Middle East Water Project: Water Allocation System (WAS) Model

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Middle East Water Project: Water Allocation System (WAS) Model
Managing Water in the Shared
Jordan River Basin
HydroEconomics, Engineering,
Environment, Drought & Politics
David E. Rosenberg
NRM
1
Learning Objectives
Lebanon
Syria
Pal.
(Gaza)
Palestine
(West Bank)
Jordan
Israel
IRAN
Egypt
PAL.
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
Red Sea
• Differentiate water value
from quantity
• Maximize value
• Describe major features
of the Jordan River basin
• Identify effects of
drought on water value
• Use shadow value results
to suggest new programs &
infrastructure
• Recommend how to restore
the Dead Sea
2
Economic Principles
• “Water is a scarce resource. Scarce
resources have value.” Gideon Fishelson
• Desalinating seawater (plus conveying from
the seacoast) puts an upper bound on the
value of water in dispute
• Think about water values not quantities
• Maximize this value
3
Maximizing value
• Water allocation decisions
– Amount, where, when, and to which users
• Benefits from use
– Users -- agricultural, urban, industrial, etc.
– Location and time
• Costs
– Extract, treat, and convey to point of use
– Treat, reuse, and convey wastewater
• Limitations on allocations
– Physical -- availability, infrastructure, losses, etc.
– Policy – min. requirements, set-asides, pricing, etc.
4
Maximize net welfare
Price ($/unit)
Demand Curve
Cost function
P*
Q*
Quantity (units)
5
Price ($/unit)
Maximize net benefits
(equation form)
Demand Curve
P(Q) = β (∑qQq)α
Cost function
C(Q)
P*
Q*
Net Benefits = Area under Demand Curve
– Area under Cost Curve
Quantity (units)
Max Z 
Q*
Q*
Q 0
Q 0
 PQ dQ   C Q dQ
 



Max Z 
QD

q

  1  q

a 1
  cs QS s
s
Infrastructure, Management and
Policy Constraints
•
•
•
•
•
minls ≤ Local sourcels ≤ maxls, V ls
mini ≤ Importi ≤ maxi , V i
mintww ≤ Treated wastewatertww ≤ maxtww, V tww
minu ≤ Useu ≤ maxu, V u
minsa ≤ Setasidesa ≤ maxsa, V sa
• and others!!
~ 13,600 equations
~ 48,000 decision variables
Above: Zara-Ma’een pipes now deliver up to
47.5 MCM/year
Application
The Middle East Water Project
Middle ground: Outlet to the Dead Sea, Jordan (400 meters below sea level)
Background: Jerusalem Hills, Israel (800 meters above sea level)
Hydrology
100 mm/yr
0
500
• Rainfall
50
100 km
Haifa
900
Irbid
Pal.
– i.e, 2 –35 in/year
(EXACT, USGS, 1999)
Jerusalem
Zarka
Amman
Hebron
Jordan
Israel
• Water Resources
Resources [Mcm/yr]
Jordan
Surface Water
333-400
Groundwater
485-450
Treated Wastewater
68-137
Total
886-987
3
Per-capita [m /pers/yr]
Availability
179
Use
Israel Palestine
685
64
1,059
175
213
1,957
239
326
68
Syria
Lebanon
594
1,606
21,000
2,200
1,750
733
Eilat
Ma’an
Aqaba
9
• Surface Waters
(approximately 1,324 MCM
per year)
1. Lower Jordan River (< 100 Mcm)
2. Yarkon River
3. Wadi Zarka (97 Mcm )
4. Wadi Mujib (35 Mcm )
10
• Groundwater
Mountain aquifers:
 Northeastern:
~145mcm/year
 Western:
~360mcm/year
 Eastern:
~172mcm/year
12 aquifers in Jordan
(mostly Yarmuk and
Zarqa):
~270mcm/year
Total:
~ 950mcm/year
Demographics
Country
Israel
Jordan
Palestine
- West Bank
- Gaza
Population
Growth
(Millions in
Rate (%)
2000)
6
1-2%
5.5
2-3%
3.5
2-3%
2.3
1.2
Top: Amman, Jordan (2.2 million)
Left: Hebron, West Bank (0.8 million)
Below: Haifa, Israel (0.8 million)
Infrastructure
• Galilee (500 MCM storage)
• National water carrier
(Israel, 300-400 MCM)
• King Abdullah Canal (Jordan,
100–120 MCM)
• Unity Dam (Jordan,
110/10 MCM capacity/use)
• Zara-Ma’een (Jordan, 50 MCM)
• Disi Conveyor (Jordan, <150
MCM)
• Red Sea-Dead Sea Project
(Jordan, Israel, Palestine,
850 MCM)
13
100 mm/yr
500
0
50
100 km
900
Amman
Jordan
Israel
Some Water-Related History
• 1918 - Ottoman Empire falls &
start of British Mandate
• 1948 - State of Israel
• 1952 - Johnson Mediations
• 1967 - Middle East War
• 1973 - 2nd Middle East War
• 1988 - 1st Intifada
• 1992 - Oslo Accords
• 1994 - Israel – Jordan Peace
• 2000 - 2nd Intifada
Right: Hijazi railroad bridge
across the Yarmuk River bombed
during 1967 war
Current issues
• Contested water rights (Mountain Aquifer, 600
MCM, and lower Jordan River).
• Role for water conservation
• Water resources to support future population
growth & environmental needs?
• Share or build private desalination plants?
• Links to other disputes over land, security,
partitioning Jerusalem, and right for Palestinian
refugees to return.
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WAS Model
• 45 districts
• Conveyance capacity
– Freshwater
– Recycled water
Left: Date palm farm
near Arava, Israel
warning not to drink
the reclaimed water
16
Model Use
• It’s complicated
– You may not fully
understand implications of
your inputs
• Experiment with choices
– Interact with model
• The model does not
“make” water policy
• Rather
– You impose policies
– Model respects these
policies absolutely
– Model shows how to
efficiently implement
policies and policy
consequences
17
Model Outputs
• Demand served to each use in each
district
• Water transfers
• Shadow value / scarcity rent for
water in each district
• Benefits to add/expand
infrastructure
• Gains from trading water & money
18
More on shadow values
•
•
•
•
•
Price buyers will pay (or producers will charge) for 1 more unit
Associated with each model mass conservation constraint
Marginal cost
Model output
Amount objective
fxn. will increase if
relax a binding
constraint by one
unit
• Shadow price
• Depends on
availabilities,
demands, and
policies input by
user


