land-patent-19354

Land Patent
When this land was originally settled, the colonists
brought themselves under the Crown of
England. Thereby, all of the land in the colonies was
considered to be the property of the Crown. This legal
theory meant that the King could let anyone he wished
to live on the land and even may have granted an
equitable title to such a subject. However, in equity
there is discretion, and at the discretion of the King, the
equitable title holder could be dispossessed and the land
taken back for the Crown.
One of the sorest points for the colonists in their
decision to throw off the King’s yoke was the King’s
propensity to take advantage of his discretionary power
to seize lands at his caprice. After the War for
Independence, the founders of the new nation of the
United States decided to make use of the instrument of
the Land Patent to sever the land from the control of the
administration of government. This was the main
purpose on utilizing the Land Patent in this
country. While subsequently settled lands could be
patented, the Declaration of Independence and the
subsequent peace treaty operated as the original Land
Patent for the previously settled land in the original 13
colonies.
Because of the early exploits of America’s brave
pioneers in the lands west of the Mississippi, it had been
realized long before the war that the continent of North
America was of considerable geographic size, and it
was, thus, greatly desired by the people that the
enormous expanse of the Public Lands of the United
States be made available for settlement. Congress
agreed that that was an excellent idea since the land
would be put into productive use and that the whole
country would consequently benefit. The individual
willing to work the land by and for his own direct
benefit, it was thought, would be the best choice to carry
out this goal. It was with this belief in mind that
Congress passed the statutes granting public lands. See
Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483, 487 (1890).
In order that this distribution of Public Lands could be
carried out expeditiously and according to the desire to
prevent the current, or any future, administration of
government from invading property rights (as had the
King), Congress placed the Land Patent of the United
States in positions above all other conveyances of
property, by exempting lands granted under the Land
Patent from debt incurred prior to the patenting. Ruddy
v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 107 (1918).
“Acting within its discretion, Congress determined that
in order to promptly dispose of public lands and bring
about their PERMANENT occupation and development,
it was proper to create the designated exemption; and we
are unable to say that the conclusion was ill-founded or
that the means were either prohibited or not appropriate
to the adequate performance of the high duties which the
legislature owed to the public.” (emphasis added)
The effect of this legislation was to give to the patentee,
once the patent was perfected via proper procedure, an
ability to hold title that is nearly absolute. Steel v.
Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447, 454 (1882).
“As we said in the case of Smelting Company v. Kemp;
“It is this UNASSAILABLE character [of the patent]
which gives it its chief, indeed its only value, as a means
of quieting its possessor in the enjoyment of the lands it
embraces.”” (emphasis added)
The validity of the patent could not be attacked except
under fraud or clerical error and either of these
circumstances has to be proven in a court of law, and the
challenge must be brought within six months of the
granting of the patent. In fact, in a court of law, the
patent is the conclusive proof of legal title. Id. 452
“It is among the elementary principles of the law that in
actions of ejectment the legal title must prevail. The
patent of the United States passes that title. Whoever
holds it MUST recover against those who have only
unrealized hopes to obtain it, or claims which it is the
exclusive province of a court of equity to
enforce. However great these may be, they constitute no
defense in an action at law based upon the patent. That
instrument must first be got out of the way, or its
enforcement enjoined, before others having mere
equitable rights can gain or hold possession of the lands
it covers. This is so well established, so completely
embedded in the law of ejectment that no one ought to
be misled by any argument to the contrary.” (emphasis
added)
See also Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 374, 382 (1888)
and Carter v. Ruddy, 166 U.S. 493, 496 (1897).
In an action of ejectment (now called eviction or forcible
entry and detainer) the right to the possession of the
property must be positively proven by a legal title. Fenn
v. Home, 21 How. 481, 483 (1858).
“That the plaintiff in ejectment must in all cases prove a
legal title to the premises in himself, at the time of the
demise laid in the declaration, and that evidence of an
equitable estate will not be sufficient for a recovery, are
principles so elementary and so familiar to the
profession as to render unnecessary the citation of
authority in support of them… This legal title the
plaintiff must establish either upon a connected
documentary chain of evidence, or upon proofs of
possession of sufficient duration to warrant the legal
conclusion of the existence of such written title.”
In the case of lands granted under a Land Patent, a
“connected documentary chain of evidence” is on public
record at the Recorder of Deeds for the county in which
the land is located. Even the sovereign States
themselves do not have the power to overturn Land
Patents and their effects upon the land, namely, the
severance from the interference in them by the
administration of government. Gibson v. Chouteau, 13
Wall. 92, 102 (1871).
