Rural women migrating to urban garment factories in

Transcription

Rural women migrating to urban garment factories
in Myanmar
Chaw Chaw
___________________________________________________________
For more than a decade Myanmar1 has taken halting steps away from the
‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ towards a more market-oriented economy.2 The
country’s leaders have attempted to encourage expansion of export-oriented
industry, especially garment production. This has succeeded to an extent, in that
there has been some relocation to Myanmar of labour-intensive industries,
particularly from more economically advanced East Asian countries. As wage
levels in some of those countries have risen, industries such as textiles have been
shifting to where costs are lower. Other factors, such as companies dodging
importing countries’ quota rules, have also been important.
Young rural women have been recruited into the urban labour market following
the recent establishment of industrial zones around Yangon, the capital. This
rural-urban migration is a new phenomenon in Myanmar. Women that were
previously under parental control, economically dependent and confined within a
small geographical area, are now earning their own incomes and being exposed
to the wider socioeconomic arena. The values, attitudes and ideologies of
migrant daughters may change rapidly along with their changing livelihoods.
Moreover, parents and daughters who have grown up under different
socioeconomic realities have different ways of understanding and interpreting
these processes of change (Lie and Lund 1991:149) and may respond in very
different ways.
This chapter aims to examine shifting power relations between parents and
migrant daughters in the context of the daughters’ employment in urban-based
industries. This study of one of the social challenges brought about by
industrialisation poses several questions. What are the changes and effects
1
Editor’s note: Some readers may fault this chapter for failing to critically examine the role of the
state in Myanmar – usually the primary preoccupation of writers about the country. The author,
unlike many who write on Myanmar/Burma, lives in the country and is bound by certain
constraints that need no mention here. This chapter looks at certain aspects of the impact of
industrialisation on rural families in Myanmar. Much writing already exists on the role of the
military regime in both the rural sector and the country’s fledgling industrial development. Such
topics, while important, are beyond the reach of this chapter for a variety of reasons.
2
While profound changes have occurred since the days of extreme autarky, the Yangon
government interventions in the economy remain significant. In a ranking of 123 countries,
Myanmar ranked second to last in terms of economic freedom (Fraser Institute 2002).
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Chaw Chaw
brought about by industrialisation – more specifically, factory employment – in
the lives of rural-to-urban working women? How does industrialisation,
specifically factory employment, affect the relationship between parents and
working daughters?
This study draws upon empirical data I collected from two urban industrial zones
in the Yangon area, Hlaing Thar Yar and South Dagon, and two rural villages,
Ywa Thit and Kyun Gone. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to
obtain information in both the urban and rural settings. I looked at women’s
experiences in factory employment, household patterns and strategies, accepted
norms and values in the village and migrants’ accounts of the perceptions and
responses of their parents and communities. In addition to regular visits with
factory workers, I also visited families at the two selected villages to see things
from their perspective. Both villages are accessible by bus or car directly from
Yangon. The main income source of both villages is farming and the majority of
the population practices Buddhism.
Industrial development
The tentative opening of the economy in 1988 to foreign trade and investment
has provided opportunities for companies from newly industrialising economies
like South Korea and neighbouring countries like Thailand to gain comparative
advantage by moving their labour-intensive industries to Myanmar. This
development has removed Myanmar from its self-imposed autarky and given it a
place, albeit a very low-ranking one, in the ‘new international division of labour’.
This division of labour rewards countries that have low labour costs and curbs on
union organising with investment from countries with higher costs and/or more
organised labour.
A new foreign investment law was passed in Myanmar in November 1988
allowing the establishment of wholly owned foreign enterprises and joint
ventures. Foreign partners in joint ventures with local firms are required to take
at least a 35% equity stake (Lutkenhorst 1990). These arrangements give priority
to export promotion.
There have also been other state-initiated incentives to promote industrialisation
through the impetus of foreign investment in Myanmar. Industrial zones, where
new factories would be located, have been created in response to state policies,
especially after the promulgation of the Private Industrial Enterprise Law in
1990.
Between 1988 and 1999, two types of zones were developed in and around
Yangon. The first type is oriented towards general industries owned by local
entrepreneurs, whereas the second type aims to attract foreign investors. The
Department of Human Settlement and Housing Development has established
eight industrial zones in the satellite towns and surroundings of Yangon.
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RURAL WOMEN MIGRATING TO URBAN GARMENT FACTORIES IN MYANMAR
Accompanying this growth in the number of labour-intensive textile and foodprocessing factories, women’s participation in the urban labour force has
increased significantly. Employment by gender in four Yangon industrial zones
is shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Gender of employees in four Yangon industrial zones
1
2
3
4
Zone
Hlaing Thar Yar
Shwe Pyi Thar
South Dagon 1
South Dagon 2
Total
Women
2,600
2,128
2,150
1,229
8,107
%
71
65
59
36
58
Men
1,062
1,156
1,503
2,150
5,871
%
29
35
41
64
42
Total
3,662
3,284
3,653
3,379
13,978
%
26.2
23.5
26.1
24.2
100.0
Source: Industrial Zones Supervisions Committee 2000
The number of garment factories had increased significantly by the mid-1990s.
The data in Table 2 on the growth of registered private industries provided by
Industrial Zones Supervision Committees show that the number of garment
factories increased from 17 in 1992 to 69 in 1996, and then to nearly 100 by
1998.