19
Shadow values are spatially related
SV1 @ District 1
CC12 From District 1 to District 2
SV2 @ District 2
SV2  SV1  CC12
• Interpretation:
– Build conveyance when difference in shadow values
between districts is larger than conveyance cost
– Build a desalination plant when shadow value in district on
a seacoast is greater than desal. cost
20
Sample results
• Desal.
along
Israeli
Coast?
21
Sample results
• Desal.
along
Israeli
Coast?
• With
30%
supply
drop?
22
Sample results (continued)
Shadow
values in
Jordan
Water
conservation
No conservation
23
Overall net benefits for Jordan in
2020
Scenario
1. Base Case
2. With water conservation
3. Optimal expansions with water conservation and
leak reduction
4. Disi carrier branches to Madaba and Karak
Net Benefits
($ Millions/year)
Single-Event Stochastic
2,740
6,397
6,906
6,830
6,893
24
Raise the
Dead [Sea]?
• 30 m drop since 1960
• 33% decline in
surface area
• Problems
–
–
–
–
Sink holes
GW contamination
Reduced tourism
Decreased mineral
extraction
25
Red Sea-Dead Sea Project Proposal
• Jordan, Israel, &
Palestinian proposal
• 180 km long
• Facilities
–
–
–
–
Intake at Aqaba/Eilat
Hydropower generation
Desalination
Pump to Amman
• Costs
– $US 5 billion capital
– $US 1.2/m3 operational
• World Bank now
assessing feasibility
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Change in system-wide expected costs
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Impacts across countries
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Conclusions
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Allocate water by value not quantity
Separate water ownership from water use
Separation allows transfers of water and money
Monetize and de-emotionalize water conflicts
The value of waters in dispute by Palestinians and
Israelis is small
Water should not be a cause for war
Water conservation can generate substantial
national and regional benefits
Infrastructure alone will not raise the Dead
Droughts can change things
29
Postscript
• 10+ year collaboration by Israeli,
Palestinian, Jordanian, American, and
Dutch scientists
• Separate participation by each government
• Water not included in the Geneva Accord
• Continuing work to improve model
– Multi-year
– Capacity expansion, conservation programs, and
stochastic water availability (Rosenberg et al,
2008)
30
References
Fisher et al. (2002). Water Resources Research
38(11), 1243, doi:10.1029/2001.
Fisher et al. (2005). “Liquid Assets…” (Resources for
the Future, Washington, D.C.).
Rosenberg et al. (2008) Water Resources Research
44, W11402, doi:10.1029/2007WR006519.
Rosenberg (2011). "Raising the Dead without a Red
Sea-Dead Sea project? Hydro-economics and
governance." Hydrology and Earth System
Sciences, 15, 1243-1255, doi:10.5194/hess-151243-2011.
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