“In the Federal Courts, where the distinction between
legal and equitable proceedings is strictly maintained,
and remedies afforded by law and equity are separately
pursued, the action of ejectment can only be sustained
upon the possession by the plaintiff of the legal title…in
the action of ejectment in the Federal Courts, the legal
title must prevail, and the patent, when regular on its
face, is conclusive evidence of that title.
So also in the action of ejectment in the State courts,
when the question presented is whether the plaintiff or
the defendant has the superior legal title from the United
States, the patent must prevail. For, as said in Bagnell v.
Broderick, ‘Congress has the sole power to declare the
dignity and effect of titles emanating from the United
States; and the whole legislation of the Federal
government in reference to the public lands declares the
patent the superior and conclusive evidence of legal
title…’” (emphasis added)
Furthermore, the states may not legislate a superior, or
even an equal, instrument to the Land Patent. Bagnell
et. al. v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, 451 (1839).
“…we deny that the states have any power to declare
certificates of purchase of equal dignity with a
patent. Congress alone can give them such effect.”
“No more can private property be so taken away by
judicial decision and handed over, gratis, to the State.
‘The touchstone of due process is the protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of the
government.’” Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290,
294-298 (1967); California ex rel. State Lands
Commission v. United States, No. 89 Original (June 18,
1982); Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal. 373
(1859); Chipley v. Farris, 45 Cal. 527 (1873); Cassidy
v. Carr, 48 Cal. 339 (1874); Los Angeles Farming &
Milling Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal. 594, 49 P. 714
(1897), aff’d sub nom. Thompson v. Los Angeles
Farming & Milling Co., 180 U.S. 71 (1901); Leese v.
Clark, 18 Cal. 535 (1861);
“It [the patent] passes whatever interest the United
States may then have possessed in the premises. It
operates in consequence as an absolute bar to all claims
under the United States having their origin subsequent to
the petition.
But the patent has a still further operation and effect. It
is not merely a deed of the United States, conveying
whatever interest they may have held in the premises at
the institution of the proceedings before the Land
Commission. It is also a record of the Government,
showing its action and judgment with respect to the title
of the patentees at the date of the cession…This
instrument, as we have stated, is the record of the
Government upon the title of the patentee to the land
described therein, declaring the validity of that title and
that it rightfully attaches to the land. Upon all the
matters of fact and law essential to authorize its
issuance, it imports absolute verity; and it can only be
vacated and set aside by direct proceedings instituted by
the Government, or by parties acting in the name and by
the authority of the Government. Until thus vacated it is
conclusive, not only between the patentee and the
Government, but between parties claiming in privity
with either by title subsequent.” 18 Cal. 571-572
(citation omitted).
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687
(1979).
United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U.S.
472 (1924).
“Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of
great importance to the public that when they are once
decided they should no longer be considered open. Such
decisions become rules of property, and many titles may
be injuriously affected by their change. Legislatures
may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they
affect the future only; but where courts vacillate and
overrule their own decisions on the construction of
statutes affecting the title to real property, their decisions
are retrospective, and may affect titles purchased on the
faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of
this nature, when once decided, should be considered no
longer doubtful or subject to change.” 265 U.S. at 486487. (citations omitted)
As early as 1898 this Court was able to say:
“[I]f there is any one thing respecting the administration
of the public lands which must be considered as settled
by repeated adjudications of this court, it is that the
decision of the land department upon mere questions of
fact is, in the absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and
such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the
courts.” Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93, 99
(1898). More v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70, 83
(1888). Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354 (1942).
[ambiguity] Heath v. Wallace, 138 U.S. 573 (1891);
French v. Fyan, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 169 (1876); Steel v. St.
Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 447
(1882);
interpretation of a federal land conveyance is determined
by federal law.
Shively v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U.S. 1, 9-10; 38 L.Ed.
331. 335; 14 S.Ct. 548. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296
U.S. 22, [80 L.Ed. 17-18. United States v. o’Donnell,
303 U.S. 509.
settlement of titles:
Knight v. U.S. Land Association, 142 U.S. 184, [35
L.Ed. 982;] Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 489, [18 L.Ed.]
The patent serves to protect the patentee’s land from all
incursions of administrative power. United States v.
Stone, 2 Wall. 525, 535 (1864).
“A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is
conclusive as against the Government, and all claiming
under junior patents of titles, until it is set aside or
annulled by some judicial tribunal [because of fraud or
other ministerial impropriety at the time of the
patenting].”