Table 2 Textile and garment factories and employee numbers
1992
Fact’s
Textiles
Garments
1996
1997
1998
Workers
Fact’s
Workers
Fact’s
Workers
Fact’s
Workers
1,520
10,543
2,348
17,334
2,353
17,512
2,337
17,500
17
230
69
8,870
77
9,967
98
10,187
Source: Industrial Zones Supervisions Committee 2000
It should be noted that manufacturing still only makes up about 6.5% of
Myanmar’s estimated GDP, with agriculture contributing more than 60% (US
Commercial Service 2002). Furthermore, Myanmar’s garment exports are very
small compared with other exporters, as seen in data from the USA, the world’s
largest garment importer. For instance, in 2000 the USA imported US$419
million of clothing from Myanmar, just 0.6% of its total clothing imports of
more than US$66 billion. However, the increase of imports from Myanmar was
significant, with imports increasing by 46% in 1999 (from 1998) by a further
109% in 2000 (from 1999) (WTO 2001:152 Table IV 79). While the garment
trade amongst Asian economies accounts for about 15% of the world total (Table
3), the export of garments from Myanmar is primarily centred on the USA, with
Canada a secondary, though far less significant market (Vicary and Turnell
2001).
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Table 3 Asian garment exports to the world 1990-2000
Value of exports (US$ million)
China
Hong Kong,
China
HK domestic exports
HK re-exports
Taiwan
Thailand
India
Philippines
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
1990
9,669
15,406
1995
24,049
21,297
1998
30,048
22,164
1999
30,078
22,371
2000
36,071
24,215
9,266
6,140
3,987
2,817
2,530
1,733
1,646
638
9,540
11,757
3,251
5,008
4,110
2,420
3,376
1,758
9,667
12,497
3,189
3,540
4,782
2,324
2,630
…
9,571
12,800
2,862
3,453
5,153
2,111
3,857
2,287
9,935
14,280
2,967
3,948
…
2,385
4,734
…
% of total
exports from
each country
1990
2000
15.6
14.5
18.7
12.0
31.9
11.5
5.9
12.2
14.1
21.5
6.4
32.2
42.0
8.0
2.0
5.7
14.2
6.0
7.6
49.9
Source: WTO 2001:155 Extract from Table IV 81
Most of Myanmar’s garment factories appear to have been financed by Korean,
Taiwanese and Hong Kong firms. Factors accounting for East Asian investment
likely include Myanmar’s low labour costs, state prohibitions on labour
organising and efforts to circumvent US quotas limiting imports from individual
countries. As countries reach the limits of their US import quotas, investment in
Myanmar’s garment industry becomes attractive because its US import quotas
have not been filled. This advantage will disappear in 2005, however, when
World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules come into effect, thereby ending the
quota system. Ultimately, this will drive higher-wage countries into direct
competition with export powerhouse China. This fact might best explain the
move by companies from countries like South Korea to set up plant in Myanmar,
where lower labour and other costs might maintain company competitiveness
(Vicary and Turnell 2001).
Despite its rapid growth in recent years, the Myanmar garment industry is
particularly vulnerable due to its dependence on the US market. This became
clear in 2001 with the introduction in the US Senate of a bill that would have
banned imports of all goods from Myanmar. While ultimately unsuccessful,
pressure from US politicians opposed to the Myanmarese government will likely
continue. Added to this is the success of a grassroots campaign in the United
States and United Kingdom to convince large retailers like WalMart, as well as
university campuses, to stop selling goods made in Myanmar.
These factors cast doubt over the sustainability of the fledgling Myanmar
garment industry. In fact, US Commerce Department figures show a 22% drop
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in imports (measured in square feet) in the first nine months of 2002. Whether
this is due to the boycott campaign – which to date has pressured at least 33
major companies (eg. WalMart, Tommy Hilfiger, Levi-Strauss) to eschew
Myanmarese products – or US economic troubles, or other factors, is unclear.
Rural-urban linkages and migration of young women
Rural-urban linkages have become stronger since the establishment of industrial
zones. Rural village informants say that before 1988 they only occasionally went
to Yangon or other big cities. Leaving the village and working in cities was a
strange experience. Since 1988, government emphasis on improving physical
linkages such as roads,3 bridges and rail systems have led to the spatial
integration of rural people with urban areas by reducing travel time and costs.
Physical linkages allow greater access to non-agricultural employment and
migration opportunities in the nearby cities. Villagers explain that many people
move back and forth between village and city for petty trade or for short-term
work in construction sites or factories. Even before the increased flow of
migration due to the establishment of industrial zones, people moved whenever
there were job opportunities at nearby towns during the farming off-season.
As infrastructure development in the cities and better job opportunities
increasingly lead rural people to move to cities, rural-urban linkages have
strengthened. Those who settle in cities form networks which can eventually
accommodate friends or relatives newly arrived from surrounding villages. The
boundaries between rural and urban are becoming more fluid because of the
continuous movement of people between village and city. News and information
about life and opportunities in the Yangon industrial zones flow back to the
villages almost everyday via the many people moving between city and village.
These rural-urban linkages give opportunities for young women to look for jobs
in urban areas since parents are not as sensitive and wary of urban life as before.
According to informants long resident in the industrial zones, rural-to-urban
migration has increased remarkably. Although there is no segregated data on the
place of origin of workers in industrial zones, interviews with factory employees
indicate that workers from rural areas constitute more than two-thirds of all
employees in each factory.
