Fontanilla v. Thermo Cool Mechanical, 2016onsc7023

Transcription

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE:
The Estate of Felisa Santillan Fontanilla et al, Plaintiffs
AND:
Thermo Cool Mechanical et al, Defendants
AND:
L. J. Redpath & Associates et al, Third Parties
BEFORE:
Emery J.
COUNSEL: David Shellnutt, Counsel for the Plaintiffs
Lindsay Lorimer & Samantha Gordon, Counsel for the proposed
Defendant, Watts Water Technologies (Canada) Inc.
Heather Douglas for the proposed Defendant, Gayton Systems
Development Inc. and
Kaleigh Nusbaum for the Defendant, 1343140 Ontario Inc. O/A
Thermo Cool Mechanical
HEARD:
August 17 and September 22, 2016
ENDORSEMENT
2016 ONSC 7023 (CanLII)
CITATION: Fontanilla v. Thermo Cool Mechanical, 2016 ONSC 7023
COURT FILE NO.: CV-13-346-A1
DATE: 2016 12 08
[1]
The plaintiff brings this motion to regularize the pleadings in this action,
of claim accordingly.
[2]
The plaintiff’s motion is brought within an action arising from injuries
suffered by the late Felisa Santillan Fontanilla. Mrs. Fontanilla was a resident of
Living Waters Residence Inc., a retirement home. On January 31, 2011, Mrs.
Fontanilla was preparing to take a bath in her apartment. When in the bathtub,
she turned on the hot and cold water taps for bathwater. Suddenly and without
warning, the chrome diverter spout of the bathtub faucet burst, spraying scalding
water over her body. Mrs. Fontanilla suffered severe burns to sensitive parts of
her body as a result.
[3]
Mrs. Fontanilla passed away on October 6, 2011. The plaintiffs allege that
her death was caused by or related to the injuries she suffered from the events
on January 31, 2011.
[4]
Mrs. Fontanilla’s estate commenced the action against 1343140 Ontario
Inc. operating as Thermo Cool Mechanical (“Thermo Cool”), and Living Waters
Residence Inc. (“Living Waters”) on January 25, 2013 for the pain she suffered
before her death. Members of her family, including her husband, Ernesto
Fontanilla, their children and grandchildren are the plaintiffs advancing claims
under the Family Law Act.
including an order granting leave to add defendants and to amend the statement
[5]
The proposed Defendants, L. J. Redpath & Associates, Michael West, T.O.
did not file responding material, or appear on the motion. An order shall go on an
unopposed basis granting leave to add those parties as defendants and to
amend the statement of claim accordingly.
[6]
Justice Andre made an order on July 7, 2015 appointing Erneliza Curia as
the litigation administrator for the estate of the plaintiff, Felisa Santillan Fontanilla.
The title of proceedings shall therefore be amended to show that the Estate of
Felisa Santillan Fontanilla is represented by its litigation administrator, Erneliza F.
Coria.
Justice Andre’s order contained an order to continue the action with
respect to that plaintiff.
[7]
The proposed defendants, Watts Water Technologies (Canada) Inc.
(“Watts”) and Gayton Systems Development Inc. (“Gayton”) oppose the motion.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is dismissed as against them.
Materials on the motion
[8]
Tammy Ring, a lawyer at Lerners LLP having carriage of the plaintiff’s file,
swore an affidavit on June 3 2015 in support of the motion to add the proposed
defendants. Ms. Ring deposes that she spoke over the telephone on April 1,
2014 with Rob Mueller of Aviva Canada, and learned for the first time of other
potential parties. Aviva Canada is the insurer of the defendant, Thermo Cool.
Cool Mechanical and Almilli Mechanical Heating Air Conditioning & Refrigeration
[9]
Ms. Ring deposes that Mr. Mueller did not provide her with any specific
that time.
[10]
The statement of claim makes allegations that Living Waters failed to
ensure that the premises were kept safe. The plaintiffs allege the equipment
located on those premises was not installed and maintained in proper working
condition, suitable for use by its tenants or the general public. The plaintiffs bring
their action against Living Waters under the Occupiers Liability Act, and for
breach of duty to hire or supervise employees or contractors properly.
