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No - LSE
LSE-Groningen Workshop 2009
Models of Value and Opinion
February 12-14, 2009
Judgment Aggregation
and
Moral Responsibility
Frank Hindriks
University of Groningen
The Doctrinal Paradox & the Discursive Dilemma
p
q
r
pqr
Serious
danger?
Effective
Measure?
Bearable
Loss?
Pay Sacrifice?
A
No
Yes
Yes
No
B
Yes
No
Yes
No
C
Yes
Yes
No
No
Majority Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Employee Safety
2
Theorem (List and Pettit 2002)
Let the agenda contain at least two distinct
atomic propositions and their conjunction, or
their disjunction, or their material
implication. Then there exists no
aggregation rule satisfying the conditions of
‘universal domain’, ‘collective rationality’,
‘systematicity’ and ‘anonymity’.
3
Pettit
•
Groups have minds of their own
•
Corporate responsibility (CR) cannot be
reduced to individual responsibility (IR)
4
Corporate Responsibility. Myth or Reality?
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
Pettit’s Argument
An Observation
A Critique
Towards an Alternative
5
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Irreducible Corporate Responsibility Thesis:
[ICRT] It is sometimes impossible to fully
distribute the responsibility of a corporate
agent to the individual members of that
agent.
6
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Excuse Condition:
[E] An individual member of an organization
cannot be blamed for a decision made by
that organization if s/he disagrees with it.
7
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
The premise-based and conclusion-based
procedures are strategically equivalent
 Pettit’s argument fails for the case of
outcome-oriented preferences
8
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Reasons for disagreement
[E*] An individual’s disagreement with the
decision the organization of which s/he is a
member affects the extent to which s/he can
be blamed for that decision only if s/he
disagrees with it for the right reasons.
9
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Reason-sensitive control
Culpable quality of will, faulty self-governance
Normative reasons
10
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Friend in distress examples:
- “busy”
- “reputation”
- “school play”
Information requirements
From the individual to the collective level
11
Dictatorship
A
p
q
r
(p  q)  s
s
WMDs?
Sufficient
Power?
Just War?
Preemptive
War?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Preemptive War
12
Dictatorship
B
p
q
r
(p  q)  s
s
WMDs?
Sufficient
Power?
Just War?
Preemptive
War?
Yes
No
Yes
No
Preemptive War
13
Dictatorship
C
p
q
r
(p  q)  s
s
WMDs?
Sufficient
Power?
Just War?
Preemptive
War?
Yes
Yes
No
No
Preemptive War
14
Oligarchy
p
q
r
(p  q)  s
s
WMDs?
Sufficient
Power?
Just War?
Preemptive
War?
A
No
Yes
Yes
No
B
Yes
No
Yes
No
C
Yes
Yes
No
No
Majority Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Preemptive War
15
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
A recipe for distributing responsibility
• Check the fault(s) of the corporate agent
• Trace them to individuals
16
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation
3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Collectivizing reason
Member and role responsibility
Corporate Responsibility (CR)
- (ir)reducibility
 a false dilemma
17
Conclusions
1. Information about normative reasons and
faulty self-governance can be used for
“tracing back” CR to IR.
2. A bottom-up approach to CR
18

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