There are no official data disaggregated by gender on the labour force in garment
factories nationwide. However, women outnumber men in three of the four
industrial zones shown in Table 1 (Industrial Zones Supervisions Committee
2000) due to the fact that these clusters of export-oriented garment factories
actively recruit women labourers. Women are targeted for factory work because
employers in many Asian countries deem them skilled yet docile, particularly
3
Between 1988 and 1997 more than 4,000 kilometres of roads were built.
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young and single women, and because they are more likely to accept low wages
than men (Eviota 1995:7).
Changing village economy and rural daughters
The entry of rural workers into the urban labour market is strongly influenced by
the declining village economy, though the conditions under which men and
women enter the labour market are different. By looking into both push and pull
factors, the different conditions that shape men and women’s entry into the
labour market can be examined. Village women, who have less access to land
because of gender ideologies and their domestic responsibilities, are more mobile
outside the village compared with men, who are mainly responsible for farm
work.
Declining village economy
Beginning in 1963-64, crops cultivated throughout the nation were classified into
two broad categories: ‘planned’ or ‘controlled’ crops, and ‘non-planned’ or ‘noncontrolled’ crops. Cultivated areas were accordingly classified as planned and
non-planned areas. Areas of planned crops can only be grown under government
supervision. Priority for the provision of inputs, extension services and
agricultural credit are given to farmers growing these crops. Farmers growing
planned crops, especially rice, must supply a fixed amount of the produce to the
government at a fixed price.
For non-planned crops, farmers can freely choose what, how and when to
produce and sell. However, production of these crops cannot be carried out in
the areas set aside for planned crops during the season when the planned crops
are grown. In addition, the government does not guarantee the supply of inputs
for non-planned crops.
Although Myanmar began its hesitant shift toward the market in 1988,
agricultural policies such as government procurement prices of rice, policies on
agricultural credit, inputs and extension services and methods of administration
and management of economic activities and organisations remained unchanged
(Soe and Fisher 1990).
Since rice is the main planned crop, farmers have to sell a fixed amount of the
product to the government at a set price. The quota of rice to be delivered to the
government is determined mainly by the area sown and yields. Any surplus can
be sold to procurement agents. The official procurement price of rice is fixed
after taking into account the estimated cost of production. To justify the
compulsory delivery system, the state supplies agricultural inputs at subsidised
prices and agricultural credit at low interest rates (Soe and Fisher 1990). What is
the impact of the rice-price policy on small farmers? Some farms produce below
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the required quota and must sell part of the wanza (rice kept for home
consumption) to fulfil the state quota.
A small farmer who owns only five acres of land recounted the impact of riceprice policy as follows:
My farm hardly produces the required quota these days because I cannot afford
to buy fertiliser and also because of the bad weather. Sometimes I have to sell
part of wanza to fulfil the quota, so we have to buy rice for our own
consumption at the black-market price, which is twice the price of what we get
when we sell to the state. The result is indebtedness.
Rural households previously depended solely on agriculture for their livelihoods,
but today household members cannot rely only on the income provided by farm
work. In fact, rather than bringing in sufficient income, farming today instead
may bring indebtedness to poor households. Some farmers have sold or rented
their land and turned to off-farm employment, often in the city. One farmer
recounted the effect of agriculture policies as follows:
In the past having paddy land brought prosperity and wealth, but nowadays
having paddy land brings negative effects because of the fixed-price policy and
quota-system. I am thinking of selling my land or renting it out to rich farmers
and seeking a job in the city.
For the daughters of such families, some must contribute to the household
economy by working on other people’s farms, by providing domestic service to
rich households and by selling seasonal food and vegetables in the village.
Villagers frequently cite moving to the city as the best solution for poor
households since economic opportunities are limited in rural areas whereas urban
employment opportunities are greater and wages higher.
Before the
establishment of factories in the industrial zones in the city, most of the
daughters from poor families were sent to town to work as domestic helpers.
Today, they have the additional option of joining the industrial labour market.
My survey data from 30 households showed that the average income of farm
workers in the village is 2,000 kyat a month whereas the average income of
factory work is 10,500 kyat a month4 – more than five times the village income.
Rural household type
The household types of the factory workers from the two villages fall into three
categories: sub-nuclear households (which consist of a widow/er or divorcees
living alone or with other unmarried children, siblings or relatives); nuclear
4
Editor’s note: The official exchange rate of kyats to dollars in early 2003 was approximately 6.7
kyats to the US$, whereas the unofficial exchange rate is 1,100 to 1,200 kyats per US$. Hence the
kyat is presently officially overvalued at 160-170 times its street rate. In 2002 this was recognised
as overvaluing the kyat by about 100 times (US Commercial Service 2002). If this latter figure is
accepted, then the average income of factory workers at the time of the author’s survey
approximated to US$16 per month, even less in present terms.
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households (households consisting of only parents and children); and extended
households (consisting of a nuclear or sub-nuclear family plus other relatives,
often from more than two generations).
My survey data show that 60% of respondents come from nuclear households.
They share a home and meals and pool their resources. However the resource
pooling and sharing is complex since married children living separately from
their parents may sometimes support their parents and younger siblings with
goods or services, and vice versa. Extended households make up 37% of my
total sample of households. Most of the people joining the nuclear family unit
are women, including grandmothers (three out of 11 households), unmarried
aunts (two households) and daughters-in-law joining their husbands in their
parents’ homes (four households). The additional male family members
followed their wives and are helping the wives’ parents on their family farms.