[11]
Thermo Cool was the contractor hired by Living Waters to replace the
boiler and certain plumbing for the building in March 2010. The statement of
claim alleges that Thermo Cool manufactured, installed, serviced and maintained
the plumbing equipment and its parts in the retirement home where the incident
occurred. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the chrome diverter spout had
burst because it was defective. The action is therefore framed against Thermo
Cool as both a product liability and a negligence case.
[12]
Living Waters delivered its statement of defence and cross-claim dated
May 22, 2014 on or about that date. Thermo Cool delivered its statement of
defence and cross-claim dated June 11, 2014 on or about that date. On June 18,
2014, Thermo Cool issued a third party claim naming L. J. Redpath &
names or companies, or contact information for those names or companies at
Associates, Watts Water Technologies (Canada) Inc., Gayton Systems
Heating Air Conditioning & Refrigeration as third parties.
[13]
In the third party claim, Thermo Cool alleges that it was an anti-scalding/
mixing valve in the faucet that failed on January 31, 2011. The antiscalding/mixing valve in the spout for channeling water into Mrs. Fontanilla’s
bathtub had been replaced at the same time as part of the boiler replacement at
Living Waters in March 2010. The third party claim alleges that the valve had
been manufactured by Watts and had been supplied by Gayton.
[14]
Thermo Cool further pleads in the third party claim that Gayton had
reviewed the system and had recommended, as well as provided the antiscalding/mixing valve in issue.
[15]
Watts and Gayton have each defended the third party claim. Watts has
also served a statement of defence to the main action. The other third parties,
Michael West and T.O. Cool Mechanical, have delivered a defence to the main
action, and a defence to the third party claim. The third party L.J. Redpath &
Associates has served a Notice of intent to defend in the main action and a
Notice of Intent to defend against the third party claim.
[16]
To date, there has been no response from Almilli Mechanical Heating Air
Conditioning & Refrigeration.
Development Inc., Michael West, T.O. Cool Mechanical and Almilli Mechanical
[17]
Tammy Ring deposes in her affidavit that the third party claim issued by
additional parties had been identified to the plaintiffs by name.
[18]
[19]
Tammy Ring was cross-examined on her affidavit on November 20, 2015.
The plaintiffs filed no other evidence in support of the motion.
Issues and Law
[20]
The plaintiffs bring the motion to add each Watts and Gayton as
defendants under rule 5.04. This order is discretionary in nature, and dependent
upon any legal impediments to make that order at all. The plaintiffs’ further
motion to amend the statement of claim would, in my view, automatically follow if
the court were to make the first order to add those parties as defendants.
[21]
The plaintiffs take the position that Watts and Gayton should be added as
defendants to allow the plaintiffs a direct claim against those parties as the
manufacturer and supplier of the anti-scalding/mixing valve. The plaintiffs further
assert that neither Watts nor Gayton will suffer any prejudice from being joined
as defendants as they are already third parties. The plaintiffs argue that joining
Watts and Gayton is necessary for the court to make a fair and just adjudication
of the issues in the action.
Thermo Cool against Watts and Gayton and other third parties was the first time
[22]
Watts and Gayton each oppose the motion on two grounds. First, each of
diligence to discover the true nature of the cause of action or the identity of
possible defendants to the action within the time prescribed by s.4 of the
Limitations Act 2002. They argue that the time has come and gone to apply the
discoverability principle under s. 5 of the Limitations Act 2002. As a result, the
plaintiffs are now statute barred from joining them as defendants.
[23]
Watts and Gayton each submit as a separate argument that they will suffer
irreparable prejudice because the anti-scalding/mixing valve no longer exists, or
cannot be located. Each of them claims that this fact causes prejudice that
cannot be compensated by costs because they cannot test that valve or conduct
the investigations they consider necessary to make full answer and defence to
the claim.
Limitation Period
[24]
Mrs. Fontanilla is not the person seeking to make a claim for the terrible
incident that occurred on January 31, 2011. The statement of claim was issued
on January 25, 2013, more than a year after her death in October 2011. This
action has been brought by members of her family who grieve the loss of their
mother and grandmother. This is clear from paragraphs 30 and 33 of the
them argues that the plaintiffs or their counsel did not exercise reasonable
statement of claim where the family members claim damages under the Family
[25]
I also note that the action was commenced 6 days before the second
anniversary of the date the incident occurred.