See also United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103,
111 (1935).
Finally, these doctrines concerning the Land Patent are
still effective. Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State
Lands Commission & City of Los Angeles, 466 U.S.
198, 80 L.Ed. 2nd 237, 104 S.CT. 1751; USSC 82-708,
US Law Week, 4/17/1984.
“We hold that California cannot at this late date assert
its public trust easement over petitioner’s property,
when petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest had their
interest confirmed without any mention of such
easement in proceedings taken pursuant to the Act of
1851. The interest claimed by California…must have
been presented in the patent proceeding or be barred.”
The “petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest” are, of
course, the original patentee of the land and all of the
assignees of that patent through the intervening time.
In summary, the intent of the Land Patent was to forever
sever any control, over the land so patented, by any
agency of government. Congress passed legislation on
several occasions to fulfill that intent and the courts have
concluded that it was well within its power to do so. All
other interest, equitable in nature, is presumed inferior to
that of a Land Patent and, so, in any action to recover as
against patented land, the holder of the patent must
prevail. In demonstration of which we refer to the
statutes of the State of Illinois as an example, at 110 pp.
8-1208, and 1120 pp. 8-1209 which read as follows, to
wit:
“8-1208. Official Certificate-Land Office.
pp. 8-1208. Official Certificate-Land Office. The
official certificate of any register or receiver of any land
office of the United States to any fact or matter on
record in his or her office, shall be received in evidence
in any court in this State, and shall be competent to
prove the fact so certified. The certificate of any such
register, of the entry or purchase of any tract of land
within his or her district, shall be deemed and taken to
be evidence of title in the party who made such entry or
purchase, or his or her legatees, heirs or assigns, and
shall enable such party, his or her legatees or assigns, to
recover or protect the possession of the land described in
such certificate, in any action of ejectment or forcible
entry and detainer, UNLESS A BETTER LEGAL AND
PARAMOUNT TITLE BE EXHIBITED FOR THE
SAME. The signature of such register or receiver may
be proved by a certificate of the Secretary of State,
under his or her seal, that such signature is
genuine.” Amended by P.A. 83-707, pp. 1, eff. Sept. 23,
1983. (emphasis added)
“8-1209. Patents for land.
pp. 8-1209. Patents for land. A PATENT FOR LAND
SHALL BE DEEMED AND CONSIDERED A
BETTER LEGAL AND PARAMOUNT TITLE IN
THE PATENTEE, HIS OR HER LEGATEES, HEIRS
OR ASSIGNE, THAN THE OFFICIAL CERTIFICATE
OF ANY REGISTER OF A LAND OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES, OF THE ENTRY OR PURCHASE
OF THE SAME LAND.” (emphasis added)
Amended by P.A. 83-707, pp. 1, eff. Sept. 23, 1983.
Property tax – Unconstitutional – Land Untaxable by
State.
The original constitution of Wisconsin provided that the
lands of Wisconsin are untaxable. Article II, Section 2,
reads as follows:
“Sec. 2. The propositions contained in the act of
Congress, are hereby accepted, ratified and confirmed,
and shall remain irrevocable without the consent of the
United States, and it is hereby ordained that this state
shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil
within the same, by the United States, nor with any
regulations congress may find necessary for securing the
title in such soil to bona fide purchasers thereof; AND
NO TAX SHALL BE IMPOSED ON LAND,”
(emphasis added)
Sargent v. Herrick & Stevens, 221 U.S. 404, 55 L.Ed.
787;
Northern P.R. Co. v. Truitt County, 115 U.S. 600, 29
L.Ed. 477;
Town of St. John v. State Board of Tax Commissioners,
665 NE 2d 965 (1996).
Patent Unassailable
Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U.S 642, 35 L.Ed. 290
Right to Possess in Patentee
Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534
Evidence of Title
U.S. v. Stone, 2 U.S. 525, 17 L.Ed. 768
Patent as Legal Title
Minter v. Crommelin, 18 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed. 279
Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 374, 32 L.Ed. 412
Doe v. Aiken, 31 Fed 393
Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters (U.S.) 408, 10 L.Ed. 264
Patent as Estopple
Beadle v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 52 L.Ed. 849
Priority in general, for liens see;
26 U.S.C.A. § 6323
S. & S. Gasket Co. Inc. v. U.S., 635 F.2d 568
Mantovani v. Fast Fuel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 72
MDC Leasing Corp. v. New York Property Ins.
Underwriting Ass’n., 450 F. Supp. 179, affirmed 603 F.