Only one of the 30 households was a sub-nuclear household; a widow living with
other married and unmarried children. All her agricultural land and equipment
passed to married children after the death of her husband and she was left with
little resources. She depends on her children and in turn does the domestic work
and grows vegetables for household consumption.
Rural household strategies and gender division of labour
An analysis of both rural household structure and livelihood strategies reveals the
reasons behind villagers’ entry into the urban labour market. I measured the
internal structure of the household using the percentage of dependent members
per household and labour force participation of each household. These figures
reveal the households’ daily reproductive needs and productive capabilities
(Table 4). The relatively high percentage of dependent members of the
household with younger siblings still in school (34.7% of households) indicates
that one factor leading young women to seek outside employment is to support
their younger siblings through school.
Table 4 Household data
30 households in two villages
Ave. household size
Ave. number of dependents per h’hold
Ave. number engaging in agriculture
Ave. number engaging in off-farm work
Total
7.4 (100%)
2.7 (34.7%)
1.8 (26.3%)
2.9 (39.0%)
Women
4.2 (56.7%)
1.0 (12.9%)
0.2 (2.9%)
2.5 (33.6%)
Men
3.2 (43.3%)
1.7 (21.8%)
1.6 (23.4%)
0.4 (5.4%)
Source: Field data
However, in a patriarchal household structure with a hierarchy based on gender
and generation, fathers control the family’s labour and resources. While all
respondents mentioned that both fathers and mothers hold positions of relative
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power in terms of controlling children, resources and income, when asked to
draw the household structure, respondents put fathers at the top of the hierarchy.
The reason given for putting fathers in the highest position is that they are the
Eain Oo Nat (spiritual head of the household), who from birth possesses “glory,
the holiness of a man”.
Moreover, the economic power of fathers and sons as ‘breadwinners’ reinforces
intra-household gender hierarchies. Women’s labour is restricted mainly to the
domestic sphere, which perpetuates their economic dependence on husbands,
fathers and brothers. As future household heads, sons are given greater
responsibility for running farms to ensure an easy transfer from their fathers. As
shown in Table 4, only 2.9% of women are engaged in agriculture work whereas
men comprise the vast majority of family members engaged in farm work. (Of
the total household, only 26.3% of the members work on the farm.)
Women from rich households do not help with the farm work; they only manage
the household, whereas wives and daughters of small and medium farmers
provide supplementary labour on their own or other farms. Decisions about farm
work are mainly made by ‘farm managers’ – that is, fathers, or sons in cases of
households headed by women. On the other hand, decisions about non-farm
work can be made by women for the betterment of the family economy as part of
family survival strategies.
What are the strategies of rural poor households for coping and adapting to
external structural change? As noted above (see again Table 4), 26.3% of
household members (mostly male) are engaged in farm work whereas 39%
(mostly female) are engaged in off-farm work such as basket-making, working in
rice mills, selling food and vegetables, hair-dressing, carpentry and petty trade.
It is also important to note that even women who engage in some farm work are
involved in off-farm activities during the off-season. This indicates that off-farm
employment is an important household strategy of the rural poor, due to the
decline of the village economy and the insufficient income earned in agricultural
work.
Factory work in the industrial zones is another coping strategy, especially for
poor households. Parents allow daughters to migrate to the city for factory
employment since they are freer to migrate than sons, who have to work with
their fathers on the farm.
Positions of daughters in the household
Most of the migrant daughters working in the factories are unmarried and their
household responsibilities could be handed over to mothers or married sisters.
20% of the factory workers are eldest daughters whose younger siblings are still
in school. 36% are daughters whose elder brothers and sisters are working and
younger brothers and sisters are in school. The remaining 44% are eldest sisters
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who were left at home after the marriage of elder brothers or sisters, with
younger siblings still in school.
The household responsibilities handed over to children by parents depend on the
seniority of the children. The older ones have to shoulder their parents’
responsibilities. One 18-year-old factory worker explained her responsibility as
follows:
I am the third daughter in the family. My two elder brothers used to pool their
income for the family before they got married. However, after having their own
family they couldn’t give money to my parents. I knew that my parents had
difficulty sending my two younger sisters to school so I decided to work. Since
I was left as the eldest in the family, I am responsible for the younger ones,
right?
However, brothers do not want their sisters working since they feel themselves to
be responsible for the household economy like their fathers, while sisters are
responsible for household work. Factory workers with elder brothers said that
they were stopped or at least discouraged by their brothers from engaging in
factory work. The brother of one factory worker said:
I was very upset when I was told by my sister that she was going to Yangon to
work. I didn’t want her to be on her own in a place far away from the village. I
told her not to go and instead to work on the family farm and help her mother,
but she strongly resisted and asked who would provide her with extra money to
spend on her own. In the end she could do what she wanted to do, but I feel
upset to see my sister working in the factory and sometimes blame myself for
not being able to support my sister with what she wants.
Workplace conditions
Since so many working daughters from the rural areas devote their time and
labour to garment factories, exploring their lives in the workplace reveals how
the wider socioeconomic conditions shape their values, attitudes and ideologies
as expressed by their livelihood patterns and strategies.
Fordism
When factory workers from rural areas were asked about the overall work
process, none of them could fully explain it without help from co-workers. The
workers came expecting to learn sewing and then either eventually start their
own businesses in the village or be promoted to sewing machine operators in the
factory. However, their expectations have been frustrated because of the Fordist
approach to managing labour. A mass production method that divides the
organisation of production into ‘design’ and ‘execution’ functions with strict and
fine differentiation of tasks, Fordism restricts line workers to finely differentiated
and simplified work. It has been noted elsewhere that dividing the production
process into small parts results in deskilling, giving opportunities for
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management to control workers and leaving workers no room to learn the diverse
work processes (CAW 1995).