[26]
The main question I must address when determining if a limitation period
has expired to bar the plaintiffs from joining Watts and Gayton as defendants is
whether there is evidence before the court that the plaintiffs or their lawyer
exercised reasonable diligence to identify Watts and Gayton as defendants within
the applicable limitation period. In order to make this determination, it is
necessary to determine when that limitation period began to run.
[27]
It is just as important to determine whether the ability to bring an action has
expired under s. 4 of the Limitations Act 2002 when adding defendants as it is for
bringing a separate action against those parties. In Frohlick v. Pinkerton Canada
Ltd., 2008 ONCA 3, the Court of Appeal, speaking in the context of an appeal
from an order dismissing a motion for leave to amend an existing statement of
claim to add a new claim, stated that “conceptually, this should be treated no
differently than the issuance of a new and separate statement of claim that
advances a statute barred claim.”
[28]
For the purposes of the analysis, s. 5(1) and (2) of the Limitations Act 2002
read as follows:
Law Act as a result of her death.
5. (1) A claim is discovered on the earlier of,
(a) the day on which the person with the claim first knew,
(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to
by an act or omission,
(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom
the claim is made, and
(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a
proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it;
and
(b) the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the
circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the
matters referred to in clause (a). 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 5 (1).
Presumption
(2) A person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters
referred to in clause (1) (a) on the day the act or omission on which the
claim is based took place, unless the contrary is proved. 2002, c. 24,
Sched. B, s. 5 (2).
[29]
The plaintiffs rely upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Galota v.
Festival Hall Developments Ltd., 2016 ONCA 585. They take the position that
Galota sets out the current law on the discoverability of prospective defendants.
They also rely on Galota for the test of what the law expects of plaintiffs to
exercise reasonable diligence for the discoverability of claims and the naming of
defendants to the action.
[30]
In Galota, the Court of Appeal considered the findings of a motions judge
on a motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff was not required to conduct
pre-action discovery under the circumstances to learn the identity of the landlord
and possible defendant in an occupiers liability case. The plaintiff did not learn of
(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,
that party until it was disclosed at the examination for discovery of the tenant’s
[31]
The plaintiff in Galota had been injured while dancing on an elevated
dance floor located in premises leased and operated by Republik, the tenant in
the building and operator of the dance club. The plaintiff had commenced her
action against Republik, believing the claim to be insured.
[32]
Ultimately, Republik went out of business and the insurer became
insolvent. At Republik’s examination for discovery, the plaintiff learned that the
premises were owned at all material times by Festival Hall Developments Ltd.
Festival Hall was subsequently added as a defendant.
[33]
Festival Hall brought its motion for summary judgment to dismiss the
action on the ground that Ms. Galota’s claim was started more than two years
after her claim against Festival Hall was discovered, and therefore barred by s. 4
of the Limitations Act 2002. The motions judge found on the evidence that the
plaintiff was not required to take steps that were beyond reasonable diligence to
determine the identity of the owner of the premises. It was found that the facts
giving rise to her claim against Festival Hall were only discoverable when she
learned of Festival Hall’s existence some three and a half years later. The
motions judge therefore dismissed the motion for summary judgment of Festival
Hall on the basis that any exercise of reasonable diligence on the part of the
representative.
plaintiff to identify Festival Hall would not have been expected under the
[34]
The Court of Appeal agreed. Galota does not change the law regarding the
expectation that a party will exercise reasonable diligence to determine the facts
that would support a claim for which a proceeding may be brought to seek a
remedy. The court in Galota relied on the decision of Justice Van Rensburg in
Fennell v. Deol, 2016 ONCA 249. The court in Fennell recognized that, although
due diligence is a factor that the court must consider at the time a claim ought
reasonably to have been discovered, lack of due diligence is not in and of itself a
reason for dismissing a plaintiff’s claim as statute barred.
[35]
Instead, due diligence must be considered a part of the analytical process
to determine on an objective basis the day on which a reasonable person with
abilities and in circumstances of the person affected by the claim first would have
known of the matters referred to in s. 5(1)(a) to bring an action. As Justice Van
Rensburg explained in Fennell at paragraph 24:
[24]
Due diligence is part of the evaluation of s. 5(1)(b). In deciding when a
person in the plaintiff’s circumstances and with his abilities ought reasonably to
have discovered the elements of the claim, it is relevant to consider what
reasonable steps the plaintiff ought to have taken. Again, whether a party acts with
due diligence is a relevant consideration, but it is not a separate basis for
determining whether a limitation period has expired.