2d 213
U.S. v. Hage, 417 F. Supp. 74
Matter of Fisher, 7 B.R. 490
26 U.S.C.A. § 7426
Peterson v. U.S., 511 F. Supp. 250
Angelos v. Maryland Cas. Co., 380 A. 2d. 646, 38 Md.
App. 265
United States v. Champaign County, Fed. Supp. 474,
1958
For Public Land Cases
Cent. Dig. 119, 121, 314, 316, 322, 324, 332-335, 461465, 481, 720
Cases of attack on United States Land Patents and the
land so covered have been appealed to the U.S. S. Ct.
139 times and it has held each time, that, if a claim
against the land is not made before the patent is issued,
no claim made thereafter may be recognized by a court
and no Act of Congress can place such land in jeopardy
to the owner. The above case cited is: Summa
Corporation v. California ex rel. State Lands
Commission & City of Los Angeles.
“When Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for the law, …”
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485; 48 S. Ct.
564, 575; 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1354;
79 L.Ed. 2d. --- (1984), (Stevens J. dissenting).
Interests by states must have been presented in the
patent proceedings or be barred
Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 21 S.Ct. 690, 45 L.Ed.
963
U.S. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 41 S.Ct.
621, 68 L.Ed. 1110
U.S. v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 41 S.Ct.
378, 65 L.Ed. 736, pp. 1755-1758. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 182
Cal. Rptr. 599, 644 P.2d 792, reversed and remanded.
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands
Commission & City of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. 198, 80
L.Ed. 2nd 237, 104 S.Ct. 1751; USSC 82-708, US Law
Week, 4-17-1984
Title 43 U.S.C. 59, established that duly certified copies
of Federal Land Patents shall be evidence in all cases
where the originals would be evidence. Section 83 of
Title 43, covers the evidentiary effect of Certified
Federal Land Patents for all States and all the courts in
the United States must take Judicial Notice of the
Federal Patents and their evidentiary effect under these
Federal Statutes. All judges in all States shall be bound
as to the power and validity of the patents.
U.S. v. Debell, (1915 CA8 SD) 227 F. 760
Patent as foundation of Title at Law
Fenn v. Holmes, 21 Howard 481
Immunity from Collateral Attack
Collins v. Bartlett, 44 Cal 371
Webber v. Pere Marguette Boom Co., 62 Mich. 6262, 30
NW 469
Surget v. Doe, 24 Miss 118
Pittsmont Copper Co. v. Vanina, 71 Mont. 44, 227 Pac.
46
Green v. Barker, 47 Neb. 934, 66 NW 1032
Neff v. U.S., 91 CCA 241
Paterson v. Ogden, 74 P. 443, 141 Cal. 43, 99Am. St.
Rep. 31
Judicial Opinions of Form of Declaration of Land Patent
Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U.S. 488, 30 L.Ed. 1039
USCT
Scheimer v. Conway, 23 How. 235, 16 L.Ed. 452 (1860)
USCT
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel., 104 S.Ct. 1751
(1984) USCT
Fiedler v. Pipes, 107 So. 2d. 409 (1958) Louisiana
Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How 691
Land Patent as prima facie Conclusive Evidence of
Unassailable Legal Title
Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534
State v. Crawford, 13 Ariz. App. 225, 475 P. 2d. 515
Texas, etc. R. R. v. Smith, 159 U.S. 68, 40 L.Ed. 78, 15
S.Ct. 935
Miller v. Grunsky, 66P. 858, 141 Cal. 441, reversed
(1903) 75 P. 48
Ejectment against a defendant in possession cannot be
maintained in Federal court on an equitable title, gained
by entry made with the register and receiver, though the
State statutes otherwise provide.
Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U.S. 83, 84. 8 S.Ct. 431
Carter v. Ruddy, 56 Fed. 544, 15 U.S. App. 129 or 429
Le Beau v. Armitage, 47 Mo. 139
Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 382, 33 L.Ed. 415, 9
S.Ct. 90
Doe v. Aiken, 31 Fed. 393
Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S.