By engaging in only a small part of the whole production process, it is claimed
that garment workers are also de-skilled since they do not acquire knowledge of
the whole process. Working in garment factories does not provide workers with
enough skills and experience to become expert tailors, but only as good sewing
machine operators.
The Fordist approach also confines workers’ career opportunities to garment
factories. Because their limited experience and skills often cannot be transferred
from one job to another, workers are discouraged from seeking other kinds of
employment.
Occupational health and safety
Other important problems involve overwork and health dangers. For example,
most workers complain about not having free time or holidays because the work
schedule is dictated by production orders from the parent company. The average
work day is 11 hours; 13.5 hours with overtime. The workload is determined by
the number of orders from the main office. When there are fewer orders, the
workers are given a day or half-day off, without pay.
In addition, most of the factory workers complain about back pain, eyestrain,
headaches and irregular menstruation. These are common health problems
associated with factory work. Workers with more than one or two year’s
experience also suffer from gastric diseases, poor eyesight and pneumonia. They
can’t afford to go to medical doctors, so they tend to take painkillers bought from
roadside stores or use traditional medicine to cure their illnesses. Although most
of them are aware of their health problems, they insist that they must work while
they can in order to earn money and improve their lives; when they are no longer
able to work, they will return home.
Hierarchical structure and control
The vulnerable status of women factory workers is in part a result of not having
direct access to management. Although they are told to raise their opinions and
needs, these are channelled through supervisors who attend weekly staff and
management meetings. One form of labour control is providing autonomy to
supervisors, which in turn gives management less responsibility. Managers do
not deal directly with workers and use the excuse that they are not properly
informed of workers’ demands. Workers complain that their concerns are hardly
ever brought to management meetings by supervisors.
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Wage system
Three types of wage system exist in garment factories. Wages can be paid either
daily, monthly or on a piece-rate basis. Most of the factories use the daily wage
system since the companies benefit more by dictating the production quota per
day. With the piece-rate system, workers have more control over their time and
labour. The rate per piece is known and they can calculate the time necessary to
produce each piece and estimate how much remuneration they will receive. As it
stands, workers often earn only one-third of their monthly income from the daily
wage. The remainder comes from compulsory overtime, usually double the
normal wage, and bonus payments. This usually means little time off for the
workers.
Bonus payments
This is another type of control over factory labour. Workers are attracted by the
promise of bonus payments, which are more or less equivalent to the basic
monthly wage. If they fail to come on time or if they leave the workplace early
three times, they lose the bonus payment. Workers are therefore afraid to lose
their bonus by being absent or late so they come to work even when sick.
Time off
Workers have only two Sundays off each month, while at some factories they
also have the first day of the month off. Although workers are told that they
have the right to take leave according to the labour law, they often do not take
those holidays for fear of losing their bonuses.
Social consequences
In this section I examine daughters’ decision making processes. These social
actors can illustrate the conditions and consequences of their day-to-day lives
and tell us a good deal about ‘the conditions of reproduction in their society’
(Giddens 1984). In that sense, the social structure that affects individual decision
making and thus the process of social reproduction will be analysed in the
context of daughters’ employment in the urban labour market.
Change in values
One problem related to factory work is a change in values experienced by
labourers from rural areas. The value rural daughters put on work has changed
since they are now compensated in money whereas the time and labour they put
into the family farm were unpaid. On the other hand, the rigorous demands on
female workers’ time and labour weaken former attachments to village life since
they have fewer opportunities to visit their homes.
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Sexual harassment
Discrimination and abuse of power in the workplace are reflected in the female
factory workers’ experiences of sexual harassment and abuse. Burrell (1984)
views organisations as sites of women’s oppression in which sexuality and
sexual relations figure prominently. Whether located in the spheres of economy,
politics or civil society, organisations are potential sites of sexual harassment,
which both reflects and enhances patriarchy and the control it gives men over
women.
Workers explain that sexual harassment rarely occurs between Myanmarese male
and female workers because factory rules prohibit it. The offence is taken
seriously when reported to supervisors or management. Conversely, there have
been many cases of harassment of female workers by foreign males, both
physical and verbal. They tease women workers, use objectionable language
with them and sometimes approach closely and touch their hair or bodies. These
cases of sexual harassment involve hierarchical relationships where men in
superior positions wield power over women workers. Cases of sexual
harassment in factories, however, are left unreported since victims are afraid of
losing their jobs and dignity in the community.
Exploitation
In general, women workers argue that factory work is unfair, insecure,
exploitative and pays poorly. In addition to sexual harassment in the workplace,
there are other forms of worker abuse. Reported problems include: 1) refusal to
pay overtime; 2) maltreatment by foreign employers; 3) physical abuse; 4)
intentionally incorrect salary payment; 5) substituting free lunch for payment of
overtime; and 6) lack of transportation for overtime work. Such complaints have
culminated in labour strikes, all of which have occurred in Hlaing Thar Yar,
Myanmar’s most successful industrial zone. However, since the village offers no
better alternative, and factory work is much better paid, factory work has become
a ‘rational choice.’ As they flee from farm work, from domestic responsibilities
and from parental/elder control, they do gain more room to manoeuvre both
geographically and personally. As shown below, however, the factory has its
own set of constraints and dilemmas.