[36]
According to the court in Fennell and later in Galota, reasonable diligence
is only one factor to take into consideration on a motion to add parties where a
circumstances.
limitation period is an issue. In Galota, the other factors, all of which are fact
a. That the plaintiffs have sued the parties occupying the premises and
their claim was an insured claim,
b. No one has alleged any other party is potentially liable,
c. The potential liability of the proposed defendant is not obvious; and
d. The steps suggested by an expert of the proposed defendants would
not have alerted the plaintiffs to a claim against them.
[37]
I consider those other factors to favour the proposed defendants Watts and
Gayton on the evidence before me on this motion. The plaintiffs have brought
their action against the owners of the building and the contractor who installed
the boiler replacement system. There is no evidence to indicate that there is no
insurance policy responding to those claims.
[38]
The identity and role of Watts and Gayton as the manufacturer and
supplier of the valve was not obvious to the plaintiffs. However, by naming
Thermo Cool as the mechanical contractor who coordinated the boiler
replacement at Living Waters in the spring of 2010, the plaintiffs indicated that
they were aware that the malfunction of the plumbing in Mrs. Fontanilla’s
bathroom and possibly within the building itself. The plaintiffs were therefore on
driven and particular to the circumstances of each case, include the following:
notice that a further inquiry was necessary to determine the actual manufacturer
the program to replace faucets within residential units.
[39]
There was no expert evidence tendered on the motion before me with
respect to prudent steps that a “wise” solicitor ought to have taken. I therefore
make no finding of what a prudent solicitor ought to have done to hire an expert
to learn the identity and role of each Watts and Gayton within the relevant
limitation period.
[40]
Although due diligence on the part of a person in the plaintiffs
circumstances to determine the elements of a claim is but one factor in the
evaluation of when a limitation period begins, it is an important factor. Where
from outward appearances a limitation period has expired, or where
discoverability under s. 5 (1) of the Act is raised, the court is put on inquiry to
determine whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence to learn the
identity and role of a prospective defendant to extend the start and end date of a
limitation period. However, the court requires evidence of the steps taken to
meet the obligation to act with reasonable diligence. The Court of Appeal
confirmed the importance of this evidentiary requirement in Pepper v. Zellers Inc.
(2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 648 (Ont. C.A.) at paragraph 20 to 22:
[20] An examination of the evidentiary record in this case shows that the appellants'
material failed entirely to address whether they ought to have known Ms. Aube's
and supplier of any of the inner workings of the boiler replacement systems, or
[21] Importantly, there was no affidavit from the appellants' lawyer, only one from
the lawyer's law clerk, which provided no particulars of any steps taken to obtain
information and did not explain why no steps were taken. For example, there was no
reference to any inquiry of Zellers or of Messrs. [Youssuf] or Shenouda about the
name of the dispensing pharmacist and no explanation about why the two pharmacy
operators were not [page656] sued until long after the expiration of the limitation
period. As this court said in Zapfe, supra, at para. 35: "In most cases one would
expect to find, as part of a solicitor's affidavit, a list of the attempts made by the
solicitor to obtain information to substantiate the assertion that the party was
reasonably diligent."
[22] The motion judge's reasons reflect the absence of this critical evidence:
As it seems to me, the grave weakness in all this affidavit evidence proffered by the
plaintiffs is that there is no evidence at all from the solicitor or solicitors who handled
Ms. Pepper's case from the outset about the inquiries and investigation, if any, that
were made to ascertain all potentially liable parties for Ms. Pepper's illness.
