
accused
of "revisionism" and the spectre of the
kept haunting Poland7°
and
the
emergence
of
2
the
Brezhnev
after large scale
Solidarity
as
an . organised
force.
WTO forces, to Warsaw
manoeuvres
becoming apparent that the
However, the Soviet
Union
when the Polish regime
dents
only
created
Soviet
went
imposed
bitterness
102. Pravda, 17 November, 1980.
Chief
it
was
invasion. was
for
... invasion
martial
among
doctrine
chaos,
V. G. Kulikov,
WTO
Party
economic
After several trips of Marshal
and
Polish
law.
alliance
of
the
already
imminent.
by
proxy",
Such
inci-
partners.
258
Thus in this chapter we examined the inter-alliance
relationship among the members of the Pact as part
of
our
effort to understand the functional and behavioural aspect
of the Warsaw Pact.
Pact
responded
We also analysed as to how .the Warsaw
to
different
which affected the Pact and
internal
found
in
crisis
all
cases
Pact almost acted on Soviet policy directives
on
the
basis
of
collective
consensus.
Consul ta ti ve Committee (PCC),
the
situations
tba t
the
rather
The
than
Political
semina 1 institution
of
the
act hardly deliberated on the crises or took
note
the
situations.
consult
The
Soviet
gover.nment
allied partners but defina tely not
within
the
frame-
This created lot of
ners.
Soviet unilateral decisions with respect to Hungary
important
among
WTO
work.
Czechoslovakia and other
bitterness
did
of
issues
often
to create deep fissures in the Warsaw Pact.
the
shortcomings
of
socialist
alliance
not
purview
under
the
Warsaw
system.
of
the
Pact
as
Domestic
WTO
as
allied
a multinational
as
other
issues
are
concerned
thoroughly active and involved.
functioning
detente
of
period,
the
we
Pact
did
We
changed
not
military preparedness; rather
find
the
PCC
saw
that
any
However,
was
the
in
the
in
the
and . equipments
This,
so
quite
though
slackening
Europe.
were
provisions
significantly
forces
increasingly dumped into Eastern
which
treaty
came to be the target are'a of its operation.
far
threa ted
This revealed
issues
per
part-
were
however,
259
does not belittle the significal)ce of the WTO as
lateral alliance
peace
So
system.
and
security
are
seriously
concerned
and
far
as
concerned,
at
readiness to go for an all
every
European
issues
the
of
WTO
stage,
a
multi-
European
was
quite
expressed
system of
its
collective
security and disband the alliances.
It is
indeed
ant
quite
suspicious
of
behaviour,
we
that
the
West
has
remained
import-
the Soviet and WTO proposals all-throughout.
Having discussed
now
proceed
in .the
the
next
inter-allian.ce
chapter-
to
discuss
East-West
relations and the crucial issues arising out of it.

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