Cases of abuse have declined somewhat since labour protests have taken place.
However, it is too early to say that the workers’ situation in the factory will
improve since workers are generally unaware of either their rights or Myanmar
labour laws meant to protect them from employer abuse. Officials from the
Ministry of Labour are hardly concerned with enhancing workers’ rights. They
chiefly serve as negotiators between workers and employers but only when there
is strong resistance or strikes organised by the workers.
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Migration decision
Who is involved in a decision to migrate? All women responded that they
decided by themselves; no one was forced by their parents to work. However,
they did seek parental approval. Most of them collected information on factory
work from friends and relatives before making up their minds to work in the
factory. 73% of the workers engaged in factory work do so with their parents’
approval and 27% without. Most of the workers who had no difficulty in getting
parents’ approval come from very poor households. These are mostly landless
and debt-ridden households with an average monthly income less than 5,000
kyat.
Workers explained that the most common reason for parents ‘approving’ of them
working in the garment factories is that they can then make a financial
contribution to their family household via their remittances (Table 5). The
second most important reason was the parents’ inability to provide their children
with resources. A mother of one factory worker said:
Instead of keeping my daughter at home without being able to give her any
pocket money, it is better to let her work and find her own money so that she
can use her money, and in addition she will also learn how difficult it is to earn.
Table 5 Parents’ justifications for daughters working in garment factories
Reason
Financial support is needed for family/farm
Parents cannot support their personal needs
Parents cannot support their higher education
Parents let them do what they wish
To learn how hard it is to get money
Total
Frequency
%
18
13
6
6
4
47
37
28
13
13
9
100
Source: Field data.
However, when it comes to daughters’ decisions about whether to engage in
factory work, these combine economic and personal motives. The economic
motives included saving money to continue schooling or doing small business,
sending money home, spending money on their own, having a regular income
(unlike village work) and responsibility for the well-being of the household.
In terms of personal motivation, women migrate to the city to experience new
things and expand their knowledge, to flee from tiresome agriculture work, to
gain a good reputation for working in the city, to escape the control of parents
and elders, and to attain personal freedom. Therefore, it should be understood
that the decision to seek factory work is not straightforwardly economic. It is
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also an opportunity for young women to look for alternatives independent of
parents and elders.
Daughters from well-off families face a different situation. Their parents do not
easily allow them to join the urban labour force. In cases where a daughter from
a well-off family wants to work in the city, parents and sometimes brothers have
forbidden them. Parents mentioned that daughters who are away from their
family are seen by the local community as vulnerable to temptation, even as they
are envied and praised for being ‘good’ daughters who look after their parents.
Therefore, parents are pressured to defend their daughters’ reputations.
Daughters, on the other hand, also have less bargaining power and weaker
resistance to parental control since parents have more resources and sanctions
with which to bargain and threaten.
In these cases, it can be seen that the class position of households in part
determines whether daughters move into the cities, as well as the decisions that
are made prior to their move. Differences between richer and poorer households
influence such decisions and movements to the city.
Income allocation
As pointed out earlier, earnings from urban factory work are considerably higher
than from rural village farm work. Factory workers’ monthly remittances to their
households are therefore also much higher than the amount they were able to
contribute, if anything, while working in the village. Between one-third and a
half of worker income, on average 4–6,000 kyat, is sent home and the rest is
spent on food, accommodation, clothing and transport. Only an average of 1,000
kyat goes into a worker’s personal savings. Being able to send cash home give
workers a greater sense of pride than contributing labour to the family farm.
Who decides on income allocation? 83% of the respondents said that they
allocate their own earnings free from parental control. However, by looking at
the different factors that influence daughters’ decision-making, the power
relations between parents and daughters can be explored. Experiences of pooling
household income are influenced by personal factors that combine with purely
economic ones.
The first and most important factor determining daughters’ income contribution
is the nature of their parents’ livelihoods. Daughters of better-off farmers,
defined as having more than 20 acres of farmland, do not have to send their
income home. Daughters whose parents own 10 to 20 acres of land are similarly
not obliged to financially support their families every month, but only during the
beginning of the harvest period and when government loans need to be repaid.
Daughters whose parents are small landholders (less than 5 acres), tenant farmers
or engage in off-farm activities, have to support their parents every month.
These parents visit daughters on pay day, or send letters to them via travelling
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relatives, and wait for their daughters’ remittances. Remittances from workers to
their families varied from 4,000 kyat to 6,000 kyat per month.
The second factor that influences daughters’ income contribution is the family
life cycle. Daughters remit earnings when all other siblings are still in school.
Households with children still in school but with two or three others working in
factories experience a significant boost in the level of household income,
especially if combined with parents’ income. Daughters also contribute to
households where all other siblings are married and parents have retired.
Another factor is the position of daughters in the household. Among working
daughters, the older siblings are more likely to contribute to their households
than younger daughters. Younger daughters, according to this study’s findings,
contribute less since they have no younger siblings to support.
In sum, the relationship between parents and working daughters is the main
factor that determines the amount or duration of women’s contributions to the
household. This parallels the findings of Chung (1996) for Korean daughters.
This intergenerational relationship, characterised by the Korean hyo (filial piety),
can also be found in the Myanmarese family context. Both Myanmarese and
Korean working daughters said one reason for sending money home was to repay
parental obligation.