[41]
Master Dash put it this way in Wong v. Adler, [2004] O.J. No. 1575,
affirmed at [2005] O.J. No. 1399 (Div. Ct.):
[45] What is the approach a judge or master should take on a motion to add
a defendant where the plaintiff wishes to plead that the limitation period has not yet
expired because she did not know of and could not with due diligence have
discovered the existence of that defendant? In my view, as is clearly implied in
Zapfe, the motions court must examine the evidentiary record before it to determine
if there is an issue of fact or of credibility on the discoverability allegation, which is a
constituent element of the claim. If the court determines that there is such issue, the
defendant should be added with leave to plead a limitations defence. If there is no
such issue, as for example where the evidence before the motions court clearly
indicates that the name of the tortfeasor and the essential facts that make up the
cause of action against such tortfeasor, were actually known to the plaintiff
[page477] or her solicitor more than two years before the motion to amend, the
motion should be refused. If the issue is due diligence rather than actual knowledge,
this is much more likely to involve issues of credibility requiring a trial or summary
judgment motion, provided of course that the plaintiff gives a reasonable explanation
on proper evidence as to why such information was not obtainable with due
diligence. That is not to say that such motion could never be denied if the evidence
is clear and uncontradicted that the plaintiff could have obtained the requisite
information with due diligence such that there is no issue of fact or credibility.
[42]
The action was commenced when the statement of claim was issued on
January 25, 2013.
There is no evidence before the court about when the
identity and what, if any, steps they took to determine that identity. Indeed, the
appellants offer no explanation other than to say that no one gave them the
information.
statement of claim was actually served on Living Waters and Thermo Cool.
claim served on those defendants forthwith after the action was commenced. It
was further within the power and control of the plaintiffs to require each of those
defendants to deliver a statement of defence within a reasonable time, and
certainly before June of 2013.
[43]
Tammy Ring has deposed that the plaintiffs did not learn of the identity or
role of Watts and Gayton until Thermo Cool issued its third party claim naming
them and others as third parties. This is not an accurate statement. The
statement of defence of Thermo Cool dated June 11, 2014 contain the following
allegations:
a. In paragraph 4, how the anti-scalding/ mixing valve was replaced at
the same time as part of the boiler replacement contract with Living
Waters,
b. In paragraph 5, Thermo Cool pleads that the valve was
manufactured by Watts and supplied to Thermo Cool by Gayton; and
c. In
paragraph
8,
that
Gayton
reviewed
the
recommended, as well as provided, the valve at issue.
system
and
However, it was within the plaintiff’s power and control to have the statement of
[44]
The statement of defence goes on to make allegations of negligence
[45]
When the statement of claim was issued, the precise reason for the failure
of the spout to Mrs. Fontanilla’s bathtub that controlled the hot water was not
known. However, the moving parties have provided no evidence of the steps
taken before or since that time to recover the plumbing pieces or any records of
those parts that would have informed them that it was an anti-scalding/mixing
valve in the faucet that failed. This in turn could have informed them that Watts
manufactured that valve, and that Gayton supplied it for installation.
The
absence of this evidence creates a factual vacuum for the assessment of what
reasonable diligence the plaintiffs exercised to discover the identities and roles of
possible defendants.
[46]
Mr. Mueller suggested to Ms. Ring during the call on April 1, 2014 that
there were other parties who may be potentially liable. However, Ms. Ring
communicated with Mr. Mueller by telephone to learn of those parties, but not
their names, after the second anniversary of the date the incident had occurred.
Had counsel for the plaintiffs served the statement of claim and required the
delivery of statement of defence from Thermo Cool before June 2013, the identity
of Watts and Gayton and their function would have been disclosed in the
against Gayton and Watts and others later named as third parties.
statement of defence then as it was later. The telephone conversation with Mr.
[47]
In my view, the plaintiffs ought to have served the statement of claim on
Living Waters and Thermo Cool forthwith after the action was commenced in
January 2013. It was entirely within the power and control of the plaintiffs to call
for the statements of defence from each of them before June 2013. If they had
done so, the plaintiff’s would have received the statement of defence from
Thermo Cool with the allegations of material fact disclosing the identities and
roles of Watts and Gayton. That would have been the time when the respective
identities and roles of Watts and Gayton would have been discoverable to start
the limitation period running.
[48]
The request by a defendant or an insurer to waive delivery of a statement
of defence is not unusual, nor is the agreement of a plaintiff to that request.
Indeed, waiver of the requirement of a defence for a specified time or until
required is a professional courtesy, and permits the defendant time to investigate
the claim. However, the circumstances of a waiver, when timing or its terms are
put in issue, is case specific and evidence of whatever agreement was agreed
upon between the parties is necessary to give it effect. It is unfortunate in this
case that there is no evidence before the court to explain the passage of time, or
Mueller would therefore be redundant.
why a waiver or any extension of time was granted by the plaintiffs for delivery of
[49]
There is absolutely no evidence before me to explain the delay, or to
provide any reason why the plaintiff or their lawyers did not insist upon the timely
delivery of each statement of defence before June 2013. If I am correct in this
analysis, that limitation period would have expired as early as February 25, 2015.