417, 27 L.Ed. 226
Ejectment not maintainable on State Certificate of
Purchase
Kircher v. Murray, 60 Fed. 52, 23 U.S. App. 214
affirming S.C. 54 Fed. 626
Harrest v. Kinney, 44 Mich. 460, 7 N.W. 64
Moran v. Moran, 106 Mich. 12, 58 Am. St. Rep. 465, 63
N.W. 990
Headley v. Coffman, 38 Neb. 72, 56 N.W. 702
Clagett v. Kilbourne, 1 Black. 350, 17 L.Ed. 216
Wilson v. Fine, 14 Sawy. 35, 36. 38 Red. 790, 791
Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U.S. 579, 37
L.Ed. 856, 13 S.Ct. 939
Abbott v. Union, ect., Ins. Co., 127 Ind. 73, 26 N.E. 154
Estoppel has been sustained as against a municipal
corporation (county)
Beadle v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 52 L.Ed. 849
See Title 43, Sections 83 and 43 USC 57-59
Diversity of Citizenship, 28 USC 1331, 1332, 1343
Treaties, 8 Stat. 80, 8 Stat. 200, 8 Stat. 218, 9 Stat. 869,
10 Stat. 1031
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199
Lead Case Louisiana Purchase States
Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511
On ultra vires
1st Nat. Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 69 SE 1123
Norton Grocery Co. v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 144 SE 501
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. L. Herisson, 33
F.2d. 841
Am. Exp. Co. v. Cit. St. Bank, 194 NW 427
Ashley v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 410 F.
Supp. 1389
Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571,
44 L.Ed. 20 S.Ct. 222
Davidson v. Lovett, 446 F. Supp. 1171
Florida Cent. & Pen. R.R. v. Bell, 176 U.S. 321, 44
L.Ed. 486, 20 S.Ct. 399
Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273, 41 L.Ed. 157, 16 S.Ct.
1051 (1896)
Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 273, 41 L.Ed. 157, 16 S.Ct.
478 (1906)
Kirklin v. Ellerbe, 225 F. 168
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561
Nolan v. Cal. Coast. Comm., 177 Call. App. 3d 719, 722
(1986) 55 U.S.L.W. 5145
First English Evan. Luth. Church of Glendale v. Co. of
L.A. 55 U.S.L.W. 4781
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d. 266
Davis v. Pima County, 590 P. 2d. 459 (1978)
Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P. 2d. 513 (1986)
Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York,
39 N.Y. 2d. 587 (1976)
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
621
U.S. v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
Loretta v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982)
Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898)
Candid Ent. Inc., v. Grossmont Union H.S. Dist., 39 Cal.
3d. 878, 890 (1985)
Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. Ap. 3d.
317, 325 (1981)
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.
App. 3d. 110, 128 (1973)
Strumansky v. San Diego Co. Emp. Tetirement Assoc.,
11 Cal. 3d. 28, 32 (1974)
Avco Community Dev. Inc. v. South Caost Regional
Comm., 17 Cal. 3d. 785 (1976)
Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979)
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)
Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa, 69 Cal. App. 3d. 74, 78
(1977)
PennCentral, 438 U.S. 124
Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, U.S. 102 Reporter, p.
2858, 28 June, 1982. Art. I v. Art. 3 usage, Does not
have force of law. V 104, Supra Reporter, 175-1, April
17, 1984.
31 Cal. 3d. 288; 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 644 p. 2d. 792, 104
S.Ct. 1751 (1984)
U.S. Circuit Court will enforce new equity created by
State statute
Wisconsin etc., R.R. v. Wisconsin, et., Land Col, 71
Wis. 102, 36 N.W. 841
State v. Hewit Land Co., 134 Pac. Rep. 474
Hogan v. Page, 2 S.Ct. 605, 69 U.S. 605, 17 L.Ed. 854
98 Stat. 1671
Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price County
Bagnell et al. v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 450
Raestle v. Whitson, 582 P.2d. 170
Walliker v. Escott, 608 P.2d. 1272
Litchfield v. Register and Receiver, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 575,
19 L.Ed. 681
U.S. v. Steenerson, et al, 50 Fed 504, CCA 552, 4 US
App. 332
Jenkins v. Gibson, 2 La. Ann. 203, Louisiana 18 How.
87
Minter v. Crommelin, 18 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed. 279
King v. McAndrews, 11F 860, 50 CCA 29
Davis v. Fell, 211 P. 30, 59 Call. App. 438
Thompson v. Thompson, 155 P. 1190, 79 Or. 513
Vanderheyden v. Crandall, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 21
Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio 221, 17 Am. Dec. 585
Tate v. Jay, 31 Ark. 579
Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492
Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis., 367
Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 498, 10 L.Ed. 264
Wineman v. Gastrell, 54 Fed. 810
U.S. v. Cherokee Nations, 474 F.2d. 628 (1973)
Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918)
Desenroth v. Dodge, 350 Il. App. 20, 11 NE 2d. 575
(1953)
Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U.S. 26, 43 L.Ed. 601
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