In the case of daughters from the poorest and most indebted families, however,
the intergenerational relationship results in conflict. Daughters, especially those
who have been working for more than a year, covertly or overtly expressed
dissatisfaction about the economic responsibility imposed on them by their
parents. One daughter from the poorest family, who has been engaged in factory
work for nearly one and a half years, expressed her feelings towards her parents
in this way:
See, I have worked here for more than one year but couldn’t save any money for
my future. The debt that my parents have doesn’t seem like it’s going to end.
On or just before my pay day, one of my family members, most of the time my
parents, visit me and tell me all the difficulties they are facing in the village.
They do not directly me for money, but how can I let them go with empty
hands? At least, I feel guilty. Why do they expect me to support them all the
time? I also have my own difficulties and future plans. Sometime I feel like
running away from them.
Another worker expressed her feeling of guilt for not being able to fulfil her
parents’ wishes:
The reason that I came to work is to support my parents, of course, but I want to
save money for myself, too. The pressure from my parents to pay back their
debt upsets me. I was once shouting at them not to let me know all the
problems they are facing and not to expect anything from me all the time. My
mother cried but said nothing to me. I know that I should not treat my parents
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like that because they are placed in the same position with Lord Buddha. In
Buddhism, Buddha, Dharma (the doctrine of Buddha), Sangha (members of the
Buddhist Order), teachers and parents are together in the same position so we
have to pay respect to them. I felt very guilty for treating my parents like that
but sometime I feel overwhelmed by the burden and difficulties.
Some parents visit their daughters once a month or after a couple of months. By
these visits, it is understood that daughters should give money to support the
family in the village. One factory worker recounted the conflict she had with her
mother who frequently visited her:
My mother used to visit me once in two months. That annoyed me because I
knew that she was expecting money from me although she didn’t openly say it.
By knowing that, how can I let her go back to the village empty handed? I felt
guilty for that. One day I told her not to visit me and spend money for
transportation and she was very angry with me and said that she will never come
again.
The mother said that she felt very sad since her daughter had wrongly perceived
her. Actually, she visited her daughter just to see how she was doing, not to ask
money from her. She added that one day her daughter would know the feeling of
a mother towards her daughter when she becomes a mother herself. Thus these
experiences show that the income contributions of working daughters depend on
the nature and the dynamics of their relationship with their parents rather than
singularly on ‘parental control’.
It can be seen that parents do not or cannot completely control their daughters,
but do so indirectly by sometimes invoking a sense of duty towards parents.
Because as ‘good’ parents, they are supposed to give away everything they have
without demanding or expecting anything in return. If parents are too
demanding, they will not gain any respect from their children nor maintain a
good reputation in the community.
Future decisions
Continuity and change in the lives of rural daughters brought about by industrial
development are reflected in the nature of their plans and expectations for the
future. When queried, none of them were interested in long-term work in the
factory. One factory worker explained in this way:
Factory work for us is only for the short term to save money. How can we work
for the long term? Because of long working hours, our eyesight is getting poor;
we suffer from muscular stiffness, back pain and have urinary and gastric
problems. This job is not possible for us after getting married because we have
no time to do housework and care for our children. This job is good only for
young unmarried women.
Most of them do not wish to return home, either, unless they become wealthy.
One worker said that people back in the village think highly of them. On the
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other hand, some fall victim to gossip when they return to the village with empty
pockets. The high expectations imposed on workers sometimes lead them to
peddle sexual favours to foreigners in the factory or with other men to earn extra
money to boost their savings.
None of them wants to return home for the time being because they do not want
to work on the farm. When asked about settling in the city for good, 40% of
respondents wanted to return eventually to their villages. These were the young
women (under 18 years), usually the first migrant in the family and with no
relatives in the city. They have only completed primary education and thus have
fewer opportunities for work in the city apart from factory work.
The 35% who want to settle in the city are those whose siblings or relatives have
already settled there, who have decided to get married in one or two years, who
belong to villages where women have few income-earning opportunities, who
come from landless rural households, or who have engaged in factory work for
more than two years.
25% of the respondents have no idea whether to go home or settle in the city.
They have only recently arrived in the city (only 3-5 months). It was too early
for them to decide about such matters.
Some factory workers, who did not expect to get married and settle in the city,
have experienced the freedom to meet with men, thus creating “a high
probability that they will marry and raise new members of the urban society”
(Jamilah 1984:223). Some perceive marriage as a mechanism that brings change
and is “a means of upward social mobility for women” (Thadani and Todaro
1984).
According to Myanmarese culture, the notion of the ‘good woman’ lies in one’s
control of her sexuality. The constant social interaction of men and women is
considered taboo in rural villages. However, young rural women who move to
the city are likely to have ample opportunity to break this pattern.
In the factory environment rural girls must conform to traditional gender norms
of feminine propriety since they have to work together with male co-workers or
supervisors. The environment also creates chances for women to meet with men,
as there are many other migrant men working in other factories in the industrial
zones. 70% of the workers said that they had greater opportunities to mix with
men by coming to the city but 30% said emphatically that they never try to form
relationships men for fear of being considered ‘bad’ women and frowned upon
by the village community.
Marriage to urban men or men from outside the village is no longer taboo in the
countryside, but parents still resist a daughter’s marriage to men from other
places; they generally prefer their children to marry co-villagers. Parents from
poor households, on the other hand, have less power over their daughters’
220
decisions to marry, especially daughters who have supported them financially.