Therefore, the notice of motion of the plaintiffs to add Watts and Gayton as
defendants dated June 2, 2015 and initially returnable on July 7, 2015 was out of
time.
Prejudice
[50]
The responding parties also oppose the motion to add them as defendants
on the basis of non-compensable prejudice. Rule 5.04(2) states that the court
may add defendants where it will not cause prejudice that cannot be
compensated by way of costs or an adjournment.
[51]
In Frohlick, the Court of Appeal endorsed the finding of the motion judge
that the burden of showing prejudice to oppose the requested amendment rests
with the responding party and that the same could be said of a motion under
Rule 5.04(2).
a statement of defence from Thermo Cool.
[52]
The defendants state that they will suffer prejudice because a limitation
summary, the loss of a limitation defence gives rise of a presumption of
prejudice. The responding parties also state that they suffer a prejudice that
cannot be compensated by way of costs or an adjournment because Ms. Ring
conceded on her cross examination that the spout and other apparatus from Mrs.
Fontanilla’s bathtub at the time of the injury was not preserved and no longer
exists. That means the apparatus is no longer available for Watts, Gayton or any
of the other parties to the action or to the third party claim to inspect, have tested
or available to conduct their investigations.
[53]
The plaintiffs argue that they did not have access to Mrs. Fontanilla’s room
to obtain the plumbing fixtures, internal pieces or other bathtub hardware after
January 31, 2011. However, the material filed by the plaintiffs on the motion did
not provide any evidence of:
a. Specific steps taken by Mrs. Fontanilla, her family or their counsel to
make inquiries about, to give notice of or to otherwise preserve the
plumbing parts;
b. Any fact that the plaintiffs or their counsel did not have access to
Mrs. Fontanilla’s unit; or
period has expired. At paragraph 28 of Frohlick, Justice Rouleau stated that, in
c. The legal practise or customary steps that counsel for a plaintiff
evidence.
[54]
I therefore find as a fact that Watts and Gayton will suffer prejudice that
cannot be compensated by way of costs or an adjournment if they are added as
defendants to the action. Even though they are already third parties, Watts and
Gayton are currently protected by the intervening layer of defendants that serve
as the first line of defence. The plaintiffs must establish liability against those
defendants in order for the defendants to have a claim against the third parties.
In the event that the plaintiffs bring a motion for summary judgment, the motion
could involve Watts and Gayton as responding parties if they were defendants,
something they are not currently exposed to as third parties.
[55]
The plaintiffs’ motion is therefore dismissed.
Costs
[56]
If any party seeks costs on this motion, they may file written submissions
consisting of no more than three pages, not including a bill of costs, offer to settle
or other attachment, by December 16, 2016. The other parties shall then have
until December 23, 2016 to file responding materials limited to the same extent.
No reply submissions are permitted without leave. All written materials may be
would take in similar situations and circumstances to preserve
sent by fax to my judicial assistant, Ms. Priscilla Gutierrez, at 905-456-4834 in
Emery J.
Date: December 8, 2016
Brampton.
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE ONTARIO
RE:
The Estate of Felisa Santillan
Fontanilla et al, Plaintiffs
AND:
Thermo Cool Mechanical et al,
Defendants
AND:
L. J. Redpath & Associates et
al, Third Parties
BEFORE: EMERY J.
COUNSEL: David Shellnutt Counsel, for
the Plaintiffs
Lindsay Lorimer & Samantha Gordon,
Counsel for the proposed Defendant, Watts
Water Technologies (Canada) Inc.
Heather Douglas for the proposed
Defendant, Gayton Systems Development
Inc. and
Kaleigh Nusbaum for the Defendant,
1343140 Ontario Inc. O/A Thermo Cool
Mechanical
ENDORSEMENT
Emery J.
DATE:
December 8, 2016
CITATION: Fontanilla v. Thermo Cool Mechanical, 2016 ONSC 7023
COURT FILE NO.: CV-13-346-A1
DATE: 20161208

Fontanilla v. Thermo Cool Mechanical, 2016onsc7023

Transcription

Similar documents