Hence factory work in the urban areas may alter the lives of rural daughters, who
have more freedom to choose their life partners and further weaken parental
control.
Concluding remarks
The declining economy of rural villages in Myanmar has weakened the status of
parents as chief household providers. Today it is their daughters’ labour,
currently in high demand by the export-oriented garment factories, which is
absorbed by the urban labour market in Yangon. However, movements of rural
women to the city – and into factory work – are not only influenced by the
current demand for female labour or the so-called ‘push’ of a declining rural
economy. Other issues are of real importance, such as aspects of the family life
cycle, gendered responsibilities of women in rural households, the class position
of rural households and the dynamics of intergenerational/kinship relations
between parents and daughters. These sociocultural elements also determine the
extent and nature of women’s migration to the city. Rural to urban movements
are often therefore not as straightforward as many push-and-pull explanations
suggest. Furthermore, this chapter has pointed out that export-industrialisation in
Myanmar is mediated by the structural weaknesses of the rural economy, the
demand for female labour in factories and the sociocultural aspects that largely
shape the migration process of rural women to the city of Yangon.
The effects of factory employment on the lives of women workers are also
determined by the same sociocultural factors. One area examined in this chapter
was women’s control over their own lives once they leave behind their villages
and parents. Control over their lives is also less of a straightforward process for
rural women in factories. Changing status and the extent to which daughters
may gain or lose control over their lives is strongly influenced by the kinship
system (Wolf 1992). In the context of Myanmar, flexibility of the kinship
system encourages more assertive behaviour by daughters. Although daughters
did repay parental obligation, this is largely voluntary, rather than being
controlled or forced. Daughters’ contribution to the household budget commonly
is driven by the desire to please their parents and often spurred by the nature of
livelihoods of parents in the rural households.
The notion of being ‘good’ and ‘dutiful’ parents – providing for children’s needs
such as education, money and investment, and resources for marriage – prevents
the parents of factory workers from overreaching their power. Financial inability
to fulfil the needs of their children results in the reduced ability to control their
daughters. However they may covertly express their power by reminding their
daughters of what they have done for them in their childhood so that daughters
may feel obliged to be grateful and be ‘good and dutiful’ daughters.
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Chaw Chaw
Parents from poor households, who are often in debt and dependant on their
daughters’ monthly remittances, have less control over their daughters than
parents from better-off families. Young daughters who are still in the process of
figuring out their interests and learning about urban life, tend to conform more to
parental control over their income and labour. But daughters who have attained
a degree of independence and learnt many things about life outside the village
tend to rebel more against the control of their parents. Parents have less say over
the decisions and actions of daughters who have found partners and plan to start
new lives in the city. Therefore, it can be seen that the class position and life
cycle changes of the family are factors mediating the effects of factory
employment on parents and working daughters.
Thus the impacts on female factory workers brought about by industrialisation
vary according to a number of influencing factors. Generally, factory
employment, which is the rational choice of women in the context of this study,
elevates the daughter’s position in the household from being a dependent or a
low-income earner to an independent income provider.
The factory women’s visible contribution to the household in cash or in kind
improves their status within their families as well as their own self esteem. Most
women claim to be better treated as a result of their contribution to household
income and have a greater say in the family. This phenomenon has been
confirmed by other researchers. For example, Sen (1990) also found that women
considered their contribution as more important than that of the male
breadwinners in the family. This “perceived contribution” (Sen 1990:136) not
only enhances their sense of pride and self-esteem, but possibly strengthens their
bargaining position. However, by saying this, my study is not arguing that the
economic independence of working women created by factory employment has
freed women to do whatever they please; it is one factor that has strengthened
their economic autonomy.
Factory work has been a ‘rational choice’ by the women to escape agricultural
and/or domestic work. Nevertheless, controls and exploitation of their labour
within the factory setting is inevitable. On the other hand, although opportunities
remain severely limited, Myanmar factory daughters, like Javanese factory
daughters studied by (Wolf 1990), do gain some more room for manoeuvre.
Working daughters’ geographical distance from home and access to cash income
give them the opportunity to escape certain forms of parental and patriarchal
control. Gaining more control over their own lives is a key personal motivation
for migrating to the city. Although mixing with men is considered social taboo
in the rural village, being single, young and on their own also provides
opportunities for rural women in the urban environment to break this norm.
Moreover, the freedom to choose one’s life partner increases the likelihood that
rural women will settle in the city and raise new members of urban society. At
the same time, the increased room to manoeuvre within the family and the
222
insecurity of factory work combine to encourage women to think of being
housewives as a way to free themselves from both parental control and capitalist
discipline. Thus factory employment is on one hand “a tool with which to hack
and whittle away at parental and patriarchal controls over their lives” (Wolf
1992:254), while simultaneously buttressing capitalist control over their lives.
This chapter has shown the processes and effects of rural women’s movements to
the city in a developing country context. These processes are far from
straightforward, being largely shaped by the nature of gendered roles and
responsibilities, family life cycle and kinship relations, as well as a weakening
rural economy and the demand for female labour in urban centres. The effects of
factory employment and the migration process on rural women are also
contradictory: on the one hand they create room to manoeuvre and strengthen
women’s bargaining position within the household and on the other subject
women workers to capitalist discipline, sexual harrassment and hierarchical
control on the shopfloor. The drive towards greater industrialisation therefore
increases autonomy for daughters in rural households but increases their
vulnerability to low wages and insecure benefits and working conditions.
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Rural women migrating to urban garment factories in

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